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Harper's Pictorial Library of the World War, Volume XII

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  • Language English
  • PG edition 2013
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Contents

    A Community Conference on Food-Saving

    Will There Be Enough to Go Around?

    Women Doing Night Farming

    The Ore Market--Cleveland

    David Lloyd George

    President Poincaré With the Swiss President, M. Gustave Ador,
    Driving to the Peace Conference in Paris

    Where the Peace Treaty Was Signed

    Awaiting the Decision of the German Peace Delegates.

    The George Washington

    Paris Crowds Greeting President Wilson

    Henry White

    Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau

    Victoria Hall at Geneva

    William Howard Taft

    Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States

    President and Mrs. Wilson Waving Good Bye

    President Wilson's Welcome in Paris

    Sir Eric Drummond

    Lord Robert Cecil

    Berlin Demonstrations Against The Peace Treaty

    German Press Representatives in Versailles

    Dreadnoughts Welcoming President Wilson Home

    M. Stephen Pichon

    Henry Cabot Lodge

    America's Peace Capitol in Paris

    The White Flags That Meant Defeat for the German Cause and Marked
    the Beginning of the End of the War

    Paris in War Time

    Senator Philander C. Knox of Pennsylvania

    Male Population Registered and Not Registered

    Comparative Losses of Merchant Shipping During the War

    Production of Training Planes and Engines to the End of Each Month

    Number of Battle Aeroplanes in Each Army at the Date of the
    Armistice

    Secretary of War Baker Drawing Registration Numbers

    Our Flag in Alsace

    INTRODUCTION

    By PROFESSOR IRVING FISHER

    Department of Political Economy, Yale University

    In various ways, as this volume shows, the war has profoundly affected our economic and political life. War has ever been a disturber and innovator, always leaving after it a different world from that which existed previous to it. On account of our tremendously complex economic organization--the specialization of industry among nations, and the network of commerce--war today causes more profound changes than ever before. There can not be a human being in the world today whose life is not altered by the war through which we have just passed.

    In trying, now that the war is over, to stop drifting, and to think our way out of the bent (or broken) remains of the ante bellum life, the world is confronted by a maze of problems and a still greater maze of proffered solutions.

    Many of these proposals are, unfortunately, of the nature of treatment directed not at fundamental conditions, but merely at symptoms. We should be past the stage, in our social science, as we are in medicine, where we treat symptoms without a thorough diagnosis of the fundamental causes.

    And yet it is just this thorough diagnosis that we lack.

    What, then, are the changes brought about by the war which most deeply affect "the body politic," and by meeting which the most far reaching improvements can be made?

    HIGH COST OF LIVING A VITAL QUESTION

    I can not take up, or even touch on, all of them; but to one of them I wish to call especial attention--the High Cost of Living or, more generally, the high level of prices, which is the most striking economic effect of the war throughout the world. It is, as I see it, hard to over-emphasize the need for attacking this problem of the price level as a preliminary to attacking the other economic problems which the war has left us.

    We need only glance at a newspaper today, or step into a corner grocery, or fall into conversation with our neighbor in the train to have this topic come out as foremost in interest. It is, I believe, responsible for much more of our present uncertainty and confusion than is usually realized. In its ramifications it is chiefly this phase of the war's effects which, as I suggested above, touches every one of us at every point of our lives. A member of the Federal Reserve Board has called the price level problem the central economic problem of reconstruction.

    Professor William Graham Sumner, who has inspired so many to the scientific study of social conditions, used to say: "In taking up the study of any social situation, divide your study into four questions--(1) What is it? (2) Why is it? (3) What of it? (4) What are you going to do about it?"

    Let us follow this outline, and look first at the facts of the case; secondly at their causes; thirdly at the evils involved; and lastly at the remedies.

    MEASURING CHANGES IN PRICES

    We now possess a device for measuring the average change in prices. This is what is known as an "index number."

    Thus, if one commodity has risen 4 per cent. since last month and another, 10 per cent., the average rise of the two is midway between the sum of 4 per cent., and 10 per cent., or 7 per cent. It is

    4 + 10
    ------ = 7
    2

    If we call the price level of the two articles last month 100 per cent., then 107 per cent. is the "index number" for the prices of the two articles this month. The same principle, of course, applies to any number of commodities.

    The index number of the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, the best index number we have, shows an average price level in 1918 of 196 for wholesale prices and 168 for retail prices of food on the basis of 100 per cent. for 1913, the year before the war; showing that wholesale prices, on the average, almost exactly doubled. The latest index number for wholesale prices (May, 1919) is 206, and for retail (July, 1919), 190.

    A look at the history of prices shows the interesting fact that, while prices have sometimes fallen, they have generally risen. The high cost of living has been for centuries a source of complaint. In the 16th century, people objected to the price of wheat, which was three to ten times what it cost during the preceding 300 years.

    WORTHLESS PAPER MONEY

    Where, through ignorance of monetary science, irredeemable paper money was used, prices have sometimes gone up quite "out of sight." This was the case with the famous assignats of the French Revolution, and the "Continental" paper money of our own Revolution. After the Revolution a barber in Philadelphia is said to have covered the walls of his shop with continental paper money, calling it the cheapest wallpaper he could get! Jokes were also heard of a housewife taking a market-basket full of this "money" to the butcher's shop and bringing home the meat in her purse!

    This money became a hissing and a byword; and, even to this day, one of the favorite expressions for worthlessness is "not worth a Continental." We see the same situation repeated again today with Russian paper money.

    But our first scientific measurement of price movements began with 1782, the beginning of Jevons' index number of wholesale prices in England.

    COMMENTS ON FIGURE 1

    Figure 1 shows the course of prices in England from that date, and also, for comparison, that in the U.S.

    [Illustration: Figure 1

    Price Movements of the United States and England from the Earliest Index Numbers Through the First Years of the World War

    Showing, in general, a close similarity. England was on a paper basis, 1801--1820; and the United States, 1862--78. The dotted lines for these periods show the prices as translated back into gold.]

    The conspicuous feature of these curves is their great irregularity.

    Practically never are they for any length of time at all horizontal.

    Sometimes, even in time of peace, a variation of over 10 per cent. is shown in one year. The curve for the U. S. shows, at the time of the Civil War, a very considerable rise (especially as measured in terms of paper), followed by a decline beginning in 1873 and continuing to 1896.

    The fall in the first part of this period was accentuated by the return from a paper to a gold standard. From an index number of 100 in 1873, the index number dropped to 51 in 1896. This decline resulted politically in the famous Bryan "Free Silver" campaign.

    [Illustration: Figure 2

    Trend of Prices Before and After the Great Wars of History]

    Since that time, however, the course of prices has been steadily upward.

    Between 1896 and the outbreak of the war, the index number of the U. S. rose about 50 per cent. Substantially the same increase took place in Canada, while in the United Kingdom there was a rise of 35 per cent.

    This rise before the war amounted, in the United States, to about one-fifth of one per cent. per month. During the war, however, the rise amounted in this country to 1½ per cent. per month, and abroad to much more--in Germany and Austria to 3 per cent. per month, and in Russia, apparently, to 4 or 5 per cent. per month. In the light of the excitement caused up to 1914 by the comparatively moderate increase in this country, we can better understand the Russian economic unrest when a far steeper ascent of prices got under way.

    The total effect can be summed up as follows: between 1914, before the war, and November, 1918, the price level in this country (as indicated by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics retail food index number) rose 79 per cent.; that in England (according to the Statist index number), 133 per cent.; that in France, approximately 140 per cent.; that in western Europe probably at least three-fold; and in Russia perhaps ten or twenty-fold.

    The price level of the United States today is over three-fold that of

    1. Expressing the same fact in terms of the purchasing power of

    money, our dollar of today is worth only 30 cents of the money in 1896, so that as contrasted with the dollar of 1896 our dollar literally "looks like thirty cents."

    COMMENTS ON FIGURE 2

    Now it is a common belief, and one which seems to be borne out by the present situation, that war raises prices whereas peace lowers them. The matter is, however, not so simple. Each case must be considered on its own merits. Figure 2 shows price curves for the various wars.

    In general prices have risen during wars. But there has not been any such uniformity of movement after wars. Moreover in most cases the price disturbances both during and after the wars had scarcely anything to do with the coming and going of the war. In only four of the cases on the chart is the rise of prices during the war really and clearly due to the war. In the Napoleonic Wars, the war of 1812, the Civil War, and the World War the rise of prices during the war was largely due to war inflation.

    As to the after effects on prices there are likewise only four clear cases. The fall of paper prices relatively to gold after the Napoleonic Wars, and the Civil War was, in each case, clearly due to resumption of specie payments. The fall of prices in the United States after the War of 1812 was doubtless due in large measure to the resumption of foreign trade. In one case there was a rise of prices as an aftermath; the war of 1871, which gave Germany a billion dollars of indemnity, created inflation in Germany and prices rose there between 1871 and 1873 faster than in any other country. This doubtless accentuated the crash in the crisis of 1873.

    In the other cases in the diagram the many instances of rise of prices after the wars were due primarily at least, to other causes, although the cessation of war and the undue optimism and spirit of speculation which often follow may, in several instances, have contributed to the boom period and the crisis which so often came a few years later, viz., that of 1857 after the Crimean War, that of 1866 after the Civil War, as well as that of 1873 just mentioned.

    The only safe generalizations seem to be the following two: The first is that in so far as a war has been costly, i. e., has strained the economic resources of the belligerents, there has been recourse to inflation in some form and prices have risen. Besides the examples in the chart are those of the French Revolution, the American Colonial wars, the American Revolution and many others. The second generalization is that after a costly war the price level is affected up or down by the fiscal policy of the governments concerned.

    HIGH PRICES NOT DUE TO SCARCITY

    Most cherish the belief that high war prices today represent war scarcity. In the case of some countries like Belgium and some commodities like paper this is true and in such cases scarcity serves as a partial explanation of high prices. But in the case of most countries and most commodities there has been no general scarcity. The almost universal rise of prices cannot be ascribed to scarcity. Prices have risen of many goods not affected by the war or in countries remotest from the war.

    [Illustration: Copyright by Underwood & Underwood

    William McAdoo

    Secretary of the Treasury during the World War, and Director-General of the Railroads.]

    As Mr. O. P. Austin, statistician of the National City Bank, has said:

    "Raw silk, for example, for which the war made no special
    demand and which was produced on the side of the globe opposite
    that in which the hostilities were occurring, advanced from
    $3.00 per pound in the country of production in 1913 to $4.50
    per pound in 1917, and over $6.00 per pound in the closing
    months of the war. Manila hemp, also produced on the opposite
    side of the globe and not a war requirement, advanced in the
    country of production from $180 per ton in 1915 to $437 per ton
    in 1918.

    Goat skins, from China, India, Mexico and South
    America, advanced from 25 cents per pound in 1914 to over 50
    cents per pound in 1918; and yet goat skins were in no sense a
    special requirement of the war. Sisal grass produced in Yucatan
    advanced from $100 per ton in 1914 at the place of production
    to nearly $400 per ton in 1918; and Egyptian cotton, a
    high-priced product and thus not used for war purposes, jumped
    from 14 cents per pound in Egypt in 1914 to 35 cents per pound
    in 1918.

    Even the product of the diamond mines of South Africa
    advanced from 60 to 100 per cent. in price per karat when
    compared with prices existing in the opening months of the war.

    "The prices are in all cases those in the markets of the
    country in which the articles were produced
    and in most cases
    at points on the globe far distant from that in which the war
    was being waged. They are the product of countries having
    plentiful supply of cheap labor and upon which there has been
    no demand for men for service in the war. The advance in the
    prices quoted is in no sense due to the high cost of ocean
    transportation since they are those demanded and obtained in
    the markets of the country of production.

    "Why is it that the product of the labor of women and children
    who care for silk worms in China and Japan, of the Filipino
    laborer who produces the Manila hemp, the Egyptian fellah who
    grows the high grade cotton, the native workman in the diamond
    mines of South Africa, the Mexican peon in the sisal field of
    Yucatan, the Chinese coolie in the tin mines of Malay, or the
    goatherd on the plains of China, India, Mexico or South America
    has doubled in price during the war period?"

    Mr. Austin goes on to show that the scarcity or "increased demand" for war goods has been greatly exaggerated. It is true that some 40 million men were at one time fighting in the war. But this is less than 2½ per cent. of the world's population and it must not be forgotten that these 40 million were also consumers before the war. Their withdrawal from industry did not really create a vacuum of even 1 per cent. of the world's productive power; as women, boys and old men took their places and others worked harder than in peace time.

    In addition to the 40 million soldiers, some 150 million people have been required to work on "war work" at home but they have simply been "switched" from other forms of production which have been correspondingly reduced. War supplies were demanded but these also largely "switched" the demand from former and industrial uses. Lord D'Abernon found that in England those objects of luxury "which would seem to be influenced not at all or only very remotely and to a very small degree by increased cost of labor and materials," such as old books, prints and coins, had, nevertheless, advanced, roughly speaking 50 per cent., during the war.

    Thus "scarcity" and especial "war demands" do not go far toward explaining the high price level even in Europe and not at all, I believe, in this country.

    In the United States while certain things have become scarce, including certain foods, the general mass of goods has been actually increased as a consequence of war.

    The raw materials used in the United States in 1918 were 16 per cent. more than in 1913 and 2 per cent. more than in 1917. The physical volume of trade is estimated variously to be in 1918 from 22 per cent. to 41 per cent. above that in 1913 and 8 per cent. above that in 1917.

    President Wilson, in his address to Congress, August 8, 1919, on the high cost of living, gave other impressive examples as to foods, especially eggs, frozen fowls, creamery butter, salt beef, and canned corn, showing that scarcity is not the cause of high prices.

    HIGH PRICES DUE TO MONETARY CAUSES

    The truth is that the chief causes of the rise of prices in war time are monetary causes.

    It is almost invariably true that the great price movements of history are chiefly monetary. This is shown, in the first place by the fact that countries of like monetary standards have like price movements. Thus--to consider gold-standard countries--there has usually been a remarkable family resemblance between the curves representing the rise and fall of the index numbers of the United States, Canada, England, France, Belgium, Holland, Scandinavia, Germany, Austria and Italy. Again, the price movements in silver countries show a strong likeness, as in India and China between 1873 and 1893.

    On the other hand, we find a great contrast between gold and silver countries or between any countries which have different monetary standards. In the World War the data are still too meager to enable us to express all the relations in exact figures, but we may arrange the different countries in the approximate order in which their prices have risen. The order of the nations corresponds, in general, with the order in which the currency in those nations has been inflated by paper as well as with the order in which their monetary units have depreciated in the foreign exchange markets.

    This order--of ascending prices and of inflated currency--is as follows, beginning with the least rise and inflation: India, Australia, New Zealand, United States, Canada, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, Holland, England, Norway, France, Germany, Austria and Russia.

    [Illustration: Figure 3.

    Money and the Price Level

    Showing a correspondence between the quantity of money and the level of prices. Since the middle of 1915, when the quantity of money in the United States began to be greatly affected by the war, the correspondence has been close, changes in the price level seeming usually to follow changes in the quantity of money one to three months later.]

    The ups and downs of prices correspond with the ups and downs of the money supply. Throughout all history this has been so. For this general statement there is sufficient evidence even where we lack the index numbers by which to make accurate measurements. Whenever there have been new discoveries of gold and rapid outpourings from mines, prices have gone up with corresponding rapidity.

    This was observed in the 16th century, after great quantities of the precious metals had been brought to Europe from the Americas; and again in the 19th century, after the Californian and Australian gold finds of the fifties; and still again, in the same century after the South African, Alaskan and Cripple Creek mining of the nineties.

    Likewise when other causes than mining, such as paper money issues, produce violent changes in the quantity or quality of money, violent changes in the price level usually follow.

    COMMENTS ON FIGURE 3

    The World War furnishes important examples of this. In the United States the curve for the quantity of money in circulation and the curve for the index number of prices run continuously parallel, the price curve following the money curve after a lag of one to three months. It was in August, 1915, that the quantity of money in the United States began its rapid increase. One month later prices began to shoot upward, keeping almost exact pace with the quantity of money. In February, 1916, money suddenly stopped increasing, and two or three months later prices stopped likewise.

    As figure 3 shows, similar striking correspondences have continued to occur with an average lag between the money cause and the price effect of apparently about one and three-quarters months.

    On the whole, the money in circulation in the United States rose from three and one-third billions in 1913 to five and a half billions in 1918, and bank deposits from thirteen to twenty-five billions, both approximately corresponding to the rise in prices.

    Taking a world-wide view, the money in circulation in the world outside of Russia has increased during the war from fifteen billions to forty-five billions and the bank deposits in fifteen principal countries from twenty-seven billions to seventy-five billions. That is both money and deposits have trebled; and prices, on the average have perhaps trebled also.

    The Bolsheviki are a law unto themselves. They have issued eighty billion dollars of paper money, or more than in all the rest of the world put together. Consequently prices in Russia have doubtless reached the sky, though no exact measure of them, since the Bolshevist régime, is at hand.

    The increase of over thirty billions in the money of the world (outside of Russia) is as Austin says "more, in its face value, than all the gold and all the silver turned out by all the mines of all the world in 427 years since the discovery of America."

    The conclusion toward which the foregoing and other arguments lead is that, in this war as in general in the past, the great outstanding disturber of the price level has always been money. If this is the case, how fruitless, except as treatments of symptoms, are price-fixing, or campaigns aimed at profiteers! The cry of profiteering may hinder a real solution of the difficulty by diverting attention from the real issue and fanning and giving up an object to the spirit of revolt. Money is so much an accepted convenience in practice that it has become a great stumbling block in theory.

    Since we talk always in terms of money and live in a money atmosphere, as it were, we become as unconscious of it as we do of the air we breathe.

    ASSOCIATE EVILS OF HIGH PRICES

    We have now considered the cost of living situation under the two questions "What is it?" and "Why is it?"

    The third question, "What of it?"--i. e., what are the evils connected with it--is more easily answered today, when it comes home to all of us, that it might have been 10 years ago.

    If, for each one of us, the rise of income were to keep up exactly with the rise in cost of living, then the high cost of living would have no terrors; it would be merely on paper. But no such perfect adjustment ever occurs or can occur. Outstanding contracts and understandings in terms of money make this out of the question. The salaried men and the wage earners suffer--that is, the cost is borne by those with relatively "fixed" incomes.

    The truth is, the war was largely paid for, not by taxes or loans but by the High Cost of Living. The result is that the effort to avoid discontent of tax payers has created or rather aggravated the discontent over high prices. Every rise in the cost of living brings new recruits to the labor malcontents who feel victimized by society and have come to hate society.

    They cite, in their indictment, the high price of necessities and the high profits of certain great corporations both of which they attribute, not to the aberrations of our monetary yardstick but to deliberate plundering by "profiteers" or a social system of "exploitation." They grow continually more suspicious and nurse an imaginary grudge against the world. We are being threatened by more quack remedies--revolutionary socialism, syndicalism, and Bolshevism.

    Radicalism rides on the wave of high prices.

    As a matter of fact, the real wages in 1918, that is, their purchasing power, were only 80 per cent. of the real wages of 1913. That is, while the retail prices of food advanced 68 per cent., wages in money advanced only 30 per cent. The real wages of 1913 were in turn less than in earlier years.

    Lord D'Abernon, in a recent speech in the House of Lords said: "I am convinced and cannot state too strongly my belief that 80 per cent. of our present industrial troubles and our Bolshevism which is so great a menace to Europe are due to this enormous displacement in the value of money." In fact, before the war, rising costs of living were manufacturing socialists all over the world, including Germany, and the German Government may have weighed, as one of the expected dynastic advantages of war, the suppression of the growing internal class struggle which this high cost of living was bringing on apace.

    MANY SUGGESTED REMEDIES INADEQUATE

    We are now ready for the question, "What can be done about it?" So far as the past is concerned, comparatively little. Bygones must largely be bygones. So far as wages and salaries are concerned, the remedy must be to raise them rather than to lower the high cost of living. While some kinds of work have had excessive wages during the war, this has not been true in general, public opinion to the contrary notwithstanding. I quite agree with Mr. Gompers that the wage level should not be lowered even if it could be. On the contrary it should be raised to catch up with prices, just as was done after the Civil War.

    But in regard to contracts little relief for past injuries can be expected. We would best use the past as a lesson for the future. That is what I understand by "reconstruction."

    [Illustration: John Pierpont Morgan

    The banking house of Morgan was closely identified with international finance throughout the World War.]

    Many impracticable plans have been proposed. Secretary Redfield undertook to stabilize prices by arbitrarily fixing them. He failed, necessarily. We might as well try to fix the sea level by pressing on the ocean. The same, as I stated above, is true of a campaign against profiteers though proposed by so high an authority as President Wilson.

    PROPOSED REMEDY

    The plan I shall here outline has received the approval of a large number of leading economists, business men, and organizations, including President Hadley of Yale; a committee of economists appointed to consider the purchasing power of money in relation to the war; Frank A. Vanderlip, president of the National City Bank of New York; George Foster Peabody, Federal Reserve banker of New York; John Perrin, Federal Reserve Agent of San Francisco; Henry L. Higginson, the veteran banker of Boston; Roger W.

    Babson, statistician; John Hays Hammond, mining engineer; John V. Farwell, of Chicago; Leo S. Rowe, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury: United States Senator, Robert L. Owen, one of the authors of the Federal Reserve Act; Ex-Senator Shafroth; the late Senator Newlands; Sir David Barbour, one of the originators of the Indian gold exchange standard; the Society of Polish Engineers; the New England Purchasing Agents' Association; and a few Chambers of Commerce.

    WANTED--A STANDARDIZED DOLLAR

    Our dollar is now simply a fixed weight of gold--a unit of weight, masquerading as a unit of value. It is almost as absurd to define a unit of value, or general purchasing power, in terms of weight as to define a unit of length in terms of weight. What good does it do us to be assured that our dollar weighs just as much as ever? We want a dollar which will always buy the same aggregate quantity of bread, butter, beef, bacon, beans, sugar, clothing, fuel, and the other essential things that we spend it for.

    What is needed is to stabilize or standardize the dollar just as we have already standardized the yardstick, the pound weight, the bushel basket, the pint cup, the horsepower, the volt, and, indeed, all the units of commerce except the dollar.

    Money today has two great functions. It is a medium of exchange and it is a standard of value. Gold was chosen because it was a good medium, not because it was a good standard. And so, because our ancestors found a good medium of exchange, we now find ourselves saddled with a bad standard of value!

    The problem before us is to retain gold as a good medium and yet to make it into a good standard; not to abandon the gold standard but to rectify it; not to rid ourselves of the gold dollar but to make it conform in purchasing power to the composite or goods-dollar. The method of rectifying the gold standard consists in suitably varying the weight of the gold dollar. The gold dollar is now fixed in weight and therefore variable in purchasing power. What we need is a gold dollar fixed in purchasing power and therefore variable in weight.

    I do not think that any sane man, whether or not he accepts the theory of money which I accept, will deny that the weight of gold in a dollar has a great deal to do with its purchasing power. More gold will buy more goods.

    Therefore more gold than 25.8 grains will, barring counteracting causes, buy more goods than 25.8 grains itself will buy. If today the dollar, instead of being 25.8 grains or about one-twentieth of an ounce of gold, were an ounce or a pound or a ton of gold it would surely buy more than it does now, which is the same thing as saying that the price level would be lower than it is now.

    A Mexican gold dollar weighs about half as much as ours and has less purchasing power. If Mexico should adopt the same dollar that we have and that Canada has, no one could doubt that its purchasing power would rise--that is, the price level in Mexico would fall.

    Since, then, the heavier or the lighter the gold dollar is the more or the less is its purchasing power, it follows that, if we add new grains of gold to the dollar just fast enough to compensate for the loss in the purchasing power of each grain, or vice versa take away gold to compensate for a gain, we shall have a fully "compensated dollar," a stationary instead of fluctuating dollar, when judged by its purchasing power.

    But how, it will be asked, is it possible, in practice, to change the weight of the gold dollar? The feat is certainly not impossible, for it has often been accomplished. We ourselves have changed the weight of our gold dollar twice--once in 1834, when the gold in the dollar was reduced 7 per cent., and again in 1837, when it was increased one-tenth of 1 per cent. If we can change it once or twice a century, we can change it once or twice a month!

    HOW GOLD CIRCULATES

    In actual fact, gold now circulates almost entirely through "yellowbacks," or gold certificates. The gold itself, often not in the form of coins at all but of "bar gold," lies in the government vaults.

    The abolition of gold coin would make no material change in the present situation.

    If gold thus circulated only in the form of paper representatives it would evidently be possible to vary at will the weight of the gold dollar without any such annoyance or complication as would arise from the existence of coins. The government would simply vary the quantity of gold bullion which it would exchange for a paper dollar--the quantity it would give or take at a given time. As readily as a grocer can vary the amount of sugar he will give for a dollar, the government could vary the amount of gold it would give for a dollar.

    CRITERION OF STANDARDIZATION

    But, it will now be asked, what criterion is to guide the government in making these changes in the dollar's weight? Am I proposing that some government official should be authorized to mark the dollar up or down according to his own caprice? Most certainly not. A definite and simple criterion for the required adjustments is at hand--the now familiar "index number" of prices.

    If, for instance, the index number is found to be 1 per cent. above the ideal par, this fact will indicate that the purchasing power of the dollar has gone down; and this fact will be the signal and authorization for an increase of 1 per cent. in the weight of the gold dollar. What is thereby added to the purchasing power of the gold dollar will be automatically registered in the purchasing power of its circulating certificate. If the correction is not enough, or if it is too much, the index number next month will tell the story.

    Absolutely perfect correction is impossible, but any imperfection will continue to reappear and so cannot escape ultimate correction. Suppose, for instance, that next month the index number is found to remain unchanged at 101. Then the dollar is at once loaded an additional 1 per cent. And if, next month, the index number is, let us say, 100½ (that is, one half of 1 per cent above par) this one-half of 1 per cent. will call for a third addition to the dollar's weight, this time of one-half of one per cent.

    And so, as long as the index number persists in staying even a little above par, the dollar will continue to be loaded each month, until, if necessary, it weighs an ounce--or a ton, for that matter. But, of course, long before it can become so heavy, the additional weight will become sufficient; so that the index number will be pushed back to par--that is, the circulating certificate will have its purchasing power restored. Or suppose the index number falls below par, say 1 per cent. below.

    This fact will indicate that the purchasing power of the dollar has gone up. Accordingly, the gold dollar will be reduced in weight 1 per cent., and each month that the index number remains below par the now too heavy dollar will be unloaded and the purchasing power of the certificate brought down to par.

    Thus by ballast thrown overboard or taken on, our dollar is kept from drifting far from the proper level. The result is that the price level would oscillate only slightly. Instead of there being any great price convulsions, such as we find throughout history, the index number would run, say 101, 100½, 101, 100, 102, 101½, 100, 98, 99, 99, 99½, 100, etc., seldom getting off the line more than 1 or 2 per cent.

    A PROBLEM CALLING FOR URGENT ACTION

    With the question now before us, it is evident that the problem of our monetary standards has much more than theoretical significance. It is a practical problem, and, I submit, the most pressing which the war has left us. I do not offer the solution described above as the only answer to the problem. It is, however, a working basis, a starting point, from which we may be able to work out a better plan. Some scientifically sound plan is essential, or we shall be the victims of quack remedies.

    Finally, now is the time to take up the matter. Public interest is now focused on the cost of living and is very largely educated to the fact that the high prices have a monetary basis. Furthermore, the world is looking to us, as never before, for leadership. It is our golden opportunity to set world standards. If we adopt a stable standard of value, it seems certain that other nations, as fast as they can straighten out their affairs, resume specie payments, and secure again stable pars of exchange, will follow our example.

    Let us, then, who realize the situation, act upon our knowledge; and secure a boon for all future generations, a true standard for contracts, a stabilized dollar.

    [Illustration: Copyright by Underwood & Underwood

    President Wilson and Rear Admiral Grayson Passing the Palace of the King in Brussels]

    The Great Results of the War

    The Great Results of the War

    PART I

    I--ECONOMIC RESULTS OF THE WAR

    Striking Changes Made by the European Conflict Upon the Economic Life of the Great Nations

    The paramount position of War Finance was brought vividly and continuously before the whole people of the United States by the Liberty Loan campaigns. This lesson was an old one though it was enforced by all the improved methods of modern publicity. To Napoleon Bonaparte is attributed the statement that three things are necessary to wage a successful war: money, more money, and still more money.

    FINDING THE MONEY FOR WAR

    It has been well said that:

    "Perhaps the greatest surprise of the war to most people, even
    to those who had studied political economy, has been the
    enormous expenditure of money which a nation can incur, and the
    length of time which it can go on fighting without complete
    exhaustion. This should not have been in reality a surprise to
    anyone who had studied past history, for all experience shows
    that lack of money itself has never prevented a nation from
    continuing to fight, if it were determined to fight.

    The
    financial condition of Revolutionary France at the commencement
    of Napoleon's career was wretched in the extreme, yet France
    went on fighting for nearly twenty years after that. The Balkan
    States can hardly be said ever to have had great financial
    resources, and yet they fought, one after the other, two severe
    wars, and are now fighting a third still more severe and
    prolonged. The Boers in South Africa found no difficulty in
    fighting the British Empire for three years with practically no
    financial resources. The Mexicans recently managed to fight one
    another for a good many years in the same way.

    Lastly, the
    Southern states in our own Civil War fought for years a
    desperate and losing fight and were ultimately beaten to the
    ground, not so much by a lack of money, as by an actual lack of
    things to live on and fight with. In fact, all history proves,
    and this war proves over again, that if what the Germans call
    'the will to fight' exists lack of money will never stop a
    nation's fighting, provided it possesses or can obtain its
    absolutely minimum requirements of food, clothing, and
    munitions of war.

    It was Bismarck who said: 'If you will give
    me a printing press, I will find you the money.' In finding the
    money required for an exhausting war a nation is driven to all
    sorts of desperate financial expedients which may very
    seriously affect its economic life, but if a nation wants to
    continue fighting and can produce, or be induced to produce,
    the things that are absolutely necessary for life and warfare,
    the government will get hold of those things somehow. If it
    cannot get them in any other way, ultimately it will take
    them."

    STRONG POSITION OF UNITED STATES

    When the war opened England was in the strongest position of any of the Allies. She was the greatest creditor nation in the world. That is, she was able to purchase goods from foreign countries on easier terms than her associates. Russia and Italy were debtor nations and had to borrow even before the war in order to balance their foreign accounts. So these members of the Entente had to be assisted in making purchases abroad.

    England was able for a long time to keep up her exchange rate in New York. This was done by the shipment of gold and by inducing the holders of American securities in England to sell or lend such securities to their government.

    England was forced to act as the agent of other Powers who were fighting with her. Until the United States came in, it was the greatest industrial arsenal among the Allies. Large imports were naturally a feature of this policy. The United States soon began to feel the result of the changes in international credit. Exports almost doubled between 1912 and 1917, the figures being in millions, $2,399,000,000 and $6,231,000,000, respectively.

    Another side of the United States trade account to the world is indicated by the following classified list of loans to January, 1917:

    "Between August 1, 1914, and December 31, 1916, the loans
    raised in the United States by foreign countries were estimated
    to reach $2,325,900,000, of which $175,000,000 had been repaid.
    The net indebtedness on January 1, 1917, was therefore
    $2,150,900,000. The loans may be classified geographically as
    follows:

    Europe $1,893,400,000
    Canada 270,500,000
    Latin America 157,000,000
    China 5,000,000
    --------------
    Total foreign loans $2,325,900,000
    Less amount paid, estimated 175,000,000
    --------------
    Net foreign indebtedness $2,150,900,000

    "The loans of the belligerent countries which were floated in
    the United States up to the close of 1916 are divided as
    follows:

    Great Britain $908,400,000
    France 695,000,000
    Russia 160,000,000
    Germany 45,000,000[1]
    Canada 270,500,000
    --------------
    Total $2,078,900,000[2]

    [1] Estimated.

    [2] Nearly $1,900,000,000 of this constituted war loans.

    NEW PACE IN WAR FINANCE

    A new pace in war finance was set by the United States when it became a belligerent. It had to provide for an increase of taxation ascending from the point of $3,000,000,000 in 1917 to over $8,000,000,000 in 1918.

    The largest source of estimated revenue was from taxes on excess profits, including war profits of $3,100,000,000, and the next was from taxes on incomes, $1,482,186,000 from individuals, and $828,000,000 from corporations. The New York Journal of Commerce shows by the following table the difference between the old and the new system of taxation.

    Exemptions under the new law were the same as under the old: $1,000 for single persons and $2,000 for married, $200 additional allowed for each dependent child under eighteen years of age:

    Incomes Tax Under
    Old New
    Law Law
    $2,500 $10 $30
    3,000 20 60
    3,500 30 90
    4,000 40 120
    4,500 60 150
    5,000 80 180
    5,500 105 220
    6,000 130 260
    6,500 155 330
    7,000 180 400
    7,500 205 470
    8,000 235 545
    8,500 265 620
    9,000 295 695
    9,500 325 770
    10,000 355 845
    12,500 530 1,320
    15,000 730 1,795
    20,000 1,180 2,895
    25,000 1,780 4,240
    30,000 2,380 5,595
    35,000 2,980 7,195
    40,000 3,580 8,795
    45,000 4,380 10,645
    50,000 5,180 12,495
    55,000 5,980 14,695
    60,000 6,780 16,895
    70,000 8,880 21,895
    80,000 10,980 27,295
    100,000 16,180 39,095
    150,000 31,680 70,095
    200,000 49,180 101,095
    300,000 92,680 165,095
    500,000 192,680 207,095
    1,000,000 475,180 647,095
    5,000,000 3,140,180 3,527,095

    The following estimated yield from other sources is given by the same authority:

    "Transportation--Freight, $75,000,000; express, $20,000,000;
    passenger fares, $60,000,000; seats and berths, $5,000,000; oil
    by pipe lines, $4,550,000.

    "Beverages (liquors and soft drinks), $1,137,600,000; stamp
    taxes, $32,000,000; tobacco cigars, $61,364,000; cigarettes,
    $165,240,000; tobacco, 104,000,000; snuff, $9,100,000; papers
    and tubes, $1,500,000.

    "Special Taxes.--Capital stock, $70,000,000; brokers,
    $1,765,000; theaters, etc., $2,143,000; mail order sales,
    $5,000,000; bowling alleys, billiard and pool tables,
    $2,200,000; shooting galleries, $400,000; riding academies,
    $50,000; business license tax, $10,000,000; manufacturers of
    tobacco, $69,000; manufacturers of cigars, $850,000;
    manufacturers of cigarettes, $240,000; use of automobiles and
    motor cycles, $72,920,000.

    "Telegraph and telephone messages, $15,000,000; insurance,
    $12,000,000; admissions (theaters, circuses, etc.),
    $100,000,000; club dues, $9,000,000.

    "Excise Taxes.--Automobiles, etc., $123,750,000; jewelry,
    sporting goods, etc., $80,000,000; other taxes on luxuries at
    10 percent., $88,760,000; other taxes on luxuries (apparel,
    etc., above certain prescribed prices), at 20 percent.,
    $181,095,000.

    "Gasoline, $40,000,000; yachts and pleasure boats, $1,000,000."

    "The income tax law levies on all citizens or residents of the
    United States a normal tax of 12 percent. upon the amount of
    income in excess of exemptions, except that on the first $4,000
    of the taxable amount the rate shall be 6 percent. The law also
    increases the surtaxes all along the line.

    The advances by
    grades compared with the percentage under the old law are:
    $5,000 to $7,500 incomes, increased from 1 to 2 percent.;
    $7,500 to $10,000, from 2 to 3 percent.; $10,000 to $12,500,
    from 3 to 7 percent.; $12,500 to $15,000, from 4 to 7 percent.;
    $15,000 to $20,000, from 5 to 10 percent.; $20,000 to $30,000,
    from 8 to 15 percent.; $30,000 to $40,000, from 8 to 20
    percent.; $40,000 to $50,000, from 12 to 25 percent.; $50,000
    to $60,000, from 12 to 32 percent.; $60,000 to $70,000, from 17
    to 38 percent.; $70,000 to $80,000, from 17 to 42 percent.;
    $80,000 to $90,000, from 22 to 46 percent.; $90,000 to
    $100,000, from 22 to 46 percent.; $100,000 to $150,000, from
    27 to 50 percent.; $150,000 to $200,000, from 31 to 50
    percent.; $200,000 to $250,000, from 37 to 52 percent.;
    $250,000 to $300,000, from 42 to 55 percent.

    The rate continues
    to increase, but on incomes of over $5,000,000 the increase is
    only from 63 percent., under former law to 65 percent."

    [Illustration: Copyright by International Film Service

    Women Munition Workers in the International Fuse and Arms Works

    Before entering the war, the United States was the great arsenal of the Allies. After our entry, production of munitions increased, while the man power in the industry diminished through enlistments and the draft.

    Women took up the work and showed surprising ability.]

    MEANING OF NEW TAXATION

    According to a calculation published in the New York World the war revenue bill imposed a war tax of $80 on every man, woman and child in the United States, or approximately $400 for each family. The amount expected to be derived from each item is given in the following table:

    Individual income tax $1,482,186,000
    Corporation income tax 894,000,000
    Excess and war profits 3,200,000,000
    Estate tax 110,000,000
    Transportation 164,550,000
    Telegraph and telephone 16,000,000
    Insurance 12,000,000
    Admissions 100,000,000
    Club dues 9,000,000
    Excise, luxury, and semi-luxury 518,305,000
    Beverages 1,137,600,000
    Stamp taxes--chiefly documentary 32,000,000
    Tobacco and products 341,204,000
    Special business and
    automobile-user's Taxes 165,607,000
    --------------
    Total $8,182,452,000

    With the operation of this tax the people of the United States found it no longer possible to speak in terms of opprobrium of the tax-ridden people of Europe. The American income tax has a higher rate on large incomes than that provided for under the English system. A man in the United States with an income of $5,000,000 is taxed nearly 50 percent., more than in England. The New York Tribune published tables printed below comparing the income tax rates of the United States with those existing in France and in Great Britain.

    INCOME TAX COMPARISON

    A compilation made for the Wall Street Journal shows that the United States income tax even with the increases made in 1918 was still far lower than the English income tax:

    "The great bulk, numerically, of incomes taxed in 1917 was in
    the field reached by the lowering of the exemption in the 1917
    law.... It is a fact, however, that no one of these new
    taxpayers was called on to contribute more than $40 to the
    government, as the rate was only 2 percent., while all other
    incomes paid a basic normal tax of 4 percent. The lowest rate
    for normal tax in Great Britain is 2 shillings and 3 pence on
    the pound, or 11¼ percent., and the exemption is only $600. The
    basic normal tax under the new English law is 6 shillings on
    the pound, or 30 percent., on all incomes over $25,000.

    United States
    Old Law New Law United Kingdom France
    Income Rate Rate Rate (%) Rate
    Am't (%) Am't (%) Unearned Earned (%)

    $ 2,500 $10 .40 $30 1.20 11.25 8.44 1.25
    3,000 20 .67 60 2.00 14.84 11.87 1.67
    3,500 30 .86 90 2.57 16.24 12.96 2.07
    4,000 46 1.00 120 3.00 18.16 14.53 2.44
    4,500 60 1.33 150 3.33 18.75 15.00 2.86
    5,000 80 1.60 180 3.60 18.75 15.00 3.20
    5,500 105 1.91 220 4.00 22.50 18.75 3.48
    6,000 130 2.16 260 4.33 22.50 18.75 3.71
    6,500 155 2.38 330 5.08 22.50 18.75 3.90
    7,000 180 2.57 400 5.71 22.50 18.75 4.07
    7,500 205 2.73 470 6.27 22.50 18.75 4.21
    8,000 235 2.93 545 6.81 26.25 22.50 4.34
    8,500 265 3.12 620 7.29 26.25 22.50 4.53
    9,000 295 3.28 695 7.72 26.25 22.50 4.69
    9,500 325 3.42 770 8.11 26.25 22.50 4.84
    10,000 355 3.55 845 8.45 26.25 22.50 4.98
    12,500 530 4.24 1,320 10.56 30.00 26.25 5.53
    15,000 730 4.87 1,795 11.97 32.08 32.08 6.07
    20,000 1,180 5.90 2,895 14.48 34.06 34.06 6.99
    25,000 1,780 7.12 4,245 16.98 35.75 35.75 7.84
    30,000 2,380 7.93 5,595 18.65 37.29 37.29 8.41
    35,000 2,980 8.51 7,195 20.56 38.75 38.75 8.99
    40,000 3,580 8.95 8,795 21.99 39.84 39.84 9.43
    45,000 4,380 9.73 10,645 23.66 40.97 40.97 9.77
    50,000 5,180 10.36 12,495 24.99 41.88 41.88 10.05
    55,000 5,980 10.87 14,695 26.72 42.84 42.84 10.27
    60,000 6,780 11.30 16,895 28.16 43.65 43.65 10.45
    70,000 8,880 12.69 21,895 31.26 44.91 44.91 10.75
    80,000 10,980 13.72 27,295 34.12 45.86 45.86 10.96
    100,000 16,180 16.18 39,095 39.10 47.19 47.19 11.27
    150,000 31,680 21.12 70,095 46.73 48.96 48.96 11.68
    200,000 49,180 24.59 101,095 50.55 49.84 49.84 11.89
    300,000 92,680 30.89 165,095 55.03 50.73 50.73 12.09
    500,000 192,680 38.54 297,095 59.42 51.44 51.44 12.25
    1,000,000 475,180 47.52 647,095 64.71 51.97 51.97 12.38
    5,000,000 3,140,000 62.80 3,527,095 70.54 52.39 52.39 12.48

    "Actual rate, allowing for deductions, normal tax, and surtaxes, based on taxes on incomes of heads of families. Persons with no dependents pay more; those with more than one pay less. $2,000 is exempted for heads of families, $1,000 for bachelors. Below $4,000, 6 per cent. is the normal tax; above, 12 per cent. Surtaxes begin at $5,000."

    "If the new normal tax in the United States were made uniformly
    12 percent.--wiping out the 2 percent. discrimination of the
    1917 law--a single man in this country with a salary of $1,500
    a year would be called on to pay $60 in income tax, as against
    an English tax of $101.25. Assuming that the normal tax were
    raised to 12 percent. and the surtax and excess tax were left
    as at present, an unmarried American with a salary of $10,000
    would pay $1,430.20, while the unmarried Englishman would pay
    $2,250.

    If the Englishman derived his $10,000 income from
    rentals, his tax would be increased to $2,625, while the
    American tax would be reduced to $1,165--an Irish dividend on
    effort.

    "According to a level where the British surtax becomes
    effective, take a salary of $20,000. The English normal tax on
    this would be $6,000 and the surtax $812.50 (figuring $5 to the
    pound), a total of $6,812.50. At the suggested rate of 12
    percent., the American's normal tax would be $2,145.60 (rate
    applying to $20,000, less $1,000 exemption and $1,120 excess
    tax); the surtax would be $444 and the excess tax $1,120; a
    total of $3,709.60.

    If the American cut non-tax-free coupons
    for his income instead of working for it, his tax would be
    reduced to $2,780, making it more than $600, less than one-half
    the English tax. This, be it remembered, is figuring the
    American normal tax at the supposititious rate of 12 percent.

    "Going abruptly to an income of $1,000,000, the American normal
    tax at 12 percent., would be $119,880, against an English normal
    tax of $300,000. The increase in the American normal tax would
    be $79,960 over present rates. The American surtax at present
    rates would be $435,300, as against a British surtax of
    $217,915; total American, $555,180, English, $519,687.50. No
    account is taken in this computation of any excess tax on the
    American income. With an income of $3,000,000. the American
    normal tax at 12 percent. would be $359,880, an increase of
    $239,960 over present rates.

    The surtax at present rates would
    be $1,680,300, a total of $2,040,180, or nearly 70 percent.,
    the rate on the last $1,000,000 being at 75 percent. The
    corresponding British tax is, normal, $900,000, and surtax
    $669,685; total, $1,569,685, or nearly 52 percent., the actual
    maximum rate being 52½ percent. on all excess over $50,000.

    "Expressed in tabular form, comparative results from a normal
    tax of 12 percent., combined with present surtax rates and
    assuming all income up to $50,000 to be earned income for a
    single man, would be as follows:

    U.S. Per British Per
    Income Tax Cent. Tax Cent.

    $1,500 $60.00 4.00 $101.25 6.75
    3,000 240.00 8.00 375.00 12.50
    5,000 480.00 9.60 750.00 15.00
    7,500 789.40 10.52 1,406.25 18.75
    10,000 1,430.20 14.30 2,250.00 22.50
    15,000 2,534.80 16.90 4,812.50 32.08
    20,000 3,709.60 18.55 6,812.50 34.06
    30,000 6,336.00 21.12 11,187.50 37.29
    40,000 8,956.00 22.39 15,937.50 39.84
    50,000 11,855.20 23.71 20,937.50 40.18
    75,000 18,605.20 24.81 34,062.50 45.42
    100,000 26,855.20 26.80 47,187.50 47.19
    150,000 46,355.20 30.90 73,437.50 48.96
    250,000 92,355.20 36.94 125,937.50 50.37
    500,000 235,355.20 47.07 257,187.50 51.44
    700,000 359,355.20 51.33 362,187.50 51.74
    750,000 390,355.20 52.05 388,437.50 51.79
    1,000,000 557,855.20 55.78 519,687.50 51.97
    3,000,000 2,042,855.20 68.09 1,569,687.50 52.32
    10,000,000 7,292,855.20 72.93 5,244,687.50 52.45

    "With additional exemption of $1,000 for heads of families and
    $200 each for dependent children, the United States figures in
    the table would be reduced by $120 for the $1,000 exemption and
    $24 for each child. There are similar deductions to be made in
    the English figures. Furthermore, for incomes above $50,000,
    deduction for the excess tax has not been figured exactly in
    order to avoid long computations. This would slightly reduce
    the figure on the large incomes.

    But for demonstrative
    purposes, the table gives a fairly accurate general comparison
    of the range of taxes under the proposed English law and a
    tentative 12 percent. normal rate under our law.

    "It will be noticed that the rates would come together just
    below $750,000. It is in the range between $5,000 and $500,000
    incomes that greatest divergence in rates occurs. The British
    tax takes its largest jump between $10,000 and $15,000, where
    the surtax begins to operate. The United States gradations are
    erratic and irregular, showing the haphazard manner in which
    the steps of the surtax were applied."

    ATTITUDE TOWARD WAR TAX BILL

    The passing of the war tax bill was not altogether easy sailing; there was plenty of criticism from the press throughout the country.

    Republican editors and congressmen wondered why the bill did not contain a tax on cotton, and one Pennsylvania congressman thought that the tax levy should be at the rate of three dollars a bale. Senator Smoot of Utah attacked the bill as a bunglesome measure.

    The New York Journal of Commerce called attention to the discrimination between those whose income is in the form of services or property and those who get it in cash:

    "Take the case, for instance, of the salaried employee of a
    bank or factory who receives $5,000 a year, out of which he
    pays his house rent and his usual costs of living; contrast him
    with the case of a farmer who owns his land and obtains the
    bulk of what he needs, both in food, fuel, and other
    essentials, for himself and family in produce or in goods
    obtained by trade at the neighboring village; the situation
    becomes clear and shows why it is that the farming class pays
    only a microscopic proportion of the income tax at the present
    time."

    And the Democratic New York World agreed that the farmer "is not carrying his share of the load of war taxation," and observes:

    "An analysis of income tax returns for the fiscal year 1916,
    recently published, shows that, although farmers are the most
    numerous class of Americans engaged in gainful occupations,
    they were at the foot of the list proportionately among income
    tax payers. Outside of the notorious war profiteers, no element
    of our population has advantaged so greatly by war as
    agriculturists; yet in the year of which we speak only one
    farmer in four hundred paid a farthing's tax upon income. In
    this respect preachers and teachers showed a higher
    percentage."

    There was some demand for extending the income tax downwards to cover smaller incomes, for example, we find the Council Bluffs' Nonpareil contending:

    "The men of more moderate income should be required to pay at
    least a nominal income tax. This is a common country. It
    belongs to common people. And common people will esteem it a
    privilege to contribute their mites. One dollar per hundred on
    a thousand-dollar income would be both reasonable and just."

    CRITICISM OF THE TAX

    The attitude of the New York press is indicated by the Evening Sun and the Times. The New York Evening Sun (Rep.) said the committee "left so many rough edges upon their work." In the opinion of this newspaper, Mr. Kitchin "has given us a measure of class-taxation highly accentuated, and yet has failed to suit the McAdoo group, the most clear-minded adherents of the conscription-of-wealth idea.

    He has produced a confused series of taxes beyond the practical power of the ordinary busy citizen to master or comprehend, but has not combined these into a harmonious system." The morning Sun even went so far as to remark that "nothing that the Senate could do could make the Kitchin measure worse than it is." Yet it by no means criticized all the features of the bill.

    It objected to the proposed taxes on oil producers as discouraging the production of oil, and styled the plan to tax distributed corporation earnings at twelve percent. and undistributed earnings at eighteen percent. "simply a fool tax," which "will help to lock the wheels of every great industry in this country."

    The foundation mistake of the bill, in the opinion of the New York Times (Ind.

    Dem.) was the "attempt to assess taxes upon the smallest possible number of persons and businesses, leaving a great majority of the people free from a levy direct or indirect." The Times thought that this policy was dictated by the desire "to leave the mass of voters free from grounds of complaint against the party in power." It insisted that there should be a consumption tax levying "upon the breakfast table and upon the purchases of a great mass of people." Such necessities as tea, coffee, cocoa, sugar, should bear a tax, in the opinion of this and other newspapers.

    The number of those taxed was also kept comparatively small by the retention of the old income exemption limits, namely, $1,000 for bachelors and $2,000 for married men, with the normal tax rate placed at only six percent. on incomes up to $5,000.

    WILSON'S TAX PROGRAM

    An outline of what was expected from the people of the country as a financial contribution was given by Mr. Wilson in his May (1918) address to Congress, when he decided to ask its members to remain in Washington and prepare a new revenue bill. Mr. Wilson's call for immediate action in behalf of both the public and the Treasury Department was a summons to a universal duty in language which, it is remarked, "was never before used in a tax speech." He said in part:

    "We can not in fairness wait until the end of the fiscal year
    is at hand to apprize our people of the taxes they must pay on
    their earnings of the present calendar year, whose accountings
    and expenditures will then be closed.

    "We can not get increased taxes unless the country knows what
    they are to be and practices the necessary economy to make them
    available. Definiteness, early definiteness, as to what its
    tasks are to be is absolutely necessary for the successful
    administration of the treasury....

    "The present tax laws are marred, moreover, by inequities which
    ought to be remedied....

    "Only fair, equitably distributed taxation of the widest
    incidence, drawing chiefly from the sources which would be
    likely to demoralize credit by their very abundance, can
    prevent inflation and keep our industrial system free of
    speculation and waste.

    [Illustration: Poster for Boy Scouts Who Worked for the Victory Loan]

    "We shall naturally turn, therefore, I suppose, to war profits
    and incomes and luxuries for the additional taxes. But the war
    profits and incomes upon which the increased taxes will be
    levied will be the profits and incomes of the calendar year
    1918. It would be manifestly unfair to wait until the early
    months of 1919 to say what they are to be....

    "Moreover, taxes of that sort will not be paid until the June
    of next year, and the treasury must anticipate them....

    "In the autumn a much larger sale of long-time bonds must be
    effected than has yet been attempted....

    "And how are investors to approach the purchase of bonds with
    any sort of confidence or knowledge of their own affairs if
    they do not know what taxes they are to pay and what economies
    and adjustments of their business they must effect? I can not
    assure the country of a successful administration of the
    treasury in 1918 if the question of further taxation is to be
    left undecided until 1919."

    Mr. Wilson's appeal for the practice of personal economy met with widespread approval in England, as it did in the United States. The Economist considered that his manifesto to the American people on this subject was among the greatest documents that the war has produced.

    National self-sacrifice had gone far, but not far enough. To attain Mr.

    Wilson's standard of individual patriotism much was still needed, the Economist says:

    "We still have a very long way to go before we can attain to
    President Wilson's standard of individual patriotism. From the
    outbreak of war to the end of last year the small investor in
    this country has lent £118,179,000 to the government. Moreover,
    in the first two months of 1917 as much as £40,000,000 was
    contributed to war loans in one form or another in the shape of
    small savings. That result represents a great deal of patriotic
    saving, and reflects the highest credit on the committee, as
    well as upon the Montagu committee, which devised so suitable a
    form of investment as the 15s 6d certificate.

    But far more is
    required. During the war loan campaign, war savings
    certificates brought in £3,000,000 in a single week. That
    effort was, perhaps, too great to be kept up; but it is hardly
    satisfactory that, in spite of the hard work of the committee,
    and an enormous growth in the number of active war savings
    associations all over the country, the weekly receipts from the
    15s 6d certificates have fallen back to the £800,000 to
    £900,000 level which was reached last December.

    This relapse
    may be partially accounted for by the late increase in the cost
    of living, but there can be no doubt that much more might yet
    be done by the masses of people of moderate means to whom the
    small certificates appeal. Nor is there any evidence that the
    wealthier classes, generally speaking, have done nearly as
    much, in the matter of war self denial, as they might have
    done."

    LUXURY TAXES

    When it came to a question of taxing luxuries, the difficulty was to decide what was a luxury. The situation perplexed Congress, for we find one congressman in Pennsylvania who held that collar buttons and cuff buttons were a necessity, while a representative from Texas asserted that Texas could get along without either collar buttons and cuff buttons and still be patriotic. A congressman from Oklahoma thought that all kinds of buttons could be done away with, adding, "Before I came to Congress I could use nails for my suspenders." Congressman from agricultural states considered that automobiles and gasoline were not luxuries but were really necessities, especially for farmers.

    Many newspapers opposed anything like a luxury tax. We find the New York Times advising the imposition of taxes on tea, sugar, coffee and cocoa. These are good revenue producers but few politicians care to interfere with the free breakfast table. The Wall Street Journal approved of luxury taxes because they would be a means of enforcing thrift. The Treasury's plan for imposing these taxes may be gathered from the following condensed summary:

    "Fifty percent. on the retail price of jewelry, including
    watches and clocks, except those sold to army officers.

    "Twenty percent. on automobiles, trailers and truck units,
    motor cycles, bicycles automobile, motor cycle, and bicycle
    tires, and musical instruments.

    "A tax on all men's suits selling for more than $30, hats over
    $4, shirts over $2, pajamas over $2, hosiery over 35 cents,
    shoes over $5, gloves over $2, underwear over $3, and all
    neckwear and canes.

    "On women's suits over $40, coats over $30, ready-made dresses
    over $35, skirts over $15, hats over $10, shoes over $6,
    lingerie over $5, corsets over $5. Dress goods--silk over $1.50
    a square yard; cotton over 50 cents a square yard, and wool
    over $2 per square yard. All furs, boas and fans.

    "On children's clothing--on children's suits over $15, cotton
    dresses over $3, linen dresses over $5, silk and wool dresses
    over $8, hats $5, shoes $4, and gloves $2.

    "On house furnishings, all ornamental lamps and fixtures, all
    table linen, cutlery and silverware, china and cut glass; all
    furniture in sets for which $5 or more is paid for each piece;
    on curtains over $2 per yard, and on tapestries, rugs, and
    carpets over $5 per square yard.

    "On all purses, pocketbooks, handbags, brushes, combs and
    toilet articles, and all mirrors over $2.

    "Ten percent. on the collections from the sales of vending
    machines.

    "Ten percent. on all hotel bills amounting to more than $2.50
    per person per day. Also the present 10 percent. tax on cabaret
    bills is made to apply to the entire restaurant or café bill.

    TAXES OF MANUFACTURER OR PRODUCER

    "Ten cents a gallon on all gasoline to be paid by the wholesale
    dealers.

    "Ten percent. tax on wire leases.

    "Graduated taxes on soft drinks. Mineral now taxed 1 cent a
    gallon to pay 16 cents. Chewing gum now taxed 2 percent. of
    the selling price, to pay 1 cent on each 5-cent package.

    "Motion-picture shows and films: abolish the foot tax of ¼ and
    ½-cent a foot and substitute a tax of 5 percent. on the rentals
    received by the producer, and double the tax rate on
    admissions.

    "Double the present taxes on alcoholic beverages, tobacco and
    cigarettes.

    "Automobiles--a license tax on passenger automobiles graduated
    according to horsepower.

    "Double club membership dues.

    "Household servants, made 25 percent. of the wages of one
    servant up to 100 percent. of the combined wages of four or
    more. Female servants, each family exempted from tax on one
    servant. All additional servants (female) from 10 to 100
    percent. on all over four."

    LUXURIES IMPORTED

    Heavy taxes on luxuries were anticipated but until these taxes were considered it was hardly realized how much of the consumption in America was concerned with articles that could be considered luxuries; for example, the country imported $6,000,000 worth of foreign cigarette papers. Pictures, statuary and other works of art were brought into the country to the extent of $17,000,000. Over $2,000,000 worth of ivory was imported every year; over $2,000,000 worth of mother-of-pearl and more than $2,500,000 worth of bulbs and roots.

    Higher taxes were urged by the financial experts, so we see a writer in Financial America emphasizing the connection between the importation of luxuries and the need of shipping:

    "America can not spare ships to bring costly garments and
    furnishings thousands of miles across the sea. For the war
    period these articles can be replaced at home with materials
    that cost less labor and less money. The money spent for
    domestic goods remains in America and maintains our working
    population and our business and banking resources.

    "We lack a sufficient market for our cotton crop, owing to the
    lack of ships. Americans should wear more cotton. The money
    spent upon it maintains the Southern planter and his family.
    Modern processes give it the appearance of silk. It serves very
    well as carpets, curtains, hangings, and furniture coverings.
    It should answer present needs for such fabrics. A heavier tax
    on imports of these goods is indicated as a means of revenue
    and war economy.

    "Imported wearing apparel of silk pays 60 percent. duty and of
    wool 44 cents a pound and 60 percent. ad valorem. There is a
    graduated rate on dress goods of these materials. Despite the
    tax, America spent more on imported manufactures of silk in
    1917 than ever, the total being nearly $40,000,000. The same
    was true of woolen goods, amounting to $23,000,000.

    "Our imports of woolen carpets and rugs, most of them brought
    half way round the world from oriental lands, were also larger.
    They cost us $3,740,000, though America is a large producer of
    carpets and rugs, fine as well as coarse. These imports paid
    ten cents a square foot and 40 percent. ad valorem.
    Evidently, it was not enough.

    "We also spent $53,000,000 for imported cotton manufactures,
    including cloth, laces, curtains, handkerchiefs, veils, and
    wearing apparel, though America is the world's chief producer
    of cotton. A higher tariff is indicated as a tax on those who
    insist on the foreign product.

    TAXES ON TOBACCO

    "America has a large tobacco industry at home. We import
    tobacco in vast quantities from every producing land to satisfy
    the whimsical and varying tastes of connoisseurs. Our own
    tobacco is discouraged by those who smoke it under the name of
    Turkish, Egyptian, Cuban, Dutch, Spanish, and other foreign
    products, and pay a heavy price for the critical taste which
    their vanity causes them to imagine they possess. Last year
    these imports of leaf tobacco alone were valued at $26,000,000,
    or $10,000,000 more than in 1915.

    The war tax is five cents a
    pound added to eight cents paid under the internal revenue act,
    or thirteen cents altogether. There is also a duty of $1.85 to
    $2.50 a pound. To increase the tax would encourage the industry
    in Kentucky, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and other
    states, while saving our resources in ships and keeping our
    money at home.

    "In addition, America spent $7,000,000 for foreign-made cigars
    and cigarettes last year. These purchases support foreign
    factories, although our own factories use the same raw material
    which they import. They have jumped nearly $3,000,000 in two
    years. Until the war is ended, Americans should be satisfied
    with cigars 'made in America.' The present war tax ranges from
    one tenth of a cent to one cent on each cigar, according to
    value, in addition to a duty of $4.50 a pound and 25 percent.
    ad valorem.

    A higher tax would deprive the smoker of nothing
    but a craving for the foreign label on his cigar box, unless he
    chose to pay well for it. He can even get a Spanish name on his
    American-made cigar.

    DIAMONDS, LEATHER AND MILLINERY

    "America spent $41,000,000 in 1917 to import diamonds, pearls,
    and other precious stones and imitations, not set. They paid a
    war tax of only 3 percent. when made into jewelry. America
    could be content with beauty less adorned to keep this
    $40,000,000 at home, or those who insist on sending their money
    to African mine owners and Dutch cutters should pay a larger
    tax.

    "America last year had a tremendous bill for hides and skins of
    $209,000,000, nearly two and a half times that of 1915. Much of
    it was for the great necessities of the army. A good proportion
    of the rest was unnecessary. These imports of raw material are
    free of duty and there is no war tax on leather goods.
    Substitutes have been devised for many of them.

    These should be
    encouraged by a tax on the unnecessary use of leather in
    furnishings, decorations, toilet articles, hand bags, trunks,
    high shoes, belts, hatbands, and many small articles.
    Substitutes for these will be provided quickly enough if
    leather is lacking. A heavy tax would help the movement. The
    tremendous military and other legitimate demands for leather
    goods will keep the industry in thriving condition without so
    much waste.

    "For imported millinery materials America spent nearly
    $13,000,000 last year, and we also spent $3,000,000 for mere
    feathers, tributes to feminine vanity that filled up many ships
    needed for war use. The greater part of this stuff came 10,000
    miles from China and Japan. There are plenty of substitutes
    that a high war tax would encourage, including those provided
    by the American hen.

    "Our imported glassware, on which there is no war tax, cost
    nearly $2,000,000. It occupies large space aboard ship, owing
    to voluminous packing that is necessary. Imported china,
    porcelain, earthenware, and crockery cost America nearly
    $6,500,000."

    BEARING THE BURDEN

    In spite of the enormous cost of war operations, roseate views were taken of the ability of the country to surmount the unusual difficulties. Unprecedented taxes were being paid, heavy subscriptions to the Liberty Loans were being collected and yet the business of the country seemed to show a high degree of prosperity. This optimistic outlook marks the following comment found in a circular published by the First National Bank in Boston, after it had called attention to the small number of failures reported throughout the country for August,

    1. No such low record had been reached since July, 1901:

    "The steps that have been taken to curtail credits have
    resulted in greater conservatism, and have had a beneficent
    effect, which is likely to continue for some time after the
    present necessity disappears. The business foundation is
    extremely sound. Figures of resources of savings banks show
    that the subscriptions to the Liberty Loans have brought only
    a trifling decrease in savings deposits. Evidently subscribers
    are buying bonds with their current income rather than with
    their savings.

    In other words, the Liberty Loans represent
    additions to the savings of the country, and not merely
    transfers of investments."

    It was prophesied that in spite of the enormous financial obligations assumed by the United States normal conditions would soon be restored.

    History shows, the circular goes on to say, that financial recovery from devastation has been prompt and complete. Even the railway conditions at this time were viewed optimistically. Such a competent authority as the Wall Street Journal did not anticipate the financial troubles that soon overtook railway administration under government control. It thought that, by the end of the year, the existing debits on current operations would probably be wiped out:

    "Aggregate railroad earnings and expenses for July of all the
    important roads in the country are in line with the individual
    statements of the different roads already published in showing
    large increases in both gross and net revenues. They also
    indicate, so far as one month's operating results may be used
    to generalize from, that the railroads are now on a
    self-supporting basis, if they are not actually returning a
    profit to the government on current operation.

    "Net operating income of these roads for the month of July
    (1918) was $137,845,425 as compared with $92,599,620 in the
    same month of 1917. In a recent statement from the
    Director-General's office the compensation payable to the
    railroad companies for the use of their property by the
    government was estimated at $650,000,000 for the first eight
    months of the year, or at the rate of $81,250,000 a month. The
    net operating income of the Class 1 roads as mentioned above
    exceeds this monthly rental figure by $56,595,000."

    THE FIRST GOVERNMENT LOAN, 1789

    Although called by other names, the United States has had issues of Liberty Bonds on several occasions during a period of one hundred and twenty-nine years, notably in the first years of the Republic and in the Civil War. The first was floated in 1789, the year when the Federal Government was established. Alexander Hamilton was Secretary of the Treasury and on him devolved the duty of raising funds for the government.

    "Conditions being pressing, Hamilton, in raising the necessary
    money, at first did not wait even for the approval of Congress,
    but went to the Bank of New York, which he had helped to found
    in 1784--the second bank in the United States and the first in
    New York City--to raise the first necessary money. At a meeting
    of the board of directors the new secretary of the treasury
    asked for a loan of $200,000. It was promptly and unanimously
    granted, the money to be advanced in five installments of
    $20,000 each and ten of $10,000 each, at 6 percent.

    On the
    following day Hamilton sent to the bank the first bond ever
    issued by the United States Treasury--a bond of $20,000--on
    receipt of which the money was paid over, so that the United
    States Treasury could show $20,000 cash on hand. In The
    Investor's Magazine
    , where these facts were recently brought
    to light, we are further told that the bond then issued is
    still carefully preserved by the bank which bought it. Quite
    unlike the now familiar Liberty Bonds of 1917 and 1918, it was
    executed with an ordinary quill pen, such as was in use in
    those times, and signed in ink by the secretary.

    With its seal
    somewhat yellow with age, the bond is still in an excellent
    state of preservation."

    [Illustration: Richards in the Phila. North American

    Dropping the First Bomb]

    POPULARITY OF THE LIBERTY LOANS

    America's financial reputation stood at a fairly high level after the close of the Civil War. An era of unexampled production ensued for more than five decades, yet there were many timorous souls who were frightened at the thought of the United States being called upon to bear the burden of the colossal loans. The surprising feature of the Liberty Loans was the elasticity of the subscriptions. The subscribers for the first three loans numbered respectively 4,500,000, 10,020,000, 17,000,000; in every case the records show over subscription. A graphic statement of the nation's riches was presented by S. L. Frazier in the Northwestern Banker, Des Moines, October, 1918:

    "Our resources are well up toward $300,000,000,000, or about
    equal to the combined resources of France, England, and
    Germany. Our annual production is close to $50,000,000,00,
    amounts that stagger the imagination. Why it would take ten
    thousand years to count the dollars representing out country's
    resources counting one each second, and working day and night
    and Sundays."

    The New York Tribune remarked, "If any learned professor of economics had predicted that on top of ten billions of government loans in one year a fourth Liberty Loan would reach nearly seven billions we know what we all would have thought."

    HOW EUROPE WILL PAY US BACK

    An official in the National City Bank of New York, Mr. G. E. Roberts, is quoted by the New York Times as saying that the wealth-producing equipment of the country had become greater than ever during the war. He did not believe either that there would be any difficulty of the United States being paid back for the money it had loaned foreign governments.

    "We are going to be peculiarly situated in our foreign
    relations after the war. We have paid off the greater part of
    what we owe abroad, and we have lent to foreign governments
    some $7,000,000,000 or $8,000,000,000. Including all loans by
    the time the war is over, probably there will be annual
    interest payments coming to us amounting to $400,000,000 or
    $500,000,000. How are we going to receive our pay? I am not
    questioning the ability of our debtors to raise this amount
    from their people. I have no doubt they can do it, but in what
    manner are they going to make payment to us?

    They can't pay it
    in gold; they haven't the gold to do it, and the total
    production of gold in the world outside of the United States
    wouldn't be enough to do it. We won't want them to pay it in
    goods, for that would interfere seriously with our home
    industries....

    "There is only one way out, and that is by extending more
    credit to them. We will have to capitalize the interest
    payments and reinvest them abroad. And if we want to sell goods
    to them we will have to take their bonds and stocks. In short,
    we will have to play the part that England has played in the
    past, of steadily increasing our foreign investments."

    While the great sums subscribed for the Fourth Loan by banks, corporations, and individuals had a spectacular interest, observed the New York World, it was the plain people who made the loan a conspicuous success, and the twenty-one million subscribers mean in effect the purchase of a new Liberty Bond by "every American family."

    THE LOAN PERIODS

    There were very good reasons on the part of the government for selecting the definite periods at which the Liberty Loans were to be issued. There were also very good reasons derived from experience by which the government was guided in preparing for the loans. Prior to the fourth loan Secretary McAdoo believed that it could be made to reach fully one-fourth of the population of the country. Preparation for it was made through publicity on a scale hitherto unprecedented. The Washington correspondent of the New York Journal of Commerce, writing on July 31, 1918, said:

    "The country will be appealed to, with new and striking film
    arguments, with a great variety of poster slogans, and with a
    use of the press and the platform such as has never been
    witnessed before in this country.

    "There are to be nineteen days of actual campaign work. The
    great task of organization and preparation is now going on.
    Artists have been making posters, writers have been preparing
    arguments, and printing presses in all parts of the country
    have been turning out many millions of mottoes, cartoons, and
    slogans."

    He added interesting data as to outstanding treasury certificates and war expenses. The time chosen for the loan was probably as good, it thought, as could have been selected, inasmuch as it would fall just after the bulk of the crops had been harvested and when much of them had been sold at good figures.

    "War expenses for July were somewhat less than for June and
    May, amounting to about $1,482,000,000 as compared with
    $1,512,000,000, the record for June, and $1,508,000,000 for
    May, the Treasury Department announced. The outlay for July,
    however, was approximately the amount estimated in advance by
    the treasury, and expenses for August probably will be higher,
    it was said.

    "During July the government's daily outlay was about
    $48,000,000, an average of $38,000,000 daily was for ordinary
    expenses of the army, navy, shipping board, and other agencies,
    and $10,000,000 daily in loans to the Allies. Total ordinary
    expenditures for the month were about $1,157,000,000 and loans
    to the Allies $325,000,000.

    "Receipts from sale of War Savings Stamps July 3rd passed the
    half-billion dollar mark, of which $200,000,000 came in this
    month as a result of the campaign on Thrift Day, June 28th.

    "The government now is financing itself mainly through the sale
    of certificates of indebtedness, in anticipation of the Fourth
    Liberty Loan. More than $1,600,000,000 came in from this source
    in July. In addition, the government received $491,000,000 from
    belated income and excess profits taxes, and $97,000,000 from
    miscellaneous internal revenue. Customs duties yielded only
    $14,000,000.

    "Payments on the Third Liberty Loan now amount to
    $3,652,000,000, leaving $524,000,000 to come in from the next
    installment payment."

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    THE LIBERTY LOANS--BY FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICTS

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FIRST LOAN SECOND LOAN THIRD LOAN FOURTH LOAN

    (June, 1917-- (Oct., 1917-- (1918-- (1918--
    3½ 4 4¼ 4¼
    Per Cent.) Per Cent.) Per Cent.) Per Cent.)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Boston $332,447,600 $476,950,050 $354,537,250 $632,221,850
    New York 1,186,788,400 1,550,453,450 1,115,243,650 2,044,778,000
    Philadelphia 232,309,250 380,350,250 361,963,500 598,763,650
    Cleveland 286,148,700 486,106,800 405,051,150 702,059,800
    Richmond 109,737,100 201,212,500 186,259,050 352,688,200
    Atlanta 57,878,550 90,695,750 137,649,450 213,885,200
    Chicago 357,195,950 585,853,350 608,878,600 969,209,000
    St.

    Louis 86,134,700 184,280,750 199,835,900 296,388,550
    Minneapolis 70,255,500 140,932,650 180,892,100 241,028,300
    Kansas City 91,758,850 150,125,750 204,092,800 294,646,450
    Dallas 48,948,350 77,899,850 116,220,650 145,944,450
    San Francisco 175,623,900 292,671,150 287,975,000 459,000,000
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total $3,035,226,850 $4,617,532,300 $4,176,516,850 $6,989,047,000
    subscriptions
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Total quotas $2,000,000,000 $3,000,000,000 $3,000,000,000 $6,000,000,000
    Total 2,000,000,000 3,808,766,150 4,176,516,850 6,989,047,000
    allotments
    Total number of 4,500,000 10,020,000 17,000,000 21,000,000
    subscribers
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NEW YORK CITY SUBSCRIPTIONS

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Manhattan $960,417,050 $1,095,189,000 $702,577,750 $1,353,449,550 Bronx 404,700 1,015,500 5,112,350 5,751,800 Brooklyn 30,312,000 44,424,200 52,427,600 100,469,650 Queens 2,202,600 4,136,150 10,137,350 17,331,900 Richmond 679,600 1,373,700 3,386,800 5,075,750 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Total city $994,015,950 $1,146,139,150 $773,641,859 $1,482,078,650 subscriptions ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Included in the Third Loan subscription total is $17,917,750 subscribed by the United States Treasury.

    War Savings Stamps subscriptions totalled $879,330,000 up to November 20, 1918.

    THE INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR

    Some curious facts were brought out in the effort of the Liberty Campaign propaganda to reach the individual investor. In the large cities the organization was remarkably successful. In the smaller communities it was a greater difficulty. In a suburb or a small town everybody knows everybody else and the Liberty Loan Committee had hard work in getting subscribers. Mr. A. W. Atwood of Princeton thinks that the occupational and vocational classification of possible investors was not tried.

    Widows and maiden ladies who had inherited $50,000 or $75,000 were not reached. Some of them who were patriotic came forward of their own accord. The little town of Kircunkson in New York State exceeded its quota many times and there was an item in the papers about it. The success of the Liberty Loan in that town was due to the fact that it contained a large sanitarium patronized by millionaires. Yet there were no banks in the town and if their banking resources were used as a basis their quota would have been very small indeed.

    As to the assignment of quotas Mr. Atwood makes the point that it was sometimes based on population, sometimes based on the amount of bank resources. He thought that in small places it would be better to post up a list of those who had subscribed and he even thought that if the country made the effort it could ultimately raise a loan of $100,000,000,000, his reason being the following:

    "This country is approaching, as England has long ago, the
    position of being a possessor of great accumulated wealth. One
    broker after another is really nothing but a family investment
    agent. That is what it amounts to. There are railroad magnates,
    bankers, steel kings, copper kings and so on indefinitely.
    Hundreds of firms in the New York Stock Exchange are nothing
    but channels for the investment of accumulated wealth and I do
    not think we realize how much there is of that in this
    country."

    LIBERTY LOANS AND THRIFT

    One of the best methods of testing the influence of Liberty Loan activities on the thrift of the country is used by Bradstreet's in its examination of the annual report of the United States League of Building and Loan Associations. These Associations, be it remembered, are not patronized by capitalists but almost wholly by wage earners. During the past fifteen years the membership of building and loan associations has increased 150 percent. and since the war broke in 1914, the number of members has extended 52 percent. The latest report shows a gain in assets of 30 percent. over the amount indicated in 1914.

    The following tables taken from Bradstreet's give detailed items of the financial situation of these important organizations:

    The following table gives membership and total assets of building and loan associations for a fifteen-year period:

    Membership Assets
    1902--03 1,530,707 $577,228,014
    1903--04 1,566,700 579,556,112
    1904--05 1,631,046 600,342,586
    1905--06 1,642,127 629,344,257
    1906--07 1,699,714 673,129,198
    1907--08 1,839,119 731,508,446
    1908--09 1,920,257 784,175,753
    1909--10 2,016,651 856,332,719
    1910--11 2,169,893 931,867,175
    1911--12 2,332,829 1,030,687,031
    1912--13 2,518,442 1,136,949,465
    1914--15 3,103,935 1,357,707,900
    1915--16 3,334,899 1,484,205,875
    1916--17 3,568,342 1,696,707,041
    1917--18 3,838,612 1,769,142,175

    The following table shows total membership and total assets for States in which accurate statistics are compiled by state supervisors. The data for other States are consolidated under the heading, "Other States," and the figures given are estimated:

    --------------1917--18---------------
    Members Assets Increase
    Pennsylvania 677,911 $324,265,393 $25,438,326
    Ohio 767,100 321,741,529 51,188,940
    New Jersey 329,063 168,215,913 13,088,951
    Massachusetts 247,725 126,695,037 13,389,130
    Illinois 246,800 113,528,525 8,050,122
    New York 199,571 86,072,829 6,442,948
    Indiana 202,409 78,112,917 5,818,661
    Nebraska 101,929 54,545,630 6,627,783
    California 42,227 35,928,447 3,134,429
    Michigan 69,041 35,659,360 4,279,888
    Kentucky 62,846 27,085,282 1,272,372
    Missouri 56,116 26,770,144 3,226,311
    Kansas 66,442 26,000,167 2,446,058
    Louisiana 47,793 25,911,928 1,362,683
    Dist.

    Columbia 37,075 22,399,995 255,115
    Wisconsin 50,612 19,887,368 3,013,526
    North Carolina 37,400 17,608,000 1,703,230
    Washington 46,318 14,444,177 2,366,450
    Arkansas 21,053 10,583,447 409,439
    Iowa[3] 33,035 9,638,852 ........
    Minnesota 22,020 8,979,642 626,537
    West Virginia 21,500 8,119,131 369,564
    Colorado[3] 10,200 6,688,983 ........
    Maine 14,959 6,671,239 233,961
    Oklahoma 18,142 6,554,175 2,354,175
    Rhode Island 11,499 5,938,436 577,906
    Connecticut 14,900 4,869,748 610,423
    South Dakota 5,857 3,603,836 89,286
    N.

    Hampshire 8,554 3,336,072 322,812
    Tennessee 5,166 3,207,754 [4]112,865
    North Dakota 5,785 2,837,118 90,308
    Texas 7,156 2,314,927 372,489
    Montana 4,239 1,849,935 209,906
    New Mexico 3,545 1,469,276 72,660
    Vermont 749 287,791 52,079
    Other States 341,875 157,319,172 10,975,756
    --------- -------------- ------------
    Total 3,838,612 $1,769,142,175 $170,514,039

    [3] Reports issued biennially; figures of 1916 used.

    [4] Decrease.

    [Illustration: A Poster Used During the Fourth Liberty Loan Campaign]

    THE THRIFT HABIT

    Such was the success of the Liberty Loan campaign in appealing to all classes of private investors, that it became an interesting speculation whether the popular thrift habit would survive war conditions. It was the general belief in financial centers that the habit of saving had been promoted. Perhaps no better illustration of the thrift habit could be presented than returns made by the savings banks of Boston in October, 1918.

    At that date these banks had $321,000,000 against $319,000,000 at the same date in 1917, the previous banner total for the end of a banking year. It was estimated by Mr. Ingalls Kimball, the New York Times annalist, that twenty million separate individuals were saving by the method of subscribing to the Liberty Loans, and, as more than $800,000,000 worth of War Saving stamps had been sold, it was probable that nearly half the population of the country was saving money in one of these new ways. As to the method of continuing to encourage thrift, Mr.

    Kimball pointed out the value of the experience derived from the Liberty Bond Campaign:

    "The thrift machine set up by the Treasury was as follows: 1.
    small unit government bonds; 2. non-interest-bearing Thrift
    Stamps; 3. War Savings Stamps--a short-term obligation paying
    interest at maturity.

    "This was the mechanism. What was the power that actuated the
    machine to such wonderful effect? 1. salesmanship, including
    every modern device of advertising; 2. distribution: (a)
    through retail stores; (b) through employers, by partial
    payments (usually pay-roll deduction).

    "From these simple elements was built up a campaign that
    induced the people to save in a new and unaccustomed way at
    least twenty times as much as they had ever before saved in the
    same time. None of the elements was unimportant, but
    salesmanship, probably, contributed most. The selling campaigns
    of the Liberty Loans and War Savings Stamps were carried on by
    the largest and most effective selling organization ever put
    together, under the direction of the ablest men in the United
    States, and with an energy and devotion that were unimaginable.
    This selling force was irresistible.

    Everybody bought because
    everybody was asked, or begged, or told, to buy. Under the same
    stimulus almost anything would have sold.

    "SAVING AT THE SOURCE"

    "Next in importance to the direct selling effort came
    distribution. For the first time in the history of finance it
    has been made easy to save; for the first time the great retail
    channels of distribution have been thrown open to saving; for
    the first time millions of wage-earners have learned the value
    and ease of 'Saving at the Source' by pay-envelope deduction of
    a dollar or so a week toward a Liberty Bond."

    Mr. Kimball questioned whether or not we are to lose the benefit of the great lesson of thrift and whether some plan could be devised to make us keep on saving. No problem of reconstruction seemed to him more important than this, "yet in no one of the announced conferences on reconstruction do I find mention of it." He then goes on to say:

    "The greatest thrift lesson in the world is thrift, no matter
    what its motive. A great many hundred thousand persons in this
    country have found themselves this year possessed of $100 or
    more in one piece for the first time in their lives; often
    without realization of how they got it. Will that lesson last?
    Will the wage-earner, now that loan drives are over, keep on
    saving, going weekly to the bank to put in his dollar. The
    answer to these questions is, unfortunately, 'no.'

    "It would be perfectly possible to continue the issue of War
    Savings Stamps, and there are many advocates of this plan, but
    it is doubtful if distribution could be permanently maintained
    on anything like its present scale. Merchants and banks, with
    rare exceptions, would scarcely continue to handle them, for
    the cost is not inconsiderable, and there is no compensating
    commercial gain. In the postoffices alone their continued sale
    would set up competition with the present postal savings
    system, which would serve no good purpose and would be highly
    confusing.

    "Can the savings banks successfully undertake this great task?
    I believe they could.

    I believe a national savings bank,
    operating through commercial banks, stores, and employers all
    over the United States, making its investments through a small
    compact, very highly paid and very efficient and very
    stringently supervised board of executives in one city,
    supporting a vigorous, numerous, and far-flung selling
    organization, similar in many respects to the industrial life
    insurance organizations, could undertake this work and, were it
    possible to act quickly enough, could keep the thrift movement
    going without losing the amazing momentum which it has now
    acquired."

    SPENDING THE MONEY

    For a period of twenty-five months, from April, 1917, through April, 1919, the United States spent for war purposes more than $1,000,000 an hour. All sorts of comparisons are used to make this figure seizable by the imagination. For example, the whole sum, nearly $22,000,000,000, was twenty times the whole of the pre-war debt. Indeed, it was nearly large enough to pay the entire cost of our Government from 1791 up to the outbreak of the European War.

    In addition to the actual war cost of our own Government Congress paid to various associated governments the sum of $8,850,000,000. As to how this enormous sum of money was spent, two-thirds of the amount practically was spent upon the Army, and the rate of expenditure for the Army was constantly advancing period by period.

    Even after the termination of hostilities there was a very high daily average owing to the building of ships for the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the construction and operation of naval vessels, food, clothing, pay and transportation of the Army. The Quartermaster's Department had the largest proportion of expenditure.

    The amount spent about equals the value of all the gold produced in the whole world from the discovery of America up to the outbreak of the European War. The pay for the Army during the period of warfare was larger than the combined salaries of all of the public school principals and teachers in the United States for five years, from 1912 to 1916.

    Some of the money spent represents permanent assets. At the end of the war there were large stocks of clothing on hand and large supplies of standardized trucks. There were thousands of Liberty motors and service planes that were available for other uses. Engineer, signal and medical equipment still continued to have a value, but if the race for militarism is maintained it is hard to see how the quantities of war munitions can fail to escape the scrap heap in a few years' time.

    Comparing the individual estimates of war expenditure, it is noteworthy that the Austro-Hungarian Empire spent almost as much as the United States. Of all the powers Germany spent the largest sum, $39,000,000,000--one billion more than England.

    MONEY LOANED TO ASSOCIATE NATIONS

    The following is quoted from the Annalist for December, 1918:

    "Money owed to a government by the nations of the world, with
    whom it is in active commercial competition, is another line of
    fortifications in defense of the frontier. Let us, then
    consider our debts and our debtors, and how we both propose to
    pay. Our long-time loans may be scheduled as follows:

    First Loan $2,000,000,000
    Second Loan 3,808,766,000
    Third Loan 4,170,019,650
    Fourth Loan 6,989,047,000
    ---------------
    $16,967,832,650

    "The totals of each of the above loans have changed substantially since allotment, through conversions with a correspondingly increasing charge on the service. However, the gross amount is substantially unchanged. Of the old loans the Treasury statement of March 31 showed the following totals:

    Consol. 2's of 1930 $599,724,050
    4's of 1925 118,489,900
    Panama Canal 2's, 1906 48,954,180
    Panama Canal 2's, 1908 5,947,400
    Panama Canal 3's, 1911 50,000,000
    Conversion 3's, 1946--7 28,894,500
    Postal Savings 2½'s, 1931--7 10,758,560
    Postal Savings 2½'s, 1938 302,140,000
    --------------
    $1,184,908,590

    "The short-term loans in the shape of certificates of indebtedness and War Savings Stamps at the present writing are as follows:

    4½% certificates, Series E $639,493,000
    4½% certificates, Series 4F 625,216,500
    4½% certificates, Series 4G 614,069,000
    -------------
    $1,878,778,500

    "In addition to the above a series of certificates of
    indebtedness, designated as TA, bearing interest at four per
    cent. and maturing July 15, 1919, was issued to a small amount
    in anticipation of next year's income taxes. The sale proved to
    be slow, and further issuance was discontinued and a new issue
    for the same purpose and of a similar maturity bearing interest
    at 4½% per cent. was substituted. The sale of these securities
    through the agency of the Federal Reserve Banks is in the
    nature of a continuous operation, and no totals so far have
    been announced.

    [Illustration: Detroit--City of Automobiles

    Many thousands of standardized trucks were made in Detroit during the war rush, the automobile having proved to be indispensable to the fighting forces overseas.]

    "The sale of War Savings Stamps and certificates has increased
    the national debt by $1,257,000,000, or within 400 million of
    the maximum under the first authorization. A second series,
    however, amounting to two billion dollars, has been authorized,
    so that the operation will probably continue into the coming
    year. The Treasury for the fiscal year 1917--18 estimated
    receipts of $663,200,000 from this source and about a billion
    for 1918--19.

    The first estimate was out of line, owing to the
    difficulty in getting the plan into smooth operation.
    Subsequent results have, however, justified the average of
    expectations.

    "The pre-war debt, in the light of recent figures, is almost
    negligible, and the outstanding certificates in anticipation of
    taxes and the Fourth Liberty Loan will be redeemed in due
    course by the flow of funds owing to the Government in taxes
    and subscription payments. The problem of how to deal with the
    eighteen-billion-dollar war debt is the vital question. How
    much of this sum represents a charge on the coming generation
    and how much an invaluable national asset?

    WHAT IS OWED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

    "We have loaned abroad the following items:

    Great Britain $3,745,000,000
    France 2,445,000,000
    Italy 1,160,000,000
    Russia 325,000,000
    Belgium 183,520,000
    Greece 15,790,000
    Cuba 15,000,000
    Serbia 12,000,000
    Rumania 6,666,666
    Liberia 5,000,000
    Czechoslovak Republic 7,000,000
    -------------
    [5]$7,919,976,666

    [5] Increased to $9,646,419,494 by October, 1919.

    "Here, then, are figures totaling nearly half of our war debts
    that are not only self-supporting but also a double-edged
    weapon in the international market. In the first place, they
    represent money spent at home on American goods, from which the
    American manufacturer has taken his toll of profit; and in the
    second place, they have put the world in our debt to an extent
    that will be difficult to pay in the exchange of goods.

    "Imports of foreign commodities or even gold will take a decade
    to halve the debt, for the gold can not be spared, nor do we
    wish it, and our creditors will find it difficult to increase
    their exports to a point capable of bringing about a balance in
    their favor. The imports from Europe are bound to be offset by
    our own exports, some able economists predicting a balance of a
    billion dollars in our favor for the next five years.
    Regardless of the demands to be made upon us from this source,
    it is probable that the peak-load of expenditure has been
    reached and the period of readjustment and redemption set in.

    "Charging off, then, our loans to the Allies as an asset, let
    us then consider how we may best meet the bill due the American
    people. Vague discussions of the creation of a huge sinking
    fund have been heard, although for some reason or other, in
    history these operations have not been entirely successful.
    Fortunately the bulk of our debt has an early callable date,
    and the Treasury has recently come in for much applause by
    advocating no more loans unless they be in the nature of a
    one-to five-year currency. Experience teaches that the full
    benefit and effect of war taxes are rarely felt until after the
    war.

    England, after the Napoleonic wars, came back with a
    rapidity that astonished the Exchequer itself. Taxes rolled up
    in such a volume and expenses dropped with demobilization to
    such an extent that the Government found itself anticipating
    the callable date in national debts by market purchases, and
    even then it was found convenient gradually to reduce the scale
    of taxation.

    "Our experience after the Civil War was very similar to
    England's, and the Treasury's surplus annually accumulated to a
    point that forced the Government to buy back at high premiums
    the bonds it was not privileged to call. This was true, though
    to a lesser degree, with the Spanish war loan.

    "It seems as though the two operations of liquidating our own
    debts and the debt of Europe to the United States dovetailed
    perfectly into one gradual and stupendous task. While Europe is
    paying her indebtedness to us without interfering with the
    development of international trade by the sale of foreign
    securities in our home market our buyers here must receive the
    tools to operate with through the redemption and repurchase of
    their Liberty Bonds. In this half of the deal safety, as usual,
    lies in the middle course.

    It is hoped that taxes will be
    maintained at a level that will infallibly provide funds for
    fixed redemptions with a sufficient surplus to get a flying
    start by purchase around the present low levels."

    FINANCIAL STATUS OF ENGLAND IN 1914

    One year before the war England's position in regard to the balance of trade was most favorable. Her imports were valued at $3,210,000,000 and her exports at $2,560,000,000. But it was usually estimated that foreign countries owed England about $1,610,000,000 annually for interest on capital lent for shipping freights and for banking insurance and other commissions. The total amount owed her, therefore was $4,170,000,000 as against $3,210,000,000 which she owed for her imports. She had therefore a favorable balance of about $960,000,000 which was lent abroad.

    The war brought an enormous decrease in tonnage, and the excess of imports over exports attained the figure of $1,950,000,000 a year.

    Exceptional measures had to be taken to maintain the exchange rates with the United States from whom the chief purchases were made. Large amounts of gold were exported, but by June, 1915, there was a collapse in American exchange. Drastic measures were used to induce the holders of American securities in England to sell or lend those securities to the Government. In this way exchange was kept up practically to the gold point. This question of exchange and the position of England as the director of the financial campaign of the Allies is illustrated from an address given by Mr. R. H. Brand to the American Bankers Association, in September, 1917:

    "Of course no nation could permanently tolerate such
    unfavorable trade balances as those from which the Allies in
    Europe are now suffering. They can only do so now and keep
    their exchanges with the United States steady by borrowing
    immense sums here. But the war itself is not permanent, and the
    question is merely whether the present state of affairs can be
    continued long enough to enable all the enemies of the Central
    Powers to exert their full strength and win a final victory.

    "You will no doubt all have noticed that the credits granted
    Great Britain have been greater than those granted to any other
    Ally. The reasons are simple, though they are not, I think,
    generally understood. We have, in the first place, the largest
    war and munition program of any Ally; in the second place, as I
    have shown above, we are, with the exception of the United
    States, the greatest industrial arsenal among the Allies; that
    necessarily involves large imports. We send a great deal of
    steel from England to our Allies; we have to replace it by
    steel from here.

    We make rifles for Russia; we have to import
    the steel to make them. We send boots to Russia; we have to
    import the leather needed. These examples might be multiplied
    many times. Thirdly, we extend large credits in England to our
    Allies, some part of which they may use anywhere in the world,
    and this part may ultimately come back on the sterling exchange
    in New York. Lastly, it is well known that neutrals who are
    owed money by England unfortunately find it convenient to
    utilize the sterling exchange in New York in order to recoup
    themselves in dollars.

    But so also do neutrals who are owed
    money by the other Allies. So long as we maintain the sterling
    exchange this appears to be inevitable, and the burden of
    financing both our own and our Allies' trade tends to fall on
    that exchange. It is by our maintenance of this sterling
    exchange that the continuance of our Allies' trade is rendered
    possible. The maintenance of the sterling exchange means the
    maintenance of the allied exchanges. All these factors together
    exert an immense influence.

    If England had had only herself to
    finance since the beginning of the war, and indeed even if she
    had only herself to finance now, it is quite possible she would
    not have needed to borrow at all abroad."

    LOSS IN PRODUCTIVE POWER

    The extent of the withdrawal of productive power can only be judged by figures. Of the 7,500,000 men serving in the British Army, 4,530,000 were contributed by Great Britain, 900,000 by the British dominions and colonies; and the remaining 1,000,000 by India and the various British African dependencies. Production went on to a remarkable degree, but this production was largely for war purposes. It was secured by recruiting female labor to an unheard of extent in the munition factories. According to the London Economist, the financial side of the British administration was anything but satisfactory. It speaks of waste and faulty methods:

    "On the financial side our record is by no means so
    satisfactory. We have, it is true, poured out money like water,
    but much of it has been raised by faulty methods, and the
    amount of it that has been wasted is appalling to consider.

    In
    the matter of borrowing, our methods have lately been greatly
    improved; and the recommendation of the Committee on National
    Expenditure, that the system of raising money by bank credits
    should be checked as far as possible, is being brought within
    the bounds of practical politics by the great success of the
    War Savings Committee's energetic and ingenious campaign for
    prompting the sale of National War Bonds.

    Perhaps also we may
    claim some small share in that success through the adoption of
    the principle so long advocated in these columns of a lower
    rate for money at home combined with special terms for money
    left here by foreigners. But successful borrowing, direct from
    the investor, instead of in the shape of money manufactured by
    banks, is a welcome, but not sufficient, improvement. We have
    to raise much more money by taxation.

    We have also to do much
    more than has yet been done to reduce the wicked waste of
    public money and support the efforts of the Committee on
    National Expenditure to husband the resources of the nation. A
    correspondent in a provincial town in which a Tank has lately
    been busy asks: 'Is it not pathetic to see widows and children
    scraping together their shillings and pennies to help the
    Government, while we have tens of thousands of pounds being
    squandered by a profligate Ministry of Munitions!'"

    [Illustration: Copyright Underwood & Underwood

    A Woman Doing Road Construction Work

    Of the 7,500,000 men serving in the British Army, 4,530,000 were contributed by Great Britain. Yet production was speeded up by recruiting and training the labor of women.]

    EQUALIZING LOANS AND TAXATION

    A thorny problem of all war finance is how to equalize as far as possible the amount of money furnished by taxation with the amounts borrowed. The proportion indicated in the last English war budget of 1918 was that between £842,000,000 raised by taxes and 2,000,000,000 sterling by fresh borrowing. Besides, war experience shows that the parliamentary estimates in each year were always far below the amount spent. In 1917 in Great Britain the shortage was upwards of £400,000,000.

    According to the London Economist, no effective steps were taken to stop the profligate extravagance by which public money was poured out through the sieves of the war spending departments into the pockets of innumerable manufacturers, middlemen and traders, not to mention the ever growing sums allocated to the privy purses of countless new bodies of officials. Each year, it says, there is a new debt charge of some £120,000,000 and each year there is a constant rise of prices in wages that enhances the cost of governmental goods and services.

    The amount raised by taxation, £842,000,000, seems enormously large, but as the London Nation states:

    "The enormous rise of prices only makes it represent half that
    amount in actual purchasing power. Before the war our
    expenditure was 200 millions. If money had kept the same value,
    the taxation and other public income for this year would only
    have been 420 millions, a little more than twice the pre-war
    level. Would that have seemed so heroic an effort for a
    patriotic nation? No. It can never be repeated too often that a
    really rigorous taxation, begun in 1914 and carried on till
    now, would have left us in a far sounder condition both for
    conducting the war and for facing the peace finance.

    The money
    and the goods are there. We get them. But we get them by
    crooked and expensive methods of borrowing which inflate
    prices, oppress the poorer purchasers, put huge war loot into
    the pockets of contractors and financiers, and fail to restrain
    expenditure in luxuries."

    GERMANY'S ECONOMIC PREPARATION FOR WAR

    There is much evidence to show that long before the war began financial preparations were made in Germany for the great struggle. For a considerable period prior to 1914, Germany and Russia had been engaged in a contest to accumulate a gold supply. Russia, it is known, had begun to withdraw the large balances which she kept in German, French and English banks. In Germany the story was circulated that in 1913 the Kaiser inquired of the governor of the Imperial Bank if the German banks were equipped for war.

    Being told that they were not ready he is said to have replied: "When I ask that question again I want a different answer." The Imperial Bank of Germany became an active bidder at the London gold auctions for the gold which arrived weekly from South Africa, and its activity along these lines was shown by the increasing of the German gold reserve in the bank vaults from $184,000,000 on December 31, 1912, to $336,000,000, the amount it stood at a month before the war began.

    In addition, the Imperial Bank collected for the Government a sum of about thirty million dollars to be added to the same amount said to be stored in the vaults of the Julius Thurm at Spandau, and to be used as a war chest. Other European countries were increasing their gold supplies, so it was not surprising that the New York markets were called upon to export eighty-four million dollars of gold for six months before the outbreak of the war.

    The entire gold production of the world during the eighteen months ending on June 30, 1914, was approximately $705,000,000. Of this amount, about two million dollars was required for the arts, and one hundred and fifty million dollars went to British India. This left about $350,000,000 to be applied to monetary uses and the whole of this amount was absorbed by the four great central banks of Germany, France, Russia and Austria-Hungary.

    In order to resist raids on the German gold reserve a policy of note issuing was adopted. The situation, as forecast by Mr. C. A. Conant in September, 1914, in the New York Times, can be gathered from the following extract:

    "With the general suspension of gold payments at the central
    banks of Europe, except at the Bank of England, the banks are
    in a position to resist raids upon their gold and to lend their
    resources, as far as sound banking policy permits, to the
    struggle of their Governments to maintain national
    independence. In England, while the bank is still paying gold
    for notes, the policy of keeping gold in circulation has been
    abandoned, and the old limit of note issue, which was £5
    ($24.40), has been lowered to 10 shillings ($2.44) and £1
    ($4.88).

    "It is not the purpose of any of the European Powers, however,
    to carry on the war by issues of paper money. The suspension of
    gold payments at the banks and the issue of notes for small
    denominations, which are legal tender in domestic transactions,
    is for the purpose of husbanding the gold stock against
    needless runs and keeping it as a guaranty fund of national
    solvency. It is the course which was adopted by France at the
    time of the Franco-German War in 1870, but so prudently were
    the affairs of the Bank of France conducted that the paper
    never fell more than 2½ per cent. below its value in gold.

    "A similar policy of reserve will probably be pursued by the
    banks of France, Germany, and Russia in the present contest.
    The Government of France has raised the maximum limit of the
    note circulation of the bank by nearly $1,000,000,000, but the
    increase will not be used except as additional currency may be
    required, owing to the restriction in other forms of credit and
    the special demand for notes in the districts where the armies
    are gathered.

    "The suspension of specie payments does not convey to the
    banking community quite the same doleful warning of the
    unlimited issue of paper and its steady depreciation in gold
    which were conveyed by specie suspension in the United States
    in 1861 or by Austria-Hungary and Russia in the desperate
    contest of the Napoleonic wars. Monetary science is better
    understood at the present time than in those days."

    GERMAN WAR FINANCE

    Among all the belligerent powers Germany occupied the unique position of using the war as an excuse for not publishing national accounts. The sole guide to her expenditure must be looked for in the credit votes passed by the Reichstag. Using this method, it is estimated that Germany spent about $30,000,000 a day. To cover this expenditure there was a regular plan of national loan--in March and September. This was the method followed in all the four years of the war. During the intervening six months there was an issue of Treasury bills.

    The German people were, apparently, schooled to these regular demands with commendable promptness, but the Imperial Government adopted a policy of inflation in the hope that a speedy victory would bring fruits in the shape of an indemnity, and so the German people would avoid being called upon to bear war burdens. Taxation was introduced only reluctantly and at a later period, and merely for the purpose of meeting so-called normal civil expenditure and interest on war debt.

    The plan followed was to spare the middle classes as far as possible from additional taxation charges.

    THE LOAN BUREAU SCHEME

    The war loans have been, on paper, most successful. For example, the seventh loan of September, 1917, yielded $3,000,000,000; the eighth loan nearly $4,000,000,000. There was a large amount of ready money in the country and besides this all stocks of raw material have been realized.

    Large as the loans have been they have not been able to keep pace with the increase of expenditure. Out of the total amount of $30,000,000,000 about $20,000,000,000 have been covered by long-term loans. Of course, owing to the peculiar situation of Germany in relation to her allies, which were dependent upon her financial support, these loans have been raised by the German people themselves. The German Loan Bureaus were criticized at the beginning of the war, and German figures show that only about ten percent. of the national loans were involved in the Loan Bureau scheme. These Loan Bureaus, it was announced, would continue after the declaration of peace.

    According to the London Economist, Germany followed an easy and sure policy of war finance, although the same authority does not hesitate to use the terms "complete financial ruin" in connection with German post-war finance.

    The whole subject of German inflation is difficult to analyze. The Economist works out a post-war expenditure of $5,000,000,000 a year against a revenue of a billion and a half. Its estimate of German inflation is contained in the following passage:

    "To take note circulation alone is obviously misleading,
    particularly in view of the violent efforts that have been
    made, especially during the last year, to extend the use of the
    check, and in other ways to limit as far as possible the use
    of notes. For what these figures are worth, it may be said that
    the total note circulation of the country at the end of June
    (1918), including Reichsbank notes, State Bank notes, Treasury
    notes, and loan notes, stood at £1,030,000,000, as compared
    with £109,300,000 on July 23, 1914.

    Reichsbank deposits, again,
    stood on June 30, at £459,100,000, as compared with £47,600,000
    on July 23, 1914, while the deposits of the eight 'great'
    banks, even at the end of 1917, stood at £800,000,000, as
    compared with £250,000,000 at the end of 1914, £362,000,000 at
    the end of 1915, and £500,000,000 at the end of 1916."

    In this connection it is interesting to give a summary of Germany's war expenses as reported in the London Economist:

    "In his comparison of German war finance with ours, the
    Chancellor, in his Budget speech, made the following points:
    First, that German war expenditure is now £6,250,000--almost
    the same as ours--though our expenditure includes items (such
    as separation allowances) which are not included in the German
    figures.

    Second, that the whole amount of the German Votes of
    Credit (£6,200 millions) has been added to their war debt,
    'because their taxation has not covered their peace expenditure
    in addition to their debt charge.' Third, the total amount of
    new taxation levied by them since the beginning of the war
    comes to £365 millions, against our £1,044 millions.

    Fourth, in
    a year's time they will have a deficit, comparing the revenue
    with the expenditure, of £385 millions at least. 'If that were
    our position,' the Chancellor added, 'I should certainly think
    that bankruptcy was not far from the British Government.'
    Fifth, with the exception of the war increment tax, 'scarcely
    any of the additional revenue has been obtained from the
    wealthier classes in Germany'."

    GERMAN WAR PROFITS

    An extraordinary list of the gigantic war profits collected by Germany was drawn up by A. Cheraband, the well known French critic. He estimated that in three years Germany had spent $322.50 per head, France $444.00, Great Britain $559.75. He presents a list of war profits made by Germany. The "booty" he divided into movable and immovable property. In the former category he includes the 212,000 square miles of territory that had fallen into German clutches, and this he values at $32,000,000,000, which, he says, is a conservative estimate. Turning to the movable booty, he classifies it as follows:

    "(a) Capture of 'Human Material.'--This consists of the
    46,000,000 Allied subjects from whom the Germans obtain free
    labor.

    "(b) Capture of War Material.--Guns, rifles, munitions,
    vehicles, locomotives, railway trucks, and thousands of miles
    of railway. The Belgian railway system alone is worth nearly
    $600,000,000.

    "(c) Capture of Foodstuffs.--Everywhere the Germans have
    stolen horses, cattle, corn, potatoes, sugar, alcohol,
    foodstuffs of every kind, and crops grown by the forced labor
    drawn from the 46,000,000 Allied subjects whom they have
    enslaved.

    "(d) Theft of Raw Materials.--Throughout the occupied
    territories the Germans have appropriated coal, petroleum,
    iron, copper, bronze, zinc, lead, etc., either in the mines or
    from private individuals; textile materials, such as woolen and
    cotton. In the towns of northern France alone the Germans stole
    $110,000,000 worth of wool.

    "(e) Theft of Industrial Plant.--On a methodical plan
    throughout the occupied territories, the motors, engines,
    machine-tools, steam and electric hammers, steel-rolling mills,
    looms, models, and industrial plant of all kinds have been
    carried off to Germany.

    "(f) Thefts of Furniture.--The way in which furniture and
    household goods were stolen and carried off is confessed by
    implication in the following advertisement published in the
    Kölnische Zeitung at the beginning of April, 1917:

    "'Furniture moved from the zones of military operations in all
    directions by Rettenmayer at Wiesbaden.'

    "It is impossible to estimate the money value of the goods thus
    removed.

    "(g) Seizure of Works of Art.--The works of art collected for
    centuries in museums, churches, and by private individuals in
    Poland, Italy, Belgium, and France have been carried off by the
    Germans.

    "(h) War Levies.--Scores of millions in money have been
    secured by the Germans in the form of requisitions, fines, war
    levies, war taxes, and forced loans.

    "(i) Thefts of Coin, Jewels, and Securities.--In the occupied
    regions, and especially wherever they have been obliged to
    evacuate those regions, as, for instance, at Noyon, the Germans
    have emptied, by order, the safes and strong boxes of private
    persons and of banks and have carried off securities, jewels,
    and silver. In September and October, 1917, they seized at one
    stroke the deposits of Allied subjects in the Belgian banks
    amounting to $120,000,000.

    "In view of the high prices of foodstuffs, coal, metals,
    petroleum, war materials and machines, it is clear that the
    booty thus secured by the Germans during the last three years
    in the occupied territories is certainly worth several billion
    dollars."

    [Illustration: A Woman Operating a Multiple Spindle Drill in an English Shell Factory

    Photo by James M. Beck

    "Since the war broke out," said M. Barriol, a French celebrated actuary, "no less than 1,500,000 women have been added to the ranks of wage earners in England, an increase of fully 25 per cent."]

    GERMAN MONEY INDEMNITY

    It became commonplace after Germany's defeat was evident that her war cost must include the cost of the destruction she had caused her enemies. To estimate this was no easy matter. The attitude of the Germans on the subject was indicated by their constantly expressed hope that trade would recommence as usual and that they would be able to start economic relations in a favorable position. So we find the Cologne Chamber of Commerce beginning to prepare for peace by adopting a resolution expressing the hope that the destruction of French and Belgian industries would allow the rapid recovery of German power.

    The Wall Street Journal used this statement as a guide to the Allied Powers for measuring the kind of indemnity that would be imposed upon Germany.

    "One of the departments of the Government at Washington has in
    its files a report of a German commission on industry after the
    war. Reading this, one can understand the motive for what at
    one time looked like pure vandalism. Vandalism it was, by
    descendants of the Vandals, but it was a deliberate destruction
    of international competitors, killing the workmen--and
    workwomen--and destroying plants and machinery for the one
    purpose of removing competition.

    A physical injury to a child
    helped to weaken future competition in the world's trade; and
    it was upon the power gained thereby that Germany hoped to
    launch another war for world domination....

    "A peace that gives the cold-blooded perpetrators of these
    crimes an advantage over their victims would not be equitable.
    If any must suffer, let it be those who are guilty, but don't
    give them a start ahead of their victims.

    "In substance, that point should declare that Germany shall not
    profit through the wrecking of any Allied industry. Except to
    admit necessary foodstuffs, the blockade should not be lifted
    until every Allied country from England to Serbia has been
    industrially rebuilt. One object of the wholesale murder of
    civilians was to weaken industrially the enemy countries. The
    greater proportionate loss of man-power in the Allied countries
    should be met by restrictions on the entry of raw materials
    into Germany. Every piece of stolen machinery should be
    returned before her own industries are allowed to resume."

    The soft plan of dealing with Germany's war cost was championed by Secretary Daniels. The Springfield Republican and the New Republic seemed to agree with the Manchester Guardian that Germany ought to be helped rather than punished, that the main thing was to set her on her feet again.

    "Representative papers like the New York Times, Syracuse
    Post-Standard, Buffalo Express, and Sacramento Bee all
    insist that while we might or perhaps should claim no
    war-expenses from Germany, 'we must exact payment,' in the
    words of the Syracuse daily, 'to the last penny for losses
    suffered through illegal warfare.' Germany's submarine campaign
    cost us, according to this paper's figures, 375,000 tons of
    shipping and 775 civilian lives.

    If we take the burden of
    payment for this property and these lives from the guilty
    shoulders of Germany it would only be to 'pass it on to the
    innocent shoulders of the American taxpayer,' which, the New
    York Times declares, would be 'rank injustice'."

    FORECASTING THE TOTAL COST OF WAR

    It is interesting also to note an attempt made by one of the expert statisticians attached to the Guaranty Trust Company of New York to estimate the total cost of the war at the close of the four-year period.

    The five main Allies possessed, before the war, $406,000,000,000 for national work, a sum nearly four times as great as the national wealth of the two Central Powers. In four years the seven leading belligerents had spent $134,000,000,000. The only way to grasp the meaning of this enormous sum is to contrast the cost of the World War with all former wars. The total cost of wars that had taken place since the American Revolution was $23,000,000,000; the World War costs therefore, are six times greater. In these figures, staggering as they are, it was comparatively easy to figure out the costs, debts and interests of actual war expenditures.

    Much more complicated is the problem of estimating the property value destroyed through military operations on land and sea:

    LOSS FROM DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY

    "The total area of the war zone is 174,000 square miles, of
    which the Western theater of the war, in France and Belgium,
    stretches over an area of 19,500 square miles, and it contains
    over 3,000 cities, villages, and hamlets, great manufacturing
    and agricultural districts, of which some have been totally
    annihilated and some heavily affected. The estimate by the
    National Foreign Trade Council of the war losses, which
    unfortunately does not go beyond 1916, is as follows:

    "'Destruction of buildings and industrial machinery in Belgium,
    $1,000,000,000, and in France $700,000,000. The destruction of
    agricultural buildings and implements, of raw materials, of
    crops and live stock, has been estimated at a sum of
    $780,000,000 in Belgium and $680,000,000 in France. Roads were
    destroyed frequently by the retreating troops and have been
    seriously damaged by heavy gun fire and excessive use. The
    losses from destruction of railway bridges, etc., have been
    estimated in Belgium at $275,000,000 and in France at
    $300,000,000.

    "'In the Eastern theater of the War Germany has been invaded
    only in eastern Prussia, where the agricultural population has
    been seriously impaired. Heavy damage was inflicted upon
    bridges, roads, and governmental property, including railroads.
    The direct cost to Germany through the loss of agricultural
    products, of manufacturing products, as well as in interest on
    investments abroad, of earnings from shipping and banking
    houses, and profits of insurance and mercantile houses engaged
    in business abroad has been enormous'."

    ECONOMIC LOSS OF MAN-POWER

    The same expert goes on to figure out the economic value of the loss of human life:

    "Mr. M. Barriol, the celebrated actuary, gives the following
    figures as the capital value of man: in the United States,
    $4,100; in Great Britain, $4,140; in Germany, $3,380; in
    France, $2,900; in Russia, $2,020; in Austria-Hungary, $2,020
    or an average capital value for the five foreign nations of
    $2,892.

    "The number of men already lost is 8,509,000 killed and
    7,175,000 permanently wounded, or a total of 15,684,000. Thus
    society has been impoverished through the death and permanent
    disability of a part of its productive man-power to the extent
    of $45,000,000,000.

    "The loss of men, measured in terms of the capital value of the
    workers withdrawn from industry, is offset in some degree by
    the enhancement of the capital value of the remaining
    producers.... This loss of man-power is also partly offset by
    the large contingents of women drawn into industries. In
    England, out of a female population of 23,000,000, about
    6,000,000 were engaged before the outbreak of the war in
    gainful occupations. Since the war broke out no less than
    1,500,000 women have been added to the ranks of wage-earners,
    an increase of fully 25 per cent.

    Moreover, about 400,000 women
    have shifted from non-essential occupations to men's work. In
    the United States, approximately 1,266,000 women are now
    engaged in industrial work, either directly or indirectly
    necessary to carry on the war.

    EFFECTS ON POPULATION

    "The physical and moral effects of the war, the moral strain to
    which the nations have been subjected, the 'shell-shock' which
    has reacted upon the population at home as well as upon the
    soldiers on the battlefield, the undernourishment and
    starvation of children as well as adults, all have resulted in
    a lowered vitality, the ill effects of which, especially in the
    countries of the Central Powers, are already seen in an
    increase of the death rate, in a spread of epidemics and
    diseases that have taxed the medical resources of all
    countries.

    The lowered vitality of the race, which is still further
    aggravated by the millions of incapacitated soldiers and the
    premature and excessive employment of children and women in the
    industries, will eventually make for a lower standard of
    efficiency in all human activities, or a retardation of human
    progress. Authoritative statements are to the effect that in
    Belgium in the earlier period of the war, the deaths of women
    and children far outnumbered those of men. Annual deaths among
    the German civilian population have increased by a million
    above the normal.

    "Besides the loss in actual population there is a loss of
    potential population. Carefully compiled figures show that by
    1919 the population of Germany will be 7,500,000 less than it
    would have been under ordinary circumstances. The people in
    Austria in 1919 will be 8 per cent. less in numbers than in the
    year before the war. Hungary will be still worse off; it will
    have a population of 9 per cent. lower than in pre-war days."

    CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT'S ESTIMATES

    The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace made public in November, 1919, an elaborate report on the cost of the World War in human life and in property and the consequent economic losses. The chief conclusions derived from this intensive study of all the conditions may be summarized as follows:

    All the wars of the nineteenth century from the Napoleonic down
    to the Balkan wars of 1912--1913, show a loss of life of
    4,449,300, according to the report, while the known and
    presumed dead of the World War reached 9,998,771. (See Vol.
    III, pp.

    403-5.) The monetary value of the individuals lost to
    each country is estimated, the highest value on human life
    being given to the United States, where each individual's
    economic worth is placed at $4,720, with England next at
    $4,140; Germany third, at $3,380; France and Belgium, each
    $2,900; Austria-Hungary at $2,720, and Russia, Italy, Serbia,
    Greece, and the other countries at $2,020.

    With a loss of more than 4,000,000 the estimate puts Russia in
    the lead in human economic loss, the total being more than
    $8,000,000,000; Germany is next with $6,750,000,000; France,
    $4,800,000,000; England, $3,500,000,000; Austria-Hungary,
    $3,000,000,000; Italy, $2,384,000,000; Serbia, $1,500,000,000;
    Turkey, almost $1,000,000,000; Rumania, $800,000,000; Belgium,
    almost $800,000,000; the United States slightly more than
    $500,000,000; Bulgaria, a little more than $200,000,000;
    Greece, $75,000,000; Portugal, $8,300,000, and Japan, $600,000.
    On this basis the total in human life lost cost the world
    $33,551,276,280, and the loss to the world in civilian
    population is placed at an equal figure.

    The attempt to determine property losses is the least
    satisfactory, as it is the most difficult. The destruction and
    devastation in the invaded areas of Belgium, France, Russian
    Poland, Serbia, Italy and parts of Austria are probably
    incapable of exact determination, and it may well be doubted if
    the exact losses will ever be known.

    The total property loss on land is put at $29,960,000,000,
    one-third of which was suffered by France alone, its loss being
    given as $10,000,000,000, with Belgium next at $7,000,000,000,
    and the other countries following as follows:

    Italy, $2,710,000,000; Serbia, Albania, and Montenegro,
    $2,000,000,000; The British Empire and Germany, each,
    $1,750,000,000; Poland, $1,500,000,000; Russia, $1,250,000,000;
    Rumania, $1,000,000,000, and East Prussia, Austria, and Ukraine
    together, the same amount.

    [Illustration: Copyright by Central News Service

    Launching the Quistconck at Hog Island

    According to the report of the Carnegie Endowment the cargo loss at sea was $3,800,000,000, the total tonnage and cargo loss being $6,800,000,000. To offset the Allied loss in shipping, ship-building in the United States was rushed at topmost speed.]

    In the property losses on sea, that is, to shipping and cargo,
    the report estimates that "the construction cost of the tonnage
    loss can scarcely be estimated at less than $200 a ton, and the
    monetary loss involved in the sinking of this 15,398,392 gross
    tons may, therefore, be placed at about $3,000,000,000." To
    this is added loss of cargo, which is estimated at $250 a ton,
    giving a cargo loss of $3,800,000,000, and a total tonnage and
    cargo loss of $6,800,000,000.

    Among the indirect costs of the war, loss of production is
    placed at $45,000,000,000. In arriving at this figure an
    average of 20,000,000 men are counted as having been withdrawn
    from production during the whole period of the war, and their
    average yearly productive capacity is placed at $500. War
    relief is another indirect cost which totalled up to
    $1,000,000,000; and the loss to the neutral nations is given as
    $1,750,000,000.

    With the total direct costs of the war amounting to
    $186,336,637,097 and the indirect costs to $151,612,542,560,
    the stupendous total of $337,946,179,657 is reached. Finally,
    the report says:

    "The figures presented in this summary are both
    incomprehensible and appalling, yet even these do not take into
    account the effect of the war on life, human vitality,
    economic well-being, ethics, morality, or other phases of human
    relationships and activities which have been disorganized and
    injured. It is evident from the present disturbances in Europe
    that the real costs of the war cannot be measured by the direct
    money outlays of the belligerents during the five years of its
    duration, but that the very breakdown of modern economic
    society might be the price exacted."

    THE WAR AS A PRODUCT OF HIGH PRICES

    All of the great wars in European history have been followed by periods of increased production and economic expansion. Experts are convinced that the World War will prove no exception to the world's previous experience. Wars have been the principal influence that have determined the course of commodities and prices.

    In the Napoleonic Wars the index number rose seventy-two points in twenty years, but during the four years between 1914 and 1918 there was a rise of one hundred and eight points in four and a half years, a movement which Edgar Crammond, widely known British expert in economic and financial affairs, declared to be a movement to which there was no precedent in point of rapidity or magnitude. In an address outlined in the New York Journal of Commerce this authority estimated the direct cost of the war to the Allies as being roughly $145,000,000,000.

    The Central Powers had spent about $60,000,000,000. The total cost in dollars he estimated at $260,000,000,000. The upheaval caused by the war was manifested, according to the same authority, in the rise of the cost of living and in the universal increase of wages. Other economic consequences will be more gradually unfolded.

    Prospects of fall in the price of commodities and wages as the result of peace, he thinks, will be arrested for two reasons: First, the vast increase in the amount of paper money; second, the huge amount of public debts to the belligerents. He saw an additional psychological cause in the attitude of the laboring classes to maintain wages at a higher level than before the war and to improve the standard of living.

    Reduced production is sufficient to account for all the economic disturbances that were produced during the war, according to the London Statist, which says:

    "It is enough to say that production is reduced almost to a
    minimum, while consumption is going on at a most extravagant
    rate. Those who wish to pose as economists without competent
    knowledge are telling the public that all the evil is due to
    this, that, and the other thing--such, for example, as
    inflation, the rise in prices, the enormous loans raised, and
    several other fads. It is pure moonshine.

    The world is
    impoverished, firstly, because so much of the world's manhood
    is withdrawn from production to consumption; and, secondly,
    because reduction in production is so serious that very little
    has been saved either by the belligerents or the neutral
    countries of Europe, at all events. International trade is
    really carried on by barter. It is true that money is
    frequently paid. At the present time money has in some markets
    to be paid because credit has been injured, and those who
    possess wealth are not as willing as they used to be to trust
    to mere credit."

    QUESTIONS OF INFLATION

    The enormous advance of prices in England was synchronous with the issue of currency notes to an excess of £700,000,000 beyond the gold reserve.

    High officials in British administration ascribed this rise to the increased consuming capacity. According to the British Board of Trade a sovereign could purchase no more during the war time than eleven shillings would just before the war started. A writer in the Fortnightly Review, Mr. W. F. Ford, quotes Jevons' remark in his classical book on money in explanation of the phenomenon.

    "A number of bankers all trying to issue additional notes resemble a number of merchants offering to sell corn for future delivery, and the value of gold will be affected as the price of corn certainly is. We are too much inclined to look upon the value of gold as a fixed datum line in commerce, but in reality it is a very variable thing." Substitute today the word Government for bankers and one can see the reason for the upward rise in prices.

    This rise would take place apart from any questions of war waste, profiteering, difficulties of transport by sea or land or shortage of labor. All the countries involved have followed the same policy of inflation. The operation is depicted in the following passage:

    "The inevitable result of extensive note issues by a number of
    Governments was that prices were irresistibly impelled upwards
    in all belligerent countries--apart from any questions of war
    waste, profiteering, difficulties of transport by sea or land,
    or shortage of labor. Belligerent countries became
    extraordinarily good markets in which to sell goods; and a
    golden harvest was temptingly displayed to neutral nations, in
    whose favor enormous trade balances rapidly grew up. In large
    part these balances were met by payment in gold....

    But just as
    gold substitutes in the shape of paper money swelled the
    currencies and increased prices in the belligerent countries,
    so also the large quantities of gold coin sent to neutral
    States in payment for goods supplied to the warring nations
    swelled the currencies and increased prices in the neutral
    states themselves.

    The withdrawal of gold set up a natural
    tendency for prices to fall in the countries from which it had
    been exported; but not only was this tendency overcome, but the
    upward movement of prices was continued by the action of the
    several Governments in placing still further issues of
    inconvertible paper money on their respective markets.

    The net
    results have been that currencies have been inflated and prices
    forced up all over the world, that inconvertible paper money is
    tending more and more to drive out gold from the currencies of
    the states that issue it, and that the gold so driven out is
    being absorbed into the currencies of the neutral nations.
    Between August, 1914, and the date of her own declaration of
    war, America increased the amount of her gold currency by
    approximately £200,000,000 sterling. No real benefit has
    accrued.

    "The currencies of the whole world have been artificially
    inflated to the extent that, under the most favorable
    circumstances existing in any part of the world, £5 are now
    needed to do the work in circulation that before the war was
    accomplished by £3. The loss to people with fixed incomes, the
    disturbance of trade, the potential labor difficulties are
    stupendous. And as a result of purchasing war material at
    excessively high prices, the dead weight of debt incurred by
    all the countries at war is very much greater than it need have
    been had currencies been kept within reasonable bounds."

    CURRENCY EXPANSION IN GREAT BRITAIN

    In Great Britain £200,000,000 worth of new paper currency was placed in circulation and there was a considerable expansion in the use of banknotes, silver and copper coinage. Proposals were made that the famous English Bank Act should be repealed and that excess issues of banknotes should be made legal on the payment of a tax. But apart from these theories of involving the banking system there was a good deal of adverse criticism.

    "Mr. Herbert Samuel made a masterly attack upon the vicious
    system of War Finance, by which no less a sum than £196,170,000
    is added to the expenditure by bonuses and increases of wages,
    which, in their turn, only force prices still higher and raise
    the cost of living. Lives have been conscripted; incomes have
    been conscripted; the only thing which has not been conscripted
    is labor. If the Government had at an early stage of the war
    had the courage to fix wages, instead of prices, the cost of
    living would then have been regulated by supply and demand.

    By
    fixing prices of commodities, after they had risen to almost
    famine figures, we have the maximum of loss and inconvenience,
    high wages, dear food, and a war bill that increases day by
    day. Despite Mr. Bonar Law's assurance that the bill of the
    year would not be so high as he expected, we have the fact that
    we are spending over seven millions a day. The satire of 'the
    cheap loaf' consists in its cost to the nation at large of
    £45,000,000 a year. Bonuses to munition workers amount to
    £40,000,000, bonuses to miners come to £20,000,000, to railway
    workers £10,000,000, to potato growers £5,000,000.

    Is this
    anything else but a system of gigantic corruption? In order
    that artisans and agriculturists may be kept in good humor with
    the war, they are bribed with bonuses and allowed to buy food
    at prices which are partially paid by the rest of the
    community. If ever there was a case of robbing Peter to pay
    Paul it is here."

    AMERICA'S EXPERIENCE WITH INFLATION

    Protests against war inflation were not confined to British specialists in finance. What is inflation? As used by the more careful writers on the subject today, it is taken to signify the increase of bank credits not represented by any immediate addition to current wealth.

    For example, if the Government borrows by an issue of bonds, such bonds taken by the banks, and payment for them made in the form of bank credit which is at once transferred to individuals who have furnished labor or supplies, it is evident that there has been a net addition to the purchasing power of the community not represented by any corresponding addition to wealth whether of a saleable or available form. Mr.

    Delano, a member of the Federal Reserve Board, said that the war had produced a world inflation the like of which had never occurred before--"The usual symptoms of such methods of inflation are the disappearance of metallic money and the general advance in the prices of commodities." He gives the following illustration of what has taken place in this process of inflation:

    "Prior to our entry into the war, when the European nations
    were buying heavily in the United States, they paid largely in
    gold for what they bought, and as a result about a billion
    dollars in gold coin came to this country in the period of two
    and one-half years. The reason the European nations were able
    to send us their gold was that they printed paper money for
    their own use, releasing gold for us.

    But that gold inflation
    in this country is one explanation of the general advance in
    prices of all commodities, although undoubtedly it is not the
    only explanation; for it must be freely admitted that prices
    have been affected, first, by scarcity, occasioned by increased
    demand from Europe for many articles produced by us; second, by
    reason of the fact that increases in taxes and wages of labor
    have entered into the cost of production and sale of all
    articles and account for a share of the increased prices of
    commodities."

    CIVIL WAR INFLATION.

    The United States had large experience with inflation during the Civil War. Some $500,000,000 were in this way added to the cost of the war which might have been avoided. A plain statement of the real incidents of inflation is given by Mr. A. C. Miller of the Federal Reserve Board in his Financial Mobilization for War, in the following passage:

    "For let it not for a moment be overlooked that inflation, in
    its effects, amounts to conscriptive taxation of the masses. It
    is, indeed, one of the worst and the most unequal forms of
    taxation, because it taxes men, not upon what they have or
    earn, but upon what they need or consume.

    The only difference
    for the masses between this kind of disguised and concealed
    taxation and taxes which are levied and collected openly is
    that in the case of the latter the government gets the revenue,
    while in the former case it borrows it, and those to whom it is
    eventually repaid are not those, for the most part, who have
    been mulcted for it.

    Inflation therefore produces a situation
    akin to double taxation in that the great mass of the consuming
    public is hard hit by the rise of prices induced by the
    degenerated borrowing policy and later has to be taxed in order
    to produce the revenue requisite to sustain the interest charge
    on the debt contracted and to repay the principal. The active
    business and speculative classes can usually take care of
    themselves in the midst of the confusion produced by inflation
    and recoup themselves for their increasing outlays. Indeed
    inflation frequently makes for an artificial condition of
    business prosperity.

    That is why war times are frequently
    spoken of in terms of enthusiasm by the class of business
    adventurers. But it is a prosperity that is dear-bought and at
    the expense of the great body of plain living people. It would
    be a monstrous wrong if in financing our present war we should
    pursue methods that would land us in a sea of inflation in
    which the great body of the American people, who are called
    upon to contribute the blood of their sons to the war, were
    made the victims of a careless or iniquitous financial policy."

    INFLATION ILLUSTRATED.

    One of the ways in which inflation was caused in the United States during the war period was the plan adopted by the banks of financing the loan directly by means of bank credits to the buyers. According to Mr.

    Carl Snyder the banking officials roughly agree that on the first Liberty Loan for $2,000,000,000 the banks may have loaned somewhere near half the total and on the second loan even more. Of course, this means a heavy expansion of bank credit. Economists are generally agreed that the flooding of the country with paper money brings about an enormous rise in prices. They differ chiefly in regard to the degree of inflation. The most accepted statement of inflation is that prices vary directly as the volume of the actual currency employed and its rate of turn over or velocity, and inversely with the volume of trade.

    The effect of bank credits is exactly that of an excessive issue of notes; that is, if they are expanded more rapidly than the actual volume of business there is a rise in prices, that is to say there is inflation.

    The situation of the country during the war in regard to business was put plainly by Mr. Snyder in the following words: "Railroads cannot haul any more goods. The government is already stepping in to shut down on shipments on certain lines of industry. We can not get any more coal unless labor is drafted from other industries, and as a whole we cannot get any more labor as is evident from the fantastic wages that are now being paid.

    In a word, production and therefore the actual volume of exchange is practically at the limit and has been for a year or more. No expansion of bank credits can put this production any higher. It follows, therefore, as a practical fact that any expansion of bank loans now means inflation--to all practical intents dollar for dollar." Because of the introduction of a billion dollars worth of gold into the country, prices have risen nearly one hundred percent.

    The expansion of bank credits increases the cost of living and the cost of the war will be doubled.

    Some bankers estimated that if the war lasted the expansion of bank loans might reach $50,000,000,000. The progress of these loans was encouraged by the cutting of the required metallic reserve under the new Federal Reserve system and the system of book credits with the Federal Reserve banks allowed to the banks that are members of the system. The following is Mr. Snyder's description of the way the inflation was encouraged.

    "Every dollar of gold may become three dollars of Federal Bank
    credits and each dollar of this may in turn become the basis of
    eight dollars of credits for the Central Reserve cities, ten
    dollars for the smaller cities and fifteen dollars for the
    country banks, which works out to a practical average of ten
    dollars for all the banks in the Federal Reserve system."

    He then went on to speak of the possibilities of this inflation and uttered a warning of the danger, because the only obstacle in the way was the good sense and conservatism of the American banks. Some authorities hold that a war cannot be fought without inflation. Mr.

    Snyder thought that the United States with large ante-war income could and should have tried the experiment. People want easy money and flush times. If credit were contracted there would be tight money and a high interest rate. Mr. McAdoo and the Administration at Washington feel highly elated when they roll up five billion of statistics, half of which are merely bank rolls. It seems not to matter that all this may add two or three billion to the already swollen credit currency and that the millions of poor people, small investors and life insurance holders who cannot expand their income in any adequate way must pay the piper.

    These are the millions who rarely have any voice in national affairs, and all the more so because they are for the most part ignorant. It seems an idle consequence that we may spend perhaps ten long weary years of hard times, of falling prices, declining business and sharp distress, paying for the orgy of inflated prices, waste and extravagance in which we are now indulging.

    [Illustration: Photo by Paul Thompson

    Ship-building at Camden, N. J.

    One of the financial effects of the war was the transformation of the United States from a debtor to a creditor nation. Immense private fortunes were made. In no industry was there a greater boom than in ship-building.]

    CREDIT EXPANSION

    The wide expansion of credit can be studied by making a comparison of the gold holdings of the leading nations. For example, in 1914 just before the outbreak of the war, the amount of cash held by all the banks of the United States was estimated at about $1,639,000,000. Of this amount about $913,000,000 was in the form of gold or gold certificates.

    Upon this basis there rested a structure of credit amounting to $21,351,000,000. In other words the gold basis of the country's deposit credits amounted to 4.27 percent.

    In 1916 the cash held was $1,911,000,000; about $1,140,000,000 was in gold; and on this basis there rested a credit structure of $28,250,000,000.

    UNITED STATES A CREDITOR NATION

    One of the financial effects of the war was the transformation of the United States from a debtor to a creditor nation. The reconstruction period in finance is certain to bring about a situation described by a writer in the Wall Street Journal as one of the most interesting developments known in financial history. Financial waste in emergency measures was a superficial side of America's part in the World War. But this writer considers that what happened during the war was not altogether financial waste:

    "A great upheaval took place in the world of finance. Credit
    resources were brought to the fore and nations established on a
    financial basis of far-reaching importance, but of a kind that
    had only a secondary place before.

    "The war has turned the United States from a debtor to a
    creditor nation. Formerly we owed abroad something like
    $4,000,000,000, about three-quarters of which sum we have
    bought back. Moreover, Europe now owes us about
    $9,000,000,000--on private account; about $2,000,000,000 in
    securities; in United States Government obligations over
    $7,000,000,000. The world is under obligations to us in
    interest alone of between $400,000,000 and $500,000,000 a
    year."

    After the United States took an active part in the war large credits and loans were made in behalf of other countries as the following excerpt shows:

    "A total appropriation of $7,000,000,000 has been made,
    $3,000,000,000 by the Act of April 24, 1917, and $4,000,000,000
    by the Act of September 24, 1917. Under these authorizations
    credits have been established in favor of the governments of
    Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, Belgium, and Serbia.
    These loans, up to January 17, 1918, are given in the following
    table:

    Loans and Balances
    Country Credits Agreed Loans Under-Established
    Upon Made Credits

    Great Britain $2,045,000,000 $1,985,000,000 $60,000,000 France 1,285,000,000 1,225,000,000 60,000,000 Italy 500,000,000 450,000,000 50,000,000 Russia 325,000,000 187,729,750 137,270,250 Belgium 77,400,000 75,400,000 2,000,000 Serbia 6,000,000 4,200,000 1,800,000

    Totals $4,238,400,000 $3,927,329,750 $311,070,250

    "On the basis of the requests being made on the Treasury, it is
    estimated that credits aggregating approximately $500,000,000
    per month will be required to meet the urgent war needs of the
    foreign governments receiving advances from the United States.
    At this rate approximately the entire appropriation authorized
    by Congress will be accredited to our Allies by the close of
    the present fiscal year (June 30, 1918).

    "A significant feature of the loans floated in this country in
    the last three and a half years has been the fact that many
    states and municipalities which formerly went to London to sell
    their securities have recently been financed through the United
    States. About $150,000,000 of the Canadian loans went to
    provinces and municipalities, and many of the South American
    obligations were contracted for municipal improvements. The
    neutral nations of Europe have also sought accommodation in the
    American money market.

    Loans have been made to the city of
    Dublin, Ireland, the London Water Board, and the French cities
    of Paris, Bordeaux, Lyons, and Marseilles."

    DISAPPEARANCE OF GOLD CURRENCY

    During the war gold almost ceased to be currency in all the Allied countries. The Central Powers at the end of the struggle had comparatively little. Of the total gold production the United States produced about twenty-five percent., while the British Empire produced nearly sixty-four. A writer in the Edinburgh Review proposed to take the opportunity of creating a standard price for gold. For example, if the standard price of gold were reduced to half, the prices of all commodities would come down in sympathy.

    We must take advantage of the fact that we are working with a paper currency, and all authorities agree that financial stability is only secured by the backing of as much gold as possible against paper securities and emergencies.

    The plan involved an increase of the standard price. The success of the scheme depends upon the concordant will of the United States and Great Britain to adopt it as the following article suggests:

    "Obviously if Great Britain or any other country alone
    attempted to alter the standard price of gold, and therefore
    the value of the present sovereign (or its equivalent), the
    currency would be debased, instead of being enhanced. It would
    also in effect amount to a partial repudiation of national
    debt. A standard ceases to be a standard if one nation can
    arbitrarily alter it, but surely there can be no argument
    against the creation of a new standard sanctioned by the whole
    civilized world for their mutual advantage.

    If Great Britain
    and the United States were to proclaim their desire to adopt my
    scheme it is hardly likely that any country other than the
    Central Powers would fail to welcome it. Spain, for instance,
    has increased her gold reserve to about £80,000,000 and greatly
    enhanced the value of her currency thereby. Would she fail to
    grasp the happy chance of making this £120,000,000, and would
    any country continue to part with its gold at £4 per ounce when
    it could get £6 or £8?"

    WAR'S EFFECT ON SILVER

    Along with all other commodities, that cinderella of finance--silver--had a share in the general rise in prices. One of the reasons is the enormous falling off of silver production in Mexico, where one-third of the total world supply is produced; another is the great demand for silver. Prior to the war, the use of silver plate by the wealthy classes had largely fallen off; but the war, because of the rise in wages, brought about a largely increased demand for silver to be used in ornaments:

    "The war has brought into the market a vast number of new
    buyers for ornaments, whose demand in the aggregate is
    estimated to more than compensate for the falling off in the
    purchases by the wealthy classes of silver plate.

    Wages
    everywhere, not merely in England, but practically all over the
    world, have advanced, and particularly in Western Europe;
    moreover, immense numbers of women, and even children, are
    being employed who were not employed before, and those who were
    employed before have a larger income, particularly amongst the
    wage earning classes, than has been the case in this country
    for many years past."

    The use of silver in coinage, too, was notably increased. Gold disappeared in countries where gold coins were used; paper money and silver token money took its place. Another reason for the advance in silver is connected with the demand for the metal in eastern countries.

    According to the London Statist:

    " ... About half the annual production of silver throughout the
    world is absorbed by the East, meaning principally India and
    China. It has to be borne in mind that prices in the East have
    advanced as well as in Europe and the two Americas, and,
    consequently, more token money is required there as well as
    here. Silver is the standard of value, and not token money at
    all, in China; and in India, while gold is nominally the
    standard of value, the rupee is the actual coin in which the
    Indian natives, as distinct from mere government officials,
    reckon their wealth.

    Now, as one result of the war, nearly all
    the governments forbid the export of gold; consequently, India
    requires a steadily increasing supply of silver, not merely to
    do the work that silver did before the war, but, in addition,
    to supply the void created by the prohibition of the export of
    gold."

    STOCK EXCHANGE WAR

    The accompanying diagram showing how military operations in Europe affected the average prices of fifty stocks, half industrial and half railway, was published in the New York Times Annalist:

    The wider black area shows the high and low average prices of
    the twenty-five industrials included in the fifty, and the
    white area the corresponding figures for the twenty-five rails.
    The lines begin at a time when Germany was suffering severely
    from her failure at Verdun and from losses in men and territory
    from the great Allied Somme offensive. The subsequent rapid
    decline (November to February) embraces the period of
    Bethmann-Hollweg's sensational peace offensive, followed a few
    weeks later by Germany's intensified submarine warfare.

    The
    lowest point of all (December, 1917) was reached after
    Germany's successful counter-thrust for Cambrai, her "peace
    offensive" with the Bolsheviki at Brest-Litovsk, and the taking
    over of our railroads by the government.--Literary Digest,
    October 19, 1918.

    A further indication of how military operations reacted on Stock Exchange quotations was shown in the decided improvement that took place since the end of July, 1918, after the Germans were pushed back in their drive towards Paris. The most direct way of measuring this influence is to take the quotations for the bonds and notes of the Allied Governments dealt in at the New York Stock Exchange since 1915:

    "The lowest quotations for these bond and note issues were
    reached in 1917, when the cause of the Allies assumed a gloomy
    appearance. The depression was aggravated by the general
    decline of the entire securities market in the later part of
    that year. Some recovery occurred by the end of last year, but
    the beginning of 1918 saw them still depressed.

    Last March,
    April, May and June, when the great German drives were in
    progress, they showed little disposition to break, but after
    the active participation of the American Army in the fighting
    began and news came that the counter-offensive had assumed a
    decided and successful phase, an assertion of strength took
    place in foreign government bonds, carrying quotations 'not
    only to the highest of the year, but in some instances to the
    best figures attained since they first made their appearance in
    the American market.' The following tabulation is presented by
    Bradstreet's as giving the range of prices for the most
    prominent bonds and short-term notes of foreign countries
    during 1917 and 1918, with the quotations for them on August
    22nd:

    /---1917----\ /---1918----\ Aug.
    High Low High Low 22
    Am. For. Sec. 5s. 1919 97-7/8 90 98 94½ 97½
    Anglo-French 5s. 1920 95 81-7/8 95 88¼ 94¾
    Canada 5s. 1926 100 89 95 90-7/8 92
    Canada 5s. 1931 100¼ 87½ 94 88-7/8 92-3/8
    Fr. Republic 5-1/2s. 1919 101 91½ 99 94 98-7/8
    U. Kingdom 5s. 1918 98-5/8 95½ 100 97 99-7/8
    U. Kingdom 5-1/2s. 1919 98-7/8 93¼ 99¼ 95¼ 98¾
    U. King. 5-1/2s, new 1919 101-9/16 95¼ 100 9¾ 99-5/8
    U. Kingdom 5-1/2s.

    1921 98½ 84½ 95¾ 91-5/8 95-3/8
    French Cities
    Paris 6s. 1921 96-7/8 73½ 92-1/8 81-5/8 91-7/8
    Bordeaux 6s. 1919 96-7/8 74 95½ 84 94-7/8
    Lyons 6s. 1919 96-7/8 74 95½ 84 94¾
    Marseilles 6s. 1919 96-7/8 74 95½ 84 94¾
    Russian Govern.[6]
    External 6½% 98¾ 45 64½ 33 61
    External 5½% 1921 98-5/8 36 60½ 34½ 57

    [6] Curb market quotations.

    [Illustration: Diagram Showing the Effect of the War on the Prices of Stocks

    (See explanation on page 32)]

    "British issues, as shown above, declined least of all, 'and
    consequently had less ground to regain in the rise,'
    Bradstreet's adds:

    "The feeling of confidence in England's credit has all along
    been a factor in connection with its American obligations. This
    will doubtless be strengthened by the announcement made this
    week that the United Kingdom secured 5 per cent. notes, due
    September 1, 1918, will be paid at their maturity on that date.
    There were originally $250,000,000 of these notes, which were
    sold in our market in 1916; but the outstanding issue has been
    reduced to about $180,000,000 by purchases in the market for
    redemption. French obligations have been one of the chief
    features of the advance.

    As will be seen from the above table,
    the French Republic 5½ per cents., due 1919, have risen 6
    points from the low figures of the year. The 6 per cent. notes
    of the French cities, Paris, Lyons, Bordeaux, and Marseilles,
    with rises of about 10 points each, are conspicuous examples of
    the good effects following the checking of the German advance
    and the counter-offensive launched by the Allies and the
    American Army.

    No division of this part of the bond market has,
    however, shown such a marked improvement as the Russian
    external or dollar bonds, which though not listed at the Stock
    Exchange, are dealt in extensively on the New York Curb
    market'."

    GERMAN PROPERTY IN AMERICA

    Until the United States entered the war with Germany it had never been realized that an enormous share of the economic wealth of the country was under German control. Attorney-General Palmer, in an address at Detroit, estimated this share to be about two billion dollars in money value, with an economic and political value far greater:

    "Furthermore, this structure was 'designed so to hold American
    industry as to frustrate the organization of our resources in
    case of war.' With two hundred American corporations controlled
    by the financial and military power in Germany, we had a
    situation that 'might easily have been fatal in America had it
    not been discovered in time.' When the war began in 1914 the
    structure 'had become so large and powerful and was so firmly
    entrenched in the industrial life of our country that its real
    commanders in Germany cherished the hope that it would prove
    the make-weight which would keep America out of the war, or,
    failing in that, constitute a powerful ally of the German cause
    in our very midst.'" Mr.

    Palmer added:

    "'During the last twenty-five or thirty years Germany had built
    up upon American soil a structure reaching into every part of
    the country and stretching its arms across the seas to fasten
    upon Porto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Hawaii, and the
    Philippines. Congress has declared that all these enemy
    properties shall be managed and administered by the Alien
    Property Custodian with all the powers of a common law trustee,
    the proceeds to be distributed after the war in such manner as
    the Congress may determine.

    This means that the final
    disposition of the properties or the funds realized from their
    sale will be a topic for discussion and a subject for
    settlement at the council table of the nations at which
    permanent peace shall be restored to the world.

    "'This being so, it seems to me to be an important part of our
    work to capture the army which Germany skilfully and craftily
    planted midst the busy wheels of American industry, and to
    break, never to be again repaired, the industrial and
    commercial chain which Germany has stretched across the
    American continent and our insular possessions. I would let
    Germany understand now that her plan has dismally failed.

    I
    would let her understand now that no matter how long she
    fights, or what sacrifice she makes, or what price she pays,
    however much territory she may occupy, or whatever worlds she
    may conquer, there is one place which she will never soil again
    with the tramp of the marching legions of her industrial army.
    That is the United States of America. I would divorce utterly
    and forever all German capital from American industry'."

    II--WARTIME FOOD AND PRICE PROBLEMS

    Intricacies of a Perplexing and Critical Situation Which Taxed the Ingenuity of Statesmen of All the Belligerents

    Europe was financially plunged into anarchy in August, 1914. All the exchanges were demoralized, checks were not cashed, the five-pound note became a worthless scrap of paper. The only thing that counted was gold and goods. Prices advanced to prohibited levels. England, in danger of a food famine, set up a Food Control Committee. Then the discovery was made that the country was short of sugar. This shortage was due to the fact that the war broke out when supplies from Cuba and elsewhere were stopping and when the German imports had not begun.

    Sugar was bought to the value of $86,000,000 from every country which had it to sell. When the sugar merchants began to put the price up, purchasing was stopped for the time. Later the Government managed to secure the quantity required, because it became the only sugar importer. It also supplied the French Government with sugar at cost price. Any further difficulties with the sugar supply were due to freight shortage.

    By this system sugar was cheaper in England than in any other belligerent country and the Exchequer took in $34,000,000 in the way of taxes, after raising the rate from 45¢ per hundred weight to $3.36 per hundred weight.

    In its control of the meat situation, the Government put itself in a dominating position by seizing all steamers that had refrigerating space. Enormous quantities of canned meats were imported from the United States from the American packing firms, but the Government practically created a state monopoly in frozen meat. This product was distributed by it to all the other belligerents, except Russia. The purchase of wheat was entrusted to a large importing house, which acted as an agent of the Government. For supplying the fish market, a service of fishing boats was maintained and a deal with Norway was made by which the whole Norwegian fish supply was secured:

    "The British Government went into the beef business in order to
    supply the troops at home and overseas with chilled meat. It
    did so at an average cost of 12 cents per pound. It also
    supplied all meat of this kind required by the French Army, the
    Italian Army, the Belgians, and the Serbians. The amount of
    meat required for the British and French armies was over 50,000
    tons per month; for the Italian Army about 10,000 tons per
    month. These quantities increased proportionately with the
    additions to the forces.

    Having created a state monopoly in the
    importation and control of chilled meat, the Government had to
    make provisions for domestic supplies outside the Army. The
    Board of Trade arranged to sell to British firms the surplus
    meat at market prices. They obtained a small commission, lower
    than it hitherto received from traders. Sales to speculators
    were prohibited.

    "Wheat was quite as important as sugar and beef, although there
    was less risk of a world-corner. Wheat was purchased for
    Government account on somewhat similar lines as beef. One of
    the largest importing houses was commissioned to do all the
    purchasing, while the other houses held off, and it was four
    months before the corn trade, on the selling side, discovered
    that purchases were made for the state. Naturally the
    commission which the state paid on such transactions was
    nominal. The British Government organization bought and shipped
    wheat, oats, fodder, etc., for Italy.

    The French Government
    bought their civil ravitaillement wheat through the Hudson
    Bay Company. Large purchases were made in Canada on behalf of
    the Italian Government."

    UNITED STATES AS FOOD PRODUCER

    "It is hard to realize that the United States was in 1917 much
    less favorably situated for producing a huge food surplus than
    it was thirty years before. In the interim industrialism had
    made huge strides in the land, and a great urban population has
    risen to eat up a large part of the surplus of food produced by
    the farms. This change is indicated by a growth of the urban
    population in the twenty years from 1890 to 1910 from
    22,720,223 to 42,625,383, or more than 80 per cent., while
    rural population during the same period increased from
    40,227,491 to 49,348,883, or less than 25 per cent.

    If the same
    ratios have been maintained since 1910 urban population has now
    become one-half of the whole. In terms of food production
    decidedly more than one-half of our population now produces a
    very insignificant part of the food which it consumes, for the
    rural population includes all who live in towns of less than
    2,500. The significance of the change is indicated by the
    following figures of the production, export, and consumption
    of typical food products.

    The comparison is between the average
    of the five-year period ending in 1895 and that ending in 1914.
    The average production of wheat per year for the former period
    was 476,678,000 bushels; for the latter 697,459,000 bushels, an
    increase of 46 per cent. Between these periods domestic
    consumption increased from 310,107,000 to 588,592,000 bushels,
    or about 90 per cent., while exports decreased from 166,571,000
    to 104,945,000 bushels, or 37 per cent. The average production
    of corn for the former period was 1,602,171,000 bushels; for
    the latter 2,752,372,000 bushels, or an increase of 72 per
    cent.

    Consumption increased from 1,552,003,000 to 2,790,962,000
    bushels, or 79 per cent., while exports decreased from
    50,168,000 to 41,509,000 bushels, or 17 per cent. The figures
    upon sugar, beef, pork, and other staples lead to similar
    conclusions. The growth of industrial centers has given us an
    increasingly urban population which has been consuming a larger
    and larger part of the food surplus."

    THE FOOD CONTROLLER

    No policy of laissez-faire for handling the food situation was possible. The need of direction was paramount and required administrative talent of a high order. Fortunately the United States met this demand.

    The work of Herbert M. Hoover was one of the main factors in securing the Allied victory. This was recognized by as conservative an organ of public opinion as the London Economist, which speaks of him as an unimpeachable authority and as the organizer of the Allied victory. His experience is a tribute to the wonderful readiness and self-sacrifice shown by the Americans in the matter of food consumption and to the untiring and increasing success of our fleet in combating the submarine.

    How much success in the war depended upon food supplies may be gauged from the panicky feeling prevailing in Government quarters in England when it was reported in the winter of 1917--18, that the American wheat surplus had been used up. Lord Rhonda, the British Food Controller, cabled to Mr. Hoover--"We are beaten, the war is over." Then began the era in the United States of wheatless days and war bread. The result of this period of national abstinence enabled the exportation to Europe of about 150,000,000 bushels of wheat.

    A British member of the Allied Food Commission said it was very remarkable to see a whole nation denying itself of all wheat products, "not because it was short but because it wanted to assist." This rationing was accomplished with very little exercise of authority, and the peril of the defeat of the Allies by famine was averted.

    [Illustration: Centres of Live Stock Production Throughout the World]

    AMERICA'S CONTRIBUTION IN FOOD TO THE ALLIES

    Mr. Hoover in a letter to President Wilson stated that the total value of American food shipments to Allied countries for their armies, for the civilian population, Belgium relief and Red Cross, amounted to about $1,400,000,000 for the fiscal year, 1918:

    "Shipments of meats, fats, and dairy products were as follows,

    Pounds.
    Fiscal year, 1916--17 2,166,500,000
    Fiscal year, 1917--18 3,011,100,000
    Increase 844,600,000

    "'Our slaughterable animals at the beginning of the last fiscal
    year were not appreciably larger in number than the year
    before, and particularly in hogs; they were probably less';
    so, as Mr. Hoover points out, 'the increase in shipments is due
    to conservation and the extra weight of animals added by our
    farmers.' Our shipments of cereal and cereal products have
    been,

    Bushels.
    Fiscal year, 1916--17 259,900,000
    Fiscal year, 1917--18 340,800,000
    Increase 80,900,000

    "The total shipment of wheat from our last harvest was about
    141,000,000 bushels, with 13,900,000 of rye, a total of
    154,900,000 bushels, of prime breadstuffs. Mr. Hoover notes a
    remarkable achievement in connection with the wheat shipments

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    Title
    Harper's Pictorial Library of the World War, Volume XII
    Release date
    November 17, 2013 [eBook #44213]
    Language
    English
    Credits
    Produced by Juliet Sutherland, Martin Mayer and the Online
    Most recently updated
    October 23, 2024
    Front matter as received (title page, contents)
     HARPER'S PICTORIAL LIBRARY
     OF THE WORLD WAR
    
     _In Twelve Volumes
     Profusely Illustrated_
    
     VOLUME XII
    
     THE GREAT RESULTS OF THE WAR
    
     Economics and Finance, The Peace
     Treaty, The League of Nations. Index
    
    
    [Illustration: Painting by Frank Stick A Soldier of the Soil]
    
    
     =HARPER'S PICTORIAL LIBRARY
     OF THE WORLD WAR=
    
     _In Twelve Volumes
     Profusely Illustrated_
    
     FOREWORD BY CHARLES W. ELIOT, PhD.
    
     _President Emeritus, Harvard University_
    
     VOLUME XII
    
     The Great Results of the War
    
     _Economics and Finance, The Treaty of Versailles
     and League of Nations----Index_
    
     WITH INTRODUCTION BY PROFESSOR IRVING FISHER, YALE UNIVERSITY
    
     _Edited by_
    
     DR. W. L. BEVAN, KENYON COLLEGE
     _and_
     DR. HUGO C. M. WENDEL, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
    
     GENERAL EDITORIAL BOARD
    
        PROF. ALBERT BUSHNELL HART
          Harvard University
    
        GEN. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, U.S.A.
          Chief of Staff, 42nd Division
    
        ADMIRAL ALBERT GLEAVES
          U.S. Navy
    
        PROF. W. O. STEVENS
          U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis
    
        GEN. ULYSSES G. MCALEXANDER
          U.S. Army
    
        JOHN GRIER HIBBEN
          President of Princeton University
    
        J. B. W. GARDINER
          Military Expert, _New York Times_
    
        COMMANDER C. C. GILL, U.S.N.
          Lecturer at Annapolis and aide
          to Admiral Gleaves
    
        HENRY NOBLE MACCRACKEN
          President of Vassar College
    
        PROF. E. R. A. SELIGMAN
          Columbia University
    
        DR. THEODORE F. JONES
          Professor of History, New York
          University
    
        CARL SNYDER
    
        PROF. JOHN SPENCER BASSETT
          Professor of History, Smith College
    
        MAJOR C. A. KING, JR.
          History Department, West Point
    
     HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
    
     NEW YORK AND LONDON
    
     Established 1817
    
    Copyright, 1920, by Harper & Brothers Printed in the United States of
    America M-U
    
    
    
    
                 CONTENTS OF VOLUME XII                            PAGE
    
      _Introduction_ Professor Irving Fisher                        vii
    
                 PART I
    
      I. Economic Results of the War                                  1
      II. Wartime Food and Price Problems                            34
      III. Industry and Labor in Wartime                             65
      IV. Government Control                                         87
      V. The Money Cost of the War, Edwin R. A. Seligman            105
      VI. American Business in the War, Grosvenor B. Clarkson       115
      VII. The Liberty Loan Army, Guy Emerson                       126
      VIII. Food and the War, Vernon Kellogg                        135
      IX. The High Cost of Living, Director of the Council of       142
          National Defense
    
                 PART II
    
      I. The Peace Conference at Work, Thomas W. Lamont             149
      II. Wilson's Fourteen Points                                  163
      III. How the Peace Treaty Was Signed                          165
      IV. The Peace Treaty--Its Meaning to America, George W.       170
          Wickersham
    
      THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
    
      Preamble                                                      179
      Part I. The Covenant of the League of Nations                 182
      Part II. Boundaries of Germany                                186
      Part III. Political Clauses for Europe                        188
      Part IV. German Rights and Interests Outside Germany          206
      Part V. Military, Naval, and Aerial Clauses                   209
      Part VI. Prisoners of War and Graves                          216
      Part VII. Penalties                                           217
      Part VIII. Reparation                                         217
      Part IX. Financial Clauses                                    226
      Part X. Economic Clauses                                      229
      Part XI. Aerial Navigation                                    246
      Part XII. Ports, Waterways, and Railways                      247
      Part XIII. Labor                                              255
      Part XIV. Guarantees                                          261
      Part XV. Miscellaneous Provisions                             262
    
      Rejection of the Peace Treaty                                 264
      The Reservations Which Failed                                 269
      Peace by Congressional Enactment Fails                        271
      The Map of Europe Remade                                      279
      Our Part in Winning the War                                   280
    
      Index
      Text                                                          291
      Illustrations
      I. Portraits                                                  363
      II. General                                                   368
      Maps                                                          383
    
      ILLUSTRATION IN COLOR
      A Soldier of the Soil                               _Frontispiece_
    
    
    
    
    Illustrations in this volume
    
    
      Price Movements of the United States and England from the Earliest
      Index Numbers Through the First Years of the World War
    
      Trend of Prices Before and After the Great Wars of History
    
      William McAdoo
    
      Money and the Price Level
    
      John Pierpont Morgan
    
      President Wilson and Rear Admiral Grayson Passing the Palace of the
      King in Brussels
    
      Women Munition Workers in the International Fuse and Arms Works
    
      Poster for Boy Scouts Who Worked for the Victory Loan
    
      Dropping the First Bomb
    
      A Poster Used During the Fourth Liberty Loan Campaign
    
      Detroit--City of Automobiles
    
      A Woman Doing Road Construction Work
    
      A Woman Operating a Multiple Spindle Drill in an English Shell
      Factory
    
      Launching the Quistconck at Hog Island
    
      Ship-building at Camden, N. J.
    
      Diagram Showing the Effect of the War on the Prices of Stocks
    
      Centres of Live Stock Production Throughout the World
    
      Members of "The Women's Land Army" in England
    
      A Map Issued by the Food Administration to Show Food Conditions in
      Europe After the Signing of the Armistice
    
      A Food Riot in Sweden
    
      Harry A. Garfield
    
      Drying Fruit and Vegetables to Save Tin and Glass
    
      "Back on the Farm"
    
      The Nations and Their Wheat Supply
    
      A Municipal Canning Station
    
      In the Heart of the Bethlehem Steel Plant
    
      Forging Armor Plate
    
      Building Howitzers
    
      Guns and Armaments for United States and Her Allies
    
      Plowing by Night
    
      A War Time Warning
    
      Women Workers in America
    
      Samuel P. Gompers
    
      Walker D. Hines
    
      Building a Steel Ship in Seattle, Washington
    
      Hog Island Ship-building Yards
    
      Launching the City of Portland on the Columbia River, near Portland,
      Oregon
    
      Examining Cargoes for Contraband
    
      An Antidote for the Submarine Pest
    
      The Awkward Squad
    
      The Economic Conference in Paris
    
      Lord Reading
    
      While the Men Fought, Those Left Behind Bought Bonds
    
      French School Children Waiting to Welcome General Pétain
    
      United States Council of National Defense and Its Advisory
      Commission
    
      Bernard M. Baruch
    
      Daniel Willard
    
      John D. Ryan
    
      A Poster Used During the Fourth Liberty Loan Campaign
    
      A Poster for the Third Liberty Loan Campaign
    
      Victory Way at Night
    
      The Battle Scene at Home
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