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Title: Lux Mundi: A Series of Studies in the Religion of the Incarnation,

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LUX MUNDI: A SERIES OF STUDIES IN THE RELIGION OF THE INCARNATION, ***

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Apparent typographical errors have been corrected; inconsistent hyphens
have been retained; essay headings have been simplified.




 Oxford
 HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY




 LUX MUNDI

 _A SERIES OF STUDIES_
 IN THE
 RELIGION OF THE INCARNATION

 EDITED
 BY CHARLES GORE, M.A.

 PRINCIPAL OF PUSEY HOUSE
 FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD

 _TENTH EDITION_

  A quella Luce cotal si diventa,
  Che volgersi da lei per altro aspetto
  È impossibil che mai si consenta.

 LONDON
 JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET
 1890

 [_All rights reserved_]




 ESSAYS AND CONTRIBUTORS.


1. _Faith._

 Rev. H. S. HOLLAND, M.A., Canon of St. Paul's, sometime
 Senior Student of Christ Church.

2. _The Christian Doctrine of God._

 Rev. AUBREY MOORE, M.A., Hon. Canon of Christ Church, Tutor
 of Magdalen and Keble Colleges.

3. _The Problem of Pain: its bearing on faith in God._

 Rev. J. R. ILLINGWORTH, M.A., Rector of Longworth, sometime
 Fellow of Jesus and Tutor of Keble Colleges.

4. _The Preparation in History for Christ._

 Rev. E. S. TALBOT, D.D., Vicar of Leeds, sometime Warden of
 Keble College.

5. _The Incarnation in relation to Development._

 Rev. J. R. ILLINGWORTH.

6. _The Incarnation as the Basis of Dogma._

 Rev. R. C. MOBERLY, M.A., Vicar of Great Budworth, sometime
 Senior Student of Christ Church.

7. _The Atonement._

 Rev. and Hon. ARTHUR LYTTELTON, M.A., Master of Selwyn
 College, Cambridge, sometime Tutor of Keble College.

8. _The Holy Spirit and Inspiration._

 Rev. C. GORE, M.A., Principal of Pusey House, Fellow of
 Trinity College.

9. _The Church._

 Rev. W. LOCK, M.A., Sub-Warden of Keble and Fellow of
 Magdalen Colleges.

10. _Sacraments._

 Rev. F. PAGET, D.D., Canon of Christ Church, and Regius
 Professor of Pastoral Theology.

11. _Christianity and Politics._

 Rev. W. J. H. CAMPION, M.A., Tutor of Keble College.

12. _Christian Ethics._

 Rev. R. L. OTTLEY, M.A., Vice-Principal of Cuddesdon, late
 Senior Student of Christ Church.




PREFACE.


1. This volume is primarily due to a set of circumstances which exists
no longer. The writers found themselves at Oxford together between the
years 1875-1885, engaged in the common work of University education;
and compelled for their own sake, no less than that of others, to
attempt to put the Catholic faith into its right relation to modern
intellectual and moral problems. Such common necessity and effort led
to not infrequent meetings, in which a common body of thought and
sentiment, and a common method of commending the faith to the
acceptance of others, tended to form itself. We, who once enjoyed this
happy companionship, are now for the most part separated. But at least
some result of our temporary association remains, which it is hoped
may justify and explain the present volume.

2. For this collection of essays represents an attempt on behalf of
the Christian Creed in the way of explanation. We are sure that Jesus
Christ is still and will continue to be the 'Light of the world.' We
are sure that if men can rid themselves of prejudices and mistakes
(for which, it must be said, the Church is often as responsible as
they), and will look afresh at what the Christian faith really means,
they will find that it is as adequate as ever to interpret life and
knowledge in its several departments, and to impart not less
intellectual than moral freedom. But we are conscious also that if the
true meaning of the faith is to be made sufficiently conspicuous it
needs disencumbering, reinterpreting, explaining. We can but quote in
this sense a distinguished French writer who has often acted as an
inspiration to many of us. Père Gratry felt painfully that the dogmas
of the Church were but as an 'unknown tongue' to many of the best of
his compatriots. 'It is not enough,' he said, 'to utter the mysteries
of the Spirit, the great mysteries of Christianity, in formulas, true
before God, but not understood of the people. The apostle and the
prophet are precisely those who have the gift of interpreting these
obscure and profound formulas for each man and each age. To translate
into the common tongue the mysterious and sacred language ... to speak
the word of God afresh in each age, in accordance with both the
novelty of the age and the eternal antiquity of the truth, this is
what S. Paul means by interpreting the unknown tongue. But to do this,
the first condition is that a man should appreciate the times he lives
in. "Hoc autem tempus quare non probatis[1]?"'

3. We have written then in this volume not as 'guessers at truth,' but
as servants of the Catholic Creed and Church, aiming only at
interpreting the faith we have received. On the other hand, we have
written with the conviction that the epoch in which we live is one of
profound transformation, intellectual and social, abounding in new
needs, new points of view, new questions; and certain therefore to
involve great changes in the outlying departments of theology, where
it is linked on to other sciences, and to necessitate some general
restatement of its claim and meaning.

This is to say that theology must take a new development. We grudge
the name development, on the one hand, to anything which fails to
preserve the type of the Christian Creed and the Christian Church; for
development is not innovation, it is not heresy: on the other hand, we
cannot recognise as the true 'development of Christian doctrine,' a
movement which means merely an intensification of a current tendency
from within, a narrowing and hardening of theology by simply giving it
greater definiteness or multiplying its dogmas.

The real development of theology is rather the process in which the
Church, standing firm in her old truths, enters into the apprehension
of the new social and intellectual movements of each age: and because
'the truth makes her free' is able to assimilate all new material, to
welcome and give its place to all new knowledge, to throw herself into
the sanctification of each new social order, bringing forth out of her
treasures things new and old, and shewing again and again her power of
witnessing under changed conditions to the catholic capacity of her
faith and life.

4. To such a development these studies attempt to be a contribution.
They will be seen to cover, more or less, the area of the Christian
faith in its natural order and sequence of parts, but the intention is
not to offer complete theological treatises, or controversial defences
of religious truths: it is rather to present positively the central
ideas and principles of religion, in the light of contemporary thought
and current problems. The only one of the essays in fact which has any
degree of formal completeness, is that on Christian Ethics, a subject
on which the absence of systematic books of a genuine English growth
seems to justify a more detailed treatment.

5. The main omissions of which we are conscious are due to want of
space. For instance, we should have been very glad to attempt a
separate treatment of the subject of sin; though we hope the line that
would be taken about it has been sufficiently indicated by more than
one writer[2]. Again, we have left aside any detailed discussion of
historical evidences; but it will be seen that our attempt has been so
to present the principles of the Christian faith as to suggest the
point of view from which evidences are intelligible, and from which
they will, it is firmly believed, be found satisfactory. Once more, if
we have not found room for a treatment of miracles, at least we hope
that the Church's conception of God, as He manifests Himself in nature
and in grace, which we have endeavoured to express, will at once
acquit us of any belief in capricious 'violations of law;' and will
also suggest a view of the world as disordered by sin and crying out
for redemption, which will make it intelligible that 'miracles' should
appear, not as violating law, but as a necessary element in its
restoration as well as its completer exhibition; contrary, not to the
fundamental order of the Divine working, but only to a superficial or
mechanical view of it, or to a view which sin has distorted or
preoccupation with physical science has unduly narrowed.

6. It only remains to explain that we have written not as mere
individuals, but as ministers, under common conditions, of a common
faith. This unity of conviction has enabled us freely to offer and
accept mutual criticism and suggestion; so that without each of us
professing such responsibility for work other than his own, as would
have involved undue interference with individual method, we do desire
this volume to be the expression of a common mind and a common hope.

 C. G.

 PUSEY HOUSE,
 _Michaelmas, 1889_.

[1] Gratry, _Henri Perreyve_, Paris 1880, p. 162.

[2] See pp. 208-211, 292-3, 318-20, 475-6.




PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.


The author of the Essay _The Holy Spirit and Inspiration_ has
endeavoured to obviate further misunderstanding of his meaning on one
important point by rewriting some sentences on pp. 359-60, in
accordance with the _Corrigenda_ inserted in the Fourth Edition.




PREFACE TO THE TENTH EDITION.


I.

There are two things which may fairly be regretted in regard to the
criticisms--often the very kind and encouraging criticisms--which,
this book has received. There is, first, the disproportionate
attention which has been given to some twenty pages on the subject of
the inspiration of Holy Scripture, an attention so disproportionate as
to defeat the object which the writers had in view in assigning to
that subject its place in the general treatment of the work of the
Holy Spirit--the object, namely, of giving it its proper context in
the whole body of Christian truth: and there is, secondly, the fact
that we have not generally succeeded in gaining the attention of our
critics to the point of view from which these 'studies' were written,
and the purpose they were intended to serve.

Our purpose was 'to succour a distressed faith' by endeavouring to
bring the Christian Creed into its right relation to the modern growth
of knowledge, scientific, historical, critical; and to the modern
problems of politics and ethics[3]. We were writing as for Christians,
but as for Christians perplexed by new knowledge which they are
required to assimilate and new problems with which they are required
to deal. What is needed to help men in such perplexity is not
compromise, for compromise generally means tampering with principle,
but readjustment, or fresh correlation, of the things of faith and the
things of knowledge. In detail this will, no doubt, involve
concessions, and that on both sides, because both sides have been
liable to make mistakes[4]; but in the main what is to be looked for
is a reconciliation which shall at once set the scientific and
critical movement, so far as it is simply scientific and critical,
free from the peril of irreligion, and the religious movement free
from the imputation of hostility to new knowledge--as free as any
movement can be, which is intensely concerned to nourish and develop
what is permanent and unchanging in human life. Such a reconciliation
has more than once been effected in the past, though never without a
preliminary period of antagonism[5]; our confidence that it will be
effected anew in the future lies partly in the fact that we see it
already taking place in some minds which seem to us to represent the
best life and thought of our time both scientific and religious. One
such at least[6] we knew and have lost, though only from present
intercourse, in Aubrey Moore. Nobody could know him and think of him
as 'compromising' either his faith or his science. He lived primarily
and with deepest interest in his religious life and theological study,
but he lived also with intense reality in the life of science. And the
debt we owe to him, over and above the debt under which his personal
character lays us for ever, is that of having let us see how the two
lives of faith and of science can melt into one. He felt indeed and
wrestled with the difficulties of adjustment. He had not, as it seemed
to us, nearly finished his work in this respect. But he had done
enough for our encouragement: enough to help us to believe that the
best minds of the future are to be neither religious minds defying
scientific advance, nor scientific minds denying religion, but minds
in which religion interprets and is interpreted by science, in which
faith and enquiry subsist together and reinforce one another. The
reason why he should have been so soon taken from us and from the
Church on earth--taken when 'our need was the sorest'--lies in the
impenetrable mysteries of God. 'Si dolemus ablatum, non tamen
obliviscimur quod datus fuit, et gratias agimus quod habere illum
meruimus.... Pusillus corde eram et confortabat me; piger et
negligens, et excitabat me[7].'


II.

It seems to us that a due regard to the point of view from which these
studies were written would have obviated some of the criticisms upon
them. For instance, it would have explained why we forbore to enter
upon the questions which may be raised as to the seat and methods of
Church authority. It was because these questions do not arise
practically till the work has been done to which we were attempting to
minister. When a man is once reassured that his faith in Christ is
capable of rational justification, he begins naturally to enquire what
exactly the Christian religion involves in this or that detail, and
how its manifestly authoritative character, as a Divine Revelation, is
to find expression: but these enquiries hardly begin till the
preliminary reassurance has been gained.

The _moral_ authority of Christianity, of Christian lives and
characters, does indeed exercise a determining influence on the
promotion and recovery of faith; but men do not often either win a
hold on the creed for the first time, or recover it where it has been
lost or impaired, because the theological authority of the Church
enables them to take it on trust. The very grounds of that authority
are for the moment too much in question to admit of the proper amount
of deference being given to it. Thus it seemed to us better in this
volume to be content with general statements as to the principle of
Church authority[8], leaving out its detailed discussion as unsuitable
to our present purpose.

Of course, however, we were conscious all the time that we were
ourselves amenable to the bar of authority and were bound to feel sure
that nothing we were saying was transgressing the laws which the
Catholic Church has laid down. We should indeed be unanimous in
disclaiming any desire to have 'license to say what we please' in our
position as Church teachers. All meaning would be taken out of the
effort and hope this book represents if we could not believe that we
were speaking as the Church would have us speak. As the essay on
Inspiration has been chiefly called in question on the ground of
authority, the author of it must be allowed to plead that he did
assure himself he was saying nothing which the Church in her past
action had not left him free to say, while for the future he does
earnestly desire in due course, and after due enquiry, an action of
Church authority on the relation of modern critical methods to the
doctrine of Inspiration; and further he believes that the Anglican
churches, holding as they do so conspicuous a place in traditional
reverence for the Scriptures, while they are so free on the other hand
from the obscurantist fear of historical enquiry, are more likely than
any other part of the Church to arrive at determinations on the
subject such as will be of material service to the whole of
Christendom. But for the present there can be no doubt the subject is
not ripe for any official or formal determinations.


III.

It seems to us also that some of the criticisms on the treatment of
Inspiration in Essay VIII, which shall be presently dealt with, have
been due to the same forgetfulness of the writer's aim, and of the
general aim of the whole book. Our traditional belief in the Bible is
at the present time confronted with a body of critical literature
which claims to overthrow a great many of the accepted opinions about
the Old Testament Scriptures. The criticism is at least grave and
important enough to claim attention, to necessitate that we should
come to a more or less clear understanding of the relation in which
our faith stands towards it. The writer of the essay did not write as
a biblical critic but as a theological student and teacher, bound to
give a candid consideration to a criticism which bears directly upon
the sacred books of our religion. His object was not to discuss and
determine questions of biblical criticism, but to explain, as it
appears to him, the relation which theology is to take up towards
them. And he wrote 'in the mind of those who have felt the trouble in
the air:' he wrote to succour a faith distressed by the problems
criticism is raising. That faith is very widely distressed by them,
and that not merely in academic circles, does not admit of question.
Nor did it seem to him to admit of question that the best way to deal
with this distress was not to attempt to solve problems, which,
because of the immense area over which discussion ranges, do not admit
of ready solutions; but to attempt to state the main conclusions
criticism is claiming to have arrived at, as the critics themselves
would have us state them; to show that our Christian faith is not
vitally affected by them; and so to divert an anxious mind from
problems which it cannot solve, at least at present, and fix it on the
central truths of our religion, helping it to feel how, if it be once
grounded on these central truths, the issue of the critical discussion
can be awaited, with keen interest indeed, but without alarm. But this
assurance of mind in face of the critical controversy is only possible
if we see that the critical positions are in fact compatible with the
real _inspiration_ of Holy Scripture. Now the best way to give
reassurance on this point seemed to be for the writer to make it plain
that he himself felt the great force and appeal of the critical case,
and that his conviction that the real Inspiration of the Old Testament
was unaffected by it, did not depend upon its being underrated. Had
the main purpose of the writer been to help to determine critical
positions, he would have been bound to write both at greater length
and also with more exactness and discrimination. But on the other
hand, the purpose of reassurance would have had less chance of being
successfully accomplished--as in some cases we have reason to believe
with thankfulness that it has been accomplished or assisted--if the
writer had been more reluctant to accept, at least hypothetically,
what are claimed as critical results. We all know by experience that
freedom and happiness in our attitude as Christians towards problems
not easily solved, or even easily brought to crucial tests, are most
readily secured if we can feel that our faith is, at the last resort,
independent of the exact solution arrived at. Thus our object was to
give to anxious enquirers, of whom there are surely an immense number
most deserving of any help which can be given them, a freedom in
regard to Old Testament problems as wide as the Catholic faith seemed
to warrant.


IV.

We cannot but accept the very general suggestion of our critics that
we ought to have attempted a separate treatment of the problem of sin.
Some such treatment is now offered in the second appendix, and offered
in the form of a republication of what has previously seen the light,
so that it may be plain that the absence of it from earlier editions
was not due to lack of conviction or unwillingness to deal with the
subject. The appendix is not in fact more than a drawing out of what
is involved in some passages of the essays taken together[9]. Thus the
fifth essay takes up a very clear position as to the practical aspect
which sin bears in human life. The fact is emphasized that sin, as our
moral consciousness knows it and Christianity has successfully dealt
with it, is a phenomenon unique in the world:--it is what nothing else
is, violation of law. Now this is the essence of the Christian
doctrine of sin, as S. John states it: 'Sin is lawlessness[10].' Sin
and lawlessness are coincident terms. This view of sin is primarily
_practical_; it may be represented in fact as a postulate required for
successfully dealing with sin, a postulate justified and verified by
its results. But because it is thus verified and justified, it passes
like any other hypothesis which explains facts, in proportion to the
range and thoroughness of the experience which tests it, out of the
region of mere working hypotheses into that of accepted truths. Thus
it is to the Christian consciousness an accepted truth, that sin, all
down the long history of humanity, has been a violation of the divine
order, a refusal of obedience, a corruption of man's true nature. Sin,
as such, has always been a source of confusion, not of progress. We
can indeed recognise how the movement and development in humanity has
frequently[11] been in fact conditioned by sin; but we should still
contend that it has never been the sin in itself which has been the
spring of force and progress, but the faculties of will and intellect
which sin was using. Always the will and intellect would have worked
better and more fruitfully in the result if they had been free from
the taint of selfishness and rebellion against God. Always sin, as
such, has been a lowering and not a raising of human life: a fall and
not a rise. Thus sin at the beginning of human life must have been not
merely the awakening of moral consciousness, but the obscuring and
tainting of it by lawlessness and disobedience. Sin, as all down its
history, so in its origin, is a fall; a fall, moreover, entailing
consequences on those who come after, in virtue of the inviolable
solidarity of the human race. To this view of sin original and actual,
Christianity appears to be bound; and it is a view that, as we have
now endeavoured to show[12], brings us into no conflict with
scientific discovery. For science never attempts to prove that man
might not have developed otherwise than as in fact he has, or that the
actual development has been the best possible: nor has Christianity
ever in its best representatives, certainly not in its patristic
representatives, been identified with a denial that human history as a
whole has been a development upwards from below[13]. The Old Testament
is in fact among ancient literatures, the literature of development,
of progress[14].


V.

The criticisms on our treatment of Inspiration have been so abundant,
and have gone into such detail, that it will be obvious that any
attempt to reply to them must be a more individual effort than the
attempt to reply to the criticisms on the general aim and spirit of
the book. For while the writers in this volume are at one as to the
general attitude which they would wish the Church to assume towards
the critical treatment of the Old Testament, as they are at one in the
general line of treatment adopted throughout this volume, they cannot
pretend to be at one on all the details of a complicated subject. The
writer of the particular essay alone can be responsible for these: and
with reference to them he must be understood to speak simply in his
own person.

1. The passage about Inspiration was written under the conviction that
recent criticism of the Old Testament represents a real advance in
analytical method as applied to literature, and thus a most serious
movement of thought. As such it has been estimated by the Bishop of
Oxford in his recent Charge. He says, 'The Holy Scriptures of the Old
Testament are now going through a process of analytical criticism
which has, as we believe, had no parallel, for acuteness of
investigation, carefulness of method, and completeness of apparatus,
since the days in which they began to be regarded as a code of
inspired literature, and certainly not since the days of our blessed
Lord's life on earth; at which period we understand that to all
intents and purposes the books which we receive, as the Canonical Old
Testament Scriptures, had taken their existing form[15].' But like the
scientific movement of our time, the critical movement has been
accompanied by all the arbitrariness and tendency to push things to
extremes which appears to be an almost inseparable attendant upon
living and vigorous movements, ecclesiastical and secular. Further
than this, its representatives have been--and here again the
conditions of the scientific movement are reproduced--very frequently
men personally opposed to the Christian faith, and even thoroughly
rationalistic in temper and tone. But it does not follow in the case
of criticism, any more than in the case of science, that we are not to
learn a great deal from a movement characterized even predominantly by
'extremeness' and unbelief. And in fact, in the past fifty years there
appears to have been a solid critical advance, underneath a great deal
of controversial arbitrariness and irreligious insolence. Now I
thought that I should best serve the purpose with which I was writing,
if I went as far as I could in ungrudging recognition of the claims of
criticism, and involved myself as little as possible in doubtful
discussions; but I did also intend to express, and believed myself to
have expressed with sufficient clearness[16], my own conviction that
it was with the more conservative among the recent critics, and not
with the more extreme, that the victory would lie. Thus when I said,
in a sentence which has been specially criticized (partly because its
wording was somewhat ambiguous), that criticism is reaching 'results
as sure as scientific enquiry,' what I intended so to characterize was
not the extreme conclusions of Wellhausen, but substantially the
conclusions shared in common by Wellhausen and Dillmann, by critics
theologically more conservative, like König and Riehm, by Delitzsch in
his last position, by the French Catholic orientalist, F. Lenormant,
as well as by an increasing body of English scholars[17]. Nor is there
a single line of what I wrote which would be affected, so far as I
see, even if Professor Margoliouth were satisfactorily to make out his
case for throwing back the period of the 'Middle Hebrew[18].' As to
the grounds on which we have been asked to date the bulk of the Psalms
below the Captivity, and even in the Maccabean period, they may appear
indeed quite unconvincing; but it would have been utterly beside my
purpose, as it would also have been out of my power, to give them
adequate discussion[19], nor would it seem as if even so improbably
late a date as that suggested would really affect their Messianic or
spiritual character. Let us affirm then without any hesitation that
there is a good deal of arbitrariness and extremeness in current
criticism as applied to the Old Testament. But surely we should be the
victims of a dangerous delusion if we were to imagine that because
there is a good deal that is unsubstantial in recent criticism,
therefore there is no substantial force in what really represents the
successive labours of many generations of students. I do not think
that we can conceal from ourselves that if we are to defend a purely
conservative attitude in regard to Old Testament literature, we shall
require quite different canons of evidence from those which we are
able so successfully to use in vindicating the historical character of
the New Testament: or again, in vindicating the claims of the
apostolic ministry and the sacramental system to be part of the
original fabric of the Christian Church. In other words, the critical
principles of historical enquiry which _do_ so amply justify us in
retaining substantially the traditional position in regard as well to
the New Testament documents as to our Church principles, _do not_
carry us to the same point in the field of the Old Testament. No doubt
there the vastness of the field is a permanent obstacle to uniformly
certain results. A great deal must remain, and probably for ever, more
or less an open question. But this necessary uncertainty, if it
imposes on critics an obligation of caution, imposes also on us
churchmen an obligation of reserve in dogmatic requirement. We do not
wish to run the risk of making a claim on men's minds for the
acceptance of positions for which we have only this to urge, that they
cannot be absolutely disproved.

2. The changed view of the development of Old Testament literature,
such as can be truly said to be proposed for our acceptance by modern
critics with a great deal of unanimity, _if it be granted for the
moment that it is compatible with the real inspiration of the books_,
involves no important change in our spiritual use of the Old
Testament; in the use of it for the purposes of 'faith and morals.'
This latter use of Scripture depends simply on our rightly
interpreting the meaning of the books as they exist.

There is a great principle enunciated by S. Augustine in regard to the
Old Testament which requires to be kept constantly in view. It is that
as the Old Testament is manifested in the New, so the New Testament is
latent in the Old[20]. In order to recognize this there is no
discussion necessary of the method by which our 'Old Testament'
received its present shape. The evidence of it lies in the Old
Testament considered as a finished product. As such, we cannot study
that 'divine library' without being struck both by its unity, so far
greater than belongs to any other literature[21], and by the fact that
like no other literature it looks forward to an end not yet attained,
a divine event in which is to be its justification and its
interpretation. The Old Testament demands the New to bring out its
true meaning: the New appeals back to the Old to bear witness to the
continuity of the divine purpose of which it is the outcome. It is
from this point of view that we understand the appeal which, in the
New Testament, is so constantly made to the older Scriptures. Whether
they are appealed to, as in the Sermon on the Mount, as containing the
record of a moral education, divine though imperfect, which the Christ
was to complete[22]; or as by St. Paul, as the record of a preparatory
and temporary discipline by means of external enactments of God,
calculated to awaken the dull conscience of men to the reality and
holiness of the divine will, and so to make men conscious of sin
against God, and ready to welcome the dispensation of pardon and
grace[23]; or, as in the Epistle to the Hebrews, as a system of ritual
and ceremonial observances, in which were shadowed forth by the
inspiring Spirit[24] the deep truths of the still-needed sacrifice,
and the access to God not yet won for man; or finally, as by almost
all the New Testament writers, as a prophetic dispensation in which
the Messianic hope found gradual expression in fuller and exacter
lineaments, and produced an anticipation which Christ only could
satisfy[25]:--from any of these points of view, or from all taken
together, we are concerned only with the Old Testament as it finally
appears, not with the method by which it came into being. It cannot be
too strongly emphasized that when we seek reassurance in regard to the
inspiration of those books of the Old Testament, to which our Lord and
His Church refer us, we find it primarily in the substance of the
books as they are given to us, not in any considerations of the manner
in which they came into existence[26].

And if this is so, it needs to be borne in mind that the
responsibility for bringing it home to the consciences of men, the
responsibility for thus preventing that breach in religious continuity
which the change in critical and literary conceptions of the Old
Testament might otherwise occasion, lies in a preeminent degree upon
those of us who are most impressed with the valid elements of the
recent criticism. It belongs to us to see to it that, so far as lies
with us, the Bible shall not be less prized by the generations that
are coming, as the divine, the inspired volume, than it has been by
the generations that are gone. It belongs to us to attend to the
double admonition of the _De Imitatione_: 'Every scripture must be
read in the same spirit in which it was written:' and 'Do not enquire
who said this, but pay heed to what is said.'

3. There is one appeal which the New Testament makes to the Old which
was not alluded to above, as it does not in fact fall naturally under
S. Augustine's principle of the New Testament lying hid in the
Old--namely the appeal to it as to a historical record of God's actual
dealings with His people: a record of things which actually 'happened
unto them for ensamples, and are written for our admonition.' But this
appeal again would not be invalidated unless it were shown--not merely
that there is an ideal element mixed with the history in the Old
Testament record, but--that the element which is not mere narrative of
events as they happened, the element of idealism, reaches to the point
of obscuring the real significance of the facts and distorting their
divine meaning. Whereas the truth is that the ideal element in the
narrative comes from the real divine meaning in the facts being
brought into emphatic prominence rather than overlooked; and we may
depend upon it that no results of criticism have tended to weaken our
belief that the chroniclers of Israel's history, whether prophetic or
priestly, were inspired to see its true meaning and tendency, and from
their different points of view to bring it out in its completeness.
And it is important to remember in this connection that the Jewish
idea of 'history' was never our modern critical idea of a mere record.
They ranked their history from Joshua to the books of Kings under the
head of 'prophecy,' and intimate to us by this very classification
that they see in the historian one who not only records but interprets
facts[27].

4. The changed view of the Old Testament books which modern criticism
asks of us, concerns, then, not so much their contents, as the
circumstances of their composition and the method by which they
reached their present form. When we pass to this latter class of
considerations we are prepared for any information which criticism or
tradition can give us, while at the same time our indestructible
conviction, fortified by the strongest internal testimony of the
books, that here is the Holy Spirit's work, gives us an antecedent
expectation that the mode of composition in the case of each book will
be such as God in His condescension can have sanctioned and used. God,
I say, in His condescension--because undoubtedly the whole Old
Testament does represent a condescension of God to a low stage of
human development. Here then we need the recognition of a second great
principle which S. Augustine lays down, viz. that 'as wrong is done to
the Old Testament if it be denied to come from the just and good God,
so wrong is done to the New if it be put on a level with the Old[28].'

For all the reality of its inspiration the Old Testament is on a lower
level than the New. Thus it is now almost universally recognised that
God in the Old Testament is seen appealing to the human conscience at
a low stage of its development, tolerating what was not according to
His original will or His ultimate purpose[29], as in the case of
divorce, and even, as in the case of Abraham's sacrifice, appealing to
men to do things which in a more fully developed state of the
conscience could not be even conceived of as commanded by God, in
order that through their very obedience to the appeal they might be
led higher into the knowledge of what God could, and could not,
enjoin. How fully this principle in God's dealings was recognised and
justified by the early Christian authorities has been already brought
out in this volume[30].

Again, the same method of condescending to what was not in itself
perfect, but was susceptible of a gradual education, appears in the
institutions of the Old Testament law of worship. Modern enquirers are
pressing upon us the fact that the ritual law of Israel is closely
akin to the common ritual customs of Semite races. 'What I may call
the natural basis of Israel's worship,' says Prof. Robertson Smith,
'was very closely akin to that of the neighbouring cults[31].' The
peculiarity of Israel's religion lay in fact not in the ritual itself,
but in the moral and theological turn given to the ritual. According
to this view God in the law appears as diverting to good uses, by an
act of condescension, ritual customs which it would have been
premature to abolish. Such a view of the ritual is somewhat strange to
the ears of modern Churchmen, but it was undoubtedly the prevalent
view of the law among the great writers of Christian antiquity.
References to illustrate this have been given in the eighth essay[32].

But I may add to the passages there referred to another of very
striking force. S. Chrysostom is explaining why God should have
appealed to the astrological notions of the wise men and led them by
no other leading than that of a star. It is because 'in exceeding
condescension He calls them through what is familiar.... In imitation
of this Paul too reasons with the Greeks from an altar, and adduces
testimony from the poets, while he harangues the Jews with
circumcision, and makes from the sacrifices a beginning of instruction
for those who are living under the law. For since to every one
familiar things are dear, therefore both God Himself and the men who
were sent from God, with a view to the salvation of the world, manage
things on this principle. Think it not then unworthy of Him to have
called them by a star; for by the same rule thou wilt find fault with
all the Jewish rites also--both the sacrifices and the purifications
and the new moons, and the ark, and the temple itself. For all these
things had their origin from Gentile grossness. Yet God, on account of
the salvation of those in error, endured to be worshipped by means of
the very things through which those outside were worshipping demons,
only giving them a slight alteration, that little by little he might
draw them away from their customs and lead them up to the high
philosophy.'

Now if we recognize that God in the Old Testament can condescend for
the purposes of His revelation to a low stage of conscience, and a low
stage of worship, what possible ground have we for denying that He can
use for purposes of His inspiration literary methods also which belong
to a rude and undeveloped state of intelligence? If He can 'inspire'
with true teaching the native Semite customs of ritual, why can He not
do the same with their traditions of old time? How can we reasonably
deny that the earlier portions of Genesis _may_ contain the simple
record of primitive prehistoric tradition of the Semites[33], moulded
and used by the Holy Spirit, as on all showing the record manifestly
has been moulded and used, to convey the fundamental principles of all
true religion? Or again, granted that, on the 'dramatic' hypothesis,
Deuteronomy written not by Moses, but in Moses' name, to incorporate
the Mosaic tradition, represents a literary method greatly inferior,
in sense of exactitude, to the method of personal testimony as we have
it in S. John[34], or of careful investigation and use of original
testimony, as we have it in S. Luke[35]; granted this--how can we, in
view of the manifest facts of God's condescension, find ourselves in a
position to deny that He can have used such a method as a vehicle of
His inspiration[36]? There is, it must be emphasized, no critical
reason why we should assign the composition of any book of the Old
Testament to the motive of fraud. No doubt hostile critics have
sometimes suggested, for example, that the 'discovery' of the book of
the law in the Temple in the days of Josiah was a 'got up' proceeding,
the book having really been written and hidden at the very time in
order to be 'discovered'; but there is no positive evidence at all to
support such a view, while all the evidence is satisfied by the
hypothesis that an earlier prophet, some hundred years previously[37],
working upon an actual and possibly written tradition of Moses' last
speech, had cast this tradition into the dramatic form and
promulgated, as from Moses' lips, the law which he knew to represent
ultimately Moses' authority or the authority of God in Moses. That
such a method should have been adopted surprises us surely no more
than that Hosea should have been led to use such extraordinary means,
as he seems in fact to have been enjoined to use, of revealing God's
mind of love towards His people. It involves no intention to deceive,
and the discovery of this 'book of the law,' lost in the careless
period which intervened, was a genuine discovery unattended by any
element of fraud.

Once again, if the book of Chronicles contains not pure history but
the priestly view of the history, granted that this priestly point of
view was _morally_ part of the divinely intended education of the
chosen people, even though its intellectual method was as imperfect as
ordinarily is the case with the treatment of traditions in 'schools'
or religious orders, in nations or churches or families, is there any
_à priori_ reason why God, who used so much that was imperfect, should
not have inspired the record of this tradition? Here again we must
emphasize that all that _criticism_ requires of us is to recognise in
the book of Chronicles the record of the history as it became coloured
in the priestly schools; there is nothing here of a morally unworthy
sort from the point of view of the contemporary conscience, but only
the same features as are noticeable in the record of tradition all the
world over[38]. Fraudulent dealing, forgery in literature, always
involves the conscious and deliberate use of methods calculated to
impose on others, _methods other than those sanctioned by the literary
conscience of the time_[39].

No doubt a particular writer, like Wellhausen, may make a bias hostile
to the supernatural apparent in his use of the critical method, and
may give in consequence an antitheological turn to his reconstruction
of history; just as many a scientific writer has done with scientific
facts and scientific method. In view of this we must 'try the spirits'
and not attribute too much force to the point of view of a particular
individual. But this will not be at all the same thing as rejecting
the modern method of criticism or repudiating those results which are
certainly accepted by many critics who are as far as possible from
rejecting the supernatural[40].

5. No serious attempt has, I think, been made to show that the view of
the development of the Old Testament literature which the modern
critical schools, with great unanimity, demand of us, is contrary to
any determination of Church authority. By this it is not meant that
the theology of the Church suggests this view: it is not the function
of the Church to advance literary knowledge, except indirectly; and
thus the Church has not had the power to anticipate the critical, any
more than it had to anticipate the scientific movement. The advance of
knowledge comes in all departments through the natural processes of
intellectual enquiry. It is only now, in fact, that the critical
problem is before the Church; but now that it is before the Church it
does not seem that the Church ought to have any _more_ difficulty in
welcoming it and assimilating it, than it has had in welcoming and
assimilating the legitimate claims of science.

With reference to the bearing of Church authority on the present
discussion, there are three points which I should wish to urge. First,
that the undivided Church never took action on the matter, in spite of
an extravagant tendency to allegorism in Origen and those who were
influenced by him.

Secondly, that as a result of this the patristic theology leaves a
wide opening at least for what we may call the modern way of regarding
the opening chapters of Genesis. Thus a Latin writer, of the fifth or
sixth century, who gives an interesting summary of the Catholic faith,
and is clearly nothing else but a recorder of accepted beliefs, after
speaking of the origin and fall of man and woman, continues thus:
'These things are known through God's revelation to His servant Moses,
whom He willed to be aware of the state and origin of man, as the
books which he produced testify. For all the divine authority (i.e.
the scriptural revelation) appears to exist under such a mode as is
either the mode of history which narrates only what happened, or the
mode of allegory in such sense that it cannot represent the course of
history, or a mode made up of these two so as to remain both
historical and allegorical[41].' A great deal more in the same sense
as this might be produced.

Thirdly, it must be urged that since the division of Christendom no
part of the Church appears really to have tightened the bond of
dogmatic obligation. Our own formularies are of course markedly free
from definition on the subject, and the refusal of the Roman Church to
define the scope of inspiration, beyond the region of faith and
morals, has been remarkable[42].

6. But does the authority of our Lord bind us to repudiate, in loyalty
to Him, the modern views of the origin of the Old Testament books? On
this subject I wish to express my sincere regret that I should have
written so briefly in my essay as to lay myself open to be
misunderstood to suggest our Lord's fallibility as a teacher. I trust
that the passage, as it has stood since the fourth edition[43], will
be at least recognised as plain in its meaning and theologically
innocent. I must ask leave to defer to another occasion the fuller
discussion of this important subject in connection with the doctrine
of the Person of Christ. Meanwhile I would suggest that the longer one
thinks of it the more apparent it will become that _any hypothesis as
to the origin of any one book of the Old Testament, which is
consistent with a belief in its inspiration, must be consistent also
with our Lord having given it His authorisation_. If His Spirit could
inspire it, He, in that Spirit, could give it His recognition--His
recognition, that is to say, in regard to its spiritual function and
character. Thus as we scan carefully our Lord's use of the Old
Testament books, we are surely struck with the fact that nothing[44]
in His use of them depends on questions of authorship or date; He
appeals to them in that spiritual aspect which abides through all
changes of literary theory--their testimony to the Christ: 'Search the
Scriptures ... they are they which testify of Me.' He would thus lead
men to ask about each book of the Old Testament simply the
question,--What is the element of teaching preparatory to the
Incarnation, what is the testimony to Christ, which it supplies? I do
not see how with due regard to the self-limitation which all use of
human forms of thought and speech must on all showing have involved to
the Eternal Son, it can be a difficulty in the way of accepting the
modern hypothesis, that our Lord referred to the inspired books under
the only name by which His reference would have been intelligible to
His hearers. Unless He had violated the whole principle of the
Incarnation, by anticipating the slow development of natural
knowledge, He must have spoken of the Deuteronomist as 'Moses[45],' as
naturally as He spoke of the sun 'rising.' Nor does there seem in fact
any greater difficulty in His speaking of one who wrote 'in the spirit
and power' of Moses as Moses, than in His speaking of one who,
according to the prophecy, came 'in the spirit and power of Elias' as
himself, Elias. 'If ye will receive it, this is Elias.' 'Elias is
already come[46].'

Once more: if the Holy Spirit could use the tradition of the flood to
teach men about divine judgments, then our Lord in the same Spirit can
refer to the flood, for the same purpose. It has however been recently
denied that this can be so, unless the tradition accurately represents
history. 'I venture to ask,' Professor Huxley writes[47], 'what sort
of value as an illustration of God's method of dealing with sin has an
account of an event that never happened?' I should like to meet this
question by asking another. Has the story of the rich man and Lazarus
any value as an illustration of God's method of dealing with men?
Undoubtedly it has. Now what sort of narrative is this? Not a
narrative of events that actually happened, in the sense that there
was a particular beggar to whom our Lord was referring. The narrative
is a _representative_ narrative[48], a narrative of what is constantly
occurring under the form of a particular typical incident. Now the
narrative of the flood belongs to a quite different class of
literature, inasmuch as it is not due to any _deliberate_ action of
imagination; but it resembles our Lord's story _at least_ in being
representative. It is no doubt based on fact. The traditions of the
flood in all races must run back to a real occurrence. But the actual
occurrence cannot be exactly estimated. What we have in Genesis is a
tradition used as a vehicle for spiritual teaching. As the story is
told it becomes, like that of Dives and Lazarus, a typical narrative
of what is again and again happening. Again and again, as in the
destruction of Jerusalem, or in the French Revolution, God's judgments
come on men for their sin: again and again teachers of righteousness
are sent to warn of coming judgment and are ridiculed by a world which
goes on buying and selling, marrying and giving in marriage, till the
flood of God's judgment breaks out and overwhelms them. Again and
again, through these great judgments there emerges a remnant, a
faithful stock, to be the fountain head of a new and fresh
development. The narrative of the flood is a representative narrative,
and our Lord, who used the story of Dives and Lazarus, can use this
too[49].


VI.

Professor Huxley's article alluded to just now is a somewhat
melancholy example of a mode of reasoning which one had hoped had
vanished from 'educated circles' for ever--that namely which regards
Christianity as a 'religion of a book' in such sense that it is
supposed to propose for men's acceptance a volume to be received in
all its parts as on the same level, and in the same sense, Divine. On
the contrary, Christianity is a religion of a Person. It propounds for
our acceptance Jesus Christ, as the revealer of the Father. The test
question of the Church to her catechumens has never been: 'Dost thou
believe the Bible?' but 'Dost thou believe that Jesus Christ is the
Son of God?' If we do believe that, then we shall further believe in
the Bible: in the Old Testament as recording how God prepared the way
for Christ; in the New Testament as recording how Christ lived and
taught, and containing the witness borne to Him by His earthly friends
and ministers. The Bible thus 'ought to be viewed as not a revelation
itself, but a record of the proclaiming and receiving of a revelation,
by a body which is still existent, and which propounds the revelation
to us, namely the body of Christians commonly called the Church[50].'
The Bible is the record of the proclamation of the revelation, not the
revelation itself. The revelation is in the Person of Christ, and the
whole stress therefore of _evidential_ enquiry should be laid upon the
central question whether the Divine claim made for Jesus Christ by the
Church is historically justified. The whole evidential battle of
Christianity must thus be fought out on the field of the New
Testament, not of the Old. If Christ be God, the Son of God,
incarnate, as the Creeds assert, Christianity is true. No one in that
case will find any permanent difficulty in seeing that in a most real
sense the Bible, containing both Old and New Testaments, is an
'inspired volume.'

Now faith in the Godhead of our Lord is very far from being a mere
matter of 'evidences.' On this enough is said by more than one writer
in this volume[51]. But so far as 'historical evidences' go, we have
them in our generation in quite fresh force and power. For our New
Testament documents have passed through a critical sifting and
analysis of the most trenchant and thorough sort in the fifty years
that lie behind us. From such sifting we are learning much about the
process through which they took their present shape. But in all that
is material we feel that this critical investigation has only
reassured us in asserting the historical truth of the records on which
our Christian faith rests. This reassurance has been both as to the
substance, and as to the quality of the original apostolic testimony
to Christ. As to its substance, because the critical investigation
justifies us in the confident assertion--more confident as the
investigation has been more thorough than ever before--that the Christ
of our four Gospels, the Christ with His Divine claim and miraculous
life-giving power, the Christ raised from the dead the third day and
glorified at God's right hand, the Christ who is the Son of God
incarnate, is the original Jesus of Nazareth, as they beheld Him and
bore witness who had been educated in closest intercourse with Him. We
are reassured also as to the quality of the apostolic testimony. In
some ages testimony has been careless--so careless, so clouded with
superstition and credulity, as to be practically valueless. But in the
apostles we have men who knew thoroughly the value of testimony and
what depended upon it, who bore witness to what they had seen, and in
all cases, save in the exceptional case of S. Paul, to what they had
seen over a prolonged period of years; whose conviction about Christ
had been gradually formed in spite of much 'slowness of heart,' and
even persistent 'unbelief'; formed also in the face of Sadducean
scepticism and in the consciousness of what would be said against
them; formed into such irresistible strength and unanimity by the
solid impress of facts that nothing could shake it, either in the
individual or in the body. Such testimony does all for us that
testimony can do in such a case. It supports externally and justifies
a traditional faith, which is commended to us at the same time
internally by its self-evidencing power. And with that faith as the
strength of our life we can await with confidence the issue of minor
controversies.

It may be hoped that the discussion which this book has raised may do
good in two ways.

It may enable people to put the Bible into its right place in the
fabric of their Christian belief. It may help to make it plain that in
the full sense the Christian's faith is faith only in a Person, and
that Person Jesus Christ: that to justify this faith he needs from the
Scriptures only the witness of some New Testament documents,
considered as containing history: while his belief in the Bible as
inspired is, speaking logically, subsequent to his belief in Christ,
and even, when we include the New Testament, subsequent to his belief
in the Church, as the Body of Christ, rather than prior to it[52].

There is also another good result to which we may hope to see the
present controversy minister--the drawing of a clear line in regard to
development between the Old Testament and the New. For all modern
criticism goes to emphasize the gradualness of the process through
which, under the Old Covenant, God prepared the way for Christ. Now
all that can be brought to light in this sense, the Church can await
with indifference from a theological point of view, because it is of
the essence of the Old Testament to be the record of a gradual
self-disclosure of God continuous and progressive till the incarnation
of Jesus Christ. It is, on the other hand, of the essence of the New
Testament revelation that, as given in Christ and proclaimed by His
apostles, it is, as far as this world is concerned, in its substance,
final and adequate for all ages. It is this, because of its essential
nature. If Christ is 'the Word made flesh,' the 'Son of God made Son
of Man,' then finality essentially belongs to this disclosure of
Godhead and this exhibition of manhood. 'He that hath seen Him hath
seen the Father,' and he that hath seen Him hath seen perfect man,
hath seen our manhood in its closest conceivable relation to God, at
the goal of all possible spiritual and moral development. All our
growth henceforth can only be a growth into 'the measure of the
stature of His fulness'--a growth into the understanding and
possession of Him who was once manifested. Finality is of the essence
of the New Covenant, as gradual communication of truth was of the Old.

If these two results are obtained, we shall not be liable any more to
be asked 'where we are going to stop' in admitting historical
uncertainty. 'If you admit so much uncertainty in the Old Testament,
why do you not admit the same in the New?' We shall not be liable to
be asked this question, because it will be apparent that the
starting-point as of enquiry, so of security, lies in the New
Testament and then proceeds to extend itself to the Old. For us, at
least, the Old Testament depends upon the New, not the New upon the
Old.

Nor shall we be liable any more to be asked, 'Why, if you admit so
much development in actual substance in the truth revealed under the
Old Covenant, cannot you admit a similar augmentation under the New?'
This question will be prevented, because it will be apparent that the
essential conditions are different in the two cases. Progress in
Christianity is always reversion to an original and perfect type, not
addition to it: it is progress only in the understanding of the
Christ. 'Regnum tuum, Domine, regnum omnium saeculorum; et dominatio
tua in omni generatione et generationem.'

 C. G.

 PUSEY HOUSE,
 _July, 1890_.

  The chief changes of any importance in this edition are (1) the
  addition of a note at the end of the first essay; (2) the alteration
  of a few sentences on pp. 289, 296-7 of Essay VII; (3) the
  alteration of note 2 on p. 345 and note 1 on p. 346 in Essay VIII;
  (4) the expansion on p. 357, § 6 of the opening sentences; (5) the
  addition of an appendix on _The Christian Doctrine of Sin_.

[3] By the phrase 'to attempt to put the Catholic faith into its right
relation to modern intellectual and moral problems' (Preface to First
Edition) it was not by any means intended to suggest that the modern
problems or the modern sciences were the things of the first
importance and the faith only secondary. What was intended was that,
as holding the Faith, we needed, as the Church has often needed, to
bring that with which we are ourselves identified, into relation to
the claims, intellectual and practical, made upon us from outside.

[4] Cf. Dr. Pusey, _University Sermons_, 1864-1879. 'Unscience, not
science, contrary to faith,' pp. 18 ff.

[5] Cf. the history of the relations of the Church to Aristotelian
philosophy: Milman, _Latin Christianity_, ed. 4, vol. ix. pp. 110 ff.;
and later the relations of Christianity to the Copernican astronomy:
Salmon, _Infallibility of the Church_, p. 230.

[6] See the tribute to his memory by Mr. G. J. Romanes: _Guardian_,
Jan. 29, 1890.

[7] From S. Bernard's most touching sermon (_in Cant. 26_) on the
death of his brother Gerard.

[8] See Essay VI. pp. 226-227, 250 ff.; Essay VIII. pp. 324-327; and
Essay IX. pp. 384-390.

[9] See Preface, p. ix. note 1.

[10] Cf. Dr. Westcott's note on 1 S. John iii. 4, ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ
ἀνομία.

[11] Cf. F. Lenormant, _Les Origines de l'histoire_. Paris, 1880, t.
1, p. 191. 'C'est dans la race de Qaîn que la Bible place l'invention
des arts et des métiers. "Les fils du siècle sont plus habiles que les
enfants de lumière."'

[12] Cf. p. 534.

[13] Cf. p. 535, note 1.

[14] Cf. F. Lenormant, _Les Origines_, t. 1, pp. 63-66. It is a
pleasure to refer to this work by a distinguished Catholic and man of
learning. The Preface is an admirable discussion of the relation of
scientific enquiry to belief in Inspiration.

[15] _Oxford Diocesan Gazette_, July, 1890 (Parker, Oxford), p. 91.

[16] The summary statements on pp. 351-2 as to the historical
character of the Old Testament represent, I believe, a 'conservative'
attitude, an attitude towards the history very unlike that, for
instance, of Wellhausen.

[17] See Ed. Riehm, _Einleitung in das A. T._ (Halle, 1889), §§ 15-18,
24, 27. F. E. König, _Offenbarungsbegriff des A. T._ (Leipzig, 1882),
t. 11, pp. 321 ff. Cf. also _Hauptprobleme der Altisr.-Religionsgesch._
(Leipzig, 1884). F. Delitzsch, _Genesis_, Clark's trans. (Edinb.,
1888), i. 19-38. F. Lenormant, _Les Origines_, Préface. I venture to
think that those who want to study the modern criticism of the Old
Testament would be less likely to be prejudiced against it if they
were to begin their study with the assistance of Riehm and König,
rather than of more rationalistic scholars. I ought to add that while
the scholars mentioned above agree substantially as to the analysis of
the Pentateuch, they differ as to the position assigned to the
Priestly Code, which Dillmann and Riehm hold to be prior to
Deuteronomy, Wellhausen, König and Delitzsch subsequent to it.

[18] _Essay on the place of Ecclesiasticus in Semitic Literature._
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890, pp. 20, 21. I allude to this essay
because it has excited considerable interest, but it has not received
favourable notice from critics either English or German. For a review
by a very competent critic, see Prof. Nöldeke in the _Lit.
Centralblatt_, July 12, 1890.

[19] I may say that the motive for what is said about Ps. cx on p. 359
was simply the conviction that our Lord in the passage there in
question cannot fairly be taken as giving instruction on a critical
question of authorship, not the difficulty of assigning the particular
Psalm to the age of David. The solution which I propose, p. 359, as to
our Lord's words is however only one of several which are possible
even for those who agree with me in the conviction expressed above.
See, for instance, Edersheim, _Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah_
(London, 1884), ii. p. 406, and Bp. Thirlwall as quoted in Dean
Perowne's _Commentary on the Psalms_ (London 1871), ii. pp. 302 ff.

[20] S. Augustine, _Quæst. 73 in Exod._: 'Quamquam et in vetere
[Testamento] novum lateat, et in novo vetus pateat.' Quoted by Dr.
Liddon, _The worth of the Old Testament_, p. 28.

[21] Cf. Didymus _in Psalm._ xxi. 19, where he interprets Christ's
'seamless robe,' of the Holy Scriptures which they 'part' who accept
one and reject another. 'This robe of Jesus is also indivisible, for
it is seamless. Its unity is not enforced but natural [οὐ γὰρ
βεβιασμένην ἕνωσιν ἀλλὰ συμφυῆ ἔχει]; it is 'from above' [from the
top, A.V.] because it is inspired; it is 'woven throughout,' because
in its whole force it is from above.'

[22] S. Matt. v. 17-48, cf. xix. 8: 'Moses, because of the hardness of
your hearts,' etc.

[23] After S. Paul, S. Augustine is the great exponent of this
principle in early days; see esp. _de spiritu et littera_, xix. (34):
Lex ergo data est ut gratia quaereretur: gratia data est ut lex
impleretur.

[24] See esp. Heb. ix. 8, 'The Holy Spirit this signifying;' and cf.
Dr. Westcott on this Epistle, pp. 233 ff.

[25] I would venture to recommend Riehm's _Messianic Prophecy_
(Clark's trans.), as a summary account of prophecy both reverent and
critical.

[26] Cf. Hooker's account of our grounds for believing that 'Scripture
... is divine and sacred.' 'By experience,' he says, 'we all know,
that the first outward motive leading men so to esteem of the
Scripture is the authority of God's Church.... Afterwards the more we
bestow our labour in reading or hearing the mysteries thereof, the
more we find that the thing itself doth answer our received opinion
concerning it.' Later again, as against 'infidels or atheists,' we
must 'maintain the authority of the books of God ... by such kind of
proofs ... that no man living shall be able to deny it, without
denying some apparent principle such as all men acknowledge to be
true.' _E. P._ III. viii. 14.

[27] The Chronicles and the later historical books, as is well known,
were included in the third class of 'Hagiographa' with the Psalmists
and Moralists.

The truth of this paragraph depends upon (1) the character, (2) the
extent of the idealism of Old Testament facts. On this something more
is said later on. Here I am only concerned to distinguish an idealism
which truly interprets facts, even if it throws their spiritual
meaning into high relief, from a merely imaginative treatment which
perverts and distorts them. Thus if the Chronicler idealizes, it is by
emphasizing, beyond the point of actual fact, the priestly element in
the history which at the same time did both really exist and really
represent the divine purpose.

[28] _De Gestis Pelag._ v. (15), 'Sicut veteri Testamento si esse ex
Deo bono et summo negetur, ita et novo fit injuria si veteri
aequetur.' S. Augustine does not perhaps carry out the recognition of
this principle as fully as some other of the Fathers: for refs. see
pp. 229 ff.

[29] S. Matt. xix. 8.

[30] See pp. 329 ff.

[31] _Religion of the Semites._ Edinburgh, 1889, p. 4.

[32] p. 329, note 2. The passage here added is from S. Chrysost. _in
Matt._ vi. 3. The same idea is discerned by Bp. Lightfoot in S. Paul;
see on Gal. iv. 11.

[33] I use the word 'myth' for those primitive stories on p. 356. The
legitimacy of this use may be disputed, see e.g. Riehm, _Einleitung_,
p. 342. But I endeavour to explain exactly the sense in which the word
is used. On Strauss's application of the myth theory to the Gospel
narratives, I should quite assent to the remarks of Dr. Mill,
_Mythical Interpretation of the Gospels_ (Cambridge, 1861), pp. 97,
98.

[34] S. John i. 14, xix. 35, xxi. 24; 1 S. John i. 1-3.

[35] S. Luke i. 1-4.

[36] I would call attention in this connection to Dr. Salmon's remarks
on S. Jude's use, even in the New Testament canon, of the traditions
contained in the Assumption of Moses, and his quotation of the book of
Enoch: see at the end of his lecture on S. Jude's Epistle in the
_Introduction to the New Testament_.

[37] Cf. Riehm, _Einleitung_, i. p. 246: 'Das Gesetzbuch kann nicht
erst unter Josia geschrieben sein, sondern es muss spätestens zur Zeit
des Hiskia entstanden sein, und zwar bevor dieser König seine
Reformation ganz durchgeführt hatte.'

[38] A common feature in all traditions is what Wellhausen describes
as the main characteristic of the Chronicler, 'the timeless manner of
looking at things which is natural to him.' He 'figures the old Hebrew
people as in exact conformity with the pattern of the later Jewish
community.' _Proleg. to Hist. of Israel_ (Edinburgh, 1885), pp.
190-193. In tradition what _is_ authoritative tends to be represented
as what _always has been_ authoritative.

[39] Thus the Pseudo-Isidorian Decretals are properly called
forgeries; and the evidence of this would lie in the fact that the
author could not have afforded to disclose the method and
circumstances of their production.

[40] Thus Riehm, whose position is described above on p. xx, has a
noble section (_Einleit._ pp. 349 ff.) on the Pentateuch considered as
the record of a Revelation. The conviction of the revelation of God is
ascribed in part to 'the immediate impression which the Pentateuch
makes. Anyone who reads it, so as to allow its contents to work upon
his spirit, must receive the impression that a consciousness of God,
such as is here expressed, cannot be derived from flesh and blood.'

[41] _De fide Catholica._ The treatise is ascribed to Boethius: see
Boetii, _Opuscula Sacra_ (Teubner Series), p. 178. On the fresh
evidence of the authorship of those treatises supplied by the
_Anecdoton Holderi_ see Hodgkin's _Letters of Cassiodorus_, London,
1886, pp. 80-1.

[42] See the account in Manning's _Temporal Mission of the Holy
Ghost_, London, 1877, pp. 156-160, and p. 166. Cf. also Newman's words
below, p. 350.

[43] pp. 359-60.

[44] Nothing--except, on the customary interpretation, His reference
to Psalm cx. This does seem to lay stress on David's authorship,
unless it be regarded, as it certainly seems to me fair to regard it,
as a question, rather than as positive instruction at all--a question
simply calculated to lead the Pharisees to examine their own
principles. Unless it be so interpreted it does seem to depend, as an
argument, on personal authorship, because unless it be by David, it
seems very difficult to suppose it written in David's person. It would
naturally be a Psalm in which _the King is addressed_.

[45] S. John v. 46-47.

[46] S. Luke i. 17; S. Matt. xi. 14; xvii. 12.

[47] _Nineteenth Century_, July, 1890, p. 20. The bulk of his argument
is directed against a position different from mine. Here I am only
concerned with a single point.

[48] The proper name 'Lazarus' is presumably used because of its
meaning. It should be noticed that the story is not a _parable_ proper
like that of the Sower or the Prodigal Son.

[49] It may be remarked that to regard 'the flood' as a representative
or typical expression of a whole class of divine judgments, helps us
in interpreting S. Peter's use of it in 1 Peter iii. 19-20. There is
no reason for an exceptional treatment of those who perished in one
particular flood, but there is every reason why 'the Gospel should
have been preached to those who died' under God's physical judgments
of old times, supposing these, as we must suppose them, not to
represent God's final moral judgment on individuals: see 1 Peter
iv. 6.

[50] These words are Bishop Steere's: see the _Memoir_ of him by R. M.
Heanley, London, 1888, p. 404. He admirably characterizes the true
function of the Bible in the Church. It is (1) a criterion, not a
teacher; (2) a record of the proclamation of the revelation, not the
revelation itself.

[51] See pp. 29 ff., 229 ff., 337 ff.

[52] Cp. pp. 338-341, where this is explained. The 'logical' order of
belief is often no doubt not the order of experience. The Bible can
draw men to itself, and through itself to Christ, before they take any
heed of the Church. But to feel the power of inspiration is a
different thing from having reasoned grounds for calling certain books
inspired.




SYNOPSIS OF CONTENTS.


I.

FAITH.
                                                                       PAGE
    I. Faith; its situation; its behaviour; challenged by novel
       experiences; alarmed at its own perplexity                       3-5

       Yet why alarmed?                                                   5

       Perplexity consistent with faith, when faith is stripped of
       its habitual corroborations from without: and summoned to
       submit itself to internal observation                            5-8

       For faith is an elemental act of personal self: and,
       therefore, like all such acts, e.g. of thought; will; love;
       is, necessarily, incapable of offering itself for
       scientific examination                                          8-11

   II. What is faith?                                                 11-12

       The motion in us of our sonship in the Father; the
       conscious recognition, and realization, of our inherent
       filial adhesion to God                                         13-15

       This intimacy of relationship is capable of indefinite
       growth, of 'supernatural' development                             15

       The history of faith is the gradual discovery of this
       increasing intimacy                                            16-18

       The demand for faith is (_a_) _universal_, for all are sons;
       (_b_) _urgent_, as appealing to a vital fact;
       (_c_) _tolerant_, as reposing on existent fact                 18-21

  III. Faith, an act of _basal_ personality, at the root of
       all outflowing activities; is present, as animating force,
       within all natural faculties. When summoned out, into
       positive or direct action on its own account = Religion,
       i.e. the emergence, into open manifestation, of Fatherhood
       and sonship, which lie hidden within all secular life          21-28

       Faith, an energy of basal self, using, as instruments and
       material, the sum of faculties; therefore, each faculty,
       _separately_, can give but a _partial_ vindication of an
       integral act of faith                                          28-29

       This applies to _Reason_; compare its relation to acts
       of affection, imagination, chivalry; all such acts are acts
       of _Venture_, using evidence of reason in order to go
       beyond evidence                                                30-34

       So faith makes use of all knowledge, but is, itself, its
       own motive. It uses, as its instrument, every stage of
       science; but is pledged to no one particular stage             34-38

   IV. Faith, simple adhesion of soul to God; yet, once begun, it
       has a history of its own; long, complicated, recorded in
       Bible, stored up in Creeds                                     38-41

       This involves difficulties, intricacies, efforts; all this,
       the necessary consequence of our being born in the 'last
       days'                                                          41-45

       Yet to the end, faith remains an act of personal and
       spiritual adhesion                                             45-46

    V. Faith, not only covers a long past, but anticipates the
       future; it pledges itself ahead, e.g. in the case of
       'ordination vows.' Such pledges justified, because the act
       of faith is personal; and the object of faith is final,
       i.e. 'Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever'        46-54


II.

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD.

    I. Object of the essay and attitude assumed                       57-59

   II. A broad contrast between the God of Philosophy and the God
       of religion                                                    59-60

       Attempts to get rid of the opposition (1) by division of
       territory; (2) by confusion of terms                           60-63

  III. Religion demands that God shall be Personal, and stand in a
       moral relationship with man                                    63-65

   IV. Growth and purification of the religious conception of God     65-68

    V. _Religion and Morals._ Collision between the two in Greece,
       and its consequences. Synthesis of religion and morality
       among the Jews: and in Christianity                            68-78

       Subsequent collisions between religion and morals within
       the Christian Church. The Reformation a moral protest.
       Immorality of its later developments. Modern protest
       against these                                                  78-82

   VI. _Religion and Reason._ Protest of Greek Philosophy against
       Polytheism. Christian Theology the meeting-point of Jewish
       religion and Greek Philosophy                                  82-86

       What Theology is. Objection to it from the side of
       (1) religion, (2) philosophy                                   86-90

       The Christian doctrine of the Trinity an appeal to the
       reason                                                         90-91

       Its answer to the speculative problems of Greek thought
       (1) as to what unity is; (2) as to the immanence of reason
       in nature                                                      91-95

       The witness of the Fathers                                        95

       The doctrine of the Trinity the true Monotheism; the
       doctrine of the _Logos_ as personal yet immanent               95-96

  VII. The Christian doctrine of God why challenged in the present
       day                                                               96

       The deism of the last century. The new science of nature.
       Evolution restores the truth of the Divine immanence which
       deism denied. Pantheistic reaction                            96-102

       The Christian doctrine of God the safeguard of rational
       religion against deism and pantheism                         102-103

 VIII. The so-called 'proofs' of the existence of God               103-104

       Parallel between the belief in God and the belief in nature  104-107

       Verification in experience the only 'proof.' Reason in both
       the interpreter of Faith                                     107-109


III.

THE PROBLEM OF PAIN.

   The problem of pain admits of no new treatment, but the attempt
   to use it as an argument against Christianity calls for a
   recapitulation of what may be said on the other side                 113

   Pain is (1) animal, (2) human.

   (1) Animal pain is a thing of which we can only form
       imaginative conjectures; and these, besides being liable to
       exaggeration, are not of a nature to form premisses for
       argument                                                     113-116

   (2) Common sense tells us that human pain contributes as
       (_a_) punitive, (_b_) purgatorial, (_c_) prophylactic,
       to the development of the individual and the race            116-119

   Natural religion further views it as the necessary condition of
   approach, by sinful beings, to the Divine; and looks for its
   fuller explanation to a future existence                         119-122

   Christianity carries on the view of natural religion, and sees
   in pain and suffering:--

   (_a_) The antidote to sin                                        122-124

   (_b_) The means of individual and social progress                124-125

   (_c_) The source of sympathy with man                                125

   (_d_) The secret of union with God                               125-126


IV.

PREPARATION IN HISTORY FOR CHRIST.

   General considerations on the study of the historical
   preparation, as part of the study of the Incarnation             129-133

   Special value of such study in the present age of historical
   and scientific method which

       may be able to gauge finally the value of naturalist
       theories of the origin of Christianity                       133-134

       may find its own congenial 'signs' in the beauty of
       manifold preparing process; in the wonder of an apparently
       unique convergence of lines of preparation                   134-137

    I. General preparation--in the world at large:

       (1) In the shaping of its external order                     138-142

       (2) Through its inward experiences of

           Failure                                                  142-146

           Progress                                                 146-150

   II. Special preparation--in Israel:

       (1) The singularity of Israel's external position at the
           critical moment of the Christian Era                     150-156

       (2) The paradox of its inward character                      156-159

       (3) The peculiar influences which had made it what it was:   159-160

           _a._ Prophecy                                            160-167

           _b._ The Law                                             167-169

           _c._ The Course of its History                           170-175

  III. The independence of the two preparations; the paradox of
       their fulfilment in one Christ                               175-178


V.

THE INCARNATION AND DEVELOPMENT.

    I. The theory of evolution has recalled our minds to the
       'cosmical significance' of the Incarnation, which was a
       prominent thought in (1) the early (2) mediaeval church      181-187

   II. Theology and Science move in different but parallel planes:
       one gives the meaning, the other the method of creation      187-188

       Thus the doctrine of 'the Eternal Word' is compatible with
       all the verified results of scientific teaching on

       (1) energy                                                       188

       (2) teleology                                                188-193

       (3) origin and antiquity of man                              193-195

       (4) mental and moral evolution                               195-199

       (5) the relation of philosophy to Theology                   199-202

       (6) the comparative study of religions                       202-205

       while in the Christian view, it both illuminates and is
       illuminated by those results                                 205-206

  III. But when the planes intersect, and we say 'the Word was
       made flesh,' we are said to traverse experience                  207

       (1) This charge is only a critical presumption               207-208

       (2) All novelties traverse past experience                       208

       (3) Moral experience is as real as physical                  208-209

       (4) The Incarnation harmonizes with our moral experience     209-210

       (5) By reorganizing morality it reorientates character           211

       (6) It has therefore a true relation to all phases of human
           life                                                     211-214


VI.

THE INCARNATION AS THE BASIS OF DOGMA.

    I. The principle of Dogma is not to be attacked or defended
       on _à priori_ grounds. The real question is whether
       the Incarnation, as asserted, is true or false. And this is
       a question for evidence                                      217-220

       Even scientific 'dogmata' differ less from religious dogmas
       than is sometimes supposed, in that (_a_) both are received
       on evidence, (_b_) both require an experimental verification,
       or (in so far as either are still held along with error)
       correction                                                   220-224

       The acceptance of dogmatic truth is essentially reasonable.
       Its claims to (_a_) authority, (_b_) finality, are not the
       ground for accepting it, but a necessary outcome of the facts
       accepted in it                                               224-229

   II. The evidence for the Incarnation is as many-sided as human
       life                                                         229-233

       But primarily historical. The crucial fact is the
       Resurrection                                                 233-236

       Everything is involved in the answer to 'What think ye of
       Christ?'                                                     236-238

       It is an error to think of the belief of the Church as an
       edifice built up in the age of the Councils                  238-239

       The decisions of the Councils represent only a growth in
       intellectual precision through experience of error           239-245

       The creed in its whole substance is the direct outcome of
       the fact of the Incarnation                                  245-250

  III. The dogmatic creed is to be distinguished from the body of
       theological literature which comments upon it                    250

       Theological comment is variable: it may err, it may
       develop. Herein lie most of the disputes of technical, and
       the advances of popular, theology                            250-255

       Even the creeds are human on the side of their language      255-258

   IV. The 'damnatory clauses,' though easily misunderstood,
       really mean what is both true, and necessary                 258-260

       Christian dogmatism is after all devotion to truth, for
       truth's sake                                                 260-261

    V. The modern reading of the Scriptures without miracle and
       the Christ without Godhead depends for its justification
       upon the truth of an hypothesis                              262-266

       But this hypothesis explains away, instead of explaining,
       the evidence; while it is itself incapable of proof          266-270

       Historical reality is essential to the truth of the
       Incarnation. Mere spiritualism ends in unreality             270-272


VII.

THE ATONEMENT.

    I. Sin and sacrifice in relation to the Atonement               275-276

       1. Twofold character of sin:--

          (_a_) A state of alienation from God                      276-277

          (_b_) A state of guilt                                    277-279

       2. Twofold character of sacrifice:--

          (_a_) The expression of man's original relation to God    279-280

          (_b_) The expiation of sin, and propitiation of wrath     280-281

          Both aspects shewn in the ceremonies of the Mosaic Law    281-282

       3. Inadequacy of man's offerings to satisfy sense of
          personal guilt                                            282-285

   II. The death of Christ answers to the demands of the sense of
       sin and of the desire for forgiveness                            285

       1. Christ's death a sacrifice of propitiation:--

          (_a_) Of the wrath of God, which is--

                (1) The hostility of Divine Nature to sin           285-287

                (2) The expression of the eternal law of
                    righteousness                                      288

          (_b_) By virtue--

                (1) Of the obedience manifested by Him              289-290

                (2) Of His recognition of the Divine justice            290

                (3) Of His death as the necessary form of both      290-292

                    The propitiatory character of His death shewn--

                      (i.) By the general relation between
                           physical and spiritual death             292-293

                     (ii.) Because of the nature of Him who
                           endured it                               293-294

                    (iii.) Because of the results flowing from it       294

          (_c_) On behalf of men, for He is our Representative--

                (1) As Victim, by His perfect humanity our
                    sinbearer                                       294-297

                (2) As Priest, able to offer what man could not     297-298

                    The true vicariousness of His Priesthood            298

       2. Christ's death the source of life                         298-299

          (_a_) As delivering us from sin                               299

          (_b_) As bestowing new life                                   299

          (_c_) As uniting us to God                                    299

                But only as connected with and issuing in the
                Resurrection and Ascension                          300-301

       3. Christ's death in relation to man's responsibility            301

          (_a_) The Atonement, being forgiveness, must remit
                some of the consequences of sin                     301-302

          (_b_) But our mystical union with Christ ensures
                our share in the sacrifice                          302-303

                (1) Not in its propitiation, which we can only
                    plead                                           303-304

                (2) But by faith which accepts it and recognises
                    its justice                                     304-305

                (3) And by following Him in obedience through
                    suffering                                       305-307

  III. Consideration of certain erroneous statements of the
       doctrine                                                         307

       1. The implied divergence of Will in the Godhead             307-308

       2. The view of Redemption as wrought for us, not in us           308

       3. The view that Christ redeemed us by taking our
          punishment instead of us                                      309

          (1) The essential punishment of alienation He could not
              bear                                                      309

          (2) The penal sufferings which He bore are not remitted
              to us                                                     309

          (3) But He bore them that we, like Him, may bear them
              sacrificially, not as punishment                      309-310

   IV. Short summary.

       1. The death of Christ as propitiatory      } tested by
                                                   }
       2. His death as transforming pain and death } experience     310-312


VIII.

THE HOLY SPIRIT AND INSPIRATION.

   Christianity is an experienced or manifested life: because its
   essence is the possession of the Spirit, and the Spirit is Life  315-317

    I. The Holy Spirit the life-giver:--

          In nature                                                 317-318

          In man                                                    318-319

          In the gradual recovery of man from sin                   319-320

          In Christ                                                 320-321

          In the Church                                             321-322

       His work in the Church:--

          1. Social or ecclesiastical                               322-323

          2. Nourishing individuality: both of character through
             the Sacraments, and of judgment through authority      323-327

          3. Consecrating the whole of nature, material as well as
             spiritual                                              327-328

          4. By a gradual method                                        328

             Imperfection of the Old Testament                      328-331

                   "      of the Church                             331-332

       The Holy Spirit personally present and continually
       operative in the Church                                      332-333

   II. The Theology of the Holy Spirit. Real but limited
       knowledge through revelation                                 334-335

       He is (_a_) distinct in Person but very God,
       (_b_) proceeding from the Father and the Son,
       (_c_) One in essence with the Father and the Son             334-335

       The Doctrine of the Trinity not Tritheistic                  335-336

  III. The Inspiration of Holy Scripture. Fatal results of not
       keeping this in context with the rest of the Holy Spirit's
       work in the Church                                           337-340

       1. It is an article of the Faith, not among its bases        340-341

       2. It is a necessary article                                     341

       3. Its certain and primary meaning, as seen by examination
          of the books of the Old and New Testaments                341-348

       4. Its practical meaning and obligation                      349-351

          Questions raised as to its meaning by Old Testament
          criticism:--

          (_a_) While the Old Testament is, like the New
                Testament, certainly and really historical, can it
                admit of elements of idealism in the narrative?     351-354

          (_b_) Can it admit of dramatic composition?               354-356

          (_c_) Can it admit the presence of primitive myths?       356-357

       The Church not prevented from admitting these to be open
       questions either:--

          (1) By any dogmatic definitions of inspiration            357-358

          (2) By our Lord's language as to the Old Testament        358-360

       We may expect the criticism of the Old Testament, like that
       of the New, to deepen and enlarge, not impair, our
       reverence for the 'Word of God'                              360-362


IX.

THE CHURCH.

   The Church the final satisfaction of certain social instincts,
   viz. the need of co-operation for life, for knowledge, and for
   worship                                                              365

   These instincts are:--

       (1) Universal                                                365-368

       (2) Embodied in Judaism, and combined with the principle
           of God's election of one people to be a source of
           blessing to others                                       368-370

       (3) Fulfilled in the Incarnation                             370-372

    I. The Church as the centre of spiritual life: offers its
       blessings, without limitation, to all who are willing to
       submit to spiritual discipline, and combines them in a
       brotherhood of common service                                372-375

       Hence it is, of necessity:--

       (1) A _visible_ body                                         375-377

       (2) _One_, both in its spiritual life and in external
           organization. This unity implied in the New Testament,
           and explained in the second century, as centering in
           the Episcopate. The Apostolical Succession is thus the
           pledge of historic continuity, and has always been the
           mark of the English Church. Loyalty to the Church is no
           narrowing of true sympathy                               377-384

   II. The Church as the Teacher of Truth: primarily by bearing
       witness to truths revealed to it; secondarily by
       interpreting the relation of these truths to each other      384-387

       Hence:--

       (1) It witnesses to the reality of central spiritual truths
           and teaches them authoritatively to its members              387

       (2) It trains its members to a rational apprehension of
           these truths                                             387-388

       (3) It leaves great freedom on points not central            388-389

       (4) It protects the truths themselves from decay             389-390

  III. The Church the home of worship: worship the Godward
       expression of its life: its highest expression in the
       Eucharist: its priestly work earned out from the first by
       a special class of ministers                                 390-393

       Each aspect of the Church's work completed by the
       co-operation of the Blessed Dead                                 394

       Causes of the apparent failure of the Church                 394-400

       Need of its witness and work in modern times                 400-402


X.

SACRAMENTS.

   Comprehensiveness a characteristic distinction of fruitful and
   enduring work: which will here be traced in the sacramental
   work of the Church; with incidental reference to the evidential
   import of the inner coherence of Christianity, and its perfect
   aptness for humanity                                             405-408

    I. Christianity claims to be a way of life for men: whose
       nature and life involve two elements; which are usually
       distinguished as bodily and spiritual                        408-409

       The distinction of these two elements real; their union
       essential                                                    409-411

       It is to be inquired whether this complexity of man's
       nature is recognised and provided for in the Church of
       Christ                                                           411

   II. Grounds for anticipating that it would be so:--

       (1) In the very fact of the Incarnation; and more
           particularly                                             411-413

       (2) In the character of the preparatory system whose
           forecasts it met                                         413-414

       (3) And in certain conspicuous features of Christ's
           ministry                                                 414-415

       The work of Sacraments to be linked with this anticipation       415

  III. The prominence of the Sacramental principle in Christ's
       teaching: to be estimated with reference to the previous
       convictions of those whom He taught                          415-416

       There is thus found:--

       (1) Abundant evidence that the general principle of
           Sacraments is accepted, to be a characteristic of
           Christianity                                             416-417

       (2) The authoritative appointment of particular expressions
           for this general principle:--

           Expressions foreshown in preparatory history:
           anticipated in preliminary discourses: appointed with
           great solemnity and emphasis                             417-418

           [These expressions such as may be seen to be
           intrinsically appropriate, ethically helpful and
           instructive, and safeguards against individualism.]      418-420

       (3) An immediate recognition in the Apostolic Church of the
           force of this teaching, and of the necessary prominence
           of Sacraments                                            420-421

   IV. The correspondence between the ministry of Sacraments and
       the complex nature of man appears in three ways: since:--

       (1) The dignity and the spiritual capacity of the material
           order is thus vindicated and maintained: so that unreal
           and negative spirituality is precluded, and provision
           is made for the hallowing of stage after stage in a
           human life                                               422-426

       (2) The claim of Christianity to penetrate the bodily life
           is kept in its due prominence by the very nature of
           Sacraments: the redemption of the body is foreshown; and
           perhaps begun                                            426-429

       (3) The evidences of mystery in human nature, its moments
           of unearthliness, its immortal longings, its impatience
           of finite satisfaction, being recognised and accounted
           for by the doctrine of Grace are met by Sacraments: and
           led in an ordered progress towards a perfect end         429-433


XI.

CHRISTIANITY AND POLITICS.

   INTRODUCTORY.--The twofold problem of Christianity in its
   relation to human society--

   (1) To consecrate; (2) to purify                                 437-440

    I. The Church is _neutral_ as to natural differences, e.g.
       the form of government, autocratic or democratic leaning     440-442

   II. The Church _supplements_ the moral influence of the
       State, in respect of--

       (1) The appeal to higher motives                             443-445
           e.g. as to the duties of--

           (_a_) Governors and governed                             446-451

           (_b_) Owners of property                                 451-452

       (2) The support of the weak against the strong               452-455

       (3) The maintenance of religion                              455-461

  III. The Church _purifies_ the whole social life of mankind--

       (1) By spreading Christian ideas                             461-462

       (2) By maintaining the Christian type of character           462-463

   CONCLUSION.--The Church appeals to deeper needs than the
   State and is therefore fundamentally Catholic, and only
   incidentally national                                            463-464


XII.

CHRISTIAN ETHICS.

   General characteristics of the Christian ethical system          467-468

   Dogmatic postulates:--

        (1) Doctrine of God: God a Personal and Ethical Being       469-470

        (2) Doctrine of Man: his ideal nature; his destiny as
            related to the good through conscience and freedom;
            his present condition                                   470-476

        (3) Doctrine of Christ: Catholic view of His Person         476

    I. Christ's revelation of the Highest Good                      476-480

            The Kingdom of God: twofold meaning of the term         477-479

            Christian view of the world                             479-480

   II. The Moral Law; its authority, sanctions, and content         480-489

            The basis of obligation found in the idea of personal
            relationship between God and Man                        480-482

            The sanctions, and motives of Christian Morality        482-484

            The Law of Duty embraced in the decalogue               484-489

  III. Christ the pattern of character                              489-504

            Conditions required in the perfect example              490-491

            Christ the pattern of filial dependence, obedience,
            and love                                                491-494

            Virtuous action seen to imply a harmony of the
            different elements in personality, postulating a
            threefold virtuous principle supernaturally imparted    494-496

       Christian character: the Christian personality in its
       relation:--

            (1) To God--Christian Wisdom                            497-498

            (2) To Man--Christian Justice                           498-501

            (3) To Self--Christian Temperance                       501-502

            (4) To the hindrances of environment--Christian
                Fortitude                                           502-503

   IV. Christ the source of the recreation of character             504-512

            Claim of Christianity to recreate character             504-505

            Dogmatic truths implied in the recreative process       505-506

            Holiness dependent on a permanent relation to Christ        506

            The Church a school of character, and sphere of
            individual discipline                                   506-508

            Christian ascetics--their ground in reason, and effect
            on character                                            509-512

    V. The consummation of God's kingdom                            512-518

            The intermediate stage                                      513

            The final stage of glory:

            (i) The kingdom to be finally manifested                513-514

            (ii) and purified through judgment                          514

       Extent and limits of the final triumph of good               514-516

       Perfection of human personality: the perfect state one of

                harmony                                             516-517

                glory                                                   517

                blessedness                                             517

                and fellowship in a moral community                     517

   VI. Conclusion: relation of Christian Ethics to the products of
       civilization, to individual character, to social life        518-520

   APPENDIX I. ON SOME ASPECTS OF CHRISTIAN DUTY                    521-525

   APPENDIX II. ON THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SIN                    526-538




I.

_FAITH._

HENRY SCOTT HOLLAND.


I. In proposing to consider the origin and growth of faith, we have a
practical, and not a merely theoretical, aim. We are thinking of the
actual problems which are, at this moment, encompassing and hindering
faith: and it is because of their urgency and their pressure, that we
find it worth while to go back upon our earliest beginnings, in order
to ask what Faith itself means. For only through an examination of its
nature, its origin, and its structure, will it be possible for us to
sift the questions which beset us, and to distinguish those to which
Faith is bound to give an answer from those which it can afford to let
alone.

We set out then on our quest, in the mind of those who have felt the
trouble that is in the air. Even if we ourselves be not of their
number, yet we all suffer from their hesitation: we all feel the
imparted chill of their anxieties. For we are of one family: and the
sickness, or depression of some, must affect the whole body. All of
us, even the most confident, are interested in the case of those who
are fearing for themselves, as they sadly search their own hearts, and
ask, 'What is it to believe? Do I know what it is to believe? Have I,
or have I not, that which can be called "faith"? How can I be sure?
What can I say of myself?' Such questions as these are haunting and
harassing many among us who find themselves facing the Catholic Creed,
with its ring of undaunted assurance, with its unhesitating claim to
unique and universal supremacy, and contrast with this their own faint
and tentative apprehension of the strong truths, which are so
confidently asserted. Such men and women are anxious and eager to
number themselves among those that believe: but can they call this
temper 'belief,' which is so far below the level of the genuine
response which those Creeds obviously expect? Where is the blitheness
of faith? Where is its unshaken conviction? Where is its invincible
simplicity? Why is it that they only succeed in moving forward with
such painful indecision?

Now, it is to this temper that this essay is addressed. It does not
aim at convicting a hostile disbelief, but at succouring a distressed
faith. And this it does under the conviction that, in so doing, it is
responding to the peculiar character and needs of the situation.

For the urgency, the peril of the hour, lies, not so much in the
novelty, or force, of the pressure that is brought to bear against
faith, as in the behaviour of faith itself under the pressure. What
has happened is, not that faith has been confounded, but that it has
been challenged. It has been challenged by new social needs, by
strange developments of civilisation, by hungers that it had not yet
taken into account, by thirsts that it had not prepared itself to
satisfy. It has been challenged by new scientific methods, wholly
unlike its familiar intellectual equipment; by new worlds of facts
opened to its astonishment through discoveries which have changed the
entire look of the earth; by immense masses of novel material, which
it has been suddenly and violently required to assimilate; by strange
fashions of speech in science and history; by a babel of 'unknown
tongues' in all departments of learning and literature.

Faith is under the pressure of this challenge: and the primary
question is, how will it behave? What is it going to say, or do, in
face of this exciting transformation which has passed over the entire
surface of our intellectual scenery? How will it deal with the
situation? Will it prove itself adequate to the crisis? To what extent
can it afford to submit to the transforming process which has already
operated upon the mind and the imagination? If it submit, can it
survive? And in what condition? with what loss, or damage, or change?
On every side these challenges reach it; they beat at its doors; they
arrive in pelting haste; they clamour for immediate solutions.

Now faith, under these rapid and stormy challenges, is apt to fall
into panic. For this, surely, is the very meaning of a panic--a fear
that feeds upon itself. Men in a panic are frightened at finding
themselves afraid. So now with faith; it is terrified at its own
alarm. How is it (it asks itself) that it should find itself baffled
and timorous? If faith were faith, would it ever lose its confidence?
To be frightened is to confess itself false: for faith is confidence
in God, Who can never fail. How can faith allow of doubt or
hesitation? Surely for faith to hesitate, to be confused, is to deny
its very nature. Thus many anxious and perplexed souls retreat before
their own perplexities. Because their faith is troubled, they distrust
and abandon their faith. The very fact that it is in distress becomes
an argument against it.

It is at this point, and because of this particular peril that we are
urgently required to consider very seriously the nature and conditions
of faith. For our panic arises from our assumption that faith is of
such a nature, that the perplexity, into which, now and again, we find
ourselves thrown, must be impossible to it, must be incompatible with
it. Now, is this so? Ought we to expect of faith that its confidence
should never fail it--that its light should be always decisive? Is
faith incriminated by the mere fact that it is in difficulties?

Let us, first, consider what has occurred. Perhaps the situation
itself, if we quietly review it, will give a reason why it is that,
just at the moment when we most need vigour and assurance, we should
find ourselves stripped of all that tends to reassure.

For the peculiarity of the disturbance which we have got to encounter
lies in this, that it has removed from us the very weapons by which we
might hope to encounter it. Faith's evidential material is all
corroborative and accumulative; it draws it from out of an external
world, which can never wholly justify, or account for the internal
reality, yet which can so group itself, that from a hundred differing
lines, it offers indirect and parenthetic and convergent witness of
that which is, itself, beyond the reach of external proof. It is this
gradual grouping of an outer life into that assorted perspective in
which it offers the most effective corroboration of the inner truth,
which faith slowly accomplishes upon the matter which human science
presents to it. When once the grouping is achieved, so that the outer
world, known under certain scientific principles, tallies harmoniously
with its inner convictions, faith feels secure. The external life
offers it pictures, analogies, metaphors--all echoing and repeating
the internal world. Faith beholds itself mirrored: and, so echoed, so
mirrored, it feels itself in possession of corroborating evidences.
But the present scientific confusion seems to have shattered the
mirror--to have broken up the perspective--to have dissolved the
well-known groupings. It is true, as some of the essays which follow
will try to show, that the convulsion of which we speak, lies,
chiefly, in a change of position, or of level; so that great masses of
the matter, now thrown into confusion, will be found to compose
themselves afresh, under the newer conditions of review, and will
appear again as part and parcel of the scientific scenery. It is a
change of perspective more than anything else. But, no doubt, such a
change is just of the character to upset us, to disturb us; for,
during the change, while shifting from the old position to the new, we
are in the very chaos of confusion; everything seems, for the moment,
to be tumbling about around us: the entire scene grows unsteady;
though, indeed, when once we have got our feet firmly placed at the
new level of vantage, much, that once was familiar, is discovered to
be back again in its place, looking much the same as of old. It is the
_first_ shock of this enforced transition which is so calculated to
terrify: as when, for instance, men see their habitual reliance on the
evidence for design in nature, which had been inherited from Paley,
yield, and vanish, under the review of the facts with which the theory
of evolution acquaints them. What they feel is, that their familiar
mode of interpreting their faith, of justifying it, of picturing it,
has abruptly been torn from them. That which once seemed to evidence
it in the outer world, has ceased to be accepted or trusted. The
habitual ways of argument, the accepted assumptions, which they had
hitherto used as their supports and their instruments--have been
withdrawn--have become obsolete. Faith is thrown back on itself, on
its own inherent, naked vitality; it is robbed for the moment of that
sense of solidity and security, which fortifies and refreshes it, when
the outer world of natural facts, and the inner world of intellect and
fancy, all corroborate its confidence in itself, by harmonious
attestations of its validity. The old world of things had been brought
into this adaptation with the principles of belief. Faith was at home
in it, and looked out over it with cheerfulness, and moved about it
with freedom. But that old world is gone; and the new still lies
untested, unsorted, unverified, unassimilated, unhandled. It looks
foreign, odd, remote. Faith finds no obvious corroborations in it:
there, where it used to feel buttressed and warm, it now feels chilly
and exposed[53].

This is the first consequence, and it is serious enough in itself to
provoke alarm. Faith cannot be at ease or confident, until the outer
world responds to its own convictions; and yet ease and confidence are
exactly what it is challenged to exhibit.

And then, when a man, under this sense of fear, deprived of external
testimonies, attempts to exhibit, to evoke, to examine, his inner
conviction, in its inherent and vital character, as it is in itself,
unsupported by adventitious aids, he is astonished at his own
difficulty in discovering or disclosing it. Where is it all fled--that
which he had called his faith? He had enjoyed it, had relied on it,
had again and again asserted it in word and deed: and now, when he
wants to look at it, when he is summoned to produce it, when he is
challenged to declare its form and fashion; he finds himself dazed,
bewildered, searching helplessly for that which ever escapes him,
grasping at a fleeting shadow, which baffles his efforts to endow it
with fixity and substance. And, so finding, he grows yet more
desperately alarmed: it seems to him that he has been self-deceived,
betrayed, abandoned. He is bitterly sensitive to the sharp contrast
between the triumphant solidity with which scientific facts bear down
upon him, certified, undeniable, substantial, and the vague, shifty,
indistinct phantom, into which his conviction vanishes as soon as he
attempts to observe it in itself, or draw it out for public
inspection.

Yet, if we consider what faith signifies, we shall see at once that
this contrast ought to carry with it no alarm. It is a contrast which
follows on the very nature of faith. If we had understood its nature,
we could never have expected it to disclose itself under the same
conditions as those which govern the observation of scientific facts.
Faith is an elemental energy of the soul, and the surprise that we are
undergoing at not being able to bring it under direct observation, is
only an echo of the familiar shock with which we learn that science
has ransacked the entire bodily fabric of man, and has nowhere come
across his soul; or has searched the heavens through and through with
its telescope, and has seen no God. We are upset for a moment when
first we hear this; and then, we recover ourselves as we recollect
that, if God be what we believe Him to be, immaterial and spiritual,
then He would cease to be Himself, if He were visible through a
telescope: and that if the spirit of man be what we believe it to be,
that is the very reason why no surgeon's knife can ever arrive at it.

And, as with the soul, so with all its inherent and essential acts.
They are what it is: they can no more be visible than it can. How can
any of the basal intuitions, on which our knowledge rests, present
themselves to our inspection in the guise of external and phenomenal
facts? That which observes can never, strictly speaking, observe
itself. It can never look on at itself from outside, or view itself as
one among the multitude of things that come under its review. How can
it? It is itself the organ of vision: and the eye cannot see its own
power of seeing. This is why natural science, which is an organised
system of observation, finds that its own observing mind is absolutely
and totally outside its ken. It can take stock of the physiological
condition of thoughts or of feelings; but they themselves, in their
actual reality, are all rigidly shut out from the entire area of
scientific research. Wherever they begin, it ends; its methods
abruptly fail. It possesses no instrument by which to make good its
advance further. For the only instrument which it knows how to use,
and by which alone it can search, and examine, is itself the object
which it desires to submit to examination. But if _it_ is to be
examined, who, and what, is to conduct the examination? The observing
mind that turns round to explore itself, carries itself round as it
turns. It can never say--'Let me look at myself, as if I were a
phenomenon, as a fact presented to my own consciousness,' for it
itself would be engaged in the act of looking: it itself is the
consciousness to which it proposes to present itself[54]. So again,
the thought itself can never hope, by rigid analysing, to arrive at
last at itself, as the final residue of the analysis, for it is
itself, all along, employed as analyst. The process of analysis is,
itself, the real disclosure of what thought is: and this disclosure is
made just as effectively even though the result of the analysis be to
declare that it can discover nothing that corresponds to thought. It
is, indeed, impossible that anything should so correspond, except the
power to analyse; but this power _is_ thought: and every act of the
analysis, which issues in the sceptical conclusion, has verified the
real existence of thought. It is the same with all profound spiritual
acts. None of them can ever be offered to public inspection: they can
never be handed across to another, for him to look at. For they are
living acts, and not external results. How can an act of will, or of
love, be submitted to observation? Its outward result is there to be
examined; but it, itself, is incapable of transportation. If anyone
were to ask 'What is it you mean by thinking, or loving, or willing?'
who could tell him? It would be obviously impossible to explain,
except to a being who could think, will, and love. You could give him
illustrations of what you mean--signs--instances--evidences; but they
can only be intelligible, as evidences, to one who already possesses
the faculties. No one can do a piece of thinking for another, and hand
it over to him in a parcel. Only by thinking, can it be known what
thought is: only by feeling can it be understood what is meant by a
feeling: only by seeing, willing, loving, can we have the least
conception of sight, or of will, or of love.

And faith stands with these primary intuitions. It is deeper and more
elemental than them all: and, therefore, still less than they can it
admit of translation into other conditions than its own;--can still
less submit itself to public observation. It can never be looked at
from without. It can be known only from within itself. Belief is only
intelligible by believing. Just as a man who is asked to say what love
is, apart from all its outward manifestations and results, must be
driven back on the iteration--'Love is--what love is: everyone who
loves, knows; no one who does not love, can ever know;' just as a man,
who is challenged to describe and define his feelings or his desires,
when stripped of all the outward evidences that they can possibly give
of themselves, is thrown into inarticulate bewilderment, and can give
no intelligible answer, and can fashion to himself no distinct feature
or character, and can only assert, confusedly, that he feels what he
feels, and that to desire is to desire;--so with faith. The scientific
convulsion has shaken and confused its normal modes of self-interpretation,
its usual evidences, signs, illustrations: these outer aids at
definition, by metaphor or by corroboration, are all brought under dim
eclipse for the moment: their relative values have been thrown into
uncertainty: they are undergoing temporary displacement, and no one is
quite sure which is being shifted, and which can be trusted to stand
firm. Faith, robbed of its habitual aids to expression, is summoned to
show itself on the field, in its own inner character. And this is just
what it never can or may do. It can only reiterate, in response to the
demand for definition, 'Faith is faith.' 'Believing is--just
believing.' Why, then, let ourselves be distressed, or bewildered, by
finding ourselves reduced to this impotence of explanation? Far from
it being an incrimination of our faith, to find ourselves caught in
such a difficulty of utterance, it is just what must happen if faith
be a profound and radical act of the inner soul. It is, essentially,
an active principle, a source of energy, a spring of movement: and, as
such, its verification can never take place through passive
introspection. It verifies itself only in actions: its reality can
only be made evident through experience of its living work.


II. We may, then, free ourselves from the sinister suspicions which
belong to panic. It is not the superficiality of our faith, which is
the secret of our bewilderment, but its depth. The deepest and most
radical elements of our being are, necessarily, the hardest to
unearth. They are, obviously, the most remote from the surface of our
lives: they are the rarest to show themselves in the open daylight:
they require the severest effort to disentangle their identity: they
lie below all ordinary methods of utterance and expression; they can
only be discovered through careful recognition of the secret
assumptions which are involved in the acts and words which they
habitually produce. By these acts and words their existence and their
force is suggested, but not exhausted--manifested, but not accounted
for. These form our only positive interpretation and evidence: and
such evidence must, therefore, always remain inadequate, imperfect; we
have always and inevitably to go behind it, and beyond it, in order to
reach and touch the motive-energy which is disclosed to us through it.
No wonder that we find this far from an easy matter. No wonder that,
under the pressure of a hostile challenge, we often lose ourselves in
a confused babble, as we struggle to make plain to others, or even to
ourselves, these innermost convictions of our souls.

Indeed, such things can never be made plain: no one ought to expect
that they should. For, if we think of it, the primary acts of spirit
must be the _last_ things that can ever be made plain; for the entire
life issuing from them is their only interpretation, so that only when
that life is closed, can their interpretation be complete. And here,
in faith, we are at the root of a life which, as we believe, it will
take eternity to fulfil. And, if so, only in and through eternity can
its full evidence for itself be produced, or its right interpretation
be yielded.

Surely, this truth clears us from many clamorous demands, which ask of
us an impossible verification. For if once we saw that we were
employed in verifying the nature of that which, if it be real, can,
confessedly, present us, on this side of the grave, only with the most
fragmentary evidence of its character, we should put lightly aside the
taunting challenge to produce such proof of our motive principle as
will stand comparison with the adequate and precise evidences of a
scientific fact, or which will submit to the rigid tests of a legal
examination. If faith be faith, it could not, for that very reason,
fulfil the conditions so proposed to it. These legal and scientific
conditions are laboriously and artificially limited to testing the
presence of a motive, or a force, which must be assumed to exist under
fixed, precise, complete conditions, here and now. They pre-suppose
that, for all practical purposes, its quantity cannot vary, or
fluctuate. If it be present at all, it is present in a distinct and
formal manner, open to definite measurement, expressing itself in
unalterable characteristics. The entire consideration of its activity
is strictly confined to the normal horizon of the actual world of
present existence. These assumptions are the first necessity of all
forms of science, without making which, it could not even begin. They
are the conditions of all its success. But they are also its
limitations: and as such, they most certainly exclude from their
survey, anything that professes to exist after the manner of faith.
For what is faith? It is no steady force, existing under certified and
unvarying conditions which receive their final determination in the
world about us. Faith is, while it is here on earth, only a tentative
probation: it is a struggling and fluctuating effort in man to win for
himself a valid hold upon things that exist under the conditions of
eternity. In faith, we watch the early and rude beginnings, amid an
environment that but faintly and doubtfully responds to it, of a power
still in the womb--still unborn into its true sphere--still enveloped
in dark wrappings which encumber and impede. We see here but its
blind, uncertain pushings, its hesitating moves, now forward, now
back, now strangely vigorous and assertive, and then again, as
strangely weak and retreating. Its significance, its interpretation,
its future possibilities, its secret of development--all these lie
elsewhere, beyond death, beyond vision: we can but dimly guess, from
its action here, what powers feed it, on what resources it can rely,
what capacity of growth is open to it, what final issue determines the
measure and value of its efforts and achievements here. Such a force
as this is bound to upset all our ablest calculations. We can never
lay down rules to govern and predict its capabilities. It will
disappoint every conceivable test that we can devise for fixing its
conditions. It will laugh at our attempts to circumscribe its action.
Where we look for it to be weak, it will suddenly show itself strong:
when we are convinced that we may expect a vigorous display of its
capacities, it will mysteriously lapse. All this may terribly
disconcert us. It may tempt us into angry declarations that such an
incalculable existence is unworthy of scientific attention--is
fanciful, is unreal. But the only lesson which we ought to learn is
that methods adapted for one state of things are bound to prove
themselves futile when applied to another. If we are employed in
observing a life, which has its ground and its end in a world beyond
the present, then all methods framed for the express and definite
purpose of examining life as it exists here and now, will necessarily
prove themselves ludicrously inapt. The futility, the barrenness, the
ineptitude of our researches, lies, not with the faith against which
we level our irritable complaints, but with the methods which, by
their very terms of definition, proclaim themselves to be misplaced.

Where, then, must we dig to unearth the roots of faith? What are the
conditions of its rise and exercise? Wherein lie its grounds, and the
justification of its claim?

Faith grounds itself, solely and wholly, on an inner and vital
relation of the soul to its source. This source is most certainly
elsewhere; it is not within the compass of the soul's own activity. In
some mode, inconceivable and mysterious, our life issues out of an
impenetrable background: and as our life includes spiritual elements,
that background has spiritual factors: and as our life is personal,
within that background exists personality. This supply of life in
which we begin, from out of which our being opens, can never cease, so
long as we exist, to sustain us by one continuous act. Ever its
resources flow in: ever its vital support is unwithdrawn. In some
fashion or other, we all know that this must be so: and the Christian
Creed only lifts into clear daylight, and endows with perfect
expression, this elementary and universal verity, when it asserts that
at the very core of each man's being lies, and lives, and moves, and
works, the creative energy of the Divine Will--'the Will of our Father
Which is in Heaven.'

We stand, by the necessities of our existence, in the relationship of
sons to a Father, Who has poured out into us, and still pours, the
vigour of His own life. This is the one basis of all faith. Unless
this relationship actually exists, there could be no faith: if it
exists, then faith is its essential corollary: it is bound to appear.
Our faith is simply the witness to this inner bond of being. That
bond, which is the secret of our entire existence, accounting for all
that we are, or do, or feel, or think, or say, must become capable of
recognition by a being that is, in any sense, free, intelligent,
conscious: and this recognition by us of the source from whence we
derive, is what we mean by faith. Faith is the sense in us that we are
Another's creature, Another's making. Even as we not only feel, but
feel that we feel; not only think, but know that we think; not only
choose, but determine to choose: so, below and within all our willing,
and thinking, and feeling, we are conscious of Another, whose mind and
will alone make possible both the feeling that we feel, and also the
capacity to feel it; both the thought that we think, and also the
capacity to know it; both the will that we put forth, as well as the
power to determine it. Every act, every desire, every motive of ours,
is dependant on the source out of sight: we hang on Another's will; we
are alive in Another's life. All our life is a discovery, a
disclosure, of this secret. We find it out only by living. As we put
out powers that seem to be our own, still even in and by the very act
of putting them out, we reveal them to be not our own; we discover
that we are always drawing on unseen resources. We are sons: that is
the root-law of our entire self. And faith is the active instinct of
that inner sonship: it is the point at which that essential sonship
emerges into consciousness; it is the disclosure to the self of its
own vital secret; it is the thrill of our inherent childhood, as it
makes itself felt within the central recesses of the life; it is the
flame that shoots into consciousness at the recognition of the touch
of our divine fatherhood; it is the immediate response of the sonship
in us to its discovered origin.

Faith, then, is an instinct of relationship based on an inner actual
fact. And its entire office and use lies in realising the secret fact.
For the bond is spiritual; and it can only realise itself in a spirit
that has become aware of its own laws. No blind animal acceptance of
the divine assistance can draw out the powers of this sonship. The
reception of the assistance must itself be conscious, loving,
intelligent, willing. The natural world can receive its full
capacities from God without recognition of the source whence they flow
in: but this absence of living recognition forbids it ever to surpass
those fixed limits of development which we name 'natural.' But a
creature of God that could not only receive but recognise that it
received, would, by that very recognition, lay itself open to an
entirely novel development; it would be susceptible of infinitely
higher influences shed down upon it from God; it would admit far finer
and richer inpourings of divine succours; it would be fed, not only
from underground channels as it were, but by fresh inlets which its
consciousness of its adherence in God would uncover and set in motion.
The action of God upon His creatures would be raised to a new level of
possibility: for a living and intelligent will has capacities of
receptivity, which were altogether excluded so long as God merely
gave, and the creature blindly and dumbly took. Faith, then, opens an
entirely new career for creaturely existence; and the novelty of this
career is expressed in the word 'supernatural.' The 'supernatural'
world opens upon us as soon as faith is in being[55].

And this career, it will be seen, is markedly distinct from the
natural in this--that it is capable of ever advancing expansion. All
natural things, which blindly accept their life from God, must,
perforce, have a decreed and certified development, limited by the
conditions in which they are found existing. Their receptivity is a
fixed quantity, determined by the character imposed upon them at
creation, and bound to come to an abrupt arrest at some precise
point[56]. But receptivity through conscious recognition is open to a
development of which it is impossible for us to fix the limits. For
this living recognition itself advances in its capacity to see and
understand. Every act by which it recognises the Giver in the gifts,
heightens and intensifies its power to recognise Him; and every
increase of its power to recognise Him increases also its capacity to
receive; and this increase will again react on the faculties of
recognition. A vision opens out of spiritual growth, in which every
step forward made through incoming grace, makes a new step possible,
finds a fresh grace ever waiting to crown its latest gift with ever
new endowment. The sonship that is at work underground in man, below
the level of consciousness, at the hidden base of faith, is one that
holds in it capacities which can only be evoked under the appeals of a
living and voluntary faith. Faith is the discovery of an inherent
sonship, which, though already sealed to it, already in action,
nevertheless cannot but withhold its more rich and splendid energies
until this discovery is made; and which discloses them only according
to the progressive clearness and force with which the process of
discovery advances. The history of faith is the history of this
gradual disclosure, this growing capacity to recognise and receive,
until the rudimentary omen of God's fatherhood in the rudest savage
who draws, by clumsy fetich, or weird incantation, upon a power
outside himself, closes its long story in the absolute recognition,
the perfect and entire receptivity, of that Son of man, who can do
nothing of Himself, 'but what He seeth the Father do,' and, for that
very reason, can do everything: for whatsoever 'the Father doeth, the
Son doeth also.'

Faith, then, is not only the recognition by man of the secret source
of his being, but it is itself, also, the condition under which the
powers, that issue from that source, make their arrival within him.
The sonship, already germinal, completes itself, realises itself in
man, through his faith. Not only is the unconscious human nature held
by attachment to the Father who feeds it with hidden succours, but
faith is, itself, the power by which the conscious life attaches
itself to God; it is an apprehensive motion of the living spirit, by
which it intensifies its touch on God; it is an instinct of surrender,
by which it gives itself to the fuller handling of God: it is an
affection of the will, by which it presses up against God, and drinks
in divine vitality with quickened receptivity[57].

What then will be its characteristics? We have only to keep close to
the conception of sonship, and we shall understand them well enough.
Faith is the attitude, the temper, of a son towards a father. That is
a relationship that we all can understand for ourselves. We know it,
in spite of all the base and cruel corruptions under which, in the
homes of man, its beauty lies disfigured. Still, beneath disguises, we
catch sight, in rare and happy conditions, of that beautiful intimacy
which can spring up between a son and a father, where love is one with
reverence, and duty fulfils itself in joy. Such a sonship is like a
spiritual instinct, which renders intelligible to the son every mood
and gesture of the father. His very blood moves in rhythm to the
father's motives. His soul hangs, for guidance, on the father's eyes:
to him, each motive of the father justifies itself as a satisfying
inspiration. The father's will is felt deliciously encompassing him
about; enclosed within it, his own will works, glad and free in its
fortifying obedience. Such a relationship as this needs no justifying
sanction beyond itself: it is its own sanction, its own authority, its
own justification. 'He is my father': that is a sufficient reason for
all this sympathetic response to another's desire. 'I am his son':
that is the final premiss in which all argument comes to a close. The
willing surrender of the heart is the witness to a _fact_ which is
beyond argument, which accepts no denial, yet which is no tyrannous
fate, but is a living and animating bond of blood, which it is a joy
to recognise, and an inspiration to confess.

It is in such a spirit of sonship that faith reveals and realises
itself. Faith is that temper of sympathetic and immediate response to
Another's will which belongs to a recognised relationship of vital
communion. It is the spirit of confident surrender, which can only be
justified by an inner identification of life. Its primary note,
therefore, will be _trust_--that trust of Another, which needs no
ulterior grounds on which to base itself, beyond what is involved in
the inherent law of this life. Faith will ever discover, when its
reason for action, or belief, are traced to their last source, that it
arrives at a point where its only and all-sufficient plea will be 'God
is my Father: I am His child.' That relationship is its root; on the
top of that relationship faith works; as a witness to that
relationship, it puts forth all the spiritual temper which, of
necessity, follows on this intimacy of contact.

And, here, we find ourselves in the presence of the law by which faith
claims to be _universal_. Unless this inner relationship be a fact,
faith could not account for itself: but if it be a fact, it must
constitute a fixed and necessary demand upon all men. All are,
equally, 'children of God': and the answer to the question 'Why should
I believe?' must be, for ever and for all, valid; 'because you are a
child of God.' Faith is nothing but the spiritual temper and attitude,
which belong, inherently, to such a fact. No one can escape from such
a claim: for his existence constitutes the claim. If he be a child, it
must be demanded, of him, that he should display the characteristics
of his childhood: the father must, of necessity, be concerned with the
question of his own recognition by his son. Our manhood lies in this
essential sonship: and, if so, then to be without faith, without the
conscious realisation of the sonship, is to be without the fulness of
a man's proper nature. It is to be inhuman: to be curtailed of the
natural development: to be maimed and thwarted. It means that the
vital outcome of the inner verity has been arrested; that the
sensitive perceptions have been blunted and stunted; that the sonship
in us has, somehow, lost touch with its true fatherhood.

We learn at once, as we consider this, the interpretation of that
two-sided character, which surprises us in God's dealings with
men:--i.e. the imperative rigour of His stated requirements, coupled
with His wide and patient tolerance, in actual fact.

As a Father of all, He cannot, conceivably, be satisfied with anything
short of complete recognition by His children. He must look for faith;
He must require it of them all: He must leave no means untried by
which to secure it: He must seek to win it at all costs: His love is
inevitably and cruelly hindered, unless He can obtain it: and when He
obtains it, He must passionately desire to establish, evoke, develope,
perfect it: for each rise in faith is a rise in capacities of
intercourse, of intimacy, between Father and son. We see how strenuous
and zealous will be His efforts to build up faith in men: we
understand how urgent, and pressing, and alarming will become His
entreaties, His warnings, His menaces, His appeals, if faith is
allowed to slide or fail. Loss of faith means a shattered home, a
ruptured intimacy, a sundered love; it means that a Father must look
on while the very nature He has made in His image shrivels and
shrinks, and all hope of growth, of advancing familiarity, of
increasing joy, of assured sympathy, is cut down and blighted. We all
know the bitterness of a breach which scatters a family into
fragments: and that is but a faint shadow of all which the great
Father sees to be involved in the broken contact between Himself and
His son. What standard have we by which to sound the abyss of divine
disappointment, as God waits ready with gift upon gift of endless
grace which He will pour out upon the child of His love, as the
endless years open out new wonders of advancing intimacy; and lo! the
channel by which alone the gifts can reach him, is choked and closed?
Faith is the son's receptivity: it is that temper of trust, which
makes the entry of succours possible: it is the medium of response: it
is the attitude of adherence to the Father, by virtue of which
communications can pass. If faith goes, all further action of God upon
the soul, all fresh arrival of power, is made impossible. The channel
of intercourse is blocked.

The demand, then, for faith by God is bound to be exacting, and
urgent, and universal. But, then, this demand holds in reserve a
ground of hope, of patience, of tolerance, of charity, which we can,
in no single instance, venture to limit. For the faith, which it
rigorously asks for, reposes, as we see, on an inner and essential
relationship, already existent, which knits man to his God. Not even
the Fall, with all its consequent accumulations of sin, can avail to
wholly undo this primitive condition of existence. The fatherhood of
God still sustains its erring children; the divine image is blurred,
but not blotted out. Still, at the close of the long days, our Lord
can speak to the wondering men who flock about Him, of One Who is even
now their Father in Heaven. This objective and imperishable
relationship, the underlying ground of all our being, is the
pre-supposition of all faith, without which it would itself be
impossible. And, this being so, God can afford to wait very long for
faith to show itself. So long as its primary condition is there, there
is always hope. The stringent demand is not inspired by the mind of a
lawgiver, nor pressed home with the austerity of a judge; it expresses
the hunger of a father's heart, to win the confidence and to evoke the
capacities of the children of its love. Such a hunger is, indeed, more
rigorous and exact than the letter of any law: it aspires after a more
accurate correspondence; it is sensitive to more delicate
distinctions: but, nevertheless, it holds, in its fatherliness, far
wider capacities of toleration than lawgiver, or judge. That same
heart of the father, which in its hunger of love is so exacting, will,
out of the same hunger, never despair, and never forsake: it will
never cease from the pursuit of that responsive trust which it
desires; it will make allowances, it will permit delays, it will weave
excuses, it will endure rebuffs, it will condescend to persuasion, it
will forget all provocations, it will wait, it will plead, it will
repeat its pleas, it will take no refusal, it will overleap all
obstacles, it will run risks, it will endlessly and untiringly
forgive, if only, at the last, the stubborn child-heart yield, and the
tender response of faith be won.

Here, then, we seem to see why the nature of faith allows for two
points which surprise us in God's dealings, as if with a
contradiction. On the one hand, we hear Him, though prophet and
priest, insisting, with severe precision, on the necessity of a right
and accurate faith. On the other, we cannot but recognise, in the open
area of actual life, the evidences of a wide and almost boundless
toleration. Again and again it must have seemed to us that the Church
and the world gave, thus, antithetical evidence of God's character.
Yet, in truth, both speak the voice of one and the same God, Who, in
His undivided love, both passionately seeks for the delicate and
direct response of an accurate faith; and, also, in order not to lose
this final joy, 'suffereth long, and is kind, beareth all things,
believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.'
Yes!--has even to endure that men should pit His toleration against
His love, and should argue that, because He will wait so long and
quietly for the fruit that He desires to reap, therefore, He does not
desire the fruit. In reality, the degree of the toleration, with which
God will patiently wait for the fruits of faith, is the measure of the
extremity of His desire for it. Just because He wants it so much, He
waits so long.


III. If faith, then, be the witness and the exercise of our sonship in
God, we can recognise at once the place it will hold among the other
powers and capacities of our nature. We are so unfortunately apt to
rank it as one among many faculties, and then to find ourselves
engaged in agitating controversies concerning its limits and its
claims. We have to secure for it, against the rest, a field for free
dominion; and that field is hard to define; and rival powers beset it;
and there are raids and skirmishes on every frontier; and reason is
ever making violent incursions on the one side, and feeling is
actively besieging it on the other: and the scientific frontiers,
which we are ever on the point of fixing, shift, and change, and
vanish, as soon as we determine them; and the whole force of Christian
apologetics is spent in aimless and barren border-warfare.

But, if what we have been saying be true, the whole trouble turns on a
mistake. Faith is not to be ranked by the side of the other faculties
in a federation of rival powers, but is behind them all. It goes back
to a deeper root; it springs from a more primitive and radical act of
the central self than they. It belongs to that original spot of our
being, where it adheres in God, and draws on divine resources. Out
from that spot our powers divide, radiating into separate
gifts,--will, memory, feeling, reason, imagination, affection; but all
of them are but varying expressions of that essential sonship, which
is their base. And all, therefore, run back into that home where faith
abides, and works, and rises, and expands. At the root of all our
capacities lies our sonship; at the root of all our conscious life
lies faith, the witness of our sonship. By adherence in God, we put
out our gifts, we exercise our functions, we develop our faculties;
and faith, therefore, far from being their rival, whom they are
interested in suspecting, and curbing, and confining within its
limits, is the secret spring of their force, and the inspiration of
their growth, and the assurance of their success. All our knowledge,
for instance, relies upon our sonship; it starts with an act of
faith[58]. We throw ourselves, with the confidence of children, upon
an external world, which offers itself to our vision, to our touch, to
our review, to our calculation, to our handling, to our use. Who can
assure us of its reality, of its truth? We must measure it by those
faculties under the manipulation of which it falls: but how can the
faculties guarantee to us their own accuracy? How can we justify an
extension of our own inner necessities to the world of outward things?
How can we attribute to nature that rational and causative existence
which we find ourselves forced to assume in it? Our justification, our
confidence, all issue, in the last resort, from our sonship. Our
powers have, in them, some likeness to those of God. If He be our
Father, if we be made in His image, then, in our measure, we can rely
upon it that we close with Nature in its reality; that our touch, our
sight, our reason, have some hold on the actual life of things; that
we see and know in some such manner, after our degree, as God Himself
sees and knows. In unhesitating reliance upon our true sonship, we
sally out and deal with the world; we act upon the sure conviction
that we are not altogether outside the secret of objective existence.
We refuse absolutely to doubt, or go behind the reports made to us by
feeling, by memory, by thought. If once we are clear as to what the
report is, we rest on it; we ask for no power to stand (as it were)
outside our own experience, our own knowledge, so as to assure
ourselves of their veracity. We are certain that our Father cannot
have misguided us; that we are within His influence; that we are in
modified possession of His truth; that our capacities reflect His
mind. We could not have so confidently recognised, understood, and
handled the world, if it had been wholly foreign to us. As it is, we
lay instinctive hold upon it; we take spontaneous possession; we exert
authority upon it; we feel our inherent right over it; we are at home
in it; we move freely about it, as children in a father's house.
Acting in this faith, all our capacities justify themselves to us;
they respond to our reliance upon them; they develop into ever
advancing strength under the motions of this trust; they form a
continual and increasing witness to the verity of that sonship in
which we have believed.

Faith, then, belongs to our entire body of activities. We live by
faith. By faith, under the inspiration of faith, we put out our life,
we set to work, we exercise faculties, we close with our
opportunities, we have confidence in our environment, we respond to
calls, we handle critical emergencies, we send out far abroad our
experimental intelligence, we discover, we accumulate experiences, we
build, and plant, and develop. An elemental act of faith lies at the
root of all this advance; and every motion that we make, demands a
renewal of that primitive venture. In all secular progress 'we walk by
faith.' Every step revives the demand. Just as the earth, if it
necessitates the idea of a primal creation, requires, by exactly the
same necessity, an incessant renewal of that first creative act, so
our life, if it required faith to start it, requires faith every
moment to sustain it. Our faculties never arrive at a use which is
self-dependent and self-originated, as if they could grow beyond the
tentative conditions of their earliest assays. They originate in a
venturous experiment; and, however long, and however complicated that
experiment become, it retains its original character; it remains
experimental to the end. The _results_, no doubt, justify the venture
made; but, then, the first venture involved such immense assumptions,
that no results reached can ever complete its justification, and so
remove its tentative nature. For, by assuming a real correspondence
between our faculties and the world with which they deal, it assumed
that such a correspondence would never fail us; would be capable of
infinite verification; would prove adequate to all possible
experiences; would receive indefinite and progressive extension. No
verifications ever reached can, then, exhaust the faith of that
primitive venture; they can only serve to exhibit to it how far more
was contained within that venture than it could ever have conceived.
New knowledge, new experience, far from expunging the elements of
faith, make ever fresh demands upon it; they constitute perpetual
appeals to it to enlarge its trust, to expand its original audacity.
And yet the very vastness of those demands serves to obscure and
conceal their true character. This is the key to much of our present
bewilderment. The worlds of knowledge and of action have assumed such
huge proportions, have accumulated such immense and complicated
resources, have gained such supreme confidence in their own stability,
have pushed forward their successes with such startling power and
rapidity, that we have lost count of their primal assumption. In
amazement at their stupendous range, we are over-awed; we dare not
challenge them with their hypothetical origin, or remind them that
their entire and wonderful structure is but an empty and hollow dream,
unless they are prepared to place their uttermost trust in an
unverified act of faith. Given that trust, which relies on the reality
of the bond which holds between our inner faculties and the outer
world, then all this marvellous vision is rooted on a rock, has
validity and substance. Withdraw that spiritual trust in our sonship,
and all this fairy-world, won for us by science and experience,

  These cloud-capped towers, these gorgeous palaces,
  The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
  Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve,
  And, like an unsubstantial pageant faded,
  Leave not a rack behind.

Our secular and scientific life is an immense experiment in faith,--an
experiment which verifies itself by success, but which justifies
itself only if it remembers to attribute all its success to the
reality of that hidden relationship to God, which is the key to all
its capacities, the justification of all its confidence, and the
security of all its advance.

Such a remembrance is not easy for it: for the exercise of the
capacities is instinctive and spontaneous, and it requires an effort
of reflection to question the validity of such exercise. And such an
effort seems tiresome and impertinent in the heat of successful
progress, in the thick of crowding conquests. The practical man is apt
to give an irritated stamp on the ground, which to him feels so solid,
and to deem this a sufficient answer to the importunate inquiry how he
knows that he has any substantial world to know and to handle. For
faith lies _behind_ our secular life, secreted within it: and the
secular life, therefore, can go on as if no faith was wanted; it need
not trouble its head with perplexing questions, whether its base be
verifiable by the same standards and measures as its superstructure.
Its own practical activity is complete and free, whether it discover
its hidden principle or not: just as Mr. Jourdain's conversation was
complete and free, long before he discovered that he was talking
prose. We have to stand outside our secular life and reflect on it, to
disclose its true spring. The appeal to faith here is indirect.

But, in religion, this hidden activity is evoked by a direct appeal:
it is unearthed; it is summoned to come forward on its own account.
God demands of this secret and innermost vitality that it should no
longer lie incased within the other capacities, but that it should
throw off its sheltering covers, and should emerge into positive
action, and should disclose its peculiar and native character. God,
the Father, calls faith out of its dim background into the front of
the scene. He does this under the pressure of invocations, which
address their appeals through, and by means of, the secular and
visible material, within and behind which He is ever at work. This
had, indeed, always told of His invisible and eternal Godhead: but it
did so indirectly, by requiring Him as its constant pre-supposition
and base. Now, it is so used as to bring God into direct and positive
evidence, by means of acts, which bring forward the energies of His
immediate Fatherhood. All the growth of Eden had always testified to
the existence and the name of God: but a new stage was reached when He
was felt moving, in evening hours, amid the trees of the garden. And
as the Father presses forward out of His silent background, so the
secret sonship in man emerges out of its deep recesses in positive
response, using its own secular faculties by which to carry itself
forward into evidence and action. This definite and direct contact
between the God Who is the hidden source of all life, and the faith
which is the hidden spring of all human activity--this disclosure by
the Father, met by this discovery by the son--this is Religion: and
the history of Religion is the story of its slow and gradual advance
in sanity and clearness, until it culminates in that special
disclosure which we call Revelation; which, again, crowns itself in
that Revelation of the Father through the Son, in which the disclosure
of God to man and the discovery by man of God are made absolute in Him
Who is one with the Father, knowing all that the Father does, making
known all that the Father is.

Now here we have reached a parting of ways. For we have touched the
point at which the distinctions start out between what is secular and
what is sacred--between virtue and godliness--between the world and
the Church. If 'Religion' means this coming forward into the
foreground of that which is the universal background of all existence,
then we cut ourselves free from the perplexity which benumbs us when
we hear of the 'Gospel of the Secular Life;' of the 'Religion of
Humanity;' of doctors and scientific professors being 'Ministers of
Religion;' of the 'Natural Religion' which is contained within the
borders of science with its sense of wonder, or of art with its vision
of beauty. All this is so obviously true in one sense that it sinks to
the level of an amiable commonplace; but if this be the sense
intended, why is all this emphasis laid upon it? Yet if more than this
is meant, we are caught in a juggling maze of words, and are losing
hold on vital distinctions, and feel ourselves to be rapidly
collapsing into the condition of the unhappy Ninevites, who knew not
their right hands from their left.

The word 'Religion,' after all, has a meaning: and we do not get
forward by labouring to disguise from ourselves this awkward fact.
This positive meaning allows everything that can be asked in the way
of sanctity and worth, for nature and the natural life. All of it is
God-given, God-inspired, God-directed; all of it is holy. But the
_fact_ of this being so is one thing: the _recognition_ of it is
another; and it is this recognition of God in things which is the core
and essence of religion. Natural life is the life in God, which has
not yet arrived at this recognition: it is not yet, as such,
religious. The sacred and supernatural office of man is to press
through his own natural environment, to force his spirit through the
thick jungle of his manifold activities and capacities, to shake
himself free from the encompassing complexities, to step out clear and
loose from all entanglement, to find himself, through and beyond all
his secular experiences, face to face with a God, Who, on His side, is
for ever pushing aside the veil which suggests and conceals Him, for
ever disengaging Himself from the phenomena through which He arrives
at man's consciousness, for ever brushing away the confusions, and
coming out more and more into the open, until, through and past the
'thunder comes a human voice;' and His eyes burn their way through
into man's soul; and He calls the man by his name, and takes him
apart, and hides him in some high and separate cleft of the rock, far
from all the glamour and tumult of crowded existence, and holds him
close in the hollow of His hand as He passes by, and names to him,
with clear and memorable voice, the 'Name of the Lord, the Lord God,
merciful, gracious, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth,
forgiving iniquity, and Who will by no means clear the guilty.' Here
is Religion. It is the arrival at the secret; the discovery by the son
of a Father, Who is in all His works, yet is distinct from them
all,--to be recognised, known, spoken with, loved, imitated,
worshipped, on His own account, and for Himself alone.

Religion, in this sense, is perfectly distinct from what is secular:
yet, in making this distinction, it brings no reproach: it pronounces
nothing common or unclean. It only asks us not to play with words: and
it reminds us that, in blurring this radical distinction, we are
undoing all the work which it has been the aim of the religious
movement to achieve. For the history of this movement is the record of
the gradual advance man has made in disentangling 'the Name of God'
from all its manifestations. Religion is the effort to arrive at that
Name, in its separable identity, in its personal and distinct
significance. It is the fulfilment of the unceasing cry 'Tell me Thy
name!' In religion we are engaged in the age-long task of lifting the
Name, clear and high, above the clang and roar of its works, that
through and by means of all that He is, we may pierce through to the
very God of gods, and may close with Him in the blessed solitude of a
love which knits heart to heart and spirit to spirit, without any
withholding interval, with no veil to hinder or intervene.

The growth of faith, then, means the gradual increase of this personal
contact, this spiritual intimacy between Father and son. To achieve
this increasing apprehension of the Father's character and love, faith
uses, as instruments and as channels, all its natural faculties, by
which to bring itself forward into action, and through which to
receive the communications, which arrive at it from the heart and will
of Him, Who, on His side, uses all natural opportunities as the
material of a speech, which is ever, as man's ear becomes sensitive
and alert, growing more articulate, and positive, and personal.

The entire human nature,--imagination, reason, feeling,
desire,--becomes to faith a vehicle of intercourse, a mediating aid in
its friendship with God. But faith itself lies deeper than all the
capacities of which it makes use: it is, itself, the primal act of the
elemental self, there at the root of life, where the being is yet
whole and entire, a single personal individuality, unbroken and
undivided. Faith, which is the germinal act of our love for God, is an
act of the whole self, there where it is one, before it has parted off
into what we can roughly describe as separate and distinguishable
faculties. It therefore uses, not one or other of the faculties, but
all; and in a sense it uses them all at once, just as any complete
motion of will, or of love, acts with all the united force of many
combined faculties. A perfect act of love would combine, into a single
movement, the entire sum of faculties, just because it proceeds from
that basal self, which is the substance and unity of them all. So with
faith. Faith, the act of a willing adhesion to God the Father,
proceeds from a source deeper than the point at which faculties
divide.

And this has a most vital bearing on the question of faith's
evidences. It is here we touch on the crucial characteristic which
determines all our logical and argumentative position.

For, if a movement of faith springs from a source anterior to the
distinct division of faculties, then no one faculty can adequately
account for the resultant action. Each faculty, in its separate stage,
can account for _one_ element, for _one_ factor, which contributed to
the result: and that element, that factor, may be of greater or less
importance, according to the rank of the faculty in the entire self.
But, if the movement of faith has also included and involved many
other elements which appear, when analysed out, in the domains of the
other faculties; then the account which each separate faculty can give
of the whole act, can never be more than partial. Its evidence must be
incomplete. If the central self has gathered its momentum from many
channels, it is obvious that the amount contributed by any one channel
will be unable to justify the force exerted, or to explain the event
that followed. If we track home each faculty employed to this central
spring of energy, we shall see that each points to the result,
contributes to it, suggests it; but the result will always be more
than the evidence, so collected, can warrant.

This limitation, which we may allow about other faculties, is apt to
become a stumbling-block when we apply it to the high gift of reason.
Reason, somehow, seems to us to rise into some supreme and independent
throne; it reviews the other faculties; and is, therefore, free from
their limitations. We fear to hint that it has any lord over it. How
can we assume such a lordship without dubbing ourselves irrational
obscurantists, who in folly try to stamp out the light?

But we are not, in reality, dreaming of limiting reason by any
limitations except those which it makes for itself. We are not
violently attempting to make reason stop short at any point, where it
could go on. We are only asking, is there any point at which it stops
of itself, and cannot go further? We propose to use reason right out,
to press it to its utmost limit, to spur it to put forth all its
powers; and we assert that, so doing, reason will, at last, reveal its
inability to get right to the end, to carry clear home. And why?
Because the self is not only rational but something more: it combines,
with its unbroken, central individuality, other elements besides
reason: and therefore, of sheer necessity, whenever that central self
puts out an elemental act in which the integral spring of personal
energy takes part,--such as an act of will, or love, or faith,--then,
reason can be but one factor, but one element, however important, in
that issuing act: and if so, then it can give but a partial account of
it; its own contribution can not wholly explain, or justify the
result. In Bishop Butler's language, the utmost that reason can do is
to make it 'very probable.'

The real root-question in this time-worn controversy is just this: is,
or is not, reason the most primal and elemental act of the integral
personality? If it is, then, of course, it regulates and determines
all subordinate acts. Everything must finally submit to its
arbitration: for everything, if tracked back far enough, must
terminate in an act of reason.

But if, as Christianity asserts, the ultimate and elemental self be a
moral will, that can believe, and love, then, though this self
contains in it reason, it also goes back behind reason. Reason is
indeed one of its essential elements, but it is not its entire
essence, for this includes within itself, that which appears as
feeling, and desire, and imagination, and choice, and passion, as well
as that which shows itself as reason. When, therefore, the self puts
out its primitive power, it will do actions which satisfy reason,
indeed, but which reason cannot exhaustively analyse, or interpret,
since the entire force of reason, if it were all brought into action,
would still be only a partial contribution to the effect.

As a fact, we all of us are perfectly familiar with this limitation,
in affairs of affection and friendship. We never have here that
paralysing awe of reason, which haunts us in matters of religion. We
never allow ourselves to be bullied into submission to its supremacy.
We should laugh at it, if it attempted to dictate to us; or to account
for all our motives. Not that we are at war with it: or are shirking
it: or are afraid of it. We can have affections and friendships, which
have every possible justification which reason can offer. Every
conceivable expediency can unite to authorise and approve them. Every
interest may be served by them. They may stand every test which a cool
common-sense, or a calm impartial judgment, or an acute calculation of
consequences can apply to them. They may be the very embodiment of
reason. And yet, by no amount of calculated expediencies, by no
pressure of rational considerations, could we dream, for one moment,
that our friendship was accounted for. If ever it could trace its
origin to these motives, it would cease to be what we thought it. The
discovery would destroy it. All possible considerations and
calculations might have been present, and yet they would be utterly
powerless to create in us the love. And the love, however gladly it
may recognise the approving considerations, would repudiate, with
amazement, and with laughter, any presumption on their part to say,
'this is why you love.'

It is the same with all primal acts of heroism. They may be absolutely
rational: yet, they would cease to be heroic, they would never be
done, if they did not call upon a force, which, indeed, may determine
its direction by reason, but which uses quite other motives to induce
itself to act. Utilitarianism, which attempts to account for such
heroic momentum by purely rational considerations, finds itself
reduced to shifts which all those can see through, who refuse to be
juggled out of their own experiences. It is the same with all the
higher forms of moral energy. All of them go beyond their evidences.
They all lift the rational motives, which suggest and determine the
direction of their activity, by an impulsive force, which has in it
the power of initiative, of origination. Every high act of will is a
new creation. As the gunpowder sleeps, until the spark alights upon
it, so the directions of reason remain below the level of action,
until the jet of a living will fuses its fire with their material. The
act which results may, indeed, be capable of complete interpretation
on reasonable grounds: it may be able to show reasons which account
for every fragment of it: yet, still, the living force which drew
together, and combined all those separate reasons into a single
resultant act, has a creative and original character. The series of
reasons, however complete, cannot account for the result, for they
cannot possibly account for their own combination: and without this
combination of their momentum the result would not be there.

It is well to recall briefly this character of the moral will, the
affections, the love, of man. For these are faith's nearest and
dearest allies. It is here, in these elemental motions, that faith
finds its closest parallel. It is something very like an act of will,
a movement of love, an heroic and chivalrous moral venture. And
whenever we desire to understand its relations to reason, we must
persistently recall the attitude towards reason taken by these
fundamental forms of energy; only remembering that faith is yet more
elemental, yet more completely the act of the central integral self,
even than these. Where they leave reason behind, it will do so yet
further. Where they call upon something deeper, and more primitive
than reason, it will do the same, and yet more triumphantly. It is not
that either it or they are without reason: or that they stand outside
reason, consulting it so far as they choose, and then dropping it; it
is not that reason may not be found in every corner and fragment of
their activity, pervading, colouring, restraining, limiting,
directing, justifying it: but simply that what we call the rational
self is not only rational, but also something more: that, if analysed
out, the reason will not appear as the root and core of the man, but
rather as an element inhering in a yet more central base: and that
whenever the energy of vital action is put out, we are driven to look
through and beyond reason, if we would unearth the source whence the
act springs.

The relation, then, of reason to faith is not strange, or forced, or
unfamiliar to us, if it is much the same as its relation to the
affections, or to moral acts and intuitions. We know what to expect,
what part it ought to play in such a case. As in a case of heroic
moral daring, or high affection, so, in a matter of faith, we shall
expect that reason, with its arguments and its evidences, will play
all round and about it, will go before it, discussing the path to
follow, will follow after it, unravelling the secret forces at work in
it: will watch, and analyse, and learn, and warn; will reconnoitre,
and examine, and survey, and discover: will justify, interpret,
defend, assist. But yet we shall expect, also, that the act of faith
will do more than all the arguments can anticipate: that it will hold
itself free from them all: that it will appeal, not to them, but to
its own inherent force, for the final decision: that it will move by
instinct, by spontaneity, by inspiration: that it will rush past all
evidences, in some great stride; that it will brush through scruples
that cannot be gainsaid, and obstacles that cannot be got over; that
it will surprise, that it will outdo, that it will create; that it
will bring novel forces into play, invisible, unaccountable,
incalculable; that it will fly, when reason walks; that it will laugh,
when reason trembles: that it will over-leap barriers which reason
deems final. As with love, so with faith, it will take in all
evidences, it will listen to all proofs; but when they have done their
utmost, it has yet got to begin; it itself, after all its
calculations, must make the actual spring, which is the decision. Out
of itself, it draws its strength: out of itself it makes its effort;
by being what it is, it sees what it sees, it does what it does. It
uses the evidence; but uses it to leap from, to go further. Its
motives, advances, efforts, issue from within itself. Just as the
lover's final answer to the question, 'why did you do that?' must be,
'because I loved'; so the final answer of the believer, in explanation
of an act, can never be wrung out of the reasonable grounds for so
acting; it must always be 'because I believed.' Just as man first
acts, and speaks, and reason, following behind, can at last discover
that his actions were all consecutive, and that his language has a
perfect grammar; so faith has always to make its venture, prompted and
inspired from within, and only long afterwards can it expect to learn
that if it has been true to itself, to its proper promptings, then its
action can, by slow and plodding reason, be thoroughly interpreted and
justified. Faith is, above all things, anticipatory. The sonship,
within, anticipates what the Father has in store for it: by means of
affection, by rapid instincts of love, it assumes what it cannot yet
verify, it foretells the secrets that lie hidden within the Father's
eyes. So anticipating, it makes its venture;--a venture which love
alone can understand and justify, though the faithfulness of the
eternal and supreme Father ensures that the anticipation shall receive
its full verification.

If this be the relation of faith to reason, we see the explanation of
what seems, at first sight, to the philosopher, to be the most
irritating and hypocritical characteristic of faith. It is always
shifting its intellectual defences. It adopts this or that fashion of
philosophical apology; and then, when this is shattered by some novel
scientific generalisation, faith, probably after a passionate struggle
to retain the old position, suddenly and gaily abandons it, and takes
up with the new formula, just as if nothing had happened: it discovers
that the new formula is admirably adapted for its purposes, and is, in
fact, just what it always meant, only it has unfortunately omitted to
mention it. So it goes on, again and again; and no wonder that the
philosophers growl at those humbugs, the clergy!

But they are criticising faith as if it were a theory, as if knowledge
were its province, while, in truth, the seat of faith lies back behind
the region of knowledge. Its radical acts and motives are independent
of any particular condition of thought or science: they are deeper
recessed; they exist in their own right, and under their own
conditions. True, they may not be able to express themselves, to get
their energies forward, to set themselves free, to manifest
themselves, except through the mediation of knowledge,--through the
instruments and channels which the science of the day provides them.
But this does not confuse their inherent and distinct character. They
never identify themselves with the tools they use. They sit quite
loose to the particular state of thought, the formula, the terms,
through which they make their way out into action. And, moreover,
since the acts of faith are more radical than those of reason, and
since they belong to the entire man acting in his integrity, they
therefore of necessity anticipate, in their degree, all that the man,
by slow development, by the patient industry of reasoning, will
laboriously disclose. Lying deeper than all knowledge, they hold in
them the condition under which all knowledge will be arrived at. They
constitute the activity which ought to be at the background of all our
reasoning. No particular or partial state of knowledge can exhaust
their significance. Each step knowledge makes does but illustrate, in
some new fashion, the relation of all knowledge to faith--does but
elucidate the characteristics of that primal sonship. In each fresh
discovery or generalisation, faith finds a new instrument for
expressing its old convictions; it is taught to see the weak points,
the imperfections of its former expressions; it understands where they
hold good, and where they failed; it gets out more of itself than ever
before, through the new channels opened to it; it discovers more of
its own character by finding better modes in which to manifest it. It
does but half know itself, so long as its expression is encumbered.

The advance of secular knowledge, then, is for faith, an acquired
gain: for by it, it knows itself better; it sees more of what was
involved in its vital convictions. It has a struggle, no doubt, in
dropping off the expressions that have grown familiar to it, and in
detecting the fresh insight into its own nature which it can win by
the new terminology: but when once it has mastered the terms, new
lights break out upon it, new suggestions flash, new capacities
disclose themselves. It has won a new tool: when it has become
familiarised with the use of it, it can do great and unexpected things
with it.

But, for all that, it is but a new tool, worked by the old
convictions; they have not changed, any more than love changes, though
the slow development of married life may carry the lovers into unknown
experiences, in foreign lands, under changed skies. The two, if they
be faithful, learn far more of what the love they plighted means, as
each sweeping revolution carries them hither and thither, than ever
they understood on the wedding day; yet it is ever the old love then
pledged, which they hold fast to the end. Its identity is emphasised
by the changes. So with faith. It may absorb its energies in the joy
of wielding the particular instrument with which, at any one moment,
science supplies it. But it will never the least fear to drop it, so
soon as the advancing skill and the pushing minds of men have
elaborated for it some yet more delicate and subtle tool, wherewith to
give free play to its native vitalities.

For faith is moved by but one solitary passion--the hope of cleaving,
closer and ever closer, to the being of God. It is, itself, nothing
but this act of personal adherence, of personal cohesion; and all else
is, for it, material that can be subdued to this single service. Each
bettering of knowledge intensifies the possibilities of this cohesion;
and, for that, it is welcomed. It opens out fresh aspects of the good
Father: it uncovers new treasures of His wisdom: therefore, for faith,
it is an ever-mounting ladder, by which it draws nearer and nearer,
spirit to spirit, heart to heart. No idle or indifferent matter this;
and right knowledge, therefore, is for faith, a serious and pressing
need. And, moreover, faith is pledged to use all possible guidance and
direction in making its great act of self-surrender to God. And it is
the peculiar office of reason, and of the rational conscience, to
guard it from any distorted and unworthy venture. Faith has to make
its leap; but to make it exactly in that direction, and in no other,
where reason points the way. It is bound therefore to use all its
intelligent resources: it may not fall below the level of its highest
reason without the risk of sinking to a superstition. This is the
radical difference between what we here claim, and that which a
superstition demands of us. A superstition asks faith to shut its
eyes. We ask it to open them as wide as it can. We demand this of it
as a positive duty. It is bound, as an act of the whole man, to use
every conceivable means and security which knowledge can bring it. For
so alone can it secure itself against the hazards which encompass its
adventure. It cannot afford to enter on that venturous committal of
itself less equipped and instructed than it was open to it to be. It
must put all to use that can better its offer of itself to God.

It is, in this seriousness, that faith is apt to embrace so fast the
dominant scientific or philosophical creed. It has found, through this
creed, a new and thrilling insight into God's mind, and it fastens on
this precious gift; and dwells delightedly on it, and spends itself in
absorbing the peculiar truths which this particular way of thinking
brings to the front. So that, at last, when the smash comes, when the
floods break in, when the accumulation of new facts outside the old
lines necessitates a total reconstruction of the intellectual fabric,
faith seems to have gone under with the ruined scheme to which it had
attached itself so firmly.

Yet, if ever it has implicated its own fate with that of any
particular form of knowledge, it has been false to itself. It has no
more right to identify itself with any intellectual situation than it
has to pin its fortunes to those of any political dynasty. Its eternal
task lies in rapid readjustment to each fresh situation, which the
motion of time may disclose to it. It has that in it which can apply
to all, and learn from all. Its identity is not lost, because its
expressions vary and shift: for its identity lies deep in personality;
and personality is that which testifies to its own identity by the
variety and the rapidity of its self-adaptation to the changes of
circumstance. So with faith. Its older interpretations of itself are
not false, because the newer situations have called for different
manifestations. Each situation forces a new aspect to the front. But
ever it is God and the soul, which recognise each other under every
disguise. Now it is in one fashion and now in another: but it is
always one unalterable wisdom which is justified, recognised, and
loved, by those who are her children.

We will not, then, be the least afraid of the taunt, that we are all
accepting and delivering from our pulpits that which once threw us
into anger and dismay. Only let us learn our true lesson; and, in our
zeal to appreciate the wonders of Evolution, let us hold ourselves
prepared for the day which is bound to come, when again the gathering
facts will clamour for a fresh generalisation: and the wheel will give
one more turn; and the new man will catch sight of the vision which is
preparing; and the new book will startle; and the new band of youthful
professors will denounce and demolish our present heroes; and all the
reviews and magazines will yelp in chorus at their heels, proclaiming
loudly that now, at last and for ever, the faith, which has pledged
itself so deeply to the obsolete and discredited theory of Evolution,
is indeed dead and done with. Faith will survive that crisis, as it
has survived so many before: but it will be something, if it does not
drag behind it the evil record of passion, and blindness, with which
it has too often disgraced its unwilling passage from truth to truth.


IV. But here our objections take, perhaps, a new turn altogether. 'Ah,
yes!' it will be said; 'faith, if it were a simple surrender of the
soul to God, a childlike adhesion of the spiritual sonship in us to
its Father, Who is in heaven, might sit loose to all formulæ,
theories, discoveries, in the way described. Faith, if it limited
itself to this mystical communion, might be beyond the scope and
criticism of reason. But this is not the least what you really ask of
us. The faith, for which you practically plead, the only form of faith
actually open to us, has rashly left these safe confines: it has
implicated itself with a vast body of facts recorded in a book. It has
involved itself in intricate statements of dogma. How can you claim to
be free from the control of logic and criticism, in things so directly
open to logical treatment? This spiritual faith of yours has mixed
itself up with alien matter, with historical incidents, with
intellectual definitions: here are things of evidence and proof. Here
its locks are shorn; its mystic strength is gone. Delilah holds it
fast; it is a prisoner in the hands of the Philistines. If you will
retreat again back into the region of simple spiritual intuitions, and
abandon to reason this debatable land, how gladly would we follow you!
But that is just what you refuse to do.'

Now, here is the serious moment for us of to-day. It is quite true
that all would be plain and easy, if we might be allowed to make this
retreat--if we might limit our claims for the spirit to that simple
childlike intuition which, instinctively, feels after, and surrenders
to, the good Father in heaven. But what would that retreat mean? It
would mean an attempt, desperate and blind, to turn back the world's
story, to ignore the facts, to over-leap the distinctions of time and
place, to deny experience, to force ourselves back into primitive
days, to imagine ourselves children again. Simple intuitions of God,
simple communion with the Father, unquestioned, undistracted,--this is
the privilege of primitive days, when minds are simple, when
experience is simple, when society is simple. Plain, easy, and direct
situations admit of plain, easy, and direct handling. But our
situation is not plain, easy, or direct. Our minds are intricate and
complicated; our story has been a long and a difficult one; our social
condition is the perplexed deposit of age-long experiences. The faith,
which is to be ours to-day, must be a faith of to-day. It cannot
remain at the level of childhood, when nothing else in us or about us
is the least childlike. It cannot babble out in pretty baby-language,
when the situation with which it has to deal is terribly earnest,
serious, perilous, and intense. It must be level with its work; and
its work is complicated, hard, disciplined: how can it expect to
accomplish it without effort, without pain, without training, without
intricacy? The world is old; human life is old; and faith is old also.
It has had many a strange and stormy experience; it has learned much
on the way; it has about it the marks of old troubles; the care, the
patience, the completeness of age, have left their stamp upon it. It
has had a history, like everything else; and it reaches us to-day, in
a form which that history behind it can alone make intelligible. Four
thousand years have gone to its making--since Abraham first laid hold,
in a definite and consistent manner, of the faith which is ours
to-day. All those centuries it has been putting itself together,
growing, enriching itself, developing, as it faced and measured each
new issue, each gathering complication, each pressing hazard. This
long experience has built up faith's history: and, by study of that
history, we can know why it was that faith could not stand still at
that point where we should find it so convenient to rest. Faith
appeals to its own story to justify its career; it bears about that
history with it as its explanation, why, and how it has arrived at its
present condition. That history is its proof how far it has left its
first childhood behind it, how impossible it is, at the end of the
days, to return to the beginning. The history, which constitutes our
difficulty, is its own answer. For there, in that Bible, lies the
recorded story of the facts which pressed hard upon the earliest
intuition of God, and drove it forward, and compelled it to fix
itself, and to define itself, and to take a firmer root, and to make
for itself a secure dwelling-place, and to shape for itself a career.
The Bible is the apology which our faith carries with it, and offers
as a proof of the necessity which has forced it to go beyond its
primitive efforts, until it has reached the stage at which we now
encounter it. It portrays there, before our eyes, how it all began;
how there came to this man and to that, the simple augury, the
presage, the spasm of spiritual insight, the flash, the glimpse, the
intimation; until there came the man, Abraham, in whom it won the
emphasis, the solidity, the power, of a call. 'Oh! that we might be
content to feel, as he, the presence of the Everlasting! Why not leave
us in peace, we cry, with the simple faith of Abraham?' And the answer
is plain: 'because it is the nineteenth century after Christ, instead
of the nineteenth century before.' We are making a mistake of dates.
Let us turn to our Bible and read. There we watch the reasons
disclosing themselves why that simple faith could not abide in arrest
at its first moment; why it must open a new career, with new duties,
and new responsibilities, and new problems. The seed is sown, but it
has to grow; to make good its footing amid the thick of human affairs;
to root itself in the soil of human history; to spread itself out in
institutions; to push its dominion; to widen its range; to become a
tree that will fill the land. Before Abraham, it was but a flying
seed, blown by the winds; now, it is a stable, continuous, masterful
growth. It must be this, if it is ever to make effective its spiritual
assertions over the increasing intricacy of human affairs.

What, let us ask, is that life of faith which historically began with
Abraham? It is a friendship, an intimacy, between man and God, between
a son and a father. Such an intimacy cannot be idle or stagnant; it
cannot arrest its instinctive development. It holds in it infinite
possibilities of growth: of increasing familiarity, of multiplied
communion. And, thus, such a friendship creates a story of its own; it
has its jars, its frictions, its entanglements; alas! on one side, its
lapses, its quarrels, its blunders, its misunderstandings: and then,
on the other, its corresponding indignations, and withdrawals, and
rebukes; and yet again, its reconciliations, its reactions, its
pardons, its victories. Ever it moves forward on its chequered path:
ever God, the good Friend, spends Himself in recovering the intimacy,
in renewing it, in purging it, in raising it. Its conditions expand:
its demands intensify: its perils deepen: its glories gather: until it
consummates its effort in the perfected communion of God and man--in
Him, Who completes and closes the story of this ever-growing intimacy,
by that act of supreme condescension which brings down God to inhabit
and possess the heart of man: and by that act of supreme exaltation,
which uplifts man into absolute union with the God Who made him.

This is the story: the Bible is its record. As a body of incidents and
facts it must be subject to all the conditions of history and the laws
of evidence; as a written record it introduces a swarm of questions,
which can be sifted and decided by rational criticism. This entails
complications, it must be confessed; but they are inevitable. The
intimacy between man and God cannot advance, except through the
pressure of connected and recorded experience. A human society which
has no record of its past is robbed of its future. It is savage: it
cannot go forward, because it cannot look back. So with this divine
friendship. Its recorded experiences are the one condition of its
growth. Without them it must always be beginning afresh: it must
remain imprisoned at the starting-post. The length and complexity of
its record is the measure of its progress; even though they must
present, at the same time, a larger surface to the handling of
criticism, and may involve a deeper degree of obscurity in details.

And, after all, though details drawn out of a dead past permit
obscurity, the nature and character of the main issue become ever more
fixed and distinct, as the long roll of circumstances discloses its
richer secrets. The very shift and confusion of the surface-material
throws out, in emphatic contrast, the firm outlines of the gathering
and growing mystery. Ever the advance proceeds, throwing off all that
is accidental, immaterial, subservient: ever man becomes clearer in
his recognition of the claims made on him by the hope which God keeps
ever before Him, 'They shall be my people: I will be their God.' Ever
the necessities of such an intimate affection point to the coming of
the Christ. Christ is the end, the sum, the completion, of this
historic friendship: and His advent is, therefore, absolutely
unintelligible unless it is held in relation to the long experience,
which He interprets, justifies, and fulfils. Faith in Christ is the
last result, the ultimate and perfected condition of that faith of
Abraham, which enabled him to become the first friend of God. And the
immense experience that lay between Abraham and St. Paul, can alone
bridge the interval, can alone exhibit the slow and laborious
evolution, through which the primitive apprehension of God was
transformed into the Christian Creed--that mighty transformation,
spread out over two thousand years of varied history, which our Lord
summed up in the lightning-flash, 'Your father Abraham rejoiced to see
my day: and he saw it, and was glad.' The Book is the record of those
tested and certified experiments, which justified our Lord in
asserting that to believe in God was, necessarily, to believe in Him.
No one can understand that assertion, unless by seeing it worked out,
in detail, by the searching logic of experience.

Faith in Christ, then, includes faith in the Bible: and, in saying
that, we have already cleared away much of the difficulty that beset
us. For our faith in Christ becomes the measure and standard of our
faith in the Bible. We believe in it as the record of our growing
intimacy with God. Faith is, still, a spiritual cohesion of person
with person,--of the living soul with a living God. No details that
intervene confuse this primitive relation. Only, that cohesion was not
reached at one leap. It is ancient: it has traversed many incidents
and trials: it has learned much: it has undergone patient
apprenticeship: it has been bonded by the memory of multitudinous
vicissitudes. Like all else that is human, it has grown. The details
of events are the media of that growth. In _that_ character they are
vitally essential to the formed intimacy: but in that character alone.
They are not valued for their own sake; but for the cause which they
served. Belief in God never changes its character, and becomes belief
in facts: it only developes into a deeper and deeper belief in God, as
disciplined by facts. The facts must be real, if the discipline is to
be real: but, apart from this necessity, we are indifferent to them.
We can listen to anything which historical criticism has to tell us,
of dates and authorship; of time and place. It may supply all the gaps
in our record, showing how the material there briefly gathered, had,
itself, a story, and slowly came together, and had sources and
associations elsewhere. All such research adds interest to the record,
as it opens out to us the action of the Divine Intimacy, in laying
hold of its material. We watch it, by the aid of such criticism, at
its work of assimilation; and, in uncovering its principles of
selection, we apprehend its inner mind: we draw closer to our God. The
more nearly we can ally the early conditions of Israel to those of
Arabian nomads, the more delicate and rare becomes our apprehension of
that divine relationship, which, by its perpetual pressure, lifted
Israel to its marvellous supremacy, and which, by its absence, left
the Arabian to be what he is to-day.

The point at which criticism must hold off its hands is, of course, a
most subtle matter to decide. But we can, at least, be sure of
this--that such a point will be no arbitrary one; it will be there,
where criticism attempts to trench on the reality and the uniqueness
of the Divine Intimacy, which those incidents served to fashion, and
those books detected and recorded, and Christ consummated. Our faith
in Christ must determine what, in the Bible, is vital to its own
veracity. There is no other measure or rule of what we mean by
inspiration.

The preparation for Christ, then, necessitates such complications as
these. And the character of His advent intensified and thickened them.
For, while asking of us the purest form of spiritual adherence, He
makes that demand in a shape which is imbedded throughout in concrete
historical facts, which, as facts, must be subject to the thumb of
critical discussion, and to all the external handling of evidence and
argument.

And, then, on the top of this, He has, of necessity, raised the
question of His own Personality to such a pitch of vital value, that
the full force of man's intellectual activities is drawn towards its
consideration,--is summoned to contemplate, and measure, and apprehend
it,--is compelled to examine and face its tremendous issues. The
supreme act of personal surrender, for which Christ unhesitatingly
asks, cannot conceivably pass beyond its child-stage without forming a
direct and urgent challenge to the intellect to say how, and why, such
an act can be justified, or such a claim interpreted. No faith can
reach to such an absolute condition without finding itself involved in
anxieties, perils, problems, complications. Its very absoluteness is a
provocation to the questioning and disputing mind,--to the hesitating
and scrupulous will. And the result, the inevitable result, of such a
faith--proposed, as it was, to a world no longer young and childlike,
but matured, old, thoughtful, experienced--is the Dogmatic Creeds. We
clamour against these intellectual complications: we cry out for the
simple primitive faith. But, once again, it is a mistake of dates. We
cannot ask to be as if eighteen centuries had dropped out,
unnoticed--as if the mind had slumbered since the days of Christ, and
had never asked a question. We cannot hope to be in the same condition
after a question has been asked, as we were before it had ever
occurred to us to ask it. The Creeds only record that certain
questions have, as a fact, been asked. Could our world be what it is,
and not have asked them? These difficulties of a complicated faith are
only the reflection of the difficulties of a complicated life. If, as
a fact, we are engaged in living a life which is intricate, subtle,
anxious, then any faith which hopes to cover and embrace that life,
cannot escape the necessity of being intricate, subtle, and anxious
also. No child's creed can satisfy a man's needs, hunger, hopes,
anxieties. If we are asked to throw over the complications of our
Creeds, we must beg those that ask us, to begin by throwing over the

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