With the Flag to Pretoria: A History of the Boer War of 1899-1900. Volume 1

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Title: With the Flag to Pretoria: A History of the Boer War of 1899-1900. Volume 1

Author: Herbert Wrigley Wilson

Release date: March 19, 2015 [eBook #48534]
Most recently updated: October 24, 2024

Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WITH THE FLAG TO PRETORIA: A HISTORY OF THE BOER WAR OF 1899-1900. VOLUME 1 ***

_WITH THE FLAG TO PRETORIA._

[Illustration:

_S. Begg._]

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN VISITING HER WOUNDED SOLDIERS.

The Queen has throughout the war shown the greatest solicitude for the
wounded. On March 22, 1900, Her Majesty paid a visit to the Herbert
Hospital at Woolwich, and personally handed gifts of flowers to over
a hundred wounded men, in each case accompanying the gift with a few
words of sympathy, which often had reference to the services of the
particular man whom she addressed. The patients included survivors from
Colenso, Spion Kop, &c. The Irish soldiers, whose gallantry had been
specially noteworthy, were favoured with special notice. The Queen was
accompanied by the Princess Christian and the Princess Victoria of
Schleswig-Holstein.]

WITH THE FLAG

TO PRETORIA

_A History of the Boer War of 1899-1900_

BY H. W. WILSON

_Author of "Ironclads in Action," &c. &c._

ILLUSTRATED MAINLY FROM PHOTOGRAPHS AND AUTHENTIC SKETCHES
TAKEN IN SOUTH AFRICA

VOL. I.

LONDON

PUBLISHED BY HARMSWORTH BROTHERS, LIMITED

1900

[Illustration]

PREFACE.

The chief point of interest in the South African war, apart from
its political aspect, will always be that it was the first great
struggle fought out under the new conditions which smokeless powder
has introduced. No invention has made a greater change in the art
of war than this; the revolution is so profound that it can only be
compared with that brought about by the general adoption of firearms
four hundred years or more ago. So late as the Spanish-American war
of 1898 a large part of the United States army was equipped with the
Springfield rifle, firing smoke-producing powder, so that in that
war, in spite of the fact that the Spanish Army was supplied with the
Mauser, the full consequences of the revolution could not be observed
and ascertained. The British Army, when it took the field in October,
1899, was face to face with factors the precise effect of which could
only be conjectured. Magazine, or, to give them their older name,
"repeating," rifles had been employed as far back as the American Civil
War of 1861-5, though they were in every way vastly inferior to our
modern Mausers and Lee-Metfords. But smokeless powder was a distinctly
novel element.

It is easy to ascribe our defeats in the early part of the war, as some
have ascribed them, to the "stupidity" of the British officers and
generals. At bottom, however, it would seem that much of this unsuccess
was due to the new conditions of war, coupled with the Boer's inherited
capacity for taking cover and his absolute knowledge of the country.
Again and again our men came suddenly and almost without notice under
a deluge of bullets from perfectly invisible rifles. When once engaged
in this manner it was difficult for them to go forward and dangerous
to retreat. There was no means of guessing the strength of the foe.
No dense clouds of smoke revealed at once his location and the exact
volume of his fire. It was uncertain whether we had to deal with 500
men using magazine fire, or with 5,000 firing in a leisurely manner.
There may have been a neglect of reconnaissance, yet against troops
thus concealed personal reconnaissance repeatedly failed. On their side
the Boers had no such difficulty to face in fighting us. All through
our earlier battles we disdained the use of cover and often advanced to
the attack in comparatively close formations--a splendid target.

The same invisibility which marked the Boer riflemen marked also their
artillery, which was not massed, but scattered gun by gun, wide apart
and artfully concealed. As one result of this disposition, we seldom
succeeded in silencing the Boer weapons; but, on the other hand, except
at Spion Kop, they inflicted trivial loss upon us. The enemy's most
effective gun was the "Pom-Pom," which, though it caused infinitesimal
loss of life, was especially dreaded by our soldiers for the great
rapidity of its discharge. The frequent flashes from its muzzle,
however, rendered it comparatively easy to locate and to put out of
action.

It has been often debated whether as science progresses war grows
more bloody. A learned Russian, M. Bloch, had argued, before this
struggle began, that the deadliness of modern weapons rendered mutual
annihilation of the two combatants probable. It need scarcely be said
that this forecast has been disproved by events. There has been nothing
in the present war in the least comparable with the hideous butchery of
Borodino, when, in 1812, with the old flint-lock smooth-bore musket and
smooth-bore cannon, over 30,000 French were killed or wounded out of
125,000, and over 40,000 Russians out of 110,000.

Excluding prisoners, in no case did the British losses in battle reach
one tenth of the force engaged, and in the Spion Kop fighting, where
the heaviest casualties were incurred, they were spread over a week.
Another striking feature is the low proportion of killed. Usually in
the past the killed have numbered one-third to one fourth of the total
wounded. In this war they have generally been from one fifth to one
tenth, and sometimes an even lower fraction, as a result of the use
of the small-bore bullet. Not only so, but an enormous number of the
wounded have recovered. Thus, taking the Casualty Return of July 11,
we find that of over 12,000 wounded only 695 have died. In Napoleon's
day the proportion would have been more like 5,000, and in the era of
the Franco-Prussian war 3,000. Clearly, then, the risk to life in war
is not increasing. Disease is as deadly as ever, but it may safely be
said that much of our loss would have been preventable with a better
hospital organisation.

We have been asked by several correspondents to set forth in a short
table the losses in the battles recorded in the present volume, and we
take the opportunity of doing so, adding a rough estimate of the Boer
force opposed. The Boer losses, unhappily, cannot be ascertained with
the slightest accuracy, and even the estimates of their armies are
largely conjectural. It should be noted that only combatants--cavalry,
artillery, and infantry--are included in our figures, and that
deductions are made for details absent at the base, for the sick, and
for men not present for duty. The numbers in one or two instances
differ slightly from those of the text of the work, the latest official
returns necessarily differing in some cases from the figures obtained
on the battlefield.

-------------+------+----------+-----------+----------+-------+------+------
| | | |Prisoners | | |
| | | | and | |Brit- |
| | Killed. | Wounded. | Missing. | | ish | Boer
| +----------+-----------+----------| Total |Force |Force
| |Offi-| |Offi-| |Offi-| |Casual-| En- | En-
Battle of |Date. |cers.|Men.|cers.| Men.|cers.|Men.| ties. |gaged.|gaged.
-------------+------+-----+----+-----+-----+-----+----+-------+------+------
Dundee |Oct. | 8 | 40 | 11 | 84 | 25 | 306| 474 | 3,400| 7,000
|20. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Elandslaagte |Oct. | 5 | 50 | 30 | 169 | 0 | 4| 258 | 3,500| 2,000
|21. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Rietfontein |Oct. | 1 | 11 | 6 | 98 | 0 | 2| 118 | 5,100|7,000?
|24. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Farquhar's |Oct. | 6 | 57 | 9 | 244 | 43 | 925| 1,284 |10,000|20,000
Farm and |30. | | | | | | | | |
Nicholson's | | | | | | | | | |
Nek | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Belmont |Nov. | 3 | 50 | 25 | 220 | 0 | 0| 298 | 8,000|3,000?
|23. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Willow Grange|Nov. | 0 | 11 | 1 | 66 | 1 | 8| 87 | 3,500| 2,000
|23. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Enslin |Nov. | 3 | 13 | 6 | 163 | 0 | 9| 194 | 7,500| 2,500
|25. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Modder River |Nov. | 4 | 66 | 20 | 393 | 0 | 2| 485 | 9,000| 8,000
|28. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Stormberg |Dec. | 0 | 32 | 7 | 51 | 13 | 619| 722 | 2,500|1,000?
|10. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Magersfontein|Dec. | 23 |148 | 45 | 646 | 0 | 108| 970 |12,500|10,000
|11. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Colenso |Dec. | 7 |128 | 43 | 719 | 21 | 207| 1,125 |15,000|10,000
|15. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Week of |Jan. | | | | | | | | |
Battles and |17-24.| 27 |245 | 53 |1,050| 7 | 351| 1,733 |17,500|12,000
Spion Kop | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
Vaal Krantz |Feb. | 2 | 23 | 18 | 326| 0 | 5| 374 |15,000|10,000
|5-7. | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
-------------+------+-----+----+-----+-----+-----+----+-------+------+------

Some remarks appear to be called for as to the lessons to be derived
from the war, and the directions in which some modification of our
present military system and methods may seem desirable. These remarks
will fitly find a place at the conclusion of our work. In the meantime
let us not forget that if errors of judgment have been committed, they
have been committed by men whose zeal and patriotism has never been
doubted. We cannot refrain, however, from alluding here to the greatest
of all the lessens which this war has taught, not us alone, but all the
world--the solidarity of the Empire. And for that great demonstration
what sacrifice was not worth making!

ERRATA.

p. 4, note beneath top illustration, _for_ "February 26"
_read_ "February 27."

p. 6, note beneath illustration at foot of page, _for_
"74th regiment" _read_ "94th regiment."

p. 16, note beneath second illustration, _for_ "£250,000"
_read_ "£25,000."

p. 35, line 4 from bottom, _for_ "Dublin Fusiliers" _read_
"Royal Irish Fusiliers."

p. 108, note beneath portrait of Col. Long, _for_
"mortally wounded" _read_ "severely wounded."

p. 129, line 15, _for_ "1st Worcesters" _read_ "2nd
Berkshires."

p. 151, line 15, _for_ "Lieutenant Taylor of the Navy"
_read_ "Lieutenant Taylor of the 2nd Yorkshire Light
Infantry."

p. 204, first paragraph: The identity of the prisoner here
referred to has not been established, but the Editor
has received statements which have satisfied him that
ex-Sergeant-Major Greener, of the Royal Engineers,
was never with the Boer army, and that the strong
expression used with regard to him was misapplied.

p. 248, line 39, _for_ "ankle-deep" _read_ "axle-deep."

p. 275, lines 3 and 4, _delete the words_, "Grey though he
was, this was his first action." (Major Childe, whose
age was 46, had served in the Egyptian campaign of
1882.)

p. 277, note beneath portrait, _for_ "Sir Reginald Clare
Hart, K.C.B., &c." _read_ "Major-General A. FitzRoy
Hart, C.B., commanding the 5th Brigade of the 10th
Division" _and cancel remainder of note_.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

PAGES

CHAPTER I.--THE EXPLOSION. Oct. 11, 1899. AND EVENTS PREVIOUS THERETO.

The Boer Ultimatum--Intrigues against British
supremacy--Great Britain's interest in the Dutch
Republics--Common interests of the white peoples--Early
history of Cape Colony--Unpopularity of the Dutch
East India Company--British capture Capetown--"The
Great Trek"--England recognises the Republics--Their
attitude towards us--Sir Bartle Frere--Majuba--The
Outlanders--The Jameson raid--Kruger--His character--Sir
Alfred Milner--The Bloemfontein conference--Transvaal
refuses England's demands--War 3-16

CHAPTER II.--THE OVERRUNNING OF NORTHERN NATAL. Oct. 11-Oct. 27, 1899.

Hurried Preparations for War--The Reserves
Mobilised--Enthusiasm of the British Public--Strength
of the Forces in Natal and Cape Colony--Strength of
the Enemy--The Attack Delayed--Disposition of the
Boer Forces--Positions of the British at Dundee and
Ladysmith--Battle of Dundee--Symons wounded--Storming
of Talana Hill--The Treacherous White Flag--Yule's
March--Battle of Elandslaagte--British and Boer
Losses--"Remember Majuba!"--Action at Rietfontein--The
Boer Tactics--White decides to hold Ladysmith 17-34

CHAPTER III.--THE INVESTMENT OF LADYSMITH, MAFEKING, AND KIMBERLEY.
Oct. 27-Nov. 1899.

The Boers seize the heights dominating Ladysmith--The
Battle of Farquhar's Farm--White withdraws to
save the town--The guns brought off--Dramatic
advent of the Bluejackets--Loss of Carleton's
column--Neglect of precautions at Ladysmith--The
town beleaguered--Condition of affairs on the
Western Frontier--Doubtful attitude of the Schreiner
Ministry--First act of war--Attempts to capture
Mafeking--The Boers seize Vryburg--Kimberley
isolated--Bombardment commenced--Stormberg district
abandoned by the British--Attitude of the Cape Dutch 35-56

CHAPTER IV.--THE DISPATCH OF THE ARMY CORPS. Oct. 25-Dec. 9, 1899.

Dilatoriness of the Government--Full notice to the
enemy--Mobilisation begins--Small proportion of
cavalry--Loyal action of the Colonies--The greatest
Expeditionary Force ever sent over seas--Embarkation
of the troops--Food supplies--The voyage out--The plan
of campaign--Character of the country--New tactics
required--Despatch of the Fifth and Sixth Divisions 57-69

CHAPTER V.--THE BEGINNING OF THE ADVANCE IN NATAL AND CAPE COLONY.
Oct. 30-Dec. 14, 1899.

Natal threatened--Armoured trains--Ladysmith
bombarded--Assault on the town--The Boers
at Chieveley--Armoured train wrecked near
Chieveley--Endeavours to clear the obstruction--Capture
of Mr. Winston Churchill--The Estcourt garrison in
danger--Shelling of Mooi River Camp--Boer advance
checked at Nottingham Road--The Willow Grange
fight--Arrival of Lord Dundonald and General
Buller--Comparison of the opposing armies--The forward
movement begins--Boer position at Colenso--Buller
determines to attack 70-89

CHAPTER VI.--THE FIRST BATTLE OF COLENSO. Dec. 15, 1899.

The battle begins--Bombardment of Fort Wylie--Artillery
pushed forward--The Boers open fire--The guns
abandoned--General Hart's position--The Dublin
Fusiliers attempt to ford the Tugela--Their retirement
ordered--Failure to carry Hlangwane--Advance of
Hildyard's Brigade--General withdrawal ordered--Death
of Lieutenant Roberts--Guns and men captured by
the Boers--Retirement effected in good order--Our
losses--Scarcity of water--Bravery of the Army Medical
Corps--Impressions of an eye-witness--Armistice--A day
of blunders 90-109

CHAPTER VII.--THE BATTLE OF STORMBERG. Nov. 2-Dec. 10, 1899.

Mistakes of the Boer Generals--British withdraw from
Naauwpoort and Stormberg--General Gatacre takes
command--Advance of the Boers--Omnibus Horses for the
Artillery--Conditions of successful attack--Gatacre
moves upon Stormberg--The forces detrain at Molteno--The
wrong road taken--The column surprised--The
fight--Fatigue of the British troops--A gun
abandoned--Order to retreat given--The dead and wounded
left--Narrow escape of the armoured train--The return to
Molteno--British losses--Disastrous results--The Boers
seize Colesberg--British re-occupy Naauwpoort--Arrival
of General French 110-129

CHAPTER VIII.--LORD METHUEN'S ADVANCE. Nov. 10-23, 1899.

Lord Methuen takes charge of the Western
Campaign--Reconnaissance towards Belmont--Heavy loss
of officers--Lord Methuen reinforced--Advance to
Fincham's Farm--British victory at Belmont--Chaplain
Hill's bravery--Contraventions of usages of war--Boers
retreat--Frontal attack criticized--Lord Methuen
congratulates the troops 130-144

CHAPTER IX.--LORD METHUEN'S ADVANCE--_continued_. Nov. 23-Dec.
2, 1899.

March to Swinks Pan--Advance of Ninth Brigade--Battle of
Enslin--Bombardment of the Boer position--Reinforcements
sent for--The Bluejackets and Marines take the
kopje--British losses--The Queen congratulates
the Naval Brigade--Boer losses--Lack of water at
Enslin--Lord Methuen's address to the troops--March
to Klokfontein--Lord Methuen's available forces--The
Boers in force at the Modder River--Disposition of
troops--Scene of the battle--Boer preparations--Battle
of the Modder--The torture of thirst--Sleep during
battle--Arrival of an additional Field Battery--Attempts
to cross the river--Retreat of the Boers--Comparison
of British and Boer losses--British artillery
fire--Characteristics of the fighting--The Boers
fire on the Red Cross--Conduct of the Free Staters
impugned--Kruger's remonstrances 145-171

CHAPTER X.--THE BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN. Nov. 29-Dec. 12, 1899.

New bridge over the Modder--Lord Methuen
reinforced--British communications
threatened--Position of Magersfontein--Boer
defences--Boer methods--Difficulty of relieving
Kimberley--Skirmishing--Lord Methuen's plans--Choice of
Sunday--Disposition of troops--Attack on Magersfontein
kopjes--General Wauchope's premonitions--Night
march--Boers open fire--Demoralisation of Highland
regiments--Accounts of the fighting--General Wauchope's
death--Collapse of Highland Brigade--Artillery
support--Reinforcements--Heroism on the field--Protest
against Lord Methuen's orders--Artillery cover
Highlanders' retreat--Incidents of the battle--British
retirement to Modder River--British losses--Cronje's
account--Criticism of Lord Methuen's tactics--Burial of
General Wauchope 172-204

CHAPTER XI.--THE NATION UNDER DEFEAT. Dec. 12, 1899-Jan. 1900.

Critical position of Great Britain--Her
prestige in danger--Crass ignorance of military
affairs--German system--Responsibility of Statesmen
and Generals--Government unprepared--Necessity of
reorganisation--Former national crises--Measures taken
for defense--Change of Generals--Lord Roberts' military
career--Lord Kitchener in the Sudan--Embarkation for
South Africa--General Hector Macdonald--Offers of the
Colonies--Australian and Canadian contingents--Mr.
Seddon's loyal speech--Volunteers from Asiatic
dependencies--London's contribution--Imperial
Yeomanry--Gloomy outlook 205-234

CHAPTER XII.--THE FLANK MOVEMENT IN NATAL. Dec. 15, 1899-Jan.
16, 1900.

Further preparations for the relief of Ladysmith--Burial
of Lieutenant Roberts--Destruction of Colenso
road-bridge--Picket surprised by Boers--Fifth Division
reaches Natal--Want of howitzers--Arrival of a balloon
and traction engines--Christmas in camp--Disposition
of relief force--Boer positions--Mr. Winston Churchill
escapes--Boer attack on Cæsar's Camp--Messages from
Ladysmith--Relief force attacks Colenso--Advances
on Springfield and Hussar Hill--Fail to draw the
Boers--Further message from Ladysmith--Storm ends
a desultory movement--The flag still flying in
Ladysmith--Heroes in rags--Mud everywhere--Composition
of the relief force--The army moves--Hampered by
baggage--Difficulties of the march--Dundonald
seizes Zwart Kop--The pont intact--The Boers
entrenching--General Buller's plan of attack--The
crossing of Potgieter's Drift 235-262

CHAPTER XIII.--SPION KOP. Jan. 16-27, 1900.

Warren's Divisions cross the Tugela--The enemy
entrenching--The artillery and transport cross--A
long delay--Spion Kop bombarded--Lyttelton's feigned
attack--The cavalry seize Acton Homes--Desultory
movements before Spion Kop--Change of plan--Advance
on the left ordered--Capture of Three-tree Hill and
Bastion Hill--Death of Major Childe--Assault ordered and
countermanded--Lyttelton's advance--Warren telegraphs
for howitzers--Rumoured relief of Ladysmith--Another
day of little progress--Pathetic humour--Assault
ordered and postponed--Another council of war--Warren
reinforced--The storming force--Ascent of Spion Kop--A
Boer picket surprised--The storming force halts
too soon--Tardy reinforcements--Botha determines
to recapture the hill--Positions of the opposing
forces--The Boers bombard the British position--Woodgate
wounded--Thorneycroft put in command--A frightful
struggle--Lack of artillery support--Boer attempts
to rush the position--The King's Royal Rifles
storm a ridge--Desperate straits--Confusion of
commands--Thorneycroft determines to withdraw--Scene on
the hill after the battle--Losses in the action--The
retreat--Causes of the defeat 263-307

CHAPTER XIV.--VAAL KRANTZ. Jan. 30-Feb. 7, 1900.

Substantial reinforcements--Guns taken to summit of
Zwart Kop--Plan of attack on Vaal Krantz--Lie of the
land--Another crossing of the Tugela--Demonstration
towards Brakfontein--Bombardment of Vaal
Krantz--Infantry storm the height--Difficulty of
holding the position--Disappearing guns--Renewed
attacks--Council of war--Evacuation of the
ridge--Losses--Disappointment in Britain 308-319

CHAPTER XV.--COLESBERG AND THE WEST. Dec. 1899-Feb. 10, 1900.

General French's position--Engagements near Arundel and
Rensburg--The Boers fall back on Colesberg--British camp
moved to Rensburg--Fighting round Coles Kop--French's
mobility--Loss of a commissariat train--Both sides
reinforced--General Schœman repulsed--Death of
Major Harvey--Boers driven back--Disaster to the
Suffolks--Occupation of Slingersfontein--Guns and
supplies hauled up Coles Kop--Small actions near
Colesberg--Boer attack near Slingersfontein--Guarding
the railway junctions--Gradual withdrawal of
British forces--A ride for life--Accuracy of
Australian shooting--Coles Kop and Slingersfontein
evacuated--British retire to Arundel--Seizure of
German steamers--Lord Roberts conciliates the
Colonials--Reorganisation of transport--Roberts and
Kitchener leave Capetown--Lord Methuen keeps the enemy
busy--Demonstrations towards Koodoesberg Drift--Roberts
in camp--Preparations for the great blow--Composition of
the Grand Army 320-345

CHAPTER XVI.--THE GRAND ARMY RELIEVES KIMBERLEY. Feb. 10-16, 1900.

Lord Roberts addresses the officers--Cavalry
leaders--Advance to Ramdam--French at Waterval
Drift--De Kiel's Drift secured--Sunset on the
veldt--Cronje's optimism--The cavalry push forward--Heat
and thirst--Veldt on fire--Rondeval and Klip Drifts
seized--Advance of the infantry--Halt at the
Modder--Cavalry opposed--Lancers clear a nek--In touch
with Kimberley--Capture of Alexandersfontein--Entry into
Kimberley--Bivouac in a Boer camp--C.I.V.s' baptism
of fire--Seizure of Jacobsdal--Convoy attacked by De
Wet--Waggons abandoned--Cronje's retreat--The Boers
carry off their big gun--Orders to head Cronje 346-364

[Illustration: SOUTH AFRICA]

[Illustration: WITH THE FLAG TO PRETORIA.

"He is out on active service,
Wiping something off a slate."--KIPLING.]

[Illustration:

_From a photograph by Bassano._

FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR, K. P., V. C., &c.

Born at Cawnpore, India, 1832; son of General Sir Abraham Roberts,
G.C.B.; educated at Eton, Sandhurst, and Addiscombe; Second Lieutenant
(Bengal Artillery), 1851; Lieutenant, 1857; Captain, 1860; Brev. Major,
1860; Brev. Lieut.-Colonel, 1868; Brev. Colonel, 1875; Major-General,
1878; Lieut.-General, 1883; General, 1890; raised to the peerage, 1892;
Field-Marshal, 1895. D.A.Q.M.G. throughout the Indian Mutiny; served in
Abyssinia, 1867-8; commanded the Kuram Field Force, 1879, Kabul Field
Force, 1879-80, Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, 1880; in Afghanistan, 1880;
in Burma, 1886. Commander-in-Chief (Madras), 1881; Commander-in-Chief
in India, 1885-93; Commander of the Forces in Ireland, 1895, and in
South Africa, December, 1899.]

[Illustration: PRETORIA.]

WITH THE FLAG
TO PRETORIA

CHAPTER I.

THE EXPLOSION.

The Boer Ultimatum--Intrigues against British
supremacy--Great Britain's interest in the Dutch
Republics--Common interests of the white peoples--Early
history of Cape Colony--Unpopularity of the Dutch
East India Company--British capture Capetown--"The
Great Trek"--England recognizes the Republics--Their
attitude towards us--Sir Bartle Frere--Majuba--The
Outlanders--The Jameson raid--Kruger--His
character--Sir Alfred Milner--The Bloemfontein
conference--Transvaal refuses England's demands--War.

On October 11, 1899, began what was to prove the greatest struggle in
which England has engaged since the peace that followed Waterloo. For
at 5 p.m. on that day the forty-eight hours allowed by the Transvaal
Government for a favourable answer to its ultimatum expired, and the
forces of the two Boer Republics put themselves in motion to carry out
their favourite threat of sweeping the English from South Africa into
the sea.

[Sidenote: The Boer Ultimatum.]

Thus came the explosion--the culminating catastrophe of a decade of
race-hatred in South Africa, the inevitable and certain result of
British moral cowardice and surrender in the past. Twenty years back it
had been foreseen and foretold by the prophets; for the last five years
before the hour of conflict the British nation had felt instinctively
that it was drawing steadily nearer; had watched with apprehension the
enormous armaments of the Transvaal, and heard with rage and shame the
story of the persistent oppression by the Boers of thousands of loyal
British citizens.

[Illustration: "A GENTLEMAN IN KHAKI."

Khaki, originally used in India only, but now universal in foreign
campaigns, is a canvas-like fabric, cool in summer and warm in winter.
It is precisely the colour of the dusty, yellow-brown veldt, and its
name is derived from the Persian word for dust.]

[Sidenote: [1652-1709.]

All men had dreaded it; many had striven to avert it; many more had
prayed that it might not come in their day. But it had come at last and
found Great Britain utterly unprepared, still clinging against hope
to the hope of peace, confused and distracted by false predictions
that the Boers would never fight, and by the ignorant assurance of
partisans who declared that Britain must never resort to force, but
must be contented with talk and threats alone, however grave her
grievances.

[Sidenote: Intrigues against British Supremacy.]

Napoleon once said that France and England would never remain at peace;
their peace would be only suppressed war. And it might as truly be said
of the Transvaal that, since the great betrayal of British interests
which followed Majuba and which gave self-government back to the Dutch
Republic, it had never been at peace with Britain, but had for eighteen
years maintained barely concealed hostilities against all things
British. It had armed, plotted, lied, conspired, intrigued, oppressed,
prevaricated for the one great end of domination in South Africa at
whatever cost. Like the upas tree of the fable, it had corrupted the
soil of South Africa with its poison; it had blasted loyalty to Great
Britain in the surrounding territories; it had become a centre, and
a rallying point for all that was most bitterly opposed to British
supremacy and to the ideals which have made our race so great. The one
principle upon which its power was founded was the inequality of the
white races--the servitude of the Englishman to the Dutch.

[Illustration: MAJUBA HILL.

The scene of the disastrous defeat which we suffered at the hands of
the Boers on February 27, 1881. At that time there was no railway in
this portion of Natal, and the country was even more sparsely populated
than at present.]

The great principle upon which the British Empire has been built up is
that all men are equal before the law, and that all civilised races
stand upon precisely the same footing. As we profoundly believe, not
that we English are the favoured people of God, but that so long as we
are faithful to the noblest call of duty and to the highest instincts
which are in us as a race, we are helping the cause of progress,
which is the cause of God, we know that, whatever checks, whatever
vicissitudes, whatever disappointments may befall, we march to victory.
Our cause is the cause of liberty and of the right.

[Illustration: FIGURE-HEAD ROCK, MAJUBA.]

If we look at the map of South Africa as it stood in the days before
the war, we shall observe that in the centre of British territories,
cut off from all access to the sea, lay two states, one independent of
England--the Orange Free State; the other, the Transvaal, in a position
of quasi-independence. For a few miles, it is true, the Transvaal
boundary on the east is conterminous with Portuguese possessions;
indeed, it approaches very close to the magnificent harbour of Delagoa
Bay.

[Illustration: KAFFIR WOMEN CARRYING BEER.

The natives make a fermented drink from mealies (Indian corn) which
is known as Kaffir beer. It is carried from one kraal to another by
strings of women walking in Indian file and carrying on their heads
great yellow gourds containing their favourite drink.]

[Sidenote: 1652-1709.] _Conflict of Races in South Africa._]

[Sidenote: Great Britain's Interest in the Dutch Republics.]

But with this exception the two Boer States are closely shut in by
British colonies. Hence of necessity the British Empire must always
have been profoundly interested in the internal condition of these two
Dutch republics. Had they been peaceful and orderly States, as was the
Orange Free State up to that evil day when it became demoralised by the
gold lavished from the Transvaal secret service funds, they might have
existed in perfect amity. Had they been content to accept things as
they were, there could have been no quarrel.

In the British colonies of Natal and Cape Colony, the one to the
south-east of the Boer Republics, the other to the west and south-west,
were many thousands of Dutch, closely connected by family and by race
with the inhabitants of those republics. It was the one desire of the
Government of the Transvaal to unite these Dutch against the English,
and to sap their loyalty, though they had no grievances and had been
given in every respect the same privileges as the Englishmen.

No other theory will explain the conduct of the Transvaal. It had
assumed the title of "South African Republic," and taken to itself a
four-coloured flag as emblem of the future union of Transvaal, Orange
Free State, Cape Colony, and Natal under its sovereign influence.

[Illustration: O'NEILL'S HOUSE.

Temporary hospital for wounded men brought from Majuba; the house where
the Anglo-Boer Convention was held in 1881 and the treaty signed.]

[Illustration: O'NEILL'S HOUSE.

The room in which the Convention of 1881 was signed.]

[Illustration: VIEW ON THE ORANGE RIVER, FROM THE RAILWAY BRIDGE.

The Orange River divides Cape Colony from the Orange Free State. This
view is taken from a railway bridge connecting the two, and looking up
stream. The Orange River is one of the few South African rivers that
rarely, if ever, dries up.]

[Sidenote: [1652-1709]

The conflict of races in South Africa was complicated by the presence
of the Bantu peoples, who gradually overcame the original inhabitants
of South Africa, the Hottentots and Bushmen, and are themselves
a conquering race, who increase in numbers with the peace which
civilisation brings, and who do not suffer, as do many dark-skinned
peoples, from the white man's vices and diseases.[1]

[1] Bantu is the generic name for the native tribe, of which the Zulus,
Swazies, Amatongas, and Matabele are the off-shoots. There are no pure
Bantus left in South Africa, but it is the root-race from which all the
more warlike tribes have sprung.

[Sidenote: Common Interests of the White Peoples.]

Though accurate statistics of the proportion of English and
Dutch-speaking inhabitants in the various South African states cannot
be obtained, it is probable that in British and Dutch South Africa
there were, in 1899, 400,000 Englishmen or men of English descent,
500,000 Dutch, and 3,500,000 Indians, Malays, Hottentots, and natives
of the various Kaffir tribes. In Cape Colony and the Orange Free
State of the white races the Dutch preponderated; in the Transvaal,
Natal, and Rhodesia, the British. Instinct should have united the
white peoples, for, dwelling amidst a vast number of Bantus, warlike
by nature and intelligent above the common run of negro, both white
peoples were face to face with a common danger--a danger which the many
fierce struggles with the great tribes of the Zulus, Matabele, and
Basutos, had in the past proved to be a very real and ever-present one.

Here were the very conditions which should have produced peace and
amity--two kindred white races of the same faith, and almost of the
same blood, confronted by hourly peril from the blacks.

Why, then, was it that Englishmen and Dutchmen could not dwell in
peace? Hereafter we shall have to follow the whole sad story out in
detail; in this place it may suffice briefly to recapitulate the most
essential facts.

[Illustration: OLD DUTCH HOUSE IN PAPENDORP IN WHICH THE CAPITULATION
OF THE CAPE FROM HOLLAND TO GREAT BRITAIN WAS SIGNED IN 1806.]

[Illustration: PRETORIA NACHTMAAL.

Four times a year the country Boers come into Pretoria for Nachtmaal
(Holy Communion). They outspan their waggons on the Church Square, camp
out for a week with their wives and families, and do their shopping for
the ensuing three months.]

[Illustration: BATTLEFIELD OF BRONKHORST SPRUIT.

The scene of the battle between the Boers and the English in 1881, when
a detachment of the 94th regiment was surprised by a party of the enemy
in ambush and nearly annihilated.]

[Sidenote: Early History of Cape Colony.]

[Sidenote: 1709-1833.] _Early History of Cape Colony._]

Capetown was first occupied by the Dutch East India Company in 1652 as
a naval station on the road to India. At first it was only a military
post; five years later a dozen men were allowed to settle outside the
limits of the Dutch fortress, buying and selling under most stringent
regulations laid down by the Company. The Dutch forcibly took the land
from the Hottentots where they could not obtain its cession for a
consideration. Gradually they increased in numbers and spread inland;
at the close of the seventeenth century they were reinforced by a
number of Huguenots, exiled from France on account of their religion,
and for the most part men of high birth and noble character. The new
comers attempted to keep their tongue and identity, but in 1709 the
Dutch Company forbade all use of French in official communications, and
the language rapidly became obsolete.

A homogeneous Dutch community grew up in this remote region--for the
Cape was, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one of the
least-explored and most out-of-the-way parts of the earth--which knew
no literature but the Bible, which preserved the manners and traditions
of the seventeenth century, and which from its frequent disputes with
the Dutch East India Company's tyrannical government imbibed a rooted
aversion to all laws and restraints.

It was a strong, old-world community, which retrograded rather than
advanced as time went on, which in its utter isolation escaped the
soothing influence of civilisation, and in which every man, as far as
he could, did that which was right in his own eyes.

[Illustration: THE PAARDEKRAAL COMMEMORATION.

The Paardekraal (Horse-pound) Monument erected near Krugersdorp by the
Boers to commemorate their independence. Periodically great meetings
are held here, when prayers are offered and patriotic speeches made.
Beneath the monument is a sort of cellar, into which every Boer in
passing throws a stone as a token of his visit.]

[Sidenote: Unpopularity of the Dutch East India Company. British
capture Capetown.]

The colonists were perpetually in conflict with the hated Dutch East
India Company; they were in open revolt when in 1795 a British force
appeared off Table Bay and captured Capetown. There was at first no
antagonism between the conquerors and the colonists. When the Cape was
re-occupied in 1806, it having been restored to Holland in the peace of
1802, Sir Home Popham was able to trust very largely to the colonists
for the defence of the place. He lays emphasis on their dislike for the
Dutch Company and on their loyalty to the Union Jack.

[Illustration: A LAAGER, SHOWING THE LONG CAPE WAGGONS USED IN A "TREK."

When Boers are trekking, or travelling from one place to another, they
outspan their waggons at night and put them end-on in the form of an
oblong. The cattle are tethered in the centre, and the interstices of
the wheels filled up with wacht-een-beitje or wait-a-bit thornbush.]

[Sidenote: [1837-1854]

It was not until England began to interfere with the treatment of the
natives by the Dutch colonists that Dutch discontent first showed
itself. The prohibition of the use of the Dutch language in official
documents and in the law courts, the abolition of slavery in 1834--for
which most inadequate compensation was made by England--and the
meddling in the government of the colony by doctrinaires in England
who knew and cared little or nothing for the peculiar circumstances,
familiar to the men on the spot, caused general irritation amongst
a people always averse to law and order, and by nature inclined to
nomadic habits.

[Sidenote: "The Great Trek."]

The abolition of slavery was the immediate cause which led to "the
Great Trek" in 1837, when many hundreds of Dutch colonist-farmers
or "Boers," as they now came to be called, went forth with their
waggons and women and children and belongings into the vast, unknown,
mysterious, remote lands which then bordered upon the colony. They
settled down in what is now Natal, the Orange Free State, and the
southern Transvaal.

Natal was annexed by England in 1843; the Orange Free State in 1848,
after the Boers had been defeated at Boomplaats in the first real
engagement fought in South Africa between the English and the Dutch
colonists.

[Illustration: "STUCK" ON THE DRAKENSBERG.

The Drakensberg Mountains form the northern boundary of Natal, dividing
that colony from the Orange Free State. The passes are of a difficult
and often dangerous nature for waggon-transit.]

[Illustration: FORDING A RIVER IN THE TRANSVAAL.

Except after heavy rains all the rivers are easily crossed at the
different drifts or fords, and after a long, dusty trek, the team of
sixteen oxen enjoy the coolness of the water, and linger in the stream
for as long as their drivers will permit.]

[Sidenote: England recognises the Republics.]

In 1852 the independence of the Transvaal was recognised by the Sand
River Convention, with the express stipulation that slavery should
never be permitted within the territories of the Republic. Two years
later England abandoned the Orange Free State for no reason whatever,
except her dislike for onerous responsibilities.

All this while war with the Kaffir tribes had continued, in which
British soldiers did most of the work and the British people paid
most of the cost. All this while, too, one able man after another was
going out from England to govern South Africa, and, because his ways
were not the home government's ways, was returning in disgrace. Sir
Benjamin D'Urban, Sir Harry Smith, Sir George Grey, all walked the same
sad road; all did what was wise, far-sighted, and just; all gained
the respect of the English and the Dutch in the colony, and all alike
were over-ruled, interfered with, or recalled. Jerusalem stoned the
prophets; England preferred not to listen to them: either had in the
end to pay bitterly for this refusal to hear and learn the truth.

[Sidenote: 1854-1877.] _The Zulu War._]

And thus there grew up in South Africa two independent Dutch
communities, outside the pale of our Empire, and this, too, in a
country which nature clearly meant to be one organic whole.

[Sidenote: Their attitude toward us.]

These two republics differed much in their attitude to England. The
Orange Free State was always on friendly terms; the Transvaal always
more or less hostile. The Orange State was reasonably well governed;
the Transvaal became an anarchic, loosely compacted, lawless, bankrupt
country, where decent government was unknown. Its chequered existence
ended for a time in 1877, when, with treasury empty, and threatened on
the one hand by Cetewayo and the Zulus and on the other by the Bantu
chief Secocoeni, it was annexed in the name of Great Britain by Sir
Theophilus Shepstone.

Having taken over the Transvaal, England proceeded to break up the
power of the Zulus and to subdue Secocoeni. Trade revived, and
everything looked well, though there was still a good deal of veiled
discontent, due to the British failure to grant self-government,
when for party purposes, to eject Lord Beaconsfield from office, Mr.
Gladstone began to declaim against the "invasion of a free people," as
he called the annexation of the Transvaal. He was followed by Mr. John
Morley and Mr. Leonard Courtney, and by most of his party in this kind
of talk.

[Illustration: A BOER COMMANDANT IN FIGHTING KIT.]

[Illustration: BOER CANNON USED IN THE WAR OF 1881.

These are old Boer cannon made by inexperienced workmen, and said to be
fashioned from the iron rims of wheels taken off the British waggons
captured at Bronkhorst Spruit. They form a remarkable contrast with the
modern guns with which the Boers are now armed.]

Never have rash and foolish words so swiftly come home to harass the
speakers, as in this case. Mr. Gladstone achieved his object, and
attained power for what afterwards proved to be the most disastrous and
humiliating period in British history. His speeches had been reprinted
in the Transvaal, and had inspired hopes which the Boers now expected
him to fulfil. They were disappointed. On June 8, 1880, he wrote to
a Transvaal deputation, "Our judgment is that the Queen cannot be
advised to relinquish the Transvaal," and that "obligations have been
contracted which cannot now be set aside."

[Illustration: A BOER "LONG TOM" AT PRETORIA STATION, EN ROUTE FOR THE
SCENE OF WAR.

This powerful weapon, a Creusot gun of 5·9 inches calibre, has a range
of 10,000 yards. It was christened "Long Tom" by our men at Ladysmith,
where one of these guns was disabled in a night sortie. With equal
aptness a Boer gun whose shells constantly fell short was nicknamed
"Weary Willie."]

[Sidenote: [1877-1881]

[Sidenote: Sir Bartle Frere.]

But though outwardly Mr. Gladstone's attitude was the attitude of
a strong man, he took no precautions to meet Boer discontent. The
warnings of Sir Bartle Frere, the British governor at the Cape, were
unheeded. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach had thrown him over once because he
had not been able to prevent the Zulu war; Mr. Gladstone now recalled
him at the very time when a brave, loyal, far-sighted, single-hearted
man, such as Bartle Frere undoubtedly was, was most needed in South
Africa. Abandoned by both parties, betrayed, and treated with a
contumelious contempt which his noble services had never deserved, he
turned his face sadly towards England. Two months later the Transvaal
rose in revolt.

[Illustration: FREE STATE ARTILLERY AT BLOEMFONTEIN.

The standing armies of both the Orange Free State and the Transvaal
consist of a few hundred State Artillery, largely recruited and
officered by Germans and Hollanders. This picture shows the Orange
Free State Artillery in gala uniform on the way to parade. They are
commanded by Major Albrecht, a German.]

[Sidenote: Majuba.]

In quick succession three checks, or positive defeats, were inflicted
upon a small British force, the most serious that of Majuba. The
British government had announced that, come what might, it would
suppress the insurrection, but losing heart and terrified by the
prospect of a Dutch rising in the Cape, it conceded to the insurgents
a limited measure of self-government, and strove to delude the world
by talk of magnanimity. It explained that there was real nobility in
receding from its pledges and giving way to a small but victorious
force of Boers. Many people at the time doubted this nobility, and
by an explicit statement of Lord Kimberley on November 14, 1899, the
surrender is now known to have been due to cowardice, and to cowardice
alone.

[Illustration: SIR BARTLE FRERE (the centre figure at the table),
STAFF, CHAPLAIN, AND SECRETARY OUTSIDE THE BRITISH RESIDENCY IN
PRETORIA, 1880.]

A settlement based upon cowardice could never last, could never prove
satisfactory. The Transvaal Government used Mr. Gladstone's fears as
a lever to extort a fresh convention and get fresh concessions. Its
attitude to England was almost openly hostile.

[Sidenote: The Outlanders.]

[Sidenote: 1881-1896.] _The English a Subject Race._]

And now the discovery of gold brought immense wealth and a large
British population into its midst. The rights of that British
population, known as Uitlanders or Outlanders, had been very
inadequately guaranteed by Mr. Gladstone, who foresaw nothing, and
thus failed hopelessly in the greatest department of statesmanship.
The Transvaal Boers remained what they had been in the days of the
Great Trek and in the early forties. They kept all the power in their
own hands and made of the English--from whose wealth, however, and
from whose energy they took ample toll--a subject race, excluded from
all voice in the management of affairs, deprived of the rights of free
speech and of free press, unable to obtain justice in the Boer courts,
openly insulted and outraged without hope of redress. Corruption was
rampant in the governing circles.

[Illustration: JOHANNESBURG.

Up to September 1886 there was not a single house on the site of the
now flourishing town of Johannesburg. It owes its existence entirely to
the discovery of gold, of which a reef 130 miles long runs through the
town and district.]

[Illustration: A DUST STORM IN JOHANNESBURG.

This is a very cloudy view of Goldopolis. Periodically, especially in
winter, vast dust storms prevail, which obscure everything with an
opaque gritty haze as thick as a London fog, and far more unpleasant.]

The tone of the Dutch Parliament or Raad reflected the temper of the
whole Boer community, which may have been suited to the seventeenth
century, but was wholly out of place at the close of the nineteenth.
Pillar-boxes were effeminate; locusts were a plague sent from God, and
might not be interfered with; railways had not the divine blessing and
brought all manner of calamity; the firing of bombs to bring down rain
was impious profanity; the size of neckties ought to be regulated by
the authorities. At every turn there were fierce expressions of hatred
for England and Englishmen. Foreigners were called in to help hold down
the English; the government openly and undisguisedly coquetted with
Germany and with any power which it believed hostile to the British
Empire.

[Sidenote: The Jameson Raid.]

Then came the Jameson Raid, provoked by misgovernment and by the
growing exasperation throughout the British Empire, but in itself
indefensible. It failed signally, and left no heroic memory of resolute
fighting to the end against overpowering odds, but only shame and
sorrow in its trail. Yet it at least served to rivet the gaze of
England upon what was happening in South Africa. Even before the raid
the Transvaal Government had begun to arm; it now proceeded to build
up a great military power, purchasing cannon literally by the hundred
and rifles by the thousand, erecting immense fortifications at Pretoria
and Johannesburg, and concluding a secret alliance with the Orange Free
State. The money for these armaments was wrung from the Outlanders. By
the lavish use of secret service funds the press of Continental Europe
was set yelling against England, and treason was fomented in Cape
Colony.

[Sidenote: 1881-1896.]

The treatment of the Outlanders went from bad to worse, till Englishmen
and Englishwomen were murdered, like Edgar and Mrs. Applebee, without
redress. No great nation could permit its subjects to suffer
continued humiliation in a country over which that nation had certain
rights--however shadowy--and it grew monthly more certain that Great
Britain must at last intervene.

[Illustration: COLESBERG: PRESIDENT KRUGER'S BIRTH-PLACE.

Seventy-four years ago Paul Kruger was born in the neighbourhood of
Colesberg in Cape Colony. He left it with his parents in 1837, at the
time of "the Great Trek," and travelled northwards to the wild country,
which eventually became the South African Republic.]

[Sidenote: Kruger.]

The president and the evil genius of the Transvaal through this epoch
was Stephanus Paulus Johannes Kruger, born in Cape Colony on October
10, 1825. He was a man of indomitable courage and extraordinary force
of character--a fighting man from his youth up. His coolness was shown
on one occasion, when, out hunting, he suddenly one day, from the top
of a kopje--a hillock such as cover the surface of the upland plains
of South Africa--saw a large number of Kaffirs evidently advancing
to attack him. He sat calmly down without betraying the slightest
trepidation, shook the sand from his rough raw-hide shoes, and then
waved and signalled with his rifle as if to a considerable force of
Boers behind him under shelter of the kopje. The Kaffirs, convinced by
his show of boldness that he was not alone, precipitately retreated.

[Sidenote: His character.]

As a diplomatist, Mr. Kruger earned Bismarck's commendation. The
great German, who had met him, saw in him the strongest man of our
time. He was, however, destitute of that noble instinct without which
statesmanship builds upon the shifting sands--the instinct of justice
and fair play. Personally corrupt, since he was not above charging very
heavy travelling expenses for a certain trip in which he was the guest
of Cape Colony; winking at or openly justifying corruption in others;
laying up a colossal fortune out of the stealings of himself and his
friends from the State, he had all the uncouthness and all the iron
determination of an Abraham Lincoln, but lacked the great American's
cleanness of hand and love of justice and of right.

[Illustration: PRESIDENT KRUGER.

Born at Rustenberg, near Colesberg, Cape Colony, October 10, 1825.
Emigrated across the Vaal, 1837. Member of Executive Council under
President Burghers, 1872. President of Transvaal since 1883; re-elected
1888, 1893, 1898.]

[Illustration: DOPPER CHURCH, PRETORIA.

The Dopper or Quaker Church, Pretoria, where President Kruger very
often preached. It stood directly opposite his house, and has quite
recently been replaced by a more modern structure.]

[Sidenote: 1881-1896.] _Character of President Kruger._]

Mr. Kruger was by birth a peasant, and remained to the end a peasant in
ideas. His will power was coupled with a subtle cunning; his horizon
was narrow, and limited and never expanded; his mind was always filled
with suspicion and jealousy of all that he could not understand. His
patriotism had not prevented him from taking office under the British
Government, and asking from that government higher pay. His attitude to
the Outlanders, were these of British nationality, was one of insolent
contempt. When Johannesburg presented a petition asking for reforms, he
remarked, "Ah! that's just like my monkey. You know I keep a monkey in
my back yard, and the other day, when we were burning some rubbish, the
monkey managed to get his tail burnt, whereupon he bit me. That's just
like these people in Johannesburg. They burn their tails in the fire of
speculation and then they come and bite me."

[Illustration: THE PRESIDENT'S HOUSE, PRETORIA.

This house was given to Paul Kruger by a man named Nellmapius, the
original liquor concessionaire, as a small token of gratitude. The only
outward signs of its purpose are the flagstaff and a lazy sentry.]

"Protest! protest!" he said on another occasion, "what is the good of
protesting? You have not got the guns! I have."

[Illustration: A MONSTER ANT-HILL.

The veldt throughout South Africa, but particularly in parts of the
Transvaal, is dotted at frequent intervals by ant-heaps, some of which
are as large as the one shown above. The natives use the smaller ones
as ovens, first driving out the ants by smoke, and then hollowing out
the inside.]

[Illustration: THE RAADZAAL, PRETORIA.

After the General Election to the Volksraad or Parliament of the
Transvaal in 1898, the new members were formally sworn in, and
President Kruger made a speech from the balcony under the awning to
the crowd waiting in Church Square. The soldiers are the Pretoria
Volunteers in their gala uniform.]

The outward appearance of Mr. Kruger is in keeping with his sinister
personality. A shabby frock coat deluged with coffee stains, a seedy
silk hat without gloss, an immense scarf of office which sorts
grotesquely with this apparel, and ill-fitting trousers barely long
enough to meet the boots, are his familiar habiliments. He smokes and
drinks coffee incessantly. He has the fervent piety of a Torquemada;
believes himself under the peculiar protection of God; and interlards
his discourse with religious ejaculations, as if God could smile upon
tyranny and corruption. He has exaggerated the outward roughness of
Cromwell, forgetting, however, that, to complete the picture, the vast
tolerance, which is Cromwell's greatest merit, is required.

[Sidenote: [1896-1899.]

[Sidenote: Sir Alfred Milner.]

To meet this man in a duel of giants, England sent out her greatest
and ablest administrator. Sir Alfred Milner went to his arduous task
with the solid approval--even with the prayers--of the whole nation.
Messrs. Morley and Courtney, and all the faint hearts that masquerade
in the party of Little Englanders, blessed the choice. He was known to
be wise, moderate, restrained, strong. An Oxford man, he had learnt,
in a school which imparts character even more than learning, that the
Englishman's duty is not to seek wealth, luxury, or ease, but, in the
highest sense, to live well. He did not parade religion, but then it
was in his heart. He did not talk of patriotism, but then he had never
been in foreign pay, like Mr. Kruger. His manners were not uncouth,
his dress was that of the ordinary world. No act of meanness, of
corruption, of unscrupulousness can be imputed to him. His career had
been one of unsullied brilliance. He was "straight," as he was brave.

At Cape Colony he was welcomed by all. He made no move, but sat still
and studied the country, studied the situation, studied Mr. Kruger and
Mr. Kruger's policy. He followed impassively the machinations of the
Bond, the Dutch party which had organised itself in Cape Colony. Mr.
Kruger fancied that here was another man who could be twisted round his
thumb, but he was greatly mistaken. Sir Alfred Milner was only striving
to discover the truth before he took action.

[Illustration: OOM PAUL AND TANT' SANNIE.

Paul Kruger and Mrs. Kruger, after whom Mr. Chamberlain enquired on a
memorable occasion. The President has been twice married; the present
Mrs. Kruger was a Miss Malan. The couple are familiarly known in South
Africa as "Uncle Paul and Aunt Sannie."]

[Sidenote: The Bloemfontein Conference.]

The crisis drew nearer when an immense petition to the Queen was
forwarded by the Outlanders, praying for redress of their grievances. A
conference was arranged between President Kruger and Sir Alfred Milner
at Bloemfontein, and at it Sir Alfred put forward minimum demands--for
a reform of the franchise in the Transvaal, by which the Outlanders
would be able to obtain votes, and for a redistribution of seats. The
demands were refused, Mr. Kruger offering very much less, and the
conference broke up.

[Illustration: SIR A. MILNER AND PRESIDENT KRUGER LEAVING THE
CONFERENCE AT BLOEMFONTEIN, June, 1899.

No greater contrast can be imagined than the young, dapper, cultured
diplomatist, and the rugged, wily, and uncultured old President.]

[Sidenote: SEPT. 1899.] _British Demands Refused._]

Then followed a long diplomatic battle between the British Government
and Mr. Kruger. Something on our part was conceded of Sir Alfred's
minimum, but not by Sir Alfred; nothing was conceded by the Transvaal,
which at every turn asserted its right to be considered a "sovereign
independent state." Mr. Kruger, as he had always prophesied, was aided
and encouraged in his resistance by a certain party of Englishmen which
denounced Sir Alfred Milner, pretended that England was aiming at "the
destruction of the Transvaal Republic," and asserted that England must
concede, and ought to concede, because the nation would never go to war.

[Illustration: BLOEMFONTEIN, CAPITAL OF THE ORANGE FREE STATE.]

Finally, on September 8, a British note was despatched demanding
a franchise attainable after five years' residence, a greater
representation for the Outlander majority in the Volksraad--the
Transvaal parliament--and equality of the Dutch and English languages
in that Parliament. An early answer was required. At the same time
5,000 troops were ordered from England and 5,000 from India to South
Africa, where our garrison did not much exceed 7,000 men.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Elliott & Fry._

SIR ALFRED MILNER.

Son of a doctor of medicine; was educated in Germany, and at King's
College, London, and Balliol College, Oxford; barrister, 1881; engaged
in journalism, 1882-5; Private Secretary to Mr. Goschen, 1887-9;
Under Secretary for Finance in Egypt, 1889-92; Chairman of Board of
Inland Revenue, 1892-7; K. C. B., 1895; Governor of the Cape, and High
Commissioner of South Africa since 1897.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Elliott & Fry._

RT. HON. JOSEPH CHAMBERLAIN.

Born in London, 1836; son of a Birmingham screw manufacturer; Chairman
of Birmingham School Board, 1873; Mayor, 1874-5-6; M. P. for Birmingham
since 1876; President of the Board of Trade, 1880; President of the
Local Government Board, 1886, both under Mr. Gladstone. He differed
from that leader on the question of Home Rule, and resigned, 1886. In
1895 he became Secretary of State for the Colonies in Lord Salisbury's
administration.]

[Sidenote: Transvaal refuses England's demands.]

On the 16th the Transvaal replied with a flat refusal of the vital
demands. At the same time came news of immense military preparations
in the Transvaal and of a general exodus of British subjects from
Johannesburg. Yet England still waited in hope of a peaceful
settlement, and the government even now failed to take the steps which
should have been taken at once; it did not engage transports, mobilise
an army, and with all possible speed despatch it to South Africa.

[Sidenote: [OCT. 7-9, 1899.]

How terrible was the danger, how near the British Empire in South
Africa to its fall in the days which followed the 16th, was not at the
time apprehended by the public. Yet the government knew, or should have
known. Not till October 7, in face of the hourly growing peril, was
mobilisation ordered in England.

[Illustration: REFUGEES LEAVING JOHANNESBURG.

Owing to the immense crowds of refugees leaving Johannesburg, the
rolling stock of the Netherlands South African Railway was unequal
to the demands made upon it, and very many hapless Uitlanders had
to travel hundreds of miles in cattle trucks, amid terribly trying
discomforts.]

[Sidenote: War!]

On the 9th, the Boer ultimatum was handed in, demanding the withdrawal
of the troops which had reached South Africa since June 1, 1899, and
of all troops on their way. There was only one possible answer to this
insolent missive--War.

[Illustration: REFUGEES WAITING TO EMBARK AT LOURENÇO MARQUES.

Lourenço Marques is the nearest seaport to Pretoria, and belongs to
Portugal. The photograph was taken on the occasion when many refugees
from the Transvaal waited all night on the jetty for the ship _Avondale
Castle_, which had been stopped by H. M. S. _Philomel_ and compelled
to discharge at Durban £25,000 in specie consigned to the Transvaal
Government.]

[Illustration: BRITISH SUBJECTS LEAVING JOHANNESBURG AFTER THE
PRESENTATION OF THE ULTIMATUM.]

[Illustration:

_[Photo by Gregory._

RESERVES MOBILISING AT SOUTHAMPTON

"His regiment didn't need to send to find him."]

CHAPTER II.

THE OVERRUNNING OF NORTHERN NATAL.

[Sidenote: Hurried preparations for war.]

The Transvaal ultimatum for the moment united all Englishmen. No one
was found to suggest the idea of surrender to such monstrous and
treasonable demands. The calling out of the reserves began amidst
an excitement which has never been paralleled in our day. Time,
unfortunately, was required to get the troop-ships ready, for the
Admiralty had not been given a fair chance. Time was also required for
the collection of transport, without which no army can move. Horses,
mules, tinned meat and food of all kinds, had to be purchased hurriedly
in every direction. The sense of public anxiety was augmented by the
knowledge that the army sent out could not be in South Africa, ready
for work, within six weeks from the date when mobilisation began. And
very much might happen in that time.

[Illustration: ARMOURED TRAIN FIRED UPON BY THE BOERS.

This train was attacked by the Boers near Spyfontein, October 15.
An attack on a similar train three days earlier, at Kraaipan, near
Mafeking, was the first overt act of war.]

[Sidenote: The Reserves mobilised.]

Yet there was outward calm. The reservists answered the call like
Englishmen; like men, that is to say, who know a painful duty lies
before them and will do it. Scarcely one was missing when the time
given them to rejoin had elapsed. Deserters, who had shipped for
America, of their own free will came back to fight the Boers. Men rose
from beds of sickness that they might serve with the old colours and
not betray the confidence reposed in them. There was no exultation, no
desire to fight for fighting's sake, only a calm determination to end
the twenty years' purgatory of misrule in the Transvaal by coming to
the aid of brother Englishmen.

[Sidenote: [OCT. 1899.]

[Sidenote: Enthusiasm of the British public.]

The nation, too, began to feel that it had a solemn duty to its
soldiers. Vast crowds followed the reservists to the points of
mobilisation; eyes were dim at the thought of the sacrifice these brave
men were making. For they were going to adventure "life and love and
youth for the great prize of death in battle," at their country's call.
They were exchanging, many of them, comfort and comparative ease for
the hunger and rain and cold of the dreary bivouac, for the toilsome
march beneath the burning sun of the veldt, for torture by wounds, and
death in its most terrifying forms. They were leaving behind them women
and children who looked to them for daily bread. Yet they came with a
single heart; came cheerfully, and gave to their country all that they
had to give as the choicest offering of their love and devotion.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Elliott & Fry._

LADY RANDOLPH CHURCHILL,

_née_ Miss Jennie Jerome. Of American parentage; she is the mother of
two sons, one of whom, Mr. Winston Churchill, was recently a prisoner
in Pretoria, having displayed conspicuous bravery in a small fight at
which he was present as a newspaper correspondent. Lady Randolph was
instrumental in organising the hospital ship _Maine_ as a token of
American brotherhood with Great Britain.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

MISS NORMAN AND NURSING SISTERS ON BOARD THE S.S. "TROJAN."]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

DEPARTURE OF THE 1st BATTALION, RIFLE BRIGADE: H.R.H. THE DUKE OF
CONNAUGHT LIGHTING THE MEN'S CIGARETTES.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 1899.] _Hospital Ships and Relief Funds._]

Those who at home and in ease were to reap the fruits of their love
and devotion responded to the best of their power. Employers announced
that they would pay half wages to the women and children whose
bread-winners had been called away; enormous funds were raised to
support the widowed and the fatherless of those who should fall, and
to keep in comfort the families of the soldiers. Workmen subscribed
their shillings; the well-to-do their guineas; the rich their thousands
of pounds. The most intensely national of poets, Mr. Rudyard Kipling,
appealed in touching verse to the nation's heart. In answer to his
appeal women sent their rings, children their pence, and the poor and
humble gifts in kind. No names were published; the giving was simple
and unostentatious, and therefore all the nobler. Thus our soldiers
were made to feel that they went forth to battle with the nation's love
and with its fervent prayers.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by W. & D. Downey, Ebury Street._

THE "PRINCESS OF PITY."

The latest photograph of H. R. H. the Princess of Wales in Drawing-room
dress.]

[Illustration: THE "PRINCESS OF WALES" HOSPITAL SHIP; FORMERLY THE
"MIDNIGHT SUN" EXCURSION STEAMER.

Her Royal Highness, ever to the front in the cause of suffering
humanity, has taken the keenest and most earnest interest in the
fitting-up of this hospital ship towards the cost of which she has made
a large private grant of funds.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

THE ALEXANDRA WARD ON BOARD THE "PRINCESS OF WALES" HOSPITAL SHIP.]

Nor were these schemes all. The Princess of Wales--Princess of Pity she
has rightly been called--at the head of the Red Cross Society, with
private effort, equipped hospitals and hospital ships; Lady Randolph
Churchill, widow of a man who loved England, who strove for honest
reform, and whose name will not soon be forgotten, of American birth
herself, raised, with the aid of other American ladies in London, a
fund for a hospital ship; Lady White, the wife of the British general
in Natal, collected a great sum to furnish the soldiers of the heroic
Natal Field Force with Christmas gifts; every steamer carried away
to the Cape presents of provisions, dainties, clothing, tobacco and
cigarettes, for the men fighting in the field. From the Queen on her
throne to the peasant in his cottage all gave liberally. The flood
gates of generosity were opened; a universal impulse of patriotism
moved the nation.

[Sidenote: [OCT. 1899.]

[Sidenote: Strength of the forces in Natal and Cape Colony.]

Meantime in South Africa the situation was one of the utmost peril.
The Transvaal had originally intended to despatch its ultimatum on
September 17 or 18, and then to begin the war. At this date none of
the reinforcements from England or from India had arrived. The British
troops available were four battalions of infantry,[2] two regiments of
cavalry, three batteries of field artillery, and one mountain battery
in Natal, under the orders of Major-General Sir Penn Symons, a total of
about 5,000 men and 18 guns. In Cape Colony were only two-and-a-half
battalions, or 2,000 men all told, under General Sir F. Walker.

[2] A battalion of infantry numbers from 800 to 1010 men. A regiment of
cavalry is 480 men. A battery of artillery has 6 guns and 180 men. The
guns are: in field artillery, 15-pounders (_i.e._, they fire a shell
weighing 15 lb.); in horse artillery, 12-pounders; and in mountain
artillery, 7-pounders.

[Illustration:

[_Photo Window & Grove._

GENERAL SIR GEORGE STEWART WHITE.

Born 1835; son of J. R. White, Esq., of Whitehall, co. Antrim; educated
at Sandhurst; entered the Army, 1853; served in Indian Mutiny; captain,
1863; Major, 1873; was in the Afghan War of 1878-80, and present at the
occupation of Kabul, and in the expedition to Maidan, Sharpur; Military
Secretary to Viceroy of India; Lieut.-Colonel, Gordon Highlanders,
1881; Colonel, 1885; Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General
in Egypt; commanded a brigade in Burmah, 1885-86 (for which service
he was promoted Major-General, and thanked by Indian Government),
and an expedition into Zhob; Commander-in-Chief in India, 1893-8;
Quartermaster-General to the Forces, 1898.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gunn & Stuart._

LADY WHITE.]

[Sidenote: Strength of the Enemy.]

Against these the Transvaal alone could put into the field 40,000 or
50,000 men with 70 or 80 guns. The Orange Free State could dispose of
10,000 to 15,000 men with 30 or more guns. Thus, if the Boer forces
had advanced in the third week of September, they could unquestionably
have swept the British out of Natal, and have made themselves masters
of the whole of northern Cape Colony. With the fighting qualities which
they have since displayed, they must have surrounded and captured the
diminutive British detachments which kept vigil close to the frontiers
of a formidable military power. Why, then, was the attack delayed?

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

OFF TO THE WAR!

Bidding farewell to the Army Service Corps at Southampton.]

[Sidenote: The attack delayed.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 1899.] _The Boer Forces Mobilised._]

In the first place the Orange Free State was not at that date ready to
throw in its lot with the Transvaal. It had no quarrel whatever with
England, and many Englishmen lived happily within its borders. Only a
prodigal use of Mr. Kruger's secret service funds, and the desperate
exertions of the Free State President, Mr. Steyn, obtained the consent
of its Volksraad to the war. Moreover, when that consent had been
obtained its armaments were incomplete. Ammunition was wanting; and
so, reluctantly, all movement was postponed by the plotters against
the British Empire till the first day of October. Even then, it was
calculated, it would be easy to sweep the "rooineks" into the sea,
as but few of the Indian troops would have arrived. By October 1 the
Transvaal completed its mobilisation, and was ready to attack. It was
expected that the first Boer victory would be followed by a tremendous
uprising of the Cape Dutch, the disloyal of whom had been armed and
were in constant correspondence with Pretoria.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by R. Stanley & Co._

LADY SYMONS.

Widow of General Symons, and promoter of a fund for the widows and
orphans of soldiers.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by R. Stanley & Co._

GENERAL SIR W. PENN SYMONS,

Who fell in the assault on the Boer position commanding Dundee.]

But on October 1 good fortune once more intervened to save our empire.
The Transvaal commandoes had assembled, but transport and commissariat
were so defective that the Boers were in danger of starvation. The
want of rain, too, had left the veldt bare and dry, without grass
or sustenance for horses and cattle. It would, therefore, be almost
impossible without commissariat for men and beasts to subsist. Delay
was thus forced upon the Boers. The transport arrangements were
improved, while the commandoes watched eagerly for the first rains, due
in early October, which were to be the signal of action for them, and
of slaughter for the hapless British soldiery.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

GOOD BYE, DADDY!

A Pipe-Major of the Scots Guards starting for the front.]

[Sidenote: Disposition of the Boer forces.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 1899.]

The main Boer forces threatened Natal, which colony, from its
passionate loyalty to the mother country, was peculiarly odious to Mr.
Kruger. The Transvaalers were assembled, 15,000 to 20,000 strong, at
Zandspruit, just across the frontier of the extreme northern angle of
Natal; the Free Staters, 10,000 or more strong, were to the west of the
many passes which cross the Drakensberg range, threatening the whole
north of the colony. The lie of the frontier hereabouts gave the enemy
great advantages. Natal sends up a narrow wedge-shaped strip of country
between the Free State and the Transvaal. From Ladysmith, at its base,
to the most northerly point, this wedge is 50 miles long. How to defend
the wedge with a small force was the British problem. If a force were
placed at the northernmost point it would be liable to be cut off
and surrounded by the Free Staters crossing the passes and seizing
positions in its rear, while the Transvaalers attacked in front. If
stationed farther south the same risk remained, though it would be
easier to retire. If the whole wedge were abandoned the political
effect would be disastrous.

[Illustration: LAING'S NEK.

The "Nek" is the ridge between the two hills; it was the scene of a
battle in 1881, and over it the Boers swarmed into Natal in 1899.]

[Illustration: ELANDSLAAGTE: THE SCENE OF THE BATTLE.]

[Sidenote: Positions of the British at Dundee and Ladysmith.]

Before the landing of the reinforcements, receiving news of the secret
Boer conspiracy to invade the colony, General Sir Penn Symons, in
command in Natal, decided to abandon the extreme north of the wedge,
where lie the ill-omened battlefields of Laing's Nek, Majuba, and
the Ingogo, and to place as large a force as he could spare at the
small town of Dundee, 35 miles from Ladysmith and connected with it
by railway. When the reinforcements from India arrived in the first
week of October, and General White took over the command in Natal,
this detachment was strengthened, and the main force established at
Ladysmith. The Dundee force, under Symons, was 4,600 strong with 18
guns; the Ladysmith division, under White, numbered about 7,500 men
with 24 guns. The latter was reinforced by Natal troops and volunteers
in the first ten days of war, till on October 20 it may have reached
9,000. Meantime, this weak little army remained almost unconscious of
the storm which was about to burst upon it, for the opinion generally
held by British officers was that, owing to his bad transport and
defective organisation, the enemy would not be able to move south for
some weeks.

[Illustration: GLENCOE.

The railway on the left runs to Pretoria; that on the right to Dundee.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 19, 20, 1899.] _The Campaign Opens._]

The early days of the war in Natal encouraged this belief. On October
12 the Boers seized Laing's Nek and began crossing the Drakensberg in
small parties. A few shots were exchanged between the scouts on either
side, but there was no real fighting. No one fancied that Dundee was in
any danger; on the 16th, a correspondent wrote from Ladysmith that the
enemy was expected to remain inactive. Nor were any great precautions
taken by General Symons. His officers reconnoitred from time to time;
patrols and pickets were out; the main force lay in a valley dominated
by lofty hills, some point on which he meant to occupy when the
approach of the enemy made it necessary. As he could not know from what
quarter the enemy would come, this central position was perhaps the
best that could be assumed. There was little ammunition at Dundee, and
the place was entirely dependent for most things, including supplies,
upon its communications with Ladysmith.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by H. Nicholls._

NATAL CARBINEERS LEAVING LADYSMITH FOR THE FRONTIER.]

The Boers, perfectly informed of the British position, and directed
by skilful strategists, had really determined to attack this Dundee
force with the greater part of their army. The Johannesburg commando,
2,000 strong, under General Kock, opened operations by moving south
from Laing's Nek, and on October 19 seized a position at Elandslaagte,
astride of the railway between Dundee and Ladysmith. A train laden with
supplies was captured by the Boers. The 20th was fixed by Generals
Joubert and Meyer for the annihilation of General Symons' force. Meyer
was to attack from the east with 7,000 men, Joubert from the north-west
with 17,000. On the night of the 19th, Meyer's men seized Talana Hill,
a precipitous height to the east of and overlooking the British camp at
Dundee. They placed several guns in position there. At 2·30 a.m. of the
20th a British picket was driven in. The night was dark and misty; as
the dawn spread over the grey hills, out of the mist came the boom of
a heavy gun, and a shell dropped plump in the middle of the astonished
Britishers.

[Sidenote: Battle of Dundee.]

Thus General Symons was taken completely by surprise. But in this
emergency he showed a courage and a decision which were above all
praise. As the day broke he put his breakfastless, hungry men into line
of battle and sent out his three field batteries to respond to the
enemy's artillery fire, which now grew very galling. Along the ridge of
Talana Hill, through the thick, wet mist, the Boers could be at times
made out. So long as they remained there our position was untenable.
They must be dislodged, and dislodged at whatever cost.

[Illustration: ROYAL DUBLIN FUSILIERS MARCHING OUT OF LADYSMITH FOR
DUNDEE.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 20, 1899.]

From the British camp the ground for some distance sloped down to a
river bed; then followed a short stretch of gently rising ground, and
at the foot of Talana Hill a narrow belt of wood. This passed, the
real ascent began. Halfway up the hill and just at the point where the
declivity steepened almost to a precipice ran a stone wall, parallel
to the ridge. The Boer position was one of extreme strength. It gave
their picked shots excellent cover, and enabled their rifles and cannon
to sweep with the deadliest effect the slopes below, over which the
British must advance.

While the Dublins, King's Rifles, and Irish Fusiliers went forward to
the river bed, the British artillery cannonaded the ridge at a range of
2,000 yards. The Boer guns, after a two hours' duel, either withdrew or
were silenced; the moment for the infantry assault had come. And what
an assault! to be delivered by three battalions, with present for duty
not more than 2,000 men, upon a seemingly impregnable position, held by
5,000 marksmen whose fame had filled the world.

In extended order, with the British guns firing furiously over their
heads, the three battalions went forward. They reached the wood under
a terrible fire from the heights above; in the wood men began to drop
under the rain of bullets. The Royal Irish Fusiliers and King's Rifles
lost their formation amidst the trees and undergrowth, which spread
confusion and gave no shelter from the pitiless Mausers of the enemy.
Yet the line did not halt. Slowly it gained ground, passed out of the
upper edge of the wood, and began to cross the Aceldama between it and
the wall.

[Illustration: PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF DUNDEE.

October 20, 1899.]

[Sidenote: Symons wounded.]

All the morning General Symons had exposed himself with perfect
indifference to death. He was everywhere, conspicuous by reason of
the lancer with a red flag who followed him to mark his position for
his aide-de-camps. He rode to the lower edge of the wood to tell his
men that they must take the hill, to encourage them by his presence,
and to give them that praise which only the bravest of the brave can
bestow in battle with effect. "You are fine fellows," he shouted to
them. Just after he had spoken, as he was galloping back, he was struck
by a bullet in the groin and mortally wounded. So long as he could
he concealed his wound; then, as his strength failed, he fell or was
lifted from his horse and was carried off the field, calm and confident
to the last. He sent a message to his men that the wound was but
slight, and that he would soon be with them again.

[Illustration: BOER BURGHERS LEAVING JOHANNESBURG FOR THE FRONT.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 20, 1899.] _The Battle of Dundee._]

[Sidenote: Storming of Talana Hill.]

At 10 o'clock the tide of the British advance had surged up to the
stone wall. Under shelter of this there was a prolonged halt while
the artillery bombardment of the ridge continued. Yet so heavy was
the Boer rifle fire that it was death to leave the shelter of the
wall. About 12, however, there came a lull, and instantly the British
line dashed forward with drums beating, bugles sounding, and officers
in advance. This was the most perilous stage of the combat, for, as
our infantry painfully won its way up the last ascent, the British
artillery had perforce to cease its fire. Under a terrific rain of
bullets the thin brown line worked slowly forward towards the flaming
ridge; for the last time the bugles sounded; bayonets were fixed; and
with fierce cheers the top was won. Here fell Colonel Gunning and
Captain Pechell, in front of their men, as soldiers and Englishmen
should fall. The Boers did not wait to meet the last charge. As the
hill was crowned they galloped off, leaving 100 dead and wounded behind
them, and two flags.

[Illustration: _F. C. Dickinson._] [_From a Sketch made on the spot._

STORMING OF TALANA HILL.]

[Sidenote: The treacherous white flag.]

The guns had moved up; the enemy were below us and before us, open
to the swift massacre which well-handled artillery can inflict upon
demoralised masses of men. But the guns did not open; the enemy had
hoisted the white flag, and by this shameful ruse covered the retreat.
A great opportunity was lost. Worse still was to follow. The 18th
Hussars and mounted infantry had been despatched to work round the
enemy's flank; in attempting this a squadron of cavalry and most of the
mounted infantry were surrounded by overwhelming forces of Boers and
captured. Thus, though the British infantry had fought gloriously, and
given freely of its life-blood, the success was an almost fruitless
one. The victory did, indeed, save the British force from annihilation,
and showed what Britons, well led, could do; beyond that it had no
results. It was purchased, too, at a great price. Forty-seven British
dead and 221 wounded strewed the slopes of Talana; 208 of the flanking
cavalry and mounted infantry were missing or prisoners.

[Sidenote: [OCT. 20-24, 1899.]

[Sidenote: Yule's march.]

The battle won, ammunition for another fight was wanting. Ladysmith was
cut off; on the 21st Joubert showed in force to the north, and two big
40-pounders, to which the British had nothing that could effectively
reply, began to bombard the camp. A new position was taken up to the
south of Dundee, out of range of the enemy's big guns. Hence, on the
22nd, General Yule, who had succeeded to the command after General
Symons' fall, hearing of the victory of Elandslaagte, marched with a
detachment to intercept the flying Boers. The task was too serious a
one for his small force, and he had to return. So dangerous was his
position growing hour by hour, that late that evening he determined
to retreat. The night was rainy and misty; at 9 p.m. he marched out
with all his transport, abandoning his camp and his wounded, even
the stricken Sir Penn Symons, and set his face for Beith. He was not
molested; on the 23rd, with beating hearts, the little brigade of
Britishers, now only 4,000 strong, crossed the difficult pass through
the Biggersberg, where a single handful of Boers might well have barred
all passage, and brought about a terrible disaster: the pass, however,
was unguarded. Thereafter the way was plain. On the 24th Sir George
White's guns were heard; next day the advance of the column gained
touch with the main British force. On this day General Symons died
in the enemy's hands, and was buried sadly at night by a small body
of Englishmen and English sympathisers in Dundee. A message from our
gracious Queen and well-won promotion came too late for his dying ears.

[Illustration: _R. Caton Woodville._] [_From photo taken on the
Battlefield._

GORDONS ADVANCING AT ELANDSLAAGTE.]

The retreat of the Dundee force was admirably conceived and well
executed. Yet it is impossible to deny that the gravest risks were
run by hanging on to a very exposed position with a small force. Had
the Boers shown their wonted activity, the detachment must have been
destroyed or captured. It owed its escape to gallant fighting and good
luck.

[Sidenote: OCT. 20,21, 1899.] _Operations at Elandslaagte._]

While these things had been happening at Dundee, General White, at
Ladysmith, had not been inactive. Much of his attention had been
occupied by the Orange Free State commandoes, which showed in great
strength, perpetually threatening Ladysmith and the route to Colenso,
but always retreating when any attempt was made to bring them to
battle. This was good strategy, and an essential part of the campaign
for the capture of Dundee and its garrison. On the 19th the arrival
of a small force of the enemy at Elandslaagte and the capture of a
train at the station there became known. A previous train, which was
actually standing in the station when the Boers arrived on the scene,
escaped through the daring and presence of mind of the engine-driver,
who turned on full steam and dashed through the enemy towards Dundee,
before they could bring guns to bear.

On the 20th General French went out towards Elandslaagte with a few
mounted infantry and some cavalry, supported by two battalions, to
reconnoitre. As the troops moved off, far away from the north-east came
the dull booming of the cannon, which told of battle raging at Dundee.
The day was so rainy and misty that little could be ascertained. The
British troops fell back in the afternoon, and heard the cheering news
of a great victory at Dundee.

[Illustration: PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF ELANDSLAAGTE.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Elandslaagte.]

On the 21st General French once more left Ladysmith, very early. He had
with him the Imperial Light Horse, raised from the British Outlanders,
six guns of the Natal Artillery, and 400 of the Manchester regiment
in a train. An armoured train accompanied the cavalry. Elandslaagte
was very cautiously approached, but towards 8·30 a.m. the enemy came
into sight. The Boers were riding about on the small plain in which
Elandslaagte is situated; their main position was on a long, rocky
ridge which dropped at the northern end to a "nek" or pass, where
could be discerned their camp. Beyond this again was a small detached
hill. Just behind the camp rose a high, conical mountain, on which
breastworks of stone could be made out, dominating the whole position.
Black figures could be seen all along the sky-line of the ridge,
indicating that the enemy was in force.

[Illustration:

_W. Dewar._]

REMOVING THE WOUNDED AFTER THE BATTLE OF ELANDSLAAGTE.

This operation had to be performed in a pouring rain and in almost
total darkness.]

The Natal Artillery opened the battle by directing a fire upon the
railway station. At once the Boers replied. Two shells, beautifully
aimed, fell right amongst the British guns, putting one ammunition
waggon out of action. Our weapons were old and feeble 7-pounders, the
Boer guns long-range quick-firing 14-pounders--the weapons lost in the
shameful Raid, and now by strange retribution pointed against the brave
men who had to pay for the deplorable mistakes of the past. Nothing
but withdrawal could have saved the Natal Artillery. The guns fell
back and the British force hastened out of range, while General French
telegraphed instantly for reinforcements.

[Sidenote: [OCT. 21, 1899.]

A couple of hours later these began to come up. First arrived the 5th
Lancers and two batteries of field artillery, tearing along with double
teams at a gallop. Then came Colonel Ian Hamilton, who had fought and
received more than one wound in the struggle with the Boers in 1881. He
brought with him the rest of the Manchesters and 1,200 Devonshires and
Gordon Highlanders. This gave General French a total of 2,000 infantry,
480 artillery, and about 800 cavalry; he was now able to return and
resume the attack.

The two British field batteries opened a furious fire on the Boer guns,
which were located on the top of the long ridge; the British cavalry
pushed round to the left and right of the Boer position; the British
infantry, in open formation--Gordons and Manchesters on the right,
dismounted men of the Imperial Light Horse in the centre, and Devons on
the left--prepared to advance to the assault when the cannon had done
their work. It was to be Talana Hill over again, but this time with a
weaker Boer force.

The enemy's guns were fought with the most obstinate courage; shrapnel
constantly burst amidst them: three times their gunners fell back and
each time returned to their work. The roar of the artillery duel filled
the air, yet in spite of all its sound and fury, the loss of life on
either side was as yet small.

[Illustration: _Max Cowper._] [_After a photograph._

LANDING AT CAPETOWN OF COMMANDANT PRETORIUS, WOUNDED AND CAPTURED AT
ELANDSLAAGTE.]

The day was advancing, and if the position was to be carried before
night fell, the stormers must advance, though the British artillery
preparation was still far from complete. As the hours wore on, General
French sent in his infantry to the assault. A thunderstorm raged over
the scene of carnage as the line went forward, adding to the grandeur
of the spectacle. The British advance across the plain under a fearful
fire was splendidly conducted; the Devons were as steady as on parade,
firing volleys from time to time and always slowly gaining ground, till
they reached the foot of the final steep ascent which led to the summit
of the ridge. Men were dropping every moment; the Mauser bullets sang
through the air thick as swarms of bees, while in front the crest of
the ridge glowed with the perpetual rifle fire of the enemy against the
inky blackness of the storm-clouds.

[Sidenote: OCT. 21, 1899.] _The First British Victory of the War._]

On the right, the Gordons, Manchesters, and Light Horse were also
pushing forward. With a roar of cheering they gained the top of the
ridge, living and dead and dying in one compact mass. The air rang with
tumultuous shouts; the bugles sounded the charge, for the Gordons had
yet to storm their way along the ridge under a withering stream of lead
which poured from an eminence at its further end; Colonel Ian Hamilton
was playing his last card. But the Gordons, after a brief check, swept
on along the ridge, tearing down or cutting the barbed wire fences
which in half-a-dozen places intersected it. Each fence, each stop,
meant death to many gallant men. At last, however, the Boer guns were
gained; the Devons too came pouring up the hill, and a torrent of
British soldiery swept exultant upon the last Boer remnants.

[Illustration:

_J. Finnemore._]

CHARGE OF THE LANCERS AFTER THE BATTLE OF ELANDSLAAGTE.]

The men at the enemy's guns were bayonetted, and some volleys were
poured in upon the host of fugitives tearing down the other side of the
hill. A few unwounded and many wounded prisoners were taken.

But as the enemy fled in the falling darkness, the Lancers and Light
Horse rode at them. From the nature of things they could give no
mercy. The terrible steel spears did their work amongst the yelling,
panic-stricken fugitives; the Light Horse, too, had much to avenge--the
murder of Edgar and innumerable shameful outrages in the past--and they
avenged it. It was a complete and decisive victory, the first that had
been gained in the war.

[Sidenote: British and Boer losses.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 21, 1899.]

The British losses were heavy, considering that less than 3,000 men
had been engaged on our side. Fifty-five were killed and 199 wounded,
the Gordons suffering most severely. One-third of the half-battalion
engaged was left upon the ground, and fourteen officers, amongst whom
was their colonel, were killed or wounded. The Imperial Light Horse
also lost their colonel, Scott-Chisholm, shot three times in quick
succession as he reached the top of the ridge. Major Sampson, who had
fought the Boers before, and suffered for the honour of an Englishman
long years of imprisonment in Pretoria Jail, now poured out his blood
once more for his country. What the enemy's loss was it is impossible
to say; 65 Boers were buried by the British on the ridge, at least 50
were killed by the Lancers, and as many more may have been removed
before the assault. In killed alone the Boers must have lost 150. Two
hundred prisoners, mostly wounded, were taken, and probably 200 wounded
were removed. The Johannesburg commando, about 2,000 strong, was
completely broken up.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Lambert Weston, Folkestone._

MAJOR-GENERAL J. D. P. FRENCH.

Born in 1852. Served in the Militia, but joined the 8th Hussars as
Lieutenant in Feb. 1874, and changed to the 19th Hussars in March.
Captain 1880. Major 1883. Served in the Nile Expedition in 1884-5, and
accompanied Sir H. Stewart's column in the attempt to rescue Gordon
at Khartoum. Lt.-Colonel, 1885. Colonel, 1889. In command of Cavalry
Division in South Africa with rank of Lt.-General, 1899; won the
victory of Elandslaagte, Major-General 1900 (in recognition of his
services in relieving Kimberley).]

[Sidenote: "Remember Majuba!"]

As a feat of arms on the British part the victory was a wonderful one.
Words can scarcely give an idea of the strength of the Boer position.
"Remember Majuba!" shouted the victorious troops, and it was Majuba
over again, but with the difference that this time it was the Boers who
were beaten. They fought bravely, but it is sad to relate that there
were many instances of the most discreditable savagery on their part.
A burgher deliberately shot two wounded British soldiers, when several
Britishers came on him at his bloody work. He dropped on his knees and
cried for mercy, but got what he deserved. A Gordon officer was killed
by a Boer to whom he gave quarter. Another Boer showed a white flag and
then emptied a revolver into the approaching Britishers, who were off
their guard.

[Illustration: FUNERAL OF THE BOER GENERAL KOCH AT PRETORIA.]

[Illustration: BOER PRISONERS ON BOARD H.M.S. PENELOPE AT SIMONSTOWN.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 21, 1899.] _After the Battle._]

Amongst the wounded Boers were many men of note in the Transvaal.
General Koch was wounded, and his son, Judge Koch, who had acquitted
the murderers of the British subject, Edgar, at Johannesburg some
months before, was killed. Colonel Schiel, a German officer who had
directed the Boer artillery and had in the past been guilty of inhuman
atrocities to the natives, was severely wounded.

Night fell before the battle was over. The rain still poured down, the
wind was bitterly cold; and the agony endured by the wounded, lying out
on that stony mountain without shelter, food and water, was terrible.
With all the expedition that was possible in the inky darkness the
field of battle was searched for living men. The badly wounded were
carried down the slopes to the enemy's captured camp; the slightly hurt
gathered, Boers and Englishmen, round the camp fires. Our men gave the
best places--the snuggest corners, if there could be any snug corners
in the open on such a night as that--to their enemies.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by G. Lynch._

GENERAL YULE'S MARCH.

From a photograph taken at a drift on the road.]

With daylight General French's force marched back to Ladysmith. Among
the prizes of the battle were the train, officers and correspondents,
captured by the Boers on the 19th.

[Illustration:

[_S. H. Vedder._

ABUSE OF THE WHITE FLAG BY THE BOERS AT ELANDSLAAGTE.]

During the later stages of the action General White had been present.
Yet with knight-like generosity he refused to take over the command
or to assume for himself any credit. His despatch gave the glory to
General French alone.

[Sidenote: Action of Rietfontein.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 24, 1899.]

A day later, on October 23, the Boers were once more at Elandslaagte,
this time in very great force. Fearing that they would work across the
railway and cut off General Yule's retreat, General White determined
to occupy their attention. Early on the 24th 3,000 infantry, four
batteries of artillery, and 1,500 cavalry and mounted infantry moved
out from Ladysmith. Ten miles had been covered, and the British force
was still five miles from Elandslaagte, when the Boers were found
several thousand strong in a formidable position along a ridge near
Rietfontein, on the little stream known as Modder Spruit. On two lofty
eminences, Matawana's Kop and Jonono's Kop, they had artillery. Their
skirmishers were driven in, and our guns at once unlimbered and opened
a hot fire, which was as warmly returned. Attempts were made by the
British to work round the enemy's flank, but this, with the small
number of men available, was quite impossible.

[Illustration: BRITISH WARSHIPS AT SIMONSTOWN THE DAY AFTER THE BATTLE
OF ELANDSLAAGTE.

Flags were run up to the mastheads in honour of the British victory.]

[Illustration: PLAN OF THE ACTION AT RIETFONTEIN.]

[Illustration: MAP OF GENERAL YULE'S MARCH FROM DUNDEE TO LADYSMITH.]

The enemy in turn endeavoured to achieve the same manœuvre against our
forces, and the attempt was not repulsed without difficulty or loss.
The firing was very heavy, yet the British troops, it was noticed,
shot as steadily and as accurately as the Boers, showing how vast an
improvement had been effected in the training of our army since the
dark days of 1881. As for the Boer artillery, its aim was magnificent,
but its projectiles were bad. The British infantry, covering the
British gunners, suffered heavily. The Gloucesters, in the forefront of
the battle, lost their colonel and 63 men killed, wounded, or missing.
As the morning wore on there was difficulty in preventing what had been
intended only for a skirmish growing into a furious pitched battle. At
last, about 1 p.m., the welcome news arrived that General Yule's column
was near enough to be safe. It had heard the roar of the firing, and
was hurrying towards the field to co-operate. Keeping in touch with
Yule, General White withdrew his men and marched back to Ladysmith. The
British loss was heavy, considering that this was little more than a
skirmish, and that no assault on the enemy's position was delivered: 12
were killed, 104 wounded, and 2 missing. The Boers, probably, suffered
to about the same extent.

[Sidenote: OCT. 27, 1899.] _Exposed Situation of Ladysmith._]

Three days passed before further operations were undertaken. General
Yule's men were wearied with hard marching: General White's with
continuous marching, counter-marching, and fighting, and rest had to
be given to the infantry. The enemy used the time to bring down troops
from the north; Joubert's thousands and his powerful artillery took
post round the north and east of Ladysmith; other thousands from the
Free State continued the line of investment to the west and south. On
the 27th they showed with men and guns near Pieter's, on the railway
between Ladysmith and Colenso, with the obvious intention of cutting
General White's communications with the rear. Only the efforts of
General French with the British cavalry kept them back.

[Illustration: SLOPES OF INTINTANYONE.]

[Illustration: ROYAL DUBLIN FUSILIERS AT THE FOOT OF INTINTANYONE THE
DAY BEFORE THE BATTLE.]

[Sidenote: The Boer tactics.]

The Boer strategy was of archaic simplicity, but great effectiveness;
it aimed at enveloping the British forces, in small detachments,
entrenching Boer commandoes round the British camps, bringing up
artillery of the heaviest possible calibre, and then inviting attack.
The Boers themselves rarely assaulted. They had infinite patience,
and, when once the British were shut in, waited for time and hunger to
accomplish the required object.

The town of Ladysmith was badly situated for defensive purposes. It was
dominated by two high hills which rose the one to the north-east and
the other to the east, known as Lombard's Kop and Bulwana Mountain,
four or five miles distant. To the rear of the town was the Klip River,
which was fordable except during heavy rains. Here centred the roads
and railways from the Transvaal, from the Free State, and from eastern
and southern Natal. Here also great quantities of stores and ammunition
had been accumulated, in readiness for a forward move. The distance by
railway from Pietermaritzburg, the capital of Natal, was 119 miles;
from Durban, the real British base, 189 miles.

[Illustration: GENERAL SIR GEORGE WHITE UNDER FIRE AT ELANDSLAAGTE.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 27, 1899.]

[Sidenote: White decides to hold Ladysmith.]

General White had now to arrive at a most critical decision. He had to
determine whether he should hold on to Ladysmith or abandon the place
and fall slowly back. It was already clear that the Boers were far
stronger than anyone in the British army had supposed. They had heavy
artillery, with which the British force was utterly unprovided, and
even their field-guns had on occasion outranged ours. They had fought
splendidly; after each battle and each British victory it was said that
the "moral effect" would be enormous, yet, nevertheless, the Boers
always advanced, and appeared to come up smiling. Moreover, certain
circumstances had taken the edge off our victories. After Dundee the
Boers had captured a great part of our cavalry; and Yule's retreat
left them all our wounded of that battle. After Elandslaagte had come
Rietfontein, in which they had fully held their own. They had overrun
the northern wedge of Natal, and were confident of driving the British
into the sea.

[Illustration: NEWCASTLE, NATAL.

This little town, near the Transvaal border, was abandoned by the
British when concentrating at Dundee and Ladysmith. The late Mr.
Escombe, formerly Premier of Natal, was staying here, and was one of
the last to leave.]

[Illustration: FORT AMIEL, NEWCASTLE.]

No substantial help could be expected for three weeks; the only
reinforcements immediately available were the Border Regiment and the
Rifle Brigade, at the most 1,600 men, which were landing at Durban
on their way from Europe. But if General White fell back the moral
effect would be very bad, and the difficulty of preventing the enemy
from overrunning the centre of Natal and plundering the loyalists very
great; moreover, the vast accumulation of British stores and ammunition
at Ladysmith would have to be either destroyed or abandoned if our army
retreated.

[Illustration: HOLLANDERS IN POSSESSION AT FORT AMIEL, NEWCASTLE.

These Hollanders must not be confused with the Boers; they are natives
of Holland in the pay of the Transvaal Government. The photograph shows
a party of them in occupation of Fort Amiel, after the abandonment of
Newcastle by the British.]

General White, therefore, decided to hold the town. He had now under
his orders about 12,000 men and 48 guns--36 15-pounders of the field
artillery and 12 7-and 9-pounders of little value. Of the total force
about 2,400 were mounted men. Against these the Boers had from 25,000
to 30,000 men and a large number of guns. They were, to a man, mounted,
and good horsemen; many of them knew the country; all were accustomed
to the peculiar warfare which the terrain in South Africa renders
necessary.

[Illustration: A SUNDAY SERVICE IN LADYSMITH.]

CHAPTER III.

THE INVESTMENT OF LADYSMITH, MAFEKING, AND KIMBERLEY.

On October 27 a strong British column marched out of Ladysmith and
reconnoitred. The enemy, being not as yet in sufficient strength, or
possibly anxious to draw the British on, fell back, and there was
nothing more than an interchange of shots.

[Illustration: MARITZBURG HOTCHKISS GUN DETACHMENT.

Shut up in Ladysmith; Lieut. Walker in command.]

[Sidenote: The Boers seize the heights dominating Ladysmith.]

There was a lull until the 30th. Between the 26th and 29th the Boers,
repeating their Dundee tactics, seized the ridge to the north of
Ladysmith known as Pepworth Hill, about 7,000 yards from the town,
and placed two or more heavy 40-pounder siege guns in position there.
They also brought up a large number of smaller guns--Schneider-Canet
quick-firers and Maxim automatic 1-pounders--from the ample store
with which the gold wrung from the Outlanders had provided them, and
throwing up entrenchments, further strengthened a naturally strong and
commanding position.

[Illustration: NATAL CARBINEERS WITH MAXIM GUN.

This picture represents the detachment under Lieut. Gallway in camp at
Ladysmith. They were taken prisoners in the battle of Dundee.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 29, 1899.]

On October 29 a war balloon which had just arrived from England was
sent up, and the Boer positions were reconnoitred. Late in the evening
the greater part of two battalions of infantry--the Gloucesters and
Dublin Fusiliers--under Colonel Carleton, with a mountain battery, a
total of about 1,200 men, were detailed to move out, under cover of
night, to seize two hills close to the Klip River and six miles to the
north of Ladysmith, thus securing the British left for next day's work.
The only enemies expected to be encountered in this direction were the
Free Staters, who were reported to be in no great force.

[Illustration: LADYSMITH CAMP IN THE EARLY DAYS OF THE WAR.]

To the right of Carleton was Colonel Ian Hamilton with three battalions
of infantry, the Imperial Light Horse, and three batteries. He took
post facing Pepworth Hill during the night. On his right again was
a brigade, five battalions strong, under Colonel Grimwood, with
three batteries, facing the Boer position at Farquhar's Farm, to the
north-east of Ladysmith.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by H. Nicholls, Johannesburg._

THE DEVONS IN ACTION.

This photograph was taken on the battlefield, and represents the
Devonshire regiment in a position facing Pepworth Hill, firing from
behind boulders, which form an effective cover. One of the men, having
just fired, has risen to watch the effect of his shot. The photograph
demonstrates the absence of smoke from modern rifle-fire.]

Last of all, on the extreme British right, was General French with the
whole of the cavalry. Only a skeleton force was left behind to defend
Ladysmith. The main attack was to be delivered by Hamilton's brigade
upon Pepworth Hill.

[Illustration: PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF FARQUHAR'S FARM.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 30, 1899.] _The Boers Reinforced._]

Dawn came, and with it an unpleasant accompaniment in the shape of
shells from the big Boer 40-pounders, which fell in the town. The
battle opened when the British troops were noticed by the enemy to be
drawn up in the appointed positions. In front of our men were green
swelling hills or frowning ridges, the skylines broken only by the
enemy's entrenchments and here and there by their field-guns. The whole
country, indeed, seemed alive with their hosts, which held in ample
force the horseshoe-shaped heights dominating Ladysmith from the east
and north-east.

[Illustration: WAR BALLOON IN USE AT LADYSMITH.]

[Sidenote: The Battle of Farquhar's Farm.]

The enemy's field artillery opened from Pepworth Hill and Farquhar's
Farm upon the British infantry; the British artillery kept under cover
and did not reply till the hostile guns, which fired smokeless powder
and which were therefore most difficult to find, had been located.
Then at last our batteries got to work, and a fierce duel began. The
ridge and the plain below were both one sheet of flame. The main Boer
artillery position was soon a mass of small clouds of smoke from our
bursting shrapnel. About 6·50 the enemy's guns seemed to be silenced,
or fired only spasmodically, whereupon our guns shelled the gullies of
the heights in which the Boer marksmen lay for shelter, driving them
back. Gradually our artillery fire also abated, and the battle paused.

[Illustration: GENERAL JOUBERT, COMMANDING THE FORCES OF THE TRANSVAAL.

General Pietrus Jacobus Joubert, born at Cango, Cape Colony, 1833;
State Attorney of Transvaal, 1867; acted as President during Kruger's
absence in Europe, 1883-84. Has twice been an unsuccessful candidate
for the Presidency.]

[Illustration: A BOER COMMANDO.

When occasion arises for a Boer commando to be called out, the Field
Cornet or local magistrate rides round to the neighbouring farms and
commandeers, _i.e._ orders out, the farmers into the field. They go
out just as they are, with rifle, bandolier, their horse, and a piece
of biltong, or dried meat, in their pocket. A collection of some two
or three hundred farmers from one particular district is termed a
commando.]

[Illustration: A BOER SHARPSHOOTER.

_R. Caton Woodville._] _By permission of H. Graves & Co._]

From the column on the left no news had arrived. About six heavy
firing was heard in its direction; an hour later came the crash of
a furious fusillade, in which the growl of the Maxim could plainly
be heard. To this quarter was shortly afterwards seen moving a very
strong commando of the enemy. It was observed pouring down a far-off
hill "like a colony of ants on the march." The roar of firing on the
left grew louder, and the battle broke out with renewed vigour over
all the wide sweep of the quadrant. The Boer guns opened once more; it
was clear that the enemy had been strongly reinforced. They showed all
round in such strength that the Imperial Light Horse on the left centre
had to fall back, and the British artillery in this quarter changed
position slightly to meet the oncoming foe. A heavy fire checked the
Boer advance, but could not defeat it; to prevent the main British
force from being cut off from its left, our troops were thrust forward,
battalion by battalion, until every available man was in line.
[Sidenote: [OCT. 30, 1899.]

Two British batteries pushed forward into the open and dosed the
Boer 40-pounders and other guns on Pepworth Hill with shrapnel so
effectively that they almost ceased fire.

On the right, however, fresh Boer weapons were each minute coming
into line, and the artillery preponderance hitherto on our side was
threatening to pass from us. The enemy's automatic 1-pounder guns were
particularly annoying, directing their stream of small but deadly
shells upon our guns and our infantry. Yet so splendidly was the
British artillery handled that once more it got the better of the foe,
checked the counter-attack on the right, and was paving the way for
an infantry assault upon the Boer position at Farquhar's Farm when
suddenly the most disquieting news arrived from Ladysmith.

[Sidenote: White withdraws to save the town.]

This was an urgent message from Colonel Knox, in command of the town,
to Sir George White, stating that the enemy appeared to be on the
verge of making a determined attack on Ladysmith and the British camp
from the north. Without doubt the Boers advancing in this quarter were
the commandoes which should have been held back by Carleton's unlucky
column. General White could do nothing but retreat; there was only a
mere handful of men in Ladysmith. But to withdraw his forces from a
pitched battle, in the presence of a vastly superior enemy, was no easy
task.

[Illustration:

_John Charlton._]

BRINGING OFF THE GUNS.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 30, 1899.] _Heroism of the Field Artillery._]

The battlefield at this moment was a strange spectacle. Though hill
and plain spurted continuous flame, a man standing midway between
the two armies could have discerned little. It was not the battle of
the past with masses of men theatrically manœuvring amidst clouds of
smoke, but the battle of to-day--of the future--a weird, empty-looking
smokeless field, where only the fearful din of hidden guns and rifles,
of Maxims, Nordenfelts and Hotchkisses, of bursting shell and shrapnel,
told of the presence of two combatant peoples. The troops, even the
guns, were, as far as could be, behind cover, whence it followed that
the effects of the artillery fight, though nerve-shaking enough, were
incommensurate on either side with all the tremendous sound and fury.
The air was thick with splinters, shells, shrapnel, and bullets, yet
this mighty storm burst for the most part ineffectually on the veldt.

[Illustration: NAVAL 45-POUNDER (4·7) GUN.

This is one of the guns of H.M.S. Doris, mounted on Captain Scott's
improvised carriage, and brought from the Cape to Durban by H.M.S.
_Powerful_. The photograph was taken while the gun was on its way to
the front.]

[Illustration:

[_From a Photograph taken at Simonstown._

H.M.S. "POWERFUL."

Brought half a battalion from Mauritius, on Captain Lambton's own
initiative, when proceeding from China to the Cape; and furnished the
contingent which arrived so opportunely at Ladysmith during the battle.]

[Sidenote: The guns brought off.]

The two battalions of the King's Royal Rifles were the leading
infantry, and as they were ordered to retreat came under a heavy fire,
and were thrown into disastrous confusion. Indeed, for a moment it
looked like complete rout, and had the enemy snatched his opportunity
that would have been the end of the Ladysmith army. But with superb
devotion the 53rd Field Battery galloped forward and prepared to offer
the last sacrifice which artillery can make--to save the army at the
cost of its own annihilation. The automatic Maxim shells rained upon
the guns; a cloud of dust hid the 15-pounders from view; but the
gunners stuck manfully, heroically to their task under a terrible
cross-fire. For half-an-hour they held their ground; one limber was
shattered; five out of six horses of one gun were killed. Then, at
last, the five intact guns fell back. Nor was the sixth gun abandoned.
Bombardier Saunders, Gunners Bright and Barron, and Drivers Macpherson,
Darcy, and Stoddard, under Captain Thwaites, dashed back with a team
and limber from the waggons and under a tremendous fire brought off the
last weapon.

[Illustration: LANDING AT DURBAN OF REINFORCEMENTS FOR LADYSMITH.

The enthusiasm of the loyal colonists found expression in their lavish
gifts to the soldiers and sailors on the way to the front. Cigars,
pineapples, pillows, and ladies' visiting cards were pressed upon them,
the last with promises to send anything which might be needed, "on
demand."]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 30, 1899.]

This half-hour's delay was the salvation of Ladysmith. Already one of
the two battalions from Durban, the 2nd Rifle Brigade, had arrived
by train and deployed upon the battlefield, a most welcome help and
reinforcement. The 53rd and 13th Batteries covered the retreat in the
centre, the one withdrawing while the other shelled the enemy. As the
town of Ladysmith was neared it was discovered that the report of an
intended Boer attack had been either unfounded or premature. But the
Boer 40-pounders on Pepworth Hill were pouring a galling fire into
the town. Help was needed to keep these long range guns in order, for
none of our field artillery weapons could drive their projectiles the
required distance. Help was dramatically forthcoming.

[Illustration: MAXIM AUTOMATIC GUN.

The action of this gun will be readily understood on reference to this
section. The block A travels to and fro on the guides C (one on each
side). It is provided with a rising front B, which at each stroke
runs up the inclined plane E, along the upper guide D, and picks up a
cartridge from the continuous belt shown just below the letter M. At
the next stroke this cartridge F is driven into the orifice G in line
with the barrel and fired. The empty case is then withdrawn, and at
the next stroke is forced into the orifice I, whence succeeding cases
push it on till it drops out at L. The gun is started by hand, but when
once working the "recoil" from the explosion of the cartridge drives
the block A back, and the springs K and J then force it forward again.
This reciprocating motion is kept up so long as the thumbs are pressed
against the springs N. The barrel is surrounded by a cylinder full of
water to keep it cool.]

[Illustration: LYDDITE SHELL

As fired by the large naval guns at Ladysmith. _a_ detonating pellet;
_b_ weight; _c_ guncotton priming.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

SIGHTING A MAXIM GUN.

In this case the gun is mounted on a galloping carriage. Sometimes it
is mounted on a tripod, as shown in the illustration at the foot of
page 35.]

[Sidenote: Dramatic advent of the Bluejackets.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 30, 1899.] _The Disaster of Nicholson's Nek._]

Early that morning a Naval Brigade, 280 strong, from H.M.S. _Powerful_,
under the orders of Captain Lambton, had arrived on the scene, bringing
two Maxims, four long naval 12-pounders, and two 45-pounders. These
weapons had been taken from on board the ships of the Cape Squadron or
from the reserve naval stores, and by the ingenuity of Captain P. Scott
of the Navy, and Assistant-Engineer Roskruge, had been mounted upon
special carriages which would permit their being handled in the field.
The sailors had with them a large supply of lyddite shells--shells
charged with the terrible high explosive which had been tried for the
first time in war at Omdurman, and which kill, without apparent injury,
men fifty yards away from the spot where they burst, by the mere shock
of their detonation. The bluejackets had come post-haste, standing on
no ceremony, travelling up all night by train from Durban. The big
45-pounders were too heavy and cumbrous to be got into position in the
exceeding emergency; the 12-pounders, however, at once moved out to
the aid of the hard-pressed Natal Field Force.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Pearse._

LADYSMITH AND THE KLIP RIVER.]

The sturdy bluejackets, splendidly led, had whipped one of their guns
into position almost before their arrival was known. "Action!" and the
breech was opened and closed: "Fire!" and a shell went sailing towards
the Boer 40-pounders. Then followed the fearful crash of the common
shells. Eight missiles from the Navy gun did the work: the enemy's
fire was stilled; and one more great record was added to the countless
achievements of the ever-ready British Navy. Silence fell upon the
field, and it was possible to number the slain.

In this battle, known as that of Farquhar's Farm, the British losses on
the centre and right were about 60 killed and 240 wounded.

[Sidenote: Loss of Carleton's Column.]

The afternoon wore on and no news came in from Carleton's column on the
left. Disaster had evidently befallen it, for stragglers and wounded
brought in during the morning stories of an extraordinary stampede of
mules during the night, which had thrown the little force into complete
confusion.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by H. Nicholls, Johannesburg._

ARTILLERY RETURNING TO LADYSMITH AFTER THE BATTLE OF FARQUHAR'S FARM.

The waggons on either side of the street were loaded with ammunition
and commissariat for a three or four days' fight. Owing to the disaster
at Nicholson's Nek they never went into the field. The red-cross flag
was flying from the Town Hall, which had been turned into a hospital.]

[Illustration: TRANSPORT MULES AT LADYSMITH.

The stampeding of some of these mules led to the disaster at
Nicholson's Nek.]

[Illustration: BRITISH PRISONERS, CAPTURED AT NICHOLSON'S NEK, ON THE
ROAD FROM THE STATION TO THE RACE-COURSE, PRETORIA.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 30, 1899.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 30, 1899.] _A Hopeless Struggle._]

What had happened was as follows. The column started at 10·30 p.m.,
with the Royal Irish Fusiliers leading, the six mountain guns and
208 mules in the centre, and the Gloucesters bringing up the rear.
The night was very dark, but through the darkness could be heard the
ominous sound of the snapping of breech-blocks on either flank, and
occasionally the clear ring of a dropped rifle, indicating that the
enemy was close at hand. Nearing the point which was to be seized the
column had to make its way through a defile. While in the midst of
this defile a shot was suddenly fired, and great boulders were rolled
down from the precipitous mountain walls. On this the troops by order
lay down and waited. As they were waiting a Boer picket galloped
furiously through the midst of our men, and the mules took fright,
easily wrenched themselves loose from the prostrate mule-drivers, and
bolted back upon the Gloucesters. The Gloucesters in their turn mistook
the terrified animals for a commando of Boers and fired upon them,
increasing the turmoil and confusion. Nothing could stop the battery
mules, and they tore through the ranks, taking with them the animals
laden with the reserve ammunition for the infantry. The plight of the
column was hopeless; it was in too great disorder promptly to retreat,
and when daylight came it seized the nearest position available,
some miles short of its original destination. This position was a
flat-topped, stony hill, commanded by a ridge to the south, by a kopje
to the east, and by two hills to the west, which were speedily occupied
by the Boers. The British troops did the best they could; rough
breastworks were built of stones and a brave resistance was offered to
the terrible fire which the enemy speedily poured in from close range
on all sides. But any success was out of the question; it only remained
for the officers and men to be shot down till they could surrender
with honour, or till Sir George White could send them help from
Ladysmith. About 9 the Boer fire became very galling, and it was almost
impossible for the British troops to reply. None of the enemy could be
seen: there was only a persistent shower of bullets to indicate his
presence. In no direction could shelter be obtained. The bullets came
from east, west, north, and south.

[Illustration: THE TOWN HALL. LADYSMITH.]

[Illustration: LADYSMITH RAILWAY STATION.

This station was shelled by the Boers while the civilians were
entraining to leave the town, but little damage was done.]

[Illustration: A CUTTING ON THE NATAL RAILWAY, NEAR LADYSMITH.]

[Illustration: THE LAST MAIL-TRAIN OUT OF LADYSMITH.]

Two companies of Gloucesters held the culminating point of the hill
to the south. Soon after 9 they were driven back by the enemy's fire,
when a party of Boers climbed to the position and swept the plateau at
very close range with their rifles. Shelter was sought by the British
soldiers upon the reverse slope of the hill, but even here they were
found and shot down by the rifles of the enemy. Orders were given to
the Irish Fusiliers to fix bayonets and die like men, when suddenly
the "Cease fire!" sounded, and it was seen that someone in the British
force had raised the white flag. The fury of the subalterns and of the
soldiers was indescribable. Their rifles had to be forced from many of
the men, and there were not a few who flung themselves down and sobbed
at the shame and dishonour. Yet the column was in hopeless plight, and
further resistance could only have meant useless slaughter. Twenty-nine
officers, 898 men, and four guns of the mountain battery thus passed
into the enemy's hands. Of the four guns, however, two were useless.
About 150 men in all, many wounded, escaped into Ladysmith with tidings
of the disaster, and 86 more, all wounded, were under flag of truce
brought into the British hospitals. The killed on the field of battle
numbered 52.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Capt. Lascelles Davidson._

DUMMY GUNS SET UP BY THE BRITISH TO DRAW THE ENEMY'S FIRE.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 30-NOV. 2, 1899.]

As the result of this defeat, it became certain that Ladysmith must
stand a siege. Yet even now the town was not emptied of civilians, as
it should have been, though all non-residents, who were for the most
part spies, were ordered to take themselves off. The cavalry, who would
be useless in a siege, were not sent south. The railway to the north
of Ladysmith had not been destroyed, but was allowed to fall into the
hands of the Boers intact, so that they were able to bring up from
Johannesburg and Pretoria stores, munitions, and guns. This was a very
serious mistake, as the Boers' weakest point was their transport; with
the railway in their hands they were able with ease to maintain the
siege.

[Illustration: 4·7-INCH NAVAL GUN, AS MOUNTED FOR DEFENSIVE PURPOSES.]

[Illustration: NAVAL DETACHMENT WITH MAXIM GUN ON TRIPOD STAND.]

[Sidenote: Neglect of precautions at Ladysmith.]

In other directions there was an unfortunate amount of carelessness.
For instance, on November 2 a Boer ambulance containing British wounded
was allowed to enter the town, and was not immediately taken charge of
by the British medical staff. It was afterwards discovered that the
driver was a foreign artillery officer in the Boer service, who used
his opportunity to examine the weak points of the town. This ruse was
certainly unjustifiable, but steps might well have been taken to guard
against it, for our generals knew by this time the character of the
enemy. There were other grave abuses of the Red Cross flag; on October
30 the Boers masked one of their laagers with an ambulance, and on the
31st they built an emplacement for a gun under shelter of the sacred
emblem.

[Illustration: NAVAL QUICK-FIRING GUN DETACHMENT.]

[Sidenote: The town beleaguered.]

On the night of the 31st all preparations for a siege were made.
Earthworks were constructed by the garrison, the naval 4·7's placed in
the best position, and ammunition and stores distributed at various
points wide apart so as to be safe from fire.

[Illustration:

_John Charlton._]

NATAL FIELD ARTILLERY DESCENDING THE BANK OF A "SPRUIT" OR STREAM.]

[Sidenote: [NOV. 3, 1899.]

November 1 was spent in getting in the wounded, under a flag of truce.
Next day the Boers bombarded the town, mortally wounding Lieutenant
Egerton, but had one of their laagers captured by the British cavalry
and a battery of artillery. In the afternoon General French left
by train for Pietermaritzburg; at Pieters, two stations south of
Ladysmith, the Boers were in position with a Maxim 1-pounder and fired
on the train. The General only escaped death by lying on the floor of
the compartment, as projectiles riddled the side of the carriage. The
engine-driver showed great pluck and presence of mind, and this, the
last train to leave Ladysmith, got through the enemy's lines in safety.
Later in the afternoon railway and telegraph communications were
interrupted, and Ladysmith was isolated.

[Illustration: THE ARMOURED TRAIN DESTROYED BY THE BOERS AT KRAAIPAN.

The destruction of this train was the first overt act of war (see page
49). Kraaipan is a station between Mafeking and Vryburg on the Cape to
Cairo Railway.]

On the 3rd a sortie towards Bulwana Mountain was made by the besieged
force, but the Boers were found to be too strong to be attacked.
Already the enemy was developing an advance southwards into the heart
of Natal; on the 2nd, Colenso, where lay a small British garrison of
bluejackets and Dublin Fusiliers, was shelled, and the probability
of the detachment being isolated and overwhelmed was so great, that
it was, perhaps somewhat precipitately, withdrawn. The great railway
bridge across the Tugela fell into the enemy's hands. Here, again,
it would have been wise for the British troops to have broken up the
bridges instead of leaving them for the enemy's use. It was certain
that the Boers, when they should be at last driven back, would not be
so obliging.

[Illustration: GENERAL BULLER'S ARRIVAL AT CAPETOWN.

General Buller arrived at Capetown on the 31st October, the day after
the battle at Farquhar's Farm and the disaster at Nicholson's Nek. He
received a most enthusiastic welcome. The photograph represents the
scene in Adderley Street.]

The situation in Natal was now unfortunate in the extreme. No British
reinforcements were within reach. The main army in the Colony was
beleaguered in Ladysmith; between the Boers and Durban were only the
Colonial troops, at the outside not much over 2,500 strong, a few
seamen landed from the British warships, and two regular battalions,
the Dublin Fusiliers and the Borderers. A bold, decided advance, and
the Boers might yet make good their boast of hoisting the four-coloured
flag over Durban.

[Sidenote: Condition of affairs on the Western Frontier.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 1899.] _British Forces in Cape Colony._]

Meantime on the western frontier of the Boer republics the enemy was
hard at work. The British forces in this direction were altogether
insignificant. At De Aar, an important railway junction on the line
between Capetown and Kimberley, was a handful of British troops
guarding a great accumulation of stores for the use of the Army Corps
when it arrived. The camp was practically undefended, and was open to
a daring attack, for the garrison was too weak to occupy the heights
which commanded it. Hopetown, on the Orange River, to the north of
De Aar, was occupied by a diminutive force. At Orange River station
the great bridge over the Orange River was held by a detachment of
bluejackets, and by a handful of infantry entrenched at either end.
Beyond that point, which is over 580 miles by rail from Capetown,
the line to Kimberley had to be left unguarded. In Kimberley was a
detachment of the Loyal North Lancashire battalion, a battery of
garrison artillery with some old 7-pounder muzzle-loaders, and a
considerable number of volunteers raised and armed by the De Beers
Company, which worked the diamond mines. The main difficulty was the
provisioning of the place, for there were some 10,000 Kaffir workers in
the mines, who were not permitted by the Boers to go to their homes.

[Illustration: COL. PLUMER'S FORCE WATERING HORSES, ON THE WAY FROM
BULUWAYO TO TULI.]

[Illustration: COLONEL PLUMER'S FORCE MARCHING OUT OF BULUWAYO.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 1899.]

Kimberley lies close to the Free State frontier and 647 miles north of
Capetown. In an analogous position close to the Transvaal frontier,
230 miles further to the north, and on the long railway which descends
from Rhodesia to the sea, stands Mafeking, with Vryburg halfway between
it and Kimberley. At Mafeking had assembled a small British force of
irregulars, raised by Colonel Baden-Powell, an officer of exceptional
dash and capacity, from the splendid material available in Rhodesia,
and some detachments of the British South Africa Company's police.
Still further to the north and more than a thousand miles from the
Cape were other small detachments under Colonel Plumer, at Palapye,
Makloutsi, and Tuli, on the northern frontier of the Transvaal. Between
these detachments and Mafeking, between Mafeking and Kimberley, between
Kimberley and Orange River, the communications could not be protected,
and were certain to be broken. Thus from the first it was evident that
Mafeking and Kimberley would have to stand sieges of considerable
duration.

[Illustration: RHODESIAN HORSE.

The Rhodesian Horse was originally formed during the Matabele War, in
the course of which it did magnificent service. A contingent is here
shown under the command of Lieut. Maurice Gifford. A detachment of this
regiment proceeded to the relief of Mafeking under Colonel Plumer and
repulsed the Boers on more than one occasion.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Elliott & Fry._

COLONEL R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL.

Colonel R. S. S. Baden-Powell, who is commanding the plucky little
garrison of Mafeking, is forty-three years old, and was educated at
Charterhouse. He joined the 13th Hussars in 1876, and has seen service
in India, Afghanistan, and South Africa. His recently published
textbook on the art of scouting has had an enormous circulation. He has
also written many books of travel and sport, is a noted amateur artist
and actor, and equally at home at scouting, fighting, pigsticking,
polo, big-game shooting, hunting, yachting, acting, singing, writing,
and painting. Major, 1892; Lt.-Colonel, 1896; Colonel, 1897.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Bassano._

LT.-COLONEL HERBERT S. O. PLUMER.

Has seen much active service in Africa. He was present at El Teb
and Tamal in the Soudan War of 1884; and in South Africa, under Sir
F. Carrington in 1896, he raised and commanded a corps of Mounted
Riflemen. He commands the gallant little contingent of Rhodesians whose
business it is to relieve Mafeking. Col. Plumer has an unusually happy
knack of being able to get on well with colonial troopers.]

On the southern frontier of the Free State handfuls of troops occupied
the important railway junctions of Naauwpoort and Stormberg, and there
were British outposts at Aliwal North. It should be explained that
three railways run from the littoral of Cape Colony inland to the Free
State or the Free State frontier. The first comes up from Capetown to
Kimberley by De Aar; the second from Port Elizabeth to Bloemfontein
by Rosmead Junction and Naauwpoort; the third from East London by
Stormberg to Springfontein on the Bloemfontein and Port Elizabeth
railway. Lines from De Aar to Naauwpoort and from Rosmead to Stormberg
connect the three. Stormberg and Naauwpoort were therefore points of
the utmost strategical importance.

[Sidenote: Doubtful attitude of the Schreiner Ministry.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 11-17, 1899.] _The War on the Western Frontier._]

The attitude of the Dutch Ministry in power in Cape Colony was so
dubious that defensive preparations were rendered most difficult. Mr.
Schreiner, the Cape Premier, allowed tons of ammunition and hundreds
of railway trucks to enter the Free State just before the war, and
seems to have taken no steps of any kind to protect the Colony against
invasion. The Cape Mounted Police, a superb body of men, 1,900 strong,
the Cape Mounted Rifles, 1,000 strong, and the Cape Volunteers, 4,000
strong, were not drawn upon for defence as they should have been. The
volunteers were not properly armed or supplied with ammunition. In
fact, the Cape Ministry appeared to hold to the view that a strict
neutrality ought to be preserved by the Colony. There may have been
an object not altogether unfriendly in this--to keep quiet the Cape
Dutch--or there may have been real disloyalty. But had 5,000 or 6,000
Cape Colonials been available at the outset, Stormberg could have been
firmly held, and the Boers prevented from besieging Kimberley.

[Illustration: VICTORIA HOSPITAL, MAFEKING.

Repeatedly fired on by the Boers during the siege.]

[Illustration: FORT AT MAFEKING.]

[Sidenote: First Act of War.]

The Boers opened proceedings on the western frontier by advancing on
October 11 under Commandant Cronje from Zeerust to Mafeking, while
they broke the railway both to the north and south. On the 13th the
siege began. On the night of the 12-13th an armoured train, bringing
up two 7-pounder guns and ammunition, which had been sent forward from
Capetown, was derailed at Kraaipan, a station forty miles south of
Mafeking, and its contents and the party in charge were captured. The
engine-driver and one man succeeded in escaping to the south. This was
the first example which showed the utter uselessness of armoured trains
operating without any support. A rail removed or thrown out of gauge,
and they were at the enemy's mercy.

[Illustration: NATIVE VILLAGE, MAFEKING.]

The Boers seem to have anticipated an easy and an early success at
Mafeking. The resources of the place were small; the garrison all told
did not exceed 1,200 men, and was ill provided with artillery. But
there was a large accumulation of stores and ammunition, which would
at least enable the defenders to hold out for some months. Cronje had
under him 4,000 or 5,000 men with good artillery, and had all the
resources of the Pretoria arsenals and magazines behind him. He could
draw guns of the heaviest calibre if he wanted them.

[Illustration: BOER COMMANDO CROSSING ALIWAL BRIDGE.]

[Sidenote: Attempts to capture Mafeking.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 17-31, 1899.]

On the 14th the enemy were engaged by the garrison, with an armoured
train supporting, and were driven back with some loss. On the 17th the
Boers began to shell the town with small field guns, but caused no
loss. A few houses were slightly damaged, a dog was killed, and that
was all. On the night of this day, as the Boers were pushing their
trenches dangerously near the British lines, a sortie was brilliantly
executed by Captain Fitzclarence with sixty men. He stormed the enemy's
position at the point of the bayonet, and did great execution amongst
the Boers, who were taken wholly by surprise. Various little sorties
took place during the next few days, and Cronje gave courteous notice
that he intended to bombard. At the same time he cut off the British
water-supply.

[Illustration: BRITISH PRISONERS SEIZED AT VRYBURG.

The three armed men who are standing up are typical Boers of the
district. Their prisoners are--Hellawell, of the London _Daily Mail_
and the _Cape Times_, in the centre; Townshend, of the _Bechuanaland
News_, on the left; Lelyveldt, a compositor, on the right of the group;
and a native guide.]

On the 24th the Boers placed three heavy siege guns in position, and
with them shelled the town, while the smaller weapons kept up a heavy
fire. Three bedrooms were wrecked, the gas plant destroyed, and the
town set on fire. Next day the bombardment was resumed, and the enemy
massed for an assault, compelling the little British force to leave
the bomb-proofs and line the trenches. Day after day these experiences
continued till on the 31st an assault was actually delivered upon
Cannon Kopje, an outlying hill protected by a small fort. The Boers
advanced under cover of the fire of four 15-pounder field guns and of
a 5·9-inch siege gun, but were repulsed after a long and desperate
struggle, in which the little garrison suffered severely and lost the
services of Captains Marsham and Pechell, both of whom were killed.

[Illustration:

[_From a sketch by a British officer, brought through the
enemy's lines by a native runner._

PLAN OF MAFEKING,

Showing the British and Boer lines and the spots where fighting took
place during the early days of the siege.]

To keep his men in good spirits, always a hard task in a long siege,
Colonel Baden-Powell held impromptu concerts, at which fragments of
popular operas were given by the ladies and officers in the town. He
speedily obtained the complete confidence of his men. No precaution
was neglected; everything was foreseen; and in spite of his limited
resources he was never beaten. By common agreement between the British
and the Boers, Sunday was observed as a day of truce. Once or twice
when the Boers were noticed to be digging trenches on that day,
"B.-P.," as his men called him, drew Cronje's attention to the fact,
and the digging stopped. The Boers, however, persistently shelled the
hospital and a convent which the nuns had refused to abandon. These
heroic ladies attended the sick and wounded, and took the fullest share
in the hard work, setting an example which was above all praise.

[Illustration: ORANGE RIVER BRIDGE.

This bridge, carrying the railway from the Cape to Kimberley and
Mafeking, marked the northern position of the British during the early
days of the war. Although weakly held, it did not fall into the enemy's
hands. The photograph shows the camp of the small force which held the
northern or exposed end of the bridge.]

[Illustration: OORLOG'S SPRUIT BRIDGE, BETWEEN COLESBURG AND NORVAL'S
PONT. DESTROYED BY BOERS, November 5.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 17-31, 1899.] _Bombardment of Mafeking._]

On November 7 the garrison made a very successful sortie, drawing the
Boers under the fire of our ambushed artillery by a feigned retreat.
The enemy broke and fled in great disorder, losing heavily. After this
an interval of Boer inactivity followed, though the town was constantly
shelled. Cronje, with a good number of his men, was withdrawn, as his
services were wanted elsewhere, and Commandant Snyman replaced him. The
position of the biggest of the Boer guns was altered; the Boer field
artillery left for the south.

[Illustration: _G. Soper._] [_From a photograph by J. E. Neilly._

A LULL IN THE FIGHTING: DINNER-TIME AT MAFEKING DURING THE SIEGE.

This photograph represents the interior of the "Graveyard Redan," at
the cemetery, and is shown on the extreme right of the plan on opposite
page.]

[Sidenote: [OCT. 12-15, 1899.]

The accuracy of the Boer fire was great. Seven successive shots from
the 5·9-inch gun struck the front of one of the forts, completely
destroying the earthworks, though, strangely enough, there was no loss
of life. The convent was hit eight times; a shell struck a hotel and,
bursting, moved a billiard table some inches without injuring those
who were playing billiards. Another shell took off the roof of a house
in which five men were breakfasting without wounding any of the five.

[Illustration: SCENE AT COLESBERG AT THE READING OF SIR ALFRED MILNER'S
PROCLAMATION AGAINST DISLOYALTY.]

[Sidenote: The Boers seize Vryburg.]

Turning from gallant little Mafeking to the earlier stages of the
siege of Kimberley, Boer forces had assembled at Boshof and Jacobsdal,
the one to the north-east, the other to the south of that town, in
readiness for a move when President Kruger gave the signal. On October
12 the Jacobsdal commando crossed the frontier, seized Modder River
station, telephoned to Kimberley to try to find out the force in
the town, and then made all preparations for the destruction of the
iron bridge which spans the river at this point. The Boshof commando
advanced on Riverton, a station on the railway to the north of the
town, drove back a detachment of Cape Police, and looted and wrecked
the town. On the 15th a brush between an armoured train with British
troops on board and a small Boer force took place at Spytfontein,
ten miles south of Kimberley. Several of the enemy were killed and
wounded without any British casualties. On the same day Vryburg, half
way between Kimberley and Mafeking, was evacuated by the Bechuanaland
Police and seized by the enemy. On the 17th the Modder River bridge was
destroyed with dynamite, a previous attempt to blow up the bridge-piers
having failed. The Boers employed a number of "skilled Continental
engineers," whose whereabouts and nationality will have to be inquired
into after the war, to accomplish the work. Finally, Belmont station,
a few miles north of the Orange River, was occupied by a detachment
and fortified, while demonstrations were actually made against Orange
River station. Thus Kimberley was thoroughly isolated and cut off from
the outer world. The enemy now proceeded to "annex" Bechuanaland to
the Transvaal, and Griqualand West to the Orange Free State, and to
"commandeer" or expel all residents within these districts. Those who
were "commandeered" had to serve against their own country. Most of the
British residents took to flight, but a few who remained were seized
and impressed for the Boer armies, in violation of all the dictates of
international law and of the laws of war.

[Illustration: THE CAPTORS OF VRYBURG.

The Lichtenburg commando, reinforced largely by rebel farmers from Cape
Colony.]

[Sidenote: OCT. 24-30, 1899.] _Fighting at Kimberley._]

To protect Kimberley from assault a hedge of thorn bushes was built
round the town and earthworks were raised. The enemy, however, at first
kept at a very respectful distance, and seemed contented simply to
intercept communications. On October 24 a reconnoitring party under
Major Turner went out to the north along the railway and came into
collision with a small Boer force. Reinforcements were telegraphed for
to Kimberley, and a couple of companies of North Lancashires with two
armoured trains were sent up the line. The Boers were driven back; they
lost Commandant Botha and several men, while the British had 24 killed
and wounded. There was great excitement in Kimberley during the fight,
crowds pouring out to watch the little British force at its work.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Bassano._

RIGHT HON. CECIL JOHN RHODES, P.C.

Born in 1853; the fourth son of the late Rev. Francis W. Rhodes, Rector
of Bishop Stortford. He went to South Africa about 1870 in a poor state
of health; eventually settled in Kimberley, and after many years of
very hard work effected the amalgamation of the various diamond mining
interests into the De Beers Company; has been Premier of Cape Colony;
conceived and organised the Chartered Company of British South Africa;
a thorough and ardent Imperialist, a wonderful man of business, and
the builder of Greater South Africa. His personal exertions during the
recent siege of Kimberley endeared him to every one in the beleaguered
town.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by N. P. Edwards._

KIMBERLEY MARKET PLACE.]

[Sidenote: Kimberley isolated.]

[Sidenote: OCT.-NOV. 1899.]

[Sidenote: Bombardment commences.]

At the end of October the Boer force besieging the town was
strengthened by detachments from Mafeking, and probably by recruits
from amongst the disloyalists in the Griqualand West district. The
investment became closer, and the enemy began to show more daring. On
November 1, either by accident or by one of the enemy's shells, the
dynamite stores of the De Beers Mining Company were exploded, causing
a fearful shock and great alarm in the town. On the 7th, after two
days' notice had been given, the bombardment of Kimberley began. About
70 shells, most of them of small size and very inferior quality, were
fired by the enemy, but with no other result than to shatter a cooking
pot. Amidst general mirth the fragments of this vessel were put up to
auction, the best specimens fetching as much as a couple of pounds.

[Illustration:

_Frank Craig._]

SEIZING A KOPJE.]

[Sidenote: Stormberg district abandoned by the British.]

On the southern frontier the Boers remained inactive all October.
Small detachments of them were observed at Bethulie, at Norvals
Pont, and at the Colesberg Bridge. A larger commando 1,500 strong,
with three guns, was noticed drilling and practising on the north
bank of the Orange River. At this date 2,500 Boers were watching the
Basutos, who, it was feared, would take advantage of the war to wipe
off old scores. But owing to the tact and skill of Sir G. Lagden, the
British Resident in Basutoland, this tribe of Kaffir warriors was
kept so thoroughly in hand that it soon became safe for the enemy to
withdraw their commandoes and move them to Norvals Pont and Bethulie.
The Boers were further emboldened by the victory of Joubert before
Ladysmith on October 30. On November 1 they crossed the Orange River
in all directions and in considerable force, their main body making
Stormberg Junction, some fifty miles south of the Free State border,
its objective.

[Sidenote: OCT.-NOV. 1899.] _The Boers in Cape Colony._]

Stormberg Junction was a point the possession of which was almost vital
to the British forces. It was easily defensible, and if lost might be
very hard to retake. It commanded the lines of communication between
the advance from East London and the advance from Port Elizabeth, so
that if it fell into the enemy's hands the eastern portion of Cape
Colony would be entirely cut off from the west. Through the later weeks
of October it had been occupied by a small naval brigade with guns, and
by a detachment of the Berkshire regiment. On November 3, by express
orders from General Buller, this little garrison retired and fell back
upon Queenstown, farther down the East London railway. At the same
time a skeleton force at Naauwpoort was withdrawn to De Aar. The Boers
pushed forward slowly; Aliwal North was occupied and rechristened
Oliviersfontein, in honour of the Boer commandant; then they appeared
in some force at Burghersdorp, some miles to the north of Stormberg,
and destroyed a bridge at Steynsburg, on the line between Stormberg
and Naauwpoort Junction. The disloyal farmers of this district crowded
in numbers to the Free State flag, and the "commandeering" of British
subjects and confiscation of British property went on merrily. It was
a terrible time for the loyal Britishers, who had foreseen what was
coming, but whose warnings had uniformly been disregarded.

[Illustration:

[_From a Photograph._

FACING THE BOERS.]

[Illustration: EX-PRESIDENT STEYN.

Martinus Theunis Steyn, President of the Orange Free State, was born
at Wynburg (about 50 miles N.E. of Bloemfontein) Oct. 2, 1857. His
father was a waggon-builder and farmer. He lived an outdoor life during
his early years, and at twelve went to school at the Grey College
in Bloemfontein. At nineteen he was sent to study law in Holland
and England, and returned to his native State when twenty-five. He
practised at the bar of the Supreme Court, became Attorney-General and
(in 1889) a judge. In 1895, on the retirement of Mr. Reitz, he was
elected President. It was not until September 1899 that he definitely
threw in his lot with Kruger and the Transvaal Boers in opposition to
the British Government.]

[Illustration: THE PRESIDENCY, BLOEMFONTEIN.

Formerly the official residence of President Steyn.]

[Sidenote: Attitude of the Cape Dutch.]

During these weeks there were signs of ferment in all directions in
the Colony. The Boers had expected a rising of all the Dutch, and
asserted that they had received promises to that effect from the
leaders of the Bond or Dutch party at the Cape. Rifles and ammunition
had certainly been surreptitiously poured into the Colony from the
north and distributed to those whom the Boers thought they could
trust. Trains with troops and munitions of war on board were fired
upon well to the south of De Aar, and obstructions on many occasions
were found placed upon the line. But the general attitude of the
Dutch Colonials was a hedging one. They had no real grievance against
the Imperial Government, which had given them the fullest measure of
self-government, and, though sympathising warmly with the Boers, and
sharing to some extent their dream of an independent South Africa under
Boer rule, they waited for some big success before irrevocably throwing
in their lot with the enemies of the British Queen.

[Illustration: HER MAJESTY ADDRESSING THE WIVES AND CHILDREN OF THE
HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY AND RESERVISTS AT WINDSOR, November 29, 1899.

After reviewing the 1st Battalion of the Grenadier Guards, Her Majesty,
with that unfailing sympathy which since the opening of war has
endeared her more than ever to her subjects, spoke some words of good
cheer to the wives and children of the Life Guards, the Blues, and the
Reservists, who had that morning left for South Africa.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

HER MAJESTY REVIEWING AT WINDSOR THE COMPOSITE REGIMENT OF HOUSEHOLD
CAVALRY UNDER ORDERS TO PROCEED TO THE CAPE (November 11, 1899).

The regiment consisted of men selected from the 1st and 2nd Life Guards
and the Horse Guards Blue; preference was given to light weights, out
of consideration for the horses. H.R.H. the Prince of Wales had bidden
the regiment farewell on the preceding day.]

CHAPTER IV.

THE DESPATCH OF THE ARMY CORPS.

[Sidenote: Dilatoriness of the Government.]

The first reinforcements for the British army in South Africa to
leave England after the tension became acute were three batteries of
artillery, which had been ordered out as far back as September 8.
Their despatch had been talked of for some months before, but such was
the irresolution and timidity of the Cabinet that delay after delay
had occurred. Even now, though these guns were most urgently needed,
they were not sent out in the fastest procurable transports, but,
with a strange neglect of military necessities, were placed on board
two comparatively slow ships--the _Zibenghla_ and _Zayathla_. Both
cleared on September 25, but instead of being able at once to proceed,
were detained by defects in boilers or by heating of the coal in the
bunkers. The _Zibenghla_ did not leave the Mersey until October 7;
the _Zayathla_, a little more fortunate, got away from Queenstown on
September 29. This ill-omened delay is significant in view of later
events. Finally the _Zayathla_ reached Capetown on October 25 and the
_Zibenghla_ on the 30th, having occupied, in one way and another, 30
to 35 days on a voyage which could have been accomplished with ease
by vessels of moderate speed in 20 or 21 days. It is quite clear that
those responsible for providing funds--cheapness was alleged as an
excuse for selecting such slow vessels--had completely misapprehended
the gravity of the crisis, and forgotten Nelson's great saying,
_Five minutes make the difference between victory and defeat_. It is
impossible with our British system of administration to discover who
exactly was to blame, but clearly someone made a very serious mistake.

[Illustration: RESERVISTS AT SOUTHAMPTON DOCKS READING THE LATEST NEWS
FROM THE FRONT.

The alacrity with which the Reservists answered to the call to the
colours has already been mentioned (p. 17).]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

EMBARKATION OF THE NORTHUMBERLAND FUSILIERS AT SOUTHAMPTON.]

[Sidenote: [OCT.-NOV. 1899.]

[Sidenote: Full notice to the enemy.]

The British army had been so organised and prepared by the War Office
and successive Cabinets that no considerable body of men was ready to
take the field on immediate notice. An elaborate process had to be
gone through before any considerable number of squadrons, batteries,
and battalions could leave our shores. The immature boys and raw
recruits had to be weeded out and replaced by reservists who had left
the colours. To call up the reservists the consent of Parliament was
necessary, and to convene Parliament some notice would of course have
to be given. The whole system was admirably adapted to ensure our
enemies having the very fullest notice and the very fullest warning
of our intentions; and, as has been seen already, the Boers were not
slow to take advantage of our ineptitude. How we should have fared in
like circumstances against a European enemy must be left to conjecture.
There would have been no such lethargy as the Boers displayed in the
first week of war.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

OFF!

S.S. _German_ with 1st Battalion Rifle Brigade leaving Southampton.]

Had the mobilisation been completed, as many urged, in May or June, the
Boers could not have gained a month's start, since in May and June the
grass upon the veldt is too scanty to permit of extensive movements.
They could not well open their campaign until October, when the first
heavy rains fall. Yet in the end it may be that the Boers were defeated
by our own unsuspiciousness. Had our Army Corps been sent out in May
or June the Republics would have "climbed down," Britain would have
once more gone to sleep, and Mr. Kruger would have waited till we were
entangled in hostilities with some great power, and then have struck us
with terrible effect.

[Illustration: Rt. Hon. G. J. Goschen. Marquis of Lansdowne.

Marquis of Salisbury. Duke of Devonshire. Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour.

THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.]

[Sidenote: OCT.-NOV. 1899.] _Strength of the Army Corps._]

[Sidenote: Mobilisation begins.]

The order to mobilise was issued on October 7, but the mobilisation did
not officially begin till the 9th. There was--indeed there could be--no
hurry over the operation, for transports were not ready, but had to be
prepared as rapidly as possible. The total force which it was decided
to despatch was as follows:--

Nom. Fighting
strength. strength. Guns.
1 Cavalry Division 5,500 4,820 12
3 Infantry Divisions 30,000 26,430 54
Corps Troops 5,000 3,450 48
Line of Communications and Reserves 11,000 11,000 --
------- ------- ---
51,500 45,700 114

[Illustration:

[_Photo by the Stereoscopic Co._

FIELD-MARSHAL VISCOUNT WOLSELEY, K.P., &c.; COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE
ARMY.

Born in 1833, son of Major Garnet Joseph Wolseley; is of Irish birth.
Entered the Army 1852; Captain, 1855; Major, 1858; Lt.-Colonel, 1859;
Colonel, 1865; Governor of Natal, 1875; Lt.-General and Governor of
Cyprus, 1878; Commander of Forces in Ireland, 1890-95; General, 1882;
Field-Marshal, 1894. Served in Burmah, the Crimea, at Lucknow, in China
and Canada; commanded the Red River Expedition, 1870, the Ashantee
Expedition, 1873; the Egyptian Expedition, 1882, and the Gordon Relief
Expedition, 1884. As Commander-in-Chief at home he shares with Lord
Lansdowne, the Secretary of State for War, the responsibility for the
number and equipment of the troops sent out.]

The "fighting force," it should be explained, includes only cavalry,
artillery, and infantry, and excludes engineers, army service corps,
and ammunition columns. Thus the total strength of these three arms
despatched to South Africa was under 46,000 men. In many of the
published estimates the "troops on the line of communications" were
placed at 10,000, but they were actually much under 10,000, being only
seven battalions strong. To these, 4,000 "reserves at base" had to be
added. Thus it would appear that from the first the Army Corps was
below its theoretical strength.

[Sidenote: Small proportion of cavalry.]

[Sidenote: [OCT.-NOV. 1899.]

Some further facts have to be noted, as they will help to explain
certain of the British reverses. Out of this 46,000 men only 5,600 men
were mounted--cavalry or mounted infantry. This is a smaller proportion
than would be found in any European army of the same size, and was
dangerously small in view of the fact that in South Africa we were to
encounter an enemy who was mounted to a man. Nor was the artillery as
strong as might have been desired. A German corps of the same size
would have had five more batteries, or 30 more guns. In the course
of the war our need of artillery was such that batteries had to be
improvised from the guns carried on board our warships.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Chas. Knight._

THE BLACK WATCH LEAVING ALDERSHOT.

Like all the other regiments ordered out, the Royal Highlanders (better
known as the "Black Watch") under General Wanchope, who was afterwards
killed at Magersfontein, was cheered by enthusiastic crowds as it left
for Africa.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

TOMMY AS SEA-COOK. DINNER-TIME ON BOARD A TRANSPORT.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Stephen Cribb._

STORES TO DRAW UPON: RIFLES IN THE ARMOURY AT PORTSMOUTH.]

[Sidenote: Loyal action of the Colonies.]

To the above totals a certain number of Colonial troops must be added.
Canada, New Zealand, New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, Western
Australia, South Australia, and Tasmania, all proffered aid, but,
unfortunately, the British Home Government did not avail itself to
the fullest extent of their tendered assistance. It restricted the
contribution of men, in all cases except that of Canada, to small
detachments, and did not want even these to be composed of mounted
troops. But, though the Colonial forces probably scarcely exceeded
2,000, their appearance upon the scene gave fresh proof of the
solidarity of the British Empire, and was a striking earnest of the
loyalty of the Colonies.

[Illustration: THE SEND-OFF OF THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT FROM QUEBEC.

The photograph represents the Governor-General, Lord Minto, addressing
the troops. The French-Canadian Premier, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and the
Mayor of Quebec, also addressed them.]

[Sidenote: OCT.-NOV. 1899.] _Enthusiastic Loyalty of the Colonies._]

While Australia and Canada thus responded to the great call of duty,
Natal made the most prodigious efforts, to which fuller attention will
have to be given hereafter. She placed some 4,000 or 5,000 of her
scanty white population in the field, and her sons proved themselves
on the field of battle gallant men and skilful soldiers, winning
well-deserved tributes from all the British generals. At Durban
were many thousands of refugees from the Transvaal, eager to serve
against the Boers, but owing to the parsimony of the Home Government
indifferent use was made of their enthusiasm. Where we might have
had 5,000 good volunteers only 1,000 were raised. The Imperial Light
Horse, composed almost entirely of Outlanders, speedily made a name for
itself, and fought with invariable heroism and devotion.

[Illustration: THE VICTORIAN CONTINGENT CROSSING PRINCE'S BRIDGE,
MELBOURNE.

As in England, so in all the Colonies, immense crowds gathered to
witness the departure of volunteers for the front. This demonstration
of the loyalty of the Colonies is certainly one of the most gratifying
of the results of the war.]

[Sidenote: The greatest expeditionary force ever sent over seas.]

[Sidenote: [OCT.-NOV. 1899.]

When the mobilisation in England began the army organisation worked
very satisfactorily and smoothly. No such task as the transport of an
expeditionary force, 50,000 strong, six thousand miles over sea had
ever before been undertaken in the whole record of military history. In
the Crimean war we had moved 33,000 men with 3,350 horses and 54 guns a
distance of about three thousand miles, and that was considered a very
great feat. With each increase in the distance the space that must be
allowed man and horse grows, and an extra amount of food and stores
must be carried. For very short voyages of a few hours or less one
man can be shipped for each ton of the vessel's displacement. For such
a trip a steamer like the _Britannic_ could carry 5,000 or 6,000 men.
Actually, she embarked only 1,200 men on the voyage to South Africa,
for this reason, that if the troops were to arrive in good health and
fit for service, they could not be packed on board like sardines. The
British soldier is a valuable and expensive product, and far more
carefully treated than the Frenchman or Russian.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

GETTING CAVALRY HORSES ON BOARD.]

The Admiralty was charged with the duty of hiring and fitting
transports. It was decided that, as the supply train for the army
could not be ready in South Africa for some weeks, vessels of only
moderate speed should be chartered. In acting thus the extremity of the
emergency seems to have been in some degree overlooked. Long before
the first batch of troop-ships was half way to the Cape troops were
most urgently needed in all directions. In Natal and in central Cape
Colony our generals might have been able to dispense with an elaborate
transport system by making use of the railways. Of the steamers
chartered the great majority steamed 12 or 13 knots. The _Aurania_
of 17 knots, _Britannic_ of 16, and _Roslin Castle_ of 15, were the
fastest chosen. Though the cavalry and artillery should, strictly
speaking, have sailed first, since horses always require some days'
rest on land before they are fit for hard work after a long voyage, the
time required to provide the horse-transports with proper fittings was
so considerable that very few were able to leave with the head of the
Army Corps.

[Illustration:

_Armstrong, Whitworth & Co._]

12-POUNDER NAVAL FIELD-GUN.

The picture represents the 12-pounder gun on field carriage, as used at
Ladysmith and elsewhere.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

A 6-INCH HOWITZER OFF TO THE FRONT.

This is one of the weapons of the siege train intended for the
bombardment of Pretoria, and used against Cronje at Paardeberg.]

[Sidenote: Embarkation of the troops.]

[Sidenote: OCT.-NOV. 1899.] _Food for the Voyage._]

On Friday, October 20, the first batch of troops, 5,000 strong,
embarked at Southampton in four steamers; on the 21st, 5,615 were
shipped; on the 22nd, 4,864; and on the 23rd, 6,335, making a total in
four days of over 21,000 men. The troops were of splendid physique, a
large proportion being reservists; their conduct was sober, steady,
and irreproachable. As for the embarkation, it was conducted in every
case with machine-like order and precision. "It was almost automatic,"
says an eye-witness; "no one gave orders; there was not the slightest
fuss or flurry. Every one in every rank knew exactly what he had to
do." As the ships one by one cast loose there was a roar of cheering
from their decks and from the shore. Thus did the soldiers of the Queen
set out upon that voyage from which, alas! too many of them were never
to return.

The supplies carried on board each ship had to be very considerable
in view of the length of the voyages. Taking, as an example, the
_Sumatra_, which conveyed 1,200 men to the Cape; she was furnished
with 6,000 lb. of preserved meat, 14 tierces of salt beef, 21 barrels
of pork, 2,500 lb. of preserved potatoes, 400 lb. of compressed
vegetables, 670 lb. of salt, 100 lb. of mustard, 60 lb. of pepper, 150
gallons of vinegar, 100 lb. of pickles, 1,250 lb. of rice, 1,300 lb. of
split peas, 6,000 lb. of sugar, 140 barrels of flour, 336 lb. of suet,
900 lb. of raisins, 1,300 lb. of coffee, 113 lb. of chocolate, 1,300
lb. of treacle, 4,520 lb. of oatmeal, and 10,800 lb. of biscuit. These
were the government supplies to be issued free as rations to the men.

[Illustration:

_E. M. Rigg._]

THE LAST EMBRACE.]

In addition the canteen laid in stores of corned beef, lunch biscuits,
ginger-nuts, bloater-paste, brawn, butter, cheese, tinned haddocks,
herrings, lobsters, mackerel, jam and marmalade, sauces, sausages,
potted meats, condensed milk, blacking, laces, soap, tobacco, and other
necessaries and luxuries. These the soldiers would have to purchase out
of their none too generous pay. Though from the above list it might
seem that nothing was wanting, there were complaints, not without
foundation, of both the quality and the quantity of the food in some of
the ships. The _Arawa's_ meat was discovered, on inspection just before
she left, to be bad and had to be renewed.

There were one or two other mischances, as might indeed be expected
in an enterprise of such magnitude. The _Rapidan_ from Liverpool with
remounts on board encountered very heavy weather in the Irish Channel,
and had to put back with heavy loss in horses. The _Manchester Port_
had shipped some compressed forage which, being damp, heated on board,
and detained her till it could be removed.

[Sidenote: [OCT.-NOV. 1899.]

The total tonnage engaged in the movement of the Army Corps, its
supplies, and its transport was about 600,000, exclusive of vessels
chartered for the divisions which followed later. Yet so vast were the
shipping resources of England that the withdrawal of this great number
of steamers from the mercantile marine only slightly affected the cost
of freight.

[Illustration: ARRIVAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES LANCERS AT CAPE TOWN FROM
ENGLAND.

This detachment, being the only Colonial force in England when war
broke out, was accorded an overwhelmingly enthusiastic send-off by the
immense crowds who lined the London Streets to see them march to the
railway station.]

[Illustration: ARRIVAL OF THE WELSH FUSILIERS AT PORT ELIZABETH.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by G. W. Wilson & Co._

BUFFALO HARBOUR, EAST LONDON; WHERE PART OF THE ARMY CORPS LANDED.]

[Sidenote: The voyage out.]

[Sidenote: NOV. 1899.] _Sir Redvers Buller's Plans._]

The voyage was covered by the Channel Squadron and its cruisers. At
Gibraltar were the eight battleships of the squadron; between Gibraltar
and the Canaries, patrolling the route, the cruisers _Furious_,
_Pactolus_, and _Pelorus_; and at the Canaries the 20-knot vessels
_Niobe_ and _Diadem_. Nor were these attentions superfluous. Some days
before the time when the transports began to arrive at the Canaries a
strange cruiser appeared, which had been built in France for Brazil and
sold, no one knew to whom. Before the war there had been talk of Boer
privateers, and this vessel was a most suspicious intruder. She was
watched night and day by the cruiser _Niobe_, but it was possible that
she had confederates. Accordingly, orders were given to the transports
on leaving the Canaries to put out all lights and to alter course,
steaming 100 miles to the west of the usual trade route. Nothing
happened, however, and the Boer cruiser, if Boer cruiser the stranger
really was, vanished. It would be interesting, however, to know what
subsequently became of her.

The last of the Army Corps transports left England on November 9, and
on the same day the first arrival at Capetown was recorded. This was
the _Roslin Castle_, which had left Southampton on October 20 with
General Hildyard, his staff, and one battalion of his brigade. She
was at once sent on to Durban by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Redvers
Buller, who had reached Capetown on October 31. The next transports in
were the _Moor_, which arrived on the 10th, the _Yorkshire_, _Lismore
Castle_, _Aurania_, and _Hawarden Castle_ on the 11th, and the _Gascon_
on the 12th. Thereafter every day for a week saw the arrival of more
ships and men.

[Illustration:

_R. Caton Woodville._]

A RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE.]

[Sidenote: The plan of campaign.]

[Sidenote: [NOV. 1899.]

The original plan of campaign had been as follows:--The three British
divisions under Generals Lord Methuen, Clery, and Gatacre were to
land respectively at Capetown, Port Elizabeth, and East London. From
each of these seaports a railway line leads inland: from Capetown to
Kimberley and Buluwayo on the line which will one day run throughout
the length of Africa "from the Cape to Cairo"; from Port Elizabeth
to Bloemfontein; and from East London to Springfontein on the Port
Elizabeth and Bloemfontein railway. On nearing the Orange River these
three lines converge on a front of about 100 miles, the Capetown and
Kimberley line at Orange River station, a distance of some 570 miles,
that from Port Elizabeth at Norvals Pont, 328 miles by the railway,
and that from East London at Bethulie, a distance of 290 miles. The
use of three lines of railway, which in any case would have been very
much to our advantage, was the more desirable from the fact of the
South African lines being single tracks, with but scanty accommodation
for the returning trains, and few facilities for the transport of
huge quantities of stores and war material. It was probably intended
to effect the concentration a little south of the Orange River, or
perhaps ultimately upon Orange River station, where the Capetown and
Kimberley line crosses the river. The three divisions would then have
advanced on Bloemfontein. Meantime the original idea was that Sir
George White would be able to keep the enemy at bay in Natal. This was
a lamentable miscalculation, and the fact that after twenty days of war
he was enveloped, defeated, and shut up in Ladysmith with 12,000 men
profoundly affected the whole conduct of the campaign.

[Illustration: OUDEMOLEN CAMP.

12th Lancers parading one hour after receiving orders to proceed to the
front.]

[Illustration: ARRIVAL OF NEW SOUTH WALES LANCERS IN CAPE TOWN.

Passing the General Post Office in Adderley Street.]

The problem before General Buller when he reached South Africa was a
difficult one to resolve. Was he to depart from his plan of campaign
and detach a great part of his force to Natal to relieve Ladysmith?
If he did so, an advance on Bloemfontein must be almost indefinitely
postponed. Or was he to advance resolutely upon Bloemfontein and to
trust to such strategy drawing off the Boers from Natal to the defence
of the threatened capital of the Free State? But, in this case,
how could he be certain that the Boers would not "swap queens"--or
determine to take Ladysmith with the 12,000 British troops inside the
town, and allow Bloemfontein to fall? It is possible that political
pressure decided the problem; but, be this as it may, General Buller
eventually decided to move about half his force to Natal. One division,
that under Lord Methuen, received orders to undertake an advance upon
Kimberley, which town was reported to be in some straits, though the
published despatches were cheerful enough in tone. Lord Methuen began
to concentrate at De Aar. General Gatacre, with a greatly attenuated
force, was sent to East London, to operate in what is perhaps the most
difficult region of all South Africa, in the midst of a population
thoroughly disloyal.

[Illustration: MARINES WITH HEAVY GUNS PASSING THROUGH DURBAN.]

[Illustration: DURBAN TOWN HALL.

This building claims to be the finest in Natal. It has been fitted up
and used as a hospital during the war.]

[Illustration:

[_Photo by the Biograph Company._

FEELING THE ENEMY.

The "firing-line" approaching within rifle range. From an instantaneous
photograph of troops actually in action.]

[Sidenote: NOV. 1899.] _Climate of South Africa._]

[Sidenote: Character of the country.]

[Sidenote: [NOV. 1899.]

A word must now be devoted to the terrain in South Africa. Except in
Natal the country through which the advance was about to take place
is generally arid, waterless, and unproductive. The climate is dry,
salubrious, and generally hot. Rain is almost unknown except in the
rainy season, which includes the months from mid-October to mid-March.
Over a great part of Western Cape Colony the rainfall is less than 10
inches; in Central Cape Colony and the west of the Free State it ranges
between 15 and 25 inches. In consequence of this diminutive rainfall
forage for horses and mules is difficult to obtain in any but the wet
season, and South Africa generally cannot maintain its own population,
but has to import breadstuff's. The physical structure of the country
is a vast table-land, 2,500 to 5,000 feet in height, lying on both
sides of the great Drakensberg Range, the topmost summits of which
rise to 11,000 feet. As in most mountainous regions, the climate of
this great upland is hot by day and cold by night. The rivers, for the
most part, shrink in the dry season to mere chains of stagnant pools;
the Orange River alone is able to float small boats along the greater
part of its course at all times of the year. When the rains do come
the tricklets swell to formidable torrents, and can only be crossed
with difficulty. The surface of the interminable table-land or veldt
is broken by innumerable low hills or kopjes, which are covered with
boulders, affording the finest possible shelter for marksmen. Here and
there rise the low conical mounds which mark the nests of white ants,
and which give equally good cover. Desolate, monotonous, and forbidding
though this land appears at first sight, its charm grows upon the
traveller. Its very dryness makes it a healthy home for the white
races; its air is clear and stimulating to a degree.

[Illustration: A VIEW IN THE KARROO.

The northern portion of Cape Colony and much of the Orange Free State
is of the arid character indicated in this photograph. It is dotted
with ant-hills and with low scrub.]

[Illustration: A KAFFIR HUT IN THE KARROO.]

[Sidenote: New tactics required.]

In such a country as this the tactics of Europe cannot be employed. The
general's greatest difficulty will be to provision and water his men
and beasts of burden. The absence of good roads compels entire reliance
upon railways, and gives them an importance which they nowhere else
possess. Yet, liable as they are to interruption by a single daring
horseman, they are most untrustworthy lines of communication, as was
seen again and again during the course of the war.

[Illustration: A BATTERY OF ARTILLERY CROSSING A DRIFT.

The rivers in South Africa are subject to rapid fluctuations in volume.
A river which is easily fordable in the morning, may by night be quite
impassable, and this fact has had to be reckoned with by our Generals.
Buller, in particular--"The Ferryman," as a humourist dubbed him on
account of his frequent crossing and recrossing of the Tugela--found
his operations greatly obstructed by the swollen river.]

[Sidenote: Despatch of the Fifth and Sixth Divisions.]

[Sidenote: NOV.-DEC. 1899.] _Despatch of the Fifth and Sixth
Divisions._]

When the news of the defeat of Sir George White on October 30 reached
England the Government did not, as might have been anticipated, gather
from this the extreme need for large reinforcements, or awake to the
gravity of the war. Three battalions were ordered out to replace the
men lost at Nicholson's Nek, but a steady stream of reinforcements
was not kept flowing towards the Cape. There was talk of mobilising a
Fifth Division, but the mobilisation was not begun until November 13,
and thus 10 days were wasted at a time when every moment was precious.
Nor was there any haste in the despatch of this Division; the first
transport conveying troops belonging to it did not leave till November
24, the last not until December 9, forty days after the disaster. The
Sixth Division was not mobilised until December. Had both divisions
been mobilised on November 3 or 4, it may safely be predicted that the
misfortunes which befell British arms in South Africa during the second
week of December would not have had to be recorded. Whatever may have
been the cause of these delays, it is certain that they occasioned deep
disappointment, not only to the generals at the front, whose despatches
again and again adverted to the necessity for more men, and especially
for more cavalry and artillery, but also to the public at home, who
throughout had manifested their readiness to meet any expense and to
make any sacrifice to secure a prompt and permanent settlement. There
were rumours of friction between the War Office and the Treasury,
but Sir Michael Hicks-Beach has indignantly repudiated the charge of
parsimony. Lord Wolseley has, however, frankly admitted that the forces
of the enemy were underestimated; an error into which, unfortunately,
we fall again and again.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Argent Archer._

RESERVISTS AT KILKENNY.

The photograph represents the playing into barracks at Kilkenny of the
last batch of reservists of the King's Royal Rifles (3rd Battalion).
Of this regiment the Duke of Cambridge is Colonel-in-Chief, and Sir
Redvers Buller Colonel-Commandant.]

[Illustration: PLAYING THE BOER GAME.

British soldiers using ant-hills and boulders for cover.]

[Illustration:

_S. Charlton._]

BRITISH CAVALRY DRIVING IN A BOER OUTPOST.]

CHAPTER V.

THE BEGINNING OF THE ADVANCE IN NATAL AND CAPE COLONY.

The Boer success before Ladysmith on October 30 was not promptly
followed up, probably because of the want of a properly organised
transport, and the diminutive British forces outside the beleaguered
town were given three or four very precious days to prepare for the
worst. Colenso, we have seen, was evacuated on November 2, and the
British garrison withdrawn to Estcourt, 27 miles farther south. The
Boers occupied a strong position on a hill known as Grobler's Kloof,
a little to the north of the Tugela, commanding thoroughly the roads
between Ladysmith and Colenso. Upon this hill they placed heavy guns
and erected entrenchments with two objects--the first to prevent the
advance of a relief force from the south, the second to shut in Sir
George White. They also showed well to the south of Colenso, in the
neighbourhood of Frere, having apparently marched by the roads which
lead down into the centre of Natal from the Upper Tugela region. They
did not immediately occupy Colenso, but they made all preparations to
destroy the two bridges, should such a measure become necessary.

[Sidenote: Natal threatened.]

The danger for Natal was great. Captain Percy Scott of the _Terrible_
landed with a large number of guns and bluejackets to defend Durban;
works were erected at Pietermaritzburg, the capital of the Colony,
and volunteer forces were raised with all possible expedition. The
Imperial Infantry Corps, 1,000 strong, was enrolled at Durban and
Pietermaritzburg; Murray's Mounted Volunteers, Thorneycroft's Mounted
Infantry, the Umvoti Mounted Volunteers, and the Durban Light Infantry
were among the other regiments raised by the Colony.

[Illustration:

_Frank Craig._]

COLD STEEL: BRITISH SOLDIERS DRIVING THE BOERS FROM A KOPJE.]
[Sidenote: [Nov. 1899.]

Hundreds of refugees from Colenso and the abandoned districts poured
down into the seaboard of Natal, yet there was no sign of panic. The
women especially distinguished themselves by their fortitude and
bravery in this hour of sad calamity. Nor did the Colonists reproach
the Home Government, which had failed, in spite of many entreaties,
adequately to garrison the Colony, though to the irresolution and
tardiness displayed by the authorities at home all these sufferings
were due.

[Illustration: DURBAN, THE BRITISH BASE IN NATAL.]

[Illustration: CAPTAIN PERCY SCOTT, C.B., OF H.M.S. "TERRIBLE."

Under Captain Scott's direction a number of 45-pounder naval guns were
rapidly supplied with carriages, which gave them mobility and rendered
them available as a sort of heavy field-gun. So mounted, they were
of the greatest service both in the defence of Ladysmith and in our
numerous assaults upon Boer positions. Captain Scott also designed a
railway truck to carry the gun, and from which it could be fired.

[_Photo by West, Southsea._]

[Illustration: GUNS LANDED BY THE "TERRIBLE" AT DURBAN, ON CAPT.
SCOTT'S CARRIAGES.]

[Sidenote: Armoured trains.]

An armoured train daily proceeded from Estcourt to reconnoitre in the
direction of Colenso. Why this dangerous and clumsy contrivance should
have been used for such a purpose it is difficult to say. The lives of
somewhere about 100 men were daily risked upon an errand which could
have been accomplished with infinitely greater ease by half-a-dozen
mounted infantry. The train was tied of necessity to one line of
advance or retreat; it was a conspicuous object, and made enough noise
with its puffing and blowing to alarm all the Boers for miles around.
Nothing could be easier for them than to bring up and lay their guns on
some particular point of the line, removing one or two rails. If this
were done after the train had passed, its retreat might be cut off and
its capture rendered certain. The risk was a matter of common talk in
the British camp, yet these foolhardy expeditions continued day by day.

[Illustration: ESTCOURT.]

[Sidenote: Nov. 4-9, 1899.] _Armoured Trains in Natal._]

On November 5 the armoured train carried two companies of the Dublin
Fusiliers close to Colenso, when the enemy was sighted. The infantry
detrained, but, as it was clearly seen that the Boers were endeavouring
to cut the British line of retreat, entrained again and fell back
towards Estcourt. Then the enemy in his turn retired, and the train
advanced cautiously as far as Colenso station, while the British
troops entered the town and removed at their leisure four waggon loads
of shell, provisions, and stores. On the 9th the train advancing on
Colenso found the line torn up about a mile from that town.

[Illustration: INSIDE AN ARMOURED TRAIN.]

[Sidenote: Ladysmith bombarded.]

Meantime the Boers had steadily bombarded Ladysmith. Day by day their
heavy guns poured shell and shrapnel into the town, doing, however,
very little damage, and inflicting insignificant loss of life. On
November 4 General White opened negotiations with Joubert, in command
of the Boer forces, for the removal of the sick and the women and
children, who should have been sent away before the siege began, but
who, with the lamentable want of foresight which characterised all our
operations, had been allowed to remain in the town till the investment
was complete. It is natural for a general officer in command of an
investing force to refuse to allow a besieged force to rid itself of
its encumbrances, but Joubert suggested that the non-combatants should
be removed to a certain point outside the zone of fire. This point
was afterwards known in the British camp as "Funkumdorf"; few of the
wounded and very few indeed of the women consented to remove to it.
In fact, the bearing of the British women was here, as in all other
quarters, heroic, and above all praise.

[Illustration: THE LEE-ENFIELD RIFLE, USED BY THE BRITISH TROOPS.

The cartridges B are placed singly in the magazine A, from which a
spring at the bottom forces them upwards till one of them enters the
breech, when it is pushed forward by the bolt D into the chamber C and
fired. The withdrawal of the bolt ejects the spent cartridge. There is
a slide which, when required, cuts off the magazine and allows single
cartridges to be used. F is a cleaner and oilcan carried within the
butt.]

[Illustration: THE MAUSER RIFLE, USED BY THE BOERS.

The cartridges E are carried in a holder, from which, by one pressure
of the thumb, they are released and dispose themselves in proper order
in the magazine A. They are pressed upwards by a spring B, and forced,
one at a time, into the chamber C by the bolt D. The rifle is sometimes
provided with a bayonet, but this the Boers do not carry.]

[Illustration: LADYSMITH CAMP AND UMBULWANA.]

[Sidenote: Assault on the town.]

[Sidenote: [NOV. 9, 1899.]

[Sidenote: NOV. 9-15, 1899.] _The Armoured Train Disaster._]

On the 9th the Boers delivered a half-hearted assault upon Ladysmith,
and were repulsed with some loss. The main attack came from the north,
and was met by the King's Royal Rifles and the Rifle Brigade. It was
never pressed home, as the Boers did not approach within a thousand
yards of the British works. They could be seen in all directions just
out of range massed for an advance, but the advance was never made.
There was a furious interchange of rifle and cannon fire, but little
more. The British losses were absurdly small--only three killed and
seventeen wounded. To what extent the enemy suffered it was difficult
to say, but there is reason to think that the Boer losses were far
heavier. When the conflict died away, the naval weapons fired a salute
of twenty-one guns in honour of the Prince of Wales' birthday, and
the troops sang the National Anthem "to the accompaniment of shrapnel
and 100-lb. shells from the Boer guns shrieking through the air."
Altogether the result of the fight was such as to make the enemy
very chary of attacking our works, and to put fresh spirit into the
beleaguered force. On this same day Mr. Kruger threatened that unless
a Transvaal spy, named Marks, who had been arrested and confined in
Ladysmith, were released, he would execute six British officers. The
threat was received with the contempt which it deserved. It appeared
that Marks was a member of the Transvaal detective service who had been
in Natal gathering information before the war. As such his detention
was perfectly justifiable; indeed, in any European struggle he would
have been summarily shot.

[Illustration: THE EYES OF THE ARMY, NATAL POLICE ON PATROL.]

[Sidenote: The Boers at Chieveley.]

On November 12 the first ray of light pierced the deep gloom in Natal,
when the first troops of General Hildyard's brigade landed from the
_Roslin Castle_ at Durban. They were at once sent up country to
Estcourt. On this same day a general movement of Boers coming from the
Free State began upon Central Natal. On the 13th the railway line was
destroyed at Chieveley, one station to the south of Colenso. A force
of about 500 Boers was seen at Chieveley on this day. The armoured
train arrived while they were actually at work destroying the line and
temporarily drove them back. About the same time parties of Boers were
seen at Estcourt, and some alarm began to be felt for the troops at
that place. On the 14th the _Lismore Castle_ and _Yorkshire_ arrived
at Durban, on the 15th the _Gascon_, and on the 16th the _Hawarden
Castle_, and landed fresh reinforcements, which were hurried up to
General Hildyard at Estcourt.

[Illustration: THE DUBLIN FUSILIERS CLIMBING INTO THE ARMOURED TRAIN ON
THE DAY OF THE DISASTER.]

[Illustration: FIRING A GUN FROM AN ARMOURED TRAIN.]

[Sidenote: Armoured train wrecked near Chieveley.]

[Sidenote: [NOV. 15, 1899.]

On the 15th a second and easily preventable reverse befell our troops
in Natal, causing general discouragement. This was the derailment
of an armoured train near Chieveley--a catastrophe which had been
foreseen for some days by every private and subaltern in the British
camp. Early on the 15th the train, with a company of Dublin Fusiliers,
half a company of Durban Light Infantry, and one wretched little
muzzle-loading 7-pounder gun from H.M.S. _Tartar_, mounted on a truck
and manned by bluejackets, left Estcourt. The train passed Frere, the
station south of Chieveley, in safety without seeing any Boers. Just
beyond Chieveley, however, the enemy were made out in some strength
upon a hill. A message reporting this fact was sent back to Estcourt,
whereupon the train was promptly ordered to return to Frere. The order
was obeyed, but when less than two miles from Frere, a hill in front
commanding the line at a distance of only 600 yards, was seen to be
held by the enemy. The Boers gave no sign of life till the train
was close under them, and then opened a tremendous fire from their
rifles and from two field guns and a Maxim automatic one-pounder.
Simultaneously the driver of the locomotive put on all steam and the
train headed furiously down a steep gradient towards Frere. But the
enemy had made full preparations. A large stone had been placed on the
line, and this derailed the leading truck (containing plate-layers'
tools, a breakdown gang, and the guard), an armoured car behind it, and
another truck. The occupants were flung through the air, and several of
them severely injured. The engine, one armoured car, and the truck with
the 7-pounder, kept the rails.

[Sidenote: Endeavours to clear the obstruction.]

Unfortunately the derailed armoured car and truck blocked the line
and had to be removed. The Boer guns had changed their position, and
opened a pitiless fire at a range of 1,300 yards. None the less, the
men of the Durban Light Infantry and the Dublin Fusiliers, led by
Captain Haldane and Mr. Winston Churchill--sometime a lieutenant in
the Army and now acting as a newspaper correspondent--bravely set to
work. Shells and bullets rained upon them, yet, in spite of this, one
truck was dragged backwards and then toppled over so as almost to clear
the line; it still overlapped slightly, and the engine was set to work
to butt it aside. There was great danger of derailing or injuring the
locomotive in this operation. Attempt after attempt was made carefully,
with unsuccess. Each time the engine moved it a little, but only a
little, and the successive pushes failed to clear the line. At last,
however, a well-aimed shell struck the locomotive, setting the wood
with which it was protected on fire, and the driver in despair turned
on full steam. With a grating, tearing sound the engine tore its way
past, but, unhappily, the armoured car and truck behind it parted their
couplings, and could not be got past the obstruction. They had to be
abandoned.

[Illustration: THE DISASTER TO THE ARMOURED TRAIN NEAR CHIEVELEY.

In which Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill, the special correspondent
of _The Morning Post_, son of the late Lord Randolph Churchill,
distinguished himself by his gallant conduct.]

As many of the wounded as possible were placed on the engine, and
keeping on the further side of it the survivors retreated. The Boers,
however, poured in such a hot fire that order soon vanished from the
British force. The engine had to put on steam to escape; the infantry
were left behind, and dropped here and there crying for help. A few
were doubling to some houses for shelter, when a wounded private raised
the white flag.

[Illustration:

[_Photo by Gregory._

GENERAL SIR REDVERS BULLER, K.C.M.G., K.C.B., V.C.

Born, 1839; entered 60th Rifles, 1858; served in China, 1860; Red
River Expedition, 1870; Ashanti War, 1874; Kaffir War, 1878; Zulu War,
1878-9; Deputy Adjutant-General, 1885; Under Secretary for Ireland,
1887; Adjutant-General, 1890; Lieut.-General, 1891; in command at
Aldershot, 1898; appointed to comman

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