Good Sense
by baron d' Paul Henri Thiry Holbach · English · Gutenberg #7319 · 368,775 chars · public domain (US)
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Title: Good Sense
Author: baron d' Paul Henri Thiry Holbach
Release date: January 1, 2005 [eBook #7319]
Most recently updated: July 28, 2009
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7319
Credits: Produced by Freethought Archives, and David Widger
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GOOD SENSE ***
Produced by Freethought Archives
GOOD SENSE WITHOUT GOD:
OR
FREETHOUGHTS OPPOSED TO SUPERNATURAL IDEAS
By Baron D'holbach
"Freethinker's Library" Series
London: W. Stewart & Co.
A Translation Of Baron D'holbach's "Le Bon Sens"
Transcriber's note: this e-text is based on an undated English translation
of "Le Bon Sens" published c. 1900. The name of the translator was not
stated.
"_Atheism_ leaves men to Sense, to Philosophy, to Laws, to
Reputation, all which may be guides to moral Virtue, tho'
Religion were not: but Superstition dismounts all these, and
erects an absolute Monarchy in the Minds of Men. Therefore,
Atheism did never perturb States; but Superstition hath been
the confusion of many. The causes of Superstition are
pleasing and sensual rights, and Ceremonies; Excess of
Pharisaical and outside holiness, Reverence to Traditions
and the stratagems of Prelates for their own Ambition and
Lucre."--_Lord Bacon._
CONTENTS
1. APOLOGUE
2. What is Theology?
3. What is Theology?
4. Man is not born with any ideas of Religion
5. It is not necessary to believe in a God
6. Religion is founded on credulity
7. All religion is an absurdity
8. The idea of God is impossible
9. On the Origin of Superstition
10. On the Origin of all Religion
11. Religious fears expose men to become a prey to imposters
12. Religion seduces ignorance by the aid of the marvellous
13. Religion seduces ignorance by the aid of the marvellous
14. No Religion, if not ages of Stupidity and Barbarism
15. All Religion was produced by the desire of domination
16. What serves as a basis to Religion is most uncertain
17. It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of a God
18. It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of a God
19. The existence of God is not proved
20. It explains nothing to say, that God is a spirit
21. Spirituality is an absurdity
22. Whatever exists is derived from Matter
23. What is the metaphysical God of modern Theology?
24. Less unreasonable to adore the Sun, than adore a spiritual Deity
25. A spiritual Deity is incapable of volition and action
26. What is God?
27. Some remarkable Contradictions in Theology
28. To adore God, is to adore a fiction
29. Atheism is authorised by the infinity of God
30. Believing not safer than not believing in God
31. Belief in God is a habit acquired in infancy
32. Belief in God is a prejudice ov successive generations
33. On the Origin of Prejudices
34. On the effects of Prejudices
35. Theology must be instilled before the age of reason
36. The wonders of nature do not prove the existence of God
37. Nature may be explained by natural causes
38. Nature may be explained by natural causes
39. The world has never been created: Matter moves of itself
40. The world has never been created: Matter moves of itself
41. Motion is essential to Matter: no Spiritual Mover
42. The existence of Man does not prove the existence of God
43. Neither Man nor the Universe are the effects of chance
44. Order of the Universe does not prove the existence of a God
45. Order of the Universe does not prove the existence of a God
46. Absurd to adore a divine intelligence
47. Qualities given God contrary to the Essence attributed to him
48. Qualities given God contrary to the Essence attributed to him
49. Absurd to say that the human race is the object of the Universe
50. God is not made for Man, nor Man for God
51. Untrue that the object of the Universe was to render Man happy
52. What is called Providence is a word without meaning
53. This pretended Providence is the enemy of Man
54. The world is not governed by an intelligent being
55. God cannot be considered immutable
56. Good and evil are the necessary effects of natural causes
57. The consolations of Theology and paradise are imaginary
58. Another romantic reverie
59. Vain that Theology attempts to clear its God from human defects
60. Impossible to believe God is of infinite goodness and power
61. Impossible to believe God is of infinite goodness and power
62. Theology's God a monster of absurdity and injustice
63. All Religion inspires contemptible fears
64. Religion, the same as the most somber and servile Superstition
65. The love of God is impossible
66. An eternally tormenting God is a most detestable being
67. Theology is a tissue of palpable contradictions
68. The pretended works of God do not prove Divine Perfections
69. The perfection of God and the pretended creation of angels
70. Theology preaches Omnipotence of its God, yet makes impotent
71. Per all religious systems, God is capricious and foolish
72. It is absurd to say that Evil does not proceed from God
73. The foreknowledge of God proves his cruelty
74. Absurdity of the stories concerning Original Sin, and Satan
75. The Devil, like Religion, was invented to enrich the priests
76. God has no right to punish man
77. It is absurd to say, that the conduct of God a mystery
78. Ought we look for consolation, from the author of our misery?
79. God who punishes the faults which he might have prevented
80. What is called Free Will is an absurdity
81. But we must not conclude that Society has no right to punish
82. Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will
83. Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will
84. God, if there were a God, would not be free
85. According to Theology, man is not free a single instant
86. There is no evil, and no sin, but must be attributed to God
87. The prayers prove dissatisfaction of the divine will
88. Absurd to imagine repair of misfortune in another world
89. Theology justifies the evil permitted by its God
90. Jehovah, exterminations prove an unjust and barbarous God
91. Is God a generous, equitable, and tender father?
92. Man's life, deposes against goodness of a pretended God
93. We owe no gratitude to what is called _Providence_
94. It is folly to suppose that Man is the favourite of God
95. A comparison between Man and brutes
96. There are no animals so detestable as Tyrants
97. A refutation of the excellence of Man
98. An oriental Tale
99. It is madness to see nothing but the goodness of God
100. What is the Soul?
101. The existence of a _Soul_ is an absurd supposition
102. It is evident that Man dies _in toto_
103. Incontestible arguments against the Spirituality of the Soul
104. On the absurdity of the supernatural causes
105. It is false that Materialism degrades
106. It is false that Materialism degrades
107. Idea of future life only useful to priest's trade
108. It is false that the idea of a future life is consoling
109. All religious principles are derived from the imagination
110. Religion a system to reconciles contradictions by mysteries
111. Absurdity of all Mysteries, invented for the interests of Priests
112, Absurdity of all Mysteries, invented for the interests of Priests
113. Absurdity of all Mysteries, invented for the interests of Priests
114. An universal God ought to have revealed an universal Religion
115. Religion is unnecessary, as it is unintelligible
116. All Religions are rendered ridiculous by the multitude of creeds
117. Opinion of a famous Theologian
118. The God of the Deists is not less contradictory
119. Aged belief in a Deity does not prove the existence of God
120. All Gods are savage: all Religions are monuments of ignorance
121. All religious usages bear marks of stupidity and barbarism
122. The more a religion is ancient and general, the more suspect
123. Scepticism in religious matters from very superficial study
124. Revelations examined
125. Where is the proof that God ever shewed himself or spoke to Men
126. There is nothing that proves miracles to have been ever performed
127. Strange that God spoke differently to different sects
128. Obscurity and suspicious origin of oracles
129. Absurdity of all miracles
130. Refutation of the reasoning of Pascal on miracles
131. Every new revelation is necessarily false
132. Blood of martyrs testifies _against_ the truth of miracles
133. Fanaticism of martyrs, and the interested zeal of missionaries
134. Theology makes its God an enemy to Reason and Common Sense
135. Faith irreconcilable with Reason; and Reason preferable to Faith
136. To what absurd and ridiculous sophisms the religious are reduced
137. Ought a man to believe, on the assurance of another man
138. Faith can take root only in feeble, ignorant, or slothful minds
139. That one Religion has greater pretensions to truth an absurdity
140. Religion is unnecessary to Morality
141. Religion the weakest barrier that can be opposed to the passions
142. Honour is a more salutary and powerful bond than Religion
143. Religion does not restrain the passions of kings
144. Origin of "the divine right of kings"
145. Religion is fatal to political ameliorations
146. Christianity preaching implicit obedience to despotism
147. One object of religious principles: eternize the tyranny of kings
148. Fatal it is to persuade kings they are responsible to God alone
149. A devout king is the scourge of his kingdom
150. Tyranny finds Religion a weak obstacle to the despair of the people
151. Religion favours the wickedness of princes
152. What is an enlightened Sovereign?
153. Of the prevailing passions and crimes of the priesthood
154. The quackery of priests
155. Religion has corrupted Morality, and produced innumerable evils
156. Every Religion is intolerant
157. The evils of a state Religion
158. Religion legitimates and authorizes crime
159. The argument, that evils attributed to Religion are faults of men
160. Religion is incompatible with Morality
161. The Morality of the Gospel is impracticable
162. A society of Saints would be impossible
163. Human nature is not depraved
164. Concerning the effects of Jesus Christ's mission
165. The remission of sins was invented for the interest of priests
166. Who fear God?
167. Hell is an absurd invention
168. The bad foundation of religious morals
169. Christian Charity, as preached and practised by Theologians!!!
170. Confession, priestcraft's gold mine
171. Supposition of the existence of a God unnecessary to Morality
172. Supernatural Morality are fatal to the public welfare
173. The union of Church and State is a calamity
174. National Religions are ruinous
175. Religion paralyses Morality
176. Fatal consequences of Devotion
177. The idea of a future life is not consoling to man
178. An Atheist is fully as conscientious as a religious man
179. An Atheistical king far preferable to a religious king
180. Philosophy produces Morality
181. Religious opinions have little influence upon conduct
182. Reason leads man to Atheism
183. Fear alone makes Theists
184. Can we, and ought we, to love God?
185. God and Religion are proved to be absurdities
186. The existence of God, has not yet been demonstrated
187. Priests are more actuated by self-interest, than unbelievers
188. Presumption, and badness, more in priests, than in Atheists
189. Prejudices last but for a time
190. What if priests the apostles of reason
191. If Philosophy were substituted for Religion!
192. Recantation of an unbeliever at the point of death proves nothing
193. It is not true that Atheism breaks the bonds of society
194. Refutation of the opinion, that Religion necessary for the vulgar
195. Logical systems are not adapted to the capacity of the vulgar
196. On the futility and danger of Theology
197. On the evils produced by implicit faith
198. On the evils produced by implicit faith
199. All Religions were established by impostors, in days of ignorance
200. All Religions borrow from one another ridiculous ceremonies
201. Theology has always diverted philosophy from its right path
202. Theology explains nothing
203. Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded progress
204. Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded progress
205. Religion is an extravagance and a calamity
206. Religion prevents us from seeing the true causes of misfortunes
PUBLISHER'S NOTE
The chief design in reprinting this translation, is to preserve "_the
strongest atheistical work_" for present and future generations of English
Freethinkers.
The real author was, unquestionably, Paul Thyry; Baron D'Holbach, and not
John Meslier, to whom this work has been wrongly attributed, under the
title of "Le Bon Sens" (Common Sense).
In 1770, Baron D'Holbach published his masterpiece, "Systeme de la
Nature," which for a long time passed as the posthumous work of M. de
Mirabaud. That text-book of "Atheistical Philosophy" caused a great
sensation, and two years later, 1772, the Baron published this excellent
abridgment of it, freed from arbitrary ideas; and by its clearness of
expression, facility, and precision of style, rendered it most suitable
for the average student.
"Le Bon Sens" was privately printed in Amsterdam, and the author's name
was kept a profound secret; hence, Baron D'Holbach escaped persecution.
THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE
When we examine the opinions of men, we find that nothing is more
uncommon, than common sense; or, in other words, they lack judgment
to discover plain truths, or to reject absurdities, and palpable
contradictions. We have an example of this in Theology, a system revered
in all countries by a great number of men; an object regarded by them
as most important, and indispensable to happiness. An examination of
the principles upon which this pretended system is founded, forces us
to acknowledge, that these principles are only suppositions, imagined
by ignorance, propagated by enthusiasm or knavery, adopted by timid
credulity, preserved by custom which never reasons, and revered solely
because not understood.
In a word, whoever uses common sense upon religious opinions, and will
bestow on this inquiry the attention that is commonly given to most
subjects, will easily perceive that Religion is a mere castle in the
air. Theology is ignorance of natural causes; a tissue of fallacies
and contradictions. In every country, it presents romances void of
probability, the hero of which is composed of impossible qualities. His
name, exciting fear in all minds, is only a vague word, to which, men
affix ideas or qualities, which are either contradicted by facts, or
inconsistent.
Notions of this being, or rather, _the word_ by which he is designated,
would be a matter of indifference, if it did not cause innumerable ravages
in the world. But men, prepossessed with the opinion that this phantom is
a reality of the greatest interest, instead of concluding wisely from its
incomprehensibility, that they are not bound to regard it, infer on the
contrary, that they must contemplate it, without ceasing, and never lose
sight of it. Their invincible ignorance, upon this subject, irritates
their curiosity; instead of putting them upon guard against their
imagination, this ignorance renders them decisive, dogmatic, imperious,
and even exasperates them against all, who oppose doubts to the reveries
which they have begotten.
What perplexity arises, when it is required to solve an insolvable
problem; unceasing meditation upon an object, impossible to understand,
but in which however he thinks himself much concerned, cannot but excite
man, and produce a fever in his brain. Let interest, vanity, and ambition,
co-operate ever so little with this unfortunate turn of mind, and society
must necessarily be disturbed. This is the reason that so many nations
have often been the scene of extravagances of senseless visionaries, who,
believing their empty speculations to be eternal truths, and publishing
them as such, have kindled the zeal of princes and their subjects, and
made them take up arms for opinions, represented to them as essential to
the glory of the Deity. In all parts of our globe, fanatics have cut each
other's throats, publicly burnt each other, committed without a scruple
and even as a duty, the greatest crimes, and shed torrents of blood. For
what? To strengthen, support, or propagate the impertinent conjectures of
some enthusiasts, or to give validity to the cheats of impostors, in the
name of a being, who exists only in their imagination, and who has made
himself known only by the ravages, disputes, and follies, he has caused.
Savage and furious nations, perpetually at war, adore, under divers names,
some God, conformable to their ideas, that is to say, cruel, carnivorous,
selfish, blood-thirsty. We find, in all the religions, "a God of armies,"
a "jealous God," an "avenging God," a "destroying God," a "God," who
is pleased with carnage, and whom his worshippers consider it a duty to
serve. Lambs, bulls, children, men, and women, are sacrificed to him.
Zealous servants of this barbarous God think themselves obliged even to
offer up themselves as a sacrifice to him. Madmen may everywhere be seen,
who, after meditating upon their terrible God, imagine that to please him
they must inflict on themselves, the most exquisite torments. The gloomy
ideas formed of the deity, far from consoling them, have every where
disquieted their minds, and prejudiced follies destructive to happiness.
How could the human mind progress, while tormented with frightful
phantoms, and guided by men, interested in perpetuating its ignorance and
fears? Man has been forced to vegetate in his primitive stupidity: he has
been taught stories about invisible powers upon whom his happiness was
supposed to depend. Occupied solely by his fears, and by unintelligible
reveries, he has always been at the mercy of priests, who have reserved to
themselves the right of thinking for him, and of directing his actions.
Thus, man has remained a slave without courage, fearing to reason, and
unable to extricate himself from the labyrinth, in which he has been
wandering. He believes himself forced under the yoke of his gods, known
to him only by the fabulous accounts given by his ministers, who, after
binding each unhappy mortal in the chains of prejudice, remain his
masters, or else abandon him defenceless to the absolute power of tyrants,
no less terrible than the gods, of whom they are the representatives.
Oppressed by the double yoke of spiritual and temporal power, it has been
impossible for the people to be happy. Religion became sacred, and men
have had no other Morality, than what their legislators and priests
brought from the unknown regions of heaven. The human mind, confused
by theological opinions, ceased to know its own powers, mistrusted
experience, feared truth and disdained reason, in order to follow
authority. Man has been a mere machine in the hands of tyrants and
priests. Always treated as a slave, man has contracted the vices of
slavery.
Such are the true causes of the corruption of morals. Ignorance and
servitude are calculated to make men wicked and unhappy. Knowledge,
Reason, and Liberty, can alone reform and make men happier. But every
thing conspires to blind them, and to confirm their errors. Priests cheat
them, tyrants corrupt and enslave them. Tyranny ever was, and ever will
be, the true cause of man's depravity, and also of his calamities. Almost
always fascinated by religious fiction, poor mortals turn not their eyes
to the natural and obvious causes of their misery; but attribute their
vices to the imperfection of their natures, and their unhappiness to the
anger of the gods. They offer to heaven vows, sacrifices, and presents, to
obtain the end of sufferings, which in reality, are attributable only to
the negligence, ignorance, and perversity of their guides, to the folly of
their customs, and above all, to the general want of knowledge. Let men's
minds be filled with true ideas; let their reason be cultivated; and there
will be no need of opposing to the passions, such a feeble barrier, as the
fear of gods. Men will be good, when they are well instructed; and when
they are despised for evil, or justly rewarded for good, which they do to
their fellow citizens.
In vain should we attempt to cure men of their vices, unless we begin by
curing them of their prejudices. It is only by showing them the truth,
that they will perceive their true interests, and the real motives that
ought to incline them to do good. Instructors have long enough fixed men's
eyes upon heaven; let them now turn them upon earth. An incomprehensible
theology, ridiculous fables, impenetrable mysteries, puerile ceremonies,
are to be no longer endured. Let the human mind apply itself to what is
natural, to intelligible objects, truth, and useful knowledge.
Does it not suffice to annihilate religious prejudice, to shew, that
what is inconceivable to man, cannot be good for him? Does it require any
thing, but plain common sense, to perceive, that a being, incompatible
with the most evident notions--that a cause continually opposed to
the effects which we attribute to it--that a being, of whom we can say
nothing, without falling into contradiction--that a being, who, far
from explaining the enigmas of the universe, only makes them more
inexplicable--that a being, whom for so many ages men have vainly
addressed to obtain their happiness, and the end of sufferings--does it
require, I say, any thing but plain, common sense, to perceive--that the
idea of such a being is an idea without model, and that he himself is
merely a phantom of the imagination? Is any thing necessary but common
sense to perceive, at least, that it is folly and madness for men to hate
and damn one another about unintelligible opinions concerning a being of
this kind? In short, does not every thing prove, that Morality and Virtue
are totally incompatible with the notions of a God, whom his ministers
and interpreters have described, in every country, as the most capricious,
unjust, and cruel of tyrants, whose pretended will, however, must serve as
law and rule the inhabitants of the earth?
To discover the true principles of Morality, men have no need of theology,
of revelation, or of gods: They have need only of common sense. They have
only to commune with themselves, to reflect upon their own nature, to
consider the objects of society, and of the individuals, who compose
it; and they will easily perceive, that virtue is advantageous, and vice
disadvantageous to themselves. Let us persuade men to be just, beneficent,
moderate, sociable; not because such conduct is demanded by the gods, but,
because it is pleasant to men. Let us advise them to abstain from vice
and crime; not because they will be punished in another world, but because
they will suffer for it in this.--_These are,_ says Montesquieu, _means
to prevent crimes--these are punishments; these reform manners--these are
good examples._
The way of truth is straight; that of imposture is crooked and dark.
Truth, ever necessary to man, must necessarily be felt by all upright
minds; the lessons of reason are to be followed by all honest men. Men are
unhappy, only because they are ignorant; they are ignorant, only because
every thing conspires to prevent their being enlightened; they are wicked
only because their reason is not sufficiently developed.
By what fatality then, have the first founders of all sects given to
their gods ferocious characters, at which nature revolts? Can we imagine
a conduct more abominable, than that which Moses tells us his God showed
towards the Egyptians, where that assassin proceeds boldly to declare, in
the name and by the order of _his God_, that Egypt shall be afflicted
with the greatest calamities, that can happen to man? Of all the different
ideas, which they give us of a supreme being, of a God, creator and
preserver of mankind, there are none more horrible, than those of the
impostors, who represented themselves as inspired by a divine spirit, and
"Thus saith the Lord."
Why, O theologians! do you presume to inquire into the impenetrable
mysteries of a being, whom you consider inconceivable to the human mind?
You are the blasphemers, when you imagine that a being, perfect according
to you, could be guilty of such cruelty towards creatures whom he has
made out of nothing. Confess, your ignorance of a creating God; and cease
meddling with mysteries, which are repugnant to _Common Sense_.
DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS GIVEN IN THE FRENCH EDITION
Section
1. APOLOGUE
2, 3. What is Theology?
4. Man is not born with any ideas of Religion
5. It is not necessary to believe in a God
6. Religion is founded on credulity
7. All religion is an absurdity
8. The idea of God is impossible
9. On the Origin of Superstition
10. On the Origin of all Religion
11. Religious fears expose men to become a prey to imposters
12, 13. Religion seduces ignorance by the aid of the marvellous
14. There would never have been any Religion, if there had not been
ages of Stupidity and Barbarism
15. All Religion was produced by the desire of domination
16. What serves as a basis to Religion is most uncertain
17, 18. It is impossible to be convinced of the existence of a God
19. The existence of God is not proved
20. It explains nothing to say, that God is a spirit
21. Spirituality is an absurdity
22. Whatever exists is derived from Matter
23. What is the metaphysical God of modern Theology?
24. It would be less unreasonable to adore the Sun, than to adore
a spiritual Deity
25. A spiritual Deity is incapable of volition and action
26. What is God?
27. Some remarkable Contradictions in Theology
28. To adore God, is to adore a fiction
29. Atheism is authorised by the infinity of God, and the impossibility
of knowing the Divine essence
30. Believing in God is neither safer nor less criminal than not
believing in him
31. Belief in God is a habit acquired in infancy
32. Belief in God is a prejudice established by successive generations
33. On the Origin of Prejudices
34. On the effects of Prejudices
35. The Religious principles of modern Theology could not be believed
if they were not instilled into the mind before the age of reason
36. The wonders of nature do not prove the existence of God
37, 38. Nature may be explained by natural causes
39, 40. The world has never been created: Matter moves of itself
41. Additional proofs that motion is essential to Matter, and that
consequently it is unnecessary to imagine a Spiritual Mover
42. The existence of Man does not prove the existence of God
43. Nevertheless, neither Man nor the Universe are the effects of chance
44, 45. The order of the Universe does not prove the existence of a God
46. A Spirit cannot be intelligent it is absurd to adore a divine
intelligence
47, 48. All the qualities, which Theology gives to its God are contrary
to the Essence which is attributed to him
49. It is absurd to say that the human race is the object and end
of the formation of the Universe
50. God is not made for Man, nor Man for God
51. It is not true that the object of the formation of the Universe
was to render Man happy
52. What is called Providence is a word without meaning
53. This pretended Providence is the enemy of Man
54. The world is not governed by an intelligent being
55. God cannot be considered immutable
56. Good and evil are the necessary effects of natural causes.
What is a God that cannot change any thing?
57. The consolations of Theology and the hope of paradise and of
a future life, are imaginary
58. Another romantic reverie
59. It is in vain that Theology attempts to clear its God from human
defects: either this God is not free, or else he is more wicked
than good
60, 61. It is impossible to believe that there exists a God of
infinite goodness and power
62. Theology makes its God a monster of absurdity, injustice,
malice, and atrocity
63. All Religion inspires contemptible fears
64. There is no difference between Religion, and the most somber
and servile Superstition
65. To judge from the ideas which Theology gives of the Deity, the
love of God is impossible
66. An eternally tormenting God is a most detestable being
67. Theology is a tissue of palpable contradictions
68. The pretended works of God do not prove Divine Perfections
69. The perfection of God is not rendered more evident by the
pretended creation of angels
70. Theology preaches the Omnipotence of its God, yet constantly
makes him appear impotent
71. According to all religious systems, God would be the most
capricious and most foolish of beings
72. It is absurd to say that Evil does not proceed from God
73. The foreknowledge attributed to God would give men a right
to complain of his cruelty
74. Absurdity of the theological stories concerning Original Sin,
and concerning Satan
75. The Devil, like Religion, was invented to enrich the priests
76. If God has been unable to render human nature incapable of sin,
he has no right to punish man
77. It is absurd to say, that the conduct of God ought to be a mystery
for man
78. Ought the unfortunate look for consolation, to the sole author
of their misery
79. A God, who punishes the faults which he might have prevented,
is a mad tyrant, who joins injustice to folly
80. What is called Free Will is an absurdity
81. But we must not conclude that Society has no right to punish
82, 83. Refutation of the arguments in favour of Free Will
84. God himself, if there were a God, would not be free: hence the
inutility of all Religion
85. According to the principles of Theology, man is not free a
single instant
86. There is no evil, no disorder, and no sin, but must be attributed
to God: consequently God has no right either to punish or recompence
87. The prayers offered to God sufficiently prove dissatisfaction of
the divine will
88. It is the height of absurdity to imagine, that the injuries and
misfortunes, endured in this world, will be repaired in another world
89. Theology justifies the evil and the wickedness, permitted by its God,
only by attributing to him the principle, that "Might makes Right,"
which is the violation of all Right
90. The absurd doctrine of Redemption, and the frequent exterminations
attributed to Jehovah, impress one with the idea of an unjust and
barbarous God
91. Can a being, who has called us into existence merely to make us
miserable, be a generous, equitable, and tender father?
92. Man's life, and all that occurs, deposes against the liberty of Man,
and against the justice and goodness of a pretended God
93. It is not true, that we owe any gratitude to what is called
_Providence_
94. It is folly to suppose that Man is the king of nature, the favourite
of God, and unique object of his labours
95. A comparison between Man and brutes
96. There are no animals so detestable as Tyrants
97. A refutation of the excellence of Man
98. An oriental Tale
99. It is madness to see nothing but the goodness of God, or to think
that this universe is only made for Man
100. What is the Soul?
101. The existence of a _Soul_ is an absurd supposition; and the existence
of an _immortal_ Soul still more absurd
102. It is evident that Man dies _in toto_
103. Incontestible arguments against the Spirituality of the Soul
104. On the absurdity of the supernatural causes, to which Theologians
are constantly having recourse
105, 106. It is false that Materialism degrades
107. The idea of a future life is only useful to those, who trade on
public credulity
108. It is false that the idea of a future life is consoling
109. All religious principles are derived from the imagination.
God is a chimera; and the qualities, attributed to him,
reciprocally destroy one another
110. Religion is but a system imagined in order to reconcile
contradictions by the aid of mysteries
111, 112, 113. Absurdity and inutility of all Mysteries, which were only
invented for the interests of Priests
114. An universal God ought to have revealed an universal Religion
115. What proves, that Religion is unnecessary, is, that it is
unintelligible
116. All Religions are rendered ridiculous by the multitude of creeds,
all opposite to one another, and all equally foolish
117. Opinion of a famous Theologian
118. The God of the Deists is not less contradictory, nor less chimerical
than the God of the Christians
119. It by no means proves the existence of God to say, that, in every
age, all nations have acknowledged some Deity or other
120. All Gods are of a savage origin: all Religions are monuments of
the ignorance, superstition, and ferocity of former times: modern
Religions are but ancient follies, re-edited with additions and
corrections
121. All religious usages bear marks of stupidity and barbarism
122. The more a religious opinion is ancient and general, the more it
ought to be suspected
123. Mere scepticism in religious matters, can only be the effect of
a very superficial examination
124. Revelations examined
125. Where is the proof that God ever shewed himself to Men, or ever
spoke to them?
126. There is nothing that proves miracles to have been ever performed
127. If God has spoken, is it not strange that he should have spoken
so differently to the different religious sects?
128. Obscurity and suspicious origin of oracles
129. Absurdity of all miracles
130. Refutation of the reasoning of Pascal concerning the manner in which
we must judge of miracles
131. Every new revelation is necessarily false
132. The blood of martyrs testifies _against_ the truth of miracles, and
_against_ the divine origin attributed to Christianity
133. The fanaticism of martyrs, and the interested zeal of missionaries,
by no means prove the truth of Religion
134. Theology makes its God an enemy to Reason and Common Sense
135. Faith is irreconcilable with Reason; and Reason is preferable
to Faith
136. To what absurd and ridiculous sophisms every one is reduced, who
would substitute Faith for Reason!
137. Ought a man to believe, on the assurance of another man, what is
of the greatest importance to himself
138. Faith can take root only in feeble, ignorant, or slothful minds
139. To teach, that any one Religion has greater pretensions to truth
than another, is an absurdity, and cause of tumult
140. Religion is unnecessary to Morality
141. Religion is the weakest barrier that can be opposed to the passions
142. Honour is a more salutary and powerful bond than Religion
143. Religion does not restrain the passions of kings
144. Origin of "the divine right of kings," the most absurd, ridiculous,
and odious, of usurpations
145. Religion is fatal to political ameliorations: it makes despots
licentious and wicked, and their subjects abject and miserable
146. Christianity has propagated itself by preaching implicit obedience
to despotism
147. One object of religious principles is to eternize the tyranny
of kings
148. How fatal it is to persuade kings that they are responsible for
their actions to God alone
149. A devout king is the scourge of his kingdom
150. Tyranny sometimes finds the aegis of Religion a weak obstacle
to the despair of the people
151. Religion favours the wickedness of princes by delivering them
from fear and remorse
152. What is an enlightened Sovereign?
153. Of the prevailing passions and crimes of the priesthood
154. The quackery of priests
155. Religion has corrupted Morality, and produced innumerable evils
156. Every Religion is intolerant
157. The evils of a state Religion
158. Religion legitimates and authorizes crime
159. Refutation of the argument, that the evils attributed to Religion
are but the bad effects of human passions
160. Religion is incompatible with Morality
161. The Morality of the Gospel is impracticable
162. A society of Saints would be impossible
163. Human nature is not depraved
164. Concerning the effects of Jesus Christ's mission
165. The dogma of the remission of sins was invented for the interest
of priests
166. Who fear God?
167. Hell is an absurd invention
168. The bad foundation of religious morals
169. Christian Charity, as preached and practised by Theologians!!!
170. Confession, priestcraft's gold mine, and the destruction of the
true principles of Morality
171. The supposition of the existence of a God is by no means necessary
to Morality
172. Religion and its supernatural Morality are fatal to the
public welfare
173. The union of Church and State is a calamity
174. National Religions are ruinous
175. Religion paralyses Morality
176. Fatal consequences of Devotion
177. The idea of a future life is not consoling to man
178. An Atheist is fully as conscientious as a religious man, and has
better motives for doing good
179. An Atheistical king would be far preferable to a religious king
180. Philosophy produces Morality
181. Religious opinions have little influence upon conduct
182. Reason leads man to Atheism
183. Fear alone makes Theists
184. Can we, and ought we, to love God?
185. God and Religion are proved to be absurdities by the different
ideas formed of them
186. The existence of God, which is the basis of Religion, has not yet
been demonstrated
187. Priests are more actuated by self-interest, than unbelievers
188. Pride, presumption, and badness, are more often found in priests,
than in Atheists
189. Prejudices last but for a time: no power is durable which is not
founded upon truth
190. What an honourable power ministers of the Gods would obtain,
if they became the apostles of reason and the defenders of liberty!
191. What a glorious and happy revolution it would be for the world,
if Philosophy were substituted for Religion!
192. The recantation of an unbeliever at the point of death proves
nothing against the reasonableness of unbelief
193. It is not true that Atheism breaks the bonds of society
194. Refutation of the often repeated opinion, that Religion is necessary
for the vulgar
195. Logical and argumentative systems are not adapted to the capacity
of the vulgar
196. On the futility and danger of Theology
197, 198. On the evils produced by implicit faith
199. History teaches us, that all Religions were established by
impostors, in days of ignorance
200. All Religions, ancient or modern, have borrowed from one
another ridiculous ceremonies
201. Theology has always diverted philosophy from its right path
202. Theology explains nothing
203, 204. Theology has always fettered Morality, and retarded progress
205. It cannot be too often repeated and proved, that Religion is an
extravagance and a calamity
206. Religion prevents us from seeing the true causes of misfortunes
GOOD SENSE WITHOUT GOD
APOLOGUE
1.
There is a vast empire, governed by a monarch, whose strange conduct is
to confound the minds of his subjects. He wishes to be known, loved,
respected, obeyed; but never shows himself to his subjects, and everything
conspires to render uncertain the ideas formed of his character.
The people, subjected to his power, have, of the character and laws of
their invisible sovereign, such ideas only, as his ministers give them.
They, however, confess, that they have no idea of their master; that his
ways are impenetrable; his views and nature totally incomprehensible.
These ministers, likewise, disagree upon the commands which they pretend
have been issued by the sovereign, whose servants they call themselves.
They defame one another, and mutually treat each other as impostors and
false teachers. The decrees and ordinances, they take upon themselves
to promulgate, are obscure; they are enigmas, little calculated to be
understood, or even divined, by the subjects, for whose instruction they
were intended. The laws of the concealed monarch require interpreters;
but the interpreters are always disputing upon the true manner of
understanding them. Besides, they are not consistent with themselves; all
they relate of their concealed prince is only a string of contradictions.
They utter concerning him not a single word that does not immediately
confute itself. They call him supremely good; yet many complain of his
decrees. They suppose him infinitely wise; and under his administration
everything appears to contradict reason. They extol his justice; and the
best of his subjects are generally the least favoured. They assert, he
sees everything; yet his presence avails nothing. He is, say they, the
friend of order; yet throughout his dominions, all is in confusion and
disorder. He makes all for himself; and the events seldom answer
his designs. He foresees everything; but cannot prevent anything. He
impatiently suffers offence, yet gives everyone the power of offending
him. Men admire the wisdom and perfection of his works; yet his works,
full of imperfection, are of short duration. He is continually doing and
undoing; repairing what he has made; but is never pleased with his work.
In all his undertakings, he proposes only his own glory; yet is never
glorified. His only end is the happiness of his subjects; and his
subjects, for the most part want necessaries. Those, whom he seems to
favour are generally least satisfied with their fate; almost all appear
in perpetual revolt against a master, whose greatness they never cease to
admire, whose wisdom to extol, whose goodness to adore, whose justice to
fear, and whose laws to reverence, though never obeyed!
This EMPIRE is the WORLD; this MONARCH GOD; his MINISTERS are the PRIESTS;
his SUBJECTS MANKIND.
2.
There is a science that has for its object only things incomprehensible.
Contrary to all other sciences, it treats only of what cannot fall under
our senses. Hobbes calls it the _kingdom of darkness_. It is a country,
where every thing is governed by laws, contrary to those which mankind are
permitted to know in the world they inhabit. In this marvellous region,
light is only darkness; evidence is doubtful or false; impossibilities
are credible: reason is a deceitful guide; and good sense becomes madness.
This _science_ is called _theology_, and this theology is a continual
insult to the reason of man.
3.
By the magical power of "ifs," "buts," "perhaps's," "what do we know,"
etc., heaped together, a shapeless and unconnected system is formed,
perplexing mankind, by obliterating from their minds, the most clear ideas
and rendering uncertain truths most evident. By reason of this systematic
confusion, nature is an enigma; the visible world has disappeared, to give
place to regions invisible; reason is compelled to yield to imagination,
who leads to the country of her self-invented chimeras.
4.
The principles of every religion are founded upon the idea of a GOD. Now,
it is impossible to have true ideas of a being, who acts upon none of our
senses. All our ideas are representations of sensible objects. What then
can represent to us the idea of God, which is evidently an idea without an
object? Is not such an idea as impossible, as an effect without a cause?
Can an idea without an archetype be anything, but a chimera? There are,
however, divines, who assure us that the idea of God is innate; or that
we have this idea in our mother's womb. Every principle is the result of
reason; all reason is the effect of experience; experience is acquired
only by the exercise of our senses: therefore, religious principles are
not founded upon reason, and are not innate.
5.
Every system of religion can be founded only upon the nature of God and
man; and upon the relations, which subsist between them. But to judge
of the reality of those relations, we must have some idea of the divine
nature. Now, the world exclaims, the divine nature is incomprehensible to
man; yet ceases not to assign attributes to this incomprehensible God, and
to assure us, that it is our indispensable duty to find out that God, whom
it is impossible to comprehend.
The most important concern of man is what he can least comprehend. If God
is incomprehensible to man, it would seem reasonable never to think of
him; but religion maintains, man cannot with impunity cease a moment to
think (or rather dream) of his God.
6.
We are told, that divine qualities are not of a nature to be comprehended
by finite minds. The natural consequence must be, that divine qualities
are not made to occupy finite minds. But religion tells us, that the poor
finite mind of man ought never to lose sight of an inconceivable being,
whose qualities he can never comprehend. Thus, we see, religion is the
art of turning the attention of mankind upon subjects they can never
comprehend.
7.
Religion unites man with God, or forms a communication between them; yet
do they not say, God is infinite? If God be infinite, no finite being can
have communication or relation with him. Where there is no relation, there
can be no union, communication, or duties. If there be no duties between
man and his God, there is no religion for man. Thus, in saying God is
infinite, you annihilate religion for man, who is a finite being. The idea
of infinity is to us an idea without model, without archetype, without
object.
8.
If God be an infinite being, there cannot be, either in the present or
future world, any relative proportion between man and his God. Thus, the
idea of God can never enter the human mind. In supposition of a life, in
which man would be much more enlightened, than in this, the idea of the
infinity of God would ever remain the same distance from his finite mind.
Thus the idea of God will be no more clear in the future, than in the
present life. Thus, intelligences, superior to man, can have no more
complete ideas of God, than man, who has not the least conception of him
in his present life.
9.
How has it been possible to persuade reasonable beings, that the thing,
most impossible to comprehend, was most essential to them? It is because
they have been greatly terrified; because, when they fear, they cease
to reason; because, they have been taught to mistrust their own
understanding; because, when the brain is troubled, they believe every
thing, and examine nothing.
10.
Ignorance and fear are the two hinges of all religion. The uncertainty in
which man finds himself in relation to his God, is precisely the motive
that attaches him to his religion. Man is fearful in the dark--in moral,
as well as physical darkness. His fear becomes habitual, and habit makes
it natural; he would think that he wanted something, if he had nothing to
fear.
11.
He, who from infancy has habituated himself to tremble when he hears
pronounced certain words, requires those words and needs to tremble. He is
therefore more disposed to listen to one, who entertains him in his fears,
than to one, who dissuades him from them. The superstitious man wishes to
fear; his imagination demands it; one might say, that he fears nothing so
much, as to have nothing to fear.
Men are imaginary invalids, whose weakness empirics are interested to
encourage, in order to have sale for their drugs. They listen rather to
the physician, who prescribes a variety of remedies, than to him, who
recommends good regimen, and leaves nature to herself.
12.
If religion were more clear, it would have less charms for the ignorant,
who are pleased only with obscurity, terrors, fables, prodigies, and
things incredible. Romances, silly stories, and the tales of ghosts and
wizards, are more pleasing to vulgar minds than true histories.
13.
In point of religion, men are only great children. The more a religion is
absurd and filled with wonders, the greater ascendancy it acquires over
them. The devout man thinks himself obliged to place no bounds to his
credulity; the more things are inconceivable, they appear to him divine;
the more they are incredible, the greater merit, he imagines, there is in
believing them.
14.
The origin of religious opinions is generally dated from the time, when
savage nations were yet in infancy. It was to gross, ignorant, and
stupid people, that the founders of religion have in all ages addressed
themselves, when they wished to give them their Gods, their mode of
worship, their mythology, their marvellous and frightful fables. These
chimeras, adopted without examination by parents, are transmitted, with
more or less alteration, to their children, who seldom reason any more
than their parents.
15.
The object of the first legislators was to govern the people; and the
easiest method to effect it was to terrify their minds, and to prevent
the exercise of reason. They led them through winding bye-paths, lest they
might perceive the designs of their guides; they forced them to fix their
eyes in the air, for fear they should look at their feet; they amused them
on the way with idle stories; in a word, they treated them as nurses do
children, who sing lullabies, to put them to sleep, and scold, to make
them quiet.
16.
The existence of a God is the basis of all religion. Few appear to doubt
his existence; yet this fundamental article utterly embarrasses every mind
that reasons. The first question of every catechism has been, and ever
will be, the most difficult to resolve. (In the year 1701, the
holy fathers of the oratory of Vendome maintained in a thesis, this
proposition--that, according to St. Thomas, the existence of God is not,
and cannot be, a subject of faith.)
17.
Can we imagine ourselves sincerely convinced of the existence of a being,
whose nature we know not; who is inaccessible to all our senses; whose
attributes, we are assured, are incomprehensible to us? To persuade me
that a being exists or can exist, I must be first told what that being is.
To induce me to believe the existence or the possibility of such a
being, it is necessary to tell me things concerning him that are not
contradictory, and do not destroy one another. In short, to fully convince
me of the existence of that being, it is necessary to tell me things that
I can understand.
18.
A thing is impossible, when it includes two ideas that mutually destroy
one another, and which can neither be conceived nor united in thought.
Conviction can be founded only upon the constant testimony of our senses,
which alone give birth to our ideas, and enable us to judge of their
agreement or disagreement. That, which exists necessarily, is that, whose
non-existence implies a contradiction. These principles, universally
acknowledged, become erroneous, when applied to the existence of a
God. Whatever has been hitherto said upon the subject, is either
unintelligible, or perfect contradiction, and must therefore appear absurd
to every rational man.
19.
All human knowledge is more or less clear. By what strange fatality have
we never been able to elucidate the science of God? The most civilized
nations, and among them the most profound thinkers, are in this respect no
more enlightened than the most savage tribes and ignorant peasants; and,
examining the subject closely, we shall find, that, by the speculations
and subtle refinements of men, the divine science has been only more and
more obscured. Every religion has hitherto been founded only upon what is
called, in logic, _begging the question_; it takes things for granted, and
then proves, by suppositions, instead of principles.
20.
Metaphysics teach us, that God is a _pure spirit_. But, is modern theology
superior to that of the savages? The savages acknowledge a _great spirit_,
for the master of the world. The savages, like all ignorant people,
attribute to _spirits_ all the effects, of which their experience cannot
discover the true causes. Ask a savage, what works your watch? He will
answer, _it is a spirit_. Ask the divines, what moves the universe? They
answer, _it is a spirit_.
21.
The savage, when he speaks of a spirit, affixes, at least, some idea to
the word; he means thereby an agent, like the air, the breeze, the breath,
that invisibly produces discernible effects. By subtilizing every thing,
the modern theologian becomes as unintelligible to himself as to others.
Ask him, what he understands by a spirit? He will answer you, that it is
an unknown substance, perfectly simple, that has no extension, that has
nothing common with matter. Indeed, is there any one, who can form the
least idea of such a substance? What then is a spirit, to speak in the
language of modern theology, but the absence of an idea? The idea of
_spirituality_ is an idea without model.
22.
Is it not more natural and intelligible to draw universal existence from
the matter, whose existence is demonstrated by all the senses, and whose
effects we experience, which we see act, move, communicate motion, and
incessantly generate, than to attribute the formation of things to an
unknown power, to a spiritual being, who cannot derive from his nature
what he has not himself, and who, by his spiritual essence, can create
neither matter nor motion? Nothing is more evident, than that the idea
they endeavour to give us, of the action of mind upon matter, represents
no object. It is an idea without model.
23.
The material _Jupiter_ of the ancients could move, compose, destroy,
and create beings, similar to himself; but the God of modern theology is
sterile. He can neither occupy any place in space, nor move matter, nor
form a visible world, nor create men or gods. The metaphysical God is fit
only to produce confusion, reveries, follies, and disputes.
24.
Since a God was indispensably requisite to men, why did they not worship
the Sun, that visible God, adored by so many nations? What being had
greater claim to the homage of men, than the day-star, who enlightens,
warms, and vivifies all beings; whose presence enlivens and regenerates
nature, whose absence seems to cast her into gloom and languor? If any
being announced to mankind, power, activity, beneficence, and duration, it
was certainly the Sun, whom they ought to have regarded as the parent of
nature, as the divinity. At least, they could not, without folly, dispute
his existence, or refuse to acknowledge his influence.
25.
The theologian exclaims to us, that God wants neither hands nor arms to
act; that _he acts by his will_. But pray, who or what is that God, who
has a will, and what can be the subject of his divine will?
Are the stories of witches, ghosts, wizards, hobgoblins, etc., more absurd
and difficult to believe than the magical or impossible action of mind
upon matter? When we admit such a God, fables and reveries may claim
belief. Theologians treat men as children, whose simplicity makes them
believe all the stories they hear.
26.
To shake the existence of God, we need only to ask a theologian to
speak of him. As soon as he has said a word upon the subject, the
least reflection will convince us, that his observations are totally
incompatible with the essence he ascribes to his God. What then is God?
It is an abstract word, denoting the hidden power of nature; or it is a
mathematical point, that has neither length, breadth, nor thickness. David
Hume, speaking of theologians, has ingeniously observed, _that they have
discovered the solution of the famous problem of Archimedes--a point in
the heavens, whence they move the world_.
27.
Religion prostrates men before a being, who, without extension, is
infinite, and fills all with his immensity; a being, all-powerful, who
never executes his will; a being, sovereignly good, who creates only
disquietudes; a being, the friend of order, and in whose government all
is in confusion and disorder. What then, can we imagine, can be the God of
theology?
28.
To avoid all embarrassment, we are told, "that it is not necessary to know
what God is; that we must adore him; that we are not permitted to extend
our views to his attributes." But, before we know that we must adore a
God, must we not know certainly, that he exists? But, how can we assure
ourselves, that he exists, if we never examine whether the various
qualities, attributed to him, do really exist and agree in him? Indeed,
to adore God, is to adore only the fictions of one's own imagination, or
rather, it is to adore nothing.
29.
In view of confounding things the more, theologians have not declared what
their God is; they tell us only what he is not. By means of negations and
abstractions, they think they have composed a real and perfect being. Mind
is that, which is _not_ body. An infinite being is a being, who is _not_
finite. A perfect being is a being, who is _not_ imperfect. Indeed, is
there any one, who can form real ideas of such a mass of absence of ideas?
That, which excludes all idea, can it be any thing but nothing?
To pretend, that the divine attributes are beyond the reach of human
conception, is to grant, that God is not made for man. To assure us, that,
in God, all is infinite, is to own that there can be nothing common to him
and his creatures. If there be nothing common to God and his creatures,
God is annihilated for man, or, at least, rendered useless to him. "God,"
they say, "has made man intelligent, but he has not made him omniscient;"
hence it is inferred, that he has not been able to give him faculties
sufficiently enlarged to know his divine essence. In this case, it
is evident, that God has not been able nor willing to be known by his
creatures. By what right then would God be angry with beings, who were
naturally incapable of knowing the divine essence? God would be evidently
the most unjust and capricious of tyrants, if he should punish an Atheist
for not having known, what, by his nature, it was impossible he should
know.
30.
To the generality of men, nothing renders an argument more convincing
than fear. It is therefore, that theologians assure us, _we must take the
safest part_; that nothing is so criminal as incredulity; that God will
punish without pity every one who has the temerity to doubt his existence;
that his severity is just, since madness or perversity only can make
us deny the existence of an enraged monarch, who without mercy avenges
himself on Atheists. If we coolly examine these threatenings, we shall
find, they always suppose the thing in question. They must first prove the
existence of a God, before they assure us, it is safest to believe, and
horrible to doubt or deny his existence. They must then prove, that it is
possible and consistent, that a just God cruelly punishes men for having
been in a state of madness, that prevented their believing the existence
of a being, whom their perverted reason could not conceive. In a word,
they must prove, that an infinitely just God can infinitely punish the
invincible and natural ignorance of man with respect to the divine nature.
Do not theologians reason very strangely? They invent phantoms, they
compose them of contradictions; they then assure us, it is safest not
to doubt the existence of these phantoms they themselves have invented.
According to this mode of reasoning, there is no absurdity, which it would
not be more safe to believe, than not to believe.
All children are born Atheists; they have no idea of God. Are they then
criminal on account of their ignorance? At what age must they begin to
believe in God? It is, you say, at the age of reason. But at what time
should this age commence? Besides, if the profoundest theologians lose
themselves in the divine nature, which they do not presume to comprehend,
what ideas must man have of him?
31.
Men believe in God only upon the word of those, who have no more idea of
him than themselves. Our nurses are our first theologians. They talk
to children of God as if he were a scarecrow; they teach them from the
earliest age to join their hands mechanically. Have nurses then more true
ideas of God than the children whom they teach to pray?
32.
Religion, like a family estate, passes, with its incumbrances, from
parents to children. Few men in the world would have a God, had not
pains been taken in infancy to give them one. Each would receive from his
parents and teachers the God whom they received from theirs; but each,
agreeably to his disposition, would arrange, modify, and paint him in his
own manner.
33.
The brain of man, especially in infancy, is like soft wax, fit to receive
every impression that is made upon it. Education furnishes him with almost
all his ideas at a time, when he is incapable of judging for himself. We
believe we have received from nature, or have brought with us at birth,
the true or false ideas, which, in a tender age, had been instilled into
our minds; and this persuasion is one of the greatest sources of errors.
34.
Prejudice contributes to cement in us the opinions of those who have been
charged with our instruction. We believe them much more experienced than
ourselves; we suppose they are fully convinced of the things which they
teach us; we have the greatest confidence in them; by the care they have
taken of us in infancy, we judge them incapable of wishing to deceive us.
These are the motives that make us adopt a thousand errors, without other
foundation than the hazardous authority of those by whom we have been
brought up. The prohibition likewise of reasoning upon what they teach us,
by no means lessens our confidence; but often contributes to increase our
respect for their opinions.
35.
Divines act very wisely in teaching men their religious principles before
they are capable of distinguishing truth from falsehood, or their left
hand from their right. It would be as difficult to instill into the mind
of a man, forty years old, the extravagant notions that are given us of
the divinity, as to eradicate them from the mind of him who had imbibed
them from infancy.
36.
It is observed, that the wonders of nature are sufficient to lead us to
the existence of a God, and fully to convince us of this important truth.
But how many are there in the world who have the time, capacity, or
disposition, necessary to contemplate Nature and meditate her progress?
Men, for the most part, pay no regard to it. The peasant is not struck
with the beauty of the sun, which he sees every day. The sailor is not
surprised at the regular motion of the ocean; he will never draw from it
theological conclusions. The phenomena of nature prove the existence of a
God only to some prejudiced men, who have been early taught to behold the
finger of God in every thing whose mechanism could embarrass them. In the
wonders of nature, the unprejudiced philosopher sees nothing but the
power of nature, the permanent and various laws, the necessary effects of
different combinations of matter infinitely diversified.
37.
Is there any thing more surprising than the logic of these divines, who,
instead of confessing their ignorance of natural causes, seek beyond
nature, in imaginary regions, a cause much more unknown than that nature,
of which they can form at least some idea? To say, that God is the author
of the phenomena of nature, is it not to attribute them to an occult
cause? What is God? What is a spirit? They are causes of which we have no
idea. O wise divines! Study nature and her laws; and since you can
there discover the action of natural causes, go not to those that are
supernatural, which, far from enlightening, will only darken your ideas,
and make it utterly impossible that you should understand yourselves.
38.
Nature, you say, is totally inexplicable without a God. That is to say,
to explain what you understand very little, you have need of a cause which
you understand not at all. You think to elucidate what is obscure, by
doubling the obscurity; to solve difficulties, by multiplying them. O
enthusiastic philosophers! To prove the existence of a God, write complete
treatises of botany; enter into a minute detail of the parts of the human
body; launch forth into the sky, to contemplate the revolution of the
stars; then return to the earth to admire the course of waters; behold
with transport the butterflies, the insects, the polypi, and the organized
atoms, in which you think you discern the greatness of your God. All these
things will not prove the existence of God; they will prove only, that you
have not just ideas of the immense variety of matter, and of the effects,
producible by its infinitely diversified combinations, that constitute the
universe. They will prove only your ignorance of nature; that you have no
idea of her powers, when you judge her incapable of producing a multitude
of forms and beings, of which your eyes, even with the assistance of
microscopes, never discern but the smallest part. In a word, they will
prove, that, for want of knowing sensible agents, or those possible
to know, you find it shorter to have recourse to a word, expressing an
inconceivable agent.
39.
We are gravely and repeatedly told, that, _there is no effect without
a cause_; that, _the world did not make itself_. But the universe is
a cause, it is not an effect; it is not a work; it has not been made,
because it is impossible that it should have been made. The world has
always been; its existence is necessary; it is its own cause. Nature,
whose essence is visibly to act and produce, requires not, to discharge
her functions, an invisible mover, much more unknown than herself. Matter
moves by its own energy, by a necessary consequence of its heterogeneity.
The diversity of motion, or modes of mutual action, constitutes alone the
diversity of matter. We distinguish beings from one another only by the
different impressions or motions which they communicate to our organs.
40.
You see, that all is action in nature, and yet pretend that nature, by
itself, is dead and without power. You imagine, that this all, essentially
acting, needs a mover! What then is this mover? It is a spirit; a being
absolutely incomprehensible and contradictory. Acknowledge then, that
matter acts of itself, and cease to reason of your spiritual mover,
who has nothing that is requisite to put it in action. Return from
your useless excursions; enter again into a real world; keep to _second
causes_, and leave to divines their _first cause_, of which nature has no
need, to produce all the effects you observe in the world.
41.
It can be only by the diversity of impressions and effects, which bodies
make upon us, that we feel them; that we have perceptions and ideas
of them; that we distinguish one from another; that we assign them
properties. Now, to see or feel an object, the object must act upon our
organs; this object cannot act upon us, without exciting some motion in
us; it cannot excite motion in us, if it be not in motion itself. At
the instant I see an object, my eyes are struck by it; I can have no
conception of light and vision, without motion, communicated to my
eye, from the luminous, extended, coloured body. At the instant I smell
something, my sense is irritated, or put in motion, by the parts that
exhale from the odoriferous body. At the moment I hear a sound, the
tympanum of my ear is struck by the air, put in motion by a sonorous body,
which would not act if it were not in motion itself. Whence it evidently
follows, that, without motion, I can neither feel, see, distinguish,
compare, judge, nor occupy my thoughts upon any subject whatever.
We are taught, that _the essence of a thing is that from which all its
properties flow_. Now, it is evident, that all the properties of bodies,
of which we have ideas, are owing to motion, which alone informs us of
their existence, and gives us the first conceptions of them. I cannot be
informed of my own existence but by the motions I experience in myself. I
am therefore forced to conclude, that motion is as essential to matter as
extension, and that matter cannot be conceived without it.
Should any person deny, that motion is essential and necessary to matter;
they cannot, at least, help acknowledging that bodies, which seem dead and
inert, produce motion of themselves, when placed in a fit situation to
act upon one another. For instance; phosphorus, when exposed to the air,
immediately takes fire. Meal and water, when mixed, ferment. Thus dead
matter begets motion of itself. Matter has then the power of self-motion;
and nature, to act, has no need of a mover, whose pretended essence would
hinder him from acting.
42.
Whence comes man? What is his origin? Did the first man spring, ready
formed, from the dust of the earth? Man appears, like all other beings, a
production of nature. Whence came the first stones, the first trees, the
first lions, the first elephants, the first ants, the first acorns? We
are incessantly told to acknowledge and revere the hand of God, of an
infinitely wise, intelligent and powerful maker, in so wonderful a work as
the human machine. I readily confess, that the human machine appears to me
surprising. But as man exists in nature, I am not authorized to say that
his formation, is above the power of nature. But I can much less conceive
of this formation, when to explain it, I am told, that a pure spirit, who
has neither eyes, feet, hands, head, lungs, mouth nor breath, made man by
taking a little clay, and breathing upon it.
We laugh at the savage inhabitants of Paraguay, for calling themselves
the descendants of the moon. The divines of Europe call themselves the
descendants, or the creation, of a pure spirit. Is this pretension any
more rational? Man is intelligent; thence it is inferred, that he can be
the work only of an intelligent being, and not of a nature, which is void
of intelligence. Although nothing is more rare, than to see man make use
of this intelligence, of which he seems so proud, I will grant that he is
intelligent, that his wants develop this faculty, that society especially
contributes to cultivate it. But I see nothing in the human machine, and
in the intelligence with which it is endued, that announces very precisely
the infinite intelligence of the maker to whom it is ascribed. I see that
this admirable machine is liable to be deranged; I see, that his wonderful
intelligence is then disordered, and sometimes totally disappears; I
infer, that human intelligence depends upon a certain disposition of the
material organs of the body, and that we cannot infer the intelligence of
God, any more from the intelligence of man, than from his materiality. All
that we can infer from it, is, that God is material. The intelligence of
man no more proves the intelligence of God, than the malice of man proves
the malice of that God, who is the pretended maker of man. In spite of all
the arguments of divines, God will always be a cause contradicted by its
effects, or of which it is impossible to judge by its works. We shall
always see evil, imperfection and folly result from such a cause, that is
said to be full of goodness, perfection and wisdom.
43.
"What?" you will say, "is intelligent man, is the universe, and all it
contains, the effect of _chance_?" No; I repeat it, _the universe is not
an effect_; it is the cause of all effects; every being it contains is
the necessary effect of this cause, which sometimes shews us its manner of
acting, but generally conceals its operations. Men use the word _chance_
to hide their ignorance of true causes, which, though not understood, act
not less according to certain laws. There is no effect without a cause.
Nature is a word, used to denote the immense assemblage of beings, various
matter, infinite combinations, and diversified motions, that we behold.
All bodies, organized or unorganized, are necessary effects of certain
causes. Nothing in nature can happen by chance. Every thing is subject
to fixed laws. These laws are only the necessary connection of certain
effects with their causes. One atom of matter cannot meet another _by
chance_; this meeting is the effect of permanent laws, which cause every
being necessarily to act as it does, and hinder it from acting otherwise,
in given circumstances. To talk of the _fortuitous concourse of atoms_, or
to attribute some effects to chance, is merely saying that we are ignorant
of the laws, by which bodies act, meet, combine, or separate.
Those, who are unacquainted with nature, the properties of beings, and
the effects which must necessarily result from the concurrence of certain
causes, think, that every thing takes place by chance. It is not chance,
that has placed the sun in the centre of our planetary system; it is by
its own essence, that the substance, of which it is composed, must occupy
that place, and thence be diffused.
44.
The worshippers of a God find, in the order of the universe, an invincible
proof of the existence of an intelligent and wise being, who governs it.
But this order is nothing but a series of movements necessarily produced
by causes or circumstances, which are sometimes favourable, and sometimes
hurtful to us: we approve of some, and complain of others.
Nature uniformly follows the same round; that is, the same causes produce
the same effects, as long as their action is not disturbed by other
causes, which force them to produce different effects. When the operation
of causes, whose effects we experience, is interrupted by causes, which,
though unknown, are not the less natural and necessary, we are confounded;
we cry out, _a miracle!_ and attribute it to a cause much more unknown,
than any of those acting before our eyes.
The universe is always in order. It cannot be in disorder. It is our
machine, that suffers, when we complain of disorder. The bodies, causes,
and beings, which this world contains, necessarily act in the manner in
which we see them act, whether we approve or disapprove of their effects.
Earthquakes, volcanoes, inundations, pestilences, and famines are effects
as necessary, or as much in the order of nature, as the fall of heavy
bodies, the courses of rivers, the periodical motions of the seas, the
blowing of the winds, the fruitful rains, and the favourable effects, for
which men praise God, and thank him for his goodness.
To be astonished that a certain order reigns in the world, is to be
surprised that the same causes constantly produce the same effects. To
be shocked at disorder, is to forget, that when things change, or are
interrupted in their actions, the effects can no longer be the same. To
wonder at the order of nature, is to wonder that any thing can exist; it
is to be surprised at any one's own existence. What is order to one being,
is disorder to another. All wicked beings find that every thing is in
order, when they can with impunity put every thing in disorder. They find,
on the contrary, that every thing is in disorder, when they are disturbed
in the exercise of their wickedness.
45.
Upon supposition that God is the author and mover of nature, there could
be no disorder with respect to him. Would not all the causes, that he
should have made, necessarily act according to the properties, essences,
and impulses given them? If God should change the ordinary course of
nature, he would not be immutable. If the order of the universe, in
which man thinks he sees the most convincing proof of the existence,
intelligence, power and goodness of God, should happen to contradict
itself, one might suspect his existence, or, at least, accuse him of
inconstancy, impotence, want of foresight and wisdom in the arrangement of
things; one would have a right to accuse him of an oversight in the choice
of the agents and instruments, which he makes, prepares, and puts in
action. In short, if the order of nature proves the power and intelligence
of the Deity, disorder must prove his weakness, instability, and
irrationality.
You say, that God is omnipresent, that he fills the universe with his
immensity, that nothing is done without him, that matter could not act
without his agency. But in this case, you admit, that your God is the
author of disorder, that it is he who deranges nature, that he is the
father of confusion, that he is in man, and moves him at the moment he
sins. If God is every where, he is in me, he acts with me, he is deceived
with me, he offends God with me, and combats with me the existence of God!
O theologians! you never understand yourselves, when you speak of God.
46.
In order to have what we call intelligence, it is necessary to have ideas,
thoughts, and wishes; to have ideas, thoughts, and wishes, it is necessary
to have organs; to have organs, it is necessary to have a body; to act
upon bodies, it is necessary to have a body; to experience disorder, it is
necessary to be capable of suffering. Whence it evidently follows, that a
pure spirit can neither be intelligent, nor affected by what passes in the
universe.
Divine intelligence, ideas, and views, have, you say, nothing common with
those of men. Very well. How then can men judge, right or wrong, of these
views; reason upon these ideas; or admire this intelligence? This would be
to judge, admire, and adore that, of which we can have no ideas. To adore
the profound views of divine wisdom, is it not to adore that, of which we
cannot possibly judge? To admire these views, is it not to admire without
knowing why? Admiration is always the daughter of ignorance. Men admire
and adore only what they do not comprehend.
47.
All those qualities, ascribed to God, are totally incompatible with a
being, who, by his very essence, is void of all analogy with human beings.
It is true, the divines imagine they extricate themselves from this
difficulty, by exaggerating the human qualities, attributed to the
Divinity; they enlarge them to infinity, where they cease to understand
themselves. What results from this combination of man with God? A mere
chimera, of which, if any thing be affirmed, the phantom, combined with so
much pains, instantly vanishes.
Dante, in his poem upon _Paradise_, relates, that the Deity appeared
to him under the figure of three circles, forming an iris, whose lively
colours generated each other; but that, looking steadily upon the dazzling
light, he saw only his own figure. While adoring God, it is himself, that
man adores.
48.
Ought not the least reflection suffice to prove, that God can have none
of the human qualities, all ties, virtues, or perfections? Our virtues and
perfections are consequences of the modifications of our passions. But
has God passions as we have? Again: our good qualities consist in our
dispositions towards the beings with whom we live in society. God,
according to you, is an insulated being. God has no equals--no
fellow-beings. God does not live in society. He wants the assistance of no
one. He enjoys an unchangeable felicity. Admit then, according to your own
principles, that God cannot have what we call virtues, and that man cannot
be virtuous with respect to him.
49.
Man, wrapped up in his own merit, imagines the human race to be the sole
object of God in creating the universe. Upon what does he found this
flattering opinion? We are told: that man is the only being endued with
intelligence, which enables him to know the Deity, and to render him
homage. We are assured, that God made the world only for his own glory,
and that it was necessary that the human species should come into this
plan, that there might be some one to admire his works, and glorify him
for them. But, according to these suppositions, has not God evidently
missed his object? 1st. Man, according to yourselves, will always labour
under the completest impossibility of knowing his God, and the most
invincible ignorance of his divine essence. 2ndly. A being, who has no
equal, cannot be susceptible of glory; for glory can result only from the
comparison of one's own excellence with that of others. 3rdly. If God be
infinitely happy, if he be self-sufficient, what need has he of the homage
of his feeble creatures? 4thly. God, notwithstanding all his endeavours,
is not glorified; but, on the contrary, all the religions in the world
represent him as perpetually offended; their sole object is to reconcile
sinful, ungrateful, rebellious man with his angry God.
50.
If God be infinite, he has much less relation with man, than man with
ants. Would the ants reason pertinently concerning the intentions,
desires, and projects of the gardener? Could they justly imagine, that a
park was planted for them alone, by an ostentatious monarch, and that the
sole object of his goodness was to furnish them with a superb residence?
But, according to theology, man is, with respect to God, far below what
the vilest insect is to man. Thus, by theology itself, which is wholly
devoted to the attributes and views of the Divinity, theology appears a
complete folly.
51.
We are told, that, in the formation of the universe, God's only object was
the happiness of man. But, in a world made purposely for him, and governed
by an omnipotent God, is man in reality very happy? Are his enjoyments
durable? Are not his pleasures mixed with pains? Are many persons
satisfied with their fate? Is not man continually the victim of physical
and moral evils? Is not the human machine, which is represented as a
master-piece of the Creator's skill, liable to derangement in a thousand
ways? Should we be surprised at the workmanship of a mechanic, who should
shew us a complex machine, ready to stop every moment, and which, in a
short time, would break in pieces of itself?
52.
The generous care, displayed by the Deity in providing for the wants,
and watching over the happiness of his beloved creatures, is called
_Providence_. But, when we open our eyes, we find that God provides
nothing. Providence sleeps over the greater part of the inhabitants of
this world. For a very small number of men who are supposed to be happy,
what an immense multitude groan under oppression, and languish in misery!
Are not nations forced to deprive themselves of bread, to administer to
the extravagances of a few gloomy tyrants, who are no happier than their
oppressed slaves?
At the same time that our divines emphatically expatiate upon the goodness
of Providence, while they exhort us to repose our confidence in her, do
we not hear them, at the sight of unforeseen catastrophes, exclaim, that
_Providence sports with the vain projects of man_, that she frustrates
their designs, that she laughs at their efforts, that profound wisdom
delights to bewilder the minds of mortals? But, shall we put confidence in
a malignant Providence, who laughs at, and sports with mankind? How will
one admire the unknown ways of a hidden wisdom, whose manner of acting is
inexplicable? Judge of it by effects, you will say. We do; and find, that
these effects are sometimes useful, and sometimes hurtful.
Men think they justify Providence, by saying, that, in this world, there
is much more good than evil to every individual of mankind. Supposing the
good, we enjoy from Providence, is to the evil, as a _hundred to ten_;
will it not still follow, that, for a hundred degrees of goodness,
Providence possesses ten of malignity; which is incompatible with the
supposed perfection of the divine nature.
Almost all books are filled with the most flattering praises of
Providence, whose attentive care is highly extolled. It would seem as
if man, to live happily here below, needed not his own exertions. Yet,
without his own labour, man could subsist hardly a day. To live, he is
obliged to sweat, toil, hunt, fish, and labour without intermission.
Without these second causes, the first cause, at least in most countries,
would provide for none of our wants. In all parts of the globe, we see
savage and civilized man in a perpetual struggle with Providence. He is
necessitated to ward off the strokes directed against him by Providence,
in hurricanes, tempests, frosts, hail-storms, inundations, droughts, and
the various accidents, which so often render useless all his labours. In a
word, we see man continually occupied in guarding against the ill offices
of that Providence, which is supposed to be attentive to his happiness.
A bigot admired divine Providence for wisely ordering rivers to pass
through those places, where men have built large cities. Is not this man's
reasoning as rational, as that of many learned men, who incessantly
talk of _final causes_, or who pretend that they clearly perceive the
beneficent views of God in the formation of all things?
53.
Do we see then, that Providence so very sensibly manifests herself in the
preservation of those admirable works, which we attribute to her? If it
is she, who governs the world, we find her as active in destroying, as
in forming; in exterminating, as in producing. Does she not every moment
destroy, by thousands, the very men, to whose preservation and welfare
we suppose her continually attentive? Every moment she loses sight of
her beloved creature. Sometimes she shakes his dwelling, sometimes she
annihilates his harvests, sometimes she inundates his fields, sometimes
she desolates them by a burning drought. She arms all nature against man.
She arms man himself against his own species, and commonly terminates his
existence in anguish. Is this then what is called preserving the universe?
If we could view, without prejudice, the equivocal conduct of Providence
towards the human race and all sensible beings, we should find, that far
from resembling a tender and careful mother, she resembles rather those
unnatural mothers, who instantly forgetting the unfortunates of their
licentious love, abandon their infants, as soon as they are born, and who,
content with having borne them, expose them, helpless, to the caprice of
fortune.
The Hottentots, in this respect are much wiser than other nations, who
treat them as barbarians, and refuse to worship God; because, they
say, _if he often does good, he often does evil_. Is not this manner of
reasoning more just and conformable to experience, than that of many men,
who are determined to see, in their God, nothing but goodness, wisdom, and
foresight, and who refuse to see that the innumerable evils, of which this
world is the theatre, must come from the same hand, which they kiss with
delight?
54.
Common sense teaches, that we cannot, and ought not, to judge of a cause,
but by its effects. A cause can be reputed constantly good, only when it
constantly produces good. A cause, which produces both good and evil, is
sometimes good, and sometimes evil. But the logic of theology destroys all
this. According to that, the phenomena of nature, or the effects we behold
in this world, prove to us the existence of a cause infinitely good; and
this cause is God. Although this world is full of evils; although disorder
often reigns in it; although men incessantly repine at their hard fate;
we must be convinced, that these effects are owing to a beneficent and
immutable cause; and many people believe it, or feign believe.
Every thing that passes in the world, proves to us, in the clearest
manner, that it is not governed by an intelligent being. We can judge of
the intelligence of a being only by the conformity of the means, which he
employs to attain his proposed object. The object of God, is the happiness
of a man. Yet, a like necessity governs the fate of all sensible beings,
who are born only to suffer much, enjoy little, and die. The cup of man
is filled with joy and bitterness; good is every where attended with evil;
order gives place to disorder; generation is followed by destruction.
If you say, that the designs of God are mysterious and that his ways are
impenetrable; I answer, that, in this case, it is impossible to judge
whether God be intelligent.
55.
You pretend, that God is immutable! What then produces a continual
instability in this world, which you make his empire? Is there a state,
subject to more frequent and cruel revolutions, than that of this unknown
monarch? How can we attribute to an immutable God, sufficiently powerful
to give solidity to his works, a government, in which every thing is in
continual vicissitude? If I imagine I see a God of uniform character in
all the effects favourable to my species, what kind of a God can I see in
their continual misfortunes? You tell me, it is our sins, which compel
him to punish. I answer, that God, according to yourselves, is then not
immutable, since the sins of men force him to change his conduct towards
them. Can a being, who is sometimes provoked, and sometimes appeased, be
constantly the same?
56.
The universe can be only what it is; all sensible beings in it enjoy and
suffer; that is, are moved sometimes in an agreeable, and sometimes in a
disagreeable manner. These effects are necessary; they result necessarily
from causes, which act only according to their properties. These effects
necessarily please, or displease, by a consequence of nature. This same
nature compels me to avoid, avert, and resist some things, and to seek,
desire, and procure others. In a world, where every thing is necessary,
a God, who remedies nothing, who leaves things to run in their necessary
course,--is he any thing but destiny, or necessity personified? It is a
deaf and useless God, who can effect no change in general laws, to which
he is himself subject. Of what importance is the infinite power of a
being, who will do but very little in my favour? Where is the infinite
goodness of a being, indifferent to happiness? Of what service is the
favour of a being, who, is able to do an infinite good, does not do even a
finite one?
57.
When we ask, why so many miserable objects appear under the government of
a good God, we are told, by way of consolation, that the present world
is only a passage, designed to conduct man to a happier one. The divines
assure us, that the earth we inhabit, is a state of trial. In short, they
shut our mouths, by saying, that God could communicate to his creatures
neither impossibility nor infinite happiness, which are reserved for
himself alone. Can such answers be satisfactory? 1st. The existence of
another life is guaranteed to us only by the imagination of man, who,
by supposing it, have only realized the desire they have of surviving
themselves, in order to enjoy hereafter a purer and more durable
happiness. 2ndly. How can we conceive that a God, who knows every thing,
and must be fully acquainted with the dispositions of his creatures,
should want so many experiments, in order to be sure of their
dispositions? 3rdly. According to the calculations of their chronologists,
our earth has existed six or seven thousand years. During that time,
nations have experienced calamities. History exhibits the human species
at all times tormented and ravaged by tyrants, conquerors, and heroes; by
wars, inundations, famines, plagues, etc. Are such long trials then likely
to inspire us with very great confidence in the secret views of the Deity?
Do such numerous and constant evils give a very exalted idea of the
future state, his goodness is preparing for us? 4thly. If God is so kindly
disposed, as he is asserted to be, without giving men infinite happiness,
could he not at least have communicated the degree of happiness, of which
finite beings are susceptible here below? To be happy, must we have an
_infinite_ or _divine_ happiness? 5thly. If God could not make men happier
than they are here below, what will become of the hope of a _paradise_,
where it is pretended, that the elect will for ever enjoy ineffable
bliss? If God neither could nor would avert evil from the earth, the only
residence we can know, what reason have we to presume, that he can or
will avert evil from another world, of which we have no idea? Epicurus
observed: "either God would remove evil out of this world, and cannot; or
he can, and will not; or he has neither the power nor will; or, lastly, he
has both the power and will. If he has the will, and not the power, this
shews weakness, which is contrary to the nature of God. If he has the
power, and not the will, it is malignity; and this is no less contrary
to his nature. If he is neither able nor willing, he is both impotent and
malignant, and consequently cannot be God. If he be both willing and able
(which alone is consonant to the nature of God) whence comes evil, or
why does he not prevent it?" Reflecting minds are still waiting for a
reasonable solution of these difficulties; and our divines tell us, that
they will be removed only in a future life.
58.
We are told of a pretended _scale of beings_. It is supposed, that God
has divided his creatures into different classes, in which each enjoys
the degree of happiness, of which it is susceptible. According to this
romantic arrangement, from the oyster to the celestial angels, all
beings enjoy a happiness, which is suitable to their nature. Experience
explicitly contradicts this sublime reverie. In this world, all sensible
beings suffer and live in the midst of dangers. Man cannot walk without
hurting, tormenting, or killing a multitude of sensible beings, which are
in his way; while he himself is exposed, at every step, to a multitude of
evils, foreseen or unforeseen, which may lead him to destruction. During
the whole course of his life, he is exposed to pains; he is not sure, a
moment, of his existence, to which he is so strongly attached, and which
he regards as the greatest gift of the Divinity.
59.
The world, it will be said, has all the perfection, of which it is
susceptible: since it is not God who made it, it must have great qualities
and great defects. But we answer, that, as the world must necessarily have
great defects, it would have been more conformable to the nature of a
good God, not to have created a world, which he could not make completely
happy. If God was supremely happy, before the creation of the world, and
could have continued to be supremely happy, without creating the world,
why did he not remain at rest? Why must man suffer? Why must man exist? Of
what importance is his existence to God? Nothing, or something? If man's
existence is not useful or necessary to God, why did God make man? If
man's existence is necessary to God's glory, he had need of man; he was
deficient in something before man existed. We can pardon an unskilful
workman for making an imperfect work; because he must work, well or ill,
upon penalty of starving. This workman is excusable, but God is not.
According to you, he is self-sufficient; if so, why does he make men? He
has, you say, every thing requisite to make man happy. Why then does he
not do it? Confess, that your God has more malice than goodness, unless
you admit, that God, was necessitated to do what he has done, without
being able to do it otherwise. Yet, you assure us, that God is free. You
say also, that he is immutable, although it was in _Time_ that he began
and ceased to exercise his power, like the inconstant beings of this
world. O theologians! Vain are your efforts to free your God from defects.
This perfect God has always some human imperfections.
60.
"Is not God master of his favours? Can he not give them? Can he not take
them away? It does not belong to his creatures to require reasons for
his conduct. He can dispose of the works of his own hands as he pleases.
Absolute sovereign of mortals, he distributes happiness or misery,
according to his good pleasure." Such are the solutions given by
theologians to console us for the evils which God inflicts upon us.
We reply, that a God, who is infinitely good, cannot be _master of his
favours_, but would by his nature be obliged to bestow them upon his
creatures; that a being, truly beneficent, cannot refrain from doing good;
that a being, truly generous, does not take back what he has given; and
that every man, who does so, dispenses with gratitude, and has no right to
complain of finding ungrateful men.
How can the odd and capricious conduct, which theologians ascribe to
God, be reconciled with religion, which supposes a covenant, or mutual
engagements between God and men? If God owes nothing to his creatures,
they, on their part, can owe nothing to their God. All religion is founded
upon the happiness that men think they have a right to expect from the
Deity, who is supposed to say to them: _Love me, adore me, obey me: and I
will make you happy_. Men, on their part, say to him: _Make us happy, be
faithful to your promises, and we will love you, we will adore you,
and obey your laws_. By neglecting the happiness of his creatures,
distributing his favours according to his caprice, and retracting his
gifts, does not God break the covenant, which serves as the basis of all
religion? Cicero has justly observed, that _if God is not agreeable to
man, he cannot be his God_. Goodness constitutes deity; this goodness can
be manifested to man only by the blessings he enjoys; as soon as he is
unhappy, this goodness disappears, and with it the divinity. An infinite
goodness can be neither limited, partial, nor exclusive. If God be
infinitely good, he owes happiness to all his creatures. The unhappiness
of a single being would suffice to annihilate unbounded goodness. Under an
infinitely good and powerful God, is it possible to conceive that a single
man should suffer? One animal, or mite, that suffers, furnishes invincible
arguments against divine providence and its infinite goodness.
61.
According to theology, the afflictions and evils of this life are
chastisements, which guilty men incur from the hand of God. But why are
men guilty? If God is omnipotent, does it cost him more to say: "Let every
thing in the world be in order; let all my subjects be good, innocent, and
fortunate," than to say: "Let every thing exist"? Was it more difficult
for this God to do his work well, than badly? Religion tells us of a
hell; that is, a frightful abode, where, notwithstanding his goodness,
God reserves infinite torments for the majority of men. Thus after having
rendered mortals very unhappy in this world, religion tells them, that God
can render them still more unhappy in another! The theologian gets over
this, by saying, that the goodness of God will then give place to his
justice. But a goodness, which gives place to the most terrible cruelty,
is not an infinite goodness. Besides, can a God, who, after having been
infinitely good, becomes infinitely bad, be regarded as an immutable
being? Can we discern the shadow of clemency or goodness, in a God filled
with implacable fury?
62.
Divine justice, as stated by our divines, is undoubtedly a quality very
proper to cherish in us the love of the Divinity. According to the ideas
of modern theology, it is evident, that God has created the majority of
men, with the sole view of putting them in a fair way to incur eternal
punishment. Would it not have been more conformable to goodness, reason,
and equity, to have created only stones or plants, and not to have created
sensible beings; than to have formed men, whose conduct in this world
might subject them to endless punishment in the other? A God perfidious
and malicious enough to create a single man, and then to abandon him to
the danger of being damned, cannot be regarded as a perfect being; but
as an unreasonable, unjust, and ill-natured. Very far from composing
a perfect God, theologians have formed the most imperfect of beings.
According to theological notions, God would resemble a tyrant, who, having
put out the eyes of the greater part of his slaves, should shut them up
in a dungeon, where, for his amusement, he would, incognito, observe their
conduct through a trap-door, in order to punish with rigour all those,
who, while walking about, should hit against each other; but who would
magnificently reward the few whom he had not deprived of sight, in
avoiding to run against their comrades. Such are the ideas, which the
dogma of gratuitous predestination gives us of the divinity!
Although men are continually repeating that their God is infinitely good;
yet it is evident, that in reality, they can believe nothing of the
kind. How can we love what we do not know? How can we love a being, whose
character is only fit to throw us into inquietude and trouble? How can we
love a being, of whom all that is said tends to render him an object of
utter detestation?
63.
Many people make a subtle distinction between true religion and
superstition. They say, that the latter is only a base and inordinate fear
of the Deity; but that the truly religious man has confidence in his God,
and loves him sincerely; whereas, the superstitious man sees in him only
an enemy, has no confidence in him, and represents him to himself as
a distrustful, cruel tyrant, sparing of his benefits, lavish of his
chastisements. But, in reality, does not all religion give us the same
ideas of God? At the same time that we are told, that God is infinitely
good, are we not also told, that he is very easily provoked, that he
grants his favours to a few people only, and that he furiously chastises
those, to whom he has not been pleased to grant favours?
64.
If we take our ideas of God from the nature of things, where we find a
mixture of good and evil, this God, just like the good and evil of which
we experience, must naturally appear capricious, inconstant, sometimes
good, and sometimes malevolent; and therefore, instead of exciting our
love, must generate distrust, fear, and uncertainty. There is then no
real difference between natural religion, and the most gloomy and servile
superstition. If the theist sees God only in a favourable light; the bigot
views him in the most hideous light. The folly of the one is cheerful,
that of the other is melancholy; but both are equally delirious.
65.
If I draw my ideas of God from theology, he appears to inspire aversion.
Devotees, who tell us, that they sincerely love their God, are either
liars or fools, who see their God only in profile. It is impossible to
love a being, the very idea of whom strikes us with terror, and whose
judgments make us tremble. How can we, without being alarmed, look upon
a God, who is reputed to be barbarous enough to damn us? Let not divines
talk to us of a filial, or respectful fear, mixed with love, which men
ought to have for their God. A son can by no means love his father, when
he knows him to be cruel enough to inflict upon him studied torments for
the least faults he may commit. No man upon earth can have the least spark
of love for a God, who reserves chastisements, infinite in duration and
violence, for ninety-nine hundredths of his children.
66.
The inventors of the dogma of eternal hell-torments have made of that God,
whom they call so good, the most detestable of beings. Cruelty in men is
the last act of wickedness. Every sensible mind must revolt at the bare
recital of the torments, inflicted on the greatest criminal; but cruelty
is much more apt to excite indignation, when void of motives. The most
sanguinary tyrants, the Caligulas, the Neros, the Domitians, had, at
least, some motives for tormenting their victims. These motives were,
either their own safety, or the fury of revenge, or the design of
frightening by terrible examples, or perhaps the vanity of making
a display of their power, and the desire of satisfying a barbarous
curiosity. Can a God have any of these motives? In tormenting the victims
of his wrath, he would punish beings, who could neither endanger his
immoveable power, nor disturb his unchangeable felicity. On the other
hand, the punishments of the other life would be useless to the living,
who cannot be witnesses of them. These punishments would be useless to the
damned, since in hell there is no longer room for conversion, and the
time of mercy is past. Whence it follows, that God, in the exercise of
his eternal vengeance, could have no other end than to amuse himself,
and insult the weakness of his creatures. I appeal to the whole human
race;--is there a man who feels cruel enough coolly to torment, I do
not say his fellow-creature, but any sensible being whatever, without
emolument, without profit, without curiosity, without having any thing
to fear? Confess then, O theologians, that, even according to your own
principles, your God is infinitely more malevolent than the worst of men.
Perhaps you will say, that infinite offences deserve infinite punishments.
I answer, that we cannot offend a God, whose happiness is infinite; that
the offences of finite beings cannot be infinite; that a God, who
is unwilling to be offended, cannot consent that the offences of his
creatures should be eternal; that a God, infinitely good, can neither be
infinitely cruel, nor grant his creatures an infinite duration, solely for
the pleasure of eternal torments.
Nothing but the most savage barbarity, the most egregious roguery, or the
blindest ambition could have imagined the doctrine of eternal punishments.
If there is a God, whom we can offend or blaspheme, there are not upon
earth greater blasphemers than those, who dare to say, that this same God
is a tyrant, perverse enough to delight, during eternity, in the useless
torments of his feeble creatures.
67.
To pretend, that God can be offended at the actions of men, is to
annihilate all the ideas, which divines endeavour to give us, in other
respects, of this being. To say, that man can trouble the order of the
universe; that he can kindle the thunder in the hands of his God; that
he can defeat his projects, is to say, that man is stronger than his God,
that he is the arbiter of his will, that it depends upon him to change
his goodness into cruelty. Theology continually pulls down, with one hand,
what it erects with the other. If all religion is founded upon a God,
who is provoked and appeased, all religion is founded on a palpable
contradiction.
All religions agree in exalting the wisdom and infinite power of the
Deity. But no sooner do they display his conduct, than we see nothing
but imprudence, want of foresight, weakness and folly. God, it is said,
created the world for himself; and yet, hitherto, he has never been able
to make himself suitably honoured by it. God created men in order to have,
in his dominions, subjects to render him their homage; and yet, we see men
in continual revolt against him.
68.
They incessantly extol the divine perfections; and when we demand
proofs of them, they point to his works, in which, they assure us, these
perfections are written in indelible characters. All these works are,
however, imperfect and perishable. Man, who is ever regarded as the
most marvellous work, as the master-piece of the Deity, is full of
imperfections, which render him disagreeable to the eyes of the almighty
Being, who formed him. This surprising work often becomes so revolting and
odious to its author, that he is obliged to throw it into the fire. But,
if the fairest of God's works is imperfect, how can we judge of the
divine perfections? Can a work, with which the author himself is so little
pleased, induce us to admire the ability of its Maker? Man, considered
in a physical sense, is subject to a thousand infirmities, to numberless
evils, and to death. Man, considered in a moral sense, is full of faults;
yet we are unceasingly told, that he is the most beautiful work of the
most perfect of beings.
69.
In creating beings more perfect than men, it appears, that heretofore God
has not better succeeded, nor given stronger proofs of his perfection.
Do we not see, in many religions, that angels, have even attempted to
dethrone him? God proposed the happiness of angels and men; yet, he has
never been able to render happy either angels or men;--the pride, malice,
sins, and imperfections of the creatures have always opposed the will of
the perfect Creator.
70.
All religion is obviously founded upon this principle, that _God does what
he can, and man what he will_. Every system of religion presents to us
an unequal combat between the Deity on one part, and his creatures on the
other, in which the former never comes off to his honour. Notwithstanding
his omnipotence, he cannot succeed in rendering the works of his hands
such as he would have them. To complete the absurdity, there is a
religion, which pretends, that God himself has died to redeem mankind; and
yet, men are not farther from any thing, than they are from what God would
have them.
71.
Nothing is more extravagant, than the part, theology makes the Divinity
act in every country. Did he really exist, we should see in him the most
capricious, and senseless being. We should be compelled to believe, that
God made the world only to be the theatre of his disgraceful wars with
his creatures; that he created angels, men, and demons, only to make
adversaries, against whom he might exercise his power. He renders men free
to offend him, malicious enough to defeat his projects, too obstinate to
submit; and all this merely for the pleasure of being angry, appeased,
reconciled, and of repairing the disorder they have made. Had the Deity at
once formed his creatures such as he would have them, what pains would he
not have spared himself, or, at least, from what embarrassments would he
not have relieved his theologians!
Every religion represents God as busy only in doing himself evil. He
resembles those empirics, who inflict upon themselves wounds, to have an
opportunity of exhibiting to the public the efficacy of their ointment.
But we see not, that the Deity has hitherto been able radically to cure
himself of the evil, which he suffers from man.
72.
God is the author of all; and yet, we are assured that evil does not come
from God. Whence then does it come? From man. But, who made man? God. Evil
then comes from God. If he had not made man as he is, moral evil or sin
would not have existed in the world. The perversity of man is therefore
chargeable to God. If man has power to do evil, or to offend God, we are
forced to infer, that God chooses to be offended; that God, who made man,
has resolved that man shall do evil; otherwise man would be an effect
contrary to the cause, from which he derives his being.
73.
Man ascribes to God the faculty of foreseeing, or knowing beforehand
whatever will happen; but this prescience seldom turns to his glory,
nor protects him from the lawful reproaches of man. If God foreknows
the future, must he not have foreseen the fall of his creatures? If he
resolved in his decrees to permit this fall, it is undoubtedly because it
was his will that this fall should take place, otherwise it could not have
happened. If God's foreknowledge of the sins of his creatures had been
necessary or forced, one might suppose, that he has been constrained by
his justice to punish the guilty; but, enjoying the faculty of foreseeing,
and the power of predetermining every thing, did it not depend upon God
not to impose upon himself cruel laws, or, at least, could he not dispense
with creating beings, whom he might be under the necessity of punishing,
and rendering unhappy by a subsequent decree? Of what consequence is it,
whether God has destined men to happiness or misery by an anterior decree,
an effect of his prescience, or by a posterior decree, an effect of
his justice? Does the arrangement of his decrees alter the fate of the
unhappy? Would they not have the same right to complain of a God, who,
being able to omit their creation, has notwithstanding created them,
although he plainly foresaw that his justice would oblige him, sooner or
later, to punish them?
74.
"Man," you say, "when he came from the hand of God, was pure, innocent,
and good; but his nature has been corrupted, as a punishment for sin."
If man, when just out of the hands of his God, could sin, his nature was
imperfect. Why did God suffer him to sin, and his nature to be corrupted?
Why did God permit him to be seduced, well knowing that he was too feeble
to resist temptation? Why did God create _satan_, an evil spirit, a
tempter? Why did not God, who wishes so much good to the human race,
annihilate once for all so many evil genii, who are naturally enemies of
our happiness; or rather, why did God create evil spirits, whose victories
and fatal influence over mankind, he must have foreseen? In fine, by what
strange fatality in all religions of the world, has the evil principle
such a decided advantage over the good principle, or the divinity?
75.
There is related an instance of simplicity, which does honour to the heart
of an Italian monk. One day, while preaching, this pious man thought
he must announce to his audience, that he had, thank heaven, at last
discovered, by dint of meditation, a sure way of rendering all men happy.
"The devil," said he, "tempts men only to have in hell companions of his
misery. Let us therefore apply to the Pope, who has the keys of heaven
and hell; let us prevail upon him to pray to God, at the head of the whole
church, to consent to a reconciliation with the devil, to restore him to
favour, to reinstate him in his former rank, which cannot fail to put an
end to his malicious projects against mankind." Perhaps the honest monk
did not see, that the devil is at least as useful as God to the ministers
of religion. They have too much interest in their dissensions, to be
instrumental in an accommodation between two enemies, upon whose combats
their own existence and revenues depend. Let men cease to be tempted
and to sin, and the ministry of priests will be useless. Manicheism is
evidently the hinge of every religion; but unhappily, the devil, invented
to clear the deity from the suspicion of malice, proves to us, every
moment, the impotence or unskilfulness of his celestial adversary.
76.
The nature of man, it is said, was necessarily liable to corruption. God
could not communicate to him _impeccability_, which is an inalienable
attribute of his divine perfection. But if God could not make man
impeccable, why did he give himself the pains to make man, whose nature
must necessarily be corrupted, and who must consequently offend God? On
the other hand, if God himself could not make human nature impeccable, by
what right does he punish men for not being impeccable? It can be only
by the right of the strongest; but the right of the strongest is called
violence, and violence cannot be compatible with the justest of beings.
God would be supremely unjust, should he punish men for not sharing with
him his divine perfections, or for not being able to be gods like him.
Could not God, at least, have communicated to all men that kind of
perfection, of which their nature is susceptible? If some men are good,
or render themselves agreeable to their God, why has not that God done the
same favour, or given the same dispositions to all beings of our species?
Why does the number of the wicked so much exceed the number of the good?
Why, for one friend, has God ten thousand enemies, in a world, which it
depended entirely upon him to people with honest men? If it be true, that,
in heaven, God designs to form a court of saints, of elect, or of men who
shall have lived upon earth conformably to his views, would he not have
had a more numerous, brilliant, and honourable assembly, had he composed
it of all men, to whom, in creating them, he could grant the degree of
goodness, necessary to attain eternal happiness? Finally, would it not
have been shorter not to have made man, than to have created him a being
full of faults, rebellious to his creator, perpetually exposed to cause
his own destruction by a fatal abuse of his liberty?
Instead of creating men, a perfect God ought to have created only angels
very docile and submissive. Angels, it is said, are free; some have
sinned; but, at any rate, all have not abused their liberty by revolting
against their master. Could not God have created only angels of the good
kind? If God has created angels, who have not sinned, could he not have
created impeccable men, or men who should never abuse their liberty? If
the elect are incapable of sinning in heaven, could not God have made
impeccable men upon earth?
77.
Divines never fail to persuade us, that the enormous distance which
separates God and man, necessarily renders the conduct of God a mystery
to us, and that we have no right to interrogate our master. Is this answer
satisfactory? Since my eternal happiness is at stake, have I not a right
to examine the conduct of God himself? It is only in hope of happiness
that men submit to the authority of a God. A despot, to whom men submit
only through fear, a master, whom they cannot interrogate, a sovereign
totally inaccessible, can never merit the homage of intelligent beings.
If the conduct of God is a mystery, it is not made for us. Man can neither
adore, admire, respect, nor imitate conduct, in which every thing is
inconceivable, or, of which he can often form only revolting ideas; unless
it is pretended, that we ought to adore every thing of which we are forced
to be ignorant, and that every thing, which we do not know, becomes for
that reason an object of admiration. Divines! You never cease telling us,
that the designs of God are impenetrable; that _his ways are not our
ways, nor his thoughts our thoughts_; that it is absurd to complain of
his administration, of the motives and springs of which we are totally
ignorant; that it is presumption to tax his judgments with injustice,
because we cannot comprehend them. But when you speak in this strain, do
you not perceive, that you destroy with your own hands all your profound
systems, whose only end is to explain to us the ways of the divinity,
which, you say, are impenetrable? Have you penetrated his judgments, his
ways, his designs? You dare not assert it, and though you reason about
them without end, you do not comprehend them any more than we do. If, by
chance, you know the plan of God, which you wish us to admire, while
most people find it so little worthy of a just, good, intelligent, and
reasonable being, no longer say, this plan is impenetrable. If you are as
ignorant of it as we are, have some indulgence for those who ingenuously
confess, they comprehend nothing in it, or that they see in it nothing
divine. Cease to persecute for opinions, of which you understand nothing
yourselves; cease to defame each other for dreams and conjectures, which
every thing seems to contradict. Talk to us of things intelligible and
really useful to men; and no longer talk to us of the impenetrable ways of
God, about which you only stammer and contradict yourselves.
By continually speaking of the immense depths of divine wisdom, forbidding
us to sound them, saying it is insolence to cite God before the tribunal
of our feeble reason, making it a crime to judge our master, divines
teach us nothing but the embarrassment they are in, when it is required to
account for the conduct of a God, whose conduct they think marvellous only
because they are utterly incapable of comprehending it themselves.
78.
Physical evil is commonly regarded as a punishment for sin. Diseases,
famines, wars, earthquakes, are means which God uses to chastise wicked
men. Thus, they make no scruple of attributing these evils to the severity
of a just and good God. But, do not these scourges fall indiscriminately
upon the good and bad, upon the impious and devout, upon the innocent and
guilty? How, in this proceeding, would they have us admire the justice
and goodness of a being, the idea of whom seems comforting to so many
wretches, whose brain must undoubtedly be disordered by their misfortunes,
since they forget, that their God is the arbiter, the sole disposer of the
events of this world. This being the case, ought they not to impute their
sufferings to him, into whose arms they fly for comfort? Unfortunate
father! Thou consolest thyself in the bosom of Providence, for the loss of
a dear child, or beloved wife, who made thy happiness. Alas! Dost thou not
see, that thy God has killed them? Thy God has rendered thee miserable,
and thou desirest thy God to comfort thee for the dreadful afflictions he
has sent thee!
The chimerical or supernatural notions of theology have so succeeded in
destroying, in the minds of men, the most simple, dear, and natural ideas,
that the devout, unable to accuse God of malice, accustom themselves to
regard the several strokes of fate as indubitable proofs of celestial
goodness. When in affliction, they are ordered to believe that God loves
them, that God visits them, that God wishes to try them. Thus religion has
attained the art of converting evil into good! A profane person said with
reason--_If God Almighty thus treats those whom he loves, I earnestly
beseech him never to think of me_.
Men must have received very gloomy and cruel ideas of their God, who is
called so good, to believe that the most dreadful calamities and piercing
afflictions are marks of his favour! Would an evil genius, a demon,
be more ingenious in tormenting his enemies, than the God of goodness
sometimes is, who so often exercises his severity upon his dearest
friends?
79.
What shall we say of a father, who, we are assured, watches without
intermission over the preservation and happiness of his weak and
short-sighted children, and who yet leaves them at liberty to wander at
random among rocks, precipices, and waters; who rarely hinders them from
following their inordinate appetites; who permits them to handle, without
precaution, murderous arms, at the risk of their life? What should we
think of the same father, if, instead of imputing to himself the evil that
happens to his poor children, he should punish them for their wanderings
in the most cruel manner? We should say, with reason, that this father is
a madman, who unites injustice to folly. A God, who punishes faults, which
he could have prevented, is a being deficient in wisdom, goodness, and
equity. A foreseeing God would prevent evil, and thereby avoid having to
punish it. A good God would not punish weaknesses, which he knew to be
inherent in human nature. A just God, if he made man, would not punish
him for not being made strong enough to resist his desires. _To punish
weakness is the most unjust tyranny._ Is it not calumniating a just God,
to say, that he punishes men for their faults, even in the present life?
How could he punish beings, whom it belonged to him alone to reform, and
who, while they have not _grace_, cannot act otherwise than they do?
According to the principles of theologians themselves, man, in his present
state of corruption, can do nothing but evil, since, without divine grace,
he is never able to do good. Now, if the nature of man, left to itself,
or destitute of divine aid, necessarily determines him to evil, or renders
him incapable of good, what becomes of the free-will of man? According to
such principles, man can neither merit nor demerit. By rewarding man for
the good he does, God would only reward himself; by punishing man for the
evil he does, God would punish him for not giving him grace, without which
he could not possibly do better.
80.
Theologians repeatedly tell us, that man is free, while all their
principles conspire to destroy his liberty. By endeavouring to justify
the Divinity, they in reality accuse him of the blackest injustice. They
suppose, that without grace, man is necessitated to do evil. They affirm,
that God will punish him, because God has not given him grace to do good!
Little reflection will suffice to convince us, that man is necessitated
in all his actions, that his free will is a chimera, even in the system of
theologians. Does it depend upon man to be born of such or such parents?
Does it depend upon man to imbibe or not to imbibe the opinions of his
parents or instructors? If I had been born of idolatrous or Mahometan
parents, would it have depended upon me to become a Christian? Yet,
divines gravely assure us, that a just God will damn without pity all
those, to whom he has not given grace to know the Christian religion!
Man's birth is wholly independent of his choice. He is not asked whether
he is willing, or not, to come into the world. Nature does not consult
him upon the country and parents she gives him. His acquired ideas, his
opinions, his notions true or false, are necessary fruits of the education
which he has received, and of which he has not been the director. His
passions and desires are necessary consequences of the temperament given
him by nature. During his whole life, his volitions and actions are
determined by his connections, habits, occupations, pleasures, and
conversations; by the thoughts, that are involuntarily presented to his
mind; in a word, by a multitude of events and accidents, which it is out
of his power to foresee or prevent. Incapable of looking into futurity,
he knows not what he will do. From the instant of his birth to that of
his death, he is never free. You will say, that he wills, deliberates,
chooses, determines; and you will hence conclude, that his actions are
free. It is true, that man wills, but he is not master of his will or
his desires; he can desire and will only what he judges advantageous to
himself; he can neither love pain, nor detest pleasure. It will be
said, that he sometimes prefers pain to pleasure; but then he prefers
a momentary pain with a view of procuring a greater and more durable
pleasure. In this case, the prospect of a greater good necessarily
determines him to forego a less considerable good.
The lover does not give his mistress the features which captivate him; he
is not then master of loving, or not loving the object of his tenderness;
he is not master of his imagination or temperament. Whence it evidently
follows, that man is not master of his volitions and desires. "But man,"
you will say, "can resist his desires; therefore he is free." Man resists
his desires, when the motives, which divert him from an object, are
stronger than those, which incline him towards it; but then his resistance
is necessary. A man, whose fear of dishonour or punishment is greater than
his love of money, necessarily resists the desire of stealing.
"Are we not free, when we deliberate?" But, are we masters of knowing or
not knowing, of being in doubt or certainty? Deliberation is a necessary
effect of our uncertainty respecting the consequences of our actions. When
we are sure, or think we are sure, of these consequences, we necessarily
decide, and we then act necessarily according to our true or false
judgment. Our judgments, true or false, are not free; they are necessarily
determined by the ideas, we have received, or which our minds have formed.
Man is not free in his choice; he is evidently necessitated to choose what
he judges most useful and agreeable. Neither is he free, when he suspends
his choice; he is forced to suspend it until he knows, or thinks he knows,
the qualities of the objects presented to him, or, until he has weighed
the consequences of his actions. "Man," you will say, "often decides in
favour of actions, which he knows must be detrimental to himself; man
sometimes kills himself; therefore he is free." I deny it. Is man master
of reasoning well or ill? Do not his reason and wisdom depend upon the
opinions he has formed, or upon the conformation of his machine? As
neither one nor the other depends upon his will, they are no proof of
liberty. "If I lay a wager, that I shall do, or not do a thing, am I
not free? Does it not depend upon me to do it or not?" No, I answer; the
desire of winning the wager will necessarily determine you to do, or not
to do the thing in question. "But, supposing I consent to lose the wager?"
Then the desire of proving to me, that you are free, will have become a
stronger motive than the desire of winning the wager; and this motive
will have necessarily determined you to do, or not to do, the thing in
question.
"But," you will say, "I feel free." This is an illusion, that may be
compared to that of the fly in the fable, who, lighting upon the pole of
a heavy carriage, applauded himself for directing its course. Man, who
thinks himself free, is a fly, who imagines he has power to move the
universe, while he is himself unknowingly carried along by it.
The inward persuasion that we are free to do, or not to do a thing, is but
a mere illusion. If we trace the true principle of our actions, we shall
find, that they are always necessary consequences of our volitions and
desires, which are never in our power. You think yourself free, because
you do what you will; but are you free to will, or not to will; to desire,
or not to desire? Are not your volitions and desires necessarily excited
by objects or qualities totally independent of you?
81.
"If the actions of men are necessary, if men are not free, by what right
does society punish criminals? Is it not very unjust to chastise beings,
who could not act otherwise than they have done?" If the wicked act
necessarily according to the impulses of their evil nature, society,
in punishing them, acts necessarily by the desire of self-preservation.
Certain objects necessarily produce in us the sensation of pain; our
nature then forces us against them, and avert them from us. A tiger,
pressed by hunger, springs upon the man, whom he wishes to devour; but
this man is not master of his fear, and necessarily seeks means to destroy
the tiger.
82.
"If every thing be necessary, the errors, opinions, and ideas of men
are fatal; and, if so, how or why should we attempt to reform them?" The
errors of men are necessary consequences of ignorance. Their ignorance,
prejudice, and credulity are necessary consequences of their inexperience,
negligence, and want of reflection, in the same manner as delirium or
lethargy are necessary effects of certain diseases. Truth, experience,
reflection, and reason, are remedies calculated to cure ignorance,
fanaticism and follies. But, you will ask, why does not truth produce this
effect upon many disordered minds? It is because some diseases resist all
remedies; because it is impossible to cure obstinate patients, who refuse
the remedies presented to them; because the interest of some men, and the
folly of others, necessarily oppose the admission of truth.
A cause produces its effect only when its action is not interrupted by
stronger causes, which then weakens or render useless, the action of the
former. It is impossible that the best arguments should be adopted by men,
who are interested in error, prejudiced in its favour, and who decline all
reflection; but truth must necessarily undeceive honest minds, who seek
her sincerely. Truth is a cause; it necessarily produces its effects, when
its impulse is not intercepted by causes, which suspend its effects.
83.
"To deprive man of his free will," it is said, "makes him a mere machine,
an automaton. Without liberty, he will no longer have either merit or
virtue." What is merit in man? It is a manner of acting, which renders
him estimable in the eyes of his fellow-beings. What is virtue? It is a
disposition, which inclines us to do good to others. What can there be
contemptible in machines, or automatons, capable of producing effects so
desirable? Marcus Aurelius was useful to the vast Roman Empire. By what
right would a machine despise a machine, whose springs facilitate its
action? Good men are springs, which second society in its tendency to
happiness; the wicked are ill-formed springs, which disturb the order,
progress, and harmony of society. If, for its own utility, society
cherishes and rewards the good, it also harasses and destroys the wicked,
as useless or hurtful.
84.
The world is a necessary agent. All the beings, that compose it, are
united to each other, and cannot act otherwise than they do, so long as
they are moved by the same causes, and endued with the same properties.
When they lose properties, they will necessarily act in a different way.
God himself, admitting his existence, cannot be considered a free
agent. If there existed a God, his manner of acting would necessarily
be determined by the properties inherent in his nature; nothing would be
capable of arresting or altering his will. This being granted, neither our
actions, prayers, nor sacrifices could suspend, or change his invariable
conduct and immutable designs; whence we are forced to infer, that all
religion would be useless.
85.
Were not divines in perpetual contradiction with themselves, they would
see, that, according to their hypothesis, man cannot be reputed free an
instant. Do they not suppose man continually dependent on his God? Are we
free, when we cannot exist and be preserved without God, and when we cease
to exist at the pleasure of his supreme will? If God has made man out of
nothing; if his preservation is a continued creation; if God cannot, an
instant, lose sight of his creature; if whatever happens to him, is an
effect of the divine will; if man can do nothing of himself; if all the
events, which he experiences, are effects of the divine decrees; if he
does no good without grace from on high, how can they maintain, that a man
enjoys a moment's liberty? If God did not preserve him in the moment
of sin, how could man sin? If God then preserves him, God forces him to
exist, that he may sin.
86.
The Divinity is frequently compared to a king, whose revolted subjects are
the greater part of mankind; and it is said, he has a right to reward the
subjects who remain faithful to him, and to punish the rebellious. This
comparison is not just in any of its parts. God presides over a machine,
every spring of which he has created. These springs act agreeable to the
manner, in which God has formed them; he ought to impute it to his own
unskilfulness, if these springs do not contribute to the harmony of the
machine, into which it was his will to insert them. God is a created king,
who has created to himself subjects of every description; who has formed
them according to his own pleasure whose will can never find resistance.
If God has rebellious subjects in his empire, it is because God has
resolved to have rebellious subjects. If the sins of men disturb the order
of the world, it is because it is the will of God that this order should
be disturbed.
Nobody dares to call in question the divine justice; yet, under the
government of a just God, we see nothing but acts of injustice and
violence. Force decides the fate of nations, equity seems banished from
the earth; a few men sport, unpunished, with the peace, property, liberty,
and life of others. All is disorder in a world governed by a God who is
said to be infinitely displeased with disorder.
87.
Although men are for ever admiring the wisdom, goodness, justice, and
beautiful order of Providence, they are, in reality, never satisfied with
it. Do not the prayers, continually addressed to heaven, shew, that men
are by no means satisfied with the divine dispensations? To pray to God
for a favour, shews diffidence of his watchful care; to pray to him to
avert or put an end to an evil, is to endeavour to obstruct the course
of his justice; to implore the assistance of God in our calamities, is to
address the author himself of these calamities, to represent to him, that
he ought, for our sake, to rectify his plan, which does not accord with
our interest.
The Optimist, or he who maintains that _all is well_, and who incessantly
cries that we live in _the best world possible_, to be consistent, should
never pray; neither ought he to expect another world, where man will be
happier. Can there be a better world than _the best world possible_? Some
theologians have treated the Optimists as impious, for having intimated
that God could not produce a better world, than that in which we live.
According to these doctors, it is to limit the power of God, and to
offer him insult. But do not these divines see, that it shews much less
indignity to God, to assert that he has done his best in producing this
world, than to say, that, being able to produce a better, he has had
malice enough to produce a very bad one? If the Optimist, by his system,
detracts from the divine power, the theologian, who treats him as a
blasphemer, is himself a blasphemer, who offends the goodness of God in
espousing the cause of his omnipotence.
88.
When we complain of the evils, of which our world is the theatre, we are
referred to the other world, where it is said, God will make reparation
for all the iniquity and misery, which, for a time, he permits here below.
But if God, suffering his eternal justice to remain at rest for a long
time, could consent to evil during the whole continuance of our present
world, what assurance have we, that, during the continuance of another
world, divine justice will not, in like manner, sleep over the misery of
its inhabitants?
The divines console us for our sufferings by saying, that God is patient,
and that his justice, though often slow, is not the less sure. But do
they not see, that patience is incompatible with a just, immutable, and
omnipotent being? Can God then permit injustice, even for an instant? To
temporize with a known evil, announces either weakness, uncertainty,
or collusion. To tolerate evil, when one has power to prevent it, is to
consent to the commission of evil.
89.
Divines every where exclaim, that God is infinitely just; but that _his
justice is not the justice of man_. Of what kind or nature then is
this divine justice? What idea can I form of a justice, which so often
resembles injustice? Is it not to confound all ideas of just and unjust,
to say, that what is equitable in God is iniquitous in his creatures?
How can we receive for our model a being, whose divine perfections are
precisely the reverse of human?
"God," it is said, "is sovereign arbiter of our destinies. His supreme
power, which nothing can limit, justly permits him to do with the works
of his own hands according to his good pleasure. A worm, like man, has no
right even to complain." This arrogant style is evidently borrowed from
the language, used by the ministers of tyrants, when they stop the mouths
of those who suffer from their violences. It cannot then be the language
of the ministers of a God, whose equity is highly extolled; it is not made
to be imposed upon a being, who reasons. Ministers of a just God! I will
inform you then, that the greatest power cannot confer upon your God
himself the right of being unjust even to the vilest of his creatures. A
despot is not a God. A God, who arrogates to himself the right of doing
evil, is a tyrant; a tyrant is not a model for men; he must be an object
execrable to their eyes.
Is it not indeed strange, that in order to justify the Divinity, they make
him every moment the most unjust of beings! As soon as we complain of his
conduct, they think to silence us by alleging, that _God is master_; which
signifies, that God, being the strongest, is not bound by ordinary rules.
But the right of the strongest is the violation of all rights. It seems
right only to the eyes of a savage conqueror, who in the heat of his fury
imagines, that he may do whatever he pleases with the unfortunate victims,
whom he has conquered. This barbarous right can appear legitimate only to
slaves blind enough to believe that everything is lawful to tyrants whom
they feel too weak to resist.
In the greatest calamities, do not devout persons, through a ridiculous
simplicity, or rather a sensible contradiction in terms, exclaim, that
_the Almighty is master_. Thus, inconsistent reasoners, believe, that the
_Almighty_ (a Being, one of whose first attributes is goodness,) sends you
pestilence, war, and famine! You believe that the _Almighty_, this good
being, has the will and right to inflict the greatest evils, you can bear!
Cease, at least, to call your God _good_, when he does you evil; say not,
that he is just, say that he is the strongest, and that it is impossible
for you to ward off the blows of his caprice.
_God_, say you, _chastises only for our good_. But what real good can
result to a people from being exterminated by the plague, ravaged by wars,
corrupted by the examples of perverse rulers, continually crushed under
the iron sceptre of a succession of merciless tyrants, annihilated by the
scourges of a bad government, whose destructive effects are often felt for
ages? If chastisements are good, then they cannot have too much of a good
thing! _The eyes of faith_ must be strange eyes, if with them they see
advantages in the most dreadful calamities, in the vices and follies with
which our species are afflicted.
90.
What strange ideas of divine justice must Christians have, who are taught
to believe, that their God, in view of reconciling to himself the human
race, guilty, though unconscious, of the sin of their fathers, has put to
death his own son, who was innocent and incapable of sinning? What should
we say of a king, whose subjects should revolt, and who, to appease
himself, should find no other expedient than to put to death the heir of
his crown, who had not participated in the general rebellion? "It is,"
the Christian will say, "through goodness to his subjects, unable of
themselves to satisfy divine justice, that God has consented to the cruel
death of his son." But the goodness of a father to strangers does not
give him the right of being unjust and barbarous to his own son. All
the qualities, which theology ascribes to God, reciprocally destroy one
another. The exercise of one of his perfections is always at the expense
of the exercise of another.
Has the Jew more rational ideas of divine justice than the Christian?
The pride of a king kindles the anger of heaven; _Jehovah_ causes the
pestilence to descend upon his innocent people; seventy thousand subjects
are exterminated to expiate the fault of a monarch, whom the goodness of
God resolved to spare.
91.
Notwithstanding the various acts of injustice, with which all religions
delight to blacken the Divinity, men cannot consent to accuse him of
iniquity. They fear, that, like the tyrants of this world, truth will
offend him, and redouble upon them the weight of his malice and tyranny.
They hearken therefore to their priests, who tell them, that their God
is a tender father; that this God is an equitable monarch whose object in
this world is to assure himself of the love, obedience and respect of
his subjects; who gives them liberty of acting only to afford them
an opportunity of meriting his favours, and of acquiring an eternal
happiness, which he does not owe them. By what signs can men discover
the tenderness of a father, who has given life to the greater part of his
children merely to drag out upon the earth a painful, restless, bitter
existence? Is there a more unfortunate present, than that pretended
liberty, which, we are told, men are very liable to abuse, and thereby to
incur eternal misery?
92.
By calling mortals to life, what a cruel and dangerous part has not the
Deity forced them to act? Thrown into the world without their consent,
provided with a temperament of which they are not masters, animated by
passions and desires inherent in their nature, exposed to snares which
they have not power to escape, hurried away by events which they could not
foresee or prevent, unhappy mortals are compelled to run a career, which
may lead them to punishments horrible in duration and violence.
Travellers inform us, that, in Asia, a Sultan reigned, full of fantastical
ideas, and very absolute in his whims. By a strange madness, this prince
spent his time seated at a table, upon which were placed three dice and a
dice-box. One end of the table was covered with pieces of silver, designed
to excite the avarice of his courtiers and people. He, knowing the
foible of his subjects, addresses them as follows: _Slaves, I wish your
happiness. My goodness proposes to enrich you, and make you all happy. Do
you see these treasures? Well, they are for you; strive to gain them; let
each, in his turn, take the box and dice; whoever has the fortune to throw
sixes, shall be master of the treasure. But, I forewarn you, that he who
has not the happiness to throw the number required, shall be precipitated
for ever into a dark dungeon, where my justice demands that he be burned
with a slow fire._ Upon this discourse of the monarch, the company look at
each other affrighted. No one wishes to expose himself to so dangerous
a chance. _What!_ says the enraged Sultan, _does no one offer to play? I
tell you then you must; My glory requires that you should play. Play then;
obey without replying._ It is well to observe, that the dice of the despot
are so prepared, that out of a hundred thousand throws, there is but one,
which can gain the number required. Thus the generous monarch has the
pleasure of seeing his prison well filled, and his riches seldom ravished
from him. Mortals! this SULTAN is your GOD; his TREASURE IS HEAVEN; his
DUNGEON IS HELL, and it is you who hold the DICE!
93.
Divines repeatedly assure us, that we owe Providence infinite gratitude
for the numberless blessings it bestows. They loudly extol the happiness
of existence. But, alas! how many mortals are truly satisfied with their
mode of existence? If life has sweets, with how much bitterness is it not
mixed? Does not a single chagrin often suffice suddenly to poison the most
peaceable and fortunate life? Are there many, who, if it were in their
power would begin again, at the same price, the painful career, in which,
without their consent, destiny has placed them?
They say, that existence is a great blessing. But is not this existence
continually troubled with fears, and maladies, often cruel and little
deserved? May not this existence, threatened on so many sides, be torn
from us any moment? Where is the man, who has not been deprived of a dear
wife, beloved child, or consoling friend, whose loss every moment intrudes
upon his thoughts? There are few, who have not been forced to drink of the
cup of misfortune; there are few, who have not desired their end. Finally,
it did not depend upon us to exist or not to exist. Should the bird then
be very grateful to the fowler for taking him in his net and confining him
in his cage for his diversion?
94.
Notwithstanding the infirmities and misery which man is forced to undergo,
he has, nevertheless, the folly to think himself the favourite of his God,
the object of all his cares, the sole end of all his works. He imagines,
that the whole universe is made for him; he arrogantly calls himself the
_king of nature_, and values himself far above other animals. Mortal! upon
what canst thou found thy haughty pretensions? It is, sayest thou, upon
thy soul, upon thy reason, upon the sublime faculties, which enable thee
to exercise an absolute empire over the beings, which surround thee. But,
weak sovereign of the world; art thou sure, one moment, of the continuance
of thy reign? Do not the smallest atoms of matter, which thou despisest,
suffice to tear thee from thy throne, and deprive thee of life? Finally,
does not the king of animals at last become the food of worms? Thou
speakest of thy soul! But dost thou know what a soul is? Dost thou not
see, that this soul is only the assemblage of thy organs, from which
results life? Wouldst thou then refuse a soul to other animals, who live,
think, judge, and compare, like thee; who seek pleasure, and avoid pain,
like thee; and who often have organs, which serve them better than thine?
Thou boastest of thy intellectual faculties; but do these faculties, of
which thou art so proud, make thee happier than other animals? Dost
thou often make use of that reason, in which thou gloriest, and to
which religion commands thee not to listen? Are those brutes, which thou
disdainest, because they are less strong or less cunning than thou art,
subject to mental pains, to a thousand frivolous passions, to a thousand
imaginary wants, to which thou art a continual prey? Are they, like thee,
tormented by the past, alarmed at the future? Confined solely to the
present, does not what you call their _instinct_, and what I call their
_intelligence_, suffice to preserve and defend them, and to supply them
with all they want? Does not this instinct, of which thou speakest with
contempt, often serve them better than thy wonderful faculties? Is not
their peaceful ignorance more advantageous to them, than those extravagant
meditations and worthless researches, which render thee unhappy, and
for which thy zeal urges thee even to massacre the beings of thy noble
species? Finally, have these beasts, like so many mortals, a troubled
imagination, which makes them fear, not only death, but likewise eternal
torments?
Augustus, hearing that Herod, king of Judea, had put his sons to death,
exclaimed: _It is much better to be Herod's hog, than his son_. As much
may be said of man. This dear child of Providence runs far greater risks
than all other animals; having suffered much in this world, does he not
imagine, that he is in danger of suffering eternally in another?
95.
Where is the precise line of distinction between man and the animals whom
he calls brutes? In what does he differ essentially from beasts? It is,
we are told, by his intelligence, by the faculties of his mind, and by his
reason, that man appears superior to all other animals, who, in all their
actions, move only by physical impulses, in which reason has no share.
But finally, brutes, having fewer wants than man, easily do without his
intellectual faculties, which would be perfectly useless in their mode of
existence. Their instinct is sufficient; while all the faculties of man
scarcely suffice to render his existence supportable, and to satisfy the
wants, which his imagination and his prejudices multiply to his torment.
Brutes are not influenced by the same objects, as man; they have not the
same wants, desires, nor fancies; and they very soon arrive to maturity,
while the mind of man seldom attains to the full enjoyment and free
exercise of its faculties and to such a use of them, as is conducive to
his happiness.
96.
We are assured, that the human soul is a simple substance. It should
then be the same in every individual, each having the same intellectual
faculties; yet this is not the case. Men differ as much in the qualities
of the mind, as in the features of the face. There are human beings
as different from one another, as man is from a horse or a dog. What
conformity or resemblance do we find between some men? What an infinite
distance is there between the genius of a Locke or a Newton, and that of a
peasant, Hottentot, or Laplander?
Man differs from other animals only in his organization, which enables
him to produce effects, of which animals are not capable. The variety,
observable in the organs of individuals of the human species suffices to
explain the differences in what is called their intellectual faculties.
More or less delicacy in these organs, warmth in the blood, mobility
in the fluids, flexibility or stiffness in the fibres and nerves, must
necessarily produce the infinite diversity, which we observe in the minds
of men. It is by exercise, habit and education, that the mind is
unfolded and becomes superior to that of others. Man, without culture and
experience, is as void of reason and industry, as the brute. A stupid man
is one, whose organs move with difficulty, whose brain does not easily
vibrate, whose blood circulates slowly. A man of genius is he, whose
organs are flexible, whose sensations are quick, whose brain vibrates
with celerity. A learned man is he, whose organs and brain have been long
exercised upon objects to which he is devoted.
Without culture, experience, or reason, is not man more contemptible and
worthy of hatred, than the vilest insects or most ferocious beasts? Is
there in nature a more detestable being, than a Tiberius, a Nero, or a
Caligula? Have those destroyers of the human race, known by the name of
conquerors, more estimable souls than bears, lions, or panthers? Are there
animals in the world more detestable than tyrants?
97.
The superiority which man so gratuitously arrogates to himself over other
animals, soon vanishes in the light of reason, when we reflect on human
extravagances. How many animals shew more mildness, reflection, and
reason, than the animal, who calls himself reasonable above all others?
Are there among men, so often enslaved and oppressed, societies as
well constituted as those of the ants, bees, or beavers? Do we ever
see ferocious beasts of the same species mangle and destroy one another
without profit? Do we ever see religious wars among them? The cruelty
of beasts towards other species arises from hunger, the necessity of
nourishment; the cruelty of man towards man arises only from the vanity of
his masters and the folly of his impertinent prejudices. Speculative men,
who endeavour to make us believe, that all in the universe was made for
man, are much embarrassed, when we ask, how so many hurtful animals can
contribute to the happiness of man? What known advantage results to
the friend of the gods, from being bitten by a viper, stung by a gnat,
devoured by vermin, torn in pieces by a tiger, etc.? Would not all these
animals reason as justly as our theologians, should they pretend that man
was made for them?
98.
AN EASTERN TALE.
At some distance from Bagdad, a hermit, renowned for his sanctity, passed
his days in an agreeable solitude. The neighbouring inhabitants, to obtain
an interest in his prayers, daily flocked to his hermitage, to carry him
provisions and presents. The holy man, without ceasing, gave thanks to God
for the blessings, with which providence loaded him. "O Allah!" said he,
"how ineffable is thy love to thy servants. What have I done to merit the
favours, that I receive from thy bounty? O Monarch of the skies! O Father
of nature! what praises could worthily celebrate thy munificence, and thy
paternal care! O Allah! how great is thy goodness to the children of men!"
Penetrated with gratitude, the hermit made a vow to undertake, for the
seventh time, a pilgrimage to Mecca. The war which then raged between the
Persians and Turks, could not induce him to defer his pious enterprise.
Full of confidence in God, he sets out under the inviolable safeguard of
a religious habit. He passes through the hostile troops without any
obstacle; far from being molested, he receives, at every step, marks of
veneration from the soldiers of the two parties. At length, borne down
with fatigue, he is obliged to seek refuge against the rays of a scorching
sun; he rests under the cool shade of a group of palm-trees. In this
solitary place, the man of God finds not only an enchanting retreat, but
a delicious repast. He has only to put forth his hand to gather dates
and other pleasant fruits; a brook affords him the means of quenching his
thirst. A green turf invites him to sleep; upon waking he performs the
sacred ablution, and exclaims in a transport of joy: "O Allah! how great
is thy goodness to the children of men!" After this perfect refreshment,
the saint, full of strength and gaiety, pursues his way; it leads him
across a smiling country, which presents to his eyes flowery hillocks,
enamelled meadows, and trees loaded with fruit. Affected by this sight, he
ceases not to adore the rich and liberal hand of providence, which appears
every where providing for the happiness of the human race. Going a little
farther, the mountains are pretty difficult to pass; but having once
arrived at the summit, a hideous spectacle suddenly appears to his view.
His soul is filled with horror. He discovers a vast plain laid waste
with fire and sword; he beholds it covered with hundreds of carcases,
the deplorable remains of a bloody battle, lately fought upon this field.
Eagles, vultures, ravens and wolves were greedily devouring the dead
bodies with which the ground was covered. This sight plunges our pilgrim
into a gloomy meditation. Heaven, by special favour, had enabled him to
understand the language of beasts. He heard a wolf, gorged with human
flesh, cry out in the excess of his joy: "O Allah! how great is thy
goodness to the children of wolves. Thy provident wisdom takes care to
craze the minds of these detestable men, who are so dangerous to our
species. By an effect of thy Providence, which watches over thy creatures,
these destroyers cut one another's throats, and furnish us with sumptuous
meals. O Allah! how great is thy goodness to the children of wolves!"
99.
A heated imagination sees in the universe only the blessings of heaven;
a calmer mind finds in it both good and evil. "I exist," say you; but is
this existence always a good? "Behold," you say, "that sun, which lights;
this earth, which for you is covered with crops and verdure; these
flowers, which bloom to regale your senses; these trees, which bend under
the weight of delicious fruits; these pure waters, which run only to
quench your thirst; those seas, which embrace the universe to facilitate
your commerce; these animals, which a foreseeing nature provides for your
use." Yes; I see all these things, and I enjoy them. But in many climates,
this beautiful sun is almost always hidden; in others, its excessive heat
torments, creates storms, produces frightful diseases, and parches the
fields; the pastures are without verdure, the trees without fruit, the
crops are scorched, the springs are dried up; I can only with difficulty
subsist, and now complain of the cruelties of nature, which to you
always appears so beneficent. If these seas bring me spices, and useless
commodities, do they not destroy numberless mortals, who are foolish
enough to seek them? The vanity of man persuades him, that he is the
sole center of the universe; he creates for himself a world and a God;
he thinks himself of sufficient consequence to derange nature at his
pleasure. But, concerning other animals, he reasons like an atheist. Does
he not imagine, that the individuals different from his own are automatons
unworthy of the blessings of universal providence, and that brutes cannot
be objects of his justice or goodness? Mortals regard the happy or unhappy
events, health or sickness, life or death, plenty or want, as rewards or
punishments for the right use or abuse of the liberty, with which they
erroneously imagine themselves endowed. Do they reason in the same manner
concerning the brutes? No. Although they see them, under a just God, enjoy
and suffer, equally subject to health and sickness, live and die, like
themselves, it never occurs to them to ask by what crime, these beasts
could have incurred the displeasure of their Creator? Have not men,
blinded by their religious prejudices, in order to free themselves from
embarrassment, carried their folly so far as to pretend that beasts have
no feeling?
Will men never renounce their foolish pretensions? Will they never
acknowledge that nature is not made for them? Will they never see that
nature has placed equality among all beings she has produced? Will they
never perceive that all organized beings are equally made to be born and
die, enjoy and suffer? Finally, far from having any cause to be puffed
up with their mental faculties, are they not forced to grant, that these
faculties often make them more unhappy than beasts, in which we find
neither opinions, prejudices, vanities, nor follies, which every moment
decide the welfare of man?
100.
The superiority which men arrogate over other animals, is chiefly founded
upon their opinion, that they have the exclusive possession of an immortal
soul. But ask them what this soul is, and they are puzzled. They will say,
it is an unknown substance--a secret power distinct from their bodies--a
spirit, of which they have no idea. Ask them how this spirit, which they
suppose to be like their God wholly void of extension, could combine
itself with their material bodies, and they will tell you, they know
nothing about it; that it is to them a mystery; that this combination is
an effect of the omnipotence of God. These are the ideas that men form of
the hidden, or rather imaginary substance, which they consider as the main
spring of all their actions!
If the soul is a substance essentially different from the body, and
can have no relation to it, their union would be, not a mystery, but an
impossibility. Besides, this soul being of a nature different from the
body, must necessarily act in a different manner; yet we see that this
pretended soul is sensible of the motions experienced by the body, and
that these two substances, essentially different, always acts in concert.
You will say that this harmony is also a mystery. But I will tell you,
that I see not my soul, that I know and am sensible of my body only, that
it is this body which feels, thinks, judges, suffers, and enjoys; and
that all these faculties are necessary results of its own mechanism, or
organization.
101.
Although it is impossible for men to form the least idea of the soul, or
the pretended spirit, which animates them; yet they persuade themselves
that this unknown soul is exempt from death. Every thing proves to them,
that they feel, that they think, that they acquire ideas, that they enjoy
and suffer, only by means of the senses, or material organs of the body.
Admitting even the existence of this soul, they cannot help acknowledging,
that it depends entirely upon the body, and undergoes, all its
vicissitudes; and yet it is imagined, that this soul has nothing, in
its nature, similar to the body; that it can act and feel without the
assistance of the body; in a word, that this soul, freed from the body,
and disengaged from its senses, can live, enjoy, suffer, experience
happiness, or feel excruciating torments. Upon such a tissue of
absurdities is built the marvellous opinion of the _immortality of the
soul_. If I ask, what are the motives for believing the soul immortal,
they immediately answer, that it is because man naturally desires to be
immortal: but, because you desire a thing ardently, can you infer that
your desire will be fulfilled? By what strange logic can we dare affirm,
that a thing cannot fail to happen, because we ardently desire it? Are
desires, begotten by the imagination, the measure of reality? The impious,
you say, deprived of the flattering hope of another life, wish to be
annihilated. Very well: may they not then as justly conclude, from _their_
desire, that they shall be annihilated, as you may conclude from _your_
desire, that you shall exist for ever.
102.
Man dies, and the human body after death is no longer anything but a mass
incapable of producing those motions, of which the sum total constituted
life. We see, that it has no longer circulation, respiration, digestion,
speech, or thought. It is pretended, that the soul is then separated from
the body; but to say, that this soul, with which we are unacquainted, is
the principle of life, is to say nothing, unless that an unknown power is
the hidden principle of imperceptible movements. Nothing is more natural
and simple, than to believe, that the dead man no longer lives: nothing
is more extravagant, than to believe, that the dead man is still alive. We
laugh at the simplicity of some nations, whose custom is to bury provision
with the dead, under an idea that it will be useful and necessary to them
in the other life. Is it then more ridiculous or absurd to suppose, that
men will eat after death, than to imagine, that they will think, that they
will be actuated by agreeable or disagreeable ideas, that they will enjoy
or suffer, and that they will experience repentance or delight, after the
organs, adapted to produce sensations or ideas, are once dissolved. To say
that the souls of men will be happy or unhappy after death, is in other
words to say, that men will see without eyes, hear without ears, taste
without palates, smell without noses, and touch without hands. And
persons, who consider themselves very reasonable, adopt these ideas!
103.
The dogma of the immortality of the soul supposes the soul to be a simple
substance; in a word, a spirit. But I ask again, what is a spirit? "It
is," say you, "a substance void of extension, incorruptible, having
nothing common with matter." If so, how is your soul born, and how does it
grow, how does it strengthen or weaken itself, how does it get disordered
and grow old, in the same progression as your body?
To all these questions you answer, that these are mysteries. If so, you
cannot understand them. If you cannot understand them, why do you decide
about a thing, of which you are unable to form the least idea? To believe
or affirm any thing, it is necessary, at least, to know in what it
consists. To believe in the existence of your immaterial soul, is to
say, that you are persuaded of the existence of a thing, of which it is
impossible for you to form any true notion; it is to believe in words
without meaning. To affirm that the thing is as you say, is the height of
folly or vanity.
104.
Are not theologians strange reasoners? Whenever they cannot divine the
_natural_ causes of things, they invent what they call _supernatural_;
such as spirits, occult causes, inexplicable agents, or rather _words_,
much more obscure than the _things_ they endeavour to explain. Let us
remain in nature, when we wish to account for the phenomena of nature; let
us be content to remain ignorant of causes too delicate for our organs;
and let us be persuaded, that, by going beyond nature, we shall never
solve the problems which nature presents.
Even upon the hypothesis of theology, (that is, supposing an all-powerful
mover of matter,) by what right would theologians deny, that their God
has power to give this matter the faculty of thought? Was it then more
difficult for him to create combinations of matter, from which thought
might result, than spirits who could think? At least, by supposing matter,
which thinks, we should have some notions of the subject of thought, or of
what thinks in us; whereas, by attributing thought to an immaterial being,
it is impossible to form the least idea of it.
105.
It is objected against us, that materialism makes man a mere machine,
which is said to be very dishonourable. But, will it be much more
honourable for man, if we should say, that he acts by the secret impulses
of a spirit, or by a certain _I know not what_, that animates him in a
manner totally inexplicable.
It is easy to perceive, that the supposed superiority of _spirit_ over
matter, or of the soul over the body, has no other foundation than men's
ignorance of this soul, while they are more familiarized with _matter_,
with which they imagine they are acquainted, and of which they think they
can discern the origin. But the most simple movements of our bodies are to
every man, who studies them, as inexplicable as thought.
106.
The high value, which so many people set upon spiritual substance, has no
other motive than their absolute inability to define it intelligibly. The
contempt shewn for _matter_ by our metaphysicians, arises only from the
circumstance, that familiarity begets contempt. When they tell us, that
_the soul is more excellent and noble than the body_, they say what they
know not.
107.
The dogma of another life is incessantly extolled, as useful. It
is maintained, that even though it should be only a fiction, it is
advantageous, because it deceives men, and conducts them to virtue. But
is it true, that this dogma makes men wiser and more virtuous? Are the
nations, who believe this fiction, remarkable for purity of morals? Has
not the visible world ever the advantage over the invisible? If those, who
are trusted with the instruction and government of men, had knowledge and
virtue themselves, they would govern them much better by realities, than
by fictions. But crafty, ambitious and corrupt legislators, have every
where found it better to amuse with fables, than to teach them truths,
to unfold their reason, to excite them to virtue by sensible and real
motives, in fine, to govern them in a rational manner. Priests undoubtedly
had reasons for making the soul immaterial; they wanted souls to people
the imaginary regions, which they have discovered in the other life.
Material souls would, like all bodies, have been subject to dissolution.
Now, if men should believe, that all must perish with the body, the
geographers of the other world would evidently lose the right of guiding
men's souls towards that unknown abode; they would reap no profits from
the hope with which they feed them, and the terrors with which they
oppress them. If futurity is of no real utility to mankind, it is, at
least, of the greatest utility to those, who have assumed the office of
conducting them thither.
108.
"But," it will be said, "is not the dogma of the immortality of the soul
comforting to beings, who are often very unhappy here below? Though it
should be an error, is it not pleasing? Is it not a blessing to man to
believe, that he shall be able to enjoy hereafter a happiness, which
is denied him upon earth?" Thus, poor mortals! you make your wishes the
measure of truth; because you desire to live for ever, and to be happier,
you at once conclude, that you shall live for ever, and that you shall be
more fortunate in an unknown world, than in this known world, where you
often find nothing but affliction! Consent therefore to leave, without
regret, this world which gives the greater part of you much more torment
than pleasure. Submit to the order of nature, which demands that you, as
well as all other beings, should not endure for ever.
We are incessantly told, that religion has infinite consolations for the
unfortunate, that the idea of the soul's immortality, and of a happier
life, is very proper to elevate man, and to support him under adversity,
which awaits him upon earth. It is said, on the contrary, that materialism
is an afflicting system, calculated to degrade man; then it puts him
upon a level with the brutes, breaks his courage, and shows him no other
prospect than frightful annihilation, capable of driving him to despair
and suicide, whenever he is unhappy. The great art of theologians is to
blow hot and cold, to afflict and console, to frighten and encourage.
It appears by theological fictions, that the regions of the other life are
happy and unhappy. Nothing is more difficult than to become worthy of the
abode of felicity; nothing more easy than to obtain a place in the abode
of torment, which God is preparing for the unfortunate victims of
eternal fury. Have those then, who think the other life so pleasant and
flattering, forgotten, that according to them, that life is to be attended
with torments to the greater part of mortals? Is not the idea of total
annihilation infinitely preferable to the idea of an eternal existence,
attended with anguish and _gnashing of teeth_? Is the fear of an end more
afflicting, than that of having had a beginning! The fear of ceasing to
exist is a real evil only to the imagination, which alone begat the dogma
of another life.
Christian ministers say that the idea of a happier life is joyous.
Admitted. Every person would desire a more agreeable existence than that
he enjoys here. But, if paradise is inviting, you will grant, that hell is
frightful. Heaven is very difficult, and hell very easy to be merited. Do
you not say, that a _narrow_ way leads to the happy regions, and a _broad_
way to the regions of misery? Do you not often say, that _the number of
the elect is very small, and that of the reprobate very large_? Is not
Grace, which your God grants but to a very few, necessary to salvation?
Now, I assure you, that these ideas are by no means consoling; that I had
rather be annihilated, once for all, than to burn for ever; that the
fate of beasts is to me more desirable than that of the damned; that the
opinion which relieves me from afflicting fears in this world, appears to
me more joyous, than the uncertainty arising from the opinion of a God,
who, master of his grace, grants it to none but his favourites, and
permits all others to become worthy of eternal torment. Nothing but
enthusiasm or folly can induce a man to prefer improbable conjectures,
attended with uncertainty and insupportable fears.
109.
All religious principles are the work of pure imagination, in which
experience and reason have no share. It is extremely difficult to combat
them, because the imagination, once prepossessed by chimeras, which
astonish or disturb it, is incapable of reasoning. To combat religion and
its phantoms with the arms of reason, is like using a sword to kill gnats;
as soon as the blow is struck, the gnats and chimeras come hovering round
again, and resume in the mind the place, from which they were thought to
have been for ever banished.
When we reject, as too weak, the proofs given of the existence of a God,
they instantly oppose to the arguments, which destroy that existence,
an _inward sense_, a deep persuasion, an invincible inclination, born in
every man, which holds up to his mind, in spite of himself, the idea of an
almighty being, whom he cannot entirely expel from his mind, and whom he
is compelled to acknowledge, in spite of the strongest reasons that can
be urged. But whoever will analyse this _inward sense_, upon which such
stress is laid, will perceive, that it is only the effect of a rooted
habit, which, shutting their eyes against the most demonstrative proofs,
subjects the greater part of men, and often even the most enlightened, to
the prejudices of childhood. What avails this inward sense, or this deep
persuasion, against the evidence, which demonstrates, that _whatever
implies a contradiction cannot exist_?
We are gravely assured, that the non-existence of God is not demonstrated.
Yet, by all that men have hitherto said of him, nothing is better
demonstrated, than that this God is a chimera, whose existence is totally
impossible; since nothing is more evident, than that a being cannot
possess qualities so unlike, so contradictory, so irreconcilable, as
those, which every religion upon earth attributes to the Divinity. Is not
the theologian's God, as well as that of the deist, a cause incompatible
with the effects attributed to it? Let them do what they will, it is
necessary either to invent another God, or to grant, that he, who, for so
many ages, has been held up to the terror of mortals, is at the same time
very good and very bad, very powerful and very weak, unchangeable and
fickle, perfectly intelligent and perfectly void of reason, of order
and permitting disorder, very just and most unjust, very skilful and
unskilful. In short, are we not forced to confess, that it is impossible
to reconcile the discordant attributes, heaped upon a being, of whom
we cannot speak without the most palpable contradictions? Let any
one attribute a single quality to the Divinity, and it is universally
contradicted by the effects, ascribed to this cause.
110.
Theology might justly be defined the _science of contradictions_. Every
religion is only a system, invented to reconcile irreconcilable notions.
By the aid of habit and terror, man becomes obstinate in the greatest
absurdities, even after they are exposed in the clearest manner. All
religions are easily combated, but with difficulty extirpated. Reason
avails nothing against custom, which becomes, says the proverb, _a second
nature_. Many persons, in other respects sensible, even after having
examined the rotten foundation of their belief, adhere to it in contempt
of the most striking arguments. Whenever we complain of religion, its
shocking absurdities, and impossibilities, we are told that we are not
made to understand the truths of religion; that reason goes astray, and is
capable of leading us to perdition; and moreover, that _what is folly
in the eyes of man, is wisdom in the eyes of God_, to whom nothing
is impossible. In short, to surmount, by a single word, the most
insurmountable difficulties, presented on all sides by theology, they get
rid of them by saying, these are _mysteries_!
111.
What is a mystery? By examining the thing closely, I soon perceive, that
a mystery is nothing but a contradiction, a palpable absurdity, a manifest
impossibility, over which theologians would oblige men humbly to shut
their eyes. In a word, a mystery is whatever our spiritual guides cannot
explain.
It is profitable to the ministers of religion, that people understand
nothing of what they teach. It is impossible to examine what we do not
comprehend; when we do not see, we must suffer ourselves to be led. If
religion were clear, priests would find less business.
Without mysteries there can be no religion; mystery is essential to it;
a religion void of mysteries, would be a contradiction in terms. The God,
who serves as the foundation of _natural religion_, or _deism_, is himself
the greatest of mysteries.
112.
Every revealed religion is filled with mysterious dogmas, unintelligible
principles, incredible wonders, astonishing recitals, which appear to have
been invented solely to confound reason. Every religion announces a hidden
God, whose essence is a mystery; consequently, the conduct, ascribed to
him, is no less inconceivable than his essence. The Deity has never spoken
only in an enigmatical and mysterious manner, in the various religions,
which have been founded in different regions of our globe; he has
everywhere revealed himself only to announce mysteries; that is, to
inform mortals, that he intended they should believe contradictions,
impossibilities, and things to which they were incapable of affixing any
clear ideas.
The more mysterious and incredible a religion is, the more power it has
to please the imagination of men. The darker a religion is, the more it
appears divine, that is, conformable to the nature of a hidden being, of
whom they have no ideas. Ignorance prefers the unknown, the hidden, the
fabulous, the marvellous, the incredible, or even the terrible, to what is
clear, simple, and true. Truth does not operate upon the imagination in so
lively a manner as fiction, which, in other respects, everyone is able to
arrange in his own way. The vulgar like to listen to fables. Priests and
legislators, by inventing religions and forging mysteries have served the
vulgar people well. They have thereby gained enthusiasts, women and fools.
Beings of this stamp are easily satisfied with things, which they are
incapable of examining. The love of simplicity and truth is to be
found only among the few, whose imagination is regulated by study and
reflection.
The inhabitants of a village are never better pleased with their parson,
than when he introduces Latin into his sermon. The ignorant always
imagine, that he, who speaks to them of things they do not understand, is
a learned man. Such is the true principle of the credulity of the people,
and of the authority of those, who pretend to guide nations.
113.
To announce mysteries to men, is to give and withhold; it is to talk in
order not to be understood. He, who speaks only obscurely, either seeks to
amuse himself by the embarrassment, which he causes, or finds his interest
in not explaining himself too clearly. All secrecy indicates distrust,
impotence, and fear. Princes and their ministers make a mystery of their
projects, for fear their enemies should discover and render them abortive.
Can a good God amuse himself by perplexing his creatures? What interest
then could he have in commanding his ministers to announce riddles and
mysteries?
It is said, that man, by the weakness of his nature, is totally incapable
of understanding the divine dispensations, which can be to him only a
series of mysteries; God cannot disclose to him secrets, necessarily above
his reach. If so, I answer again, that man is not made to attend to the
divine dispensations; that these dispensations are to him by no means
interesting; that he has no need of mysteries, which he cannot understand;
and consequently, that a mysterious religion is no more fit for him, than
an eloquent discourse is for a flock of sheep.
114.
The Deity has revealed himself with so little uniformity in the different
countries of our globe, that in point of religion, men regard one another
with hatred and contempt. The partisans of the different sects think
each other very ridiculous and foolish. Mysteries, most revered in one
religion, are objects of derision to another. God, in revealing himself
to mankind, ought at least, to have spoken the same language to all, and
saved their feeble minds the perplexity of inquiring which religion really
emanated from him, or what form of worship is most acceptable in his
sight.
A universal God ought to have revealed a universal religion. By what
fatality then are there so many different religions upon earth? Which is
really right, among the great number of those, each of which exclusively
pretends to be the true one? There is great reason to believe, that no
religion enjoys this advantage. Division and disputes upon opinions are
indubitable signs of the uncertainty and obscurity of the principles, upon
which they build.
115.
If religion were necessary at all, it ought to be intelligible to all. If
this religion were the most important concern of men, the goodness of God
would seem to demand, that it should be to them of all things the most
clear, evident, and demonstrative. Is it not then astonishing, that this
thing so essential to the happiness of mortals, is precisely that, which
they understand least, and about which, for so many ages, their teachers
have most disputed? Priests have never agreed upon the manner of
understanding the will of a God, who has revealed himself.
The world, may be compared to a public fair, in which are several
empirics, each of whom endeavours to attract the passengers by decrying
the remedies sold by his brothers. Each shop has its customers, who
are persuaded, that their quacks possess the only true remedies; and
notwithstanding a continual use of them, they perceive not the inefficacy
of these remedies, or that they are as infirm as those, who run after the
quacks of a different shop.
Devotion is a disorder of the imagination contracted in infancy. The
devout man is a hypochondriac, who only augments his malady by the
application of remedies. The wise man abstains from them entirely; he pays
attention to his diet, and in other respects leaves nature to her course.
116.
To a man of sense, nothing appears more ridiculous, than the opinions,
which the partisans of the different religions with equal folly entertain
of each other. A Christian regards the _Koran_, that is, the divine
revelation announced by Mahomet, as nothing but a tissue of impertinent
reveries, and impostures insulting to the divinity. The Mahometan, on the
other hand, treats the Christian as an _idolater_ and a _dog_. He sees
nothing but absurdities in his religion. He imagines he has a right to
subdue the Christian, and to force him, sword in hand, to receive the
religion of his divine prophet. Finally, he believes, that nothing is
more impious and unreasonable, than to worship a man, or to believe in the
Trinity. The _protestant_ Christian who without scruple worships a man,
and firmly believes the inconceivable mystery of the _trinity_,
ridicules the _catholic_ Christian for believing in the mystery of
_transubstantiation_; he considers him mad, impious, and idolatrous,
because he kneels to worship some bread, in which he thinks he sees God.
Christians of every sect regard, as silly stories, the incarnations
of _Vishnu_, the God of the Indies; they maintain, that the only true
_incarnation_ is that of _Jesus_, son of a carpenter. The deist, who
calls himself the follower of a religion, which he supposes to be that of
nature, content with admitting a God, of whom he has no idea, makes a jest
of all the mysteries, taught by the various religions in the world.
117.
Is there any thing more contradictory, impossible, or mysterious, than the
creation of matter by an immaterial being, who, though immutable, operates
continual changes in the world? Is any thing more incompatible with every
notion of common sense, than to believe, that a supremely good, wise,
equitable and powerful being presides over nature, and by himself directs
the movements of a world, full of folly, misery, crimes and disorders,
which by a single word, he could have prevented or removed? In fine,
whenever we admit a being as contradictory as the God of theology, how can
we reject the most improbable fables, astonishing miracles, and profound
mysteries.
118.
The Deist exclaims: "Abstain from worshipping the cruel and capricious God
of theology; mine is a being infinitely wise and good; he is the father of
men, the mildest of sovereigns; it is he who fills the universe with his
benefits." But do you not see that every thing in this world contradicts
the good qualities, which you ascribe to your God? In the numerous family
of this tender father, almost all are unhappy. Under the government of
this just sovereign, vice is triumphant, and virtue in distress. Among
those blessings you extol, and which only enthusiasm can see, I behold a
multitude of evils, against which you obstinately shut your eyes. Forced
to acknowledge, that your beneficent God, in contradiction with himself,
distributes good and evil with the same hand, for his justification you
must, like the priest, refer me to the regions of another life. Invent,
therefore, another God; for yours is no less contradictory than that of
theologians.
A good God, who does evil, or consents to the commission of evil; a
God full of equity, and in whose empire innocence is often oppressed; a
perfect God, who produces none but imperfect and miserable works; are not
such a God and his conduct as great mysteries, as that of the incarnation?
You blush for your fellow-citizens, who allow themselves to be persuaded,
that the God of the universe could change himself into a man, and die upon
a cross in a corner of Asia. The mystery of the incarnation appears to you
very absurd. You think nothing more ridiculous, than a God, who transforms
himself into bread, and causes himself daily to be eaten in a thousand
different places. But are all these mysteries more contradictory to
reason than a God, the avenger and rewarder of the actions of men? Is man,
according to you, free, or not free? In either case, your God, if he has
the shadow of equity, can neither punish nor reward him. If man is free,
it is God, who has made him free; therefore God is the primitive cause of
all his actions; in punishing him for his faults, he would punish him for
having executed what he had given him liberty to do. If man is not free to
act otherwise than he does, would not God be most unjust, in punishing man
for faults, which he could not help committing.
The minor, or secondary, absurdities, with which all religions abound, are
to many people truly striking; but they have not the courage to trace
the source of these absurdities. They see not, that a God full of
contradictions, caprices and inconsistent qualities, has only served
to disorder men's imaginations, and to produce an endless succession of
chimeras.
119.
The theologian would shut the mouths of those who deny the existence of
God, by saying, that all men, in all ages and countries, have acknowledged
some divinity or other; that every people have believed in an invisible
and powerful being, who has been the object of their worship and
veneration; in short, that there is no nation, however savage, who are not
persuaded of the existence of some intelligence superior to human nature.
But, can an error be changed into truth by the belief of all men? The
great philosopher Bayle has justly observed, that "general tradition, or
the unanimous consent of mankind, is no criterion of truth."
There was a time, when all men believed that the sun moved round the
earth, but this error was detected. There was a time, when nobody believed
the existence of the antipodes, and when every one was persecuted, who
had temerity enough to maintain it. At present, every informed man firmly
believes it. All nations, with the exception of a few men who are less
credulous than the rest, still believe in ghosts and spirits. No sensible
man now adopts such nonsense. But the most sensible people consider it
their duty to believe in a universal spirit!
120.
All the gods, adored by men, are of savage origin. They have evidently
been imagined by stupid people, or presented, by ambitious and crafty
legislators, to ignorant and uncivilized nations, who had neither capacity
nor courage to examine the objects, which through terror they were made to
worship.
By closely examining God, we are forced to acknowledge, that he evidently
bears marks of a savage nature. To be savage is to acknowledge no right
but force; it is to be cruel beyond measure; to follow only one's own
caprice; to want foresight, prudence, and reason. Ye nations, who call
yourselves civilized! Do you not discern, in this hideous character, the
God, on whom you lavish your incense? Are not the descriptions given
you of the divinity, visibly borrowed from the implacable, jealous,
revengeful, sanguinary, capricious inconsiderate humour of man, who has
not cultivated his reason? O men! You adore only a great savage, whom
you regard, however, as a model to imitate, as an amiable master, as a
sovereign full of perfection.
Religious opinions are ancient monuments of ignorance, credulity,
cowardice, and barbarism of their ancestors. Every savage is a child
fond of the marvellous, who believes every thing, and examines nothing.
Ignorant of nature, he attributes to spirits, enchantments, and to
magic, whatever appears to him extraordinary. His priests appear to him
sorcerers, in whom he supposes a power purely divine, before whom his
confounded reason humbles itself, whose oracles are to him infallible
decrees which it would be dangerous to contradict.
In religion, men have, for the most part, remained in their primitive
barbarity. Modern religions are only ancient follies revived, or presented
under some new form. If the savages of antiquity adored mountains, rivers,
serpents, trees, and idols of every kind; if the EGYPTIANS paid homage to
crocodiles, rats, and onions, do we not see nations, who think themselves
wiser than they, worship bread, into which they imagine, that through
the enchantments of their priests, the divinity has descended. Is not the
Bread-God the idol of many Christian nations, who, in this respect, are as
irrational, as the most savage?
121.
The ferocity, stupidity, and folly of uncivilized man have ever disclosed
themselves in religious practices, either cruel or extravagant. A spirit
of barbarity still survives, and penetrates the religions even of the
most polished nations. Do we not still see human victims offered to
the divinity? To appease the anger of a God, who is always supposed as
ferocious, jealous and vindictive, as a savage, do not those, whose manner
of thinking is supposed to displease him, expire under studied torments,
by the command of sanguinary laws? Modern nations, at the instigation of
their priests, have perhaps improved upon the atrocious folly of barbarous
nations; at least, we find, that it has ever entered the heads of savages
to torment for opinions, to search the thoughts, to molest men for the
invisible movements of their brains?
When we see learned nations, such as the English, French, German, etc.,
continue, notwithstanding their knowledge, to kneel before the barbarous
God of the Jews; when we see these enlightened nations divide into
sects, defame, hate, and despise one another for their equally ridiculous
opinions concerning the conduct and intentions of this unreasonable God;
when we see men of ability foolishly devote their time to meditate the
will of this God, who is full of caprice and folly, we are tempted to cry
out: O men, you are still savage!!!
122.
Whoever has formed true ideas of the ignorance, credulity, negligence, and
stupidity of the vulgar, will suspect opinions the more, as he finds
them generally established. Men, for the most part, examine nothing: they
blindly submit to custom and authority. Their religious opinions, above
all others, are those which they have the least courage and capacity to
examine: as they comprehend nothing about them, they are forced to be
silent, or at least are soon destitute of arguments. Ask any man, whether
he believes in a God? He will be much surprised that you can doubt it. Ask
him again, what he understands by the word _God_. You throw him into
the greatest embarrassment; you will perceive immediately, that he is
incapable of affixing any real idea to this word, he incessantly repeats.
He will tell you, that God is God. He knows neither what he thinks of it,
nor his motives for believing in it.
All nations speak of a God; but do they agree upon this God? By no means.
But division upon an opinion proves not its evidence; it is rather a sign
of uncertainty and obscurity. Does the same man always agree with himself
in the notions he forms of his God? No. His idea varies with the changes,
which he experiences;--another sign of uncertainty. Men always agree in
demonstrative truths. In any situation, except that of insanity, every one
knows that two and two make four, that the sun shines, that the whole
is greater than its part; that benevolence is necessary to merit the
affection of men; that injustice and cruelty are incompatible with
goodness. Are they thus agreed when they speak of God? Whatever they
think, or say of him, is immediately destroyed by the effects they
attribute to him.
Ask several painters to represent a chimera, and each will paint it in a
different manner. You will find no resemblance between the features, each
has given it a portrait, that has no original. All theologians, in giving
us a picture of God, give us one of a great chimera, in whose features
they never agree, whom each arranges in his own way, and who exists only
in their imaginations. There are not two individuals, who have, or can
have, the same ideas of their God.
123.
It might be said with more truth, that men are either skeptics or
atheists, than that they are convinced of the existence of God. How can we
be assured of the existence of a being, whom we could never examine,
and of whom it is impossible to conceive any permanent idea? How can
we convince ourselves of the existence of a being, to whom we are
every moment forced to attribute conduct, opposed to the ideas, we had
endeavoured to form of him? Is it then possible to believe what we cannot
conceive? Is not such a belief the opinions of others without having
any of our own? Priests govern by faith; but do not priests themselves
acknowledge that God is to them incomprehensible? Confess then, that a
full and entire conviction of the existence of God is not so general, as
is imagined.
Scepticism arises from a want of motives sufficient to form a judgment.
Upon examining the proofs which seem to establish, and the arguments which
combat, the existence of God, some persons have doubted and withheld their
assent. But this uncertainty arises from not having sufficiently examined.
Is it possible to doubt any thing evident? Sensible people ridicule an
absolute scepticism, and think it even impossible. A man, who doubted his
own existence, or that of the sun, would appear ridiculous. Is this more
extravagant than to doubt the non-existence of an evidently impossible
being? Is it more absurd to doubt one's own existence, than to hesitate
upon the impossibility of a being, whose qualities reciprocally destroy
one another? Do we find greater probability for believing the existence of
a spiritual being, than the existence of a stick without two ends? Is the
notion of an infinitely good and powerful being, who causes or permits
an infinity of evils, less absurd or impossible, than that of a square
triangle? Let us conclude then, that religious scepticism can result only
from a superficial examination of theological principles, which are in
perpetual contradiction with the most clear and demonstrative principles.
To doubt, is to deliberate. Scepticism is only a state of indetermination,
resulting from an insufficient examination of things. Is it possible for
any one to be sceptical in matters of religion, who will deign to revert
to its principles, and closely examine the notion of God, who serves
as its basis? Doubt generally arises either from indolence, weakness,
indifference, or incapacity. With many people, to doubt is to fear the
trouble of examining things, which are thought uninteresting. But religion
being presented to men as their most important concern in this and the
future world, skepticism and doubt on this subject must occasion perpetual
anxiety and must really constitute a bed of thorns. Every man who has not
courage to contemplate, without prejudice, the God upon whom all religion
is founded, can never know for what religion to decide: he knows not what
he should believe or not believe, admit or reject, hope or fear.
Indifference upon religion must not be confounded with scepticism. This
indifference is founded upon the absolute assurance, or at any rate upon
the probable belief, that religion is not interesting. A persuasion that
a thing which is pretended to be important is not so, or is only
indifferent, supposes a sufficient examination of the thing, without which
it would be impossible to have this persuasion. Those who call themselves
sceptics in the fundamental points of religion, are commonly either
indolent or incapable of examining.
124.
In every country, we are assured, that a God has revealed himself. What
has he taught men? Has he proved evidently that he exists? Has he informed
them where he resides? Has he taught them what he is, or in wh
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