History of the Zulu War
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Title: History of the Zulu War
Author: Alexander Wilmot
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HISTORY
OF
THE ZULU WAR.
[Illustration: STEREOSCOPIC CO COPYRIGHT.
(_Facsimile of his Signature on the last Draft drawn by him
through the Standard Bank on Messrs. Rothschild & Co._)]
HISTORY
OF
THE ZULU WAR.
BY
A. WILMOT, F.R.G.S.
LONDON:
RICHARDSON AND BEST, PATERNOSTER ROW;
AND
A. WHITE AND CO.,
"SOUTH AFRICAN MAIL" OFFICE, 17, BLOMFIELD STREET.
CAPE OF GOOD HOPE:
TO BE HAD OF ALL BOOKSELLERS THROUGHOUT THE COLONY.
1880.
LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.
PREFATORY NOTE.
The salient features and the principal events of the Zulu war
are referred to in this volume. Long and uninteresting details
respecting minor operations are omitted, and an attempt is made to
furnish a readable book, which gives a fair view of the causes,
origin, and progress of the war. It must be borne in mind that
South African Kafir wars constitute one tragedy in various acts.
The Zulu campaigns are merely last links of a chain. The war with
Cetywayo is identical in principle with those waged with Gaika,
T'Slambie, Dingaan, Kreli, and Sandilli. The tide of savagery has
been periodically rolled back, and it was either necessary that
this should be done, or that white men should abandon Southern
Africa. The fatuous policy of Lord Glenelg caused the wars of 1846
and 1852, and there is in essence no difference between it and the
policy advocated by the opponents of Sir Bartle Frere. In order
not to load this introductory note with lengthy observations, a
paper will be found in the Appendix treating upon this subject.[1]
Blue Books and correspondents' letters necessarily form the
principal authorities. The preliminary portion of the book has
been really requisite, and it is hoped that it will be found not
the least interesting portion of the volume. No doubt, in the
first connected narrative of the Zulu war, many omissions and
inaccuracies may be discovered, but every effort has been made to
collect the truth from the most reliable authorities, and to tell
it without fear, favour, or prejudice.
PORT ELIZABETH,
_25th September, 1879_.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
EARLY HISTORY OF THE ZULU NATION AND OF NATAL 1
CHAPTER II.
NATIVE POLICY IN NATAL—LAWS, CUSTOMS, AND RELIGION OF THE
ZULUS 21
CHAPTER III.
EVENTS PRELIMINARY TO ZULU WAR—COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES 34
CHAPTER IV.
LORD CHELMSFORD'S PLANS—THE BATTLE OF ISANDHLWANA—THE
HEROIC DEFENCE OF RORKE'S DRIFT—PANIC IN THE COLONY—REQUEST
FOR REINFORCEMENTS—REPLY FROM THE QUEEN—THE
MINISTRY—SIR BARTLE FRERE—LORD CHELMSFORD 50
CHAPTER V.
PEARSON'S COLUMN—MARCH TO EKOWE—BATTLE OF INYEZANE—EKOWE—ZULU
ARMY—WOOD'S COLUMN—REINFORCEMENTS
FROM ENGLAND—THE COLONISTS—THE NAVY 71
CHAPTER VI.
THE ZLOBANE MOUNTAIN—PIET UYS—THE BATTLE OF KAMBULA—THE
INTOMBE DISASTER—BATTLE OF GHINGHELOVO—RELIEF
OF EKOWE 91
CHAPTER VII.
THE SERVICES OF NATIVE CONTINGENTS—LORD CHELMSFORD AND
SIR H. BULWER—REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN—DIFFICULTIES
OF TRANSPORT—IMMENSE DELAY—BURYING THE DEAD AT
ISANDHLWANA 112
CHAPTER VIII.
SIR BARTLE FRERE'S POLICY—CENSURE OF THE HOME GOVERNMENT—SLOW
OPERATIONS—AFFAIR OF THE 5TH OF JUNE—THE
PRINCE IMPERIAL—HIS ARRIVAL—SERVICES—CHARACTER—DEATH—COURT-
MARTIAL—FUNERAL RITES AND EMBARKATION
OF THE BODY OF THE PRINCE IMPERIAL 140
CHAPTER IX.
THE POLICY OF SIR BARTLE FRERE—SLOW ADVANCE OF THE
BRITISH COLUMNS—APPOINTMENT AND ARRIVAL OF SIR GARNET
WOLSELEY—BATTLE OF ULUNDI—RESIGNATION AND DEPARTURE
OF LORD CHELMSFORD 170
CHAPTER X.
LORD CHELMSFORD'S POLICY—PROMPTNESS AND DECISION OF SIR
GARNET WOLSELEY—THE HUNT AND CAPTURE OF CETYWAYO—DEPARTURE
FROM NATAL—THE LAST OF THE ZULU KINGS
A PRISONER IN THE CASTLE OF CAPE TOWN—GREAT MEETING
WITH ZULU CHIEFS—SIR G. WOLSELEY'S SPEECH—SETTLEMENT
OF THE COUNTRY—END OF THE WAR 203
APPENDIX 231
[Illustration: MAP OF ZULU LAND AND PART OF NATAL
_Stanford's Geogˡ Estabᵗ_]
HISTORY OF THE ZULU WAR.
CHAPTER I.
EARLY HISTORY OF THE ZULU NATION AND OF NATAL.
Two different races met in Southern Africa about the middle of
the seventeenth century. One had migrated from the centre of
the continent; the other sent out settlers from one of the most
civilized and prosperous countries of Europe. These races were
the Kafirs and the Dutch. The former arrived at the banks of the
Great Fish River about the same time that Surgeon Van Riebeek
landed on the shores of Table Bay for the purpose of establishing
"a place of refreshment for the outward and homeward bound
fleets of the chartered Dutch East India Company." The progress
of the new colony was so gradual and slow that it was not until
the nineteenth century that Kafir irruptions were effectually
checked, and then the British Government had assumed sovereignty
over the Cape of Good Hope. Different causes, to which it is not
necessary to refer, made the descendants of the Dutch settlers
so dissatisfied with our rule that a portion of them, in the
year 1837, passed into that easterly portion of Southern Africa
styled Natal. There they came in contact with the bravest and
best-organized portion of the great Kafir race. The Ama-Zulus
were originally a small and despised tribe. They were "tobacco
sellers," or pedlars, and carried on this occupation at the
beginning of the present century in the country between the Black
and White Umvolosi rivers. In contradistinction to the nature of
their employment, and as an emblem of the ambition of the people,
the name they gave themselves was one of the proudest they could
have chosen, as "the Zulus" in the Kafir tongue signifies "the
Celestials." At an early period in this century a great leader
arose among them, who became the Genghis Khan of Southern Africa.
This chief was fitly named "Utskaka"—"Chaka," or "Break of Day;"
and it was in consequence of his efforts and of his success that a
new era commenced for his countrymen.
[Sidenote: _Chaka and his army._]
Chaka was never defeated, and never fled before a foe. Having
ascended the throne by means of the murder of his uncle, he
proceeded at once to convert a nation of pedlars into a nation of
warriors. Immense care was taken with military training, and the
weapon by means of which the Roman soldiers conquered the world
was adopted for the use of the army. The short sword, or stabbing
assegai, was supplied, with the command that each warrior should
carry but one, and either bring it back from the battle-field or
be put to death as a coward. Marriage was forbidden, although the
gratification of brutal lust was allowed. No warrior could have a
wife or child to imbue him with any tender sentiment. The practice
of circumcision, although one of the most ancient and important
rites, was abandoned, so that everything, no matter how sacred
or how important, was sacrificed in order to create invincible
legions. The army consisted of three divisions. The first was
composed of veterans, styled "amadoda," or men; the second of
youths, "ebuto;" and the third of "ezibuto," or carriers. It
was in the last division that conquered enemies were frequently
enrolled. The king was the commander-in-chief, and under him were
the principal indunas, or ministers of state. Each regiment was
at least 1500 strong, and was led by a captain, who had under
him numerous subalterns. Military kraals were scattered over the
country, generally of an oval shape, and of large dimensions.
Reviews took place at the great place of the king, where songs,
dances, and chivalrous games were all made use of to increase
the military enthusiasm of the warriors. When war was determined
upon, extreme secrecy was observed, spies were sent out, and the
usual incantations and sacrifices performed by the priest or
witch-doctor. A herald, dressed in the skins of wild beasts, so
as to present a terrific appearance, then was sent to the army,
and cried with a loud voice, "Maiku-puke!"—"Go up!" An inspiring
oration was delivered by the king, and they went forth to conquer
or to die, fifty thousand well-organized, determined savages,
giving no quarter, slaying men, women, children, and even domestic
animals. Thus has a warrior described the onset of one of these
savage armies:—"The Matabele lions raised the shout of death,
and fell upon their victims. It was the shout of victory. Their
hissing and hollow groans told their progress among the dead. A
few moments laid hundreds on the ground. The clash of shields was
the signal of triumph. They entered the town with the roar of the
lion; they pillaged and fired the houses, speared the mothers, and
cast their infants to the flames. They slaughtered cattle; they
danced and sang till the dawn of day; they ascended and killed
till their hands were weary of the spear."
Chaka not only led his army in person, but was accustomed himself
to seize the first victim, and to kill him with his spear. After
subduing the petty tribes around, he bore his victorious arms
further, and carried fire and sword along the slopes of the
Drakenberg Mountains. One of his greatest conquests was over the
Undwandwa people, and this was followed by the destruction of the
Umtetwas. An attack was then made upon the brave Amaquabi, who
occupied both sides of the Tugela river, which forms the present
boundary of Natal. Merciless slaughters followed victory, and the
tide of conquest only ceased on the banks of the Umsimvoboo.
In the year 1828, Lieutenant Farewell, Mr. H. Fynn, and a few
others, were permitted to visit Chaka, who then resided at a
distance of about 150 miles in a north-north-east direction from
D'Urban, Port Natal. The Englishmen were received by the mighty
Zulu potentate with great ceremony. Nine thousand armed warriors
stood around, and the despotic character of the monarch was
reflected in the servile submission with which he was treated by
his subjects. Chaka munificently granted a large tract of country
to Mr. H. Fynn, and subsequently conferred a similar favour upon
Lieutenant King. These grants—and all grants of this nature—were,
strictly speaking, mere feudal investitures, paramount rights
being retained by the monarch. The first European settlement
in Natal was thus formed. An act of treason on the part of one
of Chaka's greatest lieutenants alienated him from his native
land, and became the means of carrying fire and sword north of
the Drakenberg Mountains as far as Bamangwato. Moselekatsi,
whom Captain Harris styles the "Lion of the North," was this
lieutenant. Wherever he moved destruction and death marked his
path, and he soon succeeded in rearing another cruel military
despotism over the graves of those whom he had conquered.
[Sidenote: _Assassination of Chaka._]
The last army of Chaka which went forth to destroy was itself
destroyed by one of those strange judgments which bear analogy
to that inflicted on the hosts of Sennacherib. A nation dwelling
close to the Palula river had to be conquered, but before this
place was reached a frightful disease, styled "blood sickness,"
broke out, and was so fatal in its results that only a few men of
the great army were able to return to tell the tale. Scarcely had
this event occurred, when the tyrant was himself assassinated.
Chaka was seated peacefully in his kraal, near the Umvoti river,
surrounded by his councillors and principal officers, when a
band of desperate men, headed by his brother Dingaan, rushed
among them, and each, seizing his victim, plunged a spear into
his heart. Thus perished the Napoleon of the Zulu race, by the
hand of his own nearest relative, and at a moment when he did
not suspect treachery or dream of any insurrection against his
well-consolidated power.
Dingaan—"poor fellow!"—was no doubt secretly encouraged by a large
portion of the Zulu people. A number of the principal captains
and friends of the late monarch fled, and several were put to
death. The new capital was removed from the Umvati river to the
White Umvolosi river, distant 45 miles in a direct line from the
sea, and about 160 miles from D'Urban. The favour that had been
extended by Chaka to the few Englishmen who arrived in Natal
with Mr. H. Fynn was a sufficient reason for the adoption by his
successor of an exactly opposite policy. An army of 3000 men
was sent to D'Urban, and the few English settlers escaped with
the utmost difficulty. Every vestige of property was destroyed.
Quietness was, however, restored in a few years afterwards, and in
the year 1833 Dingaan sent down spies to find out what progress
had been made by the intruders.
Captain Allen Gardiner arrived in 1835, and proceeded to the great
place of the king. This missionary traveller mentions incidentally
that, according to treaty, he brought back several men who had
fled from the cruel despotism of the Zulu monarch. These captives
fully calculated upon being put to death. Captain Gardiner pleaded
for them, and was able to assure them that the king had promised
to spare their lives. Nowha, one of the unfortunate prisoners,
mournfully replied, "They are killing us now;" and they were all
cruelly tortured to death by starvation.[2]
[Sidenote: _Dingaan and the Boers._]
In consequence of various causes, among which discontent with
British rule requires prominent mention, a number of Dutch
farmers left the Cape Colony in 1835, and, under the command
of Pieter Retief, crossed the Drakensberg Mountains in 1837,
and entered Natal. Their leader proceeded to Dingaan's capital,
for the purpose of negotiating a treaty of peace and obtaining
a formal cession of territory. In the last week of January,
1838, Pieter Retief, accompanied by seventy picked horsemen,
crossed the Buffalo river, and on the 2nd of February arrived at
Dingaan's kraal. The Zulu monarch fixed the 4th of February as
the day for signing a formal cession of an immense district in
Natal to the emigrant Boers. The necessary document, drawn out
by the Rev. Mr. Owen, missionary, with Dingaan, was duly signed,
and business having been satisfactorily concluded, the Dutchmen
were invited into the king's kraal to take leave of Dingaan. As
requested, Retief and his followers left their arms outside. The
Zulu monarch, surrounded by his favourite regiments, conversed
in the most friendly manner, and while a "stirrup cup" of maize
beer was in course of being drunk, suddenly cried out, "Bulala
matagati!"—"Kill the wizards!" These words were the signal for
a cruel massacre. More than 3000 savages beat to death, with
knobkerries, the unfortunate Dutchmen who had been weak enough
to trust to Zulu promises and Zulu honesty. The corpses of the
slaughtered men were dragged out of the kraal to an adjacent
hillock, and there allowed to become the prey of wolves and
vultures.
Dingaan looked upon the massacre of the farmers who had vainly
trusted to his honour as only a commencement of hostilities. Ten
regiments were immediately ordered out to exterminate all the
Dutch emigrants. While these people were, without suspicion,
waiting for the return of their husbands and relatives, a Zulu
army crawled up to their nearest camp, near the Blaauwkrantz
river, close to the present commemorative town of Weenen, or
"Weeping." A sudden surprise at the dawn of day was effected,
and then ensued the barbarous murder in cold blood of every man,
woman, and child. Other detachments surprised other parties,
and few escaped. The destroying army moved swiftly southward
and towards the sea. Wherever the "laager" plan was adopted, it
was successful; and at "Necht Laager," on the Bushmans river, a
few determined men succeeded in defending themselves against an
overwhelming force of savages. The engagement lasted all day, but
when the farmers' ammunition was nearly exhausted, the fire from
a 3-pounder, rigged at the back of one of the waggons, killed
several Zulu chiefs, and caused a precipitate retreat. The men who
were afterwards able to visit the principal scenes of slaughter
discovered frightful scenes of horror and misery. Waggons were
demolished, and by their ruins lay the corpses of men, women,
and children abandoned to the wild beasts. Among the heaps of
dead found at Weenen two young girls were picked out, one of whom
had been pierced by nineteen assegai stabs, and the other by
twenty-one. Both survived, although they remained cripples for
life. It is estimated that in one week 600 white settlers were
sacrificed as victims to the savage treachery of Dingaan.
[Sidenote: _Slaughter of English._]
Vengeance was determined upon by the Dutch emigrants, and a
party of 400, having placed themselves under the command of
Piet Uys and of Hendrik Potgieter, advanced from the Klip River
Division against Dingaan. This took place in April, 1838; but
unfortunately, shortly before, a party of Englishmen from D'Urban,
with 700 friendly Zulus, having crossed the Tugela river near its
mouth and destroyed a native town, the army of Dingaan, which had
been kept in reserve, suddenly surrounded them and killed nearly
every European.[3] The conquerors followed up their success as far
as D'Urban, and forced the few white people then resident there
to take refuge on board a vessel named the _Comet_, fortunately
lying at anchor in the bay. Dingaan, with his principal forces,
watched the Dutch emigrants, and learned that Piet Uys and Hendrik
Potgieter had placed themselves at the head of 400 men, with the
object of invading Zululand. The wily savage allowed the Dutchmen
to advance to a place closed in between two hills, within a few
miles of his capital, and thence led them to a valley, where a
desperate hand-to-hand combat took place. The farmers had been
accustomed to fight by firing from horseback, and then falling
back rapidly to reload. They were so hemmed in by their position,
that this mode of procedure was impossible, and they were at last,
in desperation, compelled to concentrate their fire on one portion
of the Zulu host. They then charged through the gap thus made,
and escaped. Unfortunately, Piet Uys did not succeed in cutting
his way through, and died with his son, fighting bravely against
terrible odds. After this disastrous engagement, the Boers were so
disheartened that hostilities were for some time suspended. They
were renewed in August, 1838, when Dingaan attacked the Dutch in
their laagers, but was in all cases repulsed with loss. Towards
the close of that year, an army of 10,000 Zulus attacked the Dutch
farmers in a strongly intrenched position at the Umslatoos river.
The engagement took place on Sunday, the 16th of December. For
three hours overwhelming masses of natives endeavoured to force
the emigrant camp, until Pretorius, finding that ammunition was
beginning to fail, ordered 200 men to sally forth on horseback,
and take the enemy in flank. This manœuvre was successful, and the
forces of Dingaan were compelled to fly, after leaving a large
number on the field.[4] After this decisive battle 5000 head of
cattle were captured, and an advance was made to the hillock where
lay the mortal remains of Retief and the brave men who perished
with him. A frightful and ghastly spectacle was beheld: broken
skulls, on which could be seen the marks of the knobkerries and
stones with which they had been fractured, bones of legs and arms,
and, strange to say, the skeleton of Retief, recognizable by a
leathern pouch or bandoleer, in which was found the deed signed by
Dingaan, resigning to the emigrant farmers "the place called Port
Natal, together with all the land annexed; that is to say, from
the Tugela to the Umzimvoboo river, and from the sea to the north,
as far as the land may be useful and in my possession."
[Sidenote: _Arrival of Major Charteris._]
On the return of the emigrant Boers from this very successful
attack on the Zulus, they were surprised to find that a small
detachment of Highlanders, under the command of Major Charteris
had taken possession of the Bay of Natal. This was done by
order of Sir George Napier, Governor of the Cape Colony, from
a desire[5] "to put an end to the unwarranted occupation of
parts of the territories belonging to the natives by certain
emigrants of the Cape Colony, being subjects of his Majesty."
No conflict, however, took place at this time. The Dutch were
busily employed during the year 1839 in laying out the towns
of Pietermaritzburg[6] and D'Urban, as well as in appointing
landrosts or magistrates, and establishing regulations for the
government of the country. Dingaan frequently sent in ambassadors
charged with messages of peace, but it was soon discovered that
this was merely a plan for carrying out a system of espionage.
A brother of Dingaan, named Panda, who had been generally looked
upon with contempt as a mere sensualist who was undisposed for the
fatigues of warfare, became an object of jealousy to the king,
in consequence of a large party among the Zulus, who were tired
of constant fighting and bloodshed, showing some disposition to
prefer him to his brother. An attempt to capture and kill Panda
was followed by his flight across the Tugela into Natal, and his
application to the Dutch emigrant farmers for assistance. Such an
opportunity was gladly seized upon; and in the next year (1840) an
army of Panda's, 4000 strong, was joined by 400 mounted farmers,
under the command of Andries Pretorius. While the forces were
mustering in Pietermaritzburg, an ambassador from Dingaan, named
Tamboosa, arrived, bringing proposals for peace. Upon being seized
and questioned, this messenger admitted that one of the objects
of his mission was to obtain every possible information, with a
view of reporting it to his master. This, however, by no means
justified the blunder and crime committed by the Dutch farmers,
who put Tamboosa to death, and would not even listen to his prayer
for mercy on behalf of his young attendant, who suffered with him.
Scarcely was this execution over when the armies of Dingaan and
Panda met in battle. In this fierce encounter two regiments were
entirely destroyed, and the fortune of the day declared in favour
of Panda, merely in consequence of a portion of his brother's army
deserting in his favour. The Dutch farmers vigorously followed
up this success, and forced Dingaan to take shelter among a small
tribe close to Delagoa Bay, who killed him in order to secure the
favour of his conquerors.
[Sidenote: _Panda proclaimed king._]
On the 14th of February, 1840, and on the banks of the Umvolosi
river, the emigrant Boers proclaimed Panda king of the Zulu
people, and at the same time declared that their own sovereignty
extended from St. Lucia Bay to the Umzimvoboo (St. John's).
Shortly previous to this date, Sir George Napier had ordered the
British garrison to abandon D'Urban, and Captain Jervis, who held
the local command, said, on the occasion of his departure, that
he wished the inhabitants peace and happiness, hoping that they
would cultivate these beautiful regions in quiet and prosperity,
"ever regardful of the rights of the people whose country you
have adopted, and whose home you have made your own." We cannot
be surprised that, under all the circumstances, the emigrant
Boers looked upon Natal as rightfully their country, and that
the British Government had even abandoned it in their favour.
Having assisted in conquering Dingaan, and placed Panda upon the
throne, there was no reason to fear native aggressions. No fewer
than 36,000 head of cattle were given in by the new monarch as an
indemnity, so that the Boers were able to settle down not only in
peace, but with considerable additional means at their disposal.
The government adopted by this society of farmers was of an
exceedingly ill-concerted character, and soon proved to be
essentially anarchic and unworkable. The legislative, executive,
and judicial powers were centred in a Volksraad of twenty-four
members, who were required to assemble every three months
at Pietermaritzburg. All the members performed their duties
gratuitously, but landrosts, each of whom enjoyed a salary of
£100 per annum, were appointed at the chief town, as well as at
D'Urban and Weenen. Two or three members of the Volksraad, who
happened to live near Pietermaritzburg, formed what was styled the
Commissie Raad, to whom executive functions requiring immediate
despatch were entrusted; but whatever they did had to be submitted
for approval to the entire Volksraad. Besides, a federal bond of
union existed with the Winburg, Caledon, and Madder districts of
the Orange Free State, from which places delegates were sent. The
acts of the Commissie Raad, as well as those of the permanent
officials, were so assailed in the Volksraad, and such personal
and offensive attacks were indulged in by this body, that good
government became impossible; and so little was law respected,
that Judge Cloete informs us that when he arrived as Commissioner
in 1843, the landrost of Pietermaritzburg informed him that a
judgment which he had passed several months before, against a
respectable inhabitant living only a few miles from that town,
ordering him to return cattle which he had illegally withheld from
a Hottentot, was still a dead letter, as the defendant had openly
declared he would shoot the first messenger of the law who should
dare to come on his premises.
[Sidenote: _The English and the Boers._]
The Volksraad of the Boers had applied to the Governor of the
Cape Colony for acknowledgment and recognition of the State as
free and independent, and Sir George Napier had returned an answer
by no means unfavourable, but their conduct soon made it evident
that it would be impossible to grant their petition. Stock was
stolen from Natal farmers towards the end of the year 1840, and
armed burghers, under Andries Pretorius, were instructed to pursue
the thieves. Traces of cattle, supposed to be those stolen, were
followed to some kraals of the Amabaka tribe, and without any
delay these people were attacked, several killed, 3000 head of
cattle and 250 sheep and goats carried off. At the same time
seventeen children were seized—in fact, captured as slaves. The
conduct of Pretorius was approved by the Volksraad, but Sir George
Napier found himself obliged to reprobate it in the strongest
language. British troops were immediately sent to the Umgasi
river, between the Kei and the Umzimvoboo, and his Excellency
declined any further intercourse with the emigrant Boers, unless
they distinctly acknowledged that they were subjects of the Queen
of England. Although the Home Government was at that time very
reluctant to extend its colonial possessions, a despatch was sent
to Sir George Napier, in which he was informed that her Majesty
could not acknowledge the independence of her own subjects, but
that the trade of the emigrant Boers would be placed upon the
same footing as that of any other British settlement, upon their
receiving a military force to exclude the interference with the
country by any other European power. It was then within the
option of the Boers to secure all the substantial advantages of
self government; but as in the Transvaal now, so in Natal at the
period in question—obstinate folly animated the councils of the
people, and an ultimatum was sent, stating their intention "to
remain on the same footing as heretofore." Upon this, Sir George
Napier issued a proclamation, in which it was stated that as
the emigrant farmers had refused to be recognised or treated as
British subjects, and had recently passed a resolution by which
all Kafirs inhabiting Natal were to be removed, without their
consent, into the country of Faku (Pondoland), military occupation
of the colony would be resumed. Shortly afterwards, the troops
stationed at the Umgazi camp were ordered to march to Natal. This
small force, consisting of 250 men, besides a small party of the
Cape corps and two field-pieces, arrived safely at D'Urban, and a
few days afterwards the brig _Pilot_ came to anchor in the bay,
bringing them stores and provisions, as well as two 18-pounders
and ammunition. This vessel was soon afterwards followed by the
schooner _Mazeppa_.
The Volksraad of the emigrant Boers was astonished and indignant
at the military occupation of D'Urban, and more than 300 men,
under Andries Pretorius, were immediately ordered out. The capture
of some cattle, and the receipt of a letter ordering him to quit
Natal, so enraged the commander of the small English force, that
he led a night attack against the Dutch camp at Congella. So ill
managed, however, was the expedition, that Captain Smith was
repulsed and his guns captured. Out of 140 men whom he led in
this unfortunate affray no fewer than 103 were killed, wounded,
and missing. He then saw that his little force was reduced
to extremities, but exerted himself most indefatigably and
perseveringly to resist to the last. A fortification something
similar in character to a laager was formed at D'Urban, by means
of the numerous waggons in the camp, with the requisite trenches
and mounds. The Dutch Boers fortunately allowed the time in which
they should have taken advantage of their victory to pass by,
and soon saw that, in consequence of their inertness, a conquest
which in the first instance would have been easy was now converted
into a siege. In the mean time Captain Smith was able to send off
for assistance to the Cape Colony. Richard King, then living in
a hut at D'Urban, volunteered to carry the despatches. Mr. G. C.
Cato conveyed him and his horses across the channel to the Bluff,
and then he rode off, leading a spare horse, and before daybreak
succeeded in passing the Umcomas river. There he was safe from
the danger of pursuit, but had to face the perils of crossing
two hundred rivers, and of traversing a wild country inhabited
by savages. Upon this slender thread hung the destinies of the
British in Natal.
[Sidenote: _The English besieged._]
Encouraged by their success, the Boers overpowered the detachment
of British troops stationed at the Point, and took most of the
English residents prisoners to Pietermaritzburg.[7] Then all their
efforts were directed against the fort, in which Captain Smith had
been able to mount an 18-pounder and to secure provisions and
ammunition. The farmers, who had three field-pieces, carried on a
heavy cannonade for three days, and when they had exhausted their
ammunition, turned the siege into a rigorous blockade. Two sorties
made by the garrison were unavailing, and at last the rations
were reduced to the smallest quantity sufficient to sustain life;
dried horseflesh became the principal article of food, and the
utmost anxiety prevailed as to the success of Richard King, and
the arrival of reinforcements from the Cape Colony. Many a time
eyes were strained for some sign of assistance; at last, on the
night of the 24th of June, they saw, with inexpressible relief,
the rockets and blue lights which announced that a vessel with
reinforcements had arrived.
Dick King had succeeded. After a ride of many hundreds of miles
over trackless, unknown, and savage regions, he had safely reached
the Cape Colony. It was on the ninth day after he left the Bluff
at Natal that he arrived, almost exhausted, in Graham's Town.
Colonel Hare, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Eastern Province,
immediately sent the grenadier company of the 27th Regiment, in
the schooner _Conch_, from Port Elizabeth, and when Sir George
Napier heard the news in Cape Town, he lost no time in persuading
Admiral Percy to despatch the flagship _Southampton_, with the
25th Regiment on board, under the command of Colonel Cloete. The
ship of war arrived at Natal only one day after the _Conch_. A
landing was immediately effected with very trifling loss; the Boer
force was driven back to the Congella. A gale of wind drove the
Southampton to sea, and supplies became so scarce that Colonel
Cloete was obliged to obtain the services of Zulus to secure
cattle. Some of these killed two Dutch farmers, and this gave
occasion to a panic among the Boers, who precipitately fled to
Pietermaritzburg.
[Sidenote: _Dismay of the Boers._]
Amidst great consternation and great confusion, a meeting of
the Volksraad was held in the church at Pietermaritzburg, when
recriminations, quarrelling, and loud talking occupied the entire
Sunday. At last it was resolved to propose terms of peace to
Colonel Cloete; but the ignorance and simplicity of the Boers were
displayed by their holding out as a threat the succour they might
receive from the King of Holland, to whom letters had some time
previously been sent by the hands of a trader named Smellekamp.
After negotiations, Colonel Cloete granted an amnesty to all
except four ringleaders, and Natal was peaceably once more under
the rule of the British Crown. These transactions took place in
1842; and in the following year the Honourable Henry Cloete,
afterwards a Judge of the Supreme Court of the Cape Colony, was
sent to Natal as her Majesty's Commissioner, with ample authority
to inaugurate a settled system of government, and to put an end
to the anarchy and confusion which prevailed. By the exercise of
great tact and judgment he was successful. A powerful radical
faction in the Volksraad opposed submission in the most outrageous
and foolish manner. They even adopted a plan to assassinate the
leading members of the peace party; but Andries Pretorius, one of
the latter, and a wise, true friend of his adopted country, having
discovered the plot, exposed it publicly, and brought its authors
to shame. Judge Cloete tells us that this patriot addressed the
meeting in a strain of impassioned extemporaneous eloquence not
unworthy of Cicero when denouncing Cataline, and turned the tide
so powerfully against the would-be assassins as to entirely
defeat their plot. Entire submission to the British Government
followed. Major Smith was succeeded by Colonel Boys, of the 45th
Regiment, as military commandant, and his Honour Martin West,
resident magistrate of Graham's Town, was appointed the first
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal.
CHAPTER II.
NATIVE POLICY IN NATAL. LAWS, CUSTOMS, AND RELIGION OF THE ZULUS.
The protection of the natives was the professed object of the
British Government in taking possession of Natal. The conquests of
Chaka had driven no fewer than 100,000 fugitives to the westward
of the Tugela river, and how to rule this vast and fast increasing
number of natives soon became a problem fraught both with
difficulty and danger. Mr. Theophilus Shepstone, son of a Wesleyan
missionary, thoroughly conversant with the Kafir language,
customs, manners, and habits, was appointed to take charge of
the numerous natives of Natal. His policy can be very briefly
described. It was to keep all the coloured races entirely distinct
from the white population. They were collected in locations, and
governed by their own laws, through their own chiefs, under Mr.
Shepstone as the great chief. Large tracts of country, rugged and
mountainous, were set apart for the various tribes, and there,
in an Italian climate, and in the lap of a most productive and
generous soil, they increased and multiplied. Christianity and
real civilization were ignored, and a most dangerous _imperium
in imperio_ created. The wretched refugees who fled from the Zulu
tyrant found their lot in Natal incomparably more happy than in
the precarious existence of former days. Their easy, savage,
sensuous life made them useless citizens, and when labour was
required for the sugar plantations on the coast, it had to be
obtained from India. However smoothly and well the native policy
seemed to work, it soon became very evident that the 20,000 white
people of Natal were really seated on a political volcano. Three
hundred thousand heathen savages of an alien race had the power
to rise and destroy them at any moment, and it was impossible to
be sure that they might not at any time have the inclination. All
the checks which religion and civilization place on men had been
deliberately cast aside. No doubt the Zulu monarch was feared; but
there can be no doubt also that if the dread paramount ruler of
the Zulu race had at any time crossed the Tugela as a conqueror,
tens of thousands of his own race in the colony would have joined
him out of fear, and hastened to prove their loyalty by the
massacre of every white inhabitant of Natal. This is no fanciful
idea, but sober earnest fact.[8]
[Sidenote: _The Shepstone native policy._]
There was no difficulty at first in subjecting to proper control
the broken, dispirited bands of refugees, who sought shelter,
food, and protection in Natal; and if right methods had been
adopted, one of the finest races of the African continent would
have been raised from a state of loathsome degradation to one
of civilization—saved from heathenism themselves to become
coadjutors with the white races in raising the country to real
prosperity. In place of this, the cruel slavery of polygamy was
permitted, which allows the men to live in independent idleness
by means of the severe drudgery of their oppressed wives.
Grossly impure and inhuman laws and practices, including the
vile superstitions of witchcraft, were tolerated and allowed. No
country could advance under such circumstances, and the colony
of Natal, therefore, remains at the present day what it has
always been—immeasurably behind the Cape of Good Hope; a land of
samples in which nothing really succeeds, and where sugar, which
forms its principal export, is even now a doubtful experiment,
on which labour imported from India at enormous cost has to be
employed; a lovely country, whose fertility is almost as great as
its beauty, but cursed by a most unchristian, wicked, and foolish
system of government, so far as the great bulk of the population
is concerned. It would have been very easy at the outset to
establish comparatively small locations, presided over by British
magistrates, who would have administered justice according to
British law. If, in addition, title-deeds had been given in such
a manner as to give individual rights, then, in the words of the
Rev. W. C. Holden,[9] the large number of natives within the
colony might have been converted into men who would take a real
interest in the country and soil, for the defence of which they
would fight and die. They would have become a strong wall of
defence against the Zulu on the east, and the Amaxosa on the west,
instead of a source of continual danger and alarm.[10] Slavery was
abolished everywhere throughout the British dominions, with the
one exception of Natal. There 50,000 women were sold for wives to
the highest bidder, as horses, cattle, and goods at an auction
mart, under the special sanction and special arrangement of the
Queen's Government.
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to pass briefly in
review the laws, manners, and customs of the Zulu race. Without
a knowledge of this subject it will be perfectly impossible to
appreciate the policy of Sir Bartle Frere, or to understand
either the real causes of the war, or of many events in its
progress. We have seen that Chaka, the Zulu conqueror, formed a
great military nation. His successors were specially warriors,
and as the people chose similar weapons to those with which the
ancient Romans conquered the world, so, like that people, were
they fully animated with the feeling that _virtus_, or the highest
possible merit, consisted in bravery in the field of battle. The
Boers despised the enemy, and hundreds of their bravest men fell
victims. Almost about the same time, the English settlers at
D'Urban made the same mistake, and 2000 of their Kafir allies, as
well as several of their own number, were slaughtered and left to
be devoured by beasts of prey on the hills of Zululand. History
repeats itself: Lord Chelmsford made the same mistake, which was
expiated in the blood of hundreds of British soldiers on the field
of Isandhlwana.
[Sidenote: _Zulu customs._]
Among the Zulus every female child is so much property, and in
this respect treated exactly like a chattel or beast of burden.
Her life is one of the grossest degradation and slavery. When
she has reached the age of puberty disgusting ceremonies are
performed, and there is no idea or appreciation of chastity. The
most brutal lust is not only tolerated, but actually enforced by
law. When a girl is married, she is merely sold to the highest
bidder, entirely without reference to her own consent, and then
becomes the slave of her husband, for whom she has to labour in
the field and perform menial work. The day after the party of
a bride has arrived at her owner's hut, the peculiar ceremony
takes place of the woman being allowed and enjoined to tax her
powers to the utmost to use abusive language to her lord. She
pours every insulting and provoking epithet she can think of upon
him, this being the last time in which she is permitted to act
and speak independently. At last she takes a certain feather out
of her head, by means of which the act of marriage, or rather
of going into slavery, becomes complete. Mr. Holden speaks of
the great obscenity at "marriage" celebrations, and remarks
that "no respectable pages can be defiled with a description
of what then takes place, especially in connection with the
marriage of men of rank and chiefs. There is full licence given
to wholesale debauchery, and both men and women glory in their
shame."[11] It is impossible to pursue this subject further. This
is certain, that the very grossest and most filthy obscenities
and immoralities are absolutely enjoined and required by Zulu
law and custom. Marriage is entirely a misnomer. To quote from
an excellent authority, "No word corresponding to the Saxon
word 'wife' is found in the Zulu language. The term most nearly
approaching to it is _umkake_, and its correlatives _umkako_ and
_umkami_, which means his _she_ or _female_. The man owns his
wives as truly, according to native law, as he does his spear or
his goat, and he speaks of them accordingly." The owner of the
woman says, "I have paid so many cattle for you; therefore you
are _my slave_, my dog, and your proper place is under my feet."
One of these poor slaves, when seen standing by a load far too
great for her strength, was asked if she could carry it. She
stood up and ingenuously remarked, "If I were a man I could not,
but I am a woman." There is no slavery in the world more sad or
deplorable than that to which the poor women of the Zulu nation
are subjected.[12]
[Sidenote: _Religion of the Zulus._]
Spiritualism is the religion of the Zulu, and witchcraft is the
machinery by means of which it is practised. Only a very vague
idea exists about a Supreme Being, and the definite national
faith embraces only a belief in the influence of the spirits of
deceased ancestors. The ghosts of departed chiefs and warriors
are specially respected and feared. It is to these spirits that
they attribute all the power given by Christians to God, and
the witch-doctors are the mediums or priests of the worship. A
knowledge of subtle and powerful vegetable poisons exists, and
so common is the practice of secret poisoning that universal
safeguards are used against it. Every one who gives food to
another takes a part himself, in proof that it contains no poison.
Besides deadly drugs, there is what is styled the "ubuti," or
bewitching matter, which is supposed to be deposited in some
secret place, and to be made the instrument of evil by means of
supernatural agency. The "isanusi," or witch-doctors, are the
go-betweens, whose duty it is to discover and to avert evil.
These men fill the threefold office of doctors, priests, and
soothsayers. They heal diseases, offer sacrifices, and exercise
the art of divination. As they are assumed to have full power
over the invisible world, their influence is enormous, and is
readily taken advantage of by chiefs and powerful men, for the
purpose of destroying enemies and promoting schemes of war and
plunder. A youth who aspires to be enrolled among the isanusi
gives early signs of being destined for the office. He dreams of
the spirits of the departed chiefs of his people, sees visions,
falls into fits of frenzy; he catches snakes and twists them round
his person, seeks out medicinal roots, and goes for instruction
to experienced isanusi. At last what is called a "change in the
moon" takes place within him; he becomes a medium fitted to hold
converse with spirits, and is able to communicate with them. One
of the greatest authorities who has ever lived with and studied
the Kafir races—Mr. Warner—says, "It is impossible to suppose that
these priests are not, to a considerable extent, self-deceived, as
well as the deceivers of others; and there is no difficulty, to
one who believes the Bible to be a divine revelation, in supposing
that they are also to a certain extent under Satanic influence;
for the idolatrous and heathen nations of the earth are declared
in the inspired volume to be, in a peculiar manner, under the
influence and power of the devil."
[Sidenote: _Witch doctors._]
Every illness and misfortune is supposed to be caused by
witchcraft. It usually happens that the suspected person is a
rich man, or some one on whom it is thought desirable to wreak
vengeance. The people of the kraal and neighbourhood go in
a body to the isanusi, who, before their arrival, foretells
their approach, and makes other revelations, frequently so
extraordinary that the Rev. Mr. Holden,[13] who is thoroughly
conversant with the subject, states that there is much greater
difficulty in explaining these phenomena by ordinary means than
by supernatural interposition. The whole company, on arrival,
sit down and salute the witch-doctor; they are then told to beat
the ground with their sticks, and while this is in course of
being done, he repeatedly shouts out, "Yeswa!"—"He is here!" He
discloses secrets about the accused, and at last, fixing his
eyes upon the doomed one, charges him with the crime. Generally
the isanusi succeeds in selecting the suspected person; but if he
fail, a circle is formed, and a wild, frenzied dance performed,
amidst most frightful gesticulations and cries. Among the Zulus,
not only is the unfortunate person killed whom the witch-doctor
declares guilty, but his wife and children are murdered, and his
property seized. Among the Amaxosa Kafirs, the most frightful
tortures are used to induce the unfortunate victim to confess.[14]
It is difficult to appreciate adequately the enormous power of
the witch-doctors. It was in 1857 that Umhlakaza was made a
willing tool in the hands of Kreli, Sandilli, and Umhala for the
purpose of a war of extermination against the whites. It was
prophesied that if the people destroyed their cattle and corn,
the whole would rise again with vast increase, and that their
enemies would be utterly destroyed. Sir George Grey had taken
every precaution, and war was therefore made impossible. Like
the witches in "Macbeth," the prophet had merely lured on his
victims to destruction. Having burned their ships, by destroying
all their resources there was no escape, and, in spite of the
humane exertions of the colonists, 70,000 human beings perished
of famine in a land of plenty. It will thus be seen how an entire
people can easily be induced to embark in the most desperate
undertakings by the skilful use of the superstitious means at
the disposal of their chiefs. Sacrifices of beasts are offered
by the priests, according to prescribed rules. These are made to
the spirits of the departed. A hut is sacredly cleaned and set
apart, in which the sacrifice is shut up during the night, in
order that the "isituta," or spirits, may drink in its flavour.
On the next day the place is opened, and the meat devoured by the
people. All sacrifices, with trifling exceptions, must be offered
by priests. The blood is never spilt, but caught in a vessel, and
it is necessary to burn the bones. The frenzy or inspired madness
characteristic of the priests of the ancient oracles is commonly
assumed by the priests of the Zulu spiritualists, and many of
their ceremonies are occult, and have never been made known to
Europeans.
[Sidenote: _Great military rite._]
The Zulu government is thoroughly despotic. The will of the
tyrant is law, and he has unlimited power of life or death. We
have seen that Chaka sacrificed everything to military power,
and in order to succeed, banished even circumcision, and refused
to allow his warriors to marry. Women's love and children's
tenderness were forbidden to the stern soldiers of the new
empire. Medicines composed of various plants and roots were used
to purify the body and make it strong, and ordinarily sacrifices
were offered for the same purpose. The great national sacrifice
to make the army invulnerable is styled "ukukufula," when flesh
is cut off the shoulder of a living beast and roasted on a fire
into which certain charms have been thrown. Each man bites off a
mouthful, and passes on the meat to the next, while the priest
makes incisions in parts of their bodies, into which he inserts
the powdered charcoal of the charms. The poor animal is left in
torture all this time, and is not killed until the ceremonies
are ended. A decoction is also prepared from medicinal roots,
and sprinkled by means of the tail of an ox over the bodies of
the warriors. All this is designed to make the Zulus either
invulnerable, or to enable them, if they do fall in battle, to
join triumphantly the heroes of their race in the spirit world.
The three great divisions of the army already referred to,
comprising "men," "young men," and "carriers," were sub-divided
into regiments with a proper staff of officers. The Zulu strength
is in attack, when with ferocious yells they throw themselves
with undaunted bravery upon their enemy. Two horns advance and
endeavour to flank the foe, while the main body follows quickly to
their support. _Virtus_—military bravery—is their _summum bonum_,
and death is the immediate penalty of any form of cowardice.
Extreme cunning and dissimulation are considered essential
qualifications of a general, so that to lure a foe into ambush,
or to deceive him by illusory promises or messages of peace, are
considered proofs of wisdom and ability. Honour, humanity, and
generosity are perfectly unknown, and merely considered signs of
weakness. When an enemy is defeated, prisoners are never taken,
and those not killed in the heat of battle are cruelly tortured
and mutilated, with every mark of indignity and contempt. Women
and children are not spared, and the most cruel destruction of
the most cruel northern barbarians, who devastated Europe, pales
before the complete and effectual ruin which marks the progress of
a Zulu conqueror.
[Sidenote: _Sir Bartle Frere._]
In times of peace the army remains at military kraals, and is
occasionally called up to the great place of the king for review.
It is always in a state of readiness, and burning for employment.
War is the pastime, glory, and wish of the men, who eagerly
desire to wash their spears in blood, that they may obtain the
only glory for which they care to live, and secure that plunder
which can enable them to acquire wives and cattle. Nothing could
be more dangerous, or a more awful threat to a colony, than an
army of this description under the orders of a despotic savage,
without the slightest principle, and urged on to fight by all the
traditions and ideas of his race. Let it be remembered also that
the country of Natal was once owned by the Zulus, and that, while
held by a garrison of only 20,000 whites, there were no fewer than
300,000 savage heathen inhabitants in it of similar colour, race,
and religion to the people of Cetywayo. Once let the flood-gates
be lifted and a conquering "invulnerable" army enter Natal,
nothing could prevent the general rising of the vast masses of
natives within that colony. If that had occurred, British dominion
would have set in an ocean of blood, and every white man, woman,
and child in the settlement must have been slaughtered. It was
one wise, good man who averted that catastrophe, and his name
was Bartle Frere. Slowly, but most certainly, will the mists of
prejudice be lifted from the minds of the English people, and they
will learn to know that the policy they so much vilified saved the
British name from dishonour, and the British people and British
interests in South Africa from destruction.
CHAPTER III.
EVENTS PRELIMINARY TO ZULU WAR—COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.
[Sidenote: _The Transvaal in danger._]
Thirty-six years had elapsed since the eventful ride of Dick
King from D'Urban to Graham's Town. The British colony of
Natal had grown slowly. Immigrants arrived; a representative
Constitution was granted. During this period numbers of people
of Dutch extraction formed settlements in the Orange Free State
and Transvaal Republic. The British Government in the first
instance established sovereignty over the former country, but
abandoned it on the 23rd of February, 1854. The Republic commenced
from that date. So far as the Transvaal is concerned, Potgieter
established the town of Potchefstroom in 1839, and soon after
enormous territory, extending from the Vaal to the Limpopo, came
under the dominion of the South African Republic. The first
session of Volksraad was held in 1848, and it was in 1852 that
Pretorius succeeded in obtaining the treaty at Sand river, by
means of which the independence of the Republic was recognized by
the British Crown. One of the first Acts of the Volksraad was to
repeal a former resolution fixing their southern boundary at the
twentyfifth degree of south latitude, because the Volksraad has
no means of determining where the said degree of south latitude
is. Amongst the people civilization made slow progress. "Not many
years ago," wrote Mr. Thomas Baines in his valuable work on the
Gold Regions of South Africa, "their own Surveyor-General was
mobbed for using a theodolite in the streets of Potchefstroom
instead of stepping off the distance like the Veldt Valkt miester
of the good old times." Sir Arthur Cunynghame, in his recent
narrative, gives us yet more amusing and striking illustrations
of the utter simplicity and ignorance of the Boers. As was to be
expected under the circumstances, the Government was extremely
narrow and objectionable; in proof of which it is only necessary
to state that no Englishman or German was allowed to possess
landed property, it was forbidden to discover or work minerals,
while slavery really existed, and was practised under what was
styled the Apprentice Law, passed in 1856.[15] In spite of the
discovery of gold-fields at Pilgrim's Rest, the country became
insolvent, wars with the natives took place, and at last such
a state of insolvency and danger was attained that the British
Government found it imperatively necessary to intervene. The
Zulus, under Cetywayo, intended to overrun the country, and this
would have threatened all British South Africa. The northern
territory of the State had already been abandoned to the natives;
the Government was powerless, and all confidence in it had fled;
commerce was destroyed, and the country was bankrupt. Under these
circumstances, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, on the 12th of April,
1877, found himself imperatively obliged to place the Transvaal
territory under the protection of the British flag.
In Natal, under the administration of Sir Benjamin Pine, during
the year 1873, a rebellion broke out on the part of a chief named
Langalibalele, which was only prevented from becoming a general
war by the admirably prompt action of the local Government.
The philanthropic societies in England, with Bishop Colenso,
championed the cause of this rebel, and Sir B. Pine was, in
consequence of their exertions, recalled. Sir Garnet Wolseley, who
succeeded that officer, says, "Langalibalele, as I am informed by
all classes here, official and non-official (a small knot of men
of extreme views excepted), is regarded by the native population
at large as a chief who, having defied the authorities, and in
doing so occasioned the murder of two white men, is now suffering
for that conduct. In their opinion his attempts to brave the
Government have been checkmated, and his banishment from the
colony, regarded as a lenient punishment by the natives at large,
cannot fail to be a serious warning to all other Kafir chiefs, not
only in Natal but in the whole of South Africa, to avoid imitating
his example."[16]
Sir Garnet Wolseley effected an important change in the colonial
legislature, by adding eight nominee members to the Council, which
previously consisted of five _ex-officio_ and fifteen elected
members. The annexation of the Transvaal followed; and, speaking
of this, Sir Benjamin Pine says that "the strong ground taken in
defence of the measure is that its hostilities with the native
tribes seriously imperilled the peace of our colonies—that it was,
in fact, a next-door neighbour's house in flames, which might any
moment set ours on fire. In this respect, the ground for annexing
the Transvaal Republic was very much stronger than that which
justified our taking possession of Natal. The latter country did
not at that time touch our boundary at any point. It was a house
several streets off."
[Sidenote: _Diamonds and guns._]
The discovery of diamonds in South Africa, in 1867, exercised by
degrees an enormous influence upon the attitude of the natives
throughout Southern Africa. When the success of the dry diggings
at the New Rush caused the formation of Kimberley, that town
became the centre of an enormous gun trade. From north and east,
thousands of Kafirs of various tribes flocked to a place where
they could obtain, for the reward of their labour, the means of
exterminating the hated white man in South Africa. The Gealekas
under Kreli, the Gaikas of Sandilli, as well as the Zulus beyond
Natal, were not slow to seize such an opportunity. For years
the trade continued, and the weapons purchased were soon used
against the Government which permitted their sale. Wars were waged
upon the eastern and northern borders of the Cape Colony during
1877, 1878, and 1879. Sir Benjamin Pine, with some fancy and a
great deal of truth, styles the diamond of the Kimberley mines
the bloodstone of South Africa. As the Zulu system makes war
a necessity constantly thirsted for by the army, advantage was
taken of the easy opportunity of getting firearms afforded by the
inconceivable blindness and fatuity of the British Government. In
the year 1877, Cetywayo had quite made up his mind for a deadly
conflict with the white man. Guns were purchased, preparations
were made, and the army crouched like a tiger in its lair, ready
to spring.
Since the first establishment of the colony of Natal, and of
the Transvaal Republic, the Governments of these countries had
the Zulu military power suspended, like the sword of Damocles,
as a perpetual threat over their heads. Of course, by the
annexation of the latter State in 1877, all its responsibilities
devolved upon her Majesty's Government. Cetywayo, the son of
Panda, succeeded his father in the year 1872, and it formed
part of Sir T. Shepstone's policy to conciliate and please him
in every possible manner. That officer went so far as to attend
his coronation, which was celebrated with the grandest forms of
savage ceremonial.[17] At the same time a number of promises and
engagements were received from the king. All this was, of course,
merely a solemn farce. The descendant of Dingaan, who first signed
a deed giving Natal to the Dutch, and then murdered in cold blood
the men who had trusted to his honour, was not likely to depart
from the traditions and policy of his race. Dissimulation, fraud,
and cunning are characteristic qualities of every Zulu ruler, and
Cetywayo excelled in them all. The Government of Natal was lulled
into security, while Bishop Colenso and the well-meaning but
profoundly ignorant men who form the self-styled philanthropical
societies in England have, even up to the present moment, been
completely hoodwinked and deceived. Sir Bartle Frere, writing of
Cetywayo's solemn promises, says, "None of these promises have
been since fulfilled; the cruelties and barbarisms which deformed
the internal administration of Zululand in Panda's reign have been
aggravated during the reign of Cetywayo, and his relations with
his neighbours have been conducted in a spirit fatal to peace and
security beyond the Zulu border."[18]
[Sidenote: _Natal in danger._]
The well-organized and peculiarly formidable military power of the
Zulus was still further consolidated and strengthened by Cetywayo,
so that a standing menace and threat of a very serious nature
existed against both Natal and the Transvaal. Nothing can better
prove the danger than the fact that the Zulu monarch formally and
repeatedly requested the consent of the British Government to
wars of aggression, which he proposed for the ostensible purpose
of initiating his young soldiers in bloodshed, and reviving
the system of unprovoked territorial aggression which had been
so successfully carried out by the model and demi-god of the
nation—Chaka.
A large tract of land on the western boundary of Zululand, between
the Buffalo and Pongolo rivers, which had long formed part of
the Transvaal, was claimed by the Zulus, and they had requested
the Natal Government to arbitrate in this matter. Eventually a
Commission was appointed, which decided that Cetywayo's cession
of a tract of land relied on by the Transvaal claim was promised
when he was only heir apparent, and that the cession had not
been subsequently formally ratified by his father Panda, nor by
the great council of the Zulu nation; therefore the country in
question had never ceased to belong to them. Private rights of
_bonâ fide_ settlers, which could not in justice be abrogated,
were confirmed, but otherwise the sovereignty of the territory was
ceded to the Zulus. Since his installation the tone of Cetywayo
had become entirely altered. When a remonstrance was sent against
a barbarous murder of young women by the king, replies of extreme
insolence were sent to the Natal Government, and the opportunity
was taken to state that no responsibility was admitted; at the
same time, the solemn installation promises were distinctly
denied, and Cetywayo affirmed his intention of shedding blood in
future on a much greater scale. In the latter part of July, 1878,
the Zulu chief Sirayo entered British territory, carried off two
women—British subjects—and forcibly put them to death. Redress was
demanded, but not given.
On the 11th of December, 1878, a final message was sent to
Cetywayo, in which the reasonable and just demands of the
Government were summarized. He was called upon to give up the
offenders who had violated British territory, and to effect
various reforms in the administration of his government, in
accordance with the solemn promises made at his installation. A
few informal messages made and retracted only served to show the
cunning and deceit of Cetywayo, and it was clear to demonstration
that the Zulu potentate and the Zulu army had determined upon war.
[Sidenote: _Hostile attitude of the Zulus._]
The High Commissioner writes (30th September) to the Imperial
Government:—"It is difficult to give any adequate idea of the
strength of evidence of the state of feeling. Zulu regiments are
reported as moving about on unusual and special errands, several
of them organizing royal hunts on a great scale in parts of the
country where little game is to be expected, and where the obvious
object is to guard the border against attack. The hunters are
said to have received orders to follow any game they may rouse
across the border, which it appears is, according to Zulu custom,
a recognized mode of provoking or declaring war. Unusual bodies of
armed men are stated to watch all drifts and roads leading into
Zululand, and these guards are occasionally reported as warning
off Natal natives from entering the Zulu territory, accompanying
the warning with contemptuous intimation that orders have been
given to kill all Natalions if they trespass across the border.
Zulu subjects came hastily into Natal to reclaim cattle which they
had sent hither to graze, giving as their reason that Zululand is
so disturbed that they know not what will happen. Serious alarm is
expressed because three large ships have been seen on the coast
making for Delagoa Bay, and great irritation is expressed by Zulus
at the stoppage of the supplies of arms and ammunition they used
to receive through that port.
"The reports first received of raids into Natal territory by
large bodies of armed men, who dragged two refugee women out of
the huts of British subjects, with expressions of contemptuous
disregard for what the English Government might think, or say,
or do, and the murders of the women directly they were on the
other side of the boundary line, appear to be confirmed in every
particular.
"There seems to be no doubt that the parties were headed by two
sons of Sirayo. This chief lives near the Natal border, and was
well known as extremely anti-English in his feelings. Until quite
lately he was so little in favour with Cetywayo, that he had not
for some time attended to any summons to the royal kraal. He
was nevertheless appointed by Cetywayo to represent him at the
Boundary Commission. Partly, it was said, on account of his rank
and influence and known antipathy to Europeans, and partly because
he could not refuse to attend at the royal kraal to give an
account of his stewardship, he did so attend, and in the absence
of the prime minister, was appointed to act for him, a proceeding
which, considering his known anti-English feeling, is regarded as
significant.
"It is to be remembered that the facts, of which a brief summary
is here given, have been sifted from a mass of very alarming
rumours, current during the month, which his Excellency the
Lieutenant-Governor considered more doubtful, or unworthy of
credit, but which are circulated in a manner to increase agitation
and excitement on both sides of the border."
[Sidenote: _Firmness of Sir Bartle Frere._]
The only question remained—Were we to allow the enemy to wait
for a favourable opportunity and attack us at an advantage, or
protect Natal and British South Africa by a policy of firmness
and consistency? The latter alternative was chosen by her
Majesty's High Commissioner; and on the 4th of January, 1879,
Sir Bartle Frere placed in the hands of Lieutenant-General Lord
Chelmsford, commanding in South Africa, the further enforcement
of all demands.[19] There can be no doubt whatever that this
course was the only possible one consistent with the safety of
Natal and British South Africa. Cetywayo had been long preparing
for war, and had most fully determined upon it, urged on by the
irrepressible warlike organization and the army, which thirsted
for an opportunity of exertion and could not safely be balked.
Self-preservation and self-defence rendered it absolutely
necessary that an army should enter Zululand.
Early in January, 1879, four columns crossed the Tugela. The line
of advance described a crescent, of which one horn rested on
Luneberg, or the Pongolo, and the other, or base, terminated at
the lower drift of the Tugela, close to the sea. Colonel Pearson
was in command of the first column, whose centre was an intrenched
camp on the summit of a bluff directly overlooking the Tugela
river.
It consisted of—
Regular infantry.—1500, comprising eight companies of the Buffs
under Colonel Parnell, and six companies of the 99th under Colonel
Welman.
Royal Engineers.—One company, with two 7-pounder guns, under
Lieutenant Lloyd.
Naval Brigade.—200 blue jackets and marines, under Captain
Campbell, from H.M.S. _Active_ and _Tenedos_, with three Gatling
guns.
Mounted infantry.—200 of Captain Barrow's.
Mounted volunteers.—200 belonging to the D'Urban Mounted Rifles
(Captain W. Shepstone); Alexander Mounted Rifles (Captain
Arbuthnot); Victoria Mounted Rifles (Captain Sauer); Stanger
Mounted Rifles (Captain Addison); the Natal Hussars (Captain
Norton). To all this must be added a native contingent of 2000,
under Major Graves, and two companies of the 99th, posted at
Stanger and D'Urban. This was the coast column.
The second column was planted at a commanding position called
Krantz Kop, inaccessible except on the Natal side. It comprised
3300 natives, with 200 European officers, supported by two rocket
tubes under Lieutenant Russell, R.E., and 250 mounted natives.
[Sidenote: _Lord Chelmsford's advance._]
The head-quarters of the third column was at Helpmakaar, situated
on high and open ground commanding an extensive prospect.
The depôts were at Grey Town and Ladysmith. This column was
exceptionally strong, and consisted of seven companies of the
1-24th, and eight of the 2-24th; six 7-pounder guns with special
Kaffrarian carriages; a squadron of mounted infantry under Captain
Browne; the Natal Mounted Police, 150 strong; the Natal Carbineers
(Captain Shepstone); the Buffalo Border Guard (Captain Robson);
the Newcastle Mounted Rifles (Captain Bradstreet); 2000 of the
Native Contingent, 2nd Regiment, under Commandant Lonsdale,
and 2000 natives under Colonel Glyn. General Lord Chelmsford,
commander-in-chief, accompanied the column.
The fourth column had Utrecht as its base, and rested its line
on the Blood river, thus covering the disputed Transvaal border.
It comprised the 13th and 90th Regiments, six guns, Buller's
Light Horse, and a number of natives. It consisted of about 2000
well-seasoned, reliable men, exclusive of the natives, and was
under the command of Colonel Evelyn Wood, V.C.
On the 10th of January, 1879, the full period expired for the Zulu
king to meet the demands of her Majesty's High Commissioner. On
the 11th of January No. 3 column, under Colonel Glyn, crossed the
Buffalo river into Zululand. Heavy rains had made the roads very
bad, and caused the Tugela to rise so much that a barrel-raft,
a pont, and a boat had to be made use of for the passage of the
troops. No opposition whatever was made by the enemy. In the mean
time the fourth column, under Colonel Wood, had been halted at
Bemba's Kop, distant about thirty-five miles from Rorke's Drift.
On the 11th of January, Lord Chelmsford, with the bulk of
the mounted men of No. 3 column, met Colonel Wood with his
"irregulars" about twenty miles from Rorke's Drift, and was
completely satisfied with the efficiency of the latter force,
and attributed the satisfactory state of Wood's column to its
commander's energy and military knowledge.[20]
[Sidenote: _Burning of Sirayo's kraal._]
On the 12th of January, Lord Chelmsford wrote: "We have had our
first fight to-day. I ordered the whole force out this morning
to reconnoitre the road along which we shall eventually have to
pass. In passing by the Nkudu hill, we noticed that some herds
of cattle had been driven up close under the krantz where one of
Sirayo's strongholds was said to be. I ordered Colonel Glyn, with
four companies 1-24th, and the 1-3rd Native Contingent, to work
up under the krantz in skirmishing order. On the approach of this
force near the krantz, fire was opened upon them out of the caves,
and the fight commenced. It lasted about half an hour, and ended
in our obtaining possession of all the caves and all the cattle.
Colonel Degacher, who had been sent for from camp when we found
that the krantz was occupied by the enemy, came up towards the
end of the affair with half-battalion 2-24th, and about 400 of the
2-3rd Native Contingent. This force went forward to Sirayo's own
kraal, which is situated under a very steep krantz filled with
caves. The British soldiers and natives skirmished, or rather
clambered, up the steep mountain-side, and entered all the caves,
which were found empty. I ordered Sirayo's kraal to be burned,
but none of the other huts were touched. The Native Contingent
behaved very well, and not a native touched a woman or child, or
killed the wounded men."[21] Subsequently Colonel Russell, with a
small detached force, was attacked by sixty of the enemy, but his
men dismounted and succeeded in killing nine or ten, among whom
was one of Sirayo's sons. This action was, in fact, the storming
of the stronghold of one of Cetewayo's principal chiefs, and was
accompanied by the capture of 500 cattle. Lord Chelmsford says of
this engagement, "I have visited two wounded Zulus who were in our
hospital, and have seen that they are well looked after. Directly
they are well enough I shall let them go, so that they may tell
their friends how the British make war."
Both previous to the successful and unresisted crossing of the
Tugela, as well as subsequently, frequent rains had caused great
discomfort to the troops, as well as immensely increased the
difficulties of transport. The _impedimenta_ of the large force
in the field was exceedingly great, and the want of knowledge of
the character of the roads, or tracks, and the capacity of oxen
to do the work, resulted in many delays and difficulties. Large
masses of infantry were moved into the enemy's country, whose
entire dependence for supplies was placed upon heavy waggons drawn
by numerous oxen. No system of carriers was established, and, with
the exception of the fourth (Wood's) column, the movement of the
troops was necessarily exceedingly slow. On the march each column
was exposed to be attacked at a disadvantage, so enormous was
the train of waggons which had to be guarded, and the knowledge
of these facts evidently enabled the Zulus to perceive the best
opportunity of striking a fatal blow. At a very early stage in
the war, Lord Chelmsford saw the difficulties connected with the
mode of supplies adopted, as he writes on the 16th of January,
"It would be impossible to keep a long line of road passable for
a convoy of waggons, and were we to advance far into the country
it would be almost certain that, instead of our supplies coming to
us, we should have to return for our supplies."
[Sidenote: _Zulu tactics._]
The country into which the British troops had entered was
one in which the mountain-sides are furrowed by deep kloofs
or ravines, generally covered by luxuriant vegetation. The
euphorbia, the cactus, the aloe, and mimosa grow in profusion,
and the bush in many places forms a natural fortress, in which
savages can easily lie in wait to surprise an enemy. It was in
such native fastnesses that the Kafirs of the Cape Colony loved
to wait—panther-like—either in war to attack the white man,
or in peace to rob his flocks and herds. The Zulus, however,
fortunately adopted tactics of a different character. Their plan
was to attack in the open field, and, by means of bravery and
overwhelming numbers, to entirely crush the enemy. It was thus
that Chaka had conquered, and it was upon the same system that
Cetywayo relied.
CHAPTER IV.
LORD CHELMSFORD'S PLANS—THE BATTLE OF ISANDHLWANA—THE HEROIC
DEFENCE OF RORKE'S DRIFT—PANIC IN THE COLONY—REQUEST FOR
REINFORCEMENTS—REPLY FROM THE QUEEN—THE MINISTRY—SIR BARTLE
FRERE—LORD CHELMSFORD.
It is desirable for the sake of justice that the plans of Lord
Chelmsford in commencing the campaign should be given in his own
words. They are contained in a memorandum dated 16th January, 1879,
and are as follows:—
"The reports which I receive from officers commanding the several
columns now operating against Cetywayo show clearly that at this
season of the year a rapid advance into the heart of Zululand is
absolutely impossible.
"The present state of the roads in Natal will be sufficient to
bring home to the mind of every one what difficulties must stand
in the way of those who are endeavouring to move forward into the
enemy's country, over tracts which have never been traversed,
except by a very few traders' wagons.
[Sidenote: _Lord Chelmsford's plans._]
"No. 3 column at Rorke's Drift cannot possibly move forward even
eight miles, until two swamps, into which our waggons sank up to
the body, have been made passable.
"This work will occupy us for at least four days, and we shall find
similar obstacles in front of us, in every march we are anxious to
make.
"Accepting the situation, therefore, it remains for me to determine
what modification of the plan of campaign at first laid down will
be necessary.
"I consider that my original idea of driving, as far as possible,
all the Zulus forward towards the north-east part of their country,
is still thoroughly sound.
"Without, therefore, attempting to push forward faster than our
means will admit of, I propose with Nos. 1, 2, and 3 columns to
thoroughly clear or subjugate the country between the Buffalo and
Tugela rivers and the Umhlatoosi river, by means of expeditions
made by those columns from certain fixed positions.
"No. 1 column will, as already instructed, occupy Etshowe.
"Instead, however, of crossing the Umhlatoosi river to Mr.
Samuelson's mission station (St. Paul's), it will move a portion of
its force to Entumeni, and occupy that position as well as Etshowe.
"Having established itself firmly in those two positions, the main
object of this column will be to clear the Inkandhla bush and
forest, or to induce the chiefs and headmen of the tribes residing
or specially stationed in that part of the country to tender their
submission.
"No. 3 column will first advance to a position near the Inkandhla
hill, and from there, assisted by a portion of No. 2 column, will
clear the Equideni forest, or induce the chiefs, etc., to submit.
"This work completed, the portion of No. 2 column under
Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford will move towards the mission station
near the Empand-leni hill, whilst No. 3 column advances to a fresh
position near the Isipezi hill, detaching, if necessary, part of
its force to support No. 2 column.
"These combined moves will, I hope, have the effect of removing any
dangerously large body from the Natal border.
"Colonel Wood, commanding No. 4 column, has been informed of
these intended movements, and has been instructed to act together
independently about the head waters of the White Umvoloosi river.
"When Cetywayo has either surrendered or been defeated, which can
only take a few more days to decide, Colonel Wood will take up
a position covering Utrecht and the adjacent Transvaal border,
wherever he considers his force can be most usefully employed. He
will not attempt to advance towards the Inhlazatze mountain until
an advance by the other three columns across the Umhlatoosi river
has become possible.
"By these movements I hope to be able to clear that portion of
Zululand which is situated south of the Umhlatoosi river, and
behind a straight line drawn from the head waters of that river to
the head waters of the White Umvoloosi river.
[Sidenote: _The fatal twenty-second of January._]
"Should the Swazies come down to the Pongolo river, that part of
Zululand which is behind a straight line drawn from the head waters
of the Umvoloosi river to the junction of the Bevan and Pongolo
rivers, will also, no doubt, be abandoned, and possibly as far as
the Lebombo mountains.
"I trust that this plan of campaign will meet with the approval of
the High Commissioner.
"From a military point of view I am convinced that it is the only
practicable one at this time of year, and if successfully carried
out, is capable of producing very satisfactory results.
"I am equally confident that, politically, it will also have good
results.
"We shall occupy a large extent of Zululand, and shall threaten the
portion which remains to the king. We shall completely cover the
Natal border, and shall to a considerable extent do the same for
the Transvaal. We expect Cetywayo to keep his army mobilized, and
it is clear his troops will have difficulty in finding sufficient
supplies."
On the 20th of January, 1879, the camp of the third column was
at the Isandhlwana mountain. This force was under the command of
Colonel Glyn, C.B., and the general commanding had accompanied it
from the Tugela river. On the date just quoted, orders were given
to Commandant Lonsdale and Major Dartnell to go out the following
morning, and make a forward movement with a force composed of
Native Contingent, Police, and Volunteers. On the next day (21st
January), Major Dartnell sent in word that the enemy was near
him in considerable force. Upon this Lord Chelmsford ordered
the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, the mounted infantry, and four
guns, to be under arms at once, and this force left so soon as
there was light enough to see the road. Before Lord Chelmsford
left, he sent the following order to Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford,
commanding No. 2 column:—"Move up to Isandhlwana camp at once with
all your mounted men and rocket battery. Take command of it. I am
accompanying Colonel Glyn, who is moving off at once to attack
Matyana and a Zulu force said to be twelve or fourteen miles off,
and at present watched by Natal Police, Volunteers, and Natal
Native Contingent. Colonel Glyn takes with him 2-24th Regiment,
four guns R.A., and Mounted Infantry."[22] Major Clery, senior
staff officer to the third column, says—"Before leaving the camp I
sent written instructions to Colonel Pulleine, 24th Regiment, to
the following effect:—'You will be in command of the camp during
the absence of Colonel Glyn. Draw in' (I speak from memory) 'your
camp, or your line of defence,'—I am not certain which—'while the
force is out. Also draw in the line of your infantry outposts
accordingly; but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced.'
I went to Colonel Pulleine's tent just before leaving camp, to
ascertain that he had got those instructions, and I again repeated
them verbally to him."[23] Captain Alan Gardiner, of the 14th
Hussars, states that he left the camp with Lord Chelmsford on the
22nd of January, and was sent back into camp with an order from
the general, between 10 and 11 a.m. that day. Colonel Pulleine was
informed that the camp of the force out was to be struck, and sent
on immediately; "also rations and forage for about seven days."
This order came too late. At the moment of its receipt Colonel
Durnford was falling back and begging Colonel Pulleine to send him
reinforcements, and the enemy began to appear in large numbers.
[Sidenote: _Intentions of the Zulus._]
In order to make the proceedings of this fatal day more easily
understood, it is now necessary to advert to the proceedings of
the Zulu army. This was 20,000 strong, and consisted of the Undi
corps, the Nokenke and Umcityu regiments, and the Nkobamakosi and
Inbonambi regiments. These comprised the flower of Cetywayo's
troops. During the night of the 21st of January they were ordered
to move in small detached bodies to a position about a mile
and a half to the east of the camp at Isandhlwana, on a stony
table-land, only about 1000 yards distant from the spot visited
by Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn on the afternoon of the 21st
of January. No fires were lighted, and the stillness of death was
preserved. The centre was occupied by the Undi corps, the right
wing by the Nokenke and Umcityu, and the left by the Inbonambi and
the Nkobamakosi regiments. The king's orders comprised a simple
command to drive the third column back into Natal. But there
was no intention whatever of making an attack upon the 22nd of
January. The state of the moon was unfavourable, the usual medicine
sprinkling had not taken place, nor had the war-song been chanted.
What superstition forbade was, however, conceded to expediency.
When the division of the British forces was noticed, and their
gross ignorance and carelessness observed, the Zulu leaders felt
like Cromwell, when he exclaimed, with reference to the Scottish
army, "The Lord has delivered them into our hands."
On the morning of the 22nd of January, the mounted Basutos
sent out under the command of Colonel Durnford fired upon the
Umcityu regiment. This was too favourable an opportunity to be
neglected. Here was a portion only of the third column, with an
unfortified camp, whose defenders were scattering themselves over
a large space, utterly ignorant and careless of the fact that the
overwhelming and concentrated Zulu force was close beside them.
The charge of the Umcityu regiment was immediately and vigorously
followed by that of the Nokenke, Inbonambi, and Nkobamikosi
regiments, the Undi corps holding its ground. Up to this time in
the day there had been no fighting. Early in the morning, not long
after the departure of the general, a body of the Native Contingent
had been sent out to scout, and either did not see or pretended
not to see any enemy. About 9 a.m. Colonel Durnford, R.E., arrived
with 250 mounted men and 250 native infantry, who were at once
divided into three bodies and scattered to the left east, the
left front, and the rear. So far from a plan of concentration
being adopted, the very opposite course was pursued. It was the
force sent to the left east that was attacked by the Zulu army.
No further concealment was now necessary, and messengers arrived
informing Colonel Durnford that an enormous force was advancing.
A consultation then took place between that officer and Colonel
Pulleine, when some difference of opinion seemed to prevail. A
company of the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, was then immediately
moved up to a distance of about a mile and a half from the camp,
where, at a neck of the Isandhlwana hill, an attempt was made to
check the advance of the Zulu army. For a very short time only this
manœuvre was successful.
[Sidenote: _The Zulu attack._]
The Zulu army now advanced in a steady, quiet, and determined
manner. The Umcityu regiment formed the right centre, and was
engaged with one company of the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment,
and about 200 of Colonel Durnford's natives; the left centre was
composed of the Nokenke regiment, which was shelled by the two guns
as it advanced. Next on the left, came the Imbonambi regiment,
with the Nkobamakosi regiment outside of it, both making a turning
movement and threatening the front of the camp, while driving
before them a body of Colonel Durnford's mounted men, supported
by a patrol of volunteers.[24] The Undi corps, on seeing that the
other four regiments had commenced the attack, concealed themselves
on the north side of the Isandhlwana mountain, and so turned as to
arrive at the western front where the waggon road crosses the neck.
On the left front of the camp our infantry behaved with extreme
gallantry, and succeeded in thrice repulsing the Nkobamakosi
regiment; but the Inbonambi regiment coming up as a reinforcement,
enabled the Zulus to push forward along the south front of the camp
and accomplish their turning movement. The guns were moved to the
right of the Native Contingent, and troops lined the nullah below;
three companies of the 1-24th remained on the left of the camp,
supported by Durnford's mounted Basutos, who had been driven back.
The single company of the 1-24th, which had been thrown out a mile
and a half from the camp, was retiring, fighting to the best of
their ability, and, of course, was cut off to a man.
The Zulu army was fast surrounding the camp. They had been held
only partially in check by our fire, and their own was remarkably
ineffective. Their overwhelming numbers and their extremely
advantageous position filled them with redoubled courage. In place
of advancing steadily and in silence, they now began to double
and to shout exultantly to each other. The Native Contingent
and camp-followers fled in all directions, seized by panic; the
Undi corps showed itself on the right rear of the camp, cutting
off retreat to Rorke's Drift, and a hand-to-hand combat against
overwhelming odds was imminent. Like the sea breaking against
land, the Zulu host came on invincibly, with overwhelming power
and strength. Then took place one of the most awful tragedies ever
recorded in the pages of history. With short stabbing assegais, on
rushed the naked savages, accompanying the death groans of their
victims with yells and shouts of triumph. No mercy was either
expected or granted. Hundreds of men, overpowered by brute force,
fell at their posts, and their fate was rendered more pitiable, as
well as more blamable, by a failure in the supply of ammunition.
[Sidenote: _The camp at Isandhlwana._]
From first to last, nothing could have been worse managed than
the defence of our camp at Isandhlwana. Profound ignorance and
rashness caused the dispersion of a force which, if formed in
hollow square—or better still, laagered in accordance with the
Dutch custom—would have defied the enemy, at least until such
time as the general, with the rest of the third column, could
have arrived. The lamentable spectacle was seen at Isandhlwana of
brave soldiers sacrificed through the most glaring incompetency
and folly. For the British infantry there was no opportunity of
escape—death at their post on the field of battle was inevitable;
but for the mounted men a chance occurred in consequence of the
Nkobamakosi regiment neglecting to make a junction with the Undi.
This was taken advantage of by a crowd of fugitives. In the flight
many were killed before the Buffalo river was reached, and many
were drowned and shot when trying to cross it. The Zulus, however,
had themselves suffered severely. The Umcityu lost heavily from
the fire of the single company of the 24th Regiment which was
sent out from camp never to return, the Nkobamakosi fell in
heaps, and the hill down which the Nokenke came was covered with
slain. As regards the British troops, our loss comprised 62 men
of the N Battery, 5th Brigade, Royal Artillery; 7 of the Royal
Engineers, including Colonel Durnford; 405 of the 1st Battalion,
24th Regiment, including Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, Captains
Degacher, Mostyn, Wardell, and Younghusband (Lieutenant and
Adjutant Melvill was killed on the western side of the Buffalo
river, when most gallantly defending the colours of his regiment,
which were afterwards found wrapped round his body); 165 men of the
2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment; Surgeon-Major Shepherd, Army Medical
Department; 12 Mounted Infantry; 26 Natal Mounted Police; 22 Natal
Carbineers; 7 Newcastle Mounted Rifles, and 3 Buffalo Borderguard;
37 of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment, Natal Native Contingent; 37
of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment, Natal Native Contingent. Among
the Carbineers and other volunteer corps were the sons of many of
the leading inhabitants of Natal, and in the Police also were many
relatives of colonists. The official lists comprising white men
killed, publish more than 770 names; but there is no doubt that,
including the loyal natives, quite 1000 of our men must have been
slain. All the baggage, guns, and ammunition became the property of
the enemy, and in the incredibly short space of one hour from the
beginning of the general attack, one of the most signal victories
possible had been gained by the Zulu army. The number of white men
who escaped across the Buffalo river was about forty, in addition
to natives on horseback and foot. Of the former, about twenty-five
or thirty arrived at Helpmakaar between 5 and 6 p.m. The Undi
corps, believing that the camp had been plundered by the other
portions of their army, thought it desirable to advance quickly on
Rorke's Drift to secure the booty there, and hurried off for this
destination, little dreaming of the possibility of any resistance.
[Sidenote: _Ignorance of Lord Chelmsford._]
While these occurrences had been taking place, Lord Chelmsford,
with Colonel Glyn and a large portion of the third column, were
absent in advance. On the 20th of January, the general had made
a reconnoissance as far as a place called Matyana's stronghold—a
deep valley, full of caves. Not having time to examine this place
thoroughly, two separate parties were ordered out to bring back
a full description of it. One of these, under Major Dartnell,
reported that he found the enemy in force, and would be able to
attack if three companies of infantry were sent to him. This was
not acceded to. At 2.30 a.m. on the 22nd of January, Colonel Glyn
was ordered to move to Dartnell's assistance with six companies
2-24th, four guns, and the mounted infantry. Colonel Durnford was
at the same time ordered up to strengthen the Isandhlwana camp. The
general followed Colonel Glyn's reinforcements, and reached Major
Dartnell at 6.30 a.m. The enemy shortly showed at a distance, but
retreated when a general advance was made. All this was, no doubt,
part of the Zulu plan of amusing this portion of our forces, and
keeping them from the Isandhlwana camp. The only actual engagement
that took place was at the extreme right, where 500 Zulus were cut
off, of whom 30 were killed. At 9 a.m. a short note was received
from Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, stating that firing had been
heard, but giving no further particulars. Lieutenant Milne, A.D.C.,
was sent by the general to the top of a high hill from which the
camp could be seen, and he remained there for at least an hour,
with a very powerful telescope, but could detect nothing unusual in
that direction. A site for a new camp was then fixed upon, and the
troops were ordered to bivouac there that night. The general then
started to return to camp with the mounted infantry under Colonel
Russell. When within six miles from Isandhlwana, Lord Chelmsford
found the 1st Battalion, Native Contingent, halted, and shortly
after Commandant Lonsdale rode up to report that he had ridden
into camp, and found it in possession of the Zulus. Intimation had
been received so far back as between 9.30 and 10 a.m.[25] that
there was a force of the enemy in the close neighbourhood of the
camp. Major Clery at this time received a half sheet of foolscap
from Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, giving him that information,
and as the force was only twelve miles from camp, an immediate
rapid advance would have saved the day. The exact words of this
letter are not given in the evidence, and are clearly of the utmost
consequence. It was after this, however, that Lieutenant Milne,
A.D.C., descended the hill, with the report that he noticed nothing
except the cattle being driven into camp. This fact, however,
was of great consequence, taken in connection with the pressing
nature of the despatch from Colonel Pulleine. Notwithstanding all
this, nothing was suspected until the dreadful news came like a
thunderclap, that the camp had been taken and its defenders killed.
So soon as the general heard the awful news, he sent back Major
Gossett, A.D.C., to order Colonel Glyn to advance with all his
force. He was six miles off, and it was then 4 p.m. The advance
party, with the general, continued to go forward, until they were
within two miles from the camp, when they halted. Colonel Russell
went to the front to reconnoitre, and returned about 5.45 with a
report that "all was as bad as could be." The Zulus held the camp.
At 6 p.m. Colonel Glyn came up with his troops, which, having been
formed into fighting order, were addressed by the general. No sign
of wavering was perceptible. They advanced with steady courage,
determined to attack and go through any enemy. Guns in the centre;
three companies 2-24th on each flank in fours; Native Contingent;
mounted infantry on extreme right, Natal Mounted Volunteers on the
extreme left; Mounted Police in reserve;—in this order the force
went forward with great speed. The artillery shelled the crest of
the narrow neck over which the line of retreat lay, and positions
were seized without opposition. The curtain of night had fallen
over the dreadful scene of carnage, and the entire force, tired and
dispirited, lay down amidst the _débris_ of the plundered camp and
the corpses of men, horses, and oxen. The weariness and sorrow of
these hours of darkness will never be forgotten. The troops fully
expected to be attacked in front and rear; but fortunately the
Zulus knew better how to gain than how to improve a victory, and
although there were several alarms, not a shot was fired, and Lord
Chelmsford, with the remnant of his forces, was able at dawn of day
to hurry on to the relief of Rorke's Drift.
[Sidenote: _The disaster discovered._]
On the 22nd of January, Lieutenant Chard, R.E., was left in command
at Rorke's Drift by Major Spalding, who went to Helpmakaar to
hurry on the company of the 24th Regiment ordered to protect the
ponts. About 3.15 p.m. of that day, two men came riding furiously
from Zululand, and shouted to be taken across the river. These were
Lieutenant Adendorff, of Lonsdale's regiment, and a carbineer.
The former remained to assist in the defence; the latter galloped
off to take the intelligence to Helpmakaar. The news was of the
frightful disaster at Isandhlwana—that the Zulus were advancing on
the colony in force, and that Rorke's Drift must, therefore, be
held at all cost. Lieutenant Bromhead, who commanded the company
of the 24th Regiment at the camp near the commissariat stores,
had just then received a note from the third column, and sent
for Lieutenant Chard. Preparations for defence were made with
the utmost vigour. Separate buildings were connected by walls of
mealie-bags and two waggons; the store building and hospital were
loopholed and barricaded. All available materials were made use of,
and the brave little garrison determined to repulse the enemy or
die behind their frail entrenchments.
At the river the ferryman, Daniells, and Sergeant Milne, 3rd Buffs,
offered to moor the pont in the middle of the stream, and with a
few men fight from its deck; but this offer was declined, and the
brave fellows who made it were enrolled among the garrison.
[Sidenote: _Rorke's Drift._]
The sound of firing was heard at 4.20 p.m. Previously, an officer
of Durnford's had been requested to send outposts in the direction
of the enemy, and to check their advances as much as possible.
His men, however, would not obey orders, and rode off, 100 in
number, to Helpmakaar. About the same time, Captain Stephenson,
with his detachment of Natal Native Contingent, left the little
garrison. The line of defence was at once seen to be too extended
for the small number of men that were left, and a new entrenchment
of biscuit-boxes had at once to be commenced. The wall had only
been built two boxes high, when, at 4.30 p.m., 600 Zulus were
seen advancing at a run against the south wall. They were met by
a well-sustained fire, but, notwithstanding their heavy loss,
continued to advance within fifty yards. Here they encountered
the additional cross-fire from the store and were checked.
Unfortunately, however, some were able to take advantage of the
shelter afforded by the cook-house ovens, etc. By far the larger
number never stopped, but moved to the left, round the hospital,
and made a rush at the north-west wall of mealie-bags. A desperate
bayonet struggle took place here, which resulted in the repulse of
the enemy with heavy loss.
The bush in the immediate neighbourhood, which had not been cut
down, enabled the Zulus to advance under cover close to the wall.
A number of desperate assaults were made, all of which were most
splendidly met and repulsed by the bayonet.
A very harassing fire was encountered from the rocks, which
caused severe loss, and about 6 p.m. obliged a retreat behind the
entrenchment of the biscuit-boxes. While all this was going on,
the Zulus had been attempting to force the hospital, and shortly
afterwards set fire to its roof. The garrison there most gallantly
defended the building from floor to floor, bringing out all the
sick that could be moved. Four privates of the 24th Regiment
(Williams, Hook, R. Jones, and W. Jones) were the last men to
leave, holding the doorway with the bayonet, their own ammunition
being exhausted.
Mealie-bags were then converted into a sort of redoubt, which gave
a second line of fire all round. While this was being done, the
hospital was in flames, and the enemy continued to make desperate
attempts to fire the roof of the stores. Shortly before darkness
came on, the gallant little force was completely surrounded, and,
after repulsing several attacks, felt compelled to retire to the
centre of their entrenchments. The vigour of the siege continued
until after midnight, and then it lapsed into a desultory fire,
which was kept up all night.
About 4 a.m. on the 23rd of January, the firing ceased, and
at daybreak the enemy was out of sight over the hill to the
south-west. The number of the defending force was exactly 104,[26]
and that of the Zulus who attacked about 3000. No fewer than 350
of the enemy were killed. Thus was the colony of Natal saved by
the undaunted resolution of a little band of heroes whose conduct
rivals that of the men of Thermopylæ.
At about 7 a.m. a large body of the enemy were seen advancing.
No reinforcements had arrived from Helpmakaar, although they had
been specially sent for, and the ammunition was almost expended.
At about 8 a.m. the third column providentially appeared in sight,
and Lord Chelmsford and staff soon afterwards galloped up to
Rorke's Drift and warmly congratulated its gallant defenders.
They had by their undaunted bravery and firm attitude before an
overwhelming force of the enemy done much to neutralize the effect
of the disaster at Isandhlwana, and, Lord Chelmsford himself
officially reports, "no doubt saved Natal from a serious invasion."
He adds, "The cool, determined courage displayed by the gallant
garrison is beyond all praise, and will, I feel sure, receive ample
recognition."
[Sidenote: _Natal saved._]
The disaster at Isandhlwana, looked at correctly, confirms most
strongly the arguments advanced by the High Commissioner in favour
of the war. It became perfectly evident that the Zulu king had
an army at his command which could, almost any day, unexpectedly
invade Natal; and, owing to the great extent of frontier and
character of the natives within the colony, they might have
devastated the country without the possibility of being adequately
checked. To use the words of Sir Bartle Frere, it would have been
vain—almost criminal—to ignore the fact that there had grown
up by our sufferance alongside Natal a very powerful military
organization, directed by an irresponsible, bloodthirsty, and
treacherous despot. This extraordinary power simply made the
existence of a peaceful English community so precarious as to
prevent its safe continuance in any other form than that of an
armed camp. So soon as the news of Isandhlwana reached the colony,
a terrible panic was the result. The inhabitants fled to the
towns, laagers were formed in every direction, while in D'Urban
and Pietermaritzburg entrenchments and fortifications were at once
erected. The heroic defence of Rorke's Drift and the providential
flooding of the Tugela river were the means of saving the colony.
Flushed with victory, nothing would have been able to withstand
the Zulu armies, if they had crossed the boundary and, in their
well-organized form, entered Natal.
As a result of the Isandhlwana disaster, the native allies could
no longer be trusted, and melted away by means of desertion. Lord
Chelmsford was obliged to report that large British reinforcements
were absolutely required if the operations against the Zulus
were to be carried to a successful issue. Three British infantry
regiments, two cavalry regiments, and one company of Royal
Engineers, as well as 100 artillerymen, were asked for. When the
request reached England, it was immediately granted, but a fearful
period of suspense and anxiety intervened. It is difficult to
pourtray in words the feelings of the white inhabitants of Natal,
who every moment expected to hear that a savage, ruthless foe was
in full march for the purpose of utterly exterminating the hated
white race. Sixty miles only intervened between D'Urban and the
Tugela river; Pietermaritzburg was still more exposed. Numbers of
people fled to the seaboard, and thence to the neighbouring colony;
while, behind laagers and hastily constructed fortifications, the
people waited in expectant terror for every item of news from the
theatre of war. In the Cape colony, the most vigorous measures
were adopted by its Government. Two hundred volunteers from Cape
Town, and 100 from Port Elizabeth, proceeded immediately to King
William's Town and relieved the 88th Regiment, ordered to Natal;
900 mounted yeomanry were called out to occupy certain positions
on the border, in conjunction with 800 Cape Mounted Riflemen.
Two thousand Europeans were thus placed under arms, 1700 of whom
were mounted men. This was really necessary in order to keep
down possible insurrections of Pondos, Basutos, and Griquas. All
the black races throughout Southern Africa had to be feared, as
they only waited an opportunity to make common cause against the
Europeans. Already in detail had the Gealekas and the Gaikas been
thoroughly defeated, but the Basutos and Pondos had hitherto hung
back. The Zulu war was watched by them with lively feelings of
interest and their sympathies were, of course, enlisted on the side
of Cetywayo.
[Sidenote: _Feeling in England._]
Her Majesty the Queen, with the utmost sympathy and promptness,
caused the Secretary of State to telegraph, on the 18th of
February, her sorrow at the loss of so many brave officers and men
of the regular and colonial forces, and her full confidence that
Lord Chelmsford would be able to meet the difficulties in which he
was placed. The message ended with the words, "Full reinforcements
of all arms will be sent with the utmost despatch."
The Imperial Ministry was fiercely attacked in England for having
entered upon the Zulu war, and succumbed to the pressure of
public opinion so far as to blame Sir Bartle Frere for taking,
without their full knowledge and sanction, a course almost certain
to result in war, which every effort should have been used to
avoid. The High Commissioner, under his commission, was not only
empowered, but really authorized and obliged, to enter upon
this war. His Excellency knew that it was necessary to open the
campaign at once in Zululand; and the mild, modified rebuke of the
Conservative Ministry was evidently wrung from them more by the
exigencies of party than by the actual circumstances. A disaster
always evokes a cry for victims, and the British populace were
loud in the usual _væ victis_ clamour. Sir Bartle Frere, however,
stood firm, strong in the confidence of eventually obtaining
justice; while the Ministry at home were sufficiently powerful and
sufficiently noble to refuse to sacrifice Lord Chelmsford to the
ferocious outcry that was raised against him.
CHAPTER V.
PEARSON'S COLUMN—MARCH TO EKOWE—BATTLE OF INYEZANE—EKOWE—ZULU
ARMY—WOOD'S COLUMN—ZULU RAIDS—REINFORCEMENTS FROM ENGLAND—THE
COLONISTS—THE NAVY.
We have now to advert to the proceedings of No. 1 column, comprising
1200 British troops, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson.
Having crossed the Tugela river, an advance was commenced towards Ekowe
on the 18th of January. No fewer than 130 waggons, as well as a number of
other vehicles, accompanied this column, whose order of march was as
follows:—
Cavalry.
Detachment Royal
Engineers.
Cavalry. One cart.
Company Native Half company Natal Company Native
Contingent. Native Pioneers. Contingent.
One cart.
Company of Buffs. Company of Buffs.
Company Native Two companies Buffs. Company Native
Contingent. Contingent.
Royal Artillery.
Two guns.
Two companies Buffs.
A and B Companies
Naval Brigade, with
two 24-pounder rockets
and crews.
Company Royal Engineers.
│
│
│
130 waggons and other vehicles.
│
│
│
{Three companies Native Contingent.}
{ Gatling crew. }
Rearguard. { Royal Marines. } Rearguard.
{ Two companies Buffs. }
The difficulties of transport were considerable, and the immense
train of waggons not only delayed progress, but made an attack,
when the troops were in motion, more difficult to resist. Nothing
of consequence occurred on the march, excepting the destruction
of a large military kraal. The enemy, however, hovered about the
column, and only waited for a favourable opportunity.
[Sidenote: _Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson's column._]
At last, on the 22nd of January, the day of Isandhlwana, the march
was commenced at 5 a.m. After passing five miles along a fertile
valley, the path turned suddenly to the left, and the ascent of
the high land on which Ekowe is situated commenced. The head of
the column reached the turning, and was preparing to halt for
breakfast, when it was suddenly attacked along the entire right
flank and on both fronts. The Zulus had been lying in ambush.
Rushing from bush to bush, and firing with great rapidity, they
advanced in extended order so as to come within a distance of
150 yards. Their advance was checked by the heavy fire from two
7-pounders, Royal Artillery, and two 24-pounder Naval Brigade
rockets, placed on a knoll at the foot of the pass commanding the
valley from which the flank attack proceeded. Two companies of the
Buffs, as well as A and B companies of the Naval Brigade, assisted
in holding this position, and poured in a steady fire. While these
proceedings were going on under the personal direction of Colonel
Pearson, the waggons continued to park, and as soon as the length
of the column had sufficiently decreased, two companies of the
Buffs, which had been guarding the waggons, were directed to clear
the enemy out of the bush. Led by Captains Harrison and Wild, they
got into skirmishing order, and in good style drove the Zulus back
into the open plain, where they were effectually swept by rockets,
shells, and musketry. The main body of the mounted infantry, under
Major Barrow and Captain Wynne, were now able to move forward.
An attempt to outflank on the part of the enemy was defeated by
the Naval Brigade and a part of the Native Contingent. Shortly
afterwards, a brilliant and successful attack was made upon heights
where a considerable body of Zulus were posted. The Zulus then fled
in all directions, and a complete victory was gained.
[Illustration: A. The enemy. C. Chest of Zulu army.
BB. Horns of Zulu army. D. Loins of Zulu army.]
The plan of fighting by the Zulus was in accordance with their
usual well-organized scheme. The formation of their attack is in
the figure of a beast, with horns, chest, and loins. They usually
make a feint with one horn, whilst the other, concealed by long
grass or bush, sweeps round for the purpose of encompassing its
enemy. The chest then advances, and endeavours by its vast power
to crush opposition. The loins are kept at a distance and only join
in pursuit.
The action of Inyezani lasted exactly one hour and a half,
commencing at 8 a.m. and the last shot being fired at 9.30 a.m. The
British loss was 12 killed and 16 wounded, while of the Zulus 300
were slain. It is conjectured that the attacking force comprised
nearly 5000 men.
After the battle was over the column calmly resumed the even tenor
of its way, and at night bivouacked on a high ridge distant only
three miles from the battle-field. The road led up a winding and
steep ascent, and on the 23rd of January, after marching six miles
further, Ekowe was reached. The intention was to leave surplus
stores here, with a small garrison, and push on to Cetywayo's kraal
at Ulundi. But these plans had to be completely changed. On the
29th of January, about noon, a messenger galloped in from Lord
Chelmsford with the news of the fearful disaster at Isandhlawana,
and that the entire Zulu army might be expected to attack them.
Colonel Pearson had to decide either to hold the fort, or to march
back, at once and quickly, to the Tugela river. A council of
war was assembled, and, by a small majority, it was resolved to
maintain their position at all costs. The result proved that this
was a wise determination.
[Sidenote: _The camp at Ekowe._]
In order to husband resources, all the cavalry, with the two
battalions of Native Contingent, were sent back, and by this means
the garrison lost all means of obtaining information of the enemy's
movements. The Victoria, Stanger, and D'Urban Mounted Rifles, as
well as the Natal Hussars, and two battalions of the Natal Native
Contingent, rode away at 2 p.m. of the day on which the order was
given, and at midnight arrived safely on the banks of the Tugela,
not having seen a Zulu on the way. Colonel Ely, _en route_ with
supplies, was directed to hasten on to Ekowe, and, in order to do
so more effectually, abandoned eight waggons, with their contents
of flour, biscuit, lime-juice, sugar, etc. On the 30th of January,
all the troops came inside the embryo fort; tents were no longer
allowed, and officers and men were obliged to huddle together under
waggons. The garrison consisted of 1339 whites and 355 blacks, of
whom 47 whites and 290 blacks were non-combatants. The armament
comprised 1200 Martini rifles, with 330 rounds per rifle; 1
Gatling, with 127,000 rounds; 2 rocket tubes, with 83 rockets; and
2 7-pounders, with 500 rounds.
The garrison had 3000 oxen, but were obliged to drive away a large
number, and soon learned, by the loss of 90 slaughter oxen from
the ditch of the parapet, that large numbers of Zulus were close
at hand. The fort soon attained a respectable appearance. It was
oblong in shape—east and west sides, 300 yards each; north side,
120 yards; south, 180 yards. Waggons were placed round the inside
of the parapet, a few yards distant. The church was converted into
a hospital, the schoolroom and parsonage into storerooms, and all
other buildings were demolished. All hands were up at réveille, and
engaged all day in making the fort, and, when that was completed,
in making roads. At 8 p.m. the "last post" sounded, and then all
gave themselves to sleep, often broken by the alarm of the church
bell, when the parapets were manned at once. A few irregular horse
had been enrolled, who did outpost duty during the day. At this
time an army of 20,000 Zulus was lying in wait between Ekowe and
the Tugela.
Lord Chelmsford desired Colonel Pearson to reduce his garrison,
and to establish a portion of it at the Tugela forts; but this
was clearly impossible, and it is very surprising that such an
order could ever have been issued. On the 6th of February, Colonel
Pearson wrote, suggesting that twenty waggons, with a convoy,
should be sent. In reply, the general sent word that there would
not be a force at Lower Tugela for six weeks sufficient to insure a
convoy to Ekowe, but wished the garrison there reduced and a flying
column formed. This was quite out of the question, and, of course,
was not attempted. On the 10th of February the fort was completed,
with ditches seven feet deep and twelve feet wide, flanked by
_caponnières_ or by the parapet itself; wire entanglements on
the glacis, and stakes in the ditch. The two 7-pounders were at
the south-east and south-west angles, the rocket battery at the
north-west, and the Gatling on the east face of the parapet.
The stench, at night particularly, was absolutely sickening,
although every effort was made to keep the camp clean. Rations soon
had to be reduced. A bottle of pickles fetched 25_s._; sardines,
12_s._; tin of milk, 23_s._; a ham, £7 10_s._ There was always,
however, a sufficient quantity of food of a coarse description,
and the only famine that the garrison really suffered from was a
dearth of news. Intelligence of how the war was going on, and of
the outside world, was greedily and earnestly thirsted for. Convoys
were always looked for and never arrived. No attack was ever made
upon the fort by the wily Zulus, although they lay in wait for any
opportunity.
[Sidenote: _Life at the camp._]
The defence of Rorke's Drift had not only saved Natal from
destruction, but Ekowe from attack. Affairs dragged on in a dull,
monotonous manner all through February until the beginning of
March. From a slight elevation near the camp the Lower Tugela
could be seen, and H.M.S. _Active_ cruising on the coast. Many a
time were eyes stretched over the thirty-five miles of country
intervening between Ekowe and Natal for some sign of relief and of
succour.
An officer in Ekowe says, "The troops inside consisted of three
companies of the 99th Regiment, five companies of the 2-3rd Buffs,
one company Royal Engineers, one company of the Pioneers, the
Naval Brigade, a body of artillery, and nineteen of the Native
Contingent, amongst them being several non-commissioned officers,
whom we found exceedingly useful, two of them being at once
selected as butchers, whilst two others were 'promoted' to the
rank of 'bakers to the troops.' Others attended to the sanitary
arrangements of the garrison, and altogether they were found to be
also exceedingly useful. As a portion of the column the company
of pioneers under the command of Captain Beddoes did a great deal
of very important work. This company was composed of ninety-eight
natives, one captain, and three lieutenants, and their proceedings
in connection with the making of the new road were watched with
much interest. They worked with the Naval Brigade, about three
companies of soldiers, and several men of the Royal Artillery. This
road was found useless in consequence of the numerous swampy places
at the foot of each of the numerous hills which occurred along the
route. Very thick bush had to be cut through, and at first but
slow progress was made. The road, as is generally known, took a
direction towards the Inyezane. Whilst out on one occasion, the
road party saw a torpedo explosion, which took place about three
miles from where the party was working. It had been accidentally
fired by Kafirs, who were unaware of the dangers connected with the
implement, and it is believed that several of them were killed. The
road was altogether a bad one. The relief column used it on their
way up, but only the pioneers and the mounted men went by that
route on the way back. In fact, it would have been useless to have
attempted to use it for the passage of waggons. Whenever the road
party went out they were fired on by Kafirs, but of course shots
were returned, and many a Zulu warrior was knocked over whilst the
work was being proceeded with. Everything in camp was conducted in
a most orderly manner. We were roused at half-past five, sharp,
and at eight o'clock, sharp, lights were out. For one month we
existed very comfortably on full rations, but at the end of that
time we were put on short rations, made up as follow:—One pound
and a quarter of trek oxen beef, six ounces of meal, one ounce and
a quarter of sugar, third of an ounce of coffee, onesixth of an
ounce of tea, one-ninth of an ounce of pepper, and a quarter of an
ounce of salt. Life of course was very monotonous. The bands of the
two regiments played on alternate afternoons, and every morning
they were to be heard practising outside the entrenchment. The most
pleasant part of the day was just after six o'clock, when we used
to be enlivened in the cool of the evening by the fife and drum
band, playing the 'retreat.' The water with which we were supplied
was indeed excellent, and the bathing places, I need not say, were
very extensively patronized. The grazing was not nearly sufficient
for the cattle, and from the first they must have suffered very
much from want of nourishment. You will have heard of the fate of
the 1100 head of oxen and the span of donkeys which we sent away
from the camp in expectation of their reaching the Lower Tugela.
They left us in charge of nineteen Kafirs; but at the Inyezane they
were attacked by a large body of Kafirs. The natives in charge of
the cattle decamped and reached the fort in safety, and the enemy
got possession of the whole of the cattle, which they drove off.
The donkeys were all killed, with the exception of one, and this
sagacious animal surprised everybody in camp by returning soon
after the Kafirs had come back."
[Sidenote: _Movements of Cetewayo._]
Shortly after the disaster at Isandhlwana, the main body of the
Zulu army went up to the king to be doctored with charms taken
from the mutilated bodies of the killed of the English army. The
intended movements of Cetywayo were described as follows:—"When
the doctoring is done, the king will order a still stronger force
than that of 22nd January; perhaps 20,000 or 30,000 to attack in
one mass Colonel Glynn's column, and if they succeed, then attack
Colonel Wood's column; but if they do not succeed in doing this,
he will try to check and harass the English columns in Zululand
by manœuvring a sufficient number of soldiers around them, and
simultaneously make strong impetuous raids into the colony, as he
has prohibited his people making raids in small numbers; he has
furthermore plainly and repeatedly expressed himself to the effect
that if he is to lose his life and kingdom, he will first make such
havoc in Natal that it for ever shall be remembered." The truth is
that something little short of a universal panic prevailed, which
only by degrees subsided as time passed on without any invasion,
and leisure was allowed for reflection. It does not seem to have
been remembered that in every direction except one, and by all
the columns except that of Colonel Glyn, the Zulus were defeated.
Isandhlwana was a purely exceptional case, entirely attributable to
blundering of the most gross and evident character. The defence of
Rorke's Drift and the battle of Ineyezani were most significant. At
the former a handful of infantry defended themselves successfully
behind mealie-bags and biscuit-boxes against three times their
number; at the latter, an overwhelming force was easily defeated in
the field by the simple strategy of common sense.
No. 4 column, under Colonel Wood, operated in the north and acted
as a means of defence to Utrecht and the Transvaal. It was assisted
from the first by a number of irregulars and volunteers. Successful
forays were made on various occasions, but it would be tedious
to do more than refer to these, although the greatest gallantry
and skill were exhibited. Colonel Wood most deservedly increased
his reputation as a brilliant and successful leader. A fort was
established at Kambula hill, entrenched in such a manner as to defy
the attacks of a savage enemy.
[Sidenote: _Discontent among the Boers._]
February was a month of suspense. Cetywayo had an opportunity of
which he did not avail himself, but was contented with reorganizing
and reanointing his armies. Colonel Pearson remained at Ekowe;
forts were placed on the Tugela river; mounted forces were
distributed along the border from Fort Pearson to Thring's Post.
There was, in addition, a border guard of white officers and
natives, about 1500 strong. "Stanger"—fifteen miles on the Natal
side—as well as D'Urban, Maritzburg, and every town of the least
consequence, was fortified, and then volunteer and citizen soldiers
prepared themselves for any emergency. The High Commissioner,
Sir Bartle Frere, who had proceeded to Natal on the outbreak of
hostilities, still remained at Pietermaritzburg, and was there in
the best possible position for giving that advice and assistance so
necessary in the serious emergencies in which a British colony and
a British general were placed. Unfortunately, many of the people of
Dutch extraction in the Transvaal seemed to take the opportunity
for loudly protesting against the annexation of that territory to
the Crown, then recently effected by Sir Theophilus Shepstone.
A people's committee was appointed, and a firm determination
expressed to regain that republican liberty of which they believed
they had been unjustly deprived. One of the most satisfactory
events of this month was the evident desire of the king's brother,
Oham, to be regarded as our friend. His country lay in the
north-west of Zululand, and at an interview held with Colonel Wood,
conditions of surrender were arranged. Early in March he came in
with more than 600 people.
Under the orders and with the connivance of Cetywayo, the chiefs
Umbellini and Manyanyoba perpetrated the most horrid cruelties.
Atrocious outrages had been committed long previously, but the
Transvaal republican authorities had not apparently considered it
expedient to report them fully. The little town of Luneberg was
undoubtedly saved by a company of troops sent there by Colonel
Wood. This officer had it in his power, when passing through
Manyanyoba's country, to crush him and his warriors, but accepted
in good faith the statement of that chief, professing a desire to
come under the British Government. In spite of this, on the 10th of
February, a Zulu war party, led by Umbellini, crossed the Pongolo,
and was joined on the north by a strong force of Manyanyoba's
people, led by Manyanyoba himself.[27] The combined force consisted
of 1500 men. At half-past 3 a.m. of the 11th February, they reached
the mission station of the Rev. Mr. Wagner, only four miles from
Luneberg, and then commenced a scene of most atrocious murder. Men,
women, and children were massacred. The houses of the Christian
natives were given to the flames, and no fewer than seven children
were burnt alive. From Wagner's they went to Nomapela's kraal,
where they killed two men, eleven women, and fifteen children.
Thence they proceeded to Luhlanya's kraal, where they murdered one
man, two women, and two children. But it is unnecessary to prolong
the narrative; suffice it to say that they went through the country
with fire and sword, sparing neither age nor sex, and plundering
wherever they had an opportunity. Bodies of women and children were
found frightfully mutilated, and at Mr. Wagner's house a woman was
found still alive, who bore thirty-seven assegai wounds on her body.
[Sidenote: _Life at Helpmakaar._]
The movements of the main Zulu army were mysterious. One day scouts
arrived with the information that the enemy was in force between
the Tugela and Ekowe; another day information was received that
there was an army beyond the later place. The plan adopted on our
side was simply to entrench and wait. A dull, monotonous round of
garrison duty had to be performed at a number of posts, while the
danger was so great and imminent as to turn every citizen into a
soldier, and every town into a barrack. As a specimen of life at
a fort, we quote from a correspondent who writes in February from
"Helpmakaar:" "Here we are, foot artillery, police, and contingent,
about 500 strong, living in tents during the day and going into
the fort at night. With the exception of a stink of rotten mealies
and the rain continually swelling through and through, the fort
is not so bad, being so strong and well built that the men here
now could hold it against the whole of the Zulu army. It is
not healthy. Hospital leaks. What with guards, vedettes, etc.,
the duties are very heavy." What was said at Helpmakaar might
have been said with very little variation at every other fort.
The most active operations were carried on from Colonel Wood's
column, whose head-quarters were entrenched at Kambula. Among its
brilliant exploits was the capture, on the 20th February, of the
almost inaccessible Makkatees mountain. One of the captured natives
said that our troops had not come a day too soon, as Cetywayo had
promised to send reinforcements.
[Sidenote: _Arrival of reinforcements._]
The first ship to arrive with reinforcements was H.M.S. _Shah_,
which anchored at Port Natal on Thursday, the 6th of March. The
troops available by her were 392 men of the Naval Brigade and 200
men from the St. Helena garrison.[28] Baker and Lonsdale's Light
Horse, as well as other irregulars, were recruited in the Cape
Colony, and sent on by degrees. The first steamer from England to
arrive with reinforcements was the _Pretoria_, of the Union Royal
Mail Steam Shipping Company's fleet. She made the run to Natal in
less than twenty-four days, and had on board 34 officers, 7 staff
officers, and 890 men of the 71st Highlanders. The British soldiers
were received in Natal with the utmost enthusiasm, as saviours of
the country. Each ship and each regiment was eagerly looked for and
gladly welcomed. Previous to the _Pretoria_, the 57th Regiment had
arrived from Ceylon in H.M. troopship _Tamar_. The Secretary of War
telegraphed, on the 13th of February, to Lord Chelmsford that the
following reinforcements had been placed under immediate orders
for Natal:—Two regiments of cavalry, each 648 men and 480 horses;
two field batteries of artillery, 336 men and 220 horses; one field
company of Engineers; five regiments of infantry from home, each
806 men; 57th Regiment from Ceylon; three companies Army Reserve
Corps, 140 men, 380 horses; Army Hospital Corps, 140; drafts for
the 57th, the 24th, and Royal Artillery. The steamers employed to
bring out these troops were—
_Line._ _Troops conveyed._
The Pretoria Union S.S. Co. 91st Highlanders
Danube Ditto 200 men 60th Rifles
Dublin Castle D. Currie & Co. 3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade
England National S.S. Co. 17th Lancers and horses
France Ditto Ditto
Egypt Ditto 1st Dragoon Guards and horses
Spain Ditto Ditto
Loando British and African
S.S. Co. Military stores and field
Ditto 58th Regiment
China Ditto 94th Regiment
Olympus Ditto Royal Artillery
Palmyra Ditto Royal Engineers
Manora McNeil Denny M Battery, 6th Brigade,
Royal Horse Artillery
City of Paris[29] Inman Company 21st Regiment
City of Venice Smith & Sons Army Service and Hospital Corps
Clyde Temperley's Drafts of 24th Regiment.
Wrecked off Cape Coast,
brought in by _Tamar_
Queen Margaret Queen Line Army Service Corps and horses
Andean East India and Reserve ammunition column
Pacific
STAFF OF THE TROOPS.
Major-General Marshall; 1 brigade major; 1 A.D.C.
Major-General Crealock. Ditto
Major-General Newdigate. Ditto
These magnificent steamships used the utmost despatch, and in
little more than twenty days[30] from England each one arrived at
the Cape of Good Hope. The voyage thence to Natal only occupies
three days. Immense enthusiasm prevailed as each noble steamer and
well-known regiment arrived. The landing at D'Urban was performed
in the most expeditious manner, and without the slightest accident.
In the midst of all these arrivals and the excitement connected
with them, apprehensions of Zulu inroads were at an end; but it
was felt that the retrieval of the disaster at Isandhlwana would
be a serious work, and that energy and ability were requisite to
bring the war to a speedy and satisfactory termination. The 12th
of March was observed throughout the colony of Natal as a day of
humiliation, and in every church prayers were offered up to the
God of battles, that He would bless our arms. The people of Natal
had, in proportion to their numbers, sent out a considerable force
across the Tugela. There was mourning in many families for sons,
brothers, husbands, slain at Isandhlwana; and the losses caused to
sugar estates and other interests by the war were neither small nor
unimportant. The war was entirely an imperial act—levied by the
High Commissioner, and carried on in Zululand for the protection of
the Transvaal and of British South Africa generally, as well as of
Natal.
[Sidenote: _The colonists maligned._]
When transport prices increased in accordance with the inexorable
laws of supply and demand, immense sums were obtained by waggoners
as well as by owners of oxen and waggons. Other classes also
greatly benefited by the large military expenditure. It stands to
reason that very large sums of money spent in South Africa must
have permeated through all classes of the community. At the same
time, it is incorrect to charge the people with special greed
and rapacity. They have been libelled by more than one person;
and with reference to various charges, the Rev. Mr. de Witt, at
an early stage of the war, publicly stated in London that the
people of Natal treated the Zulus worse than dogs, while, at a
subsequent period, Mr. Archibald Forbes, correspondent of the
_Daily News_, maligned them in the most insulting manner. It is so
well known as to be beyond question that the Zulus are extremely
well-treated—too well-treated frequently—by the colonists; and
to those conversant with the subject, the missionary's statement
at once is seen in its true light, as a mere attempt to obtain a
little popularity by joining the usual successful outcry against
the oppression of coloured races by the "cruel white men," so
constantly echoed by people who have never lived among blacks,
and are perfectly ignorant of the facts of the case. Philanthropy
obtained at this price, and by means of calumnies against our
fellow-countrymen at a distance and in a most trying position of
danger, cannot be estimated at a high price. Mr. Forbes was so very
short a time in Natal as to be perfectly incompetent to judge of
the entire character of the people. His sweeping condemnations must
be attributed to bad temper, occasioned by petty inconveniences
or rudeness; but it is a pity that a man of his eminence and
ability should permit such considerations to affect his judgment
or guide his pen. The fact is that the people of the colonies,
and of Natal very especially, are, in proportion to their number,
quite superior to the people of Europe. There is more education and
more intelligence; consequently, quite as much honesty. Let any
man who is really qualified to speak by a real knowledge of the
colonies say whether or not this is the truth. Of course, it must
be admitted that there is a greater spirit of independence and more
freedom, with less conventionality; but this is merely a sequence
of the circumstances in which colonists are necessarily placed.
Intelligent and influential public writers in England have gone
so far as to assert that "it would not be safe to rely on the
energetic co-operation of the Cape." His Excellency the Governor
and High Commissioner thus disposes of this subject:—"I fear that
possibly, in the press of work, I may have omitted to do justice to
the patriotic and energetic spirit shown by the Cape ministry, who
in this respect represent, I believe, very faithfully the feeling
of the colony generally.
"The Cape Government, indeed, appears to me to have done all and
much more than could have been expected from it. It has spared a
regiment and a half of her Majesty's forces, taken its own recently
subdued rebellious districts entirely under its own charge, and
is sending to Natal very useful contingents of volunteers, native
levies, waggon drivers, supplies of arms, and means of transport in
mules, horses, etc.
[Sidenote: _Public spirit at the Cape._]
"The tone and spirit generally shown by the Cape Government and
people will naturally be compared with that shown by the sister
colony of Natal, whose interests are so much greater; and without
any reflection on Natal, the population of which has risen to the
occasion, the comparison will be by no means unfavourable to the
Cape.
"It must not be forgotten that the nearer we approach the seat
of war, actual or threatened, the greater will be the natural
disinclination of colonists to volunteer for any but home service,
and to leave their houses defenceless. This is, I feel sure, the
principal reason of any disinclination to encourage volunteering
for service in Zululand; and the threatened disturbance in
Basutoland will naturally disincline the Cape colonists to weaken
too far their own means of defence."
The services of the navy during the entire war were of the
utmost value. In a despatch dated the 15th of February, the High
Commissioner brings specially to the notice of her Majesty's
Government the excellent service performed by the naval brigades
landed from H.M.S. _Active_ and _Tenedos_ by Admiral Sullivan,
and subsequently from the _Boadicea_. These men, in arduous and
prolonged military operations, earned most thoroughly the title of
"bravest of the brave." No sailor ever turned his back on an enemy
during the war, and it was with difficulty that their impetuous
heroism could be checked. The _Active_ men helped to win the battle
of Ineyezane, and were with Colonel Pearson at Ekowe; Fort Tenedos
was manned by the men of the ship of that name. This important
fort commanded the crossing of the Tugela river near its mouth.
Men-of-war cruising on the coast produced an excellent effect, but
it is the services of the gallant "blue jackets" in the field which
are specially deserving of eulogium.
So soon as the news of the Isandhlwana disaster had been received
at St. Helena, Governor Janisch obtained the consent of the
military and naval authorities to send off at once every available
man to Natal. This was done with promptitude. And the first real
ray of sunshine from home reached our troops in Zululand when they
heard that 650 gallant men in H.M.S. _Shah_, Captain Bradshaw, had
arrived in Natal to assist them.
CHAPTER VI.
THE ZLOBANE MOUNTAIN—PIET UYS—THE BATTLE OF KAMBULA—THE INTOMBE
DISASTER—BATTLE OF GHINGHELOVO—RELIEF OF EKOWE.
It is now necessary to refer to the operations of Colonel Wood's
column.
On the 27th of March a force started from the Kambula camp to
attack the Zlobane mountain, consisting of detachments of the
Frontier Light Horse, Raaff's Corps, Weatherley's Rangers, Baker's
Horse, Major Tremlett with rocket tube, and the burgher force.
The number of horsemen was 400, and in addition a large body of
the Native Contingent was sent, under Major Leet, 1-13th, and
Lieutenant Williams, 58th Regiment. Another column was despatched,
consisting of mounted infantry, Kaffrarian Mounted Rifles, and
Wood's Irregulars, under Commandant Schermbrucker. Colonel Wood,
chief in command, and staff followed. We will go with the first
column under Colonel Buller, which halted at noon on the south side
of the Zinquin neck. Colonel Weatherley, with his troopers, arrived
half an hour afterwards. As the column passed the south side of
the Zlobane mountain, two shots were fired from an elephant gun,
and three fires were instantaneously lit on a shelf of rock near
the summit. Commandant Uys, a brave Dutch burgher, who had already
frequently distinguished himself in the war, acted as guide, and
the march onward took place in perfect silence. Moving forward in
the stillness of death, the east side of the mountain was reached.
As the time of action approached, the front post of danger and of
honour was taken by Commandant Uys, Colonel Buller, Majors Leet and
Tremlett. When 500 yards from the top, the enemy opened a furious
fire, in which Lieutenant Williams was killed; but our gallant
fellows pressed on without faltering for an instant, and gained
the top of the mountain, although the ascent was extremely steep
and trying. The fight continued at this point for another hour,
and during the entire time the British force was exposed to a most
galling fire from Zulus stationed behind rocks and in caves. When
Colonel Wood was within 100 feet from the summit, Mr. Lloyd, his
interpreter, fell mortally wounded, and his own horse was shot
under him. Colonel Weatherley was desired to dislodge one or two
Zulus who were causing most of the loss; but as his men did not
advance rapidly, Captain Campbell, Lieutenant Lysons, and three men
of the 90th, jumping over a low wall, ran forward and charged into
a cave, where Captain (the Hon. R.) Campbell, leading in the most
gallant and determined manner, was shot dead. Lieutenant Lysons and
Private Fowler followed closely on his footsteps, and one of them,
for each shot fired, killed one Zulu and dislodged another, who
crawled away by a subterraneous passage, reappearing higher up the
mountain.
[Sidenote: _The Zlobane mountain._]
After silencing the fire of the Zulus at the top of the Zlobane
mountain, Colonel Buller and Commandant Raaff rode to the westward
end, where the track divides it. The Zulus had fortified the pass
with stone walls, and from this position were annoying the rear
of the attacking force. In the mean time parties of Raaff's and
Baker's Horse, and the burgher force, kept up a hot fire on the
enemy lurking under the krantzes on the north-west side, where the
Zulu troops had built huts for encampment. After having been four
or five hours on the summit, Colonel Buller, with Commandments
Uys and Raaff, were returning from silencing the enemy's fire at
the pass, when they noticed the arrival of a body of Zulus on the
northern extremity of the mountain. Colonel Buller rode off to
attack them, but before he could get half-way, he saw that troops
of natives were climbing every available baboon-path, with the
object of cutting off the retreat of our men from the only two
passes by which it was possible to descend. At the same time,
two great columns of the enemy were seen approaching along the
top of the mountain to the eastward, and another dense mass of
men advancing from the southward. Colonel Buller then gave the
order to ride for the pass over the krantz at the neck, which
was the only exit left open. Then ensued a scene which almost
defies description. Down a descent fearfully steep and covered
with boulders horses were ridden at full speed. Many who lost
their steeds were saved on the cruppers of their comrades. At the
foot, Colonel Buller, with other officers, did everything possible
to rally sufficient men to cover the retreat of those still
descending, but every effort was in vain. The retreat became a
flight, and that even degenerated into a species of stampede, panic
guiding the actions of the fugitives. It was when endeavouring to
descend the mountain that the brave Commandant Uys was killed. He
had already reached such a forward position as to be comparatively
free from danger, when he learned that one of his sons was behind,
and might probably fall into the enemy's hands. He returned
immediately, but only to die. A ring of savages closed around him.
True to the traditions of his race, he fought bravely to the last,
and only succumbed to overwhelming force. He fell, stabbed to
death by numerous assegais. The family of Piet Uys was celebrated
in Kafir wars. He was born in the Humansdorp district of the Cape
Colony, and his family left that neighbourhood for Natal in 1837.
Both his father and brother were killed fighting against Dingaan,
and he himself, determining to avenge their death, was among the
first to offer his services. In one of his letters he writes, "I
fight in a good faith and a righteous cause. I must avenge the
death of my father and brother, although in doing so I am almost
sure to lose my life; yet I cannot restrain myself when I remember
how they were slain."
A similar fate was reserved for the gallant Colonel Weatherley.
This officer, with his Rangers, delayed starting in retreat, and
lost his way. Nearly every man of his force was cut off, while
their brave leader, holding his son—a boy of fourteen—to his
breast, fought manfully, until he fell pierced with numerous wounds.
[Sidenote: _Death of Uys and Weatherley._]
Thus perished two of the most gallant officers who served in the
war—one of Dutch extraction, the other an Englishman. The services
of Commandant Uys were of such great value, in consequence of
his bravery and thorough knowledge of the country, as to receive
special recognition, and no more gallant officer fought under the
British flag than poor Weatherley, of the Transvaal Rangers.
Among those killed at the Zlobane was a man named Calverley,
whose antecedents were of a very peculiar and somewhat suspicious
character. He had come as ambassador from Oham, the brother of
Cetywayo, by whom he was evidently completely trusted. Shuffling
and vacillation characterized the negotiations, and it was noticed
in camp that Calverley rode the horse on which Lieutenant Coghill
was killed at Isandhlwana. He likewise possessed property known
to have been lost in that disaster. But for strict military
discipline, Calverley would undoubtedly have been killed by our
soldiers, and even after Oham came over he was still treated with
suspicion. On this day, however, he expiated any faults he may have
committed by his blood, and died fighting in the British ranks
against the enemies of Oham and of England.
Colonel Wood was riding slowly under the Zlobane mountain to the
westward, perfectly unconscious of the existence of a large Zulu
force moving on the left across his front. When about half-way,
at the centre of the mountain, one of the natives, named Umtanga,
explained by signs that a large Zulu army was close upon them.
From an adjacent hill they perceived that a great host was marching
towards them, disposed in five columns, with horns and the usual
dense "chest," in accordance with the rule of formation for attack.
An order was sent to Colonel Russell, who was then ascending the
western end of the range, to move eastward and cover the movement
of our natives to the camp. At 7 p.m. Colonel Wood reached camp.
Intelligence came in that Captain Barton's party were on foot about
ten miles distant, and Colonel Buller at once started in heavy
rain, and was able by means of led horses to bring in seven men,
who were the sole survivors of the Border Horse and of Captain
Barton's party. Thus terminated this disastrous affair, in which
our loss amounted to about 120 men, and in which the enemy gained
additional courage for the great attack on the camp so shortly to
follow.
[Sidenote: _Captain D'arcy's escape._]
Captain D'Arcy, of Irregular Horse, thus briefly and forcibly sums
up his experience of Zlobane:—"Now to give you a short account.
Three hundred and fifty of the mounted men had to take a very
strong position, a hill called the Zlobane. We got up there,
driving the natives back at every point, although they fought very
well. Williams was killed as we charged up the hill, the baron on
the top when he was in command of his troop; a Zulu spotted him
from a hole, right through his head. Barton was sent down a hill
with some of C Troop, and just as we got down we saw about 20,000
Zulus below us, trying to get between us and the camp. We at once
crossed the hill to come down a most fearfully steep place; the
Dutchmen got to the place, rushed down, and bolted as hard as they
could go. My troop was leading, and Blaine, myself, and Hutton
got them to go quietly down the hill, which was really a fearful
place. I had, of course, to stop on the top of the hill, as we
were retreating; the Zulus all this time were giving us awful
pepper from Martini rifles. I saw, I thought, all our men down,
and then considered I had to think of myself. I got half-way down,
when a stone about the size of a small piano came bounding down. I
heard a shout above, 'Look out below,' and down the beastly thing
came right on my horse's leg, cutting it right off. I at the same
time got knocked down the hill by another horse, and was nearly
squeezed to death. I had taken the bridle off, and was about to
take the saddle (I mean I was going up the hill to take it off
my horse), when I heard a scream; I looked up, and saw the Zulus
right in among the white men, stabbing horses and men. I made a
jump for it, and got down somehow or other, and ran as hard as I
could with seventy rounds of ball cartridge, a carbine, revolver,
field-glass, and heavy boots. I went some 300 yards, when a fellow
called Francis got a horse for me, but no saddle or bridle—a rein
did for both; when one of the Frontier Light Horse got wounded
through the leg, and I had to jump off, put him on my horse, and
run again. Colonel Buller saved my life by taking me up behind
him on his horse; then Blaine, who had been keeping the natives
off in the rear, saw me (as after I got my breath I got off the
colonel's horse), and he nearly cried when he met me, all the
fellows thinking I had been killed on the top of the hill. He
behaved as he always does, and stuck to me, and pulled me through
the second time. The third time a major in the artillery, Tremlett
by name, took me up behind. Our men and officers all behaved well,
but the other volunteers were what Major Robinson would call a big
rabble. We lost ninety-three white men and a number of natives.
The Frontier Light Horse lost three officers and twenty-four
non-commissioned officers and men, and sixty-six horses. Each of
our men arrived in camp with another man behind him."
The great Zulu army which nearly succeeded in encircling Colonel
Wood's mounted party at the Zlobane mountain, was discerned from
the Kambula camp at 9 a.m. on the 29th of March. Flushed with the
success of the previous day, and depending on their vast number and
excellent organization, they had determined to sweep away for ever
the small white force which had entrenched itself in their midst.
For four hours the Zulu army continued to advance at a slow pace,
executing the manœuvres considered necessary to surround Kambula.
The left horn was seen marching in the direction of Balter Spruit
for over three hours before the men of the right horn made their
appearance. About 1 p.m. the enemy began to make a rapid advance
to the right of the Kambula hill, facing Blood river. It was then
time to prepare. Orders were given to eat dinners with haste. The
alarm sounded, tents were lowered, positions were taken up on and
underneath the waggons, boxes of ammunition were opened, and every
preparation for defence was promptly made.
[Sidenote: _Zulu disaster at Kambula._]
When the right horn of the Zulu army was within two miles distance,
a mounted party went out amidst hearty cheers to give them battle.
Having advanced and fired, the enemy became too numerous, and our
men retired, drawing the Zulus after them, which was the real
object of this manœuvre. The right horn of the enemy's army then
commenced its attack in earnest, pressing on most bravely in spite
of a tremendous fire from the artillery, the 90th Light Infantry,
and the 1-13th. Shell ploughed their ranks, but they re-formed
and steadily came on. At last, chiefly through the scathing fire
of shot and shell from four of our big guns, the movements of the
enemy became paralyzed, and a panic commenced. At the rear of the
laager a body of the Zulus had gained the top of the hill, about
300 yards off, and kept up a galling fire upon the men of the
13th Regiment. All, however, was soon over, the Zulus wavered,
hesitated, turned, and fled. Amidst lusty cheers our men followed
in pursuit. F and G Companies of the 13th charged them down the
ravine at the point of the bayonet. Shrapnel, case shot, etc.,
continued to pour from the field-pieces on the heavy masses of
disorganized Zulus. The cavalry for seven miles pursued them, until
it was too dark to see. Many were shot down at distances of ten and
fifteen yards, while hand-to-hand encounters with the flying foe
diversified the scene.
The strength of the Zulu army at Kambula exceeded 20,000, and
their plan of battle was evidently to advance the right horn of
their army so as to entice our troops to come out and attack
it. The left horn would then have advanced up the ravine, and
gaining the summit of the hill, charge and take possession of the
waggons, thus completely surrounding our position. In fact, the
Isandhlwana tactics were to be repeated. Fortunately, however,
the lesson we learned there was not in vain, and Kambula proved
this to demonstration. The Native Contingent ran away before the
fight, but the Basutos stood steadily at their posts and fought
well. The flower of Cetywayo's army, consisting of young unmarried
men, was engaged in this attack, and more than 1200 were slain.
No fewer than 785 bodies of Zulus were buried in the immediate
vicinity of the camp. It is noteworthy that they had many kinds of
breechloaders—Martini, Snider, and Mitford's patterns being all
represented. It was a grand sight to see the great moving mass
of more than 20,000 Zulu warriors advancing straight amidst a
withering fire. They shouted out when near the camp, "We are the
boys from Isandhlwana," and retreated under circumstances where
no European forces in the world could have advanced. The victory
was specially one of artillery. The first shot was fired at 1.25
p.m., and the last at 5.25 p.m. Three hundred and sixty-two shells
and eighty-six charges of canister were expended. Many acts of
gallantry were performed. Colonel Wood, as usual, was pre-eminent.
The bravery and coolness of Captain Woodgate was the subject of
admiration, while Colonel Buller greatly added to the laurels he
had so deservedly earned in the retreat from the Zlobane mountain.
It was on the latter occasion that he six times risked his life
in carrying out of danger and saving six men who,
being unhorsed, must otherwise have fallen into the hands of a
remorseless and savage foe. Thirty killed and fifty wounded was the
loss on our side at the battle of Kambula.
[Sidenote: _Intombe._]
A description of the repulse of the Zulus from Kambula camp has
been written by Commandant Schermbrucker, and this is what he
says:—"As soon as we saw them turning their backs, I got all my
Kaffrarians rapidly to mount the horses already saddled, and
shortly afterwards all the mounted forces in camp were ready, and
we raced helter-skelter after the flying Zulus. I took the extreme
right, Colonel Buller led the centre, and Colonel Russell, with
mounted infantry, took the left. For fully seven miles I chased two
columns of the enemy, who tried to escape over the Umvolozi, but
I came beforehand and pushed them off the road. They fairly ran
like bucks; but I was after them like the whirlwind, and shooting
incessantly into the thick column, which could not have been less
than 5000 strong. They became exhausted, and shooting them down
would have taken too much time; so we took the assegais from the
dead men, and rushed among the living ones, stabbing them right and
left, with fearful revenge for the misfortunes of the 28th inst. No
quarter was given."
On the 12th of March a very serious disaster occurred at the
Intombe river, where an escort of the 80th Regiment, under Captain
Moriarty, was laagered. That officer commanded a party of 104 men
convoying a train of eighteen waggons variously loaded, _en route_
from Derby to Luneberg. The flooded state of the river caused
detention for several days. A small party under Lieutenant Harward
was stationed on the other side. That officer heard a shot fired
at 4 a.m., and shortly afterwards was roused by an alarm, and saw,
when the fog lifted, a dense mass of Zulus, about 4000 in number,
extending across the valley and on the point of surprising the
camp on the other side of the river. He immediately put his men,
thirty-five in number, under arms, and directed their fire on the
flanks of the enemy. With tremendous celerity, Captain Moriarty's
force was surprised and the camp taken. An immediate retreat was
made by Harward, but not before the awful sight was witnessed
of the enemy slaughtering our men on the banks of the river and
in the water. The Zulus crossed and came on in dense masses. A
hand-to-hand fight ensued, and a vain attempt to rally was made;
then, finding re-formation impossible, Lieutenant Harward put spurs
to his horse and galloped into Luneberg. Forty-four men were killed.
[Sidenote: _Losses of the English._]
An eye-witness, Mr. Josiah Sussons, says:—"I was in the waggon,
sleeping, and early in the morning I got up to see if it was
daylight, and saw the Kafirs swarming around within twenty yards of
me. The alarm was given, and Captain Moriarty called out, 'Guards
out.' I ran back to my waggon to get my rifle (which belonged to
No. 1 Company, Transvaal Rifle Volunteers, of which corps I am a
member), but in the confusion of the bullets flying about me, I
could not get it out. I now found it so dangerous that I determined
to try to bolt, if I could, without remaining to take my clothes.
As I emerged from the waggon for the last time, I heard Captain
Moriarty cry out, 'Fire away, men; I am done.' I then went to
the adjoining waggon to call Whittington (also a Pretoria man),
and I told him the niggers were around. He immediately came out
and jumped down, but was caught almost as soon as he got to the
ground, and assegaied. The poor fellow shrieked out, but without
avail, as no assistance was at hand. Seeing that I was powerless
to do anything, having no arms of any kind, I ran down between the
oxen, and made for the river, which was about sixty yards off. I
found the Zulus shooting and stabbing the people in all directions.
The sight was a most horrifying one, and never to be forgotten. I
had to dodge about to save myself, and am surprised that I managed
to get through at all. As soon as I got to the river, I jumped in
and made a dive, as swimming was too dangerous, the Zulus standing
on the banks, and at the edge of the river, as thick as thieves,
throwing assegais and aiming their guns wherever they saw a head.
I came up about the middle of the river, but the moment my head
was out, I saw several Zulus pointing their guns, and ready to
fire. I therefore dived again, and came out on the other side. The
river was very full at the time, and a strong current running. In
crossing I had torn off my shirt, the only garment I possessed,
and therefore when I landed I was entirely in a state of nudity.
I now found that fighting was still going on on all sides of me,
and that it was almost impossible I could get any further, and in
my desperation I contemplated throwing myself in the water, to
be drowned peaceably, rather than suffer the death by torture of
many of those I saw around me. I, however, got into a courageous
spirit again, and dashed off, keeping as much out of the way of the
enemy as I could. Several shots were fired at me, and assegais were
flying in all directions, but somehow I happened to be fortunate
and got clear of the encampment. I made for Meyer's station as fast
as I could, and overtook one soldier on the road, who was shot
dead just as I got up to him. I overtook two others shortly after,
who were also shot. Getting further on, I fell in with Sergeant
Booth and about a dozen men, who were keeping up a retreating
fire, and fighting very pluckily. I rested for a few minutes with
them, during which time I espied the Zulus coming round the hill
to intercept us. I informed Sergeant Booth of this, and he kept
up a steady fire upon them, and made the enemy retire back into
the hills. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of Sergeant
Booth on this occasion; he fought most pluckily, and lost four
of his small band here. It was entirely owing to their doing so
well that any of us managed to get through at all. The Zulus would
have entirely surrounded us, and not a soul could have escaped.
Seventeen leaders and drivers were killed altogether, amongst them
being Whittington, Campbell, and Goss. As I got in camp, I met
Major Tucker going out with his men to the relief."
[Sidenote: _Hair-breadth escape._]
One of the most sensational events which occurred during April
at the head-quarters camp of the fourth (Colonel Wood's) column,
was the arrival there of a man whose hairbreadth escapes enable
us to realize that truth is stranger than fiction. Captain Mayne
Reid could scarcely venture on imagining what our readers will
find stated below as sober fact. There may be exaggeration or
colouring, but in the main the narrative is correct. Mr. Rudolph,
landrost of Utrecht, when out scouting on the Zunguin Neck with
five men, encountered a party of forty Zulus, of whom he killed
four. He picked up about the same time a Frenchman named Grandier,
who had belonged to Colonel Weatherley's troop of Border Horse,
and was made prisoner by the enemy when so many of his comrades
fell at the Zlobane mountain. The story was told to Colonel Wood
and the staff—Captain Maude taking notes, the substance of which
is as follows:—He (Grandier) was one of the very few who succeeded
in charging through the mass of Zulus by whom they were beset in
front and rear. He had got on to fairly good ground, and had set a
comrade on his horse, he running by the side, when a Kafir caught
him by the leg, and he was immediately overpowered by numbers and
made prisoner. His captors took him to Umbellini's kraal, on the
south side of the Zlobane, about half-way up. He saw that chief,
who asked him where Shepstone was, and who was the commander of the
commando to which he belonged. He was kept prisoner that night in a
kraal, and sent out the next morning to work in the mealie fields.
Soon after he was taken by two or three mounted men to the middle
of a big commando, all of whom threatened him with death, while
the chief, Manymane, ordered him to be sent prisoner to Cetywayo.
He stopped one day after that at the Zlobane, starting the next
day for Ulundi in charge of four men riding, while he was made
to walk and carry their provisions. He was quite naked, all his
clothes having been taken from him. They took four days to make the
journey, arriving in the evening, when a messenger was sent forward
to announce their coming to the king. He remained all that night
and next day tied in a field. On the following day, at noon, he was
taken to Cetywayo, where a half-caste Dutchman, with long hair,
translated. Cetywayo asked what the English wanted coming in that
way to his country. He asked after Oham, where he was stopping,
and said he would kill him and Shepstone and everyone else, as he
had plenty of men to do the work. He was very particular to learn
the name of the commander of the Kambula column. After replying to
these questions, Grandier was removed in custody to a kraal, where
he was threatened and beaten with very little respite, and for four
days had nothing but mealies to eat. Some messengers then came and
reported to Cetywayo that Umbellini and his brother had been killed
in the attack on Colonel Wood's camp. On this Cetywayo ordered
Grandier to be sent back to Umbellini's Kafirs, that they might
sacrifice him to the _manes_ of their deceased chief. He was sent
back next day with a guard of two Zulus, only one of whom had a
gun, though plentifully supplied with assegais. On the 13th, about
noon, they were resting, after a long tramp, and the Zulus being
sleepy, Grandier watched his opportunity, snatched an assegai, and
pinned one man to the earth; the other woke up in a fright and
ran for his life. Grandier then made off in the direction of the
camp, walking all night and steering a course by the stars, when
this morning he was seen by Mr. Rudolph's party and brought in,
so crippled in the feet that he is at present in hospital. He saw
at Ulundi a Portuguese, who makes guns for Cetywayo, and on the
morning of the 14th so large a force of Kafirs, driving cattle,
passed him that he was obliged to remain hid all the morning to let
them pass.
[Sidenote: _Relief of Ekowe._]
About the beginning of April, everything was at last ready for the
relief of Ekowe. Nearly six thousand troops of all arms started
from Fort Tenedos, representing almost every branch of the service.
The relieving column consisted as follows:—
EKOWE RELIEVING COLUMN.
FIRST DIVISION OF THE COLUMN.
Lieutenant-Colonel Law, R.A., commanding.
Men.
Naval Brigade of H.M.S. _Shah_ and _Tenedos_,
except the Royal Marines of the _Shah_ 350
The 57th Regiment 640
2 companies the "Buffs" 140
5 companies 99th Regiment 430
5th Battalion N.N.C. 1200
Mounted infantry 70
Do. volunteers 40
Do. natives 130
Native foot scouts 150
Commissariat and transport department —
Medical department —
——
Total 1660 whites.
1480 N.C.
——
Grand total 3140 fighting men.
====
Artillery—2 9-pounder guns.
2 24-pounder rocket tubes.
1 Gatling gun.
There accompanied this division of the column the train of
supplies for Ekowe (a month's supply for 1200 men, about 25
waggons); a train of supplies for both divisions of the column for
10 days, about 25 waggons.
SECOND DIVISION OF THE COLUMN.
Lieutenant-Colonel Pemberton, 60th Rifles, commanding.
Men.
Naval Brigade of H.M.S. _Boadicea_ 190
Royal Marines, _Shah_ and _Boadicea_ 100
60th Rifles 540
91st Highlanders 850
4th Battalion N.N.C. 800
Commissariat and transport department —
Medical department —
————
Total 1680 whites.
800 N.C.
————
Total fighting men 2480
====
Artillery—2 24-pounder rocket tubes.
1 Gatling gun.
Grand total 1660 whites.
1680 do.
————
3340
1480 natives.
800 do.
————
2280
————
Grand total of fighting men 5620
On Saturday, the 30th of March, a start was made at daybreak, and
the column halted within entrenchments for the night at Inyoni
river. The force advanced without tents, and with only a blanket
and waterproof sheet for each man. On Sunday, the Amatekulu
river was reached, and here a considerable detention took place
in consequence of difficulty in crossing. On Tuesday the column
reached the hills which border the Inyezane valley, and then a
site was selected for an entrenched laager. On this day mounted
patrols and scouts of the enemy were seen for the first time. News
was then received that a large force was marching down, and that
an attack might be expected at any moment. The famous Ginghelovo
camp was then constructed. It was made sufficiently large for 2000
cattle to be placed in the centre, trenches were dug, and the
waggons laced together according to the approved method.
[Sidenote: _Camp at Ginghelovo._]
About eight o'clock on Tuesday evening (2nd April), a false alarm
took place, but nothing further noteworthy occurred until daybreak
of the next day, when the mounted natives and scouts were sent
out. A little before 6 a.m. (Wednesday, 3rd April) our men fell
back shooting steadily, and immediately after two large columns
of the enemy were seen coming down the Inyezane hills, while one
came round the left by the Amatekulu Bush, and another smaller
one from the direction of the old military kraal. In ten minutes'
time the camp was surrounded and the attack commenced. The nature
of the ground favoured the enemy, who came up with a rush to a
distance of 400 yards; then they scattered and obtained shelter in
long grass which grew about the camp. For one hour and a half, a
heavy fusillade was kept up from both sides, and as the Gatlings,
two 9-pounder guns, and the rocket tubes were all in action,
such a tremendous fire was poured into the enemy as to prevent
the possibility of their advancing. Many of our men, firing from
waggons and high positions, were able to pick off Zulus with their
rifles. This destructive fire evidently had a great effect upon
the enemy. At half past seven o'clock, the mounted men and those
of the Native Contingent went out amidst tremendous cheering, and
drove the Zulus before them from the long grass, and continued the
pursuit for a distance of four miles. Masses of the enemy then
clustered upon the hills, but dispersed upon being shelled from the
fort.
During the action, Lord Chelmsford and his staff went round the
trenches, encouraging the men, and telling them to fire steadily
and low. The general himself was not mounted, but the members of
his staff were. Colonel Crealock received a wound in the arm, and
lost a horse; a bullet went through Lieutenant Milne's clothes; and
Captain Molyneux had two horses shot under him. No fewer than 773
dead bodies of the enemy were found within a distance of 1000 yards
from the fort.
A flying column was now formed, consisting of the 57th, 60th, and
91st regiments, with 100 of the Naval Brigade, and a few of John
Dunn's scouts. It ought to be mentioned that Dunn had already
performed excellent service, and was attached to head-quarters as
principal guide. The life of this man had been a very peculiar one.
Born of English parents in the Cape Colony, he had been brought to
Natal, and early in life entered Zululand as a trader. Eventually,
he learned the language and adopted the manners and habits of the
savages. He was made an induna or chief, acquired cattle, wives,
and other property, and in many respects became the right-hand
councillor and adviser of Cetywayo. This is the more remarkable as
he had, previous to that monarch's accession, espoused the cause
of his brother. It is suspected that he made himself peculiarly
useful in supplying guns, and in this way gained much of both his
influence and his wealth. When war was declared by Britain, he
came over with his flocks, herds, and wives, became the trusted
adviser and guide of the general in command, and was marked out for
preferment and favour.
[Sidenote: _Meeting of Pearson and Chelmsford._]
The flying column left at daybreak on Thursday, reached the
Inyezane at about eleven, and as the sun was setting came in view
of the large hill behind which lay Ekowe. Colonel Pearson galloped
out by the new road, with 500 of his men, and when he grasped the
hand of Lord Chelmsford felt like one called forth from a dungeon
to the cheerful light of the sun. The fort he had guarded so well
was relieved. Crushing anxiety and responsibility were succeeded
by thankful congratulations. The cloud which hung around Ekowe had
passed away.[31]
CHAPTER VII.
THE SERVICES OF NATIVE CONTINGENTS—LORD CHELMSFORD AND SIR H.
BULWER—REVIEW OF THE CAMPAIGN—DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSPORT—IMMENSE
DELAY—BURYING THE DEAD AT ISANDHLWANA.
The Native Contingent, composed of loyal Zulus, although a large
force, turned out a comparatively useless one. After the battle
of Isandhlwana, Colonel Glynn reports (on the 24th of January),
"The whole of the Native Contingent walked off this morning." The
reasons for this conduct are furnished elaborately in a minute
of Sir H. Bulwer, Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, dated the 29th
of January. These men had numerous complaints. On the night of
the 23rd of January, whilst the European force at Rorke's Drift
was entrenched, the Native Contingent had no such protection.
The general and his staff leaving camp exercised a depressing
influence. Uncertainty existed regarding their wives and families.
These reasons, and reasons such as these, were furnished as
explanations for their desertion. Sir Henry Bulwer had been always
of opinion that to do away with the native system of organization
for the purpose of substituting a regimental system was one of very
doubtful advisableness. Nevertheless, he consented to give the men
required, and no fewer than 7050 were sent into the field. Lord
Chelmsford declared that he had never been able to understand what
the tribal system was, and that as often as he had endeavoured to
obtain information he had been baffled by vague generalities and
oft-repeated laudations. So anxious, however, were the commandants
to carry out what they considered the tribal system, that the
companies were organized with uneven strength, in order that men
of different tribes should be kept distinct. Sir Henry Bulwer
believed that each column should have had a Native Contingent, and
that these should have been led by officers who represented the
Lieutenant-Governor, or Supreme Chief. They would have then moved
and fought in accordance with their customs. The general could
not agree to this. The natives must be divided into battalions
1000 strong, and into companies 100 strong. They were not to fight
in their own fashion, and European officers, who did not know
their language, were given commands among them. Dissatisfaction,
discontent, and inefficiency resulted in such a manner that in all
respects the large Native Contingent, numbering more than 7000 men,
was a failure.
[Sidenote: _Bulwer and Chelmsford._]
Later on, very serious differences of opinion arose between Lord
Chelmsford and Sir Henry Bulwer. In reply to suggestions from the
general, the Executive Council of Natal decided, on the 1st of
March, that—
"(_a._) In the opinion of this Council the proposition that raiding
expeditions should be made into the Zulu country by the natives
of this colony is unadvisable of adoption, as being an impolitic
and undesirable system of war, as being calculated to provoke
retaliation, and as tending to demoralize the people engaged in it.
"(_b._) 1. That the proposition to call out every available native
in the colony is open to serious objections.
"2. That a large proportion of the able-bodied male population
has already been called out, and that this Council considers it
undesirable to press the power of the Supreme Chief to a point that
would probably cause serious discontent amongst the natives.
"3. That all trading, commercial, and farming operations would be
thereby disorganized and ruinous consequences would ensue, the
natives forming practically the only labouring portion of the
population in the upper districts of the colony.
"4. That the calling out of the whole able-bodied male population
would, in all probability, induce a panic, and be attended with
serious inconveniences."
It will thus be seen that very unfortunate differences of opinion
existed between the supreme military power and the civil government
of Natal. It certainly must be admitted that, as a rule, the
friendly Zulus of the colony were of little good as fighting men
in the campaign. Whether or not the opposite would have been the
case if the dangerous experiment had been tried of allowing them to
fight with their own weapons and in their own fashion is extremely
doubtful. The tribal system, root and branch, is a failure in
Natal, and a constant source of danger and anxiety. So soon,
therefore, as by means of enlightened statesmanship it can be
completely broken up and destroyed, the better for the protection
and defence of the colony, as well as for the cause of civilization
and the nation we are trying to civilize.
[Sidenote: _Correspondence._]
On the 11th of April, the general, writing to the Secretary of
State for War, says, "My orders regarding demonstrations were
fully carried out, but the fullness of the Tugela would have
prevented any general raid being made, even if the Natal natives
had not been forbidden to cross the border by his Excellency the
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal." In order to enable my readers to
understand the entire question fully, I subjoin that portion of
Sir Henry Bulwer's despatch to the Secretary of State (April 16)
which refers to the subject. He says, "I have placed under the
command of the lieutenant-general, for service in the Zulu country,
the Natal Mounted Police, most of the Natal Mounted Volunteers,
a number of natives who have been formed into what is called the
Natal Native Contingent, and a number of natives for pioneer,
transport, and hospital service, and that I have never interfered
with them, nor have I expected that the lieutenant-general's orders
to them should be referred to me before being complied with; but
with regard to the native levies, which have been called out
for the defence of the colony, and placed under the command of
colonial district commanders to protect the border and the colony,
I have never placed them in any way, directly or indirectly,
under the command of the lieutenant-general for service in the
Zulu country, nor have I authorized, directly or indirectly, in
any way, their being taken across the border, or their being
employed in making raids into the Zulu country. These levies were
called out expressly and solely for service in the colony and for
the defence of the colony, and were placed under the colonial
district commanders for that purpose only. The colonial district
commanders were, of course, made subject, so far as regarded the
defence of their districts, and the movement and disposition of
any forces under them in their districts, to the military command;
but no authority has been given, either to these colonial district
commanders or to the lieutenant-general, to employ the native
levies, which were exclusively called out for the defence of the
colony, on any service in the Zulu country, and I submit that the
lieutenant-general in issuing any instructions for these native
levies to cross the border to make raids into Zulu country, in
issuing these instructions as he has done, without my authority,
without my concurrence, and positively without any reference to
me, has exceeded his powers and acted without a due regard for the
authority of this Government.
"I pass by the question of the expediency or policy of making
raids into the Zulu country. In a letter addressed by me to the
High Commissioner, I have ventured to put before his Excellency
for his consideration the question of the expediency of such a
policy, and the risks involved in such a course, namely, the
risk of retaliation, and the risk of irritating and alienating
unnecessarily those of the Zulu people who might otherwise be
disposed to come to friendly terms with us, and through whose
friendly disposition towards us a satisfactory solution of the
difficulties between us and the Zulu people might eventually be
more easily arrived at. But I do not claim to have any authority in
respect of this question, and I have done no more than venture to
lay my suggestion before the High Commissioner, and to forward a
copy of my letter to the lieutenant-general.
[Sidenote: _Native levies._]
"With regard to the employment of the native levies who had
been called up for the defence of the border on service beyond
the border and in making raids, I have already shown that the
levies to which I refer were never in any way placed under the
lieutenant-general for employment across the border; and I have
also shown that they were levies which have nothing whatsoever
to do with the Native Contingent battalions to which the
lieutenant-general refers as having been hitherto associated
with the British troops, and which were placed under his command
for service across the border. The question, therefore, put by
the lieutenant-general, in the way that it is put before the
Secretary of State for War, by not distinguishing between the two
descriptions of native forces, but, as is actually done in the
last paragraph but one, by naming and associating the two together
as if there were no distinction between them, fails, I think, to
represent the real state of the case."
The general in command had felt extremely what he considered the
absence of co-operation on the part of Sir Henry Bulwer. Writing
to the Secretary of State for War on the 11th of April, Lord
Chelmsford mentions that when he had determined to move up to
Ekowe, secret instructions were sent to the different commanders
along the border from the Lower Tugela up to Kambula hill,
requesting them to make strong demonstrations all along the line,
and, if possible, to raid into Zululand. At this juncture the
Lieutenant-Governor forbade the Natal natives to cross. A general
raid into Zululand effected by a large body of native troops would,
in the opinion of Lord Chelmsford, have produced very important
results, and the general strongly resents the interference of Sir
H. Bulwer with his plans. The quarrel—for it was nothing less—to
which allusion has now been made, was very probably one of the
reasons for the appointment of Sir Garnet Wolseley, who in his own
person united both supreme civil and supreme military power.
In the Zulu war there were two campaigns—the first ended in
Isandhlwana, the second at Ulundi. Between these battles there was
an immense interval, chiefly occupied in moving great masses of
men and greater masses of supplies to the front. Lord Chelmsford
is blamed for want of foresight and care in the first campaign,
want of energy and judgment in the second campaign, and want of
generalship in both. There are two sides to the case, and it is
necessary to advert to both. Great difficulties were in the way;
but until the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley and the joyful day
of Ulundi, it must be admitted that the general did not conquer
obstacles, but obstacles conquered him.
[Sidenote: _Review of the campaign._]
Let us endeavour to view the general conduct of the first campaign
in the light of facts about which there can be no question. Early
in January Lord Chelmsford was at the head of an army sufficiently
numerous and powerful for the conquest of Zululand. We shall see
that at Ulundi 4000 soldiers, properly handled, were adequate to
the complete defeat of 20,000 Zulus, comprising the flower of
Cetywayo's army; therefore it is absurd to imagine that, if good
generalship had been used, any defeat could have been sustained
in the first advance. Colonel Pearson was thoroughly victorious
at Inyezane, and Colonel Wood was also successful. Disastrous
failure, however, overtook the column of the general-in-chief.
Lord Chelmsford, conducting a large force with enormous stores,
made Rorke's Drift on the Tugela his base of operations, and
subsequently was forced to trust to the extraordinary efforts of
a young Engineer officer for the safety of Natal. All experience
of Zulu warfare had shown the absolute necessity of entrenchments,
yet the central column marched into Zululand without constructing
a single breastwork. The personal safety of the commander-in-chief
and that of half his column became really due to a sudden
inspiration and to a happy accident. Young subalterns conceived and
carried a plan of defence where mealie-bags formed the breastworks
and biscuit-boxes the entrenchments. It was providential that such
officers as Chard and Bromhead were there to do the work.
Lord Chelmsford was woefully deficient in knowledge of the enemy's
movements. An immense army lay in wait to destroy his camp while
he, with scattered forces, pursued a Will-o'-the-wisp foe which
found no difficulty in luring him on to destruction. He had
mounted men, but does not seem to have used them efficiently as
scouts. Colonel Buller, the able head of his intelligence branch,
was in quite another part of the country. Lord Chelmsford either
completely despised the enemy, which was a blunder in itself, or
he was incapable of appreciating his real position, and of taking
the evident means of preserving the column under his charge. He
evidently wanted that genius or instinct so absolutely necessary to
constitute a great military leader. A really great general, like a
poet, is born, not made; and it was the misfortune of the British
army not to have secured one on this important occasion.
No entrenchment or laager was either made or ordered to be made at
Isandhlwana, although it must be admitted that if the general had
been as lucky in subordinates there as at Rorke's Drift, a very
different issue of the day would have been the result. Nothing
could surpass the madness of Colonel Durnford in scattering his
troops at the very moment when, by means of laagering, or at least
forming a hollow square, it would have been possible to resist
the attack of the enemy. It is a libel on our soldiers to hint
that they did not behave well. The short service system is in no
way responsible for the disaster. The gallant 24th, as well as
the other troops, fought with the utmost bravery, and, if they
had been commanded by such a man as Wood or Pearson, undoubtedly
would have gained a brilliant victory. A few hundred Dutchmen,
without breech-loading guns, had behind a rough fortification of
waggons defied an entire Zulu army. Chard and Bromhead, with 100
infantry soldiers, at the back of mealie-bags and biscuit-boxes,
were able to drive back immensely superior forces. It is therefore
preposterous to imagine that our troops at Isandhlwana, assisted by
well-served large guns, could not easily, if properly commanded,
have been able to hold their own, at least until the rest of the
column arrived.
[Sidenote: _Lord Chelmsford criticised._]
In ten days' time Lord Chelmsford was so unfortunate as to sustain
a most signal defeat, in which half his force was literally
butchered, and his large quantity of ammunition and stores captured
by the enemy. His flank was turned and his column surprised by an
army of naked savages, without artillery, about whose movements his
ignorance was as profound as it was surprising. A similar success
to that gained by Colonel Pearson would have virtually concluded
the war. A march to Ulundi by a strong flying column would have
been possible, and Great Britain might then have saved the blood of
many of her best soldiers, and fully three million pounds sterling
of her treasure.
The opinions now expressed are those of the majority of military
correspondents and military men, but the thorough novelty and
difficulty of operations do not seem sufficiently taken into
account. Besides, in judging Lord Chelmsford, it must be specially
remembered that his instructions about concentrating at Isandhlwana
camp were not attended to, and to this fact many attributed the
disaster that ensued. Certainly no one deserved sympathy more than
this general, whose misfortunes were quite as great as his faults.
Subsequently, he did everything in his power to make the campaign
successful. Reinforcements poured in, and were pushed forward
to the front. It is true that delays occurred, but these, it is
argued, were thoroughly unsurmountable. We shall find at last that
Lord Chelmsford finished the campaign with glory and success at the
great battle of Ulundi. The people of Natal and the Cape Colony,
who had sympathized with his reverses, thoroughly recognized the
greatness of this victory and rejoiced in his triumph. It is only
fair, when furnishing opinions full of condemnation, to refer at
the same time to the fact that contrary views are held by numerous
men of intelligence, who have had every opportunity of studying the
subject.
The disaster of Isandhlwana was pregnant with results almost too
awful to contemplate. Natal was panic-stricken. Twenty thousand
white people were threatened, not only with the victorious army,
but with hundreds of thousands of natives, kept heathen and alien
from motives of policy, who would have, out of fear of Cetywayo,
quickly joined any army of massacre which that tyrant could
have sent to devastate Natal. Fortunately, in spite of their
much-vaunted strategy, the Zulus proved unequal to the task of
taking advantage of their victory. Had they, in the first instance,
only allowed the general to move forward into his new camp, the
destruction of the column could have been made complete. It was
by a miracle that Lord Chelmsford and the men with him escaped.
If they had been attacked when, exhausted and dispirited, they
flung themselves down on the reeking plain of Isandhlwana, it is
extremely likely that the general and every man with him would
have been killed. The gross absurdity of blaming Lord Chelmsford
for not burying the dead on the field is only equalled by its
injustice. The general and the remnant of his column were really
fugitives, and it was not until they found that, by the heroic
defence of Rorke's Drift, the base of operations was still held,
that they were able to breathe with any degree of safety. It was
hoping against hope to imagine that a place really left unfortified
could have been held against a victorious army; and it is well to
recognize the fact that not only Natal and its people, but Lord
Chelmsford and the remnant of his column, were saved by the heroes
of this colonial Thermopylæ.
[Sidenote: _Panic in Natal._]
The awful pause of suspense, which lasted many weeks, passed by.
The Tugela river and the indecision of the Zulu king saved the
colony. Reinforcements which had been telegraphed for poured in
with amazing celerity, and both Natal and British honour were
saved. For nine weeks the beleaguered column under General Pearson
had to suffer privations, and the Zulus, who had experienced what
British soldiers could do behind biscuit-boxes at Rorke's Drift,
hesitated to attack them when behind regular entrenchments at
Ekowe. At last, as we had seen, relief was sent. Then another
period of delay set in. Masses of troops continued to arrive, and
early in May our strength in Natal comprised more than 22,000 men,
divided as follows:—
First division (General Crealock's) 9,215
Second division (General Newdigate's) 10,238
General Wood's[32] flying column 3,092
——————
Effective and non-effective 22,545
[Sidenote: _The transport difficulty._]
This was a large army, the most powerful force of Europeans ever
engaged in war within South Africa. The occasion was supreme,
as the greatest power of the native races had challenged the
white man to a combat _à l'outrance_, and the question simply
was whether the Queen or Cetywayo should rule supreme in the
southern portion of this continent. Reinforcements were sent out
with immense celerity, and landed with the utmost despatch and
with neither casualty nor danger. But the delay in moving them
was most disappointing. It must have puzzled the Zulus immensely
to understand why we were so extraordinarily slow. Five weeks had
elapsed since the battle of Ginghelovo without any set engagement
with the enemy taking place, and the Press began to grumble.
Transport rose to unprecedented rates. Twenty shillings per cwt.,
or £20 per ton, was charged for the carriage of provisions a
distance of fifty-four miles, from D'Urban to Pietermaritzburg.
Oxen died in hundreds, and the progress of the battalions of
infantry which were marching against an enemy famous for their
celerity was most disheartening. The plan of Lord Chelmsford
was that of sending on masses of troops, whose _impedimenta_ in
the shape of baggage and means of supply was so enormous as to
completely cripple their movements. At a subsequent period, after
the arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley, we shall find that officer
successfully employing more than 2000 Zulu carriers; but this
method, cheap and efficient, does not seem to have been tried by
Lord Chelmsford.
To lessen the enormous difficulties of transport, which crushed the
efforts of our soldiers, a successful attempt was made to find a
landing-place on the Zululand coast. H.M. gunboat _Forester_ was
sent on this quest, which was ultimately successful, and Port
Durnford was established as a place for landing supplies. This
cut off more than a hundred miles of difficult road, and was of
immense service to the advancing columns. During May, 1879, the
_Forester_[33] performed important duties in this service, and more
than once fired at bands of the enemy near the seashore.
It is impossible to write any chronicle of the movements of General
Crealock's column which would be of interest. It crawled along
among hundreds of dead oxen killed in dragging its heavy baggage
and supplies over bad roads. Enormous expenditure for commissariat
and transport services went on, and it was very evident that this
war would be waged at frightful cost. The British lion growled in
England, and there was an undoubted echo in the colonies.
[Sidenote: _Position of the forces._]
On the 15th of May, the head-quarters of the South African field
force, under Major-General Newdigate, was situated on the Buffalo
river, near Doornberg. The force comprised:—Right wing of the 17th
Lancers; three companies 1-21st Regiment; six companies 58th; N
battery, 5th Brigade, Royal Artillery, with six 7-pounders, under
Colonel Harness; N Battery, 6th Brigade, with six 9-pounders;
Army Service Corps, Army Hospital Corps, Bengaugh's Native
Battalion, Natal Pioneers, and Natal Carbineers. Colonel Tatton
Browne commanded the Royal Artillery, and Captain Anstey the Royal
Engineers. Twelve miles further on, at Conference Hill, was
the most advanced post, where Colonel Davies, Grenadier Guards,
commanded. The garrison was composed of six companies of the 94th
Regiment, Bettington's troop of Natal Horse, a detachment of the
Royal Engineers, and Shepstone's Mounted Basutos. Another fort
and laager had been erected for their defence, while eight miles
further on towards the north-east was Brigadier-General Wood's new
camp at Magwechana, close to the Sand Spruit, one of the sources
of the White Umvolosi. General Marshall was with the cavalry camp.
The experience of Isandhlwana was thoroughly sufficient, and the
most complete precautions on all occasions were taken to prevent
the possibility of disaster. Forts and fortified positions covered
the country, but, nevertheless, there is excellent authority for
saying that if a Zulu impi had been ordered to invade, there would
have been no difficulty in driving back the weak border guard which
lined the Tugela, getting behind the regular forces, and making a
rapid destructive raid and an equally rapid retreat.[34] Cetywayo's
neglect of his opportunities was more useful in protecting Natal
than the immense armed force which, with infinite toil and a
slowness almost passing description, moved on towards Ulundi.
Loud were the public outcries at the transport break-down and the
tardiness of operations. General Newdigate's magnificent force
seemed paralyzed, and the difficulties of grass for horses and
supplies for troops _en route_ was the theme of every journal and
the excuse for a delay which was as costly as it was disappointing.
On the 17th of May, a road was made in the direction of Landman's
Drift, and a few days afterwards all the cavalry proceeded to
Rorke's Drift, and thence to Isandhlwana, for the purpose of
burying the dead. It was certainly full time to perform this duty.
One of the disgraceful occurrences or sad consequences of the Zulu
war is the fact, which cannot be slurred over without comment,
that the bodies of our brave men who fell at Isandhlwana remained
unburied for more than four months. Two regiments of Dragoon
Guards, with the Lancers and numerous other troops, moved on with
alacrity to perform the honourable task. The force advanced in
line, _échelon_, or column of squadrons, with extensive advance
and rear guards, as well as flankers. At night the men bivouacked
in groups of twelve, with their saddles turned inwards and placed
in a circle. At last they looked down from the Biggarsberg upon
Rorke's Drift and the Isandhlwana mountain in the distance. One
regiment of the Lancers and one of the Dragoon Guards, as well as
half the Natal Carbineers, swept the country in the neighbourhood.
The smoke of blazing huts rose up like burnt-offerings from the
hill-altars of Zululand. The signal-fires of the savages helped
to light up the country at night, and the British were again on
the field where Cetywayo had gained his first and last victory.
General Marshall, with Dragoons, Lancers, irregular horse, police,
and artillery, crossed the river at daybreak, and advanced in open
order. But my readers will prefer to read an account of what was
seen and done at Isandhlwana from the pen of a soldier who was
there. The correspondent of the _Times_ of Natal writes:—
[Sidenote: _Troops marching._]
"We pushed on very steadily and carefully, and at half-past nine
our advance-guard was on the ridge overlooking the valley beyond
Isandhlwana. There it lay, a magnificent stretch of country, with
undula
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