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The Anatomy of Suicide

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Title: The Anatomy of Suicide

Author: Forbes Winslow


        
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[Illustration: Vide p. 331.]


THE ANATOMY OF SUICIDE:

by

FORBES WINSLOW,

Member of the Royal College of Surgeons, London;
Author of “Physic and Physicians.”


   “But is there yet no other way, besides
   These painful passages; how we may come
   To death, and mix with our connatural dust?

         *       *       *       *       *

   Nor love thy life, nor hate: but what thou liv’st
   Live well; HOW LONG OR SHORT PERMIT TO HEAVEN.”

   MILTON.







London:
Henry Renshaw, 356, Strand.
Sold By Carfrae & Son, Edinburgh;
And Fannin & Co., Dublin.
1840.


  TO

  JAMES JOHNSON, ESQ., M.D.

  PHYSICIAN EXTRAORDINARY TO THE LATE KING,
  ETC. ETC.

  This Work is dedicated,

  AS A TESTIMONY OF RESPECT FOR HIS HIGH PROFESSIONAL ATTAINMENTS,

  AND AS AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE

  ADVANTAGES DERIVED FROM A PERUSAL OF THE MANY ABLE WORKS

  WITH WHICH HE HAS ENRICHED

  THE MEDICAL LITERATURE OF HIS COUNTRY.


  _London,—May, 1840._




PREFACE.


This treatise had its origin in the following circumstance:—A
few months ago, the author had the honour of reading before the
_Westminster Medical Society_, a paper on “Suicide Medically
considered,” which giving rise to an animated discussion, and evolving
an expression of the opinions of several eminent professional men,
excited at the time much interest.

It was the author’s object in his paper to establish a fact, he
believes, of primary importance,—that the disposition to commit
self-destruction is, to a great extent, amenable to those principles
which regulate our treatment of ordinary disease; and that, to a degree
more than is generally supposed, it originates in derangement of the
brain and abdominal viscera.

Notwithstanding, however, these points were not considered with the
minuteness commensurate with their value, the discussion which followed
the author’s communication afforded him great satisfaction. It tended
to strengthen in his mind an opinion previously formed, that the
members of the medical profession were inferior to no other class in a
knowledge of those higher branches of philosophy that give dignity and
elevation to human character.

To explain more fully the author’s views on the subject of Suicide is
the object of the present work, which is, strange to say, the first
in England that has been exclusively devoted to this important and
interesting branch of inquiry.

Hitherto suicide has been the theme of the novel and the drama, and has
never, with the exception of an incidental notice in works on medical
jurisprudence, been considered in this country in reference to its
pathological and physiological character.

That an intimate acquaintance with this branch of knowledge is highly
important to the medical philosopher, few will deny; that it is a
subject of general and painful interest, all must admit. The apparent
coolness with which suicide is often committed has induced many to
suppose that the unfortunate perpetrator was at the time in possession
of a sound mind; and it is this idea which has induced the profession
to conceive the subject as one foreign to their pursuits, and belonging
rather to the province of the moral philosopher. How far the author has
succeeded in disproving this opinion, it is for others to decide.

He takes this opportunity of acknowledging the assistance he has
received from the writings of Pinel, Esquirol, Falret, Fodére, Arnold,
Crichton, Willis, Black, Haslam, Burrows, Conolly, Pritchard, Mayo,
Ellis, Paris, Smith, Beck, Taylor, and Ray. To the pages of Dr.
Johnson’s Medico-chirurgical Review, the Medical Gazette, the Lancet,
and British and Foreign Medical Review, he is also largely indebted.

In conclusion, the author, conscious of its imperfections, claims for
his work no other praise than that it is the first attempt in this
country to reflect light on a branch of medical and moral philosophy,
the importance of which is only equalled by the difficulties impeding
its investigation. He will feel himself amply repaid, should his
introductory essay (for such only can it be considered) stimulate
others more competent than himself to prosecute the inquiry which he
has commenced. Their success will afford him much satisfaction and
pleasure; for in the attainment of their endeavours will his hopes be
fulfilled, and his ambition gratified.


  LONDON,—MAY, 1840.




CONTENTS.


  CHAPTER I.

  SUICIDES OF THE ANCIENTS.—ANCIENT LAWS AND OPINIONS
  ON THE SUBJECT OF SUICIDE.

  Examples of antiquity no defence of suicide—Causes of ancient
  suicides—The suicides of Asdrubal, Nicocles, Isocrates,
  Demosthenes, Hannibal, Mithridates, the inhabitants of
  the city of Xanthus, Cato, Charondas, Lycurgus, Codrus,
  Themistocles, Emperor Otho, Brutus and Cassius, Mark Antony
  and Cleopatra, Petronius, Lucan, Lucius Vetus, Sardanapalus,
  M. Curtius, Empedocles, Theoxena—Noble resistance of
  Josephus—Scripture suicides: Samson, Saul, Ahitophel, Judas
  Iscariot, Eleazar, Razis—Doctrines of the stoics, Seneca,
  Epictetus, Zeno—Opinions of Cicero, Pliny, on suicide—Ancient
  laws on suicide                                                 p. 1-29


  CHAPTER II.

  WRITERS IN DEFENCE OF SUICIDE.

  Opinions of Hume—Effect of his writings—Case of suicide caused
  by—The doctrines of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Montaigne
  examined—Origin of Dr. Donne’s celebrated work—Madame de
  Staël’s recantation—Robert of Normandy, Gibbon, Sir T. More,
  and Robeck’s opinions considered                               p. 30-35


  CHAPTER III.

  SUICIDE A CRIME AGAINST GOD AND MAN.—IT IS NOT AN
  ACT OF COURAGE.

  The sin of suicide—The notions of Paley on the
  subject—Voltaire’s opinion—Is suicide self-murder?—Is it
  forbidden in Scripture?—Shakspeare’s views on the subject—The
  alliance between suicide and murder—Has a  man a right to
  sacrifice his own life?—Everything held upon trust—Suicide
  a sin against ourselves and neighbour—It is not an act of
  courage—Opinion of Q. Curtius on the subject—Buonaparte’s
  denunciation of suicide—Dryden’s description of the suicide in
  another world                                                  p. 36-44


  CHAPTER IV.

  ON THE INFLUENCE OF CERTAIN MENTAL STATES IN INDUCING
  THE DISPOSITION TO SUICIDE.

  Moral causes of disease—Neglect of psychological
  medicine—Mental philosophy a branch of medical study—Moral
  causes of suicide—Tables of Falret, &c.—Influence of
  remorse—Simon Brown, Charles IX. of France—Massacre of
  St. Bartholomew—Terrible death of Cardinal Beaufort, from
  remorse—The Chevalier de S——. Influence of disappointed
  love—Suicide from love—Two singular cases—Effects of
  jealousy—Othello—Suicide from this passion—The French opera
  dancer—Suicide from wounded vanity—False pride—The remarkable
  case of Villeneuve, as related by Buonaparte—Buonaparte’s
  attempt at suicide—Ambition—Despair, cases of suicide from—The
  Abbé de Rancé—Suicide from blind impulse—Cases—Mathews,
  the comedian—Opinion of Esquirol on the subject—Ennui,
  birth of—Common cause of suicide in France—Effect of
  speculating in stocks—Defective education—Diffusion of
  knowledge—“Socialism” a cause of self-destruction—Suicide
  common in Germany—Werter—Goëthe’s attempt at suicide—Influence
  of his writings on Hackman—Suicide from reading Tom Paine’s
  “Age of Reason”—Suicide to avoid punishment—Most remarkable
  illustrations—Political excitement—Nervous irritation—Love
  of notoriety—Hereditary disposition—Is death painful? fully
  considered, with cases—Influence of irreligion                p. 45-107


  CHAPTER V.

  IMITATIVE, OR EPIDEMIC SUICIDE.

  Persons who act from impulse liable to be influenced—Principle
  of imitation, a natural instinct—Cases related by Cabanis and
  Tissot—The suicidal barbers—Epidemic suicide at the Hôtel
  des Invalids—Sydenham’s epidemic—The ladies of Miletus—Dr.
  Parrish’s case—Are insanity and suicide contagious?          p. 108-114


  CHAPTER VI.

  SUICIDE FROM FASCINATION.

  Singular motives for committing suicide—A man who delighted
  in torturing himself—A dangerous experiment—Pleasures of
  carnage—Disposition  to leap from precipices—Lord Byron’s
  allusion to the influence of fascination—Miss Moyes and
  the Monument—A man who could not trust himself with a
  razor—Esquirol’s opinion of such cases—Danger of ascending
  elevated places                                              p. 115-120


  CHAPTER VII.

  OF THE ENTHUSIASM AND MENTAL IRRITABILITY WHICH, IF
  ENCOURAGED, WOULD LEAD TO SUICIDE.

  Connexion between genius and insanity—Authors of fiction
  often feel what they write—Metastasio in tears—The enthusiasm
  of Pope, Alfieri, Dryden—Effects of the first reading of
  Telemachus and Tasso on Madame Roland’s mind—Raffaelle and
  his celebrated picture of the Transfiguration—The convulsions
  of Malbranche—Beattie’s Essay on Truth—Influence of intense
  study on Boerrhave’s mind—The demon of Spinello and
  Luther—Bourdaloue and his violin—Byron’s sensitiveness—Men do
  not always practise what they preach—Cases of Smollett, La
  Fontaine, Sir Thomas More, Zimmerman—Tasso’s spectre—Johnson’s
  superstition—Concluding remarks                              p. 121-129


  CHAPTER VIII.

  PHYSICAL CAUSES OF SUICIDE.

  Influence of climate—The foggy climate of England does not
  increase the number of suicides—Average number of suicides in
  each month, from 1817 to 1826—Influence of seasons—Suicides
  at Rouen—The English not a suicidal people—Philip Mordaunt’s
  singular reasons for self-destruction—Causes of French
  suicides—Influence of physical pain—Unnatural vices—Suicide
  the effect of intoxication—Influence of hepatic disease
  on the mind—Melancholy and hypochondriasis, Burton’s
  account of—Cowper’s case of suicide—Particulars of his
  extreme depression of spirits—Byron and Burns’s melancholy
  from stomach and liver derangement—Influence of bodily
  disease on the mind—Importance of paying attention to it—A
  case of insanity from gastric irritation—Dr. Johnson’s
  hypochondria—Hereditary suicide, illustrated by cases—Suicide
  from blows on the head, and from moral shocks communicated to
  the brain—Dr. G. Mantell’s valuable observations and cases
  demonstrative of the point—Concluding remarks                p. 130-161


  CHAPTER IX.

  MORAL TREATMENT OF SUICIDAL MANIA.

  Diseases of the brain not dissimilar to affections of other
  organs—Early symptoms of insanity—The good effects of
  having plenty to do—Occupation—Dr. Johnson’s opinion on the
  subject—The pleasure derived from cultivating a taste for
  the beauties of nature—Effect of volition on diseases of
  the mind—Silent grief injurious to mental health—Treatment
  of _ennui_—The time of danger, not the time of disease—The
  Walcheren expedition—The retreat of the ten thousand Greeks
  under Xenophon—Influence of music on the mind in the cure of
  disease—Cure of epidemic suicide—Buonaparte’s remedy—How the
  women of Miletus were cured of the disposition to suicide, and
  other illustrations—Cases shewing how easily the disposition
  to suicide may be diverted—On the cure of insanity by
  stratagems—On the importance of removing the suicidal patient
  from his own home—On the regulation of the passions          p. 162-194


  CHAPTER X.

  PHYSICAL TREATMENT OF THE SUICIDAL DISPOSITION.

  On the dependence of irritability of temper on physical
  disease—Voltaire and an Englishman agree to commit
  suicide—The reasons that induced Voltaire to change his
  mind—The ferocity of Robespierre accounted for—The state
  of his body after death—The petulance of Pope dependent
  on physical causes—Suicide from cerebral congestion,
  treatment of—Advantages of bloodletting, with cases—Damien
  insane—Cold applied to the head, of benefit—Good effects of
  purgation—Suicide caused by a tape-worm—Early indications of
  the disposition to suicide—The suicidal eye—Of the importance
  of carefully watching persons disposed to suicide—Cunning
  of such patients—Numerous illustrations—The fondness for a
  particular mode of death—Dr. Burrows’ extraordinary case—Dr.
  Conolly on the treatment of suicide—Cases shewing the
  advantage of confinement                                     p. 195-220


  CHAPTER XI.

  IS THE ACT OF SUICIDE THE RESULT OF INSANITY?

  The instinct of self-preservation—The love of life—Dr.
  Wolcott’s death-bed—Anecdote of the Duke de Montebello—Louis
  XI. of France—Singular  death of a celebrated lawyer—Dr.
  Johnson’s horror of dying—The organ of destruction
  universal—Illustrations of its influence—Sir W. Scott, on
  the motives that influence men in battle—Have we any test of
  insanity?—Mental derangement not a specific disease—Importance
  of keeping this in view—Insanity not always easily detected—Is
  lowness of spirits an evidence of derangement?—The cunning
  of lunatics—Esquirol’s opinion that insanity is always
  present—Moral insanity—The remarkable case of Frederick of
  Prussia—Suicide often the first symptom of insanity—Cases
  in which persons have been restored to reason from loss
  of blood, after attempting suicide—The cases of Cato, Sir
  Samuel Romilly, Lord Castlereagh, Colton, and Chatterton,
  examined—Concluding remarks                                  p. 221-245


  CHAPTER XII.

  SUICIDE IN CONNEXION WITH MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE.

  The importance of medical evidence—The questions which medical
  men have to consider in these cases—Signs of death from
  strangulation—Singular positions in which the bodies of those
  who have committed suicide have been found—The particulars of
  the Prince de Condé’s case—On the possibility of voluntary
  strangulation—General Pichegru’s singular case—The melancholy
  history of Marc Antonie Calas—How to discover whether a person
  was dead before thrown into water—Singular cases—Admiral
  Caracciolo—Drowning in a bath—The points to keep in view in
  cases of suspicious death—Was Sellis murdered?—Death from
  wounds—The case of the Earl of Essex                         p. 246-264


  CHAPTER XIII.

  STATISTICS OF SUICIDE.

  Number of suicides in the chief capitals of Europe from 1813
  to 1831—Statistics of death from violence in London from 1828
  to 1832—Number of suicides in London for a century and a
  half—Suicides in Westminster from 1812 to 1836—Suicide more
  frequent among men than women—Mode of committing—Influence of
  age—Effect of the married state—Infantile suicides—M. Guerry
  on suicides in France—Cases—Suicide and murder—Suicide in
  Geneva                                                       p. 265-279


  CHAPTER XIV.

  APPEARANCES PRESENTED AFTER DEATH IN THOSE WHO
  HAVE COMMITTED SUICIDE.

  Thickness of cranium—State of membranes and vessels of
  brain—Osseous excrescences—Appearances discovered in one
  thousand three hundred and thirty-eight cases—Lesions of the
  lungs, heart, stomach, and intestines—Effect of long-continued
  indigestion                                                  p. 280-282


  CHAPTER XV.

  SINGULAR CASES OF SUICIDE.

  Introduction—Contempt of death—Eustace Budgel—M. de Boissy
  and his wife—Mutual suicides from disappointed love—Suicide
  from mortification—Mutual suicide from poverty—A French lady
  while out shooting—A fisherman after praying—Determination to
  commit if not cured—Extraordinary case after seduction—Madame
  C. from remorse—M. de Pontalba after trying to murder his
  daughter-in-law—Young lady in a pet—Sir George Dunbar—James
  Sutherland while George III. was passing—Lancet given by a
  wife to her husband to kill himself—Servant girl—Curious
  verses by a suicide—Robber on being recognised—A man who
  ordered a candle to be made of his fat—After gaming—Writing
  whilst dying—From misfortune just at a moment of
  relief—Curious papers written by a suicide—By heating a
  barrel in the fire—By tearing out the brains—Sisters by the
  injunction of their eldest sister—Mutual from poverty—Girl
  from a dream—Three servants in one pond—Indifference as to
  mode—By starvation—A man forty-five days without eating—Mutual
  of two boys after dining at a restaurateur’s—By putting head
  under the ice—By a pair of spectacles—By jumping amongst
  the bears—Young lady from gambling—Verses by a suicide—To
  obtain salvation—A lover after accidentally shooting his
  mistress—Mutual attempt—M. Kleist and Madame Vogle—Richard
  Smith and wife—Love and suicide—Bishop of Grenoble—Suicide
  in a pail of water—Mutual suicide of two soldiers—Lord
  Scarborough—A man who advertised to kill himself for benefit
  of family—The case of Creech, and the romantic history of
  Madame de Monier—Suicide of M. ——, after threatening to kill
  his brother—Two young men—Two lovers—Homicide and suicide from
  jealousy—Cure of penchant for suicide—Attempt at prevented—Man
  in a belfry—Attempt at—The extraordinary case of Lovat by
  crucifixion                                                  p. 283-334


  CHAPTER XVI.

  CAN SUICIDE BE PREVENTED BY LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS?—INFLUENCE
  OF MORAL INSTRUCTION.—CONCLUSION.

  The legitimate object of punishment—The argument of
  Beccaria—A legal solecism—A suicide not amenable to human
  tribunals—Evidence at coroners’ courts _ex-parte_—The old law
  of no advantage—No penal-law will restrain a man from the
  commission of suicide.—Verdict of _felo-de-se_ punishes the
  innocent, and therefore unjust—All suicides insane, and
  therefore not responsible agents—The man who reasons himself
  into suicide not of sound mind—Rational mode of preventing
  suicide by promoting religious education                     p. 335-340




ERRATA.

  Page 46, for “mens conscia” &c. read _mens sana in corpore
  sano_, and for “Horace” read JUVENAL.




ANATOMY OF SUICIDE.




CHAPTER I.

SUICIDES OF THE ANCIENTS.—ANCIENT LAWS AND OPINIONS ON THE SUBJECT OF
SUICIDE.


  Examples of antiquity no defence of suicide—Causes of ancient
  suicides—The suicides of Asdrubal, Nicocles, Isocrates,
  Demosthenes, Hannibal, Mithridates, the inhabitants of
  the city of Xanthus, Cato, Charondas, Lycurgus, Codrus,
  Themistocles, Emperor Otho, Brutus and Cassius, Mark Antony
  and Cleopatra, Petronius, Lucan, Lucius Vetus, Sardanapalus,
  M. Curtius, Empedocles, Theoxena—Noble resistance of
  Josephus—Scripture suicides: Samson, Saul, Ahitophel, Judas
  Iscariot, Eleazar, Razis—Doctrines of the stoics, Seneca,
  Epictetus, Zeno—Opinions of Cicero, Pliny, on suicide—Ancient
  laws on suicide.

Human actions are more under the influence of example than precept;
consequently, suicide has often been justified by an appeal to the
laws and customs of past ages. An undue reverence for the authority of
antiquity induces us to rely more upon what has been said or done in
former times, than upon the dictates of our own feelings and judgement.
Many have formed the most extravagant notions of honour, liberty, and
courage, and, under the impression that they were imitating the noble
example of some ancient hero, have sacrificed their lives. They urge
in their defence that suicide has been enjoined by positive laws, and
allowed by ancient custom; that the greatest and bravest nation in
the world practised it; and that the most wise and virtuous sect of
philosophers taught that it was an evidence of courage, magnanimity,
and virtue. There is no mode of reasoning so fallacious as that which
is constantly appealing to examples. A man who has made up his mind
to the adoption of a particular course can easily discover reasons
to justify himself in carrying out his preconceived opinions. If a
contemplated action, abstractedly considered, be good, cases may
be of service in illustrating it. There must be some test by which
to form a correct estimate of the justness or lawfulness of human
actions; and until we are agreed as to what ought to constitute that
standard, examples are perfectly useless. No inferences deduced from
the consideration of the suicides of antiquity can be logically applied
to modern instances. We live under a Christian dispensation. Our
notions of death, of honour, and of courage, are, in many respects,
so dissimilar from those which the ancients entertained, that the
subject of suicide is placed entirely on a different basis. In the
early periods of history, self-destruction was considered as an
evidence of courage; death was preferred to dishonour. These principles
were inculcated by celebrated philosophers, who exercised a great
influence over the minds of the people; and, in many instances, the
act of self-immolation constituted a part of their religion. Is it,
then, to be wondered at, that so many men, eminent for their genius,
and renowned for their valour, should, under such circumstances, have
sacrificed themselves?

The famous suicides of antiquity generally resulted from one of three
causes:—First, it was practised by those who wished to avoid pain and
personal suffering of body and mind; secondly, when a person considered
the act as a necessary vindication of his honour; and thirdly, when
life was sacrificed as an example to others.

The first class is the most excusable of the three. Pain, physical
or mental, puts a man’s courage severely to the test. He may have to
choose between the alternative of years of unmitigated anguish, or an
immediate release from torture. Need we feel surprise at many resorting
to the latter alternative, when they have been taught to believe death
either to be an eternal sleep, or a sure entrance into regions of
happiness!

How many instances have we on record of persons who have dispatched
themselves to avoid falling into the hands of an enemy! The case of
the wife of Asdrubal, the Carthaginian general, is a famous instance
of the kind. Asdrubal had deserted his post, and had fled to Scipio;
and during his absence his wife took shelter with her troops in
the temple, which she set on fire. She then attired herself in her
richest robes, and holding her two children in her hands, addressed
Scipio—who had surrounded the building with his troops—in the following
language:—“You, O Roman, are only acting according to the laws of open
war; but may the gods of Carthage, and those in concert with them,
punish that false wretch who, by such a base desertion, has betrayed
his country, his gods, his wife, his children! Let him adorn thy gay
triumph; let him suffer in the sight of all Rome those indignities and
tortures he so justly merits!”

The case of Nicocles, King of Paphos, in Cyprus, who committed suicide
in conjunction with his wife and daughter, on the approach of King
Ptolemy, is another in point. Isocrates, the celebrated Athenian
orator, starved himself to death, sooner than submit to the dominion of
Philip of Macedon. Demosthenes also poisoned himself, when Antipater,
Alexander’s ambassador, required the Athenians to deliver up their
orators, fearful of being subjected to slavery and disgrace.

The persecution to which the Romans subjected Hannibal, after he was
oppressed with years and sunk in obscurity, impelled him to have
recourse to the poison which he always kept about him in a ring,
against sudden emergencies. Mithridates took poison, and administered
the same to his wives and daughters, in order to escape being taken
prisoner by Pompey, before whose victorious arms he had been compelled
to fly.

The case of the inhabitants of the city of Xanthus is another
remarkable instance of the determination exhibited by thousands of
persons, resolved sooner to die by their own hands than submit to
the dominion of a conqueror. Notwithstanding the proffered clemency
of Brutus, who not only wept at the dreadful scene he witnessed, but
commanded his soldiers to extinguish the fire, and even offered a
reward for every inhabitant whose life was saved, the people were so
eager for death that they rushed into the flames with exclamations of
delight, and forceably drove back the soldiers who were sent by Brutus
for the purpose of saving their lives.

The example of Cato is applauded by some writers as a proof of
magnanimity; the action was the reverse; it was the effect of pride
and timidity. If ever Rome required his experience and patriotic
counsels it was at that very period. To desert the duty which Rome had
a right to demand by a voluntary death was the meanest conduct in his
character. It stamped an indelible stain on his reputation, which only
a supposition that his intellect was impaired could rationally excuse.
It was not the virtuous Cato who had stemmed the torrent of tyranny,
who had crushed the Cataline conspiracy, who had given the most noble
examples of virtuous resolution and rectitude in moral conduct, but
the enfeebled Cato, sinking under the accumulation of evils, whose
soul was depressed with suspense and distracting passions, waiting an
opportunity for revenge, or preparing to finish his life on the first
disappointment.

If such examples were admitted magnanimous, in any serious quarrel
or war, where success could not be commanded, it might be considered
laudable to commit suicide. The consequences of such reasoning would
be obvious. On such occasions, countries would lose their bravest
generals, private families their noblest and most experienced
supporters.

“If I cannot acquire what I wish,” says Cato, “I will kill myself;
I will not live to grace Cæsar’s triumph, though I know Cæsar to be
the most generous and clement of conquerors; I cannot consent to
receive Cæsar’s favours. My pride is wounded; my fears destroy all
tranquillity; my body is sinking under adversity; I will not dedicate
my services to my distressed country under the auspices of successful
Cæsar. I will plunge a sword into my bosom, and commit an injustice to
myself, which through a long life I never committed to others. From
the uniformity of my former patriotic character, writers, without
deep reasoning, will paint this concluding action in glowing colours;
they will give additional lustre to an immortal reputation.” Such,
we conceive, were the secret springs of action in Cato’s mind; such
were the contending passions which excited the delirium. It was not
the placid, judicious Cato of former years, but the depressed Cato,
_impos mentis_, committing a rash action, contrary to all his former
great reasoning, and virtuous persevering conduct. It was, in fact,
Cato’s act of insanity; it was not dying to serve his country, but to
effectually rob Cæsar of his eminent services; it therefore appears
more the effect of private pique and despondency than a demonstration
of public virtue or courage. Had all others concerned in that civil
war followed this extraordinary example, the country would have
been robbed of many of its brightest ornaments. Cato could not say
with Horace, “Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori,” for it was not
for his countrymen that he died, but to gratify a selfish caprice,
a personal resentment and hatred to Cæsar and his power. Had Cæsar
attacked the city while Cato enjoyed a vigour of mind and body, and
when the citizens were better disciplined and less corrupt, he would
have despised such inglorious conduct; he would rather have hoped for
some future opportunity to dispel the dark clouds overwhelming the
distracted country.

Physicians have frequent opportunities of observing the diminution of
human courage and wisdom from long continued misfortunes, or bodily
infirmities. The most lively, spirited, and enterprising, have become
depressed from reiterated disappointment; cowardice and despair have
succeeded to the most unquestionable bravery and ambition. The man
is then changed; his blood is changed; and with these his former
sentiments. The timidity is no longer Cato’s, but belongs to the
miserable _debilitated body_ of Cato, which had lost that _vigorous
soul_ that so eminently distinguished on other important occasions this
excellent and divine patriot.

La Motte observes, with reference to Cato’s death—

  “Stern Cato, with more equal soul,
  Had bowed to Cæsar’s wide control,
  With Rome, had to her conqueror bowed,
  But that his spirit, rough and proud,
  Had not the courage to await
  A pardoned foe’s too humbling fate.”

Voltaire, in alluding to the lines quoted above, says, “It was, I
believe, because Cato’s soul was always equal, and retained to the last
its love for his country and her laws, that he chose rather to perish
with her than to crouch to the tyrant. He died as he had lived.

“Incapable of surrendering, and to whom? to the enemy of Rome—to the
man who had forcibly robbed the public treasury in order to make war
upon his fellow citizens, and enslave them by means of their own
money. A pardoned foe! It seems as if La Motte Houdart was speaking of
some revolted subject who might have obtained his Majesty’s pardon by
letters in chancery. It seems (continues Voltaire) rather absurd to say
that Cato slew himself through weakness. None but a strong mind can
thus surmount the most powerful instinct of nature. This strength is
sometimes that of frenzy; but a frantic man is not weak.”

In forming an estimate of the condition of Cato’s mind, we must not
look at him as delineated by the dramatist and poet, but as exhibited
by the historian and philosopher. Our notions of Cato are too often
based on Addison’s, and not Plutarch’s description of his character.
That Cato was one of the most complete and perfect examples in
antiquity of private manners and of public spirit cannot be questioned;
and therefore, in this respect, worthy to be held up as an example.
Sallust thus eulogizes Cato:—“His glory can neither be increased by
flattery nor lessened by detraction. He was one who chose to be, rather
than to appear good. He was the very image of virtue, and in all points
of disposition more like the gods than men. He never did right that he
might seem to do right, but because he could not do otherwise. That
only seemed to be reasonable which was just. Free from all human vices,
he was superior to the vicissitudes of fortune.” It was the dignity of
Cato’s life that stamped a celebrity on the mode of his death.

In forming a judgment of the motives which led this distinguished
man to sacrifice his life, we must look at him in connexion with his
great enemy, Cæsar. He was not only opposed to him on public, but on
private grounds. Cæsar’s intimacy with Servilia, Cato’s sister, was
the ground of much conversation at Rome. During one of the debates
concerning the Cataline conspiracy, Cæsar received a letter whilst he
was in the senate house. Cato, who had intimated that Cæsar had been
privy to Cataline’s proceedings, and believing that the letter might
refer to the subject, from the manner in which Cæsar endeavoured to
conceal it, demanded that it should be handed over to him. The letter
was accordingly handed to Cato, when, perceiving that it was a letter
from Servilia to Cæsar, full of protestations of love to his deadliest
enemy, he threw it at Cæsar in a great rage, and called him a drunkard.
This, added to the circumstance of Cæsar’s complete triumph over him,
induced Cato to put an end to his own life. He did not commit suicide
to defeat usurpation, or to preserve the liberties and laws of Rome,
but it was done when he despaired of his country. It arose from his
horror of tyranny, and the feeling of intolerable shame at the prospect
of a long life under an arbitrary master. The superstructure of years
was in a moment levelled to the dust. He had to choose between death
or slavery. After the defeat at Thapsus, and hearing that Cæsar was
marching against him, Lucius Cæsar offered to intercede for Cato. His
answer was as follows:—“If I would save my life, I ought to go myself;
but I will not be beholden to the tyrant for any act of his injustice;
and ’tis unjust for him to pretend to pardon those as a lord over
whom he has no lawful power.” Although it was evident he was bent
upon suicide, he persuaded his son to go to Cæsar, and cautioned his
friend Statilius, whom Plutarch calls “a known Cæsar-hater,” not to
kill himself, but to submit to the conqueror. He then entered into a
discussion concerning liberty, which he carried on so violently that
his friends were apprehensive that he would lay hands on himself.
In consequence of this, his son removed his sword. Cato is then
represented as reading Plato’s Phædo, and then calling for his sword,
which they refused to bring him. He called a second and third time, and
in a fit of rage he struck the servant, and wounded him, and by doing
so, injured his own hand, which prevented him from effectually killing
himself with his weapon. After he had stabbed himself, his wound was
dressed; but so determined was he to sacrifice his life, that he tore
open the wound forcibly, and pulled his bowels out, and thus effected
his purpose.[1]

It has been said that Addison approved of Cato’s self-murder. This
does not appear to be the fact, if we are to judge from the words which
he has put in the mouth of the dying hero—

  “I am sick to death; oh, when shall I get loose
  From this vain world, the abode of guilt and sorrow!
  And yet methinks a beam of light breaks in
  On my departing soul. Alas, I fear
  I have been too hasty! O ye powers that search
  The heart of man, and weigh his inmost thoughts,
  If I have done amiss, impute it not:
  The best may err, but you are good, and—(_dies._)”

Two celebrated instances amongst the Grecians of men who voluntarily
sacrificed their lives in order to maintain the dignity and importance
of their own institutions, are exhibited in the cases of Charondas and
Lycurgus. The former, in order to encourage a proper freedom of debate,
had made it death to come armed into the assembly of the states. One
day, coming himself in haste to a convention without having first laid
aside his sword, he was rebuked by some one present, as a transgressor
of his own laws. Stung with the justice of the imputation, he instantly
plunged the sword into his own heart, both as a sacrifice to the
violated majesty of the law, and a tremendous example of disinterested
justice; trusting, moreover, thus to seal with his own blood a strict
observance in others of his wholesome institutions.

When Lycurgus had accomplished his great work of legislation in Sparta,
he took the following method of rendering his system unchangeable and
immortal. He stated that it was necessary that he should consult the
Delphian oracle relative to his new laws. He then made all the Spartan
magistrates and people take a solemn oath that they would observe
and keep his laws inviolate “till his return.” He accordingly went
to consult the oracle, and having sent back the answer in writing to
Sparta, “That the laws were excellent, and would render the people
great and happy who should observe them,” he resolved never to return
himself, in order that the people might never be absolved from their
oath. He accordingly starved himself to death. Plutarch considers
that Lycurgus reasoned himself into the act, under the belief that a
good statesman and patriot should seek to make his death itself in
some way useful to his country. The same authority considers that
he intended the mode of his death to be a practical illustration of
the great principle which pervaded the whole code of his laws, which
was—_temperance_.

Alike honourable, in a worldly point of view, was the death of Codrus,
King of Athens. The oracle was consulted with reference to the
condition of the country. That nation was predicted to be prosperous
whose king should be first slain by the enemy. Codrus disguised himself
as a private soldier, and entered the enemy’s camp, where he contrived
to pick a quarrel with the first man he met, whom he permitted to slay
him; thus, for the good of his country, courting his own death.

Themistocles is said to have poisoned himself rather than lead on the
Persian army against his own countrymen, although fame, wealth, and
honour were within his grasp.

The Emperor Otho, to avoid the further sacrifice of life in the
imperial contest, resolved to die by his own hands, notwithstanding
his troops implored and beseeched him to lead them on to a second
engagement in which victory was almost certain. King Otho’s answer to
the demand of his soldiers is considered to embody the spirit of true
Roman heroism—“Deny me not the glory of laying down my own life to
preserve yours. The more hope there is left, the more honourable is my
early retirement; since it is by my death alone that I can prevent the
further effusion of Roman blood, and restore peace and tranquillity
to a distracted empire, by being ready to die for its peace and
security.”[2]

Two of the most distinguished men of antiquity who sacrificed their
own lives were Brutus and Cassius. Before their battle with Cæsar
on the plains of Philippi, these two warriors had a conversation on
suicide. Cassius asked Brutus what his opinions were on the subject of
self-destruction, provided fortune did not favour them in the contest
in which they were about to be engaged. Brutus replied, that formerly
he had embraced such sentiments as induced him to condemn Cato for
killing himself; he deemed it an act of irreverence towards the gods,
and that it was no evidence of courage. But he continues, “Now, in
the midst of dangers, I am quite of another mind.” He then proceeds
to tell Cassius of his determination to surrender up his life “on the
Ides of March.” He states no particular reasons for having changed
his opinions on the subject of suicide. The issue of the battle is
well known. Many things conspired to damp the courage of Cassius and
Brutus. In imitation of Cæsar, Brutus made a public lustration for his
army in the field, and during the ceremony an unlucky omen is said to
have happened to Cassius. The garland he was to wear at the sacrifice
was given to him the wrong side outwards; the person, also, who bore
the golden image before Cassius stumbled, and the image fell to the
ground. Several birds of prey hovered about his camp, and swarms of
bees were seen within the trenches. Cassius, believing in the Epicurean
philosophy, considered all these circumstances as disheartening omens
of his fate. After the defeat of Cassius, he ordered his freedman to
kill him, which he did by severing his head from his body.

Plutarch makes Brutus die most stoically. After having taken an
affectionate leave of his friends, and having assured them that he
was only angry with fortune for his country’s sake, since he esteemed
himself in his death more happy than his conquerors, he advised them to
provide for their own safety. He then retired, and, with the assistance
of Strato, he ran his sword through his body. Dion Cassius (Lib. xlvii.)
represents Brutus as far from acting the stoic at his last moments. He
is said just before his death to have quoted the following passage from
Euripides—“O wretched virtue! thou art a bare name! I mistook thee for
a substance; but thou thyself art the slave of fortune.”

In considering the motives that induced Brutus to destroy himself,
we must not forget to take into calculation the effect which the
apparition he saw previous to the battle of Philippi must have had
on his mind. Brutus was naturally watchful, sparing in his diet, and
allowed himself but little time for sleep. He never retired to rest,
day or night, until he had arranged all his business. At this time,
involved as he was in the operations of war, and solicitous for the
event, he only slumbered a little after supper, and spent the remainder
of the night in attending to his most urgent affairs. When these were
dispatched, he occupied himself in reading till the third watch, when
the tribunes and centurions came to him for orders. Thus, a little
before he left Asia, he was sitting alone in his tent, by a dim light,
at a late hour. The whole army lay in sleep and silence, while Brutus,
wrapped in meditation, thought he perceived something enter his tent;
turning towards the door, he saw a monstrous and horrible spectre
standing by the side of his bed. “What art thou?” said he, boldly.
The spectre answered, “I am thy evil genius, Brutus! Thou wilt see
me at Philippi.” To which he calmly replied, “I’ll meet thee there.”
In the morning he communicated to Cassius what he had seen. Cassius,
who was an Epicurean, had often disputed with Brutus on the subject
of apparitions. He said, when he had heard the statement of Brutus,
that the spectre was not a spirit, but a real being; and argued at
considerable length on the subject, and induced the general to think
that his fate was decided. There can be no doubt but that this singular
presentiment co-operated with other circumstances in inducing Brutus to
fall by his own hands.[3]

Amongst the ancient suicides, those of Mark Antony and Cleopatra
deserve especial consideration. It is not our purpose to enter into an
elaborate history of these celebrated characters, but merely to refer
to those circumstances that had an immediate connexion with their last
moments.

Three circumstances acted powerfully on Antony’s mind in inducing him
to seek a voluntary death. The first was his having been defeated by
Cæsar; the second, the idea that Cleopatra had betrayed him; and the
third was the belief in Cleopatra’s death.

As soon as Antony was defeated, the unhappy queen fled to her monument,
ordered all the doors to be barred, and commanded that Antony should
be informed that she was dead. He was overwhelmed with grief, and
retiring to his chamber, opened his coat of mail, and ordered his
faithful servant Eros (who had been engaged to kill him whenever he
should think it necessary) to dispatch him. Eros drew his sword,
and, instead of killing his master, ran it through his own body, and
fell dead at Antony’s feet. Antony then plunged his sword into his
bowels, and threw himself on the couch. The wound was not, however,
immediately fatal. In a short period after, Diomedes, Cleopatra’s
servant, came to Antony with a request that he would instantly repair
to her chamber. His delight was unbounded when he heard that Cleopatra
was alive, and he directly ordered his servant to carry him to her.
As she would not allow the doors to be opened, Antony was drawn up to
her window by a cord. He was suspended for a considerable time in the
air stretching out his hands to Cleopatra. Notwithstanding she exerted
all her strength, strained every nerve, and distorted her features
in endeavouring to draw him up, it was with the greatest difficulty
it was effected. Cleopatra laid him on the bed, and, standing over
him, so extreme was her anguish, that she rent her clothes, and beat
and wounded her breast. After Antony’s death, when Cleopatra heard
that Cæsar had dispatched Gallus to take her prisoner, and that he
had effected an entrance into the monument, _she attempted to stab
herself with a dagger which she always carried about with her for that
purpose_. When she heard that it was Cæsar’s intention to send her
into Syria, she asked permission to visit Antony’s tomb, over which
she poured forth most bitter lamentations. “Hide me, hide me,” she
exclaimed, “with thee in the grave; for life, since _thou_ hast left
it, has been misery to _me_.” After crowning the tomb with flowers,
she kissed it, and ordered a bath to be prepared. She then sat down to
a magnificent supper; after which, a peasant came to the gate with a
small basket of figs covered with leaves, which was admitted into the
monument. Amongst the figs and under the leaves was concealed the asp,
which Cleopatra applied to her bosom. She was found dead, attired in
one of her most gorgeous dresses, decorated with brilliants, and lying
on her golden bed.

Few of the illustrious men of antiquity have exhibited such philosophic
coolness as Petronius, after he had determined to sacrifice his life.
The levity which distinguished his voluntary death was in accordance
with the gaiety and frivolity of his life. The capricious friendship
of a Nero had been withdrawn from him, and in consequence he had
determined on his own death. This _arbiter elegantiarum_ during life,
determined to indulge in a luxurious refinement of that death he was
preparing to encounter. Being well aware he could not long escape
from the murderous edict, after a fall from the summit of imperial
favour, he opened and closed his veins at pleasure. He slept during the
intervals, or sauntered about and enjoyed the delights of conversation
with his friends; but his discourse was not of so elevated a character
as that attributed to Seneca or Socrates.

The poet Lucan exhibited great apparent serenity at the approach of
death. After the veins of his arm had been voluntarily opened, and he
had lost a large quantity of blood, he felt his hands and his legs
losing their vitality. As the hour of death approached, he commenced
repeating several lines out of his own Pharsalia, descriptive of a
person similarly situated to himself. These lines he repeated until he
died.

Cocceius Nerva starved himself to death in the reign of Tiberius. It
was said that he was displeased with the state of public affairs, and
had made up his mind to die whilst his own integrity remained unsullied.

During the bloody reign of Nero, many singular suicides took place. The
particulars attending the deaths of Lucius Vetus, his mother-in-law
Sextia, and Pollutia his daughter, are worth recording. After Lucius
had distributed all his wealth among his domestics, requesting them
to remove everything from his house excepting three couches, he, with
his mother-in-law and daughter, retired into the same chamber, opened
a vein with the same lancet, and after, reclining each on a separate
couch, waited calmly the approach of death. His eyes, and those of his
mother-in-law, were both fixed on the daughter, while the daughter’s
wandered from one to the other. It was the earnest prayer of each of
them to die first, and to leave the others in the act of expiring.[4]

When the throne of Sardanapalus was endangered, he conceived a
magnificent and truly luxurious mode of committing suicide, quite in
character with the extravagance and dissoluteness of his former life.
He erected a funeral pile of great height in his palace, and adorned
it with the most sumptuous and costly ornaments. In the middle of this
building was a chamber of one hundred feet in length, built of wood,
in which a number of golden couches and tables were spread. On one of
these he reclined with his wife, his numerous concubines occupying
the rest. The building was encompassed round at some distance with
large beams and thick wood, to prevent all egress from the place.
Much combustible matter, and an immense pile of wood were also placed
within, together with an infinite quantity of gold and silver, royal
vestments, costly apparel, rich furniture, curious ornaments, and
all the apparatus of luxury and magnificence. All being arranged, this
splendid funeral pile was set on fire, and continued burning until the
fifteenth day; during which time Sardanapalus revelled in all kinds
of sensualities. The multitude without were in astonishment at the
tremendous scene, and at the immense clouds of incense and smoke which
issued with the flames. It was stated that the king was engaged in
offering some extraordinary sacrifices; while the attendants within
alone knew that this dissolute prince was putting such a splendid end
to his effeminate life.[5]

There has been some dispute as to the death of Marcus Curtius. Plutarch
attributes his death to accident, but Procillius considers that it
was voluntary. He says, the earth having opened at a particular time,
the Aruspices declared it necessary, for the safety of the republic,
that the bravest man in the city should throw himself into the gulf;
whereupon Curtius, mounting his horse, leaped armed into it, and the
gulf immediately closed. But Livy and Dionysius relate the circumstance
in a different manner. They say that Curtius was a Sabine, who, having
at first repulsed the Romans, but being in his turn overpowered by
Romulus, and endeavouring to make good his retreat, fell into the lake,
which from that time bore his name. The lake was situated almost in the
centre of the Roman forum. Some writers consider the name was derived
from Curtius the Consul, because he caused it to be walled in after it
had been struck with lightning.[6]

The death of the celebrated philosopher and poet, Empedocles, of
Sicily, was remarkable. Wishing to be believed a god, and that his
death might be unknown, he threw himself into the crater of Mount Ætna,
and perished in the flames. The mode of his death was not discovered
until some time afterwards, when one of his sandals was thrown up from
the volcano.

Ancient history affords us many noble examples of individuals who
preferred voluntary death to dishonour and loss of character. If ever
self-murder could be considered as in the slightest degree justifiable,
it would be under such circumstances. Who cannot but honour the conduct
of the noble virgins of Macedon, who threw themselves into the wells,
and courted death, sooner than submit to the dishonourable proposals
of the Roman governor! When Theoxena was pursued by the emissaries of
Philip, king of Macedon, who had been guilty of murdering her first
husband, she produced a dagger and a box of poison, and placing them
before the crew of the ship in which she was endeavouring to make her
escape, she said, “Death is now our only remedy and means of vengeance;
let each take the method that best pleases himself of avoiding the
tyrant’s pride, cruelty, and lust. Come on, my brave companions
and family, seize the sword or drink of the cup, as you prefer an
instantaneous or gradual death.” Some fell on the sword, others drank
the poison until death was effected. After Theoxena had accomplished
her designs, she threw herself into the arms of her husband, and they
both plunged into the sea.

The resistance which Josephus made to the importunities of his soldiers
to fall by his own hand sooner than surrender to the enemy, is perhaps
the most noble instance of the kind on record. After the success of
the Romans in Judæa, Josephus, who commanded the Jewish army, wished
to deliver himself up to his conquerors; he was encouraged to this by
certain dreams and visions. When Josephus’s intention was known, the
soldiers flocked round him, and expressed their indignation at his
intention. They urged him to fall by his own sword, and to let them
follow his example, sooner than abandon the field. To this appeal
Josephus replies, “Oh, my friends, why are you so earnest to kill
yourselves? why do you set your soul and body, which are such dear
companions, at such variance? It is a brave thing to die in war, but
it should be by the hands of the enemy. It is a foolish thing to do
that for ourselves, which we quarrel with them for doing to us. It is a
brave thing to die for liberty; but still it should be in battle, and
by those who would take that liberty from us. He is equally a coward
who will not die when he is obliged to die. What are we afraid of, when
we will not go up and meet the Romans? Is it death? Why then inflict it
on ourselves? You say, We must be slaves. Are we then in a clear state
of liberty at present? Self-murder is a crime most remote from the
common nature of all animals, and an instance of impiety against God
our Creator.”

Josephus, in the spirit of a true philosopher, urged his soldiers to
abandon the notion of suicide; but instead of being calmed by his
discourse, they became enraged, and rushed on him. Fearing that the
case was hopeless, Josephus prevailed upon them to listen to the
following proposal. He persuaded them to draw lots; the man on whom
the first lot fell was to be killed by him who had the second, and the
second by the third, and so on. In this way no soldier would perish
by his own hand, except the last man. Lots were accordingly drawn;
Josephus drew his with the rest. He who had the first lot willingly
submitted his neck to him who had the second. It happened that Josephus
and a soldier were left to draw lots; and as the general was desirous
neither to imbrue his own hand in the blood of his countryman, nor to
be condemned by lot himself, he persuaded the soldier to trust his
fidelity, and to live as well as himself. Thus ended this tragical
scene, and Josephus immediately surrendered himself up to Vespasian.

The first instance of suicide recorded in Scripture is that of Samson.
After suffering many indignities from the hands of the Philistines, his
anger was roused to the highest pitch, and, resting against the pillars
that supported the building in which the lords of the Philistines
and an infinite number of others were assembled, he offered up the
following prayer: “O Lord God, remember me, I pray thee, and strengthen
me, I pray thee, only this once, O God, that I may at once be avenged
of the Philistines for my two eyes;” and taking hold of the pillars, he
said, “Let me die with the Philistines: and he bowed himself with all
his might, and the house fell upon the lords and all that were therein;
so that the dead which he slew at his death were more than they which
he slew in his life.”

In Samson’s case, there is nothing said in Scripture either to condemn
or justify the act; but it appears evident from the whole history of
the last events of his life, that he was but an instrument in the
hands of God for the accomplishment of his wise purposes. The glory of
God had been violated in the person of Samson; he had been subjected
by the Philistines to great indignities; and it was to demonstrate
the power of God in the destruction of his enemies that Samson’s life
was sacrificed. Samson is, then, to be considered as a martyr to his
religion and his God.

The case of Saul has also been cited. It is thus referred to in
Scripture:—“And the battle went sore against Saul, and the archers hit
him, and he was sore wounded of the archers. Then said Saul unto his
armourbearer, Draw thy sword, and thrust me through therewith, lest
these uncircumcised come and thrust me through, and abuse me. But his
armourbearer would not, for he was sore afraid; therefore Saul took a
sword and fell upon it. And when his armourbearer saw that Saul was
dead, he fell likewise upon his sword and died with him.”[7]

It must be recollected that the Jews considered that a man was
justified in committing suicide to prevent his falling into the
enemy’s hand, and on this account Saul was commended for killing
himself. But there was nothing glorious in Saul’s death. His army was
defeated by the Philistines, and Saul sounded a retreat; and as he was
making his ignominious flight, an arrow from the ranks of the enemy hit
him, and it was then that he implored his armourbearer to dispatch him.

Much has been made of the self murder* of Ahitophel. Donne has referred
to it at some length. He says that in this case there can be “no room
for excuse.” Ahitophel was considered one of the wisest counsellors of
his age. He joined Absalom in his rebellion against his lawful prince,
David; and when he saw that it was God’s determination to defeat his
counsel, and that his advice for the first time was neglected, he
became full of secret indignation and disappointment; and in order
to avoid the consequences of his own utter despair and ruin, for his
perfidy, he hanged himself. Nothing can be urged in justification
of this act. The facts are presented to us in biblical history; and
we are left to form our own judgment upon the course which this
“Machiavellian counsellor,” as he has been termed, thought proper to
adopt.

Donne has also cited the case of Judas Iscariot.[8] He must have
been sadly in want of sound illustrations to have brought forward the
instance of this traitor as a justification of the act of suicide.
Judas has been considered by some writers as a martyr. Petilian said
“that Judas, and all who killed themselves through remorse of sin,
ought to be accounted martyrs, because they punish in themselves what
they grieve to have committed.” To whom Augustine replies, “Thou hast
said, that the traitor perished by the rope, and has left a rope behind
him for such as himself. But we have nothing to do with him. We do not
venerate those as martyrs who hang themselves.”

The case, mentioned by the same authority, of Eleazar, the brother of
Judas Maccabeus, taken from the book of the Maccabees, is said to be
one of voluntary suicide, and where self-destruction was laudable.
Eleazar sacrificed his own life for the purpose of destroying King
Antiochus, and therefore his suicide is to be considered as a voluntary
sacrifice for the good of his country.

The self-destruction of Razis is full of horror, and can only be quoted
as an evidence of the act of a madman. When the tower in which Razis
was fighting against the enemy of Nicanor was set on fire, he fell
on his own sword, “Choosing rather,” says the text, “to die manfully
than fall into the hands of the wicked, to be abused otherwise than
beseemed his noble birth; but missing his stroke through haste, the
multitude also rushing within doors, he ran boldly up to the wall, and
cast himself down manfully among the thickest of them; but they quickly
giving back, and a space being made, he fell down in the midst of a
void place. Nevertheless, while there was yet breath within him, being
inflamed with anger, he rose up; and though his blood gushed out like
spouts of water, and his wounds were grievous, yet he ran through in
the midst of the throng, and standing on a steep rock, when, as his
blood was not quite gone, he plucked out his bowels, and taking them in
both his hands, he cast them upon the throng, and calling upon the Lord
of life and spirit to restore him them again, he thus died.”[9]

Having considered the remarkable suicides of antiquity, we will now
briefly allude to those doctrines and opinions of the celebrated
philosophers of ancient times, which must of necessity have tended to
create this recklessness of human life.

The doctrines inculcated by the stoical philosophers, or the disciples
of Zeno, must have increased the crime of suicide. “A stoical wise man
is ever ready to die for his country or his friends. A wise man will
never look upon death as an evil; that he will despise it, and be ready
to undergo it at any time.” “A wise man,” says Diog. Laertius, in his
life of Zeno, when expounding the stoical philosophy, “will quit life,
when oppressed with severe pain, or when deprived of any of his senses,
or when labouring under desperate diseases.” It is astonishing that a
sect of philosophers who inculcated that pain was no evil, should so
often have practised suicide. Much as we would condemn such principles,
still we must admit that most of the admired characters of antiquity
belonged to this celebrated sect—men distinguished for their wisdom,
learning, and the strictness of their morals. Cato was a stoic, and he
put into practice the principles of the sect to which he belonged.[10]

Among the philosophers of antiquity, Seneca stands preeminently*
forward as the defender of suicide. He says, “Does life please you?
live on. Does it not? go from whence you came. No vast wound is
necessary; a mere puncture will secure your liberty. It is a bad
thing (you say) to be under the necessity of living; but there is no
necessity in the case. Thanks be to the gods, nobody can be compelled
to live.”[11] These were the principles of the “wise Seneca,” and yet
he wanted the courage to commit suicide when put to the test. He says,
“Being emaciated by a severe illness, I often thought of suicide,
but was recalled by the old age of a most indulgent father; for I
considered not how resolutely ‘I’ could encounter death, but how ‘he’
could bear up under my loss.” This is not, however, the only instance
in which Seneca yielded his stoical principles to the dictates of
natural affection and rational judgment.

Among other distinguished philosophers who advocated suicide was
Epictetus. Although a stoic, he did not blindly follow the doctrines
of Zeno. Epictetus considered that it was the duty of man to suffer to
almost any extent before he sacrificed his own life. “If you like not
life, you may leave it; the door is open; get you gone! But a little
smoke ought not to frighten you away; it should be endured, and will
thereby be often surmounted.”

Epictetus followed strictly his own principles: in this respect he
was superior to Seneca. Seneca was born in the lap of good fortune;
Epictetus was a slave, and had to pass through the rugged paths of
adversity, bodily pain, and penury. Seneca was banished from Rome for
an intrigue; Epictetus was sent into exile for being a man of learning
and a philosopher.

When Epictetus was beaten unmercifully by his master, he said, with
great composure, “You will certainly break my leg.” He did so; and the
philosopher calmly rejoined, “Did I not tell you you would do it?”
This was in the true spirit of stoical philosophy.

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus was, perhaps, one of the brightest ornaments
of the sect of stoics. He carried into the minutest concern of life the
doctrine of Zeno. “He was,” says Gibbon, “severe to himself, indulgent
to the imperfections of others, just and beneficent to all mankind.”

Zeno, the founder of the sect of stoical philosophers, acted up to
the principles which he inculcated to his disciples. His suicide is
recorded to be as follows:—As he was going out of his school one day,
at the age of ninety-eight, he fell down, put a finger out of joint,
went home, and hanged himself.

Cleanthes, also, the successor of Zeno, followed the example of his
master in philosophy, by shortening the period of his life in the
following manner:—After having used abstinence for two days, by the
advice of his physician, for the cure of a trifling indisposition under
which he was labouring, he had permission to return to his former diet;
but he refused all sustenance, saying, “_that as he had advanced so far
on his journey towards death, he would not retreat_.” He accordingly
starved himself to death.

Among the most distinguished orators of antiquity who spoke in favour
of suicide stands Cicero. During his banishment he would have actually
destroyed himself, if it had not been for his natural timidity and
want of resolution. He writes to his brother Quintus, “The tears of my
friends have prevented me from flying to death as my refuge.”

Pliny was an advocate of suicide. In a chapter entitled “On God,” he
writes thus—“The chief comfort of man in his imperfect state is this,
that even the Deity cannot do all things. For instance, he cannot put
himself to death when he pleases, which is the greatest indulgence he
has given to man amid the severe evils of life.” Pliny belonged to the
Epicureans, and his notions are in accordance with the doctrines of
that sect.

Pliny the younger appears to have had different notions on the
subject. When lamenting the death of a dear friend, Corellius Rufus,
who had killed himself, he says, “He is dead—dead by his own hand,
which agonizes my grief; for that is the most lamentable kind of death
which neither proceeds from nature nor from fate.” The whole epistle
from which the above extract is made indicates a noble and feeling
heart.

It appears that the Roman laws respecting suicide were of a fiscal
nature. They viewed the act not as a crime abstractedly, but considered
how far the circumstance affected the state or treasury. In some
portion of the Roman empire the magistrate had the power of granting
or refusing permission to commit suicide. If the decision was given
against the applicant, and he persisted in sacrificing his life,
disgrace and ignominy were heaped upon his body, and it was buried in
the most humiliating manner. The tenour of the law relating to suicide
laid down in “Justinian’s Digests” is to the following effect:—“Those
who, being actually accused, or who being caught in any crime, and
dreading a prosecution, made way with themselves, were to have their
effects confiscated. But this confiscation was no punishment of
suicide, _as a crime in itself_, being then only to take place when the
crime committed incurred the confiscation of property, and when the
person accused of it would have been found guilty. For which reason
the heirs-at-law were permitted (if they thought proper) to try the
cause as though the accused person, who had put a period to his life,
had been still living; and if his innocence could be proved, they were
still entitled to his effects. But if any one killed himself, either
through weariness of life, or an impatience under pain or ill health,
for a load of private debt, or for any other reason not affecting the
state or public treasury, the property of the deceased flowed in its
natural channel. In the case of an attempted but incomplete suicide,
where a man was under no accusation, a distinction was made as to the
causes impelling to it, before the question as to its punishment was
to be determined. If it proceeded not from weariness of life, or an
impatience under the pressure of some calamity, the attempter was to
suffer the same punishment as if he had effected his purpose; and for
this reason, because he who without reason spared not his own life,
would not be likely to spare another man’s.”[12]

If a prisoner committed suicide, the jailor authorized to protect him
was punished very severely. The Roman law made a distinction between
soldiers and civilians. If a soldier attempted to take away his life,
and it could not be proved that he was suffering at the time from great
grief, misfortune, madness, &c., it was deemed a capital offence, and
death was the punishment. And even in cases where it was established
that the act was the result of mental perturbation, he was dismissed
from the service with ignominy and disgrace.

During the pure ages of the Roman Republic, when religion was
reverenced, when the gods were looked up to with respect as the
disposers of all events, suicide was but little known. But when the
philosophy of Greece was introduced into the Roman Empire, and the
manners of the people became corrupted and degenerated, the crime
increased to an alarming extent. This indifference to life was also
augmented by the spread of stoical and epicurean principles. The stoic
was taught to believe his life his own; that he was the sole arbiter of
his existence; and that he could live or die as he pleased. The same
principles were inculcated by the epicurean philosophy. Is it, then, to
be wondered at, that suicide should be of common occurrence, when such
degrading principles had taken possession of the minds of the people?

By the law of Thebes, the person who committed suicide was deprived of
his funeral rites, and his name and memory were branded with infamy.
The Athenian law was equally severe: the hand of the self-murderer
was cut off, and buried apart from his body, as having been an enemy
and traitor to it. The Greeks considered suicide as a most heinous
crime. The bodies of suicides, according to the Grecian custom, were
not burned to ashes, but were immediately buried. They considered it
a pollution of the holy element of fire to consume in it the carcases
of those who had been guilty of self-murder. Suicides were classed
“with the public or private enemy; with the traitor, and conspirator
against his country; with the tyrant, the sacrilegious wretch, and
such grievous offenders whose punishment was impalement alive on a
cross.”[13]

These laws, however, fell into disuse, as appears evident from the
circumstance of there being so many cases of suicide which escaped this
treatment.

In the island of Ceos the magistrates had the power of deciding whether
a person had sufficient reasons for killing himself. A poison was kept
for that purpose, which was given to the applicant who made out his
case before the magistracy.

The same custom was followed among the Massilians, the ancient
inhabitants of Marseilles. A preparation of hemlock was kept in
readiness, and the senate, on hearing the merits of the case, had the
power to decide whether the applicant had good and substantial reasons
for committing suicide. There was, no doubt, much good effected by this
regulation, as it clearly acknowledged the principle that the power
of a man over his own life rested not in himself, but in the voice of
the magistrate, who alone was to determine how his life or death might
affect the state.

Libanius, of Antioch, who flourished towards the end of the fourth
century, has very happily ridiculed the practice to which we have
alluded. In some imaginary pleadings before the senate, he advocates
the cause of a man who wishes to swallow the hemlock draught, that
he may be freed from the garrulity of a loquacious wife. “Truly,”
says he, “if our legislator had not been addicted too much to law
making, I should have been under no necessity of proving before you
the expediency of my departure, but a rope and the first tree would
have given me peace and quiet. But since he, determining we should be
slaves, has deprived us even of the liberty of dying when we please,
and has enchained us with decrees on this business, I imprecate the
author and obey his mandates, in thus laying my complaints and my
request before you.” He then, with considerable eloquence and humour,
advocates the cause of the “envious man,” who wishes to taste the
“suicidal draught” because his neighbour’s wealth had increased beyond
his own. “Let the wretch,” he says, “recite his calamities, let the
senate bestow the antidote, and let grief be dissolved in death.”

Libanius then pleads in behalf of Timon, the man hater, who begs
permission to dispatch himself because he was bound by profession to
hate all mankind, but he could not help loving Alcibiades.

It is a singular circumstance connected with the subject of suicide,
that authors who have written in its defence should quote the cases
referred to in this chapter in justification of their views. They
have not taken into consideration the peculiar customs, habits, and
religion of the people, which of course must have greatly influenced
their actions. How absurd would it be for us to take the authority of
antiquity as an infallible rule of conduct. The Massagetes considered
those unhappy who died a natural death, and therefore eat their dearest
friends when they grew old. The Libarenians broke their necks down a
precipice. The Bactrians were thrown alive to the dogs. The Scythians
buried the dearest friends of the deceased with them alive, or killed
them on the funeral pile. The Roman people, when sunk in vice and
licentiousness, considered it a mark of courage and honour to fall by
their own hands, and suicide was a common occurrence with them.

“In the beginning of the spring,” says Malt. Brun, “a shocking ceremony
takes place at Cola Bhairava, in the mountains between the rivers Taptæ
and Nerbuddah. It is the practice of some persons of the lowest tribes
in Berar to make vows of suicide, in return for answers which their
prayers are believed to have received from their idols. This is the
place where such vows are performed in the beginning of spring, when
eight or ten victims generally throw themselves from a precipice. The
ceremony gives rise to an annual fair, and some trade.”[14]

No just distinction can be drawn between these customs. The Indian
widow, in obedience to the religion of her country, ascends the
funeral pile of her husband, and is burnt to death. Thousands annually
sacrifice their lives by throwing themselves under the wheels of their
idol Juggernaut. Strong feelings of religion impel them to this; they
become excluded from society, they lose caste, and are subjected to
all kinds of persecution if they do not bow to the customs of the
country. What legitimate argument can be deduced from these facts in
favour of suicide? And yet these cases are considered to constitute
a justification of the stoical dogma, that we have a right when we
please to put an end to our own existence. Desperate indeed must be the
circumstances of those who are compelled to found their reasoning on so
flimsy a basis.




CHAPTER II.

WRITERS IN DEFENCE OF SUICIDE.


  Opinions of Hume—Effect of his writings—Case of suicide caused
  by—The doctrines of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Montaigne
  examined—Origin of Dr. Donne’s celebrated work—Madame de
  Staël’s recantation—Robert of Normandy, Gibbon, Sir T. More,
  and Robeck’s opinions considered.

It will be foreign to my purpose to enter elaborately into an
examination of the opinions of those who have thought proper to justify
the commission of suicide. The arguments which have been advanced by
Hume, Donne, Rousseau, Madame de Staël, Montesquieu, Montaigne, Gibbon,
Voltaire, and Robeck, are founded on such gross and apparent fallacies,
that they carry with them their own refutation.

Hume, whose pen was always ready to support opinions at variance with
the precepts of the Christian religion, wrote an essay on the subject
of suicide. He has endeavoured to shew that self-murder is consistent
with our duty to God, our neighbour, and ourselves. Referring to the
first of these three heads, he says—“As, on the one hand, the elements
and other inanimate parts of creation carry on their action without
regard to the particular interests and situation of men, so men are
entrusted to their own judgment and discretion in the various shades
of matter, and may employ every faculty with which they are endowed in
order to provide for their ease, happiness, or preservation.”

If an action be clearly shewn to be an infringement of the laws of
God, it certainly cannot be one which he has left us to exercise
at discretion. All the laws of religion and morality are so many
abridgments of man’s liberty, in the exercise of his judgment and
discretion for his own happiness. Hume then proceeds to examine
whether suicide be a breach of duty to our neighbour and society. He
observes—“A man who retires from life does no harm to society,—he
only ceases to do good; which, if it be an injury, is of the lowest
kind.” The man who sacrifices his own life does a _great injury_ to
society. There are very few men in the world who have no relations
or connexions, and he entails upon these the opprobrium that society
attaches to the crime of suicide. Independently of this, his example
acts injuriously on the minds of others, who may not have such good
reasons for suicide as he has. “I believe,” continues Hume, “that no
man ever threw away life while it was worth keeping. For such is our
natural horror of death, that small motives will never be able to
reconcile us to it.” He might as well have stated that such is our
horror of poverty that no man ever threw away _riches_ which were worth
keeping. The fallacy consists in drawing a conclusion from a mind
supposed in its right state, in which every faculty, propensity, and
aversion has its due proportion of strength; and in which the natural
horror of death will secure a man from throwing away a life which is
worth keeping: and this conclusion is applied to a _depraved_ state of
mind, in which it can by no means hold.

The same author asserts, “That it would be no crime in me to divert
the Nile or Danube from its course, if I could; where, then, is the
crime of turning a few ounces of blood out of its natural channel?” The
argument is too puerile to merit refutation. He must first establish
that no injury would accrue from diverting the course of the Nile and
Danube, before any argument can be deduced from it which is worth one
moment’s consideration.

It has been asserted, and remains uncontradicted, that Mr. Hume lent
his “Essay on Suicide” to a friend, who on returning it told him it was
a most excellent performance, and pleased him better than anything he
had read for a long time. In order to give Hume a practical exhibition
of the effects of his defence of suicide, his friend shot himself the
day after returning him his Essay.

If, in any one instance, suicide might admit of something like an
apology, it would have been in this—if the detestable author of this
abominable treatise had, on receiving the melancholy intelligence,
committed it to the flames, and terminated his own pernicious existence
by a cord. But the cold-blooded infidel was too cowardly to execute
summary justice on himself. With a truly diabolical spirit, his delight
was to scatter firebrands among the people, and say, “Am I not in
sport?”

Mr. Hume is the hero of modern infidels, because he is the only one
among them whose life was not disgraced by the grossest of vices;
for this, his selfish and avaricious spirit affords, perhaps, the
true reason. It is well known that Hume, in more than one instance,
sacrificed his principles (if he had any) to views of emolument at the
suggestion of the booksellers. It has been said that he was scarcely
guilty of a good or benevolent action. His treatment of Rousseau was
unfeeling in the extreme; and an intimate friend of the essayist
affirms, that “his heart was as hard and cold as marble.”

Montesquieu’s arguments in favour of suicide appear to border very
closely on those advanced by Hume. They will be found in a letter
written in the character of a Persian resident in Europe.

Rousseau[15] in his “Nouvelle Heloïse” observes, “The more I reflect
upon it (suicide), the more I find that the question reduces itself
to this fundamental proposition:—To seek one’s own good, and avoid
one’s own harm in that which hurts not another, is the law of nature.”
Rousseau must first clearly establish that what he terms “seeking
one’s own good” will not be productive of injury to others. According
to the notion of what the majority of men conceive to be their good,
much evil would result from allowing mankind to act under the influence
of their own feelings and judgment. What one man considers “good,”
another considers evil; and what often appears to be very beneficial to
ourselves, if examined fairly, will be found to be the very reverse.

Montaigne’s arguments are borrowed from ancient writers in defence of
suicide. He assumes at the commencement that suicide is not an evil.
He says, that pain, and the fear of suffering a worse death, is an
excusable incitement to suicide. The whole that he has advanced is but
a string of sophistries.

Dr. Donne has entered more fully into the defence of suicide than any
other writer. The whole of his work appears to be written for the
purpose of demonstrating that it is praiseworthy to shew a contempt of
life in the discharge of our duty, and in the execution of noble and
beneficent enterprises.

Dr. Donne was probably drawn to the contemplation of this subject by
his own sufferings. While he was secretary to Lord Chancellor Egerton,
he married a young lady of rank superior to his own, which gave offence
to his patron, and he was consequently dismissed from office. He
suffered extreme poverty with his wife and children; and in a letter,
in which he adverts to the illness of a daughter whom he tenderly
loved, he says that he dares not expect relief, even from death, as he
cannot afford the expense of a funeral. He afterwards took orders, and
was promoted to the deanery of St. Paul’s. In the early part of his
life, and probably during the period of his sufferings, he wrote his
book, entitled, “Βιαθανατος, _A Declaration of that paradox
or thesis, that self-homicide is not so naturally sin that it may never
be otherwise_.” He did not publish it. He desired _it to be remembered,
that it was written by Jack Donne, not by Dr. Donne_; and it was
published many years after his death, by his son, a dissipated young
man, tempted by his necessities to forget his father’s prohibition.

_Madame de Staël_ attempted to justify suicide in her work on the
passions, but she, greatly to her honour, published her celebrated
“Reflections on Suicide,” which was written as a recantation of some
opinions on the subject incidentally expressed in the work alluded
to. She expresses the change in her sentiments on this subject in the
following curious manner:—“J’ai l’acte du suicide, dans mon ouvrage sur
l’influence des passions, et je me suis repentie depuis de cétte parole
inconsiderée. J’etois alors dans tout l’orgueil et la vivacité de la
première jeunesse; mais à quoi servirait-il de vivre, si ce n’était
dans l’espoir de s’ameliorer.”

Madame de Staël has treated the subject with considerable ingenuity
and ability, and with a great deal of eloquence, but she has hardly
enforced sufficiently the arguments against this crime which may be
deduced from the use of that portion of existence we pass upon earth.
We are wise and good just in proportion as we consider and treat life
and all its incidents as moral means to a great end. Upon every moment
of time an eternity is dependent; and whenever we sacrifice a moment,
we throw away an instrument by which we might have created an eternity
of happiness.

All mankind are not placed upon an equality. Some experience pleasure,
others pain, privation or suffering; the tools with which we are to
work may be inconvenient or burthensome, or light and pleasant; but
they must be the most useful and efficacious, or they would not be
put into our hands; at any rate, they are all we have. We cannot fix
too deeply on our minds the truth that life is not an absolute, but a
relative existence, as in its relation to the eternity with which it is
connected, consists all its value and importance.

_Robert of Normandy_, surnamed the Devil, sacrificed his own life,
and before doing so he wrote a work in defence of suicide, in which
he argued that there was no law that forbids a person to deprive
himself of life; that the love of life is to be subservient to that
of happiness; that our body is a mean and contemptible machine, the
preservation of which we ought not so highly to value; if the human
soul be mortal, it receives but a slight injury, but if immortal,
the greatest advantage; a benefit ceases to be one when it becomes
troublesome, and then surely a man ought to be allowed to resign it;
a voluntary death is often the only method of avoiding the greatest
crime; and finally, that suicide is justified by the example of most
nations in the world. Such is the substance of the arguments in favour
of suicide urged by Robert of Normandy, and worthy of his celebrated
namesake.

Gibbon and Sir Thomas More are cited as champions in favour of suicide;
but there is nothing which these authors have advanced that merits a
separate consideration.




CHAPTER III.

SUICIDE A CRIME AGAINST GOD AND MAN.—IT IS NOT AN ACT OF COURAGE.


  The sin of suicide—The notions of Paley on the
  subject—Voltaire’s opinion—Is suicide self-murder?—Is it
  forbidden in Scripture?—Shakspeare’s views on the subject—The
  alliance between suicide and murder—Has a man a right to
  sacrifice his own life?—Everything held upon trust—Suicide
  a sin against ourselves and neighbour—It is not an act of
  courage—Opinion of Q. Curtius on the subject—Buonaparte’s
  denunciation of suicide—Dryden’s description of the suicide in
  another world.

Among the black catalogue of human offences, there is not, indeed,
any that more powerfully affects the mind, that more outrages all
the feelings of the heart, than the crime of suicide. Our laws have
branded it with infamy, and the industry which is exerted by surviving
relatives to conceal its perpetration evinces that the shame which is
attached to it is of that foul and contagious character, that even the
innocent consider themselves infected by its malignity.

Much discussion has taken place as to whether self-murder is expressly
forbidden in the Old or New Testament.[16] Paley, who is a high
authority on all questions connected with moral philosophy, denies that
it is. He considers that the article in the decalogue so often brought
forward, “Thou shalt do no murder,” is inconclusive. “I acknowledge (he
observes) that there is to be found neither any express determination
of the question, nor sufficient evidence to prove that the case of
suicide was in the contemplation of the law which prohibits murder. Any
inference, therefore, which we deduce from Scripture, can be sustained
only by _construction and implication_.”

To maintain that God has not forbidden us to destroy the work of his
hands, because self-murder is not particularly specified, is to leave
us at liberty to commit many other offences which are not named among
the prohibitions, but which are included under general heads. When
God said to Noah, “Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood
be shed, for in the image of God made he man,” it is evident that,
whatever meaning we may attach to the last words, in whatever sense man
is said to be made in the image of God, the reason of the prohibition
holds as strong against self-murder as against any other kind of
murder. If I am commanded not to shed the blood of another man because
he is made in the _image of God_, I am not justified in shedding my own
blood, as I stand in the same relation to the Deity as my fellow-men.
But there is a particular reason why suicide is not any where expressly
forbidden by _name_; that is, that whatever sins and offences God,
as a lawgiver, prohibits, he does so with a penalty; he affixes such
a punishment to such a crime, and he who transgresses is to undergo
the determined punishment in this world or in the next. Neither God
nor the magistrate can prohibit self-murder with any penalty that can
affect the criminal himself; because of his very crime, he escapes
all temporal punishment in person—he has anticipated the operation of
the law. In fact, he has, in his own person, acted the part of the
criminal, judge, jury, and executioner; he is dead before the law
can take any cognizance of his offence. No law can be enacted to any
purpose without a penalty; where, therefore, there can be no penalty,
there can be no law. Self-murder prevents all penalty, and therefore
wants no particular prohibition; it must therefore be included under
general commands, and forbidden as a _sin_, which it is only in the
power of God to take cognizance of, in another world.

Again, doubtlessly the inspired writer considered suicide of such an
atrocious nature that the warnings of conscience were sufficient to
prevent its frequency, and because the voice of nature instinctively
cries out against it.

That the act of suicide must be most offensive in the sight of God is
evident, since it is that which most directly violates those laws by
which his providence has formed, and still directs, the universe. If
any one principle in man is instinctive and implanted in him by the
hand of nature, it is that of self preservation. Different religions
and different codes have marked out particular duties, and proscribed
particular crimes; in this, every religion unites, every society
concurs, and every individual acknowledges within his own bosom the
sacred command. If, therefore, to disobey the ordinances of God must be
sinful in his sight, if ever the ordinances of men are to be respected,
what must be the guilt of that person who violates the first law of
nature, who disregards the principle that holds human society together,
that fits us for every duty, and prompts us in the performance of them!

But it is not merely against the ordinance of his Creator that the
self-murderer offends,[17] he is guilty of a breach of duty to his
neighbour. He plants a dagger not merely in his own breast, but in that
of his dearest, his tenderest connexions. He wantonly sports with the
pangs of sensibility, and covers with the blush of shame the cheek of
innocence. With a degree of ingratitude which excites our abhorrence,
he clouds with sorrow the future existence of those by whom he was most
tenderly beloved, and affixes a mark of ignominy on his unfortunate
descendants. He disobeys the first of social laws, that order by which
God appropriated his labours to the welfare of society, and, because he
fancies he can no longer exist with comfort to himself, disregards all
the duties which he owes to others.

The alliance between suicide and the murder of others is a closer one
than is generally supposed. How many instances are recorded in which
suicide and homicide have been conjoined! He who will not scruple to
take away his own life, will not require much reasoning to impel him
to sacrifice another’s. We refer to the cases of Mithridates, king of
Pontus, and Nicocles, as illustrative of this position. Many modern
instances are recorded of the same character.

It was maintained by Marcus Aurelius, that there was no more of evil in
parting from life than in going out of a smoky chamber; and Rousseau
asks, “Why should we be permitted to cut off a leg, if we may not
equally take away life? has not the will of God given us both?” Madame
de Staël very properly observes that the following passage in Scripture
replies to this sophism—“If thy hand offend thee, cut it off; if thine
eye offend thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee.” Temptation is
evidently referred to in the above passage, but it may consistently be
used in refutation of Rousseau’s illogical argument. Although a man may
use any means placed in his power for the removal of physical evils, he
is distinctly prohibited from destroying his existence.

The interrogatory argument, if it can be so denominated, which is so
often used in justification of suicide—“Cannot a man do what he likes
with his own?”—is based upon an absurd and gross fallacy. Man, during
his residence on this earth, is but a trustee; his wealth, his talents,
his time, and his very life, are but trust property. He can call
nothing truly his own; he is held accountable for the most apparently
trivial action he performs. Life is given to him for noble purposes;
it is an emanation from the Deity himself; and no circumstances would
justify us in asserting that our very existence is placed at our own
disposal. How truly has the noble poet observed, when alluding to the
tenure upon which we hold everything during this life—

  “Can despots compass aught that hails their sway,
  Or call one solid span of earth their own,
  Save that wherein at last they crumble bone by bone?”

This life is one of privation. We are born to misery; we are led to
expect disappointment at every step we take; blighted expectations,
ruined hopes, pain, mental and bodily, constitute a part and parcel of
our very existence. No man was more overwhelmed with any species of
misfortune than Job; he was emphatically styled “_the man of grief_;”
and when, prostrated to the earth by the most poignant misery, his wife
exhorted him to quit life,—to “curse God, and die,”—he replied, “What,
shall I receive good from the hand of God, and not evil?”

No suffering, however acute, could for one moment justify the
commission of self-murder. “The concluding scene in the life of Jesus
Christ,” says Madame de Staël, with a fervid eloquence which does her
immortal honour, “seems peculiarly intended to confute those who
contend for the right of destroying life to escape misfortune. The
dread of suffering seized him who had willingly devoted himself to
death for the good of mankind. He prayed a long time to his Father in
the Mount of Olives, and his countenance was shaded by the anguish
of death. ‘My Father,’ he cried, ‘if it be possible, let this cup
pass from me.’ Thrice with tears was this prayer repeated. All the
sorrows of our nature had passed through his divine mind; like us, he
feared the violence of men; like us, perhaps, regretted those whom
he cherished and loved, his mother and his disciples; like us, he
loved this earth, and the celestial pleasures resulting from active
benevolence, for which he incessantly thanked his Father. But, not able
to avert the destined chalice, he cried, ‘Oh, my Father, let thy will
be done,’ and resigned himself into the hands of his enemies. What
more can be sought for in the gospel respecting resignation to grief,
and the duty of supporting it with fortitude and patience.” Poets
and orators have entered into a chivalrous rivalry to celebrate the
character of the “bold man struggling with the storms of fate.” That
adversity refines and ennobles our nature there cannot be a doubt. The
most beautiful features of the human mind are developed in suffering;
the ordeal through which we pass, however repugnant and abhorrent it
may be to our feelings, produces a moral regeneration in the character.
We come out of the “fiery furnace,” like gold and silver, deprived of
much of our dross; and life, youthful and innocent life, again dawns
upon us and gladdens our hearts.

Suicide is an injury to our neighbour and to society. As long as life
lasts,—no matter what amount of misery a person may suffer,—he has it
in his power to contribute to the happiness of others. By mitigating
the distresses of others, his own will be subdued. Let a man writhing
under the torture of the gout be brought into contact with a person
suffering from the intense agony of tic doloureux, and he will have a
practical illustration of the fact, that there are others in the world
worse off than himself.

Suicide has been defended as an act of courage. Courage, forsooth! If
ever there is an act of cowardice, it is that exhibited by the person
who, to escape from the disappointments and vexations of the world,
wantonly puts an end to his existence. The man of courage will defy the
opinions and scorns of the world, when he knows himself to be in the
right; will be above sinking under the petty misfortunes that assail
him; will make circumstances bow to him; will court difficulties and
dangers, in order to shew that he is able to master them.

It was a noble sentiment which Q. Curtius put into the mouth of Darius,
after every ray of hope had abandoned him:—“I will wait,” cried the
king, addressing his attendants, “the issue of my fate. You wonder,
perhaps, that I do not terminate my own life; but I choose rather to
die by another’s crime than by my own.” The sentiments of Cleomenes,
king of Sparta, expressed when his fortunes appeared most desperate,
are equally noble and magnanimous. Being much urged by a friend to
dispatch himself, he replied—“By seeking this easy and ready kind of
death, you think to appear brave and courageous; but better men than
you and I have been oppressed by fortune, and borne down by multitudes.
He that sinks under toil, or yields to affliction, or is overcome by
the opinions and reproaches of men, gives way, in fact, to his own
effeminacy and cowardice. A voluntary death is never to be chosen as a
relief from action, but as exemplary in itself, it being base to live
or die only for ourselves. The death to which you now invite us is only
proposed as a release from present misery, but conveys with it no signs
of bravery or prospects of advantage.”

Euripides put the following words in the mouth of Hercules: “I have
considered, and, though oppressed with misfortunes, I have determined
thus: Let no one depart out of life through fear of what may happen to
him; for he who is not able to resist evils will fly, like a coward,
from the darts of the enemy.”

When Buonaparte was told of the prevalent opinion, that he ought not
to have survived his political downfall, he calmly replied—“No, no; I
have not enough of the Roman in me to destroy myself.” After reasoning,
with considerable ingenuity, on the subject of suicide, he concluded
by giving expression to this decided opinion:—“Suicide is a crime the
most revolting to my feelings; nor does any reason present itself to my
understanding by which it can be justified. It certainly originates in
that species of fear which we denominate cowardice, (_poltronnerie_.)
For what claim can that man have to courage who trembles at the frowns
of fortune? True heroism consists in becoming superior to the ills
of life, in whatever shape they may challenge him to the combat.” He
might have added—“Tu ne cede malis, sed contrà audentior ito.” On
another occasion, when talking on the subject of suicide, Buonaparte
observed, “If Marius had slain himself in the marshes of Minturnæ, he
never would have stood the seventh time for consul.” After having been
some time at St. Helena, he one day spoke further on the subject of
suicide. He observed:—“With respect to the English language, I have
been very diligent. I now read your newspapers with ease; and must own
that they afford me no inconsiderable amusement. They are occasionally
inconsistent, and sometimes abusive. In one paper I am called a
_Lear_; in another, a _tyrant_; in a third, a _monster_; and in one of
them—which I really did not expect—I am described as a _coward_. But it
turned out, after all, that the writer did not accuse me of avoiding
danger in the field of battle, or flying from an enemy, or fearing to
look at the menaces of fate and fortune. It did not charge me with
wanting presence of mind in the hurry of battle, and in the suspense of
conflicting armies; no such thing. I wanted courage, it seems, because
I did not coolly take a dose of poison, or throw myself into the sea,
or blow out my brains. The editor most certainly misunderstands me; I
have, at least, too much courage for that.”[18]

We think it has decidedly been established in the preceding
observations that suicide is a crime clearly prohibited in the Bible;
that it is, in every sense of the term, self-murder; and that our duty
to our Creator, to ourselves, and to society, loudly calls upon us to
denounce it, and hold it up to the scorn and reprobation of mankind.
How terrifically has Dryden, in his Fables, portrayed the condition of
the unfortunate suicide in another world:—

  “The slayer of himself, too, saw I there:
  The gore, congealed, was clotted in his hair.
  With eyes half closed, and mouth wide ope, he lay,
  And grim as when he breathed his sullen soul away.”




CHAPTER IV.

ON THE INFLUENCE OF CERTAIN MENTAL STATES IN INDUCING THE DISPOSITION
TO SUICIDE.


  Moral causes of disease—Neglect of psychological
  medicine—Mental philosophy a branch of medical study—Moral
  causes of suicide—Tables of Falret, &c.—Influence of
  remorse—Simon Brown, Charles IX. of France—Massacre of
  St. Bartholomew—Terrible death of Cardinal Beaufort, from
  remorse—The Chevalier de S——. Influence of disappointed
  love—Suicide from love—Two singular cases—Effects of
  jealousy—Othello—Suicide from this passion—The French opera
  dancer—Suicide from wounded vanity—False pride—The remarkable
  case of Villeneuve, as related by Buonaparte—Buonaparte’s
  attempt at suicide—Ambition—Despair, cases of suicide from—The
  Abbé de Rancé—Suicide from blind impulse—Cases—Mathews,
  the comedian—Opinion of Esquirol on the subject—Ennui,
  birth of—Common cause of suicide in France—Effect of
  speculating in stocks—Defective education—Diffusion of
  knowledge—“Socialism” a cause of self-destruction—Suicide
  common in Germany—Werter—Goëthe’s attempt at suicide—Influence
  of his writings on Hackman—Suicide from reading Tom Paine’s
  “Age of Reason”—Suicide to avoid punishment—Most remarkable
  illustrations—Political excitement—Nervous irritation—Love
  of notoriety—Hereditary disposition—Is death painful? fully
  considered, with cases—Influence of irreligion.

In our voyage through life, the passions are said to be the gales that
swell the canvass of the mental bark; they obstruct or accelerate
its course, and render the passage favourable or full of danger, in
proportion as they blow steadily from a proper point, or are adverse or
tempestuous. Like the wind itself, the passions are engines of mighty
power and of high importance. Without them we cannot proceed, and with
them we may be shipwrecked and lost. Curbed in and regulated, they
constitute the source of our most elevated happiness; but when not
subdued, they drive the vessel on the rocks and quicksands of life, and
ruin us.

  “How few beneath auspicious planets born
  With swelling sails make good the promis’d port,
  With all their wishes freighted.”

  YOUNG.

“In this country,” Dr. J. Johnson justly observes, “where man’s
relations with the world around him are multiplied beyond all example
in any other country, in consequence of the intensity of interest
attached to politics, religion, amusement, literature, and the arts;
where the temporal concerns of an immense proportion of the population
are in a perpetual state of vacillation; where spiritual affairs excite
in the minds of many great anxiety; and where speculative risks are
daily involving in difficulties all classes of society,—the operation
of physical causes in the production of disease dwindles into complete
insignificance when compared with that of anxiety and perturbation of
mind.”

“Mens conscia recti in corpore sano,” is Horace’s well-known
description of the happy man. Lucretius appears to have formed a
correct estimate of the most important bodily and mental conditions on
which our happiness depends:—

  “O wretched mortals! race perverse and blind!
  Through what dread, dark, what perilous pursuits
  Pass ye this round of being! Know ye not,
  Of all ye toil for, Nature nothing asks,
  But for the _body_ freedom from disease,
  And sweet unanxious quiet for the mind?”

Like human beings, the sciences are closely connected with, and are
mutually dependent upon, one another. The link in the chain may not be
apparent, but it has a real and palpable existence. Medical and moral
science are more nearly allied than we should, _à priori_, conclude.
We speak of the science of medicine, not the practice of it; for,
like judgment and wit, or, as the author of the School for Scandal
ironically observes, like _man and wife_, how seldom are they seen in
happy union. Garth feelingly alludes to this unnatural divorce:—

  “The healing art now, sick’ning, hangs its head,
  And, once a _science_, has become a _trade_.”

Psychological medicine has been sadly neglected. We recoil from the
study of mental philosophy as if we were encroaching on holy ground. So
great is the prejudice against this branch of science, that it has been
observed, that to recommend a man to study metaphysics was a delicate
mode of suggesting the propriety of confining him in a lunatic asylum!

In order to become a useful physician, it is necessary to become a good
metaphysician; so says a competent authority. It was not, however,
Dr. Cullen’s intention to recommend that species of philosophy which
confounds the mind without enlightening it, and which, like an _ignis
fatuus_, dazzles only to lead us from the truth. To the medical man we
can conceive no preliminary study more productive of advantage than
that which tends to call into exercise the latent principle of thought,
and to accustom the mind to close, rigid, and accurate observation.
The science of mind, when properly investigated, teaches us the laws
of our mental frame, and shews us the origin of our various modes and
habits of thought and feeling—how they operate upon one another, and
how they are cultivated and repressed; it disciplines us in the art of
induction, and guards us against the many sources of fallacy in the
practice of making inferences; it gives precision and accuracy to our
investigations, by instructing us in the nicer discriminations of truth
and falsehood.

The value of mental philosophy as a branch of education will be
properly appreciated when we consider that this ennobling principle was
given to us for the purpose of directing and controlling our powers and
animal propensities, and bringing them into that subjection whereby
they become beneficial to the individual and to the world at large,
enabling him to exchange with others those results which the power
of his own and the gigantic efforts of other minds have developed;
maintaining and perpetuating the most dignified and exalted state of
happiness, the attribute of social life; unfolding not only treasures
which the concentrated powers of individuals are enabled to discover,
but developing those more quiet and unobtrusive characteristics of
virtuous life, those social affections, which are alone calculated to
make our present state of being happy.

Independently of the utility of the study, what a world of delight is
open to the mind of that man who has devoted some portion of his time
to the investigation of his mental organization! In him we may truly
behold—

              “Nature, gentle, kind,
  By culture tamed, by liberty refreshed,
  And all the radiant fruits of truth matured.”

When we take into consideration the tremendous influence which the
different mental emotions have over the bodily functions, when we
perceive that violent excitement of mind will not only give rise to
serious functional disorder, but actual organic disease, leading to the
commission of suicide, how necessary does it appear that he to whose
care is entrusted the lives of his fellow-creatures, should have made
this department of philosophy a matter of serious consideration! It
is no logical argument against the study of mental science, to urge
that we are in total ignorance of the nature or constitution of the
human understanding. We know nothing of the nature of objects which are
cognizable to sense, and which can be submitted to actual experiment,
and yet we are not deterred from the investigation of their properties
and mutual influences. The passions are to be considered, in a medical
point of view, as a part of our constitution. They stimulate or depress
the mind, as food and drink do the body. Employed occasionally, and in
moderation, both may be of use to us, and are given to us by nature for
this purpose; but when urged to excess, the system is thrown off its
balance, and disease is the result.

To the medical philosopher, nothing can be more deeply interesting than
to trace the reciprocity of action existing between different mental
conditions, and affections of particular organs. Thus the passion of
fear, when excited, has a sensible influence on the action of the
heart; and when the disease of this organ takes place independently of
any mental agitation, the passion of fear is powerfully roused. Anger
affects the liver and confines the bowels, and frequently gives rise
to an attack of jaundice; and in hepatic and intestinal disease, how
irritable the temper is!

Hope, or the anticipation of pleasure, affects the respiration; and
how often do we see patients, in the last stage of pulmonary disease,
entertaining sanguine expectations of recovery to the very last!

As the passions exercise so despotic a tyranny over the physical
economy, it is natural to expect that the crime of suicide should
often be traced to the influence of mental causes. In many cases,
it is difficult to discover whether the brain, the seat of the
passions, be primarily or secondarily affected. Often the cause of
irritation is situated at some distance from the cerebral organ; but
when the fountain-head of the nervous system becomes deranged, it
will react on the bodily functions, and produce serious disease long
after the original cause of excitement is removed. It is not our
intention to attempt to explain the _modus operandi_ of mental causes
in the production of the suicidal disposition. That such effects
result from an undue excitement of the mind cannot for one moment
be questioned. Independently of mental perturbation giving rise to
maniacal suicide, there are certain conditions of mind, dependent
upon acquired or hereditary disposition, or arising from a defective
expansion of the intellectual faculties, which originate the desire for
self-destruction. These states will all be alluded to in the course of
the present inquiry.

Some idea of the influence of certain mental states on the body will
be obtained by an examination of the various tables which have been
published, in this and other countries, respecting the causes of
suicide, as far as they could be ascertained.

The following suicides were committed in London, between the years 1770
and 1830:[19]—

  _Indication of Causes._      _Men._   _Women._

  Poverty                       905      511
  Domestic grief                728      524
  Reverse of fortune            322      283
  Drunkenness and misconduct    287      208
  Gambling                      155      141
  Dishonour and calumny         125       95
  Disappointed ambition         122      410
  Grief from love                97      157
  Envy and jealousy              94       53
  Wounded self-love              53       53
  Remorse                        49       37
  Fanaticism                     16        1
  Misanthropy                     3        3
  Causes unknown               1381      377
                               ————     ————
                      Total    4337[20] 2853

According to a table formed by Falret of the suicides which took place
between 1794 and 1823, the following results appear:—Of 6782 cases, 254
were from disappointed love, and of this number 157 were women; 92 were
from jealousy; 125 from being calumniated; 49 from a desire, without
the means, of vindicating their characters; 122 from disappointed
ambition; 322 from reverses of fortune; 16 from wounded vanity; 155
from gambling; 288 from crime and remorse; 723 from domestic distress;
905 from poverty; 16 from fanaticism.

In preparing the present work, we have endeavoured to obtain access to
documents which would throw some light on the probable origin of the
many cases of self-destruction which have taken place within the last
four or five years. In many cases we could obtain no insight into the
motives of the individuals; but in nine-tenths of those whose histories
we succeeded in making ourselves somewhat conversant with, we found
that mental causes played a very conspicuous part in the drama. Our
experience on this point accords with that of many distinguished French
physicians who have devoted their time and talents to the consideration
of the subject.

In considering the influence of mental causes, we shall in the first
instance point out the effects of certain passions and dispositions
of the individual on the body; then investigate the operation of
education, irreligion, and certain unhealthy conditions of the mind
which predispose the individual to derangement and suicide.

There is no passion of the mind which so readily drives a person to
suicide as remorse. In these cases, there is generally a shipwreck of
all hope. To live is horror; the infuriated sufferer feels himself an
outcast from God and man; and though his judgment may still be correct
upon other subjects, it is completely overpowered upon that of his
actual distress, and all he thinks of and aims at is to withdraw with
as much speed as possible from the present state of torture, totally
regardless of the future.


  “I would not if I could be blest,
   I want no other paradise but rest.”


The most painfully interesting and melancholy cases of insanity are
those in which remorse has taken possession of the mind. Simon Brown,
the dissenting clergyman, fancied that he had been deprived by the
Almighty of his immortal soul, in consequence of having accidentally
taken away the life of a highwayman, although it was done in the act
of resistance to his threatened violence, and in protection of his
own person. Whilst kneeling upon the wretch whom he had succeeded in
throwing upon the ground, he suddenly discovered that his prostrate
enemy was deprived of life. This unexpected circumstance produced so
violent an impression upon his nervous system, that he was overpowered
by the idea of an involuntary homicide, and for this imaginary crime
fancied himself ever afterwards condemned to one of the most dreadful
punishments that could be inflicted upon a human being.

A young lady was one morning requested by her mother to stay at home;
notwithstanding which, she was tempted to go out. Upon her return to
her domestic roof, she found that the parent whom she had so recently
disobliged had expired in her absence. The awful spectacle of a
mother’s corpse, connected with the filial disobedience which had
almost immediately preceded, shook her reason from its seat, and she
has ever since continued in a state of mental derangement.

It is said that the solitary hours of Charles the Ninth of France were
rendered horrible by the repetition of the shrieks and cries which had
assailed his ears during the massacre of St. Bartholomew.[21]

The death of Cardinal Beaufort is represented as truly terrible. The
consciousness of having murdered the Duke of Gloucester is said to
have rendered Beaufort’s death one of the most terrific scenes ever
witnessed. Despair, in its worst form, appeared to take possession of
his mind at the last moment. His concluding words, as recorded by
Harpsfield,[22] were—“And must I then die? Will not all my riches save
me? I could purchase the kingdom, if that would save my life. What! is
there no bribing of death? When my nephew, the Duke of Bedford, died,
I thought my happiness and my authority greatly increased; but the
Duke of Gloucester’s death raised me in fancy to a level with kings,
and I thought of nothing but accumulating still greater wealth, to
purchase at last the triple crown. Alas! how are my hopes disappointed!
Wherefore, O my friends, let me earnestly beseech you to pray for me,
and recommend my departing soul to God!” A few minutes before his
death, his mind appeared to be undergoing the tortures of the damned.
He held up his two hands, and cried—“Away! away!—why thus do ye look at
me?” It was evident he saw some horrible spectre by his bed-side. This
last scene in the Cardinal’s life has been most ably delineated by the
immortal Shakspeare:—


  SCENE—_The Cardinal’s Bed-chamber_.

  _Enter_ KING HENRY, SALISBURY, and WARWICK.

  _King Hen._ How fares my Lord? Speak, Beaufort, to thy sovereign.

  _Cardinal._ If thou be’st Death, I’ll give thee England’s treasure,
  Enough to purchase such another island,
  So thou wilt let me live, and feel no pain.

  _King Hen._ Ah! what a sign it is of evil life
  When death’s approach is seen so terrible.

  _Warwick._ Beaufort, it is thy sovereign speaks to thee.

  _Cardinal._ Bring me unto my trial when you will.
  Died he[23] not in his bed? Where should he die?
  Can I make men live whe’er they will or no?
  O, torture me no more, I will confess—
  Alive again? then shew me where he is:
  I’ll give a thousand pound to look upon him—
  He hath no eyes, the dust hath blinded them.—
  Comb down his hair; look! look! it stands upright,
  Like lime-twigs set to catch my winged soul.—
  Give me some drink, and bid the apothecary
  Bring the strong poison that I bought of him.

  _King Hen._ O thou eternal Mover of the Heav’ns,
  Look with a gentle eye upon this wretch.
  O, beat away the busy meddling fiend,
  That lays strong siege unto this wretch’s soul,
  And from his bosom purge this black despair.

  _Warwick._ See how the pangs of death do make him grin!

  _Salisbury._ Disturb him not; let him pass peaceably.

  _King Hen._ Peace to his soul, if God’s good pleasure be!
  Lord Cardinal, if thou think’st on heaven’s bliss,
  Lift up thy hand, make signal of thy hope.—
  He dies, and makes no sign—O God, forgive him!

  _Warwick._ So bad a death argues a monstrous life.

  _King Hen._ Forbear to judge, for we are sinners all.—
  Close up his eyes, and draw the curtain close,
  And let us all to meditation.[24]

M. Guillon relates the following remarkable case:—“The Chevalier de S——
had been engaged in seventeen ‘affairs of honour,’ in each of which his
adversary fell. But the images of his murdered rivals began to haunt
him night and day; and at length he fancied he heard nothing but the
wailings and upbraidings of seventeen families—one demanding a father,
another a son, another a brother, another a husband, &c. Harassed by
these imaginary followers, he incarcerated himself in the monastery of
La Trappe; but the French revolution threw open this asylum, and turned
the chevalier once more into the world. He was now no longer able to
bear the remorse of his own conscience, or, as he imagined, the sight
of seventeen murdered men, and therefore put himself to death. It is
evident that insanity was the consequence of the remorse, and the cause
of the suicide.

“No disease of the imagination is so difficult to cure as that which
is complicated with the idea of guilt: fancy and conscience then act
interchangeably upon us, and so often shift their places, that the
illusions of one are not distinguished from the dictates of the other.
If fancy presents images not moral or religious, the mind drives them
away when they give pain; but when melancholy notions take the form of
duty, they lay hold on the faculties without opposition, because we are
afraid to exclude or banish them.”[25]

How accurately has the poet depicted the tortures, the sleeplessness,
of a guilty conscience:—

  “Though thy slumber may be deep,
  Yet thy spirit shall not sleep;
  There are shades which will not vanish,
  There are thoughts thou canst not banish;
  By a power to thee unknown,
  Thou canst never be alone;
  Thou art wrapt as with a shroud,
  Thou art gathered in a cloud;
  And for ever shalt thou dwell
  In the spirit of this spell.”

A woman with her husband had been employed in a French hospital as
servants for a considerable time. Having left their situations, the
wife, _thirty years_ afterwards, declared she heard a voice within,
commanding her to repair instantly to the chief commissioner of police,
and confess the thefts she had committed during the time she was at
the hospital. The fact was, that she had been guilty of appropriating
occasionally to her own use a portion of the food supplied for the
patients attached to the Institution. The commissioner listened to the
woman’s story, and her demand that she should be punished, but refused
to take any cognizance of the offence. She returned home, and for some
time was extremely dejected. She became so miserable that existence was
no longer desirable; and as the legal tribunals refused to punish her,
she determined on suicide, which she committed at the age of fifty-one.

It is admitted, by almost universal consent, that there is no affection
of the mind that exerts so tremendous an influence over the human race
as that of love.

  “To love, and feel ourselves beloved,”

is said to constitute the height of human happiness. This sacred
sentiment, which some have debased by the term passion, when unrequited
and irregulated, produces the most baneful influence upon the system.

“A youthful passion, which is conceived and cherished without any
certain object, may be compared to a shell thrown from a mortar by
night: it rises calmly in a brilliant track, and seems to mix, and
even to dwell for a moment with the stars of heaven; but at length it
falls—it bursts—consuming and destroying all around, even as itself
expires.”[26]

From the constitution of woman, from the peculiar position which she
of necessity holds in society, we should, _à priori_, have concluded
that in her we should see manifested this sentiment in all its purity
and strength. Such is the fact. A woman’s life is said to be but the
history of her affections. It is the soul within her soul; the pulse
within her heart; the life blood along her veins, “blending with every
atom of her frame.” Separated from the bustle of active life—isolated
like a sweet and rare exotic flower from the world, it is natural to
expect that the mind should dwell with earnestness upon that which is
to constitute almost its very being, and apart from which it has no
existence.

  “Alas! the love of woman, it is known
  To be a lovely and a fearful thing;
  For all of theirs upon that die is thrown;
  And if ’tis lost, life hath no more to bring
  To them, but mockeries of the past alone.”

  BYRON.

The term “broken heart” is not a mere poetical image. Cases are
recorded in which that organ has been ruptured in consequence of
disappointed hope. Let those who are sceptical as to the fact that
physical disease so often results from blighted affection, visit the
wards of our public and private asylums. In those dreary regions of
misery they will have an opportunity of witnessing the wreck of many
a form that was once beauteous and happy. Ask their history, and you
will be told of holy and sincere affection nipped in the bud—of wild
and passionate love strangled at its birth—of the death of all human
hopes, of a severance from those about whom every fibre of the soul had
entwined itself. Silent and sullen grief, black despair,

  “And laughter loud, amidst severest woe,”

are the painful images that meet the eye at every step we take through
these “hells upon earth.”[27]

In this country, the great majority of the cases of insanity among
women, in our establishments devoted to the reception of the insane,
can clearly be traced to unrequited and disappointed affection. This
is not to be wondered at, if we consider the present artificial state
of society. We make “merchandize of love;” both men and women are
estimated, not by their mental endowments, not by their moral worth,
not by their capacity of making the domestic fire-side happy, but
by the length of their respective purses. Instead of seeking for a
heart, we look for a dowry. Money is preferred to intellect; pure and
unadulterated affection dwindles into nothingness when placed in the
same scale with titles and worldly honours,

  “And Mammon wins his way
  Where seraphs might despair.”

How little do those who ought to be influenced by more elevated motives
calculate the seeds of wretchedness and misery which they are sowing
for those who, by nature, have a right to demand that they should be
actuated by other principles!

            “Shall I be won
  Because I’m valued as a _money-bag_?
  For that I bring to him who winneth me,”[28]

says Catherine, in the spirit of honest indignation. It should be
remembered that “wedlock joins nothing, if it joins not hearts.”

How many melancholy cases of suicide can clearly be traced to this
cause! Death is considered preferable to a long life of unmitigated
sorrow. When the heart is seared, when there exists no “green spot
in memory’s dreary waste,”—when all hope is banished from the mind,
and wretched loneliness and desolation take up their residence in the
heart, need it excite surprise that the quiet and rest of the grave is
eagerly longed for! If a mind thus worked upon be not influenced by
religious principles, self-destruction is the idea constantly present
to the imagination.

Of all the sufferings, however, to which we are exposed during our
sojourn below, nothing is so truly overwhelming and irreparable as
the death of one with whom all our early associations are inseparably
linked—one endeared to us by the most pleasing recollections. Death
leaves a blank in our existence; a cold shuddering shoots through the
frame, a mist flits before our eyes, darkening the face of nature,
when the heart that mingled all its feelings with ours lies, cold and
insensible, in the silent grave.

As long as life lasts, there is hope; but death snatches every ray
of consolation from the mind. The only prop that supported us is
removed, and the mansion crumbles to the dust; the mind becomes
utterly and hopelessly wrecked. To say that this is but the effect on
understandings constitutionally weak, is to say what facts will not
establish. The most elevated and best cultivated minds are often the
most sensitively alive to such impressions.

The following case made considerable noise at Lyons, in 1770. A young
gentleman of rank, of handsome exterior, possessing considerable mental
endowments, and most respectably connected, fell in love with a young
lady, who, like himself, possessed a handsome person, in union with
accomplishments of a high order. They met; the passion was reciprocal,
and the gentleman accordingly made an application to her parents to
be allowed to consummate their bliss by marriage. The parents, as
parents sometimes do under these circumstances, refused compliance.
The gentleman took it greatly to heart; it preyed much upon his mind,
and in the midst of his grief he burst a blood-vessel. His case was
given over by the medical men. The young lady, on being made acquainted
with his condition, paid him a clandestine visit, and they then agreed
to destroy themselves. Accordingly the lady brought with her, on her
next visit, two pistols and two daggers, in order that, if the pistols
missed, the daggers might the next moment pierce their hearts. They
embraced each other for the last time. Rose-coloured ribbons were tied
to the triggers of the pistols; the lover holding the ribbon of his
mistress’ pistol, while she held the ribbon of his; both fired at a
given signal, and both fell at the same instant dead on the floor!

The case now about to be recorded presents some peculiarly interesting
features. An English lady, moving in the first circles of society,
went, in company with her friends, to the opera at Paris. In the next
box sat a gentleman, who appeared, from the notice he took of the
lady, to be enamoured of her. The lady expressed herself annoyed at
the observation which she had attracted, and moved to another part of
the box. The gentleman followed the carriage home, and insisted upon
addressing the lady, declaring that he had had the pleasure of meeting
her elsewhere, and that one minute’s conversation would convince her
of the fact, and do away with the unfavourable impression which his
apparent rudeness might have made upon her mind. As his request did
not appear at the moment unreasonable, she consented to see him for
a minute by herself. In that short space of time he made a fervent
declaration of his affection; acknowledged that desperation had
compelled him to have recourse to a _ruse_ to obtain an interview,
and that, unless she looked favourably on his pretensions, he would
kill her and then himself. The lady expressed her indignation at the
deceit he had practised, and said, with considerable firmness, that
he must quit the house. He did so, retired to his home, and with a
lancet opened a vein in his arm. He collected a portion of blood in a
cup, and with it wrote a note to the lady, telling her that his blood
was flowing fast from his body, and it should continue to flow until
she consented to listen to his proposals. The lady, on the receipt of
the note, sent her servant to see the gentleman, and found him, as
he represented, actually bleeding to death. On the entreaty of the
lady, the arm was bound up and his life saved. On writing to the lady,
under the impression that she would now accept his addresses, he was
amazed on receiving a cool refusal, and a request that he would not
trouble her with any more letters. Again driven to desperation, he
resolved effectually to kill himself. He accordingly loaded a pistol
and directed his steps towards the residence of his fair amorosa,
when, knocking at the door, he gained admission, and immediately
blew out his brains. The intelligence was communicated to the lady,
she became dreadfully excited, and a severe attack of nervous fever
followed. When the acute symptoms subsided, her mind was completely
deranged. Her insanity took a peculiar turn. She fancied she heard a
voice commanding her to commit suicide, and yet she appeared to be
possessed of sufficient reason to know that she was desirous of doing
what she ought to be restrained from accomplishing. Every now and then
she would exclaim, “Take away the pistol! I won’t hang myself! I won’t
take poison!” Under the impression that she would kill herself, she
was carefully watched; but notwithstanding the vigilance which was
exercised she had sufficient cunning to conceal a knife, with which,
during the temporary absence of the attendant, she stabbed herself in
the abdomen, and died in a few hours. It appears that the idea that she
had caused the death of another, and that she had it in her power to
save his life by complying with his wishes, produced the derangement
of mind under which she was labouring at the time of her death; and
yet she did not manifest, and it was evident to everybody that she
had not, the slightest affection for the gentleman who professed so
much to admire her. Possessing naturally a sensitive mind, it was
easily excited. The peculiar circumstances connected with her mental
derangement were sufficient to account for the delusions under which
she laboured. Altogether the case is full of interest.

Few passions tend more to distract and unsettle the mind than that
of jealousy. Insanity and suicide often owe their origin to this
feeling. One of the most terrific pictures of the dire effects of this
“green-eyed monster” on the mind is delineated in the character of
Othello. In the Moor of Venice we witness a fearful struggle between
fond and passionate love and this corroding mental emotion. Worked
upon by the villainous artifices of Iago, Othello is led to doubt the
constancy of Desdemona’s affection; the very doubt urges him almost to
the brink of madness; but when he feels assured of her guilt, and sees
the gulf into which he has been hurled, and the utter hopelessness of
his condition, he abandons himself to despair. Nothing which the master
spirit of Shakspeare ever penned can equal the exquisitely touching
and melting pathos of the speech of the Moor when he becomes perfectly
conscious of the wreck of one around whom every tendril of his heart
had indissolubly interwoven itself. To be forcibly severed from one
dearer to us than our own existence is a misfortune that requires much
philosophy to bear up against; to be torn from a beloved object by
death, to feel that the earth encloses in its cold embrace the idol
of our affections, freezes the heart; but to be separated from one who
has forfeited all claim to our affection and friendship, and who still
lives, but lives in dishonour, must be a refinement of human misery.
Need we then wonder that, when influenced by such feelings, Othello
should thus give expression to the overflowings of his soul:—

                “Oh now, for ever,
  Farewell the tranquil mind! farewell content!
  Farewell the plumed troop, and the big wars,
  That make ambition virtue! Oh, farewell!
  Farewell the neighing steed, and the shrill trump,
  The spirit-stirring drum, th’ ear-piercing fife,
  The royal banner, and all quality,
  Pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war!
  And, oh, you mortal engines, whose rude throats
  Th’ immortal Jove’s dread clamours counterfeit,
  Farewell! Othello’s occupation’s gone!”

It is under the infliction of such a concentration of misery that many
a mind is shattered, and that death is courted as the only relief
within its grasp. Othello, having discovered when it was too late that
he had wrongly suspected Desdemona, and had sacrificed the life of the
sweetest creature on earth, a combination of passions drives him to
distraction, and under their influence he plunges the dagger into his
heart. Jealousy was not, as some have supposed, the exclusive cause of
Othello’s suicide.

The following singular case attracted considerable notice fifteen
years ago. A woman was subjected to much maltreatment by her husband.
She was jealous of his attentions to one of the servants, and she had
frequently declared, that if he persisted in insulting her under her
own roof she would either cause his or her own death. On one occasion
she was more than usually violent, and expressed her determination to
ruin him. Fearful that she would carry her threat into execution, he
had her placed in a room where there was no furniture, and nothing
that she could use for the purpose of self-destruction. Her rage was
greatly increased by this barbarous treatment, and her screams were
sufficiently loud to alarm the whole neighbourhood. As her husband
refused to release her from confinement, she determined no longer to
submit to his brutal control, and resolved to commit suicide. Having no
instrument that she could use, she felt some difficulty in effecting
her purpose. She held her breath for some time, but that did not
succeed. She then tried to strangle herself with her hands, but that
mode was equally unsuccessful. Her determination was so resolutely
fixed, that in desperation she tore her hair out by the roots. Still
death did not come to her relief. In vain she searched in every corner
of the room for something with which she might effectually take away
her life. Just as she was beginning to give up the idea as hopeless,
her eye caught a sight of the glass in the window; she instantly broke
a pane, and with a piece of it endeavoured to cut her throat; and yet
she could not succeed in effecting her horrid purpose. At last, as a
dernier resort, she resolved to swallow a piece of the broken glass,
hoping by this means to choke herself. She did so, and the glass stuck
in her throat, and produced the most excruciating agony. Her groans
became audible; the husband became alarmed, and opened the door, when
he found his wife apparently in the last struggles of death. Medical
relief was immediately obtained, and although everything that surgical
ingenuity could suggest was had recourse to, she died, a melancholy
spectacle of the effects of unsubdued passion.

The two following cases shew how trifling a cause often incites to
self-destruction:—

Madame N——, a once famous dancer at the French opera-house, was taken
to task by her husband for not acquitting herself so well in the ballet
as she usually did. She exhibited indications of passion at the, as
she thought, unmerited reproof. When she arrived home, she resolved to
die, but was much puzzled to effect her purpose. The next morning, she
purchased a potent poison, but when she returned to her home she found
that her husband looked suspiciously at her, and appeared to watch her
movements. She then made up her mind to take the fatal draught in the
evening, as she was going in the carriage to the opera. She accordingly
did so; the poison did not have an immediate effect. The ballet
commenced, and Madame N—— was led on the stage; and it was not until
she had commenced dancing that she began to feel the draught producing
the desired effect. She complained of illness, and was removed to her
dressing-room, where she expired in the arms of her husband, confessing
that she had, in a fit of chagrin at his rebuke, swallowed poison!

A young gentleman, of considerable promise, of high natural and
acquired attainments, had been solicited to make a speech at a public
meeting, which was to take place in the town in which he resided. As
he had never attempted to address extemporaneously a public body,
he expressed himself extremely nervous as to the result, and asked
permission to withdraw his name from the published list of speakers.
This wish was not, however, complied with, as it was thought that when
the critical moment arrived he would not be found wanting even in the
art of public speaking. He had prepared himself with considerable care
for the attempt. His name was announced from the chair; when he rose
for the purpose of delivering his sentiments. The exordium was spoken
without any hesitation; and his friends felt assured that he would
acquit himself with great credit. He had not, however, advanced much
beyond his prefatory observations, when he hesitated, and found himself
incapable of proceeding. He then sat down, evidently excessively
mortified. In this state he retired to a room where the members of the
committee had previously met, and cut his throat with his penknife. He
wounded the carotid artery, and died in a few minutes.

A case of suicide from mortified pride, somewhat similar to the last,
occurred some years ago in London. A gentleman, whose imagination was
much more active than his judgment, conceived that he was possessed of
histrionic powers equal to those which were exhibited by the immortal
Garrick. A manager of a London theatre, to whom he was introduced,
allowed him to make his débût at his theatre. As is often the case,
the public formed a different estimate of his abilities to that which
the vanity of the young aspirant had induced him to form; and the
consequence was, that he was well hissed and hooted for his presumption
in attempting a character for which his talents so little adapted him.
Being naturally sensitive, his failure preyed on his mind; and under
the influence of the mortification, he hung himself, leaving in his
room the following laconic epistle, addressed to his mother:—

“MY DEAR MOTHER,—All my hopes have been ruined. I fancied myself a man
of genius; the reality has proved me to be a fool. I die, because life
is no longer to be supported. Look charitably on this last action of my
life. Adieu!”

A common cause of suicide is the feeling of false pride. The only
reason assigned for the desperate act of Elizabeth Moyes, who
threw herself from the Monument, was, that, owing to the reduced
circumstances of her father, (a baker,) it was determined that she
should procure a situation at a confectioner’s, and support herself.
This she allowed to prey upon her mind, although she expressed a
concurrence in the propriety of the course suggested. How true it is—

  “Abstract what others feel, what others think,
  All pleasures sicken, and all glories sink.”

  POPE.

Owing to the fictitious notions abroad in society, the ridiculously
false views which are taken of worldly honours, the ideas which
a sickly sentimentality infuses into the mind, this feeling is
engendered, to an alarming extent, through the different ranks of
society. This constitutes one great element which is undermining and
disorganizing our social condition. A fictitious value is affixed to
wealth and position in the world; it is estimated for itself alone, all
other considerations being placed out of view.

  “None think the great unhappy but the great.”

Vatel committed suicide because he was not able to prepare as sumptuous
an entertainment as he wished for his guests.

We cannot conceive how this evil is to be obviated, unless it be
possible to revolutionize the ideas which are generally attached to
fame and worldly grandeur. It is difficult to persuade such persons
that the end of fame is merely

  “To have, when the original is dust,
  A name, a wretched picture, and worse bust.”

There is a nameless, undefinable something, that the world is taught
to sigh after—is always in search of; a moral _ignis fatuus_, which
is dazzling to lead it from the road which points to true and
unsophisticated happiness.

Persons naturally proud are less able than others to bear up against
the distresses of life; they are more severely galled by the yoke of
adversity; and hence this passion often produces mental derangement.
Such characters exhibit a morbid desire for praise; it acts like moral
nourishment to their souls; it is a stimulus that is almost necessary
to their very being, forgetting that

  “Praise too dearly loved, or warmly sought,
  Enfeebles all eternal weight of thought;
  ’Till the fond soul, within itself unblest,
  _Leans for all pleasure on another’s breast_.”

Dr. Reid justly observes, that “he who enters most deeply into the
misfortunes of others, will be best able to bear his own. A practical
benevolence, by habitually urging us to disinterested exertion, tends
to alienate the attention from any single train of ideas, which, if
favoured by indolence and self contemplation, might be in danger
of monopolizing the mind, and occasions us to lose a sense of our
personal concerns in an enlarged and liberal sympathy with the general
good.”

Villeneuve, the celebrated French admiral, when he was taken prisoner
and brought to England, was so much grieved at his defeat that he
studied anatomy in order to destroy himself. For this purpose he bought
some anatomical plates of the heart, and compared them with his own
body, in order to ascertain the exact situation of that organ. On
his arrival in France, Buonaparte ordered that he should remain at
Rennes, and not proceed to Paris. Villeneuve, afraid of being tried by
a court-martial for disobedience of orders, and consequently losing
his fleet, (for Napoleon had ordered him not to sail or to engage the
English,) determined to destroy himself; and accordingly took his
plates and compared them with the position of his heart. Exactly in the
centre he made a mark with a large pin; then fixed it, as near as he
could judge, in the same spot in his own breast, and shoved it on to
its head; it penetrated his heart, and he expired. When the room was
opened, he was found dead, the pin through his breast, and a mark in
the plate corresponding with the wound.[29]

It has been said that after the death of Josephine, and when Buonaparte
was overwhelmed with misfortunes, he attempted suicide. Those who
consider Napoleon immaculate deny the accuracy of the charge. But in
order to give the reader an opportunity of judging for himself, we lay
before him Sir Walter Scott’s account of the transaction referred to.
“Buonaparte,” he observes, “belonged to the Roman school of philosophy;
and it is confidently reported by Baron Fane, his secretary—though not
universally believed—that he designed to escape from life by an act of
suicide. The Emperor, according to this account, had carried with him,
ever since his retreat from Moscow, a packet containing a preparation
of opium, made up in the same manner with that used by Condorcet,
for self-destruction. His valet-de-chambre, in the night of the 12th
or 13th of April, heard him arise, and pour something into a glass
of water, drink, and return to bed. In a short time afterwards the
man’s attention was called by sobs and stifled groans; an alarm took
place in the chateau; some of the principal persons were roused, and
repaired to Napoleon’s chamber. Yvan, the surgeon who had procured him
the poison, was also summoned; but hearing the Emperor complain that
the operation of the potion was not quick enough, he was seized with a
panic of terror, and fled from the palace at full gallop. Napoleon took
the remedies recommended, and a long fit of stupor ensued, with profuse
perspiration. He awakened much exhausted, and surprised at finding
himself still alive. He said aloud, after a few moments’ reflection,
‘Fate will not have it so;’ and afterwards appeared reconciled to
undergo his destiny without similar attempts at personal violence.”
Napoleon’s illness was, at the time, imputed to indigestion. A general
of the highest distinction transacted business with Napoleon on the
morning of the 13th of April. He seemed pale and dejected, as from
recent and exhausting illness. His only dress was a night-gown and
slippers; and he drank, from time to time, a quantity of ptisan, or
some such liquid, which was placed beside him, saying he had suffered
severely during the night, but that his complaint had left him.[30]

We cannot conceive a more piteous condition than that of a man of
great ambition without the powers of mind which are indispensable for
its gratification. In him a constant contest is going on between an
intellect constitutionally weak, and a desire to distinguish himself
in some particular department of life. How often a man so unhappily
organized ends his career in a mad-house, or terminates his miserable
existence by suicide! Let men be taught to make correct estimates of
their own capabilities, to curb in the imagination, to cease “building
castles in the air,” if we wish to advance their mental and bodily
health. “_Ne sutor ultra crepidam_,” said Apelles to the cobbler. A
young man who “penned a stanza when he ought to engross,” blew out his
brains because he had failed in inducing a London publisher to purchase
an epic poem which he had written, and which he had the vanity to
conceive was equal to Paradise Lost, forgetting that, in order to be a
poet,—

        “Nature’s kindling breath
  Must fire the chosen genius; nature’s hand
  Must string his nerves and imp his eagle wings.”

That this state of mind predisposes and often leads to the commission
of suicide, numerous cases testify.

Despair often drives men to suicide. The dread of poverty and want;
the hopes in which we often injudiciously place too much of our
happiness entirely blasted; either honest or false pride humbled by
public or private contempt; ambitious views suddenly and unexpectedly
disappointed; pains of the body, the loss of those dear and near to
us,—tend to originate this feeling, and induce the unhappy person to
seek relief in self-murder.

How terrible is the situation of the man exposed to the influence of
this passion, and deprived of the cheering and elevating influence
of hope! We had an opportunity, some years back, of witnessing the
case of a maniac, whose derangement of mind consisted in his having
abandoned himself completely to despair. He laboured under no distinct
or prominent delusion, but his mental alienation consisted in the total
absence of all prospect of relief. The iron had entered his very soul;
he appeared as if the hand of a relentless destiny had written on the
threshold of his door, as on the gate of the Inferno of Dante, the
heart-rending sentence, “Abandon all hope!”

A woman is seduced by some heartless and profligate wretch; she is in
a short time forsaken and left to her fate. Her mind recurs to the
past; she recalls to recollection her once happy state of innocence and
peace. Scorned by the world, shunned by her relations and friends, she
is driven to a state of agonizing distraction. Despair, in its worst
features, takes possession of her mind, and under this feeling she puts
an end to her existence. A man under the operation of this passion
wrote as follows:—

“It has pleased the Almighty to weaken my understanding, to undermine
my reason, and to render me unfit for the discharge of my duty. My
blood rolls in billows and torrents of despair. It must have vent.
How? I possess a place to which I am a dishonour, inasmuch as I am
incapable of discharging it properly; I prevent some better man from
doing it more justice. This piece of bread which I lament is all that I
have to support myself and family; even this I do not merit; I eat it
in sin, and yet I live. Killing thought! which a conscience hitherto
uncorrupted inspires. I have a wife, also, and my child reproaches me
with its existence. But you do not know, my dear friends, that if my
unhappy life is not speedily ended, my weak head will require all your
care, and I shall become a burthen rather than an assistance to you.
It is better that I yield myself a timely sacrifice to misfortune,
than, by permitting the delusion to continue longer, I consume the
last farthing of my wife’s inheritance. It is a duty of every person
to do that which his situation requires; reason commands it, religion
approves. My life, such as it is, is a mere animal life, devoid of
reason; in my mind, a life which stands in opposition to duty is moral
death, and worse than that which is natural. In favour of the few whose
life I cannot render happy, it is at least my duty not to become an
oppression. I ought to relieve them from a weight which sooner or later
cannot fail to crush them.”

This unfortunate man, after penning the above account of his morbid
feelings, sent his wife to church on Sunday, May 13th, 1783; and
after writing an addition to his journal, took a pair of scissors and
attempted, although unsuccessfully, to terminate his life by cutting
his throat. He then opened the arteries at the wrists, and again failed
in destroying himself; he staggered to the window, and saw his wife
returning home, upon which he seized a knife used for killing deer, and
stabbed himself in the heart. He was lying weltering in his blood when
his wife came in, but was not quite dead. M. le Clarc, who relates the
case, observes, that he was a man of understanding, and of a lively
wit. He possessed a great deal of theoretical learning; his heart was
incorruptibly honest. Like every calm and determined self-murderer, he
was proud; but his pride was not the pride of rank, of riches, or of
learning, but that divine pride which arises from a consciousness of
incorruptible honesty, and of being possessed of good powers of mind.
The office he held was that of an assistant judge in a small college of
justice at Insterberg. His mother had been once deranged in her mind.

Few persons have given a more striking example of this passion than the
Abbé de Rancé, when first touched with remorse for the enormity of his
past life, and before the disturbed state of his mind had settled into
that turn for religious seclusion and mortification which produced the
appalling austerities of La Trappe. “To a state of frantic despair,”
says Don Lancelot, in his letter to La Mère Angelique of Port Royal,
“succeeded a black melancholy. He sent away all his friends, and shut
himself up in his mansion at Veret, where he would not see a creature.
His whole soul, nay, even his bodily wants, seemed wholly absorbed in
a deep and settled gloom. Shut up in a single room, he even forgot to
eat and drink; and when the servant reminded him that it was bed-time,
he started as from a deep reverie, and seemed unconscious that it
was not still morning. When he was better, he would often wander in
the woods for the entire day, wholly regardless of the weather. A
faithful servant, who sometimes followed him by stealth, often watched
him standing for hours together in one place, the snow and the rain
beating on his head, whilst he, unconscious of his position, was wholly
absorbed in painful recollections. Then, at the fall of a leaf, or the
noise of the deer, he would awake as from a slumber, and, wringing
his hands, hasten to bury himself in a thicker part of the wood, or
else throw himself prostrate, with his face in the snow, and groan
bitterly.”[31]

How many commit suicide from what is termed a _blind impulse_! They
fancy that an internal voice tells them to kill themselves; and
considering it impossible to resist what they term a destiny, they do
so. A gentleman, a merchant of the city of London, had been exposed to
great mental perturbation; his nervous system had received a severe
shock. He suffered extremely from a dread of going mad. As he was
walking home one afternoon, he heard a voice say, “Kill thyself!”
“Commit suicide!” and from that moment he could not banish the idea
from his mind. Two or three times he was on the eve of obeying the
mandate of this internal voice; but he fortunately possessed sufficient
resolution to resist the temptation. In this state of mind he consulted
a physician, who ordered him to be cupped in the neighbourhood of the
head. His bowels were attended to, and he was recommended to visit
some friends in the north of Scotland, and to banish from his mind all
ideas connected with business. He followed the advice of his judicious
physician, and in a short time he completely recovered.

In the midst of health apparently perfect and uniform, a man was
attacked with a sudden disposition to destroy. He seized a stick,
raised it, struck indiscriminately and broke everything that presented
itself to him. After some seconds, the stick fell from his hands,
and he appeared restored to himself. The man knew nothing of what he
had just done. He was reproached, he was shewn the remnants of the
things that he had broken; he thought they were ridiculing him, and
he was greatly irritated. He was again seized with frenzy, and killed
a person. He was taken before a court of justice, acquitted on the
ground of insanity, and placed in an hospital. This disposition to
destroy returned at distant intervals; it then came on more frequently;
and finally, changed into fits of epilepsy. A person seized with
this morbid desire is not always unconscious of the approach of the
disposition; he has sometimes a presentiment of it, perceives its
danger, seeks to combat it, and frequently succeeds in effecting his
purpose.

A labourer, at the end of his day’s work, felt himself seized with an
irresistible desire of running; he rushed upon the quay, which goes
from the Louvre to the Grève: every obstacle was overcome. An attempt
was made to stop him, but it was not successful. At last he dexterously
engaged one of his arms in the wheel of a carriage, which happened to
be within his reach. Thus withheld, he recovered his breath, became
calm, and appeared to have no idea of what had occurred. This feeling
was again manifested, and he was properly sent by his friends to an
hospital, when it was discovered that he had a disease of the spinal
marrow.

A man arrived upon the Pont Neuf; he rushed violently to the parapet,
and precipitated himself into the Seine. He was seen by some of the
bystanders, who drew him out of the water and saved his life. After
some days of complete restoration, his friends asked him the reason of
his strange conduct. He replied, “I cannot give any account. I am in
the happiest situation in the world. I have only to play with fortune
and with men. I have never been ill. I do not know what troubles may
come upon me. I can only recollect my arrival on the Pont Neuf, and my
recall to life.”

The particulars of the following fact are recorded in Mrs. Mathews’
life of her husband. Mathews the comedian had lived for some days a
vapid and inactive life. His spirit had been pressed down, “cabin’d,
cribb’d, confin’d.” In this state of mind, a party of gentlemen called
upon him, and proposed a day’s excursion. Accordingly, they all mounted
their horses. Mrs. Mathews says—“My husband’s depressed spirits were
exhilarated by the beauty of the weather, and the prospect of a day’s
pleasure (free from the restraint of a room, listening to truisms) in
the open air, where he would have uncontrolled power to gaze upon his
idol, Nature, in her most beautiful form. He had not ridden out of
the city for some weeks, and was in a state of childish delight and
excitement. At this moment his eyes turned upon one of the party, a
very little man, who was perched on a very tall horse, and who seemed
unusually grave and important. Mr. Mathews looked at him for a moment;
and the next, knocked him off with a smart blow, felling him to the
ground. The whole party were struck with horror; but no one felt more
shocked than he who had committed the outrage. He dismounted, picked up
the little victim to his unaccountable freak, declared himself unable
to give any motive for the action, but that it was an impulse he could
not resist; and afterwards, in relating this extraordinary incident, he
declared his conviction that it was done in a moment of frenzy, induced
by the too sudden reaction from previous stagnation of all freedom and
amusement.”

A young woman, about twenty years of age, who had been insane but a
short time, and appeared to be recovering, after having assisted to
whitewash and clean a ward in an asylum in which she was confined, was
sitting, in the evening, taking tea with the nurse and several other
inmates. She took advantage of the opportunity when the nurse went to
the cupboard for some sugar to seize a knife with which some bread had
just been cut; and in the presence of the whole party, in an instant,
before her hand could be arrested, cut her throat in so dreadful a
manner that she died almost immediately.

A patient in the Asylum at Wakefield, the wife of a labourer, a
kind-hearted and clever woman, was afflicted with such a propensity
to destroy that she was almost constantly obliged to be kept in
confinement; and when at liberty, she could not resist the pleasure
of breaking anything she met with. In one instance, she saw some
tea-cups on a table, and for some time walked backwards and forwards,
and checked the inclination; but eventually the temptation proved too
strong, and she swept them at once on to the floor. She afterwards
regretted the circumstance; but the impulse was too powerful to be
resisted.

A monomaniac (says Esquirol) heard a voice within him repeat these
words—“_Kill thyself! kill thyself!_” He therefore committed suicide,
in obedience to this superior power, whose order he dare not withstand.

A man, under a religious hallucination, believed himself to be in
communication with the Deity. He fancied he heard a celestial voice
saying—“_My son, come and seat thyself by my side._” He opened the
window to obey the invitation, fell down, and fractured his leg. When
he was carried to his bed, he expressed the greatest astonishment on
finding that he had precipitated himself from the window.

A young lady of considerable beauty was accosted in the street by a
strange gentleman. She took no notice at first of the unwarrantable
liberty; but on finding that he persisted in following her, she
attempted, by quickening her pace, to escape. Being extremely timid,
and having naturally a very nervous temperament, she was much excited.
The person in the garb of a gentleman followed her for nearly a mile,
and when he saw that she was home, he suddenly turned down a street,
and disappeared. The young lady expressed herself extremely ill soon
after she entered the house. A physician was sent for, who declared his
astonishment at her severe illness from a cause so trifling. During
the following night she manifested indications of mental derangement,
with a disposition to commit suicide. A strait-waistcoat was procured,
and all apprehensions of her succeeding in gratifying the propensity of
self-destruction was removed. Some weeks elapsed before she recovered.
To all appearance she was perfectly well. She had no recollection of
what had transpired, and expressed herself amazed when she was told
that she had wished to kill herself. Two months after she left her bed
she was missed. Search was made in every direction, but in vain. After
the lapse of two days, she was discovered floating in a pond of water
several miles from her home. In her pocket was discovered a piece of
paper, on which were written the following lines:—“Oh, the misery and
wretchedness I have experienced for the last month no one but myself
can tell. A demon haunts me—life is insupportable. A voice tells me
that I am destined to fall by my own hands. I leave this world for
another, where I hope to enjoy more happiness. Adieu.”

We have no doubt that in this case, although the acute symptoms of
insanity had subsided, she had not recovered completely her sane
state of mind. None but those conversant with the subject of mental
derangement would believe that so trifling a circumstance as that of
being spoken to in the street would have produced so violent an attack
of maniacal delirium as was witnessed in the case of this poor girl.

M. Esquirol states that he has never seen an unequivocal instance
of any individual drawn to the commission of suicide by a kind of
irresistible impulse, independently of any secret grievance, real or
imaginary. Could the secret feelings of these suicides be accurately
ascertained, there would generally, if not always, be found some
lurking source of discontent, real or fanciful, in the breast, which
serve as motives to their suicidal propensity. Many instances are on
record, it is true, where men have put a period to their existence
without any apparent visible cause or motive; but as Rousseau has
justly observed, “_Le bonheur n’a point d’enseigne exterieur: pour en
juger, il faudrait lire dans le cœur de l’homme heureux_.”

“Individuals,” says Esquirol, “who appear outwardly the residence of
happiness, are often inwardly the focus of chagrin, and tortured with
distracting passions. That man can destroy his own life, being at the
same time happy in his mind, is a phenomenon which human reason cannot
comprehend.”

A diseased temperament, a serious lesion of one or more of the viscera,
a gradual exhaustion of the energies of the system, may so aggravate
the miseries of life as to hasten the period of voluntary death. But
how are we to account for the irresistible propensity to suicide which
sometimes exists, independent of any apparent mental or physical
ailments? A melancholic, whose case was published in Fourcroy’s Medical
Journal of 1792, once said, “I am in prosperous circumstances; I have a
wife and a child who constitute my happiness; I cannot complain of bad
health, and still I feel a horrible propensity to throw myself into the
Seine.” His declaration was too fatally verified in the event. Crichton
was once consulted upon the case of a young man, twenty-four years
of age, in full vigour and health, who was tormented by periodical
accessions of these gloomy feelings and propensities. At those times
he meditated his own destruction. But on a nearer view of the fatal
act, he shrunk back into himself, and recoiled with horror from its
execution. Without relinquishing his project, he never had the courage
to accomplish it. “It is in cases like these,” says Crichton, “that
energetic measures of coercion, and the effectual excitement of terror,
should lend their aid to the powers of medicine and regimen.”

In many cases of suicide, the act is preceded by a long train of
perverted reasoning. These individuals become taciturn, morose,
pusillanimous, and distrustful. The future presents itself to their
view under the most unfavourable aspect, and despair becomes painted
on their countenances. Their eyes become hollow; they complain of
sleeplessness, and are disturbed by frightful dreams. The bowels are
in an inactive state; the functions of the liver become to a certain
extent suspended. It is in this state that they contemplate the idea
of suicide; and the diaries which some have kept of their sensations
and thoughts disclose the various kinds of death which they have
contemplated and rejected, one after another, often for reasons the
most preposterous and ridiculous. It is singular that in these journals
they generally endeavour to hide their despondency and their mental
aberration, while their moral and intellectual weakness is sure to be
betrayed. They often accuse themselves of insanity, and bewail their
unhappy lot; others argue most ingeniously in favour of their meditated
suicide. Others again, subdued as it were by the force of the moral and
religious principles which they have imbibed, represent to themselves
that the act they contemplate is contrary to the moral end for which
man was created—fatal to the welfare and happiness of their families.
Then ensues a conflict in their breasts. If reason and religion
prevail, the project is abandoned,—sometimes abandoned altogether. If
otherwise, the suicide is committed. Falret knew the case of a woman
who exhibited a tendency to suicide, but who was delivered for a period
from the commission of the crime by the principles of religion in which
her mind had been educated. A long period elapsed before she could
reconcile herself to the act of suicide, and then she argued herself
into it by the following piece of sophistry:—“There are no general
rules without exceptions; and I am the precise exception in this
case: therefore I may commit suicide without violating my religious
principles.”

Having once conceived the idea of suicide, the mind is often rendered
so miserable in consequence of it, that the person rushes into the arms
of death in order to escape from the terrible state of anticipation.
Others meditate on the bloody deed for years. Rousseau, after drawing
a piteous portrait of his proscribed and solitary condition, and of
the state of his health, adds, “_Puisque mon corps n’est plus pour moi
qu’un embarras, un obstacle à mon repos, cherchons donc à m’en degager
le plus tôt que je pourrai_.”

_Tedium vitæ_, or _ennui_, is said to be a frequent cause of suicide.
We have heard of an Englishman who hanged himself in order to avoid the
trouble of pulling off and on his clothes. Goëthe knew a gardener, and
the overseer of some extensive pleasure-grounds, who once splenetically
exclaimed, “Shall I see these clouds for ever passing, then, from
east to west?” So singularly developed was this weariness of life,
this feeling of satiety, in one of our distinguished men, that it is
said of him that he viewed with dissatisfaction the return of spring,
and wished, by way of change, that everything would, for once, be red
instead of green.[32]

  “—— Within that ample nich,
  With every quaint device of splendour rich,
  Yon phantom, who, from vulgar eyes withdrawn,
  Appears to stretch in one eternal yawn:
  Of empire here he holds the tottering helm,
  Prime-minister in Spleen’s discordant realm,
  The pillar of her spreading state, and more,
  Her darling offspring, whom on earth she bore.
  For, as on earth his wayward mother strayed,
  Grandeur, with eyes of fire, her form surveyed,
  And with strong passion starting from his throne,
  Unloos’d the sullen queen’s reluctant zone.
  From his embrace, conceived in moody joy,
  Rose the round image of a bloated boy:
  His nurse was, Indolence; his tutor, Pomp,
  Who kept the child from every childish romp.
  They rear’d their nursling to the bulk you see,
  And his proud parents called their imp—_Ennui_.”

  _Hayley’s Triumphs of Temper._

It is rare for an Englishman to commit suicide from ennui. The English
are different in this respect from the French people. The causes which
lead to suicide in this country, are those connected with sudden
reverse of fortune, or grievous disappointments, which are allowed to
prey upon the mind until the individual seeks relief in the arms of
death. In great commercial communities, where men may be reduced, in a
few minutes, from affluence to beggary; where the hopes and aspirations
of years are levelled in a moment to the dust, and the individual finds
himself exposed to the insulting pity of friends, and the searching
curiosity of the public, we need not feel surprise, when all these
circumstances rush upon a man’s mind in the sudden convulsion and
turbulence of its elements, that he should welcome the only escape from
the abyss into which he has been hurled.

It has been stated, by a competent authority, that the week following
the drawing of the last lottery in England, no less than fifty suicides
were committed!

_M. Gase_, in a memoir read before the _Academie Royale de Médecine_,
traces the increase of suicide in Paris to the spirit of gambling
which the Parisians so passionately indulge in. The extended system of
speculation in this country approximates in its pernicious effects on
the constitution to those which have been considered to result from
gambling. The following case, which was communicated to a popular
journal, by Dr. J. Johnson, forcibly illustrates how the constitution
may be undermined by rash, inconsiderate conduct, during the excitement
arising from temporary circumstances:—

One day, on the Stock Exchange, when the rumours of failings at home
and commotions abroad were producing such alarming vacillations in the
public funds that the whole property of a gentleman of high probity,
temperance, and respectability, was in momentary jeopardy, he found
himself in so terrible a state of nervous agitation that he was obliged
to leave the scene of confusion, and apply to wine, though quite
unaccustomed to more than a glass or two after dinner. To his utmost
surprise, the wine had no apparent effect, though he drank glass after
glass, in rapid succession, until he had finished a whole bottle.
Not the slightest inebriating influence was induced by this unusual
quantity taken before dinner. His nervous agitation was, however,
calmed, and he went back to the Exchange, and transacted business with
steadiness, composure, and equanimity. None of the ordinary effects
of wine were produced at the time, but a few days afterwards he was
seized with a severe attack of indigestion, a malady by which he had
never been previously affected. This case shews that although mental
agitation masks, or even prevents, the usual effects of wine, and
other stimulants, at the time, and thus enables, and indeed induces,
men to take more than under ordinary circumstances, yet the ulterior
effects are greatly worse on the constitution than if the stimulants
had produced the usual excitement at the moment of their reception into
the stomach. It is thus, we have no doubt, that the nervous system
of thousands in this country is ruined, and, in numerous cases, the
seeds of suicidal derangement sown, and that without the victims being
conscious of the channel through which they have been poisoned.

Defective education is a frequent cause of suicide. At the present
day, the ornamental has taken the place of the substantial; the showy
and specious, the situation of the solid and virtuous. The endowments
of the mind and cultivation of the heart are forced to yield to the
external accomplishments and graces of the body, and polished manners
are too generally preferred to sound morals. The importance of fashion
is inculcated in opposition to reason; religion is made to bow down
before the shrine of honour; and the fear of the world is taught to
supersede the fear of God. But what superstructure can be raised
on so sandy a foundation? It can support no incumbent weight; and,
in consequence, it cannot be deemed surprising that an inundation
of folly and vice, like a sweeping torrent, should bear down all
before it. The dignity of personal worth and character is a point
too little considered. Brilliant parts supersede sound judgment;
and disinterested virtue, integrity, and public spirit, are out of
character in a nation immersed in voluptuousness. Education of a
light and frivolous character leads to a vacuity of serious thoughts
and solid principles of conduct. Luxury and profligacy, in all ages,
have operated injuriously on the human mind. Cato the elder observes
that there could be no friendship in a man whose palate had quicker
sensations than his brain and heart. The man who has no internal
sources of enjoyment to fly to when others fail,—he whose happiness
consists in an indulgence in the pleasures of the senses, when these
ephemeral sources of gratification are removed, will, to avoid the
vacuum which is made in his existence, readily terminate his own life.

There cannot be a doubt but that the general diffusion of knowledge,
and the desire to place within the command of the humblest person
the advantages of education, have not a little tended to promote the
crime of suicide. It may be opposed to all our _à priori_ reasoning
to suppose that, in proportion as the intellect becomes expanded,
knowledge and civilization diffused, the desire to commit self-murder
would be engendered. It is an indisputable fact, that insanity, in
all its variations, is in a ratio to the refinement and civilization
of a country. “It is clearly proved,” says Brown, “that in Finéstre,
where the people are in a deplorable state of ignorance, and education
is entirely neglected, only twelve in a hundred of the inhabitants
being able to write or read, few suicides occur, at least only in
the proportion of one in 25,000. In Paris, that focus of all that is
brilliant and imposing in science and literature, the crime is of
common occurrence. In Coréze, where only twelve in the hundred can
read or write, one suicide in 47,000 occurs; and in the High Loire one
in 163,000. On the other hand, in Oise and Lower Seine, both places
in possession of the highest degree of general instruction, and of
the means of advancing in improvement, suicides occur in every 5000
or 9000 inhabitants. In the north of France, Catholicism has been
nearly extirpated, and there suicide and crime predominate; south
of the Loire, on the contrary, it still retains a strong hold of the
affections of the people, and there suicide, and its sinister crimes
or maladies are comparatively rare. This affords a noble proof that
the effects of Christianity, in whatever form and under whatever
circumstances, are peace and joy.”[33]

It is our firm belief that the increase of suicide in this country is
to a certain extent to be traced to the atrocious doctrines promulgated
with such zeal by the sect of modern infidels, who falsely denominate
themselves _Socialists_; a class whose opinions are subversive of all
morality and Christianity, and which sap the foundation of society
itself. It is natural to expect when such principles of infidelity are
inculcated, when men are taught to believe in the non-existence of a
God, and to consider they are not accountable agents, and are under the
operation of an organization over which they have no control, that they
should look with philosophic indifference on suicide, and consider it
as a justifiable mode of putting an end to the misery and wretchedness
engendered by their own opinions. Such doctrines must of necessity
be productive of great evil to society; and it becomes the duty of
every Christian and well-wisher to his fellow-men to hold them up to
reprobation. The opinions of Owen strike at the root of all order,
and of all virtue, social and public, and break down every barrier of
law and restraint, making the passions the only standard of right and
wrong—the animal appetites the only test of virtue and vice.

In the Bishop of Exeter’s able speech in the House of Lords, on
the subject of Socialism, he stated that cases of suicide under
circumstances of the most dreadful suffering had occurred, which had
been brought about by Mr. Owen’s pernicious doctrines. The learned
prelate related the particulars of the following case:—Mr. Parke,
a most respectable inhabitant of Wolverhampton, had an apprentice,
who had been in the habit of attending Socialists’ meetings, and
hearing their lectures. He purchased all their publications, and his
master’s shop not being of that kind to furnish them, he was obliged
to go elsewhere to obtain them. He dined and drank tea as usual with
Mr. Parke on the Sunday, and left after tea to attend St. George’s
Church. Not coming home at the usual hour, his master sat up for him
until 12 o’clock, when, as he had not returned, he concluded that his
relations had detained him. He was, however, found dead, in a sort of
lumber room, the next morning. Two bottles of poison were lying by his
side; the one which occasioned his death contained prussic acid; the
other, nux vomica: near him were lying four letters, one addressed to
his father, another to Mr. Parke, a third to the jury, and a fourth
containing his creed; in all of which he expressed his disbelief in the
Bible, considering it “the most dangerous book that ever was written,”
and if ever such a person as Jesus Christ lived, he was the weakest man
he ever heard of. In one of the letters he also stated that he had been
nurtured in superstition, (meaning, that he had been brought up as a
member of the church of England,) and that when he read Owen’s works
he “shuddered at their common sense.” He denied all belief in a future
state of retribution; and as he considered apprenticeship slavery, he
thought it more prudent to suffer pain for a moment than to endure six
years’ servitude. He earnestly entreated the jury not to bring in a
verdict of insanity.

It appears from a letter to the Bishop of Exeter, written by the
unfortunate youth’s uncle, that he had been from infancy an exceedingly
lively boy; between him and his parents the most glowing affection, as
well as the most boundless confidence, existed; but the fatal poison
of Socialism changed a confiding heart into a cold concentration of
selfishness. After the verdict of the jury, the uncle declared aloud,
before a crowded room, in a most vehement manner, that, were he in the
presence of the Queen, he would proclaim Owen as the murderer of his
nephew.

The indifference with which self-murder is looked at in Germany is
to be ascribed in a great measure to the popular productions of that
country. We are reluctant to denounce as undoubted causes of suicide
the works of men of splendid talents; but in such a case it would be
wrong, it would be criminal, to mince the matter, and plead any excuse
for so detestable a work as Werter, which has unhinged the minds of
thousands, before they were aware of its impoisoned and insidious
tendency. That it is the work of a man of genius only makes its
blackening influence the stronger; as the fascination of the style,
and the intense interest of the narrative, operate like an infernal
spell to smooth the road to self-destruction. Its leading theme is,
that human passions, and particularly love, are immediately inspired by
Heaven; and that it would be wrong—nay, that it is impossible—to resist
them; and consequently, if a lover meets with disappointment, his only
virtuous course is suicide, which is triumphantly catalogued among the
virtues, as it was by the heathen morality of the ancients.

This work, together with Foscolo’s imitation of it, the “_Ultime
Lettere di Jacopo Ortis_,” and all publications of a similar character,
ought to be repudiated by every sound thinking man. Resistance to
the dictates of passion, when it prompts to crime and suicide, is
a most deadly sin against Werterism; whilst, obeying the passions
to the letter, even if they incite to criminal love or self-murder,
gives to its disciple the stamp of one of the virtuous who have
courageously braved the laws of good order, fearlessly dared to trample
under foot all the commands of God and man, and stood forth as the
redoubted champions of human supremacy and the glorious right of
self-destruction. Such are the principles of the miscreants who wish to
prove that suicide is a virtue; and, with the sentiments found in the
pages of Werter, they rush headlong and unthinkingly into a deep and
awful futurity.

It is not generally known that Goëthe, the author of the work alluded
to, attempted suicide. He considered the death of the Emperor Otho as
worthy of imitation. In contemplating the feelings which influenced
that monarch, he says he convinced himself that if he could not proceed
as Otho had done, he was not entitled to resolve on renouncing life. He
adds, “By this conviction, I saved myself from the purpose, or indeed,
more properly speaking, from the whim, of suicide. Among a considerable
collection of arms, I possessed a costly well-ground dagger. This I
laid down nightly by my side; and, before extinguishing the light,
I tried whether I could succeed (_à la Otho_) in sending the sharp
point an inch or two deep into my heart. But as I truly never could
succeed, I at last took to laughing at myself, threw away all these
hypochondriacal crotchets, and determined to live.”

In the melancholy case of Hackman and Miss Ray, the following is the
substance of a correspondence which passed between them on the subject
of Werter. Hackman was refused the sight of this book by Miss R.,
who had a copy of the French translation, because, as she expresses
herself, she saw too great a similarity between her lover and Werter,
not only in point of situation, but in the impetuosity of their
tempers. “The book you mention,” says Miss R., “is just the only book
you should never read. On my knees, I beg you never to read it! Perhaps
you have read it; perhaps—I am distracted! Heaven only knows to whom
I may be writing this letter.” To this, Hackman, who was in Ireland,
replies: “Nonsense! to say it will make me unhappy, or that I shall
not be able to read it. Must I pistol myself because a thick-blooded
German has been fool enough to set the example, or because a German
novelist has feigned such a story.” Werter was read, and the effect was
most injurious on his mind. Whilst confined in Newgate, he wrote the
following letter:—“Among my papers you will see, my friend, some lines
I wrote on reading Goëthe’s Werter, translated from German into French,
which, whilst I was in Ireland, Miss R. refused to lend me. When I
returned to England, I made her let me read it. But I never shewed her
these lines, for fear they should make her uneasy. Unhappy Werter!
still less pretence hadst thou for suicide than I. After finally
seeing thy Charlotte married to another—marrying her thyself—hadst
thou a right over thy existence, because she was not thy wife? Yet
wast thou less barbarous than I; for thou didst not seek to die in her
presence,—but neither didst thou doubt her love. We can neither of us
hope for pardon!”

The lines were these, supposed to be found, after Werter’s death, upon
the ground by the pistol—

  “If chance some kindred spirit should relate
  To future times unhappy Werter’s fate;
  Should in some pitying, almost pardoning age,
  Consign my sorrows to some weeping page;
  And should the affecting page be haply read
  By some new Charlotte—mine will then be dead.
  (Yes; she shall die—sole solace of my love!
  And we shall meet—for so she said—above.)
  O Charlotte! (Martha—by whatever name,
  Thy faithful Werter hands thee down to fame,)
  O be thou sure thy Werter never knows
  The fatal story of my kindred woes!
  O do not, fair one,—by my shocking end
  I charge thee!—do not let thy feeling friend
  Shed his sad sorrows o’er my tearful tale:
  Example, spite of precept, may prevail.”

It may be mentioned, as a fact corroborating the opinion, that
productions of an infidel character have a tendency to originate a
disposition to suicide by weakening the moral principles; that when
the celebrated and notorious Tom Paine’s “Age of Reason” was first
published, the papers of the day recorded many cases of self-murder
committed by persons who avowed that the idea never entered their heads
until they had become familiar with the works of the above-mentioned
writer. An individual, zealous in the diffusion of Paine’s principles,
purchased several hundred copies of his work, which he most
industriously circulated, gratuitously, in quarters where he knew the
doctrines of Christianity had already obtained a footing. A copy of the
“Age of Reason,” elegantly bound, was received by a young lady who was
acting in the capacity of a governess in the family of a gentleman of
great respectability. The lady had no conception from whom the present
came, and having heard of the book, she felt a curiosity to become
acquainted with the doctrines which it inculcated. The circumstance of
her having received the book was not mentioned to any member of the
family with whom she resided; and in the evening, when she retired to
her own room, she read it with great attention. The family noticed,
in a few weeks, a perceptible alteration in the appearance of the
young lady. She became extremely thoughtful and contemplative. Her
health also appeared sensibly affected. The mother of the children
whom she was instructing took advantage of the first opportunity of
speaking to her on the subject. She expressed herself very unhappy in
her mind, but refused to disclose the cause of her mental uneasiness.
It was thought she had formed an attachment, and was suffering from
the effects of disappointed affection. She was questioned on these
points, but persisted in concealing the circumstances which had
been operating so injuriously on her mind. The mental dejection
increased, and the result was, an alarming attack of nervous fever, of
which she was cured by an able physician with much difficulty. When
convalescent, she was noticed one day busily employed in writing, and
when interrupted, shewed great anxiety to secrete the piece of paper
on which she had been transcribing her thoughts. In the course of the
evening of the same day, a deep groan was heard to issue from her
room. The servant immediately entered, when, to her great horror, she
saw the governess on the floor with a terrible gash in her throat.
Assistance was directly obtained, but, alas! not in time to save the
life of the poor unfortunate girl. On searching her desk, a sheet of
paper was discovered, on which she had disclosed her reasons for the
rash act. She said, that from the moment she read the “Age of Reason,”
her mind became unsettled. Her previous religious impressions were
undermined; in proportion as she was induced to imbibe the doctrines
of Tom Paine, so she became miserable and wretched. From one error
she fell into another, until she actually believed that death was
annihilation; and although she appeared firmly rooted in this belief,
she expressed herself horrified beyond all expression at the bare idea
of dissolution. For some time prior to her illness, she had felt an
impulse to sacrifice her life, but had not the courage to perform the
act. After her recovery, she felt the impulse renewed with increased
strength, until, with a hope of escaping from an accumulation of misery
which was weighing her to the earth, she determined to commit suicide.
She also, in the document referred to, asked her friends to forgive
her, and to take warning from her fate.

That many rush into suicide in order to escape the just and legal
punishment of their crimes cannot be a matter of doubt. Many under such
circumstances are influenced by a fear of public exposure, and prefer
death to the idea of being compelled to undergo the ordeal of a trial
in a court of justice. The following case is but the type of many that
could be related:—

A young man of family, the Hon. Mr. ——, staying at an inn in Portsmouth,
previously to sailing for India, where he was going out as an
aide-de-camp to General——, with a party of friends, also officers,
joined company at supper one evening with Mr. Bradbury, the clown of
Covent Garden Theatre, a person of very gentlemanlike exterior and
manners, and ambitious of the society of gentlemen. He was in the habit
of using a very magnificent and curious snuff-box, and on this occasion
it was much admired by the party, and handed round for inspection from
one to the other. Mr. Bradbury soon after left the inn, and retired
to his lodging, when he missed his box, and immediately returned to
inquire for it. The gentlemen with whom he had spent the evening had
all retired to bed; but he left word with the porter to mention to the
officers early the next day that he had left the box, and to request
them to restore it to him when found.

The next morning, Mr. Bradbury again hastened to the inn, anxious
to recover his property, and met on his way the Hon. Mr. ——, and
communicated his loss to him; when he was informed by that gentleman
that a similar circumstance had occurred to himself, his bed-room
having been robbed the night before of his gold watch, chain, and
seals, &c., and that he was on his way to a Jew in the town to apprize
him of the robbery, in order that if such articles should be offered
for sale, he might stop them and detain the person who presented them.
This was very extraordinary! Mr. Bradbury then met the other gentlemen
of the party, and was told by them that their rooms had also been
robbed, one of bank notes to a great amount, another of a gold watch,
&c.

The Hon. Mr. —— was violently infuriated by his loss; and as he was
bound to sail from Portsmouth when the ship was ready, he naturally
dreaded being compelled to depart without his property. He hinted,
too, that he had certain suspicions of certain people. An officer
was sent for from London. This man came down promptly, to the great
satisfaction of the Hon. Mr. ——; and after searching the house and
their trunks, Rivett (the officer) addressed the gentlemen, observing,
that there was yet a duty unperformed, and which was a painful one to
him—he must search the _persons_ of all present, and as the Hon.
Mr. ——’s trunks had been the first to be inspected, perhaps he would
allow him to examine him at once. To this he agreed; but the next moment0
he was observed to look very ill. Rivett was proceeding to search
him, as a matter of course, when he requested that everybody would
leave the room, except the officer and Mr. Bradbury, which request
was immediately complied with. He then fell upon his knees, entreated
for mercy, and placed Mr. Bradbury’s box in his hand, begging him to
forgive him and spare his life. Rivett upon this proceeded to search
him, but he resisted; the object was effected by force, and the
greater part of the property found that had been stolen in the house.
The officer, conceiving that he had not got the whole of the bank
notes, inquired of Mr. —— where the remainder was; when he pointed to
a pocket-book which was under the foot of the bed; and while Rivett
relaxed his hold of him, and was in the act of stooping to pick up
the book, Mr. —— caught up a razor and cut his throat. Rivett and Mr.
Bradbury seized an arm each, and forced the razor from him; but he
was so determined on self-destruction, that he twisted his head about
violently in different ways, in order to make the wound larger and
more fatal. To prevent him from continuing this, he was braced up with
linen round his neck so tightly that he could not move it. A surgeon
of the town, with two assistants, came, and after seeing the wound,
gave it as their opinion that it was possible for him to recover, and
by the assistance of some powerful soldiers holding him, they dressed
the wound. His clothes were then cut off, and he was carried down
stairs into another room. During this operation he coughed violently;
but whether naturally or by design, to make his wound worse, was not
ascertained. It had, however, the effect of setting his wound bleeding
again, and the dressing was obliged to be repeated.

The sequel of this distressing case was of an equally melancholy
character.

Poor Mr. Bradbury was standing close to the unfortunate young man when
he committed the sudden attempt upon his own life. The horror of the
act, and the shocking appearance of his lacerated throat, the blood
from which flowed out upon Mr. Bradbury, in short, this heart-rending
result of the previous agitation and discovery, acted upon the
sensibility of Mr. Bradbury to such an extent as to deprive him of
reason. This fact was noticeable two days after the above scene, by
his entering a church, and after the service was ended, going into the
vestry, and requesting the clergyman to pray for him, as he intended
to cut his throat! This distemper of mind was not too great at first
to admit of partial control; but it daily increased, and ultimately
caused him to be placed under restraint.[34]

A woman, about thirty-six years of age, who had been well educated,
but whose conduct had not been exempt from some irregularities, in
consequence of intemperance and manifold disappointments, became
affected with madness. She was by turns furious and melancholic, and
conceived she had murdered one of her children, for which she ought to
suffer death. She detailed the manner in which she had destroyed the
child, and the motives which actuated her, so circumstantially, and
with so much plausibility and feeling, that if it had not been known
that her child was living, the physician under whose care she was
placed might have been deceived. By her own hands she had repeatedly
endeavoured to terminate her existence, but was prevented by constant
vigilance and due restraint. Her disposition to suicide was afterwards
relinquished; but she still persisted that for the murder of the child
she ought to suffer death, and requested to be sent to Newgate, in
order to be tried, and undergo the sentence of the law; indeed, she
appeared to derive consolation from the hope of becoming a public
example, and expiating her supposed crime on the scaffold. While in
this state, and with a hope of convincing her of its safety, the child
was brought to visit her. When she beheld it, there was a temporary
burst of maternal affection; she kissed it, and for a few moments
appeared to be delighted: but a look of suspicion quickly succeeded,
and this was shortly followed by a frown of indignation, which rendered
the removal of the child a measure of wholesome necessity. Perhaps
in no instance was the buoyancy of madness more conspicuous over
reason, recollection, and feeling. She insisted they had attempted to
impose on her a strange child, which bore a faint resemblance to her
own; however, by such subterfuges she was not to be deceived; she
had strangled the child until life had totally departed, and it was
not in the order of nature that it should exist again. The effect of
this interview was an exasperation of her disorder: she became more
cunning and malignant, and her desire for an ignominious death was
augmented. To render this more certain, and accelerate her projected
happiness, she enticed into her apartment a young female patient to
whom she appeared to be attached, and having previously platted some
threads of her bed-quilt into a cord, she fixed it round the neck of
the young woman, and proceeded to strangle her. Fortunately, some
person entered the room and unloosed the cord in time to save her.
When this unhappy maniac was questioned concerning the motive which
induced her to attempt the destruction of a person for whom she had
manifested kindness, she very calmly replied, that as the murder of her
own child was disbelieved, she wished to exhibit a convincing proof
of the ferocity of her nature, that she might instantly be conveyed
to Newgate and hanged, which she desired as the greatest blessing.
With considerable satisfaction, we may add, that in a few months,
notwithstanding her derangement had been of three years’ duration, this
woman perfectly recovered, and for a considerable time performed the
duties of an important and respectable office.[35]

The great increase of the crime of suicide has been referred by many
able physicians of the present day to the political excitement to which
the minds of the people have been exposed of late years. In despotic
countries, suicide and insanity are seldom heard of: the passions
are checked by the nature of the government; the imagination is not
elevated to an unhealthy standard; every man is compelled to follow the
calling in life to which he is born, and for which he has capacity;
and on this account the evil and corrupt dispositions of the mind are,
to a certain extent, kept in abeyance. In republican governments, the
greatest latitude is allowed to the turbulent passions; all mankind
are theoretically placed on an equality; the man whose “talk is of
bullocks” considers himself as fit to carry on the complicated business
of government as he whose education, associations, and experience tend
to qualify him for the duties of a legislator.

In proportion as men are exposed to the influence of causes which
excite the passions, so will they become predisposed to mental
derangement in all its forms. The French and American revolutions
increased considerably the crime of suicide. It has been said that
during the “reign of terror” statistical evidence does not shew that
self-murder was more common than at any other period. Perhaps the
alleged unfrequency of suicide may be attributed to the circumstance
of the French people having been so busy in killing others that they
had no time to think of killing themselves. More than the average
number of suicides may not have really occurred during the crisis of
the Revolution, but it is an undisputed fact that, both before and
after that political convulsion, self-destruction prevailed to an
alarming extent. Disappointed hopes, wounded pride and vanity, blighted
ambition, loss of property, death of friends, disgust of life, all
came into active operation after the turbulence and bloodshed of the
Revolution had somewhat subsided: these passions, working upon minds
easily excited, and not under the benign influence of religion, it was
almost natural to expect that great recklessness of life should be
exhibited. Such facts demonstrate to us the folly of uselessly exciting
the passions of the people, and raising in their minds exaggerated
expectations from political changes.

The tendency of refined sensibility to become wound up in a paroxysm,
terminating in suicidal attempts, is strikingly illustrated in a case
reported by Dr. Burrows:—

“A gentleman of a family of rank, and distinguished for talent, married
early in life the object of his most ardent affections. He possessed
extreme sensibility, with a most highly cultivated and refined mind.
It may be remarked, as a constitutional peculiarity, that his natural
pulse did not exceed forty beats in a minute. When anything suddenly
occurred to agitate him, it produced an attack of fever, and his pulse
was accelerated in an astonishing degree. Though in ordinary affairs
he was a man of firm resolution and great spirit, yet when this fit
happened, he was seized with such a panic, or impulse, that he knew
not what he did, and he was unnerved for days. His lady being well
acquainted with the infirmities of his constitution, rendered him,
by her good sense and soothing, a happier man than he had previously
been. Most unfortunately, she died in the first year of her marriage.
His grief at her loss was excessive; and even when time had abated
its poignancy, he continued very miserable. His thoughts were always
reverting to the virtues of her whom he had lost, and the comparative
happiness he had enjoyed in her society. He tried everything to divert
his melancholy; but these impulses would follow reflection; and then
his ideas adverted to self-destruction. He reasoned with himself
upon the subject till, he confessed, he had become an infidel in
religion, and could no longer view the act as wicked. I had,” said
Dr. Burrows, “an opportunity of knowing the exact state of his mind
during this struggle, from perusing some notes which he had written,
describing it. He expressed himself with the utmost tenderness and
affection with respect to his departed wife, and of his intention of
soon joining her by a voluntary death; not, however, in heaven, but
in Elysium. One night, after having been occupied in reading to some
dear relations, and apparently much enjoying the subject, he retired
to his chamber. He undressed, and dismissed his valet. His gloomy
reflections recurred. One of these strange impulses came over him.
He seized a pistol, and discharged it: it failed of effect. He fired
another

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