
Gutenberg · ebook 44143
Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy, Vol. 2 of 2
by Baron Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton · English · public domain in the US
Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy, Vol. 2 of 2 by Baron Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton is an English public-domain text held from Project Gutenberg (ebook #44143). Thiers as Chief of the Executive--Negotiations respecting a new Anglo-French Commercial Treaty--Return of the Princes--Embarrassment caused by the Comte de Chambord--Question of voting in the House of Lords--Thiers elected President--State of parties in France--Irritation in Germany against Thiers--Diplomatic incident at Constantinople--Signature of…
CHAPTER X
THE THIRD REPUBLIC
1871-1873
## PAGE
Thiers as Chief of the Executive--Negotiations respecting a new
Anglo-French Commercial Treaty--Return of the Princes--Embarrassment
caused by the Comte de Chambord--Question
of voting in the House of Lords--Thiers elected President--State
of parties in France--Irritation in Germany against Thiers--Diplomatic
incident at Constantinople--Signature of Anglo-French
Commercial Treaty--Death of the Emperor Napoleon--Lord
Odo Russell on Bismarck's policy--Fall of Thiers--Bismarck
and Arnim 1
CHAPTER XI
MARSHAL MACMAHON'S PRESIDENCY
1873-1875
MacMahon as President of the Republic--Franco-German
relations--Bismarck's confidences to Lord Odo Russell--Political
confusion in France--The war scare of 1875--Rumoured intention
of Khedive to sell his Suez Canal shares--Lord Odo Russell on
Bismarck's Foreign Policy--Purchase of Khedive's shares by H.M.
Government 47
CHAPTER XII
THE EASTERN QUESTION
1876-1878
The Powers and Turkey: England and the Andrassy Note--Gambetta
on French Politics--Simplicity of Marshal MacMahon--Political
consequences of French military re-organisation--Struggle
between the Marshal and Parliament--The Constantinople
Conference: Determination of Lord Derby to do nothing--Intrigues
of the Duc Décazes--Constitutional crisis in
France--Defeat of Marshal MacMahon: new Radical Ministry
formed under Dufaure with Waddington as Foreign Minister--Treaty
of San Stefano; nervousness of French Government--Determination
of H.M.
Government to secure a Conference--Invitation
to Lord Lyons to be the British representative at
Berlin--Resignation of Lord Derby: appointment of Lord
Salisbury--Lord Salisbury's circular of April 1st, 1878--Inquiry
of Lord Salisbury respecting French desire for Tunis--The Anglo-Turkish
Convention--The Congress of Berlin--Reception in
France of the Anglo-Turkish Convention--Waddington and
Tunis--Sir H. Layard on the Treaty of Berlin 95
CHAPTER XIII
M. GRÉVY'S PRESIDENCY
1878-1879
Paris Exhibition of 1878: desire of Queen Victoria to visit it
incognito--Tunis--Resignation of MacMahon: Election of
Grévy--Waddington Prime Minister: his difficulties--Anglo-French
policy in Egypt--Question of deposing the Khedive
Ismail--Differences between British and French Governments
with regard to Egypt--Deposition of the Khedive by the Sultan--Death
of the Prince Imperial: effect in France--Proposed
visit of Gambetta to England: his bias in favour of English
Conservatives--Resignation of Waddington: Freycinet Prime
Minister--Coolness between France and Russia 161
CHAPTER XIV
THE REVIVAL OF FRANCE
1880-1881
Change of Government in England and reversal of Foreign Policy--The
French Embassy in London: Freycinet's model Ambassador--Personal
characteristics of Lord Lyons: On ne lui connait
pas de vice--The work at the Paris Embassy--The Eastern
Question: Mr. Goschen at Constantinople--The Dulcigno
Demonstration and the difficulties of the European Concert--Proposal
to seize Smyrna--Opportune surrender of the Sultan--H.M.
Government and the Pope: Mission of Mr. Errington,
M.P.--Gambetta on the European situation--French expedition
to Tunis--Ineffectual objections of H.M.
Government--Establishment
of French Protectorate over Tunis--Irritation in England
and Italy--Distinction drawn between Tunis and Tripoli--Attempt
to negotiate a new Anglo-French Commercial
Treaty: Question of Retaliation 209
CHAPTER XV
ARABI'S REBELLION
1881-1882
Egypt: the coup d'état of the Colonels: joint Anglo-French
action--Gambetta as Prime Minister--His desire to remain on good
terms with England--Egypt: the Dual Note--Gambetta in favour of
a more resolute joint policy--Fall of Gambetta after two months
of office--Ministry formed by Freycinet--French vacillation
with regard to Egypt--Decision of H.M.
Government to employ
force--Bombardment of Alexandria--Decision of French Government
to take no part in expedition--Fall of Freycinet--Invitation to
Italy to join in expedition declined--Effect produced in France by
British military success in Egypt--French endeavour to re-establish
the Control in Egypt--Madagascar and Tonquin 258
CHAPTER XVI
ANGLOPHOBIA
1883-1885
Death of Gambetta--General discontent in France--Change of
Government: Jules Ferry Prime Minister--Waddington appointed
Ambassador in London--Insult to King of Spain in
Paris--Growth of French ill-will towards English influence in
Egypt--Baron de Billing and General Gordon--Establishment
of French Protectorate over Tonquin--Egyptian Conference
in London--Renewed request to Lord Lyons to vote in House
of Lords--Anti-English combination with regard to Egypt--Jules
Ferry on the necessity of delivering a coup foudroyant upon
China--French reverse in Tonquin: resignation of Jules Ferry--New
Government under Freycinet--Bismarck and the persons
whom he disliked--Funeral of Victor Hugo--Return of Lord
Salisbury to the Foreign Office--Anglophobia in Paris: scurrilities
of Rochefort 305
CHAPTER XVII
THE LAST YEAR'S WORK
1886-1887
Lord Rosebery at the Foreign Office--His surprise at
ill-feeling shown by French Government--Proceedings of General
Boulanger--Princes' Exclusion Bill--Boulanger at the Review
of July 14th--Causes of his popularity--General Election
in England: Lord Salisbury Prime Minister--The Foreign
Office offered to Lord Lyons--Egyptian questions raised
by French Government--Apprehension in France of a German
attack--Embarrassment caused by Boulanger--Unofficial attempt
on behalf of French Government to establish better relations
with England--Application by Lord Lyons to be permitted to
resign--Pressed by Lord Salisbury to remain until end of the
year--Desire of French Government to get rid of Boulanger--Lord
Salisbury's complaints as to unfriendly action of the French
Government in various parts of the world--Resignation of Lord
Lyons--Created an Earl--His death 360
APPENDIX
Lord Lyons in Private Life. By MRS. WILFRID WARD 415
INDEX 429
LIST OF PLATES IN VOL. II
FACING PAGE
LORD LYONS AT THE AGE OF 65 Frontispiece
WILLIAM HENRY WADDINGTON 169
GENERAL BOULANGER 370
THE BRITISH EMBASSY, PARIS 420
(Photograph by F. Contet, Paris.)
LORD LYONS
A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY
CHAPTER X
THE THIRD REPUBLIC
(1871-1873)
Strictly speaking, the existence of the National Assembly which had been summoned to ratify the Preliminaries of Peace, had now[1] come to an end, but under prevailing circumstances, it was more convenient to ignore Constitutional technicalities, and the Government proceeded to carry on the business of the country on the basis of a Republic. Thiers had been elected Chief of the Executive, and it was astonishing how rapidly his liking for a Republic increased since he had become the head of one.
It was now part of his task to check the too reactionary tendencies of the Assembly and to preserve that form of government which was supposed to divide Frenchmen the least. The feeling against the Government of National Defence was as strong as ever, and the elections of some of the Orleans princes gave rise to inconvenient demonstrations on the part of their political supporters, who pressed for the repeal of the law disqualifying that family.
Thiers realized plainly enough that the revival of this demand was premature, and would only add to the general confusion, and had therefore induced the princes to absent themselves from Bordeaux, but the question could no longer be avoided.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, June 6, 1871.
Thiers has been hard at work 'lobbying,' as the Americans
say, but could not come to any settlement with the Assembly,
and so begged them to postpone the question of the elections of
the Princes of Orleans till the day after to-morrow. One of the
plans proposed was that the provisional state of things should
be formally continued for two years, by conferring his present
powers on Thiers for that period. This would, it was hoped, keep
the Republicans quiet and allay the impatience of the monarchical
parties, by giving them a fixed time to look forward to.
But this,
it seems, the majority in the Assembly would not promise to vote.
On the other hand, Thiers is said to be afraid of having the Duc
d'Aumale and perhaps Prince Napoleon also, speaking against him
in the Assembly, and attacking him and each other outside. Then
comes the doubt as to the extent to which the fusion between the
Comte de Chambord and the other Princes, or rather that between
their respective parties, really goes. Altogether nothing can be
less encouraging than the prospect.
The Duc d'Aumale, as Lieutenant
Général du Royaume, to prepare the way for the Comte de Chambord,
is, for the moment, the favourite combination. In the meantime
Thiers has thrown a sop to the majority by putting an Orleanist
into the Home Office. The idea at Versailles yesterday was that
Thiers and the Assembly would come to a compromise on the basis
that the Orleans elections should be confirmed, but with a preamble
repeating that nothing done was to be held to prejudge the question
of the definitive government of France.
When the question came up, Thiers yielded on the point of the admission of the Princes, and the majority were highly pleased at having extorted this concession. Lord Lyons, dining at Thiers's house at Versailles, a few days after the debate in the Assembly, met there the German General von Fabrice, the Prince de Joinville, the Duc d'Aumale, and the Duc de Chartres, and mentions the significant fact that M. and Madame Thiers and the rest of the company treated these Princes with even more than the usual respect shown to Royal personages.
In private conversation Thiers expressed great confidence in soon getting the Germans out of the Paris forts, but both he and Jules Favre complained that Bismarck was a very bad creditor, and insisted upon having his first half-milliard by the end of the month: in fact, the Germans were so clamorous for payment that they hardly seemed to realize how anxious the French were to get rid of them, and that if the money was not immediately forthcoming, it was only because it was impossible to produce it.
What was of more immediate concern to the British Government than either the payment of the indemnity or the future of the Orleans princes, was the prospect of a new Commercial Treaty. This was sufficiently unpromising. Lord Lyons had pointed out during the Empire period, that under a Constitutional régime in France, we were not likely to enjoy such favourable commercial conditions as under personal government, and the more liberal the composition of a French Government, the more Protectionist appeared to be its policy.
Thiers himself was an ardent Protectionist, quite unamenable to the blandishments of British Free Traders, who always appear to hold that man was made for Free Trade, instead of Free Trade for man, and the Finance Minister, Pouyer Quertier, entertained the same views as his chief.
But, even if the Emperor were to come back, it was more than doubtful whether he would venture to maintain the existing Commercial Treaty as it stood, and there was every probability that the Bordeaux wine people and other so-called French Free Traders would turn Protectionist as soon as they realized that there was no prospect of British retaliation.
What cut Lord Lyons (an orthodox Free Trader) to the heart, was that, just as the French manufacturers had got over the shock of the sudden introduction of Free Trade under the Empire and had adapted themselves to the new system, everything should be thrown back again. It was likely, indeed, that there would be some opposition to Thiers's Protectionist taxes, but he knew well enough that there were not a sufficient number of Free Traders in the Assembly, or in the country, to make any effective resistance to the Government.
When approached on the subject, the French Ministers asserted that all they wanted was to increase the revenue, and that all they demanded from England was to be allowed to raise their tariff with this view only, whereas, in their hearts, they meant Protection pure and simple. Lord Lyons's personal view was that England would be better off if the Treaty was reduced to little more than a most favoured nation clause.
'The only element for negotiation with the school of political economy now predominant here,' he sadly remarked, 'would be a threat of retaliation, and this we cannot use.' It will be found subsequently that this was the one predominant factor in all commercial negotiations between the two Governments.
A long conversation with Thiers, who was pressing for a definite reply from Her Majesty's Government on the subject of a new Treaty showed that matters from the British point of view were as unsatisfactory as they well could be.
Thiers, whose language respecting England was courteous and friendly, made it clear that Her Majesty's Government must choose between the proposed modifications in the tariff and the unconditional denunciation of the whole Treaty, and that if the Treaty were denounced, England must not expect, after its expiration, to be placed upon the footing of the most favoured nation.
He considered that he had a right to denounce the Treaty at once, but had no wish to act in an unfriendly spirit, and had therefore refrained from doing so, and although he and his colleagues considered that the existing Treaty was disadvantageous and even disastrous to France, they had never promoted any agitation against it, and had confined themselves to proposing modifications of the tariff, which their financial necessities and the state of the French manufacturing interests rendered indispensable.
Coal and iron, which were articles of the greatest importance to England, were not touched, and all that had, in fact, been asked for was a moderate increase on the duties on textile fabrics. As for the French Free Traders, whatever misleading views they might put forward in London, their influence upon the Assembly would be imperceptible, and it remained therefore for Her Majesty's Government to decide whether they would agree to the changes he had proposed to them, or would give up altogether the benefits which England derived from the Treaty.
Thiers's real motive was disclosed later on, when, whilst asserting that he should always act in a friendly spirit towards England, he admitted that 'England was a much more formidable competitor in commerce than any other nation.' Concessions which might safely be made to other countries might very reasonably be withheld from her.
For instance, privileges which might be safely granted to the Italian merchant navy might, if granted to Great Britain, produce a competition between English and French shipping very disadvantageous to France.
It would also be certainly for the interest of France that she should furnish herself with colonial articles brought direct to her own ports rather than resort, as at present, to the depôts of such goods in Great Britain. Nothing could be further from his intentions than to be influenced by any spirit of retaliation, nor, if the Treaty should be denounced, would he, on that account, be less friendly to England in political matters; but it was evident that, in making his financial and commercial arrangements, the interests and necessities of France must be paramount.
In conclusion he pressed for an immediate answer from Her Majesty's Government in order that the French Government might complete their plans, which were of urgent importance.
To the impartial observer the opinions expressed by Thiers seem to be logical, natural, and reasonable, unless the principle of looking after one's own interests is unreasonable; but to the ardent devotees of Free Trade, they must have appeared in the light of impiety. Lord Lyons, in reporting the interview, remarked that 'nothing could have been more unsatisfactory than Thiers's language,' and added significantly that he himself had managed to keep his temper.
Thiers did not get his definite answer, and the wrangle continued until in February, 1872, the French Government, with the general approval of the nation, gave notice of the termination of the Commercial Treaty of 1860.
The Bill abrogating the proscription of the French Royal families had been passed by the Assembly, and the elections of the Duc d'Aumale and the Prince de Joinville consequently declared valid, but these princes having established their rights, wisely remained in the background. Not so another illustrious Royalist, the Comte de Chambord. This prince, who was also included in the reversal of the disqualifying law, returned to France and issued a proclamation from the Château of Chambord in July which spread consternation in the Royalist camp.
After explaining that his presence was only temporary and that he desired to create no embarrassment, he declared that he was prepared to govern on a broad basis of administrative decentralization, but that there were certain conditions to which he could not submit. If he were summoned to the throne he would accept, but he should retain his principles, and above all the White Flag which had been handed down to him by his ancestors.
This announcement seemed, to say the least, premature, and the supporters of a Republic must have warmly congratulated themselves upon having to encounter an enemy who played so completely into their hands.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, July 11, 1871.
The Comte de Chambord seems to have upset the Legitimist
coach. The Legitimist Deputies have been obliged to repudiate
the White Flag, being sure that they could never be elected to a
new Chamber under that Banner, and of course fusion between the
Orleans Princes and their cousin is now out of the question.
Thiers said to me last night that he did not regard the
Comte de Chambord's declaration in favour of the White Flag as
irrevocable--and that it looked as if it had been made in a moment
of ill-temper. According to Thiers, both the Comte de Chambord and
the Comte de Paris eagerly desire to be kings--most people doubt,
however, whether the Comte de Chambord does really wish it. All
that has occurred tends to strengthen and prolong Thiers's hold on
power, and he is rejoicing accordingly.
Indeed, there is hardly a
Frenchman who professes to doubt that Thiers's Government is the
only Government possible at the moment.
Gambetta is not considered by Thiers to be dangerous; he
declares that he will only maintain a constitutional or legal
opposition so long as the Government is Republican, and if he and
his supporters stick to this, Thiers will certainly have no great
cause to dread them. If Rouher had been elected he would have been
a formidable opponent, though he has been too much accustomed
to lead an applauding and acquiescing majority to be good at
speaking to a hostile audience.
Thiers says that the rejection of
Rouher will be a good thing for his own health and repose, as he
should have found it very fatiguing to have to answer the great
Imperialist orator.
The hurry with which the new duties were rushed through
the Assembly on Saturday is disquieting. Thiers and Jules Favre
protest, however, that they are determined to do nothing irregular
regarding the Commercial Treaties. The Swiss Minister tells me his
Government is determined to insist upon the strict execution of
the Swiss Treaty, without admitting any alteration of the tariffs,
but then the Swiss Treaty does not expire for five or six years. I
take care to give no opinion as to what we shall or shall not do.
Thiers talked again last night of conferring with me soon about the
details of the changes.
I am not very anxious that he should do so,
as confusion is much more likely than anything else to arise from
carrying on the discussion in both places at once.
Half my time is taken up with the affairs of the unfortunate
English prisoners. It is necessary to be cautious, for the French
Authorities are extremely touchy on the subject. There does not
appear to be any danger of their being executed, as fortunately
they are a very insignificant and unimportant set of insurgents,
if insurgents they were; but they are kept a long time without
examination, and some do run the risk of being shipped off to New
Caledonia.
The Comte de Chambord, having effectually destroyed the chances of his own party for the time being, now disappeared from the scene, and nothing more was heard of him or his White Flag for a considerable period.
The summer of 1871 did not pass without the old question of voting in the House of Lords cropping up again. In July, Lord Lyons received an intimation from the Liberal Whip that his vote was wanted on the following day, accompanied by a letter from Lord Granville in the same sense. He declined to come, on the same ground as formerly, viz. that he considered it advisable that a diplomatist should keep aloof from home politics, and also because he was extremely reluctant to give votes on questions of which he had little knowledge.
The particular question involved was presumably a vote of censure on the Government in connection with the Army Purchase Bill, and he seems to have taken it for granted that Lord Granville would make no objection. A letter from the latter showed that he was mistaken.
- * * * *
Lord Granville to Lord Lyons.
Foreign Office, July 17, 1871.
I cannot agree with the principle you lay down--Lord Stuart,
my father, the late Lord Cowley, and Lord Normanby when Ambassador
at Paris used to vote when specially summoned. So did Lord Cowley,
although he served under successive Governments. So did Lord
Westmoreland and others. I find no recommendation of your principle
in the report of the Committee of the House of Commons, and
although Lord Derby may have given evidence in favour of it, his
father gave practical proof in several instances that he entirely
disagreed with it.
A Foreign Government can hardly believe in the confidential
relations of this Government and her Ambassador, if the latter
being a Peer abstains from supporting them when a vote of want of
confidence, or one amounting to it, is proposed against them.
Clarendon brought before the Cabinet your disinclination to
vote on the question of the Irish Church. They unanimously decided
that we had a claim upon you, and you were good enough to consent,
stating the grounds you mention in your letter of yesterday.
It is of course too late for any practical result to our
controversy as regards to-night, but I hope you will consider
that I have a claim on you for the future, when your vote is of
importance. I shall never ask you unnecessarily to come over.
An intimation of this kind from an official chief could not well be disregarded, but the reply to Lord Granville's letter is conclusive in its arguments.
- * * * *
Paris, July 27, 1871.
Your letter of the 17th about my voting in the House of Lords
goes farther than Lord Clarendon did on the previous occasion.
Lord Clarendon originally acquiesced in my not voting on the Irish
Church Bill, and when he subsequently begged me to come over,
unless I objected to the Bill, he founded his request principally
upon a strong opinion of Mr. Gladstone's that it was the duty of
a peer not to abstain from voting, and that every vote was of
consequence. On this ground he expressed a hope that I should come
over unless I was opposed to the Bill.
Of my predecessors, the only one who was in a position
resembling mine, was the present Lord Cowley; and certainly he will
always be a high authority with me.
I have been for more than thirty years, and I still am,
devoted to my own profession, and I am sure that if I can be of
any use in my generation, and do myself any credit, it must be
as a diplomatist. I have worked my way up in the regular course
of the profession, and have served under successive Governments,
both before and since I became a peer, without any reference to
home politics.
In fact, I received my original appointment to the
service from Lord Palmerston; I was made paid attaché by Lord
Aberdeen; I was sent to Rome by Lord Russell; to Washington by Lord
Malmesbury; to Constantinople by Lord Russell; and finally to Paris
by Lord Derby. The appointment was given to me in the ordinary way
of advancement in my profession, and I was told afterwards by Lord
Clarendon that my being wholly unconnected with any party at home
had been considered to be a recommendation.
I have myself always
thought that a regular diplomatist could only impair his efficiency
by taking part in home politics, and I have throughout acted upon
this conviction. During the thirteen years or thereabouts which
have elapsed since I succeeded to my father's peerage, I have given
only one vote in the House of Lords; the question, the Irish Church
vote, was one on which there really did seem to be a possibility
that the decision might turn upon one vote; and the question, as it
stood before the House, was hardly a party question.
In addition to all this, I must say that while I have a very
great reluctance to give blind votes, I do not wish to be diverted
from my diplomatic duties by having to attend to home questions;
also, I would rather give my whole energies to carrying out the
instructions of the Government abroad, without having continually
to consult my conscience about voting in the House of Lords.
I did not intend to have given you the trouble of reading
a long answer to your letter, but I have just received another
summons from Lord Bessborough. I hope, however, you will not press
me to come over to vote on Monday. You were at all events good
enough to say that you should never ask me to come unnecessarily;
but if, after considering my reasons, you insist upon my coming, I
must of course defer to your opinion and do what you desire.
It is difficult to believe that Lord Granville, who was one of the most amiable and considerate of men, was acting otherwise than under pressure in thus endeavouring to utilize an Ambassador as a party hack.
His arguments certainly do not bear much investigation. If a foreign government could not feel any confidence in an Ambassador who failed to support his party by a vote in Parliament, what confidence could they possibly feel in him if his party were out of office, and he continued at his post under the orders of political opponents?
If the Clarendon Cabinet really decided that they had a claim upon diplomatists as party men it only showed that they were conspicuously wanting in judgment and a prey to that dementia which occasionally seizes upon British statesmen when a division is impending. That state of mind is intelligible when a division in the House of Commons is concerned, but what passes comprehension is that pressure should be put upon members of the House of Lords to vote, whose abstention is obviously desirable, whilst scores of obscure peers are left unmolested.
One peer's vote was as good as another's in 1871, just as it is now; but in the division on the vote of censure on the Army Purchase Bill only 244 peers voted out of a House containing about double that number.
Before long the question of the prolongation of Thiers's powers for a fixed period became the chief topic of interest. He was infinitely the most important personage in France, and a large number of members were desirous of placing him more or less in the position of a constitutional sovereign, and obliging him to take a Ministry from the majority in the Assembly.
The majority in the Assembly not unnaturally thought that their ideas ought to prevail in the Government, and they resented being constantly threatened with the withdrawal of this indispensable man, an action which, it was thought, would amount to little short of a revolution.
What they wanted, therefore, was to bestow a higher title upon him than Chief of the Executive Power, which would exclude him from coming in person to the Assembly; and it was only the difficulty of finding some one to take his place, and the desire to get the Germans out of the Paris forts that kept them quiet.
Like many other eminent persons considered to be indispensable, Thiers now began to give out that he really desired to retire into private life, and that it was only the country which insisted upon his staying in office, while as a matter of fact, he was by no means as indifferent to power as he fancied himself to be. In the Chamber he damaged his reputation to some extent by displays of temper and threats of resignation, but there was never much doubt as to the prolongation of his powers.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, Aug. 25, 1871.
Thiers quitted the Tribune in a pet yesterday, and the whole
series of events in the Assembly has very much lowered his credit.
In the one thing in which he was thought to be pre-eminent, the
art of managing a deliberative body, he completely failed: and his
first threatening to resign, and then coming back and half giving
in, has very much damaged him. Nevertheless the general opinion
is that the prolongation of his powers will pass, upon his making
it a condition, as a vote of confidence, of his remaining.
But it
is difficult to believe, even if it be passed by a considerable
majority, that things can go on smoothly between him and the
Assembly very long. If any party had a leader and courage, it might
do almost anything in France at this moment.
Arnim[2] is expected on Saturday. I knew him years ago at
Rome. I doubt his being a conciliatory negotiator. The French
believe that Bismarck is so anxious to obtain commercial advantages
for Alsace, that he will give them great things in return. He
is supposed to wish, in the first place, to conciliate his new
subjects; and, in the second, to divert for a time from Germany
the torrent of Alsatian manufactures which would pour in if the
outlets into France were stopped up.
The French hope to get the
Paris forts evacuated in return for a continuance of the free
entrance of Alsatian goods into France until the 1st of January,
and they even speculate upon getting the Prussians to evacuate
Champagne, and content themselves with keeping the army, which was
to have occupied it, inside the German frontier, the French paying
the expenses, as if it were still in France. All this to be given
in return for a prolongation of commercial privileges for Alsace.
It would be ungenerous of 'most favoured nations' to claim similar
privileges.
Thiers was too full of the events of the afternoon in the
Assembly to talk about the Commercial Treaty. I don't believe he
has brought the Committee round to his duties on raw materials.
At the end of August, the Assembly by a very large majority passed a bill conferring upon Thiers the title of President of the Republic and confirmed his powers for the duration of the existing Assembly, adopting at the same time a vote of confidence in him personally. The result of these proceedings was that the attempt to make a step towards the definite establishment of a Republic and to place Thiers as President for a term of years in a position independent of the Assembly, failed.
The bill asserted what the Left had always denied, viz. the constituent power of the Assembly, and declared that the President was responsible to it. So far, it expressed the sentiments of the moderate men, and the minority was composed of extreme Legitimists and extreme Republicans. It also proved that Thiers was still held to be the indispensable man.
The Assembly, which had adjourned after the passing of the above-mentioned bill, met again in December, and was supposed to be more Conservative than ever, owing to the fear created by Radical progress in the country. Thiers's Presidential Message did not afford much satisfaction to the extreme partisans on either side, and it was evident that he did not desire any prompt solution of the Constitutional question, preferring to leave himself free, and not to be forced into taking any premature decision. As for the Legitimist, Orleanist, and Moderate Republican groups, their vacillation tended only to the advantage of two parties, the Bonapartists and the Red Republicans.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, Dec. 26. 1871.
The New Year will open gloomily for France. The Germans appear
to be alarmed, or at all events irritated, by Thiers's military
boasts and military preparations. The boasts are certainly unwise,
and preparations or anything else which encourages the French
to expect to get off paying the three milliards are extremely
imprudent. The Germans mean to have their money and keep the
territory they have taken, and they say that they had better have
it out with France now that she is weak, than wait till she has
got strong again.
The irritation of the French against the Germans
seems to grow, and the Germans are angry with the French for not
loving them, which after the conditions of peace, to say nothing of
the events of the war, seems somewhat unreasonable.
Thiers so far holds his own, and no party seems willing to
displace him, while no party agrees with him. The one thing in
which men of all parties seem to agree is in abusing Thiers, and
I must say that a good deal of the abuse is exceedingly unjust.
But with the members of the Assembly in this inflammable state of
feeling towards him, an unexpected spark may at any moment make
them flare up and turn him out almost before they are aware of
it.
The general idea is that the Assembly would appoint the Duc
d'Aumale to succeed him; the acceptance of the Duc d'Aumale by
the country would depend upon the amount of vigour he showed in
putting down illegal opposition by force. There are members of the
Assembly who wish to declare that in case of Thiers's abdication
or dethronement, the President of the Assembly is to exercise the
Executive Power.
This is with a view of bringing forward Grévy, who
is an honourable, moderate man, but an old thoroughbred Republican.
The immediate event people are looking forward to with interest
and anxiety is the election of a deputy for Paris on the 7th of
next month. No one will be surprised if a Red is returned, in
consequence of the men of order declining to vote. The Legitimists
and the Orleanists seem to be at daggers drawn again.
Arnim says that Bismarck's fierce despatch was partly intended
to strengthen Thiers's hands in resisting violence against the
Germans. If this is so, the ferocity went too far beyond the mark
to be successful, great as the provocation on the French side was.
I will write a mild disclaimer of the accuracy of Jules
Favre's accounts of his communications with me. There is no malus
animus, I think, in them. My Russian and Italian colleagues are
very much annoyed by the language he attributes to them.
The fierce despatch referred was a harsh communication from Bismarck complaining of the recent acquittal of some Frenchmen who had assassinated German soldiers of the army of occupation.
At the close of 1871, the Bonapartist Party, although scarcely represented in the Assembly, appeared to be that which caused the Government the most anxiety. That party had undoubtedly made progress in the country; it held out the hope of a vigorous and determined maintenance of public order, and a vast number of Frenchmen were so much out of heart, so wearied and disgusted by the results of the attempts at political liberty, and so much afraid of the triumph of the Commune, that they were prepared to sacrifice anything in order to be assured of peace and tranquillity. The peasants, shopkeepers, and even many of the workmen in the towns, sighed for the material prosperity of the Empire.
They believed that the Emperor had been betrayed by his Ministers and Generals, and were willing to excuse his personal share even in the capitulation of Sedan. If more confidence could have been felt in his health and personal energy, the advocates of a restoration of the Empire would have been still more numerous.
As it was, a great mass of the ignorant and the timid were in favour of it, and it was the opinion of so impartial an observer as the British Ambassador, that if a free vote could have been taken under universal suffrage a majority would probably have been obtained for the re-establishment upon the throne of Napoleon III. If the Imperialists could by any means have seized upon the executive Government and so directed the operations of a plébiscite, there was little doubt as to their securing the usual millions of votes under that process.
With them, as with the other parties, the difficulty lay in bringing about such a crisis as would enable them to act, and the Emperor himself was disinclined to take any adventurous step.
The Legitimists had the advantage of holding to a definite principle, but it was a principle which carried little weight in the country in general. Their chief, the Comte de Chambord, had shown himself to be so impracticable, that it really seemed doubtful whether he wished to mount the throne, and the party had more members in the existing Assembly than it was likely to obtain if a fresh general election took place; added to which it had quarrelled with the Orleanists, a union with whom was essential to the attainment of any practical end.
The Orleanists were weakened by their dissensions with the Legitimists and discouraged by what they considered the want of energy and enterprise of the Princes of the family. The members of the Orleans party suffered from the want of a definite principle, and consisted chiefly of educated and enlightened men who held to Constitutional Monarchy and Parliamentary Government; in reality they were a fluctuating body willing to accept any Government giving a promise of order and political liberty.
The moderate Republicans included in their ranks many honest and respected men, but they had to contend with the extreme unpopularity of the Government of National Defence in which they had formed the chief part, and although the existing Government was nominally based upon their principles, they did not appear to be gaining ground. The extreme Republicans endeavoured to make up by violence what they wanted in numerical strength, and as they saw no prospect of obtaining office in a regular manner, founded their hopes upon seizing power at a critical moment with the help of the Paris mob.
Amidst this collection of parties stood Thiers's Government, supported heartily by none, but accepted by all. By skilful management, by yielding where resistance appeared hopeless, and by obtaining votes sometimes from one side of the Assembly, and sometimes from the other, Thiers had carried many points to which he attached importance, and had never yet found himself in a minority. His Government was avowedly a temporary expedient, resting upon a compromise between all parties, or rather upon the adjournment of all constitutional questions.
To the monarchical parties which formed the majority of the Assembly, Thiers's apparent adoption of the Republican system rendered him especially obnoxious. On the other hand, the Republicans were dissatisfied because, the whole weight of the Government was not unscrupulously used for the purpose of establishing a Republic permanently, with or without the consent of the people.
On the centralization of the administration, on military organization, on finance, and on other matters, Thiers's personal views were widely different from those generally prevalent in the Assembly, and there was plenty of censure and criticism of him in private; but no one party saw its way to ensuring its own triumph, and all were weighed down by the necessity of maintaining endurable relations with Germany. In forming such relations, Thiers had shown great skill and obtained considerable success in his arduous task.
Bismarck, in imposing the hardest possible conditions of peace, had acted avowedly on the principle that it was hopeless to conciliate France, and that the only security for Germany lay in weakening her as much as possible. This policy having been carried out, the German public and the German press appeared to be quite surprised that France was slow to be reconciled to her conquerors, and even to doubt whether already France was not too strong for their safety.
The apparent recovery of the French finances may well have surprised them disagreeably, but Thiers was not over careful to avoid increasing their distrust. His intention to create a larger army than France had ever maintained before, and his frequent praises of the army he already possessed, was not reassuring to them. It was, therefore, not altogether surprising that they should have felt some doubts as to the consequences of finding themselves confronted by an immense army, when they called upon France to pay the remaining three milliards in
- Nevertheless the German Government had expressed its confidence in
Thiers, and it would have been almost impossible for any new Government to have placed matters on as tolerable a footing.
All things considered, therefore, it seemed not improbable that the existing Government might last for some time, although its life was somewhat precarious, since it was liable to be upset by commotions and conspiracies, and having no existence apart from Thiers, its duration was bound to depend on the health and strength of a man nearly seventy-four years old.
In January, 1872, Thiers, in consequence of a dispute in the Chamber over the question of a tax on raw materials, tendered his resignation, but was persuaded with some difficulty to reconsider it. 'I have never known the French so depressed and so out of heart about their internal affairs,' wrote Lord Lyons. 'They don't believe Thiers can go on much longer, and they see nothing but confusion if he is turned out.
The Legitimists and Orleanists are now trying for fusion. They are attempting to draw up a constitution on which they can all agree, and which, when drawn up, is to be offered to the Comte de Chambord, and if refused by him, then to the Comte de Paris. I hear they have not yet been able to come to an understanding on the first article. It all tends to raise the Bonapartists.
Many people expect to hear any morning of a coup by which Thiers and the Assembly will be deposed, and an appel au peuple, made to end in a restoration of the Empire.' Probably it was the knowledge of a Bonapartist reaction in the country that led Thiers to make a singularly foolish complaint against an alleged military demonstration in England in favour of the ex-Emperor.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, Feb. 9, 1872.
M. Thiers said to me yesterday at Versailles that he had
been told that a general of the name of Wood had marched 6000 of
Her Majesty's troops to Chislehurst to be reviewed by the Emperor
Napoleon.
M. Thiers went on to say that no one could appreciate more
highly than he did the noble and generous hospitality which England
extended to political exiles, and that he had indeed profited by
it in his own person. He admired also the jealousy with which the
English nation regarded all attempts from abroad to interfere with
the free exercise of this hospitality. He should never complain
of due respect being shown to a Sovereign Family in adversity.
But
he thought that there was some limit to be observed in the matter.
For instance, he himself, while on the best terms with the reigning
dynasty in Spain, still always treated the Queen Isabella, who was
in France, with great respect and deference. Nevertheless, when Her
Majesty had expressed a desire to go to live at Pau, he had felt it
to be his duty to ask her very courteously to select a residence at
a greater distance from the frontier of Spain.
In this, as in all
matters, he felt that consideration for the exiles must be tempered
by a due respect for the recognized Government of their country.
Now if the Emperor Napoleon should choose to be present at a review
of British troops, there could be no objection to his being treated
with all the courtesy due to a head which had worn a crown. It was,
however, a different thing to march troops to his residence to hold
a review there in his honour.
Thiers had not taken the trouble to substantiate his ridiculous complaint, and his action was an instance of the extreme gullibility of even the most intelligent French statesmen, where foreign countries are concerned, and so perturbed was the French Government at the idea of a Bonapartist restoration, that according to Captain Hotham, British Consul at Calais, two gunboats, the Cuvier and Faon, were at that time actually employed in patrolling the coast between St. Malo and Dunkirk with a view to preventing a possible landing of the Emperor Napoleon.
A little later, the Duc de Broglie, French Ambassador in London, made a tactless remonstrance to Lord Granville with regard to the presence of the Emperor and Empress at Buckingham Palace, on the occasion of a National Thanksgiving held to celebrate the recovery of the Prince of Wales from a dangerous illness.
- * * * *
Lord Granville to Lord Lyons.
Foreign Office, March 1, 1872.
The Duc de Broglie told me to-day that he had been rather
surprised when he heard of the Emperor and Empress having been at
Buckingham Palace on so public an occasion as that of last Tuesday,
that I had not mentioned it to him on Monday afternoon, when we had
had a long conversation. It would have enabled him to write to M.
de Rémusat,[3] and thus have prevented any of the effect which a
sudden announcement in the papers might create in France.
I told him that I had not been consulted and did not know the
fact of the invitation when I saw him, and that if I had, I should
probably have mentioned it to him, although not a subject about
which I should have written.
I should have explained to him that it was an act of courtesy
of the Queen to those with whom she had been on friendly relations,
and that it was analogous to many acts of courtesy shown by the
Queen to the Orleanist Princes.
He laid stress on the publicity of the occasion, and on the
few opportunities which he, as Ambassador, had of seeing the Queen,
of which he made no complaint; but it made any attentions to the
Emperor on public occasions more marked. He was afraid that the
announcement would produce considerable effect, not upon statesmen,
but upon the press in France.
I repeated that the admission of the Emperor and Empress had
no political significance, but had been in pursuance with the
long-established habit of the Queen to show personal courtesy
to Foreign Princes with whom she had been formerly on friendly
relations.
The fall of the Finance Minister, Pouyer Quertier, in the spring had given rise to hopes that the French commercial policy would become more liberal, but the letters quoted below show how powerless were the arguments of the British Government and how completely wasted upon the French Ministers were the lamentations of the British free traders, and their prognostications of ruin to those who were not sufficiently enlightened to adopt their policy.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, March 5, 1872.
I suppose Pouyer Quertier is really out, but we see so many
changes from hour to hour in resolutions here, that I shall not
report it officially until his successor is gazetted. We cannot
have a more Protectionist successor; but, after all, no one is so
bigoted a Protectionist as Thiers himself.
Nevertheless the change of Minister will give a chance or an
excuse for a change of policy to some extent. I think that with a
view to this some stronger expression of displeasure, or rather
perhaps of regret than we have hitherto ventured upon, might have
a good effect. The new Minister and perhaps even Thiers himself
might be struck by a report from Broglie that you had put strongly
before him the impossibility, whatever efforts the Government might
make, of preventing public opinion in England becoming hostile to
France if the present commercial policy is persisted in.
It is in
fact plain that there is no probability of France obtaining the
concessions from the Treaty Powers, on which Thiers professed to
reckon. The result already is that, whatever may have been the
intention, the Mercantile Marine Law is in practice a blow which
falls on England, and not on other European Powers. Unless the
French Government means to give us a real most favoured nation
clause, the result of denouncing our treaty will be to place us,
when it expires, at a special disadvantage as compared with other
nations.
And what it now asks us to effect by negotiation, is to
hasten the moment at which it can accomplish this. It is quite idle
to talk of special friendship for us, when its measures practically
treat us much worse than they do the Germans. M. de Rémusat and
some other people are fond of saying that it is quite impossible
that France could bear to see two nations so friendly as Belgium
and England placed exceptionally in a position inferior to Germany.
But France seems to bear this with great equanimity so far as our
merchant navy is concerned.
The demand we have made to be exempted from the surtaxes de
pavillon under our most favoured nation clause would give the
French Government a means of remedying the injustice if it wished
to do so. At any rate some strong expressions of discontent on
our part might increase the disinclination of the Assembly and
some members of the Government to insist on imposing the duties on
the raw materials. It would be very convenient if there were some
retaliatory measures to which we could resort, without injuring
ourselves or departing from our own Free Trade principles.
The
French Government grossly abuses, in order to influence the
Assembly, our assurances of unimpaired good will, and reluctance
to retaliate; and so, in my opinion, is preparing the way for the
real diminution of good will which its success in carrying its
protectionist measures, to our special injury, must produce in the
end.
The present Government of France does not gain strength; far
from it. The Imperialists are gaining strength, as people become
more and more afraid of the Reds, and feel less and less confidence
in the power either of Thiers, or the Comte de Chambord, or the
Comte de Paris, to keep them down. The end will probably be brought
about by some accident when it is least expected. It would not be
wise to leave out of the calculation of possibilities, the chance
of Thiers's Government dragging on for some time yet, and it would
be very difficult to predict what will succeed it.
At present the
Legitimists and Orleanists seem to have lost, and to be daily
losing prestige, and naturally enough, to be bringing down with
them the Assembly in which they are or were a majority.
Perhaps I ought to say that the despatch which I send you
to-day about the sojourn of our Royal Family in the South of
France applies exclusively to them. Everybody knows or ought to
know that affairs are uncertain in France, but I should not think
it necessary or proper to warn private people against coming to
France or staying there.
The conspicuous position of members
of the Royal Family increase the risk of their being placed in
awkward circumstances, and circumstances which would be of little
consequence in the case of private people, would be very serious
and embarrassing if they affected members of the Royal Family of
England.
The last passage referred to a stay at Nice contemplated by the Prince of Wales. In the event of any change of Government, it was always feared that disorders would take place in the southern towns of France.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, March 14, 1872.
The commercial disputes with the French Government which, as
you know, I always apprehended, are coming thick upon us. I foresaw
what was coming and begged Thiers, Rémusat and other members of
the Government over and over again to guard against vexations in
the execution of the Treaty while it lasted. I make little doubt,
notwithstanding, that all these violent and unfair proceedings are
prompted, not checked, from Paris.
The Spaniards have found out the only way to deal with the
Protectionist spirit here. The slightest hint at retaliation would
have such an effect in the Assembly as to stop the onward career of
illiberality. As things now are, the extortioners have the game in
their own hands. They levy what duty they please, and pay just as
much or as little attention as may suit them, to our remonstrances.
It is a very disagreeable affair for one who, like myself, is
really anxious that there should be good feeling between the two
countries. We are in a fix.
On the one hand, we cannot, without
injuring ourselves and abandoning our principles, retaliate; and
on the other hand, while they feel sure we shall do no more than
remonstrate, the Protectionist officials will care very little.
If indeed the general opinion is to be relied upon, the present
Government and its chief may come down with a crash at any moment,
but I don't know whether a change would benefit us commercially.
Lord Lyons, like Lord Granville and other English public men and officials of the day, was a Free Trader, as has already been stated.
But it would be difficult for the most ardent Protectionist to make out a stronger case against the helplessness of a Free Trade policy when negotiating with a foreign Government than is disclosed in these letters, and there are any number of others all in the same strain. All the protestations of goodwill, of sympathy, and benefit to the human race, etc., were, and presumably are still, a pure waste of time when addressed to a country about to frame a tariff in accordance with its own interests, unless the threat of retaliation is used in order to retain some bargaining power, as apparently the Spaniards had already discovered.
It has already been stated that Thiers's plans of military re-organization and his somewhat imprudent language had caused some agitation in Germany, and when the German Ambassador, Count Arnim, returned to his post at Paris in the spring of 1872, it was freely rumoured that he was the bearer of remarkably unpleasant communications.
These apprehensions turned out to be exaggerated, and Thiers in conversation always assumed a lamb-like attitude of peace. He denied that the Germans had addressed any representations to him, said that all suspicions against him were grossly unjust, that it would be absolute madness for France to think of going to war, and that, for his part, the keystone of all his foreign policy was peace. As for his army reform schemes, he was a much misunderstood man. He was undoubtedly reorganizing the military forces of France, and it was his duty to place them upon a respectable footing, and so provide a guarantee for peace.
It was, however, quite false to say that he was arming, for that term implied that he was making preparations for war, and that he was putting the army into a condition to pass at once from a state of peace to a state of war. He was doing nothing of the sort; on the contrary, his efforts were directed to obtaining the evacuation of the territory, by providing for the payment of the war indemnity to Germany, and it could hardly be supposed that if he were meditating a renewal of the contest, he would begin by making over three milliards to her.
From Arnim's language, it appeared that the German public was irritated and alarmed at the perpetual harping of the French upon the word 'Revenge,' and that the German military men (the militaires who were always so convenient to Bismarck for purposes of argument) conceived that the best guarantee for peace would be to keep their soldiers as long as possible within a few days' march of Paris.
The German fears were, no doubt, greatly exaggerated, but if they existed at all they were largely due to Thiers's own language, who, while not talking indeed of immediate revenge, was fond of boasting of the strength and efficiency of the French army, and even of affirming that it was at that very moment equal to cope with the Germans.
That he was conscious of having created suspicion may be inferred from the fact that when the Prince of Wales passed through Paris on his way from Nice to Germany, he begged H.R.H. to use his influence at the Court of Berlin to impress upon the Emperor and all who were of importance there, that the French Government, and the President himself in particular, desired peace above all things, and were resolved to maintain it. A letter from the British Ambassador at Berlin throws some light upon the prevalent German feeling.
- * * * *
Mr. Odo Russell[4] to Lord Lyons.
British Embassy, Berlin, April 27, 1872.
Since your letter of the 9th inst. reached me feelings have
changed in Berlin.
Thiers's Army bill and Speech have irritated the Emperor,
Bismarck and indeed everybody.
The Generals tell the Emperor it would be better to fight
France before she is ready than after; but Bismarck, who scorns the
Generals, advises the Emperor to fight France morally through
Rome and the Catholic alliances against United Germany.
Although he denies it, Bismarck probably caused those violent
articles against Thiers to appear in the English newspapers, and he
tells everybody that Thiers has lost his esteem and may lose his
support. The next grievance they are getting up against him is that
he is supposed to have made offers through Le Flô to Russia against
Germany.
In short, from having liked him and praised him and wished for
him, they are now tired of him and think him a traitor because he
tries to reform the French Army on too large a scale!
Gontaut[5] does not appear to do anything beyond play the
agreeable, which he does perfectly, and every one likes him. But
it is said that Agents, financial Agents I presume, are employed
by Thiers to communicate through Jewish Bankers here indirectly
with Bismarck. Through these agents Thiers is supposed to propose
arrangements for an early payment of the 3 milliards and an early
withdrawal of the German troops of occupation,--the payment
to be effected by foreign loans and the guarantee of European
Bankers,--in paper not in gold.
Bismarck has not yet pronounced
definitely, but the Emperor William won't hear of shortening the
occupation of France. Indeed, he regrets he cannot by Treaty leave
his soldiers longer still as a guarantee of peace while he lives,
for he is most anxious to die at peace with all the world.
So that nothing is done and nothing will be done before Arnim
returns to Paris. He has no sailing orders yet and seems well
amused here.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Mr. Odo Russell.
Paris, May 7, 1872.
Many thanks for your interesting letter.
Arnim's account of public opinion at Berlin entirely confirms
that which you give, only he says Bismarck would be personally
willing to come to an arrangement with France for payment of the
milliards and the evacuation of the territory, but that he will not
run any risk of injuring his own position by opposing either Moltke
or public opinion on this point.
I don't think the Germans need the least fear the French
attacking them for many years to come. The notion of coming now
to destroy France utterly, in order to prevent her ever in the
dim future being able to revenge herself, seems simply atrocious.
The French are so foolish in their boasts, and the Germans so
thin-skinned, that I am afraid of mischief.
I should doubt Bismarck's being wise in setting himself in
open hostility to the Vatican. The favour of the Holy See is seldom
of any practical use, so far as obtaining acts in its favour, to a
Protestant or even to a Roman Catholic Government; but the simple
fact of being notoriously in antagonism to it, brings a vast amount
of opposition and ill-will on a Government that has Catholic
subjects. The fear of this country's being able at this moment
to work the Catholic element in Germany or elsewhere against the
German Emperor appears to me to be chimerical.
I wish the Germans would get their milliards as fast as they
can, and go: then Europe might settle down, and they need not be
alarmed about French vengeance, or grudge the French the poor
consolation of talking about it.
Arnim was a good deal struck by the decline in Thiers's
vigour, since he took leave of him before his journey to Rome, but
he saw Thiers some days ago, when the little President was at his
worst.
- * * * *
Mr. Odo Russell to Lord Lyons.
British Embassy, Berlin, May 11, 1872.
I have nothing new to say about the relations of France and
Germany, but my friends here seem so alarmed at the idea that
France cannot pay the much longed for three milliards, that if
Thiers really does pay them, all the rest will be forgiven and
forgotten, and the withdrawal of the German troops will then be
impatiently called for. Like yourself I write the impressions of
the moment and am not answerable for future changes of public
opinion.
Clearly the thing to be desired for the peace of the world
is the payment by France and the withdrawal by Germany, after which
a normal state of things can be hoped for--not before.
The Pope, to my mind, has made a mistake in declining to
receive Hohenlohe. He ought to have accepted and in return sent a
Nuncio to Berlin, thereby selling Bismarck, and controlling his
German Bishops and the Döllinger movement.
Bismarck is going away on leave to Varzin. He is so irritable
and nervous that he can do no good here at present, and rest is
essential to him.
Your letter of the 7th is most useful to me, many thanks for
it. I shall not fail to keep you as well informed as I can.
In reality, the Germans made little difficulty about the arrangements for the payment of the indemnity and evacuation of French territory, and early in July Thiers was able to state confidently that he felt certain of being able to pay the whole of the indemnity by March, 1874, and that he had only obtained an additional year's grace in order to guard against accidents.
A curious incident which occurred in July, 1872, showed how, if sufficient ingenuity be employed, a trivial personal question may be turned to important political use. The Comte de Vogué, French Ambassador at Constantinople, who possessed little or no diplomatic experience, before proceeding on leave from his post, had an audience of the Sultan.
The Sultan received him standing, and began to talk, when Vogué interrupted His Majesty, and begged to be allowed to sit down, as other Ambassadors had been accustomed to do, according to him, on similar occasions. What the Sultan actually did at the moment was not disclosed, but he took dire offence, and telegrams began to pour in upon the Turkish Ambassador at Paris desiring him to represent to the French Government that if Vogué came back his position would be very unpleasant--intimating in fact that his return to Constantinople must be prevented.
The French Foreign Minister, however, refused this satisfaction to the Sultan, and the Turkish Ambassador in his perplexity sought the advice of Lord Lyons, who preached conciliation, and urged that, at all events, no steps ought to be taken until Vogué had arrived at Paris, and was able to give his version of the incident.
The French, naturally enough, were at that moment peculiarly susceptible on all such matters, and more reluctant to make a concession than if they were still on their former pinnacle of grandeur at Constantinople, although Vogué was clearly in the wrong, for Lord Lyons admitted that he had himself never been asked to sit. The importance of the incident consisted in the fact that it gave an opportunity of cultivating the goodwill of Russia, as the traditional enemy of Turkey.
No Frenchman had ever lost sight of the hope that some day or other an ally against Germany might be found in Russia, and there were not wanting signs of a reciprocal feeling on the part of the latter. It had, for instance, been the subject of much remark, that the Russian Ambassador at Paris, Prince Orloff, had recently been making immense efforts to become popular with all classes of the French: Legitimists, Orleanists, Imperialists, Republicans, and especially newspaper writers of all shades of politics.
As it was well known that neither Prince nor Princess Orloff were really fond of society, these efforts were almost overdone, but nevertheless they met with a hearty response everywhere, from Thiers downwards, for all Frenchmen were eagerly hoping for a quarrel between Russia and Germany, and were ready to throw themselves into the arms of the former in that hope. Russia, on her side, was clearly not unwilling to cultivate a friendship which cost nothing, and might conceivably be of considerable profit.
On November 5 the new Anglo-French Commercial Treaty was signed, indignant British Free Traders striving to console themselves with the thought that France would soon discover the error of her ways and cease to lag behind the rest of the civilized world in her economic heresy.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, Nov. 12, 1872.
I saw Thiers on Friday after I wrote to you on that day; and
I dined with him on Saturday. He looked remarkably well, and was
in high spirits and in great good humour, as he ought to be, with
us. He spoke, as indeed he always does, as if he felt quite sure
that he should have his own way with the Assembly in all things.
As regards the organic measures, he talked as if the fight would
be entirely with the Right; but both sections of the Left have
declared against organic changes to be made by this Assembly.
I
suppose, however, Thiers is pretty sure to get his own powers
prolonged for four years certain, and this is what he cares about.
I do not, however, find in my Austrian, German, and Russian
colleagues so unqualified an acquiescence in Thiers remaining
in power as they professed before I went away. It is said that
the three Emperors at Berlin were alarmed at the prospect of the
definitive establishment of any Republic, and still more so at
the apparent tendency of M. Thiers's policy to leave the country
to drift into a Red Republic, whenever he quitted the scene.
However this may be, there is certainly a change in the language
of their Representatives here, not very marked, but nevertheless
quite perceptible.
Orloff in particular talks as if an immediate
Imperialist restoration were not only desirable but probable. If he
really thinks it probable, he is almost alone in the opinion.
The Prince de Joinville, who came to see me yesterday,
said that he had been a great deal about in the country, and
that he found everywhere an absolute indifference to persons
and dynasties, and a simple cry for any Government which would
efficiently protect property.
He thought that Thiers would be
supported for this reason, but that whatever institutions might
be nominally established, they would last only as long as Thiers
himself did, and that afterwards everything would be in question,
and the country probably divide itself into two great parties,
Conservatives and Reds, between whom there would be a fierce
struggle notwithstanding the great numerical superiority of the
former.
In the absence of exciting internal topics, the year closed with a slight sensation provided by Gramont, who, it might have been supposed, would have preferred not to court further notoriety. Count Beust had recently asserted that he had warned France against expecting help from Austria in the event of a war with Prussia. Gramont replied by publishing a letter in which the following statement occurred. 'L'Autriche considère la cause de la France comme la sienne, et contribuera au succès de ses armes dans les limites du possible.'
This quotation was supposed to be taken from a letter from Beust to Metternich, dated July 20, 1870 (the day after the declaration of war), and left by Metternich with Gramont, who took a copy and returned the original. Metternich was believed to have shown the letter also to the Emperor Napoleon and to Ollivier. The letter was represented as going on to say that the neutrality proclaimed by Austria was merely a blind to conceal her armaments, and that she was only waiting till the advance of winter rendered it impossible for Russia to concentrate her forces.
It was generally believed that there was plenty of evidence that an offensive and defensive alliance was in course of negotiation between France and Austria in 1869, though no treaty was signed, and the record appears to have consisted in letters exchanged between the two Emperors, but as Gramont had nothing more than a copy of a letter from Beust to Metternich his evidence was legally defective, whatever its moral value, and it was questionable whether as an ex-Minister he had any right to disclose such secrets.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, Dec. 31, 1872.
Gramont's further revelations confirm what I told you in my
letter of the 24th. The question is becoming tiresome. I conceive
there is no doubt that Beust at Vienna, and Metternich here,
fanned the flame of French discontent after Sadowa, with a view
to avenging themselves when Austria and France should be ready,
and circumstances favourable. I think also that Gramont came back
from Vienna full of Beust's warlike ideas, and very well inclined
to carry them out.
What exchange of letters may have taken place
between the two Emperors, or what record of any kind there may be
of engagements between the two countries to help one another, it is
more difficult to say.
The assertion is that after war had been declared, Austria
engaged to move on the 15th September. Others say that she also
required that France should have an army in Baden.
This is not inconsistent with her having dissuaded France from
war in July, 1870, when she knew positively it would be premature
for herself, and probably had some suspicion that France was also
not really prepared.
Early in January, 1873, the Emperor Napoleon died at Chiselhurst. The view of Thiers was that this event would render the Bonapartists, for the time, more turbulent and less dangerous. He believed that the Emperor's personal influence had been used to quiet the impatience of his followers, while, on the other hand, his death removed the only member of the family who was popular enough in France to be a formidable candidate. Thiers's childish susceptibility with regard to the Bonapartists showed itself in his expressed hope that the Emperor's death would be followed by the disappearance of the public sympathy in England with the family in its misfortunes.
The opinions of Thiers seem to have been generally prevalent. The Emperor was remarkably kind and courteous to all who approached him; he was a firm friend; not, as a rule, an implacable enemy, and he inspired no small number of people with a warm attachment to him personally. He was also generally popular, and the glittering prosperity of the early part of his reign was attributed by a large part of the common people to his own genius and merits, while they were prone to consider that its disastrous close was due to treason.
No other member of the family excited feelings of the same kind, and in France a cause was always so largely identified with an individual that there was no doubt that the hold of the Imperialists upon the country was largely weakened by the loss of their chief.
It is perhaps worth noting that Lord Lyons, although it was notoriously difficult to extract any such opinions from him, did in after years admit reluctantly to me, that although he liked Napoleon III. personally, he had always put a low estimate upon his capacity.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Jan. 31, 1873.
I cannot say that the political atmosphere grows clearer. The
Right are in their hearts as anxious as ever to depose Thiers.
They believe as firmly as ever that if he makes the new elections,
he will have a Chamber, not only of Republicans, but of very
advanced Republicans. They see that all their little endeavours to
restrain him and to establish ministerial responsibility will have
no political effect. The death of the Emperor has not strengthened
Thiers's position with regard to the Right.
On the contrary,
they are less disposed to bear with him since the removal of the
candidate for the Throne of whom they were most afraid, and from
whom they justly thought that Thiers would make every effort to
shield them. They are consequently, even more than they usually
are, employed in casting about for something to put in Thiers's
place. The Fusion is again 'almost' made, and MacMahon is again
talked of as ready to take the Government during the transition
from the Republic to the King.
Orloff, the Russian Ambassador, propounded to me to-day a plan
of his own for preventing conflicts between Russia and England
in Central Asia. So far as I understood it, it was that England
and Russia should enter into a strict alliance, should encourage
and protect, by force of arms, commerce between their Asiatic
Dominions, and unite them at once by a railroad. He said there
was a Russian company already formed which desired to connect the
Russian railway system with the Anglo-Indian railways.
He told me
that Brünnow was always writing that war between England and Russia
was imminent and that England was preparing for it. If Brünnow's
vaticinations are believed, they may perhaps have a not unwholesome
effect upon the Russian Government.
Prince Orloff seems to have had in contemplation that Trans-Persian Railway which has met with the approval of the Russian and British Governments at the present day. The Russian advance in Central Asia in 1872 and 1873 had been the subject of various perfectly futile representations on the part of Her Majesty's Government, but Baron Brünnow must have been a singularly credulous diplomatist if he really believed that we were making preparations for a war with Russia or any one else.
If Orloff with prophetic insight foresaw a Trans-Persian Railway, Thiers might be acclaimed as being the first person to suggest the project of the Triple Entente between England, France, and Russia. Strangely enough it was the affairs of Spain that put this notion into his head, the idea prevalent in France being that Germany was bent on making that country a dangerous neighbour to France, and bestowing a Hohenzollern prince upon her as sovereign. The prospect of an 'Iberic Union,' which was being discussed at the time, was considered to be exceptionally threatening to France, and Thiers had had quite enough of united states on the French frontier.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, March 4, 1873.
M. Thiers spoke to me last night very confidentially about
Spain and Portugal. The Spanish question was, he said, becoming so
serious that it could hardly be considered an internal question.
Among other things, the independence of Portugal was at stake. Now,
in his opinion, the best chance of avoiding a collision between the
Powers of Europe would be that England, France, and Russia should
come to an understanding on the subject.
He did not think that
there would be any difficulty in effecting such an understanding;
and indeed he had reason to believe that Russia was at this moment
particularly well disposed to act in concert with England. He was
far from being so absurd as to propose a new Holy Alliance; indeed,
he desired to avoid all show and ostentation--indeed all publicity.
He simply wished that, without any parade, the three Powers he had
named should concert measures in order to avert events which might
imperil the peace of Europe.
After some further conversation, he
observed that it would be impossible to avert a collision, if the
Peninsula were formed into one Iberic state with a Hohenzollern for
a monarch.
I did not invite M. Thiers to state more definitely in what
form he proposed that the understanding between France, Russia, and
England should be effected, or what combined action he proposed
they should adopt. I thought indeed that it would be very dangerous
for France to enter into any sort of an alliance with Foreign
Powers against Germany at this moment, and that the smallest result
might be to delay the evacuation of French territory.
Nor indeed
did I know that there was any evidence that Germany was actively
pursuing designs in Spain in such a way and to such a degree,
as would render it proper or advantageous to try the hazardous
experiment of undertaking to settle a European question without
her, not to say in spite of her.
I consequently only listened to what M. Thiers said. He
concluded by telling me to treat his idea as most strictly
confidential and to confide it only to your ear in a whisper.
As regards the state of Spain, M. Thiers said that he believed
the Federal Party was after all the party of order; that at all
events it was predominant in all the outer circumference of
Spain; that the Unitarians existed only in Madrid and the central
provinces, and that the North was Carlist or Federal. This being
the case, his advice to the Government of Madrid had been to make
concessions to the Federals. He did not think that, if properly
managed, their pretensions would go much beyond what was called in
France 'decentralisation administrative.'
The view of the Federals being the party of order in Spain
was new to me, but M. Thiers was beset by a host of deputies and I
could not continue the conversation.
A letter from Lord Odo Russell[6] to Lord Lyons admirably defines the attitude of Germany, and is an exceptionally lucid summary of Bismarckian policy in general.
- * * * *
British Embassy, Berlin, March 14, 1873.
Thanks for yours of the 4th instant.
As regards Spain, Thiers, and Bismarck I cannot add anything
more definite or more precise. Bismarck and the Emperor William
are so far satisfied that the Republic will make room for the
Alphonsists so that they can afford to wait and look on.
What Bismarck intends for Spain later, no one can guess, but
clearly nothing favourable or agreeable to France.
The two great objects of Bismarck's policy are:
(1) The supremacy of Germany in Europe and of the German race
in the world.
(2) The neutralization of the influence and power of the Latin
race in France and elsewhere.
To obtain these objects he will go any lengths while he lives,
so that we must be prepared for surprises in the future.
A change has come over the Emperor and his military advisers
in regard to the evacuation of French territory, as you have seen
by his speech on opening the German Parliament.
His Majesty is now prepared to withdraw his garrison as soon
as the fifth and last milliard shall have been paid by Paris and
received at Berlin.
So that if it is true that Thiers proposes to pay the fifth
milliard in monthly instalments of 250,000,000 fs. beginning from
the 1st of June, the evacuation might be expected in October and
France be relieved of her nightmare.
This I look upon as a most desirable object. It appears to
me that the re-establishment of the future balance of power in
Europe on a general peace footing, is the thing Diplomacy should
work for, and that nothing can be done so long as the Germans have
not got their French gold, and the French got rid of their German
soldiers.
The Germans, as you know, look upon the war of revenge as
unavoidable and are making immense preparations for it.
Germany is in reality a great camp ready to break up for any
war at a week's notice with a million of men.
We are out of favour with the Germans for preferring the old
French alliance to a new German one, as our commercial policy is
said to prove, and this impression has been lately confirmed by
Thiers's exposé des motifs.
Thiers is again out of favour at Berlin, because the Russian
Government has warned the German Government that Thiers is working
to draw Russia into the Anglo-French Alliance contrary to their
wishes. I believe myself that the alliance or understanding between
Russia and Germany, Gortschakoff and Bismarck is real, intimate, and
sincere; and that they have agreed to preserve Austria so long as
she obeys and serves them, but woe to Austria if ever she attempts
to be independent!
Then the German and Slav elements she is composed of, will be
made to gravitate towards their natural centres, leaving Hungary
and her dependencies as a semi-oriental vassal of Germany and
Russia. However, those are things of the future, at present I can
think of nothing but the crisis at home and the deep regret I feel
at losing my kind benefactor Lord Granville as a chief. My only
consolation is that he will the sooner return to power as our
Premier, for he is clearly the man of the future.
I hope you will write again occasionally.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord O. Russell.
Paris, April 8, 1873.
Many thanks for your most interesting letter of the 14th. I
entirely agree with you that the one object of diplomacy should be
to re-establish the balance of power in Europe on a peace footing.
The payment of the indemnity and the departure of the German troops
from France are of course necessary to the commencement of anything
like a normal state of things. The French all more or less brood
over the hope of vengeance, and the Germans give them credit for
being even more bent upon revenge than they really are. So Germany
keeps up an enormous army, and France strains every nerve to raise
one; and what can diplomatists do?
In Germany they seem to attach a great deal more than due
importance to the Commercial Treaty, as a sign of a tendency
towards a renewal of the Anglo-French Alliance. But then the
Germans have always been more angry with us for not helping to blot
France out of Europe than the French have been with us for not
helping them out of the scrape they got into by their own fault.
Germans and French are to my mind alike unreasonable, but we only
suffer the ordinary fate of neutrals.
Thiers professes to have no thought of forming any alliance at
present; and to consider that it would be absurd of France to try
for more at this moment than to ward off great questions, and live
as harmoniously as she can with all Foreign Powers, without showing
a preference to any. This is no doubt the wise and sensible policy.
Thiers certainly acts upon it so far as England is concerned. Does
he also act upon it as regards Russia? I cannot say. I think there
is a little coquetry between him and the Russians.
Lord Granville appears to have sent through the Duchesse de Galliera a private message warning Thiers of the dangers of his advances to Russia; but the latter asserted that although the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg had been directed to maintain the most cordial relations with the Russian Government, matters had not gone further than that, and that he had made no communications which he should object to Germany knowing of. Thiers's tenure of power was, however, destined shortly to come to an end.
On May 24, the veteran who had rendered such invaluable services to the country was defeated by a combination of opponents, and Marshal MacMahon became President of the Republic in his stead. The change of Government was received quietly by the country; the elaborate precautions which had been taken in case of disorder proved superfluous, and the funds rose on the assumption that the Marshal was to prove to be the new saviour of society.
MacMahon, who had reluctantly accepted the honour thrust upon him, was generally regarded as a French General Monk, but which of the three pretenders was to be his Charles the Second remained a matter of complete uncertainty. The fickle crowd hastened to prostrate itself before the rising sun, and the first reception held by the new President at Versailles constituted a veritable triumph; swarms of people of all sorts attending, particularly those members of smart society who had long deserted the salons of the Préfecture.
Amongst the throng were particularly noticeable the Duc d'Aumale and his brothers, wearing uniform and the red ribands which they had never been known to display before. All looked smooth and tranquil, as it usually did at the beginning; but the Government so far had not done anything beyond changing Prefects and Procureurs. The political situation, for the time being, might be summed up in the phrase that the French preferred to have at their head a man qui monte à cheval, rather than a man qui monte à la tribune.
Although the dismissal of Thiers savoured of ingratitude, it was not altogether unfortunate for him that he had quitted office at that particular moment, for little doubt was felt that, with or without any error of policy on his own part, the country was gradually drifting towards communism. At any rate, he could compare with just pride the state in which he left France to the state in which he found her.
Although the last German soldier had not yet left French soil, the credit of the liberation of the country was due to him, and by his financial operations, successful beyond all expectations, he had not only paid off four milliards, but provided the funds for discharging the fifth, and so admirably conducted the negotiations that the German Government was willing to withdraw the rest of the occupying force.
The fall of Thiers caused searchings of heart at Berlin, and a conversation with Count Arnim, the German Ambassador at Paris, in June showed that the German Government regarded MacMahon with anything but favour. Arnim stated that displeasure had been felt at Berlin, both at language held by the Marshal before his appointment, and at his neglect in his former position to act with proper courtesy towards the Emperor's Ambassador in France.
The German Government did not doubt that the remainder of the indemnity would be paid, but Thiers indulged less than other Frenchmen in hostile feelings towards Germany, and he and a few of the people about him seemed to be the only Frenchmen who could bring themselves to act with propriety and civility in their relations with Germans.
In fact, Thiers's foreign policy had been wise and conciliatory, but as for his internal policy, he, Count Arnim, avowed that he entirely concurred in the opinion that it would have thrown the country in a short time into the hands of the Red Republicans.
The unfortunate Arnim was apparently at this time unconscious of his impending doom, although, as the following interesting letter from Lord Odo Russell to Lord Lyons shows, his fate had been sealed months before.
- * * * *
British Embassy, Berlin, Jan. 18, 1873.
What I have to say to-day grieves me to the soul, because it
goes against my excellent friend and landlord Harry Arnim.
Said friend, it is said, could not resist the temptation of
turning an honest penny in the great War Indemnity Loan at Paris,
and the Jew Banker he employed, called Hanseman, let it out to
Bismarck, who could not understand how Arnim was rich enough to buy
estates in Silesia and houses in Berlin.
Now Bismarck, who is tired of Arnim, and thinks him a rising
rival, will make use of this discovery with the Emperor whenever he
wants to upset Arnim and send a new man to Paris.
He thinks him a rising rival because Arnim went to Baden
last autumn and advised the Emperor, behind Bismarck's back, to
go in for an Orleanist Monarchy and drop Thiers, in opposition to
Bismarck's policy, who wishes to drop all Pretenders and uphold
Thiers as long as he lives.
Besides which Arnim hinted at a readiness to take office at
home if Bismarck came to grief.
The Emperor is fond of Arnim and listened with complacency and
told Bismarck when he returned from Varzin,--Bismarck has vowed
revenge! I have not written all this home because it would serve
no purpose yet,--but it may be useful to you as a peep behind the
curtain. Meanwhile Bismarck has appointed one of his secret
agents as Commercial Secretary to the Paris Embassy to watch Arnim.
His name is Lindau and as he is a very able man and an old friend
of mine, I have given him a letter to you. He might become useful
some day.
Let me add in confidence that he corresponds privately and
secretly with Bismarck behind Arnim's back.
- * * * *
It will be observed that the views expressed by Arnim to Lord Lyons in June are not altogether consistent with those attributed to him in the above letter, but Lord Odo Russell's opinion that his implacable chief would crush him at the first opportunity was only too well justified before long.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 1: June, 1871.]
[Footnote 2: German Ambassador at Paris.]
[Footnote 3: Foreign Minister in succession to M. Jules Favre.]
[Footnote 4: Subsequently Lord Ampthill.]
[Footnote 5: French Ambassador at Berlin.]
[Footnote 6: Formerly Mr. Odo Russell.]
CHAPTER XI
MARSHAL MACMAHON'S PRESIDENCY
(1873-1875)
The new French Government had been received with great favour by the upper classes, while the remainder of the population remained indifferent, but the Marshal was credited with the wish to place the Comte de Chambord on the throne, and the language of his entourage was strongly Legitimist, auguries being drawn from a frequent remark of the Maréchale, who was supposed to dislike her position: nous ne sommes pas à notre place!
As the confused political situation began to clear, it became evident that everything depended upon the Comte de Chambord himself, and if he could be brought to adopt anything like a reasonable attitude, it was generally felt that there would be a large majority in his favour in the Assembly. The historic White Flag manifesto issued from Salzburg at the end of October effectually ruined the Legitimist cause.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, Oct. 31, 1873.
The Royalists were counting up new adhesions and expecting a
letter from the Comte de Chambord which was to be read from the
tribune at the last moment and rally the waiters upon Providence
and the waverers to them, when, to their utter consternation,
the actual letter arrived, and fell like a shell with a violent
explosion in the midst of them.
I don't know what they are to do. All plans for making the
Comte de Paris or the Duc d'Aumale Regent will be voted against
by the present Legitimists, unless the Comte de Chambord approves
them. It is very doubtful whether any explanation could do away
with the impression the letter will have produced throughout the
country, which was already averse from the idea of the Legitimist
King.
The maintenance of MacMahon and the present Ministry seems the
best mode of postponing trouble, but it cannot do much more than
postpone.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, Nov. 3, 1873.
If the Chamber met to-morrow, I suppose it would vote the
prolongation of MacMahon's powers; and though no one can answer
for what a day or an hour may bring forth, I suppose this is what
must be done. It is said that the Marshal himself insists upon a
term of six years, if not ten. This is rather hard to understand,
if, as I believed, he really wished to be out of the thing, and I
doubt its adding practically to the stability of his Government.
On the other hand, the Conservatives want to have the prolongation
voted in such a way as to make it apparent that MacMahon is their
President.
It would not suit them that he should be elected
unanimously, or nearly so, as he perhaps might be. This would put
him, they think, in a position too like that which Thiers held. The
preposterous notion of making a Lieutenant General of the Kingdom
to govern in the name of a King of full age and in possession of
all his faculties, who would undoubtedly repudiate and denounce
his representative, has been put an end to by the refusal of the
Princes of Orleans, one and all, it is affirmed, to accept the post.
Thiers told me the day before yesterday that he did not
intend to oppose the Government this session, and that we might
count on a quiet winter. We shall see.
The Legitimists are furious with their King, as well they
may be. How long this may last, one cannot say, but the numbers
of those who adore him quand même, as a sort of fetish, have
certainly fallen off.
MacMahon had been as much disappointed with the Chambord manifesto as the ultra-Legitimists themselves, and had looked forward to retiring from a position which he found distasteful; but as no king was available, and he was looked upon as the only guarantee for order, obviously the best course was to secure the prolongation of his powers for as long a period as possible. After many long and stormy discussions MacMahon was declared President of the Republic for seven years, and a committee of thirty was appointed to consider the Constitutional Laws.
This result was so far satisfactory to the Right, that it enabled them to retire from the dangerous position in which they were placed by the attempt to put the Comte de Chambord on the throne, but it failed to establish a durable Government, and the whole period of MacMahon's Presidency was marked by a ceaseless struggle with his Republican opponents, which only terminated with his fall four years later.
The anxieties of French Ministers were, however, not confined to internal difficulties. Although the fact was concealed as much as possible, the anti-Ultramontane campaign of Bismarck created serious alarm in the beginning of 1874, and in that year may be said to have originated the long series of panics, well or ill founded, which have prevailed in France ever since.
MacMahon in conversation did not scruple to express his fear of a country which, according to him, could place 800,000 men on the Rhine in less than seventeen days, and made the interesting confession that the French military authorities had never credited the famous reports of Colonel Stoffel[7] as to Prussian military efficiency. The Foreign Minister, the Duc Décazes, expressed the strongest apprehensions.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Granville.
Paris, Jan. 17, 1874.
The fall of France has never, I think, been brought so
forcibly home to me, as when I listened yesterday to the humble
deprecation which Décazes was obliged to make with regard to
Bismarck's threats, in the same room in which I had so often heard
the high language with which the Imperial Minister used to speak of
the affairs of Europe. One can only hope that Odo may be right in
thinking that Bismarck's menaces may subside, when he has carried
his Army Bill at home.
But may not his eagerness in his contest
with the Ultramontanes continue and carry him on to language and
even to measures against France from which it may be difficult for
him to draw back? and of course there is a limit to the submission
of the French Government, however disastrous it may know the
consequences of resistance to be. It is difficult to persecute
any religion in these days, but it is impossible for the French
Government to set itself in violent opposition to the predominant
religion in France.
I do not know what means we may have of getting
pacific and moderate counsels listened to at Berlin, but I do
not think the weakness of France a sufficient safeguard to other
countries against the perils of the present state of things to the
peace of Europe. It may be very easy to bully and to crush France,
but will it be possible to do this without raising a storm in other
quarters?
What Bismarck wanted was that the French Government should attack the French bishops; and in order to conciliate him, a circular was issued by the Minister of the Interior remonstrating with them on the nature of the language in which their pastoral addresses were couched.
The well-known clerical newspaper the Univers was suppressed, and although every effort was made to disguise the various acts of subserviency resorted to, it was perfectly well known to what cause they were due, and it was not surprising that the French writhed under the necessity of submitting to such dictation.
In view of the military weakness of France, however, it was useless to think of resistance, the Duc d'Aumale, who commanded the most vulnerable district, having reported confidentially that there were neither fortresses nor an army which would have any chance of repelling a German invasion; added to which, owing to considerations of economy, the conscription was six months in arrear.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Odo Russell.
Paris, Feb. 3, 1874.
The French want above all things to keep the peace, or, to put
it otherwise, to escape being attacked by Germany in their present
defenceless state. What, in your opinion, should they do? Of course
the temptation to the unprincipled war party in Germany to attack
them while they are unable to defend themselves, is very great;
and that party must know that a war this year would be much less
hazardous than one next year, and so on, as each year passes.
The next question I want your advice upon is what, if
anything, can other Powers, and particularly England, do to help to
preserve peace? This is a question peculiarly within your province,
as the one thing to be considered in answering it, is the effect
that anything we do may have at Berlin.
I am not very hopeful, but I think the chances of peace will
be very much increased if we can tide over this year 1874.
I can see no consolation for a fresh war. I suppose Bismarck
would be ready to buy the neutrality of Russia with Constantinople,
and that France will give Russia anything even for a little help.
The Emperor Alexander has told General Le Flô[8] at St.
Petersburg that there will not be war. Do you attach much
importance to this?
You will call this a questionnaire rather than a letter, but
if you have anything to catechise me upon in return, I will answer
to the best of my ability.
The Lyttons' are, as you may suppose, a very great pleasure to
me, and they have had a great success here.
No one was better fitted than Lord Odo Russell, who was a persona grata with Bismarck, to answer these queries. The Emperor Alexander had been very emphatic in assuring General Le Flô on several occasions that there would be no war, but Lord Odo was in all probability quite correct in his opinion that this was no real safeguard.
- * * * *
Lord Odo Russell to Lord Lyons.
Berlin, Feb. 20, 1874.
I was glad after a long interval to see your handwriting
again, and doubly glad to find you inclined to renew our
correspondence. You ask: Firstly, What in my opinion should the
French do to escape being attacked by Germany in their present
defenceless state?
In my opinion nothing can save them if Bismarck is
determined to fight them again; but then, is it France or is it
Austria he is preparing to annihilate? In Bismarck's opinion,
France, to avoid a conflict with him, should gag her press,
imprison her bishops, quarrel with Rome, refrain from making
an army or from seeking alliances with other Powers all out of
deference to Germany.
Secondly. What can other Powers, and particularly England,
do to help to preserve peace?
A Coalition is impossible; advice or interference adds to
Bismarck's excuses for going to war, so the only course Governments
can follow is to let him do as he pleases and submit to the
consequences, until he dies.
Thirdly. Do I attach any importance to the Emperor of
Russia's pacific assurances?
None whatever, because Bismarck is prepared to buy his
co-operation with anything he pleases in the East.
Bismarck is now master of the situation at home and abroad.
The Emperor, the Ministers, the Army, the Press, and the National
majority in Parliament are instruments in his hands, whilst abroad
he can so bribe the great Powers as to prevent a coalition and make
them subservient to his policy. Now, his policy, as you know, is
to mediatize the minor States of Germany and to annex the German
Provinces of Austria, so as to make one great centralized Power
of the German-speaking portions of Europe.
To accomplish this he
may require another war, but it may be with Austria and not with
France, which he now puts forward to keep up the war spirit of the
Germans and to remind Europe of his powers. Besides which he has to
pass the unpopular Army Bill and War Budget which he failed in last
summer.
His anti-Roman policy will serve him to pick a quarrel with
any Power he pleases by declaring that he has discovered an
anti-German conspiracy among the clergy of the country he wishes to
fight.
Such is the situation, but it does not follow that we shall
have war before another year or two are over or more, nor need we
have war if Bismarck can carry out his plans without it.
At present the tone of Bismarck and Bülow is quite pacific,
and I notice a great desire for the co-operation of England in
maintaining the peace of Europe generally.
Lord Lyons's own opinions were in exact agreement with Lord Odo Russell's, and the general uncertainty as to Bismarck's intentions continued to preoccupy both the French and the English Governments, although the Emperor of Russia persisted in assuring General Le Flô that there would be no war, and it was assumed in some quarters that the German Emperor disapproved of the Bismarckian policy.
The general election in England at the beginning of 1874, resulting in the return of the Conservative party to power, placed Lord Derby again at the Foreign Office in the room of Lord Granville, and the long letter which follows was presumably intended to enlighten him on the subject of French politics generally. It is, at all events, a concise review of the situation.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Derby.
Feb. 24, 1874.
I thank you cordially for your letter of yesterday, and I
resume with very peculiar satisfaction my diplomatic correspondence
with you. I wish the subject of it was as pleasant to me as is the
fact of its renewal; but I cannot help being more than usually
anxious about the prospects of Europe and of France in particular.
This spring and summer are the especially critical seasons for
France.
She will be for a long time to come far too weak to indulge
in aggression, except indeed as a secondary ally of some stronger
Power, but even next year, she will not be in the absolutely
helpless condition which is at this moment so strong a temptation
to national hatreds, and to the military thirst for gold and glory
which prevails with a party in Germany. I am afraid the peace of
Europe depends entirely upon the view Bismarck may take of the
easiest means of bringing all German-speaking nations under one
rule.
The wolf can always find reasons for quarrelling with the
lamb, and as Bismarck himself told Odo Russell, he has had a good
deal of experience of this kind of thing. The French lamb will not
be skittish, and indeed will hardly venture to bleat, for some
time. For my own part, I am constantly on the watch to forestall
questions which may make difficulties between France and any other
country; for if Bismarck wants war, it would suit him to be able to
appear to be only taking his part in a quarrel already made.
Italy is the most dangerous neighbour from this point of
view, and the presence of the Orénoque at Civita Vecchia is the
ticklish point. It is a very delicate matter to touch; for if the
question came very prominently into notice, it might raise one of
the storms in the press of all countries, which are so often the
precursors of evil times. The ship is supposed to be at Civita
Vecchia to give the Pope the means of leaving Italy, if he wishes
to do so; and I suppose the Vatican might relieve the French of
embarrassment by saying that she is not wanted.
In fact, if the
Italian Government intended to prevent the Pope's going away, they
would of course stop him before he got to Civita Vecchia, and if
they abstained (as would no doubt be the case) from interfering
with his movements, he could get a ship to depart in, whenever he
pleased.
I do not know that there is any ill-feeling in Switzerland
towards France, but the Ultramontane disputes give Bismarck a lever
to work with.
I believe the French Government have completely drawn in their
horns about the Armenian Patriarch question and the Protectorate of
the Latin Christians in the East, since Bismarck appeared on the
field at Constantinople.
In looking out for small beginnings of troubles, I have
thought of Tunis. I suppose we may lay aside all apprehension of
attempts of France to change the frontier or to bring the Regency
into more complete dependency upon her, at the present moment. I
find by a despatch from Mr. Wood, that the German commodore, in his
conversation with the Bey, insisted particularly upon the interests
of German subjects being put upon as good a footing as those of the
subjects of any other country.
I think Décazes takes the humiliating position in which
France, and he as her Foreign Minister, are placed, with more
equanimity and temper than most Frenchmen would; and so long as
the present, or any other Government, not absolutely unreasonable,
is at the head of affairs, France will be prudent in her foreign
relations.
Of Marshal MacMahon's seven years' lease of power, only three
months have elapsed; a time too short to give much foundation for
conjecture as to its probable duration. Both he himself and his
Ministers take opportunities of declaring that its continuance
is above discussion, and that they will maintain it against all
comers. There are two things against it.
First, the extreme
difficulty of giving it anything like the appearance of permanence
and stability which would rally to it that great majority of
Frenchmen who are ready at all times to worship the powers that
be, if only they look as if they were likely to continue to be.
Secondly, there is the character of the Marshal himself. He is
honest and a brave soldier, but he does not take such a part in
affairs as would increase his personal prestige. The danger,
in fact, is that by degrees he may come to be looked upon as a
nullité!
The Imperialists are agitating themselves and spending money,
as if they were meditating an immediate coup. The wiser heads
counsel patience, but the old horses, who sorely miss the pampering
they had under the Empire, are getting very hungry, and are afraid
that they themselves may die before the grass has grown.
The fear of an Imperialist attempt has in some degree brought
back to the Government the support of the Legitimists, and in fact
the Comte de Chambord has quarrelled with his own party. The Fusion
has put an end to the Orleanist Party, as a party for placing
the Comte de Paris on the throne; but the question of appointing
the Duc d'Aumale Vice-President, in order to have some one ready
to succeed MacMahon in case of need, is seriously considered. I
suppose, however, that MacMahon would look upon this as destructive
of the arrangements between him and the Assembly.
And then the
whole system depends upon the maintenance by hook or by crook of
a majority, which has not yet ceased to melt away, as seats become
vacant and new elections take place.
The Duc de Bisaccia, the new French Ambassador in London, even at his first interview with Lord Derby, did not scruple to avow that he felt quite certain that the Republican form of government would not last, and he went on to assert that Bismarck's head had been turned by success, and that he aimed at nothing less than the conquest of Europe, being quite indifferent either to the views of his Imperial Master, or of the Crown Prince.
Whatever the prospects of the Republic, the prospects of Bisaccia's own party (Legitimist) were indisputably gloomy, for the prevailing sentiment in France at the time was hostility to the White Flag and to the clerical and aristocratic influences of which it was held to be the emblem.
The great majority of the people were Republican, and the most numerous party after the Republican was the Imperial, but the Presidency of Marshal MacMahon was acquiesced in, for the moment, by all parties, because it was believed to be capable of preserving order, because it left the question of the definitive government of the country still undecided, and because no party saw its way to securing the pre-dominence of its own ideas.
The existing state of things was accounted for by the history of the establishment of the seven-years Presidency.
When the Orleans Princes tendered their allegiance to the Comte de Chambord in the previous autumn, the fusion, so long talked of, was complete, and it was supposed that a Parliamentary Monarchy with the Tricolour Flag, might be established under the legitimate head of the Bourbons; but the Comte de Chambord struck a fatal blow to these hopes by his celebrated letter, and the Conservatives felt that there was no time to be lost in setting up a Government having some sort of stability.
The plan which they adopted was that of conferring power upon Marshal MacMahon for a fixed and long period. Had a short period been proposed, it would have been agreed to almost unanimously; but this was not their object. They wished it to be apparent to the country that the Marshal was specially the President of the Conservative majority: they asked for a term of ten years: obtained seven, and secured from the Marshal a declaration of adherence to their views.
The slight modification of the Ministry which ensued, resulted in placing the Government more completely in the hands of the party pledged to a monarchical form of Government, and the Ministry thus reconstituted, set itself to the task of resisting the progress of Radicalism and Communism in the country.
But the suspicion of favouring the White Flag clung to the Government, and although the latter, following the example of the Empire, had installed their partisans in office, as mayors, etc., by thousands throughout the country, the candidates supported by the Government had, in almost every instance, found themselves at the bottom of the poll when elections took place; and the results showed that a large accession of votes had been received by the Republican and Imperialist parties. Of these the former had gained most, but the latter possessed a backing in the country which was inadequately represented by their numbers in the Assembly.
It should, however, be added that there did not appear on any side a disposition to embarrass the Government by factious or bitter opposition with regard to the three departments, Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs, in which the practical interests of the country were most deeply involved. The financial policy of M. Magne[9] was generally supported; and with regard to votes for the Army and Navy, the Government had rather to resist a pressure to increase the expenditure on these heads, than to urge the necessity of considerable supplies.
In the conduct of foreign affairs, the defenceless state of France had made the avoidance of an attack from Germany the one overwhelming care of the Government. To effect this object, to give Germany no pretext for a quarrel, and to make submission to the behests of Bismarck as little galling and in appearance as little humiliating as possible, had been the constant occupation of the Foreign Minister.
In this effort he was seconded by the Assembly, and indeed every one in and out of that body, except a few clerical and Legitimist bigots, felt it to be a patriotic duty to abstain from embarrassing the Government in its relations with foreign Powers.
Another reassuring feature in the situation was, that there were no symptoms of attempts to resist by force the authority of the Assembly, as no party seemed likely to venture to oppose by force a Government which disposed of the army; and the army in 1874 showed no prediction for any particular candidate for the throne sufficiently strong to overcome its habitual obedience to the Constitutional Government, whatever that Government might be.
As an instance of the dictation practised by Bismarck towards France in foreign affairs, it may be mentioned that in January, 1874,[10] Count Arnim formally announced to the Duc Décazes that the German Government would not tolerate the assumption by France of the suzerainty of Tunis, or of a Protectorate over that country. To this Décazes humbly replied that there had never been the least question of anything of the kind--a statement which can scarcely be described as accurate.
Whether Bismarck entertained any designs with regard to Tunis is not known, but it was in this year that Germany began to show some signs of interest in the Philippines and other places supposed to be of some colonial value. The following extract from a letter written on the subject by the late Lord Lytton, who was at the time Secretary of Embassy at Paris, is a striking instance of rare and remarkable political prescience.
- * * * *
Lord Lytton to Lord Lyons.
Paris, Oct. 27, 1874.
- * * * *
Odo's impression (communicated to you) that Bismarck does
not want colonies rather surprises me. It seems to me a perfectly
natural and quite inevitable ambition on the part of a Power so
strong as Germany not to remain an inland state a moment longer
than it can help, but to get to the sea, and to extend its seaboard
in all possible directions. Is there any case on record of an
inland state suddenly attaining to the military supremacy of Europe
without endeavouring by means of its military strength and prestige
to develop its maritime power?
But you can't be a Maritime Power
without colonies, for if you have ships you must have places to
send them to, work for them to do, and a marine Exercier-Platz
for training seamen. That is why I have always thought that the
English school of politicians which advocates getting rid of our
colonies as profitless encumbrances, ought (to be consistent) to
advocate the simultaneous suppression of our navy. Lord Derby says
that though Germany may probably cherish such an ambition, she
will have as much seaboard as she can practically want as long
as she retains possession of the Duchies.
But that is not a very
convenient commercial seaboard, and I confess I can't help doubting
the absence of all desire for more and better outlets to the
sea, so long as her military power and prestige remain unbroken.
Anyhow, there seems to be now a pretty general instinct throughout
Europe, and even in America, that a policy of maritime and colonial
development must be the natural result of Germany's present
position: and such instincts, being those of self-preservation, are
generally, I think, what Dizzy calls 'unerring' ones.
A letter from Lord Odo Russell written about this period throws a curious light upon Bismarck's imaginary grievances, and the difficulties which he was prepared to raise upon the slightest provocation. Probably no Minister of modern times ever uttered so many complaints, threatened so often to resign, and yet wielded such absolute power.
- * * * *
Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby.
Berlin, Nov. 9, 1874.
I found Prince Bismarck in one of his confidential moods
the other day, and he indulged me in a long talk about his own
interests, past, present, and prospective.
Among many other things, he said that his life had been
strangely divided into phases or periods of twelve years each.
Born in 1815, he had left home when he was twelve years old to
begin his studies. At 24 he inherited his small patrimony and his
father's debts, and entered upon the life and duties of a country
gentleman. At 36 (1851) his diplomatic career began, and he was
sent to Frankfort, Vienna, St. Petersburg and Paris. At 48 (1863)
he was recalled to form the present Administration, which in twelve
years had carried on three wars and made the German Empire.
He was
now 60 and worn out with the responsibilities and anxieties of
office, and he was resolved to enter upon a new phase (of 12 years
he hoped) by resigning and retiring into private life--a resolution
he begged I would keep to myself for the present.
I said I could well understand his wish for rest, but I did
not believe the Emperor or the country would allow him to indulge
in it, as he was well enough and strong enough to govern Germany
for many years to come.
He replied that he felt quite strong enough to govern Germany,
but not to be governed himself any longer by the Emperor, whose
obstinacy and narrow mindedness were more than he could bear.
I said I had often heard him complain of his Court duties
before, but it appeared to me that he always carried his points,
and that after some resistance the Emperor gave way in the end and
followed his advice.
He replied that it was that very struggle with his Imperial
Master that had worn him out and that he no longer felt strong
enough to carry on after sixty. He then related to me a series of
very curious anecdotes illustrating his struggles with the Crown,
and what he called the want of confidence and ingratitude of the
Emperor.
I asked him whether anything had lately occurred calculated to
increase his wish for rest.
He said that his present difference with the Emperor related
to the new army organization. The Emperor and his generals thought
the sole object of the German Empire was to turn the nation into an
army for the greater glory of the House of Hohenzollern; whilst he
held that there must be some limit to the heavy strain of military
obligations the Crown was ever anxious to impose on the people.
I asked whether he was alluding to the Landsturm Bill, which
placed every German from the age of 16 to 42 at the disposal of the
War Department.
He replied that he did not exactly allude to that, but there
were other measures in contemplation, elaborated in the Emperor's
military Cabinet, he could not give his sanction to, and which
would consequently lead to another painful struggle. He considered
that his great task had been completed in 1870 to 1872, and that he
could now retire and leave the internal organization of Germany to
other hands.
The Crown Prince, he thought, might possibly govern
on more Constitutional principles than his father, who, born
in the last century, had not yet been able to realize what the
duties of a Constitutional Sovereign were, and thought himself as
King of Prussia above the Constitution, as the Emperor Sigismund
thought himself above grammar when he wrote bad Latin.
A danger
to which the Crown Prince would be exposed as Sovereign was his
love for intrigue and backstairs influence--'some one or other
always concealed behind the door or curtain.' The Prince was not as
straightforward as he appeared, and he suffered from the weakness
of obstinacy and the obstinacy of weakness due to unbounded conceit
and self-confidence--but at the same time he meant well.
After a good deal more talk about his family, his property,
and his longing for country life and pursuits, we parted.
Without attaching undue importance to Prince Bismarck's
oft-repeated threat of resignation, I do not suppose he would go
out of his way to tell me and others so, without intention. My
impression is that he wants to obtain something or other from the
Emperor which he can make conditional on remaining in office, well
knowing that His Majesty cannot do without him. Besides which,
his retirement from office would have the appearance of a defeat,
consequent on his failure to coerce the Pope and his legions. He is
not the man to admit a defeat while he lives.
Time will show what
more he wants to satisfy his gigantic ambition.
The fear of war with Germany had died away temporarily in the summer, and the various political parties in France were free to continue their struggles and to reduce the situation to almost unexampled confusion.
The motives of the Comte de Chambord and his followers were too remote for ordinary human understanding, and their object appeared to be to bring about a crisis and a dissolution of the Assembly on the most disadvantageous terms to themselves. Moderate Republicans were looking to the Duc d'Aumale as a safeguard against the Imperialists on the one hand, and the Reds on the other. Republicans of various shades, and the Reds in particular, were coquetting with Prince Napoleon, and he with them.
Most men and most parties appeared to have particular objects, which they hated with a hatred more intense than their love for the object of their affections. Thiers, it was believed, would have rather seen anything, even a restoration of the Empire, than have the Duc de Broglie and the Orleanists in power. Notwithstanding the fusion, the Legitimists would have probably preferred Gambetta (or some one still more extreme) than an Orleans Prince--and so on.
'I cannot make head or tail of French internal politics,' Lord Derby wrote, at the end of the year, 'and presume that most Frenchmen are in the same condition. It looks as if nobody could see their way till the present Assembly is dissolved and a new one elected.'
The beginning of the new year was signalized in Paris by the appearance of the Lord Mayor of London, who had been invited to attend the opening of the new Opera House. That functionary has always been invested in French popular opinion with semi-fabulous attributes, and he seems to have risen to the level of the occasion. 'The Lord Mayor,' wrote the unimpressionable Lord Lyons, 'is astonishing the Parisians with his sword, mace, trumpeters, and State coaches. So far, however, I think the disposition here is to be pleased with it all, and I keep no countenance and do what I have to do with becoming gravity.' A little later, however, he was constrained to add:--
I am afraid the Lord Mayor's head has been turned by the
fuss which was made with him here, for he seems to have made a
very foolish speech on his return to England.
Strange to say the
Parisians continued to be amused and pleased with his pomps and
vanities to the end, although the narrow limits between the sublime
and the ridiculous were always on the point of being over passed.
I abstained from going to the banquets given to him, or by him,
except a private dinner at the Elysée; but I had him to dinner
here, and, I think, sent him away pleased with the Embassy, which
it is always as well to do, and if so, I have reaped the reward of
my diplomatic command over my risible muscles.
It was not perhaps surprising that the Lord Mayor should have been thrown off his intellectual balance, for the honours accorded to him far surpassed those paid to ordinary mortals and resembled rather those habitually reserved for crowned heads. When he visited the opera the ex-Imperial box was reserved for his use; the audience rose at his entry, and the orchestra played the English National Anthem. Twice he dined with the President of the Republic; the Prefect of the Seine gave a banquet in his honour; so did the authorities at Boulogne; and to crown all, the Tribunal of Commerce struck a medal in commemoration of his visit.
The one thing that was fairly clear in French politics, besides abhorrence of the White Flag, was the gradual progress of Bonapartism which was beginning to frighten Conservatives as well as Republicans, and the Bonapartists themselves were inclined to regret having helped to turn Thiers out of office, because the army was becoming more and more anti-Republican, and it would be much easier to turn it against a civilian than against its natural head, a Marshal of France.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Derby.
Jan. 26, 1875.
Bonapartism is still in the ascendant, and certainly the
Assembly is doing everything to give weight to the assertion that
France is unfit for Parliamentary Government. No one believes in
a moderate Republic, as a self-supporting institution unconnected
with some particular individual. The 'Conservative Republic'
was devised for M. Thiers. The Septennate Republic, if it be a
Republic, would be scouted if MacMahon were not at the head of
it. The Comte de Chambord is impossible.
The Orleanists have cast
in their lot with his, and besides, the Government they represent
being constitutional or Parliamentary, is exactly what is most
out of favour, with the exception of the White Flag. As I have
said all along, the dispute is between a very advanced Republic
and the Empire, and confugiendum est ad imperium is becoming
more and more the cry of those who dread Communism. Those who have
personal reasons for fearing the Empire are already taking their
precautions.
Friends of the Orleans Princes are believed to have
seriously conferred (not with the knowledge or consent of the
Princes themselves, so far as I have heard) with the Bonaparte
leaders, in order to ascertain what the Orleans family would
have to expect if the Prince Imperial returned. At any rate the
Bonapartist papers have been insinuating that they would be allowed
to stay in France and keep their property; and these insinuations
are of course intended to relieve tender Orleanist consciences of
scruples in coming round to the Imperial cause.
The officers in the army are becoming more and more averse
from all idea of a permanent Republic. They would willingly wait to
the end of MacMahon's time, but they are beginning to talk of the
possibility of his being so much disgusted by the way in which he
is worried by the Assembly, as to throw the Presidency up.
In short France is at this moment in a fear of Bonapartism.
It may, and very probably will, subside this time, but it differs
from most intermittent fevers in this, that the attacks recur at
shorter and shorter intervals, and increase instead of diminish in
intensity.
Fear of the Imperialists drove Conservatives into voting with Gambetta and other advanced Republicans; a ministerial crisis took place; the Assembly gave contradictory decisions and generally discredited itself, and the confusion grew so great that it seemed impossible to unravel it.
'I have spent three afternoons at Versailles,' wrote Lord
Lyons on February 26th, 'and have seen a Constitution made there.
I have seen also such a confusion of parties and principles as I
hope never to witness again. I found Décazes, Broglie, and a great
number of Right Centre deputies at the MacMahons' last evening.
They all, and particularly Décazes, looked to me very unhappy,
and indeed they did not affect to be at all satisfied with the
occurrences in the Assembly.
Like the horse in the fable who
invited the man to get on his back, the Right Centre have let the
Left get on their backs to attack Bonapartism, and don't know how
to shake them off again.'
The ceaseless struggles between the various political parties in France, which were of little interest to the outside world, were temporarily interrupted in the spring of 1875 by the war scare which so greatly agitated Europe at the time, but which subsequently became an almost annual phenomenon.
Unfortunately, Lord Lyons was in England during the greater portion of this critical period, and there are wanting, consequently, documents which might have thrown light upon what has always been a somewhat mysterious episode, but it would appear that the symptoms of alarm on the part of the French first showed themselves about March 11. On that day the Duc Décazes drew the attention of the British Ambassador to three incidents which ought to engage the serious attention of those Governments who were desirous of maintaining peace in Europe.
These were the threatening representation made by the German Minister at Brussels to the Belgian Government respecting the language and conduct of the Ultramontane Party in that country; the pointed communication to the French Government of this representation; and the prohibition of the export of horses from Germany.
Prince Bismarck, said Décazes, seemed to become more and more inclined to revive old grievances and to require of foreign countries the exercise of an unreasonable and impossible control over the prelates and even over the lay members of the Roman Catholic Church, and as for the decree forbidding the export of horses, it was so inexplicable that it could only add to uneasiness. It might be easy for England, and for some other nations, to regard these things calmly, but to France they constituted a serious and immediate peril.
In spite of the steps taken during the past year to conciliate Germany on the subject of the Bishop's charges, the German Government had never officially intimated that it considered the question to be closed, and Count Arnim had used the significant expression to him, that it was only closed 'so far as any question between you and us can ever be looked upon as closed.' He believed that it was only owing to the influence of other Powers, and of England in particular, that the danger had been averted in 1874; and he now hoped that the same influence would be exerted in the same way.
Décazes added a somewhat surprising piece of information which had been imparted to him in January, 1874, by Prince Orloff, the Russian Ambassador, viz. that in that month an order to occupy Nancy had absolutely been issued by the German Government to its troops, and that there were strong grounds for believing that this order has been rescinded chiefly owing to influence exerted at Berlin by Russia.
So far as is known, there is no corroboration of this story, and it would appear that Prince Orloff was so anxious to convince France of the goodwill of Russia that he thought it advisable to drag England into the question, but it was not surprising that France should be sensitively alive to the danger she incurred, if Bismarck, irritated by his Ultramontane difficulties, should choose to throw the blame upon the Roman Catholics of other countries, or should resort to quarrels with foreign nations as a means of diverting public opinion in Germany from inconvenient questions at home.
Prince Hohenlohe, the new German Ambassador, who also saw Lord Lyons on the same day, volunteered no opinion upon the representation to Belgium which had excited so much perturbation, but remarked with regard to the exportation of horses that the 'agriculturists might have been alarmed by the prospect of a drain of horses for foreign countries. He had no reason to suppose that purchases of horses had been made in Germany by the French Government for military purposes; but he had heard that a considerable number had lately been brought there for the Paris fiacres.'
It will not have escaped notice that the German Government--or rather Bismarck--was fortunate in always having excellent reasons available, either for not complying with inconvenient requests, or for explaining away disquieting symptoms; thus, in 1870, the insuperable difficulty to disarmament was the King of Prussia; during the peace negotiations, all harsh conditions were due to les militaires, and in 1875 the German agriculturists and the Paris cabs were responsible for any uneasiness that might be felt temporarily.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Derby.
Paris, March 16, 1875.
I saw Décazes last night and found him in a greater state of
alarm about the intentions of Germany than anything specific he
told me seemed to warrant. The retirement of Bismarck to Varzin
will not reassure the French, because they remember that he was
there when the war broke out in 1870.
There is observable here, and not least among the Russians, a
sort of impression that there is to be a movement of some kind in
the East.
In short, there is a great deal of vague uneasiness and fear
that peace is in danger.
The German Embassy here has certainly been taking great pains
to put it about that the prohibition to export horses has been
decreed solely from economical, and not from military motives.
That Embassy keeps up very close relations with the Times
correspondent[11] here, and his subordinates. Of course the trouble
it has taken has increased instead of allaying alarm. Décazes
constantly harps on the string of the influence of England at
Berlin, and the consolation it affords him to feel sure that it is
exercised quietly on the side of peace. The position is a painful
one.
Without particular friendships and alliances, France is
absolutely at the mercy of Germany, and if she tries to form such
friendships and alliances, she may bring the wrath of the great
Chancellor down upon her instantly.
- * * * *
Lord Derby to Lord Lyons.
Foreign Office, March 16, 1875.
I do not know and cannot conjecture the cause of Décazes's
anxiety. Nothing has passed or is passing in any part of Europe to
justify alarm as to an early disturbance of general peace. But I
hear of a similar feeling of uneasiness at Berlin; and the Russian
Government is credited with designs as to the nature of which no
two persons agree. Until we hear more, I shall be inclined to set
down all these rumours of wars to the time of year, and to the
absence of any exciting questions (so far as foreign relations are
concerned) to occupy men's minds.
I may tell you confidentially that Bismarck has given us
through Odo Russell a serious warning against the unfriendly
feelings of the Russian Government towards England. He may be only
trying to stir up jealousy, a game which he often plays, or he may
be sincere. I take his hint as one not to be slighted, yet not
infallibly trusted. Gortschakoff is no doubt much disgusted about
the Conference; the Czar also to some extent; and probably they
both feel that they had miscalculated the effect of the Russian
marriage on English policy. But beyond this I know no cause of
quarrel. Dead calm for the moment.
I cannot conceive any reason why
you should not take your leave when you wish it. Paris is always
within reach if anything new turns up.
It is obvious from the above that neither Lord Derby nor Lord Lyons felt any very serious apprehensions, and the latter was permitted to go home on leave at the beginning of April. On April 10, Lord Odo Russell wrote to Lord Derby:--
Bismarck is at his old tricks again--alarming the Germans
through the officious Press, and intimating that the French are
going to attack them, and that Austria and Italy are conspiring
in favour of the Pope, etc. Now he has succeeded in making the
Emperor and the Crown Prince believe that France is meditating an
invasion of Germany through Belgium! And, not knowing any better,
they are in despair and have ordered the War Department to make
ready for defence. This crisis will blow over like so many others,
but Bismarck's sensational policy is very wearisome at times.
Half
the Diplomatic Body have been here since yesterday to tell me that
war was imminent, and when I seek to calm their nerves and disprove
their anticipations, they think that I am thoroughly bamboozled by
Bismarck.
In the middle of April there appeared in the Berlin Post the celebrated article entitled: 'Is War in Sight?' and as it was well known that such articles were not written except under official inspiration, something akin to a real panic took place, more especially when other German papers began to write in a similar strain. Letters from Mr.
Adams, who had been left as Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, show the pitiable condition of terror to which the French Government was reduced, and the efforts made by Décazes to obtain British support. Décazes urged that England ought to take an active part in protesting against the new theory that one nation was justified in falling upon another for no other reason than that the latter might possibly prove troublesome in the future.
He said that he had protested to the German Ambassador against the attitude of the German Government, after all the assurances that it had received from the French Government, and added that if war took place in August, as he feared, he should advise MacMahon to retire with his army beyond the Loire without firing a shot and wait there 'until the justice of Europe should speak out in favour of France.' The idea of openly identifying England with the French cause did not commend itself apparently to Mr. Disraeli.
'I had a rather long conversation about French politics with
Mr. Disraeli,' Lord Lyons wrote to Mr. Adams on April 21st, 'and I
found him thoroughly well up in the subject. He wishes to encourage
confidence and goodwill on the part of France towards England,
but sees the danger to France herself of any such appearance of a
special and separate understanding as would arouse the jealousy of
Bismarck.
- * * * *
'With a little variation in the illustrations, Décazes's
language to you was just what he used to me before I left Paris.
Germany can, I suppose, overrun France whenever she pleases, a
fortnight after she determines to do so; and no one can tell how
suddenly she may come to this determination. Whether Décazes is
wise in perpetually crying "wolf" I cannot say. He is naturally
anxious to keep Europe on the alert, but I am not sure that the
repetition of these cries does not produce the contrary effect.'
During the second half of April the tension began to diminish, but Lord Odo Russell, who was certainly no alarmist, felt convinced that, so long as Bismarck remained in office, the peace of Europe was in jeopardy, for his power had now become absolute, and neither the Emperor nor the Crown Prince were capable of withstanding him. Writing on April 24, he remarks: 'The prospect of another war fills me with horror and disgust, and if Bismarck lives a few years longer I do not see how it can be prevented.
The Emperor's powers of resistance are over; he does what Bismarck wishes, and the Crown Prince, peace-loving as he is, has not sufficient independence of character to resist Bismarck's all-powerful mind and will.'
A few days later the Belgian Minister at Berlin reported to Lord Odo Russell an alarming communication made to him by Count Moltke.
- * * * *
Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby.
Berlin, May 1, 1875.
Since writing to you to-day, at this late hour my Belgian
colleague Baron Nothomb has called to tell me that he had a long
conversation with Moltke yesterday fully confirming what is said
in my despatch. Moltke added that, much as he hated war, he did
not see how Germany could avoid it next year, unless the Great
Powers 'coalesced' to persuade France to reduce her armaments to a
reasonable peace establishment.
Then Nothomb told me that Bismarck had sent Bülow to him with
the following confidential message: 'Tell your King to get his army
ready for defence, because Belgium may be invaded by France sooner
than we expect.'
This message Nothomb writes to Brussels to-day. He is under
an impression that in the event of war, Bismarck intends to occupy
Belgium, as Frederick the Great occupied Saxony when he suspected
Maria Theresa of wanting to take her revenge for the loss of
Silesia. This is curious, and you will probably hear more about it
from Brussels. I write in haste for the Messenger.
The evident desire of Bismarck to fasten a quarrel upon France aroused the indignation of Lord Derby, who realized that the intervention of Russia was the best method of preventing it.
- * * * *
Lord Derby to Lord O. Russell.
Foreign Office, May 3, 1875.
You seem reassured as to the immediate prospect, and the panic
in Paris has subsided, but great uneasiness remains. Lumley[12]
writes to me that the state of things seems to him most critical,
and the language which you report as held by Moltke is unpleasant
enough. Münster[13] has not called for the last few days: when last
I saw him, his language about French armaments tallied exactly
with that which you and others report as being held by German
representatives throughout Europe.
Is there no hope of Russian interference to maintain peace?
It cannot be the interest of Russia to have France destroyed and
Germany omnipotent. If the Czar were to say that a new war must not
take place, and that he would not allow it, Bismarck would hardly
undertake to fight Russia and France combined. I see little other
prospect of averting mischief, and if it begins, where is it to end?
Even here, and notwithstanding the sympathy felt in the
main for the Protestant German Empire, the outrageous injustice
of picking a quarrel with France, because she does not choose to
remain disarmed, would produce its effect. There would be a great
revulsion of feeling; not unlike that which took place when the
first Napoleon had begun to show his real character and objects.
The English public knows little about foreign concerns, but it does
understand that hitting a man when he is down is not fair play, and
I think in the rest of Europe fear and jealousy of the predominant
Power would give France many adherents.
I do what I can to point this out in a quiet and friendly way;
but without being sanguine.
- * * * *
May 4. The conversation about Belgium in the House of Lords
last night led to no result. I think I see a growing feeling,
indicated by the language of the press, that the German demands are
not necessarily unreasonable, and that we should at least hear more
of the case before pronouncing judgment.
To judge by the reports which Nothomb sends to his own
Government, he has been thoroughly frightened, and is ready to
advise unconditional acceptance of German proposals. Is he disposed
to be an alarmist? Or has Bismarck established a personal hold over
him?
We are quiet at this office, busy in Parliament; the Session
threatens to be long, but it will not be eventful.
On May 6, Lord Odo Russell reported that Count Schouvaloff, the Russian Ambassador in London, had just arrived at Berlin from St. Petersburg, and was the bearer of important tidings.
The good news he brought respecting our relations with Russia
filled me with delight after the dark allusions made to me here
at Court and by the Chancellor during the winter. As regards
Germany and the war rumours, Count Schouvaloff gave me the most
satisfactory and welcome news that the Emperor of Russia is coming
to Berlin on Monday next, will insist on the maintenance of peace
in Europe, even at the cost of a rupture with Germany, and that he
can reckon on the support of Austria in doing so.
How Bismarck will meet the humiliating blow of being told by
his allies, Russia and Austria, that he must keep the peace with
France, when he has proclaimed to the world that France is ready to
take her revenge, it is difficult to foretell. But we must not be
surprised if it hastens on the outburst it is intended to prevent.
I hope not, and do not expect it, but I shall not be surprised if
it does, because Austria has really joined Russia. She has become
an obstacle in the way of German development, which Bismarck will
try to remove.
It had, of course, been the object of Bismarck to sow dissension between England and Russia, and he had taken elaborate pains to convince the British Government that Russia was animated by the most hostile feelings. Consequently the extremely frank and friendly sentiments expressed by Count Schouvaloff were in the nature of an agreeable surprise, but the effusion of the Russian Envoy was so great that he seems to have slightly overdone the part.
- * * * *
Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby.
Berlin, May 8, 1875.
I did not report Schouvaloff's conversation because he was
going to tell you all he had to say in great detail as soon as he
reached London. His frankness is fascinating, but on reflection it
does not inspire absolute confidence. I feel at first inclined to
believe all he says; but when I think it over, it appears too good
to be true.
If all he represents himself to have said to Bismarck about
the power of Russia to coerce Germany under certain circumstances
be strictly true, Bismarck would scarcely want him to succeed
Gortschakoff, as he does, if he did not feel that he could make a
tool of him (Schouvaloff).
According to Schouvaloff, the Czar and Gortschakoff are
to tell Bismarck next week that a new war must not take place,
and that if he does not submit and agree, Russia, with the
concurrence of Austria, is prepared to side with France to render
war impossible. In all probability, their conferences will end
in mutual assurances of peace and good will, and we shall hear
no more of war rumours and French armaments until those of
Germany are ready; and as Bismarck is a match both for the Czar
and Gortschakoff, I shall not be surprised to hear that he has
persuaded them to let him have his own way in the end.
But this is
mere conjecture; we shall know more about it all a week hence.
The whole of Bismarck's policy now tends to produce a
coalition of the peaceful Powers against Germany, and his Church
policy, to produce dissensions in Germany and arrest the progress
of unification. It is therefore evident that he seeks a conflict
for purposes of his own.
I may be wrong, but I cannot but think that he wants to
mediatize the smaller German Powers and weaken Austria so as to
render her alliance useless to Russia, France, and Italy.
If I understand Schouvaloff correctly, Bismarck endeavoured to
set Russia against us, as he attempted to set us against Russia,
and he seemed to expect that Bismarck would make Gortschakoff
various offers in return for Russian co-operation or neutrality.
Indeed, he insinuated that he thought Bismarck a little out of his
mind at times.
The importance of the Czar's language and attitude at Berlin
is so great that I look forward with anxious interest to the
results of next week's conferences. For my part I have been careful
to hold the language you tell me you hold at home on these matters
in a friendly spirit to Germany and in the interest of European
Peace.
On the same date (May 8), the Emperor Alexander and Prince Gortschakoff started on the journey to Berlin from which so much was anticipated, and the British Government addressed a despatch to Lord Odo Russell which was also circulated at Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Rome, instructing him to use all his power to put an end to the misunderstanding which had arisen between France and Germany. It is worthy of note that when this despatch was communicated to the Austrian Government, that Government alone declined to instruct their Ambassador at Berlin in the sense desired, on the ground that it would irritate Bismarck.
The Emperor Alexander and Gortschakoff arrived at Berlin on May 10, and the question of peace or war must have been decided with extreme rapidity, for Lord Odo Russell dined with Bismarck on that night, and the latter took the opportunity to express his thanks 'for the very friendly offer, which he highly appreciated, as a proof of good will and confidence on the part of Her Majesty's Government.' At the same time he expressed some naïve surprise at the offer, maintaining that all his efforts tended in the direction of peace; that the war rumours were the work of the stockjobbers and the press, and that France and Germany were on excellent terms!
Under the circumstances, it is highly creditable to Lord Odo Russell that he received this communication with becoming gravity.
Gortschakoff who made his appearance after the dinner professed great satisfaction at Bismarck's language; but in conversation with Lord Odo Russell on the following day (May 11), Bismarck spoke with much irritation of Gortschakoff's intervention, which he attributed to senile vanity, and stated that he had refused Gortschakoff's request for a categorical promise not to go to war, because such a promise would have implied the existence of an intention which he repudiated.
On May 12, Gortschakoff sent a telegram to St. Petersburg which gave dire offence: La paix est assurée: and the Emperor of Russia requested Lord Odo to inform Her Majesty's Government that he felt certain of the maintenance of peace. Bismarck, secretly furious at the frustration of his plans, outwardly betrayed no ill-humour and put a good face upon his failure.
- * * * *
Lord O. Russell to Lord Derby.
Berlin, May 15, 1875.
Although Bismarck is as civil, confidential, and amiable
to me as ever, I fancy that he must be frantic at our combined
action with Russia in favour of peace, which took him by surprise.
However that matters little, and he will get over it, as he wishes
to keep well with us. But he will seek an opportunity of paying
out Gortschakoff for having come the Peacemaker and Dictator over
Germany again.
For my part, I was delighted at the course pursued by Her
Majesty's Government and at the instructions you sent me, which I
feel sure will do good, both at home and abroad.
The old Emperor William, whose bodily health is wonderful, but
whose mental powers are declining, will have been surprised and
grieved at the Queen writing to the Czar instead of to himself.
Bismarck thinks it is due to an intrigue of the Empress Augusta
to spite him. His hatred and abuse of the Empress is a perfect
mania. The Crown Prince sent for me to talk the incident over. He
asked many questions, but was himself reserved, beyond deploring
Bismarck's nervous state and policy which had been the cause of
such useless alarm. He asked whether I saw any likely successor to
Bismarck if his health broke down.
I said plenty would be found
in Germany when there was a demand for them, which Bismarck's
popularity at present excluded. The Prince, though reserved, was
very cordial and very anxious for information.
Your conversation with Schouvaloff is word for word what he
said to me. I note one mistake on his part. He spoke with certainty
of Austrian co-operation, which failed us at the last moment.
I was much impressed by the warmth and eloquence of the
Czar's utterances of friendship for England. He seemed really
to feel deeply what he said, and to wish with all his heart for
an alliance with us. Gortschakoff was less ardent: it is not in
his nature; but he was persuasive and consistent in his friendly
assurances. Schouvaloff's attitude and language will show whether
my impressions are correct or not.
Münster's assurances to you in regard to the German army are
quite correct, I believe; only it is better prepared for war than
any other army in the world, and at ten days' notice. But when
Bismarck tells him to lament the alarm he has created himself, and
to ascribe it to Ultramontane influences in the press, Münster must
feel rather ashamed of his master.
We may certainly reckon on peace for this year. Next year
peace must depend on the state of Bismarck's combinations for
the completion of his task--the unification of Germany--Russia
permitting. He left for Varzin this morning, which will do him
good; but he returns on the 27th instant to receive the King and
Queen of Sweden who stay three days in Berlin.
I did not mention in my official report that the Czar asked
me to tell him frankly, if I was at liberty to do so, whether I
thought Bismarck had designs on Austria. I told him what the wishes
of the National Party were, and what they expected of Bismarck
their leader, and that I believed he contemplated weakening Austria
to strengthen Germany. The Czar thanked me and said that although
suspicion had been suggested to him from many sides, he could not
get himself to believe in so much perfidy.
Such then in brief is the story of the great war scare of 1875, a tale which has been told by many writers with embellishments suggested by either Anglophil or Russophil proclivities.
Which of the two countries, England or Russia, contributed most towards the preservation of peace will probably always remain a subject of discussion, but Bismarck at all events never forgave Gortschakoff his vainglorious telegram, and he used afterwards to maintain that, whereas the English had 'behaved like gentlemen,' the conduct of the Russian Government came under a distinctly opposite category.
It is a remarkable fact that in spite of the indisputable evidence furnished not only by the foregoing correspondence, but from other sources, Bismarck subsequently had the hardihood to assert that the war scare of 1875 was a myth invented partly by Décazes for stockjobbing purposes and partly by the Ultramontane press--even the English press being according to his assertions under Ultramontane influence. In the authoritative work 'Bismarck: his Reflections and Reminiscences' it is lightly dismissed as an elaborate fiction.
'So far was I from entertaining any such idea at the time, or afterwards, that I would rather have resigned than lent a hand in picking a quarrel which would have had no other motive than preventing France from recovering her breath and her strength.'
Busch, in his better-known narrative, is also discreetly reticent on the subject, and the only reference to it occurs in some notes dictated to him by Bismarck in 1879. 'As far back as 1874 the threads of the Gortschakoff-Jomini policy are to be found in the foreign press--oglings and advances towards an intimacy between Russia and France of la revanche. The rejection of these addresses is due rather to France than to Russia. This policy does not appear to have originated with the Emperor Alexander.
It culminated in the period 1875-77, when the rumour was circulated that Gortschakoff had saved France from us, and when he began one of his circular despatches with the words, Maintenant la paix est assurée. You remember Blowitz's report in the Times. Read it again and mention the matter. His account was correct, except when he spoke of an anti-French military party in Prussia. No such party existed.'
It is instructive to compare with these passages the statements made in the 'Memoirs and Letters of Sir Robert Morier.'
The crisis was definitely passed when Lord Lyons returned to Paris, and he found the French overflowing with gratitude for the exertions of Her Majesty's Government in favour of peace. Both Marshal MacMahon and the Duc Décazes were profuse in their expressions, and the latter, in particular, said that he attached immense importance to the fact that the same sentiments in favour of peace had been expressed simultaneously at Berlin by England and Russia.
At the same time, while much encouraged at the thought that the danger of an attack from Germany had been averted, he affirmed very positively that he should not on this account relax his endeavours to avoid giving umbrage to the German Government.
On its being pointed out to him that it was obvious that the vast and increasing sums which figured in the Budget of the French War Department had produced in Germany a very general impression that France was preparing for an immediate retaliatory war, he gave the somewhat unconvincing assurance that a vote for clothing the reserve would be struck out, but would be replaced by a supplementary vote introduced in the winter, when a vote for clothing might seem 'natural and unimportant.' According to Décazes, both the Emperor of Russia and Gortschakoff had, on more than one occasion, used language which showed that they viewed with satisfaction the efforts of France to restore her military power, and he endeavoured to impress upon the Ambassador that Holland first, and then Belgium, were next to France most in danger from German ambition.
Finally, he pointed out with great satisfaction that Russia had not lent an ear to the offers which had, he presumed, been made to her at Berlin, to forward any ambitious views she might have in the East, and he said that he considered this particularly important, because it removed the only obstacle which might have interfered with a cordial co-operation, on the part of the British and Russian Governments, for the preservation of the peace of Europe.
Whether any such offers were made or refused is not known, but as the next few years were to show, Décazes's conclusion was about as faulty a one as could well be imagined.
'As regards public opinion in this country,' said Lord Lyons.
'I find no diminution of the conviction that at the present moment
a war with Germany would be fatal to France, and that very many
years must elapse before France will be able to undertake such
a war with any prospect of success.
All Frenchmen are earnestly
desirous that their army should be as speedily as possible placed
upon such a footing as to give them some security against attack,
and some influence in the world--but few look forward to there
being a time when they can contend with Germany, unless they have a
powerful ally to fight beside them in the field.
'In the meantime I must confess that the gratitude towards
England, which I hear expressed by men of all parties, far exceeds
anything that I could have expected. On the one hand it shows
perhaps the greatness of the terror from which the French have just
been relieved; but on the other, it is, I think, an indication of a
sincere disposition to accept heartily and ungrudgingly any proof
of good will from England.'
The insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which broke out in the summer of 1875, and the Turkish bankruptcy which followed a little later, provided the French with fresh cause for apprehension, as it was realized that the Eastern Question was once again reopened, and that any differences that might arise between England and Russia would be to the disadvantage of France.
The French, who now saw the hand of Bismarck in everything, believed that he had a plan of sending the Austrian army into the Herzegovina, and the Russian army into some other part of Turkey, with a view to sending the German army into France, and much as the Government would have liked to have done something for the French bondholders, and at the same time to have recovered some of the influence formerly enjoyed at Constantinople, it was afraid to take any action which might irritate the omnipotent chancellor.
Perhaps this was just as well, as far as England was concerned. The project of a European Conference at Constantinople, which had been already mooted, did not appear in any way to be conducive to British interests. Austria and Russia were not in agreement as to the policy to be pursued. The former had every reason to fear a Slav development on the frontier.
On the other hand, the Emperor of Russia could not, even if he wished it, afford to disregard the feeling of the Russians in favour of their fellows in race and in religion. Both Andrassy and Gortschakoff foreseeing that neither could obtain a solution entirely acceptable to opinion in his own country, desired apparently to throw a part of the responsibility on a European Conference. But in such a Conference Russia would be supreme. France and Germany would bid against each other for her favour. Austria would be afraid to set herself against her, and if England had any different views, she would always be outvoted.
Attention was shortly, however, diverted to another quarter. On November 17, Lord Derby learnt that it was absolutely necessary for the Khedive to procure between three and four millions sterling before the end of the month, and that he was preparing to sell his Suez Canal Shares.
- * * * *
Lord Derby to Lord Lyons.
10, Downing Street, Whitehall, Nov. 17, 1875.
I am not quite easy in my mind about a story I hear, to the
effect that the Khedive is negotiating with a French Company for
the sale of his interest in the Suez Canal. If the telegram has not
been sent to you officially, I will enclose it. Now his bias has
always hitherto been against the pretensions of Lesseps, and he has
been of use to us in keeping that rather irrepressible gentleman in
order. If he withdraws from the concern, and a French Company takes
his place in it, our position will be very unfavourably altered.
Have you heard anything of the negotiations in question?
I really
think the matter very serious, and it is one of which the English
public will fully understand the importance.
I think I am not violating any confidence in enclosing to you
for your personal use only an extract from Odo Russell's letter to
me received on Monday which seems to throw light on the situation.
I can add to it nothing in the way of comment.
Your information as to the position of the French Government
is satisfactory. It looks as if the worst of their troubles were
over.
P.S.--Since I began this note I have received further details,
which I send you, and, I may add in strict confidence that we are
prepared ourselves to take over the Viceroy's interest, if it
cannot be kept out of French hands by other means.
I find Lord Odo's letter is with the Prime Minister, so the
extract I promised must wait till next messenger.
The result of Lord Lyons's inquiries, which had to be made very discreetly, so as not to create suspicion, was the discovery that the Khedive was actively negotiating with a French Company, but it was believed that he wanted to mortgage, and not to sell the shares. Lord Derby's next letter to Lord Lyons shows how reluctantly he took action.
- * * * *
Nov. 19, 1875.
From General Stanton's[14] telegrams it appears that the
Khedive has no intention of selling his interest in the Suez Canal,
though he may be obliged to mortgage it for a time. He has promised
to give us notice, if, from any cause, he should change his mind,
and to give us the option of purchase.
I sincerely hope we may not be driven to that expedient. The
acquisition would be a bad one financially, and the affair might
involve us in disagreeable correspondence both with France and
the Porte. But there is a strong feeling here about not letting
the Canal go still more exclusively into French hands, and as we
contribute nearly four-fifths of the traffic, it cannot be said
that this jealousy is unreasonable. There are intrigues of all
sorts going on at Cairo, but I think we may reckon on the Khedive
being true to us, if not tempted too strongly. I rely on you to
tell me all you hear on the subject.
The memorandum of Lord Odo Russell referred to by Lord Derby is a lucid exposition of the European situation at the time and of Bismarck's attitude with regard to the other Powers, more especially Russia.
- * * * *
Berlin, Nov. 12, 1875.
Bülow is loquacious and straightforward on most subjects; but
his reticence on Oriental affairs is remarkable. I have repeatedly
tried the experiment of talking over what the newspapers say, to
draw him out, but he becomes silent and embarrassed, and seeks to
change the subject, and when questioned, replies that he has not
lately received any information from Constantinople.
I have in consequence tried to find out through confidential
sources what it all means, and putting two and two together, I
make out that Bismarck feels uncertain of Russia, and does not
wish to be committed too soon. Since Gortschakoff assumed the post
of peacemaker between France and Germany, Bismarck has failed to
re-establish confidential relations with Russia.
In regard to
Oriental affairs, Gortschakoff, instead of being satisfied to act
with his German and Austrian allies exclusively, has sought to
keep up an equally balanced understanding with England, France and
Italy: from which Bismarck suspects that Gortschakoff does not mean
to let him have his own way and wishes to control Germany through
the united action and agreement of the other European Powers.
This
does not suit his book, and above all, he fears that Russia wishes
to keep on good terms with England and France; which would, in his
opinion, neutralize the exclusive action of the three Northern
Powers, over which he hoped to establish his own influence to the
exclusion of all other Governments. By lending his assistance to
Russia in the East, he calculated on Russian neutrality in regard
to his own plans, as was the case during the late war with France.
The joint action of Russia and England last May, in the
interest of peace, took him by surprise, destroyed his fondest
calculations, and left him isolated and disappointed to reflect
on the possibility of a peace coalition against Germany, which he
could not break up without the certainty of Russian neutrality
or assistance.
He feels that Gortschakoff has abandoned him for
the time being, that he has lost the confidence of the Emperor
Alexander, and that while they live, there is but little hope of
a change of policy in Russia, favourable to his plans--viz. the
breaking up of Austria and the neutralization of the minor German
sovereignties.
Bismarck reckoned much on his friend Schouvaloff, but
Schouvaloff turned traitor last May, and is less German in England
than he was in Russia, which Bismarck cynically attributed to the
influence of wine and women.
Now Bismarck, I am told, affects honest indignation at the
manner in which Russia is deceiving and misleading Austria in
regard to Turkey; but in what that consists, I do not yet clearly
understand.
When he returns to Berlin he may possibly speak to me on these
subjects, and I should be glad to know whether there is anything in
particular which you may wish me to say, or not to say.
On the whole the present situation of affairs seems to me
favourable to the maintenance of peace.
Of course we must be prepared for an occupation of some
portions of European Turkey by Austria and Russia, but that need
not necessarily lead to war.
I have also endeavoured to find out what the views of
the National Party in regard to the East really are, and I
find that the breaking up of European Turkey would be received
with satisfaction, for the Turk has no friends in Germany. The
German provinces of Austria are looked upon as the natural and
inevitable inheritance, sooner or later, of the German Empire,
for which Austria might be compensated in Turkey, with or without
Constantinople.
Some people talk wildly of giving Constantinople
to Greece, as less likely to be objected to by the Western Powers.
But even Russia might take possession of Constantinople without
objection on the part of Germany. Anything calculated to break the
influence of France in the East, which is still thought to be too
great, would be popular in Germany, and more especially if the
interests of the Latin Church could be injured by it.
England may have Egypt if she likes. Germany will graciously
not object.
Since May it has become manifest that Russia has the power
to hamper the movements of Germany and arrest her progress
effectually, and that Germany can undertake nothing new without
the passive consent of Russia. This power must be so intolerable
to Bismarck that he is sure to exercise all his skill in drawing
Russia out of the combined arms of the Great Powers, back into
his own exclusive embrace. This, a difference between Russia and
Austria about Turkey, might enable him to achieve.
Bismarck's endeavours last winter to make us suspicious of
Russia, and vice versâ, are now fully explained. His failure must
add to the general irritation he suffers from.
The situation will become clearer when he returns to Berlin in
the course of the winter.
Lord Odo Russell's view of the situation tallied with what Gortschakoff had said to Décazes, Thiers, and other people at Vevey, earlier in the year. The preservation of peace seemed, therefore, to rest largely on Russia, and it was unfortunate that the Eastern Question presented itself in a form which certainly favoured Bismarck's efforts to create differences between Russia and Austria, and between Russia and England.
Further inquiries in Paris with regard to the Khedive's action seemed to confirm the view that he was seeking to mortgage the shares, but to whom they were to be mortgaged was unknown. On November 27, there arrived through Lord Tenterden, Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, the intelligence that Her Majesty's Government had bought the shares.
- * * * *
Lord Tenterden to Lord Lyons.
Foreign Office, Nov. 25, 1875.
Lord Derby is ill and at home. I am not sure therefore whether
he is writing to you to-night to tell you about the Suez Canal.
General Stanton telegraphed that Lesseps (supposed to be backed
by French Government) was offering four millions sterling (fr.
100,000,000) for the Khedive's shares, but that the Khedive would
sell them to England for the same sum. Thereupon he was instructed
to offer this amount, and the Khedive accepted this morning. The
contract was signed to-day, as we have just heard by telegram.
Messrs.
Rothschild advance the money on the security of the shares,
£1,000,000 in December, and the rest by instalments, the Khedive
to pay 5 per cent. on the shares while they remain without bearing
interest (the interest being hypothecated for the next twenty
years).
Her Majesty's Government are to apply to Parliament to take
the bargain off the Rothschilds' hands.
Practically, therefore, subject to Parliament's assent, Her
Majesty's Government have bought the shares.
I am writing in the greatest hurry but the above is a correct
outline of the case.
I suppose the French will make an ugly face.
P.S. It has all been kept very secret so far, so pray be
supposed to be ignorant till Lord Derby tells you.
The action of Her Majesty's Government was taken none too soon, for as Lord Lyons reported, the shares very nearly fell into the hands of the French. On November 26 the purchase of the shares was publicly announced, and on the following day Lord Derby had an interview with the French Ambassador on the subject.
- * * * *
Lord Derby to Lord Lyons.
Foreign Office, Nov. 27, 1875.
I have seen d'Harcourt. He came to hear what I could tell him
about the Suez affair, and I told him the whole story exactly as it
is.
He says that there will be some soreness in France, and I am
afraid he is right. You know the facts, and I need not therefore
repeat them. The points which I dwelt on were these:
We did not wish that the Khedive would sell, nor was there on
our part the slightest desire to alter the status quo. But we
could not help his selling, and as he had decided on doing so, we
took the only effectual steps to prevent the possibility of the
shares falling into hands whose possession of them might not be
favourable to our interests. The suddenness of the whole affair was
not our doing. If we had delayed, other purchasers would have come
forward. We had to take the opportunity as it offered itself or
lose it altogether.
It is not in the power of the British Government to act
as Continental Governments can, through third parties--banks,
financial companies, and the like. What we do, we must do openly,
and in our own names, so that Parliament may judge of the whole
transaction. This I said in answer to a remark made by d'Harcourt,
that the act would have had less political significance if done
through some company, or otherwise, and not directly in the name of
the State.
We hold even now a minority of the canal shares. The question
for us is not one of establishing an exclusive interest, but of
preventing an exclusive interest from being established as against
us.
I have always expressed my opinion that the best arrangement
for all the world would be the placing of the Canal under an
International Commission, like that of the Danube; and I think so
still. I knew, I said, that the French Government were not prepared
to entertain any such idea, and I therefore did not put it forward;
but if France and other Governments altered their way of thinking,
I did not think any difficulties would be made by England.
M. d'Harcourt expressed some fear, or at least thought that
some would be felt, lest the Khedive should be unable to pay his
promised £200,000 a year, and we in consequence should use some
means to coerce him, which would practically establish England in
authority in Egypt. I assured him that nothing was further from our
thoughts. We wanted the passage through Egypt as free for ourselves
as for the rest of the world, and we wanted nothing more.
The purchase of the Suez Canal shares has always been surrounded with much glamour and mystery, but in reality it seems to have been a perfectly straightforward and business-like proceeding, to which no reasonable objection could be taken. So far from being a profound political coup long calculated in advance, the action of Her Majesty's Government was totally unpremeditated, and as far as Lord Derby was concerned, it was undertaken with reluctance, and under the conviction that England was making a bad bargain.
So little confidence did Lord Derby feel, and so averse was he from incurring any further responsibility in Egypt, that he unhesitatingly declined a new proposal of the Khedive that he should sell to the British Government his contingent interest in the profits of the Suez Canal above five per cent., and informed the French of the fact. The British public, which warmly approved the transaction, seems to have been a better judge of the Foreign Secretary's action than he was himself.
The four millions' worth of shares acquired by the British Government represented nine-twentieths of the entire amount, and it is interesting to compare these figures with the estimate put upon the value of the Canal by Lesseps. On July 11, 1874, the latter called upon Lord Lyons and said that two persons from England had sounded him about the sale of the Canal; one a member of the English branch of the Rothschild family, and the other a Baron Emile d'Erlanger, a well-known banker living in Paris.
The Rothschild was no doubt Nathaniel,[15] M.P. for Aylesbury,
who was here in the beginning of June. Lesseps said that on being
pressed by him to state a sum, for which the Canal might be
purchased, he had said a milliard (£40,000,000) and he declared
that although this sum had startled even a Rothschild, it was only
a fair one. His object with me seemed to be to give the impression
that the shareholders would not sell the Canal for any sum.[16]
Although the French could hardly be expected to approve of the action of the British Government, which, if it had occurred some years earlier, would have caused a storm of indignation, they were, under existing circumstances, forced to accept it with tolerable equanimity, as it was of no use to add a coolness with England to their other difficulties; and, in addition, they gained a great deal by the rise which took place in Canal shares and Egyptian securities. Lesseps professed himself to be delighted and Bismarck sent a message to say that the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government had met with the support of the German Government.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 7: French Military Attaché at Berlin before the war of 1870.]
[Footnote 8: French Ambassador at St. Petersburg.]
[Footnote 9: Finance Minister.]
[Footnote 10: Lord Lyons to Lord Granville, Jan. 16, 1874.]
[Footnote 11: Blowitz.]
[Footnote 12: British Minister at Brussels.]
[Footnote 13: German Ambassador at London.]
[Footnote 14: British Consul-General at Cairo.]
[Footnote 15: Now Lord Rothschild.]
[Footnote 16: Lord Lyons to Lord Derby, July 11, 1874.]
CHAPTER XII
THE EASTERN QUESTION
(1876-1878)
In January, 1876, the gradual spread of the insurrection in Turkey led to the concoction by the three Imperial Powers of the so-called 'Andrassy Note,' and the great question was whether England would consent to take part in its presentation, in view of her traditional attitude towards Turkey.
Lord Derby, in a letter to Lord Lyons, stated that Bismarck was very anxious that we should do so, and explained that although 'one can trust none of these Governments, it is as well to give them credit for acting honestly until the reverse is proved,' and he was therefore in favour of such a course himself. In a letter[17] addressed to Mr.
Disraeli, asking for his views on the subject, Lord Derby remarked that: "It is too late to stand on the dignity and independence of the Sultan; a Sovereign who can neither keep the peace at home, nor pay his debts, must expect to submit to some disagreeable consequences."
Lord Lyons, on being consulted, concurred with Lord Derby's views.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Derby.
Paris, Jan. 14, 1876.
I hardly see how England is to avoid supporting the Andrassy
Note. If we stand aloof we shall stand alone. If our secession
produces no effect and the Turks still accept, we shall be in
the same foolish position France was in 1840; with this serious
inconvenience, that if the Andrassy plan fails in pacifying the
Herzegovina, we shall be blamed for the failure, as having caused
it by breaking up the unanimity of Europe. If the Turks do not
accept, they will be ready enough to throw the responsibility upon
us, and to call upon us to get them out of the scrape into which
they will get with the other Powers.
I think that by consenting we
should leave the Powers least excuse for attacking Turkey, or at
all events, least excuse for pushing on without consulting us. I
should not be for qualifying our support too much, for, if we do,
the failure of the plan, which is in my opinion more than probable,
will still be attributed to us, and a support, given as it were
against our will, and restricted to the least possible amount, will
be treated very much as opposition. I say all this because you ask
me to tell you what I think: but there are two important elements
for forming an opinion which I lack.
I mean a knowledge of public
opinion in England, and a knowledge of the real feelings of the
three Empires towards each other.
The despatch from Odo Russell looks as if Bismarck was
preparing for the possibility of a quarrel with Russia. Ever since
1870 he has been very naturally trying to turn every opportunity
of dividing England from France to account. But since you joined
Russia in insisting upon peace last year, and still more since
the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, he has no doubt formed a
higher opinion of England, and conceived the idea that she still
has the will and the means to play a foremost part in European
politics.
Like everybody else, he feels sure that if there is a
quarrel between Russia and Germany, France will side with Russia.
In order to prevent his enemy being all powerful at sea, he must
have the English fleet not merely neutral, but on his side. The
only advantage he can offer to England is support on the Eastern
Question, and it is on this question that he would have the best
chance of embroiling her with Russia. What part he means Austria to
play, I find it more difficult to guess.
That he intends some day,
and by some means, to annex German Austria to the German Empire I
make no doubt, but I suppose he is in no hurry to add so large a
Roman Catholic and Southern population to the electors of the Diet
of the Empire.
The worst service we could render France at present would
be to set up a separate understanding with her in opposition to
Germany.
The French Government was desperately anxious that England should not separate herself from the other Powers, partly from fear that such action would cause European complications, and partly because it was particularly desirous of getting credit with Russia for having brought English opinion round to Russian views. Her Majesty's Government finally decided to join in the Andrassy Note, although it would appear from Lord Derby's language, that the Cabinet were not unanimous on the question.
Meanwhile French internal politics remained in the same confused and unsatisfactory state which had prevailed for so long. The divisions amongst the Conservatives had made Monarchical Government in any form impossible, and yet they refused to acquiesce, even temporarily, in the moderate form of Republic which had been established, and seemed bent upon doing all they could to exchange their King Log for a King Stork in the shape of a Red Republic.
The elections which took place in the beginning of the year 1876 resulted in large Republican majorities both in the Senate and in the Chamber, and in the case of the former, this result was singularly unfortunate for Marshal MacMahon, as it deprived him of the power of forcing a dissolution. A letter from Lord Lyons to the Prince of Wales, who was on his way back from India, summarizes the French internal situation.
- * * * *
Paris, March 7, 1876.
I cannot give your Royal Highness a very satisfactory
account of French politics, although I do not take so gloomy a
view of them as many Frenchmen do. The large number of advanced
Republicans in the new Chamber of Deputies, the not inconsiderable
number of Ultra-Radicals, and the complete defeat of the Moderate
Conservatives in the Elections not unnaturally frighten the upper
classes of Frenchmen.
But in fact so many of the members are quite
new men, that one cannot foresee how parties will group themselves.
The Chambers meet to-morrow, and in about a month's time it will
be possible to form an opinion as to how things are likely to go.
So long as Marshal MacMahon is at the head of the State and of the
army, there can be no fear of any serious disturbance of material
order; and if he is at the same time firm and conciliatory with the
new Chamber, and willing to take a Ministry from the more moderate
members of the majority, he will very probably be rewarded by
finding how tame demagogues can become in office.
I understand the
Marshal insists upon having Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs
whom he knows and in whom he has confidence, but that he is willing
to let the other Departments be filled by men taken in the ordinary
way from the majority.
So far we have not this year been disturbed, as we were
last spring, by rumours of war, and agriculture and commerce are
flourishing in France, and the revenue goes on increasing.
Of the Egyptian Financial Question Your Royal Highness
will learn all particulars on the spot. Neither that, nor the
Herzegovina question are settled at this moment, but we must hope
that they are on the eve of being settled.
One of the new features in the French political situation was the recovery by Gambetta of his former influence, and as he was now a person of considerable influence, Sheffield was utilized for the purpose of eliciting his views. The late Mr. George Sheffield, who acted as Lord Lyons's private secretary for over twenty years, was a well-known figure in the political and social world of Paris, and included in his acquaintance most people both there and in London who were worth knowing.
Not only did he enjoy much personal popularity, but as he was known to be completely in Lord Lyons's confidence, he was the recipient of much confidential information, and generally believed to be a model of discretion. One of his peculiarities was that, in spite of much practice, he spoke very imperfect French with an atrocious accent, but this circumstance never appeared to prejudice him in any way, and it may incidentally be noted that the possession of what is called a good French accent is a much overrated accomplishment in France itself.
Frenchmen rarely wish to listen; they desire to talk themselves and to be listened to; to them, as a rule, a foreigner is a foreigner and nothing more, and whether he speaks French well or ill, they seldom notice and rarely care.
Gambetta, having secured a listener in the person of Sheffield, was no doubt delighted to expound his views on the situation. First of all, speaking on the subject of Bonapartist successes at the elections, he said that Bonapartism would die out as soon as it was realized that a moderate Republic was firmly established.
He expressed great delight at the fall of Thiers (Thiers had once described him as a fou furieux), and said that under him no real self-acting Republic could ever have been formed, that it would have fallen to pieces at his death, and indeed that the best thing Thiers could do for the Republic would be to die.
For Marshal MacMahon's entourage he had a great dislike, but for the Marshal himself much respect, and he aspired to be Prime Minister under him--a post to which he considered that he was fully entitled, but which the Décazes, Broglie, the Marshal's secretaries and the Maréchale and her friends would do their best to prevent him obtaining.
He professed confidence in being able to keep the extreme Radicals in order; said that the Red Flag was as obnoxious to him as the White Flag; that he was not inclined to grant a general amnesty to the Communists, and that he would not agree to the re-establishment of the National Guard. He also professed himself to be in favour of Free Trade, and asserted that the commercial Treaty concluded by Napoleon III. accounted for many of the Bonapartist successes.
Gambetta's aspiration of serving under the Marshal was never fulfilled, the above-mentioned entourage being presumably too strong for him; but the upper classes in France continued to look forward to the future with undiminished apprehension. French capital, reversing the present process, began to pour steadily into England, and it was stated that the rich Radicals were not the last in sending their money abroad.
'Marshal MacMahon's position,' wrote Lord Lyons at the end
of March, 'does not improve. He has so little political knowledge
or ability that, as events have shown, he exercises little or no
personal influence in politics. There is also a jealousy springing
up with regard to Emmanuel d'Harcourt and other people about him
who are supposed to direct his political conduct.
The officers
now at the head of the army would follow the Marshal very far in
any Conservative direction, but it may be questioned whether they
would submit patiently to being placed under a Radical Minister
of War--Gambetta for instance. It is the Marshal's political
intelligence that is doubted. No one has a word to say against his
disinterestedness, his honour, or his courage.'
Marshal MacMahon, a simple and amiable soldier, who knew nothing about politics, was credited with an overwhelming admiration for the capacity of his private secretary, Emmanuel d'Harcourt.
Upon one occasion, the question of applying for the extradition of a criminal who had fled to America was being discussed in his presence. 'Well,' said the Marshal, 'we must telegraph at once to San Francisco.' 'Pardon, M. le Maréchal,' interposed d'Harcourt, 'Washington, not San Francisco, is the capital of the United States.' The Marshal was so astounded at the profundity of his private secretary's knowledge that he was only able to ejaculate: 'Ce diable d'Harcourt! il sait tout!'
Many stories were told of his engaging simplicity of character, of which the following will serve as an instance. Upon one occasion he was inspecting a military academy, and was informed that there was present a young Arab chieftain of distinguished lineage to whom it would be desirable to address some words of encouragement. The young man was brought up, whereupon the following brief colloquy ensued:--
Marshal: 'Ah! c'est vous qui êtes le nègre?'
Arab Chief: 'Oui, M. le Maréchal.'
Marshal: 'Eh bien, mon garçon, continuez!'
By a curious combination of circumstances, Marshal MacMahon, with his inadequate political and intellectual equipment, was still able for some time to fill the place of a constitutional sovereign, and virtually the French were living under a constitutional Monarchy, with an Executive possessing large powers, rather than under a Republic. This state of things, however, could not last for long, and it seemed as if the choice lay between the youthful Prince Imperial and the establishment of a really Radical Republic.
In one respect the French had every reason to congratulate themselves, namely, upon the re-organization of their army, and some of the political consequences which were likely to result from this increased and increasing military strength are pointed out in the following letter.
- * * * *
Lord Lyons to Lord Derby.
Paris, Sept. 26, 1876.
As soon as General Conolly finishes his visits to the Autumn
Manoeuvres and makes his reports, it may perhaps be desirable for
me to send you some observations on the political consequences of
the great progress the French Army is making. All the officers of
Foreign Armies and the English officers especially who have been
out with the French troops this autumn, seem to agree in regarding
the improvement as being undoubted and very considerable.
In short,
it may not unreasonably be expected that in about three years from
this time, the French Army will be in such a state, that France
will count for as much or nearly as much, in the balance of power
in Europe, as she did before 1870.
The different phases of public opinion since the peace of
1871 may be described as follows. At first, rage and mortification
produced a wild and unreasoning cry for revenge. This was followed
by a depression almost amounting to despair. In this state of
things the rumours of an intended attack by Germany in 1875
produced nearly a panic. Since that time hope and confidence have
gradually returned. The general sentiment now is that France is
safely 'biding her ti
Edition notice Project Gutenberg source, credits & licence
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LORD LYONS
VOLUME II
[Illustration: _Lord Lyons, at the age of 65._
LONDON: EDWARD ARNOLD.]
LORD LYONS
A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY
BY
LORD NEWTON
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOLUME II
WITH PORTRAITS
LONDON
EDWARD ARNOLD
1913
_All rights reserved_
CONTENTS OF VOL. IIHeader as received
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