Thirty Years' View (Vol. 2 of 2)
by Thomas Hart Benton · English · Gutenberg #44837 · 4,143,379 chars · public domain (US)
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Thirty Years' View (Vol. 2 of 2)
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.
Title: Thirty Years' View (Vol. 2 of 2)
Author: Thomas Hart Benton
Release date: February 5, 2014 [eBook #44837]
Most recently updated: October 24, 2024
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44837
Credits: Produced by Curtis Weyant, Julia Neufeld and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
file was produced from images generously made available
by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THIRTY YEARS' VIEW (VOL. 2 OF 2) ***
Transcriber's note:
Text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_).
Small capital text has been replaced with all capitals.
Text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=).
The carat character (^) indicates that the following letter is
superscripted. If two or more letters are superscripted they are
enclosed in curly brackets (example: M^{R.}).
* * * * *
[Illustration: titlepage]
[Illustration: _J. Rodgers, sc._
_View of the Senate of the United States in Session._
M^{R.} BENTON ON THE FLOOR.
_from a large Engraving Published by E. Anthony_
New York, D Appleton & C^{o.}]
THIRTY YEARS' VIEW;
OR,
A HISTORY OF THE WORKING OF THE AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT FOR THIRTY YEARS,
FROM 1820 TO 1850.
CHIEFLY TAKEN
FROM THE CONGRESS DEBATES, THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF GENERAL JACKSON,
AND THE SPEECHES OF EX-SENATOR BENTON, WITH HIS
ACTUAL VIEW OF MEN AND AFFAIRS:
WITH
HISTORICAL NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS, AND SOME NOTICES OF EMINENT
DECEASED COTEMPORARIES.
BY A SENATOR OF THIRTY YEARS.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. II.
NEW YORK:
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,
1, 3, AND 5 BOND STREET.
LONDON: 16 LITTLE BRITAIN.
1883.
Entered according to act of Congress, in the year 1856, by
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY,
in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the
Southern District of New York.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.
CHAP. PAGE
I. Inauguration of Mr. Van Buren 7
II. Financial and Monetary Crisis--General Suspension
of Specie Payments by the Banks 9
III. Preparation for the Distress and Suspension 11
IV. Progress of the Distress, and Preliminaries
for the Suspension 16
V. Actual Suspension of the Banks--Propagation
of the Alarm 20
VI. Transmigration of the Bank of the United
States from a Federal to a State Institution 23
VII. Effects of the Suspension--General Derangement
of Business--Suppression and Ridicule
of the Specie Currency--Submission
of the People--Call of Congress 26
VIII. Extra Session--Message, and Recommendations 28
IX. Attacks on the Message--Treasury Notes 32
X. Retention of the Fourth Deposit Instalment 36
XI. Independent Treasury and Hard Money Payments 39
XII. Attempted Resumption of Specie Payments 42
XIII. Bankrupt Act against Banks 43
XIV. Bankrupt Act for Banks--Mr. Benton's
Speech 45
XV. Divorce of Bank and State--Mr. Benton's
Speech 56
XVI. First Regular Session under Mr. Van Buren's
Administration--His Message 65
XVII. Pennsylvania Bank of the United States--Its
Use of the Defunct Notes of the expired
Institution 67
XVIII. Florida Indian War--Its Origin and Conduct 70
XIX. Florida Indian War--Historical Speech of
Mr. Benton 72
XX. Resumption of Specie Payments by the New
York Banks 83
XXI. Resumption of Specie Payments--Historical
Notices--Mr. Benton's Speech--Extracts 85
XXII. Mr. Clay's Resolution in Favor of Resuming
Banks, and Mr. Benton's Remarks
upon it 91
XXIII. Resumption by the Pennsylvania United
States Bank; and others which followed
her lead 94
XXIV. Proposed Annexation of Texas--Mr. Preston's
Motion and Speech--Extracts 94
XXV. Debate between Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun,
Personal and Political, and leading
to Expositions and Vindications of
Public Conduct which belong to History 97
XXVI. Debate between Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun--Mr.
Clay's Speech--Extracts 101
XXVII. Debate between Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun--Mr.
Calhoun's Speech--Extracts 103
XXVIII. Debate between Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun--Rejoinders
by each 112
XXIX. Independent Treasury, or, Divorce of
Bank and State--Passed in the Senate--Lost
in the House of Representatives 124
XXX. Public Lands--Graduation of Price--Pre-emption
System--Taxation when Sold 125
XXXI. Specie Basis for Banks--One-third of the
Amount of Liabilities the Lowest Safe
Proportion--Speech of Mr. Benton on
the Recharter of the District Banks 128
XXXII. The North and the South--Comparative
Prosperity--Southern Discontent--Its
True Cause 130
XXXIII. Progress of the Slavery Agitation--Mr. Calhoun's
Approval of the Missouri Compromise 134
XXXIV. Death of Commodore Rodgers, and Notice
of his Life and Character 144
XXXV. Anti-duelling Act 148
XXXVI. Slavery Agitation in the House of Representatives,
and Retiring of Southern
Members from the Hall 150
XXXVII. Abolitionists Classified by Mr. Clay--Ultras
Denounced--Slavery Agitators
North and South Equally denounced
as Dangerous to the Union 154
XXXVIII. Bank of the United States--Resignation
of Mr. Biddle--Final Suspension 157
XXXIX. First Session Twenty-sixth Congress--Members--
Organization--Political Map of the House 158
XL. First Session of the Twenty-sixth Congress--President's
Message 162
XLI. Divorce of Bank and State--Divorce decreed 164
XLII. Florida Armed Occupation Bill--Mr.
Benton's Speech--Extracts 167
XLIII. Assumption of the State Debts 171
XLIV. Assumption of the State Debts--Mr. Benton's
Speech--Extracts 172
XLV. Death of General Samuel Smith, of Maryland;
and Notice of his Life and Character 176
XLVI. Salt--the Universality of its Supply--Mystery
and Indispensability of its Use--Tyranny
and Impiety of its Taxation--Speech
of Mr. Benton--Extracts 176
XLVII. Pairing off 178
XLVIII. Tax on Bank Notes--Mr. Benton's Speech--Extracts 179
XLIX. Liberation of Slaves belonging to American
Citizens in British Colonial Ports 182
L. Resignation of Senator Hugh Lawson
White of Tennessee--His Death--Some
Notice of his Life and Character 184
LI. Death of Ex-Senator Hayne of South Carolina--Notice
of his Life and Character 186
LII. Abolition of Specific Duties by the Compromise
Act of 1833--Its Error, and
Loss to the Revenue, shown by Experience 189
LIII. Refined Sugar and Rum Drawbacks--their
Abuse under the Compromise
Act of 1833--Mr. Benton's Speech 190
LIV. Fishing Bounties and Allowances, and
their Abuse--Mr. Benton's Speech--Extracts 194
LV. Expenditures of the Government 198
LVI. Expenses of the Government, Comparative
and Progressive, and Separated
from Extraordinaries 200
LVII. Death of Mr. Justice Barbour of the Supreme
Court, and Appointment of Peter
V. Daniel, Esq., in his place 202
LVIII. Presidential Election 203
LIX. Conclusion of Mr. Van Buren's Administration 207
LX. Inauguration of President Harrison--His
Cabinet--Call of Congress--and Death 209
LXI. Accession of the Vice-President to the
Presidency 211
LXII. Twenty-seventh Congress--First Session--List
of Members, and Organization of
the House 213
LXIII. First Message of Mr. Tyler to Congress,
and Mr. Clay's Programme of Business 215
LXIV. Repeal of the Independent Treasury Act 219
LXV. Repeal of the Independent Treasury Act--Mr.
Benton's Speech 220
LXVI. The Bankrupt Act--What it was--and
how it was Passed 229
LXVII. Bankrupt Bill--Mr. Benton's Speech--Extracts 234
LXVIII. Distribution of the Public Land Revenue,
and Assumption of the State
Debts 240
LXIX. Institution of the Hour Rule in Debate
in the House of Representatives--Its
Attempt, and Repulse in the Senate 247
LXX. Bill for the Relief of Mrs. Harrison,
Widow of the late President of the
United States 257
LXXI. Mrs. Harrison's Bill--Speech of Mr.
Benton--Extracts 262
LXXII. Abuse of the Naval Pension System--Vain
attempt to Correct it 265
LXXIII. Home Squadron, and Aid to Private
Steam Lines 271
LXXIV. Recharter of the District Banks--Mr.
Benton's Speech--Extracts 273
LXXV. Revolt in Canada--Border Sympathy--Firmness
of Mr. Van Buren--Public
Peace Endangered--and Preserved--Case
of McLeod 276
LXXVI. Destruction of the Caroline--Arrest and
Trial of McLeod--Mr. Benton's
Speech--Extracts 291
LXXVII. Refusal of the House to allow Recess
Committees 304
LXXVIII. Reduction of the Expense of Foreign
Missions by reducing the Number 305
LXXIX. Infringement of the Tariff Compromise
Act of 1833--Correction of Abuses in
Drawbacks 307
LXXX. National Bank--First Bill 317
LXXXI. Second Fiscal Agent--Bill Presented--Passed--Disapproved
by the President 331
LXXXII. Secret History of the Second Bill for a
Fiscal Agent, called Fiscal Corporation--Its
Origin with Mr. Tyler--Its
Progress through Congress under his
Lead--Its Rejection under his Veto 342
LXXXIII. The Veto Message hissed in the Senate
Galleries 350
LXXXIV. Resignation of Mr. Tyler's Cabinet 353
LXXXV. Repudiation of Mr. Tyler by the Whig
Party--their Manifesto--Counter
Manifesto by Mr. Caleb Cushing 357
LXXXVI. The Danish Sound Dues 362
LXXXVII. Last Notice of the Bank of the United
States 365
LXXXVIII. End and Results of the Extra Session 372
LXXXIX. First Annual Message of President Tyler 373
XC. Third Plan for a Fiscal Agent, called
Exchequer Board--Mr. Benton's
Speech against it--Extracts 376
XCI. The Third Fiscal Agent, entitled a
Board of Exchequer 394
XCII. Attempted Repeal of the Bankrupt Act 395
XCIII. Death of Lewis Williams, of North
Carolina, and Notice of his Life and
Character 396
XCIV. The Civil List Expenses--the Contingent
Expenses of Congress--and the
Revenue Collection Expense 397
XCV. Resignation and Valedictory of Mr. Clay 398
XCVI. Military Department--Progress of its Expense 404
XCVII. Paper Money Payments--Attempted by
the Federal Government--Resisted--Mr.
Benton's Speech 406
XCVIII. Case of the American Brig Creole with
Slaves for New Orleans, carried by Mutiny
into Nassau, and the Slaves Liberated 409
XCIX. Distress of the Treasury--Three Tariff Bills,
and Two Vetoes--End of the Compromise
Act 413
C. Mr. Tyler and the Whig Party--Confirmed
Separation 417
CI. Lord Ashburton's Mission, and the British
Treaty 420
CII. British Treaty--The Pretermitted Subjects--Mr.
Benton's Speech--Extracts 426
CIII. British Treaty--Northeastern Boundary
Article--Mr. Benton's Speech--Extracts 438
CIV. British Treaty--Northwestern Boundary--Mr.
Benton's Speech--Extracts 441
CV. British Treaty--Extradition Article--Mr.
Benton's Speech--Extract 444
CVI. British Treaty--African Squadron for the
Suppression of the Slave Trade--Mr.
Benton's Speech--Extract 449
CVII. Expense of the Navy--Waste of Money--Necessity
of a Naval Peace Establishment,
and of a Naval Policy 452
CVIII. Expenses of the Navy--Mr. Benton's Speech--Extracts 456
CIX. Message of the President at the Opening
of the Regular Session of 1842-'3 460
CX. Repeal of the Bankrupt Act--Mr. Benton's
Speech--Extracts 463
CXI. Military Academy and Army Expenses 466
CXII. Emigration to the Columbia River, and
Foundation of its Settlement by American
Citizens--Frémont's First Expedition 468
CXIII. Lieutenant Frémont's First Expedition--Speech,
and Motion of Senator Linn 478
CXIV. Oregon Colonization Act--Mr. Benton's
Speech 479
CXV. Navy Pay and Expenses--Proposed Reduction--Speech
of Mr. Meriwether, of Georgia--Extracts 482
CXVI. Eulogy on Senator Linn--Speeches of Mr.
Benton and Mr. Crittenden 485
CXVII. The Coast Survey--Attempt to diminish
its Expense, and to expedite its Completion
by restoring the Work to Naval and
Military Officers 487
CXVIII. Death of Commodore Porter, and Notice of
his Life and Character 491
CXIX. Refunding of General Jackson's Fine 499
CXX. Repeal of the Bankrupt Act--Attack of
Mr. Cushing on Mr. Clay--Its Rebuke 503
CXXI. Naval Expenditures and Administration--Attempts
at Reform--Abortive 507
CXXII. Chinese Mission--Mr. Cushing's Appointment
and Negotiation 510
CXXIII. The Alleged Mutiny, and the Executions
(as they were called) on Board the United
States man-of-war, Somers 522
CXXIV. Retirement of Mr. Webster from Mr.
Tyler's Cabinet 562
CXXV. Death of William H. Crawford 562
CXXVI. First Session of the Twenty-eighth
Congress--List of Members--Organization
of the House of Representatives 563
CXXVII. Mr. Tyler's Second Annual Message 565
CXXVIII. Explosion of the Great Gun on Board
the Princeton man-of-war--the Killed
and Wounded 567
CXXIX. Reconstruction of Mr. Tyler's Cabinet 569
CXXX. Death of Senator Porter, of Louisiana--Eulogium
of Mr. Benton 569
CXXXI. Naval Academy, and Naval Policy of
the United States 571
CXXXII. The Home Squadron--Its Inutility and
Expense 575
CXXXIII. Professor Morse--His Electro-Magnetic
Telegraph 578
CXXXIV. Frémont's Second Expedition 579
CXXXV. Texas Annexation--Secret Origin--Bold
Intrigue for the Presidency 581
CXXXVI. Democratic Convention for the Nomination
of Presidential Candidates 591
CXXXVII. Presidential--Democratic National Convention--Mr.
Calhoun's Refusal to
Submit his Name to it--His Reasons 596
CXXXVIII. Annexation of Texas--Secret Negotiation--Presidential
Intrigue--Schemes
of Speculation and Disunion 599
CXXXIX. Texas Annexation Treaty--First Speech
of Mr. Benton against it--Extracts 600
CXL. Texas or Disunion--Southern Convention--Mr.
Benton's Speech--Extracts 613
CXLI. Texas or Disunion--Violent Demonstrations
in the South--Southern Convention
proposed 616
CXLII. Rejection of the Annexation Treaty--Proposal
of Mr. Benton's Plan 619
CXLIII. Oregon Territory--Conventions of 1818
and 1828--Joint Occupation--Attempted
Notice to Terminate it 624
CXLIV. Presidential Election 625
CXLV. Amendment of the Constitution--Election
of President and Vice-President--Mr.
Benton's Plan 626
CXLVI. The President and the Senate--Want
of Concord--Numerous Rejections of
Nominations 629
CXLVII. Mr. Tyler's Last Message to Congress 631
CXLVIII. Legislative Admission of Texas into the
Union as a State 632
CXLIX. The War with Mexico--Its Cause--Charged
on the Conduct of Mr. Calhoun--Mr.
Benton's Speech 639
CL. Mr. Polk's Inaugural Address--Cabinet 649
CLI. Mr. Blair and the Globe superseded as
the Administration Organ--Mr. T. Ritchie
and the Daily Union substituted 650
CLII. Twenty-ninth Congress--List of Members--First
Session--Organization of
the House 655
CLIII. Mr. Polk's First Annual Message to
Congress 657
CLIV. Death of John Forsyth 659
CLV. Admission of Florida and Iowa 660
CLVI. Oregon Treaty--Negotiations commenced,
and broken off 660
CLVII. Oregon Question--Notice to abrogate the
Article in the Treaty for a Joint Occupation--The
President denounced in
the Senate for a supposed Leaning to
the Line of Forty-nine 662
CLVIII. Oregon Territorial Government--Boundaries
and History of the Country--Frazer's
River--Treaty of Utrecht--Mr.
Benton's Speech--Extracts 667
CLIX. Oregon Joint Occupation--Notice authorized
for terminating it--British Government
offers the Line of 49--Quandary of
the Administration--Device--Senate
Consulted--Treaty made and Ratified 673
CLX. Meeting of the Second Session of the 29th
Congress--President's Message--Vigorous
Prosecution of the War Recommended--Lieutenant-general
proposed to be created 677
CLXI. War with Mexico--The War Declared,
and an Intrigue for Peace commenced
the same Day 679
CLXII. Bloodless Conquest of New Mexico--How
it was Done--Subsequent Bloody Insurrection,
and its Cause 682
CLXIII. Mexican War--Doniphan's Expedition--Mr.
Benton's Salutatory Address, St.
Louis, Missouri 684
CLXIV. Frémont's Third Expedition, and Acquisition
of California 688
CLXV. Pause in the War--Sedentary Tactics--"Masterly
Inactivity" 693
CLXVI. The Wilmot Proviso--Or, Prohibition of
Slavery in the Territories--Its Inutility
and Mischief 694
CLXVII. Mr. Calhoun's Slavery Resolutions, and
Denial of the Right of Congress to Prohibit
Slavery in a Territory 696
CLXVIII. The Slavery Agitation--Disunion--Key
to Mr. Calhoun's Policy--Forcing the
Issue--Mode of Forcing it 698
CLXIX. Death of Silas Wright, Ex-Senator and
Ex-Governor of New York 700
CLXX. Thirtieth Congress--First Session--List of
Members--President's Message 702
CLXXI. Death of Senator Barrow--Mr. Benton's
Eulogium 706
CLXXII. Death of Mr. Adams 707
CLXXIII. Downfall of Santa Anna--New Government
in Mexico--Peace Negotiations--Treaty
of Peace 709
CLXXIV. Oregon Territorial Government--Anti-Slavery
Ordinance of 1787 applied to
Oregon Territory--Missouri Compromise
Line of 1820, and the Texas Annexation
Renewal of it in 1845, affirmed 711
CLXXV. Mr. Calhoun's New Dogma on Territorial
Slavery--Self-extension of the Slavery
Part of the Constitution to Territories 713
CLXXVI. Court-martial of Lieutenant-colonel Frémont 715
CLXXVII. Frémont's Fourth Expedition, and Great
Disaster in the Snows at the Head of
the Rio Grande del Norte--Subsequent
Discovery of the Pass he sought 719
CLXXVIII. Presidential Election 722
CLXXIX. Last Message of Mr. Polk 724
CLXXX. Financial Working of the Government
under the Hard Money System 726
CLXXXI. Coast Survey--Belongs to the Navy--Converted
into a Separate Department--Expense
and Interminability--Should
be done by the Navy,
as in Great Britain--Mr. Benton's
Speech--Extract 726
CLXXXII. Proposed Extension of the Constitution
of the United States to the Territories,
with a View to make it carry
Slavery into California, Utah and
New Mexico 729
CLXXXIII. Progress of the Slavery Agitation--Meeting
of Members from the Slave
States--Inflammatory Address to
the Southern States 733
CLXXXIV. Inauguration of President Taylor--His
Cabinet 737
CLXXXV. Death of Ex-President Polk 737
CLXXXVI. Thirty-first Congress--First Session--List
of Members--Organization of
the House 738
CLXXXVII. First and only Annual Message of
President Taylor 740
CLXXXVIII. Mr. Clay's Plan of Compromise 742
CLXXXIX. Extension of the Missouri Compromise
Line to the Pacific Ocean--Mr.
Davis, of Mississippi, and Mr.
Clay--The Wilmot Proviso 743
CXC. Mr. Calhoun's Last Speech--Dissolution
of the Union proclaimed unless
the Constitution was amended,
and a Dual Executive appointed--one
President from the Slave States
and one from the Free States 744
CXCI. Death of Mr. Calhoun--His Eulogium
by Senator Butler 747
CXCII. Mr. Clay's Plan of Slavery Compromise--Mr.
Benton's Speech Against
it--Extracts 749
CXCIII. Death of President Taylor 765
CXCIV. Inauguration and Cabinet of Mr. Fillmore 767
CXCV. Rejection of Mr. Clay's Plan of Compromise 768
CXCVI. The Admission of the State of California--Protest
of Southern Senators--Remarks
upon it by Mr. Benton 769
CXCVII. Fugitive Slaves; Ordinance of 1787--The
Constitution--Act of 1793--Act
of 1850 773
CXCVIII. Disunion Movements--Southern Press
at Washington--Southern Convention
at Nashville--Southern Congress
called for by South Carolina
and Mississippi 780
CXCIX. The Supreme Court--Its Judges,
Clerk, Attorney-Generals, Reporters
and Marshals during the Period
treated of in this Volume 787
CC. Conclusion 787
THIRTY YEARS' VIEW.
ADMINISTRATION OF MARTIN VAN BUREN.
CHAPTER I.
INAUGURATION OF MR. VAN BUREN.
March the 4th of this year, Mr. Van Buren was inaugurated President
of the United States with the usual formalities, and conformed to
the usage of his predecessors in delivering a public address on the
occasion: a declaration of general principles, and an indication
of the general course of the administration, were the tenor of his
discourse: and the doctrines of the democratic school, as understood
at the original formation of parties, were those professed. Close
observance of the federal constitution as written--no latitudinarian
constructions permitted, or doubtful powers assumed--faithful
adherence to all its compromises--economy in the administration of
the government--peace, friendship and fair dealing with all foreign
nations--entangling alliances with none: such was his political
chart: and with the expression of his belief that a perseverance
in this line of foreign policy, with an increased strength, tried
valor of the people, and exhaustless resources of the country,
would entitle us to the good will of nations, protect our national
respectability, and secure us from designed aggression from foreign
powers. His expressions and views on this head deserve to be
commemorated, and to be considered by all those into whose hands the
management of the public affairs may go; and are, therefore, here
given in his own words:
"Our course of foreign policy has been so uniform and
intelligible, as to constitute a rule of executive conduct
which leaves little to my discretion, unless, indeed, I were
willing to run counter to the lights of experience, and the
known opinions of my constituents. We sedulously cultivate the
friendship of all nations, as the condition most compatible
with our welfare, and the principles of our government. We
decline alliances, as adverse to our peace. We desire commercial
relations on equal terms, being ever willing to give a fair
equivalent for advantages received. We endeavor to conduct our
intercourse with openness and sincerity; promptly avowing our
objects, and seeking to establish that mutual frankness which is
as beneficial in the dealings of nations as of men. We have no
disposition, and we disclaim all right, to meddle in disputes,
whether internal or foreign, that may molest other countries;
regarding them, in their actual state, as social communities,
and preserving a strict neutrality in all their controversies.
Well knowing the tried valor of our people, and our exhaustless
resources, we neither anticipate nor fear any designed
aggression; and, in the consciousness of our own just conduct,
we feel a security that we shall never be called upon to exert
our determination, never to permit an invasion of our rights,
without punishment or redress."
These are sound and encouraging views, and in adherence to them,
promise to the United States a career of peace and prosperity
comparatively free from the succession of wars which have loaded
so many nations with debt and taxes, filled them with so many
pensioners and paupers, created so much necessity for permanent
fleets and armies; and placed one half the population in the
predicament of living upon the labor of the other. The stand which
the United States had acquired among nations by the vindication of
her rights against the greatest powers--and the manner in which
all unredressed aggressions, and all previous outstanding injuries,
even of the oldest date, had been settled up and compensated under
the administration of President Jackson--authorized this language
from Mr. Van Buren; and the subsequent conduct of nations has
justified it. Designed aggression, within many years, has come from
no great power: casual disagreements and accidental injuries admit
of arrangement: weak neighbors can find no benefit to themselves
in wanton aggression, or refusal of redress for accidental wrong:
isolation (a continent, as it were, to ourselves) is security
against attack; and our railways would accumulate rapid destruction
upon any invader. These advantages, and strict adherence to the
rule, to ask only what is right, and submit to nothing wrong, will
leave us (we have reason to believe) free from hostile collision
with foreign powers, free from the necessity of keeping up war
establishments of army and navy in time of peace, with our great
resources left in the pockets of the people (always the safest and
cheapest national treasuries), to come forth when public exigencies
require them, and ourselves at liberty to pursue an unexampled
career of national and individual prosperity.
One single subject of recently revived occurrence in our domestic
concerns, and of portentous apparition, admitted a departure from
the generalities of an inaugural address, and exacted from the
new President the notice of a special declaration: it was the
subject of slavery--an alarming subject of agitation near twenty
years before--quieted by the Missouri compromise--resuscitated in
1835, as shown in previous chapters of this View; and apparently
taking its place as a permanent and most pestiferous element in
our presidential elections and federal legislation. It had largely
mixed with the presidential election of the preceding year: it was
expected to mix with ensuing federal legislation: and its evil
effect upon the harmony and stability of the Union justified the
new President in making a special declaration in relation to it,
and even in declaring beforehand the cases of slavery legislation
in which he would apply the qualified negative with which the
constitution invested him over the acts of Congress. Under this
sense of duty and propriety the inaugural address presented this
passage:
"The last, perhaps the greatest, of the prominent sources of
discord and disaster supposed to lurk in our political condition,
was the institution of domestic slavery. Our forefathers were deeply
impressed with the delicacy of this subject, and they treated it
with a forbearance so evidently wise, that, in spite of every
sinister foreboding, it never, until the present period disturbed
the tranquillity of our common country. Such a result is sufficient
evidence of the justice and the patriotism of their course; it is
evidence not to be mistaken, that an adherence to it can prevent all
embarrassment from this, as well as from every other anticipated
cause of difficulty or danger. Have not recent events made it
obvious to the slightest reflection, that the least deviation from
this spirit of forbearance is injurious to every interest, that of
humanity included? Amidst the violence of excited passions, this
generous and fraternal feeling has been sometimes disregarded;
and, standing as I now do before my countrymen in this high place
of honor and of trust, I cannot refrain from anxiously invoking my
fellow-citizens never to be deaf to its dictates. Perceiving, before
my election, the deep interest this subject was beginning to excite,
I believed it a solemn duty fully to make known my sentiments in
regard to it; and now, when every motive for misrepresentations
have passed away, I trust that they will be candidly weighed and
understood. At least, they will be my standard of conduct in the
path before me. I then declared that, if the desire of those of my
countrymen who were favorable to my election was gratified, 'I must
go into the presidential chair the inflexible and uncompromising
opponent of every attempt, on the part of Congress, to abolish
slavery in the District of Columbia, against the wishes of the
slaveholding States; and also with a determination equally decided
to resist the slightest interference with it in the States where
it exists.' I submitted also to my fellow-citizens, with fulness
and frankness, the reasons which led me to this determination. The
result authorizes me to believe that they have been approved, and
are confided in, by a majority of the people of the United States,
including those whom they most immediately affect. It now only
remains to add, that no bill conflicting with these views can ever
receive my constitutional sanction. These opinions have been adopted
in the firm belief that they are in accordance with the spirit that
actuated the venerated fathers of the republic, and that succeeding
experience has proved them to be humane, patriotic, expedient,
honorable and just. If the agitation of this subject was intended
to reach the stability of our institutions, enough has occurred to
show that it has signally failed; and that in this, as in every
other instance, the apprehensions of the timid and the hopes of the
wicked for the destruction of our government, are again destined to
be disappointed."
The determination here declared to yield the presidential sanction
to no bill which proposed to interfere with slavery in the States;
or to abolish it in the District of Columbia while it existed in
the adjacent States, met the evil as it then presented itself--a
fear on the part of some of the Southern States that their rights of
property were to be endangered by federal legislation: and against
which danger the veto power was now pledged to be opposed. There was
no other form at that time in which slavery agitation could manifest
itself, or place on which it could find a point to operate--the
ordinance of 1787, and the compromise of 1820, having closed up the
Territories against it. Danger to slave property in the States,
either by direct action, or indirectly through the District of
Columbia, were the only points of expressed apprehension; and
at these there was not the slightest ground for fear. No one in
Congress dreamed of interfering with slavery in the States, and the
abortion of all the attempts made to abolish it in the District,
showed the groundlessness of that fear. The pledged veto was not a
necessity, but a propriety;--not necessary, but prudential;--not
called for by anything in congress, but outside of it. In that
point of view it was wise and prudent. It took from agitation its
point of support--its means of acting on the fears and suspicions
of the timid and credulous: and it gave to the country a season of
repose and quiet from this disturbing question until a new point of
agitation could be discovered and seized.
The cabinet remained nearly as under the previous administration:
Mr. Forsyth, Secretary of State; Mr. Woodbury, Secretary of the
Treasury; Mr. Poinsett, Secretary at War; Mr. Mahlon Dickerson,
Secretary of the Navy; Mr. Amos Kendall, Postmaster General; and
Benjamin F. Butler, Esq. Attorney General. Of all these Mr. Poinsett
was the only new appointment. On the bench of the Supreme Court,
John Catron, Esq. of Tennessee, and John McKinley, Esq. of Alabama,
were appointed Justices; William Smith, formerly senator in Congress
from South Carolina, having declined the appointment which was
filled by Mr. McKinley. Mr. Butler soon resigning his place of
Attorney General, Henry D. Gilpin, Esq. of Pennsylvania (after a
temporary appointment of Felix Grundy, Esq. of Tennessee), became
the Attorney General during the remainder of the administration.
CHAPTER II.
FINANCIAL AND MONETARY CRISIS: GENERAL SUSPENSION OF SPECIE
PAYMENTS BY THE BANKS.
The nascent administration of the new President was destined to
be saluted by a rude shock, and at the point most critical to
governments as well as to individuals--that of deranged finances and
broken-up treasury; and against the dangers of which I had in vain
endeavored to warn our friends. A general suspension of the banks,
a depreciated currency, and the insolvency of the federal treasury,
were at hand. Visible signs, and some confidential information,
portended to me this approaching calamity, and my speeches in the
Senate were burthened with its vaticination. Two parties, inimical
to the administration, were at work to accomplish it--politicians
and banks; and well able to succeed, because the government money
was in the hands of the banks, and the federal legislation in the
hands of the politicians; and both interested in the overthrow of
the party in power;--and the overthrow of the finances the obvious
means to the accomplishment of the object. The public moneys had
been withdrawn from the custody of the Bank of the United States:
the want of an independent, or national treasury, of necessity,
placed them in the custody of the local banks: and the specie order
of President Jackson having been rescinded by the Act of Congress,
the notes of all these banks, and of all others in the country,
amounting to nearly a thousand, became receivable in payment of
public dues. The deposit banks became filled up with the notes of
these multitudinous institutions, constituting that surplus, the
distribution of which had become an engrossing care with Congress,
and ended with effecting the object under the guise of a deposit
with the States. I recalled the recollection of the times of
1818-19, when the treasury reports of one year showed a superfluity
of revenue for which there was no want, and of the next a deficit
which required to be relieved by a loan; and argued that we must now
have the same result from the bloat in the paper system which we
then had. I demanded--
"Are we not at this moment, and from the same cause, realizing the
first part--the illusive and treacherous part--of this picture? and
must not the other, the sad and real sequel, speedily follow? The
day of revulsion must come, and its effects must be more or less
disastrous; but come it must. The present bloat in the paper system
cannot continue: violent contraction must follow enormous expansion:
a scene of distress and suffering must ensue--to come of itself out
of the present state of things, without being stimulated and helped
on by our unwise legislation."
Of the act which rescinded the specie order, and made the notes of
the local banks receivable in payment of all federal dues, I said:
"This bill is to be an era in our legislation and in our political
history. It is to be a point on which the view of the future age
is to be thrown back, and from which future consequences will be
traced. I separate myself from it: I wash my hands of it: I oppose
it. I am one of those who promised gold--not paper. I promised the
currency of the constitution, not the currency of corporations. I
did not join in putting down the Bank of the United States to put
up a wilderness of local banks. I did not join in putting down
the paper currency of a national bank, to put up a national paper
currency of a thousand local banks. I did not strike Cæsar to make
Antony master of Rome."
The condition of our deposit banks was desperate--wholly inadequate
to the slightest pressure on their vaults in the ordinary course
of business, much less that of meeting the daily government drafts
and the approaching deposit of near forty millions with the States.
The necessity of keeping one-third of specie on hand for its
immediate liabilities, was enforced from the example and rule of
the Bank of England, while many of our deposit banks could show but
the one-twentieth, the one-thirtieth, the one-fortieth, and even
the one-fiftieth of specie in hand for immediate liabilities in
circulation and deposits. The sworn evidence of a late Governor of
the Bank of England (Mr. Horsely Palmer), before a parliamentary
committee, was read, in which he testified that the average
proportion of coin and bullion which the bank deems it prudent to
keep on hand, was at the rate of the third of the total amount of
all her liabilities--including deposits as well as issues. And this
was the proportion which that bank deemed it prudent to keep--that
bank which was the largest in the world, situated in the moneyed
metropolis of Europe, with its list of debtors within the circuit
of London, supported by the richest merchants in the world, and
backed by the British government, which stood her security for
fourteen millions sterling, and ready with her supply of exchequer
bills (the interest to be raised to insure sales), at any moment
of emergency. Tested by the rule of the Bank of England, and our
deposit banks were in the jaws of destruction; and this so evident
to me, that I was amazed that others did not see it--those of our
friends who voted with the opponents of the administration in
rescinding the specie order, and in making the deposit with the
States. The latter had begun to take effect, at the rate of about
ten millions to the quarter, on the first day of January preceding
Mr. Van Buren's inauguration: a second ten millions were to be
called for on the first of April: and like sums on the first days
of the two remaining quarters. It was utterly impossible for the
banks to stand these drafts; and, having failed in all attempts to
wake up our friends, who were then in the majority, to a sense of
the danger which was impending, and to arrest their ruinous voting
with the opposition members (which most of them did), I determined
to address myself to the President elect, under the belief that,
although he would not be able to avert the blow, he might do much
to soften its force and avert its consequences, when it did come.
It was in the month of February, while Mr. Van Buren was still
President of the Senate, that I invited him into a committee room
for that purpose, and stated to him my opinion that we were on the
eve of an explosion of the paper system and of a general suspension
of the banks--intending to follow up that expression of opinion with
the exposition of my reasons for thinking so: but the interview
came to a sudden and unexpected termination. Hardly had I expressed
my belief of this impending catastrophe, than he spoke up, and
said, "Your friends think you a little exalted in the head on that
subject." I said no more. I was miffed. We left the room together,
talking on different matters, and I saying to myself, "_You will
soon feel the thunderbolt._" But I have since felt that I was
too hasty, and that I ought to have carried out my intention of
making a full exposition of the moneyed affairs of the country. His
habitual courtesy, from which the expression quoted was a most rare
departure, and his real regard for me, both personal and political
(for at that time he was pressing me to become a member of his
cabinet), would have insured me a full hearing, if I had shown a
disposition to go on; and his clear intellect would have seized and
appreciated the strong facts and just inferences which would have
been presented to him. But I stopped short, as if I had nothing
more to say, from that feeling of self-respect which silences a
man of some pride when he sees that what he says is not valued. I
have regretted my hastiness ever since. It was of the utmost moment
that the new President should have his eyes opened to the dangers
of the treasury, and my services on the Committee of Finance had
given me opportunities of knowledge which he did not possess.
Forewarned is forearmed; and never was there a case in which the
maxim more impressively applied. He could not have prevented the
suspension: the repeal of the specie circular and the deposit
with the States (both measures carried by the help of votes from
professing friends), had put that measure into the hands of those
who would be sure to use it: but he could have provided against it,
and prepared for it, and lessened the force of the blow when it did
come. He might have quickened the vigilance of the Secretary of
the Treasury--might have demanded additional securities from the
deposit banks--and might have drawn from them the moneys called
for by appropriation acts. There was a sum of about five millions
which might have been saved with a stroke of the pen, being the
aggregate of sums drawn from the treasury by the numerous disbursing
officers, and left in the banks in their own names for daily current
payments: an order to these officers would have saved these five
millions, and prevented the disgrace and damage of a stoppage in the
daily payments, and the spectacle of a government waking up in the
morning without a dollar to pay the day-laborer with, while placing
on its statute book a law for the distribution of forty millions of
surplus. Measures like these, and others which a prudent vigilance
would have suggested, might have enabled the government to continue
its payments without an extra session of Congress, and without the
mortification of capitulating to the broken banks, by accepting and
paying out their depreciated notes as the currency of the federal
treasury.
CHAPTER III.
PREPARATION FOR THE DISTRESS AND SUSPENSION.
In the autumn of the preceding year, shortly before the meeting of
Congress, Mr. Biddle, president of the Pennsylvania Bank of the
United States (for that was the ridiculous title it assumed after
its resurrection under a Pennsylvania charter), issued one of those
characteristic letters which were habitually promulgated whenever
a new lead was to be given out, and a new scent emitted for the
followers of the bank to run upon. A new distress, as the pretext
for a new catastrophe, was now the object. A picture of ruin was
presented, alarm given out, every thing going to destruction; and
the federal government the cause of the whole, and the _national_
recharter of the defunct bank the sovereign remedy. The following is
an extract from that letter.
"The Bank of the United States has not ceased to exist more
than seven months, and already the whole currency and exchanges
are running into inextricable confusion, and the industry
of the country is burdened with extravagant charges on all
the commercial intercourse of the Union. And now, when these
banks have been created by the Executive, and urged into these
excesses, instead of gentle and gradual remedies, a fierce
crusade is raised against them, the funds are harshly and
suddenly taken from them, and they are forced to extraordinary
means of defense against the very power which brought them
into being. They received, and were expected to receive, in
payment for the government, the notes of each other and the
notes of other banks, and the facility with which they did so
was a ground of special commendation by the government; and now
that government has let loose upon them a demand for specie
to the whole amount of these notes. I go further. There is an
outcry abroad, raised by faction, and echoed by folly, against
the banks of the United States. Until it was disturbed by the
government, the banking system of the United States was at
least as good as that of any other commercial country. What
was desired for its perfection was precisely what I have so
long striven to accomplish--to widen the metallic basis of
the currency by a greater infusion of coin into the smaller
channels of circulation. This was in a gradual and judicious
train of accomplishment. But this miserable foolery about an
exclusively metallic currency, is quite as absurd as to discard
the steamboats, and go back to poling up the Mississippi."
The lead thus given out was sedulously followed during the winter,
both in Congress and out of it, and at the end of the session had
reached an immense demonstration in New York, in the preparations
made to receive Mr. Webster, and to hear a speech from him, on
his return from Washington. He arrived in New York on the 15th of
March, and the papers of the city give this glowing account of his
reception:
"In conformity with public announcement, yesterday, at about
half past 3 o'clock, the Honorable DANIEL WEBSTER arrived in
this city in the steamboat Swan from Philadelphia. The intense
desire on the part of the citizens to give a grateful reception
to this great advocate of the constitution, set the whole city
in motion towards the point of debarkation, for nearly an hour
before the arrival of the distinguished visitor. At the moment
when the steamboat reached the pier, the assemblage had attained
that degree of density and anxiety to witness the landing, that
it was feared serious consequences would result. At half past
3 o'clock Mr. Webster, accompanied by Philip Hone and David B.
Ogden, landed from the boat amidst the deafening cheers and
plaudits of the multitude, thrice repeated, and took his seat
in an open barouche provided for the occasion. The procession,
consisting of several hundred citizens upon horseback, a large
train of carriages and citizens, formed upon State street,
and after receiving their distinguished guest, proceeded with
great order up Broadway to the apartments arranged for his
reception at the American Hotel. The scene presented the most
gratifying spectacle. Hundreds of citizens who had been opposed
to Mr. Webster in politics, now that he appeared as a private
individual, came forth to demonstrate their respect for his
private worth and to express their approbation of his personal
character; and thousands more who appreciated his principles and
political integrity, crowded around to convince him of their
personal attachment, and give evidence of their approval of
his public acts. The wharves, the shipping, the housetops and
windows, and the streets through which the procession passed,
were thronged with citizens of every occupation and degree,
and loud and continued cheers greeted the great statesman at
every point. There was not a greater number at the reception
of General Jackson in this city, with the exception of the
military, nor a greater degree of enthusiasm manifested upon
that occasion, than the arrival upon our shores of Daniel
Webster. At 6 o'clock in the evening, the anxious multitude
began to move towards Niblo's saloon, where Mr. Webster was to
be addressed by the committee of citizens delegated for that
purpose, and to which it was expected he would reply. A large
body of officers were upon the ground to keep the assemblage
within bounds, and at a quarter past six the doors were opened,
when the saloon, garden, and avenues leading thereto were
instantly crowded to overflowing.
The meeting was called to order by Alderman Clark, who proposed
for president, David B. Ogden, which upon being put to vote was
unanimously adopted. The following gentlemen were then elected
vice-presidents, viz: Robert C. Cornell, Jonathan Goodhue,
Joseph Tucker, Nathaniel Weed; and Joseph Hoxie and G. S.
Robins, secretaries.
Mr. W. began his remarks at a quarter before seven o'clock,
P.M. and concluded them at a quarter past nine. When he entered
the saloon, he was received with the most deafening cheers. The
hall rang with the loud plaudits of the crowd, and every hat was
waving. So great was the crowd in the galleries, and such was
the apprehension that the apparently weak wooden columns which
supported would give way, that Mr. W. was twice interrupted
with the appalling cry "_the galleries are falling_," when only
a window was broken, or a stove-pipe shaken. The length of the
address (two and a half hours), none too long, however, for the
audience would with pleasure have tarried two hours longer,
compels us to give at present only the heads of a speech which
we would otherwise now report in detail."
Certainly Mr. Webster was worthy of all honors in the great city
of New York; but having been accustomed to pass through that
city several times in every year during the preceding quarter
of a century, and to make frequent sojourns there, and to speak
thereafter, and in all the characters of politician, social guest,
and member of the bar,--it is certain that neither his person nor
his speaking could be such a novelty and rarity as to call out upon
his arrival so large a meeting as is here described, invest it with
so much form, fire it with so much enthusiasm, fill it with so much
expectation, unless there had been some large object in view--some
great effect to be produced--some consequence to result: and of
all which this imposing demonstration was at once the sign and the
initiative. No holiday occasion, no complimentary notice, no feeling
of personal regard, could have called forth an assemblage so vast,
and inspired it with such deep and anxious emotions. It required
a public object, a general interest, a pervading concern, and a
serious apprehension of some uncertain and fearful future, to call
out and organize such a mass--not of the young, the ardent, the
heedless--but of the age, the character, the talent, the fortune,
the gravity of the most populous and opulent city of the Union. It
was as if the population of a great city, in terror of some great
impending unknown calamity, had come forth to get consolation and
counsel from a wise man--to ask him what was to happen? and what
they were to do? And so in fact it was, as fully disclosed in the
address with which the orator was saluted, and in the speech of
two hours and a half which he made in response to it. The address
was a deprecation of calamities; the speech was responsive to the
address--admitted every thing that could be feared--and charged
the whole upon the mal-administration of the federal government. A
picture of universal distress was portrayed, and worse coming; and
the remedy for the whole the same which had been presented in Mr.
Biddle's letter--the recharter of _the_ national bank. The speech
was a manifesto against the Jackson administration, and a protest
against its continuation in the person of his successor, and an
invocation to a general combination against it. All the banks were
sought to be united, and made to stand together upon a sense of
common danger--the administration their enemy, the national bank
their protection. Every industrial pursuit was pictured as crippled
and damaged by bad government. Material injury to private interests
were still more vehemently charged than political injuries to the
body politic. In the deplorable picture which it presented of the
condition of every industrial pursuit, and especially in the "war"
upon the banks and the currency, it seemed to be a justificatory
pleading in advance for a general shutting up of their doors,
and the shutting up of the federal treasury at the same time. In
this sense, and on this point, the speech contained this ominous
sentence, more candid than discreet, taken in connection with what
was to happen:
"_Remember, gentlemen, in the midst of this deafening din against
all banks, that if it shall create such a panic, or such alarm, as
shall shut up the banks, it will shut up the treasury of the United
States also._"
The whole tenor of the speech was calculated to produce discontent,
create distress, and excite alarm--discontent and distress for
present sufferings--alarm for the greater, which were to come. This
is a sample:
"Gentlemen, I would not willingly be a prophet of ill. I most
devoutly wish to see a better state of things; and I believe the
repeal of the treasury order would tend very much to bring about
that better state of things. And I am of opinion, gentlemen,
that the order will be repealed. I think it must be repealed. I
think the east, west, north and south, will demand its repeal.
But, gentlemen, I feel it my duty to say, that if I should be
disappointed in this expectation, I see no immediate relief to
the distresses of the community. I greatly fear, even, that the
worst is not yet. I look for severer distresses; for extreme
difficulties in exchange; for far greater inconveniences in
remittance, and for a sudden fall in prices. Our condition is
one not to be tampered with, and the repeal of the treasury
order being something which government can do, and which will do
good, the public voice is right in demanding that repeal. It is
true, if repealed now, the relief will come late. Nevertheless
its repeal or abrogation is a thing to be insisted on, and
pursued till it shall be accomplished."
The speech concluded with an earnest exhortation to the citizens of
New York to do something, without saying what, but which with my
misgivings and presentiments, the whole tenor of the speech and the
circumstances which attended it--delivered in the moneyed metropolis
of the Union, at a time when there was no political canvass
depending, and the ominous omission to name what was required to
be done--appeared to me to be an invitation to the New York banks
to close their doors! which being done by them would be an example
followed throughout the Union, and produce the consummation of a
universal suspension. The following is that conclusion:
"Whigs of New York! Patriotic citizens of this great
metropolis!--Lovers of constitutional liberty, bound by interest
and affection to the institutions of your country, Americans
in heart and in principle! You are ready, I am sure, to fulfil
all the duties imposed upon you by your situation, and demanded
of you by your country. You have a central position; your city
is the point from which intelligence emanates, and spreads in
all directions over the whole land. Every hour carries reports
of your sentiments and opinions to the verge of the Union. You
cannot escape the responsibility which circumstances have thrown
upon you. You must live and act on a broad and conspicuous
theatre either for good or for evil, to your country. You cannot
shrink away from public duties; you cannot obscure yourselves,
nor bury your talent. In the common welfare, in the common
prosperity, in the common glory of Americans, you have a stake,
of value not to be calculated. You have an interest in the
preservation of the Union, of the constitution, and of the true
principles of the government, which no man can estimate. You
act for yourselves, and for the generations that are to come
after you; and those who, ages hence, shall bear your names,
and partake your blood, will feel in their political and social
condition, the consequences of the manner in which you discharge
your political duties."
The appeal for action in this paragraph is vehement. It takes every
form of violent desire which is known to the art of entreaty.
Supplication, solicitation, remonstrance, importunity, prayer,
menace! until rising to the dignity of a debt due from a moneyed
metropolis to an expectant community, he demanded payment as matter
of right! and enforced the demand as an obligation of necessity, as
well as of duty, and from which such a community could not escape,
if it would. The nature of the action which was so vehemently
desired, could not be mistaken. I hold it a fair interpretation of
this appeal that it was an exhortation to the business population
of the commercial metropolis of the Union to take the initiative
in suspending specie payments, and a justificatory manifesto for
doing so; and that the speech itself was the first step in the grand
performance: and so it seemed to be understood. It was received
with unbounded applause, lauded to the skies, cheered to the echo,
carefully and elaborately prepared for publication,--published
and republished in newspaper and pamphlet form; and universally
circulated. This was in the first month of Mr. Van Buren's
presidency, and it will be seen what the second one brought forth.
The specie circular--that treasury order of President Jackson,
which saved the public lands from being converted into broken bank
paper--was the subject of repeated denunciatory reference--very
erroneous, as the event has proved, in its estimate of the measure;
but quite correct in its history, and amusing in its reference to
some of the friends of the administration who undertook to act a
part for and against the rescission of the order at the same time.
"Mr. Webster then came to the treasury circular, and related the
history of the late legislation upon it. 'A member of Congress,'
said he, 'prepared this very treasury order in 1836, but the
only vote he got for it was his own--he stood 'solitary' and
'alone' (a laugh); and yet eleven days after Congress had
adjourned--only six months after the President in his annual
message had congratulated the people upon the prosperous sales
of the public lands,--this order came out in known and direct
opposition to the wishes of nine-tenths of the members of
Congress.'"
This is good history from a close witness of what he relates. The
member referred to as having prepared the treasury order, and
offered it in the shape of a bill in the Senate, and getting no vote
for it but his own,--who stood solitary and alone on that occasion,
as well as on some others--was no other than the writer of this
View; and he has lived to see about as much unanimity in favor of
that measure since as there was against it then. Nine-tenths of the
members of Congress were then against it, but from very different
motives--some because they were deeply engaged in land speculations,
and borrowed paper from the banks for the purpose; some because
they were in the interest of the banks, and wished to give their
paper credit and circulation; others because they were sincere
believers in the paper system; others because they were opposed
to the President, and believed him to be in favor of the measure;
others again from mere timidity of temperament, and constitutional
inability to act strongly. And these various descriptions embraced
friends as well as foes to the administration. Mr. Webster says
the order was issued eleven days after that Congress adjourned
which had so unanimously rejected it. That is true. We only waited
for Congress to be gone to issue the order. Mr. Benton was in the
room of the private secretary (Mr. Donelson), hard by the council
chamber, while the cabinet sat in council upon this measure. They
were mostly against it. General Jackson ordered it, and directed
the private Secretary to bring him a draft of the order to be
issued. He came to Mr. Benton to draw it--who did so: and being
altered a little, it was given to the Secretary of the Treasury to
be promulgated. Then Mr. Benton asked for his draft, that he might
destroy it. The private secretary said no--that the time might come
when it should be known who was at the bottom of that Treasury
order: and that he would keep it. It was issued on the strong will
and clear head of President Jackson, and saved many ten millions
to the public treasury. Bales of bank notes were on the road to
be converted into public lands which this order overtook, and
sent back, to depreciate in the vaults of the banks instead of the
coffers of the treasury. To repeal the order by law was the effort
as soon as Congress met, and direct legislation to that effect was
proposed by Mr. Ewing, of Ohio, but superseded by a circumlocutory
bill from Mr. Walker and Mr. Rives, which the President treated as a
nullity for want of intelligibility: and of which Mr. Webster gave
this account:
"If he himself had had power, he would have voted for Mr.
Ewing's proposition to repeal the order, in terms which Mr.
Butler and the late President could not have misunderstood;
but power was so strong, and members of Congress had now
become so delicate about giving offence to it, that it would
not do, for the world, to repeal the obnoxious circular,
plainly and forthwith; but the ingenuity of the friends of
the administration must dodge around it, and over it--and now
Mr. Butler had the unkindness to tell them that their views
neither he, lawyer as he is, nor the President, could possibly
understand (a laugh), and that, as it could not be understood,
the President had pocketed it--and left it upon the archives of
state, no doubt to be studied there. Mr. W. would call attention
to the remarkable fact, that though the Senate acted upon this
currency bill in season, yet it was put off, and put off--so
that, by no action upon it before the ten days allowed the
President by the constitution, the power over it was completely
in his will, even though the whole nation and every member of
Congress wished for its repeal. Mr. W., however, believed that
such was the pressure of public opinion upon the new President,
that it must soon be repealed."
This amphibology of the bill, and delay in passing it, and this
dodging around and over, was occasioned by what Mr. Webster calls
the delicacy of some members who had the difficult part to play,
of going with the enemies of the administration without going
against the administration. A chapter in the first volume of this
View gives the history of this work; and the last sentence in the
passage quoted from Mr. Webster's speech gives the key to the views
in which the speech originated, and to the proceedings by which it
was accompanied and followed. "_It is believed that such is the
pressure of public opinion upon the new President that it must soon
be repealed._"
In another part of his speech, Mr. Webster shows that the repealing
bill was put by the whigs into the hands of certain friends of
the administration, to be by them seasoned into a palatable dish;
and that they gained no favor with the "bold man" who despised
flinching, and loved decision, even in a foe. Thus:
"At the commencement of the last session, as you know,
gentlemen, a resolution was brought forward in the Senate for
annulling and abrogating this order, by Mr. Ewing, a gentleman
of much intelligence, of sound principles, of vigorous and
energetic character, whose loss from the service of the country,
I regard as a public misfortune. The whig members all supported
this resolution, and all the members, I believe, with the
exception of some five or six, were very anxious, in some way,
to get rid of the treasury order. But Mr. Ewing's resolution
was too direct. It was deemed a pointed and ungracious attack
on executive policy. Therefore, it must be softened, modified,
qualified, made to sound less harsh to the ears of men in power,
and to assume a plausible, polished, inoffensive character. It
was accordingly put into the plastic hands of the friends of the
executive, to be moulded and fashioned, so that it might have
the effect of ridding the country of the obnoxious order, and
yet not appear to question executive infallibility. All this
did not answer. The late President is not a man to be satisfied
with soft words; and he saw in the measure, even as it passed
the two houses, a substantial repeal of the order. He is a man
of boldness and decision; and he respects boldness and decision
in others. If you are his friend, he expects no flinching;
and if you are his adversary, he respects you none the less,
for carrying your opposition to the full limits of honorable
warfare."
Mr. Webster must have been greatly dissatisfied with his democratic
allies, when he could thus, in a public speech, before such
an audience, and within one short month after they had been
co-operating with him, hold them up as equally unmeritable in the
eyes of both parties.
History deems it essential to present this New York speech of
Mr. Webster as part of a great movement, without a knowledge of
which the view would be imperfect. It was the first formal public
step which was to inaugurate the new distress, and organize the
proceedings for shutting up the banks, and with them, the federal
treasury, with a view to coerce the government into submission to
the Bank of the United States and its confederate politicians. Mr.
Van Buren was a man of great suavity and gentleness of deportment,
and, to those who associated the idea of violence with firmness,
might be supposed deficient in that quality. An experiment upon
his nerves was resolved on--a pressure of public opinion, in the
language of Mr. Webster, under which his gentle temperament was
expected to yield.
CHAPTER IV.
PROGRESS OF THE DISTRESS, AND PRELIMINARIES FOR THE SUSPENSION.
The speech of Mr. Webster--his appeal for action--was soon followed
by its appointed consequence--an immense meeting in the city of
New York. The speech did not produce the meeting, any more than
the meeting produced the speech. Both were in the programme, and
performed as prescribed, in their respective places--the speech
first, the meeting afterwards; and the latter justified by the
former. It was an immense assemblage, composed of the elite of what
was foremost in the city for property, talent, respectability; and
took for its business the consideration of the times: the distress
of the times, and the nature of the remedy. The imposing form of
a meeting, solemn as well as numerous and respectable, was gone
through: speeches made, resolutions adopted: order and emphasis
given to the proceedings. A president, ten vice-presidents,
two secretaries, seven orators (Mr. Webster not among them: he
had performed his part, and made his exit), officiated in the
ceremonies; and thousands of citizens constituted the accumulated
mass. The spirit and proceedings of the meeting were concentrated
in a series of resolves, each stronger than the other, and each
more welcome than the former; and all progressive, from facts and
principles declared, to duties and performances recommended. The
first resolve declared the existence of the distress, and made the
picture gloomy enough. It was in these words:
"Whereas, the great commercial interests of our city have
nearly reached a point of general ruin--our merchants driven
from a state of prosperity to that of unprecedented difficulty
and bankruptcy--the business, activity and energy, which
have heretofore made us the polar star of the new world, is
daily sinking, and taking from us the fruits of years of
industry--reducing the aged among us, who but yesterday were
sufficiently in affluence, to a state of comparative want; and
blighting the prospects, and blasting the hopes of the young
throughout our once prosperous land: we deem it our duty to
express to the country our situation and desires, while yet
there is time to retrace error, and secure those rights and
perpetuate those principles which were bequeathed us by our
fathers, and which we are bound to make every honorable effort
to maintain."
After the fact of the distress, thus established by a resolve, came
the cause; and this was the condensation of Mr. Webster's speech,
collecting into a point what had been oratorically diffused over
a wide surface. What was itself a condensation cannot be farther
abridged, and must be given in its own words:
"That the wide-spread disaster which has overtaken the
commercial interests of the country, and which threatens
to produce general bankruptcy, may be in a great measure
ascribed to the interference of the general government with
the commercial and business operations of the country; its
intermeddling with the currency; its destruction of the national
bank; its attempt to substitute a metallic for a credit
currency; and, finally, to the issuing by the President of
the United States of the treasury order, known as the 'specie
circular.'"
The next resolve foreshadowed the consequences which follow from
governmental perseverance in such calamitous measures--general
bankruptcy to the dealing classes, starvation to the laboring
classes, public convulsions, and danger to our political
institutions; with an admonition to the new President of what might
happen to himself, if he persevered in the "_experiments_" of a
predecessor whose tyranny and oppression had made him the scourge of
his country. But let the resolve speak for itself:
"That while we would do nothing which might for a moment
compromit our respect for the laws, we feel it incumbent
upon us to remind the executive of the nation, that the
government of the country, as of late administered, has
become the oppressor of the people, instead of affording them
protection--that his perseverance in the experiment of his
predecessor (after the public voice, in every way in which that
voice could be expressed, has clearly denounced it as ruinous
to the best interests of the country) has already caused the
ruin of thousands of merchants, thrown tens of thousands of
mechanics and laborers out of employment, depreciated the
value of our great staple millions of dollars, destroyed the
internal exchanges, and prostrated the energies and blighted
the prospects of the industrious and enterprising portion
of our people; and must, if persevered in, not only produce
_starvation_ among the laboring classes, but inevitably lead
to disturbances which may endanger the stability of our
institutions themselves."
This word "_experiment_" had become a staple phrase in all the
distress oratory and literature of the day, sometimes heightened
by the prefix of "_quack_," and was applied to all the efforts of
the administration to return the federal government to the hard
money currency, which was the currency of the constitution and the
currency of all countries; and which efforts were now treated as
novelties and dangerous innovations. Universal was the use of the
phrase by one of the political parties some twenty years ago: dead
silent are their tongues upon it now! Twenty years of successful
working of the government under the hard money system has put an
end to the repetition of a phrase which has suffered the fate of
all catch-words of party, and became more distasteful to its old
employers than it ever was to their adversaries. It has not been
heard since the federal government got divorced from bank and paper
money! since gold and silver has become the sole currency of the
federal government! since, in fact, the memorable epoch when the
Bank of the United States (former sovereign remedy for all the ills
the body politic was heir to) has become a defunct authority, and an
"obsolete idea."
The next resolve proposed a direct movement upon the
President--nothing less than a committee of fifty to wait upon
him, and "_remonstrate_" with him upon what was called the ruinous
measures of the government.
"That a committee of not less than fifty be appointed to repair
to Washington, and remonstrate with the Executive against the
continuance of "the specie circular;" and in behalf of this
meeting and in the name of the merchants of New York, and the
people of the United States, urge its immediate repeal."
This formidable committee, limited to a minimum of fifty, open to
a maximum of any amount, besides this "_remonstrance_" against the
specie circular, were also instructed to petition the President to
forbear the collection of merchants' bonds by suit; and also to call
an extra session of Congress. The first of these measures was to
stop the collection of the accruing revenues: the second, to obtain
from Congress that submission to the bank power which could not be
obtained from the President. Formidable as were the arrangements
for acting on the President, provision was discreetly made for
a possible failure, and for the prosecution of other measures.
With this view, the committee of fifty, after their return from
Washington, were directed to call another general meeting of the
citizens of New York, and to report to them the results of their
mission. A concluding resolution invited the co-operation of the
other great cities in these proceedings, and seemed to look to an
imposing demonstration of physical force, and strong determination,
as a means of acting on the mind, or will of the President; and thus
controlling the free action of the constitutional authorities. This
resolve was specially addressed to the merchants of Philadelphia,
Boston and Baltimore, and generally addressed to all other
commercial cities, and earnestly prayed their assistance in saving
the whole country from ruin.
"That merchants of Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, and the
commercial cities of the Union, be respectfully requested to
unite with us in our remonstrance and petition, and to use their
exertions, in connection with us, to induce the Executive of
the nation to listen to the voice of the people, and to recede
from a measure under the evils of which we are now laboring, and
which threatens to involve the whole country in ruin."
The language and import of all these resolves and proceedings were
sufficiently strong, and indicated a feeling but little short of
violence towards the government; but, according to the newspapers
of the city, they were subdued and moderate--tame and spiritless,
in comparison to the feeling which animated the great meeting. A
leading paper thus characterized that feeling:
"The meeting was a remarkable one for the vast numbers
assembled--the entire decorum of the proceedings--and especially
for the deep, though subdued and restrained, excitement which
evidently pervaded the mighty mass. It was a spectacle that
could not be looked upon without emotion,--that of many thousand
men trembling, as it were, on the brink of ruin, owing to the
measures, as they verily believe, of their own government,
which should be their friend, instead of their oppressor--and
yet meeting with deliberation and calmness, listening to a
narrative of their wrongs, and the causes thereof, adopting
such resolutions as were deemed judicious; and then quietly
separating, to abide the result of their firm but respectful
remonstrances. But it is proper and fit to say that this
moderation must not be mistaken for pusillanimity, nor be
trifled with, as though it could not by any aggravation of
wrong be moved from its propriety. No man accustomed, from the
expression of the countenance, to translate the emotions of the
heart, could have looked upon the faces and the bearing of the
multitude assembled last evening, and not have felt that there
were fires smouldering there, which a single spark might cause
to burst into flame."
Smouldering fires which a single spark might light into a flame!
Possibly that spark might have been the opposing voice of some
citizen, who thought the meeting mistaken, both in the fact of
the ruin of the country and the attribution of that ruin to the
specie circular. No such voice was lifted--no such spark applied,
and the proposition to march 10,000 men to Washington to demand a
redress of grievances was not sanctioned. The committee of fifty
was deemed sufficient, as they certainly were, for every purpose of
peaceful communication. They were eminently respectable citizens,
any two, or any one of which, or even a mail transmission of their
petition, would have commanded for it a most respectful attention.
The grand committee arrived at Washington--asked an audience of the
President--received it; but with the precaution (to avoid mistakes)
that written communications should alone be used. The committee
therefore presented their demands in writing, and a paragraph from
it will show the degree to which the feeling of the city had allowed
itself to be worked up.
"We do not tell a fictitious tale of woe; we have no selfish or
partisan views to sustain, when we assure you that the noble
city which we represent, lies prostrate in despair, its credit
blighted, its industry paralyzed, and without a hope beaming
through the darkness of the future, unless the government of our
country can be induced to relinquish the measures to which we
attribute our distress. We fully appreciate the respect which
is due to our chief magistrate, and disclaim every intention
inconsistent with that feeling; but we speak in behalf of a
community which trembles upon the brink of ruin, which deems
itself an adequate judge of all questions connected with the
trade and currency of the country, and believes that the policy
adopted by the recent administration and sustained by the
present, is founded in error, and threatens the destruction of
every department of industry. Under a deep impression of the
propriety of confining our declarations within moderate limits,
we affirm that the value of our real estate has, within the last
six months, depreciated more than forty millions: that within
the last two months, there have been more than two hundred and
fifty failures of houses engaged in extensive business: that
within the same period, a decline of twenty millions of dollars
has occurred in our local stocks, including those railroad
and canal incorporations, which, though chartered in other
States, depend chiefly upon New York for their sale: that the
immense amount of merchandise in our warehouses has within the
same period fallen in value at least thirty per cent.; that
within a few weeks, not less than twenty thousand individuals,
depending on their daily labor for their daily bread, have been
discharged by their employers, because the means of retaining
them were exhausted--and that a complete blight has fallen upon
a community heretofore so active, enterprising and prosperous.
The error of our rulers has produced a wider desolation than the
pestilence which depopulated our streets, or the conflagration,
which laid them in ashes. We believe that it is unjust to
attribute these evils to any excessive development of mercantile
enterprise, and that they really flow from that unwise system
which aimed at the substitution of a metallic for a paper
currency--the system which gave the first shock to the fabric of
our commercial prosperity by removing the public deposits from
the United States bank, which weakened every part of the edifice
by the destruction of that useful and efficient institution,
and now threatens to crumble it into a mass of ruins under the
operations of the specie circular, which withdrew the gold and
silver of the country from the channels in which it could be
profitably employed. We assert that the experiment has had a
fair--a liberal trial, and that disappointment and mischief are
visible in all its results--that the promise of a regulated
currency and equalized exchanges has been broken, the currency
totally disordered, and internal exchanges almost entirely
discontinued. We, therefore, make our earnest appeal to the
Executive, and ask whether it is not time to interpose the
paternal authority of the government, and abandon the policy
which is beggaring the people."
The address was read to the President. He heard it with entire
composure--made no sort of remark upon it--treated the gentlemen
with exquisite politeness--and promised them a written answer the
next day. This was the third of May: on the fourth the answer
was delivered. It was an answer worthy of a President--a calm,
quiet, decent, peremptory refusal to comply with a single one of
their demands! with a brief reason, avoiding all controversy, and
foreclosing all further application, by a clean refusal in each
case. The committee had nothing to do but to return, and report: and
they did so. There had been a mistake committed in the estimate of
the man. Mr. Van Buren vindicated equally the rights of the chief
magistrate, and his own personal decorum; and left the committee
without any thing to complain of, although unsuccessful in all their
objects. He also had another opportunity of vindicating his personal
and official decorum in another visit which he received about the
same time. Mr. Biddle called to see the President--apparently a
call of respect on the chief magistrate--about the same time, but
evidently with the design to be consulted, and to appear as the
great restorer of the currency. Mr. Van Buren received the visit
according to its apparent intent, with entire civility, and without
a word on public affairs. Believing Mr. Biddle to be at the bottom
of the suspension, he could not treat him with the confidence and
respect which a consultation would imply. He (Mr. Biddle) felt the
slight, and caused this notice to be put in the papers:
"Being on other business at Washington, Mr. Biddle took occasion
to call on the President of the United States, to pay his
respects to him in that character, and especially, to afford the
President an opportunity, if he chose to embrace it, to speak of
the present state of things, and to confer, if he saw fit, with
the head of the largest banking institution in the country--and
that the institution in which such general application has been
made for relief. During the interview, however, the President
remained profoundly silent upon the great and interesting topics
of the day; and as Mr. Biddle did not think it his business to
introduce them, not a word in relation to them was said."
Returning to New York, the committee convoked another general
meeting of the citizens, as required to do at the time of their
appointment; and made their report to it, recommending further
forbearance, and further reliance on the ballot box, although (as
they said) history recorded many popular insurrections where the
provocation was less. A passage from this report will show its
spirit, and to what excess a community may be excited about nothing,
by the mutual inflammation of each other's passions and complaints,
combined with a power to act upon the business and interests of the
people.
"From this correspondence it is obvious, fellow-citizens, that
we must abandon all hope that either the justice of our claims
or the severity of our sufferings will induce the Executive to
abandon or relax the policy which has produced such desolating
effects--and it remains for us to consider what more is to be
done in this awful crisis of our affairs. Our first duty under
losses and distresses which we have endured, is to cherish with
religious care the blessings which we yet enjoy, and which can
be protected only by a strict observance of the laws upon which
society depends for security and happiness. We do not disguise
our opinion that the pages of history record, and the opinions
of mankind justify, numerous instances of popular insurrection,
the provocation to which was less severe than the evils of which
we complain. But in these cases, the outraged and oppressed
had no other means of redress. Our case is different. If we
can succeed in an effort to bring public opinion into sympathy
with the views which we entertain, the Executive will abandon
the policy which oppresses, instead of protecting the people.
Do not despair because the time at which the ballot box can
exercise its healing influence appears so remote--the sagacity
of the practical politician will perceive the change in public
sentiment before you are aware of its approach. But the effort
to produce this change must be vigorous and untiring."
The meeting adopted corresponding resolutions. Despairing of acting
on the President, the move was to act upon the people--to rouse and
combine them against an administration which was destroying their
industry, and to remove from power (at the elections) those who were
destroying the industry of the country. Thus:
"_Resolved_, That the interests of the capitalists, merchants,
manufacturers, mechanics and industrious classes, are dependent
upon each other, and any measures of the government which
prostrate the active business men of the community, will also
deprive honest industry of its reward; and we call upon all our
fellow-citizens to unite with us in removing from power those
who persist in a system that is destroying the prosperity of our
country."
Another resolve summed up the list of grievances of which they
complained, and enumerated the causes of the pervading ruin which
had been brought upon the country. Thus:
"_Resolved_, That the chief causes of the existing distress
are the defeat of Mr. Clay's land bill, the removal of the
public deposits, the refusal to re-charter the Bank of the
United States, and the issuing of the specie circular. The land
bill was passed by the people's representatives, and vetoed
by the President--the bill rechartering the bank was passed
by the people's representatives, and vetoed by the President.
The people's representatives declared by a solemn resolution,
that the public deposits were safe in the United States Bank;
within a few weeks thereafter, the President removed the public
deposits. The people's representatives passed a bill rescinding
the specie circular: the President destroyed it by omitting
to return it within the limited period; and in the answer to
our addresses, President Van Buren declares that the specie
circular was issued by his predecessor, omitting all notice
of the Secretary of the Treasury, who is amenable directly to
Congress, and charged by the act creating his department with
the superintendence of the finances, and who signed the order."
These two resolves deserve to be noted. They were not empty or
impotent menace. They were for action, and became what they were
intended for. The moneyed corporations, united with a political
party, were in the field as a political power, to govern the
elections, and to govern them, by the only means known to a moneyed
power--by operating on the interests of men, seducing some, alarming
and distressing the masses. They are the key to the manner of
conducting the presidential election, and which will be spoken of in
the proper place. The union of Church and State has been generally
condemned: the union of Bank and State is far more condemnable.
Here the union was not with the State, but with a political party,
nearly as strong as the party in possession of the government,
and exemplified the evils of the meretricious connection between
money and politics; and nothing but this union could have produced
the state of things which so long afflicted the country, and from
which it has been relieved, not by the cessation of their imputed
causes, but by their perpetuation. It is now near twenty years
since this great meeting was held in New York. The ruinous measures
complained of have not been revoked, but become permanent. They have
been in full force, and made stronger, for near twenty years. The
universal and black destruction which was to ensue their briefest
continuance, has been substituted by the most solid, brilliant,
pervading, and abiding prosperity that any people ever beheld.
Thanks to the divorce of Bank and State. But the consummation was
not yet. Strong in her name, and old recollections, and in her
political connections--dominant over other banks--bribing with
one hand, scourging with the other--a long retinue of debtors and
retainers--desperate in her condition--impotent for good, powerful
for evil--confederated with restless politicians, and wickedly,
corruptly, and revengefully ruled: the Great Red Harlot, profaning
the name of a National Bank, was still to continue a while longer
its career of abominations--maintaining dubious contest with the
government which created it, upon whose name and revenues it had
gained the wealth and power of which it was still the shade, and
whose destruction it plotted because it could not rule it. Posterity
should know these things, that by avoiding bank connections, their
governments may avoid the evils that we have suffered; and, by
seeing the excitements of 1837, they may save themselves from ever
becoming the victims of such delusion.
CHAPTER V.
ACTUAL SUSPENSION OF THE BANKS: PROPAGATION OF THE ALARM.
None of the public meetings, and there were many following the
leading one in New York, recommended in terms a suspension of specie
payments by the banks. All avoided, by concert or instinct, the
naming of that high measure; but it was in the list, and at the head
of the list, of the measures to be adopted; and every thing said or
done was with a view to that crowning event; and to prepare the way
for it before it came; and to plead its subsequent justification by
showing its previous necessity. It was in the programme, and bound
to come in its appointed time; and did--and that within a few days
after the last great meeting in New York. It took place quietly
and generally, on the morning of the 10th of May, altogether, and
with a concert and punctuality of action, and with a military and
police preparation, which announced arrangement and determination;
such as attend revolts and insurrections in other countries. The
preceding night all the banks of the city, three excepted, met
by their officers, and adopted resolutions to close their doors
in the morning: and gave out notice to that effect. At the same
time three regiments of volunteers, and a squadron of horse, were
placed on duty in the principal parts of the city; and the entire
police force, largely reinforced with special constables, was on
foot. This was to suppress the discontent of those who might be
too much dissatisfied at being repulsed when they came to ask for
the amount of a deposit, or the contents of a bank note. It was
a humiliating spectacle, but an effectual precaution. The people
remained quiet. At twelve o'clock a large mercantile meeting took
place. Resolutions were adopted by it to sustain the suspension,
and the newspaper press was profuse and energetic in its support.
The measure was consummated: the suspension was complete: it was
triumphant in that city whose example, in such a case, was law to
the rest of the Union. But, let due discrimination be made. Though
all the banks joined in the act, all were not equally culpable; and
some, in fact, not culpable at all, but victims of the criminality,
or misfortunes of others. It was the effect of necessity with the
deposit banks, exhausted by vain efforts to meet the quarterly
deliveries of the forty millions to be deposited with the States;
and pressed on all sides because they were government banks, and
because the programme required them to stop first. It was an act of
self-defence in others which were too weak to stand alone, and which
followed with reluctance an example which they could not resist.
With others it was an act of policy, and of criminal contrivance,
as the means of carrying a real distress into the ranks of the
people, and exciting them against the political party to whose
acts the distress was attributed. But the prime mover, and master
manager of the suspension, was the Bank of the United States, then
rotten to the core and tottering to its fall, but strong enough to
carry others with it, and seeking to hide its own downfall in the
crash of a general catastrophe. Having contrived the suspension, it
wished to appear as opposing it, and as having been dragged down
by others; and accordingly took the attitude of a victim. But the
impudence and emptiness of that pretension was soon exposed by the
difficulty which other banks had in forcing her to resume; and by
the facility with which she fell back, "solitary and alone," into
the state of permanent insolvency from which the other banks had
momentarily galvanized her. But the occasion was too good to be lost
for one of those complacent epistles, models of quiet impudence and
cool mendacity, with which Mr. Biddle was accustomed to regale the
public in seasons of moneyed distress. It was impossible to forego
such an opportunity; and, accordingly, three days after the New York
suspension, and two days after his own, he held forth in a strain
of which the following is a sample:
"All the deposit banks of the government of the United States in
the city of New York suspended specie payments this week--the
deposit banks elsewhere have followed their example; which was
of course adopted by the State banks not connected with the
government. I say of course, because it is certain that when
the government banks cease to pay specie, all the other banks
must cease, and for this clear reason. The great creditor in
the United States is the government. It receives for duties the
notes of the various banks, which are placed for collection in
certain government banks, and are paid to those government banks
in specie if requested. From the moment that the deposit banks
of New York, failed to comply with their engagements, it was
manifest that all the other deposit banks must do the same, that
there must be a universal suspension throughout the country, and
that the treasury itself in the midst of its nominal abundance
must be practically bankrupt."
This was all true. The stoppage of the deposit banks was the
stoppage of the Treasury. Non-payment by the government, was an
excuse for non-payment by others. Bankruptcy was the legal condition
of non-payment; and that condition was the fate of the government as
well as of others; and all this was perfectly known before by those
who contrived, and those who resisted the deposit with the States
and the use of paper money by the federal government. These two
measures made the suspension and the bankruptcy; and all this was so
obvious to the writer of this View that he proclaimed it incessantly
in his speeches, and was amazed at the conduct of those professing
friends of the administration who voted with the opposition on
these measures, and by their votes insured the bankruptcy of the
government which they professed to support. Mr. Biddle was right.
The deposit banks were gone; the federal treasury was bankrupt; and
those two events were two steps on the road which was to lead to the
re-establishment of the Bank of the United States! and Mr. Biddle
stood ready with his bank to travel that road. The next paragraph
displayed this readiness.
"In the midst of these disorders the Bank of the United States
occupies a peculiar position, and has special duties. Had it
consulted merely its own strength it would have continued its
payments without reserve. But in such a state of things the
first consideration is how to escape from it--how to provide
at the earliest practicable moment to change a condition which
should not be tolerated beyond the necessity which commanded it.
The old associations, the extensive connections, the established
credit, the large capital of the Bank of the United States,
rendered it the natural rallying point of the country for the
resumption of specie payments. It seemed wiser, therefore, not
to waste its strength in a struggle which might be doubtful
while the Executive persevered in its present policy, but to
husband all its resources so as to profit by the first favorable
moment to take the lead in the early resumption of specie
payments. Accordingly the Bank of the United States assumes that
position. From this moment its efforts will be to keep itself
strong, and to make itself stronger; always prepared and always
anxious to assist in recalling the currency and the exchanges of
the country to the point from which they have fallen. It will
co-operate cordially and zealously with the government, with the
government banks, with all the other banks, and with any other
influences which can aid in that object."
This was a bold face for an eviscerated institution to assume--one
which was then nothing but the empty skin of an immolated
victim--the contriver of the suspension to cover its own rottenness,
and the architect of distress and ruin that out of the public
calamity it might get again into existence and replenish its
coffers out of the revenues and credit of the federal government.
"Would have continued specie payments, if it had only consulted
its own strength"--"only suspended from a sense of duty and
patriotism"--"will take the lead in resuming"--"assumes the position
of restorer of the currency"--"presents itself as the rallying
point of the country in the resumption of specie payments"--"even
promises to co-operate with the government:" such were the impudent
professions at the very moment that this restorer of currency, and
rallying point of resumption, was plotting a continuance of the
distress and suspension until it could get hold of the federal
moneys to recover upon; and without which it never could recover.
Indissolubly connected with this bank suspension, and throwing
a broad light upon its history, (if further light were wanted,)
was Mr. Webster's tour to the West, and the speeches which he
made in the course of it. The tour extended to the Valley of the
Mississippi, and the speeches took for their burden the distress and
the suspension, excusing and justifying the banks, throwing all
blame upon the government, and looking to the Bank of the United
States for the sole remedy. It was at Wheeling that he opened the
series of speeches which he delivered in his tour, it being at that
place that he was overtaken by the news of the suspension, and which
furnished him with the text for his discourse.
"Recent evils have not at all surprised me, except that they
have come sooner and faster than I had anticipated. But, though
not surprised, I am afflicted; I feel any thing but pleasure
in this early fulfilment of my own predictions. Much injury is
done which the wisest future counsels can never repair, and
much more that can never be remedied but by such counsels and
by the lapse of time. From 1832 to the present moment I have
foreseen this result. I may safely say I have foreseen it,
because I have presented and proclaimed its approach in every
important discussion and debate, in the public body of which I
am a member. We learn to-day that most of the eastern banks have
stopped payment; deposit banks as well as others. The experiment
has exploded. That bubble, which so many of us have all along
regarded as the offspring of conceit, presumption and political
quackery, has burst. A general suspension of payment must be the
result; a result which has come, even sooner than was predicted.
Where is now that better currency that was promised? Where is
that specie circulation? Where are those rupees of gold and
silver, which were to fill the treasury of the government as
well as the pockets of the people? Has the government a single
hard dollar? Has the treasury any thing in the world but credit
and deposits in banks that have already suspended payment? How
are public creditors now to be paid in specie? How are the
deposits, which the law requires to be made with the states on
the 1st of July, now to be made."
This was the first speech that Mr. Webster delivered after the
great one before the suspension in New York, and may be considered
the epilogue after the performance as the former was the prologue
before it. It is a speech of exultation, with bitter taunts to
the government. In one respect his information was different from
mine. He said the suspension came sooner than was expected: my
information was that it came later, a month later; and that he
himself was the cause of the delay. My information was that it was
to take place in the first month of Mr. Van Buren's administration,
and that the speech which was to precede it was to be delivered
early in March, immediately after the adjournment of Congress:
but it was not delivered till the middle of that month, nor got
ready for _pamphlet_ publication until the middle of April; which
delay occasioned a corresponding postponement in all the subsequent
proceedings. The complete shutting up of the treasury--the loss
of its moneys--the substitution of broken bank paper for hard
money--the impossibility of paying a dollar to a creditor: these
were the points of his complacent declamation: and having made
these points strong enough and clear enough, he came to the remedy,
and fell upon the same one, in almost the same words, that Mr.
Biddle was using at the same time, four hundred miles distant, in
Philadelphia: and that without the aid of the electric telegraph,
not then in use. The recourse to the Bank of the United States was
that remedy! that bank strong enough to hold out, (unhappily the
news of its suspending arrived while he was speaking:) patriotic
enough to do so! but under no obligation to do better than the
deposit banks! and justifiable in following their example. Hear him:
"The United States Bank, now a mere state institution, with no
public deposits, no aid from government, but, on the contrary,
long an object of bitter persecution by it, was at our latest
advices still firm. But can we expect of that Bank to make
sacrifices to continue specie payment? If it continue to do so,
now the deposit banks have stopped, the government will draw
from it its last dollar, if it can do so, in order to keep up a
pretence of making its own payments in specie. I shall be glad
if this institution find it prudent and proper to hold out; but
as it owes no more duty to the government than any other bank,
and, of course, much less than the deposit banks, I cannot see
any ground for demanding from it efforts and sacrifices to favor
the government, which those holding the public money, and owing
duty to the government, are unwilling or unable to make; nor do
I see how the New England banks can stand alone in the general
crush."
The suspension was now complete; and it was evident, and as good
as admitted by those who had made it, that it was the effect of
contrivance on the part of politicians, and the so-called Bank of
the United States, for the purpose of restoring themselves to power.
The whole process was now clear to the vision of those who could see
nothing while it was going on. Even those of the democratic party
whose votes had helped to do the mischief, could now see that the
attempt to deposit forty millions with the States was destruction
to the deposit banks;--that the repeal of the specie circular was
to fill the treasury with paper money, to be found useless when
wanted;--that distress was purposely created in order to throw the
blame of it upon the party in power;--that the promptitude with
which the Bank of the United States had been brought forward as a
remedy for the distress, showed that it had been held in reserve for
that purpose;--and the delight with which the whig party saluted the
general calamity, showed that they considered it their own passport
to power. All this became visible, after the mischief was over, to
those who could see nothing of it before it was done.
CHAPTER VI.
TRANSMIGRATION OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES FROM A FEDERAL TO A
STATE INSTITUTION.
This institution having again appeared on the public theatre,
politically and financially, and with power to influence national
legislation, and to control moneyed corporations, and with
art and skill enough to deceive astute merchants and trained
politicians,--(for it is not to be supposed that such men would
have committed themselves in her favor if they had known her
condition,)--it becomes necessary to trace her history since the
expiration of her charter, and learn by what means she continued an
existence, apparently without change, after having undergone the
process which, in law and in reason, is the death of a corporation.
It is a marvellous history, opening a new chapter in the necrology
of corporations, very curious to study, and involving in its
solution, besides the biological mystery, the exposure of a legal
fraud and juggle, a legislative smuggle, and a corrupt enactment.
The charter of the corporation had expired upon its own limitation
in the year 1836: it was entitled to two years to wind up its
affairs, engaging in no new business: but was seen to go on after
the expiration, as if still in full life, and without the change of
an attribute or feature. The explanation is this:
On the 19th day of January, in the year 1836, a bill was reported
in the House of Representatives of the General Assembly of
Pennsylvania, entitled, "_An act to repeal the State tax, and to
continue the improvement of the State by railroads and canals;
and for other purposes_." It came from the standing committee on
"_Inland navigation and internal improvement_;" and was, in fact,
a bill to repeal a tax and make roads and canals, but which,
under the vague and usually unimportant generality of "_other
purposes_," contained the entire draught of a charter for the
Bank of the United States--adopting it as a Pennsylvania State
bank. The introduction of the bill, with this addendum, colossal
tail to it, was a surprise upon the House. No petition had asked
for such a bank: no motion had been made in relation to it: no
inquiry had been sent to any committee: no notice of any kind
had heralded its approach: no resolve authorized its report: the
unimportant clause of "_other purposes_," hung on at the end of
the title, could excite no suspicion of the enormous measures
which lurked under its unpretentious phraseology. Its advent was
an apparition: its entrance an intrusion. Some members looked at
each other in amazement. But it was soon evident that it was the
minority only that was mystified--that a majority of the elected
members in the House, and a cluster of exotics in the lobbies,
perfectly understood the intrusive movement:--in brief, it had been
smuggled into the House, and a power was present to protect it
there. This was the first intimation that had reached the General
Assembly, the people of Pennsylvania, or the people of the United
States, that the Bank of the United States was transmigrating!
changing itself from a national to a local institution--from a
federal to a State charter--from an imperial to a provincial
institution--retaining all the while its body and essence, its
nature and attributes, its name and local habitation. It was a new
species of metempsychosis, heretofore confined to souls separated
from bodies, but now appearing in a body that never had a soul: for
that, according to Sir Edward Coke, is the psychological condition
of a corporation--and, above all, of a moneyed corporation.
The mystified members demanded explanations; and it was a case in
which explanations could not be denied. Mr. Biddle, in a public
letter to an eminent citizen, on whose name he had been accustomed
to hang such productions, (Mr. John Quincy Adams,) attributed the
procedure, so far as he had moved in it, to a "_formal application
on the part of the legislature to know from him on what terms
the expiring bank would receive a charter from it_;" and gave up
the names of two members who had conveyed the application. The
legislature had no knowledge of the proceeding. The two members
whose names had been vouched disavowed the legislative application,
but admitted that, in compliance with suggestions, they had written
a letter to Mr. Biddle in their own names, making the inquiry; but
without the sanction of the legislature, or the knowledge of the
committees of which they were members. They did not explain the
reason which induced them to take the initiative in so important
business; and the belief took root that their good nature had
yielded to an importunity from an invisible source, and that they
had consented to give a private and bungling commencement to what
must have a beginning, and which could not find it in any open or
parliamentary form. It was truly a case in which the first step
cost the difficulty. How to begin was the puzzle, and so to begin
as to conceal the beginning, was the desideratum. The finger of
the bank must not be seen in it, yet, without the touch of that
finger, the movement could not begin. Without something from the
Bank--without some request or application from it, it would have
been gratuitous and impertinent, and might have been insulting and
offensive, to have offered it a State charter. To apply openly for
a charter was to incur a publicity which would be the defeat of
the whole movement. The answer of Mr. Biddle to the two members,
dexterously treating their private letter, obtained by solicitation,
as a formal legislative application, surmounted the difficulty! and
got the Bank before the legislature, where there were friends enough
secretly prepared for the purpose to pass it through. The terms
had been arranged with Mr. Biddle beforehand, so that there was
nothing to be done but to vote. The principal item in these terms
was the stipulation to pay the State the sum of $1,300,000, to be
expended in works of internal improvements; and it was upon this
slender connection with the subject that the whole charter referred
itself to the committee of "_Inland navigation and internal
improvement_;"--to take its place as a proviso to a bill entitled,
"_To repeal the State tax, and to continue the improvements of the
State by railroads and canals_;"--and to be no further indicated in
the title to that act than what could be found under the addendum
of that vague and flexible generality, "_other purposes_;" usually
added to point attention to something not worth a specification.
Having mastered the first step--the one of greatest difficulty, if
there is truth in the proverb--the remainder of the proceeding was
easy and rapid, the bill, with its proviso, being reported, read a
first, second, and third time, passed the House--sent to the Senate;
read a first, second, and third time there, and passed--sent to
the Governor and approved, and made a law of the land: and all in
as little time as it usually requires to make an act for changing
the name of a man or a county. To add to its titles to infamy, the
repeal of the State tax which it assumed to make, took the air of
a bamboozle, the tax being a temporary imposition, and to expire
within a few days upon its own limitation. The distribution of the
bonus took the aspect of a bribe to the people, being piddled out
in driblets to the inhabitants of the counties: and, to stain the
bill with the last suspicion, a strong lobby force from Philadelphia
hung over its progress, and cheered it along with the affection
and solicitude of parents for their offspring. Every circumstance
of its enactment announced corruption--bribery in the members who
passed the act, and an attempt to bribe the people by distributing
the bonus among them: and the outburst of indignation throughout
the State was vehement and universal. People met in masses to
condemn the act, demand its repeal, to denounce the members who
voted for it, and to call for investigation into the manner in
which it passed. Of course, the legislature which passed it was in
no haste to respond to these demands; but their successors were
different. An election intervened; great changes of members took
place; two-thirds of the new legislature demanded investigation,
and resolved to have it. A committee was appointed, with the usual
ample powers, and sat the usual length of time, and worked with the
usual indefatigability, and made the usual voluminous report; and
with the usual "lame and impotent conclusion." A mass of pregnant
circumstances were collected, covering the whole case with black
suspicion: but direct bribery was proved upon no one. Probably, the
case of the Yazoo fraud is to be the last, as it was the first, in
which a succeeding general assembly has fully and unqualifiedly
condemned its predecessor for corruption.
The charter thus obtained was accepted: and, without the change
of form or substance in any particular, the old bank moved on as
if nothing had happened--as if the Congress charter was still in
force--as if a corporate institution and all its affairs could
be shifted by statute from one foundation to another;--as if
a transmigration of corporate existence could be operated by
legislative enactment, and the debtors, creditors, depositors, and
stockholders in one bank changed, transformed, and constituted
into debtors, creditors, depositors and stockholders in another.
The illegality of the whole proceeding was as flagrant as it was
corrupt--as scandalous as it was notorious--and could only find
its motive in the consciousness of a condition in which detection
adds infamy to ruin; and in which no infamy, to be incurred, can
exceed that from which escape is sought. And yet it was this broken
and rotten institution--this criminal committing crimes to escape
from the detection of crimes--this "counterfeit presentment" of a
defunct corporation--this addendum to a Pennsylvania railroad--this
whited sepulchre filled with dead men's bones, thus bribed and
smuggled through a local legislature--that was still able to
set up for a power and a benefactor! still able to influence
federal legislation--control other banks--deceive merchants
and statesmen--excite a popular current in its favor--assume a
guardianship over the public affairs, and actually dominate for
months longer in the legislation and the business of the country.
It is for the part she acted--the dominating part--in contriving
the financial distress and the general suspension of the banks in
1837--the last one which has afflicted our country,--that renders
necessary and proper this notice of her corrupt transit through the
General Assembly of the State of Pennsylvania.
CHAPTER VII.
EFFECTS OF THE SUSPENSION: GENERAL DERANGEMENT OF BUSINESS:
SUPPRESSION AND RIDICULE OF THE SPECIE CURRENCY: SUBMISSION OF THE
PEOPLE: CALL OF CONGRESS.
A great disturbance of course took place in the business of the
country, from the stoppage of the banks. Their agreement to receive
each others' notes made these notes the sole currency of the
country. It was a miserable substitute for gold and silver, falling
far below these metals when measured against them, and very unequal
to each other in different parts of the country. Those of the
interior, and of the west, being unfit for payments in the great
commercial Atlantic cities, were far below the standard of the
notes of those cities, and suffered a heavy loss from difference
of exchange, as it was called (although it was only the difference
of depreciation,) in all remittances to those cities:--to which
points the great payments tended. All this difference was considered
a loss, and charged upon the mismanagement of the public affairs
by the administration, although the clear effect of geographical
position. Specie disappeared as a currency, being systematically
suppressed. It became an article of merchandise, bought and sold
like any other marketable commodity; and especially bought in
quantities for exportation. Even metallic change disappeared, down
to the lowest subdivision of the dollar. Its place was supplied
by every conceivable variety of individual and corporation
tickets--issued by some from a feeling of necessity; by others, as a
means of small gains; by many, politically, as a means of exciting
odium against the administration for having destroyed the currency.
Fictitious and burlesque notes were issued with caricatures and
grotesque pictures and devices, and reproachful sentences, entitled
the "_better currency_:" and exhibited every where to excite
contempt. They were sent in derision to all the friends of the
specie circular, especially to him who had the credit (not untruly)
of having been its prime mover--most of them plentifully sprinkled
over with taunting expressions to give them a personal application:
such as--"This is what you have brought the country to:" "the end
of the experiment:" "the gold humbug exploded:" "is this what was
promised us?" "behold the effects of tampering with the currency."
The presidential mansion was infested, and almost polluted with
these missives, usually made the cover of some vulgar taunt. Even
gold and silver could not escape the attempted degradation--copper,
brass, tin, iron pieces being struck in imitation of gold and
silver coins--made ridiculous by figures and devices, usually the
whole hog, and inscribed with taunting and reproachful expressions.
Immense sums were expended in these derisory manufactures,
extensively carried on, and universally distributed; and reduced
to a system as a branch of party warfare, and intended to act on
the thoughtless and ignorant through appeals to their eyes and
passions. Nor were such means alone resorted to to inflame the
multitude against the administration. The opposition press teemed
with inflammatory publications. The President and his friends were
held up as great state criminals, ruthlessly destroying the property
of the people, and meriting punishment--even death. Nor did these
publications appear in thoughtless or obscure papers only, but in
some of the most weighty and influential of the bank party. Take,
for example, this paragraph from a leading paper in the city of New
York:
"We would put it directly to each and all of our readers,
whether it becomes this great people, quietly and tamely to
submit to any and every degree of lawless oppression which their
rulers may inflict, merely because _resistance_ may involve
us in trouble and expose those who resist, to censure? We are
very certain their reply will be, '_No_, but at what point
is "resistance to commence?"--is not the evil of resistance
greater "than the evil of submission?"' We answer promptly, that
resistance on the part of a free people, if they would preserve
their freedom, should always commence whenever it is made
plain and palpable that there has been a deliberate violation
of their rights; and whatever temporary evils may result from
such resistance, it can never be so great or so dangerous to
our institutions, as a blind submission to a most manifest act
of oppression and tyranny. And now, we would ask of all--what
shadow of right, what plea of expediency, what constitutional
or legal justification can MARTIN VAN BUREN offer to the people
of the United States, for having brought upon them all their
present difficulties by a continuance of the _specie circular_,
after two-thirds of their representatives had declared their
solemn convictions that it was injurious to the country and
should be repealed? Most assuredly, none, and we unhesitatingly
say, that it is a more high-handed measure of _tyranny_ than
that which cost _Charles_ the 1st his crown and his head--more
illegal and unconstitutional than the act of the British
ministry which caused the patriots of the revolution to destroy
the tea in the harbor of Boston--and one which calls more loudly
for resistance than any act of Great Britain which led to the
Declaration of Independence."
Taken by surprise in the deprivation of its revenues,--specie
denied it by the banks which held its gold and silver,--the federal
government could only do as others did, and pay out depreciated
paper. Had the event been foreseen by the government, it might have
been provided against, and much specie saved. It was now too late
to enter into a contest with the banks, they in possession of the
money, and the suspension organized and established. They would only
render their own notes: the government could only pay in that which
it received. Depreciated paper was their only medium of payment;
and every such payment (only received from a feeling of duresse)
brought resentment, reproach, indignation, loss of popularity to
the administration; and loud calls for the re-establishment of the
National Bank, whose notes had always been equal to specie, and
were then contrived to be kept far above the level of those of
other suspended banks. Thus the administration found itself, in the
second month of its existence, struggling with that most critical of
all government embarrassments--deranged finances, and depreciated
currency; and its funds dropping off every day. Defections were
incessant, and by masses, and sometimes by whole States: and all on
account of these vile payments in depreciated paper. Take a single
example. The State of Tennessee had sent numerous volunteers to
the Florida Indian war. There were several thousands of them, and
came from thirty different counties, requiring payments to be made
through a large part of the State, and to some member of almost
every family in it. The paymaster, Col. Adam Duncan Steuart, had
treasury drafts on the Nashville deposit banks for the money to make
the payments. They delivered their own notes, and these far below
par--even twenty per cent. below those of the so-called Bank of the
United States, which the policy of the suspension required to be
kept in strong contrast with those of the government deposit banks.
The loss on each payment was great--one dollar in every five. Even
patriotism could not stand it. The deposit banks and their notes
were execrated: the Bank of the United States and its notes were
called for. It was the children of Israel wailing for the fleshpots
of Egypt. Discontent, from individual became general, extending
from persons to masses. The State took the infection. From being
one of the firmest and foremost of the democratic States, Tennessee
fell off from her party, and went into opposition. At the next
election she showed a majority of 20,000 against her old friends;
and that in the lifetime of General Jackson; and contrary to what it
would have been if his foresight had been seconded. He foresaw the
consequences of paying out this depreciated paper. The paymaster had
foreseen them, and before drawing a dollar from the banks he went
to General Jackson for his advice. This energetic man, then aged,
and dying, and retired to his beloved hermitage,--but all head and
nerve to the last, and scorning to see the government capitulate
to insurgent banks,--acted up to his character. He advised the
paymaster to proceed to Washington and ask for solid money--for the
gold and silver which was then lying in the western land offices. He
went; but being a military subordinate, he only applied according
to the rules of subordination, through the channels of official
intercourse: and was denied the hard money, wanted for payments
on debenture bonds and officers of the government. He did not go
to Mr. Van Buren, as General Jackson intended he should do. He
did not feel himself authorized to go beyond official routine. It
was in the recess of Congress, and I was not in Washington to go
to the President in his place (as I should instantly have done);
and, returning without the desired orders, the payments were
made, through a storm of imprecations, in this loathsome trash:
and Tennessee was lost. And so it was, in more or less degree,
throughout the Union. The first object of the suspension had been
accomplished--a political revolt against the administration.
Miserable as was the currency which the government was obliged to
use, it was yet in the still more miserable condition of not having
enough of it! The deposits with the States had absorbed two sums
of near ten millions each: two more sums of equal amount were
demandable in the course of the year. Financial embarrassment, and
general stagnation of business, diminished the current receipts from
lands and customs: an absolute deficit--that horror, and shame, and
mortal test of governments--showed itself ahead. An extraordinary
session of Congress became a necessity, inexorable to any
contrivance of the administration: and, on the 15th day of May--just
five days after the suspension in the principal cities--the
proclamation was issued for its assembling: to take place on
the first Monday of the ensuing September. It was a mortifying
concession to imperative circumstances; and the more so as it had
just been refused to the grand committee of Fifty--demanding it in
the imposing name of that great meeting in the city of New York.
CHAPTER VIII.
EXTRA SESSION: MESSAGE, AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
The first session of the twenty-fifth Congress, convened upon the
proclamation of the President, to meet an extraordinary occasion,
met on the first Monday in September, and consisted of the following
members:
SENATE.
NEW HAMPSHIRE--Henry Hubbard and Franklin Pierce.
MAINE--John Ruggles and Ruel Williams.
VERMONT--Samuel Prentiss and Benjamin Swift.
MASSACHUSETTS--Daniel Webster and John Davis.
RHODE ISLAND--Nehemiah R. Knight and Asher Robbins.
_Connecticut_--John M. Niles and Perry Smith.
_New York_--Silas Wright and Nathaniel P. Tallmadge.
_New Jersey_--Garret D. Wall and Samuel L. Southard.
_Delaware_--Richard H. Bayard and Thomas Clayton.
_Pennsylvania_--James Buchanan and Samuel McKean.
_Maryland_--Joseph Kent and John S. Spence.
_Virginia_--William C. Rives and William H. Roane.
NORTH CAROLINA--Bedford Brown and Robert Strange.
SOUTH CAROLINA--John C. Calhoun and Wm. Campbell Preston.
GEORGIA--John P. King and Alfred Cuthbert.
ALABAMA--Wm. Rufus King and Clement C. Clay.
MISSISSIPPI--John Black and Robert J. Walker.
LOUISIANA--Robert C. Nicholas and Alexander Mouton.
TENNESSEE--Hugh L. White and Felix Grundy.
KENTUCKY--Henry Clay and John Crittenden.
ARKANSAS--Ambrose H. Sevier and William S. Fulton.
MISSOURI--Thomas H. Benton and Lewis F. Linn.
ILLINOIS--Richard M. Young and John M. Robinson.
INDIANA--Oliver H. Smith and John Tipton.
OHIO--William Allen and Thomas Morris.
MICHIGAN--Lucius Lyon and John Norvell.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
MAINE--George Evans, John Fairfield, Timothy J. Carter, F. O. J.
Smith, Thomas Davee, Jonathan Cilley, Joseph C. Noyes, Hugh J.
Anderson.
NEW HAMPSHIRE--Samuel Cushman, James Farrington, Charles G.
Atherton, Joseph Weeks, Jared W. Williams.
MASSACHUSETTS--Richard Fletcher, Stephen C. Phillips, Caleb Cushing,
Wm. Parmenter, Levi Lincoln, George Grinnell, jr., George N. Briggs,
Wm. B. Calhoun, Nathaniel B. Borden, John Q. Adams, John Reed,
Abbott Lawrence, Wm. S. Hastings.
RHODE ISLAND--Robert B. Cranston, Joseph L. Tillinghast.
CONNECTICUT--Isaac Toucey, Samuel Ingham, Elisha Haley, Thomas T.
Whittlesey, Launcelot Phelps, Orrin Holt.
VERMONT--Hiland Hall, William Slade, Heman Allen, Isaac Fletcher,
Horace Everett.
NEW YORK--Thomas B. Jackson, Abraham Vanderveer, C. C. Cambreleng,
Ely Moore, Edward Curtis, Ogden Hoffman, Gouverneur Kemble, Obadiah
Titus, Nathaniel Jones, John C. Broadhead, Zadoc Pratt, Robert
McClelland, Henry Vail, Albert Gallup, John I. DeGraff, David
Russell, John Palmer, James B. Spencer, John Edwards, Arphaxad
Loomis, Henry A. Foster, Abraham P. Grant, Isaac H. Bronson, John H.
Prentiss, Amasa J. Parker, John C. Clark, Andrew D. W. Bruyn, Hiram
Gray, William Taylor, Bennett Bicknell, William H. Noble, Samuel
Birdsall, Mark H. Sibley, John T. Andrews, Timothy Childs, William
Patterson, Luther C. Peck, Richard P. Marvin, Millard Fillmore,
Charles F. Mitchell.
NEW JERSEY--John B. Aycrigg, John P. B. Maxwell, William Halstead,
Jos. F. Randolph, Charles G. Stratton, Thomas Jones Yorke.
PENNSYLVANIA--Lemuel Paynter, John Sergeant, George W. Toland,
Charles Naylor, Edward Davies, David Potts, Edward Darlington, Jacob
Fry, jr., Matthias Morris, David D. Wagener, Edward B. Hubley, Henry
A. Muhlenberg, Luther Reilly, Henry Logan, Daniel Sheffer, Chas.
McClure, Wm. W. Potter, David Petriken, Robert H. Hammond, Samuel
W. Morris, Charles Ogle, John Klingensmith, Andrew Buchanan, T. M.
T. McKennan, Richard Biddle, William Beatty, Thomas Henry, Arnold
Plumer.
DELAWARE--John J. Milligan.
MARYLAND--John Dennis, James A. Pearce, J. T. H. Worthington,
Benjamin C. Howard, Isaac McKim, William Cost Johnson, Francis
Thomas, Daniel Jenifer.
VIRGINIA--Henry A. Wise, Francis Mallory, John Robertson, Charles
F. Mercer, John Taliaferro, R. T. M. Hunter, James Garland, Francis
E. Rives, Walter Coles, George C. Dromgoole, James W. Bouldin, John
M. Patton, James M. Mason, Isaac S. Pennybacker, Andrew Beirne,
Archibald Stuart, John W. Jones, Robert Craig, Geo. W. Hopkins,
Joseph Johnson, Wm. S. Morgan.
NORTH CAROLINA--Jesse A. Bynum, Edward D. Stanley, Charles Shepard,
Micajah T. Hawkins, James McKay, Edmund Deberry, Abraham Rencher,
William Montgomery, Augustine H. Shepherd, James Graham, Henry
Connor, Lewis Williams, Samuel T. Sawyer.
SOUTH CAROLINA--H. S. Legare, Waddy Thompson, Francis W. Pickens,
W. K. Clowney, F. H. Elmore, John K. Griffin, R. B. Smith, John
Campbell, John P. Richardson.
GEORGIA--Thomas Glascock, S. F. Cleveland, Seaton Grantland, Charles
E. Haynes, Hopkins Holsey, Jabez Jackson, Geo. W. Owens, Geo. W. B.
Townes, W. C. Dawson.
TENNESSEE--Wm. B. Carter, A. A. McClelland, Joseph Williams, (one
vacancy,) H. L. Turney, Wm. B. Campbell, John Bell, Abraham P.
Maury, James K. Polk, Ebenezer J. Shields, Richard Cheatham, John W.
Crockett, Christopher H. Williams.
KENTUCKY--John L. Murray, Edward Rumsey, Sherrod Williams, Joseph
R. Underwood, James Harlan, John Calhoun, John Pope, Wm. J. Graves,
John White, Richard Hawes, Richard H. Menifee, John Chambers, Wm. W.
Southgate.
OHIO--Alexander Duncan, Taylor Webster, Patrick G. Goode, Thomas
Corwin, Thomas L. Hamer, Calvary Morris, Wm. K. Bond, J. Ridgeway,
John Chaney, Samson Mason, J. Alexander, jr., Alexander Harper, D.
P. Leadbetter, Wm. H. Hunter, John W. Allen, Elisha Whittlesey, A.
W. Loomis, Matthias Shepler, Daniel Kilgore.
ALABAMA--Francis S. Lyon, Dixon H. Lewis, Joab Lawler, Reuben
Chapman, J. L. Martin.
INDIANA--Ratliff Boon, John Ewing, William Graham, George H. Dunn,
James Rariden, William Herrod, Albert S. White.
ILLINOIS--A. W. Snyder, Zadoc Casey, Wm. L. May.
LOUISIANA--Henry Johnson, Eleazer W. Ripley, Rice Garland.
MISSISSIPPI--John F. H. Claiborne, S. H. Gholson.
ARKANSAS--Archibald Yell.
MISSOURI--Albert G. Harrison, John Miller.
MICHIGAN--Isaac E. Crary.
FLORIDA--Charles Downing.
WISCONSIN--George W. Jones.
In these ample lists, both of the Senate and of the House, will
be discovered a succession of eminent names--many which had then
achieved eminence, others to achieve it:--and, besides those which
captivate regard by splendid ability, a still larger number of those
less brilliant, equally respectable, and often more useful members,
whose business talent performs the work of the body, and who in
England are well called, the working members. Of these numerous
members, as well the brilliant as the useful, it would be invidious
to particularize part without enumerating the whole; and that would
require a reproduction of the greater part of the list of each
House. Four only can be named, and they entitled to that distinction
from the station attained, or to be attained by them:--Mr. John
Quincy Adams, who had been president; _Messrs._ James K. Polk,
Millard Fillmore and Franklin Pierce, who became presidents. In my
long service I have not seen a more able Congress; and it is only
necessary to read over the names, and to possess some knowledge of
our public men, to be struck with the number of names which would
come under the description of useful or brilliant members.
The election of speaker was the first business of the House; and Mr.
James K. Polk and Mr. John Bell, both of Tennessee, being put in
nomination, Mr. Polk received 116 votes; and was elected--Mr. Bell
receiving 103. Mr. Walter S. Franklin was elected clerk.
The message was delivered upon receiving notice of the organization
of the two Houses; and, with temperance and firmness, it met all
the exigencies of the occasion. That specie order which had been
the subject of so much denunciation,--the imputed cause of the
suspension, and the revocation of which was demanded with so much
pertinacity and such imposing demonstration,--far from being given
up was commended for the good effects it had produced; and the
determination expressed not to interfere with its operation. In
relation to that decried measure the message said:
"Of my own duties under the existing laws, when the banks
suspended specie payments, I could not doubt. Directions were
immediately given to prevent the reception into the Treasury
of any thing but gold and silver, or its equivalent; and every
practicable arrangement was made to preserve the public faith,
by similar or equivalent payments to the public creditors.
The revenue from lands had been for some time substantially
so collected, under the order issued by the directions of my
predecessor. The effects of that order had been so salutary,
and its forecast in regard to the increasing insecurity of bank
paper had become so apparent, that, even before the catastrophe,
I had resolved not to interfere with its operation. Congress
is now to decide whether the revenue shall continue to be so
collected, or not."
This was explicit, and showed that all attempts to operate upon the
President at that point, and to coerce the revocation of a measure
which he deemed salutary, had totally failed. The next great object
of the party which had contrived the suspension and organized the
distress, was to extort the re-establishment of the Bank of the
United States; and here again was an equal failure to operate upon
the firmness of the President. He reiterated his former objections
to such an institution--not merely to the particular one which had
been tried--but to any one in any form, and declared his former
convictions to be strengthened by recent events. Thus:
"We have seen for nearly half a century, that those who advocate
a national bank, by whatever motive they may be influenced,
constitute a portion of our community too numerous to allow us
to hope for an early abandonment of their favorite plan. On the
other hand, they must indeed form an erroneous estimate of the
intelligence and temper of the American people, who suppose that
they have continued, on slight or insufficient grounds, their
persevering opposition to such an institution; or that they can
be induced by pecuniary pressure, or by any other combination
of circumstances, to surrender principles they have so long
and so inflexibly maintained. My own views of the subject are
unchanged. They have been repeatedly and unreservedly announced
to my fellow-citizens, who, with full knowledge of them,
conferred upon me the two highest offices of the government.
On the last of these occasions, I felt it due to the people
to apprise them distinctly, that, in the event of my election,
I would not be able to co-operate in the re-establishment of a
national bank. To these sentiments, I have now only to add the
expression of an increased conviction, that the re-establishment
of such a bank, in any form, whilst it would not accomplish the
beneficial purpose promised by its advocates, would impair the
rightful supremacy of the popular will; injure the character and
diminish the influence of our political system; and bring once
more into existence a concentrated moneyed power, hostile to
the spirit, and threatening the permanency, of our republican
institutions."
Having noticed these two great points of pressure upon him, and
thrown them off with equal strength and decorum, he went forward
to a new point--the connection of the federal government with any
bank of issue in any form, either as a depository of its moneys,
or in the use of its notes;--and recommended a total and perpetual
dissolution of the connection. This was a new point of policy, long
meditated by some, but now first brought forward for legislative
action, and cogently recommended to Congress for its adoption.
The message, referring to the recent failure of the banks, took
advantage of it to say:
"Unforeseen in the organization of the government, and forced
on the Treasury by early necessities, the practice of employing
banks, was, in truth, from the beginning, more a measure of
emergency than of sound policy. When we started into existence
as a nation, in addition to the burdens of the new government,
we assumed all the large, but honorable load, of debt which was
the price of our liberty; but we hesitated to weigh down the
infant industry of the country by resorting to adequate taxation
for the necessary revenue. The facilities of banks, in return
for the privileges they acquired, were promptly offered, and
perhaps too readily received, by an embarrassed treasury. During
the long continuance of a national debt, and the intervening
difficulties of a foreign war, the connection was continued
from motives of convenience; but these causes have long since
passed away. We have no emergencies that make banks necessary
to aid the wants of the Treasury; we have no load of national
debt to provide for, and we have on actual deposit a large
surplus. No public interest, therefore, now requires the renewal
of a connection that circumstances have dissolved. The complete
organization of our government, the abundance of our resources,
the general harmony which prevails between the different States,
and with foreign powers, all enable us now to select the system
most consistent with the constitution, and most conducive to
the public welfare."
This wise recommendation laid the foundation for the Independent
Treasury--a measure opposed with unwonted violence at the time,
but vindicated as well by experience as recommended by wisdom; and
now universally concurred in--constituting an era in our financial
history, and reflecting distinctive credit on Mr. Van Buren's
administration. But he did not stop at proposing a dissolution of
governmental connection with these institutions; he went further,
and proposed to make them safer for the community, and more amenable
to the laws of the land. These institutions exercised the privilege
of stopping payment, qualified by the gentle name of suspension,
when they judged a condition of the country existed making it
expedient to do so. Three of these general suspensions had taken
place in the last quarter of a century, presenting an evil entirely
too large for the remedy of individual suits against the delinquent
banks; and requiring the strong arm of a general and authoritative
proceeding. This could only be found in subjecting them to the
process of bankruptcy; and this the message boldly recommended.
It was the first recommendation of the kind, and deserves to be
commemorated for its novelty and boldness, and its undoubted
efficiency, if adopted. This is the recommendation:
"In the mean time, it is our duty to provide all the remedies
against a depreciated paper currency which the constitution
enables us to afford. The Treasury Department, on several former
occasions, has suggested the propriety and importance of a
uniform law concerning bankruptcies of corporations, and other
bankers. Through the instrumentality of such a law, a salutary
check may doubtless be imposed on the issues of paper money,
and an effectual remedy given to the citizen, in a way at once
equal in all parts of the Union, and fully authorized by the
constitution."
A bankrupt law for banks! That was the remedy. Besides its efficacy
in preventing future suspensions, it would be a remedy for the
actual one. The day fixed for the act to take effect would be the
day for resuming payments, or going into liquidation. It would be
the day of honesty or death to these corporations; and between these
two alternatives even the most refractory bank would choose the
former, if able to do so.
The banks of the District of Columbia, and their currency, being
under the jurisdiction of Congress, admitted a direct remedy in
its own legislation, both for the fact of their suspension and the
evil of the small notes which they issued. The forfeiture of the
charter, where the resumption did not take place in a limited time,
and penalties on the issue of the small notes, were the appropriate
remedies;--and, as such were recommended to Congress.
There the President not only met and confronted the evils of the
actual suspension as they stood, but went further, and provided
against the recurrence of such evils thereafter, in four cardinal
recommendations: 1, never to have another national bank; 2, never
to receive bank notes again in payment of federal dues; 3, never
to use the banks again for depositories of the public moneys; 4,
to apply the process of bankruptcy to all future defaulting banks.
These were strong recommendations, all founded in a sense of justice
to the public, and called for by the supremacy of the government,
if it meant to maintain its supremacy; but recommendations running
deep into the pride and interests of a powerful class, and well
calculated to inflame still higher the formidable combination
already arrayed against the President, and to extend it to all that
should support him.
The immediate cause for convoking the extraordinary session--the
approaching deficit in the revenue--was frankly stated, and the
remedy as frankly proposed. Six millions of dollars was the
estimated amount; and to provide it neither loans nor taxes were
proposed, but the retention of the fourth instalment of the deposit
to be made with the States, and a temporary issue of treasury notes
to supply the deficiency until the incoming revenue should replenish
the treasury. The following was that recommendation:
"It is not proposed to procure the required amount by loans or
increased taxation. There are now in the treasury nine millions
three hundred and sixty-seven thousand two hundred and fourteen
dollars, directed by the Act of the 23d of June, 1836, to be
deposited with the States in October next. This sum, if so
deposited, will be subject, under the law, to be recalled, if
needed, to defray existing appropriations; and, as it is now
evident that the whole, or the principal part of it, will
be wanted for that purpose, it appears most proper that the
deposits should be withheld. Until the amount can be collected
from the banks, treasury notes may be temporarily issued, to be
gradually redeemed as it is received."
Six millions of treasury notes only were required, and from this
small amount required, it is easy to see how readily an adequate
amount could have been secured from the deposit banks, if the
administration had foreseen a month or two beforehand that the
suspension was to take place. An issue of treasury notes, being an
imitation of the exchequer bill issues of the British government,
which had been the facile and noiseless way of swamping that
government in bottomless debt, was repugnant to the policy of
this writer, and opposed by him: but of this hereafter. The third
instalment of the deposit, as it was called, had been received by
the States--received in depreciated paper, and the fourth demanded
in the same. A deposit demanded! and claimed as a debt!--that is
to say: the word "_deposit_" used in the act admitted to be both
by Congress and the States a fraud and a trick, and distribution
the thing intended and done. Seldom has it happened that so gross a
fraud, and one, too, intended to cheat the constitution, has been so
promptly acknowledged by the high parties perpetrating it. But of
this also hereafter.
The decorum and reserve of a State paper would not allow the
President to expatiate upon the enormity of the suspension which
had been contrived, nor to discriminate between the honest and
solvent banks which had been taken by surprise and swept off in a
current which they could not resist, and the insolvent or criminal
class, which contrived the catastrophe and exulted in its success.
He could only hint at the discrimination, and, while recommending
the bankrupt process for one class, to express his belief that with
all the honest and solvent institutions the suspension would be
temporary, and that they would seize the earliest moment which the
conduct of others would permit, to vindicate their integrity and
ability by returning to specie payments.
CHAPTER IX.
ATTACKS ON THE MESSAGE: TREASURY NOTES.
Under the first two of our Presidents, Washington, and the first
Mr. Adams, the course of the British Parliament was followed in
answering the address of the President, as the course of the
sovereign was followed in delivering it. The Sovereign delivered his
address in person to the two assembled Houses, and each answered
it: our two first Presidents did the same, and the Houses answered.
The purport of the answer was always to express a concurrence, or
non-concurrence with the general policy of the government as thus
authentically exposed; and the privilege of answering the address
laid open the policy of the government to the fullest discussion.
The effect of the practice was to lay open the state of the
country, and the public policy, to the fullest discussion; and, in
the character of the answer, to decide the question of accord or
disaccord--of support or opposition--between the representative
and the executive branches of the government. The change from the
address delivered in person, with its answer, to the message sent
by the private secretary, and no answer, was introduced by Mr.
Jefferson, and considered a reform; but it was questioned at the
time, whether any good would come of it, and whether that would not
be done irregularly, in the course of the debates, which otherwise
would have been done regularly in the discussion of the address. The
administration policy would be sure to be attacked, and irregularly,
in the course of business, if the spirit of opposition should not
be allowed full indulgence in a general and regular discussion. The
attacks would come, and many of Mr. Jefferson's friends thought
it better they should come at once, and occupy the first week or
two of the session, than to be scattered through the whole session
and mixed up with all its business. But the change was made, and
has stood, and now any bill or motion is laid hold of, to hang a
speech upon, against the measures or policy of an administration.
This was signally the case at this extra session, in relation to
Mr. Van Buren's policy. He had staked himself too decisively
against too large a combination of interests to expect moderation
or justice from his opponents; and he received none. Seldom has any
President been visited with more violent and general assaults than
he received, almost every opposition speaker assailing some part of
the message. One of the number, Mr. Caleb Cushing, of Massachusetts,
made it a business to reply to the whole document, formally and
elaborately, under two and thirty distinct heads--the number of
points in the mariner's compass: each head bearing a caption to
indicate its point: and in that speech any one that chooses, can
find in a condensed form, and convenient for reading, all the points
of accusation against the democratic policy from the beginning of
the government down to that day.
Mr. Clay and Mr. Webster assailed it for what it contained, and
for what it did not--for its specific recommendations, and for its
omission to recommend measures which they deemed necessary. The
specie payments--the disconnection with banks--the retention of
the fourth instalment--the bankrupt act against banks--the brief
issue of treasury notes; all were condemned as measures improper
in themselves and inadequate to the relief of the country: while,
on the other hand, a national bank appeared to them to be the
proper and adequate remedy for the public evils. With them acted
many able men:--in the Senate, Bayard, of Delaware, Crittenden, of
Kentucky, John Davis, of Massachusetts, Preston, of South Carolina,
Southard, of New Jersey, Rives, of Virginia:--in the House of
Representatives, Mr. John Quincy Adams, Bell, of Tennessee, Richard
Biddle, of Pennsylvania, Cushing, of Massachusetts, Fillmore, of New
York, Henry Johnson, of Louisiana, Hunter and Mercer, of Virginia,
John Pope, of Kentucky, John Sargeant, Underwood of Kentucky,
Lewis Williams, Wise. All these were speaking members, and in
their diversity of talent displayed all the varieties of effective
speaking--close reasoning, sharp invective, impassioned declamation,
rhetoric, logic.
On the other hand was an equal array, both in number and
speaking talent, on the other side, defending and supporting the
recommendations of the President:--in the Senate, Silas Wright,
Grundy, John M. Niles, King, of Alabama, Strange, of North
Carolina, Buchanan, Calhoun, Linn, of Missouri, Benton, Bedford
Brown, of North Carolina, William Allen, of Ohio, John P. King, of
Georgia, Walker, of Mississippi:--in the House of Representatives,
Cambreleng, of New York, Hamer, of Ohio, Howard and Francis Thomas,
of Maryland, McKay, of North Carolina, John M. Patton, Francis
Pickens.
The treasury note bill was one of the first measures on which the
struggle took place. It was not a favorite with the whole body of
the democracy, but the majority preferred a small issue of that
paper, intended to operate, not as a currency, but as a ready means
of borrowing money, and especially from small capitalists; and,
therefore, preferable to a direct loan. It was opposed as a paper
money bill in disguise, as germinating a new national debt, and as
the easy mode of raising money, so ready to run into abuse from
its very facility of use. The President had recommended the issue
in general terms: the Secretary of the Treasury had descended into
detail, and proposed notes as low as twenty dollars, and without
interest. The Senate's committee rejected that proposition, and
reported a bill only for large notes--none less than 100 dollars,
and bearing interest; so as to be used for investment, not
circulation. Mr. Webster assailed the Secretary's plan, saying--
"He proposes, sir, to issue treasury notes of small
denominations, down even as low as twenty dollars, not bearing
interest, and redeemable at no fixed period; they are to be
received in debts due to government, but are not otherwise to
be paid until at some indefinite time there shall be a certain
surplus in the treasury beyond what the Secretary may think its
wants require. Now, sir, this is plain, authentic, statutable
paper money; it is exactly a new emission of old continental.
If the genius of the old confederation were now to rise up in
the midst of us, he could not furnish us, from the abundant
stores of his recollection, with a more perfect model of paper
money. It carries no interest; it has no fixed time of payment;
it is to circulate as currency, and it is to circulate on the
credit of government alone, with no fixed period of redemption!
If this be not paper money, pray, sir, what is it? And, sir,
who expected this? Who expected that in the fifth year of the
_experiment for reforming the currency_, and bringing it to an
absolute gold and silver circulation, the Treasury Department
would be found recommending to us a regular emission of
paper money? This, sir, is quite new in the history of this
government; it belongs to that of the confederation which has
passed away. Since 1789, although we have issued treasury notes
on sundry occasions, we have issued none like these; that is
to say, we have issued none not bearing interest, intended for
circulation, and with no fixed mode of redemption. I am glad,
however, Mr. President, that the committee have not adopted the
Secretary's recommendation, and that they have recommended the
issue of treasury notes of a description more conformable to the
practice of the government."
Mr. Benton, though opposed to the policy of issuing these notes,
and preferring himself a direct loan in this case, yet defended the
particular bill which had been brought in from the character and
effects ascribed to it, and said:
"He should not have risen in this debate, had it not been for
the misapprehensions which seemed to pervade the minds of some
senators as to the character of the bill. It is called by some
a paper-money bill, and by others a bill to germinate a new
national debt. These are serious imputations, and require to be
answered, not by declamation and recrimination, but by facts and
reasons, addressed to the candor and to the intelligence of an
enlightened and patriotic community.
"I dissent from the imputations on the character of the bill. I
maintain that it is neither a paper-money bill, nor a bill to
lay the foundation for a new national debt; and will briefly
give my reasons for believing as I do on both points.
"There are certainly two classes of treasury notes--one for
investment, and one for circulation; and both classes are
known to our laws, and possess distinctive features, which
define their respective characters, and confine them to their
respective uses.
"The notes for investment bear an interest sufficient to induce
capitalists to exchange gold and silver for them, and to lay
them by as a productive fund. This is their distinctive feature,
but not the only one; they possess other subsidiary qualities,
such as transferability only by indorsement--payable at a
fixed time--not re-issuable--nor of small denomination--and
to be cancelled when paid. Notes of this class are, in fact,
loan notes--notes to raise loans on, by selling them for hard
money--either immediately by the Secretary of the Treasury, or,
secondarily, by the creditor of the government to whom they
have been paid. In a word, they possess all the qualities which
invite investment, and forbid and impede circulation.
"The treasury notes for currency are distinguished by
features and qualities the reverse of those which have been
mentioned. They bear little or no interest. They are payable
to bearer--transferable by delivery--re-issuable--of low
denominations--and frequently reimbursable at the pleasure of
the government. They are, in fact, paper money, and possess
all the qualities which forbid investment, and invite to
circulation. The treasury notes of 1815 were of that character,
except for the optional clause to enable the holder to fund them
at the interest which commanded loans--at seven per cent.
"These are the distinctive features of the two classes of notes.
Now try the committee's bill by the test of these qualities.
It will be found that the notes which it authorizes belong
to the first-named class; that they are to bear an interest,
which may be six per cent.; that they are transferable only by
indorsement; that they are not re-issuable; that they are to be
paid at a day certain--to wit, within one year; that they are
not to be issued of less denomination than one hundred dollars;
are to be cancelled when taken up; and that the Secretary of the
Treasury is expressly authorized to raise money upon them by
loaning them.
"These are the features and qualities of the notes to be issued,
and they define and fix their character as notes to raise loans,
and to be laid by as investments, and not as notes for currency,
to be pushed into circulation by the power of the government;
and to add to the curse of the day by increasing the quantity of
unconvertible paper money."
Though yielding to an issue of these notes in this particular form,
limited in size of the notes to one hundred dollars, yet Mr. Benton
deemed it due to himself and the subject to enter a protest against
the policy of such issues, and to expose their dangerous tendency,
both to slide into a paper currency, and to steal by a noiseless
march into the creation of public debt, and thus expressed himself:
"I trust I have vindicated the bill from the stigma of being a
paper currency bill, and from the imputation of being the first
step towards the creation of a new national debt. I hope it is
fully cleared from the odium of both these imputations. I will
now say a few words on the policy of issuing treasury notes
in time of peace, or even in time of war, until the ordinary
resources of loans and taxes had been tried and exhausted. I am
no friend to the issue of treasury notes of any kind. As loans,
they are a disguised mode of borrowing, and easy to slide into
a currency: as a currency, it is the most seductive, the most
dangerous, and the most liable to abuse of all the descriptions
of paper money. 'The stamping of paper (by government) is
an operation so much easier than the laying of taxes, or of
borrowing money, that a government in the habit of paper
emissions would rarely fail, in any emergency, to indulge itself
too far in the employment of that resource, to avoid as much as
possible one less auspicious to present popularity.' So said
General Hamilton; and Jefferson, Madison Macon, Randolph, and
all the fathers of the republican church, concurred with him.
These sagacious statesmen were shy of this facile and seductive
resource, 'so liable to abuse, and so certain of being abused.'
They held it inadmissible to recur to it in time of peace,
and that it could only be thought of amidst the exigencies
and perils of war, and that after exhausting the direct and
responsible alternative of loans and taxes. Bred in the school
of these great men, I came here at this session to oppose, at
all risks, an issue of treasury notes. I preferred a direct
loan, and that for many and cogent reasons. There is clear
authority to borrow in the constitution; but, to find authority
to issue these notes, we must enter the field of constructive
powers. To borrow, is to do a responsible act; it is to incur
certain accountability to the constituent, and heavy censure
if it cannot be justified; to issue these notes, is to do an
act which few consider of, which takes but little hold of the
public mind, which few condemn and some encourage, because it
increases the quantum of what is vainly called money. Loans
are limited by the capacity, at least, of one side to borrow,
and of the other to lend: the issue of these notes has no
limit but the will of the makers, and the supply of lamp-black
and rags. The continental bills of the Revolution, and the
assignats of France, should furnish some instructive lessons
on this head. Direct loans are always voluntary on the part of
the lender; treasury note loans may be a forced borrowing from
the government creditor--as much so as if the bayonet were put
to his breast; for necessity has no law, and the necessitous
claimant must take what is tendered, whether with or without
interest--whether ten or fifty per cent. below par. I distrust,
dislike, and would fain eschew, this treasury note resource. I
prefer the direct loans of 1820-'21. I could only bring myself
to acquiesce in this measure when it was urged that there was
not time to carry a loan through its forms; nor even then could
I consent to it, until every feature of a currency character had
been eradicated from the face of the bill."
The bill passed the Senate by a general vote, only Messrs. Clay,
Crittenden, Preston, Southard, and Spence of Maryland, voting
against it. In the House of Representatives it encountered a more
strenuous resistance, and was subjected to some trials which showed
the dangerous proclivity of these notes to slide from the foundation
of investment into the slippery path of currency. Several motions
were made to reduce their size--to make them as low as $25; and that
failing, to reduce them to $50; which succeeded. The interest was
struck at in a motion to reduce it to a nominal amount; and this
motion, like that for reducing the minimum size to $25, received a
large support--some ninety votes. The motion to reduce to $50 was
carried by a majority of forty. Returning to the Senate with this
amendment, Mr. Benton moved to restore the $100 limit, and intimated
his intention, if it was not done, of withholding his support from
the bill--declaring that nothing but the immediate wants of the
Treasury, and the lack of time to raise the money by a direct loan
as declared by the Secretary of the Treasury, could have brought him
to vote for treasury notes in any shape. Mr. Clay opposed the whole
scheme as a government bank in disguise, but supported Mr. Benton's
motion as being adverse to that design. He said:
"He had been all along opposed to this measure, and he saw
nothing now to change that opinion. Mr. C. would have been glad
to aid the wants of the Treasury, but thought it might have been
done better by suspending the action of many appropriations not
so indispensably necessary, rather than by resorting to a loan.
Reduction, economy, retrenchment, had been recommended by the
President, and why not then pursued? Mr. C.'s chief objection,
however, was, that these notes were mere post notes, only
differing from bank notes of that kind in giving the Secretary a
power of fixing the interest as he pleases.
"It is, said Mr. C., a government bank, issuing government
bank notes; an experiment to set up a government bank. It
is, in point of fact, an incipient bank. Now, if government
has the power to issue bank notes, and so to form indirectly
and covertly a bank, how is it that it has not the power to
establish a national bank? What difference is there between a
great government bank, with Mr. Woodbury as the great cashier,
and a bank composed of a corporation of private citizens? What
difference is there, except that the latter is better and safer,
and more stable, and more free from political influences,
and more rational and more republican? An attack is made at
Washington upon all the banks of the country, when we have at
least one hundred millions of bank paper in circulation. At
such a time, a time too of peace, instead of aid, we denounce
them, decry them, seek to ruin them, and begin to issue paper in
opposition to them! You resort to paper, which you profess to
put down; you resort to a bank, which you pretend to decry and
to denounce; you resort to a government paper currency, after
having exclaimed against every currency except that of gold and
silver! Mr. C. said he should vote for Mr. Benton's amendment,
as far as it went to prevent the creation of a government bank
and a government currency."
Mr. Webster also supported the motion of Mr. Benton, saying:
"He would not be unwilling to give his support to the bill, as a
loan, and that only a temporary loan. He was, however, utterly
opposed to every modification of the measure which went to
stamp upon it the character of a government currency. All past
experience showed that such a currency would depreciate; that
it will and must depreciate. He should vote for the amendment,
inasmuch as $100 bills were less likely to get into common
circulation than $50 bills. His objection was against the old
continental money in any shape or in any disguise, and he would
therefore vote for the amendment."
The motion was lost by a vote of 16 to 25, the yeas and nays being:
YEAS--Messrs. Allen, Benton, Clay, of Kentucky, Clayton, Kent,
King, of Georgia, McKean, Pierce, Rives, Robbins, Smith, of
Connecticut, Southard, Spence, Tipton, Webster, White--16.
NAYS--Messrs. Buchanan, Clay, of Alabama, Crittenden, Fulton,
Grundy, Hubbard, King, of Alabama, Knight, Linn, Lyon, Morris,
Nicholas, Niles, Norvell, Roane, Robinson, Smith, of Indiana,
Strange, Swift, Talmadge, Walker, Williams, Wall, Wright,
Young--25.
CHAPTER X.
RETENTION OF THE FOURTH DEPOSIT INSTALMENT.
The deposit with the States had only reached its second instalment
when the deposit banks, unable to stand a continued quarterly drain
of near ten millions to the quarter, gave up the effort and closed
their doors. The first instalment had been delivered the first of
January, in specie, or its equivalent; the second in April, also
in valid money; the third one demandable on the first of June, was
accepted by the States in depreciated paper: and they were very
willing to receive the fourth instalment in the same way. It had
cost the States nothing,--was not likely to be called back by the
federal government, and was all clear gains to those who took it
as a deposit and held it as a donation. But the Federal Treasury
needed it also; and likewise needed ten millions more of that amount
which had already been "_deposited_" with the States; and which
"_deposit_" was made and accepted under a statute which required
it to be paid back whenever the wants of the Treasury required it.
That want had now come, and the event showed the delusion and
the cheat of the bill under which a distribution had been made in
the name of a deposit. The idea of restitution entered no one's
head! neither of the government to demand it, nor of the States to
render back. What had been delivered, was gone! that was a clear
case; and reclamation, or rendition, even of the smallest part,
or at the most remote period, was not dreamed of. But there was a
portion behind--another instalment of ten millions--deliverable
out of the "_surplus_" on the first day of October: but there was
no surplus: on the contrary a deficit: and the retention of this
sum would seem to be a matter of course with the government, only
requiring the form of an act to release the obligation for the
delivery. It was recommended by the President, counted upon in the
treasury estimates, and its retention the condition on which the
amount of treasury notes was limited to ten millions of dollars.
A bill was reported for the purpose, in the mildest form, not to
repeal but to postpone the clause; and the reception which it met,
though finally successful, should be an eternal admonition to the
federal government never to have any money transaction with its
members--a transaction in which the members become the masters,
and the devourers of the head. The finance committee of the Senate
had brought in a bill to repeal the obligation to deposit this
fourth instalment; and from the beginning it encountered a serious
resistance. Mr. Webster led the way, saying:
"We are to consider that this money, according to the provisions
of the existing law, is to go equally among all the States, and
among all the people; and the wants of the Treasury must be
supplied, if supplies be necessary, equally by all the people.
It is not a question, therefore, whether some shall have money,
and others shall make good the deficiency. All partake in the
distribution, and all will contribute to the supply. So that it
is a mere question of convenience, and, in my opinion, it is
decidedly most convenient, on all accounts, that this instalment
should follow its present destination, and the necessities of
the Treasury be provided for by other means."
Mr. Preston opposed the repealing bill, principally on the ground
that many of the States had already appropriated this money; that is
to say, had undertaken public works on the strength of it; and would
suffer more injury from not receiving it than the Federal Treasury
would suffer from otherwise supplying its place. Mr. Crittenden
opposed the bill on the same ground. Kentucky, he said, had made
provision for the expenditure of the money, and relied upon it, and
could not expect the law to be lightly rescinded, or broken, on the
faith of which she had anticipated its use. Other senators treated
the deposit act as a contract, which the United States was bound to
comply with by delivering all the instalments.
In the progress of the bill Mr. Buchanan proposed an amendment, the
effect of which would be to change the essential character of the
so called, deposit act, and convert it into a real distribution
measure. By the terms of the act, it was the duty of the Secretary
of the Treasury to call upon the States for a return of the deposit
when needed by the Federal Treasury: Mr. Buchanan proposed to
release the Secretary from this duty, and devolve it upon Congress,
by enacting that the three instalments already delivered, should
remain on deposit with the States until called for by Congress. Mr.
Niles saw the evil of the proposition, and thus opposed it:
"He must ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment, and was
sorry it had been offered. If it was to be fully considered, it
would renew the debate on the deposit act, as it went to change
the essential principles and terms of that act. A majority of
those who voted for that act, about which there had been so much
said, and so much misrepresentation, had professed to regard
it--and he could not doubt that at the time they did so regard
it--as simply a deposit law; as merely changing the place of
deposit from the banks to the States, so far as related to the
surplus. The money was still to be in the Treasury, and liable
to be drawn out, with certain limitations and restrictions, by
the ordinary appropriation laws, without the direct action of
Congress. The amendment, if adopted, will change the principles
of the deposit act, and the condition of the money deposited
with the States under it. It will no longer be a deposit; it
will not be in the Treasury, even in point of legal effect or
form: the deposit will be changed to a loan, or, perhaps more
properly, a grant to the States. The rights of the United States
will be changed to a mere claim, like that against the late Bank
of the United States; and a claim without any means to enforce
it. We were charged, at the time, of making a distribution of
the public revenue to the States, in the disguise and form of a
deposit; and this amendment, it appeared to him, would be a very
bold step towards confirming the truth of that charge. He deemed
the amendment an important one, and highly objectionable; but
he saw that the Senate were prepared to adopt it, and he would
not pursue the discussion, but content himself with repeating
his request for the ayes and noes on the question."
Mr. Buchanan expressed his belief that the substitution of Congress
for the Secretary of the Treasury, would make no difference in
the nature of the fund: and that remark of his, if understood as
sarcasm, was undoubtedly true; for the deposit was intended as a
distribution by its authors from the beginning, and this proposed
substitution was only taking a step, and an effectual one, to make
it so: for it was not to be expected that a Congress would ever
be found to call for this money from the States, which they were
so eager to give to the States. The proposition of Mr. Buchanan
was carried by a large majority--33 to 12--all the opponents of
the administration, and a division of its friends, voting for it.
Thus, the whole principle, and the whole argument on which the
deposit act had been passed, was reversed. It was passed to make the
State treasuries the Treasury _pro tanto_ of the United States--to
substitute the States for the banks, for the keeping of this surplus
until it was wanted--and it was placed within the call of a federal
executive officer that it might be had for the public service when
needed. All this was reversed. The recall of the money was taken
from the federal executive, and referred to the federal legislative
department--to the Congress, composed of members representing the
States--that is to say, from the payee to the payor, and was a
virtual relinquishment of the payment. And thus the deposit was made
a mockery and a cheat; and that by those who passed it.
In the House of Representatives the disposition to treat the deposit
as a contract, and to compel the government to deliver the money
(although it would be compelled to raise by extraordinary means what
was denominated a surplus), was still stronger than in the Senate,
and gave rise to a protracted struggle, long and doubtful in its
issue. Mr. Cushing laid down the doctrine of contract, and thus
argued it:
"The clauses of the deposit act, which appertain to the present
question, seem to me to possess all the features of a contract.
It provides that the whole surplus revenue of the United
States, beyond a certain sum, which may be in the Treasury on
a certain day, shall be deposited with the several States;
which deposit the States are to keep safely, and to pay back
to the United States, whenever the same shall be called for by
the Secretary of the Treasury in a prescribed time and mode,
and on the happening of a given contingency. Here, it seems
to me, is a contract in honor; and, so far as there can be a
contract between the United States and the several States, a
contract in law; there being reciprocal engagements, for a
valuable consideration, on both sides. It is, at any rate, a
quasi-contract. They who impugn this view of the question argue
on the supposition that the act, performed or to be performed
by the United States, is an inchoate gift of money to the
States. Not so. It is a contract of deposit; and that contract
is consummated, and made perfect, on the formal reception of
any instalment of the deposit by the States. Now, entertaining
this view of the transaction, I am asked by the administration
to come forward and break this contract. True, a contract made
by the government of the United States cannot be enforced in
law. Does that make it either honest or honorable for the United
States to take advantage of its power and violate its pledged
faith? I refuse to participate in any such breach of faith. But
further. The administration solicits Congress to step in between
the United States and the States as a volunteer, and to violate
a contract, as the means of helping the administration out of
difficulties, into which its own madness and folly have wilfully
sunk it, and which press equally upon the government and the
people. The object of the measure is to relieve the Secretary of
the Treasury from the responsibility of acting in this matter
as he has the power to do. Let him act. I will not go out of my
way to interpose in this between the Executive and the several
States, until the administration appeals to me in the right
spirit. This it has not done. The Executive comes to us with
a new doctrine, which is echoed by his friends in this House,
namely, that the American government is not to exert itself for
the relief of the American people. Very well. If this be your
policy, I, as representing the people, will not exert myself for
the relief of your administration."
Such was the chicanery, unworthy of a _pie-poudre_ court--with
which a statute of the federal Congress, stamped with every word,
invested with every form, hung with every attribute, to define it
a deposit--not even a loan--was to be pettifogged into a gift! and
a contract for a gift! and the federal Treasury required to stand
and deliver! and all that, not in a low law court, where attorneys
congregate, but in the high national legislature, where candor and
firmness alone should appear. History would be faithless to her
mission if she did not mark such conduct for reprobation, and
invoke a public judgment upon it.
After a prolonged contest the vote was taken, and the bill carried,
but by the smallest majority--119 to 117;--a difference of two
votes, which was only a difference of one member. But even that
was a delusive victory. It was immediately seen that more than one
had voted with the majority, not for the purpose of passing the
bill, but to gain the privilege of a majority member to move for a
reconsideration. Mr. Pickens, of South Carolina, immediately made
that motion, and it was carried by a majority of 70! Mr. Pickens
then proposed an amendment, which was to substitute definite for
indefinite postponement--to postpone to a day certain instead of the
pleasure of Congress: and the first day of January, 1839, was the
day proposed; and that without reference to the condition of the
Treasury (which might not then have any surplus), for the transfer
of this fourth instalment of a deposit to the States. The vote being
taken on this proposed amendment, it was carried by a majority
of 40: and that amendment being concurred in by the Senate, the
bill in that form became a law, and a virtual legalization of the
deposit into a donation of forty millions to the States. And this
was done by the votes of members who had voted for a deposit with
the States; because a donation to the States was unconstitutional.
The three instalments already delivered were not to be recalled
until Congress should so order; and it was quite certain that it
never would so order. At the same time the nominal discretion of
Congress over the deposit of the remainder was denied, and the duty
of the Secretary made peremptory to deliver it in the brief space
of one year and a quarter from that time. But events frustrated
that order. The Treasury was in no condition on the first day of
January, 1839, to deliver that amount of money. It was penniless
itself. The compromise act of 1833, making periodical reductions in
the tariff, until the whole duty was reduced to an _ad valorem_ of
twenty per cent., had nearly run its course, and left the Treasury
in the condition of a borrower, instead of that of a donor or lender
of money. This fourth instalment could not be delivered at the time
appointed, nor subsequently;--and was finally relinquished, the
States retaining the amount they had received: which was so much
clear gain through the legislative fraud of making a distribution
under the name of a deposit.
This was the end of one of the distribution schemes which had so
long afflicted and disturbed Congress and the country. Those schemes
began now to be known by their consequences--evil to those they were
intended to benefit, and of no service to those whose popularity
they were to augment. To the States the deposit proved to be an
evil, in the contentions and combinations to which their disposition
gave rise in the general assemblies--in the objects to which they
were applied--and the futility of the help which they afforded.
Popularity hunting, on a national scale, gave birth to the schemes
in Congress: the same spirit, on a smaller and local scale, took
them up in the States. All sorts of plans were proposed for the
employment of the money, and combinations more or less interested,
or designing, generally carried the point in the universal scramble.
In some States a pro rata division of the money, per capite, was
made; and the distributive share of each individual being but a few
shillings, was received with contempt by some, and rejected with
scorn by others. In other States it was divided among the counties,
and gave rise to disjointed undertakings of no general benefit.
Others, again, were stimulated by the unexpected acquisition of
a large sum, to engage in large and premature works of internal
improvement, embarrassing the State with debt, and commencing works
which could not be finished. Other States again, looking upon the
deposit act as a legislative fraud to cover an unconstitutional and
demoralizing distribution of public money to the people, refused
for a long time to receive their proffered dividend, and passed
resolutions of censure upon the authors of the act. And thus the
whole policy worked out differently from what had been expected. The
States and the people were not grateful for the favor: the authors
of the act gained no presidential election by it: and the gratifying
fact became evident that the American people were not the degenerate
Romans, or the volatile Greeks, to be seduced with their own
money--to give their votes to men who lavished the public moneys on
their wants or their pleasures--in grain to feed them, or in shows
and games to delight and amuse them.
CHAPTER XI.
INDEPENDENT TREASURY AND HARD MONEY PAYMENTS.
These were the crowning measures of the session, and of Mr. Van
Buren's administration,--not entirely consummated at that time,
but partly, and the rest assured;--and constitute in fact an era
in our financial history. They were the most strenuously contested
measures of the session, and made the issue completely between
the hard money and the paper money systems. They triumphed--have
maintained their supremacy ever since--and vindicated their
excellence on trial. Vehemently opposed at the time, and the
greatest evil predicted, opposition has died away, and given
place to support; and the predicted evils have been seen only in
blessings. No attempt has been made to disturb these great measures
since their final adoption, and it would seem that none need now
be apprehended; but the history of their adoption presents one
of the most instructive lessons in our financial legislation,
and must have its interest with future ages as well as with the
present generation. The bills which were brought in for the
purpose were clear in principle--simple in detail: the government
to receive nothing but gold and silver for its revenues, and
its own officers to keep it--the Treasury being at the seat of
government, with branches, or sub-treasuries at the principal points
of collection and disbursement. And these treasuries to be real,
not constructive--strong buildings to hold the public moneys, and
special officers to keep the keys. The capacious, strong-walled and
well-guarded custom houses and mints, furnished in the great cities
the rooms that were wanted: the Treasury building at Washington was
ready, and in the right place.
This proposed total separation of the federal government from all
banks--called at the time in the popular language of the day, the
divorce of Bank and State--naturally arrayed the whole bank power
against it, from a feeling of interest; and all (or nearly so) acted
in conjunction with the once dominant, and still potent, Bank of the
United States. In the Senate, Mr. Webster headed one interest--Mr.
Rives, of Virginia, the other; and Mr. Calhoun, who had long acted
with the opposition, now came back to the support of the democracy,
and gave the aid without which these great measures of the session
could not have been carried. His temperament required him to have a
lead; and it was readily yielded to him in the debate in all cases
where he went with the recommendations of the message; and hence
he appeared, in the debate on these measures, as the principal
antagonist of Mr. Webster and Mr. Rives.
The present attitude of Mr. Calhoun gave rise to some taunts in
relation to his former support of a national bank, and on his
present political associations, which gave him the opportunity to
set himself right in relation to that institution and his support of
it in 1816 and 1834. In this vein Mr. Rives said:
"It does seem to me, Mr. President, that this perpetual and
gratuitous introduction of the Bank of the United States into
this debate, with which it has no connection, as if to alarm the
imaginations of grave senators, is but a poor evidence of the
intrinsic strength of the gentleman's cause. Much has been said
of argument _ad captandum_ in the course of this discussion. I
have heard none that can compare with this solemn stalking of
the ghost of the Bank of the United States through this hall, to
'frighten senators from their propriety.' I am as much opposed
to that institution as the gentleman or any one else is, or
can be. I think I may say I have given some proofs of it. The
gentleman himself acquits me of any design to favor the interest
of that institution, while he says such is the necessary
consequence of my proposition. The suggestion is advanced for
effect, and then retracted in form. Whatever be the new-born
zeal of the senator from South Carolina against the Bank of
the United States, I flatter myself that I stand in a position
that places me, at least, as much above suspicion of an undue
leaning in favor of that institution as the honorable gentleman.
If I mistake not, it was the senator from South Carolina who
introduced and supported the bill for the charter of the United
States Bank in 1816; it was he, also, who brought in a bill in
1834, to extend the charter of that institution for a term of
twelve years; and none were more conspicuous than he in the
well-remembered scenes of that day, in urging the restoration of
the government deposits to this same institution."
The reply of Mr. Calhoun to those taunts, which impeached his
consistency--a point at which he was always sensitive--was quiet
and ready, and the same that he had often been heard to express in
common conversation. He said:
"In supporting the bank of 1816, I openly declared that, as a
question _de novo_, I would be decidedly against the bank, and
would be the last to give it my support. I also stated that,
in supporting the bank then, I yielded to the necessity of the
case, growing out of the then existing and long-established
connection between the government and the banking system. I
took the ground, even at that early period, that so long as
the connection existed, so long as the government received and
paid away bank notes as money, they were bound to regulate
their value, and had no alternative but the establishment
of a national bank. I found the connection in existence and
established before my time, and over which I could have no
control. I yielded to the necessity, in order to correct the
disordered state of the currency, which had fallen exclusively
under the control of the States. I yielded to what I could not
reverse, just as any member of the Senate now would, who might
believe that Louisiana was unconstitutionally admitted into the
Union, but who would, nevertheless, feel compelled to vote to
extend the laws to that State, as one of its members, on the
ground that its admission was an act, whether constitutional or
unconstitutional, which he could not reverse. In 1834, I acted
in conformity to the same principle, in proposing the renewal
of the bank charter for a short period. My object, as expressly
avowed, was to use the bank to break the connection between the
government and the banking system gradually, in order to avert
the catastrophe which has now befallen us, and which I then
clearly perceived. But the connection, which I believed to be
irreversible in 1816, has now been broken by operation of law.
It is now an open question. I feel myself free, for the first
time, to choose my course on this important subject; and, in
opposing a bank, I act in conformity to principles which I have
entertained ever since I have fully investigated the subject."
Going on with his lead in support of the President's
recommendations, Mr. Calhoun brought forward the proposition to
discontinue the use of bank paper in the receipts and disbursements
of the federal government, and supported his motion as a measure as
necessary to the welfare of the banks themselves as to the safety of
the government. In this sense he said:
"We have reached a new era with regard to these institutions.
He who would judge of the future by the past, in reference
to them, will be wholly mistaken. The year 1833 marks the
commencement of this era. That extraordinary man who had the
power of imprinting his own feelings on the community, then
commenced his hostile attacks, which have left such effects
behind, that the war then commenced against the banks, I clearly
see, will not terminate, unless there be a separation between
them and the government,--until one or the other triumphs--till
the government becomes the bank, or the bank the government. In
resisting their union, I act as the friend of both. I have, as
I have said, no unkind feeling toward the banks. I am neither
a bank man, nor an anti-bank man. I have had little connection
with them. Many of my best friends, for whom I have the highest
esteem, have a deep interest in their prosperity, and, as far
as friendship or personal attachment extends, my inclination
would be strongly in their favor. But I stand up here as the
representative of no particular interest. I look to the whole,
and to the future, as well as the present; and I shall steadily
pursue that course which, under the most enlarged view, I
believe to be my duty. In 1834 I saw the present crisis. I
in vain raised a warning voice, and endeavored to avert it.
I now see, with equal certainty, one far more portentous. If
this struggle is to go on--if the banks will insist upon a
reunion with the government, against the sense of a large and
influential portion of the community--and, above all, if they
should succeed in effecting it--a reflux flood will inevitably
sweep away the whole system. A deep popular excitement is never
without some reason, and ought ever to be treated with respect;
and it is the part of wisdom to look timely into the cause, and
correct it before the excitement shall become so great as to
demolish the object, with all its good and evil, against which
it is directed."
Mr. Rives treated the divorce of bank and State as the divorce of
the government from the people, and said:
"Much reliance, Mr. President, has been placed on the popular
catch-word of divorcing the government from all connection
with banks. Nothing is more delusive and treacherous than
catch-words. How often has the revered name of liberty been
invoked, in every quarter of the globe, and every age of the
world,
Showing first 200,000 characters. Full text: gutenberg.org/ebooks/44837