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Life and Times of Washington, Volume 2

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Title: Life and Times of Washington, Volume 2

Author: John Frederick Schroeder
        Benson John Lossing


        
Release date: May 1, 2005 [eBook #8145]
                Most recently updated: December 10, 2023

Language: English

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Credits: Charles Aldarondo, Tiffany Vergon, Marvin A. Hodges, Charles Franks, the Online Distributed Proofreading Team and David Widger


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LIFE AND TIMES OF WASHINGTON, VOLUME 2 ***




LIFE AND TIMES OF WASHINGTON

VOLUME II

By John F. Schroeder and Benson John Lossing


[Editorial note: The title page of the 1903 source for this e-text
                 identifies the author only as "Schroeder-Lossing"
                 without first names or other identification.  The
                 available evidence indicates the work was begun by
                 John Frederick Schroeder (1800-1857) and after his
                 death was completed by Benson John Lossing (1813-
                 1891).]




REVISED, ENLARGED, AND ENRICHED: AND WITH A SPECIAL INTRODUCTION BY
EDWARD C. TOWNE, B.A.




TABLE OF CONTENTS.


VOLUME II. PART IV. Washington Continental Commander-in-Chief.
1775-1783.


CHAP. X. Lord Howe Outgeneraled by Washington

     XI. Washington Holds Howe in Check

    XII. Burgoyne's Defeat and Surrender

   XIII. Washington at Valley Forge

    XIV. The Battle of Monmouth

     XV. Washington Directs a Descent on Rhode Island

    XVI. Washington Prepares to Chastise the Indians

   XVII. Washington's Operations in the Northern States

  XVIII. Campaign in the North—Arnold's Treason

    XIX. Operations at the South

     XX. Preparations for a New Campaign

    XXI. The Campaign at the South

   XXII. Continuation of the Campaign at the South

  XXIII. Washington Captures Cornwallis

   XXIV. Final Events of the Revolution

       *       *       *       *       *

PART V. Washington, a Private Citizen. 1783-1788.

 CHAP.

      I. Washington's Return to Private Life

     II. Washington President of the Constitutional Convention

       *       *       *       *       *

PART VI. Washington as President and in Retirement. 1789-1799.

      I. Washington Elected First President of the United States

     II. Washington's Inauguration and First Administration Formed

    III. Measures for Establishing the Public Credit

     IV. Establishment of a National Bank

      V. Political Parties Developed

     VI. Washington Inaugurates the System of Neutrality

    VII. Washington Sends Jay to England

   VIII. Washington Quells the Western Insurrection

     IX. Washington Signs Jay's Treaty

      X. Washington Maintains the Treaty-Making Power of the Executive

     XI. Washington Retires from the Presidency

    XII. Washington Appointed Lieutenant-General

   XIII. Last Illness, Death, and Character of Washington

       *       *       *       *       *

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. Vol. II.

 WASHINGTON AS PRESIDENT

 VALLEY FORGE--WASHINGTON AND LAFAYETTE

 WASHINGTON AT TRENTON

 MAJOR-GENERAL BARON STEUBEN

 PHILIP SCHUYLER

 HORATIO GATES

 BATTLE OF GERMANTOWN

 TREASON OF ARNOLD

 ROBERT MORRIS

 LEE'S CAVALRY SKIRMISHING AT THE BATTLE OF GUILFORD

 GENERAL FRANCIS MARION

 MAJOR-GENERAL NATHANAEL GREENE

 ALEXANDER HAMILTON

 ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON

 WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL TO HIS OFFICERS

 LAFAYETTE

 JOHN JAY

 INAUGURATION OF WASHINGTON

 THE FIRST CABINET

 JOHN HANCOCK

 JOHN ADAMS

 WASHINGTON AND FAMILY AT MOUNT VERNON

 CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN MARSHALL

 THOMAS JEFFERSON

 HENRY LAURENS




CHAPTER X.


WASHINGTON OUT-GENERALS HOWE. 1777.


Among the many perplexing subjects which claimed the attention of
Washington during the winter (1776-1777), while he was holding his
headquarters among the hills at Morristown, none gave him more annoyance
than that of the treatment of American prisoners in the hands of the
enemy. Among the civilized nations of modern times prisoners of war are
treated with humanity and principles are established on which they are
exchanged. The British officers, however, considered the Americans as
rebels deserving condign punishment and not entitled to the sympathetic
treatment commonly shown to the captive soldiers of independent nations.
They seem to have thought that the Americans would never be able,
or would never dare, to retaliate. Hence their prisoners were most
infamously treated. Against this the Americans remonstrated, and,
on finding their remonstrances disregarded, they adopted a system of
retaliation which occasioned much unmerited suffering to individuals.
Col. Ethan Allen, who had been defeated and made prisoner in a bold but
rash attempt against Montreal, was put in irons and sent to England as
a traitor. In retaliation, General Prescott, who had been taken at the
mouth of the Sorel, was put in close confinement for the avowed purpose
of subjecting him to the same fate which Colonel Allen should suffer.

Both officers and privates, prisoners to the Americans, were more
rigorously confined than they would otherwise have been, and, that
they might not impute this to wanton harshness and cruelty, they were
distinctly told that their own superiors only were to blame for any
severe treatment they might experience.

The capture of General Lee became the occasion of embittering the
complaints on this subject, and of aggravating the sufferings of the
prisoners of war. Before that event something like a cartel for the
exchange of prisoners had been established between Generals Howe
and Washington, but the captivity of General Lee interrupted that
arrangement. The general, as we have seen, had been an officer in the
British army, but having been disgusted had resigned his commission,
and, at the beginning of the troubles, had offered his services to
Congress, which were readily accepted. General Howe affected to consider
him as a deserter, and ordered him into close confinement. Washington
had no prisoner of equal rank, but offered six Hessian field officers
in exchange for him, and required that, if that offer should not be
accepted, General Lee should be treated according to his rank in the
American army. General Howe replied that General Lee was a deserter from
his majesty's service, and could not be considered as a prisoner of war
nor come within the conditions of the cartel. A fruitless discussion
ensued between the Commanders-in-Chief. Congress took up the matter and
resolved that General Washington be directed to inform General Howe,
that should the proffered exchange of six Hessian field officers for
General Lee not be accepted, and his former treatment continued, the
principle of retaliation shall occasion five of the Hessian field
officers, together with Lieut. Col. Archibald Campbell, or any other
officers that are or shall be in possession of equivalent in number or
quality, to be detained, in order that the treatment which General Lee
shall receive may be exactly inflicted upon their persons. Congress also
ordered a copy of their resolution to be transmitted to the Council of
Massachusetts Bay, and that they be desired to detain Lieutenant-Colonel
Campbell, and keep him in close custody till the further orders of
Congress, and that a copy be also sent to the committee of Congress, in
Philadelphia, and that they be desired to have the prisoners, officers,
and privates lately taken properly secured in some safe place.

Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell of the Seventy-first Regiment, with about
270 of his men, had been made prisoner in the bay of Boston, while
sailing for the harbor, ignorant of the evacuation of the town by
the British. Hitherto the colonel had been civilly treated; but,
on receiving the order of Congress respecting him, the Council of
Massachusetts Bay, instead of simply keeping him in safe custody,
according to order, sent him to Concord jail, and lodged him in a filthy
and loathsome dungeon, about twelve or thirteen feet square. He was
locked in by double bolts and expressly prohibited from entering the
prison yard on any consideration whatever. A disgusting hole, fitted up
with a pair of fixed chains, and from which a felon had been removed to
make room for his reception, was assigned him as an inner apartment.
The attendance of a servant was denied him, and no friend was allowed to
visit him.

Colonel Campbell naturally complained to Howe of such unworthy
treatment, and Howe addressed Washington on the subject. The latter
immediately wrote to the Council of Massachusetts Bay, and said, "You
will observe that exactly the same treatment is to be shown to Colonel
Campbell and the Hessian officers that General Howe shows to General
Lee, and as he is only confined to a commodious house, with genteel
accommodation, we have no right or reason to be more severe to Colonel
Campbell, whom I wish to be immediately removed from his present
situation and put into a house where he may live comfortably."

The historian (Gordon), who wrote at the time, gives a very graphic
account of the sufferings of the American prisoners in New York, which,
dreadful as it seems, is confirmed by many contemporary authorities. He
says: "Great complaints were made of the horrid usage the Americans met
with after they were captured."

The garrison of Fort Washington surrendered by capitulation to General
Howe, the 16th of November. The terms were that the fort should be
surrendered, the troops be considered prisoners of war, and that the
American officers should keep their baggage and sidearms. These articles
were signed and afterwards published in the New York papers. Major Otho
Holland Williams, of Rawling's Rifle Regiment, in doing his duty
that day, unfortunately fell into the hands of the enemy. The haughty
deportment of the officers, and the scurrility of the soldiers of the
British army, he afterward said, soon dispelled his hopes of being
treated with lenity. Many of the American officers were plundered of
their baggage and robbed of their sidearms, hats, cockades, etc., and
otherwise grossly ill-treated. Williams and three companions were, on
the third day, put on board the Baltic-Merchant, a hospital ship, then
lying in the sound. The wretchedness of his situation was in some degree
alleviated by a small pittance of pork and parsnip which a good-natured
sailor spared him from his own mess. The fourth day of their captivity,
Rawlings, Hanson, M'Intire, and himself, all wounded officers, were put
into one common dirt-cart and dragged through the city of New York as
objects of derision, reviled as rebels, and treated with the utmost
contempt.

From the cart they were set down at the door of an old wastehouse, the
remains of Hampden Hall, near Bridewell, which, because of the openness
and filthiness of the place, he had a few months before refused as
barracks for his privates, but now was willing to accept for himself
and friends, in hopes of finding an intermission of the fatigue and
persecution they had perpetually suffered. Some provisions were issued
to the prisoners in the afternoon of that day, what quantity he could
not declare, but it was of the worst quality he ever, till then, saw
made use of. He was informed the allowance consisted of six ounces of
pork, one pound of biscuit, and some peas per day for each man, and
two bushels and a half of sea coal per week for the officers to each
fireplace. These were admitted on parole, and lived generally in
wastehouses. The privates, in the coldest season of the year, were close
confined in churches, sugar-houses, and other open buildings (which
admitted all kinds of weather), and consequently were subjected to the
severest kind of persecution that ever unfortunate captives suffered.

Officers were insulted and often struck for attempting to afford some
of the miserable privates a small relief. In about three weeks Colonel
Williams was able to walk, and was himself a witness of the sufferings
of his countrymen. He could not describe their misery. Their
constitutions were not equal to the rigor of the treatment they received
and the consequence was the death of many hundreds. The officers were
not allowed to take muster-rolls, nor even to visit their men, so that
it was impossible to ascertain the numbers that perished; but from
frequent reports and his own observations, he verily believed, as well
as had heard many officers give it as their opinion, that not less than
1,500 prisoners perished in the course of a few weeks in the city of New
York, and that this dreadful mortality was principally owing to the want
of provisions and extreme cold. If they computed too largely, it must be
ascribed to the shocking brutal manner of treating the dead bodies, and
not to any desire of exaggerating the account of their sufferings.

When the King's commissary of prisoners intimated to some of the
American officers General Howe's intention of sending the privates
home on parole, they all earnestly desired it, and a paper was signed
expressing that desire; the reason for signing was, they well knew the
effects of a longer confinement, and the great numbers that died when on
parole justified their pretensions to that knowledge. In January almost
all the officers were sent to Long Island on parole, and there billeted
on the inhabitants at $2 per week.

The filth in the churches (in consequence of fluxes) was beyond
description. Seven dead have been seen in one of them at the same time,
lying among the excrements of their bodies. The British soldiers were
full of their low and insulting jokes on those occasions, but less
malignant than the Tories. The provision dealt out to the prisoners was
not sufficient for the support of life, and was deficient in quantity,
and more so in quality. The bread was loathsome and not fit to be
eaten, and was thought to have been condemned. The allowance of meat
was trifling and of the worst sort. The integrity of these suffering
prisoners was hardly credible. Hundreds submitted to death rather than
enlist in the British service, which they were most generally pressed
to do. It was the opinion of the American officers that Howe perfectly
understood the condition of the private soldiers, and they from thence
argued that it was exactly such as he and his council intended. After
Washington's success in the Jerseys, the obduracy, and malevolence of
the Royalists subsided in some measure. The surviving prisoners were
ordered to be sent out as an exchange, but several of them fell down
dead in the streets while attempting to walk to the vessels.

Washington wrote to General Howe in the beginning of April: "It is a
fact not to be questioned that the usage of our prisoners while in your
possession, the privates at least, was such as could not be justified.
This was proclaimed by the concurrent testimony of all who came out.
Their appearance justified the assertion, and melancholy experience in
the speedy death of a large part of them, stamped it with infallible
certainty."

The cruel treatment of the prisoners being the subject of conversation
among some officers captured by Sir Guy Carleton, General Parsons, who
was of the company, said, "I am very glad of it." They expressed their
astonishment and desired him to explain himself. He thus addressed them:
"You have been taken by General Carleton, and he has used you with great
humanity, would you be inclined to fight against him?" The answer was,
"No." "So," added Parsons, "would it have been, had the troops taken by
Howe been treated in like manner, but now through this cruelty we shall
get another army."

The Hon. William Smith, learning how the British used the prisoners,
and concluding it would operate to that end by enraging the Americans,
applied to the committee of New York State for leave to go into the city
and remonstrate with the British upon such cruel treatment, which he
doubted not but that he should put a stop to. The committee,
however, either from knowing what effect the cruelties would have in
strengthening the opposition to Britain, or from jealousies of his being
in some other way of disservice to the American cause or from these
united, would not grant his request.

Washington, at the beginning of 1777, determined to have the army
inoculated for the smallpox, which had made fearful ravages in the
ranks. It was carried forward as secretly and carefully as possible, and
the hospital physicians in Philadelphia were ordered at the same time to
inoculate all the soldiers who passed through that city on their way
to join the army. The same precautions were taken in the other military
stations, and thus the army was relieved from an evil which would have
materially interfered with the success of the ensuing campaign.
The example of the soldiery proved a signal benefit to the entire
population, the practice of inoculation became general, and, by little
and little, this fatal malady disappeared almost entirely.

In the hope that something might be effected at New York, Washington
ordered General Heath, who was in command in the Highlands, to move
down towards the city with a considerable force. Heath did so, and in a
rather grandiloquent summons called upon Fort Independence to surrender.
The enemy, however, stood their ground, and Heath, after a few days,
retreated, having done nothing, and exposed himself to ridicule for not
having followed up his words with suitable deeds.

While Washington was actively employed in the Jerseys in asserting the
independence of America, Congress could not afford him much assistance,
but that body was active in promoting the same cause by its enactments
and recommendations. Hitherto the Colonies had been united by no bond
but that of their common danger and common love of liberty. Congress
resolved to render the terms of their union more definite, to ascertain
the rights and duties of the several Colonies, and their mutual
obligations toward each other. A committee was appointed to sketch the
principles of the union or confederation.

This committee presented a report in thirteen Articles of Confederation
and perpetual Union between the States, and proposed that, instead of
calling themselves the United Colonies, as they had hitherto done, they
should assume the name of the United States of America; that each State
should retain its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the confederation
expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled;
that they enter into a firm league for mutual defense; that the free
inhabitants of any of the States shall be entitled to the privileges
and immunities of free citizens in any other State; that any traitor or
great delinquent fleeing from one State and found in another shall be
delivered up to the State having jurisdiction of his offense; that full
faith and credit shall be given in each of the States to the records,
acts, and judicial proceedings of every other State; that delegates
shall be annually chosen in such manner as the legislature of each State
shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday of November, with
power to each State to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time
within the year, and to send others in their stead; that no State shall
be represented in Congress by less than two or more than seven members,
and no person shall be a delegate for more than three out of six years,
nor shall any delegate hold a place of emolument under the United
States; that each State shall maintain its own delegates; that in
Congress each State shall have only one vote; that freedom of speech
shall be enjoyed by the members, and that they shall be free from
arrest, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace; that no
State, without the consent of Congress, shall receive any ambassador, or
enter into any treaty with any foreign power; that no person holding any
office in any of the United States shall receive any present, office, or
title from any foreign State, and that neither Congress nor any of the
States shall grant any titles of nobility; that no two or more of the
States shall enter into any confederation whatever without the consent
of Congress; that no State shall impose any duties which may interfere
with treaties made by Congress; that in time of peace no vessels of
war or military force shall be kept up in any of the States but by the
authority of Congress, but every State shall have a well-regulated and
disciplined militia; that no State, unless invaded, shall engage in war
without the consent of Congress, nor shall they grant letters of marque
or reprisal till after a declaration of war by Congress; that colonels
and inferior officers shall be appointed by the Legislature of each
State for its own troops; that the expenses of war shall be defrayed out
of a common treasury, supplied by the several States according to the
value of the land in each; that taxes shall be imposed and levied by
authority and direction of the several States within the time prescribed
by Congress; that Congress has the sole and exclusive right of deciding
on peace and war, of sending and receiving ambassadors, and entering
into treaties; that Congress shall be the last resort on appeal in
all disputes and differences between two or more of the States; that
Congress have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the
alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of
the respective States, fixing the standard of weights and measures,
regulating the trade, establishing post-offices, appointing all
officers of the land forces in the service of the United States, except
regimental officers, appointing all the officers of the naval forces,
and commissioning all officers whatever in the service of the United
States, making rules for the government and regulation of the said land
and naval forces, and directing their operations; that Congress have
authority to appoint a committee to sit during their recess, to be
dominated a Committee of the States, and to consist of one delegate from
each State; that Congress shall have power to ascertain the necessary
sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States, and
to appropriate and apply the same, to borrow money or emit bills on
the credit of the United States, to build and equip a navy, to fix the
number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each State for its
quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such State;
that the consent of nine States shall be requisite to any great public
measure of common interest; that Congress shall have power to adjourn to
any time within the year, and to any place within the United States, but
the adjournment not to exceed six months, and that they shall publish
their proceedings monthly, excepting such parts relating to treaties,
alliances, or military operations, as in their judgment require
secrecy; that the yeas and nays of the delegates of each State shall,
if required, be entered on the journal, and extracts granted; that the
Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall, during the recess
of Congress, exercise such powers as Congress shall vest them with;
that Canada, if willing, shall be admitted to all the advantages of
the union; but no other colony shall be admitted, unless such admission
shall be agreed to by nine States; that all bills of credit emitted,
moneys borrowed, or debts contracted by Congress before this
confederation, shall be charges on the United States; that every State
shall abide by the determinations of Congress on all questions submitted
to them by this confederation; that the articles of it shall be
inviolably observed by every State, and that no alteration in any of
the articles shall be made, unless agreed to by Congress, and afterward
confirmed by the legislature of every State.

Such was the substance of this confederation or union. After much
discussion, at thirty-nine sittings, the articles were approved by
Congress, transmitted to the several State Legislatures, and, meeting
with their approbation, were ratified by all the delegates on the 15th
of November, 1778.

Congress maintained an erect posture, although its affairs then wore the
most gloomy aspect. It was under the provisions of this confederation
that the war was afterward carried on, and, considered as a first
essay of legislative wisdom, it discovers a good understanding, and
a respectable knowledge of the structure of society. Had peace been
concluded before the settlement of this confederation, the States would
probably have broken down into so many independent governments, and the
strength of the Union been lost in a number of petty sovereignties.

It is not hazarding much to say that, considering all the circumstances,
it was the best form of government which could have been framed at
that time. Its radical defect arose from its being a confederation
of independent States, in which the central government had no direct
recourse to the people. It required all grants of men or money to be
obtained from the State governments, who were often, during the war,
extremely dilatory in complying with the requisitions of Congress. This
defect was strongly felt by Washington, who was often compelled to exert
his personal influence, which, in all the States, was immense, to
obtain the supplies which Congress had no power to exact. We shall
see hereafter, that in forming the new constitution, a work in which
Washington took a leading part, this defect was remedied.

While Congress was beginning to form these articles of confederation,
and Washington was giving a new aspect to the war in New Jersey, the
people of Great Britain, long accustomed to colonial complaints and
quarrels, and attentive merely to their own immediate interests, paid
no due regard to the progress of the contest or to the importance of the
principles in which it originated. Large majorities in both houses of
parliament supported the ministry in all their violent proceedings,
and although a small minority, including several men of distinguished
talents, who trembled for the fate of British liberty if the court
should succeed in establishing its claims against the colonists,
vigorously opposed the measures of administration, yet the great body
of the people manifested a loyal zeal in favor of the war, and the
ill success of the Colonists in the campaign of 1776, gave that zeal
additional energy.

But amidst all the popularity of their warlike operations, the
difficulties of the ministry soon began to multiply. In consequence of
hostilities with the American provinces, the British West India islands
experienced a scarcity of the necessaries of life. About the time
when the West India fleet was about to set sail, under convoy, on its
homeward voyage, it was discovered that the negroes of Jamaica meditated
an insurrection. By means of the draughts to complete the army in
America, the military force in that island had been weakened, and the
ships of war were detained to assist in suppressing the attempts of the
negroes. By this delay the Americans gained time for equipping their
privateers. After the fleet sailed it was dispersed by stormy weather
and many of the ships, richly laden, fell into the hands of the American
cruisers who were permitted to sell their prizes in the ports of France,
both in Europe and in the West Indies.

The conduct of France was now so openly manifested that it could no
longer be winked at, and it drew forth a remonstrance from the British
cabinet. The remonstrance was civilly answered, and the traffic in
British prizes was carried on somewhat more covertly in the French ports
in Europe; but it was evident that both France and Spain were in a state
of active preparation for war. The British ministry could no longer shut
their eyes against the gathering storm, and began to prepare for it.
About the middle of October (1776) they put sixteen additional ships
into commission, and made every exertion to man them.

On the 31st of October the parliament met and was opened by a speech
from the throne, in which his majesty stated that it would have given
him much satisfaction if he had been able to inform them that the
disturbances in the revolted Colonies were at an end, and that the
people of America, recovering from their delusion, had returned to their
duty; but so mutinous and determined was the spirit of their leaders
that they had openly abjured and renounced all connection and
communication with the mother country and had rejected every
conciliatory proposition. Much mischief, he said, would accrue not only
to the commerce of Great Britain but to the general system of Europe if
this rebellion were suffered to take root. The conduct of the Colonists
would convince every one of the necessity of the measures proposed to be
adopted, and the past success of the British arms promised the happiest
results; but preparations must be promptly made for another campaign. A
hope was expressed of the general continuance of tranquility in Europe,
but that it was thought advisable to increase the defensive resources at
home.

The addresses to the speech were in the usual form, but amendments
were moved in both houses of parliament; in the Commons by Lord John
Cavendish and in the Lords by the Marquis of Rockingham. After an
animated debate the amendment was rejected, in the House of Commons by
242 against 87, and in the Lords by 91 against 26. During the session
of parliament some other attempts were made for adopting conciliatory
measures, but the influence of ministry was so powerful that they were
all completely defeated, and the plans of administration received the
approbation and support of parliament.

During the winter (1776-1777), which was very severe, the British
troops at Brunswick and Amboy were kept on constant duty and suffered
considerable privations. The Americans were vigilant and active, and the
British army could seldom procure provisions or forage without fighting.
But although in the course of the winter the affairs of the United
States had begun to wear a more promising aspect, yet there were still
many friends of royalty in the provinces. By their open attachment to
the British interest, numbers had already exposed themselves to the
hostility of the patriotic party; and others, from affection to Britain
or distrust of the American cause, gave their countenance and aid to
General Howe. Early in the season a considerable number of these men
joined the royal army, and were embodied under the direction of the
Commander-in-Chief with the same pay as the regular troops, besides
the promise of an allotment of land at the close of the disturbances.
Governor Tryon, who had been extremely active in engaging and
disciplining them, was promoted to the rank of major-general of the
Loyal Provincialists. [1]

The campaign opened on both sides by rapid predatory incursions and bold
desultory attacks. At Peekskill, on the North river, about fifty miles
above New York, the Americans had formed a post, at which, during the
winter, they had collected a considerable quantity of provisions and
camp-equipage to supply the stations in the vicinity as occasion might
require.

The most mountainous part of the district, named the Manor of Courland,
was formed into a kind of citadel, replenished with stores, and
Peekskill served as a port to it. On the 23d of March (1777), as soon
as the river was clear of ice, Howe, who thought Peekskill of more
importance than it really was, detached Colonel Bird, with about 500
men, under convoy of a frigate and some armed vessels, against that
post. General M'Dougal, who commanded there, had then only about 250
men in the place. He had timely notice of Colonel Bird's approach, and,
sensible that his post was untenable, he exerted himself to remove the
stores to the strong grounds about two miles and a half in his rear; but
before he had made much progress in the work the British appeared, when
he set fire to the stores and buildings and retreated. Colonel Bird
landed and completed the destruction of the stores which he was unable
to remove. On the same day he re-embarked, and returned to New York.

On the 8th of April (1777), says Gordon, Congress concluded upon the
erection of a monument to the memory of General Warren in the town of
Boston, and another to the memory of General Mercer in Fredericksburg,
in Virginia, and that the eldest son of General Warren, and the youngest
son of General Mercer, be educated from henceforward at the expense of
the United States. They conveyed in a few words the highest eulogium on
the characters and merits of the deceased. Through inattention, General
Warren, who fell on Breed's Hill, had not been properly noted when
Congress passed their resolve respecting General Montgomery: the
proposal for paying due respect to the memory of Mercer led to the like
in regard to Warren.

On the 13th of April Lord Cornwallis and General Grant, with about 2,000
men, attempted to surprise and cut off General Lincoln, who, with 500
men, was posted at Bound Brook, seven miles from Brunswick, and nearly
succeeded in their enterprise. But by a bold and rapid movement Lincoln,
when almost surrounded, forced his way between the British columns and
escaped, with the loss of sixty men, his papers, three field pieces, and
some baggage.

At that early period of the campaign Howe attempted no grand movement
against the main body of the army under Washington at Morristown, but
he made several efforts to interrupt his communications, destroy his
stores, and impede his operations. He had received information that
the Americans had collected a large quantity of stores in the town of
Danbury and in other places on the borders of Connecticut. These
he resolved to destroy, and appointed Major-General Tryon of the
Provincials, who panted for glory in his newly-acquired character, to
command an expedition for that purpose, but prudently directed Generals
Agnew and Sir William Erskine to accompany him.

On the 25th of April (1777) the fleet appeared off the coast of
Connecticut, and in the evening the troops were landed without
opposition between Fairfield and Norwalk. General Silliman, then
casually in that part of the country, immediately dispatched expresses
to assemble the militia. In the meantime Tryon proceeded to Danbury
which he reached about 2 the next day. On his approach Colonel
Huntingdon, who had occupied the town with about 150 men, retired to a
neighboring height, and Danbury, with the magazines it contained, was
consumed by fire.

General Arnold, who was also in the State superintending the recruiting
service, joined General Silliman at Reading, where that officer had
collected about 500 militia. General Wooster, who had resigned his
commission in the Continental service, and been appointed major-general
of the militia, fell in with them at the same place, and they proceeded
in the night through a heavy rain to Bethel, about eight miles from
Danbury. Having heard next morning that Tryon, after destroying the town
and magazines, was returning, they divided their troops, and General
Wooster, with about 300 men, fell in his rear, while Arnold, with about
500, crossing the country, took post in his front at Ridgefield. Wooster
came up with his rear about 11 in the morning, attacked it with great
gallantry, and a sharp skirmish ensued in which he was mortally wounded,
[2] and his troops were repulsed.

Tryon then proceeded to Ridgefield where he found Arnold already
entrenched on a strong piece of ground, and prepared to dispute his
passage. A warm skirmish ensued, which continued nearly an hour.
Arnold was at length driven from the field after which he retreated to
Paugatuck, about three miles east of Norwalk.

At break of day next morning, after setting Ridgefield on fire, the
British resumed their march. About 11 in the forenoon, April 28th
(1777), they were again met by Arnold, whose numbers increased during
the day to rather more than 1,000 men, among whom were some Continental
troops. A continued skirmishing was kept up until 5 in the afternoon,
when the British formed on a hill near their ships. The Americans
attacked them with intrepidity, but were repulsed and broken. Tryon,
availing himself of this respite, re-embarked his troops and returned to
New York.

The loss of the British amounted to about 170 men. [3] That of the
Americans was represented by Tryon as being much more considerable. By
themselves it was not admitted to exceed 100. In this number, however,
were comprehended General Wooster, Lieutenant-Colonel Gould, and another
field officer, killed, and Colonel Lamb wounded. Several other
officers and volunteers were killed. Military and hospital stores to
a considerable amount, which were greatly needed by the army, were
destroyed in the magazines at Danbury, but the loss most severely
felt was rather more than 1,000 tents which had been provided for the
campaign about to open.

Not long afterward this enterprise was successfully retaliated. A
British detachment had been for some time employed in collecting forage
and provisions on the eastern end of Long Island. Howe supposed this
part of the country to be so completely secured by the armed vessels
which incessantly traversed the Sound, that he confided the protection
of the stores deposited at a small port called Sag Harbor to a schooner
with twelve guns and a company of infantry.

General Parsons, who commanded a few recruits at New Haven, thinking
it practicable to elude the cruisers in the bay, formed the design of
surprising this party and other adjacent posts, the execution of which
was entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Meigs, a gallant officer who had
accompanied Arnold in his memorable march to Quebec. He embarked with
about 230 men on board 13 whale-boats, and proceeded along the coast
to Guilford, where he was to cross the Sound. With about 170 of his
detachment, under convoy of two armed sloops, he proceeded (May
23, 1777) across the Sound to the north division of the island near
Southhold in the neighborhood of which a small foraging party against
which the expedition was in part directed, was supposed to lie, but they
had marched two days before to New York. The boats were conveyed across
the land, a distance of about fifteen miles, into a bay which deeply
intersects the eastern end of Long Island, where the troops re-embarked.
Crossing the bay they landed at 2 in the morning, about four miles from
Sag Harbor, which they completely surprised and carried with charged
bayonets. At the same time a division of the detachment secured the
armed schooner and the vessels laden with forage, which were set on fire
and entirely consumed. Six of the enemy were killed and ninety taken
prisoners. A very few escaped under cover of the night.

The object of his expedition being effected without the loss of a man,
Colonel Meigs returned to Guilford with his prisoners. "Having," as
was stated in the letter to General Parsons, "moved with such uncommon
celerity as to have transported his men by land and water 90 miles in 25
hours." Congress directed a sword to be presented to him, and passed a
resolution expressing the high sense entertained of his merit, and of
the prudence, activity, and valor displayed by himself and his party.

The exertions made by Washington through the winter to raise a powerful
army for the ensuing campaign had not been successful. The hopes
respecting its strength, which the flattering reports made from every
quarter had authorized him to form, were cruelly disappointed, and
he found himself not only unable to carry into effect the offensive
operations he had meditated, but unequal even to defensive warfare. That
steady and persevering courage, however, which had supported himself and
the American cause through the gloomy scenes of the preceding year
did not forsake him, and that sound judgment which applies to the best
advantage those means which are attainable, however inadequate they may
be, still remained. His plan of operations was adapted to that which
he believed his enemy had formed. He was persuaded either that General
Burgoyne, who was then at Quebec, would endeavor to take Ticonderoga and
to penetrate to the Hudson, in which event General Howe would cooperate
with him by moving up that river, and attempting to possess himself
of the forts and high grounds commanding its passage, or that Burgoyne
would join the grand army at New York by sea, after which the combined
armies would proceed against Philadelphia.

To counteract the designs of the enemy, whatever they might be, to
defend the three great points, Ticonderoga, the Highlands of New York,
and Philadelphia, against two powerful armies so much superior to him
in arms, in numbers, and in discipline, it was necessary to make such an
arrangement of his troops as would enable the parts reciprocally to
aid each other without neglecting objects of great and almost equal
magnitude, which were alike threatened, and were far asunder. To effect
these purposes, the troops of New England and New York were divided
between Ticonderoga and Peekskill, while those from Jersey to North
Carolina inclusive, were directed to assemble at the camp to be formed
in Jersey. The more southern troops remained in that State for its
protection.

These arrangements being made and the recruits collected, the camp
at Morristown was broken up, the detachments called in, and the army
assembled at Middlebrook (May 28, 1777), just behind a connected
ridge of strong and commanding heights north of the road leading to
Philadelphia, and about ten miles from Brunswick.

This camp, the approaches to which were naturally difficult, Washington
took care to strengthen still further by entrenchments. The heights in
front commanded a prospect of the course of the Raritan, the road to
Philadelphia, the hills about Brunswick, and a considerable part of the
country between that place and Amboy, so as to afford him a full view of
the most interesting movements of the enemy.

The force brought into the field by the United States required all
the aid which could be derived from strong positions and unremitting
vigilance. On the 20th of May (1777) the army in Jersey, excluding
cavalry and artillery, amounted to only 8,378 men, of whom upwards of
2,000 were sick. The effective rank and file were only 5,738.

Had this army been composed of the best disciplined troops, its
inferiority in point of numbers must have limited its operations to
defensive war, and have rendered it incompetent to the protection of any
place whose defense would require a battle in the open field. But more
than half the troops were unacquainted with the first rudiments
of military duty, and had never looked an enemy in the face. As an
additional cause of apprehension, a large proportion of the soldiers,
especially from the middle States, were foreigners, in whose attachment
to the American cause full confidence could not be placed.

Washington, anticipating a movement by land toward Philadelphia, had
taken the precaution to give orders for assembling on the western bank
of the Delaware an army of militia strengthened by a few Continental
troops, the command of which was given to General Arnold who was then in
Philadelphia employed in the settlement of his accounts.

The first and real object of the campaign on the part of Howe was the
acquisition of Philadelphia. He intended to march through Jersey, and
after securing the submission of that State to cross the Delaware on a
portable bridge constructed in the winter for the purpose and proceed
by land to that city. If, in the execution of this plan, the Americans
could be brought to a general action on equal ground, the advantages of
the royal army must insure a victory. But should Washington decline an
engagement and be again pressed over the Delaware the object would be as
certainly obtained.

Had Howe taken the field before the Continental troops were assembled
this plan might probably have been executed without any serious
obstruction, but the tents and camp equipage expected from Europe
did not arrive until Washington had collected his forces and taken
possession of the strong post on the Heights of Middlebrook. It would be
dangerous to attack him on such advantageous ground, for, although his
camp might be forced, victory would probably be attended with such loss
as to disable the victor from reaping its fruits.

If it was deemed too hazardous to attack the strong camp at Middlebrook,
an attempt to cross the Delaware in the face of an army collected on its
western bank, while that under Washington remained unbroken in his rear,
was an experiment of equal danger. It suited the cautious temper of Howe
to devise some other plan of operation to which he might resort should
he be unable to seduce Washington from his advantageous position.

The two great bays of Delaware and Chesapeake suggested the alternative
of proceeding by water, should he be unable to maneuver Washington out
of his present encampment.

The plan of the campaign being settled and some small reinforcements
with the expected camp equipage being received from Europe, Howe,
leaving a garrison in New York and a guard in Amboy, assembled his army
at Brunswick, and gave strong indications of an intention to penetrate
through the country to the Delaware and reach Philadelphia by land.

Believing this to be his real design Washington (June 13, 1777) placed
a select corps of riflemen under the command of Colonel Morgan, who had
distinguished himself in the unfortunate attempt to storm Quebec, and
in whom those particular qualities which fit a man for the command of a
partisan corps, designed to act on the lines of a formidable enemy, were
eminently united.

He was ordered to take post at Vanvighton's bridge on the Raritan, just
above its confluence with the Millstone river, to watch the left flank
of the British army and seize every occasion to harass it.

Early in the morning of the 14th, Howe, leaving 2,000 men under the
command of General Matthews at Brunswick, advanced in two columns toward
the Delaware. The front of the first, under Cornwallis, reached Somerset
Court House, nine miles from Brunswick, by the appearance of day, and
the second, commanded by General de Heister, reached Middlebush about
the same time.

This movement was made with the view of inducing Washington to quit his
fortified camp and approach the Delaware, in which event, Howe expected
to bring on an engagement on ground less disadvantageous than that now
occupied by the American army. But Washington understood the importance
of his position too well to abandon it.

On the first intelligence that the enemy was in motion, he drew out his
whole army, and formed it to great advantage on the heights in front of
his camp. This position was constantly maintained. The troops remained
in order of battle during the day, and in the night slept on the ground
to be defended.

In the meantime the Jersey militia, with alacrity theretofore unexampled
in that State, took the field in great numbers. They principally joined
General Sullivan, who had retired from Princeton, behind the Sourland
hills toward Flemington, where an army of some extent was forming, which
could readily cooperate with that under the immediate inspection of
Washington.

The settled purpose of Washington was to defend his camp, but not to
hazard a general action on other ground. He had therefore determined not
to advance from the heights he occupied into the open country, either
towards the enemy or the Delaware.

The object of Howe was, by acting on his anxiety for Philadelphia, to
seduce him from the strong ground about Middlebrook, and tempt him to
approach the Delaware in the hope of defending its passage. Should
he succeed in this, he had little doubt of being able to bring on an
engagement, in which he counted with certainty on victory.

The considerations which restrained Howe from attempting to march
through Jersey, leaving the American army in full force in his rear, had
determined Washington to allow him to proceed to the Delaware, if such
should be his intention. In that event, he had determined to throw those
impediments only in the way of the hostile army which might harass and
retard its march, and maintaining the high and secure grounds north
of the road to be taken by the enemy, to watch for an opportunity of
striking some important blow with manifest advantage.

Washington was not long in penetrating Howe's designs. "The views of
the enemy," he writes to General Arnold in a letter of the 17th (June,
1777), "must be to destroy this army and get possession of Philadelphia.
I am, however, clearly of opinion, that they will not move that way
until they have endeavored to give a severe blow to this army. The risk
would be too great to attempt to cross a river when they must expect
to meet a formidable opposition in front and would have such a force
as ours in their rear. They might possibly be successful, but the
probability would be infinitely against them. Should they be imprudent
enough to make the attempt, I shall keep close upon their heels and will
do everything in my power to make the project fatal to them."

"But, besides the argument in favor of their intending, in the first
place, a stroke at this army, drawn from the policy of the measure,
every appearance contributes to conform the opinion. Had their design
been for the Delaware in the first instance, they would probably have
made a secret, rapid march for it, and not have halted so as to awaken
our attention, and give us time to prepare for obstructing them. Instead
of that they have only advanced to a position necessary to facilitate an
attack on our right, the part in which we are most exposed. In addition
to this circumstance, they have come out as light as possible, leaving
all their baggage, provisions, boas, and bridges at Brunswick. This
plainly contradicts the idea of their intending to push for the
Delaware."

Finding the American army could not be drawn from its strong position
Howe determined to waste no more time in threatening Philadelphia
by land, but to withdraw from Jersey and to embark his army as
expeditiously as possible for the Chesapeake or the Delaware. On the
night of the 19th of June (1777), he returned to Brunswick, and on the
22d to Amboy, from which place the heavy baggage and a few of his troops
passed into Staten Island on the bridge which had been designed for the
Delaware. [2]

Washington had expected this movement from Brunswick and had made
arrangements to derive some advantage from it. General Greene was
detached with three brigades to annoy the British rear, and Sullivan
and Maxwell were ordered to cooperate with him. In the meantime the army
paraded on the Heights of Middlebrook, ready to act as circumstances
might require.

About sunrise, Colonel Morgan drove in a picket-guard, soon after which
that division commenced its march to Amboy. Some sharp skirmishing took
place between this party and Morgan's regiment, but the hope of gaining
any important advantage was entirely disappointed, and the retreat to
Amboy was effected with inconsiderable loss.

In order to cover his light parties, which still hung on the British
flank and rear, Washington advanced six or seven miles to Quibbletown
on the road to Amboy, and Lord Stirling's division was pushed still
further, to the neighborhood of the Metucking Meeting House, for the
purpose of co-operating with the light parties should the retreat to
Staten Island afford an opportunity of striking at the rear.

Believing it now practicable to bring on an engagement and probably
hoping to turn the left of the American army and gain the heights in its
rear, Howe, in the night of the 25th, recalled the troops from Staten
Island, and early next morning (June 26, 1777) made a rapid movement
in two columns, towards Westfield. The right, under the command of
Cornwallis took the route by Woodbridge to the Scotch plains, and the
left, led by Howe in person, marched by Metucking Meeting House to fall
into the rear of the right column. It was intended that the left should
take a separate road soon after this junction and attack the left flank
of the American army at Quibbletown, while Cornwallis should gain the
heights on the left of the camp at Middlebrook. Four battalions with six
pieces of cannon were detached to Bonhamtown.

About Woodbridge the right column fell in with one of the American
parties of observation, which gave notice of this movement. Washington
discerned his danger, put the whole army instantly in motion, and
regained the camp at Middlebrook. Cornwallis fell in with Lord Stirling
and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the Americans were driven from
their ground with the loss of three field-pieces and a few men. They
retreated to the hills about the Scotch Plains and were pursued as far
as Westfield. Perceiving the passes in the mountains on the left of the
American camp to be guarded, and the object of this skilful maneuver to
be, consequently, unattainable, Cornwallis returned through Rahway to
Amboy, and the whole army crossed over to Staten Island. Washington was
now again left to his conjectures respecting the plan of the campaign.
The very next day (June 27), after Howe had finally evacuated the
Jerseys, intelligence was received of the appearance of Burgoyne on
Lake Champlain, and that Ticonderoga was threatened. This intelligence
strengthened the opinion that the design of Howe must be to seize the
passes in the mountains on the Hudson, secure the command of that river,
and effect a junction between the two armies. Yet Washington could not
permit himself to yield so entirely to this impression, as to make a
movement which might open the way by land to Philadelphia. His army,
therefore, maintained its station at Middlebrook, but arrangements were
made to repel any sudden attack on the posts which defended the Hudson.

Some changes made in the stations of the British ships and troops
having relieved Washington from his apprehensions of a sudden march to
Philadelphia, he advanced Sullivan's division to Pompton Plains, on
the way to Peekskill, and proceeded with the main body of his army to
Morristown, thus approaching the Highlands of New York without removing
so far from Middlebrook as to be unable to regain that camp should Howe
indicate an intention to seize it.

Meanwhile Howe prosecuted diligently his plan of embarkation, which was
necessarily attended with circumstances indicating a much longer voyage
than one up the North river. These circumstances were immediately
communicated to the Eastern States, and Congress was earnestly pressed
to strengthen the fortifications on the Delaware, and to increase the
obstructions in that river.

In the midst of these appearances certain intelligence was received
that Burgoyne was in great force on the lakes, and was advancing against
Ticonderoga. This intelligence confirmed the opinion that the main
object of Howe must be to effect a junction with Burgoyne on the North
river. Under this impression Washington ordered Sullivan to Peekskill,
and slowly advanced himself, first to Pompton Plains, and afterward to
the Clove, where he determined to remain until the views of the enemy
should be disclosed.

While Washington thus anxiously watched the movements of his adversary,
an agreeable and unexpected piece of intelligence was received from New
England. The command of the British troops in Rhode Island had devolved
on General Prescot. Thinking himself perfectly secure in an island,
the water surrounding which was believed to be entirely guarded by his
cruisers, and at the head of an army greatly superior to any force then
collected in that department, he indulged himself in convenient quarters
rather distant from camp, and was remiss with respect to the guards
about his person. Information of this negligence was communicated to the
main, and a plan was formed to surprise him. This spirited enterprise
was executed with equal courage and address by Lieutenant-Colonel Barton
of the Rhode Island militia.

On the night of the 10th (June, 1777) he embarked on board four
whale-boats at Warwick Neck, with a party consisting of about forty
persons, including Captains Adams and Philips, and several other
officers. After proceeding about ten miles by water unobserved by the
British guard boats, although several ships of war lay in that quarter,
he landed on the west of the island, about midway between Newport
and Bristol Ferry, and marching a mile to the quarters of Prescot,
dexterously seized the sentinel at his door, and one of his aids. The
general himself was taken out of bed and conveyed to a place of safety.

The success of this intrepid enterprise diffused the more joy throughout
America, because it was supposed to secure the liberation of General Lee
by enabling Washington to offer an officer of equal rank in exchange for
him.

Congress expressed a high sense of the gallant conduct of Colonel Barton
and his party, and presented him with a sword as a mark of approbation.

As the fleet fell down toward Sandy Hook, Washington withdrew slowly
from the Clove, and disposed his army in different divisions, so as to
march to any point which might be attacked.

At length the embarkation was completed and the fleet put to sea. Still,
its destination was uncertain. It might be going to the south, or
it might return to New York and ascend the Hudson. Soon, however,
Washington received intelligence that it had been seen off the capes
of the Delaware. It was of course expected to come up the Delaware and
attack Philadelphia.

Washington ordered the army to march to Germantown, and himself hastened
forward to Chester. The fleet of the British had disappeared again. It
might have returned to New York, or it might have sailed to New England,
with a view to joining Burgoyne as he was advancing on Ticonderoga.

During this period of suspense and conjecture, Washington was for
several days in Philadelphia consulting on public measures with the
committees and members of Congress. Here he first met Lafayette. This
young nobleman, whose name has since become so dear to every American
heart, was born at Auvergne, in France, on the 6th of September, 1757.
His family was of ancient date and of the highest rank among the French
nobility. He was left an orphan at an early age, heir to an immense
estate, and exposed to all the temptations of "the gayest and most
luxurious city on earth at the period of its greatest corruption. He
escaped unhurt." Having completed his college education, he married at
the age of sixteen the daughter of the Duke D'Ayen, of the family of
Noailles. She was younger than himself and was always "the encourager of
his virtues, and the heroic partner of his sufferings, his great name,
and his honorable grave." [3]

In the summer of 1776 (says Mr. Everett), and just after the American
declaration of independence, Lafayette was stationed at Metz, a
garrisoned town on the road from Paris to the German frontier with the
regiment to which he was attached as a captain of dragoons, not then
nineteen years of age. The Duke of Gloucester, the brother of the King
of England happened to be on a visit to Metz, and a dinner was given to
him by the commandant of the garrison. Lafayette was invited with other
officers to the entertainment. Dispatches had just been received by the
duke from England relating to American affairs--the resistance of the
Colonists, and the strong measures adopted by the ministers to crush the
rebellion. Among the details stated by the Duke of Gloucester was
the extraordinary fact that these remote, scattered, and unprotected
settlers of the wilderness had solemnly declared themselves an
independent people. That word decided the fortunes of the enthusiastic
listener, and not more distinctly was the great declaration a charter
of political liberty to the rising States, than it was a commission to
their youthful champion to devote his life to the same cause.

The details which he heard were new to him. The American contest was
known to him before but as a rebellion--a tumultuary affair in a remote
transatlantic colony. He now, with a promptness of perception
which, even at this distance of time, strikes us as little less than
miraculous, addressed a multitude of inquiries to the Duke of Gloucester
on the subject of the contest. His imagination was kindled at the idea
of a civilized people struggling for political liberty. His heart was
warmed with the possibility of drawing his sword in a good cause. Before
he left the table his course was mentally resolved on, and the brother
of the King of England (unconsciously, no doubt) had the singular
fortune to enlist, from the French court and the French army, this
gallant and fortunate champion in the then unpromising cause of the
colonial Congress.

He immediately repaired to Paris to make further inquiries and
arrangements toward the execution of his great plan. He confided it
to two young friends, officers like himself, the Count de Ségur and
Viscount de Noailles, and proposed to them to join him. They shared his
enthusiasm, and determined to accompany him, but on consulting their
families, they were refused permission. But they faithfully kept
Lafayette's secret. Happily--shall I say--he was an orphan, independent
of control, and master of his own fortune, amounting to near $40,000 per
annum.

He next opened his heart to the Count de Broglie, a marshal in the
French army. To the experienced warrior, accustomed to the regular
campaigns of European service, the project seemed rash and quixotic, and
one that he could not countenance. Lafayette begged the count at least
not to betray him, as he was resolved (notwithstanding his disapproval
of the subject) to go to America. This the count promised, adding,
however, "I saw your uncle fall in Italy, and I witnessed your father's
death at the battle of Minden, and I will not be accessory to the ruin
of the only remaining branch of the family." He then used all the powers
of argument which his age and experience suggested to him, to dissuade
Lafayette from the enterprise, but in vain. Finding his determination
unalterable, he made him acquainted with the Baron De Kalb, who the
count knew was about to embark for America--an officer of experience and
merit who, as is well known, fell at the battle of Camden.

The Baron de Kalb introduced Lafayette to Silas Deane, then agent of the
United States in France, who explained to him the state of affairs in
America, and encouraged him in his project. Deane was but imperfectly
acquainted with the French language, and of manners somewhat repulsive.
A less enthusiastic temper than that of Lafayette might, perhaps, have
been chilled by the reception that he met with from Deane. He had, as
yet, not been acknowledged in any public capacity, and was beset by
the spies of the British ambassador. For these reasons it was judged
expedient that the visit of Lafayette should not be repeated, and their
further negotiations were conducted through the intervention of Mr.
Carmichael, an American gentleman at that time in Paris. The arrangement
was at length concluded, in virtue of which Deane took upon himself,
without authority, but by a happy exercise of discretion, to engage
Lafayette to enter the American service with the rank of major-general.
A vessel was about to be dispatched with arms and other supplies for
the American army, and in this vessel it was settled that he should take
passage.

At this juncture the news reached France of the evacuation of New York,
the loss of Fort Washington, the calamitous retreat through New Jersey,
and other disasters of the campaign of 1776. The friends of America in
France were in despair. The tidings, bad in themselves, were greatly
exaggerated in the British gazettes. The plan of sending an armed
vessel with munitions was abandoned. The cause, always doubtful, was now
pronounced desperate, and Lafayette was urged by all who were privy to
his project, to give up an enterprise so wild and hopeless. Even our
commissioners (for Deane had been joined by Dr. Franklin and Arthur Lee)
told him they could not in conscience urge him to proceed. His answer
was: "My zeal and love of liberty have perhaps hitherto been the
prevailing motive with me, but now I see a chance of usefulness which
I had not anticipated. These supplies I know are greatly wanted by
Congress. I have money; I will purchase a vessel to convey them to
America, and in this vessel my companions and myself will take passage."

His purpose was opposed by the government, and he was obliged to escape
into Spain and sail from that country. He landed near Georgetown in
South Carolina, and in company with the Baron de Kalb, the companion
of his voyage, proceeded to Charleston, where they were received with
enthusiasm by the magistrates and the people.

As soon as possible they proceeded by land to Philadelphia. On his
arrival there, with the eagerness of a youth anxious to be employed upon
his errand, he sent his letters to Mr. Lovell, chairman of the committee
of foreign relations. He called the next day at the hall of Congress,
and asked to see this gentleman. Mr. Lovell came out to him, stated that
so many foreigners offered themselves for employment in the American
army that Congress was greatly embarrassed to find them commands; that
the finances of the country required the most rigid economy, and that he
feared, in the present case, there was little hope of success. Lafayette
perceived that the worthy chairman had made up his report without
looking at the papers; he explained to him that his application,
if granted, would lay no burden upon the finances of Congress, and
addressed a letter to the president, in which he expressed a wish to
enter the American army on the condition of serving without pay or
emolument, and on the footing of a volunteer. These conditions removed
the chief obstacles alluded to in reference to the appointment of
foreign officers; the letters brought by Lafayette made known to
Congress his high connections, and his large means of usefulness,
and without an hour's delay he received from them a commission of
major-general in the American army, a month before he was twenty years
of age.

Washington was at headquarters when Lafayette reached Philadelphia,
but he was daily expected in the city. The introduction of the youthful
stranger to the man on whom his career depended was therefore delayed
a few days. It took place in a manner peculiarly marked with the
circumspection of Washington, at a dinner party, where Lafayette was one
among several guests of consideration. Washington was not uninformed
of the circumstances connected with his arrival in the country. He knew
what benefit it promised the cause if his character and talents were
adapted to the cause he had so boldly struck out, and he knew also how
much it was to be feared that the very qualities which had prompted
him to embark in it, would make him a useless and even a dangerous
auxiliary. We may well suppose that the piercing eye of the Father of
his Country was not idle during the repast. But that searching glance,
before which pretense or fraud never stood undetected, was completely
satisfied. When they were about to separate, Washington took Lafayette
aside, spoke to him with kindness, paid a just tribute to the noble
spirit which he had shown, and the sacrifices he had made in the
American cause, invited him to make the headquarters of the army his
home, and to regard himself at all times as one of the family of the
Commander-in-Chief.

Such was the reception given to Lafayette by the most sagacious and
observant of men, and the personal acquaintance thus commenced ripened
into an intimacy, a confidence, and an affection without bounds, and
never for one moment interrupted. If there lived a man whom Washington
loved it was Lafayette. The proofs of this are not wanted by those who
have read the history of the Revolution, but the private correspondence
of these two great men, hitherto unpublished, discloses the full extent
of the mutual regard and affection which united them. It not only shows
that Washington entertained the highest opinion of the military talent,
the personal probity, and the general prudence and energy of Lafayette,
but that he regarded him with the tenderness of a father, and found in
the affection which Lafayette bore to him in return one of the greatest
comforts and blessings of his own life. Whenever the correspondence of
Washington and Lafayette shall be published, the publication will
do what perhaps nothing else can--raise them both in the esteem and
admiration of mankind.

Our readers will pardon this somewhat lengthened quotation respecting
the bosom friend of Washington. We now return to our narrative of
events.

Late in the month of August (1777), Washington was relieved from his
suspense in regard to the movements of Howe. He received intelligence
that the British fleet had sailed up Chesapeake Bay, and that he was
landing his army at the head of Elk river, now Elkton. It was at length
clearly apparent that his object was the capture of Philadelphia.

At the place of debarkation the British army was within a few days'
march of Philadelphia; no great rivers were in its way, and there was
no very strong position of which the enemy could take possession. On
landing, General Howe issued a proclamation promising that private
property should be respected, and offering pardon and protection to all
who should submit to him, but, as the American army was at hand, the
proclamation produced little effect.

Washington distinctly understood the nature of the contest in which he
was engaged, and, sensible of the inferiority of his raw and disorderly
army to the veteran troops under Howe, he wished to avoid a general
engagement, but aware of the effect which the fall of Philadelphia would
produce on the minds of the people, determined to make every effort in
order to retard the progress and defeat the aim of the royal army.

Accordingly, he marched to meet General Howe, who, from want of horses,
many of which had perished in the voyage, and from other causes, was
unable to proceed from the head of the Elk before the 3d of September
(1777). On the advance of the royal array, Washington retreated across
Brandywine creek, which falls into the Delaware at Wilmington. He took
post with his main body opposite Chad's ford, where it was expected the
British would attempt the passage, and ordered General Sullivan, with a
detachment, to watch the fords above. He sent General Maxwell with about
1,000 light troops, to occupy the high ground on the other side of
the Brandywine, to skirmish with the British, and retard them in their
progress.

On the morning of the 11th of September, the British army advanced in
two columns; the right, under General Knyphausen, marched straight
to Chad's ford; the left, under Cornwallis, accompanied by Howe and
Generals Grey, Grant, and Agnew, proceeded by a circuitous route toward
a point named the Forks, where the two branches of the Brandywine unite,
with a view to turn the right of the Americans and gain their rear.
General Knyphausen's van soon found itself opposed to the light troops
under General Maxwell. A smart conflict ensued. General Knyphausen
reinforced his advanced guard, and drove the Americans across the
rivulet to shelter themselves under their batteries on the north bank.
General Knyphausen ordered some artillery to be placed on the most
advantageous points, and a cannonade was carried on with the American
batteries on the heights beyond the ford.

Meanwhile the left wing of the British crossed the fords above the
Forks. Of this movement General Washington had early notice, but the
information which he received from different quarters, through his raw
and unpracticed scouts, was confused and contradictory, and consequently
his operations were embarrassed. After passing the fords, Cornwallis
took the road to Dilworth, which led him on the American right. General
Sullivan, who had been appointed to guard that quarter, occupied the
heights above Birmingham Church, his left extending to the Brandywine,
his artillery judiciously placed, and his right flank covered by woods.
About four in the afternoon Cornwallis formed the line of battle
and began the attack: for some time the Americans sustained it with
intrepidity, but at length gave way. When Washington heard the firing
in that direction he ordered General Greene, with a brigade, to support
General Sullivan. General Greene marched four miles in forty-two
minutes, but, on reaching the scene of action, he found General
Sullivan's division defeated, and in confusion. He covered the retreat,
and, after some time, finding an advantageous position, he renewed the
battle, and arrested the progress of the pursuing enemy.

General Knyphausen, as soon as he heard the firing of Cornwallis's
division, forced the passage of Chad's ford, attacked the troops opposed
to him, and compelled them to make a precipitate and disorderly retreat.
General Washington, with the part of his army which he was able to keep
together, retired with his artillery and baggage to Chester, where he
halted within eight miles of the British army, till next morning, when
he retreated to Philadelphia.

Among the foreign officers engaged in this battle besides Lafayette, who
was wounded in the leg during the action, were General Deborre, a French
officer; [6] General Conway, an Irishman, who had served in France;
Capt. Louis Fleury, a French engineer, and Count Pulaski, a Polish
nobleman, subsequently distinguished as a commander of cavalry.

As must ever be the case in new-raised armies, unused to danger and from
which undeserving officers have not been expelled, their conduct was not
uniform. Some regiments, especially those which had served the preceding
campaign, maintained their ground with the firmness and intrepidity of
veterans, while others gave way as soon as they were pressed. The author
of a very correct history of the war, speaking of this action, says: "A
part of the troops, among whom were particularly numbered some Virginia
regiments, and the whole corps of artillery, behaved exceedingly well in
some of the actions of this day, exhibiting a degree of order, firmness,
and resolution, and preserving such a countenance in extremely sharp
service, as would not have discredited veterans. Some other bodies of
their troops behaved very badly."

The official letter of Sir William Howe stated his loss at rather less
than 100 killed and 400 wounded, and this account was accepted at the
time as true. A late discovery shows its falsehood. Mr. Headley, in his
recent "Life of Washington," notices the finding of a document which
settles the question.

It was found, he says, among Gen. James Clinton's papers, carefully
filed away and indorsed by himself. On the back, in his own handwriting,
is inscribed: "Taken from the enemy's ledgers, which fell into the hands
of General Washington's army at the action of Germantown."

Within is the following statement: "State of the British troops and
position they were in when they made the attack at Brandywine, the 11th
of September, 1777.

   The upper ford, under the command of Lieutenant
   Lord Cornwallis:

                                                        Killed and
   Second Regiment, British Guards; Second                 wounded.
   Regiment, Light Infantry                      1,740         612
   Second Brigade, British Foot                  2,240         360
   First Division, Hessians                        800          70
   Ferguson's Riflemen                              80          46
                                                ______       _____
   Totals                                        4,860       1,088


   Middle ford, under the command of Major-General
   Gray:


   Second Battalion, Guards                                    500
   Second Battalion, Second Highlanders                        700
   Second Battalion, Seventieth Highlanders                    700
                                                              ____
   Total                                                     1,900


   Lower ford, under the command of Lieutenant-General
   Knyphausen:

   Second Brigade, consisting of the Fourth,            Killed and
     Fifth, Tenth, Fifteenth, Twenty-third,                wounded.
     Twenty-seventh, Twenty-eighth, Fortieth,
     Forty-fourth, and Fifty-fifth Regiments     2,240         580
     Hessians to the amount of                     800          28
     Queen's Rangers                               480         290
                                              ________       _____

        Total                                    3,520         898
                                                 1,900
                                                 4,860       1,088
                                              ________      ______

        The whole British force                 10,280       1,986
                                                 1,986
                                              ________
                                                8,294"

The estimate, says Mr. Headley, of the total force which the British
had on the field, makes the two armies actually engaged about equal. The
heavy loss here given seems, at first sight, almost incredible, and
puts an entirely different aspect on the battle. Of the authenticity and
accuracy of this document I think there can be no doubt.

From the ardor with which Washington had inspired his troops before this
action, it is probable that the conflict would have been more severe had
the intelligence respecting the movement on the left of the British army
been less contradictory. Raw troops, changing their ground in the moment
of action, and attacked in the agitation of moving, are easily thrown
into confusion. This was the critical situation of a part of Sullivan's
division, and was the cause of its breaking before Greene could be
brought up to support it, after which it was impossible to retrieve the
fortune of the day. But had the best disposition of the troops been made
at the time, which subsequent intelligence would suggest, the action
could not have terminated in favor of the Americans. Their inferiority
in numbers, in discipline, and in arms was too great to leave them a
probable prospect of victory. A battle, however, was not to be avoided.
The opinion of the public and of Congress demanded it. The loss of
Philadelphia, without an attempt to preserve it, would have excited
discontent throughout the country, which might be productive of serious
mischief, and action, though attended with defeat, provided the loss
be not too great, must improve an army in which not only the military
talents, but even the courage of officers, some of them of high rank,
remained to be ascertained.

The battle of Brandywine was not considered as decisive by Congress,
the general, or the army. The opinion was carefully cherished that the
British had gained only the ground, and that their loss was still more
considerable than had been sustained by the Americans. Congress appeared
determined to risk another battle for the metropolis of America. Far
from discovering any intention to change their place of session, they
passed vigorous resolutions for reinforcing the army, and directed
Washington to give the necessary orders for completing the defenses of
the Delaware.

From Chester the army marched through Darby, over the Schuylkill bridge
to its former ground near the falls of that river. Greene's division,
which, having been less in action, was more entire than any other,
covered the rear, and the corps of Maxwell remained at Chester until
the next day as a rallying point for the small parties and straggling
soldiers who might yet be in the neighborhood.

Having allowed his army one day for repose and refreshment, Washington
recrossed the Schuylkill and proceeded on the Lancaster road, with the
intention of risking another engagement.

Sir William Howe passed the night of the 11th on the field of battle. On
the succeeding day he detached Major-General Grant with two brigades
to Concord Meeting House, and on the 13th (September, 1777), Lord
Cornwallis joined General Grant, and marched toward Chester. Another
detachment took possession of Wilmington, to which place the sick and
wounded were conveyed.

To prevent a sudden movement to Philadelphia by the lower road the
bridge over the Schuylkill was loosened from its moorings, and General
Armstrong was directed, with the Pennsylvania militia, to guard the
passes over that river.

On the fifteenth the American army, intending to gain the left of the
British, reached the Warren tavern, on the Lancaster road, twenty-three
miles from Philadelphia. Intelligence was received early next morning
that Howe was approaching in two columns. It being too late to reach the
ground he had intended to occupy Washington resolved to meet and engage
him in front.

Both armies prepared with great alacrity for battle. The advanced
parties had met, and were beginning to skirmish, when they were
separated by a heavy rain, which, becoming more and more violent,
rendered the retreat of the Americans a measure of absolute necessity.
The inferiority of their arms never brought them into such imminent
peril as on this occasion. Their gun-locks not being well secured, their
muskets soon became unfit for use. Their cartridge-boxes had been so
badly constructed as not to protect their ammunition from the tempest.
Their cartridges were soon damaged, and this mischief was the more
serious, because very many of the soldiers were without bayonets.

The army being thus rendered unfit for action the design of giving
battle was reluctantly abandoned by Washington and a retreat commenced.
It was continued all the day and great part of the night, through a cold
and most distressing rain and very deep roads. A few hours before day
(September 17th), the troops halted at the Yellow Springs, where their
arms and ammunition were examined, and the alarming fact was disclosed
that scarcely a musket in a regiment could be discharged and scarcely
one cartridge in a box was fit for use. This state of things suggested
the precaution of moving to a still greater distance in order to refit
their arms, obtain a fresh supply of ammunition, and revive the spirits
of the army. Washington therefore retired to Warwick Furnace on the
south branch of French creek, where ammunition and muskets might be
obtained in time to dispute the passage of the Schuylkill and make yet
another effort to save Philadelphia.

The extreme severity of the weather had entirely stopped the British
army. During two days Howe made no other movement than to unite his
columns.

From French creek General Wayne was detached with his division into
the rear of the British with orders to join General Smallwood, and,
carefully concealing himself and his movements, to seize every occasion
which this march might offer of engaging them to advantage. Meanwhile,
General Washington crossed the Schuylkill at Parker's Ferry, and
encamped on both sides of Perkyomen creek.

General Wayne lay in the woods near the entrance of the road from Darby
into that leading to Lancaster, about three miles in the rear of
the left wing of the British troops encamped at Trydruffin, where
he believed himself to be perfectly secure. But the country was so
extensively disaffected that Howe received accurate accounts of his
position and of his force. Major-General Gray was detached to surprise
him, and effectually accomplished his purpose. About 11 in the night of
the 20th his pickets, driven in with charged bayonets, gave the first
intimation of Gray's approach. Wayne instantly formed his division, and,
while his right sustained a fierce assault, directed a retreat by the
left, under cover of a few regiments, who, for a short time, withstood
the violence of shock. In his letter to Washington, he says that they
gave the assailants some well-directed fires, which must have done
considerable execution, and that, after retreating from the ground on
which the engagement commenced, they formed again, at a small distance
from the scene of action, but that both parties drew off without
renewing the conflict. He states his loss at about 150 killed and
wounded. The British accounts admit, on their part, a loss of only 7.

When the attack commenced, General Smallwood, who was on his march to
join Wayne, a circumstance entirely unexpected by General Gray, was
within less than a mile of him, and, had he commanded regulars, might
have given a very different turn to the night. But his militia thought
only of their own safety, and, having fallen in with a party returning
from the pursuit of Wayne, fled in confusion, with the loss of only one
man.

Some severe animadversions on this unfortunate affair having been
made in the army, General Wayne demanded a court-martial, which, after
investigating his conduct, was unanimously of opinion, "that he had done
everything to be expected from an active, brave, and vigilant officer,"
and acquitted him with honor.

Having secured his rear, by compelling Wayne to take a greater distance,
Howe marched along the valley road to the Schuylkill and encamped on the
bank of that river, from the Fatland ford up to French creek, along
the front of the American army. To secure his right from being turned,
Washington again changed his position and encamped with his left near,
but above, the British right.

Howe now relinquished his plan of bringing Washington to another battle,
and thinking it advisable, perhaps, to transfer the seat of war to the
neighborhood of his ships, determined to cross the Schuylkill and take
possession of Philadelphia. In the afternoon he ordered one detachment
to cross at Fatland ford, which was on his right, and another to cross
at Gordon's ford, on his left, and to take possession of the heights
commanding them. These orders were executed without much difficulty, and
the American troops placed to defend these fords were easily dispersed.

This service being effected, the whole army marched by its right,
about midnight, and crossing at Fatland without opposition, proceeded
a considerable distance toward Philadelphia, and encamped with its left
near Sweed's ford and its right on the Manatawny road, having Stony Run
in its course.

It was now apparent that only immediate victory could save Philadelphia
from the grasp of the British general whose situation gave him the
option of either taking possession of that place or endeavoring to bring
on another engagement. If, therefore, a battle must certainly be risked
to save the capital it would be necessary to attack the enemy.

Public opinion, which a military chief finds too much difficulty in
resisting, and the opinion of Congress, required a battle; but, on a
temperate consideration of circumstances, Washington came to the wise
decision of avoiding one for the present.

His reasons for this decision were conclusive. Wayne and Smallwood had
not yet joined the army. The Continental troops ordered from Peekskill,
who had been detained for a time by an incursion from New York, were
approaching, and a reinforcement of Jersey militia, under General
Dickenson, was also expected.

To these powerful motives against risking an engagement, other
considerations of great weight were added, founded on the condition of
his soldiers. An army, maneuvering in an open country, in the face of
a very superior enemy, is unavoidably exposed to excessive fatigue and
extreme hardship. The effect of these hardships was much increased by
the privations under which the American troops suffered. While in almost
continual motion, wading deep rivers, and encountering every vicissitude
of the seasons, they were without tents, newly without shoes, or winter
clothes, and often without food.

A council of war concurred in the opinion Washington had formed, not to
march against the enemy, but to allow his harassed troops a few days
for repose and to remain on his present ground until the expected
reinforcements should arrive.

Immediately after the battle of Brandywine, the distressed situation
of the army had been represented to Congress, who had recommended the
executive of Pennsylvania to seize the cloths and other military stores
in the warehouses of Philadelphia, and, after granting certificates
expressing their value, to convey them to a place of safety. The
executive, being unwilling to encounter the odium of this strong
measure, advised that the extraordinary powers of the Commander-in-Chief
should be used on the occasion. Lieut. Col. Alexander Hamilton, one
of the General's aides, already in high estimation for his talents and
zeal, was employed on this delicate business. "Your own prudence," said
the General, in a letter to him while in Philadelphia, "will point out
the least exceptionable means to be pursued; but remember, delicacy and
a strict adherence to the ordinary mode of application must give place
to our necessities. We must, if possible, accommodate the soldiers with
such articles as they stand in need of or we shall have just reason
to apprehend the most injurious and alarming consequences from the
approaching season."

All the efforts, however, of this very active officer could not obtain
a supply in any degree adequate to the pressing and increasing wants of
the army.

Colonel Hamilton was also directed to cause the military stores which
had been previously collected to a large amount in Philadelphia, and the
vessels which were lying at the wharves, to be removed up the Delaware.
This duty was executed with so much vigilance that very little public
property fell, with the city, into the hands of the British general,
who entered it on the 26th of September (1777). The members of Congress
separated on the 18th, in the evening, and reassembled at Lancaster on
the 27th of the same month. From thence they subsequently adjourned
to Yorktown, where they remained eight months, till Philadelphia was
evacuated by the British.

From the 25th of August, when the British army landed at the head of
Elk, until the 26th of September, when it entered Philadelphia, the
campaign had been active, and the duties of the American general
uncommonly arduous.

Some English writers bestow high encomiums on Sir William Howe for his
military skill and masterly movements during this period. At Brandywine
especially, Washington is supposed to have been "out-generaled, more
out-generaled than in any action during the war." If all the operations
of this trying period be examined, and the means in possession of both
be considered, the American chief will appear in no respect inferior
to his adversary, or unworthy of the high place assigned to him in the
opinions of his countrymen. With an army decidedly inferior, not only
in numbers, but in every military requisite except courage, in an open
country, he employed his enemy near thirty days in advancing about sixty
miles. In this time he fought one general action, and, though defeated,
was able to reassemble the same undisciplined, unclothed, and almost
unfed army; and, the fifth day afterward, again to offer battle. When
the armies were separated by a storm which involved him in the most
distressing circumstances, he extricated himself from them, and still
maintained a respectable and imposing countenance.

The only advantage he is supposed to have given was at the battle of
Brandywine, and that was produced by the contrariety and uncertainty
of the intelligence received. A general must be governed by his
intelligence, and must regulate his measures by his information. It
is his duty to obtain correct information, and among the most valuable
traits of a military character is the skill to select those means which
will obtain it. Yet the best-selected means are not always successful;
and, in a new army, where military talent has not been well tried by the
standard of experience, the general is peculiarly exposed to the chance
of employing not the best instruments. In a country, too, which is
covered with wood precise information of the numbers composing different
columns is to be gained with difficulty.

Taking into view the whole series of operations, from the landing of
Howe at the Head of Elk to his entering Philadelphia, the superior
generalship of Washington is clearly manifest. Howe, with his numerous
and well-appointed army, performed a certain amount of routine work and
finally gained the immediate object which he had in view--the possession
of Philadelphia--when, by every military rule, he should have gone
up the Hudson to cooperate with Burgoyne. Washington, with his army,
composed almost entirely of raw recruits and militia, kept his adversary
out of Philadelphia a month, still menaced him with an imposing front in
his new position, and subsequently held him in check there while Gates
was defeating and capturing Burgoyne.

We shall see, in the ensuing chapter, that although Howe had attained
his first object in gaining possession of Philadelphia, he had still
many new difficulties and dangers to encounter at the hands of his
daring and persevering opponent before he could comfortably establish
himself in winter quarters.

1. Footnote: About this time the Royalists in the counties of Somerset
and Worcester, in the province of Maryland, became so formidable that an
insurrection was dreaded. And it was feared that the insurgents would,
in such a case, be joined by a number of disaffected persons in the
county of Sussex, in the Delaware State. Congress, to prevent this evil,
recommended the apprehension and removal of all persons of influence, or
of desperate characters, within the counties of Sussex, Worcester, and
Somerset, who manifested a disaffection to the American cause, to some
remote place within their respective States, there to be secured. From
appearances, Congress had also reason to believe that the Loyalists in
the New England governments and New York State, had likewise concerted
an insurrection. See Gordon's "History of the American Revolution," vol.
II, pp. 461, 462. By the same authority we are informed that General
Gates wrote to General Fellowes for a strong military force, for the
prevention of plots and insurrection in the provinces of New England and
New York.

2. Footnote: Congress voted a monument to his memory.

3. Footnote: Stedman, the British historian of the Revolution,
acknowledges a loss of 200, including 10 officers.

4. Footnote: Lieutenant-Colonel Palfrey, formerly an aide-de-camp to
General Washington, and now paymaster-general, wrote to his friend: "I
was at Brunswick just after the enemy had left it. Never let the
British troops upbraid the Americans with want of cleanliness, for such
dog-kennels as their huts were my eyes never beheld. Mr. Burton's house,
where Lord Cornwallis resided, stunk so I could not bear to enter it.
The houses were torn to pieces, and the inhabitants as well as the
soldiers have suffered greatly for want of provisions."--Gordon,
"History of the American Revolution."

5. Footnote: Eulogy on Lafayette. See "Orations and Speeches on Various
Occasions," by Edward Everett, vol. I, p. 462.

6. Footnote: Deborre's brigade broke first; and, on an inquiry into his
conduct being directed, he resigned. A misunderstanding existed between
him and Sullivan, on whose right he was stationed.

7. Footnote: All English writers do not concur in this view of the
matter. The British historian, Stedman, gives the following sharp
criticism on Howe's conduct in the affair of the Brandywine:

"The victory does not seem to have been improved in the degree which
circumstances appeared to have admitted. When the left column of the
British had turned Washington's right flank, his whole army was hemmed
in:--General Knyphausen and the Brandywine in front; Sir William Howe
and Lord Cornwallis on his right; the Delaware in his rear; and the
Christiana river on his left. He was obliged to retreat twenty-three
miles to Philadelphia, when the British lay within eighteen miles of
it. Had the Commander-in-Chief detached General Knyphausen's column in
pursuit early next morning, General Washington might with ease have been
intercepted, either at the Heights of Crum Creek, nine miles; at Derby,
fourteen; or at Philadelphia, eighteen miles, from the British camp;
or, the Schuylkill might have been passed at Gray's Ferry, only seventy
yards over, and Philadelphia, with the American magazines, taken, had
not the pontoons been improvidently left at New York as useless. Any one
of these movements, it was thought, might have been attended with the
total destruction of the American army. For some reason, however, which
it is impossible to divine, the Commander-in-Chief employed himself
for several days in making slight movements which could not by any
possibility produce any important benefits to the British cause."




CHAPTER XI.


WASHINGTON HOLDS HOWE IN CHECK. 1777.


Washington seems to have been by no means disheartened at the loss of
Philadelphia. On the contrary he justly regarded the circumstance of the
enemy holding that city as one which might, as in the sequel it actually
did, turn to the advantage of the American cause. Writing to General
Trumbull on the 1st of October (1777), he says: "You will hear, before
this gets to hand, that the enemy have at length gained possession of
Philadelphia. Many unavoidable difficulties and unlucky accidents which
we had to encounter helped to promote this success. This is an event
which we have reason to wish had not happened, and which will be
attended with several ill consequences, but I hope it will not be so
detrimental as many apprehend, and that a little time and perseverance
will give us some favorable opportunity of recovering our loss, and of
putting our affairs in a more flourishing condition. Our army has now
had the rest and refreshment it stood in need of, and our soldiers are
in very good spirits."

Philadelphia being lost Washington sought to make its occupation
inconvenient and insecure by rendering it inaccessible to the British
fleet. With this design works had been erected on a low, marshy island
in the Delaware, near the junction of the Schuylkill, which, from the
nature of its soil, was called Mud Island. On the opposite shore of
Jersey, at Red Bank, a fort had also been constructed which was defended
with heavy artillery. In the deep channel between, or under cover of
these batteries, several ranges of _chevaux-de-frise_ had been sunk.
These were so strong and heavy as to be destructive of any ship which
might strike against them, and were sunk in such a depth of water as
rendered it equally difficult to weigh them or cut them through; no
attempt to raise them, or to open the channel in any manner, could
be successful until the command of the shores on both sides should be
obtained.

Other ranges of _chevaux-de-frise_ had been sunk about three miles
lower down the river, and some considerable works were in progress at
Billingsport on the Jersey side, which were in such forwardness as to be
provided with artillery. These works were further supported by several
galleys mounting heavy cannon, together with two floating batteries, a
number of armed vessels, and some fire ships.

The present relative situation of the armies gave a decisive importance
to these works. Cutting off the communication of Howe with his brother's
fleet, they prevented his receiving supplies by water. While the
American vessels in the river above Fort Mifflin, the name given to
the fort on Mud Island, rendered it difficult to forage in Jersey,
Washington hoped to render his supplies on the side of Pennsylvania so
precarious as to compel him to evacuate Philadelphia.

The advantages of this situation were considerably diminished by the
capture of the Delaware frigate.

The day after Cornwallis entered Philadelphia three batteries were
commenced for the purpose of acting against any American ships which
might appear before the town. While yet incomplete they were attacked
by two frigates, assisted by several galleys and gondolas. The Delaware,
being left by the tide while engaged with the battery, grounded and was
captured, soon after which the smaller frigate and the other vessels
retired under the guns of the fort. This circumstance was the more
unfortunate as it gave the British general the command of the ferry,
and consequently free access to Jersey, and enabled him to intercept the
communication between the forts below and Trenton, from which place the
garrisons were to have drawn their military stores.

All the expected reinforcements, except the State regiment and militia
from Virginia, being arrived, and the detached parties being called in,
the effective strength of the army amounted to 8,000 Continental troops
and 3,000 militia. With this force Washington determined to approach the
enemy and seize the first favorable moment to attack him. In pursuance
of this determination the army took a position on the Skippack road,
September 30th (1777), about twenty miles from Philadelphia and sixteen
from Germantown--a village stretching on both sides the great road
leading northward from Philadelphia, which forms one continued street
nearly two miles in length. The British line of encampment crossed
this village at right angles near the center, and Cornwallis, with four
regiments of grenadiers, occupied Philadelphia. The immediate object of
General Howe being the removal of the obstructions in the river, Colonel
Stirling, with two regiments, had been detached to take possession of
the fort at Billingsport, which he accomplished without opposition.
This service being effected, and the works facing the water destroyed,
Colonel Stirling was directed to escort a convoy of provisions from
Chester to Philadelphia. Some apprehensions being entertained for the
safety of this convoy, another regiment was detached from Germantown,
with directions to join Colonel Stirling.

This division of the British force appeared to Washington to furnish a
fair opportunity to engage Sir William Howe with advantage. Determining
to avail himself of it, he formed a plan for surprising the camp at
Germantown. This plan consisted, in its general outline, of a night
march and double attack, consentaneously made, on both flanks of the
enemy's right wing, while a demonstration, or attack, as circumstances
should render proper, was to be directed on the western flank of his
left wing. With these orders and objects the American army began its
march from Skippack creek at 7 o'clock in the evening of the 3d of
October (1777), in two columns--the right, under Sullivan and Wayne,
taking the Chestnut Hill road, followed by Stirling's division in
reserve; the left, composed of the divisions of Greene and Stephen,
with M'Dougal's brigade and 1,400 Maryland and Jersey militia taking
the Limekiln and old York roads, while Armstrong's Pennsylvania militia
advanced by the Ridge road. Washington accompanied the right wing, and
at dawn of day, next morning, attacked the royal army. After a smart
conflict he drove in the advance guard, which was stationed at the head
of the village, and with his army divided into five columns prosecuted
the attack, but Lieutenant-Colonel Musgrave, of the Fortieth regiment,
which had been driven in, and who had been able to keep five companies
of the regiment together, threw himself into a large stone house in the
village, belonging to Mr. Chew, which stood in front of the main column
of the Americans, and there almost a half of Washington's army was
detained for a considerable time. Instead of masking Chew's house with
a sufficient force and advancing rapidly with their main body, the
Americans attacked the house, which was obstinately defended. The delay
was very unfortunate, for the critical moment was lost in fruitless
attempts on the house; the royal troops had time to get under arms and
be in readiness to resist or attack, as circumstances required. General
Grey came to the assistance of Colonel Musgrave; the engagement for some
time was general and warm; at length the Americans began to give way and
effected a retreat with all their artillery. The morning was very foggy,
a circumstance which had prevented the Americans from combining and
conducting their operations as they otherwise might have done, but which
now favored their retreat by concealing their movements.

In this engagement the British had 600 men killed or wounded; among
the slain were Brigadier-General Agnew and Colonel Bird, officers of
distinguished reputation. The Americans lost an equal number in killed
and wounded, besides 400 who were taken prisoners. General Nash, of
North Carolina, was among those who were killed. After the battle
Washington returned to his encampment at Skippack creek.

The plan of attack formed by Washington for the battle of Germantown
was fully justified by the result. The British camp was completely
surprised, and their army was on the point of being entirely routed,
when the continued fog led the American soldiers to mistake friends
for foes, and caused a panic which threw everything into confusion and
enabled the enemy to rally.

Washington, writing to his brother John Augustine, says: "If it had not
been for a thick fog, which rendered it so dark at times that we were
not able to distinguish friend from foe at the distance of thirty yards,
we should, I believe, have made a decisive and glorious day of it. But
Providence designed it otherwise, for, after we had driven the enemy a
mile or two, after they were in the utmost confusion and flying before
us in most places, after we were upon the point, as it appeared to
everybody, of grasping a complete victory, our own troops took fright
and fled with precipitation and disorder. How to account for this I know
not, unless, as I before observed, the fog represented their own friends
to them for a reinforcement of the enemy, as we attacked in different
quarters at the same time, and were about closing the wings of our army
when this happened. One thing, indeed, contributed not a little to our
misfortune, and that was a want of ammunition on the right wing, which
began the engagement, and in the course of two hours and forty minutes,
which time it lasted, had, many of them, expended the forty rounds that
they took into the field. After the engagement we removed to a place
about twenty miles from the enemy to collect our forces together, to
take care of our wounded, get furnished with necessaries again, and be
in a better posture either for offensive or defensive operations. We are
now advancing toward the enemy again, being at this time within twelve
miles of them."

Writing to the President of Congress (October 7, 1777) he still imputes
the disaster to the fog: "It is with much chagrin and mortification I
add that every account confirms the opinion I at first entertained, that
our troops retreated at the instant when victory was declaring herself
in our favor. The tumult, disorder, and even despair, which, it seems,
had taken place in the British army, were scarcely to be paralleled; and
it is said, so strongly did the idea of a retreat prevail, that Chester
was fixed on as their rendezvous. I can discover no other cause for
not improving this happy opportunity, than the extreme haziness of the
weather."

Much controversy has arisen among writers as to the cause of failure
at Germantown, but Washington's means of observation were certainly
not inferior to those of any other person whatever, and in the above
extracts the whole matter is clearly explained. He does not refer to
the delay at Chew's house as the cause of failure. Panic struck as the
British were, they would have been defeated, notwithstanding the delay
at that impromptu fortress, if the fog had not occasioned the American
soldiers to believe that the firing on their own side proceeded from the
enemy, and that they were about to be surrounded. Hence the recoil and
retreat. It was apparently a great misfortune, but it was the destiny
of Washington to achieve greatness in spite of severe and repeated
misfortunes.

The same opinion respecting the fog is expressed in the following
extract from a letter from General Sullivan to the President of New
Hampshire: "We brought off all our cannon and all our wounded. Our loss
in the action amounts to less than 700, mostly wounded. We lost some
valuable officers, among whom were the brave General Nash, and my two
aides-de-camp, Majors Sherburne and White, whose singular bravery must
ever do honor to their memories. Our army rendezvoused at Paulen's
Mills, and seems very desirous of another action. The misfortunes of
this day were principally owing to a thick fog which, being rendered
still more so by the smoke of the cannon and musketry, prevented our
troops from discovering the motions of the enemy, or acting in concert
with each other. I cannot help observing that with great concern I saw
our brave commander exposing himself to the hottest fire of the enemy in
such a manner that regard for my country obliged me to ride to him and
beg him to retire. He, to gratify me and some others, withdrew a small
distance, but his anxiety for the fate of the day soon brought him up
again, where he remained till our troops had retreated."

Congress unanimously adopted the following resolution on hearing of the
battle of Germantown:

"_Resolved,_ That the thanks of Congress be given to General Washington,
for his wise and well-concerted attack upon the enemy's army near
Germantown, on the 4th instant, and to the officers and soldiers of the
army for their brave exertions on that occasion; Congress being well
satisfied, that the best designs and boldest efforts may sometimes fail
by unforeseen incidents, trusting that, on future occasions, the valor
and virtue of the army will, by the blessing of Heaven, be crowned with
complete and deserved success."

The attention of both armies was now principally directed to the forts
below Philadelphia. These it was the great object of Howe to destroy,
and of Washington to defend and maintain.

The loss of the Delaware frigate, and of Billingsport, greatly
discouraged the seamen by whom the galleys and floating batteries
were manned. Believing the fate of America to be decided, an opinion
strengthened by the intelligence received from their connections in
Philadelphia, they manifested the most alarming defection, and several
officers as well as sailors deserted to the enemy. This desponding
temper was checked by the battle of Germantown, and by throwing a
garrison of Continental troops into the fort at Red Bank, called Fort
Mercer, the defense of which had been entrusted to militia. This fort
commanded the channel between the Jersey shore and Mud Island, and the
American vessels were secure under its guns. The militia of Jersey
were relied on to reinforce its garrison, and also to form a corps of
observation which might harass the rear of any detachment investing the
place.

To increase the inconvenience of Howe's situation by intercepting his
supplies Washington ordered 600 militia, commanded by General Potter,
to cross the Schuylkill and scour the country between that river and
Chester, and the militia on the Delaware, above Philadelphia, were
directed to watch the roads in that vicinity.

The more effectually to stop those who were seduced by the hope of gold
and silver to supply the enemy at this critical time, Congress passed a
resolution subjecting to martial law and to death all who should furnish
them with provisions, or certain other enumerated articles, who should
be taken within thirty miles of any city, town, or place in Jersey,
Pennsylvania, or Delaware, occupied by British troops.

These arrangements being made to cut off supplies from the country,
Washington took a strong position at White Marsh, within fourteen miles
of Philadelphia.

Meanwhile General Howe was actively preparing to attack Fort Mifflin
from the Pennsylvania shore. He erected some batteries at the mouth of
the Schuylkill, in order to command Webb's Ferry, which were attacked by
Commodore Hazlewood and silenced; but the following night a detachment
crossed over Webb's Ferry into Province Island, and constructed a slight
work opposite Fort Mifflin, within two musket shots of the blockhouse,
from which they were enabled to throw shot and shells into the barracks.
When daylight discovered this work three galleys and a floating battery
were ordered to attack it and the garrison surrendered. While the boats
were bringing off the prisoners, a large column of British troops
were seen marching into the fortress, upon which the attack on it
was renewed, but without success, and two attempts made by
Lieutenant-Colonel Smith to storm it failed. [1]

In a few nights works were completed on the high ground of Province
Island, which enfiladed the principal battery of Fort Mifflin, and
rendered it necessary to throw up some cover on the platform to protect
the men who worked the guns.

The aid expected from the Jersey militia was not received. "Assure
yourself," said Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, in a letter pressing earnestly
for a reinforcement of Continental troops, "that no dependence is to be
put on the militia; whatever men your Excellency determines on sending,
no time is to be lost." The garrison of Fort Mifflin was now reduced to
156 effectives, and that of Red Bank did not much exceed 200.

In consequence of these representations Washington ordered Col.
Christopher Greene, of Rhode Island, with his regiment, to Red Bank,
and Lieut.-Col. John Greene, of Virginia, with about 200 men, to Fort
Mifflin.

Immediately after the battle of Brandywine Admiral Howe had sailed for
the Delaware, where he expected to arrive in time to meet and cooperate
with the army in and about Philadelphia. But the winds were so
unfavorable, and the navigation of the Bay of Delaware so difficult,
that his van did not get into the river until the 4th of October. The
ships of war and transports which followed came up from the 6th to the
8th, and anchored from New Castle to Reddy Island.

The frigates, in advance of the fleet, had not yet succeeded in
their endeavors to effect a passage through the lower double row
of _chevaux-de-frise_. Though no longer protected by the fort at
Billingsport, they were defended by the water force above, and the work
was found more difficult than had been expected. It was not until the
middle of October that the impediments were so far removed as to afford
a narrow and intricate passage through them. In the meantime the fire
from the Pennsylvania shore had not produced all the effect expected
from it, and it was perceived that greater exertions would be necessary
for the reduction of the works than could safely be made in the present
relative situation of the armies. Under this impression, General Howe,
soon after the return of the American army to its former camp on the
Skippack, withdrew his troops from Germantown into Philadelphia, as
preparatory to a combined attack by land and water on Forts Mercer and
Mifflin.

After effecting a passage through the works sunk in the river at
Billingsport, other difficulties still remained to be encountered by
the ships of war. Several rows of _chevaux-de-frise_ had been sunk about
half a mile below Mud Island, which were protected by the guns of the
forts, as well as by the movable water force. To silence these
works, therefore, was a necessary preliminary to the removal of these
obstructions in the channel.

On the 21st of October (1777) a detachment of Hessians, amounting
to 1,200 men, commanded by Col. Count Donop, crossed the Delaware
at Philadelphia with orders to storm Fort Mercer, at Red Bank. The
fortifications consisted of extensive outer works, within which was an
entrenchment eight or nine feet high, boarded and fraized. Late in the
evening of the 22d Count Donop appeared before the fort and attacked
it with great intrepidity. It was defended with equal resolution by
the brave garrison of Rhode Island Continentals, under command of Col.
Christopher Greene. The outer works being too extensive to be manned
by the troops in the fort, were used only to gall the assailants while
advancing. On their near approach the garrison retired within the
inner entrenchment, whence they poured upon the Hessians a heavy
and destructive fire. Colonel Donop received a mortal wound, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Mengerode, the second in command, fell about the same
time. [2]

Lieutenant-Colonel Linsing, the oldest remaining officer, drew off his
troops and returned next day to Philadelphia. The loss of the assailants
was estimated by the Americans at 400 men. The garrison was reinforced
from Fort Mifflin, and aided by the galleys which flanked the Hessians
in their advance and retreat. The American loss, in killed and wounded,
amounted to only thirty-two men.

The ships having been ordered to cooperate with Count Donop,
the Augusta, with four smaller vessels, passed the lower line of
_chevaux-de-frise_, opposite to Billingsport, and lay above it, waiting
until the assault should be made on the fort. The flood tide setting in
about the time the attack commenced they moved with it up the river.
The obstructions sunk in the Delaware had in some degree changed its
channel, in consequence of which the Augusta and the Merlin grounded a
considerable distance below the second line of _chevaux-de-frise_, and a
strong wind from the north so checked the rising of the tide that these
vessels could not be floated by the flood. Their situation, however, was
not discerned that evening, as the frigates which were able to approach
the fort, and the batteries from the Pennsylvania shore, kept up an
incessant fire on the garrison, till night put an end to the cannonade.
Early next morning it was recommenced in the hope that, under its
cover, the Augusta and the Merlin might be got off. The Americans, on
discovering their situation, sent four fire ships against them, but
without effect. Meanwhile a warm cannonade took place on both sides,
in the course of which the Augusta took fire, and it was found
impracticable to extinguish the flames. Most of the men were taken out,
the frigates withdrawn, and the Merlin set on fire, after which the
Augusta blew up, and a few of the crew were lost in her.

This repulse inspired Congress with flattering hopes for the permanent
defense of the posts on the Delaware. That body expressed its high sense
of the merits of Colonel Greene, of Rhode Island, who had commanded in
Fort Mercer; of Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of Maryland, who had commanded
in Fort Mifflin; and of Commodore Hazlewood, who commanded the galleys;
and presented a sword to each of these officers, as a mark of the
estimation in which their services were held.

The situation of these forts was far from justifying this confidence
of their being defensible. That on Mud Island had been unskillfully
constructed and required at least 800 men fully to man the lines. The
island is about half a mile long. Fort Mifflin was placed at the lower
end, having its principal fortifications in front for the purpose of
repelling ships coming up the river. The defenses in the rear consisted
only of a ditch and palisade, protected by two blockhouses, the upper
story of one of which had been destroyed in the late cannonade. Above
the fort were two batteries opposing those constructed by the British on
Province and Carpenter's Islands, which were separated from Mud Island
only by a narrow passage between 400 and 500 yards wide.

The garrison of Fort Mifflin consisted of only 300 Continental troops,
who were worn down with fatigue and incessant watching, under the
constant apprehension of being attacked from Province Island, from
Philadelphia, and from the ships below.

Having failed in every attempt to draw the militia of New Jersey to the
Delaware, Washington determined to strengthen the garrison by further
drafts from his army. Three hundred Pennsylvania militia were detached
to be divided between the two forts, and a few days afterward General
Varnum was ordered, with his brigade, to take a position above Woodbury,
near Red Bank, and to relieve and reinforce the garrisons of both
forts as far as his strength would permit. Washington hoped that the
appearance of so respectable a Continental force might encourage the
militia to assemble in greater numbers.

Aware of the advantage to result from a victory over the British army
while separated from the fleet, Washington had been uniformly determined
to risk much to gain one. He had, therefore, after the battle of
Germantown, continued to watch assiduously for an opportunity to attack
his enemy once more to advantage. The circumspect caution of General
Howe afforded none. After the repulse at Red Bank his measures were slow
but certain, and were calculated to insure the possession of the forts
without exposing his troops to the hazard of an assault.

In this state of things intelligence was received of the successful
termination of the northern campaign, in consequence of which great part
of the troops who had been employed against Burgoyne, might be drawn to
the aid of the army in Pennsylvania. But Washington had just grounds to
apprehend that before these reinforcements could arrive Howe would gain
possession of the forts and remove the obstructions to the navigation of
the Delaware. This apprehension furnished a strong motive for vigorous
attempts to relieve Fort Mifflin. But the relative force of the armies,
the difficulty of acting offensively against Philadelphia, and, above
all, the reflection that a defeat might disable him from meeting his
enemy in the field even after the arrival of the troops expected from
the north, determined Washington not to hazard a second attack under
existing circumstances.

To expedite the reinforcements for which he waited, Washington
dispatched Colonel Hamilton to General Gates, with directions to
represent to him the condition of the armies in Pennsylvania, and
to urge him, if he contemplated no other service of more importance,
immediately to send the regiments of Massachusetts and New Hampshire to
aid the army of the middle department. These orders were not peremptory,
because it was possible that some other object (as the capture of New
York) still more interesting than the expulsion of General Howe from
Philadelphia might be contemplated by Gates; and Washington meant not to
interfere with the accomplishment of such object.

On reaching General Putnam, Colonel Hamilton found that a considerable
part of the northern army had joined that officer, but that Gates had
detained four brigades at Albany for an expedition intended to be made
in the winter against Ticonderoga. Having made such arrangements with
Putnam as he supposed would secure the immediate march of a large body
of Continental troops from that station, Colonel Hamilton proceeded
to Albany for the purpose of remonstrating with General Gates against
retaining so large and valuable a part of the army unemployed at a time
when the most imminent danger threatened the vitals of the country.
Gates was by no means disposed to part with his troops. He could not
believe that an expedition then preparing at New York was designed
to reinforce General Howe; and insisted that, should the troops then
embarked at that place, instead of proceeding to the Delaware, make a
sudden movement up the Hudson, it would be in their power, should Albany
be left defenseless, to destroy the valuable arsenal which had been
there erected, and the military stores captured with Burgoyne, which had
been chiefly deposited in that town.

Having, after repeated remonstrances, obtained an order directing three
brigades to the Delaware, Hamilton hastened back to Putnam and found the
troops which had been ordered to join Washington, still at Peekskill.
The detachment from New York had suggested to Putnam the possibility
of taking that place; and he does not appear to have made very great
exertions to divest himself of a force he deemed necessary for an
object, the accomplishment of which would give so much splendor to his
military character. In addition to this circumstance, an opinion had
gained ground among the soldiers that their share of service for the
campaign had been performed, and that it was time for them to go into
winter quarters. Great discontents, too, prevailed concerning their pay,
which the government had permitted to be more than six months in arrear;
and in Poor's brigade a mutiny broke out in the course of which a
soldier who was run through the body by his captain, shot the captain
dead before he expired. Colonel Hamilton came in time to borrow money
from the Governor, George Clinton, of New York, to put the troops
in motion; and they proceeded by brigades to the Delaware. But these
several delays retarded their arrival until the contest for the forts on
that river was terminated.

The preparations of Sir William Howe being completed, a large battery on
Province Island of twenty-four and thirty-two pounders and two howitzers
of eight inches each opened, early in the morning of the 10th of
November, upon Fort Mifflin, at the distance of 500 yards, and kept
up an incessant fire for several successive days. The blockhouses were
reduced to a heap of ruins; the palisades were beaten down, and most of
the guns dismounted and otherwise disabled. The barracks were battered
in every part, so that the troops could not remain in them. They were
under the necessity of working and watching the whole night to repair
the damages of the day, and to guard against a storm, of which they were
in perpetual apprehension. If, in the days, a few moments were allowed
for repose, it was taken on the wet earth, which, in consequence of
heavy rains, had become a soft mud. The garrison was relieved by General
Varnum every forty-eight hours, but his brigade was so weak that half
the men were constantly on duty.

Colonel Smith was decidedly of opinion, and General Varnum concurred
with him, that the garrison could not repel an assault, and ought to be
withdrawn; but Washington still cherished the hope that the place might
be maintained until he should be reinforced from the northern army.
Believing that an assault would not be attempted until the works were
battered down, he recommended that the whole night should be employed in
making repairs. His orders were that the place should be defended to the
last extremity; and never were orders more faithfully executed.

Several of the garrison were killed and among them Captain Treat, a
gallant officer, who commanded the artillery. Colonel Smith received a
contusion on his hip and arm which compelled him to give up the command
and retire to Red Bank. Major Fleury, a French officer of distinguished
merit, who served as engineer, reported to Washington that, although
the blockhouses were beaten down, all the guns in them, except two,
disabled, and several breaches made in the walls, the place was still
defensible; but the garrison was so unequal to the numbers required by
the extent of the lines, and was so dispirited by watching, fatigue, and
constant exposure to the cold rains, which were almost incessant, that
he dreaded the event of an attempt to carry the place by storm. Fresh
troops were ordered to their relief from Varnum's brigade, and the
command was taken, first by Colonel Russell, and afterward by Major
Thayer. The artillery, commanded by Captain Lee, continued to be well
served. The besiegers were several times thrown into confusion, and a
floating battery, which opened on the morning of the 14th, was silenced
in the course of the day.

The defense being unexpectedly obstinate, the assailants brought up
their ships (November 15, 1777) as far as the obstructions in the river
permitted and added their fire to that of the batteries, which was the
more fatal as the cover for the troops had been greatly impaired. The
brave garrison, however, still maintained their ground with unshaken
firmness. In the midst of this stubborn conflict, the Vigilant and a
sloop-of-war were brought up the inner channel, between Mud and Province
Islands, which had, unobserved by the besieged, been deepened by the
current in consequence of the obstructions in the main channel, and,
taking a station within 100 yards of the works, not only kept up a
destructive cannonade, but threw hand-grenades into them, while the
musketeers from the round-top of the Vigilant killed every man that
appeared on the platform.

Major Thayer applied to the Commodore to remove these vessels, and he
ordered six galleys on the service, but, after reconnoitering their
situation, the galleys returned without attempting anything. Their
report was that these ships were so covered by the batteries on Province
Island as to be unassailable.

It was now apparent to all that the fort could be no longer defended.
The works were in ruins. The position of the Vigilant rendered any
further continuance on the island a prodigal and useless waste of human
life; and on the 16th, about 11 at night, the garrison was withdrawn.

A second attempt was made to drive the vessels from their stations, with
a determination, should it succeed, to repossess the island, but the
galleys effected nothing, and a detachment from Province Island soon
occupied the ground which had been abandoned.

The day after, receiving intelligence of the evacuation of Fort Mifflin,
Washington deputed Generals De Kalb and Knox to confer with General
Varnum and the officers at Fort Mercer on the practicability of
continuing to defend the obstructions in the channel, to report thereon,
and to state the force which would be necessary for that purpose. Their
report was in favor of continuing the defense. A council of the navy
officers had already been called by the Commodore in pursuance of a
request of the Commander-in-Chief, made before the evacuation had taken
place, who were unanimously of opinion that it would be impracticable
for the fleet, after the loss of the island, to maintain its station or
to assist in preventing the _chevaux-de-frise_ from being weighed by the
ships of the enemy.

General Howe had now completed a line of defense from the Schuylkill to
the Delaware, and a reinforcement from New York had arrived at Chester.
These two circumstances enabled him to form an army in the Jerseys,
sufficient for the reduction of Fort Mercer, without weakening himself
so much in Philadelphia as to put his lines in hazard. Still, deeming
it of the utmost importance to open the navigation of the Delaware
completely, he detached Lord Cornwallis, about 1 in the morning of the
17th (1777), with a strong body of troops to Chester. From that place
his lordship crossed over to Billingsport, where he was joined by the
reinforcement from New York.

Washington received immediate intelligence of the march of this
detachment, which he communicated to General Varnum, with orders that
Fort Mercer should be defended to the last extremity. With a view to
military operations in that quarter he ordered one division of the
army to cross the river at Burlington, and dispatched expresses to the
northern troops who were marching on by brigades, directing them to move
down the Delaware on its northern side until they should receive further
orders.

General Greene was selected for this expedition. A hope was entertained
that he would be able not only to protect Fort Mercer, but to obtain
some decisive advantage over Lord Cornwallis, as the situation of
the fort, which his lordship could not invest without placing himself
between Timber and Manto creeks, would expose the assailants to great
peril from a respectable force in their rear. But, before Greene could
cross the Delaware, Cornwallis approached with an army rendered more
powerful than had been expected by the junction of the reinforcement
from New York, and Fort Mercer was evacuated. A few of the smaller
galleys escaped up the river, and the others were burnt by their crews.

Washington still hoped to recover much of what had been lost. A victory
would restore the Jersey shore, and this object was deemed so important
that General Greene's instructions indicated the expectation that he
would be in a condition to fight Cornwallis.

Greene feared the reproach of avoiding an action less than the just
censure of sacrificing the real interests of his country by engaging the
enemy on disadvantageous terms. The numbers of the British exceeded his,
even counting his militia as regulars, and he determined to wait for
Glover's brigade, which was marching from the north. Before its arrival,
Cornwallis took post on Gloucester point, a point of land making deep
into the Delaware, which was entirely under cover of the guns of the
ships, from which place he was embarking his baggage and the provisions
he had collected for Philadelphia.

Believing that Cornwallis would immediately follow the magazines he had
collected, and that the purpose of Howe was, with his united forces,
to attack the American army while divided, General Washington ordered
Greene to re-cross the Delaware and join the army.

Thus, after one continued struggle of more than six weeks, in which
the Continental troops displayed great military virtues, the army in
Philadelphia secured itself in the possession of that city by opening a
free communication with the fleet.

While Lord Cornwallis was in Jersey, and General Greene on the Delaware
above him, the reinforcements from the north being received, an attack
on Philadelphia was strongly pressed by several officers high in rank,
and was, in some measure, urged by that torrent of public opinion,
which, if not resisted by a very firm mind, overwhelms the judgment, and
by controlling measures not well comprehended may frequently produce,
especially in military transactions, the most disastrous effects. The
officers who advised this measure were Lord Stirling, Generals Wayne,
Scott, and Woodford. The considerations urged upon Washington in its
support were: That the army was now in greater force than he could
expect it to be at any future time; that being joined by the troops who
had conquered Burgoyne, his own reputation, the reputation of his army,
the opinion of Congress and of the nation required some decisive blow
on his part; and that the rapid depreciation of the paper currency,
by which the resources for carrying on the war were dried up, rendered
indispensable some grand effort to bring it to a speedy termination.

Washington reconnoitered the enemy's lines with great care and took into
serious consideration the plan of attack proposed. The plan proposed
was that General Greene should embark 2,000 men at Dunks' ferry, and
descending the Delaware in the night land in the town just before day,
attack the enemy in the rear, and take possession of the bridge over the
Schuylkill; that a strong corps should march down on the west side of
that river, occupy the heights enfilading the works of the enemy, and
open a brisk cannonade upon them, while a detachment from it should
march down to the bridge and attack in front at the same instant that
the party descending the river should commence its assault on the rear.

Not only the Commander-in-Chief, but some of his best officers--those
who could not be impelled by the clamors of the ill-informed to ruin the
public interests--were opposed to this mad enterprise. The two armies,
they said, were now nearly equal in point of numbers, and the detachment
under Lord Cornwallis could not be supposed to have so weakened Sir
William Howe as to compensate for the advantages of his position. His
right was covered by the Delaware, his left by the Schuylkill, his
rear by the junction of those two rivers, as well as by the city of
Philadelphia, and his front by a line of redoubts extending from river
to river and connected by an abatis and by circular works. It would be
indispensably necessary to carry all these redoubts, since to leave a
part of them to play on the rear of the columns while engaged in front
with the enemy in Philadelphia would be extremely hazardous. Supposing
the redoubts carried and the British army driven into the town, yet
all military men were agreed on the great peril of storming a town. The
streets would be defended by an artillery greatly superior to that of
the Americans, which would attack in front, while the brick houses
would be lined with musketeers, whose fire must thin the ranks of the
assailants.

A part of the plan, on the successful execution of which the whole
depended, was that the British rear should be surprised by the corps
descending the Delaware. This would require the concurrence of too many
favorable circumstances to be calculated on with any confidence. As the
position of General Greene was known, it could not be supposed that Sir
William Howe would be inattentive to him. It was probable that not even
his embarkation would be made unnoticed, but it was presuming a degree
of negligence which ought not to be assumed to suppose that he could
descend the river to Philadelphia undiscovered. So soon as his movement
should be observed, the whole plan would be comprehended, since it would
never be conjectured that Greene was to attack singly.

If the attack in front should fail, which was not even improbable, the
total loss of the 2,000 men in the rear must follow, and General Howe
would maintain his superiority through the winter.

The situation did not require these desperate measures. The British
general would be compelled to risk a battle on equal terms or to
manifest a conscious inferiority to the American army. The depreciation
of paper money was the inevitable consequence of immense emissions
without corresponding taxes. It was by removing the cause, not by
sacrificing the army, that this evil was to be corrected.

Washington possessed too much discernment to be dazzled by the false
brilliant presented by those who urged the necessity of storming
Philadelphia in order to throw lustre round his own fame and that of
his army, and too much firmness of temper, too much virtue and real
patriotism to be diverted from a purpose believed to be right, by the
clamors of faction or the discontents of ignorance. Disregarding
the importunities of mistaken friends, the malignant insinuations of
enemies, and the expectations of the ill-informed, he persevered in his
resolution to make no attempt on Philadelphia. He saved his army and was
able to keep the field in the face of his enemy, while the clamor of the
moment wasted in air and was forgotten.

About this time Washington learnt, by a letter from General Greene, that
his young friend Lafayette, although hardly recovered from the wound
received at Brandywine, had signalized his spirit and courage by
an attack on Cornwallis' picket guard at Gloucester point, below
Philadelphia. "The Marquis," writes Greene, "with about 400 militia and
the rifle corps, attacked the enemy's picket last evening, killed about
20, wounded many more, and took about 20 prisoners. The Marquis is
charmed with the spirited behavior of the militia and rifle corps; they
drove the enemy about half a mile and kept the ground till dark. The
enemy's picket consisted of about 300 and were reinforced during the
skirmish. The Marquis is determined to be in the way of danger."

The following letter to Washington, cited by Sparks, contains
Lafayette's own account of this affair: "After having spent the most
part of the day in making myself well acquainted with the certainty of
the enemy's motions, I came pretty late into the Gloucester road between
the two creeks. I had 10 light horse, almost 150 riflemen, and 2 pickets
of militia. Colonel Armand, Colonel Laumoy, and the Chevaliers
Duplessis and Gimat were the Frenchmen with me. A scout of my men, under
Duplessis, went to ascertain how near to Gloucester were the enemy's
first pickets, and they found at the distance of two miles and a half
from that place a strong post of 350 Hessians, with field pieces, and
they engaged immediately. As my little reconnoitering party were all in
fine spirits I supported them. We pushed the Hessians more than half a
mile from the place where their main body had been and we made them run
very fast. British reinforcements came twice to them, but, very far
from recovering their ground, they always retreated. The darkness of the
night prevented us from pursuing our advantage. After standing on
the ground we had gained, I ordered them to return very slowly to
Haddonfield."

The Marquis had only one man killed and six wounded. "I take the
greatest pleasure," he added, "in letting you know that the conduct
of our soldiers was above all praise. I never saw men so merry, so
spirited, and so desirous to go on to the enemy, whatever force they
might have, as that same small party in this little fight."

Washington, in a letter to Congress dated November 26, 1777, mentions
this affair with commendation, and suggests, as he had repeatedly done
before, Lafayette's appointment to one of the vacant divisions of the
army, and on the same day that this letter was received Congress
voted that such an appointment would be agreeable to them. Three days
afterward Washington placed Lafayette in command of the division of
General Stephen, who had been dismissed from the army for having been
intoxicated, to the great injury of the public service, on the eventful
day of the battle of Germantown. We shall see that this appointment, by
enabling Lafayette to act occasionally on a separate command, afforded
him the opportunity of rendering essential service to the cause of
independence.

On the 27th of November (1777), the Board of War was increased
from three to five members, viz.: General Mifflin, formerly aide to
Washington and recently quartermaster-general; Joseph Trumbull, Richard
Peters, Col. Timothy Pickering, of Massachusetts, and General Gates.
Gates was appointed president of the board, with many flattering
expressions from Congress. His recent triumph over Burgoyne had gained
him many friends among the members of Congress and a few among the
officers of the army. His head, naturally not over-strong, had been
turned by success, and he entered into the views of a certain clique
which had recently been formed, whose object was to disparage Washington
and put forward rather high pretensions in favor of the "hero of
Saratoga." This clique, called from the name of its most active member,
General Conway, the "Conway Cabal," we shall notice hereafter. At the
time of this change in the constitution of the Board of War it was in
full activity, and its operations were well known to Washington. In
fact, he had already applied the match which ultimately exploded the
whole conspiracy and brought lasting disgrace on every one of its
members.

General Howe in the meantime was preparing to attack Washington in
his camp, and, as he confidently threatened, to "drive him beyond the
mountains."

On the 4th of December (1777), Captain M'Lane, a vigilant officer on the
lines, discovered that an attempt to surprise the American camp at
White Marsh was about to be made, and communicated the information to
Washington. In the evening of the same day General Howe marched out of
Philadelphia with his whole force, and about 11 at night, M'Lane, who
had been detached with 100 chosen men, attacked the British van at
the Three Mile Run on the Germantown road, and compelled their front
division to change its line of march. He hovered on the front and flank
of the advancing army, galling them severely until 3 next morning, when
the British encamped on Chestnut Hill in front of the American right,
and distant from it about three miles. A slight skirmish had also taken
place between the Pennsylvania militia, under General Irvine, and the
advanced light parties of the enemy, in which the general was wounded
and the militia without much other loss were dispersed.

The range of hills on which the British were posted approached nearer
to those occupied by the Americans as they stretched northward. Having
passed the day in reconnoitering the right Howe changed his ground in
the course of the night, and moving along the hills to his right took
an advantageous position about a mile in front of the American left.
The next day he inclined still further to his right, and in doing so
approached still nearer to the left wing of the American army. Supposing
a general engagement to be approaching Washington detached Gist, with
some Maryland militia, and Morgan, with his rifle corps, to attack the
flanking and advanced parties of the enemy. A sharp action ensued in
which Major Morris, of New Jersey, a brave officer in Morgan's regiment
was mortally wounded, and twenty-seven of his men were killed and
wounded. A small loss was also sustained in the militia. The parties
first attacked were driven in, but the enemy reinforcing in numbers and
Washington unwilling to move from the heights and engage on the ground
which was the scene of the skirmish, declining to reinforce Gist and
Morgan, they, in turn, were compelled to retreat.

Howe continued to maneuver toward the flank and in front of the left
wing of the American army. Expecting to be attacked in that quarter in
full force Washington made such changes in the disposition of his troops
as the occasion required, and the day was consumed in these movements.
In the course of it Washington rode through every brigade of his army,
delivering in person his orders respecting the manner of receiving the
enemy, exhorting his troops to rely principally on the bayonet, and
encouraging them by the steady firmness of his countenance, as well as
by his words, to a vigorous performance of their duty. The dispositions
of the evening indicated an intention to attack him the ensuing morning,
but in the afternoon of the 8th the British suddenly filed off from
their right, which extended beyond the American left, and retreated
to Philadelphia. The parties detached to harass their rear could not
overtake it. [3]

The loss of the British in this expedition, as stated in the official
letter of General Howe, rather exceeded 100 in killed, wounded, and
missing, and was sustained principally in the skirmish of the 7th
(December, 1777) in which Major Morris fell.

On no former occasion had the two armies met, uncovered by works, with
superior numbers on the side of the Americans. The effective force of
the British was then stated at 12,000 men. Stedman, the historian, who
then belonged to Howe's army, states its number to have been 14,000. The
American army consisted of precisely 12,161 Continental troops and
3,241 militia. This equality in point of numbers rendered it a prudent
precaution to maintain a superiority of position. As the two armies
occupied heights fronting each other neither could attack without giving
to its adversary some advantage in the ground, and this was an advantage
which neither seemed willing to relinquish.

The return of Howe to Philadelphia without bringing on an action after
marching out with the avowed intention of fighting is the best testimony
of the respect which he felt for the talents of his adversary and the
courage of the troops he was to encounter.

The cold was now becoming so intense that it was impossible for an army
neither well-clothed nor sufficiently supplied with blankets longer to
keep the field in tents. It had become necessary to place the troops
in winter quarters, but in the existing state of things the choice of
winter quarters was a subject for serious reflection. It was impossible
to place them in villages without uncovering the country or exposing
them to the hazard of being beaten in detachment.

To avoid these calamities it was determined to take a strong position
in the neighborhood of Philadelphia, equally distant from the Delaware
above and below that city, and there to construct huts in the form of
a regular encampment which might cover the army during the winter.
A strong piece of ground at Valley Forge, on the west side of the
Schuylkill between twenty and thirty miles from Philadelphia, was
selected for that purpose, and some time before day on the morning of
the 11th of December (1777) the army marched to take possession of it.
By an accidental concurrence of circumstances Lord Cornwallis had been
detached the same morning at the head of a strong corps on a foraging
party on the west side of the Schuylkill. He had fallen in with a
brigade of Pennsylvania militia commanded by General Potter which he
soon dispersed, and, pursuing the fugitives, had gained the heights
opposite Matron's ford, over which the Americans had thrown a bridge for
the purpose of crossing the river, and had posted troops to command the
defile called the Gulph just as the front division of the American army
reached the bank of the river. This movement had been made without any
knowledge of the intention of General Washington to change his position
or any design of contesting the passage of the Schuylkill, but the
troops had been posted in the manner already mentioned for the sole
purpose of covering the foraging party.

Washington apprehended from his first intelligence that General Howe had
taken the field in full force. He therefore recalled the troops already
on the west side and moved rather higher up the river for the purpose of
understanding the real situation, force, and designs of the enemy. The
next day Lord Cornwallis returned to Philadelphia, and in the course of
the night the American army crossed the river.

Here the Commander-in-Chief communicated to his army in general orders
the manner in which he intended to dispose of them during the winter.
He expressed in strong terms his approbation of their conduct, presented
them with an encouraging state of the future prospects of their
country, exhorted them to bear with continuing fortitude the hardships
inseparable from the position they were about to take, and endeavored to
convince their judgments that those hardships were not imposed on them
by unfeeling caprice, but were necessary for the good of their country.

The winter had set in with great severity, and the sufferings of
the army were extreme. In a few days, however, these sufferings were
considerably diminished by the erection of logged huts, filled up with
mortar, which, after being dried, formed comfortable habitations, and
gave content to men long unused to the conveniences of life. The order
of a regular encampment was observed, and the only appearance of winter
quarters was the substitution of huts for tents.

Stedman, who, as we have already remarked, was in Howe's army, has not
only given a vivid description of the condition of Washington's army,
which agrees in the main with those of our own writers, but he has also
exhibited in contrast the condition and conduct of the British army in
Philadelphia. We transcribe this instructive passage:

"The American general determined to remain during the winter in the
position which he then occupied at Valley Forge, recommending to his
troops to build huts in the woods for sheltering themselves from the
inclemency of the weather. And it is perhaps one of the most striking
traits in General Washington's character that he possessed the faculty
of gaining such an ascendancy over his raw and undisciplined followers,
most of whom were destitute of proper winter clothing and otherwise
unprovided with necessaries, as to be able to prevail upon so many of
them to remain with him during the winter in so distressing a situation.
With immense labor he raised wooden huts, covered with straw and earth,
which formed very uncomfortable quarters. On the east and south an
entrenchment was made--the ditch six feet wide and three in depth; the
mound not four feet high, very narrow, and such as might easily have
been beat down by cannon. Two redoubts were also begun but never
completed. The Schuylkill was on his left with a bridge across. His rear
was mostly covered by an impassable precipice formed by Valley creek,
having only a narrow passage near the Schuylkill. On the right his camp
was accessible with some difficulty, but the approach on his front was
on ground nearly on a level with his camp. It is indeed difficult to
give an adequate description of his misery in this situation. His army
was destitute of almost every necessary of clothing, nay, almost naked,
and very often on short allowance of provisions; an extreme mortality
raged in his hospitals, nor had he any of the most proper medicines to
relieve the sick. There were perpetual desertions of parties from him of
ten to fifty at a time. In three months he had not 4,000 men and these
could by no means be termed effective. Not less than 500 horses perished
from want and the severity of the season. He had often not three days'
provisions in his camp and at times not enough for one day. In this
infirm and dangerous state he continued from December to May, during all
which time every person expected that General Howe would have stormed
or besieged his camp, the situation of which equally invited either
attempt. To have posted 2,000 men on a commanding ground near the
bridge, on the north side of the Schuylkill, would have rendered
his escape on the left impossible; 2,000 men placed on a like ground
opposite the narrow pass would have as effectually prevented a retreat
by his rear, and five or six thousand men stationed on the front and
right of his camp would have deprived him of flight on those sides. The
positions were such that if any of the corps were attacked they could
have been instantly supported. Under such propitious circumstances what
mortal could doubt of success? But the British army, neglecting all
these opportunities, was suffered to continue at Philadelphia where the
whole winter was spent in dissipation. A want of discipline and proper
subordination pervaded the whole army, and if disease and sickness
thinned the American army encamped at Valley Forge, indolence and luxury
perhaps did no less injury to the British troops at Philadelphia. During
the winter a very unfortunate inattention was shown to the feelings of
the inhabitants of Philadelphia, whose satisfaction should have been
vigilantly consulted, both from gratitude and from interest. They
experienced many of the horrors of civil war. The soldiers insulted and
plundered them, and their houses were occupied as barracks without
any compensation being made to them. Some of the first families were
compelled to receive into their habitations individual officers who were
even indecent enough to introduce their mistresses into the mansions of
their hospitable entertainers. This soured the minds of the inhabitants,
many of whom were Quakers. But the residence of the army at Philadelphia
occasioned distresses which will probably be considered by the
generality of mankind as of a more grievous nature. It was with
difficulty that fuel could be got on any terms. Provisions were most
exorbitantly high. Gaming of every species was permitted and even
sanctioned. This vice not only debauched the mind, but by sedentary
confinement and the want of seasonable repose enervated the body. A
foreign officer held the bank at the game of faro by which he made a
very considerable fortune, and but too many respectable families in
Britain had to lament its baleful effects. Officers who might have
rendered honorable service to their country were compelled, by what was
termed a bad run of luck, to dispose of their commissions and return
penniless to their friends in Europe. The father who thought he had
made a provision for his son by purchasing him a commission in the army
ultimately found that he had put his son to school to learn the science
of gambling, not the art of war. Dissipation had spread through the
army, and indolence and want of subordination, its natural concomitants.
For if the officer be not vigilant the soldier will never be alert.

"Sir William Howe, from the manners and religious opinions of the
Philadelphians, should have been particularly cautious. For this public
dissoluteness of the troops could not but be regarded by such people
as a contempt of them, as well as an offense against piety; and it
influenced all the representations which they made to their countrymen
respecting the British. They inferred from it, also, that the commander
could not be sufficiently intent on the plans of either conciliation
or subjugation; so that the opinions of the Philadelphians, whether
erroneous or not, materially promoted the cause of Congress. During the
whole of this long winter of riot and dissipation, General Washington
was suffered to continue with the remains of his army, not exceeding
5,000 effective men at most, undisturbed at Valley Forge, considerable
arrears of pay due to them; almost in a state of nature for want of
clothing; the Europeans in the American service disgusted and deserting
in great numbers, and indeed in companies, to the British army, and the
natives tired of the war. Yet, under all these favorable circumstances
for the British interest, no one step was taken to dislodge Washington,
whose cannon were frozen up and could not be moved. If Sir William Howe
had marched out in the night he might have brought Washington to action,
or if he had retreated, he must have left his sick, cannon, ammunition,
and heavy baggage behind. A nocturnal attack on the Americans would
have had this further good effect: it would have depressed the spirit
of revolt, confirmed the wavering, and attached them to the British
interest. It would have opened a passage for supplies to the city,
which was in great want of provisions for the inhabitants. It would have
shaken off that lethargy in which the British soldiers had been immerged
during the winter. It would have convinced the well-affected that the
British leader was in earnest. If Washington had retreated the British
could have followed. With one of the best-appointed in every respect
and finest armies (consisting of at least 14,000 effective men) ever
assembled in any country, a number of officers of approved service,
wishing only to be led to action, this dilatory commander, Sir William
Howe, dragged out the winter without doing any one thing to obtain
the end for which he was commissioned. Proclamation was issued after
proclamation calling upon the people of America to repair to the British
standard, promising them remission of their political sins and an
assurance of protection in both person and property, but these promises
were confined merely to paper. The best personal security to the
inhabitants was an attack by the army, and the best security of property
was peace, and this to be purchased by successful war. For had Sir
William Howe led on his troops to action victory was in his power and
conquest in his train. During Sir William Howe's stay at Philadelphia a
number of disaffected citizens were suffered to remain in the garrison;
these people were ever upon the watch and communicated to Washington
every intelligence he could wish for."

We have copied this passage from Stedman, with a view to show the
contrast between the situation of Washington and Howe and their
respective armies, as exhibited by an enemy to our cause. It is
literally the contrast between virtue and vice. The final result shows
that Providence in permitting the occupation of Philadelphia by the
British army was really promoting the cause of human liberty.

Stedman's statement of the numbers of Washington's army is erroneous,
even if it refers only to effective men, and his schemes for
annihilating Washington's army would probably not have been so easily
executed as he imagined. Still the army was very weak. Marshall says
that although the total of the army exceeded 17,000 men (February,
1778), the present effective rank and file amounted to only 5,012. This
statement alone suggests volumes of misery, sickness, destitution, and
suffering.

We must now call the reader's attention to the northern campaign of 1777
which, remote as it was from Washington's immediate scene of action, was
not conducted without his aid and direction.

1. Footnote: This was Lieut.-Col. Samuel Smith, of the Maryland line.
After serving in this perilous post at Fort Mifflin, he was made
general, and in that rank assisted in the defense of Baltimore in the
War of 1812. See Document [A] at the end of this chapter.

2. Footnote: Donop was a brave officer. He was found on the battlefield
by Captain Mauduit Duplessis, a talented French engineer, who had
assisted Greene in defense of the fort, and who attended the unfortunate
count on his death-bed till he expired, three days after the battle, at
the early age of thirty-seven. "I die," said he, in his last hour,
"a victim of my ambition, and of the avarice of my sovereign." A fine
commentary on the mercenary system of the German princes. The government
of Hesse Cassel quite recently caused the remains of Count Donop to be
removed from Red Bank, to be interred with distinguished honor in his
own country.

3. Footnote: Judge Marshall, the biographer of Washington, on whose
account of this affair ours is founded, was present on the occasion. He
served in the army from the beginning of the war; was appointed first
lieutenant in 1776, and captain in 1777. He resigned his commission in
1778, and, devoting himself to the practice of the law, subsequently
rose to the eminent office of Chief Justice of the United States. He
died at Philadelphia, July 6th, 1836, aged seventy-nine.




CHAPTER XII.


BURGOYNE'S INVASION OF NEW YORK PUNISHED BY SCHUYLER AND GATES. 1777.


We have already had occasion to refer to what was passing in the North
during the time when Washington was conducting the arduous campaign in
Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania. General Schuyler had held the chief
command of the army operating against Canada since the opening of the
war in 1775. Under his direction the force of Montgomery was sent to
Quebec in the disastrous expedition of which we have already related
the history, and Arnold was acting in a subordinate capacity to Schuyler
when he so bravely resisted the descent of Carleton on the lakes.
Schuyler also performed the best part of the service of resisting the
invasion of New York from Canada, and nearly completed the campaign
which terminated in the surrender of Burgoyne to Gates. To the events of
this campaign we now call the reader's attention.

At the commencement of the campaign of 1777 the American army on the
frontier of Canada having been composed chiefly of soldiers enlisted
for a short period only, had been greatly reduced in numbers by the
expiration of their term of service.

The cantonments of the British northern army, extending from Isle aux
Noix and Montreal to Quebec, were so distant from each other that they
could not readily have afforded mutual support in case of an attack,
but the Americans were in no condition to avail themselves of this
circumstance. They could scarcely keep up even the appearance of
garrisons in their forts and were apprehensive of an attack on
Ticonderoga as soon as the ice was strong enough to afford an easy
passage to troops over the lakes. At the close of the preceding campaign
General Gates had joined the army under Washington, and the command of
the army in the northern department, comprehending Albany, Ticonderoga,
Fort Stanwix, and their dependencies, remained in the hands of General
Schuyler. The services of that meritorious officer were more solid than
brilliant, and had not been duly valued by Congress, which, like other
popular assemblies, was slow in discerning real and unostentatious
merit. Disgusted at the injustice which he had experienced he was
restrained from leaving the army merely by the deep interest which he
took in the arduous struggle in which his country was engaged, but after
a full investigation of his conduct during the whole of his command,
Congress was at length convinced of the value of his services and
requested him to continue at the head of the army of the northern
department. That army he found too weak for the services which it was
expected to perform and ill-supplied with arms, clothes, and provisions.
He made every exertion to organize and place it on a respectable footing
for the ensuing campaign, but his means were scanty and the new levies
arrived slowly. General St. Clair, who had served under Gates, commanded
at Ticonderoga, and, including militia, had nearly 2,000 men under him,
but the works were extensive and would have required 10,000 men to man
them fully. [1]

The British ministry had resolved to prosecute the war vigorously on the
northern frontier of the United States, and appointed Burgoyne, who had
served under Carleton in the preceding campaign, to command the royal
army in that quarter. The appointment gave offense to Carleton, then
Governor of Canada, who naturally expected to be continued in
the command of the northern army, and that officer testified his
dissatisfaction by tendering the resignation of his government.
But although displeased with the nomination, he gave Burgoyne every
assistance in his power in preparing for the campaign.

Burgoyne had visited England during the winter, concerted with the
ministry a plan of the campaign and given an estimate of the force
necessary for its successful execution. Besides a fine train of
artillery and a suitable body of artillerymen, an army, consisting of
more than 7,000 veteran troops, excellently equipped and in a high state
of discipline, was put under his command. Besides this regular force he
had a great number of Canadians and savages.

The employment of the savages had been determined on at the very
commencement of hostilities, their alliance had been courted and their
services accepted, and on the present occasion the British ministry
placed no small dependence on their aid. Carleton was directed to use
all his influence to bring a large body of them into the field, and
his exertions were very successful. General Burgoyne was assisted by
a number of distinguished officers, among whom were Generals Philips,
Fraser, Powel, Hamilton, Riedesel, and Specht. A suitable naval
armament, under the orders of Commodore Lutwych, attended the
expedition.

After detaching Colonel St. Leger with a body of light troops and
Indians, amounting to about 800 men, by the way of Lake Oswego and the
Mohawk river, to make a diversion in that quarter and to join him when
he advanced to the Hudson, Burgoyne left St. John's on the 16th of June,
and, preceded by his naval armament, sailed up Lake Champlain and in a
few days landed and encamped at Crown Point earlier in the season than
the Americans had thought it possible for him to reach that place.

He met his Indian allies and, in imitation of a savage partisan, gave
them a war feast, at which he made them a speech in order to inflame
their courage and repress their barbarous cruelty. He next issued a
lofty proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of the country in
which, as if certain of victory, he threatened to punish with the utmost
severity those who refused to attach themselves to the royal cause. He
talked of the ferocity of the Indians and their eagerness to butcher the
friends of independence, and he graciously promised protection to
those who should return to their duty. The proclamation was so far from
answering the general's intention that it was derided by the people as a
model of pomposity.

Having made the necessary arrangements on the 30th of June, Burgoyne
advanced cautiously on both sides of the narrow channel which connects
Lakes Champlain and George, the British on the west and the German
mercenaries on the east, with the naval force in the center, forming a
communication between the two divisions of the army, and on the 1st of
July his van appeared in sight of Ticonderoga.

The river Sorel issues from the north end of Lake Champlain and throws
its superfluous waters into the St. Lawrence. Lake Champlain is about
eighty miles long from north to south, and about fourteen miles
broad where it is widest. Crown Point stands at what may properly be
considered the south end of the lake, although a narrow channel,
which retains the name of the lake, proceeds southward and forms a
communication with South river and the waters of Lake George.

Ticonderoga is on the west side of the narrow channel, twelve miles
south from Crown Point. It is a rocky angle of land, washed on three
sides by the water and partly covered on the fourth side by a deep
morass. On the space on the northwest quarter, between the morass and
the channel, the French had formerly constructed lines of fortification,
which still remained, and those lines the Americans had strengthened by
additional works.

Opposite Ticonderoga on the east side of the channel, which is here
between three and four hundred yards wide, stands a high circular hill
called Mount Independence, which had been occupied by the Americans when
they abandoned Crown Point, and carefully fortified. On the top of it,
which is flat, they had erected a fort and provided it sufficiently with
artillery. Near the foot of the mountain, which extends to the water's
edge, they had raised entrenchments and mounted them with heavy guns,
and had covered those lower works by a battery about half way up the
hill.

With prodigious labor they had constructed a communication between those
two posts by means of a wooden bridge which was supported by twenty-two
strong wooden pillars placed at nearly equal distances from each other.
The spaces between the pillars were filled up by separate floats,
strongly fastened to each other and to the pillars by chains and rivets.
The bridge was twelve feet wide and the side of it next Lake Champlain
was defended by a boom formed of large pieces of timber, bolted and
bound together by double iron chains an inch and a half thick. Thus
an easy communication was established between Ticonderoga and Mount
Independence and the passage of vessels up the strait prevented.

Immediately after passing Ticonderoga the channel becomes wider and, on
the southeast side, receives a large body of water from a stream at
that point called South river, but higher up named Wood creek. From the
southwest come the waters flowing from Lake George, and in the angle
formed by the confluence of those two streams rises a steep and
rugged eminence called Sugar Hill, which overlooks and commands both
Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. That hill had been examined by
the Americans, but General St. Clair, considering the force under his
command insufficient to occupy the extensive works of Ticonderoga and
Mount Independence and flattering himself that the extreme difficulty
of the ascent would prevent the British from availing themselves of it,
neglected to take possession of Sugar Hill. It may be remarked that
the north end of Lake George is between two and three miles above
Ticonderoga, but the channel leading to it is interrupted by rapids
and shallows and is unfit for navigation. Lake George is narrow, but is
thirty-five miles long, extending from northeast to southwest. At the
head of it stood a fort of the same name, strong enough to resist an
attack of Indians, but incapable of making any effectual opposition to
regular troops. Nine miles beyond it was Fort Edward on the Hudson.

On the appearance of Burgoyne's van St. Clair had no accurate knowledge
of the strength of the British army, having heard nothing of the
reinforcement from Europe. He imagined that they would attempt to take
the fort by assault and flattered himself that he would easily be able
to repulse them. But, on the 2d of July, the British appeared in great
force on both sides of the channel and encamped four miles from the
forts, while the fleet anchored just beyond the reach of the guns. After
a slight resistance Burgoyne took possession of Mount Hope, an important
post on the south of Ticonderoga, which commanded part of the lines of
that fort as well as the channel leading to Lake George, and extended
his lines so as completely to invest the fort on the west side. The
German division under General Riedesel occupied the eastern bank of the
channel and sent forward a detachment to the vicinity of the rivulet
which flows from Mount Independence. Burgoyne now labored assiduously in
bringing forward his artillery and completing his communications. On the
5th of the month (July, 1777) he caused Sugar Hill to be examined, and
being informed that the ascent, though difficult, was not impracticable,
he immediately resolved to take possession of it and proceeded with such
activity in raising works and mounting guns upon it that his battery
might have been opened on the garrison next day.

These operations received no check from the besieged, because, as it has
been alleged, they were not in a condition to give any. St. Clair was
now nearly surrounded. Only the space between the stream which flows
from Mount Independence and South river remained open, and that was to
be occupied next day.

In these circumstances it was requisite for the garrison to come to a
prompt and decisive resolution, either at every hazard to defend the
place to the last extremity or immediately to abandon it. St. Clair
called a council of war, the members of which unanimously advised the
immediate evacuation of the forts, and preparations were instantly made
for carrying this resolution into execution. The British had the command
of the communication with Lake George, and consequently the garrison
could not escape in that direction. The retreat could be effected by
the South river only. Accordingly the invalids, the hospital, and such
stores as could be most easily removed, were put on board 200 boats and,
escorted by Colonel Long's regiment, proceeded, on the night between
the 5th and 6th of July, up the South river towards Skeenesborough. The
garrisons of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence marched by land through
Castleton, towards the same place. The troops were ordered to march out
in profound silence and particularly to set nothing on fire. But these
prudent orders were disobeyed, and, before the rear guard was in motion,
the house on Mount Independence, which General Fermoy had occupied, was
seen in flames. That served as a signal to the enemy, who immediately
entered the works and fired, but without effect, on the rear of the
retreating army.

The Americans marched in some confusion to Hubbardton whence the main
body, under St. Clair, pushed forward to Castleton. But the English
were not idle. General Fraser, at the head of a strong detachment of
grenadiers and light troops, commenced an eager pursuit by land upon the
right bank of Wood creek: General Riedesel, behind him, rapidly
advanced with his Brunswickers, either to support the English or to act
separately as occasion might require. Burgoyne determined to pursue the
Americans by water. But it was first necessary to destroy the boom and
bridge which had been constructed in front of Ticonderoga. The British
seamen and artificers immediately engaged in the operation, and in less
time than it would have taken to describe their structure, those works
which had cost so much labor and so vast an expense, were cut through
and demolished. The passage thus cleared, the ships of Burgoyne
immediately entered Wood creek and proceeded with extreme rapidity
in search of the Americans. All was in movement at once upon land
and water. By three in the afternoon the van of the British squadron,
composed of gunboats, came up with and attacked the American galleys
near Skeenesborough Falls. In the meantime three regiments which had
been landed at South bay, ascended and passed a mountain with great
expedition, in order to turn the retreating army above Wood creek, to
destroy the works at the Falls of Skeenesborough, and thus to cut off
the retreat of the army to Fort Anne. But the Americans eluded this
stroke by the rapidity of their march. The British frigates having
joined the van, the galleys, already hard pressed by the gunboats, were
completely overpowered. Two of them surrendered; three of them were
blown up. The Americans having set fire to their boats, mills, and
other works, fell back upon Fort Anne, higher up Wood creek. All their
baggage, however, was lost and a large quantity of provisions and
military stores fell into the hands of the British.

The pursuit by land was not less active. Early on the morning of the
7th of July (1777) the British overtook the American rear guard who,
in opposition to St. Clair's orders, had lingered behind and posted
themselves on strong ground in the vicinity of Hubbardton. Fraser's
troops were little more than half the number opposed to him, but aware
that Riedesel was close behind and fearful lest his chase should give
him the slip, he ordered an immediate attack. Warner opposed a vigorous
resistance, but a large body of his militia retreated and left him to
sustain the combat alone, when the firing of Riedesel's advanced guard
was heard and shortly after his whole force, drums beating and colors
flying, emerged from the shades of the forest and part of his troops
immediately effected a junction with the British line. Fraser now gave
orders for a simultaneous advance with the bayonet which was effected
with such resistless impetuosity that the Americans broke and fled,
sustaining a very serious loss. St. Clair, upon hearing the firing,
endeavored to send back some assistance, but the discouraged militia
refused to return and there was no alternative but to collect the
wrecks of his army and proceed to Fort Edward to effect a junction with
Schuyler.

Burgoyne lost not a moment in following up his success at
Skeenesborough, but dispatched a regiment to effect the capture of Fort
Anne, defended by a small party under the command of Colonel Long. This
officer judiciously posted his troops in a narrow ravine through which
his assailants were compelled to pass and opened upon them so severe
a fire in front, flank, and rear, that the British regiments, nearly
surrounded, with difficulty escaped to a neighboring hill, where the
Americans attacked them anew with such vigor that they must have been
utterly defeated had not the ammunition of the assailants given out at
this critical moment. No longer being able to fight Long's troops fell
back, and, setting the fort on fire, also directed their retreat to the
headquarters at Fort Edward.

While at Skeenesborough, General Burgoyne issued a second proclamation
summoning the people of the adjacent country to send ten deputies from
each township to meet Colonel Skeene at Castleton in order to deliberate
on such measures as might still be adopted to save those who had not
yet conformed to his first and submitted to the royal authority.
General Schuyler, apprehending some effect from this paper, issued
a counter-proclamation, stating the insidious designs of the
enemy--warning the inhabitants by the example of Jersey of the danger to
which their yielding to this seductive proposition would expose them and
giving them the most solemn assurances that all who should send deputies
to this meeting or in any manner aid the enemy, would be considered as
traitors and should suffer the utmost rigor of the law.

Nothing, as Botta remarks, [2] could exceed the consternation and
terror which the victory of Ticonderoga and the subsequent successes
of Burgoyne spread through the American provinces nor the joy and
exultation they excited in England. The arrival of these glad tidings
was celebrated by the most brilliant rejoicings at court and welcomed
with the same enthusiasm by all those who desired the unconditional
reduction of America. They already announced the approaching termination
of this glorious war; they openly declared it a thing impossible that
the rebels should ever recover from the shock of their recent losses, as
well of men as of arms and of military stores, and especially that they
should ever regain their courage and reputation, which, in war, always
contribute to success as much, at least, as arms themselves. Even the
ancient reproaches of cowardice were renewed against the Americans and
their own partisans abated much of the esteem they had borne them. They
were more than half disposed to pronounce the Colonists unworthy to
defend that liberty which they gloried in with so much complacency.
But it deserves to be noted here especially that there was no sign of
faltering on the part of the people, no disposition to submit to the
invading force. The success of the enemy did but nerve our fathers to
more vigorous resolves to maintain the cause of liberty even unto death.

Certainly the campaign had been opened and prosecuted thus far in a very
dashing style by Burgoyne and had he been able to press forward it is
quite possible that success might have crowned his efforts. But there
were some sixteen miles of forest yet to be traversed; Burgoyne waited
for his baggage and stores, and meanwhile General Schuyler, who was in
command of the American forces, took such steps as would necessarily
put a stop to the rapid approach of the enemy. Trenches were opened, the
roads and paths were obstructed, the bridges were broken up, and in the
only practicable defiles large trees were cut in such a manner on both
sides of the road as to fall across and lengthwise, which, with their
branches interwoven, presented an insurmountable barrier; in a word,
this wilderness, of itself by no means easy of passage, was thus
rendered almost absolutely impenetrable. Nor did Schuyler rest satisfied
with these precautions; he directed the cattle to be removed to the
most distant places and the stores and baggage from Fort George to Fort
Edward, that articles of such necessity for the troops might not
fall into the power of the British. He urgently demanded that all the
regiments of regular troops found in the adjacent States should be sent
without delay to join him; he also made earnest and frequent calls upon
the militia of New England and of New York. He likewise exerted his
utmost endeavors to procure himself recruits in the vicinity of Fort
Edward and the city of Albany; the great influence he enjoyed with the
inhabitants gave him in this quarter all the success he could desire.
Finally, to retard the progress of the enemy, he resolved to threaten
his left flank. Accordingly, he detached Colonel Warner, with his
regiment, into the State of Vermont with orders to assemble the militia
of the country and to make incursions toward Ticonderoga. In fact
Schuyler did everything which was possible to be done under the
circumstances, and it is not too much to assert in justice to the good
name of General Schuyler, that the measures which he adopted paved the
way to the victory which finally crowned the American arms at Saratoga.

Washington, equally with Congress, supposing that Schuyler's force was
stronger and that of the British weaker than was really the case, was
very greatly distressed and astonished at the disasters which befell
the American cause in the north. He waited, therefore, with no little
anxiety, later and more correct information before he was willing to
pronounce positively upon the course pursued by St. Clair. When that
officer joined Schuyler the whole force did not exceed 4,400 men; about
half of these were militia, and the whole were ill-clothed, badly armed,
and greatly dispirited by the recent reverses. Very ungenerously and
unjustly it was proposed to remove the northern officers from the
command and send successors in their places. An inquiry was instituted
by order of Congress, which resulted honorably for Schuyler and his
officers, and Schuyler, the able commander and zealous-hearted patriot,
remained for the present at the head of the northern department. [3]

Washington exerted himself with all diligence to send reinforcements and
supplies to the army of Schuyler. The artillery and warlike stores were
expedited from Massachusetts. General Lincoln, a man of great influence
in New England, was sent there to encourage the militia to enlist.
Arnold, in like manner, repaired thither; it was thought his ardor might
serve to inspire the dejected troops. Colonel Morgan, an officer whose
brilliant valor we have already had occasion to remark, was ordered
to take the same direction with his troop of light horse. All these
measures, conceived with prudence and executed with promptitude,
produced the natural effect. The Americans recovered by degrees their
former spirit and the army increased from day to day.

During this interval Burgoyne actively exerted himself in opening
a passage from Fort Anne to Fort Edward. But, notwithstanding the
diligence with which the whole army engaged in the work, their progress
was exceedingly slow, so formidable were the obstacles which nature as
well as art had thrown in their way. Besides having to remove the fallen
trees with which the Americans had obstructed the roads they had no less
than forty bridges to construct and many others to repair; one of these
was entirely of log work, over a morass two miles wide. In short the
British encountered so many impediments in measuring this inconsiderable
space that it was found impossible to reach the banks of the Hudson near
Fort Edward until the 30th of July (1777). The Americans, either because
they were too feeble to oppose the enemy or that Fort Edward was no
better than a ruin, not susceptible of defense, or finally because they
were apprehensive that Colonel St. Leger, after the reduction of Fort
Stanwix, might descend by the left bank of the Mohawk to the Hudson and
thus cut off their retreat, retired lower down to Stillwater where they
threw up entrenchments. At the same time they evacuated Fort George,
having previously burned their boats upon the lake, and in various ways
obstructed the road to Fort Edward. Burgoyne might have reached Fort
Edward much more readily by way of Lake George, but he had judged
it best to pursue the panic-stricken Americans, and, despite the
difficulties of the route, not to throw any discouragements in the way
of his troops by a retrograde movement.

At Fort Edward General Burgoyne again found it necessary to pause in
his career, for his carriages, which in the hurry had been made of
unseasoned wood, were much broken down and needed to be repaired. From
the unavoidable difficulties of the case not more than one-third of
the draught horses contracted for in Canada had arrived, and General
Schuyler had been careful to remove almost all the horses and draught
cattle of the country out of his way. Boats for the navigation of the
Hudson, provisions, stores, artillery, and other necessaries for the
army were all to be brought from Fort George, and although that place
was only nine or ten miles from Fort Edward, yet such was the condition
of the roads, rendered nearly impassable by the great quantities of
rain that had fallen, that the labor of transporting necessaries was
incredible. Burgoyne had collected about 100 oxen, but it was often
necessary to employ ten or twelve of them in transporting a single boat.
With his utmost exertions he had on the 15th of August conveyed only
twelve boats into the Hudson and provisions for the army for four days
in advance. Matters began to assume a very serious aspect indeed, and
as the further he removed from the lakes the more difficult it became to
get supplies from that quarter, Burgoyne saw clearly that he must look
elsewhere for sustenance for his army.

The British commander was not ignorant that the Americans had
accumulated considerable stores, including live cattle and vehicles of
various kinds at Bennington, about twenty-four miles east of the Hudson.
Burgoyne, easily persuaded that the Tories in that region would aid his
efforts, and thinking that he could alarm the country as well as secure
the supplies of which he began to stand in great need, determined
to detach Colonel Baum with a force of some six or eight hundred of
Riedesel's dragoons for the attack upon Bennington. His instructions
to Baum were "to try the affections of the country, to disconcert the
counsels of the enemy, to mount Riedesel's dragoons, to complete Peters'
corps (of Loyalists), and to obtain large supplies of cattle, horses,
and carriages." Baum set off on the 13th of August on this expedition
which was to result so unfortunately to himself, and which proved in
fact the ruin of Burgoyne's entire plans and purposes.

We have spoken of the consternation which filled the minds of men a
short time before this, when Burgoyne seemed to be marching in triumph
through the country. The alarm, however, subsided, and the New England
States resolved to make most vigorous efforts to repel the attack of
the enemy. John Langdon, a merchant of Portsmouth and speaker of the New
Hampshire Assembly, roused the desponding minds of his fellow-members to
the need of providing defense for the frontiers, and with whole-hearted
patriotism thus addressed them: "I have $3,000 in hard money; I will
pledge my plate for $3,000 more. I have seventy hogsheads of Tobago rum
which shall be sold for the most it will bring. These are at the service
of the State. If we succeed in defending our firesides and homes I may
be remunerated, if we do not the property will be of no value to me.
Our old friend Stark, who so nobly sustained the honor of our State at
Bunker Hill may be safely entrusted with the conduct of the enterprise,
and we will check the progress of Burgoyne." That brave son of New
Hampshire, General Stark, conceiving himself aggrieved by certain acts
of Congress in appointing junior officers over his head, had resigned
his commission. He was now prevailed upon to take service under
authority from his native State, it being understood that he was to
act independently as to his movements against the enemy. His popularity
speedily called in the militia, who were ready to take the field under
him without hesitation.

Soon after Stark proceeded to Manchester, twenty miles north of
Bennington, where Colonel Seth Warner, the former associate of Ethan
Allen, had taken post with the troops under his command. Here he met
General Lincoln, who had been sent by Schuyler to lead the militia to
the west bank of the Hudson. Stark refused to obey Schuyler's orders,
and Congress, on the 19th of August (1777), passed a vote of censure
upon his conduct. But Stark did not know of this, and as his course
was clearly that of sound policy, and his victory two days before the
censure cast upon him showed it to be so, he had the proud satisfaction
of knowing that the Commander-in-Chief approved of his plan of harassing
the rear of the British, and that the victory of Bennington paralyzed
the entire operations of Burgoyne.

On the day that Baum set out Stark arrived at Bennington. The progress
of the German troops, at first tolerably prosperous, was soon impeded
by the state of the roads and the weather, and as soon as Stark heard of
their approach he hurried off expresses to Warner to join him, who
began his march in the night. After sending forward Colonel Gregg to
reconnoiter the enemy he advanced to the rencontre with Baum, who,
finding the country thus rising around him, halted and entrenched
himself in a strong position above the Wollamsac river and sent off an
express to Burgoyne, who instantly dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel Breyman
with a strong reinforcement.

During the 15th of August (1777) the rain prevented any serious
movement. The Germans and English continued to labor at their
entrenchments upon which they had mounted two pieces of artillery. The
following day was bright and sunny and early in the morning Stark sent
forward two columns to storm the entrenchments at different points, and
when the firing had commenced threw himself on horseback and advanced
with the rest of his troops. As soon as the enemy's columns were seen
forming on the hill-side, he exclaimed, "See, men! there are the red
coats; we must beat to-day, or Molly Stark's a widow." The military
replied to this appeal by a tremendous shout and the battle which
ensued, as Stark states in his official report, "lasted two hours, and
was the hottest I ever saw. It was like one continual clap of thunder."
The Indians ran off at the beginning of the battle; the Tories were
driven across the river; and although the Germans fought bravely they
were compelled to abandon the entrenchments, and fled, leaving their
artillery and baggage on the field.

As Breyman and his corps approached they heard the firing and hurried
forward to the aid of their countrymen. An hour or two earlier they
might have given a different turn to the affair, but the heavy rain had
delayed their progress. They met and rallied the fugitives and returned
to the field of battle. Stark's troops, who were engaged in plunder,
were taken in great measure by surprise, and the victory might after
all have been wrested from their grasp but for the opportune arrival
of Warner's regiment at the critical moment. The battle continued until
sunset when the Germans, overwhelmed by numbers, at length abandoned
their baggage and fled. Colonel Baum, their brave commander, was killed,
and the British loss amounted to some eight or nine hundred effective
troops, in killed and prisoners. The loss of the Americans was 30 killed
and 40 wounded. Stark's horse was killed in the action.

Too much praise, as Mr. Everett well remarks, [4] cannot be bestowed on
the conduct of those who gained the battle of Bennington, officers and
men. It is, perhaps, the most conspicuous example of the performance
by militia of all that is expected of regular, veteran troops. The
fortitude and resolution with which the lines at Bunker Hill were
maintained by recent recruits against the assault of a powerful army of
experienced soldiers have always been regarded with admiration. But
at Bennington the hardy yeomen of New Hampshire, Vermont, and
Massachusetts, many of them fresh from the plough and unused to the
camp, "advanced," as General Stark expresses it in his official
letter, "through fire and smoke, and mounted breastworks that were well
fortified and defended with cannon."

Fortunately for the success of the battle Stark was most ably seconded
by the officers under him; every previous disposition of his little
force was most faithfully executed. He expresses his particular
obligations to Colonels Warner and Herrick, "whose superior skill was of
great service to him." Indeed the battle was planned and fought with a
degree of military talent and science which would have done no discredit
to any service in Europe. A higher degree of discipline might have
enabled the general to check the eagerness of his men to possess
themselves of the spoils of victory, but his ability, even in that
moment of dispersion and under the flush of success, to meet and conquer
a hostile reinforcement, evinces a judgment and resource not often
equaled in partisan warfare.

In fact it would be the height of injustice not to recognize in this
battle the marks of the master mind of the leader, which makes good
officers and good soldiers out of any materials and infuses its own
spirit into all that surround it. This brilliant exploit was the work of
Stark from its inception to its achievement. His popular name called
the militia together. His resolute will obtained him a separate
commission--at the expense, it is true, of a wise political principle,
but on the present occasion with the happiest effect. His firmness
prevented him from being overruled by the influence of General Lincoln,
which would have led him with his troops across the Hudson. How few
are the men who in such a crisis would not merely not have sought but
actually have repudiated a junction with the main army! How few who
would not only have desired, but actually insisted on taking the
responsibility of separate action! Having chosen the burden of acting
alone, he acquitted himself in the discharge of his duty with the spirit
and vigor of a man conscious of ability proportioned to the crisis. He
advanced against the enemy with promptitude; sent forward a small force
to reconnoiter and measure his strength; chose his ground deliberately
and with skill; planned and fought the battle with gallantry and
success.

The consequences of this victory were of great moment. It roused the
people and nerved them to the contest with the enemy, and it also
justified the sagacity of Washington, whose words we have quoted on
a previous page. Burgoyne's plans were wholly deranged and instead of
relying upon lateral excursions to keep the population in alarm and
obtain supplies, he was compelled to procure necessaries as best he
might. His rear was exposed, and Stark, acting on his line of policy,
prepared to place himself so that Burgoyne might be hemmed in and be, as
soon after he was, unable to advance or retreat. When Washington heard
of Stark's victory he was in Bucks county, Pennsylvania, whence he wrote
to Putnam: "As there is now not the least danger of General Howe's going
to New England I hope the whole force of that country will turn out and
by following the great stroke struck by General Stark, near Bennington,
entirely crush General Burgoyne, who, by his letter to Colonel Baum,
seems to be in want of almost everything."

The defeat at Bennington was not the only misfortune which now fell upon
the British arms. We have noted on a previous page that Burgoyne had
detached Colonel St. Leger with a body of regular troops, Canadians,
Loyalists, and Indians, by the way of Oswego, to make a diversion on
the upper part of the Mohawk river and afterward join him on his way to
Albany. On the 2d of August (1777) St. Leger approached Fort Stanwix, or
Schuyler, a log fortification situated on rising ground near the source
of the Mohawk river, and garrisoned by about 600 Continentals under the
command of Colonel Gansevoort. Next day he invested the place with an
army of sixteen or seventeen hundred men, nearly one-half of whom were
Indians, and the rest British, Germans, Canadians, and Tories. On being
summoned to surrender Gansevoort answered that he would defend the place
to the last.

On the approach of St. Leger to Fort Schuyler, General Herkimer, who
commanded the militia of Tryon county, assembled about 700 of them and
marched to the assistance of the garrison. On the forenoon of the 6th of
August a messenger from Herkimer found means to enter the fort and gave
notice that he was only eight miles distant and intended that day to
force a passage into the fort and join the garrison. Gansevoort resolved
to aid the attempt by a vigorous sally, and appointed Colonel Willet
with upwards of 200 men to that service.

St. Leger received information of the approach of Herkimer, and placed
a large body consisting of the "Johnson Greens," and Brant's Indians in
ambush near Oriskany, on the road by which he was to advance. Herkimer
fell into the snare. The first notice which he received of the presence
of an enemy was fr

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