The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918
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Title: The History of the 51st (Highland) Division 1914-1918
Author: F. W. Bewsher
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THE HISTORY OF THE 51ST (HIGHLAND) DIVISION
[Illustration: LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR G. M. HARPER, K.C.B., D.S.O.]
THE HISTORY OF THE 51ST (HIGHLAND) DIVISION
1914-1918
by
MAJOR F. W. BEWSHER
D.S.O., M.C.
Formerly Brigade Major, 152nd Infantry Brigade,
and General Staff Officer, 2nd Grade,
51st (Highland) Division
William Blackwood and Sons
Edinburgh and London
1921
Dedicated
_TO THE YOUTH OF SCOTLAND_.
_In the hope that this record of the courage, skill, and
endurance of a Highland Division may strengthen
their purpose, when their time comes, to uphold in no
lesser degree the great traditions of their forebears._
FOREWORD.
If it were possible for the General who for three years commanded all
the British Divisions in France, and was served with equal gallantry,
devotion, and success by each, to admit a predilection for any of them,
my affection would naturally turn to the Division that drew so many of
its recruits from the same part of Scotland where my boyhood was spent
and my own people lived. Those who read the pages of this book will find
therein a tale of patient endeavour and glorious achievement of which I
claim a good right to be as proud as any of my fellow-countrymen. The
51st Division does not need to boast of its prowess or its record. It
can point to the story of its deeds, plainly and simply told, and leave
the world to judge.
HAIG
OF BEMERSYDE,
F.M.
_8th August 1920._
PREFACE.
In compiling the 'History of the 51st (Highland) Division' I have been
beset by various difficulties, which have contributed towards the long
delay in its publication.
In the first place, it has been written in circumstances in which
military duties have afforded little leisure for continuous effort;
secondly, the work has been carried out in many places, most of them
highly unsuitable for research, such as the desert of Sinai, native
villages and the deserts of Lower Egypt, Jerusalem, Bir Salem, and at
sea.
Not only had the difficulty of transporting from station to station the
large mass of available material to be overcome, but also the conditions
of life in huts and under canvas in an eastern climate are seldom
conducive to clear and consecutive thinking.
Further, the material available has been unequal. Up to the conclusion
of the battle of Arras, no completed narratives of the operations
carried out by the Division were compiled. To this point, therefore, the
only resources were the bald and rather incomplete entries in the
official war diaries and personal diaries, which threw little light on
the operations in their broader aspects.
From the third battle of Ypres onwards a detailed account of all
engagements was published by Divisional Headquarters shortly after the
conclusion of each operation. These have rendered the compiling of the
'History' from this point considerably less laborious, and have allowed
it to be carried out in greater and more accurate detail.
It has been necessary, owing to the increased and increasing cost of
production, to keep the size of this book within certain bounds, and to
reduce as far as possible the number of maps. On this account there has
been no alternative but to restrict the detail in which actions are
described. It is regretted that in consequence much material which
officers and men of the Division and their relatives have submitted,
often at my request, has been necessarily omitted.
It was only thus that the book could be kept sufficiently reduced in
size to prevent its price prohibiting the circulation desired.
The 'History' is now presented with every consciousness on the part of
the author that full justice has not been done to its great subject.
Indeed, it is doubtful if full justice can be done to the part played by
the British Army in the Great War until a generation not intimately
involved in it has arisen and has come to regard the burdens sustained
for over four years by the British soldier in the true perspective.
My thanks are due to all those who have assisted me in the compilation
of this work by the loan of diaries, maps, documents, &c., and in
particular to Lieut.-General Sir G. M. Harper, K.C.B., D.S.O.;
Major-General R. Bannatine-Allason, C.B.; Brigadier-General L. Oldfield,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.; and Colonel Ian Stewart, C.M.G., D.S.O.
General Bannatine-Allason kindly wrote for me the first chapter, and
spared himself no pains in assisting to procure for me information
concerning the early days of the Division in France. Had it not been for
him and Colonel Ian Stewart, information would have been so scanty that
it is doubtful if the earlier chapters could have been written.
To Captain A. Scott, D.S.O., M.C., 7th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, late staff-captain 154th Infantry Brigade, I am
particularly indebted. Captain Scott has kindly relieved me of the
labour of reading through the proofs and of completing the final
arrangements for the publication of this book, a labour which residence
in the Near East would have made it difficult for me to perform.
Lastly, I am indebted to Mr James Blackwood, in no small degree, for
taking upon himself, while I have been abroad, much of the burden of the
preparation of this book for the Press, which would normally have fallen
upon the author.
F. W. B.
HEADQUARTERS, 3RD (LAHORE) DIVISION,
BIR SALEM, PALESTINE.
CONTENTS.
CHAP. PAGE
I. MOBILISATION 1
II. ARRIVAL IN FRANCE--FESTUBERT 10
III. THE PERIOD OF APPRENTICESHIP 28
IV. TRAINING AND REORGANISATION--THE LABYRINTH. 51
V. THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME--HIGH WOOD 73
VI. ARMENTIÈRES AND HEBUTERNE 87
VII. THE BATTLE OF THE ANCRE--BEAUMONT HAMEL 100
VIII. COURCELETTE 127
IX. THE BATTLE OF ARRAS 138
X. THE BATTLE OF ARRAS (_Contd._)--ROEUX AND
THE CHEMICAL WORKS 160
XI. THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES 192
XII. POELCAPPELLE 216
XIII. THE BATTLE of CAMBRAI 233
XIV. THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE 263
XV. THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE (_Contd._)--THE BATTLE
OF THE LYS 296
XVI. WITH THE FRENCH IN CHAMPAGNE 321
XVII. THE CAPTURE OF GREENLAND HILL 356
XVIII. THE OPERATIONS TOWARDS VALENCIENNES 372
XIX. CONCLUSION 408
ILLUSTRATIONS.
PORTRAITS.
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR G. M. HARPER,
K.C.B., D.S.O _Frontispiece_
MAJOR-GENERAL R. BANNATINE-ALLASON, C.B. _Facing p._ 46
T/MAJOR-GENERAL G. T. C. CARTER-CAMPBELL,
C.B., D.S.O. " 274
MAPS.
I. ATTACK NEAR FESTUBERT, 15TH JUNE
1915 " 18
II. HIGH WOOD, JULY 1916 " 74
III. BEAUMONT HAMEL, 13TH NOVEMBER
1916 " 114
IV. CAPTURE OF VIMY RIDGE, 9TH APRIL
1917 " 150
V. THE CHEMICAL WORKS, ROEUX " 162
VI. THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES: ADVANCE
TO THE STEENBEEK, 31ST JULY 1917 " 200
VII. POELCAPPELLE, 20TH SEPTEMBER 1917 " 222
VIII. THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI: POSITION
AT 7 P.M., 21ST NOVEMBER 1917 " 252
IX. THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE: DISPOSITION
OF 51ST (HIGHLAND) DIVISION,
MORNING, 21ST MARCH 1918 " 274
X. THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE: POSITIONS
OF 51ST (HIGHLAND) DIVISION,
24-26TH MARCH 1918 " 292
XI. THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE. (THE BATTLE
OF THE RIVER LAWE): DISPOSITIONS
OF 51ST (HIGHLAND) DIVISION,
DAWN, 12TH APRIL 1918 " 310
XII. THE COUNTER-ATTACK IN CHAMPAGNE:
THE ADVANCE ON 27TH AND 28TH
JULY 1918 " 330
XIII. THE FINAL ADVANCE: DISPOSITIONS
OF 51ST (HIGHLAND) DIVISION,
5 P.M., 28TH OCTOBER 1918 " 402
The History of the 51st (Highland) Division.
CHAPTER I.
MOBILISATION.
(By Major-General R. BANNATINE-ALLASON, C.B.)
The Highland Division arrived at its War Station, Bedford, about 15th
August 1914, and was billeted in and near that town. The farthest off
unit was the 1st Highland Brigade R.F.A., which was at St Neots. The
billeting had been previously arranged, with a view, as far as possible,
to training facilities.
The units were, many of them, considerably below strength, and,
generally speaking, horses and transport (locally acquired in Scotland)
inferior in quality, though many animals actually went overseas and did
good work.
The Division moved under General Colin Mackenzie, but he was almost
immediately transferred to command a New Army Division, and
Major-General Bannatine-Allason took over about the 24th August. The
Division, having been scattered over the north of Scotland, would and
did naturally benefit by concentration, and the work of Divisional and
other staffs immediately began to make itself felt. The movement to
Bedford was extremely well managed, and gave a foretaste of the good
staff work which was to follow.
The country round Bedford can only be called a moderate training-ground
for the larger units. The absence of ranges, the particularly obnoxious
clay soil, and generally small enclosures were obstacles to overcome.
Ranges were at once commenced; but two sites, which were under water in
winter, required a lot of pumping to make them serviceable. As a matter
of fact, the Division was never really abreast with the necessary
musketry training, though, owing to the excellent work of the Divisional
sappers, particularly of their Adjutant, Captain Wedd, and to the really
strenuous efforts of the units themselves, it is possible, even
probable, that the Division left for France with average "Territorial"
efficiency in this respect. Shortage of ammunition was, of course,
common to all.
It may be guessed that the arrival in the peaceful city of Bedford of
20,000 Highlanders would occasion some sensation, if not misgivings, in
minds of the local authorities and townspeople. Be that as it may, it
must be recorded that the best feeling soon became pronounced between
the troops and the inhabitants; and, as will be shown later, the
Highland Division left Bedford with the blessing of the "City Fathers."
Very naturally some at least of the people benefited considerably by the
invasion, but, generally speaking, the Division was treated with the
greatest kindness, and the survivors of those times will ever be
grateful for the generosity and helpfulness accorded. It may be invidious
to mention names, but when it is said that the "Chief Citizen," then
Mr Browning, set the example, the great majority of the people very
naturally followed suit. The Entertainment Committee--chairman,
Mr Henry Tebbs, with its secretary, Mr Machin, himself a born
organiser--was a boon to every man. To them, assisted by hundreds of
ladies and gentlemen, was due the New Year's dinner (appropriate to
Scotsmen), the Highland games, and innumerable concerts and other
entertainments which materially helped to enliven the few spare moments
of a strenuous existence. The clergy of all denominations gave over
their churches; schools were given up for hospitals; V.A.D. women
vied with each other in helping in the field ambulances. Each field
ambulance was opened out for training purposes as well as for care of
the sick.
A Mrs Thomson was the first V.A.D. worker, and took charge at once of
our reception hospital with much success. The G.O.C. was glad to be able
to help to obtain some recognition of her good work.
The police, both town and county, were ever sympathetic; and Major
Stevens, Chief Constable of Bedfordshire, laid himself out to smooth out
rough ground--in fact, he was a sort of voluntary chief A.P.M. and
police adviser to the G.O.C.
The Division kept New Year's "nicht," much to the amusement of the
people. Dinners were given at most messes, reels were danced in the
market square at midnight, in which, it was said, the Chief Constable
assisted. Then "Auld Lang Syne" was sung, and the men of various units
played to their billets by their pipers. The whole proceeding was most
orderly, and witnessed by many of the leading townspeople in evening
dress, while the men were under complete control by the A.P.M.
A swimming-bath--with hot and cold water--was started for the men of the
Division, the ground being given by the Midland Railway. The bath was
opened with much ceremony, and the little daughter of the Town Clerk (Mr
Stimson) gallantly took the first "header" into the tepid water. She was
presented at the time with a box of chocolates, but later with a gold
watch with a suitable inscription from the Highland Division, which may
serve in after life to remind her of her connection with that now rather
celebrated fighting unit.
There were, of course, some amusing incidents connected with our stay at
Bedford. On one occasion some one wrote to the papers complaining of the
behaviour of certain training divisions. His Majesty inquired, through
his private secretary, about the Highland Division. The G.O.C. was able
to reply, after consultations with the local authorities, that there was
far less crime in Bedford than in ordinary times of peace. On this his
Majesty was pleased to congratulate the Highlanders on their exemplary
behaviour.
To show the sort of feeling existing in the town many stories might be
told. But the following rather pathetic one is an example of the many
acts of kindness, some anonymous, that actually occurred. During the
severe epidemic of measles the G.O.C. was visiting one of the hospitals,
and seeing a poor man inside the gates and sentries, asked what business
brought him there. The man replied, "I am a working man, but I saw in
the papers that the hospitals wanted fruit, so I bring a few oranges
twice a week."
It is quite natural that imaginary evils were invented by outsiders, and
the work of the staff unnecessarily increased. But at that time, the
beginning of the war, every one wanted to do something, sometimes for
personal advertisement, sometimes to obtain congenial occupation. Two
instances may be quoted. Some one, it doesn't matter who, discovered
that the water supply of the town came from the river, and that the
health of the troops must suffer from some imaginary germ. It was
useless for the G.O.C., the Mayor, the Medical Officers of Health, and
others to protest that the people of Bedford had drunk the same water
for years, and its many thousand inhabitants were robust and healthy.
The correspondence went on for weeks, much useless scribbling resulted,
and much valuable time wasted. But the troops drank the water.
Again, there was a serious outbreak of measles among the men. Everything
possible under the circumstances was done by the Divisional medical
officers and local authorities. But people wrote to the papers, with the
best intentions, that the men were being killed almost deliberately, and
the result was a good deal of confusion, some useless correspondence,
and, again, much valuable time wasted. However, great credit is due to
the Divisional medical officers, their assistants, and the V.A.D.
ladies, for grappling with the epidemic during the bad months of
November and December. The disease worked itself out by the end of
January, and by the end of February the Division was practically sound
again.
It is an interesting fact that the epidemic was far more deadly in the
case of men from the extreme north and the islands. This is shown by the
following table, and bears out the opinion of the medical officers as to
the probable incidence of the disease in units from different
localities.
Taking the southern boundaries of Banff, Inverness, and Argyll, and
including the western islands, Scotland is roughly divided into two
fairly equal areas. Calling the northern area A, and the southern B, we
find that
A supplied 5,200: Cases of Measles, 477: Deaths, 59.
B " 13,000: " " 52: " 6.
The percentage of deaths from measles worked out to 10·8 per cent of the
cases, as seven deaths were from scarlet fever and one from diphtheria.
It will be easily understood that the rapid preparation for war of a
Territorial Division presents numerous difficulties. It was originally
laid down that Territorial troops would require, and have, six months to
complete training. Even with a very complete elementary training this is
not an over-estimation, assuming that equipment is up to date and
complete. But when it is stated that most of the equipment, guns,
rifles, technical stores, &c., were quite out of date, besides being
ridiculously inadequate, some, at least, of the difficulties are
obvious. One of the first troubles was the removal of most of the
permanent staff. Only those who know the importance of these instructors
can realise what it meant. They were, however, required elsewhere on
more important duties, and had to go. Later, the regular adjutants of
infantry were taken, also a great blow, but some eventually came back.
Such difficulties were, of course, common to all Territorial Divisions.
The Highland Division was not singular, but it had, and was able to
keep, some very excellent staff officers, both Divisional and Brigade,
who did splendid work. Here it may be recorded, and it is due to the
General Staff, War Office, and other high formations to say, that so far
from interfering with training, we received every assistance, and any
reference to that body met with prompt and sympathetic attention. So
with the Q.M.G.'s department, and it is obvious that some of those in
high places realised the wisdom of trusting the man on the spot, and
have therefore earned our gratitude.
The War Office issued a special "syllabus" for training, necessarily
modified as experience was gained, and a good deal was left to local
commanders; but, as a matter of fact, it was in most cases necessary to
begin with the "goose-step." The "barrack" discipline was excellent, but
the field discipline left much to be desired. It was some time before
some C.O.'s even could be made to understand that an order in the field
did not admit of heated argument before execution; and the rank and file
had to learn that training was not a recreation to stop when they got
tired. But all this gradually wore off, and in less than three months
units began to assume a workmanlike and even serviceable appearance on
parade.
What has been said applies to all units more or less, but while
technical units, such as ambulances, transport companies, signal
company, and engineers came on very fast, the artillery moved slowly in
the direction of preparedness for war. They had ancient "pieces," poor
and ill-fitting harness, while only in a few cases was any knowledge of
"horse management" evident. Thus, care of horses, riding and driving,
had to be instilled from the beginning. Added to this, the horses of all
mounted units, and the vehicles of transport, had been commandeered in a
great hurry on mobilisation, and were consequently rather a handicap.
New vehicles came necessarily very slowly, but with drastic castings and
the ever-ready assistance of the Remount Department, the horse question
rapidly improved. It is interesting here to record, in connection with
remounting, that a hundred polo ponies were sent to England as a present
from the "Zemindars" of Madras. They were not looked on with favour by
other units; but the G.O.C., with considerable experience of such
animals, gladly accepted the offer of them by the Director of Remounts,
with the result that the company commanders and staffs of the Highland
Division went to France better mounted than any other.
There were two notable exceptions regarding "horse management." One was
the Highland Mountain Brigade, which came down with a splendid lot of
pack ponies, and made a very creditable turn-out from the first. The
other was one of the transport companies, which showed considerable
knowledge and good work in respect of its animals. It must, however, be
common knowledge that the Highlands is not the best place from which to
obtain, in a hurry, four or five thousand good army horses, nor are
Highlanders, as a rule, "horsey" people. But in spite of all this the
improvement was wonderful, the interest taken in their animals was most
creditable to the various units, and the Division was fortunate in
digging out a lot of very useful transport officers.
So training went on in its various branches, units gradually completing
in personnel, and by December Divisional exercises were attempted.
Inspections by the Commander of the Central Force, and later by his
Majesty the King, gave a useful fillip to the proceedings, and if there
was one thing more than another which made successful training possible
under adverse circumstances, it was the grand spirit of all ranks, and
the determination of all to "play the game"--a spirit common to all
Territorial units of the kingdom. No praise can be too great for the
regimental officers and men.
Towards the end of 1914 certain units were taken from Territorial
Divisions to complete the field army, and the first "bomb-shell" came
when a field ambulance and a field company were called for. The 1/1
Highland Field Ambulance and the 1/2 Highland Field Company were sent.
Then three battalions of infantry were ordered to France. There was not
much to choose between the various battalions, so the chief
consideration was given to numerical strength. One battalion was
selected from each brigade, and 4th Seaforths, 6th Gordons, and 7th
Argylls went off. In the same way, shortly afterwards, 4th Camerons, 4th
Gordons, and 9th Argylls were sent. To replace these the 2nd line
battalions were sent from Scotland, but it was obvious that they would
not be ready to accompany the Division abroad. The 2nd line medical and
engineer units, however, came on very quickly, and soon took the place
of their front line. The mobile veterinary section--a very well-run
unit--was also depleted, and replaced by degrees.
The next and last act of depletion was the ordering of the Mountain
Artillery Brigade to the East to take part in the Gallipoli expedition.
Two batteries only were sent, and the third kept as a training unit for
mountain artillery--the only one at home. The health of Lieut.-Colonel
Robertson was doubtful, and the G.O.C. decided to retain him, and he was
afterwards given the billet of organising and commanding the Divisional
Ammunition Column. He was, as a sort of comment to the G.O.C.'s
decision, the only Colonel who served with the Division from start to
finish.
The winter of 1914-15 was a wet one, and the state of the country round
Bedford was all against training. Horse lines and the few hutments were
a sea of mud, and movement off the roads for wheeled vehicles was
difficult, in some cases impossible. However, such operations as were
possible under these conditions were very useful, judged by later
experience.
Towards the end of March 1915 it became known for certain that
Territorial Divisions would go overseas as complete units, though the
exact order of movement was undecided. There had been continual changes
in the staff, both Divisional and Brigade. Fortunately, the G.S.O. 1,
then Major Moir, Royal Scots, was retained, and to him, both in that
capacity and as, later, A.Q.M.G., the Division generally and the G.O.C.
in particular is deeply indebted. Several Brigadiers were changed, while
commanders of battalions, &c., were also weeded out, chiefly for age.
Thus, before leaving for France, the C.R.E., A.D.M.S., A.D.V.S.,
A.Q.M.G., and various other commanders, were replaced, of whom Colonel
Cook of 6th Argylls was nominated as Base Commandant in France.
At last the order came to prepare for embarkation, and there was much to
do. To begin with, the Division was six battalions short. So to complete
it a whole Lancashire brigade was sent under command of
Brigadier-General Hibbert, and two battalions of the Black Watch (6th
and 7th), which regiment was not included in the Highland Divisional
organisation.
The Lancashire brigade was a very fine one, but, of course, quite
unknown to the G.O.C. and staff, and there was little time to get to
know them. It is unnecessary to say, however, that they were received
with open arms, and still less necessary to say they "played the game,"
and at once became an integral and very useful part of the Division.
The Black Watch battalions were splendid in physique and appearance on
parade, and though they had not been trained with other troops, they
very soon proved their value, and vied with the other units in adding to
their brilliant regimental records.
So, after about twelve days of the ceaseless work of final equipment,
completion in stores, clothing, animals, and every sort of war-like
implement, eventually the Division commenced entraining for France with,
perhaps, some misgivings as to thorough training, but none whatever as
to the determination to uphold the honour of the land of its birth!
In looking back on those last days at Bedford, one can hardly understand
how the final touches were given to a unit so incomplete in nearly
everything. It seems nothing short of a miracle that Territorial
Divisions generally were completely equipped in the short space of ten
or eleven days. And it may not be out of place to record the obligations
such units are under to the ordnance, remount, and other departments,
for the ceaseless work, with depleted staffs, which was necessary, and
which was so successfully accomplished. Nor will it be out of place to
pay a final tribute to the good people of Bedford, who certainly evinced
a quite unexpected sincerity in the "send-off" of the "invaders."
Shortly before leaving, the G.O.C. sent the usual short letter of thanks
to the Town Council, through the Mayor, for the assistance, general
kindness, and consideration accorded during the Division's stay in the
town. The following letter was received in reply:--
BUSHMEAD, THE EMBANKMENT,
BEDFORD, _29th April 1915_.
Major-General ALLASON.
DEAR SIR,--Please accept on behalf of the Town and myself
our many and sincere thanks for your kind letter of
yesterday.
The people of this Borough will never forget the visit of
the Highland Division, and the desire of all concerned to
cause as little inconvenience as possible, leaving alone the
material benefits that have accrued to the inhabitants
generally through your visit.
I need hardly say how much we shall miss you. The
friendships formed during the last nine months will last for
many years to come.
We shall watch for news of the Division as if they were our
own people.
I will have your letter read at the next Council meeting.
May God grant you all a safe return to the friends you leave
behind.--Yours very truly,
(Signed) HARRY BROWNING.
CHAPTER II.
ARRIVAL IN FRANCE--FESTUBERT.
On 13th April 1915 telephone instructions were received from the War
Office that the 1/1 Highland Division was at once to be prepared for
service overseas. The following day information was received that the
battalions which had already been sent overseas would be replaced by the
6th and 7th Black Watch, and by four Lancashire battalions--the 1/4
Battalion King's Own Royal Lancashire Regiment, 1/8 Battalion the King's
Liverpool Regiment, 1/4 the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and the 2/5
Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers.
By 18th April these battalions had all joined the Division. On 29th
April orders were received that the Division would entrain to
Southampton and Folkestone for Havre and Boulogne during the next few
days.
By 5th May the journey had been completed without any unusual incidents,
and the Division was concentrated in billets in the area Busnes, Robecq,
and Lillers, and formed part of the Indian Corps (Sir James Willcocks)
of the First Army (Sir Douglas Haig).
As soon as the Division had completed its concentration in the First
Army area, General Sir Douglas Haig paid it his first of many visits.
The assistance which the Division received from Sir Douglas Haig and the
First Army Headquarters Staff while finding its legs during its first
days in France was invaluable.
At this period the general situation on the Western Front was as
follows: The second battle of Ypres, prepared by the first discharge of
asphyxiating gases, had begun on 22nd April, and was to continue with
great intensity for over a month.
During the early part of this period the French were preparing an attack
to be launched on 9th May between Arras and the right of the British
lines. The First British Army, having been ordered to support this
operation by an attack, had issued instructions directing the IVth Corps
against the German position in the neighbourhood of Richebourg
(south-west of Fromelles), and the Ist and Indian Corps against the
German trenches between Givenchy and Neuve Chapelle. These attacks as
planned were accordingly delivered on 8th, 9th, and 10th May 1915. They,
however, met with little success. It was therefore decided that the
First Army should concentrate on the southern point of attack, and renew
the operations on 12th May. This attack was subsequently postponed until
the 15th owing to low visibility.
In the attack on the 15th the Indian Corps, owing to the strength of the
enemy's defences in the neighbourhood of Richebourg l'Avoue, again
failed to make progress. The 2nd Division of the Ist Corps, however,
captured the enemy's first and support lines. On the following day, the
7th Division on the right of the 2nd Division successfully captured
several second lines of enemy trenches, and these two Divisions
continued the advance on the day after as far as the Le Quinque
Rue-Bethune road.
On 19th May the 2nd Division was relieved on this front by the 51st
Division.[1]
On the 25th, the object of these operations having been attained, orders
were given for Divisions in the line to act defensively and consolidate
the ground won.
These operations were attended by serious casualties, but, to quote Sir
John French's despatch, they assisted in securing the brilliant
successes attained by the French forces on the right, not only by
holding the enemy on this front, but by drawing off a part of the German
reinforcements which were coming up to support their forces east of
Arras. In this battle of Festubert the enemy was driven from a
strongly-fortified position, and ground was won on a front of four miles
to an average depth of 600 yards.
From the above summary it will be seen that the 51st Division was
initiated to the ways of war in the midst of a great battle. On 9th May
it remained in reserve to the Indian Corps, and was held in readiness to
move at short notice until 11th May. By this date it had become clear
that the progress of the Indian Corps had not been such as to render the
employment of its reserve at all probable.
On 14th May the 51st Division, less two brigades R.F.A. temporarily
attached to the Lahore and 49th Division, moved to the area Caestre,
Borre, Merris, Meteren, and came into G.H.Q. reserve.[2]
On 18th May the Division moved into the area La Gorgue-Vieille Chapelle.
On the night 19-20th May the 152nd Infantry Battalion began the relief
of the 2nd Division (General Horne), south of Neuve Chapelle, and on
20-21st the 153rd Infantry Brigade relieved a Canadian brigade in the
Richebourg sector.
The Highland Division during its first tour of duty in the line was thus
employed in the particularly trying operation of consolidating a
newly-won position. Few operations call for more resource and more
tactical skill on the part of junior officers and N.C.O.'s, or for more
detailed planning and arrangement on the part of commanders and staffs.
Order has immediately to be evolved from chaos. Covered approaches are
non-existent, and must be constructed before movement during daylight
becomes possible; sniping with rifles and, in some cases, field-guns is
constant; the protection afforded by barbed-wire entanglements is
wanting; arrangements for sanitation and cooking have not been planned.
In fact, the amount of work required to make the position defensible and
habitable appears overwhelming.
To make confusion worse confounded, officers, runners, reliefs, ration
parties, &c., as long as movement is restricted to the hours of
darkness, find the greatest difficulty in acquiring a working knowledge
of the geography of the defences.
Moreover the Germans, in those days of short advances, were quick at
recovering from the confusion in their artillery arrangements created
by a successful attack. They were therefore always liable to bombard a
newly-captured position heavily before the men had time to construct
sufficient field-works to protect themselves from shell splinters.
In the case of the front taken over by the Division on this occasion,
the normal difficulties were accentuated by the fact that digging-in was
only possible to a depth of from two to three feet. Everywhere in the
Flanders mud, below that level water is encountered. It is therefore
necessary to erect above ground double rows of traversed breastworks,
between which the men must live and have their being.
The difficulty of consolidation in this mud country requires to have
been experienced to be fully appreciated.
The work of maintaining breastworks, when completed, in a state of
repair is considerable, as they cannot withstand a bombardment by
artillery or trench-mortars. In consequence sections of the trenches are
frequently levelled to the ground, and have to be reconstructed. The
labour of maintaining them when once erected is, however, a small
problem when compared with the difficulty of erecting them _de novo_
during active operations.
In the first place, owing to the flatness and absence of cover from
view, which is characteristic of Flanders, the work of construction is
in the initial stages almost entirely confined to night work. As
breastworks will only stand if their sides are graded at the proper
slope, darkness makes this work infinitely more difficult. Moreover,
breastworks during their construction and before they have reached their
full thickness can be demolished by light field-guns, and be seriously
damaged even by machine-gun fire. Of these two facts the enemy used to
take full advantage. He also knew well that much of the work had to be
done by men standing in the open on his side of the breastworks, and so
made considerable use of machine-guns to inflict casualties on working
parties thus engaged.
There are other serious drawbacks to garrisoning breastwork trenches.
Deep dug-outs cannot be mined in the clay in the normal way, again on
account of water. Concrete shelters, which take a considerable time to
erect, are therefore the only alternative form of shell-proof cover.
Even these have a marked tendency to fill with water.
There was a good example of a concrete dug-out in the right sector at
Armentières in September 1916. Some simple-minded soldier, finding that
it was gradually filling with water, made a hole through the concrete
floor to let the water out. In consequence the dug-out filled with water
up to the level of the ground surface in a few hours, driving its
occupants out. A battalion medical officer subsequently visiting the
trenches came across this dug-out, and thinking it was a storage tank
for water, tested the water and caused a notice-board to be placed on
it, saying, "For ablution purposes only; not fit for drinking."
Breastwork parapets, even when they are not subjected to bombardment,
require constant attention. They have in particular a disconcerting
habit of settling down and losing height, particularly after rain. In
consequence it sometimes happens that by the gradual subsidence of the
parapet men may unwittingly expose themselves to enemy snipers in places
where a day or two previously they were completely hidden from view.
Apart from the amount of labour the upkeep of breastworks requires,
there are other reasons which make them unpleasant to live in on an
active front. During a bombardment, for instance, when a shell hits the
trench, men are constantly being buried in a heap of sandbags and earth.
They have then to be dug out immediately to save them from suffocation.
In these circumstances the rescue parties often have to work while the
bombardment continues, and with enemy snipers and machine-gunners ready
to engage them whenever they expose themselves in the breach.
German machine-gunners were also expert at firing a series of bursts
into a particular portion of breastwork until it became
non-bullet-proof. They would then continue firing bursts at irregular
intervals at the same spot, with the result that the bullets penetrated
the parapet and came through into the trench. Casualties were often
caused in this manner.
The Highland Division, thus having arrived in France with its training
only partially completed, was called upon to undertake a difficult and
unpleasant task--namely, the holding and consolidation of a
newly-captured position in Flanders. Moreover, the circumstances were
such that the Division could not carry out a period of attachment in
the line to an experienced Division for instruction.
Thus no opportunity was vouchsafed to officers and men of being "put
wise" before the full responsibility of holding a captured position was
thrust upon them. The significance of this statement is that troops on
the first occasion that they enter the battle zone are liable to be
"gobrowed" by their new circumstances. They require, as it were, a
chaperon to assist them to assess things at their true value, and teach
them what not to fear but to respect, and what they may disregard.
Discussing this question, a Brigadier-General once related how when he
first arrived in France as a company commander he saw a "woolly bear"
burst over a wood in which his company was lying in mass. He turned and
galloped back to the wood _ventre à terre_ in a frenzied state of mind,
certain that he would find numbers of his men dead and dying. He was
amazed to find that, on the contrary, not a single man had been touched.
A veteran would, of course, have regarded the woolly bear in its true
light--as a vulgar and ostentatious beast that usually burst too high
and seldom took any effect on the ground.
In the other direction one remembers the novice who, during his period
of initiation, cut up a duck-board (a most impious act in itself) in a
forward sap and kindled a smoking bonfire on which to boil a mess-tin of
water, and his indignant astonishment at the shower of rifle grenades
which he unwittingly but naturally provoked.
Indeed, the debutante Division entering its first theatre of battle may
well be excused a certain amount of shyness concerning its behaviour,
however well prompted it may have been before it left home.
General Davies, commanding the 8th Division, however, gave the 51st
every possible assistance, even lending them his own instructors to help
to complete their training. His assistance proved most valuable.
On 26th May Divisional Headquarters was shelled out of Lacouture. This
bombardment was attributed to an article which had appeared in the
press, and which disclosed the location of units about Lacouture,
including Divisional Headquarters and a Canadian 60-pounder battery. The
Germans appear to have taken full advantage of this information, as
both the Divisional Headquarters and the 60-pounder battery were heavily
shelled. Several of the Divisional Headquarters signal section were
killed or wounded, and General Bannatine-Allason had a narrow escape,
the wind screen of his car being shattered. After this episode it was
noticed that the censorship of articles appearing in the press became
more rigorous.
On taking over the line, the clearing of the battlefield had to be
undertaken in addition to the work of consolidation. The bodies of men
who had been killed in the recent operations lay thick throughout the
whole area. Even the wounded had not all been brought in. The men were
thus quickly introduced to war in its worst aspects, in a manner which
clearly revealed to them the power of modern destructive weapons.
Officers and men still speak of the depressing effect which the
spectacle of so many dead had on them. This feeling was augmented by the
unpleasant duty of searching for the bodies in the polluted atmosphere
and burying them, which had to be undertaken during their first few days
in the line.
The whole country-side was further littered with arms, equipment,
clothing, tools, and ammunition. Considerable exertions were therefore
required to save even a portion of the serviceable stores which had been
left on the ground during the preceding operations.
On 30th May the Division was transferred to the IVth Corps, being
relieved by the Indian Corps. The following day the 153rd Infantry
Brigade relieved the Canadians between Festubert and Le Quinque Rue.
This sector was subsequently divided, the 152nd Infantry Brigade taking
over the line on the left.
On 7th June orders were issued from the IVth Corps to attack the enemy's
positions about Rue d'Ouvert and Chapelle St Roch and farther south on
the morning of the 11th, with the object of gaining ground towards
Violaines. Later this attack was postponed until the 15th. On the 12th
the operation order for this attack was issued. The objective of the
IVth Corps was "the German positions from Chapelle St Roch along the Rue
d'Ouvert to L12.
"The Canadian Division was to attack on the right and form a defensive
flank; the 7th Division was allotted the Chapelle St Roch and the
southern end of the Rue d'Ouvert as its objective; and the 51st Division
the extreme end.
"The actual objective given to the 51st Division were the houses at L11,
L12, L13, and K7. At the last-named they were to join hands with the 7th
Division.
"The 154th Infantry Brigade were detailed for the attack, their right
being directed on the south-west corner of the German salient--that is,
a point about 150 yards east by south of L8. The left of this attack was
to be directed through L9."
One section of the 1/1 Highland Field Company, R.E., and "C" Company of
the 5th Seaforth Highlanders, were ordered to assemble in the D line
towards the left flank, in readiness to construct and occupy a
fire-trench between M6 and L12 after that point had been gained.
One section 2/2 Highland Field Company, R.E., with two platoons of the
154th Infantry Brigade, were ordered to assemble in B line near the
right flank. Their purpose was "to protect the right flank of the attack
and to construct a _point d'appui_ on a suitable site between L8 and
L10."
It was arranged that sufficient infantry bombing parties should be
detailed from the bombers of the Division to carry out various tasks,
according to the progress made by the assaulting infantry.
In these days the bomb commonly used was the Bethune bomb. These were
made of cast-iron, and were exploded by means of time-fuses fixed into
detonators, with patent lighters attached to the fuse. They were but
clumsy and dangerous weapons when compared with the modern Mills bomb.
Bombing and its tactics was then an art which could only be acquired by
a course of specialist training, which, with the facilities that then
existed, lasted a considerable time.
The result was that the output of bombers was small, and it was
therefore considered necessary, if full value was to be obtained from
them, to amalgamate all the bombers of each brigade into brigade
grenadier companies.
On this occasion all three brigade grenadier companies detailed bombing
squads to take part in the operations.
The artillery available for this attack was, both as regards the number
of guns and the amount of ammunition, insignificant in the light of more
recent experience. The Divisional artillery, it is true, had been
reinforced by a group of French 75's. The 15-pounders, with which the
Divisional artillery was armed, had, however, such faulty ammunition and
so little of it that effective co-operation with the infantry was,
according to modern standards, out of the question. The artillery
programme included wire-cutting, a two days' continuous bombardment, and
a final intensive bombardment. The first bombardment was to continue up
to the moment of the infantry assault. At 6 P.M., the hour of the
assault, the guns firing on the enemy's front line were to lift on to
the line L9-L10. At 6.15 P.M. there was a further lift on to the Rue
d'Orient.
The general plan can be summed up as being an attempt to straighten out
a re-entrant in our line by pinching off a salient in the enemy's.
The artillery began wire-cutting on 13th June, the deliberate
bombardment beginning on the 14th. On the 15th it continued, becoming
intensive between 5.30 P.M. and 6 P.M. Mountain-guns and trench-mortars
also joined in the bombardment.
At 6 P.M., 15th June, the attack was launched by the 4th Loyal North
Lancashires and the 6th Scottish Rifles[3] of the 154th Brigade.
The attack was at first successful; the west end of the German salient
was carried, and the attack pushed on to the main German line near the
Rue d'Ouvert, and for a time the third German trench line was occupied
and held. Three companies of the 4th King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment
were accordingly sent forward to reinforce the Scottish Rifles.
Meanwhile "C" Company of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders had advanced to
the attack at 6.45 P.M.
[Illustration: MAP 1.--ATTACK NEAR FESTUBERT, 15TH JUNE 1915.]
The action of this company of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders is amply
described by the following extracts from a letter written by a platoon
sergeant who took part in the attack:--
"On the night of the 14th we went into the front line, the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders having eased away to the left of the Divisional sector
towards the Orchard, to make room for our company.
"Communications from reserve trenches to front line were very bad;
movement had mostly to be carried out in the open under direct German
observation. Daylight movement had therefore to be restricted as much
as possible.
"On the 15th we had a most uncomfortable day. The Boche rose early,
having apparently known our plans. In fact, some of them were heard to
call across No Man's Land, 'Come along, Jocks; we are waiting for you.'
And undoubtedly they were. From early morning we were subjected to
continual shell-fire, causing many casualties to us. As the afternoon
drew on the Boche became still more lively, but we still had great
hopes. These, however, became fainter as each occasional look over the
top showed the German wire unbroken.
"At 5 o'clock we began to make our final preparations. The adjutant
and C.O. arrived and took up a point of vantage in the trench where a
view of the 6th Scottish Rifles could be got during their advance. It
was only by this means that the C.O. could judge as to the failure or
success of the Scottish Rifles.
"Thus we awaited our further orders. From this time onwards an
occasional bark from a field-gun could be heard, and a small shrapnel
burst could be seen over the German lines.
"At last the hour had come for the 6th Scottish Rifles. Over they
went. Then the Germans showed to advantage the quantity and quality of
their munitions. Machine-guns swept over the parapets and tore them to
pieces; the 154th Infantry Brigade were seen to be advancing gloriously
in front of the most colossal artillery and machine-gun fire--their
ranks thinned considerably before they were many yards from their own
trenches. But on they went and entered the German front line, where
they were lost to view.
"Our time had now come. Nothing for it but to go over. The order was
passed along, 'Get ready.' At 6.45 P.M. the order came 'Advance!' The
place was a perfect hell. Just one solid sheet of bullets. Over we
went. Many were hit on the top of the parapet; before a distance of
thirty yards was traversed all the officers of our company were hit,
as well as the brigade bombing officer (Lieutenants Mowatt and Dunnet
killed, Captains Robertson, Ritson, and Lieutenant Fraser-Campbell
wounded). On we went; but men were falling in all directions, and by
the time we were within reach of the German wire, not more than fifteen
of the company were still on the move. The outlook was hopeless, the
wire was an insurmountable obstacle, and the few who remained had to
take cover in the nearest shell-hole until darkness allowed us to make
our own lines again--a sad dejected remnant of a company."
So much for the subsidiary attack of the 5th Seaforths.
The attack of the 7th Division on the right of the 154th Infantry
Brigade had failed to develop substantially, and no progress was made.
Farther back the 1st Canadian Brigade captured the German front line
trenches.
Night thus fell with the 154th Infantry Brigade having penetrated the
German positions on a narrow front, but with both its flanks "in the
air." The situation, however, remained too obscure to enable the salient
thus made in the German lines to be utilised for developing flank
attacks against the German front and support line trenches.
The nature of the country, as has been pointed out above, made it
impossible for the men to dig themselves in, and they were thus
dependent for protection on the slender breastworks that they had been
enabled to improvise during the night amongst the débris of the German
trenches. In this exposed position they were counter attacked in the
early hours of the morning. Engaged with bombs and machine-gun fire,
both from their front and flanks, they were unable to hold their
position, and were finally forced back to their original front line
trenches. They had suffered considerable casualties, the 1/4 Loyal North
Lancashires alone having lost 19 killed, 255 wounded, and 145 missing,
amongst them 5 officers being killed and 8 wounded.
During the night the remnants of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders and the
sappers who accompanied them crawled back from the shell-holes or long
grass in which they had been lying to our own trenches. In a similar way
the Canadians, also unable to hold their exposed position on the German
trenches, had returned to their own lines.
The failure of the attack was thus complete. Great credit is, however,
due to the 154th Infantry Brigade for their advance in the face of heavy
artillery and close-range rifle and machine-gun fire. There is little
doubt but that, had the operations on their flanks been successful, they
would have had every prospect of holding their gains. "C" Company of the
5th Seaforths did all that could have been expected of them in
circumstances in which success, as it turned out, was out of the
question.
General Ross, commanding 152nd Infantry Brigade, says of them in his
report of the operations: "I am glad to say that both officers and men
behaved very well indeed, and all went into the attack with the full
intention of getting through. The company had been somewhat shaken
during bombardment, as they had had several casualties from shell-fire,
mainly from our own shells, and the German shells had fallen amongst
them more steadily than usual. The casualties are not known yet
exactly, but are heavy, being over a hundred in one company."
Results were undoubtedly discouraging in the first attack carried out by
troops of the Highland Division, but it is doubtful if, in the
circumstances, any troops could have done better.
They had within a few days of arriving in France played a principal part
in the deepest tragedy that attacking infantry can assist in--the
tragedy of uncut wire.
After a gallant advance across No Man's Land, through which nothing but
their determination to close with the enemy could have carried them, the
survivors had been suddenly halted by an intact entanglement covered at
close range by rifles and machine-guns.
In cases such as this the whole impetus of the attack collapses, skill
and initiation are no longer of avail, the brain can no longer help the
body. Some men plunge into the entanglement, tearing at it with their
wire-cutters, and lacerating their flesh on the barbs until they fall.
Others double up and down the belt looking for a gap through which they
may make their way. Odd heroes may find such a gap, and, if they live to
reach the German trenches, leap into them, subsequently to be posted as
missing. Their story is never told.
Others, with a disregard for death born of despair, may stand for a
moment or two and return the enemy's fire until they are shot down.
Only those survive to answer the roll who either fall wounded and have
strength subsequently to regain their own lines under cover of darkness,
or who with quick perception see that the obstacle is impenetrable, and
instantly seek cover in which they may be hid until nightfall.
Uncut wire might be written as the epitaph on the grave of many a
British infantryman, and equally well in later days, when air
reconnaissance was perfected, on the grave of many a commander's
reputation.
During the following night the 6th Scottish Rifles, the 4th Loyal North
Lancashires, and the 4th King's Own Royal Lancashire Regiment were
withdrawn, and were replaced by the 8th Liverpools and the 7th Black
Watch. The latter had been sent up from the 153rd Infantry Brigade to
take over the reserve trenches.
On the morning of the 16th orders were received from the IVth Corps to
renew the attack at 4.45 P.M. after an artillery bombardment. The 5th
and 7th Gordons from the 153rd Brigade were therefore temporarily
attached to the 154th Brigade to replace the battalions which had been
withdrawn.
The attack met with no more success than its predecessor. The 8th
Liverpools, supported by the 7th Black Watch, carried out the advance.
It was, however, impeded from the start by a heavy bombardment opened on
our trenches by the enemy. The 8th Liverpools managed to get forward in
small parties, and passed the west end of the German salient. The troops
on their right flanks were, however, unable to make progress, and about
8 P.M. the Liverpools were forced back to our trenches.
It had been intended that, if the 154th Brigade was successful, the
152nd Brigade should continue the attack. These orders were therefore
cancelled, and during the night the 5th and 7th Gordon Highlanders
replaced the 7th Black Watch and 8th Liverpools.
In view of the failure of the first attack, it is doubtful if the
second, which at best could only be hastily improvised, had any prospect
of success. However, at 5 P.M., 17th June, further orders were received
by the Divisional commander to renew the attack on the German salient at
3 A.M. on the night 17-18th after a short intense artillery preparation.
At 2.30 A.M., to the relief of all concerned, this attack was postponed
and subsequently cancelled.
The failure of these attacks can be attributed to the inadequacy of the
artillery preparation. Subsequent battles proved that the number of guns
and the allotment of ammunition per gun required is far in excess of
those allotted to the Division for the battle of Festubert, if infantry
are to have a reasonable chance of success in attacking organised
resistance, protected by strong wire entanglements.
In addition to the inadequacy in the number of guns, the 15-pounders
again proved themselves highly unsatisfactory. As evidence of the
unreliability of their ammunition, it is worth recording that Captain
Duncan of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had an eye knocked
out by a shrapnel bullet half a mile behind the British front line.
On the day after the launching of the first attack, the following
message had been received from Lieut.-General Sir James Rawlinson:
"The Corps commander wishes you to convey his appreciation to the
troops of the 51st Division for their gallant conduct of yesterday and
to-day, particularly to the assaulting battalions--_viz._, the 6th
Scottish Rifles, the 4th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, and the 8th
King's Liverpool Regiment."
On the nights 18-19th and 19-20th June the 7th Division took over the
right sector, leaving only the 153rd Brigade in the line.
On the 24th orders were received for the 51st Division to rejoin the
Indian Corps, and to take over the line from the Lahore Division south
of Laventie. On the 27th June, this relief having been completed, the
G.O.C. took over command of the new sector.
All ranks experienced a sense of relief on leaving the Festubert area.
Not only on account of the serious casualties suffered by many units
during the attacks and the retaliation provoked by them, but also for
other reasons, it was rightly regarded as an unpleasant sector.
Communications had been almost non-existent, so that movement by day was
very restricted. The trenches, where they existed, were very open, and
sniping was rife. The ill-famed "Orchard," which it was hoped might be
consolidated and incorporated into the defences, had an evil reputation.
Breastworks were no sooner erected there by night than they were knocked
down by day. The Germans were, in fact, so opposed to the consolidation
of the Orchard that they introduced trench-mortars to check it.
The large calibre trench-mortars, or "Yon Minnie Wafers," as the Jocks
styled them, do not so much damage breastworks as remove them. They
frequently leave in a place where breastworks once stood nothing but a
deep crater, with two feet of water in it. In this case the result was
that, in spite of a vast amount of work carried out on the
consolidation, the sector was still far from completed when the Division
was relieved.
In those days there was little with which to reply to trench-mortars.
Appeals to the artillery for retaliatory shoots would seldom be
answered, owing to the restrictions placed on the use of ammunition on
account of its scarcity. Mountain-guns, manned by the R.G.A., were,
however, employed, and also a form of trench howitzer; but these were
inferior weapons when compared with the formidable mortars of the
Germans.
The Laventie front was in character similar to the Festubert front. When
the Division took over the line, the defences consisted of little more
than a single line of breastworks. Behind this, some 200 to 400 yards in
rear, lay a series of detached supporting posts at intervals of from 300
to 500 yards. A reserve line composed of similar posts lay 1000 to 1500
yards in rear of the supporting posts.
The enemy was occupying the lower slopes of the Aubers Ridge, from which
he overlooked all the country in which the British defences were
situated.
Each sector has, as a rule, its particular "unhealthy spot." In the
Laventie sector Red Lamp Corner occupied this rôle.
The front line ended in a butt-end, some 100 yards from the German line
at Red Lamp Corner (Point B on the diagram); 300 yards west of Red Lamp
Corner the front line started from another butt-end (Point C). These two
butt-ends were connected by a fire-stepped communication trench (C--E).
See diagram.
[Illustration: Trench Layout]
The corner took its name from a red lamp which was lit at dusk and
placed at B to prevent the troops garrisoning CD from shooting into
those garrisoning AB in the dark. The trench from E to C was
continuously subjected to close-range rifle and machine-gun fire in
direct enfilade, and both it and the corner itself were places to be
avoided.
In these days the red lamp was a necessary precaution, as a form of
activity which came later to be known as "wind fights" frequently
occurred. A post would see or imagine it saw an enemy patrol, which it
took to be a prelude to an attack. It in consequence opened rapid fire.
This fire was taken up by posts on its right and left. Subsequently the
alarm travelled for several miles, and rapid fire was opened all along
the line. The fight, often occasioned by Private X., just out from home,
mistaking a pollarded willow for a German, involved an enormous
expenditure of ammunition, in which the shooting was not always under
complete control.
It will be easily understood that, without the red lamp, CD might have
made things very unpleasant for AB in these circumstances.
This sector presented many difficulties. The defences that had been
constructed were so limited that the troops in the line were far too
congested. They were therefore liable to suffer undue casualties in the
event of bombardment. Moreover, the supporting posts being isolated
sections of trenches clearly visible, particularly in air photographs,
were in consequence liable to attract a considerable volume of artillery
fire. Further, communicating trenches, as usual, were quite inadequate
to meet the requirements of the garrison.
General Bannatine-Allason therefore at once decided that the whole
scheme of defence must be recast and largely augmented. Accordingly work
was begun on a continuous support line, and on increasing the number of
communication trenches. In fact, a considerable effort was demanded from
the ranks to render the sector reasonably defensible.
When the Division was relieved in July much progress had been made,
General Willcocks expressing himself to the Divisional commander as very
satisfied with the great improvements that had been effected in the
defences.
In this period the Division learnt many lessons in trench craft.
On taking over the line enemy sniping was continuous. The hostile
snipers were masters of the situation, and inflicted serious casualties.
However, every effort was made to check the enemy's activities in this
respect, with excellent results. Towards the end of the Division's tour
in this sector, the Highlanders were at least on equal terms, if not
superior to the enemy as snipers. In some cases telescopic rifles were
bought by private enterprise. The men who were entrusted with these
rifles were carefully selected from amongst the gamekeepers and stalkers
in the infantry, and on several days they were able to register good
bags.
On 1st July the Division saw the first British mine exploded. At 3 A.M.
two rounds were fired by the artillery as a signal; a moment later the
mine exploded. The artillery and machine-guns then opened on the enemy's
trenches for fifteen minutes. The German retaliation was slight. When
day broke it was reported that about fifty yards of the German parapet
was blown in. Later the Germans were seen with stretchers on and about
the crater. The blow, therefore, appeared to have been successful. After
daybreak, however, the enemy snipers killed several of our men who
exposed themselves in trying to see the results of the explosion.
As in the last sector, work in the defences was considerably hampered by
the enemy's artillery and trench-mortars, which were constantly
levelling the British trenches. As usual, appeals for artillery
retaliation could seldom be met, owing to the paucity of ammunition. It
became most discouraging to the men to see their breastworks being
damaged and destroyed in this manner, their labours of the previous
night often being undone in a few minutes, without it being possible to
fire a round in retaliation. In this sector life in the trenches was
made more uncertain than ever by the introduction of the rifle grenade
by the Germans.
In the early part of July, Colonel Ian Stewart, D.S.O., Scottish Rifles,
who had joined the Division as G.S.O. 1 in June, formulated a scheme of
training every man in the use of the bomb. Bombing, before this
innovation, had been regarded as the duty of specialists. The new scheme
was that every man should be trained to be able to light and throw a
bomb in the case of an emergency. At the same time the brigade grenadier
companies were put through a longer and more thorough course of
instruction than had been the case in the past. The introduction of this
scheme marked a big advance in the practice of bombing.
On 20th July orders were received that the Division was to join the Xth
Corps under the command of General Morland, in the area of the
newly-formed Third Army. The Xth Corps was then to consist of the 5th
Regular Division, the 51st Territorial Division, and the 18th Service
Division. Accordingly during the nights 22-23rd and 23-24th July the
Division was relieved in the line by the Lahore and 8th Divisions.
On the 26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th of July the Division proceeded by
train to the Neuilly area east of Amiens.
CHAPTER III.
THE PERIOD OF APPRENTICESHIP.
It was some ten weeks since the Division had heard its first shot fired.
Up to the present it had, indeed, experienced war. It had, however, been
employed throughout either in actual battle or in consolidating a battle
front in particularly trying circumstances. It had, therefore, had
little time or opportunity to collect its thoughts and profit by its
experiences.
During the next few months it was given the opportunity it required, and
it will be seen that these months were profitably employed by all ranks.
This period may be called the Division's apprenticeship to war.
In this connection it must not be forgotten that, in spite of its late
successes, there was a time when the Highland Division was what can best
be described as "green." That this was the case is no reflection on the
spirit which animated the men or the manner in which the troops had been
trained by their commanders. Under the conditions of modern warfare it
could not have been otherwise.
Lord French writes of the newly-arrived Territorial Divisions: "At
first certainly they were crude and untrained, but every day they
improved under instruction, and developed great intelligence under a
thorough and practical exposition of the objects to be aimed at."
The manner in which the Division "trained on" and developed from
apprentices into skilled tradesmen was most creditable, both to the men
and to those responsible for their education in the ways of war.
One difficulty that must always exist with inexperienced troops,
particularly non-regular troops, is the question of discipline. To
maintain discipline in the circumstances of peace does not present a
tithe of the difficulties which are encountered in times of war. The ill
effects of the lack of discipline in peace conditions are evident to
all. War, on the other hand, produces fresh and unexpected
circumstances, in which experience alone can teach how efficiency is
dependent on rigorous adherence to discipline, often in apparently
trivial matters. This was felt by the Highland Division, in common with
many others, in numerous ways.
In a Division in which the officers and men of the various companies and
battalions are recruited from the same villages or towns, and are known
to one another intimately in civil life, the enforcement of the rigid
discipline demanded by war will always be a difficult matter, until
experience has shown the necessity for it.
Officers and N.C.O.'s have first to appreciate the degree to which they
must exercise command over their men, if the military machine is to
stand the test. They must also learn that the efficiency of the troops
under their command is dependent on the manner in which they supervise
the daily life and actions of their men, and on the amount of
forethought they exercise on their behalf.
Owing to inexperience, delay in reliefs, entailing much fatigue to the
men, the miscarrying of working parties, entailing the loss of valuable
time, were in the early stages frequent. Further, in spite of continual
warnings, men light-heartedly ignored the enemy, and were constantly
being killed by enemy snipers through wilful exposure. There were cases
of men asphyxiating themselves in their dug-outs with the fumes of their
own coke fires through want of the necessary precautions.
The diaries of senior officers contain frequent references to instances
in which they found the enemy working in daylight in full view,
unmolested, through want of initiative on the part of local commanders.
Occasions were not unknown when troops in the line evinced what has
since become known as "wind."
However, the Division recognised from the first that it had much to
learn, and an organised effort was made to help the men to profit by
experience in the shortest possible time. To this effort the men
responded admirably.
Junior officers and N.C.O.'s gradually acquired the necessary habit of
true command over their men. The men were quick and ready to discover
that the better disciplined a unit is, the more efficient it is, the
less it suffers from the actions of the enemy and the conditions of war.
They learnt, too, that the best-disciplined battalion is the most
comfortable and the most contented.
As Lord French writes: "Each unit learned by degrees its own relative
place and position in the great Divisional machine. Enthusiasm was
raised in the idea engendered in all ranks that they formed part of
a great engine of war, furnished by their own country and immediate
neighbourhood."
In the early stages of its apprenticeship the Division first took part
in a series of unsuccessful attacks. Subsequently it passed many weeks
in areas in which trench-mortaring and mining--the two forms of trench
warfare most trying to men's nerves--were considerably in evidence.
Nevertheless, in spite of their inexperience and of this unfortunate
beginning, the men at all times remained in good heart and retained a
high standard of morale.
By August 1915 the Division had so successfully overcome its earlier
difficulties that it was selected to instruct the 18th Division, newly
arrived from England, in trench warfare. Subsequently the 22nd Division,
32nd Division, and afterwards the 36th Division, were also attached to
the Highland Division for tours of instruction in the line.
Throughout this period the rivalry between the Territorial and New Army
Divisions was acute. The men had a strong impression, further
accentuated by the fact that the Division did not take part in the
battle of Loos, that since they were a Territorial Division, the higher
command would never employ them as a complete Division in a major
operation. In this belief, after General Harper had taken over command
of the Division, they began to call themselves Harper's Duds, asserting
that the Divisional sign, H.D., was formed from the initial letters of
these two words.
On 27th July 1915, orders were issued by the Xth Corps for the 51st
Division to take over the lines from near Becourt to the river Ancre
near Hamel, relieving the 22nd Division of the XIth French Corps.
On the night 30-31st the 152nd Brigade took over the left sector from
the 116th French Regiment. On the following night the right sector was
taken over by the 154th Infantry Brigade, who relieved the 22nd French
Territorial Regiment, and by the 153rd Brigade, who took over a portion
of the right sector from the 44th French Brigade.
The Divisional artillery, with six batteries of the 18th Division
attached for instruction, moved into the line in relief of the French
artillery on the nights 2-3rd, 3-4th, 4-5th August.
The taking over from the French, both from a military and from a social
point of view, was satisfactory in every way. The details of the handing
over were complete, and the arrangements made by the French commands and
staffs excellent.
It was a considerable relief to all to find trenches cut deep in the
chalk or loam, in place of the hated breastworks. The French system was
also extensive, and contained numerous communication trenches and trench
shelters. There was not, in consequence, the same exposed feeling which
was attached to the Festubert and Laventie trenches.
The French troops were Bretons. Their great traditions as fighters
produced immediately a bond of sympathy between them and the
Highlanders. The Highland dress and the pipes evoked great interest and
admiration in the French soldiers and in the inhabitants of the
neighbouring villages, which lost nothing from the fact that the
Highland Division was the first British Division to serve in that part
of the country.
During the relief the French officers and men did their utmost to help
our troops. Their hospitality was unbounded. Indeed, the excellent
manner in which the French officers messed, even in the line, was the
cause of considerable surprise to the British officers.
When the relief of the French troops was complete and they were marching
away to take their place in the line in Champagne, the pipers and
drummers of various units accompanied them for several miles of their
first day's march. The Bretons, having themselves pipes of a kind, were
delighted, and the manner in which they refreshed the pipers during the
march clearly showed their gratitude.
Willie Lawrie, the famous pipe-major of the 8th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, composed a pipe tune in honour of this event, known as the
"Pipers of Bouzincourt," and another called "The 8th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders farewell to the 116th De Ligne."
A copy of the tune was sent to Lieut.-Colonel V. Arnoux, commanding the
116th, from whom the following reply was received:--
11^e CORPS D'ARMÉE, 22ND DIVISION,
43RD BRIGADE.
AU BIVOUAC,
_le 10 Novembre 1915_.
Le Lieut.-Colonel ARNOUX, Commandant le 116th Regiment
d'Infanterie à Monsieur le Lieut.-Colonel DOUGLAS BAIRD,
Commandant le 1/8 Argyllshire Highlanders.
No. 1 Objet au sujet
d'une marche militaire.
MON CHER CAMARADE,--J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser reception
de la marche pour cornemutes composée par le corne-musier
major de votre bataillon, et jouée par vos cornemutes et
tambours le matin de la relève du 116th de Ligne dans le
secteur de Thiepval Authuile.
Au nom de tous mes officiers et soldats je vous prie
d'agréer mes vifs remerciements. Tous ont gardé au 116th le
meilleurs souvenirs de cette marche dont le rhythme et
l'harmonie melancolique evoquaient les mélodies du pays
natal.
Je l'ai confiée à mon chef de musique qui s'occupe de vous
composer une marche appropriée à notre musique sur la thème
de la vôtre.
Cette harmonie de nos deux marches militaires sera un
souvenir et un gage de plus de la bonne amitié qui unit nos
deux regiments et nos deux armées dans la même ardeur vers
la victoire commune.
Veuillez agréer, mon cher Camarade, l'expression de mes
souvenirs les meilleurs et les plus devoués.
V. ARNOUX.
General Baumgarten, commanding the XIth French Corps d'Armée, remained
in command until 5th August, when General Bannatine-Allason took over
from him, with his headquarters at Senlis. General Baumgarten
subsequently called on General Bannatine-Allason to express his delight
with the manner in which the taking over had been carried out without
any hitch in spite of the difficulties which arose from the difference
of language.
The new sector proved to be both interesting and instructive. Many
problems arose while the Division held this portion of the line which
required solution, and which, as it turned out, were all solved
satisfactorily.
The front was looked upon by the French as a quiet one, with the
exception of a section of the line adjacent to the Albert-Bapaume road
known as the Ilot. This ground had been captured by the French in a
brilliant advance, and on this account, though of little tactical
importance, continued to be held. Subsequently, after the Division had
been relieved in this portion of the line, the troops were withdrawn
from it. There can have been few places on the Western front where the
distance separating the Allied and the German lines was less, as in the
Ilot the breadth of the No Man's Land was in some places no more than
ten yards. The opposing trenches were thus well within bombing range,
and the locality was a running sore to both sides.
The sector did not remain a quiet one for long, and throughout the
Division's occupation of it every effort was required to prevent the
enemy from gaining the upper hand.
The most acute problem was the enemy's activity in mining. When the
sector was taken over from the French, the situation in this respect was
anything but good. No British tunnelling companies being available,
French engineers remained in charge of mining operations. This was an
unsatisfactory arrangement, and the work of countermining made little
progress, while the efforts of the enemy were fully maintained.
On the 22nd August the 179th Tunnelling Company, R.E., arrived in the
area and relieved the French engineers. It had by this time become
evident that a very considerable effort would be necessary to check the
enemy's mining if it was to continue possible to hold the existing
front-line trenches. The 179th Tunnelling Company had only a strength of
300 men with which to take over from the 500 men which the French had
employed in the sector. It was therefore decided to reinforce the
tunnellers by attaching to them infantry who in civil life had been
skilled miners.
Sixty miners from each infantry brigade were accordingly added to the
tunnellers. The efforts of the tunnelling company thus reinforced, by
dint of working continuous shifts day and night, proved equal to the
task, with the result that superiority as regards the mining situation
ultimately passed to the British.
It was, however, only after a severe struggle that this result was
obtained. The discharging of mines and of camouflets--small discharges
used for blowing in the opponent's galleries--were almost of daily
occurrence.
Mine warfare played so large a part in the trench warfare of 1915, 1916,
and 1917, and so affected the daily life of the soldier in the trenches,
that a description of what it means to those engaged in it may not be
out of place.
In the first instance, success in mine warfare is dependent on the
tunnelling company. By their efforts it is determined whether our troops
are to be blown up by the enemy, or whether it is the enemy who is to
meet this fate. To secure protection for the troops listening galleries
have to be driven at various points along the front, so that the enemy's
galleries can be located by sound, and the element of surprise can then
be eliminated. The tunnellers who listen in these galleries are equipped
with instruments by which the enemy can be heard working. If he is
close, he can be heard by the ear alone. In chalk, a good medium for the
carrying of sound, he can be heard working, without the aid of
instruments, many feet away. If he is heard still using picks or
shovels, it is known that he has not driven his gallery as far as he
intends, and that there is therefore no immediate prospect of his
blowing. If, on the other hand, he is heard tamping--_i.e._, packing in
his explosive--it is known that his work is nearly completed, and that
his mine will in a few hours be ready for exploding. In the latter case
two alternatives are available, either of which may be adopted to
protect the troops from the effect of his blowing. First, if we have a
gallery sufficiently close to his, we may blow a small mine or
camouflet, designed either to destroy his gallery or so to disintegrate
the soil by the explosion as to make further tunnelling impossible. If a
camouflet is impracticable, the only other alternative is to evacuate
the area which it is estimated will be affected by the explosion.
In some cases the tunnelling company were able to destroy his galleries
by camouflets when they were actually being worked, and thus bury the
tunnellers and their spoiling parties. On these occasions the tunnelling
company were always highly elated, as they took a professional pride in
scoring off their real opponents the tunnellers, and considered this a
far finer achievement than blowing up a trench full of mere infantrymen.
The Germans also adopted the same tactics, and continuous warfare
between the tunnellers of both sides raged underground. Though the
tunnellers, when once in their galleries, were free from the attentions
of snipers, trench-mortars, and shells, yet their own form of warfare
was hazardous and dangerous enough. When the galleries of the opposing
sides were close, it was never known whether a gallery had not been
located and might not at any moment be blown in, all the men working in
it being crushed or suffocated.
On occasions a British and German gallery would meet, and hand-to-hand
fights with picks and crowbars underground would ensue, which had to be
fought out in darkness in the narrow tunnels.
The danger from natural gases, with all the attendant difficulties of
rescuing men overcome by the fumes, was constant. Falls of earth and
chalk, possibly due to some heavy explosion above ground, might also
occur, which might bury the worker or cut him off from the exit of the
gallery.
It must be remembered that the tunnellers were not highly trained
soldiers in their early manhood, but professional miners, often men of
middle age, who had in many cases come to France straight from the pits
at home. They were, indeed, a splendid breed of men, and the infantry
owed much to them. There is little question but that they were far
superior to the German tunneller. The latter was often a cunning worker,
but the British tunneller could always be relied on to beat him for
pace. It may also be added that the tunnelling companies all contained
an appreciable number of Scottish miners.
Mine warfare affects the infantry in several ways. First, it
necessitates their finding an enormous number of carrying parties to
assist in getting rid of the spoil, as the excavated earth or chalk is
called. The infantryman never liked this work, as, among other things,
it made his clothing, particularly his kilt, extremely dirty. It also
appeared unending. However, he was reasonably contented with it if he
had the satisfaction of occasionally seeing the German trenches and
dug-outs hoisted into the air.
The question of finding working parties is, however, a minor
consideration for the infantry when compared with the possible effects
of the explosion of a German mine. This usually occurred either as
darkness fell or during the night. Though warning might have been given
by the tunnellers that a mine was to be expected, yet the explosion
always appeared to come as a surprise. To a man standing up in the
vicinity of an explosion the first sensation was a feeling that he had
been struck on the soles of the feet by a heavy beam. This was
immediately followed by the opening up of the earth and the issuing
forth of a belch of flame, capped with a great rolling cloud of smoke
and followed instantaneously by a deep muffled roar.
Huge fragments of earth and chalk, some weighing a ton or more, with
wire entanglements, trench-boards, dug-out timbers--all were hurled many
feet into the air. There followed a sensible pause, and then for some
seconds the falling débris would come pouring down. This in turn was
followed by a mist of dust which continued to float in the air for many
minutes.
If the explosion had occurred under an occupied portion of the trench,
the men in the area which was transferred into the crater were either
immediately buried or else hurled many feet into the air in the sheet of
flame and smoke, often to descend back into the crater crushed, bruised,
burnt, and almost invariably dead. Others in the immediate vicinity of
the explosion were crushed in their shelters or buried in the trenches
by the collapse of their sides. Men further away, in their turn, were in
danger of being killed or mutilated by the falling débris of stones and
chalk which whirled down from a great height into the trenches. The
result was a scene of horrible desolation. Nothing remained intact.
Trenches with their garrisons were obliterated. The positions where
posts had once been could only be determined by rifles or limbs
projecting through the upturned earth. At times, the heaving of the
earth showed where some buried man, still alive, was struggling to
extricate himself. The whole air was fetid with the sickly stench of
high explosive.
Mine warfare was, indeed, the most trying ordeal to which troops holding
trenches were exposed.
Next to mining, the most nerve-racking form of trench warfare was
provided by the trench-mortar. Towards the latter end of August the
enemy began to make a considerable use of these weapons. In consequence
the trenches were frequently severely damaged, and many casualties were
sustained. The British trench-mortars were in these days only in their
early experimental stages; moreover, difficulty always existed in
obtaining sufficient ammunition for them to be of any real service.
The enemy, on the other hand, appears to have had an unlimited supply of
ammunition for mortars of a considerably heavier calibre and longer
range than ours. At this time his commonest types were those that
discharged the "oil can" or "rum jar" and the aerial torpedo. The "oil
can" was little more than a tin canister about nine inches in diameter,
filled with high explosive, and fitted with a time fuze. In those days
it was fired from a smooth-bored wooden mortar, and in consequence
turned over and over in its flight, and was therefore not particularly
accurate. The explosion was, however, terrific, devastating to wire or
trenches, and most trying to the nerves of any one who had to live in an
area in which they habitually burst.
The aerial torpedoes had a fixed propeller which kept them from turning
over in the air, and were in consequence a more accurate projectile.
Their effects were if anything worse than those of the "oil can."
The Division had attached to it one 1-1/2-inch mortar battery and a
4-inch mortar battery for which ammunition was available only in small
quantities. On 2nd September, a 2-inch trench-mortar battery arrived,
though its ammunition did not join it till 7th October.
The 2-inch trench-mortar fired a bomb exactly similar in shape to the
hammer used in Highland games in "throwing the hammer." For this reason
it was known to the troops as "Donald Dinnie." It was also known as the
"Plum Pudding" or "Football." It was on this account that an English
brigade-major was once heard to confess that he had always thought
"Donald Dinnie" was Scots for plum pudding.
The "Donald Dinnie" was an excellent projectile when it burst in the
right place. Sometimes, however, it did not burst at all, while at
others it burst within a few feet of the mortar. Again, the mortar
frequently misfired. Trench-mortaring was rather a game of chance in
those days, with the odds slightly against the man firing the mortar.
In the early days of the "Donald Dinnie" its long iron handle, with a
diameter of two inches, was firmly fixed to the bomb. On occasions this
handle was blown tremendous distances by the explosion, and more than
once fell in the British trenches, causing casualties to the garrison.
There was thus no adequate weapon with which to counter the German
trench-mortars. He was therefore able to do considerable damage to our
trenches and troops, more or less, with impunity.
It was in consequence necessary to institute a system of artillery
retaliation, by which a certain number of rounds were fired back at the
enemy by howitzers for every trench-mortar round he fired. Howitzers of
various calibres up to 6-inch as well as the field-guns took part in
these retaliatory shoots, according to the ammunition supply. As this
became more liberal, this system tended to check the enemy's
trench-mortar activity, particularly when, by careful observation, the
positions of his trench-mortar emplacements were located, and the
retaliation was brought to bear actually on the offending mortars.
The enemy could, however, bombard certain sections of trenches so
systematically that he was able to obliterate them. This was
particularly the case opposite La Boisselle and in an area known as the
Salient. The latter received so much attention as to become untenable,
and on 1st December it was evacuated, a retrenchment being dug and
occupied behind it.
During these trench-mortar bombardments, it had been discovered that
the French shelters, having only three or four feet of cover, were not
shell-proof. They were, in fact, death-traps, as they gave the men a
false sense of security. In consequence, during a bombardment men would
crowd into them to take cover, and should a trench-mortar bomb then
strike one of them, it was blown in and all its occupants were killed.
On 21st October it was therefore decided to provide fresh dug-out
accommodation for the whole garrison. The tunnelling company, as has
been explained, was strained to its utmost to keep pace with the mining
situation. The construction of the dug-outs was therefore entrusted to
the 8th Royal Scots, who had joined the Division as the Divisional
Pioneer Battalion on 25th August 1915. Fresh calls were made on the
infantry for skilled miners, who were attached to the 8th Royal Scots.
Work was carried on day and night, and the greatest exertions were made
to provide the Division with shell-proof shelters with the minimum of
delay.
These dug-outs were designed to give 10 to 12 feet of head cover.
Charges of 60 lb. and 100 lb. of gun-cotton were exploded on the roofs
of dug-outs of this depth, and the shock of the explosion was
successfully resisted.[4]
Attempts were made to construct dug-outs by digging deep pits and then
roofing them in with layers of material calculated to burst shells; but
this was found to take more time than was required to construct a
dug-out by tunnelling.
While the mining and the construction of dug-outs was being carried on
as intensively as possible, an enormous amount of spoil (excavated earth
and chalk) was accumulated. The disposal of this spoil became a very
serious problem. Chalk cannot be scattered broadcast except at a
distance from the shaft-heads, as its presence would disclose to the
enemy that work was in progress and draw shell-fire. The accumulation of
spoil was thus very difficult to dispose of, and frequently the trenches
became almost impassable owing to the heaps of sandbags full of chalk
stacked against their sides waiting to be emptied. The usual method of
disposing of this spoil was to dump it into disused trenches and
shell-holes. These, however, were soon filled, and it became evident
that elaborate arrangements must be made beforehand for dealing with the
spoil whenever operations entailing excavations on a large scale are
planned, otherwise vast accumulations will be formed.
In this sector it was therefore necessary to establish a
carefully-organised system of spoiling parties to keep pace with the
output of the tunnellers and pioneers. It was only thus that it could be
ensured that the intensive mining and dug-out construction would not be
checked owing to delays in dealing with the excavated earth.
Large numbers of men had thus to be found daily for this work, with the
result that there was little labour available for the ordinary duties of
trench maintenance. As long as the weather remained fine, difficulty was
not experienced on this account. Subsequently, however, when the weather
changed, the whole Division was taxed to its utmost to keep the trenches
in a condition which rendered them passable to troops.
This was particularly difficult in the sector between La Boisselle and
Thiepval. Here above the chalk was a deep overlay of clay. Thus, when
towards the end of the year there was a heavy fall of rain and
subsequently of snow, the country in this area became water-logged, and
in consequence the sides of the trenches were continually collapsing.
This was partly due to the fact that the trenches constructed by the
French were cut with perpendicular sides. Trenches of this pattern stood
well enough in fine weather or where cut in chalk, but when cut in clay
could not withstand the additional pressure which the weight of absorbed
rain-water brought into play. The result was that throughout this
portion of the sector the sides of the trenches fell in, and they became
merely shapeless ditches knee- or waist-deep in mud and water. Water and
mud, too, flowed down the stairs of the dug-outs unless dams were
carefully made, while the "Bairnsfather" type of shelter collapsed on to
its occupants at least once with fatal results.
The nature of the soil was such that revetment was of little avail. Even
machine-gun pits revetted with close-lagged timbers--that is to say,
with their walls supported by a continuous lining of thick
planking--caved in. The result was that the struggle with the elements
almost took precedence over the struggle with the enemy. The carrying
out of reliefs became a question of many hours, and entailed great
exhaustion to the troops. The labour required for trench maintenance was
far in excess of the resources of the Division. Attempts were made to
dig out the trenches with their sides at a slope of 6/1, which would
enable them to stand in spite of the incessant pressure on their sides
due to the absorbed water. The soil was, however, of such a nature that
digging in its sodden state imposed an immense physical strain on the
men. Not only was the weight of the mud on the shovel considerable, but
the mud adhered to the face of the shovel and could not be flung clear
of the trench. In consequence, the men often had to hoist the shovel
with its load out of the trench, leaving the earth to be scraped from
the shovel by a man working above ground.
In spite of the increasing labours of the men, as long as the wet
weather continued it was only possible to keep the trenches sufficiently
open to enable troops to pass along them with difficulty. In some cases,
notably in Campbell Avenue, even this was not possible, and the trench
became temporarily unfit for use. Subsequently the frost came, and the
labours of trench maintenance, to the delight of all, suddenly ceased.
The sides of the trenches stood as though they had been carved out of
wood. Officers and men began to take a fresh outlook on life. For the
first time for many days they went dry-shod, and began to forget the
unpleasant feeling of a mud-sodden kilt chafing the back of the knees,
and of muddy water oozing between the toes at every step.
But this short-lived return to dry trenches only accentuated the
miseries of the inevitable thaw, for the last state became worse than
the first. Not only did the clay trenches on which so much labour had
been expended collapse _en bloc_, but the action of the frost on the
chalk made it crumble. In consequence the chalk trenches collapsed
universally. The entire trench area became a ruin. The situation was
such that strong measures alone could deal with it. The mining could not
be discontinued, as this would involve too serious a risk. All other
work was, however, stopped, and the 8th Royal Scots and the Reserve
Brigade were all employed on restoring order out of this most appalling
chaos. Even with this amount of labour available, as long as wet weather
with short intermittent periods of frost alternated, more earth and
chalk fell into the trenches day by day than could be cleared out in a
day by the available working parties.
Apart from the mining operations, the construction of dug-outs, and the
creation of entanglements, little new work was carried out in this
sector. The French had already begun a system of defence in depth. This
was worked upon and improved. The only important new work undertaken was
the construction of the corps reserve lines, known as the Bouzincourt
Switch, which ran from Martinsart to Bouzincourt and across the river
Ancre to Albert.
In this reserve line there were constructed what are believed to be the
first concrete "pill-boxes" made either by the Allies or the Germans on
the Western Front. These were formed of walls of reinforced concrete
five feet thick, with loopholes through which machine-guns could fire.
After the British lines had been driven back by the great German
offensive in March 1918, these pill-boxes were situated in or about No
Man's Land, and were on several occasions struck by direct hits. They
were, however, undamaged, and, it is hoped, played the part with success
for which they were intended.
During the period in which the Division was in this sector, great
progress towards efficiency was made by the Divisional artillery. By the
time they had arrived in France mobile warfare was for the time being in
abeyance. This was a distinct advantage to Territorial gunners, as the
conditions of service in peace time afforded them few opportunities for
training for warfare of movement. They had, however, devoted a
considerable amount of study to technical gunnery. Consequently, they
had less ground to make up than would have been the case if they had
been engaged in a war of movement.
Their training at home had, however, been carried out under difficult
conditions, and when they arrived they still required considerable
training as units. This was mostly carried out in the line, as from
the time of its arrival in France the artillery was practically
continuously in action until early in 1916. In spite of this they
made great progress. An artillery brigade commander describes them as
follows: "By the end of their first year they were good; by the end of
their second year they were better; and by the end of their third year
they were first-class field artillery,--very mobile, very quick, and
full of initiative."
On the 31st August the 15-pounders were replaced by 18-pounders, to the
great relief of all concerned. The 15-pounders had always suffered from
a very restricted supply of ammunition. What ammunition they had was so
erratic as to be a positive danger to our own troops. The gunners also
had not had the opportunities at home of becoming complete masters of
their weapons. The result was that the artillery, working in these
adverse circumstances, did not at first enjoy the confidence of the
infantry. However, their work in this sector went far towards inspiring
in the infantry full confidence in their gunners.
Preparations for the battle of Loos brought to the Division for the
first time a fairly liberal supply of ammunition. This was to be
employed for the purpose of wire-cutting and bombardment as a feint to
the big attack farther north.
On 23rd September 600 rounds (18-pounder) were issued, and on 25th
September a further 1200 rounds, an unheard-of amount in those days.
The use of the artillery became less rigid than had been the case during
the first few months at the front. On 8th November an 18-pounder gun was
run up during the night to Coniston Street, about 800 yards behind the
front line. From this position, as soon as there was sufficient light,
thirty-six rounds were fired at an enemy sap, on which work was in
progress, at a range of 1200 yards.
On 15th December experiments were made in wire-cutting with 4·5
howitzers. One howitzer fired at a range of 800 yards with percussion
shrapnel and was most successful, a lane being cut right through the
belt of wire.
The following extract from the Divisional war diary for 28th August may
be quoted as a typical instance of the enterprise shown by the Division
as regards the use of artillery during this period:--
"The repair of the parapets damaged by our mines of the 28th had been
constantly hindered by enemy rifle grenades, large trench-mortar
bombs, and aerial torpedoes. The last two sorts of bombs, having a
very large charge, had reduced the front and support line trenches
opposite La Boisselle (where most of our mine shafts are) to such an
extent that passage along them had been dangerous. Only one 1-1/2-inch
mortar battery was available to reply, as the 4-inch battery had no
ammunition. Sanction was obtained for the expenditure of 5-inch and
6-inch howitzer and 18-pounder ammunition to keep down the enemy's
fire, and enable a day working party to work on the demolished
trenches. Work was continued all day with only eight casualties."
On 28th November 1915 three 18-pounder batteries of the Lowland Brigade
were brought into action, bringing the Divisional artillery up to
establishment.
An advance was also made in this sector in machine gunnery. Eight
machine-gun emplacements were made, fitted with traversing mountings for
indirect fire. These mountings were designed by Captain S. J. L. Hardie,
machine-gun officer of the 152nd Brigade, and made by the Divisional
Supply Column.
By this means aimed indirect fire was brought to bear by day or night on
localities known to be constantly used by the enemy.
In this period few events occurred which call for detailed description.
The explosion of mines was of frequent occurrence, and in several cases
the trenches sustained damage and losses were incurred. On the 12th and
20th August the French tunnellers were successful in destroying sections
of the enemy's trenches with mines, but on the latter date the mine also
did considerable damage to the British trenches.
In September preparations for the battle of Loos began. The Third Army
was not involved in this attack. Efforts were, however, made to lead the
enemy to anticipate an offensive in this sector, so as to make him
unwilling to transfer reserves from this front to the scene of the
actual operations.
Accordingly on 21st September work was begun on preparing the sector for
attack. Sap-heads and forming-up places were constructed, while the
artillery carried out wire-cutting and bombardment.
On 25th September the combined British and French attack was launched at
Loos. On the 26th preparations for attack were discontinued in the
Divisional sector. On the 27th the allowance of ammunition was reduced
to the minimum requirements necessary for retaliation.
During the sojourn of the Division in this part of France bombardments
of villages in the back areas occurred fairly frequently--Henencourt
(Corps Headquarters), Aveluy, Authuille, Albert, and Martinsart all
receiving attention.
The enemy was particularly lucky with one heavy shell which he fired
into Authuille on 29th November. It burst close to a working party of
the 5th Seaforths, who had just fallen in to draw tools from a dump, and
wounded 26 of them, including 2 officers.
On 18th September Martinsart was bombed by a hostile aeroplane, in those
days a most unusual occurrence.
On Christmas Day a curious exchange of compliments took place with the
enemy. On Christmas Eve he sang carols; this was at once stopped by the
Divisional artillery. He then came out of his trenches to fraternise;
this was also stopped by the Divisional artillery. He retaliated by
shelling Albert; the Division on the right immediately shelled
Courcelette. The enemy then shelled Aveluy; the gunners replied by
shelling Pozières. The enemy had the last word, for he then shelled
Martinsart, where he hit a horse, a mule, and a limber loaded with
grenades, which fortunately did not burst.
While the Division was in this sector various other New Army Divisions,
as has been mentioned, were attached to it for periods of instruction in
the line. The men did not fail to make the most of the fact that they
had been selected as instructors for the rival organisation, the New
Armies, and it was a matter of great satisfaction to them to find that
they had been chosen for the work.
On 2nd August the Divisional artillery had taken over from the French,
and taken into the line six batteries of the 18th Division, who were
attached for instruction. The artillery were particularly jealous of the
18-pounders with which their pupils were armed, while they were still
equipped with the obsolete 15-pounder. The same night the 53rd Infantry
Brigade Group, 18th Division, also moved into the line to begin a period
of attachment to the 51st Division for instruction in trench warfare.
Other units of the 18th Division followed, and carried out similar
periods of instruction in the line.
On conclusion of this attachment, when the 18th Division took over
a section of the line from the 51st, Major-General F. I. Maxse,
commanding the 18th Division, wrote the following appreciative letter
to General Bannatine-Allason: "I must write you a line to say how
grateful my Division is for the great assistance we have received from
yours. General Ross has done more to help us than I have experienced
from any other G.O.C. He not only left officers behind to put us up
to local tips on his sector, but he told off his best snipers to put
our snipers on to the Huns, which they successfully did. My people all
swear by the 51st Division. May we long soldier together."
General Maxse became a great friend of the 51st Division, particularly
when, in 1917, the Division carried out two most successful operations
under his command as Corps commander in the third battle of Ypres.
In September the 65th Infantry Brigade Group and a brigade of artillery
of the 22nd Division carried out its period of instruction in trench
warfare attached to the 51st. Later in the same month officers of the
36th (Ulster) Division were similarly attached. In December the 32nd
Division was instructed in the same manner, and finally relieved the
51st in this sector.
On 24th September 1915 General Bannatine-Allason gave up command of the
Highland Division. He had for some time been in indifferent health. The
strain of the past four months, in which he had commanded the Division
during its first experiences of war, had been severe, and the General
therefore felt that he could not either with justice to himself or to
his Division continue in so responsible a position until his health was
sufficiently recovered.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL R. BANNATINE-ALLASON, C.B.]
He therefore returned to England, and was given command of the 61st (2nd
Line South Midland) Territorial Division. During the period of his
command of the 2nd Line Highland Division, the General despatched over
15,000 men and over 3000 horses to the front. Most of these men were
sent as reinforcements to the 51st Division, so that he still materially
contributed towards the successes of the Division. From this fact, and
from the fact that under his command the Division was first initiated
into the ways of war, General Bannatine-Allason is still known in the
Highlands as the "nurse" of the 51st Division.
General Bannatine-Allason was succeeded by Major-General G. M. Harper,
C.B., D.S.O., who was promoted from the command of the 17th Brigade, 6th
Division, to the command of the Highland Division.
General Harper, during his period of command, inspired all ranks with
such confidence that it is difficult to express the high regard in which
he was held by the Division.
The success and consequent reputation gained by the Highland Division
can be attributed to the happy combination of the particular qualities
of the commander and his troops, and to the brilliant manner in which
the directing genius of the former was seconded by the genius for
fighting of the latter.
No better selection of a commander could have been made for the
Division, and no Division could have better suited the particular
qualities possessed by the new commander. Experience has since proved
that General Harper understood the ways and means of defeating the
German in a manner which was probably unequalled, and certainly never
surpassed on the Western Front. Further, he possessed such gifts as an
instructor as enabled him to train his Division in these ways and means
in a manner which set a standard to the British armies in France.
On their part, under General Harper's command, the Highlanders proved
that they possessed qualities which enabled them to respond to training
in a degree which few other troops could equal.
The result was that General Harper, having formulated principles
applicable to every phase of attack and defence, was able to imbue his
whole Division in their training with these principles. In consequence,
during active operations, officers and N.C.O.'s could be relied on to
lead their men intelligently in any circumstances in accordance with
tactical methods in which they had already been exercised in their
training.
The relief of the Division by the 32nd Division began on 23rd December,
and was completed by 2nd January 1916. After the relief, the Division
moved to the Flesselles area, coming under orders of the Ist Corps.
Their time in the line, beginning as it had done on 30th July 1915, had
been long and arduous. The men were in consequence beginning to show
signs of becoming stale. Though there had been no infantry action beyond
a few encounters between patrols and a small bombing raid carried out by
the 154th Infantry Brigade on 2nd January 1916, yet the conditions had
been far from pleasant.
Great strides had been made by the enemy in trench weapons, the range,
calibre, and accuracy of his trench-mortars, and the numbers in which
they were employed, having considerably increased. His rifle grenades
had also been improved, and were used with increasing frequency. The
mining situation, as has already been pointed out, had at one time been
serious, though it never led to the same serious infantry fighting which
occurred later in the Labyrinth. The want of shell-proof cover had been
considerably felt; the burden of work imposed on the Division when the
trenches collapsed had been almost insupportable. The general conditions
of trench life during this period are admirably summed up in Sir Douglas
Haig's despatch, dated 29th May 1916, as follows:--
"Although the struggle in a general sense has not been intense, it has
been everywhere continuous....
"The maintenance and repair of our defences alone, especially in
winter, entails constant heavy work. Bad weather and the enemy combine
to flood and destroy trenches, dug-outs, and communications; all such
damages must be repaired promptly under fire, and almost certainly by
night.
"Artillery and snipers are practically never silent, patrols are out in
front of the lines every night, and heavy bombardments by the artillery
of one or both sides take place daily in various parts of the line.
Below ground there is continual mining and counter-mining, which, by
the ever-present threat of sudden explosion and the uncertainty as
to where and when it will take place, causes perhaps a more constant
strain than any other form of warfare.... In short, a steady and
continuous fight has gone on day and night above ground and below it."
It will be appreciated from the above that, though many of the days
under review were described in the official communiqués as "quiet days
on the Western Front," the quietude was not always apparent to those who
lived within the range of the enemy's activities.
The absence of depression amongst the men in these adverse circumstances
was, however, constantly remarked on, and throughout the Division
remained in good spirits.
Colonel Ian Stewart reports an incident which bears witness to the
imperturbability of the men even in the Ilot, the storm centre of the
mining activity. Colonel Stewart was crawling round the front line with
General Ross, in such close contact to the enemy that they dare speak
only in whispers for fear of provoking a shower of rifle- or
hand-grenades. As they came round a sandbagged traverse they found a
Jock sitting on his fire-step, smoking the inevitable cigarette and
reading 'Pearson's Magazine,' quite oblivious to his proximity to the
enemy.
Colonel Stewart, shortly after arriving back at Divisional Headquarters,
received a telephone message from General Ross informing him that he was
just going up to the line to investigate a mine which had been exploded
almost in the exact spot where the Jock had been reading 'Pearson's.'
The fate of the said Jock was not recorded.
The Division had profited considerably by their prolonged tour in the
same sector, and had completed its education in trench warfare in a most
thorough manner. The men had learnt trench-craft, that art which enables
them to keep the enemy constantly on the alert and at the same time to
protect themselves by their wits from avoidable casualties and
discomforts.
They had also had time to acquire that sixth sense which a short spell
of the war gave to all the fighting troops, of working, walking, and
fighting in the dark. They had become good snipers, and experienced
trench workers. They had learnt valuable lessons regarding such
questions as the influence of the nature of the soil on trench
construction, the organisation of working parties, the disposal of mine
spoil, &c.
In fact, the Division was most fortunately placed. After a long
experience of close contact with the enemy, it was now to be given a
period in which time would be available to collect and crystallise its
thoughts on the problems of defence and to be trained by General Harper
in the principles of the attack.
CHAPTER IV.
TRAINING AND REORGANISATION--THE LABYRINTH.
The Division was now out of the line for the first time under General
Harper's command, and the latter lost no time in instructing officers
and men in a form of attack which at the time was employed by no other
Division.
Past experience, emphasised by the battle of Loos, had made it evident
that to hold captured ground against the inevitable counter-attack, the
attackers have not only to compete with the enemy actually manning the
assaulted trenches. They must, in addition, dispose themselves at the
end of the advance in a manner which enables them to resist the
counter-attacks which will inevitably be delivered by the enemy's
reserves. In the past, the objectives of the attack had not been
sufficiently clearly defined, with the result that the forward movement
frequently came to an end with some bodies of troops far in advance of
others, and all in a state of disorganisation. The foremost troops were
thus left exposed, holding insufficiently consolidated salients, and
disposed in a manner which prevented command being adequately exercised
over them. The result was that the enemy was able to employ his fresh
reserves against the tired and disorganised troops holding these
salients. His counter-attacks, organised so as to be delivered both
frontally and from the flanks, were in consequence frequently
successful.
It thus followed that Divisions which in the early phases of an attack
had carried out a brilliant advance, were subsequently in the later
stages often overwhelmed and severely cut up.
It had, further, been the custom in the past for the same body of troops
to be ordered to fight its way through a succession of trench lines or
defended localities. Thus, as the action progressed, the attack became
weaker and more disorganised through casualties, and so increasingly
lost its driving power. At the same time, when the forward movement came
to a standstill, no organised bodies of troops were left suitably
disposed to hold the ground gained.
The plan of attack adopted by the 51st Division was designed to
eradicate both these sources of failure. It was realised that if
counter-attacks were to be defeated, the advance must be made in a
series of clearly-defined bounds. Each bound was to be made good before
the operations for the capture of the next began.
Further, the idea was to employ a fresh body of troops for each bound.
Thus, when the troops detailed for a particular bound had reached their
objective, they remained on it, and disposed themselves in the most
suitable manner to hold the ground they had gained against
counter-attacks. A fresh body of troops then passed through them and
made good the next bound, consolidating in their turn the ground gained.
This form of attack became the sealed pattern for all attacks carried
out by the Highland Division, and was largely responsible for the many
outstanding successes of the Division.
Gradually as the war progressed and the Division achieved one success
after another, its value became apparent, and it eventually became the
stereotyped form of attack in the majority of the Divisions in France.
During this period, apart from the training of units under their own
commanders, Divisional schools of instruction were formed to give
individual training to officers and N.C.O.'s. A Divisional grenade
school was formed, at which 13 officers and 260 other ranks were put
through a course every week. At this course instruction was given in the
Mills bomb, which had now replaced the former types of improvised bomb.
A Divisional school for infantry was also opened at Villers-Bocage under
Lieut.-Colonel D. Baird, commanding the 8th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders. At this school 20 officers and 40 N.C.O.'s attended a
series of fourteen-day courses. The object of this school was to
increase the powers of command of the senior officers and N.C.O.'s, and
to improve their knowledge of tactics.
A show-ground was also laid out, where the best methods to be adopted in
trench warfare could be demonstrated. Here also types of trenches
suitable to the varying natures and conditions of ground were
constructed for purposes of instruction.
On 8th February the course of training was interrupted by the move of
the Division to the Daours area, with a view to taking over from the
30th Division, on the sector on the north bank of the Somme. The orders
for this relief were, however, cancelled on the 18th February, and the
Division moved back to the Flesselles area.
During this period the composition of the Division underwent
considerable alteration. The three Lancashire battalions left the
Division on 3rd January 1916 to join the 55th (West Lancashire)
Division.
The 6th Scottish Rifles joined the 33rd Division. They were met again
later by many of their former comrades of the Highland Division in High
Wood in July and August 1916.
These four battalions were replaced by the 4th and 5th Black Watch, the
4th Seaforths and 4th Camerons. Brigadier-General C. E. Stewart, Black
Watch, was placed in command of this brigade, and it retained the title
154th Infantry Brigade.
In February 1916 further changes took place; the 4th and 5th Black Watch
were posted to General Headquarters, and the 4th Camerons to the Base.
These three battalions were replaced in the 154th Infantry Brigade by
the 9th Royal Scots, the 4th Gordon Highlanders, and the 7th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders.
All the battalions in the reconstituted 154th Infantry Brigade had
landed in France some months before the remainder of the Division, being
posted to various regular brigades as an additional battalion.
Thus, as regards the infantry, the original composition of the Highland
Division was restored, with the exception of the 4th Cameron
Highlanders, the 6th Gordon Highlanders, and the 9th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders.
During the same month changes were also made as regards the organisation
of machine-guns. The infantry battalions had joined the Expeditionary
Force each equipped with two machine-guns under the command of the
battalion machine-gun officer. In July 1915 the battalion machine-gun
section was increased by an additional two guns.
In January 1916 a machine-gun company of sixteen guns was affiliated to
each brigade. These companies were formed by the amalgamation of the
four battalion machine-gun sections in each brigade, Captains Hardie,
Calder, and Board commanding the companies of the 152nd, 153rd, and
154th Infantry Brigades respectively.
In the early part of 1916 the trench-mortar situation was greatly
improved. Three 2-inch trench-mortar batteries were formed by the
Divisional artillery. These mortars fired the 60-pound bomb already
described known as the "Donald Dinnie." They were still considerably
inferior to the German trench-mortars in range, but they constituted a
considerable advance on all previous experiments. Their chief faults lay
in their liability to misfire, and in their frequent inaccuracy, due to
the boxes containing the component parts not being water-tight.
When the "Donald Dinnie" did burst on its target, the effect was
gratifying. The retaliation they almost invariably drew from the enemy
was the best evidence of their efficacy, and made the duty of serving
the mortars an extremely hazardous one.
In May 1916 a light trench-mortar battery, consisting of four Stokes
mortars, was formed for each brigade. The Stokes gun proved the most
satisfactory British light trench-mortar invented, and remained the
weapon of the light trench-mortar batteries throughout the war.
On 1st March 1916 orders were received for the Division to march
northwards and take over from the 23rd French Division of the XII^{me}
Corps d'Armée in a sector north of Arras, now known to history as the
Labyrinth. This move was due to the necessity for the British to take
over more line from the French. The object was to free as many French
Divisions as possible for the defence of Verdun, against which the
German was delivering his great attack.
Preliminary reconnaissances of the new line by senior commanders and
their staffs began on 3rd March. The first troops moved off to the new
area on 6th March. During the march, the Division staged in the
Beauval-Candas area and the Frevent area. Finally, Divisional
headquarters opened on 12th March at Duisans, General Harper taking over
command of the line at 8 A.M. on that date.
The march to the new area is chiefly memorable to those who took part in
it from the fact that much of it was carried out in a blinding
snowstorm, with all its attendant discomforts.
The cold was intense, and was severely felt by parties proceeding to
carry out preliminary reconnaissances in motor lorries and by the troops
as they arrived each night in new billets.
The Division, after its six weeks period of rest and training, was at
the top of its form, and presented a most soldierly appearance. It had
profited considerably from its training, in spite of the fact that it
had been handicapped by spells of bad weather.
This was the last period of rest of more than ten days' duration which
the Division was to have until the following January.
The new sector extended roughly from the ruined village of Roclincourt
on the right to the ruined village of Neuville St Vaast (exclusive) on
the left. The front line trenches were some thousand yards east of these
two villages.
This country had been the scene of tremendous fighting when the French
had advanced along the Lorette ridge and attacked the Vimy heights in
conjunction with the British operations at Loos.
Here the French had made considerable progress, much of it yard by yard,
after bitter fighting. Their gains, however, had not all been held. The
fighting had been of so desperate and stubborn a nature that French and
Germans had repeatedly dug themselves in close proximity to each
other. As a result, the whole sector consisted of an unintelligible maze
of trenches, aptly called by the French the Labyrinth.
The country in rear of the lines contained many villages now well known
to the Highland Division--the ruins of Ecurie, Anzin, Marœuil, Bray,
Ecoivres, Mont St Eloi. This area can almost be called the spiritual
home of the Highland Division in France, since it occupied it for three
months in 1916, five months in 1917 during the battle of Arras, and
returned there in May 1918. From May onwards it remained in that part of
the world, with the exception of a brief interlude in Champagne, and
from it began its victorious advance which culminated with the
Armistice.
In this sector the whole country-side was overlooked by the enemy in an
astonishing degree. He occupied the famous feature known as the Vimy
Ridge, of which the highest point just north of Thelus reached the
height of 135 metres. His foremost trenches were on the outlying spurs
of the Ridge, while the trenches taken over from the French were in the
low-lying ground at the foot of these spurs.
The enemy thus possessed all the advantages of close observation over
our lines; while, in addition, from the upper slopes of the Ridge, he
obtained a magnificent panoramic view of the whole of the areas in rear
of the British trench systems. On a clear day he could see from Thelus
as far westwards as the road running from Habarcq to the
Hermaville-Arras road.
Moreover, south of the Scarpe, Observatory Ridge stared down at
Roclincourt and Ecurie.
The French, to neutralise his facilities for observation, had
constructed communication trenches of what seemed interminable length.
These ran from Anzin, Marœuil, and Mont St Eloi to the fire trenches,
none of these villages being within two miles of the front line. The
labour of walking along these trenches, all cut on a very winding
pattern, was severe. It, however, fortunately transpired that the French
in constructing trenches of this length had either flattered the enemy's
vigilance, or that his vigilance had subsequently diminished, as it
proved unnecessary to walk inside the trenches, certainly for the first
three-quarters of a mile.
The enemy did, however, keep a sharp look-out for movement on the roads
within range of his artillery. He had, shortly before the Division
arrived, killed a French regimental commander who took the liberty of
riding on horse-back along the Arras-Bethune road.
These long communication trenches were admirably dug by the French
Territorials, who had constructed them, and were still standing and in
daily use when the Division returned to this sector in February of the
following year.
In the British lines the defended village of Ecurie, about 100 metres
above sea-level, afforded a good view of Thelus and of the enemy's
defences at a distance of from 400 to 500 yards behind his front line.
Observation of his front-line trenches could in most places only be
obtained from observation posts in the forward area.
The relief of the French 23rd and 24th Divisions of the XII^{me} Corps
d'Armée was completed by 14th March. It was carried out during a
blizzard of great severity, which continued for forty-eight hours.
During this period the troops could do no more than remain where they
had been placed by their guides, or misplaced as the case might be.
During the relief and, in fact, until the blizzard abated, officers and
men had only a hazy idea as to where they actually were. Similarly
commanders were ignorant of the position of their troops. All three
infantry brigades were in the line--the 154th Brigade on the right in
the vicinity of Roclincourt, the 152nd in the centre, and the 153rd on
the left.
When the weather cleared, it was found that the Division had taken over
from the French an unintelligible tangle of trenches dug in what can
only be described as a vast cemetery, in which the earth in many places
barely covered the dead.
The sector was also honeycombed with mines from end to end, the enemy
apparently being complete masters of the mining situation. In fact, his
supremacy in mining had become so complete that, immediately prior to
the relief, the French had drawn up a scheme for evacuating the front
line except for lightly-held outposts. The plan they had intended to
adopt was to recast the scheme of defence and construct amidst the
existing network of derelict trenches a new support and reserve line.
The scheme had been completed, and was on the point of being put into
execution when the Highland Division took over the sector. The
Divisional commander decided to continue with this policy. The
construction of the new scheme of defences necessitated a vast amount of
work, and was only fairly complete three months later when the Division
left the sector.
This alteration in the siting of the trenches demanded the construction
of an enormous number of dug-outs. It soon became evident that without
these the daily casualty list must be heavy. Not only was the artillery
activity considerable, but the German had also concentrated in this
sector every type of trench-mortar which had been evolved, and was
extremely free in his use of them.
The mining was of a more savage nature than had been the case in La
Boisselle, and in many instances resulted in serious infantry fighting.
The mines were, as a rule, blown by the enemy with two objects. If the
breadth of No Man's Land was not considerable, they were frequently
blown with a view to destroying our trenches with their garrisons. If,
however, the breadth of No Man's Land was great, or his system of
defensive galleries were good, he would blow his mines in No Man's Land
with a view to occupying them as a line of observation and snipers'
posts. By the frequent blowing of this type of mine, he was able to
cover his front with a screen of craters which denied the British
observation of his front line, and created for him a chain of commanding
mounds along our front.
In some cases, if the crater formed by a mine explosion was some
distance from the British front line, no infantry action would follow.
If, however, a mine was blown under a British trench, it was usually
accompanied by an enemy raid, which was planned to enter our trenches
during the confusion caused by the mine and surprise the surviving
garrison. If, on the other hand, it was blown in No Man's Land close to
the British front line, it was necessary at all costs to prevent the
enemy from occupying it. Thus in the two last cases heavy infantry
fighting often occurred. In the latter case, the object of these actions
was to prevent the enemy from establishing himself on the crater. If he
did so the position was serious, for the crater became a permanent
menace to the security of our lines. Where the ground might have been
flat, a large hollow mound had now arisen. If the enemy established
himself on the British side of the mound (_i.e._, the near lip, as it
was called), he might construct sniping-posts which would dominate the
trenches. Should he only establish himself on the far lip, he still was
able, by working around the lip of the crater towards the flank, to
shoot down into our trenches in enfilade.
It was suggested that the Germans, by some peculiar method of tamping
(_i.e._, packing the explosive in the chamber), used to blow his craters
with the far lip higher than the near lip. Thus, if he only established
himself on the far lip, the near lip, being lower, did not obscure his
view to the front; conversely the view from the near lip, if occupied by
the British, was obscured to the front by the higher far lip. Whether
his craters were formed in this manner from accident (_i.e._, the lie of
the ground) or from design is not clear. The fact remained that an
examination of many craters in the Neuville St Vaast area proved this to
be the case.
These crater fights often developed into considerable minor operations
involving many casualties. They almost always took place in the dark,
and were an unpleasant ordeal for all concerned.
The crater, still smoking from its base like a miniature volcano; the
stench of the fumes; the whiteness of the freshly-turned chalk standing
out in the darkness, produced a setting which intensified the normal
horrors of battle.
When the German blew a mine he, of course, knew the hour and the place
at which the explosion would occur. He knew also from the depth of his
gallery and from the amount of explosive used how close to the spot his
assaulting troops might assemble without fear from the falling débris.
He was also able to assemble dumps of loophole plates, prepared and
portable obstacles, bombs, &c., close to the scene of operations. The
troops might or might not have been warned that a mine was to be
expected in a certain area.
In these circumstances he therefore started with the odds considerably
in his favour; and yet, as will be seen, as far as the Highland Division
was concerned, he seldom met with the success he anticipated.
His plan was to form up his consolidating party as close to the place
where the crater was to be blown as was safe. He then blew the mine, and
simultaneously opened a barrage of artillery, trench-mortars, and rifle
grenades, &c., on the two flanks and on the British side of the crater.
He thus hoped to deny to our troops access to it. Under cover of this
barrage he then rushed his assaulting parties up to the crater, and
attempted to consolidate posts both on the near and far lips.
Immediately, therefore, that a mine was blown, parties had to be
organised to rush to the crater and seize at least the near lip. These
parties had, of course, no previous knowledge as to the time at which
the mine was to be exploded. They were also liable to be temporarily
disorganised in the general confusion caused by the explosion. Thus, as
a rule, when the crater fighting began, the enemy was already on the
near lip before our parties were fairly on the scene.
A closely-contested fight would then ensue with bombs, Lewis guns, and
rifles, and would continue until the enemy had been ejected at all
events from the near lip. Posts would then be established on it, and a
sap would be dug connecting the posts to the foremost British trench.
In these encounters casualties were frequently heavy, as the parties had
often to pass through a heavy barrage, followed by their bomb carriers.
The latter were employed in large numbers, as in this form of warfare
several hundred bombs were often thrown in one night.
On first taking over, the mining situation was obscure. The French
tunnellers had been withdrawn, leaving only old French Territorials to
man the listening galleries. These veterans considered this duty _très
dangereux_, as indeed it was.
In consequence, the period was marked by a constant state of anxiety as
to what portions of the line were safe from the possibility of being
blown up at any moment.
However, on the arrival of the British tunnelling companies, which were
again largely reinforced by the coal miners in the Division, accurate
information was soon obtained as regards the enemy's underground
activity. The defensive galleries were first perfected, so that timely
warning could be given of any mine that he was likely to explode. By
this means camouflets could be used to hinder his progress. Subsequently
it became possible to take the offensive, and mines were blown to
destroy his crater positions and trenches.
Later, when heavy calls were made upon the German troops to sustain the
fighting on the Somme, they were compelled to relax their efforts in
this sector, with the result that the British tunnellers established a
marked superiority over them.
As soon as the aforementioned blizzard had cleared and commanders could
find out the disposition of the men, it became evident that the ground
in the forward area was far too thickly held. Orders were in consequence
issued for the line to be thinned immediately. Small sectors of disused
trenches were dug out to accommodate the surplus men temporarily while a
more detailed scheme of defence could be formulated.
The advisability of this measure was soon proved, as from 24th March
mines were continually being exploded under or in close proximity to the
front line. A typical case occurred on 26th March, when at 2.30 A.M. the
enemy fired two mines simultaneously, one on the left of the 152nd
Brigade, the other on the right of the 153rd.
These explosions were followed by a heavy bombardment of our front and
support trenches with shrapnel, all types of trench-mortar bombs, and
rifle and machine-gun fire. A party of about eight Germans then advanced
towards the crater in the 153rd Brigade area, but were driven back by
two officers and a party of grenadiers. Our losses were severe: 4
officers (1 killed, 2 wounded, and 1 missing) and 74 other ranks (14
killed, 24 wounded, and 36 missing). In addition, there were 24 other
ranks suffering from shock. Of these, one company of the 6th Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders lost 2nd Lieutenant M'Neil and 4 men killed, 5
wounded, and 15 missing. The missing were those unfortunate men who were
buried by the falling earth. Of these two craters, the one on the right
proved to be seventy yards in length.
On 31st March another mine was fired by the Germans on the front of the
153rd Brigade, with the loss of 1 officer wounded, 6 other ranks killed
and 3 wounded. The explosion of this mine was also followed by an
intense bombardment by weapons of all natures. A party of Germans then
entered a sap. Of these one approached a Jock who had survived the
explosion, and pointing his rifle at him, said, "Hands up, Englishman!"
The infuriated Jock threw a Mills bomb at the German, having failed to
remove the safety-pin, and shouted, "Scotsman, you ---- bastard." The
bomb struck the German full on the forehead and felled him. He was
captured, and subsequently died in the casualty clearing station from a
fractured skull.
The 6th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were particularly unfortunate
as regards mines, and by the 10th April had already experienced six
mines on their fronts.
On 28th April four mines were exploded in front of the 6th Seaforth
Highlanders and 8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. The resultant
casualties to these two battalions were 6 officers wounded at duty, 12
other ranks killed, 75 wounded, and 30 missing, believed buried. The
explosions of these mines were followed by a forty-five minutes' intense
bombardment. The Divisional artillery, however, opened a barrage on the
enemy's lines opposite the newly-formed craters with such rapidity that
he was unable to employ his infantry. Throughout the whole period the
manner in which the artillery supported the infantry in this form of
warfare was admirable, and gave the latter great encouragement.
The explosion of mines became of such frequent occurrence that the
troops became very expert in rapidly seizing and consolidating craters.
Dumps were made at frequent intervals along the front containing all the
materials required for consolidation. In a short time the troops could
be relied on to establish themselves on the near lip, however
unexpectedly a crater might be blown. This was largely due to the
gallantry and initiative of the junior officers, on whose skill and
leading success in these enterprises was dependent.
Demonstrations were given in consolidation, and a platoon for each
front-line battalion was ear-marked for the consolidation of any mine
crater which might be blown on the battalion's front.
A natural concomitant to mining was sniping. The lip of a crater affords
an excellent post from which to snipe, particularly when, as was the
case in this sector, the ground sloped from the German position towards
the British. The trenches on this sector were also particularly open.
After the enemy positions in this sector had been captured by the
Division in April 1917, an examination was made of the German crater
posts. It was astonishing to see to what an extent he could look down
into the British trenches. It was realised at the time that men walking
along the trenches were often under observation, and, indeed, the
casualties from sniping proved that this was so. It was not, however,
appreciated till later to what a degree men in the trenches,
particularly the communication trenches, were visible to the Germans. In
some places even the duck-boards at the bottom of the trenches were in
enemy view.
The result of this situation was that at first the enemy made a
considerable bag by sniping; Colonel Campbell, commanding the 4th
Seaforth Highlanders, was killed by a sniper the day after the Division
had taken over the line. Within a fortnight his successor was killed in
a similar way.
However, the Highland Division, with a number of stalkers and gillies in
its ranks, had probably the best material the country produced from
which to make snipers. After a short period devoted to organisation and
training, the snipers of the Division soon obtained a superiority over
the enemy. It, however, always remained a sector in which the greatest
care had to be exercised in looking over the parapet or in moving
amongst the saps and forward boyaux. Enemy snipers were continually
shattering periscopes with rifle shots.
In the Labyrinth the Division made its first organised raids. These
raids consisted in heavily barraging a certain area, then at a given
moment the barrage lifted off certain portions of this area and allowed
the assaulting infantry to enter it. The barrage remained down on three
sides of the area to protect the attackers who entered it from the
fourth side from interference from without while they were destroying
the Germans within. This form of barrage, originally first employed by
the Germans, was known as the Box Barrage.
The two most successful raids which took place during this period were
those carried out by Lieutenant E. A. Mackintosh of the 5th Seaforth
Highlanders (since killed in action), and Captain Herd of the 6th Black
Watch. The former was in consequence awarded the Military Cross, and the
latter the D.S.O.
Raids subsequently became of such frequent occurrence that want of
space forbids description of them all. Certain raids have, however, been
selected for description, which will be dealt with later.
These raids in particular brought to light certain facts concerning
German trench construction. The German trenches did not resemble the
small ditch-like trenches commonly seen at schools of instruction and
training grounds. They can better be compared to the marker's gallery in
a rifle range. They were ten to eleven feet deep, with the sides for the
most part revetted with planks. To get into them was not easy; to get
out of them still less easy; while evacuating the wounded from them was
a matter of very considerable difficulty. In fact, in the case of
Mackintosh's raid, it is doubtful if his wounded could have been brought
back to our lines at all had not a sally-port through which the more
severely wounded were carried been discovered.
On 21st May the enemy became extremely active. The Divisional artillery
were heavily bombarded during the afternoon and evening with
lachrymatory shells, as also were the communication trenches. At the
same time the trenches of the 25th Division on the left of the Highland
Division, and of the 47th Division, were intensely bombarded. Marœuil,
Anzin, and Mont St Eloi were also shelled during the night, as well as
several villages in rear of the 25th and 47th Divisional areas. At
Marœuil an 8-inch shell burst in the 152nd Brigade headquarter office
within a few seconds of the clerks having left it for the cellar,
completely wrecking it, and killing the staff captain's two horses,
which were tethered outside it.
This bombardment culminated in a successful hostile attack, the enemy,
with apparently little difficulty, attaining his object and establishing
himself firmly on the western slopes of the Vimy Ridge.
The cause of his success was due to the fact that he succeeded in
secretly concentrating a large force of artillery with which to support
his attack. He then subjected all the trenches involved to a bombardment
of an intensity which in those days was considered unparalleled. The
garrisons of the trenches attacked were almost completely without the
protection of shell-proof dug-outs, and the defenders were thus for the
most part killed or wounded by the bombardment before the infantry
attack was launched.
At this juncture the Divisional sector was considerably increased; in
fact, the Division took over the whole front of the XVIIth Corps. This
extension was caused by the necessity of withdrawing troops from this
part of the line preparatory to the Somme battle.
The 152nd Brigade was withdrawn on 23rd May, the 153rd and 154th
Brigades extending their brigade sectors so as to include the area
previously held by the 152nd. On the nights 1-2nd June and 2-3rd the
152nd Brigade moved northwards and relieved troops of the 25th Division
in the Neuville St Vaast sector.
To conceal from the enemy the fact that the whole Corps front was held
by the Highland Division alone, the kilt was no longer worn by the
troops in the line, khaki trousers being issued instead.
The situation in the new sector taken over by the 152nd Brigade was a
curious one. The extreme left of the enemy's attack on the Vimy Ridge
rested on the left boundary of the new sector. Thus on the brigade left
boundary in the front and support lines the British and the Germans
occupied the same trenches, sandbag bombing-stops alone separating them.
In some cases the British held communication trenches while the Germans
occupied the trench into which the communication trench led,
bombing-blocks again separating the two forces.
Across these blocks lively exchanges of bombs and rifle grenades
spasmodically occurred. The distance separating the opposing sides was,
however, so small that artillery and trench-mortars could be used by
neither owing to the danger of short rounds inflicting casualties on
friends as well as foes.
In these circumstances the left flank in the front and support lines was
very unprotected and presented to the enemy a "raw edge." It was an
uncomfortable situation, as there appeared to be every prospect of the
enemy's developing his initial success by a flank attack delivered
southwards from the area into which he had penetrated.
The feeling of apprehension on this score was accentuated by the fact
that if he supported this attack with a similar concentration of
artillery, the absence of shell-proof dug-outs in the Neuville St Vaast
sector would ensure for him success. In these circumstances the
artillery would have had an easy task, as this sector was completely
overlooked by a high crater called Broadmarsh, from which the Germans
obtained magnificent observation of the whole Divisional left front.
Broadmarsh crater was an awe-inspiring feature that appeared to follow
one with its eyes wherever one went. It was like a volcano that might
erupt at any moment, and played a prominent part in every minor
enterprise which took place in its vicinity.
In these adverse circumstances it became clear that the only way a
hostile attack against the Neuville St Vaast sector could be defeated
was by employing to the full every day's grace which the enemy gave.
A defensive flank was therefore sited and its construction begun, so as
to round off the defences where the troops were in closest contact to
the enemy and present to him a continuous front rather than an edge. The
digging of a reserve line was also put in hand, and the construction of
a large number of shell-proof dug-outs begun.
In actual fact the enemy made no further attacks, but he maintained a
continuous activity with artillery and trench-mortars. Later, after the
Somme battle had begun, the calls made on the German troops compelled
him to relax his efforts considerably. The feeling of tension was thus
appreciably lessened, though the sector could at no time be described as
a quiet one.
During this period of anxiety the situation was made still more
difficult by a snap of bitterly cold weather in June, which had followed
a period of violent rain-storms. The result was that a number of cases
of trench-feet occurred in midsummer, when all materials and stores used
for the prevention of this complaint had been handed in as no longer
required.
The weather, combined with the constant work on trench construction and
the continual mine explosions and bombardments, proved very wearing to
the men. At this period, with all three brigades employed in holding the
line, the men were in the trench area for twenty-one days and at rest
only for seven every month. The result was that, when the Division was
ordered to the Somme, they had, owing to the constant strain, become
thoroughly tired and stale. Indeed, in the Labyrinth and Neuville St
Vaast sectors, trench warfare, as far as the Highland Division was
concerned, reached its zenith of intensity. A great effort was required
from all ranks, first to reduce the superiority which the enemy had
established, later to reduce the balance so that the superiority
gradually passed to the British. There was no feature in trench warfare
in which, during the period immediately following the relief of the
French, the enemy did not hold the advantage. The mining situation, the
sniping, the absence of dug-outs, all produced acute problems which
demanded immediate solution if disaster were to be avoided.
His observation of our lines in this sector was probably unparalleled in
the British zone. He employed in large numbers rifle grenades and
trench-mortars of every calibre with astonishing accuracy. Finally, he
added to the troops an additional embarrassment by his capture of the
Vimy Ridge.
The enemy, the 2nd Guards Reserve Division, proved themselves throughout
worthy opponents, ready and eager to profit by any weakness displayed
opposite to them. This Division is remembered for an act of courtesy of
a kind seldom associated with the German people.
A certain Private Robertson of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders was captured
in a sap-head after having made a gallant attempt to defend himself, in
spite of a fractured skull. The following day a number of undetonated
rifle grenades were fired into the British lines stating in English that
the gallant soldier Private Robertson, Seaforth Highlanders, had died of
his wounds and had been buried with full military honours in the
cemetery at Rouvroy.
In spite of the strength of the opposition the men showed excellent
spirit throughout, having carried out many good raids, and having
repulsed with losses numerous hostile raids, nor was a square yard of
ground lost.
On Saturday, 24th June, an intense bombardment started at some distance
to the south, and lasted throughout the day and night. This was the
opening of the preliminary bombardment of the great Somme offensive. It
continued incessantly until 1st July, when the attack was launched.
Rumours of every kind began to circulate round the trenches, and much
speculation arose as to whether and when the Division would be given an
opportunity of taking part in the battle.
During this period the artillery carried out periodical bombardments of
the enemy's trenches, with the idea of making him think that an attack
in this sector was imminent. In this they seem to have been successful,
for each night the Germans fired intermittent short hurricane
bombardments on the front and support and communication trenches,
presumably with a view to preventing the assembly of attacking troops.
These bombardments were extremely heavy while they lasted; but, thanks
to the large number of dug-outs which had by this time been completed,
they inflicted little loss on the trench garrisons.
On 27th June arrangements were begun for the attachment of the 60th (2nd
Line London Territorial) Division to the Highland Division for a period
of instruction in the line. The news of the arrival of the 60th Division
was welcomed by all ranks, as it was looked on as a sure indication that
the Division would be relieved and would move to the Somme battle.
It had been arranged that as soon as the 60th Division were ready to
take over the line, the Highland Division should be moved to the back
areas for a period of much-needed rest and training before proceeding
southwards.
Possibly, with its later experiences of battle fighting the Division
might not have been so anxious to hurry off to take part in a great
attack. In these days, however, apart from the battle of Festubert, it
had not been employed in an offensive. Officers and men were therefore
anxious that the Division should be given an opportunity of operating in
an attack as a complete unit.
The 60th Division began their attachment on 30th June. This was carried
out first by individual officers and N.C.O.'s, then by sections, by
platoons, by companies, and finally by battalions. On 13th July the
brigades of the 60th Division began taking over from the brigades of the
Highland Division. On 14th July General Bultin, G.O.C. 60th Division,
assumed command of the sector.
This system of instruction meant that there were reliefs of some kind
being carried out every night. These were greatly hampered by the
sudden intense bombardments to which the enemy subjected the British
trenches. In consequence, casualties were frequently heavy. In one
brigade sector alone over sixty casualties were sustained during a
single night.
As a parting gift to the Germans on the last day the Division was in the
line, the 5th Gordon Highlanders raided the enemy's trenches, bombed his
dug-outs, and killed several of the garrison.
On 14th July the Division moved by motor lorry to the
Doullens-Lucheux-Baudricourt area. The popular supposition amongst the
troops was that they were bound for a rest area. On the 15th the move
was continued by march south to the area Bernaville-Candas-Hem.
All doubts were dispelled on the 20th, for the Division then entrained
at Candas and detrained at Mericourt. While passing through Amiens, it
was interesting to pass several trains going westwards, packed with
battle-soiled soldiers, all in the very best of spirits. They were a
Division coming out of the Somme battle to rest and refit. Many of them
wore captured German pickelhaubers. Apart from the raggedness of their
appearance and their stubbly beards, they looked at the top of their
form. One always felt that it was spectacles such as these which gave
the war correspondent that erroneous theory to which he adhered so
fixedly throughout the war, that soldiers like "going over the top," and
do so full of jests and wreathed in smiles.
From Mericourt the Division marched to the Ribemont-Meaulte area,
parties being sent in advance to reconnoitre the line.
On 21st July orders were received that the Highland Division would
relieve the 33rd Division in the line north-east of Fricourt during the
coming night.
Just prior to the arrival of the Division on the Somme, two officers
joined it who, second only to General Harper, were most responsible for
the high standard of efficiency which it attained. These were
Brigadier-General L. Oldfield, D.S.O., R.A., and Brigadier-General H.
Pelham Burn, D.S.O., Gordon Highlanders. The former was appointed C.R.A.
in place of Brigadier-General M. J. MacCarthy, C.M.G., who left to take
up a new appointment. The latter assumed command of the 152nd Infantry
Brigade in place of Brigadier-General W. C. Ross, C.B., who took up an
appointment at home, and later commanded a brigade in Salonika.
General Ross's departure from the 152nd Infantry Brigade caused the
deepest regret to all ranks. He had been intimately known in peace time
to many of the officers, N.C.O.'s, and men whom he now commanded in war.
He was secretary of the Territorial Force Association for his county,
and he had commanded his brigade since November 1914. General Ross had a
personality which won for him the friendship of all who came in contact
with him. The Highland soldier had become one of his first interests,
and he possessed a great knowledge and understanding of him. Further, no
one could fail to admire his natural courage. General Bannatine-Allason
has described him as spending many hours, both by day and night, in
crawling round the most exposed saps and dangerous places in his sector.
General Ross spent so much of his time amongst his men that he was a
familiar figure to them all, while he knew numbers of them by name, and
in many cases knew also their parents, families, homes, and employers.
General Oldfield was not only a scientific gunner of the first order,
but also rapidly developed a commanding knowledge of infantry tactics.
This knowledge enabled him, in conjunction with General Harper, to draw
up the artillery plans for attack and defence, so that in all operations
the infantry were directly supported by the maximum energy of his
artillery covering them. The successes of the Division were in no small
measure due to the effective manner in which the two arms co-operated.
General Oldfield was continually moving towards artillery perfection. He
set a very high standard to his officers, to which they admirably
responded. In the later stages of the war, his energy as a commander had
resulted in the Divisional artillery having reached a high degree of
efficiency. They could improvise a barrage in a shortness of time which
surprised many artillery commanders from other Divisions. They had,
further, become extremely mobile, and were possessed of extraordinary
initiative. Later chapters in this book will show how General Oldfield's
officers not only handled their guns with great skill, but also, as a
result of his teaching, were able in emergencies to take command of
disorganised detachments of men and fight equally skilfully as infantry
officers. During General Oldfield's command, all infantry commanders had
complete confidence both in the artillery and in the artillery
arrangements.
General Burn was at the time of his appointment the youngest Brigadier
in the British Army, being thirty-four years of age. Later in the war
there were several younger, but prior to the Somme fighting the day of
the young Brigadier had hardly come.
He is perhaps best described by a Jock, who said, in speaking of him,
"They a' have their fads, and his fad is effeeciency."
General Burn had abundant experience of warfare in the front line. He
had served as Adjutant, Staff-Captain, and Brigade-Major, and had
commanded three separate battalions.
It can safely be asserted that he spent every moment of the day, and
much of the night, in thinking how he could increase the efficiency of
his command and how he could do damage to the enemy.
His vast experience enabled him to grasp details which actually were
far-reaching in effect, but which to a man of less experience might have
appeared trivial or have passed unnoticed.
In every direction, even in the smallest points, he accepted only one
standard--namely, the highest; nothing less was tolerated. He spared
himself no pains to attain this standard. Holding these principles as
strongly as he did, it is natural that he found it frequently necessary
to check officers and N.C.O.'s. They, however, bore him no ill-will for
this, and officers were frequently heard to say, "You can't argue with
P.B. when he strafes, because he's always right."
To those who served with General Burn he will always stand out as a man
who possessed in full the essential qualities of the perfect soldier.
While the Division was in this sector the 6th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders left the 152nd Brigade, being posted to the 5th Division as
pioneer battalion, their place being taken by the 6th Gordon
Highlanders, who had landed in France in 1914, and had seen considerable
service with the 7th Division.
CHAPTER V.
THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME--HIGH WOOD.
The Division entered the area of the Somme battle under bad auspices. It
undoubtedly required a rest before it could be expected to reproduce its
true form. On the 21st of July it received orders to take over the line
on the same evening. On the 22nd it received orders to carry out an
attack. Moreover, this attack, for which the Division was given less
than twenty-four hours to prepare, was to be delivered from the point of
a salient. There was, in fact, a general impression throughout the
Division when they left the Somme area that their efforts had not been
attended by a reasonable chance of success.
As far as the Highland Division is concerned, the tactical feature with
which this phase of the Somme operations is primarily associated is High
Wood. This wood, the highest point in Picardy, is perched on the summit
of a large upland flanking the road, which, passing between the two
Bazentins, leads from Contalmaison to Longueval.
Between the two Bazentins is the road junction where the road through
the Mametz valley strikes the Contalmaison-Longueval road.
During previous operations, in which the 7th Dragoon Guards and the
Deccan Horse had participated, the whole of High Wood had been captured.
The enemy had, however, regained a footing in it. When the Division
arrived in this area the German line ran through Guillemont, through
Delville Wood north-east of Longueval, through High Wood, but on the
reverse slope of this aforementioned upland, north of Bazentin-le-Petit,
and between Contalmaison and Pozières.
The enemy did not, however, hold sufficient of High Wood to secure
observation of the country south-west of it, with which the Division was
primarily concerned.
Of this section of the front the portion taken over by the Division at
one time or another during its tour at duty in the line ran from a point
about half-way between Longueval and High Wood to Bazentin-le-Petit
exclusive.
The Divisional area was traversed throughout its length by the road
which ran from Becourt-Becordel-Fricourt, south of Mametz Wood-Bazentin,
and on to Longueval.
The Mametz Valley, through which this road ran, was familiarly called
the Happy Valley. The valley, with the possible exception of the
Chemical Works at Roeux, has probably stamped itself more on men's minds
than any other topographical feature with which the Division came in
contact. In Happy Valley was situated the headquarters of the brigade in
the line, and of the supporting brigade itself. In addition, the
advanced dressing station and many batteries were also located in it.
Running as it did towards the apex of a salient the enemy could
concentrate a tremendous weight of artillery against it. Thus, when he
was bombarding it with his maximum intensity, shells used to arrive from
the direction of Leuze Wood in the right rear, and from Gueudecourt and
Courcelette frontally, and from behind Pozières on the left.
This valley was the only line of communication through which every
relief, every round of ammunition, and every ration had to pass on their
way to the line, not only for the Highland Division but for several
neighbouring Divisions.
Portions of the valley were under observation from balloons, while
throughout its whole length the clouds of dust raised by the continual
stream of wheeled traffic disclosed to the enemy any considerable
movement that was taking place in it.
The enemy shelled Happy Valley mercilessly day and night, an intense
barrage of high explosive, air bursts and gas shells being placed
completely across it at irregular intervals, and moved backwards and
forwards, up and down it.
[Illustration: MAP II.--HIGH WOOD, JULY 1916.]
For the most part the only protection the residents in the valley had
against shell-fire were slits cut in the ground covered with
waterproof sheets or corrugated iron. By degrees, however, more and more
German dug-outs were discovered, until shell-proof accommodation was
ultimately found for almost all.
The valley was traversed day and night by a constant stream of traffic.
The infantry used overland tracks well clear of the road, and marched in
platoon or section groups. All wheeled traffic was, however, restricted
to the single road, so that periods of great congestion often occurred.
When the German barrage opened, men, animals, and motor vehicles broke
into their best speed. Great columns of white dust, due to the intensity
of the summer heat, rose up, choked everything, and made seeing a matter
of difficulty. Guns and limbers moved at a stretch gallop, lorries
bounded from shell-hole to shell-hole, and every effort was concentrated
on getting out of the zone involved in the barrage with as little delay
as possible.
The heavily-burdened infantryman on his way to and from the line,
however, carried too much on his back to make him think of doubling. He
used to plod along at his regulation three miles an hour, trusting that
his luck would take him through.
It was no uncommon sight to see direct hits scored on gun-teams,
limbers, and groups of infantry. When the barrage ceased and it was
possible to take stock of the result, appalling scenes were often
disclosed. Teams with their riders lying in a heap, ammunition dumps on
fire, riderless and driverless horses and waggons bolting in all
directions, and coming down in the midst of old wire entanglements, were
daily spectacles in the Happy Valley.
At each pause in the barrage all haste was made to complete the work of
succouring the wounded and collecting the dead, and filling in the
latest shell-holes in the road before it reopened.
In this valley the conduct of the Royal Army Medical Corps was superb.
Other troops could at least make some effort to make their way out of
the danger zone as fast as possible, but the bearers of the field
ambulances and the regimental stretcher-bearers could not. They slowly
pushed their wheeled stretchers from the Crucifix at Bazentin to the
dressing station, heedless of the shell-fire and their own security,
and careful only to evacuate the wounded with the minimum of discomfort
to them.
Similarly ambulance car-drivers could not join in the helter-skelter for
security on the road to Fricourt. Day and night they plied slowly along
the damaged road with their burden of wounded, returning again and again
through the valley as soon as their cars had been cleared.
Had the Germans in those days been in possession of the instantaneous
fuze which bursts its shell before it has had time to bury itself in the
earth and thus lose much of its missile effect, this road could have
been made almost impassable. Happy Valley, with its dust and its flies
and its stench of half-buried animals and men, will remain to all who
knew it an ineffaceable memory.
The trench lines taken over by the Division consisted of odd, narrow,
and shallow trenches which had gradually evolved from the connecting of
posts in which troops had dug themselves in during previous engagements.
By means of saps running into High Wood from the trench dug along its
southern and western edge, a footing was held in the wood. Between High
Wood and Delville Wood the British trenches were hidden from the Germans
opposite them and _vice versa_ by the crest line of the upland.
To the left of the wood the trench lines, which were not continuously
connected up, curved in a south-westerly direction towards
Bazentin-le-Petit, leaving the wood as the apex of an acute salient. In
this section of the front the trenches seemed to fulfil no tactical
requirements. There was no depth to the defensive system; the trenches
were little more than knee-deep, and were choked with dead. Work on a
single communication trench--High Alley, running from the Crucifix at
Bazentin to High Wood--had been begun. The Germans held a strong redoubt
in the eastern corner of High Wood. In this corner the contours were
such that there was a depression in the ground similar in shape to a
saucer. The Germans had fortified this saucer, and garrisoned it with
machine-guns, mostly sited so as to fire to a flank. They could thus, by
firing eastwards from this redoubt, rake No Man's Land in direct
enfilade. By firing westwards, they could place an enfilade barrage of
low trajectory bullets which swept the rides through the wood. This
redoubt was surmounted by wire entanglements, the tops of the pickets
being just visible when looked at frontally and from our foremost saps.
Passing through the north-east corner of the wood was a strong switch
line, which ran from Flers through High Wood towards Martinpuich. This
was a well-dug, heavily-traversed trench protected by wire, but during
this period had no completed dug-outs in it. Air photos, however, showed
where work on the shafts of several dug-outs had been begun.
The whole of this area had been the scene of repeated encounters, as the
ground amply testified. In the undergrowth of the wood, and in the
standing corn which covered the whole area, lay the dead of many
different regiments.
The result was that, owing to the scorching summer weather, the troops
in the line lived in an atmosphere of pollution and in a positive
torment of bluebottle flies. In one sap in particular, as one moved
along it the flies rose in such clouds that their buzzing sounded as the
noise of a threshing-machine. In this sap the sentries could only
tolerate the conditions by standing with their handkerchiefs tied over
their mouths and nostrils.
By 3 A.M. on 22nd July, the 154th Infantry Brigade had completed the
relief of the 33rd Division. The 13th Brigade of the 5th Division were
on their right, and the 57th Brigade of the 19th Division on their left.
Of the 154th Brigade two battalions held the line, the remaining two
being in support and reserve in Bazentin-le-Grand Wood and
Bazentin-le-Grand.
The Divisional artillery were in position in the open, the personnel for
the most part living under tarpaulin shelters. Some batteries were in
the Mametz Valley, while others were on the high ground south of
Bazentin-le-Grand. It is difficult to determine who were most to be
sympathised with--the gunners who lived alongside their guns, or the
drivers who had to pass two or three times a day through the Happy
Valley with ammunition. The batteries in positions in the valley itself
probably lived in circumstances which could not have been more hazardous
and unpleasant.
The 153rd Brigade in support occupied the area about the south-east
corner of Mametz Wood and Caterpillar Wood. The 152nd Brigade in
reserve bivouacked between Fricourt Wood and Mametz Wood.
At dawn on the 23rd the Happy Valley barrage, about which the Division
had received no information, opened with great intensity. The 153rd and
152nd Brigades were seriously involved in it, and suffered considerable
casualties. The 152nd Brigade was immediately fallen-in and marched
westwards towards Fricourt, ultimately moving to bivouac in the vicinity
of Becourt-Becordel. The 153rd Brigade extended its area so as to
diminish the number of casualties.
It was later discovered that numerous shell-proof dug-outs existed in
and about Mametz and Fricourt Woods. Apparently no organised
reconnaissances of this area had been made, for had this been the case,
and had the location of these dug-outs been made known to the Division
on its arrival in the area, many unnecessary casualties would have been
avoided.
The day on which the relief was concluded, 22nd July, the Division
received orders to carry out an attack during the coming night. The
objectives given were the north-east and north-west edges of High Wood
and the switch trench from the north-east of High Wood to a point five
hundred yards north-west of it.
The 154th Brigade was detailed to carry out this operation. As a
preliminary the redoubt at the eastern corner of High Wood was to be
seized at 10 P.M. in conjunction with the left brigade, 5th Division.
The main attack on the German switch line was timed to take place at
1.30 P.M.
The troops engaged in this attack had little or no knowledge of the
enemy's dispositions. They had barely completed the relief by dawn on
the previous night. During the day movement was restricted and
patrolling impossible. Thus when the attack was launched at 10 P.M.,
circumstances had afforded the attackers no opportunity of studying the
ground, or of forming any detailed plan of action. Added to this the
wood was such that the trees prevented a shrapnel barrage from being
effective. Further, the "going" within the wood, owing to shell-holes,
brambles, dense undergrowth, and wire entanglements, was extremely
bad--so bad, in fact, that even many weeks after its capture, to walk
from one end of the wood to the other was a laborious process demanding
considerable physical effort.
The attack was therefore delivered with an ineffective barrage with
which the men were unable to keep up. The result was that the enemy had
little inducement to take cover. He was thus able with his machine-guns
and riflemen, whom he posted at night in the woods in advance of his
trench lines, to defeat the attack completely and inflict heavy losses
on the 4th Gordon Highlanders, and the 9th Royal Scots.
At 1.30 A.M. the main attack was delivered, but it met with no better
fate. The volume of fire, particularly from the machine-guns in the
redoubt, was so intense that no progress could be made. The men had
advanced to the attack with great gallantry, but the cross-fire opposed
to them rendered success impossible. Morning found them back in their
original line, but seriously depleted in numbers.
The day was spent in improving the trenches and in connecting by a
trench the southern edge of High Wood with the Windmill north of
Bazentin-le-Grand. Both the troops in the line and the brigade in
support were heavily shelled during the day, lachrymatory shells and 5·9
howitzers being used profusely.
During the night work was continued on the trench joining High Wood and
the Windmill, and in High Alley. By the end of the night the latter was
negotiable for traffic to within sixty yards of the wood. The following
day the former of these two trenches was heavily and accurately
bombarded.
At 7.30 P.M., 24th July, the enemy launched a surprise attack against
High Wood and against the left company of the 154th Brigade. For some
time the situation was obscure, but by 10 P.M. the artillery had been
asked to slacken. It subsequently transpired that our line remained
intact, and that the German attackers were falling back.
During the attack the enemy again barraged the new trench mentioned
above extremely heavily. He also bombarded High Wood and set it on fire.
By 11.30 P.M. the situation was completely in hand, and work in the
trenches was resumed.
Meanwhile orders had been received that the 154th Brigade was to relieve
the left battalion of the 5th Division, and thus extend its front
towards Longueval. This relief was completed by 6 A.M., and gave the
brigade a frontage of some 2500 yards to hold.
On 25th July the enemy bombarded Mametz Valley and Fricourt Wood in a
most savage fashion with guns of all calibres. This bombardment opened
at noon, and continued until 6 P.M. It was the worst experience of
shell-fire which the residents in Happy Valley encountered during the
Division's sojourn in the Somme area. Much material damage and many
casualties resulted.
At 9.20 P.M. the 4th Seaforth Highlanders delivered another attack
against the German redoubt. It, however, met a worse fate than its
predecessor. An intense machine-gun fire was opened on the British
trenches at the moment when the attackers were mounting the parapet. The
troops suffered such losses from this fire that the attack never
materialised.
This operation roused the enemy considerably, and he shelled the forward
area throughout the night. In this bombardment he used a considerable
number of shells containing phosgene gas. This was one of the earliest
occasions on which this form of gas was used. It was particularly
insidious, as at first it did not cause any inconvenience, and its smell
was not offensive, being similar to that of sweet apples.
Meanwhile the brigade in support had been kept fully occupied. The
intense heat created a great demand for water for the first-line troops.
The water supply in the forward area was, however, non-existent, so that
a dump of petrol tins of water had to be formed in the Happy Valley.
From this dump all the water used in the forward area was carried by the
supporting brigade. Similarly, with no light railways in repair, every
round of S.A.A. bombs, trench-mortar ammunition, Very lights, barbed
wire, screw pickets, &c., had to be carried forward by man power. The
result was that practically every man in the supporting brigade made at
least one journey daily from the dumps at the south-east corner of
Mametz Wood to the forward dumps in rear of High Wood. The labour thus
entailed, coupled with the fact that the supporting brigade lived in a
heavily-shelled area with insufficient dug-out accommodation, meant that
the troops had lost much of their fighting efficiency before they went
into the line. In the circumstances there was, however, no alternative.
On the 26th July the 153rd Brigade relieved the 154th Brigade, and the
152nd Brigade moved forward to the support position. This relief was
considerably interrupted by a further lavish use of phosgene by the
Germans.
The work of consolidating and digging more trenches south and south-west
of the wood was continued, as until touch in the front line could be
obtained on the left, that flank was in the air.
On the 27th the forward area and the supporting brigade (152nd) in
Mametz Valley were heavily shelled all night. This shelling was intense,
it being estimated that two shells per minute burst in the area close to
brigade headquarters alone throughout the night; 77 mm. gas shells were
primarily used, but 5·9's were also from time to time employed freely.
As a result of this bombardment the 8th Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders alone sustained eighty gas casualties.
During the following day the 153rd Brigade co-operated in an attack on
Longueval by rifle and machine-gun and Stokes mortar fire. They,
however, took no part in the infantry action.
During the night 27-28th July, connection in the front line was
established about 200 yards north-east of the Bazentin Windmill by the
6th Black Watch with the 29th Division. For the first time in this
sector a continuous line of defence was presented to the enemy.
The 153rd Infantry Brigade had carried out a number of patrols. They had
already had three days in which to reconnoitre the enemy's position and
study the lie of the land when they received orders to attack the
enemy's line from half-way between Delville and High Woods to the
western edge of High Wood.
Patrols had located the enemy as occupying various positions, and these
were subjected to bombardments during the forty-eight hours previous to
the attack. At this stage in the war the shooting of the heavy howitzers
had not reached that pitch of accuracy to which it afterwards attained.
Nor was the liaison between the infantry and the Corps artillery as
close as it became later. These causes and faulty observation made the
shooting somewhat erratic at a place where very exact shooting was
necessary. To these bombardments the enemy usually replied by shelling
the Mametz Valley and the infantry in the line.
The attack was launched at 6.10 P.M., and to the east of the wood
proceeded some distance. However, on topping the rise in the middle of
No Man's Land, the troops came under a very severe machine-gun fire, in
which the accursed redoubt on the eastern corner of the wood, as usual,
played a prominent part.
In the wood itself the advance was again checked by enfilade machine-gun
fire, and the result of the action was much the same as it had been in
the case of the 154th Brigade.
The net gains were, however, an advance of 200 yards on the right and
centre, and of 70 yards in the wood. The men maintained themselves in
their new positions in the wood for some time. Finally, however, owing
to the intensity of the enemy's bombardment, they withdrew to their
original positions.
The right and centre consolidated their new position in posts, and held
their gains.
Orders were meanwhile issued for the attack to be resumed at 9.45 P.M.
These orders were, however, not received at Divisional headquarters in
sufficient time to enable them to be transmitted to the attacking
companies before the attack was due to start. No further action
therefore took place.
The 31st July was remarkable for a violent bombardment of the country
between Bazentin-le-Grand and Mametz Wood, which was practically
continuous throughout the day.
On 1st August, the 152nd Infantry Brigade relieved the 153rd, and the
154th Brigade moved forward to the support brigade area. It had now
become quite clear that no good purpose could be served by ordering the
Division to carry out any further local attacks. There was no reason to
suppose that such attacks would meet with any more success than their
predecessors. The 152nd Infantry Brigade was therefore instructed to
adopt a vigorous policy of peaceful penetration. By that is meant that
the policy was to be the acquisition of more ground by digging and by
minor operations, without the delivery of any set piece attack involving
a large number of troops.
Orders were thus issued for as much ground as possible to be gained in
High Wood by sapping forward. Progress was also to be made between High
Wood and the Divisional right boundary, by digging-in posts in advance
of the existing front line during the night, and ultimately connecting
them up into continuous trenches.
The actual labour of digging in the wood was considerable, as beneath
the soil there lay a tangled mass of thick roots, in many cases too
stout to be severed by a spade. The work, therefore, was slow and
arduous, axes and billhooks having to be employed as well as picks and
shovels. The enemy, however, paid little attention to the working
parties.
On the right it was considered likely that, as there was no cover, the
enemy would interfere considerably with digging operations. An apparatus
was therefore employed, known as the Bartlett Forcing Jack. The Bartlett
Jack was designed to drive iron pipes loaded with tin canisters of
ammonal (containing two lb. of ammonal per foot run) through the ground
at a depth of from four to five feet. When a sufficient length of pipe
had been driven into the ground in the required direction, the charge
was exploded. The explosion blew a fissure in the ground which served as
a trench. In this instance the labour of carrying the pipes and ammonal
up to the line, and of working the task, proved incommensurate with the
results obtained. This was particularly so when it became evident that
considerable liberties could be taken by working parties without
interference from the Boche.
On the night 3-4th August General Burn decided to employ a considerable
working party and boldly "jump" a trench some 200 yards in front of the
existing front line. That is to say, instead of sapping forwards and
digging "T" heads at the ends of the saps for the posts to occupy, and
finally connecting the "T" heads together so as to form a continuous
trench, a continuous fire trench was dug in the first instance during
the night, and occupied by a garrison at dawn. Subsequently
communication trenches were cut to connect this trench with the support
line, Seaforth Trench.
The Germans thus on 4th August woke to find that the whole of the
Divisional front line, exclusive of the wood, had advanced some 200
yards towards them.
When the Division was relieved on 7th August, more than half High Wood
was in our hands and consolidated. The redoubt in the eastern corner
was, however, as formidable as ever. To the right of the wood the line
had been advanced some 300 yards, while to the left the position had
been so consolidated that there was no gap in the lines, and the flank
was properly secured.
In addition, High Alley, 1000 yards in length, had been cleared out and
made into a first-class communication trench by the 8th Royal Scots.
Further east they had also dug a completely new communication trench
called Thistle Alley. The digging of these trenches was a considerable
task, as the soil for the most part consisted of chalk containing
countless large flints or gravel, so that every spadeful had to be
loosened by the pick before it could be thrown out of the trench.
On 7th August the 152nd Brigade was relieved by the 100th Brigade, 33rd
Division. Owing to the intensity of the enemy's shelling of the valley
at night, it was decided for the first time to carry out the relief in
daylight. In spite of some apprehension caused by three German
aeroplanes flying low over the lines while the relief was in progress,
the experiment proved highly successful. The 152nd Brigade, in fact, did
not sustain a single casualty during the operation.
On 8th August the Division remained in bivouacs near Meaulte, in
glorious weather. In the evening the "Balmorals," the Divisional troupe,
using the tail-board of a lorry as a stage, gave a performance in the
open air, which was attended by practically the entire infantry of the
Division. It is doubtful if, in the whole of their highly successful
career, any performance given by the "Balmorals" was more appreciated
than this one.
The Division had passed from sixteen days of continuous and
unsatisfactory strife to an unexpected haven of rest, set in the midst
of corn-lands during harvest-time.
It was a real refreshment for the men to sit in the cool of a
delightful summer evening and listen to "Stanley" and "Gertie," both of
whom rose to the occasion admirably.
So ended the first offensive operations in which the Division had been
employed as a whole unit. The results had been disappointing and
dispiriting to all. Over 3500 casualties, including more than 150
officers, had been sustained in two fruitless attempts to carry a German
position which remained intact, in spite of many attacks by a succession
of Divisions, until 15th September. The Germans had shown that High Wood
could not be taken hurriedly by a direct frontal attack.
Three months later General Harper was able to show that the much
stronger position of Beaumont Hamel could be stormed frontally after
careful preparations and with adequate artillery support.
High Wood was finally overcome by a mine, which shattered the redoubt,
and by tanks, which on this occasion were employed for the first time in
the Great War.
The mine referred to above was suggested by General Pelham Burn on the
morning of 5th August as being the least costly means of subduing the
redoubt. His suggestion was at once adopted. Tunnelling officers
reported at brigade headquarters the same evening, the actual mining
operations beginning on the following morning.
It was most satisfactory to those engaged in High Wood to visit it after
the German withdrawal in the Somme area, and see in place of the saucer
in which the German redoubt was situated a vast crater. Many graves were
in it and round it, and arms, equipment, and ammunition lay scattered
about it. In fact, it had all the appearance of having admirably served
its purpose.
On the 9th August the Division, less the artillery, which remained in
the line, entrained at Edgehill and Mericourt, and was moved to the area
Longpré-Pont Remy. The following day it again entrained, and began to
move into the Blaringham area.
High Wood now stands in the centre of a vast cemetery. There is barely a
portion of ground of the size of a tennis court in all that country-side
which does not contain the graves of one or more British soldiers. In
the wood itself stand memorials erected to the memory of the fallen of
many Divisions which were shattered there. The Highland Division was not
by any means the only Division which failed to capture a natural
fortress situated at the apex of a salient.
CHAPTER VI.
ARMENTIÈRES AND HEBUTERNE.
On 15th and 16th August the 153rd and 154th Brigades relieved the 1st
New Zealand Division in the line. The new front extended from Chapelle
d'Armentières on the right to the river Lys on the left. The 152nd
Brigade in reserve was billeted in Armentières. Divisional headquarters
opened at 98 Rue Sadi Carnot.
By 19th August the Divisional artillery had arrived from the Somme, and
completed the relief of the New Zealand artillery.
The tour of duty in the Armentières sector was remarkable for its
tranquillity. The weather was excellent, the breastwork trenches
reasonably comfortable, and the enemy's activity slight. The town of
Armentières itself provided many excellent billets for the troops in
reserve, and for all three brigade headquarters. The batteries were also
for the most part comfortable, some of them being in the unique position
of occupying houses for quarters, with their guns in the gardens and
conservatories.
Armentières was indeed fairly described by the Jocks as _bon_. In these
days it was still occupied by civilian inhabitants in large numbers.
There were in consequence plenty of the beloved "estaminets," as they
were usually called, and numerous shops. The latter all appeared to keep
the same articles in stock--"vin blonk," "oofs"--either to be consumed
on the premises or taken home; chips and those wonderful post-cards on
which patriotic designs were embroidered in alarmingly coloured silks,
and on which were superscribed such mottoes as "To my dear sweetheart,"
"To my darling wife."
The officers were equally well catered for, considering that
Armentières was within range of the lightest field-guns. There were a
few naturally expensive and equally naturally indifferent tea-shops.
There were one or two restaurants where dinner could be obtained, in
which the French cooking afforded a relief from the normal efforts of
the company's mess cook. And there was the famous Lucienne's.
Lucienne lived at a corner house in the Rue Sadi Carnot, and had
assisted in the management of a restaurant there since the early days of
the war. The majority of the neighbouring houses, including the large
church some fifty yards from the restaurant, had at one time or another
been struck by shells. Most of Lucienne's windows had been broken during
these bombardments. She, however, still possessed the most buoyant
spirits. She had ready wits, and in any form of badinage usually had the
last word. She, in fact, resembled a character from a light opera rather
than a player in the real drama of war. After the German offensive in
April 1918 she was driven out of Armentières, but remained undaunted;
and subsequently, after the tide had turned, opened a similar
establishment in Amiens. The officers of the Division had to thank
Lucienne's courage for many a pleasant evening spent in Armentières.
The sector, in fact, acted as a tonic to the Division, and with its
quiet trenches, wonderful weather, and good billets soon effaced all the
bitter memories of the Somme and the weariness of the Labyrinth.
The enemy's activity, such as it was, was directed chiefly against the
town and the suburbs of Houplines, both places being intermittently
shelled, particularly the latter. At times the bombardments were severe,
Divisional headquarters being ultimately shelled out of their house in
Rue Sadi Carnot, and being in consequence moved to Steenwerk.
On 11th September the Division sustained a considerable loss in the
death of Brigadier-General C. E. Stewart, C.M.G., commanding the 154th
Infantry Brigade. General Stewart and his intelligence officer were
walking through Houplines when a chance shell burst within a few feet of
them, killing them both. It was a case of the cruellest bad luck, as
this was the only shell which fell in that vicinity during the day.
General Stewart had commanded the 154th Brigade since its reconstitution
as a Highland brigade. His troops were considerably attached to him, and
his loss was much felt by them.
On 17th September, Brigadier-General J. G. H. Hamilton, D.S.O., Black
Watch, assumed command of the 154th Brigade.
Operations at this sector were for the most part confined on the part of
the enemy to a fairly consistent but only moderate activity with the
Minenwerfer. At times, too, he was active with his Grenatenwerfer,
known to the troops as the "Pineapples" or "Fishtail." "Yon
minnie-wafers" were fortunately clearly visible in the air, and so with
a little judgment could be avoided. They had, however, a most
devastating effect on breastwork trenches, with the result that, as a
rule, more damage was done in a day than could be repaired in
twenty-four hours by the troops available. Minenwerfer sentries were
posted who, whenever they saw or heard a "minnie" fired, blew a whistle.
The troops in the trenches then at once looked into the air to locate
the bomb. As soon as they had judged where it was going to fall, they
took the necessary steps not to be there at the time of its arrival.
Watching the "minnies" in the air rather resembled waiting for a high
catch in the deep field at cricket. If there was no wind it was
comparatively easy to judge them. If, however, there was a strong breeze
blowing, the wind would catch them and alter their flight considerably.
The men, however, soon learnt their idiosyncrasies, and it was a rare
occurrence for casualties to be inflicted by them.
The Grenatenwerfer was quite a different proposition. This form of
projectile was fired from a machine of about the same size and weight as
a typewriter, and in consequence it could be moved with ease from place
to place after every few rounds. It was thus difficult to locate the
position from which it was fired. Further, it was most unusual to be
able to see the projectile in the air, so that no steps could be taken
to avoid it.
As regards British operations, a discharge of gas from cylinders took
place on 31st August. The preparations for this discharge involved a
considerable amount of work. The cylinders of gas had to be carried the
full length of the communication trenches, each one being supported by
two men. The weight of these cylinders was so great that a second pair
of men were also required for each cylinder to act as reliefs.
Enormous carrying parties were therefore required to carry the cylinders
to the fire-bays in the front line into which they were to be installed
by the gas companies. This was always an unpleasant task, as the danger
of a bullet or fragment of shell striking a cylinder and causing a
leakage of gas in the midst of the carrying party was ever present.
The discharge on this night was followed by a raid half an hour later.
The enemy, however, was found to be alert, and he met the raiders with
such a heavy machine-gun fire that they were unable to reach the hostile
wire.
Subsequently raids became a frequent occurrence. On 15th September four
raids were carried out. In each case Bangalore torpedoes--_i.e._, long
tubes of ammonal with a time fuse--were used to destroy the enemy's
wire.
These raids were carried out by the 6th Gordon Highlanders, the 6th
Seaforth Highlanders, the 7th Gordon Highlanders, and the 7th Black
Watch.
Of these, the first and third failed owing to the torpedoes not
bursting; the second was an unqualified success, and is described in
detail later. The fourth was successful, but only two Germans were found
in the trench.
The following night two more raids took place. Of these, one carried out
by the 5th Gordon Highlanders was completely successful, and twenty-five
Germans are reported to have been killed. The second raid, carried out
by the 9th Royal Scots, was also successful, but only one German was
found in the trenches. He was killed.
On 22nd September the 6th Gordon Highlanders made a second attempt at
the raid which had been unsuccessful on 15th September. However, the
enterprise again had to be abandoned, as the torpedo failed to explode
and the wire remained uncut.
As raiding became so marked a feature of the war, space forbids that
each raid should be described in detail. General Harper was therefore
asked to select the raid he considered most suitable for description,
and he has chosen that carried out by the 6th Seaforth Highlanders on
15th September 1916. This raid is therefore now described in detail.
The area selected for the operation was a most prominent salient formed
by the German front line. Through the apex of this salient, and running
at right angles to the fronts of the opposing forces, ran the
Armentières-Lille Railway. Across the base of the salient ran a
well-defined entrenchment.
The general plan was as follows: The raiders were divided up into two
parties, each consisting of one officer (Lieutenants J. Sainter and D.
F. Jenkins), one sergeant, one corporal, and ten privates, with a
blocking party each of one N.C.O. and three men.
The scheme was that each party should cut the wire at its own point of
entry by means of Bangalore torpedoes, while the wire was to be cut for
a point of exit by the 2-inch mortars.
The two parties were to enter the salie
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