History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12)
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Title: History of Greece, Volume 10 (of 12)
Author: George Grote
Release date: February 11, 2016 [eBook #51183]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
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TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE
* Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
* Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
* Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ
λοιπά~.
* Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has
also been checked with this later edition and with Perseus,
when the reference was found.
* Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept,
but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant
usage was found.
* Some inconsistencies in the use of diæresis (like “reorganize”
and “reörganize”) and in the use of accents over proper nouns
(like “Autokles” and “Autoklês”) have been retained.
* Throughout the text, “Mövers” has been changed to “Movers”, when
referring to Franz Karl Movers, as it is the spelling used in the
title pages of his main works in German.
* The following changes were also made, after checking with other
editions:
page 27: “Phokæn” → “Phokæan” (that Phokæan lady).
page 94: “from” → “at” (arriving at Sparta)
page 96: “Kannônes” → “Kannônus” (psephism of Kannônus).
page 374: “troad” → “Troad” (especially in the Troad).
note 711: “vii, 39” → “vii, 4, 39” (“Xen. Hellen. vii, 4, 39”)
* In note 965, the printed book version has been retained: “Μὴ
κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητόν περ ἐοῦσαν”, but the original English
edition has “Μὴ κινεῖ Καμάριναν, ἀκινητὸς γὰρ ἀμείνων”.
HISTORY OF GREECE.
BY
GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.
VOL. X.
REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
PREFACE TO VOL. X.
The present Volume is already extended to an unusual number of pages;
yet I have been compelled to close it at an inconvenient moment,
midway in the reign of the Syracusan despot Dionysius. To carry that
reign to its close, one more chapter will be required, which must be
reserved for the succeeding volume.
The history of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, forming as it does
a stream essentially distinct from that of the Peloponnesians,
Athenians, etc., is peculiarly interesting during the interval
between 409 B.C. (the date of the second Carthaginian invasion) and
the death of Timoleon in 336 B.C. It is, moreover, reported to us
by authors (Diodorus and Plutarch), who, though not themselves very
judicious as selectors, had before them good contemporary witnesses.
And it includes some of the most prominent and impressive characters
of the Hellenic world,—Dionysius I., Dion with Plato as instructor,
and Timoleon.
I thought it indispensable to give adequate development to this
important period of Grecian history, even at the cost of that
inconvenient break which terminates my tenth volume. At one time I
had hoped to comprise in that volume not only the full history of
Dionysius I., but also that of Dionysius II. and Dion—and that of
Timoleon besides. Three new chapters, including all this additional
matter, are already composed and ready. But the bulk of the present
volume compels me to reserve them for the commencement of my next,
which will carry Grecian history down to the battle of Chæroneia
and the death of Philip of Macedon—and which will, I trust, appear
without any long interval of time.
G. G.
LONDON, FEB. 15, 1852.
CONTENTS.
VOL. X.
PART II.
CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
CHAPTER LXXVI.
FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS
BY SPARTA.
Peace or convention of Antalkidas. Its import and character.
Separate partnership between Sparta and Persia.—Degradation
in the form of the convention—an edict drawn up, issued, and
enforced, by Persia upon Greece.—Gradual loss of Pan-hellenic
dignity, and increased submission towards Persia as a means
of purchasing Persian help—on the part of Sparta.—Her
first application before the Peloponnesian war; subsequent
applications.—Active partnership between Sparta and Persia
against Athens, after the Athenian catastrophe at Syracuse.
Athens is ready to follow her example.—The Persian force aids
Athens against Sparta, and breaks up her maritime empire.—No
excuse for the subservience of Sparta to the Persians. Evidence
that Hellenic independence was not destined to last much
longer.—Promise of universal autonomy—popular to the Grecian
ear—how carried out.—The Spartans never intended to grant,
nor ever really granted, general autonomy.—Immediate point
made against Corinth and Thebes—isolation of Athens.—Persian
affairs—unavailing efforts of the Great King to reconquer
Egypt.—Evagoras, despot of Salamis in Cyprus.—Descent of
Evagoras—condition of the island of Cyprus.—Greek princes of
Salamis are dispossessed by a Phœnician dynasty.—Evagoras
dethrones the Phœnician, and becomes despot of Salamis.—Able
and beneficent government of Evagoras.—His anxiety to revive
Hellenism in Cyprus—he looks to the aid of Athens.—Relations
of Evagoras with Athens during the closing years of the
Peloponnesian war.—Evagoras at war with the Persians—he receives
aid both from Athens and from Egypt—he is at first very
successful, so as even to capture Tyre.—Struggle of Evagoras
against the whole force of the Persian empire after the peace
of Antalkidas.—Evagoras, after a ten years’ war, is reduced,
but obtains an honorable peace, mainly owing to the dispute
between the two satraps jointly commanding.—Assassination of
Evagoras, as well as of his son Pnytagoras, by an eunuch slave
of Nikokreon.—Nikoklês, son of Evagoras, becomes despot of
Salamis. Great power gained by Sparta through the peace of
Antalkidas. She becomes practically mistress of Corinth, and the
Corinthian isthmus. Miso-Theban tendencies of Sparta—especially
of Agesilaus.—The Spartans restore Platæa. Former conduct of
Sparta towards Platæa.—Motives of Sparta in restoring Platæa.
A politic step, as likely to sever Thebes from Athens.—Platæa
becomes a dependency and outpost of Sparta. Main object of Sparta
to prevent the reconstitution of the Bœotiad federation—Spartan
policy at this time directed by the partisan spirit of
Agesilaus, opposed by his colleague Agesipolis.—Oppressive
behavior of the Spartans towards Mantinea. They require the
walls of the city to be demolished.—Agesipolis blockades the
city, and forces it to surrender, by damming up the river
Ophis. The Mantineans are forced to break up their city into
villages.—Democratical leaders of Mantinea—owed their lives
to the mediation of the exiled king Pausanias.—Mantinea is
pulled down and distributed into five villages.—High-handed
despotism of Sparta towards Mantinea—signal partiality of
Xenophon. Return of the philo-Laconian exiles in the various
cities, as partisans for the purposes of Sparta—case of
Phlius.—Competition of Athens with Sparta for ascendency at
sea. Athens gains ground, and gets together some rudiments of a
maritime confederacy.—Ideas entertained by some of the Spartan
leaders, of acting against the Persians for the rescue of the
Asiatic Greeks.—Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates.—State of
Macedonia and Chalkidikê—growth of Macedonian power during
the last years of the Peloponnesian war.—Perdikkas and
Archelaus—energy and ability of the latter.—Contrast of Macedonia
and Athens.—Succeeding Macedonian kings—Orestes, Æropus,
Pausanias, Amyntas. Assassination frequent.—Amyntas is expelled
from Macedonia by the Illyrians.—Chalkidians of Olynthus—they
take into their protection the Macedonian cities on the coast,
when Amyntas runs away before the Illyrians. Commencement of the
Olynthian confederacy.—Equal and liberal principles on which the
confederacy was framed from the beginning. Accepted willingly
by the Macedonian and Greco-Macedonian cities.—The Olynthians
extend their confederacy among the Grecian cities in Chalkidic
Thrace—their liberal procedure—several cities join.—Akanthus
and Apollonia resist the proposition. Olynthus menaces. They
then solicit Spartan intervention against her.—Speech of
Kleigenes the Akanthian envoy at Sparta.—Envoys from Amyntas at
Sparta.—The Spartan Eudamidas is sent against Olynthus at once,
with such force as could be got ready. He checks the career
of the Olynthians.—Phœbidas, brother of Eudamidas, remains
behind to collect fresh force, and march to join his brother
in Thrace. He passes through the Theban territory and near
Thebes.—Conspiracy of Leontiades and the philo-Laconian party in
Thebes, to betray the town and citadel to Phœbidas.—The opposing
leaders—Leontiades and Ismenias—were both Polemarchs.—Leontiades
overawes the Senate, and arrests Ismenias: Pelopidas and
the leading friends of Ismenias go into exile.—Phœbidas in
the Kadmeia—terror and submission at Thebes.—Mixed feelings
at Sparta—great importance of the acquisition to Spartan
interests.—Displeasure at Sparta more pretended than real,
against Phœbidas; Agesilaus defends him.—Leontiades at Sparta—his
humble protestations and assurances—the ephors decide that they
will retain the Kadmeia, but at the same time fine Phœbidas.—The
Lacedæmonians cause Ismenias to be tried and put to death.
Iniquity of this proceeding.—Vigorous action of the Spartans
against Olynthus—Teleutias is sent there with a large force,
including a considerable Theban contingent. Derdas coöperates
with him.—Teleutias being at first successful, and having become
over-confident, sustains a terrible defeat from the Olynthians
under the walls of their city.—Agesipolis is sent to Olynthus
from Sparta with a reinforcement. He dies of a fever.—Polybiades
succeeds Agesipolis as commander—he reduces Olynthus to
submission—extinction of the Olynthian federation. Olynthus and
the other cities are enrolled as allies of Sparta.—Intervention
of Sparta with the government of Phlius.—Agesilaus marches an
army against Phlius—reduces the town by blockade, after a long
resistance. The Lacedæmonians occupy the acropolis, naming a
council of one hundred as governors. 1-72
CHAPTER LXXVII.
FROM THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY THE LACEDÆMONIANS DOWN TO THE
CONGRESS AT SPARTA, AND PARTIAL PEACE, IN 371 B.C.
Great ascendency of Sparta on land in 379 B.C.—Sparta is now
feared as the great despot of Greece.—Strong complaint of
the rhetor Lysias, expressed at the Olympic festival of 384
B.C.—Panegyrical oration of Isokrates.—Censure upon Sparta
pronounced by the philo-Laconian Xenophon.—His manner of marking
the point of transition in his history—from Spartan glory to
Spartan disgrace.—Thebes under Leontiades and the philo-Spartan
oligarchy, with the Spartan garrison in the Kadmeia—oppressive
and tyrannical government.—Discontent at Thebes, though under
compression. Theban exiles at Athens.—The Theban exiles at
Athens, after waiting some time in hopes of a rising at Thebes,
resolve to begin a movement themselves.—Pelopidas takes the
lead—he, with Mellon and five other exiles, undertakes the task
of destroying the rulers of Thebes. Coöperation of Phyllidas the
secretary, and Charon at Thebes.—Plans of Phyllidas for admitting
the conspirators into Thebes and the government-house—he
invites the polemarchs to a banquet.—The scheme very nearly
frustrated—accident which prevented Chlidon from delivering
his message.—Pelopidas and Mellon get secretly into Thebes,
and conceal themselves in the house of Charon.—Leontiades
and Hypates are slain in their houses.—Phyllidas opens the
prison, and sets free the prisoners. Epaminondas and many other
citizens appear in arms.—Universal joy among the citizens on
the ensuing morning, when the event was known. General assembly
in the market-place—Pelopidas, Mellon, and Charon are named
the first Bœotarchs.—Aid to the conspirators from private
sympathizers in Attica.—Pelopidas and the Thebans prepare to
storm the Kadmeia—the Lacedæmonian garrison capitulate and
are dismissed—several of the oligarchical Thebans are put to
death in trying to go away along with them. The harmost who
surrendered the Kadmeia is put to death by the Spartans.—Powerful
sensation produced by this incident throughout the Grecian
world.—Indignation in Sparta at the revolution of Thebes—a
Spartan army sent forth at once under king Kleombrotus. He
retires from Bœotia without achieving anything.—Kleombrotus
passes by the Athenian frontier—alarm at Athens—condemnation
of the two Athenian generals who had favored the enterprise of
Pelopidas.—Attempt of Sphodrias from Thespiæ to surprise the
Peiræus by a night-march. He fails.—Different constructions
put upon this attempt and upon the character of Sphodrias.—The
Lacedæmonian envoys at Athens seized, but dismissed.—Trial of
Sphodrias at Sparta; acquitted through the private favor and
sympathies of Agesilaus.—Comparison of Spartan with Athenian
procedure.—The Athenians declare war against Sparta, and contract
alliance with Thebes.—Exertions of Athens to form a new maritime
confederacy, like the Confederacy of Delos. Thebes enrolls
herself as a member.—Athens sends round envoys to the islands
in the Ægean. Liberal principles on which the new confederacy
is formed.—Envoys sent round by Athens—Chabrias, Timotheus,
Kallistratus.—Service of Iphikrates in Thrace after the peace of
Antalkidas. He marries the daughter of the Thracian prince Kotys,
and acquires possession of a Thracian seaport, Drys.—Timotheus
and Kallistratus.—Synod of the new confederates assembled at
Athens—votes for war on a large scale.—Members of the confederacy
were at first willing and harmonious—a fleet is equipped.—New
property-tax imposed at Athens. The Solonian census.—The
Solonian census retained in the main, though with modifications,
at the restoration under the archonship of Eukleides in 403
B.C.—Archonship of Nausinikus in 378 B.C.—New census and
schedule then introduced, of all citizens worth twenty minæ and
upwards, distributed into classes, and entered for a fraction of
their total property; each class for a different fraction.—All
metics, worth more than twenty-five minæ, were registered in
the schedule; all in one class, each man for one-sixth of his
property. Aggregate schedule.—The Symmories—containing the
twelve hundred wealthiest citizens—the three hundred wealthiest
leaders of the Symmories.—Citizens not wealthy enough to be
included in the Symmories, yet still entered in the schedule,
and liable to property-tax. Purpose of the Symmories—extension
of the principle to the trierarchy.—Enthusiasm at Thebes
in defence of the new government and against Sparta.
Military training—the Sacred Band.—Epaminondas.—His previous
character and training—musical and intellectual, as well as
gymnastic. Conversation with philosophers, Sokratic as well as
Pythagorean.—His eloquence—his unambitious disposition—gentleness
of his political resentments.—Conduct of Epaminondas at the
Theban revolution of 379 B.C.—he acquires influence, through
Pelopidas, in the military organization of the city.—Agesilaus
marches to attack Thebes with the full force of the Spartan
confederacy—good system of defence adopted by Thebes—aid from
Athens under Chabrias. Increase of the Theban strength in
Bœotia, against the philo-Spartan oligarchies in the Bœotian
cities.—Second expedition of Agesilaus into Bœotia—he gains no
decisive advantage. The Thebans acquire greater and greater
strength. Agesilaus retires—he is disabled by a hurt in the
leg.—Kleombrotus conducts the Spartan force to invade Bœotia.—He
retires without reaching Bœotia.—Resolution of Sparta to equip
a large fleet, under the admiral Pollis. The Athenians send
out a fleet under Chabrias—Victory of Chabrias at sea near
Naxos. Recollections of the battle of Arginusæ.—Extension
of the Athenian maritime confederacy, in consequence of the
victory at Naxos.—Circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Timotheus
with an Athenian fleet—his victory over the Lacedæmonian
fleet—his success in extending the Athenian confederacy—his
just dealing.—Financial difficulties of Athens.—She becomes
jealous of the growing strength of Thebes—steady and victorious
progress of Thebes in Bœotia.—Victory of Pelopidas at Tegyra
over the Lacedæmonians.—The Thebans expel the Lacedæmonians out
of all Bœotia, except Orchomenus—they reorganize the Bœotian
federation.—They invade Phokis—Kleombrotus is sent thither
with an army for defence—Athens makes a separate peace with
the Lacedæmonians.—Jason of Pheræ—his energetic character and
formidable power.—His prudent dealing with Polydamas.—The
Lacedæmonians find themselves unable to spare any aid for
Thessaly—they dismiss Polydamas with a refusal. He comes to terms
with Jason, who becomes Tagus of Thessaly.—Peace between Athens
and Sparta—broken off almost immediately. The Lacedæmonians
declare war again, and resume their plans upon Zakynthus and
Korkyra.—Lacedæmonian armament under Mnasippus, collected from
all the confederates, invades Korkyra.—Mnasippus besieges the
city—high cultivation of the adjoining lands.—The Korkyræans
blocked up in the city—supplies intercepted—want begins—no hope
of safety except in aid from Athens. Reinforcement arrives from
Athens—large Athenian fleet preparing under Timotheus. Mnasippus
is defeated and slain—the city supplied with provisions.—Approach
of the Athenian reinforcement—Hypermenês, successor of Mnasippus,
conveys away the armament, leaving his sick and much property
behind.—Tardy arrival of the Athenian fleet—it is commanded not
by Timotheus, but by Iphikrates—causes of the delay—preliminary
voyage of Timotheus, very long protracted.—Discontent at Athens,
in consequence of the absence of Timotheus—distress of the
armament assembled at Kalauria—Iphikrates and Kallistratus
accuse Timotheus. Iphikrates named admiral in his place.—Return
of Timotheus—an accusation is entered against him, but trial is
postponed until the return of Iphikrates from Korkyra.—Rapid
and energetic movements of Iphikrates towards Korkyra—his
excellent management of the voyage. On reaching Kephallenia,
he learns the flight of the Lacedæmonians from Korkyra.—He
goes on to Korkyra, and captures by surprise the ten Syracusan
triremes sent by Dionysius to the aid of Sparta.—Iphikrates in
want of money—he sends home Kallistratus to Athens—he finds
work for his seamen at Korkyra—he obtains funds by service
in Akarnania.—Favorable tone of public opinion at Athens, in
consequence of the success at Korkyra—the trial of Timotheus
went off easily—Jason and Alketas come to support him—his
quæstor is condemned to death.—Timotheus had been guilty
of delay, not justifiable under the circumstances—though
acquitted, his reputation suffered—he accepts command under
Persia.—Discouragement of Sparta in consequence of her defeat at
Korkyra, and of the triumphant position of Iphikrates.—Helikê
and Bura are destroyed by an earthquake.—The Spartans again send
Antalkidas to Persia, to sue for a fresh intervention—the Persian
satraps send down an order that the Grecian belligerents shall
make up their differences.—Athens disposed towards peace.—Athens
had ceased to be afraid of Sparta, and had become again jealous
of Thebes.—Equivocal position of the restored Platæa, now that
the Lacedæmonians had been expelled from Bœotia.—The Thebans
forestall a negotiation by seizing Platæa, and expelling the
inhabitants, who again take refuge at Athens.—Strong feeling
excited in Athens against the Thebans, on account of their
dealings with Platæa and Thespiæ. The Plataic discourse of
Isokrates.—Increased tendency of the Athenians towards peace
with Sparta—Athens and the Athenian confederacy give notice to
Thebes. General congress for peace at Sparta.—Speeches of the
Athenian envoys Kallias, Autokles, Kallistratus.—Kallistratus
and his policy.—He proposes that Sparta and Athens shall divide
between them the headship of Greece—Sparta on land, Athens at
sea—recognizing general autonomy.—Peace is concluded. Autonomy of
each city to be recognized: Sparta to withdraw her harmosts and
garrisons.—Oaths exchanged. Sparta takes the oath for herself and
her allies. Athens takes it for herself: her allies take it after
her, successively.—The oath proposed to the Thebans. Epaminondas,
the Theban envoy, insists upon taking the oath in the name of
the Bœotian federation. Agesilaus and the Spartans require that
he shall take it for Thebes alone.—Daring and emphatic speeches
delivered by Epaminondas in the congress—protesting against the
overweening pretensions of Sparta. He claims recognition of the
ancient institutions of Bœotia, with Thebes as president of
the federation.—Indignation of the Spartans, and especially of
Agesilaus—brief questions exchanged—Thebes is excluded from the
treaty.—General peace sworn, including Athens, Sparta, and the
rest—Thebes alone is excluded.—Terms of peace—compulsory and
indefeasible confederacies are renounced—voluntary alliances
alone maintained.—Real point in debate between Agesilaus and
Epaminondas. 72-174
CHAPTER LXXVIII.
BATTLE OF LEUKTRA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.
Measures for executing the stipulations made at the congress of
Sparta.—Violent impulse of the Spartans against Thebes.—King
Kleombrotus is ordered to march into Bœotia, and encamps at
Leuktra.—New order of battle adopted by Epaminondas.—Confidence
of the Spartans and of Kleombrotus.—Battle of Leuktra.—Defeat
of the Spartans and death of Kleombrotus.—Faint adherence of
the Spartan allies.—Spartan camp after the defeat—confession of
defeat by sending to solicit the burial-truce.—Great surprise,
and immense alteration of feeling, produced throughout Greece
by the Theban victory.—Effect of the news at Sparta—heroic
self-command.—Reinforcements sent from Sparta.—Proceedings in
Bœotia after the battle of Leuktra. The Theban victory not
well received at Athens.—Jason of Pheræ arrives at Leuktra—the
Spartan army retires from Bœotia under capitulation.—Treatment
of the defeated citizens on reaching Sparta—suspension of
the law.—Lowered estimation of Sparta in Greece—prestige of
military superiority lost.—Extension of the power of Thebes.
Treatment of Orchomenus and Thespiæ.—Power and ambition of
Jason.—Plans of Jason—Pythian festival.—Assassination of Jason
at Pheræ.—Relief to Thebes by the death of Jason—satisfaction in
Greece.—Proceedings in Peloponnesus after the defeat of Leuktra.
Expulsion of the Spartan harmosts and dekarchies.—Skytalism at
Argos—violent intestine feud.—Discouragement and helplessness of
Sparta.—Athens places herself at the head of a new Peloponnesian
land-confederacy.—Accusation preferred in the Amphyctionic
assembly, by Thebes against Sparta.—The Spartans are condemned
to a fine—importance of this fact as an indication.—Proceedings
in Arcadia.—Reëstablishment of the city of Mantinea by its own
citizens.—Humiliating refusal experienced by Agesilaus from the
Mantineans—keenly painful to a Spartan.—Feeling against Agesilaus
at Sparta.—Impulse among the Arcadians towards Pan-Arcadian
union. Opposition from Orchomenus and Tegea.—Revolution at
Tegea—the philo-Spartan party are put down or expelled.—Tegea
becomes anti-Spartan, and favorable to the Pan-Arcadian
union.—Pan-Arcadian union is formed.—March of Agesilaus against
Mantinea. Evidence of lowered sentiment in Sparta.—Application by
the Arcadians to Athens for aid against Sparta; it is refused:
they then apply to the Thebans.—Proceedings and views of
Epaminondas since the battle of Leuktra.—Plans of Epaminondas for
restoring the Messenians in Peloponnesus.—Also, for consolidating
the Arcadians against Sparta.—Epaminondas and the Theban army
arrive in Arcadia. Great allied force assembled there. The
allies entreat him to invade Laconia.—Reluctance of Epaminondas
to invade Laconia—reasonable grounds for it.—He marches into
Laconia—four lines of invasion.—He crosses the Eurotas and
approaches close to Sparta.—Alarm at Sparta—arrival of various
allies to her aid by sea.—Discontent in Laconia among the Periœki
and Helots—danger to Sparta from that cause.—Vigilant defence of
Sparta by Agesilaus.—Violent emotion of the Spartans, especially
the women. Partial attack upon Sparta by Epaminondas.—He retires
without attempting to storm Sparta: ravages Laconia down to
Gythium. He returns into Arcadia.—Great effect of this invasion
upon Grecian opinion—Epaminondas is exalted, and Sparta farther
lowered.—Foundation of the Arcadian Megalopolis.—Foundation of
Messênê.—Abstraction of Western Laconia from Sparta.—Periœki
and Helots established as freemen along with the Messenians
on the Lacedæmonian border.—The details of this reorganizing
process unhappily unknown.—Megalopolis—the Pan-Arcadian Ten
Thousand.—Epaminondas and his army evacuate Peloponnesus.—The
Spartans solicit aid from Athens—language of their envoys, as
well as those from Corinth and Phlius, at Athens.—Reception of
the envoys—the Athenians grant the prayer.—Vote passed to aid
Sparta—Iphikrates is named general.—March of Iphikrates and his
army to the Isthmus.—Trial of Epaminondas at Thebes for retaining
his command beyond the legal time—his honorable and easy
acquittal. 174-241
CHAPTER LXXIX.
FROM THE FOUNDATION OF MESSENE AND MEGALOPOLIS TO THE DEATH OF
PELOPIDAS.
Changes in Peloponnesus since the battle of Leuktra.—Changes
out of Peloponnesus.—Amyntas prince of Macedonia.—Ambitious
views of Athens after the battle of Leuktra.—Her aspirations to
maritime empire, and to the partial recovery of kleruchies.—She
wishes to recover Amphipolis—Amyntas recognizes her right to the
place.—Athens and Amphipolis.—Death of Jason and Amyntas—state
of Thessaly and Macedonia.—Alexander of Pheræ—he is opposed
by Pelopidas—influence of Thebes in Thessaly.—State of
Macedonia—Alexander son of Amyntas—Euridikê—Ptolemy.—Assistance
rendered by the Athenian Iphikrates to the family of
Amyntas.—Iphikrates and Timotheus.—The Spartan allied
army defends the line of Mount Oneium—Epaminondas breaks
through it, and marches into Peloponnesus.—Sikyon joins the
Thebans—Phlius remains faithful to Sparta.—Reinforcement from
Syracuse to Peloponnesus, in aid of Sparta.—Forbearance and
mildness of Epaminondas.—Energetic action and insolence of the
Arcadians—Lykomedes animates and leads them on.—Great influence
of Lykomedes.—Elis tries to recover her supremacy over the
Triphylian towns, which are admitted into the Arcadian union,
to the great offence of Elis.—Mission of Philiskus to Greece
by Ariobarzanes.—Political importance of the reconstitution
of Messênê, which now becomes the great subject of discord.
Messenian victor proclaimed at Olympia.—Expedition of Pelopidas
into Thessaly.—The Tearless Battle—victory of the Spartan
Archidamus over the Arcadians.—Third expedition of Epaminondas
into Peloponnesus—his treatment of the Achæan cities.—The Thebans
reverse the policy of Epaminondas, on complaint of the Arcadians
and others. They do not reëlect him Bœotarch.—Disturbed state of
Sikyon. Euphron makes himself despot—his rapacious and sanguinary
conduct.—Sufferings of the Phliasians—their steady adherence
to Sparta.—Assistance rendered to Phlius by the Athenian
Chares—surprise of the fort of Thyamia.—Euphron is expelled from
Sikyon by the Arcadians and Thebans—he retires to the harbor,
which he surrenders to the Spartans.—Euphron returns to Sikyon—he
goes to Thebes, and is there assassinated.—The assassins are put
upon their trial at Thebes—their defence.—They are acquitted by
the Theban Senate.—Sentiment among the Many of Sikyon, favorable
to Euphron—honors shown to his body and memory.—The Sikyonians
recapture their harbor from the Spartans.—Application of Thebes
for Persian countenance to her headship—mission of Pelopidas and
other envoys to Susa.—Pelopidas obtains from Persia a favorable
rescript.—Protest of the Athenians and Arcadians against the
rescript.—Pelopidas brings back the rescript. It is read publicly
before the Greek states convoked at Thebes.—The states convoked
at Thebes refuse to receive the rescript. The Arcadian deputies
protest against the headship of Thebes.—The Thebans send the
rescript to be received at Corinth; the Corinthians refuse:
failure of the Theban object.—Mission of Pelopidas to Thessaly.
He is seized and detained prisoner by Alexander of Pheræ.—The
Thebans despatch an army to rescue Pelopidas. The army, defeated
and retreating, is only saved by Epaminondas, then a private
man.—Triumph of Alexander in Thessaly and discredit of Thebes.
Harsh treatment of Pelopidas.—Second Theban army sent into
Thessaly, under Epaminondas, for the rescue of Pelopidas, who
is at length released by Alexander under a truce.—Oropus is
taken from Athens and placed in the hands of the Thebans. The
Athenians recall Chares from Corinth.—Athens discontented with
her Peloponnesian allies; she enters into alliance with Lykomedes
and the Arcadians. Death of Lykomedes.—Epaminondas is sent as
envoy into Arcadia; he speaks against Kallistratus.—Project of
the Athenians to seize Corinth; they are disappointed.—They
apply to Sparta.—Refusal of the Spartans to acknowledge the
independence of Messênê; they reproach their allies with
consenting.—Corinth, Epidaurus, Phlius, etc., conclude peace
with Thebes, but without Sparta—recognizing the independence of
Messênê.—Athens sends a fresh embassy to the Persian king—altered
rescript from him, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an Athenian
possession.—Timotheus sent with a fleet to Asia—Agesilaus—revolt
of Ariobarzanes.—Conquest of Samos by Timotheus.—Partial
readmission to the Chersonese obtained by Timotheus.—Athenian
kleruchs or settlers sent thither as proprietors.—Difficulties
of Athens in establishing kleruchs in the Chersonese.—Kotys
of Thrace.—Timotheus supersedes Iphikrates.—Timotheus acts
with success on the coast of Macedonia and Chalkidikê. He
fails at Amphipolis.—Timotheus acts against Kotys and near the
Chersonese.—Measures of the Thebans in Thessaly—Pelopidas is sent
with an army against Alexander of Pheræ.—Epaminondas exhorts the
Thebans to equip a fleet against Athens.—Discussion between him
and Menekleidas in the Theban assembly.—Menekleidas seemingly
right in dissuading naval preparations.—Epaminondas in command
of a Theban fleet in the Hellespont and Bosphorus. Pelopidas
attacks Alexander of Pheræ—his success in battle—his rashness—he
is slain.—Excessive grief of the Thebans and Thessalians for his
death.—The Thebans completely subdue Alexander of Pheræ. 242-310
CHAPTER LXXX.
FROM THE DEATH OF PELOPIDAS TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA.
Conspiracy of the knights of Orchomenus against
Thebes—destruction of Orchomenus by the Thebans.—Repugnance
excited against the Thebans—regret and displeasure of
Epaminondas.—Return of Epaminondas from his cruise—renewed
complications in Peloponnesus.—State of Peloponnesus—Eleians and
Achæans in alliance with Sparta.—The Eleians aim at recovering
Triphylia—the Spartans, at recovering Messênê.—War between
the Eleians and Arcadians; the latter occupy Olympia.—Second
invasion of Elis by the Arcadians. Distress of the Eleians.
Archidamus and the Spartans invade Arcadia.—Archidamus
establishes a Spartan garrison at Kromnus. The Arcadians gain
advantages over him—armistice.—The Arcadians blockade Kromnus,
and capture the Spartan garrison.—The Arcadians celebrate
the Olympic festival along with the Pisatans—excluding the
Eleians.—The Eleians invade the festival by arms—conflict
on the plain of Olympia—bravery of the Eleians.—Feelings of
the spectators at Olympia.—The Arcadians take the treasures
of Olympia to pay their militia.—Violent dissensions arising
among the members of the Arcadian communion, in consequence
of this appropriation. The Arcadian assembly pronounces
against it.—Farther dissensions in Arcadia—invitation sent to
the Thebans—peace concluded with Elis.—The peace generally
popular—celebrated at Tegea—seizure of many oligarchical
members at Tegea by the Theban harmost.—Conduct of the Theban
harmost.—View taken by Epaminondas.—His view is more consistent
with the facts recounted by Xenophon, than the view of Xenophon
himself.—Policy of Epaminondas and the Thebans.—Epaminondas
marches with a Theban army into Peloponnesus, to muster at
Tegea.—Agesilaus and the Spartans are sent for.—Night-march of
Epaminondas to surprise Sparta. Agesilaus is informed in time
to prevent surprise.—Epaminondas comes up to Sparta, but finds
it defended.—He marches back to Tegea—despatches his cavalry
from thence to surprise Mantinea.—The surprise is baffled,
by the accidental arrival of the Athenian cavalry—battle
of cavalry near Mantinea, in which the Athenians have the
advantage.—Epaminondas resolves to attack the enemy near
Mantinea.—View of Xenophon—that this resolution was forced upon
him by despair—examined.—Alacrity of the army of Epaminondas,
when the order for fighting is given.—Mantinico-Tegeatic
plain—position of the Lacedæmonians and Mantineans.—March of
Epaminondas from Tegea.—False impression produced upon the
enemy by his manœuvres.—Theban order of battle—plans of the
commander.—Disposition of the cavalry on both sides.—Unprepared
state of the Lacedæmonian army.—Battle of Mantinea—complete
success of the dispositions of Epaminondas.—Victory of the
Thebans—Epaminondas is mortally wounded.—Extreme discouragement
caused by his death among the troops, even when in full victory
and pursuit.—Victory claimed by both sides—nevertheless the
Lacedæmonians are obliged to solicit the burial-truce.—Dying
moments of Epaminondas.—The two other best Theban officers
are slain also in the battle.—Who slew Epaminondas? Different
persons honored for it.—Peace concluded—_statu quo_ recognized,
including the independence of Messênê—Sparta alone stands
out—the Thebans return home.—Results of the battle of Mantinea,
as appreciated by Xenophon—unfair to the Thebans.—Character of
Epaminondas.—Disputes among the inhabitants of Megalopolis. The
Thebans send thither a force under Pammenes, which maintains the
incorporation.—Agesilaus and Archidamus.—State of Persia—revolted
satraps and provinces—Datames.—Formidable revolt of the satraps
in Asia Minor—it is suppressed by the Persian court, through
treachery.—Agesilaus goes as commander to Egypt—Chabrias is
there also.—Death and character of Agesilaus.—State of Egypt
and Persia.—Death of Artaxerxes Mnemon. Murders in the royal
family.—Athenian maritime operations—Timotheus makes war
against Amphipolis and against Kotys.—Ergophilus succeeds
Timotheus at the Chersonese—Kallisthenes succeeds him against
Amphipolis—war at sea against Alexander of Pheræ.—Ergophilus
and Kallisthenes both unsuccessful—both tried.—Autokles in the
Hellespont and Bosphorus—convoy for the corn-ships out of the
Euxine.—Miltokythes revolts from Kotys in Thrace—ill-success of
the Athenians.—Menon—Timomachus—as commanders in the Chersonese.
The Athenians lose Sestos.—Kephisodotus in the Chersonese.
Charidemus crosses thither from Abydos.—Assassination of
Kotys.—Kersobleptes succeeds Kotys. Berisades and Amadokus, his
rivals—ill-success of Athens—Kephisodotus.—Improved prospects of
Athens in the Chersonese—Athenodorus—Charidemus.—Charidemus is
forced to accept the convention of Athenodorus—his evasions—the
Chersonese with Sestos is restored to Athens.—The transmarine
empire of Athens now at its maximum. Mischievous effects of her
conquests made against Olynthus.—Maximum of second Athenian
empire—accession of Philip of Macedon. 311-383
CHAPTER LXXXI.
SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT
BEFORE SYRACUSE.
Syracuse after the destruction of the Athenian
armament.—Anticipation of the impending ruin of Athens—revolution
at Thurii.—Syracusan squadron under Hermokrates goes to
act against Athens in the Ægean.—Disappointed hopes—defeat
at Kynossema—second ruinous defeat at Kyzikus.—Sufferings
of the Syracusan seamen—disappointment and displeasure at
Syracuse.—Banishment of Hermokrates and his colleagues. Sentence
communicated by Hermokrates to the armament.—Internal state of
Syracuse—constitution of Diokles.—Difficulty of determining
what that constitution was.—Invasion from Carthage.—State of
the Carthaginians.—Extent of Carthaginian empire—power, and
population—Liby-Phœnicians.—Harsh dealing of Carthage towards
her subjects. Colonies sent out from Carthage.—Military force of
Carthage.—Political constitution of Carthage.—Oligarchical system
and sentiment at Carthage.—Powerful families at Carthage—Mago,
Hamilkar, Hasdrubal.—Quarrel between Egesta and Selinus in
Sicily.—Application of Egesta to Carthage for aid—application
granted—eagerness of Hannibal.—Carthaginian envoys sent to
Sicily.—Hannibal crosses over to Sicily with a very large
armament. He lays siege to Selinus.—Vigorous assault on
Selinus—gallant resistance—the town is at length stormed.—Selinus
is sacked and plundered—merciless slaughter.—Delay of the
Syracusans and others in sending aid. Answer of Hannibal to
their embassy.—Hannibal marches to Himera and besieges it.
Aid from Syracuse under Diokles—sally from Himera. Hannibal
destroys Himera, and slaughters three thousand prisoners, as an
expiation to the memory of his grandfather.—Alarm throughout
the Greeks of Sicily—Hannibal dismisses his army, and returns
to Carthage.—New intestine discord in Syracuse—Hermokrates
comes to Sicily.—He levies troops to effect his return by
force.—He is obliged to retire—he establishes himself in the
ruins of Selinus, and acts against the Carthaginians.—His
father attempts to reënter Syracuse, with the bones of the
Syracusans slain near Himera. Banishment of Diokles.—Hermokrates
tries again to penetrate into Syracuse with an armed force.—He
is defeated and slain.—First appearance of Dionysius at
Syracuse.—Weakness of Syracuse, arising out of this political
discord—party of Hermokrates. Danger from Carthage.—Fresh
invasion of Sicily, by the Carthaginians. Immense host under
Hannibal and Imilkon.—Great alarm in Sicily—active preparations
for defence at Agrigentum.—Grandeur, wealth, and population of
Agrigentum.—The Carthaginians attack Agrigentum. They demolish
the tombs near its walls. Distemper among their army. Religious
terrors—sacrifice.—Syracusan reinforcement to Agrigentum,
under Daphnæus. His victory over the Iberians. He declines to
pursue them.—Daphnæus enters Agrigentum. Discontent against
the Agrigentine generals, for having been backward in attack.
They are put to death.—Privations in both armies—Hamilkar
captures the provision-ships of the Syracusans—Agrigentum
is evacuated.—Agrigentum taken and plundered by the
Carthagians.—Terror throughout Sicily.—Bitter complaints against
the Syracusan generals.—The Hermokratean party at Syracuse comes
forward to subvert the government and elevate Dionysius.—Harangue
of Dionysius in the Syracusan assembly against the generals,
who are deposed by vote of the people, and Dionysius with others
appointed in their room.—Ambitious arts of Dionysius—he intrigues
against his colleagues, and frustrates all their proceedings. He
procures a vote for restoring the Hermokratean exiles.—Dionysius
is sent with a Syracusan reinforcement to Gela. He procures the
execution or banishment of the Geloan oligarchy.—He returns
to Syracuse with an increased force—he accuses his colleagues
of gross treason.—Dionysius is named general, single-handed,
with full powers.—Apparent repentance of the people after the
vote. Stratagem of Dionysius to obtain a vote ensuring to him a
body of paid guards.—March of Dionysius to Leontini.—Dionysius
establishes himself at Syracuse as despot.—Dionysius as
despot—the means whereby he attained the power. 383-446
CHAPTER LXXXII.
SICILY DURING THE DESPOTISM OF THE ELDER DIONYSIUS AT SYRACUSE.
Imilkon with the Carthaginian army marches from Agrigentum to
attack Gela.—Brave defence of the Geloans—Dionysius arrives
with an army to relieve them.—Plan of Dionysius for a general
attack on the Carthaginian army.—He is defeated and obliged
to retreat.—He evacuates Gela and Kamarina—flight of the
population of both places, which are taken and sacked by the
Carthaginians.—Indignation and charges of treachery against
Dionysius.—Mutiny of the Syracusan horsemen—they ride off to
Syracuse, and declare against Dionysius.—Their imprudence.
Dionysius master of Syracuse.—Propositions of peace come from
Imilkon. Terms of peace.—Collusion of Dionysius with the
Carthaginians, who confirm his dominion over Syracuse. Pestilence
in the Carthaginian army.—Near coincidence, in time, of this
peace, with the victory of Lysander at Ægospotami—sympathy
of Sparta with Dionysius.—Depressed condition of the towns
of Southern Sicily, from Cape Pachynus to Lilybæum.—Strong
position of Dionysius.—Strong fortifications and other
buildings erected by Dionysius, in and about Ortygia.—He
assigns houses in Ortygia to his soldiers and partisans—he
distributes the lands of Syracuse anew.—Exorbitant exactions
of Dionysius—discontent at Syracuse.—Dionysius marches out of
Syracuse against the Sikels—mutiny of the Syracusan soldiers
at Herbesa—Dorikus the commander is slain.—The Syracusan
insurgents, with assistance from Rhegium and Messênê, besiege
Dionysius in Ortygia.—Despair of Dionysius—he applies to a
body of Campanians in the Carthaginian service, for aid.—He
amuses the assailants with feigned submission—arrival of the
Campanians—victory of Dionysius.—Dionysius strengthens his
despotism more than before—assistance lent to him by the
Spartan Aristus—Nikoteles the Corinthian is put to death.—He
disarms the Syracusan citizens—strengthens the fortifications
of Ortygia—augments his mercenary force.—Dionysius conquers
Naxus, Katana, and Leontini.—Great power of Dionysius.
Foundation of Alæsa by Archonides.—Resolution of Dionysius to
make war upon Carthage.—Locality of Syracuse—danger to which
the town had been exposed, in the Athenian siege.—Additional
fortifications made by Dionysius along the northern ridge of
the cliffs of Epipolæ, up the Euryalus.—Popularity of the
work—efforts made by all the Syracusans as well as by Dionysius
himself.—Preparations of Dionysius for aggressive war against
the Carthaginians.—Improvement in the behavior of Dionysius
towards the Syracusans.—His conciliatory offers to other
Grecian cities in Sicily. Hostile sentiment of the Rhegines
towards him. Their application to Messênê.—He makes peace with
Messênê and Rhegium.—He desires to marry a Rhegine wife. His
proposition is declined by the city. He is greatly incensed.—He
makes a proposition to marry a wife from Lokri—his wish is
granted—he marries a Lokrian maiden named Doris.—Immense warlike
equipment of Dionysius at Syracuse—arms, engines, etc.—Naval
preparations in the harbor of Syracuse. Enlargement of the bulk
of ships of war—quadriremes and quinqueremes.—General sympathy
of the Syracusans in his projects against Carthage.—He hires
soldiers from all quarters.—He celebrates his nuptials with two
wives on the same day—Doris and Aristomachê. Temporary good
feeling at Syracuse towards him.—He convokes the Syracusan
assembly, and exhorts them to war against Carthage.—He desires
to arrest the emigration of those who were less afraid of the
Carthaginian dominion than of his.—He grants permission to
plunder the Carthaginian residents and ships at Syracuse. Alarm
at Carthage—suffering in Africa from the pestilence.—Dionysius
marches out from Syracuse with a prodigious army against
the Carthaginians in Sicily.—Insurrection against Carthage,
among the Sicilian Greeks subject to her. Terrible tortures
inflicted on the Carthaginians.—Dionysius besieges the
Carthaginian seaport Motyê.—Situation of Motyê—operations of
the siege—vigorous defence.—Dionysius overruns the neighboring
dependencies of Carthage—doubtful result of the siege of
Motyê—appearance of Imilkon with a Carthaginian fleet—he is
obliged to return.—Desperate defence of Motyê. It is at length
taken by a nocturnal attack.—Plunder of Motyê—the inhabitants
either slaughtered or sold for slaves.—Farther operations of
Dionysius.—Arrival of Imilkon with a Carthaginian armament—his
successful operations—he retakes Motyê.—Dionysius retires to
Syracuse.—Imilkon captures Messênê.—Revolt of the Sikels from
Dionysius. Commencement of Tauromenium.—Provisions of Dionysius
for the defence of Syracuse—he strengthens Leontini—he advances
to Katana with his land-army as well as his fleet.—Naval battle
off Katana—great victory of the Carthaginian fleet under
Magon.—Arrival of Imilkon to join the fleet of Magon near
Katana—fruitless invitation to the Campanians of Ætna.—Dionysius
retreats to Syracuse—discontent of his army.—Imilkon marches
close up to Syracuse—the Carthaginian fleet come up to occupy
the Great Harbor—their imposing entry. Fortified position
of Imilkon near the Harbor.—Imilkon plunders the suburb of
Achradina—blockades Syracuse by sea.—Naval victory gained by the
Syracusan fleet during the absence of Dionysius.—Effect of this
victory in exalting the spirits of the Syracusans.—Public meeting
convened by Dionysius—mutinous spirit against him—vehement
speech by Thedorus.—Sympathy excited by the speech in the
Syracusan assembly.—The Spartan Pharakidas upholds Dionysius—who
finally dismisses the assembly, and silences the adverse
movement.—Alliance of Sparta with Dionysius—suitable to her
general policy at the time. The emancipation of Syracuse depended
upon Pharakidas.—Dionysius tries to gain popularity.—Terrific
pestilence among the Carthaginian army before Syracuse.—Dionysius
attacks the Carthaginian camp. He deliberately sacrifices a
detachment of his mercenaries.—Success of Dionysius, both by sea
and by land, against the Syracusan position.—Conflagration of
the Carthaginian camp—exultation at Syracuse.—Imilkon concludes
a secret treaty with Dionysius, to be allowed to escape with the
Carthaginians, on condition of abandoning his remaining army.
Destruction of the remaining Carthaginian army, except Sikels and
Iberians.—Distress at Carthage—miserable end of Imilkon.—Danger
of Carthage—anger and revolt of her African subjects—at length
put down. 446-512
HISTORY OF GREECE.
PART II.
CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
CHAPTER LXXVI.
FROM THE PEACE OF ANTALKIDAS DOWN TO THE SUBJUGATION OF OLYNTHUS BY
SPARTA.
The peace or convention[1] which bears the name of Antalkidas, was an
incident of serious and mournful import in Grecian history. Its true
character cannot be better described than in a brief remark and reply
which we find cited in Plutarch. “Alas for Hellas (observed some one
to Agesilaus) when we see our Laconians _medising_!”—“Nay (replied
the Spartan king), say rather the Medes (Persians) _laconising_.”[2]
[1] It goes by both names; Xenophon more commonly speaks of ἡ
εἰρήνη—Isokrates, of αἱ συνθῆκαι.
Though we say, the peace _of_ Antalkidas, the Greek authors say ἡ
ἐπ’ Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνη; I do not observe that they ever phrase it
with the genitive case Ἀνταλκίδου simply, without a preposition.
[2] Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 22 (compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 23;
and his Apophtheg. Lacon. p. 213 B). Ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀγησίλαος, πρὸς
τὸν εἰπόντα—Φεῦ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὅπου μηδίζουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ Λάκωνες!...
Μᾶλλον, εἶπεν, οἱ Μῆδοι λακωνίζουσι.
These two propositions do not exclude each other. Both were perfectly
true. The convention emanated from a separate partnership between
Spartan and Persian interests. It was solicited by the Spartan
Antalkidas, and propounded by him to Tiribazus on the express
ground, that it was exactly calculated to meet the Persian king’s
purposes and wishes,—as we learn even from the philo-Laconian
Xenophon.[3] While Sparta and Persia were both great gainers, no
other Grecian state gained anything, as the convention was originally
framed. But after the first rejection, Antalkidas saw the necessity
of conciliating Athens by the addition of a special article providing
that Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros should be restored to her.[4] This
addition seems to have been first made in the abortive negotiations
which form the subject of the discourse already mentioned, pronounced
by Andokides. It was continued afterwards and inserted in the final
decree which Antalkidas and Tiribazus brought down in the king’s name
from Susa; and it doubtless somewhat contributed to facilitate the
adherence of Athens, though the united forces of Sparta and Persia
had become so overwhelming, that she could hardly have had the means
of standing out, even if the supplementary article had been omitted.
Nevertheless, this condition undoubtedly did secure to Athens a
certain share in the gain, conjointly with the far larger shares both
of Sparta and Persia. It is, however, not less true, that Athens,
as well as Thebes,[5] assented to the peace only under fear and
compulsion. As to the other states of Greece, they were interested
merely in the melancholy capacity of partners in the general loss and
degradation.
[3] Xen. Hellen. iv, 8, 14.
[4] The restoration of these three islands forms the basis
of historical truth in the assertion of Isokrates, that the
Lacedæmonians were so subdued by the defeat of Knidus, as to come
and tender maritime empire to Athens—(ἐλθεῖν τὴν ἀρχὴν δώσοντας)
Orat. vii, (Areopagit.) s. 74; Or. ix, (Evagor.); s. 83. But the
assertion is true respecting a later time; for the Lacedæmonians
really did make this proposition to Athens after they had been
enfeebled and humiliated by the battle of Leuktra; but not before
(Xenoph. Hellen. vii. 1, 3).
[5] Diodor. xiv, 111.
That degradation stood evidently marked in the form, origin, and
transmission, of the convention, even apart from its substance.
It was a fiat issued from the court of Susa; as such it was
ostentatiously proclaimed and “sent down” from thence to Greece. Its
authority was derived from the king’s seal, and its sanction from his
concluding threat, that he would make war against all recusants. It
was brought down by the satrap Tiribazus (along with Antalkidas),
read by him aloud, and heard with submission by the assembled
Grecian envoys, after he had called their special attention to the
regal seal.[6] Such was the convention which Sparta, the ancient
president of the Grecian world had been the first to solicit at
the hands of the Persian king, and which she now not only set the
example of sanctioning by her own spontaneous obedience, but even
avouched as guarantee and champion against all opponents; preparing
to enforce it at the point of the sword against any recusant state,
whether party to it or not. Such was the convention which was now
inscribed on stone, and placed as a permanent record in the temples
of the Grecian cities;[7] nay, even in the common sanctuaries,—the
Olympic, Pythian, and others,—the great _foci_ and rallying points of
Pan-hellenic sentiment. Though called by the name of a convention,
it was on the very face of it a peremptory mandate proceeding from
the ancient enemy of Greece, an acceptance of which was nothing less
than an act of obedience. While to him it was a glorious trophy, to
all Pan-hellenic patriots it was the deepest disgrace and insult.[8]
Effacing altogether the idea of an independent Hellenic world,
bound together and regulated by the self-acting forces and common
sympathies of its own members,—even the words of the convention
proclaimed it as an act of intrusive foreign power, and erected the
barbarian king into a dictatorial settler of Grecian differences; a
guardian[9] who cared for the peace of Greece more than the Greeks
themselves. And thus, looking to the form alone, it was tantamount to
that symbol of submission—the cession of earth and water—which had
been demanded a century before by the ancestor of Artaxerxes from the
ancestors of the Spartans and Athenians; a demand, which both Sparta
and Athens then not only repudiated, but resented so cruelly, as to
put to death the heralds by whom it was brought,—stigmatizing the
Æginetans and others as traitors to Hellas for complying with it.[10]
Yet nothing more would have been implied in such cession than what
stood embodied in the inscription on that “colonna infame,” which
placed the peace of Antalkidas side by side with the Pan-hellenic
glories and ornaments at Olympia.[11]
[6] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 30, 31. Ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ παρήγγειλεν ὁ Τιρίβαζος
παρεῖναι ~τοὺς βουλομένους ὑπακοῦσαι~, ἣν βασιλεὺς εἰρήνην
καταπέμποι, ταχέως πάντες παρεγένοντο. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ξυνῆλθον,
~ἐπιδείξας ὁ Τιρίβαζος τὰ βασιλέως σημεῖα~, ἀνεγίνωσκε τὰ
γεγραμμένα, εἶχε δὲ ὧδε·
Ἀρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς ~νομίζει δίκαιον~, τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις
ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομένας καὶ Κύπρον· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας
Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμους εἶναι, πλὴν
Λήμνου, καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου, ταύτας δὲ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον, εἶναι
Ἀθηναίων. Ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτην τὴν εἰρήνην μὴ δέχονται, ~τούτοις
ἐγὼ πολεμήσω~, μετὰ τῶν ταὐτα βουλομένων, καὶ πέζῇ καὶ κατὰ
θάλασσαν, καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ χρήμασιν.
[7] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 211. Καὶ ταύτας ἡμᾶς
ἠνάγκασεν (the Persian king) ἐν στήλαις λιθίναις ἀναγράψαντας ἐν
τοῖς κοινοῖς τῶν ἱερῶν ἀναθεῖναι, πολὺ κάλλιον τρόπαιον τῶν ἐν
ταῖς μάχαις γιγνομένων.
The Oratio Panegyrica of Isokrates (published about 380
B.C., seven years afterwards) from which I here copy, is
the best evidence of the feelings with which an intelligent
and patriotic Greek looked upon this treaty at the time;
when it was yet recent, but when there had been full time
to see how the Lacedæmonians carried it out. His other
orations, though valuable and instructive, were published
later, and represent the feelings of after-time.
Another contemporary, Plato in his Menexenus (c. 17, p. 245
D), stigmatizes severely “the base and unholy act (αἰσχρὸν καὶ
ἀνόσιον ἔργον) of surrendering Greeks to the foreigner,” and
asserts that the Athenians resolutely refused to sanction it.
This is a sufficient mark of his opinion respecting the peace of
Antalkidas.
[8] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 207. Ἃ χρῆν ἀναιρεῖν,
καὶ μηδεμίαν ἐᾷν ἡμέραν, νομίζοντες, ~προστάγματα καὶ οὐ
συνθήκας~ εἶναι, etc. (s. 213). Αἰσχρὸν ἡμᾶς ~ὅλης τῆς Ἑλλάδος
ὑβριζομένης~, μηδεμίαν ποιήσασθαι κοινὴν τιμωρίαν, etc.
The word προστάγματα exactly corresponds with an expression of
Xenophon (put in the mouth of Autokles the Athenian envoy at
Sparta), respecting the dictation of the peace of Antalkidas by
Artaxerxes—Καὶ ὅτε μὲν ~Βασιλεὺς προσέταττεν~ αὐτονόμους τὰς
πόλεις εἶναι, etc. (Xen. Hellen. vi, 3, 9).
[9] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 205. Καίτοι πῶς οὐ χρὴ
διαλύειν ταύτας τὰς ὁμολογίας, ἐξ ὧν τοιαύτη δόξα γέγονεν, ὥστε
ὁ μὲν Βάρβαρος κήδεται τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ φύλαξ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐστὶν,
ἡμῶν δέ τινές εἰσιν οἱ λυμαινόμενοι καὶ κακῶς ποιοῦντες αὐτήν;
The word employed by Photius in his abstract of Theopompus
(whether it be the expression of Theopompus himself, we cannot
be certain—see Fragm. 111, ed. Didot), to designate the position
taken by Artaxerxes in reference to this peace, is—τὴν εἰρήνην
ἣν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβράβευσεν—which implies the peremptory decision
of an official judge, analogous to another passage (139) of the
Panegyr. Orat. of Isokrates—Νῦν δ’ ἐκεῖνός (Artaxerxes) ἐστιν, ὁ
διοικῶν τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάθμους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι
καθιστάς. Πλὴν γὰρ τούτου τί τῶν ἄλλων ὑπόλοιπόν ἐστιν; Οὐ καὶ
τοῦ πολέμου κύριος ἐγένετο, καὶ ~τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπρυτάνευσε~, καὶ
τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων ἐπιστάτης καθέστηκεν;
[10] Herodot. vi, 49. κατηγόρεον Αἰγινητέων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν,
προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα.
[11] Isokrates, Orat. xii, (Panathen.) s. 112-114.
Plutarch (Agesil. c. 23; Artaxerxes, c. 21, 22) expresses
himself in terms of bitter and well-merited indignation of this
peace,—“if indeed (says he) we are to call this ignominy and
betrayal of Greece by the name of _peace_, which brought with it
as much infamy as the most disastrous war.” Sparta (he says) lost
her headship by her defeat at Leuktra, but her honor had been
lost before, by the convention of Antalkidas.
It is in vain, however, that Plutarch tries to exonerate
Agesilaus from any share in the peace. From the narrative
(in Xenophon’s Hellenica, v. i, 33) of his conduct at
the taking of the oaths, we see that he espoused it most
warmly. Xenophon (in the Encomium of Agesilaus, vii, 7)
takes credit to Agesilaus for being μισοπέρσης, which was
true, from the year B.C. 396 to B.C. 394. But in B.C. 387,
at the time of the peace of Antalkidas, he had become
μισοθηβαῖος; his hatred of Persia had given place to hatred
of Thebes.
See also a vigorous passage of Justin (viii, 4), denouncing
the disgraceful position of the Greek cities at a later time
in calling in Philip of Macedon as arbiter; a passage not less
applicable to the peace of Antalkidas; and perhaps borrowed from
Theopompus.
Great must have been the change wrought by the intermediate
events, when Sparta, the ostensible president of Greece,—in her
own estimation even more than in that of others,[12]—had so lost
all Pan-hellenic conscience and dignity, as to descend into an
obsequious minister, procuring and enforcing a Persian mandate for
political objects of her own. How insane would such an anticipation
have appeared to Æschylus, or the audience who heard the Persæ! to
Herodotus or Thucydides! to Perikles and Archidamus! nay, even to
Kallikratidas or Lysander! It was the last consummation of a series
of previous political sins, invoking more and more the intervention
of Persia to aid her against her Grecian enemies.
[12] Compare the language in which the Ionians, on their revolt
from Darius king of Persia about 500 B.C., had implored the aid
of Sparta (Herodot. v, 49). Τὰ κατήκοντα γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα· Ἰώνων
παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ’ ἐλευθέρων—ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον
μὲν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ~ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσῳ προεστέατε τῆς
Ἑλλάδος~.
How striking is the contrast between these words and the peace of
Antalkidas! and what would have been the feelings of Herodotus
himself if he could have heard of the latter event!
Her first application to the Great King for this purpose dates from
the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, and is prefaced by an
apology, little less than humiliating, from king Archidamus; who, not
unconscious of the sort of treason which he was meditating, pleads
that Sparta, when the Athenians are conspiring against her, ought
not to be blamed for asking from foreigners as well as from Greeks
aid for her own preservation.[13] From the earliest commencement to
the seventh year of the war, many separate and successive envoys
were despatched by the Spartans to Susa; two of whom were seized in
Thrace, brought to Athens, and there put to death. The rest reached
their destination, but talked in so confused a way, and contradicted
each other so much, that the Persian court, unable to understand
what they meant,[14] sent Artaphernes with letters to Sparta (in the
seventh year of the war) complaining of such stupidity, and asking
for clearer information. Artaphernes fell into the hands of an
Athenian squadron at Eion on the Strymon, and was conveyed to Athens;
where he was treated with great politeness, and sent back (after the
letters which he carried had been examined) to Ephesus. What is more
important to note is, that Athenian envoys were sent along with him,
with a view of bringing Athens into friendly communication with the
Great King; which was only prevented by the fact that Artaxerxes
Longimanus just then died. Here we see the fatal practice, generated
by intestine war, of invoking Persian aid; begun by Sparta as an
importunate solicitor,—and partially imitated by Athens, though we do
not know what her envoys were instructed to say, had they been able
to reach Susa.
[13] Thucyd. i, 82. Κἀν τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερα αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι
ξυμμάχων τε προσαγωγῇ καὶ Ἑλλήνων ~καὶ βαρβάρων~, εἴ ποθέν τινα
~ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων~ δύναμιν προσληψόμεθα, (~ἀνεπίφθονον~ δὲ,
ὅσοι ὥσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων ἐπιβουλευόμεθα, μὴ Ἕλληνας
μόνον ~ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους~ προσλαβόντας διασωθῆναι), etc. Compare
also Plato, Menexenus, c. 14, p. 243 B.
[14] Thucyd. ii, 7, 67; iv, 50.
Nothing more is heard about Persian intervention until the year of
the great Athenian disasters before Syracuse. Elate with the hopes
arising out of that event, the Persians required no solicitation, but
were quite as eager to tender interference for their own purposes, as
Sparta was to invite them for hers. How ready Sparta was to purchase
their aid by the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks, and that too
without any stipulations in their favor,—has been recounted in my
last volume.[15] She had not now the excuse,—for it stands only as an
excuse and not as a justification—of self-defence against aggression
from Athens, which Archidamus had produced at the beginning of the
war. Even then it was only a colorable excuse, not borne out by the
reality of the case; but now, the avowed as well as the real object
was something quite different,—not to repel, but to crush, Athens.
Yet to accomplish that object, not even of pretended safety, but
of pure ambition, Sparta sacrificed unconditionally the liberty of
her Asiatic kinsmen; a price which Archidamus at the beginning of
the war would certainly never have endured the thoughts of paying,
notwithstanding the then formidable power of Athens. Here, too,
we find Athens following the example; and consenting, in hopes of
procuring Persian aid, to the like sacrifice, though the bargain was
never consummated. It is true that she was then contending for her
existence. Nevertheless, the facts afford melancholy proof how much
the sentiment of Pan-hellenic independence became enfeebled in both
the leaders, amidst the fierce intestine conflict terminated by the
battle of Ægospotami.[16]
[15] See Vol. IX, Ch. LXXV, p. 360.
Compare the expressions of Demosthenes (cont. Aristokrat. c. 33,
p. 666) attesting the prevalent indignation among the Athenians
of his time, about this surrender of the Asiatic Greeks by
Sparta,—and his oration De Rhodior. Libertate, c. 13, p. 199,
where he sets the peace of Kallias, made by Athens with Persia in
449 B.C., in contrast with the peace of Antalkidas, contracted
under the auspices of Sparta.
[16] This is strikingly set forth by Isokrates, Or. xii,
(Panathen.) s. 167-173. In this passage, however, he distributes
his blame too equally between Sparta and Athens, whereas the
blame belongs of right to the former, in far greater proportion.
Sparta not only began the practice of invoking the Great King,
and invoking his aid by disgraceful concessions,—but she also
carried it, at the peace of Antalkidas, to a more extreme point
of selfishness and subservience. Athens is guilty of following
the bad example of her rival, but to a less extent, and under
greater excuse on the plea of necessity.
Isokrates says in another place of this discourse, respecting
the various acts of wrong-doing towards the general interest
of Hellas—ἐπιδεικτέον τοὺς μὲν ἡμετέρους ~ὀψιμαθεῖς~ αὐτῶν
γεγενημένους, Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ~τὰ μὲν πρώτους, τὰ δὲ μόνους~,
ἐξαμαρτόντας (Panath. s. 103). Which is much nearer the truth
than the passage before referred to.
After that battle, the bargain between Sparta and Persia would
doubtless have been fulfilled, and the Asiatic Greeks would have
passed at once under the dominion of the latter,—had not an entirely
new train of circumstances arisen out of the very peculiar position
and designs of Cyrus. That young prince did all in his power to
gain the affections of the Greeks, as auxiliaries for his ambitious
speculations; in which speculations both Sparta and the Asiatic
Greeks took part, compromising themselves irrevocably against
Artaxerxes, and still more against Tissaphernes. Sparta thus became
unintentionally the enemy of Persia, and found herself compelled to
protect the Asiatic Greeks against his hostility, with which they
were threatened; a protection easy for her to confer, not merely
from the unbounded empire which she then enjoyed over the Grecian
world, but from the presence of the renowned Cyreian Ten Thousand,
and the contempt for Persian military strength which they brought
home from their retreat. She thus finds herself in the exercise of a
Pan-hellenic protectorate or presidency, first through the ministry
of Derkyllidas, next of Agesilaus, who even sacrifices at Aulis,
takes up the sceptre of Agamemnon, and contemplates large schemes of
aggression against the Great King. Here, however, the Persians play
against her the same game which she had invoked them to assist in
playing against Athens. Their fleet, which fifteen years before she
had invited for her own purposes, is now brought in against herself,
and with far more effect, since her empire was more odious as well as
more oppressive than the Athenian. It is now Athens and her allies
who call in Persian aid; without any direct engagement, indeed, to
surrender the Asiatic Greeks, for we are told that after the battle
of Knidus, Konon incurred the displeasure of the Persians by his
supposed plans for reuniting them with Athens,[17] and Athenian aid
was still continued to Evagoras,—yet, nevertheless, indirectly paving
the way for that consummation. If Athens and her allies here render
themselves culpable of an abnegation of Pan-hellenic sentiment, we
may remark, as before, that they act under the pressure of stronger
necessities than could ever be pleaded by Sparta; and that they might
employ on their own behalf, with much greater truth, the excuse of
self-preservation preferred by king Archidamus.
[17] Cornelius Nepos, Conon. c. 5.
But never on any occasion did that excuse find less real place than
in regard to the mission of Antalkidas. Sparta was at that time
so powerful, even after the loss of her maritime empire, that the
allies at the Isthmus of Corinth, jealous of each other and held
together only by common terror, could hardly stand on the defensive
against her, and would probably have been disunited by reasonable
offers on her part; nor would she have needed even to recall
Agesilaus from Asia. Nevertheless, the mission was probably dictated
in great measure by a groundless panic, arising from the sight of
the revived Long Walls and refortified Piræus, and springing at
once to the fancy, that a new Athenian empire, such as had existed
forty years before, was about to start into life; a fancy little
likely to be realized, since the very peculiar circumstances which
had created the first Athenian empire were now totally reversed.
Debarred from maritime empire herself, the first object with Sparta
was, to shut out Athens from the like; the next, to put down all
partial federations or political combinations, and to enforce
universal autonomy, or the maximum of political isolation; in
order that there might nowhere exist a power capable of resisting
herself, the strongest of all individual states. As a means to this
end, which was no less in the interest of Persia than in hers, she
outbid all prior subserviences to the Great King, betrayed to him
not only one entire division of her Hellenic kinsmen, but also the
general honor of the Hellenic name in the most flagrant manner,—and
volunteered to _medise_ in order that the Persians might repay her by
_laconising_.[18] To ensure fully the obedience of all the satraps,
who had more than once manifested dissentient views of their own,
Antalkidas procured and brought down a formal order signed and sealed
at Susa; and Sparta undertook, without shame or scruple, to enforce
the same order,—“the convention sent down by the king,”—upon all her
countrymen; thus converting them into the subjects, and herself into
a sort of viceroy or satrap, of Artaxerxes. Such an act of treason
to the Pan-hellenic cause was far more flagrant and destructive than
that alleged confederacy with the Persian king, for which the Theban
Ismenias was afterwards put to death, and that, too, by the Spartans
themselves.[19] Unhappily it formed a precedent for the future, and
was closely copied afterwards by Thebes;[20] foreboding but too
clearly the short career which Grecian political independence had to
run.
[18] Isok. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 145. Καὶ τῷ βαρβάρῳ τῷ τῆς Ἀσίας
κρατοῦντι συμπράττουσι (the Lacedæmonians) ὅπως ὡς μεγίστην ἀρχὴν
ἕξουσιν.
[19] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 35.
[20] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 33-39.
That large patriotic sentiment, which dictated the magnanimous answer
sent by the Athenians[21] to the offers of Mardonius in 479 B.C.,
refusing in the midst of ruin present and prospective, all temptation
to betray the sanctity of Pan-hellenic fellowship,—that sentiment
which had been during the two following generations the predominant
inspiration of Athens, and had also been powerful, though always
less powerful, at Sparta,—was now, in the former, overlaid by more
pressing apprehensions, and in the latter completely extinguished.
Now it was to the leading states that Greece had to look, for holding
up the great banner of Pan-hellenic independence; from the smaller
states nothing more could be required than that they should adhere
to and defend it, when upheld.[22] But so soon as Sparta was seen to
solicit and enforce, and Athens to accept (even under constraint),
the proclamation under the king’s hand and seal brought down by
Antalkidas,—that banner was no longer a part of the public emblems
of Grecian political life. The grand idea represented by it,—of
collective self-determining Hellenism,—was left to dwell in the
bosoms of individual patriots.
[21] Herodot. viii, 143.
The explanation which the Athenians give to the Spartan envoys,
of the reasons and feelings which dictated their answer of
refusal to Alexander (viii, 144), are not less impressive than
the answer itself.
But whoever would duly feel and appreciate the treason of the
Spartans in soliciting the convention of Antalkidas, should read
in contrast with it that speech which their envoys address to the
Athenians, in order to induce the latter to stand out against the
temptations of Mardonius (viii, 142).
[22] The sixth oration (called Archidamus) of Isokrates sets
forth emphatically the magnanimous sentiments, and comprehensive
principles, on which it becomes Sparta to model her public
conduct,—as altogether different from the simple considerations
of prudence and security which are suitable to humbler states
like Corinth, Epidaurus, or Phlius (Archidamus, s. 105, 106, 110).
Contrast these lofty pretensions with the dishonorable realities
of the convention of Antalkidas,—not thrust upon Sparta by
superior force, but both originally sued out, and finally
enforced by her, for her own political ends.
Compare also Isokrates, Or. xii. (Panathen.) s. 169-172, about
the dissension of the leading Grecian states, and its baneful
effects.
If we look at the convention of Antalkidas apart from its form and
warranty, and with reference to its substance, we shall find that
though its first article was unequivocally disgraceful, its last was
at least popular as a promise to the ear. Universal autonomy, to
each city, small or great, was dear to Grecian political instinct.
I have already remarked more than once that the exaggerated force
of this desire was the chief cause of the short duration of Grecian
freedom. Absorbing all the powers of life to the separate parts,
it left no vital force or integrity to the whole; especially, it
robbed both each and all of the power of self-defence against foreign
assailants. Though indispensable up to a certain point and under
certain modifications, yet beyond these modifications, which Grecian
political instinct was far from recognizing, it produced a great
preponderance of mischief. Although, therefore, this item of the
convention was in its promise acceptable and popular,—and although
we shall find it hereafter invoked as a protection in various
individual cases of injustice,—we must inquire how it was carried
into execution, before we can pronounce whether it was good or evil,
the present of a friend or of an enemy.
The succeeding pages will furnish an answer to this inquiry. The
Lacedæmonians, as “presidents (guarantees or executors) of the peace,
sent down by the king,”[23] undertook the duty of execution; and
we shall see that from the beginning they meant nothing sincerely.
They did not even attempt any sincere and steady compliance with the
honest, though undistinguishing, political instinct of the Greek
mind; much less did they seek to grant as much as was really good,
and to withhold the remainder. They defined autonomy in such manner,
and meted it out in such portions, as suited their own political
interests and purposes. The promise made by the convention,
except in so far as it enabled them to increase their own power by
dismemberment or party intervention, proved altogether false and
hollow. For if we look back to the beginning of the Peloponnesian
war, when they sent to Athens to require general autonomy throughout
Greece, we shall find that the word had then a distinct and serious
import; demanding that the cities held in dependence by Athens should
be left free, which freedom Sparta might have ensured for them
herself at the close of the war, had she not preferred to convert
it into a far harsher empire. But in 387 (the date of the peace of
Antalkidas) there were no large body of subjects to be emancipated,
except the allies of Sparta herself, to whom it was by no means
intended to apply. So that in fact, what was promised, as well as
what was realized, even by the most specious item of this disgraceful
convention, was—“that cities should enjoy autonomy, not for their
own comfort and in their own way, but for Lacedæmonian convenience;”
a significant phrase (employed by Perikles,[24] in the debates
preceding the Peloponnesian war) which forms a sort of running text
for Grecian history during the sixteen years between the peace of
Antalkidas and the battle of Leuktra.
[23] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36.
Ἐν δὲ τῷ πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἀντιῤῥόπως τοῖς ἐναντίοις πράττοντες
οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ~πολὺ ἐπικυδέστεροι ἐγένοντο~ ἐκ τῆς ἐπ’
Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνης καλουμένης· ~προστάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὸ
βασιλέως καταπεμφθείσης εἰρήνης~ καὶ τὴν αὐτονομίαν ταῖς πόλεσι
πράττοντες, etc.
[24] Thucyd. i, 144. Νῦν δὲ τούτοις (to the Lacedæmonian envoys)
ἀποκρινάμενοι ἀποπέμψωμεν ... τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους
ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα, καὶ ὅταν
κἀκεῖνοι ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀποδῶσι πόλεσι ~μὴ σφίσι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις
ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ αὐτοῖς ἑκάστοις, ὡς βούλονται~.
I have already mentioned that the first two applications of
the newly-proclaimed autonomy, made by the Lacedæmonians, were
to extort from the Corinthian government the dismissal of its
Argeian auxiliaries, and to compel Thebes to renounce her ancient
presidency of the Bœotian federation. The latter especially was an
object which they had long had at heart;[25] and by both, their
ascendency in Greece was much increased. Athens, too, terrified by
the new development of Persian force as well as partially bribed
by the restoration of her three islands, into an acceptance of the
peace,—was thus robbed of her Theban and Corinthian allies, and
disabled from opposing the Spartan projects. But before we enter upon
these projects, it will be convenient to turn for a short time to the
proceedings of the Persians.
[25] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 36. οὗπερ πάλαι ἐπεθύμουν.
Even before the death of Darius Nothus (father of Artaxerxes and
Cyrus) Egypt had revolted from the Persians, under a native prince
named Amyrtæus. To the Grecian leaders who accompanied Cyrus in his
expedition against his brother, this revolt was well known to have
much incensed the Persians; so that Klearchus, in the conversation
which took place after the death of Cyrus about accommodation with
Artaxerxes, intimated that the Ten Thousand could lend him effectual
aid in reconquering Egypt.[26] It was not merely these Greeks who
were exposed to danger by the death of Cyrus, but also the various
Persians and other subjects who had lent assistance to him; all of
whom made submission and tried to conciliate Artaxerxes, except
Tamos, who had commanded the fleet of Cyrus on the coasts both of
Ionia and Kilikia. Such was the alarm of Tamos when Tissaphernes
came down in full power to the coast, that he fled with his fleet
and treasures to Egypt, to seek protection from king Psammetichus,
to whom he had rendered valuable service. This traitor, however,
having so valuable a deposit brought to him, forgot every thing
else in his avidity to make it sure, and put to death Tamos with
all his children.[27] About 395 B.C., we find Nephereus king of
Egypt lending aid to the Lacedæmonian fleet against Artaxerxes.[28]
Two years afterwards (392-390 B.C.), during the years immediately
succeeding the victory of Knidus, and the voyage of Pharnabazus
across the Ægean to Peloponnesus,—we hear of that satrap as employed
with Abrokomas and Tithraustes in strenuous but unavailing efforts
to reconquer Egypt.[29] Having thus repulsed the Persians, the
Egyptian king Akoras is found between 390-380 B.C.,[30] sending aid
to Evagoras in Cyprus against the same enemy. And in spite of farther
efforts made afterwards by Artaxerxes to reconquer Egypt, the native
kings in that country maintained their independence for about sixty
years in all, until the reign of his successor Ochus.
[26] Xen. Anab. ii, 5, 13.
It would appear that the revolt of Egypt from Persia must date
between 414-411 B.C.; but this point is obscure. See Boeckh,
Manetho und die Hundsstern-Periode, pp. 358, 363, Berlin 1845; and
Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub Imperio Persarum, p. 55.
M. Rehdautz, Vitæ Iphicratis, Timothei, et Chabriæ, p. 240, places
the revolt rather earlier, about 414 B.C.; and Mr. Fynes Clinton
(Fasti Hellen. Appendix, ch. 18, p. 317) countenances the same
date.
[27] Diodor. xiv, 35.
This Psammetichus is presumed by Ley (in his Dissertation above
cited, p. 20) to be the same person as Amyrtæus the Saite in the
list of Manetho, under a different name. It is also possible,
however, that he may have been king over a part of Egypt,
contemporaneous with Amyrtæus.
[28] Diodor. xiv, 79.
[29] This is the chronology laid down by M. Rehdautz (Vitæ
Iphicratis, Chabriæ, et Timothei, Epimetr. ii, pp. 241, 242) on
very probable grounds, principally from Isokrates, Orat. iv,
(Panegyr.) s. 161, 162.
[30] Diodor. xv, 2, 3.
But it was a Grecian enemy,—of means inferior, yet of qualities much
superior, to any of these Egyptians,—who occupied the chief attention
of the Persians immediately after the peace of Antalkidas: Evagoras,
despot of Salamis in Cyprus. Respecting that prince we possess a
discourse of the most glowing and superabundant eulogy, composed
after his death for the satisfaction (and probably paid for with
the money) of his son and successor Nikoklês, by the contemporary
Isokrates. Allowing as we must do for exaggeration and partiality,
even the trustworthy features of the picture are sufficiently
interesting.
Evagoras belonged to a Salaminian stock or Gens called the Teukridæ,
which numbered among its ancestors the splendid legendary names of
Teukrus, Telamon, and Æakus; taking its departure, through them,
from the divine name of Zeus. It was believed that the archer
Teukrus, after returning from the siege of Troy to (the Athenian)
Salamis, had emigrated under a harsh order from his father Telamon,
and given commencement to the city of that name on the eastern
coast of Cyprus.[31] As in Sicily, so in Cyprus, the Greek and
Phœnician elements were found in near contact, though in very
different proportions. Of the nine or ten separate city communities,
which divided among them the whole sea-coast, the inferior towns
being all dependent upon one or other of them,—seven pass for
Hellenic, the two most considerable being Salamis and Soli; three
for Phœnician,—Paphos, Amathus, and Kitium. Probably, however,
there was in each a mixture of Greek and Phœnician population, in
different proportions.[32] Each was ruled by its own separate prince
or despot, Greek or Phœnician. The Greek immigrations (though their
exact date cannot be assigned) appear to have been later in date
than the Phœnician. At the time of the Ionic revolt (B.C. 496), the
preponderance was on the side of Hellenism; yet with considerable
intermixture of Oriental custom. Hellenism was, however, greatly
crushed by the Persian reconquest of the revolters, accomplished
through the aid of the Phœnicians[33] on the opposite continent. And
though doubtless the victories of Kimon and the Athenians (470-450
B.C.) partially revived it, yet Perikles, in his pacification with
the Persians, had prudently relinquished Cyprus as well as Egypt;[34]
so that the Grecian element in the former, receiving little
extraneous encouragement, became more and more subordinate to the
Phœnician.
[31] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokl.) s. 50; Or. ix, (Evagoras) s.
21; Pausanias, ii, 29, 4; Diodor. xiv, 98.
The historian Theopompus, when entering upon the history of
Evagoras, seems to have related many legendary tales respecting
the Greek Gentes in Cyprus, and to have represented Agamemnon
himself as ultimately migrating to it (Theopompus, Frag. 111, ed.
Wichers; and ed. Didot. ap. Photium).
The tomb of the archer Teukrus was shown at Salamis in Cyprus.
See the Epigram of Aristotle, Antholog. i, 8, 112.
[32] Movers, in his very learned investigations respecting the
Phœnicians (vol. iii, ch. 5, p. 203-221 _seq._), attempts to
establish the existence of an ancient population in Cyprus,
called Kitians; once extended over the island, and of which the
town called Kitium was the remnant. He supposes them to have
been a portion of the Canaanitish population, anterior to the
Jewish occupation of Palestine. The Phœnician colonies in Cyprus
he reckons as of later date, superadded to, and depressing these
natives. He supposes the Kilikian population to have been in
early times Canaanitish also. Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 166)
inclines to admit the same hypothesis as highly probable.
The sixth century B.C. (from 600 downwards) appears to have been
very unfavorable to the Phœnicians, bringing upon Tyre severe
pressure from the Chaldeans, as it brought captivity upon the
Jews. During the same period, the Grecian commerce with Egypt was
greatly extended, especially by the reign of the Phil-hellenic
Amasis, who acquired possession of Cyprus. Much of the Grecian
immigration into Cyprus probably took place at this time; we know
of one body of settlers invited by Philokyprus to Soli, under the
assistance of the Athenian Solon (Movers, p. 244 _seq._).
[33] Herodot. v, 109.
Compare the description given by Herodotus of the costume and
arms of the Cypriots in the armament of Xerxes,—half Oriental
(vii, 90). The Salaminians used chariots of war in battle (v,
113); as the Carthaginians did, before they learnt the art of
training elephants (Diodor. xvi, 80; Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 27).
[34] See Vol. V. of this History, Ch. xlv, p. 335.
It was somewhere about this time that the reigning princes of
Salamis, who at the time of the Ionic revolt had been Greeks of
the Teukrid Gens,[35] were supplanted and dethroned by a Phœnician
exile who gained their confidence and made himself despot in their
place.[36] To insure his own sceptre, this usurper did everything
in his power to multiply and strengthen the Phœnician population,
as well as to discourage and degrade the Hellenic. The same policy
was not only continued by his successor at Salamis, but seems also
to have been imitated in several of the other towns; insomuch that
during most part of the Peloponnesian war, Cyprus became sensibly
dis-hellenized. The Greeks in the island were harshly oppressed; new
Greek visitors and merchants were kept off by the most repulsive
treatment, as well as by threats of those cruel mutilations of the
body which were habitually employed as penalties by the Orientals;
while Grecian arts, education, music, poetry, and intelligence, were
rapidly on the decline.[37]
[35] One of these princes, however, is mentioned as bearing the
Phœnician name of Siromus (Herod. v, 104).
[36] We may gather this by putting together Herodot. iv, 102; v,
104-114, with Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 22.
[37] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 23, 55, 58.
Παραλαβὼν γὰρ (Evagoras) ~τὴν πόλιν ἐκβεβαρβαρωμένην~, καὶ διὰ
τὴν τῶν Φοινίκων ἀρχὴν οὔτε τοὺς Ἕλληνας προσδεχομένην, οὔτε τέχνας
ἐπισταμένην, οὔτ’ ἐμπορίῳ χρωμένην, οὔτε λιμένα κεκτημένην, etc.
Πρὶν μὲν γὰρ λαβεῖν Εὐαγόραν τὴν ἀρχὴν, οὕτως ἀπροσοίστως καὶ
χαλεπῶς εἶχον, ὥστε καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων τούτους ἐνόμιζον εἶναι
βελτίστους οἵ ~τινες ὠμότατα πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας διακείμενοι~
τυγχάνοιεν, etc.
This last passage receives remarkable illustration from the
oration of Lysias against Andokides, in which he alludes to the
visit of the latter to Cyprus—μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἔπλευσεν ὡς τὸν
Κιτιέων βασιλέα, καὶ προδιδοὺς ληφθεὶς ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἐδέθη, καὶ οὐ
μόνον τὸν θάνατον ἐφοβεῖτο ἀλλὰ τὰ καθ’ ἡμέραν αἰκίσματα,
~οἰόμενος τὰ ἀκρωτήρια ζῶντος~ ἀποτμηθήσεσθαι (s. 26).
Engel (Kypros, vol. i, p. 286) impugns the general correctness of
this narrative of Isokrates. He produces no adequate reasons, nor
do I myself see any, for this contradiction.
Not only Konon, but also his friend Nikophemus, had a wife and
family at Cyprus, besides another family in Athens (Lysias, De
Bonis Aristophanis, Or. xix, s. 38).
Notwithstanding such untoward circumstances, in which the youth of
the Teukrid Evagoras at Salamis was passed, he manifested at an
early age so much energy both of mind and body, and so much power of
winning popularity, that he became at once a marked man both among
Greeks and Phœnicians. It was about this time that the Phœnician
despot was slain, through a conspiracy formed by a Kitian or Tyrian
named Abdêmon, who got possession of his sceptre.[38] The usurper,
mistrustful of his position, and anxious to lay hands upon all
conspicuous persons who might be capable of doing him mischief,
tried to seize Evagoras; but the latter escaped and passed over to
Soli and Kilikia. Though thus to all appearance a helpless exile,
he found means to strike a decisive blow, while the new usurpation,
stained by its first violences and rapacity, was surrounded by
enemies, doubters, or neutrals, without having yet established any
firm footing. He crossed over from Soli in Kilikia, with a small but
determined band of about fifty followers,—obtained secret admission
by a postern gate of Salamis,—and assaulted Abdêmon by night in
his palace. In spite of a vastly superior number of guards, this
enterprise was conducted with such extraordinary daring and judgment,
that Abdêmon perished, and Evagoras became despot in his place.[39]
[38] Theopompus (Fr. 111) calls Abdêmon a Kitian; Diodorus
(xiv, 98) calls him a Tyrian. Movers (p. 206) thinks that both
are correct, and that he was a Kitian living at Tyre, who had
migrated from Salamis during the Athenian preponderance there.
There were Kitians, not natives of the town of Kition, but
belonging to the ancient population of the island, living in the
various towns of Cyprus; and there were also Kitians mentioned as
resident at Sidon (Diogen. Laert. Vit. Zenon. s. 6).
[39] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evagoras) s. 29-35; also Or. iii,
(Nikokl.) s. 33; Theopomp. Fragm. 111, ed. Wichers and ed. Didot.
Diodor. xiv, 98.
The two latter mention the name, Audymon or Abdêmon, which
Isokrates does not specify.
The splendor of this exploit was quite sufficient to seat Evagoras
unopposed on the throne, amidst a population always accustomed to
princely government; while among the Salaminian Greeks he was still
farther endeared by his Teukrid descent.[40] His conduct fully
justified the expectations entertained. Not merely did he refrain
from bloodshed, or spoliation, or violence for the gratification
of personal appetite; abstinences remarkable enough in any Grecian
despot to stamp his reign with letters of gold, and the more
remarkable in Evagoras, since he had the susceptible temperament
of a Greek, though his great mental force always kept it under due
control.[41] But he was also careful in inquiring into, and strict in
punishing crime, yet without those demonstrations of cruel infliction
by which an Oriental prince displayed his energy.[42] His government
was at the same time highly popular and conciliating, as well towards
the multitude as towards individuals. Indefatigable in his own
personal supervision, he examined everything for himself, shaped out
his own line of policy, and kept watch over its execution.[43] He was
foremost in all effort and in all danger. Maintaining undisturbed
security, he gradually doubled the wealth, commerce, industry, and
military force, of the city, while his own popularity and renown went
on increasing.
[40] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 33.
[41] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 53. ἡγούμενος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ
ἀγόμενος ὑπ’ αὐτῶν, etc.
[42] Isokr. Or. ix, 51. οὐδένα μὲν ἀδικῶν, τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς
τιμῶν, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἁπάντων ἄρχων, ~νομίμως δὲ τοὺς
ἐξαμαρτάνοντας~ κολάζων (s. 58)—ὃς οὐ μόνον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ πόλιν
πλείονος ἀξίαν ἐποίησεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὅλον, τὸν περιέχοντα
τὴν νῆσον, ~ἐπὶ πρᾳότητα καὶ μετριότητα~ προήγαγεν, etc.; compare
s. 81.
These epithets, _lawful_ punishment, _mild_ dealing, etc., cannot
be fully understood except in contrast with the mutilations
alluded to by Lysias, in the passage cited in a note on page
16, above; also with exactly similar mutilations, mentioned by
Xenophon as systematically inflicted upon offenders by Cyrus
the younger (Xenoph. Anabas. i, 9, 13). Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν (says
Isokrates about the Persians) οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς οἰκέτας, ὡς
ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν—Or. iv, (Paneg.) 142.
[43] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 50-56.
The language of the encomiast, though exaggerated, must doubtless
be founded in truth, as the result shows.
Above all, it was his first wish to renovate, both in Salamis and
in Cyprus, that Hellenism which the Phœnician despots of the last
fifty years had done so much to extinguish or corrupt. For aid in
this scheme, he seems to have turned his thoughts to Athens, with
which city he was connected as a Teukrid, by gentile and legendary
sympathies,—and which was then only just ceasing to be the great
naval power of the Ægean. For though we cannot exactly make out the
date at which Evagoras began to reign, we may conclude it to have
been about 411 or 410 B.C. It seems to have been shortly after that
period that he was visited by Andokides the Athenian;[44] moreover,
he must have been a prince not merely established, but powerful,
when he ventured to harbor Konon in 405 B.C., after the battle of
Ægospotami. He invited to Salamis fresh immigrants from Attica and
other parts of Greece, as the prince Philokyprus of Soli had done
under the auspices of Solon,[45] a century and a half before. He
took especial pains to revive and improve Grecian letters, arts,
teaching, music, and intellectual tendencies. Such encouragement was
so successfully administered, that in a few years, without constraint
or violence, the face of Salamis was changed. The gentleness and
sociability, the fashions and pursuits, of Hellenism, became again
predominant; with great influence of example over all the other towns
of the island.
[44] Lysias cont. Andokid. s. 28.
[45] Plutarch, Solon, c. 26.
Had the rise of Evagoras taken place a few years earlier, Athens
might perhaps have availed herself of the opening to turn her
ambition eastward, in preference to that disastrous impulse which
led her westward to Sicily. But coming as he did only at that later
moment when she was hard pressed to keep up even a defensive war, he
profited rather by her weakness than by her strength. During those
closing years of the war, when the Athenian empire was partially
broken up, and when the Ægean, instead of the tranquillity which it
had enjoyed for fifty years under Athens, became a scene of contest
between two rival money-levying fleets,—many out-settlers from
Athens, who had acquired property in the islands, the Chersonesus, or
elsewhere, under her guarantee, found themselves insecure in every
way, and were tempted to change their abodes. Finally, by the defeat
of Ægospotami (B.C. 405), all such out-settlers as then remained
were expelled, and forced to seek shelter either at Athens (at that
moment the least attractive place in Greece), or in some other
locality. To such persons, not less than to the Athenian admiral
Konon with his small remnant of Athenian triremes saved out of the
great defeat, the proclaimed invitations of Evagoras would present
a harbor of refuge nowhere else to be found. Accordingly, we learn
that numerous settlers of the best character, from different parts
of Greece, crowded to Salamis.[46] Many Athenian women, during the
years of destitution and suffering which preceded as well as followed
the battle of Ægospotami, were well pleased to emigrate and find
husbands in that city;[47] while throughout the wide range of the
Lacedæmonian empire, the numerous victims exiled by the harmosts and
dekarchies had no other retreat on the whole so safe and tempting.
The extensive plain of Salamis afforded lands for many colonists. On
what conditions, indeed, they were admitted, we do not know; but the
conduct of Evagoras as a ruler, gave universal satisfaction.
[46] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 59-61; compare Lysias, Or.
xix, (De Aristoph. Bon.) s. 38-46; and Diodor. xiv, 98.
[47] Isokrates, _l. c._ παιδοποιεῖσθαι δὲ τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν
γυναῖκας λαμβάνοντες παρ’ ἡμῶν, etc.
For the extreme distress of Athenian women during these trying
times consult the statement in Xenophon, Memorab. ii, 7, 2-4.
The Athenian Andokides is accused of having carried out a young
woman of citizen family,—his own cousin, and daughter of an
Athenian named Aristeides,—to Cyprus, and there to have sold
her to the despot of Kitium for a cargo of wheat. But being
threatened with prosecution for this act before the Athenian
Dikastery, he stole her away again and brought her back to
Athens; in which act, however, he was detected by the prince, and
punished with imprisonment from which he had the good fortune
to escape. (Plutarch, Vit. X, Orat. p. 834; Photius, Cod. 261;
Tzetzes, Chiliad. vi, 367).
How much there may be of truth in this accusation, we have no
means of determining. But it illustrates the way in which the
Athenian maidens, who had no dowry at home, were provided for by
their relatives elsewhere. Probably Andokides took this young
woman out, under the engagement to find a Grecian husband for her
in Cyprus. Instead of doing this, he sold her for his own profit
to the harem of the prince; or at least, is accused of having so
sold her.
During the first years of his reign, Evagoras doubtless paid his
tribute regularly, and took no steps calculated to offend the Persian
king. But as his power increased, his ambition increased also. We
find him towards the year 390 B.C., engaged in a struggle not merely
with the Persian king, but with Amathus and Kitium in his own island,
and with the great Phœnician cities on the mainland. By what steps,
or at what precise period, this war began, we cannot determine. At
the time of the battle of Knidus (394 B.C.) Evagoras had not only
paid his tribute, but was mainly instrumental in getting the Persian
fleet placed under Konon to act against the Lacedæmonians, himself
serving aboard.[48] It was in fact (if we may believe Isokrates)
to the extraordinary energy, ability, and power, displayed by him
on that occasion in the service of Artaxerxes himself, that the
jealousy and alarm of the latter against him are to be ascribed.
Without any provocation, and at the very moment when he was profiting
by the zealous services of Evagoras, the Great King treacherously
began to manœuvre against him, and forced him into the war in
self-defence.[49] Evagoras accepted the challenge, in spite of the
disparity of strength, with such courage and efficiency, that he at
first gained marked successes. Seconded by his son Pnytagoras, he not
only worsted and humbled Amathus, Kitium, and Soli, which cities,
under the prince Agyris, adhered to Artaxerxes,—but also equipped a
large fleet, attacked the Phœnicians on the mainland with so much
vigor as even to take the great city of Tyre; prevailing, moreover,
upon some of the Kilikian towns to declare against the Persians.[50]
He received powerful aid from Akoris, the native and independent
king in Egypt, as well as from Chabrias and the force sent out by
the Athenians.[51] Beginning apparently about 390 B.C., the war
against Evagoras lasted something more than ten years, costing the
Persians great efforts and an immense expenditure of money. Twice
did Athens send a squadron to his assistance, from gratitude for his
long protection to Konon and his energetic efforts before and in the
battle of Knidus,—though she thereby ran every risk of making the
Persians her enemies.
[48] This much appears even from the meagre abstract of Ktesias,
given by Photius (Ktesiæ Persica, c. 63, p. 80, ed. Bähr).
Both Ktesias and Theopompus (Fr. iii, ed. Wichers, and ed. Didot)
recounted the causes which brought about the war between the
Persian king and Evagoras.
[49] Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 71, 73, 74. πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον
(Evagoras) οὕτως ἐκ πολλοῦ περιδεῶς ἔσχε (Artaxerxes), ~ὥστε
μεταξὺ πάσχων εὖ~, πολεμεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπεχείρησε, δίκαια μὲν οὐ
ποιῶν, etc.—ἐπειδὴ ~ἠναγκάσθη πολεμεῖν~ (_i. e._ Evagoras).
[50] Isokr. Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 75, 76; Diodor. xiv, 98; Ephorus,
Frag. 134, ed. Didot.
[51] Cornelius Nepos, Chabrias, c. 2; Demosthenes adv. Leptinem,
p. 479, s. 84.
The satrap Tiribazus saw that so long as he had on his hands a
war in Greece, it was impossible for him to concentrate his force
against the prince of Salamis and the Egyptians. Hence, in part, the
extraordinary effort made by the Persians to dictate, in conjunction
with Sparta, the peace of Antalkidas, and to get together such a
fleet in Ionia as should overawe Athens and Thebes into submission.
It was one of the conditions of that peace that Evagoras should be
abandoned;[52] the whole island of Cyprus being acknowledged as
belonging to the Persian king. Though thus cut off from Athens, and
reduced to no other Grecian aid than such mercenaries as he could
pay, Evagoras was still assisted by Akoris of Egypt, and even by
Hekatomnus prince of Karia with a secret present of money.[53] But
the peace of Antalkidas being now executed in Asia, the Persian
satraps were completely masters of the Grecian cities on the Asiatic
sea-board, and were enabled to convey round to Kilikia and Cyprus not
only their whole fleet from Ionia, but also additional contingents
from these very Grecian cities. A large portion of the Persian
force acting against Cyprus was thus Greek, yet seemingly acting by
constraint, neither well paid nor well used,[54] and therefore not
very efficient.
[52] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 162. Εὐαγόραν—ὃς ἐν ταῖς
συνθήκαις ἔκδοτός ἐστιν, etc.
We must observe, however, that Cyprus had been secured to the
king of Persia, even under the former peace, so glorious to
Athens, concluded by Perikles about 449 B.C., and called the
peace of Kallias. It was, therefore, neither a new demand on
the part of Artaxerxes, nor a new concession on the part of the
Greeks, at the peace of Antalkidas.
[53] Diodor. xv, 2.
It appears that Artaxerxes had counted much upon the aid of
Hekatomnus for conquering Evagoras (Diodor. xiv, 98).
About 380 B.C., Isokrates reckons Hekatomnus as being merely
dependent in name on Persia; and ready to revolt openly on the
first opportunity (Isokrates, Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 189).
[54] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 153, 154, 179.
The satraps Tiribazus and Orontes commanded the land force, a large
portion of which was transported across to Cyprus; the admiral Gaos
was at the head of the fleet, which held its station at Kitium in the
south of the island. It was here that Evagoras, having previously
gained a battle on land, attacked them. By extraordinary efforts he
had got together a fleet of two hundred triremes, nearly equal in
number to theirs; but after a hard-fought contest, in which he at
first seemed likely to be victorious, he underwent a complete naval
defeat, which disqualified him from keeping the sea, and enabled the
Persians to block up Salamis as well by sea as by land.[55] Though
thus reduced to his own single city, however, Evagoras defended
himself with unshaken resolution, still sustained by aid from Akoris
in Egypt; while Tyre and several towns in Kilikia also continued
in revolt against Artaxerxes; so that the efforts of the Persians
were distracted, and the war was not concluded until ten years
after its commencement.[56] It cost them on the whole (if we may
believe Isokrates)[57] fifteen thousand talents in money, and such
severe losses in men, that Tiribazus acceded to the propositions
of Evagoras for peace, consenting to leave him in full possession
of Salamis, under payment of a stipulated tribute, “like a slave
to his master.” These last words were required by the satrap to be
literally inserted in the convention; but Evagoras peremptorily
refused his consent, demanding that the tribute should be recognized
as paid by “one king to another.” Rather than concede this point
of honor, he even broke off the negotiation, and resolved again to
defend himself to the uttermost. He was rescued, after the siege had
been yet farther prolonged, by a dispute which broke out between
the two commanders of the Persian army. Orontes, accusing Tiribazus
of projected treason and rebellion against the king, in conjunction
with Sparta, caused him to be sent for as prisoner to Susa, and thus
became sole commander. But as the besieging army was already wearied
out by the obstinate resistance of Salamis, he consented to grant
the capitulation, stipulating only for the tribute, and exchanging
the offensive phrase enforced by Tiribazus, for the amendment of the
other side.[58]
[55] Diodor. xv, 4.
[56] Compare Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 187, 188—with
Isokrates, Or. ix, (Evag.) s. 77.
The war was not concluded,—and Tyre as well as much of
Kilikia was still in revolt,—when Isokrates published the
Panegyrical Oration. At that time, Evagoras had maintained
the contest six years, counting either from the peace of
Antalkidas (387 B.C.) or from his naval defeat about a year
or two afterwards; for Isokrates does not make it quite
clear from what point of commencement he reckons the six
years.
We know that the war between the king of Persia and
Evagoras had begun as early as 390 B.C., in which year
an Athenian fleet was sent to assist the latter (Xenoph.
Hellen. iv, 8, 24). Both Isokrates and Diodorus state
that it lasted ten years; and I therefore place the
conclusion of it in 380 or 379 B.C., soon after the date
of the Panegyrical Oration of Isokrates. I dissent on
this point from Mr. Clinton (see Fasti Hellenici, ad
annos 387-376 B.C., and his Appendix, No. 12—where the
point is discussed). He supposes the war to have begun
after the peace of Antalkidas, and to have ended in 376
B.C. I agree with him in making light of Diodorus, but he
appears to me on this occasion to contradict the authority
of Xenophon,—or at least only to evade the necessity
of contradicting him by resorting to an inconvenient
hypothesis, and by representing the two Athenian
expeditions sent to assist Evagoras in Cyprus, first in 390
B.C., next in 388 B.C., as relating to “_hostile measures
before the war began_” (p. 280). To me it appears more
natural and reasonable to include these as a part of the
war.
[57] Isokrates, Or. ix, s. 73-76.
[58] Diodor. xv. 8, 9.
This remarkable anecdote, of susceptible Grecian honor on the
part of Evagoras, is noway improbable, and seems safe to admit
on the authority of Diodorus. Nevertheless, it forms so choice
a morsel for a panegyrical discourse such as that of Isokrates,
that one cannot but think he would have inserted it had it come
to his knowledge. His silence causes great surprise—not without
some suspicion as to the truth of the story.
It was thus that Evagoras was relieved from his besieging enemies,
and continued for the remainder of his life as tributary prince
of Salamis under the Persians. He was no farther engaged in war,
nor was his general popularity among the Salaminians diminished
by the hardships which they had gone through along with him.[59]
His prudence calmed the rankling antipathy of the Great King, who
would gladly have found a pretext for breaking the treaty. His
children were numerous, and lived in harmony as well with him as
with each other. Isokrates specially notices this fact, standing as
it did in marked contrast with the family-relations of most of the
Grecian despots, usually stained with jealousies, antipathies, and
conflict, often with actual bloodshed.[60] But he omits to notice
the incident whereby Evagoras perished; an incident not in keeping
with that superhuman good fortune and favor from the gods, of which
the Panegyrical Oration boasts as having been vouchsafed to the hero
throughout his life.[61] It was seemingly not very long after the
peace, that a Salaminian named Nikokreon formed a conspiracy against
his life and dominion, but was detected, by a singular accident,
before the moment of execution, and forced to seek safety in flight.
He left behind him a youthful daughter in his harem, under the care
of an eunuch (a Greek, born in Elis) named Thrasydæus; who, full of
vindictive sympathy in his master’s cause, made known the beauty of
the young lady both to Evagoras himself and to Pnytagoras, the most
distinguished of his sons, partner in the gallant defence of Salamis
against the Persians. Both of them were tempted, each unknown to
the other, to make a secret assignation for being conducted to her
chamber by the eunuch; both of them were there assassinated by his
hand.[62]
[59] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikokles) s. 40,—a passage which must
be more true of Evagoras than of Nikokles.
[60] Isokrat. Or. ix, s. 88. Compare his Orat. viii, (De Pace) s.
138.
[61] Isokrates, ib. s. 85. εὐτυχέστερον καὶ θεοφιλέστερον, etc.
[62] I give this incident, in the main, as it is recounted in the
fragment of Theopompus, preserved as a portion of the abstract
of that author by Photius (Theopom. Fr. 111, ed. Wichers and ed.
Didot).
Both Aristotle (Polit. v, 8, 10) and Diodorus (xv, 47) allude
to the assassination of Evagoras by the eunuch; but both these
authors conceive the story differently from Theopompus. Thus
Diodorus says—Nikoklês, the eunuch, assassinated Evagoras, and
became “despot of Salamis.” This appears to be a confusion of
Nikoklês with Nikokreon. Nikoklês was the son of Evagoras, and
the manner in which Isokrates addresses him affords the surest
proof that _he_ had no hand in the death of his father.
The words of Aristotle are—ἡ (ἐπίθεσις) τοῦ εὐνούχου Εὐαγόρᾳ
τῷ Κυπρίῳ· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὴν γυναῖκα παρελέσθαι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ
ἀπέκτεινεν ὡς ὑβρισμένος. So perplexing is the passage in its
literal sense, that M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the note to his
translation, conceives ὁ εὐνοῦχος to be a surname or _sobriquet_
given to the conspirator, whose real name was Nikoklês. But this
supposition is, in my judgment, contradicted by the fact, that
Theopompus marks the same fact, of the assassin being an eunuch,
by another word—Θρασυδαίου ~τοῦ ἡμιάῤῥενος~, ὃς ἦν Ἠλεῖος τὸ
γένος, etc.
It is evident that Aristotle had heard the story differently
from Theopompus, and we have to choose between the two. I
prefer the version of the latter; which is more marked as well
as more intelligible, and which furnishes the explanation why
Pnytagoras,—who seems to have been the most advanced of the sons,
being left in command of the besieged Salamis when Evagoras
quitted it to solicit aid in Egypt,—did not succeed his father,
but left the succession to Nikoklês, who was evidently (from the
representation even of an eulogist like Isokrates) not a man
of much energy. The position of this eunuch in the family of
Nikokreon seems to mark the partial prevalence of Oriental habits.
Thus perished a Greek of preëminent vigor and intelligence,
remarkably free from the vices usual in Grecian despots, and
forming a strong contrast in this respect with his contemporary
Dionysius, whose military energy is so deeply stained by crime and
violence. Nikoklês, the son of Evagoras, reigned at Salamis after
him, and showed much regard, accompanied by munificent presents,
to the Athenian Isokrates; who compliments him as a pacific and
well-disposed prince, attached to Greek pursuits and arts, conversant
by personal study with Greek philosophy, and above all, copying his
father in that just dealing and absence of wrong towards person or
property, which had so much promoted the comfort as well as the
prosperity of the city.[63]
[63] Isokrates, Or. iii, (Nikoklês) s. 38-48; Or. ix, (Evagoras)
s. 100; Or. xv, (Permut.) s. 43. Diodorus (xv, 47) places the
assassination of Evagoras in 374 B.C.
We now revert from the episode respecting Evagoras,—interesting not
less from the eminent qualities of that prince than from the glimpse
of Hellenism struggling with the Phœnician element in Cyprus,—to the
general consequences of the peace of Antalkidas in Central Greece.
For the first time since the battle of Mykalê in 479 B.C., the
Persians were now really masters of all the Greeks on the Asiatic
coast. The satraps lost no time in confirming their dominion. In all
the cities which they suspected, they built citadels and planted
permanent garrisons. In some cases, their mistrust or displeasure was
carried so far as to raze the town altogether.[64] And thus these
cities, having already once changed their position greatly for the
worse, by passing from easy subjection under Athens to the harsh rule
of Lacedæmonian harmosts and native decemvirs,—were now transferred
to masters yet more oppressive and more completely without the pale
of Hellenic sympathy. Both in public extortion, and in wrong doing
towards individuals, the commandant and his mercenaries, whom the
satrap maintained, were probably more rapacious, and certainly more
unrestrained, than even the harmosts of Sparta. Moreover, the Persian
grandees required beautiful boys as eunuchs for their service, and
beautiful women as inmates of their harems.[65] What was taken
for their convenience admitted neither of recovery nor redress;
and Grecian women, if not more beautiful than many of the native
Asiatics, were at least more intelligent, lively, and seductive,—as
we may read in the history of that Phokæan lady, the companion of
Cyrus, who was taken captive at Kunaxa. Moreover, these Asiatic
Greeks, when passing into the hands of Oriental masters, came under
the maxims and sentiment of Orientals, respecting the infliction of
pain or torture,—maxims not only more cruel than those of the Greeks,
but also making little distinction between freemen and slaves.[66]
The difference between the Greeks and Phœnicians in Cyprus, on this
point, has been just noticed; and doubtless the difference between
Greeks and Persians was still more marked. While the Asiatic Greeks
were thus made over by Sparta and the Perso-Spartan convention of
Antalkidas, to a condition in every respect worse, they were at the
same time thrown in, as reluctant auxiliaries, to strengthen the
hands of the Great King against other Greeks,—against Evagoras in
Cyprus,—and above all, against the islands adjoining the coast of
Asia,—Chios, Samos, Rhodes, etc.[67] These islands were now exposed
to the same hazard, from their overwhelming Persian neighbors, as
that from which they had been rescued nearly a century before by the
Confederacy of Delos, and by the Athenian empire into which that
Confederacy was transformed. All the tutelary combination that the
genius, the energy, and the Pan-hellenic ardor, of Athens had first
organized, and so long kept up,—was now broken up; while Sparta, to
whom its extinction was owing, in surrendering the Asiatic Greeks,
had destroyed the security even of the islanders.
[64] Isokrates. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142, 156, 190. Τάς τε πόλεις
τὰς Ἑλληνίδας οὕτω κυρίως παρείληφεν, ὥστε τὰς μὲν κατασκάπτειν,
ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀκροπόλεις ἐντειχίζειν.
[65] See Herodot. vi, 9; ix, 76.
[66] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 142.
Οἷς (to the Asiatic Greeks after the peace of Antalkidas) οὐκ
ἐξαρκεῖ δασμολογεῖσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀκροπόλεις ὁρᾷν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν
κατεχομένας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ταῖς κοιναῖς συμφοραῖς δεινότερα πάσχουσι
τῶν παρ’ ἡμῖν ἀργυρωνήτων· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὕτως αἰκίζεται τοὺς
οἰκέτας, ὡς ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἐλευθέρους κολάζουσιν.
[67] Isokrat. Or. iv, (Paneg.) s. 143, 154, 189, 190. How
immediately the inland kings, who had acquired possession of the
continental Grecian cities, aimed at acquiring the islands also,
is seen in Herodot. i, 27. Chios and Samos indeed, surrendered
without resisting, to the first Cyrus, when he was master of
the continental towns, though he had no naval force (Herod. i,
143-169). Even after the victory of Mykalê, the Spartans deemed
it impossible to protect these islanders against the Persian
masters of the continent (Herod. ix, 106). Nothing except the
energy and organization of the Athenians proved that it was
possible to do so.
It soon appeared, however, how much Sparta herself had gained by
this surrender in respect to dominion nearer home. The government
of Corinth,—wrested from the party friendly to Argos, deprived of
Argeian auxiliaries, and now in the hands of the restored Corinthian
exiles who were the most devoted partisans of Sparta,—looked to her
for support, and made her mistress of the Isthmus, either for offence
or for defence. She thus gained the means of free action against
Thebes, the enemy upon whom her attention was first directed. Thebes
was now the object of Spartan antipathy, not less than Athens had
formerly been; especially on the part of King Agesilaus, who had to
avenge the insult offered to himself at the sacrifice near Aulis,
as well as the strenuous resistance on the field of Koroneia. He
was at the zenith of his political influence; so that his intense
miso-Theban sentiment made Sparta, now becoming aggressive on all
sides, doubly aggressive against Thebes. More prudent Spartans,
like Antalkidas, warned him[68] that his persevering hostility
would ultimately kindle in the Thebans a fatal energy of military
resistance and organization. But the warning was despised until it
was too fully realized in the development of the great military
genius of Epaminondas, and in the defeat of Leuktra.
[68] Plutarch, Agesil. c. 26; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 13.
I have already mentioned that in the solemnity of exchanging oaths
to the peace of Antalkidas, the Thebans had hesitated at first to
recognize the autonomy of the other Bœotian cities; upon which
Agesilaus had manifested a fierce impatience to exclude them from the
treaty, and attack them single-handed.[69] Their timely accession
balked him in this impulse; but it enabled him to enter upon a series
of measures highly humiliating to the dignity as well as to the power
of Thebes. All the Bœotian cities were now proclaimed autonomous
under the convention. As solicitor, guarantee, and interpreter, of
that convention, Sparta either had, or professed to have, the right
of guarding their autonomy against dangers, actual or contingent,
from their previous Vorort or presiding city. For this purpose she
availed herself of this moment of change to organize in each of them
a local oligarchy, composed of partisans adverse to Thebes as well as
devoted to herself, and upheld in case of need by a Spartan harmost
and garrison.[70] Such an internal revolution grew almost naturally
out of the situation; since the previous leaders, and the predominant
sentiment in most of the towns, seem to have been favorable to
Bœotian unity, and to the continued presidency of Thebes. These
leaders would therefore find themselves hampered, intimidated, and
disqualified, under the new system, while those who had before been
an opposition minority would come forward with a bold and decided
policy, like Kritias and Theramenes at Athens after the surrender of
the city to Lysander. The new leaders doubtless would rather invite
than repel the establishment of a Spartan harmost in their town, as a
security to themselves against resistance from their own citizens as
well as against attacks from Thebes, and as a means of placing them
under the assured conditions of a Lysandrian dekarchy. Though most of
the Bœotian cities were thus, on the whole, favorable to Thebes,—and
though Sparta thrust upon them the boon, which she called autonomy,
from motives of her own, and not from their solicitation,—yet,
Orchomenus and Thespiæ, over whom the presidency of Thebes appears to
have been harshly exercised, were adverse to her, and favorable to
the Spartan alliance.[71] These two cities were strongly garrisoned
by Sparta, and formed her main stations in Bœotia.[72]
[69] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 33.
[70] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 46. Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι
καθειστήκεσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις. Respecting the Bœotian city
of Tanagra, he says—ἔτι γὰρ τότε καὶ τὴν Τανάγραν οἱ περὶ
Ὑπατόδωρον, φίλοι ὄντες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, εἶχον (v, 4, 49).
Schneider, in his note on the former of these two passages,
explains the word δυναστεῖαι as follows—“Sunt factiones
optimatium qui Lacedæmoniis favebant, cum præsidio et harmostâ
Laconico.” This is perfectly just; but the words ὥσπερ ἐν
Θήβαις seem also to require an explanation. These words allude
to the “factio optimatium” at Thebes, of whom Leontiades was
the chief; who betrayed the Kadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) to
the Lacedæmonian troops under Phœbidas in 382 B.C.; and who
remained masters of Thebes, subservient to Sparta and upheld by
a standing Lacedæmonian garrison in the Kadmeia, until they were
overthrown by the memorable conspiracy of Pelopidas and Mellon
in 379 B.C. It is to this oligarchy under Leontiades at Thebes,
devoted to Spartan interests and resting on Spartan support,—that
Xenophon compares the governments planted by Sparta, after the
peace of Antalkidas, in each of the Bœotian cities. What he says,
of the government of Leontiades and his colleagues at Thebes,
is—“that they deliberately introduced the Lacedæmonians into the
acropolis, and enslaved Thebes to them, in order that they might
themselves exercise a despotism”—τούς τε τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσαγαγόντας
εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν αὐτοὺς, καὶ βουληθέντας Λακεδαιμονίοις τὴν
πόλιν δουλεύειν, ὥστε αὐτοὶ τυραννεῖν (v, 4, 1: compare v, 2,
36). This character—conveying a strong censure in the mouth
of the philo-Laconian Xenophon—belongs to all the governments
planted by Sparta in the Bœotian cities after the peace of
Antalkidas, and, indeed, to the Dekarchies generally which she
established throughout her empire.
[71] Xenoph. Memorab. iii, 5, 2; Thucyd. iv, 133; Diodor. xv, 79.
[72] Xen. Hellen. v, 4, 15-20; Diodor. xv, 32-37; Isokrates, Or.
xiv, (Plataic.) s. 14. 15.
The presence of such garrisons, one on each side of Thebes,—the
discontinuance of the Bœotarchs, with the breaking up of all symbols
and proceedings of the Bœotian federation,—and the establishment of
oligarchies devoted to Sparta in the other cities,—was doubtless a
deep wound to the pride of the Thebans. But there was another wound
still deeper, and this the Lacedæmonians forthwith proceeded to
inflict,—the restoration of Platæa.
A melancholy interest attaches both to the locality of this town, as
one of the brightest scenes of Grecian glory,—and to its brave and
faithful population, victims of an exposed position combined with
numerical feebleness. Especially, we follow with a sort of repugnance
the capricious turns of policy which dictated the Spartan behavior
towards them. One hundred and twenty years before, the Platæans had
thrown themselves upon Sparta, to entreat her protection against
Thebes. The Spartan king Kleomenes had then declined the obligation
as too distant, and had recommended them to ally themselves with
Athens.[73] This recommendation, though dictated chiefly by a wish
to raise contention between Athens and Thebes, was complied with;
and the alliance, severing Platæa altogether from the Bœotian
confederacy, turned out both advantageous and honorable to her until
the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. At that time, it suited
the policy of the Spartans to uphold and strengthen in every way
the supremacy of Thebes over the Bœotian cities; it was altogether
by Spartan intervention, indeed, that the power of Thebes was
reëstablished, after the great prostration as well as disgrace which
she had undergone, as traitor to Hellas and zealous in the service
of Mardonius.[74] Athens, on the other hand, was at that time doing
her best to break up the Bœotian federation, and to enrol its various
cities as her allies; in which project, though doubtless suggested
by and conducive to her own ambition, she was at that time (460-445
B.C.) perfectly justifiable on Pan-hellenic grounds; seeing that
Thebes as their former chief had so recently enlisted them all in
the service of Xerxes, and might be expected to do the same again
if a second Persian invasion should be attempted. Though for a
time successful, Athens was expelled from Bœotia by the defeat of
Korôneia; and at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the whole
Bœotian federation (except Platæa), was united under Thebes, in bitter
hostility against her. The first blow of the war, even prior to any
declaration, was struck by Thebes in her abortive nocturnal attempt
to surprise Platæa. In the third year of the war, king Archidamus,
at the head of the full Lacedæmonian force, laid siege to the latter
town; which, after an heroic defence and a long blockade, at length
surrendered under the extreme pressure of famine; yet not before one
half its brave defenders had forced their way out over the blockading
wall, and escaped to Athens, where all the Platæan old men, women,
and children, had been safely lodged before the siege. By a cruel
act which stands among the capital iniquities of Grecian warfare,
the Lacedæmonians had put to death all the Platæan captives, two
hundred in number, who fell into their hands; the town of Platæa
had been razed, and its whole territory, joined to Thebes, had
remained ever since cultivated on Theban account.[75] The surviving
Platæans had been dealt with kindly and hospitably by the Athenians.
A qualified right of citizenship was conceded to them at Athens, and
when Skionê was recaptured in 420 B.C., that town (vacant by the
slaughter of its captive citizens) was handed over to the Platæans
as a residence.[76] Compelled to evacuate Skionê, they were obliged
at the close of the Peloponnesian war,[77] to return to Athens,
where the remainder of them were residing at the time of the peace
of Antalkidas; little dreaming that those who had destroyed their
town and their fathers forty years before, would now turn round and
restore it.[78]
[73] Herodot. vi, 108.
[74] See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 327 of this History.
[75] Thucyd. iii, 68.
[76] Thucyd. v, 32; Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 126; Or.
xii, (Panathen.) s. 101.
[77] Plutarch, Lysand. c. 14.
[78] Pausanias, ix, 1, 3.
Such restoration, whatever might be the ostensible grounds on which
the Spartans pretended to rest it, was not really undertaken either
to carry out the convention of Antalkidas, which guaranteed only the
autonomy of _existing_ towns,—or to repair previous injustice, since
the prior destruction had been the deliberate act of themselves, and
of King Archidamus the father of Agesilaus,—but simply as a step
conducive to the present political views of Sparta. And towards
this object it was skilfully devised. It weakened the Thebans, not
only by wresting from them what had been, for about forty years,
a part of their territory and property; but also by establishing
upon it a permanent stronghold in the occupation of their bitter
enemies, assisted by a Spartan garrison. It furnished an additional
station for such a garrison in Bœotia, with the full consent of the
newly-established inhabitants. And more than all, it introduced
a subject of contention between Athens and Thebes, calculated to
prevent the two from hearty coöperation afterwards against Sparta.
As the sympathy of the Platæans with Athens was no less ancient
and cordial than their antipathy against Thebes, we may probably
conclude that the restoration of the town was an act acceptable to
the Athenians; at least, at first, until they saw the use made of
it, and the position which Sparta came to occupy in reference to
Greece generally. Many of the Platæans, during their residence at
Athens, had intermarried with Athenian women,[79] who now, probably,
accompanied their husbands to the restored little town on the north
of Kithæron, near the southern bank of the river Asôpus.
[79] Isokrates, Or. xiv. (Plataic.) s. 54.
Had the Platæans been restored to a real and honorable autonomy, such
as they enjoyed in alliance with Athens before the Peloponnesian
war, we should have cordially sympathized with the event. But the
sequel will prove—and their own subsequent statement emphatically
sets forth—that they were a mere dependency of Sparta, and an outpost
of Spartan operations against Thebes.[80] They were a part of the
great revolution which the Spartans now brought about in Bœotia;
whereby Thebes was degraded from the president of a federation into
an isolated autonomous city, while the other Bœotian cities, who had
been before members of the federation, were elevated each for itself
into the like autonomy; or rather (to substitute the real truth[81]
in place of Spartan professions) they became enrolled and sworn in
as dependent allies of Sparta, under oligarchical factions devoted
to her purposes and resting upon her for support. That the Thebans
should submit to such a revolution, and, above all, to the sight of
Platæa as an independent neighbor with a territory abstracted from
themselves,—proves how much they felt their own weakness, and how
irresistible at this moment was the ascendency of their great enemy,
in perverting to her own ambition the popular lure of universal
autonomy held out by the peace of Antalkidas. Though compelled to
acquiesce, the Thebans waited in hopes of some turn of fortune
which would enable them to reörganize the Bœotian federation; while
their hostile sentiment towards Sparta was not the less bitter for
being suppressed. Sparta on her part kept constant watch to prevent
the reunion of Bœotia;[82] an object in which she was for a time
completely successful, and was even enabled, beyond her hopes, to
become possessed of Thebes itself,[83] through a party of traitors
within,—as will presently appear.
[80] See the Orat. xiv, (called Plataicus) of Isokrates; which
is a pleading probably delivered in the Athenian assembly by
the Platæans (after the second destruction of their city),
and, doubtless, founded upon their own statements. The painful
dependence and compulsion under which they were held by Sparta,
is proclaimed in the most unequivocal terms (s. 31, 33, 48);
together with the presence of a Spartan harmost and garrison in
their town (s. 14).
[81] Xenophon says, truly enough, that Sparta made the Bœotian
cities αὐτονόμους ἀπὸ τῶν Θηβαίων (v. 1, 36), which she had long
desired to do. Autonomy, in the sense of disconnection from
Thebes, was insured to them,—but in no other sense.
[82] To illustrate the relations of Thebes, the other Bœotian
cities, and Sparta, between the peace of Antalkidas and the
seizure of the Kadmeia by Sparta (387-382 B.C.)—compare
the speech of the Akanthian envoys, and that of the Theban
Leontiades, at Sparta (Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 16-34). Ὑμᾶς
(the Spartans) τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’
ἓν εἴη, etc. Καὶ ὑμεῖς γε τότε μὲν ἀεὶ προσείχετε τὸν νοῦν,
πότε ἀκούσεσθε βιαζομένους αὐτοὺς (the Thebans) τὴν Βοιωτίαν
ὑφ’ αὑτοῖς εἶναι· νῦν δὲ, ἐπεὶ τάδε πέπρακται, οὐδὲν ὑμᾶς δεῖ
Θηβαίους φοβεῖσθαι, etc. Compare Diodor. xv, 20.
[83] In the Orat. (14) Plataic. of Isokrates, s. 30—we find it
stated among the accusations against the Thebans, that during
this period (_i. e._ between the peace of Antalkidas and the
seizure of the Kadmeia) they became sworn in as members of the
Spartan alliance and as ready to act with Sparta conjointly
against Athens. If we could admit this as true, we might also
admit the story of Epaminondas and Pelopidas serving in the
Spartan army at Mantinea (Plutarch, Pelop. c. 3). But I do not
see how it can be even partially true. If it had been true, I
think Xenophon could not have failed to mention it: all that he
does say, tends to contradict it.
In these measures regarding Bœotia, we recognize the vigorous hand,
and the miso-Theban spirit, of Agesilaus. He was at this time the
great director of Spartan foreign policy, though opposed by his more
just and moderate colleague king Agesipolis,[84] as well as by a
section of the leading Spartans, who reproached Agesilaus with his
project of ruling Greece by means of subservient local despots or
oligarchies in the various cities,[85] and who contended that the
autonomy promised by the peace of Antalkidas ought to be left to
develop itself freely, without any coërcive intervention on the part
of Sparta.[86]
[84] Diodor. xv. 29.
[85] How currently this reproach was advanced against Agesilaus,
may be seen in more than one passage of the Hellenica
of Xenophon; whose narrative is both so partial, and so
ill-constructed, that the most instructive information is dropped
only in the way of unintentional side-wind, where we should
not naturally look for it. Xen. Hellen. v. 3, 16. πολλῶν δὲ
λεγόντων Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς ὀλίγων ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώπων πόλει (Phlius)
ἀπεχθάνοιτο (Agesilaus) πλέον πεντακισχιλίων ἀνδρῶν. Again,
v, 4, 13. (Ἀγησίλαος) εὖ εἰδὼς, ὅτι, εἰ στρατηγοίη, λέξειαν οἱ
πολῖται, ὡς Ἀγησίλαος, ὅπως βοηθήσειε τοῖς τυράννοις, πράγματα τῇ
πόλει παρέχοι, etc. Compare Plutarch, Agesil. c. 24-26.
[86] Diodorus indeed affirms, that this was really done, for
a short time; that the cities which had before been dependent
allies of Sparta were now emancipated and left to themselves;
that a reaction immediately ensued against those dekarchies
or oligarchies which had hitherto managed the cities in the
interests of Sparta; that this reaction was so furious, as
everywhere to kill, banish, or impoverish, the principal
partisans of Spartan supremacy; and that the accumulated
complaints and sufferings of these exiles drove the Spartans,
after having “endured the peace like a heavy burthen” (ὥσπερ
βαρὺ φόρτιον—xv, 5) for a few months, to shake it off, and
to reëstablish by force their own supremacy as well as the
government of their friends in all the various cities. In this
statement there is nothing intrinsically improbable. After what
we have heard of the dekarchies under Sparta, no extent of
violence in the reaction against them is incredible, nor can we
doubt that such reaction would carry with it some new injustice,
along with much well-merited retribution. Hardly any but Athenian
citizens were capable of the forbearance displayed by Athens both
after the Four Hundred and after the Thirty. Nevertheless, I
believe that Diodorus is here mistaken, and that he has assigned
to the period immediately succeeding the peace of Antalkidas,
those reactionary violences which took place in many cities
about sixteen years subsequently, _after the battle of Leuktra_.
For Xenophon, in recounting what happened after the peace of
Antalkidas, mentions nothing about any real autonomy granted by
Sparta to her various subject-allies, and subsequently revoked;
which he would never have omitted to tell us, had the fact been
so, because it would have supplied a plausible apology for the
high-handed injustice of the Spartans, and would have thus lent
aid to the current of partiality which manifests itself in his
history.
Far from any wish thus to realize the terms of peace which they
had themselves imposed, the Lacedæmonians took advantage of an
early moment after becoming free from their enemies in Bœotia and
Corinth, to strain their authority over their allies beyond its
previous limits. Passing in review[87] the conduct of each during
the war, they resolved to make an example of the city of Mantinea.
Some acts, not of positive hostility, but of equivocal fidelity,
were imputed to the Mantineans. They were accused of having been
slack in performance of their military obligations, sometimes even
to the length of withholding their contingent altogether, under
pretence of a season of religious truce; of furnishing corn in
time of war to the hostile Argeians; and of plainly manifesting
their disaffected feeling towards Sparta,—chagrin at every success
which she obtained,—satisfaction, when she chanced to experience
a reverse.[88] The Spartan ephors now sent an envoy to Mantinea,
denouncing all such past behavior, and peremptorily requiring that
the walls of the city should be demolished, as the only security
for future penitence and amendment. As compliance was refused, they
despatched an army, summoning the allied contingents generally for
the purpose of enforcing the sentence. They intrusted the command
to king Agesipolis, since Agesilaus excused himself from the duty,
on the ground that the Mantineans had rendered material service to
his father Archidamus in the dangerous Messenian war which had beset
Sparta during the early part of his reign.[89]
[87] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8. Αἰσθόμενοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους
ἐπισκοποῦντας τοὺς ξυμμάχους, ὁποῖοί τινες ἕκαστοι ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ
αὐτοῖς ἐγεγένηντο, etc.
[88] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 2. He had before stated, that the
Mantineans had really shown themselves pleased, when the
Lacedæmonian Mora was destroyed near Corinth by Iphikrates (iv,
5, 18).
[89] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 3.
Having first attempted to intimidate the Mantineans by ravaging
their lands, Agesipolis commenced the work of blockade by digging
a ditch around the town; half of his soldiers being kept on guard,
while the rest worked with the spade. The ditch being completed, he
prepared to erect a wall of circumvallation. But being apprised that
the preceding harvest had been so good, as to leave a large stock
of provision in the town, and to render the process of starving it
out tedious both for Sparta and for her allies,—he tried a more
rapid method of accomplishing his object. As the river Ophis, of
considerable breadth for a Grecian stream, passed through the middle
of the town, he dammed up its efflux on the lower side;[90] thus
causing it to inundate the interior of the city and threaten the
stability of the walls; which seem to have been of no great height,
and built of sun-burnt bricks. Disappointed in their application to
Athens for aid,[91] and unable to provide extraneous support for
their tottering towers, the Mantineans were compelled to solicit a
capitulation. But Agesipolis now refused to grant the request, except
on condition that not only the fortifications of their city, but
the city itself, should be in great part demolished; and that the
inhabitants should be re-distributed into those five villages, which
had been brought together, many years before, to form the aggregate
city of Mantinea. To this also the Mantineans were obliged to submit,
and the capitulation was ratified.
[90] In 1627, during the Thirty years’ War, the German town of
Wolfenbüttel was constrained to surrender in the same manner, by
damming up the river Ocker which flowed through it; a contrivance
of General Count Pappenheim, the Austrian besieging commander.
See Colonel Mitchell’s Life of Wallenstein, p. 107.
The description given by Xenophon of Mantinea as it stood in
385 B.C., with the river Ophis, a considerable stream, passing
through the middle of it, is perfectly clear. When the city,
after having been now broken up, was rebuilt in 370 B.C., the
site was so far changed that the river no longer ran through it.
But the present course of the river Ophis, as given by excellent
modern topographical examiners, Colonel Leake and Kiepert, is
at a very considerable distance from the Mantinea rebuilt in
370 B.C.; the situation of which is accurately known, since
the circuit of its walls still remains distinctly marked. The
Mantinea of 370 B.C., therefore, as compared with the Mantinea in
385 B.C., must have been removed to a considerable distance—or
else the river Ophis must have altered its course. Colonel
Leake supposes that the Ophis had been artificially diverted
from its course, in order that it might be brought through the
town of Mantinea; a supposition, which he founds on the words
of Xenophon,—σοφωτέρων γενομένων ταύτῃ γε τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὴ
διὰ τειχῶν ποταμὸν ποιεῖσθαι (Hellen. v, 2, 7). But it is very
difficult to agree with him on this point, when we look at his
own map (annexed to the Peloponnesiaca) of the Mantinice and
Tegeatis, and observe the great distance between the river Ophis
and Mantinea; nor do the words of Xenophon seem necessarily to
imply any artificial diversion of the river. It appears easier to
believe that the river has changed its course. See Leake, Travels
in Morea, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 71; and Peloponnesiaca, p. 380;
and Ernst Curtius, Peloponnesos, p. 239—who still, however,
leaves the point obscure.
[91] Diodor. xv, 5.
Though nothing was said in the terms of it about the chiefs of the
Mantinean democratical government, yet these latter, conscious that
they were detested both by their own oligarchical opposition and
by the Lacedæmonians, accounted themselves certain of being put
to death. And such would assuredly have been their fate, had not
Pausanias (the late king of Sparta, now in exile at Tegea), whose
good opinion they had always enjoyed, obtained as a personal favor
from his son Agesipolis the lives of the most obnoxious, sixty in
number, on condition that they should depart into exile. Agesipolis
had much difficulty in accomplishing the wishes of his father. His
Lacedæmonian soldiers were ranged in arms on both sides of the
gate by which the obnoxious men went out; and Xenophon notices it
as a signal mark of Lacedæmonian discipline, that they could keep
their spears unemployed when disarmed enemies were thus within
their reach; especially as the oligarchical Mantineans manifested
the most murderous propensities, and were exceedingly difficult to
control.[92] As at Peiræus before, so here at Mantinea again,—the
liberal, but unfortunate, king Pausanias is found interfering in the
character of mediator to soften the ferocity of political antipathies.
[92] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 6. Οἰομένων δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τῶν
ἀργολιζόντων, καὶ τῶν τοῦ δήμου προστατῶν, διεπράξατο ὁ πατὴρ
(see before, v, 2, 3) παρὰ τοῦ Ἀγησιπόλιδος, ἀσφάλειαν αὐτοῖς
ἔσεσθαι, ἀπαλλαττομένοις ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἑξήκοντα οὖσι. Καὶ
ἀμφοτέρωθεν μὲν τῆς ὁδοῦ, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τῶν πυλῶν ἔχοντες τὰ
δόρατα οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔστησαν, θεώμενοι τοὺς ἐξιόντας· ~καὶ
μισοῦντες αὐτοὺς ὅμως ἀπείχοντο αὐτῶν ῥᾷον ἢ οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν
Μαντινέων~· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν εἰρήσθω μέγα τεκμήριον πειθαρχίας.
I have remarked more than once, and the reader will here observe
a new example, how completely the word βέλτιστοι—which is applied
to the wealthy or aristocratical party in politics, as its
equivalent is in other languages, by writers who sympathize with
them—is divested of all genuine ethical import as to character.
The city of Mantinea was now broken up, and the inhabitants were
distributed again into the five constituent villages. Out of
four-fifths of the population, each man pulled down his house in
the city, and rebuilt it in the village near to which his property
lay. The remaining fifth continued to occupy Mantinea as a village.
Each village was placed under oligarchical government, and left
unfortified. Though at first (says Xenophon) the change proved
troublesome and odious, yet presently, when men found themselves
resident upon their landed properties,—and still more, when they felt
themselves delivered from the vexatious demagogues,—the new situation
became more popular than the old. The Lacedæmonians were still better
satisfied. Instead of one city of Mantinea, five distinct Arcadian
villages now stood enrolled in their catalogue of allies. They
assigned to each a separate xenâgus (Spartan officer destined to the
command of each allied contingent), and the military service of all
was henceforward performed with the utmost regularity.[93]
[93] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 7.
He says of this breaking up of the city of Mantinea, διῳκίσθη ἡ
Μαντίνεια τετραχῆ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. Ephorus (Fr. 138,
ed. Didot) states that it was distributed into the five original
villages; and Strabo affirms that there were _five_ original
constituent villages (viii, p. 337). Hence it is probable that
Mantinea the city was still left, after this διοίκισις, to
subsist as one of the five unfortified villages; so that Ephorus,
Strabo, and Xenophon may be thus made to agree, in substance.
Such was the dissection or cutting into parts of the ancient city
Mantinea; one of the most odious acts of high-handed Spartan
despotism. Its true character is veiled by the partiality of the
historian, who recounts it with a confident assurance, that after
the trouble of moving was over, the population felt themselves
decidedly bettered by the change. Such an assurance is only to be
credited, on the ground that, being captives under the Grecian laws
of war, they may have been thankful to escape the more terrible
liabilities of death or personal slavery, at the price of forfeiting
their civic community. That their feelings towards the change were
those of genuine aversion, is shown by their subsequent conduct after
the battle of Leuktra. As soon as the fear of Sparta was removed,
they flocked together, with unanimous impulse, to reconstitute and
refortify their dismantled city.[94] It would have been strange
indeed had the fact been otherwise; for attachment to a civic
community was the strongest political instinct of the Greek mind.
The citizen of a town was averse—often most unhappily averse—to
compromise the separate and autonomous working of his community
by joining in any larger political combination, however equitably
framed, and however it might promise on the whole an increase of
Hellenic dignity. But still more vehemently did he shrink from the
idea of breaking up his town into separate villages, and exchanging
the character of a citizen for that of a villager, which was nothing
less than great social degradation, in the eyes of Greeks generally,
Spartans not excepted.[95]
[94] This is mentioned by Xenophon himself (Hellen. vi, 5,
3). The Lacedæmonians, though they remonstrated against it,
were at that time too much humiliated to interfere by force
and prevent it. The reason why they did not interfere by force
(according to Xenophon) was that a general peace had just then
been sworn, guaranteeing autonomy to every distinct town, so
that the Mantineans under this peace had a right to do what
they did—στρατεύειν γε μέντοι ἐπ’ αὐτοὺς οὐ δυνατὸν ἐδόκει
εἶναι, ἐπ’ αὐτονομίᾳ τῆς εἰρήνης γεγενημένης (vi, 5, 5). Of
this second peace, Athens was the originator and the voucher;
but the autonomy which it guaranteed was only the same as had
been professedly guaranteed by the peace of Antalkidas, of which
Sparta had been the voucher.
General autonomy, as interpreted by Athens, was a different thing
from general autonomy as it had been when interpreted by Sparta.
The Spartans, when they had in their own hands both the power
of interpretation and the power of enforcement, did not scruple
to falsify autonomy so completely as to lay siege to Mantinea
and break up the city by force; while, when interpretation and
enforcement had passed to Athens, they at once recognized that
the treaty precluded them from a much less violent measure of
interference.
We may see by this, how thoroughly partial and Laconian is
the account given by Xenophon of the διοίκισις of Mantinea;
how completely he keeps out of view the odious side of that
proceeding.
[95] See the remarkable sentence of the Spartans, in which they
reject the claim of the Pisatans to preside over and administer
the Olympic festival (which had been their ancient privilege)
because they were χωρίται and not fit for the task (Xen. Hellen.
iii, 2, 31): compare χωριτικῶς (Xen. Cyrop. iv. 5, 54).
In truth the sentence executed by the Spartans against Mantinea was
in point of dishonor, as well as of privation, one of the severest
which could be inflicted on free Greeks. All the distinctive glory
and superiority of Hellenism,—all the intellectual and artistic
manifestations,—all that there was of literature and philosophy, or
of refined and rational sociality,—depended upon the city-life of the
people. And the influence of Sparta, during the period of her empire,
was peculiarly mischievous and retrograde, as tending not only to
decompose the federations such as Bœotia into isolated towns, but
even to decompose suspected towns such as Mantinea into villages;
all for the purpose of rendering each of them exclusively dependent
upon herself. Athens, during her period of empire, had exercised no
such disuniting influence; still less Thebes, whom we shall hereafter
find coming forward actively to found the new and great cities of
Megalopolis and Messênê. The imperial tendencies of Sparta are worse
than those of either Athens or Thebes; including less of improving
or Pan-hellenic sympathies, and leaning the most systematically upon
subservient factions in each subordinate city. In the very treatment
of Mantinea just recounted, it is clear that the attack of Sparta was
welcomed at least, if not originally invited, by the oligarchical
party of the place, who sought to grasp the power into their own
hands and to massacre their political opponents. In the first object
they completely succeeded, and their government probably was more
assured in the five villages than it would have been in the entire
town. In the second, nothing prevented them from succeeding except
the accidental intervention of the exile Pausanias; an accident,
which alone rescued the Spartan name from the additional disgrace
of a political massacre, over and above the lasting odium incurred
by the act itself; by breaking up an ancient autonomous city, which
had shown no act of overt enmity, and which was so moderate in its
democratical manifestations as to receive the favorable criticism
of judges rather disinclined towards democracy generally.[96] Thirty
years before, when Mantinea had conquered certain neighboring
Arcadian districts, and had been at actual war with Sparta to
preserve them, the victorious Spartans exacted nothing more than
the reduction of the city to its original district;[97] now they
are satisfied with nothing less than the partition of the city into
unfortified villages, though there had been no actual war preceding.
So much had Spartan power, as well as Spartan despotic propensity,
progressed during this interval.
[96] Aristot. Polit. vi, 2, 2.
[97] Thucyd. v, 81.
The general language of Isokrates, Xenophon, and Diodorus,[98]
indicates that this severity towards Mantinea was only the most
stringent among a series of severities, extended by the Lacedæmonians
through their whole confederacy, and operating upon all such of
its members as gave them ground for dissatisfaction or mistrust.
During the ten years after the surrender of Athens, they had been
lords of the Grecian world both by land and sea, with a power never
before possessed by any Grecian state; until the battle of Knidus,
and the combination of Athens, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth, seconded
by Persia, had broken up their empire at sea, and much endangered
it on land. At length the peace of Antalkidas, enlisting Persia on
their side (at the price of the liberty of the Asiatic Greeks), had
enabled them to dissolve the hostile combination against them. The
general autonomy, of which they were the authorized interpreters,
meant nothing more than a separation of the Bœotian cities from
Thebes,[99] and of Corinth from Argos,—being noway intended to apply
to the relation between Sparta and her allies. Having thus their
hands free, the Lacedæmonians applied themselves to raise their
ascendency on land to the point where it had stood before the battle
of Knidus, and even to regain as much as possible of their empire at
sea. To bring back a dominion such as that of the Lysandrian harmosts
and dekarchies, and to reconstitute a local oligarchy of their most
devoted partisans, in each of those cities where the government had
been somewhat liberalized during the recent period of war,—was their
systematic policy.
[98] Isokrates, Or. iv, (Panegyr.) s. 133, 134, 146, 206; Or.
viii, (De Pace) s. 123; Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 1-8; Diodor. xv, 5,
9-19.
[99] Xen. Hellen. v, 1, 35.
Those exiles who had incurred the condemnation of their
fellow-citizens for subservience to Sparta, now found the season
convenient for soliciting Spartan intervention to procure their
return. It was in this manner that a body of exiled political
leaders from Phlius,—whose great merit it was that the city when
under their government had been zealous in service to Sparta, but
had now become lukewarm or even disaffected in the hands of their
opponents,—obtained from the ephors a message, polite in form but
authoritative in substance, addressed to the Phliasians, requiring
that the exiles should be restored, as friends of Sparta banished
without just cause.[100]
[100] Xen. Hellen. v. 2, 8-10.
The consequences of this forced return are difficult to foresee;
they will appear in a subsequent page.
While the Spartan power, for the few years succeeding the peace of
Antalkidas, was thus decidedly in ascending movement on land, efforts
were also made to reëstablish it at sea. Several of the Cyclades
and other smaller islands were again rendered tributary. In this
latter sphere, however, Athens became her competitor. Since the
peace, and the restoration of Lemnos, Imbros and Skyros, combined
with the refortified Peiræus and its Long Walls,—Athenian commerce
and naval power had been reviving, though by slow and humble steps.
Like the naval force of England compared with France, the warlike
marine of Athens rested upon a considerable commercial marine, which
latter hardly existed at all in Laconia. Sparta had no seamen except
constrained Helots or paid foreigners;[101] while the commerce of
Peiræus had both required and maintained a numerous population of
this character. The harbor of Peiræus was convenient in respect of
accommodation, and well-stocked with artisans,—while Laconia had few
artisans, and was notoriously destitute of harbors.[102] Accordingly,
in this maritime competition, Athens, though but the shadow of her
former self, started at an advantage as compared with Sparta, and
in spite of the superiority of the latter on land, was enabled to
compete with her in acquiring tributary dependencies among the
smaller islands of the Ægean. To these latter, who had no marine of
their own, and who (like Athens herself) required habitual supplies
of imported corn, it was important to obtain both access to Peiræus
and protection from the Athenian triremes against that swarm of
pirates, who showed themselves after the peace of Antalkidas, when
there was no predominant maritime state; besides which, the market of
Peiræus was often supplied with foreign corn from the Crimea, through
the preference shown by the princes of Bosphorus to Athens, at a time
when vessels from other places could obtain no cargo.[103] A moderate
tribute paid to Athens would secure to the tributary island greater
advantages than if paid to Sparta,—with at least equal protection.
Probably, the influence of Athens over these islanders was farther
aided by the fact, that she administered the festivals, and lent
out the funds, of the holy temple at Delos. We know by inscriptions
remaining, that large sums were borrowed at interest from the
temple-treasure, not merely by individual islanders, but also by the
island-cities collectively,—Naxos, Andros, Tenos, Siphnos, Seriphos.
The Amphiktyonic council who dispensed these loans (or at least the
presiding members) were Athenians named annually at Athens.[104]
Moreover, these islanders rendered religious homage and attendance
at the Delian festivals, and were thus brought within the range of a
central Athenian influence, capable, under favorable circumstances,
of being strengthened and rendered even politically important.
[101] Xen. Hellen. vii, 1, 3-12.
[102] Xen. Hell. iv, 8, 7.
[103] Isokrates, Orat. xvii, (Trapezit.) s. 71.
[104] See the valuable inscription called the Marmor Sandvicense,
which contains the accounts rendered by the annual Amphiktyons at
Delos, from 377-373 B.C.
Boeckh, Staats-haushaltung der Athener, vol. ii, p. 214, ed. 1;
vol. ii, p. 78 _seq._, ed. 2nd.
The list of cities and individuals who borrowed money from the
temple is given in these accounts, together with the amount of
interest either paid by them, or remaining in arrear.
By such helps, Athens was slowly acquiring to herself a second
maritime confederacy, which we shall presently find to be of
considerable moment, though never approaching the grandeur of
her former empire; so that in the year 380 B.C., when Isokrates
published his Panegyrical Discourse (seven years after the peace of
Antalkidas), though her general power was still slender compared with
the overruling might of Sparta,[105] yet her navy had already made
such progress, that he claims for her the right of taking the command
by sea, in that crusade which he strenuously enforces, of Athens and
Sparta in harmonious unity at the head of all Greece, against the
Asiatic barbarians.[106]
[105] This is the description which Isokrates himself gives
(Orat. xv, (Permutat.) s. 61) of the state of the Grecian world
when he published his Panegyrical Discourse—ὅτε Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν
ἦρχον τῶν Ἑλλήνων, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταπεινῶς ἐπράττομεν, etc.
[106] The Panegyrical Discourse of Isokrates, the date of it
being pretty exactly known, is of great value for enabling us
to understand the period immediately succeeding the peace of
Antalkidas.
He particularly notices the multiplication of pirates, and the
competition between Athens and Sparta about tribute from the
islands in the Ægean (s. 133). Τίς γὰρ ἂν τοιαύτης καταστάσεως
ἐπιθυμήσειεν, ἐν ᾗ καταποντισταὶ μὲν τὴν θάλασσαν κατέχουσι,
πελτασταὶ δὲ τὰς πόλεις καταλαμβάνουσι, etc.
... Καίτοι χρὴ τοὺς φύσει καὶ μὴ διὰ τύχην μέγα φρονοῦντας
τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειρεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ~τοὺς νησιώτας
δασμολογεῖν~, οὓς ἄξιόν ἐστιν ἐλέειν, ὁρῶντας τούτους μὲν διὰ
σπανιότητα τῆς γῆς ὄρη γεωργεῖν ἀναγκαζομένους, τοὺς δ’ ἠπειρώτας
δι’ ἀφθονίαν τῆς χώρας τὴν μὲν πλείστην αὐτῆς ἀργὸν περιορῶντας,
etc. (s. 151).
... Ὧν ἡμεῖς (Athenians and Spartans) οὐδεμίαν ποιούμεθα
πρόνοιαν, ἀλλὰ ~περὶ μὲν τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἀμφισβητοῦμεν~,
τοσαύτας δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τηλικαύτας τὸ μέγεθος δυνάμεις οὕτως
εἰκῇ τῷ βαρβάρῳ παραδεδώκαμεν.
Compare Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 12—μὴ εἰς νησύδρια ἀποβλέποντας,
etc.
It would seem that a few years after the peace of Antalkidas, Sparta
became somewhat ashamed of having surrendered the Asiatic Greeks
to Persia; and that king Agesipolis and other leading Spartans
encouraged the scheme of a fresh Grecian expedition against Asia,
in compliance with propositions from some disaffected subjects of
Artaxerxes.[107] Upon some such project, currently discussed though
never realized, Isokrates probably built his Panegyrical Oration,
composed in a lofty strain of patriotic eloquence (380 B.C.) to
stimulate both Sparta and Athens in the cause, and calling on both,
as joint chiefs of Greece, to suspend dissensions at home for a great
Pan-hellenic manifestation against the common enemy abroad. But
whatever ideas of this kind the Spartan leaders may have entertained,
their attention was taken off, about 382 B.C. by movements in a
more remote region of the Grecian world, which led to important
consequences.
[107] Diodor. xv, 9, 19.
Since the year 414 B.C. (when the Athenians were engaged in the
siege of Syracuse), we have heard nothing either of the kings of
Macedonia, or of the Chalkidic Grecian cities in the peninsula of
Thrace adjoining Macedonia. Down to that year, Athens still retained
a portion of her maritime empire in those regions. The Platæans
were still in possession of Skiônê (on the isthmus of Pallênê)
which she had assigned to them; while the Athenian admiral Euetion,
seconded by many hired Thracians, and even by Perdikkas king of
Macedonia, undertook a fruitless siege to reconquer Amphipolis on
the Strymon.[108] But the fatal disaster at Syracuse having disabled
Athens from maintaining such distant interests, they were lost to
her along with her remaining empire,—perhaps earlier; though we
do not know how. At the same time, during the last years of the
Peloponnesian war, the kingdom of Macedonia greatly increased in
power; partly, we may conceive, from the helpless condition of
Athens,—but still more from the abilities and energy of Archelaus,
son and successor of Perdikkas.
[108] Thucyd. vii, 9.
The course of succession among the Macedonian princes seems not to
have been settled, so that disputes and bloodshed took place at
the death of several of them. Moreover, there were distinct tribes
of Macedonians, who, though forming part, really or nominally, of
the dominion of the Temenid princes, nevertheless were immediately
subject to separate but subordinate princes of their own. The reign
of Perdikkas had been troubled in this manner. In the first instance,
he had stripped his own brother Alketas of the crown,[109] who
appears (so far as we can make out) to have had the better right to
it; next he had also expelled his younger brother Philippus from his
subordinate principality. To restore Amyntas the son of Philippus,
was one of the purposes of the Thrakian prince Sitalkês, in the
expedition undertaken conjointly with Athens, during the second year
of the Peloponnesian war.[110] On the death of Perdikkas (about
413 B.C.), his eldest or only legitimate son was a child of seven
years old; but his natural son[111] Archelaus was of mature age and
unscrupulous ambition. The dethroned Alketas was yet alive, and had
now considerable chance of reëstablishing himself on the throne;
Archelaus, inviting him and his son under pretence that he would
himself bring about their reëstablishment, slew them both amidst
the intoxication of a banquet. He next despatched the boy, his
legitimate brother, by suffocating him in a well; and through these
crimes made himself king. His government, however, was so energetic
and able, that Macedonia reached a degree of military power such as
none of his predecessors had ever possessed. His troops, military
equipments, and fortified places, were much increased in numbers;
while he also cut straight roads of communication between the various
portions of his territory,—a novelty seemingly everywhere, at that
time.[112] Besides such improved organization (which unfortunately we
are not permitted to know in detail), Archelaus founded a splendid
periodical Olympic festival, in honor of the Olympian Zeus and
the Muses,[113] and maintained correspondence with the poets and
philosophers of Athens. He prevailed upon the tragic poets Euripides
and Agathon, as well as the epic poet Chœrilus, to visit him in
Macedonia, where Euripides especially was treated with distinguished
favor and munificence,[114] remaining there until his death in
406 or 405 B.C. Archelaus also invited Sokrates, who declined the
invitation,—and appears to have shown some favor to Plato.[115] He
perished in the same year as Sokrates (399 B.C.), by a violent
death; two Thessalian youths, Krateuas and Hellanokrates, together
with a Macedonian named Dekamnichus, being his assassins during a
hunting-party. The first two were youths to whom he was strongly
attached, but whose dignity he had wounded by insulting treatment and
non-performance of promises; the third was a Macedonian, who, for
having made an offensive remark upon the bad breath of Euripides, had
been given up by the order of Archelaus to the poet, in order that
he might be flogged for it. Euripides actually caused the sentence
to be inflicted; but it was not till six years after his death that
Dekamnichus, who had neither forgotten nor forgiven the affront,
found the opportunity of taking revenge by instigating and aiding the
assassins of Archelaus.[116]
[109] This is attested by Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471 A.
... Ὅς γε (Archelaus son of Perdikkas) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτον αὐτὸν
τὸν δεσπότην καὶ θεῖον (Alketas) μεταπεμψάμενος, ~ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν
ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκας αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο~, etc.
This statement of Plato, that Perdikkas expelled his brother
Alketas from the throne, appears not to be adverted to by the
commentators. Perhaps it may help to explain the chronological
embarrassments connected with the reign of Perdikkas, the years
of which are assigned by different authors, as 23, 28, 35, 40,
41. See Mr. Clinton, Fasti Hellen. ch. iv, p. 222—where he
discusses the chronology of the Macedonian kings: also Krebs,
Lection. Diodoreæ, p. 159.
There are no means of determining when the reign of Perdikkas
began—nor exactly, when it ended. We know from Thucydides that he
was king in 432, and in 414 B.C. But the fact of his acquiring
the crown by the expulsion of an elder brother, renders it less
wonderful that the beginning of his reign should be differently
stated by different authors; though these authors seem mostly
to conceive Perdikkas as the immediate successor of Alexander,
without any notice of Alketas.
[110] Thucyd. i, 57; ii, 97-100.
[111] The mother of Archelaus was a female slave belonging
to Alketas; it is for this reason that Plato calls Alketas
~δεσπότην~ καὶ θεῖον of Archelaus (Plato, Gorgias, c. 26. p. 471
A.)
[112] Thucyd. ii, 100. ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε, etc. See the note in
Ch. lxix, p. 17 of Vol. ix.
[113] Arrian, i, 11; Diodor. xvii, 16.
[114] Plutarch, De Vitioso Pudore, c. 7, p. 531 E.
[115] Aristotel. Rhetoric, ii, 24; Seneca, de Beneficiis, v, 6;
Ælian, V. H. xiv, 17.
[116] See the statements, unfortunately very brief, of Aristotle
(Politic. v, 8, 10-13). Plato (Alkibiad. ii, c. 5, p. 141 D),
while mentioning the assassination of Archelaus by his παιδικὰ
represents the motive of the latter differently from Aristotle,
as having been an ambitious desire to possess himself of the
throne. Diodorus (xiv, 37) represents Krateuas as having killed
Archelaus unintentionally in a hunting-party.
Καὶ τῆς Ἀρχελάου δ’ ἐπιθέσεως Δεκάμνιχος ἡγεμὼν ἐγένετο,
παροξύνων τοὺς ἐπιθεμένους πρῶτος· αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ὀργῆς, ὅτι αὐτὸν
ἐξέδωκε μαστιγῶσαι Εὐριπίδῃ τῷ ποιητῇ· ὁ δὲ Εὐριπίδης ἐχαλέπαινεν
εἰπόντος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσώδειαν τοῦ στόματος (Arist. Pol. _l.
c._).
Dekamnichus is cited by Aristotle as one among the examples of
persons actually scourged; which proves that Euripides availed
himself of the privilege accorded by Archelaus.
These incidents, recounted on the authority of Aristotle, and
relating as well to the Macedonian king Archelaus as to the Athenian
citizen and poet Euripides, illustrate the political contrast
between Macedonia and Athens. The government of the former is one
wholly personal,—dependent on the passions, tastes, appetites, and
capacities, of the king. The ambition of Archelaus leads both to his
crimes for acquiring the throne, and to his improved organization of
the military force of the state afterwards; his admiration for the
poets and philosophers of Athens makes him sympathize warmly with
Euripides, and ensure to the latter personal satisfaction for an
offensive remark; his appetites, mingling license with insult, end by
drawing upon him personal enemies of a formidable character. _L’Etat,
c’est moi_—stands marked in the whole series of proceedings; the
personality of the monarch is the determining element. Now at Athens,
no such element exists. There is, on the one hand, no easy way of
bringing to bear the ascendency of an energetic chief to improve the
military organization,—as Athens found to her cost, when she was
afterwards assailed by Philip, the successor after some interval, and
in many respects the parallel, of Archelaus. But on the other hand,
neither the personal tastes nor the appetites, of any individual
Athenian, count as active causes in the march of public affairs,
which is determined by the established law and by the pronounced
sentiments of the body of citizens. However gross an insult might
have been offered to Euripides at Athens, the dikasts would never
have sentenced that the offender should be handed over to him to be
flogged. They would have inflicted such measure of punishment as the
nature of the wrong, and the preëxisting law appeared to them to
require. Political measures, or judicial sentences, at Athens, might
be well or ill-judged; but at any rate, they were always dictated
by regard to a known law and to the public conceptions entertained
of state-interests, state-dignity, and state-obligations, without
the avowed intrusion of any man’s personality. To Euripides,—who
had throughout his whole life been the butt of Aristophanes and
other comic writers, and who had been compelled to hear, in the
crowded theatre, taunts far more galling than what is ascribed to
Dekamnichus,—the contrast must have been indeed striking, to have
the offender made over to him, and the whip placed at his disposal,
by order of his new patron. And it is little to his honor, that
he should have availed himself of the privilege, by causing the
punishment to be really administered; a punishment which he could
never have seen inflicted, during the fifty years of his past life,
upon any free Athenian citizen.
Krateuas did not survive the deed more than three or four days, after
which Orestes, son of Archelaus, a child, was placed on the throne,
under the guardianship of Æropus. The latter, however, after about
four years, made away with his ward, and reigned in his stead for
two years. He then died of sickness, and was succeeded by his son
Pausanias; who, after a reign of only one year, was assassinated and
succeeded by Amyntas.[117] This Amyntas (chiefly celebrated as the
father of Philip and the grandfather of Alexander the Great), though
akin to the royal family, had been nothing more than an attendant
of Æropus,[118] until he made himself king by putting to death
Pausanias.[119] He reigned, though with interruptions, twenty-four
years (393-369 B.C.); years, for the most part, of trouble and
humiliation for Macedonia, and of occasional exile for himself. The
vigorous military organization introduced by Archelaus appears to
have declined; while the frequent dethronements and assassinations
of kings, beginning even with Perdikkas the father of Archelaus,
and continued down to Amyntas, unhinged the central authority
and disunited the various portions of the Macedonian name; which
naturally tended to separation, and could only be held together by a
firm hand.
[117] Diodor. xiv. 84-89.
[118] Ælian, V. H. xii, 43; Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263; Justin,
vii, 4.
[119] Diodor. xiv, 89. Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ καὶ Παυσανίας ὁ τῶν
Μακεδόνων βασιλεὺς, ἀναιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἀμύντου δόλῳ, ἄρξας ἐνιαυτόν·
τὴν δὲ βασιλείαν κατέσχεν Ἀμύντας, etc.
The interior regions of Macedonia were bordered, to the north,
north-east, and north-west, by warlike barbarian tribes, Thracian and
Illyrian, whose invasions were not unfrequent and often formidable.
Tempted, probably, by the unsettled position of the government,
the Illyrians poured in upon Amyntas during the first year of his
reign; perhaps they may have been invited by other princes of the
interior,[120] and at all events their coming would operate as
a signal for malcontents to declare themselves. Amyntas,—having
only acquired the sceptre a few months before by assassinating his
predecessor, and having little hold on the people,—was not only
unable to repel them, but found himself obliged to evacuate Pella,
and even to retire from Macedonia altogether. Despairing of his
position, he made over to the Olynthians a large portion of the
neighboring territory,—Lower Macedonia or the coast and cities round
the Thermaic Gulf.[121] As this cession is represented to have been
made at the moment of his distress and expatriation, we may fairly
suspect that it was made for some reciprocal benefit or valuable
equivalent; of which Amyntas might well stand in need, at a moment of
so much exigency.
[120] See in Thucyd. iv, 112—the relations of Arrhibæus, prince
of the Macedonians called Lynkestæ in the interior country, with
the Illyrian invaders—B.C. 423.
Archelaus had been engaged at a more recent period in war with a
prince of the interior named Arrhibæus,—perhaps the same person
(Aristot. Polit. v, 8, 11).
[121] Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19. Ἀπογνοὺς δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν, Ὀλυνθίοις
μὲν τὴν συνεγγὺς χώραν ἐδωρήσατο, etc. Τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων
δωρησαμένου πολλὴν τῆς ὁμόρου χώρας, διὰ τὴν ἀπόγνωσιν τῆς ἑαυτοῦ
δυναστείας, etc.
The flight of Amyntas, after a year’s reign, is confirmed by
Dexippus ap. Syncell. p. 263.
It is upon this occasion that we begin to hear again of the
Chalkidians of Olynthus, and the confederacy which they gradually
aggregated around their city as a centre. The confederacy seems to
have taken its start from this cession of Amyntas,—or rather, to
speak more properly, from his abdication; for the cession of what
he could not keep was of comparatively little moment, and we shall
see that he tried to resume it as soon as he acquired strength.
The effect of his flight was, to break up the government of Lower
or maritime Macedonia, and to leave the cities therein situated
defenceless against the Illyrians or other invaders from the
interior. To these cities, the only chance of security, was to throw
themselves upon the Greek cities on the coast, and to organize in
conjunction with the latter a confederacy for mutual support. Among
all the Greeks on that coast, the most strenuous and persevering
(so they had proved themselves in their former contentions against
Athens when at the summit of her power) as well as the nearest, were
the Chalkidians of Olynthus. These Olynthians now put themselves
forward,—took into their alliance and under their protection the
smaller towns of maritime Macedonia immediately near them,—and soon
extended their confederacy so as to comprehend all the larger towns
in this region,—including even Pella, the most considerable city
of the country.[122] As they began this enterprise at a time when
the Illyrians were masters of the country so as to drive Amyntas
to despair and flight, we may be sure that it must have cost them
serious efforts, not without great danger if they failed. We may
also be sure that the cities themselves must have been willing, not
to say eager, coadjutors; just as the islanders and Asiatic Greeks
clung to Athens at the first formation of the confederacy of Delos.
The Olynthians could have had no means of conquering even the less
considerable Macedonian cities, much less Pella, by force and against
the will of the inhabitants.
[122] Xenoph. Hellen. v, 2, 12. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης
μεγίστη πόλις Ὄλυνθος σχεδὸν πάντες ἐπίστασθε. Οὗτοι τῶν πόλεων
προσηγάγοντο ἔστιν ἃς, ἐφ’ ᾧτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι νόμοις καὶ
συμπολιτεύειν· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν μειζόνων προσέλαβόν τινας. Ἐκ
δὲ τούτου ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν
ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, τοῦ βασιλέως Μακεδόνων. Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰσήκουσαν αἱ
ἐγγύτατα αὐτῶν, ταχὺ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς πόῤῥω καὶ μείζους ἐπορεύοντο·
καὶ κατελίπομεν ἡμεῖς ἔχοντας ἤδη ἄλλας τε πολλὰς, καὶ Πέλλαν,
ἥπερ μεγίστη τῶν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ πόλεων. Καὶ Ἀμύνταν δὲ αἰσθανόμεθα
ἀποχωροῦντά τε ἐκ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ ὅσον οὐκ ἐκπεπτωκότα ἤδη ἐκ
πάσης Μακεδονίας.
We know from Diodorus that Amyntas fled the country in despair,
and ceded a large proportion at least of Lower Macedonia to the
Olynthians. Accordingly, the struggle between the latter and
Amyntas (here alluded to), must have taken place when he came
back and tried to resume his dominion.
How the Illyrians were compelled to retire, and by what steps the
confederacy was got together, we are not permitted to know. Our
information (unhappily very brief) comes from the Akanthian envoy
Kleigenês, speaking at Sparta about ten years afterwards (B.C. 383),
and describing in a few words the confederacy as it then stood.
But there is one circumstance which this witness,—himself hostile
to Olynthus and coming to solicit Spartan aid against her,—attests
emphatically; the equal, generous, and brotherly principles, upon
which the Olynthians framed their scheme from the beginning. They
did not present themselves as an imperial city enrolling a body of
dependent allies, but invited each separate city to adopt common
laws and reciprocal citizenship with Olynthus, with full liberty
of intermarriage, commercial dealing, and landed proprietorship.
That the Macedonian cities near the sea should welcome so liberal a
proposition as this, coming from the most powerful of their Grecian
neighbors, cannot at all surprise us; especially at a time when they
were exposed to the Illyrian invaders, and when Amyntas had fled the
country. They had hitherto always been subjects;[123] their cities
had not (like the Greek cities) enjoyed each its own separate
autonomy within its own walls; the offer, now made to them by the
Olynthians, was one of freedom in exchange for their past subjection
under the Macedonian kings, combined with a force adequate to protect
them against Illyrian and other invaders. Perhaps also these various
cities,—Anthemus, Therma, Chalastra, Pella, Alôrus, Pydna, etc.,—may
have contained, among the indigenous population, a certain proportion
of domiciliated Grecian inhabitants, to whom the proposition of the
Olynthians would be especially acceptable.
[123] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 12—τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν
ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου, etc.; compare v, 2, 38.
We may thus understand why the offer of Olynthus was gladly
welcomed by the Macedonian maritime cities. They were the first who
fraternized as voluntary partners in the confederacy; which the
Olynthians, having established this basis, proceeded to enlarge
farther, by making the like liberal propositions to the Greek cities
in their neighborhood. Several of these latter joined voluntarily;
others were afraid to refuse; insomuch that the confederacy came
to include a considerable number of Greeks,—especially, Potidæa,
situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, and commanding the road of
communication between the cities within Pallênê and the continent.
The Olynthians carried out with scrupulous sincerity their professed
principles of equal and intimate partnership, avoiding all
encroachment or offensive preëminence in favor of their own city. But
in spite of this liberal procedure, they found among their Grecian
neighbors obstructions which they had not experienced from the
Macedonian. Each of the Grecian cities had been accustomed to its own
town-autonomy and separate citizenship, with its peculiar laws and
customs. All of them were attached to this kind of distinct political
life, by one of the most tenacious and universal instincts of the
Greek mind; all of them would renounce it with reluctance, even on
consenting to enter the Olynthian confederacy, with its generous
promise, its enlarged security, and its manifest advantages; and
there were even some who, disdaining every prospective consideration,
refused to change their condition at all except at the point of the
sword.
Among these last were Akanthus and Apollonia, the largest cities
(next to Olynthus) in the Chalkidic peninsula, and, therefore,
the least unable to stand alone. To these the Olynthians did not
make application, until they had already attracted within their
confederacy a considerable number of other Grecian as well as
Macedonian cities. They then invited Akanthus and Apollonia to come
in, upon the same terms of equal union and fellow-citizenship. The
proposition being declined, they sent a second message intimating
that, unless it were accepted within a certain time, they would
enforce it by compulsory measures. So powerful already was the
military force of the Olynthian confederacy, that Akanthus and
Apollonia, incompetent to resist without foreign aid, despatched
envoys to Sparta to set forth the position of affairs in the
Chalkidic peninsula, and to solicit intervention against Olynthus.
Their embassy reached Sparta about B.C. 383, when the Spartans,
having broken up the city of Mantinea into villages, and coërced
Phlius, were in the full swing of power over Peloponnesus,—and when
they had also dissolved the Bœotian federation, placing harmosts
in Platæa and Thespiæ as checks upon any movement of Thebes. The
Akanthian Kleigenês, addressing himself to the Assembly of Spartans
and their allies, drew an alarming picture of the recent growth
and prospective tendencies of Olynthus, invoking the interference
of Sparta against that city. The Olynthian confederacy (he said)
already comprised many cities, small and great, Greek as well as
Macedonian,—Amyntas having lost his kingdom. Its military power,
even at present great, was growing every day.[124] The territory,
comprising a large breadth of fertile corn-land, could sustain a
numerous population. Wood for ship-building was close at hand, while
the numerous harbors of the confederate cities ensured a thriving
trade as well as a steady revenue from custom-duties. The neighboring
Thracian tribes would be easily kept in willing dependence, and would
thus augment the military force of Olynthus; even the gold mines of
Mount Pangæus would speedily come within her assured reach. “All
that I now tell you (such was the substance of his speech) is matter
of public talk among the Olynthian people, who are full of hope and
confidence. How can you Spartans, who are taking anxious pains to
prevent the union of the Bœotian cities,[125] permit the aggregation
of so much more formidable a power, both by land and by sea, as this
of Olynthus? Envoys have already been sent thither from Athens and
Thebes,—and the Olynthians have decreed to send an embassy in return
for contracting alliance with those cities; hence, your enemies will
derive a large additional force. We of Akanthus and Apollonia, having
declined the proposition to join the confederacy voluntarily, have
received notice that, if we persist, they will constrain us. Now we
are anxious to retain our paternal laws and customs, continuing as
a city by ourselves.[126] But if we cannot obtain aid from you, we
shall be under the necessity of joining them,—as several other cities
have already done, from not daring to refuse; cities, who would have
sent envoys along with us, had they not been afraid of offending
the Olynthians. These cities, if you interfere forthwith, and with
a powerful force, will now revolt from the new confederacy. But if
you postpone your interference, and allow time for the confederacy
to work, their sentiments will soon alter. They will come to be knit
together in attached unity, by the co-burgership, the intermarriage,
and the reciprocity of landed possessions, which have already been
enacted prospectively. All of them will become convinced that they
have a common interest both in belonging to, and in strengthening the
confederacy,—just as the Arcadians, when they follow you, Spartans,
as allies, are not only enabled to preserve their own property, but
also to plunder others. If, by your delay, the attractive tendencies
of the confederacy should come into real operation, you will
presently find it not so much within your power to dissolve.[127]”
[124] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14.
The number of Olynthian troops is given in Xenophon as eight
hundred hoplites—a far greater number of peltasts—and one
thousand horsemen, assuming that Akanthus and Apollonia joined
the confederacy. It has been remarked by Mr. Mitford and others,
that these numbers, as they here stand, must be decidedly smaller
than the reality. But we have no means of correction open to us.
Mr. Mitford’s suggestion of eight thousand hoplites in place of
eight hundred, rests upon no authority.
Demosthenes states that Olynthus by herself, and before she had
brought all the Chalkidians into confederacy (οὔπω Χαλκιδέων
πάντων εἰς ἓν συνῳκισμένων—De Fals. Leg. c. 75, p. 425) possessed
four hundred horsemen, and a citizen population of 5000; no more
than this (he says) at the time when the Lacedæmonians attacked
them. The historical statements of the great orator, for a time
which nearly coincides with his own birth, are to be received
with caution.
[125] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 16. Ἐννοήσατε δὲ καὶ τόδε, πῶς εἰκὸς,
ὑμᾶς τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι, ὅπως μὴ καθ’ ἓν εἴη, πολὺ δὲ
μείζονος ἀθροιζομένης δυνάμεως ἀμελῆσαι, etc.
I translate here the substance of the speech, not the exact words.
[126] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 14. Ἡμεῖς δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι,
βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι, καὶ αὐτοπολῖται
εἶναι· εἰ μέντοι μὴ βοηθήσει τις, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμῖν μετ’ ἐκείνων
γίγνεσθαι.
[127] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 18. Δεῖ γε μὴν ὑμᾶς καὶ τόδε εἰδέναι,
ὡς, ἣν εἰρήκαμεν δύναμιν μεγάλην οὖσαν, οὔπω δυσπάλαιστός τις
ἐστίν· αἱ γὰρ ἄκουσαι τῶν πόλεων ~τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνοῦσαι~,
αὗται, ἄν τι ἴδωσιν ἀντίπαλον, ταχὺ ἀποστήσονται· ~εἰ μέντοι
συγκλεισθήσονται ταῖς τε ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ἐγκτήσεσι παρ’ ἀλλήλαις,
ἃς ἐψηφισμένοι εἰσὶ—καὶ γνώσονται, ὅτι μετὰ τῶν κρατούντων
ἕπεσθαι κερδαλέον ἐστὶν~, ὥσπερ Ἄρκαδες, ὅταν μεθ’ ὑμῶν ἴωσι, τά
τε αὐτῶν σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἁρπάζουσιν—~ἴσως οὔκεθ’ ὁμοίως
εὔλυτα ἔσται~.
This speech of the Akanthian envoy is remarkable in more than one
respect. Coming from the lips of an enemy, it is the best of all
testimonies to the liberal and comprehensive spirit in which the
Olynthians were acting. They are accused,—not of injustice, nor of
selfish ambition, nor of degrading those around them,—but literally,
of organizing a new partnership on principles too generous and too
seductive; of gently superseding, instead of violently breaking
down, the barriers between the various cities, by reciprocal ties
of property and family among the citizens of each; of uniting them
all into a new political aggregate, in which not only all would
enjoy equal rights, but all without exception would be gainers. The
advantage, both in security and in power, accruing prospectively to
all, is not only admitted by the orator, but stands in the front of
his argument. “Make haste and break up the confederacy (he impresses
upon Sparta) before its fruit is ripe, so that the confederates may
never taste it nor find out how good it is; for if they do, you
will not prevail on them to forego it.” By implication, he also
admits,—and he says nothing tending even to raise a doubt,—that the
cities which he represents, Akanthus and Apollonia, would share
along with the rest in this same benefit. But the Grecian political
instinct was nevertheless predominant,—“We wish to preserve our
paternal laws, and to be a city by ourselves.” Thus nakedly is
the objection stated; when the question was, not whether Akanthus
should lose its freedom and become subject to an imperial city like
Athens,—but whether it should become a free and equal member of a
larger political aggregate, cemented by every tie which could make
union secure, profitable, and dignified. It is curious to observe
how perfectly the orator is conscious that this repugnance, though
at the moment preponderant, was nevertheless essentially transitory,
and would give place to attachment when the union came to be felt as
a reality; and how eagerly he appeals to Sparta to lose no time in
clenching the repugnance, while it lasted. He appeals to her, not for
any beneficial or Pan-hellenic objects, but in the interests of her
own dominion, which required that the Grecian world should be as it
were pulverized into minute, self-acting, atoms without cohesion,—so
that each city, or each village, while protected against subjection
to any other, should farther be prevented from equal political union
or fusion with any other; being thus more completely helpless and
dependent in reference to Sparta.
It was not merely from Akanthus and Apollonia, but also from the
dispossessed Macedonian king Amyntas, that envoys reached Sparta to
ask for aid against Olynthus. It seems that Amyntas, after having
abandoned the kingdom and made his cession to the Olynthians, had
obtained some aid from Thessaly and tried to reinstate himself
by force. In this scheme he had failed, being defeated by the
Olynthians. Indeed we find another person named Argæus, mentioned
as competitor for the Macedonian sceptre, and possessing it for two
years.[128]
[128] Diodor. xiv, 92; xv, 19.
Demosthenes speaks of Amyntas as having been expelled from his
kingdom by the Thessalians (cont. Aristokrat. c. 29, p. 657).
If this be historically correct, it must be referred to some
subsequent war in which he was engaged with the Thessalians,
perhaps to the time when Jason of Pheræ acquired dominion over
Macedonia (Xenoph. Hellen. vi, 1, 11).
After hearing these petitioners, the Lacedæmonians first declared
their own readiness to comply with the prayer, and to put down
Olynthus; next, they submitted the same point to the vote of the
assembled allies.[129] Among these latter, there was no genuine
antipathy against the Olynthians, such as that which had prevailed
against Athens before the Peloponnesian war, in the synod then
held at Sparta. But the power of Sparta over her allies was now
far greater than it had been then. Most of their cities were under
oligarchies, dependent upon her support for authority over their
fellow-citizens; moreover, the recent events in Bœotia and at
Mantinea had operated as a serious intimidation. Anxiety to keep
the favor of Sparta was accordingly paramount, so that most of the
speakers as well as most of the votes, declared for war,[130] and a
combined army of ten thousand men was voted to be raised. To make
up such total, a proportional contingent was assessed upon each
confederate; combined with the proviso now added for the first
time, that each might furnish money instead of men, at the rate of
three Æginæan oboli (half an Æginæan drachma) for each hoplite. A
cavalry-soldier, to those cities which furnished such, was reckoned
as equivalent to four hoplites; a hoplite, as equivalent to two
peltasts; or pecuniary contribution on the same scale. All cities in
default were made liable to a forfeit of one stater (four drachmæ)
per day, for every soldier not sent; the forfeit to be enforced by
Sparta.[131] Such licensed substitution of pecuniary payment for
personal service, is the same as I have already described to have
taken place nearly a century before in the confederacy of Delos
under the presidency of Athens.[132] It was a system not likely to
be extensively acted upon among the Spartan allies, who were at once
poorer and more warlike than those of Athens. But in both cases it
was favorable to the ambition of the leading state; and the tendency
becomes here manifest, to sanction, by the formality of a public
resolution, that increased Lacedæmonian ascendency which had already
grown up in practice.
[129] See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. xlviii. p. 79.
[130] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 20. Ἐκ τούτου μέντοι, πολλοὶ μὲν
ξυνηγόρευον στρατιὰν ποιεῖν, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ βουλόμενοι
Λακεδαιμονίοις χαρίζεσθαι, etc.
[131] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 21, 22.
Diodorus (xv, 31) mentions the fact that an hoplite was reckoned
equivalent to two peltasts, in reference to a Lacedæmonian
muster-roll of a few years afterwards; but it must have been
equally necessary to fix the proportion on the present occasion.
[132] See Vol. V. Ch. xlv, p. 302 of this History.
The Akanthian envoys, while expressing their satisfaction with
the vote just passed, intimated that the muster of these numerous
contingents would occupy some time, and again insisted on the
necessity of instant intervention, even with a small force; before
the Olynthians could find time to get their plans actually in work or
appreciated by the surrounding cities. A moderate Lacedæmonian force
(they said), if despatched forthwith, would not only keep those
who had refused to join Olynthus, steady to their refusal, but also
induce others, who had joined reluctantly, to revolt. Accordingly the
ephors appointed Eudamidas at once, assigning to him two thousand
hoplites,—Neodamodes (or enfranchised Helots), Periœki, and Skiritæ
or Arcadian borderers. Such was the anxiety of the Akanthians for
haste, that they would not let him delay even to get together the
whole of this moderate force. He was put in march immediately, with
such as were ready; while his brother Phœbidas was left behind
to collect the remainder and follow him. And it seems that the
Akanthians judged correctly. For Eudamidas, arriving in Thrace after
a rapid march, though he was unable to contend against the Olynthians
in the field, yet induced Potidæa to revolt from them, and was
able to defend those cities, such as Akanthus and Apollonia, which
resolutely stood aloof.[133] Amyntas brought a force to coöperate
with him.
[133] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 24; Diodor. xv, 21.
The delay in the march of Phœbidas was productive of consequences no
less momentous than unexpected. The direct line from Peloponnesus
to Olynthus lay through the Theban territory; a passage which the
Thebans, whatever might have been their wishes, were not powerful
enough to refuse, though they had contracted an alliance with
Olynthus,[134] and though proclamation was made that no Theban
citizens should join the Lacedæmonian force. Eudamidas, having
departed at a moment’s notice, passed through Bœotia without a halt,
in his way to Thrace. But it was known that his brother Phœbidas was
presently to follow; and upon this fact the philo-Laconian party in
Thebes organized a conspiracy.
[134] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 27-34.
They obtained from the ephors, and from the miso-Theban feelings
of Agesilaus, secret orders to Phœbidas, that he should coöperate
with them in any party movement which they might find opportunity
of executing;[135] and when he halted with his detachment near the
gymnasium a little way without the walls, they concerted matters as
well with him as among themselves. Leontiades, Hypatês, and Archias,
were the chiefs of the party in Thebes favorable to Sparta; a party
decidedly in minority, yet still powerful, and at this moment so
strengthened by the unbounded ascendency of the Spartan name, that
Leontiades himself was one of the polemarchs of the city. Of the
anti-Spartan, or predominant sentiment in Thebes,—which included most
of the wealthy and active citizens, those who came successively into
office as hipparchs or generals of the cavalry,[136]—the leaders were
Ismenias and Androkleides. The former, especially, the foremost as
well as ablest conductor of the late war against Sparta, was now in
office as Polemarch, conjointly with his rival Leontiades.
[135] This is the statement of Diodorus (xv, 20), and
substantially that of Plutarch (Agesil. c. 24), who intimates
that it was the general belief of the time. And it appears to me
much more probable than the representation of Xenophon—that the
first idea arose when Phœbidas was under the walls of Thebes,
and that the Spartan leader was persuaded by Leontiades to act
on his own responsibility. The behavior of Agesilaus and of the
ephors after the fact is like that of persons who had previously
contemplated the possibility of it. But the original suggestion
must have come from the Theban faction themselves.
[136] Plutarch (De Genio Socratis, c. 5, p. 578 B.) states that
most of these generals of cavalry (τῶν ἱππαρχηκότων νομίμως) were
afterwards in exile with Pelopidas at Athens.
We have little or no information respecting the government of
Thebes. It would seem to have been at this moment a liberalized
oligarchy. There was a Senate, and two Polemarchs (perhaps the
Polemarchs may have been more than two in all, though the words
of Xenophon rather lead us to suppose _only_ two)—and there seems
also to have been a civil magistrate, chosen by lot (ὁ κυαμιστὸς
ἄρχων) and renewed annually, whose office was marked by his
constantly having in his possession the sacred spear of state (τὸ
ἱερὸν δόρυ) and the city-seal (Plutarch, De Gen. Socr. c. 31. p.
597—B.—C.).
At this moment, it must be recollected, there were no such
officers as Bœotarchs; since the Lacedæmonians, enforcing the
peace of Antalkidas, had put an end to the Bœotian federation.
While Ismenias, detesting the Spartans, kept aloof from Phœbidas,
Leontiades assiduously courted him and gained his confidence. On the
day of the Thesmophoria,[137] a religious festival celebrated by
the women apart from the men, during which the acropolis or Kadmeia
was consecrated to their exclusive use,—Phœbidas, affecting to have
concluded his halt, put himself in march to proceed as if towards
Thrace; seemingly rounding the walls of Thebes, but not going into
it. The Senate was actually assembled in the portico of the agora,
and the heat of a summer’s noon had driven every one out of the
streets, when Leontiades, stealing away from the Senate, hastened
on horseback to overtake Phœbidas, caused him to face about, and
conducted the Lacedæmonians straight up to the Kadmeia; the gates
of which, as well as those of the town, were opened by his order as
polemarch. There were not only no citizens in the streets, but none
even in the Kadmeia; no male person being permitted to be present
at the feminine Thesmophoria; so that Phœbidas and his army became
possessed of the Kadmeia without the smallest opposition. At the
same time they became possessed of an acquisition of hardly less
importance,—the persons of all the assembled Theban women; who served
as hostages for the quiet submission, however reluctant, of the
citizens in the town below. Leontiades handed to Phœbidas the key of
the gates, and then descended into the town, giving orders that no
man should go up without his order.[138]
[137] The rhetor Aristeides (Or. xix, Eleusin. p. 452 Cant.;
p. 419 Dind.) states that the Kadmeia was seized during the
Pythian festival. This festival would take place, July or August
382 B.C.; near the beginning of the third year of the (99th)
Olympiad. See above in this History, Vol. VI. Ch. liv, p. 455,
note. Respecting the year and month in which the Pythian festival
was held, there is a difference of opinion among commentators.
I agree with those who assign it to the first quarter of the
third Olympic year. And the date of the march of Phœbidas would
perfectly harmonize with this supposition.
Xenophon mentions nothing about the Pythian festival as being in
course of celebration when Phœbidas was encamped near Thebes: for
it had no particular reference to Thebes.
[138] Xen. Hellen. v, 2, 28, 29.
The assembled Senate heard with consternation the occupation of the
acropolis by Phœbidas. Before any deliberation could be taken among
the senators, Leontiades came down to resume his seat. The lochages
and armed citizens of his party, to whom he had previously given
orders, stood close at hand. “Senators (said he), be not intimidated
by the news that the Spartans are in the Kadmeia; for they assure
us that they have no hostile purpose against any one who does not
court war against them
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