The Blocking of Zeebrugge
by Alfred Francis Blakeney Carpenter · English · Gutenberg #45718 · 470,756 chars · public domain (US)
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Title: The Blocking of Zeebrugge
Author: Alfred Francis Blakeney Carpenter
Release date: May 22, 2014 [eBook #45718]
Most recently updated: October 24, 2024
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE ***
[Frontispiece: STORMING THE MOLE. _Drawn by Charles De Lacy from
details supplied by the Author_]
THE BLOCKING OF
ZEEBRUGGE
BY
CAPTAIN A. F. B. CARPENTER, V.C., R.N.
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
ADMIRAL EARL BEATTY
AND APPRECIATIONS BY
MARSHAL FOCH, REAR-ADMIRAL SIMS
AND
COUNT VISART
(BURGOMASTER OF BRUGES)
WITH ILLUSTRATIONS
BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
The Riverside Press Cambridge
1922
COPYRIGHT, 1922, BY ALFRED F. B. CARPENTER
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
The Riverside Press
CAMBRIDGE -- MASSACHUSETTS
PRINTED IN THE U.S.A.
TO
THE MAN-IN-THE-STREET
{vii}
INTRODUCTION
BY ADMIRAL EARL BEATTY
In appreciating the military reasons which directed the operations
connected with the blocking of Zeebrugge, it is desirable to recall to
mind the general naval situation at the beginning of 1918.
Briefly stated, the German High Seas Fleet was contained within the
waters of the Heligoland Bight by the British Grand Fleet, whilst
German submarines were engaged on vast operations, having for their
object the stoppage of the trade of Great Britain, and interference
with our lines of communication.
In the face of such an attack, the aim of Great Britain was either to
destroy the enemy submarines, or, failing destruction, to prevent their
egress from their bases. Convoy operations, patrol operations, and
mining operations in all seas were carried out to achieve the former
aim, and accomplished great results.
But enemy submarines continued to be built almost as rapidly as they
were destroyed. It was essential, therefore, to take what measures
were possible to render useless their bases and interfere with their
freedom of exit, and it was with this military object that plans for
the blocking of Zeebrugge were initiated.
Emphasis has been laid on the military reason which underlay this
operation, because an erroneous impression has existed in some quarters
that the Zeebrugge operations were more in the nature of an offensive
designed to lower the morale of the enemy and enhance that of the
British Navy, which, as a whole, had little opportunity of coming to
grips with the enemy.
{viii}
Whilst these moral results undoubtedly were felt after the operation,
they were not the military reasons, reasons alone which justified so
complex and difficult an undertaking, reasons which were never lost
sight of during the planning and carrying out of the operations.
The plan was surely laid; simple in general design, details were worked
out with foresight and exactitude. The factors of surprise,
mystification, and diversion were utilised to the utmost. The
resources of science were given full scope. Training to carry out the
plan proceeded with energy and understanding, co-ordination and
co-operation being apparent throughout. It was carried out with
determination.
In Captain Carpenter's book we are let into the full secret, and are
led step by step through the various phases referred to above, which
were to be crowned by the glorious achievement of St. George's Day,
1918. His pages bring out once again the moral and military virtues of
the British Navy, Officers and Men. They demonstrate that the spirit
which existed in our Naval Wars of past centuries, wars which laid the
foundation of the Empire, remains undiminished in the naval personnel
of to-day.
It is for us to ensure that these glorious traditions are understood by
all, and in being understood are handed on to those who come after us.
This book, in placing on record the matchless qualities displayed by
all concerned in the blocking of Zeebrugge, I welcome for this purpose.
BEATTY
_Admiral of the Fleet_
19_th July_, 1921
{ix}
APPRECIATION
BY MARSHAL FOCH
C'est dans un sentiment de solidarité que s'est réalisée l'union des
Alliés, en 1914, quand la cause de la Civilisation s'est trouvée
menacée.
A tous les moments critiques de la guerre, l'union s'est ainsi
resserrée devant le danger, et lorsqu'il s'est agi de fermer un des
repaires d'où les sousmarins ennemis menaçaient les communications
vitales des Alliés, dans une manoeuvre splendide, avec un esprit commun
de sacrifice absolu, le port de Zeebrugge a été attaqué et
definitivement fermé.
Le Commandant du _Vindictive_ a tenu à rappeler les détails de
l'opération dans laquelle il a joué un rôle si brillant, et son livre
constituera un précieux enseignement et donnera aux générations futures
un exemple splendide.[1]
F. FOCH
[1] When in 1914 the cause of civilisation was menaced, it was the
instinct of solidarity that brought about the Union of the Allies.
At every critical moment of the war, in the face of peril, this bond
was renewed; and when it became a question of closing one of the lairs
from which the enemy submarines threatened the vital communications of
the Allies, the port of Zeebrugge was attacked and closed once and for
all by a superb manoeuvre involving a common spirit of supreme
sacrifice.
The Captain of the _Vindictive_ has undertaken to tell in detail the
story of the action in which he played so brilliant a part, and his
book will afford a valuable record and set forth a fine example to
future generations.
{xi}
APPRECIATION
BY REAR-ADMIRAL SIMS, U.S.N.
Few incidents of the Great War had a greater influence in inspiring
enthusiasm in the fighting forces and increasing their morale than the
successful attack upon Zeebrugge; and it will long remain as an example
of what can be accomplished by the thorough co-ordination of the
elements of a sound plan with the various limiting conditions of place,
time, state of sea and air, and the material equipment suitable and
available.
The reader of this volume will at once be struck by the painstaking
care with which it was necessary that each detail be worked out, and
each unit assigned its particular task to be executed at a specified
time and place. Also that the amount of detail was necessarily so
great, and their dependence one upon another so vital to ultimate
success, that the whole may be compared to a complicated mechanism so
designed to meet peculiar conditions that the failure of any part--any
unit or group--or a material change in any of the conditions, would
have deranged essential elements of the plan and might have jeopardised
the success of the expedition.
But the principal lesson to be learned from the attack is not so much
the thoroughness of the preparation and training and the efficiency of
the weapons, essential as they of course were, as it is the influence
of the spirit and the initiative and loyalty of the {xii} personnel
that carried it out. These elements supplied the "steam," the
flexibility, and the lubrication that ensured the harmonious working of
the whole mechanism of which they were the soul. The basic principle
was the splendid morale of the personnel inspired by the high character
of its leaders.
Apart from the great interest of this narrative to the laymen, as a
military exploit of the most brilliant character, and an inspiring
story of heroism in war, it will always prove of great value to those
military men of both branches of the service who realise the tremendous
influence of the morale of their forces--the confidence in the ability
of the leader which encourages initiative and inspires the highest type
of loyalty.
WM. S. SIMS
{xiii}
APPRECIATION
BY COUNT VISART
(_Burgomaster of Bruges_)
Ainsi que tous mes concitoyens j'ai appris avec une grande satisfaction
que la fameuse attaque de Zeebrugge par le _Vindictive_ allait faire le
sujet d'un livre publié prochainement par Capitaine Alfred F. B.
Carpenter, un des héros qui ont pris une part glorieuse à cet exploit.
Cette entreprise de la Marine de Guerre Anglaise a été assurément une
des faits de guerre les plus extraordinaires des temps anciens et
modernes. Elle a été accompliée avec une énergie et une audace qui a
déjoué toutes les prévisions des Allemands.
Ainsi en dépit de toutes les difficultés, de tous les dangers, et de
pertes cruelles, l'assaut prodigieux du mole a jeté l'épouvante parmi
les ennemis et en même temps le _Vindictive_ et les bateaux qui le
suivaient ont embouteillé dans leur repaire les abominables U.B.
La cannonade entendue à Bruges nous avait déjà donné l'éveil et bientôt
les rumeurs que les Allemands n'avaient pu intercepter et la
consternation qu'ils tentaient vainement de dissimuler nous ont appris
que l'Angleterre avait frappé un grand coup. Un tel événement releva
tous nos courages.
Nous espérons qu'à Zeebrugge, sur le territoire de Bruges, un
magnifique monument immortalisera ce fait inoui, mais c'est avec le
plus grand intérêt que nous connaîtrons par le livre de Capitaine
Carpenter toutes les circonstances de cette histoire héroïque et {xiv}
les noms des hommes qui ont donné une nouvelle gloire à la Marine
Anglaise.[2]
AMIDER VISART
_Bourgemestre de Bruges_
[2] It was with great satisfaction that I and all my fellow citizens
learned that the famous attack on Zeebrugge by the _Vindictive_ was to
be the subject of a book, to be published in the near future, written
by Captain Alfred F. B. Carpenter, one of the heroes who took a
glorious part in that exploit.
This enterprise of the British Navy was assuredly one of the most
extraordinary feats of war in both ancient and modern times. It was
accomplished with such energy and audacity as to baffle all the German
plans.
In spite of all the difficulties, dangers, and cruel losses, the
wonderful assault on the mole created consternation amongst the enemy;
and the ships which followed the _Vindictive_ bottled up the abominable
submarines in their base.
The sound of heavy firing heard in Bruges had already warned us; later,
the receipt of rumours which the Germans had been unable to intercept,
and their consternation which they were vainly endeavouring to conceal,
proved to us that England had struck a mighty blow. Such an event
renewed our courage.
We hope that at Zeebrugge, which is within the territory of Bruges, a
magnificent memorial will eventually immortalise this unprecedented
action, and it is with the greatest interest that we shall learn from
Captain Carpenter's book all the circumstances of this heroic episode
and the names of the men who added this new glory to the British Navy.
{xv}
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
As a result of having delivered many lectures, under official auspices
and in compliance with private invitations, on "The Blocking of
Zeebrugge," the author has received several requests to record the
story in more permanent form. Underlying these requests there appears
to be a feeling that first-hand accounts of enterprises in the Great
War should be of some value towards preserving that spirit which
rallied all classes of individuals in the British Empire, in the Allied
Countries, and in the United States of America, to the common cause of
upholding civilisation in the face of danger. That opinion, indeed,
has been openly stated to the author in Great Britain, by leading
members of the educational profession and of the Church, by naval and
military officers and others. Opinions of a similar type also have
been received from the United States, where, during a recent series of
visits to many of the larger cities, the author personally experienced
that solid friendship for Great Britain which is sometimes hidden
beneath surface irritations of a political nature.
Misunderstandings must occasionally arise between communities and
between the members of any single community; they readily take root and
develop into serious argument where the existence of a _common cause_
is forgotten. For that reason the author feels that the
above-mentioned opinions are not without foundation. Whilst attempting
to show that co-operation between the several units of a fighting force
{xvi} and confidence between superiors and subordinates are important
factors towards success in war, he has made this humble endeavour to
induce the belief that co-operation and confidence in other walks of
life are no less necessary.
There is danger of this blocking enterprise being allotted a false
position in the contemporary histories of the late war owing to the
somewhat prevalent custom of describing war operations with little
reference to the various considerations, factors, and events which gave
them birth.
The man-in-the-street is sometimes carried away by enthusiasm or
despondency, as the case may be, when unexpected events occur during
hostilities; he is apt to give little thought to the "why" and
"wherefore" of the occurrences. That fact has been exemplified clearly
enough with respect to this particular event, for, on all sides, one
heard the public verdict, given in the colloquial vulgarism of the
period, that the affair was a fine "stunt." The word "stunt," as
unmusical to the ear as it was offensive to those concerned in the
operations, has been defined as "a voluntary act, spectacular, usually
unnecessary, sometimes involving risk, and designed to attract
attention." However, the man-in-the-street meant well, and, after all,
could justifiably plead that his lack of education on naval matters was
to blame. The author has therefore addressed this book to the
man-in-the-street, and has endeavoured to "put him wise," as our
cousins across the water are in the habit of remarking.
The official despatches dealing with the blocking operations on the
Flanders coast were published early {xvii} in 1919, and, as far as
despatches can go, gave a splendid account of the enterprise forming
the subject of this book. But despatches are strictly limited in
length and necessarily deal more with cold-blooded statements of fact
than with psychological aspects. When one reads despatches of the
great leaders of the past concerning the operations in their campaigns
one cannot fail to notice the almost complete absence of any reference
to the moral factor in war. Yet Napoleon himself declared, "The moral
is to the physical as three is to one." Material results can easily be
gauged under peace conditions, whereas moral effect on human nature in
war is only discoverable from one's own war experiences, which are
necessarily limited, and from the experiences of others as set forth in
the historical records of past wars. It was partly for that reason,
presumably, that Napoleon studied the campaigns of Cæsar and Hannibal
although their instruments of war were long since out of date.
The usual reasons for the omission of the moral factors from despatches
are twofold. Firstly, the leader from whom the despatch emanates may
consider it inadvisable to publish his preconceived ideas as to the
eventual effect of the operations on the morale of the enemy; this
concealment is especially necessary if the despatch is published before
the declaration of peace. Secondly, the writer of the despatch is
often unaware, at the time of writing, of the effect already obtained
against the enemy's morale; such effects may not be discoverable for
many months after the operations have been concluded. Under certain
circumstances it may also be temporarily {xviii} inadvisable to present
to the enemy, through the medium of despatches, information concerning
psychological effects on one's own personnel. These omissions,
therefore, must not be taken to infer that the moral factors were
ignored. It is clear, then, that post-war accounts of operations may
be far from superfluous whether considered from the point of view of
the man-in-the-street or that of the student of war.
Without some conception of the strategical situation arising from the
German occupation of the Flanders coast it would be difficult to grasp
the true nature of the enterprise described herein. An examination of
the strategical outlook alone, however, would be insufficient. The
geographical and hydrographical, and even the meteorological,
situations largely influenced the choice of tactical methods to be
pursued for the attainment of the object in view. It is therefore
important to consider the situation from these various standpoints in
some detail.
The book has been divided into two parts. Part I deals with the
Situation, the Object, the General Plan for the attainment of the
Object, the Preparatory Work involved, and the various occurrences up
to the eve of the Attack. Part II describes the events which occurred
during the operation itself, and includes some consideration of both
the material and moral results of the enterprise and the lessons to be
drawn therefrom.
For the illustrations the author is much indebted to the Admiralty, Air
Ministry, Imperial War Museum, and Press, to whom he makes this
grateful acknowledgment.
{xix}
With regard to the personal side of the story, it may be as well to
point out that many of the officers and men concerned were mentioned in
the official despatch; that fact lessens one of the difficulties
attached to the author's task. A compromise between the purely
impersonal attitude and the very natural desire to render full justice
to each individual, regardless of the reader's patience, has been aimed
at.
The author trusts that the reader will be tolerant of omission and
repetition, and will forgive the rather obvious shortcomings of a
literary nature which, alas, appear all too frequently in the book.
ALFRED F. B. CARPENTER
8_th March_, 1921
{xxi}
CONTENTS
PART I
Introduction by Admiral Earl Beatty
Appreciation by Marshal Foch
Appreciation by Rear-Admiral Sims, U.S.N.
Appreciation by Count Visart
Author's Preface
I. The Strategical Situation. The German Bases
in Flanders. The Conception of the Plan
II. The Local Situation. The Local Defences
III. The Outlying Obstacles. Considerations of Salvage
IV. Past Experience. Smoke Screens. The Chances of Success
V. Planning The Operation. Matters Affecting
the Plan. Attacks on the Mole
VI. The Vessels Involved: Their Duties. The Rescue Work
VII. Matters affecting the Passage. The Supporting
Forces. The German Sea-Forces. The
Preparatory Work
VIII. The Personnel. Secrecy. Training. Some Personalities
IX. The Waiting Period. The Volunteering Spirit
X. Meteorological and Tidal Conditions. Visibility
XI. The Orders and Instructions. The Time Factor
{xxii}
XII. The First Attempt. The Return to Harbour
XIII. The Second Attempt and Return. Preparing for the Third
Attempt. Rewriting the Orders. German Optimism
PART II
Foreword
I. The Start. The Oversea Passage
II. The Approach
III. The Commencement of the Attack
IV. The Fight on the Mole. H.M.S. Iris
V. The Attack on the Railway Viaduct
VI. The Smoke Screening. Subsidiary Attacks
VII. The Work of the Blockships
VIII. The Retirement
IX. The Material Results
X. The Moral Effect
XI. Some Remarks on the Enterprise
Appendix. A List of Vessels and Craft in the Operations
Index
{xxiii}
ILLUSTRATIONS
Storming the Mole . . . . . . . . . _Frontispiece_
Drawn by Charles De Lacy from details supplied by the author
Captain Alfred F. B. Carpenter
A Portion of the German Battery on the Lighthouse
Extension of the Mole
View of the Canal Entrance with its Curved Piers
Aerial Photograph of the Canal Entrance
The Northeastern End of the Mole
The Blockships fitting out for the Enterprise
H.M.S. Vindictive before Fitting Out
A Portion of the Broad Part of the Mole
The Outer Wall, Showing the Parapet Pathway
Sixteen Feet Above The Floor of the Mole
H.M.S. Vindictive's Specially Constructed Gang-Ways
One of the Monitors
H.M. Ships Iris (right) and Daffodil
Lieut.-Col. Bertram N. Elliot
Lieut.-Commander Arthur L. Harrison
Wing-Commander Frank A. Brock
Captain Henry C. Halahan
Vice-Admiral Sir Roger J. B. Keyes (missing from book)
Diagrammatic Sketch of the Attack
Drawn By Charles De Lacy From Details Supplied By The Author
H.M.S. Vindictive's Bridge and Flame-Thrower Hut (right)
{xxiv}
The Fight on the Mole
Drawn by Charles De Lacy from details supplied by the author
Lieut. George N. Bradford
Lieut. Claude E. K. Hawkings
Lieut. Richard D. Sandford
Commander Valentine F. Gibbs
The Railway Viaduct
Aerial Photograph taken through the Clouds a Few
Hours after the Enterprise
The Three Blockships shortly after the Attack
Intrepid and Iphigenia
The Western Side of the Blocked Channel
The Eastern Side of the Blocked Channel
H.M.S. _Vindictive_ at Dover after the Attack
H.M.S. _Vindictive_ on her Return to Dover
MAPS AND PLANS
Chart showing the Relative Positions of Dover,
Zeebrugge, Heligoland, and the Exits from the North Sea
The Canal System of Belgium
The Port of Zeebrugge
Chart of Dover to Zeebrugge
Plan of Canal Entrance Channel
Sectional Sketch of Sunken Blockships
Section of the Mole through No. 3 Shed
Specimen Diagram for ascertaining Available Period
{1}
THE BLOCKING OF ZEEBRUGGE
PART I
{3}
THE BLOCKING
OF ZEEBRUGGE
CHAPTER I
THE STRATEGICAL SITUATION. THE GERMAN BASES
IN FLANDERS. THE CONCEPTION OF THE PLAN.
The main function of a navy in war is that of obtaining the command of
the sea. The purpose for which such "command" is desired is the
utilisation of the sea-lines of communication and the denial of the
same to the enemy.
Soon after the commencement of the war in 1914 the sea-lines of
communication across the English Channel assumed considerable, if not
paramount, importance for the transfer of personnel and material from
Britain to the Allied forces in France. It was equally incumbent on
the navy to maintain the trans-Atlantic and other lines of
communication along which the necessities of life and war were carried
to the Allies in all theatres of war.
[Sidenote: The Strategical Situation]
The first step towards obtaining "command of the sea" is the removal of
the obstacles which stand in one's way. In this particular case the
main obstacle (admittedly constructed for the purpose) was the German
High Seas Fleet. Thus the first duty of the British Grand Fleet was
that of destroying the {4} so-called High Seas Fleet, or, if
destruction was found to be impracticable, of reducing it to
inactivity. The German Fleet was fully alive to that fact, and, almost
throughout the war, hid themselves away in their naval bases under the
protection of their coast defences. Thus, as events showed, the High
Seas Fleet did not prove to be a very serious obstacle to our Command
of the sea; but, and this fact is easily forgotten, we could not
_foresee_ the continuance of their ineptitude and lack of spirit. The
German submarines, however, were a formidable obstacle, indeed. It is
unnecessary to reiterate what is already common knowledge on that point.
Submarines, by their nature, have certain limitations. Except in the
case of the submarine cruisers, which only materialised in the latter
part of the war, such craft are considerably hampered in their
movements by their comparatively small radius of action. Owing to the
geographical situation of Germany, her submarines were forced to expend
an important percentage of their fuel during the outward and homeward
voyages between their bases and the trade routes. This expenditure
cannot merely be judged by the distances which had to be traversed; the
expenditure of fuel in the submarine bears some relation to the _whole
circumstances_ of the voyage.
The endurance of the personnel is another important factor, and is
similarly affected by the circumstances under which they are employed.
For instance, in waters patrolled by enemy vessels, high speed must
always be readily available and the strain on the personnel, consequent
on the danger of sudden attack from surface craft, aircraft, or other
submarines, {5} to say nothing of the presence of mine-fields, is
increased. Thus the longer the passage that the German submarines were
forced to undertake in comparatively narrow and dangerous waters--such
as the North Sea--the less work could they do on our more important
trade routes. That statement is closely connected with the subject of
this book.
It did not require very much intelligence on the part of the German
Admiralty to realise that the possession of bases on the Flanders coast
would greatly facilitate their submarine campaign owing to the
consequent reduction of the voyages to and from the trans-Atlantic, or
Channel, trade routes. Flanders was therefore used, as will be
explained later in detail, to provide advanced bases for German
submarines.
The coast of Flanders lent itself to other naval uses. In addition to
the _guerre-de-course_ tactics of the enemy--i.e., the direct attack on
Allied merchant vessels--it was always open to Germany to take their
whole main fleet to sea for the purpose of seeking advantageous
conditions for bringing a portion of our Grand Fleet to action.
Movements of modern fleets under war conditions necessitate the use of
various types of small craft to precede them--e.g., mine-sweepers for
clearing channels for the fleet to pass through, destroyers for
supporting the mine-sweepers and for driving back the enemy's small
craft, light cruisers for scouting purposes, etc. Mine-sweepers and
torpedo craft, by virtue of their small size, are unable to keep the
sea for long periods. It will therefore be realised that, in the event
of the High Seas Fleet putting to sea for operations in southern
waters, the Flanders coast provided {6} Germany with an advanced base
from which their light craft could operate.
The German torpedo craft based in Flanders, therefore, would be able to
serve a double purpose, viz., that already mentioned and that of
attacking our patrol craft, our coast and our merchant vessels when
opportunity offered. The mine-sweepers could also serve a double
purpose in that they were required to sweep channels for the ingress
and egress of submarines based in Flanders whilst being suitably placed
for sweeping duties in advance of the main fleet. That Flanders was
also suitable for aircraft bases is as well known as it is obvious; but
it may not be generally understood that such aircraft would also be of
special value to the main fleet under the conditions stated above.
Thus, to sum up, the occupation of the Flanders coast by the German sea
forces would be of treble value--to provide, firstly, a base for the
submarines employed on commerce destruction; secondly, a base for the
advanced flotillas and aircraft operating in conjunction with the main
fleet in the event of the latter coming south; and, thirdly, a base
from which to attack our southern coasts or sea-patrols and from which
to indulge in air raids against British and French territory.
The foregoing consideration of the possible uses of Flanders to the
German Navy shows the inherent value of an advanced base in that
locality; the intrinsic value obviously depended upon the existence of
suitable harbours for use as bases. Let us now examine the
geographical situation.
[Illustration: CHART SHOWING THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF DOVER,
ZEEBRUGGE, HELIGOLAND, AND THE EXITS FROM THE NORTH SEA.]
In the latter part of 1917 the Flanders coast, as far westward as
Nieuport, was in the possession of the {7} Germans. The northern
extremity of the line separating the German and Allied armies was
situated approximately on the Yser Canal, which emanates from Nieuport
harbour. The latter was dominated by the gun-fire of both armies; its
use was, therefore, denied to both. The only other harbours on the
coast of Flanders were Ostende, Blankenberghe, and Zeebrugge. These
will be described in some detail presently.
[Sidenote: The Flanders Coast]
The Flanders coast consists mainly of flat country barely elevated
above the level of the sea. Sand-hills along the shore act as a
barrier between the sea and the land. Parallel to the shore the tidal
current runs to and fro with considerable velocity. The tendency for
the tidal current to wash away the sand from the shore is partially
countered by the use of groynes, such as are similarly used to maintain
our own coastline in many parts of England. Although the groynes on
the Flanders coast are carried well out into the sea--they are often
100 yards in length--the movement of sand along the coast is very
considerable, and, as will be explained later, has a strong influence
on the harbour situation in that locality.
The approaches to the coast are beset with shoals reaching to a
distance of eight miles from the land. These shoals have always
provided serious obstacles to navigation. During times of peace the
charts of this locality had been kept corrected by virtue of continual
surveying. The shoals were frequently moving and new shoals appeared
from time to time. The channels required almost constant dredging.
For obvious reasons during the occupation of Flanders by the Germans it
was not possible for the Allies to continue either the surveying or the
dredging.
{8}
Before the war navigation off this coast required the use of many
facilities such as buoys and lighthouses. At the best of times buoys
are not very dependable as navigational aids owing to their tendency to
break away in heavy weather or to drag their anchors along the bottom.
Their positions need to be "fixed" from time to time by means of angles
to shore objects, or by methods of astronomical observation, and then
compared with the positions shown on the charts. Lighthouses, however,
unless they are of the small type without lighthouse-keepers, are more
efficient aids to the navigator. During the war the lighthouses east
of Nieuport were only used by the Germans during short periods when
specially required for their own craft; the majority of the buoys were
withdrawn and the remainder were moved to new positions which were
frequently altered to prevent the Allies from making use of them.
Thus, during the war, the charts available to the Allies were very soon
obsolete; no others were obtainable. Navigation off the Flanders
coast, for Allied vessels of any size, therefore, became decidedly
hazardous.
The tides on the coasts, in addition to running alternately eastward
and westward with considerable velocity, also caused large differences
in sea-level amounting to fifteen feet between the highest and lowest
states of the tide.
[Sidenote: The Canal System]
Mention has already been made that the only harbours on the coast
eastward of Nieuport were situated at Ostende, Blankenberghe, and
Zeebrugge. But these were not natural harbours. They had been
artificially cut out of the coast-line by means of {9} dredging. The
entrance channels were preserved by piers built out into the sea and by
dredging operations designed to retain the desired depths of water.
[Illustration: BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF CANALS]
Ostende, before the war, had been much used as a commercial harbour,
and was therefore provided with numerous wharves, basins, and docks.
It was a suitable harbour for all classes of submarines and torpedo
craft. Blankenberghe was a little harbour about nine miles east of
Ostende and three miles west of Zeebrugge. Its depth was exceedingly
small; it could, therefore, only be used for shallow draught vessels
such as fishing boats, motor boats, and the like. It was true that the
rise of tide, amounting to approximately fifteen feet, would enable
larger vessels to enter or leave near the time of high water, but any
naval vessel stationed in a harbour from which it can only proceed to
sea during a limited portion of the twenty-four hours at once loses
much of its value. Zeebrugge could accommodate vessels up to a
considerable size: the harbour works and depths will be described in
detail presently. Although these three places provided the only
harbours on the coast, there was a harbour of great importance at
Bruges, about eight miles inland from Zeebrugge.
{10}
Bruges harbour was also entirely artificial, consisting of locks,
basins, and waterways built on the canal system. Bruges was connected
to the sea by means of canals running to Zeebrugge and Ostende, these
canals converging on the waterways of Bruges in such a manner that
vessels of a certain limited size could pass from Ostende to Zeebrugge,
and vice versa, without actually proceeding into the open sea. A
series of small canals also connected Bruges to Antwerp, via Ghent, but
this canal system, being only constructed to accommodate barges, did
not materially add to the value of Bruges as a harbour for sea-going
vessels.
Of the three canal systems connecting at Bruges, the canal to Zeebrugge
easily held first place in importance. This canal was built by the
Belgians. It was commenced in 1896 and completed in 1907. Six and a
quarter miles in length, it was almost entirely straight throughout.
It could accommodate torpedo-boat destroyers or submarines, both of the
largest size, and could, if required, have been used by light cruisers.
[Sidenote: The Harbours in Flanders]
At the seaward end of the Ostende and Zeebrugge canals, locks were
constructed so that vessels could pass from the canals to the sea, or
the reverse, at any state of the tide, without lowering the level of
the water in the canal.
The above-mentioned harbours were used for naval purposes by Germany as
follows. Bruges was chosen as the main naval base. Shelters for
protecting submarines from aerial attack, floating docks, repair
workshops, all the other facilities which go to make a modern dockyard
for small vessels, and the necessary stores and ammunition, were to be
found there. The {11} number of naval craft based on Flanders appeared
to vary considerably; but, at the beginning of 1918, approximately
eighteen submarines and twenty-five destroyers or torpedo-boats would
be at Bruges on an average day. The submarines lay in the special
shelters which were covered by roofs of reënforced concrete several
feet in thickness. Bruges, then, was not only the dockyard but also
the resting-place of practically all the German naval craft based on
Flanders.
The sea exits from Bruges, as already mentioned, were situated at
Ostende and Zeebrugge. There was some doubt, however, whether the
Bruges-Ostende canal could be used for the passage of anything larger
than very shallow draught vessels such as motor boats or barges. The
Ostende canal was known to be narrow, tortuous, and shallow; it had
been constructed many years earlier than the Zeebrugge canal.
At Zeebrugge and Ostende a few German craft were usually stationed for
duties of an immediate nature such as mine-sweeping, patrolling, and
duties connected with the defence of the coast. These harbours were
specially useful as taking-off places for vessels which had
concentrated in readiness for operations at sea, or as bolt-holes for
the same craft when pursued by our patrol vessels. Both harbours were
open to bombardment from the sea; that reason, more than any other,
probably influenced the Germans to use Bruges for their main base.
Ostende, being more open to attack from the sea and air than was
Zeebrugge, was the less important harbour of the two.
Blankenberghe harbour, owing to its small size and shallow depth, was
used as a base for the German {12} armed motor boats; it is believed
that about thirty were stationed there. This harbour, being
unconnected with the canal system, was not in direct inland
communication with Bruges by water.
In addition to the submarines and torpedo craft already mentioned, the
Germans had a large number of trawlers based on the various harbours
for mine-sweeping and patrol duties. At Zeebrugge they had their
largest seaplane base in Flanders; another seaplane base was situated
at Ostende.
In due course Flanders had become a veritable hornet's nest. Let us
consider for a few moments to what extent these hornets could trouble
us.
[Sidenote: Our Lines of Communication]
Across the English Channel, and especially in its eastern portion, we
had established lines of communication of tremendous importance. It is
no exaggeration to state that, every few _minutes_ of the day and
night, a vessel, of one sort or another, left the English shore for
France with her cargo of personnel, guns, ammunition, food or fuel,
etc. Day after day, night after night, for months on end, a constant
stream of vessels poured across the Channel in support of the Allied
armies or on the return trip to English ports with wounded, men to whom
a welcome spell of leave had been granted, empties for refilling, motor
transport vehicles for repair, and the like. The wounded were carried
in hospital ships; but, as the world knows and can never forget, the
Germans ruthlessly torpedoed them whenever the chance offered,
regardless of the Geneva Convention, heedless of the damnable
inhumanity of the proceeding, seeking only for opportunities for
indulging in the frightfulness which formed part of their Kultur.
{13}
All these vessels were continually open to attack, not only from
submarines but also from the surface craft and aircraft based in
Flanders. At any chosen moment, preferably at night or during misty
days, these hornets could emanate from Ostende or Zeebrugge on their
deadly missions. Further westward our trans-Atlantic lines of
communication offered innumerable opportunities for the German
submarine commanders to display their brutality against comparatively
defenceless merchant vessels, or to attack transports carrying
munitions of war and troops from the American Continent. The passage
through the English Channel afforded the most direct route for German
submarines proceeding to, or returning from, their hunting-grounds.
The mercantile traffic off the southeast coast of England and in the
entrance to the Thames was also within easy reach of the German bases
in Flanders; so were our seaside resorts, such as Ramsgate and Margate,
which provided favourable opportunities for bombardments with resultant
casualty lists of innocent women and children.
Dunkerque and Calais on the French coast were the nearest seaport
objectives to the Flanders coast; they both experienced frequent aerial
attacks and an occasional bombardment from the sea.
As a counter to the German craft in Flanders the British Admiralty had
established a force known as the "Dover Patrol." As the name implies,
this force was primarily based on Dover. Their duties were mainly
those of protecting the transports bound across the English Channel,
preventing the German naval craft from passing through the Straits of
{14} Dover, and watching the exits from Bruges so as to obtain timely
information of concentrated German forces putting to sea. The story of
the Dover Patrol is of intense interest, but so many pages would be
required to do it even bare justice that I can only refer the reader to
books written especially on that subject. Suffice it to say here that,
day and night, winter and summer, fair weather and foul, the Dover
force patrolled the sea so successfully that the German attempts to use
their surface craft for attacking the Allies were few and far between.
The difficulties of preventing the submarines passing through the
Straits of Dover were immense. We must realise that the maximum
portion of a submerged submarine visible above water amounts to a
periscope of a few inches in diameter. Compare that dimension to the
width of the Strait which at its narrowest part is twenty miles. _A
few inches in twenty miles_--if I have calculated aright that means
that the visible portion of the submarine would cover little more than
_one-millionth_ part of the surface between Dover and Cape Grisnez.
And when we also realise that the periscope would only be raised above
water for a few seconds at long intervals we shall begin to understand
the difficulty of the problem. Yet, as we know now, the Dover Patrol
force, under the direction of Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, eventually
rendered the passage through the Straits to all intents and purposes
impossible for a submarine. All honour to the Dover Patrol!
[Sidenote: The Dover Patrol]
A point which, until recently, unaccountably seemed to have escaped
notice was that the work of the Dover Patrol was carried out on behalf
of all the {15} Allies and of the United States. It was not a British
force acting solely in British interests. Though it is difficult, and
perhaps invidious, to apportion the credit for protecting the Allied
lines of communication, yet there is no shadow of doubt that the troops
from Canada and from the United States of America owed to the Dover
Patrol force a tremendous debt of gratitude for their safe passage
overseas. Recognition of this fact has since been shown by the
erection at New York, and on the French coast, of memorials to the
Dover Patrol. When the late war has faded into history, and those of
us who took part have long since "gone west," such memorials will
remain to bear witness to the splendid sacrifice and unselfish
gallantry of those hardy seamen who did their utmost to uphold the
honour of civilisation and to destroy the forces working for its
overthrow. (This opportunity of acknowledging the success of their
extremely arduous efforts, humble and brief though the acknowledgment
may be, partially counterbalances my regrets at not having had the
chance of serving with the "Dover Patrol" except on the occasion which
this book is designed to describe.)
[Illustration: CAPTAIN ALFRED F. B. CARPENTER, V.C., R.N.]
The final closing of the Straits, however, was far from accomplished by
the spring of 1918. At that time we had reason to believe that a large
percentage of the total Allied losses in merchant ships was caused by
the Flanders submarines, and that the percentage was on the increase.
Now patrol work of the type described above is essentially defensive in
its nature. This statement is not intended to imply that the Dover
Patrol force were always employed on defensive tactics; such was {16}
by no means the case. Our monitors frequently bombarded the coast
defences and the harbour works at Ostende and Zeebrugge; our motor
boats were continually patrolling close off the three coast harbours,
watching for opportunities to torpedo any German vessels which ventured
to sea; our mine-laying craft were employed, night after night, in
laying mines to the detriment of the German submarines. But from time
to time various suggestions had been made that we should adopt still
more offensive measures against the enemy. It is a very simple matter
to make suggestions, but by no means so simple to accompany them with a
reasoned statement, based on logical deduction, which will _convince
the authorities_ of their value. Until a particular Plan has been put
into execution it may, in the literal sense, be rightly designated a
"paper scheme." It is both unreasonable and unfair to attach a
derogatory sense to the term. It is equally unreasonable for authors
of schemes which have not passed the paper stage to belittle operations
when the latter, based on schemes which differed from their own, have
actually taken place with successful results.
[Sidenote: Paper Schemes]
Whatever suggestions were made, it is clear that there could be only
two radical methods of attaining our object. The most satisfactory, of
course, would have been the recapture of the Flanders coast and of
Bruges, with all the hornets in their nests, by means of military
operations. Unfortunately that was impracticable; the Allied armies
were not yet sufficiently strong. The only alternative to capture of
the craft in their harbours was that of preventing them putting to
sea--i.e., destroying or blocking {17} their exits. Several schemes
for blocking operations had been proposed. In tactical method they had
varied from blowing up the harbour entrances, as suggested by the
Halifax disaster, to "building in" the entrances under cover of poison
gas. Whether such methods were considered too risky, too expensive, or
too hopelessly fantastic is more than the author of this book knows.
An attack on Zeebrugge had been strongly advocated by an eminent flag
officer in November, 1916, but no details were given by him as to the
nature of the operation. In May, 1917, detailed proposals for an
attack had been submitted to the Admiralty by another distinguished
officer. This attack involved a landing on the Mole at Zeebrugge, the
general idea of which was not dissimilar from that eventually followed.
This particular scheme had not earned the approval of Their Lordships,
nor was it considered suitable by the Vice-Admiral then in command at
Dover.
Many months after the blocking of Zeebrugge had become an accomplished
fact two earlier schemes came to light--these having emanated from the
author of that submitted in May, 1917. In November, 1917, however, the
only previous proposals which were available for consideration by the
Planning Division of the Staff were those of November, 1916, and May,
1917, mentioned above.
In November, 1917, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe was First Sea Lord and
Chief of the Naval Staff. He had requested the Director of Plans to
consider, amongst many other things, the possibility of blocking the
Belgian ports.
{18}
The Plan was _evolved in the Admiralty_, being commenced on November
13th, and laid before Their Lordships on December 3d. The Plan was
accepted as feasible, and earned Their Lordships' decision to have it
carried out. No previous Plan had reached that stage. The original
edition of the Plan did not emanate from another country, or from
civilian sources, or from any other source outside the Admiralty
buildings in Whitehall except in so far as the details of one
particular phase of the operation were the outcome of conversations, at
the headquarters of the Air Force, with an expert on the formation of
artificial fogs.
[Sidenote: The Conception of the Plan]
The foregoing definite fact has been purposely inserted to correct
other statements which have been published elsewhere, presumably in
error. I shall deal with the details of the Plan in a subsequent
chapter.
Before leaving the consideration of the _origin_ of the Plan, I should
like to emphasise one particular point. Perhaps this can be most
readily illustrated by a simple simile. An uncorked bottle, containing
some noxious fluid, stands upon the table. You realise the
disagreeable results which will follow on the escape of its contents.
You cork the bottle. Now your action is so obviously correct that you
scarcely give it another thought. If any credit was due to anybody you
would probably take it to yourself; you would not apportion any
particular merit to that fond parent who first initiated you into this
obvious solution of the problem. In the case, therefore, of the
Blocking of Zeebrugge one need not apportion credit to the person who
first _suggested the mere idea_; the credit is entirely due to the man
who, in spite of all the difficulties, {19} evolved a _method_ of
"corking the bottle" and who, later, overcoming the great obstacles in
the way, carried the method into execution.
Before we pass on to review the difficulties of blocking the exits from
the German bases it would be advisable to consider the probable effects
of such an operation; this being the logical sequence actually followed
before the details of the Plan were formulated.
The results to be attained by blocking the exits would probably be as
follows. Firstly, there would be a reduction in the number of Allied
vessels sunk by mine or submarine warfare; secondly, a decrease in raid
activity on the part of the enemy torpedo craft; thirdly, the loss of a
convenient advanced base for small craft operating in conjunction with
certain movements of the High Seas Fleet; and, fourthly, the reduction
in the number of enemy vessels available for the purposes mentioned.
The first two results concerned reduction of enemy activity arising
from the longer passages involved by the use of more distant bases such
as Heligoland or the German rivers from which the small craft could
continue their depredations. The third result speaks for itself. With
regard to the fourth, it has already been stated that, on an average
day, there would be many torpedo craft or submarines resting and
repairing at Bruges. If the exits were blocked the use of these craft
would be denied to the enemy, just as effectually as if they were sunk,
for as long as the exits remained unopened. This loss to the enemy,
temporary or permanent, could doubtless be described in terms of
reduction of Allied losses of {20} merchant tonnage. The Admiralty
authorities could probably have calculated, within fairly correct
estimates, the average loss of merchant tonnage caused to the Allies by
a single enemy submarine or surface torpedo craft. Our former average
loss per given period would thus be lessened in proportion to the
number of enemy vessels bottled up in the canals during that period.
[Sidenote: Results to be Obtained]
There would, of course, be other, less important, consequences arising
from the blocking of these exits; e.g., the inconveniences caused by
the necessary transfer of fuelling and repair facilities elsewhere, the
extra work thrown on the escorting vessels in the Bight, and the fact
that the craft already at sea and operating from the Flanders coast
would be forced to curtail their current trips if they desired to
arrive at their new bases with their usual reserves of fuel.
All these material gains to the Allies would be of considerable
importance, but the moral effect was not unworthy of consideration.
The more audacious an undertaking against an enemy the more intense
will be the victor's enthusiasm consequent on success, and the greater
the despondency and loss of moral to the vanquished. Attempts to block
a hostile port in the face of carefully prepared defence measures may
certainly be described as audacious, unless the word "impertinent,"
which the author is inclined to allocate to this particular event, is
deemed to be more truly descriptive. If we endeavour to imagine what
our own feelings would be on hearing that enemy vessels had entered one
of our strongly defended harbours and blocked the entrance, we shall
arrive at some idea as to the probable moral effect produced {21} by
such an enterprise. In spite of the almost entire absence of activity
on the part of the High Seas Fleet, the Germans had never ceased to
sing its praises with all the bombast of which their waning spirit was
capable. It was not difficult, therefore, to estimate the dejection
and consternation that would spread throughout Germany when the success
of our efforts became known. The loss of prestige in the German Navy
would be not merely certain but perhaps of vital consequence later on.
{22}
CHAPTER II
THE LOCAL SITUATION. THE LOCAL DEFENCES.
[Sidenote: Zeebrugge Mole]
The village of Zeebrugge stands near the entrance to the
Zeebrugge-Bruges canal. At about half a mile inland from the coast at
Zeebrugge the canal lock was situated. To seaward of the lock, the
entrance channel, being open to the sea, was tidal. On the eastern
side of the entrance channel, about midway between the lock and the
coast-line, a small tidal harbour had been constructed for the use of
fishing craft. This tidal harbour was of no special value for naval
purposes, owing to its small depth. From the coast-line the entrance
channel was continued into the sea for a distance of about two hundred
and seventy yards by means of estacades--i.e., wooden piers. These
piers, curving outwards from the shore, are conspicuous in the
illustrations. For the purpose of protecting the canal entrance from
rough seas, which might interfere with the passage of vessels to and
from the canal, the famous Zeebrugge Mole had been constructed for the
Belgians. Semi-circular in shape, it emanated from the shore at a
distance of about half a mile to the westward of the canal entrance;
thence it curved round to the northward and eastward. This curved Mole
protected a roadstead, of some three hundred acres in extent, from
northerly and westerly gales. Easterly winds did not cause such heavy
seas as those from the directions already named owing to the protection
afforded by the Netherlands coast.
[Illustration: PORT OF ZEEBRUGGE]
{23}
The construction of the Mole was a colossal task. There are no similar
works of such magnitude in Great Britain or the United States. When
lecturing in the latter country I always made a point of emphasising
that fact to our American cousins; their unfailing humour never failed
to appreciate this little friendly "dig."
The total length of the Mole was over one and a half miles. For
purposes of description it may be divided into four portions.
Commencing at the shoreward end, the first portion of the Mole took the
form of a stone railway pier built into the sea for a distance of two
hundred and fifty yards. This pier was connected to the second
portion, which consisted of an iron-piled railway viaduct three hundred
and thirty yards in length. This, in turn, was connected to the third
portion, which formed the Mole proper. The latter was built of
concrete blocks on its seaward and shore sides, the central part being
filled with gravel and paved with granite. The width of this portion
of the Mole was no less than eighty-one yards, and its length about
eighteen hundred and seventy-five, or rather over a land mile. At its
northeastern end, the fourth portion consisted of an extension piece,
two hundred and sixty yards long and fifteen feet broad, with a
lighthouse at its eastern extremity.
If the Mole had been constructed solid throughout its entire length,
the task of keeping the channel, leading to the canal entrance, or the
roadstead, at a convenient depth would have been impossible owing to
silt.
Silt may be defined as the movement of sand or mud, according to the
nature of the sea bottom in the {24} locality, due to current. The
bottom of the sea in this locality was sand. The current off the
Flanders coast is caused by tide--it is usually spoken of as tidal
stream. Tidal streams reverse their direction of movement about every
six hours. Now the movement of sand caused by a tidal stream tends to
deposit that sand in or against any irregularity with which it meets,
whether the latter is a groove on the sea bed or an obstacle such as a
wreck. This deposit first takes place from one direction, and then,
when the tidal stream reverses, from the opposite direction. It will
therefore be seen that, where a channel is artificially cut on the
floor of the sea, silt will continually tend to fill that channel again
until the bottom is level once more. And a ship which grounds in a
locality affected by silt will have sand deposited against her sides
much to the detriment of salvage operations. These facts are well
enough known to seamen and have an important bearing on this narrative.
[Sidenote: Concerning Silt]
Suppose for a moment that the entire Mole had been built in solid
formation--i.e., that the tidal stream had no free passage under the
viaduct. The west-going stream would tend to carry sand into the
roadstead between the Mole and the canal entrance, whereas the
east-going stream would be unable to remove the deposit a few hours
later. Thus the roadstead would soon have become useless, and access
to the canal would have been impracticable.
The sand along the whole Flanders coast was extremely susceptible to
movement. Such tendency was partially countered by the extensive use
of groynes. These latter, however, could not be carried {25} very far
out into the sea owing to the difficulties of construction and repair.
There were, therefore, no artificial barriers to prevent the movement
of the sand to the eastward or westward beyond a short distance from
the shore. Hence the necessity for keeping a portion of the Mole open
to allow the tidal stream to flow in both directions. Even so, a large
shoal had formed in the roadstead, and reduced the acreage available
for anchorage purposes.
When first designed the open viaduct was of shorter length than that
eventually constructed; the alteration was considered necessary after
local experience of the silt had been obtained. The iron piles, or
pillars, on which the viaduct was supported were of great strength and
much interlaced with steel rods to allow for severe buffeting in heavy
gales and to take the strain of railway traffic. A portion was
actually demolished by a gale when under construction, and the
completion of the Mole was consequently delayed for many months.
When making enquiries in search of expert advice on questions of
salvage, I had an interesting conversation with an individual who had
had considerable experience in salving vessels in other waters. Maybe
this book will remind him of our discussion. In his opinion salvage
work presented no great difficulties. It was only a matter of
obtaining the necessary apparatus, he thought, and any
vessel--concrete-filled or otherwise--could be removed in a month or
so. "How about silt?" I asked.
"Oh, silt shouldn't make much difference," he replied, and added, "but
we have no silt to speak of in that part of the world, so I cannot say
for certain."
{26}
We then discussed the possibilities of salving a blockship at
Zeebrugge, for he had been informed of the proposed operation.
Eventually our conversation nearly resulted in a wager; that we came to
no terms was perhaps due to the fact that payment might have
necessitated application to a war widow.
The first and second portions of the Mole had not been materially
altered by the Germans during their occupation.
[Sidenote: The Outer Wall and the Parapet]
The third portion of the Mole will require detailed description. In
peace days the Mole had been used as a commercial wharf as well as a
breakwater. Ships used to secure alongside its inner wall. All the
necessary facilities, such as bollards for securing hawsers, fixed and
travelling cranes for loading or unloading cargo, and arrangements for
embarking passengers, had been provided. A large railway passenger
station, nearly two hundred yards long, was situated near its
southwestern end; a goods station and a coal shed, both very large
buildings, stood further to the northeastward. The floor level of this
portion of the Mole was about nine feet above the level of high tide.
On the outer (seaward) side a high wall, of great strength and
thickness, had been constructed for the purpose of preventing rough
seas from breaking over the Mole and damaging the sheds or washing away
the railway. The top of this wall was twenty feet above the floor
level of the Mole and therefore twenty-nine feet above the level of
high tide: at low tide it towered forty-four feet above the sea.
The fourth portion of the Mole was really formed by a continuation of
the outer wall, which extended beyond the third portion to the
lighthouse.
{27}
The appearance of all portions of the outer wall, as viewed by anybody
situated in a boat alongside it, was exactly similar throughout its
entire length from the lighthouse to the railway viaduct. Thus the
individual in the boat, except in the unlikely event of being able to
see over the top of the wall, would be unable to tell, at all
definitely, whereabouts his boat was situated relative to objects on
the Mole. But this fact had not been accidentally overlooked by the
designer of the Mole; there was no object in taking it into
consideration, for there was then no idea of any vessel berthing
alongside the outer wall. For instance, there were no bollards, no
cranes, no capstans for working hawsers, in fact no arrangements
whatever for berthing a ship. I have already stated that this outer
wall was of great thickness, varying from twenty-five feet on the sea
bottom to ten feet in that portion standing above the floor level of
the Mole. Four feet below the top of the wall there was a pathway,
nine feet broad, running the whole length of the wall. This pathway
was known as the parapet. The parapet was bounded on its seaward side
by the four-foot wall just mentioned; on its inner side iron railings,
three feet high, were placed to prevent anybody falling from the
pathway to the floor of the Mole sixteen feet below. Flights of steps
led up from the Mole floor to the parapet, but these flights were very
few and far between.
That portion of the outer wall which formed the lighthouse extension of
the Mole was broadened, above the sea level, to about seventeen feet
throughout its length. The pathway was similar to that just described,
but fifteen feet in width. This portion of {28} the Mole was hollow, a
tunnel inside it running from the third portion of the Mole to the base
of the lighthouse.
The navigable channel from the open sea to the canal entrance could
only be maintained in an efficient state by means of continual
dredging, owing to the silt. The channel passed close to the
lighthouse at the end of the Mole, and then in a fairly direct line,
for a distance of three-quarters of a mile, to a position midway
between the extremities of the two piers marking the canal entrance.
Thence the deep water channel passed slightly to the westward of the
central line between the piers. This latter portion of the channel had
become exceedingly narrow by virtue of the sandbanks which had formed
on either side of it and which actually uncovered at low water. A
vessel drawing more than twelve feet or so was forced to keep exactly
in the middle of this dredged channel to avoid grounding. Photographs
taken at or near high tide gave the channel the appearance of extending
from one pier to the other, at least a distance of one hundred yards;
those taken near low water showed how narrow the channel really was.
In the region of the two piers the silting of the sand was more rapid
than elsewhere: the narrowest part of the channel was situated near the
shore ends of these piers.
[Sidenote: Defences on the Mole]
The Germans had not rested satisfied with either the Mole, the canal
entrance, or the lock as they found them. The Mole itself had been
transformed into a fortress, and further defences had been constructed
for the purpose of guarding the canal.
[Illustration: A PORTION OF THE GERMAN BATTERY ON THE LIGHTHOUSE
EXTENSION OF THE MOLE. VIEW OF THE CANAL ENTRANCE WITH ITS CURVED
PIERS. This photograph was taken at high tide. Note the Mole in the
distance]
Batteries were placed on both sides of the canal entrance. These
ranged from four-inch guns to {29} twelve-inch guns. Barbed wire
entanglements were erected along the shore line; trenches, containing
machine guns, were dug close behind them. It was believed that a boom
of some sort, capable of being hauled across the channel or removed at
will, was kept handy to the outer lock gate. The gate itself,
"caisson" is the correct technical term, was withdrawn into an armoured
housing, impervious to shells or bombs, when the lock was opened to
allow vessels to pass through. The caisson was also provided with an
armoured roof for defence against aerial bombs. The lights on the
wooden piers were only lit when specially required to guide a German
vessel to the entrance.
On the Mole a very large seaplane base was established with the
original passenger station as its principal building. Several other
buildings for housing seaplanes, fuel, or bombs, and workshops were
erected by the Germans close by. A merchant steamer, the _Brussels_,
formerly commanded by the ill-fated Captain Fryatt, whom the Germans
did to death so abominably, was moored alongside the station, and was
believed to be used as living quarters for the personnel of the
seaplane base.
The broad portion of the Mole was used as a base for submarines passing
through Zeebrugge _en route_ for Bruges or to the open sea; it was also
used for such torpedo craft and mine-sweepers as were required for
immediate duty in that locality. From the north-eastern large shed to
the lighthouse the Mole had been turned into a veritable fortress. It
was believed that the lighthouse was used as the Mole signal station.
A battery of six or seven guns was situated on {30} the lighthouse
extension of the Mole. These guns were at first surmised to be
3.5-inch guns, but it is probable that they were larger--in fact, up to
5.9-inch guns firing a shell of approximately one hundred pounds in
weight. It was believed that the guns of this battery could fire out
to sea and could be turned to fire towards the shore.
Any vessel approaching from seaward and passing into the dredged
channel, _en route_ to the canal, would be within the danger zone of
this battery, from the latter's extreme range out at sea to the canal
lock, always provided that the state of the visibility allowed the
vessel to be seen. Incidentally, owing to the situation of the deep
channel, the vessel would be obliged to pass within _a few yards_ of
this battery when rounding the Mole end. A vessel endeavouring to
berth alongside the outer wall would have to approach close to this
battery, i.e., on a westerly course. At first sight it might appear
feasible to approach _from_ the westward on an easterly course and thus
avoid passing close to the battery, but that is not so. High tide and
slack stream do not coincide on this coast. For about three hours on
each side of high tide the streams run _to_ the eastward: at other
states of the tide there would be insufficient depths of water for a
vessel to berth alongside. It would therefore be necessary to approach
from the eastward, i.e., to stem the tidal stream.
[Illustration: AERIAL PHOTOGRAPH OF THE CANAL ENTRANCE. Taken shortly
before the enterprise, showing the sandbanks narrowing the entrance
channel. At the top of the photograph a dredger at work indicates the
position of the approach channel]
Now let us imagine for a few moments a duel between this battery and a
warship within--say--one thousand yards. The reader probably knows
that such a distance nowadays comes within the definition of
"point-blank range"; i.e., a range at which a gun {31} practically
cannot miss a ship. Picture, then, an average-sized vessel of three
hundred feet in length. The guns could hardly miss her--in fact, the
gunners could select which particular portion of her should serve as
their target. The ship's guns would return the fire. The most
vulnerable portions of the battery ashore are the guns themselves. The
muzzle of each gun showing just above the wall would, as viewed from
the ship, cover barely one square foot in size. Now at golf we call it
a "fluke" when a golfer holes out from the tee although he has attained
his object. (I apologise for this to non-golfers.) Similarly, if the
ship's gun _hits_ the shore gun we should call it a "fluke," although
that is the object forming the target. And, as already implied, if the
shore gun _misses_ the ship, that also will be a "fluke." On the face
of it, it certainly does not look as if the ship would stand much
chance, even at a distance of one thousand yards. But how if she is
closer? If a thousand yards is point-blank range, how shall we
designate a hundred yards?
At the eastern end of the broad part of the Mole, and on its floor
level, the Germans had erected a battery of three heavy guns. These
were so placed that they could fire on any incoming vessel immediately
she rounded the lighthouse. Woe betide a vessel attempting to do so in
the face of such guns. The latter were probably of the 5.9-inch type.
Under water, immediately below this battery, we eventually found some
submerged torpedo tubes, but I am not aware as to whether they were
constructed before the blocking operation or not; their direction of
fire was similar to that of the guns above them.
{32}
Close westward of these batteries of heavy guns and torpedoes, and
standing against the high outer wall, the Germans had constructed a
long shed of reënforced concrete; this shed provided the living space
for the personnel of the Mole garrison.
The total numbers of Germans on the Mole probably reached not less than
a thousand. Although this number may include the personnel of the
seaplane base yet they would all be available for the defence of the
Mole in case of an attack.
Slightly to the westward of the garrison's quarters, trenches had been
sunk in the floor of the Mole and surrounded by three complete sets of
barbed wire entanglements. It was believed that the usual accessories
of a coast fort--e.g., searchlights and range-finders, etc.--were
placed on the outer wall parapet, and that there would probably be some
small guns there also.
[Sidenote: The Booms and Torpedo Craft]
So much for the Mole itself. Across the channel the Germans had placed
booms. One of these, consisting of four Rhine barges, was moored
between the eastern end of the broad part of the Mole and a buoy
situated two hundred and seventy yards to the southward. These barges
were filled with stone, had nets slung beneath them, and were connected
together by wire hawsers. If a surface vessel attempted to pass
between the buoy and the Mole she would be brought up by this boom and
probably damaged by collision with one of the barges. If a submarine
attempted to dive underneath the barges she would be caught up in the
nets. The other boom consisted of entanglement nets moored between a
series of buoys to the southeastward of the barges. Any ship
attempting {33} to pass through them would probably have her propellers
entangled, with the result that her engines would be brought to a
complete stop. Thus, whichever boom was encountered by a ship, the
latter would, at the least, be partially disabled and stopped. The
Mole batteries could then have sunk her at their leisure by gunfire.
The only route by which a vessel could pass clear of these two booms
was that between the southeastern barge and the northern entanglement
net; i.e., within two hundred and fifty yards of the heavy gun battery
on the Mole. But even if, by dint of good fortune or special good
management, a vessel managed to pass the Mole batteries and the booms,
she would still have to run the gantlet of the naval vessels in the
anchorage and the batteries on shore before reaching the canal.
[Illustration: THE NORTHEASTERN END OF THE MOLE
a. The shadows of the parapet wall and of the lighthouse
at its extremity
b. The Mole batteries
c. Trench system surrounded by barbed wire
d. German torpedo craft alongside Mole
e. The barge boom
f. The boom of entanglement nets]
The German torpedo craft, which were available for local duty, used to
berth alongside the inner side of the Mole, close to the westward of
the barge boom. By virtue of their guns, torpedoes, and searchlights,
and the fact that they probably kept up steam in readiness for instant
action, these craft provided a valuable addition to the Mole and canal
defences.
The foregoing description of the local defences at Zeebrugge has
probably been sufficiently detailed to lead to the conclusion that the
Germans were fully alive to the possibility of attacks on the Mole or
canal. Whether or not they considered that such attacks would only
form part of some more ambitious operation, such as a military landing
on the coast, our enemies had left practically no stone unturned to
repel them. The defence measures must have {34} appeared, especially
to those on the spot, to be more than sufficient.
It is well known that, although the possession of detailed local
knowledge will usually be of great value towards the formation of plans
of attack, there are occasions when local knowledge is apt to make
local difficulties loom extremely large. For instance, in this
particular case, the navigational difficulties caused by the strong
tidal stream, the difficulty of recognising objects on the low-lying
shore during darkness, the uninviting appearance of the outer Mole wall
as an obstacle to be surmounted, and many other matters would probably
have induced the belief, in those who were actually acquainted with
these difficulties, that such attacks would have no chance of success.
There is, therefore, reason to believe that, although they realised an
attack might be attempted, the Germans were perfectly satisfied that
the defences could neither be improved nor penetrated.
The reader will probably have arrived at the conclusion that the
Germans were devilish in their thoroughness. Yet there was still one
joint left in their armour--and we penetrated it. But I must not
anticipate.
{35}
CHAPTER III
THE OUTLYING OBSTACLES. CONSIDERATIONS OF SALVAGE.
Thus far I have only dealt with the local defences of Zeebrugge. But
there were many other obstacles in our way--such as the coast
batteries, mines, surface patrol vessels, submarines, aircraft, and the
vagaries of the weather in addition to the navigational difficulties
mentioned in the first chapter.
The coast-line of Flanders bristled with guns. The section of the
coast from three miles west of Ostende to six miles east of Zeebrugge,
approximately twenty-one miles in length, was defended by two hundred
and twenty-five guns; one hundred and thirty-six of these were of the
heavy type, i.e., six-inch and above, up to fifteen-inch guns.
At one period of the war, soon after the Germans first obtained
possession of that locality, the coast defences had been few and far
between. In those days our ships used to bombard from such short
ranges as ten thousand yards. In course of time heavier guns were set
up on shore so that our vessels were forced to keep at a more
respectful distance. The first bombardments from ten thousand yards
had been answered by the establishment of German guns having a range of
fifteen thousand yards. When better weapons became available for
bombardment from twenty thousand yards the Germans replied with guns
{36} firing up to twenty-five thousand yards. And thus the duel
continued. Finally, the ranges increased to upwards of forty thousand
yards (twenty-three land miles). Monitors were specially constructed
for this purpose and their marksmanship was wonderfully accurate. This
accuracy is borne out by the fact that scarcely any damage was caused
to the residential quarter, although Ostende was bombarded again and
again; yet works of military importance, such as docks and railway
stations, closely adjoining the residential quarter, were hit time
after time.
In a straightforward gunnery duel between a ship and a fort, within the
effective range of each, the former stands no chance. In these days,
however, such duels savour little of the old-time broadside fighting
between ships.
Even the largest and most modern coast guns are of comparatively small
avail for defensive purposes unless the attacking ships are visible, or
unless the firing can be controlled satisfactorily by such indirect
means as the use of aircraft for observational purposes. At night the
attackers must be illuminated by star-shell, flares, or searchlights.
Under the ordinary fog conditions--i.e., when the whole locality is
obscured by fog--aircraft cannot observe the results of firing nor can
the attacking forces be illuminated.
Under exceptional fog conditions--i.e., when a fog (natural or
artificial) lies between the shore guns and the attacking vessels, the
latter being in clear weather--good co-operation between the batteries
and aircraft in daylight enables the fire to be directed so accurately
as to ensure destruction to vessels which remain in the danger zone.
[Illustration: A portion of Chart 1406, showing the Dover Strait, the
waters between Dover and Zeebrugge, the shoals, the extent of the
German minefields, the section of fortified coast (shaded), and the
danger zone of the German batteries.]
{37}
The only alternative to directed firing is that of barrage firing, such
as is used so greatly in modern land warfare. The defence guns can
establish a shell barrage, for a limited period, across any zone which
the attacking ship is attempting to penetrate _en route_ to her
objective. The vessel which steams into an efficient heavy gun barrage
from modern guns is unlikely to survive.
[Sidenote: German Coast Defences]
I afterwards visited one of the large German batteries near Ostende,
called the Jakobynessen battery, which mounted fifteen-inch guns and
fired projectiles weighing nearly one ton each--seventeen hundredweight
to be precise. They were mounted in specially constructed gun-pits
amongst the sand-hills close behind the shore, and were so well hidden
that they could not be seen from a distance of little more than a
single gun's length. The projectiles stood over six feet high and were
murderous-looking instruments of warfare. These particular guns, and
there were others of a like nature, could probably have ranged up to
sixty thousand yards (over thirty-four land miles).
The whole area off this section of the coast, up to about twenty miles
to seaward, was included in the danger zone of the coast batteries. No
vessel could maintain her position in that area, under ordinary
conditions of visibility, for more than a few minutes at the outside
limit. The reader may consider, however, that a ship desiring to
attack the coast would merely have to approach in foggy weather or
under cover of darkness. In foggy weather she would be unable to
locate her objective--so that can be ruled out. At night she might
conceivably arrive within a few thousand yards without being seen or
heard. {38} But immediately she was located by the defences the latter
would fire their star-shell and switch on their searchlights. The
whole area would thus be illuminated like daylight. The vessel
discovered under such conditions would probably be blown to pieces
within five minutes.
Thus it is manifest that ships cannot approach a hostile coast, in the
face of modern defences, under the ordinary conditions of daylight or
darkness, or in fog.
We will now consider the mine problem. The German mine-fields extended
to a distance of several miles from the coast. We had reason to know
of their presence; from time to time, as reported in the press, our
vessels had been blown up.
Mine-fields off one's own coast provide a certain measure of defence.
But they are also an embarrassment in that one's own vessels cannot
pass through them, when approaching or leaving harbour, unless safe
channels are kept clear for the purpose. This applied to the
mine-fields under review.
[Sidenote: The German Mine-fields]
The reader may possibly have jumped to the conclusion that all we had
to do was to navigate calmly through the German safe channels. It
certainly sounds plausible. As a matter of fact, such an idea borders
on the ridiculous. Let us think this matter out carefully. Our forces
could not pass through such channels unless they possessed information
as to the positions of those channels. But if such information were
received, the chances would be long odds on the information having been
"made in Germany." Far from such information being correct, therefore,
the positions mentioned would probably be those of the most dangerous
mine-fields. Nevertheless, suppose {39} we received information which,
from the nature of its source and data, we had every reason to credit;
and suppose we acted on such information. Well, on the voyage across
the sea, or even before we actually start, the enemy discover that we
intend to attack. What will they do? Their argument would be as
follows: "The British are coming over to attack us; they may have
discovered the positions of our safe channels; we dare not take any
chances so we will mine our own safe channels immediately."
Mine-layers, kept ready for instant use, would be sent to sea at once.
In a very short space of time, probably an hour would be more than
sufficient, the previous safe channels would have been converted into
areas of the greatest danger.
There are alternative methods which the attackers may adopt. Firstly,
they may advance to the attack preceded by a force of mine-sweepers.
Now mine-sweeping is a very slow process if it is to be carried out
thoroughly. It is inconceivable that a large force of these vessels
could steam about, mine-sweeping, near the enemy's coast for a
considerable period without being discovered. Their discovery would
give the whole show away; the enemy would know that we were
approaching; the whole element of surprise would be lost.
The other method open to the attackers is that of proceeding to their
objective without mine-sweepers, after having carefully weighed the
probabilities of danger existing on the various alternative routes,
and, on arriving at the danger area, passing through it and _chancing
the result_. And that is what we did--we chanced it! But I am
anticipating once more.
{40}
Outside the German mine-fields, and in any inshore areas which were
unmined, German patrol craft would probably be stationed. Patrol
craft, in comparatively narrow waters, are effective for discovering
the approach of surface vessels in clear weather by day or night. The
_minimum_ harm that they could do to the attacking force would be that
of reporting the latter's approach. A single alarm rocket might be
sufficient. It is, therefore, almost inconceivable that the patrol
vessels could be passed without the alarm being given. Any gun-firing
would, of course, act as an alarm; ramming, a much more silent method,
would be the best course open to the attacking craft if they
encountered the patrols.
There were two other forms of patrol, however, which could provide even
more serious obstacles.
Submarines, stationed on the route between the attacker's base and the
objective, could patrol at periscope depth. The passing of the
squadrons, viewed through the periscope of the unseen submarine would
be reported by wireless telegraphy immediately the submarine could come
to the surface. Thus, long before the attack commenced, the defenders
would be perfectly well aware of the attacker's approach, whereas the
latter would imagine that their mission was unsuspected. This use of a
submarine, as a lookout, would be of infinitely greater importance, in
such an event as this, than her use as a torpedo vessel.
Aircraft patrolling off the coast--say at a height of five thousand
feet--would be able to see as far as the southeast coast of England,
provided the atmosphere were clear. Under average conditions of {41}
visibility there would be no difficulty in discovering a naval force
several miles distant. Such discovery would be immediately reported to
the defences with the same result as that just described in the case of
the submarine. The Germans had a strong force of seaplanes based on
the Flanders coast. These machines were generally patrolling the
vicinity--_provided the Allied aircraft were not about_.
[Sidenote: Summary of Obstacles]
We have now arrived at the stage where we can make a summary of the
main obstacles in the way of a blocking enterprise at Zeebrugge. There
were (_a_) the aerial patrol; (_b_) outlying submarines; (_c_) surface
patrol vessels; (_d_) mines; (_e_) uncharted shoals; (_f_) lack of
navigational aids; (_g_) coast defence batteries and illuminating
apparatus; (_h_) the guns on the Mole; (_i_) the obstruction booms;
(_j_) the harbour defence craft; (_k_) the shore batteries defending
the canal; (_l_) the difficulties of seamanship in a tideway; and
lastly (_m_) the vagaries of the weather.
In connection with a blocking enterprise at Ostende the same obstacles
applied with the exception of those resulting from the presence of the
Mole.
The list is undoubtedly formidable _though not yet complete_. The
operation, on the face of it, did not seem to be altogether simple.
In writing this book I may be taken to task for concentrating on the
operation at Zeebrugge and leaving the Ostende stories untold.
The latter operations, there were two, would necessitate a volume to
themselves. And--this is the all-important point--I am not competent
to render a first-hand account of them because I was not in the
position of an eye-witness. Let us hope that the story {42} will be
written some day, so that the splendid work of poor Godsal,[1] who
afterwards lost his life at Ostende in my old ship, and of his gallant
troop may be properly recorded.
[1] Commander A. E. Godsal.
Owing to the fact that we were uncertain as to the extent to which
Ostende could be utilised as an exit from Bruges, we naturally decided
to assume its efficiency; i.e., to assume that blocking the craft in at
Bruges would necessitate blocking both Zeebrugge and Ostende.
The harbour entrance at Ostende was somewhat similar to the canal
entrance at Zeebrugge. There were two piers flanking the entrance
channel, the whole area being commanded by shore batteries. The only
other comparison between the places which calls for mention here is as
follows. Whereas the Mole at Zeebrugge provided additional obstacles
against entry, it also acted as a landmark from which the canal
entrance could be found. At Ostende the defence obstacles would be
less complicated, but the harbour entrance would be more difficult to
locate.
Now, the decision to block both exits naturally led to the conclusion
that they should be blocked simultaneously if practicable. Otherwise
the operation at one place would serve as a warning to the other. For
instance, it would have been rather absurd for us to block Zeebrugge
one night with a view to coming along on the following night to block
Ostende. The absurdity would have been only slightly less in degree if
we blocked one exit at--say--midnight with the idea of blocking the
other at 2 A.M. For the defence batteries at the two places would
naturally be in {43} telephonic communication, and even half an hour's
notice at the second exit would be sufficient to prepare a very warm
reception for us. Simultaneous blocking was our aim; thus the whole
operation was directed to that end, a fact which influenced the events
to be related.
It has been suggested that "blocking the exit" was not the best method
of preventing the egress of German vessels from the Zeebrugge canal.
An alternative method, that of destroying the lock-gate by gun-fire,
was referred to. The idea sounds plausible enough at first. As a
matter of fact, many attempts had been made, by means of long-range
bombardments, to achieve that end. They had all failed. The lock-gate
appeared to have a charmed life. Huge shell had burst in its vicinity
and yet it still remained intact. The suggestion was then put forward
that the lock-gate should be bombarded _from close range_ under cover
of smoke or gas. This suggestion was accompanied by the opinion that
an attempt at blocking the channel would be futile. I am much puzzled
at this idea of close bombardment. For it was as obvious, as it was
known to be a fact, that the Germans would withdraw the gate into its
armoured recess immediately a bombardment was suspected. This would
have been the work of a few moments; the outer lock-gate would have
been rendered absolutely immune from destruction.
The argument that there were two lock-gates, outer and inner, and that
the Germans could not withdraw both, owing to the fear of the canal
running dry, also sounds plausible until it is closely examined.
Firstly, however, it is clear that the canal would only run dry if both
lock-gates were opened _at low tide_; secondly, an {44} inshore
operation at low tide would preclude the use of any craft other than
those of shallow draught; thirdly, owing to the presence of the outer
wall of the Mole, whose height would be over forty feet at low tide,
the bombarding vessels could only obtain a direct line of fire at the
lock from a position inside the Mole where the extensive shoals would
allow very little room for manoeuvring, to say nothing of the defences
on the Mole itself; fourthly, the canal, even if emptied, would refill
from the rising tide within a few hours, and there was no certainty
that the temporary evacuation of the water would cause serious damage;
and lastly, one may assume, if there was really any substance in the
idea, that the Vice-Admiral whose many long-range bombardments had
failed to achieve their purpose would have long since attempted a
short-range attack.
So, the decision to block the entrance at Zeebrugge having been
reached, the best position for blocking had to be considered. It has
already been shown that the narrowest portion of the channel to seaward
of the lock was situated near the shore ends of the wooden piers.
Another position even narrower in size was that of the lock-gateway
itself. But the mere width of the position chosen was by no means the
only consideration.
The actual sinking of the blockships in position did not provide the
final argument; a point of great importance concerned the
practicability of removing them out of the channel; it is of little use
to block a channel in such a manner that it can easily be unblocked.
This matter concerns the art of salvage.
Salvage is a highly technical subject, but a few {45} remarks at this
stage are necessary if the reader is to appreciate the extent to which
considerations of salvage affected the problem under discussion.
Salvage operations must vary according to the circumstances of each
particular case. The size of the vessel, the damage which she has
sustained, the manner in which she is resting on the bottom of the sea,
the nature of the ground, the tides, the depth of water, the degree of
exposure to rough seas, the proximity of shelter for salvage craft, and
the distance from the land are all factors of importance, but they by
no means exhaust the list.
One of our main purposes in considering salvage operations was that of
ascertaining the chief obstacles to salvage, so that we could provide
the enemy with as many of those identical obstacles as lay in our power.
Another important object, concerning the immediate problem at
Zeebrugge, was that of deciding the best type and size of vessel to be
used in addition to the question of what particular damage each vessel
should receive, and how she should be fitted to defy attempts at
removal.
There are three principal methods of removing a sunken ship. First,
bodily removal with the aid of some lifting agent. Second, dispersion
by explosive means. Third, piecemeal removal by cutting away.
Regarding the first-mentioned method, a small vessel can be lifted by
passing hawsers beneath her and securing the ends to salvage craft on
the surface overhead. The hawsers being hauled taut at low tide, the
vessel will lift off the bottom when the rise of tide lifts the salvage
craft, and can then be {46} transported bodily elsewhere. Larger
vessels can be lifted by the use of compressed air, or by pumping out
the vessel after closing all holes under water. Provided the ship is
upright the compressed air method can leave out of account the damage
sustained below the vessel's normal waterline, but the remainder of the
hull must be rendered airtight. Air can then be pumped into the hull
until the vessel is lifted, and she can be towed away as required.
This method has been used successfully when removing large vessels, but
the practicability of rendering them airtight chiefly depends on the
damage which they have sustained. The pumping-out method,
comparatively speaking, is the most simple one to adopt, provided that
the damage to the hull is small. The damaged portion must be repaired
by divers unless the more elaborate method of building a
coffer-dam--i.e., a sort of dock--around the ship, is pursued. Divers
cannot work in a strong tidal current or in rough weather. The repair
of holes under water is rendered extremely difficult, if not actually
impossible, when the bottom of the ship is badly holed with the ship
resting on the damaged portion. The ship must be made watertight, or
nearly so, below the surface of the sea before she can be lifted. The
word "watertight" is qualified here because, as a matter of accuracy,
the ship can be pumped out and lifted, provided that the pumps can
eject water at a greater rate than the latter is flowing in. Before
passing on to consider the next method it may be as well to remark that
special difficulty is experienced when moving sand--i.e., silt--has
access to the holes in the ship.
Dispersion by means of explosive charges may, {47} under certain
circumstances, be a simple operation, but, on the other hand, there are
certain conditions which put this method outside the pale of choice.
For instance, in the case of a ship sunk in a narrow channel where much
silt is experienced, the explosive method is almost worse than useless.
For every explosion in a given section of a vessel will tend to shatter
that portion into several pieces. Each piece falls to the bottom and
forms a new obstruction. Silt then enormously aggravates the
situation, for the sand will collect against the obstruction until it
becomes a miniature sandbank. Such shoals are then difficult to
remove. A bucket-dredger--i.e., a vessel fitted with an endless chain
of buckets for scooping up the bottom--will break her buckets as soon
as they encounter the steel kernel of the shoal. On the other hand, a
suction dredger--i.e., a vessel designed to suck up sand off the
sea-bottom--cannot raise solid material. Neither type of dredger can
remove the _cause_ of the shoal; any removal of sand under such
conditions is merely temporary; the sand will recommence building up
the shoal as soon as the dredger ceases work. Dredging against such
obstacles is of little more use than dredging against rocks.
There remains the third method, namely, piece-meal removal by means of
"cutting away." Cutting away can be accomplished, in the ordinary
course of events, by means of acetylene gas cutters or by pneumatic
tools. Acetylene gas will cut through steel with little more effort
than a knife cutting through india-rubber. But acetylene gas cannot be
used under water and cannot cut through large thicknesses of cement.
Pneumatic tools provide a very laborious and {48} tedious means of
cutting large quantities of steel. Work under water entails the use of
divers. Thus, the removal of a ship by the piecemeal process is an
exceedingly prolonged undertaking, especially as each piece must be
lifted out when cut away; for reasons already stated the pieces must on
no account be allowed to fall to the sea-bottom.
From the foregoing remarks we arrive at the following conclusions. The
blockships should be too large to lift off the bottom by the hawser
method. They should be extensively damaged and sunk in such a manner
that they would rest on the damaged portion of the hull. They should
be fitted to counter "cutting away" tactics, and should be sunk in
positions where silt would render impracticable the explosive method of
dispersion; the damage should be so situated as to give the silting
sand access to the hull through the holes in the latter.
These general anti-salvage considerations, however, did not furnish us
with all the data required. They required to be dealt with in greater
detail, and the matter of dimensions was another important factor.
It was essential to render impossible the passage of the German naval
craft out of the canal _over the top_ of the sunken blockships. The
tide at Zeebrugge rises fifteen feet between its low and high levels.
Allowing six feet as the minimum depth required to float small naval
craft, it will be seen that the upper portion of each blockship should
reach to within six feet of high tide level, or, at least, nine feet
above low tide level, when resting on the bottom. The height of the
blockship's hull, therefore, would need to be equal to the depth of the
sea at low tide level plus, at {49} least, nine feet. Now, the choice
of vessel is naturally limited. In the midst of war it is unlikely
that a navy would possess many craft, if any, which were not already in
use for other purposes. Thus, the dimensions just referred to would
have to fall within certain limits, namely, those corresponding to the
dimensions of the only vessels from which one is likely to be able to
choose. That part of the total height due to the rise of tide was
beyond control; it would be the same anywhere in the same locality.
Thus, the position chosen for the blocking must necessarily have a low
tide depth of such an amount as would make the total depth at high
water correspond to the total height of the available hulls.
Then again the number of ships required would depend on the relation
between their horizontal dimensions and the breadth of the channel to
be blocked. For instance, a single vessel whose beam dimensions were
approximately equal to the breadth of the lock gateway would be
sufficient to block the latter, provided that the height of her hull
also agreed with the conditions just mentioned above.
Now, it had to be borne in mind that if a vessel was sunk in the lock
gateway the "cutting-away" method would be greatly facilitated by the
erection of cranes and machinery, within a few feet of the vessel, on
dry land. This position, being so far removed from the tidal current
which runs parallel with the Belgian coast, was unaffected by silt.
Thus, although the lock gateway, by reason of its small breadth, could
be completely blocked by any suitable vessel sunk therein, the work of
salvage would be very much less difficult here than elsewhere.
{50}
Further out, between the wooden piers at the canal entrance, the
navigable channel was approximately one hundred and twenty feet in
breadth; i.e., slightly over one-third of the whole distance between
the piers. A vessel of one hundred and twenty feet in length,
therefore, would require to be turned dead across the navigable channel
before sinking if she was to block {51} every inch of it. Obviously, a
vessel of three hundred feet in length would not require to turn
herself to anything like the same extent. The maximum depth in this
position was believed to be about thirty-six feet at high tide level.
Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that a blockship sunk between the
wooden piers would need to have a hull whose height was not less than
thirty feet, and to have a length of at least one hundred and twenty
feet.
[Illustration: Plan of CANAL ENTRANCE CHANNEL]
[Illustration: SECTIONAL SKETCH of SUNKEN BLOCKSHIPS]
In this position the silt was known to be very active. That fact,
taken in conjunction with the exposure to rough seas, the presence of
the tidal current, and the impracticability of erecting salvage plant
on the land within easy reach of the vessel, rendered it obvious that,
all things considered, the position between the wooden piers would be
the ideal blocking position if suitable vessels were available for the
purpose, and if such vessels were damaged and sunk with due regard to
anti-salvage considerations.
{52}
It is common knowledge that when vessels are fitted out as blockships
they usually carry a goodly cargo of cement. The general notion,
however, about the use of this material is that it is merely intended
to make the ships heavier and thus less capable of being lifted. That
is only partially correct. There is another and more important use for
cement, namely, as a counter against the use of acetylene gas for
cutting the ships to pieces. The general scheme is that of placing the
cement in just those positions where cutting would be most necessary;
in our case, in those portions of the ship which would be above the
lowest level of the tide and up to within six feet of the highest tide
level. The depth of our chosen position being twenty-one feet at low
water and thirty-six feet at high water, this meant that the cement
would need to be placed between the levels of twenty-one feet and
thirty feet above the keel, provided that the ship was sunk in an
upright position. With regard to the latter proviso, steps must be
taken to guard against the eventuality of the ship resting on her beam
ends on the sea-bottom as a result of capsizing when foundering. This
cautionary measure necessitated placing the cement between the levels
of twenty-one feet and thirty feet from her beam ends at either side of
the vessel as well as between the same vertical distances from her
keel. Nothing should be left to chance that can be provided for in
advance.
It was clear enough that the task of ever getting the ships into the
desired positions for sinking would be far from simple; having attained
that object it would be the height of stupidity to sink the ships in
such a manner, and so fitted, that their removal would be comparatively
easy.
{53}
After the operation had been successfully completed I could not help
being rather amused at a certain individual who expressed the opinion
that "the Germans are so cute that they'll probably remove the
blockships in a day or two." Why were some people always so ready to
credit the Germans with everything that's wonderful? The reasons were
not far to seek; such ideas arose partly from natural ignorance on
technical matters and partly because the Germans never ceased to assure
us how marvellous a nation they were. And some of us believed it!
_Verb. sap_.
With all the difficulties in the way of attainment, what counter
considerations were there to make the attempt worth the undertaking?
{54}
CHAPTER IV
PAST EXPERIENCE. SMOKE SCREENS. THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS.
What were the chances of success?
The lessons of personal experience and of past history are the chief
guides when calculating the probability of success in any operation.
He who ignores history acts unwisely. He who studies history and
proposes to attempt something which has always failed hitherto either
may be excessively foolish or may be aware of a new factor affecting
the situation. He may be merely flying in the face of Providence or
basing new proposals on a well-considered judgment of the new
circumstances.
[Sidenote: Analogous Operations]
Naval history contains a few examples of operations somewhat analogous
to that under investigation. The more noted are the attacks on
Martinique in 1794, on Teneriffe in 1797, the attack on Ostende in
1798, the cutting out of the _Hermione_ from Puerto Cabello in 1799,
the sinking of the American steamer _Merrimac_ at Santiago de Cuba in
1898, the Japanese attempts to block the entrance to Port Arthur in
1904, and, during the late war, the attempt to block the Rufigi River
by a British collier in November, 1914.
In none of these cases were the conditions quite parallel to those at
Zeebrugge and Ostende, but some features of each bore a certain
similarity.
The attacks on Martinique and Puerto Cabello {55} showed the great
value of determination and initiative in the face of powerful shore
defences. They also showed the disadvantage accruing to the defence
force by reason of the latter's ignorance as to the true nature and
object of an attack by sea forces.
The attack on Santa Cruz, Teneriffe, was led by the immortal Nelson
himself. It involved the storming of the Mole which was defended by
the enemy's batteries. Two attempts were made. The first was carried
out in the face of adverse weather conditions which rendered "surprise"
impossible; the attack was withdrawn soon after the landing parties had
left their ships. The second attempt, made two days later, was also a
failure, but a glorious failure indeed. Very few of the boats reached
the Mole, which, however, after a desperate encounter was captured by
the storming parties. The latter were unable to advance owing to the
fire from the hostile batteries. Nelson, who, it will be remembered,
lost his right arm in this engagement, failed in his object. This
failure provided the outstanding interruption to the long list of
victories gained by our greatest naval hero of all time; Nelson himself
expressed his feelings of disappointment and physical incapacity with
the words "I go hence and am no more seen."
The attack on Ostende in May, 1798, was directed against the lock gates
for the purpose of interfering with the concentration of the flotillas
destined for the invasion of England. This attack had originally
included a blocking operation, but that idea was apparently abandoned.
The attack, carried out in the face of a rather feeble defence, was
completely successful, but a severe gale prevented the {56}
re-embarkation of the forces, with the result that over one hundred and
sixty were killed or wounded and nearly eleven hundred and fifty were
taken prisoners--an interesting point in view of the fact that only
about half a dozen casualties occurred during the attack itself. The
embodiment of the main principles of fighting led to success on that
occasion as they will usually do under similar conditions. The moral
effect in England, in spite of the heavy losses, is recorded as having
been most beneficial.
The blocking attempts at Santiago and Port Arthur, carried through with
complete indifference to danger in each case, were failures.
[Sidenote: Main Factors of Difficulty]
The main difficulties with which blockships must contend may be briefly
stated as follows:
(_a_) That of _locating the destination_ in darkness, increased by the
absence of the usual local navigational aids such as lighthouses,
buoys, etc.
(_b_) That of _reaching the destination_, when located, in the face of
the enemy's opposition.
(_c_) That of _turning and sinking the vessel_, after reaching the
destination, so that the channel will be efficiently blocked.
Dealing with these difficulties in detail, the reader is probably aware
of the fact that navigation is by no means an exact science. On the
open sea a captain is usually satisfied if he knows his position to
within three or four miles. When approaching the coast this wide
margin of safety must be considerably reduced--hence the need of
lighthouses, buoys, fog signals, and so forth. The upkeep of such aids
is naturally in the hands of the power which occupies the coast {57}
concerned. Thus, under war conditions, one aims at removing all
navigational aids, as far as one's own requirements will allow, which
may assist the enemy. By this means, the enemy when approaching one's
coast, must either trust to the rather inexact methods used in the open
sea or they must establish their own navigational aids beforehand. The
objection to the latter is manifest; craft sent ahead to lay down
buoys, etc., are apt to give one's intentions away, and it is open to
the enemy to remove such aids as soon as they are placed.
With regard to the second main difficulty, namely, that of reaching the
destination, when located, in the face of the enemy's opposition, the
difficulty here is so obvious as to render detailed remarks unnecessary.
With regard to the difficulty of turning and sinking the vessel
satisfactorily, this is largely a matter of seamanship. With wind and
tide both affecting a vessel it is seldom possible either to keep her
stationary over a particular position or to turn her through a large
angle without such aids as tugs, hawsers, and anchors, etc.
But a ship does not go down instantaneously, nor is it a simple matter
to sink her in an upright position. One end of the ship is likely to
sink before the other: most of us have seen photographs of a ship with
her bows or stern standing vertically in the water just before the
vessel makes her final plunge. Whilst the ship is actually sinking the
local current is apt to move her considerably before she is resting on
the bottom throughout her whole length. Thus the third difficulty can
only be surmounted by a specially fine display of seamanship, and, in
such cases as we are {58} reviewing, this display must be rendered
under the most trying conditions imaginable.
Now, in the case of the blocking attempt at Santiago the _Merrimac_,
Lieutenant Hobson of United States Navy, failed to reach her desired
destination after it had been located. The attempt could scarcely have
been more gallantly made, but the difficulties, arising from
insufficient opportunity to make complete preparations, almost
foredoomed the operation to failure.
At Port Arthur, the Japanese made three attempts to block the exit
against the egress of the Russian Fleet. No less than eighteen
blockships were used. In spite of great determination and splendid
self-sacrifice on the part of all concerned no blockship managed to
sink herself in the correct position.
During the late war the difficulty of sinking the ship satisfactorily,
after reaching the desired position, was made manifest both in the
River Tigris and in the Cameroon River. In each case our enemies, the
Turks and Germans respectively, _endeavoured to block their own
channels before we even arrived on the scene_. In the absence of all
opposition from an enemy, in broad daylight, and at their own leisure,
they sunk their ships and _failed to block the channels_--two clear
illustrations of seamanship difficulties.
All the searchings into past history failed to discover one single
occasion in which a blocking enterprise of any real similarity to that
desired had succeeded. That fact, taken into conjunction with the
difficulties brought to light by a detailed consideration of the
problem, was neither productive of encouragement nor conducive to
optimism.
{59}
The reader will probably admit, at this stage, that the difficulties of
blocking the highly fortified canal entrances at Zeebrugge and Ostende
appeared almost insuperable.
But where there's a will there's often a way. A way had to be found.
_A way was found_.
[Sidenote: The Use of Artificial Fogs]
The factors which combined to make "the game worth the candle" were as
follows: firstly, the use of smoke screens; secondly, the element of
surprise and the use of diversionary measures; thirdly, detailed
preparation and determination combined with efficiency.
The use of smoke screens provided a factor which had been absent in
previous attempts in history.
Mention has already been made of the great deterrent afforded by the
presence of hostile batteries and of the varying degrees of efficiency
of gun-fire as a defence against attacks from the sea. If smoke could
be utilised in such a manner as to hide the attacking force from the
batteries without completely blinding the former, and if at the same
time the attack could be made under cover of darkness so as to prevent
aircraft from assisting those batteries, a set of conditions less
unfavourable to the attackers would then be forthcoming. Obviously,
this necessitated the smoke drifting shorewards ahead of the
approaching vessels; i.e., the assistance of a wind blowing more or
less directly towards the shore.
It is well here to caution the reader against a commonly erroneous idea
in this connection. It is often supposed that the use of smoke was a
sort of panacea for all evils, that it provided a counter to all
obstacles. This was very far from being the case, as will now be {60}
explained. Firstly, let us consider the navigational difficulties.
Smoke could not possibly assist the ships to avoid shoals when
approaching the coast. Smoke could not prevent the vessels from being
seen and reported by surface patrol craft, submarines, or aircraft
during the trip across the sea. The danger from mines could not be
avoided by the use of smoke. It has already been pointed out that it
is quite difficult enough to locate one's destination on a dark night
when the lighthouses have been extinguished and other navigational aids
withdrawn. Even a landsman will realise that if, as an addition to
such inconvenient conditions, one places an artificial fog between the
approaching vessels and their destination the problem is not going to
become any more easy to solve. The utmost that one could gain from the
use of smoke was some measure of protection from the shore batteries,
but, as just shown, such use provided a further obstacle to be
surmounted. Then again there is nothing so fickle in the life of a
sailor as the wind. If the wind died away or changed to an off-shore
direction, smoke might be practically useless for covering one's
approach.
I have sometimes been asked why we made no use of poison gas clouds.
There were two main reasons. The last thing we desired was to risk
killing those downtrodden Belgians who were still allowed to reside in
their unhappy country. In addition to that, the fickleness of the wind
might waft the poison gas in the direction of our own vessels.
[Sidenote: Surprise Essential]
With regard to the element of surprise and the use of diversionary
measures, one of the principles laid down by Stonewall Jackson is,
"Always mystify, {61} mislead, and surprise the enemy." The meaning of
surprise is apt to be misconstrued. In an operation of this kind one
could not arrange for the blockships to arrive suddenly "as a bolt from
the blue" at a moment when the enemy have no suspicions whatever that
any trouble is brewing. Thus, surprise and mystification had to go
hand in hand. The only practical method in such cases, whether in
trench warfare or in sea fighting, is to give the enemy as much to
think about as one possibly can, to make him wonder what on earth is
going to happen next, to mislead him into believing the eventuality is
very different from that intended, and, then, as the late war
expression so aptly puts it, "when the enemy has the wind up," surprise
him by carrying out your main object in view.
Diversionary measures in this particular case were not difficult to
evolve. Many different reasons obtained for employing our sea forces
off the Flanders coast. To mention a few, there were bombardments from
the sea, landing operations on the shore, supporting the flank of the
military in their land attacks, mining or mine-sweeping operations,
laying submarine traps, supporting aerial attacks, and so on. The
presence of our vessels might indicate any one of these objects and
each would call for a different set of defensive measures.
The full development of defensive measures cannot be attained until one
can clearly ascertain the attacker's object. Even when the latter has
been discovered, the time required to bring all your powers of defence
into action must vary according to how far you have just previously
been misled. Our best {62} course, therefore, was to ensure that our
object would be discovered so late in the proceedings that it would be
attained before full advantage of the discovery could be utilised.
Initiative usually pertains to the attacking force. Where the defence
is open to several different forms of attack, the defending commander
is apt to be so apprehensive beforehand, and so perplexed at the time,
that his position will be weakly defended at all points. As the attack
develops and he receives an _apparent_ indication of its object he will
make haste to concentrate all his defence measures at the threatened
position, and then, if the attackers have acted wisely, there is
considerable likelihood of his being taken by surprise too late to
guard efficiently against the real blow. Uneasy lies the head of the
commander who is forced to adopt the defensive role in war.
The diversionary measures actually undertaken will be described
presently.
[Sidenote: Attention to Detail]
Determination and efficiency are not unknown in His Majesty's Navy.
But efficiency of a particular description was required, and this would
necessitate special training, which, if practicable, must be continued
until every officer and every man knew instinctively what to do and how
to set about it, no matter what circumstances might arise, and until
every piece of machinery and every device, however intricate, had been
proved to be satisfactory for the purpose in hand.
What then were the chances of success? Who could say? Clearly enough,
there must have been a divergence of opinion on this point.
Difficulties loom large. Optimism, on the other hand, is a very
pleasant {63} encouragement. I believe, however, that even the most
optimistic individual concerned in the enterprise was not entirely free
from qualms as the event drew nearer. Complete success seemed at times
to be so much to hope for. But Sir David Beatty and Sir Roger Keyes
wouldn't hear of failure, and that alone did much to ensure success.
They did not set themselves up on pedestals as men who _could not
fail--they left no stone unturned to ensure success_. It would be
difficult to imagine anything more calculated to bring about failure
than any sign of doubt, or hesitation, on the part of the leaders of an
enterprise. There _must_ be no failure--that was the long and short of
it--it was the spirit which governed the actions of the great leaders
of the past.
But sentiment alone is insufficient to guarantee success. It is but a
foundation stone on which to commence the building. Rotten timber
erected on the firmest foundation will not provide adequate protection
against the lightest gale. Nobody realised this more fully than
Vice-Admiral Keyes, who was determined that every link of the chain
should be of maximum strength commensurate with elasticity and general
handiness. Many were the hours given to the consideration of the
smallest details; without such work an operation becomes a mere gamble.
{64}
CHAPTER V
PLANNING THE OPERATION. MATTERS AFFECTING
THE PLAN. ATTACKS ON THE MOLE.
A war operation, such as this, passes through various stages before it
can be put into execution. It emanates originally from a suggestion.
If the suggestion seems to bear further consideration certain
individuals are ordered to appreciate the situation, that is, to
thoroughly thrash out all the arguments for and against and to weigh
the chances and effects of success and failure. Should the results of
such an appreciation be favourable, the investigation leads to the
formation of a Plan.
[Sidenote: Formation of a Plan]
Plans are based, to a considerable extent, on the personnel and
material believed to be available. In like manner the calculations as
to future requirements of personnel and material are based on the types
of operations which are likely to be carried out. But it is
conceivable that a projected plan may be found to involve the
unforeseen use of material to the detriment of other operations already
in view. Thus the feasibility of putting a naval plan into operation
cannot be judged unless fairly complete details are given as to the
numbers and types of ships, men, and stores involved. The formulated
results of such investigation, arising out of the original suggestion
may be designated the first edition of the Plan.
The authorities then consider the Plan both from the view of general
outlook and from that of detailed {65} requirements. Let us suppose
that the Plan is considered to be of value, and that no objections hold
good as to the practicability of execution provided the ships and men
_are_ available. This latter proviso then requires attention. Many
questions have to be considered. Can the ships be diverted from their
present duties? What special alterations or additions are necessary?
Can the dockyard undertake the work? If so, to what extent will other
work in hand be interrupted? Will the men require special training?
Are the necessary stores ready at hand? How long will the preparations
take? And so on. A hundred and one points must be carefully enquired
into. It is only after a great deal of investigation, correspondence
with various departments, and conferences for co-ordinating the results
of enquiries, that the details can be arranged. A plan served up in
the form of a mosaic is of little more use than the works of a
chronometer contained in half a dozen different boxes.
In course of time decisions are arrived at and orders are issued for
the preparatory work to be taken in hand. But it is unlikely that all
the proposals contained in the first edition of the plan have been
agreed to. Modifications are almost sure to be necessary. Perhaps the
suggested vessels are required for other purposes and substitutes must
be forthcoming. The technical experts may decide that different types
of material would lead to improvement. Possibly the facilities for
special training of the personnel are not available at the moment. The
plan must, therefore, be re-drafted on the basis of the personnel and
material available, and must take into consideration the dates by which
the various phases of the preparatory {66} work can be completed. All
this takes time and serves as a reminder, indeed, that patience is a
virtue. The second edition of the plan is evolved and the next stage
is reached.
But put aside, for a moment, the question of what material and
personnel are available. When a plan, conveying a general idea, has
come under the critical examination of the Higher Command to the extent
of being "passed" for the commencement of detailed preparation, it has
then to be _gradually built up_ from the operational point of view.
Additions will almost always be necessary as the investigation
proceeds, and some time will elapse before the plan can be considered
as complete in every particular.
A further duty then devolves upon the operational staff. They must
produce the orders necessary to give effect to the plan as detailed in
its final edition.
[Sidenote: Writing of the Orders]
This again is no small affair. The writing of orders is a high art in
itself. Orders must not be too centralized or too cut-and-dried.
Ample allowance must be made for initiative, while realising that mere
go-as-you-please methods are likely to lead to disaster. It is usually
the unexpected that happens in war. A single set of orders cannot
cover every eventuality. And even if it could, nobody would have
either the time or inclination to wade through such a voluminous
document. This is clearly enough exemplified in legal matters. Laws
are framed to cover every possible case, but as often as not they fail
to attain such success. Even so, how many ordinary folk can be
bothered to wade through a legal document? What with the alternatives,
and saving clauses, such publications are dull to a degree. The
marriage laws are {67} typical of this. A man may not marry his
grandmother. That clause was presumably inserted for the discomfiture
of that unique individual who _might_ contemplate such a peculiar
alliance.
The issue of orders needs careful training and much experience. Orders
must be fool-proof--that is the guiding axiom. If an order is
misunderstood it is ten chances to one that the fault lies with the man
who gives the order.
If I have sorely tried the patience of the reader it is because of my
endeavour to emphasise the point that the order "carry on" is not
sufficient to put a suggestion into execution in the matter of a few
hours. New situations have to be met by fresh dispositions, and this
fact has come very much to the fore in these days of strife.
The operations on the Flanders coast were the outcome of some months of
hard work--mental as well as manual. A few details of the plan may now
be worthy of consideration.
On December 3, 1917, the plan had emanated from an Admiralty Department
under the direction of Rear-Admiral Keyes, Director of Plans, to give
him his titles at that time. The nature of the operation and the
customary procedure, having regard to the locality concerned, would
entail its execution coming under the command of the Vice-Admiral at
Dover. The latter apparently desired to modify the plan and submitted
his proposals on December 18th. He suggested the idea that an attack
on the Mole, not previously mentioned in the plan, should accompany the
blocking operations. As a diversion (pardon the anticipation) this
idea was eventually embodied after {68} exhaustive consideration had
shown it to be necessary.
[Sidenote: Vice-Admiral Keyes]
As already stated this particular type of diversion was somewhat
similar to that included in a previous scheme, referred to on page 17
as having been forwarded in May, 1917, which at that time was
considered impracticable by the Vice-Admiral at Dover. The actual
method proposed on December 18th by the latter for giving effect to his
idea of a Mole attack was not followed, for it happened that
Rear-Admiral Keyes took over the Dover Command, with the acting rank of
Vice-Admiral, after his own plan had been submitted, and nearly four
months before it could be carried out. The coincidence--if it was a
coincidence--was extremely advantageous. An operation can be so much
better worked up by an officer who has handled the plan from its
inception. But in the ordinary course of events such an arrangement is
impracticable. An admiral or general in active employment in the face
of the enemy, as a general rule, has not sufficient spare time for the
formation of plans in every detail, nor has he a superabundance of
staff officers for the purpose. No words of mine could ever do justice
to Sir Roger Keyes, so I will not make the attempt. Suffice it to
record that every soul in the enterprise possessed complete confidence
in his leadership; this fact was half the battle won before we even
started.
Admiral Keyes was given an absolutely free hand by Their Lordships; all
the details, from A to Z, were worked out under his direction. The
"paper scheme" rapidly developed into practical shape; I will endeavour
to describe the data and arguments from {69} which its final shape was
evolved. Before doing so, however, it may be as well to put on record
a fact that might escape the notice of the reader. The responsibility
of the Officer in Command of an operation must necessarily be great,
but the responsibility of the Higher Command, in this case the Board of
Admiralty, which has to either sanction or disallow the execution of
proposed operations, is by no means small. That they sanctioned it in
this case and also chose the right man to carry it out must never be
forgotten.
Having reached a decision as to our object and considered the obstacles
in the way of attainment, let us now pass on to the manner in which it
was proposed to overcome the various difficulties. We will commence
with the most important phase of the operation, namely, the actual
blocking and the nature, requirements, and duties of the blockships.
Reference to the previous description of the locality and to the
principles governing the use of blockships serves to show that a single
vessel of the light-cruiser class, or above, would suffice as far as
dimensions were concerned. But nothing possesses such a large element
of chance as war; for that reason it was considered advisable to
provide at least three blockships at Zeebrugge and two at Ostende.
With regard to the requirements of each blockship, they may be briefly
stated as follows. Firstly, she must have the ability to proceed under
her own steam to her destination. The task of towing a blockship into
position in the face of enemy opposition is quite impracticable.
Secondly, her draught of water must not be excessive, having due regard
to the depth of {70} the channel. Next, she would require a certain
degree of defensive power; it would be rather heartrending, after all
one's efforts at taking a blockship to within a short distance of her
destination, if any small enemy craft could approach without hindrance
and sink the ship before her destination was actually reached.
The blockships must also be handy vessels, so that they would be
manageable up to the last moment, provided they escaped serious damage.
It has been stated previously that these ships must be so fitted and
sunk that their removal would be extremely difficult. Five old light
cruisers which were available, or rather which could be replaced at
their present duties, were chosen for the purpose. They were H.M.S.
_Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia, Brilliant, and Sirius_; the first three
being destined for Zeebrugge and the others for Ostende.
[Illustration: THE BLOCKSHIPS FITTING OUT FOR THE ENTERPRISE. H.M.S.
VINDICTIVE BEFORE FITTING OUT.]
A few months previously a couple of steamers had been fitted out for
some such operation under another Vice-Admiral, but it will be seen
that, as a result of detailed investigation of all the obstacles and
factors affecting the problem, the Plan described herein differed from
its predecessors in that respect; in fact the arguments against the use
of merchant vessels were considered from the outset to be overwhelming.
[Sidenote: Hazards of the Blockships]
The work of surmounting such difficulties as escorting the blockships
across the seas and locating their destinations would require the use
of other units, and will, therefore, be described later. Speaking
generally, the actual tasks of reaching their destinations _when
located_ and of sinking themselves in position, difficult though they
were, could best be left to the pilotage and seamanship of the
blockship officers. {71} Here again, the author is anxious to lay
special emphasis on the fact that successful results of the blocking
operation--such as had never been attained in history--were absolutely
dependent upon the good work of the blockship personnel; to them would
the credit be due.
At Ostende, the work of the blockships, with regard to reaching their
destination, was confined to that of running the gantlet of the shore
batteries when once the entrance had been located, but the
latter--i.e., the location of the entrance--presented considerable
difficulty.
At Zeebrugge, there would be less difficulty in finding the entrance if
the Mole extremity, three-quarters of a mile to seaward, could be
located. But a serious factor existed here which was absent at Ostende.
Blockships proceeding into Zeebrugge would have to risk the fire of the
Mole batteries during the first part of the approach. They would then
have to steam in _behind those batteries_ and run the gantlet of the
batteries ashore. Now this was a pretty big proposition.
In the second chapter it was shown that the three-gun battery situated
on the broad portion of the Mole at its northeastern extremity, taken
in conjunction with the establishment of the barge boom and
entanglement nets, rendered it extremely hazardous for the blockships
to round the Mole _en route_ to the canal entrance; in fact it was
almost a certainty that they would be sunk by the Mole guns.
Nevertheless, the canal entrance was our objective. Somehow, by hook
or crook, the blockships were intended to reach it. Thus, one of the
first local {72} problems requiring solution was that of removing,
temporarily or otherwise, the obstacle afforded by the three-gun Mole
battery. Similarly, though perhaps in a lesser degree, we had also to
take into account the battery of six smaller guns on the lighthouse
extension of the Mole.
[Sidenote: Object of Attacking Mole]
Considered in a general manner, there were three lines of enquiry from
which a solution of the problem might be forthcoming. Firstly, that
concerning the destruction of the guns or their crews, or both, or
diverting their fire, by means of action from a distance. Secondly,
that of attaining a similar result by action on the spot. Thirdly,
that of rendering the blockships invisible during their passage. These
may be dealt with briefly. The first method entailed the use of either
gun-fire or poison gas. The outcome of a gun-fire duel between a ship
and a battery has already been described sufficiently to show that the
chances of destroying the battery guns are exceedingly small. The use
of poison gas has been shown to be inadvisable. The third method--that
of rendering the blockships invisible to the battery--would have
entailed the use of a smoke screen. If such a screen could have the
effect mentioned it is obvious to the meanest intellect that it would
also have the effect of hiding their destination from the blockships
just at the critical period when it would be absolutely essential to
see exactly where they were going.
[Illustration: A PORTION OF THE BROAD PART OF THE MOLE. Note the
concrete submarine shelter (white)]
And so no method would suffice, except the second mentioned above,
namely, destroying the guns or their crews, or both, or diverting their
fire, by means of action _on the spot_. This entailed an attack on the
Mole itself, carried out by vessels actually berthed {73} alongside.
The author, although well aware of the unpardonable fault of
repetition, desires at this stage to lay great emphasis on the fact
that an attack on the Mole itself could only be designed as a
diversionary measure calculated to directly assist the blockships past
one of the positions of danger. The reader is requested to pardon
anticipation. Subsequent to the operation, many of the public appeared
to have formed the idea that the attack on the Mole was the main
attack, and that the use of the blockships was a sort of afterthought.
I shall have more to say about this later.
Just as the three-gun battery provided a serious obstacle to the
passage of blockships round the Mole end, so also would it prevent the
similar passage of other vessels endeavouring to secure alongside the
berthing wharf on the inner side of the Mole preparatory to attacking
the Mole batteries. Thus, if the Mole was to be stormed, _the storming
parties must land on the outer side of the Mole_, remembering that the
three-gun battery could not fire to the northward owing to being twenty
feet below the top of the high outer wall. But the outer wall of the
Mole was never intended for use as a berthing position for vessels, and
probably never had been used by any vessel for such a purpose--hence
the complete absence of all berthing facilities as described in an
earlier chapter. The development of the argument concerning this
projected attack had led us to the point where we needed to consider
seriously the practicability of getting any vessel, or vessels,
alongside the outer wall, of securing there, and of landing men thence
for attacking the Mole batteries.
The depth of water, the construction of the Mole, {74} the rate of the
tidal current, and many other matters required careful examination.
The depth was a doubtful matter; but, the operation being timed to take
place near high tide so that the blockships could enter the canal,
there was every likelihood of its being sufficient. Breakwaters when
also intended as wharfs are usually built with their inner sides--i.e.,
the sides protected from bad weather--vertical like the face of an
ordinary wall, but with their seaward sides formed of large blocks of
material dropped more or less indiscriminately, one above the other, so
that the wall will be jagged for the purpose of breaking up the waves
in bad weather. In such cases a ship could not possibly secure to the
seaward side without being severely damaged, and certainly could not
remain there. At Zeebrugge, however, we had reason to believe that the
seaward side of the Mole was nearly vertical and that no danger would
accrue from jagged blocks of stone or concrete.
[Illustration: SECTION of MOLE through No. 3 Shed]
At high tide the tidal current on the Belgian coast is flowing at its
greatest speed--a phenomenon nearly always found in comparatively
narrow waters--and its rate was expected to be about three and a half
miles per hour, its direction of flow being to the eastward. So far,
then, the matter of reaching a position alongside chiefly concerned the
art of seamanship if we leave the enemy's opposition out of account.
Next we had to consider the problem of securing alongside and of
disembarking the storming parties. The most simple method of berthing
alongside a wall, in the case of a sizable vessel, is to place the
vessel roughly in position and then to use tugs to push her bodily
against the wall, afterwards securing the {76} hawsers in the usual
manner. This led to the idea of having a second vessel to act as tug
and of providing special means to take the place of the ordinary
hawser-and-bollard method of securing.
The wall on the outer side, as previously described, rose to a height
of twenty-nine feet above the level of high water. This height was far
above that of the deck of an average vessel. The fact that the landing
would have to be made on a narrow parapet, high above the level of the
Mole proper, was also hardly calculated to assist matters. The
probable existence of guns on the parapet itself, so placed as to be
able to rake the decks of a vessel alongside, and the possible presence
of obstructions placed by the Germans on the outer side of the Mole,
had to be taken into account. It has also been mentioned above that
the use of smoke screens necessitated a wind blowing towards the shore;
thus the Mole itself could afford no protection from the wind or sea.
The Austrian military failure on the River Piave, during the late war,
afforded a good example of the disabilities resulting from insufficient
room to debouch a force which has crossed an obstacle into the enemy's
territory. Clearly, it might be very awkward if the storming parties
were unable to descend from the parapet rapidly enough to forestall any
enemy attempts at concentration near the storming point.
All these considerations led to the choice of H.M.S. _Vindictive_ for
carrying the main portion of the storming parties.
The attack on the Mole might also provide an opportunity for destroying
material thereon. Although this was obviously a secondary
consideration it was {77} an opportunity not to be missed. The amount
of destructive work which could be done would depend upon the
circumstances of the moment, but it was decided to have a special
demolition party, provided with the necessary gear, to accompany the
primary attacking forces.
[Illustration: THE OUTER WALL, SHOWING THE PARAPET PATHWAY 16 FEET
ABOVE THE FLOOR OF THE MOLE]
Clearly enough, it would be somewhat futile if one only began to
consider the work of demolition as soon as the moment arrived for such
work to commence. With the object of being prepared in all respects
careful consideration, therefore, was given to the different methods of
demolition which would be most suitable under varying circumstances.
Following such consideration it would be necessary to train one's
demolition parties in this technical pursuit and to provide a
sufficiency of suitable destructive material.
[Sidenote: Plans for Demolition]
When making preparations for an operation of this, or similar type, one
is apt to allow secondary objects to loom too large unless great
caution is taken to prevent it. In this particular case, however
correct it might be to fully prepare, down to the smallest detail, for
everything in advance, it was necessary to bear in mind that demolition
on the Mole could hardly assist the blockships to seal the canal exit
and, even if successful, could not bring us very great benefit. Thus
it was clear that demolition should only be prepared for and undertaken
provided that it did not hinder the attainment of our main object in
the smallest particular.
H.M.S. _Vindictive_ had to be fitted with a special deck from which
gangways could be extended to bridge the gulf between the ship and the
top of the twenty-nine-foot wall. For this purpose she was given {78}
a large number of gangways poised at an angle of about forty-five
degrees from the ship's side. The idea was that on arriving alongside
the Mole, the gangways would be lowered till they rested on the top of
the wall. The storming parties, at a prearranged signal, should run
out along the gangways and jump down to the parapet pathway four feet
below the wall top. They should then get across the pathway, over the
iron handrails on its inner side, down to the floor level of the Mole,
sixteen feet below, and then start the work. Now, one cannot expect
men carrying all their accoutrements and paraphernalia, such as rifles,
machine-guns, flame-throwers, bombs and grenades, rifle and gun
ammunition, and such-like to jump down a drop of sixteen feet on to a
stone surface. So it was arranged that the advanced storming parties
should carry long storming ladders to place against the wall on its
inner side and thus facilitate access to the floor level. Seamen were
to land first, both for the purpose just stated and for securing the
ship to the Mole after the _Vindictive_ had been pushed alongside the
Mole by another vessel.
[Illustration: H.M.S. VINDICTIVE'S SPECIALLY CONSTRUCTED GANGWAYS. Two
of the parapet anchors for grappling the Mole can be seen at the end of
the bridge in the background]
[Sidenote: Fittings in _Vindictive_]
Owing to the absence of bollards for securing hawsers, special
grappling irons, fitted with double pronged hooks, with hawsers
attached to them and the ship, were designed for the purpose of hooking
on top of the wall. In reality we proposed using the methods of the
good old days when vessels grappled each other and indulged in
hand-to-hand fighting between their respective storming parties. The
weight of these grappling irons necessitated the use of special davits
for suspending them in a similar manner to that used for the gangways.
Special weapons, such as {79} bomb-mortars and flame-throwers, to be
worked from the ship, were provided for clearing the Mole immediately
abreast the ship prior to sending the storming parties over the top.
The _Vindictive_ also carried most of her original gun armament for
engaging enemy vessels _en route_, for shelling the six-gun battery on
the lighthouse extension of the Mole, and for defending herself against
attacks, when at the Mole, from enemy vessels in a seaward direction.
Special howitzers were carried for engaging the shore batteries after
the ship was secured, and rapid-firing guns were placed in the
fighting-top of the foremast for engaging the batteries on the Mole.
The wall being at least twenty-nine feet above the water, no gun at a
less height could fire over it in a downward direction. Much other
special material--peculiar to the operation in hand--was required, but
space does not admit of describing it all in detail.
The reader will already have realised that the _Vindictive_ was to be a
weird craft indeed--something very different from the usual run of
warships even in these days.
Now, as regards the storming of the Mole, it would have been a
dangerous policy to put all "our eggs in one basket." There was no
small chance of the _Vindictive_ being mined _en route_, owing to her
heavy draught, or of being sunk by gun-fire, owing to the large target
which she would present, before reaching the Mole. It was, therefore,
decided to use two other vessels in addition to the _Vindictive_.
The ferry steamers _Iris_ and _Daffodil_ were chosen for carrying a
portion of the storming parties to the attack. There was considerable
difficulty in finding {80} two vessels suitable to our purpose; time
did not permit of constructing special craft before the projected date
of the operation. It must be remembered that we could not write round
to all the naval and mercantile ports explaining our requirements. An
officer, sent on a tour for the purpose, unostentatiously visited the
likely places until he found these two vessels. I often wonder what
imaginary yarns he conjured up for the purpose of stifling curiosity.
[Sidenote: _Iris_ and _Daffodil_]
The _Iris_ and _Daffodil_ were both well known to Liverpool folk, being
used for conveying passengers across the River Mersey many times daily.
They were extremely handy craft, could each carry fifteen hundred men
if required, and drew very little water, but they possessed two serious
disadvantages. Firstly, their decks were so low as to necessitate the
use of long storming ladders for reaching the parapet. Secondly, their
steaming qualities were comparatively poor, judged from the point of
view of the operation for which they were required. Just picture their
ordinary daily employment for a moment. Waiting alongside one of the
piers at Liverpool till their usual quota of passengers had embarked,
they would make the short trip across the river to the Birkenhead shore
and then wait once more. During this second period of waiting the
steam pressure would be increased in the boilers in readiness for the
next short voyage across the river. Compare that employment with a
trip of nearly one hundred miles across the open sea. It will then be
evident that the task allotted to these two ferry vessels was by no
means simple from the engineering point of view alone.
All this, however, was carefully thought out, and {81} it was decided
that their advantages outweighed their disadvantages. Both craft, by
nature of their work, were designed to stand heavy bumping alongside
piers; their draught was small, and, as already stated, they were easy
to handle. After minor alterations they proceeded to the port of
assembly in charge of their naval crews and adopted the title H.M.S.,
much to the amusement of those of us who made their acquaintance for
the first time. It is rumoured that one of these two vessels arrived
at her destination _with her anti-submarine escort in tow_, which thus
early showed that proud spirit to which she so justly proved her right
on St. George's Day, 1918.
The first duty of the _Daffodil_ on arrival at the Mole was to be that
of pushing the _Vindictive_ bodily alongside. The former vessel was to
place herself at right angles to the latter, bows against the latter's
side, and to continue pushing until _Vindictive_, which would
previously have anchored, was secured by means of the grapnels.
_Daffodil_ was then to drop alongside _Vindictive_ and her parties were
to climb over the latter and up to the Mole. The _Iris_ was to go
alongside the Mole ahead of _Vindictive_, to anchor, to grapnel the
parapet, and to land her storming parties by means of ladders against
the wall, her decks being too low to allow the use of large gangways as
carried in _Vindictive_.
In the event of _Vindictive_ being sunk, _Iris_ and _Daffodil_ were to
storm the Mole as best they could and do everything possible to knock
out the three-gun battery or divert its fire from the blockships.
It was believed that the Mole garrison consisted of about one thousand
men. But what of {82} reënforcements arriving from the shore? Access
to the Mole would entail the crossing of the viaduct by such
reënforcements. Therefore the viaduct must be destroyed.
Consideration on this point led to a decision to utilise one or more
submarines filled with explosives and to blow them up under the
viaduct, so as to cut the latter in twain.
This particular phase of the operation had not been included in the
original Plan evolved at the Admiralty. As previously stated the first
edition could not be expected to cover every single investigation of
every point in the problem. The attack on the viaduct, after a large
amount of experimental work ordered by Vice-Admiral Keyes, took the
following shape.
Two submarines, each carrying several tons of high explosive, were to
accompany the expedition. They were each to carry a crew of two
officers and four men, who, after securing their craft underneath the
viaduct, were to light the time fuses and then to take to the boats.
Each submarine carried a small motor-driven dinghey for this latter
purpose.
So much, then, for the blockships, storming vessels, and submarines at
present.
{83}
CHAPTER VI
THE VESSELS INVOLVED: THEIR DUTIES. THE RESCUE WORK.
In addition to the special vessels mentioned in the preceding chapter,
many other vessels and craft were required to assist in the operation.
One can imagine the amateur reckoning up the probable number as
follows. Three blockships at Zeebrugge and two at Ostende, three
storming ships and two submarines at the former place. That makes ten
vessels of sorts. Allow a few more for other purposes--say, fifteen
altogether. As a matter of fact, there were one hundred and sixty-two.
Let us see why so many were required.
Take the requirements necessitated by the use of smoke screens. It has
already been stated that the section of coast on which the Germans had
established heavy gun batteries was twenty-one miles in length. Smoke
screens were required to mask those guns so that the approach of the
blockships and storming vessels should remain undiscovered until the
latest possible moment. This meant that a large number of craft were
necessary for smoke screening alone. Again, if the smoke screens were
to be efficient the smoke would have to be emitted within a short
distance of the coast; i.e., in comparatively shallow water. Thus
shallow-draught vessels were necessary. Shallow draught goes
hand-in-hand with small dimensions. The carrying capacity of small
craft is very {84} limited; this constituted an additional reason for
employing large numbers.
Further craft were required for assisting to locate the destination,
for dealing with enemy vessels putting to sea during the attack, for
defending our ships against other enemy vessels already at sea, for
assisting to tow some of the smaller units across the seas, for
rescuing the crews of the blockships, and for various diversionary
measures. The latter included long-range bombardments from the sea and
subsidiary attacks on the Mole, the units required being monitors and
their attendant craft and fast motor boats. Other diversionary
measures, not requiring naval vessels for their accomplishment, were
bombing attacks by aircraft and bombardments from our shore guns.
[Illustration: ONE OF THE MONITORS. H.M. SHIPS IRIS (RIGHT) AND
DAFFODIL.]
The aircraft were intended to attract the attention of those on duty in
an overhead direction, whilst encouraging the remainder to keep under
cover. The long-range bombardments would tend to keep the enemy's
larger batteries occupied in expending ammunition in their endeavour to
locate and silence our guns. Subsidiary attacks, carried out by fast
motor craft against the Mole, and against German vessels berthed at its
inner side, were calculated to confuse the situation as far as the
enemy were concerned. It was arranged that the R.M.A. siege guns on
the northern flank of the Allied army should bombard for the purpose of
simulating a prelude to a land attack.
The reason for the employment of one hundred and sixty-two vessels, not
including aircraft, will now be somewhat more clear. The various
classes comprised cruisers, submarines, ferry-boats, monitors,
destroyers, motor launches, small motor boats of a fast type, {85} and
one ordinary ship's steamboat; the latter was to be used in connection
with rescuing the crews of the submarines.
With the exception of the blockships, storming vessels, and submarines,
the majority of the craft were drawn from the forces attached to the
Dover Command; these latter, being in full commission already, did not
require new officers and men to be specially appointed for our
purposes. Seven French torpedo craft and four French motor launches
were included in the operation. The aircraft were drawn from the 61st
and 65th Wings of the Royal Air Force.
Space does not admit of describing the work of all these units in
detail, but it may be of interest to mention one or two.
[Sidenote: Precautions Against Fatigue]
Whenever an operation of this description is afoot, it is extremely
advisable that the personnel destined to take part in the more hectic
part of the fighting should not only be trained to the last ounce, but
quite fresh on arrival. The individual cannot give of his best when
fatigued--a truism exemplified again and again during the late war.
But ships do not cross the ocean without any effort on the part of
their personnel. It is not a case of merely turning on a tap, saying,
"hey presto," and going to bed. Far from it. Engines do not revolve
merely for the asking. Large vessels carry large engineering
complements, but always require about half on duty at a time when at
sea. Small craft may have small engines, but their complements are
also small. So, whether the vessel be large or small, the work below
calls for strenuous duties from the engineering personnel--only those
who have undertaken such duties can realise the {86} immense effort and
the accompanying fatigue which falls to their lot. Then again the ship
cannot navigate herself. The steering and the lookout duties both call
for great concentration of attention, especially at night when steaming
without lights in the close company of other vessels, in the vicinity
of shoals, and in enemy waters. Guns' crews must stand by the guns so
as to be ready at a moment's notice.
Now, this expedition would have to steam many miles across the seas.
How then could the crews be fresh on arrival? This particular problem
was solved as follows. Arrangements were made to provide each
blockship with a number of men, over and above the minimum required at
the climax of the operation, for the purpose of handling the vessel and
its engines during the passage overseas whilst those men required for
the "final run" would be resting. Extra officers could not be spared
for this purpose.
The _Vindictive_, _Iris_, and _Daffodil_ were differently situated in
this respect. It was intended--as I shall explain presently--to bring
these three vessels back on completion of the operation; the total
number of personnel on board need not be kept down to the barest
minimum. In fact, they were each to carry two complete sets of
personnel, namely, those remaining in the ship throughout and those
landing on the Mole.
The submarines, motor launches, and fast motor boats, owing to lack of
accommodation, could not be given extra personnel for the trip across;
it was, therefore, decided to tow all such craft throughout the greater
portion of the passage across the seas. Even that decision did not
relieve the crews of all {87} duty, but gave them some respite, and,
what was equally important, helped to ensure their arrival in the
vicinity of their place of duty.
[Sidenote: Rescue Work]
The rescue work required much thought. Bearing in mind the main object
which had to be attained, it will be understood that all such questions
as rescue work and retirement, however important from the point of view
of humanity, must be relegated to a comparatively secondary
consideration.
One cannot wage war without "breaking eggs." He who attempts to do so
will seldom accomplish anything worth while. The lives of men are,
indeed, a precious responsibility on the shoulders of their leader, but
his primary duty in action is to obtain the utmost value from his men
rather than to adopt the negative attitude of merely preventing their
lives from being lost. This does not signify that lives should be
thrown away without a thought. Not one life should be sacrificed in
the execution of superior order unless the order is absolutely
essential to the success of the work in hand, or, putting it in another
way, unless the life is given so that others may live. The leader,
therefore, has a difficult problem to solve. How far is he justified
in risking failure through the natural desire to preserve life? The
armchair critic, who has never been faced with such responsibility, who
can have no conception of the different situations which arise in war,
may sneer at the leader who places too great a store on the lives of
his subordinates, or may hurl accusations of callous indifference at
the superior whose successful operation is accompanied by a long
casualty list. But we can leave any such critic to his sneers and
accusations, knowing, as we do, that he is {88} least dangerous to the
community in war-time if he remains in his chair.
Each blockship, as already stated, was to carry the minimum number of
personnel which could bring success. But the minimum number was large.
During the "final run" to their destinations they would require the
engineering and stokehold parties, lookouts, guns' crews for
self-defence, the navigation party conning and steering the ship, and
complete spare navigation parties for taking over command in an
emergency. These with a few others, such as signalmen, brought the
total in each ship up to no less than fifty-three.
In the case of the _Merrimac_ at Santiago, during the Spanish-American
war, Lieutenant Hobson was accompanied by only about half a dozen men.
At Port Arthur the Japanese blockships, at each of their attempts, also
carried very small crews. But it must not be forgotten that all those
attempts failed.
Now, it was decided to give each blockship a large lifeboat and some
life-saving rafts, and also to arrange for other craft to proceed to
the rescue. The chances of recovering any of the personnel certainly
appeared to be very remote, especially when one realised that the
rescue would have to be effected practically underneath the enemy's
guns, and even behind their trench defence system on the coast-line.
The chances of rescue must bear some relation to the numbers to be
rescued. For this reason it was decided to disembark the oversea
passage crews from each blockship before arriving within the danger
zone.
[Sidenote: Motor Launches for Rescue Work]
When the question arose as to which of the motor {89} launches should
be used for effecting the rescue of the crews from the blockships,
volunteers were asked for. In spite of the almost incredible
difficulties and tremendous risk involved the number of applications
for this dangerous task was most embarrassing. Eventually lots were
drawn and the winners were greatly envied by their less fortunate
confrères.
The organisation necessary to ensure efficient co-operation, and
co-ordination of effort, was no small matter. Every vessel, however
small, had important duties to fulfil. At any moment during the
operation success might depend on the action of a single unit: it would
be difficult to conceive any circumstances where the value of
initiative would be more pronounced. Nothing could be left to
chance--any suggestion of possible failure was unthinkable.
{90}
CHAPTER VII
MATTERS AFFECTING THE PASSAGE. THE SUPPORTING FORCES. THE GERMAN
SEA-FORCES. THE PREPARATORY WORK
Safe passage across the seas, especially from the navigational point of
view, provided much food for thought. The liability of new shoals to
form and of old shoals to move their position, the consequent lack of
dependence on the charts, and the absence of the usual navigational
aids have already been mentioned.
These navigational difficulties, increased by the low visibility which
obtains at night, combined to form the first of the three main
obstacles to be encountered in blocking operations of this nature,
namely, the difficulty of locating the destination.
Considerable amusement was caused in naval circles, subsequent to the
operation, when a certain individual, from another country, published a
special piece of "inside information," to wit, that the method whereby
_Vindictive_ reached Zeebrugge Mole was a great secret, known only to
Captain Carpenter and one other, involving intricate calculations in
connection with astronomical phenomena. I was extremely interested in
this suggestion for it was the first that I had heard of it. As a
matter of fact the safe navigation was largely the outcome of a very
fine piece of work by two officers specially lent from the Hydrographic
Department of the Admiralty.[1]
[1] Captain H. P. Douglas and Lieutenant-Commander F. E. B. Haselfoot.
{91}
The major portion of the area through which the various forces were to
pass was surveyed under great difficulties.
[Sidenote: Object of Special Survey]
The surveying vessels were often forced to remain within the danger
zone of the German batteries, and, owing to shortness of time, had to
utilise every possible opportunity for fixing positions of buoys,
taking soundings, examining areas where new shoals were suspected,
marking the limits of old shoals, laying down special marks to assist
the passage of the expedition, and to enable the bombarding vessels to
take up their positions with accuracy. Old obstructions had to be
removed and wrecks had to be correctly charted. The vagaries of the
weather rendered the task all the more difficult, and interference from
the enemy was experienced on more than one occasion. Incidentally both
these officers were on board H.M.S. _Botha_ when she rammed and sank
the German torpedo-boat A-19, which was out with a few others on one of
their very infrequent tip-and-run escapades off Dunkirk; this was a
pleasant interlude for these hard-worked officers. No country in the
world can boast of such an efficient Hydrographic Department as our
own. Their work in the war passed almost unrecorded, but none the less
appreciated by those of us "who went down to the sea in ships." No
praise could be too great for the work of the surveyors employed on our
behalf.
It will be readily understood that little reliance could be placed on
large conspicuous buoys laid by us near the enemy's coast. On
discovering such navigational marks the enemy would presumably either
move them a mile or so, for the purpose of interfering {92} with our
navigation, or else remove them altogether. Buoys, to be of any
practical use, must be conspicuous, hence the likelihood of their being
seen by the enemy unless placed in position at the last possible
moment. This alternative was actually followed; it does not require
much imagination to realise the difficulties and dangers in placing
them in readiness for the operation and in removing them again on each
occasion when the operation was postponed.
The strong tidal stream in the southern portion of the North Sea
renders navigation rather anxious work in misty weather, or in
darkness, especially as the normal rate of the current is much
influenced by weather. Naturally, there is less danger of hitting a
shoal which one is endeavouring to avoid, if the ship is steaming
either directly with or against the current; the error in such cases is
confined to the time at which any particular position will be reached.
But when steaming _across_ the current a small eccentricity on the part
of the latter may make all the difference between reaching the desired
position and missing it altogether. The current running parallel to
the Belgian coast attains a speed of about three knots under normal
conditions. Should a three-knot allowance be made when steaming across
the tide there would be a serious error of position at the end of an
hour's run if the tidal stream happened to be running at the rate of
two and three-quarters or three and one-quarter knots; it must be
realised that a ship cannot discover the rate of the tidal stream in a
given area until she has completed her passage through it; i.e., until
she has already suffered from its eccentricities.
For the purposes of the particular case under review {93} it was
necessary for the expedition to arrive at an _exact_ position, thus
tidal calculations and navigational aids assumed great importance. But
they alone were insufficient to ensure accurate navigation. Compasses
must be correct, or their errors known, and the speed of the ship due
to its own engines requires to be carefully gauged. For a given speed
of engine the speed of a ship varies according to her draught and the
state of the ship's hull under water. All these considerations will
serve to show the extreme necessity for working out courses, speeds,
and times beforehand with the utmost accuracy, for repeatedly checking
them to ensure the absence of clerical error, for reconsidering
allowances for the vagaries of the elements, and for correcting the
results from day to day according to the tidal differences due to the
ever-changing phases of the moon. The careful navigator always follows
a similar procedure, but, in ordinary cases, he knows that a fault in
position can probably be remedied in time to avoid untoward incident.
In our movements, however, there would be small chance of remedy if the
blockships failed to find the canal entrance, or if the submarines were
unable to locate the viaduct, or if the storming vessels missed the
Mole.
[Sidenote: Clearing the Mines]
Preparation for the passage across the seas involved yet another matter
of considerable importance. Vast numbers of mines had been laid, both
by ourselves and by the enemy, during the previous three and a half
years, in the areas through which the expedition must pass before
reaching the permanent German defence mine-fields near the Flanders
coast. Doubtless other mines had dragged with the tide {94} across our
desired route. Special mine-sweeping work was, therefore, necessary to
render the major portion of the passage even tolerably safe from mines.
The reader can probably appreciate the difficult nature of that task
with its attendant risks and necessity for thoroughness.
In addition to the one hundred and sixty-two vessels whose duties have
been mentioned, other supporting squadrons were necessary far out at
sea. The possibility of our intentions having become known to the
enemy had to be borne in mind. In such an event the enemy would, of
course, adopt special measures to ensure giving the expedition a warm
reception on arrival, but a most important eventuality for us to guard
against was that of meeting a superior concentrated enemy force already
at sea waiting to intercept us _en route_. Scouting craft, both aerial
and naval, were therefore required; it was also advisable that our
fighting fleet should be conveniently situated in case the chance arose
of defeating any such counter to our expedition.
[Sidenote: German High Seas Fleet]
Whenever we employed our small craft to operate in enemy waters we had
to bear in mind a certain possibility. The enemy on becoming aware of
our movements, or intentions, and perhaps feeling unusually courageous,
_might_ say, "Here are a number of small enemy vessels close to our
harbours, let us engage them with the whole strength of our fleet and
thereby achieve a great victory for the Fatherland." And so, in case
the German Fleet left their harbours, unlikely though it might be, our
Grand Fleet was always "in the offing" at such times ready to meet the
so-called High Seas Fleet and send them down to the place where they
ought to go.
{95}
The man-in-the-street must have wondered what the Grand Fleet was doing
at sea so often in view of the fact that the enemy hid themselves
almost throughout the war. The difficulty lay in the fact that we
could not be perfectly certain that the constitution of German naval
valour would continue to include ninety-nine per cent of discretion.
Time after time the Grand Fleet hoped against hope that they might meet
the enemy. The operations off the Belgian coast seemed to hold out yet
another slender hope; this, pardon the anticipation, proved to be as
forlorn as usual. The history of the High Seas Fleet, with respect to
their oft-repeated desire to try conclusions with the Grand Fleet, can
be briefly narrated. In the four and a quarter years following the
outbreak of war the High Seas Fleet came out once, and once only, with
the express intention of meeting the Grand Fleet--and that was to
surrender! On the one other occasion when they met our fleet,
incidentally by accident, they concentrated all their efforts at escape
and then claimed the victory. The German Navy never had any
traditions--now they have one less!
The reader may well ask what connection these remarks have with the
subject of the blocking operation. A very close connection indeed.
Napoleon--perhaps the greatest student of war and certainly one of the
greatest generals that the world has seen--remarked, and repeated again
and again, that in war "the moral is to the physical as three is to
one." Every great leader understands the value of morale and every man
who has served his country in war has at least a subconscious
realisation of the moral factor.
{96}
Just consider the moral effect of the German inactivity. In our men
the uppermost feelings towards the enemy were those of contempt. There
is small need to consider the morale of the High Seas Fleet, for is it
not recorded by their own Admiral, von Scheer, that the men mutinied at
the last because they believed they were being sent out to fight our
fleet? Take the case of our Dover Patrol force. They knew that the
enemy could choose their own time for dashing out of the Belgian ports
to attack our cross-channel communications. They knew that the chances
of intercepting such enemy under adverse conditions, such as during
darkness or fog, were very small. Yet month after month passed by and
the enemy surface craft did next to nothing. Sometimes our advanced
patrols came into touch with enemy patrols. On each occasion, I
believe almost without exception, the enemy craft turned and ran at
utmost speed for home. In the case of our small motor boats there had
been meetings with those of the enemy within a mile or two of the
latter's bases: here again, there is no recorded instance of one, or
even two, of their craft standing up to one of ours. The reader will
understand the resultant moral effect. Some day perhaps we shall hear
the romantic story of these adventurous small craft working from the
Dover area--how one of them coolly steamed in underneath Ostende Pier
one night to repair her engine whilst the German sentries paraded up
and down just overhead, how another ran in behind Zeebrugge Mole in
broad daylight and fired her torpedoes at German vessels berthed
alongside, and so on. Is it difficult to imagine the feeling of
superiority and confidence possessed by our personnel?
{97}
[Sidenote: German Morale]
The morale of the German naval forces in Flanders concerned us much
more closely than that of the High Seas Fleet. Under ordinary
circumstances we should have been exceedingly apprehensive of any
German torpedo craft at Zeebrugge or in the vicinity, especially those
at Blankenberghe, but experience had served to show that they were none
too ready to further the "über" portion of "Deutschland über Alles."
Thus we were all the more ready to take risks which may have seemed to
be uncommonly close to the border-line between "justifiable" and the
reverse.
In recounting the preparations which followed naturally upon the main
considerations connected with the problem in hand there has been a
certain amount of unavoidable anticipation.
It has already been explained that the conduct of the operation fell to
the Vice-Admiral commanding the Dover Patrol, and that a very large
number of vessels of various classes and many specially trained
personnel were required. Thus the fitting out of the vessels, the
preparation of material, and the training of the personnel also came
under the direction of the Vice-Admiral.
It must not be forgotten that the ordinary work of the Dover Patrol
could not be interrupted even for one day at this period. The lines of
communication across the Channel, important as they had already been
throughout the war, were now of such vital importance that the Allied
situation on the main battle front depended on the work of the Dover
Patrol more than ever before. During February and March, 1918, when
the preparations for our enterprise were in full {98} swing, and
especially during the latter month, the Germans were concentrating
every possible effort to break down the Allied resistance. Their final
great "push" was in full swing and the Allied troops were being hard
pressed almost to the point of giving way. British, Colonial, and
American reënforcements were being poured into France by every
available route; guns, ammunition, and stores were passing across the
Channel in an endless stream of shipping. The situation was critical
to a degree. If the Dover Patrol force had failed at such a time the
war might have had a very different ending. And in the midst of this
terribly anxious period we were forced to request great additional
effort for the purposes which the author is endeavouring to describe.
One may be pardoned for thinking that the blocking operation, with all
its complicated requirements, should have received undivided attention,
but such a thing was impossible. Those were busy days at Dover.
Special material, such as artificial fog apparatus, had to be
constructed and fitted in the craft concerned. The use of the
apparatus had to be practised with a view to discovering the conditions
under which the best results could be obtained. Neighbouring commands,
such as at Portsmouth and The Nore, were exceedingly helpful in this
latter respect. The use of howitzers, flame projectors, bomb-mortars,
grappling irons, scaling ladders, and many other fighting appliances
not usually found in men-o'-war had to be investigated.
[Sidenote: Production of Smoke]
A special factory was established at Dover under Wing-Commander
Brock--of whom I shall have much to tell--mainly in connection with the
{99} developments and use of artificial fog, but also to further the
design and production of other material. Sixty men worked at this
factory. Their output, both in quality and quantity, was most
satisfactory in spite of the many handicaps with which such innovations
have to contend. The difficulty of obtaining special material, when
the output of every large firm in the country was already earmarked for
other purposes, was not lessened by the fact that our urgent demands
could seldom be supported, owing to the necessity for secrecy, by
explanations as to the purposes in view.
The use of artificial fog in war was by no means an entirely new idea.
The device had already been utilised by our naval forces off the
Belgian coast, and a quantity of data on the subject was available as a
result of its use in fighting on land. But all forms of fog
screens--and there were many--had hitherto possessed disadvantages
which would militate against satisfactory results in an enterprise such
as we contemplated. The main difficulty attached to the smoke
apparatus at Dover was that a very visible flame was emitted; this
would have completely given our presence away as the smoke was intended
to _hide our presence_ and cover our advance. Some attempts had been
made to surmount this difficulty, but experiments proved the apparatus
to be hopelessly unsuited to our requirements. The reader, however,
will not desire to be introduced to a highly technical treatise on this
subject. Suffice it to say that, as a result of prolonged experimental
work, a new type of fog was evolved which satisfied all requirements.
The trials were not altogether devoid of humour. It is rumoured that
on one occasion a fog produced in the Dover {100} Straits refused to
dissipate itself for three days, with the result that mercantile
captains said some very hard things about the clerk of the weather.
The blockships and _Vindictive_ were fitted out at Chatham. That
dockyard was already being taxed to its utmost. The situation demanded
that every man should strive to exceed his previous utmost efforts--one
of the few points on which our enemies may congratulate themselves.
Secrecy was, of course, essential. Yet in the case of the ships
fitting out at Chatham the number of men who played an indirect part in
the operation ran into four figures. The same thing applied at
Portsmouth where the _Iris_, the _Daffodil_, and the submarines
destined to attack the railway viaduct at Zeebrugge were fitted out.
The director of Naval Construction, Sir Tennyson D'Eyncourt, and the
Director of Dockyards, Rear-Admiral L. E. Power, brought all their
valuable knowledge, and that of their respective staffs, to bear on the
problem. Much of the usual formality governing inter-departmental
procedure was waived. Paper work was reduced to a minimum. The real
nature of the operation was made known to few at that period. The war
had taught men not to ask questions unless the information was an
absolute necessity. Nevertheless many must have wondered what was
afoot; special steps had to be taken, therefore, to prevent leakage of
information, of which more anon.
{101}
CHAPTER VIII
THE PERSONNEL. SECRECY. TRAINING. SOME PERSONALITIES.
No naval or military training is necessary to realise that the success
of any war operation is mainly dependent upon the personnel. In these
days of machinery and munitions, however, we are apt to become
ultra-materialistic in our imagination. We read of so many million
rounds of ammunition, so many thousand tons of merchant shipping, such
and such new-fangled weapons. But the necessity for efficient
personnel is, after all, the crux of the whole matter. What use a ship
without a crew, or an aeroplane without a pilot? Truly the question of
personnel is paramount. No belligerent state ever suffered from a
surplus of fighting men in the midst of a war. How strange it seemed
to us in those critical days that we had ever been content to rely on
an overseas expeditionary force of only 150,000 men.
The ordinary use of warships against the enemy involves no special
requirements of personnel beyond those which can be foreseen when the
ships are originally designed. Design naturally results from projected
employment whether the design be constructional or instructional. But
for the purposes of this unusual kind of operation special types of
officers and men were required and special training had to be arranged
for. The operation itself--in official {102} parlance--was considered
to be _hazardous_. Success would depend upon the work of the personnel
to an unusual degree. This fact was early recognised.
It is difficult to define the type of men required. They should be
volunteers as far as that was practicable. They must be "all out for
business." In view of the hazardous nature of their enterprise it was
advisable that they should be unmarried.
In the Grand Fleet alone there were many thousands of men spoiling for
a fight. Nor was this surprising. During nearly four years of
waiting, tuned up to the last note of efficiency, there had been only
one action in which the major portion of the main fleet was engaged,
and only a few smaller actions in which opportunities were available
for the crews of our large ships to show their worth. But how many of
the public realised the vastness of its work?--the incessant
patrolling, the continual sweeps up and down and across the North Sea,
with only a glimpse of an enemy vessel on the rarest occasions, and
that but a momentary vision of her stern disappearing at the utmost
speed as the vessel fled to her nearest port of refuge. As a
blue-jacket was heard to remark, "It's always tip and run with devilish
little of the tip."
The everlasting practices, manoeuvring, and drills, designed towards
the attainment and upkeep of efficiency, may have been novel enough for
the first few months, but the novelty soon wore off. Not that the men
ever showed any sign of weariness. It was more a case of hope deferred.
I was in that fleet for three years and three months and can speak from
experience. One marvelled at the spirit of the men. They were always
ready for "the {103} day"--hungry for it, praying for it. Even the
theatrical entertainments, which they organised in their spare time,
were brimful of topical allusions to the absent enemy.
[Sidenote: Grand Fleet Personnel]
The personnel of the Grand Fleet--I especially allude to those who had
served in the Fleet from the outbreak of war--were, indeed, spoiling
for a fight. They had read from time to time of the splendid actions
fought by their contemporaries in other theatres of the war; it was
only human that they should feel extremely envious of these others.
It must not be forgotten that the efficiency of our main fleet at the
outbreak of war was mainly due to the untiring efforts of its
personnel. The work of the fleet in the years immediately preceding
the war had been exceedingly strenuous; very different from the sea
life of a decade earlier. The days of "hurrah" cruises, when gunnery
practices took second place to festivities, had long since passed.
Manoeuvres, firing exercises with guns and torpedoes, night attacks and
steam trials at sea were alternated with "rests" in harbour, where
evolutions, drills, and instructions of all sorts, conferences and war
games had kept us pretty well occupied. Admittedly, then, service in
the main fleet required a high state of efficiency; an individual who
fell short of this requirement was not wanted. Thus, speaking
generally, the personnel of the main fleet at the outbreak of war were
only there because they were considered to be deserving of a place on
the efficiency roll. Yet many of these very officers and men had not
seen an enemy ship since the outbreak of war. It is not difficult,
therefore, to imagine their envy of those others to whom {104}
opportunities had been vouchsafed to prove their worth in action.
The choice of the personnel for our particular enterprise had to be
governed, to a certain extent, by those most readily available. The
question thus arose as to whether the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand
Fleet, Sir David Beatty, would consent to lend any of his officers and
men for the operation. The Vice-Admiral was anxious that the Grand
Fleet should be given a share in this affair. The Commanders-in-Chief
of the three southern dockyard ports and the Commandants of the Royal
Marine Artillery and Light Infantry were also consulted; many personnel
at these latter establishments would be awaiting draft in the ordinary
course of events and might, therefore, be more easily spared than those
from the Grand Fleet.
[Sidenote: Selecting the Men]
If the German High Seas Fleet had shown any activity it is a doubtful
matter whether Sir David Beatty would have allowed his officers and men
to leave the fleet. It must be understood that it was not merely a
case of borrowing these men for a day or two, but for a period of
several weeks, so that they could be specially trained for their
somewhat unusual duties. Sir David Beatty, however, considered that
the risk of rendering his ships temporarily short-handed was justified
in view of the importance of our expedition. His chief difficulty lay
in the matter of selection. Owing to the necessity of secrecy he could
not issue an ordinary memorandum to all and sundry stating our object
and asking for volunteers. So each Flag Officer was requested to
produce a certain number of officers and men from his own particular
{105} squadron. Likely individuals were to be asked if they were
prepared to undertake something "hazardous"; no further intimation as
to the nature of the enterprise was to be promulgated. Similar methods
of selection were adopted at the naval and marine depots. It is not
difficult to imagine the buzz of excitement which passed through each
ship when rumour suggested that there was something afoot.
If the nature of the operation had been divulged and volunteers
requested, there would have been twenty thousand names sent in. That
was the Commander-in-Chief's own opinion. But the secret must be
safeguarded. So the selection was made by the officers--so many men
from each ship, seamen, stokers, and marines. At that stage the
selected men knew nothing except that they were required for something
"hazardous."
Life in the fleet was not altogether free from hazard in the ordinary
course of events. With one's living space surrounded by the most
destructive of high explosives in close proximity, perhaps a matter of
inches, with the seas either mine-strewn or, in the absence of mines,
containing lurking submarines, with the ever-present danger of
collision between vessels steaming at high speed without lights on the
darkest night, it cannot be said that naval life in war-time carries an
insignificant insurance premium.
But the coming operation was something different. It was declared to
be "hazardous." If the usual life at sea as described above carried no
such descriptive title, the word "hazardous" meant much.
Though little enough was known as to the business ahead, it was
sufficient to raise the envy of the great {106} majority of men who
were not fortunate enough to be selected. One could well imagine the
little knots of men who gathered together in the evening and discoursed
on the injustice of being left behind. The intense interest with which
the special training of the chosen few was watched could almost be
felt. For boat-pulling, physical drill, and route marching, commenced
immediately, were the order of the day, just to prepare the men for the
more intensive training to follow.
A good deal of consideration had to be given to the choice of officers.
The question of seniority of the blockship commanders gave food for
thought. Each of these vessels would also require at least three
executive officers. The chance of the captain being bowled over early
in the proceedings was none too small. So the conning and steering
arrangements and the whole system of command in each ship was to be
triplicated. Thus each officer must be ready to take over the
responsibility of command at a moment's notice. Similar considerations
affected the choice of officers for the storming vessels. Still
further executive officers were required for charge of the storming
parties. Engineer officers must be forthcoming for these special
vessels. At first all these officers, just as in the case of the men,
knew nothing of the circumstances under which they were required,
except that it was for a hazardous business.
The majority of the officers and men for the blockships and storming
vessels were drawn from the Grand Fleet; most of the remainder were
obtained from the naval depots.
[Sidenote: The American Battle Squadron]
When visiting the United States of America at the {107} end of 1918 I
was often asked to explain why American naval personnel were not
included in the enterprise. On more than one occasion there were
strong evidences of disagreeable insinuations having been circulated
through pro-German influences. It was suggested that relations between
the British and American squadrons in the Grand Fleet left much to be
desired, and that feelings of jealousy had caused us to decline
American assistance for the purposes of our enterprise. Nothing could
be further from the truth. The American battle squadron was never
referred to as such. They formed the "sixth" battle squadron of the
Grand Fleet. Their ships and ours constituted _one_ fleet, working for
a single end and guided by common sentiment. For the furtherance of
successful co-operation the Americans had literally "thrown overboard"
everything that could weaken the combination. Their signalling
arrangements, tactical manoeuvring, and special gunnery methods had all
been brought into line with ours. The unselfishness and sacrifice
involved can only be fully appreciated by members of our own sea
service.
From the day of their arrival the Americans had been actuated with but
one purpose, namely, that of leaving no stone unturned to enhance their
value as a reënforcement. Admiral Rodman, who commanded the Sixth
Battle Squadron, was ever in close touch with Admiral Beatty. The
genuine friendship between his squadron and the rest of the fleet will
never be forgotten in our service. There was but one fleet. But the
question of utilising their personnel for our immediate affair was
governed by something more than cordiality and co-operation. Secrecy
had to be {108} maintained. If we had transferred a few score American
officers and men to Chatham, where there were no American ships, for
special training with our own, curiosity would have been aroused at
once, comment would have followed and, in a very short while, the
secret might have been public property.
Admiral Beatty and Admiral Rodman had discussed the whole subject and
decided that American assistance was inadvisable for the reason given.
I was also asked if it was true that an American officer had come over
to Zeebrugge in _Vindictive_ as a stowaway. It was not true.
Admiral Rodman had previously held an important post in connection with
the Panama Canal, and he let us have the benefit of his experiences
with regard to questions of salvage. Nearly a year later he was kind
enough to attend a large meeting with the author in New York, where, in
no uncertain language, he nailed the pro-German insinuations to the
board.
[Sidenote: Captains of Blockships]
Amongst the first officers to leave the Grand Fleet were those destined
to command the blockships; the fitting out of the latter had already
commenced. The usual custom concerning seniority for command of light
cruisers was waived, these officers, whose ranks varied from a
Commander to a Lieutenant of less than three years' standing, being
selected from those available mainly by virtue of their character and
capability. Those selected to command _Iris_ and _Daffodil_ were also
sent south as early as practicable. On arrival at Dover they were told
the "secret." It was probably self-control combined with the somewhat
artificial reserve arising from good discipline which enabled them to
refrain from giving vent to {109} their feelings of elation. One of
them told me that he had the sensation of being released from prison;
the opportunity of being able to show his worth had come at last. Each
officer read through the "plan" so as to make himself acquainted with
the broad outlines of the whole enterprise. One of the blockship
commanders expressed the opinion that the blocking of Ostende would be
"easy meat" compared to the undertaking at Zeebrugge, and he earnestly
requested that he might command a blockship destined for the latter
place. This request was granted. Incidentally his opinion was wrong.
Subsequently, thanks to his own splendid efforts, he caused his
comparison between the two places to appear all the more erroneous by
assisting to make the blocking of Zeebrugge seem relatively simple.
The main ideas governing the preparatory work, as already stated, had
been evolved under the direction of Admiral Keyes. Many questions,
however, of a more local description remained to be decided on the
spot. The blockship officers, therefore, thoroughly investigated every
detail which bore on their duties and devised many local improvements,
especially in connection with the handling of the vessels.
They left nothing undone to ensure a successful issue of their efforts.
No other subject held any interest for them in those days. Just how to
take their ships to their allotted positions--that was their one
consideration. The question of being rescued after their work was
completed held a very secondary place. Perhaps the rescue vessels
might be able to do something towards it. Perhaps not. Anyway, that
mattered nothing in comparison with the crucial {110} point. And so
they schemed and discussed and organised and tested. And what a grand
reward they obtained for their labours!
I should like to mention in passing that the first blockship officer to
come south was Lieutenant Ivor B. Franks, in whose hands much of the
early work connected with fitting out the blockships was placed, with
splendid results which reflected great credit on him. He commanded
_Iphigenia_ during the first two attempts made against Zeebrugge, but,
most unluckily for him, he developed appendicitis just before the final
attempt. It was largely due to his earnest entreaties that Admiral
Keyes gave the command to the previous second-in-command, who was a
Lieutenant of only one year standing. Once again Lieutenant Franks,
for whom we all felt the greatest sympathy, had shown the value of his
judgment.
During this period the constructive work on the ships proceeded apace.
The _Vindictive_ rapidly changed her appearance. Every unessential
fitting that could be removed in the time at our disposal was wafted
away. The foremast was cut off just above the fighting-top. The
mainmast was removed altogether and a large portion of it was fitted
horizontally across the deck, extending several feet over the port side
of the ship, as a bumpkin designed to prevent the port propeller from
bumping against the Mole at Zeebrugge.
Special fenders were fitted on the ship's side to prevent damage to the
latter when secured to the Mole, and a fender of colossal proportions
was added to the port side of the forecastle for the express purpose of
bumping the Mole on arrival.
{111}
Other alterations and additions have been described in Chapter V.
H.M.S. _Hindustan_, Captain A. P. Davidson, D.S.O., was lent as a depot
vessel for our officers and men who had been concentrated at Chatham.
There was then no living accommodation on board _Vindictive_ or in the
blockships.
[Sidenote: Informing the Officers]
The Vice-Admiral took an early opportunity of assembling all the
officers and making the whole plan known to them collectively. The
secret was to be kept from the men until later, in accordance with the
principle of never divulging a secret to anybody except those to whom
the information is indispensable.
The personnel specially required for storming the Mole at Zeebrugge
were divided into three main parties, viz., Seamen storming parties
under the command of Captain Henry C. Halahan, D.S.O., R.N., Marine
storming parties (drawn from the 4th Battalion) under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Bertram N. Elliot, D.S.O., R.M.L.I., and a
demolition party consisting of both Seamen and Marines under the
command of Lieutenant-Commander Cecil C. Dickinson, R.N.
The Marine Infantrymen were put through intensive training at one of
the southern depots; this training was arranged and personally
supervised by Lieutenant-Colonel Elliot, whose powers of imagination
and organisation were of a high order and whose optimism was very
encouraging. He was tremendously enthusiastic from the first moment
when he was let into the secret. As second-in-command of the Naval
Forces in Servia he had previously rendered splendid service and had
been awarded the D.S.O. {112} After the fall of Belgrade I believe
that he had traversed the entire country on foot in his endeavour to
help his force to safety. I remember a lady telling me that she and
her friends had been much interested on recent nights in watching a
large party of Marines indulging in peculiar antics on a hill opposite
her house; also that the hill was partly covered with strips of canvas
in a seemingly aimless fashion. I expressed my astonishment at the
strange proceeding. Incidentally the canvas strips were laid out to
represent different portions of Zeebrugge Mole, though, at that period,
the men believed they represented some enemy position elsewhere.
[Sidenote: Intensive Training]
The Marine Artillerymen, destined to man the howitzers and some other
guns in _Vindictive_, were trained at another depot.
The seamen were largely trained at Chatham under military supervision
and advice; the excellence of this training received a well-deserved
tribute in the official despatch. The demolition parties were also
trained at Chatham.
Training in night fighting was the main idea. Instruction in bombing,
bayonet fighting, and all types of trench raiding was given. The men
believed that they were required for some special service in France;
their enthusiasm was unbounded.
[Illustration: LIEUT.-COL. BERTRAM N. ELLIOT, D.S.O., R.M.L.I.,
LIEUT.-COM. ARTHUR L. HARRISON, R.N., WING-COM. FRANK A. BROCK,
R.N.A.S., CAPTAIN HENRY C. HALAHAN, D.S.O., R.N.]
Taking everything into consideration and looking at the operation of
attacking the Mole from a general point of view, it was not dissimilar
to a trench raid on a large scale. The preparatory bombardment, the
rush "over the top," the probability of encountering barbed wire, the
descent to the main level of the Mole, the hand-to-hand fighting in the
dark, and {113} finally the clearing of dug-outs, all combined to liken
that phase of the operation to one of the many night raids with which
the military were so well acquainted on the western front. The senior
officers of the Seamen and Marine storming parties had both gained much
experience of such fighting ashore. It was to be a raid of the first
water, a super-raid. The military officers were most enthusiastic
about our men. They declared that these men could carry any position.
For they were all picked men; and even so some of them were weeded out
as not quite reaching high-water mark at the game. It was generally
conceded that the Hun, wherever he was to come to close quarters with
such antagonists, would have an uncomfortable evening.
It has been mentioned above that special personnel were not required
for the large majority of vessels which were already in full commission
and employed on active duty in the Dover Command. The personnel
required for the blockships and storming vessels and for other special
purposes amounted to eighty-six officers and sixteen hundred and
ninety-eight men; of these, seven hundred and fifty, in the aggregate,
were drawn from the Royal Marines.
Having been working in the Plans Department of the Admiralty when the
operation was originally thought out under Admiral Keyes, my further
services had been lent to him, after he took over the Command at Dover,
in connection with the operational staff work. Very much to my delight
I had then been offered the billet of navigator of the expedition, and
my duties were to include those of placing _Vindictive_ alongside the
Mole. The Vice-Admiral originally {114} proposed to direct the
operation from on board _Vindictive_, but was forced to the conclusion
that he could do so more satisfactorily from a destroyer, thus avoiding
the possibility of being confined to any single position in the area of
the attack. In the Vice-Admiral's absence Captain Halahan, appointed
in command of the seamen storming parties, became the Senior Executive
Officer in the ship. It was pointed out that that fact would result in
the unusual case of the Senior Officer on board not being responsible
for the handling of the ship. Captain Halahan would not even listen to
any suggestion of difficulty arising from such a situation, and, I am
anxious to record this fact, he proposed that his acting rank of
Captain should be transferred from himself to me, so that the officer
responsible for handling the vessel should also be the Senior Executive
Officer on board in accordance with the usual
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