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The Complete Works in Philosophy, Politics and Morals of the late Dr. Benjamin Franklin, Vol. 3 [of 3]

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Title: The Complete Works in Philosophy, Politics and Morals of the late Dr. Benjamin Franklin, Vol. 3 [of 3]

Author: Benjamin Franklin


        
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE COMPLETE WORKS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND MORALS OF THE LATE DR. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, VOL. 3 [OF 3] ***

  TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE

  This is Volume 3 of a 3-volume set. The other two volumes are also
  accessible in Project Gutenberg using
  https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/48136 and
  https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/48137.

  Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.

  Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
  corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
  the text and consultation of external sources.

  More detail can be found at the end of the book.




  The
  WORKS
  Of
  BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, L.L.D.

  VOL. 3.

  [Illustration: (Stalker Sculptor.)]

  PRINTED,

  for Longman, Hurst, Rees & Orme, Paternoster Row, London.




  THE
  COMPLETE
  WORKS,
  IN
  PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND MORALS,
  OF THE LATE
  DR. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN,
  NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND ARRANGED:
  WITH
  MEMOIRS OF HIS EARLY LIFE,
  WRITTEN BY HIMSELF.

  IN THREE VOLUMES.

  VOL. III.

  London:

  PRINTED FOR J. JOHNSON, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD;
  AND LONGMAN, HURST, REES, AND ORME,
  PATERNOSTER-ROW.

  1806.

  JAMES CUNDEE, PRINTER,
  LONDON.




  CONTENTS.


  VOL. III.


  PAPERS ON AMERICAN SUBJECTS BEFORE THE REVOLUTIONARY
  TROUBLES.

                                                                 _Page._

  Albany papers; containing, I. reasons and motives on which the
  plan of union for the colonies was formed;--II. reasons against
  partial unions;--III. and the plan of union drawn by B. F. and
  unanimously agreed to by the commissioners from New Hampshire,
  Massachusett's Bay, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Maryland,
  and Pensylvania, met in congress at Albany, in July 1754, to consider
  of the best means of defending the king's dominions in America,
  &c. a war being then apprehended; with the reasons or
  motives for each article of the plan                                3

  Albany papers continued. I. letter to Governor Shirley, concerning
  the imposition of direct taxes upon the colonies, without their
  consent                                                            30

  II. Letter to the same; concerning direct taxes in the colonies imposed
  without consent, indirect taxes, and the Albany plan of
  union                                                              31

  III. Letter to the same, on the subject of uniting the colonies more
  intimately with Great Britain, by allowing them representatives
  in parliament                                                      37

  Plan for settling two Western colonies in North America, with reasons
  for the plan, 1754                                                 41

  Report of the committee of aggrievances of the assembly of Pensylvania,
  dated Feb. 22, 1757                                                50

  An historical review of the constitution and government of Pensylvania,
  from its origin; so far as regards the several points of controversy
  which have, from time to time, arisen between the several
  governors of that province, and their several assemblies. Founded
  on authentic documents                                             59

  The interest of Great Britain considered, with regard to her colonies,
  and the acquisitions of Canada and Guadaloupe                      89

  Remarks and facts relative to the American paper-money            144

  To the freemen of Pensylvania, on the subject of a particular
  militia-bill, rejected by the proprietor's deputy or governor     157

  Preface by a member of the Pensylvanian assembly (Dr. Franklin)
  to the speech of Joseph Galloway, Esq. one of the members for
  Philadelphia county; in answer to the speech of John Dickinson,
  Esq. delivered in the house of the assembly of the province of
  Pensylvania, May 24, 1764, on occasion of a petition drawn up
  by order, and then under the consideration of the house, praying
  his majesty for a royal, in lieu of a proprietary government      163

  Remarks on a late protest against the appointment of Mr. Franklin
  as agent for this province (of Pensylvania)                       203

  Remarks on a plan for the future management of Indian affairs     216


  PAPERS ON AMERICAN SUBJECTS DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY
  TROUBLES.

  Causes of the American discontents before 1768                    225

  Letter concerning the gratitude of America, and the probability and
  effects of an union with Great Britain; and concerning the repeal
  or suspension of the stamp act                                    239

  Letter from Governor Pownall to Dr. Franklin, concerning an equal
  communication of rights, privileges, &c. to America by Great
  Britain                                                           243

  Minutes to the foregoing, by Dr. Franklin                         244

  The examination of Dr. Franklin before the English house of commons,
  in February, 1766, relative to the repeal of the American
  stamp act                                                         245

  Attempts of Dr. Franklin for conciliation of Great Britain with the
  colonies                                                          286

  Queries from Mr. Strahan                                          287

  Answer to the preceding queries                                   290

  State of the constitution of the colonies, by Governor Pownall; with
  remarks by Dr. Franklin                                           299

  Concerning the dissentions between England and America            310

  A Prussian edict, assuming claims over Britain                    311

  Preface by the British editor (Dr. Franklin) to "The votes and
  proceedings of the freeholders, and other inhabitants of the town
  of Boston, in town-meeting assembled according to law (published
  by order of the town), &c."                                       317

  Account of governor Hutchinson's letters                          322

  Rules for reducing a great empire to a small one, presented to a late
  minister, when he entered upon his administration                 334

  State of America on Dr. Franklin's arrival there                  346

  Proposed vindication and offer from congress to parliament, in
  1775                                                              347

  Reprobation of Mr. Strahan's parliamentary conduct                354

  Conciliation hopeless from the conduct of Great Britain to
  America                                                           355

  Account of the first campaign made by the British forces in
  America                                                           357

  Probability of a separation                                       358

  Letter to Monsieur Dumas, urging him to sound the several courts
  of Europe, by means of their ambassadors at the Hague, as to any
  assistance they may be disposed to afford America in her struggle
  for independence                                                  360

  Letter from Lord Howe to Dr. Franklin                             365

  Dr. Franklin's answer to Lord Howe                                367

  Comparison of Great Britain and America as to credit, in 1777     372


  PAPERS, DESCRIPTIVE OF AMERICA, OR RELATING TO THAT
  COUNTRY, WRITTEN SUBSEQUENT TO THE REVOLUTION.

  Remarks concerning the savages of North America                   383

  The internal state of America; being a true description of the interest
  and policy of that vast continent                                 391

  Information to those who would remove to America                  398

  Concerning new settlements in America                             409

  A comparison of the conduct of the ancient Jews, and of the
  Antifederalists in the United States of America                   410

  Final speech of Dr. Franklin in the late federal convention       416


  PAPERS ON MORAL SUBJECTS AND THE ECONOMY OF LIFE.

  The busy-body                                                     421

  The way to wealth, as clearly shown in the preface of an old Pensylvania
  almanack, intitled, Poor Richard Improved                         453

  Advice to a young tradesman                                       463

  Necessary hints to those that would be rich                       466

  The way to make money plenty in every man's pocket                467

  New mode of lending money                                         468

  An economical project                                             469

  On early marriages                                                475

  Effect of early impressions on the mind                           478

  The whistle                                                       480

  A petition to those who have the superintendency of education     483

  The handsome and deformed leg                                     485

  Morals of chess                                                   488

  The art of procuring pleasant dreams                              493

  Dialogue between Franklin and the gout                            499

  On the death of relatives                                         507

  The ephemera an emblem of human life                              508

  APPENDIX, NO. I.--CONTAINING PAPERS PROPER FOR INSERTION,
  BUT OMITTED IN THE PRECEDING VOLUMES.

  Letter to Sir Hans Sloane                                         513

  Letter to Michael Collinson, Esq.                                 514

  Letter respecting captain Cook                                    515

  An address to the public, from the Pensylvania society for promoting
  the abolition of slavery, and the relief of free negroes, unlawfully
  held in bondage                                                   517

  Plan for improving the condition of the free blacks               519

  Paper: a poem                                                     523

  Plain truth; or, serious considerations on the present state of the
  city of Philadelphia, and province of Pensylvania                 524

  Four letters to Mr. Whetley                                      543*

  APPENDIX, NO. II.--CONTAINING LETTERS BY SEVERAL
  EMINENT PERSONS, ILLUSTRATIVE OF DR. FRANKLIN'S
  MANNERS AND CHARACTER.

  Letter from the late Dr. Price to a gentleman in America          543

  Letter from Mr. Thomas Jefferson to the late Dr. William Smith, of
  Philadelphia                                                      545

  Letter from the late Dr. Joseph Priestly                          547




  _ERRATA._

  _Page._        _Line._
      24             8 from the bottom: for DAY, read LAY.
      39             6, for iuppose, read suppose.
      60             5 from the bottom: for Cruger, read Stuber.
     449             7 from the bottom: for PLEIADS, read PLEIADES.




PAPERS

ON

AMERICAN SUBJECTS

BEFORE THE

_REVOLUTIONARY TROUBLES_.

[_The papers under the present head, of American Politics before the
Troubles, in the volume of Dr. Franklin's works, printed for Johnson
in 1799, from which they are nearly all taken, were divided into
two parts, as if distinct from each other, viz. Papers on American
Subjects before the Troubles; and Papers on Subjects of Provincial
Politics. As we can see no grounds for this distinction, we have
brought them together, and have placed them in the order of their
dates, conceiving such to be the natural order of papers furnishing
materials for history._]




PAPERS

ON

AMERICAN SUBJECTS,

BEFORE THE

_REVOLUTIONARY TROUBLES_.




ALBANY PAPERS.

  _Containing_, I. _Reasons and Motives on which the_ PLAN _of_
  UNION _for the_ COLONIES _was formed_;--II. _Reasons against
  partial Unions_;--III. _And the Plan of Union drawn by B. F. and
  unanimously agreed to by the Commissioners from New Hampshire,
  Massachusett's Bay, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Maryland, and
  Pensylvania[1], met in Congress at Albany, in July 1754, to
  consider of the best Means of defending the King's Dominions in
  America, &c. a War being then apprehended; with the Reasons or
  Motives for each Article of the Plan._

B. F. was one of the four commissioners from Pensylvania[2].

I. _Reasons and Motives on which the Plan of Union was formed._


The commissioners from a number of the northern colonies being
met at Albany, and considering the difficulties that have always
attended the most necessary general measures for the common defence,
or for the annoyance of the enemy, when they were to be carried
through the several particular assemblies of all the colonies;
some assemblies being before at variance with their governors or
councils, and the several branches of the government not on terms of
doing business with each other; others taking the opportunity, when
their concurrence is wanted, to push for favourite laws, powers,
or points, that they think could not at other times be obtained,
and so creating disputes and quarrels; one assembly waiting to see
what another will do, being afraid of doing more than its share, or
desirous of doing less; or refusing to do any thing, because its
country is not at present so much exposed as others, or because
another will reap more immediate advantage; from one or other of
which causes, the assemblies of six (out of seven) colonies applied
to, had granted no assistance to Virginia, when lately invaded by
the French, though purposely convened, and the importance of the
occasion earnestly urged upon them; considering moreover, that one
principal encouragement to the French, in invading and insulting the
British American dominions, was their knowledge of our disunited
state, and of our weakness arising from such want of union; and that
from hence different colonies were, at different times, extremely
harassed, and put to great expence both of blood and treasure, who
would have remained in peace, if the enemy had had cause to fear the
drawing on themselves the resentment and power of the whole; the
said commissioners, considering also the present incroachments of
the French, and the mischievous consequences that may be expected
from them, if not opposed with our force, came to an unanimous
resolution,--_That an union of the colonies is absolutely necessary
for their preservation_.

The manner of forming and establishing this union was the next point.
When it was considered, that the colonies were seldom all in equal
danger at the same time, or equally near the danger, or equally
sensible of it; that some of them had particular interests to manage,
with which an union might interfere; and that they were extremely
jealous of each other; it was thought impracticable to obtain a joint
agreement of all the colonies to an union, in which the expence and
burthen of defending any of them should be divided among them all;
and if ever acts of assembly in all the colonies could be obtained
for that purpose, yet as any colony, on the least dissatisfaction,
might repeal its own act and thereby withdraw itself from the union,
it would not be a stable one, or such as could be depended on: for if
only one colony should, on any disgust withdraw itself, others might
think it unjust and unequal that they, by continuing in the union,
should be at the expence of defending a colony, which refused to
bear its proportionable part, and would therefore one after another,
withdraw, till the whole crumbled into its original parts. Therefore
the commissioners came to another previous resolution, viz. _That it
was necessary the union should be established by act of parliament_.

They then proceeded to sketch out a _plan of union_, which they
did in a plain and concise manner, just sufficient to show
their sentiments of the kind of union that would best suit the
circumstances of the colonies, be most agreeable to the people,
and most effectually promote his majesty's service and the general
interest of the British empire. This was respectfully sent to the
assemblies of the several colonies for their consideration, and to
receive such alterations and improvements as they should think fit
and necessary; after which it was proposed to be transmitted to
England to be perfected, and the establishment of it there humbly
solicited.

This was as much as the commissioners could do[3].

       *       *       *       *       *


II. _Reasons against partial Unions._

It was proposed by some of the commissioners, to form the colonies
into two or three distinct unions; but for these reasons that
proposal was dropped even by those that made it: [viz.]

1. In all cases where the strength of the whole was necessary to be
used against the enemy, there would be the same difficulty in degree,
to bring the several unions to unite together, as now the several
colonies; and consequently the same delays on our part and advantage
to the enemy.

2. Each union would separately be weaker than when joined by the
whole, obliged to exert more force, be oppressed by the expence, and
the enemy less deterred from attacking it.

3. Where particular colonies have _selfish views_, as New York with
regard to Indian trade and lands; or are less exposed, being covered
by others, as New Jersey, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Maryland; or
have particular whims and prejudices against warlike measures in
general, as Pensylvania, where the Quakers predominate; such colonies
would have more weight in a partial union, and be better able to
oppose and obstruct the measures necessary for the general good, than
where they are swallowed up in the general union.

4. The Indian trade would be better regulated by the union of the
whole than by partial unions. And as Canada is chiefly supported by
that trade, if it could be drawn into the hands of the English (as
it might be if the Indians were supplied on moderate terms, and by
honest traders appointed by and acting for the public) that alone
would contribute greatly to the weakening of our enemies.

5. The establishing of new colonies westward on the Ohio and the
lakes (a matter of considerable importance to the increase of British
trade and power, to the breaking that of the French, and to the
protection and security of our present colonies,) would best be
carried on by a joint union.

6. It was also thought, that by the frequent meetings-together
of commissioners or representatives from all the colonies, the
circumstances of the whole would be better known, and the good of
the whole better provided for; and that the colonies would by this
connection learn to consider themselves, not as so many independent
states, but as members of the same body; and thence be more ready to
afford assistance and support to each other, and to make diversions
in favour even of the most distant, and to join cordially in any
expedition for the benefit of all against the common enemy.

These were the principal reasons and motives for forming the plan of
union as it stands. To which may be added this, that as the union of
the *******

    The remainder of this article is lost.


III. _Plan of a proposed Union of the several Colonies of
Massachusett's Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New
York, New Jersey, Pensylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
and South Carolina, for their mutual Defence and Security, and
for extending the British Settlements in North America, with the
Reasons and Motives for each Article of the Plan [as far as could be
remembered.]_

It is proposed--That humble application be made for an act of
parliament of Great Britain, by virtue of which one general
government may be formed in America, including all the said colonies,
within and under which government each colony may retain its present
constitution, except in the particulars wherein a change may be
directed by the said act, as hereafter follows[4].


PRESIDENT GENERAL, AND GRAND COUNCIL.

_That the said general government be administered by a president
general, to be appointed and supported by the crown; and a grand
council, to be chosen by the representatives of the people of the
several colonies met in their respective assemblies._

It was thought that it would be best the president general should be
supported as well as appointed by the crown; that so all disputes
between him and the grand council concerning his salary might be
prevented; as such disputes have been frequently of mischievous
consequence in particular colonies, especially in time of public
danger. The quit-rents of crown-lands in America might in a short
time be sufficient for this purpose.--The choice of members for the
grand council is placed in the house of representatives of each
government, in order to give the people a share in this new general
government, as the crown has its share by the appointment of the
president-general.

But it being proposed by the gentlemen of the council of New York,
and some other counsellors among the Commissioners, to alter the
plan in this particular, and to give the governors and council of
the several provinces a share in the choice of the grand council, or
at least a power of approving and confirming or of disallowing the
choice made by the house of representatives, it was said:

"That the government or constitution proposed to be formed by the
plan, consists of two branches; a president general appointed by
the crown, and a council chosen by the people, or by the people's
representatives, which is the same thing.

"That by a subsequent article, the council chosen by the people can
effect nothing without the consent of the president general appointed
by the crown; the crown possesses therefore full one half of the
power of this constitution.

"That in the British constitution, the crown is supposed to possess
but one third, the lords having their share.

"That this constitution seemed rather more favorable for the crown.

"That it is essential, to English liberty, [that] the subject should
not be taxed but by his own consent, or the consent of his elected
representatives.

"That taxes to be laid and levied by this proposed constitution will
be proposed and agreed to by the representatives of the people, if
the plan in this particular be preserved:

"But if the proposed alteration should take place, it seemed as if
matters may be so managed, as that the crown shall finally have the
appointment not only of the president general, but of a majority of
the grand council; for seven out of eleven governors and councils are
appointed by the crown:

"And so the people in all the colonies would in effect be taxed by
their governors.

"It was therefore apprehended, that such alterations of the plan
would give great dissatisfaction, and that the colonies could not be
easy under such a power in governors, and such an infringement of
what they take to be English liberty.

"Besides, the giving a share in the choice of the grand council would
not be equal with respect to all the colonies, as their constitutions
differ. In some, both governor and council are appointed by the
crown. In others, they are both appointed by the proprietors. In
some, the people have a share in the choice of the council; in
others, both government and council are wholly chosen by the people.
But the house of representatives is every where chosen by the people;
and therefore, placing the right of choosing the grand council in the
representatives is equal with respect to all.

"That the grand council is intended to represent all the several
houses of representatives of the colonies, as a house of
representatives doth the several towns or counties of a colony. Could
all the people of a colony be consulted and unite in public measures,
a house of representatives would be needless: and could all the
assemblies conveniently consult and unite in general measures, the
grand council would be unnecessary.

"That a house of commons or the house of representatives, and the
grand council, are thus alike in their nature and intention. And
as it would seem improper that the king or house of lords should
have a power of disallowing or appointing members of the house of
commons;--so likewise, that a governor and council appointed by
the crown should have a power of disallowing or appointing members
of the grand council (who, in this constitution, are to be the
representatives of the people.)

"If the governors and councils therefore were to have a share in the
choice of any that are to conduct this general government, it should
seem more proper that they chose the president-general. But this
being an office of great trust and importance to the nation, it was
thought better to be filled by the immediate appointment of the crown.

"The power proposed to be given by the plan to the grand council
is only a concentration of the powers of the several assemblies in
certain points for the general welfare; as the power of the president
general, is of the powers of the several governors in the same points.

"And as the choice therefore of the grand council by the
representatives of the people, neither gives the people any new
powers, nor diminishes the power of the crown, it was thought and
hoped the crown would not disapprove of it."

Upon the whole, the commissioners were of opinion, that the choice
was most properly placed in the representatives of the people.


ELECTION OF MEMBERS.

_That within [___] months after the passing such act, the house of
representatives, that happen to be sitting within that time, or that
shall be especially for that purpose convened, may and shall choose
members for the grand council, in the following proportion, that is
to say,_

  Massachussett's Bay                                       7
  New Hampshire                                             2
  Connecticut                                               5
  Rhode Island                                              2
  New York                                                  4
  New Jerseys                                               3
  Pennsylvania                                              6
  Maryland                                                  4
  Virginia                                                  7
  North Carolina                                            4
  South Carolina                                            4
                                                          ----
                                                           48

It was thought, that if the least colony was allowed two, and the
others in proportion, the number would be very great and the expence
heavy; and that less than two would not be convenient, as a single
person, being by any accident prevented appearing at the meeting, the
colony he ought to appear for would not be represented. That as the
choice was not immediately popular, they would be generally men of
good abilities for business, and men of reputation for integrity; and
that forty-eight such men might be a number sufficient. But, though
it was thought reasonable, that each colony should have a share in
the representative body in some degree, according to the proportion
it contributed to the general treasury: yet the proportion of wealth
or power of the colonies is not to be judged by the proportion here
fixed; because it was at first agreed, that the greatest colony
should not have more than seven members, nor the least less than two:
and the settling these proportions between these two extremes was not
nicely attended to, as it would find itself, after the first election
from the sums brought into the treasury, as by a subsequent article.


PLACE OF FIRST MEETING.

--_who shall meet for the first time at the city of Philadelphia
Pensylvania, being called by the president-general as soon as
conveniently may be after his appointment._

Philadelphia was named as being the nearer the centre of the
colonies, where the commissioners would be well and cheaply
accommodated. The high-roads, through the whole extent, are for
the most part very good, in which forty or fifty miles a day may
very well be and frequently are travelled. Great part of the way
may likewise he gone by water. In summer time, the passages are
frequently performed in a week from Charles Town to Philadelphia and
New York; and from Rhode Island to New York through the Sound, in two
or three days; and from New York to Philadelphia, by water and land,
in two days, by stage boats and wheel-carriages that set out every
other day. The journey from Charles Town to Philadelphia may likewise
be facilitated by boats running up Chesapeak Bay three hundred miles.
But if the whole journey be performed on horseback, the most distant
members (viz. the two from New Hampshire and from South Carolina) may
probably render themselves at Philadelphia in fifteen or twenty days;
the majority may be there in much less time.


NEW ELECTION.

_That there shall be a new election of the members of the grand
council every three years; and on the death or resignation of any
member, his place shall be supplied by a new choice at the next
silting of the assembly of the colony he represented._

Some colonies have annual assemblies, some continue during a
governor's pleasure; three years was thought a reasonable medium, as
affording a new member time to improve himself in the business, and
to act after such improvement; and yet giving opportunities, frequent
enough, to change him, if he has misbehaved.


PROPORTION OF MEMBERS AFTER THE FIRST THREE YEARS.

_That after the first three years, when the proportion of money
arising out of each colony to the general treasury can be known, the
number of members to be chosen for each colony shall from time to
time, in all ensuing elections, be regulated by that proportion (yet
so as that the number to be chosen by any one province be not more
than seven, nor less than two.)_

By a subsequent article it is proposed, that the general council
shall lay and levy such general duties, as to them may appear most
equal and least burthensome, &c. Suppose, for instance, they lay a
small duty or excise on some commodity imported into or made in the
colonies, and pretty generally and equally used in all of them; as
rum perhaps, or wine; the yearly produce of this duty or excise, if
fairly collected, would be in some colonies greater, in others less,
as the colonies are greater or smaller. When the collector's accounts
are brought in, the proportions will appear; and from them it is
proposed to regulate the proportion of representatives to be chosen
at the next general election, within the limits however of seven and
two. These numbers may therefore vary in course of years, as the
colonies may in the growth and increase of people. And thus the quota
of tax from each colony would naturally vary with its circumstances;
thereby preventing all disputes and dissatisfactions about the just
proportions due from each; which might otherwise produce pernicious
consequences, and destroy the harmony and good agreement that ought
to subsist between the several parts of the union.


MEETINGS OF THE GRAND COUNCIL, AND CALL.

_That the grand council shall meet once in every year, and oftener if
occasion require, at such time and place as they shall adjourn to at
the last preceding meeting, or as they shall be called to meet at by
the president general on any emergency; he having first obtained in
writing the consent of seven of the members to such call, and sent
due and timely notice to the whole._

It was thought, in establishing and governing new colonies or
settlements, regulating Indian trade, Indian treaties, &c. there
would be every year sufficient business arise to require at least one
meeting, and at such meeting many things might be suggested for the
benefit of all the colonies. This annual meeting may either be at a
time or place certain, to be fixed by the president general and grand
council at their first meeting; or left at liberty, to be at such
time and place as they shall adjourn to, or be called to meet at by
the president general.

In time of war it seems convenient, that the meeting should be in
that colony, which is nearest the seat of action.

The power of calling them on any emergency seemed necessary to be
vested in the president general; but that such power might not be
wantonly used to harass the members, and oblige them to make frequent
long journies to little purpose, the consent of seven at least to
such call was supposed a convenient guard.


CONTINUANCE.

_That the grand council have power to choose their speaker; and
shall neither be dissolved, prorogued, nor continued sitting longer
than six weeks at one time, without their own consent or the special
command of the crown._

The speaker should be presented for approbation; it being convenient,
to prevent misunderstandings and disgusts, that the mouth of the
council should be a person agreeable, if possible, both to the
council and president general.

Governors have sometimes wantonly exercised the power of proroguing
or continuing the sessions of assemblies, merely to harass the
members and compel a compliance; and sometimes dissolve them on
slight disgusts. This it was feared might be done by the president
general, if not provided against: and the inconvenience and hardship
would be greater in the general government than in particular
colonies, in proportion to the distance the members must be from
home, during sittings, and the long journies some of them must
necessarily take.


MEMBERS' ALLOWANCE.

_That the members of the grand council shall be allowed for their
service ten shillings sterling per diem, during their session and
journey to and from the place of meeting; twenty miles to be reckoned
a day's journey._

It was thought proper to allow _some_ wages, lest the expence might
deter some suitable persons from the service;--and not to allow _too
great_ wages, lest unsuitable persons should be tempted to cabal for
the employment, for the sake of gain. Twenty miles was set down as
a day's journey, to allow for accidental hinderances on the road,
and the greater expences of travelling than residing at the place of
meeting.


ASSENT OF PRESIDENT GENERAL AND HIS DUTY.

_That the assent of the president general be requisite to all acts of
the grand council; and that it be his office and duty to cause them
to be carried into execution._

The assent of the president general, to all acts of the grand council
was made necessary, in order to give the crown its due share of
influence in this government, and connect it with that of Great
Britain. The president general, besides one half of the legislative
power, hath in his hands the whole executive power.


POWER OF PRESIDENT GENERAL AND GRAND COUNCIL. TREATIES OF PEACE AND
WAR.

_That the president general, with the advice of the grand council,
hold or direct all Indian treaties in which the general interest of
the colonies may be concerned; and make peace or declare war with
Indian nations._

The power of making peace or war with Indian nations is at present
supposed to be in every colony, and is expressly granted to some
by charter, so that no new power is hereby intended to be granted
to the colonies. But as, in consequence of this power, one colony
might make peace with a nation that another was justly engaged in
war with; or make war on slight occasions without the concurrence or
approbation of neighbouring colonies, greatly endangered by it; or
make particular treaties of neutrality in case of a general war, to
their own private advantage in trade, by supplying the common enemy;
of all which there have been instances--it was thought better, to
have all treaties of a general nature under a general direction; that
so the good of the whole may be consulted and provided for.


INDIAN TRADE.

_That they make such laws as they judge necessary for regulating all
Indian trade._

Many quarrels and wars have arisen between the colonies and Indian
nations, through the bad conduct of traders, who cheat the Indians
after making them drunk, &c. to the great expence of the colonies
both in blood and treasure. Particular colonies are so interested in
the trade as not to be willing to admit such a regulation as might be
best for the whole; and therefore it was thought best under a general
direction.


INDIAN PURCHASES.

_That they make all purchases, from Indians for the crown, of lands
not now within the bounds of particular colonies, or that shall
not be within their bounds when some of them are reduced to more
convenient dimensions._

Purchases from the Indians, made by private persons, have been
attended with many inconveniences. They have frequently interfered,
and occasioned uncertainty of titles, many disputes and expensive
law-suits, and hindered the settlement of the land so disputed.
Then the Indians have been cheated by such private purchases, and
discontent and wars have been the consequence. These would be
prevented by public fair purchases.

Several of the colony charters in America extend their bounds to
the South Sea, which may be perhaps three or four thousand miles in
length to one or two hundred miles in breadth. It is supposed they
must in time be reduced to dimensions more convenient for the common
purposes of government[5].

Very little of the land in those grants is yet purchased of the
Indians.

It is much cheaper to purchase of them, than to take and maintain the
possession by force: for they are generally very reasonable in their
demands for land[6]; and the expence of guarding a large frontier
against their incursions is vastly great; because all must be
guarded, and always guarded, as we know not where or when _to expect
them_[7].


NEW SETTLEMENTS.

_That they make new settlements on such purchases, by granting lands
in the king's name, reserving a quit-rent to the crown for the use of
the general treasury._

It is supposed better that there should be one purchaser than many;
and that the crown should be that purchaser, or the union in the name
of the crown. By this means the bargains may be more easily made, the
price not inhanced by numerous bidders, future disputes about private
Indian purchases, and monopolies of vast tracts to particular persons
(which are prejudicial to the settlement and peopling of country)
prevented; and the land being again granted in small tracts to the
settlers, the quit-rents reserved may in time become a fund for
support of government, for defence of the country, ease of taxes, &c.

Strong forts on the lakes, the Ohio, &c. may, at the same time they
secure our present frontiers, serve to defend new colonies settled
under their protection; and such colonies would also mutually defend
and support such forts, and better secure the friendship of the far
Indians.

A particular colony has scarce strength enough to extend itself by
new settlements, at so great a distance from the old: but the joint
force of the union might suddenly establish a new colony or two in
those parts, or extend an old colony to particular passes, greatly to
the security of our present frontiers, increase of trade and people,
breaking off the French communication between Canada and Louisiana,
and speedy settlement of the intermediate lands.

The power of settling new colonies is therefore thought a valuable
part of the plan, and what cannot so well be executed by two unions
as by one.


LAWS TO GOVERN THEM.

_That they make laws for regulating and governing such new
settlements, till the crown shall think fit to form them into
particular governments._

The making of laws suitable for the new colonies, it was thought,
would be properly vested in the president general and grand council;
under whose protection they will at first necessarily be, and who
would be well acquainted with their circumstances, as having settled
them. When they are become sufficiently populous, they may by the
crown be formed into complete and distinct governments.

The appointment of a sub-president by the crown, to take place in
case of the death or absence of the president general, would perhaps
be an improvement of the plan; and if all the governors of particular
provinces were to be formed into a standing council of state, for the
advice and assistance of the president general, it might be another
considerable improvement.


RAISE SOLDIERS AND EQUIP VESSELS, &C.

_That they raise and pay soldiers and build forts for the defence of
any of the colonies, and equip vessels of force to guard the coasts
and protect the trade on the ocean, lakes[8], or great rivers; but
they shall not impress men in any colony, without the consent of the
legislature._

It was thought, that quotas of men, to be raised and paid by the
several colonies, and joined for any public service, could not always
be got together with the necessary expedition. For instance, suppose
one thousand men should be wanted in New Hampshire on any emergency;
to fetch them by fifties and hundreds out of every colony, as far as
South Carolina, would be inconvenient, the transportation chargeable
and the occasion perhaps passed before they could be assembled;
and therefore, that it would be best to raise them (by offering
bounty-money and pay) near the place where they would be wanted, to
be discharged again when the service should be over.

Particular colonies are at present backward to build forts at
their own expence, which they say will be equally useful to their
neighbouring colonies; who refuse to join, on a presumption that such
forts _will_ be built and kept up, though they contribute nothing.
This unjust conduct weakens the whole; but the forts being for the
good of the whole, it was thought best they should be built and
maintained by the whole, out of the common treasury.

In the time of war, small vessels of force are sometimes necessary
in the colonies to scour the coast of small privateers. These being
provided by the union will be an advantage in turn to the colonies
which are situated on the sea, and whose frontiers on the land-side,
being covered by other colonies, reap but little immediate benefit
from the advanced forts.


POWER TO MAKE LAWS, LAY DUTIES, &C.

_That for these purposes they have power to make laws, and lay
and levy such general duties, imports, or taxes, as to them shall
appear most equal and just (considering the ability and other
circumstances of the inhabitants in the several colonies,) and such
as may be collected with the least inconvenience to the people;
rather discouraging luxury, than loading industry with unnecessary
burthens._

The laws which the president general and grand council are impowered
to make _are such only_ as shall be necessary for the government of
the settlements; the raising, regulating, and paying soldiers for
the general service; the regulating of Indian trade; and laying and
collecting the general duties and taxes. (They should also have a
power to restrain the exportation of provisions to the enemy from
any of the colonies, on particular occasions, in time of war.) But
is it not intended that they may interfere with the constitution and
government of the particular colonies; who are to be left to their
own laws, and to lay, levy, and apply their own taxes as before.


GENERAL TREASURER AND PARTICULAR TREASURER.

_That they may appoint a general treasurer and particular treasurer
in each government when necessary; and from time to time may order
the sums in the treasuries of each government into the general
treasury; or draw on them for special payments, as they find most
convenient._

The treasurers here meant are only for the general funds, and not for
the particular funds of each colony, which remain in the hands of
their own treasurers at their own disposal.


MONEY HOW TO ISSUE.

_Yet no money to issue but by joint orders of the president general
and grand council; except where sums have been appropriated to
particular purposes, and the president general is previously
impowered by an act to draw for such sums._

To prevent misapplication of the money, or even application that
might be dissatisfactory to the crown or the people, it was thought
necessary, to join the president general and grand council in all
issues of money.


ACCOUNTS.

_That the general accounts shall be yearly settled and reported to
the several assemblies._

By communicating the accounts yearly to each assembly, they will be
satisfied of the prudent and honest conduct of their representatives
in the grand council.


QUORUM.

_That a quorum of the grand council, impowered to act with the
president general, do consist of twenty-five members; among whom
there shall be one or more from a majority of the colonies._

The quorum seems large, but it was thought it would not be
satisfactory to the colonies in general, to have matters of
importance to the whole transacted by a smaller number, or even by
this number of twenty-five, unless there were among them one at least
from a majority of the colonies; because otherwise, the whole quorum
being made up of members from three or four colonies at one end of
the union, something might be done that would not be equal with
respect to the rest, and thence dissatisfactions and discords might
rise to the prejudice of the whole.


LAWS TO BE TRANSMITTED.

_That the laws made by them for the purposes aforesaid shall not be
repugnant, but, as near as may be, agreeable to the laws of England,
and shall be transmitted to the king in council for approbation as
soon as may be after their passing; and if not disapproved within
three years after presentation, to remain in force._

This was thought necessary for the satisfaction of the crown, to
preserve the connection of the parts of the British empire with the
whole, of the members with the head, and to induce greater care and
circumspection in making of the laws, that they be good in themselves
and for the general benefit.


DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT GENERAL.

_That in case of the death of the president general, the speaker of
the grand council for the time being shall succeed, and be vested
with the same powers and authorities, to continue till the king's
pleasure be known._

It might be better, perhaps, as was said before, if the crown
appointed a vice president, to take place on the death or absence of
the president general; for so we should be more sure of a suitable
person at the head of the colonies. On the death or absence of both,
the speaker to take place (or rather the eldest king's-governor) till
his majesty's pleasure be known.


OFFICERS HOW APPOINTED.

_That all military commission officers, whether for land or
sea-service, to act under this general constitution, shall be
nominated by the president general; but the approbation of the grand
council is to be obtained, before they receive their commissions. And
all civil officers are to be nominated by the grand council, and to
receive the president general's approbation before they officiate._

It was thought it might be very prejudicial to the service, to have
officers appointed unknown to the people, or unacceptable, the
generality of Americans serving willingly under officers they know:
and not caring to engage in the service under strangers, or such as
are often appointed by governors through favour or interest. The
service here meant, is not the stated settled service in standing
troops; but any sudden and short service, either for defence of
our own colonies, or invading the enemies country; (such as, the
expedition to Cape Breton in the last war; in which many substantial
farmers and tradesmen engaged as common soldiers under officers of
their own country, for whom they had an esteem and affection; who
would not have engaged in a standing army, or under officers from
England.)--It was therefore thought best, to give the council the
power of approving the officers, which the people will look upon
as a great security of their being good men. And without some such
provision as this, it was thought the expence of engaging men in the
service on any emergency would be much greater, and the number who
could be induced to engage much less; and that therefore it would be
most for the king's service and general benefit of the nation, that
the prerogative should relax a little in this particular throughout
all the colonies in America; as it had already done much more in the
charters of some particular colonies, viz. Connecticut and Rhode
Island.

The civil officers will be chiefly treasurers and collectors of
taxes; and the suitable persons are most likely to be known by the
council.


VACANCIES HOW SUPPLIED.

_But in case of vacancy by death, or removal of any officer civil
or military under this constitution, the governor of the province
in which such vacancy happens may appoint, till the pleasure of the
president general and grand council can be known._

The vacancies were thought best supplied by the governors in each
province, till a new appointment can be regularly made; otherwise the
service might suffer before the meeting of the president general and
grand council.


EACH COLONY MAY DEFEND ITSELF ON EMERGENCY, &C.

_That the particular military as well as civil establishments in
each colony remain in their present state, the general constitution
notwithstanding; and that on sudden emergencies any colony may
defend itself, and lay the accounts of expence thence arising before
the president general and general council, who may allow and order
payment of the same, as far as they judge such accounts just and
reasonable._

Otherwise the union of the whole would weaken the parts, contrary
to the design of the union. The accounts are to be judged of by the
president general and grand council, and allowed if found reasonable:
this was thought necessary to encourage colonies to defend
themselves, as the expence would be light when borne by the whole;
and also to check imprudent and lavish expence in such defences.[9]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The reader must be informed here, that this plan was intended for
all the colonies; but, commissioners from some of them not attending
(from causes which I cannot specify) their consent to it was not,
in this respect, universally expressed. Governor Pownall, however,
says, "That he had an opportunity of conversing with, and knowing
the sentiments of the commissioners appointed by their respective
provinces, to attend this congress, to which they were called by the
crown; of learning from their experience and judgment, the actual
state of the American business and interest; and of hearing amongst
them, the grounds and reasons of that American union, which they then
had under deliberation, and transmitted the plan of to England;" and
he adds, in another place, "that the sentiments of our colonies were
collected in an authentic manner on this subject in the plan proposed
by Dr. Franklin, and unanimously agreed to in congress." See Governor
Pownall's Administration of the British Colonies. Vol. I. p. 13.
Edit. 4, 1774, and Vol. II. p. 86. B. V.

[2] "Mr. [since Governor] Hutchinson was one of the commissioners
for Massachusetts Bay." Governor Pownall as above, Vol. II. p. 144.
"Thomas Pownall, Esq.; brother to John Pownall, Esq.; one of the
secretaries to the board of trade, and afterwards Governor of the
Massachusetts, was upon the spot." History of the British Empire in
North America, p. 25. B. V.

[3] Dr. Davenant was so well convinced of the expediency of an union
of the colonies, that he recites, at full length, a plan contrived,
as he says, with good judgment for the purpose. Davenant, Vol. I. p.
40, 41, of Sir C. Whitworth's Edition. B. V.

[4] The reader may perceive, by the difference of the type, which is
the text of the plan, and which the _reasons and motives_ mentioned
in the title. They are thus consolidated for his convenience. The
editor has taken one or two farther liberties in _transposing_ these
Albany papers; but the sense remains as before. B. V.

[5] Mr. Baron M----, in page 200 of his account of the Proceedings at
Quebec, for obtaining an Assembly, has the following hint: "The vast
enlargement of the province of Quebec by adding to it a new territory
that contains, according to Lord Hillsborough's estimation, of it,
five hundred and eleven millions of acres (that is, more land than
Spain, Italy, France, and Germany put together, and most of it good
land) is a measure that would require an ample discussion."----That
the reader may not suspect that these dimensions were convenient
for uncommon purposes of government, I shall quote the motives
assigned upon this occasion by the act regulating the government
of Quebec. "By the arrangements made by the royal proclamation, a
very large extent of [outlying] country, within which there were
several colonies and settlements of the subjects of France, who
claimed to remain therein under the faith of the said treaty, was
left without any provision being made for the administration of civil
government therein:" _i. e._ a few Indian traders were a pretext for
this appropriation of a tract of country, which, according to the
minister's estimate, was more than thirteen times larger than England
and Wales united, nearly one hundred and twenty eight times larger
than Jamaica, almost one-eighth part of Europe, and considerably more
than one-thirty-eighth part of the whole habitable earth (comparing
it with the several calculations in The Political Survey of Great
Britain, by Dr. Campbell, and in that of Jamaica, by Mr. Long.) "Now
_all_ the inhabitants of the province of Quebec," says this very
act, "amounted at the conquest to above sixty-five thousand [only,]
professing the religion of the church of Rome, and enjoying an
established form of constitution and system of laws." B.V.

[6] "Dr. Franklin (says Mr. Kalm the Swede,) and several other
gentlemen, frequently told me, that a powerful Indian, who possessed
Rhode Island, had sold it to the English for a pair of spectacles:
it is large enough for a prince's domain, and makes a peculiar
government at present. This Indian knew how to set a true value upon
a pair of spectacles: for undoubtedly if those glasses were not so
plentiful, and only a few of them could be found, they would, on
account of their great use, bear the same price with diamonds."
See Kalm's Travels into North America, Vol. I. p. 386, 387. "At
the time when the Swedes first arrived, they bought land at a very
inconsiderable price. For a piece of baize, or a pot full of brandy,
or the like, they could get a piece of ground, which at present would
be worth more than 290_l._ sterling." Ib. Vol. II. p. 118.--The truth
is, that the Indians considered their lands as mere _hunting-manors_,
and not as farms. B. V.

[7] To guard against the incursions of the Indians, a plan was
sent over to America (and, as I think, by authority) suggesting
the expediency of clearing away the woods and bushes from a tract
of land, a mile in breadth, and extending along the back of
the colonies. Unfortunately, besides the large expence of this
undertaking (which, if one acre cost 2_l._ sterling, and six hundred
and forty acres make a square mile, is 128,000_l._ _first cost_ for
every 100 miles) it was forgotten, that the Indians, like other
people, knew the difference between day and night, and that a mile of
advance and another of retreat were nothing to the celerity of such
an enemy.--This plan, it is said, was the work of Dean Tucker; and
possibly might contain many other particulars. The plans of Doctor
Franklin and Governor Pownall appear much more feasible. B. V.

[8] "According to a plan which had been proposed by Governor Pownall,
and approved of by congress."--Administration of the Colonies, Vol.
II. p. 143. B. V.

[9] This plan of union, it will appear from the next page, was
rejected; and another proposed to be substituted by the English
minister, which had for its chief object, the taking power from the
_people_ in the colonies in order to give it to the _crown_. B. V.




ALBANY PAPERS CONTINUED.


  I. LETTER _to Governor Shirley, concerning the Imposition of direct
  Taxes upon the Colonies, without their Consent_.[10]

  _Tuesday Morning._

  SIR,

I return you the loose Sheets of the plan, with thanks to your
excellency for communicating them.

I apprehend, that excluding the people of the colonies from all share
in the choice of the grand council will give extreme dissatisfaction;
as well as the taxing them by act of parliament, where they have no
representation. It is very possible, that this general government
might be as well and faithfully administered without the people, as
with them; but where heavy burdens are to be laid upon them, it has
been found useful, to make it as much as possible their own act; for
they bear better, when they have, or think they have, some share in
the direction; and when any public measures are generally grievous,
or even distasteful, to the people, the wheels of government move
more heavily.

FOOTNOTE:

[10] These letters to Governor Shirley first appeared in the London
Chronicle for Feb. 6-8, 1766, with an introduction signed _A Lover of
Britain_. In the beginning of the year 1776, they were republished
in Almon's Remembrancer, with an additional prefatory piece, under
the signature of _A Mourner over our Calamities_.--I shall explain
the subject of them in the words of one of these writers. "The Albany
Plan of Union was sent to the government here for approbation: had
it been approved and established by authority from hence, English
America thought itself sufficiently able to cope with the French,
without other assistance; several of the colonies having alone, in
former wars, withstood the whole power of the enemy, unassisted
not only by the mother-country, but by any of the neighbouring
provinces.--The plan, however, was not approved here; but a _New
one_ was formed instead of it; by which it was proposed, that 'the
governors of all the colonies, attended by one or two members of
their respective councils, should assemble, and concert measures
for the defence of the whole, erect forts where they judged proper,
and raise what troops they thought necessary, with power to draw
on the treasury here for the sums that should be wanted, and the
treasury to be reimbursed by a _tax laid on the colonies by act of
parliament_.'--This _New plan_ being communicated by Governor Shirley
to a gentleman of Philadelphia (Dr. Franklin) then in Boston (who
hath very eminently distinguished himself, before and since that
time, in the literary world, and whose judgment, penetration, and
candor, as well as his readiness and ability to suggest, forward,
or carry into execution, every scheme of public utility, hath most
deservedly endeared him, not only to our fellow-subjects throughout
the continent of North America, but to his numberless friends on
this side the Atlantic) occasioned the following remarks from him,
which perhaps may contribute in some degree to its being laid aside.
As they very particularly show the then sentiments of the Americans
on the subject of a parliamentary tax, before the French power in
that country was subjected, and before the late restraints on their
commerce; they satisfy me, and I hope they will convince your readers
(contrary to what has been advanced by some of your correspondents)
that those particulars have had no share in producing the present
opposition to such a tax, nor in disturbances occasioned by it,
which these papers indeed do almost prophetically foretel. For
this purpose, having accidentally fallen into my hands, they are
communicated to you by one who is, not _partially_, but in the _most
enlarged sense_,

  "A LOVER OF BRITAIN." B. V.




  II. LETTER _to the same; concerning direct Taxes in the Colonies
  imposed without Consent, indirect Taxes, and the Albany Plan of
  Union_.

  _Wednesday Morning._

  SIR,

I mentioned it yesterday to your excellency as my opinion, that
excluding the people of the colonies from all share in the choice
of the grand council would probably give extreme dissatisfaction,
as well as the taxing them by act of parliament, where they have
no representation. In matters of general concern to the people, and
especially where burdens are to be laid upon them; it is of use to
consider, as well what they will be apt to think and say, as what
they ought to think: I shall therefore, as your excellency requires
it of me, briefly mention what of either kind occurs to me on this
occasion.

First, they will say, and perhaps with justice, that the body of the
people in the colonies are as loyal, and as firmly attached to the
present constitution, and reigning family, as any subjects in the
king's dominions.

That there is no reason to doubt the readiness and willingness of
the representatives they may choose, to grant from time to time
such supplies for the defence of the country, as shall be judged
necessary, so far as their abilities will allow.

That the people in the colonies, who are to feel the immediate
mischiefs of invasion and conquest by an enemy, in the loss of their
estates, lives, and liberties, are likely to be better judges of the
quantity of forces necessary to be raised and maintained, forts to be
built and supported, and of their own abilities to bear the expence
than the parliament of England, at so great a distance.

That governors often come to the colonies merely to make fortunes,
with which they intend to return to Britain; are not always men of
the best abilities or integrity; have many of them no estates here,
nor any natural connections with us, that should make them heartily
concerned for our welfare; and might possibly be fond of raising and
keeping up more forces than necessary, from the profits accruing to
themselves, and to make provision for their friends and dependents.

That the counsellors in most of the colonies, being appointed by
the crown, on the recommendation of governors, are often persons of
small estates, frequently dependent on the governors for offices, and
therefore too much under influence.

That there is therefore great reason to be jealous of a power, in
such governors and councils, to raise such sums as they shall judge
necessary, by drafts on the lords of the treasury, to be afterwards
laid on the colonies by act of parliament, and paid by the people
here; since they might abuse it, by projecting useless expeditions,
harassing the people, and taking them from their labour to execute
such projects, merely to create offices and employments, and gratify
their dependents, and divide profits.

That the parliament of England is at a great distance, subject to
be misinformed and misled by such governors and councils, whose
united interests might probably secure them against the effect of any
complaint from hence.

That it is supposed an undoubted right of Englishmen, not to be taxed
but by their own consent, given through their representatives:

That the colonies have no representatives in parliament.

That to propose taxing them by parliament, and refuse them the
liberty of choosing a representative council, to meet in the
colonies, and consider and judge of the necessity of any general tax,
and the quantum, shows a suspicion of their loyalty to the crown,
or of their regard for their country, or of their common sense and
understanding; which they have not deserved.

That compelling the colonies to pay money without their consent,
would be rather like raising contributions in an enemy's country,
than taxing of Englishmen for their own public benefit.

That it would be treating them as a conquered people, and not as true
British subjects.

That a tax laid by the representatives of the colonies might be
easily lessened as the occasions should lessen; but, being once laid
by parliament under the influence of the representations made by
governors, would probably be kept up, and continued for the benefit
of governors; to the grievous burthen and discontentment of the
colonies, and prevention of their growth and increase.

That a power in governors, to march the inhabitants from one end of
the British and French colonies to the other, being a country of at
least one thousand five hundred miles long, without the approbation
or the consent of their representatives first obtained to such
expeditions, might be grievous and ruinous to the people, and would
put them upon a footing with the subjects of France in Canada, that
now groan under such oppression from their governor, who for two
years past has harrassed them with long and destructive marches to
Ohio.

That if the colonies in a body may be well governed by governors and
councils appointed by the crown, without representatives; particular
colonies may as well, or better be so governed; a tax may be laid
upon them all by act of parliament for support of government;
and their assemblies may be dismissed as an useless part of the
constitution.

That the powers proposed by the Albany plan of union, to be vested
in a grand council representative of the people, even with regard to
military matters, are not so great, as those which the colonies of
Rhode Island and Connecticut are entrusted with by their charters,
and have never abused; for by this plan, the president general is
appointed by the crown, and controls all by his negative; but in
those governments, the people choose the governor, and yet allow him
no negative.

That the British colonies bordering on the French are properly
frontiers of the British empire; and the frontiers of an empire are
properly defended at the joint expence of the body of the people in
such empire:--it would now be thought hard by act of parliament to
oblige the Cinque ports or sea coasts of Britain, to maintain the
whole navy, because they are more immediately defended by it, not
allowing them at the same time a vote in choosing members of the
parliament; and, as the frontiers of America bear the expence of
their own defence, it seems hard to allow them no share in voting the
money, judging of the necessity and sum, or advising the measures.

That besides the taxes necessary for the defence of the frontiers,
the colonies pay yearly great sums to the mother-country
unnoticed:--for 1. Taxes paid in Britain by the landholder or
artificer must enter into and increase the price of the produce of
land and manufactures made of it; and great part of this is paid by
consumers in the colonies, who thereby pay a considerable part of the
British taxes.

2. We are restrained in our trade with foreign nations; and where we
could be supplied with any manufacture cheaper from them, but must
buy the same dearer from Britain, the difference of price is a clear
tax to Britain.

3. We are obliged to carry a great part of our produce directly to
Britain; and where the duties laid upon it lessen its price to the
planter, or it sells for less than it would in foreign markets, the
difference is a tax paid to Britain.

4. Some manufactures we could make, but are forbidden, and must take
them of British merchants: the whole price is a tax paid to Britain.

5. By our greatly encreasing the demand and consumption of British
manufactures, their price is considerably raised of late years; the
advantage is clear profit to Britain, and enables its people better
to pay great taxes; and much of it being paid by us, is clear tax to
Britain.

6. In short, as we are not suffered to regulate our trade, and
restrain the importation and consumption of British superfluities
(as Britain can the consumption of foreign superfluities) our whole
wealth centers finally amongst the merchants and inhabitants of
Britain; and if we make them richer, and enable them better to pay
their taxes, it is nearly the same as being taxed ourselves, and
equally beneficial to the crown.

These kind of secondary taxes, however, we do not complain of, though
we have no share in the laying or disposing of them: but to pay
immediate heavy taxes, in the laying, appropriation, and disposition
of which, we have no part, and which perhaps we may know to be as
unnecessary as grievous, must seem hard measure to Englishmen, who
cannot conceive, that by hazarding their lives and fortunes in
subduing and settling new countries, extending the dominion, and
increasing the commerce of the mother-nation, they have forfeited
the native rights of Britons; which they think ought rather to be
given to them, as due to such merit, if they had been before in a
state of slavery. -- -- --

These, and such kinds of things as these, I apprehend, will be
thought and said by the people, if the proposed alteration of the
Albany plan should take place. Then the administration of the board
of governors and council so appointed, not having the representative
body of the people to approve and unite in its measures, and
conciliate the minds of the people to them, will probably become
suspected and odious; dangerous animosities and feuds will arise
between the governors and governed; and every thing go into confusion.

Perhaps I am too apprehensive in this matter; but having freely given
my opinion and reasons, your excellency can judge better than I,
whether there be any weight in them, and the shortness of the time
allowed me will I hope in some degree excuse the imperfections of
this scrawl.

With the greatest respect and fidelity, I have the honour to be

  your excellency's most obedient,

  and most humble servant,

  B. FRANKLIN.




  III. LETTER _to the same, on the Subject of uniting the
  Colonies more intimately with Great Britain, by allowing them
  Representatives in Parliament_.


  _Boston, Dec. 22, 1754._

  SIR,

Since the conversation your excellency was pleased to honour me
with, on the subject of _uniting the colonies_ more intimately with
Great Britain, by allowing them _representatives in parliament_, I
have something further considered that matter, and am of opinion,
that such an union would be very acceptable to the colonies,
provided they had a reasonable number of representatives allowed
them; and that all the old acts of parliament restraining the trade
or cramping the manufactures of the colonies be at the same time
repealed, and the British subjects _on this side the water_ put, in
those respects, on the same footing with those in Great Britain,
till the new parliament, representing the whole, shall think it
for the interest of the whole to re-enact some or all of them: it
is not that I imagine so many representatives will be allowed the
colonies, as to have any great weight by their numbers; but I think
there might be sufficient to occasion those laws to be better and
more impartially considered, and perhaps to overcome the interest
of a petty corporation, or of any particular set of artificers or
traders in England, who heretofore seem, in some instances, to have
been more regarded than all the colonies, or than was consistent with
the general interest, or best natural good. I think too, that the
government of the colonies by a parliament, in which they are fairly
represented, would be vastly more agreeable to the people, than the
method lately attempted to be introduced by royal instruction; as
well as more agreeable to the nature of an English constitution, and
to English liberty; and that such laws, as now seem to bear hard on
the colonies, would (when judged by such a parliament for the best
interest of the whole) be more cheerfully submitted to, and more
easily executed.

I should hope too, that by such an union, the people of Great
Britain, and the people of the colonies, would learn to consider
themselves, as not belonging to different communities with different
interest, but to one community with one interest; which I imagine
would contribute to strengthen the whole, and greatly lessen the
danger of future separations.

It is, I suppose, agreed to be the general interest of any state,
that its people be numerous and rich; men enow to fight in its
defence, and enow to pay sufficient taxes to defray the charge;
for these circumstances tend to the security of the state, and
its protection from foreign power. But it seems not of so much
importance, whether the fighting be done by John or Thomas, or the
tax paid by William or Charles. The iron manufacture employs and
enriches British subjects, but is it of any importance to the state,
whether the manufacturer lives at Birmingham or Sheffield, or both;
since they are still within its bounds, and their wealth and persons
still at its command? Could the Goodwin Sands be laid dry by banks,
and land equal to a large country thereby gained to England, and
presently filled with English inhabitants, would it be right to
deprive such inhabitants of the common privileges enjoyed by other
Englishmen, the right of vending their produce in the same ports,
or of making their own shoes; because a merchant or a shoemaker,
living on the old land, might fancy it more for his advantage to
trade or make shoes for them? Would this be right, even if the land
were gained at the expence of the state? And would it not seem less
right, if the charge and labour of gaining the additional territory
to Britain had been borne by the settlers themselves? and would not
the hardship appear yet greater, if the people of the new country
should be allowed no representatives in the parliament enacting
such impositions? Now I look on the colonies as so many countries
gained to Great Britain, and more advantageous to it, than if they
had been gained out of the seas around its coasts, and joined to its
lands; for being in different climates, they afford greater variety
of produce, and materials for more manufactures; and being separated
by the ocean, they increase much more its shipping and seamen: and,
since they are all included in the British empire, which has only
extended itself by their means; and the strength and wealth of the
parts is the strength and wealth of the whole; what imports it to the
general state, whether a merchant, a smith, or a hatter, grow rich in
Old or New England? and if, through increase of people, two smiths
are wanted for one employed before, why may not the _new_ smith be
allowed to live and thrive in the _new_ country, as well as the _old_
one in the _old_? In fine, why should the countenance of a state be
_partially_ afforded to its people, unless it be most in favour of
those who have most merit? and if there be any difference, those
who have most contributed to enlarge Britain's empire and commerce,
increase her strength, her wealth, and the numbers of her people, at
the risque of their own lives and private fortunes in new and strange
countries, methinks ought rather to expect some preference. With the
greatest respect and esteem, I have the honour to be

  Your Excellency's most obedient

  and humble Servant,

  B. FRANKLIN.




  _Plan for settling two Western Colonies in North America, with
  Reasons for the Plan, 1754[11]._


The great country back of the Apalachian mountains, on both sides
the Ohio, and between that river and the lakes is now well known,
both to the English and French, to be one of the finest in North
America, for the extreme richness and fertility of the land; the
healthy temperature of the air, and mildness of the climate; the
plenty of hunting, fishing, and fowling; the facility of trade
with the Indians; and the vast convenience of inland navigation or
water-carriage by the lakes and great rivers, many hundred of leagues
around.

From these natural advantages it must undoubtedly (perhaps in less
than another century) become a populous and powerful dominion; and a
great accession of power, either to England or France.

The French are now making open encroachments on these territories, in
defiance of our known rights; and, if we longer delay to settle that
country, and suffer them to possess it,--these _inconveniences and
mischiefs_ will probably follow:

1. Our people, being confined to the country between the sea and the
mountains, cannot much more increase in number; people increasing
in proportion to their room and means of subsistence. (See the
Observations on the Increase of Mankind, &c. Vol. II.)

2. The French will increase much more, by that acquired room and
plenty of subsistence, and become a great people behind us.

3. Many of our debtors, and loose English people, our German
servants, and slaves, will probably desert to them, and increase
their numbers and strength, to the lessening and weakening of ours.

4. They will cut us off from all commerce and alliance with the
western Indians, to the great prejudice of Britain, by preventing the
sale and consumption of its manufactures.

5. They will both in time of peace and war (as they have always done
against New England) set the Indians on to harrass our frontiers,
kill and scalp our people, and drive in the advanced settlers; and
so, in preventing our obtaining more subsistence by cultivating of
new lands, they discourage our marriages, and keep our people from
increasing; thus (if the expression may be allowed) killing thousands
of our children before they are born. -- -- --

If two strong colonies of English were settled between the Ohio and
lake Erie, in the places hereafter to be mentioned,--these advantages
might be expected:

1. They would be a great security to the frontiers of our other
colonies; by preventing the incursions of the French and French
Indians of Canada, on the back parts of Pensylvania, Maryland,
Virginia, and the Carolinas; and the frontiers of such new colonies
would be much more easily defended, than those of the colonies last
mentioned now can be, as will appear hereafter.

2. The dreaded junction of the French settlements in Canada with
those of Louisiana would be prevented.

3. In case of a war, it would be easy, from those new colonies, to
annoy Louisiana, by going down the Ohio and Mississippi; and the
southern part of Canada, by sailing over the lakes; and thereby
confine the French within narrower limits.

4. We should secure the friendship and trade of the Miamis or
Twigtwees (a numerous people, consisting of many tribes, inhabiting
the country between the west end of lake Erie, and the south end
of lake Hurons, and the Ohio) who are at present dissatisfied with
the French, and fond of the English, and would gladly encourage and
protect an infant English settlement in or near their country, as
some of their chiefs have declared to the writer of this memoir.
Further, by means of the lakes, the Ohio, and the Mississippi, our
trade might be extended through a vast country, among many numerous
and distant nations, greatly to the benefit of Britain.

5. The settlement of all the intermediate lands, between the present
frontiers of our colonies on one side, and the lakes and Mississippi
on the other, would be facilitated and speedily executed, to the
great increase of Englishmen, English trade, and English power.

The grants to most of the colonies are of long narrow slips of land,
extending west from the Atlantic to the South Sea. They are much too
long for their breadth; the extremes at too great a distance; and
therefore unfit to be continued under their present dimensions.

Several of the old colonies may conveniently be limited westward by
the Allegeny or Apalachian mountains; and new colonies formed west of
those mountains.

A single old colony does not seem strong enough to extend itself
otherwise than inch by inch: it cannot venture a settlement far
distant from the main body, being unable to support it: but if the
colonies were united under one governor-general and grand council,
agreeable to the Albany plan, they might easily, by their joint
force, establish one or more new colonies, whenever they should judge
it necessary or advantageous to the interest of the whole.

But if such union should not take place, it is proposed that two
charters be granted, _each_ for some considerable part of the lands
west of Pensylvania and the Virginian mountains, to a number of the
nobility and gentry of Britain; with such Americans as shall join
them in contributing to the settlement of those lands, either by
paying a proportion of the expence of making such settlements, or
by actually going thither in person, and settling themselves and
families.

That by such charters it be granted, that every actual settler be
intitled to a tract of [___] acres for himself, and [___] acres
for every poll in the family he carries with him; and that every
contributor of [___] guineas be intitled to a quantity of acres,
equal to the share of a single settler, for every such sum of [___]
guineas contributed and paid to the colony treasurer; a contributor
for [___] shares to have an additional share _gratis_; that settlers
may likewise be contributors, and have right of land in both
capacities.

That as many and as great privileges and powers of government be
granted to the contributors and settlers, as his majesty in his
wisdom shall think most fit for their benefit and encouragement,
consistent with the general good of the British empire; for
extraordinary privileges and liberties, with lands on easy terms,
are strong inducements to people to hazard their persons and
fortunes in settling new countries; and such powers of government as
(though suitable to the circumstances, and fit to be trusted with an
infant colony) might be judged unfit, when it becomes populous and
powerful; these might be granted for a term only; as the choice of
their own governor for ninety-nine years; the support of government
in the colonies of Connecticut and Rhode Island (which _now_ enjoy
that and other like privileges) being much less expensive, than in
the colonies under the immediate government of the crown, and the
constitution more inviting.

That the first contributors to the amount of [___] guineas be
empowered to choose a treasurer to receive the contribution.

That no contributions be paid till the sum of [___] thousand guineas
be subscribed.

That the money thus raised be applied to the purchase of the lands
from the Six Nations and other Indians, and of provisions, stores,
arms, ammunition, carriages, &c. for the settlers; who, after having
entered their names with the treasurer, or person by him appointed
to receive and enter them, are, upon public notice given for that
purpose, to rendezvous at a place to be appointed, and march in a
body to the place destined for their settlement, under the [charge]
of the government to be established over them. Such rendezvous and
march however not to directed, till the number of names of settlers
entered, capable of bearing arms, amount at least to [___] thousand.
-- -- --


It is apprehended, that a great sum of money might be raised in
America on such a scheme as this; for there are many who would be
glad of any opportunity, by advancing a small sum at present, to
secure land for their children, which might in a few years become
very valuable; and a great number it is thought of actual settlers
might likewise be engaged (some from each of our present colonies)
sufficient to carry it into full execution by their strength and
numbers; provided only, that the crown would be at the expence
of removing the little forts the French have erected in their
incroachments on his majesty's territories, and supporting a strong
one near the falls of Niagara, with a few small armed vessels, or
half-galleys to cruize on the lakes. * * * * * -- -- --


For the security of this colony in its infancy, a small fort might
be erected and for some time maintained at Buffalonic on the Ohio,
above the settlement; and another at the mouth of the Hioaga, on
the south side of lake Erie, where a port should be formed, and a
town erected, for the trade of the lakes.--The colonists for _this
settlement_ might march by land through Pensylvania. -- -- --


The river Siotha, which runs into the Ohio about two hundred miles
below Logs Town, is supposed the fittest seat for the _other colony_;
there being for forty miles on each side of it and quite up to its
heads a body of all rich land; the finest spot of its bigness in
all North America, and has the particular advantage of sea-coal in
plenty (even above ground in two places) for fuel, when the woods
shall be destroyed. This colony would have the trade of the Miamis or
Twigtwees; and should, at first, have a small fort near Hock-kockin,
at the head of the river; and another near the mouth of Wabash.
Sandoski, a French fort near the lake Erie, should also be taken; and
all the little French forts south and west of the lakes, quite to the
Mississippi, be removed, or taken and garrisoned by the English.--The
colonists for this settlement might assemble near the heads of the
rivers in Virginia, and march over land to the navigable branches
of the Kanhawa, where they might embark with all their baggage and
provisions, and fall into the Ohio, not far above the mouth of
Siotha. Or they might rendezvous at Will's Creek, and go down the
Mohingahela to the Ohio.

The fort and armed vessels at the strait of Niagara would be a vast
security to the frontiers of these new colonies against any attempts
of the French from Canada. The fort at the mouth of the Wabash would
guard that river, the Ohio, and Cutava river, in case of any attempt
from the French of Mississippi. (Every fort should have a small
settlement round it; as the fort would protect the settlers, and the
settlers defend the fort and supply it with provisions.) -- -- --


The difficulty of settling the first English colonies in America,
at so great a distance from England, must have been vastly greater,
than the settling these proposed new colonies: for it would be the
interest and advantage of all the present colonies to support these
new ones; as they would cover their frontiers, and prevent the growth
of the French power behind or near their present settlements; and the
new country is nearly at equal distance from all the old colonies,
and could easily be assisted from all of them.

And as there are already in the old colonies many thousands of
families that are ready to swarm, wanting more land; the richness
and natural advantage of the Ohio country would draw most of them
thither, were there but a tolerable prospect of a safe settlement.
So that the new colonies would soon be full of people; and from
the advantage of their situation, become much more terrible to the
French settlements, than those are now to us. The gaining of the
back Indian trade from the French, by the navigation of the lakes,
&c. would of itself greatly weaken our enemies:--it being now their
principal support, it seems highly probable, that in time they must
be subjected to the British crown, or driven out of the country.

Such settlements may better be made now, than fifty years hence,
because it is easier to settle ourselves, and thereby prevent the
French settling there as they seem now to intend, than to remove them
when strongly settled.

If these settlements are postponed, then more forts and stronger,
and more numerous and expensive garrisons must be established, to
secure the country, prevent their settling, and secure our present
frontiers; the charge of which may probably exceed the charge of the
proposed settlements, and the advantage nothing near so great.

The fort at Oswego should likewise be strengthened, and some armed
half-gallies, or other small vessels, kept there to cruise on lake
Ontario, as proposed by Mr. Pownall in his paper laid before the
commissioners at the Albany treaty[12].

If a fort was also built at Tirondequat on lake Ontario and a
settlement made there near the lake side, where the lands are said to
be good, (much better than at Oswego;) the people of such settlements
would help to defend both forts on any emergency[13]

FOOTNOTES:

[11] For the occasion which produced this plan, see what follows. I
apprehend it was given to Governor Pownall, 1754, for the purpose of
being inserted in his memorial; but this point of anecdote I cannot
sufficiently ascertain.

"Extract of a Memorial drawn up by Order of, and presented to his
Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland, 1756, by T. Pownall.

"In other parts of our frontier, that are not the immediate residence
and country of Indians, some other species of barrier should be
thought of, of which nothing can be more effectual than a barrier
colony: but even this cannot be carried ... into execution and
effect, without the previous measure of _entrepôts_ in the country
between us and the enemy.... All mankind must know, that no body of
men, whether as an army, or as an emigration of colonists, can march
from one country to another, through an inhospitable wilderness,
without magazines; nor with any safety, without posts communicating
among each other by practicable roads, to which to retire in case of
accidents, repulse, or delay.

"It is a fact, which experience evinces the truth of, that we have
always been able to outsettle the French; and have driven the Indians
out of the country more by settling than fighting; and that whenever
our settlements have been wisely and completely made, the French,
neither by themselves nor their dogs of war, the Indians, have been
able to remove us. It is upon this fact I found the propriety of the
measure of settling a barrier colony in those parts of our frontiers,
_which are not the immediate residence or hunting-grounds of our_
Indians. This is a measure that will be effectual; and will not only
in time pay its expence, but make as great returns as any of our
present colonies do; will give a strength and unity to our dominions
in North America; and give us possession of the country, as well as
settlement in it. But above all this, the state and circumstances of
our settlements render such a measure not only proper and eligible,
but absolutely necessary. The English settlements, as they are at
present circumstanced, are absolutely at a stand; they are settled
up to the mountains: and in the mountains there is no where together
land sufficient for a settlement large enough to subsist by itself,
and to defend itself, and preserve a communication with the present
settlements.

"If the English would advance one step further, or cover themselves
where they are, it must be at once, by one large step over the
mountains, with a numerous and military colony. Where such should
be settled, I do not take upon me to say: at present I shall only
point out the measure and the nature of it, by inserting two schemes,
one of Mr. Franklin's, the other of your memorialist; and if I
might indulge myself with scheming, I should imagine that two such
were sufficient, and only requisite and proper: one at the back of
Virginia, filling up the vacant space between the five nations and
southern confederacy, and connecting, into one system, our barrier;
the other somewhere in the Cohass or Connecticut river, or wherever
best adapted to cover the New England colonies. These, with the
little settlements mentioned above in the Indian countries, complete
my idea of this branch." See Governor Pownall's Administration of the
Colonies. Vol. II. p. 228-231, 5th edition.

The reader must carry along with him a distinction between the plans
of Dr. Franklin and Governor Pownall here referred to. The first
(which is before him) is particular, and proposes a plan for _two_
settlements in the unlocated lands to the westward of Pensylvania
and the Virginian mountains, and is totally silent with respect to a
settlement in New England: the other treats of the mode of settling
new colonies in North America in general, leaving the precise
situation to be in some measure pointed out by the foregoing extract.

The copy from which this paper is printed, has appearances of being
rather incorrectly taken from the original. B. V.

[12] See his work above quoted, Vol. II. p. 234. _et seq._ and p.
179. _et seq._ B. V.

[13] This whole proposal was neglected, though the French thought
a considerable settlement very practicable, in order to get at the
Ohio. See Governor Pownall, Vol. II. p. 236.

Dr. Franklin also failed in another proposal for settling to the
south of the Ohio. B. V.




  _Report of the Committee of Aggrievances of the Assembly of
  Pensylvania, dated Feb. 22, 1757[14]._


In obedience to the order of the house, we have drawn up the heads
of the most important aggrievances that occur to us, which the
people of this province with great difficulty labour under; the many
infractions of the constitution (in manifest violation of the royal
grant, the proprietary charter, the laws of this province, and of the
laws, usages, and customs of our mother-country) and other matters;
which we apprehend call aloud for redress.

They are as follow:


_First_, By the royal charter (which has ever been, ought to be,
and truly is, the principal and invariable fundamental of this
constitution) King Charles the Second did give and grant unto William
Penn, his heirs and assigns, the province of Pensylvania; and also to
him and his heirs, and his or their _deputies_ or lieutenants, free,
full, and absolute power, for the good and happy government thereof,
to make and enact any laws, "according to their best discretion;
by and with the advice, assent, and approbation of the _freemen_
of the said country, or of their delegates or deputies;" for the
raising of money, or any other end appertaining to the public state,
peace, or safety of the said country. By the words of this grant,
it is evident, that full powers are granted to the _deputies_ and
lieutenants of William Penn and his heirs, to concur with the people
in framing laws for their protection and the safety of the province,
according to their best discretion; independent of any instructions
or directions they should receive from their _principals_. And it is
equally obvious to your committee, that the _people_ of this province
and their representatives were interested in this royal grant; and
by virtue thereof have an original right of legislation inherent in
them; which neither the proprietors nor any other person whatsoever
can divest them of, restrain, or abridge, without manifestly
violating and destroying the letter, spirit, and design of this grant.

Nevertheless we unfortunately find, that the proprietaries of this
province, regardless of this sacred fundamental of our rights and
liberties, have so abridged and restricted their late and present
_governor's_ discretion in matters of legislation, by their illegal,
impracticable, and unconstitutional instructions and prohibitions;
that no bill for granting aids and supplies to our most gracious
sovereign (be it ever so reasonable, expedient, and necessary for
the defence of this his majesty's colony, and safety of his people)
unless it be agreeable thereto, can meet with his approbation: by
means whereof the many considerable sums of money which have been
offered for those purposes, by the assemblies of this province (ever
anxious to maintain his honour and rights,) have been rejected; to
the great encouragement of his majesty's enemies, and the imminent
danger of the loss of this colony.


_Secondly_, The representatives of the people in general assembly
met, by virtue of the said royal grant, and the charter of privileges
granted by the said William Penn, and a law of this province, have
right to, and ought to enjoy all the powers and privileges of an
assembly, according to the rights of the free-born subjects of
England, and as is usual in any of the plantations in America: [also]
it is an indubitable and now an incontested right of the commons of
England, to _grant aids_ and supplies to his majesty in any manner
they think most easy to themselves and the people; and they [also]
are the sole judges of the _measure_, _manner and time_ of granting
and raising the same.

Nevertheless the proprietaries of this province, in contempt of the
said royal grant, proprietary charter, and law of their colony,
designing to subvert the fundamentals of this constitution, to
deprive the assembly and people of their rights and privileges, and
to assume an arbitrary and tyrannical power over the liberties and
properties of his majesty's liege subjects, have so restrained their
governors by the _despotic instructions_ (which are not to be varied
from, and are particularly directory in the framing and passing of
money-bills and supplies to his majesty, as to the mode, measure,
and time) that it is impossible for the assembly, should they lose
all sense of their most essential rights, and comply with those
instructions, to grant sufficient aids for the defence of this his
majesty's province from the common enemy.


_Thirdly_, In pursuance of sundry acts of general assembly, approved
of by the crown, [and] a natural right inherent in every man
antecedent to all laws, the assemblies of this province have had the
power of _disposing_ of the _public_ monies, that have been raised
for the encouragement of trade and support of government, by the
interest money arising by the loan of the bills of credit and the
excise. No part of these monies was ever paid by the _proprietaries_,
or ever raised on their estates; and therefore they can have no
pretence of right to a voice in the disposition of them. They
have ever been applied with prudent frugality to the honour and
advantage of the public, and the king's immediate service, to the
general approbation of the people: the credit of the government has
been preserved, and the debts of the public punctually discharged.
In short, no inconveniencies, but great and many advantages have
accrued, from the assembly's prudent care and management of these
funds.

Yet the proprietaries resolved to deprive the assemblies of the power
and means of _supporting an agent_ in England, and of prosecuting
their complaints and remonstrating their aggrievances, when injured
and oppressed, to his majesty and his parliament: and to rob them
of this natural right (which has been so often approved of by their
gracious sovereign) have, by their said instructions, prohibited
their governor from giving his assent to any laws emitting or
re-emitting any paper-currency or bills of credit, or for raising
money by excise or any other method; unless the governor or commander
in chief for the time being, by clauses to be inserted therein, has
_a negative in the disposition_ of the monies arising thereby; let
the languishing circumstances of our trade be ever so great, and a
further or greater medium be ever so necessary for its support.


_Fourthly_, By the laws and statutes of England, the chief rents,
honours, and castles of the crown are taxed, and _pay their
proportion_ to the supplies that are granted to the king for the
defence of the realm and support of government: his majesty,
the nobility of the realm, and all the British subjects, do now
actually contribute their proportion towards the defence of America
in general, and this province in particular: and it is in a more
especial manner the duty of the _proprietaries_ to pay their
proportion of a tax, for the immediate preservation of their own
estates, in this province. To exempt therefore any part of their
estates from their reasonable part of this necessary burthen, it is
unjust as it is illegal, and as new as it is arbitrary.

Yet the proprietaries, notwithstanding the general danger to which
the nation and its colonies are exposed, and great distress of this
province in particular, by their said instructions, have prohibited
their governors from passing laws for the raising supplies for its
defence; _unless_ all their located, unimproved, and unoccupied
lands, quit-rents, fines, and purchase monies on interest (the much
greater part of their enormous estates in this colony) are expressly
exempted from paying any part of the tax.


_Fifthly_, By virtue of the said royal charter, the proprietaries are
invested with a power of doing every thing "which unto a compleat
establishment of justice, unto courts and tribunals, forms of
judicature, and manner of proceedings, do belong." It was certainly
the import and design of this grant, that the courts of judicature
should be formed, and the _judges_ and officers thereof hold their
commissions, in a manner not repugnant, but agreeable to the laws
and customs of England: that thereby they might remain free from
the influence of persons in power, the rights of the people might
be preserved, and their properties effectually secured. That the
guarantee, William Penn (understanding the said grant in this light)
did, by his original frame of government, covenant and grant with
the people, that the judges and other officers should hold their
commissions during their _good behaviour, and no longer_.

Notwithstanding which, the governors of this province have, for
many years past, granted all the commissions to the judges of the
king's bench or supreme court of this province, and to the judges
of the court of common pleas of the several counties, to be held
during their _will and pleasure_; by means whereof, the said judges
being subject to the influence and directions of the proprietaries
and their governors, their favourites and creatures, the laws may
not be duly administered or executed, but often wrested from their
true sense; to serve particular purposes, the foundation of justice
may be liable to be destroyed; and the lives, laws, liberties,
privileges, and properties of the people thereby rendered precarious
and altogether insecure; to the great disgrace of our laws, and the
inconceivable injury of his majesty's subjects.


Your committee further beg leave to add, that besides these
aggrievances, there are other hardships the people of this province
have experienced, that call for redress.--The _inlistment of
servants, without the least satisfaction_ being made to the masters,
has not only prevented the cultivation of our lands, and diminished
the trade and commerce of the province, but is a burthen extremely
unequal and oppressive to individuals. And should the practice
continue, the consequence must prove very discouraging to the further
settlement of this colony, and prejudicial to his majesty's future
service.--Justice, therefore, demands, that satisfaction should be
made to the masters of such inlisted servants; and that the right of
masters to their servants be confirmed and settled.--But as those
servants have been inlisted into his majesty's service for the
general defence of America, and not of this province only, but all
the colonies, and the nation in general, have and will receive equal
benefit from their service; this satisfaction should be made at the
expence of the nation, and not of the province only.

That the people now labour under _a burthen of taxes_, almost
insupportable by so young a colony, for the defence of its
long-extended frontier, of about two hundred miles from New Jersey
to Maryland; without either of those colonies, or the three lower
counties on Delaware, contributing their proportion thereto; though
their frontiers are in a great measure covered and protected by our
forts. And should the war continue, and with it this unequal burthen,
many of his majesty's subjects in this province will be reduced to
want, and the province, if not lost to the enemy, involved in debt,
and sunk under its load.

That notwithstanding this weight of taxes, the assemblies of this
province _have given to the general service_ of the nation, five
thousand pounds to purchase provisions for the troops under General
Braddock; 2,985_l._ 0_s._ 11_d._ for clearing a road by his orders;
10,514_l._ 10_s._ 1_d._ to General Shirley, for the purchasing
provisions for the New England forces; and expended the sum of
2,385_l._ 0_s._ 2½_d._ in supporting the inhabitants of Nova Scotia;
which likewise we conceive ought to be a national expence.

And that his majesty's subjects, the merchants and insurers in
England, as well as the merchants here and elsewhere, did during
the last, and will during the present war, greatly suffer in their
property, trade, and commerce, by the _enemy's privateers_ on this
coast, and at our capes, unless some method be fallen on to prevent
it.


Wherefore your committee are of opinion, That the commissioners
intended to be sent to England[15], to solicit a memorial and
redress of the many infractions and violations of the constitution;
should also have it in charge, and be instructed to represent
to our most gracious sovereign and his parliaments, the several
unequal burthens and hardships before-mentioned;--and endeavour to
procure satisfaction to the masters of such servants as have been
inlisted, and the right of masters to their servants established and
confirmed;--and obtain a repayment of the said several sums of money,
some assistance towards defending our extensive frontier, and a
vessel of war to protect the trade and commerce of this province.

  Submitted to the correction of the house.

  _Feb. 22, 1757._

FOOTNOTES:

[14] The English colony-governments seem to have been considered
as of three sorts. First, _provincial_ governments; where the
constitution originally depends on the king's commission, and
instructions given to his governors; and the assemblies, held under
that authority, have their share in making local ordinances not
repugnant to English law. Next, _proprietary_ governments; where a
district of country is given by the crown to individuals, attended
with certain legislative powers in the nature of a fief; with a
provision for the sovereignty at home, and also for the fulfilment
of the terms and end of the grant. Lastly, _charter_ governments,
where the fundamentals of the government are previously prescribed
and made known to the settlers, being in no degree left subject to a
governor's commission or proprietor's will. (See Blackstone, Vol. I.
Introd. § 4.)--Good faith however to mankind seemed to require, that
the constitutions, once begun under the provincial or proprietary
governments, should remain unaltered (except for improvement) to the
respective settlers, equally as in charter-governments. B. V.

[15] Dr. Franklin was afterwards appointed to present this address,
as agent for the province of Pensylvania, and departed from America
for the purpose in June 1757. See his life, Vol. I. p. 134. While in
England, the more effectually to accomplish the business upon which
he was sent, he wrote the article that follows in the next page,
entitled An historical Review, &c. _Editor._




  _An historical Review of the Constitution and Government of
  Pensylvania, from its Origin; so far as regards the several Points
  of Controversy which have, from Time to Time, arisen between the
  several Governors of that Province, and their several Assemblies.
  Founded on authentic Documents._

  Those who would give up _essential liberty_, to purchase a little
  _temporary safety_, deserve neither _liberty_ nor _safety_.

  Griffiths, 1759[16].


  DEDICATION.

  To the right honourable Arthur Onslow, speaker of the honourable
  House of Commons.

  SIR,

The subject of the following sheets is an unhappy one: the
controversy between the proprietaries and successive assemblies of
Pensylvania: a controversy which has often embarrassed, if not
endangered the public service: a controversy which has been long
depending, and which still seems to be as far from an issue as ever.

Our blessed saviour reproaches the Pharisees with laying heavy
burdens on men's shoulders, which they themselves would not stir with
a single finger.

Our proprietaries, sir, have done the same; and, for the sake of the
commonwealth, the province has hitherto submitted to the imposition:
not indeed, without the most strenuous endeavours to lay the load
equally, the fullest manifestations, and the strongest protestations
against the violence put upon them.

Having been most injuriously misrepresented and traduced in print,
by the known agents and dependents of those gentlemen their fellow
subjects, they at last find themselves obliged to set forth an
historical state of their case, and to make their appeal to the
public upon it.

With the public opinion in their favour, they may with the more
confidence lift up their eyes to the wisdom of parliament and the
majesty of the crown, from whence alone they can derive an effectual
remedy.

To your hands, sir, these papers are most humbly presented, for
considerations so obvious, that they scarce need any explanation.

The Roman provinces did not stand more in need of patronage than
ours: and such clients as we are would have preferred the integrity
of Cato to the fortune of Cæsar.

The cause we bring is in fact the cause of all the provinces in one:
it is the cause of every British subject in every part of the British
dominions: it is the cause of every man who deserves to be free every
where.

The propriety, therefore, of addressing these papers to a gentleman,
who, for so many successive parliaments, with so much honour to
himself and satisfaction to the public, has been at the head of the
commons of Great Britain, cannot be called in question.

You will smile, sir, perhaps, as you read the references of a
provincial assembly to the rights and claims of parliament; but we
humbly conceive, it will be without the least mixture of resentment;
those assemblies having nothing more in view, than barely to
establish their privileges on the most rational and solid basis they
could find, for the security and service of their constituents.

And you are humbly besought, sir, not to think the worse of this
address, because it has been made without your permission or privity.

Nobody asks leave to pay a debt: every Briton is your debtor, sir:
and all we have said, or can say, is but a poor composition for what
we owe you.

You have conferred as much honour on the chair you fill, as the chair
has conferred on you.

Probity and dignity are your characteristics.

May that seat always derive the same lustre from the same qualities!

This at least ought to be our prayer, whether it is or not within our
expectations.

For the province of Pensylvania, as well as in my own private
capacity, I have the honour to be, with the most profound respect,

  Sir,

  your most obedient humble servant,

  THE EDITOR.


INTRODUCTION.

To obtain an infinite variety of purposes by a few plain principles
is the characteristic of nature. As the eye is affected so is the
understanding: objects at distance strike it according to their
dimensions, or the quantity of light thrown upon them; near,
according to their novelty or familiarity as they are in motion or
at rest. It is the same with actions. A battle is all motion; a hero
all glare: while such images are before us, we can attend to nothing
else. Solon and Lycurgus would make no figure in the same scene with
the king of Prussia; and we are at present so lost in a military
scramble on the continent next us, in which it must be confessed we
are deeply interested, that we have scarce time to throw a glance
towards America, where we have also much at stake, and where, if any
where, our account must be made up at last.

We love to stare more than to reflect, and to be indolently amused
at our leisure, than to commit the smallest trespass on our patience
by winding a painful tedious maze, which would pay us in nothing but
knowledge.

But then as there are some eyes that can find nothing marvellous but
what is marvellously great, so there are others equally disposed to
marvel at what is marvellously little; and who can derive as much
entertainment from this microscope in examining a mite, as Dr. ----
in ascertaining the geography of the moon, or measuring the tail of a
comet.

Let this serve as an excuse for the author of these sheets, if he
needs any, for bestowing them on the transactions of a colony, till
of late hardly mentioned in our annals; in point of establishment
one of the last upon the British list, and in point of rank one of
the most subordinate, as being not only subject, in common with the
rest, to the crown, but also to the claims of a _proprietary_, who
thinks he does them _honour_ enough in governing them by _deputy_;
consequently so much further removed from the royal eye, and so much
the more exposed to the pressure of self-interested _instructions_.

Considerable, however, as most of them, for happiness of situation,
fertility of soil, product of valuable commodities, number of
inhabitants, shipping, amount of exportations, latitude of rights and
privileges, and every other requisite for the being and well-being of
society, and more considerable than any of them all for the celerity
of its growth, unassisted by any human help but the vigour and virtue
of its own excellent constitution.

A father and his family, the latter united by interest and affection,
the former to be revered for the wisdom of his institutions and
the indulgent use of his authority, was the form it was at first
presented in. Those who were only ambitious of repose found it
here; and as none returned with an evil report of the land, numbers
followed: all partook of the leaven they found: the community still
wore the same equal face: nobody aspired: nobody was oppressed:
industry was sure of profit, knowledge of esteem, and virtue of
veneration.

An assuming _landlord_, strongly disposed to convert free tenants
into abject vassals, and to reap what he did not sow, countenanced
and abetted by a few desperate and designing dependents, on the one
side; and on the other, all who have sense enough to know their
rights, and spirit enough to defend them, combined as one man against
the said landlord and his encroachment in the form it has since
assumed.

And surely a nation born to liberty like this, bound to leave it
unimpaired as they received it from their fathers in perpetuity
to their heirs, and interested in the conservation of it in every
appendix to the British empire, the particulars of such a contest
cannot be wholly indifferent.

On the contrary, it is reasonable to think, the first workings of
power against liberty, and the natural efforts of unbiassed men
to secure themselves against the first approaches of oppression,
must have a captivating power over every man of sensibility and
discernment amongst us.

Liberty it seems thrives best in the woods. America best cultivates
what Germany brought forth. And were it not for certain ugly
comparisons, hard to be suppressed, the pleasure arising from such a
research would be without alloy.

In the feuds of Florence recorded by Machiavel, we find more to
lament and less to praise. Scarce can we believe the first citizens
of the ancient republics had such pretensions to consideration,
though so highly celebrated in ancient story. As to ourselves, we
need no longer have recourse to the late glorious stand of the French
parliament to excite our emulation.

It is a known custom among farmers, to change their corn from season
to season, for the sake of filling the bushel: and in case the wisdom
of the age should condescend to make the like experiment in another
shape, from hence we may learn, whither to repair for the proper
species.

It is not however to be presumed, that such as have long been
accustomed to consider the colonies in general as only so many
dependencies on the council board, the board of trade, and the board
of customs; or, as a hot-bed for causes, jobs and other pecuniary
emoluments, and as formed as effectually by _instructions_ as by
_laws_, can be prevailed on to consider those patriot rustics with
any degree of respect.

But how contemptibly soever these gentlemen may talk of the colonies,
how cheap soever they may hold their assemblies, or how insignificant
the planters and traders who compose them, truth will be truth, and
principle, principle, notwithstanding.

Courage, wisdom, integrity, and honour are not to be measured by the
place assigned them to act in, but by the trials they undergo and
the vouchers they furnish: and if so manifested, need neither robes
or titles to set them off.


CONTENTS.

List of governors of Pensylvania, and dates of the several charters,
&c. of that province.

Abstract of the charter granted to William Penn.

Certain conditions or concessions of Mr. Penn to the first
adventurers in, and settlers of, Pensylvania.

Mr. Penn's first frame of government.

His reservation of quit rents.

His second frame of government.

The province of Pensylvania and the territory of the three lower
counties united by his management.

Remonstrance of a subsequent assembly against the said union.

Motives of the planters, assigned by the said assembly, for accepting
the second frame of government.

Mr. Penn's return to England, and appointment of commissioners to
administer the government.

Disorders which ensued during his absence.

Captain Blackwell's government.

The government assumed into the lands of the crown in 1693, and
administered by colonel Fletcher, governor of New York.

He declares the constitution of Mr. Penn's government, and that of
their majesties, to be directly opposite to each other.

He menaces the assembly with an annexion of their province to that of
New York.

Protestation against passing of bills, amended by the governor
and council, without the previous assent of the assembly to those
amendments, and of money-bills before grievances have been redressed.

Remonstrance to Mr. Penn concerning this period.

The governor admits the principles of the quakers, not to carry arms,
or levy money to make war; and solicits a supply to feed the hungry
and clothe the naked (Indians).

The assembly insist on their right to appropriate as well as to raise
money.

The government of William Markham, Esq.

A new act of settlement or frame of government.

The government resumed by Mr. Penn.

The province purged from the odium of favouring pirates, and carrying
on an illicit trade.

A new model of elections agreed to.

The assembly formed thereon dissolved.

Another assembly called upon another model, to meet at Newcastle
instead of Philadelphia.

Aids granted for the proprietary-governor, in exchange for a
conformation of property.

An aid of 350_l._ sterling to the crown on this account.

Mr. Penn's plausible speech to a new assembly.

Three of the requisitions they made to him, with his answers and
their replies.

A breach between the province and the territory.

The last charter of privileges, which, under the royal charter, is
_now_ the rule of government.

It is unanimously rejected by the freemen of the territory.

Mr. Penn's departure for England.

Andrew Hamilton, Esq. deputy-governor, in vain endeavours to unite
the territory with the province.

John Evans, Esq. succeeds Hamilton, and makes the like endeavour,
also in vain.

Controversy between him and the assembly concerning the bill to
confirm the charter.

Nine several heads of complaint entered in the minutes of the
assembly, as the ground of a representation to the proprietary; being
the representation several times before cited.

The remainder of that representation.

A copy of it demanded by the governor and refused by the assembly.

The latter make a merit of having forborne to make their
representation public.

The governor obtains an assembly to his wish, by undue practices.

Animosities between Lloyd, speaker of the assembly, and Logan,
secretary to the governor and council.

The governor censures the proprietary's charter of property.

The draughtman's defence of it.

The governor declares the proprietary's high resentment of the
assembly's representation.

The assembly's reply.

The governor refers to the charter of privileges as the only rule of
government.

The assembly complains of infractions made in it.

Their representation to the proprietary against the governor.

Logan impeached by the assembly.

An unanimous vote of thanks to the proprietary for recalling Evans.

General view of Gookin's government.

Assembly's character of themselves.

A proprietary-governor a wretched thing.

Artful conduct of governor Keith.

Mr. Penn's death.

The province left in the hands of trustees.

Logan, one of those trustees, obtains a majority in the council
against the governor.

Logan makes a voyage to England, and returns with private
instructions to Keith, which Keith communicates to the assembly.

The governor and assembly in concert pay no regard to the said
instructions.

A controversy in print, between the governor and Logan thereon.

A breach between the governor and speaker.

The province in a state of tranquillity for nine years under his
administration.

A pathetic reflection on the melancholy case of governors recalled.

Pensylvania easy to be governed, if well governed.

Private instructions from the proprietary in two several instances
declared void.

The proprietary of Pensylvania too inconsiderable here at home to be
a patron to the province, and too unsizeably great there.

The proprietaries the sole purchasers of Indian lands:--the people
at the sole expence of Indian affairs:--treaties and purchases
concomitant.

The quit-rents of Pensylvania, paid to the proprietary, first
demanded and granted to defray the charge of government.

Notwithstanding which the people now pay taxes for that purpose, and
the proprietaries insist on holding their estates tax-free.

Paper-money first issued in Pensylvania.

Precautions taken to secure it from depreciation.

Mr. Penn's trustees averse to the said issue, till a provision was
made, at the expence of the province, to render his heirs gainers by
it.

Room left in the constitution of the province for self defence by
force of arms, though the use of arms was not consistent with the
principles of quakers.

In consequence of complaints to parliament, of the mischiefs arising
from excessive issues of paper-money by the eastern governments (that
is to say those of New England) a general instruction was sent to
_all_ the governors of North America, not to give their assent to any
farther bills of that nature, without a suspending clause, till his
majesty's pleasure should be known.

The assembly grants money in aid of the expedition against Carthagena.

The governor inlists indented servants upon that occasion; and the
assembly apply the money they had given to indemnify the masters.

They give 3,000_l._ towards the public service, to be applied as his
majesty should direct.

Also another sum of 4,000_l._ to furnish necessaries to the troops in
Louisburgh.

And yet another sum of 5,000_l._ towards the intended expedition
against Canada in the year 1746, by an addition of the like sum to
their paper currency, and notwithstanding the above instruction, the
governor gave his assent to the bill for that purpose.

The proprietaries of Pensylvania oppose the bill brought into
parliament for restraining the northern colonies from issuing paper
bills of credit, and make a merit of it in the province.

The assembly call upon the proprietaries to contribute to the expence
of Indian affairs, which they decline.

The assembly's representation thereon.

A bill for increasing the provincial paper-currency in proportion to
the increase of the province, by an addition of 20,000_l._ thereto.

Rejected by the governor for being unseasonably timed.

And petitioned by the inhabitants.

A message from the governor (Hamilton) preparing the house to expect
incursions from the French among the Indians in alliance with them,
and requiring assistance on their behalf.

The answer of the proprietaries to the representation of the assembly
concerning the expence of Indian affairs.

The assembly's message sent to the governor, together with the
currency-bill he had before rejected.

Another message to him concerning Indian affairs, and notifying a
present of condolence to the Twigtwee tribe.

Governor's message, importing his assent to the currency-bill, with a
suspending clause.

Resolution of the assembly not to accept this clause, with their
reasons.

A note of regret, that some temperament had not been found out at
home, to prevent the controversy, which was now on the point of
breaking out.

Remonstrance of the assembly against the said clause.

The governor's message of adherence thereto.

The assembly's reply.

Their reply to the proprietary's answer to the representation on
Indian expences.

Unanimous resolution of the assembly concerning the necessity of a
remission of their paper-currency.

Lord Holdernesse's letter and other papers laid before them, together
with a written message from the governor thereon.

The assembly's answer, accompanied with their currency-bill.

The governor rejects it; but offers to pass a bill for striking a
farther sum on a proper fund for sinking the same in a few years.

The assembly prudently avail themselves of the cautions in lord
Holdernesse's letter concerning _undoubted limits_, to decline taking
any part in the broil, till the government of Virginia, as first
concerned, should set the first example.

The governor revives the old controversy concerning the paper-money
instruction.

Declares in another paper he had _undoubted assurance_, that part
of his majesty's dominions _within_ his government was at that time
invaded, and demands supplies to arm the province, &c.

The assembly demur, and desire a short adjournment.

The governor not only persists in his former declaration, but
maintains, that the case was the same, whether the invasion of the
enemy was made in Virginia or Pensylvania.

The assembly adjourn to May 6, and are assembled by the governor
April 2, in order to lay before them papers from governor Dinwiddie;
and demand a supply.

Debates in the assembly on the _quantum_, and a new adjournment.

Another session, and a message from the governor, accompanied with
intelligence, that the French were before the fort built by the
Virginians on the Ohio; with dispatches and a proposition from the
governors of Boston and New York, for an union of the colonies, &c.

A joint bill for granting an aid of 10,000_l._ to the king, and
20,000_l._ for replacing torn and ragged bills, offered.

Amendments proposed by the governor.

Unanimously rejected by the assembly, and for what reasons.

The governor's reply.

A reflection thereon.

Resolutions of the assembly.

And message to the governor before their adjournment.

They are re-convened by special summons on the occasion of
Washington's defeat, and required to form chearful and vigorous
resolutions for dislodging the enemy, in concurrence with Virginia.

The proceedings of the commissioners at Albany laid before them.

They prepare and present a bill for striking 35,000_l._ in bills of
credit, and the rest for replacing defective bills.

Which the governor evades for want of sufficient powers to pass it.

Governor Morris's arrival at Philadelphia, and first speech to a new
assembly.

The assembly's answer and adjournment.

Being assembled again, a letter from Sir Thomas Robinson, secretary
of state, is laid before them; and the governor in his speech
requires them to raise and keep up a considerable body of troops.

They present a bill for raising 40,000_l._ on the former plan; half
of this sum for the public service; with a message, expressing their
concern at a paragraph in the secretary of state's letter, by which
it appeared their conduct had not been fairly represented at home.

The old instruction, and an opinion of the attorney-general's,
pleaded by the governor in bar of his assent, unless the money was
raised in a five-years fund.

A letter from Sir Thomas Robinson to the governor of Pensylvania,
dispatched at the same time with others of similar tendency to the
other governors of the northern colonies.

Which the governor, in his comment upon it, endeavours to narrow the
application of, to Pensylvania only.

A message from the assembly, fully demonstrating, that Pensylvania
was not comprehended in the instruction insisted upon; and that in
case it was, the present emergency was one of those, which, according
to the very letter of that instruction, might be provided for
notwithstanding: also desiring a sight of the instructions he himself
had received from his principals.

A second message, in which they call upon the governor to give his
assent to the bill, as what would answer all the purposes recommended
to them in Sir Thomas Robinson's letter.

The governor's reply, declining the bill as before; because the
supply might be otherwise raised, and evading the communication of
his instructions.

The assembly's rejoinder, justifying the requisition they made of his
instructions; and intimating, that an appeal to the crown was the
only method left them of being continued in the use and benefit of
their birthright, and charter liberties.

The governor questions their right to have these instructions laid
before them, and endeavours to put them beside their point, by
magnifying the preparations of the French, &c.

The assembly order the papers which had passed between the
proprietaries and them to be printed, which till then they had
avoided.

Their unanimous resolutions concerning the proprietary instructions,
in which they declare it as their opinion, that the said instructions
were the principal if not the sole obstruction to their bill: also
the most essential points contained in their reply to the governor's
charges against them.

A brief of the governor's sur-rejoinder.

Some general remarks.

The assembly make their appeal to the crown, inform the governor
thereof, signify their inclination to adjourn till May, and give his
instructions the _coup de grace_.

The governor's expostulatory message thereon.

He demands a copy of their minutes; they order him one when the
printed copies were _finished_, and adjourn.

Upon Braddock's arrival in Virginia, they are re-assembled by special
summons: the demands made by message on that occasion.

The governor reprimands them for having published Sir Thomas
Robinson's letter in their minutes, and for not delivering him a copy
of those minutes so soon as he had required them.

The assembly's answer thereto.

Orders and counter-orders to the printer of these minutes.

Two messages from the governor; one communicating a design of
general Shirley to build a fort _within the limits_ of his majesty's
territories near _Crown Point_, to which the assembly is required
to contribute; and the other, notifying first the arrival of
Braddock's forces, and then the expectations entertained at home,
that the colonies would raise an additional number of forces,
furnish provisions, &c. all terminated with a kind of menace of
the resentment of his majesty and the parliament, in case of a
disappointment.

_Twenty five thousand pounds_ granted to the king's use, to be raised
by an emission of paper-bills to the same amount, and to be sunk by
an extension of the excise for ten years.

Refused by the governor, on the old pretence of a contrary
instruction.

A provision demanded for the expence of an Indian treaty.

A memorial to the assembly from Mr. Quincy, a commissioner from the
government of Massachusett's Bay, expressing both his concern, that
the governor could not be induced to pass the said money-bill, and
his acknowledgments of the _chearfulness_ shown by them in granting
10,000_l._ for victualling the forces to be employed in New England;
being part of the money so granted; and urging them to find out some
other means of rendering their purpose effectual.

The assembly resolve to raise the said sum on the credit of the
province.

Another paper of acknowledgment from the said Mr. Quincy.

The governor refuses to return the said bill to the assembly; informs
them the French had fitted out fifteen sail of the line, with six
thousand land forces, and calls upon them to put the province into a
state of defence, as the enemy could not be ignorant how plentiful
and defenceless it was; yet advises a short adjournment.

They meet again, and a squabble arising between them about a bill
merely provincial, he revives the former controversy.

The assembly's spirited answer to this captious message.

A remark thereon.

They are re-assembled.

A hardy assertion, concerning the paper-money act passed by governor
Thomas, refuted by a fact.

An acknowledgment from the officers of the regular forces of certain
presents made to them by the assembly.

The governor's message to the assembly, said to be founded on a
representation of general Braddock's, requiring them to enable him to
furnish the said general with provisions under proper convoys, &c. &c.

The assembly desire to have the general's letter laid before them,
which the governor declines, and thereby occasions a new controversy.

The assembly send up two other bills; one of 10,000_l._ for
exchanging old bills, and one of 15,000_l._ for the king's use, on
the model of that formerly passed by governor Thomas, and confirmed
at home by the royal authority, since the instruction so often cited
had been sent to the said governor.

Such amendments offered to it by the governor, as he could not but be
pre-convinced would not be allowed.

The assembly adjourn till September; but are again convoked in July,
on occasion of Braddock's defeat.

The governor's speech.

The assembly vote an aid of 50,000_l._ by a tax on all real and
personal estates.

The governor makes a pompous offer in the proprietary's name, of
certain lands west of Allegheny mountains, to such adventurers as
would fight for them, and calls upon the assembly to afford some
assistance to such as should accept the same.

A remonstrance which certain inhabitants of certain places were
induced to present to the assembly.

The address of the assembly to the governor.

Their 50,000_l._ money-bill returned, with an amendment, by which the
WHOLE _proprietary estate_ was to be _exempted_ from tax.

The message of the assembly to the governor on that occasion,
desiring his reasons for that exemption.

The governor's reply, containing four curious reasons.

The assembly's rejoinder, refuting those reasons.

Other papers which passed between them at the same crisis.

The residue of Braddock's troops being recalled from the frontiers,
notwithstanding an application of the assembly to the governor
requesting their continuance, he calls upon the house to provide for
the security of the Back-inhabitants.

A remark thereon.

The governor alarms and embarrasses them with petitions from certain
persons requiring to be armed; _intelligence_ of Indians actually
set out, to fall upon their frontiers; recommendations to provide
by law against exporting provisions to the enemy, as a requisite to
facilitate the reduction of Louisburgh; and _demands_ of all manner
of _things_ for the assistance of colonel Dunbar, who, by orders from
general Shirley, was again to proceed towards Fort Duquesne.

A proposal from certain gentlemen of Philadelphia to subscribe
500_l._ in lieu of the proprietary proportion of the tax in question,
and upon a presumption that the proprietaries would honourably
reimburse them.

The assembly send up their bill to the governor again, together with
the said proposal, as containing by implication an acknowledgment
that the tax was founded in equity, and also a farther security to
the governor, in case he should give his assent to the bill.

Their message to the governor, correcting his manner of stating the
Louisburgh point, and observing, that all required of them from New
England was to prolong the excellent laws they had already made.

Some seasonable remarks.

The governor's verbal answer to the assembly's message concerning the
money-bill, adhering to his amendment.

He contends for a militia.

The assembly order 1,000_l._ if so much remain in their treasury, to
arm the Back-inhabitants.

They signify their purpose to adjourn, and refer the affair of a
militia-bill to a new assembly.

Their proceedings at the next meeting: the governor demands an
additional supply of provision to be sent to Albany, at the
requisition of governor Phipps, for the use of the forces of
Massachusett's Bay: and another supply for the provisional troops of
Connecticut and Rhode Island, which he was _informed_ were raised in
addition to those already employed in the reduction of Crown-Point.

The assembly apply for a sight of Phipps's letter, which is refused.

The old controversy renewed.

A new one concerning the roads opened at the expence of the province
for the convenience of the king's forces, which is carried on with
much acrimony on both sides.

As a last effort for the public service the assembly authorize by
vote a loan, or voluntary subscription, of 10,000_l._ to be raised in
a fortnight, and refer the lenders to the next assembly for payment.

An apology for the length of this treatise; and a brief state of the
province at this period.

The new assembly, after a session of four days, suffered to adjourn
themselves without proceeding to business, for want of having the
intelligence then in the governor's hands in due form imparted to
them.

Being re-convoked, the governor informs them, that a party of French
and Indians had passed the mountains, and were encamped within
eight miles of the capital, and, after a liberal intermixture of
upbraidings and self-sufficiencies, demands a supply; premising, that
it might be raised by an emission of any sum in paper, provided funds
were found for sinking it in five years, &c.

A reference to the only act of parliament extant, and that an
ineffectual one, to prevent the oppressions practised by provincial
governors.

Politics of various kinds, and from various quarters, presented to
the assembly.

The assembly reduce and rectify the matter of alarm communicated by
the governor; and advise such measures as might reclaim the Indians,
&c.

A new message concerning the depredations of the Indians.

_Sixty thousand pounds_ granted, to be struck in bills of credit,
which were to be sunk by a tax of _six-pence_ in the pound; and a
poll-tax of _ten shillings_ a head, yearly, for four years; which the
governor refuses, and talks of _setting off_ for the back counties.

A new message, reporting, that the Susquehanna Indians had offered
their service to the province, provided it was accepted without delay.

Two messages from the assembly to the governor; the first concerning
peace with the Indians, and the money bill; the other an answer to
his concerning the Susquehanna Indians.

They send up a bill for regulating the Indian trade.

The famous Kentish petition to the house of commons, in 1701, outdone
by the mayor of Philadelphia, and one hundred and thirty three other
inconsiderates, in a demand on their assembly to constitute a militia
forthwith.

A petition of certain of the people called Quakers, for peaceable
measures.

Progress of the controversy concerning the bill, which the governor
offers to pass with a suspending clause.

Resolutions of the assembly hereupon.

Message from the governor concerning another Indian massacre, and
demanding an immediate supply, &c.

Another from the assembly to him, justifying their bill both in
matter and manner.

They send him up a militia bill.

The governor's invective against their whole conduct.

He passes the militia bill, under the specific declaration that it
was an improper one.

He communicates to the assembly a discussion of Indian affairs, as
prepared by his council; calls upon them to provide for a swarm
of French banished out of Nova Scotia; and signifies, that the
proprietaries had sent an order upon their receiver-general, for
5000_l._ as a free gift to the public.

Another remonstrance from the mayor of Philadelphia and his posse.

The assembly's reply to the governor's invective, which for the
present they declined making use of.

The answer they did make use of.

Parley between the speaker and twenty-nine petitioners, or rather
prescribers to the assembly.

Unanimous resolutions concerning the right of granting supplies to
the crown; and a new money bill, out of which the proprietary estate
was excepted, in consideration of the late grant of 5000_l._

The assembly's message to the governor, explaining the use and
pressing the dispatch of the Indian trade bill.

The governor's evasive answer.

His message desiring the advice of the house.

The assembly's answer.

Their message relative to the complaint of the Shawanese Indians.

Their resolution concerning the Indian trade bill; also concerning
irregular and improper petitions.

They adjourn; and two months after re-assemble by special summons.

The governor's message on that occasion.

The message of the assembly in regard to the inlisting purchased
servants.

General Shirley's letter of acknowledgment for a voluntary present of
clothing sent by the province to his troops.

The assembly remind the governor of the Indian trade bill.

He returns it with amendments; as also their bill for extending the
excise.

They adhere to their bills and assign their reasons.

The governor goes to Newcastle and the assembly adjourn.

Sir William Johnson's treaty with the six nations laid before them at
their next meeting.

The governor appearing strongly inclined to involve the province in
a war with the Delawares and Shawanese, some of the people called
Quakers petition for specific measures.

The governor on the other hand alarms the house with an account of a
number of people coming in a body to make _demands_ upon them.

Their unanimity on that occasion.

The governor takes advantage of this incident to declare war against
the said two Indian nations.

He also demands farther supplies, and intimates, that certain
Indians, long subsisted by the province, were retiring in discontent,
&c.

The assembly's answer.

The return made by the governor.

The resolutions of the assembly concerning a plan of military
operations communicated to them by the governor.

They adjourn and are re-assembled.

The governor's message to them from a place called _Harris's Ferry_.

A petition of the association companies in Philadelphia, concerning
the insufficiency of the militia law.

The reply of the assembly to the governor's message, accompanied with
a bill for prohibiting provisions.

Another session, and two other messages from the governor, who was
still posted at Harris's Ferry.

A money bill ordered, but postponed on the receipt of intelligence
from Sir Charles Hardy and Sir William Johnson, that the Delawares
and Shawanese were disposed to renew their alliance.

The governor proclaims a suspension of arms.

The assemblies' message to him, in which they again press him to pass
the Indian trade bill; he promises to reconsider it; and a second
time calls upon them to make some (additional) provision for his
support.

Six members desire leave upon the adjournment to quit their seats,
and at the next session present a written paper to the house as a
testimonial thereof.

The resignation accepted and new writs issued.

The governor's message notifying the appointment of Lord Loudoun to
be commander in chief in America; as also the act of parliament for
raising a regiment of foreigners; recommending particularly, that the
masters of such indented servants as should engage in the service
might be indemnified; and that, as by the expiration of an act passed
in the Lower Counties, the Pensylvanian act, lately passed, would
expire also, they would prepare a proper bill for continuing the
embargo, &c.

The assembly's reply; in which they show, the governor had
invalidated the acts of all the other colonies by the law he had
passed in the Lower Counties.

Their message concerning the excise and Indian trade bills; and his
answer, that he would not recede from his amendments because of his
proprietary instruction.

The instruction itself.

A remark; and the resolution of the house on the said instruction.

An act for emitting 4000_l._ in bills of credit, on behalf of the
proprietaries, to supply so far the public occasions, till their
receiver-general should be enabled by his receipts to make good their
order.

An act, for striking and issuing the sum of 40,000_l._ for the king's
use, sent up to the governor.

His message concerning an attack to be apprehended from the Indians
about harvest time.

The assembly's answer.

A bill to permit the exportation of provisions for the king's
service, notwithstanding the act of prohibition.

The governor's evasive conduct in relation thereto.

The assembly apprise him, July 5, of their intention to adjourn till
August 2; and are told that he has no objection.

Notwithstanding which, he re-assembles them a fortnight afterwards,
in the midst of their harvest, under the pretence of continuing the
prohibition act.

Petition of the merchants in relation to the embargo.

The assembly's answer to the governor's message.

Another message to him concerning the preamble to the 4000_l._ bill
on behalf of the proprietaries.

The governor's answer.

He sends down another preamble, which is not relished; refuses to
pass the excise bill, and expunges the clause in the 40,000_l._ bill
for taxing the proprietary estate.

His message concerning Indian affairs, and the expence of conducting
them.

The assembly's answer.

The governor's reply.

A parting compliment from general Shirley to the province.

A new session, and the governor's message thereon.

The assembly's answer.

Governor Morris is superseded by governor Denny.

The governor complimented on his arrival.

The first speech a continuation of the old system.

The business of the assembly at a stand for a few days.

Their address; and message, requesting copies of his proprietary
instructions.

Certain of the said instructions communicated.

A short comment upon them.

A message to the governor.

The governor's answer.

A bill prepared for striking the sum of 60,000_l._ for the king's
use, to be sunk by an excise.

A conference on the said bill.

The assembly's answer to the governor's objections.

The governor's answer, signifying, that he _would not_ give his
assent to it.

Resolutions of the assembly after a _protest_ against the
_instructions_, and a _salvo_ for their own _rights_, to prepare a
new bill.

A new bill prepared and passed.

A brief apology for the conduct of the assembly on this occasion.

A remonstrance voted.

Conclusion; with a testimonial of commodore Sprag in behalf of the
assembly.


AN APPENDIX, containing sundry original papers relative to the
several points in controversy between the governors and assemblies of
Pensylvania, viz.

1. The representation of the assembly to the proprietaries,
requesting them to bear a proportionable part of Indian expences.

2. The proprietaries' answer; and assembly's remarks thereon.

3. A message from governor Morris, containing his additional
arguments to show the _unreasonableness_ of taxing the proprietary
estate for its defence, and in support of the restrictions he was
under in that respect.

4. The assembly's answer thereto.

5. The governor's reply.

6. The assembly's rejoinder.


  [Note. _In the above four messages great part of the points in
  dispute between the proprietaries and people of the province are
  fully litigated; and the perusal of them is necessary to those who
  would have a thorough knowledge of the controversy._]


7. The speaker of the Pensylvanian assembly's paper of authorities
relating to the rights of the commons over money-bills, and in
support of the 50,000_l._ bills passed by the assembly, so far as it
relates to the taxing the proprietary estate within that province.

8. Report of a committee of assembly on the proprietary
_instructions_ relative to _money-bills_; clearly demonstrating, that
though the proprietaries would at length appear to be willing to
have their estates taxed in common with other estates, yet that were
laws passed pursuant to these instructions, much the greatest part
of their estate would be exempted, and that the sums necessary to be
granted for his majesty's service in that province could not possibly
be raised thereby, &c. &c. _A paper of importance._

9. Mr. Thomas Penn's estimate of the _value_ of the proprietary
estate in Pensylvania, upwards of twenty years ago; with remarks
thereon, showing its prodigious increase since that time, the profits
arising to the HOUSE OF PENN from their Indian purchases, and the
huckstering manner in which they dispose of lands to the king's
subjects in that province.

10. A specimen of the anonymous abuses continually published against
the inhabitants of Pensylvania, by the proprietaries and their
agents, with Mr. W. Franklin's refutation thereof.

11. Some remarks on the conduct of the last and present governor,
with regard to their employing the provincial forces as _regulars_,
rather than as _rangers_; and showing the secret reason why that
province is at present without a _militia-law_, notwithstanding the
several bills which have been lately passed by the assembly for that
purpose.

12. An account of sundry sums of money paid by the province for his
majesty's service, _since the commencement of the present troubles in
America_.

13. An extract from an original letter of Mr. Logan, containing,
among other things, his opinion of the proprietary right to the
government of the three Delaware counties; and which serves to
account for the particular favour shown that government from time to
time.

FOOTNOTE:

[16] This is the title of an octavo volume, consisting of nearly
five hundred pages closely printed. It was written, as mentioned in
the preceding note, while Dr. Franklin was in England as agent for
the province of Pensylvania, to further the ends of his mission, by
removing the unfavourable impressions which had taken place to the
prejudice of the Pensylvanians: and "it must be confessed," as a
reviewer of the work observes, "they had in our author a most zealous
and able advocate. His sentiments are manly, liberal, and spirited;
his style close, nervous, and rhetorical. By a forcible display of
the oppressions his clients have sustained, he inclines us to pity
their condition; by an enumeration of their virtues he endeavours to
remove the idea, which many have entertained, of their unimportance,
and, abstracted from their consideration in a political light, they
claim our regard by reason of their own personal merits." Interesting
however as the controversy between the governors and the assembly
of Pensylvania may have been at the time, it is too little so now
to justify the insertion of so voluminous an account of it in the
present collection, and we shall content ourselves therefore with
extracting the dedication, preface, and contents. It is singular,
that neither the editor of Dr. Franklin's works, whom we have
designated by the letters B. V.; nor Dr. Stuber, the continuator of
his life, should have mentioned this publication. The work is indeed
anonymous, but it is so well known to have been Dr. Franklin's, that
in the common library catalogue of the British Museum it is ranked
under his name. _Editor._




  _The Interest of Great Britain considered, with Regard to her
  Colonies, and the Acquisitions of Canada and Guadaloupe[17]._

I have perused with no small pleasure the Letter addressed to Two
Great Men, and the Remarks on that letter. It is not merely from
the beauty, the force and perspicuity of expression, or the general
elegance of manner conspicuous in both pamphlets, that my pleasure
chiefly arises; it is rather from this, that I have lived to see
subjects of the greatest importance to this nation publicly discussed
without party views, or party heat, with decency and politeness, and
with no other warmth, than what a zeal for the honour and happiness
of our king and country may inspire; and this by writers, whose
understanding (however they may differ from each other) appears not
unequal to their candour and the uprightness of their intention.

But, as great abilities have not always the best information, there
are, I apprehend, in the Remarks, some opinions not well founded,
and some mistakes of so important a nature, as to render a few
observations on them necessary for the better information of the
public.

The author of the Letter, who must be every way best able to support
his own sentiments, will, I hope, excuse me, if I seem officiously
to interfere; when he considers, that the spirit of patriotism, like
other qualities good and bad, is catching; and that his long silence
since the Remarks appeared has made us despair of seeing the subject
farther discussed by his masterly hand. The ingenious and candid
remarker, too, who must have been misled himself before he employed
his skill and address to mislead others, will certainly, since he
declares he _aims at no seduction_[18], be disposed to excuse even
the weakest effort to prevent it.

And surely, if the general opinions that possess the minds of the
people may possibly be of consequence in public affairs, it must be
fit to set those opinions right. If there is danger, as the remarker
supposes, that "extravagant expectations" may embarrass "a virtuous
and able ministry," and "render the negotiation for peace a work of
infinite difficulty[19];" there is no less danger that expectations
too low, through want of proper information, may have a contrary
effect, may make even a virtuous and able ministry less anxious,
and less attentive to the obtaining points, in which the honour and
interest of the nation are essentially concerned; and the people less
hearty in supporting such a ministry and its measures.

The people of this nation are indeed respectable, not for their
numbers only, but for their understanding and their public spirit:
they manifest the first, by their universal approbation of the
late prudent and vigorous measures, and the confidence they so
justly repose in a wise and good prince, and an honest and able
administration; the latter they have demonstrated by the immense
supplies granted in parliament unanimously, and paid through the
whole kingdom with chearfulness. And since to this spirit and
these supplies our "victories and successes[20]" have in great
measure been owing, is it quite right, is it generous to say, with
the remarker, that the people "had no share in acquiring them?"
The mere mob he cannot mean, even where he speaks of the madness
of the people; for the madness of the mob must be too feeble and
impotent, armed as the government of this country at present is, to
"overrule[21]," even in the slightest instances, the virtue "and
moderation" of a firm and steady ministry.

While the war continues, its final event is quite uncertain. The
victorious of this year may be the vanquished of the next. It may
therefore be too early to say, what advantages we ought absolutely
to insist on, and make the _sine quibus non_ of a peace. If the
necessity of our affairs should oblige us to accept of terms less
advantageous than our present successes seem to promise us; an
intelligent people, as ours is, must see that necessity, and will
acquiesce. But as a peace, when it is made, may be made hastily; and
as the unhappy continuance of the war affords us time to consider,
among several advantages gained or to be gained, which of them may
be most for our interest to retain, if some and not all may possibly
be retained; I do not blame the public disquisition of these points,
as premature or useless. Light often arises from a collision of
opinions, as fire from flint and steel; and if we can obtain the
benefit of the _light_, without danger from the _heat_ sometimes
produced by controversy, why should we discourage it?

Supposing then, that heaven may still continue to bless his majesty's
arms, and that the event of this just war may put it in our power
to retain some of our conquests at the making of a peace; let us
consider,

  [1. _The security of a dominion, a justifiable and prudent ground
  upon which to demand cessions from an enemy._]

_Whether we are_ to confine ourselves to those possessions only
_that were "the objects for which we began the war[22]."_ This the
remarker seems to think right, when the question relates to "_Canada,
properly so called_; it having never been mentioned as one of those
objects, in any of our memorials or declarations, or in any national
or public act whatsoever." But the gentleman himself will probably
agree, that if the cession of Canada would be a real advantage to
us; we may demand it under his second head, as an "_indemnification_
for the charges incurred" in recovering our just rights; otherwise,
according to his own principles, the demand of Guadaloupe can have no
foundation.--That "our claims before the war were large enough for
possession and for security too[23]," though it seems a clear point
with the ingenious remarker, is, I own, not so with me. I am rather
of the contrary opinion, and shall presently give my reasons.

But first let me observe, that we did not make those claims
because they were large enough for security, but because we could
rightfully claim no more. Advantages gained in the course of this
war may increase the extent of our rights. Our claims before
the war contained _some_ security; but that is no reason why we
should neglect acquiring _more_, when the demand of more is become
reasonable. It may be reasonable in the case of America, to ask for
the security recommended by the author of the Letter[24], though it
would be preposterous to do it in many other cases. His proposed
demand is founded on the little value of Canada to the French;
the right we have to ask, and the power we may have to insist on
an indemnification for our expences; the difficulty the French
themselves will be under of restraining their restless subjects in
America from encroaching on our limits and disturbing our trade; and
the difficulty on our parts of preventing encroachments, that may
possibly exist many years without coming to our knowledge.

But the remarker "does not see why the arguments, employed concerning
a security for a peaceable behaviour in Canada, would not be equally
cogent for calling for the same security in Europe[25]." On a
little farther reflection, he must I think be sensible, that the
circumstances of the two cases are widely different.--_Here_ we are
separated by the best and clearest of boundaries, the ocean, and we
have people in or near every part of our territory. Any attempt to
encroach upon us, by building a fort even in the obscurest corner of
these islands, must therefore be known and prevented immediately.
The aggressors also must be known, and the nation they belong to
would be accountable for their aggression. In America it is quite
otherwise. A vast wilderness, thinly or scarce at all peopled,
conceals with ease the march of troops and workmen. Important passes
may be seized within our limits, and forts built in a month, at a
small expence, that may cost us an age, and a million, to remove.
Dear experience has taught this. But what is still _worse_, the wide
extended forests between our settlements and theirs, are inhabited
by barbarous tribes of savages, that delight in war, and take pride
in murder; subjects properly neither of the French nor English,
but strongly attached to the former by the art and indefatigable
industry of priests, similarity of superstitions, and frequent family
alliances. These are easily, and have been continually, instigated
to fall upon and massacre our planters, even in times of full peace
between the two crowns; to the certain diminution of our people and
the contraction of our settlements[26]. And though it is known they
are supplied by the French, and carry their prisoners to them, we
can, by complaining, obtain no redress; as the governors of Canada
have a ready excuse, that the Indians are an independent people, over
whom they have no power, and for whose actions they are therefore not
accountable. Surely circumstances so widely different may reasonably
authorise different demands of security in America, from such as are
usual or necessary in Europe.

The remarker however thinks, that our real dependance for keeping
"France or any other nation true to her engagements, must not be in
demanding securities which no nation whilst _independent_ can give;
but on our own strength and our own vigilance[27]." No nation that
has carried on a war with disadvantage, and is unable to continue
it, can be said, under such circumstances, to be _independent_;
and while either side thinks itself in a condition to demand an
indemnification, there is no man in his senses, but will, cæteris
paribus, prefer an indemnification, that is a cheaper and more
effectual security than any other he can think of. Nations in this
situation demand and cede countries by almost every treaty of peace
that is made. The French part of the island of St. Christophers was
added to Great Britain in circumstances altogether similar to those
in which a few months may probably place the country of Canada.
Farther security has always been deemed a motive with a conqueror to
be less moderate; and even the _vanquished_ insist upon security as a
reason for demanding what they acknowledge they could not otherwise
properly ask. The security of the frontier of France _on the side
of the Netherlands_ was always considered in the negotiation, that
began at Gertrudenburgh, and ended with that war. For the same
reason they demanded and had Cape Breton. But a war, concluded to
the advantage of France, has always added something to the power,
either of France, or the house of Bourbon. Even that of 1733, which
she commenced with declarations of her having no ambitious views,
and which finished by a treaty, at which the ministers of France
repeatedly declared, that she desired nothing for herself, in effect
gained for her Lorrain, an indemnification ten times the value of
all her North American possessions. In short, security and quiet of
princes and states have ever been deemed sufficient reasons, when
supported by power, for disposing of rights; and such disposition
has never been looked on as want of moderation. It has always been
the foundation of the most general treaties. The security of Germany
was the argument for yielding considerable possessions there to the
Swedes: and the security of Europe divided the Spanish monarchy by
the partition-treaty, made between powers who had no other right
to dispose of any part of it. There can be no cession that is not
supposed at least, to increase the power of the party to whom it is
made. It is enough that he has a right to ask it, and that he does
it not merely to serve the purposes of a dangerous ambition.

Canada, in the hands of Britain, will endanger the kingdom of
France as little as any other cession; and from its situation and
circumstances cannot be hurtful to any other state. Rather, if
peace be an advantage, this cession may be such to all Europe. The
present war teaches us, that disputes arising in America may be an
occasion of embroiling nations; who have no concerns there. If the
French remain in Canada and Louisiana, fix the boundaries as you
will between us and them, we must border on each other for more
than fifteen hundred miles. The people that inhabit the frontiers
are generally the refuse of both nations, often of the worst morals
and the least discretion; remote from the eye, the prudence, and
the restraint of government. Injuries are therefore frequently, in
some part or other of so long a frontier, committed on both sides,
resentment provoked, the colonies first engaged, and then the mother
countries. And two great nations can scarce be at war in Europe,
but some other prince or state thinks it a convenient opportunity
to revive some ancient claim, seize some advantage, obtain some
territory, or enlarge some power at the expence of a neighbour. The
flames of war, once kindled, often spread far and wide, and the
mischief is infinite. Happy it proved to both nations, that the
Dutch were prevailed on finally to cede the New Netherlands (now
the province of New York) to us at the peace of 1674; a peace that
has ever since continued between us, but must have been frequently
disturbed, if they had retained the possession of that country,
bordering several hundred miles on our colonies of Pensylvania
westward, Connecticut and the Massachusetts eastward. Nor is it
to be wondered at, that people of different language, religion,
and manners, should in those remote parts engage in frequent
quarrels; when we find, that even the people of our _own colonies_
have frequently been so exasperated against _each other_, in their
disputes about boundaries, as to proceed to open violence and
bloodshed.

  [2. _Erecting forts in the back settlements, almost in no instance
  a sufficient security against the Indians and the French; but the
  possession of Canada implies every security, and ought to be had,
  while in our power._]

But the remarker thinks _we shall be_ sufficiently _secure in
America, if we "raise English forts at such passes as may at once
make us respectable to the French and to the Indian nations[28]."_
The security desirable in America may be considered as of three
kinds. 1. A security of possession, that the French shall not drive
us out of the country. 2. A security of our planters from the inroads
of savages, and the murders committed by them. 3. A security that
the British nation shall not be obliged, on every new war, to repeat
the immense expence occasioned by this, to defend its possessions in
America. Forts, in the most important passes, may, I acknowledge,
be of use to obtain the _first_ kind of security: but as those
situations are far advanced beyond the inhabitants, the expence of
maintaining and supplying the garrisons will be very great even in
time of full peace, and immense on every interruption of it; as it is
easy for skulking-parties of the enemy, in such long roads through
the woods, to intercept and cut off our convoys, unless guarded
continually by great bodies of men.--The _second_ kind of security
will not be obtained by such forts, unless they were connected by
a wall like that of China, from one end of our settlements to the
other. If the Indians, when at war, marched like the Europeans,
with great armies, heavy cannon, baggage, and carriages; the passes
through which alone such armies could penetrate our country, or
receive their supplies, being secured, all might be sufficiently
secure; but the case is widely different. They go to war, as they
call it, in small parties; from fifty men down to five. Their hunting
life has made them acquainted with the whole country, and scarce any
part of it is impracticable to such a party. They can travel through
the woods even by night, and know how to conceal their tracks. They
pass easily between your forts undiscovered; and privately approach
the settlements of your frontier inhabitants. They need no convoys
of provisions to follow them; for whether they are shifting from
place to place in the woods, or lying in wait for an opportunity to
strike a blow, every thicket and every stream furnishes so small
a number with sufficient subsistence. When they have surprised
separately, and murdered and scalped a dozen families, they are gone
with inconceivable expedition through unknown ways; and it is very
rare that pursuers have any chance of coming up with them[29]. In
short, long experience has taught our planters, that they cannot
rely upon forts as a security against Indians: the inhabitants of
Hackney might as well rely upon the tower of London, to secure them
against highwaymen and housebreakers.--As to the _third_ kind of
security, that we shall not, in a few years, have all we have now
done, to do over again in America, and be obliged to employ the same
number of troops, and ships, at the same immense expence, to defend
our possessions there, while we are in proportion weakened here: such
forts I think, cannot prevent this. During a peace, it is not to be
doubted the French, who are adroit at fortifying, will likewise erect
forts in the most advantageous places of the country we leave them;
which will make it more difficult than ever to be reduced in case of
another war. We know by the experience of this war, how extremely
difficult it is to march an army through the American woods, with its
necessary cannon and stores, sufficient to reduce a very slight fort.
The accounts at the treasury will tell you, what amazing sums we have
necessarily spent in the expeditions against two very trifling forts,
Duquesne, and Crown Point. While the French retain their influence
over the Indians, they can easily keep our long extended frontier
in continual alarm, by a very few of those people; and with a small
number of regulars and militia, in such a country, we find they can
keep an army of ours in full employ for several years. We therefore
shall not need to be told by our colonies, that if we leave Canada,
however circumscribed, to the French, "we have done nothing[30];" we
shall soon be made sensible _ourselves_ of this truth, and to our
cost.

I would not be understood to deny, that even if we subdue and
retain Canada, some _few forts_ may be of use to secure the goods
of the traders, and protect the commerce, in case of any sudden
misunderstanding with any tribe of Indians: but these forts will be
best under the care of the colonies interested in the Indian trade,
and garrisoned by their provincial forces, and at their own expence.
Their own interest will then induce the American governments to
take care of such forts in proportion to their importance, and see
that the officers keep their corps full, and mind their duty. But
any troops of ours placed there, and accountable here, would, in
such remote and obscure places, and at so great a distance from the
eye and inspection of superiors, soon become of little consequence,
even though the French were left in possession of Canada. If the
four independent companies, maintained by the crown in New York
more than forty years, at a great expence, consisted, for most part
of the time, of faggots chiefly; if their officers enjoyed their
places as sinecures, and were only, as a writer[31] of that country
styles them, a kind of military monks; if this was the state of
troops posted in a populous country, where the imposition could
not be so well concealed; what may we expect will be the case of
those, that shall be posted two, three, or four hundred miles from
the inhabitants, in such obscure and remote places as Crown Point,
Oswego, Duquesne, or Niagara? they would scarce be even faggots; they
would dwindle to mere names upon paper, and appear no where but upon
the muster-rolls.

Now _all the kinds_ of security we have mentioned are obtained
by subduing and _retaining_ Canada. Our present possessions in
America are secured; our planters will no longer be massacred by the
Indians, who, depending absolutely on us for what are now become the
necessaries of life to them (guns, powder, hatchets, knives, and
clothing) and having no other Europeans near, that can either supply
them, or instigate them against us; there is no doubt of their being
always disposed, if we treat them with common justice, to live in
perpetual peace with us. And with regard to France, she cannot, in
case of another war, put us to the immense expence of defending that
long extended frontier; we shall then, as it were, have our backs
against a wall in America; the sea coast will be easily protected by
our superior naval power: and here "our own watchfulness and our own
strength" will be properly, and cannot but be successfully employed.
In this situation, the force, now employed in that part of the world,
may be spared for any other service here or elsewhere; so that both
the offensive and defensive strength of the British empire, on the
whole, will be greatly increased.

But to leave the French in possession of Canada, _when it is in our
power to remove them, and depend_ (as the remarker proposes) _on
our own_ "strength and watchfulness[32]" _to prevent the mischiefs
that may attend it, seems neither safe nor prudent_. Happy as we now
are, under the best of kings, and in the prospect of a succession
promising every felicity a nation was ever blessed with; happy too in
the wisdom and vigour of every part of the administration; we cannot,
we ought not to promise ourselves the uninterrupted continuance of
those blessings. The safety of a considerable part of the state, and
the interest of the whole, are not to be trusted to the wisdom and
vigour of _future administrations_; when a security is to be had
more effectual, more constant, and much less expensive. They, who
can be moved by the apprehension of dangers so remote, as that of
the future independence of our colonies (a point I shall hereafter
consider) seem scarcely consistent with themselves, when they
suppose we may rely on the wisdom and vigour of an administration
for their safety.--I should indeed think it less material whether
Canada were ceded to us or not, if I had in view only the security
of _possession_ in our colonies. I entirely agree with the remarker,
that we are in North America "a far greater continental as well
as naval power;" and that only cowardice or ignorance can subject
our colonies there to a French conquest. But for the same reason I
disagree with him widely upon another point.

  [3. _The blood and treasure spent in the American wars, not spent
  in the cause of the colonies alone._]

I do not think, that our "blood and treasure has been expended," as
he intimates, "_in the cause of the colonies_," and that we are
"making conquests for _them_[33];" yet I believe this is too common
an error. I do not say, they are altogether unconcerned in the event.
The inhabitants of them are, in common with the other subjects of
Great Britain, anxious for the glory of her crown, the extent of
her power and commerce, the welfare and future repose of the whole
British people. They could not therefore but take a large share in
the affronts offered to Britain; and have been animated with a truly
British spirit to exert themselves beyond their strength, and against
their evident interest. Yet so unfortunate have they been, that their
virtue has made against them; for upon no better foundation than this
have they been supposed the authors of a war, carried on for their
advantage only. It is a great mistake to imagine, that the American
country in question between Great Britain and France is claimed as
the property of any _individuals or public body in America_; or that
the possession of it by Great Britain is likely, in any lucrative
view, to redound at all to the advantage of any person there.
On the other hand, the bulk of the inhabitants of North America
are _land-owners_, whose lands are inferior in value to those of
Britain, only by the want of an equal number of people. It is true,
the accession of the large territory claimed before the war began
(especially if that be secured by the possession of Canada) will
tend to the increase of the British subjects faster, than if they
had been confined within the mountains: yet the increase within the
mountains only would evidently make the comparative population equal
to that of Great Britain much sooner than it can be expected, when
our people are spread over a country six times as large. I think this
is the only point of light in which this question is to be viewed,
and is the only one in which any of the colonies are concerned.--No
colony, no possessor of lands in any colony, therefore wishes for
conquests, or can be benefitted by them, otherwise than as they may
be a means of _securing peace on their borders_. No considerable
advantage has resulted to the colonies by the conquests of this
war, or can result from confirming them by the peace, but what they
must enjoy in common with the rest of the British people; with this
evident drawback from their share of these advantages, that they will
necessarily lessen, or at least prevent the increase of the value of
what makes the principal part of their private property [their land].
A people, spread through the whole tract of country on this side
the Mississippi, and secured by Canada in our hands, would probably
for some centuries find employment in agriculture, and thereby free
us at home effectually from our fears of American manufactures.
Unprejudiced men well know, that all the penal and prohibitory
laws that ever were thought on will not be sufficient to prevent
manufactures in a country, whose inhabitants surpass the number that
can subsist by the husbandry of it. That this will be the case in
America soon, if our people remain confined within the mountains, and
almost as soon should it be unsafe for them to live beyond, though
the country be ceded to us, no man acquainted with political and
commercial history can doubt. Manufactures are founded in poverty:
it is the multitude of poor without land in a country, and who must
work for others at low wages or starve, that enables undertakers to
carry on a manufacture, and afford it cheap enough to prevent the
importation of the same kind from abroad, and to bear the expence of
its own exportation.--But no man, who can have a piece of land of
his own, sufficient by his labour to subsist his family in plenty,
is poor enough to be a manufacturer, and work for a master. Hence,
while there is land enough in America for our people, there can never
be manufactures to any amount or value. It is a striking observation
of a very _able pen_[34], that the natural livelihood of the thin
inhabitants of a forest country is hunting; that of a greater number,
pasturage: that of a middling population, agriculture; and that of
the greatest, manufactures; which last must subsist the bulk of the
people in a full country, or they must be subsisted by charity, or
perish. The extended population, therefore, that is most advantageous
to Great Britain, will be best effected, because only effectually
secured, by our possession of Canada.

So far as the _being_ of our present colonies in North America is
concerned, I think indeed with the remarker, that the French there
are not _"an enemy to be apprehended[35];"_--but the expression is
too vague to be applicable to the present, or indeed to any other
case. Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, unequal as they are to this nation
in power and numbers of people, are enemies to be still apprehended;
and the Highlanders of Scotland have been so for many ages, by the
greatest princes of Scotland and Britain. The wild Irish were able
to give a great deal of disturbance even to Queen Elizabeth, and
cost her more blood and treasure than her war with Spain. Canada, in
the hands of France, has always stinted the growth of our colonies,
in the course of this war, and indeed before it, has disturbed
and vexed even the best and strongest of them; has found means to
murder thousands of their people, and unsettle a great part of their
country. Much more able will it be to starve the growth of an infant
settlement. Canada has also found means to make this nation spend two
or three millions a year in America; and a people, how small soever,
that in their present situation, can do this as often as we have a
war with them, is, methinks, "an enemy to be apprehended."

Our North American colonies are to be considered as the _frontier
of the British empire_ on that side. The frontier of any dominion
being attacked, it becomes not merely "the cause" of the people
immediately attacked (the inhabitants of that frontier) but properly
"the cause" of the whole body. Where the frontier people owe and
pay obedience, there they have a right to look for protection:
no political proposition is better established than this. It is
therefore invidious, to represent the "blood and treasure" spent in
this war, as spent in "the cause of the colonies" only; and that they
are "absurd and ungrateful," if they think we have done nothing,
unless we "make conquests for them," and reduce Canada to gratify
their "vain ambition," &c. It will not be a conquest for _them_,
nor gratify any vain ambition of theirs. It will be a conquest for
the _whole_; and all our people will, in the increase of trade, and
the ease of taxes, find the advantage of it. Should we be obliged
at any time, to make a war for the protection of our commerce, and
to secure the exportation of our manufactures, would it be fair to
represent such a war, merely as blood and treasure spent in the
cause of the weavers of Yorkshire, Norwich, or the West; the cutlers
of Sheffield, or the button-makers of Birmingham? I hope it will
appear before I end these sheets, that if ever there was a national
war, this is truly such a one: a war in which the interest of the
whole nation is directly and fundamentally concerned. Those, who
would be thought deeply skilled in human nature, affect to discover
self-interested views every where at the bottom of the fairest, the
most generous conduct. Suspicions and charges of this kind meet
with ready reception and belief in the minds even of the multitude,
and therefore less acuteness and address, than the remarker is
possessed of, would be sufficient to persuade the nation generally,
that all the zeal and spirit, manifested and exerted by the colonies
in this war, was only in "their own cause," to "make conquests for
themselves," to engage us to make more for them, to gratify their own
"vain ambition."

But should they now humbly address the mother-country in the terms
and the sentiments of the remarker; return her their grateful
acknowledgments for the blood and treasure she had spent in "their
cause;" confess that enough had not been done "for them;" allow that
"English forts, raised in proper passes, will, with the wisdom and
vigour of her administration," be a sufficient future protection;
express their desires that their people may be confined within
the mountains, lest [if] they are suffered to spread and extend
themselves in the fertile and pleasant country on the other side,
they should "increase infinitely from all causes," "live wholly
on their own labour" and become independent; beg therefore that
the French may be suffered to remain in possession of Canada, as
their neighbourhood may be useful to prevent our increase, and the
removing them may "in its consequences be even dangerous[36]:"--I
say, should such an address from the colonies make its appearance
here (though, according to the remarker, it would be a most just
and reasonable one) would it not, might it not with more justice
be answered:--We understand you, gentlemen, perfectly well: you
have only your own interest in view: you want to have the people
confined within your present limits, that in a few years the lands
you are possessed of may increase tenfold in value! you want to
reduce the price of labour, by increasing numbers on the same
territory, that you may be able to set up manufactures and vie with
your mother-country! you would have your people kept in a body,
that you may be more able to dispute the commands of the crown, and
obtain an independency. You would have the French left in Canada, to
exercise your military virtue, and make you a warlike people, that
you may have more confidence to embark in schemes of disobedience,
and greater ability to support them! You have tasted too, the sweets
of TWO OR THREE MILLIONS sterling per annum spent among you by our
fleets and forces, and you are unwilling to be without a pretence
for kindling up another war, and thereby occasioning a repetition of
the same delightful doses! But, gentlemen, allow us to understand
_our_ interest a little likewise: we shall remove the French from
Canada, that you may live in peace, and we be no more drained by your
quarrels. You shall have land enough to cultivate, that you may have
neither necessity nor inclination to go into manufactures; and we
will manufacture for you, and govern you.

A reader of the Remarks may be apt to say, if this writer would
have us restore Canada, on principles of moderation, how can we,
consistent with those principles, retain Guadaloupe, which he
represents of so much greater value!--I will endeavour to explain
this, because by doing it I shall have an opportunity of showing the
truth and good sense of the answer to the interested application I
have just supposed: The author then is only apparently and not really
inconsistent with himself. If we can obtain the credit of moderation
by restoring Canada, it is well: but we should, however, restore it
at _all events_; because it would not only be of no use to us; but
"the possession of it (in his opinion) may in its consequences be
dangerous[37]." As how? Why, plainly, (at length it comes out) if the
French are not left there to check the growth of our colonies, "they
will extend themselves almost without bounds into the inland parts,
and increase infinitely from all causes; becoming a numerous, hardy,
independent people; possessed of a strong country, communicating
little or not at all with England, living wholly on their own labour,
and in process of time knowing little and enquiring little about the
mother-country." In short, according to this writer, our present
colonies are large enough and numerous enough; and the French ought
to be left in North America to prevent their increase, lest they
become not only useless, but dangerous to Britain. I agree with the
Gentleman, that with Canada in our possession, our people in America
will increase amazingly. I know, that their common rate of increase,
where they are not molested by the enemy, is doubling their numbers
every twenty-five years, by natural generation only; exclusive of the
accession of foreigners[38]. I think this increase continuing would
probably, in a century more, make the number of British subjects on
that side the water more numerous than they now are on this; But,

  [4. _Not necessary that the American colonies should_ cease being
  useful to the _mother-country_. _Their_ preference _over the
  West-Indian colonies stated_.]

_I am far from entertaining on that account, any fears of their
becoming either useless or dangerous to us; and I look on those fears
to be merely imaginary, and without any probable foundation._--The
remarker is reserved in giving his reasons; as in his opinion this
"is not a fit subject for discussion."--I shall give mine, because
I conceive it a subject necessary to be discussed; and the rather,
as those fears, how groundless and chimerical soever, may, by
possessing the multitude, possibly induce the ablest ministry to
conform to them against their own judgment; and thereby prevent the
assuring to the British name and nation a stability and permanency,
that no man acquainted with history durst have hoped for, till our
American possessions opened the pleasing prospect. The remarker
thinks, that our people in America, "finding no check from Canada,
would extend themselves almost without bounds into the inland parts,
and increase infinitely from all causes." The very reason he assigns
for their so extending, and which is indeed the true one (their
being "invited to it by the pleasantness, fertility, and plenty of
the country,") may satisfy us, that this extension will continue to
proceed, as long as there remains any pleasant fertile country within
their reach. And if we even suppose them confined by the waters
of the Mississippi westward, and by those of St. Laurence and the
lakes to the northward; yet still we shall leave them room enough
to increase, even in the manner of settling now practised there,
till they amount to perhaps a hundred millions of souls. This must
take some centuries to fulfil: and in the _mean time_, this nation
must necessarily supply them with the manufactures they consume;
because the new settlers will be employed in agriculture; and the
new settlements will so continually draw off the spare hands from
the old, that our present colonies will not, during the period we
have mentioned, find themselves in a condition to manufacture, even
for their own inhabitants, to any considerable degree, much less for
those who are settling behind them.

Thus our trade must, till that country becomes as fully peopled as
England (that is for centuries to come) be continually increasing,
and with it our naval power; because the ocean is between us
and them, and our ships and seamen must increase as that trade
increases.--The human body and the political differ in this;
that the first is limited by nature to a certain stature, which,
when attained, it cannot ordinarily exceed: the other, by better
government and more prudent police, as well as by change of manners
and other circumstances, often takes fresh starts of growth, after
being long at a stand; and may add tenfold to the dimensions it
had for ages been confined to. The mother, being of full stature,
is in a few years equalled by a growing daughter: but in the case
of a mother-country and her colonies, it is quite different. The
growth of the children tends to increase the growth of the mother,
and so the difference and superiority is longer preserved. Were the
inhabitants of this island limited to their present number by any
thing in nature, or by unchangeable circumstances, the equality
of population between the two countries might indeed sooner come
to pass: but sure experience, in those parts of the island where
manufactures have been introduced, teaches us; that people increase
and multiply in proportion as the means and facility of gaining a
livelihood increase; and that this island, if they could be employed,
is capable of supporting ten times its present number of people. In
proportion, therefore, as the demand increases for the manufactures
of Britain, by the increase of people in her colonies, the number
of her people at home will increase; and with them, the strength as
well as the wealth of the nation. For satisfaction in this point, let
the reader compare in his mind the number and force of our present
fleets, with our fleet in Queen Elizabeth's time[39], before we had
colonies. Let him compare the ancient, with the present state of our
towns on or near our western coast (Manchester, Liverpool, Kendal,
Lancaster, Glasgow, and the countries round them) that trade with
any manufacture for our colonies (not to mention Leeds, Halifax,
Sheffield, and Birmingham,) and consider what a difference there is
in the numbers of people, buildings, rents, and the value of land
and of the produce of land; even if he goes back no farther than is
within man's memory. Let him compare those countries with others on
the same island, where manufactures have not yet extended themselves;
observe the present difference, and reflect how much greater our
strength may be (if numbers give strength) when our manufacturers
shall occupy every part of the island where they can possibly be
subsisted.

But, say the objectors, "there is a _certain distance from the
sea_, in America, beyond which the expence of carriage will put a
stop to the sale and consumption of your manufactures; and this,
with the difficulty of making returns for them, will oblige the
inhabitants to manufacture for themselves; of course, if you suffer
your people to extend their settlements beyond that distance, your
people become useless to you:" and this distance is limited by some
to two hundred miles, by others to the Apalachian mountains.--Not
to insist on a very plain truth, that no part of a dominion, from
whence a government may on occasion draw supplies and aids both of
men and money (though at too great a distance to be supplied with
manufactures from some other part) is therefore to be deemed useless
to the whole; I shall endeavour to show, that these imaginary limits
of utility, even in point of commerce, are much too narrow. The
inland parts of the continent of Europe are farther from the sea,
than the limits of settlement proposed for America. Germany is full
of tradesmen and artificers of all kinds, and the governments there
are not all of them always favourable to the commerce of Britain; yet
it is a well-known fact, that our manufactures find their way even
into the heart of Germany. Ask the great manufacturers and merchants
of the Leeds, Sheffield, Birmingham, Manchester, and Norwich
goods; and they will tell you, that some of them send their riders
frequently through France or Spain, and Italy, up to Vienna, and back
through the middle and northern parts of Germany, to show samples of
their wares, and collect orders, which they receive by almost every
mail, to a vast amount. Whatever charges arise on the carriage of
goods are added to the value, and all paid by the consumer. If these
nations, over whom we have no government, over whose consumption
we can have no influence, but what arises from the cheapness and
goodness of our wares, whose trade, manufactures, or commercial
connections are not subject to the control of our laws, as those of
our colonies certainly are in some degree; I say, if these nations
purchase and consume such quantities of our goods, notwithstanding
the remoteness of their situation from the sea; how much less likely
is it, that the settlers in America, who must for ages be employed
in agriculture chiefly, should make cheaper for themselves the goods
our manufacturers at present supply them with: even if we suppose the
carriage five, six, or seven hundred miles from the sea as difficult
and expensive, as the like distance into Germany: whereas in the
latter, the natural distances are frequently doubled by political
obstructions; I mean the intermixed territories and clashing
interests of princes[40]. But when we consider, that the inland
parts of America are penetrated by great navigable rivers; that
there are a number of great lakes, communicating with each other,
with those rivers, and with the sea, very small portages here and
there excepted[41]; that the sea-coasts (if one may be allowed the
expression) of those lakes only amount at least to two thousand seven
hundred miles, exclusive of the rivers running into them (many of
which are navigable to a great extent for boats and canoes, through
vast tracts of country); how little likely is it that the expence on
the carriage of our goods into those countries should prevent the
use of them. If the poor Indians in those remote parts are now able
to pay for the linen, woollen, and iron wares they are at present
furnished with by the French and English traders (though Indians have
nothing but what they get by hunting, and the goods are loaded with
all the impositions fraud and knavery can contrive to inhance their
value) will not industrious English farmers, hereafter settled in
those countries, be much better able to pay for what shall be brought
them in the way of fair commerce?

If it is asked, _What_ can such farmers raise, wherewith to pay
for the manufactures they may want from us? I answer, that the
inland parts of America in question are well known to be fitted for
the production of hemp, flax, pot-ash, and above all, silk; the
southern parts may produce olive-oil, raisins, currants, indigo, and
cochineal. Not to mention horses and black cattle, which may easily
be driven to the maritime markets, and at the same time assist in
conveying other commodities. That the commodities first mentioned
may easily, by water and land-carriage, be brought to the sea-ports
from interior America, will not seem incredible, when we reflect,
that _hemp_ formerly came from the Ukraine and most southern parts of
Russia to Wologda, and down the Dwina to Archangel; and thence, by a
perilous navigation, round the North Cape to England, and other parts
of Europe. It now comes from the same country up the Dnieper, and
down the Duna[42], with much land-carriage. Great part of the Russia
_iron_, no high-priced commodity, is brought three hundred miles by
land and water from the heart of Siberia. _Furs_ [the produce too of
America] are brought to Amsterdam from all parts of Siberia, even
the most remote, Kamstchatka. The same country furnishes me with
another instance of extended inland commerce. It is found worth while
to keep up a mercantile communication between Pekin in China, and
Petersburgh. And none of these instances of inland commerce _exceed_
those of the courses by which, at several periods, _the whole trade
of the East_ was carried on. Before the prosperity of the Mameluke
dominion in Egypt fixed the staple for the riches of the East at
Cairo and Alexandria (whither they were brought from the Red Sea)
great part of those commodities were carried to the cities of Cashgar
and Balk. (This gave birth to those towns, that still subsist upon
the remains of their ancient opulence, amidst a people and country
equally wild.) From thence those goods were carried down the Amû (the
ancient Oxus) to the Caspian Sea, and up the Wolga to Astrachan; from
whence they were carried over to, and down the Don, to the mouth of
that river; and thence again the Venetians directly, and the Genoese
and Venetians indirectly (by way of Kaffa and Trebisonde) dispersed
them through the Mediterranean and some other parts of Europe.
Another part of those goods was carried over-land from the Wolga to
the rivers Duna and Neva; from both they were carried to the city
of Wisbuy in the Baltic (so eminent for its sea-laws); and from the
city of Ladoga on the Neva, we are told they were even carried by the
Dwina to Archangel; and from thence round the North Cape.--If iron
and hemp will bear the charge of carriage from this inland country,
_other metals_ will, as well as iron; and certainly _silk_, since
3_d._ per _lb._ is not above 1 per cent on the value, and amounts to
28_l._ per ton. If the _growths_ of a country find their way out of
it; the _manufactures_ of the country where they go will infallibly
find their way into it.

They, who understand the economy and principles of manufactures,
know, that it is impossible to establish them in places not populous:
and even in those that are populous, hardly possible to establish
them to the prejudices of the places _already in possession of them_.
Several attempts have been made in France and Spain, countenanced by
the government, to draw from us, and establish in those countries,
our hard-ware and woollen manufactures; but without success. The
reasons are various. A manufacture is part of a great system of
commerce, which takes in conveniencies of various kinds; methods
of providing materials of all sorts, machines for expediting and
facilitating labour, all the channels of correspondence for vending
the wares, the credit and confidence necessary to found and support
this correspondence, the mutual aid of different artizans, and a
thousand other particulars, which time and long experience have
_gradually_ established. A part of such a system cannot support
itself without the whole: and before the whole can be obtained the
part perishes. Manufactures, where they are in perfection, are
carried on by a multiplicity of hands, each of which is expert only
in his own pa

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