Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their effects on the civilization of Europe
by Jaime Luciano Balmes · English · Gutenberg #50436 · 2,210,551 chars · public domain (US)
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their effects on the civilization of Europe
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.
Title: Protestantism and Catholicity compared in their effects on the civilization of Europe
Author: Jaime Luciano Balmes
Release date: November 12, 2015 [eBook #50436]
Most recently updated: October 22, 2024
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/50436
Credits: Produced by Josep Cols Canals, Les Galloway and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
file was produced from images generously made available
by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROTESTANTISM AND CATHOLICITY COMPARED IN THEIR EFFECTS ON THE CIVILIZATION OF EUROPE ***
PROTESTANTISM
AND
CATHOLICITY
COMPARED IN THEIR
EFFECTS ON THE CIVILIZATION OF EUROPE.
WRITTEN IN SPANISH
BY THE REV. J. BALMES.
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH.
Second Edition.
BALTIMORE:
PUBLISHED BY JOHN MURPHY & CO.
No. 178 MARKET STREET.
PITTSBURG: GEORGE QUIGLEY.
_Sold by Booksellers generally._
1851.
ENTERED, according to the Act of Congress, in the year eighteen
hundred and fifty, by JOHN MURPHY & CO., in the Clerk's Office of the
District Court of Maryland.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
Among the many and important evils which have been the necessary
result of the profound revolutions of modern times, there appears a
good extremely valuable to science, and which will probably have a
beneficial influence on the human race,--I mean the love of studies
having for their object man and society. The shocks have been so rude,
that the earth has, as it were, opened under our feet; and the human
mind, which, full of pride and haughtiness, but lately advanced on a
triumphal car amid acclamations and cries of victory, has been alarmed
and stopped in its career. Absorbed by an important thought, overcome
by a profound reflection, it has asked itself, "What am I? whence do I
come? what is my destination?" Religious questions have regained their
high importance; and when they might have been supposed to have been
scattered by the breath of indifference, or almost annihilated by the
astonishing development of material interests, by the progress of the
natural and exact sciences, by the continually increasing ardour of
political debates,--we have seen that, so far from having been stifled
by the immense weight which seemed to have overwhelmed them, they have
reappeared on a sudden in all their magnitude, in their gigantic form,
predominant over society, and reaching from the heavens to the abyss.
This disposition of men's minds naturally drew their attention to the
religious revolution of the sixteenth century; it was natural that they
should ask what this revolution had done to promote the interests of
humanity. Unhappily, great mistakes have been made in this inquiry.
Either because they have looked at the facts through the distorted
medium of sectarian prejudice, or because they have only considered
them superficially, men have arrived at the conclusion, that the
reformers of the sixteenth century conferred a signal benefit on the
nations of Europe, by contributing to the development of science, of
the arts, of human liberty, and of every thing which is comprised in
the word _civilization_.
What do history and philosophy say on this subject? How has man,
either individually or collectively, considered in a religious,
social, political, or literary point of view, been benefited by the
reform of the sixteenth century? Did Europe, under the exclusive
influence of Catholicity, pursue a prosperous career? Did Catholicity
impose a single fetter on the movements of civilization? This is the
examination which I propose to make in this work. Every age has its
peculiar wants; and it is much to be wished that all Catholic writers
were convinced, that the complete examination of these questions is
one of the most urgent necessities of the times in which we live.
Bellarmine and Bossuet have done what was required for their times; we
ought to do the same for ours. I am fully aware of the immense extent
of the questions I have adverted to, and I do not flatter myself that I
shall be able to elucidate them as they deserve; but, however this may
be, I promise to enter on my task with the courage which is inspired
by a love of truth; and when my strength shall be exhausted, I shall
sit down with tranquillity of mind, in expectation that another, more
vigorous than myself, will carry into effect so important an enterprise.
PREFACE TO THE AMERICAN EDITION.
The work of Balmes on the comparative influence of Protestantism
and Catholicity on European civilization, which is now presented to
the American public, was written in Spanish, and won for the author
among his own countrymen a very high reputation. A French edition
was published simultaneously with the Spanish, and the work has
since been translated into the Italian and English languages, and
been widely circulated as one of the most learned productions of the
age, and most admirably suited to the exigencies of our times. When
Protestantism could no longer maintain its position in the field of
theology, compelling its votaries by its endless variations to espouse
open infidelity, or to fall back upon the ancient church, it adopted
a new mode of defence, in pointing to its pretended achievements as
the liberator of the human mind, the friend of civil and religious
freedom, the patron of science and the arts; in a word, the active
element in all social ameliorations. This is the cherished idea and
boasted argument of those who attempt to uphold Protestantism as a
system. They claim for it the merit of having freed the intellect of
man from a degrading bondage, given a nobler impulse to enterprise
and industry, and sown in every direction the seed of national and
individual prosperity. Looking at facts superficially, or through the
distorted medium of prejudice, they tell us that the reformers of the
16th century contributed much to the development of science and the
arts, of human liberty, and of every thing which is comprised in the
word _civilization_. To combat this delusion, so well calculated to
ensnare the minds of men in this materialistic and utilitarian age, the
author undertook the work, a translation of which is here presented
to the public. "What do history and philosophy say on this subject?
How has man, either individually or collectively, considered in a
religious, social, political, or literary point of view, been benefited
by the reform of the 16th century? Did Europe, under the exclusive
influence of Catholicity, pursue a prosperous career? Did Catholicity
impose a single fetter on the movements of civilization?" Such is the
important investigation which the author proposed to himself, and
it must be admitted that he has accomplished his task with the most
brilliant success? Possessed of a penetrating mind, cultivated by
profound study and adorned with the most varied erudition, and guided
by a fearless love of truth, he traverses the whole Christian era,
comparing the gigantic achievements of Catholicity, in curing the evils
of mankind, elevating human nature, and diffusing light and happiness,
with the results of which Protestantism may boast; and he proves, with
the torch of history and philosophy in his hand, that the latter, far
from having exerted any beneficial influence upon society, has retarded
the great work of civilization which Catholicity commenced, and which
was advancing so prosperously under her auspicious guidance. He does
not say that nothing has been done for civilization by _Protestants_;
but he asserts and proves that _Protestantism_ has been greatly
unfavorable, and even injurious to it.
By thus exposing the short-comings, or rather evils of Protestantism,
in a social and political point of view, as Bossuet and others had
exhibited them under the theological aspect, Balmes has rendered a
most important service to Catholic literature. He has supplied the
age with a work, which is peculiarly adapted to its wants, and which
must command a general attention in the United States. The Catholic,
in perusing its pages, will learn to admire still more the glorious
character of the faith which he professes: the Protestant, if sincere,
will open his eyes to the incompatibility of his principles with the
happiness of mankind: while the scholar in general will find in it a
vast amount of information, on the most vital and interesting topics,
and presented in a style of eloquence seldom equalled.
"The reader is requested to bear in mind that the author was a native
of Spain, and therefore he must not be surprised to find much that
relates more particularly to that country. In fact, the fear that
Protestantism might be introduced there seems to have been the motive
which induced him to undertake the work. He was evidently a man of
strong national as well as religious feeling, and he dreaded its
introduction both politically and religiously, as he considered that it
would be injurious to his country in both points of view. He thought
that it would destroy the national unity, as it certainly did in other
countries.
"A very interesting part of the work is that where he states the
relations of religion and political freedom; shows that Catholicity
is by no means adverse to the latter, but, on the contrary, highly
favorable to it; and proves by extracts from St. Thomas Aquinas
and other great Catholic divines, that they entertained the most
enlightened political views. On the other hand, he shows that
Protestantism was unfavorable to civil liberty, as is evidenced by the
fact, that arbitrary power made great progress in various countries
of Europe soon after its appearance. The reason of this was, that the
moral control of religion being taken away, physical restraint became
the more necessary." The author, on this subject, naturally expresses
a preference for monarchy, it being a cherished inheritance from his
forefathers; but, it will be noticed that the principles which he lays
down as essential to a right administration of civil affairs, regard
the substance and not the form of government; are as necessary under a
republican as under the monarchical system; and, if duly observed, they
cannot fail to ensure the happiness of the people. This portion of the
volume will be read with peculiar interest in this country, and ought
to command an attentive consideration.
In preparing this edition of the work from the English translation by
Messrs. Hanford and Kershaw, care has been taken to revise the whole of
it, to compare it with the original French, and to correct the various
errors, particularly the mistakes in translation. A biographical notice
of the illustrious writer has also been prefixed to the volume, to give
the reader an insight into his eminent character, and the valuable
services he has rendered to his country and to society at large.
BALTIMORE, November 1, 1850.
NOTICE OF THE AUTHOR.
James Balmes was born at Vich, a small city in Catalonia, in Spain,
on the 28th of August, 1810. His parents were poor, but noted for
their industry and religion, and they took care to train him from his
childhood to habits of rigid piety. Every morning, after the holy
sacrifice of mass, his mother prostrate before an altar dedicated to
St. Thomas of Aquin, implored this illustrious doctor to obtain for
her son the gifts of sanctity and knowledge. Her prayers were not
disappointed.
From seven to ten years of age, Balmes applied himself with great
ardor to the study of Latin. The two following years were devoted to a
course of rhetoric, and three years more were allotted to philosophy;
a ninth year was occupied with the prolegomena of theology. Such was
the order of studies in the seminary of Vich. While thus laboring to
store his mind with knowledge, Balmes preserved an irreproachable line
of conduct. Called to the ecclesiastical state, he submitted readily
to the strict discipline which this vocation required, and he was seen
nowhere but under the parental roof, at the church, in some religious
community, or in the episcopal library. At the age of fourteen he was
admitted to a benefice, the revenue of which, though small, enabled
him to complete his education. In 1826, he went to the University
of Cervera, which at that time was the centre of public instruction
in that part of Spain. It numbered four colleges, in all of which
an enlightened piety prevailed, affording the young Balmes a most
favorable opportunity of developing his rare qualities. Here, the frame
and habit of his mind were observable to all, in his deep and animated
look, in his grave and modest demeanor, and in his method of study. He
would read a few pages over a table, his head resting upon his hands;
then, wrapt in his mantle, he would spend a long time in reflection.
"The true method of study," he used to say, "is to read little, to
select good authors, and to think much. If we confined ourselves to
a knowledge of what is contained in books, the sciences would never
advance a step. We must learn what others have not known. During my
meditations in the dark, my thoughts ferment, and my brain burns like a
boiling cauldron."
Devoted to the acquisition of knowledge, he cultivated retirement as
a means of facilitating the attainment of his object. His thirst for
learning was so intense, that it held him under absolute sway, and he
found it necessary at a later period to offer a systematic resistance
to its exclusive demands. Pursuing his favorite method of study,
Balmes remained four years at the University of Cervera, reading no
other works than the Sum of St. Thomas, and the commentaries upon it
by Bellarmine, Suarez and Cajetan. If he made any exception from this
rule, it was in favor of Chateaubriand's _Génie du Christanisme_.
"Every thing," said he, "is to be found in St. Thomas; philosophy,
religion, politics: his writings are an inexhaustible mine." Having
thus strengthened his mind by a due application to philosophical and
theological studies, he proceeded to enlarge his sphere of knowledge
by reading a greater variety of authors. In taking up a work, he first
looked at the table of contents, and when it suggested an idea or fact
which seemed to open before him a new path, he read that part of the
volume which developed this idea or fact; the rest was overlooked.
In this way, he accumulated a rich store of varied erudition. At
the age of twenty-two he knew by memory the tabular contents of an
extraordinary number of volumes; he had learned the French language;
he spoke and wrote Latin better than his native tongue, and had been
admitted successively to the degrees of bachelor and licentiate in
theology. The virtues of his youth, far from having been weakened
by these studies, had acquired greater strength and maturity. As he
approached the solemn period of his ordination, he became still more
remarkable for the gravity and modesty of his deportment. He prepared
himself for his elevation to the priesthood by a retreat of one hundred
days. After his promotion to the sacerdotal dignity, which took place
in his native city, he returned to the University of Cervera, where he
continued his studies, and performed the duties of assistant professor.
Here also he began to manifest his political views; but, always with
that discretion and moderation for which the Spanish clergy have been
with few exceptions distinguished during the last twenty years. At that
period Spain was agitated by two conflicting parties, that of Maria
Christina and the other of Don Carlos. Balmes avoided all questions
which were rather calculated to encourage the spirit of faction than
promote the general interest of the country. In 1835 he evinced this
circumspection in a remarkable degree, when the doctorate which had
been conferred upon him, required him to deliver an address in honor
of the reigning monarch. Maria Christina was then the queen regent,
and civil war was about to commence in the mountains of Catalonia; but
Balmes performed his task without allusion to politics, and without
offending the adherents of either party.
After two years of study at Cervera, where he applied himself to
theology and law, our author returned to Vich, where he determined
to spend four years more in retirement, for the purpose of maturing
his character and knowledge. In this solitude, he devoted himself to
history, poetry and politics, but principally to mathematics, of which
he obtained a professorship in 1837. During all these literary labors,
Balmes was actuated by a lively faith, and a sincere, unassuming piety.
Religious meditation, intermingled with scientific reflections, was
the constant occupation of his mind; he did not neglect, however, the
exterior practices of devotion. Besides the celebration of the holy
sacrifice, he frequently visited the blessed sacrament, and paid his
homage to the B. Virgin in some solitary chapel. The _Following of
Christ_, the _Sum_ of the angelic doctor, and the Holy Scriptures,
were always in his hands, and he took pleasure in reading the ascetic
writers of his own country. In this way did he prepare himself, until
the age of thirty, to become one of the most solid and gifted minds
of our time, and to act the important part to which he was called by
Divine Providence.
The first literary effort of Balmes before the public, was a prize
essay which he wrote on clerical celibacy. This was soon followed by
another production of his pen, entitled "Observations on the Property
of the Clergy, in a social, political, and commercial point of view,"
which was elicited by the clamoring of the revolutionary army under
Espartero for the spoliation of the clergy. The learning, philosophy
and eloquence of the writer in this work, excited the wonder and
admiration of the most distinguished statesmen in the country. Some
months after, he published his "Political Considerations on the
Condition of Spain," in which he had the courage to defend the rights
of both parties in the country, and to suggest means of a conciliatory
nature for restoring public order and tranquillity.
Amidst these political efforts, Balmes did not lay aside his peculiar
functions as a minister of God. The edification of the faithful, the
religious instruction of youth, and the defence of the faith against
the assaults of heresy and rationalism, were constant objects of his
attention. During the same year, 1840, he translated and published
the "Maxims of St. Francis of Sales for every day in the year;" he
also composed a species of catechism for the instruction of young
persons, which was very extensively circulated. At the same time he
undertook the preparation of the present work, in order to counteract
the pernicious influence exerted among his countrymen by Guizot's
lectures on European civilization, and to neutralize the facilities
offered under the regime of Espartero for the success of a Protestant
Propagandism in Spain. The occasion and object of this work rendered it
expedient that it should be published simultaneously in Spanish and in
French, and with this view our author visited France, and afterwards,
to extend his observations, passed into England.
On his return to Barcelona, towards the close of 1842, Balmes became a
collaborator in the editing of the _Civilizacion_, a monthly periodical
of great merit, devoted to literary reviews, and to solid instruction
on the current topics of the day. His connection with this work lasted
only eighteen months. He then commenced a review of his own, entitled
the _Sociedad_, a philosophical, political, and religious journal,
which acquired a great reputation during the one year of its existence.
Driven soon after into retirement by the disturbances of the times,
Balmes composed another philosophical work, _El Criterio_, which is a
course of logic adapted to every capacity.
From the national uprising that overthrew the government of Espartero,
there arose a general feeling of patriotic independence, which called
for the cessation of civil strife, and the harmonizing of the two
parties that divided the nation. Many of the adherents of Maria
Christina, who were the nobility and the bourgeoisie, recognized the
excesses of the revolutionary faction which they had called to their
aid, while the Carlists were not all in favor of absolute monarchy, and
numbered an imposing majority among the lower classes. All these men of
wise and moderate views longed to see a remedy applied to the wounds
of their afflicted country; and with one accord they turned their
eyes upon Balmes, as the only individual capable of conducting this
important affair. He had already, in his _Political Considerations_,
indicated the principal idea of his policy for putting an end to the
national evils; it was a matrimonial alliance between the Queen and
the son of Don Carlos. Under these circumstances he commenced in
February, 1844, a new journal, entitled _Pensamiento de la Nacion_,
the object of which was to denounce the revolutionary spirit as the
enemy of all just and peaceful government, and to inspire the Spanish
people with a proper reverence for the religious, social and political
inheritance received from their ancestors, and with a due respect for
the reasonable ameliorations of the age. In this spirit the different
questions of the day were discussed with energy and calmness, and
especially the project of an alliance between the Queen and the son
of Don Carlos, which Balmes considered of the utmost importance.
This measure, such as he proposed it, was, to use the language of
his biographer, "the reconciliation of the past and the future, of
authority and liberty, of monarchy and representative government."
Such was the patriotism, dignity and force, with which our author
conducted his hebdomadal, that it won the esteem of a large portion of
the most distinguished men among the Carlists, while it also acquired
favor among an immense number in the opposite party. To support its
views, a daily journal, the _Conciliador_, was started by a body of
young but fervid and brilliant writers, and nothing it would seem was
wanting to insure a triumph for the friends of Spain. Prudence, energy,
moderation, reason and eloquence, with a majority of the people on
their side, deserved and should have commanded success; but they could
not prevail against diplomatic influence and court intrigue. Balmes
learned with equal surprise and affliction, in the retirement of his
native mountains, that the government had resolved to offer the Queen
in marriage to the infant Don Francisco, and the infanta to the Duke
of Montpensier. This was a severe stroke to the sincere and ardent
patriotism of Balmes. He might have resisted this policy with the power
and eloquence of his pen, but he preferred a silent resignation to the
heat of political strife, and the _Pensamiento de la Nacion_, although
a lucrative publication, was discontinued on the 31st of December, 1846.
During that same year, our author collected into one volume his
various essays on politics, as well for his own vindication as for
the diffusion of sound instruction on the condition of Spain. The
following year he completed his "Elementary course of Philosophy."
But his physical strength was not equal to these arduous labors. To
re-establish in some degree his declining health, he travelled in Spain
and France, and remained several weeks in Paris. The intellectual and
moral corruption which was gnawing at the very vitals of the French
nation, and threatened all Europe with its infection, filled him with
increased anxiety. He predicted the dissolution of society, and a
return to barbarism, unless things would take some unexpected turn
through the special interposition of Providence. This last hope was
the only resource left, in his opinion, for the salvation of society
and civilization, and he exulted when he beheld Pius IX opening a new
career for Italy, and consecrating the aspirations and movements of all
who advocated legitimate reform and rational liberty. The political
ameliorations, however, of the sovereign Pontiff appeared to the
opponents of liberalism in Spain, at variance with the great opposition
which Balmes had always exhibited to the revolutionary spirit. Hence,
it became necessary for him to pay the just tribute of his admiration
to the illustrious individual who sat in the chair of Peter, and to
proclaim the eminent virtues of the prince and the pontiff. This he
did with surpassing eloquence, in a brochure entitled _Pius IX_, the
brilliant style of which is only equalled by its wisdom of thought. In
this work, he sketches with graphic pen, the acts of the papal policy,
showing that the holy see is the best guide of men in the path of
liberty and progress, that Pius IX shows a profound knowledge of the
evils that afflict society, and possesses all the energy and firmness
necessary to apply their proper remedy. Balmes was full of hope for the
future, in contemplating the course of the great head of the church,
and he cherished this hope to the last moment of his life. His essay on
the policy of Pius IX was the last production of his pen. His career
in literature was brief, but brilliant and effective. Eight years only
had elapsed since his appearance as a writer, and he had labored with
eminent success in every department of knowledge. The learned divine,
the profound philosopher, the enlightened publicist, he has stamped
upon his age the impress of his genius, and bequeathed to posterity
a rich legacy in his immortal works. In the moral as well as in the
intellectual point of view, his merit may be summed up in those words
of _Wisdom_: "Being made perfect in a short space, he fulfilled a long
time." chap. iv.
This distinguished ecclesiastic, the boast of the Spanish clergy and
the Catalan people, died at Vich, his native city, on the 9th of July,
1848, in the same spirit of lively faith and fervent piety which had
always marked his life. His funeral took place on the 11th, with all
the pomp that could be furnished by the civil and ecclesiastical
authorities. The municipality decreed that one of the public places
should be named after him.
Balmes was little below the middle height, and of weak and slender
frame. But the appearance of feeble health which he exhibited, was
combatted by the animation of his looks. His forehead and lips bore
the impress of energy, which was to be seen also in his eyes, black,
deep-set, and of unusual brightness. The expression of his countenance
was a mixture of vivacity, openness, melancholy and strength of mind.
A careful observer of all his sacerdotal duties, he found in the
practices of piety, the vigor which he displayed in his intellectual
labors. The distribution of his time was extremely methodical, and his
pleasures consisted only in the society of his friends. To the prospect
of temporal honors and the favor of the great, he was insensible;
neither did he seek after ecclesiastical dignities or literary
distinctions. His aim was the diffusion of truth, not the acquisition
of a great reputation. These qualities, however, with his eminent
talents, varied erudition, and invaluable writings, have won for him a
universal fame.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
THE NAME AND NATURE OF PROTESTANTISM, _Page_ 25
CHAPTER II.
THE CAUSES OF PROTESTANTISM.
What ought to be attributed to the genius of its founders--Different
causes assigned for it--Errors on this subject--Opinions of Guizot--Of
Bossuet--True cause of Protestantism to be found in the social
condition of European nations, 28
CHAPTER III.
EXTRAORDINARY PHENOMENON IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.
Divinity of the Catholic Church proved by its relations with the human
mind--Remarkable acknowledgment of M. Guizot--Consequences of that
acknowledgment, 38
CHAPTER IV.
PROTESTANTISM AND THE HUMAN MIND.
Protestantism contains a principle of dissolution--It tends naturally
to destroy all faith--Dangerous direction given to the human
mind--Description of the human mind, 42
CHAPTER V.
INSTINCT OF FAITH IN THE SCIENCES.
Instinct of faith--This instinct extends to all the
sciences--Newton, Descartes--Observations on the history of
philosophy--Proselytism--Present condition of the human mind, 46
CHAPTER VI.
DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS WANTS OF NATIONS--MATHEMATICS--MORAL SCIENCES.
Important error committed by Protestantism, with regard to the
religious government of the human mind, 50
CHAPTER VII.
INDIFFERENCE AND FANATICISM.
Two opposite evils, fruits of Protestantism--Origin of fanaticism--The
Church has prepared the history of the human mind--Private
interpretation of the Bible--Passage from O'Callaghan--Description of
the Bible, 53
CHAPTER VIII.
FANATICISM--ITS DEFINITION--FANATICISM IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.
Connexion between fanaticism and religious feeling--Impossibility of
destroying it--Means of diminishing it--The Church has used these
means, and with what result?--Observations on the pretended Catholic
fanatics--Description of the religious excitement of the founders of
orders in the Church, 57
CHAPTER IX.
INCREDULITY AND RELIGIOUS INDIFFERENCE IN EUROPE THE FRUITS
OF PROTESTANTISM.
Lamentable symptoms of these from the beginning of
Protestantism--Remarkable religious crisis in the latter part of the
seventeenth century--Bossuet and Leibnitz--The Jansenists--Their
influence--Dictionary of Bayle--The epoch when that work
appeared--State of opinions among the Protestants, 60
CHAPTER X.
CAUSES OF THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF PROTESTANTISM.
Important question with regard to the continuance of
Protestantism--Religious indifference with respect to man collectively
and individually--European societies with relation to Mahometanism and
idolatry--How Catholicity and Protestantism are capable of defending
the truth--Intimate connexion between Christianity and European
civilization, 64
CHAPTER XI.
THE POSITIVE DOCTRINES OF PROTESTANTISM ARE REPUGNANT TO THE INSTINCT
OF CIVILIZATION.
Doctrines of Protestantism divided into positive and negative--Singular
phenomenon: one of the principal dogmas of the founders of
Protestantism repugnant to European civilization--Eminent service which
Catholicity has done to civilization by defending free will--Nature of
error--Nature of truth, 68
CHAPTER XII.
EFFECTS WHICH THE INTRODUCTION OF PROTESTANTISM INTO SPAIN WOULD HAVE
PRODUCED.
Present state of religious ideas in Europe--Victories of
religion--State of science and literature--Condition of modern
society--Conjectures on the future influence of Catholicity--Is
it probable that Protestantism will be introduced into
Spain?--England--Her connexion with Spain--Pitt--Nature of religious
ideas in Spain--Situation of Spain--How she may be regenerated, 70
CHAPTER XIII.
PROTESTANTISM AND CATHOLICITY IN THEIR RELATION TO SOCIAL
PROGRESS--PRELIMINARY COUP D'ŒIL.
Commencement of the parallel--Liberty--Vague meaning of the
word--European civilization chiefly due to Catholicity--East
and West--Conjectures on the destinies of Catholicity amid the
catastrophies that may threaten in Europe--Observations on
philosophical studies--Fatalism of a certain modern historical school,
79
CHAPTER XIV.
DID THERE EXIST, AT THE TIME WHEN CHRISTIANITY APPEARED, ANOTHER
PRINCIPLE OF REGENERATION?
Condition, religious, social, and scientific, of the world at
the appearance of Christianity--Roman law--The influence of
Christian ideas thereon--Evils of the political organization of the
empire--System adopted by Christianity; her first care was to change
ideas--Christianity and Paganism with regard to the teaching of moral
doctrines--Protestant preaching, 84
CHAPTER XV.
DIFFICULTIES WHICH CHRISTIANITY HAD TO OVERCOME IN THE WORK OF SOCIAL
REGENERATION--SLAVERY--COULD IT HAVE BEEN DESTROYED MORE SPEEDILY THAN
IT WAS BY CHRISTIANITY?
The Church was not only a great and productive school, but she was
also a regenerating association--What she had to do--Difficulties
which she had to overcome--Slavery--By whom was it abolished?--Opinion
of M. Guizot--Immense number of the slaves--Caution necessary in the
abolition of slavery--Was immediate abolition possible?--Refutation of
the opinion of M. Guizot, 90
CHAPTER XVI.
IDEAS AND MANNERS OF ANTIQUITY RESPECTING SLAVERY--THE CHURCH BEGINS
BY IMPROVING THE CONDITION OF SLAVES.
The Catholic Church not only employs her doctrines, her maxims, and
her spirit of charity, but also makes use of practical means in
the abolition of slavery--Point of view in which this historical
fact ought to be considered--False ideas of the ancients on the
subject--Homer, Plato, Aristotle--Christianity began forthwith to
combat these errors--Christian doctrines on the connexion between
master and slave--The Church employs herself in improving the
condition of slaves, 94
CHAPTER XVII.
MEANS USED BY THE CHURCH TO ENFRANCHISE SLAVES.
1st. She zealously defends the liberty of the
enfranchised--Manumission in the churches--Effects of this
practice--2d. Redemption of captives--Zeal of the Church in practising
and extending the redemption of captives--Prejudices of the Romans on
this point--The zeal of the Church for this object contributes, in an
extraordinary degree, to the abolition of slavery--The Church protects
the liberty of the free, 102
CHAPTER XVIII.
CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT.
3d. System of the Church with regard to slaves belonging to
Jews--Motives which actuated the Church in the enfranchisement of
her own slaves--Her indulgence to them--Her generosity towards
the freed--The slaves of the Church considered as consecrated to
God--Salutary effects of this way of viewing them--4th. Liberty is
granted to those who wish to embrace the monastic state--Effects of
this practice--Conduct of the Church with regard to the ordination of
slaves--Abuses introduced in this respect checked--Discipline of the
Spanish Church on this point, 106
CHAPTER XIX.
DOCTRINES OF ST. AUGUSTIN AND ST. THOMAS OF AQUIN ON THE SUBJECT OF
SLAVERY--RECAPITULATION.
Doctrine of St. Augustin on this subject--Importance of this
doctrine with respect to the abolition of slavery--Refutation of
M. Guizot--Doctrine of St. Thomas on the same subject--Marriage
of slaves--Regulation of canon law on that subject--Résumé of the
means employed by the Church in the abolition of slavery--Refutation
of M. Guizot--The abolition of slavery exclusively due to
Catholicity--Protestantism had no share therein, 111
CHAPTER XX.
CONTRAST BETWEEN THE TWO KINDS OF CIVILIZATION.
Picture of modern civilization--Civilizations not
Christian--Civilization is composed of three elements: the individual,
the family, and the society--The perfectness of these three elements
depends on the perfectness of doctrines, 115
CHAPTER XXI.
OF THE INDIVIDUAL--OF THE FEELING OF INDIVIDUALITY OUT OF
CHRISTIANITY.
Distinction between the individual and the citizen--Of the
individuality of barbarians according to M. Guizot--Whether
in antiquity individuality belonged exclusively to the
barbarians--Twofold principle of the feeling of personal
independence--This feeling infinitely modified--Picture of barbarian
life--True character of individuality among the barbarians--Avowal of
M. Guizot--The feeling of individuality, according to the definition
of M. Guizot, belongs in a certain way to all the ancient nations,
118
CHAPTER XXII.
HOW THE INDIVIDUAL BECAME ABSORBED BY THE ANCIENT SOCIETY.
Respect for _man_ unknown to the ancients--What has been seen
in modern revolutions--Tyranny of public power over private
interests--Explanation of a twofold phenomenon, which presents itself
to us in antiquity and in modern societies not Christian--Opinion of
Aristotle--Remarkable characteristic of modern democracy, 126
CHAPTER XXIII.
OF THE PROGRESS OF INDIVIDUALITY UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF CATHOLICITY.
The feeling of true independence was possessed by the faithful of the
primitive Church--Error of M. Guizot on this point: 1st, dignity of
conscience sustained by the Christian society; 2d, feeling of duty;
language of St. Cyprian; 3d, development of the interior life; 4th,
defence of free will by the Catholic Church--Conclusion, 131
CHAPTER XXIV.
OF THE FAMILY--MONOGAMY--MARRIAGE-TIE INDISSOLUBLE.
Woman ennobled by Catholicity alone--Practical means employed by
the Church to raise woman--Christian doctrine on the dignity of
woman--Monogamy--Different conduct of Catholicity and Protestantism on
this point--Firmness of Rome with respect to marriage--Effects of that
firmness--Doctrine of Luther--Indissolubility of marriage--Of divorce
among Protestants--Effects of Catholic doctrine with regard to this
sacrament, 135
CHAPTER XXV.
THE PASSION OF LOVE.
Pretended rigor of Catholicity with respect to unhappy marriages--Two
systems of governing the passions--Protestant system--Catholic
system--Examples--Passion of gambling--Explosion of the passions
in time of public troubles--Of the passion of love--Its
inconstancy--Marriage alone is not a sufficient control--What is
wanted to make it a control--Of the unity and fixity of Catholic
doctrine--Conclusion, 140
CHAPTER XXVI.
OF VIRGINITY IN ITS SOCIAL ASPECT.
Of the ennoblement of woman by virginity--Conduct of Protestantism on
this point--Close analysis of the heart of woman--Of virginity with
respect to population--England--Serious thoughts required for the mind
of woman--Salutary influence of monastic customs--General method of
appreciation, 146
CHAPTER XXVII.
OF CHIVALRY, AND THE MANNERS OF THE BARBARIANS IN THEIR INFLUENCE ON
THE CONDITION OF WOMAN.
The life of feudal lords according to M. Guizot--The passions and
faith in chivalry--Chivalry did not ennoble woman, it supposed her
to be ennobled--Of the respect of the Germans for woman--Analysis
of a passage of Tacitus--Reflections on that historian--It is
difficult thoroughly to understand the manners of the Germans--Action
of Catholicity--Important distinction between Christianity and
Catholicity--That the Germans of themselves were incapable of giving
dignity to woman, 150
CHAPTER XXVIII.
OF THE PUBLIC CONSCIENCE IN GENERAL.
What the public conscience is--Influence of the feelings on the
public conscience in general--Education contributes to form the
conscience--State of the public conscience in modern times--What has
been able to form the public conscience in Europe--Successive contests
maintained by Christian morality, 157
CHAPTER XXIX.
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PUBLIC CONSCIENCE ACCORDING TO
MONTESQUIEU--HONOR--VIRTUE.
Institution of censors according to Montesquieu--Two kinds of
prejudice in the author of the _Esprit des Lois_--He assigns
honor as the principle of monarchies, and virtue as that of
republics--Explanation of the feeling of honor--What is required
to strengthen this feeling--The censorial power replaced by the
religious--Examples--Contrasts, 161
CHAPTER XXX.
ON THE DIFFERENT INFLUENCE OF PROTESTANTISM AND CATHOLICITY ON THE
PUBLIC CONSCIENCE.
Catholicity considered as a creed--As an institution--Ideas, in
order to be efficacious, must be realized in an institution--What
Protestantism has done to destroy Christian morality--What it has
done to preserve it--What is the real power of preaching among
Protestants--Of the sacrament of penance with relation to the public
conscience--Of the degree to which the Catholic religion raises
morality--Of unity in the soul--Unity simplifies--Of the great
number of moralists within the bosom of the Catholic Church--Of the
peculiar force of ideas--Distinction between ideas with respect to
their peculiar force--Whether the human race is a faithful depositary
of the truth--How the truth has been preserved among the Jews--The
native power of Schools--Institutions are required, not only to
teach, but also to apply doctrines--Of the press with relation to the
preservation of ideas--Of intuition--Of discourses, 165
CHAPTER XXXI.
OF GENTLENESS OF MANNERS IN GENERAL.
Wherein gentleness of manners consists--Difference between gentle
and effeminate manners--Influence of the Catholic Church in
softening manners--Pagan and Christian societies--Slavery--Paternal
authority--Public games--Reflections on Spanish bull-fights, 172
CHAPTER XXXII.
OF THE AMELIORATION OF MANNERS BY THE ACTION OF THE CHURCH.
Elements adapted to perpetuate harshness of manners in the bosom of
modern society--Conduct of the Church in this respect--Remarkable
canons and facts--St. Ambrose and the Emperor Theodosius--The Truce of
God--Very remarkable regulations of the ecclesiastical authority on
this subject, 175
CHAPTER XXXIII.
OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC BENEFICENCE IN EUROPE.
Difference between Protestantism and Catholicity with respect to
public beneficence--Paradox of Montesquieu--Remarkable canons of the
Church--Injury done by Protestantism to the development of public
beneficence--The value of philanthropy, 184
CHAPTER XXXIV.
OF TOLERANCE IN MATTERS OF RELIGION.
The question of intolerance has been examined with bad faith--What
tolerance is--Tolerance of opinions--Of error--Tolerance in the
individual--With religious men--With unbelievers--Two kinds of
religious men--Two kinds of unbelievers--Tolerance in society--What
is its origin?--Source of the tolerance which prevails in society at
present, 189
CHAPTER XXXV.
OF THE RIGHT OF COERCION IN GENERAL.
Intolerance is a general fact in history--Dialogues with the
partisans of universal tolerance--Does there exist a right
of punishing doctrines?--Researches into the origin of that
right--Disastrous influence of Protestantism and infidelity in this
matter--Of the importance which Catholicity attaches to the sin of
heresy--Inconsistency of certain timid Voltairians--Another reflection
on the right of punishing doctrines--Résumé, 196
CHAPTER XXXVI.
OF THE INQUISITION IN SPAIN.
Institutions and legislation founded on intolerance--Causes of the
rigor displayed in the early times of the Inquisition--Three epochs in
the history of the Inquisition in Spain: against the Jews and Moors;
against the Protestants; against the unbelievers--Severities of the
Inquisition--Causes of those severities--Conduct of the Popes in that
matter--Mildness of the Roman Inquisition--The intolerance of Luther
with respect to the Jews--The Moors and Moriscoes, 203
CHAPTER XXXVII.
SECOND PERIOD OF THE INQUISITION IN SPAIN.
New Inquisition attributed to Philip II.--Opinion of M.
Lacordaire--Prejudice against Philip II.--Observations on the work
called _Inquisition Dévoilée_--Rapid _coup d'œil_ at the
second epoch of the Inquisition--Trial of Carranza--Observation on
this trial, and on the personal qualities of the illustrious
accused--Why there is so much partiality against Philip II.--Reflections
on the policy of that monarch--Singular anecdote of a preacher who was
compelled to retract--Reflections on the influence of the spirit of the
age, 210
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN THEMSELVES.
Conduct of Protestantism with respect to religious
institutions--Whether these institutions have been of importance
in history--Sophism on the subject of the real origin of religious
institutions--Their correct definition--Of association among the early
faithful--The faithful dispersed in the deserts--Relations between the
Papacy and religious institutions--Of an essential want of the human
heart--Of Christian pensiveness--Of the need of associations for the
practice of perfection--Of vows--A vow is the most perfect act of
liberty--True notion of liberty, 219
CHAPTER XXXIX.
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN HISTORY--THE EARLY SOLITARIES.
Character of religious institutions in a historical point of view--The
Roman empire--The barbarians--The early Christians--Condition of the
Church when Christianity ascended the throne of the Cæsars--Life of
the fathers of the desert--Influence of the solitaries on philosophy
and manners--The heroism of penance saves morality--The most
corrupting climate chosen for the triumph of the most austere virtues,
229
CHAPTER XL.
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN THE EAST.
Influence of monasteries in the East--Why civilization triumphed
in the West and perished in the East--Influence of the Eastern
monasteries on Arabian civilization, 234
CHAPTER XLI.
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS IN THE HISTORY OF THE WEST.
Peculiar character of religious institutions in the West--St.
Benedict--Struggle of the monks against the decline of things--Origin
of monastic property--The possessions of the monks serve to
create respect for property--Population becomes spread over the
country--Science and letters in cloisters Gratian--arouses the study
of law, 238
CHAPTER XLII.
OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS DURING THE SECOND HALF OF THE MIDDLE AGES IN
THE WEST--THE MILITARY ORDERS.
Character of the military orders--Opinion of the Crusades--The
foundation of the military orders is a continuation of the Crusades,
242
CHAPTER XLIII.
CONTINUATION OF THE SAME SUBJECT--EUROPE IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY.
Transformation of the monastic spirit in the thirteenth
century--Religious institutions arise every where--Character of
European opposed to that of other civilizations--Mixture of various
elements in the spirit of the thirteenth century--Semi-barbarous
society--Christianity and barbarism--A delusion common in the study
of history--Condition of Europe at the beginning of the thirteenth
century--Wars become more popular--Why the intellectual movement
began in Spain sooner than in the rest of Europe--Ebullition of
evil during the course of the twelfth century--Tanchème--Eon--The
Manichees--Vaudois--Religious movement at the beginning of the
thirteenth century--The mendicant and preaching orders--The character
of these orders--Their influence--Their relations with the Papacy,
244
CHAPTER XLIV.
RELIGIOUS ORDERS FOR THE REDEMPTION OF CAPTIVES.
Multitude of Christians reduced to slavery--Religious orders for the
redemption of captives were necessary--The Order of the Trinity and
that of Mercy--St. Peter Armengol, 256
CHAPTER XLV.
UNIVERSAL ADVANCE OF CIVILIZATION IMPEDED BY PROTESTANTISM.
Effects of Protestantism on the progress of civilization in the world,
beginning with the sixteenth century--What enabled civilization,
during the middle ages, to triumph over barbarism--Picture of Europe
at the beginning of the sixteenth century--The civilizing missions
of the 16th century interrupted by the schism of Luther--Why the
action of the Church on barbarous nations has lost power during
three centuries--Whether the Christianity of our days is less
adapted to propagate the faith than that of the early ages of the
Church--Christian missions in the early times of the Church--What the
real mission of Luther has been, 260
CHAPTER XLVI.
THE JESUITS.
Their importance in the history of European civilization--Causes of
the hatred which has been excited against them--Character of the
Jesuits--Contradiction of M. Guizot on this subject--Whether it be
true, as M. Guizot says, that the Jesuits have destroyed nations in
Spain--Facts and dates--Unjust accusations against the Company of
Jesus, 268
CHAPTER XLVII.
THE FUTURE OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS--THEIR PRESENT NECESSITY.
Present state of religious institutions--Picture of society--Inability
of industry and commerce to satisfy the heart of man--Condition
of minds with respect to religion--Religious institutions will
be necessary to save existing society--Nothing fixed in that
society--Means are wanting for social organization--The march of
European nations has been perverted--Physical means of restraining the
masses--Moral means are required--Religious institutions reconcilable
with the advancement of modern times, 274
CHAPTER XLVIII.
RELIGION AND LIBERTY.
Rousseau--The Protestants Divine law--Origin of power--False
interpretation of the divine law--St. John Chrysostom--On paternal
authority--Relations between paternal authority and civil power,
281
CHAPTER XLIX.
THE ORIGIN OF SOCIETY, ACCORDING TO CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS.
Doctrines of theologians on the origin of society--The character
of Catholic theologians compared to that of modern writers--St.
Thomas--Bellarmin--Suarez--St. Alphonsus de Liguori--Father
Concina--Billuart--The _Compendium_ of Salamanca, 288
CHAPTER L.
OF DIVINE LAW, ACCORDING TO CATHOLIC DOCTORS.
On the divine law--Divine origin of civil power--In what manner
God communicates this power--Rousseau--On pacts--The right of life
and death--The right of war--Power must necessarily emanate from
God--Puffendorf--Hobbes, 298
CHAPTER LI.
THE TRANSMISSION OF POWER, ACCORDING TO CATHOLIC DOCTORS.
_Direct_ or _indirect_ communication of civil power--The
distinction between the two opinions important in some respects; in
others, not so--Why Catholic theologians have so zealously maintained
the doctrine of mediate communication, 305
CHAPTER LII.
ON THE FREEDOM OF LANGUAGE UNDER THE SPANISH MONARCHY.
Influence of doctrines on society--Flattery lavished on power--Danger
of this flattery--Liberty of speech on this point in Spain during the
last three centuries--Mariana--Saavedra--In the absence of religion
and morality, the most rigorous political doctrines are incapable
of saving society--Why the conservative schools of our days are
powerless--Seneca--Cicero--Hobbes--Bellarmin, 311
CHAPTER LIII.
OF THE FACULTIES OF THE CIVIL POWER.
Of the faculties of civil power--Calumnies of the enemies of the
Church--Definition of _law_ according to St. Thomas--General reason
and general will--The venerable Palafox--Hobbes--Grotius--The
doctrines of certain Protestants favorable to despotism--Justification
of the Catholic Church, 317
CHAPTER LIV.
ON RESISTANCE TO THE CIVIL POWER.
Of resistance to the civil power--Parallel between Protestantism
and Catholicity on this point--Unfounded apprehensions of certain
minds--Attitude of revolutions in this age--The principle
inculcated by Catholicity on the obligation of obeying the lawful
authorities--Preliminary questions--Difference between the two
powers--Conduct of Catholicity and Protestantism with regard to the
separation of the two powers--The independence of the spiritual
power a guarantee of liberty to the people--Extremes which meet--The
doctrine of St. Thomas on obedience, 324
CHAPTER LV.
ON RESISTANCE TO DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS.
Governments existing merely _de facto_--Right of resistance to
these governments--Napoleon and the Spanish nation--Fallacy of the
doctrine establishing the obligation of obedience to mere _de facto_
governments--Investigation of certain difficulties--Accomplished
facts--How we are to understand the respect due to accomplished facts,
330
CHAPTER LVI.
HOW IT IS ALLOWED TO RESIST THE CIVIL POWER.
On resistance to lawful authority--The doctrines of the Council
of Constance on the assassination of a king--A reflection on the
inviolability of kings--Extreme cases--Doctrine of St. Thomas of
Aquin, Cardinal Bellarmin, Suarez, and other theologians--The Abbé
de Lamennais' errors--He is wrong in imagining that his doctrine,
condemned by the Pope, is the same as St. Thomas of Aquin's--A
parallel between the doctrines of St. Thomas and those of the Abbé
de Lamennais--A word on the temporal power of the Popes--Ancient
doctrines on resistance to power--Language of the Counsellors of
Barcelona--The doctrine of certain theologians on the case of the
Sovereign Pontiff's falling into heresy in his private capacity--Why
the Church has been calumniously accused of being sometimes favorable
to despotism, and sometimes to anarchy, 336
CHAPTER LVII.
ON POLITICAL SOCIETY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
The Church and political forms--Protestantism and liberty--Language of
M. Guizot--The state of the question better defined--Europe at the end
of the fifteenth century--Social aristocracy, and democracy, 343
CHAPTER LVIII.
ON MONARCHY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
The idea entertained of monarchy at this period--The application of
this idea--Difference between monarchy and despotism--The nature of
monarchy at the commencement of the sixteenth century--Its relations
with the Church, 346
CHAPTER LIX.
ON ARISTOCRACY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
The nobility and the clergy--The differences between these two
aristocracies--The nobility and monarchy--Differences between them--An
intermediate class between the throne and the people--The causes of
the fall of the nobility, 348
CHAPTER LX.
ON DEMOCRACY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.
The opinion entertained of democracy--The prevailing doctrines
of that epoch--The doctrines of Aristotle neutralised by the
teaching of Christianity--On castes--A passage from M. Guizot on
castes--Influence of the celibacy of the clergy in preventing an
hereditary succession--The consequences resulting from a married
clergy--Catholicity and the people--Development of the industrial
classes in Europe--The Hanseatic Confederation--_Establishment of
the trades-corporations of Paris_--Industrial movement in Italy and
Spain--Calvinism and the democratic element--Protestantism and the
democrats of the sixteenth century, 350
CHAPTER LXI.
VALUE OF DIFFERENT POLITICAL FORMS--CHARACTER OF MONARCHY IN EUROPE.
Value of political forms--Catholicity and liberty--Monarchy was
essential--Character of European monarchy--Difference between
Europe and Asia--Quotation from Count de Maistre--An institution
for the limiting of power--Political liberty not indebted to
Protestantism--Influence of Councils--The aristocracy of talent
encouraged by the Church, 356
CHAPTER LXII.
HOW MONARCHY WAS STRENGTHENED IN EUROPE.
Monarchy in the sixteenth century is strengthened in Europe--Its
preponderance over free institutions--Why the word _liberty_ is a
scandal to some people--Protestantism contributed to the destruction
of popular institutions, 361
CHAPTER LXIII.
TWO SORTS OF DEMOCRACY.
Two sorts of democracy--Their parallel march in the history
of Europe--Their characters--Their causes and effects--Why
absolutism became necessary in Europe--Historical
facts--France--England--Sweden--Denmark--Germany, 364
CHAPTER LXIV.
CONTEST BETWEEN THE THREE SOCIAL ELEMENTS.
Contest between monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy--How monarchy
came to prevail--Fatal effects of the weakening of the political
influence of the clergy--Advantages which might have arisen from this
influence to popular institutions--Relations of the clergy with all
powers and classes of society, 370
CHAPTER LXV.
POLITICAL DOCTRINES BEFORE THE APPEARANCE OF PROTESTANTISM.
Parallel between the political doctrines of the eighteenth century,
those of modern publicists, and those which prevailed in Europe before
the appearance of Protestantism--Protestantism has prevented the
homogeneity of European civilization--Historical proofs, 374
CHAPTER LXVI.
OF POLITICAL DOCTRINES IN SPAIN.
Catholicity and politics in Spain--Real state of the question--Five
causes contributed to the overthrow of popular institutions in
Spain--Difference between ancient and modern liberty--The _Communeros_
of Castille--The policy of her kings--Ferdinand the Catholic and
Ximenes--Charles V.--Philip II., 377
CHAPTER LXVII.
POLITICAL LIBERTY AND RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE.
Political liberty and religious intolerance--Europe was developed
under the exclusive influence of Catholicity--Picture of Europe from
the eleventh to the fourteenth century--Condition of the social
problem at the end of the fifteenth century--Temporal power of the
Popes--Its character, origin, and effects, 382
CHAPTER LXVIII.
UNITY IN FAITH RECONCILED WITH POLITICAL LIBERTY.
It is false that unity of faith is opposed to political
liberty--Impiety is allied with liberty or despotism, according to
circumstances--Modern revolutions--Difference between the revolution
of the United States and that of France--Pernicious effects of the
French revolution--Liberty impossible without morality--Remarkable
passage from St. Augustin on forms of government, 388
CHAPTER LXIX.
INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF CATHOLICITY.
Catholicity in its relations with intellectual development--What
is the influence of the principle of submission to
authority--What are the effects of this principle with
respect to all the sciences--Parallel between ancients and
moderns--God--Man--Society--Nature, 392
CHAPTER LXX.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT.
Historical investigation of the influence of Catholicity on the
development of the human mind--Refutation of one of M. Guizot's
opinions--John Erigena--Roscelin and Abelard--St. Anselm, 398
CHAPTER LXXI.
RELIGION AND THE HUMAN INTELLECT IN EUROPE.
Religion and the human intellect in Europe--Difference between the
intellectual development of the nations of antiquity and those
of Europeans--Causes that have accelerated this development in
Europe--Origin of the spirit of subtilty--Service which the Church
rendered to the human mind by her opposition to the subtilties of the
innovators--Parallel between Roscelin and St. Anselm--Reflections on
St. Bernard--St. Thomas of Aquin--Advantage of his dictatorship in the
schools--Advent of St. Thomas in the middle ages of immense advantage
to me human mind, 404
CHAPTER LXXII.
PROGRESS OF THE HUMAN MIND FROM THE ELEVENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT
TIME.
Progress of the human mind from the eleventh century to our own
times--Different phases--Protestantism and Catholicity in their
relations to learning, to criticism, to the learned languages, to the
foundation of universities, to the progress of literature and the
arts, to mysticism, to high philosophy, to metaphysics, to ethics, to
religious philosophy, and to the philosophy of history, 412
CHAPTER LXXIII.
SUMMARY OF THE WORK--DECLARATION OF THE AUTHOR.
Summary of the work--The author submits it to the judgment of the
Roman Church, 419
NOTES
APPENDIX
INDEX
TABLE OF NOTES.
NOTE PAGE
1 421. Gibbon and Bossuet's History of the Variations.
2 421. Intolerance of Luther and the other Coryphæi of
Protestantism.
3 421. Origin of the name Protestantism.
4 422. Observations on names.
5 422. Of abuses in the Church.
6 423. Of the unity and harmonious action of Catholicism--Happy
idea of St. Francis of Sales.
7 423. Acknowledgments of the most distinguished Protestants with
regard to its weakness--Luther, Melancthon, Beza, Calvin,
Grotius, Papin, Puffendorf and Leibnitz--Of a posthumous
work by Leibnitz on religion.
8 424. On human knowledge--Louis Vives.
9 425. On mathematics--Eximeno, a Spanish Jesuit.
10 425. Heresies of the early ages--their character.
11 425. Superstition and fanaticism of Protestantism--Luther's devil,
Zwinglius's phantom, Melancthon's prognostics, Mathias
Harlem, the Tailor of Leyden, King of Sion; Hermann, Nicholas
Hacket, and others, visionaries and fanatics.
12 427. Visions of Catholics--St. Theresa, her visions.
13 428. Bad faith of the founders of Protestantism--Passages proving
this--Ravages committed by incredulity after that
time--Gruet--Remarkable passages from Montaigne.
14 429. Extravagance of the early heresies, a proof of the state of
knowledge in those times.
15 430. Canons and other documents which shew the solicitude of the
Church to improve the lot of slaves, and the various means
which she used to complete the abolition of slavery.
§ 1. Canons intended to improve the lot of slaves.
§ 2. Canons intended to defend the freed, and to protect
those who were recommended to the Church.
§ 3. Canons and other documents relating to the redemption
of captives.
§ 4. Canons relating to the protection of the freed.
436. § 5. Canons concerning the slaves of Jews.
§ 6. Canons concerning the enfranchisement of the slaves of
the Church.
§ 7. Conduct of the Church with regard to modern
slavery--Apostolic letters of St. Gregory XVI.--Slave
trade--Doctrine, conduct, and influence of the Church
with regard to the abolition of the trade, and of
slavery in the Colonies--Passage from Robertson.
16 442. Doctrines of Plato and Aristotle touching infanticide--Their
doctrine on the rights of society.
17 444. Degradation of woman in ancient times, especially in Rome.
18 444. The Germans of Tacitus judged according to subsequent events.
19 445. Corruption of ancient manners.
20 445. Different opinions of religion and philosophy on the power of
ideas--How far it is true that every idea requires an
institution.
21 446. Christianity is still in our days the source of mildness of
manners.
22 447. Influence of the Church on barbarian legislation--Councils of
Toledo--What the indulgence of the criminal code among the
barbarians proves.
23 449. Constant intervention of the Church in the administration of
public beneficence--Regulations of the Council of Trent on
this subject--Property of hospitals considered as that of the
Church.
24 450. Reference to the following note.
25 450. Distinction between civil and religious intolerance--Error of
Rousseau on this point--False doctrine of the _Contrat
Social_.
26 452. Passages from old laws relative to the Inquisition--Pragmatic
sanction of Ferdinand and Isabella--Laws of Philip II. and
III.--Pragmatic sanction of Ferdinand and Isabella concerning
the relations of the Spanish Inquisition with Rome--Passage
from Don Antonio Perez, which mentions the anecdote of the
preacher at Madrid--Letter from Phillip II. to Arias Montano,
on the subject of the library of the Escurial.
26 456. (_Appendix._) A few words on Puigblanch, Villeneuve, and
Llorente.
27 458. Religious institutions in an historical point of view--Last
_coup-d'œil_ at their origin and development--Details with
respect to the vow of chastity which virgins and widows made
in the early ages of the Church.
28 459. Remarkable texts explaining the passage of St. Paul in the
13th chapter of his Epistle to the Romans--Cicero--Horace.
29 462. A remarkable fact.
30 463. Quotations from P. Fr. John de Ste.-Marie, and from
P. Zeballos.
31 470. St. Thomas reminds princes of their duties.
32 471. The opinion of D. Felix d'Amat, bishop of Palmyra, on the
obedience due to _de facto_ governments.
33 471. Remarkable passages from St. Thomas and Suarez, on the
disputes which may arise between governors and the
governed--Father Marquez on the same subject.
34 475. Charter of _Hermandad_ between the kingdoms of Leon and
Galicia and that of Castille, for the preservation and
defence of their _fueros_ and liberties.
35 476. A remarkable passage from Capmany on the organization of the
industrial classes--The origin and salutary effects of the
institution of trades-corporation.
36 480. Reflections of Count de Maistre on the causes which render
the celebration of General Councils less frequent.
37 480. Indication of historical sources for the confirmation of
certain facts.
38 480. Texts of St. Thomas on political forms--Other texts of
St. Thomas to prove that the law, and not the will of man,
should govern--Opinions of P. Mariana--Opinions of the
venerable Palafox on the subject of imposts, taken from his
Memoir to the King--Severe language of the same author
against tyranny and those who advise or excuse it--Passage
from P. Marquez on the right of levying tributes in general;
its particular application to Castile--The opinion of the
same author relative to the right of the supreme authority to
the property of its subjects--A case in which, according to
him, that authority may dispose of this property.
39 484. Reference to historical sources to ascertain the march of the
development of monarchical power in the different provinces
of Spain.
40 484. A just observation of Count de Maistre on the conduct of the
Popes compared to that of other sovereigns.
41 485. Passages in which St. Anselm expounds his views on religious
subjects--Intellectual movement arising in the bosom of the
Church without transgressing the bounds of faith--Another
passage proving that the demonstration applied by Descartes
to the existence of God had been discovered by
St. Anselm--Corroborative Documents in support of a
refutation of M. Guizot's errors on the doctrines of Abelard.
PROTESTANTISM COMPARED WITH CATHOLICITY.
CHAPTER I.
NAME AND NATURE OF PROTESTANTISM.
There is a fact in existence among civilized nations, very important
on account of the nature of the things which it affects--a fact of
transcendent importance, on account of the number, variety, and
consequence of its influences--a fact extremely interesting, because it
is connected with the principal events of modern history. This fact is
Protestantism.
Like a clap of thunder, it attracted at once the attention of all
Europe; on one side it spread alarm, and on the other excited the most
lively sympathy: it grew so rapidly, that its adversaries had not time
to strangle it in its cradle. Scarcely had it begun to exist, and
already all hope of stopping, or even restraining it, was gone; when,
emboldened by being treated with respect and consideration, it became
every day more daring; if exasperated by rigour, it openly resisted
measures of coercion, or redoubled and concentrated its forces, to
make more vigorous attacks. Discussions, the profound investigations
and scientific methods which were used in combating it, contributed to
develop the spirit of inquiry, and served as vehicles to propagate its
ideas.
By creating new and prevailing interests, it made itself powerful
protectors; by throwing all the passions into a state of fury, it
aroused them in its favor. It availed itself, by turns, of stratagem,
force, seduction, or violence, according to the exigencies of times and
circumstances. It attempted to make its way in all directions; either
destroying impediments, or taking advantage of them, if they were
capable of being turned to account.
When introduced into a country, it never rested until it had obtained
guarantees for its continued existence; and it succeeded in doing so
everywhere. After having obtained vast establishments in Europe--which
it still retains--it was transported into other parts of the world, and
infused into the veins of simple and unsuspecting nations.
In order to appreciate a fact at its just value, to embrace it in
all its relations, and to distinguish properly between them, it is
necessary to examine whether the constituting principle of the fact can
be ascertained, or at least whether we can observe in its appearance
any characteristic trait capable of revealing its inward nature.
This examination is very difficult when we have to do with a fact of
the kind and importance of that which now occupies our attention. In
matters of this sort, numbers of opinions accumulate in the course of
time, in favor of all which arguments have been sought. The inquirer,
in the midst of so many and such various objects, is perplexed,
disconcerted, and confounded; and if he wish to place himself in a
more advantageous point of view, he finds the ground so covered with
fragments, that he cannot make his way without risk of losing himself
at every step.
The first glance which we give to Protestantism, whether we consider
its actual condition, or whether we regard the various phases of its
history, shows us that it is very difficult to find any thing constant
in it, any thing which can be assigned as its constituent character.
Uncertain in its opinions, it modifies them continually, and changes
them in a thousand ways. Vague in its tendencies, and fluctuating in
its desires, it attempts every form, and essays every road. It can
never attain to a well-defined existence; and we see it every moment
enter new paths, to lose itself in new labyrinths.
Catholic controversialists have pursued and assailed it in every
way; ask them what has been the result? They will tell you that they
had to contend with a new Proteus, which always escaped the fatal
blow by changing its form. If you wish to assail the doctrines of
Protestantism, you do not know where to direct your attacks, for
they are unknown to you, and even to itself. On this side it is
invulnerable, because it has no tangible body. Thus, no more powerful
argument has ever been urged, than that of the immortal Bishop of
Meaux--viz. "You change; and that which changes is not the truth." An
argument much feared by Protestantism, and with justice; because all
the various forms which are assumed to evade its force, only serve to
strengthen it. How just is the expression of that great man! At the
very title of his book, Protestantism must tremble: The History of the
Variations! A history of variations must be a history of error. (See
note [1] at the end of the vol.)
These unceasing changes, which we ought not to be surprised at finding
in Protestantism, because they essentially belong to it, show us
that it is not in possession of the truth; they show us also, that
its moving principle is not a principle of life, but an element of
dissolution. It has been called upon, and up to this time in vain, to
fix itself, and to present a compact and uniform body. How can that be
fixed, which is, by its nature, kept floating about in the air? How can
a solid body be formed of an element, the essential tendency of which
is towards an incessant division of particles, by diminishing their
reciprocal affinity, and increasing their repellent force?
It will easily be seen that I speak of the right of private judgment in
matters of faith, whether it be looked upon as a matter of human reason
alone, or as an individual inspiration from heaven.
If there be any thing constant in Protestantism, it is undoubtedly
the substitution of private judgment for public and lawful authority.
This is always found in union with it, and is, properly speaking,
its fundamental principle: it is the only point of contact among the
various Protestant sects,--the basis of their mutual resemblance. It is
very remarkable that this exists, for the most part, unintentionally,
and sometimes against their express wishes.
However lamentable and disastrous this principle may be, if the
coryphæi of Protestantism had made it their rallying point, and had
constantly acted up to it in theory and practice, they would have
been consistent in error. When men saw them cast into one abyss after
another, they would have recognised a system,--false undoubtedly;
but, at any rate, a system. As it is, it has not been even that: if
you examine the words and the acts of the first Reformers, you will
find that they made use of this principle as a means of resisting
the authority which controlled them, but that they never dreamed of
establishing it permanently; that if they labored to upset lawful
authority, it was for the purpose of usurping the command themselves;
that is to say, that they followed, in this respect, the example
of revolutionists of all kinds, of all ages, and of all countries.
Everybody knows how far Luther carried his fanatical intolerance; he
who could not bear the slightest contradiction, either from his own
disciples or anybody else, without giving way to the most senseless
fits of passion, and the most unworthy outrages. Henry VIII. of
England, who founded there what is called the liberty of thinking, sent
to the scaffold those who did not think as he did; and it was at the
instigation of Calvin that Servetus was burnt alive at Geneva.
I insist upon this point, because it seems to me to be of great
importance. Men are but too much inclined to pride; and if they heard
it constantly repeated, without contradiction, that the innovators
of the sixteenth century proclaimed the freedom of thought, a secret
interest might be excited in their favor; their violent declamations
might be regarded as the expressions of a generous movement, and
their efforts as a noble attempt to assert the rights of intellectual
freedom. Let it be known, never to be forgotten, that if these men
proclaimed the principle of free examination, it was for the purpose of
making use of it against legitimate authority; but that they attempted,
as soon as they could, to impose upon others the yoke of their own
opinions. Their constant endeavour was, to destroy the authority which
came from God, in order to establish their own upon its ruins. It is
a painful necessity to be obliged to give proofs of this assertion;
not because they are difficult to find, but because one cannot adduce
the most incontestable of them without calling to mind words and deeds
which not only cover with disgrace the founders of Protestantism, but
are of such a nature, that they cannot be mentioned without a blush on
the cheek, or written without a stain upon the paper.[2]
Protestantism, when viewed in a mass, appears only a shapeless
collection of innumerable sects, all opposed to each other, and
agreeing only in one point, viz. in protesting against the authority
of the Church. We only find among them particular and exclusive names,
commonly taken from the names of their founders; in vain have they made
a thousand efforts to give themselves a general name expressive of a
positive idea; they are still called after the manner of philosophical
sects. Lutherans, Calvinists, Zuinglians, Anglicans, Socinians,
Arminians, Anabaptists, all these names, of which I could furnish an
endless host, only serve to exhibit the narrowness of the circle in
which these sects are enclosed; and it is only necessary to pronounce
them, to show that they contain nothing universal, nothing great.
Everybody who knows any thing of the Christian religion must be
convinced by this fact alone, that these sects are not truly Christian.
But what occurred when Protestantism attempted to take a general name,
is singularly remarkable. If you examine its history, you will see
that all the names which it attempted to give itself failed, if they
contained any positive idea, or any mark of Christianity; but that it
adopted a name taken by chance at the Diet of Spires; a name which
carries with it its own condemnation, because it is repugnant to the
origin, to the spirit, to the maxims, to the entire history of the
Christian religion; a name which does not express that unity--that
union which is inseparably connected with the Christian name; a name
which is peculiarly becoming to it, which all the world gives to it by
acclamation, which is truly its own--viz. _Protestantism_.[3]
Within the vast limits marked out by this name, there is room for
every error and for every sect. You may deny with the Lutherans the
liberty of man, or renew with the Arminians the errors of Pelagius. You
may admit with some that real presence, which you are free to reject
with the Calvinists and Zuinglians; you may join with the Socinians
in denying the divinity of Jesus Christ; you may attach yourself to
Episcopalians, to Puritans, or, if you please, to the extravagances
of the Quakers; it is of no consequence, for you always remain a
Protestant, for you protest against the authority of the Church; your
field is so extensive, that you can hardly escape from it, however
great may be your wanderings; it contains all the vast extent that we
behold on coming forth from the gates of the Holy City.[4]
CHAPTER II.
CAUSES OF PROTESTANTISM.
What, then, were the causes of the appearance of Protestantism in
Europe, of its development, and of its success? This is a question
well worthy of being examined to the bottom, because it will lead us
to inquire into the origin of this great evil, and will put us in a
condition to form the best idea of this phenomenon, so often but so
imperfectly described.
It would be unreasonable to look for the causes of an event of this
nature and importance, in circumstances either trivial in themselves,
or circumscribed by places and events of a limited kind. It is a
mistake to suppose that vast results can be produced by trifling
causes; and if it be true that great events sometimes have their
commencement in little ones, it is no less certain that the commencing
point is not the cause; and that to be the commencement of a thing, and
to be its real cause, are expressions of a widely different meaning.
A spark produces a dreadful conflagration, but it is because it falls
upon a heap of inflammable materials. That which is general must have
general causes; and that which is lasting and deeply rooted must have
lasting and profound causes.
This law is true alike in the moral as in the physical order; but its
applications cannot be perceived without great difficulty, especially
in the moral order, where things of great importance are sometimes
clothed in a mean exterior; where each effect is found allied with so
many causes at once, connected with them by ties so delicate, that,
possibly, the most attentive and piercing eye may miss altogether, or
regard as a trifle, that which perhaps has produced very great results:
trifling things, on the other hand, are frequently so covered with
glitter, tinsel, and parade, that it is very easy to be deceived by
them. We are always too much inclined to judge by appearances.
It will appear from these principles, that I am not disposed to
give great importance to the rivalry excited by the preaching of
indulgences, or to the excesses which may have been committed by some
inferiors in this matter; these things may have been an occasion, a
pretext, a signal to commence the contest, but they were of too little
importance in themselves to put the world in flames. There would be,
perhaps, more apparent plausibility in seeking for the causes of
Protestantism in the characters and positions of the first reformers;
but this also would be unsatisfactory.
People lay great stress on the violence and fury of the writings and
speeches of Luther, and show how apt this savage eloquence was to
inflame men's minds, and drag them into the new errors by the deadly
hatred against Rome with which it inspired them. Too much stress also
is laid on the sophistical art, the order and elegance of the style
of Calvin; qualities which served to give an appearance of regularity
to the shapeless mass of new errors, and make them more acceptable
to men of good taste. The talents and other qualities of the various
innovators are described in the same way with more or less truth.
I will not deny to Luther, Calvin, and the other founders of
Protestantism, the titles on which their sad celebrity is founded;
but I venture to assert that we cannot attribute to their personal
qualities the principal influence upon the development of this evil,
without palpably mistaking and underrating the importance of the evil
itself, and forgetting the instructions of universal history.
If we examine these men with impartiality, we shall find that their
qualities were not greater than those of other sectarian leaders, if
so great. Their talents, their learning, and their knowledge, have
passed through the crucible of criticism, and there is, even among
Protestants, no well-instructed and impartial person who does not now
consider the extravagant eulogiums which have been lavished upon them,
as the exaggerations of party. They are classed among the number of
those turbulent men who are well fitted to excite revolutions; but
the history of all times and countries, and the experience of every
day, teach that men of this kind are not uncommon, and that they
arise everywhere when a sad combination of events affords them a fit
opportunity.
When causes more in proportion to Protestantism, by their extent
and importance, are sought for, two are commonly pointed out: the
necessity of reform, and the spirit of liberty. "There were numerous
abuses," says one party; "legitimate reform was neglected: this
negligence produced revolution." "The human intellect was in fetters,"
says another; "the mind longed to break its chains; Protestantism
was only a grand effort for the freedom of human thought, a great
movement towards liberating the human mind." It is true, that these
two opinions point out causes of great importance and of wide extent:
both are well adapted to make partisans. The one, by establishing the
necessity of reform, opens a wide field for the censure of neglected
laws and relaxed morals; this theme always finds sympathy in the heart
of man,--indulgent towards its own defects, but stern and inexorable
towards the faults of others. With respect to the other opinion, which
raises the cry of the movement of religious liberty and the freedom of
the human mind, it is sure to be widely adopted: there are always a
thousand echoes to a cry which flatters our pride.
I do not deny that a reform was necessary; to be convinced of this, I
need only glance at history, and listen to the complaints of several
great men, justly regarded by the Church as among the most cherished
of her sons. I read in the first decree of the Council of Trent, that
one of the objects of the Council was the reform of the Christian
clergy and people; I learn from the mouth of Pius IV., when confirming
the said Council, that one of the objects for which it was assembled,
was the correction of morals, and the re-establishment of discipline.
Notwithstanding all this, I am not inclined to give to abuses so
much influence as has been attributed to them. I must also say, that
it appears to me that we give a very bad solution of the question,
when, to show the real cause of the evil, we insist on the fatal
results produced by these abuses. These words also, "a new movement
of liberty," appear to me altogether insufficient. I shall say, then,
with freedom, in spite of my respect for those who entertain the first
opinion, and my esteem for the talents of those who refer all to the
spirit of liberty, that I cannot find in either that analysis, at once
philosophical and historical, which, without wandering from the ground
of history, examines facts, clears them up, shows their inward nature,
their relations and connections.
If men have wandered so much in the definition and explanation of
Protestantism, it is because they have not sufficiently observed that
it is not only a fact common to all ages of the history of the Church,
but that its importance and its particular characteristics are owing
to the epoch when it arose. This simple consideration, founded on
the constant testimony of history, clears up every thing; we have no
longer to seek in the doctrines of Protestantism for any thing singular
or extraordinary; all its characteristics prove that it was born in
Europe, and in the sixteenth century. I shall develop these ideas, not
by fanciful reasonings or gratuitous suppositions, but by adducing
facts which nobody can deny.
It is indisputable that the principle of submission to authority in
matters of faith has always encountered a vigorous resistance in the
human mind. I shall not point out here the causes of this resistance;
I propose to do so in the course of this work; I shall content myself
at present with stating this fact, and reminding those who may be
inclined to call it in question, that the history of the Church has
always been accompanied by the history of heresies. This fact has
presented different phases according to the changes of time and place.
Sometimes making a rude mixture of Judaism and Christianity, sometimes
combining the doctrines of Jesus Christ with the dreams of the East, or
corrupting the purity of faith by the subtilties and chicaneries of
Grecian sophistry; this fact presents us with as many different aspects
as there are conditions of the mind of man. But we always find in it
two general characteristics, which clearly show that it has always had
the same origin, notwithstanding the variation in its object and in the
nature of its results: these two characteristics are, hatred of the
authority of the Church, and the spirit of sect.
In all ages sects have arisen, opposing the authority of the Church,
and establishing as dogmas the errors of their founders: it was
natural for the same thing to happen in the sixteenth century. Now,
if that age had been an exception to the general rule, it seems to
me, looking at the nature of the human mind, that we should have
had to answer this very difficult question, How is it possible that
no sect appeared in that age? I say, then, error having once arisen
in the sixteenth century, no matter what may have been its origin,
occasion, and pretext--a certain number of followers having assembled
around its banner--Protestantism forthwith presents itself before me
in all its extent, with its transcendent importance, its divisions,
and subdivisions; I see it, with boldness and energy, making a general
attack on all the doctrines and discipline taught and observed
by the Church. In place of Luther, Zuinglius, and Calvin, let us
suppose Arius, Nestorius, and Pelagius; in place of the errors of the
former, let them teach the errors of the latter; it will all lead
to the same result. The errors will excite sympathy; they will find
defenders; they will animate enthusiasts; they will spread, they will
be propagated with the rapidity of fire, they will be diffused, they
will throw sparks in all directions; they will all be defended with
a show of knowledge and erudition; creeds will change unceasingly; a
thousand professions of faith will be drawn up; the liturgy will be
altered,--will be destroyed; the bonds of discipline will be broken; we
shall have to sum up all in one word, Protestantism.
How did it happen that the evil in the sixteenth century was
necessarily so extensive, so great, and so important? It was because
the society of that time was different from any other that had preceded
it; that which at other times would only have produced a partial fire,
necessarily caused in the sixteenth century a frightful conflagration.
Europe was then composed of a number of immense states, cast, so to
speak, in the same mould, resembling each other in ideas, manners, laws
and institutions, drawn together incessantly by an active communication
which was kept up alternately by rival and common interests; knowledge
found in the Latin language an easy means of diffusion; in fine, most
important of all, there had become general over all Europe a rapid
means of disseminating ideas and feelings, a creation which had flashed
from the human mind like a miraculous illumination, a presage of
colossal destinies, viz. the press.
Such is the activity of the mind of man, and the ardour with which it
embraces all sorts of innovation, that when once the standard of error
was planted, a multitude of partisans were sure to rally round it. The
yoke of authority once thrown off, in countries where investigation
was so active, where so many discussions were carried on, where ideas
were in such a state of effervescence, and where all the sciences
began to germinate, it was impossible for the restless mind of man
to remain fixed on any point, and a swarm of sects was necessarily
produced. There is no middle path; either civilized nations must remain
Catholic, or run through all the forms of error. If they do not attach
themselves firmly to the anchor of truth, we shall see them make a
general attack upon it, we shall see them assail it in itself, in all
that it teaches, in all that it prescribes. A man of free and active
mind will remain tranquil in the peaceful regions of truth, or he will
seek for it with restlessness and disquietude. If he find only false
principles to rest on,--if he feel the ground move under his feet,
he will change his position every moment, he will leap from error to
error, and precipitate himself from one abyss to another. To live amid
errors, and be contented with them, to transmit error from generation
to generation, without modification or change, is peculiar to those
who vegetate in debasement and ignorance; there the mind of man is not
active, because it is asleep.
From the point of view where we have now placed ourselves, we can see
Protestantism such as it is. From this commanding position we see
every thing in its place, and it is possible for us to appreciate
its dimensions, to perceive its relations, calculate its influence,
and explain its anomalies. Men there assume their true position; as
they are seen in close proximity with the great mass of events, they
appear in the picture as very small figures, for which others may
be substituted without inconvenience; which may be placed nearer or
farther off, and the features and complexion of which are not of any
consequence. Of what importance, then, are the energy of character, the
passion, and boldness of Luther, the literary polish of Melancthon, and
the sophistical talents of Calvin? We are convinced, that to lay stress
upon all this, is to lose our time, and explain nothing.
What were these men, and the other coryphæi of Protestantism? Was
there any thing really extraordinary about them? We shall find men
like them everywhere. There are some among them who did not surpass
mediocrity; and it may be said of almost all, that if they had not
obtained an unhappy celebrity, they would hardly have been celebrated
at all. Why, then, did they effect such great things? They found a mass
of combustibles, and they set them on fire. Certainly this was not
difficult, and yet it was all they did. When I see Luther, mad with
pride, commit those extravagances which were the subject of so many
lamentations on the part of his friends--when I see him grossly insult
all who oppose him, put himself in a passion, and vomit forth a torrent
of impure words against all those who do not humble themselves in his
presence, I am scarcely moved by any other feeling than pity. This man,
who had the extraordinary mania of calling himself the _Notharius Dei_,
became delirious; but he breathed, and his breath was followed by a
terrible conflagration: it was because a powder-magazine was at hand on
which he threw a spark. Nevertheless, like a man blinded by insanity,
he cried out, "Behold my power! I breathe, and my breath puts the world
in flames!"
But, you will ask me, what was the real influence of abuses? If we take
care not to leave the point of view where we now are, we shall see
that they were an occasion, and that they sometimes afforded food, but
that they did not exercise all the influence which has been attributed
to them. Do I wish, then, to deny, or to excuse them? Not at all.
I can appreciate the complaints of some men, who are worthy of the
most profound respect; but while lamenting the evil, these men never
pretended to detail the consequences. The just man when he raises his
voice against vice, the minister of the sanctuary when he is burning
with zeal for the house of the Lord, express themselves in accents so
loud and vehement, that they must not always be taken literally. Their
whole hearts are opened, and, inflamed as they are with a zealous love
of justice, they make use of burning words. Men without faith interpret
their expressions maliciously, exaggerating and misrepresenting them.
It appears to me to be clear, from what I have just shown, that the
principal cause of Protestantism is not to be found in the abuses
of the middle ages. All that can be said is, that they afforded
opportunities and pretexts for it. To assert the contrary would be to
maintain that there were always numerous abuses in the Church from
the beginning, even in the time of her primitive fervor, and of that
proverbial purity of which our opponents have said so much; for even
then there were swarms of sects who protested against her doctrines,
denied her divine authority, and called themselves the true Church. The
case is the same, and the inference cannot be denied. If you allege the
extent and rapid propagation of Protestantism, I will remind you that
such was also the case with other sects; I will repeat to you the words
of St. Jerome, with regard to the ravages of Arianism: "All the world
groans, and is full of astonishment at finding itself Arian." I will
repeat, again, that if you observe any thing remarkable and peculiar
belonging to Protestantism, it ought not to be attributed to abuses,
but to the epoch when it appeared.
I believe I have said enough to give an idea of the influence which
abuses could exert; yet, as it is a subject which has occupied much
attention, and on which many mistakes have been made, it will be well
to revert to it once more, to make our ideas on the subject still
clearer. That lamentable abuses had crept in during the course of the
middle ages, that the corruption of manners had been great, and that,
consequently, reform was required, is a fact which cannot be denied.
This fact is proved to us, with respect to the eleventh and twelfth
centuries, by irreproachable witnesses, such as St. Peter Damien, St.
Gregory VII., and St. Bernard. Some centuries later, even after many
abuses had been corrected, they were still but too considerable, as
is witnessed by the complaints of men who were inflamed with a desire
of reform. We cannot forget the alarming words addressed by Cardinal
Julian to Pope Eugenius IV., on the subject of the disorders of the
clergy, especially those of Germany.
Having fully avowed the truth on this point, and my opinion that the
cause of Catholicity does not require dissimulation or falsehood to
defend it, I shall devote a few words to examining some important
questions. Are we to blame the court of Rome or the bishops for these
great abuses? I venture to think that they were to be attributed to
the evils of the time alone. Let us call to mind the events which had
taken place in the midst of Europe; the dissolution of the decrepit
and corrupt empire of Rome; the irruption and inundation of northern
barbarians; their fluctuations, their wars, sometimes with each
other, and sometimes with the conquered nations, and that for so many
ages; the establishment and absolute reign of feudalism, with all its
inconveniences, its evils, its troubles, and disasters; the invasion of
the Saracens, and their dominion over a large portion of Europe; now,
let any reflecting man ask himself whether such revolutions must not of
necessity produce ignorance, corruption of morals, and the relaxation
of all discipline. How could the ecclesiastical society escape being
deeply affected by this dissolution, this destruction of the civil
society? Could she help participating in the evils of the horrible
state of chaos into which Europe was then plunged?
But were the spirit and ardent desire of reforming abuses ever wanting
in the Church? It can be shown that they were not. I will not mention
the saints whom she did not cease to produce during these unhappy
periods; history proves their number and their virtues, which, so
vividly contrasting with the corruption of the age, show that the
divine flames which descended on the Apostles had not been extinguished
in the bosom of the Catholic Church. This fact proves much; but there
is another still more remarkable, a fact less subject to dispute, and
which we cannot be accused of exaggerating; a fact which is not limited
to individuals, but which is, on the contrary, the most complete
expression of the spirit by which the whole body of the Church was
animated; I mean, the constant meeting of councils, in which abuses
were reproved and condemned, and in which sanctity of morals and the
observance of discipline were continually inculcated. Happily this
consoling fact is indisputable; it is open to every eye; and to be
aware of it, one only needs to consult a volume of ecclesiastical
history, or the proceedings of councils. There is no fact more worth
our attention; and I will add, that perhaps all its importance has not
been observed.
Let us remark what passes in other societies: we see that in proportion
to the change of ideas and manners, laws everywhere undergo a rapid
modification; and if manners and ideas come to be directly opposed
to laws, the latter, reduced to silence, are soon either abolished or
trodden under foot. Nothing of this sort has happened in the Church.
Corruption has extended itself everywhere to a lamentable degree; the
ministers of religion have allowed themselves to be carried away by
the stream, and have forgotten the sanctity of their vocation; but the
sacred fire did not cease to burn in the sanctuary; the law was there
constantly proclaimed and inculcated; and, wonderful spectacle! the men
who themselves violated it frequently assembled to condemn themselves,
to censure their own conduct, and thus to render more public and more
palpable the contrast which existed between their instructions and
their actions. Simony and incontinence were the prevailing vices;
if you open the canons of councils, you will find them everywhere
anathematized. Nowhere do you find a struggle so prolonged, so
constant, so persevering, of right against wrong; you always see,
throughout so many ages, the law, opposed face to face to the irregular
passions, maintain itself firm and immovable, without yielding a
single step, without allowing them a moment of repose or peace until
they were subjugated. And this constancy and tenacity of the Church
were not useless. At the commencement of the sixteenth century, at the
time when Protestantism appeared, we find abuses comparatively less
numerous, morals perceptibly improved, discipline become more strict,
and observed with sufficient regularity. The time when Luther declaimed
was not like that when St. Peter Damien and St. Bernard deplored the
evils of the Church. The chaos was reduced to form; order, light, and
regularity had made rapid progress; and an incontestable proof that
the Church was not then plunged in such ignorance and corruption as
is alleged, is, that she produced the great assemblage of saints who
shed so much lustre on the age, and the men who displayed their eminent
wisdom at the Council of Trent. Let us remember that great reforms
require much time; that they met with much resistance both from the
clergy and laity; that for having undertaken them with firmness, and
urged them with vigour, Gregory VII. has been charged with rashness.
Let us not judge of men without regard to times and places; and let
us not pretend to measure every thing according to our own limited
ideas; ages move in an immense orbit, and the variety of circumstances
produces situations so strange and complicated that we can hardly form
an idea of them.
Bossuet, in his History of the Variations, after having differently
classed the spirit which guided certain men, before the thirteenth
century, in their attempts at reform, and having cited the threatening
words of Cardinal Julian on the subject of abuses, adds: "It is thus
that, in the fifteenth century, this cardinal, the greatest man of
his times, deplored these evils, and foresaw their fatal effects; by
which he seems to have predicted those that Luther was about to bring
on all Christianity, and in the first place on Germany; and he was
not deceived when he thought that the neglect of reformation, and the
increased hatred against the clergy, was about to produce a sect more
dangerous to the Church than the Bohemians." (_Hist. des Variat._
liv. i.) It is inferred from these words that the illustrious Bishop
of Meaux found one of the principal causes of Protestantism in the
omission of a legitimate reform made in time. Nevertheless, we must
not suppose from this that Bossuet meant, in any degree, to excuse
the promoters of it, or that he had any idea of sanctioning their
intentions; on the contrary, he ranked them as turbulent innovators,
who, far from promoting the real reform which was desired by wise and
prudent men, only served to render it more difficult, by introducing,
by the means of their erroneous doctrines, the spirit of disobedience,
schism, and heresy.
In spite of the authority of Bossuet, I cannot persuade myself to look
upon abuses as one of the principal causes of Protestantism; but it is
not necessary to repeat what I have said in support of this opinion. It
may not, however, be useless to repeat, that the authority of Bossuet
is misapplied when used to justify the intentions of the reformers,
since the illustrious prelate is the first to declare them highly
culpable, and to observe, that if abuses were in existence, their
intention was not to correct them, but rather to make them a pretext
for abandoning the faith of the Church, throwing off the yoke of lawful
authority, breaking the bands of discipline, and introducing thereby
disorder and licentiousness.
How, indeed, can we attribute to the reformers the real spirit of
reform, when almost all of them proved the contrary by the ignominy
of their own conduct? If they had condemned, by the austerity of
their morals, or by devoting themselves to a severe asceticism, the
relaxations of which they complained, there might be a question whether
their extravagances were not the effects of exaggerated zeal, and if
some excess in the love of virtue had not drawn them into error. But
they did nothing of the kind. Let us hear on this point an eye-witness,
a man who certainly cannot be accused of fanaticism, since the
connection which he had with the leaders of Protestantism has rendered
him culpable in the eyes of many. Behold what Erasmus said, with his
usual wit and bitterness: "The reform, as far as it has gone, has been
limited to the secularization of a few nuns and the marriage of a few
priests; and this great tragedy finishes with an event altogether
comic, since every thing is wound up, as in comedies, by a marriage."
This shows to conviction the true spirit of the innovators of the
sixteenth century. It is clear that, far from wishing the reformation
of abuses, they wished rather to increase them. This bare consideration
of facts has led M. Guizot, on this point, into the path of truth,
when he rejects the opinion of those who pretend, that the Reformation
was "an attempt conceived and executed simply with the intention of
reconstructing a pure and primitive Church. The Reformation," he said,
"was not a mere attempt at religious amelioration, or the fruit of a
Utopian humanity and virtue." (_Histoire Générale de la Civilisation en
Europe_, douzième leçon.)
We shall have now no difficulty in appreciating at its just value
the explanation which the same writer gives of this phenomenon. "The
Reformation," says M. Guizot, "was a great attempt at the liberation of
human thought--an uprising of the mind of man." This attempt, according
to M. Guizot, arose out of the energetic movement given to the human
mind, and the state of inaction into which the Roman Church had
fallen; it arose from this, that the human mind advanced rapidly and
impetuously, while the Church remained stationary. Explanations of this
kind, and this one in particular, are very apt to draw admirers and
proselytes; these ideas are high, and placed on a level so lofty and
extended, that they cannot be looked at closely by the generality of
readers; and, moreover, they appear in brilliant imagery, which blinds
the sight and prejudices the judgment.
That which restrains freedom of thought, as understood by M. Guizot
and other Protestants is, authority in matters of faith: it was, then,
against this authority that the uprising of the mind declared itself;
or, in other words, the mind rebelled, because it advanced, while the
Church, immovable in her doctrines, was, according to the expression of
M. Guizot, "in a stationary state."
Whatever may be the disposition of mind of M. Guizot towards the dogmas
of the Catholic Church, he ought, as a philosopher, to have seen that
it was a great mistake to point out as the distinctive characteristic
of one period, that which had been at every time a glorious title
for the Church. For more than eighteen hundred years the Church has
been stationary in her dogmas, and it is no equivocal proof that she
possesses the truth: the truth is unchangeable, because it is one.
What the Church was in the sixteenth century, she had been before, and
she has been since. She had nothing particular, she adopted no new
characteristic. The reason, then, by which it is attempted to explain
this phenomenon, viz. the uprising of the mind, cannot advance the
explanation a single step; and if this be the reason why M. Guizot
compares the Church to governments grown old, we will tell him that
she has had this old age from her cradle. M. Guizot, as if he had
himself felt the weakness of his reasoning, presents his thoughts in
groups, and as it were _pêle-mêle_; he parades before his readers ideas
of different kinds, without taking pains to classify or distinguish
them; one would be inclined to think that he meant to distract them
by variety, and confound them by mixture. Judging, indeed, from the
context of his discourse, the epithets _inert and stationary_, which
he applies to the Church, do not appear, according to his intention,
to relate to matters of faith; and he gives us to understand that
he speaks rather of the pretensions of the Church with regard to
politics and state economy. He has taken pains, elsewhere, to repel as
calumnies, the charges of tyranny and intolerance which have been so
often made against the court of Rome.
We find here an incoherence of ideas which was not to be expected in so
clear a mind; and as many persons may scarcely be inclined to believe
how far this incoherence extends, it is necessary to give his words
literally: they will show us into what inconsistencies great minds can
fall when they are placed in a false position.
"The government of the human mind, the spiritual power," says M.
Guizot, "had fallen into an inert and stationary condition. The
political influence of the Church, of the court of Rome, was much
diminished; European society no longer was ruled by it; it had passed
under the control of lay governments. Nevertheless, the spiritual
power preserved all its pretensions, all its _éclat_, all its external
importance. There happened in this respect, what has more than once
happened to old governments. The greater part of the complaints made
against it were hardly better founded."
It is evident that M. Guizot, in this passage, does not point out
any thing which is at all connected with liberty, any thing which is
not quite of another kind: why does he not do so? The court of Rome,
he tells us, had seen its political influence diminished, and yet it
preserved its pretensions; the direction of European society no longer
belonged to it, but Rome kept its pomp and its external importance. Is
any thing here meant besides the rivalries of which political affairs
had been the subject? Did M. Guizot forget what he himself said some
pages before, viz. that it did not appear to him to be reasonable to
assign the rivalry of kings with the ecclesiastical power as the cause
of Protestantism, and that such a cause was not adequate to the extent
and importance of the event?
Although all this has no direct connection with freedom of thought,
still, if any one be inclined to attribute the uprising of the mind
to the intolerance of the court of Rome, let him listen to M. Guizot:
"It is not true," says he, "that in the sixteenth century the court of
Rome was very tyrannical; that abuses, properly so called, were then
more numerous, more crying, than they had been at other times; never,
perhaps, on the contrary, had the ecclesiastical power been more easy,
more tolerant, more disposed to let things go their own way. Provided
that it was not itself called in question, provided that the rights
which it had formerly enjoyed were allowed in theory, that the same
existence was secured, and the same tributes were paid to it, it would
willingly have allowed the human mind to remain at peace, if the human
mind had done the same in respect to it."
Thus M. Guizot seems to have forgotten what he had urged with the view
of showing that the Protestant Reformation was a great attempt at the
liberation of human thought--a rebellion of the mind of man. He does
not allege any thing which was an obstacle to the freedom of man's
thoughts; and he himself acknowledges that there was nothing to provoke
this rebellion, as, for example, intolerance or cruelty; he has himself
just told us that the ecclesiastical government of the sixteenth
century, far from being tyrannical, was easy and tolerant, and that,
if left to itself, it would willingly have allowed the human mind to
remain tranquil.
It is, then, evident, that the great attempt at the liberation of
the human mind is, in M. Guizot's mouth, only a vague, undefined
expression,--a brilliant veil with which he seems to have wished
to cover the cradle of Protestantism, even at the risk of being
inconsistent with his own opinions. He reverts to the political
rivalries which he before rejected. Abuses have no importance in his
eyes; he cannot find in them the real cause; and he forgets what he had
just asserted in the preceding lecture, viz. that if necessary reform
had been made in time, the religious revolution might have been avoided.
He tries to give a picture of the obstacles to the liberty of thought,
and endeavours to rise to the general considerations which embrace
all the importance and influences of the human mind; but he stops at
_éclat_, at _external importance_, and _political rivalries_; he lowers
his flight to the level of tributes and services.
This incoherence of ideas, this weakness of reasoning, and
forgetfulness of assertions previously made, will appear strange
only to those who are accustomed rather to admire the high flights
of talented men than to study their aberrations. It is true that M.
Guizot was in a position in which it was very difficult to avoid being
dazzled and deceived. If it be true that we cannot observe attentively
what passes on the ground around us without narrowing our view of
the horizon,--if this method leads the observer to form a collection
of isolated facts rather than compare general maxims, it is not less
certain that, by extending our observations over a larger space, we
run the risk of many illusions. Too great generalization borders on
hypothesis and fancy. The mind, when taking an immoderate flight in
order to get a general view of things, no longer sees them as they
really are; perhaps sometimes even loses sight of them altogether.
Therefore it is that the loftiest minds should frequently remember the
words of Bacon: "We do not want wings, but lead." Too impartial not to
confess that abuses had been exaggerated,--too good a philosopher not
to see that they could not have had so great an effect,--M. Guizot,
who was prevented by his sense of dignity and decency from joining the
crowd who incessantly raise the cry of cruelty and intolerance, has
made an effort to do justice to the Church of Rome; but, unfortunately,
his prejudices against the Church would not allow him to see things in
their true light. He was aware that the origin of Protestantism must be
sought in the human mind itself; but, knowing the age and epoch when he
was speaking, he thought it was necessary to propitiate his audience by
frequent appeals to liberty, in order that his discourse might be well
received. This is the reason why, after having tempered the bitterness
of his reproaches against the Church by a few soft words, he reserves
all that is noble, grand, and generous for the ideas which produced the
Reformation, and throws on the Church all the shadows of the picture.
While acknowledging that the principal cause of Protestantism is to
be found in the human mind, it is easy to abstain from these unjust
comparisons; and M. Guizot might have avoided the inconsistency to
which we have alluded. He might have discovered the origin of the fact
in the character of the human mind; he might, at the same time, have
shown the greatness and importance of it, while simply explaining the
nature and position of the societies in which it appeared. In fine, he
might have observed that it was no _extraordinary effort_, but a mere
repetition of what has happened in every age; and a phenomenon, the
character of which depended on the particular state of the atmosphere
in which it was produced.
This way of considering Protestantism as an ordinary event, increased
and developed by the circumstances in which it arose, appears to me to
be as philosophical as it is little attended to. I shall support it by
another observation, which will supply us with reasons and examples at
the same time.
The state of modern society for three hundred years has been such,
that all the events that have occurred have acquired a character of
generalization, and consequently an importance, which distinguishes
them from all the events of a similar kind which occurred at other
times and in a different social state. If we examine the history of
antiquity, we shall see that all the events therein occurring were
isolated in some sort from each other; this was what rendered them
less beneficial when they were good, and less injurious when they were
bad. Carthage, Rome, Sparta, Athens, all these nations more or less
advanced in the career of civilization, each followed its own path, and
progressed in a different way. Ideas, manners, political constitutions,
succeeded each other, without our being able to perceive any influence
of the ideas of one nation on those of another, or of the manners
of one nation on those of another; we do not find any evidence of a
tendency to bring nations to one common centre.
We also remark that, except when forced to intermix, ancient nations
could be a long time in close proximity without losing their
peculiarities, or suffering any important change by the contact.
Observe how different is the state of things in Europe in modern times.
A revolution in one country affects all others; an idea sent forth
from the schools agitates nations and alarms governments. Nothing is
isolated, every thing is general, and acquires by expansion a terrible
force. It is impossible to study the history of one nation without
seeing all the others make their appearance on the stage; and we cannot
study the history of a science or an art without discovering a thousand
connections with objects which do not belong to science or to art.
All nations are connected, objects are assimilated, relations increase.
The affairs of one nation are interesting to all the others, and
they wish to take part in them. This is the reason why the idea of
_non-intervention_ in politics is, and always will be, impracticable;
it is, indeed, natural for us to interfere in that in which we are
interested.
These examples, although taken from things of a different kind, appear
to me very well calculated to illustrate my idea of the religious
events of that period. Protestantism, it is true, is thereby stripped
of the philosophic mantle by which it has been covered from its
infancy; it loses all right to be considered as full of foresight,
magnificent projects, and high destinies, from its cradle, but I do not
see that its importance and extent are thereby diminished; the fact
itself, in a word, is unimpaired, but the real cause of the imposing
aspect in which it has presented itself to the world is explained.
Every thing, in this point of view, is seen in its just dimensions;
individuals are scarcely perceived, and abuses appear only what they
really are--opportunities and pretexts; vast plans, lofty and generous
ideas, and efforts at independence of mind, are only gratuitous
suppositions. Thence ambition, war, the rivalry of kings, take their
position as causes more or less influential, but always in the second
rank. All the causes are estimated at their real value; in fine, the
principal causes being once pointed out, it is acknowledged that the
fact was sure to be accompanied in its development by a multitude of
subordinate agents. There remains still an important question in this
matter, viz. what was the cause of the hatred, or rather the feeling of
exasperation, on the part of sectarians against Rome? Was it owing to
some great abuse, some great wrong on the part of Rome? There is but
one answer to make, viz. that in a storm, the waves always dash with
fury against the immovable rock which resists them.
So far from attributing to abuses all the influence which has been
assigned to them on the birth and development of Protestantism, I am
convinced, on the contrary, that all imaginable legitimate reforms,
and the greatest degree of willingness on the part of the Church
authorities to comply with every exigence, would not have been able to
prevent that unhappy event.
He has paid little attention to the extreme inconstancy and fickleness
of the human mind, and studied its history to little purpose, who does
not recognise in the event of the sixteenth century one of those great
calamities which God alone can avert by a special intervention of his
providence.[5]
CHAPTER III.
EXTRAORDINARY PHENOMENON IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.
The proposition contained in the concluding lines of the last
chapter suggests a corollary, which, if I am not mistaken, offers
a new demonstration of the divine origin of the Catholic Church.
Her existence for eighteen centuries, in spite of so many powerful
adversaries, has always been regarded as a most extraordinary thing.
Another prodigy, too little attended to, and of not less importance
when the nature of the human mind is taken into account, is, _the unity
of the Church's doctrines, pervading, as it does, all her various
instructions, and the number of great minds which this unity has always
enclosed within her bosom_.
I particularly call the attention of all thinking men to this point;
and although I cannot hope to develop this idea in a suitable manner,
I am sure they will find in it matter for very serious reflection.
This method of considering the Church may perhaps recommend itself to
the taste of some readers on another account, viz. because I shall lay
aside Revelation, in order to consider Catholicity, not as a Divine
religion, but as a school of philosophy.
No one who has studied the history of letters can deny that the Church
has, in all ages, possessed men illustrious for science. The history of
the Fathers of the first ages of the Church is nothing but the history
of the most learned men in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia; the list
of learned men who preserved, after the irruption of the Barbarians,
some remains of ancient knowledge, is composed of churchmen. In modern
times you cannot point out a branch of human knowledge, in which a
considerable number of Catholics have not figured in the first rank.
Thus there has been, for eighteen hundred years, an uninterrupted
chain of learned men, who were Catholics, that is, men united in the
profession of the doctrines taught by the Catholic Church. Let us
lay aside for a moment the divine characteristics of Catholicity, to
consider it only as a school or sect; I say, that in the fact which I
have pointed out, we find a phenomenon so extraordinary, that its equal
cannot be found elsewhere, and that no effort of reason can explain it,
according to the natural order of human things.
It is certainly not new in the history of the human mind for a
doctrine, more or less reasonable, to be professed for a time by a
certain number of learned and enlightened men; this has been shown
in schools of philosophy both ancient and modern. But for a creed to
maintain itself for many ages, by preserving the adhesion of men of
learning of all times and of all countries--of minds differing among
themselves on other points--of men opposed in interests and divided by
rivalries, is a phenomenon new, unique, and not to be found anywhere
but in the Catholic Church. It always has been, and still is, the
practice of the Church, while one in faith and doctrine, to teach
unceasingly--to excite discussion on all subjects--to promote the study
and examination of the foundations on which faith itself reposes--to
scrutinize for this purpose the ancient languages, the monuments of the
remotest times, the documents of history, the discoveries of scientific
observation, the lessons of the highest and most analytic sciences, and
to present herself with a generous confidence in the great lyceums,
where men replete with talents and knowledge concentrate, as in a
focus, all that they have learned from their predecessors, and all that
they themselves have collected: and nevertheless we see her always
persevere with firmness in her faith and in the unity of her doctrines;
we see her always surrounded by illustrious men, who, with their
brows crowned with the laurels of a hundred literary contests, humble
themselves, tranquil and serene, before her, without fear of dimming
the brightness of the glory which surrounds their heads.
We ask those who see in Catholicity only one of the innumerable
sects by which the earth has been covered, to point out elsewhere a
similar fact; to explain to us how the Church has been able to show
us a phenomenon, constantly existing, so opposed to the ever-varying
spirit of the human mind; let them tell us by what secret talisman
the Sovereign Pontiffs have been able to do what other men have found
impossible. Those men, who bowed their heads at the command of the
Vatican, who have laid aside their own opinions to adopt those of a
man called the Pope, were not simple and ignorant men. Look at them
attentively; you will see in the boldness of their mien their knowledge
of their own intellectual power; you will read in their bright and
penetrating eyes the flame of genius which burns in their breasts. They
are the same men who have filled the highest places in the academies
of Europe; who have spread their fame over the world, and whose names
have been handed down to future generations. Examine the history of all
ages, search all the countries of the world, and if you find anywhere
such an extraordinary combination of knowledge in union with faith, of
genius in submission to authority, and of discussion without breach
of unity, you will have made an important discovery, and science will
have to explain a new phenomenon. But you know well that you cannot
do so. This is the reason why you have recourse to new stratagems in
order to cast a shade on the brightness of this fact; for you feel that
impartial reason and common sense must draw from it the conclusion that
there is in the Catholic Church something which is not to be found
elsewhere.
These facts, say our adversaries, are certain; the reflections which
they suggest are dazzling at first sight; but if we examine the subject
thoroughly, we shall see the difficulties they raise disappear. This
phenomenon, which we have seen realized in the Catholic Church, and
which is not found elsewhere, only proves that there has always been
in the Church a fixed system, which has been developed with uniform
regularity. The Church knew that union is the source of strength; that
union cannot exist without unity of doctrine; and that unity cannot
be preserved without submission to authority. This simple observation
established, and constantly maintained, the principle of submission.
Such is the explanation of the phenomenon. The idea, we grant, is
profoundly wise, the scheme is grand, the system is extraordinary;
but they do not prove any thing in favor of the Divine origin of
Catholicism.
This is the best reply which they can make; it is easy to show that
the difficulty remains entire. Indeed, if it be true that there has
existed a society on earth which has been for eighteen centuries guided
by one fixed and constant principle--a society which has known how
to bind to this principle eminent men of all ages and countries, the
following questions must be asked of our adversaries:--Why has the
Church alone possessed this principle, and monopolized this idea? If
other sects have been in possession of it, why have they not acted on
it? All the philosophic sects have disappeared, one after another; the
Church alone remains. Other religions, in order to preserve some sort
of unity, have been compelled to shun the light, to avoid discussion,
to hide themselves in the thickest shades. Why has the Church preserved
her unity while seeking the light, while publishing her books in open
day, while lavishing all sorts of instruction, and founding everywhere
colleges, universities, and establishments of every description, where
all the splendor of knowledge and erudition has been concentrated?
It is not enough to say that there was a plan--a system; the difficulty
lies in the existence of this plan and this system; it consists in
explaining how they were conceived and executed. If we had to do with
a small number of men, in limited circumstances, times, and countries,
for the execution of a limited project, there would be nothing
extraordinary; but we have to do with a period of eighteen hundred
years, with all the countries of the world, with circumstances the
most varied, the most different, and the most opposed to each other;
we have to do with a multitude of men who did not meet together, or
act in concert. How is all this to be explained? If it were a plan and
a system devised by man, we should ask, What was the mysterious power
of Rome which enabled her to unite around her so many illustrious men
of all times and of all countries? How did the Roman Pontiff, if he be
only the chief of a sect, manage to fascinate the world to this extent?
What magician ever did such wonders? Men have long declaimed against
his religious despotism; why has no one been found to wrest the sceptre
from his grasp? why has not a pontifical throne been raised capable of
disputing the pre-eminence with his, and of maintaining itself with
equal splendor and power? Shall we attribute it to his temporal power?
This power is very limited. Rome was not able to contend in arms with
any of the other European powers. Shall we attribute it to the peculiar
character, to the knowledge or the virtues of the men who have occupied
the Papal throne? There has been, during these eighteen hundred years,
an infinite variety in the characters and in the talents and virtues of
the Popes. For those who are not Catholics, who do not see in the Roman
Pontiff the vicar of Jesus Christ,--the rock on which He has built His
Church,--the duration of this authority must be the most extraordinary
phenomenon; and it is certainly one of the questions most worthy of
being examined by the science which devotes itself to the history of
the human mind; how there existed for many centuries an uninterrupted
series of learned men, always faithful to the doctrines of the Roman
See?
M. Guizot himself, in comparing Protestantism with the Roman Church,
seems to have felt the force of this truth; and its light appears to
have made him confused in his remarks. Let us listen again to this
writer, whose talents and renown have dazzled, on this point, so
many readers, who do not examine the solidity of proofs when they
are clothed in brilliant images, and who applaud all kinds of ideas
when they are conveyed to them in a torrent of enchanting eloquence;
men who, pretending to intellectual independence, subscribe, without
inquiry, to the decisions of the leaders of their school; who receive
their doctrines with submission, and dare not even raise their heads to
ask for the titles of their authority. M. Guizot, like all the great
men among Protestants, was aware of the immense void which exists amid
its various sects, and of the force and vigour which is contained in
Catholicity; he has not been able to free himself from the rule of
great minds,--a rule which is explicitly confirmed by the writings of
the greatest men of the Reformation. After pointing out the inconstant
progress of Protestantism, and the error which it has introduced into
the organization of intellectual society, M. Guizot proceeds thus:
"People have not known how to reconcile the rights and necessities of
tradition with those of liberty; and the cause of it undoubtedly has
been, that the Reformation did not fully understand and accept either
its principles or its effects." What sort of a religion must that
be which does not fully understand and accept its principles or its
effects?
Did a more formal condemnation of the Reformation ever issue out of the
mouth of man? could any thing of the kind ever be said of the sects
of philosophers, ancient or modern? Can the Reformation, then, after
this, pretend to direct men or society? "Thence arises," continues
M. Guizot, "a certain air of inconsistency and narrowness of spirit,
which has often given advantages over it to its opponents. The latter
knew very well what they did and what they wished; they ascended to
the principles of their conduct, and avowed all their consequences.
There never was a government more consistent, more systematic than
that of the Church of Rome." But whence was the origin of a system so
consistent? When we consider the fickleness and inconstancy of the
human mind, do not this system, this consistency, and these fixed
principles, speak volumes to the philosopher and man of good sense?
We have observed those terrible elements of dissolution which have
their source in the mind of man, and which have acquired so much force
in modern society; we have seen with what fatal power they destroy
and annihilate all institutions, social, political, and religious,
without ever succeeding in making a breach in the doctrines of
Catholicity,--without altering that system, so fixed and so consistent.
Is there no conclusion to be drawn from all this in favour of
Catholicity? To say that the Church has done that which no schools, or
governments, or societies, or religions could do, is it not to confess
that she is wiser than every thing human? And does it not clearly prove
that she does not owe her origin to human thought, and that she is
derived from the bosom of the Creator? This society--formed, you say,
by men--this government, directed by men, has endured for eighteen
hundred years; it extends to all countries, it addresses the savage in
the forest, the barbarian in his tent, the civilized man in the most
populous cities; it reckons among its children the shepherd clothed
in skins, the laborer, the powerful nobleman; it makes its laws heard
alike by the simple mechanic at his work, and the man of learning in
his closet absorbed in the profoundest speculations. This government
has always had, according to M. Guizot, a full knowledge of its actions
and its wishes; it has always been consistent in its conduct. Is not
this avowal its most convincing apology, its most eloquent panegyric;
and shall it not be considered a proof that it contains within itself
something more than human?
A thousand times have I beheld this prodigy with astonishment; a
thousand times have my eyes been fixed upon that immense tree which
extends its branches from east to west, from north to south; I see
beneath its shade a multitude of different nations, and the restless
genius of man reposing in tranquillity at its feet.
In the East, at the period when this divine religion first appeared,
I see, amidst the dissolutions of all sects, the most illustrious
philosophers crowd to hear her words. In Greece, in Asia, on the banks
of the Nile, in all the countries where, a short time before, swarmed
innumerable sects, I see appear on a sudden a generation of great men,
abounding in learning, in knowledge, in eloquence, and all agreeing in
the unity of Catholic doctrine.
In the West, a multitude of barbarians throw themselves on an empire
falling to decay; a dark cloud descends upon an horizon charged with
calamities and disasters; there, in the midst of a people submerged in
the corruption of morals, and having lost even the remembrance of their
ancient grandeur, I see the only men who can be called worthy heirs of
the Roman name, seek, in the retirement of their temples, an asylum
for the austerity of their morals; it is there that they preserve,
increase, and enrich the treasure of ancient knowledge. But my
admiration reaches its height, when I observe that sublime intellect,
worthy heir of the genius of Plato, which, after having sought the
truth in all the schools, in all the sects, and with indomitable
boldness run through all human errors, feels itself subjugated by
the authority of the Church, and transforms the freethinker into the
great Bishop of Hippo. In modern times the series of great men who
shone in the times of Leo X. and Louis XIV. passes before my eyes.
I see the illustrious race still continue throughout the calamities
of the eighteenth century; and in the nineteenth I see fresh heroes,
who, after having followed error in all directions, come to hang their
trophies at the gates of the Catholic Church. What, then, is this
prodigy? Has a sect or religion like it ever before been seen? These
men study every thing, dispute on every thing, reply to every thing,
know every thing; but always agreeing in unity of doctrine, they bend
their noble and intellectual brows in respectful obedience to faith. Do
we not seem to behold another planetary system, where globes of fire
revolve in their vast orbits in the midst of immensity, always drawn
to their centre by a mysterious attraction? That central force, which
allows no aberration, takes from them nothing of their extent, or of
the grandeur of their movement; but it inundates them with light, while
giving to their motion a more majestic regularity.[6]
CHAPTER IV.
PROTESTANTISM AND THE MIND.
This fixedness of idea, this unanimity of will, this wisdom and
constancy of plan, this progress with a firm step towards a definite
object and end; and, in fine, this admirable unity, acknowledged in
favor of Catholicism by M. Guizot himself, have not been imitated by
Protestantism, either in good or evil. Protestantism, indeed, has not
a single idea, of which it can say: "This is my own." It has attempted
to appropriate to itself the principle of private judgment in matters
of faith; and if several of its opponents have been too willing to
accord it, it was because they were unable to find therein any other
constitutive element; it was also because they felt that Protestantism,
in boasting of having given birth to such a principle, labored to
throw disgrace on itself, like a father who boasts of having unworthy
and depraved sons. It is false, however, that Protestantism produced
this principle of private judgment, since it was itself the offspring
of that principle. That principle, before the Reformation, was formed
in the bosom of all sects; it is the real germ of all errors; in
proclaiming it, Protestants only yielded to a necessity which is common
to all the sects separated from the Church.
There was therein no plan, no foresight, no system. The mere resistance
to the authority of the Church included the necessity of unlimited
private judgment, and the establishment of the understanding as supreme
judge; even had the coryphæi of Protestantism wished from the first to
oppose the consequences and applications of this right, the barrier was
broken, and the torrent could not have been confined.
"The right of examining what we ought to believe," says a celebrated
Protestant, (_Germany_, by Mad. de Staël, part iv. chap. 2), "is the
foundation of Protestantism. The first Reformers did not think thus;
they thought themselves able to place the pillars of Hercules of the
mind according to their own lights; but they were mistaken in hoping to
make those who had rejected all authority of this kind in the Catholic
religion submit to their decisions as infallible." This resistance on
their part proves, that they were not led by any of those ideas, which,
although erroneous, show, in some measure, nobleness and generosity of
heart; and that it is not of them that the human mind can say: "They
have erred, but it was in order to give me more liberty of action."
"The religious revolution of the sixteenth century," says M. Guizot,
"did not understand the true principles of intellectual liberty; it
liberated the human mind, and yet pretended to govern it by law."
But it is in vain for man to struggle against the nature of things:
Protestantism endeavored, without success, to limit the right of
private judgment. It raised its voice against it, and sometimes
appeared to attempt its total destruction; but the right of private
judgment, which was in its own bosom, remained there, developed
itself, and acted there in spite of it. There was no middle course for
Protestantism to adopt: it was compelled either to throw itself into
the arms of authority, and thus acknowledge itself in the wrong, or
else allow the dissolving principle to exert so much influence on its
various sects, as to destroy even the shadow of the religion of Jesus
Christ, and debase Christianity to the rank of a school of philosophy.
The cry of resistance to the authority of the Church once raised, the
fatal results might be easily imagined; it was thus easy to foresee
that that poisoned germ, in its development, must cause the ruin of all
the Christian truths; and what could prevent its rapid development in
a soil where fermentation was so active? Catholics were not wanting to
proclaim loudly the greatness and imminence of the danger; and it must
be allowed that many Protestants foresaw it clearly. No one is ignorant
that the most distinguished men of the sect gave their opinions on
this point, even from the beginning. Men of the greatest talent never
found themselves at ease in Protestantism. They always felt that there
was an immense void in it; this is the reason why they have constantly
inclined either towards irreligion or towards Catholic unity.
Time, the best judge of opinions, has confirmed these melancholy
prognostics. Things have now reached such a pass, that those only who
are very ill instructed, or who have a very limited grasp of mind, can
fail to see that the Christian religion, as explained by Protestants,
is nothing more than an opinion--a system made up of a thousand
incoherent parts, and which is degraded to the level of the schools
of philosophy. If Christianity still seems to surpass these schools
in some respects, and preserves some features which cannot be found
in what is the pure invention of the mind of man, it ought not to be
a matter of astonishment. It is owing to that sublimity of doctrine
and that sanctity of morality which, more or less disfigured, always
shines while a trace is preserved of the words of Jesus Christ. But
the feeble light which struggles with darkness after the sun has sunk
below the horizon, cannot be compared to that of day: darkness advances
and spreads; it extinguishes the expiring reflection, and night comes
on. Such is the doctrine of Christianity among Protestants. A glance
at these sects shows us that they are not purely philosophical, but it
shows us at the same time that they have not the characters of true
religion. Christianity has no authority therein; and is there like a
being out of its proper element,--a tree deprived of its roots: its
face is pale and disfigured like that of a corpse. Protestantism talks
of faith, and its fundamental principle destroys it; it endeavors to
exalt the gospel, and its own principle, by subjecting that gospel to
private judgment, weakens its authority. If it speak of the sanctity
and purity of Christian morality, it is reminded that some of its
dissenting sects deny the divinity of Jesus Christ; and that they all
may do so according to the principle on which it rests. The Divinity
of Jesus Christ once doubted, the God-made man is reduced to the rank
of a great philosopher and legislator; He has no longer the authority
necessary to give to His laws the august sanction which renders them
so holy in the eyes of men; He can no longer imprint upon them the
seal which raises them above all human thoughts, and His sublime
instructions cease to be lessons flowing from the lips of uncreated
Wisdom.
If you deprive the human mind of the support of authority of some
kind or other, on what can it depend? Abandoned to its own delirious
dreams, it is forced again into the gloomy paths which led the
philosophers of the ancient schools to chaos. Reason and experience
are here agreed. If you substitute the private judgment of Protestants
for the authority of the Church, all the great questions respecting
God and man remain without solution. All the difficulties are left;
the mind is in darkness, and seeks in vain for a light to guide it in
safety: stunned by the voices of a hundred schools, who dispute without
being able to throw any light on the subject, it relapses into that
state of discouragement and prostration in which Christianity found it,
and from which, with so much exertion, she had withdrawn it. Doubt,
pyrrhonism, and indifference become the lot of the greatest minds; vain
theories, hypothetical systems, and dreams take possession of men of
more moderate abilities; the ignorant are reduced to superstitions and
absurdities.
Of what use, then, would Christianity have been on the earth, and what
would have been the progress of humanity? Happily for the human race,
the Christian religion was not abandoned to the whirlwind of Protestant
sects. In Catholic authority she has found ample means of resisting the
attacks of sophistry and error. What would have become of her without
it? Would the sublimity of her doctrines, the wisdom of her precepts,
the unction of her counsels, have been now any thing more than a
beautiful dream, related in enchanting language by a great philosopher?
Yes, I must repeat, without the authority of the Church there is no
security for faith; the divinity of Jesus Christ becomes a matter
of doubt; His mission is disputed; in fact, the Christian religion
disappears. If she cannot show us her heavenly titles, give us full
certainty that she has come from the bosom of the Eternal, that her
words are those of God Himself, and that He has condescended to appear
on earth for the salvation of men, she has then lost her right to
demand our veneration. Reduced to the level of human ideas, she must,
then, submit to our judgment like other mere opinions; at the tribunal
of philosophy she may endeavor to maintain her doctrines as more or
less reasonable; but she will always be liable to the reproach of
having wished to deceive us, by passing herself off as divine when she
was only human; and in all discussions on the truth of her doctrines,
she will have this fatal presumption against her, viz. that the account
of her origin was an imposture.
Protestants boast of their independence of mind, and reproach the
Catholic religion with violating the most sacred rights, by demanding
a submission which outrages the dignity of man. Here extravagant
declamation about the strength of our understanding is introduced with
good effect; and a few seductive images and expressions, such as "_bold
flights_" and "_glittering wings_," &c., are enough to delude many
readers.
Let the human mind enjoy all its rights; let it boast of possessing
that spark of divinity called the intellect; let it pass over all
nature in triumph, observing all the beings by which it is surrounded,
and congratulate itself on its own immense superiority, in the midst
of the wonders with which it has known how to embellish its abode;
let it point out, as proofs of its strength and grandeur, the changes
which are everywhere worked by its presence; by its intellectual
force and boldness it has acquired the complete mastery over nature.
Let us acknowledge the dignity and elevation of our minds to show
our gratitude to our Creator, but let us not forget our weakness and
defects. Why should we deceive ourselves by fancying that we know what
we are really ignorant of? Why forget the inconstancy and variableness
of our minds, and conceal the fact, that with respect to many things,
even of those with which we are supposed to be acquainted, we have but
confused ideas? How delusive is our knowledge, and what exaggerated
notions we have of our progress in information? Does not one day
contradict what another had affirmed? Time runs its course, laughs at
our predictions, destroys our plans, and clearly shows how vain are our
projects.
What have those geniuses who have descended to the foundations of
science, and risen by the boldest flights to the loftiest speculations,
told us? After having reached the utmost limits of the space which it
is permitted to the human mind to range over,--after having trodden the
most secret paths of science, and sailed on the vast ocean of moral
and physical nature, the greatest minds of all ages have returned
dissatisfied with the results. They have seen a beautiful illusion
appear before their eyes,--the brilliant image which enchanted them
has vanished; when they thought they were about to enter a region
of light, they have found themselves surrounded with darkness, and
they have viewed with affright the extent of their ignorance. It is
for this reason that the greatest minds have so little confidence
in the strength of the human intellect, although they cannot but be
fully aware that they are superior to other men. The sciences, in the
profound observation of Pascal, have two extremes which meet each
other: the first is, the pure natural state of ignorance in which men
are at their birth; the other extreme is, that at which great minds
arrive when, having reached the utmost extent of human knowledge, they
find that they know nothing, and that they are still in the same state
of ignorance as at first. (_Pensées_, 1 partie, art. 6.)
Catholicism says to man, "Thy intellect is weak, thou hast need of a
guide in many things." Protestantism says to him, "Thou art surrounded
by light, walk as thou wilt; thou canst not have a better guide than
thyself." Which of the two religions is most in accordance with the
lessons of the highest philosophy?
It is not, therefore, surprising that the greatest minds among
Protestants have all felt a certain tendency towards Catholicism, and
have seen the wisdom of subjecting the human mind, in some things,
to the decision of an infallible authority. Indeed, if an authority
can be found uniting in its origin, its duration, its doctrines, and
its conduct, all the characteristics of divinity, why should the mind
refuse to submit to her; and what has it to gain by wandering, at the
mercy of its illusions, on the most serious subjects, in paths where it
only meets with recollections of errors, with warnings and delusions?
If the human mind has conceived too great an esteem for itself, let
it study its own history, in order to see and understand how little
security is to be found in its own strength. Abounding in systems,
inexhaustible in subtilties; as ready in conceiving a project as
incapable of maintaining it; full of ideas which arise, agitate, and
destroy each other, like the insects which abound in lakes; now raising
itself on the wings of sublime inspiration, and now creeping like a
reptile on the face of the earth; as able and willing to destroy the
works of others, as it is impotent to construct any durable ones of
its own; urged on by the violence of passion, swollen with pride,
confounded by the infinite variety of objects which present themselves
to it; confused by so many false lights and so many deceptive
appearances, the human mind, when left entirely to itself, resembles
those brilliant meteors which dart at random through the immensity of
the heavens, assume a thousand eccentric forms, send forth a thousand
sparks, dazzle for a moment by their fantastic splendour, and disappear
without leaving even a reflected light to illuminate the darkness.
Behold the history of man's knowledge! In that immense and confused
heap of truth, error, sublimity, absurdity, wisdom, and folly, are
collected the proofs of my assertions, and to that do I refer any one
who may be inclined to accuse me of having overcharged the picture.[7]
CHAPTER V.
INSTINCT OF FAITH IN THE SCIENCES.
The truth of what I have just advanced with respect to the weakness
of our intellect, is proved by the fact that the hand of God has
placed at the bottom of our souls a preservative against the excessive
changeability of our minds, even in things which do not regard
religion. Without this preservative all social institutions would be
destroyed, or rather never would have had existence; without it the
sciences would not have advanced a step, and when it had disappeared
from the human heart, individuals and society would have been swallowed
up by chaos. I allude to a certain tendency to defer to authority--to
the _instinct of faith_, if I may so call it--an instinct which we
ought to examine with great attention, if we wish to know any thing of
the human mind, and the history of its development.
It has often been observed that it is impossible to comply with the
most urgent necessities, or perform the most ordinary acts of life,
without respecting the authority of the statement of others; it is easy
to understand that, without this faith, all the treasures of history
and experience would soon be dissipated, and that even the foundation
of all knowledge would disappear.
These important observations are calculated to show how vain is the
charge against the Catholic religion, of requiring nothing but faith;
but this is not my only object here; I wish to present the matter under
another aspect, and place the question in such a position as to make
this truth gain in extent and interest, without losing any thing of its
immovable firmness. In looking over the history of human knowledge, and
glancing at the opinions of our contemporaries, we constantly observe
that the men who boast the most of their spirit of inquiry and freedom
of thought, only echo the opinions of others. If we examine with
attention that great study which, under the name of science, has made
so much noise in the world, we shall observe that it contains at bottom
a large portion of authority; and that if a perfectly free spirit of
inquiry were to be introduced into it, even with respect to points
of pure reason, the greatest part of the edifice of science would be
destroyed, and very few men would remain in possession of its secrets.
No branch of knowledge, whatever may be the clearness and exactitude
of which it boasts, is an exception to this rule. Do not the natural
and exact sciences, rich as they are in evident principles, rigorous
in their deductions, abounding in observation and experience, depend,
nevertheless, for a great many of their truths, upon other truths of a
higher nature; the knowledge of which necessarily requires a delicacy
of observation, a power of calculation, a clear and penetrating _coup
d'œil_, which belongs to few?
When Newton proclaimed to the scientific world the fruit of his
profound calculations, how many of his disciples could flatter
themselves that they were able to confirm them by their own
convictions? I do not except from this question many of those who, by
laborious efforts, had been able to comprehend something of this great
man; they had followed the mathematician in his calculations, they
had a full knowledge of the mass of facts and experience which the
naturalist exposed to their view; they had listened to the reasons on
which the philosopher rested his conjectures; in this way they thought
that they were _fully convinced_, and that they did not owe their
assent to any thing but the force of reason and evidence. Well, take
away the name of Newton, efface from the mind the profound impression
made by the authority of the man who made so extraordinary a discovery,
and has employed so much genius in supporting it,--take away, I repeat
it, the shade of Newton, and you will directly see, in the minds of his
disciples, their principles vacillate, their reasonings become less
convincing and exact, and their observations appear less in accordance
with the facts. Then, he who thought himself a perfectly impartial
observer, a perfectly independent thinker, will see and understand to
how great an extent he was enthralled by the force of authority, by
the ascendency of genius; he will find that, on a variety of points,
he _assented_ without being _convinced_; and that, instead of being
a perfectly independent philosopher, he was only an obedient and
accomplished pupil.
I appeal with confidence to the testimony, not of the ignorant, not
of those who have only a smattering of scientific knowledge, but of
real men of learning, of those who have devoted much time to the
various branches of study. Let them look into their own minds, let
them examine anew what they call their scientific convictions, let
them ask themselves, with perfect calmness and impartiality, whether,
even on those subjects in which they consider themselves the most
advanced, their minds are not frequently controlled by the ascendency
of some author of the first rank. I believe they will be compelled to
acknowledge that, if they strictly applied the method of Descartes
even to some of the questions which they have studied the most, they
would find that they believe rather than are convinced. Such always
has been, and such always will be, the case. It is a thing deeply
rooted in the nature of our minds, and it cannot be prevented. Perhaps
the regulation is a matter of absolute necessity; perhaps it contains
much of that instinct of preservation which God, with so much wisdom,
has diffused throughout society; perhaps it is intended to counteract
the many elements of dissolution which society contains within its
bosom. Undoubtedly, it is often very much to be regretted that men
servilely follow in the footsteps of others, and injurious consequences
not unfrequently are the result. But it would be still worse, if men
constantly held themselves in an attitude of resistance to all others,
for fear of deception. Woe to man and to society, if the philosophic
mania of wishing to submit all matters to a rigorous examination were
to become general in the world; and woe to science, if this rigorous,
scrupulous, and independent scrutiny were extended to every thing.
I admire the genius of Descartes, and acknowledge the signal services
which he has rendered to science; but I have more than once thought
that, if his method of doubting became general for any time, society
would be destroyed. And it seems to me that, among learned men
themselves, among impartial philosophers, this method would do great
harm; at least, it may be supposed that the number of men devoid of
sense in the scientific world would be considerably increased.
Happily there is no danger of this being the case. If it be true that
there is always in man a certain tendency towards folly, there is
also always to be found there a fund of good sense which cannot be
destroyed. When certain individuals of heated imaginations attempt to
involve society in their delirium, society answers with a smile of
derision; or if it allows itself to be seduced for a moment, it soon
returns to its senses, and repels with indignation those who have
endeavored to lead it astray. Passionate declamation against vulgar
prejudice, against docility in following others and willingness to
believe all without examination, is only considered as worthy of
contempt by those who are intimately acquainted with human nature.
Are not these feelings participated in by many who belong not to the
vulgar? Are not the sciences full of gratuitous suppositions, and have
they not their weak points, with which, however, we are satisfied, as
if they afforded a firm basis to rest upon?
The right of possession and prescription is also one of the
peculiarities which the sciences present to us; and it is well worthy
of remark that, without ever having borne the name, this right has been
acknowledged by a tacit but unanimous consent. How can this be? Study
the history of the sciences, and you will find at every step this right
acknowledged and established. How is it, amid the continual disputes
which have divided philosophers, that we see an old opinion make a
long resistance to a new one, and sometimes succeed in preventing its
establishment? It is because the old opinion was in possession, and
was strengthened by the right of prescription. It is of no importance
that the words were not used, the result was the same; this is the
reason why discoverers have so often been despised, opposed, and even
persecuted.
It is necessary to make this avowal, although it may be repugnant to
our pride, and may scandalize some sincere admirers of the progress of
knowledge. These advances have been numerous; the field over which the
human mind has exercised itself, and its sphere of action, are immense;
the works by which it has proved its power are admirable; but there is
always in all this a large portion of exaggeration, and it is necessary
to make a considerable allowance, especially in the moral sciences.
It cannot justly be inferred, from these exaggerated statements, that
our intellect is capable of advancing in every path with perfect ease
and activity; no deduction can be drawn from it to contradict the fact
which we have just established, viz. the mind of man is almost always
in subjection, even imperceptibly, to the authority of other men.
In every age there appear a small number of privileged spirits, who,
by nature superior to all the rest, serve as guides in the various
careers; a numerous crowd, who think themselves learned, follow them
with precipitation, and, fixing their eyes on the standard which has
been raised, rush breathlessly after it; and yet, strange as it is,
they all boast of their independence, and flatter themselves that they
are distinguishing themselves by pursuing the new path; one would
imagine that they had discovered it, and that they were walking in it
guided by their own light and inspirations. Necessity, taste, or a
thousand other circumstances, lead us to cultivate this or that branch
of knowledge; our own weakness constantly tells us that we have no
creative power; that we cannot produce any thing of our own, and that
we are incapable of striking out a new path; but we flatter ourselves
that we share some part of the glory belonging to the illustrious
chief whose banner we follow; we sometimes will succeed in persuading
ourselves, in the midst of these reveries, that we do not fight under
anybody's standard, and that we are only rendering homage to our own
convictions, when, in reality, we are the proselytes of others.
Herein common sense shows itself to be wiser than our weak reason; and
thus language, which gives such deep expression to things, where we
find, without knowing whence they come, so much truth and exactitude,
gives us a severe admonition on the subject of these vain pretensions.
In spite of us, language calls things by their right names, and knows
how to class us and our opinions according to the leader that we
follow. What is the history of science but the history of the contests
of a small number of illustrious men? If we glance over ancient and
modern times, and bring into view the various branches of knowledge,
we shall see a number of schools founded by a philosopher of the first
rank, and then falling under the direction of another whose talents
have made him worthy to succeed the founder. Thus the thing goes on,
until circumstances having changed, or the spirit of vitality being
gone, the school dies a natural death, unless a man of bold and
independent mind appears, who takes the old school and destroys it, in
order to establish his own doctrines on the ruins.
When Descartes dethroned Aristotle, did he not immediately take his
place? Then philosophers pretended to independence--an independence
which was contradicted by the very name they bore, that of Cartesians.
Like nations who, in times of rebellion, cry out for liberty, dethrone
their old king, and afterwards submit to the first man who has the
boldness to seize the vacant throne.
It is thought in our age, as it has been in times gone by, that the
human mind acts with perfect independence, owing to declamation against
authority in scientific matters, and the exaltation of the freedom of
thought. The opinion has become general that, in these times, the
authority of any one man is worth nothing; it has been thought that
every man of learning acts according to his own convictions alone.
Moreover, systems and hypotheses have lost all credit, and a great
desire for examination and analysis has become prevalent. This has
made people believe not only that authority in scientific matters is
completely gone, but that it is henceforth impossible.
At first sight there appears to be some truth in this; but if we look
attentively around us, we shall observe that the number of leaders
is only somewhat increased, and the time of their command somewhat
shortened. Our age is truly one of commotions, literary and scientific
revolutions, like those in politics, where nations imagine that they
possess more liberty because the government is placed in the hands of
a greater number of persons, and because they find more facility in
getting rid of their rulers. They destroy those men to whom but a short
time before they have given the names of fathers and liberators; then,
the first transport being passed, they allow other men to impose upon
them a yoke in reality not less heavy. Besides the examples afforded
us by the history of the past century, at the present day we see only
great names succeed each other, and the leaders of the human mind take
each other's places.
In the field of politics, where one would imagine the spirit of
freedom ought to have full scope, do we not see men who take the
lead; and are they not looked upon as the generals of an army during
a campaign? In the parliamentary arena, do we see any thing but two
or three bodies of combatants, performing their evolutions under
their respective chiefs with perfect regularity and discipline? These
truths are well understood by those who occupy these high positions!
They are acquainted with our weakness, and they know that men are
commonly deceived by mere words. A thousand times must they have been
tempted to smile, when, contemplating the field of their triumphs,
and seeing themselves surrounded by followers who, proud of their own
intelligence, admire and applaud them, they have heard one of the most
ardent of their disciples boast of his unlimited freedom of thought,
and of the complete independence of his opinions and his votes.
Such is man, as shown to us by history and the experience of every
day. The inspiration of genius, that sublime force which raises the
minds of some privileged men, will always exercise, not only over the
ignorant, but even over the generality of men who devote themselves
to science, a real fascination. Where, then, is the insult which the
Catholic religion offers to reason when, presenting titles which prove
her divinity, she asks for that faith which men grant so easily to
other men in matters of various kinds, and even in things with which
they consider themselves to be the best acquainted? Is it an insult to
human reason to point out to him a fixed and certain rule with respect
to matters of the greatest importance, while, on the other hand, she
leaves him perfectly free to think as he pleases on all the various
questions which God has left to his discretion? In this the Church
only shows herself to be in accordance with the lessons of the highest
philosophy. She shows a profound knowledge of the human mind, and she
delivers it from all the evils which are inflicted by its fickleness,
its inconstancy, and its ambition, combined as these qualities are with
an extraordinary tendency to defer to the opinions of individuals.
Who does not see that the Catholic Church puts thereby a check on the
spirit of proselytism, of which society has had so much reason to
complain? Since there is in man this irresistible tendency to follow
the footsteps of another, does she not confer an eminent service on
humanity, by showing it a sure way of following the example of a God
incarnate? Does she not thus take human liberty under her protection,
and at the same time save from shipwreck those branches of knowledge
which are the most necessary to individuals and to society?[8]
CHAPTER VI.
DIFFERENCES IN THE RELIGIOUS WANTS OF NATIONS--MATHEMATICS--MORAL
SCIENCES.
The progress of society, and the high degree of civilization and
refinement to which modern nations have attained, will no doubt be
urged against the authority which seeks to exercise jurisdiction over
the mind. In this way men will attempt to justify what they call the
emancipation of the human mind. For my own part, this objection seems
to have so little solidity, and to be so little supported by facts,
that, from the progress of society, I should, on the contrary, conclude
that there is the more need of that living rule which is deemed
indispensable by Catholics.
To say that society in its infancy and youth may have required
this authority as a check, but that this check has become useless
and degrading since the human mind has reached a higher degree of
development, is completely to mistake the connection which exists
between the various conditions of our mind and the objects over which
this authority extends. The true idea of God, the origin, the end, and
the rule of human conduct, together with all the means with which God
has furnished us to attain to our high destiny, such are the subjects
with which faith deals, and with respect to which Catholics contend
that it is necessary to have an infallible rule. They maintain that
without this it would be impossible to avoid the most lamentable
errors, and to protect truth from the effects of human passions.
This consideration will suffice to show, that private judgment would
be much less dangerous among nations still less advanced in the career
of civilization. There is, indeed, in a young nation, a great fund of
natural candor and simplicity, which admirably disposes it to receive
with docility the instructions contained in the sacred volume. Such
a people will relish those things which are easily to be understood,
and will bow with humility before the sublime obscurity of those pages
which it has pleased God to cover with a veil of mystery. Moreover, the
condition of this people, as yet exempt from the pride of knowledge,
would create a sort of authority, since there would be found within its
bosom only a small number of men able to examine divine revelation; and
thus a centre for the distribution of instruction would be naturally
formed.
But it is far otherwise with a nation far advanced in the career of
knowledge. With the latter, the extension of knowledge to a greater
number of individuals, by augmenting pride and fickleness, multiplies
sects, and ends by revolutionizing ideas and corrupting the purest
traditions. A young nation is devoted to simple occupations; it remains
attached to its ancient customs; it listens with respect and docility
to the aged, who, surrounded by their children and grand-children,
relate with emotion the histories and the maxims which they have
received from their ancestors. But when society has reached a great
degree of development, when respect for the fathers of families and
veneration for gray hairs have become weakened; when pompous titles,
scientific display, and grand libraries make men conceive a high idea
of their intellectual powers; when the multitude and activity of
communications widely diffuse those ideas, which, when put in motion,
have an almost magical power of affecting men's minds, then it is
necessary,--it is indispensable to have an authority, always living,
always ready to act whenever it is wanted,--to cover with a protecting
ægis the sacred deposit of truths which are the same in all times and
places; truths without the knowledge of which man would be left to the
mercy of his own errors and caprices from the cradle to the grave;
truths on which society rests as its surest foundation; truths which
cannot be destroyed without shaking to pieces the whole social edifice.
The literary and political history of Europe for the last three
hundred years affords but too many proofs of this. Religious revolution
broke out at the moment when it was capable of doing the most harm: it
found society agitated by all the activity of the human mind, and it
destroyed the control when it was most necessary.
Undoubtedly, it is necessary to guard against depreciating the mind of
man by charging it with faults which it has not, or by exaggerating
those which it has; but it is no less improper to puff it up by
exalting its strength too much. The latter would be injurious to it
in several ways, and would be little likely to advance its progress;
it would also, if properly understood, be little conformable to that
gravity and discretion which ought to distinguish true science. Indeed,
to merit the name, science ought to show the folly of being vain of
what does not rightly belong to it; it ought to know its limits, and
have sufficient candor and generosity to acknowledge its weakness.
There is a fact in the history of science, which, by revealing the
intrinsic weakness of the mind, palpably shows the flattery of those
unmeasured eulogies which are sometimes lavished on it, and also
demonstrates to us how dangerous it would be to abandon it to itself
without any guide. This fact is, the obscurity which increases in
proportion as we approach the first principles of science; so that
even in those sciences the truth, evidence, and exactness of which are
considered the best established, it seems that no firm ground is to be
obtained when we attempt to go to the bottom of them; and the mind, not
finding any security, recoils in the fear of meeting with something to
throw doubt and uncertainty on the truths of which it was convinced.
I do not participate in the ill-humor of Hobbes against the
mathematics. Devoted to their progress, and deeply convinced as I am of
the advantages which their study confers on the other sciences and on
society, I shall not attempt to underrate their merit, or deny any of
their great claims; but who can say that they are an exception to the
general rule? Have they not their weak points and their darksome paths?
It is true that, when we confine ourselves to the explanation of the
first principles of these sciences, and the deduction from them of the
most elementary propositions, the mind is on firm ground, where no
fear of making a false step occurs to it. I put aside at present the
obscurity which would be found in ideology and metaphysics, if they
were to discuss certain points according to the writings of the most
distinguished philosophers. Let us confine ourselves to the circle to
which the mathematics are naturally confined. Who that has studied
them is ignorant that you may reach a point in their theories, where
the mind finds nothing but obscurity? The demonstration is before
our eyes; it has been developed in all its parts; and yet the mind
wavers, feeling within itself a kind of uncertainty which it cannot
well describe. It sometimes happens that, after reasoning a long time,
the truth rushes upon us like the light of day; but it is not until we
have walked in darkness for a long period. When we fix our attention
upon those thoughts which wander in our minds like moving lights, on
those almost imperceptible emotions which, on these occasions, arise,
and then die away in the soul, we observe that the mind, in the midst
of its fluctuations, seeks instinctively for the anchor which is to be
found in the authority of another. To reassure ourselves completely, we
then invoke the authority of some great mathematicians, and we rejoice
that the fact is placed beyond a doubt by the series of great men who
have always viewed it in the same light. But perhaps our ignorance and
pride will not admit the truth of these reflections. Let us, then,
study these sciences, or at least read their history, and we shall
be convinced that they afford numerous proofs of the weakness of the
intellect.
Did not the extraordinary invention of Newton and Leibnitz find many
opponents in Europe? Were there not required to establish it, both the
sanction of time and the touchstone of experience, which made manifest
the truth of their principles and the exactness of their reasonings?
Do you believe that, if this invention were again, for the first time,
to make its appearance in the field of science, even fortified with
all the proofs which have been brought forward to strengthen it, and
surrounded with all the light which so many explanations have shed upon
it,--do you believe, I say, that it would not need a second time the
right of prescription, to regain its tranquil and undisturbed empire?
It is easy to suppose that the other sciences have no little share in
this uncertainty arising from the weakness of the human mind; as I do
not imagine that this assertion will be called in question, I pass on
to a few remarks on the peculiar character of the moral sciences.
The fact has not been sufficiently attended to, that there is no study
more deceptive than that of the moral sciences; I say deceptive,
because this study, seducing the mind by an appearance of facility,
draws it into difficulties which it is no easy matter to overcome. It
may be compared to those tranquil waters which, although apparently
but shallow, are in reality unfathomably deep. Familiarized from our
infancy with the language of this science, surrounded by its continual
applications, and having before our eyes its truths under a palpable
form, we possess a certain facility of speaking readily on many parts
of the subject; and we have the rashness to suppose that it would not
be difficult to master its highest principles and its most delicate
relations. But wonderful as it is, scarcely have we quitted the path
of common sense, and attempted to go beyond those simple impressions
which we have received from our mothers, when we find ourselves in a
labyrinth of confusion. If the mind gives itself up to subtilties, it
ceases to listen to the voice of the heart, which speaks to it with
equal simplicity and eloquence; if it does not repress its pride,
and attend to the wise counsels of good sense, it will be guilty
of despising those salutary and necessary truths, which have been
preserved by society to be transmitted from generation to generation:
it is then, while groping its way in the dark, that it falls into the
wildest extravagances, the lamentable effects of which are so often
exemplified in the history of the sciences.
If we observe attentively, we shall find something of the same kind
in all the sciences. The Creator has taken care to supply us with
knowledge necessary for the purposes of life, and for the attainment
of our destiny; but it has not pleased Him to gratify our curiosity by
discovering to us what was not necessary. Nevertheless, in some things
He has communicated to the mind a power which renders it capable of
constantly adding to its knowledge; but, with respect to moral truths,
it has been left sterile. What man is required to know, has been deeply
engraven on his heart, in characters simple and intelligible; or is
contained in the sacred volume; and moreover, he has had pointed out
to him, in the authority of the Church, a fixed rule, to which he can
apply to have his doubts explained. With respect to the rest, man
has been placed in such a position, that if he attempt to enter into
matters which are too subtle, he only wanders backwards and forwards
in the same road, at the extremities of which he finds on the one side
skepticism, on the other pure truth.
Perhaps some modern ideologists will urge, in opposition to this,
the result of their own analytical labours. "Before men began to
analyze facts," they will say, "and while they indulged in fanciful
systems, and satisfied themselves with verbal disputes without critical
examination, all this might be true; but now that we have explained
all the ideas of moral good and evil, in so perfect a way, and have
separated the prejudice in them from the true philosophy; now that
the whole system of morality is based upon the simple principles of
pleasure and pain, and we have given the clearest ideas of these
things, such, for example, as the sensations produced in us by an
orange; to maintain your assertion, is to be ungrateful towards
science, and to underrate the fruit of our labours."
I am aware of the labours of some moral ideologists, and I know with
what deceptive simplicity they develop their theories, by giving to
the most difficult things an easy turn, which affects to make them
intelligible to the most limited minds. This is not the place to
examine these analytical investigations, and their results. I shall,
however, remark that, in spite of their promised simplicity, it
does not appear that either society or science makes much progress
through their means, and that these opinions, although but a short
time broached, are already superannuated. This is not a matter of
astonishment to us; for it was easy to perceive that, in spite of
their positiveness, if I may be allowed to use the expression, these
ideologists are as hypothetical as many of their predecessors, who
are loaded by them with sarcasms and contempt. They are a poor,
narrow-minded school, devoid of the truth, and not even adorned by the
brilliant dreams of great men; a proud and deluded school, who fancy
they explain a fact, when they only obscure it; and prove a thing, when
they only assert it; and imagine that they analyze the human heart,
when they take it to pieces.
If such is the human mind; if such is its inability in matters of
science, whether physical or moral, that it has not advanced a single
step beyond the limit prescribed by a beneficent Providence; what
service has Protestantism rendered to modern society, by impairing the
force of authority, that power which could alone present an effectual
barrier to man's unhappy wanderings?[9]
CHAPTER VII.
INDIFFERENCE AND FANATICISM.
In rejecting the authority of the Church, and in adopting this
resistance as its only principle, Protestantism was compelled to seek
its whole support in man; thus to mistake the true character of the
human mind, and its relations with religious and moral truth, was to
throw itself, according to circumstances, into the opposite extremes of
fanaticism and indifference.
It may seem strange that these opposite errors should emanate from
the same source; and yet nothing is more certain. Protestantism, by
appealing to man alone in religious matters, had only two courses to
adopt; either to suppose men to be inspired by Heaven for the discovery
of truth, or to subject all religious truths to the examination of
reason. To submit religious truths to the judgment of reason was
sooner or later to produce indifference; on the other hand, private
inspiration must engender fanaticism.
There is a universal and constant fact in the history of the human
mind--viz. its decided inclination to invent systems in which the
reality of things is completely laid aside, and where we only see
the workings of a spirit which has chosen to quit the ordinary path
in order to give itself up to its own inspirations. The history
of philosophy is little else than a perpetual repetition of this
phenomenon, which the human mind shows, in some shape or other, in all
things which admit of it. When the mind has conceived a peculiar idea,
it regards it with that blind and exclusive predilection which is found
in the love of the father for his children. Under the influence of this
prejudice, the mind developes its ideas and accommodates facts to suit
it; that which at first was only an ingenious and extravagant idea,
becomes the germ of important doctrines; and if it arise in a person of
an ardent disposition, fanaticism, the cause of so much madness, is the
consequence.
The danger is very much increased when the new system applies to
religious matters, or is immediately connected with them. The
extravagances of a diseased mind are then looked upon as inspirations
from Heaven; the fever of delirium as a divine flame; and a mania of
being singular as an extraordinary vocation. Pride, unable to brook
opposition, rises against all that it finds established; it insults
all authority; it attacks all institutions; it despises everybody; it
conceals the grossest violence under the mantle of zeal, and ambition
under the name of apostleship. The dupe of himself rather than an
impostor, the wretched maniac sometimes becomes deeply persuaded that
his doctrines are true, and that he has received the commands of
Heaven. As there is something extraordinary and striking in the fiery
language of the madman, he communicates to those who listen to him a
portion of his insanity, and makes, in a short time, a considerable
number of proselytes. The men capable of playing the first part in
this scene of madness are not numerous, it is true; but unhappily the
majority of men are foolish enough to be easily led away. History and
experience sufficiently prove that the crowd are easily attracted, and
that to form a party, however criminal, extravagant, or ridiculous, it
is only necessary to raise a standard.
I wish to take this opportunity of making an observation which I have
never seen pointed out--viz. that the Church, in her contest with
heresy, has rendered an important service to the science which devotes
itself to the examination of the true character, tendency, and power
of the human mind. The zealous guardian of all great truths, she has
always known how to preserve them unimpaired; she was fully acquainted
with the weakness of the mind of man, and its extreme proneness to
folly and extravagance; she has followed it closely in all its steps,
has watched it in all its movements, and has constantly resisted it
with energy, when it attempted to pollute the pure fountain of which
she is the guardian. During the long and violent contests which she
has had with it, the Church has made manifest its incurable folly; she
has exhibited it on every side, and has shown it in all its forms.
Thus it is that, in the history of heresies, she has made an abundant
collection of facts, and has painted an extremely interesting picture
of the human mind, where its characteristic physiognomy is faithfully
represented; a picture which will doubtless be of great service in the
composition of the important work which is yet unwritten--viz. the true
history of the human mind.[10]
Certain it is that the ravings and extravagances of fanaticism have not
been wanting in the history of Europe for the last three hundred years.
Their monuments still remain; in whatever direction we turn our steps,
we find bloody traces of the fanatical sects produced by Protestantism,
and engendered by its fundamental principle. Nothing could confine this
devastating torrent, neither the violent character of Luther, nor the
furious efforts which he made to oppose every one who taught doctrines
different from his own. Impiety succeeded impiety, extravagance
extravagance, fanaticism fanaticism. The pretended Reformation was soon
divided into as many sects as there were found men with the ingenuity
to invent and the boldness to maintain a system of their own. This was
necessarily the case; for besides the danger of leaving the human mind
without a guide on all questions of religion, there was another cause
fruitful in fatal results, I mean the private interpretation of the
sacred books.
It was then found that the best things may be abused, and that these
divine volumes, which contain so much instruction for the mind, and so
much consolation for the heart, are full of danger to the proud. How
great will this be, if you add to the obstinate resolution of resisting
all authority in matters of faith, the false persuasion that the
meaning of the Scriptures is everywhere clear, and that, in all cases,
the inspirations of Heaven may be expected to solve every doubt? What
will happen to those who turn over their pages with a longing desire
to find some text which, more or less tortured, may seem to authorize
their sophisms, subtilties, and absurdities?
There never was a greater mistake than that which was committed by the
Protestant leaders, when they placed the Bible in the hands of all
for self-interpretation; never was the nature of that sacred volume
more completely lost sight of. It is true that Protestantism had no
other method to pursue, and that every objection which it could make
to the private interpretation of the sacred text would be a striking
inconsistency, an apostasy from its own principles, and a denial
of its own origin; but at the same time, this is its most decided
condemnation. What claim, indeed, can that religion have to truth and
sanctity whose fundamental principle contains the germ of sects the
most fanatical--the most injurious to society?
It would be difficult to collect into so narrow a space, in opposition
to this essential error of Protestantism, so many facts and convincing
proofs of this, as are contained in the following lines, written by
a Protestant, O'Callaghan, which, I have no doubt, my readers will
thank me for quoting here. "Led away," says O'Callaghan, "by their
spirit of opposition to the Church of Rome, the first Reformers
loudly proclaimed the right of interpreting the Scriptures according
to each one's private judgment; but in their eagerness to emancipate
the people from the authority of the Pope, they proclaimed this right
without explanation or restriction: and the consequences were fearful.
Impatient to undermine the papal jurisdiction, they maintained without
exception, that each individual has an incontestable right to interpret
the Scriptures for himself; and as this principle, carried to the
fullest extent, was not sustainable, they were obliged to rely for
support upon another, viz. that the Bible is an easy book, within the
comprehension of all minds, and that the divine revelations contained
in it are always clear to all; two propositions which, whether we
consider them together or apart, cannot withstand a serious attack.
"The private judgment of Muncer found in the Scriptures that titles
of nobility and great estates are impious usurpations, contrary to
the natural equality of the faithful, and he invited his followers
to examine if this were not the case. They examined into the matter,
praised God, and then proceeded by fire and sword to extirpate the
impious and possess themselves of their properties. Private judgment
made the discovery in the Bible that established laws were a permanent
restriction on Christian liberty; and, behold, John of Leyden, throwing
away his tools, put himself at the head of a mob of fanatics, surprised
the town of Munster, proclaimed himself king of Sion, and took fourteen
wives at a time, asserting that polygamy is Christian liberty, and the
privilege of the saints. But if the criminal madness of these men in
another country is afflicting to the friends of humanity and of real
piety, certainly the history of England, during a great part of the
seventeenth century, is not calculated to console them. During that
period an immense number of fanatics appeared, sometimes together
and sometimes in succession, intoxicated with extravagant doctrines
and mischievous passions, from the fierce ravings of Fox to the more
methodical madness of Barclay; from the formidable fanaticism of
Cromwell to the silly profanity of 'Praise God Barebones.' Piety,
reason, and good sense seemed to be extinct on earth, and to be
succeeded by an extravagant jargon, a religious frenzy, and a zeal
without discretion. All quoted the Scriptures, all pretended to have
had inspirations, visions, and spiritual ecstasies, and all, indeed,
had equal claims to them. It was strongly maintained that it was proper
to abolish the priesthood and the royal dignity, because priests
were the ministers of Satan, and kings the delegates of the whore
of Babylon, and that the existence of both were inconsistent with
the reign of the Redeemer. The fanatics condemned science as a Pagan
invention, and universities as seminaries of antichristian impiety.
Bishops were not protected by the sanctity of their functions, or kings
by the majesty of the throne; both, as objects of contempt and hatred,
were mercilessly put to death by these fanatics, whose only book was
the Bible, without note or comment. During this time, the enthusiasm
for prayer, preaching, and the reading of the sacred books was at
the highest point; everybody prayed, preached, and read, but nobody
listened. The greatest atrocities were justified by the Scriptures; in
the most ordinary transactions of life, scriptural language was made
use of; national affairs, foreign and domestic, were discussed in the
phraseology of Holy Writ. There were scriptural plots, conspiracies,
and proscriptions; and all this was not only justified but even
sanctified by quotations from the word of God. These facts, attested
by history, have often astonished and alarmed men of virtue and piety,
_but the reader, too much imbued with his own ideas, forgets the lesson
to be learnt by this fatal experience; namely, that the Bible without
note or comment was not intended to be read by rude and ignorant men_.
"The majority of mankind must be content to receive the instructions
of others, and are not enabled to trust themselves. The most important
truths in medicine, in jurisprudence, in physics, in mathematics, must
be received from those who drink at the fountain head. The same plan
has in general been pursued with respect to Christianity; and whenever
the departure from it has been wide enough, '_society has been shaken
to its foundation_.'"
These words of O'Callaghan do not require any comment. It cannot be
said that they are hyperbolical or declamatory, as they are only a
simple and faithful narration of acknowledged facts. The recollection
of these events should suffice to prove the danger of placing the
sacred Scriptures, without note or comment, into the hands of all,
as Protestantism does, under the pretence, that the authority of the
Church is useless for understanding the holy books; and that every
Christian has only to listen to the dictates which generally emanate
from his passions and heated imagination. By this error alone, if it
had committed no other, Protestantism is self-reproved and condemned;
for it is a religion which has established a principle destructive to
itself. In order to appreciate the madness of Protestantism on this
point, and to see how false and dangerous is the position which it
has assumed with regard to the human mind, it is not necessary to be
a theologian, or a Catholic; it is enough to have read the Scriptures
with the eyes of a philosopher or a man of literature. Here is a
book which comprises, within a limited compass, the period of four
thousand years, and advances further towards the most distant future,
by embracing the origin and destiny of man and the universe--a book
which, with the continued history of a chosen people, intermingles, in
its narrations and prophecies, the revolutions of mighty empires--a
book which, side by side with the magnificent pictures of the power and
splendor of Eastern monarchs, describes, in simple colors, the plain
domestic manners, the candor, and innocence of a young nation--a book
in which historians relate, sages proclaim their maxims of wisdom,
apostles preach, and doctors instruct--a book in which prophets,
under the influence of the divine Spirit, thunder against the errors
and corruptions of the people, and announce the vengeance of the God
of Sinai, or pour forth inconsolable lamentations on the captivity
of their brethren, and the desolation and solitude of their country;
where they relate, in wonderful and sublime language, the magnificent
spectacles which are presented to their eyes; where, in moments of
ecstasy, they see pass before them the events of society and the
catastrophes of nature, although veiled in mysterious figures and
visions of obscurity--a book, or rather a collection of books, where
are to be found all sorts of styles and all varieties of narrative,
epic majesty, pastoral simplicity, lyric fire, serious instruction,
grave historical narrative, and lively and rapid dramatic action; a
collection of books, in fine, written at various times and in various
languages, in various countries, and under the most peculiar and
extraordinary circumstances. Must not all this confuse the heads of
men who, puffed up with their own conceit, grope through these pages
in the dark, ignorant of climates, times, laws, customs, and manners?
They will be puzzled by allusions, surprised by images, deceived by
expressions; they will hear the Greek and Hebrew, which was written in
those remote ages, now spoken in a modern idiom. What effects must all
these circumstances produce on the minds of readers who believe that
the Bible is an easy book, to be understood without difficulty by all?
Persuaded that they do not require the instructions of others, they
must either resolve all these difficulties by their own reflections,
or trust to that individual inspiration which they believe will not be
wanting to explain to them the loftiest mysteries. Who, after this,
can be astonished that Protestantism has produced so many absurd
visionaries and furious fanatics?[11]
CHAPTER VIII.
FANATICISM--ITS DEFINITION.--FANATICISM IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.
It would be unjust to charge a religion with falsehood, merely because
fanatics are to be found within its bosom. This would be to reject
all, because none are to be found exempt from them. A religion, then,
is not to be condemned because it has them, but because it produces
them, urges them on, and opens a field for them. If we observe closely,
we shall find at the bottom of the human heart an abundant source
of fanaticism; the history of man affords us many proofs of this
incontestable truth. Imagine whatever delusion you please, relate the
most extravagant visions, invent the most absurd system, if you only
take care to give to all a religious coloring, you may be sure that you
will have enthusiastic followers, who will heartily devote themselves
to the propagation of your doctrines, and will espouse your cause
blindly and ardently; in other words, you will have under your standard
a troop of fanatics.
Philosophers have devoted many pages to declamation against fanaticism;
they have, as it were, assumed the mission of banishing it from the
earth. They have tired mankind with philosophical lectures, and have
thundered against the monster with all the vigor of their eloquence.
They used the word, however, in so wide a sense as to include all kind
of religion. But, if they had confined themselves to attacking real
fanaticism, I believe they would have done much better if they had
devoted some time to the examination of this matter in an analytic
spirit, and had treated it, after so doing, maturely, calmly, and
without prejudice.
Inasmuch as these philosophers were aware that fanaticism is a natural
infirmity of the human mind, they could, if they were men of sen
Showing first 200,000 characters. Full text: gutenberg.org/ebooks/50436