Modern French Philosophy: a Study of the Development Since Comte
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Title: Modern French Philosophy: a Study of the Development Since Comte
Author: John Alexander Gunn
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MODERN FRENCH PHILOSOPHY: A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT SINCE COMTE ***
Modern French Philosophy
_A study of the Development since Comte._
by J. Alexander Gunn, M.A., PH.D.
_Fellow of the University of Liverpool; Lecturer in Psychology to the
Liverpool University Extension Board_
WITH A FOREWORD BY
HENRI BERGSON
_de l’Academie francaise et de l’Academie des
Sciences morales et politiques_
T. FISHER UNWIN, LTD.
LONDON: ADELPHI TERRACE
_First published in 1922._
_(All rights reserved)_
TO
MY TEACHER
ALEXANDER MAIR
PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL
AS A SMALL TOKEN OF ESTEEM
AND AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF HIS INSTRUCTION
Contents
FOREWORD BY HENRI BERGSON
PREFACE
CHAPTER I. ANTECEDENTS
CHAPTER II. MAIN CURRENTS SINCE 1851
CHAPTER III. SCIENCE
CHAPTER IV. FREEDOM
CHAPTER V. PROGRESS
CHAPTER VI. ETHICS
CHAPTER VII. RELIGION
CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
COMPARATIVE TABLE
INDEX
“Mais il n’y a pas que cette France, que cette France glorieuse, que
cette France révolutionnaire, cette France émancipatrice et initiatrice
du genre humain, que cette France d’une activité merveilleuse et comme
on l’a dit, cette France nourrie des idées générales du monde, il y a
une autre France que je n’aime pas moins, une autre France qui m’est
encore plus chère, c’est la France misérable, c’est la France vaincue
et humiliée, c’est la France qui est accablée, c’est la France qui
traîne son boulet depuis quatorze siècles, la France qui crie,
suppliante vers la justice et vers la liberté, la France que les
despotes poussent constamment sur les champs de bataille, sous prétexte
de liberté, pour lui faire verser son sang par toutes les artères et
par toutes les veines, oh! cette France-là, je l’aime.”—GAMBETTA,
_Discours_, 29 _September_, 1872.
“Les jeunes gens de tous les pays du monde qui sont venus dans les
campagnes de France combattre pour la civilisation et le droit seront
sans doute plus disposés à y revenir, apres la guerre chercher la
nourriture intellectuelle. Il importe qu’ils soient assurés de l’y
trouver, saine, abondante et forte.”—M. D. PARODI, _Inspecteur de
l’Académie de Paris, 1919_.
FOREWORD
_Je serais heureux que le public anglais sût le bien que je pense du
livre de M. Gunn, sur la philosophie francaise depuis 1851. Le sujet
choisi est neuf, car il n’existe pas, à ma connaissance, d’ouvrage
relatif à toute cette période de la philosophie française. Le beau
livre que M. Parodi vient de publier en français traite surtout des
vingt dernières années de notre activité philosophique. M. Gunn,
remontant jusqu’à Auguste Comte, a eu raison de placer ainsi devant
nous toute le seconde moitié du siècle passé. Cette période de
cinquante ans qui a précédée notre vingtième siècle est d’une
importance capitale. Elle constitue réellement notre dix-neuvième
siècle philosophique, car l’oeuvre même de Maine de Biran, qui est
antérieure, n’a été bien connue et étudiée qu’à ce moment, et la
plupart de nos idées philosophiques actuelles ont été élaborées pendant
ces cinquante ans._
_Le sujet est d’ailleurs d’une complication extrême, en raison du
nombre et de la variété des doctrines, en raison surtout de la
diversité des questions entre lesquelles se sont partagés tant de
penseurs. Dr. Gunn a su ramener toutes ces questions à un petit nombre
de problèmes essentiels : la science, la liberté, le progrès, la
morale, la religion. Cette division me paraît heureuse. Elle répond
bien, ce me semble, aux principales préoccupations de la philosophie
francaise. Elle a permis à l’auteur d’être complet, tout en restant
simple, clair, et facile à suivre._
_Elle présente, il est vrai, un inconvénient, en ce qu’elle morcelle la
doctrine d’un auteur en fragments dont chacun, pris à part, perd un peu
de sa vitalite et de son individualité. Elle risque ainsi de présenter
comme trop semblable à d’autres la solution que tel philosophe a donnée
de tel problème, solution qui, replacée dans l’ensemble de la doctrine,
apparaîtrait comme propre à ce penseur, originale et plus forte. Mais
cet inconvénient était inévitable et l’envers de l’avantage que je
signalais plus haut, celui de l’ordre, de la continuité et de la
clarté._
_Le travail du Dr. Gunn m’apparaît comme tout à fait distingué. Il
témoigne d’une information singulièrement étendue, précise et sûre.
C’est l’oeuvre d’un esprit d’une extrême souplesse, capable de
s’assimiler vite et bien la pensée des philosophes, de classer les
idées dans leur ordre d’importance, de les exposer méthodiquement et
les apprécier à leur juste valeur._
H. Bergson
[These pages are a revised extract from the more formal _Rapport_ which
was presented by M. Bergson to the University of Liverpool].
PREFACE
This work is the fruit of much reading and research done in Paris at
the Sorbonne and Bibliothèque nationale. It is, substantially, a
revised form of the thesis presented by the writer to the University of
Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy, obtained in 1921. The
author is indebted, therefore, to the University for permission to
publish. More especially must he record his deep gratitude to the
French thinkers who gave both stimulus and encouragement to him during
his sojourn in Paris. Foremost among these is M. Henri Bergson, upon
whose _rapport_ the Doctorate was conferred, and who has expressed his
appreciation of the work by contributing a Foreword for publication.
Mention must also be made of the encouragement given by the late M.
Emile Boutroux and by the eminent editor of the well-known _Revue de
Métaphysique et de Morale_, M. Xavier Léon, a leading spirit in the
_Société de Philosophie_, whose meetings the writer was privileged to
attend by invitation. Then MM. Brunschvicg, Levy-Bruhl, Lalande, Rey
and Lenoir, from time to time discussed the work with him and he must
record his appreciation of their kindness.
To Professor Mair of Liverpool is due the initial suggestion, and it
has been felt a fitting tribute to his supervision, criticism,
encouragement and sympathy that this book should be respectfully
dedicated to him by one of his grateful pupils. In the labour of
dealing with the proofs, the writer has to acknowledge the co-operation
of Miss M. Linn and Mr. J. E. Turner, M.A.
* * * * * * * * *
The method adopted in this history has been deliberately chosen for its
usefulness in emphasising the development of ideas. A purely
chronological method has not been followed. The biographical system has
likewise been rejected. The history of the development of thought
centres round problems, and it progresses in relation to these
problems. The particular manner in which the main problems presented
themselves to the French thinkers of the second half of the nineteenth
century was largely determined by the events and ideas which marked the
period from 1789 to 1851. For this reason a chapter has been devoted to
Antecedents. Between the Revolution and the _coup d’état_ of Napoleon
III., four distinct lines of thought are discernible. Then the main
currents from the year 1851 down to 1921 are described, with special
reference to the development of the main problems. The reconciliation
of _science_ and _conscience_ proved to be the main general problem,
which became more definitely that of Freedom. This in itself is
intimately bound up with the doctrines of progress, of history, of
ethics and religion. These topics are discussed in a manner which shows
their bearing upon each other. The conclusion aims at displaying the
characteristics of French thought which reveal themselves in the study
of these great problems. Its vitality, concreteness, clearness,
brilliance and precision are noted and a comparison made between French
thought and German philosophy.
From a general philosophical standpoint few periods could be so
fascinating. Few, if any, could show such a complete revolution of
thought as that witnessed since the year 1851. To bring this out
clearly is the main object of the present book. It is intended to serve
a double purpose. Primarily, it aims at being a contribution to the
history of thought which will provide a definite knowledge of the best
that has been said and thought among philosophers in France during the
last seventy years. Further, it is itself an appeal for serious
attention to be given to French philosophy. This is a field which has
been comparatively neglected by English students, so far as the
nineteenth century is concerned, and this is especially true of our
period, which is roughly that from Comte to Boutroux (who passed away
last month) and Bergson (who has this year resigned his professorship).
It is the earnest desire of the writer to draw both philosophical
students and lovers of France and its literature to a closer study and
appreciation of modern French philosophy. Emotion and sentiment are
inadequate bases for an _entente_ which is to be really _cordiale_
between any two peoples. An understanding of their deepest thoughts is
also necessary and desirable. Such an understanding is, after all, but
a step towards that iternationalisation of thought, that common fund of
human culture and knowledge, which sets itself as an ideal before the
nations of the world. _La philosophie n’a pas de patrie! Les idées sont
actuellement les forces internationales._
J. A. G.
THE UNIVERSITY,
LIVERPOOL,
_December_, 1921
CHAPTER I
(INTRODUCTORY)
ANTECEDENTS
HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE MAIN CURRENTS FROM THE REVOLUTION OF 1789 UP
TO 1851.
After the Revolution—The Traditionalists: Chateaubuand, De Bonald, De
Maistre, Lamennais, Lacordaire
_Main Currents:_
1. Maine de Biran.
2. The Eclectics: Cousin, Jouffroy.
3. The Socialists: Saint-Simon, Fourier and Cabal, Proudhon and Blanc.
4.Positivism: Auguste Comte.
CHAPTER I
ANTECEDENTS
This work deals with the great French thinkers since the time of
Auguste Comte, and treats, under various aspects, the development of
thought in relation to the main problems which confronted these men. In
the commencement of such an undertaking we are obliged to acknowledge
the continuity of human thought, to recognise that it tends to
approximate to an organic whole, and that, consequently, methods
resembling those of surgical amputation are to be avoided. We cannot
absolutely isolate one period of thought. For this reason a brief
survey of the earlier years is necessary in order to orient the
approach to the period specially placed in the limelight, namely
1851-1921.
In the world of speculative thought and in the realm of practical
politics we find reflected, at the opening of the century, the work of
the French Revolutionaries on the one hand, and that of Immanuel Kant
on the other. Coupled with these great factors was the pervading
influence of the Encyclopædists and of the thinkers of the
Enlightenment. These two groups of influences, the one sudden and in
the nature of a shock to political and metaphysical thought, the other
quieter but no less effective, combined to produce a feeling of
instability and of dissatisfaction at the close of the eighteenth
century. A sense of change, indeed of resurrection, filled the minds
and hearts of those who saw the opening of the nineteenth century. The
old aristocracy and the monarchy in France had gone, and in philosophy
the old metaphysic had received a blow at the hands of the author of
the Three Critiques.
No better expression was given to the psychological state of France at
this time than that of Alfred de Musset in his _Confession d’un Enfant
du Siècle_. _Toute la maladie du siècle présent_ (he wrote) _vient de
deux causes; le peuple qui a passé par ’93 et par 1814 porte au cœur
deux blessures. Tout ce qui était n’est plus; tout ce qui sera n’est
pas encore. Ne cherchez ailleurs le secret de nos maux._[1] De Musset
was right, the whole course of the century was marked by conflict
between two forces—on the one hand a tendency to reaction and
conservatism, on the other an impulse to radicalism and revolution.
[1] The extract is taken from _Première partie_, ch. 2. The book was
published in 1836. Somewhat similar sentiments are uttered with
reference to this time by Michelet. (See his _Histoire du XIXe
Siècle_, vol. i., p. 9).
It is true that one group of thinkers endeavoured, by a perfectly
natural reaction, to recall their fellow-countrymen, at this time of
unrest, back to the doctrines and traditions of the past, and tried to
find in the faith of the Christian Church and the practice of the
Catholic religion a rallying-point. The monarchy and the Church were
eulogised by Chateaubriand, while on the more philosophical side
efforts on behalf of traditionalism were made very nobly by De Bonald
and Joseph de Maistre. While they represented the old aristocracy and
recalled the theocracy and ecclesiasticism of the past by advocating
reaction and Ultramontanism, Lamennais attempted to adapt Catholicism
to the new conditions, only to find, as did Renan later, that “one
cannot argue with a bar of iron.” Not the brilliant appeals of a
Lacordaire, who thundered from Notre Dame, nor the modernism of a
Lamennais, nor the efforts in religious philosophy made by De Maistre,
were, however, sufficient to meet the needs of the time.
The old traditions and the old dogmas did not offer the salvation they
professed to do. Consequently various groups of thinkers worked out
solutions satisfactory to themselves and which they offered to others.
We can distinguish clearly four main currents, the method of
introspection and investigation of the inner life of the soul, the
adoption of a spiritualist philosophy upon an eclectic basis, the
search for a new society after the manner of the socialists and,
lastly, a positive philosophy and religion of humanity. These four
currents form the historical antecedents of our period and to a brief
survey of them we now turn.
* * * * * * * * *
I
To find the origin of many of the tendencies which appear prominently
in the thought of the second half of the nineteenth century,
particularly those displayed by the new spiritualistic philosophy
(which marked the last thirty years of the century), we must go back to
the period of the Revolution, to Maine de Biran (1766-1824)—a unique
and original thinker who laid the foundations of modern French
psychology and who was, we may note in passing, a contemporary of
Chateaubriand. A certain tone of romanticism marks the work of both the
literary man and the philosopher. Maine de Biran was not a thinker who
reflected upon his own experiences in retreat from the world. Born a
Count, a Lifeguardsman to Louis XVI. at the Revolution, and faithful to
the old aristocracy, he was appointed, at the Restoration, to an
important administrative position, and later became a deputy and a
member of the State Council. His writings were much greater in extent
than is generally thought, but only one important work appeared in
publication during his lifetime. This was his treatise, or _mémoire_,
entitled _Habitude_, which appeared in 1803. This work well illustrates
Maine de Biran’s historical position in the development of French
philosophy. It came at a tome when attention and interest, so far as
philosophical problems were concerned, centred round two “foci.” These
respective centres are indicated by Destutt de Tracy,[2] the disciple
of Condillac on the one hand, and by Cabanis[3] on the other. Both were
“ideologues” and were ridiculed by Napoleon who endeavoured to lay much
blame upon the philosophers. We must notice, however, this difference.
While the school of Condillac,[4] influenced by Locke, endeavoured to
work out a psychology in terms of abstractions, Cabanis, anxious to be
more concrete, attempted to interpret the life of the mind by reference
to physical and physiological phenomena.
[2] Destutt de Tracy, 1754-1836. His _Elements of Ideology_ appeared
in 1801. He succeeded Cabanis in the Académie in 1808, and in a
complimentary _Discours_ pronounced upon his predecessor claimed that
Cabanis had introduced medicine into philosophy and philosophy into
medicine. This remark might well have been applied later to Claude
Bernard.
[3] Cabanis, 1757-1808, _Rapports du Physique et du Morale de
l’Homme_, 1802. He was a friend of De Biran, as also was Ampère, the
celebrated physicist and a man of considerable philosophical power. A
group used to meet _chez Cabanis_ at Auteuil, comprising De Biran,
Cabanis, Ampère, Royard-Collard, Guizot, and Cousin.
[4] Condillac belongs to the eighteenth century. He died in 1780. His
_Traité des Sensations_ is dated 1754.
It is the special merit of De Biran that he endeavoured, and that
successfully, to establish both the concreteness and the essential
spirituality of the inner life. The attitude and method which he
adopted became a force in freeing psychology, and indeed philosophy in
general, from mere play with abstractions. His doctrines proved
valuable, too, in establishing the reality and irreducibility of the
mental or spiritual nature of man.
Maine de Biran took as his starting-point a psychological fact, the
reality of conscious effort. The self is active rather than
speculative; the self is action or effort—that is to say, the self is,
fundamentally and primarily, will. For the Cartesian formula _Cogito,
ergo sum,_ De Biran proposed to substitute that of _Volo, ergo sum_. He
went on to maintain that we have an internal and immediate perception
of this effort of will through which we realise, at one and the same
time, our self in its fullest activity and the resistance to its
operations. In such effort we realise ourselves as free causes and, in
spite of the doctrine of physical determinism, we realise in ourselves
the self as a cause of its own volitions. The greater the resistance or
the greater the effort, the more do we realise ourselves as being free
and not the absolute victims of habit. Of this freedom we have an
immediate consciousness, it is _une donnée immédiate de la conscience._
This freedom is not always realised, for over against the tendency to
action we must set the counter-tendency to passivity. Between these two
exists, in varying degrees of approach to the two extremes, _habitude_.
Our inner life is seen by the psychologist as a field of conflict
between the sensitive and the reflective side of our nature. It is this
which gives to the life of this _homo duplex_ all the elements of
struggle and tragedy. In the desires and the passions, says Maine de
Biran, the true self is not seen. The true self appears in memory,
reasoning and, above all, in will.
Such, in brief, is the outline of De Biran’s psychology. To his two
stages, _vie sensitive_ and _vie active_ (_ou réflexive_), he added a
third, _la vie divine_. In his religious psychology he upheld the great
Christian doctrines of divine love and grace as against the less human
attitude of the Stoics. He still insists upon the power of will and
action and is an enemy of the religious vice of quietism. In his
closing years De Biran penned his ideas upon our realisation of the
divine love by intuition. His intense interest in the inner life of the
spirit gives De Biran’s _Journal Intime_ a rank among the illuminating
writings upon religious psychology.
Maine de Biran was nothing if not a psychologist. The most absurd
statement ever made about him was that he was “the French Kant.” This
is very misleading, for De Biran’s genius showed itself in his
psychological power and not in critical metaphysics. The importance of
his work and his tremendous influence upon our period, especially upon
the new spiritualism, will be apparent. Indeed he himself foresaw the
great possibilities which lay open to philosophy along the lines he
laid down. “_Qui sait,_” he remarked,[5] “_tout ce que peut la
réflection concentrée et s’il n’y a pas un nouveau monde intérieur qui
pourra être découvert un jour par quelque ‘Colomb métaphysicien.’_”
With Maine de Biran began the movement in French philosophy which
worked through the writings of Ravaisson, Lachelier, Guyau, Boutroux
and particularly Bergson. A careful examination of the philosophy of
this last thinker shows how great is his debt to Maine de Biran, whose
inspiration he warmly acknowledges.
[5] Pensées, p. 213.
But it is only comparatively recently that Maine de Biran has come to
his own and that his real power and influence have been recognised.
There are two reasons for this, firstly the lack of publication of his
writings, and secondly his being known for long only through the work
of Cousin and the Eclectics, who were imperfectly acquainted with his
work. Upon this school of thought he had some little influence which
was immediate and personal, but Cousin, although he edited some of his
unpublished work, failed to appreciate its originality and value.
So for a time De Biran’s influence waned when that of Cousin himself
faded. Maine de Biran stands quite in a different category from the
Eclectics, as a unique figure at a transition period, the herald of the
best that was to be in the thought of the century. Cousin and the
Eclectic school, however, gained the official favour, and eclecticism
was for many years the “official philosophy.”
II
This Eclectic School was due to the work of various thinkers, of whom
we may cite Laromiguière (1756-1837), who marks the transition from
Condillac, Royer-Collard (1763-1845), who, abandoning Condillac, turned
for inspiration to the Scottish School (particularly to Reid), Victor
Cousin (1792-1867), Jouffroy (1796-1842) and Paul Janet (1823-1899),
the last of the notable eclectics. Of these “the chief” was Cousin. His
personality dominated this whole school of thought, his _ipse dixit_
was the criterion of orthodoxy, an orthodoxy which we must note was
supported by the powers of officialdom.
He rose from the Ecole Normale Supérieure to a professorship at the
Sorbonne, which he held from the Restoration (1815 to 1830), with a
break of a few years during which his course was suspended. These years
he spent in Germany, to which country attention had been attracted by
the work of Madame de Staël, _De l’Allemagne_ (1813). From 1830 to the
beginning of our period (1851) Cousin, as director of the Ecole Normale
Supérieure, as a _pair de France_ and a minister of state, organised
and controlled the education of his country. He thus exercised a very
great influence over an entire generation of Frenchmen, to whom he
propounded the doctrines of his spiritualism.
His teaching was marked by a strong reaction against the doctrines of
the previous century, which had given such value to the data of sense.
Cousin abhorred the materialism involved in these doctrines, which he
styled _une doctrine désolante_, and he endeavoured to raise the
dignity and conception of man as a spiritual being. In the Preface to
his Lectures of 1818, _Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien_ (Edition of 1853),
published first in 1846, he lays stress upon the elements of his
philosophy, which he presents as a true spiritualism, for it
subordinates the sensory and sensual to the spiritual. He upholds the
essentially spiritual nature of man, his liberty, moral responsibility
and obligation, the dignity of human virtue, disinterestedness,
charity, justice and beauty. These fruits of the spirit reveal, Cousin
claimed, a God who is both the author and the ideal type of humanity, a
Being who is not indifferent to the welfare and happiness of his
creatures. There is a vein of romanticism about Cousin, and in him may
be seen the same spirit which, on the literary side, was at work in
Hugo, Lamartine and De Vigny.
Cousin’s philosophy attached itself rather to the Scottish school of
“common sense” than to the analytic type of doctrine which had
prevailed in his own country in the previous century. To this he added
much from various sources, such as Schelling and Hegel among the
moderns, Plato and the Alexandrians among the ancients. In viewing the
history of philosophy, Cousin advocated a division of systems into four
classes—sensualism, idealism, scepticism and mysticism. Owing to the
insufficiency of his _vérités de sens commun_ he was prone to confuse
the history of philosophy with philosophy itself. There is perhaps no
branch of science or art so intimately bound up with its own history as
is philosophy, but we must beware of substituting an historical survey
of problems for an actual handling of those problems themselves.
Cousin, however, did much to establish in his native land the teaching
of the history of philosophy.
His own aim was to found a metaphysic spiritual in character, based
upon psychology. While he did not agree with the system of Kant, he
rejected the doctrines of the empiricists and set his influence against
the materialistic and sceptical tendencies of his time. Yet he cannot
be excused from “opportunism” not only in politics but in thought. In
order to retain his personal influence he endeavoured to present his
philosophy as a sum of doctrines perfectly consistent with the Catholic
faith. This was partly, no doubt, to counteract the work and influence
of that group of thinkers already referred to as Traditionalists, De
Bonald, De Maistre and Lamennais. Cousin’s efforts in this direction,
however, dissatisfied both churchmen and philosophers and gave rise to
the remark that his teaching was but _une philosophie de convenance_.
We must add too that the vagueness of his spiritual teaching was
largely responsible for the welcome accorded by many minds to the
positivist teaching of Auguste Comte.
While Maine de Biran had a real influence upon the thought of our
period 1851-1921, Cousin stands in a different relation to subsequent
thought, for that thought is largely characterised by its being a
reaction against eclecticism. Positivism rose as a direct revolt
against it, the neo-critical philosophy dealt blows at both, while
Ravaisson, the initiator of the neo-spiritualism, upon whom Cousin did
not look very favourably, endeavoured to reorganise upon a different
footing, and on sounder principles, free from the deficiencies which
must always accompany eclectic thought, those ideas and ideals to which
Cousin in his spiritualism had vaguely indicated his loyalty. It is
interesting to note that Cousin’s death coincides in date with the
foundation of the neo-spiritual philosophy by Ravaisson’s celebrated
manifesto to idealists, for such, as we shall see, was his _Rapport sur
la Philosophie au Dix-neuvième Siècle_ (1867). Cousin’s spiritualism
had a notable influence upon several important men—e.g., Michelet and
his friend Edgar Quinet, and more indirectly upon Renan. The latter
spoke of him in warm terms as un _excitateur de ma pensée_.[6]
[6] It is worth noting that two of the big currents of opposition,
those of Comte and Renouvier, arose outside the professional and
official teaching, free from the University which was entirely
dominated by Cousin. This explains much of the slowness with which
Comte and Renouvier were appreciated.
Among Cousin’s disciples one of the most prominent was Jouffroy of the
Collège de France. The psychological interest was keen in his work, but
his _Mélanges philosophiques_ (1883) showed him to be occupied with the
problem of human destiny. Paul Janet was a noble upholder of the
eclectic doctrine or older spiritualism, while among associates and
tardy followers must be mentioned Gamier, Damiron, Franke, Caro and
Jules Simon.
III
We have seen how, as a consequence of the Revolution and of the cold,
destructive, criticism of the eighteenth century, there was a demand
for constructive thought. This was a desire common not only to the
Traditionalists but to De Biran and Cousin. They aimed at intellectual
reconstruction. While, however, there were some who combated the
principles of the Revolution, as did the Traditionalists, while some
tried to correct and to steady those principles (as De Biran and
Cousin), there were others who endeavoured to complete them and to
carry out a more rigorous application of the Revolutionary watchwords,
_Liberté_, _Egalité_, _Fraternité_. The Socialists (and later Comte)
aimed at not merely intellectual, but social reconstruction.
The Revolution and the War had shown men that many changes could be
produced in society in a comparatively short time. This encouraged bold
and imaginative spirits. Endeavours after better things, after new
systems and a new order of society, showed themselves. The work of
political philosophers attempted to give expression to the socialist
idea of society. For long there had been maintained the ecclesiastical
conception of a perfect social order in another world. It was now
thought that humanity would be better employed, not in imagining the
glories of a “hereafter,” but in “tilling its garden,” in striving to
realise here on earth something of that blessed fellowship and happy
social order treasured up in heaven. This is the dominant note of
socialism, which is closely bound up at its origin, not only with
political thought, but with humanitarianism and a feeling essentially
religious. Its progress is a feature of the whole century.
The most notable expression of the new socialistic idea was that of
Count Henri de Saint-Simon (1760-1825), a relative of the celebrated
Duke. He had great confidence in the power of science as an instrument
for social reconstruction, and he took over from a medical man, Dr.
Burdin, the notions which, later on, Auguste Comte was to formulate
into the doctrines of Positivism. Saint-Simon’s influence showed itself
while the century was young, his first work _Lettres d’un Habitant de
Genève_ appearing in 1803. In this he outlined a scheme for placing the
authoritative power of the community, not in the hands of Church and
State, but in a freely elected body of thinkers and _artistes_. He then
endeavoured to urge the importance of order in society, as a
counterpart to the order erected by science in the world of knowledge.
To this end was directed his _Introduction aux Travaux scientifiques du
Dix-neuvième Siècle_ (1807-8). He also indicated the importance for
social welfare of abandoning the preoccupation with an imaginary
heaven, and pointed out that the more social and political theory could
be emancipated from the influence of theological dogmas the better. At
the same time he quite recognised the importance of religious beliefs
to a community, and his sociological view of religion foreshadowed
Guyau’s study, an important work which will claim our attention in due
course.
In 1813, Saint-Simon published his _Mémoire sur la Science de l’Homme_,
in which he laid down notions which were the germ of Auguste Comte’s
_Law of the Three Stages_. With the peace which followed the Battle of
Waterloo, a tremendous stimulus was given in France to industrial
activity, and Saint-Simon formulated his motto “All by industry and all
for industry.” Real power, he showed, lay not in the hands of
governments or government agents, but with the industrial class.
Society therefore should be organised in the manner most favourable to
the working class. Ultimate economic and political power rests with
them. These ideas he set forth in _L’Industrie_, 1817-18, _La
Politique_, 1819, _L’Organisateur_, 1819-30, _Le Système industriel_,
1821-22, _Le Catéchisme des Industriels_, 1822-24. Since 1817 among his
fellow- workers were now Augustin Thierry and young Auguste Comte, his
secretary, the most important figure in the history of the first half
of the century.
Finding that exposition and reasoned demonstration of his ideas were
not sufficient, Saint-Simon made appeal to sentiment by his _Appel aux
Philanthropes_, a treatise on human brotherhood and solidarity. This he
followed up in 1825 by his last book, published the year of his death,
_Le Nouveau Christianisme_. This book endeavoured to outline a religion
which should prove itself capable of reorganising society by
inculcating the brotherhood of man in a more effective manner than that
of the Christian Church. _Fraternité_ was the watchword he stressed,
and he placed women on an equal political and social footing with men.
He set forth the grave deficiencies of the Christian doctrines as
proclaimed by Catholic and Protestant alike. Both are cursed by the sin
of individualism, the virtue of saving one’s own soul, while no attempt
at social salvation is made. Both Catholics and Protestants he labelled
vile heretics, inasmuch as they have turned aside from the social
teaching of Christianity. If we are to love our neighbour as ourselves
we must as a whole community work for the betterment of our fellows
socially, by erecting a form of society more in accord with Christian
principles. We must strive to do it here and now, and not sit piously
getting ready for the next world. We must not think it religious to
despise the body or material welfare. God manifests Himself as matter
and spirit, so Religion must not despise economics but rather unite
industry and science as Love unites spirit and matter. Eternal Life, of
which Christianity makes so much, is not to be sought, argued
Saint-Simon, in another world, but here and now in the love and service
of our brothers, in the uplift of humanity as a whole.
Saint-Simon believed in a fated progress and an inevitable betterment
of the condition of the working classes. The influence of Hegel’s view
of history and Condorcet’s social theories is apparent in some of his
writings. His insistence upon organisation, social authority and the
depreciative view of liberty which he held show well how he was the
real father of many later doctrines and of applications of these
doctrines, as for example by Lenin in the Soviet system of Bolshevik
Russia. Saint-Simon foreshadowed the dictatorship of the proletariat,
although his scheme of social organisation involved a triple division
of humanity into intellectuals, artists and industrials. Many of his
doctrines had a definite communistic tendency. Among them we find
indicated the abolition of all hereditary rights of inheritance and the
distribution of property is placed, as in the communist programme, in
the hands of the organising authority. Saint-Simon had a keen insight
into modern social conditions and problems. He stressed the economic
inter-relationships and insisted that the world must be regarded as
“one workshop.” A statement of the principles of the Saint- Simonist
School, among whom was the curious character Enfantin, was presented to
the _Chambre des Députés_ in the critical year 1830. The disciples seem
to have shown a more definite communism than their master. The
influence of Saint-Simon, precursor of both socialism and positivism,
had considerable influence upon the social philosophy of the whole
century. It only diminished when the newer type of socialist doctrine
appeared, the so-called “scientific” socialism of Marx and Engels.
Saint-Simon’s impulse, however, acted powerfully upon the minds of most
of the thinkers of the century, especially in their youth. Renouvier
and Renan were fired with some of his ideas. The spirit of Saint-Simon
expressed itself in our period by promoting an intense interest in
philosophy as applied to social problems.
Saint-Simon was not, however, the only thinker at this time with a
social programme to offer. In contrast to his scheme we have that of
Fourier (1772-1837) who endeavoured to avoid the suppression of liberty
involved in the organisation proposed by Saint-Simon.
The psychology of Fourier was peculiar and it coloured his ethical and
social doctrine. He believed that the evils of the world were due to
the repression of human passions. These in themselves, if given liberty
of expression, would prove harmonious. As Newton had propounded the law
of the universal attraction of matter, Fourier endeavoured to propound
the law of attraction between human beings. Passion and desire lead to
mutual attraction; the basis of society is free association.
Fourier’s _Traité de l’Association domestique et agricole_ (1822),
which followed his _Théorie des Quatre Mouvements_ (1808), proposed the
formation of associations or groups, _phalanges_, in which workers
unite with capital for the self-government of industry. He, like Saint-
Simon, attacks idlers, but the two thinkers look upon the capitalist
manager as a worker. The intense class- antagonism of capitalist and
labourer had not yet formulated itself and was not felt strongly until
voiced on behalf of the proletariat by Proudhon and Marx. Fourier’s
proposals were those of a _bourgeois_ business man who knew the
commercial world intimately, who criticised it and condemned the
existing system of civilisation. Various experiments were made to
organise communities based upon his _phalanges_.
Cabet, the author of _Icaria_ (1840) and _Le nouveau Christianisme_,
was a further power in the promotion of socialism and owed not a little
of his inspiration to Robert Owen.
The most interesting and powerful of the early socialist philosophers
is undoubtedly Proudhon (1809- 1865), a striking personality, much
misunderstood.
While Saint-Simon, a count, came from the aristocracy, Fourier from the
_bourgeoisie_, Proudhon was a real son of the people, a mouthpiece of
the proletariat. He was a man of admirable mental energy and learning,
which he had obtained solely by his own efforts and by a struggle with
poverty and misery. Earnest and passionate by nature, he yet formulated
his doctrines with more sanity and moderation than is usually supposed.
Labels of “atheist” and “anarchist” have served well to misrepresent
him. Certainly two of his watchwords were likely enough to raise
hostility in many quarters. “God,” he said, “is evil,” “Property is
theft.” This last maxim was the subject of his book, published in 1840,
_Qu’est-ce que la propriété_? (_ou, Recherches sur le principe du droit
et du gouvernement_) to which his answer was “_C’est le vol!_” Proudhon
took up the great watchword of _Egalité_, and had a passion for social
justice which he based on “the right to the whole product of labour.”
This could only come by mutual exchange, fairly and freely. He
distinguished between private “property” and individual “possession.”
The latter is an admitted fact and is not to be abolished; what he is
anxious to overthrow is private “property,” which is a toll upon the
labour of others and is therefore ultimately and morally theft. He
hated the State for its support of the “thieves,” and his doctrines are
a philosophy of anarchy. He further enunciated them in _Système des
Contradictions économiques_ (1846) and _De la Justice_ (1858). In 1848
he was elected a _député_ and, together with Louis Blanc and Pierre
Leroux, figured in the Revolution of 1848. Blanc was a man of action,
who had a concrete scheme for transition from the capitalist régime to
the socialist state. He believed in the organisation of labour,
universal suffrage and a new distribution of wealth, but he disapproved
strongly of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of violent
revolution. Proudhon expressed his great admiration for Blanc.
The work of both of these men is a contradiction to the assertion put
forward by the Marxian school that socialist doctrine was merely
sentimental, utopian and “unscientific” prior to Marx. Many of the
views of Proudhon and Blanc were far more “scientific” than those of
Marx, because they were closer to facts. Proudhon differed profoundly
from Marx in his view of history in which he saw the influence of ideas
and ideals, as well as the operation of purely economic factors. To the
doctrine of a materialistic determination of history Proudhon rightly
opposes that of a spiritual determination, by the thoughts and ideals
of men.[7] The true revolution Proudhon and Blanc maintained can come
only through the power of ideas.
[7] Indeed, it is highly probable that with the growing
dissatisfaction with Marxian theories the work of Proudhon will come
into greater prominence, replacing largely that of Marx.
On the personal relations of Proudhon with Marx (1818-1883), who
was nine years younger than the Frenchman, see the interesting
volume by Marx’s descendant, M. Jean Longuet (Député de la Seine),
_La Politique internationale du Marxisme_ (_Karl Marx et la
France_) (Alcan).
On the debt of Marx to the French social thinkers see the account
given by Professor Charles Andler in his special edition of the
Communist Manifesto, _Le Manifeste Communiste_ (_avec introduction
historique et commentaire_), (Rieder), also the last section of
Renouvier’s Philosophie analytique de l’Histoire, vol. iv.
All these early socialist thinkers had this in common: they agreed that
purely economic solutions would not soothe the ills of society, but
that moral, religious and philosophic teaching must accompany, or
rather precede, all efforts towards social reform. The earliest of
them, Saint-Simon, had asserted that no society, no system of
civilisation, can endure if its spiritual principles and its economic
organisation are in direct contradiction. When brotherly love on the
one hand and merciless competition on the other are equally extolled,
then hypocrisy, unrest and conflict are inevitable.
IV
The rise of positivism ranks with the rise of socialism as a movement
of primary importance. Both were in origin nearer to one another than
they now appear to be. We have seen how Saint-Simon was imbued with a
spirit of social reform, a desire to reorganise human society. This
desire Auguste Comte (1798-1857) shared; he felt himself called to it
as a sacred work, and he extolled his “incomparable mission.” He
lamented the anarchical state of the world and contrasted it with the
world of the ancients and that of the Middle Ages. The harmony and
stability of mediaeval society were due, Comte urged, to the spiritual
power and unity of the Catholic Church and faith. The liberty of the
Reformation offers no real basis for society, it is the spirit of
criticism and of revolution. The modern world needs a new spiritual
power. Such was Comte’s judgment upon the world of his time. Where in
the modern world could such a new organising power be found? To this
question Comte gave an answer similar to that of Saint-Simon: he turned
to science. The influence of Saint-Simon is here apparent, and we must
note the personal relations between the two men. In 1817 Comte became
secretary to Saint-Simon, and became intimately associated with his
ideas and his work. Comte recognised, with his master, the supreme
importance of establishing, at the outset, the relations actually
obtaining and the relations possible between science and political
organisation. This led to the publication, in 1822, of a treatise,
_Plan des Travaux scientifiques nécessaires pour réorganiser la
Société_, which unfortunately led to a quarrel between the two friends,
and finally, in 1824, to a definite rupture by which Comte seems to
have been embittered and made rather hostile to his old master and to
have assumed an ungenerous attitude.[8] Comte, however, being a proud
and ambitious spirit, was perhaps better left alone to hew out his own
path. In him we have one of the greatest minds of modern France, and
his doctrine of positivism is one of the dominating features of the
first half of the century.
[8] In considering the relations between Saint-Simon and Comte we may
usefully compare those between Schelling and Hegel in Germany.
His break with Saint-Simon showed his own resources; he had undoubtedly
a finer sense of the difficulties of his reforming task than had
Saint-Simon; moreover, he possessed a scientific knowledge which his
master lacked. Such equipment he needed in his ambitious task, and it
is one of the chief merits of Comte that he _attempted_ so large a
project as the Positive Philosophy endeavoured to be.
This philosophy was contained in his _Cours de Philosophie positive_
(1830-1842), which he regarded as the theoretic basis of a reforming
political philosophy. One of the most interesting aspects of this work,
however, is its claim to be a positive _philosophy_. Had not Comte
accepted the Saint-Simonist doctrine of a belief in science as the
great future power in society? How then comes it that he gives us a
“_philosophie_ positive” in the first place and not, as we might
expect, a “_science_ positive”? Comte’s answer to this is that science,
no less than society itself, is disordered and stands in need of
organisation. The sciences have proceeded to work in a piecemeal
fashion and are unable to present us with _une vue d’ensemble_. It is
the rôle of philosophy to work upon the data presented by the various
sciences and, without going beyond these data, to arrange them and give
us an organic unity of thought, a synthesis, which shall produce order
in the mind of man and subsequently in human society.
The precise part to be played by philosophy is determined by the
existing state of scientific knowledge in the various departments and
so depends upon the general stage of intelligence which humanity has
reached. The intellectual development of humanity was formulated
generally by Comte in what is known as “The Law of the Three Stages,”
probably that part of his doctrine which is best known and which is
most obvious. “The Law of the Three Stages” merely sets down the fact
that in the race and in the individual we find three successive stages,
under which conceptions are formed differently. The first is the
theological or fictitious stage, in which the explanation of things is
referred to the operations of divine agency. The second is the
metaphysical or abstract stage when, for divinities, abstract
principles are substituted. In the third, the scientific or positive
stage, the human mind has passed beyond a belief in divine agencies or
metaphysical abstractions to a rational study of the effective laws of
phenomena. The human spirit here encounters the real, but it abstains
from pretensions to absolute knowledge; it does not theorise about the
beginning or the end of the universe or, indeed, its absolute nature;
it takes only into consideration facts within human knowledge. Comte
laid great emphasis upon the necessity of recognising the relativity of
all things. All is relative; this is the one absolute principle. Our
knowledge, he insisted (especially in his _Discours sur l’Esprit
positif_, 1844, which forms a valuable introduction to his thought as
expressed in his larger works), is entirely relative to our
organisation and our situation. Relativity, however, does not imply
uncertainty. Our knowledge is indeed relative and never absolute, but
it grows to a greater accord with reality. It is this passion for
“accord with reality” which is characteristic of the scientific or
positivist spirit.
The sciences are themselves relative and much attention is given by
Comte to the proper classification of the sciences. He determines his
hierarchy by arranging them in the order in which they have themselves
completed the three stages and arrived at positivity. Mathematics,
astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and sociology are his
arrangement. This last named has not yet arrived at the final stage; it
is but a science in the making. Comte, indeed, himself gives it its
name and founds it as the science of society, science applied to
politics, as was first indicated in his scheme of work and early ideas
of reform.
Comte strongly insists upon the social aspect of all knowledge and all
action. He even goes to the extent of regarding the individual man as
an abstraction; for him the real being is the social being, Humanity.
The study of human society has a double aspect, which is also a feature
of the other sciences. As in biology there is the study of anatomy on
the one hand and of physiology on the other, so in sociology we must
investigate both the laws which govern the existence of a society and
those which control its movements. The distinction is, in short, that
of the static and the dynamic, and it embraces in sociological study
the important conceptions of order and of progress. Comte very rightly
stressed the idea of progress as characteristic of modern times, but he
lamented its being divorced from that of order. He blamed the
conservative view of order as responsible for promoting among
“progressives” the spirit of anarchy and revolution. A positive
sociology would, Comte maintained, reconcile a true order, which does
not exclude change, with real progress, a movement which is neither
destructive nor capricious. Comte here owes a debt in part to
Montesquieu and largely to Condorcet, whose _Esquisse d’un Tableau
historique des Progrès de l’Esprit humain_ (1795) did much to promote
serious reflection upon the question of progress.
We have already noted Comte’s intense valuation of Humanity as a whole
as a Supreme Being. In his later years, notably after 1845, when he met
his “Beatrice” in the person of Clotilde de Vaux, he gave to his
doctrines a sentimental expression of which the Religion of Humanity
with its ritualism was the outcome. This positivist religion
endeavoured to substitute for the traditional God the Supreme Being of
Humanity—a Being capable, according to Comte, of sustaining our
courage, becoming the end of our actions and the object of our love. To
this he attached a morality calculated to combat the egoism which tends
to dominate and to destroy mankind and intended to strengthen the
altruistic motives in man and to raise them to the service of Humanity.
We find Comte, at the opening of our period, restating his doctrines in
his _Système de Politique positive_ (1851-54), to which his first work
was meant to serve as an Introduction. In 1856 he began his _Synthèse
subjective_, but he died in 1857. Comte is a singularly desolate
figure; the powers of officialdom were against him, and he existed
mainly by what he could gain from teaching mathematics and by a pension
raised by his admirers in England and his own land.
The influence of his philosophy has been great and far- reaching, but
it is the _spirit_ of positivism which has survived, not its content.
Subsequent developments in science have rendered much of his work
obsolete, while his Religion has never made a great appeal. Comte’s
most noted disciple, Littré (1801-1881), regarded this latter as a
retrograde step and confined himself to the early part of his master’s
work. Most important for us in the present work is Comte’s influence
upon subsequent thinkers in France, notably Taine, and we may add,
Renan, Cournot, and even Renouvier, although these last two promoted a
vigorous reaction against his philosophy in general. He influenced his
adversaries, a notable testimony. Actually, however, the positivist
philosophy found a greater welcome on the English side of the Channel
from John Stuart Mill, Spencer and Lewes. The empiricism of the English
school proved a more fruitful soil for positivism than the vague
spiritualism of Cousin to which it offered strong opposition.
Positivism, or rather the positivist standpoint in philosophy, turned
at a later date to reseek its fatherland and after a sojourn in England
reappears as an influence in the work of French thinkers near the end
of the century—e.g., Fouillée, Guyau, Lachelier, Boutroux and Bergson
express elements of positivism.
We have now passed in review the four main currents of the first half
of the century, in a manner intended to orient the approach to our
period, 1851-1921. Without such an orientation much of the subsequent
thought would lose its correct colouring and perspective. There is a
continuity, even if it be partly a continuity marked by reactions, and
this will be seen when we now examine the three general currents into
which the thought of the subsequent period is divided.
CHAPTER II
MAIN CURRENTS SINCE 1851
Introductory: Influence of events of 1848-1851—Reactionary character of
Second Empire—Disgust of many thinkers (e.g., Vacherot, Taine, Renan,
Renouvier, Hugo, Quinet)—Effects of 1870, the War, the Commune, and the
Third Republic.
General character of the Philosophy of the Period—Reaction against both
Eclecticism and Positivism.
THE THREE MAIN CURRENTS.
I. Positivist and naturalist current turning upon itself, seen in
Vacherot, Taine, and Renan.
II. Cournot, Renouvier, and the neo-critical philosophy.
III. The New Spiritual Philosophy, to which the main contributors were
Ravaisson, Lachelier, Boutroux, Fouillée, Guyau, Bergson, Blondel, and
Weber.
CHAPTER II
MAIN CURRENTS
The year 1851 was one of remarkable importance for France; a crisis
then occurred in its political and intellectual life. The hopes and
aspirations to which the Revolution of 1848 had given rise were
shattered by the _coup d’état_ of Louis Napoleon in the month of
December. The proclamation of the Second Empire heralded the revival of
an era of imperialism and reaction in politics, accompanied by a
decline in liberty and a diminution of idealism in the world of
thought. A censorship of books was established, the press was deprived
of its liberty, and the teaching of philosophy forbidden in
_lycées_.[1]
[1] The revival of philosophy in the _lycées_ began when Victor Drury
reintroduced the study of Logic.
Various ardent and thoughtful spirits, whose minds and hearts had been
uplifted by the events of 1848, hoping to see the dawn of an era
expressing in action the ideals of the first Revolution, _Liberté_,
_Egalité_, _Fraternité_, were bitterly disappointed. Social ideals such
as had been created by Saint-Simon and his school received a rude
rebuff from force, militarism and imperialism. So great was the mingled
disappointment and disgust of many that they left for ever the realm of
practical politics to apply themselves to the arts, letters or
sciences. Interesting examples of this state of mind are to be found in
Vacherot, Taine, Renan and Renouvier, and, we may add, in Michelet,
Victor Hugo and Edgar Quinet. The first of these, Vacherot, who had
succeeded Cousin as Professor of Philosophy at the Sorbonne, lost his
chair, as did Quinet and also Michelet, who was further deprived of his
position as Archivist. Hugo and Quinet, having taken active political
part in the events of 1848, were driven into exile. Disgust,
disappointment, disillusionment and pessimism characterise the attitude
of all this group of thinkers to political events, and this reacted not
only upon their careers but upon their entire philosophy. “With regard
to the Second Empire,” we find Renan saying,[2] “if the last ten years
of its duration in some measure repaired the mischief done in the first
eight, it must never be forgotten how strong this Government was when
it was a question of crushing the intelligence, and how feeble when it
came to raising it up.”
[2] In his Preface to _Souvenirs d’Enfance et de Jeunesse._
The disheartening end of the Empire in moral degeneracy and military
defeat only added to the gloominess, against which the Red Flag and the
red fires of the Commune cast a lurid and pathetic glow, upon which the
Prussians could look down with a grim smile from the heights of Paris.
Only with the establishment of the Third Republic in 1871, and its
ratification a few years later, does a feeling of cheerfulness make
itself felt in the thought of the time. The years from 1880 onwards
have been remarkable for their fruitfulness in the philosophic field—to
such an extent do political and social events react upon the most
philosophical minds. This is a healthy sign; it shows that those minds
have not detached themselves from contact with the world, that the
spirit of philosophy is a living spirit and not merely an academic or
professional product divorced from the fierce realities of history.
We have already indicated, in the treatment of the “Antecedents” of our
period, the dominance of Eclecticism, supported by the powers of
officialdom, and have remarked how Positivism arose as a reaction
against Cousin’s vague spiritualism. In approaching the second half of
the century we may in general characterise its thought as a reaction
against both eclecticism and positivism. A transitional current can be
distinguished where positivism turns, as it were, against itself in the
work of Vacherot, Taine and Renan. The works of Cournot and the
indefatigable Renouvier with his neo-criticism mark another main
current. Ultimately there came to triumph towards the close of the
century a new spiritualism, owing much inspiration to De Biran, but
which, unlike Cousin’s doctrines, had suffered the discipline of the
positivist spirit. The main contributors to this current are Ravaisson,
Lachelier, Fouillée and Guyau, Boutroux, Bergson, Blondel and Weber.
Our study deals with the significance of these three currents, and
having made this clear we shall then discuss the development of thought
in connection with the various problems and ideas in which the
philosophy of the period found its expression.
In his _Critique of Pure Reason_ Kant endeavoured, at a time when
speculation of a dogmatic and uncritical kind was current, to call
attention to the necessity for examining the instrument of knowledge
itself, and thereby discovering its fitness or inadequacy, as the case
might be, for dealing with the problems which philosophy proposes to
investigate. This was a word spoken in due season and, however much
subsequent philosophy has deviated from the conclusions of Kant, it has
at least remembered the significance of his advice. The result has been
that the attitude adopted by philosophers to the problems before them
has been determined largely by the kind of answer which they offer to
the problems of knowledge itself. Obviously a mind which asserts that
we can never be sure of knowing anything (or as in some cases, that
this assertion is itself uncertain) will see all questions through the
green-glasses of scepticism. On the other hand, a thinker who believes
that we do have knowledge of certain things and can be certain of
thiss, whether by objective proof or a subjective intuition, is sure to
have, not only a different conclusion about problems, but, what is
probably more important for the philosophic spirit, a different means
of approaching them.
Writing in 1860 on the general state of philosophy, Renan pointed out,
in his Essay _La Métaphysique el son Avenir_[3] that metaphysical
speculation, strictly so-called, had been in abeyance for thirty years,
and did not seem inclined to continue the traditions of Kant, Hegel,
Hamilton and Cousin. The reasons which he gave for this depression of
the philosophical market were, firstly, the feeling of the
impossibility of ultimate knowledge, a scepticism of the instrument, so
far as the human mind was concerned, and secondly, the rather
disdainful attitude adopted by many minds towards philosophy owing to
the growing importance of science—in short, the question, “Is there any
place left for philosophy; has it any _raison d’être_?”
[3] Essay published later (1876) in his _Dialogues et Fragments
philosophiques_. Cf. especially pp. 265-266.
The progress of the positive sciences, and the assertions of many that
philosophy was futile and treacherous, led philosophy to give an
account of itself by a kind of _apologia pro vita sua_. In the face of
remarks akin to that of Newton’s “Physics beware of metaphysics,” the
latter had to bestir itself or pass out of existence. It was, indeed,
this extinction which the more ardent and devoted scientific spirits
heralded, re-iterating the war-cry of Auguste Comte.
It was a crisis, in fact, for philosophy. Was it to become merely a
universal science? Was it to abandon the task of solving the problems
of the universe by rapid intuitions and a _priori_ constructions and
undertake the construction of a science of the whole, built up from the
data and results of the science of the parts—_i.e._, the separate
sciences of nature? Was there, then, to be no place for metaphysics in
this classification of the sciences to which the current of thought was
tending with increasing impetuosity? Was a science of primary or
ultimate truths a useless chimera, to be rejected entirely by the human
mind in favour of an all-sufficing belief in positive science? These
were the questions which perplexed the thoughtful minds of that time.
We shall do well, therefore, in our survey of the half century before
us, to investigate the two problems which were stressed by Renan in the
essay we have quoted, for his acute mind possessed a unique power of
sensing the feeling and thought of his time. Our preliminary task will
be the examination of the general attitude to knowledge adopted by the
various thinkers and schools of thought, following this by an inquiry
into the attitude adopted to science itself and its relation to
philosophy.
I
With these considerations in mind, let us examine the three currents of
thought in our period beginning with that which is at once a
prolongation of positivism and a transformation of it, a current
expressed in the work of Vacherot, Taine and Renan.
Etienne Vacherot (1809-1897) was partially a disciple of Victor Cousin
and a representative also of the positivist attitude to knowledge. His
work, however, passed beyond the bounds indicated by these names. He
remained a convinced naturalist and believer in positive science, but,
unlike Comte, he did not despise metaphysical inquiry, and he sought to
find a place for it in thought. Vacherot, who had won a reputation for
himself by an historical work on the Alexandrian School, became tne
director of the Ecole Normale Supérieure, an important position in the
intellectual world. He here advocated the doctrines by which he sought
to give a to metaphysics. His most important book, _La Métaphysique et
la Science_, in three volumes, appeared in 1858. He suffered
imprisonment the following year for His liberal principles under the
Empire which had already deprived him of his position at the Sorbonne.
The general attitude to knowledge adopted by Vacherot recalls in some
respects the metaphysical doctrines of Spinoza, and he endeavours to
combine the purely naturalistic view of the world with a metaphysical
conception. The result is a profound and, for Vacherot, irreconcilable
dualism, in which the real and the ideal are set against one another in
rigorous contrast, and the gap between them is not bridged or even
attempted to be filled up, as, at a later date, was the task assumed by
Fouillee in his philosophy of _idées-forces_. For Vacherot the world is
a unity, eternal and infinite, but lacking perfection. Perfection, the
ideal, is incompatible with reality. The real is not at all ideal, and
the ideal has no reality.[4] In this unsatisfactory dualism Vacherot
leaves us. His doctrine, although making a superficial appeal by its
seeming positivism on the one hand, and its maintenance of the notion
of the ideal or perfection on the other, is actually far more
paradoxical than that which asserts that ultimately it is the ideal
only which is real. While St. Anselm had endeavoured to establish by
his proof of the existence of God the reality of perfection, Vacherot,
by a reversal of this proof, arrives at the opposite conclusion, and at
a point where it seems that it would be for the ideal an imperfection
to exist. The absolute existence of all things is thus separated from
the ideal, and no attempt is made to relate the two, as Spinoza had so
rigorously done, by maintaining that reality _is_ perfection.[5]
[4] It is interesting to contrast this with the attitude of the new
spiritualists, especially Fouillée’s conception of idees-forces, of
ideas and ideals realising themselves. See also Guyau’s attitude.
“_L’idéal n’est-il pas, sur la terre où nous sommes
Plus fécond et plus beau que la réalité?”
—Illusion féconde_.
[5] Vacherot contributed further to the thought of his time, notably
by a book on religion, 1869, and later in life seems to have become
sympathetic to the New Spiritualism, on which he also wrote a book in
1884.
The influence of Vacherot was in some measure continued in that of his
pupil, Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893), a thinker who had considerable
influence upon the development of thought in our period. His ability as
a critic of art and literature was perhaps more marked than his purely
philosophical influence, but this is, nevertheless, important, and
cannot be overlooked.
Taine was a student of the Ecole Normale, and in 1851 was appointed to
teach philosophy at Nevers. The _coup d’état_, however, changed his
career, and he turned to literature as his main field, writing a work
on La Fontaine for his doctorate in 1853. In the year of Comte’s death
(1857) Taine published his book, _Les Philosophes français du XIXe
Siècle_, in which he turned his powerful batteries of criticism upon
the vague spiritualism professed by Cousin and officially favoured in
France at that time.[6] By his adverse criticism of Cousin and the
Eclectic School, Taine placed his influence upon the side of the
positivist followers of Comte. It would, however, be erroneous to
regard him as a mere disciple of Comte, as Taine’s positivism was in
its general form a wider doctrine, yet more rigorously scientific in
some respects than that of Comte. There was also an important
difference in their attitude to metaphysics. Taine upheld strongly the
value, and, indeed, the necessity, of a metaphysical doctrine. He never
made much of any debt or allegiance to Comte.
[6] See his chapter xii. on “The Success of Eclecticism,” pp. 283-307.
Cousin, he criticises at length; De Biran, Royer-Collard and Jouffroy
are included in his censures. We might mention that this book was
first issued in the form of articles in the _Revue de l’Instruction
publique_ during the years 1855, 1856.
In 1860 a volume dealing with the _Philosophy of Art_ appeared from his
pen, in which he not only endeavoured to relate the art of a period to
the general environment in which it arose, but, in addition, he dealt
with certain psychological aspects of the problem. Largely as a result
of the talent displayed in this work, he was appointed in 1864 to tne
chair of the History of Art and Æsthetics in the Ecole des Beaux-Arts.
Taine’s interest in philosophy, and especially in psychological
problems, was more prominently demon strated in his book _De
l’Intelligence_, the two volumes of which appeared in 1870. In this
work he takes a strict view of the human intelligence as a mechanism,
the workings of which he sets forth in a precise and cold manner. His
treatment of knowledge is akin, in some respects, to the doctrines of
the English Utilitarian and Evolutionary School as represented by John
Stuart Mill, Bain and Spencer. The main feature of the Darwinian
doctrine is set by Taine in the foreground of epistemology. There is,
according to him, “a struggle for existence” in the realm of the
individual consciousness no less than in the external world. This inner
conflict is between psychical elements which, when victorious, result
in sense-perception. This awareness, or _hallucination vraie_, is not
knowledge of a purely speculative character; it is (as, at a later
date, Bergson was to maintain in his doctrine of perception)
essentially bound up with action, with the instinct and mechanism of
movement.
One of the most notable features of Taine’s work is his attitude to
psychology. He rejects absolutely the rather scornful attitude adopted
with regard to this science by Comte; at the same time he shatters the
flimsy edifice of the eclectics in order to lay the foundation of a
scientific psychology. “The true and independent psychology is,” he
remarks, “a magnificent science which lays the foundation of the
philosophy of history, which gives life to physiology and opens up the
pathway to metaphysics.”[7] Our debt to Taine is immense, for he
initiated the great current of experimental psychology for which his
country has since become famous. It is not our intention in this
present work to follow out in any detail the purely psychological work
of the period. Psychology has more and more become differentiated from,
and to a large degree, independent of, philosophy in a strictly
metaphysical meaning of that word. Yet we shall do well in passing to
note that through Taine’s work the scientific attitude to psychologv
and its many problems was taken up and developed by Ribot, whose study
of English Psychology appeared in the same year as Taine’s
_Intelligence_. Particularly by his frequent illustrations drawn from
abnormal psychology, Taine “set the tone” for contemporary and later
study of mental activity of this type. Ribot’s later books have been
mainly devoted to the study of “the abnormal,”and his efforts are
characteristic of the labours of the Paris School, comprising Charcot,
Paulhan, Binet and Janet.[8] French psychology has in consequence
become a clearly defined “school,” with characteristics peculiar to
itself which distinguish it at once from the psychophysical research of
German workers and from the analytic labours of English psychologists.
Its debt to Taine at the outset must not be forgotten.
[7] De l’Intelligence, Conclusion.
[8] By Charcot (1825-1893), _Leçons sur les Maladies du Système
nerveux faites à la Salpêtrière_ and _Localisation dans les Maladies
du Cerveau et de la Moelle épinière_, 1880.
By Ribot (1839-1916), _Hérédité, Etude psychologique_, 1873, Eng.
trans., 1875; _Les Maladies de la Mémoire, Essai dans la
Psychologie positive_, 1881, Eng. trans., 1882; _Maladies de la
Volonté_, 1883, Eng. trans., 1884; _Maladies de la Personnalité_,
1885, Eng. trans., 1895. Ribot expressed regret at the way in which
abnormal psychology has been neglected in England. See his critique
of Bain in his _Psychologie anglaise contemporaine_. In 1870 Ribot
declared the independence of psychology as a study, separate from
philosophy. Ribot had very wide interests beyond pure psychology, a
fact which is stressed by his commencing in 1876 the periodical _La
Revue philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger_.
By Binet (1857-191!), _Magnétisme animal_, 1886; _Les Altérations
de la personnalité_, 1892; _L’Introduction à la Psychologie
expérimentale_, 1894. He founded the review _L’Année psychologique
in 1895_.
By Janet (Pierre), born 1859 now Professeur at the Collège de France,
_L’Automatisme psychologique_, 1889; _Etat mental des Hystériques_,
1894; and _Neuroses et Idées-fixes_, 1898. He founded the _Journal de
Psychologie_.
By Paulhan, _Phénomenes affectifs and L’Activité mentale_.
To the fame of the Paris School of Psychology must now be added that of
the Nancy School embracing the work of Coué.
The War and the subsequent course of events in France seemed to deepen
the sadness and pessimism of Taine’s character. He described himself as
_naturellement triste_, and finally his severe positivism developed
into a rigorous stoicism akin to that of Marcus Aurelius and Spinoza.
This attitude of mind coloured his unfinished historical work, _Les
Origines de la France contemporaine_, upon which he was engaged for the
last years of his life (1876-1894). It may be noticed for its bearing
upon the study of sociological problems which it indirectly encouraged.
Just as Taine had regarded a work of art as the product of social
environment, so he looks upon historical events. This history bears all
the marks of Taine’s rigid, positive philosophy, intensified by his
later stoicism. The Revolution of 1789 is treated in a cold and stern
manner devoid of enthusiasm of any sort. He could not make historical
narrative live like Michelet, and from his own record the Revolution
itself is almost unintelligible. For Taine, however, we must remember,
human nature is absolutely the product of race, environment and
history.[9]
[9] Michelet (1798-1874), mentioned here as an historian of a type
entirely different from Taine, influenced philosophic thought by his
volumes _Le Peuple_, 1846; _L’Amour_, 1858; _Le Prêtre, La Femme et la
Famille_, 1859; and _La Bible de l’Humanité_, 1864. He and his friend
Quinet (1803-1875), who was also a Professor at the College de France,
and was the author of _Génie des Religions_, 1842, had considerable
influence prior to 1848 of a political and religious character. They
were in strong opposition to the Roman Catholic Church and had keen
controversies with the Jesuits and Ultramontanists.
In the philosophy of Taine various influences are seen at work
interacting. The spirit of the French thinkers of the previous
century—sensualists and ideologists—reappears in him. While in a
measure he fluctuates between naturalism and idealism, the
predominating tone of his work is clearly positivist. He was a great
student of Spinoza and of Hegel, and the influence of both these
thinkers appears in his work. Like Spinoza, he believes in a universal
determination; like Hegel, he asserts the real and the rational to be
identical. In his general attitude to the problems of knowledge Taine
criticises and passes beyond the standpoints of both Hume and Kant. He
opposes the purely empiricist schools of both France and England. The
purely empirical attitude which looks upon the world as fragmentary and
phenomenal is deficient, according to Taine, and is, moreover,
incompatible with the notion of necessity. This notion of necessity is
characteristic of Taine’s whole work, and his strict adherence to it
was mainly due to his absolute belief in science and its methods, which
is a mark of all the positivist type of thought.
While he rejected Hume’s empiricism he also opposed the doctrines of
Kant and the neo-critical school which found its inspiration in Kant
and Hume. Taine asserted that it is possible to have a knowledge of
things in their objective reality, and he appears to have based his
epistemology upon the doctrine of analysis proposed by Condillac. Taine
disagreed with the theory of the relativity of human knowledge and with
the phenomenal basis of the neo-critical teaching, its rejection of
“the thing in itself.” He believed we had knowledge not merely relative
but absolute, and he claimed that we can pass from phenomena and their
laws to comprehend the essence of things in themselves. He endeavours
to avoid the difficulties of Hume by dogmatism. While clinging to a
semi-Hegelian view of rationality he avoids Kant’s critical attitude to
reason itself. We have in Taine not a critical rationalist but a
dogmatic rationalist. While the rational aspect of his thought commands
a certain respect and has had in many directions a very wholesome
influence, notably, as we have remarked, upon psychology, yet it proves
itself in the last analysis self-contradictory, for a true rationalism
is critical in character rather than dogmatic.
In Taine’a great contemporary, Ernest Renan (1823-1892), a very
different temper is seen. The two thinkers both possessed popularity as
men of letters, and resembled one another in being devoted to literary
and historical pursuits rather than to philosophy itself.
Renan was trained for the priesthood of the Roman Catholic Church. He
has left us a record of his early life in _Souvenirs d’Enfance et de
Jeunesse_. We there have an autobiography of a sincere and sensitive
soul, encouraged in his priestly career by his family and his teachers
to such a degree that he had conceived of no other career for himself,
until at the age of twenty, under the influence of modern scientific
doctrines and the criticism of the Biblical records, he found himself
an unbeliever, certainly not a Roman Catholic, and not, in the ordinary
interpretation of that rather vague term, a Christian. The harsh,
unrelenting dogmatism of the Roman Church drove Renan from
Christianity. We find him remarking that had he lived in a Protestant.
country he might not have been faced with the dilemma.[10] A _via
media_ might have presented itself in one of the very numerous forms
into which Protestant Christianity, is divided. He might have exercised
in such a sphere, his priestly functions as did Schleiermacher. Renan’s
break with Rome emphasises the clear-cut division which exists in
France between the Christian faith (represented, almost entirely by the
Roman Church) and _libre-pensée_, a point which will claim our
attention later, when we come to treat of the Philosophy of Religion.
[10] Cf. his _Souvenirs d’Enfance et de Jeunesse_, p. 292.
Having abandoned the seminary and the Church, Renan worked for his
university degrees. The events of 1848-49 inspired his young heart with
great enthusiasm, under the influence of which he wrote his _Avenir de
la Science_. This book was not published, however, until 1890, when he
had lost his early hopes and illusions. In 1849 he went away upon a
mission to Italy. “The reaction of 1850-51 and the _coup d’état_
instilled into me a pessimism of which I am not yet cured,” so he wrote
in the preface to his _Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques_.[11] Some
years after the _coup d’état_ he published a volume of essays (_Essais
de Morale et de Critique_), and he showed his acquaintance with Arabic
philosophy by an excellent treatise on _Averroes et l’Averroisme_
(1859). The following year he visited Syria and, in 1861, was appointed
Professor of Hebrew at the Collège de France. He then began his
monumental work on _Les Origines du Christianisme_, of which the first
volume, _La Vie de Jésus_, appeared in 1863. Its importance for
religious thought we shall consider in our last chapter; here it must
suffice to observe its immediate consequences. These were terrific
onslaughts from the clergy upon its author, which, although they
brought the attention of his countrymen and of the world upon Renan,
resulted in the Imperial Government suspending his tenure of the chair.
After the fall of the Empire, however, he returned to it, and under the
Third Republic became Director of the Collège de France.
[11] Published only in 1895. The preface referred to is dated 1871.
Renan, although he broke off his career in the Church and his
connection with organised religion, retained, nevertheless, much of the
priestly character all his life, and he himself confesses this: “I have
learned several things, but I have changed in nowise as to the general
system of intellectual and moral life. My habitation has become more
spacious, but it still stands on the same ground. I look upon my
estrangement from orthodoxy as only a change of opinion concerning an
important historical question, a change which does not prevent me from
dwelling on the same foundations as before.” He indeed found it
impossible to reconcile the Catholic faith with free and honest
thought. His break with the Church made him an enemy of all
superstition, and his writings raised against him the hatred of the
Catholic clergy, who regarded him as a deserter. In the customary terms
of heated theological debate he was styled an atheist. This was grossly
unfair or meaningless. Which word we use here depends upon our
definition of theism. As a matter of fact, Renan was one of the most
deeply religious minds of his time. His early religious sentiments
remained, in essence if not in form, with him throughout his life.
These were always associated with the tender memories he had of his
mother and beloved sister and his virtuous teachers, the priests in the
little town of Brittany, whence he came. Much of the Breton mysticism
clung to his soul, and much of his philosophy is a restated,
rationalised form of his early beliefs.
As a figure in the intellectual life of the time, Renan is difficult to
estimate. The very subtilty of his intellect betrayed him into an
oscillation which was far from admirable, and prevented his countrymen
in his own day from “getting to grips” with his ideas. These were
kaleidoscopic. Renan seems a type, reflecting many tendencies of the
time, useful as an illustration to the historian of the ideas of the
period; but for philosophy in the special sense he has none of the
clearly defined importance of men like Renouvier, Lachelier, Guyau,
Fouillée, Bergson or Blondel. His humanism keeps him free from
dogmatism, but his mind fluctuates so that his general attitude to the
ultimate problems is one of reserve, of scepticism and of frequent
paradox and contradiction. Renan seems to combine the positivist scorn
of metaphysics with the Kantian idealism. At times, however, his
attitude is rather Hegelian, and he believes in universal change which
is an evolving of spirit, the ideal or God, call it what we will. We
need not be too particular about names or forms of thought, for, after
all, everything “may be only a dream.” That is Renan’s attitude, to
temper enthusiasm by irony, to assert a duty of doubt, and often,
perhaps, to gain a literary brilliance by contradictory statements.
“The survey of human affairs is not complete,” he reminds us, “unless
we allot a place for irony beside that of tears, a place for pity
beside that of rage, and a place for a smile alongside respect.”[12]
[12] Preface to his _Drames philosophiques_, 1888.
It was this versatility which made Renan a lover of the philosophic
dialogue. This literary and dramatic form naturally appealed strongly
to a mind who was so very conscious of the fact that the truths with
which philosophy deals cannot be directly denied or directly affirmed,
as they are not subject to demonstration. All the high problems of
humanity Renan recognised as being of this kind, as involving finally a
rational faith; and he claimed that the best we can do is to present
the problems of life from different points of view. This is due
entirely to the peculiar character of philosophy itself, and to the
distinction, which must never be overlooked, between knowledge and
belief, between certitude and opinion. Geometry, for example, is not a
subject for dialogues but for demonstration, as it involves knowledge
and certitude. The problems of philosophy, on the contrary, involve
“_une nuance de foi_,” as Renan styles it. They involve willed
adhesion, acceptance or choice; they provoke sympathy or hate, and call
into play human personality with its varying shades of colour.
This state of _nuance_ Renan asserts to be the one of the hour for
philosophy. It is not the time, he thinks, to attempt to strengthen by
abstract reasoning the “proofs” of God’s existence or of the reality of
a future life. “Men see just now that they can never know anything of
the supreme cause of the universe or of their own destiny. Nevertheless
they are anxious to listen to those who will speak to them about
either.”[13]
[13] From his Preface to _Drames philosophiques_.
Knowledge, Renan maintained, lies somewhere between the two schools
into which the majority of men are divided. “What you are looking for
has long since been discovered and made clear,” say the orthodox. “What
you are looking for is impossible to find,” say the practical
positivists, the political “raillers” and the atheists. It is true that
we shall never know the ultimate secret of all being, but we shall
never prevent man from desiring more and more knowledge or from
creating for himself working hypotheses or beliefs.
Yet although Renan admits this truth he never approaches even the
pragmatist position of supporting “creative beliefs.” He rather urges a
certain passivity towards problems and opinions. We should, he argues
in his _Examen de Conscience philosophique_,[14] let them work
themselves out in us. Like a spectator we must let them modify our
“intellectual retina”; we must let reality reflect itself in us. By
this he does not mean to assert that the truth about that reality is a
matter of pure indifference to us-far from it. Precisely because he is
so conscious of the importance of true knowledge, he is anxious that we
should approach the study of reality without previous prejudices. “We
have no right,” he remarks, “to have a desire when reason speaks; we
must listen and nothing more.”[15]
[14] In his _Feuilles detachées_, pp. 401-443.
[15] _Feuilles détachées_, p. 402.
It must be admitted, however, that Renan’s attitude to the problems of
knowledge was largely sceptical. While, as we shall see in the
following chapter, he extolled science, his attitude to belief and to
knowledge was irritating in its vagueness and changeableness. He
appeared to pose too much as a _dilettante_ making a show of subtle
intellect, rather than a serious thinker of the first rank. His
eminence and genius are unquestioned, but he played in a bewitching and
frequently bewildering manner with great and serious problems, and one
cannot help wishing that this great intellect of his—and it was
unquestionably great—was not more steady and was not applied by its
owner more steadfastly and courageously to ultimate problems. His
writings reflect a bewildering variety of contradictory moods, playful,
scathing, serious and mocking. Indeed, he replied in his _Feuilles
detachées_ (1892) to the accusations of Amiel by insisting that irony
is the philosopher’s last word. For him as for his brilliant
fellow-countryman, Anatole France, ironical scepticism is the ultimate
product of his reflection upon life. His _Examen de Conscience_
philosophique is his Confession of Faith, written four years before his
death, in which he tries to defend his sceptical attitude and to put
forward scepticism as an apology for his own uncertainty and his
paradoxical changes of view. Irony intermingles with his doubt here
too. We do not know, he says, ultimate reality; we do not know whether
there be any purpose or end in the universe at all. There may be, but
on the other hand it may be a farce and fiasco. By refusing to believe
in anything, rejecting both alternatives, Renan argues, with a kind of
mental cowardice, we avoid the consequence of being absolutely
deceived. He recommended an adoption of mixed belief and doubt,
optimism and irony.
This is a surprising attitude in a philosopher and is not
characteristic of great modern thinkers, most of whom prefer belief
(hypothetical although that be) to non-belief. Doubtless Renan’s early
training had a psychological effect which operated perhaps largely
unconsciously throughout his life, and his literary and linguistic
ability seems to have given him a reputation which was rather that of a
man of letters than a philosopher. He had not the mental strength or
frankness to face alternatives squarely and to decide to adopt one.
Consequently he merited the application of the old proverb about being
between two stools. This application was actually made to Renan’s
attitude in a critical remark by Renouvier in his _Esquisse d’une
Classification des Doctrines philosphiques_.[16] Renouvier had no
difficulty in pointing out that the man who hesitates deprives himself
of that great reality, the exercise of his own power of free choice, in
itself valuable and more akin to reality (whatever be the choice) than
a mere “sitting on the fence,” an attitude which, so far from assuring
one of getting the advantages of both possibilities as Renan claims,
may more justly seem to deprive one of the advantages in both
directions. The needs of life demand that we construct beliefs of some
sort. We may be wrong and err, but pure scepticism such as Renan
advocated is untenable. Life, if it is to be real and earnest, demands
of us that we have faith in _some_ values, that we construct _some_
beliefs, _some_ hypotheses, by which we may work.
[16] Vol. ii., p. 395.
Both Renan and Taine exercised a considerable influence upon French
thought. While inheriting the positivist outlook they, to a great
degree, perhaps unconsciously, undermined the positive position, both
by their interest in the humanities, in art, letters and religion and
in their metaphysical attitude. Taine, beginning with a rigid
naturalism, came gradually to approach an idealistic standpoint in many
respects, while Renan, beginning with a dogmatic idealism, came to
acute doubt, hypotheses, “dreams” and scepticism. Taine kept his
thoughts in too rigid a mould, solidified, while those of Renan seem
finally to have existed only in a gaseous state, intangible, vague and
hazy. We have observed how the positivist current from Comte was
carried over by Vacherot to Taine. In Renan we find that current
present also, but it has begun to turn against itself. While we may say
that his work reflects in a very remarkable manner the spirit of his
time, especially the positivist faith in science, yet we are also able
to find in it, in spite of his immense scepticism, the indications of a
spiritualist or idealist movement, groping and shaping itself as the
century grows older.
II
While the positivist current of thought was working itself out through
Vacherot, Taine and Renan to a position which forms a connecting link
between Comte and the new spiritualism in which the reaction against
positivism and eclecticism finally culminated, another influence was
making itself felt independently in the neo-critical philosophy of
Renouvier.
We must here note the work and influence of Cournot (1801-1877), which
form a very definite link between the doctrines of Comte and those of
Renouvier. He owed much to positivism, and he contributed to the
formation of neo-criticism by his influence upon Renouvier. Cournot’s
_Essai sur le Fondement de nos Connaissances_ appeared in 1851, three
years before Renouvier gave to the world the first volume of his
_Essais de Critique générale_. In 1861 Cournot published his _Traité de
l’Enchaînement des Idées_, which was followed by his _Considerations
sur le Marche des Idées_ (1872) and _Matérialisme_, _Vitalisme_,
_Rationalisme_ (1875). These volumes form his contribution to
philosophical thought, his remaining works being mainly concerned with
political economy and mathematics, a science in which he won
distinction.
Like Comte, Cournot opposed the spiritualism, the eclecticism and the
psychology of Cousin, but he was possessed of a more philosophic mind
than Comte; he certainly had greater philosophical knowledge, was
better equipped in the history of philosophy and had much greater
respect for metaphysical theory. He shared with Comte, however, an
interest in social problems and biology; he also adopted his general
attitude to knowledge, but the spirit of Cournot’s work is much less
dogmatic than that of the great positivist, and he made no pretensions
to be a “pontiff” such as Comte aspired to be. Indeed his lack of
pretensions may account partly for the lack of attention with which his
work (which is shrewd, thoughtful and reserved) has been treated. He
aimed at indicating the foundations of a sound philosophy rather than
at offering a system of thought to the public. This temper was the
product of his scientific attitude. It was by an examination of the
sciences and particularly of the principles upon which they depend that
he formulated his group of fundamental doctrines.
He avoided hasty generalisations or a _priori_ constructions and, true
to the scientific spirit, based his thought upon the data afforded by
experience. He agreed heartily with Comte regarding the relativity of
our knowledge. An investigation of this knowledge shows it to be based
on three principles—order, chance, and probability. We find order
existing in the universe and by scientific methods we try to grasp this
order. This involves induction, a method which cannot give us absolute
certainty, although it approximates to it. It gives us probability
only. There is therefore a reality of chances, and contingency or
chance must be admitted as a factor in evolution and in human history.
Cournot foreshadows many of the doctrines of the new spiritualists as
well as those of the neo-critical school. Much in his work heralds a
Bergson as well as a Renouvier. This is noticeable in his attitude to
science and to the problem of contingency or freedom. It is further
seen in his doctrine that the _vivant_ is incapable of demonstration,
in his view of the soul or higher instinct which he distinguished from
the intelligence, in the biological interest displayed in his work (due
partly to the work of Bichat[17]), and in his idea of a _Travail de
Création_. Unlike Bergson, however, he admits a teleology, for he
believed this inseparable from living beings, but he regards it as a
hazardous finality, not rigid or inconsistent with freedom.
[17] Bichat (1771-1802) was a noted physiologist and anatomist. In
1800 appeared his _Recherches physiologiques sur la Vie et la Mort_,
followed in 1801 by _Anatomie générale, appliquée à la Physiologie et
à la Médecine_.
The immediate influence of Cournot was felt by only a small circle, and
his most notable affinity was with Renouvier, although Cournot was less
strictly an intellectualist. Like Renouvier he looked upon philosophy
as a “_Critique générale_.” He was also concerned with the problem of
the categories and with the compatibility of science and freedom, a
problem which was now assuming a very central position in the thought
of the period.
Renouvier, in the construction of his philosophy, was partly influenced
by the work of Cournot. In this lone, stern, indefatigable worker we
have one of the most powerful minds of the century. Charles Renouvier
shares with Auguste Comte the first honours of the century in France so
far as philosophical work is concerned. Curiously enough he came from
Comte’s birth-place, Montpellier. When Renouvier was born in 1815,
seventeen years later than Comte, the great positivist was in his
second year of study at the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris. To this great
scientific and mathematical institution came Renouvier, to find Comte
as _Répétiteur_ of Higher Mathematics. He was not only a keen student
of the mathematical sciences but also an ardent follower of
Saint-Simon, and although in later life he lost many of the hopes of
his youth the Saint-Simon spirit remained with him, and he retained a
keen interest in social ethics and particularly in the ideas of
Fourier, Proudhon and Blanc. At the Ecole he met as fellow-pupils Jules
Lequier and Felix Ravaisson.
Instead of entering the civil service Renouvier then applied himself to
philosophy and political science, influenced undoubtedly by Comte’s
work. The year 1848, which saw the second attempt to establish a
republic, gave Renouvier, now a zealous republican, an opportunity, and
he issued his _Manuel républicain de l’Homme et du Citoyen_. This
volume, intended for schoolmasters, had the approval of Carnot,
Minister of Education to the Provisionary Government. Its socialist
doctrines were so criticised by the Chamber of 1849 that Carnot, and
with him the Government, fell from power. Renouvier went further in his
_Gouvernement direct et Organisation communale et centrale de la
République_, in which he collaborated with his socialist friends in
outlining a scheme of communism, making the canton a local power, a
scheme which contained the germ-idea of the Soviet of Bolshevik Russia.
Such ideas were, however, far too advanced for the France of that date
and their proposal did more harm than good to the progressive party by
producing a reaction in wavering minds. Renouvier, through the paper
_Liberté de penser_, launched attacks upon the policy of the
Presidency, and began in the _Revue philosophique_ a serial _Uchronie_,
a novel of a political and philosophical character. It was never
finished. Suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, came, on December and,
the _coup d’état_. The effect of this upon Renouvier was profound.
Disgusted at the power of the monarchy, the shattering of the
republican hopes, the suppression of liberty and the general reaction,
he abandoned political life entirely. What politics lost, however,
philosophy has gained, for he turned his acute mind with its tremendous
energy to the study of the problems of the universe.
Three years after the _coup d’état_, in the same year in which Comte
completed his _Système de Politique_ positive, 1854, Renouvier
published the first volume of his _magnum opus_, the _Essais de
Critique générale_.[18] The appearance of this work is a notable date
in the development of modern French philosophy. The problems therein
discussed will concern us in later chapters. Here we must point out the
indefatigable labour given to this work by Renouvier. The writing and
revision of these essays covered almost the whole of the half century,
concluding in 1897. In their first, briefer form they occupied the
decade 1854-64, and consisted of four volumes only, which on revision
became finally thirteen.[19] These Essays range over Logic, Psychology,
the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Philosophy of History.
[18] It is interesting for the comparative study of the thought of the
century to observe that the great work of Lotze in Germany,
_Mikrocosmos_, was contemporaneous with the _Essais_ of Renouvier.
Lotze’s three volumes appeared in 1856, 1858 and 1864. The _Logik_ and
_Metaphysik_ of Lotze should also be compared with Renouvier’s
_Essais_. Further comparison or contrast may be made with reference to
the _Logic_ of both Bradley and Bosanquet in England.
[19] Since 1912 the _Essais de Critique générale_ are available in ten
volumes, owing to the publications of new editions of the first three
Essays by A. Colin in five volumes. For details of the original and
revised publication of the work, see our Bibliography, under Renouvier
(pp. 334-335).
Having thus laid the foundations of his own throught, Renouvier, in
conjunction with his scholarly friend Pillon, undertook the publication
of a monthly periodical, _L’Année philosophique_, to encourage
philosophic thought in France. This appeared first in 1867, the same
year in which Ravaisson laid the foundations of the new spiritualism by
his celebrated _Rapport_. In 1869 Renouvier published his noteworthy
treatise upon Ethics, in two volumes, _La Science de la Morale_.
The war of 1870 brought his monthly periodical to an untimely end. The
conclusion of the war in 1871 resulted in the establishment, for the
third time, of a republic, which in spite of many vicissitudes has
continued even to this day. With the restoration of peace and of a
republic, Renouvier felt encouraged to undertake the ambitious scheme
of publishing a weekly paper, not only philosophical in character but
political, literary and religious. He desired ardently to address his
countrymen at a time when they were rather intellectually and morally
bewildered. He felt he had something constructive to offer, and hoped
that the “new criticism,” as he called it, might become the philosophy
of the new republic. Thus was founded, in 1872, the famous _Critique
philosophique_, which aimed primarily at the consolidation of the
republic politically and morally,[20] This paper appeared as a weekly
from its commencement until 1884,then continued for a further five
years as a monthly. Renouvier and his friend Pillon were assisted by
other contributors, A. Sabatier, L. Dauriac, R. Allier, who were more
or less disciples of the neo-critical school. Various articles were
contributed by William James, who had a great admiration for Renouvier.
The two men, although widely different in temperament and method, had
certain affinities in their doctrine of truth and certitude.[21]
[20] In the early numbers, political articles, as was natural in the
years following 1871, were prominent. Among these early articles we
may cite the one, “Is France morally obliged to carry out the terms of
the Treaty imposed upon her by Prussia?”
[21] On this relationship see James’s _Will to Believe_, p. 143, 1897,
and the dedications in his _Some Problems of Philosophy_ (to
Renouvier), and his _Principles of Psychology_ (to Pillon), also
_Letters of William James_, September i8th, 1892.
Renouvier’s enthusiasm for his periodical did not, however, abate his
energy or ardour for more lasting work. He undertook the task of
revising and augmenting his great work, the _Essais de Critique
générale_, and added to the series another (fifth) Essay, in four
volumes. He also issued in 1876 the curious work _Uchronie_, a history
of “what might have been” (in his view) the development of European
civilisation. Together with Pillon he translated _Hume’s Treatise on
Human Nature_.
Meanwhile the _Critique philosophique_ continued to combat any symptoms
of a further _coup d’état_, and “to uphold strictly republican
principles and to fight all that savoured of Caesar or imperialism.” In
1878 a quarterly supplement _La Critique religieuse_ was added to
attack the Roman Catholic Church and to diminish its power in
France.[22]
[22] The significance of this effort is more fully dealt with in our
last chapter.
Articles which had appeared in this quarterly were published as
_Esquisse d’une Classification systématique des Doctrines
philosophiques_ in 1885 in two volumes, the second of which contained
the important Confession of Faith of Renouvier, entitled, _How I
arrived at this Conclusion_.
His thought assumed a slightly new form towards the close of the
century, at the end of which he published, in conjunction with his
disciple Prat, a remarkable volume, which took a prize at the _Académie
des Sciences morales et politiques_, to which rather late in the day he
was admitted as a member at the age of eighty-five. In its title _La
Nouvelle Monadologie_, and method it reveals the influence of Leibnitz.
The close of the century shows us Renouvier as an old man, still an
enormous worker, celebrating his eighty-sixth birthday by planning and
writing further volumes (_Les Dilemmes de la Métaphysique pure_ and its
sequel, _Histoire et Solution des Problèmes métaphysiques_). This
“grand old man” of modern French philosophy lived on into the early
years of the twentieth century, still publishing, still writing to the
last. His final volume, _Le Personnalisme_, was a restatement of his
philosophy, issued when he was in his eighty-ninth year. He died “in
harness” in 1903, dictating to his friend Prat a _résumé_ of his
thought on important points and leaving an unpublished work on the
philosophy of Kant.[23]
[23] The _résumé_ was published by Prat a couple of years later as
_Derniers Entretiens_, the volume on the _Doctrine de Kant_, followed
in 1906.
Renouvier’s career is a striking one and we have sketched it somewhat
fully here because of its showing more distinctly than that of Taine or
Renan the reflections of contemporary history upon the thinking minds
who lived through the years 1848-51 and 1870-71. Renouvier was a young
spirit in the year of the revolution, 1848, and lived right on through
the _coup d’état_, the Second Empire, the Franco-Prussian War, the
Commune, the Third Republic, and he foresaw and perhaps influenced the
Republic’s attitude to the Roman Church. His career is the most
significant and enlightening one to follow of all the thinkers who come
within our period. Let us note that he never held any academic or
public teaching appointment. His life was in the main a secluded one
and, like Comte, he found the University a limited preserve closed
against him and his philosophy, dominated by the declining eclecticism
which drew its inspiration from Cousin. Only gradually did his
influence make itself felt to such a degree that the University was
compelled to take notice of it. Now his work is more appreciated, but
not as much as it might be, and outside his own country he is little
known. The student finds his writings somewhat difficult owing to the
author’s heavy style. He has none of the literary ease and brilliance
of a Renan. But his work was great and noble, animated by a passion for
truth and a hatred of philosophical “shams” and a current of deep moral
earnestness colours all his work. He had considerable power as a
critic, for the training of the Ecole Polytechnique produced a strictly
logical temper in his work, which is that of a true philosopher, not
that of a merely brilliant _litterateur_ or _dilettante_, and he must
be regarded as one of the intellectual giants of the century.
While we see in Positivism a system of thought which opposed itself to
Eclecticism, we find in the philosophy of Renouvier a system of
doctrine which is opposed to both Eclecticism and Positivism. Indeed
Renouvier puts up a strong mental fight against both of these systems;
the latter he regarded as an ambitious conceit. He agreed, however,
with Comte and with Cournot upon the relativity of our knowledge. “I
accept,” he says, “one fundamental principle of the Positivist
School—namely, the reduction of knowledge to the laws of
phenomena.”[24] The author of the _Essais de Critique générale_
considered himself, however, to be the apostolic successor, not of
Comte, but of Kant. The title of _neo-criticisme_[25] which he gave to
his philosophy shows his affinity with the author of the _Kritik der
reinen Vernunft_. This is very noticeable in his method of treating the
problem of knowledge by criticising the human mind and especially in
his giving a preference to moral considerations.[26] It would be,
however, very erroneous to regard Renouvier as a disciple of Kant, for
he amends and rejects many of the doctrines of the German philosopher.
We have noted the fact that he translated Hume; we must observe also
that Hume’s influence is very strongly marked in Renouvier’s
“phenomenalism.”[27] “Renouvier is connected with Hume,” says Pillon,
in the preface he contributed to the translation,[28] “as much as with
Kant. . . . He reconciles Hume and Kant. . . . Something is lacking in
Hume, the notion of law; something is superfluous in Kant, the notion
of substance. It was necessary to unite the phenomenalism of Hume with
the a _priori_ teaching of Kant. This was the work accomplished by
Renouvier.”
[24] Preface to _Essais de Critique générale_.
[25] The English word “_criticism_” is, it should be noted, translated
in French by “_critique_” and not by the word “_criticisme_,” a term
which is used for the philosophy of the _Kritik_ of Kant.
[26] In recognising the primacy of the moral or practical reason in
Kant, Renouvier resembles Fichte.
[27] Renouvier’s phenomenalism should be compared with that of
Shadworth Hodgson, as set forth in the volumes of his large work on
_The Metaphysic of Experience_, 1899. Hodgson has given his estimate
of Renouvier and his relationship to him in _Mind_ (volume for 1881).
[28] _Psychologie de Hume : Traité de la Nature humaine_, Renouvier
Préface par Pillon, p. lxviii.
It may be doubted whether Pillon’s eulogy is altogether sound in its
approval of the “reconciliation” of Hume and Kant, for such a
reconciliation of opposites may well appear impossible. Renouvier
himself faced this problem of the reconciliation of opposites when at
an early age he inclined to follow the Hegelian philosophy, a doctrine
which may very well be described as a “reconciliation of opposites,”
_par excellence_. Dissatisfied, however, with such a scheme Renouvier
came round to the Kantian standpoint and then passed beyond it to a
position absolutely contrary to that of Hegel. This position is frankly
that opposites cannot be reconciled, one or the other must be rejected.
Renouvier thus made the law of contradiction the basis of his
philosophy, as it is the basis of our principles of thought or logic.
He rigorously applied this principle to that very interesting part of
Kant’s work, the antinomies, which he held should never have been
formulated. The reasons put forward for this statement were two: the
principle of contradiction and the law of number. Renouvier did not
believe in what mathematicians call an “infinite number.” He held it to
be an absurd and contradictory notion, for to be a number at all it
must be numerical and therefore not infinite. The application of this
to the Kantian antinomies, as for example to the questions, “Is space
infinite or finite? Had the world a beginning or not?” is interesting
because it treats them as Alexander did the Gordian knot. The admission
that space is infinite, or that the world had no beginning, involves
the admission of an “infinite number,” a contradiction and an
absurdity. Since, therefore, such a number is a pure fiction we _must_
logically conclude that space is finite,[29] that the world had a
beginning and that the ascending series of causes has a first term,
which admission involves freedom at the heart of things.
[29] It is interesting to observe how the stress laid by Renouvier
upon the finiteness of space and upon relativity has found expression
in the scientific world by Einstein, long after it had been expressed
philosophically.
As Renouvier had treated the antinomies of Kant, so he makes short work
of the Kantian conception of a world of noumena (_Dinge an sich_) of
which we know nothing, but which is the foundation of the phenomena we
know. Like Hume, he rejects all notion of substance, of which Kant’s
noumenon is a survival from ancient times. The idea of substance he
abhors as leading to pantheism and to fatalism, doctrines which
Renouvier energetically opposes, to uphold man’s freedom and the
dignity of human personality.
In the philosophy of Kant personality was not included among the
categories. Renouvier draws up for himself a new list of categories
differing from those of Kant. Beginning with Relation they culminate in
Personality. These two categories indicate two of the strongholds of
Renouvier’s philosophy. Beginning from his fundamental thesis “All is
relative,” Renouvier points out that as nothing can possibly be known
save by or in a relation of some sort it is evident that the most
general law of all is that of Relation itself. Relation is therefore
the first and fundamental category embracing all the others. Then
follow, Number, Position, Succession, Quality. To these are added the
important ones, Becoming, Causality, Finality proceeding from the
simple to the composite, from the abstract to the concrete, from the
elements most easily selected from our experience to that which
embraces the experience itself, Renouvier comes to the final category
in which they all find their consummation-Personality. The importance
which he attaches to this category colours his entire thought and
particularly determines his attitude to the various problems which we
shall discuss in our following chapters.
As we can think of nothing save in relation to consciousness and
consequently we cannot conceive the universe apart from personality,
our knowledge of the universe, our philosophies, our beliefs are
“personal” constructions. But they need not be on that account merely
subjective and individualistic in character, for they refer to
personality in its wide sense, a sense shared by other persons. This
has important consequences for the problem of certitude in knowledge
and Renouvier has here certain affinities to the pragmatist standpoint.
His discussion of certitude is very closely bound up with his treatment
of the problem of freedom, but we may indicate here Renouvier’s
attitude to Belief and Knowledge, a problem in which he was aided by
the work of his friend Jules Lequier,[30] whom he quotes in his second
_Essai de Critique générale_. Renouvier considers it advisable to
approach the problem of certitude by considering its opposite, doubt.
In a famous passage in his second _Essai_ he states the circumstances
under which we do not doubt—namely, “when we see, when we know, when we
believe.” Owing to our liability to error (even seeing is not
believing, and we frequently change our minds even about our “seeing”),
it appears that belief is always involved, and more correctly “we
believe that we see, we believe that we know.” Belief is a state of
consciousness involved in a certain affirmation of which the motives
show themselves as adequate. Certitude arises when the possibility of
an affirmation of the contrary is entirely rejected by the mind.
Certitude thus appears as a kind of belief. All knowledge, Renouvier
maintains, involves an affirmation of will. It is here we see the
contrast so strongly marked between him and Renan, who wished us to
“let things think themselves out in us.” “Every affirmation in which
consciousness is reflective is subordinated, in consciousness, to the
determination to affirm.” Our knowledge, our certitude, our belief,
whatever we prefer to call it, is a construction not purely
intellectual but involving elements of feeling and, above all, of will.
Even the most logically incontrovertible truth are sometimes
unconvincing. This is because certitude is not purely intellectual; it
is _une affaire passionnelle_.[31] Renouvier here not only approaches
the pragmatist position, but he recalls the attitude to will, assumed
by Maine de Biran. For the Cartesian formula De Biran had suggested the
substitution of _Volo, ergo sum_. The inadequacy of the the _Cogito,
ergo sum_ is remarked upon by Lequier, whose treatment of the question
of certainty Renouvier follows. As all demonstration is deductive in
character and so requires existing premises, we cannot expect the
_première vérité_ to be demonstrable. If, from the or certainty, we
must turn to the will to create belief, or certainty, we must turn to
the will to create beliefs, for no evidence or previous truths exist
for us. The _Cogito, ergo sum_ really does not give us a starting
point, as Descartes claimed for it, since there is no proper sequence
from _cogito_ to _sum_. Here we have merely two selves, _moi-pensée_
and _moi-objet_. We need a live spark to bridge this gap to unite the
two into one complete living self; this is found in _moi-volonté_, in a
free act of will. This free act of will affirms the existence of the
self by uniting in a synthetic judgment the thinking-self to the
object-self. “I refuse,” says Renouvier, quoting Lequier, “to follow
the work of a knowledge which would not be mine. I accept the certainty
of which I am the author.” The _première vérité_ is a free personal act
of faith. Certainty in philosophy or in science reposes ultimately upon
freedom and the consciousness of freedom.
[30] Jules Lequier was born in 1814 and entered the Ecole
polytechnique in 1834, leaving two years later for a military staff
appointment. This he abandoned in 1838. He died in 1862 after having
destroyed most of his writings. Three Years after his death was
published the volume, _La Recherche d’une première Vérité, fragments
posthumes de Jules Lequier_. The reader should note the very
interesting remarks by Renouvier at the end of the first volume of his
Psychologie rationnelle, 1912 ed., pp. 369-393, on Lequier and his
Philosophy, also the Fragments reprinted by Renouvier in that work,
_Comment trouver, comment chercher_, vol. i., on Subject and Object
(vol. ii.), and on Freedom.
[31] Lotze employs a similar phrase, eine Gemüths-sache.
Here again, as in the philosophy of Cournot, we find the main emphasis
falling upon the double problem of the period. It is in reality one
problem with two aspects—the relation of science to morality, or, in
other words, the place and significance of freedom.
The general influence of Renouvier has led to the formation of a
neo-critical “school” of thought, prominent members of which may be
cited: Pillon and Prat, his intimate friends, Séailles and Darlu, who
have contributed monographs upon their master’s teaching, together with
Hamelin, Liard and Brochard, eminent disciples. Hamelin (1856-1907),
whose premature and accidental death deprived France of a keen thinker,
is known for his _Essai sur les Eléments principaux de la
Représentation_ (1907), supplementing the doctrines of Renouvier by
those of Hegel.
In the work of Liard (1846-1917), _La Science positive et la
Métaphysique_ (1879), we see a combination of the influence of
Vacherot, Renouvier and Kant. He was also perplexed by the problem of
efficient and final causes as was Lachelier, whose famous thesis _De
l’Induction_ appeared eight years earlier. While Lachelier was
influenced by Kant, he, none the less, belongs to the current of the
new spiritualism which we shall presently examine. Liard, however, by
his adherence to many critical and neo-critical standpoints may be
justly looked upon as belonging to that great current of which
Renouvier is the prominent thinker.
Brochard (1848-1907) is mainly known by his _treatise De l’Erreur_
(1879) and his volumes on Ethics, _De la Responsabilité morale_ (1876),
and _De l’Universalité des Notions morales_ (1876), in all of which the
primacy of moral considerations is advocated in a tone inspired by
Renouvier’s strong moral standpoint. The work _De l’Erreur_ emphasises
the importance of the problem of freedom as being the crux of the whole
question involved in the relation of science and morality. Adhering to
the neo-critical doctrines in general, and particularly to the value of
the practical reason, Brochard, by his insistence upon action as a
foundation for belief, has marked affinities with the doctrines of
Blondel (and Olle-Laprune), the significance of whose work will appear
at the end of our next section.
The phenomenalism of Renouvier was followed up by two thinkers, who
cannot, however, be regarded as belonging to his neo-critical school.
In 1888 Gourd published his work entitled _Le Phénomène_, which was
followed six years later by the slightly more coherent attempt of
Boirac to base a philosophy upon the phenomenalism which expresses
itself so rigidly in Hume. In his book _L’Idée du Phénomène_ (1894), he
had, however, recourse to the Leibnitzian doctrines, which had finally
exercised a considerable influence over Renouvier himself.
III
The reaction against positivism and against eclecticism took another
form quite apart from that of the neocritical philosophy. This was the
triumphant spiritualist philosophy, as we may call it, to give it a
general name, represented by a series of great thinkers—Ravaisson,
Lachelier, Fouillée, Guyau, Boutroux, Bergson and, we may add, Blondel.
These men have all of them had an influence much greater than that of
Renouvier, and this is true of each of them separately. This is rather
noteworthy for, if we exclude Fouillee, whose writings are rather too
numerous, the works of all the other men together do not equal in
quantity the work of Renouvier. There is another point which is worthy
of notice. While Renouvier worked in comparative solitude and never
taught philosophy in any college or university, being, in fact,
neglected by the University of Paris, all the company—Ravaisson,
Lachelier, Fouillée, Guyau, Boutroux and Bergson—had a connection with
the University of Paris in general, being associated with the Sorbonne,
the Collège de France or the important Ecole Normale Supérieure.
The initiator of the spiritualistic philosophy was Ravaisson
(1815-1900), who himself drew inspiration from Maine de Biran, to whose
work he had called attention as early as 1840 in a vigorous article
contributed to the _Revue des Deux Mondes_. This roused the indignation
of Victor Cousin and the eclectics, who in revenge excluded Ravaisson
from the Institute. His independent spirit had been shown in his thesis
_De l’Habitude_ (1838)[32] and his remarkable study of the metaphysics
of Aristotle (1837-1846).
[32] Reproduced in 1894 in the _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_.
Ravaisson’s chief title to fame, however, lies in his famous
philosophic manifesto of 1867, for such, in fact, was his _Rapport sur
la Philosophie en France au XIXè Siècle_. This Report, prepared for the
_Exposition universelle_ at the request of the Ministry of Education,
marks an epoch, for with it began the current of thought which was to
dominate the close of the century. The “manifesto” was a call to free
spirits to assert themselves in favour of a valid idealism. It, in
itself, laid the foundations of such a philosophy and dealt a blow to
both the Eclectic School of Cousin and the followers of Auguste Comte.
Ravaisson wrote little, but his influence was powerful and made itself
felt in the University, where in his office of president of the
_agrégation en philosophie_ he exercised no little influence over the
minds of younger men. His pupils, among whom are to be found Lachelier,
Boutroux and Bergson, have testified to the profound and inspiring
influence which this thinker exercised. A notable tribute to his memory
is the address given by Bergson when he was appointed to take
Ravaisson’s place at the _Académie des Sciences morales et politiques_
in 1904.
Various influences meet in Ravaisson and determine his general attitude
to thought. He reverts, as we have said, to Maine de Biran, whose
insistence upon the inner life he approves. We must examine human
consciousness and make it our basis. We have in it powers of will, of
desire and of love. Ravaisson blends the Aristotelian insistence upon
Thought with the Christian insistence upon Love. In his method he
manifests the influence of the German philosopher, Schelling, whose
lectures he attended at Munich in company with the young Swiss thinker,
Secretan.[33] This influence is seen in his doctrine of synthesis and
his intellectual intuition. Science continues to give us analyses ever
more detailed, but it cannot lead us to the absolute. Our highest, most
sublime knowledge is gained by a synthesis presented in and to our
consciousness, an intuition. Further, he argues that efficient causes,
about which science has so much to say, are really dependent upon final
causes. Spiritual reality is anterior to material reality, and is
characterised by goodness and beauty. Himself an artist, imbued with a
passionate love of the beautiful (he was guardian of sculptures at the
Louvre), he constructs a philosophy in the manner of an artist. Like
Guyau, he writes metaphysics like poetry, and although he did not give
us anything like _Vers d’un Philosophe_, he would have endorsed the
remarks which Guyau made on the relation of poetry and philosophy if,
indeed, it is not a fact that his influence inspired the younger man.
[33] Charles Secretan (1815-1895), a Swiss thinker with whom Renouvier
had interesting correspondence. His _Philosophie de la Liberté_
appeared in 1848-1849, followed by other works on religious
philosophy. Pillon wrote a monograph upon him.
After surveying the currents of thought up to 1867 Ravaisson not only
summed up in his concluding pages the elements of his own philosophy,
but he ventured to assume the role of prophet. “Many signs permit us to
foresee in the near future a philosophical epoch of which the general
character will be the predominance of what may be called spiritualistic
realism or positivism, having as generating principle the consciousness
which the mind has of itself as an existence recognised as being the
source and support of every other existence, being none other than its
action.”[34] His prophecy has been fulfilled in the work of Lachelier,
Guyau, Fouillée, Boutroux, Bergson, Blondel and Weber.
[35] _Rapport_, 2nd ed., 1885, p. 275.
After Ravaisson the spiritualist philosophy found expression in the
work of Lachelier (1832-1918), a thinker whose importance and whose
influence are both quite out of proportion to the small amount which he
has written.[36] A brilliant thesis of only one hundred pages, _Du
Fondement de l’Induction_, sustained in 1871, together with a little
study on the Syllogism and a highly important article on _Psychologie
et Métaphysique_, contributed to the _Revue philosophique_ in May of
1885, constitute practically all his written work.[37] It was orally
that he made his influence felt; by his teaching at the Ecole Normale
Supérieure (1864-1875) he made a profound impression upon the youth of
the University and the Ecole by the dignity and richness of his
thought, as well as by its thoroughness.
[36] Dr. Merz, in his admirable _History of European Thought in the
Nineteenth Century_, is wrong in regard to Lachelier’s dates; he
confuses his resignation of professorship (1875) with his death. This,
however, did not occur until as late as 1918. See the references in
Mertz, vol. iii., p. 620, and vol. iv., p. 217.
[37] The thesis and the article have been published together by Alcan,
accompanied by notes on Pascal’s Wager. The _Etude sur le Syllogisme_
also forms a volume in Alcan’s _Bibliothèque de Philosophie
contemporaine_.
Lachelier was a pupil of Ravaisson, and owes his initial inspiration to
him. He had, however, a much more rigorous and precise attitude to
problems. This is apparent in the concentration of thought contained in
his thesis. It is one of Lachelier’s merits that he recognised the
significance of Kant’s work in a very profound manner. Until his thesis
appeared the influence of Leibnitz had been more noticeable in French
thought than that of Kant. It was noticeable in Ravaisson, and
Renouvier, in spite of his professed adherence to Kant, passed to a
Leibnitzian position in his _Nouvelle Monadologie_.
The valuable work _Du Fondement de l’Induction_ is concerned mainly
with the problem of final causes, which Lachelier deduces from the
necessity of totality judgments over and above those which concern
merely efficient causes. On the principle of final causes, or a
ideological conception of a rational unity and order, he founds
Induction. It cannot be founded, he claims, upon a mere empiricism.
This is a point which will concern us later in our examination of the
problem of science.
Lachelier was left, however, with the dualism of mechanism, operating
solely by efficient causes, and teleology manifested in final causes, a
dualism from which Kant did not manage to escape. In his article
_Psychologic et Métaphysique_ he endeavoured to interpret mechanism
itself as a teleological activity of the spirit.[38] He indicates the
absolute basis of our life and experience, indeed of the universe
itself, to be the absolute spontaneity of spirit. In spirit and in
freedom we live and move and have our being. We do not affirm ourselves
to be what we are, but rather we are what we affirm ourselves to be. We
must not say that our present depends upon our past, for we really
create all the moments of our life in one and the same act, which is
both present to each moment and above them all.[39] Here psychology
appears as the science of thought itself and resolves itself into
metaphysics. Here, too, we find the significance of the new
spiritualism; we see its affinity with, and its contrast to, the
doctrines of the older spiritualism as professed by Cousin. Lachelier
here strikes the note which is so clearly characteristic of this
current of thought, and is no less marked in his work than in that of
Bergson—namely, a belief in the supremacy of spirit and in the reality
of freedom.
[38] It is interesting to compare this with the attitude taken by
Lotze in Germany.
[39] _Psychologie et Métaphysique_, p. 171.
The notion of freedom and of the spontaneity of the spirit became
watchwords of the new spiritualist philosophers. Under the work and
influence of Boutroux (1845-1921) these ideas were further emphasised
and worked out more definitely to a position which assumes a critical
attitude to the dogmatism of modern science and establishes a
contingency in all things. Boutroux’s thesis _De la Contingence des
Lois de la Nature_ appeared in 1874 and was dedicated to Ravaisson. His
chief fame and his importance in the development of the spiritualist
philosophy rest upon this book alone. In 1894 he published a course of
lectures given at the Sorbonne in 1892-3, _Sur l’Idée de Loi
naturelle_, which supplements the thesis. Outside his own country
attention has been more readily bestowed upon his writings on the
history of philosophy, of which subject he was Professor. In his own
country, however, great interest and value are attached to his work on
_The Contingency of the Laws of Nature_. In this Boutroux combines the
attitude of Ravaisson with that of Lachelier. The totality of the laws
of the universe manifests, according to him, a contingency. No
explanation of these laws is possible apart from a free spiritual
activity. The stress laid upon contingency in the laws of nature
culminates in the belief in the freedom of man.
The critique of science which marked Boutroux’s work has profoundly
influenced thinkers like Hannequin, Payot and Milhaud,[40] and in the
following century appears in the work of Duhem and of Henri Poincaré,
the noted mathematician, whose books on _La Science et l’Hypothèse_
(1902), _La Valeur de la Science_ (1905), and _Science et Méthode_
(1909) have confirmed many of Boutroux’s conclusions.[41]
[40] Hannequin’s notable work is the _Essai critique sur L’Hypothèse
des Atomes_ (1896). Payot’s chief book is _La Croyance_ (1896).
Milhaud’s critique of science is contained in his _Essai sur les
Conditions et les Limites de la Certitude logique_ (1894), and in _Le
Rationnel_ (1898). Duhem’s book is _La Théorie physique_ (1906).
[41] It is interesting to note that Boutroux married Poincaré’s
sister, and that his son, Pierre Boutroux, whose education was guided
by both his uncle and his father, is now Professor at the Collège de
France. Emile Boutroux was a pupil of Zeller, whose lectures on Greek
philosophy he attended in Heidelberg, 1868. He expressed to the writer
his grief at the later prostitution of German thought to nationalist
and materialist aims. He was Professor of the History of Philosophy in
Paris from 1888, then Honorary Professor of Modern Philosophy. In 1914
he gave the Hertz Lecture to the British Academy on _Certitude et
Vérité_. He was until his death Directeur de la Fondation Thiers, a
college for post-graduate study, literary, philosophical and
scientific.
While the new spiritualist current was thus tending to a position far
removed from that of Taine, at the commencement of our period, a
wavering note was struck by the idealist Fouillée (1838-1912), who,
while maintaining a general attitude in harmony with the new doctrines
endeavoured to effect a reconciliation with the more positive attitude
to science and philosophy. In his _philosophie des ideés-forces_[42] he
endeavoured to combine and reconcile the diverging attitudes of Plato
and of Comte. He shows a scorn of the neo-critical though of Renouvier.
He wrote in his shorter life more books than did Renouvier, and he is
conspicuous among this later group of thinkers for his mass-production
of books, which appeared steadily at the rate of one _per annum_ to the
extent of some thirty-seven volumes, after he gave up his position as
_maître de conférence_ at the Ecole Normale owing to ill-health.[43]
[42] His _Evolutionnisme des Idées-forces_ appeared in 1890, _La
Psychologie des Idées-forces_ three years later. His _Morale des
Idées-forces_ belongs to the next century (1907), but its principles
were contained already in his thesis _Liberté et Déterminisme_.
[43] He only held this for three years, 1872-75.
Fouillée, with the noblest intentions, set himself to the solution of
that problem which we have already indicated as being the central one
of our period, the relation of science and ethics, or, in brief, the
problem of freedom. This was the subject of his thesis, undoubtedly the
best book he ever wrote, _La Liberté et le Déterminisme_, which he
sustained in 1872.[44] The attitude which he takes in that work is the
keynote to his entire philosophy. Well grounded in a knowledge of the
history of systems of philosophy, ancient and modern, he recognises
elements of truth in each, accompanied by errors due mainly to a
one-sided perspective.[45] He recalls a statement of Leibnitz to the
effect that most systems are right in their assertions and err in their
denials. Fouillée was convinced that there was reconciliation at the
heart of things, and that the contradictions we see are due to our
point of view. Facing, therefore, in this spirit, the problems of the
hour, he set himself “to reconcile the findings of science with the
reality of spirit, to establish harmony between the determinism upheld
by science and the liberty which the human spirit acclaims, between the
mechanism of nature and the aspirations of man’s heart, between the
True which is the object of all science and the Good which is the goal
of morality.”[46]
[44] This work created quite a stir in the intellectual and political
world in France just after the war. Fouillée’s book led to an attack
on the ministry, which did not go so far as that occasioned by
Renouvier’s volume in 1849. (See p. 61.)
[45] Fouillée stands in marked contrast to Comte in his general
acquaintance with the history of ideas. Comte, like Spencer, knew
little of any philosophy but his own. Fouillée, however, was well
schooled, not only in Plato and the ancients, but had intimate
knowledge of the work of Kant, Comte, Spencer, Lotze, Renouvier,
Lachelier, Boutroux and Bergson.
[46] This is also the idea expressed at length in his _Avenir de la
Métaphysique_, 1889.
Fouillée had no desire to offer merely another eclecticism _à la mode
de Cousin_; he selects, therefore, his own principle of procedure. This
principle is found in his notion of _idée-force_. Following ancient
usage, he employs the term “idea” for _any_ mental presentation. For
Fouillée, however, ideas are not _idées-spectacles_, merely exercising
a platonic influence “remote as the stars shining above us.” They are
not merely mental reproductions of an object, real or hypothetical,
outside the mind. Ideas are in themselves forces which endeavour to
work out their own realisation. Fouillée opposes his doctrine to the
evolutionary theory of Spencer and Huxley. He disagrees with their
mechanism and epiphenomenalism, pointing out legitimately that our
ideas, far from being results of purely physical and independent
causes, are themselves factors, and very vital factors, in the process
of evolution. Fouillée looks upon the mechanistic arrangement of the
world as an expression or symbol of idea or spirit in a manner not
unlike that of Lotze.
He bears out his view of _idées-forces_ by showing how a state of
consciousness tries to realise its object. The idea of movement is
closely bound up with the physiological and physical action, and,
moreover, tends to produce it. This realisation is not a merely
mechanistic process but is teleological and depends on the vital unity
between the physical and the mental. On this fundamental notion
Fouillée constructs his psychology, his ethic, his sociology and his
metaphysic. He sees in the evolutionary process ideas at work which
tend to realise themselves. One of these is the idea of freedom, in
which idea he endeavours to find a true reconciliation of the problem
of determinism in science and the demands of the human spirit which
declares itself free. The love of freedom arising from the idea of
freedom creates in the long run this freedom. This is Fouillée’s method
all through. “To conceive and to desire the ideal is already to begin
its realisation.” He applies his method with much success in the realm
of ethics and sociology where he opposes to the Marxian doctrine of a
materialist determination of history that of a spiritual and
intellectual determination by ideas. Fouillée’s philosophy is at once
intellectual and voluntarist. He has himself described it as
“spiritualistic voluntarism.” It is a system of idealism which reflects
almost all the elements of modern thought. In places his doctrine of
reconciliation appears to break down, and the psychological law summed
up in _idées-forces_ is hardly sufficient to bear the vast erection
which Fouillée builds upon it. The idea is nevertheless a valuable and
fruitful one. Fouillée’s respect for positive science is noteworthy, as
is also his great interest in social problems.[47]
[47] At the end of the century these problems received highly
specialised attention in the work of the sociologists inspired by
Comte’s influence. Works of special merit in this direction are:
tspmas, with his _Société’s animales_ (1876) and Tarde, predecessor of
Bergson at the Collège de France (1843-1907), with his _Criminalité
comparée_ (1898) and _Les Lois de l’Imitation_ (1900), also Durkheim’s
work _De la Division du Travail social_ (1893) and _Les Régles de la
Méthode sociologique_ (1894), and Izoulet, with his _La Cité moderne_
(1894). Note those of Levy-Bruhl, Bouglé, and Le Bon.
The importance of the sociological aspect of all problems was
emphasised in a brilliant manner by Guyau (1854-1888), the step-son of
Fouillée. Guyau was a gifted young man, whose death at the early age of
thirty-four was a sore bereavement for Fouillée and undoubtedly a
disaster for philosophy. Guyau was trained by his step-father,[48] and
assisted him in his work. When ill-health forced both men from their
professorships,[49] they lived in happy comradeship at Mentone at the
same time, it is interesting to note, that Nietzsche was residing
there. Equally interesting is it to observe that although Guyau and
Fouillée were unaware of the German thinker’s presence or his work,
Nietzsche was well acquainted with theirs, particularly that of Guyau.
Doubtless he would have been pleased to meet the author of the
_Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_ (1885) and
_L’Irreligion de l’Avenir_ (1887). Editions of these books exist in the
_Nietzsche-Archiv_ bearing Nietzsche’s notes and comments.
[48] Some authorities are of opinion that Fouillée was actually the
father of Guyau. Fouillée married Guyau’s mother.
[49] Guyau taught at the Lycée Condorcet (1874) where young Henri
Bergson was studying (1868-1878).
Guyau himself has a certain affinity with Nietzsche, arising from his
insistence upon Life and its power; but the author of the delightful
little collection _Vers d’un Philosophe_ (1881) is free from the egoism
expressed in _Der Wille zur Macht_. Guyau posits as his
_idée-directrice_ the conception of Life, both individual and social,
and in this concept he professes to find a basis more fundamental than
that of force, movement or existence. Life involves expansion and
intension, fecundity and creation. It means also consciousness,
intelligence and feeling, generosity and sociability. “He only lives
well who lives for others.” Life can only exist by extending. It can
never be purely egoistic and endure; a certain giving of itself, in
generosity and in love, is necessary for its continuance. Such is the
view which the French philosopher-poet expresses in opposition to
Nietzsche, starting, however, from the concept of Life did Nietzsche.
Guyau worked out a doctrine of ethics and of religion based upon this
concept which will demand our special attention in its proper place,
when we consider the moral and religious problem. He strove to give an
idealistic setting to the doctrines of evolution, and this alone would
give him a place among the great thinkers of the period.
In his doctrine of the relation of thought and action Guyau followed
the _philosophie des idées-forces_. On the other hand there are very
remarkable affinities between the thought of Guyau and that of Bergson.
Guyau is not so severely intellectual as Fouillée; his manner of
thought and excellence of style are not unlike Bergson. More noticeably
he has a conception of life not far removed from the _élan vital_. His
“expansion of life” has, like Bergson’s _évolution créatrice_, no goal
other than that of its own activity. After Guyau’s death in 1888 it was
found that he had been exercised in mind about the problem of Time, for
he left the manuscript of a book entitled _La Genèse de l’Idée de
Temps_.[50] He therein set forth a belief in a psychological,
heterogeneous time other than mathematical time, which is really
spatial in character. In this psychological time the spirit lives. The
year following Guyau’s death, but before his posthumous work appeared,
Bergson published his thesis _Les Données immédiates de la Conscience_
(1889), which is better described by its English title _Time and Free
Will_, and in which this problem which had been present to Guyau’s mind
is taken up and treated in an original and striking manner. In Guyau,
too, is seen the rise of the conception of activity so marked in the
work of Bergson and of Blondel. “It is _action_ and the power of life,”
he insists, “which alone can solve, if not entirely at least partially,
those problems to which abstract thought gives rise.”[51]
[50] This work was edited and published by Fouillée two years after
Guyau’s death, and reviewed by Bergson in the _Revue philosophique_ in
1891.
[51] _Esquisse d’une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction_, p. 250.
Bergson, born in 1859, Professor at the Collège de France from 1901 to
1921, now retired, has had a popularity to which none of the other
thinkers of this group, or indeed of our period, has attained. He is
the only one of the new idealists or spiritualists who is well known
outside his own country. For this reason foreigners are apt to regard
him as a thinker unrelated to any special current of thought, an
innovator. Although much is original and novel in his philosophy, his
thought marks the stage in the development to which the spiritualist
current has attained in contemporary thought. The movement of which he
forms a part we can trace back as far as Maine de Biran, to whom
Bergson owes much, as he does also to Ravaisson, Lachelier, Boutroux
and Guyau.
Two important books by Bergson came prior to 1900, his _Time and Free
Will_ (1889) and his _Matter and Memory_ (1896). His famous _Creative
Evolution_ appeared in 1907. It is but his first work “writ large,” for
we have in _Time and Free Will_ the essentials of his philosophy.
He makes, as did Guyau, a central point of Change, a universal
becoming, and attacks the ordinary notion of time, which he regards as
false because it is spatial. We ourselves live and act in _durée_,
which is Bergson’s term for real time as opposed to that fictitious
time of the mathematician or astronomer. He thus lays stress upon the
inward life of the spirit, with its richness and novelty, its eternal
becoming, its self-creation. He has his own peculiar manner of
approaching our central problem, that of freedom, of which he realises
the importance. For him the problem resolves itself into an application
of his doctrine of _la durée_, to which we shall turn in due course.
Bergson insists with Guyau and Blondel upon the primary significance of
action. The importance attached to action colours his whole theory of
knowledge. His epistemology rests upon the thesis that “the brain is an
instrument of action and not of representation,” and that “in the study
of the problems of perception the starting- point should be action and
not sensation.” This is a psychology far different from that of
Condillac and Taine, and it is largely upon his merit as a psychologist
that Bergson’s fame rests. He devoted his second work, _Matter and
Memory_, to showing that memory is something other than a function of
the brain. His distinction between “pure” memory and mere memorising
power, which is habit, recalls the _mémoire_ of Maine de Biran and of
Ravaisson upon _Habit_. Bergson sees in memory a manifestation of
spirit, which is a fundamental reality, no mere epiphenomenon. Spirit
is ever striving against matter, but in spite of this dualism which he
cannot escape, he maintains that spirit is at the origin of things.
This is a difficulty which is more clearly seen in his later book,
_Creative Evolution_. Matter is our enemy and threatens our personality
in its spiritual reality by a tendency to lead us into habit, away from
life, freedom and creativeness.
Further we must, he claims, endeavour to see things _sub specie
durationis in a durée_, in an eternal becoming. We cannot expect to
grasp all the varied reality of life in a formula or indeed in any
purely intellectual manner. This is the chief defect of science and of
the so-called scientific point of view. It tries to fix in concepts,
moulds and solid forms a reality which is living and moving eternally.
For Bergson all is Change, and this eternal becoming we can only grasp
by intuition. Intuition and intellect do not, however, oppose one
another. We are thus led to realise that Life is more than logic. The
Bergsonian philosophy concludes with intuitionism and contingency,
which drew upon it the severe criticisms of Fouillée,[52] who termed it
a philosophy of scepticism and nihilism. Of all the spiritualist group
Fouillée stands nearest the positive attitude to science, and his
strong intellectualism comes out in his criticism of Bergson, who well
represents, together with Blondel, the tendency towards
non-intellectual attitudes inherent in the spiritualist development.
Blondel has endeavoured to treat the great problems, a task which
Bergson has not attempted as yet, partly because he (Bergson) shares
Renan’s belief that “the day of philosophic systems has gone,” partly
because he desires to lay the basis of a philosophy of the spirit to
which others after him may contribute, and so he devotes his attention
to method and to those crucial points, such as the problem of freedom
upon which a larger doctrine must necessarily rest.[53]
[52] Particularly in his work _Le Mouvement idéaliste et la Réaction
contre la Science positive_ (cf. .206), 1896, and later in _La Pensée
et les nouvelles Ecoles anti-intellectualistes_, 1910.
[53] For a fuller appreciation of the Bergsonian doctrines than is
possible in such a survey as this, the reader is referred to the
author’s monograph, _Bergson and His Philosophy_, Methuen and Co.,
1920.
The current of the new idealism or spiritualism reaches a culminating
point in the work of Blondel (born about 1870), whose remarkable and
noteworthy book _L’Action_ appeared in l893.[54] The fundamental thesis
of the Philosophy of Action[55] is that man’s life is primarily one of
action, consequently philosophy must concern itself with the active
life and not merely with thought. By its nature, action is something
unique and irreducible to other elements or factors. It is not the
result of any synthesis: it is itself a living synthesis, and cannot be
dealt with as the scientist deals with his data. Blondel lays emphasis,
as did Bergson, upon “the living” being unique and inexpressible in
formulae. Intellect cannot grasp action; “one penetrates the living
reality only by placing oneself at the dynamic point of view of the
will.”[56] His words recall Bergson’s attitude to the free act. “The
principle of action eludes positive knowledge at the moment at which it
makes it possible, and, in a word that needs to be better defined, it
is subjectivity.”[57]
[54] The same year in which the philosophic interest in France,
growing since 1870, and keener in the eighties, led to the foundation
of the famous _Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_ by Xavier Léon. In
1876 (the same year in which Professor Croom Robertson in England
established the periodical _Mind_) Ribot had founded the _Revue
philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger_. These journals, along
with the teaching in the Lycées, have contributed to make the French
people the best educated, philosophically, of any people.
[55] It is interesting to note that this designation has been used by
its author to replace his original term “_pragmatisme_,” which he
employed in 1888 and abandoned upon becoming acquainted with the
theory of Peirce and James, and with their use of the term in another
manner, with which he did not agree. See _Bulletin de la Société
française de Philosophie_, 1902.
[56] _L’ Action_, p. 100.
[57] _Ibid_., p. 87.
Blondel, however, leads us beyond this subjectivity, for it is not the
will which causes what is. Far from that, he maintains that in so far
as it wills it implies something which it does not and cannot create of
itself; it wills to be what it is not yet. We do not act for the mere
sake of acting, but for some end, something beyond the particular act.
Action is not self-contained or self- sufficing: it is a striving to
further attainment or achievement. It therefore pre-supposes some
reality beyond itself. Here appear the elements of “passion” and
“suffering” due to resistance, for all action involves some opposition.
In particular moral action implies this resistance and a consciousness
of power to overcome the resistance, and it therefore involves a
reality which transcends the sphere in which we act.
Owing to this inequality between the power and the wish, we are obliged
to complete our actions or our activity in general by a belief in a
Reality beyond. It is, however, “a beyond that is within,” a Divine
power immanent in man. This view, Blondel claims, unites the idea of
God “transcendent” with the idea of God as “immanent.” Man’s action
partakes of both, for in so far as it results from his own will it is
immanent; transcendence is, however, implied in the fact that the end
of man’s action as a whole is not “given.” Blondel leads us to a
conception of a religious idealism in which every act of our ordinary
existence leads ultimately to a religious faith. Every action is
sacramental. Blondel and his follower Laberthonnière, who has taken up
this idea from his master in his volume of _Essais de Philosophie
réligieuse_ (1901), go beyond a purely pragmatist or voluntarist
position by finding the supreme value of all action, and of the
universe, not in will but in love. For Blondel this word is no mere
sentiment or transient feeling, but a concrete reality which is the
perfection of will and of intellect alike, of action and of knowledge.
The “Philosophy of Action,” asserts Blondel, includes the “Philosophy
of the Idea.” In the fact of love, he claims, is found the perfect
unity between the self and the non-self, the ground of personality and
its relation to the totality of persons, producing a unity in which
each is seen as an end to others as well as to himself. “Love,” says
Laberthonnière, “is the first and last word of all. It is the
principle, the means and the end. It is in loving that one gets away
from self and raises oneself above one’s temporal individuality. It is
in loving that one finds God and other beings, and that one finds
oneself.” It is, in short, these idealists claim, the _Summum Bonum_;
in it is found the Absolute which philosophers and religious mystics of
all ages have ever sought.
The “philosophy of action” is intimately bound up with the “philosophy
of belief,” formulated by Ollé-Laprune, and the movement in religious
thought known generally as Modernism, which is itself due to the
influence of modern philosophic thought upon the dogmas of the
Christian religion, as these are stated by the Roman Church. Both the
Philosophy of Belief and Modernism are characterised by an intense
spirituality and a moral earnestness which maintain the primacy of the
practical reason over the theoretical reason. Life, insists
Ollé-Laprune in his book _Le Prix de la Vie_ (l885),[58] is not
contemplation but active creation. He urges us to a creative evolution
of the good, to an employment of _idées-forces_. “There are things to
be made whose measure is not determined; there are things to be
discovered, to be invented, new forms of the good, ideas which have
never yet been received—creations, as it were, of the spirit that loves
the good.” This dynamism and power of will is essential. We must not
lose ourselves in abstractions; action is the supreme thing: it alone
constitutes reality.
[58] This has been followed in the new century by _La Raison et le
Rationalisme_, 1906. As early as 1880, however, he issued his work _La
Certitude morale_, which influenced Blondel, his pupil.
A similar note is sounded by the Modernists or Neo-Catholics,
particularly by the brilliant disciple and successor of Bergson, Le
Roy, who in _Dogme et Critique_ (1907) has based the reality of
religious dogma upon its practical significance. We find Péguy (who
fell on the field of battle in 1914) applying Bergsonian ideas to a
fervid religious faith. Wilbois unites these ideas to social ethics in
his _Devoir et Durée_ (1912). In quite different quarters the new
spiritualism and philosophy of action have appeared as inspiring the
Syndicalism of Sorel, who endeavours to apply the doctrines of Bergson,
Ollé-Laprune and Blondel to the solution of social questions in his
_Réflexions sur la Violence_ (1907) and _Illusions du Progrès_ (1911).
It would be erroneous to regard Bergson’s intuitional philosophy as
typical of all contemporary French thought. Following Renouvier,
Fouillée and Boutroux, there prevail currents of a more intellectualist
or rationalist type, to which we are, perhaps, too close to see in true
and historical perspective. The _élan vital_ of French thought
continues to manifest itself in a manner which combines the work of
Boutroux and Bergson with Blondel’s idealism. A keen interest is being
taken in the works of Spinoza, Kant and Hegel, and this is obviously
influencing the trend of French philosophy at the moment, without
giving rise to a mere eclecticism. French thought is too original and
too energetic for that. In addition to these classical studies we
should note the great and growing influence of the work of Durkheim and
of Hamelin, both of whom we have already mentioned. The former gave an
immense impetus to sociological studies by his earlier work. Further
interest arose with his _Formes élémentaires de la Vie religieuse_ in
1912. Hamelin indicated a turning-point from _neo-criticisme_ through
the new spiritualist doctrines to Hegelian methods and ideas.
Brunschwicg, who produced a careful study of Spinoza, wrote as early as
1897 on _La Modalité du Jugement_, a truly Kantian topic. This
thinker’s later works, _Les Etapes de la Philosophie mathematique_
(1912) and the little volume _La Vie de l’esprit_, illustrate a
tendency to carry out the line taken by Boutroux—namely, to arrive at
the statement of a valid idealism disciplined by positivism. The papers
of Berthelot in his _Evolutionnisme et Platonisme_ are a further
contribution to this great end. In the work of Evellin, _La Raison pure
et les Antinomies_ (1907), the interest in Kant and Hegel is again
seen. Noël, who contributed an excellent monograph on Lachelier to the
_Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale_ (that journal which is an
excellent witness in itself to the vitality of contemporary French
philosophy), produced a careful study of Hegel’s Logik in 1897. Since
that date interest has grown along the lines of Boutroux, Bergson and
Blondel in an attempt to reach a positive idealism, which would combine
the strictly positivist attitude so dear to French minds with the
tendency to spiritualism or idealism which they also manifest. This
attempt, which in some respects amounts to an effort to restate the
principles of Hegel in modern or contemporary terms, was undertaken by
Weber in 1903 in his book entitled _Vers le Positivisme absolu par
l’Idéalisme_. Philosophy in France realises to-day that the true course
of spiritual development will be at once positive and idealistic.
CHAPTER III
SCIENCE
INTRODUCTION: The scientific outlook—Progress of the sciences—The
positivist spirit, its action on science, philosophy and literature—The
problem as presented to philosophy.
I. Comte’s positivism—Work of prominent scientists—Position maintained
by Berthelot and Bernard—Renan’s confidence—Vacherot and
Taine—Insufficiency of sciences alone.
II. Cournot and Renouvier attack the dogmatism of science.
III. The neo-spiritualist group continue and develop this attack, which
becomes a marked feature in Lachelier, Boutroux, and Bergson.
Entire change of attitude in the development of the period.
The problem of freedom opened up in the process.
CHAPTER III
SCIENCE
Having thus surveyed the main currents of our period and indicated the
general attitude adopted to knowledge by the various thinkers, we
approach more closely to the problem of the relation of science and
philosophy. The nineteenth century was a period in which this problem
was keenly felt, and France was the country in which it was tensely
discussed by the most acute minds among the philosophers and among the
scientists. French thought and culture, true to the tradition of the
great geometrician and metaphysician Descartes, have produced men whose
training has been highly scientific as well as philosophical. Her
philosophers have been keenly versed in mathematics and physical
science, while her scientists have had considerable power as
philosophical thinkers.
One of the very prominent tendencies of thought in the first half of
the nineteenth century was the growing belief and confidence in the
natural sciences. In France this was in large measure due to the
progress of those sciences themselves and to the influences of Comte,
which was supported by the foreign influences of Kant’s teaching and
that of the English School, particularly John Stuart Mill. These three
great streams of thought, widely different in many respects, had this
in common—that they tended to confuse philosophy and science to such a
degree that it seemed doubtful whether the former could be granted any
existence by itself. Science, somewhat intoxicated by the praise and
worship bestowed upon her, became proud, arrogant and overbearing. She
scorned facts which could not be adapted to her own nature, she ignored
data which were not quantitative and materialistic, and she regarded
truth as a system of laws capable of expression by strict mathematical
methods and formulae*. Hence science became characterised by a firm
belief in absolute determinism, in laws of necessity operating after
the manner of mathematical laws. This “universal mathematic”
endeavoured also to explain the complex by reference to the simple.
Difficulties were encountered all along the line, for experience, it
was found, did not quite fit into rigid formulae*, “new” elements of
experience presented a unique character and distressing discrepancy.
Confidence in science, however, was not shaken by this, for the perfect
science, it was imagined, was assured in a short time. Patience might
be needed, but no doubt was entertained of the _possibility_ of such a
construction. Doubters were told to look at the rising sciences of
psychology and sociology, which, as Auguste Comte had himself
prophesied, were approaching gradually to the “type” venerated—namely,
an exact and mathematical character. Biology, it was urged, was merely
a special branch of physico-chemistry. As for beliefs in freedom, in
art, morality and religion, these, like philosophy (metaphysics)
itself, belonged to the earlier stages (the theological and
metaphysical) of Comte’s list, stages rapidly to be replaced by the
third and final “positive” era.
Such, briefly stated, were the affirmations so confidently put forward
on behalf of science by its devoted worshippers. Confidence in science
was a marked feature of the work written by Renan in the years
1848-1849, _L’Avenir de la Science_. Yet, paradoxical as it may seem,
Renan himself played a large part in undermining this confidence. Yet
the time of his writing this work is undoubtedly the period when the
confidence in science was most marked. By this it is not implied that
an even greater confidence in science has not been professed since by
many thinkers. That is probably true, but the important point is that
at this time the confidence in science was less resisted than ever in
its history. It seemed to have a clear field and positivism seemed to
be getting unto itself a mighty victory.
The cult of facts, which is so marked a characteristic of the
scientific or positivist temper, penetrated, it is interesting to note,
into the realm of literature, where it assumed the form of “realism.”
In his Intelligence we find Taine remarking, “_de tout petits fails
bien choisis, importants, significatifs, amplement circonstanciés et
minutieusement notés, voilà aujourd’hui la matière de toute
science_.”[1] It was also, in the opinion of several writers, the
_matière de toute littérature_. The passion for minute details shows
itself in the realism of Flaubert and Zola, in the psychology of
Stendthal* and the novels of the Goncourts. It was no accident that
their works were so loved by Taine. A similar spirit of “positivism” or
“realism” animated both them and him.
[1] Preface to _Intelligence_.
With the turn of the half century, however, a change manifested itself
by the fact that the positivist current began to turn against itself,
and our period is, in some respects, what Fouillée has called _la
réaction centre la science positive_.[2] The function of philosophy is
essentially criticism, and although at that period the vitality of
philosophy was low, it nevertheless found enough energy to criticise
the demands and credentials of Science.
[2] Compare also Aliotta’s book, _The Idealistic Reaction against
Science_, Eng. trans., 19l4.
The publication of Claude Bernard’s volume _Introduction à la Médecine
experimentale_[3] drew from the pen of Paul Janet, the last of the
Eclectic School dominated by Cousin, an article of criticism which
appeared in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, and was later published in his
volume of essays entitled, _Les Problèmes du XIXe Siècle_. Although
Janet’s essay reveals all the deficiencies of the older spiritualism,
he makes a gallant attempt to combat the dogmatism and the assumed
finality of Bernard’s point of view and that of the scientists in
general. Janet regarded the sciences and their relation to philosophy
as constituting an important problem for the century and in this
judgment he was not mistaken.
[3] _Cf_. Livre III., _Science_, chap, i., on “Method in General”;
chap, ii., on The Experimental Method in Physiology,” pp. 213-279.
I
We have, in our Introductory Chapter, reckoned Auguste Comte among the
influential antecedents of our period. Here, in approaching the study
of the problem of science, we may note that the tendency towards the
strictly scientific attitude, and to the promotion of the scientific
_spirit_ in general, was partly due to the influence of his positivism.
Comte’s intended Religion of Humanity failed, his system of positive
philosophy has been neglected, but the SPIRIT which he inculcated has
abided and has borne fruit. We would be wrong, however, if we
attributed much to Comte as the originator of that spirit. His positive
philosophy, although it greatly stimulated and strengthened the
positive attitude adopted by the natural sciences, was itself in large
measure inspired by and based upon these sciences. Consequently much of
Comte’s glory was a reflected light, his thought was a challenge to the
old spiritualism, an assertion of the rights of the sciences to
proclaim their existence and to demand serious consideration.
Although he succeeded in calling the attention of philosophy to the
natural sciences, yet owing to the mere fact that he based himself on
the sciences of his day much of his thought has become obsolete by the
progress and extension of those very sciences themselves. He tended,
with a curious dogmatism, to assign limits to the sciences by keeping
them in separate compartments and in general by desiring knowledge to
be limited to human needs. Although there is important truth in his
doctrine of discontinuity or irreducible differences, the subsequent
development of the natural sciences has cleared away many barriers
which he imagined to be impassable. There still are, and may always be,
gaps in our knowledge of the progress from inorganic to organic, from
the living creature to self-conscious personality, but we have a
greater conception of the unity of Nature than had Comte. Many new
ideas and discoveries have transformed science since his day,
particularly the doctrines dealing with heat as a form of motion, with
light, electricity, and the radio-activity of matter, the structure of
the atom, and the inter-relation of physics and chemistry.
Comte’s claim for different methods in the different departments of
science is of considerable interest, in view of present-day biological
problems and the controversies of vitalists, mechanists and
neo-vitalists.[4] Although Comte insisted upon discontinuity, yet he
urged the necessity for an _esprit d’ensemble_, the consideration of
things synthetically, in their “togetherness.” He feared that analysis,
the _esprit de détail_ or mathematisation, was being carried out _à
l’outrance_. This opinion he first stated in 1825 in his tract entitled
_Considérations sur les Sciences et les Savants_. On the social side he
brought this point out further by insisting on the _esprit d’ensemble_
as involving the social standpoint in opposition to a purely
individualistic view of human life.
[4] See, for example, _The Mechanism of Life_, by Dr. Johnstone,
Professor of Oceanography in the University of Liverpool. (Arnold,
1921.)
Comte was slow to realise the importance of Ethics as an independent
study. Psychology he never recognised as a separate discipline, deeming
it part of physiology. He gave a curious appreciation to phrenology.
Unfortunately he overlooked the important work done by the
introspectionist psychologists in England and the important work of
Maine de Biran in his own country. One is struck by Comte’s inability
to appreciate the immense place occupied by psychology in modern life
and in particular its expression in the modern novel and in much modern
poetry. An acquaintance with the works of men like De Regnier, Pierre
Loti and Anatole France is sufficient to show how large a factor the
psychological method is in French literature and life. It is to be put
down to Comte’s eternal discredit that he failed to appreciate
psychology. Here lies the greatest defect in his work, and it is in
this connection that his work is now being supplemented. Positivism in
France to-day is not a synonym for “Comtism” at all; the term is now
employed to denote the spirit and temper displayed in the methods of
the exact sciences. For Comte, we must never forget, scientific
investigation was a means and not an end in itself. His main purpose
was social and political regeneration. Positivism since Comte differs
from his philosophy by a keen attention bestowed upon psychology, and
many of Comte’s inadequate conceptions have been enriched by the
introduction of a due recognition of psychological factors.
It is to be noted that Comte died two years before Darwin’s
_chef-d’œuvre_ appeared, and that he opposed the doctrine of evolution
as put forward by Lamarck. Although Comte’s principle of discontinuity
may in general have truth in it, the problem is a far more complicated
one than he imagined it to be. Again, while Comte’s opposition to the
subjectivism of Cousin was a wholesome influence, he did not accord to
psychology its full rights, and this alone has been gravely against the
acceptance of his philosophy, and explains partly the rise and progress
of the new spiritualist doctrines. His work served a useful purpose,
but Comte never closed definitely with the problem of the precise
significance of “positivism” or with its relation to a general
conception of the universe; in short, he confined himself to increasing
the scientific spirit in thought, leaving aside the difficulty of
relating science and philosophy.
Comte stated in his _Philosophie positive_[5] that he regarded attempts
to explain all phenomena by reference to one law as futile, even when
undertaken by the most competent minds well versed in the study of the
sciences. Although he believed in discontinuity he tried to bridge some
gaps, notably by his endeavour to refer certain physiological phenomena
to the law of gravitation.
[5] Vol. i., pp. 53-56.
The chief work which this undoubtedly great mind accomplished was the
organisation of the scientific spirit as it appeared in his time. Renan
hardly does justice to him in his sarcastic remark in his _Souvenirs
d’Enfance et de Jeunesse_. “I felt quite irritated at the idea of
Auguste Comte being dignified with the title of a great man for having
expressed in bad French what all scientific minds had seen for the last
two hundred years as clearly as he had done.” His work merits more than
dismissal in such a tone, and we may here note, as the essence of the
spirit which he tried to express, his definition of the positive or
scientific attitude to the universe given at the commencement of his
celebrated Cours de _Philosophie positive_. There, in defining the
positive stage, Comte speaks of it as that period in which “the human
spirit, recognising the impossibility of obtaining absolute
conceptions, abandons the search for the origin and the goal of the
universe and the inner causes of things, to set itself the task merely
of discovering, by reasoning and by experience combined, the effective
laws of phenomena—that is to say, their invariable relations of
succession and of similarity.”[6] This positive spirit Comte strove to
express rather than to originate, for it was already there in the
sciences. Undoubtedly his work made it more prominent, more clear, and
so we have to note an interaction between positivism in the sciences
and in philosophy.
[6] Leçon i.
It is equally important for our purpose to notice that the period was
one rich in scientific thought. The work of Lavoisier and Bichat, both
of whom as contemporaries of Maine de Biran, belong to the former
century, was now bearing fruit. Lavoisier’s influence had been great
over chemistry, which he established on a modern basis, by formulating
the important theory of the conservation of mass and by clearing away
false and fan- tastic conceptions regarding combustion.[7] Bichat, the
great anatomist and physiologist, died in 1802, but the publication of
his works in a completed form was not accomplished until 1854. The work
and influence of the _Académie des Sciences_ are noteworthy features of
French culture at this time. There stands out prominently the highly
important work of Cuvier in anatomy, zoology and palæontology.[8] The
nineteenth century was a period of great scientists and of great
scientific theories. Leverrier, applying himself to the problem of the
motions of Uranus, found a solution in the hypothesis of another
planet, Neptune, which was actually discovered from his calculations in
1846. This was a notable victory for logical and scientific method. In
1809 Lamarck had outlined, prior to Spencer or Darwin, the scheme of
the evolutionary theory (Transformism).[9] Spencer’s work, which
appeared from 1850 onwards, has always commanded respect and attention
in France even among its critics.[10] Interest increased upon the
publication of Darwin’s _Origin of Species_ in 1859, and its
translation into French in 1862. These dates coincide with the rise of
the _Société d’Anthropologie_ de Paris, founded by Broca in the same
year that Darwin’s book appeared. Another translation from Darwin’s
work followed in 1872, _Descendance de l’Homme_, which aroused further
interest in the evolutionary theory. At the same time the work of men
such as Pasteur, Bertrand, Berthelot and Bernard gave an impetus and a
power to science. Poincare belongs rather to the twentieth century.
Pasteur (1822-1895) showed mankind how science could cure its ills by
patient labour and careful investigation, and earned the world’s
gratitude for his noble work. His various _Discours_ and his volume,
_Le Budget de la Science_ (1868), show his faith in this progressive
power of science. In Bertrand (1822-1900), his contemporary who held
the position of Professor of Mathematics at the College de France, a
similar attitude appears.
[7] Lavoisier perished at the guillotine in 1794, and his death was a
tragic loss to science.
[8] Cuvier’s _Anatomie comparée_ appeared in the years 1800-1805,
following his _Histoire naturelle_ (1798-1799). Later came his
_Rapport sur les Sciences naturelles_ (1810) and his work _Le Regne
animal_ (1816).He died in 1832. We may note that Cuvier opposed the
speculative evolutionary doctrines of Lamarck, with whom he indulged
in controversy.
[9] In his work, _Philosophie zoologique, ou Exposition des
Considérations relatives a l’Histoire naturelle des Animaux_, 2 vols
Paris, Dentu, 1809.
[10] His _Social Statics_ was published in 1850, and his _Psychology_
five years later. His life work, _The Synthetic Philosophy_, extends
over the period 1860-1896.
One of the foremost scientific minds, however, was Claude Bernard
(1813-1878), a friend of Renan, who held the Chair of Medicine at the
College de France, and was, in addition, the Professor of Physiology at
the Faculté des Sciences at the Sorbonne. Science, Bernard maintained,
concerns itself only with phenomena and their laws. He endeavoured in
his celebrated _Introduction à l’Etude de la Médécine expérimentale_,
published in 1865, to establish the science of physiology upon a sound
basis, having respect only to fact, not owning homage to theories of a
metaphysical character or to the authority of persons or creeds. He
desired to obtain by such a rigorous and precise method, objectivity.
“The experimental method is,” he insists, “the really scientific
method, which proclaims the freedom of the human spirit and its
intelligence. It not only shakes off the yoke of metaphysics and of
theology, in addition it refuses to admit personal considerations and
subjective standpoints.”[11]
[11] _Introduction à l’Etude de la Médécine expérimentale_, chap. ii,
sect. 4.
Bernard’s attitude is distinctly that of a positivist, and the general
tone of his remarks as well as his attitude on many special points
agrees with that of Comte. His conclusions regarding physiology are
akin to those expressed by Comte concerning biology. Bernard excludes
any metaphysical hypothesis such as the operation of a vital principle,
and adheres strictly to physicochemical formulas. He accepts, however,
Comte’s warning about the reduction of the higher to terms of the
lower, or, in Spencerian phraseology, the explanation of the more
complex by the less complex. Consequently, he carefully avoids the
statement that he desires to “reduce” physiology to physics and
chemistry. He makes no facile and light-hearted transition as did
Spencer; on the contrary, he claims that the living has some specific
quality which cannot be “reduced” to other terms, and which cannot be
summed up in the formulae of physics or chemistry. The physiologist and
the medical practitioner must never overlook the fact that every living
being forms an organism and an individuality. The physiologist,
continues Bernard, must take notice of this unity or harmony of the
whole, even while he penetrates the interior to know the mechanism of
each of its parts. The physicist and the chemist can ignore any notion
of final causes in the facts they observe, but the physiologist must
admit a harmonious finality, a harmony pre-established in the organism,
whose actions form and express a unity and solidarity, since they
generate one another. Life itself is _creation_; it is not capable of
expression merely in physico-chemical formulae. The creative character,
which is its essence, never can be so expressed. Bernard postulated an
abstract, _idée directrice et créatrice_, presiding over the evolution
of an organism. “_Dans tout germe vivant, il y a une idée créatrice qui
se développe et se manifeste par l’organisation. Pendant toute sa durée
l’être vivant reste sous l’influence de cette même force vitale,
créatrice, et la mort arrive lorsqu’elle ne peut plus se réaliser. Ici
comme partout, tout dérive de l’idée, qui, seule, crée et dirige_.”[12]
[12] _Introduction à l’Etude de la Médécine expérimentale_, p.151 ff.
The positivist spirit is again very marked in the doctrines of
Berthelot (1827-1907), another very great friend of Renan, who, in
addition to being a Senator, and Minister of Education and of Foreign
Affairs, held the Chair of Organic Chemistry at the Collège de France.
In 1886 he published his volume, Science et Philosophie, which contains
some interesting and illuminating observations upon _La Science idéale
et la Science positive_. Part of this, it may be noted, was written as
early as 1863, in correspondence with Renan, and as a reply to a letter
of his of which we shall speak presently.[13] Berthelot states his case
with a clearness which merits quotation.
[13] See the _Fragments_ of Renan, published 1876, pp 193-241.
_Reponse de M. Berthelot_.
“Positive science,” he says, “seeks neither first causes nor the
ultimate goal of things. In order to link together a multitude of
phenomena by one single law, general in character and conformable to
the nature of things, the human spirit has followed a simple and
invariable method. It has stated the facts in accordance with
observation and experience, compared them, extracted their relations,
that is the general facts, which have in turn been verified by
observation and experience, which verification constitutes their only
guarantee of truth. A progressive generalisation, deduced from prior
facts and verified unceasingly by new observations, thus brings our
knowledge from the plane of particular and popular facts to general
laws of an abstract and universal character. But, in the construction
of this pyramid of science, everything from base to summit rests upon
observation and experience. It is one of the principles of positive
science that no reality can be established by a process of reasoning.
The universe cannot be grasped by a _priori_ methods.”
Like Comte, Berthelot believed in the progress of all knowledge through
a theological and metaphysical stage to a definitely scientific or
positive era. The sciences are as yet young, and we cannot imagine the
development and improvement, social and moral, which will accrue from
their triumph in the future. For Berthelot, as for Renan, the idea of
progress was bound up essentially with the triumph of the scientific
spirit. In a Discourse at the Sorbonne given in commemoration of the
fiftieth anniversary of his being appointed Professor at the Collège de
France, we find this faith in science reiterated. “To-day,” he remarks,
“Science claims a triple direction of societies, materially,
intellectually and morally. By this fact the role of the men of
science, both as individuals and as a class, has unceasingly come to
play a great part in modern states.”
These scientific men, Berthelot and Bernard, with whom Renan was on
terms of friendship, had a large influence in the formation of his
thought, after he had quitted the seminary and the Church. As a young
man Renan possessed the positive spirit in a marked degree, and did not
fail to disclose his enthusiasm for “Science” and for the scientific
method. His book _L’Avenir de la Science_, which we have already noted,
was written when he was only twenty-five, and under the immediate
influence of the events of 1848, particularly the socialist spirit of
Saint-Simon and the “organising” attitude of Auguste Comte. It did not,
however, see publication until 1890, when the Empire had produced a
pessimistic temper in him, later accentuated by the Commune and the
Prussian War. The dominant note of the whole work is the touching and
almost pathetic belief in Science, which leads the young writer to an
optimism both in thought and in politics. “Science” constitutes for him
the all-in-all. Although he had just previously abandoned the seminary,
his priestly style remained with him to such a degree that even his
treatment of science is characterised by a mixture of the unction of
the _curé_ and the subtilty of the dialectician. Levites were still to
be necessary to the people of Israel, but they were to be the priests
of the most High, whose name, according to Renan, was “Science.”
His ardour for Science is not confined to this one book: it runs
through all his writings. Prospero, a character who personifies
rational thought in _L’Eau de Jouvence_, one of Renan’s _Drames
philosophiques_, expresses an ardent love for science continually. In
his preface to _Souvenirs d’Enfance et de Jeunesse_ we find Renan upon
the same theme. Quaintly enough he not only praises the objectivity
which is characteristic of the scientific point of view, but seems to
delight in its abstraction. The superiority of modern science consists,
he claims, in this very abstraction. But he is aware that the very
indefatigability with which we fathom nature removes us, in a sense,
further from her. He recognises how science leads away from the
immediacy of vital and close contact with nature herself. “This is,
however, as it should be,” asserts Renan, “and let no one fear to
prosecute his researches, for out of this merciless dissection comes
life.” He does not stay to assure us, or to enlighten us, as to how
that life can be infused into the abstract facts which have resulted
from the process of dissection. Fruitful and suggestive as many of his
pages are, they fail to approach the concrete difficulties which this
passage mentions.
Writing from Dinant in Brittany in 1863 to his friend, Berthelot, Renan
gives his view of the Sciences of Nature and the Historical Sciences.
This letter, reprinted in his _Dialogues et Fragments philosophiques_,
in 1876, expresses Renan’s.views in a clear and simple form upon the
place of science in his mind and also upon the idea of progress, as for
him the two are intimately connected. Extreme confidence is expressed
in the power of science. Renan at this time had written, but not
published, his _Avenir de la Science_. In a brief manner this letter
summarises much contained in the larger work. The point of view is
similar. Science is to be the great reforming power.
The word “Science” is so constantly upon Renan’s lips that we can see
that it has become an obsession with mm to employ it, or a device.
Certainly Renan’s extensive and ill-defined usage of it conceals grave
difficulties. One is tempted frequently to regard it as a synonym for
philosophy or metaphysics, a word which he dislikes. That does not,
however, add to clearness, and Renan’s usage of “Science” as a term
confuses both science and philosophy together. Even if this were not
the case, there is another important point to note— namely, that even
on a stricter interpretation Renan, by his wide use of the term,
actually undermines the confidence in the natural sciences. For he
embraces within the term “Science” not merely those branches of
investigation which we term in general the sciences of nature, but also
the critical study of language, of history and literature. He expressly
endeavours to show in the letter to Berthelot that true science must
include the product of man’s spirit and the record of the development
of that spirit.
Renan assumed quite definitely a positivist attitude to metaphysics.
“Philosophy,” he remarks, “is not a separate science; it is one side of
every science. In the great optic pencil of human knowledge it is the
central region where the rays meet in one and the same light.”
Metaphysical speculation he scorned, but he admitted the place for a
criticism of the human mind such as had been given by Kant in _The
Critique of Pure Reason_.
Kantian also, in its professions at least, was the philosophy of
Vacherot, who stated that the aim of his work, _La Métaphysique et la
Science_, was “the reconciliation of metaphysics with science.”[14]
These dialogues between a philosopher and a man of science, for of such
discussions the book is composed, never really help us to get close to
the problem, for Vacherot’s Kantianism is a profession which merely
covers an actual positivism. His metaphysical doctrines are
superimposed on a severe and rigid naturalism, but are kept from
conflict with them, or even relation with them, by being allotted to a
distant limbo of pure ideals, outside the world which science displays
to us.
[14] See particularly his statements to this effect in his Preface,
pp. xxxvii-xl.
Taine, in spite of his severely positive attitude, was a strong
champion of metaphysics. The sciences needed, he claimed, a science of
first principles, a metaphysic. Without it, “the man of science is
merely a _manœuvre_ and the artist a _dilettante_.” The positive
sciences he re- garded as inferior types of analysis. Above them “is a
superior analysis which is metaphysics, and which reduces or takes up
these laws of the sciences into a universal formula.” This higher
analysis, however, does not give the lie to the others: it completes
them.
It was indeed a belief and hope of Taine that the sciences will be more
and more perfected until they can each be expressed in a kind of
generic formula, which in turn may be capable of expression in some
single formula. This single law is being sought by science and
metaphysic, although it must belong to the latter rather than to the
former. From it, as from a spring, proceeds, according to Taine, the
eternal roll of events and the infinite sea of things.
Taine’s antagonism to the purely empirical schools centres round his
conception of the law of causality. He disagrees with the assertion
that this law is a synthetic, a _posteriori_ judgment, a habit, as Hume
said, or a mechanical _attente_, as Mill thought, or a generalisation
of the sensation of effort which we feel in ourselves, as was suggested
by Maine de Biran. Yet he also opposes Kant’s doctrine, in which
causality is regarded as a synthetic _a priori_ judgment. His own
criticism of Hume and Kant was directed to denial of the elements of
heterogeneity in experience, which are so essential to Hume’s view, and
to a denial of the distinction maintained by Kant between logical and
causal relations. Taine considered that all might be explained by
logical relations, that all experience might some day be expressed in
one law, one formula. The _more geometrico_ of Spinoza and the
“universal mathematic” of Descartes reappear in Taine. He even essays
in _L’Intelligence_ to equate the principle of causality (_principe de
raison explicative_) with that of identity.
His attempt to reduce the principle of causality to that of identity
did not succeed very well, and from the nature of the case this was to
be expected. As Fouillée well points out in his criticism of Taine,
both in _La Liberté et le Déterminisme_ and the concluding pages of his
earlier work on Plato,[15] the notion of difference and heterogeneity
which arises in the action of cause and effect can never be reducible
to a mere identity, for the notion of identity has nothing in common
with that of difference. Differences cannot be ignored; variety and
change are undeniable facts of experience. Fouillée here touches the
weak spot of Taine’s doctrine. In spite of a seemingly great power of
criticism there is an underlying dogmatism in his work, and the chief
of those dogmas, which he does not submit to criticism, is the
assertion of the universal necessity of all things. To this postulate
he gives a false air of objectivity. He avoids stating why we do
objectify causality, and he diverts discussion from the position that
this postulate may itself be subjective.
[15] Vol. 4.
The particular bearing of Taine’s psychology upon the general problem
of knowledge is interesting. He defines perception in _L’Intelligence_
as _une hallucination vraie_. His doctrine of the “double aspect,”
physical and mental, recalls to mind the Modes of Spinoza. In his
attitude to the difficult problem of movement and thought he rests in
the dualism of Spinoza, fluctuating and not enunciating his doctrine
clearly. The primacy of movement to thought he abandoned as too
mechanical a doctrine, and regarded the type of existence as mental in
character. Taine thus passes from the materialism of Hobbes to the
idealism of Leibnitz. “The physical world is reducible to a system of
signs, and no more is needed for its construction and conception than
the materials of the moral world.”
When we feel ourselves constrained to admit the necessity of certain
truths, if we are inclined to regard this as due to the character of
our minds themselves (_notre structure mentale_), as Kant maintained,
Taine reminds us that we must admit that our mind adapts itself to its
environment. He here adopts the view of Spencer, a thinker who seems to
have had far more influence upon the Continent than in his own country.
Although Taine thus reposes his epistemology upon this basis, he does
not answer the question which the Kantian can still put to him—namely,
“How do we know the structure of things?” He is unable to escape from
the difficulty of admitting either that it is from experience, an
admission which his anti-empirical attitude forbids him to make (and
which would damage his dogma of universal logical necessity), or that
our knowledge is obtained by analysing our own thoughts, in which case
he leaves us in a vicious circle of pure subjectivity from which there
is no means of escape.
The truth is that Taine vainly tried to establish a phenomenal
doctrine, not purely empirical in character like that of Hume, but a
phenomenalism wedded to a necessity which is supposed to be
self-explanatory. Such a notion of necessity, however, is formal and
abstract. Rather than accept Taine’s view of a law, a formula, an
“eternal axiom” at the basis of things, we are obliged to postulate an
activity, creative in character, of whose action universal laws are but
expressions. Law, formula, axiom without action are mere abstractions
which can of themselves produce nothing.
Taine’s positivism, however, was not so rigid as to exclude a belief in
the value of metaphysics. It is this which distinguishes him from the
Comtian School. We see in him the confidence in science complemented by
an admission of metaphysics, equivalent to a turning of “positivism” in
science and philosophy against itself. Much heavier onslaughts upon the
sovereignty of science came, however, from the thinker who is the great
logician and metaphysician of our period, Renouvier. To him and to
Cournot we now turn.
II
While Taine had indeed maintained the necessity of a metaphysic, he
shared to a large degree the general confidence in science displayed by
Comte, Bernard, Berthelot and Renan. But the second and third groups of
thinkers into which we have divided our period took up first a critical
attitude to science and, finally, a rather hostile one.
Cournot marks the transition between Comte and Renouvier. His _Essai
sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances et sur les Caractères de la
Critique philosophique_ contains some very calm and careful thought on
the relation of science and philosophy, which is the product of a
sincere and well-balanced mind.[16] He inherits from the positivists an
intense respect for scientific knowledge, and remarks at the outset
that he is hostile to any philosophy which would be so foolish as to
attempt to ignore the work of the modern sciences.
[16] See in particular the second chapter of vol. 2, _Du Contraste de
la Science et de la Philosophie et de la Philosophie des Sciences_,
pp. 216-255.
His work _Matérialisme, Vitalisme, Rationalisme_ is a striking example
of this effort on Cournot’s part, being devoted to a study of the use
which can be made in philosophy of the data afforded by the sciences.
Somewhat after the manner of Comte, Cournot looks upon the various
sciences as a hierarchy ranging from mathematics to sociology. Yet he
reminds the scientists of the insufficiency of their point of view, for
the sciences, rightly pursued, lead on to philosophy. He laments,
however, the confusion of the two, and thinks that such confusion is
“partly due to the fact that in the realm of speculations which are
naturally within the domain of the philosopher, there are to be found
here and there certain theories which can actually be reduced to a
scientific form”[17] He offers, as an instance of this, the theory of
the syllogism, which has affinities to algebraical equations—but this
interpenetration should not cause us, he argues, to abandon or to lose
sight of the distinction between science and philosophy.
[17] _Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances_, vol. 2, p. 224.
This distinction, according to Cournot, lies in the fact that science
has for its object that which can be measured, and that which can be
reduced to a rigorous chain or connection. In brief, science is
characterised by quantity. Philosophy, on the other hand, concerns
itself with quality, for it endeavours not so much to measure as to
appreciate.
Cournot reminds the apostles of science that quantity, however
intimately bound up with reality it may be, is not the essence of that
reality itself. He is afraid, too, that the neglect of philosophy by
science may cause the latter to develop along purely utilitarian lines.
As an investigation of reality, science is not ultimate. It has limits
by the fact that it is concerned with measurement, and thus is excluded
from those things which are qualitative and incapable of quantitative
expression. Science, moreover, has its roots in philosophy by virtue of
the metaphysical postulates which it utilises as its basis. Physics and
geometry, Cournot maintains, both rest upon definitions which owe their
origin to speculative thought rather than to experience, yet these
sciences claim an absolute value for themselves and for those
postulates as being descriptions of reality in an ultimate sense.
Following out his distinction between philosophy and the sciences,
Cournot claims in a Kantian manner that while the latter are products
of the human understanding the former is due to the operation of
reason. This apparent dualism Cournot does not shrink from maintaining;
indeed, he makes it an argument for his doctrine of discontinuity. The
development of a science involves a certain breach with reality, for
the progress of the science involves abstraction, which ever becomes
more complicated. Cournot here brings out the point which we noticed
was stressed by Renan.[18]
[18] See above, p. 105.
Reason produces in us the idea of order, and this “idea of order and of
reason in things is the basis of philosophic probability, of induction
and analogy.”[19] This has important bearings upon the unity of science
and upon the conception of causality which it upholds. In a careful
examination of the problems of induction and analogy, Cournot
emphasises the truth that there are facts which cannot be fitted into a
measured or logical sequence of events. Reality cannot be fitted into a
formula or into concepts, for these fail to express the infinite
variety and richness of the reality which displays itself to us.
Science can never be adequate to life, with its pulsing spontaneity and
freedom. It is philosophy with its _vue d’ensemble_ which tries to
grasp and to express this concreteness, which the sciences, bound to
their systematic connection of events within separate compartments,
fail to reach or to show us. Referring to the ideas of beauty and of
goodness, Cournot urges a “transrationalism,” as he calls it, which,
while loyal to the rational requirements of science, will enable us to
take the wider outlook assumed by philosophy.[20]
[19] _Essai sur les Fondements de nos Connaissances_, p. 384.
[20] The parallelism of some of Cournot’s ideas here with those
expressed by Bergson, although they have been enunciated by the later
thinker in a more decided manner, is so obvious as hardly to need to
be indicated.
Like Cournot, the author of the _Essais de Critique générale_ was a
keen antagonist of all those who sought to deify Science. It was indeed
this which led Renouvier to give this title to his great work, the
first part of which was published at a time when the confidence in
Science appeared to be comparatively unassailed. We find him defending
philosophy as against the scientists and others by an insistence upon
its critical function.
In examining Comte’s positivism in his work _Histoire et Solution des
Problèmes métaphysiques_, Renouvier points out that its initial idea is
a false one—namely, that philosophy can be constituted by an assembling
together of the sciences.[21] Such an assembly does not, he objects,
make a system. Each science has its own postulates, its own data, and
Science as a whole unity of thought or knowledge does not exist. He
attacks at the same time the calm presumption of the positivist who
maintains that the scientific stage is the final and highest
development. Renouvier is considerably annoyed at this unwarranted
dogmatism and assumed air of finality.
[21] Book X.: _De l’Etat actuel de la Philosophie en France_, chap.
1., _De l’Aboutissement des Esprits au Positivisme_, pp. 416-417.
Owing to the excellent training he had received at the Ecole
Polytechnique, and by his own profound study, Renouvier was able on
many technical points to meet the scientists on their own ground. His
third _Essai de Critique générale_ is devoted to a study of “the
Principles of Nature,” in which he criticises many of the principles
and assumptions of mechanism, while many pages of his two previous
_Essais_ are concerned with the discussion of questions intimately
affecting the sciences.[22]
[22] This is particularly noticeable in the matter printed as
appendices to his chapters. (_Cf_. the _Logic_, vol 2.)
An important section of his second Essay, _Psychologie rationnelle_,
deals with the “Classification of the Sciences.”[23] Renouvier there
points out that the attempt to classify the sciences in accordance with
their degrees of certainty ends in failure. All of them, when loyal to
their own principles, endeavour to display equal certainty. By loyalty
Renouvier shows that he means adherence to an examination of certain
classes of phenomena, the observation of facts and laws, with the
proposal of hypotheses, put forward frankly as such. He draws a line
between the logical and the physical sciences—a division which he
claims is not only a division according to the nature of their data,
but also according to method. Following another division, we may draw a
line between sciences which deal with objects which are organic, living
creatures, and those which are not.
[23] Vol. 2, chap. xviii., _De la Certitude des Sciences et leur
Classification rationnelle_, pp. 139-186, including later observations
on Spencer.
Renouvier’s line is not, it must be remembered in this connection, a
purely imaginary one. It is a
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