The History of the 36th (Ulster) Division
by Cyril Falls · English · Gutenberg #48716 · 877,727 chars · public domain (US)
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Title: The History of the 36th (Ulster) Division
Author: Cyril Falls
Release date: April 16, 2015 [eBook #48716]
Most recently updated: October 24, 2024
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE HISTORY OF THE 36TH (ULSTER) DIVISION ***
TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE
Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.
A superscript is denoted by ^{x}; for example, 36^{th}.
The original text has a dot under the 'th', which has been removed
in the etext.
The format of time in the original text (with a hyphen) has been
retained. For example, 11-45 a.m.
Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.
More detail can be found at the end of the book.
THE HISTORY
OF THE
36^{TH} (ULSTER) DIVISION
O socii, neque enim ignari sumus ante malorum,
O passi graviora, dabit deus his quoque finem.
VIRGIL: _Æneid_.
And he hadde been somtyme in chyvachie,
In Flaundrés, in Artoys and Pycardie,
And born hym weel.
CHAUCER: _Canterbury Tales_.
_Dawbeney_--
Wise princes, Oxford,
Fight not alone with forces. Providence
Directs and tutors strength; else elephants
And barbèd horses might as well prevail
As the most subtle stratagems of war.
FORD: _Perkin Warbeck_.
[Illustration: THE MEMORIAL TO THE 36TH (ULSTER) DIVISION AT
THIEPVAL]
THE HISTORY
OF THE
36^{TH} (ULSTER) DIVISION
BY
CYRIL FALLS
_Late Lieutenant, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers
and Captain, G.S., 36th Division_
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
FIELD MARSHAL THE LORD PLUMER
G.C.B., G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.
[Illustration: (colophon)]
M'CAW, STEVENSON & ORR, LIMITED
THE LINENHALL PRESS, BELFAST
AND 329 HIGH HOLBORN, LONDON, W.C.
1922
_This History is dedicated to the men of the_
ULSTER DIVISION,
_returned from the War, and to those who have not
come back; of whom I name two friends_:
HARRY GALLAGHER, D.S.O.,
_Captain, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
killed at the Battle of Messines, 1917_;
_and_
GEORGE BRUCE, D.S.O., M.C.,
_Brigade Major, 109th Brigade,
killed near Dadizeele, 1918_;
_Patterns to men-in-arms_.
INTRODUCTION
The history of the 36th (Ulster) Division is the record of a great
effort and a great achievement. The effort which resulted in its
inception was the outcome of the determination, on the part of a
people brought up in great traditions and inspired with a fervent
spirit of loyalty, that they should be worthily represented in the
fierce and prolonged struggle which from the outset was clearly
foreshadowed. The achievement was the response made to the call by
their representatives, the gallant deeds accomplished, the courage
and determination displayed, and the sacrifices made.
The narrative gives a very clear picture of what the campaign in
France and Flanders involved for the troops engaged in it. There is
no reference to any great strategical movements or brilliant tactical
operations, because there were none such to describe. It brings out,
however, quite plainly that the victory was gained in the only way
in which it could have been gained, by sheer hard fighting, carried
out continuously, now on a small, now on a large, scale, but always
by troops who never admitted defeat.
This was the character of the struggle into which the Ulster Division
was plunged from its entrance into the campaign until its close, and
the book describes very fully the part it played in it. Each chapter
is a little history of itself, which frequently has sufficient
subject-matter for a volume, and which always contains a record of
events or incidents of absorbing interest. It is not a narrative of a
series of unbroken successes, and there is no pretence that all the
efforts made by the Division were successful. Readers of the History
will find stories of failures, but they were glorious failures, the
account of which no-one need feel ashamed to describe or peruse.
A tribute, no more than is due, is paid to Major-General Sir
Oliver Nugent, K.C.B., D.S.O., the General who was in command of
the Division for the greater part of the campaign, and who led it
throughout with a confidence in it only equalled by its confidence in
him. All who served under him will always hold him in affectionate
remembrance, and all Ulstermen should realize that they owe him a
debt of gratitude.
I hope this History will be read, not only by those who served in the
Division and their relatives and friends, but by all Irishmen.
Young men approaching manhood and young women approaching womanhood
should read it, and ponder over the example their predecessors have
set them. For all who read will realize that in the great struggle
which convulsed Europe for more than four years the men of Ulster did
not fail.
PLUMER, F.M.
MALTA,
_25th November, 1922._
PREFACE
The history of the 36th (Ulster) Division is published under the
patronage of the Right Hon. the Lord Carson of Duncairn, the Prime
Minister of Northern Ireland, and Major-General Sir O. S. W. Nugent,
K.C.B., D.S.O.
Its publication once decided upon, the first step taken was the
formation of an influential Committee; the second, that of a
Guarantee Fund to cover the whole cost of its production, which was,
within a few weeks, largely over-subscribed.
The materials upon which the History is chiefly based are the
official War Diaries in the possession of the Historical Section
(Military Branch) of the Committee of Imperial Defence. To the
officials at 2, Cavendish Square I am indebted for courtesy and
assistance in matters of difficulty. I have made use also of a very
large number of contributions sent to me by those who served with
the Division, from Sir James Craig and Sir Oliver Nugent to several
private soldiers. So long is the list that I cannot acknowledge my
debt to these contributors by name, but I desire to thank one and all
for material without which the record would have been bald and dry,
material which has, I hope, enabled me to give some tinge of humanity
to the History. In several cases these personal contributions have
been of greater value still than this. They have--and this is
true especially of the Retreat of March, 1918--furnished me with
a record of incidents upon which official Diaries throw no light.
Two such incidents, in particular, the defence of a company of the
12th Royal Irish Rifles at Le Pontchu Quarry, near St. Quentin, on
March the 21st, and the last stand of the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles at
Cugny, three days later, have hitherto gone unrecorded, because the
survivors of these heroic episodes fell into the hands of the enemy.
I have also to thank Sir Oliver Nugent, Colonel-Commandant W. M.
Withycombe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.; Brigadier-General C. J. Griffith,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.; Brigadier-General A. St. Q. Ricardo, C.M.G.,
C.B.E., D.S.O.; Major H. F. Grant Suttie, D.S.O., M.C., and Major
J. C. Boyle for their trouble in reading the History in MS. and
for their many helpful suggestions. The Honours List, a very big
undertaking, is based almost entirely on the compilation of Mr.
Andrew Jardin, M.S.M., formerly Chief Clerk in the Administrative
Branch of Divisional Headquarters. In this and other matters
connected with the History I have had much assistance from my wife.
The most important acknowledgment, on behalf of the Committee and
all interested in the publication of the work as well as on my own,
is due to Captain Kenneth M. Moore, M.C., who acted as Honorary
Secretary. The whole of the business side of the undertaking has been
conducted by him. Into it he has thrown all his organizing ability
and his enthusiasm. No appeal has been made to him in vain.
I have only to add that it has been my endeavour to make this History
not a mere record of battles, but, so far as space has permitted,
a picture of life as it was lived in the days of war. Lacking the
second, the first is like dry bones without flesh to cover them. If I
have succeeded in combining the two, I have right to hope that I have
made a contribution, however small, to history in a general sense, as
apart from military history.
It is to-day a favourite pretension that the war was as uninteresting
as it was terrible: a vast error, based upon a temporary reaction,
when not upon a pose. I made recently the discovery that between
1906 and 1921 there were published over one hundred books on the
Napoleonic Wars. The number would have been far greater but for the
fall in the publication of all books between 1914 and 1919. So, a
hundred years hence, men will be delving into our records of the
late war. Soldiers will be studying the lessons of its battles. But
a yet greater number of seekers will be demanding with curiosity
how men lived in such circumstances, how they reacted to the strain
of war, what compensations they found. It behoves those who were
eye-witnesses to depict it in all its aspects, not to shrink from
discovering its horror, indeed, but also not to pretend that it had
not a better side. The picture now so often painted, representing
the war as a single scene in a torture chamber, whence men emerged
physical or mental wrecks, may be good anti-militarist propaganda,
but it is false, because incomplete. From those experiences many men
have emerged happy and strong. Many knew how to snatch some happiness
even from their midst. A far greater number can see, in retrospect,
that they played a part in one of the most dramatic, as well as one
of the most terrible, tragedies in history. That stands for something
of good, amid all its evil, in any man's life. The comradeship of
war's days is a memory not less happy.
It is not alone because the story of the Ulster Division is a record
of courage and fortitude, in which men who are my friends had part,
but because it represents in a microcosm man in one of the greatest
and most curious catastrophes the world has known, that I have had,
however unworthy of the task, a pleasure so intense in writing this
book.
C. F.
CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
I THE RAISING AND TRAINING OF THE DIVISION:
SEPTEMBER 1914 TO SEPTEMBER 1915 1
Lord Kitchener and Sir Edward Carson--Sir
Edward Carson's Appeal--Formation of the Division--A
Commander appointed--Training begins--The
Clan Spirit--Realities of War--The Move to England--Lord
Kitchener's Tribute--His Majesty's Review.
II THE DIVISION IN FRANCE: OCTOBER 1915 TO
JUNE 1916 22
First Experiences--Picardy--107th Brigade in
Line--The Division enters Line--Holding a Quiet
Front--Rations--The Brighter Side--Preparation for
Offensive--Reorganization of Artillery.
III THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME: JULY 1ST, 1916 41
New Aspect of Warfare--Plans for the Attack--Artillery
Programme--A Successful Raid--Anniversary
of the Boyne--Attack North of Ancre--Advance
of 107th Brigade--A Desperate Situation--July 2nd--Causes
of Failure--Move to Flanders.
IV FROM THE SOMME TO MESSINES: JULY 1916
TO JUNE 1917 64
In Line before Messines--Warfare Underground--Trench
Mortar Battles--The Policy of Raids--Lieutenant
Godson's Ambush--A Series of Raids--La
Plus Douve Farm--A Growth of Activity--Shelling
of Ulster Camp.
V MESSINES: JUNE 1917 82
Preparation for the Offensive--Plans for the
Attack--Second Army Methods--Medical Arrangements--Waiting
for Zero--First Objective reached--Wytschaete
captured--Artillery moves Forward--Pack
Transport--Death of Captain Gallagher--German
Commander's Problem--Von Richthofen.
VI THE BATTLE OF LANGEMARCK: AUGUST 1917 107
Plans of the Allies--107th Brigade enters Line--Wieltje
Dug-outs--Barrage Plans--Failure of 108th
Brigade--The Division's Losses--Causes of Failure--General
Nugent's Suggestions.
VII YPRES TO CAMBRAI: SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER
1917 125
The Hindenburg Line--Fighting at Yorkshire
Bank--Raiding Activity--The Livens Projector--Life
amidst Desolation--British Organization--Problem
of Man-power--Work in the Mist.
VIII CAMBRAI AND AFTER (I): NOVEMBER 20TH TO
22ND, 1917 143
Plans for Cambrai--Task of 109th Brigade--Tanks
move up--Capture of Spoil Heap--Defence
of Flesquières--Results of November 20th--Gains of
November 21st--Mœuvres: November 22nd--A New
Phase.
IX CAMBRAI AND AFTER (II): NOVEMBER 23RD TO
DECEMBER 31ST, 1917 162
Plans for Nov. 23rd--The Grapple at Bourlon--Relief
of 36th Division--The German Counter-offensive--British
Withdrawal--Defence of 9th Inniskillings--Attack
of 11th Inniskillings--Relief in a
Blizzard--Summary of the Battle.
X THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON THE SOMME (I):
JANUARY TO MARCH 22ND, 1918 181
The New Line--Reorganization of Division--System
of Defence--Dispositions--The Weeks of
Waiting--Morning of March 21st--The German
Assault launched--Defence of Le Pontchu--Break-through
to the South--Defence of Racecourse
Redoubt--Heroic Action of Lieutenant Knox--The
Second Withdrawal--Open Warfare begins.
XI THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON THE SOMME (II):
MARCH 23RD TO 30TH, 1918 208
Sights in Ham--Both Flanks turned--Dawn of
March 24th--2nd Rifles at Cugny--Relief of 36th
Division--Horrors of the Retreat--A Gap between
the Allies--Colonel Place captured--Counter-attack
at Erches--What the Division achieved--Action of
the Artillery--Defence of XVIII. Corps.
XII FLANDERS: THE 108TH BRIGADE IN THE MESSINES-KEMMEL
BATTLE: APRIL TO JUNE 1918 232
Back to Ypres--108th Brigade on Messines Ridge--Fighting
at Wulverghem--A Black Day--Withdrawal
from Poelcappelle--German Rebuff in
Flanders--Changes in Command--Back after a Rest.
XIII BACK TO THE MESSINES RIDGE: JULY TO SEPTEMBER,
1918 248
Successful Raids--The Enemy withdraws--A
Fighting Retreat--September 3rd and 4th--Attack
of September 6th--Move to Ypres--The Hope of
Victory.
XIV THE ADVANCE TO FINAL VICTORY (I):
SEPTEMBER 28TH TO OCTOBER 17TH, 1918 262
Attack of September 28th--Advance of September
29th--Menin-Roulers Road reached--Review of
Situation--Death of Captain Bruce--Attack of
October 14th--A Great Day--Courtrai entered--Difficulties
of Supply.
XV THE ADVANCE TO FINAL VICTORY (II):
OCTOBER 18TH TO NOVEMBER 11TH, 1918 280
Plan for Forcing the Lys--Success of the Crossing--Attack
of October 20th--The Advance continued--Kleineberg
Ridge occupied--General Jacob's
Tribute--Special Order of Marshal Foch.
XVI THE END: NOVEMBER 1918 TO JUNE 1919 294
Preparations for Christmas--The Divisional Fund--Characteristics
of 36th Division--The End.
APPENDIX I ORDER OF BATTLE 305
" II LIST OF HONOURS AND AWARDS 313
INDEX 347
MAPS
I THE BATTLE OF ALBERT, 1916 at page 62
II THE BATTLE OF MESSINES, 1917 " 106
III THE BATTLE OF LANGEMARCK, 1917 " 124
IV THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI, 1917 " 180
V THE POSITION BEFORE GERMAN ATTACK,
MARCH 21ST, 1918 " 206
VI THE RETREAT OF MARCH 1918 " 230
VII THE FINAL ADVANCES, 1918 " 292
SKETCH IN TEXT page 284
ILLUSTRATIONS
THE MEMORIAL TO THE 36TH (ULSTER) DIVISION
AT THIEPVAL Frontispiece
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR C. H. POWELL, K.C.B. facing page 14
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR O. S. NUGENT, K.C.B., D.S.O. " " 36
WINNERS OF VICTORIA CROSS, 1916 " " 76
" " " " 1917 & 1918 " " 184
MAJOR-GENERAL C. C. COFFIN, V.C., C.B., D.S.O. " " 244
THE HISTORY OF
THE 36^{TH} (ULSTER) DIVISION
CHAPTER I
THE RAISING AND TRAINING OF THE DIVISION: SEPTEMBER 1914 TO SEPTEMBER
1915
It is no rightful part of the historian of a Division in the Great
War to embark upon preliminary sketches of the state of Europe
or of the movements in international politics that preceded the
catastrophe. If once he begin to seek for causes he must seek far.
Three pistol shots fired in the narrow streets of Serajevo may be
likened to an accidental spark that explodes a great charge. But the
charge was long laid. War had been determined upon in Berlin. Without
that accidental spark, there can be no doubt that it would shortly
have been deliberately exploded by a detonator from that quarter. If
the divisional historian cannot trace the laying of the charge, which
had been accumulating, it may be a hundred, and certainly fifty,
years, let him not begin by dealing with what were merely the final
accretions. Let him begin with the beginning of the war. War was
declared between this country and Germany on the 4th of August, 1914.
There are, however, certain local circumstances anterior to that
declaration, which have an intimate connection with the particular
Division that is the subject of this History, and so could not be
omitted without robbing the latter of much of its significance. The
Ulster Division was not created in a day. The roots from which it
sprang went back into the troubled period before the war. Its life
was a continuance of the life of an earlier legion, a legion of
civilians banded together to protect themselves from the consequences
of legislation which they believed would affect adversely their
rights and privileges as citizens of the United Kingdom--the Ulster
Volunteer Force.
The Ulster Volunteer Force, or U.V.F., as it soon came to be known
the world around, was the creation of Sir Edward Carson.[1] He
believed that if the Imperial Parliament were to persist in its
declared intention of forcing the Protestant population of Ulster
into an Irish Parliament, without its consent, the inevitable
consequence would be civil war in Ireland. Unorganized resistance
would be ineffective, and would beyond doubt lead to disorder and
unnecessary bloodshed. That the attempt would be made appeared
certain. The fate of the Government was bound up with its Home Rule
Bill. A failure to carry it through would have involved instant
defeat in the House of Commons, wherein the Irish Nationalist
Party held the balance of power. All the signs pointed to a clash.
It appeared to Sir Edward Carson that the surest defence of the
political ideals of his followers lay in convincing the people of
Great Britain that Protestant Ulster would fight for the preservation
of liberties and traditions which it held dear, which, in its eyes,
were now menaced. It was in this faith that he gave his approval to
the formation of the U.V.F.
It was on the advice of Lord Roberts, a warm advocate of Ulster's
cause, that Sir Edward Carson invited General Sir George Richardson
to take command of the U.V.F. Under his leadership the force was
organized on a territorial basis. At the outbreak of war it contained
over 80,000 men between the ages of seventeen and sixty-five, and a
number of women, enrolled not only as nurses but for many of those
supplementary services which were not allotted to women in the
European war until a comparatively late period. The people of Ulster
entered into their adventure in the same spirit that they entered
into that of the war when it came, a spirit of single-minded faith
in their leaders and in themselves. Admirably did Mr. Kipling sum up
their attitude in the lines:
Believe we dare not boast,
Believe we do not fear.
Probably their worst danger was over before the declaration of war.
The incident at the Curragh, as well as conferences at the War
Office, at Aldershot, and elsewhere, of which the general public
never knew, had made it clear that the Army could not be used to
enforce the legislation projected at the cost of civil war. General
John Gough, V.C., then Sir Douglas Haig's Chief of Staff, visited
Ulster in July, and stated that the idea of coercion was abandoned.
He is known to have formed the opinion that the Ulster Volunteers
could, with experienced leaders, be made a very formidable fighting
force. He, as well as the Government, knew that those leaders would
not have been lacking.
Lord Kitchener, once at the War Office, was not long in arriving at
the same opinion as General Gough. He was appointed Secretary of
State for War on Wednesday the 5th of August. On Friday the 7th he
sent for Colonel T. E. Hickman,[2] a Member of the House of Commons,
President of the British League for the Defence of Ulster, who had
acted as Inspector-General of the U.V.F., and said to him: "I want
the Ulster Volunteers."
Colonel Hickman replied: "You must see Carson and Craig."
Lord Kitchener saw them. Sir Edward Carson's position was not easy.
He was most eager to help by every means in his power. But he had a
heavy responsibility towards the people of Ulster. If the fighting
men of the Province were to go to the war, and in their absence
a Home Rule Act, such as they had banded themselves together to
resist, were to be forced upon those they had left behind, they
would have had cause to reproach him. The Prime Minister was asked
for an assurance with regard to the Home Rule Bill. No definite
assurance could be obtained from him. A political truce had come into
operation at the beginning of hostilities, but it was ill-defined,
and the Prime Minister evidently did not see his way clearly out of
the difficulties of his situation.[3] Sir Edward raised some minor
points, asking that the word "Ulster" might succeed the number of the
Division which it was proposed to raise. To this Lord Kitchener at
first demurred, but the appelation was subsequently granted.[4]
A short delay ensued. The news from France was bad. A meeting of the
Ulster Unionist Members of Parliament, attended by Lord Roberts,
was held at Sir Edward Carson's house in Eaton Place. The result of
the meeting was that, then and there, Colonel Hickman took a letter
to Lord Kitchener, offering the aid of Sir Edward and the Council
in raising as large a force as possible from the Ulster Volunteers,
without any conditions whatsoever. Later that day there was another
meeting between the Secretary for War and the Ulster representatives
at the War Office. At first Lord Kitchener was modest in his demands,
thinking that a Brigade from the U.V.F. would be ample, at least as
a start. Captain Craig[5] assured him they could recruit a Division.
Lord Kitchener at once appointed Colonel Hickman and Captain Craig as
Chief Recruiting Officers for the Ulster area.
Captain Craig, on leaving the War Office, jumped into a taxicab in
Whitehall and went straight to a firm of outfitters with which he
had had dealings in equipment for the U.V.F., and gave an order for
10,000 complete outfits. Returning to the House he was somewhat
exercised in his mind as to where the money was to come from to pay
for all this. He spoke to Mr. Oliver Locker-Lampson,[6] one of
Ulster's staunchest friends, who pulled out a cheque-book, and said:
"Don't say another word! There's a thousand pounds: to go on with,
and nine more will follow in a day or two. This is out of a special
fund just available for your purpose."
In the first days of September Colonel Hickman and Captain Craig
crossed to Ireland to begin their work. On the 3rd of the month
Sir Edward Carson made a great appeal, at a meeting of the Ulster
Unionist Council in Belfast, to the men of the U.V.F., urging them to
come forward for the defence of the Empire, the honour of Ulster and
of Ireland.
In Ireland much had happened meanwhile. A large number of Ulstermen,
the eager spirits who would not wait, had already enlisted. Of these
the greater number had gone to the 10th Division, then being formed.
Others had crossed the Channel and joined Manchester and Glasgow
battalions. At Omagh Captain A. St. Q. Ricardo, D.S.O.,[7] Reserve of
Officers, had been put in charge of the Depot, and in mid-August had,
anticipating the formation of an Ulster Division, begun to recruit
men from the Tyrone Volunteers for a battalion of Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers. In a very short time he had two companies, which were,
as they had as yet no official status, attached to the 5th and 6th
Battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. In these battalions
some of the officers subsequently elected to remain, and went with
the 10th Division to the Dardanelles. When the Ulster Division
was formed these two companies became the nucleus of the senior
battalion of the 109th Infantry Brigade, the 9th Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers.[8] This was an exceptional incident, since Captain
Ricardo, before taking up his duties at the Omagh Depot, had been
Adjutant of the Tyrone Regiment, U.V.F. Throughout Ulster, however,
a preliminary recruiting campaign had been carried out, promises to
enlist on the official formation of an Ulster Division being obtained
from members of the U.V.F.
The short delay may have lost a few men to the Ulster Division, but
it had created an atmosphere of expectation and excitement. When
the recruiting officers arrived the men came forward with a rush,
above all in Belfast. A building near the Old Town Hall had been
taken over. As each man came out of the former after attestation,
he entered the latter, was passed from department to department,
emerging from another door a recruit in uniform, leaving his civilian
clothing to be packed up and sent home. In this respect the Ulster
Division was peculiarly fortunate. The men who enlisted in it had not
to endure those weeks of drilling in wet weather in their civilian
clothes, with inadequate boots, which were productive of moral as
well as physical discomfort. For this advantage they were indebted
to the foresight and powers of organization of Captain Craig and
his assistants, the generosity of their friends, and the aid of the
big business men of Belfast; the work being carried out without any
cost to the State. Captain Craig made further visits to the War
Office, on one of which he pointed out to Lord Kitchener that the
camp accommodation in Ulster was insufficient. Lord Kitchener replied
that such details must be arranged by others. Knowing him well from
South African days, when he had learned to regard him with the
highest admiration, Captain Craig answered that it was all very well
to talk in that autocratic manner, but that at present he himself
had not the weight behind him to carry the matter through. The
response was characteristic. Lord Kitchener summoned in succession
the Adjutant-General, the Director of Personal Services, the
Quartermaster-General, and the Director of Fortifications, and said
to them:
"Take Craig away and see that he gets what he requires."
Captain Craig was then able to return to Ireland, and set about the
building of hutted camps at Clandeboye, Ballykinlar, and Newtownards
in the east, and Finner on the Donegal coast.
The organization of the Division proceeded swiftly. A large house,
29, Wellington Place, Belfast, was taken over and equipped as
Headquarters. Three Infantry Brigades were formed: the 107th from the
City of Belfast itself; the 108th from the counties of Antrim, Down,
Armagh, Cavan, and Monaghan; the 109th from Tyrone, Londonderry,
Donegal, and Fermanagh, with one Belfast Battalion. The Pioneer
Battalion was also recruited in County Down, mainly from the Lurgan
area. The Royal Engineers, of which two Field Companies only were
raised at first, the 121st and 122nd, as well as the Divisional
Signal Company, came mainly from Belfast, above all from the great
shipyards. Royal Army Medical Corps personnel was recruited and sent
to Clandeboye, where, on the appointment of an A.D.M.S., Colonel
F. J. Greig, it was formed into three Field Ambulances, the 108th,
109th, and 110th, and moved to Newry. So successful was recruiting
for the R.A.M.C. that Colonel Greig was instructed by the War Office
to raise a Casualty Clearing Station, the 40th, which served both in
France and at Salonika. The Royal Army Service Corps personnel was
fine both in physique and intelligence. The horses were good, as was
natural, seeing how large was the proportion of horses bought for the
Army in Ireland, and among the officers were some excellent horsemen
and horsemasters. Indeed the horsemastership in the Division was
throughout the campaign of a very high order, the Infantry contriving
to keep their mules sleek and fat and the Artillery their gun-horses
fit and well-groomed amid conditions which none can realize who did
not witness them. A Cavalry Squadron and a Cyclist Company were also
formed, the former being unique in that it was a service Squadron of
the Inniskilling Dragoons.
One question which received much attention and gave rise to much
discussion was that of a Divisional Artillery. It was reluctantly
decided not to raise one in Ulster, though this meant losing many
an Ulsterman to other Divisions. The U.V.F. had no artillery and
consequently no partially trained force upon which to draw. It was
thought that the raising and training of artillery in Ulster would
take so long that it might delay the departure to the front of the
Division for several months. In those days, it will be remembered,
the one feverish anxiety of the men of the New Armies was lest the
war should be over ere they were able to play their part in it! In
the event, as will later be explained, the Division went to France
in advance of the Artillery that had been raised for it, with a
Territorial Artillery attached.
The 36th Divisional Artillery was raised, six months after the rest
of the Division, in the suburbs of London, though from quarters
stranger to one another than towns fifty miles apart in Ireland.
The 153rd and 154th Brigades R.F.A. were formed by the British
Empire League, of which one of the moving spirits was General Sir
Bindon Blood. They were recruited chiefly from Croydon, Norbury, and
Sydenham. The 172nd and 173rd Brigades, on the other hand, came from
North-east London. They were formed on the initiative of the Mayors
of East and West Ham and recruited from those districts.
The first date recorded in the Artillery annals is that of May the
5th, 1915, when sixty recruits of the 153rd Brigade assembled at
60, Victoria Street, the headquarters of the British Empire League,
and marched to Norbury, where they were billeted in private houses.
Londoners from South and North did not meet until July, when the
four Brigades and the 36th Divisional Ammunition Column were moved
to Lewes. It was within a few days of the arrival of the rest of the
Division, already at a high standard of efficiency, in England, that
serious training of the Divisional Artillery really began.
To the great regret of all Ulster, it was ruled that Sir George
Richardson, owing to the seniority of his rank, could not take
command of the Division. He remained in Belfast, working for the
good of the cause, and none can speak more highly of his efforts
and his loyalty than Sir James Craig and General Hickman, the chief
organizers of those early days. "Trusted by every class," writes an
officer who had long worked on his staff, "he was able to induce
employers to permit those of their workmen to enlist who were not
indispensable, and to perform the much more difficult task of making
the skilled craftsmen of the shipyards realize that their duty to
their country called them to remain at work, helping the Navy and
Merchant Service to hold command of the sea, on which our success
depended equally with our victory on land." How they and others,
notably the makers of linen for aircraft, who were, for the most
part, women, played their part, cannot be discussed here, though it
is a record worthy the pen of a eulogist. What is less generally
known to the people of Great Britain is that in Ulster not a strike
occurred throughout the course of the war.
Major-General C. H. Powell, C.B.,[9] an officer with a distinguished
record in the Indian Army, was appointed to the command of the
Division. Colonel Hickman, after remaining in Belfast till the three
Brigades had been formed, went to Finner to take command of the 109th.
The following is the formation of the Division as finally
constituted:--
COMMANDER:
Major-General C. H. POWELL, C.B.
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT AND QUARTER-MASTER GENERAL:
Lieut.-Colonel JAMES CRAIG.
GENERAL STAFF OFFICER, 2ND GRADE:[10]
Captain W. B. SPENDER.[11]
ROYAL ARTILLERY.[12]
(Brigadier-General H. J. BROCK.)
153rd Brigade, Royal Field Artillery.
154th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery.
172nd Brigade, Royal Field Artillery.
173rd Brigade, Royal Field Artillery.
Divisional Ammunition Column, Royal Field Artillery.
ROYAL ENGINEERS.
121st Field Company, Royal Engineers.
122nd Field Company, Royal Engineers.
150th Field Company, Royal Engineers.
107TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
(Brigadier-General G. H. H. COUCHMAN, C.B.)
8th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (East Belfast Volunteers).
9th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (West Belfast Volunteers).
10th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (South Belfast Volunteers).
15th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (North Belfast Volunteers).
108TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
(Brigadier-General G. HACKET PAIN, C.B.)[13]
11th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (South Antrim Volunteers).
12th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (Central Antrim Volunteers).
13th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (1st Co. Down Volunteers).
9th Battn. Royal Irish Fusiliers (Armagh, Monaghan, and Cavan
Volunteers).
109TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
(Brigadier-General T. E. HICKMAN, C.B., D.S.O.)
9th Battn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (Tyrone Volunteers).
10th Battn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (Derry Volunteers).
11th Battn. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (Donegal and Fermanagh
Volunteers).
14th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (Young Citizen Volunteers of
Belfast).
PIONEER BATTALION.
16th Battn. Royal Irish Rifles (2nd Co. Down Volunteers).
DIVISIONAL TROOPS.
Service Squadron, Royal Inniskilling Dragoons.
36th Divisional Signal Company, Royal Engineers.
Divisional Cyclist Company.
Royal Army Medical Corps.
108th Field Ambulance.
109th Field Ambulance.
110th Field Ambulance.
76th Sanitary Section, R.A.M.C.
Divisional Train, R.A.S.C.
48th Mobile Veterinary Section.
The present is perhaps the most suitable moment for mention of the
reserve battalions, of which six were formed in 1915: the 17th, 18th,
19th, and 20th Royal Irish Rifles, 12th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
and 10th Royal Irish Fusiliers. The 36th was the sole Irish Division
to have its own reserve formations. In addition to the provision of
drafts, these battalions had important tasks in the disturbed period
following the rebellion of Easter Week, 1916. A detachment from the
18th Royal Irish Rifles, which battalion was commanded by Colonel R.
G. Sharman Crawford, C.B.E., took part in the capture of "Liberty
Hall."
Training was in full swing by the end of September, 1914, the
107th Brigade being at Ballykinlar, the 108th at Clandeboye and
Newtownards, and the 109th at Finner; where the accommodation
consisted at this early date almost entirely of tents. By good chance
the weather of the first three weeks of October was fine and mild,
but thereafter, and before the hutting was completed, a very wet and
severe winter set in. The U.V.F. training was a great advantage. It
was easy to handle bodies of men, the most ignorant of whom could
at least number, form fours, march in step, and keep alignment from
the first. And the old organization held till it could be replaced
by the new. As one Commanding Officer writes: "The U.V.F. officers
and N.C.O.'s kept the men in order till we straightened out into
the regular army formation." The enthusiasm of the men of those
days of 1914 is something that no officer who served with them can
ever forget; something perhaps, also, that none but those officers
who began their training in the first six months of the war ever
witnessed. There is a slow-burning flame in the Ulster blood that
keeps her sons, once raised to the passion of great endeavour, at
a high and steady pitch of resolution. They took their work with
extraordinary seriousness. They were all anxiety to learn. They
made their platoon commanders, beginners for the most part like
themselves, struggle to keep ahead of them in the art that both
were acquiring. How many of the junior officers must remember those
"conferences" of sergeants and section leaders after parade hours
and the circle of keen heads bent inward toward them; how many the
"parades" on the mess table, matches for sections, inked on one side
so that after many manœuvres the front rank might remain the front!
The Infantry of the 36th Division was formed on perhaps the most
strictly territorial basis of any Division of the New Armies; the
general rule being that battalions were drawn from the larger
regimental areas of the U.V.F., companies from the smaller, and
platoons from battalion areas. This had the great advantage that
it engendered a natural companionship and spirit of pride in the
units. The company, the platoon, was a close community, an enlarged
family. In after days, in the trenches and in billets behind the
lines, the talk, not only of men from Belfast and the larger towns,
but of those from the country villages, would be of streets and, in
the latter case, of farms and lanes of which those present had known
every detail from childhood. The old clan-names of the Northumbrian
and Scottish Borders were clustered thick together. A platoon would
have five Armstrongs or Wilsons or Elliots, a company half a dozen
Irvines or Johnstons, a battalion half a score of Morrows or Hannas.
To be set against that great accretion of moral force which springs
from such a survival of the clan was the minor disadvantage that
the non-commissioned officers for the most part, and certainly all
the juniors amongst them, were the brothers and cousins and close
companions of the men they commanded. It was not that their orders
were disobeyed; it was rather that there was at first a diffidence
about the orders, which sometimes appeared to be rather in the nature
of persuasive requests. In a few units the non-commissioned officers
were changed about, so that they came in contact with men with whom
they were less familiar. But the problem was never a serious one,
and it finally disappeared. The only other disciplinary problem was
that of week-end leave. The great bulk of the men of the 107th and
108th Brigades and most of the Divisional Troops were training near
their homes. They could not understand why they should be kept in
camp doing nothing on Sundays when they might have been visiting
them. Though leave was given generously enough, this remained a sore
point till the Division moved to England. Apart from "absence without
leave" there was no crime to speak of. Such occasional blackguards
as were found in the ranks were swiftly disposed of, a sentence of
"discharged as incorrigible and worthless," which was, as a fact,
quite illegal in time of war, being their fate.
The Divisional Commander was a firm believer in marching, not only
as a preparation for that feature of military life, but as a creator
of toughness and endurance to meet the varied strain of war. By
the early months of 1915 one brigade route march of from twenty
to twenty-five miles, and shorter battalion marches each week,
had become the general rule. Equipment being slow in making its
appearance, General Powell had rucksacks, of the Alpine pattern,
made in Belfast, to be carried, fully loaded, on the march instead
of the pack, and bolts from the shipyards to take the place of
small-arm ammunition in the pouches. There was, as might be expected,
some grumbling at what appeared to be a needless imposition, but
the troops benefited by the experience, and Sir Archibald Murray,
when they marched past him the following summer, remarked how
easily they carried their packs. Numerous recruiting marches were
also carried out, which provided further training in marching and
march-discipline, and at the same time exhibited detachments of the
units from the countryside to the remotest villages in their area.
Everywhere they were received with the greatest pride and enthusiasm.
For the rest, the training was that of all the New Armies. The
Infantry had "D.P." rifles, the R.E. for a long time no material
save what was bought for them. Little musketry could be carried out,
such as there was being done with a handful of short service rifles
allotted to each battalion, and in some cases with rifles borrowed
from the U.V.F.--upon which inspecting Generals turned a blind eye.
By Infantry and Sappers alike trenches were dug, as an officer of
the latter acidly remarks, about eighteen inches wide and with
perpendicular sides. But that, of course, was a universal experience.
Much discussion took place upon the relative merits of trenches
sited upon the forward and reverse slopes of undulating ground.
Not till 1918, and then to an extent but small, was any choice to
be left by the enemy in the siting of positions. The R.A.M.C. was
the first to be equipped. The people of Ulster showed its affection
for its Division by the presentation of very fine motor ambulances,
each of which bore inscribed upon the body the name of the town or
association from which it came. In some of these cars the gangway was
sufficiently wide to take two additional stretchers, which proved an
inestimable boon in the Battle of the Somme.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL SIR C. H. POWELL, K.C.B.]
The winter, it has already been remarked, was a very wet one. The
health of the troops was generally good, a few cases of that dreadful
disease cerebro-spinal meningitis causing the medical staff its
greatest anxiety. In order, however, to spare the men as far as
possible from strain and discomfort, and to allow those that remained
to be accommodated in the huts as they were completed, some units
were moved out of the camps; the 9th Irish Fusiliers[14] of the 108th
Brigade, and the 11th Inniskillings[14] of the 109th, for example,
moving to barracks, the first to Holywood and Belfast, the second to
the town that gives the regiment its name, Enniskillen. In January
the 109th Brigade, less the 10th Inniskillings, moved to Randalstown.
The 10th Inniskillings remained on the West coast till the first days
of May, suffering the wildest weather in their exposed camp, but
probably no worse than was suffered by the rest of the Brigade in
the first days at Randalstown, which became such a quagmire that men
who slipped from the "duck-boards" between the huts sometimes sank
to their knees in the mud. As weather improved and the hutments were
completed, the full Brigades reassembled in their camps, the 10th
Inniskillings marching across Ireland, from west coast to east, to
rejoin. With the spring there began a new era of intensive training.
Meanwhile had been fought the Marne, the Aisne, the two Battles
of Ypres, Neuve Chapelle. The life in France was impossible to
imagine for those who had not seen it. Not all the marching and
countermarching, the attacks, the trench-digging, the bivouacks,
and cooking of meals in the open could print for the mind's eye an
adequate picture of that. But gradually, through letters, through
the recitals of wounded friends, men began to form some conception
of the realities of modern war, as fought against a race which, for
courage, endurance, and resource, ranked with the most formidable
warrior peoples of the world's history. The gas attack in the Salient
was evidence, if any were still needed, of the temper of the new
Germany. Men did not blanch, but it was inevitable that, to the more
seriously minded among them at least, another and a grimmer picture
than that which had been present with them at the beginning should
form itself. They had answered many calls, chief among them love of
country in various aspects. Mingled with this had been, however, the
spirit of adventure. The old rowel that had driven Ulstermen over
the seas, making them colonists and administrators, was sharpened
again by the war. It pricked on these young men, the flower of their
country. Now, perhaps, the spirit of happy adventure faded a little,
but it was replaced by that of hard resolution and duty. The training
had had its physical results. The troops were strong and supple in
their strength. But it had had a moral result also. The Division was
no longer a mass of men, even of drilled and disciplined men. It had
become, in the mysterious fashion that such things happen, welded
into a whole, a spiritual unit. Little by little the group-spirit had
grown, till before the troops quitted Ireland a sensitive observer
might fancy he could detect it whenever he came in contact with them.
One factor in this group-spirit and in the whole life of the
Division, which is here approached with diffidence, but which could
not be omitted from a faithful record, was the element of religion.
It is sometimes forgotten that the Covenant of the seventeenth
century was taken almost as widely in Ulster as in Scotland.
Undoubtedly something of the old covenanting spirit, the old sense of
the alliance of "Bible and Sword," was reborn in these men. It was
the easier recreated because of the strength of religious feeling
which had existed in times of peace in Protestant Ulster, one of the
few parts of the country wherein the reformed churches had not, by
their own admission, lost ground in the last thirty years. Religious
feeling inspired the men of Ulster in those days of training, and
remained with them in the days of war. The General commanding the
4th Division, to which the 36th was attached for instruction after
its arrival in France, spoke of his astonishment at finding so many
Ulstermen reading their Bibles. The writer of this book can bear
witness from personal observation that it was not uncommon to find a
man sitting on the fire-step of a front-line trench, reading one of
the small copies of the New Testament which were issued to the troops
by the people at home. The explanation was that, on the one hand,
religion was near and real to them; on the other, that they were
simple men. They saw no reason to hide or disguise that which was a
part of their daily lives.
The people of Ulster were given an opportunity to see their Division
as a whole. On May the 8th it was inspected by Major-General Sir Hugh
McCalmont at Malone, afterwards marching through Belfast, the salute
being taken by the General at the City Hall. It was a fine day; the
City was dressed in bunting, and the main streets rocked with a mass
of enthusiastic spectators, who had crowded in by special train from
all about the Province. The troops were to remain two months longer
in Ireland, always on the tiptoe of expectation of a move, but that
was the real farewell of Ulster to the Division she had given to the
nation.
Early in July the Division moved to Seaford, on the Sussex coast,
leaving the 9th Inniskillings to recruit at Ballycastle from the
shameful disease of German measles! But a small proportion of those
15,000 men had ever previously crossed the Irish Sea. The English
were new to them, as they were to the English. The impressions
made on either side were favourable. The men were treated with
the greatest kindliness, and, for their part, their behaviour was
excellent; reassuring, indeed, to some of those residents who had
been perturbed at the idea of this incursion of "wild Irishmen." Not
a few of the people of Seaford, on seeing the announcement of this
History in the press, wrote to the author and spoke of their pleasant
memories of the Ulstermen's sojourn in the district. Seaford made a
fine training area. It was a healthy place, and the splendid downs
behind the town were ideal for tactical exercises. Soon they were
scored with white chalk trenches. On one occasion, when the whole
Division, with the exception of the Artillery--Infantry, Cavalry,
Cyclists, Engineers, R.A.S.C., and R.A.M.C.--had been engaged in
night manœuvres, it was discovered when dawn broke that a deep trench
had been cut across a very valuable gallop belonging to an Alfriston
training stable. An apologetic letter was sent to the owner, who
wrote back expressing his pleasure that his ground had been put to a
purpose so useful, offered half his jumps to the mounted units and
young officers for practice, and scarcely hinted that he hoped the
occurrence would not be repeated.
In the last week of July, when the troops were carrying out
their usual routine of training, a message was received that
Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray, Deputy Chief of the General
Staff, would hold an immediate inspection. The result was of great
importance. Sir Archibald Murray informed Lord Kitchener on his
return that the Ulster Division was worthy of a higher place than it
occupied on the latter's private list of troops for the front. It was
not Lord Kitchener's fashion to ponder such questions.
"I'll go and see them to-morrow!" was his reply.
At half-past four on the 26th of July came a telephone message
that the Division was to parade for Lord Kitchener at 11 a.m. the
following day.
July the 27th was a bright, sunny day. Lord Kitchener came, dashed
at the waiting horses with such speed that before anyone could
speak he was on the back of one with a doubtful reputation, by no
means intended for his riding, and rode off. Colonel FitzGerald,
his Military Secretary, said he had never seen him better pleased,
and was quite unable to persuade him to leave the field for another
engagement. To General Powell he remarked that he was relieved to
find he had under his hand a Division ready for the front at a
moment's notice.
One incident of this inspection, related by the A.D.M.S. of the
Division, must be recorded, as it throws an interesting light on
Lord Kitchener's quickness of eye for and memory of details. The
personnel of the Field Ambulances was of fine physique, the mounted
men including many farmers' sons. As the Field Ambulances passed
the saluting point, Lord Kitchener turned to the A.D.M.S. with the
remark: "Those men are too fine for the R.A.M.C. You will have to
give me two hundred for the Artillery." The A.D.M.S. replied that
he hoped they would not be taken, as they had undergone a very
thorough training; to which Lord Kitchener, raising his voice,
simply repeated: "You will have to give me some of those men for the
Artillery."
A few days later an officer from the Adjutant-General's department
came down. He said that, at the moment, men were in fact not
particularly wanted for the Artillery, but that as "K." had ordered
it, they must be taken. The upshot was that, from a large number
who volunteered and some reinforcements from Newry, one hundred and
fifty were transferred to the Artillery, with the promise that they
should be used to reinforce that of their own Division--a promise
that, it is to be feared, was not in the majority of their cases
fulfilled. The sequel came two months later, when Lord Kitchener was
present at the King's Review. On reaching the 108th Field Ambulance,
the A.D.M.S. rode out to take up his position behind Lord Kitchener,
who turned to him and asked: "How many men did you send to the
Artillery?" "A hundred and fifty, sir." Lord Kitchener, somewhat
gruffly: "I thought I told you to send two hundred." The A.D.M.S.
thought it best to leave it at that.
Returning from the Seaford review, Sir Archibald Murray pointed
out to the Secretary for War that the 36th Division was not quite
so ready for France as he had supposed, since, though it had had
practice on the ranges at Seaford, as well as in Ireland, it had not
completed its official musketry and machine-gun courses, and was
not equipped for the front. Nor was the training of the Divisional
Artillery, which Lord Kitchener had not seen, nearly sufficiently
advanced. Lord Kitchener gave orders that musketry and equipment
should at once be completed, and that a fully trained Divisional
Artillery should be attached to the Division. Shortly afterwards he
said to Sir Edward Carson, referring no doubt to the New Armies only:
"Your Division of Ulstermen is the finest I have yet seen."
Owing to lack of accommodation it was a few weeks before the Division
moved to an area where its musketry could be carried out. By the
2nd of September it was assembled at Bordon and Bramshott. Here the
final equipment arrived, and there was feverish activity in fitting
it. Here also the musketry course was fired, for the most part with
American ammunition, which gave unsatisfactory results.[15] And
here the rest of the Division came to closer quarters with its own
Artillery, which had arrived at Bordon from Lewes on August the
31st. To be frank, there was some dismay when it was discovered how
elementary was its training. A year was the estimate by some regular
officers of the time needed to make it fit for service. The critics
had yet to learn what could be accomplished by intensive training,
directed from above with skill and energy, backed by hard work,
loyalty, and the swift intelligence of the Cockney from below.
The senior officers were now sent to France for instructional
purposes, being attached to the 5th and 18th Divisions. On their
return, news met General Powell that during his absence Major-General
O. S. W. Nugent, D.S.O.,[16] who had commanded a Brigade in France
with distinction, had been appointed to succeed him. The grounds of
the decision were unexceptionable: that Divisions should be taken
to France by general officers with experience of the conditions of
warfare in that country. There was, however, throughout the Division,
much sympathy with General Powell, who had been allowed to make his
tour in the line in ignorance of the fact, which the staff officers
with whom he came in contact knew, that his successor had been
appointed. He received the honour of the K.C.B. in recognition of his
high services in the training of the Division. Sir Herbert Powell
finally went to Vladivostok in charge of the British Red Cross. The
new commander was to remain with the Division for over two and a
half years. To-day his name is universally associated with it.
On September the 30th, the 36th (Ulster) Division, with the 1st/1st
London Territorial Artillery, was reviewed by His Majesty King George
the Fifth. It was desired not to prolong unduly the march past, as
His Majesty always insisted on waiting till the last man had gone
by, and General Nugent decided that the Artillery should advance in
column of batteries, and the Infantry in column of half-companies
with reduced intervals. It was a high test, triumphantly
accomplished. Lord Kitchener informed General Sir A. Hunter, G.O.C.
Aldershot Command, that the inspection was the quickest the King had
made since the beginning of the war: a triumph of staff work and of
drill. None of those who saw them is likely to forget the physique or
the bearing of that splendid body of men. It is hard to think without
emotion of what the Division was that day and the fate that awaited
it.
Lord Kitchener was there again, smiling and obviously well-pleased.
His Majesty warmly congratulated General Nugent, and, turning to Sir
George Richardson, who was present, told him what a fine Division had
been given by his Ulster Volunteers. As the King's motor-car overtook
some of the troops marching back to camp the men burst out into
wild cheering, so that the car swept along a loud-roaring line--an
unrehearsed and spontaneous exhibition of loyalty.
At the time of His Majesty's inspection the Advance Parties were
already in France. In the first days of October the Division crossed
the Channel, the mounted portion and transport to Havre, the
dismounted to Boulogne.
The year of preparation for battle was over.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Now Lord Carson of Duncairn.
[2] Now Brigadier-General T. E. Hickman, C.B., D.S.O., M.P.
[3] Sir Edward Carson's apprehensions were found to have been
justified when, on September the 15th, Mr. Asquith's Government
passed the Home Rule Act, the whole of the Unionist Party leaving
the Chamber as a protest against what it regarded as a breach of the
Truce.
[4] As, of course, were the titles "Scottish," "Irish," "Welsh,"
"Northern," "Southern," etc., to other Divisions.
[5] Now the Right Honble. Sir James Craig, Bt., Prime Minister of
Northern Ireland.
[6] Now Commander Locker-Lampson, C.M.G., D.S.O.
[7] Now Brigadier-General Ricardo, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.
[8] Captain Ricardo was asked officially to ascertain the views
of the Nationalist Party, in his district, which had a military
organization of its own. They replied that they would help on the
following conditions: (_a_) they would guard the shores of Ulster
only, and would not leave it; (_b_) they must be allowed to keep
their arms at the end of the war.
[9] Now Sir Herbert Powell, K.C.B.
[10] A G.S.O., 1st Grade, was not appointed to Divisions in training
at home.
[11] Now Lieut.-Colonel Spender, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.
[12] Formed May 1915.
[13] Now Sir G. Hacket Pain, K.B.E., C.B., M.P.
[14] In future, battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers,
Royal Irish Rifles, and Royal Irish Fusiliers will be alluded to as
"Inniskillings," "Rifles," and "Irish Fusiliers," respectively.
[15] The writer saw one man, at whose shoulder he had stood on a
U.V.F. range while he put five huge bullets from an Italian Veterli
into the bull's-eye, miss the target twice at 600 yards.
[16] Now Sir Oliver Nugent, K.C.B., D.S.O.
CHAPTER II
THE DIVISION IN FRANCE: OCTOBER 1915 TO JUNE 1916
General Nugent and his Staff arrived at Boulogne at midnight on the
3rd of October. Between the 5th and the 9th of the month the Division
concentrated in the area round Flesselles, where, some ten miles
north of Amiens, Divisional Headquarters were established. Here the
troops realized for the first time that France did not always mean
the firing-line. The sound of guns was, strangely enough, heard less
than it had been at Seaford, though the Vérey lights that could be
seen by night against the sky were evidence of the proximity of the
trenches. The countryside of the Somme was poor of soil, though
the industry of the inhabitants extracted good crops from it, and
curiously unlike that of the North of Ireland in its absence of
pasture. It was, however, pleasant enough, high and rolling, the
sites of the little villages in the uplands determined by the scanty
water supply, but traversed by numerous streams in the valleys, full
of beautiful panoramas wherever woodland interposed to break the
monotony of its contours. The villages were not uncomfortable so long
as troops could be widely spread. When, however, they were used as
"staging areas" and billeting was at all close, their poverty was
only too apparent.
Of this, some portions of the Division had early experience. On
October the 9th the 107th Brigade and the 1st/1st London Brigade
R.F.A. moved up for attachment to the 4th Division, and instruction
in trench warfare. The 4th Division at this time held a wide and
comparatively quiet front north of the River Ancre, which had been
taken over from the French during the previous summer. The general
method of instruction in vogue was the attachment of formations and
units to those next larger; that is, a battalion to an infantry
brigade, a company to a battalion, a battery to a brigade of
artillery. The troops in this preliminary experience of trench
warfare suffered less from the enemy than the elements. The weather
was bad, roads and trenches were wet; the billeting accommodation
_en route_ was scanty, and while in rest behind the line, consisted
almost entirely of war-worn tents without floor-boards. The men in
those first days scarce seemed to notice these things, so intense
was their eagerness and curiosity. The conventional and traditional
grumble of the British private soldier, a _sotto voce_ accompaniment
to the most generous efforts and the most unselfish devotion, was
forgotten here. One of the Brigadiers of the 4th Division said of
them:
"The men are extraordinarily quiet, and I thought at first somewhat
subdued, and put it down to the big marches they had had. But when I
came to talk to them I found they were like new schoolboys, taking
in everything, deadly keen, and only afraid of one thing--letting
down their unit in any way. I have never seen any men with such quiet
confidence in themselves, in spite of their efforts to hide it."
The attachments lasted five days, the 107th Brigade being the only
one which was not divided between two divisions in the line. Its
attachment being complete, the 108th was sent up, two battalions to
the 4th Division and two to the 48th, further north. Then, towards
the end of the month, the 109th Brigade had its turn with the same
two Divisions. Meanwhile the R.E. Headquarters and the three Field
Companies had moved to Arquèves, to work on the new Third Army Line,
later to become important as the Amiens Defences. At this task they
were soon joined by the 16th Rifles (Pioneers), while they also
had as companions French Territorials. All worked hard and well,
though in the light of subsequent experience their trenches were
far too narrow, and their traverses too small by half. The troops
not under instruction in the line were kept hard at work training,
officers from the 4th Division having come to initiate them into the
mysteries of bombing--mysteries to which they took in kindly fashion.
One instructor declared that the national sport of the Ulsterman,
the throwing of kidney-stones in street riots, was an admirable
preparation for bombing. Another introduction was to gas helmets,
the horrible bags of those days without even mouth-pieces. Passing
through a gas-chamber in these bags was unpleasant, though accepted
as a necessity, but "doubling" and marching in them, as ordered by
some zealous instructors, was purgatory, and resulted in some of
the men being violently sick. On October the 21st the Division,
except for such infantry and artillery as were under instruction in
the line, moved slightly further west, toward Abbeville, to a more
comfortable and spacious area about Bernaville and Canaples, with
Headquarters at Domart-en-Ponthieu.
The Higher Command had decided that the 36th Division was not to
enter the line as a formation for the present. The Battle of Loos
was not long past, when troops fresh from England had been pushed
into the fight at its fiercest and after very long marches, with
disastrous results. It was determined that in future divisions should
be given a chance gradually to accustom themselves to the conditions.
Another decision which had been arrived at was that New Army and
Territorial Divisions should receive an admixture of thirty per cent.
of regular infantry by the transfer of brigades. Orders were received
for the transfer of one brigade to the 4th Division. The 107th, in
the command of which General W. M. Withycombe, C.M.G., had succeeded
General Couchman, was selected to go. The 12th Brigade of the 4th
Division was transferred to the 36th Division in exchange.
By November the 4th the 107th Brigade, with its Light Trench Mortar
Battery, which had just arrived from England, and the 110th Field
Ambulance, were clear of the 36th Divisional area. On the 7th the
12th Brigade marched in to take its place. The 2nd Lancashire
Fusiliers of this Brigade were transferred to the 108th Brigade in
exchange for the 11th Rifles, and the 2nd Essex to the 109th in
exchange for the 14th Rifles. These inter-divisional changes lasted a
month only. Any advantages they may have had were found insufficient
to counterbalance the dislike of the break-up of their old formations
felt by battalions of both Divisions.
The Division as now constituted passed a winter very different
from that of its expectations. Late in November it moved down to
Abbeville, with Headquarters at Pont Remy, on the bank of the Somme
just outside that city. For the time it was concerned more with
sanitation than with war. Never was such cleaning of streets, such
draining of middens, such wholesale carting away of manure-heaps,
as when the Ulster Division marched into an area. The inhabitants
wondered and gaped, and a humorist wrote home that the troops "were
sweeping onward through village after village in the North of France."
Some writers--among them, it is to be regretted, a well-known
dramatist and critic of Ulster birth--have spoken unfavourably of the
French peasant and his attitude to the troops. There can be few men
of the 36th Division who look back upon the peasant-farmer of the
Somme with anything but affection and admiration. For their part,
the villagers testified by their letters and expressions of regret,
whenever a unit moved, how good had been the terms between troops and
civilians. The Calvinistic Ulsterman was sometimes a little startled
and pained at first on finding a countryside so liberally besprinkled
with shrines and crucifixes, but, if he were a countryman,
especially, he made the surprising discovery that these countrymen of
the Somme were very like himself. They thought twice before speaking
once; they had a certain dourness; they did not wear their hearts on
their sleeves, though they were furnished with those organs in the
proper places.
On November the 26th two of the Field Companies, the 121st and
150th, were returned by the Third Army, and began to assist and
supervise the infantry at work in the villages. In view of the
projected spring offensive, not actually launched till after
midsummer, all these back areas were being prepared to accommodate
large bodies of troops in some comfort. Bunks were put into barns,
the holes which had appeared in the lath and mud walls, through
shortage of male labour in the villages, were repaired, and excellent
horse-lines, with standings of chalk and stone, were built. The
timber was cut locally and sawn by the troops themselves, using their
own saw-mill.
On November the 27th the Ulster Divisional Artillery, so called at
that date to distinguish it from the London Territorial Artillery,
which was known as the 36th Divisional Artillery, landed at Havre,
and joined the Division in the area east of Abbeville. It had
remained at Bordon since the departure of the Division. Its training
was not yet complete, and it was to have a course of gunnery at
Cayeux, on the coast, south of the mouth of the Somme, before
entering the line. The only other important event, from the military
point of view, to be recorded before February, was the formation of
the 108th and 109th Machine-Gun Companies, from personnel and guns
withdrawn from the battalions. To replace the guns each battalion was
issued with four Lewis guns, which number was gradually increased
till, a year later, it had been quadrupled.
Christmas 1915 was celebrated by the troops in their billets with
sport and festivities. Many units had bought suckling pigs from
the farmers, and fattened them in anticipation of the event; none
had failed to provide some luxuries. The villagers took part in
the merrymaking, and in most of the officers' messes the people of
the house drank with their guests the toast of victory. For very
many of the men in those Somme villages it was one of the happiest
Christmases they had ever spent, and one on which they looked
back in after years with delight. Within a few days the services
of the Pioneers were lost for a long period to the Division. They
were ordered to construct, under the Chief Engineer of the Third
Army, a broad-gauge railway line between Candas and Acheux. For the
rest, there was little change in the daily life of the Division.
On New Year's Day it moved back again to the area about Domart,
roughly that in which it had been previously billeted. The same
work--wood-cutting, repairing and "bunking" of barns, construction
of horse-lines--continued, with the exception that it was done in
different villages. When the work was well in hand some training was
interspersed with it. Not till January the 30th was the Division
ordered to hold itself in readiness to take over a portion of the
line. It had passed the worst of the winter by no means disagreeably.
The 107th Brigade had existed in a fashion less idyllic. On arrival
in the 4th Division area two of its battalions, the 8th and 15th
Rifles, were transferred to the 10th and 11th Brigades respectively,
while in exchange it received three battalions, the 1st Rifle
Brigade, 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, and 2nd Monmouths. Three days
later it took over the left sector of the 4th Division front, astride
the Mailly-Maillet--Serre Road, the Brigade Headquarters being in
the former village. Here for upwards of two months it remained,
alternating with the 10th Brigade in six-day tours in the line. In
November the weather was indifferent; by December it became very
bad indeed. Men sank in the mud so that they had to be dug out by
their comrades with spades. The communication trenches were so deep
in water that they were for the most part impassable. Movement from
front to rear had to take place after dark, in the open. "Trench
feet," a disease then generally known as "frost-bite," though caused
by constant immersion of the feet in water far above freezing-point,
became prevalent. Rubber thigh boots, most precious of boons to men
in such sectors, were all too rare as yet, and had to be doled out
with parsimony. Battle casualties were light in this sector, but
the life in it was very far from pleasant. On New Year's Day the
Brigade, now returned to its original formation, exchanged it for
the right sector of the front held by 4th Division, south of the
Mailly-Maillet--Serre Road. Of this sector the chief peculiarity was
a tiny parallelogram of trenches jutting out from the British line
on the high ground east of Beaumont Hamel, known as the Redan. It
was a most unpleasant corner. In the first place, it was not more
than fifty yards from the German lines, and the mine-craters which
fringed its eastern edge, which were occupied at night by British
posts--a doubtful policy, as it appears to-day--were in constant
danger of surprise. During the 107th Brigade's tour one post was,
indeed, bombed by the enemy and a man taken out of it. In the second
place, the Redan was the scene of constant mining, and the bugbear of
battalions in reserve, which had to send up large working-parties to
carry sandbags filled with chalk for the miners. It was the one point
in our trenches which received fairly constant attention from German
gunners, and the average weekly casualties in this tiny lozenge were
probably higher than on the whole of the rest of the 4th Division's
front. One of the best pieces of work performed by the 107th Brigade
during this period was the construction, by the 8th Rifles, in one
night, of a trench a hundred yards in length and protected by a
double "apron" of wire, which denied to the enemy ground which would
have given him important observation. The digging and wiring were
carried out without arousing the least suspicion among the German
sentries.
The Brigade had during these three months established an excellent
reputation, both for work and for demeanour under fire. General
Nugent had suggested the reconstitution of the 36th Division on its
old basis on the grounds that, with three Brigades of Ulstermen, it
would be more homogeneous and of greater fighting value than as at
present constituted. This suggestion was favourably received. The
men had not been unhappy in the 4th Division, but feelings of local
patriotism were still strong in them, and they were most anxious to
return. It was announced that the reconstitution--the first of any
division so dismembered, and the only one which occurred for some
time--would take place simultaneously with the Division taking over
a portion of the front.
The 1st/1st London Artillery had departed, two howitzer batteries to
the East, and the remainder to the 38th Division in Flanders. The
original Artillery, henceforth the 36th Divisional Artillery, was
completing its training on the coast. With its exception the whole
Division now marched linewards, between the 2nd and 6th of February.
The 4th Division had meanwhile extended its right flank, and had
the 11th Brigade on the right of the 107th, its outer flank on the
River Ancre, just east of Hamel. As the new divisional boundaries
were to be the Ancre and the Mailly-Maillet--Serre Road, all that was
necessary to complete the relief and reconstitute the Division was
for the 108th Brigade to relieve the 11th. The 36th Division then
took over, at noon on February the 7th, its first line, with the
108th Brigade on the right, the 107th on the left, and the 109th in
reserve. Headquarters were at the large village, or small town, of
Acheux.
Of the next six weeks there is little of interest to report, save
a heavy bombardment of the left flank of the 107th Brigade and of
the 12th Brigade to the north of it. Shelling with 210, 105, and
77-mm. howitzers and field guns lasted for about half an hour, after
which the artillery lifted range to rear lines and communication
trenches. The 9th Rifles at once manned their battered trenches,
some men getting out beyond the wire and opening rapid fire. There
was no attack, though a party of the enemy succeeded in entering the
trenches of the 12th Brigade, to be quickly ejected. It was curious
that in this, its first bombardment, and a not inconsiderable one,
the Division did not suffer a casualty.
A mine exploded in front of the Redan cost the lives of three men
of an attached Tunnelling Company, who were buried in a blown-in
passage. Otherwise, during this period the weather was probably an
opponent more formidable than the Germans. The men in the trenches
lived under conditions of the deepest discomfort. For weeks together
the communication trenches were knee-deep in water. Previous troops
had dug deep sumps in the bottoms of the trenches, covering them with
boards, with the idea of draining off the water. But the water soon
filled these and rose till it floated off the boards. Then would
come some unfortunate fellow splashing his way along the trench,
to plunge into the hole and be soused in icy water to the waist or
higher. Some of the ills then endured were, it must be admitted,
not unavoidable. There was a certain lack of revetting material, it
is true. Few of those who were compelled to use it will forget one
notorious communication trench, "Jacob's Ladder," which ran from the
village of Mesnil to that of Hamel, down a forward slope completely
exposed to the enemy. By night the road could be followed without
worse risk than occasional bursts of machine-gun fire, so that large
bodies of men had seldom to use this trench. By day, however, men
clawing their way through its mud experienced the sensations of flies
in treacle. When time and material had become available for the
revetting of its sides, all this was changed, and "Jacob's Ladder"
lost much of its evil reputation. But on the front line trenches more
could have been done than was accomplished. The chief methods of
drainage employed were the digging of large sumpholes in the parados
of the trench to carry off the water, and the pumping of it out over
the parapet with hand-pumps, whence, of course, it presently filtered
back to the trench bottom. Scientific trench drainage, by means of
trenches cut for the purpose, had as yet made little progress, though
the undulating character of the country was suitable to it. It is
scarcely an exaggeration to say that the Division suffered more from
the wet at this time than during the following winter in Flanders, in
flat country and on a water-logged soil, simply because in the latter
case the R.E. and infantry had learnt by experience how to deal with
it.
If the 36th Division had yet something to learn by way of prevention
in these matters, it had little as regards cure. When rubber
boots--"gum-boots, thigh," in the parlance of the Ordnance--became
commoner, "trench feet" almost disappeared. The men laughed at the
special grease with which they were provided to rub their feet, but
they used it as they were ordered to do. Contrary to legend, but a
small proportion was really used for the frying of food. They laughed
also at the foot drill, each man rubbing the feet of his next number
once a day, but to a great extent they carried it out. Excellent as
these things were, the best remedy of all was found to be dry socks.
Drying them in the trenches was difficult, but it was easy to send up
dry ones by the ration parties at night, who took back the wet ones
with them and dried them during the following day.
As this History is intended not alone for men who fought in the war,
but also for their relatives and friends at home, a few remarks
on the routine of holding a line of trenches, commonplace to the
soldier as they may be, are perhaps permissible. Let us imagine a
division with two brigades in line, and one in reserve. Each of the
brigades in line would have two battalions in the trenches, relieved
at regular intervals, though never on the same night, by the other
two. These intervals were from four to eight days, according to the
weather and state of the trenches. The distance of the rest billets
from the front line, again, depended upon accommodation, the enemy's
command of the country from his observation posts, and the activity
of his artillery. They might be three or four miles back. At this
time the battalion which held the line at Hamel, on the right bank of
the Ancre, rested in Mesnil, little more than a mile from the German
lines. The battalion in the trenches had probably two companies in
the front line, one in support and one in reserve, and carried out
inter-battalion reliefs in the course of its tour. The front and
support lines were held by posts consisting of sections, about ten
or twelve men in these early days, half as many later on. These
posts furnished each a single sentry by day, and double sentries by
night. For half an hour before and half an hour after dawn, the hour
of surprise attacks, the troops would "stand to" in their trenches.
In winter months this was the hour of the rum-ration--very welcome
after a cold or wet night. Each company had one officer permanently
on duty in the trench, night and day. In the trenches these periods
were practically reversed. Night was the time when most of the work,
all the wiring, all the patrolling of "No Man's Land," was carried
out. Roughly speaking, the battalion in the line was responsible for
the work as far back as its headquarters, with the expert assistance
of a few sappers. Behind that worked the resting battalion--though
parties from this had frequently to assist the battalion in line
also--under the direction of the R.E., of which one Field Company
was in general attached to each brigade. It was important that the
infantry should know the sappers, and look upon them as assistants
rather than task-masters. The Pioneer battalion had generally some
special task of importance allotted to it under the direction of the
C.R.E.
A Machine-Gun Company at this time formed part of each brigade. The
guns were distributed in depth in the trenches, but much further
forward than was the case later on, when the number of Lewis guns
with the infantry had been increased. Such subtleties as machine-gun
barrages, indirect fire, the linking of guns by telephone to
battalion headquarters, had as yet scarce been conceived. Machine
gunners and infantry had their ammunition and bombs in boxes let into
the parapet, these stores increasing in size from front to rear.
The artillery, in rear, was also distributed in depth. Covering two
brigades, as we have imagined, it would probably be divided into two
groups, the group commander living at or near the headquarters of
his infantry brigade. For this purpose the present formation, four
artillery brigades, of which one was a howitzer brigade, was clumsy
and extravagant. The howitzer brigade, for example, was invariably
split between the groups, and its commander "functioned" as an
administrator, but not as a combatant. This system was to be modified
later. The guns were in pits, hidden as well as possible among trees
or houses, or if in the open covered with "camouflage" to match the
surrounding fields. The dug-outs of their detachments were close
at hand, and, close at hand also, were pits containing from two
to four hundred rounds per gun. At dusk the guns were laid on the
"night-lines"; that is to say, each was set so as to fire upon a
certain zone, in accordance with a previously arranged plan. A sentry
in an observation post watched the line. Within a few seconds of a
telephone call or an "S.O.S." rocket going up, the guns could open
fire. An artillery liaison officer lived with each battalion in the
trenches.
The rations arrived each day for all these people in the following
manner: The Divisional Supply Column went daily to railhead with
its lorries to meet the "pack train," bringing up the supplies to
the "refilling point," and dividing them into four groups, one for
each infantry brigade and one for all the rest of the divisional
units. Here, under the supervision of the Brigade Supply Officer, the
supplies were parcelled out, loaded into the horsed supply wagons,
and taken to the transport lines of the units, where they came into
the keeping of the Quartermaster. In a very quiet part of the front,
when the railhead was far advanced, the supply wagons could draw
direct from the railhead, cutting out altogether the Supply Column
and its lorries. Divisions were urged to do this when possible to
save petrol. Let not the innocent, however, imagine that uses were
not found for the lorries thus set at liberty!
The food we need follow no further, except in the case of a
battalion in the trenches. For all other units its preparation was
comparatively simple. But to supply the man on the fire-step with
hot food at regular intervals was a problem of some difficulty.
Rations were brought up to battalion headquarters after dusk by the
transport. In a well-organized battalion--and battalions varied
much in this respect--the maximum was done before the food left
the transport lines, the minimum when it arrived. That minimum
was the heating. In some sectors of the front it used to be said
that cooking was impossible. As a fact, there never was a sector
wherein, with resource and ingenuity, at least the _heating_ of food
already prepared was impracticable. For extras, the stock-pot was the
soldier's best friend; and unhappy was he if his battalion did not
possess it. Ration biscuit, soaked in stock and put through a mincing
machine, made "dough" which produced cheese biscuits, sausage rolls,
jam tarts. As for the dry rations, tobacco, etc., they were put into
a sandbag for each section, labelled with the number of that section.
So, at least, marched affairs in a battalion of which the internal
economy was at a high stage of efficiency.
The evacuation of wounded may also be briefly described. On a
casualty occurring the wounded man was brought by the regimental
stretcher-bearers to the Regimental Aid Post, a dug-out or shelter
near a communication trench, generally in the neighbourhood of
battalion headquarters. A mile or two further back was the Advanced
Dressing Station, to which the Field Ambulance stretcher-bearers
carried "lying-down" cases and conducted "walking" cases. If
possible, wheeled stretchers or a trench tramway were here employed.
At the A.D.S. food in some form was always ready; wounds were
re-dressed if necessary, morphia given if required, and the soothing
cigarette added. Then the cars of the Field Ambulance conveyed the
casualty to the Main Dressing Station; _i.e._, the headquarters of
the Field Ambulance. This was to all intents and purposes a temporary
hospital, where the wounded man might obtain rest, and further
surgical aid if required. It was the last stage in the divisional
chain. From it the cars of the Motor Ambulance convoy took him to the
Casualty Clearing Station, whence a hospital train bore him to the
base hospital or, during an offensive, direct to the hospital ship.
The above is an attempt to sketch, without entering into its ten
thousand complications, some of the main features of the life of a
man in the trenches. War, at that time and in such a sector as this,
had not acquired many of the horrors that were to come. Bombing
by aeroplanes was in its infancy; so was the use of gas shell.
Long-range shelling of villages with high-velocity guns was almost
unheard of hereabouts. With regard to all shelling there would appear
to have been conventions. Those who have seen German shells at
Mailly-Maillet dropping at dusk, the hour when the transport started
for the line, on to the Serre and Auchonvillers Roads, but never
closer than one hundred yards to the first houses of the village,
will agree with this opinion. The surroundings were far less grisly
and depressing than they afterwards became. There was, it must be
remembered, save that at Ypres and that which at the moment was being
fashioned at Verdun, no devastated area wider than a narrow ribbon
from the coast to Switzerland. From the Mesnil Ridge, where the
observation posts of the Division were manned by the Cyclist Company,
the country behind the enemy's lines showed green and smiling.
Villages which the troops were not to see at close hand save as
ruins, Irles, Pys, Grévillers, Bihucourt, were intact. The time could
be read with the aid of a telescope by the church clock of Bapaume.
On the British side, villages a couple of miles back were little
disturbed. Martinsart was no farther from the enemy, and here it was
possible to call on Brigade headquarters at their château as one
returned from the trenches, and drink a cup of tea poured out by the
daughter of the house, who rang for a British orderly to bring hot
water. Mediæval idyll! With spring appearing, the trenches drying,
and the grasses above them filled with field flowers; with the Valley
of the Ancre taking on a new beauty as its trees were feathered
green; with nature bursting into life, man's thoughts could not be
ever fixed upon death. Warfare, to many of the men in the Division,
must have seemed less than terrible in these days. But they were the
last of the good days. The terrible was not far off.
In the first week of March the Division extended its front, the
109th Brigade taking over the sector south of the Ancre, known by
the name of Thiepval Wood. At the same time the 36th Divisional
Artillery, back from its final training at Cayeux, took over the
defence of the long line. By the last day of the month the latter
had been shortened to the two-battalion front astride the Ancre, the
31st Division having come into line on the left. The two sub-sectors
were known as Thiepval Wood and Hamel respectively. The Hamel
sub-sector was comfortable and quiet, troubled by nothing worse than
the aggressions of a new long-range medium trench mortar, which
often smashed in its communication trenches, but seldom caused many
casualties. The battalion which held it was responsible for the
defence of the Ancre and its swampy valley, filled with miniature
lakes. This was carried out by the reserve company in the village,
which found a platoon for small and isolated posts, the most advanced
being at the bridge on the Thiepval-Hamel Road. The men enjoyed this
duty better than any other. They were never shelled, they had no work
to do, and they could employ their leisure fishing in the stream,
with the chance of an occasional shot at wild duck or widgeon.
Thiepval Wood, on the other hand, with an appearance of quietude
that deceived visitors and newcomers, was wont to be transformed by
sudden and not infrequent bombardments into a very unpleasant spot
indeed. It was here that on the 10th of March the 10th Inniskillings
suffered their real baptism of fire. At three in the afternoon there
had been ranging shots from all calibres of artillery upon the wood,
strengthening the belief of the man in the line, which was accepted
with some hesitation by the Staff, that the army opposite possessed
a "travelling circus" of heavy artillery, moved from point to point
for the covering of raids. Precisely at midnight came a roar of
explosions, a whistle and screaming of shells, a crash of falling
trees. All telephone lines were cut, and S.O.S. rockets failed to
ignite, but the artillery soon opened fire on its own initiative. On
the right of the battalion front the trenches were pounded beyond
recognition, and soon littered with dead and wounded. The garrison
of the trenches manned their fire-steps and opened rapid fire on
the enemy's front line. Not till 2 a.m. did the shelling die down.
Then it was found that the enemy had penetrated the trenches of the
troops on the right of the Division, killing a number of officers
and men, and taking several prisoners. In a Special Order of the
Day, congratulating the 10th Inniskillings, the Divisional Commander
stated that "there seemed no reason to doubt that the German
bombardment was intended to cover a raid similar to the raid which
actually took place elsewhere the same night." The battalion had the
further honour of mention in the despatches of Sir Douglas Haig. Its
losses amounted to some thirty killed and wounded.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL SIR O. S. NUGENT, K.C.B., D.S.O.]
From the moment when the Division first entered the line,
preparations had been made for the long-planned offensive. By the
month of May this work was intensified. It is difficult to give in a
few lines an adequate idea of the scope of such preliminary labour.
The mere plans and instructions issued by the Staffs of the Division,
its formations and units, would fill the greater part of this
volume. There were miles of tramway to be laid, gun-pits for the new
artillery to be constructed, roads to be improved, new communication
trenches cut, and innumerable dug-outs excavated. The heaviest task
of all was the building of two causeways over the Ancre and its
marshes; the only communications with our line on the left bank of
the river being some crazy wooden foot-bridges put up by French
troops. As a first step the drainage of the marshes was examined,
and many obstructions in the small streams removed. The flooded area
was thus decreased, but there were at first frantic protests from
the Division on the right when the water rose behind its lines. This
flooding was, however, but temporary. The construction of these
causeways was entrusted to the 122nd Field Company R.E., which
employed large infantry working parties in two shifts, from dusk to
dawn. The causeways were built of sandbags filled with chalk. The
river was constantly swept at night by machine-gun fire, and the
casualties suffered were not inconsiderable, particularly on the
northern causeway. The mainstay of the whole scheme of preparation
was the Pioneer battalion, which had already made its name by the
construction of the Candas-Acheux railway. It was for this battalion
a proud day when railhead for supplies and personnel opened at Belle
Eglise Farm on the line that was its handiwork. But the whole of the
Division worked with a will also. Tasks were nearly always completed
before the allotted time, for which the sole explanation lay not
entirely in the good hearts of the men, but also in the splendid
physique of the Division at this period.[17] The artillery dug on the
Mesnil Ridge an observation trench known as "Brock's Benefit," in
honour of their General, which contained a whole series of "O.P.s,"
and will be very well remembered by a long series of divisions
subsequently inhabiting that sector.
The first raid carried out by the Division was on May the 7th, and,
by an extraordinary coincidence, that night was also chosen by the
enemy to raid the troops of the 32nd Division on its right, at a
point about 200 yards west of that of the British raid. The German
barrage opened at 11 p.m.; the British "zero" was midnight. Major
Peacocke,[18] second-in-command of the 9th Inniskillings, had his
party already out in the sunken Thiepval-Hamel Road when the German
bombardment began. He spoke on a telephone which he had taken out
with him to his commanding officer, Colonel Ricardo, and it was
decided to carry through the raid. The British guns, trained on the
barrage lines selected for the raid, held their fire, and a most
uncomfortable hour had to be endured in Thiepval Wood. At midnight
the British barrage opened and the raiders charged in. The enemy was
on the alert, and a fierce struggle followed. The raid was successful
in inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. No prisoners were taken,
as the Germans in the deep dug-outs showed fight, firing up the
steps. The raiders thereupon bombed the dug-outs till all sounds of
life below had ceased. The casualties were trifling, but there were
a good many more in the sunken road, where the raiding party had to
lie two hours before it could return to its trenches, so heavy was
the German barrage.
Meanwhile, the enemy's intentions with regard to the troops on
the right of the 36th Division being only too clear, six platoons
of the 10th Inniskillings, two from dug-outs on the reverse slope
of Thiepval Wood, and a company from Authuille, moved up to their
support. The former body arrived in the front line of the 1st Dorsets
in time to assist them in repelling the enemy, who left a dead
officer and a wounded prisoner in the hands of the English battalion.
The company from Authuille and two guns of the 109th Machine-Gun
Company also pushed up through a very heavy barrage to the front
line. The Dorsets had suffered very considerable casualties, and
the troops of the Ulster Division assisted to man their line till
morning. The appreciation of the 32nd Division was warmly expressed
by the G.O.C.
In May took place the first reorganization of the Divisional
Artillery, the object of which was to divide the howitzers among
the Brigades, to overcome the disadvantages of which there has been
mention. Three of the Brigades, the 153rd, the 172nd, and the 173rd,
were made up of three four-gun 18-pounder batteries and one four-gun
4.5 howitzer battery. The fourth, the 154th Brigade, which had been
the Howitzer Brigade, thus lost all its howitzer batteries, and was
made up by three 18-pounder batteries, one from each of the other
Brigades, in exchange for the howitzers. Brigade Ammunition Columns
were abolished and the Divisional Ammunition Column largely increased.
At the end of May Brigadier-General Hickman, commanding the 109th
Brigade, returned to England, being succeeded by Brigadier-General R.
Shuter, D.S.O. General Hickman, whose part in the formation of the
Division has been recorded, was the last of the Infantry Brigadiers
who had accompanied the Division to France. General Hacket Pain,
commanding the 108th Brigade, had been succeeded by Brigadier-General
C. R. J. Griffith, C.M.G., D.S.O., on December the 4th.
With the month of June began those more detailed preparations for the
offensive which must be reserved for the chapter that deals with it.
By this time all ranks had become aware of what was brewing. A keen
sense of expectation was in the air. The Division had become a living
soul ere ever it crossed the Channel. The months of trench warfare
had strengthened it to an inestimable extent. The men were keyed up
to a very high pitch of daring and determination. The infantry had
the utmost confidence in itself, and in the artillery which was to
support it. Officers and men of these two arms had known each other
but a short time, but already a personal liaison, unusually close, to
grow even closer during the comparatively quiet months in Flanders,
had been established between them. The Division was to do great deeds
in after days, and upon other fields of battle, but never was there
quite the same generous and noble enthusiasm with which it entered
upon this, its first offensive. That which it was about to accomplish
will live in memory as long as there is a British Empire to honour
the exploits of British arms.
FOOTNOTES:
[17] The writer can recall working parties when the allotted task
was completed a full hour before the allotted time, owing to the
fact that the big countrymen of his company were able to carry two
sandbags full of chalk, one in either hand, at once.
[18] Afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel Peacocke, D.S.O., who was foully
murdered at his home near Cork, on June the 1st, 1921.
CHAPTER III
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME: JULY 1ST, 1916
On the first day of June, 1916, the front of the 36th Division
was held by the 107th Brigade, the 108th being in support in the
neighbourhood of Martinsart, and the 109th training. To permit the
two latter Brigades to train together, the 147th Brigade of the 49th
Division was ordered to relieve the 108th and take over its working
parties. The 108th Brigade then moved back to Varennes, and the
neighbouring villages of Harponville and Léalvillers. Training was
carried out over an elaborate system of dummy trenches marked out
with plough and spade, near Clairfaye Farm, to represent those of the
German system to be attacked. It was largely due to this preparation
that the men knew their task so well, and were able to push on to
their objectives when their leaders had fallen. On the 5th a raid was
carried out by a party of the 12th Rifles, sent up from the training
area, on the German sap that ran parallel with the main railway line
north of the Ancre.[19] The wire was cut by an ammonal torpedo. This
was a zinc tube, three inches in diameter, filled with ammonal. Each
tube was about six feet in length, but tubes could be connected up
with bayonet joints, and any length of torpedo thus made. It was
generally fired by a sapper accompanying the raiding party. The
Germans had run back or taken to their dug-outs under the fire of
our artillery, and few were seen. The dug-outs were bombed, and an
officer shot. Two tunnels leading toward the British lines were
discovered, one containing fourteen high-tension copper wires, which
seemed to point to mining with a mechanical digger. The heads of
these saps were blown in by the engineers who accompanied the raiding
party. Five nights later the Germans retaliated upon the little
salient in the British line opposite, known as the William Redan,
then held by the 15th Rifles. After our trenches had been pounded by
a bombardment of half an hour, the raiders advanced. They suffered
loss from our barrage, and not more than half a dozen ever actually
entered our trench. Half a minute's bitter hand-to-hand fighting,
and they were out of it again, bearing with them the leader of the
raid, who had been shot by a British officer. Our trenches were
considerably damaged, but casualties were not heavy.
The weather now took a turn for the worse, there being a sort of
cloud-burst on the 12th. Cross-country tracks were impassable for
infantry, and the carriage of ammunition to the new gun positions was
a very heavy task. The rain came at an unfortunate moment. Battalions
of the 109th Brigade were moving up to Aveluy Wood, south of Mesnil,
to complete the work of preparation. The 16th Rifles (Pioneers) were
there already. These troops had to endure the gravest discomfort
from the weather. Little canvas shelters were all their protection,
and for days together their clothes were not dry. Yet their work was
magnificent. When, almost at the last moment, a Regiment of French
Field Artillery joined the Division to assist in the attack, the
11th Inniskillings were ordered to help them in the construction of
gun-pits and shelters, with little enough time to do it. The men
threw themselves into the task with splendid enthusiasm. It seemed
that they worked the harder because their work was for strangers,
who would be left half-protected if they failed them. There was a
fine flavour of international courtesy in the manner of their toil,
for they gave of their free will energy that not the most skilful
of taskmasters could have wrung from them. General Nugent sent to
Colonel Brush, then in command of the Battalion, a letter of warm
congratulation upon their efforts.
In the battle that was about to begin, General Sir H. Rawlinson's
Fourth Army was taking the offensive along its whole front, with the
Sixth French Army of General Fayolle on its right. The Battle of the
Somme, the first in which our New Armies of volunteers were engaged
in great numbers, concerned the 36th Division but at its opening.
Its general aspects were, however, of the highest importance to
all the Allied troops. It differed broadly from such an action as
that of Loos. There an immediate strategic result was sought from a
small offensive. Here, while a break through was sought on the first
day, and would doubtless have been possible had the whole German
trench system been captured all along the front, thereafter the aims
became quite other. On the vast plateau of Picardy, an advance of
ten miles or thereabouts had small strategic importance. The nearest
first-class railway junction, Cambrai, was thirty miles away. The
new phase was the "limited offensive." The plan was to push forward
infantry behind artillery fire of overwhelming weight upon a broad
front, step by step, smashing down resistance. The plan was made
possible for us by the huge development of our munition factories.
It was the war of attrition. It was a mighty assault battle, wherein
England and France hurled man and gun and material upon German man
and gun and material. It had manifold and obvious blemishes. Its cost
was prodigious, particularly in its early stages, before certain
needful lessons had been learnt. It stereotyped attack and robbed
commanders of initiative, and was in this respect the text-book of
all the lessons Ludendorff impressed upon his troops in the first
three months of 1918. But--and of this there can be no shadow of
doubt to-day--it laid the foundations of final victory.[20] The
German troops were never quite the same after it, while our young
levies, dreadful as were their sacrifices, were to arrive at a far
higher standard of military value.
The 36th Division was the left Division of the X. Corps, having on
its right the 32nd Division and on its left the 29th Division, not
long arrived from the East, which was in the VIII. Corps. The 49th
Division was in X. Corps Reserve. The 36th Division was to attack
astride the Ancre. On the left, or southern bank, its objective was
the fifth line of German trenches, known as the "D" line.[21] The
right flank boundary ran from the north-east corner of Thiepval
Wood to D 8. On the right bank the objective was a triangle of
trenches enclosed between the left boundary line and the Ancre,
beyond Beaucourt Station. The left boundary ran from the point of the
salient in our lines, known as the Mary Redan, to two houses half-way
between Beaucourt and its railway station, thence along the river
to the railway bridge. The ground rose sharply on either side from
the deep-cut bed of the Ancre, but while on the northern bank it was
cut by a gorge running down from the village of Beaumont-Hamel, at
right angles to the river, and parallel with the German trenches, on
the south it swelled up in a great convex curve, rising two hundred
and fifty feet in a thousand yards. The crest was crowned by a
parallelogram of trenches, extending from the German "B" line to the
"C" line, that will live long in history as the Schwaben Redoubt.
The trenches were defended by masses of wire. An artillery officer,
who made a careful reconnaissance with a good glass from "Brock's
Benefit," on the Mesnil Ridge, counted sixteen rows guarding the
front line just south of the river, and an average of five rows along
the second line. The dug-outs, most of them at least thirty feet deep
in the chalk, were to all intents and purposes shell-proof, and were
numerous enough to house the whole trench garrison. The enormous
activity behind our lines had taught the Germans long before that an
attack was brewing. They trusted to their fortifications and awaited
it with confidence.
For the purposes of attack, the front was divided into four sections.
The right and right centre sections were allotted to the 109th and
108th Brigades respectively. The left centre section, bounded by a
line drawn from the north corner of Thiepval Wood just north of B
19, C 11, and D 11, and the Ancre, was, owing to the great frontage
of the 36th Division, not to be attacked directly. The left section,
on the right bank of the Ancre, was allotted to the 108th Brigade.
This Brigade had attached to it one battalion of the 107th. It was
to employ three battalions in the right centre section, and two in
the left section. The 107th Brigade (less one battalion) was in
Divisional Reserve.
The task of the 109th Brigade in the right section was to attack the
"A" and "B" lines within its section,[22] and to advance to a line
drawn from C 8 through B 16 to the Grandcourt-Thiepval Road at C 9;
there to halt and consolidate. For this purpose General Shuter was
attacking with two battalions, the 9th Inniskillings on the right,
the 10th on the left, in first line; and the two remaining, 11th
Inniskillings on right and 14th Rifles on left, in second. The two
first were to take and consolidate the final objective, the rear
battalions to hold the "A" and "B" lines and to send up liaison
patrols to get touch with the leading battalions. The most important
task of the 11th Inniskillings was the fortification of the Crucifix
on the Thiepval-Grandcourt Road.
The task of the 108th Brigade in the right centre section was to
clear the "A" and "B" lines within the section, and advance to the
"C" line, halting and consolidating on the salient C 9, C 10, C 11,
the north-east corner of the Schwaben Redoubt. A special detachment,
with one Stokes mortar, one Lewis and one Vickers gun, was to act as
left flank guard, to clear the communication trench from B 19 to C
12, holding the latter as a defensive post, and sending a detachment
down to C 13, to ensure observation and fire on the Grandcourt-St.
Pierre Divion Road. In addition, two officers' patrols, each a
platoon in strength, with a Lewis gun, were to reconnoitre and clear
the left of the "A" and "B" lines up to St. Pierre Divion. General
Griffith was attacking here with the 11th Rifles on the right, the
13th on the left, and the 15th Rifles of the 107th Brigade, attached,
in support.
North of the Ancre, in the left section, the task allotted to the
two remaining battalions of the 108th Brigade was to assault the
German salient on the left of its objective and clear the trenches
down to the railway, to establish strong points at B 26, B 24, and
B 21, and to occupy Beaucourt Station and the trenches immediately
behind it. It was afterwards to occupy the mill on the river bank
and the two houses beyond the station. Here the 9th Irish Fusiliers
were attacking on the right, and the 12th Rifles on the left. Of the
latter battalion one platoon was detailed to attack the railway sap,
of which mention has already been made, and one to patrol the marsh.
The assault on the "D" line, the final objective, was to be carried
out by the 107th Brigade with its three remaining battalions. The
Brigade was to advance through Thiepval Wood, following the 109th
Brigade, pass through the leading Brigades on the "C" line and attack
the "D" line from D 8 to D 9; then to extend its left to D 11.
General Withycombe disposed the 10th and 9th Rifles in first line,
the former with its right on D 8, the latter with its left on D 9.
After the capture of this objective, the 9th Rifles were to extend to
D 10 and the 10th to D 9. The 8th Rifles, moving up in rear, were to
occupy and hold from D 10 to D 11.
The assaulting battalions were to advance, each in eight successive
waves, at fifty yards' interval, but the 107th Brigade, passing
through to the attack on the final objective, was to advance in
artillery formation till compelled to extend.
The artillery consisted of the 36th Divisional Artillery, one
Brigade of the 49th Division, a Regiment of French Artillery, and,
under the orders of the X. Corps, a greater concentration of heavy
artillery than had been made in the course of the war till now,
except perhaps in the latter stages of Verdun. The preliminary
bombardment was to last five days, from the 24th to the 28th of June.
Owing to wet weather the attack was postponed two days, and there
were two extra days of bombardment. The results, as witnessed from
our observation posts, were magnificent. All wire that could be seen
was effectively cut. As one watched the big shells bursting, sending
up huge columns of earth, day after day, it appeared as though no
life could continue in that tortured and blasted area. The barrage
for the attack was not the true "creeping barrage" which was to
become universal later on, and was, indeed, employed that day by the
French. After a final intensive bombardment of sixty-five minutes, it
fired upon each German line in succession, lifting from the "A" to
the "A.I." at Zero, from the "A.I." at Zero plus three minutes, from
the "B" at Zero plus eighteen minutes, to a line 400 yards east of
this objective. Then at Zero plus twenty-eight minutes it moved on to
the "C" line, and at Zero plus one hour eighteen minutes off the "C"
line to the "D." There was then a long halt to permit of the passing
through of the 107th Brigade. At Zero plus two hours thirty-eight
minutes the barrage moved up to a line three hundred yards east of
the "D" line. At each lift, sections of 18-pounders and 4.5 howitzers
"walked up" the communication trenches to the next barrage line.
Stokes mortars were to take part in a final hurricane bombardment
prior to Zero, while medium[23] and heavy mortars were also employed,
the former on special points, the latter moving with the artillery
barrage to the extremity of their range. The French artillery joined
in the preliminary wire-cutting, using high explosive instead of
shrapnel according to its custom, but its main task was the drenching
of the Ancre valley with gas shell. Two machine-guns were to
accompany each battalion in the attack, the remaining eight of each
Machine-Gun Company being in Brigade Reserve. Guns were allotted
to all the principal strong points that were to be consolidated.
Eighteen Stokes mortars were to go forward, the personnel of the
remaining eighteen acting as carriers. Two sections of the 150th
Field Company were allotted to the 109th Brigade, and one section
of the 122nd Field Company to the 108th Brigade on each bank of
the Ancre. The remainder of the Field Companies were in Divisional
Reserve.
The medical arrangements were of peculiar difficulty, particularly
on the southern part of the front. The two Main Dressing Stations,
for stretcher cases and "walking wounded" respectively, were at
Forceville, manned by the 108th Field Ambulance, and Clairfaye Farm,
further west, manned by the 110th Field Ambulance. The Advanced
Dressing Station was situated close to the Albert-Arras Road in
Aveluy Wood. Evacuation of wounded from the Regimental Aid Posts
in Thiepval Wood and Authuille had to take place over Authuille
Bridge, or by the trench tramway which crossed the Ancre to the
north of it. The motors of the Field Ambulance were parked on the
Martinsart-Albert Road, south of the former village. For "walking
wounded" there was a collecting station west of Martinsart, whence
horsed wagons carried them by a cross-country track through
Hédauville to Clairfaye. From Hamel evacuation was simpler, though
even here it had to follow a specially dug trench from the village to
a point where the Hamel-Albert Road was screened from observation.
On the 22nd and 23rd the infantry took up the positions it was to
occupy during the bombardment; the 9th Inniskillings in the right
section of Thiepval Wood, the 11th Rifles in the left, and the 9th
Irish Fusiliers in the Hamel trenches. These troops had a purgatory
to endure. For the most part in the narrow slit assembly trenches,
with the rain pouring steadily down upon them, they were under
furious German bombardments that wreathed the wood in smoke and
flame, and made the crashing of great trees the accompaniment to the
roar of bursting shells. On the night of the 26th gas was liberated
by us from cylinders in the wood after a great bombardment. It was
the first time the Division had had to do with the abominable stuff,
which brought no good fortune. Many cylinders were burst by the
heavy German barrage, and serious casualties suffered by the men of
the Special Brigade responsible for opening the cocks, and by the
infantry assisting them.
Two hours later a raid was carried out in this sector by a party sent
up by the 13th Rifles. The men, now at a pitch of excitement and
enthusiasm that rendered them resistless opponents in hand-to-hand
fighting, swarmed into the battered German trenches, shooting right
and left, and bombing dug-outs. They returned with one German officer
and twelve other ranks as prisoners, the first captured by the 36th
Division. Their own casualties were six killed and nine wounded,
suffered for the most part in the Sunken Road, where, like the 9th
Inniskillings, they had to lie for some time ere it was possible to
return to their trenches. Captain Johnston, the leader of the raid,
brought in all his casualties, as well as his prisoners. He was to
fall five days later in the greater venture. The prisoners denied
knowledge of our gas, nor did their respirators smell of it. It was
occasionally the experience of the Division that the British gas
services rated too highly the effects of their devices.
On the 27th, "X" day, it rained in sheets, and "Y" day was little
better. It was accordingly decided by the Higher Command to postpone
the attack for two days. This necessitated a postponement of the
assembly also. Instead, inter-brigade reliefs were carried out in
the trenches to give some rest to the troops that had endured the
early hammering. Their rest, unfortunately, was in huts in Martinsart
Wood, huts that trembled and creaked to the terrific roar of siege
howitzers firing night and day beside them. Yet it was better than
that other wood across the river, which was the following day, now
"Y.1" day, visited by the heaviest bombardment yet seen. The trenches
were in a terrible state, and the men of the medium trench mortar
batteries, engaged in cutting the German wire, suffered more even
than the infantry, and earned the admiration of the latter by their
devotion to their task.
In all the circumstances it must be said that the total casualties
for the month of June, approximately seven hundred and fifty,
were not heavy. They included the results of a veritable calamity
that befell the 13th Rifles. On the evening of the 28th, "Y" day,
the battalion was relieving the 11th Rifles in Thiepval Wood,
and marching out of Martinsart by platoons at two hundred yards'
interval. As number 11 Platoon and battalion headquarters were about
to march out together a shell fell right in the midst of the party.
Fourteen were killed on the spot, and ten more died later. Almost all
the rest were wounded, including the second-in-command, Major R. P.
Maxwell, and the adjutant, Captain Wright. The confusion in the pitch
darkness, with scarce a man on his feet, was appalling. Fortunately a
platoon of the 11th Rifles, just relieved from the trenches, appeared
on the scene, and the street was speedily cleared. But the Germans
could have had far bigger hauls than this at "Lancashire Dump" on the
Albert-Hamel Road in Aveluy Wood any night they had chosen to shell
it.
This was the _rendezvous_ of a mass of transport immediately after
dusk, bringing up munitions and rations for the offensive. Large
stores of the latter were placed in specially constructed dug-outs
on the river bank. The work of the Divisional Train was here most
admirably organized by its commander, Colonel Bernard. So close
were the big convoys to the German trenches that extraordinary
precautions to avoid noise had to be taken. Wheels were bound with
straw and old motor tyres, steel chains replaced by leather straps,
boots, like those used in rolling a cricket ground, placed over the
horses' hoofs. And it was an amusing sight to see an A.S.C. driver
frantically clinging to the nose of some sociable horse that desired
to greet new acquaintances with a friendly neigh.
The reward of waiting came in a fine day on "Y.2" day, the 30th.
Divisional Headquarters moved up to their report centre on the
Englebelmer-Martinsart Road. At night the approach march took
place, and assaulting battalions returned to their positions in the
trenches. The assembly positions of the 107th Brigade (less 15th
Rifles) were in slit trenches in Aveluy Wood. The battalions marched
up by cross-country tracks, marked, one by red lanterns, the other by
green. The night was fine, and the artillery on either side rather
less active, though lachrymatory shell was falling in the wood.
In a curious complete lull that fell before dawn, men heard with
astonishment a nightingale burst into song, pouring out her bubbling
notes one upon the other, as though this had been still the pleasant
copse, deserted by man, but a kingdom of the birds, of two years gone.
The two days' postponement had had upon the men an effect contrary to
that which might have been attended. The extra strain of waiting was
more than counterbalanced by the coincidence of the date. For it was
upon July the 1st, the anniversary of the Boyne, that the sons of the
victors in that battle, after eight generations, fought this greater
fight. To them it had a very special significance. A stirring in
their blood bore witness to the silent call of their ancestors. There
seemed to them a predestination in the affair. They spoke of it as
they waited, during the final intensive bombardment, while the German
counter-barrage rained upon their trenches.
Day had dawned clear and sunny. Zero was at 7-30 a.m., when it
had been light for four hours. Far better had it been had the
conventional dawn attack been carried out. However, the first
movements were concealed by the intensity of our fire, and by smoke
barrages put down by 4-inch Stokes mortars in the valley of the
Ancre and in front of Thiepval village. The troops formed up in "No
Man's Land," facing their objectives, following for the most part,
on the left bank of the Ancre, the line of the sunken Thiepval-Hamel
Road. At 7-15 a.m. the leading companies issued from the gaps cut
in our wire, extended to two paces' interval, and moved forward to
within one hundred and fifty yards of the German trench. The hubbub
of the British bombardment was terrific; over their heads the Stokes
mortars, firing at highest rate, were slinging a hundred shells into
the air at once.
Zero! The hurricane Stokes bombardment ceased. The artillery lifted
off the first line. The whistles of the officers sounded, and the
men sprang up and advanced at steady marching pace on the German
trenches. Those who saw those leading battalions move to the assault,
above all their commanding officers, forbidden to accompany them, who
waved to them from the parapet, received one of the most powerful
and enduring impressions of their lives. Colonel Macrory of the 10th
Inniskillings speaks of "lines of men moving forward, with rifles
sloped and the sun glistening upon their fixed bayonets, keeping
their alignment and distance as well as if on a ceremonial parade,
unfaltering, unwavering." General Ricardo, then commanding the 9th
Inniskillings, wrote a few days later: "I stood on the parapet
between the two centre exits to wish them luck.... They got going
without delay; no fuss, no shouting, no running, everything solid
and thorough--just like the men themselves. Here and there a boy
would wave his hand to me as I shouted good luck to them through my
megaphone. And all had a cheery face. Most were carrying loads. Fancy
advancing against heavy fire with a big roll of barbed wire on your
shoulder!" So they bore upon the German lines, while behind them,
from Thiepval Wood, rocked by exploding shells, sheeted in the smoke
and flame of bursting shrapnel, fresh troops issued and followed upon
their advance in little columns.
It is the custom, kept throughout this History, to describe the
course of battles from the right hand to the left. If here it is
departed from, it is only because the action on the north side of
the Ancre was separate from the other and of lesser importance. Its
description, alas! will occupy small space enough. There was here in
"No Man's Land" a deep ravine, which the map contours show without
giving an idea of its abruptness. The first wave of the 9th Irish
Fusiliers reached this with little trouble, but those which followed
met with very heavy machine-gun fire, and suffered terrible loss.
Advancing at Zero with splendid dash, the survivors of a battalion
which Colonel Blacker's training had made one of the best in the
Division, swept through the enemy's front line trenches. One small
body of the right centre company in particular carried all before it,
and was last seen advancing upon Beaucourt Station. On the left the
12th Rifles had worse fortune. The wire round the German salient over
the hill-brow, less easy to observe, was less completely destroyed
than on the rest of the front. Many gaps were cut, but machine-guns
were trained upon them. Beaten back at the first rush, and having
lost the barrage, the remnants of the battalion were twice re-formed
by devoted officers under that withering hail, and twice again led
forward. It was of no avail. On their left the leading troops of the
next Division crossed the front line trenches, but were assailed from
the rear by machine-gunners emerging from dug-outs. At eight o'clock
the 36th Division was informed that the enemy had retaken his front
line. The attack north of the Ancre was a failure, though gallantry
every whit as great as that of the battalions on the left bank was
behind it.
Elsewhere, for all its losses, the attack was a complete success.
Every objective was reached. Had it been possible to attain the
same results all along the front, the day would have ended with the
greatest British victory of the war.
The leading waves, still moving as on parade, reached the German
front line trench and moved straight across it. They did not suffer
heavily. Hardly were they across, however, when the German barrage
fell upon "No Man's Land," upon the rear companies of the first
line battalions, and upon those of the second line. And immediately
the barrage left it, flanking machine-gun fire burst out from the
dominating position of Thiepval cemetery. The 11th Inniskillings and
14th Rifles, as they emerged from the wood, were literally mown
down, and "No Man's Land" became a ghastly spectacle of dead and
wounded. On the left of the line the 13th Rifles, under long-range
fire from the Beaucourt Redoubt across the river, suffered at this
stage most heavily of all. They had lost the bulk of their officers
ere ever they reached the German trenches. The Division on the right
was never able to clear Thiepval village, and it was that fact which
was responsible for the gravest losses of the 36th.
Under this deadly punishment the men never hesitated. They went
straight forward across the first two lines, sending back the few
prisoners they took. The "B" line was to be reached at 7-48. Despite
the gaps in their ranks the first wave swept upon it at precisely
that moment. There was not much fighting here, but a large number of
prisoners was taken, the German infantry surrendering as our men came
upon them. The 15th Rifles, the supporting battalion of the 108th
Brigade's attack, had, however, to deal with some Germans who came up
out of unnoticed dug-outs after the leading battalions had crossed
the "A" lines, the bombing squads told off to clear the trenches
having been destroyed by machine-gun fire. On pressed the leading
waves. Never losing the barrage, they took the "C" line, including
the north-east corner of the Schwaben Redoubt, at 8-48. Even in
the trenches they suffered loss from the flanking machine-guns,
while movement from front to rear was now all but impossible. The
supporting battalions, or their survivors, were also upon their
objectives. Every man had done what he was set to do, or dropped in
his path. And, to the eternal credit of our artillery, no man appears
to have needed his wire-cutters.
Let us turn to the 107th Brigade, which had meanwhile advanced to the
"A" line. It had moved from Aveluy Wood and across the Ancre to the
western skirts of Thiepval Wood, almost at the bottom of the valley,
assembling at 6-30 about the track known as Speyside. It had an hour
to wait, shell after shell passing just over the heads of the troops
and bursting in the marshes beyond them. At Zero, led by the 10th
Rifles, it moved back east for a short distance, to reach the rides
which were its paths to the front line. Here the men could see the
troops of the Division on the right issuing from their trenches,
and each platoon, as it extended in "No Man's Land," disappearing
before the blast of machine-gun fire that met it. The ride used by
the 10th Rifles on the right had been denuded of its foliage by
the bombardments of several days, and was in view. The battalion
came under machine-gun fire from front, right, and right _rear_
simultaneously. The commanding officer, Colonel Bernard, was killed,
and casualties were high. The final passage had to be carried out by
rushes to the front line. The leading men could even see the German
machine-guns firing at them, so that it is easy to imagine what sort
of target they offered to those guns. Lewis guns were brought forward
to engage them, but their teams were destroyed. The other battalions
suffered considerably less, being screened in their rides, and
further from the Thiepval guns. Before ten o'clock, runners, with the
skill and devotion of their kind, had come back to report that the
"C" line had been reached. Eight minutes past, it may be remembered,
was the hour for the assault upon the "D" line.
To General Nugent it had appeared long before probable that his
troops, if they went forward further as a wedge into the enemy's
defensive system, with not a yard gained on either flank, would go
only to their own destruction. At 8-32 his G.S.O.1., Colonel Place,
had asked the X. Corps whether the 107th Brigade might be stopped
from advancing upon the last line. The reply was that a new attack
was being made on Thiepval, and also by the VIII. Corps north of the
Ancre, and that the 107th Brigade must do its part by continuing
its advance. But three-quarters of an hour later, at 9-16 a.m.,
instructions from the Corps to withhold the 107th Brigade till the
situation upon the flanks had been cleared up were received. General
Withycombe was ordered to stop his troops, and employed every means
in his power to do so. But all the telephone lines taken forward had
been cut by German fire, while for a runner to reach the line now
held by the troops was a very long affair. Fortunate was he if he
crossed that zone of death without scathe. The message arrived too
late; the troops were committed to the attack. With them went forward
some men of the other Brigades.
Of that last wild and desperate venture across a thousand yards of
open country, few returned to tell the tale. Those that did tell
of an entry into that last entrenchment, of desperate hand-to-hand
fighting, and then, when the odds were too great, for the trench
was full of German reserves, of a stubborn retirement to the next
line. And now the German bombers surged up the trenches from St.
Pierre Divion, to be beaten off again and again by the 8th and
15th Rifles, and the handful of the 13th remaining on that flank.
Pressure on the other side did not come so soon: in fact, Lieutenant
Sanderson, of the 9th Rifles, reconnoitred the trench "Mouquet
Switch," on the front of the 32nd Division, and found it unoccupied.
But Thiepval's machine-guns were still firing, and "No Man's Land"
was a land of death. Two companies of the Pioneers were sent up to
dig a communication trench across, which would have permitted the
sending up of bombs and water. But at two o'clock Colonel Leader,
their commanding officer, reported that the machine-gun fire rendered
the task impossible. Supplies had run out, and the little parties
that strove to bear them across were annihilated by fire. After noon
attacks came upon the right flank also, the 11th Inniskillings at
the Crucifix, and the 9th in the Schwaben Redoubt, being hard beset.
The French artillery was ordered to put down a flank barrage on the
right, and carried out its task admirably.
The 146th Brigade of the 49th Division had crossed the Ancre during
the morning. At three p.m. it received orders to attack Thiepval
village under a barrage, after an intense bombardment. The attack
failed completely under terrific machine-gun fire. It was, in fact,
stopped after the leading battalion, the 1/6th West Yorks, had seen
the platoons which strove to deploy wither away. It was about this
time that the Germans launched a counter-attack in the open on the
left flank. Two companies emerged from the trees of the river valley
and advanced on C 11. Caught on the hill by our artillery and the
Lewis guns of the 8th Rifles, they were destroyed. There was a grave
misunderstanding about the employment of the 146th Brigade. At four
o'clock the 36th Division was informed that it was at its disposal.
General Withycombe, the senior Brigadier in Thiepval Wood, was
ordered to send two of its battalions to the Schwaben Redoubt, to
rally the troops beginning to be forced back. But two battalions of
the Brigade were already committed to the attack on Thiepval, while
the two others had moved up behind them into the trenches of the 32nd
Division. Not till 7-18 did six companies move up towards the "C"
line, and now it was too late. On this flank it was already lost, and
the Yorkshiremen were beaten off by German machine-gun fire.
Meanwhile the situation had grown desperate. Major Peacocke,
second-in-command of the 9th Inniskillings, had managed to cross "No
Man's Land" at noon into the front line about A 12, and after beating
off attacks by Germans bombing their way up from Thiepval, collected
a little bodyguard and worked forward to the Crucifix. He speedily
discovered that the holding of the ground here, now slipping from
our hands, was an impossibility unless Thiepval were taken. The men
were still determined, but at their last gasp from fatigue. There was
scarcely any ammunition or water for the Vickers guns, and it was
all but impossible to send it up. A similar report was brought to
General Griffith by Major Blair Oliphant, second-in-command of the
11th Rifles, who carried out an admirable reconnaissance. A final
counter-attack, launched in the dusk by fresh troops that had come
into Grandcourt by train during the evening, drove our men in from
the "B" line. By ten o'clock it did not appear that we had any troops
in the German lines. That which had been won at a sacrifice so vast,
had been lost for lack of support.
Fresh troops for a further attack on Thiepval were put at the
disposal of the 36th Division in the middle of the night. General
Withycombe, at 11-30 p.m., received the 4th York and Lancs, of the
148th Brigade, with the intimation that the 4th and 5th K.O.Y.L.I.'s
of the same Brigade would follow, to retake the Schwaben Redoubt,
with the assistance of the remnants of the 107th and 109th Brigades.
At one o'clock the latter battalions had not arrived. General
Withycombe made the following appreciation of the position:
It was doubtful if it would be possible to organize an attack before
daylight. This was a vital consideration, since an advance by
daylight would be swept by fire from Thiepval, which was not being
attacked that night, and the inevitable result would be a repetition
of the previous day's experiences.
If the troops did succeed in moving off before dawn, it would be
almost impossible for them to keep direction in the darkness, on
ground they did not know.
Lastly, General Withycombe submitted that, if the Schwaben Redoubt
were taken, it could not be held while Thiepval was still in German
occupation.
General Nugent was fully in accord with these views. He submitted the
matter to the Corps Commander, who replied that in such a case the
man on the spot must decide. The proposed operation was therefore
cancelled, and General Withycombe sent the 4th and 5th K.O.Y.L.I.'s
to Aveluy Wood, retaining under his hand the 4th York and Lancs, in
case of emergency.
At seven a.m. next morning, as sun dispersed the first summer
ground-mist, observers on the Mesnil Ridge saw that there were yet
British troops in small numbers in the first two lines of German
trenches. General Nugent ordered General Withycombe to support and
reinforce these troops, and to send forward supplies of bombs,
ammunition, and water. General Withycombe collected a force of four
hundred men of the four battalions of his own Brigade, together
with two guns of the 107th Machine-Gun Company. Under the command
of Major Woods, of the 9th Rifles, this devoted band moved across
"No Man's Land" at two o'clock in artillery formation. It lost a
third of its numbers from the enemy's fire, but it reached its
objectives. Two small parties of the 16th Rifles (Pioneers), with
bombs and ammunition, crossed later in the afternoon, going through
the German barrage in most gallant fashion. On the left flank Major
Woods found Corporal Sanders, of the 7th West Yorks, with a party of
forty men, whom he described as "played out, but full of fight." He
had been beating off German bombing attacks all night, had rescued
several wounded Ulstermen, and taken a number of prisoners. This
stout-hearted N.C.O. was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross.
That night the 36th Division was relieved by the 49th. The 148th
Brigade relieved the 107th in the two lines of trenches now held,
between A 12 and A 19. The relief was not complete till after ten
o'clock the following morning, when a weary, tattered, pitiful
remnant marched into Martinsart and flung themselves down to sleep.
They had brought back to Thiepval Wood fourteen prisoners. The total
number captured by the 36th Division in the offensive was five
hundred and forty-three. Its casualties in the two days amounted to
five thousand five hundred officers and other ranks killed, wounded,
and missing. The whole Province was thrown into mourning for its
sons. Among the dead were Colonel H. C. Bernard, of the 10th Rifles;
Major G. H. Gaffiken, of the 9th, who had led his company to the
final objective; Lieutenant G. St. G. S. Cather, Adjutant of the 9th
Irish Fusiliers, awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his services
in bringing in wounded under machine-gun fire, in the course of which
he lost his life; Captain E. N. F. Bell, 9th Inniskillings, attached
109th Trench Mortar Battery, who likewise had bestowed on him that
last honour. Captain Charles Craig, M.P. for South Antrim, was
wounded and taken prisoner. Some battalions had almost disappeared.
The 9th Irish Fusiliers, for example, had at the end of the first
day none of the officers and only eighty other ranks left unwounded
of the force that took part in the attack. The figures of the 8th
Rifles, as of a battalion below rather than above the average in
casualties, may be given in full. Officers: fifteen wounded, five
missing. Other ranks: twenty-four killed, two hundred and sixteen
wounded, one hundred and eighty-six missing. And of the "missing," it
must be recorded that three-fourths at least were in reality dead,
somewhere out in front of the line finally handed over.
Of the deeds of heroism that day accomplished, it is not possible to
enumerate one-hundredth. Notable among them were the achievements
of junior officers and N.C.O.'s when their seniors had fallen.
Lieutenant H. Gallagher, 11th Inniskillings, was the sole officer
of his battalion to cross the German front line. With his orderly's
rifle he killed six Germans holding up the advance, and then, at the
Crucifix, organized the resistance, being one of the last to quit
the German trenches at night. Lieutenant Sir Harry Macnaghten, 12th
Rifles, twice reformed the tatters of his company in "No Man's Land,"
and led them against gaps in the German wire, to fall himself on the
second occasion. Corporal John Conn, 9th Inniskillings, came upon two
of our machine-guns out of action. He repaired one under fire and
annihilated a German flanking party. He carried both guns himself
most of the way back, but had to abandon one at last owing to utter
exhaustion. These are but examples, picked at random. Another very
remarkable Victoria Cross was that won by Private Quigg, 12th Rifles,
Sir Harry Macnaghten's servant. He had, on July the 1st, advanced
thrice to the attack. Next morning he heard a rumour that his officer
was out wounded in "No Man's Land." Seven times he went out to look
for him, and seven times he brought in a wounded man, the last
dragged on a waterproof sheet from within a few yards of the German
wire.
All arms had supported the infantry finely in their great, heroic
achievement. The work of the artillery could not have been bettered.
It carried out its long and gruelling task to perfection. Even in
front of the "D" line the wire was well cut. One forward battery of
the 172nd Brigade in Hamel, in full view of the enemy, enfiladed his
lines across the Ancre, doing great execution and being handled with
extreme gallantry. The Engineers suffered very heavy casualties in
their devotion to duty, working in the marsh at keeping repaired the
vital pipe-lines, regardless of the shells that all day fell about
them. The stretcher-bearers of the R.A.M.C. were tireless. Often,
owing to break-down on the trench tramway due to shell-fire, they had
to carry wounded right down from Thiepval Wood and across the Ancre
at Authuille. Many dropped from sheer exhaustion, and many refused
to rest when reliefs arrived. The Army Service Corps drivers of the
ambulances kept their cars continuously on the roads for thirty-six
hours. There was throughout no hitch in the medical arrangements,
though at one period of the day the overcrowding of the Main Dressing
Station at Forceville, due to the strain upon the Motor Ambulance
Convoy which evacuated the wounded to the Casualty Clearing Stations,
gave rise to much anxiety.
A volume might be written--the extent of many a volume probably
has--upon the causes of the failure, for such the whole northern
section of the attack undoubtedly was. This is not the place for a
detailed discussion of them. It may at least be said that, while
the work of the artillery could not have been excelled, the whole
scheme of its employment had not reached anything approaching the
science of the following year. Artillerymen of the higher ranks were
to some extent carried away by the weight of metal for the first
time at their disposal, and carried away other arms by their new
enthusiasm. The heavy gunners believed and proclaimed that no life
could endure their fire, and that the battle would resolve itself
into an advance by the infantry to take over shattered and undefended
trenches. They had not realized that the machine-guns would be
comparatively safe under their bombardment, and that it would take
but a few seconds to bring them into action when the barrage was
past. It is probable that at a later stage of the war a fortress
such as Thiepval would not have been attacked directly by infantry
till it had been first encircled and isolated by its advance, being
kept the while under such artillery fire as would have forced the
machine-gunners to lie low, and then rushed from all sides by bombing
parties. It may be said that our organization at the beginning of
the Somme Offensive was in a transitional stage. We had realized
that defence with the machine-gun had beaten attack, and had begun
the process of increasing the quantity and improving the quality of
mechanical accessories. It was still, however, to cost thousands of
lives before the factories could produce sufficient of the latter,
or the higher commands reach the ratio between infantry force and
mechanical aids necessary to the prosecution of a given operation.
But no explanations that can be found stand without ample tribute to
the fighting qualities of the German soldier. The dash and bravery
of the counter-attacks of the bombers moving up from the valley
merit high praise. The highest, however, must be reserved for the
machine-gunners, who had sat for days in their dug-outs without fresh
food, the very earth shaking to the thunders of our artillery, and
then came up and brought their guns into action at the right moment.
On July the 5th the Division moved back to Rubempré and the
neighbouring villages, and five days later to the Bernaville area.
The Artillery remained in line under the orders of the 49th Division,
while the Pioneers, 121st and 122nd Field Companies, were left
several days at work, the former having, amongst other unpleasant
tasks, to make a communication trench across "No Man's Land" to the
new-won ground.[24] The 150th Field Company had a yet harder time. It
was sent to the 12th Division, further south, in the neighbourhood
of Ovillers, where a slight advance had been made. Its work here was
the consolidation of strong points, "before they were taken," as its
commander, Major Boyle, remarks.
[Illustration: Map I.
The Battle of Albert, 1916.]
Orders came at Bernaville for a move to Flanders. The Engineers,
relieved of their task, marched north. The rest of the Division, less
the Artillery, was moved by train from Auxi-le-Château, Frévent, and
Conteville, to Berguette, Thiennes, and Steenbecque, between Aire and
Hazebrouck, on its way to the training area west of St. Omer. The
infantry battalions were but shadows of their former selves. Well
might commanding officers feel appalled at the magnitude of the task
before them in building up anew, without the best of their officers
and N.C.O.'s. The men were very silent in these first few days after
the battle. Not one of the survivors but had lost companions who had
been two years at his side; many, friends of a lifetime. But if ever
gift be God-given, it is the healing effect of time. And in days of
war a week even is a long period. These men, moreover, felt that in
all that had happened there was no reproach for them. They, at least,
had accomplished their task in the face of incredible difficulties.
On the 12th of July, General Nugent and his Staff saw the battalions
of the 107th Brigade marching from the station of Thiennes into
Blaringhem. Sun was shining on the old Flemish village. Officers
and men wore marigolds in caps to honour the day; the bands played
"King William's March." The least practised eye could tell that to
these men confidence was returning; that the worst of the horror they
had endured had been shaken from their shoulders. They marched like
victors, as was their right.
FOOTNOTES:
[19] See Map I.
[20] For a brilliant appreciation of the Somme Battle and its
lessons, General Mangin's book, _Comment finit la Guerre_, should be
read.
[21] The boundaries of the 36th Division, with all names that occur
in the description of the battle, will be found in Map I.
[22] The "A" line consisted of a double line of trenches, a front
line, and immediate support. The second was alluded to as the "A.I."
line.
[23] Z/49 Trench Mortar Battery was attached to the 36th Division for
this operation.
[24] It was not held for long, nor was the Schwaben Redoubt to come
again into British hands for several months.
CHAPTER IV
FROM THE SOMME TO MESSINES: JULY 1916 TO JUNE 1917
On July the 13th the Division moved into the well-known training
area west of St. Omer, with headquarters at Tilques. Those of the
107th Brigade were at Bayenghem, of the 108th at Eperlecques, and of
the 109th at Boisdinghem. Here training and reorganization began,
and here reinforcements arrived in considerable numbers.[25] Five
days later the Artillery, which had remained in line covering the
49th Division, rejoined, having moved north by march route. R.A.
Headquarters were established at the château at Recques. The troops
were much refreshed by this return to civilization, and units had
leisure to absorb their drafts. Unfortunately it did not last very
long. On July the 20th Headquarters moved to Esquelbecq, to a famous
and beautiful moated château, that bore at the door rings to which
Marlborough's troopers had tied their reins, and had been occupied
by General Grant after Waterloo. Meanwhile the 108th Brigade moved
forward, by 'bus and lorry, to Kortepyp Camp, south of the village of
Neuve Eglise, and Red Lodge, on the southern slopes of Hill 63, and
west of the famous Bois de Ploegsteert, that will go down to Britons
for all time as "Plug Street Wood." On the 23rd Headquarters moved
to the château on Mont Noir, a couple of miles north of Bailleul,
and that night the 108th Brigade re-entered the line in relief of two
battalions of the 20th Division. By the end of July the 109th Brigade
had come in on the right, in relief of troops of the 41st Division,
and the 107th had relieved the 108th Brigade. The front line now
held ran from a ruin on the Neuve Eglise-Warneton Road, known as
Anton's Farm, on the right, to another known as Boyle's Farm on the
Wulverghem-Messines Road, on the left. The frontage was some three
thousand yards in a straight line, but there were over two and a half
miles of front-line trench. On September the 1st the headquarters of
the Division moved from Mont Noir to the village of St. Jans Cappel,
near Bailleul.
The Division was to remain for upwards of a year in this part of the
line, but it seldom held precisely the same section of front for more
than a few weeks at a time. The various moves cannot be treated in
detail. There were changes in August, all three Brigades entering the
line, and early in September a "side-step" to the north, the right
boundary now being the River Douve, and the left "Piccadilly Trench,"
south of the Kemmel-Wytschaete Road. The 108th Brigade was now on
the right, the 107th in the centre, and the 109th on the left. The
characteristics of the various parts of all this front were similar,
the conditions of the soil the same throughout, so that a general
description will hold good for all the period passed by the Division
in the neighbourhood.
The trenches and dug-outs, to begin with, were not such at all in
the sense in which the troops had been wont to use the names on
the Ancre. The fighting trenches consisted, everywhere save on the
highest ground, of parapets built of sandbags filled with clay. In
places there was a parados similarly constructed, but over long
stretches the men in the front line simply stood behind the wall,
with no protection against the back-burst of shells. Water in this
country appeared everywhere just below the surface, and it was
useless to dig trenches in the real sense for any purpose other than
drainage. Even the communication trenches were sunk not deeper
than a foot, and piled high on either side with earth, which made
them satisfactory enough as cover from view, but very vulnerable to
shell-fire. These communication trenches were longer than those to
which the troops had been accustomed, the approaches to the front
line being much more exposed than among the folds of the Somme
country. As for dug-outs, there were none. Little wooden-framed
shelves in the parapet, a few "baby elephants"--arched steel
shelters, which, if covered thickly enough with sandbags, afforded
protection against the shells of field guns--served for the troops
in line, while further back, for battalion headquarters and forts,
there were ruined farms, which often had good cellars, and in the
frame-work of which concrete structures could be hidden. It was hard
for troops used to the Somme chalk to accustom their minds to the
spongy nature of this soil. In the dry weeks of August, for example,
the R.E. built one very fine dug-out, twenty feet deep, and were
proud of their handiwork. In September there was in it a foot of
water, in October two; November found the water level with the top of
the stairs, and a sarcastic notice, "The R.E. Swimming Bath," at the
entrance.
When it rained, which was not seldom, all the low-lying ground
flooded. The valley of the Douve, above all, from Wulverghem to the
front line, became a muddy swamp, in which the water lay in sheets.
At such times, and indeed during a great part of the winter, many
trenches simply could not be occupied. No adequate idea of the
impression conveyed upon the mind of a man coming up north from the
clean, white trenches of the Somme can be obtained of all this area
unless it is conceived as dirty, mournful, and disconsolate; haunted
by the evil stench of blue clay, and brooded over by an atmosphere of
decay.
Since the days of the first Battle of Ypres and of the rival turning
movements which had ended in the present deadlock, the Germans
had had the best of the ground in the Messines sector. Behind
the salient of their front trenches it rose sharply, with a dip
half-way up, formed by the shallow valley of the Steenebeek, to a
dominating ridge, crowned south and north by the fortress-villages
of Messines and Wytschaete. The road joining these was the limit of
our observation, except for telescopes on Kemmel Hill. To the south
we had a fair observation point in Hill 63, but the one great boon
granted to us was Kemmel. Had it been a thousand yards nearer the
front line, it would have done much to counteract the advantage of
the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge. It is scarcely necessary to add that
the enemy had, in his long possession of the ridge, fortified it with
all his wonted industry and art. It was protected by four general
lines of well wired trenches west of the road, and peppered over with
little forts, wired all round, the garrisons of which were provided
with concrete structures, miniature houses rather than dug-outs,
proof against anything up to an eight-inch shell.
General Plumer's Second Army was at this time playing the _rôle_ of
Cinderella among the British forces. Its front was lightly held,
even at Ypres, which had grown strangely quiet of late. Certain
preparations had been made for an offensive in the summer, but had
been largely abandoned for lack of labour. The Army Commander,
however, insisted on pushing on his mining, in which he had great
faith, a faith amply to be justified the following year. Throughout
the winter and spring the Division furnished large parties for work
under the various Tunnelling Companies in the shafts that were being
driven under "No Man's Land," and beneath the strongest portions
of the enemy's front line. The German miners were skilful enough,
and on other parts of the front often gave rather more than they
got, but here, from first to last, they were out-manœuvred and
out-fought in an underground war. A striking instance of this was at
La Petite Douve Farm, on the Ploegsteert-Messines Road, where the
British tunnellers succeeded in pumping a fair proportion of the
muddy Douve into the Germans' shaft, whence they could be heard,
night after night, frantically ejecting it with a motor-pump. One
"camouflet," as a defensive explosion was called, did indeed blow
in our gallery here and undo months of work, but the enemy probably
did not know what he had achieved, and the temporary check availed
him nothing in the end. No Ulsterman who served in Flanders in that
winter and the following spring will forget the skill, patience,
and absolute contempt for danger displayed by those tunnellers.
The 171st Tunnelling Company, with which the Division was most
closely associated, will be remembered with particular affection and
admiration.
The Second Army has been called the Cinderella of our forces. Not
only was it holding a long line lightly, and with few reserves, but
the main flow of ammunition and material passed it by and went down
to the Somme, where the British were creeping forward in desperate
fighting to Bapaume. There were weeks in August and September when
the allowance of shells dropped to two and even one round per
18-pounder a day, with heavier calibres proportionately rationed.[26]
The Germans were in this respect similarly situated. Their ammunition
also was wanted on the Somme to put down those eternal barrages with
which they opposed our assaults. When the Division first arrived in
Flanders the artillery shell-fire was very light indeed. That of
the trench mortars did a good deal to replace it. The Germans had
concentrated on these weapons as their chief means of offence, and,
possessing the advantage of the ground, they used them cleverly and
with great effect. With that curious regularity that appeared to form
part of the German mentality their bombardments generally took place
almost precisely at 3-30 p.m. They were particularly severe in the
neighbourhood of the Spanbroek salient.[27] "In this sector," writes
a machine-gun officer, "I have seen five or six large 'minnies' in
the air at one time--really fearsome things. You could see the
fuses of the bombs alight in the air and follow their flight most
of the way, only to lose it when straight overhead; and then there
was nothing to do but wonder where it would fall!" These long aerial
torpedoes exploded with shattering effect and made huge craters. It
is useless to disguise the fact that, during the first few weeks
of the Division's acquaintance with these trenches, the enemy had
an ascendancy in trench-mortar warfare. That ascendancy had to be
fought down. In the first place the German mortars, or rather their
emplacements, were carefully marked down from observations taken in
the line, and by the study of aeroplane photographs. Maps were then
issued by the staff, upon which each active emplacement was shown
by name. The names began with the letter of the map square; all in
the "S" squares with S, and in the "U" squares with U. The names
chosen were generally feminine--doubtless without ironic intention.
A certain number of the emplacements were allotted to each howitzer
battery of the Divisional Artillery, and also to such 6-inch howitzer
batteries of the Corps Heavy Artillery as were available. When the
mortar opened fire, all that was necessary was for the words "Susie
active," or "Ursula active," to be wired back to the batteries.
Susie, or Ursula, as the case might be, was instantly engaged, while
any machine-guns that could be brought to bear upon her neighbourhood
also took a hand in the game. By this means it was generally found
possible to silence any individual mortar in about a quarter of an
hour at most, and to prevent it from getting the exact range, and
then knocking in a whole section of trench at leisure.
On the British side, also, big trench-mortar bombardments, aided
by the Divisional Artillery, were periodically arranged. In these
affairs the leading _rôle_ was played by that terrific weapon, the
heavy trench mortar, firing a projectile of 180 lbs., and highly
dramatic it not infrequently was. One of these monsters dwelt at
R.E. Farm, on the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road, and it was from this
locality that the principal "hates" were discharged. For perhaps
ten minutes the fire would continue, the "flying pig," as it was
called, sending over its giant shells, the medium mortars firing
their 60-lb. "plum puddings," and perhaps two batteries of light
Stokes mortars discharging twenty or twenty-five rounds a minute from
every gun. Meanwhile the 18-pounders and howitzers behind joined in,
while machine-guns fired upon communication trenches. The German
retaliation was frequently heavy, and the teams of the mortars,
heavy, medium, and light, showed grim determination in carrying out
their tasks under punishment. General Brock, the C.R.A., did not
believe in sending to the mortar batteries weaklings who were not
wanted with the guns, and these trench mortars acquired a peculiar
type of artillery officer,[28] resolute, hard-bitten, perhaps often
careless and unconventional, but capable in great moments of the most
splendid courage, lightly worn and taken for granted between comrade
and comrade.
Few who have known anything of it can recall the "flying pig" without
a smile. There was a pleasing uncertainty about this weapon. When
the first round was fired from R.E. Farm, the charge did not ignite
properly, and the big shell went forth, flaming gun-cotton marking
its path, to land three hundred yards away just behind the British
front line, making a huge crater and demolishing the local company
headquarters! Thereafter the propellent was improved, but it was
thought wiser temporarily to evacuate the front line over which the
mortar was firing. It was typical of the infantryman's good humour
that the incident was greeted everywhere with laughter and treasured
as an excellent jest. War, indeed, has a curious effect upon the
sense of humour, and far grimmer pleasantries than this were the
subjects of mirth. When a IX. Corps intelligence summary remarked
that a German cemetery behind the ridge "appeared to be filling
nicely," it was hailed as the joke of the season. It was the aim of
the Army Commander to harass by all means in his power the troops
that faced him, to prevent divisions that were sent down to the Somme
from going as fresh troops, and to prevent those others that had been
withdrawn from the hell-broth from recovering too quickly and easily
from its effects. The intense bombardments with trench artillery
were but one weapon in this campaign. Another, as autumn drew on and
supplies of ammunition came more freely to hand, was the shelling
of approaches and, above all, the railway terminus in Messines, by
night. But the principal weapon in this minor offensive was the
raiding party. So long as men who took part in the war are alive,
the subject of raids is like to crop up whenever two or three are
met together. But the conclusion of such discussions is invariably
the same. Raids were frequently useful, and sometimes imperatively
necessary; but the British raided too often. Raids to obtain
identification of troops opposite, and even to keep the enemy "on
the stretch," were justifiable; those with the object of raising the
moral of our troops were not, because they did not succeed in their
object. "No doubt," writes one of the Brigadiers of the 36th Division
who was responsible for many raids, "no doubt a successful raid had
a good effect in a unit, but not always among the raiding party. The
meticulous preparation made the 'waiting-for-the-dentist' period hard
and trying. And the raiders were always picked men, who in a battle
were of inestimable value. Many units had to deplore the loss of the
very cream of their officers, N.C.O.'s, and men in raids. And the
cold-blooded courage demanded of all concerned took heavy toll of the
nervous energy of even the biggest thruster." The Higher Command,
also, often called for raids immediately troops had taken over a
line, before they had learnt their way about in "No Man's Land" by
dint of patrolling, and before they had recovered from the effects of
an attack delivered on some other part of the front.
The record of the 36th Division with regard to raids was from first
to last a very high one. The failures were few in comparison with
the successes. It was also the case that, while the troops of the
Division carried out a great number of successful raids, the number
of occasions on which they themselves failed to repulse German raids
or lost prisoners to the raiders can be numbered on the fingers of
both hands. In the eleven months between the opening of the Somme
Offensive and the Battle of Messines, the Division carried out over a
dozen raids; but the first hand-to-hand encounter with the enemy took
place, not in his trenches, but in "No Man's Land." It is a curious
little episode, and deserves to be treated at some length.
It may be mentioned that only a short time before the Somme Battle
was the efficacy of the German apparatus for overhearing telephone
conversation realized by the British. Till then it had been our
easy custom to talk of such important matters as reliefs over
the telephone from the front line. It was established that these
casual conversations could be picked up by the enemy's instruments,
especially in chalky ground. They were accordingly banned, and,
after the British manner, from the extreme of imprudence we rushed
to a comical extreme of caution. It was currently believed that
all conversations within three miles of the line could be heard by
the Germans, and brigadiers sometimes found themselves precluded
from using the telephone. It was still possible to send telegraphic
messages, using the "fullerphone," an invention which greatly
diminished the risk of tapping. And an instrument of torture, known
as the "B.A.B. Code Book," became part of the equipment of every
officer. How many company commanders have sat in their dug-outs
translating a series of numerals into amazing gibberish, to discover
that they had wasted half an hour by using last month's correction!
On the occasion in question, an officer of the 9th Irish Fusiliers,
Lieutenant Godson, conceived the idea of using the listening set of
the enemy as a bait to take some of his men. On the afternoon of the
14th of August, he announced in the clearest possible tones, on a
telephone at company headquarters in the front line, that an officer
and three men would leave the trench at midnight, and move out on
the right of the Le Rossignol-Messines Road to reconnoitre the clump
of willows in "No Man's Land." At 9-30 p.m. he moved out to this spot
with a party of two officers and sixteen other ranks. By 10 he had
his force in prearranged formation near the willows, and waited for
what might happen. But he must be allowed to tell in his own words,
as they were written next morning, the story of his sensations and of
his achievement.
"At 11 p.m. I see, I see--what do I see? A little black mark in the
grass forty yards in front that was not there when I looked before.
O yes, it was. I look about. The moon is very full out now on our
right front. What a nice night, and so quiet! Not a sound from the
German lines. I look to the front again. I am getting fed with this.
I am wet from head to foot crawling through the wet grass.... This is
not a job for one man to be at day after day. Everyone ought to take
his turn at this. The discomfort is beastly. It is all right till I
move, then I have to warm a new place on the dank grass. Hullo! by
Jove, I've forgotten that black spot, the only thing in sight I had
made a mental note to look at again.... It's growing bigger. What the
devil is it? There's another behind, and another. They're coming!
I have heard of hearts leaping into the mouth. It meant nothing to
me, but by Jove that's what mine did. It nearly made me dizzy just
for two seconds. I collect myself. Twenty-five yards off and coming,
oh, so slowly and cautiously, moving down a little ditch in the open
that I had not noticed.... I sign to the sick scout to stop his noise
and lie close to the ground. I level my revolver. They're coming.
And one of the other men is sure to make a noise or cough.... I see
the first distinctly now, ten yards off,--nine, eight, seven, six,
five. He sees something, he whips round, all turn behind him; as far
as I can see, three, four, five, six, seven--how many? Bang, bang,
bang, ring out the rifles! I let off five with my revolver, and they
have disappeared as if by magic. 'Come on, boys!' I'm up and out. I
see a figure on his back. I leap at his throat. 'Kamerad, Kamerad!'
he shouts, and waves his hands. Clements whips by me and Ervin and
Breen."
The net result of the ambuscade was two Germans killed and four
prisoners. That the false message had been overheard could never be
exactly proved, but the probabilities seemed to be in that direction.
To summarize the raids carried out or attempted during autumn and
winter, there were two on the night of September the 15th, two on
September the 30th, three on October the 12th, two on the 31st, and
one, the most important, on November the 16th. Of these ten, six were
successful in varying degree. The two first were carried out by the
9th Rifles, just east of the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road, and by the
11th Inniskillings some five hundred yards north of it. The former,
by reason of its neatness and the fact that the raiders suffered
no loss, must be accounted the best of the series. It was sent to
obtain an identification, and it obtained one, a single prisoner.
In addition, the officer who led it shot two Germans as he entered
the trench, and a third was shot by the flank guard on the left. But
the great achievement of the raid was the work of Rifleman Kidd,
the champion long-distance bomber of the battalion, a man worth a
platoon in such an affair. By his long-range bombing he kept off,
single-handed, the German bombers moving up to the rescue, killing
three. The British casualties were three men so lightly wounded that
they remained at duty. The other raid was notable for very pretty
work by the Artillery. At this point, opposite Kruisstraat Cabaret,
the British lines jutted out into a work known as the "Bull Ring,"
which commanded some relatively high ground, about seventy yards
from the enemy's trench. The raid was just north of this work, on an
enemy trench almost on the same longitudinal line, yet a machine-gun
was able to fire from the "Bull Ring" two thousand rounds on the
enemy's trenches, while the "box" barrage of the Artillery was put
round the raiding party, and no shell came near it. Over thirty
Germans were estimated to have been killed, but, unfortunately, the
Inniskillings, besides ten wounded, had three wounded and missing.
One prisoner was taken as an identification.
The raids on the 30th were part of a series on the whole IX. Corps
front. On the right the 11th Rifles did not start, owing to an
accidental bomb explosion; in the centre the 10th Rifles were held
up by the depth of the wire; on the left the 10th Inniskillings
entered the enemy's trenches--after the fuse of their ammonal torpedo
had failed to ignite, and the sapper in charge had affixed and lit
a new one under the very noses of the German sentries--killed a
number of the enemy, blew up dug-outs, took a machine-gun, rifles,
and equipment. In the raids of the 12th of October the 108th Brigade
had again no fortune at the strongly wired Petite Douve Farm, but
the 107th and 109th Brigades each took prisoners. Of the latter
raid, carried out by the 9th Inniskillings, it is related that,
just before it took place, the two officers who planned it were out
in "No Man's Land" having a look round, and lost their way, the
trenches being here only fifty yards apart. Having seen some wire
they could not agree whether it was "ours or theirs," and tossed a
coin in a shell-hole to decide which view should prevail. The winner
approached the wire, put up his head, and was fired at at four
yards' range--and missed! He bobbed down. Again he took a look, and
again there was a miss by the sentry. Finally he heard footsteps
approach on the trench-boards, and a voice demand: "Jasus, what
are ye shootin' at?" That was a welcome and homely sound. _Sotto
voce_ explanations followed, and he and his companion came in. The
raids of October the 31st were held up by showers of bombs from the
stout-hearted Swabian peasants of the 26th (Wuertemberg) Division.
But the Wuertembergers were wanted on the Somme. On November the 16th
the 11th Inniskillings, raiding the Spanbroek salient on a front
of two hundred yards, came upon their less formidable successors,
a Saxon Division, before they were accustomed to the new trenches,
and dealt with them in terrible fashion. Twenty-three dead were
counted in the trenches, and more than twice as many must have
fallen. The terror-stricken Saxons deserted their front line on a
wide front, and the Inniskillings had their pleasure with it for half
an hour, looting everything which they could carry over, blowing up
all the dug-outs, to the accompaniment of tunes played in "No Man's
Land" on mouth organs. Three prisoners were taken. Our losses were
slight. One of the few successful raids carried out against the
Division in all its career took place on February the 14th, when the
enemy obliterated the trenches on the Wulverghem-Messines Road and
apparently captured two prisoners.
It will be remembered that the Divisional Artillery, which had
come to France consisting of three 18-pounder and one 4.5 howitzer
Brigades, had been reorganized in May, the howitzer batteries being
divided among the other three Brigades. A second reorganization
took place in September, to a basis of six-gun instead of four-gun
batteries, though the howitzer batteries did not receive their
extra section of two guns till the New Year. The 154th Brigade was
broken up, and in February 1917 the 172nd Brigade became the 113th
Army Brigade, and left the Division. The details can best be shown
by a tabular statement which appears in the "Order of Battle."
Henceforth the Artillery consisted of two Brigades only, the 153rd
and the 173rd. A large number of Army Brigades were created by the
reorganization, and were used to increase the artillery at the
disposal of divisions for offensives or in dangerous sectors. The
change had some tactical advantages, but the lot of the new Army
Brigades, "nobody's children" as it were, and constantly moved from
one lively front to another, could not be described as happy.
[Illustration: VICTORIA CROSSES OF THE 36^{th} (Ulster)
DIVISION--1916.
The late Lt. G. St. G. S. CATHER
9^{th} Royal Irish Fusiliers.
The late Pte. W. F. M^cFADZEAN
14^{th} Royal Irish Rifles.
The late Capt. E. N. F. BELL
9^{th} Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
Pte. R. QUIGG
12^{th} Royal Irish Rifles.
The Late 2/Lt. J. S. EMERSON
9^{th} Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.]
The Division always worked hard, but there was probably no part of
the front in which it attempted and accomplished so much as here.
Just at first there was shortage of material, as there was of
ammunition, but the situation soon improved. By the labours of the
Pioneers and Infantry, working under the supervision of the three
Field Companies, the whole trench system was transformed. Parapets
were built stout and strong; parados, where none had been before,
appeared to match them. The communication trenches were strengthened
and improved by the famous "A" frame, the greatest single blessing
that authority provided for troops in Flanders. The deepening of the
bed of the Douve, and the removal of obstructions by the Engineers,
did much to lessen the winter floods. Trench tramways were laid, good
shelters constructed, reinforced concrete being largely employed.
Of these the most interesting was the battalion headquarters at La
Plus Douve Farm.[29] As one approached the place, one saw no sign of
human occupation, nor of its possibility. There was nothing but a
huge roofless farm, built round three sides of a square, as is common
in Flanders. But inside one of the wings was an unobtrusive concrete
structure thirty feet long, wherein the commanding officer and his
staff dwelt in great comfort, above ground, with ample head-room,
real windows, and protection from "five-nines." The courtyard
remained as it had been when the farm was finally destroyed by
bombardment eighteen months before, and its smashed reaping-machine,
half a bicycle, and old umbrella, seemed to have grouped themselves
after a Bairnsfather drawing.
Mention must here be made of the remarkable underground barracks,
made on the southern slopes of Hill 63 by the Australian Tunnelling
Company, to which the troops of the Division acted as carriers.
Driven into the steep flank of the hill, it was proof against any
artillery, lit all through by electric light, and capable of holding
two battalions at a pinch. There its charm ended, for it must be
confessed that it was damp, close, and malodorous, and that it was
impossible to leave a battalion long in it without ill effects upon
its health.
For the first three months of 1917 the Division was without its
Pioneers, filched by the new "railway king," Sir Eric Geddes. The
Pioneers worked with their wonted vigour on 60 c.m. light railways
between Ouderdom, south of the Salient, and Kemmel, and between
Busseboom and Dickebusch, and also on broad-gauge work. In their
absence it was very difficult to continue the elaborate programmes of
construction. A temporary "Works Battalion," one company from each
Brigade, with a nucleus of one hundred trained Pioneers, who had been
retained, was formed to replace them. It was intensely unpopular
with the men, and cannot be said to have been a success. In February
practically all work of other natures ceased, so that men might be
put to that of wiring. The intense frost had converted the Belgian
inundations into solid ice! They were no obstacle to the enemy, who
for some weeks was suspected of the preparation of an offensive.
Certainly his artillery had become very aggressive, carrying out
heavy bombardments of our trenches and batteries, and shelling camps
in rear. The country was literally sown with wire, "Plug Street Wood"
being such a tangle that it has always been a mystery to those who
saw it how the Germans passed through it in 1918. The alarm died down
presently. It had never very serious foundation, but the frost in the
ground constituted a risk.
There was one advantage in holding the line in the same area
for a long period. It was possible to provide some comfort and
recreation for the troops. There were a football competition, boxing
competitions, a horse-show, many sports meetings. A large hut was
put up at Dranoutre for concerts and other entertainments. Over a
long period a 'bus ran daily from "Hyde Park Corner," just outside
Ploegsteert village, to Bailleul, which represented with its shops
and eating-houses comparative civilization. Many will recall with
regret its fine square and beautiful _Hôtel de Ville_, all smashed
to powder in 1918. Probably the worst hardships of the troops were
due to the intense cold of that winter. Life in the trenches was bad
enough, but there were many men who found it easier to sleep there
than in their rest camps. A bare, draughty wooden hut, a temperature
of fifteen degrees below zero, insufficient fuel; it does not
require much imagination to conjure up the misery implied by such
conditions.
With early spring came a great burst of activity. In the last days
of the old year the Division had been reorganized on a two-brigade
frontage, so that the troops of one Brigade might obtain some rest
and training. Now, in mid-March, it closed down to a small front,
from the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road on the right, to a point opposite
Maedelstede Farm[30] on the left. This was held by one Brigade, the
second being well back about Flêtre, while the third trained in the
pleasant neighbourhood of Lumbres, west of St. Omer. No longer was
the Second Army Cinderella. Its area was packed with troops. Even the
private soldier, who saw the opening of the splendid new railhead
at Haagedoorne, outside Bailleul, with its maze of sidings, saw the
country covered with transport lines, saw the dumps grow full, saw
the digging of new communication trenches and the laying of light
railways, must have realized that something was toward. It is certain
at least that the enemy did. On the morning of March the 24th he
bombarded the lines of the 107th Brigade on the right flank and those
of the New Zealanders, its neighbours, for an hour and a half. Just
before dawn his men were seen to issue from their trenches. Caught
by our artillery barrage and the fire of machine and Lewis guns, the
party was swept away like chaff. He made other unsuccessful attempts
to raid the Division. That, however, represented but one aspect
of his alertness. The more serious was his persistent shelling of
billets and horse-lines, and his bombing of Bailleul. It was also
observed that he had large parties at work on his rear lines.
The Second Army was preparing the capture of the Messines-Wytschaete
Ridge.
The raiding activity of the Division was renewed in those last weeks
of preparation. On several occasions men slipped across in broad
daylight to the nose of the Spanbroek salient and threw bombs into
the German trenches. On May the 19th a raid was attempted from the
"Bull Ring," but beaten off by the enemy, who in turn sent over
parties in the early hours of the morning, which were beaten off
with loss. On May the 23rd the 14th Rifles raided the trenches on
the Kemmel-Wytschaete Road, taking a prisoner and confirming the
suspicion that the Germans had reinforced their line. On the 29th a
very big party of Germans, estimated at a hundred strong, made three
attempts to enter the "Bull Ring," but was kept out by the barrage
and the fire of the Lewis guns. These raids were without doubt
attempts to reach and destroy the mine-shafts in our front line.
Meanwhile there had come into the divisional area, and moved
quietly, battery by battery, into the positions already prepared,
the Divisional Artillery of the 32nd Division, with four Army
Artillery Brigades, making a total of 192 field guns and howitzers
on the front. All the positions for the incoming batteries had
been constructed by the 36th Divisional Artillery, and much of
their ammunition stacked in them ready for their use. Upon this
General Brock was most insistent. To him and to the hard work of his
subordinates the newcomers owed provision such as incoming batteries
all too rarely met with. A great mass of heavy artillery under the
orders of the IX. Corps had arrived also, and was bombarding the
slope of the Messines Ridge, doing great execution upon the concrete
shelters with which it was studded. The Germans could play at this
game also, and they had some tempting targets. All over the back
areas were horses piqueted in the open, troops in tents. Against
these the Germans did much damage with a railway gun, which, as it
could easily be moved, was safe from our fire. On the night of May
the 27th Divisional Headquarters, which had moved up to their new
Ulster Camp, west of Dranoutre, were bombarded by a 10 c.m. gun. A
direct hit was obtained on one of the huts, and several clerks were
wounded. The shelling continued for two hours, during which the
staff and personnel of the headquarters had to take to the fields.
That which would have been pure comedy--for such the spectacle of
a whole divisional headquarters running about in the dark must
undoubtedly appear to the troops--was turned to tragedy by the death
of Lieut.-Colonel W. A. de C. King, the C.R.E., who was killed on the
spot by one shell. On the following morning General Nugent moved,
with his advanced Headquarters Staff, to the command post that had
been prepared on the western slope of Kemmel Hill.
On the 31st of May the preliminary bombardment opened.
FOOTNOTES:
[25] In the month of July the Division received 193 officers and
2,182 other ranks. These reinforcements left it still, of course,
considerably below strength.
[26] Men who served do not need to be told, but perhaps civilians
may, that there was no parallel between these conditions and those of
early days, when there were often, literally, only a few rounds per
gun available. At this time the ammunition was there, in the gun-pits
and echelons behind, and could be used quite unsparingly at a sign of
danger. When, however, there was no danger, it had to be conserved.
[27] See Map II.
[28] The heavy and medium batteries were manned by artillery, the
Stokes mortars by infantry, personnel.
[29] Local names were frequently transformed by British troops,
followed by the map-makers. This was probably La Plus Douce. When
the Douve overflowed its banks the new name was certainly the more
suitable.
[30] See Map II.
CHAPTER V
MESSINES: JUNE 1917
The Battle of Messines has more than one claim to a prominent
position in the history of the war. It was, in the first place, the
first completely successful single operation on the British front. It
shares with the action of Malmaison, fought four months later, the
distinction of being the most perfect and successful example of the
limited offensive. Lastly, it was by far the most elaborately and
carefully "mounted" action ever fought by British arms. Fine as were
the fighting qualities of the formations and units that took part in
it, the most remarkable aspects which stand out when we look back
upon it are the perfection of its organization and of the liaison
between all arms. It represented a triumph of staff work. Every man
in the huge force under his command was made to feel the guiding hand
of the Commander of the Second Army, and of one of the most brilliant
staff officers the war discovered. The troops entered upon it with
high heart. The capture of the Vimy Ridge had seemed of good augury
for the year's campaign. The doubtful success of the French offensive
in Champagne, which might have acted as a check upon this optimism,
was not generally known.
Before no other battle was there such an infinity of detail to be
mastered as in the preparation of this. It would not be difficult to
write fifty pages about the plans. Since space permits of about six
only being allotted to them, it is impossible to do more than outline
them in the briefest manner.
Some idea of the thoroughness of the training for the assault may be
gained when it is recorded that not only were attacks practised over
ground marked out to represent the German trench system, but officers
from the flanking battalions of divisions attended each others' field
days to ensure that in the minutest details there was harmony along
the line. An elaborate model of the Messines Ridge, with all its
trenches, forts, roads, and woods, was constructed by the C.E. of the
IX. Corps on the slopes of the Scherpenberg Hill, between Locre and
La Clytte. It was surrounded by a wooden gallery and trench-board
walks, so that at least a company could examine it at one time. The
men took great interest in it, while all day long little knots of
officers were to be observed studying it. Another new feature of the
attack was the message-map served out on a large scale to officers
and N.C.O.'s. This had on one side a map of the German trenches,
on which the position could be marked; and on the other a skeleton
message-form, bringing forcibly to the mind of the sender those
details in a message that were of importance to the recipient, which,
in the heat of battle, a young and inexperienced officer might forget.
Nothing was studied more carefully than the provision of food,
water, ammunition, and stores for the advancing troops. In front of
the huge divisional dumps at Lindenhoek cross-roads and "Daylight
Corner," on the Lindenhoek-Neuve Eglise Road, there were an advance
dump, a dump for each of the attacking brigades, six battalion
dumps, and many smaller in the trenches. An elaborate system of pack
transport was devised, two hundred extra pack-saddles with special
crates attached being issued. Two hundred and fifty "Yukon packs"--a
Canadian device which enabled a man trained in its use to carry a
very heavy load--were also issued. Arrangements were made to serve in
the trenches a hot meal at midnight prior to the assault. A special
ration of oranges, Oxo cubes, chewing gum, and lime juice was issued
to every man, and a tin of solidified alcohol for cooking to every
fourth man.
Means of communication, by visual signalling, pigeons, wireless,
the fullerphone, runners, and the rocket for S.O.S. calls, were
worked out in detail. For the fullerphone there were two lines of
buried cables, with cable-heads in our front line trenches. Forward
stations were selected in the enemy's line at Spanbroekmolen and
Peckham, to which armoured lines were to be laid across "No Man's
Land," from the cable-heads, by the brigade forward parties. As soon
as the final objective was reached, these forward stations were
to move to the crest of the ridge. Working independently of this
machinery, which was in the hands of the Signal Service, were the
brigade and battalion intelligence sections, the former of which were
to establish observation posts at Spanbroekmolen and Peckham, while
the latter moved up behind their battalions, selected observation
posts to follow their movements and cover their final position, and
sent out scouts to obtain touch with flanking battalions and bring
information as to their progress. For visual signalling a divisional
signal station was established on Kemmel Hill, which had a clear
line to the brigade forward stations, so that messages could be sent
either forward or back by the Lucas lamp.
The Second Army was to attack the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, and the
ground east of it as far as the Oosttaverne line.[31] The IX. Corps
was allotted from the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road to the Diependaal
Beek, a distance of six thousand four hundred yards along the front
line of the enemy's salient. It was to attack with three divisions
in line: from right to left the 36th (Ulster) Division, the 16th
(Irish) Division, and the 19th (Western) Division. These troops
were to advance to the Black Line, east of the Messines-Wytschaete
Road, after which the 11th Division, in Corps Reserve, was to pass
through to the final objective. A glance at the map will show how
the frontage of attack narrowed with every thousand yards of the
advance. On the right of the 36th Division was the 25th, in the II.
Anzac Corps.
The attack of the 36th Division, of which the final objective was
from Lumm Farm to a cutting on the Wytschaete-Oosttaverne Road east
of Staenyzer Cabaret, was to be made by two Brigades, the 107th on
the right and the 109th on the left, each having one battalion from
the 108th Brigade attached. Each Brigade was to attack with two
battalions in front, which advanced as far as the Blue Line, the
ground in rear of that objective being "mopped up" by the attached
battalion of the 108th Brigade. The remaining two battalions of each
Brigade were to pass through on the Blue Line for the advance to the
Black, providing their own "mopping-up" parties. The 107th Brigade
was to use the 8th Rifles on the right and the 9th on the left for
the attack on the Blue Line, with the 15th and 10th Rifles to pass
through to the Black Line. The 12th Rifles, from the 108th Brigade,
carried out the work of "mopping up" and consolidation in rear. The
109th Brigade was to use the 14th Rifles on the right and the 11th
Inniskillings on the left to take the Blue Line, and the 10th and 9th
Inniskillings to take the Black Line. The 11th Rifles were attached
for consolidation and "mopping up." The boundary line between the
36th and 16th Divisions ran, it will be noticed, along the main
street of Wytschaete, half the village being in the objective of each
Division.
The date of the attack was designated "Z" day, the five days of
preliminary bombardment being designated "U," "V," "W," "X," and
"Y." There had been considerable bombardment of the ridge before
"U" day, but from this day onwards it became more intense. Its
object was not the total destruction of the hostile trench system,
but the disorganization of the defence by the smashing of concrete
emplacements and shelters. It took nothing short of an 8-inch
howitzer to destroy the German concrete, while 12-inch and 15-inch
howitzers fired on Wytschaete. The cutting of wire was performed by
the 18-pounders, assisted in the case of the front line by trench
mortars. Further to disorganize the enemy, a programme of barraging
night and day his communications, and shelling his billets, was
carried out, while bursts of fire with lethal and lachrymatory gas
shell of various sorts took place throughout the period. Special
half-hour hurricane bombardments of Messines and Wytschaete, during
which every gun available, from largest to smallest, was in action,
were carried out. The barrage for the advance consisted of, firstly,
a creeping barrage of 18-pounder shrapnel, moving in advance of the
infantry, with average lifts of a hundred yards, at the rate of a
hundred yards in three minutes; and, secondly, a standing barrage
of 18-pounders, 4.5 inch howitzers, and medium and heavy howitzers,
established in succession on trenches and strong points. For the
creeping barrage there was one gun to twenty yards, firing at maximum
rate. One gun a section fired smoke shell, to screen the infantry.
The barrage was highly complicated, as, owing to the configuration of
the German salient and the varying rate of the advance, it lifted off
none of the objectives at the same moment all along the line.
Meticulous care was taken by Army Headquarters to ensure that the
preparation was as complete as human forethought could make it. Each
morning air photographs, showing the effect of the previous day's
bombardment, were circulated to Divisions in the line. Each Division
was required to state, day by day, what further special bombardment
it desired. From its observation post on Kemmel Hill the Staff of the
36th Division could see practically all the slope of the Messines
Ridge, from just above the dip of the Steenebeek valley to the crest.
Day by day it studied the ground during the bombardment. A trench or
concrete work which did not appear to have been sufficiently shelled
was noted, and request made that it should receive further attention
next day. Such requests were invariably met. Trenches and dug-outs
were shelled again and again, till Divisional Headquarters declared
itself satisfied. Many of the concrete structures were revealed
only when the bombardment of the trenches had blown away the earth
about them. They were then subjected to the fire of heavy howitzers
till destroyed. Finally, each Division was asked to state if it were
satisfied with the preparation. In the case of the 36th Division at
least, the answer was an enthusiastic affirmative.
The sympathy and understanding which existed between the Staff of the
Second Army and the man in the fighting line created a moral tone of
incalculable value to the Army's efficiency as a striking force.
The work of the preliminary bombardment threw a great strain upon the
personnel of the artillery, though such rest as possible was given
by carefully organized reliefs. The infantry was greatly impressed
with the results it could witness. In particular the liaison between
infantry and heavy gunners, hardly thought of before this action, was
of the closest, the artillery officers bringing battalion commanders
aeroplane photographs to show the results of the bombardment on their
front.
Stokes mortars and machine-guns were assigned important _rôles_ in
the early part of the attack. The 3-inch mortars belonging to the
Division, less four a brigade, to be taken forward in the attack,
were to open a hurricane bombardment for three and a half minutes at
"Zero." A battery of 4-inch Stokes mortars, specially attached, was
to preface the assault with a bombardment of the Spanbroek salient,
with two lifts, using the highly demoralizing incendiary shell known
as "thermit." Six guns of the Machine-Gun Companies of the attacking
Brigades were to go forward with them; the rest of the guns of these
companies, with those of the 108th, the 32nd, two sections of the
33rd, and six guns of the 19th Motor Machine-Gun Battery,[32] a total
of sixty-six guns, were to be employed to provide a creeping barrage
beyond that of the artillery, a standing barrage on the main defences
of the ridge, and fire on strong points, woods, and ravines. One
section of Tanks[33] was allotted. They were not to catch up the
infantry till the Blue Line was reached, and in the advance to the
Black Line were to concentrate mainly upon Wytschaete.
All the successive lines, with the exception of the Green, were to
be consolidated, special strong points being established at such
positions as L'Enfer Farm, Skip Point, and Jump Point, in the Blue
Line; and Lumm Farm, Pick House, and Torreken Farm in the Black.
The infantry was to start the work of consolidation; then, when the
Black Line had been taken, the 121st and 150th Field Companies were
to move up to work upon the principal strong points. After dusk on
the evening of "Z" day, the 122nd Field Company was to move up and
construct a wire entanglement along the whole front of the Black
Line. Small opportunity, it will be seen, was left for successful
counter-attack if the assault reached its objectives.
Two contact aeroplanes were to be in the air at once throughout the
battle, calling at fixed hours, by the sounding of a Klaxon horn and
the firing of a Vérey light, for the signals by which the infantry
was to mark its progress. The latter consisted of green flares, lit
in bunches of three, and the turning of Watson fans, marked white on
one side and black on the other.
A whole series of mines, the greatest ever used in war, was to be
fired at "Zero." Of these there were three on the 36th Division's
front: one at Kruisstraat Cabaret, one at Spanbroekmolen, and one
at Peckham. The second had been doubtful up to the last minute. The
passage to the charge had been cut some time before by a German
defensive "camouflet," and it had seemed as though the toil of a
year and of thousands of men had been wasted. The tunnellers of the
171st Company had laboured unceasingly to cut a new gallery. On the
eve of the action a scribbled note from the commanding officer to
Colonel Place, G.S.O.1. of the Division, announced that the work
was accomplished and that it was "almost certain" the mine would go
up. In case there might be failure with this or any other charge,
the assaulting infantry was instructed not to wait more than fifteen
seconds after the opening of the barrage before leaving its trenches.
For the evacuation of the wounded there was an Advanced Dressing
Station at Lindenhoek, close to the main road, skilfully prepared by
the 109th Field Ambulance. Wounded could be carried into the main
shelter by the entrance on the north side, from the trench tramway,
given what attention was necessary, and conveyed out by the exit on
the west side, where the motor ambulances of the Division arrived
by a specially constructed semi-circular road. This relieved the
main road at that point, and enabled the cars to sweep round without
turning. The cars bore the wounded to the Main Dressing Station
just east of Dranoutre, manned by the 108th Field Ambulance, while
"walking wounded" were sent by a specially-marked track to the Main
Dressing Station prepared for them and manned by the 110th Field
Ambulance a mile east of the village. From these Dressing Stations
the Motor Ambulance Park had the task of carrying the wounded to the
two Casualty Clearing Stations in Bailleul. Distances were shorter
and roads better than on the Somme; and, had the casualties been as
many as on that occasion, they would have been removed in less than
half the time and with far less discomfort to the wounded. As it most
happily chanced, the casualties were less than a fourth of those at
Thiepval.
So much for the preparations. Any of importance which have not been
mentioned will appear in the account of the actual battle.
The 108th Brigade held the line during the period of preliminary
bombardment, employing for the purpose the two battalions which it
was to retain during the battle as divisional reserve. It having
been decided to carry out some practice barrages in broad daylight,
to note the effect of the smoke shell, and see whether any guns were
shooting short, these seemed to offer good opportunity for big raids.
The first of these raids took place at 3 p.m. on June the 3rd. A
party of three officers and seventy other ranks of the 13th Rifles
entered the enemy's trenches at Peckham behind the barrage, and after
a short bombing fight captured nineteen prisoners of the 2nd German
Division. On the following afternoon at 2 p.m., a larger party of the
9th Irish Fusiliers followed the barrage into the Spanbroek salient,
returning with one officer and thirty men as prisoners--a remarkable
haul for a raid. Their casualties were two killed and six wounded.
It was a fine, sunny day, and, despite the haze of dust caused by
the shelling, the whole operation could be seen in detail from the
observation posts on Kemmel Hill. The barrage, though the rate of
fire was but a third of what it was to be on the great day, was very
impressive. It appeared a wall of curling smoke creeping slowly up
the ridge. The figures of the infantrymen following it could be seen
distinctly; there was the flash of bombs, and there were Germans
coming from their dug-outs holding up their arms. As the party
returned one man was seen to break away from it, walk back fifty
yards in most leisurely fashion, summon forth two Germans whom he had
evidently observed hiding in a hole, and bring them in at the point
of the bayonet.
The day of battle was at hand. Nothing could have been more
favourable than the elements to the British cause. The weather
was clear for observation, dry, and not unduly cold at night.[34]
The infantry which was to make the attack was bivouacked in tents
and shelters, the 107th Brigade south of Locre, the 109th S.W.
of Dranoutre, thus avoiding the shelling, particularly with gas,
wherewith the Germans visited all our hutted camps. After dusk on
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