History of Julius Cæsar, Vol. 2 of 2
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Title: History of Julius Cæsar, Vol. 2 of 2
Author: Emperor of the French Napoleon III
Release date: April 29, 2014 [eBook #45532]
Language: English
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HISTORY
OF
JULIUS CÆSAR.
[Illustration: colophon]
VOL. II.
THE WARS IN GAUL.
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
FRANKLIN SQUARE.
1866.
PUBLISHER’S NOTE.
It is, perhaps, not without interest, in publishing the second volume of
the History of Julius Cæsar, written by the Emperor Napoleon III., to
call to memory the names of Sovereigns and Princes who have employed
themselves upon the same subject.
_The King of France, Charles VIII._, showed an especial admiration for
the _Commentaries_ of Cæsar, and the celebrated monk, Robert Gaguin,
presented to him, in 1480, the translation he had made in French of the
eight books of the War in Gaul. We are informed of this in the edition
of the _translation_ by the learned monk, printed in 1500. This edition,
in large 4to, is from the press of Antoine Verard. (See J. Ch. Brunet,
_Manuel du Libraire et de l’Amateur de Livres_, fourth edition, tom. I.,
p. 518, and the _Biographie Universelle_, article _Charles VIII._)
_Charles V._, who professed a great admiration for Cæsar, left a copy of
the _Commentaries_ filled with marginal notes, written with his own
hand. It was at his instigation that the Viceroy of Sicily, Ferdinand
Gonzaga, sent a scientific mission into France to study Cæsar’s
campaigns on the localities. The forty plans which were made by the
members of this commission, and among which that of Alise is found, were
published in 1575, in the edition of James Strada.
_The Sultan Soliman II._, contemporary of Charles V., whom he had taken
for his model, sent through all Europe to procure as many copies of
Cæsar’s _Commentaries_ as could be found, which he ordered to be
collated, and caused a translation to be made into the Turkish language
for his own daily reading.
_The King of France, Henri IV._, translated the two first books of
Cæsar’s _Commentaries_. The manuscript of this translation was deposited
in the Bibliothèque du Roi, and M. des Noyers took it thence to deliver
it to Louis XIII., who, in his turn, translated the two last books of
the _Commentaries_. These two translations were joined together, and
printed at the Louvre in 1630.
_Louis XIV._ translated the first book of the _Commentaries_. His
translation was printed at Paris in 1651, in folio, with figures. This
work has not been reprinted; it is now very rare. The reader may consult
on this subject the _Méthode d’étudier l’Histoire_ of the Abbé
Lenglet-Dufresnoy, tom. II., p. 481; and J. Ch. Brunet, _Manuel du
Libraire et de l’Amateur de Livres_, fourth edition, tom. I., p. 519.
_The great Condé_, who had studied with care the campaigns of Cæsar,
encouraged the translation of the _Commentaries_ undertaken by Nicolas
Perrot d’Ablancourt; it was the translation most esteemed and the most
in vogue during the last century.
_Christina, Queen of Sweden_, had composed _Reflections on the Life and
Actions of Cæsar_, as we are informed by J. Arckenholz in his work
entitled _Mémoires concernant Christine, Reine de Suède_, Amsterdam,
1751-1760, tom. IV., No. 6, p. 4.
_Louis Philippe Joseph d’Orléans_, surnamed _Egalité_, was a great
reader of the _Commentaries_. He caused a map of Cæsar’s campaigns in
Gaul to be made.
Lastly, _the Emperor Napoleon I._, at St. Helena, dictated a _Précis des
Guerres de César_ to Comte Marchand, who published it in Paris in 1836,
in 8vo.
CONTENTS.
BOOK III.
THE WARS IN GAUL, AFTER THE “COMMENTARIES.”
CHAPTER I.
POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GALLIC WAR.
PAGE
I. ENTERPRISING CHARACTER OF THE GAULS. 1
II. WARS OF THE ROMANS BEYOND THE ALPS. 3
III. CONTINUAL PRE-OCCUPATION OF THE ROMANS IN REGARD TO THE
GAULS. 7
IV. PLAN FOLLOWED IN THE RELATION OF THE WAR IN GAUL. 13
CHAPTER II.
STATE OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR.
I. GEOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION. (_See Plate 1._) 15
II. POLITICAL DIVISIONS. (_See Plate 2._) 22
III. MANNERS. 32
IV. INSTITUTIONS. 41
CHAPTER III.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII.
(Year of Rome 696.)
(BOOK I. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
I. PROJECTS OF INVASION BY THE HELVETII. (_See Plate 3._) 49
II. CÆSAR’S ARRIVAL AT GENEVA. 52
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE RETRENCHMENT OF THE RHONE. (_See
Plate 8._) 52
IV. THE HELVETII BEGIN THEIR MARCH TOWARDS THE SAÔNE. CÆSAR
UNITES HIS TROOPS. (_See Plates 2 and 4._) 59
V. DEFEAT OF THE HELVETII ON THE SAÔNE. (_See Plates 2 and 4._) 64
VI. DEFEAT OF THE HELVETII NEAR BIBRACTE. (_See Plates 4 and 5._) 72
VII. PURSUIT OF THE HELVETII 76
VIII. OBSERVATIONS 79
CHAPTER IV.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS.
(Year of Rome 696.)
(BOOK I. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
I. SEAT OF THE SUEVI AND OTHER GERMAN TRIBES. (_See Plate 2._) 80
II. THE GAULS SOLICIT CÆSAR TO COME TO THEIR SUCCOUR. 83
III. MARCH OF CÆSAR UPON BESANÇON. (_See Plate 4._) 86
IV. PANIC IN THE ROMAN ARMY. 88
V. MARCH TOWARDS THE VALLEY OF THE RHINE. (_See Plate 4._) 91
VI. INTERVIEW BETWEEN CÆSAR AND ARIOVISTUS. (_See Plate 6._) 94
VII. MOVEMENTS OF THE TWO ARMIES. (_See Plates 2 and 6._) 97
VIII. BATTLE AGAINST THE GERMANS. (_See Plate 4._) 99
IX. OBSERVATIONS. 103
CHAPTER V.
WAR AGAINST THE BELGÆ
(Year of Rome 697.)
(BOOK II. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
I. LEAGUE OF THE BELGÆ. CÆSAR ADVANCES FROM BESANÇON TO
THE AISNE. (_See Plate 4._) 106
II. CÆSAR’S CAMP AT BERRY-AU-BAC. (_See Plates 2, 7, 8, and 9._) 109
III. BATTLE ON THE AISNE. 113
IV. RETREAT OF THE BELGÆ. 115
V. CAPTURE OF NOVIODUNUM AND BRATUSPANTIUM. (_See Plate 7._) 116
VI. MARCH AGAINST THE NERVII. (_See Plates 7 and 10._) 118
VII. BATTLE ON THE SAMBRE. (_See Plate 10._) 121
VIII. SIEGE OF THE OPPIDUM OF THE ADUATUCI. (_See Plate 11._) 128
IX. SUBJUGATION OF THE ARMORICA BY P. CRASSUS. 131
X. EXPEDITION OF GALBA INTO THE VALAIS. 132
CHAPTER VI.
(Year of Rome 698.)
(BOOK III. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
WAR OF THE VENETII--VICTORY OVER THE UNELLI--SUBMISSION OF AQUITAINE--MARCH
AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII.
I. INSURRECTION OF THE MARITIME PEOPLES. (_See Plate 12._) 135
II. WAR AGAINST THE VENETI. (_See Plate 12._) 137
III. NAVAL COMBAT AGAINST THE VENETI. (_See Plate 12._) 141
IV. VICTORY OF SABINUS OVER THE UNELLI. (_See Plate 13._) 144
V. CONQUEST OF AQUITAINE BY P. CRASSUS. 146
VI. MARCH AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII. 150
VII. OBSERVATIONS. 151
CHAPTER VII.
(Year of Rome 699.)
(BOOK IV. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
INCURSIONS OF THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI--FIRST PASSAGE OF THE
RHINE--FIRST DESCENT IN BRITAIN--CHASTISEMENT OF THE MORINI AND
THE MENAPII.
I. CÆSAR’S MARCH AGAINST THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI.
(_See Plate 14._) 153
II. ROUT OF THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI. 158
III. FIRST PASSAGE OF THE RHINE. (_See Plates 14 and 15._) 160
IV. DESCRIPTION OF BRITAIN IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR. 165
V. FIRST EXPEDITION TO BRITAIN. (_See Plates 16 and 17._) 172
VI. CHASTISEMENT OF THE MORINI AND MENAPII. 184
VII. ORDER FOR REBUILDING THE FLEET. DEPARTURE FOR ILLYRIA. 185
VIII. POINTS OF EMBARKING AND LANDING. DATE OF THE ARRIVAL
IN BRITAIN. (_See Plate 16._) 186
IX. RÉSUMÉ OF THE DATES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 699. 202
CHAPTER VIII.
(Year of Rome 700.)
(BOOK V. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
MARCH AGAINST THE TREVIRI--SECOND DESCENT IN BRITAIN.
I. INSPECTION OF THE FLEET. MARCH AGAINST THE TREVIRI. 204
II. DEPARTURE FOR THE ISLE OF BRITAIN. (_See Plate 16._) 206
III. MARCH INTO THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY. (_See Plate 16._) 208
IV. DESTRUCTION OF A PART OF THE FLEET. 210
V. CÆSAR RESUMES THE OFFENSIVE. 211
VI. MARCH TOWARDS THE THAMES. (_See Plate 16._) 214
VII. SUBMISSION OF A PART OF BRITAIN. (_See Plate 16._) 216
VIII. RE-EMBARKATION OF THE ARMY. 217
IX. OBSERVATIONS. (_See Plate 16._) 219
X. PRESUMED DATES OF THE SECOND CAMPAIGN IN BRITAIN. 223
XI. DISTRIBUTION OF THE LEGIONS IN THEIR WINTER QUARTERS.
(_See Plates 14 and 18._) 225
XII. DEFEAT OF SABINUS AT ADUATUCA. 228
XIII. ATTACK ON CICERO’S CAMP. 234
XIV. CÆSAR MARCHES TO THE SUCCOUR OF CICERO. (_See Plates 14
and 27, Fig. 8._) 236
XV. CÆSAR PLACES HIS TROOPS IN WINTER QUARTERS. LABIENUS
DEFEATS INDUTIOMARUS. 246
XVI. OBSERVATIONS. 250
CHAPTER IX.
(Year of Rome 701.)
(BOOK VI. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NERVII AND THE TREVIRI--SECOND PASSAGE OF
THE RHINE--WAR AGAINST AMBIORIX AND THE EBURONES.
I. CÆSAR AUGMENTS HIS ARMY. 253
II. WAR AGAINST THE NERVII. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GAUL. 254
III. SUBMISSION OF THE MENAPII. 256
IV. SUCCESS OF LABIENUS AGAINST THE TREVIRI. 257
V. SECOND PASSAGE OF THE RHINE. 260
VI. WAR AGAINST AMBIORIX. (_See Plates 2 and 14._) 262
VII. THE SICAMBRI ATTACK ADUATUCA. (_See Plate 18._) 265
CHAPTER X.
(Year of Rome 702.)
(BOOK VII. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
REVOLT OF GAUL--CAPTURE OF VELLAUNODUNUM, GENABUM, AND NOVIODUNUM--SIEGES
OF AVARICUM AND GERGOVIA--CAMPAIGN OF LABIENUS
AGAINST THE PARISII--SIEGE OF ALESIA.
I. REVOLT OF GAUL. 272
II. CÆSAR BEGINS THE CAMPAIGN. (_See Plate 19._) 275
III. TAKING OF VELLAUNODUNUM, GENABUM, AND NOVIODUNUM. (_See
Plate 19._) 278
IV. SIEGE OF AVARICUM. (_See Plate 20._) 287
V. ARRIVAL OF CÆSAR AT DECETIA, AND MARCH TOWARDS AUVERGNE.
(_See Plates 19 and 21._) 299
VI. BLOCKADE OF GERGOVIA. (_See Plates 21 and 22._) 303
VII. OBSERVATIONS. 319
VIII. CÆSAR LEAVES GERGOVIA IN ORDER TO JOIN LABIENUS. 320
IX. EXPEDITION OF LABIENUS AGAINST THE PARISII. (_See Plate 23._) 323
X. THE GAULS ASSUME THE OFFENSIVE. 329
XI. JUNCTION OF CÆSAR AND LABIENUS. BATTLE OF THE VINGEANNE.
(_See Plates 19 and 24._) 331
XII. BLOCKADE OF ALESIA. (_See Plates 25, 26, 27, and 28._) 338
XIII. DETAILS OF THE EXCAVATIONS AT MONT AUXOIS. (_See Plates
25, 27, and 28._) 358
CHAPTER XI.
(Year of Rome 703.)
(BOOK VIII. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
I. EXPEDITION AGAINST THE BITURIGES AND CARNUTES. 367
II. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELLOVACI. (_See Plates 29 and 30._) 369
III. BATTLE ON THE AISNE. 377
IV. DEVASTATION OF THE COUNTRY OF THE EBURONES. 379
V. EXPEDITION AGAINST DUMNACUS. 381
VI. CAPTURE OF UXELLODUNUM. (_See Plates 31 and 32._) 383
VII. EXCAVATIONS MADE AT PUY D’ISSOLU. (_See Plates 31 and 32._) 390
VIII. COMPLETE SUBMISSION OF GAUL. 395
BOOK IV.
RECAPITULATION OF THE WAR IN GAUL, AND RELATION
OF EVENTS AT ROME FROM 696 TO 705.
CHAPTER I.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 696.
I. DIFFICULTIES OF CÆSAR’S TASK. 399
II. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII. 402
III. CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS. 405
IV. SEQUEL OF THE CONSULSHIP OF L. CALPURNIUS PISO AND AULUS
GALBINIUS. 408
V. INTRIGUES OF CLODIUS. 409
VI. POMPEY CONSULTS CÆSAR ON THE RETURN OF CICERO. 410
VII. POMPEY BELIEVES HIMSELF THREATENED BY A SLAVE OF CLODIUS. 411
CHAPTER II.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 697.
I. WAR AGAINST THE BELGÆ. 413
II. RETURN OF CICERO. 416
III. POMPEY IS CHARGED WITH THE SUPPLYING OF FOOD. 419
IV. FESTIVALS TO COMMEMORATE CÆSAR’S VICTORIES. 420
V. RIOTS AT ROME. 421
CHAPTER III.
EVENTS IN ROME DURING THE YEAR 698.
I. PRESENCE IN ROME OF PTOLEMY AULETES. 424
II. CLODIUS NAMED ÆDILE. TRIAL OF MILO. 426
III. RETURN OF CATO. 429
IV. STATE OF ANARCHY IN ROME. 430
V. THE INTERVIEW AT LUCCA. 433
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERVIEW AT LUCCA. CONDUCT OF
CICERO. 438
VII. INTRIGUES OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS TO OBTAIN THE CONSULSHIP. 443
VIII. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE PEOPLES ON THE SHORES OF THE OCEAN. 445
CHAPTER IV.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 699.
I. CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE USIPETES AND THE TENCTERI. 449
II. FIRST DESCENT IN ENGLAND. 451
III. CÆSAR’S HABITS WHEN IN CAMPAIGN. 452
IV. CONSULSHIP OF POMPEY AND CRASSUS. 453
V. MOTION OF TREBONIUS ON THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCES. 456
VI. POMPEY’S SUMPTUARY LAW. 461
VII. DEPARTURE OF CRASSUS FOR SYRIA. 462
VIII. CATO PROPOSES TO DELIVER CÆSAR TO THE GERMANS. 464
CHAPTER V.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 700.
I. SECOND DESCENT IN ENGLAND. 467
II. DISPLACEMENT OF THE ARMY. DISASTER OF SABINUS. 468
III. L. DOMITIUS AHENOBARBUS AND APPIUS CLAUDIUS PULCHER,
CONSULS. 470
IV. RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF PTOLEMY IN EGYPT. 472
V. CORRUPTION OF THE ELECTIONS. 474
VI. DEATH OF CÆSAR’S DAUGHTER. 476
VII. CÆSAR’S BUILDINGS AT ROME. 477
VIII. HIS RELATIONS WITH CICERO. 478
CHAPTER VI.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 701.
I. EXPEDITION TO THE NORTH OF GAUL. SECOND PASSAGE OF
THE RHINE. 484
II. PURSUIT OF AMBIORIX. 485
III. C. DOMITIUS CALVINUS AND M. VALERIUS MESSALA, CONSULS. 486
IV. EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS AGAINST THE PARTHIANS, AND HIS
DEATH. 488
V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF CRASSUS. 499
CHAPTER VII.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 702.
I. MURDER OF CLODIUS. 501
II. THE REPUBLIC IS DECLARED IN DANGER. 505
III. POMPEY SOLE CONSUL. 506
IV. TRIAL OF MILO. 508
V. POMPEY TAKES AS HIS ASSOCIATE CÆCILIUS METELLUS PIUS
SCIPIO. 514
VI. INSURRECTION OF GAUL, AND CAMPAIGN OF 702. 516
CHAPTER VIII.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 703.
I. NEW TROUBLES IN GAUL, AND THE CAMPAIGN ON THE AISNE. 528
II. CÆSAR’S POLICY IN GAUL AND AT ROME. 530
III. SULPICIUS RUFUS AND M. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS, CONSULS. 536
IV. SPIRIT WHICH ANIMATES CÆSAR’S ADVERSARIES. 538
V. THE QUESTION OF RIGHT BETWEEN THE SENATE AND CÆSAR. 542
VI. INTRIGUES TO DEPRIVE CÆSAR OF HIS COMMAND. 548
CHAPTER IX.
EVENTS OF THE YEAR 704.
I. C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS AND L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS, CONSULS. 554
II. CÆSAR REPAIRS TO THE CISALPINE. 559
III. POMPEY RECEIVES OVATIONS, AND ASKS CÆSAR TO RETURN HIS
TWO LEGIONS. 564
IV. THE SENATE VOTES IMPARTIALLY. 569
V. VIOLENT MEASURES ADOPTED AGAINST CÆSAR. 570
VI. STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION. 572
CHAPTER X.
EVENTS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 705.
I. C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS AND L. CORNELIUS LENTULUS, CONSULS. 579
II. LENTULUS CARRIES THE SENATE AGAINST CÆSAR. 581
III. CÆSAR HARANGUES HIS TROOPS. 588
IV. CÆSAR IS DRIVEN TO CIVIL WAR. 590
V. CÆSAR CROSSES THE RUBICON. 592
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX A.
CONCORDANCE OF DATES OF THE ANCIENT ROMAN CALENDAR WITH THE
JULIAN STYLE, FOR THE YEARS OF ROME 691-709. 595
APPENDIX B.
CONCORDANCE OF ROMAN AND MODERN HOURS, FOR THE YEAR OF
ROME 699 (55 B. C.) AND FOR THE LATITUDE OF PARIS. 638
APPENDIX C.
LIST OF ANCIENT COINS FOUND IN THE EXCAVATIONS AT ALISE.
PAGE
NOTE ON THE ANCIENT COINS COLLECTED IN THE EXCAVATIONS AT ALISE. 640
COINS STRUCK IN THE MINT AT ROME. 642
COINS STRUCK IN SOUTHERN ITALY. 644
COINS STRUCK OUT OF ITALY. 644
GAULISH COINS (FROM CAMP D, ON THE BANKS OF THE OSE). 645
APPENDIX D.
NOTICE ON CÆSAR’S LIEUTENANTS.
1. T. ATTIUS LABIENUS. 648
2. PUBLIUS LUCINIUS CRASSUS. 648
3. L. ARUNCULEIUS COTTA. 649
4. QUINTUS TITURIUS SABINUS. 649
5. Q. PEDIUS. 649
6. SERVIUS SULPICIUS GALBA. 649
7. DECIMUS JUNIUS BRUTUS. 650
8. PUBLIUS SULPICIUS RUFUS. 651
9. LUCIUS MUNATIUS PLANCUS. 652
10. MARCUS LICINIUS CRASSUS. 652
11. CAIUS FABIUS. 653
12. L. ROSCIUS. 653
13. TITUS SEXTIUS. 653
14. Q. TULLIUS CICERO. 654
15. CAIUS TREBONIUS. 655
16. MINUCIUS BASILUS. 656
17. C. ANTISTIUS REGINUS. 656
18. M. SILANUS. 656
19. C. CANINIUS REBILUS. 656
20. M. SEMPRONIUS RUTILUS. 657
21. MARCUS ANTONIUS (MARK ANTONY). 657
22. PUBLIUS VATINIUS. 657
28. Q. FUFIUS CALENUS. 658
24. L. CÆSAR. 658
LIST OF PLATES TO VOLUME II.
PAGE
1. GENERAL MAP OF GAUL 15
2. GENERAL MAP OF THE PEOPLES OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR 23
3. COURSE OF THE RHONE, FROM GENEVA TO THE PAS DE L’ECLUSE 54
4. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 696 60
5. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE HELVETII 78
6. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF ARIOVISTUS 97
7. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 697 107
8. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE 110
9. CAMP OF CÆSAR ON THE AISNE 111
10. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE SAMBRE 121
11. PLAN OF THE OPPIDUM OF THE ADUATUCI 129
12. MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE VENETI 137
13. EXPEDITION OF SABINUS TO THE UNELLI 145
14. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 699 153
15. BRIDGE OF PILES BUILT ON THE RHINE 162
16. MAP OF BRITAIN FOR THE TWO EXPEDITIONS 175
17. PLAN OF DOVER 176
18. PLAN OF ADUATUCA 231
19. GENERAL MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE YEAR 702 277
20. PLAN OF AVARICUM 288
21. PLAN OF GERGOVIA 304
22. CAMP OF CÆSAR AT GERGOVIA 307
23. MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF LABIENUS AT LUTETIA 325
24. PLAN OF THE FIELD OF BATTLE OF THE VINGEANNE 334
25. PLAN OF ALESIA 340
26. VIEWS OF MONT AUXOIS 343
27. DETAILS OF THE ROMAN WORKS AT ALESIA 345
28. _Idem_ 346
29. MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE BELLOVACI 370
30. CAMP OF CÆSAR AT MONT SAINT-PIERRE 372
31. PLAN OF UXELLODUNUM 384
32. DETAILS OF THE ROMAN WORKS AT UXELLODUNUM 390
JULIUS CÆSAR.
BOOK III.
THE WARS IN GAUL, AFTER THE “COMMENTARIES.”
CHAPTER I.
POLITICAL CAUSES OF THE GALLIC WAR.
[Sidenote: Enterprising Character of the Gauls.]
I. There are peoples whose existence in the past only reveals itself by
certain brilliant apparitions, unequivocal proofs of an energy which had
been previously unknown. During the interval their history is involved
in obscurity, and they resemble those long-silent volcanoes, which we
should take to be extinct but for the eruptions which, at periods far
apart, occur and expose to view the fire which smoulders in their bosom.
Such had been the Gauls.
The accounts of their ancient expeditions bear witness to an
organisation already powerful, and to an ardent spirit of enterprise.
Not to speak of migrations which date back perhaps nine or ten centuries
before our era, we see, at the moment when Rome was beginning to aim at
greatness, the Celts spreading themselves beyond their frontiers. In the
time of Tarquin the Elder (Years of Rome, 138 to 176), two expeditions
started from Celtic Gaul: one proceeded across the Rhine and Southern
Germany, to descend upon Illyria and Pannonia (now _Western Hungary_);
the other, scaling the Alps, established itself in Italy, in the country
lying between those mountains and the Po.[1] The invaders soon
transferred themselves to the right bank of that river, and nearly the
whole of the territory comprised between the Alps and the Apennines took
the name of _Cisalpine Gaul_. More than two centuries afterwards, the
descendants of those Gauls marched upon Rome, and burnt it all but the
Capitol.[2] Still a century later (475), we see new bands issuing from
Gaul, reaching Thrace by the valley of the Danube,[3] ravaging Northern
Greece, and bringing back to Toulouse the gold plundered from the Temple
of Delphi.[4] Others, arriving at Byzantium,[5] pass into Asia,
establish their dominion over the whole region on this side Mount
Taurus, since called _Gallo-Græcia_, or _Galatia_, and maintain in it a
sort of military feudalism until the time of the war of Antiochus.[6]
These facts, obscure as they may be in history, prove the spirit of
adventure and the warlike genius of the Gaulish race, which thus, in
fact, inspired a general terror. During nearly two centuries, from 364
to 531, Rome struggled against the Cisalpine Gauls, and more than once
the defeat of her armies placed her existence in danger. It was, as it
were, foot by foot that the Romans effected the conquest of Northern
Italy, strengthening it as they proceeded by the establishment of
colonies.
Let us here give a recapitulation of the principal wars against the
Gauls, Cisalpine and Transalpine, ich have already been spoken of in the
first volume of the present work. In 531 the Romans took the offensive,
crossed the Po, and subjugated a great part of the Cisalpine. But hardly
had the north of Italy been placed under the supremacy of the Republic,
when Hannibal’s invasion (536) caused anew an insurrection of the
inhabitants of those countries, who helped to increase the numbers of
his army; and even when that great captain was obliged to quit Italy,
they continued to defend their independence during thirty-four years.
The struggle, renewed in 554, ended only in 588, for we will not take
into account the partial insurrections which followed. During this time,
Rome had not only to combat the Cisalpines, assisted by the Gauls from
beyond the Alps, but also to make war upon the men of their race in Asia
(565) and in Illyria. In this last-mentioned province the colony of
Aquileia was founded (571), and several wild tribes of Liguria, who held
the defiles of the Alps, were subjugated (588).
[Sidenote: Wars of the Romans beyond the Alps.]
II. In 600, the Romans, called to the assistance of the Greek town of
Marseilles, which was attacked by the Oxybii and the Deciates, Ligurian
tribes of the Maritime Alps,[7] for the first time carried their arms
to the other side of the Alps. They followed the course of the Corniche,
and crossed the Var; but it took, according to Strabo, a struggle of
eighty years before they obtained from the Ligures an extent of twelve
stadia (2·22 kils.), a narrow passage on the coast of the sea, to enable
them to pass through Gaul into Spain.[8] Nevertheless, the legions
pushed their encroachments between the Rhone and the Alps. The conquered
territory was given to the people of Marseilles, who soon, attacked
again by the peoples of the Maritime Alps, implored a second time the
support of Rome. In 629, the Consul M. Fulvius Flaccus was sent against
the Salluvii; and, three years afterwards,[9] the proconsul C. Sextius
Calvinus drove them back far from the sea-coast, and founded the town of
Aix (_Aquæ Sextiæ_).[10]
The Romans, by protecting the people of Marseilles, had extended their
dominion on the coast; by contracting other alliances, they penetrated
into the interior. The Ædui were at war with the Allobroges and the
Arverni. The proconsul Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus united with the former,
and defeated the Allobroges, in 633, at Vindalium, on the Sorgue
(_Sulgas_), not far from the Rhone. Subsequently, Q. Fabius Maximus,
grandson of Paulus Æmilius, gained, at the confluence of the Isère and
the Rhone, a decisive victory over the Allobroges, and over Bituitus,
king of the Arverni. By this success Q. Fabius gained the surname of
_Allobrogicus_.[11] The Arverni pretended to be descendants of the
Trojans, and boasted a common origin with the Romans;[12] they remained
independent, but their dominion, which extended from the banks of the
Rhine to the neighbourhood of Narbonne and Marseilles, was limited to
their ancient territory. The Ruteni, who had been their allies against
Fabius, obtained similarly the condition of not being subjected to the
Roman power, and were exempted from all tribute.[13]
In 636, the Consul Q. Marcius Rex founded the colony of Narbo Marcius,
which gave its name to the Roman province called _Narbonensis_.[14]
The movement which had long thrust the peoples of the north towards the
south had slackened during several centuries, but in the seventh century
of the foundation of Rome it seems to have re-commenced with greater
intensity than ever. The Cimbri and the Teutones,[15] after ravaging
Noricum and Illyria, and defeating the army of Papirius Carbo sent to
protect Italy (641), had marched across Rhætia, and penetrated by the
valley of the Rhine to the country of the Helvetii. They drew with them
a part of that people, spread into Gaul, and for several years carried
there terror and desolation. The Belgæ alone offered a vigorous
resistance. Rome, to protect her province, sent against them, or against
the tribes of the Helvetii, their allies, five generals, who were
successively vanquished: the Consul M. Junius Silanus, in 645; M.
Aurelius Scaurus, in 646; L. Cassius Longinus, in 647;[16] lastly, in
the year 649, the proconsul Q. Servilius Cæpio[17] and Cn. Manlius
Maximus. The two last each lost his army.[18] The very existence of Rome
was threatened.
Marius, by the victories gained at Aix over the Teutones (652), and at
the Campi Raudii, not far from the Adige, over the Cimbri (653),
destroyed the barbarians and saved Italy.
The ancients often confounded the Gauls with the Cimbri and Teutones;
sprung from a common origin, these peoples formed, as it were, the
rear-guard of the great army of invasion which, at an unknown epoch, had
brought the Celts into Gaul from the shores of the Black Sea.
Sallust[19] ascribes to the Gauls the defeats of Q. Cæpio and Cn.
Manlius, and Cicero[20] designates under the same name the barbarians
who were destroyed by Marius. The fact is that all the peoples of the
north were always ready to unite in the same effort when it was proposed
to throw themselves upon the south of Europe.
From 653 to 684, the Romans, occupied with intestine wars, dreamt not of
increasing their power beyond the Alps; and, when internal peace was
restored, their generals, such as Sylla, Metellus Creticus, Lucullus,
and Pompey, preferred the easy and lucrative conquests of the East. The
vanquished peoples were abandoned by the Senate to the exactions of
governors, which explains the readiness with which the deputies of the
Allobroges entered, in 691, into Catiline’s conspiracy; fear led them to
denounce the plot, but they experienced no gratitude for their
revelations.[21]
The Allobroges rose, seized the town of Vienne,[22] which was devoted to
the Romans, and surprised, in 693, Manlius Lentinus, lieutenant of C.
Pomptinus, governor of the Narbonnese. Nevertheless, some time after,
the latter finally defeated and subdued them. “Until the time of Cæsar,”
says Cicero, “our generals were satisfied with repelling the Gauls,
thinking more of putting a stop to their aggressions than of carrying
the war among them. Marius himself did not penetrate to their towns and
homes, but confined himself to opposing a barrier to these torrents of
peoples which were inundating Italy. C. Pomptinus, who suppressed the
war raised by the Allobroges, rested after his victory. Cæsar alone
resolved to subject Gaul to our dominion.”[23]
[Sidenote: Continual Pre-occupation of the Romans in regard to the
Gauls.]
III. It results from this summary of facts that the constant thought of
the Romans was, during several centuries, to resist the Celtic peoples
established on either side of the Alps. Ancient authors proclaim aloud
the fear which held Rome constantly on the watch. “The Romans,” says
Sallust, “had then, as in our days, the opinion that all other peoples
must yield to their courage; but that with the Gauls it was no longer
for glory, but for safety, that they had to fight.”[24] On his part,
Cicero expresses himself thus: “From the beginning of our Republic, all
our wise men have looked upon Gaul as _the most redoubtable enemy of
Rome_. But the strength and multitude of those peoples had prevented us
until now from combating them all.”[25]
In 694, it will be remembered, rumours of an invasion of the Helvetii
prevailed at Rome. All political pre-occupation ceased at once, and
resort was had to the exceptional measures adopted under such
circumstances.[26] In fact, as a principle, whenever a war against the
Gauls was imminent, a dictator was immediately nominated, and a levy _en
masse_ ordered. From that time no one was exempted from military
service; and, as a provision against an attack of those barbarians, a
special treasure had been deposited in the Capitol, which it was
forbidden to touch except in that eventuality.[27] Accordingly, when, in
705, Cæsar seized upon it, he replied to the protests of the tribunes
that, since Gaul was subjugated, this treasure had become useless.[28]
War against the peoples beyond the Alps was thus, for Rome, the
consequence of a long antagonism, which must necessarily end in a
desperate struggle, and the ruin of one of the two adversaries. This
explains, at the same time, both Cæsar’s ardour and the enthusiasm
excited by his successes. Wars undertaken in accord with the traditional
sentiment of a country have alone the privilege of moving deeply the
fibre of the people, and the importance of a victory is measured by the
greatness of the disaster which would have followed a defeat. Since the
fall of Carthage, the conquests in Spain, in Africa, in Syria, in Asia,
and in Greece, enlarged the Republic, but did not consolidate it, and a
check in those different parts of the world would have diminished the
power of Rome without compromising it. With the peoples of the North, on
the contrary, her existence was at stake, and upon her reverses equally
as upon her successes depended the triumph of barbarism or civilisation.
If Cæsar had been vanquished by the Helvetii or the Germans, who can say
what would have become of Rome, assailed by the numberless hordes of the
North rushing eagerly upon Italy?
And thus no war excited the public feeling so intensely as that of Gaul.
Though Pompey had carried the Roman eagles to the shores of the Caspian
Sea, and, by the tributes he had imposed on the vanquished, doubled the
revenues of the State, his triumphs had only obtained ten days of
thanksgivings. The Senate decreed fifteen,[29] and even twenty,[30] for
Cæsar’s victories, and, in honour of them, the people offered sacrifices
during sixty days.[31]
When, therefore, Suetonius ascribes the inspiration of the campaigns of
this great man to the mere desire of enriching himself with plunder, he
is false to history and to good sense, and assigns the most vulgar
motive to a noble design. When other historians ascribe to Cæsar the
sole intention of seeking in Gaul a means of rising to the supreme power
by civil war, they show, as we have remarked elsewhere, a distorted
view; they judge events by their final result, instead of calmly
estimating the causes which have produced them.
The sequel of this history will prove that all the responsibility of the
civil war belongs not to Cæsar, but to Pompey. And although the former
had his eyes incessantly fixed on his enemies at Rome, none the less for
that he pursued his conquests, without making them subordinate to his
personal interests. If he had sought only his own elevation in his
military successes, he would have followed an entirely opposite course.
We should not have seen him sustain during eight years a desperate
struggle, and incur the risks of enterprises such as those of Great
Britain and Germany. After his first campaigns, he need only have
returned to Rome to profit by the advantages he had acquired; for, as
Cicero says,[32] “he had already done enough for his glory, if he had
not done enough for the Republic;” and the same orator adds: “Why would
Cæsar himself remain in his province, if it were not to deliver to the
Roman people complete a work which was already nearly finished? Is he
retained by the agreeableness of the country, by the beauty of the
towns, by the politeness and amenity of the individuals and peoples, by
the lust of victory, by the desire of extending the limits of our
empire? Is there anything more uncultivated than those countries, ruder
than those towns, more ferocious than those peoples, and more admirable
than the multiplicity of Cæsar’s victories? Can he find limits farther
off than the ocean? Would his return to his country offend either the
people who sent him or the Senate which has loaded him with honours?
Would his absence increase the desire we have to see him? Would it not
rather contribute, through lapse of time, to make people forget him, and
to cause the laurels to fade which he had gathered in the midst of the
greatest perils? If, then, there any who love not Cæsar, it is not their
policy to obtain his recall from his province, because that would be to
recall him to glory, to triumph, to the congratulations and supreme
honours of the Senate, to the favour of the equestrian order, to the
affection of the people.”[33]
Thus, after the end of 698, he might have led his army back into Italy,
claimed triumph, and obtained power, without having to seize upon it, as
Sylla, Marius, Cinna, and even Crassus and Pompey, had done.
If Cæsar had accepted the government of Gaul with the sole aim of having
an army devoted to his designs, it must be admitted that so experienced
a general would have taken, to commence a civil war, the simplest of the
measures suggested by prudence: instead of separating himself from his
army, he would have kept it with him, or, at least, brought it near to
Italy, and distributed it in such a manner that he could re-assemble it
quickly; he would have preserved, from the immense booty taken in Gaul,
sums sufficient to supply the expenses of the war. Cæsar, on the
contrary, as we shall see in the sequel, sends first to Pompey, without
hesitation, two legions which are required from him under the pretext of
the expedition against the Parthians. He undertakes to disband his
troops if Pompey will do the same, and he arrives at Ravenna at the head
of a single legion, leaving the others beyond the Alps, distributed from
the Sambre as far as the Saône.[34] He keeps within the limit of his
government without making any preparation which indicates hostile
intentions,[35] wishing, as Hirtius says, to settle the quarrel by
justice rather than by arms.[36] In fact, he has collected so little
money in the military chest, that his soldiers club together to procure
him the sums necessary for his enterprise, and that all voluntarily
renounce their pay.[37] Cæsar offers Pompey an unconditional
reconciliation, and it is only when he sees his advances rejected, and
his adversaries meditating his ruin, that he boldly faces the forces of
the Senate, and passes the Rubicon. It was not, then, the supreme power
which Cæsar went into Gaul to seek, but the pure and elevated glory
which arises from a national war, made in the traditional interest of
the country.
[Sidenote: Plan followed in the Relation of the War in Gaul.]
IV. In reproducing in the following chapters the relation of the war in
Gaul, we have borne in mind the words of Cicero. “Cæsar,” he says, “has
written memoirs worthy of great praise. Deprived of all oratorical art,
his style, like a handsome body stripped of clothing, presents itself
naked, upright, and graceful. In his desire to furnish materials to
future historians, he has, perhaps, done a thing agreeable to the little
minds who will be tempted to load these natural graces with frivolous
ornaments; but he has for ever deprived men of sense of the desire of
writing, for nothing is more agreeable in history than a correct and
luminous brevity.”[38] Hirtius, on his part, expresses himself in the
following terms: “These memoirs enjoy an approval so general, that Cæsar
has much more taken from others than given to them the power of writing
the history of the events which they recount. We have still more reasons
than all others for admiring it, for others know only how correct and
accurate this book is; we know the facility and rapidity with which it
was composed.”[39]
If we would act upon the advice of these writers, we must digress as
little as possible from the “Commentaries,” but without restricting
ourselves to a literal translation. We have, then, adopted the narrative
of Cæsar, though sometimes changing the order of the matter: we have
abridged passages where there was a prodigality of details, and
developed those which required elucidation. In order to indicate in a
more precise manner the localities which witnessed so many battles, we
have employed the modern names, especially in cases where ancient
geography did not furnish corresponding names.
The investigation of the battle-fields and siege operations has led to
the discovery of visible and certain traces of the Roman entrenchments.
The reader, by comparing the plans of the excavations with the text,
will be convinced of the rigorous accuracy of Cæsar in describing the
countries he passed over, and the works he caused to be executed.
CHAPTER II.
STATE OF GAUL IN THE TIME OF CÆSAR.
(See Plate I.)
[Sidenote: Geographical Description.]
I. Transalpine Gaul had for its boundaries the ocean, the Pyrenees, the
Mediterranean, the Alps, and the Rhine. This portion of Europe, so well
marked out by nature, comprised what is now France, nearly the whole of
Switzerland, the Rhine Provinces, Belgium, and the south of Holland. It
had the form of an irregular pentagon, and the country of the Carnutes
(the _Orléanais_) was considered to be its centre.[40]
An uninterrupted chain of heights divided Gaul, as it divides modern
France, from north to south, into two parts. This line commences at the
Monts Corbières, at the foot of the Eastern Pyrenees, is continued by
the Southern Cévennes and by the mountains of the Vivarais, Lyonnais,
and Beaujolais (called the Northern Cévennes), and declines continually
with the mountains of the Charolais and the Côte-d’Or, until it reaches
the plateau of Langres; after quitting this plateau, it leaves to the
east the Monts Faucilles, which unite it to the Vosges, and, inclining
towards the north-west, it follows, across the mountains of the Meuse,
the western crests of the Argonne and the Ardennes, and terminates, in
decreasing undulations, towards Cape Griz-Nez, in the Pas-de-Calais.
This long and tortuous ridge, more or less interrupted, which may be
called the backbone of the country, is the great line of the watershed.
It separates two slopes. On the eastern slope flow the Rhine and the
Rhone, in opposite directions, the first towards the Northern Sea, the
second towards the Mediterranean; on the western slope rise the Seine,
the Loire, and the Garonne, which go to throw themselves into the ocean.
These rivers flow at the bottom of vast basins, the bounds of which, as
is well known, are indicated by the lines of elevations connecting the
sources of all the tributaries of the principal stream.
The basin of the Rhine is separated from that of the Rhone by the Monts
Faucilles, the southern extremity of the Vosges, called _Le trouée de
Belfort_, the Jura, the Jorat (the heights which surround the Lake of
Geneva on the north), and the lofty chain of the Helvetic Alps. In its
upper part, it embraces nearly all Switzerland, of which the Rhine forms
the northern boundary, in its course, from east to west, from the Lake
of Constance to Bâle. Near this town the river turns abruptly towards
the north. The basin widens, limited to the east by the mountains which
separate it from the Danube and the Weser; to the west, by the northern
part of the great line of watershed (the mountains of the Meuse, the
Argonne, and the western Ardennes). It is intersected, from Mayence to
Bonn, by chains nearly parallel to the course of the river, which
separate its tributaries. From Bonn to the point where the Rhine divides
into two arms, the basin opens still more; it is flat, and has no
longer a definite boundary. The southern arm bore already, in the time
of Cæsar, the name of _Waal_ (Vahalis), and united with the Meuse[41]
below Nimeguen. To the west of the basin of the Rhine, the Scheldt forms
a secondary basin.
The basin of the Rhone, in which is comprised that of the Saône, is
sharply bounded on the north by the southern extremity of the Vosges and
the Monts Faucilles; on the west, by the plateau of Langres, the
Côte-d’Or, and the Cévennes; on the east, by the Jura, the Jorat, and
the Alps. The Rhone crosses the Valais and the Lake of Geneva, follows
an irregular course as far as Lyons, and runs thence from north to south
to the Mediterranean. Among the most important of its secondary basins,
we may reckon those of the Aude, the Hérault, and the Var.
The three great basins of the western slope are comprised between the
line of watershed of Gaul and the ocean. They are separated from each
other by two chains branching from this line, and running from the
south-east to the north-west. The basin of the Seine, which includes
that of the Somme, is separated from the basin of the Loire by a line of
heights which branches from the Côte-d’Or under the name of the
mountains of the Morvan, and is continued by the very low hills of Le
Perche to the extremity of Normandy. A series of heights, extending from
north to south, from the hills of Le Perche to Nantes, enclose the basin
of the Loire to the west, and leave outside the secondary basins of
Brittany.
The basin of the Loire is separated from that of the Garonne by a long
chain starting from Mont Lozère, comprising the mountains of Auvergne,
those of the Limousin, the hills of Poitou, and the plateau of Gatine,
and ending in flat country towards the coasts of La Vendée.
The basin of the Garonne, situated to the south of that of the Loire,
extends to the Pyrenees. It comprises the secondary basins of the Adour
and the Charente.
The vast country we have thus described is protected on the north, west,
and south by two seas, and by the Pyrenees. On the east, where it is
exposed to invasions, Nature, not satisfied with the defences she had
given it in the Rhine and the Alps, has further retrenched it behind
three groups of interior mountains--first, the Vosges; second, the Jura;
third, the mountains of Forez, the mountains of Auvergne, and the
Cévennes.
The Vosges run parallel to the Rhine, and are like a rampart in the rear
of that river.
The Jura, separated from the Vosges by _the Gap (trouée) of Belfort_,
rises like a barrier in the interval left between the Rhine and the
Rhone, preventing, as far as Lyons, the waters of this latter river from
uniting with those of the Saône.
The Cévennes and the mountains of Auvergne and Forez form, in the
southern centre of Gaul, a sort of citadel, of which the Rhone might be
considered as the advanced fosse. The ridges of this group of mountains
start from a common centre, take opposite directions, and form the
valleys whence flow, to the north, the Allier and the Loire; to the
west, the Dordogne, the Lot, the Aveyron, and the Tarn; to the south,
the Ardèche, the Gard, and the Hérault.
The valleys, watered by navigable rivers, presented--thanks to the
fruitfulness of their soil and to their easy access--natural ways of
communication, favourable both to commerce and to war. To the north, the
valley of the Meuse; to the east, the valley of the Rhine, conducting to
that of the Saône, and thence to that of the Rhone, were the grand
routes which armies followed to invade the south. Strabo, therefore,
remarks justly that Sequania (_Franche-Comté_) has always been the road
of the Germanic invasions from Gaul into Italy.[42] From east to west
the principal chain of the watershed might easily be crossed in its less
elevated parts, such as the plateau of Langres and the mountains of
Charolais, which have since furnished a passage to the Central Canal.
Lastly, to penetrate from Italy into Gaul, the great lines of invasion
were the valley of the Rhone and the valley of the Garonne, by which the
mountainous mass of the Cévennes, Auvergne, and Forez is turned.
Gaul presented the same contrast of climates which we observe between
the north and south of France. While the Roman province enjoyed a mild
temperature and an extreme fertility,[43] the central and northern part
was covered with vast forests, which rendered the climate colder than it
is at present;[44] yet the centre produced in abundance wheat, rye,
millet, and barley.[45] The greatest of all these forests was that of
the Ardennes. It extended, beginning from the Rhine, over a space of two
hundred miles, on one side to the frontier of the Remi, crossing the
country of the Treviri; and, on another side, to the Scheldt, across the
country of the Nervii.[46] The “Commentaries” speak also of forests
existing among the Carnutes,[47] in the neighbourhood of the Saône,[48]
among the Menapii[49] and the Morini,[50] and among the Eburones.[51] In
the north the breeding of cattle was the principal occupation,[52] and
the pastures of Belgic Gaul produced a race of excellent horses.[53] In
the centre and in the south the richness of the soil was augmented by
productive mines of gold, silver, copper, iron, and lead.[54]
The country was, without any doubt, intersected by carriage roads, since
the Gauls possessed a great number of all sorts of wagons,[55] since
there still remain traces of Celtic roads, and since Cæsar makes known
the existence of bridges on the Aisne,[56] the Rhone,[57] the Loire,[58]
the Allier,[59] and the Seine.[60]
It is difficult to ascertain exactly the number of the population; yet
we may presume, from the contingents furnished by the different states,
that it amounted to more than seven millions of souls.[61]
[Sidenote: Political Divisions.]
II. Gaul, according to Cæsar, was divided into three great regions,
distinct by language, manners, and laws: to the north, Belgic Gaul,
between the Seine, the Marne, and the Rhine; in the centre, Celtic Gaul,
between the Garonne and the Seine, extending from the ocean to the Alps,
and comprising Helvetia; to the south, Aquitaine, between the Garonne
and the Pyrenees.[62] (_See Plate 2._) We must, nevertheless, comprise
in Gaul the Roman province, or the Narbonnese, which began at Geneva, on
the left bank of the Rhone, and extended in the south as far as
Toulouse. It answered, as nearly as possible, to the limits of the
countries known in modern times as Savoy, Dauphiné, Provence, Lower
Languedoc, and Roussillon. The populations who inhabited it were of
different origins: there were found there Aquitanians, Belgæ, Ligures,
Celts, who had all long undergone the influence of Greek civilisation,
and especially establishments founded by the Phocæans on the coasts of
the Mediterranean.[63]
These three great regions were subdivided into many states, called
_civitates_--an expression which, in the “Commentaries,” is synonymous
with _nations_[64]--that is, each of these states had its organisation
and its own government. Among the peoples mentioned by Cæsar, we may
reckon twenty-seven in Belgic Gaul, forty-three in Celtic, and twelve in
Aquitaine: in all, eighty-two in Gaul proper, and seven in the
Narbonnese. Other authors, admitting, no doubt, smaller subdivisions,
carry this number to three or four hundred;[65] but it appears that
under Tiberius there were only sixty-four states in Gaul.[66] Perhaps,
in this number, they reckoned only the sovereign, and not the dependent,
states.
1. _Belgic Gaul._ The Belgæ were considered more warlike than the other
Gauls,[67] because, strangers to the civilisation of the Roman province
and hostile to commerce, they had not experienced the effeminating
influence of luxury. Proud of having escaped the Gaulish enervation,
they claimed with arrogance an origin which united them with the Germans
their neighbours, with whom, nevertheless, they were continually at
war.[68] They boasted of having defended their territory against the
Cimbri and the Teutones, at the time of the invasion of Gaul. The memory
of the lofty deeds of their ancestors inspired them with a great
confidence in themselves, and excited their warlike spirit.[69]
The most powerful nations among the Belgæ were the Bellovaci,[70] who
could arm a hundred thousand men, and whose territory extended to the
sea,[71] the Nervii, the Remi, and the Treviri.
2. _Celtic Gaul._[72] The central part of Gaul, designated by the Greek
writers under the name of _Celtica_, and the inhabitants of which
constituted in the eyes of the Romans the Gauls properly so named
(_Galli_), was the most extensive and most populous. Among the most
important nations of Celtic Gaul were reckoned the Arverni, the Ædui,
the Sequani, and the Helvetii. Tacitus informs us that the Helvetii had
once occupied a part of Germany.[73]
These three first peoples often disputed the supremacy of Gaul. As to
the Helvetii, proud of their independence, they acknowledged no
authority superior to their own. In the centre and south of Celtic Gaul
dwelt peoples who had also a certain importance. On the west and
north-west were various maritime populations designated under the
generic name of _Armoricans_, an epithet which had, in the Celtic
tongue, the meaning of maritime. Small Alpine tribes inhabited the
valleys of the upper course of the Rhone, at the eastern extremity of
Lake Lémon, a country which now forms the Valais.
3. _Aquitaine._[74] Aquitaine commenced on the left bank of the
Garonne: it was inhabited by several small tribes, and contained none of
those agglomerations which were found among the Celts and the Belgæ. The
Aquitanians, who had originally occupied a vast territory to the north
of the Pyrenees, having been pushed backward by the Celts, had but a
rather limited portion of it in the time of Cæsar.
The three regions which composed Gaul were not only, as already stated,
divided into a great number of states, but each state (_civitas_) was
farther subdivided into _pagi_,[75] representing, perhaps, the same
thing as the tribe among the Arabs. The proof of the distinct character
of these agglomerations is found in the fact that in the army each of
them had its separate place, under the command of its own chieftains.
The smallest subdivision was called _vicus_.[76] Such, at least, are the
denominations employed in the “Commentaries,” but which were certainly
not those of the Celtic language. In each state there existed principal
towns, called indifferently by Cæsar _urbs_ or _oppidum_;[77] yet this
last name was given by preference to considerable towns, difficult of
access and carefully fortified, placed on heights or surrounded by
marshes.[78] It was to these _oppida_ that, in case of attack, the Gauls
transported their grain, their provisions, and their riches.[79] Their
habitations, established often in the forests or on the bank of a river,
were constructed of wood, and tolerably spacious.[80]
[Sidenote: Manners.]
III. The Gauls were tall in stature, their skin was white, their eyes
blue, their hair fair or chestnut, which they dyed, in order to make the
colour more brilliant.[81] They let their beard grow; the nobles alone
shaved, and preserved long moustaches.[82] Trousers or breeches, very
wide among the Belgæ, but narrower among the southern Gauls, and a
shirt with sleeves, descending to the middle of the thighs, composed
their principal dress.[83] They were clothed with a mantle or
_saie_,[84] magnificently embroidered with gold or silver among the
rich,[85] and held about the neck by means of a metal brooch. The lowest
classes of the people used instead an animal’s skin. The Aquitanians
covered themselves, probably according to the Iberic custom, with cloth
of coarse wool unshorn.[86]
The Gauls wore collars, earrings, bracelets, and rings for the arms, of
gold or copper, according to their rank; necklaces of amber, and rings,
which they placed on the third finger.[87]
They were naturally agriculturists, and we may suppose that the
institution of private property existed among them, because, on the one
hand, all the citizens paid the tax, except the Druids,[88] and, on the
other, the latter were judges of questions of boundaries.[89] They were
not unacquainted with certain manufactures. In some countries they
fabricated serges, which were in great repute, and cloths or felts;[90]
in others they worked the mines with skill, and employed themselves in
the fabrication of metals. The Bituriges worked in iron, and were
acquainted with the art of tinning.[91] The artificers of Alesia plated
copper with leaf-silver, to ornament horses’ bits and trappings.[92]
The Gauls fed especially on the flesh of swine, and their ordinary
drinks were milk, ale, and mead.[93] They were reproached with being
inclined to drunkenness.[94]
They were frank and open in temper, and hospitable toward strangers,[95]
but vain and quarrelsome;[96] fickle in their sentiments, and fond of
novelties, they took sudden resolutions, regretting one day what they
had rejected with disdain the day before;[97] inclined to war and eager
for adventures, they showed themselves hot in the attack, but quickly
discouraged in defeat.[98] Their language was very concise and
figurative;[99] in writing, they employed Greek letters.
The men were not exempt from a shameful vice, which we might have
believed less common in this county than among the peoples of the
East.[100] The women united an extraordinary beauty with remarkable
courage and great physical force.[101]
The Gauls, according to the tradition preserved by the Druids, boasted
of being descended from the god of the earth, or from Pluto (_Dis_),
according to the expression of Cæsar.[102] It was for this reason that
they took night for their starting-point in all their divisions of time.
Among their other customs, they had one which was singular: they
considered it as a thing unbecoming to appear in public with their
children, until the latter had reached the age for carrying arms.[103]
When he married, the man took from his fortune a part equal to the dowry
of the wife. This sum, placed as a common fund, was allowed to
accumulate with interest, and the whole reverted to the survivor. The
husband had the right of life and death over his wife and children.[104]
When the decease of a man of wealth excited any suspicion, his wives, as
well as his slaves, were put to the torture, and burnt if they were
found guilty.
The extravagance of their funerals presented a contrast to the
simplicity of their life. All that the defunct had cherished during his
life, was thrown into the flames after his death; and even, before the
Roman conquest, they joined with it his favourite slaves and
clients.[105]
In the time of Cæsar, the greater part of the peoples of Gaul were armed
with long iron swords, two-edged (σπἁθη), sheathed in
scabbards similarly of iron, suspended to the side by chains. These
swords were generally made to strike with the edge rather than to
stab.[106] The Gauls had also spears, the iron of which, very long and
very broad, presented sometimes an undulated form (_materis_,
σαὑνιον).[107] They also made use of light javelins without
_amentum_,[108] of the bow, and of the sling. Their helmets were of
metal, more or less precious, ornamented with the horns of animals, and
with a crest representing some figures of birds or savage beasts, the
whole surmounted by a high and bushy tuft of feathers.[109] They carried
a great buckler, a breastplate of iron or bronze, or a coat of mail--the
latter a Gaulish invention.[110] The Leuci and the Remi were celebrated
for throwing the javelin.[111] The Lingones had party-coloured
breastplates.[112] The Gaulish cavalry was superior to the
infantry;[113] it was composed of the nobles, followed by their
clients;[114] yet the Aquitanians, celebrated for their agility, enjoyed
a certain reputation as good infantry.[115] In general, the Gauls were
very ready at imitating the tactics of their enemies.[116] The habit of
working mines gave them a remarkable dexterity in all underground
operations, applicable to the attack and defence of fortified
posts.[117] Their armies dragged after them a multitude of wagons and
baggage, even in the less important expeditions.[118]
Although they had reached, especially in the south of Gaul, a tolerably
advanced degree of civilisation, they preserved very barbarous customs:
they killed their prisoners. “When their army is ranged in battle,” says
Diodorus, “some of them are often seen advancing from the ranks to
challenge the bravest of their enemies to single combat. If their
challenge is accepted, they chaunt a war-song, in which they boast of
the great deeds of their forefathers, exalting their own valour and
insulting their adversary. After the victory, they cut off their enemy’s
head, hang it to their horse’s neck, and carry it off with songs of
triumph. They keep these hideous trophies in their house, and the
highest nobles preserve them with great care, bathed with oil of cedar,
in coffers, which they show with pride to their guests.”[119]
When a great danger threatened the country, the chiefs convoked an armed
council, to which the men were bound to repair, at the place and day
indicated, to deliberate. The law required that the man who arrived last
should be massacred without pity before the eyes of the assembly. As a
means of intercommunication, men were placed at certain intervals
through the country, and these, repeating the cry from one to another,
transmitted rapidly news of importance to great distances. They often,
also, stopped travellers on the roads, and compelled them to answer
their questions.[120]
The Gauls were very superstitious.[121] Persuaded that in the eyes of
the gods the life of a man can only be redeemed by that of his fellow,
they made a vow, in diseases and dangers, to immolate human beings by
the ministry of the Druids. These sacrifices had even a public
character.[122] They sometimes constructed human figures of osier of
colossal magnitude, which they filled with living men; to these they set
fire, and the victims perished in the flames. These victims were
generally taken from among the criminals, as being more agreeable to
the gods; but if there were no criminals to be had, the innocent
themselves were sacrificed.
Cæsar, who, according to the custom of his countrymen, gave to the
divinities of foreign peoples the names of those of Rome, tells us that
the Gauls honoured Mercury above all others. They raised statues to him,
regarded him as the inventor of the arts, the guide of travellers, and
the protector of commerce.[123] They also offered worship to divinities
which the “Commentaries” assimilate to Apollo, Mars, Jupiter, and
Minerva, without informing us of their Celtic names. From Lucan,[124] we
learn the names of three Gaulish divinities, Teutates (in whom, no
doubt, we must recognise the Mercury of the “Commentaries”), Hesus or
Esus, and Taranis. Cæsar makes the remark that the Gauls had pretty much
the same ideas with regard to their gods as other nations. Apollo cured
the sick, Minerva taught the elements of the arts, Jupiter was the
master of heaven, Mars the arbiter of war. Often, before fighting, they
made a vow to consecrate to this god the spoils of the enemy, and, after
the victory, they put to death all their prisoners. The rest of the
booty was piled up in the consecrated places, and nobody would be so
impious as to take anything away from it. The Gauls rendered also, as we
learn from inscriptions and passages in different authors, worship to
rivers, fountains, trees, and forests: they adored the Rhine as a god,
and made a goddess of the Ardenne.[125]
[Sidenote: Institutions]
IV. There were in Gaul, says Cæsar, only two classes who enjoyed public
consideration and honours,[126] the Druids and the knights. As to the
people, deprived of all rights, oppressed with debts, crushed with
taxes, exposed to the violences of the great, their condition was little
better than that of slaves. The Druids, ministers of religion, presided
over the sacrifices, and preserved the deposit of religious doctrines.
The youth, greedy of instruction, pressed around them. The dispensers of
rewards and punishments, they were the judges of almost all disputes,
public or private. To private individuals, or even to magistrates, who
rebelled against their decisions, they interdicted the sacrifices, a
sort of excommunication which sequestrated from society those who were
struck by it, placed them in the rank of criminals, removed them from
all honours, and deprived them even of the protection of the law. The
Druids had a single head, and the power of this head was absolute. At
his death, the next in dignity succeeded him; if there were several with
equal titles, these priests had recourse to election, and sometimes even
to a decision by force of arms. They assembled every year in the country
of the Carnutes, in a consecrated place, there to judge disputes. Their
doctrine, it was said, came from the isle of Britain, where, in the time
of Cæsar, they still went to draw it as at its source.[127]
The Druids were exempt from military service and from taxes.[128] These
privileges drew many disciples, whose novitiate, which lasted sometimes
twenty years, consisted in learning by heart a great number of verses
containing their religious precepts. It was forbidden to transcribe
them. This custom had the double object of preventing the divulgation of
their doctrine and of exercising the memory. Their principal dogma was
the immortality of the soul and its transmigration into other bodies. A
belief which banished the fear of death appeared to them fitted to
excite courage. They explained also the movement of the planets, the
greatness of the universe, the laws of nature, and the omnipotence of
the immortal gods. “We may conceive,” says the eminent author of the
_Histoire des Gaulois_, “what despotism must have been exercised over a
superstitious nation by this caste of men, depositaries of all
knowledge, authors and interpreters of all law, divine or human,
remunerators, judges, and executioners.”[129]
The knights, when required by the necessities of war, and that happened
almost yearly, were all bound to take up arms. Each, according to his
birth and fortune, was accompanied by a greater or less number of
attendants or clients. Those who were called _ambacti_[130] performed in
war the part of esquires.[131] In Aquitaine, these followers were named
_soldures_; they shared the good as well as the evil fortune of the
chief to whom they were attached, and, when he died, not one of them
would survive him. Their number was considerable: we shall see a king of
the Sotiates possess no less than six hundred of them.[132]
The states were governed either by an assembly, which the Romans called
a senate, or by a supreme magistrate, annual or for life, bearing the
title of king,[133] prince,[134] or _vergobret_.[135]
The different tribes formed alliances among themselves, either permanent
or occasional; the permanent alliances were founded, some on a community
of territorial interests,[136] others on affinities of races,[137] or on
treaties,[138] or, lastly, on the right of patronage.[139] The
occasional alliances were the results of the necessity of union against
a common danger.[140]
In Gaul, not only each state and each tribe (_pagus_), but even each
family, was divided into two parties (_factiones_); at the head of these
parties were chiefs, taken from among the most considerable and
influential of the knights. Cæsar calls them _principes_.[141] All those
who accepted their supremacy became their clients; and, although the
_principes_ did not exercise a regular magistracy, their authority was
very extensive. This organisation had existed from a remote antiquity;
its object was to offer to each man of the people a protection against
the great, since each was thus placed under the patronage of a chief,
whose duty it was to take his cause in hand, and who would have lost all
credit if he had allowed one of his clients to be oppressed.[142] We see
in the “Commentaries” that this class of the _principes_ enjoyed very
great influence. On their decisions depended all important
resolutions;[143] and their meeting formed the assembly of the whole of
Gaul (_concilium totius Galliæ_).[144] In it everything was decided by
majority of votes.[145]
Affairs of the state were allowed to be treated only in these
assemblies. It appertained to the magistrates alone to publish or
conceal events, according as they judged expedient; and it was a sacred
duty for any one who learnt, either from without or from public rumour,
any news which concerned the _civitas_, to give information of it to the
magistrate, without revealing it to any other person. This measure had
for its object to prevent rash or ignorant men from being led into error
by false reports, and from rushing, under this first impression, into
extravagant resolutions.
In the same manner as each state was divided into two rival factions, so
was the whole of Gaul (with the exception of Belgic Gaul and Helvetia)
divided into two great parties,[146] which exercised over the others a
sort of sovereignty (_principatus_);[147] and when, in extraordinary
circumstances, the whole of Gaul acknowledged the pre-eminence of one
particular state, the chief of the privileged state took the name of
_princeps totius Galliæ_, as had been the case with the Arvernan
Celtillus, the father of Vercingetorix.[148]
This supremacy, nevertheless, was not permanent; it passed from one
nation to another, and was the object of continual ambitions and
sanguinary conflicts. The Druids, it is true, had succeeded in
establishing a religious centre, but there existed no political centre.
In spite of certain federative ties, each state had been more engaged in
the consideration of its own individuality than in that of the country
in general. This egoistic carelessness of their collective interests,
this jealous rivality among the different tribes, paralysed the efforts
of a few eminent men who were desirous of founding a nationality, and
the Gauls soon furnished the enemy with an easy means of dividing and
combating them. The Emperor Napoleon I. was thus right in saying: “The
principal cause of the weakness of Gaul was the spirit of isolation and
locality which characterised the population; at this epoch the Gauls had
no national spirit or even provincial spirit; they were governed by a
spirit of town. It is the same spirit which has since forged chains for
Italy. Nothing is more opposed to national spirit, to general ideas of
liberty, than the particular spirit of family or of town. From this
parcelling it resulted that the Gauls had no army of the line kept up
and exercised; and therefore no art and no military science. Every
nation which should lose sight of the importance of an army of the line
perpetually on foot, and which should trust to levies or national
armies, would experience the fate of the Gauls, without even having the
glory of opposing the same resistance, which was the effect of the
barbarism of the time and of the ground, covered with forests, marshes,
and bogs, and without roads, which rendered it difficult to conquer and
easy to defend.”[149] Before Cæsar came into Gaul, the Ædui and the
Arverni were at the head of the two contending parties, each labouring
to carry the day against his rival. Soon these latter united with the
Sequani, who, jealous of the superiority of the Ædui, the allies of the
Roman people, invoked the support of Ariovistus and the Germans. By dint
of sacrifices and promises, they had succeeded in bringing them into
their territory. With this aid the Sequani had gained the victory in
several combats.[150] The Ædui had lost their nobility, a part of their
territory, nearly all their clients, and, after giving up as hostages
their children and their chiefs, they had bound themselves by oath never
to attack the Sequani, who had at length obtained the supremacy of all
Gaul. It was under these circumstances that Divitiacus had gone to Rome
to implore the succour of the Republic, but he had failed;[151] the
Senate was too much engaged with intestine quarrels to assume an
energetic attitude towards the Germans. The arrival of Cæsar was
destined to change the face of things, and restore to the allies of Rome
their old preponderance.[152]
CHAPTER III.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII.
(Year of Rome 696.)
(BOOK I. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
[Sidenote: Projects of Invasion by the Helvetii.]
I. Cæsar, as we have seen, had received from the Senate and people a
command which comprised the two Gauls (Transalpine and Cisalpine) and
Illyria.[153] Yet the agitation which continued to reign in the Republic
was retaining him at the gates of Rome, when suddenly, towards the
spring of 696, news came that the Helvetii, returning to their old
design, were preparing to invade the Roman province. This intelligence
caused a great sensation.
The Helvetii, proud of their former exploits, confident in their
strength, and incommoded by excess of population, felt humiliated at
living in a country the limits of which had been made narrow by nature,
and for some years they meditated quitting it to repair into the south
of Gaul.
As early as 693, an ambitious chieftain, Orgetorix, found no difficulty
in inspiring them with the desire to seek elsewhere a more fertile
territory and a milder climate. They resolved to go and establish
themselves in the country of the Santones (the _Saintonge_), situated on
the shores of the ocean, to the north of the Gironde. Two years were to
be employed in preparations, and, by a solemn engagement, the departure
was fixed for the third year. But Orgetorix, sent to the neighbouring
peoples to contract alliances, conspired with two influential
personages--one of the country of the Sequani, the other of that of the
Ædui. He induced them to undertake to seize the supreme power, promised
them the assistance of the Helvetii, and persuaded them that those three
powerful nations, leagued together, would easily subjugate the whole of
Gaul. This conspiracy failed, through the death of Orgetorix, accused in
his own country of a design to usurp the sovereignty. The Helvetii
persisted, nevertheless, in their project of emigration. They collected
the greatest possible number of wagons and beasts of burden; and, in
order to destroy all idea of returning, they burnt their twelve towns,
their four hundred hamlets, and all the wheat they could not carry with
them. Each furnished himself with meal[154] for three months; and after
persuading their neighbours, the Rauraci,[155] the Tulingi, and the
Latobriges,[156] to imitate their example and follow them, and having
drawn to them those of the Boii who had moved from Noricum to the
neighbourhood of the Rhine, they fixed the rendezvous on the banks of
the Rhone for the 5th of the Calends of April (the 24th of March, the
day of the equinox).[157]
There were only two roads by which they could leave Helvetia; one
crossed the country of the Sequani, the entrance to which was defended
by a narrow and difficult defile, situated between the Rhone and the
Jura (the _Pas-de-l’Ecluse_), and where the wagons could with difficulty
pass one at a time. As this defile was commanded by a very lofty
mountain, a handful of men was sufficient to prevent the access. The
other road, less contracted and more easy, crossed the Roman province,
after having passed the Rhone, which separated the Allobroges from the
Helvetii, from Lake Léman to the Jura. Within this distance the river
was fordable in several places.[158] At Geneva, the extreme limit of the
territory of the Allobroges towards Helvetia, a bridge established a
communication between the two countries. The Helvetii decided on taking
the most convenient road; they reckoned, moreover, on the co-operation
of this neighbouring people, who, but recently subjugated, could have
but doubtful sympathies for the Romans.[159]
[Sidenote: Cæsar’s Arrival at Geneva.]
II. Cæsar, learning that the Helvetii intended to pass through the Roman
province, left Rome hastily in the month of March, hurried by forced
marches into Transalpine Gaul, and, according to Plutarch, reached
Geneva in eight days.[160] As he had in the province only a single
legion, he ordered a levy of as many men as possible, and then destroyed
the bridge of Geneva. Informed of his arrival, the Helvetii, who were
probably not yet all assembled, sent their men of noblest rank to demand
a passage through the country of the Allobroges, promising to commit no
injury there; they had, they said, no other road to quit their country.
Cæsar was inclined to refuse their demand at once, but he called to mind
the defeat and death of the Consul L. Cassius; and wishing to obtain
time to collect the troops of which he had ordered the levy, he gave
them hopes of a favourable reply, and adjourned it to the Ides of April
(8th of April). By this delay he gained a fortnight; it was employed in
fortifying the left bank of the Rhone, between Lake Léman and the
Jura.[161] If we estimate at 5,000 men the legion which was in the
province, and at 5,000 or 6,000 the number of soldiers of the new
levies, we see that Cæsar had at his disposal, to defend the banks of
the Rhone, about 10,000 or 11,000 infantry.[162]
[Sidenote: Description of the Retrenchment of the Rhone.]
III. The distance from Lake Léman to the Jura, following the
sinuosities of the river, is 29½ kilomètres, or 19,000 Roman paces
(_millia passuum decem novem_).[163] It is on the space comprised
between these two points that a retrenchment was raised which is called
in the “Commentaries” _murus fossaque_. This could not be a continuous
work, as the ground to be defended is intersected by rivers and ravines,
and the banks of the Rhone are almost everywhere so precipitous that it
would have been useless to fortify them. Cæsar, pressed for time, can
only have made retrenchments on the weakest points of the line where the
passage of the river was easy; indeed, this is what Dio Cassius tells
us.[164] The labours of the Romans were only supplementary, on certain
points, to the formidable natural obstacles which the Rhone presents in
the greater part of its course. The only places where an attempt could
be made to pass it, because the heights there sink towards the banks of
the river into practicable declivities, are situated opposite the modern
villages of Russin, Cartigny, Avully, Chancy, and Cologny. In these
places they cut the upper part of the slope into a perpendicular, and
afterwards hollowed a trench, the scarp of which thus gained an
elevation of sixteen feet. These works, by uniting the escarpments of
the Rhone, formed, from Geneva to the Jura, a continuous line, which
presented an impassable barrier. Behind and along this line, at certain
distances, posts and closed redoubts rendered it impregnable. (_See
Plate 3._)[165]
This retrenchment, which required only from two to three days’ labour,
was completed when the deputies returned, at the time appointed, to hear
Cæsar’s reply. He flatly refused the passage, declaring that he would
oppose it with all his means.
Meanwhile the Helvetii, and the people who took part in their
enterprise, had assembled on the right bank of the Rhone. When they
learnt that they must renounce the hope of quitting their country
without opposition, they resolved to open themselves a passage by
force. Several times--sometimes by day, and sometimes by night--they
crossed the Rhone, some by fording, others with the aid of boats joined
together, or of a great number of rafts of timber, and attempted to
carry the heights, but, arrested by the strength of the retrenchment
(_operis munitione_), and by the efforts and missiles of the soldiers
who hastened to the threatened points (_concursu et telis_), they
abandoned the attack.[166]
[Sidenote: The Helvetii begin their March towards the Saône. Cæsar
unites his Troops.]
IV. The only road which now remained was that which lay across the
country of the Sequani (the Pas-de-l’Ecluse); but this narrow defile
could not be passed without the consent of its inhabitants. The Helvetii
charged the Æduan Dumnorix, the son-in-law of Orgetorix, to solicit it
for them. High in credit among the Sequani, Dumnorix obtained it; and
the two peoples entered into an engagement, one to leave the passage
free, the other to commit no disorder; and, as pledges of their
convention, they exchanged hostages.[167]
When Cæsar learned that the Helvetii were preparing to pass through the
lands of the Sequani and the Ædui on their way to the Santones, he
resolved to oppose them, unwilling to suffer the establishment of
warlike and hostile men in a fertile and open country, neighbouring upon
that of the Tolosates, which made part of the Roman province.[168]
But, as he had not at hand sufficient forces, he resolved on uniting all
the troops he could dispose of in his vast command. He entrusts,
therefore, the care of the retrenchments on the Rhone to his lieutenant
T. Labienus, hastens into Italy by forced marches, raises there in great
haste two legions (the 11th and 12th), brings from Aquileia, a town of
Illyria,[169] the three legions which were there in winter quarters (the
7th, 8th, and 9th), and, at the head of his army, takes across the Alps
(_see Plate 4_) the shortest road to Transalpine Gaul.[170] The
Centrones, the Graioceli, and the Caturiges (see _page_ 24, _note_),
posted on the heights,[171] attempt to bar his road; but he overthrows
them in several engagements, and from Ocelum (_Usseau_),[172] the
extreme point of the Cisalpine, reaches in seven days the territory of
the Vocontii, making thus about twenty-five kilomètres a day. He next
penetrates into the country of the Allobroges, then into that of the
Segusiavi, who bordered on the Roman province beyond the Rhone.[173]
These operations took two months;[174] the same time had been employed
by the Helvetii in negotiating the conditions of their passage through
the country of the Sequani, moving from the Rhone to the Saône, and
beginning to pass the latter river. They had passed the Pas-de-l’Ecluse,
followed the right bank of the Rhone as far as Culoz, then turned to the
east through Virieu-le-Grand, Tenay, and Saint-Rambert, and, thence
crossing the plains of Ambérieux, the river Ain, and the vast plateau of
the Dombes, they had arrived at the Saône, the left bank of which they
occupied from Trévoux to Villefranche. (_See Plate 4._) The slowness of
their march need not surprise us if we consider that an agglomeration of
368,000 individuals, men, women, and children, dragging after them from
8,000 to 9,000 wagons, through a defile where carriages could only pass
one abreast, would necessarily employ several weeks in passing it.[175]
Cæsar, no doubt, calculated beforehand, with sufficient accuracy, the
time it would take them to gain the banks of the Saône; and we may
therefore suppose that, at the moment when he repaired into Italy, he
hoped to bring thence his army in time to prevent them from passing that
river.
He established his camp near the confluence of the Rhone and the Saône,
on the heights which command Sathonay; thence he could equally
manœuvre on the two banks of the Saône, take the Helvetii in flank as
they marched towards that river, or prevent them, if they crossed it,
from entering into the Roman province by the valley of the Rhone. It was
probably at this point that Labienus joined him with the troops which
had been left with him, and which raised to six the number of his
legions. His cavalry, composed principally of Ædui and men raised in the
Roman province, amounted to 4,000 men. During this time the Helvetii
were ravaging the lands of the Ambarri, those of the Ædui, and those
which the Allobroges possessed on the right bank of the Rhone. These
peoples implored the succour of Cæsar. He was quite disposed to listen
to their prayers.[176]
[Sidenote: Defeat of the Helvetii on the Saône.]
V. The Saône, which crossed the countries of the Ædui and the
Sequani,[177] flowed, then as now, in certain places with an extreme
sluggishness. Cæsar says that people could not distinguish the direction
of the current. The Helvetii, who had not learned to make bridges,
crossed the river, between Trévoux and Villefranche, on rafts and boats
joined together. As soon as the Roman general had ascertained by his
scouts that three-quarters of the barbarians were on the other side of
the river, and the others were still on his side, he left his camp
towards midnight (_de tertia vigilia_) (_see note 1 on page 69_) with
three legions, came upon those of the Helvetii who were still on the
left bank, to the north of Trévoux, in the valley of the Formans,
towards six o’clock in the morning, after a march of eighteen
kilomètres, attacked them by surprise in the midst of the confusion of
passing the river, and slew a great number. Those who could escape
dispersed, and concealed themselves in the neighbouring forests. This
disaster fell upon the Tigurini (_the inhabitants of the Cantons of
Vaud, Friburg, and a part of the Canton of Berne_), one of the four
tribes of which the nation of the Helvetii was composed, the same which,
in an expedition out of Helvetia, had formerly slain the Consul L.
Cassius, and made his army pass under the yoke.[178]
After this combat, Cæsar, in order to pursue the other part of the
enemy’s army, and prevent its marching towards the south, threw a bridge
across the Saône, and transported his troops to the right bank. The
barques which followed him for the conveyance of provisions would
necessarily facilitate this operation. It is probable that a detachment
established in the defiles on the right bank of the Saône, at the spot
where Lyons now stands, intercepted the road which would have conducted
the Helvetii towards the Roman province. As to the three legions which
remained in the camp of Sathonay, they soon rejoined Cæsar. The
Helvetii, struck by his sudden approach, and by the rapidity with which
he had effected, in one single day, a passage which had cost them twenty
days’ labour, sent him a deputation, the chief of which, old Divico, had
commanded in the wars against Cassius. In language full of boast and
threatening, Divico reminded Cæsar of the humiliation inflicted formerly
on the Roman arms. The proconsul replied that he was not forgetful of
old affronts, but that recent injuries were sufficient motives for his
conduct. Nevertheless, he offered peace, on condition that they should
give him hostages. “The Helvetii,” replied Divico, “have learned from
their ancestors to receive, but not to give, hostages; the Romans ought
to know that.” This proud reply closed the interview.
Nevertheless, the Helvetii appear to have been desirous of avoiding
battle, for next day they raised their camp, and, cut off from the
possibility of following the course of the Saône to proceed towards the
south, they took the easiest way to reach the country of the Santones,
by directing their march towards the sources of the Dheune and the
Bourbince. (_See Plate 4._) This broken country, moreover, permitted
them to resist the Romans with advantage. They followed across the
mountains of Charolais the Gaulish road, on the trace of which was, no
doubt, subsequently constructed the Roman way from Lyons to Autun,
vestiges of which still exist; the latter followed the course of the
Saône as far as Belleville, where it parted from it abruptly, crossing
over the Col d’Avenas, proceeding through the valley of the Grosne to
Cluny, and continuing by Saint-Vallier to Autun. At Saint-Vallier they
would quit this road, and march towards the Loire to pass it at
Decize.[179]
Cæsar followed the Helvetii, and sent before him all his cavalry to
watch their march. These, too eager in the pursuit, came to blows with
the enemy’s cavalry in a position of disadvantage, and experienced some
loss. Proud of having repulsed 4,000 men with 500 horsemen, the Helvetii
became sufficiently emboldened to venture sometimes to harass the Roman
army. But Cæsar avoided engaging his troops; he was satisfied with
following, day by day, the enemies at a distance of five or six miles at
most (about eight kilomètres), opposing the devastations they committed
on their passage, and waiting a favourable occasion to inflict a defeat
upon them.
The two armies continued their march extremely slowly, and the days
passed without offering the desired opportunity. Meanwhile, the
provisionment of the Roman army began to inspire serious uneasiness;
wheat arrived no longer by the Saône, for Cæsar had been obliged to move
from it in order to keep up with the Helvetii. On another hand, the Ædui
delayed, under vain pretexts, sending the grain which they had promised.
The harvest, too, was not yet ripe, and even forage failed. As the day
for distribution approached, Cæsar convoked the Æduan chiefs, who were
numerous in his camp, and overwhelmed them with reproaches. One of them,
Liscus, occupied in his country the supreme magistracy, under the name
of _vergobret_; he denounced Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, as
opposing the sending of provisions; it was the same Dumnorix who had
heretofore secretly negotiated the passage of the Helvetii across the
country of the Sequani, and who, placed at the head of the Æduan
contingent, had, in the last combat, by retreating with his men, led to
the flight of the whole body of the cavalry. Cæsar sent for Divitiacus,
a man devoted to the Roman people, and revealed to him the culpable
conduct of his brother, which merited an exemplary punishment.
Divitiacus expressed the same opinion, but, in tears, implored the
pardon of Dumnorix. Cæsar granted it to him, and contented himself with
placing him under surveillance. It was, indeed, good policy not to
alienate the Æduan people by any excessive severity against a man of
power among them.
The Helvetii, after advancing northward as far as Saint-Vallier, had
turned to the west to reach the valley of the Loire. Arrived near
Issy-l’Evêque, they encamped on the banks of a tributary of the Somme,
at the foot of Mount Tauffrin, eight miles from the Roman army. Informed
of this circumstance, Cæsar judged that the moment had arrived for
attacking them by surprise, and sent to reconnoitre by what circuits the
heights might be reached. He learnt that the access was easy, and
ordered Labienus to gain, with two legions, the summit of the mountain
by bye-roads, without giving alarm to the enemy, and to wait till he
himself, marching at the head of the four other legions, by the same
road as the Helvetii, should appear near their camp; then both were to
attack them at the same time. Labienus started at midnight, taking for
guides the men who had just explored the roads. Cæsar, on his part,
began his march at two o’clock in the morning (_de quarta
vigilia_),[180] preceded by his cavalry. At the head of his scouts was
P. Considius, whose former services under L. Sylla, and subsequently
under M. Crassus, pointed him out as an experienced soldier.
At break of day Labienus occupied the heights, and Cæsar was no more
than 1,500 paces from the camp of the barbarians; the latter suspected
neither his approach nor that of his lieutenant. Suddenly Considius
arrived at full gallop to announce that the mountain of which Labienus
was to take possession was in the power of the Helvetii; he had
recognised them, he said, by their arms and their military ensigns. At
this news, Cæsar, fearing that he was not in sufficient force against
their whole army, with only four legions, chose a strong position on a
neighbouring hill, and drew up his men in order of battle. Labienus,
whose orders were not to engage in battle till he saw the troops of
Cæsar near the enemy’s camp, remained immovable, watching for him. It
was broad daylight when Cæsar learnt that his troops had made themselves
masters of the mountain, and that the Helvetii had left their camp. They
escaped him thus, through the false report of Considius, who had been
blinded by a groundless terror.
Admitting that the Helvetii had passed near Issy-l’Evêque, Mount
Tauffrin, which rises at a distance of four kilomètres to the west of
that village, answers to the conditions of the text. There is nothing to
contradict the notion that Labienus and Cæsar may have, one occupied the
summit, the other approached the enemy’s camp within 1,500 paces,
without being perceived; and the neighbouring ground presents heights
which permitted the Roman army to form in order of battle.[181]
[Sidenote: Defeat of the Helvetii near Bibracte.]
VI. That day the Helvetii continued their advance to Remilly, on the
Alène. Since the passage of the Saône, they had marched about a
fortnight, making an average of not more than eleven or twelve
kilomètres a day.[182] According to our reckoning, it must have been the
end of the month of June. Cæsar followed the Helvetii at the usual
distance, and established his camp at three miles’ distance from theirs,
on the Cressonne, near Ternant.
Next day, as the Roman army had provisions left for no more than two
days,[183] and as, moreover, Bibracte (_Mont Beuvray_),[184] the
greatest and richest town of the Ædui, was not more than eighteen miles
(twenty-seven kilomètres) distant, Cæsar, to provision his army, turned
from the road which the Helvetii were following, and took that to
Bibracte. (_See Plate 4._) The enemy was informed of this circumstance
by some deserters from the troop of L. Emilius, decurion[185] of the
auxiliary cavalry. Believing that the Romans were going from them
through fear, and hoping to cut them off from their provisions, they
turned back, and began to harass the rear-guard.
Cæsar immediately led his troops to a neighbouring hill--that which
rises between the two villages called the Grand-Marié and the
Petit-Marié (_see Plate 5_)--and sent his cavalry to impede the enemies
in their march, which gave him the time to form in order of battle. He
ranged, half way up the slope of the hill, his four legions of veterans,
in three lines, and the two legions raised in the Cisalpine on the
plateau above, along with the auxiliaries, so that his infantry covered
the whole height. The heavy baggage, and the bundles (_sarcinæ_)[186]
with which the soldiers were loaded, were collected on one point, which
was defended by the troops of the reserve. While Cæsar was making these
dispositions, the Helvetii, who came followed by all their wagons,
collected them in one place; they then, in close order, drove back the
cavalry, formed in phalanxes, and, making their way up the slope of the
hill occupied by the Roman infantry, advanced against the first
line.[187]
Cæsar, to make the danger equal, and to deprive all of the possibility
of flight, sends away the horses of all the chiefs, and even his
own,[188] harangues his troops, and gives the signal for combat. The
Romans, from their elevated position, hurl the _pilum_,[189] break the
enemy’s phalanxes, and rush upon them sword in hand. The engagement
becomes general. The Helvetii soon become embarrassed in their
movements: their bucklers, pierced and nailed together by the same
_pilum_, the head of which, bending back, can no longer be withdrawn,
deprive them of the use of their left arm; most of them, after having
long agitated their arms in vain, throw down their bucklers, and fight
without them. At last, covered with wounds, they give way, and retire to
the mountain of the castle of La Garde, at a distance of about 1,000
paces; but while they are pursued, the Boii and the Tulingi, who, to the
number of about 15,000, formed the last of the hostile columns, and
composed the rear-guard, rush upon the Romans, and without halting
attack their right flank.[190] The Helvetii, who had taken refuge on the
height, perceive this movement, return to the charge, and renew the
combat. Cæsar, to meet these two attacks, effects a change of front
(_conversa signa bipartito intulerunt_) in his third line, and opposes
it to the new assailants, while the first two lines resist the Helvetii
who had already been repulsed.[191]
This double combat was long and furious. Unable to resist the
impetuosity of their adversaries, the Helvetii were obliged to retire,
as they had done before, to the mountain of the castle of La Garde; the
Boii and Tulingi towards the baggage and wagons. Such was the
intrepidity of these Gauls during the whole action, which lasted from
one o’clock in the afternoon till evening, that not one turned his back.
Far into the night there was still fighting about the baggage. The
barbarians, having made a rampart of their wagons, some threw from
above their missiles on the Romans; others, placed between the wheels,
wounded them with long pikes (_mataræ ac tragulæ_). The women and
children, too, shared desperately in the combat.[192] At the end of an
obstinate struggle, the camp and baggage were taken. The daughter and
one of the sons of Orgetorix were made prisoners.
This battle reduced the Gaulish emigration to 130,000 individuals. They
began their retreat that same evening, and, after marching without
interruption day and night, they reached on the fourth day the territory
of the Lingones, towards Tonnerre (_see Plate 4_): they had, no doubt,
passed by Moulins-en-Gilbert, Lormes, and Avallon. The Lingones were
forbidden to furnish the fugitives with provisions or succour, under
pain of being treated like them. At the end of three days, the Roman
army, having taken care of their wounded and buried the dead, marched in
pursuit of the enemy.[193]
[Sidenote: Pursuit of the Helvetii.]
VII. The Helvetii, reduced to extremity, sent to Cæsar to treat for
their submission. The deputies met him on his march, threw themselves at
his feet, and demanded peace in the most suppliant terms. He ordered
them to say to their fellow-countrymen that they must halt on the spot
they then occupied, and await his arrival; and they obeyed. As soon as
Cæsar overtook them, he required them to deliver hostages, their arms,
and the fugitive slaves. While they were preparing to execute his
orders, night coming on, about 6,000 men of a tribe named Verbigeni
(_Soleure, Argovie, Lucerne, and part of the Canton of Berne_) fled,
either through fear that, having once delivered up their arms, they
should be massacred, or in the hope of escaping unperceived in the midst
of so great a multitude. They directed their steps towards the Rhine and
the frontiers of Germany.
On receiving news of the flight of the Verbigeni, Cæsar ordered the
peoples whose territories they would cross to stop them and bring them
back, under pain of being considered as accomplices. The fugitives were
delivered up and treated as enemies; that is, put to the sword, or sold
as slaves. As to the others, Cæsar accepted their submission: he
compelled the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobriges to return to the
localities they had abandoned, and to restore the towns and hamlets they
had burnt; and since, after having lost all their crops, they had no
more provisions of their own, the Allobroges were ordered to furnish
them with wheat.[194] These measures had for their object not to leave
Helvetia without inhabitants, as the fertility of its soil might draw
thither the Germans of the other side the Rhine, who would thus become
borderers upon the Roman province. He permitted the Boii, celebrated for
their brilliant valour, to establish themselves in the country of the
Ædui, who had asked permission to receive them. They gave them lands
between the Allier and the Loire, and soon admitted them to a share in
all their rights and privileges.
In the camp of the Helvetii were found tablets on which was written, in
Greek letters, the number of all those who had quitted their country: on
one side, the number of men capable of bearing arms; and on the other,
that of the children, old men, and women. The whole amounted to 263,000
Helvetii, 36,000 Tulingi, 14,000 Latobriges, 23,000 Rauraci, and 32,000
Boii--together, 368,000 persons, of whom 92,000 were men in a condition
to fight. According to the census ordered by Cæsar, the number of those
who returned home was 110,000.[195] The emigration was thus reduced to
less than one-third.
The locality occupied by the Helvetii when they made their submission is
unknown; yet all circumstances seem to concur in placing the theatre of
this event in the western part of the country of the Lingones. This
hypothesis appears the more reasonable, as Cæsar’s march, in the
following campaign, can only be explained by supposing him to start from
this region. We admit, then, that Cæsar received the submission of the
Helvetii on the Armançon, towards Tonnerre, and it is there that we
suppose him to have been encamped during the events upon the recital of
which we are now going to enter.
[Sidenote: Observations.]
VIII. The forces of the two armies opposed to each other in the battle
of Bibracte were about equal, for Cæsar had six legions--the 10th, which
he had found in the Roman province; the three old legions (7th, 8th, and
9th), which he had brought from Aquileia; and the two new ones (11th and
12th), raised in the Cisalpine. The effective force of each must have
been near the normal number of 6,000 men, for the campaign had only
begun, and their ranks must have been increased by the veterans and
volunteers of whom we have spoken in the first volume (page 456). The
number of the legionaries was thus 36,000. Adding 4,000 cavalry, raised
in the Roman province and among the Ædui, and probably 20,000
auxiliaries,[196] we shall have a total of 60,000 combatants, not
including the men attached to the machines, those conducting the
baggage, the army servants, &c. The Helvetii, on their side, did not
count more than 69,000 combatants, since, out of 92,000, they had lost
one-fourth near the Saône.
In this battle, it must be remarked, Cæsar did not employ the two
legions newly raised, which remained to guard the camp, and secure the
retreat in case of disaster. Next year he assigned the same duty to the
youngest troops. The cavalry did not pursue the enemies in their rout,
doubtless because the mountainous nature of the locality made it
impossible for it to act.
CHAPTER IV.
CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS.
(Year of Rome 696.)
(BOOK I. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
[Sidenote: Seat of the Suevi and other German Tribes.]
I. On the termination of the war against the Helvetii, the chiefs of
nearly all Celtic Gaul went to congratulate Cæsar, and thank him for
having, at the same time, avenged their old injuries, and delivered
their country from immense danger. They expressed the desire to submit
to his judgment certain affairs, and, in order to concert matters
previously, they solicited his permission to convoke a general assembly.
Cæsar gave his consent.
After the close of the deliberations, they returned, secretly and in
tears, to solicit his support against the Germans and Ariovistus, one of
their kings. These peoples were separated from the Gauls by the Rhine,
from its mouth to the Lake of Constance. Among them the Suevi occupied
the first rank. They were by much the most powerful and the most
warlike. They were said to be divided into a hundred cantons, each of
which furnished, every year, a thousand men for war and a thousand men
for agriculture, taking each other’s place alternately: the labourers
fed the soldiers. No boundary line, among the Suevi, separated the
property of the fields, which remained common, and no one could prolong
his residence on the same lands beyond a year. However, they hardly
lived upon the produce of the soil: they consumed little wheat, and
drank no wine; milk and flesh were their habitual food. When these
failed, they were fed upon grass.[197] Masters of themselves from
infancy, intrepid hunters, insensible to the inclemency of the seasons,
bathing in the cold waters of the rivers, they hardly covered a part of
their bodies with thin skins. They were savages in manners, and of
prodigious force and stature. They disdained commerce and foreign
horses, which the Gauls sought with so much care. Their own horses,
though mean-looking and ill-shaped, became indefatigable through
exercise, and fed upon brushwood. Despising the use of the saddle,
often, in engagements of cavalry, they jumped to the ground and fought
on foot: their horses were taught to remain without moving.[198] The
belief in the dogma of the immortality of the soul, strengthened in them
the contempt for life.[199] They boasted of being surrounded by immense
solitudes: this fact, as they pretended, showed that a great number of
their neighbours had not been able to resist them: and it was reported,
indeed, that on one side (towards the east) their territory was bounded,
for an extent of 600 miles, by desert plains; on the other, they
bordered upon the Ubii, their tributaries, the most civilised of the
German peoples, because their situation on the banks of the Rhine placed
them in relation with foreign merchants, and because, neighbours to the
Gauls, they had formed themselves to their manners.[200]
Two immense forests commenced not far from the Rhine, and extended, from
west to east, across Germany; these were the Hercynian and Bacenis
forests. (_See Plate 2._) The first, beginning from the Black Forest and
the Odenwald, covered all the country situated between the Upper Danube
and the Maine, and comprised the mountains which, further towards the
east, formed the northern girdle of the basin of the Danube; that is,
the Boehmerwald, the mountains of Moravia, and the Little Carpathians.
It had a breadth which Cæsar represents by nine long days’ march.[201]
The other, of much less extent, took its rise in the forest of
Thuringia; it embraced all the mountains to the north of Bohemia, and
that long chain which separates the basins of the Oder and the Vistula
from that of the Danube.
The Suevi inhabited, to the south of the forest Bacenis, the countries
situated between the forest of Thuringia, the Boehmerwald, the Inn, and
the Black Forest, which compose, in our days, the Duchies of
Saxe-Meiningen and Saxe-Coburg, Bavaria, and the greater part of
Wurtemberg.[202] To the east of the Suevi were the Boii (_partly in
Bohemia and partly in the north-west of Austria_);[203] to the north,
the Cherusci, separated from the Suevi by the forest Bacenis; to the
west, the Marcomanni (_the upper and middle course of the Maine_) and
the Sedusii (_between the Maine and the Neckar_); to the south, the
Harudes (_on the north of the Lake of Constance_), the Tulingi, and the
Latobriges (_the southern part of the Grand Duchy of Baden_).
On the two banks of the Rhine dwelt the Rauraci (_the territory of Bâle
and part of the Brisgau_); the Triboces (_part of Alsace and of the
Grand Duchy of Baden_): on the right bank were the Nemetes (_opposite
Spire_); the Vangiones (_opposite Worms_); the Ubii, from the Odenwald
to the watershed of the Sieg and the Ruhr. To the north of the Ubii were
the Sicambri, established in Sauerland, and nearly as far as the Lippe.
Finally, the Usipetes and the Tencteri were still farther to the north,
towards the mouth of the Rhine. (_See Plate 2._)
[Sidenote: The Gauls solicit Cæsar to come to their assistance.]
II. The Gaulish chiefs who had come to solicit the succour of Cæsar made
the following complaints against Ariovistus:--“The German king,” they
said, “had taken advantage of the quarrels which divided the different
peoples of Gaul; called in formerly by the Arverni and the Sequani, he
had gained, with their co-operation, several victories over the Ædui, in
consequence of which the latter were subjected to the most humiliating
conditions. Shortly afterwards his yoke grew heavy on the Sequani
themselves, to such a degree that, though conquerors with him, they are
now more wretched than the vanquished Ædui. Ariovistus has seized a
third of their territory;[204] another third is on the point of being
given up, by his orders, to 24,000 Harudes, who have joined him some
months ago. There are 120,000 Germans in Gaul. The contingents of the
Suevi have already arrived on the banks of the Rhine. In a few years the
invasion of Gaul by the Germans will be general. Cæsar alone can prevent
it, by his prestige and that of the Roman name, by the force of his
arms, and by the fame of his recent victory.”
Gaul thus came voluntarily, in the persons of her chiefs, to throw
herself into the arms of Cæsar, take him for the arbiter of her destiny,
and implore him to be her saviour. He spoke encouragingly, and promised
them his support. Several considerations engaged him to act upon these
complaints. He could not suffer the Ædui, allies of Rome, to be brought
under subjection by the barbarians. He saw a substantial danger for the
Republic in the numerous immigrations of fierce peoples who, once
masters of Gaul, would not fail, in imitation of the Cimbri and
Teutones, to invade the Roman province, and thence fall upon Italy.
Resolved to prevent these dangers, he proposed an interview with
Ariovistus, who was probably occupied, since the defeat of the
Helvetii, in collecting an army among the Triboci (towards
Strasburg),[205] as well to oppose the further designs of the Romans, as
to defend the part of the country of the Sequani which he had seized.
Ariovistus, it will be remembered, had been declared, under Cæsar’s
consulate, ally and friend of the Roman people; and this favour would
encourage the expectation that the head of the Germans would be willing
to treat; but he refused with disdain the proposed interview. Then Cæsar
sent messengers to him to reproach him with his ingratitude. “If
Ariovistus cares to preserve his friendship, let him make reparation for
all the injury he has inflicted upon the allies of Rome, and let him
bring no more barbarians across the Rhine; if, on the contrary, he
rejects these conditions, so many acts of violence will be punished in
virtue of the decree rendered by the Senate, under the consulate of M.
Messala and M. Piso, which authorises the governor of Gaul to do that
which he judges for the advantage of the Republic, and enjoins him to
defend the Ædui and the other allies of the Roman people.”
By this language, Cæsar wished to show that he did not violate the law,
enacted a year before under his consulate, which forbade the governors
to leave their provinces without an order of the Senate. He purposely
appealed to an old decree, which gave unlimited powers to the governor
of Gaul, a province the importance of which had always required
exceptional laws.[206] The reply of Ariovistus was equally proud:--
“Cæsar ought to know as well as he the right of the conqueror: he admits
no interference in the treatment reserved for the vanquished; he has
himself causes of complaint against the proconsul, whose presence
diminishes his revenues; he will not restore the hostages to the Ædui;
the title of brothers and allies of the Roman people will be of little
service to them. He cares little for threats. No one has ever braved
Ariovistus with impunity. Let anybody attack him, and he will learn the
valour of a people which, for fourteen years, has never sought shelter
under a roof.”[207]
[Sidenote: March of Cæsar upon Besançon.]
III. This arrogant reply, and news calculated to give alarm, hastened
Cæsar’s decision. In fact, on one side the Ædui complained to him of the
devastation of their country by the Harudes; and, on the other, the
Treviri announced that the hundred cantons of the Suevi were preparing
to cross the Rhine.[208] Cæsar, wishing to prevent the junction of
these new bands with the old troops of Ariovistus, hastened the
collecting of provisions, and advanced against the Germans by forced
marches. The negotiations having probably lasted during the month of
July, it was now the beginning of August. Starting from the
neighbourhood of Tonnerre, where we have supposed he was encamped, Cæsar
followed the road subsequently replaced by a Roman way of which vestiges
are still found, and which, passing by Tanlay, Gland, Laignes, Etrochey,
and Dancevoir, led to Langres.[209] (_See Plate 4._) After three long
days’ marches, on his arrival towards Arc-en-Barrois, he learnt that
Ariovistus was moving with all his troops to seize Besançon, the most
considerable place in Sequania, and that he had already advanced three
days’ march beyond his territory. Cæsar considered it a matter of
urgency to anticipate him, for this place was abundantly provided with
everything necessary for an army. Instead of continuing his march
towards the Rhine, by way of Vesoul, Lure, and Belfort, he advanced, day
and night, by forced marches, towards Besançon, obtained possession of
it, and placed a garrison there.[210]
The following description, given in the “Commentaries,” is still
applicable to the present town. “It was so well fortified by nature,
that it offered every facility for sustaining war. The Doubs, forming a
circle, surrounds it almost entirely, and the space of sixteen hundred
feet,[211] which is not bathed by the water, is occupied by a high
mountain, the base of which reaches, on each side, to the edge of the
river. The wall which encloses this mountain makes a citadel of it, and
connects it with the _oppidum_.”[212]
During this rapid movement of the Roman army on Besançon, Ariovistus had
advanced very slowly. We must suppose, indeed, that he halted when he
was informed of this march; for, once obliged to abandon the hope of
taking that place, it was imprudent to separate himself any farther from
his re-enforcements, and, above all, from the Suevi, who were ready to
pass the Rhine towards Mayence, and await the Romans in the plains of
Upper Alsace, where he could advantageously make use of his numerous
cavalry.
[Sidenote: Panic in the Roman Army.]
IV. During the few days which Cæsar passed at Besançon (the middle of
August), in order to assure himself of provisions, a general panic took
possession of his soldiers. Public rumour represented the Germans as men
of gigantic stature, of unconquerable valour, and of terrible aspect.
Now there were in the Roman army many young men without experience in
war, come from Rome, some out of friendship for Cæsar, others in the
hope of obtaining celebrity without trouble. Cæsar could not help
receiving them. It must have been difficult, indeed, for a general who
wished to preserve his friends at Rome, to defend himself against the
innumerable solicitations of influential people.[213] This panic had
begun with these volunteers; it soon gained the whole army. Every one
made his will; the least timid alleged, as an excuse for their fear, the
difficulty of the roads, the depth of the forests, the want of
provisions, the impossibility of obtaining transports, and even the
illegality of the enterprise.[214]
Cæsar, surprised at this state of feeling, called a council, to which he
admitted the centurions of all classes. He sharply reproached the
assembled chiefs with wishing to penetrate his designs, and to seek
information as to the country into which he intended to lead them. He
reminded them that their fathers, under Marius, had driven out the
Cimbri and the Teutones; that, still more recently, they had defeated
the German race in the revolt of the slaves;[215] that the Helvetii had
often beaten the Germans, and that they, in their turn, had just beaten
the Helvetii. As to those who, to disguise their fears, talk of the
difficulty of the roads and the want of food, he finds it very insolent
in them to suppose that their general will forget his duty, or to
pretend to dictate it to him. The care of the war is his business: the
Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones will furnish wheat; in fact, it is
already ripe in the fields (_jamque esse in agris frumenta matura_). As
to the roads, they will soon have the opportunity of judging of them
themselves. He is told the soldiers will not obey, or raise the ensigns
(_signa laturi_).[216] Words like these would not shake him; the soldier
despises the voice of his chief only when the latter is, by his own
fault, abandoned by fortune or convicted of cupidity or embezzlement. As
to himself, his whole life proves his integrity; the war of the Helvetii
affords evidence of his favour with fortune; for which cause, without
delay, he will break up the camp to-morrow morning, for he is impatient
to know if, among his soldiers, fear will prevail over honour and duty.
If the army should refuse to follow him, he will start alone, with the
10th legion, of which he will make his prætorian cohort. Cæsar had
always loved this legion, and, on account of its valor, had always the
greatest confidence in it.
This language, in which, without having recourse to the rigours of
discipline, Cæsar appealed to the honour of his soldiers, exciting at
the same time the emulation both of those whom he loaded with praise
and of those whose services he affected to disdain,--this proud
assertion of his right to command produced a wonderful revolution in the
minds of the men, and inspired the troops with great ardour for
fighting. The 10th legion first charged its tribunes to thank him for
the good opinion he had expressed towards them, and declared that they
were ready to march. The other legions then sent their excuses by their
tribunes and centurions of the first class, denied their hesitations and
fears, and pretended that they had never given any judgment upon the
war, as that appertained only to the general.[217]
[Sidenote: March towards the Valley of the Rhine.]
V. This agitation having been calmed, Cæsar sought information
concerning the roads from Divitiacus, who, of all the Gauls, inspired
him with the greatest amount of confidence. In order to proceed from
Besançon to the valley of the Rhine, to meet Ariovistus, the Roman army
had to cross the northern part of the Jura chain. This country is
composed of two very distinct parts. The first comprises the valley of
the Doubs from Besançon to Montbéliard, the valley of the Oignon, and
the intermediate country, a mountainous district, broken, much covered
with wood, and, without doubt, at the time of Cæsar’s war in Gaul, more
difficult than at present. The other part, which begins at the bold
elbow made by the Doubs near Montbéliard, is composed of lengthened
undulations, which diminish gradually, until they are lost in the plains
of the Rhine. It is much less wooded than the first, and offers easier
communications. (_See Plate 4._)
Cæsar, as he had announced, started early on the morrow of the day on
which he had thus addressed his officers, and, determined on conducting
his army through an open country, he turned the mountainous and
difficult region just described, thus making a circuit of more than
fifty miles (seventy-five kilomètres),[218] which is represented by a
semi-circumference, the diameter of which would be the line drawn from
Besançon to Arcey. It follows the present road from Besançon to Vesoul
as far as Pennesières, and continues by Vallerois-le-Bois and
Villersexel to Arcey. He could perform this distance in four days; then
he resumed, on leaving Arcey, the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine
by Belfort and Cernay.
On the seventh day of a march uninterrupted since leaving Besançon, he
learnt by his scouts that the troops of Ariovistus were at a distance of
not more than twenty-four miles (36 kilomètres).
Supposing 20 kilomètres for the day’s march, the Roman army would have
travelled over 140 kilomètres in seven days, and would have arrived on
the Thur, near Cernay. (By the road indicated, the distance from
Besançon to the Thur is about 140 kilomètres.) At this moment,
Ariovistus would have been encamped at 36 kilomètres from the Romans, to
the north, near Colmar.
Informed of the arrival of Cæsar, Ariovistus sent him word “that he
consented to an interview, now that the Roman general had come near, and
that there was no longer any danger for him in going to him.” Cæsar did
not reject this overture, supposing that Ariovistus had returned to more
reasonable sentiments.
The interview was fixed for the fifth day following.[219] In the
interval, while there was a frequent exchange of messages, Ariovistus,
who feared some ambuscade, stipulated, as an express condition, that
Cæsar should bring with him no foot soldiers, but that, on both sides,
they should confine themselves to an escort of cavalry. The latter,
unwilling to furnish any pretext for a rupture, consented; but, not
daring to entrust his personal safety to the Gaulish cavalry, he mounted
on their horses men of the 10th legion, which gave rise to this jocular
saying of one of the soldiers: “Cæsar goes beyond his promise; he was to
make us prætorians, and he makes us knights.”[220]
[Sidenote: Interview between Cæsar and Ariovistus.]
VI. Between the two armies extended a vast plain, that which is crossed
by the Ill and the Thur. A tolerably large knoll rose in it at a nearly
equal distance from either camp.[221] This was the place of meeting of
the two chieftains. Cæsar posted his mounted legion at 200 paces from
the knoll, and the cavalry of Ariovistus stood at the same distance. The
latter demanded that the interview should take place on horseback, and
that each of the two chiefs should be accompanied only by ten horsemen.
When they met, Cæsar reminded Ariovistus of his favours, of those of the
Senate, of the interest which the Republic felt in the Ædui, of that
constant policy of the Roman people which, far from suffering the
abasement of its allies, sought incessantly their elevation. He repeated
his first conditions.
Ariovistus, instead of accepting them, put forward his own claims: “He
had only crossed the Rhine at the prayer of the Gauls; the lands which
he was accused of having seized, had been ceded to him; he had
subsequently been attacked, and had scattered his enemies; if he has
sought the friendship of the Roman people, it is in the hope of
benefiting by it; if it becomes prejudicial to him, he renounces it; if
he has carried so many Germans into Gaul, it is for his personal safety;
the part he occupies belongs to him, as that occupied by the Romans
belongs to them; his rights of conquest are older than those of the
Roman army, which had never passed the limits of the province. Cæsar is
only in Gaul to ruin it. If he does not withdraw from it, he will regard
him as an enemy, and he is certain that by his death he shall gain the
gratitude of a great number of the first and most illustrious personages
in Rome. They have informed him by their messengers that, at this price,
he would gain their good-will and friendship. But if he be left in free
possession of Gaul, he will assist in all the wars that Cæsar may
undertake.”
Cæsar insisted on the arguments he had already advanced: “It was not one
of the principles of the Republic to abandon its allies; he did not
consider that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus any more than to the Roman
people. When formerly Q. Fabius Maximus vanquished the Arverni and the
Ruteni, Rome pardoned them, and neither reduced them to provinces nor
imposed tribute upon them. If, then, priority of conquest be invoked,
the claims of the Romans to the empire of Gaul are the most just; and if
it be thought preferable to refer to the Senate, Gaul ought to be free,
since, after victory, the Senate had willed that she should preserve her
own laws.”
During this conversation, information was brought to Cæsar that the
cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching the knoll, and were throwing
stones and darts at the Romans. Cæsar immediately broke up the
conference, withdrew to his escort, and forbade them to return the
attack, not from fear of an engagement with his favourite legion, but in
order to avoid, in case he should defeat his enemies, the suspicion that
he might have taken advantage of their good faith to surprise them in an
interview. Nevertheless, the arrogance of Ariovistus, the disloyal
attack of his cavalry, and the rupture of the conference, were soon
known, and excited the ardour and impatience of the Roman troops.
Two days afterwards, Ariovistus made a proposal for a renewal of the
conference, or for the sending to him of one of Cæsar’s lieutenants.
Cæsar refused, the more so because, the day before, the Germans had
again advanced and thrown their missiles at the Romans, and that thus
his lieutenant would not have been safe from the attacks of the
barbarians. He thought it more prudent to send as his deputy Valerius
Procillus, the son of a Gaul who had become a Roman citizen, who spoke
the Celtic language, and who was on familiar terms with Ariovistus, and
M. Mettius, with whom the German king was bound by the rights of
hospitality. They had hardly entered the camp of Ariovistus, when he
ordered them to be thrown into fetters, under pretence that they were
spies.[222]
[Sidenote: Movements of the two Armies.]
VII. The same day, the German king broke up his camp and took another
position at the foot of the Vosges (_sub monte_), at a distance of 6,000
paces from that of Cæsar, between Soultz and Feldkirch, not far from the
Lauch. (_See Plate 6._) Next day he crossed the Thur, near its
confluence with the Ill, ascended the left banks of the Ill and the
Doller, and only halted at Reiningen, after having gone two miles (three
kilomètres) beyond the Roman camp. By this manœuvre, Ariovistus cut
off Cæsar’s communication with Sequania and the Æduan country, but he
left open the communications with the country of the Leuci and the
Lingones.[223] (_See the Map of Gaul, 2._) The two armies thus encamped
at a short distance from each other. During the five following days,
Cæsar drew out his troops each day, and formed them in order of battle
at the head of his camp (_pro castris suas copias produxit_), but was
not able to provoke the Germans to fight; all hostility was limited to
cavalry skirmishes, in which the latter were much practised. To 6,000
horsemen was joined an equal number of picked men on foot, among whom
each horseman had chosen one to watch over him in combat. According to
circumstances, the horsemen fell back upon the footmen, or the latter
advanced to their assistance. Such was their agility, that they kept up
with the horses, running and holding by the mane.[224]
Cæsar, seeing that Ariovistus persisted in shutting himself up in his
camp and intercepting his communications, sought to re-establish them,
chose an advantageous position about 600 paces (900 mètres) beyond that
occupied by the Germans, and led thither his army drawn up in three
lines. He kept the first and second under arms, and employed the third
on the retrenchments. The spot on which he established himself is
perhaps the eminence situated on the Little Doller, to the north of
Schweighausen. Ariovistus sent thither about 16,000 of his light troops
and all his cavalry, to intimidate the Romans and impede the works.
Nevertheless, the third line continued them, and the two others repelled
the attack. The camp once fortified, Cæsar left in it two legions and a
part of the auxiliaries, and took back the four others to the principal
camp. The two Roman camps were 3,600 mètres distant from each other.
Hitherto Cæsar had been satisfied with drawing out his troops and
backing them upon his retrenchments; the next day, persisting in his
tactics (_instituto suo_) of trying to provoke Ariovistus to fight, he
drew them up at a certain distance in advance of the principal camp, and
placed them in order of battle (_paulum a majoribus castris progressus,
aciem instruxit_). In spite of this advanced position (_ne tum
quidem_), Ariovistus persisted in not coming out. The Roman army
re-entered the camp towards midday, and a part of the German troops
immediately attacked the small camp. Both armies fought resolutely till
evening, and there were many wounded on both sides. Astonished at seeing
that, in spite of this engagement, Ariovistus still avoided a general
battle, Cæsar interrogated the prisoners, and learnt that the matrons
charged with consulting destiny had declared that the Germans could not
be conquerors if they fought before the new moon.[225]
[Sidenote: Battle against the Germans.]
VIII. Next day, leaving a sufficient guard in the two camps, Cæsar
placed all his auxiliaries in view of the enemy, in advance of the
smaller camp; the number of the legionaries being less than that of the
Germans, he sought to conceal his inferiority from the enemy by
displaying other troops. While the Germans took these auxiliaries for
the two legions which occupied the lesser camp, the latter left it by
the Decuman gate, and, unperceived, went to rejoin the other four. Then
Cæsar drew up his six legions in three lines, and, marching forward, he
led them up to the enemy’s camp (_usque ad castra hostium accessit_).
This offensive movement allowed the Germans no longer the choice of
avoiding battle: they quitted their camp, descended into the plain,[226]
drew up in line, by order of nations, at equal intervals--Harudes,
Marcomanni, Suevi, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, and Sedusii; and, to
deprive themselves of all possibility of flight, inclosed themselves on
the sides and in the rear by a circuit of carriages and wagons, on which
they placed their women: dishevelled and in tears, these implored the
warriors, as they marched to the battle, not to deliver them in slavery
to the Romans. In this position, the Roman army faced the east, and the
German army the west, and their lines extended over a space now partly
covered by the forest of Nonnenbruch.[227]
Cæsar, still more to animate his soldiers, determined to give them
witnesses worthy of their courage, and placed at the head of each legion
either one of his lieutenants or his quæstor.[228] He led the attack in
person, with his right wing, on the side where the Germans seemed
weakest. The signal given, the legions dash forward; the enemy, on his
side, rushes to the encounter. On both sides the impetuosity is so great
that the Romans, not having time to use the _pilum_, throw it away, and
fight hand to hand with the sword. But the Germans, according to their
custom, to resist an attack of this kind, form rapidly in phalanxes of
three or four hundred men,[229] and cover their bare heads with their
bucklers. They are pressed so close together, that even when dead they
still remain standing.[230] Such was the ardour of the legionaries, that
many rushed upon these sort of tortoises, tearing away the bucklers, and
striking the enemies from above.[231] The short and sharp-pointed swords
of the Romans had the advantage over the long swords of the
Germans.[232] Nevertheless, according to Appian, the legions owed their
victory chiefly to the superiority of their tactics and the steadiness
with which they kept their ranks.[233] Ariovistus’s left did not resist
long; but while it was driven back and put to flight, the right, forming
in deep masses, pressed the Romans hard. Young P. Crassus, commander of
the cavalry placed at a distance from the thick of the battle, and
better placed to judge of its incidents, perceived this, sent the third
line to the succour of the wavering legions, and restored the combat.
Soon Ariovistus’s right was obliged to give way in its turn; the rout
then became general, and the Germans desisted from flight only when they
reached the Rhine, fifty miles from the field of battle.[234] They
descended, no doubt, the valley of the Ill as far as Rhinau, thus
retracing a part of the road by which they had come. (_See Plate 4._)
Cæsar sent his cavalry after them; all who were overtaken were cut to
pieces; the rest attempted to swim across the river, or sought safety in
boats. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who threw himself into a
boat[235] he found attached to the bank. According to Plutarch and
Appian,[236] 80,000 men perished in the combat and during the pursuit.
Two of the wives of the German king experienced the same fate; one was a
Sueve, the other a Norician. Of his two daughters, one was killed and
the other taken prisoner. Cæsar says that, as he himself pursued the
enemy with his cavalry, he experienced a pleasure equal to that given by
victory when he recovered, first Procillus, loaded with a triple chain,
and who had thrice seen the barbarians draw lots whether he should be
burnt alive or not, and, subsequently, M. Mettius, both of whom, as we
have seen, had been sent by him as messengers to Ariovistus.
The report of this glorious exploit having spread beyond the Rhine, the
Suevi, who had come to its banks, returned home. The Ubii, who dwelt
near the river, pursued their terrified bands, and slew a considerable
number of the fugitives.
Cæsar, having concluded two great wars in one single campaign, placed
his army in winter quarters among the Sequani rather sooner than the
season required--at the beginning of September--and left them under the
command of Labienus. He then left, and went to hold the assemblies in
Cisalpine Gaul.[237]
[Sidenote: Observations.]
IX. There are several things worthy of remark in this campaign:--
1. The resolution taken by Cæsar to gain possession of Besançon, and
thus to anticipate Ariovistus. We see the importance which he attaches
to that military position as a point of support and of supply.
2. The facility with which a whole legion transforms itself into
cavalry.
3. The judicious use which Cæsar makes of his light troops (_alarii_),
by assembling them in mass, so that the enemy should believe in a
greater number of legions.
4. Lastly, this singular circumstance, that the third line, which serves
as reserve and decides the fate of the battle, receives from young P.
Crassus, and not from the general-in-chief, the order to attack.
The dates of the principal events of this year may be indicated in the
following manner:--
Rendezvous of the Helvetii on the
banks of the Rhone (the day of the
equinox) March 24.
Cæsar refuses them a passage through
the province April 8.
Arrival at the confluence of the Rhone
and the Saône of the legions from
Italy and Illyria June 7.
Defeat of the Tigurini on the Saône June 10.
Passage of the Saône by Cæsar June 12.
About fifteen days’ march (_De Bello
Gallico_, I. 15) From June 13 to June 27.
Manœuvre of Labienus to surprise the
Helvetii June 28.
Battle of Bibracte June 29.
Cæsar remains three days interring the
dead; marches on the fourth; employs
six days in his march from
the field of battle to the country of
the Lingones, and there overtakes
the Helvetii in their retreat,
From June 30 to July 8.
Negotiations with Ariovistus (a month),
From July 8 to August 8.
Departure of Cæsar (from Tonnerre,
to meet Ariovistus) August 10.
Arrival of Cæsar at Besançon August 16.
Abode of Cæsar at Besançon,
From August 16 to August 22.
Departure from Besançon (“the harvest
is ripe,” _De Bello Gallico_, I. 40) August 22.
March of seven days from Besançon
to the Rhine From August 22 to August 28.
Interview (five days afterwards) September 2.
Manœuvres (about eight days),
From September 3 to September 10.
Battle of the Thur (fought before the
new moon, which took place on the
18th of September) September 10.
CHAPTER V.
WAR AGAINST THE BELGÆ.
(Year of Rome 697.)
(BOOK II. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
[Sidenote: League of the Belgæ. Cæsar advances from Besançon to the
Aisne.]
I. The brilliant successes gained by Cæsar over the Helvetii and the
Germans had delivered the Republic from an immense danger, but at the
same time they had roused the distrust and jealousy of most of the
nations of Gaul. These conceived fears for their independence, which
were further increased by the presence of the Roman army in Sequania.
The irritation was very great among the Belgæ. They feared that their
turn to be attacked would come when Celtic Gaul was once reduced to
peace. Besides, they were excited by influential men who understood
that, under Roman domination, they would have less chance of obtaining
possession of the supreme power. The different tribes of Belgic Gaul
entered into a formidable league, and reciprocally exchanged hostages.
Cæsar learnt these events in the Cisalpine province, through public
rumour and the letters of Labienus. Alarmed at the news, he raised two
legions in Italy, the 13th and 14th, and, in the beginning of
spring,[238] sent them into Gaul, under the command of the lieutenant
Q. Pedius.[239] It is probable that these troops, to reach Sequania
promptly, crossed the Great St. Bernard, for Strabo relates that one of
the three routes which led from Italy into Gaul passed by Mount
Pœrinus (_Great St. Bernard_), after having traversed the country of
the Salassi (_Valley of Aosta_), and that this latter people offered at
first to assist Cæsar’s troops in their passage by levelling the roads
and throwing bridges across the torrents; but that, suddenly changing
their tone, they had rolled masses of rock down upon them and pillaged
their baggage. It was no doubt in the sequel of this defection that,
towards the end of the year 697, Cæsar, as we shall see farther on, sent
Galba into the Valais, to take vengeance on the mountaineers for their
perfidious conduct and to open a safe communication with Italy.[240]
As soon as forage was abundant, he rejoined his legions in person,
probably at Besançon, since, as we have seen, they had been placed in
winter quarters in Sequania. He charged the Senones and the other Celts
who bordered upon Belgic Gaul to watch what was doing there and inform
him of it. Their reports were unanimous: troops were being raised, and
an army was assembling. Cæsar then decided upon immediately entering
into campaign.
His army consisted of eight legions: they bore the numbers 7, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, and 14. As their effective force, in consequence of marches
and previous combats, cannot have been complete, we may admit a mean of
5,000 men to the legion, which would make 40,000 men of infantry. Adding
to these one-third of auxiliaries, Cretan archers, slingers, and
Numidians, the total of infantry would have been 53,000 men. There was,
in addition to these, 5,000 cavalry and a body of Æduan troops under the
command of Divitiacus. Thus the army of Cæsar amounted to at least
60,000 soldiers, without reckoning the servants for the machines,
drivers, and valets, who, according to the instance cited by Orosius,
amounted to a very considerable number.[241]
After securing provisions, Cæsar started from Besançon, probably in the
second fortnight in May, passed the Saône at Seveux (_see Plate 4_),
crossed the country of the Lingones in the direction of Langres, at
Bar-sur-Aube, and entered, towards Vitry-le-François, on the territory
of the Remi, having marched in about a fortnight 230 kilomètres, the
distance from Besançon to Vitry-le-François.[242]
The Remi were the first Belgic people he encountered in his road (_qui
proximi Galliæ ex Belgis sunt_). Astonished at his sudden appearance,
they sent two deputies, Iccius and Adecumborius, the first personages of
their country, to make their submission, and offer provisions and every
kind of succour. They informed Cæsar that all the Belgæ were in arms,
and that the Germans on that side of the Rhine had joined the coalition;
for themselves, they had refused to take any part in it, but the
excitement was so great that they had not been able to dissuade from
their warlike projects the Suessiones themselves, who were united with
them by community of origin, laws, and interests. “The Belgæ,” they
added, “proud of having been formerly the only people of Gaul who
preserved their territory from the invasion of the Teutones and Cimbri,
had the loftiest idea of their own valour. In their general assembly,
each people had engaged to furnish the following contingents:--The
Bellovaci, the most warlike, could send into the field 100,000 men; they
have promised 60,000 picked troops, and claim the supreme direction of
the war. The Suessiones, their neighbours, masters of a vast and fertile
territory, in which are reckoned twelve towns, furnish 50,000 men; they
have for their king Galba, who has been invested, by the consent of the
allies, with the chief command. The Nervii, the most distant of all, and
the most barbarous among these peoples, furnish the same number; the
Atrebates, 15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the Menapii,
7000; the Caletes, 10,000; the Veliocasses and the Veromandui, 10,000;
the Aduatuci, 19,000; lastly, the Condrusi, Eburones, Cæresi, and
Pæmani, comprised under the general name of Germans, are to send 40,000;
in all, about 296,000 men.”[243]
[Sidenote: Cæsar’s Camp at Berry-au-Bac.]
II. Cæsar could judge, from this information, the formidable character
of the league which he had now to combat. His first care was to try to
divide the hostile forces, and, with this view, he induced Divitiacus,
in spite of the friendly relations which had long united the Ædui with
the Bellovaci, to invade and ravage the territory of the latter with the
Æduan troops. He then required the senate of the Remi to repair to his
presence, and the children of the _principes_ to be brought to him as
hostages; and then, on information that Galba was marching to meet him,
he resolved to move to the other side of the Aisne, which crossed the
extremity of the territory of the Remi (_quod est in extremis Remorum
finibus_),[244] and encamp there in a strong position, to await the
enemy’s attack. The road he had hitherto followed led straight to the
Aisne, and crossed it by a bridge at the spot where now stands the
village of Berry-au-Bac. (_See Plate 7._) He marched in great haste
towards this bridge, led his army across it, and fixed his camp on the
right side of the road, on the hill situated between the Aisne and the
Miette, a small stream with marshy banks, which makes a bend in that
river between Berry-au-Bac and Pontavert. (_See Plate 8._) This hill,
called Mauchamp, is of small elevation (about 25 mètres) above the
valley of the Aisne, and in its length, from east to west, it presents
sufficient space for the Roman army to deploy. Laterally, it sinks to
the level of the surrounding ground by slight undulations, and the side
which looks upon the Miette descends by a gentle slope towards the banks
of the stream. This position offered several advantages: the Aisne
defended one side of the camp; the rear of the army was protected, and
the transports of provisions could arrive in safety through the
countries of the Remi and other friendly peoples. Cæsar ordered a work
to be constructed on the right bank of the Aisne, at the extremity of
the bridge, where he established a post (_see Plates 8 and 9_),[245] and
he left on the other side of the river the lieutenant Q. Titurius
Sabinus with six cohorts. The camp was surrounded by a retrenchment
twelve feet high, and by a fosse eighteen feet wide.[246]
Meanwhile the Belgæ, after having concentrated their forces in the
country of the Suessiones, to the north of the Aisne, had invaded the
territory of the Remi. On their road, and at eight miles from the Roman
camp (_see Plate 7_), was a town of the Remi called Bibrax
(_Vieux-Laon_).[247] The Belgæ attacked it vigorously, and it was
defended with difficulty all day. These peoples, like the Celts,
attacked fortresses by surrounding them with a crowd of combatants,
throwing from every side a great quantity of stones, to drive the
defenders away from the walls; then, forming the tortoise, they advanced
against the gates and sapped the walls. When night had put a stop to the
attack, Iccius, who commanded in the town, sent information to Cæsar
that he could hold out no longer, unless he received prompt succour.
Towards midnight the latter sent him Numidians, Cretan archers, and
Balearic slingers, who had the messengers of Iccius for their guides.
This re-enforcement raised the courage of the besieged, and deprived the
enemy of the hope of taking the town; and after remaining some time
round Bibrax, laying waste the land and burning the hamlets and houses,
they marched towards Cæsar, and halted at less than two miles from his
camp. Their fires, kindled on the right bank of the Miette, indicated a
front of more than 8,000 paces (twelve kilomètres).
The great numbers of the enemy, and their high renown for bravery, led
the proconsul to resolve to postpone the battle. If his legions had in
his eyes an incontestible superiority, he wished, nevertheless, to
ascertain what he could expect from his cavalry, which was composed of
Gauls. For this purpose, and to try, at the same time, the courage of
the Belgæ, he engaged them every day in cavalry combats in the undulated
plain to the north of the camp. Once certain that his troops did not
yield in valour to those of the enemy, he resolved to draw them into a
general action. In front of the entrenchments was an extensive tract of
ground, advantageous for ranging an army in order of battle. This
commanding position was covered in front and on the left by the marshes
of the Miette. The right only remained unsupported, and the Belgæ might
have taken the Romans in flank in the space between the camp and the
stream, or turned them by passing between the camp and the Aisne. To
meet this danger, Cæsar made, on each of the two slopes of the hill, a
fosse, perpendicular to the line of battle, about 400 paces (600 mètres)
in length, the first reaching from the camp to the Miette, the second
joining it to the Aisne. At the extremity of these fosses he established
redoubts, in which were placed military machines.[248]
[Sidenote: Battle on the Aisne.]
III. Having made these dispositions, and having left in the camp his two
newly-raised legions to serve as a reserve in case of need, Cæsar placed
the six others in array of battle, the right resting on the
retrenchments. The enemy also drew out his troops and deployed them in
face of the Romans. The two armies remained in observation, each waiting
till the other passed the marsh of the Miette, as the favourable moment
for attack. Meanwhile, as they remained thus stationary, the cavalry
were fighting on both sides. After a successful charge, Cæsar,
perceiving that the enemies persisted in not entering the marshes,
withdrew his legions. The Belgæ immediately left their position to move
towards the Aisne, below the point where the Miette entered it. Their
object was to cross the river between Gernicourt and Pontavert, where
there were fords, with part of their troops, to carry, if they could,
the redoubt commanded by the lieutenant Q. Titurius Sabinus, and to cut
the bridge, or, at least, to intercept the convoys of provisions, and
ravage the country of the Remi, to the south of the Aisne, whence the
Romans drew their supplies.
The barbarians were already approaching the river, when Sabinus
perceived them from the heights of Berry-au-Bac;[249] he immediately
gave information to Cæsar, who, with all his cavalry, the light-armed
Numidians, the slingers, and the archers, passed the bridge, and,
descending the left bank, marched to meet the enemies towards the place
threatened. When he arrived there, some of them had already passed the
Aisne. An obstinate struggle takes place. Surprised in their passage,
the Belgæ, after having experienced considerable loss, advance
intrepidly over the corpses to cross the river, but are repulsed by a
shower of missiles; those who had reached the left bank are surrounded
by the cavalry and massacred.[250]
[Sidenote: Retreat of the Belgæ.]
IV. The Belgæ having failed in taking the _oppidum_ of Bibrax, in
drawing the Romans upon disadvantageous ground, in crossing the river,
and suffering, also, from want of provisions, decided on returning home,
to be ready to assemble again to succour the country which might be
first invaded by the Roman army. The principal cause of this decision
was the news of the threatened invasion of the country of the Bellovaci
by Divitiacus and the Ædui: the Bellovaci refused to lose a single
instant in hurrying to the defence of their hearths. Towards ten o’clock
in the evening, the Belgæ withdrew in such disorder that their departure
resembled a flight. Cæsar was informed immediately by his spies, but,
fearing that this retreat might conceal a snare, he retained his
legions, and even his cavalry, in the camp. At break of day, better
informed by his scouts, he sent all his cavalry, under the orders of the
lieutenants Q. Pedius and L. Aurunculeius Cotta,[251] and ordered
Labienus, with three legions, to follow them. These troops fell upon the
fugitives, and slew as many as the length of the day would permit. At
sunset they gave up the pursuit, and, in obedience to the orders they
had received, returned to the camp.[252]
The coalition of the Belgæ, so renowned for their valour, was thus
dissolved. Nevertheless, it was of importance to the Roman general, in
order to secure the pacification of the country, to go and reduce to
subjection in their homes the peoples who had dared to enter into league
against him. The nearest were the Suessiones, whose territory bordered
upon that of the Remi.
[Sidenote: Capture of Noviodunum and Bratuspantium.]
V. The day after the flight of the enemy, before they had recovered from
their fright, Cæsar broke up his camp, crossed the Aisne, descended its
left bank, invaded the country of the Suessiones, arrived after a long
day’s march (45 kilomètres) before Noviodunum (_Soissons_) (_see Plate
7_), and, informed that this town had a weak garrison, he attempted the
same day to carry it by assault; he failed, through the breadth of the
fosses and the height of the walls. He then retrenched his camp, ordered
covered galleries to be advanced (_vineas agere_),[253] and all things
necessary for a siege to be collected. Nevertheless, the crowd of
fugitive Suessiones threw themselves into the town during the following
night. The galleries having been pushed rapidly towards the walls, the
foundations of a terrace[254] to pass the fosse (_aggere jacto_) were
established, and towers were constructed. The Gauls, astonished at the
greatness and novelty of these works, so promptly executed, offered to
surrender. They obtained safety of life at the prayer of the Remi.
Cæsar received as hostages the principal chiefs of the country, and even
the two sons of King Galba, exacted the surrender of all their arms, and
accepted the submission of the Suessiones. He then conducted his army
into the country of the Bellovaci, who had shut themselves up, with all
they possessed, in the _oppidum_ of Bratuspantium (_Breteuil_).[255] The
army was only at about five miles’ distance from it, when all the aged
men, issuing from the town, came, with extended hands, to implore the
generosity of the Roman general; when he had arrived under the walls of
the place, and while he was establishing his camp, he saw the women and
children also demanding peace as suppliants from the top of the walls.
Divitiacus, in the name of the Ædui, interceded in their favour. After
the retreat of the Belgæ and the disbanding of his troops, he had
returned to the presence of Cæsar. The latter, who had, at the prayer
of the Remi, just shown himself clement towards the Suessiones,
displayed, at the solicitation of the Ædui, the same indulgence towards
the Bellovaci. Thus obeying the same political idea of increasing among
the Belgæ the influence of the peoples allied to Rome, he pardoned them;
but, as their nation was the most powerful in Belgic Gaul, he required
from them all their arms and 600 hostages. The Bellovaci declared that
the promoters of the war, seeing the misfortune they had drawn upon
their country, had fled into the isle of Britain.
It is curious to remark the relations which existed at this epoch
between part of Gaul and England. We know, in fact, from the
“Commentaries,” that a certain Divitiacus, an Æduan chieftain, the most
powerful in all Gaul, had formerly extended his power into the isle of
Britain, and we have just seen that the chiefs in the last struggle
against the Romans had found a refuge in the British isles.
Cæsar next marched from Bratuspantium against the Ambiani, who
surrendered without resistance.[256]
[Sidenote: March against the Nervii.]
VI. The Roman army was now to encounter more formidable adversaries. The
Nervii occupied a vast territory, one extremity of which touched upon
that of the Ambiani. This wild and intrepid people bitterly reproached
the other Belgæ for having submitted to foreigners and abjured the
virtues of their fathers. They had resolved not to send deputies, nor to
accept peace on any condition. Foreseeing the approaching invasion of
the Roman army, the Nervii had drawn into alliance with them two
neighbouring peoples, the Atrebates and the Veromandui, whom they had
persuaded to risk with them the fortune of war: the Aduatuci, also, were
already on the way to join the coalition. The women, and all those whose
age rendered them unfit for fighting, had been placed in safety, in a
spot defended by a marsh, and inaccessible to an army, no doubt at
Mons.[257]
After the submission of the Ambiani, Cæsar left Amiens to proceed to the
country of the Nervii; and after three days’ march on their territory,
he arrived probably at Bavay (_Bagacum_), which is considered to have
been their principal town. There he learnt by prisoners that he was no
more than ten miles (fifteen kilomètres) distant from the Sambre, and
that the enemy awaited him posted on the opposite bank of the
river.[258] He thus found himself on the left bank, and the Nervii were
assembled on the right bank.[259] (_See Plate 7._)
In accordance with the informations he had received, Cæsar sent out a
reconnoitring party of scouts and centurions, charged with the selection
of a spot favourable for the establishment of a camp. A certain number
of the Belgæ, who had recently submitted, and other Gauls, followed him,
and accompanied him in his march. Some of them, as was known
subsequently by the prisoners, having observed during the preceding days
the usual order of march of the army, deserted during the night to the
Nervii, and informed them that behind each of the legions there was a
long column of baggage; that the legion which arrived first at the camp
being separated by a great space from the others, it would be easy to
attack the soldiers, still charged with their bundles (_sarcinæ_); that
this legion once routed and its baggage captured, the others would not
dare to offer any resistance. This plan of attack was the more readily
embraced by the Belgæ, as the nature of the locality favoured its
execution. The Nervii, in fact, always weak in cavalry (their whole
force was composed of infantry), were accustomed, in order to impede
more easily the cavalry of their neighbours, to notch and bend
horizontally young trees, the numerous branches of which, interlaced and
mingled with brambles and brushwood, formed thick hedges, a veritable
wall which nothing could pass through, impenetrable even to the
eye.[260] As this kind of obstacle was very embarrassing to the march of
the Roman army, the Nervii resolved to hide themselves in the woods
which then covered the heights of Haumont, to watch there the moment
when it would debouch on the opposite heights of the Sambre, to wait
till they perceived the file of baggage, and then immediately to rush
upon the troops which preceded.[261] (_See Plate 10._)
[Sidenote: Battle on the Sambre.]
VII. The centurions sent to reconnoitre had selected for the
establishment of the camp the heights of Neuf-Mesnil. These descend in a
uniform slope to the very banks of the river. Those of Boussières, to
which they join, end, on the contrary, at the Sambre, in sufficiently
bold escarpments, the elevation of which varies from five to fifteen
mètres, and which, inaccessible near Boussières, may be climbed a little
lower, opposite the wood of Quesnoy. The Sambre, in all this extent, was
no more than about three feet deep. On the right bank, the heights of
Haumont, opposite those of Neuf-Mesnil, descend on all sides in gentle
and regular slopes to the level of the river. In the lower part, they
were bare for a breadth of about 200 Roman paces (300 mètres), reckoning
from the Sambre; and then the woods began, which covered the upper
parts. It was in these woods, impenetrable to the sight, that the Belgæ
remained concealed. They were there drawn up in order of battle: on the
right, the Atrebates; in the centre, the Veromandui; on the left, the
Nervii; these latter facing the escarpments of the Sambre. On the open
part, along the river, they had placed some posts of cavalry. (_See
Plate 10._)
Cæsar, ignorant of the exact position where the Belgæ were encamped,
directed his march towards the heights of Neuf-Mesnil. His cavalry
preceded him, but the order of march was different from that which had
been communicated to the Nervii by the deserters; as he approached the
enemy, he had, according to his custom, united six legions, and placed
the baggage in the tail of the column, under the guard of the two
legions recently raised, who closed the march.
The cavalry, slingers, and archers passed the Sambre and engaged the
cavalry of the enemy, who at one moment took refuge in the woods, and at
another resumed the offensive, nor were ever pursued beyond the open
ground. Meanwhile, the six legions debouched. Arrived on the place
chosen for the camp, they began to retrench, and shared the labour among
them. Some proceeded to dig the fosses, while others spread themselves
over the country in search of timber and turf. They had hardly begun
their work, when the Belgæ, perceiving the first portion of the baggage
(which was the moment fixed for the attack), suddenly issue from the
forest with all their forces, in the order of battle they had adopted,
rush upon the cavalry and put it to rout, and run towards the Sambre
with such incredible rapidity that they seem to be everywhere at
once--at the edge of the wood, in the river, and in the midst of the
Roman troops; then, with the same celerity, climbing the hill, they rush
towards the camp, where the soldiers are at work at the retrenchments.
The Roman army is taken off its guard.
Cæsar had to provide against everything at the same time. It was
necessary to raise the purple standard as the signal for hastening to
arms,[262] to sound the trumpets to recall the soldiers employed in the
works, to bring in those who were at a distance, form the lines,
harangue the troops, give the word of order.[263] In this critical
situation, the experience of the soldiers, acquired in so many combats,
and the presence of the lieutenants with each legion, helped to supply
the place of the general, and to enable each to take, by his own
impulse, the dispositions he thought best. The impetuosity of the enemy
is such that the soldiers have time neither to put on the ensigns,[264]
nor to take the covering from their bucklers, nor even to put on their
helmets. Each, abandoning his labours, runs to range himself in the
utmost haste under the first standard which presents itself.
The army, constrained by necessity, was drawn up on the slope of the
hill, much more in obedience to the nature of the ground and the
exigencies of the moment than according to military rules. The legions,
separated from one another by thick hedges, which intercepted their
view, could not lend each other mutual succour; they formed an irregular
and interrupted line: the 9th and 10th legions were placed on the left
of the camp, the 8th and 11th in the centre, the 7th and 12th on the
right. In this general confusion, in which it became as difficult to
carry succour to the points threatened as to obey one single command,
everything was ruled by accident.
Cæsar, after taking the measures most urgent, rushes towards the troops
which chance presents first to him, takes them as he finds them in his
way, harangues them, and, when he comes to the 10th legion, he recalls
to its memory, in a few words, its ancient valour. As the enemy was
already within reach of the missiles, he orders the attack; then,
proceeding towards another point to encourage his troops, he finds them
already engaged.
The soldiers of the 9th and 10th legions throw the _pilum_, and fall,
sword in hand, upon the Atrebates, who, fatigued by their rapid advance,
out of breath, and pierced with wounds, are soon driven back from the
hill they have just climbed. These two legions, led no doubt by
Labienus, drive them into the Sambre, slay a great number, cross the
river at their heels, and pursue them up the slopes of the right bank.
The enemy, then thinking to take advantage of the commanding position,
form again, and renew the combat; but the Romans repulse them anew, and,
continuing their victorious march, take possession of the Gaulish camp.
In the centre, the 8th and 11th legions, attacked by the Veromandui, had
driven them back upon the banks of the Sambre, to the foot of the
heights, where the combat still continued.
While on the left and in the centre victory declared for the Romans, on
the right wing, the 7th and 12th legions were in danger of being
overwhelmed under the efforts of the whole army of the Nervii, composed
of 60,000 men. These intrepid warriors, led by their chief, Boduognatus,
had dashed across the Sambre in face of the escarpments of the left
bank; they had boldly climbed these, and thrown themselves, in close
rank, upon the two legions of the right wing. These legions were placed
in a position the more critical, as the victorious movements of the left
and centre, by stripping almost entirely of troops that part of the
field of battle, had left them without support. The Nervii take
advantage of these circumstances: some move towards the summit of the
heights to seize the camp, others outflank the two legions on the right
wing (_aperto latere_).
As chance would have it, at this same moment, the cavalry and
light-armed foot, who had been repulsed at the first attack, regained
pell-mell the camp; finding themselves unexpectedly in face of the
enemy, they are confounded, and take to flight again in another
direction. The valets of the army, who, from the Decuman gate and the
summit of the hill, had seen the Romans cross the river victoriously,
and had issued forth in hope of plunder, look back; perceiving the
Nervii in the camp, they fly precipitately. The tumult is further
increased by the cries of the baggage-drivers, who rush about in terror.
Among the auxiliaries in the Roman army, there was a body of Treviran
cavalry, who enjoyed among the Gauls a reputation for valour. When they
saw the camp invaded, the legions pressed and almost surrounded, the
valets, the cavalry, the slingers, the Numidians, separated, dispersed,
and flying on all sides, they believed that all was lost, took the road
for their own country, and proclaimed everywhere in their march that the
Roman army was destroyed.
Cæsar had repaired from the left wing to the other points of the line.
When he arrived at the right wing, he had found the 7th and 12th legions
hotly engaged, the ensigns of the cohorts of the 12th legion collected
on the same point, the soldiers pressed together and mutually
embarrassing each other, all the centurions of the 4th cohort and the
standard-bearer killed; the standard lost; in the other cohorts most of
the centurions were either killed or wounded, and among the latter was
the primipilus Sextius Baculus, a man of rare bravery, who was destined
soon afterwards to save the legion of Galba in the Valais. The soldiers
who still resisted were exhausted, and those of the last ranks were
quitting the ranks to avoid the missiles; new troops of enemies
continually climbed the hill, some advancing to the front against the
Romans, the others turning them on the two wings. In this extreme
danger, Cæsar judges that he can hope for succour only from himself:
having arrived without buckler, he seizes that of a legionary of the
last ranks and rushes to the first line; there, calling the centurions
by their names and exciting the soldiers, he draws the 12th legion
forward, and causes more interval to be made between the files of the
companies in order to facilitate the handling of their swords. His
example and encouraging words restore hope to the combatants and revive
their courage. Each man, under the eyes of their general, shows new
energy, and this heroic devotedness begins to cool the impetuosity of
the enemy. Not far thence, the 7th legion was pressed by a multitude of
assailants. Cæsar orders the tribunes gradually to bring the two legions
back to back, so that each presented its front to the enemy in opposite
directions. Fearing no longer to be taken in the rear, they resist with
firmness, and fight with new ardour. While Cæsar is thus occupied, the
two legions of the rear-guard, which formed the escort of the baggage
(the 13th and 14th), informed of what was taking place, arrive in haste,
and appear in view of the enemy at the top of the hill. On his part, T.
Labienus, who, at the head of the 9th and 10th legions, had made himself
master of the enemy’s camp on the heights of Haumont, discovers what is
passing in the Roman camp. He judges, by the flight of the cavalry and
servants, the greatness of the danger with which Cæsar is threatened,
and sends the 10th legion to his succour, which, re-passing the Sambre,
and climbing the slopes of Neuf-Mesnil, runs in haste to fall upon the
rear of the Nervii.
On the arrival of these re-enforcements, the whole aspect of things
changes: the wounded raise themselves, and support themselves on their
bucklers in order to take part in the action; the valets, seeing the
terror of the enemy, throw themselves unarmed upon men who are armed;
and the cavalry,[265] to efface the disgrace of their flight, seek to
outdo the legionaries in the combat. Meanwhile the Nervii fight with the
courage of despair. When those of the first ranks fall, the nearest take
their places, and mount upon their bodies; they are slain in their turn;
the dead form heaps; the survivors throw, from the top of this mountain
of corpses, their missiles upon the Romans, and send them back their own
_pila_. “How can we, then, be astonished,” says Cæsar, “that such men
dared to cross a broad river, climb its precipitous banks, and overcome
the difficulties of the ground, since nothing appeared too much for
their courage?” They met death to the last man, and 60,000 corpses
covered the field of battle so desperately fought, in which the fortune
of Cæsar had narrowly escaped wreck.
After this struggle, in which, according to the “Commentaries,” the race
and name of the Nervii were nearly annihilated, the old men, women, and
children, who had sought refuge in the middle of the marshes, finding no
hopes of safety, surrendered.[266] In dwelling on the misfortune of
their country, they said that, of 600 senators, there remained only
three; and that, of 60,000 combatants, hardly 500 had survived. Cæsar,
to show his clemency towards the unfortunate who implored it, treated
these remains of the Nervii with kindness; he left them their lands and
towns, and enjoined the neighbouring peoples not only not to molest
them, but even to protect them from all outrage and violence.[267]
[Sidenote: Siege of the _Oppidum_ of the Aduatuci.]
VIII. This victory was gained, no doubt, towards the end of July. Cæsar
detached the 7th legion, under the orders of young P. Crassus, to reduce
the maritime peoples of the shores of the ocean: the Veneti, the Unelli,
the Osismii, the Curiosolitæ, the Essuvii, the Aulerci, and the Redones.
He proceeded in person, with the seven other legions, following the
course of the Sambre, to meet the Aduatuci, who, as we have seen above,
were marching to join the Nervii. They were the descendants of those
Cimbri and Teutones who, in their descent upon the Roman province and
Italy in the year 652, had left on this side the Rhine 6,000 men in
charge of as much of the baggage as was too heavy to be carried with
them. After the defeat of their companions by Marius, and many
vicissitudes, these Germans had established themselves towards the
confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, and had there formed a state.
As soon as the Aduatuci were informed of the disaster of the Nervii,
they returned to their own country, abandoned their towns and forts, and
retired, with all they possessed, into one _oppidum_, remarkably
fortified by nature. Surrounded in every direction by precipitous rocks
of great elevation, it was accessible only on one side by a gentle
slope, at most 100 feet wide, defended by a fosse and double wall of
great height, on which they placed enormous masses of rock and pointed
beams. The mountain on which the citadel of Namur is situated[268]
answers sufficiently to this description. (_See Plate 11._)
On the arrival of the army, they made at first frequent sorties, and
engaged in battles on a small scale. Later, when the place was
surrounded by a countervallation of twelve feet high in a circuit of
15,000 feet,[269] with numerous redoubts, they kept close in their
_oppidum_. The Romans pushed forward their covered galleries, raised a
terrace under shelter of these galleries, and constructed a tower of
timber, intended to be pushed against the wall. At the sight of these
preparations, the Aduatuci, who, like most of the Gauls, despised the
Romans on account of their small stature, addressed the besiegers
ironically from their walls, not understanding how a great machine,
placed at a great distance, could be put in motion by men so diminutive.
But when they saw this tower move and approach the walls, struck with a
sight so strange and so new to them, they sent to implore peace,
demanding, as the only condition, that they should be left in possession
of their arms. Cæsar refused this condition, but declared that, if they
surrendered before the ram had struck their wall, they should be placed,
like the Nervii, under the protection of the Roman people, and preserved
from all violence. The besieged thereupon threw such a quantity of arms
into the fosses that they filled them almost to the height of the wall
and the terrace; yet, as was afterwards discovered, they had retained
about one-third. They threw open their gates, and that day remained
quiet.
The Romans had occupied the town; towards evening, Cæsar ordered them to
leave it, fearing the violences which the soldiers might commit on the
inhabitants during the night. But these, believing that after the
surrender of the place the posts of the countervallation would be
guarded with less care, resume the arms they had concealed, furnish
themselves with bucklers of bark of trees, or wicker, covered hastily
with skins, and, at midnight, attack the part of the works which seems
most easy of access. Fires, prepared by Cæsar, soon announce the attack.
The soldiers rush to the spot from the nearest redoubts; and, though the
enemies fight with the obstinacy of despair, the missiles thrown from
the entrenchments and the towers disperse them, and they are driven back
into the town with a loss of 4,000 men. Next day the gates were broken
in without resistance, and, the town once taken, the inhabitants were
sold publicly to the number of 53,000.[270]
[Sidenote: Subjugation of Armorica by P. Crassus]
IX. Towards the time of the conclusion of this siege (the first days of
September), Cæsar received letters from P. Crassus. This lieutenant
announced that the maritime peoples on the coasts of the ocean, from the
Loire to the Seine, had submitted. On the arrival of this news at Rome,
the Senate decreed fifteen days of thanksgivings.[271]
These successful exploits, and Gaul entirely pacified, gave to the
barbarian peoples so high an opinion of the Roman power, that the
nations beyond the Rhine, particularly the Ubii, sent deputies to Cæsar,
offering hostages and obedience to his orders. Anxious to proceed to
Italy and Illyria, he commanded the deputies to return to him at the
commencement of the following spring, and placed his legions, with the
exception of the 12th, in winter quarters, in the countries of the
Carnutes, the Andes, and the Turones, neighbouring upon the localities
where Crassus had been making war.[272] They were probably _échelonnés_
in the valley of the Loire, between Orleans and Angers.
[Sidenote: Expedition of Galba into the Valais.]
X. Before he departed for Italy, Cæsar sent Servius Galba, with a part
of the cavalry and the 12th legion, into the country of the Nantuates,
the Veragri, and the Seduni (_peoples of Chablais and Lower and Upper
Valais_), whose territory extended from the country of the Allobroges,
Lake Léman, and the Rhone, to the summit of the Alps. His object was to
open an easy communication with Italy by way of these mountains, that
is, by the Simplon and the St. Bernard, where travellers were
continually subject to exactions and vexations. Galba, after some
successful battles, by which all these peoples were subdued, obtained
hostages, placed two cohorts among the Nantuates, and the rest of his
legions in a town of the Veragri called Octodurus (_Martigny_). This
town, situated in a little plain at the bottom of a glen surrounded by
high mountains, was divided into two parts by a river (_the Drance_).
Galba left one bank to the Gauls, and established his troops on the
other, which he fortified with a fosse and rampart.
Several day had passed in the greatest tranquillity, when Galba learnt
suddenly that the Gauls had during the night evacuated the part of the
town which they occupied, and that the Veragri and the Seduni were
appearing in great numbers on the surrounding mountains. The situation
was most critical; for not only could Galba reckon on no succour, but he
had not even finished his retrenchments, or gathered in his provisions
in sufficient quantity. He called together a council, in which it was
decided, in spite of the opinions of some chiefs, who proposed to
abandon the baggage and fight their way out, that they should defend the
camp; but the enemies hardly gave the Romans time to make the necessary
dispositions. Suddenly they rush from all sides towards the
retrenchments, and throw a shower of darts and javelins (_gæsa_). Having
to defend themselves against forces which are continually renewed, they
are obliged to fight all at once, and to move incessantly to the point
that are most threatened. The men who are fatigued, and even the
wounded, cannot quit the place. The combat had lasted six hours: the
Romans were exhausted with fatigue. Already they began to be short of
missiles; already the Gauls, with increasing audacity, were filling up
the fosse and tearing down the palisades; already the Romans were
reduced to the last extremity, when the primipilus, P. Sextius Baculus,
the same who had shown so much energy in the battle of the Sambre, and
C. Volusenus, tribune of the soldiers, advise Galba that the only hope
which remained was in a sally. The suggestion is adopted. At the command
of the centurions, the soldiers confine themselves to parrying the
missiles, and take breath; then, when the signal is given, rushing on
all sides to the gates, they fall upon the enemy, put him to rout, and
make an immense slaughter. Of 30,000 Gauls, about 10,000 were slain.[273]
In spite of this, Galba, not believing himself in safety in so difficult
a country, in the midst of hostile populations, brought back the 12th
legion into the country of the Allobroges, where it wintered.[273]
CHAPTER VI.
(Year of Rome 698.)
(BOOK III. OF THE “COMMENTARIES.”)
WAR OF THE VENETI--VICTORY OVER THE UNELLI--SUBMISSION OF
AQUITAINE--MARCH AGAINST THE MORINI AND THE MENAPII.
[Sidenote: Insurrection of the Maritime Peoples.]
I. While Cæsar was visiting Illyria and the different towns of the
Cisalpine, such as Ravenna and Lucca, war broke out anew in Gaul. The
cause was this. Young P. Crassus was in winter quarters with the 7th
legion among the Andes, near the ocean; as he fell short of wheat, he
sent several prefects and military tribunes to ask for provisions from
the neighbouring peoples. T. Terrasidius was deputed to the Unelli,[274]
M. Trebius Gallus to the Curiosolitæ, and Quintus Velanius, with T.
Silius, to the Veneti. This last people was the most powerful on the
whole coast through its commerce and its navy. Its numerous ships served
to carry on a traffic with the isle of Britain. Possessed of consummate
skill in the art of navigation, it ruled over this part of the ocean.
The Veneti first seized Silius and Velanius, in the hope of obtaining in
exchange for them the return of the hostages given to Crassus. Their
example was soon followed. The Unelli and the Curiosolitæ seized, with
the same design, Trebius and Terrasidius; they entered into an
engagement with the Veneti, through their chiefs, to run the same
fortune, excited the rest of the neighbouring maritime peoples to
recover their liberty, and all together intimated to Crassus that he
must send back the hostages if he wished his tribunes and prefects to be
restored.
Cæsar, then very far distant from the scene of these events, learnt them
from Crassus. He immediately ordered galleys to be constructed on the
Loire, rowers to be fetched from the coast of the Mediterranean, and
sailors and pilots to be procured. These measures having been promptly
executed, he repaired to the army as soon as the season permitted. At
the news of his approach, the Veneti and their allies, conscious that
they had been guilty of throwing into fetters envoys invested with a
character which is inviolable, made preparations proportionate to the
danger with which they saw they were threatened. Above all, they set to
work making their ships ready for action. Their confidence was great:
they knew that the tides would intercept the roads on the sea-coast;
they reckoned on the difficulty of the navigation in those unknown
latitudes, where the ports are few, and on the want of provisions, which
would not permit the Romans to make a long stay in their country.
Their determination once taken, they fortified their _oppida_, and
transported to them the wheat from their fields. Persuaded that the
country of the Veneti would be the first attacked, they gathered
together all their ships, no doubt in the vast estuary formed by the
river Auray in the Bay of Quiberon. (_See Plate 12._) They allied
themselves with the maritime peoples of the coast, from the mouth of the
Loire to that of the Scheldt,[275] and demanded succour from the isle of
Britain.[276]
In spite of the difficulties of this war, Cæsar undertook it without
hesitation. He was influenced by grave motives: the violation of the
right of nations, the rebellion after submission, the coalition of so
many peoples; above all, by the fear that their impunity would be an
encouragement to others. If we believe Strabo, Cæsar, as well as the
Veneti, had other reasons to desire this war: on one side, the latter,
possessed of the commerce of Britain, already suspected the design of
the Roman general to pass into that island, and they sought to deprive
him of the means; and, on the other, Cæsar could not attempt the
dangerous enterprise of a descent on England till after he had destroyed
the fleet of the Veneti, the sole masters of the ocean.[277]
[Sidenote: War against the Veneti.]
II. Be this as it may, in order to prevent new risings, Cæsar divided
his army so as to occupy the country militarily. The lieutenant T.
Labienus, at the head of a part of the cavalry, was sent to the Treviri,
with the mission to visit the Remi and other peoples of Belgic Gaul, to
maintain them in their duty, and to oppose the passage of the Rhine by
the Germans, who were said to have been invited by the Belgæ. P. Crassus
was ordered, with twelve legionary cohorts, and a numerous body of
cavalry, to repair into Aquitaine, to prevent the inhabitants of that
province from swelling the forces of the insurrection. The lieutenant Q.
Titurius Sabinus was detached with three legions to restrain the Unelli,
the Curiosolitæ, and the Lexovii. The young D. Brutus,[278] who had
arrived from the Mediterranean with the galleys,[279] received the
command of the fleet, which was increased by the Gaulish ships borrowed
from the Pictones, the Santones, and other peoples who had submitted.
His instructions enjoined him to sail as soon as possible for the
country of the Veneti. As to Cæsar, he proceeded thither with the rest
of the land army.
The eight legions of the Roman army were then distributed thus: to the
north of the Loire, three legions; in Aquitaine, with Crassus, a legion
and two cohorts; one legion, no doubt, on the fleet; and two legions and
eight cohorts with the general-in-chief, to undertake the war against
the Veneti.[280]
We may admit that Cæsar started from the neighbourhood of Nantes, and
directed his march to the Roche-Bernard, where he crossed the Vilaine.
Having arrived in the country of the Veneti, he resolved to profit by
the time which must pass before the arrival of his fleet to obtain
possession of the principal _oppida_ where the inhabitants took refuge.
Most of these petty fortresses on the coast of the Veneti were situated
at the extremities of tongues of land or promontories; at high tide they
could not be reached by land, while at low tide the approach was
inaccessible to ships, which remained dry on the flats; a double
obstacle to a siege.
The Romans attacked them in the following manner: they constructed on
the land, at low tide, two parallel dykes, at the same time serving for
terraces (_aggere ac molibus_), and forming approaches towards the
place. During the course of construction, the space comprised between
these two dykes continued to be inundated with water at every high tide;
but as soon as they had succeeded in joining them up to the _oppidum_,
this space, where the sea could no longer penetrate, remained finally
dry, and then presented to the besiegers a sort of place of arms useful
in the attack.[281]
With the aid of these long and laborious works, in which the height of
the dykes finished by equalling that of the walls, the Romans succeeded
in taking several of these _oppida_. But all their labours were thrown
away; for, as soon as the Veneti thought themselves no longer safe, they
evacuated the _oppidum_, embarked with all their goods on board their
numerous vessels, and withdrew to the neighbouring _oppida_, the
situations of which offered the same advantages for a new resistance.
The greater part of the fine season had passed away in this manner.
Cæsar, convinced at length that the assistance of his ships was
indispensable, came to the resolution of suspending these laborious and
fruitless operations until the arrival of his fleet; and, that he might
be near at hand to receive it, he encamped to the south of the Bay of
Quiberon, near the coast, on the heights of Saint-Gildas. (_See Plate
12._)
The vessels of the fleet, held back by contrary winds, had not yet been
able to assemble at the mouth of the Loire. As the Veneti had foreseen,
they navigated with difficulty on this vast sea, subject to high tides,
and almost entirely unfurnished with ports. The inexperience of the
sailors, and even the form of the ships, added to their difficulties.
The enemy’s ships, on the contrary, were built and rigged in a manner to
enable them to wrestle with all obstacles; flatter than those of the
Romans, they had less to fear from the shallows and low tide. Built of
oak, they supported the most violent shocks; the front and back, very
lofty, were beyond the reach of the strongest missiles. The beams
(_transtra_), made of pieces of timber a foot thick, were fixed with
iron nails, an inch in bigness; and the anchors were held by iron chains
instead of cables; soft skins, made very thin, served for sails, either
because those peoples were nearly or entirely unacquainted with linen,
or because they regarded the ordinary sails as insufficient to support,
with such heavy ships, the impetuosity of the winds of the ocean. The
Roman ships were superior to them only in agility and the impulse of the
oars. In everything else, those of the Veneti were better adapted to the
nature of the localities and to the heavy seas. By the solidity of their
construction they resisted the ships’ beaks, and by their elevation they
were secure from the missiles, and were difficult to seize with the
grappling-irons (_copulæ_).[282]
[Sidenote: Naval Combat against the Veneti.]
III. The Roman fleet, thanks to a wind from the east or north-east, was
at length enabled to set sail.[283] It quitted the Loire, and directed
its course towards the Bay of Quiberon and Point Saint-Jaques. (_See
Plate 12._) As soon as the Veneti perceived it, they sent out from the
port formed by the river Auray 220 ships well armed and well equipped,
which advanced to encounter it. During this time, the Roman fleet
reached Point Saint-Jaques, where it formed in order of battle near the
shore. That of the Veneti drew up in front of it. The battle took place
under the very eyes of Cæsar and his troops, who occupied the heights on
the shore.
It was the first time that a Roman fleet appeared on the ocean.
Everything conspired to disconcert Brutus, as well as the tribunes of
the soldiers and the centurions who commanded each vessel: the impotence
of the beaks against the Gaulish ships; the height of the enemy’s poops,
which overlooked even the high towers of the Roman vessels; and lastly,
the inefficiency of the missiles thrown upwards. The military chiefs
were hesitating, and had already experienced some loss,[284] when, to
remedy this disadvantage, they imagined a method having some analogy
with that to which Duillius owed his victory over the Carthaginians in
492: they tried to disable the Gaulish vessels by the aid of hooks
(_falces_) similar to those which were used in attacks on fortresses
(_non absimili forma muralium falcium_).[285] The _falx_ was an iron
with a point and sharpened hook, fixed at the end of long poles, which,
suspended to the masts by ropes, received an impulsion similar to that
of the ram. One or more ships approached a Gaulish vessel, and, as soon
as the crew had succeeded in catching with one of these hooks the ropes
which attached the yards to the masts, the sailors rowed away with all
their strength, so as to break or cut the cords. The yards fell; the
disabled vessel was immediately surrounded by the Romans, who boarded
it; and then all depended on mere valour. This manœuvre was
completely successful. The soldiers of the fleet, knowing that no act of
courage could pass unperceived by Cæsar and the land troops, emulated
one another in zeal, and captured several of the enemy’s vessels. The
Gauls prepared to seek their safety in flight. They had already swerved
their ships to the wind, when suddenly there came on a dead calm. This
unexpected occurrence decided the victory. Left without the possibility
of moving, the heavy Gaulish vessels were captured one after another; a
very small number succeeded in gaining the coast under favour of the
night.
The battle, which began at ten o’clock in the morning, had lasted till
sunset. It terminated the war with the Veneti and the other maritime
peoples of the ocean. They lost in it, at one blow, all their youth, all
their principal citizens, and all their fleet; without refuge, without
the means of defending any longer their _oppida_, they surrendered
themselves, bodies and goods. Cæsar, wishing to compel the Gauls in
future to respect the rights of nations, caused the whole Senate to be
put to death and the rest of the inhabitants to be sold for slaves.
Cæsar has been justly reproached with this cruel chastisement; yet this
great man gave such frequent proofs of his clemency towards the
vanquished, that he must have yielded to very powerful political motives
to order an execution so contrary to his habits and temper. Moreover, it
was a sad effect of the war to expose incessantly the chiefs of the
Gallic states to the resentments of the conquerors and the fury of the
mob. While the Roman general punished the Senate of the Veneti for its
revolt and obstinate resistance, the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii
slaughtered theirs because it laboured to prevent them from joining the
insurrection.[286]
[Sidenote: Victory of Sabinus over the Unelli.]
IV. While these events were taking place among the Veneti, Q. Titurius
Sabinus gained a decisive victory over the Unelli. At the head of this
nation, and other states in revolt, was Viridovix, who had been joined,
a few days before, by the Aulerci-Eburovices and the Lexovii. A
multitude of men of no account, who had joined him from all parts of
Gaul, in the hope of pillage, came to increase the number of his troops.
Sabinus, starting, we believe, from the neighbourhood of Angers with his
three legions, arrived in the country of the Unelli, and chose there for
his camp a position which was advantageous in all respects. He
established himself on a hill belonging to the line of heights which
separates the basin of the Sée from that of the Célune, where we now
find the vestiges of a camp called Du Chastellier.[287] (_See Plate
13._) This hill is defended on the west by escarpments; to the north,
the ground descends from the summit by a gentle slope of about 1,000
paces (1,500 mètres) to the banks of the Sée. Viridovix came and took a
position in face of the Roman camp, at a distance of two miles, on the
heights of the right bank of the stream. Every day he deployed his
troops and offered battle in vain. As Sabinus remained prudently shut up
in his camp, his inaction drew upon him the sarcasms of his own
soldiers, and to such a degree the contempt of the enemy, that the
latter advanced to the foot of his entrenchments. He considered that, in
face of so great a number of troops, it was not the duty of a
lieutenant, in the absence of his general-in-chief, to give battle,
without at least having in his favour all the chances of success. But,
not satisfied with having convinced the enemies of his weakness, he
determined further to make use of a stratagem; he persuaded a clever and
cunning Gaul to repair to Viridovix, under pretence of being a
deserter, and to spread the report that the Romans, during the following
night, would quit secretly their camp, in order to go to the succour of
Cæsar. At this news, the barbarians cried out that they must seize the
favourable opportunity to march against the Romans, and let none of them
escape. Full of ardour, they compelled Viridovix to give the order for
arming. Already confident of victory, they loaded themselves with
branches and brushwood to fill up the fosses, and rushed to attack the
retrenchments. In the hope of not giving time to the Romans to assemble
and arm, they advance with rapidity, and arrive out of breath. But
Sabinus was prepared, and, at the opportune moment, he gives the order
to issue suddenly by the two gates, and to fall upon the enemies while
they were encumbered with their burdens. The advantage of the locality,
the unskilfulness and fatigue of the Gauls, and the valour of the
Romans, all contributed to their success. The barbarians, pursued by the
cavalry, were cut to pieces. The neighbouring peoples immediately
submitted.
Cæsar and Sabinius received intelligence at the same time, one of the
victory over the Unelli, the other of the result of the combat against
the Veneti.[288]
[Sidenote: Conquest of Aquitaine by P. Crassus.]
V. Almost at the same time, P. Crassus, detached, as we have seen, with
twelve cohorts and a body of cavalry, arrived in Aquitaine, which,
according to the “Commentaries,” formed the third part of Gaul.[289] He
believed that he could not display too much prudence in a country
where, a few years before, the lieutenant L. Valerius Præconinus had
lost his army and his life, and the proconsul L. Mallius had experienced
a great defeat. Having provided for supplies, assembled the auxiliaries,
and chosen by name the most courageous men of Toulouse and Narbonne, he
led his army into the lands of the Sotiates, who, very numerous, and
strong especially in excellent cavalry, attacked the Roman army during
its march. Their horsemen were at first repulsed and pursued; but,
suddenly unmasking their infantry, which lay in ambush in a defile (_in
convalle_), they charge the Romans as they were dispersed, and the
battle re-commenced with fury.
Proud of their ancient victories, the Sotiates expected by their valour
to save Aquitaine; on their side, the troops of Crassus sought to show
what they could do under a young chief, at a distance from their general
and the other legions. The victory in the end remained with the Romans.
Crassus pursued his march, and having arrived before the _oppidum_ of
the Sotiates (the town of _Sos_), attempted to carry it by assault; but
the vigorous resistance he met with obliged him to have recourse to
covered galleries and towers. The enemies had recourse sometimes to
sallies, sometimes to subterranean galleries, carried so far that they
went under the works of the besiegers (a labour familiar to the
Aquitanians on account of the numerous mines they worked); yet, all
their efforts failing against the activity of the Roman soldiers, they
made offers to surrender. Crassus accepted their submission, and the
Sotiates delivered up their arms. During the capitulation,
Adiatunnus,[290] supreme chief of the country, followed by 600 trusty
men of the class called _soldures_, attempted a sally from another side
of the town. At the clamours which arose, the Romans ran to arms, and,
after a severe struggle, drove him back into the _oppidum_;
nevertheless, Crassus granted him the same terms as the others.
When he had received their arms and hostages, Crassus started for the
countries of the Vasates and the Tarusates. But these barbarians, far
from being discouraged by the so prompt fall of an _oppidum_ fortified
by nature and art, leagued together, raised troops, and demanded succour
and chiefs of the peoples of Citerior Spain, which joined upon
Aquitaine. Formerly companions in arms of Q. Sertorius, these chiefs
enjoyed a great military reputation, and, in their tactics as well as in
their method of fortifying their camps, imitated the Romans. Crassus had
too few troops to spread them far from him, while the enemies threw out
detachments on all sides, who intercepted his provisions. At last, as he
saw their numbers increasing daily, he became convinced that there was
danger in deferring a battle. He assembled his council; which was of the
same opinion, and the combat was fixed for the morrow.
At daybreak, the Roman troops issued from the camp and formed in two
lines, with the auxiliaries in the centre; in this position they awaited
the enemy. The latter, trusting in their numbers, full of recollections
of their ancient glory, imagined that they could easily overpower the
weak Roman army. Still they thought it more prudent to obtain the
victory without a blow, persuaded that by intercepting his provisions
they would force Crassus to a retreat, and that they should then attack
with advantage in the confusion of his march. They therefore remained
shut up in their camp, and let the Romans range their troops and offer
battle. But this deliberate temporising, which had all the appearance of
fear, kindled, on the contrary, that of the Romans: they demanded with
loud cries to march against the enemy without delay. Crassus yields to
their impatience, and leads them forward. Some fill the fosse, others
drive away with a shower of missiles the barbarians who stand on the
rampart. The auxiliaries, on whom Crassus placed little reliance for
action, render, nevertheless, important services: they pass the stones
and missiles, or carry heaps of turf to fill up the fosse. Meanwhile the
enemy was offering an obstinate resistance, when some of the cavalry
brought information to Crassus that, on the side of the Decuman gate,
the camp was not so well fortified, and that the access was more
easy.[291] He then directs the prefects of the cavalry to excite the
ardour of the soldiers with the hope of recompenses; orders them to take
the cohorts who, left to guard the camp, had not yet been engaged in
the battle, and to
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