History of Greece, Volume 07 (of 12)
by George Grote · English · Gutenberg #51181 · 1,044,672 chars · public domain (US)
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Title: History of Greece, Volume 07 (of 12)
Author: George Grote
Release date: February 11, 2016 [eBook #51181]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
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TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE
* Italics are denoted by underscores as in _italics_.
* Small caps are represented in upper case as in SMALL CAPS.
* Letter spaced Greek text is enclosed in tildes as in ~καὶ τὰ
λοιπά~.
* Obvious printer errors have been silently corrected, after
comparison with a later edition of this work. Greek text has
also been corrected after checking with this later edition and
with Perseus, when the reference was found.
* Original spelling, hyphenation and punctuation have been kept,
but variant spellings were made consistent when a predominant
usage was found.
* Some inconsistencies in the use of accents over proper nouns
(like “Alkibiades” and “Alkibiadês”) have been retained.
* The following changes were also made, after checking with
Perseus and other editions:
note 337: “Thucyd. vi, 69” → “Thucyd, i, 69”
note 573: “vii, 73” → “viii, 73”
HISTORY OF GREECE.
BY
GEORGE GROTE, ESQ.
VOL. VII.
REPRINTED FROM THE LONDON EDITION
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS
329 AND 331 PEARL STREET.
CONTENTS.
VOL. VII.
PART II.
CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
CHAPTER LV.
FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF
OLYMPIAD 90.
Negotiations for peace during the winter after the battle
of Amphipolis.—Peace called the Peace of Nikias—concluded
in March 421 B.C. Conditions of peace.—Peace accepted at
Sparta by the majority of members of the Peloponnesian
alliance.—The most powerful members of the alliance refuse
to accept the truce—Bœotians, Megarians, Corinthians, and
Eleians.—Position and feelings of the Lacedæmonians—their
great anxiety for peace—their uncertain relations with
Argos.—Steps taken by the Lacedæmonians to execute the
peace—Amphipolis is not restored to Athens—the great
allies of Sparta do not accept the peace.—Separate
alliance for mutual defence concluded between Sparta and
Athens.—Terms of the alliance.—Athens restores the Spartan
captives.—Mismanagement of the political interests of
Athens by Nikias and the peace party.—By the terms of
the alliance Athens renounced all the advantages of her
position in reference to the Lacedæmonians—she gained none
of those concessions upon which she calculated, while
they gained materially.—Discontent and remonstrances
of the Athenians against Sparta in consequence of the
non-performance of the conditions—they repent of having
given up the captives—excuses of Sparta.—New combinations
in Peloponnesus—suspicion entertained of concert between
Sparta and Athens—Argos stands prominently forward—state
of Argos—aristocratical regiment of one thousand formed
in that city.—The Corinthians prevail upon Argos to stand
forward as head of a new Peloponnesian alliance.—Congress
of recusant Peloponnesian allies at Corinth—the Mantineians
join Argos—state of Arcadia—rivalship of Tegea and
Mantineia.—Remonstrances of Lacedæmonian envoys at the
congress at Corinth—redefence of the Corinthians—pretence
of religious scruple.—The Bœotians and Megarians refuse
to break with Sparta, or to ally themselves with Argos—the
Corinthians hesitate in actually joining Argos.—The
Eleians become allies of Argos—their reasons for doing
so—relations with Lepreum—the Corinthians now join Argos
also.—Refusal of Tegea to separate from Sparta.—The
Corinthians are disheartened—their application through
the Bœotians to Athens.—The Lacedæmonians emancipate the
Arcadian subjects of Mantineia—they plant the Brasidean
Helots at Lepreum.—Treatment of the Spartan captives after
their liberation from Athens and return to Sparta—they are
disfranchised for a time and in a qualified manner.—The
Athenians recapture Skiônê—put to death all the adult
males.—Political relations in Peloponnesus—change of ephors
at Sparta—the new ephors are hostile to Athens.—Congress
at Sparta—Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian deputies,
present—long debates, but no settlement attained of any
one of the disputed points—intrigues of the anti-Athenian
ephors—Kleobulus and Xenarês.—These ephors try to bring
about underhand an alliance between Sparta and Argos,
through the Bœotians—the project fails.—The Lacedæmonians
conclude a special alliance with the Bœotians, thereby
violating their alliance with Athens—the Bœotians raze
Panaktum to the ground.—Application from the Argeians
to Sparta to renew the expiring treaty. Project of
renewed treaty agreed upon. Curious stipulation about
combat by champions, to keep the question open about
the title to Thyrea.—Lacedæmonian envoys go first to
Bœotia, next to Athens—they find Panaktum demolished—they
ask for the cession of Pylos from Athens.—The envoys
are badly received at Athens—angry feeling against
the Lacedæmonians.—Alkibiadês stands forward as a
party-leader. His education and character.—Great energy
and capacity of Alkibiadês in public affairs—his
reckless expenditure—lawless demeanor—unprincipled
character, inspiring suspicion and alarm—military
service.—Alkibiadês—Sokratês—the Sophists.—Conflicting
sentiments entertained towards Alkibiadês—his great energy
and capacity. Admiration, fear, hatred, and jealousy, which
he inspires.—Alkibiadês tries to renew the ancient but
interrupted connection of his ancestors with Lacedæmon,
as proxeni.—The Spartans reject his advances—he turns
against them—alters his politics, and becomes their enemy
at Athens.—He tries to bring Athens into alliance with
Argos.—He induces the Argeians to send envoys to Athens—the
Argeians eagerly embrace this opening, and drop their
negotiations with Sparta.—Embassy of the Lacedæmonians
to Athens, to press the Athenians not to throw up the
alliance. The envoys are favorably received.—Trick by which
Alkibiadês cheats and disgraces the envoys, and baffles
the Lacedæmonian project. Indignation of the Athenians
against Sparta.—Nikias prevails with the assembly to
send himself and others as envoys to Sparta, in order to
clear up the embarrassment.—Failure of the embassy of
Nikias at Sparta—Athens concludes the alliance with Argos,
Elis, and Mantineia.—Conditions of this convention and
alliance.—Complicated relations among the Grecian states
as to treaty and alliance.—Olympic festival of the 90th
Olympiad, July 420 B.C., its memorable character.—First
appearance of Athens at the Olympic festival since the
beginning of the war. Immense display of Alkibiadês in
the chariot-race.—The Eleians exclude the Spartan sacred
legation from this Olympic festival, in consequence of
alleged violation of the Olympic truce.—Alarm felt at the
festival lest the Spartans should come in arms.—Depressed
estimation of Sparta throughout Greece—Herakleia. 1-61
CHAPTER LVI.
FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF
MANTINEIA.
New policy of Athens, attempted by Alkibiadês.—Expedition
of Alkibiadês into the interior of Peloponnesus.—Attack
upon Epidaurus by Argos and Athens.—Movements of the
Spartans and Argeians.—The sacred month Karneius—trick
played by the Argeians with their calendar—Congress
at Mantineia for peace—the discussions prove
abortive.—Athenian lordship of the sea—the alliance between
Athens and Sparta continues in name, but is indirectly
violated by both.—Invasion of Argos by Agis and the
Lacedæmonians, Bœotians, and Corinthians.—Approach of the
invaders to Argos by different lines of march.—Superior
forces and advantageous position of the invaders—danger
of Argos—Agis takes upon him to grant an armistice to
the Argeians, and withdraws the army—dissatisfaction of
the allies.—Severe censure against Agis on his return
to Sparta.—Tardy arrival of Alkibiadês, Lachês, etc.,
with the Athenian contingent at Argos—expedition of
Athenians, Eleians, Mantineians, and Argeians, against
the Arcadian town of Orchomenus.—Plans against Tegea—the
Eleians return home.—Danger of Tegea—Agis and the
Lacedæmonians march to its relief.—Manœuvres of Agis
to bring on a battle on fair ground.—Forward march
and new position of the Argeians.—The Lacedæmonians
are surprised: their sudden and ready formation into
battle order.—Gradation of command and responsibility
peculiar to the Lacedæmonian army.—Lacedæmonian line:
privileged post of the Skiritæ on the left.—Uncertain
numbers of both armies.—Preliminary harangues to the
soldiers.—Battle of Mantineia.—Movement ordered by Agis,
on the instant before the battle; his order disobeyed.
His left wing is defeated.—Complete ultimate victory
of the Lacedæmonians.—Great effects of the victory in
reëstablishing the reputation of Sparta.—Operations
of Argeians, Eleians, etc., near Epidaurus.—Political
change at Argos, arising out of the battle of
Mantineia.—Oligarchical conspiracy of the Thousand-regiment
at Argos, in concert with the Lacedæmonians.—Treaty of
peace between Sparta and Argos.—Treaty of alliance between
Sparta and Argos—dissolution of the alliance of Argos with
Athens, Mantineia, and Elis.—Submission of Mantineia to
Sparta.—Oligarchical revolution effected at Argos by the
Thousand, in concert with the Lacedæmonians.—Oligarchy in
Sikyôn and the towns in Achaia.—Violences of the Thousand
at Argos: counter-revolution in that town: restoration of
the democracy.—Proceedings of the restored Argeian Demos:
tardiness of Sparta.—Alkibiadês at Argos: measures for the
protection of the democracy.—Nominal peace, but precarious
relations, between Athens and Sparta.—Relations of Athens
with Perdikkas of Macedonia.—Negligence of Athens about
Amphipolis: improvidence of Nikias and the peace-party:
adventurous speculations of Alkibiadês.—Projected
contention of ostracism between Nikias and Alkibiadês.
Proposition supported by Hyperbolus.—Gradual desuetude of
the ostracism, as the democracy became assured.—Siege of
Mêlos by the Athenians.—Dialogue set forth by Thucydidês,
between the Athenian envoys and the Executive Council
of Mêlos.—Language represented by Thucydidês as having
been held by the Athenian envoys—with the replies of
the Melians.—Refusal of the Melians to submit.—Siege and
capture of Mêlos.—Remarks upon the event.—View taken by
Thucydidês of this incident.—Place which it occupies in the
general historical conception of Thucydidês. 61-118
CHAPTER LVII.
SICILIAN AFFAIRS AFTER THE EXTINCTION OF THE GELONIAN
DYNASTY.
Expulsion of the Gelonian dynasty from Syracuse, and
of other despots from the other Sicilian towns.—Large
changes of resident inhabitants—effects of this
fact.—Relative power and condition of the Sicilian
cities. Political dissensions at Syracuse. Ostracism
tried and abandoned.—Power and foreign exploits
of Syracuse.—Sikels in the interior of Sicily—the
Sikel prince Duketius—he founds the new Sikel town
of Palikê.—Exploits of Duketius—he is defeated and
becomes the prisoner of the Syracusans, who spare him,
and send him to Corinth.—Duketius breaks his parole
and returns to Sicily.—Conquests of Syracuse in the
interior of Sicily—death of Duketius.—Prosperity
and power of Agrigentum.—Intellectual movement in
Sicily—Empedoklês—Tisias—Korax—Gorgias.—Sicilian
cities—their condition and proceedings at the first
breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, 431 B.C.—Relations
of Sicily to Athens and Sparta—altered by the quarrel
between Corinth and Korkyra and the intervention of
Athens.—Expectations entertained by Sparta of aid from the
Sicilian Dorians, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian
war. Expectations not realized.—The Dorian cities in
Sicily attack the Ionian cities in Sicily.—The Ionic
cities in Sicily solicit aid from Athens—first Athenian
expedition to Sicily under Lachês.—Second expedition
under Pythodôrus.—Indecisive operations near Messênê and
Rhegium.—Defeat of the Messenians by the Naxians and
Sikels, near Naxos.—Eurymedon and Sophoklês, with a larger
Athenian fleet, arrive in Sicily.—Congress of the Sicilian
cities at Gela. Speech of Hermokratês.—General peace made
between the Sicilian cities. Eurymedon accedes to the
peace, and withdraws the Athenian fleet.—Displeasure of the
Athenians against Eurymedon and his colleagues.—Intestine
dissension in Leontini—expulsion of the Leontine Demos,
by the aid of Syracuse.—Application of the Leontine
Demos for help to Athens. The Athenians send Phæax
to make observations.—Leontini depopulated—the Demos
expelled—Leontine exiles at Athens.—War between Selinus and
Egesta—the latter applies to Athens for aid.—Promises of
the Egestæans: motives offered to Athens for intervention
in Sicily.—Alkibiadês warmly espouses their cause, and
advises intervention.—Inspecting commissioners despatched
by the Athenians to Egesta—frauds practised by the
Egestæans to delude them.—Return of the commissioners to
Athens—impression produced by their report. Resolution
taken to send an expedition to Sicily.—Embarrassment of
Nikias as opposer of the expedition.—Speech of Nikias
at the second assembly held by the Athenians.—Reply
of Alkibiadês.—The assembly favorable to the views
of Alkibiadês—adheres to the resolution of sailing
to Sicily.—Second speech of Nikias—exaggerating the
difficulties and dangers of the expedition, and demanding a
force on the largest scale.—Effect of this speech—increased
eagerness of the assembly for the expedition—order and
unanimity in reference to the plan.—Excitement in the city
among all classes—great increase in the scale on which the
expedition was planned.—Large preparations made for the
expedition.—Review of these preliminary proceedings to the
Sicilian expedition.—Advice and influence of Nikias.—Advice
and influence of Alkibiadês.—Athens believed herself
entitled to be mistress of the islands as well as of the
sea. 118-162
CHAPTER LVIII.
FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE ATHENIANS TO ATTACK SYRACUSE,
DOWN TO THE FIRST WINTER AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN SICILY.
Preparations for the expedition against Sicily—general
enthusiasm and sanguine hopes at Athens.—Abundance in
the Athenian treasury—display of wealth as well as of
force in the armament.—Mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens.
Numbers and sanctity of the Hermæ.—Violent excitement
and religious alarm produced by the act at Athens.—The
authors of the act unknown—but it was certainly done by
design and conspiracy.—Various parties suspected—great
probability beforehand that it would induce the Athenians
to abandon or postpone the expedition.—The political
enemies of Alkibiadês take advantage of the reigning
excitement to try and ruin him.—Anxiety of the Athenians
to detect and punish the conspirators—rewards offered for
information.—Informations given in—commissioners of inquiry
appointed.—First accusation of Alkibiadês, of having
profaned and divulged the Eleusinian mysteries.—Violent
speeches in the assembly against Alkibiadês unfavorably
received.—He denies the charge and demands immediate
trial—his demand is eluded by his enemies.—Departure of
the armament from Peiræus—splendor and exciting character
of the spectacle.—Solemnities of parting, on shipboard
and on the water’s edge.—Full muster of the armament
at Korkyra.—Progress to Rhegium—cold reception by the
Italian cities.—Feeling at Syracuse as to the approaching
armament—disposition to undervalue its magnitude,
and even to question its intended coming.—Strenuous
exhortations of Hermokratês, to be prepared.—Temper and
parties in the Syracusan assembly.—Reply of Athenagoras,
the popular orator.—Interposition of the stratêgi to
moderate the violence of the debate.—Relative position
of Athenagoras and other parties at Syracuse.—Pacific
dispositions of Athenagoras.—His general denunciations
against the oligarchical youth were well founded.—Active
preparations at Syracuse on the approach of the
Athenian armament.—Discouragement of the Athenians at
Rhegium on learning the truth respecting the poverty
of Egesta.—The Athenian generals discuss their plan of
action—opinion of Nikias.—Opinion of Alkibiadês.—Opinion
of Lamachus.—Superior discernment of Lamachus—plan of
Alkibiadês preferred.—Alkibiadês at Messênê—Naxos joins
the Athenians. Empty display of the armament.—Alkibiadês
at Katana—the Athenians masters of Katana—they establish
their station there. Refusal of Kamarina.—Alkibiadês is
summoned home to take his trial.—Feelings and proceedings
at Athens since the departure of the armament.—Number of
citizens imprisoned on suspicion—increased agony of the
public mind.—Peisander and Chariklês the commissioners
of inquiry.—Information of Diokleidês.—More prisoners
arrested—increased terror in the city—Andokidês
among the persons imprisoned.—Andokidês is solicited
by his fellow-prisoners to stand forward and give
information—he complies.—Andokidês designates the
authors of the mutilation of the Hermæ—consequence of
his revelations.—Questionable authority of Andokidês, as
to what he himself really stated in information.—Belief
of the Athenians in his information—its tranquillizing
effects.—Anxiety and alarm revived, respecting
the persons concerned in the profanation of the
Eleusinian mysteries.—Revival of the accusation against
Alkibiadês.—Indictment presented by Thessalus, son
of Kimon, against Alkibiadês.—Resolution to send for
Alkibiadês home from Sicily to be tried.—Alkibiadês quits
the army, as if to come home: makes his escape at Thurii,
and retires to Peloponnesus.—Conduct of the Athenian public
in reference to Alkibiadês—how far blamable. Conduct of
his enemies.—Mischief to Athens from the banishment of
Alkibiadês. Languid operations of the Sicilian armament
under Nikias.—Increase of confidence and preparations at
Syracuse, arising from the delays of Nikias.—Manœuvre of
Nikias from Katana—he lands his forces in the Great Harbor
of Syracuse.—Return of the Syracusan army from Katana to
the Great Harbor—preparations for fighting Nikias.—Feelings
of the ancient soldier.—Harangue of Nikias.—Battle near the
Olympieion—victory of the Athenians.—Unabated confidence
of the Syracusans—they garrison the Olympieion—Nikias
reembarks his army, and returns to Katana.—He determines
to take up his winter quarters at Katana, and sends
to Athens for reinforcements of horse.—His failure at
Messênê, through the betrayal by Alkibiadês.—Salutary
lesson to the Syracusans, arising out of the recent
defeat—mischiefs to the Athenians from the delay of
Nikias.—Confidence of the Athenians at home in Nikias—their
good temper—they send to him the reinforcements
demanded.—Determined feeling at Syracuse—improved measures
of defence—recommendations of Hermokratês.—Enlargement
of the fortifications of Syracuse. Improvement of
their situation. Increase of the difficulties of
Nikias.—Hermokratês and Euphêmus—counter-envoys at
Kamarina.—Speech of Euphêmus.—The Kamarinæans maintain
practical neutrality.—Winter proceedings of Nikias from
his quarters at Katana.—Syracusan envoys sent to solicit
aid from Corinth and Sparta.—Alkibiadês at Sparta—his
intense hostility to Athens.—Speech of Alkibiadês in the
Lacedæmonian assembly.—Great effect of his speech on
the Peloponnesians.—Misrepresentations contained in the
speech.—Resolutions of the Spartans.—The Lacedæmonians send
Gylippus to Syracuse. 163-243
CHAPTER LIX.
FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE BY NIKIAS,
DOWN TO THE SECOND ATHENIAN EXPEDITION UNDER DEMOSTHENES,
AND THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENERAL WAR.
Movements of Nikias in the early spring.—Local condition
and fortifications of Syracuse, at the time when Nikias
arrived.—Inner and Outer City.—Localities without the wall
of the outer city—Epipolæ.—Possibilities of the siege when
Nikias first arrived in Sicily—increase of difficulties
through his delay.—Increased importance of the upper
ground of Epipolæ. Intention of the Syracusans to occupy
the summit of Epipolæ.—The summit is surprised by the
Athenians.—The success of this surprise was essential
to the effective future prosecution of the siege.—First
operations of the siege.—Central work of the Athenians
on Epipolæ, called The Circle.—First counter-wall of
the Syracusans.—Its direction, south of the Athenian
circle—its completion.—It is stormed, taken, and destroyed
by the Athenians.—Nikias occupies the southern cliff—and
prosecutes his line of blockade south of the Circle.—Second
counter-work of the Syracusans—reaching across the marsh,
south of Epipolæ, to the river Anapus.—This counter-work
attacked and taken by Lamachus—general battle—death
of Lamachus.—Danger of the Athenian circle and of
Nikias—victory of the Athenians.—Entrance of the Athenian
fleet into the Great Harbor.—The southern portion of the
wall of blockade, across the marsh to the Great Harbor,
is prosecuted and nearly finished.—The Syracusans offer
no farther obstruction—despondency at Syracuse—increasing
closeness of the siege.—Order of the besieging operations
successively undertaken by the Athenians.—Triumphant
prospects of the Athenians. Disposition among the Sikels
and Italian Greeks to favor them.—Conduct of Nikias—his
correspondents in the interior of Syracuse.—Confidence of
Nikias—comparative languor of his operations.—Approach
of Gylippus—he despairs of relieving Syracuse.—Progress
of Gylippus, in spite of discouraging reports.—Approach
of Gylippus is made known to Nikias. Facility of
preventing his farther advance—Nikias despises him, and
leaves him to come unobstructed. He lands at Himera in
Sicily.—Blindness of Nikias—egregious mistake of letting
in Gylippus.—Gylippus levies an army and marches across
Sicily from Himera to Syracuse.—The Corinthian Goggylus
reaches Syracuse before Gylippus—just in time to hinder
the town from capitulating.—Gylippus with his new-levied
force enters Syracuse unopposed.—Unaccountable inaction
of Nikias.—Vigorous and aggressive measures of Gylippus,
immediately on arriving.—Gylippus surprises and captures
the Athenian fort of Labdalum.—He begins the construction
of a third counter-wall, on the north side of the Athenian
circle.—Nikias fortifies Cape Plemmyrium.—Inconveniences
of Plemmyrium as a maritime station—mischief which ensues
to the Athenian naval strength.—Operations of Gylippus in
the field—his defeat.—His decisive victory—the Athenians
are shut up within their lines. The Syracusan counter-wall
is carried on so far as to cut the Athenian line of
blockade.—Farther defences provided by Gylippus, joining
the higher part of Epipolæ with the city wall.—Confidence
of Gylippus and the Syracusans—aggressive plans against
the Athenians, even on the sea.—Discouragement of Nikias
and the Athenians.—Nikias sends home a despatch to
Athens, soliciting reinforcements.—Despatch of Nikias
to the Athenian people.—Resolution of the Athenians to
send Demosthenês with a second armament.—Remarks upon the
despatch of Nikias.—Former despatches of Nikias.—Effect
of his despatch upon the Athenians.—Treatment of
Nikias by the Athenians.—Capital mistake committed by
the Athenians.—Hostilities from Sparta certain and
impending.—Resolution of Sparta to invade Attica forthwith,
and to send farther reinforcements to Sicily. 243-286
CHAPTER LX.
FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ATHENS
AND SPARTA, DOWN TO THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN
ARMAMENT IN SICILY.
Active warlike preparations throughout Greece during
the winter of 414-413 B.C.—Invasion of Attica by
Agis and the Peloponnesian force—fortification of
Dekeleia.—Second expedition from Athens against Syracuse,
under Demosthenês.—Operations of Gylippus at Syracuse. He
determines to attack the Athenians at sea.—Naval combat in
the harbor of Syracuse—the Athenians victorious.—Gylippus
surprises and takes Plemmyrium.—Important consequences
of the capture.—Increased spirits and confidence of the
Syracusans, even for sea-fight.—Efforts of the Syracusans
to procure farther reinforcements from the Sicilian
towns.—Conflicts between the Athenians and Syracusans
in the Great Harbor.—Defeat of a Sicilian reinforcement
marching to aid Syracuse—Renewed attack by Gylippus
on the Athenians.—Disadvantages of the Athenian fleet
in the harbor. Their naval tactics impossible in the
narrow space.—Improvements in Syracusan ships suited to
the narrow space.—The Syracusans threaten attack upon
the Athenian naval station.—Additional preparations
of Nikias—battle renewed.—Complete defeat of the
Athenians.—Danger of the Athenian armament—arrival of
Demosthenês with the second armament.—Voyage of Demosthenês
from Korkyra.—Imposing effect of his entry into the Great
Harbor.—Revived courage of the Athenians. Judicious
and decisive resolutions of Demosthenês.—Position and
plans of Demosthenês.—Nocturnal march of Demosthenês
to surprise Epipolæ, and turn the Syracusan line of
defence.—Partial success at first—complete and ruinous
defeat finally.—Disorder of the Athenians—great loss
in the flight.—Elate spirits, and renewed aggressive
plans, of the Syracusans.—Deliberation and different
opinions of the Athenian generals.—Demosthenês insists
on departing from Sicily—Nikias opposes him.—Demosthenês
insists at least on removing out of the Great
Harbor.—Nikias refuses to consent to such removal.—The
armament remains in the Great Harbor, neither acting nor
retiring.—Infatuation of Nikias.—Increase of force and
confidence in Syracuse.—Nikias at length consents to
retreat. Orders for retreat privately circulated.—Eclipse
of the moon—Athenian retreat postponed.—Eclipses
considered as signs—differently interpreted—opinion of
Philochorus.—Renewed attacks of the Syracusans—defeat of
the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbor.—Partial success
ashore against Gylippus.—The Syracusans determine to block
up the mouth of the harbor, and destroy or capture the
whole Athenian armament.—Large views of the Syracusans
against the power of Athens—new hazards now opened to
endanger that power.—Vast numbers, and miscellaneous
origin, of the combatants now engaged in fighting for
or against Syracuse.—The Syracusans block up the mouth
of the harbor.—The Athenians resolve to force their way
out—preparations made by the generals.—Exhortations of
Nikias on putting the crews aboard.—Agony of Nikias—his
efforts to encourage the officers.—Bold and animated
language of Gylippus to the Syracusan fleet.—Syracusan
arrangements. Condition of the Great Harbor—sympathizing
population surrounding it.—Attempt of the Athenian fleet
to break out—battle in the Great Harbor.—Long-continued
and desperate struggle—intense emotion—total defeat of the
Athenians.—Military operations of ancient times—strong
emotions which accompanied them.—Causes of the defeat of
the Athenians.—Feelings of the victors and vanquished after
the battle.—Resolution of Demosthenês and Nikias to make
a second attempt—the armament are too much discouraged
to obey.—The Athenians determine to retreat by land—they
postpone their retreat, under false communications from
Syracuse.—The Syracusans block up the roads, to intercept
their retreat.—Retreat of the Athenians—miserable condition
of the army.—Wretchedness arising from abandoning the
sick and wounded.—Attempt of the generals to maintain
some order—energy of Nikias.—Exhortations of Nikias to
the suffering army.—Commencement of the retreat—harassed
and impeded by the Syracusans.—Continued conflict—no
progress made by the retreating army.—Violent storm—effect
produced on both parties—change of feeling in the last
two years.—Night march of the Athenians, in an altered
direction, towards the southern sea.—Separation of
the two divisions under Nikias and Demosthenês. The
first division under Nikias gets across the river
Erineus.—The rear division under Demosthenês is pursued,
overtaken, and forced to surrender.—Gylippus overtakes
and attacks the division of Nikias.—Nikias gets to the
river Asinarus—intolerable thirst and suffering of the
soldiers—he and his division become prisoners.—Total
numbers captured.—Hard treatment and sufferings of
the Athenian prisoners at Syracuse.—Treatment of
Nikias and Demosthenês—difference of opinion among the
conquerors.—Influence of the Corinthians—efforts of
Gylippus—both the generals are slain.—Disgrace of Nikias
after his death, at Athens—continued respect for the memory
of Demosthenês.—Opinion of Thucydidês about Nikias.—How
far that opinion is just.—Opinion of the Athenians about
Nikias—their steady over-confidence and over-esteem
for him, arising from his respectable and religious
character.—Over-confidence in Nikias was the greatest
personal mistake which the Athenian public ever committed. 287-352
CHAPTER LXI.
FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ATHENIAN ARMAMENT IN SICILY,
DOWN TO THE OLIGARCHICAL CONSPIRACY OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AT
ATHENS.
Consequences of the ruin of the Athenian armament in
Sicily.—Occupation of Dekeleia by the Lacedæmonians—its
ruinous effects upon Athens.—Athens becomes a
military post—heavy duty in arms imposed upon the
citizens.—Financial pressure.—Athens dismisses her
Thracian mercenaries—massacre at Mykalêssus.—The Thracians
driven back with slaughter by the Thebans.—Athenian
station at Naupaktus—decline of the naval superiority of
Athens.—Naval battle near Naupaktus—indecisive result.—Last
news of the Athenians from Syracuse—ruin of the army
there not officially made known to them.—Reluctance of
the Athenians to believe the full truth.—Terror and
affliction at Athens.—Energetic resolutions adopted by
the Athenians—Board of Probûli.—Prodigious effect of the
catastrophe upon all Greeks—enemies and allies of Athens
as well as neutrals—and even on the Persians.—Motions
of king Agis.—The Eubœans apply to Agis for aid in
revolting from Athens—the Lesbians also apply, and
are preferred.—The Chians, with the same view, make
application to Sparta.—Envoys from Tissaphernês and
Pharnabazus come to Sparta at the same time.—Alkibiadês
at Sparta—his recommendations determine the Lacedæmonians
to send aid to Chios.—Synod of the Peloponnesian allies
at Corinth—measures resolved.—Isthmian festival—scruples
of the Corinthians—delay about Chios—suspicions of
Athens.—Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth to Chios—it
is defeated by the Athenians.—Small squadron starts
from Sparta under Chalkideus and Alkibiadês, to go to
Chios.—Energetic advice of Alkibiadês—his great usefulness
to Sparta.—Arrival of Alkibiadês at Chios—revolt of the
island from Athens.—General population of Chios was
disinclined to revolt from Athens.—Dismay occasioned at
Athens by the revolt of Chios—the Athenians set free
and appropriate their reserved fund.—Athenian force
despatched to Chios under Strombichidês.—Activity of
the Chians in promoting revolt among the other Athenian
allies—Alkibiadês determines Milêtus to revolt.—First
alliance between the Peloponnesians and Tissaphernês,
concluded by Chalkideus at Milêtus.—Dishonorable and
disadvantageous conditions of the treaty.—Energetic efforts
of Athens—democratical revolution at Samos.—Peloponnesian
fleet at Kenchreæ—Astyochus is sent as Spartan admiral
to Ionia.—Expedition of the Chians against Lesbos.—Ill
success of the Chians—Lesbos is maintained by the
Athenians.—Harassing operations of the Athenians against
Chios.—Hardships suffered by the Chians—prosperity
of the island up to this time.—Fresh forces from
Athens—victory of the Athenians near Milêtus.—Fresh
Peloponnesian forces arrive—the Athenians retire, pursuant
to the strong recommendation of Phrynichus.—Capture of
Iasus by the Peloponnesians—rich plunder—Amorgês made
prisoner.—Tissaphernês begins to furnish pay to the
Peloponnesian fleet. He reduces the rate of pay for the
future.—Powerful Athenian fleet at Samos—unexpected
renovation of the navy of Athens.—Astyochus at Chios and
on the opposite coast.—Pedaritus, Lacedæmonian governor at
Chios—disagreement between him and Astyochus.—Astyochus
abandons Chios and returns to Milêtus—accident whereby
he escaped the Athenian fleet.—The Athenians establish a
fortified post in Chios, to ravage the island.—Dorieus
arrives on the Asiatic coast with a squadron from Thurii,
to join Astyochus—maritime contests near Knidus.—Second
Peloponnesian treaty with Tissaphernês, concluded by
Astyochus and Theramenês.—Comparison of the second
treaty with the first.—Arrival of a fresh Peloponnesian
squadron under Antisthenês at Kaunus—Lichas comes out as
Spartan commissioner.—Astyochus goes with the fleet from
Milêtus to join the newly-arrived squadron—he defeats
the Athenian squadron under Charmînus.—Peloponnesian
fleet at Knidus—double dealing of Tissaphernês—breach
between him and Lichas.—Peloponnesian fleet masters
Rhodes, and establishes itself in that island.—Long
inaction of the fleet at Rhodes—paralyzing intrigues of
Tissaphernês—corruption of the Lacedæmonian officers. 353-402
HISTORY OF GREECE.
PART II.
CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.
CHAPTER LV.
FROM THE PEACE OF NIKIAS TO THE OLYMPIC FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY.
My last chapter and last volume terminated with the peace called the
Peace of Nikias, concluded in March 421 B.C., between Athens and the
Spartan confederacy, for fifty years.
This peace—negotiated during the autumn and winter succeeding the
defeat of the Athenians at Amphipolis, wherein both Kleon and
Brasidas were slain—resulted partly from the extraordinary anxiety
of the Spartans to recover their captives who had been taken at
Sphakteria, partly from the discouragement of the Athenians, leading
them to listen to the peace-party who acted with Nikias. The general
principle adopted for the peace was, the restitution by both parties
of what had been acquired by war, yet excluding such places as had
been surrendered by capitulation: according to which reserve the
Athenians, while prevented from recovering Platæa, continued to hold
Nisæa, the harbor of Megara. The Lacedæmonians engaged to restore
Amphipolis to Athens, and to relinquish their connection with the
revolted allies of Athens in Thrace; that is, Argilus, Stageirus,
Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, and Spartôlus. These six cities, however,
were not to be enrolled as allies of Athens unless they chose
voluntarily to become so, but only to pay regularly to Athens the
tribute originally assessed by Aristeidês, as a sort of recompense
for the protection of the Ægean sea against private war or piracy.
Any inhabitant of Amphipolis or the other cities, who chose to leave
them, was at liberty to do so, and to carry away his property.
Farther, the Lacedæmonians covenanted to restore Panaktum to Athens,
together with all the Athenian prisoners in their possession. As to
Skiônê, Torônê, and Sermylus, the Athenians were declared free to
take their own measures. On their part, they engaged to release all
captives in their hands, either of Sparta or her allies; to restore
Pylus, Kythêra, Methônê, Pteleon, and Atalantê; and to liberate all
the Peloponnesian or Brasidean soldiers now under blockade in Skiônê.
Provision was also made, by special articles, that all Greeks should
have free access to the sacred Pan-Hellenic festivals, either by
land or sea; and that the autonomy of the Delphian temple should be
guaranteed.
The contracting parties swore to abstain in future from all injury
to each other, and to settle by amicable decision any dispute which
might arise.[1]
[1] Thucyd. v, 17-29.
Lastly, it was provided that if any matter should afterwards occur
as having been forgotten, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians might by
mutual consent amend the treaty as they thought fit. So prepared, the
oaths were interchanged between seventeen principal Athenians and as
many principal Lacedæmonians.
Earnestly bent as Sparta herself was upon the peace, and ratified as
it had been by the vote of a majority among her confederates, still,
there was a powerful minority who not only refused their assent
but strenuously protested against its conditions. The Corinthians
were discontented because they did not receive back Sollium and
Anaktorium; the Megarians, because they did not regain Nisæa; the
Bœotians, because Panaktum was to be restored to Athens: the Eleians
also on some other ground which we do not distinctly know. All of
them, moreover, took common offence at the article which provided
that Athens and Sparta might, by mutual consent, and without
consulting the allies, amend the treaty in any way that they thought
proper.[2] Though the peace was sworn, therefore, the most powerful
members of the Spartan confederacy remained all recusant.
[2] Thucyd. v, 18.
So strong was the interest of the Spartans themselves, however,
that having obtained the favorable vote of the majority, they
resolved to carry the peace through, even at the risk of breaking
up the confederacy. Besides the earnest desire of recovering their
captives from the Athenians, they were farther alarmed by the fact
that their truce for thirty years concluded with Argos was just now
expiring. They had indeed made application to Argos for renewing it,
through Lichas the Spartan proxenus of that city. But the Argeians
had refused, except upon the inadmissible condition that the border
territory of Kynuria should be ceded to them: there was reason to
fear therefore that this new and powerful force might be thrown into
the scale of Athens, if war were allowed to continue.[3]
[3] Thucyd. v, 14, 22, 76.
Accordingly, no sooner had the peace been sworn than the Spartans
proceeded to execute its provisions. Lots being drawn to determine
whether Sparta or Athens should be the first to make the cessions
required, the Athenians drew the favorable lot: an advantage so very
great, under the circumstances, that Theophrastus affirmed Nikias to
have gained the point by bribery. There is no ground for believing
such alleged bribery; the rather, as we shall presently find Nikias
gratuitously throwing away most of the benefit which the lucky lot
conferred.[4]
[4] Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.
The Spartans began their compliance by forthwith releasing all
the Athenian prisoners in their hands, and despatching Ischagoras
with two other envoys to Amphipolis and the Thracian towns. These
envoys were directed to proclaim the peace as well as to enforce
its observance upon the Thracian towns, and especially to command
Klearidas, the Spartan commander in Amphipolis, that he should
surrender the town to the Athenians. But on arriving in Thrace, these
envoys met with nothing but unanimous opposition: and so energetic
were the remonstrances of the Chalkidians, both in Amphipolis and out
of it, that even Klearidas refused obedience to his own government,
pretending that he was not strong enough to surrender the place
against the resistance of the Chalkidians. Thus completely baffled,
the envoys returned to Sparta, whither Klearidas thought it prudent
to accompany them, partly to explain his own conduct, partly in hopes
of being able to procure some modification of the terms. But he found
this impossible, and he was sent back to Amphipolis with peremptory
orders to surrender the place to the Athenians, if it could possibly
be done; if that should prove beyond his force, then to come away,
and bring home every Peloponnesian soldier in the garrison. Perhaps
the surrender was really impracticable to a force no greater
than that which Klearidas commanded, since the reluctance of the
population was doubtless obstinate. At any rate, he represented it to
be impracticable: the troops accordingly came home, but the Athenians
still remained excluded from Amphipolis, and all the stipulations of
the peace respecting the Thracian towns remained unperformed. Nor
was this all. The envoys from the recusant minority (Corinthians and
others), after having gone home for instructions, had now come back
to Sparta with increased repugnance and protest against the injustice
of the peace, so that all the efforts of the Spartans to bring them
to compliance were fruitless.[5]
[5] Thucyd. v, 21, 22.
The latter were now in serious embarrassment. Not having executed
their portion of the treaty, they could not demand that Athens should
execute hers: and they were threatened with the double misfortune of
forfeiting the confidence of their allies without acquiring any one
of the advantages of the treaty. In this dilemma they determined to
enter into closer relations, and separate relations, with Athens,
at all hazard of offending their allies. Of the enmity of Argos,
if unaided by Athens, they had little apprehension; while the
moment was now favorable for alliance with Athens, from the decided
pacific tendencies reigning on both sides, as well as from the
known philo-Laconian sentiment of the leaders Nikias and Lachês.
The Athenian envoys had remained at Sparta ever since the swearing
of the peace, awaiting the fulfilment of the conditions; Nikias
or Lachês, one or both, being very probably among them. When they
saw that Sparta was unable to fulfil her bond, so that the treaty
seemed likely to be cancelled, they would doubtless encourage, and
perhaps may even have suggested, the idea of a separate alliance
between Sparta and Athens, as the only expedient for covering the
deficiency; promising that under that alliance the Spartan captives
should be restored. Accordingly, a treaty was concluded between the
two, for fifty years; not merely of peace, but of defensive alliance.
Each party pledged itself to assist in repelling any invaders of
the territory of the other, to treat them as enemies, and not to
conclude peace with them without the consent of the other. This was
the single provision of the alliance, with one addition, however,
of no mean importance, for the security of Lacedæmon. The Athenians
engaged to lend their best and most energetic aid in putting down any
rising of the Helots which might occur in Laconia. Such a provision
indicates powerfully the uneasiness felt by the Lacedæmonians
respecting their serf-population: but at the present moment it was of
peculiar value to them, since it bound the Athenians to restrain, if
not to withdraw, the Messenian garrison of Pylos, planted there by
themselves for the express purpose of provoking the Helots to revolt.
An alliance with stipulations so few and simple took no long time
to discuss. It was concluded very speedily after the return of the
envoys from Amphipolis, probably not more than a month or two after
the former peace. It was sworn to by the same individuals on both
sides; with similar declaration that the oath should be annually
renewed, and also with similar proviso that Sparta and Athens might
by mutual consent either enlarge or contract the terms, without
violating the oath.[6] Moreover, the treaty was directed to be
inscribed on two columns: one to be set up in the temple of Apollo at
Amyklæ, the other in the temple of Athênê, in the acropolis of Athens.
[6] Thucyd. v, 23. The treaty of alliance seems to have been
drawn up at Sparta, and approved or concerted with the Athenian
envoys; then sent to Athens, and there adopted by the people;
then sworn to on both sides. The interval between this second
treaty and the first (οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, v, 24), may have been
more than a month; for it comprised the visit of the Lacedæmonian
envoys to Amphipolis and the other towns of Thrace, the
manifestation of resistance in those towns, and the return of
Klearidas to Sparta to give an account of his conduct.
The most important result of this new alliance was something
not specified in its provisions, but understood, we may be well
assured, between the Spartan ephors and Nikias at the time when it
was concluded. All the Spartan captives at Athens were forthwith
restored.[7]
[7] Thucyd. v, 24.
Nothing can demonstrate more powerfully the pacific and acquiescent
feeling now reigning at Athens, as well as the strong philo-Laconian
inclinations of her leading men (at this moment Alkibiadês was
competing with Nikias for the favor of Sparta, as will be stated
presently), than the terms of this alliance, which bound Athens to
assist in keeping down the Helots, and the still more important
after-proceeding, of restoring the Spartan captives. Athens thus
parted irrevocably with her best card, and promised to renounce her
second best, without obtaining the smallest equivalent beyond what
was contained in the oath of Sparta to become her ally. For the last
three years and a half, ever since the capture of Sphakteria, the
possession of these captives had placed her in a position of decided
advantage in regard to her chief enemy; advantage, however, which
had to a certain extent been countervailed by subsequent losses.
This state of things was fairly enough represented by the treaty of
peace deliberately discussed during the winter, and sworn to at the
commencement of spring, whereby a string of concessions, reciprocal
and balancing, had been imposed on both parties. Moreover, Athens had
been lucky enough in drawing lots to find herself enabled to wait for
the actual fulfilment of such concessions by the Spartans, before
she consummated her own. Now the Spartans had not as yet realized
any one of their promised concessions: nay, more; in trying to do
so, they had displayed such a want either of power or of will, as
made it plain, that nothing short of the most stringent necessity
would convert their promises into realities. Yet, under these marked
indications, Nikias persuades his countrymen to conclude a second
treaty which practically annuls the first, and which insures to
the Spartans gratuitously all the main benefits of the first, with
little or none of the correlative sacrifices. The alliance of Sparta
could hardly be said to count as a consideration: for that alliance
was at this moment, under the uncertain relations with Argos, not
less valuable to Sparta herself than to Athens. There can be little
doubt that, if the game of Athens had now been played with prudence,
she might have recovered Amphipolis in exchange for the captives:
for the inability of Klearidas to make over the place, even if we
grant it to have been a real fact and not merely simulated, might
have been removed by decisive coöperation on the part of Sparta
with an Athenian armament sent to occupy the place. In fact, that
which Athens was now induced to grant was precisely the original
proposition transmitted to her by the Lacedæmonians four years
before, when the hoplites were first inclosed in Sphakteria, but
before the actual capture. They then tendered no equivalent, but
merely said, through their envoys, “Give us the men in the island,
and accept in exchange peace, together with our alliance.”[8] At that
moment there were some plausible reasons in favor of granting the
proposition: but even then, the case of Kleon against it was also
plausible and powerful, when he contended that Athens was entitled
to make a better bargain. But _now_, there were no reasons in its
favor, and a strong concurrence of reasons against it. Alliance with
the Spartans was of no great value to Athens: peace was of material
importance to her; but peace had been already sworn to on both sides,
after deliberate discussion, and required now only to be carried into
execution. That equal reciprocity of concession, which presented the
best chance of permanent result, had been agreed on; and fortune had
procured for her the privilege of receiving the purchase-money before
she handed over the goods. Why renounce so advantageous a position,
accepting in exchange a hollow and barren alliance, under the
obligation of handing over her most precious merchandise upon credit,
and upon credit as delusive in promise as it afterwards proved
unproductive in reality? The alliance, in fact, prevented the peace
from being fulfilled: it became, as Thucydidês himself[9] admits, no
peace, but a simple suspension of direct hostilities.
[8] Thucyd. iv, 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ὑμᾶς προκαλοῦνται ἐς
σπονδὰς καὶ διάλυσιν πολέμου, διδόντες μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ ξυμμαχίαν
καὶ ἄλλην φιλίαν πολλὴν καὶ οἰκειότητα ἐς ἀλλήλους ὑπάρχειν,
ἀνταιτοῦντες δὲ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας.
[9] Thucyd. v, 26. οὐκ εἰκὸς ὂν εἰρήνην αὐτὴν κριθῆναι, etc.
Thucydidês states on more than one occasion, and it was the
sentiment of Nikias himself, that at the moment of concluding the
peace which bears his name, the position of Sparta was one of
disadvantage and dishonor in reference to Athens;[10] alluding
chiefly to the captives in the hands of the latter; for as to other
matters, the defeats of Delium and Amphipolis, with the serious
losses in Thrace, would more than countervail the acquisitions
of Nisæa, Pylus, Kythêra, and Methônê. Yet so inconsiderate and
short-sighted were the philo-Laconian leanings of Nikias and the
men who now commanded confidence at Athens, that they threw away
this advantage, suffered Athens to be cheated of all those hopes
which they had themselves held out as the inducement for peace, and
nevertheless yielded gratuitously to Sparta all the main points which
she desired. Most certainly there was never any public recommendation
of Kleon, as far as our information goes, so ruinously impolitic as
this alliance with Sparta and surrender of the captives, wherein
both Nikias and Alkibiadês concurred. Probably the Spartan ephors
amused Nikias, and he amused the Athenian assembly, with fallacious
assurances of certain obedience in Thrace, under alleged peremptory
orders given to Klearidas. And now that the vehement leather-dresser,
with his criminative eloquence, had passed away, replaced only by an
inferior successor, the lamp-maker[11] Hyperbolus, and leaving the
Athenian public under the undisputed guidance of citizens eminent for
birth and station, descended from gods and heroes, there remained
no one to expose effectively the futility of such assurances, or to
enforce the lesson of simple and obvious prudence: “Wait, as you are
entitled to wait, until the Spartans have performed the onerous part
of their bargain, before you perform the onerous part of yours. Or,
if you choose to relax in regard to some of the concessions which
they have sworn to make, at any rate stick to the capital point of
all, and lay before them the peremptory alternative—Amphipolis in
exchange for the captives.”
[10] Thucyd. v, 28. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων
μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς.—(Νικίας)
λέγων ἐν μὲν τῷ σφετέρῳ καλῷ (Athenian) ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκείνων ἀπρεπεῖ
(Lacedæmonian) τὸν πόλεμον ἀναβάλλεσθαι, etc. (v, 46)—Οἷς πρῶτον
μὲν (to the Lacedæmonians) διὰ ξυμφορῶν ἡ ξύμβασις, etc.
[11] Aristophan. Pac. 665-887.
The Athenians were not long in finding out how completely they had
forfeited the advantage of their position, and their chief means of
enforcement, by giving up the captives; which imparted a freedom
of action to Sparta such as she had never enjoyed since the first
blockade of Sphakteria. Yet it seems that under the present ephors
Sparta was not guilty of any deliberate or positive act which
could be called a breach of faith. She gave orders to Klearidas
to surrender Amphipolis if he could; if not, to evacuate it, and
bring the Peloponnesian troops home. Of course, the place was not
surrendered to the Athenians, but evacuated; and she then considered
that she had discharged her duty to Athens, as far as Amphipolis was
concerned, though she had sworn to restore it, and her oath remained
unperformed.[12] The other Thracian towns were equally deaf to her
persuasions, and equally obstinate in their hostility to Athens. So
also were the Bœotians, Corinthians, Megarians, and Eleians: but the
Bœotians, while refusing to become parties to the truce along with
Sparta, concluded for themselves a separate convention or armistice
with Athens, terminable at ten days’ notice on either side.[13]
[12] Thucyd. v, 21-35.
[13] Thucyd. v, 32.
In this state of things, though ostensible relations of peace and
free reciprocity of intercourse between Athens and Peloponnesus were
established, the discontent of the Athenians, and the remonstrances
of their envoys at Sparta, soon became serious. The Lacedæmonians
had sworn for themselves and their allies, yet the most powerful
among these allies, and those whose enmity was most important
to Athens, continued still recusant. Neither Panaktum, nor the
Athenian prisoners in Bœotia, were yet restored to Athens; nor had
the Thracian cities yet submitted to the peace. In reply to the
remonstrances of the Athenian envoys, the Lacedæmonians affirmed
that they had already surrendered all the Athenian prisoners in
their own hands, and had withdrawn their troops from Thrace, which
was, they said, all the intervention in their power, since they were
not masters of Amphipolis, nor capable of constraining the Thracian
cities against their will. As to the Bœotians and Corinthians, the
Lacedæmonians went so far as to profess readiness to take arms
along with Athens,[14] for the purpose of constraining them to
accept the peace, and even spoke about naming a day, after which
these recusant states should be proclaimed as joint enemies, both
by Sparta and Athens. But their propositions were always confined
to vague words, nor would they consent to bind themselves by any
written or peremptory instrument. Nevertheless, so great was their
confidence either in the sufficiency of these assurances, or in the
facility of Nikias, that they ventured to require from Athens the
surrender of Pylus, or at least the withdrawal of the Messenian
garrison with the Helot deserters from that place, leaving in it none
but native Athenian soldiers, until farther progress should be made
in the peace. But the feeling of the Athenians was now seriously
altered, and they received this demand with marked coldness. None
of the stipulations of the treaty in their favor had yet been
performed, none even seemed in course of being performed: so that
they now began to suspect Sparta of dishonesty and deceit, and deeply
regretted their inconsiderate surrender of the captives.[15] Their
remonstrances at Sparta, often repeated during the course of the
summer, produced no positive effect: nevertheless, they suffered
themselves to be persuaded to remove the Messenians and Helots from
Pylus to Kephallenia, replacing them by an Athenian garrison.[16]
[14] Thucyd. v, 35. λέγοντες ἀεὶ ὡς μετ’ Ἀθηναίων τούτους,
ἢν μὴ θέλωσι, κοινῇ ἀναγκάσουσι· ~χρόνους δὲ προὔθεντο ἄνευ
ξυγγραφῆς~, ἐν οἷς χρῆν τοὺς μὴ ἐσιόντας ἀμφοτέροις πολεμίους
εἶναι.
[15] Thucyd. v, 35. τούτων οὖν ὁρῶντες οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἔργῳ
γιγνόμενον, ὑπετόπευον τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μηδὲν δίκαιον
διανοεῖσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε Πύλον ἀπαιτούντων αὐτῶν ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλὰ
~καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἄνδρας μετεμέλοντο ἀποδεδωκότες~, etc.
[16] Thucyd. v, 35. πολλάκις δὲ καὶ πολλῶν λόγων γενομένων ἐν τῷ
θέρει τούτῳ, etc.
The Athenians had doubtless good reason to complain of Sparta. But
the persons of whom they had still better reason to complain, were
Nikias and their own philo-Laconian leaders; who had first accepted
from Sparta promises doubtful as to execution, and next—though
favored by the lot in regard to priority of cession, and thus
acquiring proof that Sparta either would not or could not perform her
promises—renounced all these advantages, and procured for Sparta
almost gratuitously the only boon for which she seriously cared. The
many critics on Grecian history, who think no term too harsh for the
demagogue Kleon, ought in fairness to contrast his political counsel
with that of his rivals, and see which of the two betokens greater
forethought in the management of the foreign relations of Athens.
Amphipolis had been once lost by the improvident watch of Thucydidês
and Euklês: it was now again lost by the improvident concessions of
Nikias.
So much was the Peloponnesian alliance unhinged by the number of
states which had refused the peace, and so greatly was the ascendency
of Sparta for the time impaired, that new combinations were now
springing up in the peninsula. It has already been mentioned that
the truce between Argos and Sparta was just now expiring: Argos
therefore was free, with her old pretensions to the headship of
Peloponnesus, backed by an undiminished fulness of wealth, power,
and population. Having taken no direct part in the late exhausting
war, she had even earned money by lending occasional aid on both
sides;[17] while her military force was just now farther strengthened
by a step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart
a body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth
and station, to receive constant military training at the public
expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves,
apart from the other citizens.[18] To a democratical government like
Argos, such an institution was internally dangerous, and pregnant
with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present
moment, the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only
of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with
Sparta was expiring, and that the disorganized state of the Spartan
confederacy opened new chances to her ambition of regaining something
like headship in Peloponnesus.
[17] Thucyd. v, 28. Aristophan. Pac. 467, about the Argeians,
δίχοθεν μισθοφοροῦντες ἄλφιτα.
He characterizes the Argeians as anxious for this reason to
prolong the war between Athens and Sparta. This passage, as well
as the whole tenor of the play, affords ground for affirming that
the Pax was represented during the winter immediately preceding
the Peace of Nikias, about four or five months after the battle
of Amphipolis and the death of Kleon and Brasidas; not two years
later, as Mr. Clinton would place it, on the authority of a date
in the play itself, upon which he lays too great stress.
[18] Thucyd. v, 67. Ἀργείων οἱ Χίλιοι λογάδες, οἷς ἡ πόλις ~ἐκ
πολλοῦ~ ἄσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρεῖχε.
Diodorus (xii, 75) represents the first formation of this
Thousand-regiment at Argos as having taken place just about this
time, and I think he is here worthy of credit; so that I do not
regard the expression of Thucydidês ἐκ πολλοῦ as indicating a
time more than two years prior to the battle of Mantineia. For
Grecian military training, two years of constant practice would
be a _long_ time. It is not to be imagined that the Argeian
democracy would have incurred the expense and danger of keeping
up this select regiment during all the period of their long
peace, just now coming to an end.
The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now inducing
them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new chief. They had
mistrusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing that she had
separate interests from the confederacy, arising from desire to get
back her captives: in the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and
Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies,
especially those in Thrace, being put out of sight. Moreover, that
article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens
and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that
they chose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as
if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens
against the confederacy.[19] And the alarm, once roused, was still
farther aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta
and Athens, which followed so closely afterwards, as well as by the
restoration of the Spartan captives.
[19] Thucyd. v, 29. μὴ μετὰ Ἀθηναίων σφᾶς βούλωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι
δουλώσασθαι: compare Diodorus, xii, 75.
Such general displeasure among the Peloponnesian states at the
unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened
in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own,
first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring
from the conferences at Sparta,—where the recent alliance between
the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the
latter had vainly endeavored to prevail upon their allies to accept
the peace,—the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate
what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the
leading men in that city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step
forward as saviour of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were
openly betraying to the common enemy, and to invite for that purpose,
into alliance for reciprocal defence, every autonomous Hellenic state
which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in
all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred
of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a
board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers
to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection,
there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly in the
Argeian democracy. This suggestion—privately made by the Corinthians,
who returned home immediately afterwards—was eagerly adopted both
by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realize their
long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners were
accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they
might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those
two cities, no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the
public assembly.[20]
[20] Thucyd. v, 28.
Meanwhile, the Corinthians, though they had been the first to set the
Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling
themselves publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of
Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was the Mantineians who made
the first application to Argos under the notice just issued. And
here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the
secondary and interior states of Peloponnesus. Mantineia and Tegea,
being conterminous as well as the two most considerable states in
Arcadia, were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself only a
year and a half before in a bloody but indecisive battle.[21] Tegea,
situated on the frontiers of Laconia, and oligarchically governed,
was tenaciously attached to Sparta: while for that very reason, as
well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantineia
was less so, though she was still enrolled in and acted as a member
of the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for
herself[22] a little empire in her own neighborhood, composed of
village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject allies, and
comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest
had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens; a
period when the lesser states of Peloponnesus generally, and even
subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under
the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to
render their unpaid service against the common enemy; so that she
was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and
for the emancipation of these subjects, who lay, moreover, near
to the borders of Laconia. Such interference would probably have
been invoked earlier; only that Sparta had been under pressing
embarrassments—and farther, had assembled no general muster of the
confederacy against Athens—ever since the disaster in Sphakteria. But
now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as
motive for interference.
[21] Thucyd. iv, 134.
[22] Thucyd. v, 29. τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς Ἀρκαδίας
κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον, ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ
ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ
καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον.
As to the way in which the agreement of the members of the
confederacy modified the relations between subordinate and
imperial states, see farther on, pages 25 and 26, in the case of
Elis and Lepreum.
To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any
of them from being mediatized or grouped into aggregations under the
ascendency of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta;
especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by
insuring to every lesser state a substantive vote at the meetings of
the confederacy.[23] Moreover, the rivalry of Tegea would probably
operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantineia. Under such
apprehensions, the Mantineians hastened to court the alliance and
protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy
of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta[24] (for so it was
considered) excited great sensation throughout Peloponnesus, together
with considerable disposition, amidst the discontent then prevalent,
to follow the example.
[23] Thucyd. i, 125.
[24] Thucyd. v, 29. ~Ἀποστάντων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων~, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη
Πελοπόννησος ἐς θροῦν καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι ποιητέον τοῦτο,
νομίζοντες πλέον τέ τι εἰδότας μεταστῆναι αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς
Λακεδαιμονίους ἅμα δι’ ὀργῆς ἔχοντες, etc.
In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of
the congress at Corinth; whither the Lacedæmonians thought it
necessary to send special envoys to counteract the intrigues going
on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians strenuous
remonstrance, and even reproach, for the leading part which they
had taken in stirring up dissension among the old confederates, and
organizing a new confederacy under the presidency of Argos. “They
(the Corinthians) were thus aggravating the original guilt and
perjury which they had committed by setting at nought the formal
vote of a majority of the confederacy, and refusing to accept the
peace,—for it was the sworn and fundamental maxim of the confederacy,
that the decision of the majority should be binding on all,
except in such cases as involved some offence to gods or heroes.”
Encouraged by the presence of many sympathizing deputies, Bœotian,
Megarian, Chalkidian from Thrace,[25] etc., the Corinthians replied
with firmness. But they did not think it good policy to proclaim
their real ground for rejecting the peace, namely, that it had not
procured for themselves the restoration of Sollium and Anaktorium:
since, first, this was a question in which their allies present had
no interest; next, it did not furnish any valid excuse for their
resistance to the vote of the majority. Accordingly, they took their
stand upon a pretence at once generous and religious; upon that
reserve for religious scruples, which the Lacedæmonian envoy had
himself admitted, and which of course was to be construed by each
member with reference to his own pious feeling. “It _was_ a religious
impediment (the Corinthians contended) which prevented us from
acceding to the peace with Athens, notwithstanding the vote of the
majority; for we had previously exchanged oaths, ourselves apart from
the confederacy, with the Chalkidians of Thrace at the time when they
revolted from Athens: and we should have infringed those separate
oaths, had we accepted a treaty of peace in which these Chalkidians
were abandoned. As for alliance with Argos, we consider ourselves
free to adopt any resolution which we may deem suitable, after
consultation with our friends here present.” With this unsatisfactory
answer the Lacedæmonian envoys were compelled to return home. Yet
some Argeian envoys, who were also present in the assembly for the
purpose of urging the Corinthians to realize forthwith the hopes of
alliance which they had held out to Argos, were still unable on their
side to obtain a decided affirmative, being requested to come again
at the next conference.[26]
[25] Thucyd. v, 30. Κορίνθιοι δὲ παρόντων σφίσι τῶν ξυμμάχων,
ὅσοι οὐδ’ αὐτοὶ ἐδέξαντο τὰς σπονδάς (παρεκάλεσαν δὲ αὐτοὺς αὐτοὶ
πρότερον) ἀντέλεγον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ~ἃ μὲν ἠδικοῦντο, οὐ
δηλοῦντες ἄντικρυς~, etc.
[26] Thucyd. v, 30.
Though the Corinthians had themselves originated the idea of the new
Argeian confederacy and compromised Argos in an open proclamation,
yet they now hesitated about the execution of their own scheme.
They were restrained in part doubtless by the bitterness of
Lacedæmonian reproof; for the open consummation of this revolt,
apart from its grave political consequences, shocked a train of very
old feelings; but still more by the discovery that their friends,
who agreed with them in rejecting the peace, decidedly refused
all open revolt from Sparta and all alliance with Argos. In this
category were the Bœotians and Megarians. Both of these states—left
to their own impression and judgment by the Lacedæmonians, who did
not address to them any distinct appeal as they had done to the
Corinthians—spontaneously turned away from Argos, not less from
aversion towards the Argeian democracy than from sympathy with the
oligarchy at Sparta:[27] they were linked together by communion of
interest, not merely as being both neighbors and intense enemies of
Attica, but as each having a body of democratical exiles who might
perhaps find encouragement at Argos. Discouraged by the resistance of
these two important allies, the Corinthians hung back from visiting
Argos, until they were pushed forward by a new accidental impulse,
the application of the Eleians; who, eagerly embracing the new
project, sent envoys first to conclude alliance with the Corinthians,
and next to go on and enroll Elis as an ally of Argos. This incident
so confirmed the Corinthians in their previous scheme, that they
speedily went to Argos, along with the Chalkidians of Thrace, to join
the new confederacy.
[27] Thucyd. v, 31. Βοιωτοὶ δὲ καὶ Μεγαρῆς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγοντες
ἡσύχαζον, ~περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων~, καὶ νομίζοντες
σφίσι τὴν Ἀργείων δημοκρατίαν αὐτοῖς ὀλιγαρχουμένοις ἧσσον
ξύμφορον εἶναι τῆς Λακεδαιμονίων πολιτείας.
These words, περιορώμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, are not clear,
and have occasioned much embarrassment to the commentators,
as well as some propositions for altering the text. It would
undoubtedly be an improvement in the sense, if we were permitted
(with Dobree) to strike out the words ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων as
a gloss, and thus to construe περιορώμενοι as a middle verb,
“waiting to see the event,” or literally, “keeping a look-out
about them.” But taking the text as it now stands, the sense
which I have given to it seems the best which can be elicited.
Most of the critics translate περιορώμενοι “slighted or despised
by the Lacedæmonians.” But in the first place, this is not true
as a matter of fact: in the next place, if it were true, we
ought to have an adversative conjunction instead of καὶ before
νομίζοντες, since the tendency of the two motives indicated would
then be in opposite directions. “The Bœotians, though despised
by the Lacedæmonians, still thought a junction with the Argeian
democracy dangerous.” And this is the sense which Haack actually
proposes, though it does great violence to the word καὶ.
Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold translate περιορώμενοι “feeling
themselves slighted;” and the latter says, “The Bœotians and
Megarians took neither side; not the Lacedæmonian, for they felt
that the Lacedæmonians had slighted them; not the Argive, for
they thought that the Argive democracy would suit them less than
the constitution of Sparta.” But this again puts an inadmissible
meaning on ἡσύχαζον, which means “stood as they were.” The
Bœotians were not called upon to choose between two sides or two
positive schemes of action: they were invited to ally themselves
with Argos, and this they decline doing: they prefer to _remain
as they are_, allies of Lacedæmon, but refusing to become parties
to the peace. Moreover, in the sense proposed by Dr. Arnold, we
should surely find an adversative conjunction in place of καὶ.
I submit that the word περιορᾶν does not necessarily mean “to
slight or despise,” but sometimes “to leave alone, to take
no notice of, to abstain from interfering.” Thus, Thucyd. i,
24. Ἐπιδάμνιοι—πέμπουσιν ἐς τὴν Κερκύραν πρέσβεις—δεόμενοι μὴ
σφᾶς ~περιορᾶν~ φθειρομένους, etc. Again, i, 69, καὶ νῦν τοὺς
Ἀθηναίους οὐχ ἑκάς ἀλλ’ ἐγγὺς ὄντας ~περιορᾶτε~, etc. The same
is the sense of περιϊδεῖν and περιόψεσθαι, ii, 20. In all these
passages there is no idea of _contempt_ implied in the word: the
“leaving alone” or “abstaining from interference,” proceeds from
feelings quite different from contempt.
So in the passage here before us, περιορώμενοι seems the
_passive_ participle in this sense. Thucydidês, having just
described an energetic remonstrance sent by the Spartans to
prevent Corinth from joining Argos, means to intimate (by the
words here in discussion) that _no_ similar _interference_ was
resorted to by them to prevent the Bœotians and Megarians from
joining her: “The Bœotians and Megarians remained as they were,
_left to themselves by the Lacedæmonians_, and thinking the
Argeian democracy less suitable to them than the oligarchy of
Sparta.”
The conduct of Elis, like that of Mantineia, in thus revolting from
Sparta, had been dictated by private grounds of quarrel, arising
out of relations with their dependent ally Lepreum. The Lepreates
had become dependent on Elis some time before the beginning of the
Peloponnesian war, in consideration of aid lent by the Eleians to
extricate them from a dangerous war against some Arcadian enemies.
To purchase such aid, they had engaged to cede to the Eleians half
their territory; but had been left in residence and occupation of it,
under the stipulation of paying one talent yearly as tribute to the
Olympian Zeus; in other words, to the Eleians as his stewards. When
the Peloponnesian war began,[28] and the Lacedæmonians began to call
for the unpaid service of the Peloponnesian cities generally, small
as well as great, against Athens, the Lepreates were, by the standing
agreement of the confederacy, exempted for the time from continuing
to pay their tribute to Elis. Such exemption ceased with the war; at
the close of which Elis became entitled, under the same agreement,
to resume the suspended tribute. She accordingly required that the
payment should then be recommenced: but the Lepreates refused, and
when she proceeded to apply force, threw themselves on the protection
of Sparta, by whose decision the Eleians themselves at first agreed
to abide, having the general agreement of the confederacy decidedly
in their favor. But it presently appeared that Sparta was more
disposed to carry out her general system of favoring the autonomy
of the lesser states, than to enforce the positive agreement of
the confederacy. Accordingly the Eleians, accusing her of unjust
bias, renounced her authority as arbitrator, and sent a military
force to occupy Lepreum. Nevertheless, the Spartans persisted in
their adjudication, pronounced Lepreum to be autonomous, and sent a
body of their own hoplites to defend it against the Eleians. The
latter loudly protested against this proceeding, and pronounced the
Lacedæmonians as having robbed them of one of their dependencies,
contrary to that agreement which had been adopted by the general
confederacy when the war began,—to the effect that each imperial city
should receive back at the end of the war all the dependencies which
it possessed at the beginning, on condition of waiving its title to
tribute and military service from them so long as the war lasted.
After fruitless remonstrances with Sparta, the Eleians eagerly
embraced the opportunity now offered of revolting from her, and of
joining the new league with Corinth and Argos.[29]
[28] Thucyd. v, 31. Καὶ μέχρι τοῦ Ἀττικοῦ πολέμου ἀπέφερον·
ἔπειτα παυσαμένων διὰ πρόφασιν τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ Ἠλεῖοι
ἐπηνάγκαζον, οἱ δ’ ἐτράποντο πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους.
For the _agreement_ here alluded to, see a few lines forward.
[29] Thucyd. v, 31. τὴν ξυνθήκην προφέροντες ἐν ᾗ εἴρητο, ἃ
ἔχοντες ἐς τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον καθίσταντό τινες, ταῦτα ἔχοντας
καὶ ἐξελθεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἴσον ἔχοντες ἀφίστανται, etc.
Of the agreement here alluded to among the members of the
Peloponnesian confederacy, we hear only in this one passage.
It was extremely important to such of the confederates as
were imperial cities; that is, which had subordinates or
subject-allies.
Poppo and Bloomfield wonder that the Corinthians did not appeal
to this agreement in order to procure the restitution of
Sollium and Anaktorium. But they misconceive the scope of the
agreement, which did not relate to captures made during the war
by the common enemy. It would be useless for the confederacy to
enter into a formal agreement that none of the members should
lose anything through capture made by the enemy. This would
be a question of superiority of force, for no agreement could
bind the enemy. But the confederacy might very well make a
covenant among themselves, as to the relations between their own
imperial _immediate_ members, and the _mediate_ or subordinate
dependencies of each. Each imperial state consented to forego
the tribute or services of its dependency, so long as the latter
was called upon to lend its aid in the general effort of the
confederacy against the common enemy. But the confederacy at the
same time gave its guarantee, that the imperial state should
reënter upon these suspended rights, so soon as the war should
be at an end. This guarantee was clearly violated by Sparta in
the case of Elis and Lepreum. On the contrary, in the case of
Mantineia, mentioned a few pages back, p. 19, the Mantineians had
violated the maxim of the confederacy, and Sparta was justified
in interfering at the request of their subjects to maintain the
autonomy of the latter.
That new league, including Argos, Corinth, Elis, and Mantineia, had
now acquired such strength and confidence, that the Argeians and
Corinthians proceeded on a joint embassy to Tegea to obtain the
junction of that city, seemingly the most powerful in Peloponnesus
next to Sparta and Argos. What grounds they had for expecting success
we are not told. The mere fact of Mantineia having joined Argos,
seemed likely to deter Tegea, as the rival Arcadian power, from doing
the same: and so it proved, for the Tegeans decidedly refused the
proposal, not without strenuous protestations that they would stand
by Sparta in everything. The Corinthians were greatly disheartened
by this repulse, which they had by no means expected, having been
so far misled by general expressions of discontent against Sparta
as to believe that they could transfer nearly the whole body of
confederates to Argos. But they now began to despair of all farther
extension of Argeian headship, and even to regard their own position
as insecure on the side of Athens; with whom they were not at peace,
while by joining Argos they had forfeited their claim upon Sparta
and all her confederacy, including Bœotia and Megara. In this
embarrassment they betook themselves to the Bœotians, whom they again
entreated to join them in the Argeian alliance: a request already
once refused, and not likely to be now granted, but intended to usher
in a different request preferred at the same time. The Bœotians were
entreated to accompany the Corinthians to Athens, and obtain for them
from the Athenians an armistice terminable at ten days’ notice, such
as that which they had contracted for themselves. In case of refusal,
they were farther entreated to throw up their own agreement, and to
conclude no other without the concurrence of the Corinthians. So far
the Bœotians complied, as to go to Athens with the Corinthians, and
back their application for an armistice, which the Athenians declined
to grant, saying that the Corinthians were already included in the
general peace, if they were allies of Sparta. On receiving this
answer the Corinthians entreated the Bœotians, putting it as a matter
of obligation, to renounce their own armistice, and make common cause
as to all future compact. But this request was steadily refused. The
Bœotians maintained their ten days’ armistice; and the Corinthians
were obliged to acquiesce in their existing condition of peace _de
facto_, though not guaranteed by any pledge of Athens.[30]
[30] Thucyd. v, 32. Κορινθίοις δὲ ἀνακωχὴ ἄσπονδος ἦν πρὸς
Ἀθηναίους.
Upon which Dr. Arnold remarks: “By ἄσπονδος is meant a mere
agreement in words, not ratified by the solemnities of religion.
And the Greeks, as we have seen, considered the breach of their
word very different from the breach of their oath.”
Not so much is here meant even as that which Dr. Arnold supposes.
There was no agreement at all, either in words or by oath. There
was a simple absence of hostilities, _de facto_, not arising out
of any recognized pledge. Such is the meaning of ἀνακωχὴ, i, 66;
iii, 25, 26.
The answer here made by the Athenians to the application of
Corinth is not easy to understand. They might, with much better
reason, have declined to conclude the ten day’s armistice with
the _Bœotians_, because these latter still remained allies of
Sparta, though refusing to accede to the general peace; whereas
the Corinthians, having joined Argos, had less right to be
considered allies of Sparta. Nevertheless, we shall still find
them attending the meetings at Sparta, and acting as allies of
the latter.
Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians were not unmindful of the affront which
they had sustained by the revolt of Mantineia and Elis. At the
request of a party among the Parrhasii, the Arcadian subjects of
Mantineia, they marched under king Pleistoanax into that territory,
and compelled the Mantineians to evacuate the fort which they had
erected within it; which the latter were unable to defend, though
they received a body of Argeian troops to guard their city, and
were thus enabled to march their whole force to the threatened
spot. Besides liberating the Arcadian subjects of Mantineia,
the Lacedæmonians also planted an additional body of Helots and
Neodamodes at Lepreum, as a defence and means of observation on
the frontiers of Elis.[31] These were the Brasidean soldiers, whom
Klearidas had now brought back from Thrace. The Helots among them had
been manumitted as a reward, and allowed to reside where they chose.
But as they had imbibed lessons of bravery under their distinguished
commander, their presence would undoubtedly be dangerous among the
serfs of Laconia: hence the disposition of the Lacedæmonians to
plant them out. We may recollect that not very long before, they
had caused two thousand of the most soldierly Helots to be secretly
assassinated, without any ground of suspicion against these victims
personally, but simply from fear of the whole body and of course
greater fear of the bravest.[32]
[31] Thucyd. v, 33, 34. The Neodamodes were Helots previously
enfranchised, or the sons of such.
[32] Thucyd. iv, 80.
It was not only against danger from the returning Brasidean Helots
that the Lacedæmonians had to guard, but also against danger—real
or supposed—from their own Spartan captives, liberated by Athens
at the conclusion of the recent alliance. Though the surrender of
Sphakteria had been untarnished by any dishonor, nevertheless these
men could hardly fail to be looked upon as degraded, in the eyes
of Spartan pride; or at least they might fancy that they were so
looked upon, and thus become discontented. Some of them were already
in the exercise of various functions, when the ephors contracted
suspicions of their designs, and condemned them all to temporary
disqualification for any official post, placing the whole of their
property under trust-management, and interdicting them, like minors,
from every act either of purchase or sale.[33] This species of
disfranchisement lasted for a considerable time; but the sufferers
were at length relieved from it, the danger being supposed to be
over. The nature of the interdict confirms, what we know directly
from Thucydidês, that many of these captives were among the first and
wealthiest families in the state, and the ephors may have apprehended
that they would employ their wealth in acquiring partisans and
organizing revolt among the Helots. We have no facts to enable
us to appreciate the situation; but the ungenerous spirit of the
regulation, as applied to brave warriors recently come home from a
long imprisonment—justly pointed out by modern historians—would not
weigh much with the ephors under any symptoms of public danger.
[33] Thucyd. v, 34. Ἀτίμους ἐποίησαν, ἀτιμίαν δὲ τοιαύτην, ὥστε
μήτε ἄρχειν, μήτε πριαμένους τι, ἢ πωλοῦντας, κυρίους εἶναι.
Of the proceedings of the Athenians during this summer we hear
nothing, except that the town of Skiônê at length surrendered to
them after a long-continued blockade, and that they put to death
the male population of military age, selling the women and children
into slavery. The odium of having proposed this cruel resolution two
years and a half before, belongs to Kleon; that of executing it,
nearly a year after his death, to the leaders who succeeded him,
and to his countrymen generally. The reader will, however, now be
sufficiently accustomed to the Greek laws of war not to be surprised
at such treatment against subjects revolted and reconquered. Skiônê
and its territory was made over to the Platæan refugees. The native
population of Delos, also, who had been removed from that sacred
spot during the preceding year, under the impression that they were
too impure for the discharge of the sacerdotal functions, were
now restored to their island. The subsequent defeat of Amphipolis
had created a belief at Athens that this removal had offended the
gods; under which impression, confirmed by the Delphian oracle,
the Athenians now showed their repentance by restoring the Delian
exiles.[34] They farther lost the towns of Thyssus on the peninsula
of Athos, and Mekyberna on the Sithonian gulf, which were captured by
the Chalkidians of Thrace.[35]
[34] Thucyd. v, 32.
[35] Thucyd. v, 35-39. I agree with Dr. Thirlwall and Dr. Arnold
in preferring the conjecture of Poppo, Χαλκιδῆς, in this place.
Meanwhile the political relations throughout the powerful Grecian
states remained all provisional and undetermined. The alliance still
subsisted between Sparta and Athens, yet with continual complaints on
the part of the latter that the prior treaty remained unfulfilled.
The members of the Spartan confederacy were discontented; some had
seceded, and others seemed likely to do the same; while Argos,
ambitious to supplant Sparta, was trying to put herself at the head
of a new confederacy, though as yet with very partial success.
Hitherto, however, the authorities of Sparta—king Pleistoanax as well
as the ephors of the year—had been sincerely desirous to maintain
the Athenian alliance, so far as it could be done without sacrifice,
and without the real employment of force against recusants, of which
they had merely talked in order to amuse the Athenians. Moreover,
the prodigious advantage which they had gained by recovering the
prisoners, doubtless making them very popular at home, would attach
them the more firmly to their own measure. But at the close of the
summer—seemingly about the end of September or beginning of October,
B.C. 421—the year of these ephors expired, and new ephors were
nominated for the ensuing year. Under the existing state of things
this was an important revolution: for out of the five new ephors,
two—Kleobûlus and Xenarês—were decidedly hostile to peace with
Athens, and the remaining three apparently indifferent.[36] And we
may here remark, that this fluctuation and instability of public
policy, which is often denounced as if it were the peculiar attribute
of a democracy, occurs quite as much under the constitutional
monarchy of Sparta, the least popular government in Greece, both in
principle and detail.
[36] Thucyd. v, 36.
The new ephors convened a special congress at Sparta for the
settlement of the pending differences, at which among the rest
Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian envoys were all present. But,
after prolonged debates, no approach was made to agreement; so that
the congress was on the point of breaking up, when Kleobûlus and
Xenarês, together with many of their partisans,[37] originated, in
concert with the Bœotian and Corinthian deputies, a series of private
underhand manœuvres for the dissolution of the Athenian alliance.
This was to be effected by bringing about a separate alliance between
Argos and Sparta, which the Spartans sincerely desired, and would
grasp at in preference, so these ephors affirmed, even if it cost
them the breach of their new tie with Athens. The Bœotians were
urged, first to become allies of Argos themselves, and then to bring
Argos into alliance with Sparta. But it was farther essential that
they should give up Panaktum to Sparta, so that it might be tendered
to the Athenians in exchange for Pylos; for Sparta could not easily
go to war with them while they remained masters of the latter.[38]
[37] Thucyd. v, 37. ἐπεσταλμένοι ἀπό τε τοῦ Κλεοβούλου καὶ
Ξενάρους καὶ ὅσοι φίλοι ἦσαν αὐτοῖς, etc.
[38] Thucyd. v, 36.
Such were the plans which Kleobûlus and Xenarês laid with the
Corinthian and Bœotian deputies, and which the latter went home
prepared to execute. Chance seemed to favor the purpose at once: for
on their road home, they were accosted by two Argeians, senators
in their own city, who expressed an earnest anxiety to bring about
alliance between the Bœotians and Argos. The Bœotian deputies, warmly
encouraging this idea, urged the Argeians to send envoys to Thebes
as solicitors of the alliance; and communicated to the bœotarchs, on
their arrival at home, both the plans laid by the Spartan ephors and
the wishes of these Argeians. The bœotarchs also entered heartily
into the entire scheme; receiving the Argeian envoys with marked
favor, and promising, as soon as they should have obtained the
requisite sanction, to send envoys of their own and ask for alliance
with Argos.
That sanction was to be obtained from “the Four Senates of the
Bœotians;” bodies, of the constitution of which nothing is known.
But they were usually found so passive and acquiescent that the
bœotarchs, reckoning upon their assent as a matter of course,
even without any full exposition of reasons, laid all their plans
accordingly.[39] They proposed to these four Senates a resolution
in general terms, empowering themselves in the name of the Bœotian
federation to exchange oaths of alliance with any Grecian city which
might be willing to contract on terms mutually beneficial: their
particular object being, as they stated, to form alliance with
the Corinthians, Megarians, and Chalkidians of Thrace, for mutual
defence, and for war as well as peace with others only by common
consent. To this specific object they anticipated no resistance on
the part of the Senates, inasmuch as their connection with Corinth
had always been intimate, while the position of the four parties
named was the same, all being recusants of the recent peace. But
the resolution was advisedly couched in the most comprehensive
terms, in order that it might authorize them to proceed farther
afterwards, and conclude alliance on the part of the Bœotians and
Megarians with Argos; that ulterior purpose being however for the
present kept back, because alliance with Argos was a novelty which
might surprise and alarm the Senates. The manœuvre, skilfully
contrived for entrapping these bodies into an approval of measures
which they never contemplated, illustrates the manner in which an
oligarchical executive could elude the checks devised to control
its proceedings. But the bœotarchs, to their astonishment, found
themselves defeated at the outset: for the Senates would not even
hear of alliance with Corinth, so much did they fear to offend Sparta
by any special connection with a city which had revolted from her.
Nor did the bœotarchs think it safe to divulge their communications
with Kleobûlus and Xenarês, or to acquaint the Senates that the whole
plan originated with a powerful party in Sparta herself. Accordingly,
under this formal refusal on the part of the Senates, no farther
proceedings could be taken. The Corinthian and Chalkidian envoys left
Thebes, while the promise of sending Bœotian envoys to Argos remained
unexecuted.[40]
[39] Thucyd. v, 38. οἰόμενοι τὴν βουλὴν, κἂν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα
ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν ... ταῖς τέσσαρσι
βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσι.
[40] Thucyd. v, 38.
But the anti-Athenian ephors at Sparta, though baffled in their
schemes for arriving at the Argeian alliance through the agency
of the Bœotians, did not the less persist in their views upon
Panaktum. That place—a frontier fortress in the mountainous range
between Attica and Bœotia, apparently on the Bœotian side of Phylê,
and on or near the direct road from Athens to Thebes which led
through Phylê[41]—had been an Athenian possession, until six months
before the peace, when it had been treacherously betrayed to the
Bœotians.[42] A special provision of the treaty between Athens
and Sparta, prescribed that it should be restored to Athens; and
Lacedæmonian envoys were now sent on an express mission to Bœotia,
to request from the Bœotians the delivery of Panaktum as well as
of their Athenian captives, in order that by tendering these to
Athens she might be induced to surrender Pylos. The Bœotians refused
compliance with this request, except on condition that Sparta should
enter into special alliance with them as she had done with the
Athenians. Now the Spartans stood pledged by their covenant with the
latter, either by its terms or by its recognized import, not to enter
into any new alliance without their consent. But they were eagerly
bent upon getting possession of Panaktum; while the prospect of
breach with Athens, far from being a deterring motive, was exactly
that which Kleobûlus and Xenarês desired. Under these feelings,
the Lacedæmonians consented to and swore the special alliance with
Bœotia. But the Bœotians, instead of handing over Panaktum for
surrender, as they had promised, immediately razed the fortress to
the ground; under pretence of some ancient oaths which had been
exchanged between their ancestors and the Athenians, to the effect
that the district round it should always remain without resident
inhabitants, as a neutral strip of borderland, and under common
pasture.
[41] See Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii, ch.
xvii, p. 370.
[42] Thucyd. v, 3.
These negotiations, after having been in progress throughout
the winter, ended in the accomplishment of the alliance and the
destruction of Panaktum at the beginning of spring or about the
middle of March. And while the Lacedæmonian ephors thus seemed to
be carrying their point on the side of Bœotia, they were agreeably
surprised by an unexpected encouragement to their views from another
quarter. An embassy arrived at Sparta from Argos, to solicit renewal
of the peace just expiring. The Argeians found that they made no
progress in the enlargement of their newly-formed confederacy, while
their recent disappointment with the Bœotians made them despair of
realizing their ambitious projects of Peloponnesian headship. But
when they learned that the Lacedæmonians had concluded a separate
alliance with the Bœotians, and that Panaktum had been razed, their
disappointment was converted into positive alarm for the future.
Naturally inferring that this new alliance would not have been
concluded except in concert with Athens, they interpreted the whole
proceeding as indicating that Sparta had prevailed upon the Bœotians
to accept the peace with Athens, the destruction of Panaktum being
conceived as a compromise to obviate disputes respecting possession.
Under such a persuasion,—noway unreasonable in itself, when the two
contracting governments, both oligarchical and both secret, furnished
no collateral evidence to explain their real intent,—the Argeians saw
themselves excluded from alliance not merely with Bœotia, Sparta,
and Tegea, but also with Athens; which latter city they had hitherto
regarded as a sure resort in case of hostility with Sparta. Without
a moment’s delay, they despatched Eustrophus and Æson, two Argeians
much esteemed at Sparta, and perhaps proxeni of that city, to press
for a renewal of their expiring truce with the Spartans, and to
obtain the best terms they could.
To the Lacedæmonian ephors this application was eminently acceptable,
the very event which they had been manœuvring underhand to bring
about: and negotiations were opened, in which the Argeian envoys
at first proposed that the disputed possession of Thyrea should
be referred to arbitration. But they found their demand met by a
peremptory negative, the Lacedæmonians refusing to enter upon such
a discussion, and insisting upon simple renewal of the peace now at
an end. At last the Argeian envoys, eagerly bent upon keeping the
question respecting Thyrea open, in some way or other, prevailed upon
the Lacedæmonians to assent to the following singular agreement.
Peace was concluded between Athens and Sparta for fifty years; but
if at any moment within that interval, excluding either periods
of epidemic or periods of war, it should suit the views of either
party to provoke a combat by chosen champions of equal number for
the purpose of determining the right to Thyrea, there was to be full
liberty of doing so; the combat to take place within the territory of
Thyrea itself, and the victors to be interdicted from pursuing the
vanquished beyond the undisputed border of either territory. It will
be recollected, that about one hundred and twenty years before this
date, there had been a combat of this sort by three hundred champions
on each side, in which, after desperate valor on both sides, the
victory as well as the disputed right still remained undetermined.
The proposition made by the Argeians was a revival of this old
practice of judicial combat: nevertheless, such was the alteration
which the Greek mind had undergone during the interval, that it now
appeared a perfect absurdity, even in the eyes of the Lacedæmonians,
the most old-fashioned people in Greece.[43] Yet since they hazarded
nothing, practically, by so vague a concession, and were supremely
anxious to make their relations smooth with Argos, in contemplation
of a breach with Athens, they at last agreed to the condition, drew
up the treaty, and placed it in the hands of the envoys to carry back
to Argos. Formal acceptance and ratification, by the Argeian public
assembly, was necessary to give it validity: should this be granted,
the envoys were invited to return to Sparta at the festival of the
Hyakinthia, and there go through the solemnity of the oaths.
Amidst such strange crossing of purposes and interests, the Spartan
ephors seemed now to have carried all their points; friendship with
Argos, breach with Athens, and yet the means—through the possession
of Panaktum—of procuring from Athens the cession of Pylos. But they
were not yet on firm ground. For when their deputies, Andromedês
and two colleagues, arrived in Bœotia for the purpose of going on
to Athens and prosecuting the negotiation about Panaktum, at the
time when Eustrophus and Æson were carrying on their negotiation at
Sparta, they discovered for the first time that the Bœotians, instead
of performing their promise to hand over Panaktum, had razed it to
the ground. This was a serious blow to their chance of success at
Athens: nevertheless, Andromedês proceeded thither, taking with him
all the Athenian captives in Bœotia. These he restored at Athens,
at the same time announcing the demolition of Panaktum as a fact:
Panaktum as well as the prisoners was thus _restored_, he pretended;
for the Athenians would not now find a single enemy in the place: and
he claimed the cession of Pylos in exchange.[44]
[43] Thucyd. v, 41. Τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐδόκει
μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα· ἔπειτα (ἐπεθύμουν γὰρ τὸ Ἄργος πάντως φίλιον
ἔχειν) ξυνεχώρησαν ἐφ’ οἷς ἠξίουν, καὶ ξυνεγράψαντο.
By the forms of treaty which remain, we are led to infer that
the treaty was not subscribed by any signatures, but drawn up by
the secretary or authorized officer, and ultimately engraved on
a column. The names of those who take the oath are recorded, but
seemingly no official signature.
[44] Thucyd. v. 42.
But he soon found that the final term of Athenian compliance had been
reached. It was probably on this occasion that the separate alliance
concluded between Sparta and the Bœotians first became discovered at
Athens; since not only were the proceedings of these oligarchical
governments habitually secret, but there was a peculiar motive for
keeping this alliance concealed until the discussion about Panaktum
and Pylos had been brought to a close. Both this alliance, and the
demolition of Panaktum, excited among the Athenians the strongest
marks of disgust and anger; aggravated probably rather than softened
by the quibble of Andromedês, that demolition of the fort, being
tantamount to restitution, and precluding any farther tenancy by the
enemy, was a substantial satisfaction of the treaty; and aggravated
still farther by the recollection of all the other unperformed
items in the treaty. A whole year had now elapsed, amidst frequent
notes and protocols, to employ a modern phrase; yet not one of the
conditions favorable to Athens had yet been executed, except the
restitution of her captives, seemingly not many in number; while she
on her side had made to Sparta the capital cession on which almost
everything hinged. A long train of accumulated indignation, brought
to a head by this mission of Andromedês, discharged itself in the
harshest dismissal and rebuke of himself and his colleagues.[45]
[45] Thucyd. v. 42.
Even Nikias, Lachês, and the other leading men, to whose improvident
facility and misjudgment the embarrassment of the moment was owing,
were probably not much behind the general public in exclamation
against Spartan perfidy, if it were only to divert attention from
their own mistake. But there was one of them—Alkibiadês son of
Kleinias—who took this opportunity of putting himself at the head of
the vehement anti-Laconian sentiment which now agitated the ekklesia,
and giving to it a substantive aim.
The present is the first occasion on which we hear of this remarkable
man as taking a prominent part in public life. He was now about
thirty-one or thirty-two years old, which in Greece was considered
an early age for a man to exercise important command. But such was
the splendor, wealth, and antiquity of his family, of Æakid lineage
through the heroes Eurysakês and Ajax, and such the effect of that
lineage upon the democratical public of Athens,[46] that he stepped
speedily and easily into a conspicuous station. Belonging also
through his mother Deinomachê to the gens of the Alkmæonidæ, he
was related to Periklês, who became his guardian when he was left
an orphan at about five years old, along with his younger brother
Kleinias. It was at that time that their father Kleinias was slain at
the battle of Koroneia, having already served with honor in a trireme
of his own at the sea-fight of Artemisium against the Persians. A
Spartan nurse named Amykla was provided for the young Alkibiadês, and
a slave named Zopyrus chosen by his distinguished guardian to watch
over him; but even his boyhood was utterly ungovernable, and Athens
was full of his freaks and enormities, to the unavailing regret of
Periklês and his brother Ariphron.[47] His violent passions, love of
enjoyment, ambition of preëminence, and insolence towards others,[48]
were manifested at an early age, and never deserted him throughout
his life. His finished beauty of person both as boy, youth, and
mature man, caused him to be much run after by women,[49] and even
by women of generally reserved habits. Moreover, even before the
age when such temptations were usually presented, the beauty of his
earlier youth, while going through the ordinary gymnastic training,
procured for him assiduous caresses, compliments, and solicitations
of every sort, from the leading Athenians who frequented the public
palæstræ. These men not only endured his petulance, but were
even flattered when he would condescend to bestow it upon them.
Amidst such universal admiration and indulgence, amidst corrupting
influences exercised from so many quarters and from so early an
age, combined with great wealth and the highest position, it was
not likely that either self-restraint or regard for the welfare of
others would ever acquire development in the mind of Alkibiadês. The
anecdotes which fill his biography reveal the utter absence of both
these constituent elements of morality; and though, in regard to the
particular stories, allowance must doubtless be made for scandal
and exaggeration, yet the general type of character stands plainly
marked and sufficiently established in all.
[46] Thucyd. v. 43. Ἀλκιβιάδης ... ἀνὴρ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν ὢν ἔτι τότε
νέος, ὡς ἐν ἄλλῃ πόλει, ἀξιώματι δὲ προγόνων τιμώμενος.
The expression cf Plutarch, however, ἔτι μειράκιον, seems an
exaggeration (Alkibiad. c. 10).
Kritias and Chariklês, in reply to the question of Sokratês, whom
they had forbidden to converse with or teach young men, defined a
_young man_ to be one under thirty years of age, the senatorial
age at Athens (Xenophon, Memor. i. 2. 35).
[47] Plato, Protagoras, c. 10, p. 320; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c.
2, 3, 4; Isokratês, De Bigis, Orat. xvi, p. 353, sect. 33, 34;
Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1.
[48] Πέπονθα δὲ πρὸς τοῦτον (Σωκράτη) μόνον ἀνθρώπων, ~ὃ οὐκ ἄν
τις οἴοιτο ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐνεῖναι, τὸ αἰσχύνεσθαι ὁντινοῦν~.
This is a part of the language which Plato puts into the mouth
of Alkibiadês, in the Symposion, c. 32, p. 216; see also Plato,
Alkibiad. i, c. 1, 2, 3.
Compare his other contemporary, Xenophon, Memor. i, 2, 16-25.
Φύσει δὲ πολλῶν ὄντων καὶ μεγάλων πάθων ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ φιλόνεικον
ἰσχυρότατον ἦν καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον, ὡς δῆλόν ἐστι τοῖς παιδικοῖς
ὑπομνήμασι (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 2).
[49] I translate, with some diminution of the force of the words,
the expression of a contemporary author, Xenophon, Memorab. i,
2. 24. Ἀλκιβιάδης δ’ αὖ διὰ μὲν κάλλος ὑπὸ πολλῶν καὶ σεμνῶν
γυναικῶν ~θηρώμενος~, etc.
A dissolute life, and an immoderate love of pleasure in all its
forms, is what we might naturally expect from a young man so
circumstanced; and it appears that with him these tastes were
indulged with an offensive publicity which destroyed the comfort
of his wife Hipparetê, daughter of Hipponikus who was slain at the
battle of Delium. She had brought him a large dowry of ten talents:
when she sought a divorce, as the law of Athens permitted, Alkibiadês
violently interposed to prevent her from obtaining the benefit of
the law, and brought her back by force to his house even from the
presence of the magistrate. It is this violence of selfish passion,
and reckless disregard of social obligation towards every one,
which forms the peculiar characteristic of Alkibiadês. He strikes
the schoolmaster whose house he happens to find unprovided with a
copy of Homer; he strikes Taureas,[50] a rival chorêgus, in the
public theatre, while the representation is going on; he strikes
Hipponikus, who afterwards became his father-in-law, out of a wager
of mere wantonness, afterwards appeasing him by an ample apology;
he protects the Thasian poet Hêgêmon, against whom an indictment
had been formally lodged before the archon, by effacing it with
his own hand from the published list in the public edifice, called
Metrôon; defying both magistrate and accuser to press the cause on
for trial.[51] Nor does it appear that any injured person ever dared
to bring Alkibiadês to trial before the dikastery, though we read
with amazement the tissue of lawlessness[52] which marked his private
life; a combination of insolence and ostentation with occasional
mean deceit when it suited his purpose. But amidst the perfect legal,
judicial, and constitutional equality, which reigned among the
citizens of Athens, there still remained great social inequalities
between one man and another, handed down from the times preceding
the democracy: inequalities which the democratical institutions
limited in their practical mischiefs, but never either effaced or
discredited, and which were recognized as modifying elements in the
current, unconscious vein of sentiment and criticism, by those whom
they injured as well as by those whom they favored. In the speech
which Thucydidês[53] ascribes to Alkibiadês before the Athenian
public assembly, we find the insolence of wealth and high social
position not only admitted as a fact, but vindicated as a just
morality; and the history of his life, as well as many other facts
in Athenian society, show that if not approved, it was at least
tolerated in practice to a serious extent, in spite of the restraints
of the democracy.
[50] Demosthen. cont. Meidiam, c. 49; Thucyd. vi, 16; Antipho
apud Athenæum, xii, p. 525.
[51] Athenæus, ix, p. 407.
[52] Thucyd. vi, 15. I translate the expression of Thucydidês,
which is of great force and significance—φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ οἱ
πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα ~παρανομίας~ ἐς τὴν
δίαιταν, etc. The same word is repeated by the historian, vi, 28.
τὴν ἄλλην αὐτοῦ ἐς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα οὐ δημοτικὴν ~παρανομίαν~.
The same phrase is also found in the short extract from the
λοιδορία of Antipho (Athenæus, xii, p. 525).
The description of Alkibiadês, given in that Discourse called the
Ἐρωτικὸς Λόγος, erroneously ascribed to Demosthenês (c. 12, p.
1414), is more discriminating than we commonly find in rhetorical
compositions. Τοῦτο δ’, Ἀλκιβιάδην εὑρήσεις φύσει μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν
πολλῷ χεῖρον διακείμενον, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπερηφάνως, τὰ δὲ ταπεινῶς,
τὰ δ’ ὑπεράκρως, ζῆν προῃρημένον· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς Σωκράτους ὁμιλίας
πολλὰ μὲν ἐπανορθωθέντα τοῦ βίου, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν
ἄλλων ἔργων ἐπικρυψάμενον.
Of the three epithets, whereby the author describes the bad
tendencies of Alkibiadês, full illustrations will be seen in his
proceedings, hereafter to be described. The improving influence
here ascribed to Sokratês is unfortunately far less borne out.
[53] Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 4; Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 2;
Plato, Protagoras, c. 1.
I do not know how far the memorable narrative ascribed to
Alkibiadês in the Symposium of Plato (c. 33, 34, pp. 216, 217)
can be regarded as matter of actual fact and history, so far as
Sokratês is concerned; but it is abundant proof in regard to the
general relations of Alkibiadês with others: compare Xenophon,
Memorab. i, 2, 29, 30; iv. 1-2.
Several of the dialogues of Plato present to us striking pictures
of the palæstra, with the boys, the young men, the gymnastic
teachers, engaged in their exercises or resting from them, and
the philosophers and spectators who came there for amusement
and conversation. See particularly the opening chapters of the
Lysis and the Charmidês; also the Rivales, where the scene is
laid in the house of a γραμματιστὴς, or schoolmaster. In the
Lysis, Sokratês professes to set his own conversation with
these interesting youths as an antidote to the corrupting
flatteries of most of those who sought to gain their good-will.
Οὕτω χρὴ, ὦ Ἱππόθαλες, τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινοῦντα
καὶ συστέλλοντα, ἀλλὰ μὴ, ὥσπερ σὺ, χαυνοῦντα καὶ διαθρύπτοντα
(Lysis, c. 7, p. 210).
See, in illustration of what is here said about Alkibiadês as
a youth, Euripid. Supplic. 906 (about Parthenopæus), and the
beautiful lines in the Atys of Catullus, 60-69.
There cannot be a doubt that the characters of all the Greek
youth of any pretensions were considerably affected by this
society and conversation of their boyish years; though the
subject is one upon which the full evidence cannot well be
produced and discussed.
Amidst such unprincipled exorbitances of behavior, Alkibiadês stood
distinguished for personal bravery. He served as a hoplite in the
army under Phormion at the siege of Potidæa in 432 B.C. Though then
hardly twenty years of age, he was among the most forward soldiers
in the battle, received a severe wound, and was in great danger;
owing his life only to the exertions of Sokratês, who served in
the ranks along with him. Eight years afterwards, Alkibiadês also
served with credit in the cavalry at the battle of Delium, and
had the opportunity of requiting his obligation to Sokratês, by
protecting him against the Bœotian pursuers. As a rich young man,
also, choregy and trierarchy became incumbent upon him; expensive
duties, which, as we might expect, he discharged not merely with
sufficiency, but with ostentation. In fact, expenditure of this sort,
though compulsory up to a certain point upon all rich men, was so
fully repaid, to all those who had the least ambition, in the shape
of popularity and influence, that most of them spontaneously went
beyond the requisite minimum for the purpose of showing themselves
off. The first appearance of Alkibiadês in public life is said to
have been as a donor, for some special purpose, in the ekklesia, when
various citizens were handing in their contributions: and the loud
applause which his subscription provoked was at that time so novel
and exciting to him, that he suffered a tame quail which he carried
in his bosom to escape. This incident excited mirth and sympathy
among the citizens present: the bird was caught and restored to him
by Antiochus, who from that time forward acquired his favor, and in
after days became his pilot and confidential lieutenant.[54]
[54] Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 10.
To a young man like Alkibiadês, thirsting for power and preëminence,
a certain measure of rhetorical facility and persuasive power was
indispensable. With a view to this acquisition, he frequented the
society of various sophistical and rhetorical teachers,[55] Prodikus,
Protagoras, and others; but most of all that of Sokratês. His
intimacy with Sokratês has become celebrated on many grounds, and
is commemorated both by Plato and Xenophon, though unfortunately
with less instruction than we could desire. We may readily believe
Xenophon, when he tells us that Alkibiadês—like the oligarchical
Kritias, of whom we shall have much to say hereafter—was attracted
to Sokratês by his unrivalled skill of dialectical conversation, his
suggestive influence over the minds of his hearers, in eliciting
new thoughts and combinations, his mastery of apposite and homely
illustrations, his power of seeing far beforehand the end of a long
cross-examination, his ironical affectation of ignorance, whereby
the humiliation of opponents was rendered only the more complete,
when they were convicted of inconsistency and contradiction out
of their own answers. The exhibitions of such ingenuity were in
themselves highly interesting, and stimulating to the mental
activity of listeners, while the faculty itself was one of peculiar
value to those who proposed to take the lead in public debate;
with which view both these ambitious young men tried to catch the
knack from Sokratês,[56] and to copy his formidable string of
interrogations. Both of them doubtless involuntarily respected the
poor, self-sufficing, honest, temperate, and brave citizen, in whom
this eminent talent resided; especially Alkibiadês, who not only owed
his life to the generous valor of Sokratês at Potidæa, but had also
learned in that service to admire the iron physical frame of the
philosopher in his armor, enduring hunger, cold, and hardship.[57]
But we are not to suppose that either of them came to Sokratês with
the purpose of hearing and obeying his precepts on matters of duty,
or receiving from him a new plan of life. They came partly to gratify
an intellectual appetite, partly to acquire a stock of words and
ideas, with facility of argumentative handling, suitable for their
after-purpose as public speakers. Subjects moral, political, and
intellectual, served as the theme sometimes of discourse, sometimes
of discussion, in the society of all these sophists, Prodikus and
Protagoras not less than Sokratês; for in the Athenian sense of
the word, Sokratês was a sophist as well as the others: and to the
rich youths of Athens, like Alkibiadês and Kritias, such society
was highly useful.[58] It imparted a nobler aim to their ambition,
including mental accomplishments as well as political success:
it enlarged the range of their understandings, and opened to them
as ample a vein of literature and criticism as the age afforded:
it accustomed them to canvass human conduct, with the causes and
obstructions of human well-being, both public and private: it even
suggested to them indirectly lessons of duty and prudence, from which
their social position tended to estrange them, and which they would
hardly have submitted to hear except from the lips of one whom they
intellectually admired. In learning to talk, they were forced to
learn more or less to think, and familiarized with the difference
between truth and error: nor would an eloquent lecturer fail to
enlist their feelings in the great topics of morals and politics.
Their thirst for mental stimulus and rhetorical accomplishments had
thus, as far as it went, a moralizing effect, though this was rarely
their purpose in the pursuit.[59]
[55] See the description in the Protagoras of Plato, c. 8, p. 317.
[56] See Xenophon, Memorab. i, 2, 12-24, 39-47.
Κριτίας μὲν καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδης, οὐκ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς Σωκράτους
ὡμιλησάτην, ὃν χρόνον ὡμιλείτην αὐτῷ, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς
ὡρμηκότε προεστάναι τῆς πόλεως. Ἔτι γὰρ Σωκράτει ξυνόντες
οὐκ ἄλλοις τισὶ μᾶλλον ἐπεχείρουν διαλέγεσθαι ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα
πράττουσι τὰ πολιτικά.... Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τάχιστα τῶν πολιτευομένων
ὑπέλαβον κρείττονες εἶναι, Σωκράτει μὲν οὐκ ἔτι προσῄεσαν, οὐδὲ
γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἄλλως ἤρεσκεν· εἴτε προσέλθοιεν, ὑπὲρ ὧν, ἡμάρτανον
ἐλεγχόμενοι ἤχθοντο· τὰ δὲ τῆς πóλεως ἔπραττον, ὧνπερ ἕνεκεν καὶ
Σωκράτει προσῆλθον. Compare Plato, Apolog. Sokrat. c. 10, p. 23;
c. 22, p. 33.
Xenophon represents Alkibiadês and Kritias as frequenting the
society of Sokratês, for the same reason and with the same
objects as Plato affirms that young men generally went to the
Sophists: see Plato, Sophist. c. 20, p. 232 D.
“Nam et Socrati (observes Quintilian, Inst. Or. ii, 16) objiciunt
comici, docere cum, quomodo pejorem causam meliorem reddat; et
contra Tisiam et Gorgiam similia dicit polliceri Plato.”
The representation given by Plato of the great influence acquired
by Sokratês over Alkibiadês, and of the deference and submission
of the latter, is plainly not to be taken as historical, even if
we had not the more simple and trustworthy picture of Xenophon.
Isokratês goes so far as to say that Sokratês was never known by
any one as teacher of Alkibiadês: which is an exaggeration in the
other direction. Isokratês, Busiris, Or. xi. sect. 6, p. 222.
[57] Plato, Symposium, c. 35-36, p. 220, etc.
[58] See the representation, given in the Protagoras of Plato,
of the temper in which the young and wealthy Hippokratês goes
to seek instruction from Protagoras, and of the objects which
Protagoras proposes to himself in imparting the instruction.
Plato, Protagoras, c. 2, p. 310 D.; c. 8, p. 316 C.; c. 9, p.
318, etc.: compare also Plato, Meno. p. 91, and Gorgias, c. 4. p.
449 E., asserting the connection, in the mind of Gorgias, between
teaching to speak and teaching to think—λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν, etc.
It would not be reasonable to repeat, as true and just, all the
polemical charges against those who are called Sophists, even as
we find them in Plato, without scrutiny and consideration. But
modern writers on Grecian affairs run down the Sophists even more
than Plato did, and take no notice of the admissions in their
favor which he, though their opponent, is perpetually making.
This is a very extensive subject, to which I hope to revert.
[59] I dissent entirely from the judgment of Dr. Thirlwall, who
repeats what is the usual representation of Sokratês and the
Sophists, depicting Alkibiadês as “ensnared by the Sophists,”
while Sokratês is described as a good genius preserving him from
their corruptions (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, pp.
312, 313, 314). I think him also mistaken when he distinguishes
so pointedly Sokratês from the Sophists; when he describes
the Sophists as “pretenders to wisdom;” as “a new school;” as
“teaching that there was no real difference between truth and
falsehood, right and wrong,” etc.
All the plausibility that there is in this representation, arises
from a confusion between the original sense and the modern sense
of the word Sophist; the latter seemingly first bestowed upon the
word by Plato and Aristotle. In the common ancient acceptation
of the word at Athens, it meant not a _school_ of persons
professing common doctrines, but a _class_ of men bearing the
same name, because they derived their celebrity from analogous
objects of study and common intellectual occupation. The Sophists
were men of similar calling and pursuits, partly speculative,
partly professional; but they differed widely from each other,
both in method and doctrine. (See for example Isokratês, cont.
Sophistas, Orat. xiii; Plato, Meno. p. 87 B.) Whoever made
himself eminent in speculative pursuits, and communicated his
opinions by public lecture, discussion, or conversation, was
called a Sophist, whatever might be the conclusions which he
sought to expound or defend. The difference between taking money,
and expounding gratuitously, on which Sokratês himself was so
fond of dwelling (Xenoph. Memor. i, 6, 12), has plainly no
essential bearing on the case. When Æschinês the orator reminds
the dikasts, “Recollect that you Athenians put to death _the
Sophist Sokratês_, because he was shown to have been the teacher
of Kritias,” (Æschin. cont. Timarch. c. 34, p. 74,) he uses the
word in its natural and true Athenian sense. He had no point to
make against Sokratês, who had then been dead more than forty
years; but he describes him by his profession or occupation, just
as he would have said, _Hippokratês the physician_, _Pheidias
the sculptor_, etc. Dionysius of Halikarn. calls both Plato and
Isokratês sophists (Ars Rhetor. De Compos. Verborum, p. 208 R.).
The Nubes of Aristophanês, and the defences put forth by Plato
and Xenophon, show that Sokratês was not only called by the name
Sophist, but regarded just in the same light as that in which
Dr. Thirlwall presents to us what he calls “the new School of
the Sophists;” as “a corruptor of youth, indifferent to truth or
falsehood, right or wrong,” etc. See a striking passage in the
Politicus of Plato, c. 38, p. 299 B. Whoever thinks, as I think,
that these accusations were falsely advanced against Sokratês,
will be careful how he advances them against the general
profession to which Sokratês belonged.
That there were unprincipled and immoral men among the class of
Sophists—as there are and always have been among schoolmasters,
professors, lawyers, etc., and all bodies of men—I do not
doubt; in what proportion, we cannot determine. But the extreme
hardship of passing a sweeping condemnation on the great body
of intellectual teachers at Athens, and canonizing exclusively
Sokratês and his followers, will be felt, when we recollect that
the well-known Apologue, called the _Choice of Hercules_, was the
work of the Sophist Prodikus, and his favorite theme of lecture
(Xenophon, Memor. ii, 1, 21-34). To this day, that Apologue
remains without a superior, for the impressive simplicity with
which it presents one of the most important points of view of
moral obligation: and it has been embodied in a greater number of
books of elementary morality than anything of Sokratês, Plato,
or Xenophon. To treat the author of that Apologue, and the
class to which he belonged, as teaching “that there was no real
difference between right and wrong, truth and falsehood,” etc.,
is a criticism not in harmony with the just and liberal tone of
Dr. Thirlwall’s history.
I will add that Plato himself, in a very important passage of
the Republic (vi, c. 6, 7, pp. 492-493), refutes the imputation
against the Sophists of being specially the corruptors of youth.
He represents them as inculcating upon their youthful pupils that
morality which was received as true and just in their age and
society; nothing better, nothing worse. The grand corruptor, he
says, is society itself; the Sophists merely repeat the voice
and judgment of society. Without inquiring at present how far
Plato or Sokratês were right in condemning the received morality
of their countrymen, I most fully accept his assertion that the
great body of the contemporary professional teachers taught what
was considered good morality among the Athenian public: there
were doubtless some who taught a better morality, others who
taught a worse. And this may be said with equal truth of the
great body of professional teachers in every age and nation.
Xenophon enumerates various causes to which he ascribes the
corruption of the character of Alkibiadês; wealth, rank, personal
beauty, flatterers, etc.; but he does not name the Sophists among
them (Memorab. i, 2. 24, 25).
Alkibiadês, full of impulse and ambition of every kind, enjoyed
the conversation of all the eminent talkers and lecturers to be
found in Athens, that of Sokratês most of all and most frequently.
The philosopher became greatly attached to him, and doubtless lost
no opportunity of inculcating on him salutary lessons, as far as
could be done, without disgusting the pride of a haughty and spoiled
youth who was looking forward to the celebrity of public life.
But unhappily his lessons never produced any serious effect, and
ultimately became even distasteful to the pupil. The whole life
of Alkibiadês attests how faintly the sentiment of obligation,
public or private, ever got footing in his mind; how much the ends
which he pursued were dictated by overbearing vanity and love of
aggrandizement. In the later part of life, Sokratês was marked out
to public hatred by his enemies, as having been the teacher of
Alkibiadês and Kritias. And if we could be so unjust as to judge of
the morality of the teacher by that of these two pupils, we should
certainly rank him among the worst of the Athenian sophists.
At the age of thirty-one or thirty-two, the earliest at which it
was permitted to look forward to an ascendent position in public
life, Alkibiadês came forward with a reputation stained by private
enormities, and with a number of enemies created by his insolent
demeanor. But this did not hinder him from stepping into that
position to which his rank, connections, and club-partisans, afforded
him introduction; nor was he slow in displaying his extraordinary
energy, decision, and capacity of command. From the beginning to
the end of his eventful political life, he showed a combination
of boldness in design, resource in contrivance, and vigor in
execution, not surpassed by any one of his contemporary Greeks: and
what distinguished him from all was his extraordinary flexibility
of character[60] and consummate power of adapting himself to new
habits, new necessities, and new persons, whenever circumstances
required. Like Themistoklês, whom he resembled as well in ability and
vigor as in want of public principle and in recklessness about means,
Alkibiadês was essentially a man of action. Eloquence was in him a
secondary quality, subordinate to action; and though he possessed
enough of it for his purposes, his speeches were distinguished
only for pertinence of matter, often imperfectly expressed, at
least according to the high standard of Athens.[61] But his career
affords a memorable example of splendid qualities, both for action
and command, ruined and turned into instruments of mischief by
the utter want of morality, public and private. A strong tide of
individual hatred was thus roused against him, as well from middling
citizens whom he had insulted, as from rich men whom his ruinous
ostentation outshone. For his exorbitant voluntary expenditure in
the public festivals, transcending the largest measure of private
fortune, satisfied discerning men that he would reimburse himself
by plundering the public, and even, if opportunity offered, by
overthrowing[62] the constitution to make himself master of the
persons and properties of his fellow-citizens. He never inspired
confidence or esteem in any one; and sooner or later, among a public
like that of Athens, so much accumulated odium and suspicion was sure
to bring a public man to ruin, in spite of the strongest admiration
for his capacity. He was always the object of very conflicting
sentiments: “The Athenians desired him, hated him, but still
wished to have him,” was said in the latter years of his life by a
contemporary poet; while we find also another pithy precept delivered
in regard to him: “You ought not to keep a lion’s whelp in your city
at all; but, if you choose to keep him, you must submit yourself to
his behavior.”[63] Athens had to feel the force of his energy, as an
exile and enemy, but the great harm which he did to her was in his
capacity of adviser; awakening in his countrymen the same thirst for
showy, rapacious, uncertain, perilous aggrandizement which dictated
his own personal actions.
[60] Cornel. Nepos, Alkibiad. c. 1; Satyrus apud Athenæum, xii,
p. 534; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 23.
Οὗ γὰρ τοιούτων δεῖ, τοιοῦτος εἰμ’ ἐγώ, says Odysseus, in the
Philoktêtês of Sophoklês.
[61] I follow the criticism which Plutarch cites from
Theophrastus, seemingly discriminating and measured: much
more trustworthy than the vague eulogy of Nepos, or even of
Demosthenês (of course not from his own knowledge), upon the
eloquence of Alkibiadês (Plutarch, Alkib. c. 10); Plutarch,
Reipubl. Gerend. Præcept. c. 8, p. 804.
Antisthenês, companion and pupil of Sokratês, and originator of
what is called the Cynic philosophy, contemporary and personally
acquainted with Alkibiadês, was full of admiration for his
extreme personal beauty, and pronounced him to be strong, manly,
and audacious, but unschooled, ~ἀπαίδευτον~. His scandals about
the lawless life of Alkibiadês, however, exceed what we can
reasonably admit, even from a contemporary (Antisthenês ap.
Athenæum, v, p. 220, xii, p. 534). Antisthenês had composed a
dialogue called Alkibiadês (Diog. Laërt. vi, 15).
See the collection of the Fragmenta Antisthenis (by A. G.
Winckelmann, Zurich, 1842, pp. 17-19).
The comic writers of the day—Eupolis, Aristophanês, Pherekratês,
and others—seem to have been abundant in their jests and libels
against the excesses of Alkibiadês, real or supposed. There was
a tale, untrue, but current in comic tradition, that Alkibiadês,
who was not a man to suffer himself to be insulted with impunity,
had drowned Eupolis in the sea, in revenge, for his comedy of the
Baptæ. See Meineke, Fragm. Com. Græ. Eupolidis Βάπται and Κόλακες
(vol. ii, pp. 447-494), and Aristophanês Τριφαλῆς, p. 1166:
also Meineke’s first volume, Historia Critica Comic. Græc. pp.
124-136; and the Dissertat. xix, in Buttmann’s _Mythologus_, on
the Baptæ and the Cotyttia.
[62] Thucyd. vi, 15. Compare Plutarch, Reip. Ger. Præc. c. 4, p.
800. The sketch which Plato draws in the first three chapters of
the ninth Book of the Republic, of the citizen who erects himself
into a despot and enslaves his fellow-citizens, exactly suits the
character of Alkibiadês. See also the same treatise, vi, 6-8, pp.
491-494, and the preface of Schleiermacher to his translation of
the Platonic dialogue called Alkibiadês the first.
[63] Aristophan. Ranæ, 1445-1453; Plutarch, Alkibiadês, c. 16;
Plutarch, Nikias, c. 9.
Mentioning Alkibiadês now for the first time, I have somewhat
anticipated on future chapters, in order to present a general idea
of his character, hereafter to be illustrated. But at the moment
which we have now reached (March, 420 B.C.) the lion’s whelp was yet
young, and had neither acquired his entire strength nor disclosed his
full-grown claws.
He began to put himself forward as a party leader, seemingly not long
before the Peace of Nikias. The political traditions hereditary in
his family, as in that of his relation Periklês, were democratical:
his grandfather Alkibiadês had been vehement in his opposition
to the Peisistratids, and had even afterwards publicly renounced
an established connection of hospitality with the Lacedæmonian
government, from strong antipathy to them on political grounds. But
Alkibiadês himself, in commencing political life, departed from this
family tradition, and presented himself as a partisan of oligarchical
and philo-Laconian sentiment, doubtless far more consonant to his
natural temper than the democratical. He thus started in the same
general party with Nikias and Thessalus son of Kimôn, who afterwards
became his bitter opponents; and it was in part probably to put
himself on a par with them, that he took the marked step of trying to
revive the ancient family tie of hospitality with Sparta, which his
grandfather had broken off.[64]
[64] Thucyd. v, 43, vi, 90; Isokratês, De Bigis, Or. xvi, p. 352,
sect. 27-30.
Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14) carelessly represents Alkibiadês as
being actually proxenus of Sparta at Athens.
To promote this object, he displayed peculiar solicitude for the good
treatment of the Spartan captives, during their detention at Athens.
Many of them being of high family at Sparta, he naturally calculated
upon their gratitude, as well as upon the favorable sympathies of
their countrymen, whenever they should be restored. He advocated
both the peace and the alliance with Sparta, and the restoration
of her captives; and indeed not only advocated these measures, but
tendered his services, and was eager to be employed, as the agent
of Sparta for carrying them through at Athens. From these selfish
hopes in regard to Sparta, and especially from the expectation of
acquiring, through the agency of the restored captives, the title of
Proxenus of Sparta, Alkibiadês thus became a partisan of the blind
and gratuitous philo-Laconian concessions of Nikias. But the captives
on their return were either unable, or unwilling, to carry the point
which he wished; while the authorities at Sparta rejected all his
advances, not without a contemptuous sneer at the idea of confiding
important political interests to the care of a youth chiefly known
for ostentation, profligacy, and insolence. That the Spartans
should thus judge, is noway astonishing, considering their extreme
reverence both for old age and for strict discipline. They naturally
preferred Nikias and Lachês, whose prudence would commend, if it did
not originally suggest, their mistrust of the new claimant. Nor had
Alkibiadês yet shown the mighty movement of which he was capable.
But this contemptuous refusal of the Spartans stung him so to the
quick, that, making an entire revolution in his political course,[65]
he immediately threw himself into anti-Laconian politics with an
energy and ability which he was not before known to possess.
[65] Thucyd. v, 43. Οὐ μέντοι ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήματι φιλονεικῶν
ἠναντιοῦτο, ὅτι Λακεδαιμόνιοι διὰ Νικίου καὶ Λάχητος ἔπραξαν τὰς
σπονδὰς, αὐτὸν διὰ τὴν νεότητα ὑπεριδόντες καὶ κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν
προξενίαν ποτὲ οὖσαν οὐ τιμήσαντες, ἣν τοῦ πάππου ἀπειπόντος
αὐτὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῆς νήσου αὐτῶν αἰχμαλώτους θεραπεύων διενοεῖτο
ἀνανεώσασθαι. ~Πανταχόθεν τε νομίζων ἐλασσοῦσθαι~ τό τε πρῶτον
ἀντεῖπεν, etc.
The moment was favorable, since the recent death of Kleon, for a new
political leader to espouse this side; and was rendered still more
favorable by the conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Month after month
passed, remonstrance after remonstrance was addressed, yet not one
of the restitutions prescribed by the treaty in favor of Athens had
yet been accomplished. Alkibiadês had therefore ample pretext for
altering his tone respecting the Spartans, and for denouncing them
as deceivers who had broken their solemn oaths, abusing the generous
confidence of Athens. Under his present antipathies, his attention
naturally turned to Argos, in which city he possessed some powerful
friends and family guests. The condition of that city, now free by
the expiration of the peace with Sparta, opened a possibility of
connection with Athens, and this policy was strongly recommended
by Alkibiadês, who insisted that Sparta was playing false with the
Athenians, merely in order to keep their hands tied until she had
attacked and put down Argos separately. This particular argument had
less force when it was seen that Argos acquired new and powerful
allies, Mantineia, Elis, and Corinth; but on the other hand, such
acquisitions rendered Argos positively more valuable as an ally to
the Athenians.
It was not so much, however, the inclination towards Argos, but the
growing wrath against Sparta, which furthered the philo-Argeian plans
of Alkibiadês; and when the Lacedæmonian envoy Andromedês arrived
at Athens from Bœotia, tendering to the Athenians the mere ruins of
Panaktum in exchange for Pylos; when it farther became known that
the Spartans had already concluded a special alliance with the
Bœotians without consulting Athens, the unmeasured expression of
displeasure in the Athenian ekklesia showed Alkibiadês that the time
was now come for bringing on a substantive decision. While he lent
his own voice to strengthen this discontent against Sparta, he at
the same time despatched a private intimation to his correspondents
at Argos, exhorting them, under assurances of success and promise of
his own strenuous aid, to send without delay an embassy to Athens
in conjunction with the Mantineians and Eleians, requesting to be
admitted as Athenian allies. The Argeians received this intimation
at the very moment when their citizens Eustrophus and Æson were
negotiating at Sparta for the renewal of the peace, having been sent
thither under great uneasiness lest Argos should be left without
allies to contend single-handed against the Lacedæmonians. But no
sooner was the unexpected chance held out to them of alliance with
Athens, a former friend, a democracy like their own, an imperial
state at sea, but not interfering with their own primacy in
Peloponnesus,—than they became careless of Eustrophus and Æson, and
despatched forthwith to Athens the embassy advised. It was a joint
embassy, Argeian, Eleian, and Mantineian:[66] the alliance between
these three cities had already been rendered more intimate by a
second treaty concluded since that treaty to which Corinth was a
party; but Corinth had refused all concern in the second.[67]
[66] Thucyd. v, 43.
[67] Thucyd. v, 48.
But the Spartans had been already alarmed by the harsh repulse of
their envoy Andromedês, and probably warned by reports from Nikias
and their other Athenian friends of the crisis impending respecting
alliance between Athens and Argos. Accordingly they sent off without
a moment’s delay three citizens extremely popular at Athens,[68]
Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius; with full powers to settle all
matters of difference. The envoys were instructed to deprecate all
alliance of Athens with Argos, to explain that the alliance of Sparta
with Bœotia had been concluded without any purpose or possibility of
evil to Athens, and at the same time to renew the demand that Pylos
should be restored to them in exchange for the demolished Panaktum.
Such was still the confidence of the Lacedæmonians in the strength
of assent at Athens, that they did not yet despair of obtaining
an affirmative, even to this very unequal proposition: and when
the three envoys, under the introduction and advice of Nikias, had
their first interview with the Athenian senate, preparatory to an
audience before the public assembly, the impression which they made,
on stating that they came with full powers of settlement, was highly
favorable. It was indeed so favorable, that Alkibiadês became alarmed
lest, if they made the same statement in the public assembly, holding
out the prospect of some trifling concessions, the philo-Laconian
party might determine public feeling to accept a compromise, and thus
preclude all idea of alliance with Argos.
[68] Thucyd. v, 44. Ἀφίκοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων πρέσβεις ~κατὰ
τάχος~, etc.
To obviate such a defeat of his plans, he resorted to a singular
manœuvre. One of the Lacedæmonian envoys, Endius, was his private
guest, by an ancient and particular intimacy subsisting between their
two families.[69] This probably assisted in procuring for him a
secret interview with the envoys, and enabled him to address them
with greater effect, on the day before the meeting of the public
assembly, and without the knowledge of Nikias. He accosted them in
the tone of a friend of Sparta, anxious that their proposition should
succeed; but he intimated that they would find the public assembly
turbulent and angry, very different from the tranquil demeanor of
the senate: so that if they proclaimed themselves to have come with
full powers of settlement, the people would burst out with fury, to
act upon their fears and bully them into extravagant concessions.
He therefore strongly urged them to declare that they had come,
not with any full powers of settlement, but merely to explain,
discuss, and report: the people would then find that they could gain
nothing by intimidation, explanations would be heard, and disputed
points be discussed with temper, and he (Alkibiadês) would speak
emphatically in their favor. He would advise, and felt confident
that he could persuade, the Athenians to restore Pylos, a step which
his opposition had hitherto been the chief means of preventing.
He gave them his solemn pledge—confirmed by an oath, according to
Plutarch—that he would adopt this conduct, if they would act upon his
counsel.[70] The envoys were much struck with the apparent sagacity
of these suggestions,[71] and still more delighted to find that the
man from whom they anticipated the most formidable opposition was
prepared to speak in their favor. His language obtained with them,
probably, the more ready admission and confidence, inasmuch as he
had volunteered his services to become the political agent of Sparta
only a few months before; and he appeared now to be simply resuming
that policy. They were sure of the support of Nikias and his party,
under all circumstances; if, by complying with the recommendation of
Alkibiadês, they could gain _his_ strenuous advocacy and influence
also, they fancied that their cause was sure of success. Accordingly,
they agreed to act upon his suggestion, not only without consulting
but without even warning Nikias, which was exactly what Alkibiadês
desired, and had probably required them to promise.
[69] Thucyd. viii, 6. Ἐνδίῳ τῷ ἐφορεύοντι πατρικὸς ἐς τὰ μάλιστα
φίλος—ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα Λακωνικὸν ἡ οἰκία αὐτῶν κατὰ τὴν ξενίαν
ἔσχεν· Ἔνδιος γὰρ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐκαλεῖτο.
I incline to suspect, from this passage, that the father of
Endius was not named Alkibiadês, but that Endius himself was
nevertheless named Ἔνδιος Ἀλκιβιάδου, in consequence of the
peculiar intimacy of connection with the Athenian family in
which that name occurred. If the father of Endius was really
named Alkibiadês, Endius himself would naturally, pursuant to
general custom, be styled Ἔνδιος Ἀλκιβιάδου: there would be
nothing in this denomination to call for the particular remark
of Thucydidês. But according to the view of the Scholiast and
most commentators, all that Thucydidês wishes to explain here is,
how the father of Endius came to receive the name of Alkibiadês.
Now if he had meant this, he surely would not have used the
terms which we read: the circumstance to be explained would then
have reference to the father of Endius, not to Endius himself,
nor to the family generally. His words imply that the family,
that is, each successive individual of the family, derived his
Laconian designation (not from the name of his father, but)
from his intimate connection of hospitality with the Athenian
family of Alkibiadês. Each successive individual attached to
his own personal name the genitive case Ἀλκιβιάδου, instead of
the genitive of his real father’s name. Doubtless this was an
anomaly in Grecian practice; but on the present occasion, we are
to expect something anomalous; had it not been such, Thucydidês
would not have stepped aside to particularize it.
[70] Thucyd. v, 45. Μηχανᾶται δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοῖονδέ τι ὁ
Ἀλκιβιάδης· τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους πείθει, ~πίστιν αὐτοῖς δοὺς~,
ἢν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσιν ἐν τῷ δήμῳ αὐτοκράτορες ἥκειν, Πύλον τε
αὐτοῖς ἀποδώσειν (~πείσειν γὰρ αὐτὸς Ἀθηναίους~, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν
ἀντιλέγειν) καὶ τἄλλα ξυναλλάξειν. Βουλόμενος δὲ αὐτοὺς Νικίου τε
ἀποστῆσαι ταῦτα ἔπραττε, καὶ ὅπως ~ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼν αὐτοὺς ὡς
οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν, οὐδὲ λέγουσιν οὐδέποτε ταὐτὰ, τοὺς
Ἀργείους ξυμμάχους ποιήσῃ~.
[71] Plutarch (Alkibiad. c. 14). Ταῦτα δ’ εἰπὼν ~ὅρκους ἔδωκεν
αὐτοῖς~, καὶ μετέστησεν ἀπὸ τοῦ Νικίου παντάπασι πιστεύοντας
αὐτῷ, καὶ ~θαυμάζοντας ἅμα τὴν δεινότητα καὶ σύνεσιν~, ὡς οὐ τοῦ
τυχόντος ἀνδρὸς οὖσαν. Again, Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.
Next day, the public assembly met, and the envoys were introduced;
upon which Alkibiadês himself, in a tone of peculiar mildness, put
the question to them, upon what footing they came?[72] what powers
they brought with them? They immediately declared that they had
brought no full powers for treating and settlement, but only came
to explain and discuss. Nothing could exceed the astonishment with
which this declaration was heard. The senators present, to whom
these envoys a day or two before had publicly declared the distinct
contrary,—the assembled people, who, made aware of this previous
affirmation, had come prepared to hear the ultimatum of Sparta from
their lips,—lastly, most of all, Nikias himself,—their confidential
agent and probably their host at Athens,—who had doubtless announced
them as plenipotentiaries, and concerted with them the management
of their cases before the assembly,—all were alike astounded, and
none knew what to make of the words just heard. But the indignation
of the people equalled their astonishment: there was a unanimous
burst of wrath against the standing faithlessness and duplicity
of Lacedæmonians; never saying the same thing two days together.
To crown the whole, Alkibiadês himself affected to share all the
surprise of the multitude, and was even the loudest of them all in
invectives against the envoys; denouncing Lacedæmonian perfidy and
evil designs in language far more bitter than he had ever employed
before. Nor was this all:[73] he took advantage of the vehement
acclamation which welcomed these invectives to propose that the
Argeian envoys should be called in and the alliance with Argos
concluded forthwith. And this would certainly have been done, if a
remarkable phenomenon—an earthquake—had not occurred to prevent it;
causing the assembly to be adjourned to the next day, pursuant to a
religious scruple then recognized as paramount.
[72] Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14. Ἐρωτώμενοι δ’ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου
~πάνυ φιλανθρώπως~, ἐφ’ οἷς ἀφιγμένοι τυγχάνουσιν, οὐκ ἔφασαν
ἥκειν αὐτοκράτορες.
[73] Thucyd. v, 45. Οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ἠνείχοντο, ἀλλὰ
τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ~πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον καταβοῶντος τῶν
Λακεδαιμονίων~, ἐσήκουόν τε καὶ ἑτοῖμοι ἦσαν εὐθὺς παραγαγεῖν
τοὺς Ἀργείους, etc.
Compare Plutarch, Alkib. c. 14; and Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.
This remarkable anecdote comes in all its main circumstances from
Thucydidês. It illustrates forcibly that unprincipled character which
will be found to attach to Alkibiadês through life, and presents
indeed an unblushing combination of impudence and fraud, which we
cannot better describe than by saying that it is exactly in the vein
of Fielding’s Jonathan Wild. In depicting Kleon and Hyperbolus,
historians vie with each other in strong language to mark the
impudence which is said to have been their peculiar characteristic.
Now we have no particular facts before us to measure the amount
of truth in this, though as a general charge it is sufficiently
credible. But we may affirm, with full assurance, that none of
the much-decried demagogues of Athens—not one of those sellers of
leather, lamps, sheep, ropes, pollard, and other commodities, upon
whom Aristophanês heaps so many excellent jokes—ever surpassed, if
they ever equalled, the impudence of this descendant of Æakus and
Zeus in his manner of overreaching and disgracing the Lacedæmonian
envoys. These latter, it must be added, display a carelessness of
public faith and consistency, a facility in publicly unsaying what
they have just before publicly said, and a treachery towards their
own confidential agent, which is truly surprising, and goes far to
justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged
against the Lacedæmonian character.[74]
[74] Euripid. Andromach. 445-455; Herodot. ix, 54.
The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens immediately: but
this opportune earthquake gave Nikias a few hours to recover from
his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still
contended that the friendship of Sparta was preferable to that of
Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation
of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta,
now so contradictory and inexplicable, should be made clear. He
contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and
alliance, was that of superior honor and advantage; the position
of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater
interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he
at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation
must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested
the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it.
The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already
present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might
already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted
themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But
the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honorable, must show it
forthwith: 1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2.
By restoring Amphipolis also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance
with the Bœotians, unless the Bœotians on their side chose to become
parties to the peace with Athens.[75]
[75] Thucyd. v, 46.
The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias,
invested him with the commission which he required: a remarkable
proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong
was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their
desire to keep on the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance
granted to Nikias and his policy; a perfectly fair chance, since all
that was asked of Sparta was just; but it forced him to bring matters
to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all farther evasion. His
mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobûlus and
Xenarês, the anti-Athenian ephors, was found predominant, so that
not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally
announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the
Bœotians or compelled the Bœotians to accept the peace with Athens,
the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos, the
menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a
personal favor to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be
formally renewed; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the
humiliation of his retreat to Athens. The Athenian assembly listened
to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and
with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and
voucher of this unperformed treaty; while Alkibiadês was permitted
to introduce the envoys—already at hand in the city—from Argos,
Mantineia, and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded.[76]
[76] Thucyd. v, 46; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.
The words of this, which Thucydidês gives us doubtless from the
record on the public column, comprise two engagements; one for peace,
another for alliance.
The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, have concluded a
treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each
for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire.[77]
[The express terms in which these states announce themselves as
imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No
such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon. I have
already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of
Mantineia and Elis towards Sparta, was connected with their imperial
power.]
[77] Thucyd. v, 47. ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν
ἑκάτεροι.
Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purposes of
damage.
The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, shall be allies
with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade
Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid
in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the
invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim
that city their enemy and attack it: neither of the four shall in
that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.
Reciprocal obligations imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantineia,
or Elis, shall be attacked.
Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops
through their own territory, or the territory of allies over whom
they may at the time be exercising command, either by land or sea,
unless upon joint resolution.[78]
[78] Thucyd. v, 48. καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ~ὧν ἂν ἄρχουσιν~ ἕκαστοι.
The tense and phrase here deserve notice, as contrasted with the
phrase in the former part of the treaty—τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ~ἄρχουσιν~
ἑκάτεροι.
The clause imposing actual obligation to hinder the passage of
troops, required to be left open for application to the actual
time.
In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this
treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the
space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the
territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for
a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance,
at the rate of three Æginæan oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or
archer, and of one Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman,
per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the
service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition
shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be
shared equally between all.
Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provision
was then made for the oaths,—by whom? where? when? in what words?
how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to swear on behalf of
herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, with their
respective allies, were to swear by separate cities. The oaths were
to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before
each Olympic festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantineia; by these three
cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater
Panathenæa. “The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, and the
oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the
temples of each of the four cities; and also upon a brazen column, to
be put up by joint cost at Olympia, for the festival now approaching.”
“The four cities may, by joint consent, make any change they please
in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths.”[79]
[79] Thucyd. v, 47.
The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of
complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities
than had ever before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy,
and the Athenian empire still subsisted. A peace had been concluded
between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the
confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not
merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between
Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Bœotia.
Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a
defensive alliance with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis; which three
states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other
(without Corinth), and now recently with Athens. Yet both Athens and
Sparta still retained the alliance[80] concluded between themselves,
without formal rupture on either side, though Athens still complained
that the treaty had not been fulfilled. No relations whatever
subsisted between Argos and Sparta. Between Athens and Bœotia there
was an armistice terminable at ten days’ notice. Lastly, Corinth
could not be prevailed upon, in spite of repeated solicitation from
the Argeians, to join the new alliance of Athens with Argos: so
that no relations subsisted between Corinth and Athens; while the
Corinthians began, though faintly, to resume their former tendencies
towards Sparta.[81]
[80] Thucyd. v, 48.
[81] Thucyd. v, 48-50.
The alliance between Athens and Argos, of which particulars have
just been given, was concluded not long before the Olympic festival
of the 90th Olympiad, or 420 B.C.: the festival being about the
beginning of July, the treaty might be in May.[82] That festival
was memorable, on more than one ground. It was the first which had
been celebrated since the conclusion of the peace, the leading
clause of which had been expressly introduced to guarantee to all
Greeks free access to the great Pan-Hellenic temples, with liberty
of sacrificing, consulting the oracle, and witnessing the matches.
For the last eleven years, including two Olympic festivals, Athens
herself, and apparently all the numerous allies of Athens, had been
excluded from sending their solemn legation, or theôry, and from
attending as spectators, at the Olympic games.[83] Now that such
exclusion was removed, and that the Eleian heralds (who came to
announce the approaching games and proclaim the truce connected with
them) again trod the soil of Attica,—the Athenian visit was felt
both by themselves and by others as a novelty. Some curiosity was
entertained to see what figure the theôry of Athens would make as
to show and splendor. Nor were there wanting spiteful rumors, that
Athens had been so much impoverished by the war, as to be prevented
from appearing with appropriate magnificence at the altar and in the
presence of Olympic Zeus.
[82] Καταθέντων δὲ καὶ Ὀλυμπίασι στήλην χαλκῆν κοινῇ ~Ὀλυμπίοις
τοῖς νυνί~ (Thucyd. v, 47), words of the treaty.
[83] Dorieus of Rhodes was victor in the Pankration, both in
Olymp. 88 and 89, (428-424 B.C.). Rhodes was included among the
tributary allies of Athens. But the athletes who came to contend
were privileged and (as it were) sacred persons, who were never
molested or hindered from coming to the festival, if they chose
to come, under any state of war. Their inviolability was never
disturbed even down to the harsh proceeding of Aratus (Plutarch,
Aratus, c. 28).
But this does not prove that Rhodian visitors generally, or a
Rhodian theôry, could have come to Olympia between 431-421 in
safety.
From the presence of individuals, even as spectators, little
can be inferred: because, even at this very Olympic festival of
420 B.C., Lichas the Spartan was present as a spectator, though
all Lacedæmonians were formally excluded by proclamation of the
Eleians (Thucyd. v, 50).
Alkibiadês took pride in silencing these surmises, as well as in
glorifying his own name and person, by a display more imposing than
had ever been previously beheld. He had already distinguished himself
in the local festivals and liturgies of Athens by an ostentation
surpassing Athenian rivals: but he now felt himself standing
forward as the champion and leader of Athens before Greece. He had
discredited his political rival Nikias, given a new direction to
the politics of Athens by the Argeian alliance, and was about to
commence a series of intra-Peloponnesian operations against the
Lacedæmonians. On all these grounds he determined that his first
appearance on the plain of Olympia should impose upon all beholders.
The Athenian theôry, of which he was a member, was set out with
first-rate splendor, and with the amplest show of golden ewers,
censers, etc., for the public sacrifice and procession.[84] But when
the chariot-races came on, Alkibiadês himself appeared as competitor
at his own cost,—not merely with one well-equipped chariot and four,
which the richest Greeks had hitherto counted as an extraordinary
personal glory, but with the prodigious number of seven distinct
chariots, each with a team of four horses. And so superior was their
quality, that one of his chariots gained a first prize, and another
a second prize, so that Alkibiadês was twice crowned with sprigs of
the sacred olive-tree, and twice proclaimed by the herald. Another of
his seven chariots also came in fourth: but no crown or proclamation,
it seems, was awarded to any after the second in order. We must
recollect that he had competitors from all parts of Greece to contend
against, not merely private men, but even despots and governments.
Nor was this all. The tent which the Athenian theôrs provided for
their countrymen, visitors to the games, was handsomely adorned;
but a separate tent, which Alkibiadês himself provided for a public
banquet to celebrate his triumph, together with the banquet itself,
was set forth on a scale still more stately and expensive. The rich
allies of Athens—Ephesus, Chios, and Lesbos—are said to have lent him
their aid in enhancing this display. It is highly probable that they
would be glad to cultivate his favor, as he had now become one of
the first men in Athens, and was in an ascendent course. But we must
farther recollect that they, as well as Athens, had been excluded
from the Olympic festival, so that their own feelings on first
returning might well prompt them to take a genuine interest in this
imposing reappearance of the Ionic race at the common sanctuary of
Hellas.
[84] Of the taste and elegance with which these exhibitions were
usually got up in Athens, surpassing generally every other city
in Greece, see a remarkable testimony in Xenophon, Memorabil.
iii, 3, 12.
Five years afterwards, on an important discussion which will be
hereafter described, Alkibiadês maintained publicly before the
Athenian assembly that his unparalleled Olympic display had produced
an effect upon the Grecian mind highly beneficial to Athens;[85]
dissipating the suspicions entertained that she was ruined by the
war, and establishing beyond dispute her vast wealth and power. He
was doubtless right to a considerable extent; though not sufficient
to repel the charge from himself, which it was his purpose to do,
both of overweening personal vanity, and of that reckless expenditure
which he would be compelled to try and overtake by peculation
or violence at the public cost. All the unfavorable impressions
suggested to prudent Athenians by his previous life, were aggravated
by this stupendous display; much more, of course, the jealousy and
hatred of personal competitors. And this feeling was not the less
real, though as a political man he was now in the full tide of public
favor.
[85] Thucyd. vi, 16. Οἱ γὰρ Ἕλληνες καὶ ὑπὲρ δύναμιν μείζω ἡμῶν
τὴν πόλιν ἐνόμισαν τῷ ἐμῷ διαπρεπεῖ τῆς Ὀλυμπίαζε θεωρίας,
~πρότερον ἐλπίζοντες αὐτὴν καταπεπολεμῆσθαι~· διότι ἅρματα
μὲν ἑπτὰ καθῆκα, ὅσα οὐδείς πω ἰδιώτης πρότερον, ἐνίκησά τε,
καὶ δεύτερος καὶ τέταρτος ἐγενόμην, καὶ τἄλλα ἀξίως τῆς νίκης
παρεσκευασάμην.
The full force of this grandiose display cannot be felt unless
we bring to our minds the special position both of Athens and
the Athenian allies towards Olympia,—and of Alkibiadês himself
towards Athens, Argos, and the rest of Greece,—in the first half
of the year 420 B.C.
Alkibiadês obtained from Euripidês the honor of an epinikian
ode, or song of triumph, to celebrate this event; of which a few
lines are preserved by Plutarch (Alkib. c. 11). It is curious
that the poet alleges Alkibiadês to have been first, second, and
_third_, in the course; while Alkibiadês himself, more modest
and doubtless more exact, pretends only to first, second, and
_fourth_. Euripidês informs us that Alkibiadês was crowned twice
and proclaimed twice—δὶς στεφθέντ’ ἐλαίᾳ κάρυκι βοᾷν παραδοῦναι.
Reiske, Coray, and Schäfer, have thought it right to alter this
word δὶς to τρὶς, without any authority, which completely alters
the asserted fact. Sintenis in his edition of Plutarch has
properly restored the word δὶς.
How long the recollection of this famous Olympic festival
remained in the Athenian public mind, is attested partly by the
Oratio de Bigis of Isokratês, composed in defence of the son
of Alkibiadês at least twenty-five years afterwards, perhaps
more. Isokratês repeats the loose assertion of Euripidês,
πρῶτος, δεύτερος, and τρίτος (Or. xvi, p. 353, sect. 40). The
spurious Oration called that of Andokidês against Alkibiadês
also preserves many of the current tales, some of which I
have admitted into the text, because I think them probable in
themselves, and because that oration itself may reasonably be
believed to be a composition of the middle of the fourth century
B.C. That oration puts all the proceedings of Alkibiadês in a
very invidious temper and with palpable exaggeration. The story
of Alkibiadês having robbed an Athenian named Diomêdês of a fine
chariot, appears to be a sort of variation on the story about
Tisias, which figures in the oration of Isokratês; see Andokid.
cont. Alkib. sect. 26: possibly Alkibiadês may have left one of
the teams not paid for. The aid lent to Alkibiadês by the Chians,
Ephesians, etc., as described in that oration, is likely to be
substantially true, and may easily be explained. Compare Athenæ.
i, p. 3.
Our information about the arrangements of the chariot-racing at
Olympia is very imperfect. We do not distinctly know how the
seven chariots of Alkibiadês ran,—in how many races,—for all the
seven could not, in my judgment, have run in one and the same
race. There must have been many other chariots to run, belonging
to other competitors: and it seems difficult to believe that ever
a greater number than ten can have run in the same race, since
the course involved going _twelve_ times round the goal (Pindar,
Ol. iii, 33; vi, 75). Ten competing chariots run in the race
described by Sophoklês (Electr. 708), and if we could venture to
construe strictly the expression of the poet,—~δέκατον ἐκπληρῶν~
ὄχον,—it would seem that ten was the extreme number permitted to
run. Even so great a number as ten was replete with danger to
the persons engaged, as may be seen by reading the description
in Sophoklês (compare Demosth. Ἐρωτ. Λογ. p. 1410), who refers
indeed to a Pythian and not an Olympic solemnity: but the main
circumstances must have been common to both; and we know that the
twelve turns (δωδεκάγναμπτον δωδεκάδρομον) _were_ common to both
(Pindar, Pyth. v, 31).
Alkibiadês was not the only person who gained a chariot victory
at this 90th Olympiad, 420 B.C. Lichas the Lacedæmonian also
gained one (Thucyd. v, 50), though the chariot was obliged to be
entered in another name, since the Lacedæmonians were interdicted
from attendance.
Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. of Greece, vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 316)
says: “We are not aware that the Olympiad, in which these
chariot-victories of Alkibiadês were gained, can be distinctly
fixed. But it was probably Olymp. 89, B.C. 424.”
In my judgment, both Olymp. 88 (B.C. 428) and Olymp. 89 (B.C.
424) are excluded from the possible supposition, by the fact that
the general war was raging at both periods. To suppose that in
the midst of the summer of these two fighting years, there was an
Olympic truce for a month, allowing Athens and her allies to send
thither their solemn legations, their chariots for competition,
and their numerous individual visitors, appears to me contrary
to all probability. The Olympic month of B.C. 424, would occur
just about the time when Brasidas was at the Isthmus levying
troops for his intended expedition to Thrace, and when he rescued
Megara from the Athenian attack. This would not be a very quiet
time for the peaceable Athenian visitors, with the costly display
of gold and silver plate and the ostentatious theôry, to pass
by, on its way to Olympia. During the time when the Spartans
occupied Dekeleia, the solemn processions of communicants at the
Eleusinian mysteries could never march along the Sacred Way from
Athens to Eleusis. Xen. Hell. i, 4, 20.
Moreover, we see that the very first article both of the Truce
for one year and of the Peace of Nikias, expressly stipulate
for liberty to all to attend the common temples and festivals.
The first of the two relates to Delphi expressly: the second is
general, and embraces Olympia as well as Delphi. If the Athenians
had visited Olympia in 428 or 424 B.C. without impediment, these
stipulations in the treaties would have no purpose nor meaning.
But the fact of their standing in the front of the treaty, proves
that they were looked upon as of much interest and importance.
I have placed the Olympic festival wherein Alkibiadês contended
with his seven chariots, in 420 B.C., in the peace, but
immediately after the war. No other festival appears to me at all
suitable.
Dr. Thirlwall farther assumes, as a matter of course, that there
was only _one_ chariot-race at this Olympic festival, that all
the seven chariots of Alkibiadês ran in this one race, and that
in the festival of 420 B.C., Lichas gained _the_ prize: thus
implying that Alkibiadês could not have gained the prize at the
same festival.
I am not aware that there is any evidence to prove either of
these three propositions. To me they all appear improbable and
unfounded.
We know from Pausanias (vi, 13, 2) that even in the case of the
stadiodromi, or runners who contended in the stadium, all were
not brought out in one race. They were distributed into sets, or
batches, of what number we know not. Each set ran its own heat,
and the victors in each then competed with each other in a fresh
heat; so that the victor who gained the grand final prize was
sure to have won two heats.
Now if this practice was adopted with the foot-runners, much
more would it be likely to be adopted with the chariot-racers in
case many chariots were brought to the same festival. The danger
would be lessened, the sport would be increased, and the glory
of the competitors enhanced. The Olympic festival lasted five
days, a long time to provide amusement for so vast a crowd of
spectators. Alkibiadês and Lichas may therefore both have gained
chariot-victories at the same festival: of course only one of
them can have gained the grand final prize, and which of the two
that was it is impossible to say.
If the festival of the 90th Olympiad was peculiarly distinguished
by the reappearance of Athenians and those connected with them, it
was marked by a farther novelty yet more striking, the exclusion of
the Lacedæmonians. This exclusion was the consequence of the new
political interests of the Eleians, combined with their increased
consciousness of force arising out of the recent alliance with Argos,
Athens, and Mantineia. It has already been mentioned that since the
peace with Athens, the Lacedæmonians, acting as arbitrators in the
case of Lepreum, which the Eleians claimed as their dependency,
had declared it to be autonomous, and had sent a body of troops to
defend it. Probably the Eleians had recently renewed their attacks
upon the district, since the junction with their new allies; for
the Lacedæmonians had detached thither a fresh body of one thousand
hoplites immediately prior to the Olympic festival. Out of the
mission of this fresh detachment the sentence of exclusion arose. The
Eleians were privileged administrators of the festival, regulating
the details of the ceremony itself, and formally proclaiming by
heralds the commencement of the Olympic truce during which all
violation of the Eleian territory by an armed force was a sin against
the majesty of Zeus. On the present occasion they affirmed that the
Lacedæmonians had sent the one thousand hoplites into Lepreum, and
had captured a fort called Phyrkus, both Eleian possessions, after
the proclamation of the truce. They accordingly imposed upon Sparta
the fine prescribed by the “Olympian law,” of two minæ for each man,
two thousand minæ in all; a part to Zeus Olympius, a part to the
Eleians themselves. During the interval between the proclamation of
the truce and the commencement of the festival, the Lacedæmonians
sent to remonstrate against this fine, which they alleged to have
been unjustly imposed, inasmuch as the heralds had not yet proclaimed
the truce at Sparta when the hoplites reached Lepreum. The Eleians
replied that the truce had already at that time been proclaimed among
themselves (for they always proclaimed it first at home, before
their heralds crossed the borders), so that _they_ were interdicted
from all military operations; of which the Lacedæmonian hoplites
had taken advantage to commit their last aggressions. To which the
Lacedæmonians rejoined, that the behavior of the Eleians themselves
contradicted their own allegation, for they had sent the Eleian
heralds to Sparta to proclaim the truce after they knew of the
sending of the hoplites, thus showing that they did not consider the
truce to have been already violated. The Lacedæmonians added, that
after the herald reached Sparta, they had taken no farther military
measures. How the truth stood in this disputed question, we have no
means of deciding. But the Eleians rejected the explanation, though
offering, if the Lacedæmonians would restore to them Lepreum, to
forego such part of the fine as would accrue to themselves, and to
pay out of their own treasury on behalf of the Lacedæmonians the
portion which belonged to the god. This new proposition being alike
refused, was again modified by the Eleians. They intimated that they
would be satisfied if the Lacedæmonians, instead of paying the fine
at once, would publicly on the altar at Olympia, in presence of the
assembled Greeks, take an oath to pay it at a future date. But the
Lacedæmonians would not listen to the proposition either of payment
or of promise. Accordingly the Eleians, as judges under the Olympic
law, interdicted them from the temple of Olympic Zeus, from the
privilege of sacrificing there, and from attendance and competition
at the games; that is, from attendance in the form of the sacred
legation called theôry, occupying a formal and recognized place at
the solemnity.[86]
[86] Thucyd. v, 49, 50.
As all the other Grecian states—with the single exception of
Lepreum—were present by their theôries[87] as well as by individual
spectators, so the Spartan theôry “shone by its absence” in a
manner painfully and insultingly conspicuous. So extreme, indeed,
was the affront put upon the Lacedæmonians, connected as they were
with Olympia by a tie ancient, peculiar, and never yet broken; so
pointed the evidence of that comparative degradation into which
they had fallen, through the peace with Athens coming at the back
of the Sphakterian disaster,[88] that they were supposed likely
to set the exclusion at defiance; and to escort their theôrs into
the temple at Olympia for sacrifice, under the protection of an
armed force. The Eleians even thought it necessary to put their
younger hoplites under arms, and to summon to their aid one thousand
hoplites from Mantineia as well as the same number from Argos, for
the purpose of repelling this probable attack: while a detachment
of Athenian cavalry were stationed at Argos during the festival,
to lend assistance in case of need. The alarm prevalent among the
spectators of the festival was most serious, and became considerably
aggravated by an incident which occurred after the chariot racing.
Lichas,[89] a Lacedæmonian of great wealth and consequence, had a
chariot running in the lists, which he was obliged to enter, not in
his own name, but in the name of the Bœotian federation. The sentence
of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did
not hinder him from being present as a spectator; and when he saw
his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Bœotian, his
impatience to make himself known became uncontrollable. He stepped
into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of
the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a
flagrant indecorum and known violation of the order of the festival:
accordingly, the official attendants with their staffs interfered at
once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to
his place with blows.[90] Hence arose an increased apprehension of
armed Lacedæmonian interference. None such took place, however: the
Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered
their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without
any interruption.[91] The boldness of the Eleians in putting this
affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing,
that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have
been suggested by Alkibiadês and encouraged by the armed aid from the
allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating
Sparta than in showing off Athens.
[87] Thucyd. v, 50. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν εἴργοντο τοῦ ἱεροῦ, θυσίας
καὶ ἀγώνων, καὶ οἴκοι ἔθυον· οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἐθεώρουν, πλὴν
Λεπρεατῶν.
[88] Thucyd. v, 28. Κατὰ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ἥ τε Λακεδαίμων
μάλιστα δὴ κακῶς ἤκουσε, καὶ ὑπερώφθη διὰ τὰς ξυμφορὰς, οἵ τε
Ἀργεῖοι ἄριστα ἔσχον τοῖς πᾶσι, etc.
[89] See a previous note, p. 56.
[90] Thucyd. v, 50. Λίχας ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι
ὑπὸ τῶν ῥαβδούχων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ζεύγους,
καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς
ἀγωνίσεως προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἡνίοχον, βουλόμενος
δηλῶσαι ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἅρμα.
We see by comparison with this incident how much less rough and
harsh was the manner of dealing at Athens, and in how much more
serious a light blows to the person were considered. At the
Athenian festival of the Dionysia, if a person committed disorder
or obtruded himself into a place not properly belonging to him
in the theatre, the archon or his officials were both empowered
and required to repress the disorder by turning the person out,
and fining him, if necessary. But they were upon no account to
strike him. If they did, they were punishable themselves by the
dikastery afterwards (Demosth. cont. Meidiam, c. 49).
[91] It will be seen, however, that the Lacedæmonians remembered
and revenged themselves upon the Eleians for this insult twelve
years afterwards during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph.
Hellen. iii, 2, 21; Diodor. xiv, 17).
Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther
proof was soon afforded by the fate of her colony, the Trachinian
Herakleia, established near Thermopylæ, in the third year of the
war. That colony—though at first comprising a numerous body of
settlers, in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power,
and though always under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost—had
never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by
the neighboring tribes, and administered with harshness as well
as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had
been regarded from the beginning by the neighbors, especially
the Thessalians, as an invasion of their territory; and their
hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the winter succeeding the
Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of
violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous
battle, and slain Xenarês the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the
place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without
foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies
and waverers to be able to succor it; and the Bœotians, observing her
inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would
be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia
with a body of Bœotian troops, dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor
Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians
prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant
remonstrance.[92]
[92] Thucyd. v, 51, 52.
CHAPTER LVI.
FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD NINETY DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.
Shortly after the remarkable events of the Olympic festival described
in my last chapter, the Argeians and their allies sent a fresh
embassy to invite the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a
promising opportunity, after the affront just put upon Sparta, to
prevail upon the Corinthians to desert her: but Spartan envoys were
present also, and though the discussions were much protracted, no new
resolution was adopted. An earthquake—possibly an earthquake not
real, but simulated for convenience—abruptly terminated the congress.
The Corinthians—though seemingly distrusting Argos, now that she was
united with Athens, and leaning rather towards Sparta—were unwilling
to pronounce themselves in favor of one so as to make an enemy of the
other.[93]
[93] Thucyd. v, 48-50.
In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and
Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring. Under
the inspirations of Alkibiadês, Athens was about to attempt the
new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers
and influence. At the beginning of the war, she had been maritime,
defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Periklês.
After the events of Sphakteria, she made use of that great advantage
to aim at the recovery of Megara and Bœotia, which she had before
been compelled to abandon by the thirty years’ truce, at the
recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year
of the war, but with signal ill-success; while Brasidas during that
period broke open the gates of her maritime empire, and robbed her of
many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became,
to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis: Nikias and
his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while
Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved
except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against
Amphipolis had failed, the peace concluded by Nikias had failed also:
Athens had surrendered her capital advantage, without regaining
Amphipolis; and if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative
except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this
perhaps she might have done, as we shall find her projecting to do in
the course of about four years forward, if it had not been, first,
that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about
Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious disgrace so recently
undergone there; next, that Alkibiadês, the new chief adviser or
prime minister of Athens—if we may be allowed to use an inaccurate
expression, which yet suggests the reality of the case—was prompted
by his personal impulses to turn the stream of Athenian ardor into
a different channel. Full of antipathy to Sparta, he regarded the
interior of Peloponnesus as her most vulnerable point, especially in
the present disjointed relations of its component cities. Moreover,
his personal thirst for glory was better gratified amidst the centre
of Grecian life than by undertaking an expedition into a distant and
barbarous region: lastly, he probably recollected with discomfort
the hardships and extreme cold, insupportable to all except the iron
frame of Sokrates, which he had himself endured at the blockade of
Potidæa twelve years before,[94] and which any armament destined
to conquer Amphipolis would have to go through again. It was under
these impressions that he now began to press his intra-Peloponnesian
operations against Lacedæmon, with the view of organizing a
counter-alliance under Argos sufficient to keep her in check, and
at any rate to nullify her power of carrying invasion beyond the
Isthmus. All this was to be done without ostensibly breaking the
peace and alliance between Athens and Lacedæmon, which stood in
conspicuous letters on pillars erected in both cities.
[94] Plato, Symposion, c. 35, p. 220. δεινοὶ γὰρ αὐτόθι χειμῶνες,
πάγου οἵου δεινοτάτου, etc.
Coming to Argos at the head of a few Athenian hoplites and bowmen,
and reinforced by Peloponnesian allies, Alkibiadês exhibited the
spectacle of an Athenian general traversing the interior of the
peninsula, and imposing his own arrangements in various quarters, a
spectacle at that moment new and striking.[95] He first turned his
attention to the Achæan towns in the northwest, where he persuaded
the inhabitants of Patræ to ally themselves with Athens, and even to
undertake the labor of connecting their town with the sea by means of
long walls, so as to place themselves within the protection of Athens
from seaward. He farther projected the erection of a fort and the
formation of a naval station at the extreme point of Cape Rhium, just
at the narrow entrance of the Corinthian gulf; whereby the Athenians,
who already possessed the opposite shore by means of Naupaktus, would
have become masters of the commerce of the gulf. But the Corinthians
and Sikyonians, to whom this would have been a serious mischief,
despatched forces enough to prevent the consummation of the scheme,
and probably also to hinder the erection of the walls at Patræ.[96]
Yet the march of Alkibiadês doubtless strengthened the anti-Laconian
interest throughout the Achæan coast.
[95] Thucyd. v, 52. Isokratês (De Bigis, sect. 17, p. 349)
speaks of this expedition of Alkibiadês in his usual loose and
exaggerated language: but he has a right to call attention to it
as something very memorable at the time.
[96] Thucyd. v, 52.
He then returned to take part with the Argeians in a war against
Epidaurus. To acquire possession of this city would much facilitate
the communication between Athens and Argos, since it was not
only immediately opposite to the island of Ægina now occupied by
the Athenians, but also opened to the latter an access by land,
dispensing with the labor of circumnavigating Cape Skyllæum, the
southeastern point of the Argeian and Epidaurian peninsula, whenever
they sent forces to Argos. Moreover, the territory of Epidaurus
bordered to the north on that of Corinth, so that the possession
of it would be an additional guarantee for the neutrality of the
Corinthians. Accordingly it was resolved to attack Epidaurus, for
which a pretext was easily found. As presiding and administering
state of the temple of Apollo Pythäeus (situated within the walls
of Argos), the Argeians enjoyed a sort of religious supremacy over
Epidaurus and other neighboring cities, seemingly the remnant of
that extensive supremacy, political as well as religious, which in
early times had been theirs.[97] The Epidaurians owed to this temple
certain sacrifices and other ceremonial obligations, one of which,
arising out of some circumstance which we cannot understand, was now
due and unperformed: at least so the Argeians alleged. Such default
imposed upon them the duty of getting together a military force to
attack the Epidaurians and enforce the obligation.
[97] Thucyd. v, 53, with Dr. Arnold’s note.
Their invading march, however, was for a time suspended by the news
that king Agis with the full force of Lacedæmon and her allies had
advanced as far as Leuktra, one of the border towns of Laconia on
the northwest, towards Mount Lykæum and the Arcadian Parrhasii. What
this movement meant was known only to Agis himself, who did not even
explain the purpose to his own soldiers or officers, or allies.[98]
But the sacrifice constantly offered before passing the border was
found so unfavorable, that he abandoned his march for the present
and returned home. The month Karneius, a period of truce as well as
religious festival among the Dorian states, being now at hand, he
directed the allies to hold themselves prepared for an out-march as
soon as that month had expired.
[98] Thucyd. v, 54. ᾔδει δὲ οὐδεὶς ὅποι στρατεύουσιν οὐδὲ αἱ
πόλεις ἐξ ὧν ἐπέμφθησαν.
This incident shows that Sparta employed the military force
of her allies without any regard to their feelings, quite as
decidedly as Athens; though there were some among them too
powerful to be thus treated.
On being informed that Agis had dismissed his troops, the Argeians
prepared to execute their invasion of Epidaurus. The day on which
they set out was already the twenty-sixth of the month preceding
the Karneian month, so that there remained only three days before
the commencement of that latter month with its holy truce, binding
upon the religious feelings of the Dorian states generally, to which
Argos, Sparta, and Epidaurus all belonged. But the Argeians made
use of that very peculiarity of the season, which was accounted
likely to keep them at home, to facilitate their scheme, by
playing a trick with the calendar, and proclaiming one of those
arbitrary interferences with the reckoning of time which the Greeks
occasionally employed to correct the ever-recurring confusion of
their lunar system. Having begun their march on the twenty-sixth
of the month before Karneius, the Argeians called each succeeding
day still the twenty-sixth, thus disallowing the lapse of time,
and pretending that the Karneian month had not yet commenced. This
proceeding was farther facilitated by the circumstance, that their
allies of Athens, Elis, and Mantineia, not being Dorians, were
under no obligation to observe the Karneian truce. Accordingly, the
army marched from Argos into the territory of Epidaurus, and spent
seemingly a fortnight or three weeks in laying it waste; all this
time being really, according to the reckoning of the other Dorian
states, part of the Karneian truce, which the Argeians, adopting
their own arbitrary computation of time, professed not to be
violating. The Epidaurians, unable to meet them single-handed in the
field, invoked the aid of their allies: who, however, had already
been summoned by Sparta for the succeeding month, and did not choose,
any more than the Spartans, to move during the Karneian month itself.
Some allies, however, perhaps the Corinthians, came as far as the
Epidaurian border, but did not feel themselves strong enough to lend
aid by entering the territory alone.[99]
[99] Thucyd. v, 54. Ἀργεῖοι δ’ ἀναχωρησάντων αὐτῶν (the
Lacedæmonians), τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ Καρνείου μηνὸς ἐξελθόντες τετράδι
φθίνοντος, ~καὶ ἄγοντες τὴν ἡμέραν ταύτην πάντα τὸν χρόνον~,
ἐσέβαλον ἐς τὴν Ἐπιδαυρίαν καὶ ~ἐδῄουν~· Ἐπιδαύριοι δὲ τοὺς
ξυμμάχους ἐπεκαλοῦντο· ὧν οἱ μὲν ~τὸν μῆνα προυφασίσαντο~, οἱ δὲ
καὶ ἐς μεθορίαν τῆς Ἐπιδαυρίας ἐλθόντες ἡσύχαζον.
In explaining this passage, I venture to depart from the views
of all the commentators; with the less scruple, as it seems
to me that even the best of them are here embarrassed and
unsatisfactory.
The meaning which I give to the words is the most strict and
literal possible: “The Argeians, having set out on the 26th of
the month before Karneius, and _keeping that day during the whole
time_, invaded the Epidaurian territory, and went on ravaging
it.” By “during the whole time” is meant, during the whole time
that this expedition lasted. That is, in my judgment, they
kept the twenty-sixth day of the antecedent month for a whole
fortnight or so; they called each successive day by the same
name; they stopped the computed march of time; the twenty-seventh
was never admitted to have arrived. Dr. Thirlwall translates
it (Hist. Gr. vol. iii, ch. xxiv, p. 331): “They began their
march on a day which they had _always_ been used to keep holy.”
But surely the words πάντα τὸν χρόνον must denote some definite
interval of time, and can hardly be construed as equivalent
to ἀεί. Moreover the words, as Dr. Thirlwall construes them,
introduce a new fact which has no visible bearing on the main
affirmation of the sentence.
The meaning which I give may perhaps be called in question on the
ground that such tampering with the calendar is too absurd and
childish to have been really committed. Yet it is not more absurd
than the two votes of the Athenian assembly (in 290 B.C.), who
being in the month of Munychion, first passed a vote that that
month should be the month Anthestêrion; next, that it should be
the month Boêdromion; in order that Demetrius Poliorkêtês might
be initiated both in the lesser and greater mysteries of Dêmêtêr,
both at once and at the same time. Demetrius arrived at Athens in
the month Munychion, and went through both ceremonies with little
or no delay; the religious scruple, and the dignity of the Two
Goddesses being saved by altering the name of the month twice
(Plutarch, Demetrius, c. 26).
Besides, if we look to the conduct of the Argeians themselves at
a subsequent period (B.C. 389, Xenophon, Hellen. iv, 7, 2, 5; v,
1, 29), we shall see them playing an analogous trick with the
calendar in order to get the benefit of the sacred truce. When
the Lacedæmonians invaded Argos, the Argeians despatched heralds
with wreaths and the appropriate insignia, to warn them off on
the ground of its being the period of the holy truce,—though it
_really was not so_,—~οὐχ ὅποτε κάθηκοι ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ’ ὅποτε
ἐμβάλλειν μέλλοιεν Λακεδαιμόνιοι, τότε ὑπέφερον τοὺς μῆνας~—Οἱ
δ’ Ἀργεῖοι ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσαν οὐ δυνησόμενοι κωλύειν, ἔπεμψαν, ὥσπερ
εἰώθεσαν, ἐστεφανωμένους δύο κήρυκας ~ὑποφέροντας σπονδάς~.
On more than one occasion, this stratagem was successful: the
Lacedæmonians did not dare to act in defiance of the summons of
the heralds, who affirmed that it _was_ the time of the truce,
though in reality it was not so. At last, the Spartan king
Agesipolis actually went both to Olympia and Delphi, to put
the express question to those oracles, whether he was bound to
accept the truce at any moment, right or wrong, when it might
suit the convenience of the Argeians to bring it forward as a
sham plea (ὑποφέρειν). The oracles both told him that he was
under no obligation to submit to such a pretence; accordingly, he
sent back the heralds, refusing to attend to their summons, and
invaded the Argeian territory.
Now here is a case exactly in point, with this difference; that
the Argeians, when they are invaders of Epidaurus, falsify the
calendar in order to blot out the holy truce where it really
ought to have come: whereas when they are the party invaded, they
commit similar falsification in order to introduce the truce
where it does not legitimately belong. I conceive, therefore,
that such an analogous incident completely justifies the
interpretation which I have given of the passage now before us in
Thucydidês.
But even if I were unable to produce a case so exactly parallel,
I should still defend the interpretation. Looking to the state
of the ancient Grecian calendars, the proceeding imputed to the
Argeians ought not to be looked on as too preposterous and absurd
for adoption, with the same eyes as we should regard it now.
With the exception of Athens, we do not know completely the
calendar of a single other Grecian city: but we know that the
months of all were lunar months, and that the practice followed
in regard to intercalation, for the prevention of inconvenient
divergence between lunar and solar time, was different in each
different city. Accordingly, the lunar month of one city did not,
except by accident, either begin or end at the same time as the
lunar month of another. M. Boeckh observes (ad Corp. Inscr. t. i,
p. 734): “Variorum populorum menses, qui sibi secundum legitimos
annorum cardines respondent, non quovis conveniunt anno, nisi
cyclus intercalationum utrique populi idem sit: sed ubi differunt
cycli, altero populo prius intercalante mensem dum non intercalat
alter, eorum qui non intercalarunt mensis certus cedit jam in eum
mensem alterorum qui præcedit illum cui vulgo respondet certus
iste mensis: quod tamen negligere solent chronologi.” Compare
also the valuable Dissertation of K. F. Hermann, Ueber die
Griechische Monatskunde, Götting. 1844, pp. 21-27, where all that
is known about the Grecian names and arrangement of months is
well brought together.
The names of the Argeian months we hardly know at all (see K. F.
Hermann, pp. 84-124):
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