History of Greece, Volume 09 (of 12)
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Title: History of Greece, Volume 09 (of 12)
Author: George Grote
Release date: February 11, 2016 [eBook #51182]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK HISTORY OF GREECE, VOLUME 09 (OF 12) ***
TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE
* Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
* Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
* Gesperrt Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ λοιπά~.
* Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept,
but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant
usage was found.
* Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has
also been corrected after checking with this later edition and
with Perseus, when the reference was found.
* Both “Euagoras” and “Evagoras” are used to refer to the same
ruler.
* The following changes were also made, after checking with other
editions:
page vi: “fractions” → “factions” (they divide into three
factions).
page 216: “Odrysians” → “Bithynians” (who charged through
the Bithynians).
page 326: “with” → “which” (which his successor Teleutias
... still farther completed)
note 30: “Ἑγγαδα” → “Ἑλλάδα” (Τοιοῦτοι οὔν ὄντες, ἐπόθουν εἰς
τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι).
note 626: “494” → “394” (before the autumn of 394 B.C.).
HISTORY OF GREECE
BY
GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.
VOL. IX.
REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION.
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
1880.
CONTENTS.
VOL. IX.
PART II.
CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
CHAPTER LXIX.
CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.
Spartan empire.—March of the Ten Thousand Greeks.—Persian
kings—Xerxes—Artaxerxes Longimanus.—Darius Nothus.—Cyrus the
younger in Ionia—his vigorous operations against Athens.—Youth
and education of Cyrus.—His esteem for the Greeks—his
hopes of the crown.—Death of Darius Nothus—succession of
Artaxerxes Mnemon.—Secret preparations of Cyrus for attacking
his brother.—Klearchus and other Greeks in the service of
Cyrus.—Strict administration, and prudent behavior, of
Cyrus.—Cyrus collects his army at Sardis.—The Ten Thousand
Greeks—their position and circumstances.—Xenophon.—How
Xenophon came to join the Cyreian army.—Cyrus marches
from Sardis—Kolossæ—Kelænæ.—Peltæ—Keramôn-Agora,
Käystru-Pedion.—Distress of Cyrus for money—Epyaxa
supplies him.—Thymbrium.—Tyriæum—Review of the Greeks by
Cyrus.—Ikonium—Lykaonia—Tyana.—Pass over Taurus into
Kilikia.—Syennesis of Kilikia—his duplicity—he assists Cyrus
with money.—Cyrus at Tarsus—mutiny of the Greeks—their
refusal to go farther.—Klearchus tries to suppress the
mutiny by severity—he fails.—He tries persuasion—his
discourse to the soldiers.—His refusal to march farther—well
received.—Deceitful manœuvres of Klearchus to bring the
soldiers round to Cyrus.—The soldiers agree to accompany
Cyrus farther—increase of pay.—March onward—from Tarsus to
Issus.—Flight of Abrokomas—abandonment of the passes.—Gates
of Kilikia and Syria.—Desertion of Xenias and Pasion—prudence
of Cyrus.—Cyrus marches from the sea to Thapsakus on the
Euphrates.—Partial reluctance of the army—they ford the
Euphrates.—Separate manœuvre of Menon.—Abrokomas abandons the
defence of the river—his double dealing.—Cyrus marches along
the left bank of the Euphrates—the Desert—privations of the
army.—Pylæ—Charmandê—dangerous dispute between the soldiers
of Klearchus and those of Menon.—Entry into Babylonia—treason
of Orontes—preparation for battle.—Discourse of Cyrus to his
officers and soldiers.—Conception formed by Cyrus of Grecian
superiority.—Present of Cyrus to the prophet Silanus.—Cyrus
passes the undefended trench—Kunaxa—sudden appearance of the
king’s army—preparation of Cyrus for battle.—Last orders of
Cyrus.—Battle of Kunaxa—easy victory of the Greeks on their
side.—Impetuous attack of Cyrus upon his brother—Cyrus is
slain.—Flight of Ariæus and the Asiatic force of Cyrus.—Plunder
of the Cyreian camp by Artaxerxes. Victorious attitude of the
Greeks.—Character of Cyrus.—If Cyrus had succeeded, he would
have been the most formidable enemy to Greece. 1-51
CHAPTER LXX.
RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.
Dismay of the Greeks on learning the death of Cyrus. Klearchus
offers the throne to Ariæus.—Artaxerxes summons the Greeks
to surrender—their reply—language of Phalinus.—Ariæus
refuses the throne, but invites the Greeks to join him
for retreat.—The Greeks rejoin Ariæus—interchange of
oaths—resolution to retreat together.—Position of the
Greeks—to all appearance hopeless.—Commencement of the
retreat, along with Ariæus—disorder of the army.—Heralds
from the Persians to treat about a truce.—The heralds
conduct the Greeks to villages furnished with provisions.
March over the canals.—Abundant supplies obtained in the
villages.—Visit of Tissaphernes—negotiations.—Convention
concluded with Tissaphernes, who engages to conduct the
Greeks home.—Motives of the Persians—favorable dispositions
of Parysatis towards Cyrus.—Long halt of the Greeks—their
quarrel with Ariæus.—Secret despair of Klearchus.—Retreating
march begun, under Tissaphernes—they enter within the Wall
of Media—march to Sittakê.—Alarm and suspicions of the
Greeks—they cross the Tigris.—Retreating march up the left bank
of the Tigris—to the Great Zab.—Suspicions between the Greeks
and Tissaphernes.—Klearchus converses with Tissaphernes—and
is talked over.—Klearchus, with the other Grecian generals,
visits Tissaphernes in his tent.—Tissaphernes seizes the
Greek generals. They are sent prisoners to the Persian court,
and there put to death.—Menon is reserved to perish in
torture—sentiments of queen Parysatis.—How Klearchus came
to be imposed upon.—Plans of Tissaphernes—impotence and
timidity of the Persians.—The Persians summon the Grecian army
to surrender.—Indignant refusal of the Greeks—distress and
despair prevalent among them.—First appearance of Xenophon—his
dream.—He stimulates the other captains to take the lead and
appoint new officers.—Address of Xenophon to the officers.
New generals are named, Xenophon being one.—The army is
convened in general assembly—speech of Xenophon.—Favorable
augury from a man sneezing.—Encouraging topics insisted on by
Xenophon.—Great impression produced by his speech—the army
confirm the new generals proposed.—Great ascendency acquired
over the army at once by Xenophon—qualities whereby he obtained
it.—Combination of eloquence and confidence, with soldier-like
resource and bravery.—Approach of the Persian Mithridates—the
Greeks refuse all parley.—The Greeks cross the Zab and resume
their march, harassed by the Persian cavalry.—Sufferings of
the Greeks from marching under the attacks of the cavalry.
Successful precautions taken.—Tissaphernes renews the attack,
with some effect.—Comfortable quarters of the Greeks. They
halt to repel the cavalry, and then march fast onward.—Victory
of the Greeks—prowess of Xenophon.—The Greeks embarrassed as
to their route—impossibility either of following the Tigris
farther, or of crossing it.—The strike into the mountains of the
Karduchians.—They burn much of their baggage—their sufferings
from the activity and energy of the Karduchians.—Extreme danger
of their situation.—Xenophon finds out another road to turn
the enemy’s position.—The Karduchians are defeated and the
road cleared.—Danger of Xenophon with the rear division and
baggage.—Anxiety of the Greeks to recover the bodies of the
slain.—They reach the river Kentritês, the northern boundary
of Karduchia.—Difficulties of passing the Kentritês—dream of
Xenophon.—They discover a ford and pass the river.—Xenophon
with the rear-guard repels the Karduchians and effects his
passage.—March through Armenia. Heavy snow and severe
cold.—They ford the Eastern Euphrates or Murad.—Distressing
marches—extreme misery from cold and hunger.—Rest in
good quarters—subterranean villages well stocked with
provisions.—After a week’s rest, they march onward—their
guide runs away.—They reach a difficult pass occupied by the
Chalybes—raillery exchanged between Xenophon and Cheirisophus
about stealing.—They turn the pass by a flank-march, and
force their way over the mountain.—March through the country
of the Taochi—exhaustion of provisions—capture of a
hill-fort.—Through the Chalybes, the bravest fighters whom
they had yet seen—the Skythini.—They reach the flourishing
city of Gymnias.—First sight of the sea from the mountain-top
Thêchê—extreme delight of the soldiers.—Passage through the
Makrônes.—Through the Kolchians—who oppose them and are
defeated.—Kolchian villages—unwholesome honey.—Arrival at
Trapezus on the Euxine (Trebizond).—Joy of the Greeks—their
discharge of vows to their gods—their festivals and
games.—Appendix. 52-120
CHAPTER LXXI.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS, FROM THE TIME THAT THEY
REACHED TRAPEZUS, TO THEIR JUNCTION WITH THE LACEDÆMONIAN ARMY IN
ASIA MINOR.
Greek cities on the Euxine—Sinôpê with her colonies Kerasus,
Kotyôra, and Trapezus.—Indigenous inhabitants—their relations
with the Greek colonists.—Feelings of the Greeks on the Euxine
when the Ten Thousand descended among them.—Uncertainty and
danger of what they might do.—Plans of the army—Cheirisophus
is sent to Byzantium to procure vessels for transporting
them.—Regulations for the army proposed by Xenophon during
his absence.—Adopted by the army—their intense repugnance
to farther marching.—Measures for procuring transports.
Marauding expeditions for supplies, against the Colchians and
the Drilæ.—The army leave Trapezus, and march westward along
the coast to Kerasus.—Acts of disorder and outrage committed by
various soldiers near Kerasus.—March to Kotyôra—hostilities
with the Mosynœki.—Long halt at Kotyôra—remonstrance from the
Sinopians.—Speech of Hekatonymus of Sinôpê to the army—reply
of Xenophon.—Success of the reply—good understanding
established with Sinôpê.—Consultation of the army with
Hekatonymus, who advises going home by sea.—Envoys sent by
the army to Sinôpê to procure vessels.—Poverty and increasing
disorganization or the army.—Ideas of Xenophon about founding
a new city in the Euxine, with the army.—Sacrifice of Xenophon
to ascertain the will of the gods—treachery of the prophet
Silanus.—Silanus, Timasion, and others raise calumnies
against Xenophon. General assembly of the army.—Accusations
against Xenophon—his speech in defence.—He carries the
soldiers with him—discontent and flight of Silanus.—Fresh
manœuvres of Timasion—fresh calumnies circulated against
Xenophon—renewed discontent of the army.—Xenophon convenes
the assembly again.—his address in defence of himself.—His
remonstrance against the disorders in the army.—Vote of the
army unanimously favorable to Xenophon—disapproving the
disorders, and directing trial.—Xenophon’s appeal to universal
suffrage, as the legitimate political authority. Success of
his appeal.—Xenophon recommends trial of the generals before
a tribunal formed of the lochages or captains. Satisfaction of
the army with Xenophon.—Manner in which discipline was upheld
by the officers.—Complete triumph of Xenophon. His influence
over the army, derived from his courage, his frankness, and
his oratory.—Improved feeling of the army—peace with the
Paphlagonian Korylas.—The army pass by sea to Sinôpê.—Return
of Cheirisophus—resolution of the army to elect a single
general—they wish to elect Xenophon, who declines—Cheirisophus
is chosen.—The army pass by sea to Herakleia—they wish to
extort money from the Herakleots—opposition of Cheirisophus
and Xenophon.—Dissatisfaction of the army—they divide into
three factions. 1. The Arcadians and Achæans. 2. A division
under Cheirisophus. 3. A division under Xenophon.—Arcadian
division start first and act for themselves—they get into
great danger, and are rescued by Xenophon—the army reünited at
Kalpê—old board of generals reëlected, with Neon in place of
Cheirisophus.—Distress for provisions at Kalpê—unwillingness
to move in the face of unfavorable sacrifices—ultimate victory
over the troops of the country.—Halt at Kalpê—comfortable
quarters—idea that they were about to settle there as a
colony.—Arrival of Kleander, the Spartan harmost, from
Byzantium, together with Dexippus.—Disorder in the army:
mutiny against Kleander, arising from the treachery of
Dexippus.—Indignation and threats of Kleander—Xenophon
persuades the army to submit—fear of Sparta.—Satisfaction
given to Kleander, by the voluntary surrender of Agasias with
the mutinous soldier.—Appeal to the mercy of Kleander, who is
completely soothed.—Kleander takes the command, expressing
the utmost friendship both towards the army and towards
Xenophon.—Unfavorable sacrifices make Kleander throw up the
command and sail away.—March of the army across the country
from Kalpê to Chalkêdon.—Pharnabazus bribes Anaxibius to carry
the army across the Bosphorus into Europe—false promises of
Anaxibius to the army.—Intention of Xenophon to leave the army
immediately and go home—first proposition addressed to him by
Seuthes of Thrace.—The army cross over to Byzantium—fraud
and harsh dealing of Anaxibius, who sends the army at once out
of the town.—Last orders of Anaxibius as the soldiers were
going out of the gates.—Wrath and mutiny of the soldiers, in
going away—they rush again into the gates, and muster within
the town.—Terror of Anaxibius and all within the town.—The
exasperated soldiers masters of Byzantium—danger of all within
it—conduct of Xenophon.—Xenophon musters the soldiers in
military order and harangues them.—Xenophon calms the army, and
persuades them to refrain from assaulting the town—message sent
by them to Anaxibius—they go out of Byzantium, and agree to
accept Kœratadas as their commander.—Remarkable effect produced
by Xenophon—evidence which it affords of the susceptibility of
the Greek mind to persuasive influences. Xenophon leaves the
army, and goes into Byzantium with the view of sailing home.
Kœratadas is dismissed from the command.—Dissension among the
commanders left.—Distress of the army—Aristarchus arrives from
Sparta to supersede Kleander—Polus on his way to supersede
Anaxibius.—Pharnabazus defrauds Anaxibius, who now employs
Xenophon to convey the Cyreians across back to Asia.—Aristarchus
hinders the crossing—his cruel dealing towards the sick Cyreians
left in Byzantium.—His treacherous scheme for entrapping
Xenophon.—Xenophon is again implicated in the conduct of
the army—he opens negotiations with Seuthes.—Position of
Seuthes—his liberal offers to the army.—Xenophon introduces
him to the army, who accept the offers.—Service of the army
with Seuthes, who cheats them of most of their pay.—The army
suspect the probity of Xenophon—unjust calumnies against
him—he exposes it in a public harangue, and regains their
confidence.—Change of interest in the Lacedæmonians, who
become anxious to convey the Cyreians across into Asia, in
order to make war against the satraps.—Xenophon crosses over
with the army to Asia—his poverty—he is advised to sacrifice
to Zeus Meilichios—beneficial effects.—He conducts the army
across Mount Ida to Pergamus.—His unsuccessful attempt to
surprise and capture the rich Persian Asidates.—In a second
attempt he captures Asidates—valuable booty secured.—General
sympathy expressed for Xenophon—large share personally
allotted to him.—The Cyreians are incorporated in the army of
the Lacedæmonian general Thimbron—Xenophon leaves the army,
depositing his money in the temple at Ephesus.—His subsequent
return to Asia, to take command of Cyreians as a part of the
Lacedæmonian army.—Xenophon in the Spartan service, with
Agesilaus against Athens—he is banished.—He settles at Skillus
near Olympia, on an estate consecrated to Artemis.—Charms of
the residence—good hunting—annual public sacrifice offered by
Xenophon.—Later life of Xenophon—expelled from Skillus after
the battle of Leuktra—afterwards restored at Athens.—Great
impression produced by the retreat of the Ten Thousand upon the
Greek mind. 121-180
CHAPTER LXXII.
GREECE UNDER THE LACEDÆMONIAN EMPIRE.
Sequel of Grecian affairs generally—resumed.—Spartan
empire—how and when it commenced.—Oppression and suffering
of Athens under the Thirty.—Alteration of Grecian feeling
towards Athens—the Thirty are put down and the democracy
restored.—The Knights or Horsemen, the richest proprietors
at Athens, were the great supporters of the Thirty in their
tyranny.—The state of Athens, under the Thirty, is a sample of
that which occurred in a large number of other Grecian cities,
at the commencement of the Spartan empire.—Great power of
Lysander—he establishes in most of the cities Dekarchies, along
with a Spartan harmost.—Intimidation exercised everywhere by
Lysander in favor of his own partisans.—Oppressive action of
these Dekarchies.—In some points, probably worse than the
Thirty at Athens.—Bad conduct of the Spartan harmosts—harsh
as well as corrupt. No justice to be obtained against them
at Sparta.—Contrast of the actual empire of Sparta, with
the promises of freedom which she had previously held
out.—Numerous promises of general autonomy made by Sparta—by
the Spartan general Brasidas, especially.—Gradual change in
the language and plans of Sparta towards the close of the
Peloponnesian war.—Language of Brasidas contrasted with the
acts of Lysander.—Extreme suddenness and completeness of the
victory of Ægospotami left Lysander almost omnipotent.—The
dekarchies became partly modified by the jealousy at Sparta
against Lysander. The harmosts lasted much longer.—The Thirty
at Athens were put down by the Athenians themselves, not by any
reformatory interference of Sparta.—The empire of Sparta much
worse and more oppressive than that of Athens.—Imperial Athens
deprived her subject-allies of their autonomy, but was guilty
of little or no oppression.—Imperial Sparta did this, and much
worse—her harmosts and decemvirs are more complained of than the
fact of her empire.—This more to be regretted, as Sparta had
now an admirable opportunity for organizing a good and stable
confederacy throughout Greece.—Sparta might have reörganized
the confederacy of Delos, which might now have been made to work
well.—Insupportable arrogance of Lysander—bitter complaints
against him, as well as against the dekarchies.—Lysander
offends Pharnabazus, who procures his recall. His disgust and
temporary expatriation.—Surrender of the Asiatic Greeks to
Persia, according to the treaty concluded with Sparta.—Their
condition is affected by the position and ambitious schemes of
Cyrus, whose protection they seek against Tissaphernes.—After
the death of Cyrus, Tissaphernes returns as victor and satrap
to the coast of Asia Minor.—Alarm of the Asiatic Greeks,
who send to ask aid from Sparta. The Spartans send Thimbron
with an army to Asia. His ill-success and recall—he is
superseded by Derkyllidas.—Conduct of the Cyreians loose as
to pillage.—Derkyllidas makes a truce with Tissaphernes, and
attacks Pharnabazus in the Troad and Æolis.—Distribution of the
Persian empire; relation of king, satrap, sub-satrap.—Mania,
widow of Zênis, holds the subsatrapy of Æolis under Pharnabazus.
Her regular payment and vigorous government.—Military force,
personal conquests, and large treasures, of Mania.—Assassination
of Mania, and of her son, by her son-in-law Meidias, who
solicits the satrapy from Pharnabazus, but is indignantly
refused.—Invasion and conquest of Æolis by Derkyllidas, who
gets possession of the person of Meidias.—Derkyllidas acquires
and liberates Skêpsis and Gergis, deposing Meidias, and seizing
the treasures of Mania.—Derkyllidas concludes a truce with
Pharnabazus, and takes winter quarters in Bithynia.—Command of
Derkyllidas—satisfaction of Sparta with the improved conduct of
the Cyreians.—Derkyllidas crosses into Europe, and employs his
troops in fortifying the Chersonesus against the Thracians.—He
captures and garrisons Atarneus.—He makes war upon Tissaphernes
and Pharnabazus, upon the Mæander.—Timidity of Tissaphernes—he
concludes a truce with Derkyllidas.—Derkyllidas is superseded
by Agesilaus.—Alienation towards Sparta had grown up among her
allies in Central Greece.—Great energy imparted to Spartan
action by Lysander immediately after the victory of Ægospotami;
an energy very unusual with Sparta.—The Spartans had kept all
the advantages of victory to themselves—their allies were
allowed nothing.—Great power of the Spartans—they take revenge
upon those who had displeased them—their invasion of Elis.—The
Spartan king Agis invades the Eleian territory. He retires
from it immediately in consequence of an earthquake.—Second
invasion of Elis by Agis—he marches through Triphylia and
Olympia; victorious march, with much booty.—Insurrection of
the oligarchical party in Elis—they are put down.—The Eleians
are obliged to submit to hard terms of peace.—Sparta refuses
to restore the Pisatans to the Olympic presidency.—Triumphant
position of Sparta—she expels the Messenians from Peloponnesus
and its neighborhood. 181-229
CHAPTER LXXIII.
AGESILAUS KING OF SPARTA.—THE CORINTHIAN WAR.
Triumphant position of Sparta at the close of the
war—introduction of a large sum of gold and silver by
Lysander—opposed by some of the Ephors.—The introduction of money
was only one among a large train of corrupting circumstances
which then became operative on Sparta.—Contrast between
Sparta in 432 B.C., and Sparta after 404 B.C.—Increase of
peculation, inequality, and discontent at Sparta.—Testimonies
of Isokrates and Xenophon to the change of character and habits
at Sparta.—Power of Lysander—his arrogance and ambitious
projects—flattery lavished upon him by sophists and poets.—Real
position of the kings at Sparta.—His intrigues to make himself
king at Sparta—he tries in vain to move the oracles in his
favor—scheme laid for the production of sacred documents, as
yet lying hidden, by a son of Apollo.—His aim at the kingship
fails—nevertheless he still retains prodigious influence at
Sparta.—Death of Agis, king of Sparta—doubt as to the legitimacy
of his son Leotychides. Agesilaus, seconded by Lysander,
aspires to the throne.—Character of Agesilaus.—Conflicting
pretensions of Agesilaus and Leotychides.—Objection taken against
Agesilaus on the ground of his lameness,—oracle produced by
Diopeithes—eluded by the interpretation of Lysander.—Agesilaus
is preferred as king—suspicions which always remained attached
to Lysander’s interpretation.—Popular conduct of Agesilaus—he
conciliates the ephors—his great influence at Sparta—his energy,
combined with unscrupulous partisanship.—Dangerous conspiracy at
Sparta—terror-striking sacrifices.—Character and position of the
chief conspirator Kinadon—state of parties at Sparta—increasing
number of malcontents.—Police of the ephors—information
laid before them.—Wide-spread discontent reckoned upon by
the conspirators.—Alarm of the ephors—their manœuvres for
apprehending Kinadon privately.—Kinadon is seized, interrogated,
and executed—his accomplices are arrested, and the conspiracy
broken up.—Dangerous discontent indicated at Sparta.—Proceedings
of Derkyllidas and Pharnabazus in Asia.—Persian preparations
for reviving the maritime war against Sparta—renewed activity
of Konon.—Agesilaus is sent with a land-force to Asia,
accompanied by Lysander.—Large plans of Agesilaus, for
conquest in the interior of Asia.—General willingness of
the Spartan allies to serve in the expedition, but refusal
from Thebes, Corinth, and Athens.—Agesilaus compares himself
with Agamemnon—goes to sacrifice at Aulis—is contemptuously
hindered by the Thebans.—Arrival of Agesilaus at Ephesus—he
concludes a fresh armistice with Tissaphernes.—Arrogant
behavior and overweening ascendency of Lysander—offensive to
the army and to Agesilaus.—Agesilaus humbles and degrades
Lysander, who asks to be sent away.—Lysander is sent to command
at the Hellespont—his valuable service there.—Tissaphernes
breaks the truce with Agesilaus, who makes war upon him and
Pharnabazus—he retires for the purpose of organizing a force
of cavalry.—Agesilaus indifferent to money for himself, but
eager in enriching his friends.—His humanity towards captives
and deserted children.—Spartan side of his character—exposure
of naked prisoners—different practice of Asiatics and
Greeks.—Efforts of Agesilaus to train his army, and to procure
cavalry.—Agesilaus renews the war against Tissaphernes, and
gains a victory near Sardis.—Artaxerxes causes Tissaphernes to
be put to death and superseded by Tithraustes.—Negotiations
between the new satrap and Agesilaus—the satraps in Asia Minor
hostile to each other.—Commencement of action at sea against
Sparta—the Athenian Konon, assisted by Persian ships and money,
commands a fleet of eighty sail on the coast of Karia.—Rhodes
revolts from the Spartan empire—Konon captures an Egyptian
corn-fleet at Rhodes.—Anxiety of the Lacedæmonians—Agesilaus
is appointed to command at sea as well as on land.—Severity
of the Lacedæmonians towards the Rhodian Dorieus—contrast of
the former treatment of the same man by Athens.—Sentiment of a
multitude compared with that of individuals.—Efforts of Agesilaus
to augment the fleet—he names Peisander admiral.—Operations
of Agesilaus against Pharnabazus.—He lays waste the residence
of the satrap, and surprises his camp—offence given to
Spithridates.—Personal conference between Agesilaus and
Pharnabazus.—Friendship established between Agesilaus and the son
of Pharnabazus—character of Agesilaus.—Promising position and
large preparations for Asiatic land-warfare, of Agesilaus—he is
recalled with his army to Peloponnesus.—Efforts and proceedings
of Konon in command of the Persian fleet—his personal visit to
the Persian court.—Pharnabazus is named admiral jointly with
Konon.—Battle of Knidus—complete defeat of the Lacedæmonian
fleet—death of Peisander the admiral. 230-283
CHAPTER LXXIV.
FROM THE BATTLE OF KNIDUS TO THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF
ATHENS.
War in Central Greece against Sparta—called the Corinthian
war.—Relations of Sparta with the neighboring states and with
her allies after the accession of Agesilaus. Discontent among
the allies.—Great power of Sparta, stretching even to Northern
Greece—state of Herakleia.—Growing disposition in Greece
to hostility against Sparta, when she becomes engaged in the
war against Persia.—The satrap Tithraustes sends an envoy
with money into Greece, to light up war against Sparta—his
success at Thebes, Corinth, and Argos.—The Persian money did
not create hostility against Sparta, but merely brought out
hostile tendencies pre-existing. Philo-Laconian sentiment
of Xenophon.—War between Sparta and Thebes—the Bœotian
war.—Active operations of Sparta against Bœotia—Lysander
is sent to act from Herakleia on the northward—Pausanias
conducts an army from Peloponnesus.—The Thebans apply to
Athens for aid—remarkable proof of the altered sentiment in
Greece.—Speech of the Theban envoy at Athens.—Political feeling
at Athens—good effects of the amnesty after the expulsion of
the Thirty.—Unanimous vote of the Athenians to assist Thebes
against Sparta.—State of the Bœotian confederacy—Orchomenus
revolts and joins Lysander, who invades Bœotia with his army
and attacks Haliartus.—Lysander is repulsed and slain before
Haliartus.—Pausanias arrives in Bœotia after the death of
Lysander—Thrasybulus and an Athenian army come to the aid
of the Thebans.—Pausanias evacuates Bœotia, on receiving
the dead bodies of Lysander and the rest for burial.—Anger
against Pausanias at Sparta; he escapes into voluntary exile;
he is condemned in his absence.—Condemnation of Pausanias not
deserved.—Sparta not less unjust in condemning unsuccessful
generals than Athens.—Character of Lysander—his mischievous
influence, as well for Sparta as for Greece generally.—His
plans to make himself king at Sparta—discourse of the
sophist Kleon.—Encouragement to the enemies of Sparta, from
the death of Lysander—alliance against her between Thebes,
Athens, Corinth, and Argos—the Eubœans and others join the
alliance.—Increased importance of Thebes—she now rises to the
rank of a primary power—the Theban leader Ismenias.—Successful
operations of Ismenias to the north of Bœotia—capture of
Herakleia from Sparta.—Synod of anti-Spartan allies at
Corinth—their confident hopes—the Lacedæmonians send to recall
Agesilaus from Asia.—Large muster near Corinth of Spartans
and Peloponnesians on one side, of anti-Spartan allies on the
other.—Boldness of the language against Sparta—speech of
the Corinthian Timolaus.—The anti-Spartan allies take up a
defensive position near Corinth—advance of the Lacedæmonians to
attack them.—Battle of Corinth—victory of the Lacedæmonians
in their part of the battle; their allies in the other parts
being worsted.—Lacedæmonian ascendency within Peloponnesus
is secured, but no farther result gained.—Agesilaus—his
vexation on being recalled from Asia—his large plans of Asiatic
conquest.—Regret of the Asiatic allies when he quits Asia—he
leaves Euxenus in Asia with four thousand men.—Agesilaus crosses
the Hellespont and marches homeward through Thrace, Macedonia,
and Thessaly.—Agesilaus and his army on the northern frontier
of Bœotia—eclipse of the sun—news of the naval defeat at
Knidus.—Bœotians and their allies mustered at Korôneia.—Battle
of Korôneia—Agesilaus with most of his army is victorious; while
the Thebans on their side are also victorious.—Terrible combat
between the Thebans and Spartans; on the whole, the result is
favorable to the Thebans.—Victory of Agesilaus, not without
severe wounds—yet not very decisive—his conduct after the
battle.—Army of Agesilaus withdraws from Bœotia—he goes to the
Pythian games—sails homeward across the Corinthian Gulf—his
honorable reception at Sparta.—Results of the battles of Corinth
and Korôneia. Sparta had gained nothing by the former, and had
rather lost by the latter.—Reverses of Sparta after the defeat
of Knidus. Loss of the insular empire of Sparta. Nearly all her
maritime allies revolt to join Pharnabazus and Konon.—Abydos
holds faithfully to Sparta, under Derkyllidas.—Derkyllidas
holds both Abydos and the Chersonesus opposite, in spite of
Pharnabazus—anger of the latter.—Pharnabazus and Konon sail
with their fleet to Peloponnesus and Corinth.—Assistance
and encouragement given by Pharnabazus to the allies at
Corinth—Remarkable fact of the Persian satrap and fleet at
Corinth.—Pharnabazus leaves the fleet with Konon in the Saronic
Gulf, and aids him, with money, to rebuild the Long Walls of
Athens.—Konon rebuilds the Long Walls—hearty coöperation of
the allies.—Great importance of this restoration—how much
it depended upon accident—Maintenance of the lines of Corinth
against Sparta, was one essential condition to the power of
rebuilding the Long Walls. The lines were not maintained longer
than the ensuing year. 284-324
CHAPTER LXXV.
FROM THE REBUILDING OF THE LONG WALLS OF ATHENS TO THE PEACE OF
ANTALKIDAS.
Large plans of Konon—organization of a mercenary force at
Corinth.—Naval conflicts of the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians,
in the Corinthian Gulf.—Land-warfare—the Lacedæmonians
established at Sikyon—the anti-Spartan allies occupying the
lines of Corinth from sea to sea.—Sufferings of the Corinthians
from the war being carried on in their territory. Many Corinthian
proprietors become averse to the war.—Growth and manifestation
of the philo-Laconian party in Corinth. Oligarchical form of
the government left open nothing but an appeal to force.—The
Corinthian government forestall the conspiracy by a _coup
d’état_.—Numerous persons of the philo-Laconian party are
banished; nevertheless Pasimêlus the leader is spared, and
remains at Corinth.—Intimate political union and consolidation
between Corinth and Argos.—Pasimêlus admits the Lacedæmonians
within the Long Walls of Corinth. Battle within those walls.—The
Lacedæmonians are victorious—severe loss of the Argeians.—The
Lacedæmonians pull down a portion of the Long Walls between
Corinth and Lechæum, so as to open a free passage across. They
capture Krommyon and Sidus.—Effective warfare carried on by
the light troops under Iphikrates at Corinth—Military genius
and improvements of Iphikrates.—The Athenians restore the Long
Walls between Corinth and Lechæum—expedition of the Spartan
king Agesilaus, who, in concert with Teleutias, retakes the Long
Walls and captures Lechæum.—Alarm of Athens and Thebes at the
capture of the Long Walls of Corinth. Propositions sent to Sparta
to solicit peace. The discussions come to no result.—Advantages
derived by the Corinthians from possession of Peiræum. At
the instigation of the exiles, Agesilaus marches forth with
an army to attack it.—Isthmian festival—Agesilaus disturbs
the celebration. The Corinthian exiles, under his protection,
celebrate it; then, when he is gone, the Corinthians from the
city perform the ceremony over again.—Agesilaus attacks Peiræum,
which he captures, together with the Heræum, many prisoners, and
much booty.—Triumphant position of Agesilaus. Danger of Corinth.
The Thebans send fresh envoys to solicit peace—contemptuously
treated by Agesilaus.—Sudden arrival of bad news, which spoils
the triumph.—Destruction of a Lacedæmonian mora by the light
troops under Iphikrates.—Daring and well-planned manœuvres
of Iphikrates.—Few of the mora escape to Lechæum.—The
Lacedæmonians bury the bodies of the slain, under truce
asked and obtained. Trophy erected by Iphikrates.—Great
effect produced upon the Grecian mind by this event.
Peculiar feelings of Spartans; pride of the relatives of the
slain.—Mortification of Agesilaus—he marches up to the walls
of Corinth and defies Iphikrates—he then goes back humiliated
to Sparta.—Success of Iphikrates—he retakes Krommyon,
Sidus, and Peiræum—Corinth remains pretty well undisturbed
by enemies. The Athenians recall Iphikrates.—Expedition of
Agesilaus against Akarnania—successful, after some delay—the
Akarnanians submit, and enrol themselves in the Lacedæmonian
confederacy.—The Lacedæmonians under Agesipolis invade
Argos.—Manœuvre of the Argeians respecting the season of the
holy truce. Agesipolis consults the oracles at Olympia and
Delphi.—Earthquake in Argos after the invasion of Agesipolis—he
disregards it.—He marches up near to Argos—much plunder
taken—he retires.—Transactions in Asia—efforts of Sparta to
detach the Great King from Athens.—The Spartan Antalkidas is
sent as envoy to Tiribazus. Konon and other envoys sent also,
from Athens and the anti-Spartan allies.—Antalkidas offers to
surrender the Asiatic Greeks, and demands universal autonomy
throughout the Grecian world—the anti-Spartan allies refuse
to accede to those terms.—Hostility of Sparta to all the
partial confederacies of Greece, now first proclaimed under
the name of universal autonomy.—Antalkidas gains the favor of
Tiribazus, who espouses privately the cause of Sparta, though
the propositions for peace fail. Tiribazus seizes Konon—Konon’s
career is now closed, either by death or imprisonment.—Tiribazus
cannot prevail with the Persian court, which still continues
hostile to Sparta. Struthas is sent down to act against the
Lacedæmonians in Ionia.—Victory of Struthas over Thimbron and
the Lacedæmonian army. Thimbron is slain.—Diphridas is sent
to succeed Thimbron.—Lacedæmonian fleet at Rhodes—intestine
disputes in the island.—The Athenians send aid to Evagoras
at Cyprus. Fidelity with which they adhered to him, though
his alliance had now become inconvenient.—Thrasybulus is
sent with a fleet from Athens to the Asiatic coast—his
acquisitions in the Hellespont and Bosphorus.—Victory of
Thrasybulus in Lesbos—he levies contributions along the
Asiatic coast—he is slain near Aspendus.—Character of
Thrasybulus.—Agyrrhius succeeds Thrasybulus—Rhodes still
holds out against the Lacedæmonians.—Anaxibius is sent to
command at the Hellespont in place of Derkyllidas—his vigorous
proceedings—he deprives Athens of the tolls of the strait.—The
Athenians send Iphikrates with his peltasts and a fleet to the
Hellespont. His stratagem to surprise Anaxibius.—Defeat and
death of Anaxibius.—The Athenians are again masters of the
Hellespont and the strait dues.—The island of Ægina—its past
history.—The Æginetans are constrained by Sparta into war
with Athens. The Lacedæmonian admiral Teleutias at Ægina. He
is superseded by Hierax. His remarkable popularity among the
seamen.—Hierax proceeds to Rhodes, leaving Gorgôpas at Ægina.
Passage of the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas to Asia.—Gorgôpas
is surprised in Ægina, defeated, and slain, by the Athenian
Chabrias; who goes to assist Evagoras in Cyprus.—The
Lacedæmonian seamen at Ægina unpaid and discontented.
Teleutias is sent thither to conciliate them.—Sudden and
successful attack of Teleutias upon the Peiræus.—Unprepared
and unguarded condition of Peiræus—Teleutias gains rich
plunder, and sails away in safety.—He is enabled to pay his
seamen—activity of the fleet—great loss inflicted upon Athenian
commerce.—Financial condition of Athens. The Theôrikon.—Direct
property-taxes.—Antalkidas goes up with Tiribazus to Susa—his
success at the Persian court—he brings down the terms of peace
asked for by Sparta, ratified by the Great King, to be enforced
by Sparta in his name.—Antalkidas in command of the Lacedæmonian
and Syracusan fleets in the Hellespont, with Persian aid. His
successes against the Athenians.—Distress and discouragement of
Athens—anxiety of the anti-Spartan allies for peace.—Tiribazus
summons them all to Sardis, to hear the convention which had
been sent down by the Great King.—Terms of the convention,
called the peace of Antalkidas.—Congress at Sparta for
acceptance or rejection. All parties accept. The Thebans at
first accept under reserve for the Bœotian cities.—Agesilaus
refuses to allow the Theban reserve, and requires unconditional
acceptance. His eagerness, from hatred of Thebes, to get into a
war with them single-handed. The Thebans are obliged to accept
unconditionally.—Agesilaus forces the Corinthians to send away
their Argeian auxiliaries. The philo-Argeian Corinthians go into
exile; the philo-Laconian Corinthians are restored. 326-388
HISTORY OF GREECE.
PART II.
CHAPTER LXIX.
CYRUS THE YOUNGER AND THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.
In my last volume, I brought down the History of Grecian affairs to
the close of the Peloponnesian war, including a description of the
permanent loss of imperial power, the severe temporary oppression,
the enfranchisement and renewed democracy, which marked the lot of
defeated Athens. The defeat of that once powerful city, accomplished
by the Spartan confederacy,—with large pecuniary aid from the young
Persian prince Cyrus, satrap of most of the Ionian seaboard,—left
Sparta mistress, for the time, of the Grecian world. Lysander, her
victorious admiral, employed his vast temporary power for the purpose
of setting up, in most of the cities, Dekarchies or ruling Councils
of Ten, composed of his own partisans; with a Lacedæmonian Harmost
and garrison to enforce their oligarchical rule. Before I proceed,
however, to recount, as well as it can be made out, the unexpected
calamities thus brought upon the Grecian world, with their eventual
consequences,—it will be convenient to introduce here the narrative
of the Ten Thousand Greeks, with their march into the heart of
the Persian empire and their still more celebrated Retreat. This
incident, lying apart from the main stream of Grecian affairs, would
form an item, strictly speaking, in Persian history rather than in
Grecian. But its effects on the Greek mind, and upon the future
course of Grecian affairs, were numerous and important; while as an
illustration of Hellenic character and competence measured against
that of the contemporary Asiatics, it stands preeminent and full of
instruction.
This march from Sardis up to the neighborhood of Babylon, conducted
by Cyrus the younger and undertaken for the purpose of placing him
on the Persian throne in the room of his elder brother Artaxerxes
Mnemon,—was commenced about March or April in the year 401 B.C. It
was about six months afterwards, in the month of September or October
of the same year, that the battle of Kunaxa was fought, in which,
though the Greeks were victorious, Cyrus himself lost his life. They
were then obliged to commence their retreat, which occupied about one
year, and ultimately brought them across the Bosphorus of Thrace to
Byzantium, in October or November, 400 B.C.
The death of king Darius Nothus, father both of Artaxerxes and
Cyrus, occurred about the beginning of 404 B.C., a short time after
the entire ruin of the force of Athens at Ægospotami. His reign of
nineteen years, with that of his father Artaxerxes Longimanus which
lasted nearly forty years, fill up almost all the interval from
the death of Xerxes in 465 B.C. The close of the reigns both of
Xerxes and of his son Artaxerxes had indeed been marked by those
phenomena of conspiracy, assassination, fratricide, and family
tragedy, so common in the transmission of an Oriental sceptre.
Xerxes was assassinated by the chief officer of the palace, named
Artabanus,—who had received from him at a banquet the order to
execute his eldest son Darius, but had not fulfilled it. Artabanus,
laying the blame of the assassination upon Darius, prevailed upon
Artaxerxes to avenge it by slaying the latter; he then attempted the
life of Artaxerxes himself, but failed, and was himself killed, after
carrying on the government a few months. Artaxerxes Longimanus, after
reigning about forty years, left the sceptre to his son Xerxes the
second, who was slain after a few months by his brother Sogdianus;
who again was put to death after seven months, by a third brother
Darius Nothus mentioned above.[1]
[1] See Diodor. xi, 69; xii, 64-71; Ktesias, Persica, c. 29-45;
Aristotel. Polit. v, 14, 8. This last passage of Aristotle is not
very clear. Compare Justin, x, 1.
For the chronology of these Persian kings, see a valuable
Appendix in Mr. Fynes Clinton’s Fasti Hellenici, App. 18, vol.
ii, p. 313-316.
The wars between the Persian empire, and Athens as the head of the
confederacy of Delos (477-449 B.C.), have been already related in
one of my earlier volumes. But the internal history of the Persian
empire during these reigns is scarcely at all known to us; except a
formidable revolt of the satrap Megabyzus, obscurely noticed in the
Fragments of Ktesias.[2] About 414 B.C. the Egyptians revolted.
Their native prince Amyrtæus maintained his independence,—though
probably in a part only, and not the whole, of that country,[3]—and
was succeeded by a native Egyptian dynasty for the space of sixty
years. A revolt of the Medes, which took place in 408 B.C.,
was put down by Darius, and subsequently a like revolt of the
Kadusians.[4] The peace concluded in 449 B.C., between Athens and
the Persian empire, continued without open violation, until the
ruinous catastrophe which befel the former near Syracuse, in 413
B.C. Yet there had been various communications and envoys from
Sparta to the Persian court, endeavoring to procure aid from the
Great King during the early years of the war; communications so
confused and contradictory, that Artaxerxes (in a letter addressed
to the Spartans, in 425 B.C., and carried by his envoy Artaphernes
who was captured by the Athenians), complained of being unable
to understand what they meant,—no two Spartans telling the same
story.[5] It appears that Pissuthnes, satrap of Sardis, revolted from
the Persian king, shortly after this period, and that Tissaphernes
was sent by the Great King to suppress this revolt; in which having
succeeded, by bribing the Grecian commander of the satrap’s mercenary
troops, he was rewarded by the possession of the satrapy.[6] We find
Tissaphernes satrap in the year 413 B.C., commencing operations
jointly with the Spartans, for detaching the Asiatic allies from
Athens, after her reverses in Sicily; and employing the Spartans
successfully against Amorges, the revolted son of Pissuthnes, who
occupied the strong maritime town of Iasus.[7]
[2] Ktesias, Persica, c. 38-40.
[3] See the Appendix of Mr. Fynes Clinton, mentioned in the
preceding note, p. 317.
There were some Egyptian troops in the army of Artaxerxes at
the battle of Kunaxa; on the other hand, there were other
Egyptians in a state of pronounced revolt. Compare two passages
of Xenophon’s Anabasis, i, 8, 9; ii, 5, 13; Diodor. xiii, 46; and
the Dissertation of F. Ley, Fata et Conditio Ægypti sub imperio
Persarum, p. 20-56 (Cologne, 1830).
[4] Xen. Hellen. i, 2, 19; ii, 1, 13.
[5] Thucyd. iv, 50. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐλθόντων πρεσβέων οὐδένα ταὐτὰ
λέγειν.
This incompetence, or duplicity, on the part of the Spartan
envoys, helps to explain the facility with which Alkibiades duped
them at Athens (Thucyd. v, 45). See above, in this History, Vol.
VII. ch. lv, p. 47.
[6] Ktesias, Persic. c. 52.
[7] Thucyd. viii, 28. See Vol. VII, ch. lxi, p. 389 of this
History.
The increased vigor of Persian operations against Athens, after
Cyrus, the younger son of Darius Nothus, came down to the Ionic coast
in 407 B.C., has been recounted in my preceding volume; together
with the complete prostration of Athenian power, accomplished during
the ensuing three years. Residing at Sardis and placed in active
coöperation with Greeks, this ambitious and energetic young prince
soon became penetrated with their superior military and political
efficiency, as compared with the native Asiatics. For the abilities
and character of Lysander, the Peloponnesian admiral, he contracted
so much admiration, that, when summoned to court during the last
illness of his father Darius in 405 B.C., he even confided to that
officer the whole of his tribute and treasure, to be administered in
furtherance of the war;[8] which during his absence was brought to a
victorious close.
[8] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 14. Compare Xen. Œconom. iv, 20.
Cyrus, born after the accession of his father to the throne, was
not more than eighteen years of age when first sent down to Sardis
(in 407 B.C.) as satrap of Lydia, Phrygia, and Kappadokia, and
as commander of that Persian military division which mustered at
the plain of Kastôlus; a command not including the Ionic Greeks on
the seaboard, who were under the satrapy of Tissaphernes.[9] We
cannot place much confidence in the account which Xenophon gives
of his education; that he had been brought up with his brother
and many noble Persian youths in the royal palace,—under the
strictest discipline and restraint, enforcing modest habits, with
the reciprocal duties of obedience and command, upon all of them,
and upon him with peculiar success.[10] It is contradicted by all
the realities which we read about the Persian court, and is a patch
of Grecian rather than of Oriental sentiment, better suited to the
romance of the Cyropædia that to the history of the Anabasis. But in
the Persian accomplishments of horsemanship, mastery of the bow and
of the javelin, bravery in the field, daring as well as endurance in
hunting wild beasts, and power of drinking much wine without being
intoxicated,—Cyrus stood preeminent; and especially so when compared
with his elder brother Artaxerxes, who was at least unwarlike, if not
lazy and timid.[11] And although the peculiar virtue of the Hellenic
citizen,—competence for alternate command and obedience,—formed
no part of the character of Cyrus, yet it appears that Hellenic
affairs and ideas became early impressed upon his mind; insomuch that
on first coming down to Sardis as satrap, he brought down with him
strong interest for the Peloponnesian cause, and strenuous antipathy
to that ancient enemy by whom the Persian arms had been so signally
humbled and repressed. How zealously he coöperated with Lysander and
the Peloponnesians in putting down Athens, has been shown in my last
preceding volume.[12]
[9] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 2; i, 9, 7; Xen. Hellen. i, 4, 3.
[10] Xen. Anab. i, 9, 3-5. Compare Cyropædia, i, 2, 4-6; viii, 1,
16, etc.
[11] Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 2-6; Xen. Anab. _ut sup._
[12] See Vol. VIII. ch. lxiv, p. 135.
An energetic and ambitious youth like Cyrus, having once learnt
from personal experience to appreciate the Greeks, was not slow in
divining the value of such auxiliaries as instruments of power to
himself. To coöperate effectively in the war, it was necessary that
he should act to a certain extent upon Grecian ideas, and conciliate
the good will of the Ionic Greeks; so that he came to combine the
imperious and unsparing despotism of a Persian prince, with something
of the regularity and system belonging to a Grecian administrator.
Though younger than Artaxerxes, he seems to have calculated from
the first upon succeeding to the Persian crown at the death of his
father. So undetermined was the law of succession in the Persian
royal family, and so constant the dispute and fratricide on each
vacancy of the throne, that such ambitious schemes would appear
feasible to a young man of much less ardor than Cyrus. Moreover he
was the favorite son of queen Parysatis,[13] who greatly preferred
him to his elder brother Artaxerxes. He was born after the accession
of Darius to the throne, while Artaxerxes had been born prior to
that event; and, as this latter consideration had been employed
seventy years earlier by queen Atossa[14] in determining her husband
Darius son of Hystaspes to declare (even during his lifetime) her
son Xerxes as his intended successor, to the exclusion of an elder
son by a different wife, and born before his accession,—so Cyrus,
perhaps, anticipated the like effective preference to himself from
the solicitations of Parysatis. Probably his hopes were farther
inflamed by the fact that he bore the name of the great founder of
the monarchy; whose memory every Persian reverenced. How completely
he reckoned on becoming king, is shown by a cruel act performed about
the early part of 405 B.C. It was required as a part of Persian
etiquette that every man who came into the presence of the king
should immerse his hands in certain pockets or large sleeves, which
rendered them for the moment inapplicable to active use; but such
deference was shown to no one except the king. Two first cousins of
Cyrus,—sons of Hieramenês, (seemingly one of the satraps or high
Persian dignitaries in Asia Minor), by a sister of Darius,—appeared
in his presence without thus concealing their hands;[15] upon which
Cyrus ordered them both to be put to death. The father and mother
preferred bitter complaints of this atrocity to Darius; who was
induced to send for Cyrus to visit him in Media, on the ground, not
at all fictitious, that his own health was rapidly declining.
[13] Darius had had thirteen children by Parysatis; but all
except Artaxerxes and Cyrus died young. Ktesias asserts that he
heard this statement from Parysatis herself (Ktesias, Persica, c.
49).
[14] Herodot. vii, 4.
[15] Xen. Hellen. ii, 1, 8, 9; Thucyd. viii, 58.
Compare Xen. Cyropæd. viii, 3, 10; and Lucian, Navigium seu Vota,
c. 30. vol. iii, p. 267, ed. Hemsterhuys with Du Soul’s note.
It is remarkable that, in this passage of the Hellenica, either
Xenophon, or the copyist, makes the mistake of calling Xerxes
(instead of Artaxerxes) father of Darius. Some of the editors,
without any authority from MSS., wish to alter the text from
Ξέρξου to Ἀρταξέρξου.
If Cyrus expected to succeed to the crown, it was important that he
should be on the spot when his father died. He accordingly went up
from Sardis to Media, along with his body guard of three hundred
Greeks, under the Arcadian Xenias; who were so highly remunerated for
this distant march, that the rate of pay was long celebrated.[16]
He also took with him Tissaphernes as an ostensible friend; though
there seems to have been a real enmity between them. Not long after
his arrival, Darius died; but without complying with the request
of Parysatis that he should declare in favor of Cyrus as his
successor. Accordingly Artaxerxes, being proclaimed king, went to
Pasargadæ, the religious capital of the Persians, to perform the
customary solemnities. Thus disappointed, Cyrus was farther accused
by Tissaphernes of conspiring the death of his brother; who caused
him to be seized, and was even on the point of putting him to death,
when the all-powerful intercession of Parysatis saved his life.[17]
He was sent down to his former satrapy at Sardis, whither he returned
with insupportable feelings of anger and wounded pride, and with a
determined resolution to leave nothing untried for the purpose of
dethroning his brother. This statement, given to us by Xenophon,
represents doubtless the story of Cyrus and his friends, current
among the Cyreian army. But if we look at the probabilities of the
case, we shall be led to suspect that the charge of Tissaphernes may
well have been true, and the conspiracy of the disappointed Cyrus
against his brother, a reality instead of a fiction.[18]
[16] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12.
[17] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 4.
[18] So it is presented by Justin, v, 11.
The moment when Cyrus returned to Sardis was highly favorable to his
plans and preparations. The long war had just been concluded by the
capture of Athens and the extinction of her power. Many Greeks, after
having acquired military tastes and habits, were now thrown out of
employment; many others were driven into exile, by the establishment
of the Lysandrian Dekarchies throughout all the cities at once.
Hence competent recruits, for a well-paid service like that of
Cyrus, were now unusually abundant. Having already a certain number
of Greek mercenaries, distributed throughout the various garrisons
in his satrapy, he directed the officers in command to strengthen
their garrisons by as many additional Peloponnesian soldiers as they
could obtain. His pretext was,—first, defence against Tissaphernes,
with whom, since the denunciation by the latter, he was at open
war,—next, protection of the Ionic cities on the seaboard, who had
been hitherto comprised under the government of Tissaphernes, but
had now revolted of their own accord, since the enmity of Cyrus
against him had been declared. Miletus alone had been prevented from
executing this resolution, for Tissaphernes, reinforcing his garrison
in that place, had adopted violent measures of repression, killing
or banishing several of the leading men. Cyrus, receiving these
exiled Milesians with every demonstration of sympathy, immediately
got together both an army and a fleet, under the Egyptian Tamos,[19]
to besiege Miletus by land and sea. He at the same time transmitted
to court the regular tribute due from these maritime cities, and
attempted, through the interest of his mother Parysatis, to procure
that they should be transferred from Tissaphernes to himself. Hence
the Great King was deluded into a belief that the new levies of Cyrus
were only intended for private war between him and Tissaphernes;
an event not uncommon between two neighboring satraps. Nor was it
displeasing to the court that a suspected prince should be thus
occupied at a distance.[20]
[19] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 6; i, 4, 2.
[20] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 7, 8, ὥστε οὐδὲν ἤχθετο (the king) αὐτῶν
πολεμοῦντων.
Besides the army thus collected around Miletus, Cyrus found means
to keep other troops within his call, though at a distance and
unsuspected. A Lacedæmonian officer named Klearchus, of considerable
military ability and experience, presented himself as an exile at
Sardis. He appears to have been banished, (as far as we can judge
amidst contradictory statements,) for gross abuse of authority, and
extreme tyranny, as Lacedæmonian Harmost at Byzantium, and even for
having tried to maintain himself in that place after the Ephors had
formally dismissed him. The known efficiency, and restless warlike
appetite of Klearchus,[21] procured for him the confidence of Cyrus,
who gave him the large sum of ten thousand Darics, (about £7600),
which he employed in levying an army of mercenary Greeks for the
defence of the Grecian cities in the Chersonese against the Thracian
tribes in their neighborhood; thus maintaining the troops until they
were required by Cyrus. Again, Aristippus and Menon,—Thessalians
of the great family of the Aleuadæ at Larissa, who had maintained
their tie of personal hospitality with the Persian royal family
ever since the time of Xerxes, and were now in connection with
Cyrus,[22]—received from him funds to maintain a force of two
thousand mercenaries for their political purposes in Thessaly,
subject to his call whenever he should require them. Other Greeks,
too, who had probably contracted similar ties of hospitality with
Cyrus by service during the late war,—Proxenus, a Bœotian; Agias
and Sophænetus, Arcadians; Sokrates, an Achæan, etc.,—were also
empowered by him to collect mercenary soldiers. His pretended objects
were, partly the siege of Miletus; partly an ostensible expedition
against the Pisidians,—warlike and predatory mountaineers who did
much mischief from their fastnesses in the south-east of Asia Minor.
[21] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 9; ii, 6, 3. The statements here contained
do not agree with Diodor. xiv, 12; while both of them differ from
Isokrates (Orat. viii, De Pace, s. 121; Or. xii, Panath. s. 111),
and Plutarch, Artaxerxes, c. 6.
I follow partially the narrative of Diodorus, so far as to
suppose that the tyranny which he mentions was committed by
Klearchus as Harmost of Byzantium. We know that there was a
Lacedæmonian Harmost in that town, named as soon as the town was
taken, by Lysander, after the battle of Ægospotami (Xen. Hellen.
ii, 2, 2). This was towards the end of 405 B.C. We know farther,
from the Anabasis, that Kleander was Harmost there in 400 B.C.
Klearchus may have been Harmost there in 404 B.C.
[22] Xen. Anab. i, 1, 10; Herodot. vii, 6; ix, 1; Plato, Menon,
c. 1, p. 70; c. 11, p. 78 C.
Besides these unavowed Grecian levies, Cyrus sent envoys to the
Lacedæmonians to invoke their aid, in requital for the strenuous
manner in which he had seconded their operations against Athens,—and
received a favorable answer. He farther got together a considerable
native force, taking great pains to conciliate friends as well
as to inspire confidence. “He was straightforward and just, like
a candidate for command,”—to use the expression of Herodotus
respecting the Median Dëiokês;[23] maintaining order and security
throughout his satrapy, and punishing evil doers in great numbers,
with the utmost extremity of rigor; of which the public roads
exhibited abundant living testimony, in the persons of mutilated men,
deprived of their hands, feet, or eyesight.[24] But he was also exact
in rewarding faithful service, both civil and military. He not only
made various expeditions against the hostile Mysians and Pisidians,
but was forward in exposing his own person, and munificent, rewarding
the zeal of all soldiers who distinguished themselves. He attached
men to his person both by a winning demeanor and by seasonable gifts.
As it was the uniform custom, (and is still the custom in the East),
for every one who approached Cyrus to come with a present in his
hand,[25] so he usually gave away again these presents as marks of
distinction to others. Hence he not only acquired the attachment of
all in his own service, but also of those Persians whom Artaxerxes
sent down on various pretences for the purpose of observing his
motions. Of these emissaries from Susa, some were even sent to
obstruct and enfeeble him. It was under such orders that a Persian
named Orontes, governor of Sardis, acted, in levying open war against
Cyrus; who twice subdued him, and twice pardoned him, on solemn
assurance of fidelity for the future.[26] In all agreements, even
with avowed enemies, Cyrus kept faith exactly; so that his word was
trusted by every one.
[23] Herodot. i. 96. Ὁ δὲ (Dëiokês) οἷα μνώμενος ἀρχὴν, ἰθύς τε
καὶ δίκαιος ἦν.
Xenoph. Hellen. iii, 1, 1; Diodor. xiv, 19.
[24] Xen. Anab. 1, 9, 8. Πολλάκις δ᾽ ἰδεῖν ἦν ἀνὰ τὰς στειβομένας
ὁδοὺς, καὶ ποδῶν καὶ χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν στερουμένους ἀνθρώπους.
For other samples of mutilation inflicted by Persians, not
merely on malefactors, but on prisoners by wholesale, see
Quintus Curtius, v. 5, 6. Alexander the Great was approaching
near to Persepolis, “quum miserabile agmen, inter pauca
fortunæ exempla memorandum, regi occurrit. Captivi erant
Græci ad quatuor millia ferè, quos Persæ vario suppliciorum
modo affecerunt. Alios pedibus, quosdam manibus auribusque,
amputatis, inustisque barbararum literarum notis, in longum sui
ludibrium reservaverant,” etc. Compare Diodorus, xvii, 69; and
the prodigious tales of cruelty recounted in Herodot. ix, 112;
Ktesias, Persic. c. 54-59; Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 14, 16, 17.
It is not unworthy of remark, that while there was nothing in
which the Persian rulers displayed greater invention than in
exaggerating bodily suffering upon a malefactor or an enemy,—at
Athens, whenever any man was put to death by public sentence, the
execution took place within the prison by administering a cup
of hemlock, without even public exposure. It was the minimum of
pain, as well as the minimum of indignity; as any one may see who
reads the account of the death of Sokrates, given by Plato at the
end of the Phædon.
It is certain, that, on the whole, the public sentiment in
England is more humane now than it was in that day at Athens.
Yet an Athenian public could not have borne the sight of a
citizen publicly hanged or beheaded in the market-place. Much
less could they have borne the sight of the prolonged tortures
inflicted on Damiens at Paris in 1757 (a fair parallel to the
Persian σκάφευσις described in Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 16), in the
presence of an immense crowd of spectators, when every window
commanding a view of the Place de Grève was let at a high price,
and filled by the best company in Paris.
[25] Xen. Anab. i, 9, 13.
[26] Xen. Anab. i, 6, 6.
Of such virtues, (rare in an Oriental ruler, either ancient or
modern,)—and of such secret preparations,—Cyrus sought to reap the
fruits at the beginning of 401 B.C. Xenias, his general at home,
brought together all the garrisons, leaving a bare sufficiency for
defence of the towns. Klearchus, Menon, and the other Greek generals
were recalled, and the siege of Miletus was relinquished; so that
there was concentrated at Sardis a body of seven thousand seven
hundred Grecian hoplites, with five hundred light armed.[27] Others
afterwards joined on the march, and there was, besides, a native
army of about one hundred thousand men. With such means Cyrus set
forth, (March or April, 401 B.C.), from Sardis. His real purpose was
kept secret; his ostensible purpose, as proclaimed and understood by
every one except himself and Klearchus, was to conquer and root out
the Pisidian mountaineers. A joint Lacedæmonian and Persian fleet,
under the Lacedæmonian admiral Samius, at the same time coasted
round the south of Asia Minor, in order to lend coöperation from the
sea-side.[28] This Lacedæmonian coöperation passed for a private levy
effected by Cyrus himself; for the ephors would not formally avow
hostility against the Great King.[29]
[27] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 2-3.
[28] Xen. Hellen. iii, 1, 1.
[29] Diodor. xiv, 21.
The body of Greeks, immortalized under the name of the Ten
Thousand, who were thus preparing to plunge into so many unexpected
perils,—though embarking on a foreign mercenary service, were by
no means outcasts, or even men of extreme poverty. They were for
the most part persons of established position, and not a few even
opulent. Half of them were Acadians or Achæans.
Such was the reputation of Cyrus for honorable and munificent
dealing, that many young men of good family had run away from their
fathers and mothers; others of mature age had been tempted to leave
their wives and children; and there were even some who had embarked
their own money in advance of outfit for other poorer men, as well as
for themselves.[30] All calculated on a year’s campaign in Pisidia;
which might perhaps be hard, but would certainly be lucrative, and
would enable them to return with a well-furnished purse. So the Greek
commanders at Sardis all confidently assured them; extolling, with
the emphasis and eloquence suitable to recruiting officers, both
the liberality of Cyrus[31] and the abundant promise of all men of
enterprise.
[30] Xen. Anab. vi, 4, 8. Τῶν γὰρ στρατιωτῶν οἱ πλεῖστοι ἦσαν οὐ
σπάνει βίου ἐκπεπλευκότες ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν μισθοφορὰν, ἀλλὰ τὴν
Κύρου ἀρετὴν ἀκούοντες, οἱ μὲν καὶ ἄνδρας ἄγοντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ
προσανελωκότες χρήματα, καὶ τούτων ἕτεροι ἀποδεδρακότες πατέρας
καὶ μητέρας, οἱ δὲ καὶ τέκνα καταλιπόντες, ὡς χρήματα αὐτοῖς
κτησάμενοι ἥξοντες πάλιν, ἀκούοντες καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς παρὰ
Κύρῳ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράττειν. Τοιοῦτοι οὖν ὄντες, ἐπόθουν εἰς
τὴν Ἑλλάδα σώζεσθαι. Compare v. 10, 10.
[31] Compare similar praises of Ptolemy Philadelphus, in order to
attract Greek mercenaries from Sicily to Egypt (Theokrit. xiv,
50-59).
Among others, the Bœotian Proxenus wrote to his friend Xenophon, at
Athens, pressing him strongly to come to Sardis, and offering to
present him to Cyrus, whom he, (Proxenus,) “considered as a better
friend to him than his own country;[32]” a striking evidence of the
manner in which such foreign mercenary service overlaid Grecian
patriotism, which we shall recognize more and more as we advance
forward. This able and accomplished Athenian,—entitled to respectful
gratitude, not indeed from Athens his country, but from the Cyreian
army and the intellectual world generally,—was one of the class of
Knights or Horsemen, and is said to have served in that capacity at
the battle of Delium.[33] Of his previous life we know little or
nothing, except that he was an attached friend and diligent hearer of
Sokrates; the memorials of whose conversation we chiefly derive from
his pen, as we also derive the narrative of the Cyreian march. In
my last preceding chapter on Sokrates, I have made ample use of the
Memorabilia of Xenophon; and I am now about to draw from his Anabasis
(a model of perspicuous and interesting narrative) the account of the
adventures of the Cyreian army, which we are fortunate in knowing
from so authentic a source.
[32] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Proxenus to
Xenophon) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· ὃν αὐτος ἔφη κρείττω
ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος.
[33] Strabo, ix, p. 403. The story that Sokrates carried off
Xenophon, wounded and thrown from his horse, on his shoulders,
and thus saved his life,—seems too doubtful to enter into the
narrative.
Among the proofs that Xenophon was among the Horsemen or Ἱππεῖς
of Athens, we may remark, not only his own strong interest, and
great skill in horsemanship, in the cavalry service and the
duties of its commander, and in all that relates to horses, as
manifested in his published works,—but also the fact, that his
son Gryllus served afterwards among the Athenian horsemen at the
combat of cavalry which preceded the great battle of Mantineia
(Diogen. Laërt. ii, 54).
On receiving the invitation from Proxenus, Xenophon felt much
inclined to comply. To a member of that class of Knights, which
three years before had been the mainstay of the atrocities of the
Thirty, (how far he was personally concerned, we cannot say,) it is
probable that residence in Athens was in those times not peculiarly
agreeable to him. He asked the opinion of Sokrates; who, apprehensive
lest service under Cyrus, the bitter enemy of Athens, might expose
him to unpopularity with his countrymen, recommended an application
to the Delphian oracle. Thither Xenophon went; but in truth he had
already made up his mind beforehand. So that instead of asking,
“whether he ought to go or refuse,”—he simply put the question, “To
which of the gods must I sacrifice, in order to obtain safety and
success in a journey which I am now meditating?” The reply of the
oracle,—indicating Zeus Basileus as the god to whom sacrifice was
proper,—was brought back by Xenophon; upon which Sokrates, though
displeased that the question had not been fairly put as to the
whole project, nevertheless advised, since an answer had now been
given, that it should be literally obeyed. Accordingly Xenophon,
having offered the sacrifices prescribed, took his departure first
to Ephesus and thence to Sardis, where he found the army about
to set forth. Proxenus presented him to Cyrus, who entreated him
earnestly to take service, promising to dismiss him as soon as the
campaign against the Pisidians should be finished.[34] He was thus
induced to stay, yet only as a volunteer or friend of Proxenus,
without accepting any special post in the army, either as officer
or soldier. There is no reason to believe that his service under
Cyrus had actually the effect apprehended by Sokrates, of rendering
him unpopular at Athens. For though he was afterwards banished,
this sentence was not passed against him until after the battle
of Korôneia in 394 B.C., where he was in arms as a conspicuous
officer under Agesilaus, against his own countrymen and their Theban
allies,—nor need we look farther back for the grounds of the
sentence.
[34] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4-9; v. 9, 22-24.
Though Artaxerxes, entertaining general suspicions of his brother’s
ambitious views, had sent down various persons to watch him, yet
Cyrus had contrived to gain or neutralize these spies, and had
masked his preparations so skilfully, that no intimation was conveyed
to Susa until the march was about to commence. It was only then that
Tissaphernes, seeing the siege of Miletus relinquished, and the vast
force mustering at Sardis, divined that something more was meant than
the mere conquest of Pisidian freebooters, and went up in person
to warn the king; who began his preparations forthwith.[35] That
which Tissaphernes had divined was yet a secret to every man in the
army, to Proxenus as well as the rest,—when Cyrus, having confided
the provisional management of his satrapy to some Persian kinsmen,
and to his admiral the Egyptian Tamos, commenced his march in a
south-easterly direction from Sardis, through Lydia and Phrygia.[36]
Three days’ march, a distance stated at twenty-two parasangs,[37]
brought him to the Mæander; one additional march of eight parasangs,
after crossing that river, forwarded him to Kolossæ, a flourishing
city in Phrygia, where Menon overtook him with a reinforcement of
one thousand hoplites, and five hundred peltasts,—Dolopes, Ænianes,
and Olynthians. He then marched three days onward to Kelænæ, another
Phrygian city, “great and flourishing,” with a citadel very strong
both by nature and art. Here he halted no less than thirty days, in
order to await the arrival of Klearchus, with his division of one
thousand hoplites, eight hundred Thracian peltasts, and two hundred
Kretan bowmen; at the same time Sophænetus arrived with one thousand
farther hoplites, and Sosias with three hundred. This total of Greeks
was reviewed by Cyrus in one united body at Kelænæ; eleven thousand
hoplites and two thousand peltasts.[38]
[35] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 4; ii, 3, 19.
Diodorus (xiv, 11) citing from Ephorus affirms that the first
revelation to Artaxerxes was made by Pharnabazus, who had learnt
it from the acuteness of the Athenian exile Alkibiades. That the
latter should have had any concern in it, appears improbable. But
Diodorus on more than one occasion, confounds Pharnabazus and
Tissaphernes.
[36] Diodor. xiv, 19.
[37] The parasang was a Persian measurement of length, but
according to Strabo, not of uniform value in all parts of Asia;
in some parts, held equivalent to thirty stadia, in others to
forty, in others to sixty (Strabo, xi, p. 518; Forbiger, Handbuch
der Alten Geograph. vol. i, p. 555). This variability of meaning
is no way extraordinary, when we recollect the difference between
English, Irish, and German miles, etc.
Herodotus tells us distinctly what _he_ meant by a parasang, and
what the Persian government of his day recognized as such in
their measurement of the great road from Sardis to Susa, as well
as in their measurements of territory for purposes of tribute
(Herod. v, 53; vi, 43). It was thirty Greek stadia = nearly three
and a half English miles, or nearly three geographical miles.
The distance between every two successive stations, on the road
from Sardis to Susa, (which was “all inhabited and all secure,”
διὰ οἰκεομένης τε ἅπασα καὶ ἀσφολέος), would seem to have been
measured and marked in parasangs and fractions of a parasang. It
seems probable, from the account which Herodotus gives of the
march of Xerxes (vii, 26), that this road passed from Kappadokia
and across the river Halys, through Kelænæ and Kolossæ to Sardis;
and therefore that the road which Cyrus took for his march, from
Sardis at least as far as Kelænæ, must have been so measured and
marked.
Xenophon also in his summing up of the route, (ii, 2, 6; vii,
8, 26) implies the parasang as equivalent to thirty stadia,
while he gives for the most part, each day’s journey measured
in parasangs. Now even at the outset of the march, we have
no reason to believe that there was any official measurer of
road-progress accompanying the army, like Bæton, ὁ Βηματιστὴς
Ἀλεξάνδρου, in Alexander’s invasion; see Athenæus, x, p. 442, and
Geier, Alexandri Magni Histor. Scriptt. p. 357. Yet Xenophon,
throughout the whole march, even as far as Trebizond, states the
day’s march of the army in parasangs; not merely in Asia Minor,
where there were roads, but through the Arabian desert between
Thapsakus and Pylæ,—through the snows of Armenia,—and through
the territory of the barbarous Chalybes. He tells us that in the
desert of Arabia they marched ninety parasangs in thirteen days,
or very nearly seven parasangs per day,—and that too under the
extreme heat of summer. He tells us, farther, that in the deep
snows of Armenia, and in the extremity of winter, they marched
fifteen parasangs in three days; and through the territory (also
covered with snow) of the pugnacious Chalybes, fifty parasangs in
seven days, or more than seven parasangs per day. Such marches,
at thirty stadia for the parasang, are impossible. And how did
Xenophon measure the distance marched over?
The most intelligent modern investigators and travellers,—Major
Rennell, Mr. Ainsworth, Mr. Hamilton, Colonel Chesney, Professor
Koch, etc., offer no satisfactory solution of the difficulty.
Major Rennell reckons the parasangs as equal to 2.25 geogr.
miles; Mr. Ainsworth at three geogr. miles; Mr. Hamilton (travels
in Asia Minor, c. 42, p. 200), at something less than two and a
half geogr. miles; Colonel Chesney (Euphrat. and Tigris, ch. 8,
p. 207) at 2.608 geogr. miles between Sardis and Thapsakus—at
1.98 geogr. miles, between Thapsakus and Kunaxa,—at something
less than this, without specifying how much, during the retreat.
It is evident that there is no certain basis to proceed upon,
even for the earlier portion of the route; much more, for the
retreat. The distance between Ikonium and Dana (or Tyana), is one
of the quantities on which Mr. Hamilton rests his calculation;
but we are by no means certain that Cyrus took the direct route
of march; he rather seems to have turned out of his way, partly
to plunder Lykaonia, partly to conduct the Kilikian princess
homeward. The other item, insisted upon by Mr. Hamilton, is the
distance between Kelænæ and Kolossæ, two places the site of which
seems well ascertained, and which are by the best modern maps,
fifty-two geographical miles apart. Xenophon calls the distance
twenty parasangs. Assuming the road by which he marched to have
been the same with that now travelled, it would make the parasang
of Xenophon = 2.6 geographical miles. I have before remarked that
the road between Kolossæ and Kelænæ was probably measured and
numbered according to parasangs; so that Xenophon, in giving the
number of parasangs between these two places, would be speaking
upon official authority.
Even a century and a half afterwards, the geographer Eratosthenes
found it not possible to obtain accurate measurements, in much of
the country traversed by Cyrus (Strabo, ii, p. 73.)
Colonel Chesney remarks,—“From Sardis to Cunaxa, or the mounds
of Mohammed, cannot be much under or over twelve hundred and
sixty-five geographical miles; making 2.364 geographical miles
for each of the five hundred and thirty-five parasangs given by
Xenophon between those two places.”
As a measure of distance, the parasang of Xenophon is evidently
untrustworthy. Is it admissible to consider, in the description
of this march, that the parasangs and stadia of Xenophon are
measurements rather of time than of space? From Sardis to Kelænæ,
he had a measured road and numbered parasangs of distance; it is
probable that the same mensuration and numeration continued for
four days farther, as far as Keramôn-Agora, (since I imagine that
the road from Kelænæ to the Halys and Kappadokia must have gone
through these two places,)—and possibly it may have continued
even as far as Ikonium or Dana. Hence, by these early marches,
Xenophon had the opportunity of forming to himself roughly an
idea of the time (measured by the course of the sun) which it
took for the army to march one, two, or three parasangs; and when
he came to the ulterior portions of the road, he called _that
length of time_ by the name of one, two, or three parasangs. Five
parasangs seem to have meant with him a full day’s march; three
or four, a short day; six, seven, or eight, a long, or very long
day.
We must recollect that the Greeks in the time of Xenophon had no
portable means of measuring hours, and did not habitually divide
the day into hours, or into any other recognized fraction. The
Alexandrine astronomers, near two centuries afterwards, were
the first to use ὥρη in the sense of hour (Ideler, Handbuch der
Chronologie, vol. i, p. 239.)
This may perhaps help to explain Xenophon’s meaning, when he
talks about marching five or seven parasangs amidst the deep
snows of Armenia; I do not however suppose that he had this
meaning uniformly or steadily present to his mind. Sometimes, it
would seem, he must have used the word in its usual meaning of
distance.
[38] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 8, 9. About Kelænæ, Arrian, Exp. Al. i, 29,
2; Quint. Curt. iii, 1, 6.
As far as Kelænæ, his march had been directed straight towards
Pisidia, near the borders of which territory that city is situated.
So far, therefore, the fiction with which he started was kept up.
But on leaving Kelænæ, he turned his march away from Pisidia, in
a direction nearly northward; first in two days, ten parasangs,
to the town of Peltæ; next in two days farther, twelve parasangs,
to Keramôn-Agora, the last city in the district adjoining Mysia.
At Peltæ, in a halt of three days, the Arcadian general Xenias
celebrated the great festival of his country, the Lykæa, with
its usual games and matches, in the presence of Cyrus. From
Keramôn-Agora, Cyrus marched in three days the unusual distance of
thirty parasangs,[39] to a city called Käystru-Pedion, (the plain
of Käystrus), where he halted for five days. Here his repose was
disturbed by the murmurs of the Greek soldiers, who had received no
pay for three months, (Xenophon had before told us that they were
mostly men who had some means of their own), and who now flocked
around his tent to press for their arrears. So impoverished was Cyrus
by previous disbursements,—perhaps also by remissions of tribute for
the purpose of popularizing himself,—that he was utterly without
money, and was obliged to put them off again with promises. And
his march might well have ended here, had he not been rescued from
embarrassment by the arrival of Epyaxa, wife of the Kilikian prince
Syennesis, who brought to him a large sum of money, and enabled him
to give to the Greek soldiers four months’ pay at once. As to the
Asiatic soldiers, it is probable that they received little beyond
their maintenance.
[39] These three marches, each of ten parasangs, from
Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion,—are the longest recorded in
the Anabasis. It is rather surprising to find them so; for
there seems no motive for Cyrus to have hurried forward. When
he reached Käystru-Pedion, he halted five days. Koch (Zug der
Zehn Tausend, Leipsic, 1850, p. 19) remarks that the three days’
march, which seem to have dropped out of Xenophon’s calculation,
comparing the items with the total, might conveniently be let
in here; so that these thirty parasangs should have occupied
six days’ march instead of three; five parasangs per day. The
whole march which Cyrus had hitherto made from Sardis, including
the road from Keramôn-Agora to Käystru-Pedion, lay in the great
road from Sardis to the river Halys, Kappadokia, and Susa. That
road (as we see by the March of Xerxes, Herodot. vii, 26; v,
52) passed through both Kelænæ and Kolossæ; though this is a
prodigious departure from the straight line. At Käystru-Pedion,
Cyrus seems to have left this great road; taking a different
route, in a direction nearly south-east towards Ikonium. About
the point, somewhere near Synnada, where these different roads
crossed, see Mr. Ainsworth, Trav. in the Track, p. 28.
I do not share the doubts which have been raised about Xenophon’s
accuracy, in his description of the route from Sardis to Ikonium;
though the names of several of the places which he mentions are
not known to us, and their sites cannot be exactly identified.
There is a great departure from the straight line of bearing. But
we at the present day assign more weight to that circumstance
than is suited to the days of Xenophon. Straight roads,
stretching systematically over a large region of country, are
not of that age; the communications were probably all originally
made, between one neighboring town and another, without much
reference to saving of distance, and with no reference to any
promotion of traffic between distant places.
It was just about this time that King Archelaus began to “cut
straight roads” in Macedonia,—which Thucydides seems to note as
a remarkable thing (ii, 100).
Two ensuing days of march, still through Phrygia, brought the army
to Thymbrium; two more to Tyriæum. Each day’s march is called five
parasangs[40]. It was here that Cyrus, halting three days, passed
the army in review, to gratify the Kilikian princess Epyaxa, who
was still accompanying the march. His Asiatic troops were first
made to march in order before him, cavalry and infantry in their
separate divisions; after which he himself in a chariot, and Epyaxa
in a Harmamaxa, (a sort of carriage or litter covered with an awning
which opened or shut at pleasure), passed all along the front of
the Greek line, drawn up separately. The hoplites were marshalled
four deep, all in their best trim; brazen helmets, purple tunics,
greaves or leggings, and the shields rubbed bright, just taken out
of the wrappers in which they were carried during a mere march.[41]
Klearchus commanded on the left, and Menon on the right; the other
generals being distributed in the centre. Having completed his review
along the whole line, and taken a station with the Kilikian princess
at a certain distance in front of it, Cyrus sent his interpreter to
the generals, and desired that he might see them charge. Accordingly,
the orders were given, the spears were protended, the trumpets
sounded, and the whole Greek force moved forward in battle array with
the usual shouts. As they advanced, the pace became accelerated, and
they made straight against the victualling portion of the Asiatic
encampment. Such was the terror occasioned by the sight, that all the
Asiatics fled forthwith, abandoning their property,—Epyaxa herself
among the first, quitting her palanquin. Though she had among her
personal guards some Greeks from Aspendus, she had never before seen
a Grecian army, and was amazed as well as terrified; much to the
satisfaction of Cyrus, who saw in the scene an augury of his coming
success.[42]
[40] Neither Thymbrium, nor Tyriæum, can be identified. But it
seems that both must have been situated on the line of road now
followed by the caravans from Smyrna to Konieh (Ikonium,) which
line of road follows a direction between the mountains called
Emir Dagh on the north-east, and those called Sultan Dagh on the
south-west (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 21, 22).
[41] Εἶχον δὲ πάντες κράνη χαλκᾶ, καὶ χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς, καὶ
κνημῖδας, καὶ ~τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐκκεκαθαρμένας~.
When the hoplite was on march, without expectation of an enemy,
the shield seems to have been carried behind him, with his
blanket attached to it (see Aristoph. Acharn. 1085, 1089-1149);
it was slung by the strap round his neck and shoulder. Sometimes
indeed he had an opportunity of relieving himself from the
burden, by putting the shield in a baggage-wagon (Xen. Anab. i,
7, 20). The officers generally, and doubtless some soldiers,
could command attendants to carry their shields for them (iv, 2,
20; Aristoph. 1, c.).
On occasion of this review, the shields were unpacked, rubbed,
and brightened, as before a battle (Xen. Hell. vii, 5, 20); then
fastened round the neck or shoulders, and held out upon the left
arm, which was passed through the rings or straps attached to its
concave or interior side.
Respecting the cases or wrappers of the shields, see a curious
stratagem of the Syracusan Agathokles (Diodor. xx, 11). The Roman
soldiers also carried their shields in leathern wrappers, when on
march (Plutarch, Lucull. c. 27).
It is to be remarked that Xenophon, in enumerating the arms of
the Cyreians, does not mention _breastplates_; which (though
sometimes worn, see Plutarch, Dion. c. 30) were not usually worn
by hoplites, who carried heavy shields. It is quite possible
that _some_ of the Cyreian infantry may have had breastplates as
well as shields, since every soldier provided his own arms; but
Xenophon states only what was common to all.
Grecian cavalry commonly wore a heavy breastplate, but had no
shield.
[42] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 16-19.
Three days of farther march, (called twenty parasangs in all) brought
the army to Ikonium, (now Konieh), the extreme city of Phrygia;
where Cyrus halted three days. He then marched for five days (thirty
parasangs) through Lykaonia; which country, as being out of his
own satrapy, and even hostile, he allowed the Greeks to plunder.
Lykaonia being immediately on the borders of Pisidia, its inhabitants
were probably reckoned as Pisidians, since they were of the like
predatory character:[43] so that Cyrus would be partially realizing
the pretended purpose of his expedition. He thus, too, approached
near to Mount Taurus, which separated him from Kilikia; and he here
sent the Kilikian princess, together with Menon and his division,
over the mountain, by a pass shorter and more direct, but seemingly
little frequented, and too difficult for the whole army; in order
that they might thus get straight into Kilikia,[44] in the rear of
Syennesis, who was occupying the regular pass more to the northward.
Intending to enter with his main body through this latter pass, Cyrus
first proceeded through Kappadokia (four days’ march, twenty-five
parasangs) to Dana or Tyana, a flourishing city of Kappadokia; where
he halted three days, and where he put to death two Persian officers,
on a charge of conspiring against him.[45]
[43] Xen. Anab. iii, 2, 25.
[44] This shorter and more direct pass crosses the Taurus by
Kizil-Chesmeh, Alan Buzuk, and Mizetli; it led directly to the
Kilikian seaport-town Soli, afterwards called Pompeiopolis. It
is laid down in the Peutinger Tables as the road from Iconium to
Pompeiopolis (Ainsworth, p. 40 _seq._; Chesney, Euph. and Tigr.
ii, p. 209).
[45] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 20.
This regular pass over Taurus, the celebrated Tauri-Pylæ or Kilikian
Gates, was occupied by Syennesis. Though a road fit for vehicles, it
was yet three thousand six hundred feet above the level of the sea,
narrow, steep, bordered by high ground on each side, and crossed by a
wall with gates, so that it could not be forced if ever so moderately
defended.[46] But the Kilikian prince, alarmed at the news that
Menon had already crossed the mountains by the less frequented pass
to his rear, and that the fleet of Cyrus was sailing along the coast,
evacuated his own impregnable position, and fell back to Tarsus; from
whence he again retired, accompanied by most of the inhabitants,
to an inaccessible fastness on the mountains. Accordingly Cyrus,
ascending without opposition the great pass thus abandoned, reached
Tarsus after a march of four days, there rejoining Menon and Epyaxa.
Two lochi or companies of the division of Menon, having dispersed on
their march for pillage, had been cut off by the natives; for which
the main body of Greeks now took their revenge, plundering both the
city and the palace of Syennesis. That prince, though invited by
Cyrus to come back to Tarsus, at first refused, but was at length
prevailed upon by the persuasions of his wife, to return under a
safe conduct. He was induced to contract an alliance, to exchange
presents with Cyrus, and to give him a large sum of money towards
his expedition, together with a contingent of troops; in return for
which it was stipulated that Kilikia should be no farther plundered,
and that the slaves taken away might be recovered wherever they were
found.[47]
[46] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 20. See Mr. Kinneir,
Travels in Asia Minor, p. 116; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and
Tigris, vol. i, p. 293-354; and Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the
Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 40 _seq._; also his other work,
Travels in Asia Minor, vol. ii. ch. 30, p. 70-77; and Koch,
Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 26-172, for a description of this
memorable pass.
Alexander the Great, as well as Cyrus, was fortunate enough to
find this impregnable pass abandoned; as it appears, through
sheer stupidity or recklessness of the satrap who ought to have
defended it, and who had not even the same excuse for abandoning
it as Syennesis had on the approach of Cyrus (Arrian. E. A. ii.
4; Curtius, iii, 9, 10, 11).
[47] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 23-27.
It seems evident, though Xenophon does not directly tell us so, that
the resistance of Syennesis, (this was a standing name or title of
the hereditary princes of Kilikia under the Persian crown), was a
mere feint; that the visit of Epyaxa with a supply of money to Cyrus,
and the admission of Menon and his division over Mount Taurus, were
manœuvres in collusion with him; and that, thinking Cyrus would be
successful, he was disposed to support his cause, yet careful at the
same time to give himself the air of having been overpowered, in case
Artaxerxes should prove victorious.[48]
[48] Diodorus (xiv, 20) represents Syennesis as playing a double
game, though reluctantly. He takes no notice of the proceeding of
Epyaxa.
So Livy says, about the conduct of the Macedonian courtiers in
regard to the enmity between Perseus and Demetrius, the two
sons of Philip II. of Macedon: “Crescente in dies Philippi
odio in Romanos, cui Perseus indulgeret, Demetrius summâ ope
adversaretur, prospicientes animo exitum incauti a fraude
fraternâ juvenis—_adjuvandum, quod futurum erat, rati,
fovendamque spem potentioris, Perseo se adjungunt_,” _etc._
(Livy, xl, 5).
At first, however, it appeared as if the march of Cyrus was destined
to finish at Tarsus, where he was obliged to remain twenty days. The
army had already passed by Pisidia, the ostensible purpose of the
expedition, for which the Grecian troops had been engaged; not one of
them, either officer or soldier, suspecting anything to the contrary,
except Klearchus, who was in the secret. But all now saw that they
had been imposed upon, and found out that they were to be conducted
against the Persian king. Besides the resentment at such delusion,
they shrunk from the risk altogether; not from any fear of Persian
armies, but from the terrors of a march of three months inward from
the coast, and the impossibility of return, which had so powerfully
affected the Spartan King Kleomenes,[49] a century before; most of
them being (as I have before remarked) men of decent position and
family in their respective cities. Accordingly they proclaimed their
determination to advance no farther, as they had not been engaged to
fight against the Great King.[50]
[49] See Herodot. v. 49.
[50] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 1.
Among the Grecian officers, each (Klearchus, Proxenus, Menon, Xenias,
etc.) commanded his own separate division, without any generalissimo
except Cyrus himself. Each of them probably sympathized more or less
in the resentment as well as in the repugnance of the soldiers. But
Klearchus, an exile and a mercenary by profession, was doubtless
prepared for this mutiny, and had assured Cyrus that it might be
overcome. That such a man as Klearchus could be tolerated as a
commander of free and non-professional soldiers, is a proof of the
great susceptibility of the Greek hoplites for military discipline.
For though he had great military merits, being brave, resolute, and
full of resource in the hour of danger, provident for the subsistence
of his soldiers, and unshrinking against fatigue and hardship,—yet
his look and manner were harsh, his punishments were perpetual as
well as cruel, and he neither tried nor cared to conciliate his
soldiers; who accordingly stayed with him, and were remarkable
for exactness of discipline, so long as political orders required
them,—but preferred service under other commanders, when they
could obtain it.[51] Finding his orders to march forward disobeyed,
Klearchus proceeded at once in his usual manner to enforce and
punish. But he found resistance universal; he himself with the cattle
who carried his baggage, was pelted when he began to move forward,
and narrowly escaped with his life. Thus disappointed in his attempt
at coercion, he was compelled to convene the soldiers in a regular
assembly, and to essay persuasion.
[51] Xen. Anab. ii, 6, 5-15.
On first appearing before the assembled soldiers, this harsh and
imperious officer stood for a long time silent, and even weeping;
a remarkable point in Grecian manners,—and exceedingly impressive
to the soldiers, who looked on him with surprise and in silence. At
length he addressed them: “Be not astonished, soldiers, to see me
deeply mortified. Cyrus has been my friend and benefactor. It was
he who sheltered me as an exile, and gave me ten thousand Darics,
which I expended not on my own profit or pleasure, but upon you, and
in defence of Grecian interests in the Chersonese against Thracian
depredators. When Cyrus invited me, I came to him along with you, in
order to make him the best return in my power for his past kindness.
But now, since you will no longer march along with me, I am under the
necessity either of renouncing you or of breaking faith with him.
Whether I am doing right or not, I cannot say; but I shall stand
by you, and share your fate. No one shall say of me that, having
conducted Greek troops into a foreign land, I betrayed the Greeks and
chose the foreigner. You are to me country, friends, allies; while
you are with me, I can help a friend, and repel an enemy. Understand
me well; I shall go wherever you go, and partake your fortune.”[52]
[52] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 2-7. Here, as on other occasions, I
translate the sense rather than the words.
This speech, and the distinct declaration of Klearchus that he
would not march forward against the King, was heard by the soldiers
with much delight; in which those of the other Greek divisions
sympathized, especially as none of the other Greek commanders had yet
announced a similar resolution. So strong was this feeling among the
soldiers of Xenias and Pasion, that two thousand of them left their
commanders, coming over forthwith, with arms and baggage, to the
encampment of Klearchus.
Meanwhile Cyrus himself, dismayed at the resistance encountered,
sent to desire an interview with Klearchus. But the latter, knowing
well the game that he was playing, refused to obey the summons. He,
however, at the same time despatched a secret message to encourage
Cyrus with the assurance that everything would come right at
last,—and to desire farther that fresh invitations might be sent,
in order that he (Klearchus) might answer by fresh refusals. He then
again convened in assembly both his own soldiers and those who had
recently deserted Xenias to join him. “Soldiers (said he), we must
recollect that we have now broken with Cyrus. We are no longer his
soldiers, nor he our paymaster; moreover, I know that he thinks we
have wronged him,—so that I am both afraid and ashamed to go near
him. He is a good friend,—but a formidable enemy; and has a powerful
force of his own, which all of you see near at hand. This is no time
for us to slumber. We must take careful counsel whether to stay or
go; and if we go, how to get away in safety, as well as to obtain
provisions. I shall be glad to hear what any man has to suggest.”
Instead of the peremptory tone habitual with Klearchus, the troops
found themselves now, for the first time, not merely released from
his command, but deprived of his advice. Some soldiers addressed the
assembly, proposing various measures suitable to the emergency; but
their propositions were opposed by other speakers, who, privately
instigated by Klearchus himself, set forth the difficulties either
of staying or departing. One among these secret partisans of the
commander even affected to take the opposite side, and to be
impatient for immediate departure. “If Klearchus does not choose to
conduct us back (said this speaker) let us immediately elect other
generals, buy provisions, get ready to depart, and then send to
ask Cyrus for merchant-vessels,—or at any rate for guides in our
return march by land. If he refuses both these requests, we must
put ourselves in marching order, to fight our way back; sending
forward a detachment without delay to occupy the passes.” Klearchus
here interposed to say, that as for himself, it was impossible for
him to continue in command; but he would faithfully obey any other
commander who might be elected. He was followed by another speaker,
who demonstrated the absurdity of going and asking Cyrus, either for
a guide, or for ships, at the very moment when they were frustrating
his projects. How could he be expected to assist them in getting
away? Who could trust either his ships or his guides? On the other
hand, to depart without his knowledge or concurrence was impossible.
The proper course would be to send a deputation to him, consisting
of others along with Klearchus, to ask what it was that he really
wanted; which no one yet knew. His answer to the question should
be reported to the meeting, in order that they might take their
resolution accordingly.
To this proposition the soldiers acceded; for it was but too plain
that retreat was no easy matter. The deputation went to put the
question to Cyrus; who replied that his real purpose was to attack
his enemy Abrokomas, who was on the river Euphrates, twelve days’
march onward. If he found Abrokomas there, he would punish him as he
deserved. If, on the other hand, Abrokomas had fled, they might again
consult what step was fit to be taken.
The soldiers, on hearing this, suspected it to be a deception, but
nevertheless acquiesced, not knowing what else to do. They required
only an increase of pay. Not a word was said about the Great King, or
the expedition against him. Cyrus granted increased pay of fifty per
cent. upon the previous rate. Instead of one daric per month to each
soldier, he agreed to give a daric and a half.[53]
[53] Xen. Anab. i, 3, 16-21.
This remarkable scene at Tarsus illustrates the character of the
Greek citizen-soldier. What is chiefly to be noted, is, the appeal
made to their reason and judgment,—the habit, established more
or less throughout so large a portion of the Grecian world, and
attaining its maximum at Athens, of hearing both sides and deciding
afterwards. The soldiers are indignant, justly and naturally, at the
fraud practised upon them. But instead of surrendering themselves to
this impulse arising out of the past, they are brought to look at the
actualities of the present, and take measure of what is best to be
done for the future. To return back from the place where they stood,
against the wish of Cyrus, was an enterprise so full of difficulty
and danger, that the decision to which they came was recommended by
the best considerations of reason. To go on was the least dangerous
course of the two, besides its chances of unmeasured reward.
As the remaining Greek officers and soldiers followed the example
of Klearchus and his division, the whole army marched forward from
Tarsus, and reached Issus, the extreme city of Kilikia, in five
days’ march,—crossing the rivers Sarus[54] and Pyramus. At Issus, a
flourishing and commercial port in the angle of the Gulf so called,
Cyrus was joined by his fleet of fifty triremes,—thirty-five
Lacedæmonian and twenty-five Persian triremes; bringing a
reinforcement of seven hundred hoplites, under the command of the
Lacedæmonian Cheirisophus, said to have been despatched by the
Spartan Ephors.[55] He also received a farther reinforcement of four
hundred Grecian soldiers; making the total of Greeks in his army
fourteen thousand, from which are to be deducted the one hundred
soldiers of Menon’s division, slain in Kilikia.
[54] The breadth of the river Sarus (Scihun) is given by Xenophon
at three hundred feet; which agrees nearly with the statements of
modern travellers (Koch, Der Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 34).
Compare, for the description of this country, Kinneir’s Journey
through Asia Minor, p. 135; Col. Chesney, Euphrates and Tigris,
ii, p. 211; Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of the Ten
Thousand, p. 54.
Colonel Chesney affirms that neither the Sarus nor the Pyramus
is fordable. There must have been bridges; which, in the then
flourishing state of Kilikia, is by no means improbable. He and
Mr. Ainsworth, however, differ as to the route which they suppose
Cyrus to have taken between Tarsus and Issus.
Xenophon mentions nothing about the Amanian Gates, which
afterwards appear noticed both in Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) and in
Strabo (xiv, p. 676). The various data of ancient history and
geography about this region are by no means easy to reconcile;
see a valuable note of Mützel on Quintus Curtius, iii, 17, 7.
An inspection of the best recent maps, either Colonel Chesney’s
or Kiepert’s, clears up some of these better than any verbal
description. We see by these maps that Mount Amanus bifurcates
into two branches, one of them flanking the Gulf of Issus on
its western, the other on its eastern side. There are thus two
different passes, each called Pylæ Amanides or Amanian Gates; one
having reference to the Western Amanus, the other to the Eastern.
The former was crossed by Alexander, the latter by Darius, before
the battle of Issus; and Arrian (ii, 6; ii, 7) is equally correct
in saying of both of them that they passed the Amanian Gates;
though both did not pass the same gates.
[55] Diodor. xiv. 21.
The arrival of this last body of four hundred men was a fact of some
importance. They had hitherto been in the service of Abrokomas (the
Persian general commanding a vast force, said to be three hundred
thousand men, for the king, in Phœnicia and Syria), from whom they
now deserted to Cyrus. Such desertion was at once the proof of their
reluctance to fight against the great body of their countrymen
marching upwards, and of the general discouragement reigning
amidst the king’s army. So great, indeed, was that discouragement,
that Abrokomas now fled from the Syrian coast into the interior;
abandoning three defensible positions in succession—1. The Gates of
Kilikia and Syria. 2. The pass of Beilan over Mount Amanus. 3. The
passage of the Euphrates.—He appears to have been alarmed by the
easy passage of Cyrus from Kappadokia into Kilikia, and still more,
probably, by the evident collusion of Syennesis with the invader.[56]
[56] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 3-5. Ἀβροκόμας δ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο ἐποίησεν ἀλλ᾽
ἐπεὶ ἤκουσε Κῦρον ἐν Κιλικίᾳ ὄντα, αναστρέψας ἐκ Φοινίκης, παρὰ
βασιλέα ἀπήλαυνεν, etc.
Cyrus had expected to find the gates of Kilikia and Syria stoutly
defended, and had provided for this emergency by bringing up his
fleet to Issus, in order that he might be able to transport a
division by sea to the rear of the defenders. The pass was at one
day’s march from Issus. It was a narrow road for the length of
near half a mile, between the sea on one side and the steep cliffs
terminating mount Amanus on the other. The two entrances, on the
side of Kilikia as well as on that of Syria, were both closed by
walls and gates; midway between the two the river Kersus broke out
from the mountains and flowed into the sea. No army could force this
pass against defenders; but the possession of the fleet doubtless
enabled an assailant to turn it. Cyrus was overjoyed to find it
undefended.[57] And here we cannot but notice the superior ability
and forethought of Cyrus as compared with the other Persians opposed
to him. He had looked at this as well as at the other difficulties
of his march, beforehand, and had provided the means of meeting
them; whereas, on the king’s side, all the numerous means and
opportunities of defence are successively abandoned; the Persians
have no confidence, except in vast numbers,—or when numbers fail, in
treachery.
[57] Diodor. xiv.
Five parasangs, or one day’s march from this pass, Cyrus reached the
Phœnician maritime town of Myriandrus; a place of great commerce,
with its harbor full of merchantmen. While he rested here seven days,
his two generals Xenias and Pasion deserted him; privately engaging
a merchant vessel to carry them away with their property. They could
not brook the wrong which Cyrus had done them in permitting Klearchus
to retain under his command those soldiers who had deserted them
at Tarsus, at the time when the latter played off his deceitful
manœuvre. Perhaps the men who had thus deserted may have been
unwilling to return to their original commanders, after having taken
so offensive a step. And this may partly account for the policy of
Cyrus in sanctioning what Xenias and Pasion could not but feel as a
great wrong, in which a large portion of the army sympathized. The
general belief among the soldiers was, that Cyrus would immediately
despatch some triremes to overtake and bring back the fugitives.
But instead of this, he summoned the remaining generals, and after
communicating to them the fact that Xenias and Pasion were gone,
added,—“I have plenty of triremes to overtake their merchantmen
if I chose, and to bring them back. But I will do no such thing.
No one shall say of me, that I make use of a man while he is with
me,—and afterwards seize, rob, or ill-use him, when he wishes
to depart. Nay, I have their wives and children under guard as
hostages, at Tralles;[58] but even these shall be given up to them,
in consideration of their good behavior down to the present day. Let
them go if they choose, with the full knowledge that they behave
worse towards me than I towards them.” This behavior, alike judicious
and conciliating, was universally admired, and produced the best
possible effect upon the spirits of the army; imparting a confidence
in Cyrus which did much to outweigh the prevailing discouragement,
in the unknown march upon which they were entering.[59]
[58] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 6. To require the wives or children of
generals in service, as hostages for fidelity, appears to have
been not unfrequent with Persian kings. On the other hand, it
was remarked as a piece of gross obsequiousness in the Argeian
Nikostratus, who commanded the contingent of his countrymen
serving under Artaxerxes Ochus in Egypt, that he volunteered to
bring up his son to the king as a hostage, without being demanded
(Theopompus, Frag. 135 [ed. Wichers] ap. Athenæ. vi, p. 252).
[59] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 7-9.
At Myriandrus Cyrus finally quitted the sea, sending back his
fleet,[60] and striking with his land-force eastward into the
interior. For this purpose it was necessary first to cross mount
Amanus, by the pass of Beilan; an eminently difficult road, which he
was fortunate enough to find open, though Abrokomas might easily have
defended it, if he had chosen.[61] Four days’ march brought the army
to the Chalus (perhaps the river of Aleppo), full of fish held sacred
by the neighboring inhabitants; five more days, to the sources of the
river Daradax, with the palace and park of the Syrian satrap Belesys;
three days farther, to Thapsakus on the Euphrates. This was a great
and flourishing town, a centre of commerce enriched by the important
ford or transit of the river Euphrates close to it, in latitude
about 35° 40′ N.[62] The river, when the Cyreians arrived, was four
stadia, or somewhat less than half an English mile, in breadth.
[60] Diodor. xiv, 21.
[61] See the remarks of Mr. Ainsworth, Travels in the Track of
the Ten Thousand, p. 58-61; and other citations respecting the
difficult road through the pass of Beilan, in Mützel’s valuable
notes on Quintus Curtius, iii, 20, 13, p. 101.
[62] Neither the Chalus, nor the Daradax, nor indeed the
road followed by Cyrus in crossing Syria from the sea to the
Euphrates, can be satisfactorily made out (Koch, Zug der Zehn
Tausend, p. 36, 37).
Respecting the situation of Thapsakus,—placed erroneously by
Rennell lower down the river at Deir, where it stands marked even
in the map annexed to Col. Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, and
by Reichard higher up the river, near Bir—see Ritter, Erdkunde,
part x, B. iii; West Asien, p. 14-17, with the elaborate
discussion, p. 972-978, in the same volume; also the work of
Mr. Ainsworth above cited, p. 70. The situation of Thapsakus is
correctly placed in Colonel Chesney’s last work (Euphr. and Tigr.
p. 213), and in the excellent map accompanying that work; though
I dissent from his view of the march of Cyrus between the pass of
Beilan and Thapsakus.
Thapsakus appears to have been the most frequented and
best-known passage over the Euphrates, throughout the duration
of the Seleukid kings, down to 100 B.C. It was selected as a
noted point, to which observations and calculations might be
conveniently referred, by Eratosthenes and other geographers
(see Strabo, ii, p. 79-87). After the time when the Roman empire
became extended to the Euphrates, the new Zeugma, higher up the
river near Bir or Bihrejik (about the 37th parallel of latitude)
became more used and better known, at least to the Roman writers.
The passage at Thapsakus was in the line of road from Palmyra
to Karrhæ in Northern Mesopotamia; also from Seleukeia (on the
Tigris below Bagdad) to the other cities founded in Northern
Syria by Seleukus Nikator and his successors, Antioch on the
Orontes, Seleukeia in Pieria, Laodikeia, Antioch ad Taurum, etc.
The ford at Thapsakus (says Mr. Ainsworth, p. 69, 70) “is
celebrated to this day as the ford of the Anezeh or Beduins. On
the right bank of the Euphrates there are the remains of a paved
causeway leading to the very banks of the river, and continued on
the opposite side.”
Cyrus remained at Thapsakus five days. He was now compelled formally
to make known to his soldiers the real object of the march, hitherto,
in name at least, disguised. He accordingly sent for the Greek
generals, and desired them to communicate publicly the fact, that
he was on the advance to Babylon against his brother,—which to
themselves, probably, had been for some time well known. Among the
soldiers, however, the first announcement excited loud murmurs,
accompanied by accusation against the generals, of having betrayed
them, in privity with Cyrus. But this outburst was very different to
the strenuous repugnance which they had before manifested at Tarsus.
Evidently they suspected, and had almost made up their minds to, the
real truth; so that their complaint was soon converted into a demand
for a donation to each man, as soon as they should reach Babylon;
as much as that which Cyrus had given to his Grecian detachment on
going up thither before. Cyrus willingly promised them five minæ
per head (about £19 5_s._), equal to more than a year’s pay, at the
rate recently stipulated of a daric and a half per month. He engaged
to give them, besides, the full rate of pay until they should have
been sent back to the Ionian coast. Such ample offers satisfied the
Greeks, and served to counterbalance at least, if not to efface, the
terrors of that unknown region which they were about to tread.
But before the general body of Greek soldiers had pronounced their
formal acquiescence, Menon with his separate division was already
in the water, crossing. For Menon had instigated his men to decide
separately for themselves, and to execute their decision, before
the others had given any answer. “By acting thus (said he) you will
confer special obligation on Cyrus, and earn corresponding reward.
If the others follow you across, he will suppose that they do so
because you have set the example. If, on the contrary, the others
should refuse, we shall all be obliged to retreat: but he will
never forget that you, separately taken, have done all that you
could for him.” Such breach of communion, and avidity for separate
gain, at a time when it vitally concerned all the Greek soldiers to
act in harmony with each other, was a step suitable to the selfish
and treacherous character of Menon. He gained his point, however,
completely; for Cyrus, on learning that the Greek troops had actually
crossed, despatched Glus the interpreter to express to them his
warmest thanks, and to assure them that he would never forget the
obligation; while at the same time, he sent underhand large presents
to Menon separately.[63] He passed with his whole army immediately
afterwards; no man being wet above the breast.
[63] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 12-18.
What had become of Abrokomas and his army, and why did he not defend
this passage, where Cyrus might so easily have been arrested? We are
told that he had been there a little before, and that he had thought
it sufficient to burn all the vessels at Thapsakus, in the belief
that the invaders could not cross the river on foot. And Xenophon
informs us that the Thapsakenes affirmed the Euphrates to have been
never before fordable,—always passed by means of boats; insomuch
that they treated the actual low state of the water as a providential
interposition of the gods in favor of Cyrus; “the river made way
for him to come and take the sceptre.” When we find that Abrokomas
came too late afterwards for the battle of Kunaxa, we shall be led
to suspect that he too, like Syennesis in Kilikia, was playing a
double game between the two royal brothers, and that he was content
with destroying those vessels which formed the ordinary means of
communication between the banks, without taking any means to inquire
whether the passage was practicable without them. The assertion of
the Thapsakenes, in so far as it was not a mere piece of flattery to
Cyrus, could hardly have had any other foundation than the fact, that
they had never seen the river crossed on foot (whether practicable or
not), so long as there were regular ferry-boats.[64]
[64] Xen. Anab. i, 4, 18. Compare (Plutarch, Alexand. 17)
analogous expressions of flattery—from the historians of
Alexander, affirming that the sea near Pamphylia providentially
made way for him—from the inhabitants on the banks of the
Euphrates, when the river was passed by the Roman legions and
the Parthian prince Tiridates, in the reign of the Emperor
Tiberius (Tacitus, Annal. vi. 37); and by Lucullus still earlier
(Plutarch, Lucull. c. 24).
The time when Cyrus crossed the Euphrates, must probably have
been about the end of July or beginning of August. Now the period
of greatest height, in the waters of the Euphrates near this
part of its course, is from the 21st to the 28th of May; the
period when they are lowest, is about the middle of November
(see Colonel Chesney’s Report on the Euphrates, p. 5). Rennell
erroneously states that they are lowest in August and September
(Expedit, of Xenophon, p. 277). The waters would thus be at a
sort of mean height, when Cyrus passed.
Mr. Ainsworth states that there were only twenty inches of water
in the ford at Thapsakus, from October 1841 to February 1842; the
steamers Nimrod and Nitocris then struck upon it (p. 72), though
the steamers Euphrates and Tigris had passed over it without
difficulty in the month of May.
After crossing the Euphrates, Cyrus proceeded, for nine days’
march,[65] southward along its left bank, until he came to its
affluent, the river Araxes or Chaboras, which divided Syria from
Arabia. From the numerous and well-supplied villages there situated,
he supplied himself with a large stock of provisions, to confront
the desolate march through Arabia on which they were about to enter,
following the banks of the Euphrates still further southward. It was
now that he entered on what may be called the Desert,—an endless
breadth or succession of undulations, “like the sea,” without any
cultivation or even any tree; nothing but wormwood and various
aromatic shrubs.[66] Here too the astonished Greeks saw, for the
first time, wild asses, antelopes, ostriches, bustards, some of which
afforded sport, and occasionally food, to the horsemen who amused
themselves by chasing them; though the wild ass was swifter than
any horse, and the ostrich altogether unapproachable. Five days’
march brought them to Korsôtê, a town which had been abandoned by
its inhabitants,—probably, however, leaving the provision dealers
behind, as had before happened at Tarsus, in Kilikia;[67] since the
army here increased their supplies for the onward march. All that
they could obtain was required, and was indeed insufficient, for the
trying journey which awaited them. For thirteen successive days, and
ninety computed parasangs, did they march along the left bank of
the Euphrates, without provisions, and even without herbage except
in some few places. Their flour was exhausted, so that the soldiers
lived for some days altogether upon meat, while many baggage-animals
perished of hunger. Moreover the ground was often heavy and
difficult, full of hills and narrow valleys, requiring the personal
efforts of every man to push the cars and waggons at particular
junctures; efforts in which the Persian courtiers of Cyrus, under
his express orders, took zealous part, toiling in the dirt with
their ornamented attire.[68] After these thirteen days of hardship,
they reached Pylæ; near the entrance of the cultivated territory of
Babylonia, where they seem to have halted five or six days to rest
and refresh.[69] There was on the opposite side of the river, at or
near this point, a flourishing city named Charmandê; to which many of
the soldiers crossed over (by means of skins stuffed with hay), and
procured plentiful supplies, especially of date-wine and millet.[70]
[65] Xenophon gives these nine days of march as covering fifty
parasangs (Anab. i, 4, 19). But Koch remarks that the distance
is not half so great as that from the sea to Thapsakus; which
latter Xenophon gives at sixty-five parasangs. There is here some
confusion; together with the usual difficulty in assigning any
given distance as the equivalent of the parasang (Koch, Zug der
Zehn Tausend, p. 38).
[66] See the remarkable testimony of Mr. Ainsworth, from personal
observation, to the accuracy of Xenophon’s description of the
country, even at the present day.
[67] Xen. Anab. i, 2, 24.
[68] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 4-8.
[69] I infer that the army halted here five or six days, from
the story afterwards told respecting the Ambrakiot Silanus, the
prophet of the army; who, on sacrificing, had told Cyrus that his
brother would not fight for ten days (i, 7, 16). This sacrifice
must have been offered, I imagine, during the halt—not during
the distressing march which preceded. The ten days named by
Silanus, expired on the fourth day after they left Pylæ.
It is in reference to this portion of the course of the
Euphrates, from the Chaboras southward down by Anah and Hit (the
ancient Is, noticed by Herodotus, and still celebrated from
its unexhausted supply of bitumen), between latitude 35½° and
34°—that Colonel Chesney, in his Report on the Navigation of the
Euphrates (p. 2), has the following remarks:—
“The scenery above Hit, in itself very picturesque, is greatly
heightened, as one is carried along the current, by the frequent
recurrence, at very short intervals, of ancient irrigating
aqueducts; these beautiful specimens of art and durability are
attributed by the Arabs to the times of the ignorant, meaning (as
is expressly understood) the Persians, when fire-worshippers,
and in possession of the world. They literally cover both banks,
and prove that the borders of the Euphrates were once thickly
inhabited by a people far advanced indeed in the application
of hydraulics to domestic purposes, of the first and greatest
utility—the transport of water. The greater portion is now more
or less in ruins, but some have been repaired, and kept up for
use either to grind corn or to irrigate. The aqueducts are of
stone, firmly cemented, narrowing to about two feet or twenty
inches at top, placed at right angles to the current, and carried
various distances towards the interior, from two hundred to one
thousand two hundred yards.
“But what most concerns the subject of this memoir is, the
existence of a parapet wall or stone rampart in the river, just
above the several aqueducts. In general, there is one of the
former attached to each of the latter. And almost invariably,
between two mills on the opposite banks, one of them crosses the
stream from side to side, with the exception of a passage left
in the centre for boats to pass up and down. The object of these
subaqueous walls would appear to be exclusively, to raise the
water sufficiently at low seasons, to give it impetus, as well as
a more abundant supply to the wheels. And their effect at those
times is, to create a fall in every part of the width, save the
opening left for commerce, through which the water rushes with
a moderately irregular surface. These dams were probably from
four to eight feet high originally; but they are now frequently a
bank of stones disturbing the evenness of the current, but always
affording a sufficient passage for large boats at low seasons.”
The marks which Colonel Chesney points out, of previous
population and industry on the banks of the Euphrates at this
part of its course, are extremely interesting and curious, when
contrasted with the desolation depicted by Xenophon; who mentions
that there were no other inhabitants than some who lived by
cutting millstones from the stone quarries near, and sending
them to Babylon in exchange for grain. It is plain that the
population, of which Colonel Chesney saw the remaining tokens,
either had already long ceased, or did not begin to exist, or to
construct their dams and aqueducts, until a period later than
Xenophon. They probably began during the period of the Seleukid
kings, after the year 300 B.C. For this line of road along the
Euphrates began then to acquire great importance as the means
of communication between the great city of Seleukeia (on the
Tigris, below Bagdad) and the other cities founded by Seleukus
Nikator and his successors in the North of Syria and Asia
Minor—Seleukeia in Pieria, Antioch, Laodikeia, Apameia, etc.
This route coincides mainly with the present route from Bagdad
to Aleppo, crossing the Euphrates at Thapsakus. It can hardly be
doubted that the course of the Euphrates was better protected
during the two centuries of the Seleukid kings (B.C. 300-100,
speaking in round numbers), than it came to be afterwards, when
that river became the boundary line between the Romans and the
Parthians. Even at the time of the Emperor Julian’s invasion,
however, Ammianus Marcellinus describes the left bank of the
Euphrates, north of Babylonia, as being in several parts well
cultivated, and furnishing ample subsistence, (Ammian. Marc.
xxiv, 1). At the time of Xenophon’s Anabasis, there was nothing
to give much importance to the banks of the Euphrates north of
Babylonia.
Mr. Ainsworth describes the country on the left bank of the
Euphrates, before reaching Pylæ, as being now in the same
condition as it was when Xenophon and his comrades marched
through it,—“full of hills and narrow valleys, and presenting
many difficulties to the movement of an army. The illustrator
was, by a curious accident, left by the Euphrates steamer on
this very portion of the river, and on the same side as the
Perso-Greek army, and he had to walk a day and a night across
these inhospitable regions; so that he can speak feelingly of the
difficulties which the Greeks had to encounter.” (Travels in the
Track, etc. p. 81.)
[70] I incline to think that Charmandê must have been nearly
opposite Pylæ, lower down than Hit. But Major Rennell (p. 107)
and Mr. Ainsworth (p. 84) suppose Charmandê to be the same place
as the modern Hit (the Is of Herodotus). There is no other known
town with which we can identify it.
It was during this halt opposite Charmandê that a dispute occurred
among the Greeks themselves, menacing to the safety of all. I have
already mentioned that Klearchus, Menon, Proxenus, and each of the
Greek chiefs, enjoyed a separate command over his own division,
subject only to the superior control of Cyrus himself. Some of the
soldiers of Menon becoming involved in a quarrel with those of
Klearchus, the latter examined into the case, pronounced one of
Menon’s soldiers to have misbehaved, and caused him to be flogged.
The comrades of the man thus punished resented the proceeding to such
a degree, that as Klearchus was riding away from the banks of the
river to his own tent, attended by a few followers only through the
encampment of Menon,—one of the soldiers who happened to be cutting
wood, flung the hatchet at him, while others hooted and began to pelt
him with stones. Klearchus, after escaping unhurt from this danger to
his own division, immediately ordered his soldiers to take arms and
put themselves in battle order. He himself advanced at the head of
his Thracian peltasts, and his forty horsemen, in hostile attitude
against Menon’s division; who on their side ran to arms, with Menon
himself at their head, and placed themselves in order of defence. A
slight accident might have now brought on irreparable disorder and
bloodshed, had not Proxenus, coming up at the moment with a company
of his hoplites, planted himself in military array between the two
disputing parties, and entreated Klearchus to desist from farther
assault. The latter at first refused. Indignant that his recent
insult and narrow escape from death should be treated so lightly,
he desired Proxenus to retire. His wrath was not appeased, until
Cyrus himself, apprised of the gravity of the danger, came galloping
up with his personal attendants and his two javelins in hand.
“Klearchus, Proxenus, and all you Greeks (said he), you know not what
you are doing. Be assured that if you now come to blows, it will be
the hour of my destruction,—and of your own also, shortly after me.
For if _your_ force be ruined, all these natives whom you see around,
will become more hostile to us even than the men now serving with the
King.” On hearing this (says Xenophon) Klearchus came to his senses,
and the troops dispersed without any encounter.[71]
[71] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 11-17.
After passing Pylæ, the territory called Babylonia began. The hills
flanking the Euphrates, over which the army had hitherto been
passing, soon ceased, and low alluvial plains commenced.[72] Traces
were now discovered, the first throughout their long march, of a
hostile force moving in their front, ravaging the country and burning
the herbage. It was here that Cyrus detected the treason of a Persian
nobleman named Orontes, whom he examined in his tent, in the presence
of various Persians possessing his intimate confidence, as well as
of Klearchus with a guard of three thousand hoplites. Orontes was
examined, found guilty, and privately put to death.[73]
[72] The commentators agree in thinking that we are to understand
by Pylæ a sort of gate or pass, marking the spot where the desert
country north of Babylonia—with its undulations of land, and
its steep banks along the river—was exchanged for the flat and
fertile alluvium constituting Babylonia proper. Perhaps there was
a town near the pass, and named after it.
Now it appears from Col. Chesney’s survey that this alteration
in the nature of the country takes place a few miles below Hit.
He observes—(Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 54)—“Three miles
below Hit, the remains of aqueducts disappear, and the windings
become shorter and more frequent, as the river flows through
a tract of country almost level.” Thereabouts it is that I am
inclined to place Pylæ.
Colonel Chesney places it lower down, twenty-five miles from Hit.
Professor Koch (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 44), lower down still.
Mr. Ainsworth places it as much as seventy geographical miles
lower than Hit (Travels in the Track of the Ten Thousand, p. 81);
compare Ritter, Erdkunde, West Asien, x. p. 16; xi, pp. 755-763.
[73] The description given of this scene (known to the Greeks
through the communications of Klearchus) by Xenophon, is
extremely interesting (Anab. i, 6). I omit it from regard to
space.
After three days’ march, estimated by Xenophon at twelve parasangs,
Cyrus was induced by the evidences before him, or by the reports
of deserters, to believe that the opposing army was close at hand,
and that a battle was impending. Accordingly, in the middle of the
night, he mustered his whole army, Greeks as well as barbarians;
but the enemy did not appear as had been expected. His numbers
were counted at this spot, and it was found that there were, of
Greeks ten thousand four hundred hoplites, and two thousand five
hundred peltasts; of the barbarian or Asiatic force of Cyrus, one
hundred thousand men with twenty scythed chariots. The numbers of
the Greeks had been somewhat diminished during the march, from
sickness, desertion, or other causes. The reports of deserters
described the army of Artaxerxes at one million two hundred thousand
men, besides the six thousand horse-guards commanded by Artagerses,
and two hundred scythed chariots, under the command of Abrokomas,
Tissaphernes, and two others. It was ascertained afterwards, however,
that the force of Abrokomas had not yet joined, and later accounts
represented the numerical estimation as too great by one-fourth.
In expectation of an action, Cyrus here convened the generals as
well as the Lochages (or captains) of the Greeks; as well to consult
about suitable arrangements, as to stimulate their zeal in his cause.
Few points in this narrative are more striking than the language
addressed by the Persian prince to the Greeks, on this as well as on
other occasions.
“It is not from want of native forces, men of Hellas, that I have
brought you hither, but because I account you better and braver than
any number of natives. Prove yourselves now worthy of the freedom
which you enjoy; that freedom for which I envy you, and which I would
choose, be assured, in preference to all my possessions a thousand
times multiplied. Learn now from me, who know it well, all that you
will have to encounter,—vast numbers and plenty of noise; but if
you despise these, I am ashamed to tell you what worthless stuff
you will find in these native men. Behave well,—like brave men,
and trust me for sending you back in such condition as to make your
friends at home envy you; though I hope to prevail on many of you to
prefer my service to your own homes.”
“Some of us are remarking, Cyrus, (said a Samian exile named
Gaulitês), that you are full of promises at this hour of danger, but
will forget them, or perhaps will be unable to perform them, when
danger is over.... As to ability, (replied Cyrus), my father’s empire
reaches northward to the region of intolerable cold, southward to
that of intolerable heat. All in the middle is now apportioned in
satrapies among my brother’s friends; all, if we are victorious,
will come to be distributed among mine. I have no fear of not having
enough to give away, but rather of not having friends enough to
receive it from me. To each of you Greeks, moreover, I shall present
a wreath of gold.”
Declarations like these, repeated by Cyrus to many of the Greek
soldiers, and circulated among the remainder, filled all of them with
confidence and enthusiasm in his cause. Such was the sense of force
and superiority inspired, that Klearchus asked him,—“Do you really
think, Cyrus, that your brother will fight you?... Yes, by Zeus, (was
the reply); assuredly, if he be the son of Darius and Parysatis, and
my brother, I shall not win this prize without a battle.” All the
Greeks were earnest with him at the same time not to expose his own
person, but to take post in the rear of their body.[74] We shall see
presently how this advice was followed.
[74] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 2-9.
The declarations here reported, as well as the expressions employed
before during the dispute between Klearchus and the soldiers of
Menon near Charmandê—being, as they are, genuine and authentic, and
not dramatic composition such as those of Æschylus in the Persæ,
nor historic amplification like the speeches ascribed to Xerxes in
Herodotus,—are among the most valuable evidences respecting the
Hellenic character generally. It is not merely the superior courage
and military discipline of the Greeks which Cyrus attests, compared
with the cowardice of Asiatics,—but also their fidelity and sense
of obligation which he contrasts with the time-serving treachery
of the latter;[75] connecting these superior qualities with the
political freedom which they enjoy. To hear this young prince
expressing such strong admiration and envy for Grecian freedom, and
such ardent personal preference for it above all the splendor of his
own position,—was doubtless the most flattering of all compliments
which he could pay to the listening citizen-soldiers. That a young
Persian prince should be capable of conceiving such a sentiment, is
no slight proof of his mental elevation above the level both of his
family and of his nation. The natural Persian opinion is expressed
by the conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus[76] in Herodotus.
To Xerxes, the conception of free citizenship,—and of orderly,
self-sufficing courage planted by a public discipline, patriotic as
well as equalizing,—was not merely repugnant, but incomprehensible.
He understood only a master issuing orders to obedient subjects, and
stimulating soldiers to bravery by means of the whip. His descendant
Cyrus, on the contrary, had learnt by personal observation to
enter into the feeling of personal dignity prevalent in the Greeks
around him, based as it was on the conviction that they governed
themselves and that there was no man who had any rights of his
own over them,—that the law was their only master, and that in
rendering obedience to it they were working for no one else but for
themselves.[77] Cyrus knew where to touch the sentiment of Hellenic
honor, so fatally extinguished after the Greeks lost their political
freedom by the hands of the Macedonians, and exchanged for that
intellectual quickness, combined with moral degeneracy, which Cicero
and his contemporaries remark as the characteristic of these once
high-toned communities.
[75] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 16.
[76] See Herodot. vii, 102, 103, 209. Compare the observations of
the Persian Achæmenês, c. 236.
[77] Herod. vii, 104. Demaratus says to Xerxes, respecting the
Lacedæmonians—Ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες, οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι·
ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ
οἱ σοὶ σέ.
Again, the historian observes about the Athenians, and their
extraordinary increase of prowess after having shaken off the
despotism of Hippias (v. 78)—Δηλοῖ δ᾽ οὐ καθ᾽ ἓν μόνον ἀλλὰ
πανταχοῦ, ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὥς ἐστι χρῆμα σπουδαῖον· εἰ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι
τυραννευόμενοι μὲν, οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ
πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων, μακρῷ πρῶτοι
ἐγένοντο. Δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα, ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκακεέον, ὡς
δεσπότῃ ἐργαζόμενοι· ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωϋτῷ
προθυμέετο ἐργάζεσθαι.
Compare Menander, Fragm. Incert. CL. ap. Meineke, Fragm. Comm.
Græc. vol. iv. p. 268—
Ἐλεύθερος πᾶς ἑνὶ δεδούλωται, νόμῳ·
Δυσὶν δὲ δοῦλος, καὶ νόμῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ.
Having concerted the order of battle with the generals, Cyrus
marched forward in cautious array during the next day, anticipating
the appearance of the king’s forces. Nothing of the kind was seen,
however, though abundant marks of their retiring footsteps were
evident. The day’s march, (called three parasangs) having been
concluded without a battle, Cyrus called to him the Ambrakiotic
prophet Silanus, and presented him with three thousand darics or
ten Attic talents. Silanus had assured him, on the eleventh day
preceding, that there would be no action in ten days from that time;
upon which Cyrus had told him,—“If your prophecy comes true, I will
give you three thousand darics. My brother will not fight at all, if
he does not fight within ten days.”[78]
[78] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 14-17.
In spite of the strong opinion which he had expressed in reply to
Klearchus, Cyrus now really began to conceive that no battle would
be hazarded by his enemies; especially as in the course of this last
day’s march, he came to a broad and deep trench (thirty feet broad
and eighteen feet deep), approaching so near to the Euphrates as to
leave an interval of only twenty feet for passage. This trench had
been dug by order of Artaxerxes across the plain, for a length said
to be of twelve parasangs (about forty-two English miles, if the
parasang be reckoned at thirty stadia), so as to touch at its other
extremity what was called the walls of Media.[79] It had been dug
as a special measure of defence against the approaching invaders.
Yet we hear with surprise, and the invaders themselves found with
equal surprise, that not a man was on the spot to defend it; so
that the whole Cyreian army and baggage passed without resistance
through the narrow breadth of twenty feet. This is the first notice
of any defensive measures taken to repel the invasion,—except the
precaution of Abrokomas in burning the boats at Thapsakus. Cyrus
had been allowed to traverse all this immense space, and to pass
through so many defensible positions, without having yet struck a
blow. And now Artaxerxes, after having cut a prodigious extent of
trench at the cost of so much labor,—provided a valuable means of
resistance, especially against Grecian heavy-armed soldiers,—and
occupied it seemingly until the very last moment,—throws it up from
some unaccountable panic, and suffers a whole army to pass unopposed
through this very narrow gut. Having surmounted unexpectedly so
formidable an obstacle, Cyrus as well as the Greeks imagined that
Artaxerxes would never think of fighting in the open plain. All began
to relax in that careful array which had been observed since the
midnight review, insomuch that he himself proceeded in his chariot
instead of on horseback, while many of the Greek soldiers lodged
their arms on the waggons or beasts of burden.[80]
[79] From Pylæ to the undefended trench, there intervened three
entire days of march, and one part of a day; for it occurred in
the fourth day’s march.
Xenophon calls the three entire days, twelve parasangs in all.
This argues short marches, not full marches. And it does not
seem that the space of ground traversed during any one of them
can have been considerable. For they were all undertaken with
visible evidences of an enemy immediately in front of them; which
circumstance was the occasion of the treason of Orontes, who
asked Cyrus for a body of cavalry, under pretence of attacking
the light troops of the enemy in front, and then wrote a letter
to inform Artaxerxes that he was about to desert with his
division. The letter was delivered to Cyrus, who thus discovered
the treason.
Marching with a known enemy not far off in front, Cyrus must
have kept his army in something like battle order, and therefore
must have moved slowly. Moreover the discovery of the treason of
Orontes must itself have been an alarming fact, well calculated
to render both Cyrus and Klearchus doubly cautious for the time.
And the very trial of Orontes appears to have been conducted
under such solemnities as must have occasioned a halt of the army.
Taking these circumstances, we can hardly suppose the Greeks
to have got over so much as thirty English miles of ground in
the three entire days of march. The fourth day they must have
got over very little ground indeed; not merely because Cyrus
was in momentary expectation of the King’s main army, and of
a general battle (i, 7, 14), but because of the great delay
necessary for passing the trench. His whole army (more than one
hundred thousand men), with baggage, chariots, etc., had to pass
through the narrow gut of twenty feet wide between the trench
and the Euphrates. He can hardly have made more than five miles
in this whole day’s march, getting at night so far as to encamp
two or three miles beyond the trench. We may therefore reckon
the distance marched over between Pylæ and the trench as about
thirty-two miles in all; and two or three miles farther to the
encampment of the next night. Probably Cyrus would keep near the
river, yet not following its bends with absolute precision; so
that in estimating distance, we ought to take a mean between the
straight line and the full windings of the river.
I conceive the trench to have cut the Wall of Media at a much
wider angle than appears in Col. Chesney’s map; so that the
triangular space included between the trench, the Wall, and the
river, was much more extensive. The reason, we may presume,
why the trench was cut, was, to defend that portion of the
well-cultivated and watered country of Babylonia which lay
outside of the Wall of Media—which portion (as we shall see
hereafter in the marches of the Greeks after the battle) was very
considerable.
[80] Xen. Anab. i, 7, 20. The account given by Xenophon of this
long line of trench, first dug by order of Artaxerxes, and then
left useless and undefended, differs from the narrative of
Diodorus (xiv, 22), which seems to be borrowed from Ephorus.
Diodorus says that the king caused a long trench to be dug, and
lined with carriages and waggons as a defence for his baggage;
and that he afterwards marched forth from this entrenchment, with
his soldiers free and unincumbered, to give battle to Cyrus. This
is a statement more plausible than that of Xenophon, in this
point of view, that it makes out the king to have acted upon a
rational scheme; whereas in Xenophon he appears at first to have
adopted a plan of defence, and then to have renounced it, after
immense labor and cost, without any reason, so far as we can see.
Yet I have no doubt that the account of Xenophon is the true one.
The narrow passage, and the undefended trench, were both facts of
the most obvious and impressive character to an observing soldier.
On the next day but one after passing the undefended trench, they
were surprised, at a spot called Kunaxa,[81] just when they were
about to halt for the mid-day meal and repose, by the sudden
intimation that the king’s army was approaching in order of battle
on the open plain. Instantly Cyrus hastened to mount on horseback,
to arm himself, and to put his forces in order, while the Greeks on
their side halted and formed their line with all possible speed.[82]
They were on the right wing of the army, adjoining the river
Euphrates; Ariæus with the Asiatic forces being on the left, and
Cyrus himself, surrounded by a body-guard of six hundred well-armed
Persian horsemen, in the centre. Among the Greeks, Klearchus
commanded the right division of hoplites, with Paphlagonian horsemen
and the Grecian peltasts on the extreme right, close to the river;
Proxenus with his division stood next; Menon commanded on the left.
All the Persian horsemen around Cyrus had breastplates, helmets,
short Grecian swords, and two javelins in their right hands; the
horses also were defended by facings both over the breast and head.
Cyrus himself, armed generally like the rest, stood distinguished
by having an upright tiara instead of the helmet. Though the first
news had come upon them by surprise, the Cyreians had ample time
to put themselves in complete order; for the enemy did not appear
until the afternoon was advanced. First, was seen dust, like a white
cloud,—next, an undefined dark spot, gradually nearing, until the
armor began to shine, and the component divisions of troops, arranged
in dense masses, became discernible. Tissaphernes was on the left,
opposite to the Greeks, at the head of the Persian horsemen, with
white cuirasses; on his right, stood the Persian bowmen, with their
gerrha, or wicker shields, spiked so as to be fastened in the ground
while arrows were shot from behind them; next, the Egyptian infantry
with long wooden shields covering the whole body and legs. In front
of all was a row of chariots with scythes attached to the wheels,
destined to begin the charge against the Grecian phalanx.[83]
[81] Xenophon does not mention the name Kunaxa, which comes to
us from Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8), who states that it was five
hundred stadia (about fifty-eight miles) from Babylon; while
Xenophon was informed that the field of battle was distant from
Babylon only three hundred and sixty stadia. Now, according to
Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, vol. i, p. 57), Hillah
(Babylon) is distant ninety-one miles by the river, or sixty-one
and a half miles direct, from Felujah. Following therefore the
distance given by Plutarch (probably copied from Ktesias), we
should place Kunaxa a little lower down the river than Felujah.
This seems the most probable supposition.
Rennell and Mr. Baillie Fraser so place it (Mesopotamia and
Assyria, p. 186, Edin. 1842), I think rightly; moreover the
latter remarks, what most of the commentators overlook, that the
Greeks did not pass through the Wall of Media until long after
the battle. See a note a little below, near the beginning of my
next chapter, in reference to that Wall.
[82] The distance of the undefended trench from the battle-field
of Kunaxa would be about twenty-two miles. First, three miles
beyond the trench, to the first night-station; next, a full day’s
march, say twelve miles; thirdly, a half day’s march, to the time
of the mid-day halt, say seven miles.
The distance from Pylæ to the trench having before been stated at
thirty-two miles, the whole distance from Pylæ to Kunaxa will be
about fifty-four miles.
Now Colonel Chesney has stated the distance from Hit to Felujah
Castle (two known points) at forty-eight miles of straight line,
and seventy-seven miles, if following the line of the river.
Deduct four miles for the distance from Hit to Pylæ, and we shall
then have between Pylæ and Felujah, a rectilinear distance of
forty-four miles. The marching route of the Greeks (as explained
in the previous note, the Greeks following generally, but not
exactly, the windings of the river) will give fifty miles from
Pylæ to Felujah, and fifty-three or fifty-four from Pylæ to
Kunaxa.
[83] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 8-11.
As the Greeks were completing their array, Cyrus rode to the front,
and desired Klearchus to make his attack with the Greeks upon the
centre of the enemy; since it was there that the king in person would
be posted, and if that were once beaten, the victory was gained. But
such was the superiority of Artaxerxes in numbers, that his centre
extended beyond the left of Cyrus. Accordingly Klearchus, afraid of
withdrawing his right from the river, lest he should be taken both in
flank and rear, chose to keep his position on the right,—and merely
replied to Cyrus, that he would manage everything for the best. I
have before remarked[84] how often the fear of being attacked on the
unshielded side and on the rear, led the Greek soldier into movements
inconsistent with military expediency; and it will be seen presently
that Klearchus, blindly obeying this habitual rule of precaution,
was induced here to commit the capital mistake of keeping on the
right flank, contrary to the more judicious direction of Cyrus.[85]
The latter continued for a short time riding slowly in front of the
lines, looking alternately at the two armies, when Xenophon, one of
the small total of Grecian horsemen, and attached to the division of
Proxenus, rode forth from the line to accost him, asking if he had
any orders to give. Cyrus desired him to proclaim to every one that
the sacrifices were favorable. Hearing a murmur going through the
Grecian ranks, he inquired from Xenophon what it was; and received
for answer, that the watchword was now being passed along for the
second time. He asked, with some surprise, who gave the watchword?
and what it was? Xenophon replied that it was “Zeus the Preserver,
and Victory.”—“I accept it,” replied Cyrus; “let that be the word;”
and immediately rode away to his own post in the centre, among the
Asiatics.
[84] Thucyd. v. 70. See Vol. VII, ch. lvi, p. 84 of this History.
[85] Plutarch (Artaxerx. c. 8) makes this criticism upon
Klearchus; and it seems quite just.
The vast host of Artaxerxes, advancing steadily and without noise,
were now within less than half a mile of the Cyreians, when the
Greek troops raised the pæan or usual war-cry, and began to move
forward. As they advanced, the shout became more vehement, the pace
accelerated, and at last the whole body got into a run.[86] This
might have proved unfortunate, had their opponents been other than
Grecian hoplites; but the Persians did not stand to await the charge.
They turned and fled, when the assailants were yet hardly within
bow-shot. Such was their panic, that even the drivers of the scythed
chariots in front, deserting their teams, ran away along with the
rest; while the horses, left to themselves, rushed apart in all
directions, some turning round to follow the fugitives, others coming
against the advancing Greeks, who made open order to let them pass.
The left division of the king’s army was thus routed without a blow,
and seemingly without a man killed on either side; one Greek only
being wounded by an arrow, and another by not getting out of the way
of one of the chariots.[87] Tissaphernes alone,—who, with the body
of horse immediately around him, was at the extreme Persian left,
close to the river,—formed an exception to this universal flight.
He charged and penetrated through the Grecian peltasts, who stood
opposite to him between the hoplites and the river. These peltasts,
commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, opened their ranks to let him
pass, darting at the men as they rode by, yet without losing any
one themselves. Tissaphernes thus got into the rear of the Greeks,
who continued, on their side, to pursue the flying Persians before
them.[88]
[86] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17; Diodor. xiv, 23.
[87] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 17-20.
[88] Xen. Anab i, 10, 4-8.
Matters proceeded differently in the other parts of the field.
Artaxerxes, though in the centre of his own army, yet from his
superior numbers outflanked Ariæus, who commanded the extreme left of
the Cyreians.[89] Finding no one directly opposed to him, he began to
wheel round his right wing, to encompass his enemies; not noticing
the flight of his left division. Cyrus, on the other hand, when he
saw the easy victory of the Greeks on their side, was overjoyed;
and received from every one around him salutations, as if he were
already king. Nevertheless, he had self-command enough not yet to
rush forward as if the victory was already gained,[90] but remained
unmoved, with his regiment of six hundred horse around him, watching
the movements of Artaxerxes. As soon as he saw the latter wheeling
round his right division to get upon the rear of the Cyreians, he
hastened to check this movement by an impetuous charge upon the
centre, where Artaxerxes was in person, surrounded by the body-guard
of six thousand horse, under Artagerses. So vigorous was the attack
of Cyrus, that with his six hundred horse, he broke and dispersed
this body-guard, killing Artagerses with his own hand. His own six
hundred horse rushed forward in pursuit of the fugitives, leaving
Cyrus himself nearly alone, with only the select few, called his
“Table-Companions,” around him. It was under these circumstances
that he first saw his brother Artaxerxes, whose person had been
exposed to view by the flight of the body-guards. The sight filled
him with such a paroxysm of rage and jealous ambition,[91] that
he lost all thought of safety or prudence,—cried out, “I see the
man,”—and rushed forward with his mere handful of companions to
attack Artaxerxes, in spite of the numerous host behind him. Cyrus
made directly at his brother, darting his javelin with so true an aim
as to strike him in the breast, and wound him through the cuirass;
though the wound (afterwards cured by the Greek surgeon Ktesias)
could not have been very severe, since Artaxerxes did not quit the
field, but, on the contrary, engaged in personal combat, he and those
around him, against this handful of assailants. So unequal a combat
did not last long. Cyrus, being severely wounded under the eye by the
javelin of a Karian soldier, was cast from his horse and slain. The
small number of faithful companions around him all perished in his
defence. Artasyras, who stood first among them in his confidence and
attachment, seeing him mortally wounded and fallen, cast himself down
upon him, clasped him in his arms, and in this position either slew
himself, or was slain by order of the king.[92]
[89] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 23; i, 9, 31.
[90] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 21.
Κῦρος δὲ, ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἕλληνας νικῶντας τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτοὺς καὶ
διώκοντας, ἡδόμενος καὶ προσκυνούμενος ἤδη ὡς βασιλεὺς ὑπὸ τῶν
ἀμφ᾽ αὐτὸν, ~οὐδ᾽ ὣς ἐξήχθη διώκειν~, etc.
The last words are remarkable, as indicating that no other
stimulus except that of ambitious rivalry and fraternal
antipathy, had force enough to overthrow the self-command of
Cyrus.
[91] Compare the account of the transport of rage which seized
the Theban Pelopidas, when he saw Alexander the despot of Pheræ
in the opposite army; which led to the same fatal consequences
(Plutarch, Pelopidas, c. 32; Cornel. Nepos, Pelop. c. 5). See
also the reflections of Xenophon on the conduct of Teleutas
before Olynthus.—Hellenic. v. 3, 7.
[92] Xen. Anab. i, 8, 22-29. The account of this battle and of
the death of Cyrus by Ktesias (as far as we can make it out from
the brief abstract in Photius—Ktesias, Fragm. c. 58, 59, ed.
Bähr) does not differ materially from Xenophon. Ktesias mentions
the Karian soldier (not noticed by Xenophon) who hurled the
javelin; and adds that this soldier was afterwards tortured and
put to death by Queen Parysatis, in savage revenge for the death
of Cyrus. He also informs us that Bagapatês, the person who by
order of Artaxerxes cut off the head and hand of Cyrus, was
destroyed by her in the same way.
Diodorus (xiv, 23) dresses up a much fuller picture of the
conflict between Cyrus and his brother, which differs on many
points, partly direct and partly implied, from Xenophon.
Plutarch (Artaxerxes, c. 11, 12, 13) gives an account of the
battle, and of the death of Cyrus, which he professes to have
derived from Ktesias, but which differs still more materially
from the narrative in Xenophon. Compare also the few words of
Justin, v, 11.
Diodorus (xiv, 24) says that twelve thousand men were slain of
the king’s army at Kunaxa; the greater part of them by the Greeks
under Klearchus, who did not lose a single man. He estimates the
loss of Cyrus’s Asiatic army at three thousand men. But as the
Greeks did not lose a man, so they can hardly have killed many
in the pursuit; for they had scarcely any cavalry, and no great
number of peltasts,—while hoplites could not have overtaken the
flying Persians.
The head and the right hand of the deceased prince were immediately
cut off by order of Artaxerxes, and doubtless exhibited conspicuously
to view. This was a proclamation to every one that the entire contest
was at an end; and so it was understood by Ariæus, who, together
with all the Asiatic troops of Cyrus, deserted the field and fled
back to the camp. Not even there did they defend themselves, when
the king and his forces pursued them; but fled yet farther back to
the resting-place of the previous night. The troops of Artaxerxes
got into the camp and began to plunder it without resistance. Even
the harem of Cyrus fell into their power. It included two Grecian
women,—of free condition, good family, and education,—one from
Phokæa, the other from Miletus, brought to him, by force, from their
parents to Sardis. The elder of these two, the Phokæan, named Milto,
distinguished alike for beauty and accomplished intelligence,
was made prisoner and transferred to the harem of Artaxerxes;
the other, a younger person, found means to save herself, though
without her upper garments,[93] and sought shelter among some
Greeks who were left in the camp on guard of the Grecian baggage.
These Greeks repelled the Persian assailants with considerable
slaughter; preserving their own baggage, as well as the persons
of all who fled to them for shelter. But the Asiatic camp of the
Cyreians was completely pillaged, not excepting those reserved
waggons of provisions which Cyrus had provided in order that his
Grecian auxiliaries might be certain, under all circumstances, of a
supply.[94]
[93] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 3. The accomplishments and fascinations
of this Phokæan lady, and the great esteem in which she was
held first by Cyrus and afterwards by Artaxerxes, have been
exaggerated into a romantic story, in which we cannot tell
what may be the proportion of truth (see Ælian, V. H. xii, 1;
Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 26, 27; Justin, x, 2). Both Plutarch
and Justin state that the subsequent enmity between Artaxerxes
and his son Darius, which led to the conspiracy of the latter
against his father, and to his destruction when the conspiracy
was discovered, arose out of the passion of Darius for her. But
as that transaction certainly happened at the close of the long
life and reign of Artaxerxes, who reigned forty-six years—and
as she must have been then sixty years old, if not more—we may
fairly presume that the cause of the family tragedy must have
been something different.
Compare the description of the fate of Berenikê of Chios, and
Monimê of Miletus, wives of Mithridates king of Pontus, during
the last misfortunes of that prince (Plutarch, Lucullus, c. 18).
[94] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 17. This provision must probably have been
made during the recent halt at Pylæ.
While Artaxerxes was thus stripping the Cyreian camp, he was
joined by Tissaphernes and his division of horse, who had charged
through between the Grecian division and the river. At this time,
there was a distance of no less than thirty stadia or three and a
half miles between him and Klearchus with the Grecian division;
so far had the latter advanced forward in pursuit of the Persian
fugitives. Apprised, after some time, that the king’s troops had
been victorious on the left and centre, and were masters of the
camp,—but not yet knowing of the death of Cyrus,—Klearchus
marched back his troops, and met the enemy’s forces also returning.
He was apprehensive of being surrounded by superior numbers, and
therefore took post with his rear upon the river. In this position,
Artaxerxes again marshalled his troops in front, as if to attack
him, but the Greeks, anticipating his movement, were first in making
the attack themselves, and forced the Persians to take flight even
more terror-stricken than before. Klearchus, thus relieved from all
enemies, waited awhile in hopes of hearing news of Cyrus. He then
returned to the camp, which was found stripped of all its stores;
so that the Greeks were compelled to pass the night without supper,
while most of them also had had no dinner, from the early hour at
which the battle had commenced.[95] It was only on the next morning
that they learnt, through Proklês (descendant of the Spartan king
Demaratus, formerly companion of Xerxes in the invasion of Greece),
that Cyrus had been slain; news which converted their satisfaction at
their own triumph into sorrow and dismay.[96]
[95] Xen. Anab. i, 10, 18, 19.
[96] Xen. Anab. ii. 1, 3, 4.
Thus terminated the battle of Kunaxa, and along with it the ambitious
hopes as well as the life of this young prince. His character and
proceedings suggest instructive remarks. Both in the conduct of
this expedition, and in the two or three years of administration
in Asia Minor which preceded it, he displayed qualities such as
are not seen in Cyrus called the Great, nor in any other member of
the Persian regal family, nor indeed in any other Persian general
throughout the history of the monarchy. We observe a large and
long-sighted combination,—a power of foreseeing difficulties, and
providing means beforehand for overcoming them,—a dexterity in
meeting variable exigencies, and dealing with different parties,
Greeks or Asiatics, officers or soldiers,—a conviction of the
necessity, not merely of purchasing men’s service by lavish presents,
but of acquiring their confidence by straightforward dealing and
systematic good faith,—a power of repressing displeasure when policy
commanded, as at the desertion of Xenias and Pasion, and the first
conspiracies of Orontes; although usually the punishments which he
inflicted were full of Oriental barbarity. How rare were the merits
and accomplishments of Cyrus, as a Persian, will be best felt when
we contrast this portrait, by Xenophon, with the description of
the Persian satraps by Isokrates.[97] That many persons deserted
from Artaxerxes to Cyrus,—none, except Orontes, from Cyrus to
Artaxerxes,—has been remarked by Xenophon. Not merely throughout
the march, but even as to the manner of fighting at Kunaxa, the
judgment of Cyrus was sounder than that of Klearchus. The two matters
of supreme importance to the Greeks, were, to take care of the
person of Cyrus, and to strike straight at that of Artaxerxes with
the central division around him. Now it was the fault of Klearchus,
and not of Cyrus, that both these matters were omitted; and that
the Greeks gained only a victory comparatively insignificant on
the right. Yet in spite of such mistake, not his own, it appears
that Cyrus would have been victorious, had he been able to repress
that passionate burst of antipathy which drove him, like a madman,
against his brother. The same insatiable ambition, and jealous
fierceness when power was concerned, which had before led him to put
to death two first cousins, because they omitted, in his presence,
an act of deference never paid except to the king in person,—this
same impulse, exasperated by the actual sight of his rival brother,
and by that standing force of fraternal antipathy so frequent in
regal families,[98] blinded him, for the moment, to all rational
calculation.
[97] Isokrates, Orat. iv, (Panegyric.) s. 175-182; a striking
passage, as describing the way in which political institutions
work themselves into the individual character and habits.
[98] Diodorus (xiv, 23) notices the legendary pair of hostile
brothers, Eteokles and Polyneikes, as a parallel. Compare
Tacitus, Annal. iv, 60. “Atrox Drusi ingenium, super cupidinem
potentiæ, et _solita fratribus odia_, accendebatur invidia, quod
mater Agrippina promptior Neroni erat,” etc.; and Justin, xlii, 4.
Compare also the interesting narrative of M. Prosper Mérimée, in
his life of Don Pedro of Castile; a prince commonly known by the
name of Peter the Cruel. Don Pedro was dethroned, and slain in
personal conflict, by the hand of his bastard brother, Henri of
Transtamare.
At the battle of Navarrete, in 1367, says M. Mérimée, “Don Pèdre,
qui, pendant le combat, s’était jété au plus fort de la mêlée,
s’acharna long temps à la poursuite des fuyards. On le voyait
galoper dans la plaine, monté sur un cheval noir, sa bannière
armoriée de Castille devant lui, cherchant son frère partout où
l’on combattait encore, et criant, échauffé par le carnage—‘Où
est ce bâtard, qui se nomme roi de Castille?’” (Histoire de Don
Pèdre, p. 504.)
Ultimately Don Pedro, blocked up and almost starved out in the
castle of Montiel, was entrapped by simulated negotiations into
the power of his enemies. He was slain in personal conflict by
the dagger of his brother Henri, after a desperate struggle,
in which he seemed likely to prevail, if Henri had not been
partially aided by a bystander.
This tragical scene (on the night of the 23d of March, 1369) is
graphically described by M. Mérimée (p. 564-566).
We may however remark that Hellas, as a whole, had no cause to regret
the fall of Cyrus at Kunaxa. Had he dethroned his brother and become
king, the Persian empire would have acquired under his hand such a
degree of strength as might probably have enabled him to forestall
the work afterwards performed by the Macedonian kings, and to make
the Greeks in Europe as well as those in Asia his dependents. He
would have employed Grecian military organization against Grecian
independence, as Philip and Alexander did after him. His money
would have enabled him to hire an overwhelming force of Grecian
officers and soldiers, who would (to use the expression of Proxenus
as recorded by Xenophon[99]) have thought him a better friend to
them than their own country. It would have enabled him also to take
advantage of dissension and venality in the interior of each Grecian
city, and thus to weaken their means of defence while he strengthened
his own means of attack. This was a policy which none of the Persian
kings, from Darius son of Hystaspes down to Darius Codomanus, had
ability or perseverance enough to follow out; none of them knew
either the true value of Grecian instruments, or how to employ
them with effect. The whole conduct of Cyrus, in reference to this
memorable expedition, manifests a superior intelligence, competent
to use the resources which victory would have put in his hands,—and
an ambition likely to use them against the Greeks, in avenging the
humiliations of Marathon, Salamis, and the peace of Kallias.
[99] Xen. Anab. iii, 1, 4. Ὑπισχνεῖτο δὲ αὐτῷ (Ξενοφῶντα
Πρόξενος) εἰ ἔλθοι, φίλον Κύρῳ ποιήσειν· ~ὃν αὐτός ἔφη κρείττω
ἑαυτῷ νομίζειν τῆς πατρίδος~.
CHAPTER LXX.
RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS.
The first triumphant feeling of the Greek troops at Kunaxa was
exchanged, as soon as they learnt the death of Cyrus, for dismay
and sorrow; accompanied by unavailing repentance for the venture
into which he and Klearchus had seduced them. Probably Klearchus
himself too repented, and with good reason, of having displayed,
in his manner of fighting the battle, so little foresight, and so
little regard either to the injunctions or to the safety of Cyrus.
Nevertheless he still maintained the tone of a victor in the field,
and after expressions of grief for the fate of the young prince,
desired Proklês and Glus to return to Ariæus, with the reply, that
the Greeks on their side were conquerors without any enemy remaining;
that they were about to march onward against Artaxerxes; and that if
Ariæus would join them, they would place him on the throne which had
been intended for Cyrus. While this reply was conveyed to Ariæus by
his particular friend Menon along with the messengers, the Greeks
procured a meal as well as they could, having no bread, by killing
some of the baggage animals; and by kindling fire, to cook their
meat, from the arrows, the wooden Egyptian shields which had been
thrown away on the field, and the baggage carts.[100]
[100] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 5-7.
Before any answer could be received from Ariæus, heralds appeared
coming from Artaxerxes; among them being Phalinus, a Greek from
Zakynthus, and the Greek surgeon Ktesias of Knidus, who was in the
service of the Persian king.[101] Phalinus, an officer of some
military experience and in the confidence of Tissaphernes, addressed
himself to the Greek commanders; requiring them on the part of the
king, since he was now victor and had slain Cyrus, to surrender their
arms and appeal to his mercy. To this summons, painful in the extreme
to a Grecian ear, Klearchus replied that it was not the practice for
victorious men to lay down their arms. Being then called away to
examine the sacrifice which was going on, he left the interview to
the other officers, who met the summons of Phalinus by an emphatic
negative. “If the king thinks himself strong enough to ask for our
arms unconditionally, let him come and try to seize them.” “The
king (rejoined Phalinus) thinks that you are in his power, being
in the midst of his territory, hemmed in by impassable rivers, and
encompassed by his innumerable subjects.”—“Our arms and our valor
are all that remain to us (replied a young Athenian); we shall not
be fools enough to hand over to you our only remaining treasure, but
shall employ them still to have a fight for your treasure.”[102] But
though several spoke in this resolute tone, there were not wanting
others disposed to encourage a negotiation; saying that they had been
faithful to Cyrus as long as he lived, and would now be faithful to
Artaxerxes, if he wanted their services in Egypt or anywhere else.
In the midst of this parley Klearchus returned, and was requested
by Phalinus to return a final answer on behalf of all. He at first
asked the advice of Phalinus himself; appealing to the common
feeling of Hellenic patriotism, and anticipating, with very little
judgment, that the latter would encourage the Greeks in holding out.
“If (replied Phalinus) I saw one chance out of ten thousand in your
favor, in the event of a contest with the king, I should advise you
to refuse the surrender of your arms. But as there is no chance
of safety for you against the king’s consent, I recommend you to
look out for safety in the only quarter where it presents itself.”
Sensible of the mistake which he had made in asking the question,
Klearchus rejoined,—“That is _your_ opinion; now report our
answer: We think we shall be better friends to the king, if we are
to be his friends,—or more effective enemies, if we are to be his
enemies,—with our arms, than without them.” Phalinus, in retiring,
said that the king proclaimed a truce so long as they remained in
their present position,—but war, if they moved, either onward or
backward. And to this Klearchus acceded, without declaring which he
intended to do.[103]
[101] We know from Plutarch (Artaxer. c. 13) that Ktesias
distinctly asserted himself to have been present at this
interview, and I see no reason why we should not believe him.
Plutarch indeed rejects his testimony as false, affirming that
Xenophon would certainly have mentioned him, had he been there;
but such an objection seems to me insufficient. Nor is it
necessary to construe the words of Xenophon, ἦν δ᾽ αὐτῶν Φαλῖνος
~εἶς Ἕλλην~, (ii, 1, 7) so strictly as to negative the presence
of one or two other Greeks. Phalinus is thus specified because he
was the spokesman of the party—a military man.
[102] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 12 μὴ οὖν οἴου τὰ μόνα ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα
ὑμῖν παραδώσειν· ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτοις καὶ περὶ τῶν ὑμετέρων ἀγαθῶν
μαχούμεθα.
[103] Xen. Anab. ii, 1, 14-22. Diodorus (xiv, 25) is somewhat
copious in his account of the interview with Phalinus. But he
certainly followed other authorities besides Xenophon, if even it
be true that he had Xenophon before him. The allusion to the past
heroism of Leonidas seems rather in the style of Ephorus.
Shortly after the departure of Phalinus, the envoys despatched to
Ariæus returned; communicating his reply, that the Persian grandees
would never tolerate any pretensions on his part to the crown, and
that he intended to depart early the next morning on his return; if
the Greeks wished to accompany him, they must join him during the
night. In the evening, Klearchus, convening the generals and the
lochages (or captains of lochi), acquainted them that the morning
sacrifice had been of a nature to forbid their marching against
the king,—a prohibition of which he now understood the reason,
from having since learnt that the king was on the other side of
the Tigris, and therefore out of their reach,—but that it was
favorable for rejoining Ariæus. He gave directions accordingly for a
night-march back along the Euphrates, to the station where they had
passed the last night but one prior to the battle. The other Grecian
generals, without any formal choice of Klearchus as chief, tacitly
acquiesced in his orders, from a sense of his superior decision and
experience, in an emergency when no one knew what to propose. The
night-march was successfully accomplished, so that they joined Ariæus
at the preceding station about midnight; not without the alarming
symptom, however, that Miltokythês the Thracian deserted to the king,
at the head of three hundred and forty of his countrymen, partly
horse, partly foot.
The first proceeding of the Grecian generals was to exchange solemn
oaths of reciprocal fidelity and fraternity with Ariæus. According
to an ancient and impressive practice, a bull, a wolf, a boar, and a
ram, were all slain, and their blood allowed to run into the hollow
of a shield; in which the Greek generals dipped a sword, and Ariæus,
with his chief companions, a spear.[104] The latter, besides the
promise of alliance, engaged also to guide the Greeks, in good faith,
down to the Asiatic coast. Klearchus immediately began to ask what
route he proposed to take; whether to return by that along which they
had come up, or by any other. To this Ariæus replied, that the road
along which they had marched was impracticable for retreat, from the
utter want of provisions through seventeen days of desert; but that
he intended to choose another road, which, though longer, would be
sufficiently productive to furnish them with provisions. There was,
however, a necessity (he added), that the first two or three days’
marches should be of extreme length, in order that they might get
out of the reach of the king’s forces, who would hardly be able to
overtake them afterwards with any considerable numbers.
[104] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 7-9. Koch remarks, however, with good
reason, that it is difficult to see how they could get a wolf in
Babylonia, for the sacrifice (Zug der Zehn Tausend, p. 51).
They had now come ninety-three days’ march[105] from Ephesus, or
ninety from Sardis.[106] The distance from Sardis to Kunaxa is,
according to Colonel Chesney, about twelve hundred and sixty-five
geographical miles, or fourteen hundred and sixty-four English miles.
There had been at least ninety-six days of rest, enjoyed at various
places, so that the total of time elapsed must have at least been one
hundred and eighty-nine days, or a little more than half a year;[107]
but it was probably greater, since some intervals of rest are not
specified in number of days.
[105] Such is the sum total stated by Xenophon himself (Anab.
ii, 1, 6). It is greater, by nine days, than the sum total which
we should obtain by adding together the separate days’ march
specified by Xenophon from Sardis. But the distance from Sardis
to Ephesus, as we know from Herodotus, was three days’ journey
(Herod. v, 55); and therefore the discrepancy is really only to
the amount of six, not of nine. See Krüger ad Anabas. p. 556;
Koch, Zug der Z. p. 141.
[106] Colonel Chesney (Euphrates and Tigris, c. ii, p. 208)
calculates twelve hundred and sixty-five geographical miles from
Sardis to Kunaxa or the Mounds of Mohammed.
[107] For example, we are not told how long they rested at Pylæ,
or opposite to Charmandê. I have given some grounds (in the
preceding chapter) for believing that it cannot have been less
than five days. The army must have been in the utmost need of
repose, as well as of provisions.
How to retrace their steps, was now the problem, apparently
insoluble. As to the military force of Persia in the field,
indeed, not merely the easy victory at Kunaxa, but still more the
undisputed march throughout so long a space, left them no serious
apprehensions.[108] In spite of this great extent, population, and
riches, they had been allowed to pass through the most difficult
and defensible country, and to ford the broad Euphrates, without a
blow; nay, the king had shrunk from defending the long trench which
he had specially caused to be dug for the protection of Babylonia.
But the difficulties which stood between them and their homes were
of a very different character. How were they to find their way back,
or obtain provisions, in defiance of a numerous hostile cavalry,
which, not without efficiency even in a pitched battle would be most
formidable in opposing their retreat? The line of their upward march
had all been planned, with supplies furnished, by Cyrus;—yet even
under such advantages, supplies had been on the point of failing,
in one part of the march. They were now, for the first time, called
upon to think and provide for themselves; without knowledge of either
roads or distances,—without trustworthy guides,—without any one
to furnish or even to indicate supplies,—and with a territory all
hostile, traversed by rivers which they had no means of crossing.
Klearchus himself knew nothing of the country, nor of any other
river except the Euphrates; nor does he indeed, in his heart, seem
to have conceived retreat as practicable without the consent of
the king.[109] The reader who casts his eye on a map of Asia, and
imagines the situation of this Greek division on the left bank of
the Euphrates, near the parallel of latitude 33° 30′—will hardly be
surprised at any measure of despair, on the part either of general or
soldiers. And we may add that Klearchus had not even the advantage of
such a map, or probably of any map at all, to enable him to shape his
course.
[108] Xen. Anab. i, 5, 9.
[109] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 6, 7.
In this dilemma, the first and most natural impulse was to consult
Ariæus who (as has been already stated) pronounced, with good
reason, that return by the same road was impracticable; and promised
to conduct them home by another road,—longer indeed, yet better
supplied. At daybreak on the ensuing morning, they began their march
in an easterly direction, anticipating that before night they should
reach some villages of the Babylonian territory, as in fact they
did;[110] yet not before they had been alarmed in the afternoon by
the supposed approach of some of the enemy’s horse, and by evidences
that the enemy were not far off, which induced them to slacken
their march for the purpose of more cautious array. Hence they did
not reach the first villages before dark; and these too had been
pillaged by the enemy while retreating before them, so that only
the first-comers under Klearchus could obtain accommodation, while
the succeeding troops, coming up in the dark, pitched as they could
without any order. The whole camp was a scene of clamor, dispute, and
even alarm, throughout the night. No provisions could be obtained.
Early the next morning Klearchus ordered them under arms; and
desiring to expose the groundless nature of the alarm, caused the
herald to proclaim, that whoever would denounce the person who had
let the ass into the camp on the preceding night, should be rewarded
with a talent of silver.[111]
[110] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 13. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡμέρα ἐγένετο, ~ἐπορεύοντο
ἐν δεξιᾷ ἔχοντες τὸν ἥλιον~, λογιζόμενοι ἥξειν ἅμα ἡλίῳ δύνοντι
εἰς κώμας τῆς Βαβυλωνίας χώρας· καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθησαν.
Schneider, in his note on this passage, as well as Ritter,
(Erdkunde, part. x, 3, p. 17), Mr. Ainsworth (Travels in the
Track, p. 103) and Colonel Chesney (Euph. and Tigr. p. 219),
understand the words here used by Xenophon in a sense from
which I dissent. “When it was day, the army proceeded onward on
their march, having the sun on their right hand,”—these words
they understand as meaning that the army marched _northward_;
whereas, in my judgment, the words intimate that the army marched
_eastward_. _To have the sun on the right hand_, does not so
much refer either to the precise point where, or to the precise
instant when, the sun rises,—but to his diurnal path through the
heavens, and to the general direction of the day’s march. This
may be seen by comparing the remarkable passage in Herodotus,
iv, 42, in reference to the alleged circumnavigation of Africa,
from the Red Sea round the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of
Gibraltar, by the Phœnicians under the order of Nekos. These
Phœnicians said, “that in sailing round Africa (from the Red Sea)
they had the sun on their right hand”—ὡς τὴν Λιβύην περιπλώοντες
~τὸν ἠέλιον ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ~. Herodotus rejects this statement as
incredible. Not knowing the phenomena of a southern latitude
beyond the tropic of Capricorn, he could not imagine that men in
sailing from East to West could possibly have the sun on their
right hand; any man journeying from the Red Sea to the Straits
of Gibraltar must, in his judgment, have the sun on the _left_
hand, as he himself had always experienced in the north latitude
of the Mediterranean or the African coast. See Vol. III. of this
History, ch. xviii, p. 282.
In addition to this reason, we may remark, that Ariæus and the
Greeks, starting from their camp on the banks of the Euphrates
(the place where they had passed the last night but one before
the battle of Kunaxa) and marching _northward_, could not expect
to arrive, and could not really arrive, at villages of the
Babylonian territory. But they might naturally expect to do so,
if they marched _eastward_, towards the Tigris. Nor would they
have hit upon the enemy in a northerly march, which would in fact
have been something near to a return upon their own previous
steps. They would moreover have been stopped by the undefended
Trench, which could only be passed at the narrow opening close to
the Euphrates.
[111] Xen. Anab. ii, 2, 20. This seems to have been a standing
military jest, to make the soldiers laugh at their past panic.
See the references in Krüger and Schneider’s notes.
What was the project of route entertained by Ariæus, we cannot
ascertain;[112] since it was not farther pursued. For the effect of
the unexpected arrival of the Greeks as if to attack the enemy,—and
even the clamor and shouting of the camp during the night—so
intimidated the Persian commanders, that they sent heralds the next
morning to treat about a truce. The contrast between this message,
and the haughty summons of the preceding day to lay down their arms,
was sensibly felt by the Grecian officers, and taught them that the
proper way of dealing with the Persians was by a bold and aggressive
demeanor. When Klearchus was apprised of the arrival of the heralds,
he desired them at first to wait at the outposts until he was at
leisure; then, having put his troops into the best possible order,
with a phalanx compact on every side to the eye, and the unarmed
persons out of sight, he desired the heralds to be admitted. He
marched out to meet them with the most showy and best-armed soldiers
immediately around him, and when they informed him that they had
come from the king with instructions to propose a truce, and to
report on what conditions the Greeks would agree to it, Klearchus
replied abruptly,—“Well then,—go and tell the king, that our first
business must be to fight; for we have nothing to eat, nor will any
man presume to talk to Greeks about a truce, without first providing
dinner for them.” With this reply the heralds rode off, but returned
very speedily; thus making it plain that the king, or the commanding
officer, was near at hand. They brought word that the king thought
their answer reasonable, and had sent guides to conduct them to a
place where they would obtain provisions, if the truce should be
concluded.
[112] Diodorus (xvi, 24) tells us that Ariæus intended to guide
them towards Paphlagonia; a very loose indication.
After an affected delay and hesitation, in order to impose upon the
Persians, Klearchus concluded the truce, and desired that the guides
would conduct the army to those quarters where provisions could
be had. He was most circumspect in maintaining exact order during
the march, himself taking charge of the rear guard. The guides led
them over many ditches and channels, full of water, and cut for the
purpose of irrigation; some so broad and deep that they could not be
crossed without bridges. The army had to put together bridges for
the occasion, from palm trees either already fallen, or expressly
cut down. This was a troublesome business, which Klearchus himself
superintended with peculiar strictness. He carried his spear in the
left hand, his stick in the right; employing the latter to chastise
any soldier who seemed remiss,—and even plunging into the mud and
lending his own hands in aid wherever it was necessary.[113] As it
was not the usual season of irrigation for crops, he suspected that
the canals had been filled on this occasion expressly to intimidate
the Greeks, by impressing them with the difficulties of their
prospective march; and he was anxious to demonstrate to the Persians
that these difficulties were no more than Grecian energy could easily
surmount.
[113] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 7, 13.
At length they reached certain villages indicated by their guides
for quarters and provision; and here for the first time they had a
sample of that unparalleled abundance of the Babylonian territory,
which Herodotus is afraid to describe with numerical precision.
Large quantities of corn,—dates not only in great numbers, but of
such beauty, freshness, size and flavor, as no Greek had ever seen
or tasted, insomuch that fruit like what was imported into Greece,
was disregarded and left for the slaves,—wine and vinegar, both
also made from the date-palm: these are the luxuries which Xenophon
is eloquent in describing, after his recent period of scanty fare
and anxious apprehension; not without also noticing the headaches
which such new and luscious food, in unlimited quanity, brought upon
himself and others.[114]
[114] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 14, 17.
After three days passed in these restorative quarters, they were
visited by Tissaphernes, accompanied by four Persian grandees and
a suite of slaves. The satrap began to open a negotiation with
Klearchus and the other generals. Speaking through an interpreter,
he stated to them that the vicinity of his satrapy to Greece
impressed him with a strong interest in favor of the Cyreian Greeks,
and made him anxious to rescue them out of their present desperate
situation; that he had solicited the king’s permission to save them,
as a personal recompense to himself for having been the first to
forewarn him of the schemes of Cyrus, and for having been the only
Persian who had not fled before the Greeks at Kunaxa; that the King
had promised to consider this point, and had sent him in the meantime
to ask the Greeks what their purpose was in coming up to attack
him; and that he trusted the Greeks would give him a conciliatory
answer to carry back, in order that he might have less difficulty
in realizing what he desired for their benefit. To this Klearchus,
after first deliberating apart with the other officers, replied,
that the army had come together, and had even commenced their march,
without any purpose of hostility to the King; that Cyrus had brought
them up the country under false pretences, but that they had been
ashamed to desert him in the midst of danger, since he had always
treated them generously; that since Cyrus was now dead, they had
no purpose of hostility against the King, but were only anxious
to return home; that they were prepared to repel hostility from
all quarters, but would be not less prompt in requiting favor or
assistance. With this answer Tissaphernes departed, and returned
on the next day but one, informing them that he had obtained the
King’s permission to save the Grecian army,—though not without
great opposition, since many Persian counsellors contended that it
was unworthy of the King’s dignity, to suffer those who had assailed
him to escape. “I am now ready (said he) to conclude a covenant and
exchange oaths with you; engaging to conduct you safely back into
Greece, with the country friendly, and with a regular market for you
to purchase provisions. You must stipulate on your part always to
pay for your provisions, and to do no damage to the country. If I do
not furnish you with provisions to buy, you are then at liberty to
take them where you can find them.” Well were the Greeks content to
enter into such a covenant, which was sworn, with hands given upon
it, by Klearchus, the other generals, and the lochages, on their
side,—and by Tissaphernes with the King’s brother-in-law on the
other. Tissaphernes then left them, saying that he would go back to
the King, make preparations, and return to reconduct the Greeks home;
going himself to his own satrapy.[115]
[115] Xen. Anab. ii, 3, 18-27.
The statements of Ktesias, though known to us only indirectly and
not to be received without caution, afford ground for believing that
Queen Parysatis decidedly wished success to her son Cyrus in his
contest for the throne,—that the first report conveyed to her of the
battle of Kunaxa, announcing the victory of Cyrus, filled her with
joy, which was exchanged for bitter sorrow when she was informed of
his death,—that she caused to be slain with horrible tortures all
those, who though acting in the Persian army and for the defence of
Artaxerxes, had any participation in the death of Cyrus—and that
she showed favorable dispositions towards the Cyreian Greeks.[116]
It seems probable, farther, that her influence may have been exerted
to procure for them an unimpeded retreat, without anticipating the
use afterwards made by Tissaphernes (as will soon appear) of the
present convention. And in one point of view, the Persian king had
an interest in facilitating their retreat. For the very circumstance
which rendered retreat difficult, also rendered the Greeks dangerous
to him in their actual position. They were in the heart of the
Persian empire, within seventy miles of Babylon; in a country
not only teeming with fertility, but also extremely defensible;
especially against cavalry, from the multiplicity of canals, as
Herodotus observed respecting Lower Egypt.[117] And Klearchus might
say to his Grecian soldiers,—what Xenophon was afterwards preparing
to say to them at Kalpê on the Euxine Sea, and what Nikias also
affirmed to the unhappy Athenian army whom he conducted away from
Syracuse[118]—that wherever they sat down, they were sufficiently
numerous and well-organized to become at once a city. A body of such
troops might effectually assist, and would perhaps encourage, the
Babylonian population to throw off the Persian yoke, and to exonerate
themselves from the prodigious tribute which they now paid to the
satrap. For these reasons, the advisers of Artaxerxes thought it
advantageous to convey the Greeks across the Tigris out of Babylonia,
beyond all possibility of returning thither. This was at any rate
the primary object of the convention. And it was the more necessary
to conciliate the good-will of the Greeks, because there seems to
have been but one bridge over the Tigris; which bridge could only be
reached by inviting them to advance considerably farther into the
interior of Babylonia.
[116] Ktesiæ Persica, Fragm. c. 59, ed. Bähr; compared with the
remarkable Fragment. 18, preserved by the so-called Demetrius
Phalêreus: see also Plutarch, Artaxerx. c. 17.
[117] Herodot. i, 193; ii, 108; Strabo, xvii. p. 788.
[118] Xen. Anab. v, 6, 16; Thucyd. vii.
Such was the state of fears and hopes on both sides, at the time when
Tissaphernes left the Greeks, after concluding his convention. For
twenty days did they await his return, without receiving from him
any communication; the Cyreian Persians under Ariæus being encamped
near them. Such prolonged and unexplained delay became, after a few
days, the source of much uneasiness to the Greeks; the more so as
Ariæus received during this interval several visits from his Persian
kinsmen, and friendly messages from the king, promising amnesty for
his recent services under Cyrus. Of these messages the effects were
painfully felt in manifest coldness of demeanor on the part of his
Persian troops towards the Greeks. Impatient and suspicious, the
Greek soldiers impressed upon Klearchus their fears, that the king
had concluded the recent convention only to arrest their movements,
until he should have assembled a larger army and blocked up more
effectually the roads against their return. To this Klearchus
replied,—“I am aware of all that you say. Yet if we now strike our
tents, it will be a breach of the convention and a declaration of
war. No one will furnish us with provisions; we shall have no guides;
Ariæus will desert us forthwith, so that we shall have his troops
as enemies instead of friends. Whether there be any other river for
us to cross, I know not; but we know that the Euphrates itself can
never be crossed, if there be an enemy to resist us. Nor have we any
cavalry,—while cavalry is the best and most numerous force of our
enemies. If the king, having all these advantages, really wishes to
destroy us, I do not know why he should falsely exchange all these
oaths and solemnities, and thus make his own word worthless in the
eyes both of Greeks and barbarians.”[119]
[119] Xen. Anab. ii, 4, 3-8.
Such words from Klearchus are remarkable, as they testify his
own complete despair of the situation,—certainly a very natural
despair,—except by amicable dealing with the Persians; and also his
ignorance of geography and the country to be traversed. This feeling
helps to explain his imprudent confidence afterwards in Tissaphernes.
That satrap, however, after twenty days, at last came back, with
his army prepared to return to Ionia,—with the king’s daughter
whom he had just received in marriage,—and with another grandee
named Orontas. Tissaphernes took the conduct of the march, providing
supplies for the Greek troops to purchase; while Ariæus and his
division now separated themselves altogether from the Greeks, and
became intermingled with the other Persians. Klearchus and the Greeks
followed them, at the distance of about three miles in the rear, with
a separate guide for themselves; not without jealousy and mistrust,
sometimes shown in individual conflicts, while collecting wood or
forage, between them and the Persians of Ariæus. After three days’
march (that is, apparently, three days, calculated from the moment
when they began their retreat with Ariæus) they came to the Wall of
Media, and passed through it,[120] prosecuting their march onward
through the country on its other or interior side. It was of bricks
cemented with bitumen, one hundred feet high, and twenty feet broad;
it was said to extend a length of twenty parasangs (or about seventy
miles, if we reckon the parasang at th
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