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On the Ethics of Naturalism

by W. R. Sorley · English · public domain in the US

  • Language English
  • PG edition 2015
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Contents

    On the Ethics of Naturalism by W. R. Sorley is an English public-domain text held from Project Gutenberg (ebook #48027). A catalog of publications was included at the end of the text.

    PAGE

    1. Connection of ethics with theoretical philosophy, 1

    (a) Dependence of ethical on theoretical points of view, 1
    (b) Ethics necessary to complete philosophy, 3
    2. The inquiry into the ethical end, 5
    (a) Fundamental, 5
    (b) Implies a new point of view, 7
    (c) Distinct from other ethical questions, 9
    (α) From the inquiry into the methods of ethics, 10
    (β) From moral psychology and sociology, 13
    3.

    Scope of the present inquiry, 14

    PART I.

    THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.

    CHAPTER II.

    EGOISM.

    Definition of Naturalism, 20
    Psychological hedonism, 21
    1. Its theory of action ambiguous, 22
    Referring to--
    (a) Actual consequences of action, 23
    (b) Or its expected consequences, 23
    (c) Or its present characteristics, 24
    2. Ethical inferences from this theory, 25
    3. Transition from psychological to ethical hedonism, 31
    4.

    Possible objections considered, 37

    CHAPTER III.

    THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM.

    1. Difference of the standpoints of individual and State, 41
    2. Connection between egoism and utilitarianism according to Bentham, 45

    (a) Utilitarianism not a political duty, 46
    (b) Nor a moral duty, 47
    (c) Nor insisted on as a religious duty, 49
    (d) Nor sufficiently motived in private ethics, 50
    3.

    Exhaustive character of Bentham's treatment from his point of
    view, 51
    (a) The religious sanction (Paley), 53
    (b) Limits of the political sanction, 54
    (c) Uncertainty of the social sanction, 55
    (d) And of the internal sanction so far as a result of the
    social, 56
    4.

    Mill's logical defence of utilitarianism, 57
    (a) Distinction of kinds of pleasure, 58
    (b) Ambiguities in his proof, 60
    5. Actual transition to utilitarianism, 62
    (a) Recognition of sympathy, 64
    (b) The idea of equality, 69
    6. The two sides of utilitarian theory without logical connection, 73
    7. Summary of the ethical consequences of psychological hedonism, 75

    CHAPTER IV.

    MORAL SENTIMENT.

    1. A uniform psychological theory not supplied by the opponents of

    ethical hedonism, 78
    2. The non-hedonistic theory of action, 84
    3. Ethics made to depend on the moral sense, 89
    (a) As harmony of impulses, 90
    (b) As a separate sensitive faculty, 92
    (c) As an internal law, 100
    4. The ethics of moral sentiment a mediating theory, 105

    PART II.

    THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

    CHAPTER V.

    THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY.

    1. General characteristics of the theory of evolution, 107

    An assertion of the unity of life, 109
    Primarily historical, but capable of ethical application, 110
    2. The development of morality, 116
    (a) Historical psychology, 116
    Its difficulties, 117
    Its result, 123
    (b) Development of society, 124

    CHAPTER VI.

    EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES.

    Bearing of the theory of evolution, 126
    1. On theories depending on moral sentiment or intuition, 127
    (a) Ethical value of moral sentiments affected by their
    origin, 130
    (b) Organic character of moral sentiments, 132
    Resultant attitude of evolutionism to intuitionism, 133
    2.

    On egoism: relation of egoism to altruism, 134
    (a) Social nature of the individual, 135
    (b) Limits to conciliation of egoism and altruism, 141
    (α) Continued existence of competition, 142
    (β) Different and conflicting degrees of altruism, 143
    (γ) Altruism of interest and altruism of motive, 143
    (δ) Weakness of altruistic feelings, 146
    (c) Tendency of evolution opposed to egoism, 148
    Evolution not the basis of psychological hedonism, 148
    Nor of ethical hedonism, 150
    3.

    On utilitarianism, 152
    Modification of the utilitarian method, 153
    And of its principle, 155
    Evolutionist objections to utilitarianism, 155
    (a) As prescribing an unprogressive ideal, 156
    (b) As a theory of consequences, 160
    (c) As related solely to sensibility, 161

    CHAPTER VII.

    HEDONISM AND EVOLUTIONISM.

    1. Alliance of evolutionism and hedonism, 164

    (a) From interpreting greatest happiness by the laws of
    life, 164
    (b) From interpreting life by pleasure, 165
    2. Evolutionist argument for concomitance of life and pleasure, 167
    3.

    Objections to this argument, 168
    (a) That life cannot bring more pleasure than pain, 169
    (α) From the negative nature of pleasure, 171
    (β) From the facts of human life, 172
    (b) That the evolution of life does not uniformly tend to
    pleasure, 172
    (α) Incompleteness of the evolutionist argument, 173
    (β) The pessimist doctrine that life tends to misery, 175
    (aa) The hypothesis of the unconscious, 176
    (bb) The nature of volition, 177
    (cc) The facts of human progress, 179
    Individual progress, 179
    Social progress, 181
    4.

    The psychological analysis of pleasure and pain in relation
    to evolutionist ethics, 186
    (a) The subjective nature of pleasure and pain, 187
    (b) The conditions of pleasure and pain, 190
    (c) Application of the theory of evolution, 197

    CHAPTER VIII.

    THE EVOLUTIONIST END.

    Necessity of inquiring into the ethical end suggested by the theory
    of evolution, 201
    1.

    Adaptation to environment, 203
    (a) As the end for present conduct, 207
    Opposed to progress, 207
    Does not fully represent evolution, 209
    (b) As describing the ultimate condition of life, 210
    Resultant absolute code, 211
    (α) Abstract principles of social relation, 212
    (β) Personal end only defined as adaptation, 213
    (γ) Cannot be shown to lead to happiness, 213
    (c) Insufficiency of adaptation as evolutionist end, 217
    2.

    End suggested by the tendency to variation, 221
    (a) Prescribes self-development rather than self-preservation, 222
    (b) Standard for measuring development found in complexity
    of act and motive, 227
    (α) Antinomy between social and individual ends, 231
    (β) Psychological defects, 232
    3.

    Development or increase of life as the end, 236
    (a) Subjective standard: most persistent impulses, 242
    Cannot define life without an objective standard, 244
    (b) Objective standard: defined in two ways, 247
    (α) Conformity to the type, 248
    Which can be reduced to--
    (β) Abundance and variety of vital power, 251
    That is, to the subjective standard, 253
    Summary as to the evolutionist end, 256
    (a) Difficulty of reconciling individual and social ends, 256
    (b) Hedonistic interpretation of evolution not possible, 257
    (c) No independent ethical ideal, 259

    CHAPTER IX.

    ON THE BASIS OF ETHICS.

    1. Principles involved in theory of evolution, 263
    2. Unsuccessful application of these principles to ethics, 264

    (a) The principles being treated empirically, 265
    (b) No logical transition having been effected from efficient
    to final cause, 267
    3. Difference between causality and teleology, 269
    4. Reference to self-consciousness implied in evolution, 277
    (a) Attempt to trace the genesis of self-consciousness, 278
    (b) Attempt to trace morality from reflex action, 283
    5.

    The unity of self-consciousness, 284
    (a) As making possible the transition from knowledge to
    morality, 284
    (b) As determining the character of the ethical end, 286
    (c) As showing that the realisation of the end must be
    progressive, 291

    THE ETHICS OF NATURALISM.

    CHAPTER I.

    ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.

    [Sidenote: 1. Connection of ethics with theoretical philosophy.]

    [Sidenote: (a) Dependence of ethical on theoretical points of view]

    [Sidenote: (a) teleological,]

    [Sidenote: (b) jural,]

    [Sidenote: (c) empirical:]

    It is a common remark that a writer's ethical doctrine is throughout conditioned by his attitude to the problems of theoretical philosophy. The main lines of dispute in questions of ethics may be regarded as prolongations of the controversies which arise in metaphysics and psychology. The Realism or Idealism which marks a speculative system reappears in its ethics, whilst differences in the psychological analysis of mental states, or concerning the relation of pleasure to desire, are grounds of distinction between schools of moralists.

    And not only are the special controversies of ethics decided in different ways, but the scope of the whole science is differently conceived, as the speculative standpoint changes. Thus, not for one school only, but for a whole period in the history of reflection, ethics was regarded as an inquiry into the highest human good. Opposed schools agreed in looking from this point of view, however much they might differ from one another in defining the nature of that highest good.

    At other times, according to the prevailing view, to investigate and systematise the rules of conduct has exhausted the scope of ethics--controversies being carried on as to the nature of those rules, and their source in external authority or in the internal revelation of conscience.

    Again, ethical inquiry has been apparently identified with the analysis and history of the moral affections and sentiments; while a purely external point of view seems to be sometimes adopted, and ethics held to be an investigation of the historical results of action, and of the forms, customary and institutional, in which those results find permanent expression.

    [Sidenote: to be connected by philosophy.]

    These different ways of looking at the whole subject proceed from points of view whose effects are not confined to ethics, but may be followed out in other lines of investigation. They correspond to ideas which dominate different types of thought and form different philosophical standpoints. The first starts from a teleological conception of human nature, as an organism consciously striving towards its end. The second assimilates ethics to a system of legal enactments, and is connected with the jural conceptions of theology and law.

    The two last are concerned to show that the subject-matter of ethics are facts which have to be treated by the ordinary inductive and historical methods. These different points of view, however, are to be regarded as complementary rather than as conflicting, although their complete synthesis must be worked out in the region of general philosophy, and not on purely ethical ground.

    Philosophy has thus to deal with the notions which determine the scope and character of ethical thought; and in this way it must necessarily pass from the purely speculative to the practical point of view. If it is the business of philosophy to bring into rational order the material supplied by experience, cosmical and anthropological, it cannot be without bearing on the function of man as a source of action in the world.

    The question, What are the ends man is naturally fitted to attain? or--if we prefer so to express it--What are the ends he ought to pursue? is not merely as natural as the question, What can a man know of the world and of himself?

    But the two questions are inseparably connected. To know man is to know him not only as a thinking but also as an active being; while to solve the problem of the ends of man implies knowledge both of his nature and of the sphere of his activity.

    [Sidenote: (b) Ethics necessary to complete philosophy.]

    Much distrust is often expressed of metaphysics. But it is not denied that the philosophy--whether metaphysical or not--in which our most comprehensive view of the world finds its reasoned expression, cannot neglect that aspect of things in which man is related to his surroundings as a source of action. Recent ethical literature is itself a proof of this fact.

    In its speculative developments, both realistic and idealistic, the philosophy of the present day has made the endeavour to connect its conceptions of the world of thought and nature with the ends contemplated as to be realised in the realm of action. Whatever difficulties may be involved in the transition from the "is" to the "ought to be," it is yet implied that the transition requires to be made, not merely in order that human activity may be shown to be rational, but that reason itself may be justified by leaving nothing outside its sphere.

    We must make no attempt, therefore, to draw a line of absolute separation between the first two of the three questions in which, as Kant says,[1] all the interests of our reason centre. The "What ought I to do?" of ethics is for ever falling back on the "What can I know?" of metaphysics. The question of practice must accordingly be treated throughout in connection with the question of knowledge.

    If we use Kant's distinction between speculative and practical reason, we must always bear in mind that it is the same reason which is in one reference speculative, in another practical.[2] We are not at liberty to assume with Butler[3] that "morality ... must be somewhat plain and easy to be understood: it must appeal to what we call common-sense." Nor may we presuppose, as Hutcheson did,[4] that it is a subject "about which a little reflection will discover the truth."

    The question must be looked upon not so much as one of immediate practical as of scientific interest, and reason is to be regarded as the only court of appeal.

    [Sidenote: 2. The inquiry into the ethical end]

    [Sidenote: (a) fundamental,]

    The form just quoted, in which Kant states the problem, is not altogether free from ambiguity. "What ought I to do?" may be taken to signify, What means should I adopt for the attainment of some end presupposed, perhaps unconsciously, as the end to be sought? But it is evident, not only that this is not what Kant himself meant by the question, but that, as thus put, it necessarily implies a further and deeper question.

    Not the discovery of the means, but the determination of the end itself--the end which cannot be interpreted as a mere means to some further end--is the fundamental question of ethics. It is only by misconception that this can be thought to be a trivial question. To say, as a recent scientific writer does,[5] "that happiness in one disguise or another is the end of human life is common ground for all the schools," is either to ignore what the schools have taught,[6] or else to use the word "happiness" merely as another name for the highest good.

    But, even were it still the case, as it was in the time of Aristotle, that nearly all men were agreed as to the name of the highest good, and that the common people and the cultured alike called it happiness, the difference as to what they meant by the term would still remain. To say that the ethical end is happiness is, to use Locke's terminology, a "trifling proposition"; for in so doing we merely give it a name[7]--and one which the controversies of philosophy have surrounded with confusion.

    That the end is happiness in any definite sense, for example, as the greatest balance of pleasure over pain, may be perfectly true, but stands very much in need of proof. That happiness is the highest ethical end can be assumed as true only when "happiness" is nothing more than an abbreviated expression for "the highest ethical end."

    [Sidenote: (b) implies a new point of view,]

    A difficulty of a more radical kind meets us, at the very outset of our inquiry, in the distinctively ethical notion expressed by the word "ought." Various attempts have been made to surmount or circumvent this difficulty; and some of these will come under consideration in the sequel. The very notion of conscious activity contains the idea of bringing about something which does not yet exist. It involves a purpose or end.

    The notion "ought," it is true, means more than this: it implies an obligation to pursue a definite end or conform to definite rules, regarded generally as coming from an authoritative source. In this clear and full sense, "oughtness" or duty is a comparatively recent notion, foreign to the classical period of Greek ethics. The force and definiteness belonging to the modern conception of it are due to the juridical aspect which the Stoic philosophy, Roman law, and Christian theology combined to impress upon morality.

    But even the notion of purpose or end implies a "preference" of the end sought: the state to be realised is looked upon as "better" or "more to be desired" than the existing state.

    We may ask for the reason of this superior desirableness; but the answer must soon fall back upon the assertion of something held to be desirable in itself. The question which we are always asking, and cannot help asking, "Why is such and such an end to be pursued by me?" or "Why ought I to follow such and such a course of conduct?" must soon lead to the assertion of an ultimate end.

    [Sidenote: the transition to which requires investigation;]

    This end, therefore, must not be sought for some ulterior end, nor desired as a means to satisfy any other desire. But it is still necessary to inquire into the way in which the end, held to be ultimate in a practical regard, stands related to the constitution of man and his environment.

    And the question to which I would draw attention, as the fundamental problem of ethics, is, What is that which men have variously called happiness, the highest good, the ethical end? or, more precisely, How can a transition be made from the notions of theoretical philosophy to the determination of that ethical end? No assumption is made, at starting, as to the nature of this end, or the manner of arriving at it.

    It may be a transient state of feeling, or a permanent type of character; or it may by its very nature defy exact definition,--the idea itself being perfected as its realisation is progressively approached. In any case it requires to be brought into connection with the ultimate conceptions of thought and existence.

    This question of the ethical end or highest good is thus fundamental in ethical science, and upon it all other questions in ethics finally depend. But it is easy to see that it does not cover the whole field, and that the other points of view already referred to have a legitimate application. Ethics has not only to determine the end, but to apply it to practice, and so to decide as to what is right or wrong in particular actions, and virtuous or vicious in character.

    And, in addition to the two questions thus implied--the question as to the ethical end, and that as to the application of it to practical affairs--there is another department of inquiry which has had a place assigned to it in most ethical systems, and which has a right to be regarded as belonging to ethics.

    We may investigate the place, in the individual and the community respectively, both of the sentiments and ideas and of the social institutions and customs through which morality is manifested; and this inquiry covers the twofold ground of what may be called moral psychology and moral sociology.

    [Sidenote: (c) distinct from other ethical questions:]

    Of these three questions, the first forms the subject of inquiry in the following pages. It seems to me that a great part of the obscurity which surrounds ethical argument is due to confounding these different questions. It is true that no one of them is without bearing on the others; but it is none the less necessary, in discussing any one of them, to keep its distinctness from those others well in view.

    In inquiring into the foundation on which the ethical end is based, I do not intend to develop a code of rules for practical conduct or a theory of human virtue; nor shall I attempt to trace the origin and nature of moral sentiments and ideas, or of the social institutions and customs connected with morality. If these subjects have to be introduced at all, it will be only in so far as they may be thought to decide, or tend to decide, the question more immediately in view.

    [Sidenote: (α) from inquiry into the methods of ethics.]

    [Sidenote: Limitation of this inquiry]

    [Sidenote: (aa) from necessity of investigating all logical alternatives,]

    Thus it forms no part of the present inquiry to follow out the application to conduct of different ethical ends, or to exhibit the different practical systems to which different ends naturally lead.

    It might seem indeed, at first sight, as if the development of their practical consequences might solve the question as to the nature of the ends themselves. If we assume certain possible and primâ facie reasonable ethical ends, and then see what codes of morality they will yield, surely (it may be thought) that one which affords the most consistent and harmonious code for the guidance of life will be the end to be sought in preference to all others.

    But in order that the criticism of what Professor Sidgwick has called the methods of ethics may be able to answer the question as to the end or principle of ethics, certain conditions must first be complied with.

    In the first place, it is necessary that the ends or principles whose applications to conduct are to be examined must not be uncritically accepted from the fluctuating morality of common-sense nor from the commonplaces of the schools, but must be shown to be "alternatives between which the human mind" is "necessarily forced to choose when it attempts to frame a complete synthesis of practical maxims, and to act in a perfectly rational manner."[8]

    [Sidenote: (bb) from more than one self-consistent code being possible,]

    But although this requisite is complied with, it will still remain possible, in the second place, that two or more of the assumed principles may yield systems of practical rules perfectly self-consistent, and yet inconsistent with one another.[9] It would be very hard indeed to show that both the theory of Egoistic Hedonism, and what is generally called Utilitarianism, do not succeed in doing so: and thus the examination of methods is not of itself sufficient to settle the question of the end of conduct.

    And since--to quote Mr Sidgwick[10]--it is "a fundamental postulate of ethics that either these methods must be reconciled and harmonised, or all but one of them rejected," it follows that the criticism of methods leads naturally up to an independent criticism of principles, unless indeed it can be shown that one method only yields a consistent code of practical rules.

    [Sidenote: (cc) from its assumption that the true end must give perfectly consistent rules.]

    Even in this case, however, if it led to the adoption of the end in question, it must be borne in mind that the postulate would be implied that the true ethical end must be able to yield a consistent and harmonious system of rules for practical life. Without altogether denying this postulate, it yet seems to me that it stands in need of qualification. For in different circumstances, and at different stages of individual and social development, the application of the same ethical end may naturally produce different and conflicting courses of conduct.

    We must not start with any such assumption as that the rationality of the end consists in some sort of mathematical equality which ignores alike the different environment with which one age and another surround different generations, and the different functions which one individual and another have to perform in the social whole.

    We must leave open the possibility that what is right now may be wrong in another age; we must remember that everybody may not count for one, and that some people may count for more than one; we must admit that we may have sometimes to do to others what we would not that others should do to us. The only consistency we have a right to demand must leave room for such a variety of different conditions as to be, by itself, a very insecure guide.

    From the difficulty of complying with the above conditions, it seems practically impossible for the criticism of ethical methods to decide the question of the ethical end. Even if the application to conduct of every important end has been taken account of, we are met with the difficulty that two or more mutually antagonistic though self-consistent practical codes may probably have been developed, while we are not even justified in assuming that inability to yield a system which will fit the complex circumstances of life in a perfectly harmonious manner is sufficient ground for rejecting an end shown in some other way to be reasonable.

    [Sidenote: (β) distinct from moral psychology and sociology.]

    The last department of ethics referred to--that which has to do with the origin and nature of moral sentiments and social customs--has a bearing on the question of the end of conduct in some respects more important than the investigation of ethical methods. For, whereas the latter expressly assumes certain ends as primâ facie reasonable, the former inquiry, on the contrary, is now frequently understood to be able, without presupposing any ethical relations whatever, to trace the way in which, from primitive feelings and customs, morality itself has been evolved. The psychological side of ethical inquiry has always had an important place with English moralists.

    At times, indeed, the question of the "moral faculty" has excited so much interest as to divert attention from the nature of morality itself. Moral truth has been supposed to be something known and indisputable, the only question being how we came to know it. But the psychology of ethics, reinforced by the knowledge sociology gives of the development of morality, rises now to larger issues. It attempts to show the genesis of the moral from the non-moral, to account thus for the origin of ethical ideas, and even to determine what kinds of ends are to be striven after.

    In this way, a theory of the origin and growth of moral sentiments and institutions is made to render important help to more than one of the theories which will fall to be considered in the sequel.

    [Sidenote: 3. Present inquiry limited]

    [Sidenote: to theories depending on the human constitution,]

    The present Essay has to inquire into the way in which we may determine what the end of human conduct is,--into the basis of ethics, therefore. But I do not propose to offer an exhaustive investigation of all the theories which have been or may be started in solution of the problem.

    On the contrary, I will begin by excluding from the inquiry all theories which seek the basis of ethics in something outside the constitution of man as a feeling and reasoning agent:[11] not because I contend that all such theories are primâ facie unreasonable, but because it is at any rate the more obvious course to seek to determine the function of an organism by studying its inner constitution, than by having regard to something which is external to it, and does not act upon and modify it as a necessary part of its environment.

    It is only when this method has been tried and has failed that we should seek outside us for some guide as to the part we ought to play in the universe.

    For this reason I shall not take into consideration the views of the basis of ethics which find it in positive law either divine or human, except in so far as they are shown to follow from the nature of man.

    It is not necessary for me to deny that the source of all moral obligation may be the will of God, or the commands of the sovereign, or the opinion of society, and that the highest moral ideal may be obedience to such a rule. But theories of this kind make ethics merely an application of positive theology, or of legislation, or of social sentiment, and seem only to have an appropriate place when we have failed to find an independent basis for action.

    The question which remains to be put may be expressed in these terms:

    Can we find in human nature (taken either alone or in connection with its environment) any indications of the end of human conduct, or, in other words, of the principle on which human beings "ought" to act? and if so, in what direction do these indications point, and what is their significance? The answer to this question will thus necessarily depend on the view we take of the constitution of man and his relation to his environment. And I purpose to bring this discussion within the necessary limits by considering the ethical consequences of one only of the two views into which philosophical opinion is divided.

    [Sidenote: and here to ethics of Naturalism,]

    [Sidenote: as distinguished from Rational ethics.]

    [Sidenote: Naturalism either individualistic]

    [Sidenote: or historical.]

    Now the fundamental principle of division in philosophical opinion lies in the place assigned to reason in human nature.[12] According to one theory, man is essentially a sensitive subject, though able to reason about his sensations--that is, to associate, compound, and compare them. He is supposed to be built up of sense-presentations associated with feelings of pleasure and pain.

    Recipient of external impressions which persist in idea and are accompanied by pleasure or pain on his part, and thus followed by other ideas and impressions, man's mental constitution is explained without attributing to reason any spontaneous or productive function.[13] The other view differs from this in attributing spontaneity to reason--making it, in one way or another, the source of forms of thought, principles, or ideas.

    The former may be called the Naturalistic, the latter the Rationalistic view of man: from that follows a Naturalistic or Natural ethics, from this a Rationalistic or Rational ethics. Into both these theories, in a theoretical as well as in an ethical aspect, the historical turn of thought which has characterised recent inquiry has introduced a profound modification.

    On the basis of Naturalism, we may either look upon man as an individual distinct from other individuals, as was done by Epicurus and Hobbes and the materialists of the eighteenth century, or we may consider the race as itself an organism, apart from which the individual is unintelligible, and look upon human nature as having become what it now is through a long process of interaction between organism and environment, in which social as well as psychical and physical facts have influenced the result.

    This is the view to the elaboration of which Comte and Darwin and Spencer have in different ways contributed.[14] What makes the historical method of importance philosophically, is not the mere fact that it traces a sequence of events in time, but the fact that, by doing so, it is able to look upon each link in the chain of events as necessarily connected with every other, and thus to regard as a system--or, rather, as an organism--what previous empirical theories had left without any principle of unity.

    [Sidenote: Rationalism either individualistic]

    [Sidenote: or universalistic.]

    A similar movement of thought has introduced a like modification into the Rationalistic theory.

    According to older doctrines, the individual reason is mysteriously charged with certain à priori principles which are to us laws of knowledge and of action; whereas the form of Rationalism which is now in the ascendant resembles the theory of natural evolution in this, that as the latter finds the race more real than the individual, and the individual to exist only in the race, so the former looks upon the individual reason as but a finite manifestation of the universal reason, and attempts to show the principles or constitutive elements of this universal reason or consciousness in their logical or necessary connection--leaving open to empirical investigation the way in which they have gradually disclosed themselves in the individual human subject, and in the expression of the collective life of the race.

    Thus, as Natural Ethics is divided into an individualistic and an historical view, a similar distinction might be made in Rational Ethics, though in this case it would be more difficult to follow out the distinction in detail; and many ethical systems cannot be said to have kept consistently either to one side of it or to the other.

    In the following discussion I shall investigate the ethical theory which is founded on the basis of Naturalism--working out and criticising in somewhat greater detail that form of the theory which, from the agreement it lays claim to with the results of modern science, plays so important a part in contemporary philosophical thought.

    FOOTNOTES:

    [1] Werke, ed. Hartenstein (1867), iii. 532.

    [2] Cf. Kant, Werke, iv. 237.

    [3] Sermons, v., towards the end.

    [4] Essay on the Passions and Affections, p. iv.

    [5] W. H. Rolph, Biologische Probleme, zugleich als Versuch zur Entwicklung einer rationellen Ethik, 2d ed., p. 21.

    [6] Not to mention Kant, the consistent opponent of every eudæmonistic principle, or the doctrines of a political idealist such as Mazzini (see Life and Writings (1867), iv. 223), reference may be made to a writer like W. K. Clifford, who looks from the scientific point of view, and yet holds that "happiness is not to be desired for its own sake."--Lectures and Essays (1879), ii. 121, 173.

    [7] "Auch dieser Begriff [Glückseligkeit] ist an sich ein bloss formaler, der jede beliebige materiale Bestimmung zulässt."--Zeller, Ueber Begriff und Begründung der sittlichen Gesetze (1883), p. 23.

    [8] Methods of Ethics, book i. chap. i. § 5, 3d ed., p. 11.

    [9] "The rule, 'Let every one care for me,' is quite as simple, and, in a logical point of view, defines conduct as consistently and reasonably as the rule, 'Love your neighbour as yourself.'"--Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics (1882), p. 73.

    [10] Methods of Ethics, I. i. 3, p. 6.

    [11] The difference between Aristotle and Kant in ethics is sometimes expressed (see Trendelenburg, Hist. Beiträge zur Phil., iii. 171 ff.) as if it consisted in the fact that the former investigated human nature in order to find its τέλος (~telos~), whereas the latter sought the standard of action in a transcendental ground. There is reason for this distinction in Kant's manner of statement. But both may be regarded as investigating human nature. Their difference rather consists in the different position and function assigned to reason in man.

    It is because Kant is for the moment looking upon reason as something distinct from human nature that he says that "the ground of obligation is to be sought, not in the nature of man or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but à priori simply in the notions of pure reason" (Werke, iv. 237). His "metaphysical" view of ethics, however, follows from the rational constitution of the human subject and his experience, and does not depend on any source that really "transcends" the reason of man.

    [12] Opinion is also divided according to the place assigned to reason in the world,--this principle of division corresponding almost exactly with the former.

    [13] Thus it is the object of Helvétius's first discours "De l'esprit" to prove that physical sensibility and memory are the only productive causes of our ideas.

    [14] Comte, by connecting ethics with biology; Darwin and Spencer, by the doctrine of evolution.

    PART I.

    THE INDIVIDUALISTIC THEORY.

    CHAPTER II.

    EGOISM.

    [Sidenote: Definition of Naturalism.]

    It is difficult to give an exact definition or even description of what I have called the "natural" view of man. Perhaps it may be best defined, negatively, as the view which denies to reason any spontaneous or creative function in the human constitution. For this definition, if it still leaves the positive description wanting, will at least make the classification into "natural" and "rational" exhaustive and mutually exclusive. At the same time it is to be noted that, on the theory of Naturalism, reason is not supposed to be excluded from all share in determining questions of conduct or the choice of ends.

    It would, indeed, be impossible to have even the pretence of an ethical theory without a certain use of reason.

    But its function, in this case, is limited to the merely formal one of bringing different presentations (or objects) and feelings into connection, and comparing the different states of mind thus formed with one another, not with a reason-given standard.

    [Sidenote: Psychological hedonism.]

    Since the function of reason is thus restricted, and its competency to supply an end for, or principle of, action is denied, we must seek this end either in the feelings of pleasure and pain which accompany both sensory and motor presentations,--perceptions, that is to say, and actions,--or in the more complex, or apparently more complex, emotions of the mind.

    And the latter may either be themselves reducible to feelings of pleasure or pain accompanying presentations directly pleasurable or painful, and thence transferred by association to other presentations, or they may be regarded as somehow motives to action which may be or ought to be followed on their own account. The Individualistic Theory, therefore, is not necessarily hedonistic.

    It admits of a twofold view of the "natural" man: one which looks upon him as in essence a pleasure-seeking, pain-avoiding animal; another which regards him as having a variety of impulses, some of which are not directed to his own pleasure or avoidance of pain.

    [Sidenote: 1. Its theory of action]

    [Sidenote: ambiguous,]

    [Sidenote: referring to]

    The former view--psychological hedonism, as it is called--claims to be an exhaustive analysis of the motives of human conduct, perfectly general indeed, but yet valid for every case of action.

    It denies the possibility of a man acting from any other principle than desire of pleasure or aversion from pain. The theory is, that it is a psychological law that action is motived by pleasure and pain, and that nothing else has motive-power over it.

    If, then, one pleasure (or avoidance of pain) is chosen in preference to another, it must be either by chance,--an alternative which has no ethical significance--no significance, that is, for the guidance of voluntary conduct,--or because the one course promises, or seems to promise, the attainment of a greater balance of pleasure than the other, or is actually at the time more pleasant than that other.

    Thus the view that pleasure is the only motive of human action is really identical, for ethical purposes, with the theory loosely expressed in the law that action follows the greatest pleasure.[15] I say "loosely expressed"; for the law as thus stated really admits of three quite different interpretations, not always distinguished with the precision which such subjects require.

    [Sidenote: (a) actual consequences of action,]

    [Sidenote: or (b) its expected consequences,]

    [Sidenote: or (c) its present characteristics.]

    (a) In the first place, the law might mean that action always follows the course which, as a matter of fact, will in the long-run bring the greatest balance of pleasure to the agent. It is evident that there is no ground in psychology for maintaining this view. Yet it is a fair interpretation of the "law" of psychological hedonism, as commonly stated; and it is at least an admissible supposition that this meaning of the phrase has not been without effect upon the uses to which the law has been put by some of its upholders.

    The second interpretation of the law--namely (b), that action is always in the direction which seems to the agent most likely to bring him the greatest balance of pleasure, whether it actually brings it or not--is the sense in which it appears to have been most commonly taken when expressed with any degree of accuracy.

    It is in this sense that--in language which ascribes greater consistency to men's conduct than it usually displays--"interest" is asserted by the author of the 'Système de la nature' to be "the sole motive of human action."[16] The same view is adopted by Bentham;[17] and both James Mill and John Stuart Mill identify desire with pleasure, or an "idea" of pleasure, in terms which are sufficiently sweeping, if not very carefully weighed;[18] while the will is said to follow desire, or only to pass out of its power when coming under the sway of habit.[19] Still another meaning may, however, be given to the "law" of psychological hedonism, according to which the doubtful reference to the manifold pleasures and pains, contemplated as resulting from an action, is got rid of, and (c) the agent is asserted always to choose that action or forbearance which is actually most pleasant, or least painful, to him at the time--taking account, of course, of imaginative pleasures and pains, as well as of those which are immediately connected with the senses.

    It is in this interpretation of its law that psychological hedonism seems to be most capable of defence, and in this sense it has been more than once stated and defended.[20]

    [Sidenote: 2. Ethical inferences from this theory,]

    The ethics of the form of Naturalism which is now under examination must be inferred from the "law" that human action follows the greatest pleasure, in one or other of the above meanings which that law admits of. The law is the datum or premiss from which we are to advance to an ethical conclusion. The "right" is to be evolved from the pleasurable; and the pleasurable, consequently, cannot be made to depend upon the right.

    It is certainly true of the conduct of most men, "that our prospect of pleasure resulting from any course of conduct may largely depend on our conception of it as right or otherwise."[21] But this presupposes that there is a right independent of one's own pleasure, and therefore does not apply to an ethics based on the simple theory of human nature put forward by psychological hedonism.

    [Sidenote: (a) in its first meaning,]

    [Sidenote: (b)in its second meaning:]

    [Sidenote: private ethics and legislation,]

    [Sidenote: (c) in its third meaning.]

    It is scarcely necessary to discuss the first alternative (a), as no psychologist would seriously maintain it. A society composed of men constituted in the way it supposes men to be constituted, would be a collection of rational egoists, omniscient in all that concerned the results of action, and each adopting unerringly at every moment the course of conduct which would increase his own pleasure the most.

    The conduct of any member of such a society could only be modified when--and would always be modified when--the modified conduct actually brought pleasurable results to the agent: never so as to make him prefer the public good to his own. The second alternative (b) admits of such modification taking place only when it seems to the individual that this modified action will produce a greater balance of pleasure or smaller balance of pain than any other course of action.

    Under this theory an individual might indeed prefer the public good or another man's good to his own, but only through his being deceived as to the actual results of his course of action. Ethics as determining an end for conduct is put out of court; though the statesman or the educator may modify the actions of others by providing appropriate motives.

    If the "two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure," "determine what we shall do," it is hardly necessary for them also "to point out what we ought to do."[22] The end is already given in the nature of action, though an enlightened understanding will teach men how the greatest balance of pleasure may be obtained. We can only get at a rule prescribing an end by changing our point of view from the individual to the state.

    It is best for the state that each individual should aim at the common happiness; but, when we talk of this as a moral duty for the individual, all we can mean is that the state will punish a breach of it. In the words of Helvétius,[23] "pain and pleasure are the bonds by which we can always unite personal interest to the interest of the nation....

    The sciences of morals and legislation can be only deductions from this simple principle." According to Bentham's psychology, a man is necessitated by his mental and physical nature to pursue at every moment, not the greatest happiness of the greatest number, but what seems to him his own greatest happiness.

    And what the legislator has to do is, by judiciously imposed rewards and punishments, especially the latter, to make it for the greatest happiness of each to pursue the greatest happiness of all.[24] As distinguished from this "art of legislation," "private ethics" consists only of prudential rules prescribing the best means to an end predetermined by nature as the only possible end of human action: it "teaches how each man may dispose himself to pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness."[25] The consequences to the theory of action of the third alternative (c) are similar: it only states the law with more appearance of psychological accuracy.

    If a man always follows that course of action which will give him at the time the greatest (real and imaginative) satisfaction, it is impossible for us to infer from his nature an ethical law prescribing some other end, without admitting a fundamental contradiction in human nature; while to say that he ought to seek the end he always does and cannot help seeking, is unnecessary and even unmeaning.

    Modification of character may of course be still brought about, since the kinds of action in which an individual takes pleasure may be varied almost indefinitely. But the motive made use of in this educative process must be personal pleasure; and the end the legislator has in view in his work must be the same,[26] though it is often quietly assumed that for him personal pleasure has become identified with the wider interests of the community.

    [Sidenote: Result of this ambiguity,]

    [Sidenote: ethical hedonism.]

    The different significations of which it admits show that the psychological law that action follows the greatest pleasure is by no means so clear as it may at first sight appear. Probably it is the very ambiguity of the law that has made it appear to provide a basis for an ethical system.

    When it is said that greatest pleasure is the moral end of action, this "greatest pleasure" is looked upon as the greatest possible balance of pleasurable over painful states for the probable duration of life: on the egoistic theory, of the life of the individual; on the utilitarian theory, of the aggregate lives of all men or even of all sentient beings. But when it is said that greatest pleasure is, as a matter of fact, always the motive of action, it is obvious that "greatest pleasure" has changed its signification.

    For if the same meaning were kept to, not only would the psychological law as thus stated be openly at variance with facts, but its validity would render the moral precept unnecessary.

    It is even unmeaning to say that a man "ought" to do that which he always does and cannot help doing.[27] On the other hand, if the double meaning of the phrase had been clearly stated, we should at once have seen the hiatus in the proof of egoistic hedonism--the gap between the present (or apparent) pleasure for which one does act, and the greatest pleasure of a lifetime for which one ought to act--as well as the additional difficulty of passing from egoism to utilitarianism.

    If greatest apparent pleasure--or greatest present pleasure--is by an inexorable law of human nature always sought, how can it be shown that we ought to sacrifice the apparent to the real--the present pleasure that is small to the greater future pleasure? If the individual necessarily pursues his own pleasure, how can we show that he ought to subordinate it to the pleasures of the "greatest number"?

    [Sidenote: 3. Transition from psychological to ethical hedonism.

    Right action will imply]

    [Sidenote: (a) correct estimate of consequences of action,]

    [Sidenote: (b) and corresponding strength of feeling.]

    It is a matter of fact, however, that the psychologists who maintain that action follows the greatest pleasure--meaning by that, greatest apparent or greatest present pleasure--have in their ethics made the transition to an enlightened Egoism, or even to Utilitarianism. The nature of the transition thus requires to be more clearly pointed out.

    If the former interpretation of the law of psychological hedonism could be accepted, and a man's motive for action were always what seemed to him likely to bring him the greatest pleasure on the whole, ethics--what Bentham calls private ethics--could be reduced (as Bentham finally reduces it) to certain maxims of prudence. To be fully acquainted with the sources of pleasure and pain, and to estimate them correctly, would imply possession of the highest (egoistic) morality.

    If men could be made to think rightly as to what their greatest pleasure consisted in, then right action on their part--that is to say, the pursuit of their greatest pleasure--would (according to Bentham's psychology) follow as a matter of course.

    Right conduct, however, is not so purely an affair of the intellect as this would make it. Indeed, Bentham's psychological assumption requires only to be plainly stated for its inconsistency with the facts of human action to become apparent. The "video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor" expresses too common an experience to be so easily explained away. The impulses by which action is governed are not always in accordance with what the intellect decides to be best on a survey of the whole life and its varied chances.

    In judging the consequences of action, a future good is compared with a present, regardless of the mere difference of time by which they are separated. But the springs which move the will are often at variance with the decisions of the understanding; and many men are unable to resist the strength of the impulse to act for the pleasure of the moment, though they foresee that a greater future satisfaction would follow from present self-denial.

    It would seem, then, that the facts of experience are sufficient to show that a man's conduct does not always follow the course which he thinks likely to bring him the greatest pleasure on the whole.

    But the view that a man always acts for what is most pleasant--or least painful--at the time cannot be dismissed so easily. It is not enough simply to point to the facts of human action in order to show that this hypothesis is inconsistent with them. If we instanced the self-restraint in which so many pass their lives from day to day, it might perhaps be answered that there is a persistent idea of duty, or love of reputation, or fear of social stigma, the repression of which would be more painful than the restraint it puts upon other impulses.

    Even the martyr who deliberately parts with life itself for the sake of an ideal, may be said to choose death as the least painful course open to him at the time. It should be borne in mind, however, that Professor Bain, the most thorough psychologist of Bentham's school, refuses to admit this line of defence for psychological hedonism, and holds that, in actions such as those referred to, men are really carried out of the circle of their self-regarding desires.[28] But my present purpose is not to discuss the merits of any such psychological theory, but rather to investigate its ethical consequences.

    And for this purpose the question requires to be put, how a passage is effected from psychological hedonism to an egoistic--and even to a utilitarian--theory of ethics.

    [Sidenote: The postulate that action can be rationalised]

    [Sidenote: involves these conditions,]

    If a man always acts for his greatest present pleasure, real and imaginary, it seems a far step to say that he "ought" to act--or in any way to expect that he will act--at each moment for the greatest sum of pleasure attainable in the probable duration of his life.

    But on reflection, this may turn out to follow if we postulate that conduct can be rationalised. What is meant by this egoistic "ought" may be said to be simply that to the eye of reason the pleasure of any one moment cannot be regarded as more valuable than the equal pleasure of any other moment, if it is equally certain; and that therefore to act as if it were is to act unreasonably. Man fails in acting up to reason in this sense, because his action is not motived by reason, but directly by pleasure and pain; and not by a mere estimate of pleasure and pain, but by pleasure and pain themselves.

    The psychological hedonist must maintain that the estimates of future pleasure and pain only become motives by being not merely recognised (intellectually) but felt (emotionally)--that is, by themselves becoming pleasurable or painful. If the Egoist calls any action irrational, it cannot be because the motive which produced it was not the greatest pleasure in consciousness at the time.

    It can only be on the ground that the greatest pleasure in consciousness at the time is likely to lead to a sacrifice of greater pleasure in the future; and this must be due either to intellectual misapprehension or to the imagined fruition of future pleasure not being strong enough to outweigh the pleasure which comes from a present stimulus, and to the imagined fruition of the more distant being weaker than that of the less distant pleasure.

    It is owing to a defect of the imagination on a man's part that even with complete information he does not act "up to his lights"--irrational action being partly a consequence of insufficient acquaintance with the normal results of conduct, partly due to defective imagination. Were a man's imagination of future pleasure and pain as strong as his experience of present pleasure and pain, and did he correctly appreciate the results of his conduct, then his action would, of psychological necessity, harmonise with the precepts of egoistic hedonism.

    [Sidenote: the latter of which]

    [Sidenote: is inconsistent with the nature of voluntary action.]

    Egoistic hedonism may therefore, in a certain sense, be said to be a "reasonable" end of conduct on the theory of psychological hedonism; it is the end which will be made his own by that ideally perfect man whose intellect can clearly see the issues of conduct, and whose imagination of the future causes of sensibility is so vivid that the pleasure or pain got from anticipating them is as great as if they were present, or only less lively in proportion as there is a risk of their not being realised.

    Conversely it would seem that only that man can act "reasonably" in whom imagination of pleasure (or of pain) is already of equal strength with the actual experience of it. But, if the "pleasures of the imagination" are as strong as those of sense or of reality, the latter obviously become superfluous; and it follows that the ideally perfect man is left without any motive to aim at the real thing, since he can obtain as much pleasure by imagining it. The cultured hedonist must, it would seem, be able to--

    "Hold a fire in his hand
    By thinking on the frosty Caucasus,
    Or cloy the hungry edge of appetite
    By bare imagination of a feast."

    So far as feeling or motive to action goes, no difference must exist for him between reality and imagination. And thus, although we may admit that, on this psychological basis, conduct when rationalised agrees with that prescribed by egoistic hedonism, yet it can only be rationalised by a development of the strength of the imagination, which would make the feeling which it brings with it as strong as that which accompanies a real object, and hence take away the motive for the pursuit of the latter.

    The discrepancy between representation and presentation which is necessary for the state of desire,[29] is no longer present. Hedonism vindicates its rationality only on conditions which imply the futility of action altogether. It is not merely that the attainment of the hedonistic end in practical conduct implies a strength of imagination of which no one is capable, but the conditions of acting both rationally and hedonistically, are conditions which would paralyse all activity.

    [Sidenote: 4. Possible objections to preceding argument:]

    The foregoing argument may perhaps be objected to on two grounds. On the one hand, it may be said that it ignores the vast complexity of human motive, and treats action as if it were a simple and abstract thing. On the other hand, we may be reminded of the fact that, while all men act for pleasure, the moral quality of their conduct does not depend on this fact, but on the kind of things in which they take pleasure.

    [Sidenote: (a) complexity of motive; but it is psychological hedonism which ignores this.]

    So far as the first objection is concerned, it seems to me that the fault belongs to the psychological theory of human action, the ethical consequences of which are under investigation. It is this theory which asserts that, however interwoven the threads of impulse, aversion, and habit may be, their most complex relations can be reduced to the formula, "greatest pleasure, or least pain, prevails."

    It is not necessary, indeed, that every action should be the conscious pursuit of a pleasurable object already before the mind in idea. But the theory, if consistently carried out, implies that the action which follows in the line of a previously formed habit, does so because the discomfort or pain of breaking through the habit would be sufficient to counter-balance any satisfaction that might result.

    The objection, therefore, of excessive simplicity or "abstractness," is one which cannot have greater force than when urged against the theory of psychological hedonism.

    [Sidenote: (b) difference in kind of pleasurable objects;]

    [Sidenote: but this involves a reference to something else than pleasure,]

    [Sidenote: which psychological hedonism does not admit of.]

    Further--and this is the second objection--the above analysis may be considered by some not to have taken sufficient account of the difference in the objects in which a human being can take pleasure, and of the fact that the moral quality of men differs, not according as they act for pleasure or not, but according to the kind of actions and sufferances in which they find pleasure. There can be no doubt of the importance of this distinction for questions of practical morals.

    The man in whom "selfishness takes the shape of benevolence," as it did in Bentham, is infinitely better than the man in whom it retains the form of selfishness. But the consideration is important just because it goes on the implied assumption that the hedonistic is not the chief aspect of conduct, and that there is a difference between courses of action more fundamental than the pleasurable or painful feeling attendant on them.

    If the principles on which the objection is founded were consistently adhered to and followed out, they would make not pleasure, but something else--that, namely, by which pleasures differ from one another in kind--the ethical standard. But if, in ultimate analysis, it is the pleasure felt or expected that moves to action, it would seem that there is no way in which the conclusion of the preceding argument can be avoided.

    If pleasure is the motive, it must be quâ pleasure--that is to say, either the greatest apparent pleasure, or the greatest present pleasure, is the motive. If difference of quality be admitted, we are introducing a determining factor other than pleasure. Certain kinds of pleasure may be better than others for the race or for the state.

    But these differences must be reducible to terms of individual pleasure admitting of purely quantitative comparisons, before they become motives to action.[30] From the point of view of the whole, we may say that one action leads to a greater sum of pleasure than another.

    But, in judging the action of individuals, all that we can say of it is, that to one man one class of actions gives pleasure, to another another: each man is equally following the course of action which either (a) will bring, or (b) seems to him likely to bring, the greatest pleasure, or (c) is actually most pleasant at the time. From the nature of the individual we can evolve no end beyond egoistic hedonism.

    And even this end can only be made his at each occurrence of action (assuming the first alternative (a) to be incorrect) by enlightening his intellect so that (b) will correspond with the actual greatest pleasure, or by also enlivening his imagination of future pleasures and pains so that (c) will correspond with it; and this, as has been shown, could only be effected under conditions which are inconsistent with the principles of human action.

    FOOTNOTES:

    [15] Meaning by "greatest pleasure," greatest balance of pleasure over pain, and thus inclusive of the meaning "least pain." It is the expression in terms of feeling of the statement sometimes preferred, that "action follows the line of least resistance"--a statement to which no exception can be taken, nor any importance allowed, till it be translated into definite psychological language.

    [16] "Ainsi lorsque nous disons que l'intérêt est l'unique mobile des actions humaines, nous voulons indiquer par là que chaque homme travaille à sa manière à son propre bonheur, qu'il place dans quelqu'objet soit visible, soit caché, soit réel, soit imaginaire, et que tout le système de sa conduite tend à l'obtenir."--Système de la nature (1781), i. 268.

    [17] "On the occasion of every act he exercises, every human being is led to pursue that line of conduct which, according to his view of the case taken by him at the moment, will be in the highest degree contributory to his own greatest happiness."--Constitutional Code, book i. § 2; Works, ix. 5. The continued existence of the species is, Bentham thinks, a conclusive proof of this proposition.

    [18] Thus, according to James Mill, "the terms 'idea of pleasure' and 'desire' are but two names; the thing named, the state of consciousness is one and the same. The word Desire is commonly used to mark the idea of a pleasurable sensation when the future is associated with it."--Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, J. S. Mill's edit., ii. 192; cf. Fragment on Mackintosh (1835), p. 389 f. To the same effect J. S.

    Mill says: "Desiring a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language, two different modes of naming the same psychological fact."--Utilitarianism, 7th ed., p. 58.

    [19] "Will is the child of desire, and passes out of the dominion of its parent only to come under that of habit."--Utilitarianism, p. 60.

    [20] Thus Jonathan Edwards says: "When I say that the Will is as the greatest apparent good, or (as I have explained it) that volition has always for its object the thing which appears most agreeable, it must be carefully observed, to avoid confusion and needless objection, that I speak of the direct and immediate object of the act of volition, and not some object to which the act of will has only an indirect and remote respect."--On the Freedom of the Will, part i. § 2; Works, i. 133. The matter is put still more clearly by the late Alfred Barratt: "Action does not always follow knowledge.

    Of course not: but the doctrine [Hedonism] does not require that it should; for it says, not that we follow what is our greatest possible pleasure, or what we know or 'think' to be so, but what at the moment of action is most desired."--Mind, vol. ii. 173; cf. Physical Ethics, p. 52 ff.

    So Mr Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 47: "It is more accurate to say that my conduct is determined by the pleasantest judgment, than to say that it is determined by my judgment of what is pleasantest." The negative side of the same view was expressed by Locke in his doctrine that action is moved by the most pressing uneasiness (Essay, II. xxi. 29, 31), and distinguished by him from the former view (b), that the "greater visible good" is the motive (II. xxi. 35, 44).

    [21] Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, 3d ed., p. 40.

    [22] Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. i., Works, i. 1. With this statement may be compared the assertion of Helvétius: "Il semble que, dans l'univers moral comme dans l'univers physique, Dieu n'est mis qu'un seul principe dans tous ce qui a été.... Il semble qu'il ait dit pareillement à l'homme: ...

    Je te mets sous la garde du plaisir et de la douleur: l'un et l'autre veilleront à tes pensées, à tes actions; engendreront tes passions, exciteront tes aversions, tes amitiés, tes tendresses, tes fureurs; allumeront tes désirs, tes craintes, tes espérances, te dévoileront des vérités; te plongeront dans des erreurs; et après t'avoir fait enfanter mille systèmes absurdes et différens de morale et de législation, te decouvriront un jour les principes simples, au développement desquels est attaché l'ordre et le bonheur du monde moral."--De l'esprit, III. ix, Œuvres (ed. of 1818), i.

    293.

    [23] De l'homme, concl. gén., Œuvres, ii. 608.

    [24] Cf. Système de la nature, i. 120: "La politique devrait être l'art de régler les passions des hommes et de les diriger vers le bien de la société."

    [25] Bentham, op. cit., chap. xix. (xvii. in the reprint of 1879), § 20; Works, i. 148.

    [26] Cf. Bentham, Works, ix. 5.

    [27] Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 1, 3d ed., p. 41; cf. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 9: "To a being who is simply a result of natural forces, an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning."

    [28] Cf. The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed., p. 293 ff.

    [29] Cf. Sully, Outlines of Psychology, p. 577.

    [30] Cf. J. Grote, 'Utilitarian Philosophy,' p. 20, note: "One kind of pleasure may be, systematically, to be preferred to another, but it must be because the pleasures classified under it generally exceed those under the other in intensity, or some other of the elements of value."

    CHAPTER III.

    THE TRANSITION TO UTILITARIANISM.

    [Sidenote: 1. Different standpoints of individual and state]

    It still remains possible, of course, to fix an ethical end in some other way than by studying individual human nature. We may, for instance, looking from the point of view of the community, fix its greatest happiness, instead of his own, as the individual's end. But the difficulty then arises of persuading the individual--or, indeed, making it possible for him--to regard this impersonal goal as the end of his conduct. For this purpose, Bentham seemed to look to the exercise of administrative control which, by a system of rewards and punishments, will make the greatest happiness of the individual coincide so far as possible with that of the community.[31] J. S.

    Mill, on the other hand, with his eyes turned to the subjective springs of action, saw in the gradual growth of sympathetic pleasures and pains the means by which an individual's desires would cease to conflict with those of his neighbours.

    It is in some such way that the transition is made from Egoism to Utilitarianism. The transition is made: Bentham and his school are an evidence of the fact. But it is not therefore logical. It is, indeed, important to notice that we only pass from the one theory to the other by changing our original individualistic point of view.

    Having already fixed an end for conduct regardless of the difference between the individual at the time of acting and at subsequent times, we proceed to take the much longer step of ignoring the difference between the agent and other individuals. The question is no longer, What is good or desirable for the person who is acting? but, What is best on the whole for all those whom his action may affect--that is to say, for the community?

    [Sidenote: cannot be logically connected]

    [Sidenote: through analogy of state to individual.]

    [Sidenote: Difference between one's own pleasure and the pleasure of others]

    But while it is comparatively easy to see how this transition is effected as a matter of fact, it is difficult to establish any logical connection between its different stages, or to offer any considerations fitted to convince the individual that it is reasonable for him to seek the happiness of the community rather than his own. Only that conduct, it may seem, can be reasonable which directs and perfects the natural striving of each organism towards its own pleasure.

    We may, of course, let our point of view shift from the individual to the social "organism." And in this case, if the "natural" end of each human being is his own greatest pleasure, the end of the community, or organised body of pleasure-seekers, will naturally be concluded to be the greatest aggregate pleasure of its members.

    Thus, if we can hypostatise the community, and treat it as an individual with magnified but human wants and satisfactions, then, for this leviathan, the ethical end will correspond to what is called Utilitarianism or Universalistic Hedonism. But, when we remember that the community is made up of units distinct from one another in feeling and action, the difficulty arises of establishing it as the natural end, or as a reasonable end, for each of these units to strive after the greatest pleasure of all.

    For it is evident that the pursuit of the greatest aggregate pleasure may often interfere with the attainment by the individual of his own greatest pleasure. On the other hand, the self-seeking action of the individual may no doubt lead to a loss of pleasure on the whole; but then it is not his own pleasure that is lost, only other people's. To the outsider--as to the community--it may seem irrational that a small increase in the pleasure of one unit should be allowed at the expense of a loss of greater pleasure on the part of other units.

    But it seems irrational only because the outsider naturally puts himself in the place of the community; and neither takes account of the fact that to the individual agent there is a fundamental difference between his own pleasure and any one else's pleasure: for him the former is, and the latter is not, pleasure at all.[32]

    [Sidenote: overlooked in arguing from egoism to utilitarianism.]

    This fundamental difference seems to be overlooked when the attempt is made to argue logically from egoistic psychology (or even from egoistic ethics) to utilitarianism. Indeed, the hiatus in logical proof is often only concealed by a confusion of standpoints; and J. S. Mill, while emphasising the distinction between modern Utilitarianism and the older Epicureanism, has even allowed his official "proof" of utilitarianism--such proof, that is, as he thinks the principle of Utility to be susceptible of--to rest on the ambiguity between individual and social happiness.

    [Sidenote: 2. Connection between egoism and utilitarianism according to Bentham:]

    [Sidenote: (a) Utilitarianism not a political duty,]

    This ambiguity does not seem to have been consistently avoided even by Bentham. For the most part, indeed, nothing can exceed the clearness with which he recognises the twofold and possibly conflicting interests involved in almost every action. There is the interest of the agent, and the interest of others whom his action may affect. And he also holds that, in the case of divergence of interests, the individual will act for his own.

    "The happiness of the individuals," he says,[33] "of whom a community is composed,--that is, their pleasures, and their security,--is the end, and the sole end, which the legislator ought to have in view--the sole standard in conformity to which each individual ought, as far as depends upon the legislator, to be made to fashion his conduct. But whether it be this or anything else that is to be done, there is nothing by which a man can ultimately be made to do it, but either pain or pleasure"--that is, of course, his own pain or pleasure.

    Here, then, ethical Utilitarianism and psychological Egoism are both plainly involved. A man, it is said, can only pursue general happiness by its being identical with his own happiness.

    And as it is evident, and admitted, that these two happinesses often diverge in the courses of action naturally leading to them, a man can only be beneficent, rather than selfish, through some artificial arrangement which makes beneficence to be for his interest:[34] in plain language (since rewards are only of exceptional applicability), through his being punished for not being beneficent.[35] But, as Bentham clearly shows, many cases of action cannot be safely touched by the legislator's art.

    Such cases "unmeet for punishment" include not only the actions which are beneficial or neutral in their results, but also actions hurtful to the community, though they may elude such vigilance as the state can contrive, or their restraint by punishment inflicted by the state may constitute a greater evil than the offence.[36] Probity may be exacted by the "persons stated and certain" who happen to be political superiors: except in rare instances, positive beneficence can not.

    Utilitarian conduct, therefore, is not a "political duty," because it is not fully enforced by definite punishment. The "art of legislation" is indeed said to teach "how a multitude of men, composing a community, may be disposed to pursue that course which upon the whole is the most conducive to the happiness of the whole community, by means of motives to be applied by the legislator."[37] But the means here indicated are such as cannot fully compass the attainment of the end.

    For the motives applied by the legislator either cannot reach a large part of the extra-regarding conduct of individuals, or could only reach it by entailing greater evils than those they would be used to prevent.

    [Sidenote: (b) nor a moral duty,]

    [Sidenote: (c) nor insisted on as a religious duty,]

    But if utilitarian conduct is not a political duty, it may seem evident that it is at least a moral duty.

    Now a moral duty is said by Bentham[38] to be "created by a kind of motive which, from the _un_certainty of the persons to apply it, and of the species and degree in which it will be applied, has hardly yet got the name of punishment: by various mortifications resulting from the ill-will of persons _un_certain and variable,--the community in general; that is, such individuals of that community as he whose duty is in question shall happen to be connected with." In plain language, then, moral duty simply means the ill-will of a man's neighbours which follows his conduct in so far as that conduct affects them disagreeably.

    Such ill-will on the part of a man's neighbours may result from success or from failure on his part, from a breach of etiquette, from refusal to sacrifice to the caprice of those neighbours the wider good of the society whom his conduct affects (but to whom it may be unknown), from deception or from telling the truth. In a word, the duty--that is, the punishment--is entirely uncertain: not only as regards the persons applying it, its nature and its amount, but also as regards the kind of actions to which it applies.

    They will be actions unpleasant to the people who inflict the punishment, but not necessarily hurtful to the common weal: since the immediate effects of an action are easily recognised, while its wider and more lasting consequences are neither so apparent nor appeal so surely to the interest of those who are cognisant of the action and immediately affected by it.

    Moral duty, therefore, as Bentham defines it, depending on, or rather identical with, the ill-will of one's neighbours, is indefinite and limited in its nature, and can command or sanction no such definite and wide-reaching rule for conduct as that a man should always act for the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people whom his action may affect.

    Utilitarian conduct, therefore, is neither a political duty nor a moral duty; nor does Bentham follow Paley in insisting upon it as a religious duty "created by punishment; by punishment expected at the hands of a person certain--the Supreme Being." And "if he persists in asserting it to be a duty--but without meaning it to be understood that it is on any one of these three accounts that he looks upon it as such--all he then asserts is his own internal sentiment; all he means then is that he feels himself pleased or displeased at the thoughts of the point of conduct in question, but without being able to tell why.

    In this case he should e'en say so; and not seek to give an undue influence to his own single suffrage, by delivering it in terms that purport to declare the voice either of God, or of the law, or of the people."[39]

    [Sidenote: (d) nor sufficiently motived in private ethics,]

    [Sidenote: which can be reduced to prudence.]

    This plain piece of advice which Bentham gives to Blackstone is not often neglected by himself. The motive, he once said, of his own exceptional devotion to the interests of the community was that it pleased him. "I am a selfish man," he wrote, "as selfish as any man can be.

    But in me, somehow or other, so it happens, selfishness has taken the shape of benevolence."[40] But when the matter is thus brought back from the regions of political, moral, and religious duty, to the individual ground of "private ethics," we have still to refer to Bentham's own discussion of the question, "What motives (independent of such as legislation and religion may chance to furnish) can one man have to consult the happiness of another?"[41] Bentham at once replies--and indeed the answer on his principles is obvious enough--that there is no motive which always continues adequate.

    But yet there are, he says, "no occasions in which a man has not some motives for consulting the happiness of other men." Such are "the purely-social motive of sympathy or benevolence," and "the semi-social motives of love of amity and love of reputation." A man is directly moved to promote the happiness of others through the sympathetic feelings which make the happiness of others in some degree pleasurable to himself; and he is indirectly moved to promote their happiness through his desire of their friendship and good opinion.

    So far, therefore, it is quite true that "private ethics"--or what Bentham regards as such--"concerns every member--that is, the happiness and the actions of every member of any community that can be proposed."[42] It certainly concerns their happiness, but only in so far as this is a means to the happiness of the agent.

    So that when Bentham says that "there is no case in which a private man ought not to direct his own conduct to the production of his own happiness and of that of his fellow-creatures," he should rather say that a man will[43] only direct his conduct to the happiness of his fellow-creatures in so far as such action leads to his own happiness.

    Private ethics, therefore, has to do with the happiness of others only so far as this reacts on the happiness of self; or, as Bentham ultimately defines it, in terms to which no exception can be taken: "Private ethics teaches how each man may dispose himself to pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness by means of such motives as offer of themselves."[44]

    • * * * *

    [Sidenote: 3. Bentham's treatment exhaustive from his point of view.]

    Under Bentham's hands "private ethics" is thus reduced to prudence, at the same time that the author has failed to show why the general happiness is to be aimed at by the individual as a religious or political or moral duty. Nor is this failure due to any lack of skill in following out the consequences which his premisses involved. The arguments used against him have thus an equally valid application to all who adopt the same general line of thought. For Bentham appears to have seen as clearly as any of his disciples the difficulty of bringing the egoistic basis of his theory of human nature into harmony with the universal reference required by his ethics.

    And the criticism already offered of the way in which Bentham attempts to bring about this connection may be shown not to be restricted to his special way of putting the case.

    It is necessary to remember that throughout this chapter we are looking from the individual's point of view, and inquiring how far it is possible to work from it in the direction of utilitarianism. Now it is admitted that, in pursuing his own happiness, he is sometimes led, and may be led on the whole, to neglect the general happiness.

    A sufficient reason for following the latter--or an obligation to do it--can therefore only come either from the supreme power or from one's fellow-men, and from the latter either as organised in the State, and expressing themselves by its constituted authorities, or else by the vaguer method of social praise and blame. Bentham's classification of the possible sources or kinds of duty into religious, political, and moral [or social], is therefore a natural consequence of the individualistic system.

    [Sidenote: (a) The religious sanction,]

    [Sidenote: relied on by Paley,]

    [Sidenote: inverts the relation between ethics and theology.]

    The first of these possible sources of duty is indeed only mentioned by Bentham, and then passed by. And yet it might seem that the religious sanction is a more efficient motive-power than the social, while it applies to regions of conduct which legal enactment cannot reach. Without question, the operation of such a motive is capable of bringing egoistic conduct into harmony with utilitarianism, or with any other principle of action to which the sanction may be attached.

    "Private happiness is our motive, and the will of God our rule," says Paley;[45] and in this case such conduct will be obligatory as the rule may arbitrarily determine; while, whatever it may be, there will be a strong enough motive to follow it. The whole fabric of a moral philosophy such as Paley's, therefore, rests on two theological propositions--that God has ordained the general happiness as the rule of human conduct, and that He will punish in another life those who disregard that rule.

    The basis of morality is laid in a divine command enforced by a divine threat. Perhaps it will be generally agreed that Bentham acted wisely in not laying stress on this application of the "religious sanction." Even those least inclined to theological agnosticism would reject any such rough-and-ready solution of the problem which deals with the relation of morality to the divine nature. Paley's method of treatment, they would say, inverts the relation in which theism stands to morality.

    The divine will cannot be thus arbitrarily connected with the moral law. It can be conceived to approve and sanction such an object as the happiness of mankind only when God is first of all regarded as a moral being, and the happiness of mankind as an object of moral action.

    If any relation of consequence can be asserted between them, the general happiness is to be regarded as a moral duty first, and only afterwards as a religious duty.

    [Sidenote: (b) Limits of the political sanction.]

    When he comes to the political sanction, Bentham's treatment wants nothing in respect of fulness, and even those who do not agree with his estimate of the infelicific character of many existing institutions and enactments will admit that even the best-intentioned legislator cannot make utilitarian conduct a political duty. We must bear in mind here, also, the effect which individual desires and opinions have not only on social judgments, but also on statute-law.

    In arguing on the relation of the individual to the State, we are too ready to forget that the State is represented by a legislator or body of legislators, and that we can never assume that in their cases private interest has already become identified with the larger interests of the community.[46] For were this the case, the accusation of class-legislation or private interest would not be heard so often as it is.

    [Sidenote: (c) Uncertainty of the social sanction,]

    A modern disciple of Bentham would thus be compelled, just as Bentham himself was, to make utilitarianism neither a political nor religious but a "moral" duty, enforced by and founded on the shifting and uncertain punishments or sanctions of society--what Professor Bain describes as "the unofficial expressions of disapprobation and the exclusion from social good offices."[47] But as a logical proof of utilitarianism, this means is, if possible, weaker than the preceding; for social opinion, though of somewhat wider applicability than legal enactment, has probably been, for the most part, in even less exact correspondence than it with the general happiness.

    The social sanction is strict on indifferent points of etiquette, does not consult the general interests of mankind on points of honour, and is lenient towards acts that the utilitarian moralist condemns.[48]

    [Sidenote: (d) and of the internal sanction so far as a result of the social.]

    Professor Bain, however, advances from the external disapprobation to an internal sanction--looking upon conscience as one of the powers which inflicts punishment, and lies at the source of the feeling of obligation. But if conscience is only "an ideal resemblance of public authority, growing up in the same individual mind, and working to the same end," it can, as little as its archetype, point to the maxim of utilitarianism.

    According to Professor Bain, it is through this sentiment--at first a mere imitation of external authority--that the individual becomes a law to himself, on recognising the utilities that led to the imposition of the law.[49] But on this theory, in so far as conscience continues to point to the conduct impressed upon it by its external pattern, it fails to correspond with the utilitarian maxim.

    If, on the other hand, it is modified by the comprehensive and unselfish view of the effects of conduct which utilitarianism demands, it must be at the expense of correcting its original edicts, and so far discrediting its authoritative claims.

    [Sidenote: Value of the social sanction]

    [Sidenote: apart from logical proof of utilitarianism.]

    The "social sanction" would be of much greater service if used to show how a solidarity is brought about between the interests and feelings of the individual and those of his neighbours, from which the utilitarian maxim may be arrived at by a generalisation of his principle of conduct as modified by the social impulse. But this would not constitute a logical justification of utilitarianism: it would show how the principle has been arrived at, but without giving a sufficient reason to the individual for adopting it.

    And this is really the tendency of much recent discussion--of Professor Bain's theory of conscience as a reflex of the external order, of George Grote's analysis of the moral sentiment, and of Mill's doctrine of the progressive identification of the individual's feelings with those of his neighbours through the gradual increase of sympathetic pleasures and pains: for it was to this source that Mill looked for the practical solution of the antinomy between his psychological and ethical theories, though he himself tried to pass from one position to the other by means of the "highway in the air" constructed by his own logic.

    • * * * *

    [Sidenote: 4. Mill's logical defence of utilitarianism:]

    Mill's attempt to pass by a logical method from psychological hedonism to utilitarianism is an instructive commentary on the difficulties which beset the transition. His work may be described as a vindication of the utilitarian morality, first, from the charge of sensualism; and secondly, from that of selfishness. And it is largely owing to his polemic that utilitarianism is no longer looked upon as either a sensual or a selfish theory. It is not sensual, unless, indeed, the pleasures of most men are of a sensual kind.

    So far from being selfish, it is almost stoical in the subordination of individual desires it enjoins. But Mill wished to do more than clear the character of utilitarian ethics. He wished to show a logical reason for utilitarians pursuing elevated pleasures rather than base ones, and to demonstrate the connection of his moral imperative with the principles which the school he belonged to laid down for human motives. In both these respects his failure is conspicuous.

    [Sidenote: (a) distinction of kinds of pleasure,]

    [Sidenote: determined by authority,]

    [Sidenote: either can be reduced to difference of quantity, or leads to non-hedonistic standard;]

    In the former endeavour, he went against Bentham by attempting to draw a distinction in kind amongst pleasures--a distinction not reducible to quantitative measurement. A higher degree of quality in the pleasure sought was to outweigh any difference in its amount or quantity. With this modification, utilitarianism is made to require a subordination of the lower or sensuous nature to the higher or intellectual nature.

    Pleasure, indeed, is still the end; but the "higher" pleasure takes precedence over the "lower," irrespective of the amount of pleasant feeling that results. Pleasure is still the standard, but not the ultimate standard; for a further appeal has to be made to the criterion that distinguishes one pleasure from another, not as merely greater or less, but as higher or lower. As is well known, Mill did not look either to the action or to the feeling itself for this criterion.

    To have done so would have implied an acknowledgment that pleasure was no longer regarded as the ultimate standard. He found the criterion of superiority simply in the opinion people of experience have about the relative desirability of various sorts of pleasure. But such a criterion only pushes the final question of the standard one step farther back. Those people of experience to whom Mill refers--who have tried both kinds of pleasure, and prefer one of them[50]--can they give no reason for, no account of, their preference?

    If so, to trust them is to appeal to blind authority, and to relinquish anything like a science of ethics.

    But, if Mill's authorities can reflect on their feelings, as well as feel, they can only tell us one or other of two things. Either the so-called "higher" pleasure is actually, as pleasure, so preferable to that called "lower," that the smallest amount of the one would be more pleasurable than the largest amount of the other; or else the higher is called higher, and is to be preferred to the lower--even although the latter may be greater as pleasure--because of a quality belonging to it over and above its character as pleasant feeling.

    The former verdict would be in the first place paradoxical, and, in the second place, would give up Mill's case, by reducing quality to a quantitative standard. Besides, it would be no valid ground of preference for men in general; since the pleasure of various actions and states differs according to the susceptibility of the subject.

    According to the latter verdict, the characteristic upon which the distinction of quality depends, and not pleasure itself, becomes the ethical standard.

    [Sidenote: (b) ambiguities in his proof of utilitarianism.]

    In respect of his main contention, that utilitarianism is a theory of beneficence, and not of prudence or of selfishness, Mill emphasised even more strongly than Bentham has done the distinction between the egoism which seeks its own things, and the utilitarianism according to which everybody counts for one, and nobody for more than one.

    But when he attempted to connect this doctrine logically with the psychological postulates of his school, he committed a double error.

    In the first place, he confused the purely psychological question of the motives that influence human conduct with the ethical question of the end to which conduct ought to be directed; and, in the second place, he disregarded the difference of end there may be for society as a collective whole, and for each member of the society individually.

    "There is in reality," he says,[51] "nothing desired except happiness;" and this psychological theory is too hastily identified with the ethical principle that happiness alone is desirable, or what ought to be desired and pursued.

    Moreover, "no reason," he says, "can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness." And this admission, which seems as good as saying that no reason at all can be given why the individual should desire the general happiness, is only held to be a sufficient reason for it, through assuming that what is good for all as an aggregate is good for each member of the aggregate: "That each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons."[52]

    • * * * *

    [Sidenote: Imperfect coherence of ethical and theoretical philosophy.]

    It may appear strange to offer the preceding as the logical basis of an ethical principle which has had so wide and, on the whole, beneficial an influence as utilitarianism. The explanation is to be found in the want of full coherence which often exists, and is nowhere commoner than in English ethics, between an author's practical view of life and the foundation of psychology or metaphysics with which it is connected.

    It would certainly be wrong to imagine that Bentham's self-denying labours rested on a confusion of standpoints, or that Mill's moral enthusiasm had no other support than a logical quibble. To both of them, and to many others, utilitarianism was an ethical creed influencing their lives, which was scarcely connected with the attempt to justify it logically. Such reasons in its favour as they adduced were rather after-thoughts for the defence of their creed than the foundations on which it was built.

    [Sidenote: 5. Actual transition to utilitarianism.]

    The formula of utilitarianism cannot be expressed as the conclusion of a syllogism or of an inductive inference. It seems rather to have been arrived at by the production--or the recognition--of a sympathetic or "altruistic" sentiment, which was made to yield a general principle for the guidance of conduct This process involves two steps, which are consecutive and complementary, although the positions they connect are not necessarily related.

    The first step is to overcome the selfish principle of action in the individual; the second to generalise it and obtain a principle for the non-selfish action that results. Mill seems to be the only recent writer who, in making this transition, adheres strictly to the psychological hedonism distinctive of his school. He looks to the influence of education in increasing the feeling of unity between one man and his neighbours, till individual action becomes merged in altruistic or social action.

    "The social state," he says, "is at once so natural, so necessary, and so habitual to man, that, except in some unusual circumstances, or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, he never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body."[53] This is perfectly true, but does not imply a sublation of selfishness. A man "never conceives himself otherwise than as a member of a body;" but it does not follow from this that he will subordinate his own interests to the interests of the other members when the two clash.

    In cases of conflict the individual often tends to sacrifice the good of his neighbours to his own good; and he may do so although he fully recognises the social consequences of action, just because he still remains at the ethical standpoint which treats private good as superior to public.

    It is true, as Mill contends, that, "in an improving state of the human mind, the influences are constantly on the increase, which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; which feeling, if perfect, would make him never think of, or desire, any beneficial condition for himself, in the benefits of which they are not included."[54] But this is not sufficient to connect the two antagonistic poles of Mill's system.

    It starts with assuming the notion of an "improving state" of the human mind, as determined according to an ethical standard not yet arrived at; and it gives no valid account of the means by which the improvement is to be brought about. It is prophetic of a time when the motives of human nature will have been so modified that the antagonism between self and others will be no longer felt; but it offers no practical solution of the antinomy suited to present circumstances.

    [Sidenote: (a) recognition of Sympathy]

    [Sidenote: as disinterested, by Bain,]

    The basis of the ethical sentiment by which the desires and actions of a man are to be brought into harmony with those of his fellows is investigated in a more thorough manner by Professor Bain and by George Grote. But both of these writers stand on a somewhat different platform from the strict psychological hedonism which Mill never relinquished.

    Thus Grote enumerates as "elementary tendencies of the mind," which ethical sentiment presupposes, and out of which it is compounded, self-regarding tendencies, sympathetic tendencies, benevolent affections, malevolent affections, and (though in a smaller degree) love and hatred of those who cause pleasure and pain to others;[55] and this without interpreting sympathy, in the way that Mill does, as having for its end the pleasures which come with the gratification of the sympathetic impulse, or the removal of the pain caused by its restraint.

    As Professor Bain argues, this position of Mill's "is tenable only on the ground that the omission of a disinterested act that we are inclined to, would give us so much pain that it is on the whole for our comfort that we should make the requisite sacrifice. There is plausibility in this supposition."

    But "the doctrine breaks down when we try it upon extreme cases....

    All that people usually suffer from stifling a generous impulse is too slight and transient to be placed against any important sacrifice."[56] In recognising sympathy as a "purely disinterested" impulse,[57] Mr Bain breaks loose at an important point from the psychology of Bentham. He is indeed only kept from a complete break with it by the position he ascribes to sympathy as outside of the ordinary sphere of voluntary action.

    Above all things, it would seem to be necessary that nothing should conflict with "our character as rational beings, which is to desire everything exactly according to its pleasure-value."[58] But sympathy obviously "clashes with the regular outgoings of the will in favour of our pleasures;" so that it ought to be placed outside voluntary action, and regarded simply as "a remarkable and crowning instance of the Fixed Idea."[59]

    [Sidenote: without being applied to determine the ethical end,]

    It is owing to its exclusion, as a fixed idea, from the sphere of voluntary conduct, that sympathetic appropriation of the feelings of others has little or no place assigned it by Professor Bain, when he goes on[60] to describe the way in which the moral opinions of men have actually originated. They have, he holds, a twofold source--the one arising from the necessity for public security, the other being of sentimental origin. The former makes society ordain those acts and services required for its own preservation.

    The latter leads to the confusion of this necessary element of morality with the sentimental likes and dislikes which may be characteristic of different people.

    These are "mixed up in one code with the imperative duties that hold society together;" and it is only when "we disentangle this complication, and refer each class of duties to their proper origin," that we can "obtain a clear insight into the foundations of morality."[61] Morality, therefore, is that which is imposed by society for its own preservation and security, and which is sanctioned by the punishments of society either in its "public judicial acts," or "by the unofficial expressions of disapprobation and the exclusion from social good offices."[62] Of this external law the moral sense or conscience is merely a subjective mirror or copy.

    The duty of unselfishness is not connected with the disinterested impulse of sympathy, but is traced to the external order of society, which has found it necessary to restrain the self-seeking action of individuals--a restraint which has come to be transferred to the consciences of the members of the society.

    Mr Bain's theory falls back in this way upon external authority, just as Bentham's did; and, for the same reasons, they are neither of them able to prescribe the utilitarian principle of conduct. But, in his assertion of the disinterested nature of sympathy, Mr Bain has introduced--though he has not himself utilised--a fruitful principle, by means of which a basis of moral sentiment may be found by means of which it is possible to escape from ethical as well as psychological egoism.

    [Sidenote: and by Grote.]

    This element of sympathy is most fully recognised in the instructive analysis of ethical sentiment by the late George Grote. At the same time, Grote does not, like Adam Smith, for instance, attempt to evolve the material characteristics of approbation and disapprobation from this source. The mere putting of one's self in the place of a spectator--or in that of the patient--instead of that of the agent, is only a formal change, which will modify our judgments or feelings without accounting for their actual content.

    But a uniform formal element in all ethical sentiment is, according to Grote, a man's "constant habit of viewing and judging of circumstances around him," both from the point of view of the agent and from that of the patient.[63] This twofold position is occupied by every individual.

    He is an agent, and in that position his own interests and feelings are separate from, and often at variance with, those of others. But he is also a patient in respect of the actions of others, and in that position his interests and his feelings are commonly in unison with those of the majority.

    Hence a man is led constantly to adopt ideally the point of view which is not actually his own at the time, so that "the idea of the judgment which others will form becomes constantly and indissolubly associated with the idea of action in the mind of every agent." In every community, certain actions are visited with the admiration, esteem, and protection of the society; certain other actions with the opposite feelings and results: so that there arises "an association in my mind of a certain line of conduct on the part both of myself and of any other individual agent, with a certain sentiment resulting from such conduct, and excited by it, in the minds of the general public around us.

    It is a sentiment of regulated social reciprocity as between the agent and the society amongst which he lives." And this sentiment, when enforced by a sanction, constitutes the complete form of ethical sentiment.

    As a complete explanation of the moral sentiments and judgments of men, this theory does not seem to be above criticism. It requires not only an association between every personal action and the feelings--sympathetically imagined by the agent--with which the action will be regarded by others, but it also implies that this association has become so inseparable that the feeling appears as an individual or personal one, distinguished by the subject from other sentiments which he has on consciously imagining himself in the position of others.

    But it is referred to here as illustrating what we find in Mill, and, in a different way, in Professor Bain, that the first real step towards the utilitarian standard is to make the individual pass somehow or other to a standpoint outside his own nature. In Mill this is done mainly by the assertion of the social nature of man, in Grote by showing how a moral sentiment may be arrived at by the combined action of sympathy and association.

    [Sidenote: (b) The idea of Equality]

    [Sidenote: necessary to regulate sympathy;]

    The further influence required in the transition to utilitarianism is the idea of equality. The best expression of utilitarian doctrine followed soon after the assertion of the equal rights of men which signalised the politics of the end of last century in the French and American revolutions. Bentham was permeated by the spirit of this movement, however far he might be from accepting its abstractions about natural rights. In his hands, too, utilitarianism was a political rather than an ethical doctrine.

    "Everybody to count for one and nobody for more than one" follows naturally from the phrase, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Without this assertion of the necessity of an equal distribution, there is no safeguard against sympathy being restricted and partial in its operation.

    Indeed the feeling of sympathy in itself is naturally strongest towards those with whom one is in most frequent relation, or connected by numerous associative ties; and if left to itself, it might therefore be expected to give rise to the extended selfishness of class or family interest, only relieved by a spasmodic humanitarianism.

    This tendency is corrected by the dogma of human equality, which had been formulated as a juridical maxim in the Roman Jus Gentium, but afterwards passed into a political creed, and found vent in the literature of the eighteenth century and in the public events which marked its close.

    [Sidenote: influence of the idea on Bentham.]

    The change which this notion of human equality--passed through has been traced by Sir Henry Maine.

    "Where the Roman jurisconsult had written 'æquales sunt,' meaning exactly what he said, the modern civilian wrote 'all men are equal' in the sense of 'all men ought to be equal.' The peculiar Roman idea that natural law coexisted with civil law and gradually absorbed it, had evidently been lost sight of, or had become unintelligible, and the words that had at most conveyed a theory concerning the origin, composition, and development of human institutions, were beginning to express the sense of a great standing wrong suffered by mankind."[64] Now Bentham, however far he may have been from trusting to the system of 'natural law,'[65] was certainly not beyond the influence of the idea of human equality which it carried in its train; and, from his own point of view, he laboured to defend it.

    In assimilating this idea, utilitarianism has preserved one of the best results of the old "law of nature," without the ambiguity with which it had formerly been used,[66] if in a sense which admits of a somewhat narrow and abstract interpretation.

    It is true that this does not give exactly the result which is usually described as utilitarianism. I have spoken of the notion of equality as the regulator of sympathy--a canon in accordance with which the sympathetic impulse is to be guided. Sympathy impels us to relieve the pains and increase the pleasures of our fellow-men.

    The principle of equality dictates that this sympathetic activity is to be directed to the happiness of all men equally. Every one whom our conduct may be made to affect is to count as a unit, and a unit only. The distribution is not to be according to kinship of blood or social ties, though it is so much more in our power to promote the happiness of those closely connected with us, that it may fairly occupy a larger share of our thought and energy than the happiness of other people does. Utilitarianism carries the application of the principle of equality still farther, by looking upon self as a unit whose happiness is to be regarded as of exactly equal value with that of any one else.

    With every individual reduced to the same ethical worth, happiness is declared to be the end of moral action, and equality of distribution the rule for deciding between the claims of competing individuals.

    [Sidenote: 6. The two sides of utilitarian theory not logically connected.]

    It seems to me, therefore, that utilitarianism is a theory compounded out of two quite different elements. On the one side the basis of the theory has been laid by Bentham and Mill in a naturalistic psychology which looks upon pleasure as the only object of desire. To this there is superadded the idea of equality, which is the distinctively ethical element in the theory. But it is only by confusion that the idea of equality--which Bentham expresses by the proposition that the happiness of one man is to count for no more than the happiness of another--can be supposed to be derived from the same theory of human nature as that which identifies pleasure and desire.

    Utilitarianism only becomes a practicable end for individual conduct when psychological hedonism has been given up. It is futile to say that one ought to pursue the greatest happiness of the greatest number, unless it is possible for the individual to act for something else than his own pleasure--that is, for an end which is for him not pleasure at all. In a word, utilitarianism, while maintaining that the only thing worth desiring is pleasure, must at the same time admit that pleasure is not the only object that can be or is desired: otherwise, it can never advance from the egoistic to the universalistic form.

    This view receives confirmation from the way in which utilitarianism is held by the most eminent of living moralists. In the 'Methods of Ethics,' the tradition of Bentham is expressly united with the doctrines of Butler and Clarke. Professor Sidgwick agrees with Bentham, and the long line of moralists from Epicurus downwards, in maintaining the doctrine of ethical hedonism, that pleasure is the only thing ultimately desirable; but, with Butler, he rejects the psychological hedonism, according to which pleasure is the only object of desire.

    So far from these two positions being inconsistent, it is only through the second that the first can be held in its universalistic form. The problem is, however, how to unite them. In Professor Sidgwick's theory, they are connected by the application of the ethical maxims of benevolence and equity, which an exhaustive examination of ethical intuitions has left standing as axioms of the practical reason. Though utilitarianism, therefore, is still adhered to, it is on an expressly Rational ground, not on the basis of Naturalism.

    • * * * *

    [Sidenote: 7. Summary of ethical consequences of psychological hedonism:]

    In this and the previous chapter, I have looked at human nature from the point of view of psychological hedonism, and have endeavoured to show what ethical principles that theory leads to, or is consistent with. The theory does not deny that there is a great diversity of capacities and interests in man.

    But it holds that, so far as concerns conduct, they admit of being brought under one general law--that every action is subject to the rule of the "two sovereign masters, pleasure and pain." It is evident, therefore, that if ethics is to be connected at all with psychology--if what ought to be done is in any degree what can be done--the end of conduct must be hedonistic. The psychological fact cannot indeed be without more ado turned into a moral imperative.

    Yet this much may be admitted, that if this interpretation of action leaves room for ethics at all, the end prescribed can be nothing else than pleasure, or the avoidance of pain.

    [Sidenote: (a) no logical connection with utilitarianism;]

    The question, therefore, was how to determine the pleasure which is to be sought? And I have tried to show, in the chapter just concluded, that utilitarianism does not admit of being logically arrived at from this point of view. It may indeed, under certain circumstances,[67] be the guide of political or social enactments; but these can only be made to bear upon the conduct of individuals by the sanctions which the State or Society has at its command.

    The individual can have as his maxim of conduct an end which corresponds with utilitarianism in two events only: when he is so constituted as to find his pleasure in the greatest aggregate pleasure of mankind, or when the political and social sanctions are so complete and searching as to make his individual interest and the collective interest coincide.

    The former event is unfortunately too rare to be taken into account in establishing a theory; the latter would imply an interference with individual liberty so impracticable that it is not contemplated even in the most comprehensive of socialistic schemes.

    [Sidenote: (b) admits of rational egoism]

    [Sidenote: only under impossible conditions.]

    Hedonism in psychology, therefore, means egoism in ethics. But even this theory, as the previous chapter has shown, has its own difficulties to meet. The antagonism of individual and universal has not yet been got rid of. The difficulty is no longer caused by the conflict between one man and his neighbours: it is the difference between the feeling and action of a moment, and the sum of feelings and actions which makes up a lifetime.

    It is true that, if we admit that pleasure is the only thing worth pursuing, and that by "pleasure" a man means "his own pleasure," there is so far no reason for preferring the pleasure of one moment to that of another, except as more certain or of greater amount or degree;[68] but this is to start with ascribing a value to pleasure, and not with the simple fact that pleasure is desired.

    If psychological hedonism is our starting-point--and we give to the theory the interpretation that has the greatest verisimilitude--it is the greatest present pleasure that rules. And, although the man of reflection will no doubt attempt to estimate the future pleasure at its true value in comparison with the pleasure actually present, this can never have full effect upon his will.

    It has been shown, indeed, that the realisation of egoistic hedonism is not merely unattainable from the point of view of psychological hedonism, but that it would involve conditions inconsistent with the nature of desire.

    FOOTNOTES:

    [31] Professor Bain distinguishes with greater clearness than his predecessors, first, legal duty, or that the contravention of which is punished by the ministers of the state; secondly, moral duty, enforced by the unofficial punishment of social disapprobation; and thirdly, the conduct which society leaves to individual choice, without censuring either its commission or omission. Moral duty is further distinguished by him from the meritorious, or conduct which society encourages by approval, without censuring its omission.

    [32] Mr Gurney's attempt (Mind, vii. 349 ff.) to rationalise the utilitarian "ought" depends upon the assumption that the individual feels a desire (not only for his own, but) for other people's pleasure (p. 352). From the point of view of the psychological hedonist, however, this desire is only secondary and derivative, depending upon the fact that it increases the pleasure of the subject.

    "Your pleasure," the psychological hedonist would say, "is desired by me quâ my pleasure." If, on the other hand, it is admitted that the individual has other ends than his own pleasure, there seems no ground in psychological fact for limiting these ends to something aimed at because pleasurable to others. From this point of view the first step in the establishment of an ethical theory would be an attempt to find a principle of unity in the various ends actually aimed at by individuals, and recognised by them as "good."

    This is made by Professor Sidgwick, who, while allowing that "it is possible to hold that the objective relations of conscious minds which we call cognition of Truth, contemplation of Beauty, Freedom of action, &c., are good, independently of the pleasures that we derive from them," maintains that "we can only justify to ourselves the importance that we attach to any of these objects by considering its conduciveness, in one way or another, to the happiness of conscious (or sentient) beings" (Methods of Ethics, iii. xiv. 3, 3d ed., p. 398).

    But Mr Sidgwick's Utilitarianism depends on a Rational view of human nature which is beyond the scope of the present discussion. See below, p. 74.

    [33] Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. iii. § 1; Works, i. 14.

    [34] As Paley put it, with characteristic plainness of statement, "We can be obliged to nothing, but what we ourselves are to gain or lose something by."--Moral and Political Philosophy, book ii. chap. ii.

    [35] Cf. Bain, Emotions, p. 264: "I consider that the proper meaning or import of these terms [Morality, Duty, Obligation, or Right] refers to the class of actions enforced by the sanction of punishment."

    [36] Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. xix. (xvii.), § 9 ff; Works, i. 144 ff.

    [37] Ibid., § 20, p. 148.

    [38] Fragment on Government, chap. v.; Works, i. 293. Cf. Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. iii. § 5, p. 14, where the Moral Sanction is said to proceed from "such chance persons in the community as the person in question may happen in the course of his life to have concerns with."

    [39] Bentham, Fragment on Government, loc. cit.

    [40] Works, xi. 95; cf. J. Grote, Utilitarian Philosophy, p. 137.

    [41] Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. xix. (xvii.), § 7 ff.

    [42] Loc. cit., § 8, p. 144.

    [43] "Ought" is inappropriate here according to Bentham's principles, since there is no question of punishment inflicted by a political or social or religious superior.

    [44] Loc. cit., § 20, p. 148.

    [45] Moral and Political Philosophy, book ii. chap. iii.

    [46] This is clearly recognised by Bentham: "The actual end [as distinguished from the right and proper end] of government is," he says, "in every political community, the greatest happiness of those, whether one or many, by whom the powers of government are exercised."--Constitutional Code, book i., Introd., § 2; Works, ix. 5.

    [47] The Emotions and the Will, p. 264.

    [48] Cf. Bain, The Emotions and the Will, p. 287. Professor Bain says (Emotions, p. 276 n.), "we ought to have a written code of public morality, or of the duties imposed by society, over and above what parliament imposes, and this should not be a loosely written moral treatise, but a strict enumeration of what society requires under pain of punishment by excommunication or otherwise,--the genuine offences that are not passed over." This would certainly be very desirable, were it not from the nature of the case impracticable.

    Popular judgment as to a man's conduct,--what society imposes,--is one of the things most difficult to predict: it is under the influence of most heterogeneous causes, personal, industrial, religious, political, &c. I do not think, for instance, that any one could safely undertake to describe exactly the kind of actions which will infallibly call forth the censure of British public opinion, or that of the smaller and intersecting groups into which society is divided.

    [49] Emotions, p. 288.

    [50] I have spoken, for simplicity's sake, as if there were two kinds of pleasure easily distinguishable. But the question is really much more complicated.

    [51] Utilitarianism, p. 57.

    [52] Ibid., p. 53.

    [53] Utilitarianism, p. 46. But no statement of the sociality of man could be more explicit or satisfactory than that of Butler, Sermons, i.

    [54] Utilitarianism, p. 48.

    [55] Fragments on Ethical Subjects (1876), p. 6.

    [56] The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed., p. 295.

    [57] Ibid., p. 111; cf. Mind, viii. 55: "The important exceptions to the law of Pleasure and Pain are (1) Fixed Ideas, (2) Habits, and (3) Disinterested action for others."

    [58] Emotions, p. 438.

    [59] Emotions, p. 121.

    [60] Ibid., p. 271 ff.

    [61] Ibid., p. 273.

    [62] Ibid., p. 264.

    [63] Fragments on Ethical Subjects, p. 8 f.

    [64] Ancient Law, 8th ed., p. 93.

    [65] Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. ii. § 14 n.

    [66] The ambiguity of the phrase is explained in an interesting way in Sir H. Maine's account of the change from its juridical to a political or ethical meaning. In some writers it seems to have a third and still different signification. We must thus distinguish (1) the juridical meaning, originating in the Roman "law common to all nations," which had arisen through the "constant levelling or removal of irregularities which went on wherever the prætorian system was applied to the cases of foreign litigants," modified subsequently by the Greek conception of ἰσότης (~isotês~). (2) The political meaning, that all men ought to be equal, arose from the preceding.

    But its notion of "ought" seems often to depend on an idea of the constitution of nature according to which all men are actually born equal--not only in rights, soon to be obscured by human convention, but also in power or faculty, afterwards unequally developed by education. Hence (3) the natural meaning. The doctrines of evolution and heredity have made this view seem as strange to us now as it would have done to the Romans from whom it was illegitimately derived.

    Yet at one time it seems to have been assumed, almost without question, that there is but little difference in the natural endowments of different men. This assumption lay at the basis of Hobbes's political theory--Leviathan, I. xiii. p. 60,--was stated in a more guarded form by Locke--On Education, § 1; Works, ed. of 1824, i.

    6,--and adopted almost without qualification by Helvétius, who, carrying out Locke's metaphor of the soul as, at birth, a "tabula rasa," afterwards written over with the pen of experience, says: "Quintilien, Locke, et moi, disons: L'inégalité des esprits est l'effet d'une cause connue, et cette cause est la différence de l'éducation"--the causes of the existing inequality being afterwards stated as twofold: first, the difference of environment, which may be called chance; and secondly, the difference of strength in the desire for instruction.--De l'homme, II. i., III. i., IV. xxii.; Œuvres, ii.

    71, 91, 280. (Quintilian's statement, however, is even more guarded than Locke's. Cf. Opera, ed. Spalding, i. 47.)

    [67] That is, when (1) the legislature accurately expresses the average feeling of all the members of the State; or (2) the legislators happen to be fully intelligent people in whom "selfishness" has taken the shape of benevolence.

    [68] Although, as is well known, propinquity was held by Bentham to be an independent ground of distinction and preference.--Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. iv, sect. 2.

    CHAPTER IV.

    MORAL SENTIMENT.

    [Sidenote: 1. A uniform theory such as psychological hedonism]

    Psychological hedonism possesses the merit of offering a simple and uniform theory of mental action. It may admit conflicting accounts of the kinds of action and sufferance which actually give men pleasure and pain,--a point on which, for example, Hobbes and J. S. Mill differ widely. But it has one general formula for the relation of feeling to action, which has been precise and clear enough to attract many psychologists. The ethical consequences of the theory have, indeed, turned out--if the argument of the preceding chapters is valid--to be neither so obvious nor so satisfactory as its adherents have commonly supposed.

    But it must nevertheless be admitted that, if psychology shows pleasure to be, as a matter of fact, the constant end of action, it will be useless--even if it is not impossible--for ethics to prescribe any other end.

    [Sidenote: not supplied by the opponents of ethical hedonism,]

    The opponents of ethical hedonism have thus uniformly insisted that the theory which makes pleasure the end and motive of all conscious activity is imperfect; and this psychological question has been the battle-field of many of the controversies, at any rate, of English ethics. Psychological hedonism has not, however, been confronted by the English moralists with an opposed theory of equal simplicity, nor can the controversy be said to have led to a thorough analysis of action.

    The psychological investigation has, in most cases, been carried no farther than the ethical interests at stake seemed to require; and the predominance of these interests has perhaps prevented the inquiry from being carried out with complete freedom from preconception on either side.

    A uniform theory under which our various particular desires might be brought may, indeed, be said to have been suggested by Butler.

    He meets the hedonistic proposition that all desire is for personal pleasure, by the doctrine that no particular desire has pleasure as its end, since all pleasure presupposes a previous desire in the satisfaction of which it consists.[69] This theory, which may have been derived from Plato,[70] and was afterwards used by Schopenhauer to prove the negative nature of pleasure and consequent worthlessness of life, is, however, a generalisation which cannot be made to include the whole facts to be taken account of.[71] Many pleasures occur independently of any precedent desire.

    And what Butler had to show--and was really concerned to show--was that desire was not exclusively directed to objects thus independently found to be pleasurable: the contradictory, that is to say, and not the contrary, of psychological hedonism.

    [Sidenote: in maintaining the reality of non-hedonistic activity.]

    For this purpose Butler pointed to the whole class of affections which, although they may also tend to private interest, have an immediate reference to the good of others; and, in addition to these, he contended for an original principle of benevolence towards others in human nature, as well as of self-love or care for one's own interests and happiness.

    This latter, he held, so far from being the sole principle of action, implied the existence of a number of particular passions and affections, directed immediately to external objects--the satisfaction of these desires giving pleasure, though pleasure was not the end they aimed at.

    Voluntary action is thus not brought under any common rubric; for, at the same time that the calm principle of self-love is directed to the agent's greatest pleasure, the object of hunger, for example, is said to be not pleasure but food, that of benevolence not personal pleasure but the good of others.

    [Sidenote: Non-hedonistic action generalised by Herbart,]

    [Sidenote: from the tendency of ideas to self-realisation.]

    The attempt to give unity to the non-hedonistic view of desire has come from a different quarter. Uninfluenced by the exigencies of ethical controversy, which formed the entire motive of Butler's investigation, Herbart and his school have worked out a theory of desire, which has many points of comparison with that of Butler.

    However much they may differ from the English moralist--of whose existence they are mostly ignorant--they are at one with him in rejecting the maxim of psychological hedonism, nihil appetimus nisi sub specie boni; and their differences from him are largely due to their having gone further in their analysis of the facts, and endeavoured to bring them under a general principle.

    Butler's view of the object of desire is distinguished from the Herbartian chiefly in two respects. In the first place, he identifies that object with the external or real thing, whereas Herbart is careful to point out that it is a presentation or idea. In the second place, while Butler is content to postulate an original tendency of our nature towards certain objects, Herbart attempts to get behind this tendency, and explain the phenomena of striving from the interaction of presentations.

    Over and above the ordinary hypothesis of natural realism, Butler's theory implies a sort of pre-established harmony between our active tendencies and things outside the mind, in virtue of which some of these things do, and some do not, attract our desires.

    Herbart, on the other hand, attempts nothing less than a complete genetic account of mental phenomena, explaining the facts of presentation, desire, and feeling through "the persistence of presentation in consciousness and their rise into clearer consciousness."[72] The phenomena of desire and feeling are both accounted for by this mechanism of impelling and inhibiting forces.[73]

    [Sidenote: This tendency recognised in the doctrine of fixed ideas]

    It would be beyond the scope of this Essay to examine the above view of the active side of mental phenomena. For present purposes it is enough to draw attention to the fact that the common deduction of the phenomena of desire and will from the feelings of pleasure and pain is not the only "scientific" theory of human action, and that it is rejected on its merits by writers who have no hankering after what the psychological hedonist would call the mystical element of free-will.

    It is of interest to note, too, that Professor Bain, in whose works the traditions of psychological hedonism find their most careful expression, has modified the doctrine so as to allow of desire of pleasure and avoidance of pain explaining less than had been formerly required of them.

    Outside the circle of hedonistically-determined motives, he recognises the influence of the presentation or idea as a self-realising element in the individual consciousness, apart from its pleasurable or painful characteristics.[74] Those "fixed ideas," as Mr Bain calls them, tend both to persist in the mind, and to project themselves into action, independently of pleasure and pain--or at least with a force which is out of proportion to the pleasure they bring.

    As has been already seen, it is by means of this doctrine that he explains "the great fact of our nature denominated sympathy, fellow-feeling, pity, compassion, disinterestedness."[75] To the same category belongs "much of the ambition and the aspirations of human beings....

    A certain notion--say of power, wealth, grandeur--has fixed itself in our mind and keeps a persistent hold there." It is asserted, indeed, that the action of such fixed ideas "perverts the regular operation of the will which would lead us to renounce whatever is hopeless or not worth the cost." And, certainly, their admission among mental phenomena seems to imply the superposition of a new theory of action upon the old theory of psychological hedonism. There is no disguising the importance of the modification thus introduced.

    The name "fixed idea" is misleading if it be taken to imply that persistency and tendency to action are properties belonging to a certain class of ideas only. Mr Bain's doctrine is founded on the hypothesis of the identity of the nervous centres which function in representation and in sensation, and is therefore valid of all representations or ideas.

    The characteristics of persistency, and of tendency to action, are therefore normal characteristics of presentations, though they may belong in an unusual degree to some ideas from the relation these hold to the dominant cluster of ideas in the individual consciousness.

    And if we thus attribute to all ideas without exception the tendency to self-realisation, and recognise--as we must--the relation of mutual assistance or inhibition which ideas bear to one another in virtue of their being "presented" to the same subject, we have granted the material out of which, in Herbart's skilful "Mechanik des Geistes," the phenomena of feeling and desire are woven.

    • * * * *

    [Sidenote: 2. The non-hedonistic theory of action.]

    The view of individual human nature, which holds that all its desires are not directed to personal pleasure, thus claims consideration.

    With its less restricted theory of action, this doctrine may seem to offer a larger means of determining the appropriate end of human conduct. In particular, the suggestion naturally occurs that the ethical end will, on this theory, be something else than pleasure.[76] But there is, nevertheless, no contradiction in holding--as Mr Sidgwick does--that although other objects than pleasure are actually desired, there is nothing else which can be held to be ultimately desirable, or the tendency to which can be said to have moral worth.

    [Sidenote: Difficulty of unifying the various impulses it implies,]

    The ethical barrenness of psychological hedonism has been seen to result from its narrow and inflexible view of human nature. But theories such as those now to be considered have, in an ethical regard, to overcome a difficulty of another kind in the variety of impulses which they admit upon the stage. The "objects" to which these impulses or desires relate have as yet received no further characterisation than that they are objects of desire. And the difficulty of finding a principle by which some order of precedence or value amongst them may be determined is just, in other words, the difficulty of obtaining a moral standard.

    [Sidenote: so as to determine a standard for action.]

    The question does not ordinarily arise in the above form, because the moral standard is commonly taken for granted, and the various impulses, affections, and dispositions are made to derive their ethical rank from their relation to that standard. But this method is obviously inappropriate when the standard is still to be ascertained, its determination being the object of inquiry. And it may seem that the constitution of man contains in itself a means of distinguishing the moral value of its various elements, or of the actions to which they lead, and thus furnishing a moral standard or end for conduct.

    This purpose seems to have been to some extent, though not quite clearly, kept in view by the writers who, in last century, contended against the selfish theory which had been so crudely enunciated by Hobbes. They attempted to show that selfishness was not the only, nor even the most prominent, principle of action; and, from the system of diverse principles which they found implanted in human nature, they endeavoured to work out a theory of conduct.

    [Sidenote: This attempted by the English moralists,]

    [Sidenote: but along with a utilitarian criterion,]

    [Sidenote: and with egoistic arguments.]

    Especially amongst the later English moralists--Adam Smith, for instance--the question of the end or standard came almost to drop out of sight in the midst of the controversy regarding the nature of the "moral sense" or "moral faculty"--the way, that is, in which we become aware of the difference between right and wrong. But in Shaftesbury, Butler, and Hutcheson--the writers who formulated this doctrine of the moral sense--the attempt is made to connect a theory of the criterion of morality with the source of our knowledge of it.

    Shaftesbury and Hutcheson both looked upon social welfare or the general happiness as the end of moral conduct, and the criterion in accordance with which moral character is ascribed to actions; at the same time that their main contention was for the immediateness of the "sense" by which we perceive these moral qualities.

    And they sought to establish the connection of the two doctrines by means of the benevolent feelings--which they held to be original and independent of private interest--and their immediate approval by the reflex or moral sense of the individual man. Similar ideas appear in Butler, at the same time that he tended to make conscience or the moral sense the standard of morality, as well as the source of our knowledge of it. They, as well as he, however, found it necessary to come back from the social or political to the individual point of view.

    Even if their conception of "the good" was not evolved from the nature of the individual man, their philosophical standpoint required them to leave broader ground, and show it to be the individual's natural goal. And in doing this, their constant tendency is to revert to egoistic arguments--demonstrating the complete harmony of virtue and interest, or attempting to prove to the individual that his own happiness consists in the exercise of the social affections.

    Thus Shaftesbury tries to show, by an empirical collection of results, that to have the "natural" (or social) affections too weak, or the private affections too strong, is a source of misery,[77] as well as the chief source of vice; and that, largely owing to the pleasure of virtuous action, it is "to the private interest and good of every one to work to the general good."[78] Hutcheson, again, devotes a large portion of his most mature work to allay the suspicion "that in following the impulse of our kind affections and the moral faculty we are counteracting our interests, and abandoning what may be of more consequence to our happiness than either this self-approbation or the applauses of others;"[79] while Butler, referring to virtuous conduct, says, in a well-known passage, that "when we sit down in a cool hour we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it."[80] Opposed as the whole school were to the selfish theory of human action, they never spoke of any sacrifice of private happiness as a thing to be looked for, or in any way taken into account, in conduct which is the result of calm deliberation.

    It is difficult, therefore, to avoid the judgment passed upon them by Schleiermacher, that "the English school of Shaftesbury, with all their talk about virtue, are really given up to pleasure."[81]

    [Sidenote: 3. Ethics may be made to depend on the moral sense.]

    At the same time, their writings constantly suggest a theory of morals which is neither obliged to adopt off-hand a utilitarian criterion of virtue, nor forced to fall back upon the egoistic sanctions of personal pleasure and pain. Their psychological theory points to an ethical doctrine in which pleasure is neither the sole end of action, nor its sole motive.

    They do not, indeed, make quite clear the transition from the psychological to the ethical point of view; and critics are still fond of confronting Butler with the objection he anticipated--Why ought I to obey my conscience? The apparent petitio principii of Butler's answer, Because it is the law of your nature, is due to the way in which the teleological standpoint is introduced.

    The purpose of which (according to Butler) man is the vehicle or realising organism is spoken of as a law externally imposed, and deriving its authority, not from its own nature, but from the nature of its origin.

    [Sidenote: Different views of the nature of the moral sense.]

    There would seem to be one way only to surmount the difficulty arising from the variety of impulses of which the nature of man is made up, and that is by consistently following out the teleological point of view. But what, the question is, is the final or comprehensive end to which human nature points amidst this diversity of objects of striving? The doctrine of the "moral sense" attempts to answer the question.

    Now this moral sense may either be regarded as not itself a separate faculty, but simply an expression for the harmony of human tendencies; or it may be looked upon as a separate and superior capacity, which, again, may either be interpreted in terms of sense, or of the understanding--the former interpretation leading to its identification with pleasure, the latter to its being conceived as law.

    • * * * *

    [Sidenote: (a) The harmony of impulses. Shaftesbury's theory.]

    These different methods were attempted by the English moralists--the first, however, to a less extent than the others. But it inspired much of Shaftesbury's work, though it cannot be said to have been consistently developed by him. The conflict of impulses in man was too obvious a fact not to be apparent even in Shaftesbury's roseate view of life. He recognised, indeed, not only private or self-affections, promoting the good of the individual, and "natural" or social affections, which led to the public good, but also "unnatural affections," which tended to no good whatever.[82] The reference to consequences is thus made prominent at once.

    The last class of affections is condemned outright because of its infelicific results; while an attempt is made to prove from experience that the courses of conduct to which the two former lead coincide. Shaftesbury contended for a real organic union between the individual and society; but, when he came to establish its nature, he made it consist in an asserted harmony of interests, while the obligation to virtue was allowed to rest on its conduciveness to personal pleasure.

    He sometimes spoke of virtue as identical with the harmonious development of the affections of the individual man;[83] but he expressly defined it as consisting in the individual "having all his inclinations and affections ... agreeing with the good of his kind or of that system in which he is included, and of which he constitutes a part."[84] And the two views can only be connected by proving that the harmonious development of an individual's affections will lead to the good of the species: the proof of this depending on a one-sided summation of consequences.

    Shaftesbury does, indeed, throw out the idea that both the self-affections and the "natural" or social affections become self-destructive when carried out so as to interfere with one another. But this, again, has only the previous calculus of the results of conduct to support it. He cannot show that the contradiction in the conception of a completely solitary being belongs also to the conception of a judiciously selfish being. The latter being loses the pleasures of virtuous action; but perhaps he may gain greater pleasures in their room.

    He does not develop his whole nature; but if that nature contains totally infelicific passions, the development of the whole nature is not to be recommended.

    Thus Shaftesbury is unable to reach a conception of man's nature as a harmony of impulses just on account of the external point of view which makes him treat it as an aggregate, though he contends that it is an organism. His ingenious and subtle account of the relations between the individual and society does not really go to the root of the matter, because, after all, it remains a calculus of the results of action, not an analysis of its nature. And his view of the affections constituting the individual system leaves them wanting in the unity of organic connection.

    An effort is made, however, to supply this defect by means of the reflex affections called the "moral sense," to which he ascribes an oversight over the other affections and their resultant actions. In what way, then, must we regard the nature of this faculty and the important functions assigned to it?

    • * * * *

    [Sidenote: (b) A separate faculty. Hutcheson.]

    [Sidenote: Two questions regarding it:]

    It was left to Shaftesbury's disciple, Francis Hutcheson, to elaborate with thoroughness this conception of the moral sense as a separate faculty. Hutcheson did not make any important addition to the ideas of Shaftesbury and Butler. But he worked them out more systematically; and in his last work, the 'System of Moral Philosophy,' the protest against the egoism of Hobbes has found expression in a complete theory of human nature, in which the "moral sense" is supreme, and the ends of conduct independent of self-interest.

    Hutcheson, too, keeps more closely than either of his immediate predecessors to the way of looking at human nature which is spoken of in this volume as "naturalistic." He rejects even more decidedly than Shaftesbury--much more so than Butler--any creative function of reason in determining the constitution and direction of the moral sense.[85] The questions thus arise--(a) What is the moral sense when not regarded as a rational determination of the ends of conduct? and (b) To what determination of ends or other distinction between right and wrong in action does it lead?

    On both these points there is a difference between his early 'Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue' (1725), and the more mature 'System,' published in 1755, eight years after his death.

    [Sidenote: (α) Nature of this faculty: not reason;]

    [Sidenote: at first defined as feeling of pleasure or pain,]

    Hutcheson is in earnest with the rejection of reason as a creative force. The moral sense is not, he says, a source of new ideas.

    Its objects are received in the ordinary ways by which, through "sensation and reflection," we come by our knowledge.[86] But just as we have a sense of beauty in the forms of sensible objects, so there is a moral sense given us from which, in the contemplation of our actions, we derive "still nobler pleasures" than those of physical sensation.

    This moral sense is "a determination of our minds to receive amiable or disagreeable ideas of actions."[87] So far, therefore, it seems to be simply a pleasure in the contemplation of certain actions which, we say, have "an immediate goodness." "By a superior sense," says Hutcheson, "which I call a moral one, we perceive pleasure in the contemplation of such actions in others, and are determined to love the agent (and much more do we perceive pleasure in being conscious of having done such actions ourselves) without any view of further natural advantage from them."[88] The significance of this position is easily seen.

    It is not only meant to give a criterion of moral action; it is also a short cut to the conclusion that virtue is for our private interest.

    The disquieting suspicion that morality may involve a sacrifice of individual happiness "must be entirely removed, if we have a moral sense and public affections, whose gratifications are constituted by nature our most intense and durable pleasures."[89] The elaborate analysis of conduct and enumeration of the pleasures which various affections and actions bring in their train, which Hutcheson gave in his latest work, were thus unnecessary as long as the position was maintained that the moral sense is emphatically a pleasure or pain, and that the pleasures it gives are the most intense and durable we have.

    There was only an apparent contradiction in this theory which placed the test of morality in a pleasure consequent upon moral action, and yet held that such actions were not performed from interested motives.

    In the spirit of Butler's psychology, Hutcheson contends[90] that virtue is pleasant only because we have a natural and immediate tendency towards virtuous action; our true motive is "some determination of our nature to study the good of others;" and this, although not always immediately pleasant in itself, is yet succeeded by the calm satisfaction of the moral sense. The real weakness of Hutcheson's position is the fatal one that he cannot show that it corresponds with facts; that the pleasures incidental to the moral sense outweigh all others.

    Indeed, he defends his opinion in their favour only, in a way which reminds one of Mill's method in the 'Utilitarianism,' by making every juror stand aside unless he has pledged himself to morality.[91] It is open to any one, however, to hold that the pleasures of benevolent action and the "relish" of the moral sense are not of sufficient hedonistic value to make up for the restraints they put upon conduct and the enjoyments they oblige one to forego. Even if this position be not correct, it is merely a mistake in estimating doubtful quantities.

    The man who chooses the smaller pleasure will be the loser by his mistake; but we cannot say that the selfish man is to blame for not being benevolent, because the pleasures of benevolence and the moral sense are greatest, any more than we could blame the benevolent man for not being selfish, if selfishness should turn out on the whole to leave a greater hedonistic balance at the individual's credit.

    [Sidenote: afterwards spoken of as a judgment,]

    [Sidenote: but this judgment allowed to depend on feeling.]

    A more objective determination of the moral sense is afterwards given by Hutcheson. Without professedly changing ground, he ceases to speak of it as a mere feeling of pleasure, and calls it a judgment of approbation or disapprobation.

    "It is," he says,[92] "a natural and immediate determination to approve certain affections and actions consequent upon them; or a natural sense of immediate excellence in them, not referred to any other quality perceivable by our other senses or by reasoning." Nor is this judgment of approbation consequent upon the feeling of pleasure the affection or action produces in us.

    The action is not "judged good because it gains to the agent the pleasure of self-approbation, but it gains to him this pleasure because it was antecedently good, or had that quality which, by the constitution of this sense, we must approve."[93] But, in attempting to make clear the nature of this judgment, Hutcheson seems to return, though not in so many words, to his earlier position.

    To seek a basis for the judgment in reason would have been to make the "moral sense" what Kant afterwards made it, simply practical reason. This, however, would have been a "metaphysic of ethics" inconsistent with Hutcheson's whole position. He had always opposed the narrowly intellectual view of morality in Clarke and Wollaston, and he had no conception of the function of reason which would admit of an interpretation of the judgment of approbation by an appeal to a rational determination, depending upon an idea conceived as inherent in the human constitution, and to be realised in action.

    The judgment, therefore, is referred to a "taste or relish"[94] for certain affections and actions, and this he takes no pains to distinguish from pleasure.

    The analogy he seeks to draw between the moral sense and our other powers does not really favour a distinction of it from pleasure. "To each of our powers," he says, "we seem to have a corresponding taste or sense, recommending the proper use of it to the agent, and making him relish or value the like exercise of it by another.

    This we see as to the powers of voice, of imitation, designing, or machinery, motion, reasoning; there is a sense discerning or recommending the proper exercise of them."[95] That is to say, besides the sense of hearing, which has to do with sounds, there must needs be another sense which has to do with our way of hearing sounds; besides the sense of sight, which has to do with form and colour, there must needs be another sense which has to do with our way of perceiving form and colour; and so with every other activity, especially those which proceed from our "highest powers." A doctrine such as this sets no limits to the manufacture of additional senses.

    The whole view of human nature upon which it proceeds is one of meaningless complexity, which serves the one good purpose only of showing how much ethics has suffered from a defective psychology.

    The mental objects or presentations which are distinguished from one another by the difference of their characteristic qualities, and which we therefore call colours, or sounds, or movements, are accompanied by varying degrees of pleasurable or painful feeling; and it is possible to hold that the moral sense is a name for such feelings following in the train of those complexes of presentations to which we give the name of actions, or of those other recurring complexes we call affections.

    This, practically, was the position with which Hutcheson started in the 'Inquiry.' Benevolence pleased us and selfishness pained us; just as the taste of sugar was pleasant, and that of wormwood disagreeable. Perhaps Hutcheson departed from this theory, because he saw that if conduct was made a matter of taste, there would be no sufficient reason for condemning selfishness any more than an unusual taste.

    He therefore relinquished, or seems to have relinquished, the view of the moral sense as a feeling of pleasure or pain; and under the influence, no doubt, of Butler, spoke of it as a judgment of approbation or disapprobation. But he fell back on his original theory by making this judgment depend on "a taste or relish," which only lends itself to interpretation as a peculiar feeling of pleasure.

    [Sidenote: (β) The objects of the moral sense: first said to be actions;]

    [Sidenote: afterwards to be affections;]

    The reflex nature of the moral sense is brought out more distinctly in the 'System' than in the 'Inquiry.' In his earlier work, Hutcheson had spoken of it as directly related to actions. But it was more consistent with his maturer thought to regard it as having to do with mental powers or "affections" in the first instance, and with actions only indirectly or mediately.

    "The object of this sense," he says,[96] "is not any external motion or action, but the inward affections or dispositions;" and this is made by him to account for the discrepancy which the deliverances of the moral sense show in regard to actions. It "seems ever to approve and condemn uniformly the same immediate objects, the same affections and dispositions; though we reason very differently about the actions which evidence certain dispositions or their contraries." This distinction is applied with unlimited confidence in its efficacy.

    By means of it he would explain the most fundamental differences in the moral code of men and nations. Thus people unacquainted with the industrial improvements which give the character of permanence to property, may "see no harm in depriving men of their artificial acquisitions and stores beyond their present use,"--that is to say, "no evil may appear in theft."[97]

    But it is more important in another respect; for it enables the author to avoid the difficulty of finding any principle according to which the moral sense may be related to the empirical content of action. As long as the moral sense was simply spoken of as a feeling of pleasure, it could be conveniently regarded as the consequent of external actions. But if it is an internal sense distinct from pleasure, it is easier to relate it to what he calls our internal powers or affections than to action. The moral sense, then, is to be the regulator of all our powers; and by means of it Hutcheson attempts to reduce human nature to a scale of morality.

    [Sidenote: but its grounds of preference]

    [Sidenote: mainly depend not on the nature of the affection, but on its objects.]

    It is to be noted that, in the classification he offers,[98] what are commonly called the virtues of candour, veracity, &c., are not accounted virtues at all, but only immediately connected with virtuous affections: these are identified with the "kind" or benevolent affections, directed to the happiness of sentient beings.

    Within the latter there are two grounds of preference: the deliberate affections are preferred to the passionate; those which are more extensive in the range of their objects to the less extensive.

    With regard to the former ground of preference, the "moral sense" of the community has perhaps undergone some modification since Hutcheson's time, and looks upon enthusiasm with less suspicion than it formerly did. The other ground of preference ascribed to the moral sense refers not so much to the affection itself--which is the direct or immediate object of the moral sense--as to the way in which the affection is applied, the number of the objects to which it is directed.

    The affection of benevolence is the same in nature whether its object be wide or restricted; though difference in this respect profoundly influences the actions to which it leads. The object approved or most approved by the moral sense is therefore, according to Hutcheson, utilitarian conduct, or rather, as he would say, the calm disposition leading thereto.[99] In this way he obtains a principle for determining the morality of actions; but only through the arbitrary assertion that this principle is immediately approved by the moral sense.

    The connection of the moral sense with an object such as universal benevolence could only be made out by showing a rational, or at any rate an organic union between individual sentiment and social wellbeing; and Hutcheson, like Shaftesbury, has no conception of attempting this in any other way than the traditional one of exhibiting the personal advantages of benevolent conduct, and the disadvantages that accompany selfishness.

    • * * * *

    [Sidenote: (c) Third view of the moral sense.]

    [Sidenote: Butler.]

    [Sidenote: Conscience an authoritative law,]

    Both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson were often led astray by a tendency to interpret facts as they wished them to be, rather than as they were. Their view of the consequences of action was coloured by their optimism. Butler, too, in spite of the difference in his general attitude to the value of human life, was not altogether free from a similar error.

    He thinks that Shaftesbury "has shown beyond all contradiction that virtue is naturally the interest of happiness, and vice the misery of such a creature as man."[100] But, in view of particular exceptions, or of any one not being convinced of "this happy tendency of virtue," he thinks it necessary to emphasise the "natural authority of the principle of reflection." Conscience is, he holds, a part of our inward nature; but it differs from the other parts of our nature inasmuch as it is not related immediately to an external object, but to the actions dealing with such objects, and to the dispositions leading to those actions.

    It is a principle of "reflex approbation or disapprobation," which is said to have equal respect to both public and private good. This tendency, however, would seem to be ascertained empirically.

    The deliverances of conscience are immediate judgments as to the morality of actions and affections (for Butler speaks of it as referring to both equally); and its reference to the ends which those actions or the exercise of these affections may ultimately tend to would, therefore, seem to be indirect.[101] Butler was careful, moreover, not to speak of it as an æsthetic or sensitive faculty, but as a judgment. It is not a feeling of pleasure, but the revelation of law.

    [Sidenote: and the criterion of morality.]

    The approval of conscience is thus made the criterion of morality.

    But a difficulty arises as to the way in which we are to regard the authority which conscience is said to carry along with it. Butler's utterances here commonly imply a teleological reference to an end implanted in human nature, and to be discovered by observing that nature--the realisation of the end being obligatory, because it is shown to be the purpose which the author of nature had in view in making man as he is.[102] The authority of conscience thus seems to be derived from the divine purpose which it displays. It carries within itself a claim to obedience; but the justification of this claim depends on a theological basis.

    And hence the question of the nature and origin of conscience is at once raised, in order to determine the legitimacy of its claim to be, rather than any other part of our constitution, a divinely-implanted guide.

    [Sidenote: Teleological and jural views not reconciled, nor fully developed.]

    But more than one current of thought runs through Butler's ethical treatise. The theological reference is sometimes so used as to make the obligation to morality, and even the nature of morality, depend on the will of God: though hardly according to Paley's crude method of seeking in the external revelation of the divine command a means of uniting the divergent interests of the individual and of society.

    In general, Butler's ruling idea is the idea of the system or unity of human nature, for which he was largely indebted to Shaftesbury's revival of the Platonic conception. Conscience is regarded by him as the expression of this unity. But its nature is never more deeply probed.

    Its deliverances are justified now by its supernatural mission, and now by the more prosaic fact that it leads to our individual interest[103]--at any rate, "if we take in the future"--while it could not be recommended as a guide if it did not.[104] On one side, therefore, Butler tends to a form of theological utilitarianism, such as was common in his own day, and was afterwards formulated by Paley.[105] On the other hand, his ethics more naturally allies itself with a different theory, in which the moral law is conceived as having its source in practical reason, and the naturalistic basis of ethics is definitely abandoned.

    [Sidenote: 4. The ethics of moral sentiment a mediating theory;]

    [Sidenote: explanation of its facts attempted by theory of evolution.]

    On the whole, it would appear that the psychological ethics worked out by Shaftesbury and his school occupies an insecure position between the view discussed in the two preceding chapters and that which ascribes to reason a function in the formation of objects of desire. Shaftesbury and his followers tried to strike out a middle course between the theory that ends of action may be determined by reason, and that which looks upon all desires as being desires for objects as pleasurable.

    They made the attempt to found a system of ethics on human nature, and they held that that nature could not be accounted for by the simple psychological analysis of the Epicurean school as then represented by Hobbes. On the other hand, they did not see their way to adopt the "rational" ethics only known to them in the abstract form it had received at the hands of Clarke and Wollaston. But their own theory of human nature requires a principle of harmony and co-ordination among the various impulses which they were unable to give a satisfactory account of.

    It may seem, however, that the idea of the development of man with which we are now familiar, may enable us to overcome the difficulties which formerly appeared insurmountable--showing the unity of human nature, and the tendency of its activity. The general course of evolution, to which all life has been subject, is thought to have brought about a harmony between individual and social feelings, as well as between individual and social interests, and thus to have removed the obstacles in the way of founding morality on the basis of Naturalism.

    It is, therefore, of importance to examine with care the ethical bearings of the theory of evolution.

    FOOTNOTES:

    [69] "The very idea of an interested pursuit necessarily presupposes particular passions or appetites; since the very idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an appetite or affection enjoys its object."--Sermons, Pref.; cf. Serm. xi.

    [70] Phil., 31 ff.; cf. Gorg., 495 f.; Rep., ix. 585.

    [71] Cf. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 2, 3d ed., p. 44.

    [72] Herbart, Psychologie als Wissenschaft, § 104, Werke, vi. 74; cf. Waitz, Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft, § 40, p. 418: "It is not difficult to recognise the basis of desire in the presentations brought forward by reproduction, and, at the same time, held back by an inhibition."

    [73] With Herbart's doctrine may be compared Mr H. Spencer's view of the genesis of feeling and voluntary action, Principles of Psychology, 2d ed., part iv. chaps. viii. and ix.

    [74] Cf. note to James Mill's Analysis, ii. 383 f.

    [75] The Senses and the Intellect, 3d ed., p. 344; cf. Mental and Moral Science, pp. 90, 91.

    [76] "If there be any principles or affections in the mind of man distinct from self-love, that the things those principles tend towards, or the objects of those affections are, each of them in themselves eligible to be pursued upon its own account, and to be rested in as an end, is implied in the very idea of such principle or affection."--Butler, Sermons, Pref.

    [77] Inquiry concerning Virtue, II. i. 3.

    [78] Ibid., II. ii., conclusion.

    [79] System of Moral Philosophy, i. 99.

    [80] Sermons, xi.

    [81] Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre (1803), p. 54.

    [82] Inquiry, II. i. 3.

    [83] Inquiry, II. i. 3; II. ii. 2.

    [84] Ibid., II. i. 1.

    [85] "What is Reason but that sagacity we have in prosecuting any end? The ultimate end proposed by the common moralists is the happiness of the agent himself, and this certainly he is determined to pursue from instinct. Now may not another instinct towards the public, or the good of others, be as proper a principle of virtue as the instinct toward private happiness?"--Hutcheson, Inquiry, p. 115.

    [86] Cf. System, i. 97; Inquiry, p. 124.

    [87] Inquiry, p. 124.

    [88] Ibid., p. 106.

    [89] Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (1728), p. xix.

    [90] Cf. Inquiry, p. 140 ff.

    [91] Introduction to Moral Philosophy, translated from the Latin, 2d ed., 1753, p. 43; cf. Essay on the Passions and Affections, &c., p. 128.

    [92] System, i. 58.

    [93] System, i. 53.

    [94] Ibid., i. 59.

    [95] System, i. 59.

    [96] System, i. 97.

    [97] System, i. 93.

    [98] System, i. 68 ff. With this may be compared the elaborate classification of motives, according to their moral quality, in Dr Martineau's 'Types of Ethical Theory,' ii. 176 ff.

    [99] System, i. 50.

    [100] Sermons, Pref.

    [101] Although it is not "at all doubtful in the general, what course of action this faculty or practical discerning power within us, approves.... It is ... justice, veracity, and regard to the common good."--Dissertation on Virtue.

    [102] Sermons, ii. iii.

    [103] Sermons, iii. v.

    [104] Ibid., xi.

    [105] Cf. Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik, i. 192.

    PART II.

    THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION.

    CHAPTER V.

    THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORALITY.

    [Sidenote: 1. General characteristics of the theory of evolution:]

    To relinquish the individualistic theory of ethics does not necessarily imply a recourse to evolution. It may still be possible to rest the foundation of ethics on the state, without that view of the growth of the community and of its connection with the individual which the theory of evolution involves. This, as has already been pointed out, was, in part, what Bentham did; while an attempt--in some respects more elaborate still--to deduce morality from society was made by Hobbes.

    The theory of Bentham, and of his successor Professor Bain, is indeed partly individualistic, partly social.[106] In the former reference, ethics becomes a theory of prudence; in the latter, a part of legislation. With Hobbes, on the other hand, the identification of individual and social interests is supposed to be brought about by the absolute necessity, in order to personal security, of a supreme political power, into the hands of which all men have agreed to transfer their rights to all things.

    But both Hobbes and Professor Bain might have avoided obvious difficulties had they had the theory of evolution to assist them, and had they thought themselves justified in making use of it.[107] For want of it the former has to explain morality and its binding force by means of the fiction of an "original contract"; while the latter has to account by the associations of a few years for the harmony of feeling between the individual and the whole, and for the good of the community coming to be so faithfully reflected in the consciences of its members.

    The theory of evolution, by its doctrine of the hereditary transmission of acquired modifications, gives a scientific basis for this existing solidarity between man and society.

    The great consensus of opinion amongst those who are best qualified to judge--amongst those who alone are qualified to judge--may be regarded as having established the claim of the theory of evolution to give the most satisfactory account of all forms of natural life.

    And it may seem only advancing the theory a step further, or only developing one of its applications, to make it yield a complete explanation of human nature, mental as well as physical. If ethics, then, is to be founded on a "natural" basis, no theory would seem to be complete which leaves evolution out of account.

    [Sidenote: an assertion of the unity of life;]

    In general, the theory of evolution is an assertion of the unity of life, or, in its widest form, of the unity of existence. Progressive modifications and hereditary transmission of such modifications are, it is contended, sufficient to explain the different forms and species which life now manifests.

    The assumption is specially discarded that there are fixed differences between kinds of living things making it impossible for them all to have developed from simple germs, originally of like constitution, which have, in the course of time, become more heterogeneous and complex, and so given rise to the wealth of organic life.

    But this general doctrine, held (wholly or in part) in modern times by Kant, Wolff, and Lamarck, needed to be supplemented by a definite view of the way in which the progressive modifications took place; and this required to be established as a really operative cause, before evolution could receive scientific proof. This more special element of the theory was Darwin's contribution to the subject.

    Evolution, he showed,--and herein consists his theoretical advance on Lamarck,--has taken place by the "natural selection" of organisms, so modified as to fit them for survival in the struggle for existence. Organisms in which advantageous modifications have been produced tend to survive, and to transmit their modified structure to descendants, while organisms in which such modifications have not been produced, are less able to preserve their life and to hand it on to successors.

    Older types, it is true, remain, but only in circumstances in which their continued existence does not seriously interfere with the organisms which, in the struggle for life, have developed a structure better suited to their environment: when more perfect and less perfect forms cannot exist together, only the better adapted survive.

    [Sidenote: in first instance, historical;]

    [Sidenote: but implies a teleological aspect, which may have ethical consequences.]

    The theory of evolution is thus primarily the history of an order of sequent facts and relations. It is an account of the origin or growth of things, which attempts to explain their nature and constitution by showing how they have come to be what they are. But, in so doing, it naturally reveals the method and tendency of this order.

    And it is by means of this its teleological aspect that we see how it may be possible for it not merely to trace the development of historical facts, such as the feelings and customs of men, but at the same time to make a more real contribution to ethics by pointing out the course of action to which human nature is adapted. It does not, like the old teleology, attempt to show that each thing has been formed with the design of subserving some particular purpose. On the contrary, it reverses this way of looking at things.

    The fitness of an organism to fulfil any definite end comes to be regarded as the result not of a conscious design, independent of the environment, but of the modifications produced on the organism through the necessity laid upon it by its surroundings of adapting itself to them or else disappearing. What the theory does show is, that adaptation to environment is necessary for life, and that organisms unable to adapt themselves pass away.

    Adaptation to environment will thus be implied in, or be an essential means towards, self-preservation and race-preservation, self-development and race-development. And should this preservation or development be looked upon as the end of conduct, the adaptation to environment it implies may help to define and characterise the end.

    Again: when an organism adapts itself to its environment, it does so by some modification being produced in its structure corresponding to the modified function required by the conditions of life. In this way, one organism increases in complexity in a certain direction, while another organism, in different circumstances, also develops a more complicated structure, though one of a different kind. Thus organisms, alike to begin with, become heterogeneous in nature through exposure to different surroundings.

    At the same time, by constant interaction with their environments, they become more definite and coherent in structure. Incipient modifications are developed and defined in different ways by different circumstances, and the parts of a living being are brought into closer reciprocal relations, and thus welded into a coherent organic whole.

    This is what Mr Spencer means when he says that evolution implies a transition from "an indefinite incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity":[108] the whole process being interconnected in such a way that these different aspects of it--definiteness, coherence, heterogeneity--increase together and imply one another. By this the inference would appear to be suggested that, if conduct is to harmonise with the conditions of evolution, this characteristic feature of it must be recognised in the ethical end.

    [Sidenote: Distinction of its historical and ethical aspects.]

    In saying this, I am perhaps anticipating results. But it is well to show at the outset how the essentially historical inquiry carried out by the evolutionists may suggest conclusions which are ethical in their nature. To some, indeed, it will appear superfluous to have spent even a sentence in suggesting a primâ facie case for the ethical importance of evolution. If there is one subject more than another, it may be thought, which has secured a place for itself in the scientific consciousness of the day, it is the evolution-theory of ethics.

    Without question, the phrase has been received into the scientific vocabulary; but there is a good deal, even in the official literature on the question, to make one doubt whether it is always used with a distinct conception of its meaning.

    When reference is made to the "ethics of evolution," no more is sometimes meant--though a great deal more should be meant--than an historical account of the growth of moral ideas and customs, which may provide (as Mr Stephen expresses it) "a new armoury wherewith to encounter certain plausible objections of the so-called Intuitionists." This, however, would only affect the ethical psychology of an opposed school.

    The profounder question still remains, What bearing has the theory of evolution, or its historical psychology and sociology, on the nature of the ethical end, or on the standard for distinguishing right and wrong in conduct?

    The answer to this question will be the "reconstruction" and "deeper change" which Mr Stephen holds to be necessary.[109] It is the ambiguity of the subject--or rather its twofold range--which has made the application of evolution to ethics look so obvious, and made a discussion of the easier question frequently do duty for a solution of the more difficult.

    The ethical writings of the evolutionists, indeed, often confuse the problems of history and theory in a way which presents the same difficulty to the critic as the works of the corresponding school in jurisprudence. In both, the writers seem disinclined fairly to put to themselves the question as to the kind of subjects to which so fruitful a method as that which has fallen into their hands is appropriate: what its conditions are, and whether it has any limits at all.

    Every one is now familiar with the evils of hypothetical history, and with the iniquity of the proverbial philosophic offence of constructing facts out of one's inner consciousness. The historical jurists deserve no little credit for the thoroughness with which this has been enforced by them; perhaps, too, the same lesson may be learned from the facts of the development of morality.

    But it may be questioned whether we are not at the present time more apt to confuse fact and theory in the opposite way: whether the science of law is not sometimes lost sight of in the history of legal institutions, and ethics in danger of being identified with the development of moral sentiments and customs.

    We may naturally expect the theory of evolution to throw light on such questions as the growth of moral feelings and ideas, and of the customs and institutions in which morality is expressed and embodied. But to show the process morality has passed through in the individual mind and in society still leaves the question as to the end of conduct unanswered.

    It is necessary, therefore, to keep clearly before us the distinction between the historical and the ethical problem, if we would successfully attack the subject of the bearing of the theory of evolution on this fundamental question of ethics. To the theory of evolution we are indebted for the opening up of a new field of investigation--the historical treatment of conduct.

    But it is one thing to describe the way in which men have acted in the past: to determine the end for their action now is quite a different problem; and there is no reason why the distinction should be overlooked. The interest which belongs to the history of morality is not solely nor mainly due to its bearing on questions beyond the historical sphere. That its results will not be without relation--and that of an important kind--to questions of theory may well be expected.

    But it can only tend to confusion if we treat the development of morality, in the human mind and in society, from a preconceived attitude--dogmatic or agnostic--towards the central problem of ethics.

    • * * * *

    [Sidenote: 2. The development of morality: (a) historical psychology.]

    The way in which the theory of evolution is applied to ethical psychology is easy enough to understand in principle, though complex and obscure in many of its details. We have only to postulate that mental as well as bodily traits admit of modification, and that modifications once produced can be transmitted to descendants,[110] and it at once follows that sentiments and ideas leading to actions which promote life will be encouraged and developed by natural selection.

    Thus parental and filial feelings, once originated, may have been developed through those families and tribes in which they were strongest, presenting a more united, and therefore stronger, front against hostile influences. The feelings of tribal sympathy and patriotism, too, may have had a similar history. Those races in which they were strongest would, other things being equal, obtain the mastery over and exterminate other races in which they were relatively weak.

    The compactness of the community would even be promoted by that fear of the political and of the religious control in which the feeling of obligation is said to have had its root.

    In general, benevolence and sympathy amongst a people give it a solidarity from which it derives a stronger position, so that in turn the benevolent and sympathetic feelings gain free scope to develop and expand.

    [Sidenote: Its difficulties: the origin of new feelings,]

    [Sidenote: and of the moral consciousness;]

    But the working out of this theory is not without its own difficulties. In the first place, the factor in the theory of evolution which can be most clearly traced--the principle of natural selection--is not itself a source of change or of the production of new results. It is only the means by which advantageous changes are preserved and disadvantageous changes passed by. The initiative in these changes comes either from the unequal pressure of the environment or from some tendency to vary in the organism itself.

    Now, if we suppose certain moral relations and the feelings corresponding to them to exist in a society, and to tend to greater certainty and fulness of life on the part of those who possess them, such relations and feelings will be favoured by the operation of natural selection, and will gradually be assimilated into the tissue of the social organism. But this does not account for the origin of morality generally nor of any particular moral relation; it merely shows how, having been somehow originated, it has naturally come to persist.

    There are thus really two points to be considered in tracing the development of moral ideas--the question of origin and the question of persistence. The latter is accounted for by natural selection; the former must be brought under the obscure laws of variation, laws so obscure that variations in nature are frequently spoken of as if they took place by chance. These two questions are involved at each stage in the progress of morality.

    But it is at the initial stage that the question of origin is of greatest importance: when the attempt is made to show how, in the course of time, and by the aid of purely physical and biological laws, feelings and conduct, from being merely natural and reflex, have acquired a moral character--when, in a word, the moral is being evolved out of the non-moral.

    A difficulty comes to the front here which scarcely arises when we are simply tracing the various phases through which the moral consciousness has passed, and the various forms in which moral conduct and feelings have expressed and embodied themselves.

    The latter subject is obviously within the scope of the theory of evolution, if that theory applies to the processes of the human mind and society as well as to those of external nature. And, although each stage involves a modification to be accounted for not by natural selection, but by the laws of variation, yet the variation is within facts of the same order, and creates no more difficulty than the successive modifications of living tissue which have been implied in the evolution of organic nature.

    But the transition from the non-moral to the moral is a transition to a different order of facts or--perhaps we should rather say--to a different way of looking at facts, and should not be assumed to be a process of the same kind and explicable by the same method of investigation as the passage from one fact to the similar fact which immediately follows it. It may be compared, perhaps, to the transition from the sphere of inorganic matter to that of life.

    At the same time, it is frequently maintained that we unduly limit the application of the law of evolution if we deny its power to show how morality has developed out of customs and institutions whose origin can be traced to purely natural or non-moral causes. And, for present purposes, it is sufficient to have pointed out that this does not necessarily follow from the admission that evolution applies to mental and social processes as well as to the facts of external nature.

    It is not my object to criticise any doctrine of the development of morality; but, starting with the position taken up with regard to it by the theory of evolution, to inquire what conclusions it may lead to as to the end of action.

    [Sidenote: the development of feelings apart from natural selection.]

    A further difficulty has to be met by the theory of the development of morality, which is in a sense complementary of the initial difficulty encountered in differentiating the moral from the non-moral. This further difficulty awaits it at a subsequent stage of development when the extension and refinement of moral feeling seem to have gone on in circumstances where there is no room for natural selection to work.

    Thus it has been admitted that the feeling of sympathy, and the habitual exercise of mutual good offices among members of a community, strengthen that society, and make it fit to prevail in the struggle for existence over other similar societies, the members of which are not so much at one amongst themselves in feeling and in act.

    But as benevolence and sympathy widen, and become less closely connected with a definite association of individuals, such as the family or tribe, and there ceases to be a particular body to the welfare of which these social feelings contribute, the operation of the law of natural selection becomes less certain.

    This law only tends to conserve and perfect the feelings in question, in virtue of the fact that the associations to whose good they lead are successful in the struggle for life over other associations the members of which are not animated by like feelings. The one association lives and expands, while the others are unable to maintain themselves against the encroachments of their neighbours, and thus fall to pieces.

    The law of natural selection, therefore, comes into play only when there are competing organisms struggling against one another for the means of subsistence and development.

    Not only is it the case, therefore, that the sympathy which aids the weak who are unable to take care of themselves, does not seem to be of the kind that would contribute to success in the struggle for existence; but the more general and catholic our sympathies are, the less will the law of evolution help to preserve and develop them--because the less will they tend to promote the welfare of one rival association rather than that of another. Thus the growth of really unrestricted sympathy with men as men cannot have been promoted in this way.

    The "enthusiasm of humanity" which animated the early Christians, the self-renouncing brotherhood of Buddha, the φιλανθρωπία (~philanthrôpia~) attributed to men like Xenocrates[111] who had freed themselves from the aristocratic prejudices of Athens, the "caritas generis humani" of the Stoics,--such feelings as these could not have been encouraged, any more than they could have been produced, by the operation of natural selection.

    For, however much they tend to elevate the human character, and to promote human happiness, they do not advance the welfare of one body of men to the exclusion of some other competitor in the struggle for existence.[112]

    But, although the law of natural evolution cannot account, by survival of the fittest, for any progress made by universal benevolence, yet it may explain the value ascribed to the feeling of benevolence, when its object is the family or the community.

    Besides--as has already been pointed out--natural selection always implies an initiative got from elsewhere: it does not itself produce modifications; it only chooses out favourable ones and adds them together when produced. It always implies an independent modification of the organism; its part is to select the modifications best fitted to promote life. Hence the mere fact of benevolence being universalised is not in itself an anomaly on the theory of natural selection, any more than is the fact of its being extended from the family to the tribe. Only, the latter extension is one which it perpetuates, the former is not.

    No aspect of the theory of evolution seems able to account for an extension of the feeling of universal benevolence among different people or throughout different societies.

    This feeling has neither tended to promote the welfare of the race animated by it to the exclusion of other competing races--for there are no competing races whom it could affect--nor can it be shown that it makes the individuals possessing it fitter to wage successful war against opposing forces, than other individuals.[113]

    [Sidenote: Its result: shows the social nature of the individual.]

    Apart from such special difficulties, however, comparative psychology has shed a new light on the mental structure of the individual.

    The facts it brings forward show that the nature of the individual man cannot be explained without taking into account the relations in which he stands to society by birth, education, and business.

    He is, from the first, surrounded by, and dependent upon, other individuals, and by a set of established usages and institutions which modify his life; and he is connected with these in such a way that it is impossible to consider him as merely acted upon by them and influencing them in turn. He has been produced by, and has become a part of them. His physical and mental structure bears the marks of the same influences as those by which his so-called environment has been formed. He is cell in the "tissue" of which the body social is composed. This was partly recognised, it is true, before the theory of evolution had been elaborated.

    But the organic nature of the social union is confirmed by that theory, and erected into a scientific view of human life.

    [Sidenote: (b) Development of society.]

    Now the various sentiments which bring one man into mental union with others act with greatest facility when men are connected with one another by some definite mutual bond such as that which forms the family, the clan, or the nation. The individual's feeling of sympathy with his neighbours both promotes this social union and depends upon it. But it is characteristic of the theory of evolution to put the external aspect first--the social customs and institutions--and to evolve from them the corresponding sentiments and ideas.

    Not word or thought or power, it holds, is to be regarded as the origin of morality: "Im Anfang war die That." The whole composed of these units bound together by reciprocity of feeling and function is termed the "social organism"; and what has been called moral sociology shows the way in which the outward forms which express and embody morality have grown up and become part of it.

    In this connection, the theory of natural evolution traces the process by which, from the rudimentary beginnings of society, the members composing it have gradually become more coherent amongst one another, related in definite ways instead of merely by chance, and more differentiated in function. Certain rudimentary forms--such as the family (in its rudest structure)--and the corresponding instincts are presupposed. And from this basis the origin of institutions and customs, political, religious, and industrial, is traced.

    In developing these various customs and institutions, along with the corresponding sentiments, the course of social evolution has had the effect of gradually bringing out and cultivating those feelings and tendencies in the individual which promote the welfare of the organism, while other individual tendencies, hostile to social welfare, have been repressed.

    Not sympathy and benevolence only, but honesty, temperance, justice, and all the ordinary social and personal virtues, may have their natural history traced in this way--by showing how they have contributed to the life of the individual, or of the society, or of both.[114] Through the operation of purely natural laws, the wicked are "cut off from the earth," while the "perfect remain in it" and leave their possessions to their children. This is an obvious result of natural selection.

    For those communities are always fittest to survive in which each member, in feeling and in act, is most at one with the whole. The tendency of evolution seems to be to produce not merely an ideal but an actual identification of individual and social interests, in which each man finds his own good in that of the state.

    FOOTNOTES:

    [106] The social basis of ethics is emphasised by Professor Bain in his Practical Essays (1884), p. 155: "'How is society to be held together?' is the first consideration; and the sociologist--as constitution-builder, administrator, judge--is the person to grapple with the problem. It is with him that law, obligation, right, command, obedience, sanction, have their origin and their explanation. Ethics is an important supplement to social or political law. But it is still a department of law. In any other view it is a maze, a mystery, a hopeless embroilment."

    [107] Without denying that it is possible to apply the theory of evolution to mind, Professor Bain holds that, as a fact, moral sentiment has not become organic and hereditary--"that there are no moral instincts properly so called."--The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed., p. 56.

    [108] First Principles, 4th ed., p. 380.

    [109] Science of Ethics, p. vi.

    [110] It would seem that the transmission of mental qualities only takes place in the form of modified physical structure (cf. G. H.

    Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, 1st series, i. 164). But, if we regard it as established that every mental change has a structural modification corresponding to it, the possibility of mental evolution and inheritance presents no new difficulty.

    [111] Ælian, V. H., xiii. 30.

    [112] If conscience has no other function than that assigned to it by Clifford, Lectures and Essay, ii. 169, "the preservation of society in the struggle for existence," then it can never reach universal benevolence or prescribe "duties towards all mankind."

    [113] A difficulty of another kind is suggested by Professor Bain, who holds that the "pleasure of malevolence" is not only a real element in the human constitution, but greater than would be naturally called forth by the conditions and course of development. "It is remarked by Mr Spencer," he says, "that it was necessary for the progress of the race that destructive activity should not be painful, but on the whole pleasurable. In point of fact, however, the pleasure of destruction has gone much beyond what these words express, and much beyond what is advantageous to the collective interest of animals and of human beings alike.

    The positive delight in suffering has been at all stages too great."--The Emotions and the Will, p. 66. So far from adopting this argument, however, I must confess myself still amongst the unconvinced regarding the "pleasure of malevolence."

    [114] This subject is carefully discussed in Mr Stephen's 'Science of Ethics.'

    CHAPTER VI.

    EVOLUTION AND ETHICAL THEORIES.

    [Sidenote: Bearing of the theory of evolution on previous ethical theories.]

    Before going on to inquire into the positive contributions to ethics which the theory of evolution has to offer, it is necessary to consider the relation it bears to the preceding individualistic systems of morals. It was by way of investigations in psychology and in the theory of society, that it first began to influence ethical thought. And, at first sight, it appeared to come as a natural ally of one of the opposed schools, dreaded by the side it opposed,[115] welcomed with open arms by that favoured with its friendship. But since t

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    Title
    On the Ethics of Naturalism
    Author
    W. R. Sorley
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           *       *       *       *       *
    
    
                    Shaw Fellowship Lectures, 1884
    
    
                                ON THE
                         ETHICS OF NATURALISM
    
                                  BY
                          W. R. SORLEY, M.A.
    
        FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE; AND EXAMINER IN
              PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
    
    
                     WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
                        EDINBURGH AND LONDON
                             MDCCCLXXXV
    
    
                        _All Rights reserved_
    
    
    
    
    PREFATORY NOTE.
    
    
    The Deed of Foundation of the Shaw Fellowship provides that "it
    shall be in the power of the Senatus Academicus of the University of
    Edinburgh to require the holder of the Shaw Philosophical Fellowship,
    during the fourth or fifth year of his tenure of it, to deliver in
    the University of Edinburgh a course of Lectures, not exceeding four,
    on any of the subjects for the encouragement of the study of which
    the Fellowship has been founded." The following pages consist of four
    lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh, in accordance with
    this provision, in the month of January 1884.
    
    Since their delivery, the argument of the lectures has been revised,
    and in some places enlarged. I have also thought it better to modify
    their original form by dividing the discussion into chapters.
    
                                                        W. R. S.
    
    
    
    
      CONTENTS.
    
    
      CHAPTER I.
    
      ETHICS AND ITS PROBLEMS.
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