← catalogue

The Life of a Regimental Officer During the Great War, 1793-1815

by A. F. Mockler-Ferryman · English · Gutenberg #48274 · 719,097 chars · public domain (US)

The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Life of a Regimental Officer During the Great War, 1793-1815
    
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.

Title: The Life of a Regimental Officer During the Great War, 1793-1815

Author: A. F. Mockler-Ferryman


        
Release date: February 15, 2015 [eBook #48274]
                Most recently updated: October 24, 2024

Language: English

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/48274

Credits: Produced by Brian Coe, John Campbell and the Online
        Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
        file was produced from images generously made available
        by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE LIFE OF A REGIMENTAL OFFICER DURING THE GREAT WAR, 1793-1815 ***

  TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE

  Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

  Bold text is denoted by =equal signs=.

  Underlined text is denoted by ++double plus signs++.

  The 3-star triangle symbol is denoted by ***.

  The yogh symbol is denoted by ȝ; two occurrences in "Winȝet's".

  A subscript is denoted by _{x}; one occurrence in "CHCl_{3}".

  Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
  corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
  the text and consultation of external sources.

  More detail can be found at the end of the book.




The Life of a Regimental Officer

During the Great War, 1793-1815




  The Life of

  A Regimental Officer

  During the Great War

  1793-1815


  COMPILED FROM THE CORRESPONDENCE OF

  COLONEL SAMUEL RICE, C.B., K.H.

  51ST LIGHT INFANTRY

  _AND FROM OTHER SOURCES_

  BY

  LIEUT.-COL. A. F. MOCKLER-FERRYMAN


  William Blackwood and Sons
  Edinburgh and London
  1913

  _ALL RIGHTS RESERVED_




PREFACE.


The period of English history covered by the contents of this book
is one of very considerable interest, for within that period Great
Britain rose to be a mighty power, saving Europe from destruction,
and gathering to herself the commerce of the world. One has only
to glance at a chronological table of events to satisfy oneself
that, from 1793 to 1815, the British Navy and British Army fought
continuously and desperately in the making of the Empire, winning
many great and glorious victories by sea and by land, and handing
down to posterity the names of British sailors and soldiers to be
sworn by as long as the British Empire shall exist. It was an age of
heroic deeds by heroic men. Let us call to mind how the Navy fought
at Cape St Vincent, Camperdown, the Nile, Copenhagen, and Trafalgar;
and how the Army fought in the Peninsula and at Waterloo. Let us
think of the countless minor expeditions in all parts of the world in
which army and navy together added to their laurels; of such sailors
as Nelson, Cochrane, Collingwood, Duncan, Hood, Hawke, Howe, Hotham,
Jervis, and others, and of such soldiers as Wellington, Moore, and
all the former's famous generals; and let us remember that it was by
such victories, won by such men, that England gained her place in the
world.

The stories of the lives of the great soldiers have been written over
and over again; we know all about their strategy and their tactics,
and how they guided the machines confided to their care; but of the
lesser men, who, as it were, helped to turn the wheels of, or to
apply oil to, the machinery, we know very little. Without their aid
the machine must have come to a stop; and how they kept it going
deserves to be remembered.

Samuel Rice, extracts from many of whose letters will be found in
the following pages, was one of a host of Englishmen who played
a part--even though it may have been an insignificant one--in
the making of the Empire. He was, in every sense of the word,
a Regimental Officer--one who never sought and never accepted
employment outside the Regiment. Joining the 51st in 1793 as Ensign,
he served with it, in good times and in bad, until 1831, the last
fourteen years in command. He represents a type not uncommon at the
commencement of the last century; and, at that period, probably most
regiments of the British army contained men of the same stamp, who
cared nothing for personal honour or glory, who cared little for the
good or bad opinion of their superior officers, but who lived for
THE REGIMENT, finding their reward in a conscientious performance of
regimental duty, and content to let their own actions go unnoticed
so long as they helped to uphold the reputation of their beloved
Regiment.

Nowadays, such men, from force of circumstances, are rare. The
British officer can no longer afford to remain with his regiment;
for, even if he is fortunate enough to possess sufficient private
means to do so, he can stay in the regiment for only a limited number
of years, and is forced to make way for others when still in the
prime of life. And there are wider reasons for the disappearance of
the regimental officer of the old school. Modern methods of warfare,
resulting from the improvement in weapons and the invention of new
means of locomotion and communication, require deeper thought and
deeper study than was accorded to military matters by our ancestors.
It is not enough that the officer of to-day should be acquainted only
with such things as pertain to his own branch of the service; for he
must be conversant with the tactics of all arms, and he must know a
hundred and one other things which he cannot learn by remaining with
his regiment. Furthermore, the officer who nowadays has no ambition
beyond regimental soldiering is liable to be regarded as lacking in
zeal and efficiency; and if he allows himself to drift along into the
regimental backwater, he is bound to find his progress barred before
very long. But he has advantages such as his ancestors never had.
By passing examinations he can qualify himself to hold appointments
on the staff, and he can obtain other living-wage employment away
from his regiment. A century ago there was nothing of this kind;
examinations were little indulged in; and it is not too much to
say that the majority of the staff officers came to the front and
remained in the front by personal (and often political) interest--by
a system of nepotism pure and simple. The officer, therefore, who
knew that he had no friend at court to push him on made up his mind
to remain with his regiment, and trust to good fortune to bring
him rapid promotion. He affected to despise the staff officer as
a butterfly and a place-seeker, and he threw all his heart into
his regimental duties. If proof of the value of these regimental
officers is wanting, it will be found, writ large, in the account of
every Peninsular fight, and by the aid of these men was Wellington's
fame built up. "Their most marked characteristics," says Colonel
Henderson, when discussing in his 'Science of War' the officers
of the Light Division regiments, "were that when they were left
alone they almost invariably did the right thing; that they had no
hesitation in assuming responsibility; that they could handle their
regiments and companies, if necessary, as independent units; and that
they consistently applied the great principle of mutual support."
Such were the regimental officers who had received their initial
training under the guidance of Sir John Moore, and such was Samuel
Rice, of the 51st Regiment, himself one of the earliest disciples of
that great master of the art of war.

By way of apology for bringing to notice a man unknown to fame, and
who had no pretensions to be considered famous, I may, perhaps, be
permitted to explain that, in putting this book together, my aim has
been not so much to give a biographical sketch of one individual as
to describe the lot of an ordinary regimental officer of the period;
and it seems to me that there is no more satisfactory way of doing
this than by following the career of one officer, chosen to represent
the type. With such an object in view, I believe that it would be
difficult to find a more suitable representative than Colonel Samuel
Rice, who served with the same regiment for upwards of thirty-eight
years--possibly in itself a record. Moreover, he fought with his
regiment in 1793, at the very commencement of England's great war in
Europe, and he saw the final shots fired in 1815. From what is known
of his character, it is probable that Samuel Rice would have been
the last person to have desired notoriety; but his descendants have
preserved, hitherto unpublished, letters written by him one hundred
and twenty years ago, and I have thought that some of these, showing
as they do the ways of the military world when England's reputation
was being made, are of sufficient general interest to be worthy of
publication.


My best thanks are due to Miss Lucy Augusta Rice for the loan of her
great-uncle's papers, and to the past and present officers of the
King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry--the old 51st--for information
concerning their gallant regiment.

  A. F. MOCKLER-FERRYMAN.

  ST JOHN'S HOUSE,
  TAVISTOCK.




CONTENTS.


  CHAPTER I.

  STUDYING FOR THE ARMY.
                                                                PAGE

  Samuel Rice--Birth and parentage--Education--Sent to St
  Omer in 1792--French Revolution--Preparations for war--French
  hussars and their moustaches--Massacre of
  aristocrats--Expulsion of Jesuits--Founding of Stoneyhurst
  College--Duke of Brunswick's manifesto--Citizen Rice--French
  victories over Prussians and Austrians--Troublous
  times--Rice returns to England                                   1


  CHAPTER II.

  ENSIGN OF THE 51ST.

  Rice joins the army--How commissions were obtained--The
  Purchase System--Officer's pay--Dress of officers--On
  board a transport--Disorder among the troops--Courts-martial--
  Flogging--Many false starts--Gibraltar--_Sans culottes_--
  Affairs at Toulon at the end of 1793--The 51st proceeds on
  active service--Evacuation of Toulon--Loss of the regimental
  baggage--Hyères Bay                                             14


  CHAPTER III.

  THE ATTACK ON CORSICA.

  Lieut.-Colonel John Moore--The British army in 1793--The
  officers--Moore interviews Admiral Lord Hood--England's
  position in the Mediterranean--Elba and Corsica--Horatio
  Nelson--Operations against St Fiorenzo--Origin of Martello
  towers--Operations against Bastia and against Calvi--Nelson
  loses an eye--Moore wounded--Rice's experiences--Surrender
  of Calvi--French driven from Corsica--Sickness
  among the troops                                                35


  CHAPTER IV.

  CORSICA WON AND LOST.

  Taking over the island--The life of a subaltern--Garrison
  gaieties--The Viceroy of Corsica--Misunderstandings--Disease
  and deaths--The 51st garrisons Corte--Corsican
  regiments--Sea-fights--Disaffection among the Corsicans--Pascal
  Paoli and Sir Gilbert Elliott--Bastia--General rising
  in favour of the French--Hasty evacuation of Corsica by
  the British--The army takes refuge in Elba                      56


  CHAPTER V.

  FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN TO CEYLON.

  The situation at Elba--News of Admiral Jervis's victory off
  Cape St Vincent--Evacuation of Elba--The 51st reaches
  Gibraltar--Moves to Lisbon--Napoleon's drastic methods--Position
  of Portugal--Rice a captain of light infantry--Naval
  warfare--Convoys--The 51st sails for the East
  Indies--Lands at the Cape of Good Hope--Arrives at
  Madras--Tippoo of Mysore--Prize-money and plunder--Ceylon--King
  of Kandy--A long and unfortunate war--Rice
  invalided--Affairs in Europe--The 51st returns to England       81


  CHAPTER VI.

  THE REFORM OF THE ARMY.

  Sir John Moore's great work--His treatment of regimental
  officers--He trains a brigade for war--Shorncliffe Camp--Light
  troops--Their origin and history--Discipline--Intelligent
  code--Napoleon's proposed invasion of England--Nelson's
  victory at Trafalgar--Regimental life--Uniform
  of 1808--The beginning of the Peninsular War--Sir Arthur
  Wellesley--Vimiera--Occupation of Lisbon                       102


  CHAPTER VII.

  THE CORUNNA CAMPAIGN, AND AFTER.

  Sir John Moore at Lisbon--The 51st accompanies Sir David
  Baird to Corunna--Situation in the Peninsula--Moore
  advances north--Baird ordered to co-operate--Napoleon's
  forced march from Madrid--Retreat on Corunna commences--
  Hardships--Lack of discipline--Good work of the 51st at
  Lugo--Corunna reached--The battle--Death of Sir John Moore--The
  51st arrives in England--The Walcheren Expedition--Wellesley's
  operations in the Peninsula in 1810                            126


  CHAPTER VIII.

  CAMPAIGNS OF 1811 IN THE PENINSULA.

  The 51st ordered to take the field--Joins Wellington's army--
  Condition of Portugal--Major Rice's letters--Beresford at
  Badajoz--Battle of Fuentes d'Onor--Major Rice has an
  "all-but"--The French escape from Almeida--Second siege
  of Badajoz--Assaults on St Christoval--Failure and withdrawal--
  The colours of the 51st--Strange episode--Regimental
  officers--Wellington's reticence--Winter quarters              145


  CHAPTER IX.

  CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOZ.

  Sports and amusements of the army--Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo--The
  covering force--Guarding snow-passes--Fall of the
  fortress--Marching south--Siege of Badajoz--Attempt to
  surprise Llerena--Disastrous night march--Storming of
  Badajoz--Wild scenes--Remarks on the battle of Albuhera--
  Wellington's plans--Indiscipline of the army--Marauding--
  Punishments--Peninsular generals--The soldiers' opinion of
  Wellington--Flogging in the army                               180


  CHAPTER X.

  SALAMANCA AND MADRID.

  Wellington isolates Marmont--Follows him to Salamanca--General
  Graham gives a ball--Major Rice's horse shot
  under him and afterwards eaten--Grand manœuvres--Battle
  of Salamanca--Rout of the French--Advance on Madrid--Triumphal
  entry into the capital--Capture of the Retiro--The
  51st marches with Wellington to Burgos--Abortive
  assaults--The bridge at Valladolid--French valour at
  Tordesillas--Retreat from Burgos--Drunkenness of the two
  armies--Brave regimental women--Affair at San Muños--Numerous
  stragglers--Major Rice invalided                               205


  CHAPTER XI.

  DRIVING THE FRENCH OUT OF SPAIN, 1813.

  Wellington reorganises his army--The situation discussed--The
  51st marches to the Esla river--Passage of the Esla--King
  Joseph--Battle of Vittoria--Complete victory--Flight
  of the king and his army--Marauding and drunkenness--Wellington's
  strictures--Pursuit to Pampeluna--The 51st reaches the Pyrenees--
  Sharp skirmishes--Siege of San Sebastian--A hard day's fighting--
  The French 51st Regiment--Regimental numbers--Capture of San
  Sebastian                                                      227


  CHAPTER XII.

  THE CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

  Young regimental officers--Their effect upon the campaign--
  Casualties in the 51st--Wellington plans the invasion of
  France--Crosses the Bidassoa--Fights his way into the
  Pyrenees--Major Rice commands the 51st at the battle of
  the Nivelle--Peninsular medals--Battles before Bayonne--A
  short winter's rest--Campaign of 1814--Battle of
  Orthes--With Beresford to Bordeaux--Toulouse--Napoleon
  abdicates--Peace                                               247


  CHAPTER XIII.

  THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.

  Napoleon escapes from Elba--Europe decides to crush him--The
  51st proceeds to Belgium--Lieut.-Colonel Rice commands
  the regiment--The situation at the beginning of
  June 1815--The French invasion--Quatre Bras and Ligny--The
  battle of Waterloo described--The part played by
  the 51st--Rout of the French--Flight of Napoleon--Honours
  and rewards--Colonel Rice's letter about the battle            273


  CHAPTER XIV.

  PARIS--AND PEACE.

  The advance on Paris--The storming of Cambray--Rapid
  pursuit by the Prussians--Last shots--Anecdote of a 51st
  officer--Friendly enemies--Paris occupied--Napoleon's fate--Life
  in the French capital--Return of the regiment--The
  beginning of the long peace--Garrison duty--New
  uniform--Ten years in the Ionian Isles--Colonel Rice
  concludes his regimental soldiering--His subsequent employment
  and death                                                      296


  INDEX                                                          313




THE LIFE OF A REGIMENTAL OFFICER DURING THE GREAT WAR,

1793-1815.




CHAPTER I.

STUDYING FOR THE ARMY.


Samuel Rice was born at Chislehurst on the 19th August 1775, and was
the son of John Rice, one of an old Welsh family long established
at Mydfai (Mythvey).[1] His mother was a daughter of Samuel Plumbe,
who had married the sister of Henry Thrale, M.P., the then sole
proprietor of what subsequently became Barclay & Perkins' Brewery,
and the husband of the lady who has been named by posterity "Dr
Johnson's Mrs Thrale."

Being one of a family of thirteen, young Rice was fortunate in
having grandparents possessed of the wherewithal to give their
grandchildren a start in life, and possessed, moreover, of sufficient
intelligence to assure themselves that the money spent on education
was well laid out. It is, perhaps, remarkable that, although very
ordinary boys at school and not above getting into scrapes, all of
John Rice's seven sons entered honourable professions and did well.
The eldest took Holy Orders; two were in the Royal Navy; two in the
Army; and two were lawyers, one of the latter becoming an Indian
judge and receiving the honour of knighthood. John Rice himself, who
was an only child, had been at Eton, but his sons were educated at
Cheam (Mr Gilpin's), and Samuel, the second son, remained there until
1792, when, as was customary in those days, he was sent abroad to
learn French before entering the army.

Those were stirring times. France was in a state of revolution,
with her king and queen in prison; a republican Government on the
point of being established, and Continental Europe up in arms, with
the hope of being able to restore order in the country and prevent
the excesses which were likely to result from the indiscipline of a
republican army in league with the mob. At first England maintained a
strict neutrality, and held aloof from interference with the internal
affairs of France; thus, when, in the spring of 1792, Sam Rice took
up his residence at St Omer (some twenty miles from Calais), he found
the French well-disposed towards his countrymen, though he, the true
British boy of the period, was disinclined to regard his new hosts
otherwise than as the natural enemies of his country.

In spite of the fact that he was kept hard at work, learning not only
French, but also drawing, fencing, and dancing, he appears, from
his letters home, to have found leisure for shooting, fishing, and
riding, and he thoroughly enjoyed the change of scene as well as the
novelty of being at a tutor's instead of at school. On this subject
he wrote, soon after his arrival in France, to his elder brother,
then at Cambridge--

  "It gives me great pleasure to feel myself freed of my
  leading-strings, and to be my own master, doing what I will
  without being scolded and sworn at. I am like the Frenchmen; I
  like Liberty; but I think they have carried theirs too far, and
  will not do well without a little more steadiness. We find our own
  wine; I have bought for the present two dozen of claret and one of
  Burgundy. _You_ cannot afford to drink such wine."

This matter of wine, which in those days was considered a necessity
even for a young gentleman of barely seventeen, eventually led Sam
Rice to complain to his father about the scanty allowance which he
made him. Twenty guineas a-year for extras, including clothes, was,
he said, a ridiculously small sum upon which to attempt to "live as
other gentlemen do"; and he summed up his necessary annual expenses
as follows: "Wine (weak stuff), half a bottle a-day, and occasionally
giving to friends, eight guineas; washing, hairdressing, and hair
powder, six guineas." His appeal, however, had little effect, and on
his father's refusal to increase his allowance, the young student cut
down his wine bill in order to have more money to spend on shooting.

That he benefited by his sojourn abroad is evident from the letters
which he wrote in French to his father from time to time; and his
knowledge of the language proved of the greatest value to him in
after life. Living as he did at St Omer, in an atmosphere of military
preparedness for war, he acquired at an early age habits of careful
observation; he learned also to form his own opinions and to use his
own judgment, and he became imbued with the true military spirit. His
remarks on the situation as he found it at St Omer in 1792 are of
interest--

  "St Omer," he wrote, "is well fortified with ramparts and flanked
  with bastions; and there are several drawbridges before you get
  out of the town, which, of course, makes it very inaccessible, if
  well garrisoned. But the worst part is that they have got such a
  few meagre dogs that, I am sure, at the sight of an Austrian army
  they would be glad to accept of any terms of capitulation. To be
  sure there is one battalion of Swiss, who are undoubtedly good
  soldiers; but I believe that it is generally thought that they will
  not fight, because the Swiss remain neutral, and they cannot fight
  against the Germans, as they are allies. The people do not seem
  much afraid of the Austrians;[2] they stump and bully now, but
  when the enemy comes a little closer, I am very much mistaken if
  they will not draw in their horns."

Again, a little later, he wrote--

  "There is a great preparation for war here. I don't know how many
  hundred men are employed every day in repairing the batteries, in
  forming new ones, and in making new drawbridges, as well as in
  cutting rivers to surround the town. All this is done by order of
  General Lukener. Also vast quantities of stores and ammunition are
  daily brought into the town, and hay in abundance, for I never
  walk out of the town but I meet twenty or thirty waggon-loads of
  hay coming from the country to be laid up in the town in case
  of want. I heard yesterday that a party of hussars belonging to
  the French had killed no less than four hundred of the Austrian
  cavalry, but that General Gouire (or some such name), a French
  general, was killed. I cannot say that this is a fact; but, if it
  is, most likely you will have heard of it before this reaches you.
  Some gentlemen from here have been to see the camps at Valenciennes
  and Lille, and all along the side of French Flanders, which they
  say are so strongly entrenched that it will be impossible for the
  enemy to come into the country. They saw ten thousand hussars pass
  them all at once as they were in their carriage, and had to wait
  four hours to let the cannons pass. All the hussars had great
  moustaches, which gave them a savage appearance."

The wearing of moustaches by the French cavalry was a new idea, and
the infantry soon adopted the same method of producing a "savage
appearance." The British soldier of the period, on the other hand,
prided himself on his clean-shaved face, with, at the most, a
suspicion of side whisker, cut square with the line of the mouth.
"Shaved clean, and with the hair neatly tied and powdered," was the
regulation. Moustaches were not worn in the British army until many
years after Waterloo, and the order to wear them was received with
suspicion and dislike, being regarded as an attempt to Frenchify the
British army. It is recorded of one famous cavalry regiment that the
officers paid no attention to the order until the inspecting general
made strong comments on their shaved upper lips, and ordered the
colonel to enforce the moustache regulation. Within a few days each
officer appeared on parade fully equipped with a false moustache,
and this appendage was removed when parade was over. How long this
continued is not stated, but for a long time the officers of this
particular regiment were observed to be clean shaved when in plain
clothes and heavily moustached when in uniform. The British infantry
shaved the upper lip almost up to Crimean times.

But the Frenchmen's moustaches did not impress young Rice in 1792,
for he regarded the Republican soldiers as effete and useless,
and likely to become an easy prey to the invading Austrians and
Prussians. His dislike for the French as a nation was intense, and
he prayed for their downfall. "I think the French," he wrote, "a
parcel of d--d rascals, and I heartily hope the Austrians will give
them a good thrashing. We are to have a garrison of six thousand men
here, for they expect this town to be attacked by the Austrians, who
propose to burn the place by firing red-hot bullets, and so pass
over its ashes to Brussels." As events turned out, St Omer was not
attacked, but it was hardly the place for quiet study, and it is
wonderful that, under such circumstances, the boy learned anything.
As an experience, his seven months' residence in France must have
been full of interest and excitement. He lived, as it were, on
the outskirts of the fight--at times with the enemy's guns within
earshot, and he constantly saw troops marching to the front to the
tune of "Ça ira." He lived also in the midst of the Revolution,
for although St Omer itself was comparatively quiet, the accounts
which came from Paris sickened him and filled him with righteous
indignation. In one of his letters he mentions that he has just
heard of the massacre of some thousands of Aristocrats in Paris, and
he gives vent to his feelings in no measured terms. "The cruelties
and barbarities which have been committed will ever be a stain upon
the national character. This French nation, which was once the most
gentle, has now by its cruelties rendered itself the most savage and
barbarous. I am now a strong Aristocrat, and I should imagine that
people in England who favoured the Revolution must have changed
their opinions since the recent horrible massacre in Paris."

It was, however, one thing to declare himself an Aristocrat in a
letter home, but quite another thing to let it be known in St Omer,
and he admits sailing under false colours, in that he wore "the
cockaded tricolour, decreed by the National Assembly." He excuses
himself thus: "If you were to appear without one, you would be mobbed
and called 'Aristocrat' by every saucy boy in the street. So much so
that one of the actors last night at the Playhouse, during the time
he was performing, was shouted to for his cockade, and they would not
let him perform without it. One of the others brought him one, which
he put to his breast, but that did not satisfy the audience, for they
shouted again _à chapeau_, and he was obliged to put it in his hat,
to save himself from a broken head."

Though Sam Rice held French revolutionary methods in general
abhorrence, he appears to have approved of the treatment dealt out to
the religious orders, for, in describing events at St Omer, he says:
"The nuns are all going to be turned out of their convents, and also
the friars. Most of them have been sent away, and there only remains
one church of them, from which they will be speedily dislodged.
There were twelve capital houses with nice gardens which those
rascals the monks inhabited--one for each, and they were allowed a
considerable sum for their maintenance; but now the people have seen
what rogues they were, and have turned them out neck and crop, and
have sent them into the country to live upon twelve pounds a-year.
Their library and church are turned into magazines for hay and
different stores, and all the religious houses are to be converted
into barracks for the soldiers." It is perhaps worthy of remark that
eighteen of these persecuted Jesuit fathers of St Omer were granted,
in 1794, an asylum in England, and, bringing with them several of
their pupils, founded Stonyhurst College, for the education of Roman
Catholics.

As time went on, the cloud over France grew blacker, and by the end
of August the young English student was rejoicing in the thought
that the defeat of the French army by the Allies was about to be
realised, though he gave the French credit for offering a stubborn
resistance. "The French," he wrote on the 28th August (1792), "now
that they have so long enjoyed their liberty, will never, I think,
submit to a despotic government, and I believe that some would sooner
blow themselves up in their towns than capitulate. They seem not to
have the least idea that the enemy can enter into the kingdom, but
I am very much of opinion that he will do so sooner than the French
expect, and in that event the Prussians[3] will play the devil with
them. The Duke of Brunswick in his manifesto was very severe. He
said that all who did not submit to him, when his troops presented
themselves before the towns, would be put, every one, to the sword,
when taken; and he wrote especially to the Parisians, against whom
he has vowed vengeance. Three parts of the officers of the army
which was Lafayette's have deserted, and Lukener is suspended. It was
reported that Lafayette had deserted, but it is said now that he has
been stopped in endeavouring to escape with the _caisse militaire_.
In my opinion, the situation is very bad. Longwy, a town on the
frontier, is besieged by the Prussians. If they take it (and most
probably they will), they may march straight for Paris, as there are
no other fortified towns to obstruct their passage. Success attend
them! I long to hear of their arrival at Paris. We are very quiet at
St Omer, and most probably we shall continue so, as the Prussians do
not seem to be inclined to make their attack on this side. _Wednesday
evening._--I have just read in the 'Gazette' that Longwy is taken.
The King of Prussia, at the head of his army, made the attack, and
took the town in less than fifteen hours."

On the 7th September, just after the news of the September massacres
had reached him, he discussed the situation again: "The Allies
have already taken two towns--Longwy and Verdun, and there are no
fortified towns between them and Paris, but it seems to me that
they cannot reach Paris without an immense army, otherwise they
will be cut to pieces by the French armies. They say that on Sunday
and Monday two thousand Aristocrats were massacred in Paris in the
prisons."

His next letter was dated October 3, and in it he makes no mention
of the brilliant victory of the French at Valmy, where, on the 20th
September, Kellermann defeated the Prussians under the Duke of
Brunswick, and thus gave heart to the Republican forces. He must
have known of the victory, and he may have already referred to it in
a letter which has not been preserved, for he seems to have begun
to fear that all was not going well with the Allies. "I make no
doubt but what you have heard," he says, "that Lille is besieged. My
father, I am afraid, will be anxious for my safety, but I assure you
as yet there is nothing to cause anxiety; neither do I think that
there will be. It is not possible that they can take Lille, as it
is one of the strongest towns in France, and has a garrison which
is determined to hold out to the last. They have kept up a brisk
cannonading for these two or three days past, and even here I can
hear the report of the cannons very distinctly. Most people think
that it is only a false attack to draw off the French armies from
Verdun, where the Prussians are being kept blocked up. I think this
most probable, as they would never attempt to attack such a place
as Lille with only 20,000 men. Lille is very much damaged, as the
enemy fire red-hot balls, which, of course, have set fire to a great
many houses. Numbers of people are saving themselves from Lille and
taking shelter in St Omer. They come, some in carriages, with their
children; others in carts, with their household furniture; and a
pitiful sight it is to see the poor women and children reduced to
such extremities. I was up at half after five this morning to see a
regiment depart for Lille, and I was very well amused for my pains.
The soldiers seemed to wear a melancholy air, though they marched
to the tune of 'Ça ira,' which generally gives them courage and
consolation."

The postscript to this letter shows that even an English visitor had
to fall in with republican views: "You must direct to me, '_A Citoien
Rice, chez Citoien Boudeille, Rue de l'Egalité, St Omer_,' for you
know that the title _Monsieur_ has been abolished."

With regard to Lille (Lisle) Citizen Rice's forecast was correct;
for, on the 7th October, the Prussians raised the siege and departed,
thus shattering Rice's hopes of a speedy occupation of Paris by
the Allies. The Duke of Brunswick's manifesto, which he mentioned
in a previous letter, did more harm than good, as the insolence of
its tone irritated the French into deposing their king forthwith,
massacring Aristocrats wholesale in Paris, and putting forth all
their strength to defeat the Austrians and Prussians. In this they
succeeded beyond all expectation, for the victory of Valmy was
repeated at Jemappes (November 6); and, a week later, the French
entered Brussels and occupied the Austrian Netherlands. St Omer
appears now to have settled down to comparative quiet, and the young
Englishman to his studies and amusements; but, before the end of
the year, his father began to be anxious about the state of affairs
in France, and wrote, "the complexion of the times is such as, in
my opinion, renders it no longer proper for a young man designed
for the British army to remain in France." The people of England
realised that the climax was approaching. A revulsion of feeling
against the French had set in with the suspension of King Louis in
August; the September massacres had increased it; and the arraignment
of the unfortunate king on December 11 raised it to boiling-point.
Neither was this all, for England saw in the high-handed acts of
the victorious Revolutionary leaders a menace to the "rights and
liberties of Europe."

Sam Rice, therefore, quitted France early in December, only a month
before his return would have been made compulsory by the French
Government, when, upon the execution of Louis XVI. (January 21,
1793), an open rupture occurred between England and France. His
education was now considered to be complete, and his father set to
work to obtain for him a commission in the army.




CHAPTER II.

ENSIGN OF THE 51ST.


On the 12th February 1793 (a few days after the declaration of war by
France against England and Holland), Samuel Rice was appointed to an
Ensigncy, by purchase, in the 51st Regiment (2nd West York).

At that time, under ordinary circumstances, young gentlemen obtained
commissions in the army in one of two ways. Free commissions were
granted to a limited number of the sons of officers who had performed
good service for their country, and all other commissions were
purchased, upon the recommendation of two or more officers of high
rank. There were no examinations or other means of ascertaining the
standard of education of the would-be officer, and it may be taken
that Sam Rice was better educated than most young officers who then
joined the army. The greater number of commissions were obtained by
purchase, but in times of war, when the supply of officers was short,
colonels of regiments were allowed to employ the services of young
gentlemen (usually ensigns of militia), who were termed "volunteers,"
and who hoped, by distinguishing themselves on active service, to
be granted free commissions. During the many years of war which
terminated with Waterloo, a vast number of officers entered the army
in this way, and being, for the most part, men whose very livelihood
depended upon their zeal, proved themselves valuable officers.

The so-called purchase system, in one form or another, was almost
as old as the British standing army itself, and dated back to the
time when the colonel of a regiment was entirely responsible for
his corps, which was known by his name. For many years there was no
fixed scale of charges for commissions, the colonels charging more or
less what they liked, and employing agents to sell the commissions,
so that both the colonels and the agents feathered their nests very
satisfactorily. In this manner many useless officers found their way
into the army, and it was not until 1765 that the authorities took
the matter up and issued strict regulations on the subject. Then
the price to be paid to Government for a commission as Ensign, and
for promotion to each subsequent rank, was clearly laid down, the
colonels being forbidden to make any profit for themselves, though
the matter of what was termed "over regulation" was not touched on,
but left to the regimental officers themselves.

When Sam Rice entered the army he paid £450 for his first commission
as ensign in an infantry regiment; and the regulation prices paid
to Government at that time by officers of infantry on promotion
were as follows: to lieutenant, £250; captain, £1100; major,
£1400; lieut.-colonel, £1300. Consequently, by the time an officer
had reached the rank of lieut.-colonel, he had paid to Government
altogether £4500. But if he could not find the money to purchase
any step, it was open to him to purchase promotion to the half-pay
list, at a considerably reduced price, subsequently exchanging or
purchasing back to full pay, if he desired to do so. Eventually,
on retirement, the officer received from Government a lump sum
equivalent to the value of his commission, so that he got back the
sums which he had expended. This was termed Retirement by the Sale of
Commissions, but the regulations varied from time to time, and later
on lieutenant-colonels were given the choice of taking the lump sum,
or of retiring on full pay.

The above is a brief outline of the purchase system, in so far as
transactions between officers and the Government were concerned, but
many and various complications arose from the over-regulation prices
of commissions, with which the Government had nothing to do. These
transactions were carried out among the officers of the regiment,
with the assistance of the regimental agents, and the object of them
was to maintain a healthy flow of promotion by buying out the senior
officers. Death was the only other way of displacing them, for there
was no regulation by which an officer was forced to give up the
command of a regiment after holding it for a certain length of time,
and no age limit for any other officers. Every regiment appears to
have had its own recognised tariff, depending principally on the
purses of the officers; thus the over-regulation price of, say, a
lieutenant-colonelcy of a cavalry regiment was considerably higher
than that of an infantry regiment, and a lieutenant-colonel would not
retire unless the officers junior to him subscribed the sum which
he considered his rank and appointment were worth. In such a case
the procedure would be something as follows: the lieutenant-colonel
would name his price to the senior major, who would then see how the
amount could be made up by voluntary subscriptions from such officers
as would benefit by the retirement of the lieutenant-colonel. The
senior major would, of course, pay the largest amount, and the senior
captain and senior lieutenant would probably subscribe handsomely,
if they intended to purchase their respective steps. It frequently
happened, however, that officers could not afford to purchase their
promotion, in which case a junior officer could purchase over the
heads of his seniors, the latter deciding to wait for a death
vacancy, for which no over-regulation money was required.

The injustice of a system which permitted men with money to buy their
way to the front does not seem to have struck the officers--probably
because they knew of no other system,--and its advocates maintained
that it never interfered with the advancement of a good man, whom
the authorities were able to reward with free promotion to half pay,
or even to full pay. Still, there can be no two opinions about a
system which induced officers of the army to give as a common toast,
"A bloody war and a sickly season!" The system lived long and died
hard. Its abolition was debated for thirteen years, and even then
a Bill relating to it which was introduced in the House of Commons
was thrown out by the Lords, and purchase was only finally swept
away by a Royal Warrant of 1871, at great expense to the Government,
for compensation had to be paid to such officers as had subscribed
over-regulation money for their different steps.

However, to return to young Rice. Getting the ensign properly
outfitted caused a good deal of trouble, and eventually he was much
upset at finding, when on the voyage to join, that his tailor had
provided him with a "plain cap" instead of a "laced one." That was
rather a dressy age, for ever since George the Second reorganised
the uniform of the army on the Prussian model, tight-fitting
clothes, lace, frills, and powder reigned supreme. Each year saw
the introduction of some new ornamentation wherewith the soldier's
dress was beautified; and much more attention was paid to the smart
appearance of the men than to their professional training. The
officers, therefore, had to be very particular about their uniform,
as well as about their hair, and strict regulations were issued from
time to time as to the mode of wearing the hair, changes taking
place every few years. In 1793, both officers and men wore their
hair powdered and "clubbed"--_i.e._, the long, flat, greased and
powdered tail was rolled up, and bound round with a leather strap,
upon which, by way of ornament, the officers had a rosette, and the
men a small disc of polished leather. The head-dress of the period
was a black three-cornered cocked hat, with a black silk cockade
and silver lace and button; the full-dress coat, scarlet with
grass-green facings, was cut away in front, with tails falling to
the back of the knees; white breeches, and black cloth gaiters; the
sword hanging on the left side from a white leather cross-belt, over
the right shoulder and under the one epaulette; red silk sash wound
round the waist, over the waistcoat, but under the coat, and having
its tassels hanging towards the left side; a black leather stock
filling the opening in the collar of the coat, a white starched frill
beneath, and the silver gorget, with rosettes and ribbons, hanging
at the neck. In this manner was Sam Rice dressed when he put on his
"regimentals" for the edification of his sisters.

The 51st, under the command of Lieut.-Colonel John Moore, had left
England for Gibraltar in March 1792, and young Rice, after fitting
himself out, was ordered to embark in the _Neptune_ transport at
Portsmouth at the end of May 1793, and proceed to Gibraltar with a
draft for the regiment. England was now at war with France, and the
navies of the two countries were busy sweeping the seas. Transports
were not permitted to put to sea without the escort of a fleet, and,
as often as not, men-of-war were too much occupied to be available
for convoy duty. Consequently the unfortunate men on the _Neptune_
and other transports were kept on board in English ports for five
weary months, every day hoping that the morrow would see the Blue
Peter at the mast-head. Some of the letters written by Sam Rice under
these trying circumstances are not without interest. Early in June he
wrote to his father from Spithead, where the _Neptune_ was lying at
anchor--

  "I cannot say I much admire living at Spithead, and especially
  when in this state of uncertainty. It is not at all improbable but
  what we shall lay here some time longer, for I neither hear nor
  see anything that is like a preparation for a convoy. It is very
  unlucky for us that we lost the opportunity of going with Lord
  Hood. The _Venus_, which had an engagement with a French frigate,
  came in here yesterday. I fancy, if the truth were known, she got
  the worst of it, for she had two-and-twenty men and one lieutenant
  killed, as report says. By that I should think that the action must
  have been very smart. I was invited to dine on board the _Circe_[4]
  to-day, but could not go, as I am the only officer in the ship. She
  has taken a great many vessels, but chiefly privateers. Three were
  brought in this morning, with the British flag flying triumphant
  o'er the national one of France."

  The soldiers confined on the transports appear to have given a
  good deal of trouble, and strong measures had to be resorted to in
  order to maintain discipline. "In my last letter," wrote Ensign
  Rice, "I told you that I was to sit on a Court Martial, to be held
  on the _Granby_ transport. The crimes alleged against the prisoner
  were: impudence to one of the officers, disobedience of orders, and
  defrauding one of his messmates. I being the youngest officer had
  to give first my opinion, so sentenced him to receive 150 lashes;
  the next, which was Williams, said 200, as did all the rest. I
  was present at the punishment. Two drummers were sent for from
  Portsmouth, to perform. But the commanding officer, Captain Wood,
  considering he was but a raw recruit, or, I suppose, nothing but
  a wild Irishman, forgave him a little less than half the number,
  hoping that that would be sufficient for the present, and serve as
  an example to the rest. Our men, upon the whole, behave themselves
  tolerably well. We are obliged now and then to tie them up, for
  fighting or quarrelling, or suchlike things, but it is the nature
  of an Irishman to be quarrelsome. We cannot but expect it, and more
  especially when there are so many together."

Writing a week later, he again referred to the conduct of the troops
on the _Granby_: "The soldiers on board the _Granby_ transport were
yesterday very rebellious, but unluckily we could not pick out any
to make an example of. These fellows will never be orderly till they
have had, each of them, a good flogging, which, I think, they stand a
fair chance of having before they have been many days at Gibraltar. I
am very confident that if we were not surrounded by men-of-war, and
were to go to Gibraltar without a convoy, we should all be murdered."

The references to flogging in the two last letters must not be taken
to imply that young Rice was shaping for a martinet in this early
stage of his military career. In those days sentence of flogging
was passed on a soldier for offences which nowadays would carry
no higher punishment than a few days' detention; and, in reading
descriptions of military and naval punishments of a century ago, one
marvels at their positive brutality. It may be that we have finer
feelings than our ancestors had, or our natures may have become
softer, but whatever has brought about the change, the fact remains
that accounts of what took place on an ordinary flogging parade in
time of peace make one wonder how a civilised country like England
could have permitted such barbarities. Men were sentenced to receive
so many hundred lashes--even up to two thousand, on the bare back,
with a cat-o'-nine-tails--and the mode of carrying the punishment
into execution was as follows: The regiment having been drawn up in
square facing inwards, and the "triangle," of solid spars,[5] having
been erected in the centre of the square, the prisoner was marched in
and ordered to strip to the waist. He was then secured by the wrists
to the top of the triangle, and by the thighs and ankles to the side
spars. At a given signal the drum-major and his drummers advanced,
and were ordered by the commanding officer to "do their duty." The
first drummer took off his coat, and delivered twenty-five lashes,
when he was relieved by a second drummer, who delivered the same
number, the drum-major standing by with a cane ready to strike the
drummer if the lashes were not administered with sufficient strength.
And these drummers were all trained to the work, by flogging the
fleece off a sheep's skin, both with the right hand and with the
left, so that alternate drummers should inflict the punishment from
opposite sides of the triangle. Near at hand stood the adjutant
and the surgeon, the former to register the number of lashes, and
the latter to observe the victim and order him to be taken down if
he thought that further punishment at the time would endanger his
life. But there was no question of respite, for the number of lashes
awarded had to be given, if not at one time, then at several times.
Immediately the man was taken down, he was marched to hospital, and
carefully attended to until his back had healed; then, if he still
had more lashes to come, he was taken out again, and his back cut
open afresh; and we have it on the authority of Sir Charles Napier,
the Conqueror of Sind, that a man was often brought to the triangle a
third and a fourth time to receive the remainder of his punishment.

We spare the reader further details of this barbarous work, and we
have only said so much because it was necessary in order to show the
spirit of the times, and in order to draw attention to some of the
unpleasant duties of regimental officers.[6] It may be thought that
corporal punishment was rarely inflicted, but official returns prove
otherwise, and it is no exaggeration to say that, towards the end of
the eighteenth century, a regiment on home service would parade round
the triangle at least two or three times in a month. "In 1793," says
Lord William Bentinck, "infliction by the cat-o'-nine-tails was the
ordinary and general punishment for every offence, great and small,
only varied as to the amount according to the different degrees
of culpability, but always the lash; except in regard to the most
trivial offences, corporal punishment was the echo in each and every
one of the Articles of War."

It is not difficult to understand that, under such circumstances,
recruits for the army were slow in coming forward. Moreover, the
Government of the day neglected the soldier's comfort and welfare
in every possible way, underfeeding him, underpaying him, and
accommodating him in vile quarters. The majority of the recruits
brought up for enlistment were produced by the "crimps," who resorted
to every mean device in their prosperous business of catching men and
selling them to Government, and one can scarcely wonder that such
unwilling soldiers should have resented the harsh discipline to which
they were immediately subjected. These were the men with whom young
Rice first came into contact at Portsmouth--men, cooped up on board
ship, without recreation of any kind, for weeks on end, and unable
even to make a bid for freedom by desertion.

That there should have been a spirit of unrest on board the
transports was not very strange, but the possibility of the
disaffected troops murdering their officers was, of course, only wild
talk on the part of a youthful subaltern. This, however, was not a
very pleasant commencement to a young officer's service, but things
seem to have settled down as time went on, and as more military
officers joined the transports for duty. The only excitement was
that provided by the arrival of a man-of-war, after a successful
engagement. "I saw the _Nymph_," wrote Sam Rice on the 1st July, "as
well as _La Cléopatre_, coming into the harbour. The latter had her
mizzen-mast shot away, and was everywhere, I fancy, considerably
damaged. I have not been on board either of them; in fact, the truth
is, I have not been ashore since they came in. The brave sons of the
Republic, I understand, fought with great courage, as did, as usual,
the sons of Old England. The French captain was killed, or else, you
may depend upon it, the engagement would have lasted till one of them
had gone to the bottom. The _Phaeton_ has taken a very fine French
ship, named _La Prompte_. She only rates as a sloop in France, but is
as big as any of our twenty-eights."

In the middle of July the officers on the transports saw a chance of
sailing with the fleet under Lord Howe, but he had other business
on hand, and went without them. Sam expressed his disgust at his
lordship's conduct. "We thought that we were to sail under the
protection of Lord Howe's fleet, but in that we were disappointed,
for he sailed last Sunday evening without having the politeness to
take us with him. When we shall now sail I know not; but the report
is that it will be very soon and suddenly. It needs be so, for they
have given us a fair spell of Portsmouth. I now know enough of a
transport, which means that I will never go in one again, if I can
get my passage in any other vessel. I almost agree with Dr Johnson
that it is as well to enter a jail as a cabin.[7] We have had a bad
fever on board our ship for some time. Two have died of it, and
many more are ill at the hospital. I should not be surprised if we
were all to take the fever, after being so long confined in these
old rusty colliers, now in His Majesty's service for the purpose
of transporting us to Gibraltar. We are to be joined by seven more
transports, and Colonel Lindsay is to take the command of us all.
He has sent us two thousand cartridges on board, and orders how
we are to act in case of attack by the enemy. If one of us should
be separated from our convoy, and see a Frenchman, we are to run
immediately, and our men to be ordered to go betwixt decks. But, if
the Frenchman sails better than us, and comes alongside, we are,
with all our padding, to board, and play hell and the devil among
them--that is to say, if possible. There has been a great change
among the officers from ship to ship. I am the only one left upon
this ship, and consequently am officer commandant, till a Captain
Alcock, who is appointed here, comes on board. He has got a wife,
whom he intends to take to Gibraltar with him. I'd just as soon have
the devil on board as a woman; not that I have any natural antipathy
to women, but I assure you they are a great nuisance, especially in
such a confined place as a cabin. You might perhaps think a lady a
wonderful acquisition to a sea party, but I am very certain, if you
had ever been on a voyage with a woman you would never desire it
again."

Within the month he changed his mind about the lady, and on August 13
he imagined that he was within measurable distance of the end of all
his troubles. "I have just time to tell you," he scribbled in haste,
"that we have received our orders for sailing. Our convoy fired a gun
and hoisted a signal to get under weigh immediately. I do not suppose
we shall go farther than St Helens to-day. I came ashore this morning
at six o'clock to take leave of Old England, and to bring on board
Captain and Mrs Alcock. We have the _Diadem_, sixty-four, and the
_Active_, frigate, for our convoy." Five days later he wrote again
from St Helens, Isle of Wight, still jubilant at the thought that at
last he had made a start for Gibraltar, though disappointed in being
kept back by adverse winds. His letter shows how the vagaries of the
wind upset all calculations in the days of sailing vessels, and he
wrote as follows:--

  "I think I never beheld a finer sight in my life than the sailing
  of our fleet from Spithead. It consisted of about seventy-five
  sail. The _Diadem_ led the way; and the _Active_ brought up the
  rear. We had made about four leagues, when, to our great sorrow,
  our Commodore fired a gun as a signal to put back to St Helens,
  not thinking it prudent to put to sea, the wind not being very
  favourable. The 14th, we lay at anchor. The 15th, our Commodore
  early in the morning fired a gun for to get under weigh, which
  we immediately did. But we were again obliged to put back to St
  Helens, not being able to weather the land. The 16th, at anchor
  as before. The 17th, it blew a heavy gale, drove us from our
  anchorage, and carried us down almost as far as Spithead. The
  same day we were nigh being run foul of by an Ostend vessel,
  which had also broken from her anchor. I never experienced such
  a gale before, and, indeed, it rather astonished the old seamen,
  especially at this time of year. The wind is still contrary. I
  hope we shall soon leave this disagreeable place, which is worse
  than Spithead. Captain Alcock, who, I told you, has the military
  command of the _Neptune_, is really a worthy man, and has behaved
  to me, since he has been on board, with the greatest friendship and
  civility. He is more like a father to me than a commanding officer.
  He knows all the officers in our regiment, and has promised to
  introduce me, but more particularly to those whom he thinks it
  proper for a young man to associate with. Captain Alcock's younger
  brother is in my regiment, and is the oldest captain in it; he
  says that his brother will always stand my friend. I think I cannot
  be better off than I am at present. I am very well and happy in
  having met with such a worthy fellow as Captain Alcock. He has not
  been married above two months. His wife is a charming and agreeable
  woman, and we are all very comfortable together."

The fleet got away from St Helens on the 22nd August, but was
overtaken by another gale, and had to run for Portland Bay, where the
ships were forced to shelter until the 8th September. By that time
the bay had become filled with ships bound for various parts of the
world, the West India fleet of transports amongst them, and at length
the wind showed signs of being favourable for departure. Yet, as Sam
Rice's next letter shows, luck was all against them, and a few days
later the ships turned about and anchored in Torbay.

Writing from Torbay on the 17th September he describes what had
happened--

  "We left Weymouth on the 8th, the wind being in our favour. I
  believe never so large a fleet sailed from that place before, or
  ever will again. We were no less than two hundred sail in number.
  Many were the people who assembled to see us depart, and I do not
  in the least doubt but that the sight was highly worth seeing.
  We passed by this port, where we saw the Grand Fleet lying at
  anchor, and we little thought then that we should be obliged to
  go in. In a very short time we cleared the Land's End and steered
  on our course for Gibraltar. We had nearly reached the Bay of
  Biscay, when, to our great surprise, a frigate came up and spoke
  to our Commodore, upon which a signal was made for us all to
  bear homewards as fast as possible. You may be sure we were all
  thunderstruck at this uncommon proceeding, and were not a little
  vexed at the thought of returning after having made so much way.
  The next morning we passed by the Scilly Islands, and from thence
  bore away as fast as possible for this place, where we are safely
  riding with the Grand Fleet. The frigate above mentioned had been
  sent by Lord Howe, who, having had intelligence that the French
  fleet was not far off, and consisted of thirty-two sail of the
  line and nine frigates, very prudently, and fortunately for us,
  dispatched a frigate immediately with orders for us to return
  with all possible expedition. I was at first very much vexed
  at returning, but am now rejoiced to think that we have been
  fortunately saved from the rapacious claws of the French 'Sans
  culottes.'[8] I hear we have taken Toulon, with a great deal of
  shipping, but that we have had bad success before Dunkirk.[9] Three
  regiments are gone from the garrison of Gibraltar to Toulon; so, if
  any regiments go to the West Indies, ours most probably will be
  one. Our men are now in a sad condition; we have now three hospital
  ships, and all full of men with fevers. Several have died, and, no
  doubt, more will, if they continue much longer on board a ship. It
  is thought that we shall sail with Lord Howe's fleet, but that is
  at present quite uncertain."

Eventually, after having put back no less than nine times altogether,
the transports succeeded in getting away, and reached Gibraltar in
November, when Ensign Rice and his two hundred recruits joined the
51st. He found war the one topic of conversation, and the prospects
of the regiment proceeding on active service being freely discussed.
He learned now the true story of Toulon, which, although actually in
the occupation of a British and allied force, had not been "taken
with a great deal of shipping," but had been peacefully garrisoned
at the request of the Royalist (or Girondist) inhabitants. Admiral
Hood, who had brought his fleet to the Mediterranean, was cruising
up the coast from Gibraltar, when he received a message from the
Royalist Admiral at Toulon, asking him to co-operate in the defence
of that place against the Republicans (or Jacobins), and to hold
it until the monarchy should be restored. Hood agreed, and on the
27th August, troops having been sent from Gibraltar, and a Spanish
squadron having joined the British fleet, the Admiral took possession
of the forts and the many men-of-war in the harbour--amounting to not
less than one-third of the navy of France. He at once dismantled the
ships, and removed such of the sailors as were known to favour the
Republican cause, and he then sought assistance from the Spanish,
Neapolitan, and neighbouring Allies who, in the course of time, sent
him some 12,000 men. This mixed force, with 2000 British troops under
General O'Hara, essayed to protect Toulon from the ravages of the
Republicans, who soon arrived--to the number of 25,000--to besiege
the place, and by November became so active that General O'Hara sent
to Gibraltar for reinforcements.

The 50th and the 51st, which, for some weeks, had been standing
ready to go to the relief of the garrison of Toulon, at once
embarked (December 5), and young Rice considered himself in luck's
way in being called upon to take the field so soon after joining.
Ill-fortune, however, still dogged his footsteps, for the captains of
the transports delayed for three days in putting to sea, thus losing
a fair wind, so that it was not until the 29th that the regiment
arrived off Toulon, when it learned that the place had been evacuated
in haste ten days before, the garrison having made an unsuccessful
sally, in which General O'Hara was severely wounded and captured.
Finding that the garrison was now too weak to hold the town against
the vastly superior numbers of the Republican forces, Lord Hood set
fire to as many as possible of the French ships in the harbour, blew
up powder and stores, successfully embarked the British garrison, as
well as nearly 15,000 Royalists, who feared for their safety when
the Republicans should enter the town, and sailed for Hyères Bay[10]
(a little to the east of Toulon), where, on the 31st December, the
transports conveying the 50th and 51st joined the fleet--to be
received very coldly by the Admiral.

But Lord Hood's disappointment at the lateness of their arrival was
no greater than that of the officers of the reinforcing regiments.
That Toulon should have been abandoned, and that their prospects of
honour and glory should have been torn from them by no fault of their
own was bad enough, but, to make matters worse, the 51st lost all
their regimental baggage and stores, including everything belonging
to the officers, which had been placed on a separate vessel for
conveyance to Toulon. Sam Rice, a philosopher even in those days,
refers to this minor trouble very briefly. "The officers' and the
regimental baggage," he wrote, "went into Toulon in the _Moselle_
frigate,[11] which separated from the transports during the night and
did not know that the town was evacuated, because the English flag
was kept flying. You see we military gentlemen are subject to losses
as well as the rest of the world." And the loss both to officers and
the men was severe, for their colonel had been at great pains to
stock the ship with everything that the regiment could want.




CHAPTER III.

THE ATTACK ON CORSICA.


When Sam Rice joined the 51st, Lieut.-Colonel (afterwards Sir John)
Moore had held the command for three years, but was even then only
in his thirty-second year; for his promotion had been rapid, and he
had reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel in the thirteenth year of
his service. That Moore was a strong man goes without saying, and
that he was a man of very exceptional talents the world discovered
subsequently. A perfect gentleman, of unblemished character, a
reliable and zealous soldier, he was able to bring a great influence
to bear on those whom he commanded, and he had a special gift for
training young officers. It was in this respect that Sam Rice
benefited by being appointed to a regiment with such a commanding
officer, and he learned under Moore things which he never forgot.
At that time the condition of a regiment depended entirely upon the
commanding officer, for in the last decade of the eighteenth century
the British army was not in a very satisfactory state. Sir Henry
Bunbury,[12] who made a study of such matters, wrote sixty years
afterwards: "Men of the present generation can hardly form an idea
of what the military forces of England really were when the great
war broke out in 1793. Our army was lax in its discipline, entirely
without system, and very weak in numbers. Each colonel of a regiment
managed it according to his own notions, or neglected it altogether.
There was no uniformity of drill or movement, professional pride was
rare, professional knowledge still more so. The regimental officers
in those days were, as well as their men, hard drinkers; and the
latter, under a loose discipline, were much addicted to marauding and
acts of licentious violence, which made them detested by the people
of the country."

It is perhaps unjust to describe the officers as hard drinkers, if
by that is meant that they were all drunkards, or that they drank
harder than did their civilian friends and relatives. The morals of
the army were possibly no worse than the morals of general society at
that period, for it was an age of heavy drinking, when respectable
and respected old gentlemen drank themselves under the table every
evening, and boasted of the number of bottles of port which they
could consume at a sitting. Yet, if the opinions of Bunbury and
other writers holding somewhat similar views of the British army in
pre-Peninsular times are to be accepted, it cannot be maintained
that the tone among the officers of ordinary regiments of the line
was of a high order. Some certainly drank a great deal more than was
good for them; otherwise it would hardly have been necessary to put
in print in the standing orders of a certain regiment the caution
that "the Surgeon and his Mate must always be strictly sober."
Gambling was indulged in to an inordinate extent; and duelling was
not unknown. The fact is that the army was suffering from long years
of inaction, and from the pernicious effects of service in America,
India, and the West Indies, where regiments went to pieces and took
years to recover themselves. To this must be added the further
fact that the regimental officer was promoted not by merit, but by
purchase; so that it was only necessary for a man to bide his time,
and to have sufficient money at his back to buy his steps when they
came, and in due course he commanded his regiment, and continued to
command it until he could be bought out.

But, it may be asked, if such was indeed the state of affairs, how
came it that the British army rapidly emerged from this condition
of darkness to save Europe? How came it that the hard-drinking
British officer was able to pull himself together, and become
transformed into an upright and zealous soldier, capable of enduring
endless hardships and displaying great gallantry? The answer is
that all regiments were not bad; that most regiments--even the bad
ones--possessed some officers of high moral character and endowed
with exceptional talents, and when war came in 1793 these officers,
on the principle of the "survival of the fittest," came to the front,
and gradually established a tone on active service which had been
impossible to uphold in times of peace. Some regiments possessed
more of such officers than others, and some regiments, again, chanced
to have a colonel with sufficient strength of will to give a short
shrift to any of his subordinates who were not likely to be of value
to him. As the war progressed many of the junior, and not a few of
the senior, officers willingly or unwillingly fell out, to make room
for better men; many were found wanting and were removed; and many
had undermined their constitutions to such an extent that in their
first campaign they were carried off by what was commonly described
as "the fever," or the "distemper." While the weeding-out process
was at work during the last few years of the eighteenth century, and
during the opening years of the nineteenth, the annual wastage of
officers was immense; after that, matters righted themselves.

Still, it is an error to suppose that the whole army was in so bad
a state in 1793 as Bunbury would have us believe, for there are
still in existence the printed standing orders of a few regiments of
the line of about this date, and from these there is proof enough
that very great attention was paid to the wellbeing of corps. The
discipline was strict, though of the severe and mechanical order,
and it was maintained solely by the lash; duties in quarters were
performed with the utmost regularity; and if the standing orders
were carried out, the regiments should have been in excellent order.
It may, of course, be possible that such regiments as had standing
orders were, from this very fact, good regiments, and that the
strictures of Bunbury and others applied to the bad regiments, which
were, perhaps, more numerous than the good ones.

It is, however, quite certain that when the 51st regiment went on
service in 1793, its general condition left nothing to be desired,
since Moore had paid attention to such weeding-out of officers as was
necessary when he first took up the command in 1790, and all young
officers who joined afterwards were kept under his ever-watchful eye
until he was sure of them. "He felt that a perfect knowledge and an
exact performance of the humble, but important duties of a subaltern
officer, are the best foundations for subsequent military fame";[13]
and he required from his officers a punctilious attention to duty
and a thorough knowledge of their profession, so that they might be
looked up to and respected by the soldiers whom they were called upon
to command. And, a perfect gentleman himself, he had no place in the
51st for any officer who was not the same. He was not a martinet, and
he did not ride rough-shod over his officers and men, but he knew
exactly when the occasion demanded a right enforcement of discipline,
and when discipline could be relaxed without detriment to the
"machine," which he proudly described, in September 1793, as being in
as good order as he could get it.

So much has been said here of Colonel Moore's characteristics,[14]
because he was Sam Rice's first commanding officer, and because
his teachings left their mark upon the man who served continuously
with Moore's old regiment for thirty-eight years. To return to
affairs in the Mediterranean: Colonel Moore, as senior officer with
the reinforcements which joined Lord Hood's fleet in Hyères Bay,
immediately went on board the _Victory_, and reported his arrival to
the Admiral, who somewhat churlishly remarked that the reinforcements
were meagre and had arrived too late to be of any use. He forgot
that the delay was due to dilatoriness on the part of his own naval
officers, and he forgot also that had the reinforcements arrived a
fortnight earlier, they could not have prevented the evacuation of
Toulon, since, on the 16th December, the enemy had captured the forts
which dominated the anchorage of the British fleet.

The Admiral was now busily engaged in working out a plan for
employing the troops on the transports in some enterprise which,
while redounding to his own credit, would compensate in a measure for
the abandonment of the great French arsenal; for he was aware that
the evacuation of Toulon without destroying all the French ships,
although the only step that, under the circumstances, was possible,
might be regarded in England as a grave failure on his part.
Something, he decided, must be done at once, and that something must
take the form of providing for the British fleet in the Mediterranean
a base deeper in than that afforded by Gibraltar, which was at that
time the only British possession in the Mediterranean, and almost a
thousand miles from Genoa, in the neighbourhood of which port the
French and Austrian armies were operating. Lord Hood realised from
the outset the broad principle that, as Captain Mahan[15] says, "the
policy of Great Britain was to control the sea for the protection
of commerce, and to sustain on shore the continental powers in the
war against France--chiefly by money, but also by naval co-operation
when feasible." Under these circumstances, the Admiral's thoughts
naturally turned to Corsica, which, though still garrisoned by French
troops, was known to be more or less in revolt against the Republican
Government. The exact state of affairs in the island, however, and
the strength of the French defences and garrisons, were things about
which Lord Hood had little information; and though he regretted the
necessity for delaying the capture of Corsica, he wisely accepted,
on this occasion, the advice of the military commanders to send two
military officers to reconnoitre and report on the practicability of
making a descent on the island. Moore and a major of artillery named
Koehler were selected for this duty, and on the 11th January (1794)
left in the _Lowestoffe_ frigate, in which also sailed Sir Gilbert
Elliott, one of the King's Commissioners in the Mediterranean, who
was to endeavour to persuade the Corsican inhabitants to assist the
British force in ridding the island of the French interlopers.

It is unnecessary to dwell on Corsican history further than to say
that from 1559 to 1768 the island was a dependency of Genoa, and
that in the latter year, contrary to the wishes of the people,
was basely sold to France. The Corsicans then made a bid for
independence, but within a few months (1769) their army, under Pascal
(or Pasquale) Paoli, was defeated and crushed by the Count de Vaux.
It was with this Paoli, who, after a period of exile in England, had
returned to Corsica, that Sir Gilbert Elliott opened up negotiations,
and from him, without much difficulty, obtained the promise that the
Corsicans would aid the British in every possible way. Moore and his
companion made a careful reconnaissance of the various French posts
and forts, and on the 25th January the former returned to the Admiral
with his report. The fleet was then on its way from Hyères Bay to the
island of Elba, and in a few days anchored off Porto Ferrajo, where
it was proposed to disembark the Royalist refugees from Toulon and
place them under the protection of Tuscany (to whom Elba belonged),
while arrangements were being made for the leap on Corsica.

The story of the operations which followed, as told by the
chroniclers, is somewhat marred in the telling by constant references
to the bickerings and petty jealousies of the naval and military
commanders, each of whom appears to have been afraid that the rival
service would obtain all the _kudos_. Why, the reader may wonder,
is it necessary to hark back to these regrettable incidents, which
did not greatly affect the result of the operations? Only because
at one time they threatened to destroy the reputation of John
Moore, Colonel of the 51st, and did actually lead to his temporary
downfall. Lord Hood, strongly backed up by Horatio Nelson, then
captain of the _Agamemnon_, despised soldiers, and thought little
of the opinions of military officers. The naval plan was to rush at
everything, without weighing the consequences, and the suggestions
of the General, David Dundas (who had succeeded O'Hara), and other
military officers of experience, who counselled proceeding with
caution, were blown away, as showing weakness and want of enterprise.
Nelson himself said, "Armies go so slow, that seamen think they never
mean to get forward; but I daresay they act on a surer principle,
though we seldom fail." Nelson was, of course, in a measure right,
but he and other naval officers of the period failed to realise the
great difference between the facilities afforded to the respective
services--that whereas seamen always had at their back their ship,
providing them with quarters, food, ammunition, and everything that
they required; soldiers, when once put ashore on an expedition, had
to take everything with them and look after themselves.

The three principal places in Corsica held by the French were St
Fiorenzo (now St Florent) on the north, Bastia on the east, and Calvi
on the west; and in that order Lord Hood decided to attack each place
in succession. St Fiorenzo, the first to be dealt with, was situated
at the head of a deep bay, studded on the western shore with detached
forts, or towers, which, being constructed of solid masonry in a
circular form, deflected the round-shots which struck them. The most
formidable of these advanced works was the tower of Mortella,[16]
and it was impossible to attack St Fiorenzo until these outworks had
been carried. With the object, therefore, of reducing the Mortella
Tower, Moore was ordered to land at a little distance away, and with
the 51st (numbering 350) and a mixed force of soldiers and sailors
(numbering another 350), and with two guns, to march inland and
take the tower in rear, while the ships bombarded it from the sea.
Moore's force landed on the night of the 7th February, and after a
long march among the mountains reached, on the following evening,
a point from which the enemy's fortifications could be clearly
examined. Moore, who had reconnoitred them on his previous visit, was
surprised to find that the French had strengthened their position
considerably, and he came to the conclusion that his handful of men
was quite insufficient to assail all the fortifications in front of
St Fiorenzo. He therefore sent a despatch to General Dundas, and
reported that to attack with any prospect of success would require
all the General's available troops.

That day was spent in getting the guns into position and in a further
reconnaissance, while two ships bombarded the Mortella redoubt,
though without breaching it. The ships, moreover, were set on fire
by the enemy's hot shot, and were forced to sheer off, with a loss of
some sixty men. On the next day more guns were mounted on land, but
although they did little damage to the solid tower, their fire made
it impossible for the enemy to show himself or reply, and the French
officer in command, seeing that he could no nothing, surrendered.
The next outwork to be disposed of was the Convention redoubt, and
this gave a good deal of trouble. Moore, who was still conducting
operations on land, inspected the ground with General Dundas and
Major Koehler, and discovered an excellent artillery position, from
which it would be possible to batter the Convention. The difficulty
was to get the guns up the steep, rocky hill, but, with the aid of
a party of seamen with tackle, two 18-pounders and a howitzer were
mounted within the next few days, and a mortar and some other guns
were placed on a more accessible position, when the enemy's redoubt
was subjected to a heavy cannonade for two days. Moore had now with
him only the 51st, but on the 17th February the General gave him
orders for the assault that night. The Royals were to join the 51st,
and Moore was to assail the front of the redoubt, while the other
British regiments and the Corsicans were to deliver simultaneous
assaults on either flank.

Moore decided to attack in column of companies, the first company
consisting of the grenadiers and light infantry[17] of the Royals,
the second of the grenadiers of the 51st, the third of the light
company of the 51st, then the battalion of the Royals (only
sufficient to make five companies), then three companies of the 51st.
The other five companies of the 51st followed in rear as a support;
and in rear again came 130 sailors, under Captain Cooke, with
entrenching tools.

At 8.30 P.M., by the light of a brilliant moon, Moore led the
advance, which for a quarter of a mile could only be made in file.
After a little he reached a spot open enough to form up the column;
the enemy's piquets fired a few shots, as they realised what was
taking place; and Moore immediately ordered his column to push on.
When within fifty yards of the redoubt, they found themselves in a
slight hollow, unexposed to the enemy's fire, and here Moore halted
them for a few seconds preparatory to the final uphill rush. A moment
later the Royals and the 51st leaped into the head of the work, and
crossed bayonets with the Frenchmen, who stood their ground gallantly
and fought with desperation. Eventually, however, the flank attacks
pushed in and overwhelmed the defenders, though in the darkness it
was difficult to distinguish friend from foe, and, to add to the
confusion, the enemy holding the neighbouring redoubt of Fornali
began to open with grape-shot upon the victorious British. But before
midnight the latter had entrenched themselves, and within an hour it
was learned that the French had abandoned Fornali.

Arrangements were now made for the attack on St Fiorenzo itself, but
before they had been completed the enemy withdrew from the place and
retired to the fortified town of Bastia, situated on the east coast
of Corsica, and barely ten miles across the neck of the peninsula
from St Fiorenzo.

The coast near Bastia was quite open, and the town was not fortified
on that side; elsewhere, however, it was defended by four detached
redoubts and a citadel placed on heights at a little distance inland.
On February 23, Moore and General Dundas went across the mountains
to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and on the following day the
51st and 69th advanced to within a mile and a quarter of the French
piquets, who were heard throughout the night digging entrenchments
for their further security on the ground which it was necessary for
the British to occupy in order to capture Bastia from the land side.
Becoming aware of this, General Dundas, in the morning, ordered Moore
to withdraw his force, and, to the surprise and disappointment of
every one, the withdrawal took place. Moore at first imagined that
the General's idea was to perfect arrangements before delivering
the assault, but after a while he discovered that, in spite of Lord
Hood's constant request for co-operation from the land forces,
General Dundas had refused to attempt the capture of the town with
the small force under his command. This was a bitter discovery for
Moore, who was longing to lead his regiment to the front, but he
concealed his disappointment, as he considered that it would be "a
species of mutiny for a subordinate officer to pass any opinion" on
the action of his General.

Lord Hood, never on good terms with General Dundas, now brought
matters to a head by sending a somewhat extraordinary letter, in
which he said that upon the evacuation of Toulon the General's
command had practically ended, and that he (Lord Hood) was in
supreme command of both the fleet and the army. The General replied
with calmness that, unless the Admiral could produce his commission
from the King, neither he nor his officers would acknowledge his
pretensions to the command of the land forces. But Lord Hood's letter
probably had the result which he desired, for on the following day
General Dundas, on the grounds of ill health, gave up the command,
and having appointed the next senior officer, Colonel D'Aubant, a
brigadier-general, and given him the temporary command of the army,
left for England on the 11th March. D'Aubant proved himself a useless
commander, and being averse to an assault on Bastia, threw cold
water on every plan laid before him. In vain did Lord Hood urge the
necessity for an attempt being made by the land forces; and, after
holding several councils of war, he at length declared that he would
take Bastia with the marines[18] and sailors. Already a month had
been wasted in looking at the place--a month which gave the enemy
leisure to perfect his fortifications and entrenchments. Almost
another month passed before Bastia fell; and its fall was brought
about not by assault or bombardment, but by starvation, resulting
from Lord Hood's careful blockade from the sea and the Corsicans'
watchfulness on land. There had been practically no fighting, and
though Hood and Nelson dignified the operations with the name of
siege, the army was never in position, and all that was undertaken
by the ships was the maintenance of a strict blockade, and the
landing of some guns and a fighting force under Nelson. The guns did
little damage to the enemy or his works, thus wasting much valuable
ammunition, and the force commanded by Nelson (consisting of 1183
soldiers acting as marines on board ship and 250 sailors) made no
advance. On the 19th May Bastia was starved into surrender, and the
3500 men of the garrison gave up their arms to the British combined
forces, which numbered no more than 3000 soldiers and sailors.

Attention was now directed to Calvi (on the west coast of Corsica),
the only place of importance remaining in the possession of
the French. It was known that they had been busy for some time
victualling the place for a siege, and Lord Hood determined to
operate before the garrison of Calvi could be further reinforced.
Brigadier-General D'Aubant had gone home, on being relieved by
General Charles Stuart, who had been sent out from England to succeed
General Dundas, an appointment which met with the approval of every
one and which gave confidence to the troops. The regiments in
Corsica, though seven in number, were miserably weak, as they were
required to furnish detachments for duty as marines on board the
ships, and the climate had begun to tell on the health of the men.
General Stuart's "army," available for operations against Calvi,
consisted, therefore, of no more than 2300 men. These troops were
conveyed in transports from Bastia to Mortella Bay, and, on the 19th
June, after a further voyage, disembarked a few miles from Calvi,
and marched inland to a camp on the high ground some three miles
from the fortress. Colonel Moore was given the command of a special
"corps of reserve," consisting of the "flank companies of the Royal
Irish, 50th, and 51st, and the remains of the 2nd Battalion of the
Royals," so the command of the 51st devolved, for the time being, on
Major Pringle. Two outworks of considerable strength lay in front,
_i.e._, on the land side, of Calvi--viz., the Fort of Mozzello and
the fortified rock of Monteciesco. Batteries were immediately thrown
up on commanding heights, about 500 yards from these outworks, and on
the 7th July the enemy evacuated Monteciesco. The guns now turned on
Mozzello, and for ten days endeavoured to make a practicable breach,
the assailants suffering the whole time from the fire from Calvi
itself and from some minor outworks, and Captain Nelson, who was
present, unfortunately losing an eye, from splinters of stone being
flung into his face by a round-shot striking the ground in front of
him.

Before daylight on the morning of the 19th July, a breach having
been effected in the walls of the Mozzello redoubt, the troops
moved forward to the assault. Colonel Moore led the stormers, some
of whom carried sandbags, and others ladders. Shot, hand-grenades,
and live shells were hurtled down upon them by the defenders, but,
nothing daunted, the grenadiers charged forward, and plying their
bayonets with vigour, drove the Frenchmen out of the redoubt. In this
desperate encounter Moore was wounded in the head by a splinter of
a shell, but though knocked senseless for a moment, he continued to
lead his men until he made certain that the place had been secured,
and that entrenchments had been thrown up to cover the troops from
the fire of the enemy's guns in Calvi.

With the capture of the Mozzello redoubt, however, the enemy's
resistance virtually came to an end, and his guns ceased to fire. Yet
the Frenchmen refused to capitulate, and the British prosecuted the
siege with vigour, pushing forward new batteries and mounting upwards
of thirty pieces of ordnance. Moore wrote at the time: "The men and
officers fall ill daily; considerably more than a third of our force
are in the sick report; perhaps there never was so much work done by
so few men in the same space of time."[19] By the 30th July the enemy
began to consider the matter of terms, as Calvi had been set on fire
in two or three places, and the British guns were doing much damage.
After this General Stuart stopped all firing, while he entered into
negotiations with General Casabianca; and on the 10th August Calvi
surrendered, the defenders laying down their arms and forthwith
embarking on transports.

Young Rice, as a very junior subaltern in the 51st, of course had no
opportunity of distinguishing himself in these operations, and he
does not appear to have been much impressed by his first campaign. On
the 2nd August 1794 he wrote to his father from "Camp before Calvi,"
as follows:--

  "A flag of truce having just gone in, or rather hoisted in the town
  by the enemy, and being not so much distracted by shot and shell, I
  embrace the opportunity (which I may say with truth is almost the
  only one I have had since the commencement of the siege) of writing
  these few lines. Do not expect now, when I begin, that I am going
  to give you minute details of all our operations here. In the first
  place, it would not be in my power, and, in the next, they would
  be very uninteresting. The papers will in all probability soon
  show the fate of Calvi and the operations before it. They are, in
  my opinion, better able to provide news of that nature than are
  private letters. The most satisfactory news, I imagine, to you will
  be that of my health and safety. The flag of truce above mentioned
  will in all probability terminate in the capitulation of Calvi,
  which I am extremely glad to think likely, not on account of the
  danger of shot and shell, but on account of the great sickness from
  which both officers and men are suffering. The disease, which is a
  fever, not only happens to the most delicate, but seizes in the
  most sudden manner on the most robust and healthy. We have now out
  of our army upwards of 2000 lying in fevers, and a great number of
  officers. It is not very dangerous, but two officers have died of
  it. In my opinion, the disease arises from our having to lie in the
  trenches exposed to the intense heat of the sun. I am quite tired
  of the siege. We have taken all the enemy's outposts and silenced
  all his guns, and the town has been in flames for some days. If
  they continue stubborn, the General is determined to hearken to
  no more flags of truce, as he has so often been humbugged by them
  before; but to batter a breach and enter the town by storm, which
  will be easily effected, though perhaps not without a few broken
  heads. As yet only four officers have been killed, and six or seven
  wounded. Colonel Moore was slightly wounded on the head at the
  storming of the Mozzello redoubt, but is now, I am happy to say,
  quite recovered. An unfortunate shot killed an officer[20] of ours
  the day before yesterday in the trenches. He had only just joined,
  and was an excellent young fellow, and is much lamented.

  "I would thank you to tell Mr Greenwood[21] to write to Colonel
  Moore, as is customary, about my promotion; for until that time I
  do not take the rank of lieutenant in the regiment.

  "I was at the taking of Bastia, though did not reap many laurels
  there. All I can say is that we were ready to do anything that
  there was to be done. My Lord Hood and his marines claimed the
  honour--if there was any--of taking that town. Bastia is a very
  good town, and will make very pleasant quarters. Calvi is to
  appearance no great things. Ajaccio is much the pleasantest place
  in the whole island.

  "_August 4th._--My lieutenancy was this day noted to the
  regiment--the commission dated 1st April. We have not yet taken
  possession of the town, but are pretty certain the business is at
  an end. The General has not thought fit to divulge the great secret.

  "_August 11th._--The enemy marched out of Calvi yesterday with the
  honours of war, and embarked on board transports for conveyance to
  Toulon. The town of Calvi is in a deplorable state."


Sir John Moore's Diary bears out this last statement. "It is
inconceivable," he wrote, "the destruction our fire has occasioned;
there is literally not a house which has not been damaged by shot or
shell. The whole is a heap of ruins." Moore also often lamented the
sickness from which the troops suffered, but an entry made in his
Diary of the 16th August shows that Sam Rice's regiment was better
off than most. "The 51st," said Moore, "have fewer sick than any
other regiment, owing undoubtedly to our surgeon, M'Cleish, who is
a diligent and intelligent man; but also, in a great degree, to the
good regulation of our regimental hospital for these three or four
years past. This was one of the first things to which I attended on
getting the command of the regiment. It has remained in good order
ever since then. I am now rewarded by having three times the number
of duty men of _any regiment here_."[22]

The cause of all this sickness among the troops was undoubtedly
exposure, for there appears to have been no epidemic of any kind, and
modern soldiers under similar circumstances would probably suffer
equally. In the daytime the men lay out continuously beneath the
fierce heat of a Mediterranean summer's sun, and their dress was that
worn in England in the winter--viz., tight-fitting cloth clothes,
with their "clubbed" hair beneath a hat which, if anything, made
their heads the hotter. At night they slept out, almost uncovered,
among the mountains, at a temperature sometimes so low as almost to
freeze the very marrow in their bones. That sunstroke and sun fever
should have fallen upon them was little to be wondered at.




CHAPTER IV.

CORSICA WON AND LOST.


With the capture of Calvi French resistance in Corsica came to an
end, and the island became a British possession, the Corsicans, some
two months earlier, having declared their allegiance to the King of
England. Sir Charles Stuart at once began the distribution of his
troops in garrisons about the island, and the 51st sailed from Calvi
on the 19th August, going round to Bastia, of which place they were
to form the garrison. Writing from Bastia on the 11th September, Sam
Rice gives some account of events:--

  "I have the pleasure of telling you that we have quitted our canvas
  houses, and have taken up our quarters in this garrison, which is
  by no means an unpleasant one. How long we shall continue here is
  very uncertain at present, as there are other places in the island
  which must be garrisoned. Our regiment will very probably go to
  Ajaccio, which is, by all accounts, one of the pleasantest and most
  healthy places in the whole island. General Stuart, Colonel Moore,
  and some others of the great men set out, about a week ago, to
  take a tour of the island, for the purpose, I suppose, of finding
  out what places it will be necessary to garrison. The French, I
  hear, are making great preparations at Toulon, to endeavour to
  retake the island. I hope they will make the attempt, when we will
  give them a warm reception.

  "In the letter which I wrote to you after the surrender of Calvi, I
  think I mentioned the extreme sickness of our army. It was nothing
  then to what it is now. You will be astonished when I tell you
  that the 51st Regiment was almost 500 strong at the commencement
  of the siege of Calvi, but now, I am sorry to say, we have not a
  hundred fit for duty. The rest of the regiments are in the same
  way. The 12th Light Dragoons, who have had no fatigue, suffer alike
  from this shocking and unwholesome climate. The Corsicans say
  that, after this month is over, the climate will be very healthy
  until July. It is to be hoped so, else I am certain that in the
  course of three months we shall not have an English soldier in the
  island, if they continue to die as they have done for this some
  time past. The officers have suffered just as much as the men. I
  am the only officer of the regiment who has not been sick, and how
  I have weathered it so long is to me astonishing. In the conquest
  of this island we have suffered little by the sword, but sickness
  has played the devil. This is a subject too shocking to dwell upon,
  though we are so habituated to hear of deaths, that the death of a
  man is scarcely more noticed than that of a fly.

  "I forgot to tell you that we left Calvi the 19th August--my
  birthday--and embarked on board transports for this place, which is
  not above a day's sail with a good wind, but we unfortunately were
  kept nearly a week at sea. I believe I never gave you an account of
  Bastia; indeed I don't know whether I can, further than that it is
  a large and populous place, and resembles very much the generality
  of French towns. We are very much crowded here with French refugees
  who came from Toulon, so much so that the officers cannot get
  lodgings, which I think a great hardship after having been so
  long in the field. I have been employed since I have been here in
  recruiting my kit, which was rather the worse for campaigning. My
  bedding and cot I had the misfortune to lose the first week I was
  in Corsica, which was, I think, the greatest misfortune that could
  happen to a man, except the loss of his head. My softest bed for
  many months was the ground, with one blanket (which I purchased)
  to cover me. It was not really cold, so it did not much signify.
  You used to tell me what a lazy life a soldier's was. I don't
  know how it is, but I have not yet found it so, without you call
  lying in one's clothes for three or four months together, mounting
  out-pickets, and all such pleasant amusements being lazy. I assure
  you that the little service I have seen here has done me a great
  deal of good, and has shown me that there are more rough things
  than smooth in life.

  "We are going to be very gay here. An Italian Opera is shortly
  to open, which is to be patronised by the Governor, and is much
  approved of by the garrison. A coffee-house for English papers is
  also to be established, which I think a much better thing than the
  former. In fact, you do not know how grand we are going to be.

  "The _Moselle_ frigate, which, as I told you, went into Toulon
  with all our baggage and was captured, fell into our possession
  again coming out of Calvi, but the 'Sans culottes' took care that
  we should have none of our things with her. I shall come in for
  some prize-money for Calvi. Two fine frigates were taken with the
  town--_La Melpomonie_ and _La Mignonne_, which, it is to be hoped,
  will fetch some cash."

This letter and the following one give some idea of the life of a
subaltern in a marching regiment on foreign service in 1794, and for
that reason are not without interest. They deal little with politics,
because such matters did not concern a junior lieutenant in the army
who had sufficient to occupy his time in looking after the welfare
of his men, and in performing the ordinary routine duties of his
regiment and of the garrison. And it may be taken as certain that a
subaltern in Moore's regiment did not have much idle time.

  "BASTIA, _October 21, 1794_.

  "Since my last, Sir Gilbert Elliott has been appointed Viceroy
  of the extensive kingdom of Corsica, on account of which the
  municipality gave a Ball to the officers of the garrison and
  inhabitants. It was 'perfect liberty and equality,' for I believe
  such a mixture of people never was seen at any assembly whatever.
  The supper induced a great many of the poor Toulon emigrants, of
  whom there are numbers here, to go. Without exaggerating, they
  eat more voraciously and in a more unchristianlike manner than
  any pack of hounds I ever saw. It was certainly the most beastly
  sight I ever beheld, though at the same time the most laughable.
  Some pulling fowls into pieces with their hands; others legs and
  shoulders of mutton, and many pocketing. In short, it was the most
  complete scramble that I ever saw, or, I believe, ever was seen.
  Colonel Hely, of the 11th, gave the garrison a Ball last week,
  which was done in a very genteel manner. General Stuart gives one
  to-night, which, I daresay, will excel them all in brilliancy. He
  is a very gentlemanlike, pleasant man.

  "Sir Gilbert Elliott went yesterday to Corte, where he is going to
  stay a few months, and then returns to Bastia. Corte is distant
  about five-and-forty miles from here, and is the place where the
  Corsican parliament is held. There is an excellent road all the
  way to it, which was made at considerable expense by the French.
  I cannot give you any account of the country, as I have seen so
  little of it. Those who have been round the island, and in the
  internal parts, do not speak very favourably of it. I am sorry
  I cannot tell you our troops get much better, though it is to
  be hoped that they soon will, as the weather begins to get cold
  and consequently more favourable to their complaints, which are
  chiefly the fever and ague. We continue daily to bury a great
  number of men, and I am afraid we shall for this some time to come.
  It is a shocking sight to go round the different hospitals, which
  are crowded with patients. It is a duty which we have frequently to
  do, and which, you may conceive, is not a very pleasant one, though
  at the same time very necessary.

  "Poor Tourle of our regiment has been extremely ill ever since we
  left Calvi, and has just gone, with another captain of ours, to the
  internal parts of the country for the recovery of their healths.
  Most of the officers who have had this complaint have gone over
  to Italy, which is no doubt the best place, the climate being so
  favourable. We cannot muster above a hundred and fifty men fit for
  duty now, and I am afraid it will be some time before we can call
  ourselves a regiment again. The 12th Regiment of Light Dragoons
  embarked here for England the other day, and sailed with Lord Hood,
  who is also going home. The French fleet still continues to be
  blocked up by us. What will be the event of the blockade is not in
  my power to tell. Some pretend to say that the French left Toulon
  through policy. It no doubt keeps that port open. I can scarcely
  imagine that that was their intention, but leave it to more able
  politicians than myself to judge. By the last accounts from the
  Continent, we heard that a general action was daily expected. What
  will be the result of it we are anxious to hear. Our loss in the
  West Indies, I see by the papers, has been very considerable both
  by the sword and by sickness. The French appear to still keep a
  very strong post in Guadaloupe, and before it is taken much blood
  will be shed, I imagine."

This letter contains two items of public interest--viz., that Sir
Gilbert Elliott had been appointed Viceroy of Corsica, and that
Admiral Lord Hood had sailed for England. To the subaltern Sir
Gilbert's appointment and Lord Hood's departure meant little; to
his colonel, who was behind the scenes, they meant a good deal;
and to General Stuart they meant still more. It was the beginning
of the end, and the end was the loss of Corsica to Great Britain.
The veteran Admiral, who had already passed his seventieth year,
resigned, ostensibly because England refused to send him the
reinforcements for which he asked,[23] but in reality because he
had had a "personal quarrel with Lord Spencer, then the head of
the Admiralty."[24] Accustomed to carry all before him, and to win
victory after victory, he became the idol of the people, and in the
eyes of the navy he remained for many years the very essence of a
fighting sailor who could do no wrong. His vanity was flattered, and,
as he advanced in years, he began to consider himself infallible,
refusing to listen to any advice which did not fall in with his own
views. We have seen how he treated General Dundas and his successor
General Stuart, and, although it is evident that he was well
acquainted with Moore's worth, his pride forbade him to acknowledge
that any soldier could help him. With Sir Gilbert Elliott, as a pure
civilian, his relations had always been different. Each knew that the
other's good word would carry weight in England, and each showed an
equal contempt for the opinions of soldiers. Sir Gilbert had lived
on board the _Victory_ with the Admiral for some months prior to his
appointment as Viceroy, and had acquired the greatest admiration for
the gallant sailor, who doubtless impressed upon the future Viceroy
the importance of forming judgments for himself and not listening to
the suggestions of the military commanders.

With the departure of Lord Hood, the navy ceased to be interested in
Corsican affairs, so all cause for rivalry between the two services
came to an end. A new rivalry, however, at once arose. Sir Gilbert,
as Viceroy, became an autocrat, and although the exact terms of his
commission had not yet been made known to him, he took a leaf out
of Lord Hood's book, and informed General Stuart that he considered
himself Commander-in-Chief. The General, however, was not the man to
quietly accept a subordinate position in the force with which he had
completed the conquest of Corsica, and he politely gave Sir Gilbert
to understand that he intended to retain the command of the troops
until the Viceroy should receive the King's commission authorising
him to assume the functions of Commander-in-Chief, when he would be
prepared to hand over the command. Sir Gilbert was content to bide
his time, but friction, of course, was inevitable, since, without
a complete understanding between the heads of the civil and the
military departments, it was impossible to establish any proper
form of government in a newly acquired British possession. Moore's
position is a little difficult to understand, as at that time he
held no appointment other than that of Lieut.-Colonel commanding
the 51st Regiment, although he had been recommended for the post of
Adjutant-General, in place of Sir J. St Clair, who was going home.
Yet all along Moore was General Stuart's right-hand man, and to all
intents and purposes acted as his chief staff officer. Consequently,
he upheld his General in everything that he did, and resolved to
stand or fall with him. And the fall eventually came, though not for
some months.

In the meantime the troops were moved about and garrisons established
at various places, while three battalions of Corsicans were raised
for home defence. The 51st continued to garrison Bastia until the
end of the year, and from that place Sam Rice, on the 28th December
(1794) wrote to his father as follows:--

  "I am sorry to tell you that, since my last, we have had the
  misfortune to lose poor Captain Tourle,[25] who died a martyr to
  the complaint of this climate. He was the handsomest and most
  healthy man I ever saw. No regiment, I believe, ever lost so worthy
  a fellow, both as an officer and man; nor was any one ever more
  regretted. He was buried with all military pomp, attended by the
  two generals and all the officers of the garrison. We have still
  two or three officers ill, but not dangerously so. The nature of
  the climate is such that, if once attacked, a person is subject to
  relapses. What is very singular is that the inhabitants throughout
  the country are subject to the same complaint, which carries off
  numbers of them. There was a report the other day that the French
  fleet was off Ajaccio, but it was unfounded. Admiral Hotham's fleet
  is at Leghorn, and is daily expected at St Fiorenzo. We expect
  to march in a few days for Corte, to take up our quarters there.
  It is by all accounts a wretched place, but we are all happy at
  the thoughts of anything for a change. There are three Corsican
  battalions raised here. If they are to be drilled as our soldiers
  are, to stand the charge, which I suppose they are, I do not know
  how they will behave, as their manner of fighting is what we call
  bush-fighting--that is, to take a steady aim upon any one from
  behind a bush or tree,--in short, from any place from which the
  man can fire without being seen.[26] I see that there is a talk of
  peace. I am afraid that, if we make peace, we must resign the West
  India Islands and perhaps the famous island of Corsica, which will
  be a great loss to Government.

  "If I have made many blunders in this letter, I ascribe it all to
  a pretty Corse, who has been chatting to me all the time from the
  opposite window."

In the first week of January 1795, Sir Gilbert Elliott received
despatches from home, giving him supreme command of the army in
Corsica. Thereupon General Stuart resigned, and at the same time
General Trigge was appointed by the Viceroy to command the troops,
and Colonel Moore was put in orders as Adjutant-General, though,
before taking up the appointment, he took the 51st to Corte and
settled the regiment in its new quarters. Grave fears of a French
descent on Corsica soon began to be entertained, and the defence
of the island against a strong invading force gave the military
authorities cause for apprehension. The British fleet in the
neighbouring waters was still, however, of sufficient strength to
give a measure of confidence to the sister service on shore, and
if there were jealousies when the army and the navy were employed
together, they were forgotten by the soldiers when they heard of the
sailors' victories at sea. At any rate, so much may be gained from
the following letter, written by Sam Rice from Corte on the 28th
March 1795:--

  "What has been passing in this part of the world for this last
  month is certainly worth relating, but how to do it I am certainly
  much at a loss. I will begin with Admiral Hotham's engagement
  with the French fleet, but of course all I know of the business
  is from hearsay. I can give you no days or dates, for when the
  French fleet came out and when ours attacked I know not, except
  that it all happened. A few days ago the French fleet appeared off
  Cape Corso, which did not a little alarm us, particularly as our
  fleet was not then in the Bay of St Fiorenzo. We concluded, of
  course, that a descent was intended, which was really the case.
  However, the Viceroy immediately sent an express in an open boat
  to Admiral Hotham, who was then with the fleet at Leghorn, and the
  next morning our fleet was in sight. The French still kept in the
  same place, drawn up in _ligne de bataille_, and seemed resolved
  to meet us--like true Republicans, to conquer or perish in the
  attempt. Our fleet, coming up, soon made a change in the business,
  for the French set off as fast as possible, and we after them
  with a favourable wind. As the French ran, the fight could not be
  general, and, I believe, would not have taken place at all had not
  the _Inconstant_ frigate--a remarkably fast sailer--borne down upon
  the French and engaged a 74, whereupon the French Admiral ordered
  two other 74's to her relief. By that time the _Illustrious_ and
  _Courageux_--two of our 74's--came up and engaged the _Ça Ira_ and
  _Censeur_, and I believe as desperate an action as ever was fought
  ensued. The French ships at last were obliged to strike, but not
  before having seven hundred men killed on board one of their ships
  alone. The _Courageux_ lost all her masts, and the other was
  considerably damaged. Those, I believe, were the only ships which
  came into action; the rest made the best of their way to Toulon,
  it is supposed, excepting the _Sans Culottes_, a first rate, who
  was obliged to put into Genoa, with the loss of her masts, carried
  away in a gale of wind which came on soon after the engagement.
  The intention of the French fleet in coming out of Toulon was to
  proceed immediately to Corsica, to enter the Bay of St Fiorenzo,
  to land ten thousand troops, cut out of the harbour four sail of
  the line (which they had been informed Admiral Hotham had left
  behind), and then set off with them. The scheme was excellent, but,
  fortunately for us, it did not succeed, for it would have given
  them a complete superiority by sea, and probably we all should
  have been made prisoners of war, as it would have been impossible,
  I should think, for us to have defended ourselves with so small a
  force of British as we have in the island. The French having troops
  on board accounts for the number of men who were killed on the _Ça
  Ira_.

  "Since I began my letter an express is arrived from Bastia with the
  news that, after the dispersion of the French fleet, five sail of
  the line fell into the hands of the Spanish fleet, which was coming
  from Carthagena to our assistance. This news is generally supposed
  to be authentic, which I hope may be the case. I forgot to mention
  to you before that the _Berwick_, a 74 of ours, who, I think I
  told you in my last, had rolled her masts overboard in a gale of
  wind, was going from St Fiorenzo to Leghorn to be repaired, when,
  unfortunately, she fell in with the French fleet off Cape Corso,
  and was taken. She, notwithstanding, made a very gallant action, in
  which her captain was killed. Our fleet is now in Porto Spezia, not
  far, I believe, from Genoa."

The details of the fight described above are substantially correct,
though the engagement was carried on for two days, and the bulk
of the fighting was done by the _Agamemnon_ (Captain Nelson).
Undoubtedly, by this action Admiral Hotham saved Corsica for the
time being, but his victory was not as complete as it might have
been, or would have been, if Nelson had been in command of the fleet.
The latter recognised the necessity for staking everything on the
destruction of the French fleet there and then, and endeavoured in
vain to persuade the Admiral to pursue and prevent the enemy from
reaching Toulon. Hotham's contentment at the result of the engagement
bore fatal fruit, for the French ships which escaped to Toulon soon
refitted, and having been joined on the 4th April by some ten others
from Brest, formed a very powerful fleet, and became a serious menace
to the small British garrison of Corsica, at the best of times not
strong enough to resist invasion, and now much reduced by sickness.
About this time the 51st lost another officer, and Rice inveighs
against the climate again:--

  "I am sorry to tell you," he writes, "that we have had the
  misfortune to lose Captain Alcock[27] of our regiment, who departed
  this life, like poor Tourle, a martyr to the complaint of this
  cursed climate. He had been but a short time ill at Bastia, from
  whence he went to Leghorn for the recovery of his health, but on
  his first landing was seized with a violent fever, which carried
  him off in the course of a few days, in spite of the faculty. You
  may recollect my mentioning both him and his brother--the latter
  who was so civil to me on coming from England, and the former on
  my joining the regiment. Thus (in Alcock and Tourle) we have lost
  two of the worthiest, gentlemanlike, and handsomest men that ever
  any regiment possessed--the one captain of grenadiers, the other of
  light infantry. They were both great friends of Colonel Moore's,
  and, in short, of all the officers.

  "We still continue to be very sickly in our regiment, having
  above one hundred privates sick in the hospital, and an equal
  proportion of officers, for of the latter we have here five sick
  in the hospital, one in Italy, two gone home for the recovery of
  their healths, two dead, and several others who have had a lucky
  escape from death. What great acquisition this island can be to the
  Crown of Great Britain I leave to abler politicians than myself to
  determine. It certainly has a tolerable bay for our shipping, and
  that is all. It has been a fine burying-ground for the British
  this last year, and if we continue during this next year to bury
  in the same proportion, I am afraid that the air will become more
  pestilential than it naturally is. In the time of the Romans this
  place was well known for its insalubrity, and the banishment of a
  criminal to Corsica was thought sufficient punishment. We expect
  Colonel Moore here daily, who is coming for change of air, he
  having been likewise ill."

Soon after this it appears to have gradually dawned on even the
regimental officers that the defences of the island were not in too
satisfactory a condition. Moore, who was indefatigable in touring
the country, knew that the coast-line was open everywhere, and that
the towns were defenceless. The Viceroy, generally optimistic,
at times suffered from panic, and went so far as to consult the
military authorities on the state of the defences and how they could
be improved. He had his own views, however, on the subject, and as
they differed entirely from those of the Adjutant-General, little,
if any, improvement took place. Moreover, intrigue was at work among
the Corsicans, many of whom already doubted if British rule was any
better than French. How much the "man in the street," otherwise the
regimental subaltern, knew of what was going on is shown by the
following letter from Sam Rice:--

  "BASTIA, _May 2, 1795_.

  "I marched here about a fortnight ago with a detachment to assist
  in doing duty in this garrison. How long I shall stay here
  I cannot say. The number of French prisoners that we have in
  different parts of the island makes the duty hard, as they must, of
  course, be guarded. I went yesterday with a party to fetch above a
  hundred of them from near Fiorenzo, and brought them here the same
  day. They behave themselves very well at present, but should the
  French fleet appear off the coast I don't know what they may do.

  "A report prevails here that the French have received a
  reinforcement from Brest of six sail of the line. If such is the
  case I think we shall not long remain in the island. The French
  have a great party here, who would immediately join them in the
  event of a descent, and those who are now of our party would, I
  daresay, be better paid by the French, and so abandon us--such is
  the character of the Corsicans. If we may believe the French, they
  will not come here; they say that they are a nation too polished to
  ever think of so barbarous a country as Corsica. Barbarous as it
  is, I daresay they would be glad to chase us from it; not that it
  would be of any value to them, but, as long as we are here, they
  will be ever jealous, and indeed, in my opinion, very naturally so.
  We have orders to hold ourselves in readiness to take the field.
  Provisions and ammunition are constantly going to the interior of
  the country, in case of a retreat. Do not be surprised if my next
  is from some camp among the mountains. I send this by Captain St
  George, who takes home the Viceroy's despatches."

From this letter it would seem that the existence of two political
parties among the Corsicans was a matter of common knowledge, and it
would seem also to have been generally known that one party favoured
the French and the other the English. How the strings were pulled was
probably only known to a very few Englishmen; possibly only to the
Viceroy and Moore. Yet the puppets, placed upon the stage, played
gaily to the audience for a while, then snapped their strings and
played without them. From the beginning the Viceroy's methods had
been distasteful to the people, and their beloved Paoli, the Corsican
patriot, endeavoured to hint as much to Sir Gilbert, who, however,
took the hint as unwarrantable interference. From that time the
Viceroy became distrustful of Paoli, and set up, in opposition to
him, one Pozzo di Borgo, a man versed in intrigue, of few scruples,
and hated by the Corsicans, who, though they continued to be loyal to
the British Government, distrusted the influence which Pozzo had over
the Viceroy. Had Sir Gilbert kept in with Paoli, and governed through
him, all might have gone well. Instead, as Sir J. F. Maurice[28]
puts it, he attempted to apply the British Constitution to a people
to whom it was unsuited, and, in doing so, he used as his instrument
a worthless man, who had not the confidence of the people. Now,
Moore was a personal friend of Paoli, and the Viceroy knew it, and
he suspected Moore of intriguing against him, though, had he been
a judge of character, he would have known that Moore was always
too straightforward and outspoken to be capable of intrigue. Yet,
believing that Moore was disloyal, he took the step which any man so
placed would take. Not being an Oriental potentate, he did not have
his enemy quietly poisoned off, but he wrote home and asked for his
removal, and Moore was, in September 1795, ordered to quit the island
within forty-eight hours. On the 4th October Moore visited the 51st
at Corte and shook the dust of Corsica from off his feet. After his
departure the plot thickened, and in the early months of 1796 matters
began to assume an uncomfortable attitude; disaffection among the
people grew rife; and Paoli, in despair, went to England. From bad,
things then went rapidly to worse, and the following letter from Sam
Rice shows how, by the middle of the year, Corsican affairs were
already approaching a crisis.

  "BASTIA, _June 27, 1796_.

  "Our correspondence, I am afraid, will, every day now, become more
  uncertain and of course less frequent, owing to the French having
  overrun so great a part of Italy, and the rapid progress which
  they are still making. Our last news from Leghorn was that the
  Republicans were within a very few hours' march of that place; if
  so, the communication by that part of Italy will be entirely at an
  end. An officer from this garrison, who is going to England, and
  who will be the bearer of this, in order to be certain of avoiding
  the French, sets out this evening for Civita Vecchia, a seaport
  near Rome, and from thence will cross the Roman territories to
  some place on the Adriatic coast, whence he will take a vessel for
  Venice.[29]

  "I have the pleasure to tell you that the Regiment left Corte
  the beginning of this month. After what I have told you of that
  place in former letters, you may imagine that none of us regretted
  leaving it and its polite and agreeable people. Since my last,
  things in Corsica have been in a very disagreeable situation. The
  cause of the discontent of the Corsicans was first owing to the
  taxes, which they thought too oppressive. That discontent was not
  then by any means general, only some few villages refusing to pay
  by force of arms, but they were soon compelled by a party of our
  garrison from Corte. The last and most serious revolt happened
  about twenty miles from Corte, at a place called Bagnano. The
  Viceroy determined to put an end to such hostile acts, and came in
  person to Corte to give energy to the business. He was attended by
  a numerous suite of the most respectable people of the island, and
  also by a number of British and foreign troops. The troops from
  Bastia were joined by our grenadier company and light infantry
  company, to which latter I have the honour of belonging. When
  everything was ready for the campaign we marched for the revolted
  country, our army consisting of near five thousand men--British,
  foreigners, and natives. The first impediment we met with was a
  fort, on a very commanding situation, built in the time of the
  French. The Corsicans, who were in possession of it, refusing
  to submit at discretion, the troops were immediately ordered to
  surround it. Our two companies marched directly up to the fort and
  kept a very hot fire of musketry on it for some time, but, finding
  it impossible to scale the walls, we were obliged to retire, with
  the loss of our too brave captain of grenadiers, four privates
  killed and five wounded. It is since said that poor Shawe,[30] who
  was the person that fell, had no such orders as he was attempting
  to carry out. Whether he had or not it is now impossible to say.
  When anything fails the blame is generally cast on the sufferer.

  "No sooner had this unfortunate business happened than the news
  came from Corte that the town and foundry of that place were
  surrounded by natives, and that they were determined to cut off
  the Viceroy and the army, upon which we were immediately ordered
  to retreat on Corte. This rebel army was now so formidable near
  Corte, and so determined, that their chief sent word to the Viceroy
  that if he would not redress their grievances he should be under
  the necessity of doing it himself by force of arms, or something
  to that purpose. The Viceroy, wishing to spare blood, granted them
  nearly, I believe, what they wanted, which was the dismissal of his
  Corsican minister and some other men who had become odious to the
  people. The short and long of the business is that the people, not
  approving of the Viceroy's choice of his ministers and people about
  him, took the opportunity I before mentioned of forcing him to act
  in a different manner. What was first thought to be the revolt of a
  few villages has ended in that of nearly the whole country. Things
  are at present pretty quiet, but there is still a very considerable
  republican party in the island, and it is said that the French
  have landed a great many arms here, and have sent over officers to
  incite the people against us.

  "I have the pleasure to tell you that I am now oldest lieutenant.
  If a vacancy should happen I would not wish to purchase, as it is
  very probable, if I have good luck, that I shall get on without,
  particularly as the war is not yet at an end."

Little did Rice think when he despatched this letter that within
four months he and his regiment, together with the remainder of the
British troops, the Viceroy and his staff of civilian officials,
would be driven from Corsica. Yet during these four months events
happened swiftly, and a combination of circumstances--many quite
unforeseen--overwhelmed the Viceroy. He himself for a long while
had been extremely unpopular with the people, who were for the most
part in open rebellion. Napoleon Buonaparte was carrying all before
him on the Continent, and the accounts of his many victories filled
with admiration the minds not only of the French "emigrants," but
also of the Corsicans themselves, who gloried in the knowledge that
the conqueror was a Corsican. Then Spain, previously leagued with
the other powers against the French Republic, basely deserted and
went over to the enemy. As soon as this was known in England, the
British Government, fearing the worst, and aware that the British
fleet in the Mediterranean was not equal to the combined Spanish and
French fleets, decided forthwith to withdraw all the troops from
the Mediterranean, and sent instructions to Sir Gilbert Elliott to
evacuate Corsica.

But before this, the Viceroy, on hearing of the capture of Leghorn
by Napoleon, had despatched Nelson to occupy the Isle of Elba, where
he established a small force as a safeguard to Corsica, and he now
proposed to withdraw altogether from the latter island, and assemble
the troops at Porto Ferrajo, in Elba, preliminary to carrying out
his orders to remove the troops from the Mediterranean. Nelson,
on the 14th October, brought the British fleet to Bastia, for the
purpose of conveying the troops to Elba, and he arrived only in the
nick of time, for he found the garrison hard-pressed, the French
"emigrants" and the Corsicans having surrounded the citadel, to
which the garrison had withdrawn, and demanded its surrender. Bastia
itself was also in the hands of rioters, who had seized British
property and threatened to make a prisoner of the Viceroy. Nelson
at once rose to the occasion, and checked the riot by training his
guns on the town, at the same time sending a message on shore to say
that he was prepared to bombard the place and utterly destroy it.
The embarkation of the troops then commenced, but took some time,
and on the 18th, when the evacuation was nearing completion, news
came that the French had landed near Cape Corso and were marching
on Bastia. The guns were hastily spiked, but only just in time, for
the last boat-load of soldiers had barely left the shore, on the
20th, before the French advanced guard marched into the citadel of
Bastia. The dignified withdrawal suggested by the British Government
resolved itself, therefore, into a somewhat undignified flight, and,
but for the timely arrival of Nelson's fleet, worse things might have
happened--possibly an ignominious surrender.

The embarkation of all the troops without the loss of a single man,
albeit that a gale of wind was blowing at the time, was a very fine
performance; and the excitement was increased by the knowledge that
the Spanish fleet was bearing down upon Corsica, and could not be
distant more than twelve leagues. Yet Nelson took the fleet safely to
Elba, and there disembarked the troops.

Thus was Corsica lost to Great Britain. "It was impolitic," says
Southey,[31] "to annex this island to the British dominions, but,
having done so, it was disgraceful thus to abandon it. The disgrace
would have been spared, and every advantage which could have been
derived from the possession of the island secured, if the people had
at first been left to form a government for themselves, and protected
by us in the enjoyment of their independence." As things turned out,
it is doubtful if any good resulted from the occupation of Corsica,
beyond that, for a period, it may have been useful to the British
fleet in the Mediterranean, although it provided no facilities for
refitting or repairing damaged ships. Of the evils produced by the
conquest and possession of the island, enough perhaps has been said.
For a time, at any rate, the reputations of Hood, Dundas,[32] Stuart,
and Moore were sullied; the Corsicans suffered oppression, hardships,
and punishment for rebellion; Paoli, the Corsican patriot, retired to
England, and died there in exile;[33] England's fair name was dragged
in the dust, and many of England's soldiers found graves in the
island. Only two men came off with flying colours: the ex-Viceroy,
Sir Gilbert Elliott, was raised to the peerage, and Nelson added
glory to his name.




CHAPTER V.

FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN TO CEYLON.


The island of Elba, where the troops had taken refuge, belonged to
Tuscany, which, with other Austrian and Italian states, was allied
with Great Britain against the French Revolutionists. Tuscany,
however, was too weak to withstand the French invasion, and had
already lost Leghorn. For a time, therefore, it became doubtful
whether the British force in Elba would be able to obtain sufficient
provisions from the mainland close to the island, as there was always
the danger of the French cutting off the supplies, and Elba itself
had few resources. To make certain that the troops should not starve,
it was decided to despatch a small expedition to the mainland, to
dislodge the French from Piombino and the neighbourhood, and keep the
communications open. This was satisfactorily carried out in November
(1796) by Colonel Wemyss and a column consisting principally of the
Royal Irish Regiment, and Piombino was held by the British for the
next three months without being troubled by the French. Pure good
fortune saved the troops, both on the mainland and in Elba, at this
time, for before the end of the year the British fleet was withdrawn
from the Mediterranean, and, had the French chosen, they could have
captured the force left behind without much difficulty.

Sam Rice's letters during this eventful period were few, probably
because there was no possibility of sending them home, but in the
spring of 1797 he succeeded in getting a letter through. He wrote as
follows:--

  "PORTO FERRAJO, ISLE OF ELBA,
  _March 22, 1797_.

  "The _Fox_ cutter, which arrived here the other day from Sir John
  Jervis, with the famous and glorious news of the Spanish fleet
  being defeated,[34] sails to-morrow for Gibraltar. There is no
  news whatever to tell you from this quarter. The French, so near
  neighbours, are very peaceably inclined towards us, for they have
  not even paid us a visit, which they might very easily have done,
  and to our great annoyance. The most unfriendly thing that they
  have done since we have been here was to stop about two hundred fat
  bullocks, which were coming for the use of the army. Our troops
  being withdrawn from the cantonment[35] was the cause of that. The
  French have resumed their old posts,[36] and if we stay here much
  longer, we must take them a second time.

  "We are all heartily tired of this place; there is not an
  amusement of any kind; it is badly supplied with provisions, and
  everything at an exorbitant price. We unfortunate subalterns can
  scarce live. Our pay barely finds a good breakfast. These are the
  pleasures incident to a military life. We are as much in the dark
  as ever about our destination. Various are the reports. Some are of
  opinion that we are to go back to Corsica; others that we shall go
  to Portugal. The latter, I hope."

It seemed as if the authorities had forgotten the existence of the
small force at Elba. "But neither Jervis nor Nelson forgot that a
detachment of the British army was marooned in a little island off
the coast of Tuscany, in imminent danger of capture by the French,
and soon after the great naval victory off Cape St Vincent, Nelson
dashed back into the Mediterranean, ascertained that de Burgh and
his troops were safe, and conveyed them safely to Gibraltar."[37]
So, within a few weeks of the date of Sam Rice's last letter from
Elba, he and his regiment were on the way back to the Rock, and the
evacuation of the Mediterranean was complete. That any one should
have thought that there was a possibility of the troops from Elba
reoccupying Corsica at this juncture shows how little was known of
the situation and of the intentions of the British Government. The
idea of going to Portugal had more in it, and Sam Rice's hopes were
shortly to be realised.

What Captain Mahan calls the "Warfare against Commerce" had now set
in with a vengeance. To put the matter briefly: Napoleon, already
practically master of Continental Europe, aimed at being master of
the world, but found himself held in check by Great Britain and her
fleet. To destroy the power of Great Britain, therefore, became his
immediate object, and he knew that the only means of bringing this
about was by the destruction of her commerce with the world. From
England, he swore, the commerce of the world should pass to France;
but England was prepared not only to hold her own, but also to
wrest from France her little all. The English nation was determined
that even if the resources of the country were drained to the last
dregs, the despot of Europe should be held in check, and as time
went on many a financial crisis threatened, so that only by the most
strenuous efforts was it found possible to provide the sinews of
war. Fortunately, at this time the people of England were patriotic
to the core, and they raised large sums of money as "Voluntary
Contributions," which they presented to Government for the purpose
of carrying on the war, only ceasing to subscribe voluntarily when,
in 1798, the Government introduced the Income Tax, and declined free
gifts of money.

Napoleon began by ordering the maritime powers of Europe to close
their ports to British trading vessels; and England at once replied
that she would cut off all trade between the Continent and the
outside world; that only through England should there be any trade
at all. Such was the condition of affairs when the troops from Elba
arrived at Gibraltar in the spring of 1797. Spain had now become
the mere catspaw of France, who dictated to her on all occasions,
and the two powers set to work to coerce Portugal into joining
them, threatening the occupation of Lisbon by a French force if
Portugal should refuse to close her ports to English ships. Portugal,
observing the heavy combination against her, and the removal of
the buffer between herself and France, almost forgot her ancient
alliance with England; but, remembering it before she had committed
herself, she rejected the Franco-Spanish overtures, declared herself
for England, and armed to resist invasion. To support her in her
brave resolve England sent Sir Charles Stuart and a body of troops
to Lisbon, and, in June 1797, the 51st proceeded from Gibraltar to
join that force. But although Napoleon, smarting under the insult
offered to the Republic of France, desired above all things to bring
Portugal to her knees, he was too deeply involved in other parts of
Europe to be able to spare troops sufficient to carry out his threat
of marching on Lisbon. The British force in occupation, therefore,
was not called upon, during the next fifteen months, to do anything
more than ordinary garrison duty, which, according to Sam Rice, was
uninteresting to a degree, though the Portuguese did their best to
show hospitality to their allies, and though Rice's younger brother,
Henry, came into Lisbon in his ship on more than one occasion, and
helped Sam to make merry.

In June 1798, Rice, with less than six years' service, was promoted
captain in the 51st, and given the command of the light infantry
company--a much coveted post. But, as he had been for some years
a light infantry lieutenant, it was natural that he should have
the command of the company, which happened to become vacant at the
opportune moment. As we have already said, the grenadier and light
companies of regiments were composed of picked officers and men,
who wore uniforms different from the rest of the regiment. In the
case of the light infantry company the hair was not "clubbed," and
the head-dress consisted of a leather cap--almost a skull-cap, with
a large round peak straight up in front. The red jacket worn was
quite short, and the gaiters were much shorter than those of other
companies. The officers and sergeants were armed with fusils, and
wore pouches; so light infantry officers had silver epaulettes on
both shoulders, the sword-belt being held in place by the one and the
pouch-belt by the other. And upon the epaulettes, as well as upon
the cross-belt plate, was worn the light infantry badge--a silver
bugle-horn. A distinctive uniform of any kind always carries great
weight, and doubtless the light company officers held their heads
high, though they had some reason for doing so, since they knew
that on active service their place was with the vanguard--in the
forefront of the fight. But their daily pay was no higher than that
of their brother officers of the battalion companies--viz., captain,
9s. 5d., and lieutenant, 5s. 8d. And they could not complain, for a
lieutenant-colonel received no more than 15s. 11d., and a major 14s.
1d.--cheap enough food for powder!

While the 51st were eating out their hearts in inaction at Lisbon,
the British Navy was doing splendid work, sweeping the seas in every
direction, capturing French merchant vessels, and protecting British
commerce. Then Napoleon, seeking new fields for conquest, suddenly
bethought him of Egypt, and forthwith transported thirty thousand men
across the Mediterranean for the enterprise; but Nelson, following
him, utterly destroyed the French fleet in those seas at the battle
of the Nile, on the 1st August 1798. After this serious defeat, there
appeared to be little prospect of Napoleon being able to carry out
his threat of marching on Lisbon, and the 51st began to speculate
about their future movements, having little doubt that they would be
sent either to the West Indies or to the East Indies. In each quarter
there was every prospect of fighting, for the West India Islands had
been the scene of much conflict of recent years, their commercial
value being considerable, and their possession being, consequently,
of great importance. In the East Indies, also, much was doing; the
East India Company was still struggling for supremacy over the
native rulers; the great Mahratta war was being waged with vigour;
and operations in the Carnatic were not yet at an end. To develop
the trade of the East Indies was at this time of vital consequence
to England, and since the insignificant French possessions in India
(Chandernagore and Pondicherry) had already been captured, British
trade had no competitors in that part of the world. It was necessary,
however, to strengthen British rule in the country by reinforcing
the land forces; and it was necessary also to keep open the long
trade route between India and England by means of the Navy. The
convoy system was by this time in excellent working order, and all
British merchant vessels sailed under escort of men-of-war. It will
be remembered that as far back as 1793 Sam Rice described in some of
his earlier letters how large numbers of merchant ships assembled at
Portsmouth to be convoyed to their destinations, and how the ship
in which he sailed to Gibraltar was one of a fleet of two hundred.
But besides these convoys, the various trading routes were patrolled
by frigates and sloops-of-war, ever on the look-out for the enemy's
cruisers or merchantmen. So by the one means or the other British
ships were given a possibility of security, though occasionally a
venturesome merchant, to whom time meant money, refused to wait for
a convoy, and sent his ship to sea without one, as often as not to
be captured. In 1798 Government decided to put a stop to these risky
proceedings, and passed an Act making a convoy compulsory for every
British merchantman. The East India Company at this time possessed
a fleet of magnificent merchant vessels, and armed with guns; but
they always sailed in a body with a convoy of men-of-war, and,
considering the time taken in collecting a sufficient number of ships
for a convoy, the service was fairly regular. As a rule, the convoy
was relieved at St Helena, men-of-war from the Indian station being
responsible for the eastern half of the voyage, and the meeting of
the outward and homeward bound fleets at the little island was, from
all accounts, a fine sight.

It was to the East Indies that the 51st eventually received orders
to move, because news had reached England that some of the native
rulers were leaguing themselves with the French to oust the British,
and in October 1798 the regiment embarked at Lisbon, joined the fleet
of East Indiamen, and sailed for St Helena. In January they put in
at the Cape of Good Hope, and the following letter, written by Sam
Rice, from that place, shows that the voyage had not been without
incident:--

  "CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA,
  _January 26, 1799_.

  "Had not our water failed, I should not have had the pleasure
  of sending you these few lines, it being the positive order for
  the Commodore not to touch anywhere, except _en cas de besoin_.
  We arrived here three weeks ago after a passage of twelve weeks.
  Nothing material happened, only that one of the large Indiamen
  ran foul of us in the night and carried away part of our stern. I
  never was so frightened in my life. I thought that it was certainly
  all over with us. You can form no idea of the shock. Seamen think
  nothing of these things, but as for me, who am not a seaman and
  have no wish to be, I am in constant fear. Soon after our arrival
  we received orders to disembark, and to remain until such time as
  a reinforcement should arrive. I am happy to say that yesterday
  orders were issued for a re-embarkation. Our heavy baggage goes
  on board to-morrow; I imagine we shall do so the day after. The
  General, whose name is Dundas, reviewed us the other morning, and
  was highly pleased with our appearance, and not without reason. We
  no doubt are, for our numbers, _the prettiest and best-disciplined
  regiment in the Service_. You will excuse my mentioning it."

Here we see the true regimental officer's pride in his corps. The
spirit which Moore had created in his officers still lived--to the
51st officer no regiment was equal to the 51st,--and without such a
feeling, which was by no means universal in those days, a regiment
was of little real value. That the 51st was in as good order as
the officers thought is vouched for by General Dundas's Inspection
Report, which is still in existence.

The presence of a British general and British troops at Capetown in
1799 is worthy of comment, because no part of South Africa belonged
to Great Britain at that time, and Capetown was not actually captured
by the British, to hold for their own, until 1806,[38] and not
acknowledged as a British possession until 1814. The reason was
this: In 1794 the Cape had been for many years in the possession
of the Dutch East India Company, whose rights no other Europeans
disputed, and at the end of that year the French overran the
Netherlands, the Hereditary Stadtholder, the Prince of Orange, taking
refuge in England. Fearing that the French would proceed against the
Dutch colonies, the Prince thought of his alliance with Great Britain
and Prussia, and forthwith (February 1795) sent to the Dutch Governor
of the Cape a despatch, ordering him to admit into the colony any
British troops which might be sent, in order that they might protect
the Dutch possession from a French invasion. This despatch was
conveyed to the Cape by a British fleet, carrying British troops,
but the Governor, knowing that the Netherlands had become a Republic
and had joined France, refused to accept the orders of the exiled
Stadtholder. The British General's position was a peculiar one; he
had been ordered by his Government to occupy Capetown as a friendly
measure, but this the Dutch Governor declined to allow him to do. A
month was spent in negotiations, and when these failed, General Craig
took matters into his own hand, occupying Simonstown, and declaring
his intention of carrying out his orders. The Dutch flew to arms, and
expressed their determination to resist the unwarrantable intrusion,
but in August were driven out of the position which they had taken
up. In the following month a reinforcement of three thousand British
soldiers joined General Craig, and against these heavy odds the
Dutch could do little, so that the occupation of Capetown on the
16th September became an easy matter. From that time until 1803 the
British held the Cape, nominally for the Dutch, but in reality for
Great Britain; but by the Peace of Amiens, signed in March 1802, it
was restored to the Dutch, with the proviso that the English East
India Company could use it as a place of call.

In April 1799 the 51st disembarked at Madras, and took up quarters
in Fort St George. Southern India (or the Carnatic, as it was then
usually called), which, for some years past, had been in a state of
unrest, owing to the tyranny of the notorious Tippoo of Mysore, was
still the scene of military operations, but the 51st arrived just too
late to take part in the great victory at Seringapatam, where, on the
4th May, the British force stormed and captured Tippoo's stronghold,
annihilated the Mysore army, and killed the infamous ruler himself.
After that the country gradually settled down to comparative quiet,
and the British troops, no longer required for keeping order, were
free for employment elsewhere, the 51st receiving orders for Ceylon.

  "The homeward-bound fleet leaves the Roads to-morrow," wrote Sam
  Rice, from Fort St George, Madras, on the 9th August 1799. "The
  mail is ordered to be made up this evening. Only one ship has left
  this coast for England since our arrival, which was with the news
  of the capture of Seringapatam. I was then with a detachment up
  the country, and did not know of her sailing, which accounts for my
  not having written before.

  "I am sorry to say that we were not fortunate enough to share the
  honours with the conquerors of Mysore and divide with them the
  immense treasure of the tyrant in his capital. It is at least
  two thousand pounds out of my pocket, besides the chance of
  plunder--and being a flank company officer would have assisted me.
  It cannot be helped; better fortune another time. By the last news
  from Europe, this part of the world is likely to be the quietest
  for some time to come. The war seems only to be just begun; the
  fate of England and of Europe in general must soon be determined.
  We embarked for Colombo, in Ceylon, soon after our arrival here.
  After cruising in the Bay for three weeks, and beating against the
  monsoon in vain, we were at length compelled to put back, with half
  our men sick. Our loss has been very great, and the Regiment is
  still very sickly. It is yet thought that, when the monsoon shifts,
  we shall again attempt Colombo. I cannot give you a favourable
  account of India; the climate is so hot that, in my opinion, no
  real pleasure can be enjoyed; but this is always the cry of a
  newcomer; time and necessity may reconcile me to it."

Sam Rice's occasional references to prize-money and plunder sound
nowadays very mercenary in a British officer, but a century ago such
things added zest to the soldier's life, for, it must be remembered,
rewards were for the few, and medals only for the most senior of the
officers. Though plunder was not regarded as legitimate, prize-money
was quite in order and regulated by Government. Everything taken
from the enemy was sold by Government, and the amount realised was
divided among the troops engaged, according to rank, so that, in
the case of big captures, even a private soldier often received as
much as £100; at Seringapatam, for instance, more than a million of
money was divided amongst the troops, who, moreover, pillaged freely
on their own account. Eventually, but not until after the middle of
the nineteenth century, prize-money came to be considered degrading
to the spirit of the British soldier, who, it was thought, should
have higher motives for doing his duty. Moreover, the distribution
of prize-money to a part of the army, because that part happened to
make a fortunate capture, was certainly unjust to the remainder of
the army who might have had an equally hard time, though with less
luck. Consequently, it was decided to substitute for prize-money
a regulated rate of field-service allowance to all officers and
men engaged in a campaign, and captures from the enemy became the
property of Government. Private plunder, as a relic of barbarism, was
generally denounced, and was often dealt with as a crime for which
the punishment was death, yet, even in the Peninsular War, it went
on to a great extent, and was at times openly winked at. And the
Peninsular War cannot be said to have seen the last of open plunder,
as witness the sacking of the Summer Palace in 1860, and somewhat
similar, though perhaps less open, incidents up to forty years later.
Apart from the moral aspect of the question, plundering by an army
is, of course, subversive of all discipline, as men once given over
to plunder become irreclaimably out of hand. It has to be dealt
with drastically--no other means can check it; for it is a curious
psychological fact that, even in this present age of civilisation,
men whose morals are above suspicion, and who under ordinary
circumstances would not dream of misappropriating the smallest
portion of another man's property, regard the property of the absent
enemy as fair loot. The man's arguments are simple ones: if he did
not take the thing, some one else would do so; when the enemy fled he
abandoned all his possessions; and findings are keepings. All said
and done, nations themselves have not always set the best example;
and some of the art treasures of Europe have changed hands more than
once as a result of conquest.

It was not until February 1800 that the 51st again embarked for the
voyage to Ceylon, having in the meanwhile returned to garrison duty
at St Thomas' Mount and at Fort St George, and on its departure the
Governor-General of Madras, Lord Clive, issued a special valedictory
order, in which he remarked on the splendid state of the regiment and
its excellent discipline. Landing at Trincomalee three days after
leaving Madras, the regiment encamped there for a week, and then went
on again, by sea, to Colombo, at which place it eked out, for nearly
two years, an extremely dull garrison existence, as may be gathered
from the following extract from a letter written by Captain Rice at
Colombo, on the 26th July 1800:--

  "Our stay at Trincomalee was not long. This is by far the best
  place in the island, but, although it is surrounded by cinnamon
  gardens and many other fine things, I cannot say much in its
  favour. It is something cooler than the coast of India; existence
  may be endured; but there is no society whatever. It is most
  probable that our Regiment will remain some time on this island,--I
  am afraid longer than we wish. Everything here is very expensive,
  owing to the difficulty of getting supplies from the coast (India),
  which can only be done in the particular seasons. A secret
  expedition has lately been fitted out at Madras. Part has already
  sailed with H.M.'s 10th Regiment. We are always left out; better
  luck, I hope, for the future. Little is stirring in the country
  since the fall of the Mysorean tyrant, nor do I think there will be
  for some time to come. A Mahratta war was talked of, but I believe
  they are too wise."

Ceylon, when the 51st went there, had two principal British
settlements on the coast--Trincomalee and Colombo, which had been
captured from the Dutch as recently as 1796.[39] The British were
also in possession of, or at any rate had control over, such a depth
of coast-line all round the island as could be dominated by ships'
guns. The remainder of the island was ruled over by an independent
chief, with whom the Dutch had attempted to form treaties of
friendship, and whom likewise the British approached. This chief, the
King of Kandy, however, disliked, and had the strongest suspicions
of the motives of, all Europeans, and was, moreover, inflated with a
sense of his own importance, so the overtures of the British Governor
came to naught. On the death of the King of Kandy in 1798, trouble
arose concerning the succession to the throne, which was usurped by a
stranger without any pretensions. Plots and counterplots ensued among
the Kandians, and after a while one of the parties endeavoured to
enlist the services of the British, to establish order. The Governor
refused to interfere in the internal affairs of the Kandians, and
nothing of particular importance occurred until 1802, when some
native traders from British territory were ill-treated and robbed by
the Kandians, and redress for the outrage being refused, Governor
North decided to march on Kandy.

Although Kandy was no great distance from Colombo, it lay high up in
the mountains, and was most difficult of approach, the roads being
bad, the jungle dense, and the passes dangerous. On the 31st January
1803, the 51st, forming part of General Macdowall's column, commenced
the march, and after surmounting many difficulties, on the 19th
February stormed and carried two strong posts, and put the enemy to
flight. Hardships and sickness told considerably on the men, but
within a week of the first brush with the enemy, the 19th and 51st
Regiments marched into Kandy, which the enemy had evacuated and set
on fire. The capture of the capital had been tolerably simple, but
little good came of it, for the General soon found that sickness had
reduced his force to less than two thousand men, barely one half
of whom were Europeans, that supplies were running short, and that
his communications with Colombo were cut by the enemy, who began to
assume a threatening attitude on all sides of Kandy. A few skirmishes
took place during March; when, learning that no reinforcements would
be sent to him, Macdowall patched up a truce with the Kandians, and
leaving a thousand men, two-thirds of whom were natives, to garrison
Kandy, withdrew the remainder of his force, including the 51st, in
safety to Colombo, which was reached on the 9th April.

During the rest of the year small detachments of the regiment were
employed in repelling aggressions on the part of the Kandians, who
raided British territory in many directions. Several officers and a
considerable number of men died of disease, and the 51st was reduced
to a mere skeleton. Nor was the health of the other troops at Colombo
any better; and when it became known, in June 1803, that the garrison
at Kandy, now a handful of weaklings, was being besieged by the
infuriated Kandians, it was found to be impossible to send a force to
its relief; and India could not spare a single man for Ceylon, as all
available troops were required for the Mahratta War. In the end, the
Kandians recaptured their capital, and murdered the remnant of the
British garrison in cold blood, though preserving the life of Major
Davie, the commandant, whom they cast into prison, doubtless under
the impression that he might be useful to them some day. The war
died out in 1805, without any attempt on the part of the British to
revenge their murdered compatriots, for the reason that no sufficient
reinforcements were ever available, and the fate of Major Davie is
pitiful to think of. For nearly nine years he languished in a dungeon
in Kandy, and died there, worn out by disease, not to be revenged
until 1815, when the power of the Kandian kings was broken for ever,
and the whole island taken over by the British.

The 51st continued to garrison Colombo until 1807, and suffered
much from the enervating climate, losing a great many officers
and men, and having a number of officers invalided home--amongst
them Samuel Rice, whose constitution was undermined, and who never
really recovered from the effects of service in Ceylon, although he
managed to fight through many subsequent campaigns. In September
the remnant of the regiment landed in England, after an absence of
fifteen years, the last nine of which had been passed in absolute
exile. Home news lost most of its interest during the six or eight
months which it took to drift through to Ceylon, and what was going
on in Europe affected the exiles little, for their own petty war and
its attendant hardships gave them sufficient to think about. Yet,
in Europe stirring events had been in progress, and the 51st, in
going to the East, were denied the satisfaction of taking part in the
reoccupation of the Mediterranean, which commenced with the capture
of Minorca by a force under Sir Charles Stuart, only a month after
the regiment sailed from Lisbon. They missed also the subsequent
capture of Malta in 1800, and the chance of sharing in Abercromby's
great victories over the French in Egypt in 1801. But they did not
miss much else, for the Peace of Amiens (March 1802) brought the war
to a close, and though France again declared war against England
fourteen months later, no actual fighting took place on shore. The
British navy, however, continued to be actively employed, more
especially in frustrating Napoleon's designs for an invasion of
England, and this grand scheme was finally wrecked in October 1805,
when the mighty Nelson, at the cost of his life, almost annihilated
the French fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar. Napoleon being thus
deprived of the means of transporting his "Army of England" across
the Channel, turned and vented his wrath on Continental Europe,
carried his conquests far and wide, and proclaimed one of his
brothers King of Naples, and another King of Holland.

That there was plenty of fighting in prospect for the army was
apparent to the officers of the 51st when they reached England, but
for the moment they had no men, and the next few months were devoted
to bringing the regiment up to strength, as well as to gaining an
insight into the vast changes which had taken place in the army and
in military methods during the past decade; for the officers, who had
been absent from England for so long, soon realised that they were
considerably behind the times. In Ceylon they had heard little or
nothing of the great reforms in progress at home--reforms initiated
by none other than their old commanding officer, Major-General John
Moore, and, as will be shown in the next chapter, far-reaching in
their ultimate results.




CHAPTER VI.

THE REFORM OF THE ARMY.


After such brilliant work as was done by Abercromby's army in Egypt
in 1801, it may seem strange that any one should have questioned the
ability of the British army to meet and defeat any numerically equal
force in Europe. Fortunately for England, however, there were in the
army officers whose deep study of their profession told them that
the tactics of fighting were moving towards a change, and that old
methods before long would have to pass away. Fortunately, again, such
officers were not carried away by the glamour of the recent victories
in Egypt, and the fact that they themselves participated in those
victories added considerably to the weight of their counsels. It has
always been the case that campaigns, however successful they may have
been, have been followed by reforms in the army; for it is only from
experience gained in actual warfare that it is possible to discover
the shortcomings of a force, or how to set matters to rights. There
was, therefore, nothing peculiar in the move which was made in 1802
towards overhauling the affairs of the army, and the prime mover in
the reforms was the Commander-in-Chief, H.R.H. the Duke of York.

As was mentioned in an earlier chapter, it was common knowledge, as
far back as 1792, that a long immunity from European warfare was
beginning to tell on the wellbeing of the British army, and that the
officers were in a measure losing touch with their profession. Still,
no immediate action was taken, and the good work done in India, the
West Indies, and elsewhere led the authorities to believe that there
was nothing very much amiss. In 1802, however, came the opportunity.
The peace patched up in that year brought about extensive reductions
in the establishment of the British army, and it became necessary
to place a great many officers on half pay. Moore, who, after much
foreign service, was then commanding the Canterbury district, and
who, as we have previously shown, had great ideas on the subject of
good officers, seized the opportunity offered by these reductions
to weed out such officers as he deemed undesirable. The matter of
seniority was nothing to him, and he applied, at any rate to the
regiments under his immediate command, the hitherto unheard-of
principle--selection, pure and simple, and made by himself. His
methods were somewhat severe, and he did not confine his operations
to the junior officers, as is evident from his correspondence with
the Adjutant-General of the Army. "Some commanding officers," he
wrote in 1803, "the state of whose regiments justify it, must be told
to retire from the service, the duties of which they are unequal to.
The command must not be allowed to devolve upon their majors, who may
be equally incapable, but be given to officers of approved talents.
One or two measures of this sort generally known would excite an
exertion which at present is much wanted."[40]

Moore was ably supported, not only by the Commander-in-Chief,
but also by his old commanding officer of Corsican days, General
David Dundas, who, in these early years of reform, first was
Quartermaster-General of the Army, and afterwards was in command
of the Southern District--and so again Moore's commanding officer.
Moore's suggestions carried immense weight with the authorities,
and a great number of officers who had failed to take their
profession seriously found themselves retired on half pay. The
result, though disastrous to the officers concerned, put new life
into the commissioned ranks, and opened the way for the remodelling
of the whole organisation of the army. The question of the officers
having been settled, and their zeal and efficiency having been
assured, Moore's work was simplified, and it was on Moore--only a
major-general commanding a comparatively small district--that the
military authorities leaned in carrying out their scheme for the
reorganisation of the army. This was, of course, natural enough, for
Moore himself, if not the originator of the scheme, was at any rate
the chosen mouthpiece of General Dundas, whose views concerning the
training of troops were held in high esteem. But what is not easy
to understand is the absence of opposition on the part of the older
conservative officers, senior to Moore. The fact, however, remains
that he was given a free hand, and when, in 1803, he determined to
reform the discipline and training of the army on lines which he had
been working out for many years, principally during active service in
the West Indies, Holland, and Egypt, he was given the command of a
special brigade of selected regiments, with which he was permitted to
experiment to his heart's content.

The sole purpose of his system was to convert the British army into
a thoroughly sound and reliable fighting machine, suitable to the
times. He had observed that Napoleon was adopting new tactics; he
foresaw that the times were changing; and he realised the fact that
the experiences of fighting in India, in the West Indies, in Holland,
and in Egypt would be of small value to troops pitted against
Napoleon's trained veterans in Europe, unless such experiences were
thoroughly examined, with a view to discovering if the army had
learned anything worth learning, or if it was still behind the times.
Moore was perfectly convinced that in tactical formations in the
attack and the defence the methods of the infantry of the army were
out of date; but he knew, also, that the men of the British army were
made of sound stuff, and that under efficient officers they could
be trained to do anything. It is worthy of note, however, that the
changes which Moore introduced did not arise, as is usually the case,
from any improvement in firearms, but rather from a careful study
of recent campaigns in various parts of the world. In short, Moore
saw what was wrong, and endeavoured to set matters right, with what
result will presently be shown.

In order to understand how it came about that the British infantry
within a few years proved more than a match for the French in the
Peninsular War, it is necessary to have some knowledge of the methods
of fighting previously adopted by the armies of the two nations, and
then to see how Moore altered these methods, by assimilating the
good and by eliminating the bad, by pruning and by inducing fresh
growth. We shall see that, in the new system of training, everything
depended on the regimental officer; and we shall see that, when war
came, it was the regimental officer who made the British army almost
invincible.

Without entering too deeply into the history of tactics, we may
say that up to the middle of the eighteenth century the fighting
formation of infantry, whether in attack or defence, consisted
generally of solid bodies of troops, which marched up in two massive
columns, and then deployed, in the face of the opposing force,
into two lines each composed of three ranks. Skirmishers were then
unknown; and very great attention was paid to drill. About 1757 we
find the Austrians using light troops (Croats) to harass Frederick
the Great's army on the march; but these do not appear to have been
properly organised, and, though always annoying, they seldom acted
with real judgment. In 1774 Mesnil Durand invented a system in which
skirmishers played a considerable part. Battalions were to move
in double company columns at deploying intervals, two of the ten
companies of each battalion acting as skirmishers to cover the whole
front of the line of columns. It was held that in this way the fire
of the skirmishers would make itself felt to such an extent that it
would only remain for the heavy columns behind to push in and crush
the enemy by sheer weight. This was to a certain extent the system
adopted by the French in 1793, and employed by the French generals
in the Peninsular War, and by Napoleon until his final defeat at
Waterloo, except that the columns of attack were deep and solid, and
not merely single battalion columns or lines of battalion columns.

It may therefore be said that skirmishers first took their place in
the organisation of Continental armies about 1774, but years before
that the question of their employment had been freely discussed. As
early as 1754 Comte Lancelot Turpin de Crissé had published a work
on the Art of War, in which he dealt with the uses of light troops
at some length, and the British army had had its bodies of trained
light infantrymen certainly before 1758.[41] In all probability they
originated about the year 1757, when the British generals, fighting
against the French in America, found that the latter's Red Indian
allies perpetually annoyed them on the march and on other occasions,
and determined to meet them in their own methods of fighting.
Consequently, every regiment in America was ordered to select "the
most enterprising officers and the most active of the privates with
the appellation of _Rangers_." Lord Howe, then commanding the 55th
Regiment, but in 1758 raised to the command of the army in the
field, was immensely impressed by the Red Indian methods of warfare,
and was supported by several commanding officers, who realised the
absurdities of tight clothes and movements in solid formation, when
engaging the enemy in the rough forest country of the New World. The
success which attended the experiment of the _Rangers_ led to the
formation of a light company in every regiment, and the valuable
services which these companies performed during the next few years
fully justified their existence. And the matter was carried still
further, for, in 1758, a whole regiment was equipped for light work,
and named Gage's Light Infantry.[42] In that year, however, while
leading a desperate attack on the French, Howe was shot dead, at the
head of the _Rangers_, in the hour of victory.

At the peace of 1763 all the light companies of regiments were
reduced, and the lessons learned in America for the time being were
forgotten. In 1770, however, some one remembered the value of light
troops, and the light companies were established afresh. In all
probability that some one was Lord Howe's brother, General William
Howe, who had distinguished himself as a leader of light infantry in
Wolfe's Quebec campaign of 1759, for in 1774 he was allowed to take
the light companies of seven regiments to Salisbury, and exercise
them as a battalion in certain manœuvres which he had invented. There
was apparently little similarity between Howe's formations and those
of Mesnil Durand mentioned above, for whereas the latter's flank
companies were employed with their own battalion, as part and parcel
of it in the fight, Howe's idea was to take these companies away from
their regiments, and form them into separate battalions, for distinct
and special work. In this way Sir William Howe, in chief command
of the British forces, employed the flank companies of regiments
during the War of American Independence, the most important and most
hazardous duties being performed by battalions composed of them.

Both Viscount Howe and his brother, Sir William, gained their first
knowledge of light troops from the Red Indians, and it may perhaps
be remarked that, in 1880-1881, irregular warfare with the Boers
gave us the idea of mounted infantry. There is a striking analogy
between the old light infantry and the modern mounted infantry:
each was the outcome of a desire for greater mobility than ordinary
infantry soldiers were capable of; each began in the same way; the
light company and the mounted infantry company contained the picked
men of the battalion, and, in war, these companies of the best men
were taken away from their regiments to work, with similar companies
of other regiments, as separate battalions, the merits or demerits of
which it is not necessary to enter into here.

To return to the development of light troops in the British army. In
1782 the light companies of nine regiments were assembled in camp at
Coxheath, Kent, and, together with two battalions of infantry and two
regiments of light dragoons, were practised in what was termed the
"Dundas Exercises," which were being tried for the first time. A year
or two later, Dundas visited the Prussian manœuvres, obtained some
fresh ideas, and then published his monumental work, which eventually
became the first drill-book authorised to be used in the British
army. Dundas, however, had very little new to say about light troops,
and his exercises were practically on the Continental model. In 1794
Sir Thomas Graham[43] (afterwards Lord Lynedoch) raised a regiment
(which was numbered the 90th), and had it equipped and drilled as a
light infantry corps, though it was not recognised officially as such
for another eleven years. It was in the above year that Moore was
working with Corsican troops in the field, and he always considered
the Corsicans the best light infantrymen in the world, although he
acknowledged that they lacked the discipline necessary for holding
their own against highly-trained troops. In 1798 Howe[44] again came
to the front, and superintended the training of a brigade of all
arms, assembled on the Essex coast, in his light drill. Lastly, in
1800, H.R.H. the Commander-in-Chief ordered the assembly at Horsham
of a temporary corps, for the purpose of training a body of men in
the use of the rifle, fourteen regiments being called upon to furnish
thirty privates and a proportion of officers and non-commissioned
officers. After the summer training, these men were moved to
Blatchington, and were then formed into the Rifle Corps (95th),[45]
for whom Colonel Coote Manningham and Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon.
W. Stewart drew up the famous 'Regulations for the Rifle Corps,'
published in 1801. The methods of training these riflemen were very
similar to those employed in training temporary light infantry corps
composed of the light companies of regiments, except in so far as the
superior range and accuracy of the rifle over the flintlock musket
altered the conditions of the attack and defence.

By this time it had been discovered that Napoleon had developed the
use of his _voltigeurs_ enormously, and that his victories were being
secured by the judicious employment of these light troops; so English
books dealing with the systematic training of light troops now began
to appear. The earliest of these was one based on a translation of
a work by a "German officer of distinction and of much military
experience," which, first produced in 1798 (reprinted in 1801 and
1803), under the title of 'Regulations for the Exercise of Riflemen
and Light Infantry, and Instructions for their Conduct in the Field,'
was ordered to be studied by all officers of the army. Who that
German officer was is never made clear, and in 1803 there appeared
another and a far more valuable work, entitled 'A Treatise upon the
Duties of Light Troops,' translated from the German of Colonel Von
Ehwald, but there is nothing in this book to lead one to believe that
Von Ehwald was the author of the earlier work. The gallant Colonel
had served in the Seven Years' War, commanded a corps of Hessian
jägers, in British pay, during the American War of Independence, and
subsequently commanded a light corps of the Danish army, and his
book contains a mass of useful information on the training of light
troops, as well as examples of their work in the field during several
campaigns.

Judging by the contents of this treatise, it is more than probable
that Sir John Moore had studied it in the original, for Von Ehwald's
ideas on discipline and training were identical with those upon which
Moore subsequently set to work. Both Von Ehwald and Moore held the
opinion that an army which could place in the field large numbers of
light troops, so highly trained and disciplined as to be capable of
working intelligently in extended order in more or less independent
small parties, would be able to outflank, outmanœuvre, and defeat an
enemy of superior strength who adhered to close formations. Rapidity
of movement, however, and the ability to make good use of ground as
well as of their firearms, were essential to the success of light
troops, and Moore knew that unless there could be produced a higher
standard of discipline than was yet known in the British army, it
would be impossible to create light troops of any value. And Moore's
ideas of discipline differed somewhat from those of most officers of
the time, in that he did not believe in the "mechanical discipline"
which made a mere automaton of the soldier, but rather in that
"intelligent discipline, best illustrated, perhaps, by a pack of
well-trained hounds, running in no order, but, without a straggler,
each making good use of his instinct, and following the same object
with the same relentless perseverance."[46] In his determination
to establish this new form of discipline lay Moore's success, and
he always maintained that by no other means than by inculcating
the strictest habits of intelligent discipline in all ranks could
self-reliance and initiative come natural to a body of troops.
Whether he discovered this for himself, or whether he learned it
from Von Ehwald, or whether, again, both of them were following the
lead of Napoleon, whose skirmishers had already made their mark in
European warfare, the fact remains that Sir John Moore was the first
person to attempt to apply it to a large number of British soldiers,
and he was the first person to succeed.

In the summer of 1803, therefore, Moore commenced work with his
famous brigade at Shorncliffe Camp, and he decided to train his
brigade as light troops, not in the usual way by extemporising
battalions out of light companies detached from various regiments,
but by employing whole regiments. For this purpose the 52nd and
the 43rd were, in 1803, formed into light infantry regiments, and,
together with the newly raised Rifle Corps (95th), handed over to
Moore to train. He began at the beginning, and thoroughly overhauled
the existing regimental systems; he went deeply into interior
economy, and instituted many reforms--so far-reaching and excellent
that they have remained almost unaltered to the present day. He
insisted that discipline could only be maintained by the officers of
all ranks always being in touch with their men, and ever having their
welfare at heart. A hard worker himself, he saw that all the officers
of his brigade worked hard also; and during the training seasons
at Shorncliffe the officers were seldom off duty on week-days, and
had to brush up for the General's inspection on Sundays, for Moore
did not recognise any necessity for recreation. On one occasion
the father of a young officer wrote to the General to say that he
proposed to send his son a horse. Moore's reply was characteristic:
"that he should be very pleased that the horse should be sent, but
that it would be necessary for the father to send with it some one to
ride it, for his son would have no time to do so."[47] His first care
was to have efficient officers; he watched them carefully, and he
got rid of those whom he deemed useless for his purpose, thus laying
the foundation-stone of the future building. With good and reliable
officers, establishing a chain of responsibility from highest to
lowest, with a thorough organisation of battalions on the company
system, with non-commissioned officers and men no longer ruled with
a rod of iron, but respecting and relying on their officers, Moore
began to see his way clear.

His next step was to practise, for a considerable time, drill and
movements in close formation--a proof that he was thorough, as well
as patient. An ordinary man with a new hobby to ride might have been
inclined to slur over, if not scoff at, things which he considered
old-fashioned. But Moore had a use for them, because he intended to
make his brigade absolutely perfect, and an example to be followed
by every other brigade in the British army. His brigade was to be
steadier on parade and better drilled than any other, and until
he was sure that it was so, he restrained himself from taking the
regiments on to their training as light troops. And he had other
reasons, for he felt that square drill, practised as a means to
an end, was the best discipline for men who were presently to act
independently and work out things for themselves. Moreover, he knew
that light troops alone would not win a battle, but that they must
be supported by well-disciplined bodies of men, moving in close
formation and maintaining strict order, until the moment arrived for
them to be thrown into the fight.

Sir David Dundas took the greatest interest in all that Moore was
doing, and often visited his camp. His drill-book was still the
official manual, and, as the first of its kind, was of the greatest
value. "There was, however, so much that was rigid, formal, and
unnecessary in Dundas's drill that it gained for him the nickname of
'Old Pivot'; while he also made the fatal mistake of distributing the
whole science of military evolution into eighteen manœuvres, which
were a sad stumbling-block to slow-witted officers. 'General,' said
Sir John Moore to him in 1804, 'that book of yours has done a great
deal of good, and would be of great value if it were not for those
damned eighteen manœuvres.' 'Why--ay,' answered Dundas slowly in
broad Scots, 'blockheads don't understand.'"[48] Yet Moore struggled
manfully with the eighteen manœuvres, and tried new methods of
performing them, before passing on to lighter movements--extended
order formations, advanced-guards, rear-guards, and outposts.

Undoubtedly, Moore's opportunity was unique, for his brigade had
its place in the defence of England, and it was thought that the
French intended to land somewhere near Shorncliffe. Consequently,
the brigade was considered to be on active service, and at the same
time was being trained for war, a state of affairs which naturally
tended to make all ranks keen to acquire military knowledge. There
was none of the make-believe of peace training; only a few miles of
sea lay between the brigade and the enemy, and on any dark night the
French might attempt to effect a landing between the Martello Towers
which studded the coast-line. At night, therefore, these towers and
three neighbouring forts were fully manned, and outposts covered the
camp on the heights above, the sentries being provided with ball
ammunition. By day, while a look-out was still maintained by the
guards, the brigade was drilled and practised at manœuvring over the
country inland; and now and again the order was given to strike camp
and march, when, within an hour, the whole brigade loaded up and
moved off--with everything complete and ready for active service in
any quarter of the globe. All this resulted from the discipline which
the General instilled into his regiments, and for three continuous
years he had them in his care. So that when, in 1806, he was called
away for service in Sicily, he left his brigade in the highest
state of discipline, and as light troops certainly superior to any
in Europe. The proof of this Moore did not live to see, but his
three regiments a few years later formed the Light Division, which
throughout the Peninsular War carried all before it.

Moore developed light movements enormously, producing a marvellous
elasticity in comparatively large bodies of troops, and under his
training whole regiments became as mobile and rapid in manœuvre as
previously no company of a regiment had been. To swiftly reach a
given point, and there bring as many rifles or muskets as possible
into the firing line; to make every officer and man use his own
intelligence in carrying out movements; and to impress upon them
the necessity for mutual support,--were the chief aims of Moore's
training; and he it was who originated for the British army that
self-dependent Thin Red Line which so soon was to become the
destroyer of Napoleon's deep and massive columns. For it was proved
over and over again in the long war which followed, that, with
opposing forces of equal numbers, the line two-deep, every man of
which was so disciplined as to stand firm, and every man of which
had the opportunity of using his rifle or musket, could make short
work of the more condensed three-deep line, or of the column which
presented a large target, and which at the same time could return
the fire only from the muskets of two ranks at the contracted head
of the column. It is interesting to note that Colonel Von Ehwald
was a strong advocate of the two-deep line both in attack and in
defence, for purposes of firing as well as for using the bayonet. "In
an attack with charged bayonets," he says, "I am convinced that, if
the corps drawn up in two ranks advances resolutely upon the other in
three, it will not be worse off for that rank less, as the pressure
of one upon the other, of which the French tacticians speak, exists
only in the imagination."

Now, the outcome of all this training of light troops was a new
fighting formation for the British army. In the first place, Moore
had proved that whole regiments could become intelligent and reliable
skirmishers, if properly taught; and he had proved, also, that
companies, or smaller bodies, of skirmishers, acting independently
though at the same time working towards the consummation of a
"general idea," were of the highest value when the commanders
of skirmishing units were allowed a free hand. Next, Moore had
discovered that, with these highly trained bodies of skirmishers
out in front, harassing the enemy in every direction, keeping down
his fire, and shattering his _moral_, massive bodies of troops in
rear were no longer required. So he instituted the attack formation
as follows:--First, the skirmishers in some strength; second, a
two-deep line in close order; third, a similar line; and it was with
these two lines, always kept in hand, that the _coup-de-grâce_--in
the shape of a withering volley, followed by a bayonet charge--was
given, at the moment when the enemy had begun to feel the effects
of the bickerings of the skirmishers. But the secret of success in
the employment of these shadowy lines against the enemy's columns
lay not only in the efficiency of the skirmishers, but also in the
superior discipline of the troops behind, who were brought up in
line of quarter-columns to within effective range of the position,
and then deployed into shoulder to shoulder lines of two ranks. It
was for these reasons that Moore drilled his regiments to become
equally proficient in close order movements as in skirmishing. Simple
as all this may appear nowadays, it was a revolution in fighting
methods, and necessitated a vast amount of preliminary training and
disciplining; but Moore's system had been carefully watched by the
authorities, and so satisfied were they of its soundness, that it
was applied as far as possible to all regiments of the army. It took
time, but the ultimate result was good, and it was soon found that a
new spirit was gradually passing into all ranks.

To sum up the nature of the reforms introduced into the army
between 1802 and 1807: we find, to begin with, a marked improvement
in the zeal and efficiency of the officers, produced not only by
getting rid of the useless ones, but also by the introduction of
new regulations relating to the grant of first commissions and
subsequent promotion. Thus the minimum age for an ensign was fixed
at sixteen,[49] and an officer was required to have served at least
three years for promotion to the rank of captain, and seven years
to that of major. Next we find the establishment of a new and high
code of discipline, as well as of morals, among both officers and
men, from which followed a closer union between the one and the
other, and a greater regard for the welfare of the soldier on the
part of the officer. Again, one uniform system of drill and manœuvre
was laid down and rigidly enforced for each arm of the service, for
hitherto such matters had been left to the commanding officers of
corps. "Such changes," wrote Lord Londonderry,[50] "together with the
establishment of hospitals for the wounded and disabled soldiers, and
for the education of children whose parents had fallen in the defence
of their country, could not fail of producing the most beneficial
effect upon the _moral_ of the British army, which, from being an
object of something like abhorrence to its own countrymen, and of
contempt to the troops of other nations, rose to command, as well as
to deserve, the esteem of the former, and the respect and admiration
of the latter."

The above is an outline of the somewhat startling ideas connected
with military reform which were thrust upon the officers of the 51st
on arriving home from Ceylon in the autumn of 1807, and they were
not slow to appreciate the situation. Their men were all new to them,
as they had brought few back to England, and they realised at once
that it would require strenuous efforts on their part to make up the
leeway. It speaks well for them that they were not found wanting,
and they were fortunate in having a commanding officer[51] capable
of rising to the occasion. The necessity of getting into fighting
trim with all speed was apparent to every one; for the cloud over
Europe still hung low and black, and the British expedition sent to
Copenhagen was at the moment destroying the Danish fleet--an act
which, it was well known, would increase Napoleon's hatred of England
tenfold. And so it proved, for before the end of the year a French
army invaded Portugal and entered Lisbon, and Napoleon thus fulfilled
his promise of humbling England's ancient ally.

The difficulties encountered by the regiment in learning its new
work were increased by constant changes of station; first it was
quartered at Chatham, then at Chichester, while early in 1808
it moved to Gosport, and in the spring to Guernsey. There is no
doubt that the regimental officers had plenty to do, with parades
morning and evening, and with a considerable amount of routine work
connected with interior economy. They were up early, as a subaltern
of each company had to call the company roll and inspect the rooms
immediately after reveille, and they were kept busy until they had
seen the men have their dinners at 1 P.M. At three o'clock the
officers dined, and turned out for parade afterwards; so they had
very little leisure for recreation, though what form of recreation
officers and men indulged in at this period is never made very clear.
Some of the officers hunted and shot, but outdoor games, as we know
them now, had not come into fashion. Cricket and football were in
their infancy, and had not reached the army; nor were there any
organised athletic sports; and, in all probability, the only games
played by the men were skittles, and a kind of "fives" in what was
termed the "ball alley." Only by marching were the soldiers kept in
good condition, for it had not yet been discovered that there was a
value in wholesome recreation.

By the spring of 1808 the 51st was a regiment again, but in the
matter of dress quite a different regiment to that which left
Lisbon for India ten years before; for the uniform of the army had
undergone alterations, and the mode of dressing the hair had changed.
The "queue," which had taken the place of the "club" in 1799, and
which was at first ten inches in length, was now shortened to seven
inches, and was tied, a little below the upper part of the collar of
the coat, with a black bow,[52] so that one inch of hair remained
free at the end; the men's coiffure, however, being no longer
powdered white. The officers still wore powdered hair and cocked
hats of considerable size, sometimes putting them on even with
the shoulders, at other times fore and aft; but for the men a new
head-dress had been devised, and this took the form of a cylindrical
shako, with a brass plate in front and above it a red and white tuft
coming out of a black cockade. The red coat had changed its shape,
and was buttoned up tight to the waist, the lapels, in the case of
the officers' coats, reaching right down, and being so made that they
could be buttoned across to form a double-breasted coat, or thrown
back to show the lining of facing cloth--something after the fashion
of the front of the present lancer tunic. The officers also wore very
high and roomy collars, to admit the large black neckcloth, which
was now much affected. And thus turned out, the whole regiment was
undoubtedly as smart as could be,--but what was better, the officers
and men were efficient soldiers.

In the meanwhile, events on the Continent had gone from bad to worse,
and Napoleon, not content with the occupation of Portugal, had thrown
off his alliance with Spain, marched on Madrid, and transferred his
brother Joseph from the throne of Naples to that of Spain. England at
once rose to the occasion, decided to free Portugal and Spain from
the French yoke, and forthwith launched an expedition of about 25,000
men for the purpose. The 51st, having so recently returned from
foreign service, was not included in the expeditionary force, which
landed, on the 1st August (1808), on the Portuguese coast, near the
mouth of the Mondego river, and commenced the advance on Lisbon. On
the 16th the French were first encountered at Obidos, where a slight
skirmish took place, and on the following day Sir Arthur Wellesley
fought and won the battle of Roliça.[53] Without entering into the
details of this the first campaign of the Peninsular War, we may
mention that the British and Portuguese routed the French at Vimiera
on the 21st August, and before the end of the month the enemy, by the
Convention of Cintra, agreed to evacuate Portugal. After this the
British army occupied Lisbon, and prepared for operations against the
French in Spain.

While these events were in progress, the 51st, chafing at having been
left behind, were moved from Guernsey to Chichester, and before long
had the satisfaction of receiving their orders for active service.




CHAPTER VII.

THE CORUNNA CAMPAIGN, AND AFTER.


After the occupation of Lisbon, Sir Arthur Wellesley, deeming it
improbable that the army would resume operations for some months,
went home on leave of absence; and, a little later, Sir John Moore
was given command of the British forces in Portugal. In October he
received despatches from Government wherein he was informed that
it had been decided to send Sir David Baird, with 10,000 men, to
Corunna, and Moore was instructed to take the 20,000 British troops
from Lisbon, and to form a junction with him forthwith, when,
together with the Spanish army, he was to attack the French and drive
them out of Spain.

To carry out his orders Moore had a choice of routes; he could
transport his force by sea to Corunna, or he could march through
Portugal and Spain. The former plan he rejected, as being likely
to cause delay; for, with sailing vessels and at such a season of
the year, it was impossible to estimate the length of time that the
voyage would occupy. He decided, therefore, to adopt the land route,
knowing that, if necessary, he could send his ships up the coast to
some port, which would then become his base, instead of Lisbon.
Accordingly, he desired Baird to march south-east to meet him at a
point to be afterwards named, probably either Valladolid or Burgos,
but the exact spot depending on the movements of the French.

Nearly three months before this the 51st had been warned for
active service, and on the 18th August marched from Chichester
to Portsmouth, where the regiment embarked in three transports,
to join Sir David Baird's force, then assembling at Falmouth for
some undisclosed destination. The regiment, mustering six hundred
bayonets, was in fine fettle, and Captain Sam Rice was in command of
the light infantry company. But eager as he and his brother officers
were to get to business, they were forced to possess their souls in
patience, for they were kept on board their transports for upwards
of two months, with little or nothing to do, except to discuss the
object of the expedition, their knowledge of which was vague in the
extreme. As far as the soldiers were concerned, they were jubilant,
and from a cause which nowadays may seem trivial. The order had gone
forth that their hair was no longer to be "tied," but cut short at
the neck! At length the long weeks of waiting came to an end, and on
the 8th October Baird's fleet of transports sailed from Falmouth,
five days later anchoring off Corunna. But even then further delays
occurred, as the Spanish officials objected to the landing of the
force, and it was another fortnight before the disembarkation was
completed.

To return to Moore. Before the end of October he had set his troops
in motion, but his arrangements were much upset by the reports of the
state of the roads which he wished to utilise for his march. So bad
were they said to be, that he considered it advisable to divide his
force and move by two routes; and before long he had reason to be
anxious about the safety of his detached columns, for the situation
was undergoing a change. At the time of his departure from Lisbon,
Moore had every reason to believe that the Spanish troops, aided
by the British forces under himself and Baird, would be able to
deal a heavy blow to the French invaders, and in this belief he was
supported by the knowledge that King Joseph, fearful of the impending
attack, had withdrawn from Madrid to the neighbourhood of Vittoria,
where he concentrated the French army on the Ebro. But Moore did know
that at this very time Napoleon was pouring reinforcements over the
Pyrenees in such quantities as to bring the strength of the French in
Spain up to some 250,000 men.

Napoleon had determined to secure Spain and Portugal at all costs;
and, placing himself at the head of the reinforcements, early in
November defeated a Spanish force which attempted to bar his way, and
advanced rapidly to Burgos. Thence he pushed a corps to the Carrion
river, to protect his right flank from the British, while he moved on
Madrid. In the meantime, Moore's main bo

Showing first 200,000 characters. Full text: gutenberg.org/ebooks/48274