Life of Napoleon Bonaparte, Volume IV.
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Title: Life of Napoleon Bonaparte, Volume IV.
Author: Walter Scott
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Most recently updated: October 24, 2024
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, VOLUME IV. ***
LIFE OF NAPOLEON
POCKET EDITION
VOL. IV.
LIFE OF
NAPOLEON BONAPARTE
BY SIR WALTER SCOTT, BART.
VOL. 4.
[Illustration: Mayence]
EDINBURGH; A. & C. BLACK.
1876
CONTENTS.
PAGE
CHAP. XLIX.--Conduct of Russia and England during the War with
Austria--Meditated Expedition of British Troops to the Continent--Sent
to Walcheren--Its Calamitous Details and Result--Proceedings of
Napoleon with regard to the Pope--General Miollis enters
Rome--Napoleon publishes a Decree, uniting the States of the Church to
the French Empire--Is Excommunicated--Pius VII. is banished from Rome,
and sent to Grenoble--afterwards brought back to Savona--Buonaparte is
attacked by an Assassin--Definitive Treaty of Peace signed at
Schoenbrun--Napoleon returns to France on the 14th November, 1809, 1
CHAP. L.--Change in Napoleon's Domestic Life--Causes which led to
it--His anxiety for an Heir--A Son of his Brother Louis is fixed upon,
but dies in Childhood--Character and influence of Josephine--Strong
mutual Attachment betwixt her and Napoleon--Fouché opens to Josephine
the Plan of a Divorce--Her extreme Distress--On 5th December, Napoleon
announces her Fate to Josephine--On 15th they are formally separated
before the Imperial Council--Josephine retaining the rank of Empress
for Life--Espousals of Buonaparte and Maria Louisa of Austria take
place at Vienna, 11th March, 1810, 17
CHAP. LI.--Almost all the Foreign French Settlements fall into the
hands of the British--French Squadron destroyed at the Isle of Aix, by
Lord Cochrane--and at the Isle of Rosas, by Lord Collingwood--Return
to the Proceedings in Spain--Soult takes Oporto--Attacked and Defeated
by Sir Arthur Wellesley--Ferrol and Corunna retaken by the
Patriots--Battle of Talavera, gained by Sir Arthur Wellesley--Created
Lord Wellington--The French Armies take many Towns and Strong
Places--Supreme Junta Retreat to Cadiz--The Guerilla System--Growing
Disappointment of Buonaparte--His immense Exertions--Battle of
Busaco--Lord Wellington's famous Retreat on Torres Vedras, 28
CHAP. LII.--Change in Napoleon's Principles of Government--Becomes
suspicious of Talleyrand and Fouché--Fouché endeavours, without the
knowledge of Napoleon, to ascertain the Views of England with respect
to Peace--His Plan is defeated by a singular Collision with a similar
one of Napoleon--and Fouché is sent away as Governor-General of
Rome--His Moral and Political Character--Murmurings of the People
against the Austrian Alliance--Continental System--Ignorance of
Napoleon of the Actual Political Feelings of Great Britain--The
License System--Louis Buonaparte--Endeavours in vain to Defend Holland
from the Effects of the Continental System--He Abdicates the Throne,
and retires to Gratz in Styria--Holland is annexed to the French
Empire, 41
CHAP. LIII.--Gustavus IV. of Sweden is Dethroned and succeeded by his
Uncle--The Crown Prince killed by a fall from his Horse--Candidates
proposed for the Succession--The Swedes, thinking to conciliate
Napoleon, fix on Bernadotte--Buonaparte reluctantly acquiesces in the
Choice--Parting Interview between Bernadotte and Napoleon--Subsequent
attempts of the latter to bind Sweden to the Policy of France--The
Crown Prince unwillingly accedes to the Continental System--Napoleon
makes a Tour through Flanders and Holland--Returns to Paris, and takes
measures for extending the Continental System--Seizure of the
Valois--Coast along the German Ocean annexed to France--Protest by the
Czar against the appropriation of Oldenburg--Russia allows the
Importation, at certain Seaports, of various articles of British
Commerce--Negotiations for Exchange of Prisoners between France and
England; and for a General Peace, broken off by Buonaparte's
unreasonable demands, 59
CHAP. LIV.--View of Napoleon's gigantic Power--The Empress Maria
Louisa delivered of a Son--Criticism on the Title given him, of King
of Rome--Speculations in regard to the advantages or disadvantages
arising from this Event--Retrospect--Ex-Queen of Etruria--Her severe
and unjustifiable Treatment by Napoleon--Lucien Buonaparte is invited
to England, where he writes Epic Poetry--Attempt to deliver Ferdinand,
defeated--Operations in Portugal--Retreat of Massena--Battles of
Fuentes d'Onoro fought by Lord Wellington--On the South Frontier of
Portugal, by Lord Beresford--Of Barossa, by General Graham--Enterprise
of Arroyo-Molinas--Spaniards defeated under Blake--Valencia captured
by the French, and he and his Army made Prisoners of War--Disunion
among the French Generals--Joseph wishes to abdicate the Throne of
Spain, 72
CHAP. LV.--Retrospect of the Causes leading to the Rupture with
Russia--Originate in the Treaty of Tilsit--Russia's alleged Reasons of
Complaint--Arguments of Napoleon's Counsellors against War with
Russia--Fouché is against the War--Presents a Memorial to Napoleon
upon the Subject--His answer--Napoleon's Views in favour of the War,
as urged to his various Advisers, 86
CHAP. LVI.--Allies on whose assistance Buonaparte might count--Causes
which alienated from him the Prince-Royal of Sweden--who signs a
Treaty with Russia--Delicate situation of the King of Prussia, whose
alliance the Emperor Alexander on that account declines--A Treaty with
France dictated to Prussia--Relations between Austria and France--in
order to preserve them Buonaparte is obliged to come under an
Engagement not to Revolutionize Poland--His error of Policy in
neglecting to cultivate the alliance of the Porte--Amount of
Buonaparte's Army--Levies for the Protection of France in the
Emperor's absence--Storming of Ciudad Rodrigo by Lord
Wellington--Buonaparte makes Overtures of Peace to Lord
Castlereagh--The Correspondence broken off--Ultimatum of Russia
rejected--Napoleon sets out from Paris, 9th May, 1812--and meets the
Sovereigns his allies at Dresden--A last attempt of Napoleon to
negotiate with Alexander proves unsuccessful, 95
CHAP. LVII.--Napoleon's Plan of the Campaign against
Russia--Understood and provided against by Barclay de Tolly, the
Russian Generalissimo--Statement of the Grand French Army--Of the
Grand Russian Army--Disaster on the River Wilia--Difficulties of the
Campaign, on the part of the French--Their defective Commissariat and
Hospital Department--Cause of Buonaparte's determination to
advance--His forced Marches occasion actual Delay--Napoleon remains
for some days at Wilna--Abbé de Pradt--His intrigues to excite the
Poles--Neutralized by Napoleon's engagements with Austria--An attempt
to excite Insurrection in Lithuania also fails, 113
CHAP. LVIII.--Proceedings of the Army under Prince
Bagration--Napoleon's manœuvres against him--King Jerome of
Westphalia is disgraced for alleged inactivity--Bagration is defeated
by Davoust, but succeeds in gaining the interior of Russia, and
re-establishing his communication with the Grand Army--which retreats
to Drissa--Barclay and Bagration meet at Smolensk on the 20th
July--The French Generals become anxious that Napoleon should close
the campaign at Witepsk for the season--He persists in
proceeding--Smolensk evacuated by De Tolly, after setting fire to the
place--Reduced condition of the French, and growing strength of the
Russian Armies--Peace effected between Russia, and England, Sweden,
and Turkey--Napoleon resolves to advance upon Moscow, 127
CHAP. LIX.--Napoleon detaches Murat and other Generals in pursuit of
the Russians--Bloody, but indecisive Action, at Valoutina--Barclay de
Tolly's defensive System relinquished, and Koutousoff appointed to the
chief command of the Russian Army--Napoleon advances from
Smolensk--Battle of Borodino fought, on 5th September--Prince
Bagration slain--Koutousoff Retreats upon Mojaisk, and thence upon
Moscow--Napoleon continues his Advance on the 12th--Count Rostopchin,
Governor of Moscow--His Character--The Russians abandon Moscow, which
is evacuated by the Inhabitants--The Grand Russian Army marches
through Moscow--Last public Court of Justice held there by Rostopchin,
after which he follows the march of the Army, 141
CHAP. LX.--On 14th September, Napoleon reaches Moscow, which he finds
deserted by the Inhabitants--The City is discovered to be on
fire--Napoleon takes up his quarters in the Kremlin--The fire is stopt
next day, but arises again at night--Believed to be wilful, and
several Russians apprehended and shot--On the third night, the Kremlin
is discovered to be on Fire--Buonaparte leaves it, and takes his abode
at Petrowsky--The Fire rages till the 19th, when four-fifths of the
City are burnt down--On the 20th, Buonaparte returns to the
Kremlin--Discussion as to the Origin of this great
Conflagration--Disorganisation and Indiscipline of the French
Army--Difficulty as to the Route on leaving Moscow--Lauriston sent
with a Letter to the Emperor Alexander--Retrospect of the March of the
Russian Army, after leaving Moscow--Lauriston has an Interview with
Koutousoff on 5th October--The Result--Armistice made by
Murat--Preparations for Retreat--The Emperor Alexander refuses to
treat, 151
CHAP. LXI.--Murat's Armistice broken off--Napoleon leaves Moscow on
19th October--Bloody Skirmish at Malo-Yarrowslavetz--Napoleon in great
danger while reconnoitring--He Retreats to Vereia, where he meets
Mortier and the Young Guard--Winzingerode made Prisoner, and insulted
by Buonaparte--The Kremlin is blown up by the French--Napoleon
continues his Retreat towards Poland--Its Horrors--Conflict near
Wiazma, on 3d November, where the French lose 4000 Men--Cross the
River Wiazma during the Night--The Viceroy of Italy reaches Smolensk,
in great distress--Buonaparte arrives at Smolensk, with the headmost
Division of the Grand Army--Calamitous Retreat of Ney's Division--The
whole French Army now collected at Smolensk--Cautious conduct of
Prince Schwartzenberg--Winzingerode freed on his road to Paris by a
body of Cossacks--Tchitchagoff occupies Minsk--Perilous situation of
Napoleon, 166
CHAP. LXII.--Napoleon divides his Army into four Corps, which leaves
Smolensk on their Retreat towards Poland--Cautious proceedings of
Koutousoff--The Viceroy's Division is attacked by Miloradowitch, and
effects a junction with Napoleon at Krasnoi, after severe
loss--Koutousoff attacks the French at Krasnoi; but only by a distant
Cannonade--The division under Davoust is reunited to Napoleon, but in
a miserable state--Napoleon marches to Liady; and Mortier and Davoust
are attacked, and suffer heavy loss--Details of the Retreat of Ney--He
crosses the Losmina, with great loss of Men and Baggage, and joins
Napoleon at Orcsa, with his Division reduced to 1500 men--The whole
Grand Army is now reduced to 12,000 effective men, besides 30,000
stragglers--Dreadful Distress and Difficulties of Buonaparte and his
Army--Singular scene betwixt Napoleon and Duroc and Daru--Napoleon
moves towards Borizoff, and falls in with the Corps of Victor and
Oudinot--Koutousoff halts at Kopyn, without attacking
Buonaparte--Napoleon crosses the Beresina at Studzianka--Partouneaux's
division cut off by Witgenstein--Severe Fighting on both sides of the
River--Dreadful losses of the French in crossing it--According to the
Russian official account, 36,000 bodies were found in the Beresina
after the thaw, 188
CHAP. LXIII.--Napoleon determines to return to Paris--He leaves
Smorgoni on 5th December--reaches Warsaw on the 10th--Curious
Interview with the Abbé de Pradt--Arrives at Dresden on the 14th--and
at Paris on the 18th at Midnight--Dreadful State of the Grand Army,
when left by Napoleon--Arrive at Wilna, whence they are driven by the
Cossacks, directing their Flight upon Kowno--Dissensions among the
French Generals--Cautious Policy of the Austrians under
Schwartzenberg--Precarious state of Macdonald--He Retreats upon
Tilsit--D'Yorck separates his Troops from the French--Macdonald
effects his Retreat to Königsberg--Close of the Russian Expedition,
with a loss on the part of the French of 450,000 Men in Killed and
Prisoners--Discussion of the Causes which led to this ruinous
Catastrophe, 203
CHAP. LXIV.--Effects of Napoleon's return upon the
Parisians--Congratulations and Addresses by all the Public
Functionaries--Conspiracy of Mallet--very nearly successful--How at
last defeated--The impression made by this event upon
Buonaparte--Discussions with the Pope, who is brought to France, but
remains inflexible--State of Affairs in Spain--Napoleon's great and
successful exertions to Recruit his Army--Guards of Honour--In the
month of April, the Army is raised to 350,000 men, independently of
the Troops left in Garrison in Germany, and in Spain and Italy, 224
CHAP. LXV.--Murat leaves the Grand Army abruptly--Eugene appointed in
his place--Measures taken by the King of Prussia for his
disenthraldom--He leaves Berlin for Breslau--Treaty signed between
Russia and Prussia early in March--Alexander arrives at Breslau on
15th; on the 16th Prussia declares War against France--Warlike
preparations of Prussia--Universal enthusiasm--Blucher appointed
Generalissimo--Vindication of the Crown Prince of Sweden for joining
the Confederacy against France--Proceedings of Austria--Unabated
spirit and pretensions of Napoleon--A Regency is appointed in France
during his absence--and Maria Louisa appointed Regent, with nominal
powers, 234
CHAP. LXVI.--State of the French Grand Army--The Russians advance, and
show themselves on the Elbe--The French evacuate Berlin, and retreat
on the Elbe--The Crown-Prince of Sweden joins the Allies, with 35,000
Men--Dresden is occupied by the Sovereigns of Russia and
Prussia--Marshal Bessières killed on 1st May--Battle of Lutzen fought
on the 2d--The Allies retire to Bautzen--Hamburgh taken possession of
by the Danes and French--Battle of Bautzen fought on the 20th and 21st
May--The Allies retire in good order--The French Generals, Bruyères
and Duroc, killed on the 22d--Grief of Napoleon for the death of the
latter--An Armistice signed on 4th June, 244
CHAP. LXVII.--Change in the results formerly produced by the French
Victories--Despondency of the Generals--Decay in the discipline of the
Troops--Views of Austria--Arguments in favour of Peace stated and
discussed--Pertinacity of Napoleon--State of the French Interior--hid
from him by the slavery of the Press--Interview betwixt Napoleon and
the Austrian Minister Metternich--Delays in the Negotiations--Plan of
Pacification proposed by Austria, on 7th August--The Armistice broken
off on the 10th, when Austria joins the Allies--Sudden placability of
Napoleon at this period--Ascribed to the news of the Battle of
Vittoria, 256
CHAP. LXVIII.--Amount and distribution of the French Army at the
resumption of Hostilities--of the Armies of the Allies--Plan of the
Campaign on both sides--Return of Moreau from America, to join the
Allies--Attack on Dresden by the Allies on 26th August--Napoleon
arrives to its succour--Battle continued on the 27th--Death of General
Moreau--Defeat and Retreat of the Allies, with great loss--Napoleon
returns from the pursuit to Dresden, indisposed--Vandamme attacks the
Allies at Culm--is driven back towards Peterswald--Conflict on the
heights of Peterswald--Vandamme is Defeated and made prisoner--Effects
of the victory of Culm, on the Allies--and on Napoleon, 268
CHAP. LXIX.--Military Proceedings in the North of Germany--Luckau
submits to the Crown-Prince of Sweden--Battles of Gross-Beeren and
Katzbach--Operations of Ney upon Berlin--He is defeated at Dennewitz,
on the 6th September--Difficult and embarrassing situation of
Napoleon--He abandons all the right side of the Elbe to the
Allies--Operations of the Allies in order to effect a
junction--Counter-exertions of Napoleon--The French Generals averse to
continuing the War in Germany--Dissensions betwixt them and the
Emperor--Napoleon at length resolves to retreat upon Leipsic, 279
CHAP. LXX.--Napoleon reaches Leipsic on 15th of October--Statement of
the French and Allied Forces--BATTLE OF LEIPSIC, commenced on 16th,
and terminates with disadvantage to the French at nightfall--Napoleon
despatches General Mehrfeldt (his prisoner) to the Emperor of Austria,
with proposals for an armistice--No answer is returned--The Battle is
renewed on the morning of the 18th, and lasts till night, when the
French are compelled to retreat, after immense loss on both
sides--They evacuate Leipsic on the 19th, the Allies in full
pursuit--Blowing up of one of the bridges--Prince Poniatowski drowned
in the Elster--25,000 French are made prisoners--The Allied Sovereigns
meet in triumph, at noon, in the Great Square at Leipsic--King of
Saxony sent under a Guard to Berlin--Reflections, 289
CHAP. LXXI.--Retreat of the French from Germany--General Defection of
Napoleon's Partisans--Battle of Hannau fought on 30th and 31st
October--Napoleon arrives at Paris on 9th November--State in which he
finds the public mind in the capital--Fate of the French Garrisons
left in Germany--Arrival of the Allied Armies on the banks of the
Rhine--General view of Napoleon's political
relations--Italy--Spain--Restoration of Ferdinand--Liberation of the
Pope, who returns to Rome--Emancipation of Holland, 303
CHAP. LXXII.--Preparations of Napoleon against the Invasion of
France--Terms of Peace offered by the Allies--Congress held at
Manheim--Lord Castlereagh--Manifesto of the Allies--Buonaparte's
Reply--State of Parties in France--The Population of France, in
general, wearied of the War, and desirous of the Deposition of
Buonaparte--His unsuccessful attempts to arouse the National
Spirit--Council of State Extraordinary, held Nov. 11th, when new taxes
are imposed, and a new Conscription of 300,000 men decreed--Gloom of
the Council, and violence of Buonaparte--Report of the State of the
Nation presented to Napoleon by the Legislative Body--The Legislative
Body is prorogued--Unceasing activity of the Emperor--National Guard
called out--Napoleon, presenting to them his Empress and Child, takes
leave of the People--He leaves Paris for the Armies, 317
CHAP. LXXIII.--Declaration of the Allies on entering
France--Switzerland--Schwartzenberg crosses the Rhine--Apathy of the
French--Junction of Blucher with the Grand Army--Crown-Prince of
Sweden--Inferiority of Napoleon's numerical Force--Battles of
Brienne--and La Rothière--Difficulties of Buonaparte, during which he
meditates to resign the Crown--He makes a successful Attack on the
Silesian Army at Champ-Aubert--Blucher is compelled to retreat--The
Grand Army carries Nogent and Montereau--Buonaparte's violence to his
Generals--The Austrians resolve on a general Retreat, as far as Nancy
and Langres--Prince Wenceslaus sent to Buonaparte's headquarters--The
French enter Troyes--Execution of Goualt, a Royalist--A Decree of
Death against all wearing the Bourbon emblems, and all Emigrants who
should join the Allies, 333
CHAP. LXXIV.--Retrospect of Events on the Frontiers--Defection of
Murat--Its consequences--Augereau abandons Franche Comté--Carnot
intrusted with the command of Antwerp--Attack on Bergen-op-Zoom, by
Sir Thomas Graham--The Allies take, and evacuate Soissons--Bulow and
Winzegerode unite with Blucher--Wellington forces his way through the
Pays des Gaves--Royalists in the West--Discontent of the old
Republicans--Views of the different Members of the Alliance as to the
Dynasties of Bourbon, and Napoleon--Proceedings of the Dukes of Berri
and Angoulême, and Monsieur--Battle of Orthez--Bourdeaux surrendered
to Marshal Beresford--Negotiations of Chatillon--Treaty of
Chaumont--Napoleon's contre-projet--Congress at Chatillon broken up, 353
APPENDIX--
No. I.--Reflections on the Conduct of Napoleon towards the
Prince-Royal of Sweden, 373
No. II.--Extract from Manuscript Observations on Napoleon's Russian
Campaign, by an English Officer of Rank, 378
[Illustration: FRANCE,
TO ILLUSTRATE THE CAMPAIGNS OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.]
CHAPTER XLIX.
_Conduct of Russia and England during the War with
Austria--Meditated Expedition of British Troops to the
Continent--Sent to Walcheren--Its Calamitous Details and
Result--Proceedings of Napoleon with regard to the Pope--General
Miollis enters Rome--Napoleon publishes a Decree, uniting the States
of the Church to the French Empire--Is Excommunicated--Pius VII. is
banished from Rome, and sent to Grenoble--afterwards brought back to
Savona--Buonaparte is attacked by an Assassin--Definitive Treaty of
Peace signed at Schoenbrun--Napoleon returns to France on the 14th
November, 1809._
The particular conditions of the peace with Austria were not adjusted
until the 14th October, 1809, although the armistice was signed nearly
three months before. We avail ourselves of the interval to notice other
remarkable events, which happened during this eventful summer; and
first, we must briefly revert to the conduct of Russia and England
during the war.
Notwithstanding the personal friendship betwixt the Emperors Alexander
and Napoleon--notwithstanding their engagements entered into at Tilsit,
and so lately revived at Erfurt, it seems to have been impossible to
engage Russia heartily as an ally of Napoleon, in a war which had the
destruction or absolute humiliation of Austria. The Court of St.
Petersburgh had, it is true, lost no time in securing the advantages
which had been stipulated for Russia in the conferences alluded to.
Finland had been conquered, torn from Sweden, to which the province had
so long belonged, and united with Russia, to whom it furnished a most
important frontier and barrier.[1] Russia was also, with connivance of
France, making war on the Porte, in order to enlarge her dominions by
the addition of Moldavia and Wallachia. But though the Court of St.
Petersburgh had gained one of these advantages, and was in a way of
obtaining the other, the Russian Ministers saw with anxiety the
impending fate of Austria, the rather that they themselves were bound by
treaty to lend their aid for her destruction. We have seen that Russia
had interposed to prevent the war. She was now unwillingly compelled to
take part in it; yet when Prince Galatzin marched into Galicia at the
head of 30,000 Russians, the manifesto which he published could be
hardly termed that of a hostile nation. The Emperor, it stated, had done
all in his power to prevent things from coming to this extremity; but
now, the war having actually broken out, he was bound by the faith of
treaties to send the stipulated number of auxiliaries.[2] The motions of
this body of Russians were slow, and their conduct in the Austrian
dominions rather that of allies than enemies. Some of the Russian
officers of rank avowed their politics to be in direct opposition to
those of the Emperor, and declared that three-fourths of the generals
commanding territorial divisions in Russia were of their opinion. These
expressions, with the unusual slowness and lenity just alluded to, were
for the present passed over without remark, but were recorded and
remembered as matter of high offence, when Napoleon thought that the
time was come to exact from Russia a severe account for every thing in
which she had disappointed his expectations.
The exertions of England, at the same period, were of a nature and upon
a scale to surprise the world. It seemed as if her flag literally
overshadowed the whole seas on the coasts of Italy, Spain, the Ionian
Islands, the Baltic Sea. Wherever there was the least show of resistance
to the yoke of Buonaparte, the assistance of the English was appealed
to, and was readily afforded. In Spain, particularly, the British
troops, led by a general whose name began soon to be weighed against
those of the best French commanders, displayed their usual gallantry
under auspices which no longer permitted it to evaporate in actions of
mere eclat.
Yet the British administration, while they had thus embraced a broader
and more adventurous, but at the same time a far wiser system of
conducting the war, showed in one most important instance, that they, or
a part of them, were not entirely free from the ancient prejudices,
which had so long rendered vain the efforts of Britain in favour of the
liberties of the world. The general principle was indeed adopted, that
the expeditions of Britain should be directed where they could do the
cause of Europe the most benefit, and the interests of Napoleon the
greatest harm; but still there remained a lurking wish that they could
be so directed, as, at the same time, to acquire some peculiar and
separate advantage to England, and to secure the accomplishment of what
was called a British object. Some of the English ministers might thus
be said to resemble the ancient converts from Judaism, who, in embracing
the Christian faith, still held themselves bound by the ritual, and
fettered by the prejudices of the Jewish people, separated as they were
from the rest of mankind.
It is no wonder that the voice of what is in reality selfishness, is
listened to in national councils with more respect than it deserves,
since in that case it wears the mask and speaks the language of a
species of patriotism, against which it can only be urged, that it is
too exclusive in its zeal. Its effects, however, are not the less to be
regretted, as disabling strong minds, and misleading wise men; of which
the history of Britain affords but too many instances.
[Sidenote: BRITISH EXPEDITION]
Besides the forces already in the Peninsula, Britain had the means of
disposing of, and the will to send to the continent, 40,000 men, with a
fleet of thirty-five ships of the line, and twenty frigates, to assist
on any point where their services could have been useful. Such an
armament on the coast of Spain might have brought to a speedy decision
the long and bloody contest in that country, saved much British blood,
which the protracted war wasted, and struck a blow, the effects of
which, as that of Trafalgar, Buonaparte might have felt on the banks of
the Danube. Such an armament, if sent to the north of Germany, ere the
destruction of Schill and the defeat of the Duke of Brunswick's
enterprise, might have been the means of placing all the northern
provinces in active opposition to France, by an effort for which the
state of the public mind was already prepared. A successful action would
even have given spirits to Prussia, and induced that depressed kingdom
to resume the struggle for her independence. In a word, Britain might
have had the honour of kindling the same flame, which, being excited by
Russia in 1813, was the means of destroying the French influence in
Germany, and breaking up the Confederation of the Rhine.
Unhappily, neither of these important objects seemed to the planners of
this enterprise to be connected in a manner sufficiently direct, with
objects exclusively interesting to Britain. It was therefore agreed,
that the expedition should be sent against the strong fortresses, swampy
isles, and dangerous coasts of the Netherlands, in order to seek for
dock-yards to be destroyed, and ships to be carried off. Antwerp was
particularly aimed at. But, although Napoleon attached great importance
to the immense naval yards and docks which he had formed in the Scheldt,
yet, weighed with the danger and difficulty of an attack upon them, the
object of destroying them seems to have been very inadequate. Admitting
that Buonaparte might succeed in building ships in the Scheldt, or
elsewhere, there was no possibility, in the existing state of the world,
that he could have been able to get sailors to man them; unless, at
least, modern seamen could have been bred on dry land, like the crews of
the Roman galleys during the war with Carthage. If even the ships could
have been manned, it would have been long ere Napoleon, with his utmost
exertions, could have brought out of the Scheldt such a fleet as would
not have been defeated by half their own numbers of British ships. The
dangers arising to Britain from the naval establishments in the Scheldt
were remote, nor was the advantage of destroying them, should such
destruction be found possible, commensurate with the expense and hazard
of the enterprise which was directed against them. Besides, before
Antwerp could be attacked, the islands of Beveland and Walcheren were to
be taken possession of, and a long amphibious course of hostilities was
to be maintained, to enable the expedition to reach the point where
alone great results were expected.
The commander-in-chief was the Earl of Chatham, who, inheriting the
family talents of his father, the great minister, was remarkable for a
spirit of inactivity and procrastination, the consequences of which had
been felt in all the public offices which he held, and which, therefore,
were likely to be peculiarly fatal in an expedition requiring the utmost
celerity and promptitude of action. It is remarkable, that though these
points in Lord Chatham's character were generally known, the public
voice at the time, in deference to the talents which distinguished his
house, did not censure the nomination.
[Sidenote: WALCHEREN.]
Upon the 30th of July, the English disembarked on the islands of South
Beveland and Walcheren; on the 1st of August they attacked Flushing, the
principal place in the neighbourhood, by land and sea. On the 15th of
August, the place surrendered, and its garrison, four or five thousand
men strong, were sent prisoners of war to England. But here the success
of the British ended. The French, who had at first been very much
alarmed, had time to recover from their consternation. Fouché, then at
the head of the police, and it may be said of the government, (for he
exercised for the time the power of minister of the interior,) showed
the utmost readiness in getting under arms about 40,000 national guards,
to replace the regular soldiers, of which the Low Countries had been
drained. In awakening the military ardour of the citizens of France, in
which he succeeded to an unusual degree, Fouché made use of these
expressions:--"Let Europe see, that if the genius of Napoleon gives
glory to France, still his presence is not necessary to enable her to
repel her enemies from her soil." This phrase expressed more
independence than was agreeable to Napoleon, and was set down as
intimating a self-sufficiency, which counterbalanced the services of the
minister.[3]
Neither did Fouché's selection of a military chief to command the new
levies, prove more acceptable. Bernadotte, whom we have noticed as a
general of republican fame, had been, at the time of Buonaparte's
elevation, opposed to his interests, and attached to those of the
Directory. Any species of rivalry, or pretence of dispute between them,
was long since ended; yet still Bernadotte was scarce accounted an
attached friend of the Emperor, though he was in some sort connected
with the house of Napoleon, having married a sister-in-law of Joseph,
the intrusive King of Spain[4]. In the campaign of Vienna, which we have
detailed, Bernadotte, (created Prince of Ponte Corvo,) commanded a
division of Saxons, and had incurred Buonaparte's censure more than
once, and particularly at the battle of Wagram, for the slowness of his
movements. The Prince of Ponte Corvo came, therefore, to Paris in a sort
of disgrace, where Fouché, in conjunction with Clarke, the minister at
war, invited him to take on himself the defence of Antwerp. Bernadotte
hesitated to accept the charge; but having at length done so, he availed
himself of the time afforded by the English to put the place in a
complete state of defence, and assembled within, and under its walls,
above thirty thousand men. The country was inundated by opening the
sluices; strong batteries were erected on both sides of the Scheldt, and
the ascending that river became almost impossible.[5]
The British naval and military officers also disagreed among themselves,
as often happens where difficulties multiply, and there appears no
presiding spirit to combat and control them. The final objects of the
expedition were therefore abandoned; the navy returned to the English
ports, and the British forces were concentrated--for what reason, or
with what expectation, it is difficult to see--in that fatal conquest,
the isle of Walcheren. Among the marshes, stagnant canals, and
unwholesome trenches of this island, there broods continually, a fever
of a kind deeply pestilential and malignant, and which, like most
maladies of the same description, is more destructive to strangers than
to the natives, whose constitutions become by habit proof against its
ravages. This dreadful disease broke out among our troops with the force
of a pestilence, and besides the numerous victims who died on the spot,
shattered, in many cases for ever, the constitution of the survivors.
The joy with which Napoleon saw the army of his enemy thus consigned to
an obscure and disgraceful death, broke out even in his bulletins, as if
the pestilence under which they fell had been caused by his own policy,
and was not the consequence of the climate, and of the ill-advised delay
which prevented our soldiers being withdrawn from it. "We are
rejoiced," he said, in a letter to the minister at war, "to see that
the English have packed themselves in the morasses of Zealand. Let them
be only kept in check, and the bad air and fevers peculiar to the
country will soon destroy their army." At length, after the loss of more
lives than would have been wasted in three general battles, the
fortifications of Flushing were blown up, and the British forces
returned to their own country.[6]
The evil consequences of this expedition did not end even here. The mode
in which it had been directed and conducted, introduced dissensions into
the British Cabinet, which occasioned the temporary secession of one of
the most able and most eloquent of its members, Mr. George Canning, who
was thus withdrawn from public affairs when his talents could be least
spared by the country. On the other hand, the appointment of Marquis
Wellesley to the situation of secretary at war, gave, in the estimation
of the public, a strong pledge that the efficient measures suggested by
the talents of that noble statesman, would be supported and carried
through by his brother Sir Arthur, to whom alone, as a general, the army
and the people began to look with hope and confidence.
While England was thus exerting herself, Buonaparte, from the castle of
Schoenbrun, under the walls of Vienna, was deciding the fate of the
continent on every point where British influence had no means of
thwarting him. One of the revolutions which cost him little effort to
accomplish, yet which struck Europe with surprise, by the numerous
recollections which it excited, was his seizure of the city of Rome, and
the territories of the Church, and depriving the Pope of his character
of a temporal prince.
[Sidenote: PIUS THE SEVENTH.]
It must be allowed, by the greatest admirers of Napoleon, that his
policy, depending less upon principle than upon existing circumstances,
was too apt to be suddenly changed, as opportunity or emergency seemed
to give occasion. There could, for example, be scarce a measure of his
reign adopted on more deep and profound consideration than that of the
Concordat, by which he re-established the national religion of France,
and once more united that country to the Catholic Church. In reward for
this great service, Pope Pius VII., as we have seen, had the unusual
complaisance to cross the Alps, and visit Paris, for the sake of adding
religious solemnity, and the blessing of St. Peter's successor, to the
ceremony of Napoleon's coronation. It might have been thought that a
friendship thus cemented, and which, altogether essential to the safety
of the Pope, was far from indifferent to the interests of Buonaparte,
ought to have subsisted undisturbed, at least for some years. But the
Emperor and Pontiff stood in a suspicious attitude with respect to each
other. Pius VII. felt that he had made, in his character of chief of
the Church, very great concessions to Napoleon, and such as he could
hardly reconcile to the tenderness of his own conscience. He, therefore,
expected gratitude in proportion to the scruples which he had
surmounted, while Buonaparte was far from rating the services of his
Holiness so high, or sympathizing with his conscientious scruples.
Besides, the Pope, in surrendering the rights of the Church in so many
instances, must have felt that he was acting under motives of
constraint, and in the character of a prisoner; for he had sacrificed
more than had been yielded by any prelate who had held the see of Rome,
since the days of Constantine. He may therefore have considered himself,
not only as doubly bound to secure what remained of the authority of his
predecessors, but even at liberty, should opportunity offer, to reclaim
some part of that which he had unwillingly yielded up. Thus
circumstanced in respect to each other, Pius VII. felt that he had done
more in complaisance to Buonaparte than he could justify to his
conscience; while Napoleon, who considered the reunion of France to
Rome, in its spiritual relations, as entirely his own work, thought it
of such consequence as to deserve greater concessions than his Holiness
had yet granted.
The Pope, on his first return to Italy, showed favourable prepossessions
for Napoleon, whom he commemorated in his address to the College of
Cardinals, as that mighty Emperor of France, whose name extended to the
most remote regions of the earth; whom Heaven had used as the means of
reviving religion in France, when it was at the lowest ebb; and whose
courtesies towards his own person, and compliance with his requests,
merited his highest regard and requital. Yet Napoleon complained, that
subsequent to this period, Pius VII. began by degrees to receive counsel
from the enemies of France, and that he listened to advisers, who
encouraged him to hold the rights of the Church higher than the desire
to gratify the Emperor. Thus a suppressed and unavowed, but perpetual
struggle took place, and was carried on betwixt the Emperor and the
Pope; the former desirous to extend and consolidate his recent
authority, the latter to defend what remained of the ancient privileges
of the Church.
It is probable, however, that, had there been only spiritual matters in
discussion between them, Napoleon would have avoided an open rupture
with the Holy Father, to which he was conscious much scandal would
attach. But in the present situation of Italy, the temporal states of
the Pope furnished a strong temptation for his ambition. These extend,
as is well known, betwixt the kingdom of Naples, then governed by
Joachim Murat, and the northern Italian provinces, all of which, by the
late appropriation of Tuscany, were now amalgamated into one state, and
had become, under the name of the kingdom of Italy, a part of the
dominions of Buonaparte. Thus the patrimony of the Church was the only
portion of the Italian peninsula which was not either directly, or
indirectly, under the empire of France; and, as it divided the
Neapolitan dominions from those of Napoleon, it afforded facilities for
descents of British troops, either from Sicily or Sardinia, and, what
Buonaparte was not less anxious to prevent, great opportunities for the
importation of English commodities. The war with Austria in 1809, and
the large army which the Archduke John then led into Italy, and with
which, but for the defeat at Eckmühl, he might have accomplished great
changes, rendered the independence of the Roman States the subject of
still greater dislike and suspicion to Buonaparte.
His ambassador, therefore, had instructions to press on the Pope the
necessity of shutting his ports against British commerce, and adhering
to the continental system; together with the further decisive measure,
of acceding to the confederacy formed between the kingdom of Italy and
that of Naples, or, in other words, becoming a party to the war against
Austria and England. Pius VII. reluctantly submitted to shut his ports,
but he positively refused to become a party to the war. He was, he said,
the father of all Christian nations; he could not, consistently with
that character, become the enemy of any.[7]
Upon receiving this refusal, Buonaparte would no longer keep terms with
him; and, in order, as he said, to protect himself against the
inconveniences which he apprehended from the pertinacity of the Holy
Father, he caused the towns of Ancona and Civita Vecchia to be occupied
by French troops, which were necessarily admitted when there were no
means of resistance.
This act of aggression, to which the Pope might have seen it prudent to
submit without remonstrance, as to what he could not avoid, would
probably have sufficiently answered all the immediate purposes of
Buonaparte; nor would he, it may be supposed, have incurred the further
scandal of a direct and irreconcilable breach with Pius VII., but for
recollections, that Rome had been the seat of empire over the Christian
world, and that the universal sovereignty to which he aspired, would
hardly be thought to exist in the full extent of majesty which he
desired to attach to it, unless the ancient capital of the world made a
part of his dominions. Napoleon was himself an Italian,[8] and showed
his sense of his origin by the particular care which he always took of
that nation, where whatever benefits his administrations conferred on
the people, reached them both more profusely and more directly than in
any other part of his empire. That swelling spirit entertained the
proud, and, could it have been accomplished consistently with justice,
the noble idea, of uniting the beautiful peninsula of Italy into one
kingdom, of which Rome should once more be the capital. He also
nourished the hope of clearing out the Eternal City from the ruins in
which she was buried, of preserving her ancient monuments, and of
restoring what was possible of her ancient splendour.[9] Such ideas as
these, dearer to Napoleon, because involving a sort of fame which no
conquest elsewhere could be attended with, must have had charms for a
mind which constant success had palled to the ordinary enjoyment of
victory; and no doubt the recollection that the existence of the Pope as
a temporal prince was totally inconsistent with this fair dream of the
restoration of Rome and Italy, determined his resolution to put an end
to his power.
[Sidenote: ROME.]
On the 2d February, 1809, General Miollis, with a body of French troops,
took possession of Rome itself, disarmed and disbanded the Pope's guard
of gentlemen, and sent his other soldiers to the north of Italy,
promising them as a boon that they should be no longer under the command
of a priest. The French cardinals, or those born in countries occupied
by, or subjected to the French, were ordered to retire to the various
lands of their birth, in order to prevent the Holy Father from finding
support in the councils of the conclave. The proposal of his joining the
Italian League, offensive and defensive, was then again pressed on the
Pope as the only means of reconciliation. He was also urged to cede some
portion of the estates of the Church, as the price of securing the rest.
On both points, Pius VII. was resolute; he would neither enter into an
alliance which he conceived injurious to his conscience, nor consent to
spoil the See of any part of its territories. This excellent man knew,
that though the temporal strength of the Popedom appeared to be gone,
every thing depended on the courage to be manifested by the Pope
personally.
At length, on the 17th May, Napoleon published a decree,[10] in which,
assuming the character of successor of Charlemagne, he set forth, 1st,
That his august predecessor had granted Rome and certain other
territories in feoff to the bishops of that city, but without parting
with the sovereignty thereof. 2d, That the union of the religious and
civil authority had proved the source of constant discord, of which many
of the Pontiffs had availed themselves to extend their secular dominion,
under pretext of maintaining their religious authority. 3d, That the
temporal pretensions of the Pope were irreconcilable with the
tranquillity and well-being of the nations whom Napoleon governed; and
that all proposals which he had made on the subject had been rejected.
Therefore it was declared by the decree, that the estates of the Church
were reunited to the French empire. A few articles followed for the
preservation of the classical monuments, for assigning to the Pope a
free income of two millions of francs, and for declaring that the
property and palace belonging to the See were free of all burdens or
right of inspection. Lastly, The decree provided for the interior
government of Rome by a Consultum, or Committee of Administrators, to
whom was delegated the power of bringing the city under the Italian
constitution. A proclamation of the Consultum, issued upon the 10th
June, in consequence of the Imperial rescript, declared that the
temporal dominion of Rome had passed to Napoleon, but she would still
continue to be the residence of the visible Head of the Catholic Church.
It had doubtless been thought possible to persuade the Pope to acquiesce
in the annihilation of his secular power, as the Spanish Bourbons were
compelled to ratify the usurpation of the Spanish crown, their
inheritance. But Pius VII. had a mind of a firmer tenor. In the very
night when the proclamation of the new functionaries finally divested
him of his temporal principality, the Head of the Church assumed his
spiritual weapons, and in the name of God, from whom he claimed
authority, by missives drawn up by himself, and sealed with the seal of
the Fisherman, declared Napoleon, Emperor of the French, with his
adherents, favourers, and counsellors, to have incurred the solemn doom
of excommunication, which he proceeded to launch against them
accordingly.[11] To the honour of Pius VII. it must be added, that,
different from the bulls which his predecessors used to send forth on
similar occasions, the present sentence of excommunication was
pronounced exclusively as a spiritual punishment, and contained a clause
prohibiting all and any one from so construing its import, as to hold it
authority for any attack on the person either of Napoleon or any of his
adherents.
[Sidenote: PIUS VII. BANISHED.]
The Emperor was highly incensed at the pertinacity and courage of the
Pontiff in adopting so bold a measure, and determined on punishing him.
In the night betwixt the 5th and 6th of July, the Quirinal palace, in
which his Holiness resided, was forcibly entered by soldiers, and
General Radet, presenting himself before the Holy Father, demanded that
he should instantly execute a renunciation of the temporal estates
belonging to the See of Rome. "I ought not--I will not--I cannot make
such a cession," said Pius VII. "I have sworn to God to preserve
inviolate the possessions of the Holy Church--I will not violate my
oath." The general then informed his Holiness he must prepare to quit
Rome. "This, then, is the gratitude of your Emperor," exclaimed the aged
Pontiff, "for my great condescension towards the Gallican Church, and
towards himself? Perhaps in that particular my conduct has been
blameworthy in the eyes of God, and he is now desirous to punish me. I
humbly stoop to his divine pleasure."
At three o'clock in the morning, the Pope was placed in a carriage,
which one cardinal alone was permitted to share with him, and thus
forcibly carried from his capital. As they arrived at the gate del
Popolo, the general observed it was yet time for his Holiness to
acquiesce in the transference of his secular estates. The Pontiff
returned a strong negative, and the carriage proceeded.[12]
At Florence, Pius was separated from Cardinal Pacca, the only person of
his court who had been hitherto permitted to attend him; and the
attendance of General Radet was replaced by that of an officer of
gendarmes. After a toilsome journey, partly performed in a litter, and
sometimes by torch-light, the aged Pontiff was embarked for Alexandria,
and transferred from thence to Mondovi, and then across the Alps to
Grenoble.
But the strange sight of the Head of the Catholic Church travelling
under a guard of gendarmes, with the secrecy and the vigilance used in
transporting a state criminal, began to interest the people in the south
of France. Crowds assembled to beseech the Holy Father's benediction,
perhaps with more sincerity than when, as the guest of Buonaparte, he
was received there with all the splendour the Imperial orders could
command.
At the end of ten days, Grenoble no longer seemed a fitting place for
his Holiness's residence, probably because he excited too much interest,
and he was again transported to the Italian side of the Alps, and
quartered at Savona. Here, it is said, he was treated with considerable
harshness, and for a time at least confined to his apartment. The
prefect of Savoy, M. de Chabrol, presented his Holiness with a letter
from Napoleon, upbraiding him in strong terms for his wilful obstinacy,
and threatening to convoke at Paris a Council of Bishops, with a view to
his deposition. "I will lay his threats," said Pius VII., with the
firmness which sustained him through his sufferings, "at the foot of the
crucifix, and I leave with God the care of avenging my cause, since it
has become his own."
The feelings of the Catholics were doubtless enhanced on this
extraordinary occasion, by their belief in the sacred, and, it may be
said, divine character, indissolubly united with the Head of the Church.
But the world, Papist and Protestant, were alike sensible to the
outrageous indecency with which an old man, a priest and a sovereign, so
lately the friend and guest of Buonaparte, was treated, for no other
reason that could be alleged, than to compel him to despoil himself of
the territories of the Church, which he had sworn to transmit inviolate
to his successors. Upon reflection, Napoleon seems to have become
ashamed of the transaction, which he endeavoured to shift from his own
shoulders, while in the same breath he apologized for it, as the act of
the politician, not the individual.[13]
Regarded politically, never was any measure devised to which the
interest of France and the Emperor was more diametrically opposed.
Napoleon nominally gained the city of Rome, which, without this step, it
was in his power to occupy at any time; but he lost the support, and
incurred the mortal hatred of the Catholic clergy, and of all whom they
could influence. He unravelled his own web, and destroyed, by this
unjust and rash usurpation, all the merit which he had obtained by the
re-establishment of the Gallican Church. Before this period he had said
of the French clergy, and certainly had some right to use the language,
"I have re-established them, I maintain them--they will surely continue
attached to me." But in innovating upon their religious creed, in
despoiling the Church, and maltreating its visible Head, he had cut the
sinews of the league which he had formed betwixt the Church and his own
government. It is easy to see the mistaken grounds on which he reckoned.
Himself an egotist, Napoleon supposed, that when he had ascertained and
secured to any man, or body of men, their own direct advantage in the
system which he desired should be adopted, the parties interested were
debarred from objecting to any innovations which he might afterwards
introduce into that system, providing their own interest was not
affected. The priests and sincere Catholics of France, on the other
hand, thought, and in conscience could not think otherwise, that the
Concordat engaged the Emperor to the preservation of the Catholic
Church, as, on the other hand, it engaged them to fealty towards
Napoleon. When, therefore, by his unprovoked aggression against the Head
of the Church, he had incurred the spiritual censure of excommunication,
they held, by consequence, that all their engagements to him were
dissolved by his own act.
[Sidenote: PIUS THE SEVENTH.]
The natural feelings of mankind acted also against the Emperor. The
Pope, residing at Rome in the possession of temporal power and worldly
splendour, was a far less interesting object to a devout imagination,
than an old man hurried a prisoner from his capital, transported from
place to place like a criminal, and at length detained in an obscure
Italian town, under the control of the French police, and their
instruments.[14]
The consequences of this false step were almost as injurious as those
which resulted from the unprincipled invasion of Spain. To place that
kingdom under his more immediate control, Napoleon converted a whole
nation of docile allies into irreconcilable enemies; and, for the vanity
of adding to the empire of France the ancient capital of the world, he
created a revolt in the opinion of the Catholics, which was in the
long-run of the utmost prejudice to his authority. The bulls of the
Pope, in spite of the attention of the police, and of the numerous
arrests and severe punishments inflicted on those who dispersed them,
obtained a general circulation; and, by affording a religious motive,
enhanced and extended the disaffection to Napoleon, which, unavowed and
obscure, began generally to arise against his person and government even
in France, from the repeated draughts upon the conscription, the
annihilation of commerce, and the other distressing consequences
arising out of the measures of a government, which seemed only to exist
in war.
While Buonaparte, at Schoenbrun, was thus disposing of Rome and its
territories, and weighing in his bosom the alternative of dismembering
Austria, or converting her into a friend, his life was exposed to one of
those chances, to which despotic princes are peculiarly liable. It had
often been predicted, that the dagger of some political or religious
enthusiast, who might be willing to deposit his own life in gage for the
success of his undertaking, was likely to put a period to Napoleon's
extended plans of ambition. Fortunately, men like Felton[15] or
Sandt[16] are rarely met with, for the powerful instinct of
self-preservation is, in the common case, possessed of influence even
over positive lunatics, as well as men of that melancholy and
atrabilious temperament, whose dark determination partakes of insanity.
Individuals, however, occur from time to time, who are willing to
sacrifice their own existence, to accomplish the death of a private or
public enemy.
The life of Buonaparte at Schoenbrun was retired and obscure. He
scarcely ever visited the city of Vienna;[17] and spent his time as if
in the Tuileries, amid his generals, and a part of his ministers, who
were obliged to attend him during his military expeditions. His most
frequent appearance in public was when reviewing his troops. On one of
these occasions [23d Sept.] while a body of the French guard was passing
in review, a young man, well dressed, and of the middle rank, rushed
suddenly forward, and attempted to plunge a long sharp knife, or
poniard, in Napoleon's bosom. Berthier threw himself betwixt his master
and the assassin, and Rapp made the latter prisoner. On his examination,
the youth evinced the coolness of a fanatic. He was a native of Erfurt,
son of a Lutheran clergyman, well educated, and of a decent condition in
life. He avowed his purpose to have killed Napoleon, as called to the
task by God, for the liberation of his country. No intrigue or
correspondence with any party appeared to have prompted his
unjustifiable purpose, nor did his behaviour or pulse testify any sign
of insanity or mental alienation. He told Buonaparte, that he had so
much respect for his talents, that if he could have obtained an audience
of him, he would have commenced the conference by an exhortation to him
to make peace; but if he could not succeed, he was determined to take
his life. "What evil have I done you?" asked Napoleon. "To me
personally, none; but you are the oppressor of my country, the oppressor
of the world, and to have put you to death would have been the most
glorious act a man of honour could do."
Stapps, for that was his name, was justly condemned to die; for no cause
can justify assassination.[18] His death was marked by the same
fanatical firmness which had accompanied his crime; and the adventure
remained a warning, though a fruitless one, to Buonaparte, that any man
who is indifferent to his own life, may endanger that of the most
absolute sovereign upon earth, even when at the head of his military
force.[19]
The negotiations for peace with Austria continued, notwithstanding the
feeble state of the latter power, to be unusually protracted. The
reason, at that time secret, became soon after publicly known.
[Sidenote: THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES.]
Buonaparte's first intentions had been to dismember the empire, which he
had found so obstinate and irreconcilable in its enmity, and, separating
from the dominions of Austria either the kingdom of Hungary, or that of
Bohemia, or both, to reduce the House of Hapsburg to the rank of a
second-rate power in Europe. Napoleon himself affirmed, when in Saint
Helena, that he was encouraged by one of the royal family (the Archduke
Charles is indicated) to persist in his purpose, as the only means of
avoiding future wars with Austria; and that the same prince was willing
to have worn one of the crowns, thus to be torn from the brows of his
brother Francis.[20] We can only say, that the avowals of Napoleon when
in exile, like his bulletins when in power, seem so generally dictated
by that which he wished to be believed, rather than by a frank adherence
to truth, that we cannot hold his unsupported and inexplicit testimony
as sufficient to impose the least stain on the noble, devoted, and
patriotic character of the archduke, whose sword and talents had so
often served his brother's cause, and whose life exhibits no indication
of that meanness which would be implied in a wish to share the spoils of
his country, or accept at the hands of the conqueror a tributary
kingdom, reft from the dominions of his king and brother. Buonaparte
himself paid the courage and devotion of the Austrian prince a
flattering compliment, when, in sending to him a decoration of the
Legion of Honour, he chose that which was worn by the common soldier, as
better suited to the determination and frankness of his character, than
one of those richly ornamented, which were assigned to men of rank, who
had perhaps never known, or only seen at some distance, the toils and
dangers of battle.
The crisis, however, approached, which was to determine the fate of
Austria. Buonaparte's favourite minister, Champagny, Duke of Cadore, had
been for some time at Presburg, arranging with Metternich the extent of
cession of territory by which Austria was to pay for her unfortunate
assumption of hostilities. The definitive treaty of peace, when at
length published, was found to contain the following articles:--I.
Austria ceded, in favour of the Princes of the Confederation of the
Rhine, Saltsburg, Berchtolsgaden, and a part of Upper Austria. II. To
France directly, she ceded her only seaport of Trieste, the districts of
Carniola, Friuli, the circle of Villach, and some part of Croatia and
Dalmatia. These dominions tended to strengthen and enlarge the French
province of Illyria, and to exclude Austria from the Adriatic, and the
possibility of communication with Great Britain. A small lordship,
called Razons, lying within the territories of the Grison League, was
also relinquished. III. To the King of Saxony, in that character,
Austria ceded some small part of Bohemia, and in the capacity of Duke of
Warsaw, she gave up to him the city of Cracow, and the whole of Western
Galicia. IV. Russia had a share, though a moderate one, in the spoils of
Austria. She was to receive, in reward of her aid, though tardily and
unwillingly tendered, a portion of Eastern Galicia, containing a
population of four hundred thousand souls. But from this cession the
town of Brody, a commercial place of consequence, was specially
excepted; and it has been said that this exception made an unfavourable
impression on the Emperor Alexander, which was not overbalanced by the
satisfaction he received from the portion of spoil transferred to
him.[21]
In his correspondence with the Russian Court, Napoleon expressed himself
as having, from deference to Alexander's wishes, given Austria a more
favourable peace than she had any reason to expect.[22] Indeed, Europe
in general was surprised at the moderation of the terms; for though
Austria, by her cessions at different points, yielded up a surface of
45,000 square miles, and a population of between three and four
millions, yet the extremity in which she was placed seemed to render
this a cheap ransom, as she still retained 180,000 square miles, and
upwards, of territory, which, with a population of twenty-one millions,
rendered her, after France and Russia, even yet the most formidable
power on the continent. But her good angel had not slept. The House of
Rodolph of Hapsburg had arisen, from small beginnings, to its immense
power and magnitude, chiefly by matrimonial alliances,[23] and it was
determined that, by another intermarriage of that Imperial House, with
the most successful conqueror whom the world had ever seen, she should
escape with comparative ease from the greatest extremity in which she
had ever been placed. There is no doubt, also, that by secret articles
of treaty, Napoleon, according to his maxim of making the conquered
party sustain the expense of the war, exacted for that purpose heavy
contributions from the Austrian Government.
He left Schoenbrun on the 16th October, the day after the definitive
treaty of peace, which takes its name from that palace, had been signed
there; and it is remarkable that no military caution was relaxed in the
evacuation of the Austrian dominions by the French troops. They
retreated by echelon, so as to be always in a position of mutual
support, as if they had still been manœuvring in an enemy's country.
On the 14th November, Napoleon received at Paris the gratulations of the
Senate, who too fondly complimented him on having acquired, by his
triumphs, the palm of peace. That emblem, they said, should be placed
high above his other laurels, upon a monument which should be dedicated
by the gratitude of the French people. "To the Greatest of Heroes who
never achieved victory but for the happiness of the world."
FOOTNOTES:
[1] See Russian proclamation to the inhabitants of Finland, Feb. 18,
1808 Annual Register, vol. l., p. 301.
[2] Annual Register, vol. l., p. 759.
[3] Mémoires de Fouché, tom. i., p. 337.
[4] In 1798, Bernadotte married Eugénie Cléry, the daughter of a
considerable merchant at Marseilles, and sister to Julia, the wife of
Joseph Buonaparte.
[5] "It was not Bernadotte whom Cambêcérès and the Duke of Feltre
requested to undertake the defence of Antwerp; but it was I who received
several couriers on this subject, and who in fact took the command of
the combined army, sufficiently in time to prevent the English
surprising Antwerp, as they already had done Walcheren. It was I who
flooded the borders of the Scheldt, and erected batteries there.
Bernadotte arrived a fortnight afterwards; and, in pursuance of the
orders of Napoleon and Clarke, which were officially communicated to me,
I resigned the command to him."--LOUIS BUONAPARTE, p. 60.
[6] See Papers relating to the expedition to the Scheldt, Parliamentary
Debates, vol. xv., Appendix; and Annual Register, vol. l., pp. 543, 546,
559.
[7] See Declaration of the Pope against the usurpations of Napoleon,
dated May 19, 1808; Annual Register, vol. l., p. 314.
[8] "Napoleon was of Italian origin, but he was born a Frenchman. It is
difficult to comprehend for what purpose are those continual repetitions
of his Italian origin. His partiality for Italy was natural enough,
since he had conquered it, and this beautiful peninsula was a trophy of
the national glory, of which Sir Walter Scott allows Napoleon to have
been very jealous. I nevertheless doubt whether he had the intention of
uniting Italy, and making Rome its capital. Many of my brother's actions
contradict the supposition. I was near him one day when he received the
report of some victories in Spain, and amongst others, of one in which
the Italian troops had greatly distinguished themselves. One of the
persons who were with him exclaimed, at this news--that the Italians
would show themselves worthy of obtaining their independence, and it was
to be desired that the whole of Italy should be united into one national
body. 'Heaven forbid it!' exclaimed Napoleon, with involuntary emotion,
'they would soon be masters of the Gauls.' Amongst all the calumnies
heaped against him, there are none more unjust than those which attack
his patriotism: he was essentially French, indeed, too exclusively so;
for all excess is bad."--LOUIS BUONAPARTE, p. 62.
[9] "With regard to the removal of the monuments of antiquity, and to
the works undertaken by my brother for their preservation, they were not
merely projected; they were not only begun, but even far advanced, and
many of them finished."--LOUIS BUONAPARTE, p. 63.
[10] Published, May 17, at Vienna, and proclaimed in all the public
squares, markets, &c., of that capital.
[11] Annual Register, vol. li., p. 513; Botta, tom. iv., p. 394.
[12] Botta, tom. iv., p. 395; Jomini, tom. iii., p. 242; Savary, tom.
ii., part ii., p. 140.
[13] See Las Cases, vol. ii., pp. 12 and 13. He avowed that he himself
would have refused, as a man and an officer, to mount guard on the Pope,
"whose transportation into France," he added, "was done without my
authority." Observing the surprise of Las Cases, he added, "that what he
said was very true, together with other things which he would learn by
and by. Besides," he proceeded, "you are to distinguish the deeds of a
sovereign, who acts collectively, as different from those of an
individual, who is restrained by no consideration that prevents him from
following his own sentiments. Policy often permits, nay orders, a prince
to do that which would be unpardonable in an individual." Of this denial
and this apology, we shall only say, that the first seems very
apocryphal, and the second would justify any crime which Machiavel or
Achitophel could invent or recommend. Murat is the person whom the
favourers of Napoleon are desirous to load with the violence committed
on the Pope. But if Murat had dared to take so much upon himself, would
it not have been as king of Naples? and by what warrant could he have
transferred the Pontiff from place to place in the north of Italy, and
even in France itself, the Emperor's dominions, and not his own?
Besides, if Napoleon was, as has been stated, surprised, shocked, and
incensed at the captivity of the Pope, why did he not instantly restore
him to his liberty, with suitable apologies, and indemnification? His
not doing so plainly shows, that if Murat and Radet had not express
orders for what they did, they at least knew well it would be agreeable
to the Emperor when done, and his acquiescence in their violence is a
sufficient proof that they argued justly.--S.
"The Emperor knew nothing of the event until it had occurred; and then
it was too late to disown it. He approved of what had been done,
established the Pope at Savona, and afterwards united Rome to the French
empire, thereby annulling the donation made of it by Charlemagne. This
annexation was regretted by all, because every one desired
peace."--SAVARY, tom. ii., part ii., p. 142.
[14] "In the eyes of Europe, Pius VII. was considered as an illustrious
and affecting victim of greedy ambition. A prisoner at Savona, he was
despoiled of all his external honours, and shut out from all
communication with the cardinals, as well as deprived of all means of
issuing bulls and assembling a council. What food for the _petite
église_, for the turbulence of some priests, and for the hatred of some
devotees! I immediately saw all these leavens would reproduce the secret
associations we had with so much difficulty suppressed. In fact,
Napoleon, by undoing all that he had hitherto done to calm and
conciliate the minds of the people, disposed them in the end to withdraw
themselves from his power, and even to ally themselves to his enemies,
as soon as they had the courage to show themselves in force."--FOUCHÉ,
tom. i., p. 335.
[15] The assassin of Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, in 1628.
[16] The political fanatic of Jena, who assassinated Kotzebue at
Manheim, in 1819.
[17] "In the midst of the Emperor's occupations at Vienna, he was not
unmindful of the memory of the Chevalier Bayard. The chapel of the
village of Martinière, in which that hero had been christened, was
repaired at great expense by his orders. He also directed that the heart
of the chevalier should be removed to the said chapel with due ceremony;
and an inscription, dictated by the Emperor himself, recording the
praises of the knight 'without fear and without reproach,' was placed on
the leaden box containing his heart."--SAVARY, tom. ii., part ii., p.
97.
[18] Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 12; Savary, tom. ii., part ii., p. 151;
Rapp, p. 141.
[19] "The wretched young man was taken to Vienna, brought before a
council of war, and executed on the 27th. He had taken no sustenance
since the 24th, because, as he said, he had sufficient strength to walk
to the place of execution. His last words were--'Liberty forever!
Germany for ever! Death to the tyrant!' I delivered the report to
Napoleon, who desired me to keep the knife that had been found upon the
criminal. It is still in my possession."--RAPP, p. 147.
[20] Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 104.
[21] For a copy of the treaty, see Annual Register, vol. li., p. 791.
[22] Annual Register, vol. li., p. 790.
[23] The verses are well known,--
"Bella gerant alii, tu, felix Austria, nube," &c.--S.
CHAPTER L.
_Change in Napoleon's Domestic Life--Causes which led to it--His
anxiety for an Heir--A Son of his brother Louis is fixed upon, but
dies in Childhood--Character and influence of Josephine--Strong
mutual attachment betwixt her and Napoleon--Fouché opens to
Josephine the Plan of a Divorce--her extreme Distress--On 5th
December, Napoleon announces her Fate to Josephine--On 15th they are
formally separated before the Imperial Council--Josephine retaining
the rank of Empress for life--Espousals of Buonaparte and Maria
Louisa of Austria take place at Vienna, 11th March, 1810._
[Sidenote: CHANGE IN NAPOLEON'S DOMESTIC LIFE.]
There is perhaps no part of the varied life of the wonderful person of
whom we treat, more deeply interesting, than the change which took place
in his domestic establishment, shortly after the peace of Vienna. The
main causes of that change are strongly rooted in human nature, but
there were others which arose out of Napoleon's peculiar situation. The
desire of posterity--of being represented long after our own earthly
career is over, by those who derive their life and condition in society
from us, is deeply rooted in our species. In all ages and countries,
children are accounted a blessing, barrenness a misfortune at least, if
not a curse. This desire of maintaining a posthumous connexion with the
world, through the medium of our descendants, is increased, when there
is property or rank to be inherited; and, however vain the thought,
there are few to which men cling with such sincere fondness, as the
prospect of bequeathing to their children's children the fortunes they
have inherited from their fathers, or acquired by their own industry.
There is kindness as well as some vanity in the feeling; for the
attachment which we bear to the children whom we see and love, naturally
flows downward to their lineage, whom we may never see. The love of
distant posterity is in some degree the metaphysics of natural
affection.
It was impossible that the founder of so vast an empire as that of
Napoleon, could be insensible to a feeling which is so deeply grafted in
our nature, as to influence the most petty proprietor of a house and a
few acres--it is of a character to be felt in proportion to the extent
of the inheritance; and so viewed, there never existed in the world
before, and, it is devoutly to be hoped, will never be again permitted
by Providence to arise, a power so extensive, so formidable as
Napoleon's. Immense as it was, it had been, moreover, the work of his
own talents; and, therefore, he must have anticipated, with the greater
pain, that the system, perfected by so much labour and blood, should
fall to pieces on the death of him by whom it had been erected, or that
the reins of empire should be grasped after that event "by some unlineal
hand,"
"No son of his succeeding."
The drop of gall, which the poet describes so naturally as embittering
the cup of the Usurper of Scotland, infused, there is no doubt, its full
bitterness into that of Napoleon.
[Sidenote: JOSEPHINE.]
The sterility of the Empress Josephine was now rendered, by the course
of nature, an irremediable evil, over which she mourned in hopeless
distress; and conscious on what precarious circumstances the continuance
of their union seemed now to depend, she gave way occasionally to fits
of jealousy, less excited, according to Napoleon,[24] by personal
attachment, than by suspicion that her influence over her husband's mind
might be diminished, in case of his having offspring by some paramour.
She turned her thoughts to seek a remedy, and exerted her influence over
her husband, to induce him to declare some one his successor, according
to the unlimited powers vested in him by the Imperial constitution. In
the selection, she naturally endeavoured to direct his choice towards
his step-son, Eugene Beauharnois, her own son by her first marriage; but
this did not meet Buonaparte's approbation. A child, the son of his
brother Louis, by Hortense Beauharnois, appeared, during its brief
existence, more likely to become the destined heir of this immense
inheritance. Napoleon seemed attached to the boy; and when he
manifested any spark of childish spirit, rejoiced in the sound of the
drum, or showed pleasure in looking upon arms and the image of war, he
is said to have exclaimed--"_There_ is a child fit to succeed, perhaps
to surpass me."[25]
The fixing his choice on an heir so intimately connected with herself,
would have secured the influence of Josephine, as much as it could
receive assurance from any thing save bearing her husband issue herself;
but she was not long permitted to enjoy this prospect. The son of Louis
and Hortense died of a disorder incident to childhood; and thus was
broken, while yet a twig, the shoot, that, growing to maturity, might
have been reckoned on as the stay of an empire. Napoleon showed the
deepest grief, but Josephine sorrowed as one who had no hope.[26]
Yet, setting aside her having the misfortune to bear him no issue, the
claims of Josephine on her husband's affections were as numerous as
could be possessed by a wife. She had shared his more lowly fortunes,
and, by her management and address during his absence in Egypt, had
paved the way for the splendid success which he had attained on his
return. She had also done much to render his government popular, by
softening the sudden and fierce bursts of passion to which his
temperament induced him to give way. No one could understand, like
Josephine, the peculiarities of her husband's temper--no one dared, like
her, to encounter his displeasure, rather than not advise him for his
better interest--no one could possess such opportunities of watching the
fit season for intercession--and no one, it is allowed on all hands,
made a more prudent, or a more beneficent use of the opportunities she
enjoyed. The character of Buonaparte, vehement by temper, a soldier by
education, and invested by Fortune with the most despotic power,
required peculiarly the moderating influence of such a mind, which could
interfere without intrusion, and remonstrate without offence.
To maintain this influence over her husband, Josephine made not only
unreluctantly, but eagerly, the greatest personal sacrifices. In many of
the rapid journeys which he performed, she was his companion. No
obstacle of road or weather was permitted to interfere with her
departure. However sudden the call, the Empress was ever ready; however
untimely the hour, her carriage was in instant attendance. The influence
which she maintained by the sacrifice of her personal comforts, was used
for the advancement of her husband's best interests--the relief of those
who were in distress, and the averting the consequences of hasty
resolutions, formed in a moment of violence or irritation.
Besides her considerable talents, and her real beneficence of
disposition, Josephine was possessed of other ties over the mind of her
husband. The mutual passion which had subsisted between them for many
years, if its warmth had subsided, seems to have left behind
affectionate remembrances and mutual esteem. The grace and dignity with
which Josephine played her part in the Imperial pageant, was calculated
to gratify the pride of Napoleon, which might have been shocked at
seeing the character of Empress discharged with less ease and
adroitness; for her temper and manners enabled her, as one early
accustomed to the society of persons of political influence, to conduct
herself with singular dexterity in the intrigues of the splendid and
busy court, where she filled so important a character. Lastly, it is
certain that Buonaparte, who, like many of those that affect to despise
superstition, had a reserve of it in his own bosom, believed that his
fortunes were indissolubly connected with those of Josephine; and loving
her as she deserved to be beloved, he held his union with her the more
intimate, that there was attached to it, he thought, a spell affecting
his own destinies, which had ever seemed most predominant when they had
received the recent influence of Josephine's presence.
Notwithstanding all these mutual ties, it was evident to the politicians
of the Tuileries, that whatever attachment and veneration for the
Empress Napoleon might profess and feel, it was likely, in the long-run,
to give way to the eager desire of a lineal succession, to which he
might bequeath his splendid inheritance. As age advanced, every year
weakened, though in an imperceptible degree, the influence of the
Empress, and must have rendered more eager the desire of her husband to
form a new alliance, while he was yet at a period of life enabling him
to hope he might live to train to maturity the expected heir.
[Sidenote: DIVORCE OF JOSEPHINE.]
Fouché, the minister of police, the boldest political intriguer of his
time, discovered speedily to what point the Emperor must ultimately
arrive, and seems to have meditated the ensuring his own power and
continuance in favour, by taking the initiative in a measure in which,
perhaps, Napoleon might be ashamed to break the ice in person.[27]
Sounding artfully his master's disposition, Fouché was able to discover
that the Emperor was struggling betwixt the supposed political
advantages to be derived from a new matrimonial union on the one hand,
and, on the other, love for his present consort, habits of society which
particularly attached him to Josephine, and the species of superstition
which we have already noticed. Having been able to conjecture the state
of the Emperor's inclinations, the crafty counsellor determined to make
Josephine herself the medium of suggesting to Buonaparte the measure of
her own divorce, and his second marriage, as a sacrifice necessary to
consolidate the empire, and complete the happiness of the Emperor.
One evening at Fontainbleau, as the Empress was returning from mass,
Fouché detained her in the embrasure of a window in the gallery, while,
with an audacity almost incomprehensible, he explained, with all the
alleviating qualifications his ingenuity could suggest, the necessity of
a sacrifice, which he represented as equally sublime and inevitable. The
tears gathered in Josephine's eyes--her colour came and went--her lips
swelled--and the least which the counsellor had to fear, was his advice
having brought on a severe nervous affection. She commanded her
emotions, however, sufficiently to ask Fouché, with a faltering voice,
whether he had any commission to hold such language to her. He replied
in the negative, and said that he had only ventured on such an
insinuation from his having predicted with certainty what must
necessarily come to pass; and from his desire to turn her attention to
what so nearly concerned her glory and happiness.[28]
In consequence of this interview, an impassioned and interesting scene
is said to have taken place betwixt Buonaparte and his consort, in which
he naturally and truly disavowed the communication of Fouché, and
attempted, by every means in his power, to dispel her apprehensions. But
he refused to dismiss Fouché, when she demanded it as the punishment due
to that minister's audacity, in tampering with her feelings; and this
refusal alone might have convinced Josephine, that though ancient
habitual affection might for a time maintain its influence in the
nuptial chamber, it must at length give way before the suggestions of
political interest, which were sure to predominate in the cabinet. In
fact, when the idea had once been started, the chief objection was
removed, and Buonaparte, being spared the pain of directly communicating
the unkind and ungrateful proposal to Josephine, had now only to afford
her time to familiarise herself with the idea of a divorce, as that
which political combinations rendered inevitable.
The communication of Fouché was made before Napoleon undertook his
operations in Spain; and by the time of the meeting at Erfurt, the
divorce seems to have been a matter determined, since the subject of a
match betwixt Buonaparte and one of the archduchesses, the possibility
of which had been anticipated as far back as the treaty of Tilsit, was
resumed, seriously treated of, and if not received with cordiality by
the Imperial family of Russia, was equally far from being finally
rejected. The reigning Empress, and the Empress Mother, were, however,
opposed to it. The ostensible motive was, as we have elsewhere said, the
difference of religion; but these high-minded princesses rejected the
alliance chiefly on account of the personal character of the suitor. And
although it must have been managed with the greatest secrecy imaginable,
it seems probable that the idea of substituting an Archduchess of
Austria for her whose hand was refused him, was started in the course of
the treaty of Schoenbrun, and had its effects in providing lenient terms
for the weaker party. Napoleon himself says, that he renounced his
purpose of dismembering Austria when his marriage was fixed upon. But
the conditions of peace were signed on the 15th of October, and
therefore the motive which influenced Napoleon in granting them must
have had existence previous to that period.
Yet the contrary is boldly asserted. The idea of the match is said to
have been suggested by the Austrian government at a later period, upon
understanding that difficulties had occurred in Napoleon's negotiation
for a matrimonial alliance in the family of Alexander. Fouché ascribes
the whole to the address of his own agent, the Comte de Narbonne, a
Frenchman of the old school, witty, pliant, gay, well-mannered, and
insinuating, who was ambassador at Vienna in the month of January
1810.[29]
But, whether the successor of Josephine were or were not already
determined upon, the measures for separating this amiable and
interesting woman from him whose fortunes she had assisted to raise, and
to whose person she was so much attached, were in full and public
operation soon after her husband's return from the campaign of Wagram.
Upon the 3d of December, Buonaparte attended the solemn service of Te
Deum for his victories. He was clad with unusual magnificence, wearing
the Spanish costume, and displaying in his hat an enormous plume of
feathers. The Kings of Saxony and Wirtemberg, who attended as his
satellites on this occasion, were placed beside him in full uniform, and
remained uncovered during the ceremony.
From the cathedral, Napoleon passed to the opening of the Legislative
Body, and boasted, in the oration he addressed to them, of the victories
which he had achieved, and the trophies which he had acquired; nay, he
vaunted of his having reunited Tuscany to the empire--as if the spoiling
the inoffensive and unresisting widow and orphan could ever be a
legitimate subject of triumph. From the existing affairs of Spain, no
direct reason for gratulation could be derived; but when Napoleon could
no longer claim praise from things as they presently stood, he was
profuse in his promises of a rapid change to the better, and spoke as a
prophet when he ceased to be the reporter of agreeable facts. "When I,"
he said, "show myself on the other side of the Pyrenees, the terrified
Leopard shall plunge into the ocean, to avoid shame, defeat, and
destruction. The triumph of my arms shall be that of the Genius of Good
over the Genius of Evil, of moderation, order, and morals, over civil
war, anarchy, and the malevolent passions." With such fair colouring
will ambition and injustice attempt to screen their purposes. A poetical
reply from M. de Fontanes assured the Emperor, that whatever was
connected with him must arise to grandeur, whatever was subjected to any
other influence was threatened with a speedy fall. "It was therefore
necessary," he continued, "to submit to your ascendency, whose counsels
are at once recommended by heroism and by policy." To this speech
Buonaparte made a rejoinder, in which, resuming the well-worn themes of
his own praises, he alluded to the obstacles which he had surmounted,
and concluded, "I and my family will always know how to sacrifice our
most tender affections to the interests and welfare of the Great
Nation." These concluding words, the meaning of which was already
guessed by all who belonged to the Court, were soon no riddle to the
public in general.
Two days afterwards, Napoleon made Josephine acquainted with the cruel
certainty, that the separation was ultimately determined upon. But not
the many months which had passed since the subject was first touched
upon by Fouché--not the conviction which she must have long since
received from various quarters, that the measure was unalterably
resolved upon, could strengthen her to hear the tongue of her beloved
husband announce what was in fact, though not in name, a sentence of
repudiation. She fell into a long and profound swoon. Napoleon was much
affected, but his resolution was taken, and could not be altered. The
preparations for the separation went on without delay.
On the 15th December, just ten days after the official communication of
her fate had been given to the Empress, Napoleon and Josephine appeared
in presence of the Arch-Chancellor, the family of Napoleon, the
principal officers of state--in a word, the full Imperial Council. In
this assembly, Napoleon stated the deep national interest which required
that he should have successors of his own body, the heirs of his love
for his people, to occupy the throne on which Providence had placed him.
He informed them, that he had for several years renounced the hope of
having children by his well-beloved Empress Josephine; and that
therefore he had resolved to subject the feelings of his heart to the
good of the state, and desire the dissolution of their marriage. He was,
he said, but forty years old, and might well hope to live to train up
such children as Providence might send him, in his own sentiments and
arts of government. Again he dwelt on the truth and tenderness of his
beloved spouse, his partner during fifteen years of happy union. Crowned
as she had been by his own hand, he desired she should retain the rank
of Empress during her life.
Josephine arose, and with a faltering voice, and eyes suffused with
tears, expressed in a few words[30] sentiments similar to those of her
husband. The Imperial pair then demanded from the Arch-Chancellor a
written instrument in evidence of their mutual desire of separation; and
it was granted accordingly, in all due form, with the authority of the
Council.
The Senate were next assembled; and on the 16th December, pronounced a
consultum, or decree, authorising the separation of the Emperor and
Empress, and assuring to Josephine a dowry of two millions of francs,
and the rank of Empress during her life. Addresses were voted to both
the Imperial parties, in which all possible changes were rung on the
duty of subjecting our dearest affections to the public good; and the
conduct of Buonaparte in exchanging his old consort for a young one, was
proclaimed a sacrifice, for which the eternal love of the French people
could alone console his heart.
The union of Napoleon and Josephine being thus abrogated by the supreme
civil power, it only remained to procure the intervention of the
spiritual authorities. The Arch-Chancellor, duly authorised by the
Imperial pair, presented a request for this purpose to the Diocesan of
the Officiality, or ecclesiastical court of Paris, who did not hesitate
to declare the marriage dissolved, assigning, however, no reason for
such their doom. They announced it, indeed, as conforming to the decrees
of councils, and the usages of the Gallican Church--a proposition which
would have cost the learned and reverend officials much trouble, if they
had been required to make it good either by argument or authority.
When this sentence had finally dissolved their union, the Emperor
retired to St. Cloud, where he lived in seclusion for some days.
Josephine, on her part, took up her residence in the beautiful villa of
Malmaison, near St. Germains. Here she principally dwelt for the
remaining years of her life, which were just prolonged to see the first
fall of her husband; an event which might have been averted had he been
content to listen more frequently to her lessons of moderation. Her life
was chiefly spent in cultivating the fine arts, of which she collected
some beautiful specimens, and in pursuing the science of botany; but
especially in the almost daily practice of acts of benevolence and
charity, of which the English _détenus_, of whom there were several at
St. Germains, frequently shared the benefit.[31] Napoleon visited her
very frequently, and always treated her with the respect to which she
was entitled. He added also to her dowry a third million of francs, that
she might feel no inconvenience from the habits of expense to which it
was her foible to be addicted.
[Sidenote: MARIA LOUISA.]
This important state measure was no sooner completed, than the Great
Council was summoned, on the 1st February, to assist the Emperor in the
selection of a new spouse. They were given to understand, that a match
with a Grand Duchess of Russia had been proposed, but was likely to be
embarrassed by disputes concerning religion. A daughter of the King of
Saxony was also mentioned, but it was easily indicated to the Council
that their choice ought to fall upon a Princess of the House of Austria.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Eugene, the son of the repudiated
Josephine, was commissioned by the Council to propose to the Austrian
ambassador a match between Napoleon and the Archduchess Maria
Louisa.[32] Prince Schwartzenberg had his instructions on the subject;
so that the match was proposed, discussed, and decided in the Council,
and afterwards adjusted between plenipotentiaries on either side, in the
space of twenty-four hours.[33] The espousals of Napoleon and Maria
Louisa were celebrated at Vienna, 11th March, 1810. The person of
Buonaparte was represented by his favourite Berthier, while the Archduke
Charles assisted at the ceremony, in the name of the Emperor Francis. A
few days afterwards, the youthful bride, accompanied by the Queen of
Naples, proceeded towards France.
With good taste, Napoleon dispensed with the ceremonies used in the
reception of Marie Antoinette, whose marriage with Louis XVI., though
never named or alluded to, was in other respects the model of the
present solemnity. Near Soissons, a single horseman, no way
distinguished by dress, rode past the carriage in which the young
Empress was seated, and had the boldness to return, as if to reconnoitre
more closely. The carriage stopped, the door was opened, and Napoleon,
breaking through all the tediousness of ceremony, introduced himself to
his bride, and came with her to Soissons.[34] The marriage ceremony was
performed at St. Cloud by Buonaparte's uncle, the Cardinal Fesch. The
most splendid rejoicings, illuminations, concerts, festivals, took place
upon this important occasion. But a great calamity occurred, which threw
a shade over these demonstrations of joy. Prince Schwartzenberg had
given a distinguished ball on the occasion, when unhappily the
dancing-room, which was temporary, and erected in the garden, caught
fire. No efforts could stop the progress of the flames, in which several
persons perished, and amongst them even the sister of Prince
Schwartzenberg. This tragic circumstance struck a damp on the public
mind, and was considered as a bad omen, especially when it was
remembered that the marriage of Louis XVI. with a former Princess of
Austria had been signalized by a similar disaster.[35]
As a domestic occurrence, nothing could more contribute to Buonaparte's
happiness than his union with Maria Louisa. He was wont to compare her
with Josephine, by giving the latter all the advantages of art and
grace; the former the charms of simple modesty and innocence. His former
Empress used every art to support or enhance her personal charms; but
with so much prudence and mystery, that the secret cares of her toilette
could never be traced--her successor trusted for the power of pleasing,
to youth and nature. Josephine mismanaged her revenue, and incurred debt
without scruple. Maria Louisa lived within her income, or if she desired
any indulgence beyond it, which was rarely the case, she asked it as a
favour of Napoleon. Josephine, accustomed to political intrigue, loved
to manage, to influence, and to guide her husband; Maria Louisa desired
only to please and to obey him. Both were excellent women, of great
sweetness of temper, and fondly attached to Napoleon.[36] In the
difference between these distinguished persons, we can easily
discriminate the leading features of the Parisian, and of the simple
German beauty; but it is certainly singular that the artificial
character should have belonged to the daughter of the West Indian
planter; that marked by nature and simplicity, to a princess of the
proudest court in Europe.
Buonaparte, whose domestic conduct was generally praiseworthy, behaved
with the utmost kindness to his princely bride. He observed, however,
the strictest etiquette, and required it from the Empress. If it
happened, for example, as was often the case, that he was prevented from
attending at the hour when dinner was placed on the table, he was
displeased if, in the interim of his absence, which was often prolonged,
she either took a book or had recourse to any female occupation--if, in
short, he did not find her in the attitude of waiting for the signal to
take her place at table. Perhaps a sense of his inferior birth made
Napoleon more tenacious of this species of form, as what he could not
afford to relinquish. On the other hand, Maria Louisa is said to have
expressed her surprise at her husband's dispensing with the use of arms
and attendance of guards, and at his moving about with the freedom of an
individual;[37] although this could be no great novelty to a member of
the Imperial Family of Austria, most of whom, and especially the Emperor
Francis, are in the habit of mixing familiarly with the people of
Vienna, at public places, and in the public walks.
As it influenced his political fate, Buonaparte has registered his
complaint, that the Austrian match was a precipice covered with flowers,
which he was rashly induced to approach by the hopes of domestic
happiness.[38] But if this proved so, it was the fault of Napoleon
himself; his subjects and his allies augured very differently of its
consequences, and to himself alone it was owing that these auguries were
disappointed. It was to have been expected, that a connexion formed with
the most ancient Imperial Family in Christendom, might have induced
Buonaparte to adopt some of those sentiments of moderation which regard
rather the stability than the increase of power. It constituted a point
at which he might pause. It might have been thought that, satiated with
success, and wearied with enterprise, he would have busied himself more
in consolidating the power which he desired to transmit to his expected
posterity, than in aiming at rendering his grandeur more invidious and
more precarious, by further schemes of ambition. Even the charms which
this union added to his domestic life, might, it was hoped, bring on a
taste for repose, which, could it have influenced that fiery imagination
and frame of iron, might have been of such essential advantage to
Europe.
Napoleon knew what was expected, and endeavoured to vindicate himself
beforehand for the disappointment which he foresaw was about to ensue.
"The good citizens rejoice sincerely at my marriage, monsieur?" he said
to Decrés, his minister.--"Very much, Sire."--"I understand they think
the Lion will go to slumber, ha?"--"To speak the truth, Sire, they
entertain some hopes of that nature." Napoleon paused an instant, and
then replied, "They are mistaken; yet it is not the fault of the Lion;
slumber would be as agreeable to him as to others. But see you not that
while I have the air of being constantly the attacking party, I am, in
fact, acting only on the defensive?" This sophism, by which Napoleon
endeavoured to persuade all men, that his constant wars arose, not from
choice, but out of the necessity of his situation, will be best
discussed hereafter.
In the meantime, we may only notice, that the Emperor Alexander judged
most accurately of the consequences of the Austrian match, when he said,
on receiving the news, "Then the next task will be, to drive me back to
my forests;" so certain he was that Napoleon would make his intimate
alliance with the Emperor Francis, the means of an attack upon Russia;
and so acute was he in seeing the germs of future and more desperate
wars, in a union from which more shortsighted politicians were looking
for the blessings of peace.
FOOTNOTES:
[24] "'A son by Josephine would have completed my happiness. It would
have put an end to her jealousy, by which I was continually harassed.
She despaired of having a child, and she in consequence looked forward
with dread to the future.'"--NAPOLEON, _Las Cases_, tom. ii., p. 298.
[25] Fouché, tom. i., p. 324.
[26] "Never did I see Napoleon a prey to deeper and more concentrated
grief; never did I see Josephine in more agonizing affliction. They
appeared to find in it a mournful presentiment of a futurity without
happiness and without hope."--FOUCHÉ, tom. i., p. 324.
[27] "It would ill have become me to have kept within my own breast the
suggestions of my foresight. In a confidential memoir, which I read to
Napoleon himself, I represented to him the necessity of dissolving his
marriage; of immediately forming, as Emperor, a new alliance more
suitable and more happy; and of giving an heir to the throne on which
Providence had placed him. Without declaring any thing positive,
Napoleon let me perceive, that, in a political point of view, the
dissolution of his marriage was already determined in his
mind."--FOUCHÉ, tom. i., p. 326.
[28] Fouché, tom. i., p. 328.
[29] Mémoires de Fouché, tom. i., p. 348.
[30] "By the permission of our dear and august consort, I ought to
declare, that not perceiving any hope of having children, which may
fulfil the wants of his policy and the interests of France, I am pleased
to give him the greatest proof of attachment and devotion which has ever
been given on earth. I possess all from his bounty; it was his hand
which crowned me; and from the height of this throne I have received
nothing but proofs of affection and love from the French people. I think
I prove myself grateful in consenting to the dissolution of a marriage
which heretofore was an obstacle to the welfare of France, which
deprived it of the happiness of being one day governed by the descendant
of a great man, evidently raised up by Providence, to efface the evils
of a terrible revolution, and to re-establish the altar, the throne, and
social order. But the dissolution of my marriage will in no degree
change the sentiments of my heart; the Emperor will ever have in me his
best friend. I know how much this act, demanded by policy, and by
interest so great, has chilled his heart; but both of us exult in the
sacrifice which we make for the good of the country."--_Moniteur_, Dec.
17, 1809; _Annual Register_, vol. li., p. 808.
[31] "In quitting the court, Josephine drew the hearts of all its
votaries after her: she was endeared to all by a kindness of disposition
which was without a parallel. She never did the smallest injury to any
one in the days of her power: her very enemies found in her a
protectress: not a day of her life but what she asked a favour for some
person, oftentimes unknown to her, but whom she found to be deserving of
her protection. Regardless of self, her whole time was engaged in
attending to the wants of others."--SAVARY, tom. ii., part ii., p. 177.
[32] Maria Louisa, the eldest daughter of the Emperor of Austria and
Maria Theresa of Naples, was born the 12th December, 1791. Her stature
was sufficiently majestic, her complexion fresh and blooming, her eyes
blue and animated, her hair light, and her hand and foot so beautiful,
that they might have served as models for the sculptor.
[33] Fouché, tom. i., p. 350.
[34] "She had always been given to understand that Berthier, who had
married her by proxy at Vienna, in person and age exactly resembled the
Emperor: she, however, signified that she observed a very pleasing
difference between them."--LAS CASES, tom. i., p. 312.
[35] "The most unfortunate presages were drawn from it; Napoleon himself
was struck with it."--FOUCHÉ, tom. i., p. 355.
[36] Las Cases, tom. i., p. 310.
[37] Voice from St. Helena, vol. ii., p. 225.
[38] "Austria had become a portion of my family; and yet my marriage
ruined me. If I had not thought myself safe, and protected by this
alliance, I should have delayed the insurrection of Poland: I should
have waited until Spain was subdued and tranquil. I set foot on an
abyss, concealed by a bed of flowers!"--NAPOLEON, _Las Cases_, tom. ii.,
p. 105.
CHAPTER LI.
_Almost all the foreign French Settlements fall into the hands of
the British--French Squadron destroyed at the Isle of Aix, by Lord
Cochrane--and at the Isle of Rosas, by Lord Collingwood--Return to
the Proceedings in Spain--Soult takes Oporto--Attacked and Defeated
by Sir Arthur Wellesley--Ferrol and Corunna retaken by the
Patriots--Battle of Talavera, gained by Sir Arthur
Wellesley--Created Lord Wellington--The French Armies take many
towns and strong Places--Supreme Junta retreat to Cadiz--The
Guerilla System--Growing disappointment of Buonaparte--His immense
exertions--Battle of Busaco--Lord Wellington's famous Retreat on
Torres Vedras._
Notwithstanding the credit which Napoleon had acquired, by dictating to
the House of Austria the triumphant treaty of Schoenbrun, and also by
allying himself with that ancient Imperial House, which had, on
different occasions, showed towards him the signs of persevering enmity,
this period of his history did not pass without his experiencing several
reverses of fortune. The few foreign settlements which hitherto remained
united to France, were now successively taken by the British. Cayenne,
Martinico, Senegal, and Saint Domingo, were conquered and occupied in
the West Indies; while Lord Collingwood, with troops furnished from
Sicily, occupied the islands of Cephalonia, Zante, Ithaca, and Cerigo.
A French squadron of men-of-war being blockaded in the roadstead of the
isle of Aix, the determined valour of Lord Cochrane was employed for
their destruction. Fire-ships were sent against the French vessels, and
though the execution was less complete than had been expected, owing to
some misunderstanding between Lord Cochrane and Admiral Gambier, who
commanded in chief, yet the greater part of the French ships were burnt,
or driven ashore and destroyed. Lord Collingwood also destroyed an
important French convoy, with the armed vessels who protected it, in
the isle of Rosas. Every thing announced that England retained the full
command of what has been termed her native element; while the
transactions in Spain showed, that, under a general who understood at
once how to gain victories, and profit by them when obtained, the land
forces of Britain were no less formidable than her navy. This subject
draws our attention to the affairs of the Peninsula, where it might be
truly said "the land was burning."
The evacuation of Corunna by the army of the late Sir John Moore, and
their return to England, which their disastrous condition rendered
indispensable, left Soult in seeming possession of Galicia, Ferrol and
Corunna having both surrendered to him. But the strength of the Spanish
cause did not lie in walls and ramparts, but in the indomitable courage
of the gallant patriots. The Galicians continued to distinguish
themselves by a war of posts, in which the invaders could claim small
advantages; and when Soult determined to enter Portugal, he was obliged
to leave Ney, with considerable forces, to secure his communication with
Spain.
[Sidenote: SOULT OCCUPIES OPORTO.]
Soult's expedition began prosperously, though it was doomed to terminate
very differently. He defeated General Romana, and compelled him to
retreat to Senabria. The frontier town of Chaves was taken by Soult,
after some resistance, and he forced his way towards Oporto. But no
sooner had the main body of Soult's army left Chaves, than, in spite of
the efforts of the garrison, the place was relieved by an
insurrectionary army of Portuguese, under General Silviera. The invader,
neglecting these operations in his rear, continued to advance upon
Oporto, carried that fine city by storm, after a desultory defence of
three days, and suffered his troops to commit the greatest cruelties,
both on the soldiers and unarmed citizens.[39]
But when Marshal Soult had succeeded thus far, his situation became
embarrassing. The Galicians, recovering their full energy, had retaken
Vigo and other places; and Silviera, advancing from Chaves to the bridge
of Amarante, interposed betwixt the French general and Galicia, and
placed himself in communication with the Spaniards.
While Soult was thus cooped up in Oporto, the English Ministry,
undaunted by the failure of their late expedition, resolved to continue
the defence of the Portuguese, and to enter into still closer alliance
with the Supreme Junta of Spain. Consulting their own opinion and the
public voice, all consideration of rank and long service was laid aside,
in order to confer the command of the troops which were to be sent to
the continent, on Sir Arthur Wellesley, whose conduct in the battle of
Vimeiro, and the subsequent explanations which he afforded at the Court
of Inquiry, had taught all Britain to believe, that if Portugal could be
defended at all, it must be by the victor of that day. He was scarce
landed at Lisbon [April 22] ere he fully justified the good opinion of
his countrymen. He crossed the Douro at different points with a celerity
for which the French were unprepared, and, after a brilliant action
under the walls of Oporto, compelled Soult to evacuate that city, and
commence a retreat, so disastrous as to resemble that of Sir John Moore.
In this retrograde movement, the French left behind them cannon,
equipments, baggage--all that can strengthen an army, and enable it to
act as such; and, after all these sacrifices, their leader could hardly
make his escape into Galicia, with scarce three-fourths of his army
remaining, where he found great difficulty in remodelling his forces.
Ney, whom he had left as governor of that province, was hard pressed by
the patriots, who defeated the French in several battles, and eventually
retook the towns of Ferrol and Corunna.
Sir Arthur Wellesley was prevented from completing Soult's defeat by
pursuing him into Galicia, because, after the Spaniards had sustained
the severe defeat of Tudela, the French had penetrated into Andalusia in
great strength, where they were only opposed by an ill-equipped and
dispirited army of 40,000 men, under the rash and ill-starred General
Cuesta. It was evident, that Marshal Victor, who commanded in Andalusia,
had it in his power to have detached a considerable part of his force on
Lisbon, supposing that city had been uncovered, by Sir Arthur
Wellesley's carrying his forces in pursuit of Soult. This was to be
prevented, if possible. The English general formed the magnificent plan,
for which Napoleon's departure to the Austrian campaign afforded a
favourable opportunity, of marching into Andalusia, uniting the British
forces with those of Cuesta, and acting against the invaders with such
vigour, as might at once check their progress in the South, and endanger
their occupation of Madrid. Unhappily an ill-timed jealousy seems to
have taken possession of Cuesta, which manifested itself in every
possible shape, in which frowardness, and a petty obstinacy of spirit,
could be exhibited. To no one of the combined plans, submitted to him by
the English general, would he give assent or effectual concurrence; and
when a favourable opportunity arrived of attacking Victor, before he was
united with the forces which Joseph Buonaparte and Sebastiani were
bringing from Madrid to his support, Cuesta alleged he would not give
battle on a Sunday.[40]
[Sidenote: BATTLE OF TALAVERA.]
The golden opportunity was thus lost; and when the allies were obliged
to receive battle instead of giving it, on the 28th July, 1809, it was
without the advantages which the former occasion held out. Yet the
famous battle of Talavera de la Reina, in which the French were
completely defeated, was, under these unfavourable circumstances,
achieved by Sir Arthur Wellesley. The event of this action, in which the
British forces had been able to defend themselves against double their
own number, with but little assistance from the Spanish army, became,
owing to the continued wilfulness of Cuesta, very different from what
such a victory ought to have produced. The French troops, assembling
from every point, left Sir Arthur no other mode of assuring the safety
of his army, than by a retreat on Portugal; and for want of means of
transport, which the Spanish general ought to have furnished, more than
fifteen hundred of the wounded were left to the mercy of the French.[41]
They were treated as became a courteous enemy, yet the incident afforded
a fine pretext to contest the victory, which the French had resigned by
flying from the field.
The assertions of the bulletins in the _Moniteur_ could not deceive men
on the true state of affairs. The Spanish Junta were sensible of the
services rendered by the English general, and, somewhat of the latest,
removed Cuesta from the command, to manifest their disapprobation of his
unaccountable conduct. At home, Sir Arthur Wellesley was promoted to the
peerage, by the title of Lord Wellington, who was destined to ascend,
with the universal applause of the nation, as high as our constitution
will permit. But Buonaparte paid the greatest compliment to the victor
of Talavera, by the splenetic resentment with which he was filled by the
news. He had received the tidings by his private intelligence, before
the officer arrived with the regular despatches. He was extremely ill
received by the Emperor; and, as if the messengers had been responsible
for the tidings they brought, a second officer, with a duplicate of the
same intelligence, was treated still more harshly, and for a time put
under arrest. This explosion of passion could not be occasioned by the
consequences of the action, for the experienced eye of Napoleon must
have discriminated the circumstances by which the effects of victory
were in a great measure lost to the allied armies; but he saw in the
battle of Talavera, an assurance given to both English and Spanish
soldiers, that, duly resisted, the French would fly from them. He
foresaw, also, that the British Government would be tempted to maintain
the contest on the continent, and that the Spaniards would be encouraged
to persevere in resistance. He foresaw, in short, that war of six
desperate and bloody campaigns, which did not terminate till the battle
of Tholouse, in 1814.
But it needed no anticipation to fill Napoleon's mind with anxiety on
the subject of Spain. It is true, fortune seemed every where to smile on
his arms. Zaragossa, once more besieged, maintained its former name, but
without the former brilliant result. After a defence as distinguished as
in the first siege, the brave garrison and citizens, deprived of means
of defence, and desperate of all hope of relief, had been compelled to
surrender some months before.[42]
Gerona, Tarragona, Tortosa, though still vigorously defended, were so
powerfully invested, that it seemed as if Catalonia, the most warlike of
the Spanish departments, was effectually subdued; and, accordingly,
these fortresses also were afterwards obliged to capitulate.
Andalusia, the richest province which sustained the patriot cause,
certainly was conquered, in consequence of a total defeat encountered by
the Spanish grand army, under Areizaga, at Ocana, November 1809, after
the English troops had retreated to the Portuguese frontier.[43] Joseph
Buonaparte, whose road was cleared by this last success, entered Cordoba
in triumph upon the 17th of January, 1810, and proud Seville itself upon
the 1st of February following. Yet the chief prize of victory had not
yet been gained. The Supreme Junta had effected their retreat to Cadiz,
which city, situated in an island, and cut off from the mainland, on one
side by a canal, and on the other three by the ocean, was capable of the
most strenuous defence.
Cadiz contained a garrison of 20,000 men, English, Spanish, and
Portuguese, under the command of General Graham, a distinguished
officer, whose merits, like those of Buonaparte, had been first
distinguished at the siege of Toulon. Marshal Soult, as first in command
in Spain, disposed himself to form the siege of this city, the capture
of which would have been almost the death-knell to the cause of the
patriots.
But although these important successes read well in the _Moniteur_, yet
such was the indomitable character of the Spaniards, which Napoleon had
contrived fully to awaken, that misfortunes, which would have crushed
all hope in any other people, seemed to them only an incentive to
further and more desperate resistance. When they talked of the state of
their country, they expressed no dismay at their present adverse
circumstances. It had cost their ancestors, they said, two centuries to
rid themselves of the Moors; they had no doubt that in a shorter time
they should free themselves of the yoke of France; but they must reckon
on time and opportunity, as well as valour. The events of the war in
many respects gave credit to their hopes. The Spaniards, often found
weak where they thought themselves strongest, proved sometimes most
powerful, where, to all human appearance, they seemed weakest. While
they lost Andalusia, believed to be so defensible, the mountainous
province of Galicia, through which the French had so lately marched
triumphantly in pursuit of the British, taking in their progress the
important maritime towns of Corunna and Ferrol, was wrenched from the
conquerors by the exertions of Romana, assisted by the warlike natives
of the country, and at the head of an undisciplined and ill-equipped
army.
[Sidenote: CATALONIA--THE GUERILLAS.]
In Catalonia, too, the French had hardly time to accomplish the conquest
of towns and fortresses to which we have alluded, when they found
themselves checked, baffled, and sometimes defeated, by the Catalans,
under Lacy, O'Donnell, and D'Eroles, who maintained the patriotic cause
at the head of those energetic marksmen, the Somatenes, or Miquelets.
Nay, while the French were extending their seeming conquests to the
Mediterranean Sea, and thundering at the gates of Cadiz, so little were
they in peaceful possession of Navarre, and the other provinces
adjoining to France, that not an officer with despatches could pass from
Burgos to Bayonne without a powerful escort, and bands of Spaniards even
showed themselves on the French frontier, and passed it for the purpose
of skirmishing and raising contributions. Such being the case on the
frontiers nearest to France, it may be well supposed, that the midland
provinces were not more subordinate. In fact, through the whole
Peninsula the French held no influence whatever that was not inspired by
the force of the bayonet and sabre; and where these could not operate,
the country was in universal insurrection.
The basis of this extensive and persevering resistance was laid in the
general system of Guerilla, or partisan warfare, to which the genius of
the Spanish people, and the character of their country, are peculiarly
fitted, and which offered a resistance to the invaders more formidable
by far than that of regular armies, because less tangible, and less
susceptible of being crushed in general actions. It was with the
defenders of Spain, as with the guardian of the enchanted castle in the
Italian romance. An armed warrior first encountered the champion who
attempted the adventure, and when he had fallen under the sword of the
assailant, the post which he had occupied appeared manned by a body of
pigmies, small in size, but so numerous and so enterprising as to annoy
the knight-errant far more than the gigantic force of his first
adversary. The qualities of a partisan, or irregular soldier, are
inherent in the national character of the Spaniard. Calm, temperate,
capable of much fatigue, and veiling under a cold demeanour an ardent
and fiery character, they are qualified to wait for opportunities of
advantage, and are not easily discouraged by difficulty or defeat. Good
marksmen in general, and handling the lance, sword, and dagger with
address, they are formidable in an ambush, and not less so in a close
mêlée, where men fight hand to hand, more as nature dictates than
according to the rules of war. The obstinacy of the Castilian character
also, had its advantages in this peculiar state of warfare. Neither
promises nor threats made any impression on them; and the severities
executed in fulfilment of menaces, only inflamed the spirit of hostility
by that of private revenge, to which the Spaniard is far more accessible
than either to the voice of caution or persuasion.
Neither were the officers less qualified for the task than the men. The
command of a guerilla was of a character not to be desired by any who
did not find himself equal to, and in some measure called upon to
accept, the dangerous pre-eminence. There were few Spanish officers
possessed of the scientific knowledge of war, and of course few adequate
to lead armies into the field; but the properties necessary for a
guerilla leader are imprinted in the human mind, and ready for exercise
whenever they are required. These leaders were, as it chanced: some of
them men of high birth and military education; some had been smugglers
or peasants, or had practised other professions; as was discovered from
their noms-de-guerre, as the Curate, the Doctor, the Shepherd, and so
forth.[44] Many of their names will be long associated with the
recollection of their gallant actions; and those of others, as of Mina
and the Empecinado,[45] will, at the same time, remind us of the gross
ingratitude with which their heroic efforts have been rewarded.
These daring men possessed the most perfect knowledge of the passes,
strengths, woods, mountains, and wildernesses, of the provinces in which
they warred; and the exact intelligence which they obtained from the
peasantry, made them intimately acquainted with the motions of the
enemy. Was too weak a French detachment moved, it ran the risk of being
cut off; was the garrison too feeble at the place which it left, the
fort was taken. The slightest as well as the most important objects, met
the attention of the guerillas; a courier could not move without a large
escort, nor could the intrusive King take the amusement of hunting,
however near to his capital, unless, like Earl Percy in the ballad,
attended by a guard of fifteen hundred men. The Juramentados, those
Spaniards that is, who had sworn allegiance to King Joseph, were of
course closely watched by the guerillas, and if they rendered themselves
inconveniently or obnoxiously active in the cause they had espoused,
were often kidnapped and punished as traitors; examples which rendered
submission to, or active co-operation with the French, at least as
imprudent as boldly opposing the invaders.
[Sidenote: THE GUERILLAS.]
The numbers of the guerillas varied at different times, as the chiefs
rose or declined in reputation, and as they possessed the means of
maintaining their followers. Some led small flying armies of two
thousand and upwards. Others, or the same chiefs under a reverse of
fortune, had only ten or twenty followers. The French often attempted to
surprise and destroy the parties by which they suffered most, and for
that purpose detached moveable columns from different points, to
assemble on the rendezvous of the guerilla. But, notwithstanding all
their activity and dexterity on such expeditions, they rarely succeeded
in catching their enemy at unawares; or if it so happened, the
individuals composing the band broke up, and dispersed by ways only
known to themselves; and when the French officers accounted them totally
annihilated, they were again assembled on another point, exercising a
partisan war on the rear, and upon the communications, of those who
lately expected to have them at their mercy. Thus invisible when they
were sought for, the guerillas seemed every where present when damage
could be done to the invaders. To chase them was to pursue the wind, and
to circumvent them was to detain water with a sieve.
Soult had recourse to severity to intimidate these desultory but most
annoying enemies, by publishing a proclamation [May 9] threatening to
treat the members of the guerillas, not as regular soldiers, but as
banditti taken in the fact, and thus execute such of them as chanced to
be made prisoners. The chiefs, in reply to this proclamation, published
a royal decree, as they termed it, declaring that each Spaniard was, by
the necessity of the times, a soldier, and that he was entitled to all
military privileges when taken with arms in his hands. They therefore
announced, that having ample means of retaliation in their power, they
would not scruple to make use of them, by executing three Frenchmen for
every one of their followers who should suffer in consequence of Soult's
unjust and inhuman proclamation.[46] These threats were fulfilled on
both sides. It is said, a horrid example of cruelty was given by a
French general, who in a manner crucified, by nailing to trees, eight
prisoners, whom he had taken from the guerillas of the Empecinado. The
daring Spaniard's passions were wound up too high to listen either to
pity or fear; he retaliated the cruelty by nailing the same number of
Frenchmen to the same trees, and leaving them to fill the forest of
Guadarama with their groans. But these excesses became rare on either
side; for the mutual interest of both parties soon led them to recur to
the ordinary rules of war.
We have given a slight sketch of the peculiar character of this singular
warfare, which constitutes a curious and interesting chapter in the
history of mankind, and serves to show how difficult it is to subject,
by the most formidable military means, a people who are determined not
to submit to the yoke. The probability of the case had not escaped the
acute eye of Buonaparte himself, who, though prescient of the
consequences, had not been able to resist the temptation of seizing upon
this splendid sovereignty, and who was still determined, as he is said
to have expressed himself, to reign at least over Spain, if he could not
reign over the Spanish people. But even this stern wish, adopted in
vengeance rather than in soberness of mind, could not, if gratified,
have removed the perplexity which was annexed to the affairs of the
Peninsula.
Buonaparte, in the spirit of calculation which was one of his great
attributes, had reckoned that Spain, when in his hands, would retain the
same channels of wealth which she had possessed from her South American
provinces. Had he been able to carry into execution his whole plan--had
the old king really embarked for Peru or Mexico, it might have happened,
that Napoleon's influence over Charles, his Queen, and her favourite
Godoy, could have been used to realize these expectations. But, in
consequence of the rupture which had taken place, the Spanish colonies,
at first taking part with the patriots of the mother country, made large
remittances to Cadiz for the support of the war against the French; and
when afterwards, adopting another view of the subject, the opportunity
appeared to them favourable for effecting their own independence, the
golden tide which annually carried tribute to Old Spain was entirely
dried up.
This Buonaparte had not reckoned upon, and he had now to regret an
improvident avidity, similar to that of Esop's boy, who killed the bird
which laid eggs of gold. The disappointment was as great as unexpected.
Napoleon had, from his private treasure, and the means he possessed in
France, discharged the whole expense of the two large armies, by whom
the territory of Spain was first occupied; and it was natural for him to
suppose, that in this, as in so many other cases, the French troops
should, after this first expedition, be paid and maintained at the
expense of the provinces in which they were quartered. This was the
rather to be expected, when Andalusia, Grenada, Valencia, fertile and
rich provinces, were added to the districts overrun by the invading
army. But, so general was the disinclination to the French, so universal
the disappearance of specie, so unintermitting the disturbances excited
by the guerillas, that both King Joseph, his court, and the French army,
were obliged to have constant recourse to Napoleon for the means of
supporting themselves; and such large remittances were made for these
purposes, that in all the countries occupied by the French, the Spanish
coin gradually disappeared from the circulation, and was replaced by
that of France. The being obliged, therefore, to send supplies to the
kingdom from which he had expected to receive them, was a subject of
great mortification to Napoleon, which was not, however, the only one
connected with the government he had established there.
[Sidenote: SITUATION OF KING JOSEPH.]
In accepting the crown of Spain at the hands of Napoleon, Joseph, who
was a man of sense and penetration, must have been sufficiently aware
that it was an emblem of borrowed and dependent sovereignty, gleaming
but with such reflected light as his brother's Imperial diadem might
shed upon it. He could not but know, that in making him King of Spain,
Napoleon retained over him all his rights as a subject of France, to
whose Emperor, in his regal as well as personal capacity, he still,
though a nominal monarch, was accounted to owe all vassalage. For this
he must have been fully prepared. But Joseph, who had a share of the
family pride, expected to possess with all others, save Buonaparte, the
external appearance at least of sovereignty, and was much dissatisfied
with the proceedings of the marshals and generals sent by his brother to
his assistance. Each of these, accustomed to command his own separate
corps d'armée, with no subordination save that to the Emperor only,
proceeded to act on his own authority, and his own responsibility,
levied contributions at pleasure, and regarded the authority of King
Joseph as that of a useless and ineffective civilian, who followed the
march along with the impediments and baggage of the camp, and to whom
little honour was reckoned due, and no obedience. In a word, so
complicated became the state of the war and of the government, so
embarrassing the rival pretensions set up by the several French
generals, against Joseph and against each other, that when Joseph came
to Paris to assist at the marriage of Napoleon and Maria Louisa, he made
an express demand, that all the French troops in Spain should be placed
under his own command, or rather that of his Major-General; and in case
this was declined, he proposed to abdicate the crown, or, what was
equivalent, that the French auxiliaries should be withdrawn from Spain.
Buonaparte had on a former occasion, named his brother generalissimo of
the troops within his pretended dominions; he now agreed that the French
generals serving in Spain should be subjected, without exception, to the
control of Marshal Jourdan, as Major-General of King Joseph. But as
these commanders were removed from Buonaparte's immediate eye, and were
obliged to render an account of their proceedings both to the intrusive
king and to Napoleon, it was not difficult for them to contrive to play
off the one against the other, and in fact to conduct themselves as if
independent of both.
These very embarrassing circumstances were increased by the presence of
the English army, which, having twice driven the French from Portugal,
showed no intention of returning to their ships, but lay on the
frontiers of the latter kingdom, ready to encourage and assist the
continued resistance of Spain. It was not the fault of the
commander-in-chief that their duties were, for the present, in a great
measure limited to those of an army of observation. If the troops which
assisted in the ill-advised Walcheren expedition had been united to
those under the command of Lord Wellington, they would, at a loss
infinitely less, and yet greatly more honourably incurred, have driven
the French beyond the Ebro, or, more probably, have compelled them to
evacuate Spain. But the British Cabinet, though adopting new and more
bold, as well as more just ideas of the force of the country, could not
be expected perhaps all at once, and amid the clamour of an Opposition
who saw nothing but reckless desperation in whatever measures were
calculated to resist France, to hazard so much of the national force
upon one single adventure, although bearing in their own eyes a
promising aspect. Statesmen, and even those of no mean character, are
apt to forget, that where a large supply of men and money is necessary
to ensure the object aimed at, it is miserable policy to attempt to
economize either; and that such ill-timed thrift must render the
difficulties attending the expedition either altogether insurmountable,
or greatly add to the loss which must be encountered to overcome them.
In the meantime, Buonaparte, with respect to the Peninsula, convulsed as
it was by civil war in every province--half-subdued and
half-emancipated--causing him an immense expense, as well as endless
contradiction and mortification--stood much in the condition, to use a
popular simile, of one, who, having hold of a wolf, feels it equally
difficult to overpower the furious animal, and dangerous to let him go.
His power over the general mind, however, rested a great deal on the
opinion commonly received, that he was destined to succeed in whatever
enterprise he undertook. He himself entertained some such ideas
concerning the force of his own destiny; and as it was no part either of
his temper or his policy to abandon what he had once undertaken, he
determined to make a gigantic effort to drive the Leopards and their
Sepoy general, as the French papers called the British and Lord
Wellington, out of Portugal; to possess himself of Lisbon; and to shut
that avenue against foreign forces again attempting to enter the
Peninsula.
In obedience to the Emperor's commands, an army, to be termed that of
Portugal, was assembled, on a scale which the Peninsula had scarcely yet
seen. It was called by the French themselves 110,000 men, but certainly
rather exceeded than fell short of the number of 80,000. This large
force was put under the command of Massena, Prince of Essling, the
greatest name in the French army, after that of Napoleon, and so
favoured by fortune, that his master was wont to call him the Spoilt
Child of Victory.[47]
Lord Wellington's British troops did not exceed 25,000 in number, and
there were among them so many invalids, that his motions were
necessarily entirely limited to the defensive. He had, however, a
subsidiary force under his command, consisting of 30,000 Portuguese, in
whom other generals might have rested little confidence; but they were
receiving British pay and British allowances, were disciplined in the
British manner, and commanded by British officers; and Lord Wellington,
who had seen the unwarlike Hindu behave himself in similar
circumstances, like a companion not unworthy of the English soldier, had
little doubt of being able to awaken the dormant and suppressed, but
natural ardour of the natives of Portugal. This force had been, in a
great measure, trained under the auspices of Marshal Beresford, an
officer who has eternal claims on the gratitude of his country, for the
generous manner in which he devoted himself to a labour, which had at
first little that was flattering or promising; and for the very great
perfection to which, by dint of skill, good temper, and knowledge of
human nature, he was able to bring his task to completion at such an
important crisis.
It was, however, of the utmost importance to avoid trusting too much to
the Portuguese troops, which were so recently levied and trained, until
they had acquired something of the practice, as well as the theory, of
the military profession.
Thus, between the weak state of the British, and the imperfect
discipline of the Portuguese, Lord Wellington was reduced to temporary
inactivity, and had the mortification to see the frontier places of
Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida taken almost in the presence of his army. The
fears of the British nation were as usual excited in an unreasonable
degree by these two sinister events; but they had both come within the
calculations of Lord Wellington, whose advance to the frontier was
without the intention of incurring any risk for the preservation of
those places, but merely, by inducing the garrisons to hold out, to
protract as long as possible a defence, the duration of which must be
equally advantageous to the allies, and wasteful to the French.
[Sidenote: TORRES VEDRAS.]
The position on which he meant to maintain the defence of Portugal, had
been long since fixed upon, and the fortifications had been as long in
progress. It was that of Torres Vedras, where, as appears from his own
evidence before the Cintra Court of Inquiry, he had expected Junot to
make a defence, after the battle of Vimeiro. All Lord Wellington's
previous movements were adjusted carefully, for the purpose of drawing
the enemy from his supplies and communications to that point, beyond
which he proposed the invader should pass no farther.
Admirably as Lord Wellington's premises were connected with the
conclusion he aimed at, chance, or rather the presumption of the French
general, favoured him with an unexpected opportunity of adding glory to
a retreat, which was dictated by prudence. Massena, if he did justice to
British courage, thought himself entitled to set the military skill of
their general at utter defiance. He saw, indeed, their retrograde
movements, from the banks of the Coa towards Lisbon, conducted with all
the deliberate and guarded caution of a game at chess; but still these
movements were retrograde, nor could he resist the temptation, by a bold
and sudden attack, to attempt to precipitate the retreat of the British,
and drive them, if not into the sea, at least into their ships, to which
he doubted not they were ultimately bound.
This led to the battle of Busaco, which was fought on the 27th of
September 1810. Upon that memorable day the British army was assembled
on the Sierra, or ridge of the hills called Busaco. Massena, by turning
the extremity of the ridge, might have compelled the English general to
recommence his retreat; but he meditated a direct attack on the
position. It was made by five strong divisions of the French. Two
attacked on the right, one of which, forcing its way to the top of the
ridge, was bayoneted and driven headlong down; the other, suffering
great loss from the fire, gave way before reaching the top. Three
divisions attacked on the left, with nearly the same fate. Defeated upon
such unfavourable ground, the enemy lost, it was computed, at least 2000
men slain, besides very many wounded. The moral effect of the battle of
Busaco was immense. It assured both the English themselves, and the
people of Portugal, that the retreat of Lord Wellington's army was not
the effect of fear, but of a deliberate choice. It evinced, also, what
degree of trust might be securely reposed in the Portuguese levies.
"They had shown themselves worthy of contending," said Lord Wellington,
in his official despatch, "in the same ranks with British troops;" and
they felt their own confidence rise as their merits became
acknowledged.[48]
The French army, declining any farther attack on the Sierra, proceeded
to turn its extremity, and move upon Lisbon by the way of Coimbra. Here
Massena established a strong rear-guard with his hospitals and wounded,
but the inspiration occasioned by the victory of Busaco had not yet
subsided among the Portuguese. Colonel Trant, a British officer, who
commanded a body of Portuguese militia, rushed gallantly into Coimbra,
and carried the place by a sudden attack. About 5000 men, many of course
wounded, with all the French hospital stores, fell into the hands of the
Portuguese; and Massena who could not recover the place, suffered all
the loss of stores and provisions which that city afforded as a depôt,
and which the fertile district in the neighbourhood might have enabled
him to collect.
Great was the surprise of both armies when the retreat of the British,
and advance of the French, suddenly terminated. The former entered a
regular position, which, by the utmost exertion of skill and labour, had
been rendered almost impregnable, being most formidably protected by
field-works and heavy guns. They found that the Tagus and port of Lisbon
afforded them assurance of subsistence, even in plenty, and that their
inferiority in numbers was completely made-up to them by the strength of
their position.
The French, on the contrary, who had fondly expected to enter Lisbon as
conquerors, found themselves in a country wasted by the hands of its
cultivators; without hospitals or magazines in their rear; in front a
foe, of whom they had lately felt the strength; and around, a hostile
population, for the greater part in arms. If, in such a situation,
Massena could be said to besiege Lisbon, he was, nevertheless, in the
utmost danger of suffering those extremities of famine which usually
fall to the lot of the beleaguered party. He seemed, by some strange
transmutation, to have changed lots with the natives of Lisbon, and to
suffer all the evils which he expected to inflict.
The war now paused on both sides. Lord Wellington had reached the point
of his defence. Massena seemed at a loss where to commence his attack.
The deer was turned to bay, but the dog sprung not. The eyes of all
Europe were rested upon the Tagus, on whose banks were to be decided the
pretensions to superiority asserted by two great generals in the name of
two mighty nations. But that event was suspended for several months,
during which it is fitting that we should resume the narrative of other
matters.
FOOTNOTES:
[39] "It was in vain that Soult strove with all his power to stop the
slaughter. The frightful scene of rape, pillage, and murder, closed not
for many hours, and what with those who fell in battle, those who were
drowned, and those sacrificed to revenge, it is said that 10,000
Portuguese died on that unhappy day! The loss of the French did not
exceed 500 men."--NAPIER, vol. ii., p. 207. See also SOUTHEY, vol. iii.,
p. 249.
[40] Southey, vol. iv., p. 10. The reader is requested to compare this
account with that given by Lord Burghersh, in his "Memoir on the Early
Campaigns of Wellington," p. 77--where the details are somewhat
differently represented--ED. (1842.)
[41] "Victor sent soldiers to every house, with orders to the
inhabitants immediately to receive and accommodate the wounded of the
two nations, who were lodged together, one English and one Frenchman;
and he expressly directed that the Englishman should always be served
first."--SOUTHEY, vol. iv., p. 49.
[42] Southey, vol. iii., p. 168.
[43] Southey, vol. iv., p. 159.
[44] Napier, vol. ii., p. 349; Southey, vol. iii., p. 511.
[45] "Various explanations have been offered of this name. One account
says, that upon finding his family murdered by the French, Juan Martin
Diaz smeared his face with pitch and made a solemn vow of vengeance.
Another, that he was so called because of his swarthy complexion. But in
the account of his life it is said, that all the inhabitants of
Castrillo de Duero, where he was born, have this nickname
indiscriminately given them by their neighbours, in consequence of a
black mud, called _pecina_, deposited by a little stream which runs
through the place; and the appellation became peculiar to him from his
celebrity."--SOUTHEY, vol. iii., p. 511.
[46] Southey, vol. iv., p. 405.
[47] Southey, vol. iv., p. 415.
[48] Southey, vol. iv., p. 482.
CHAPTER LII.
_Change in Napoleon's Principles of Government--Becomes suspicious
of Talleyrand and Fouché--Fouché endeavours, without the knowledge
of Napoleon, to ascertain the Views of England with respect to
Peace--His Plan is defeated by a singular collision with a similar
one of Napoleon--and Fouché is sent away as Governor-General of
Rome--His Moral and Political Character--Murmurings of the People
against the Austrian Alliance--Continental System--Ignorance of
Napoleon of the Actual Political Feelings of Great Britain--The
License System--Louis Buonaparte--Endeavours in vain to defend
Holland from the Effects of the Continental System--He abdicates the
Throne, and retires to Gratz in Styria--Holland is annexed to the
French Empire._
[Sidenote: CHANGES IN NAPOLEON'S GOVERNMENT.]
Since Buonaparte obtained, in 1804, the absolute rule of the French
Republic, a change had been gradually taking place in his principles of
government, and in the character of the statesmen whom he employed as
his ministers and advisers. For the first two years, and more, he had
governed on the principle of a limited monarch, who avails himself of
the best talents he can find among his subjects, and shows a deference
to those who are distinguished, either for the political part which they
have performed, or the share they possess in the good opinion of the
public. Among his advisers at this period, we find many of the leading
men of the Revolution; persons who, though they had been induced, from
various motives, to see the rise of Napoleon with equanimity, and even
to aid him, then their equal, in his attempt to climb to supreme power,
yet still remembered in what relation he and they had originally stood
to each other. In counselling an Emperor, these statesmen did it with
the more freedom, that they remembered a period when they were on a
level with him, nay, perhaps, when they stood a good deal higher.
This period of his reign, during which Napoleon suffered the wild and
powerful flights of his own ambition to be, in some degree, restrained
and directed by the judgment of others, formed the most laudable and
useful certainly, if not the most brilliant part of his career. But,
gradually as his power became augmented and consolidated, the Emperor
began to prefer that class of complaisant ministers, who would rather
reflect his own opinions, prefaced with additional recommendations and
arguments, than less courteously attempt to criticise and refute them.
The history of Napoleon justifies, or at least excuses him, for falling
into this natural error. He felt, and justly, that he was the sole
projector of his gigantic plans, and also, in a great measure, the agent
who carried them through; and he was led to believe, that, because he
did so much, he might as well do the whole. The schemes which he had
himself originally formed, were executed by his own military genius; and
thus it seemed as if the advice of counsellors, so indispensable to
other princes, might be unnecessary to a sovereign who had shown himself
all-sufficient alike in the cabinet and in the field. Yet this, though a
plausible, was a delusive argument, even though it appeared to be borne
out by the actual fact. It may be true, that in Buonaparte's councils,
few measures of consequence were suggested by his ministers, and that he
himself generally took the lead in affairs of importance. But still it
was of great consequence that such plans, having been proposed, should
be critically weighed, and canvassed by men of too much experience to be
deceived by appearances, and too much courage to be prevented from
speaking their mind. The advice of such men as Talleyrand and Fouché,
operated as a restraint upon schemes hastily adopted, or opinionatively
maintained; and their influence, though unseen and unheard, save in the
Imperial cabinet, might yet be compared to the keel of a vessel, which,
though invisible, serves to steady her among the waves, and regulate the
force by which she is propelled by her swelling canvass; or to the
pendulum of a time-piece, which checks and controls the mainspring of
the machinery. Yet, though Buonaparte must have been sensible of these
advantages, he was still more accessible to the feelings of jealousy,
which made him suspect that these statesmen were disposed rather to
establish separate interests for themselves in the government and
nation, than to hold themselves completely dependent on the Imperial
authority.
[Sidenote: TALLEYRAND--FOUCHÉ.]
The character of both Talleyrand and Fouché, indeed, authorised some
such suspicion. They had been distinguished in the French Revolution
before Napoleon's name had been heard of, were intimately acquainted
with all the springs which had moved it, and retained, as Buonaparte
might suspect, the inclination, and even the power, to interfere at some
possible state-crisis more effectually than accorded with his views of
policy. He had gorged them indeed with wealth; but, if he consulted his
own bosom, he might learn that wealth is but an indifferent compensation
for the loss of political power. In a word, he suspected that the great
services which Talleyrand rendered him with regard to foreign relations,
and Fouché as minister of police, were calculated to raise them into
necessary and indispensable agents, who might thus become, to a certain
degree, independent of his Authority. He doubted, moreover, that they
still kept up relations with a political society called Philadelphes,
consisting of old republicans and others, of different political creeds,
but who were united in their views of obtaining some degree of freedom,
either by availing themselves of such slender means of restraint as the
constitution, so carefully purged of every means of opposing the
Imperial will, might yet afford, or by waiting for some disaster
befalling Napoleon which might render their voice potential.[49]
The suspicions with which Buonaparte regarded his ministers did not rest
on vague conjecture. While he was in Spain, he received information,
appearing to indicate that a party was forming itself in the Legislative
Assembly, the bond connecting which was opposition to the Imperial will.
That body voted, it must be remembered, by ballot; and great was the
surprise and alarm of the assembly, when black balls, disapproving a
measure suggested to their consideration by government, were counted to
the number of an hundred and twenty-five, being a full third of the
members present.[50]
An official note, dated from Valladolid, 4th December, instantly
recalled the presumptuous dissentients to a sense that the power of
rejecting the laws laid before them in the Emperor's name, which they
had attempted thus boldly to exercise, was only intrusted to them for
show, but was meant to contain no really effectual power of control. The
words of Napoleon, the friend, as has been pretended, of liberal
institutions, are well worthy of remark. "Our evils," he said, "have
arisen in part from an exaggeration of ideas, which has tempted the
Legislative Body to consider itself as representing the nation; an idea
which is chimerical and even criminal, since implying a claim of
representation which is vested in the Emperor alone. The Legislative
Body ought to be called the Legislative Council--it does not possess the
right of making laws, since it has not the right of propounding them. In
the constitutional hierarchy, the Emperor, and the ministers his
organs, are the first representatives of the nation. If any other
pretensions, pretending to be constitutional, should pervert the
principles of our monarchical constitution, every thing is undone."[51]
This is all very intelligible, and shows that in principle, if not in
practice, the monarchical constitution of France rested upon the same
basis of despotism which supports the monarchical constitution of
Constantinople, where the Ulemats, or men of law, have an ostensible
title to resist the Grand Signior's edicts, and are only exposed to the
penalty of being pounded to death in a mortar, should they presume to
exercise it. Yet, a member of the French Legislative Body might have
been pardoned for being inquisitive on two subjects. 1st, He might wish
to know, if that body, chosen by the people, though indeed not directly,
did not represent their electors, whom was it that they did represent?
2dly, What was their real authority in the state, since they were not to
enjoy the power of rejecting the overtures which the constitution
contended should be laid before them, before they were passed into laws?
[Sidenote: FOUCHÉ.]
Buonaparte entertained strong suspicion that this recalcitrating humour,
so suddenly testified by so complaisant an assembly, must have had the
countenance of Talleyrand and of Fouché. So soon as he returned to
Paris, therefore, he sounded the latter minister on the revolt in the
Legislative Body, and desired his opinion on the sort of measures by
which he had repressed it. Fouché had been too long a spy upon the
private thoughts of others, to be capable of the weakness of betraying
his own. He expatiated, in a tone of panegyric, on the decisive tone of
the official note, affirmed that this was the only way to govern a
kingdom, and added, that if any constitutional body arrogated the right
of national representation, the sovereign had no choice but instantly to
dissolve it. "If Louis XVI. had acted thus," said the minister, "he
might have been alive, and King of France at this day." Astonished at
the zeal and promptitude of this reply, Buonaparte looked for an instant
with wonder at his minister, who thus avouched sentiments so different
from those which had governed the earlier part of his political life.
"And yet, Duke of Otranto," said the Emperor to the ex-jacobin,
"methinks you were yourself one of those whose voices sent Louis XVI. to
the scaffold?"--"I was," answered the supple statesman, without
confusion or hesitation; "and it was the first service which I had the
honour to render to your Majesty."[52]--This courtly answer saved the
minister for the moment; but Napoleon did not the less continue to see
in Fouché an object of suspicion and apprehension, whose power, owing to
his having been so long at the head of the police, was immense; whose
duplicity was unfathomable, and who evinced many indications of desiring
to secure some separate individual authority, either by being too
necessary to be dismissed, or too formidable to be offended.
Fouché himself has, indeed, admitted, that he endeavoured to regulate
the duties of his office, so as to secure as much power to himself as
possible, and was anxious, out of a desire of popularity, as well as
from respect for the virtue which he did not himself possess, to execute
those duties with the least possible harm to individuals. His mode of
transacting business with the Emperor was thus characteristically
described by himself. A person of rank, one of the _détenus_, desirous
of escaping from the durance in which he was confined, had been
fortunate enough to engage the interest of Fouché in his behalf. He had
received more than one intimation from this statesman, that his passport
would certainly be granted, but still it never received the Imperial
signature; and Fouché, who began to fear that his own sincerity might be
called in question, commenced one morning, in the presence of our
informer, and of one of the distinguished generals of the empire, the
following oblique explanation of the cause of his failure. "You no doubt
think yourself a brave man?" said he, addressing the general.--"Bah!"
replied the other, entering in to the same vein of raillery--"Brave?
brave as an hundred lions."--"But I," continued the statesman, "am much
braver than you. Look you, I desire some favour, the liberation of a
friend, or the like; I watch the happy moment of access, select the
moment of persuasion, am insinuating--eloquent--at length, by argument
or importunity, I am successful. Next day, the paper which should ratify
the boon which I had requested, is rejected when offered, torn perhaps,
or flung beneath a heap of petitions and supplications. Now, herein is
displayed my courage, which consists in daring again and again to
recommence the unacceptable suit, and, what is perhaps the last verge of
audacity, to claim it as a promise, which, being once pledged, can only
be redeemed by specific performance." In this confession we read the
account of a minister, still possessing influence, but declining in
favour, and already become the object of his sovereign's jealousy; to
whose personal request a favour cannot be decently refused, although a
promise, reluctantly conceded to importunity, is willingly forgotten, or
at length tardily and disobligingly granted.
Standing on these terms with a master at once watchful and jealous, we
cannot be surprised at the audacity of Fouché, who feared not to affect
a sort of independence, by anticipating the desires of Napoleon in the
public service, and even in the Imperial family. A striking instance of
the last occurred in his intrigue with Josephine on the subject of the
divorce;[53] and perhaps it was his escape out of that former
involvement,[54] without loss of power or credit, which urged him to a
second interference of a more public and national character, by which he
endeavoured to sound the possibility of accomplishing a peace with
England.
We may discover more than one motive for Fouché's proceeding in this
most important business without either the knowledge or consent of
Napoleon. He was aware that his master might have rendered it, in his
way of treating, impossible even at starting, to discover on what terms
Great Britain would conclude peace, by stating as preliminaries certain
concessions which it was probable would not be granted, but from which,
once stated, Napoleon could not himself recede. If, therefore, Fouché
could find some secret mode of ascertaining upon what terms a treaty
with England might really be obtained, he was doing a service to France,
to Britain, to Napoleon himself, and to the world. It is not the Duke of
Otranto, however, in particular, whom we would expect to incur disgrace,
and even personal hazard, on mere public grounds. But, besides the
pleasure which those who have long engaged in political intrigues find
in carrying them on, until the habit becomes as inveterate as that of
the gambler, we can see that Fouché might reasonably propose to himself
an important accession of influence by the success of such a
negotiation. If he could once acquire a knowledge of the price at which
Napoleon might obtain that peace for which the world sighed in vain, he
would become possessed of an influence over public opinion, both at home
and abroad, which could not but render him a person of extreme
importance; and if he was able to become the agent in turning such
knowledge to advantage, and negotiating such an important treaty, he
might fix himself even on Napoleon, as one of those ministers frequently
met with in history, whom their sovereign may have disliked, but could
not find means to dismiss.
[Sidenote: M. OUVRARD--FOUCHÉ.]
Acting upon such motives, or on others which we can less easily
penetrate, Fouché anxiously looked around, to consider what concessions
France might afford to make, to soothe the jealousy of England; trusting
it would be possible to come to some understanding with the British
Ministry, weakened by the loss of Mr. Canning, and disheartened by the
defeats sustained by the Spanish patriots, and the sinister event of the
Walcheren expedition. The terms which he would have been willing to have
granted, comprehended an assurance of the independence of the two
kingdoms of Holland and Spain (as if such a guarantee could have availed
any thing while these kingdoms had for sovereigns the brothers of
Napoleon, men reigning as his prefects, and, we shall presently see,
subject to removal at his pleasure,) together with the acknowledgment of
the Sicilian monarchy in the present King, and that of Portugal in the
House of Braganza. M. Ouvrard, a gentleman who had been permitted to go
to London on commercial business, was employed by Fouché to open this
delicate and furtive negotiation with the Marquis of Wellesley. But the
negotiation was disconcerted by a singular circumstance.[55]
The idea of endeavouring to know on what terms peace could be obtained,
had occurred to Napoleon as well as to Fouché; and the sovereign, on his
part, unsuccessful as he had been on two occasions in his attempt to
open a personal correspondence with the King of England, had followed
the steps of his minister, in making M. Labouchère, a commercial person,
agent of a great Dutch mercantile establishment, the medium of
communication with the British Government. The consequence was, that
Ouvrard, and the agent of the Emperor, neither of whom knew of the
other's mission, entered about the same time into correspondence with
the Marquis Wellesley, who, returned from his Spanish mission, was now
secretary at war. The British statesman, surprised at this double
application, became naturally suspicious of some intended deception, and
broke off all correspondence both with Ouvrard and his competitor for
the office of negotiator.[56]
Napoleon must naturally have been so highly incensed with Fouché for
tampering without his consent[57] in a matter of such vital consequence,
that one is almost surprised to find him limiting the effects of his
resentment to disgracing the minister. He sent for Fouché [June 2,] and
having extorted from him an avowal of his secret negotiation, he
remarked, "So, then, you make peace or war without my leave?"[58] The
consequence was, that the Duke of Otranto was deprived of his office of
minister of police, in which he was succeeded by Savary; and he was
shortly after sent into a species of honourable exile, in the character
of Governor-general of Rome.[59] It cost Buonaparte no little trouble to
redeem from the clutches of his late minister the confidential notes
which he had himself written to him upon affairs of police. For a long
time Fouché pretended that he had consigned these important documents to
the flames; and it was not until he had before his eyes the alternative
of submission or a dungeon, that he at length delivered up the Imperial
warrants, containing, no doubt, much that would have been precious to
history. Dismissed at present from the stage, we shall again meet with
this bold statesman at other periods of our history, when, as is
observed of some kinds of sea-fowl, his appearance seldom failed to
announce danger and tempest.
The character of Fouché, in point of principle or morality, could
scarcely be accounted even tolerable; but he had high talents, and in
many points the soundness of his judgment led him to pursue and
recommend moderate and beneficent measures, out of policy, if not from a
higher motive. On other accounts, also, many of the French had some
partiality to him; especially those who cast their eyes backward upon
their national history, and regretted the total loss of that freedom, so
eagerly longed for, so briefly possessed, and which they could never be
properly said to have enjoyed; and to the recovery of which, in part at
least, Fouché was understood to be favourable as far as he could or
dared. The remnant of the sterner Republicans might despise him as a
time server, yet they respected him, at the same time, as a relic of the
Revolution, and on different occasions experienced his protection. To
the Royalists also he had been courteous, and so decidedly so, as
encouraged one of the boldest agents of the Bourbons to penetrate to his
presence, and endeavour to bring him over to the cause of the exiled
family. Fouché dismissed him, indeed, with a peremptory refusal to
listen to his proposal; but he did not deliver him to the police, and he
allowed him twenty-four hours to leave the kingdom. These various
feelings occasioned to many, alarm and regret at the dismissal of the
Duke of Otranto.
The discharge of this able minister seemed the more portentous, that
shortly before it occurred, the terrible charge of which he was about to
be deprived, had received an alarming extension of jurisdiction. The
number of state prisons was extended from one, being the old tower of
Vincennes, to no less than six, situated in different parts of
France.[60] These Bastiles, chiefly old Gothic castles, were destined to
be the abode of captives, whom the Government described as persons who
could not be convicted of any crime perpetrated, but whom, as
entertaining dangerous thoughts, and principles, it was not safe to
permit to remain at large. The _lettre de cachet_, by authority of which
these victims of political suspicion were to be secluded from liberty,
was to consist in a decree of the Privy Council, which might have been
as well termed the pleasure of the Emperor. This measure was adopted on
the 3d of March, 1810, upon a report made to the Council of State in the
name of Fouché, and agreed to by them; but it was well understood, that,
in this and similar instances, the individual at the head of any
department was obliged to father the obloquy of such measures as
Napoleon desired to introduce into it. The minister of police was
therefore held guiltless of recommending an extension of the
Government's encroachments upon public liberty; which, in fact, were the
exclusive device of Napoleon and his Privy Council.[61]
[Sidenote: AUSTRIAN ALLIANCE UNPOPULAR.]
It was another unfortunate circumstance for Napoleon, that the observers
of the times ascribed the dismissal of the old Republican counsellors,
and the more rigorous measures adopted against political malecontents,
to the influence of the Austrian alliance. With many persons in France,
Buonaparte, as the Heir of the Revolution, might, like Danton,
Robespierre, and others, have exercised the most despotic authority,
providing he claimed his right to do so by and through the Revolution.
But they could not endure to see the Emperor Napoleon, while exercising
the same authority with a thousand times more lenity, attempt to improve
his right to the submission of his subjects by an alliance with one of
the ancient houses of Europe, against whom the principles of the
Revolution had declared eternal war. Every class of politicians has its
fanatics, and in that of the ancient Jacobins were many who would rather
have perished by the short, sharp terrors of the Republican guillotine,
than survived to linger in a dungeon during the pleasure of a son-in-law
of the Emperor of Germany. Such ideas, inconsistent as they were in
themselves, and utterly irreconcilable with the quiet, gentle, and
irreproachable character of Maria Louisa, who could never be justly
accused of even attempting to influence her husband upon any political
subject, circulated, nevertheless, and were even accredited in political
society. There was indeed this argument in their favour, that no other
motive could be assigned for Buonaparte's sparing Austria when she was
lying at his mercy, and choosing a partner out of her royal family, than
the desire of allying himself with the House of Hapsburg, and of gaining
such access as could be attained by such an alliance to a share in the
rights and privileges of the most ancient hereditary dynasty of Europe.
But in approaching to that fraternal alliance with legitimate royalty,
Napoleon proportionally abandoned those revolutionary principles and
associates, by whose means he had first climbed to power; and by this
change, rather of the basis of his authority than of the authority
itself, he offended many of the Republicans, without effectually gaining
the aristocrats, to whom his new connexion might have seemed a
recommendation. Indeed, when his right to sovereignty was considered
without reference to his possession, and his power to maintain it,
Napoleon was in some measure censured like the bat in the fable. The
democrats urged against him his matrimonial alliance with a house of the
ancient régime; while the aristocrats held him disqualified on account
of the origin of his power under the revolutionary system.
But although such objections existed among the zealots of both political
factions, the great body of the French people would have cared little on
what principle Napoleon had ascribed his title to the Imperial crown,
providing he had but been contented to allow the subject and himself the
advantage of a short repose from wars and conquests. This tranquillity,
however, was becoming every day less probable, for new incidents seemed
to dictate new acquisitions to the empire; and, unhappily for his own
and other countries, the opportunity of aggrandisement was with
Buonaparte all that it wanted to recommend it, and the pressure of the
occasion was always a complete justification of any measure which the
time rendered expedient.
That which now chiefly occupied him, since the overtures for peace with
England had been rendered abortive by the collision of his own
confidential emissary with that of Fouché, was the destruction of the
strength, and the sapping of the resources of that country, by dint of
enforcing and extending what he called the European Continental System;
which consisted of the abolition of all commerce, and the reducing each
nation, as in the days of primitive barbarism, to remain satisfied with
its own productions, however inadequate to the real or artificial wants
to which its progress in society had gradually given rise.
Like most foreigners, Napoleon understood little or nothing of the
constitutional opinions, or influential principles belonging to England.
He was well acquainted with human character, as modified by the
governments and customs of France and Italy; but this experience no more
qualified him to judge of the English character, than the most perfect
acquaintance with the rise and fall of the Mediterranean, amounting to
five or six inches in height, would prepare a navigator to buffet with
the powerful tides which burst and foam on the shores of the British
islands. The information which he received from that hostile country,
Buonaparte construed according to his wishes; and when it was supplied
by private intelligencers, they were of course desirous of enhancing the
value of what they told, by exaggerating its importance. It was, indeed,
no difficult task to impose on a statesman, ignorant enough of the
present state of North Britain, to believe that he could, even at this
time of day, have disturbed the security of the reigning family, by
landing in Scotland some candidate, having pretensions to the crown
through the House of Stuart. With the same inaccuracy, he concluded
every warm speech in Parliament a summons to revolt--every temporary
riot or testimony of popular displeasure, from whatever cause, a
commencement of open rebellion. He could not be convinced, that from the
peculiarity of the English constitution, and the temper of her people,
such disturbances and such violent debates must frequently exist; and
although, like eruptions on the human body, they are both unpleasant and
unseemly, they are yet the price at which sound internal health is
preserved.
[Sidenote: THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM.]
Actuated by such erroneous views as we have stated, Napoleon conceived
that in 1810 he saw in England the important results of his Continental
System, or interdiction of British commerce with the continent.
The associations of the Luddites, as they were called, were at this time
giving great disturbance in the manufacturing districts of England.
These, it is well known, were framed to prevent the introduction of
looms wrought by machinery, or power-looms, to the superseding the
ordinary looms wrought by hand. The cause would have equally existed,
and the discontent also, if the Continental System had never been heard
of; for such discontent must and will exist in every trade where a
number of men are suddenly thrown out of employment by the introduction
of abbreviated means of labour. Yet Napoleon never doubted that these
heart-burnings, and the violence of the Parliamentary debates, arose
entirely from the new mode he had found of striking at Great Britain by
the destruction of her commerce. He, therefore, as we shall presently
see, examined all Europe, with the intention of shutting every creek and
fishing-port, through which cargoes of muslins or cotton goods could by
possibility penetrate; and the absolute authority which he could
exercise over the whole continent, with the exception of Russia, and of
the "still vexed" Peninsula, entitles us to compare him to the heedful
governor of a jail, who traverses his gloomy dominions at stated hours,
striking with his hammer every bar to ascertain that it rings sound, and
proving every lock, to see that no secret means of communication exists
with the free part of humanity. Thus commerce, the silken tie which
binds nations to each other, whose influence is so salutary to all
states, so essential to the very existence of many, was in danger of
being totally abrogated, unless in as far as it was carried on by a
system of licenses.
The adoption of this system, which went in a great measure to counteract
the effects of that very Continental System which he made it such an
especial point to press and enforce upon all neutral powers, was a
singular sacrifice made by Napoleon, partly to necessity, partly to the
desire of accumulating treasure.
The license system was a relaxation of the continental blockade, of
which England had set the example by giving protections to such neutral
vessels, as, clearing out from a British port, had a certain proportion
of their cargo made up of British goods or colonial produce. This was
what, in mercantile language, is termed a real transaction--the British
merchandise was purchased by such as designed to make a profit, by
selling it again upon any part of the continent to which they might be
able to introduce it. Buonaparte, in like manner, granted Imperial
licenses, purchased for large sums of money, by which trading vessels
were permitted to import a certain quantity of colonial produce, on
condition of exporting an equal proportion of French manufactures. This
system differed from that of England, in this important respect, that
the demand for articles of the French manufactures was entirely
simulated. The goods were not wanted in Britain, could not be re-sold
there without payment of heavy duties, and were often thrown into the
sea in preference to discharging the English duties upon them. Editions
of books, a commodity thus exported, and thus disposed of, were wittily
said to be _ad usum Delphini_. The prime cost at which these French
goods had been purchased, in compliance with Buonaparte's regulations,
was of course laid upon the colonial goods, which were the only actual
subject of trade. Thus, if the French manufacturers derived any profit
from the transaction, it was raised, not by their goods being exported
and sold in foreign countries, in the usual course of trade, but by the
prime cost being imposed as a tax upon the colonial produce imported;
and the price was paid, of course, not by the foreign market, which the
goods seldom reached, but by the French consumers of sugar, rum, and
coffee.
The real temptation for continuing this attempt to force a trade, was,
as we have seen, the impossibility of dispensing with colonial produce
entirely, and the large revenue accruing to the French government from
these licenses, who, in this manner, exercising a complete monopoly in a
trade which they interdicted to all others, made immense additions to
the treasure which almost choked the vaults of the pavilion Marsan, in
the Tuileries. The language held by the minister of Napoleon to the
powers thus affected, amounted therefore to the following
proposition:--"You shall shut your ports against British commodities;
for without your doing so, it will be impossible for the Emperor
Napoleon to humble the Mistress of the Seas. But while you are thus
deprived of all commerce, whether passive or active, Napoleon reserves
to himself, by the system of license, the privilege of purchasing and
dealing in the commodities of Britain and her colonies, which, reaching
your country by any other mode than through his permission, will be
subject to confiscation, nay, to destruction."
At a later period, Buonaparte greatly regretted that he had suffered the
emolument derived from the license-trade, to seduce him into relaxing
his Continental System.[62] He seems to lament having relinquished his
supposed advantage, as a vindictive freebooter might regret his having
been reduced to let go his hold on his enemy's throat, by the tempting
opportunity of plunging his hand into the pocket of a bystander. The
injustice which thus imposed on neutrals the necessity of abstaining
from a lucrative commerce, which France, the belligerent power, reserved
to herself the privilege of carrying on, in such degree as she might
find convenient, was of so crying a description, that, at any other time
than during the irresistible ascendency of Napoleon, the very mention of
it would have revolted all Europe. And even as times stood, the
non-compliance with terms so harsh and unjust, cost the fall of two
European thrones, ere it became the means of undermining that of
Napoleon himself.
[Sidenote: LOUIS BUONAPARTE.]
The first of the royal sufferers was the brother of Napoleon, Louis
Buonaparte, who had been created King of Holland. By every account which
we have been able to collect, Louis was an amiable, well-intentioned,
and upright man, of a romantic disposition, and a melancholic
complexion, which he had increased by studying the sentimental
philosophy of Rousseau.[63] But he was, in his brother's language, an
ideologist; that is, one who is disposed to do that which is right
according to principle, rather than that which circumstances render
expedient. He was embarrassed by some family disputes, and lived on
indifferent terms with his wife,[64] who was a greater favourite with
Napoleon than was Louis himself. Since he had been under the necessity
of accepting the crown of Holland, he had endeavoured to afford that
country all the protection which could be derived from his near
relationship to Napoleon; and if he could not save his subjects entirely
from the evils of a conquered and dependent state, he endeavoured to
diminish these as much as his means permitted. The Dutch, a calm and
deliberate people, gave Louis full credit for his efforts, and, in
general, regarded him as their friend and protector. But at the period
we treat of, the evils which approached their state were far beyond
Louis' power to avert or even to modify. Other countries may have more
or less of a commercial character, but Holland exists by commerce
entirely. It was the influence of commerce which gained her amphibious
territory from the waves, and, were that influence withdrawn, her fair
towns must again become fishing villages; her rich pastures must return
to their original state of salt-water marshes, shallows, and sand-banks.
The French exactions already paid, to the amount of one hundred millions
of francs, had purchased, as the natives of Holland fondly imagined,
some right to exert the small means of commerce which remained to them,
and which, under King Louis' sanction, were almost entirely engaged in
traffic with England, now declared contraband.
Napoleon used threats and commands to induce Louis to bring his subjects
to a more rigorous observance of the Continental System, while Louis
employed expostulation and entreaty in behalf of the nation over whom he
had been called to rule. Each brother grew more obstinate in his
opinion, and at length, as the Emperor began to see that neither fear
nor favour could induce Louis to become the agent of oppression in
Holland, his removal from that country was distinctly pointed at as the
consequence of his obstinacy. It was intimated, in a report by
Champagny, the Duke de Cadore, that the situation of Louis on the throne
of Holland was rendered critical, by his feelings being divided betwixt
the imprescriptible duties which he owed to France and to his family,
and the interest which it was natural he should take in the welfare of
Dutch commerce. To terminate this strife in his brother's mind, the
report informed the public that Napoleon meant to recall the prince of
his blood whom he had placed on the Dutch throne, since the first duty
of a French prince having a place in the succession to that monarchy,
was to France exclusively; and it was intimated, that Holland, divested
of her King, and her nominal independence, would be reduced to the
condition of a province of France, occupied by French troops, and
French officers of the revenue; and thus deprived of the means of
thwarting the Continental System, so necessary for the subjugation of
Britain, by the obstinate continuance of commercial intercourse with a
nation under the ban of the empire.[65]
[Sidenote: HOLLAND--ABDICATION OF LOUIS BUONAPARTE.]
This report is peculiarly interesting, as explanatory of Buonaparte's
views respecting the rights and regal authority of the sovereigns whom
he created and displaced at pleasure, as the interests of France, or
rather as his own, required, or seemed to require. Either, however,
Napoleon became, for the moment, ashamed to acknowledge this fact so
broadly; or he thought that such a contradiction of his repeated
declarations might have a bad effect upon the Westphalian subjects of
Jerome, and upon the Spaniards, whom he desired to become those of
Joseph; or, perhaps, the remonstrances of Louis produced some temporary
effect upon his mind; for he stopped short in his full purpose, and on
the 16th March concluded a treaty with Louis, the terms of which were
calculated, it was said, to arrange disputed points betwixt the
sovereigns, and render the independence of Holland consistent with the
necessary conformity to the Continental System.
[Sidenote: July 1.]
By this treaty, Zealand, Dutch Brabant, and the whole course of the
Rhine, as well the right as the left bank, were transferred from Holland
to France. French officers of the customs were to be placed in all the
Dutch harbours; 18,000 troops were to be maintained by the kingdom of
Holland, of whom 6000 were to be French; a fleet was to be fitted out by
the same kingdom for the service of France; English manufactures were to
be prohibited by the Dutch government; and other restrictions were
subscribed to by Louis,[66] in hopes his brother's stern resolution
might be so far softened as to leave the remaining portions of the
territories of Holland in a state of nominal independence. But he was
soon made sensible that this was no part of Napoleon's intentions.
Instead of 6000 French troops, 20,000 were assembled at Utrecht, with
the purpose of being poured into Holland. Instead of this foreign
soldiery being stationed on the coasts, where alone their presence could
be requisite to prevent the contraband trade, which was the sole pretext
of introducing them at all, Louis was informed, that they were to take
military possession of the whole country; and that the headquarters of
this army, which was totally independent of his authority, were to be
established at Amsterdam, his capital.
Seeing himself thus deprived by his brother of all power in the kingdom
which was still called his, Louis generously refused to play the pageant
part of a monarch, who could neither exert his rights nor protect his
subjects. On the 1st of July he executed a deed of abdication in favour
of his son, then a minor, expressing an affectionate hope, that though
he himself had been so unhappy as to offend his brother the Emperor, he
would not, nevertheless, visit with his displeasure his innocent and
unoffending family. In a letter from Haarlem, dated the 1st July, Louis
enlarged on the causes of his abdication, in a manner honourable to his
head and his heart, and with a moderation, when he spoke of his brother,
which gave weight to his just complaints. "He could not," he said,
"consent to retain the mere title of King, separated from all real
authority in his kingdom, his capital, or even his palace. He should be,
in such a case, the witness of all that passed, without the power of
influencing the current of events for the good of his people, yet
remaining responsible for evils which he could neither remedy nor
prevent. He had long foreseen the extremity to which he was now reduced,
but could not avoid it without sacrificing his most sacred duties,
without ceasing to bear at heart the happiness of his people, and to
connect his own fate with that of the country. This," he said, "was
impossible. Perhaps," he continued, "I am the only obstacle to the
reconciliation of Holland with France. Should that prove the case, I may
find some consolation in dragging out the remainder of a wandering and
languishing life, at a distance from my family, my country, and the good
people of Holland, so lately my subjects."[67]
Having finished his vindication, and adjusted means for making it
public, which he could only do by transmitting it to England, the
Ex-King of Holland entertained a chosen party of friends at his palace
at Haarlem until near midnight, and then, throwing himself into a plain
carriage which was in attendance, left behind him the kingly name and
the kingly revenue, rather than hold them without the power of
discharging the corresponding duties of a sovereign. Louis retired to
Gratz, in Styria, where he lived in a private manner, upon a moderate
pension,[68] amusing his leisure with literature.[69] His more ambitious
consort, with a much more ample revenue, settled herself at Paris, where
her wit and talents, independent of her connexion with Napoleon,
attracted around her the world of fashion, of which she was a
distinguished ornament.
Buonaparte, as was to have been expected, paid no regard to the claim of
Louis's son, in whose favour his father had abdicated. He created that
young person Grand Duke of Berg, and, although he was yet a child, he
took an opportunity to make him a speech, which we have elsewhere
adverted to, in which, after inculpating the conduct of his brother, the
tenor of which he stated could be accounted for by _malady_ alone,[70]
he explained in few words the duties incurred by his satellite
sovereigns. "Never forget, that whatever position you may be required to
occupy, in order to conform to my line of politics, and the interest of
my empire, your first duty must always regard ME, your second must have
reference to France. All your other duties, even those towards the
countries which I commit to your charge, are secondary to these primary
obligations."
Thus was the leading principle clearly announced, upon which the nominal
independence of kingdoms allied to France was in future to be understood
as resting. The monarchs, to whom crowns were assigned, were but to be
regarded as the lieutenants of the kingdoms in which they ruled; and
whatever part the interest of their dominions might call upon them to
act, they were still subject, in the first instance, to the summons and
control of their liege lord the Emperor, and compelled to prefer what
his pleasure should term the weal of France, to every other call of duty
whatever.
[Sidenote: HOLLAND ANNEXED TO FRANCE.]
The fate of Holland was not long undecided. Indeed, it had probably been
determined on as far back as Champagny's first report, in which it had
been intimated, that Holland, with all its provinces, was to become an
integral part of France. This was contrary to the pledge given by
Napoleon to the Senate, that the Rhine should be considered as the
natural boundary of France; nor was it less inconsistent with his
pretended determination, that the independence of Holland should be
respected and maintained. But both these engagements yielded to the
force of the reasoning used by his mouth-piece Champagny, in
recommending the union of Holland with the French empire, and with
France itself. They are worth quoting, were it only to show how little
men of sense are ashamed to produce the weakest and most inconsistent
arguments, when they speak as having both the power and the settled
purpose to do wrong. "Holland," said the minister, whose very effrontery
renders his arguments interesting; "is in a manner an emanation from the
territory of France, and is necessary to the full complement of the
empire. To possess the entire Rhine," (which had been proposed as the
natural boundary of France,) "your majesty must extend the frontier to
the Zuyder-Zee. Thus the course of all the rivers which arise in France,
or which bathe her frontier, will belong to her as far as the sea. To
leave in the hands of strangers the mouths of our rivers, would be,
Sire, to confine your power to an ill-bounded monarchy, instead of
extending its dominions to the natural limits befitting an imperial
throne." On such precious reasoning (much on a par with the claim which
Napoleon set up to Great Britain as the natural appendage of France,
along with the isle of Oleron,) Holland was, 9th July, 1810, declared an
integral part of the French empire.
But the usurpation was not unavenged. It cost Buonaparte a greater
declension in public opinion than had arisen even from his unprincipled
attempts on Spain. It is true, none of the bloody and extensively
miserable consequences had occurred in Holland, which had been
occasioned by the transactions at Bayonne. But the seizure of Holland
brought Buonaparte's worst fault, his ambition, before the public, in a
more broad and decided point of view.[71]
There were people who could endure his robbing strangers, who were yet
shocked that he, so fond of his kindred, and in general so liberal to
them, should not have hesitated to dethrone his own brother, merely for
entertaining sentiments becoming the rank to which he had been raised by
himself; to disinherit his nephew; to go nigh taxing so near a relation
with mental imbecility; and all on so slight a provocation;--for the
only real point of difference, that, viz. respecting the English
commerce, had been yielded by Louis in the treaty which Napoleon had
signed, but only, it seemed, for the purpose of breaking it. It was
observed, too, that in the manly, but respectful opposition made by
Louis to his brother's wishes, there appeared nothing to provoke the
displeasure of Napoleon, though one of the most irritable of men on
subjects with which his ambition was implicated. It seemed a species of
gratuitous violence, acted as if to show that no circumstance of
relationship, family feeling, or compassion (to make no mention of
justice or moderation,) could interfere with or check the progress of
Napoleon's ambition; and whilst the more sanguine prophesied, that he
who ran so rashly, might one day run himself to a close, all agreed that
his empire, composed of such heterogeneous parts, could not, in all
probability, survive the mortal date of the founder, supposing it to
last so long. In the meantime, it was evident, that the condition of no
state, however solemnly guaranteed by Buonaparte himself, could be
considered as secure or free from change while it was subject to his
influence. To conclude the whole, the Dutch were informed by the Emperor
with bitter composure, that "he had hoped to unite them to France as
allies, by giving them a prince of his own blood as a ruler; that his
hopes, however, had been deceived; and that he had shown more
forbearance than consisted with his character, or than his rights
required;"--thus intimating some farther and unexpressed severity, which
he might have felt himself justified in adding to the virtual exile of
his brother, and the confiscation of his late dominions; and
insinuating, that the Dutch had escaped cheaply with the loss of their
separate national existence.
FOOTNOTES:
[49] Southey, vol. iii., p. 405; Fouché, tom. i., p. 339.
[50] Fouché, tom. i., p. 329.
[51] Fouché, tom. i., p. 329.
[52] Mémoires de Fouché, tom. i., p. 331.
[53] Fouché, tom. i., p. 32.
[54] "It is well known that Josephine never spoke to the Emperor
otherwise than in favourable terms of all those who were about his
person; she was even of service to M. Fouché, though he had attempted to
become the instrument for bringing about her divorce."--SAVARY, tom.
ii., p. 178.
[55] "Although Sir Walter Scott does not mention me, I am able to speak
pertinently to this affair: the following is the truth. I went to Paris
in 1809, against my inclination, to comply with the wish of the
principal Dutch, who imagined that I could prevent, or at least adjourn
by my presence in Paris, and my immediate efforts, the evident intention
of seizing upon Holland. During my stay at Paris, I was persuaded that
all the tricks, the attacks, and ill-treatment, of which I was the
object, had not for their real end the union of Holland, since it was
the interest of France to aggrandise that kingdom, but that it was a
political stratagem, to induce the English government to repeal its
decrees of council, and to conclude the peace; and I was therefore
prevailed upon while at Paris to send M. Labouchère from Amsterdam to
London with instructions to make known to the Marquis Wellesley, that if
England did not withdraw its decrees of council, the union of Holland
with France was inevitable. The reply of the marquis proved at once how
favourable my government in Holland had been to France, since the
English Government declared, 'that the fate of Holland could not fail to
occasion much interest in England; but that, in the present state of
that country, the influence of France was so entire there, that the
political change spoken of, must have some weight in the determination
of the British Cabinet.' This attempt having proved useless, I could
only succeed in delaying the union of Holland, the decree for which
being prepared beforehand, and always in readiness, was often placed
before me--by sacrificing Brabant and Zealand. After my return to
Amsterdam, I was requested to allow M. Ouvrard a passage to England. I
consented to this the more willingly, as I imagined that it was in
consequence of the step I had already taken in sending M. Labouchère to
London. A short time after, the Emperor visited Antwerp. Whilst
conversing with him there, I assured him that there had been no
communication with England except that which had taken place through M.
Ouvrard, according to his request. My astonishment was extreme on
learning, that not only it was without his request, but that he was
ignorant of it, and from that moment he determined on the discharge of
M. Fouché, who had allowed so singular a proceeding."--LOUIS BUONAPARTE,
p. 65.
[56] Fouché, tom. i., p. 354; Savary, tom. ii., part ii., p. 208.
[57] "Ah, Fouché! how well the Emperor knew you, when he said, that your
ugly foot was sure to be thrust in every body's shoes."--LAS CASES, tom.
ii., p. 18.
[58] "Napoleon left the council, and gave orders to Savary to arrest M.
Ouvrard; at the same time, I was forbidden to have any communication
with the prisoner. The next day the portfolio of the police was given to
Savary. This time it was a real disgrace."--FOUCHÉ, tom. i., p. 358.
[59] "The decree constituting Fouché Governor-general of Rome, bears
date June 3, 1810. 'This nomination,' says Fouché, 'was nothing but an
honourable veil woven by Napoleon's policy, in order to conceal and
mitigate, in the eyes of the public, my disgrace, of which his intimates
alone had the secret."--_Mémoires_, tom. ii., p. 7.
[60] Saumar, Ham, Landskaone, Pierre-Châtel, and Fennestrelles.
[61] Fouché, tom. i., p. 352.
[62] Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 283.
[63] See _ante_, vol. ii., p. 211, _note_. "Louis had been spoiled by
reading the works of Rousseau."--NAPOLEON, _Las Cases_, tom. ii., p.
306.
[64] "As Louis and Hortensia had lived almost always separate since
their marriage, except three short periods of a few months, they each
demanded of the family council a separation, presently after Louis
arrived at Paris in 1809. But after a meeting of the said council was
granted, the separation was refused, though it had long existed in point
of fact. He was informed of the refusal verbally: no document whatever
was transmitted to him on a result, on which however depended the ease,
condition, and fame of a man of honour."--LOUIS BUONAPARTE, _La
Hollande_, tom. iii., p. 199.
[65] Documens Historiques sur la Hollande, tom. iii., p. 238.
[66] "This treaty, which was rather a capitulation, was imposed by the
Emperor, signed by Verhueil, and ratified conditionally by the King, who
added the words, '_as far as possible_.'"--LOUIS BUONAPARTE, _Documens
Hist._, tom. iii., p. 248.
[67] Documens Historiques, tom. iii., p. 310.
[68] "This is not correct. I did not, nor could not, receive a pension
from any one: my revenue was derived principally from the sale of my
decorations and jewels, and the interest of the obligations I had taken
upon me, in order to encourage the loan from Holland to Prussia at the
time of the greatest misfortunes of the virtuous sovereign of that
country, who, in spite of all opposition and every political
consideration, was anxious to acquit himself towards me with scrupulous
exactitude."--LOUIS BUONAPARTE, p. 69.
[69] In 1808, Louis gave to the world a sentimental romance, called
"Marie, ou les Peines de l'Amour," of which a second edition appeared in
1814, under the title of "Marie, ou les Hollandaises." A distinguished
critic describes the royal production as "a farrago of dulness, folly,
and bad taste."--(_Quart. Rev._, vol. xii., p. 391.) His treatise,
entitled "Documens Historiques, et Réflexions sur le Gouvernement de la
Hollande," is an unpresuming account of his administration in Holland.
[70] "The conduct of your father grieves me to the heart: his disorder
alone can account for it. When you are grown up you will pay his debt
and your own."--_Documens Hist._, tom. iii., p. 326; and _Moniteur_,
July 23, 1810. "When Napoleon received the news of his brother's
abdication, he was struck with astonishment: he remained silent for a
few moments, and after a kind of momentary stupor, suddenly appeared to
be greatly agitated. His heart was ready to burst, when he exclaimed,
'Was it possible to suspect so mischievous a conduct in the brother most
indebted to me.' When I was a mere lieutenant of artillery, I brought
him up with the scanty means which my pay afforded me I divided my bread
with him; and this is the return he makes for my kindness!' The Emperor
was so overpowered by his emotion, that his grief was said to have
vented itself in sobs."--S
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