
Gutenberg · ebook 44125
The Histories of Polybius, Vol. 1 (of 2)
by Polybius · English · public domain in the US
The Histories of Polybius, Vol. 1 (of 2) by Polybius is an English public-domain text held from Project Gutenberg (ebook #44125). This book was published in two volumes, of which this is the first. The second volume was released as Project Gutenberg ebook #44126, available at https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44126.
PREFACE
This is the first English translation of the complete works of Polybius as far as they are now known. In attempting such a task I feel that I ought to state distinctly the limits which I have proposed to myself in carrying it out. I have desired to present to English readers a faithful copy of what Polybius wrote, which should at the same time be a readable English book.
I have not been careful to follow the Greek idiom; and have not hesitated to break up and curtail or enlarge his sentences, when I thought that, by doing so, I could present his meaning in more idiomatic English. Polybius is not an author likely to be studied for the sake of his Greek, except by a few technical scholars; and the modern complexion of much of his thought makes such a plan of translation both possible and desirable. How far I have succeeded I must leave my readers to decide.
Again, I have not undertaken to write a commentary on Polybius, nor to discuss at length the many questions of interest which arise from his text. Such an undertaking would have required much more space than I was able to give: and happily, while my translation was passing through the press, two books have appeared, which will supply English students with much that I might have felt bound to endeavour to give—the Achaean league by Mr. Capes, and the sumptuous Oxford edition of extracts by Mr.
Strachan-Davidson.
The translation is made from the text of Hultsch and follows his arrangement of the fragments. If this causes some inconvenience to those who use the older texts, I hope that such inconvenience will be minimised by the full index which I have placed at the end of the second volume.
I have not, I repeat, undertaken to write a commentary. I propose rather to give the materials for commentary to those who, for various reasons, do not care to use the Greek of Polybius. I have therefore in the first five complete books left him to speak for himself, with the minimum of notes which seemed necessary for the understanding of his text. The case of the fragments was different. In giving a translation of them I have tried, when possible, to indicate the part of the history to which they belong, and to connect them by brief sketches of intermediate events, with full references to those authors who supply the missing links.
Imperfect as the performance of such a task must, I fear, be, it has been one of no ordinary labour, and has occupied every hour that could be spared during several years of a not unlaborious life. And though I cannot hope to have escaped errors, either of ignorance or human infirmity, I trust that I may have produced what will be found of use to some historical students, in giving them a fairly faithful representation of the works of an historian who is, in fact, our sole authority for some most interesting portions of the world’s history.
It remains to give a brief account of the gradual formation of the text of Polybius, as we now have it.
The revival of interest in the study of Polybius was due to Pope Nicholas V (1447-1455), the founder of the Vatican Library. Soon after his election he seems to have urged Cardinal Perotti to undertake a Latin translation of the five books then known to exist. When Perotti sent him his translation of the first book, the Pope thus acknowledges it in a letter dated 28th August 1452:—[1]
“Primus Polybii liber, quem ad nos misisti, nuper a te de Graeca
in Latinam translatus, gratissimus etiam fuit et jucundissimus:
quippe in ea translatione nobis cumulatissime satisfacis. Tanta
enim facilitate et eloquentia transfers, ut Historia ipsa nunquam
Graeca, sed prorsus Latina semper fuisse videatur. Optimum igitur
ingenium tuum valde commendamus atque probamus, teque hortamur ut
velis pro laude et gloria tua, et pro voluptate nimia singulare
opus inchoatum perficere, nec labori parcas. Nam et rem ingenio
et doctrina tua dignam, et nobis omnium gratissimam efficies; qui
laborum et studiorum tuorum aliquando memores erimus....
Tu vero,
si nobis rem gratam efficere cupis, nihil negligentiae committas
in hoc opere traducendo. Nihil enim nobis gratius efficere
poteris. Librum primum a vertice ad calcem legimus, in cujus
translatione voluntati nostrae amplissime satisfactum est.”
On the 3d of January 1454 the Pope writes again to Perotti thanking him for the third book; and in a letter to Torelli, dated 13th November 1453, Perotti says that he had finished his translation of Polybius in the preceding September. This translation was first printed in 1473.
The Greek text was not printed till 1530, when an edition of the first five books in Greek, along with Perotti’s translation, was published at the Hague, opera Vincentii Obsopaei, dedicated to George, Marquess of Brandenburg. Perotti’s translation was again printed at Basle in 1549, accompanied by a Latin translation of the fragments of books 6 to 17 by Wolfgan Musculus, and reprinted at the Hague in 1598.
The chief fragments of Polybius fall into two classes; (1) those made by some unknown epitomator, who Casaubon even supposed might be Marcus Brutus, who, according to Plutarch, was engaged in this work in his tent the night before the battle of Pharsalus. The printing of these began with two insignificant fragments on the battle between the Rhodians and Attalus against Philip, Paris, 1536; and another de re navali, Basle, 1537. These fragments have continually accumulated by fresh discoveries.
(2) The other class of fragments are those made by the order of Constantinus Porphyrogenitus (911-959), among similar ones from other historians, which were to be digested under fifty-three heads or tituli; one of which (the 27th) has come down to us, discovered in the sixteenth century, containing the selecta de legationibus; and another (the 50th) de virtute et vitio. The printing of the first of these begins with the edition of Fulvius Ursinus, published at Antwerp in 1582.
This was supplemented in 1634 (Paris) by an edition by Valesius of excerpta ex collectaneis Constantini Augusti Porphyrogeneti. The first edition of something like a complete text of Polybius, containing the five entire books, the excerptae legationes, and fragments of the other books, was that of Isaac Casaubon, Paris, 1609, fo. It was accompanied by a new and very brilliant Latin translation, and a preface which has been famous among such works. It contains also a Latin translation of Aeneas Tacticus. Altogether it is a splendid book.
Some additional annotationes of Casaubon’s were published after his death in 1617, Paris.[2] Other editions followed; that of Gronovius, Amsterdam, 1670: of Ernesti, Leipsic, 1764, containing Casaubon’s translation more or less emended, and additional fragments.
But the next important step in the bibliography of Polybius was the publication of the great edition of Schweighaeuser, Leipsic, 1789-1795, in nine volumes, with a new Latin translation,—founded, however, to a great extent on Casaubon,—a new recension of the text, and still farther additions to the fragments; accompanied also by an excellent Lexicon and Onomasticon. This great work has been the foundation from which all modern commentaries on Polybius must spring.
Considerable additions to the fragments, collected from MSS. in the Vatican by Cardinal Mai, were published in 1827 at Rome. The chief modern texts are those of Bekker, 1844; Duebner (with Latin translation), 1839 and 1865; Dindorf, 1866-1868, 1882 (Teubner). A new recension of the five books and all the known fragments—founded on a collation of some twelve MSS. and all previous editions, as well as all the numerous works of importance on our Author that have appeared in Germany and elsewhere—was published by F.
Hultsch, Berlin, 1867-1872, in four volumes. This must now be considered the standard text. A second edition of the first volume appeared in 1888, but after that part of my translation had passed through the press.
Of English translations the earliest was by Ch. Watson, 1568, of the first five books. It is entitled The Hystories of the most famous Cronographer Polybios; Discoursing of the warres betwixt the Romanes and Carthaginenses, a rich and goodly work, conteining holsome counsels and wonderful devices against the inconstances of fickle Fortune.
Englished by C[hristopher] W[atson] whereunto is annexed an Abstract, compendiously coarcted out of the life and worthy Acts perpetrate by oure puissant Prince King Henry the fift. London, Imprinted by Henry Byneman for Tho. Hacket, 1568, 8vo. See Herbert’s Ames, p.
- Another translation of the five books was published by Edward
Grimestone, London, 1634, of which a second and third edition appeared in 1648 and 1673. A translation of the Mercenary War from the first book was made by Sir Walter Raleigh, and published after his death in 1647 (London, 4to). Next, a new translation of the five books was published in London, 1693 (2 vols. 8vo), by Sir H[enry] S[hears], with a preface by Dryden.
In 1741 (London, 4to) appeared “A fragment of the 6th book containing a dissertation on government, translated from the Greek of Polybius, with notes, etc., by A Gentleman.” This was followed by the first English translation, which contained any part of the fragments, as well as the five books, by the Rev. James Hampton, London, 4to, 1756-1761, which between that date and 1823 (2 vols., Oxford) went through at least seven editions. Lastly, a translation of Polybius’s account of Hannibal’s passage of the Alps is appended by Messrs.
Church and Brodribb to their translation of Livy, 21-22. There is a German translation by A. Haakh and Kraz, Stuttgart, 1858-1875. And a French translation by J. A. C. Buchon, Paris, 1842, Orléans, 1875. For the numerous German essays and dissertations on the text, and particular questions arising from the history, I must refer my readers to Engelmann’s Bibliotheca. In England such studies are rare. Mr.
Strachan-Davidson published an essay on Polybius in Hellenica; and his edition of extracts of the text (Oxford, 1888) contains several dissertations of value. Mr. Capes (London, 1888) has published an edition of extracts referring to the Achaean league, with an introductory essay on the author and his work. And a very admirable article on Polybius appears in the recent edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica by Mr. H. F. Pelham. There is also a good paper on Polybius in the Quarterly Review for 1879, No. 296.
Criticisms on Polybius, and estimates of his value as an historian, will be found in Thirlwall’s History of Greece, vol. viii.; Arnold’s History of Rome; Mommsen’s History of Rome, book iv. c. xiii.;
Freeman’s History of Federal Government and Essays; Bunbury’s Ancient Geography, vol. ii. p. 16; Law’s Alps of Hannibal. For the Roman side of his history, besides the works mentioned by Mr.
Strachan-Davidson, a good list of the literature on the 2d Punic war is given by Mr. W. T. Arnold in his edition of Dr. Arnold’s history of that period [London, Macmillan, 1886].
Finally, I have to express my warm thanks to Dr. Warre, Head Master of Eton, for aiding me with his unique knowledge of ancient and modern tactics in clearing up many points very puzzling to a civilian. To Mr. W. Chawner, Fellow and Tutor of Emmanuel College, for reading part of the translation in proof, and making valuable corrections and suggestions. And to Professor Ridgway, of Queen’s College, Cork, for corrections in the geographical fragments of book 34.
CONTENTS
PAGES
INTRODUCTION xvii-lx
BOOKS I TO IX 1-602
INTRODUCTION
I. POLYBIUS
Fortune cast the life of Polybius in stirring times.
His special claim to our admiration is that he understood the importance in the history of the world of the changes which were passing under his eyes, and exerted himself to trace the events which immediately preceded them, and from which they sprang, while it was yet possible to see and question surviving participators in them; to examine places, before they had lost all marks of the great events of which they had been the scene; and records or monuments before time had cast a doubt upon their meaning or authenticity. Nor is this ordinary praise.
Men are apt to turn their eyes upon the past, as holding all that is worthy of contemplation, while they fail to take note of history “in the making,” or to grasp the importance of the transactions of their own day. But as every year has its decisive influence on the years which succeed it, the greatest benefactor of posterity is the man who understands and records events as they pass with care and sincerity.
Laborious compilation, from the study and comparison of ancient records and monuments, has its value: it may often be all that it is possible to obtain; it may not unfrequently even serve to correct statements of contemporaries which have been deformed by carelessness or coloured by prejudice. But the best compilation is infinitely inferior in interest and instructiveness to the barest report of a contemporary.
And when such a man is also an eye-witness of much that he relates; when he knew and conversed with many of the chief actors in the great events which he records; when again he tells us of transactions so remote in time, that all written documents have necessarily perished, and those in more durable bronze and stone all but followed in their train, then indeed the interest rises to the highest pitch. Like Herodotus and Thucydides, then, Polybius tells us of his own times, and of the generations immediately preceding them.
It is true that the part of his work which has survived in a complete form deals with a period before his own day, just as the greater part of the history of Herodotus does, but in the larger part of the fragments he is writing with even more complete personal knowledge than Thucydides. He had, again, neither the faculty for story-telling possessed by Herodotus nor the literary and dramatic force of Thucydides.
The language which he spoke and wrote had lost the magic of style; had lost the lucidity and grace of Sophocles, and the rugged vigour and terseness of Thucydides. Nor had he apparently acquired any of those artifices which, while they sometimes weary us in the later rhetoricians, yet generally serve to make their writings the easiest and pleasantest of reading. Equally remote again is his style from the elaborate and involved manner of Plutarch, with its huge compound words built up of intricate sentences, more like difficult German than Greek.
Polybius had no tricks of this sort;[3] but his style lacks logical order and clearness. It seems rather the language of a man of affairs, who had had neither leisure to study style, nor taste to read widely with a view to literature as such. But after all it is Greek, and Greek that still retained its marvellous adaptability to every purpose, to every shade of thought, and every form of literature. Nor is his style in the purely narrative parts of his work wanting in a certain force, derived from singleness and directness of purpose.
He “speaks right on,” and turns neither to the right hand nor the left. It is when he reflects and argues and moralises, that his want of literary skill sometimes makes him difficult and involved; and though the thought is essentially just, and his point of view wonderfully modern, we continually feel the want of that nameless charm which the Greeks called χάρις.
His bent for historical composition was fortunately encouraged by the circumstances of his life, which gave Polybius special opportunities of satisfying his curiosity and completing his knowledge.
Not only was he the son of a man who had held the highest office in the league, and so must have heard the politics and history of Achaia discussed from his earliest youth; not only from early manhood was he himself in the thick of political business; but he knew the sovereigns of Egypt and Pergamus, of Macedonia and Syria, and the Roman generals who conquered the latter. He had visited a Roman camp and witnessed its practical arrangements and discipline.
And his enforced residence of sixteen years in Italy and Rome was, by the good fortune of his introduction to Aemilius Paullus and his sons, turned into an opportunity of unrivalled advantage for studying the laws, military discipline, and character of the imperial people whose world conquest he chronicles. Unlike his fellow-exiles, he did not allow his depressing circumstances to numb his faculties, exasperate his temper, or deaden his curiosity.
He won the confidence of the leading men at Rome; and seems, while pushing on his inquiries with untiring vigour, to have used his influence for the benefit of his countrymen, and of all Greek subjects of Rome.
But, like so many of the writers of antiquity, he has had no one to perform for him the service he had done for others in rescuing their achievements and the particulars of their career from oblivion. Of the many testimonia collected by Schweighaeuser and others from ancient writers, scarcely one gives us any details or anecdotes of the writer, whose work they briefly describe or praise. We are reduced as usual to pick out from his own writings the scattered allusions or statements which help us to picture his character and career.
[Sidenote: Birth of Polybius.]
Polybius of Megalopolis was the son of Lycortas, the friend and partisan of Philopoemen, who had served the Achaean league in several capacities: as ambassador to Rome in B.C. 189, along with Diophanes, on the question of the war with Sparta,[4] and to Ptolemy Epiphanes in B.C. 186,[5] and finally as Strategus in B.C. 184-183. Of the year of his birth we cannot be certain. He tells us that he was elected to go on embassy from the league to Ptolemy Epiphanes in the year of the death of that monarch (B.C.
181), although he was below the legal age.[6] But we do not know for certain what that age was; although it seems likely that it was thirty, that apparently being the age at which a member of the league exercised his full privileges.[7] But assuming this, we do not know how much under that age he was. Two years previously (B.C. 183) he had carried the urn at Philopoemen’s funeral.
This was an office usually performed by quite young men (νεανίσκοι)[8], probably not much over twenty years old. As we know that he lived to write a history of the Numantine war, which ended B.C. 133[9], and that he was eighty-two at the time of his death[10], we shall not, I think, be probably far wrong if we place his birth in B.C. 203 and his death in B.C. 121 as Casaubon does, who notes that the latter is just sixteen years before the birth of Cicero. But though this is a good working hypothesis, it is very far from being a demonstrated fact.
Between B.C. 181-168 he was closely allied with his father in politics; and if we wish to have any conception of what he was doing, it is necessary to form some idea of the state of parties in the Peloponnese at the time.
The crowning achievement of Philopoemen’s career had been the uniting of Sparta to the Achaean league, after the murder of the tyrant Nabis by the Aetolians who had come to Sparta as his allies (B.C. 192). In B.C. 191 the Achaeans were allowed to add Messene and Elis to their league, as a reward for their services to Rome in the war against Antiochus. The Aetolian league, the chief enemy and opponent of Achaia, was reduced to a state of humble dependence on Rome in B.C. 189, after the defeat of Antiochus at Thermopylae (B.C.
191) and the Aetolian war (B.C. 191-189). From B.C. 190 then begins the time during which Polybius says that the “name of the Achaeans became the universal one for all the inhabitants of the Peloponnese” (2, 42).
But though Sparta was included in the league she was always a restive and dissatisfied member; and the people of Elis and Messene, who were not very willing members either, were told by Flamininus that if they had any reason to complain of the federal government they were to appeal to him.[11] Now, by a treaty of alliance with Rome, decreed at Sikyon in B.C.
198, it was provided that Rome should receive no envoys from separate states of the league, but only from the league itself.[12] Flamininus, therefore, if he said what Livy reports him to have said, was violating this treaty. And this will be a good instance to illustrate the divisions of parties existing during the period of Polybius’s active political life (B.C. 181-169). We have seen that in B.C.
198 the Achaean league became an ally of Rome as a complete and independent state; that this state was consolidated by the addition of Sparta (192) and Elis and Messene (191) so as to embrace the whole of the Peloponnese; that its chief enemy in Greece, the Aetolian league, was rendered powerless in B.C. 189. The Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese had been abolished after the battle of Cynoscephalae (197) by the proclamation of Greek freedom by Flamininus (196).
But all this seeming liberty and growth in power really depended upon the favour of Rome, and was continually endangered not only by the appeals to the Senate from separate states in the league, who conceived themselves wronged, but by treasonable representations of her own envoys, who preferred a party triumph to the welfare and independence of their country[13].
In these circumstances, there were naturally differences of opinion as to the proper attitude for the league government to assume towards a state, which was nominally an equal ally, but really an absolute master. There was one party who were for submissively carrying out the will of the Roman officers who from time to time visited the Peloponnese; and for conciliating the Senate by displaying a perpetual readiness to carry out its wishes, without putting forward in any way the rights which the treaty of 198 had secured to them.
The leaders of this party, in the time of Philopoemen, were Aristaenos and Diophanes. The other party, headed till his death by Philopoemen, equally admitting that the Roman government could not be safely defied, were yet for aiming at preserving their country’s independence by strictly carrying out the terms of the Roman alliance, and respectfully but firmly resisting any encroachment upon those terms by the officers representing the Roman government. On Philopoemen’s death (B.C.
183) Lycortas, who had been his most devoted follower, took, along with Archon, the lead of the party which were for carrying out his policy; while Callicrates became the most prominent of the Romanising party. Lycortas was supported by his son Polybius when about B.C. 181 he began to take part in politics. Polybius seems always to have consistently maintained this policy. His view seems to have been that Rome, having crushed Philip and Antiochus, was necessarily the supreme power.
The Greeks must recognise facts; must avoid offending Rome; but must do so by keeping to a position of strict legality, maintaining their rights, and neither flattering nor defying the victorious Commonwealth. He believed that the Romans meant fairly by Greece, and that Greek freedom was safe in their hands[14]. But the straightforward policy of the Senate, if it was ever sincere, was altered by the traitor Callicrates in B.C.
179; who, being sent to Rome to oppose what the league thought the unconstitutional restitution of certain Spartan exiles, advised the Senate to use the Romanising party in each state to secure a direct control in Achaia[15]. Acting on this insidious advice, the Roman government began to view with suspicion the legal and independent attitude of the other party, and to believe or affect to believe that they were enemies of the Roman supremacy.
Lycortas, Archon, and Polybius, finding themselves the objects of suspicion, not less dangerous because undeserved, to the Roman government, appear to have adopted an attitude of reserve, abstaining from taking an active or prominent part in the business of the assemblies. This, however, did not succeed in averting Roman jealousy; and the commissioners, Gaius Popilius and Gnaeus Octavius, who visited the Peloponnese in B.C. 169, gave out that those who held aloof were as displeasing to the Senate as those who openly opposed it.
They were said to have resolved on formally impeaching the three statesmen before the Achaean assembly as being enemies of Rome; but when the assembly met at Aegium, they had failed to obtain any reasonable handle against them, and contented themselves with a speech of general exhortation.[16] This was during the war with Perseus, when the Romans kept a vigilant eye on all parts of Greece, and closely inquired which politicians in the several states ventured to display the least sympathy with the Macedonian king, or were believed to secretly nourish any wish for his success.
It speaks strongly both for the independent spirit still surviving in the league, as well as for the character of Archon and Polybius, that they were elected, apparently in the same assembly, the one Strategus and the other Hipparch for the year B.C.
169-168.[17] In this office Polybius doubtless hoped to carry out the principles and discipline of Philopoemen, under whom he had probably served in the cavalry, and whose management of this branch of the service he had at any rate minutely studied.[18] But there was little occasion for the use of the Achaean cavalry in his year. Being sent on a mission to Q.
Marcius Philippus at Heracleia to offer the league’s assistance in the war with Perseus, when their help was declined, he remained behind after the other ambassadors had returned, to witness the campaign.[19] After spending some time in the Roman camp, he was sent by Q. Marcius to prevent the Achaeans from consenting to supply five thousand men to Appius Claudius Cento in Epirus. This was a matter of considerable delicacy. He had to choose between offending one or the other powerful Roman.
But he conducted the affair with prudence, and on the lines he had always laid down, those, namely, of strict legality.
He found the Achaean assembly in session at Sicyon; and he carried his point by representing that the demand of Appius Claudius did not bear on the face of it the order of the Senate, without which they were prohibited from supplying the requisitions of Roman commanders.[20] He thus did not betray that he was acting on the instigation of Quintus Marcius, and put himself and the league in an attitude of loyalty toward the Senate.[21] In the same cautious spirit he avoided another complication.
Certain complimentary statues or inscriptions had been put up in various cities of the league in honour of Eumenes, king of Pergamus, and on some offence arising had been taken down. This seems to have annoyed Eumenes exceedingly; and Polybius persuaded the people that it had been ordered by Sosigenes and Diopeithes, as judges, from feelings of personal spite, and without any act of Eumenes unfriendly to the league.
He carried his point, and thus avoided offending a king who at that time was on very friendly terms with Rome.[22] But while thus minded to avoid unnecessary offence, Polybius and his party were in favour of strengthening the league by alliances which could be entered upon with safety. Egypt at this time was under the joint government of two Ptolemies, Philometor and Physcon, who were being threatened with an invasion by Antiochus Epiphanes.
The friendship of the league with the kings of Egypt had been of long standing, as far back as the time of Aratus; and though that friendship had been afterwards interrupted by the Macedonian policy of Aratus, just before his death the father of these kings had presented the league with ten ships and a sum of money. The two kings now sent to beg for aid; and asked that Lycortas should come as commander-in-chief, and Polybius as hipparch.
Lycortas and Polybius were in favour of supplying the assistance asked.[23] But the measure was opposed by Callicrates and his partisans, on the specious ground that their whole efforts should be directed to aid the Romans against Perseus. Lycortas and Polybius replied that the Romans did not require their help; and that they were bound, by gratitude, as well as by treaty, to help the Ptolemies. They carried with them the popular feeling: but Callicrates outwitted them by obtaining a dispatch from Q.
Marcius, urging the league to join the senate in effecting a reconciliation between Antiochus and the kings of Egypt. Polybius gave in, and advised compliance. Ambassadors were appointed to aid in the pacification; and the envoys from Alexandria were obliged to depart without effecting their object. They contented themselves with handing in to the magistrates the Royal letters, in which Lycortas and Polybius were invited by name to come to Alexandria.[24]
[Sidenote: B.C. 167.]
Careful, however, as he had ever been to avoid giving just offence to Rome, he and his party had long been marked by the Senate as opponents of that more complete interference in the details of Achaean politics which it wished to exercise.
This was partly owing to the machinations of Callicrates; but it was also the result of the deliberate policy of the Senate: and it was doubtless helped by the report of every Roman officer who had found himself thwarted by the appeal to legality, under the influence of the party in the league with which Polybius was connected.[25] Accordingly, soon after the final defeat of Perseus by Aemilius Paulus in B.C.
168, and the consequent dismemberment of Macedonia, the Senate proceeded to execute its vengeance upon those citizens in every state in Greece who were believed to have been opposed to the Roman interests. The commissioners entrusted with the settlement and division of Macedonia were directed to hold an inquiry into this matter also.
From every city the extreme partisans of Rome were summoned to assist them, men who were only too ready to sacrifice their political opponents to the vengeance of the power to which they had long been paying a servile and treacherous court.
From Boeotia came Mnasippus; from Acarnania, Chremes; from Epirus, Charops and Nicias; from Aetolia, Lyciscus and Tisippus; and from Achaia, Callicrates, Agesias, and Philippus.[26] Instigated by these advisers, the commissioners ordered the supposed covert enemies of Rome in the several states to proceed to Italy to take their trial. To Achaia two commissioners, Gaius Claudius and Gnaeus Domitius, were sent.
An Achaean assembly being summoned to meet them, they announced that there were certain men of influence in the league who had helped Perseus by money and other support. They required that a vote should be passed condemning them all to death; and said that, when that was done, they would publish the names. Such a monstrous perversion of justice was too much for the assembly, who refused to vote until they knew the names. The commissioners then said that all the Strategi who had been in office since the beginning of the war were involved.
One of them, Xeno, came forward, declared his innocence, and asserted that he was ready to plead his cause before any tribunal, Achaean or Roman. Upon this the commissioners required that all the accused persons should go to Rome. A list of one thousand names was drawn up, under the guidance of Callicrates, of those who were at once to proceed to Italy[27] (B.C. 167). The court of inquiry, before which they were to appear, was never held.
They were not allowed even to stay in Rome, but were quartered in various cities of Italy, which were made responsible for their safe custody: and there they remained until B.C. 151, when such of them as were still alive, numbering then somewhat less than three hundred, were contemptuously allowed to return.[28] Among these detenus was Polybius.
We do not hear that Lycortas was also one, from which it has been with some probability supposed that he was dead. More fortunate than the rest, Polybius was allowed to remain at Rome. He had made, it seems, the acquaintance of Aemilius Paulus and his two sons in Macedonia, and during the tour of Amelius through Greece after the Macedonian war.[29] And on their return to Italy he was allowed by their influence to remain in Rome; and, acting as tutor to the two boys,[30] became well acquainted with all the best society in the city.
The charming account which he gives[31] of the mutual affection existing between him and the younger son of Aemilius (by adoption now called Publius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus) bears all the marks of sincerity, and is highly to the credit of both. To it we may add the anecdote of Plutarch, that “Scipio, in observance of the precept of Polybius, endeavoured never to leave the forum without having made a close friend of some one he met there.”
But much as he owed to the friendship of the sons of Aemilius, he owed it also to his own energy and cheerful vigour that these sixteen years of exile were not lost time in his life.
He employed them, not in fruitless indulgence in homesickness, or in gloomy brooding over his wrongs, but in a careful and industrious study of the history and institutions of the people among whom he was compelled to reside[32]; in ingratiating himself with those members of the Senate who he thought might be useful to his countrymen; and in forming and maturing his judgment as to the course of policy they ought to pursue. Nor was he without means of gratifying lighter tastes.
He was an active sportsman: and the boar-hunting in the district of Laurentum not only diverted his attention from the distressing circumstances of his exile, and kept his body in vigorous health, but obtained for him the acquaintance of many men of rank and influence.
Thus for instance his intimacy with the Syrian prince Demetrius, afterwards king Demetrius Soter, was made in the hunting-field[33]: and the value which this young man attached to his advice and support is some measure of the opinion entertained generally of his wisdom, moderation, and good judgment. We have no further details of his life in Rome; but we have what is better,—its fruits, in the luminous account of its polity, the constitution of its army, and the aims of its statesmen.
[Sidenote: B.C. 151. Release of the detenus.]
At last the time came when he was once more free to visit his own country, or to extend his knowledge by visiting the countries which he wished to describe. After repeated applications to the Senate by embassies from Achaia, made without avail, in B.C. 151 Polybius appeared in person to plead the cause before the Fathers. There was now, it was thought, no reason for retaining these unfortunate men.
The original thousand had shrunk to less than three hundred; middle-aged men had become in sixteen years old and decrepit; they had lost connexions and influence in the Peloponnese; they had learnt by bitter experience the impossibility of resisting the power of Rome, and were no longer likely to venture on organising any opposition. Their longer detention could only be a measure of vengeance, and useless vengeance.
Still the debate in the Senate was long and doubtful, until it was brought to a conclusion by the contemptuous exclamation of Cato: “Are we to sit here all day discussing whether some old Greek dotards are to be buried by Italian or Achaean undertakers?” Polybius, elated by a concession thus ungraciously accorded, wished to enter the Senate once more with a further request for a restitution of their property in Achaia. But Cato bluntly bade him “remember Ulysses, who wanted to go back into the cave of the Cyclops to fetch his cap and belt.”[34]
[Sidenote: Coss. L. Marcius Censornius, Manius Manilius, B.C. 149.
Polybius sent for to Lilybaeum.]
Polybius seems to have returned to the Peloponnese at once, and to have remained there until B.C. 149, when he was suddenly summoned to serve the government whose enforced guest he had been so long. It was the year in which the Senate had determined to commence their proceedings against Carthage, which were not to be stayed until she was levelled with the ground. In B.C. 150 the victory of Massanissa had restored the oligarchs, who had been superseded by the popular anti-Roman party in Carthage.
These men hastened to make every possible offer of submission to Rome. The Senate had made up its mind for war; and yet did not at once say so.
After demanding that full satisfaction should be made to Massanissa, it next decreed that the Carthaginians must at once give three hundred of their noblest youths as hostages to the Roman consuls Manilius and Censorinus, who had sailed to Lilybaeum with secret orders to let no concession induce them to stop the war until Carthage was destroyed.[35] There was naturally some hesitation in obeying this demand at Carthage; for the hostages were to be given to the Romans absolutely without any terms, and without any security.
They felt that it was practically a surrender of their city. To overcome this hesitation Manilius sent for Polybius, perhaps because he had known and respected him at Rome, and believed that he could trust him; perhaps because his well-known opinion, as to the safety in trusting the Roman fides, might make him a useful agent. But also probably because he was known to many influential Carthaginians, and perhaps spoke their language.[36] He started for Lilybaeum at once.
But when he reached Corcyra he was met with the news that the hostages had been given up to the consul: he thought, therefore, that the chance of war was at an end, and he returned to the Peloponnese.[37]
He must soon have learnt his mistake. The Consul, in accordance with his secret instructions,—first to secure the arms in Carthage, and then to insist on the destruction of the town,—gradually let the wretched people know the extent of the submission required of them.
These outrageous demands resulted in the Carthaginians taking the desperate resolution of standing a siege. Censorinus and his colleague accordingly began operations; but they were not capable of so great an undertaking. The eyes of the whole army were turned upon Scipio Aemilianus, who was serving as a military tribune. The siege lingered through the summer of B.C. 148 without any result; and when in the autumn Scipio left for Rome, to stand for the Aedileship, he started amidst loud expressions of hope that he might return as Consul, though below the legal age.[38]
The loss of so much of Polybius’s narrative at this point leaves us uncertain when he arrived in Africa: but as he met and conversed with Massanissa,[39] who died in B.C. 148, it seems likely that he did join the army after all in B.C. 149. At any rate he was in Scipio’s train in B.C.
147-146, when he was in chief command of the army, first as consul, and then as proconsul; advised him on sundry points in the formation of his siege works; stood by his side when Carthage was burning; and heard him, as he watched the dreadful sight, utter with tearful eyes the foreboding of what might one day befall Rome.[40] Scipio is also said to have supplied him with ships for an exploring expedition round the coast of Africa;[41] and it seems most likely that this was in his year of consulship (147), as after the fall of Carthage Polybius went home.
The destruction of Carthage took place in the spring of B.C. 146. When Scipio went back to celebrate his triumph, Polybius seems to have returned to the Peloponnese, there to witness another act of vengeance on the part of Rome, and to do what he could to lighten the blow to his countrymen, and to preserve the fragments of their shattered liberties.
[Sidenote: B.C. 148.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 147.]
Among the restored Achaean exiles were Diaeus, Damocritus, Alcamenes, Theodectes, and Archicrates. They had returned with feelings embittered by their exile; and without any of the experience of active life, which might have taught them to subordinate their private thirst for revenge to the safety of their country. Callicrates died in B.C. 148, and Diaeus was Strategus in B.C. 149-148, 147-146.
The appearance of the pseudo-Philip (Andriscus) in Macedonia, and the continued resistance of Carthage during his first year of office (148), encouraged him perhaps to venture on a course, and to recommend the people to adopt a policy, on which he would otherwise not have ventured.
Troubles arising out of a disgraceful money transaction between the Spartan Menalchidas, Achaean Strategus, and the Oropians, who had bribed him to aid them against the Athenians, had led to a violent quarrel with Callicrates, who threatened to impeach him for treason to the league in the course of an embassy to Rome. To save himself he gave half the Oropian money to Diaeus, his successor as Strategus (B.C. 149-148).
This led to a popular clamour against Diaeus: who, to save himself, falsely reported that the Senate had granted the Achaeans leave to try and condemn certain Spartans for the offence of occupying a disputed territory. Sparta was prepared to resist in arms, and a war seemed to be on the point of breaking out. Callicrates and Diaeus, however, were sent early in B.C. 148 to place the Achaean case before the Senate, while the Spartans sent Menalchidas. Callicrates died on the road. The Senate heard, therefore, the two sides from Diaeus and Menalchidas, and answered that they would send commissioners to inquire into the case.
The commissioners, however, were slow in coming; so that both Diaeus and Menalchidas had time to misrepresent the Senate’s answer to their respective peoples. The Achaeans believed that they had full leave to proceed according to the league law against the Spartans; the Spartans believed that they had permission to break off from the league. Once more, therefore, war was on the point of breaking out.[42] Just at this time Q. Caecilius Metellus was in Macedonia with an army to crush Andriscus.
He was sending some commissioners to Asia, and ordered them to visit the Peloponnese on their way and give a friendly warning. It was neglected, and the Spartans sustained a defeat, which irritated them without crushing their revolt. When Diaeus succeeded Damocritus as Strategus in B.C. 147, he answered a second embassy from Metellus by a promise not to take any hostile steps until the Roman commissioners arrived.
But he irritated the Spartans by putting garrisons into some forts which commanded Laconia; and they actually elected Menalchidas as a Strategus in opposition to Diaeus. But finding that he had no chance of success Menalchidas poisoned himself.[43]
Then followed the riot at Corinth.[44] Marcus Aurelius Orestes at the head of a commission arrived at last at Corinth, and there informed the magistrates in council that the league must give up Argos, Corinth, and Sparta. The magistrates hastily summoned an assembly and announced the message from the Senate; a furious riot followed, every man in Corinth suspected of being a Spartan was seized and thrown into prison; the very residence of the Roman commissioners was not able to afford such persons any protection, and even the persons of Orestes and his colleagues were in imminent danger.
Some months afterwards a second commission arrived headed by Sextus Julius Caesar, and demanded, without any express menace, that the authors of the riot should be given up. The demand was evaded; and when Caesar returned to Rome with his report, war was at once declared.
[Sidenote: B.C. 147-146.]
The new Strategus, elected in the autumn of B.C. 147, was Critolaus.
He was a bitter anti-Romanist like Diaeus: and these statesmen and their party fancied that the Romans, having already two wars on hand, at Carthage and in Spain, would make any sacrifice to keep peace with Achaia. They had not indeed openly declined the demands of Sextus, but, to use Polybius’s expressive phrase, “they accepted with the left hand what the Romans offered with the right.”[45] While pretending to be preparing to submit their case to the Senate, they were collecting an army from the cities of the league.
Inspired with an inexplicable infatuation, which does not deserve the name of courage, Critolaus even advanced northwards towards Thermopylae, as if he could with his petty force bar the road to the Romans and free Greece. He was encouraged, it was said, by a party at Thebes which had suffered from Rome for its Macedonising policy. But, rash as the march was, it was managed with at least equal imprudence.
Instead of occupying Thermopylae, they stopped short of it to besiege Trachinian Heracleia, an old Spartan colony,[46] which refused to join the league. While engaged in this, Critolaus heard that Metellus (who wished to anticipate his successor Mummius) was on the march from Macedonia. He beat a hasty retreat to Scarpheia in Locris,[47] which was on the road leading to Elateia and the south; here he was overtaken and defeated with considerable slaughter.
Critolaus appears not to have fallen on the field; but he was never seen again. He was either lost in some marshes over which he attempted to escape, as Pausanias suggests, or poisoned himself, as Livy says.
Diaeus, as his predecessor, became Strategus, and was elected for the following year also. Diaeus exerted himself to collect troops for the defence of Corinth, nominally as being at war with Sparta. He succeeded in getting as many as fourteen thousand infantry and six hundred cavalry, consisting partly of citizens and partly of slaves; and sent four thousand picked men under Alcamenes to hold Megara, while he himself occupied Corinth. When Metellus approached, however, this outpost at Megara hastily retreated into Corinth. Metellus took up his position in the Isthmus, and offered the Achaeans the fairest terms.
Diaeus, however, induced them to reject all offers; and Metellus was kept some time encamped before Corinth.
[Sidenote: B.C. 146. Arrival of Mummius.]
It was now late in the spring of B.C. 146, and the new Consul, Lucius Mummius, arrived at the Roman camp. He at once sent Metellus back to Macedonia, and quietly awaited the arrival of fresh troops, which he had sent for from Crete and Pergamum, as well as from Italy.[48] He eventually had an army of about thirty thousand men, nearly double of the Greek army in Corinth. Nothing apparently was done till the late summer, or autumn. But then the final catastrophe was rapid and complete. The Roman officers regarded the Achaean force with such contempt, that they did not take proper precautions, so that Diaeus won a slight advantage against one of the Roman outposts.
Flushed with this success, he drew out for a pitched battle, in which he was totally defeated. He made his way to Megalopolis, where, after killing his wife, he poisoned himself.
[Sidenote: Polybius saves some statues of national interest.]
Thus by a series of imprudent measures, which Polybius denounces, but was not at home to oppose, the Achaean league had drifted into downright war with Rome; and, almost without a struggle, had fallen helplessly at her feet, forced to accept whatever her mercy or contempt might grant. Mercy, however, was to be preceded by stern punishment.
Corinth was given up to plunder and to fire, and Polybius returned from Africa in time to witness it.[49] The destruction or deportation of works of art, of pictures, statues, and costly furniture, he could not prevent; but he spoke a successful word to preserve the statues of Philopoemen in the various cities from destruction; and also begged successfully for the restoration of some of the Eponymous hero Achaeus, and of Philopoemen and Aratus, which had already been transported as far as Acarnania on their way to Italy.[50] He also dissuaded his friends from rushing to take their share in the plunder by purchasing the confiscated goods of Diaeus, which were put to auction and could be bought at low rates; and he refused to accept any of them himself.[51]
[Sidenote: The new settlement of the Peloponnese, B.C. 146-145.]
The settlement of the territories of the league was put into the hands of a commission of ten men who were sent out after the sack of Corinth; while Mummius, after seeing that such towns in the Peloponnese as had joined in the war were deprived of their fortifications and arms, and after inflicting punishment upon other towns in Greece which had shown active sympathy with Perseus, especially Thebes and Chalcis, returned home to celebrate his triumph, which was adorned with marble and bronze statues and pictures from Corinth.[52] The commissioners who had been sent out to make a final settlement of Greece, or Achaia, as it was henceforth to be called in official language, settled the general plan in conjunction with Mummius; but the commissioners continued their labours for six months, at the end of which time they departed, leaving Polybius to settle with each town the details of their local legislation.
The general principles which the commissioners laid down were first, the entire abolition of all the leagues, and consequently of the league assemblies; each town, with its surrounding district, which had once formed a canton in the league, was to be separate and independent: its magistrates, secondly, were to be selected according to a fixed assessment of property, the old equality or democracy being abolished: thirdly, no member of one canton might own property in another: fourthly, the Boeotians were ordered to pay a heavy compensation to the Heracleots and Euboeans, and the Achaeans to the Spartans: lastly, a fixed tribute to Rome was imposed on all states in Greece.[53] Some of these measures were in a few years’ time relaxed, the fines were mitigated, the rule against inter-possession of property was abolished, and the league assemblies were again allowed for certain local purposes.
But this was the end of the league as a free federation. It is often said that “Greece was now reduced to the form of a Roman province under the name of Achaia.” This is true in a sense, and yet is misleading. Achaia did not become a province like the other provinces, yearly allotted to a proconsul or propraetor or legatus, until the time of Augustus.
Such direct interference from a Roman magistrate as was thought necessary was left to the governor of Macedonia.[54] Yet in a certain sense Achaia was treated as a separate entity, and had a “formula,” or constitution, founded on the separate local laws which the commissioners found existing, or imposed, with the help of Polybius, on the several states; it paid tribute like other provinces, and was in fact, though called free, subject to Rome.
Polybius performed his task of visiting the various towns in the Peloponnese, explaining when necessary the meaning of the new arrangements, and advising them, when they had to make others for themselves, so much to the satisfaction of every one, that there was a universal feeling that he had been a benefactor to his country, and had made the best of their situation that could be made.
Statues of him are mentioned by Pausanias in several places in the Peloponnese: in Mantinea[55] and at Megalopolis,[56] with an inscription in elegiacs to the effect that “he had travelled over every land and sea; was an ally of the Romans, and mitigated their wrath against Greece.” Another in the temple of Persephone, near Acacesium,[57] under which was a legend stating that “Greece would not have erred at all if she had obeyed Polybius; and that when she did err, he alone proved of any help to her.” There were others also at Pallantium,[58] Tegea,[59] and Olympia.[60]
In these services to his country Polybius was occupied in B.C. 145.
Of his life after that we have no detailed record. He is believed to have visited Scipio while engaged on the siege of Numantia (B.C. 134-132), on which he wrote a separate treatise.[61] We know also that he visited Alexandria in the reign of Ptolemy Physcon (B.C. 146-117), and expressed his contempt for the state of the people and their rulers.[62] These years must have been also much occupied with the extension of his history, which he originally intended should end with the fall of the Macedonian kingdom (B.C.
168),[63] but which was afterwards continued to the fall of Carthage and Greece (B.C. 146);[64] for even if the history had been completed up to its originally intended limit, and the notice of extension afterwards inserted, there still was enough to do to occupy some years of a busy life; especially as he seems to have carried out his principle that an historian ought to be a traveller, visiting the localities of which he speaks, and testing by personal inspection the possibility of the military evolutions which he undertakes to describe.
His travels appear certainly to have embraced the greater part of Gaul, and it even seems possible from one passage that he visited Britain.[65] His explorations on the African coast were doubtless extensive, and he appears to have visited Phoenicia, Cilicia, and Asia Minor.
We hear of him at Sardis, though we cannot fix the date of the visit.[66] Lastly, Lucian tells us that, “returning from the country, he had a fall from his horse, the effects of which he died at the age of eighty-two.” No place is given, and no clue which may help us to be certain of the date.[67] Polybius, besides the general history, had written a treatise on Tactics,[68] a panegyric on Philopoemen,[69] a history of the Numantine war,[70] and perhaps a treatise on public speaking (δημηγορία).[71]
§ 2.—THE SOURCES OF POLYBIUS’S HISTORY
Polybius always maintains that the study of documents is only one, and not the most important, element in the equipment of an historian. The best is personal experience and personal inquiry.
[Sidenote: Personal knowledge.]
Of the sources of his own history, then, the first and best may be set down as knowledge acquired by being actually present at great events, such as the destruction of Carthage and the sack of Corinth; visits to the Roman army in camp; assisting at actual debates in his own country; personal knowledge of and service under men of the first position in Achaia; personal visits to famous localities; voyages and tours undertaken for the definite object of inspection and inquiry; and, lastly, seeing and questioning the survivors of great battles, or the men who had played a leading part in conspicuous political transactions.
From his earliest youth Polybius had enjoyed some special advantages in these respects. As he himself says, “the events in Greece fell within his own generation, or that immediately preceding his own,—and he therefore could relate what he had seen, or what he had heard from eye-witnesses” (4, 2). And of the later period he “was not only an eye witness, but in some cases an actor, and in others the chief actor” (3, 4).
When he was probably under twenty we hear of his being present at an important interview between Philopoemen and Archon;[72] and his election as hipparch in B.C. 169, soon after he reached the legal age, was in consequence of his having thrown himself with vigour into the practical working of the cavalry under Philopoemen.
In regard to Roman history and polity, we have Cicero’s testimony that he was bonus auctor in primis,[73] and more particularly in regard to chronology, quo nemo fuit in exquirendis temporibus diligentius.[74] Nor is this praise undeserved, as is shown by his energy in pushing minute and personal inquiries.
Thus he learnt the details of the Hannibalic war from some of the survivors of those actually engaged; visited the localities, and made the pass of the Alps used by Hannibal;[75] studied and transcribed the stele or bronze tablet placed by Hannibal on the Lacinian promontory;[76] travelled through Libya, Spain, Gaul, and the seas which washed their shores (perhaps even as far as Britain), in order to give a true account of them.[77] Conversed with Massanissa on the character of the Carthaginians, as well as with many of the Carthaginians themselves.[78] Carefully observed Carthagena.[79] Inspected the records at Rhodes,[80] and the Archives at Rome;[81] and studied and transcribed the treaties preserved there.[82] Visited Sardis,[83] Alexandria,[84] and Locri Epizephyrii.[85] To this, which is by no means an exhaustive account of his travels and inquiries, may be added the fact that his intimacy with the younger Africanus, grandson by adoption and nephew by marriage of the elder Scipio, must have placed at his disposal a considerable mass of information contained in the family archives of the Scipios, as to the Hannibalian war, and especially as to the campaigns in Spain.[86]
Such were some of the means by which Polybius was enabled to obtain accurate and trustworthy information.
[Sidenote: Use of previous writers by Polybius.]
It remains to inquire how far Polybius availed himself of the writings of others. He looks upon the study of books as an important part of an historian’s work, but, as we have seen, not the most important.
His practice appears to have been conformable to his theory. The greater part of his information he gained from personal observation and personal inquiry. Nevertheless, some of his history must have been learnt from books, and very little of it could have been entirely independent of them. Still, as far as we have the means of judging from the fragments of his work that have come down to us, his obligations to his predecessors are not as extensive as that of most of those who wrote after him; nor is the number of those to whom he refers great.[87]
[Sidenote: The Punic wars.]
Of his preliminary sketch contained in books 1 and 2, the first book, containing the account of the first Punic war and the Mercenary war, appears to have been derived mainly from the writings of Fabius Pictor (b. circ. B.C. 260), and Philinus of Agrigentum (contemporary and secretary of Hannibal). He complains that they were violent partisans, the one of Rome, the other of Carthage.[88] But by comparing the two, and checking both by documents and inscriptions at Rome, he, no doubt, found sufficient material for his purpose.
[Sidenote: Illyrians and Gauls.]
[Sidenote: Achaia.]
The second book contains an account of the origin of the war between Rome and Illyricum; of the Gallic or Celtic wars from the earliest times; and a sketch of Achaean history to the end of the Cleomenic war. The first two of these must have been compiled with great labour from various public documents and family records, as well as in part from Pictor. The sketch of Achaean history rested mainly, as far as it depends on books, on the Memoirs of Aratus; while he studied only to refute the writings of Phylarchus the panegyrist of Cleomenes.
He complains of the partiality of Phylarchus: but in this part of the history it was perhaps inevitable that his own views should have been coloured by the prejudices and prepossessions of a politician, and one who had been closely connected from boyhood with the patriotic Achaean party, led by Philopoemen, which was ever at enmity with all that Cleomenes did his utmost to establish.
[Sidenote: Sicilian history.]
For his account of Sicilian affairs he had studied the works of Timaeus of Tauromeniun. Although he accuses him bitterly, and at excessive length,[89] of all the faults of which an historian can be guilty, he yet confesses that he found in his books much that was of assistance to him[90] in regard both to Magna Graecia and Sicily; for which he also consulted the writings of Aristotle, especially it appears the now lost works on Polities (πολιτείαι), and Founding of Cities (κτίσεις). The severity of his criticism of Timaeus is supported by later authors.
He was nicknamed ἐπιτίμαιος, in allusion to the petulance of his criticism of others;[91] and Plutarch attacks him for his perversion of truth and his foolish and self-satisfied attempts to rival the best of the ancient writers, and to diminish the credit of the most famous philosophers.[92]
[Sidenote: Greek history.]
As far as we possess his writings, we find little trace in Polybius of a reference to the earliest historians. Herodotus is not mentioned, though there may be some indications of acquaintance with his work;[93] nor the Sicilian Philistus who flourished about B.C. 430. Thucydides is mentioned once, and Xenophon three times. Polybius was engaged in the history of a definite period, and had not much occasion to refer to earlier times; and perhaps the epitomator, in extracting what seemed of value, chose those parts especially where he was the sole or best authority.
[Sidenote: Macedonia.]
For the early history of Macedonia, he seems to have relied mostly on two pupils of Isocrates, Ephorus of Cumae and Theopompus of Chios; though the malignity of the latter deprived his authority of much weight.[94] He also studied the work of Alexander’s friend and victim, Callisthenes; and vehemently assailed his veracity, as others have done. More important to him perhaps were the writings of his own contemporaries, the Rhodians Antisthenes and Zeno; though he detects them in some inaccuracies, which in the case of Zeno he took the trouble to correct: and of Demetrius of Phalerum, whose writings he seems to have greatly admired.
[Sidenote: Egypt and Syria.]
For the contemporary history of Egypt and Syria he seems to have trusted principally to personal inquiry. He expressly (2, 37) declines entering on the early history of Egypt on the ground of its having been fully done by others (referring, perhaps, to Herodotus, Manetho, and Ptolemy of Megalopolis). For the Seleucid dynasty of Syria he quotes no authorities.
[Sidenote: Geography.]
On no subject does Polybius seem to have read so widely as on geography: doubtless as preparing himself not only for writing, but for being able to travel with the knowledge and intelligence necessary to enable him to observe rightly. He had studied minutely and criticised freely the writings of Dicaearchus, Pytheas, Eudoxus, and Eratosthenes.
He was quick to detect fallacies in these writers, and to reject their dogmatising on the possibilities of nature; yet he does not seem to have had in an eminent degree the topographical faculty, or the power of giving a graphic picture of a locality. Modern research has tended rather to strengthen than weaken our belief in the accuracy of his descriptions, as in the case of Carthagena and the site of the battle of Cannae; still it cannot be asserted that he is to be classed high in the list of topographers, whether scientific or picturesque.
[Sidenote: General Literature.]
He appears to have been fairly well acquainted with the poets; but his occasions for quoting them, as far as we have his work, are not very frequent. He seems to have known his Homer, as every Greek was bound to do. He quotes the Cypria of Stasinus, who, according to tradition, was son-in-law of Homer; Hesiod, Simonides of Ceos, Pindar, Euripides, and Epicharmus of Cos. He quotes or refers to Plato, whom he appears chiefly to have studied for his political theories; and certain technical writers, such as Aeneas Tacticus, and Cleoxenos and Democlitus, inventors of a new system of telegraphy, if they wrote it rather than taught it practically.
Even allowing for the loss of so great a part of his work, the list of authors is not a long one: and it suggests the remark, which his style as well as his own professions tend to confirm, that he was not primarily a man of letters, but a man of affairs and action, who loved the stir of political agitation, and unbent his mind by the excitement of travel and the chase.
Nothing moves his contempt more than the idea of Timaeus living peaceably for fifty years at Athens, holding aloof from all active life, and poring over the books in the Athenian libraries as a preparation for writing history; which, according to him, can only be worth reading when it springs, not from rummaging Record offices, but from taking a personal share in the political strife of the day; studying military tactics in the camp and field; witnessing battles; questioning the actors in great events; and visiting the sites of battles, the cities and lands which are to be described.
§ 3. THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE[95]
To the student of politics the history of Greece is chiefly interesting as offering examples of numerous small states enjoying complete local autonomy, yet retaining a feeling of a larger nationality founded in a community of blood, language, and religion; a community, that is, in the sense that, fundamentally united in these three particulars, they yet acknowledged variations even in them, which distinguished without entirely separating them. From some points of view the experiment may be regarded as having been successful.
From others it was a signal failure. Local jealousies and mutual provocations not only continually set city against city, clan against clan, but perpetually suggested invitations sent by one city, or even one party in a city, to foreign potentates or peoples to interfere in their behalf against another city or party, which they hated or feared, but were too weak to resist.
Thus we find the Persians, Macedonians, Syrians, and Romans successively induced to interfere in Greek politics with the assurance that there were always some states, or some party in each state, who would welcome them. From time to time men of larger views had conceived the idea of creating a united Empire of Hellas, which might present an unbroken front to the foreigner. From time to time philosophers had preached the impossibility of combining complete local independence with the idea of a strong and vigorous nationality.
But the true solution of the problem had never been successfully hit upon: and after various abortive attempts at combination, Greece was left, a helpless collection of disjointed fragments, to fall under the intrigues of Macedonia and Rome.
The Achaean league was not the first attempt at such a formation; though it was the first that ever arrived at anything like a complete scheme of federalism (unless the Aetolian preceded it); and was in many respects a fresh departure in Hellenic policy, and the first experiment in federation which seemed to contain the elements of success. From the earliest times certain Greek states had combined more or less closely, or loosely, for certain specific purposes.
Such were the various Amphictyonies, and especially the Amphictyonic league of Thermopylae and Delphi. The object of these was primarily religious: the worship of a particular deity, the care of a particular temple; the first condition of membership being therefore community of blood. But though this was the origin of their being, there were elements in their constitution which might have developed into some form of federalism, had it not been for the centrifugal forces that always tended to keep Greek states apart.
Thus we can conceive the idea of the Pylagorae from the various states gradually giving rise to the notion of a central parliament of elected representatives; and the sphere of its activity gradually extending to matters purely political, beginning with those which were on the borderland of religion and politics. And, indeed, the action of the great Amphictyonic league at times seemed to be approaching this.[96]
But the forces tending to decentralisation were always the stronger: and though the league continued to exist for many centuries, it became less and less political, and less and less influential in Greece. So too with other combinations in Greece. The community (τὸ κοινὸν) of the Ionians, beginning with a common meeting for worship at the Panionium, on one memorable occasion at least seemed for a brief space to promise to develop into a federation for mutual succour and defence. In the Ionian revolt in B.C. 500, the deputies (πρόβουλοι) of the Ionian states met and determined to combine against the enemy; they even went so far as to appoint a common general or admiral.
But the instinct of separation was too strong; at the first touch of difficulty and hardship the union was resolved into its elements.[97]
The constitution of the Boeotian league was somewhat more regular and permanent. The Boeotarchs appear to have met at regular intervals, and now and again to have succeeded in mustering a national levy. There were also four regularly constituted “Senates” to control them, though we know nothing of their constitution.[98] But the league had come to nothing; partly from the resistance of the towns to the overweening pretensions of Thebes, and later from the severity of the treatment experienced by it at the hands of Alexander and his successors.
Thessaly, again, was a loose confederacy of towns or cantons, in which certain great families, such as the Aleuadae and Scopadae, held the direction of their local affairs; or some tyrannus, as Alexander of Pherae, obtained sovereign powers. Still, for certain purposes, a connexion was acknowledged, and a Tagus of Thessaly was appointed, with the power of summoning a general levy of men. For a short time prior to the Roman conquest these officers appear to have gained additional importance; but Thessaly never was united enough to be of importance, in spite of its famous cavalry, even among Greek nations, far less to be capable of presenting a firm front to the foreigner.
One other early attempt at forming something like a Panhellenic union ought to be noticed. When the Persian invasion of B.C. 480 was threatening, deputies (πρόβουλοι) met at the Isthmus, sat there in council for some months, and endeavoured to unite Greece against the foreigner.[99] But the one expedition which was sent solely by their instigation proved a failure.[100] And when the danger was over, principally by the combined exertion of Athens and Sparta, this council seems to have died a natural death. Still for a time it acted as a supreme parliament of Greece, and assumed the power to punish with fine or death those Greeks who had medised.[101]
Besides these rudimentary leagues, which might, but did not, issue in some form of Panhellenic government, there were periods in Greek history in which the Hegemone of one state did something towards presenting the appearance of union. Thus Polycrates of Samos seemed at one time to be likely to succeed in forming a great Ionian Empire.
And in continental Greece, before the Persian wars, we find Sparta occupying the position of an acknowledged court of reference in international questions,[102]—a position in which she probably had been preceded by Argos. And after those wars, by means of the confederacy of Delos, formed at first for one specific purpose—that of keeping the Aegean free of the Persians—Athens gradually rose to the position of an imperial city, claiming active control over the external politics of a considerable portion of Greece and nearly all the islands (B.C. 478-404).
But this proved after all but a passing episode in Greek history. Athens perhaps misused her power; and Sparta took up the task with great professions, but in a spirit even less acceptable to the Greek world than that of Athens; and by the peace of Antalcidas (B.C. 387) the issue of the hundred years’ struggle with Persia left one of the fairest portions of Hellas permanently separated from the main body. Asiatic Greece never became Hellenic again.
The fall of the Persian empire before the invasion of Alexander for a while reunited it to a semi-Greek power; but Alexander’s death left it a prey to warring tyrants. It lost its prosperity and its commerce; and whatever else it became, it was never independent, or really Hellenic again.
For a few years more Sparta and then Thebes assumed to be head of Greece, but the Macedonian supremacy secured at Chaeronea (B.C. 338), still more fully after the abortive Lamian war (B.C. 323), left Greece only a nominal freedom, again and again assured to it by various Macedonian monarchs, but really held only on sufferance. The country seemed to settle down without farther struggle into political insignificance. The games and festivals went on, and there was still some high talk of Hellenic glories.
But one after another of the towns submitted to receive Macedonian garrisons and governors; and Athens, once the brilliant leader in national aspirations, practically abandoned politics, and was content to enjoy a reputation partly founded on her past, and partly on the fame of the philosophers who still taught in her gardens and porches, and attracted young men from all parts of the world to listen to their discourses, and to sharpen their wits by the acute if not very useful discussions which they promoted.[103] Sparta, far from retaining her old ascendency, had been losing with it her ancient constitution, which had been the foundation of her glory, as well perhaps as in some respects the source of her weakness; and for good or evil had ceased to count for much in Hellenic politics.
In the midst of this general collapse two portions of the Hellenic race gradually formed or recovered some sort of united government, which enabled them to play a conspicuous part in the later history of Greece, and which was essentially different from any of the combinations of earlier times of which I have been speaking. These were the Aetolians and Achaeans.
[Sidenote: Aetolian league.]
With regard to the former our information is exceedingly scanty.
They were said to have been an emigration from Elis originally;[104] but they were little known to the rest of Greece. Strange stories were told of them, of their savage mode of life, their scarcely intelligible language, their feeding on raw flesh, and their fierceness as soldiers. They were said to live in open villages, widely removed from each other, and without effective means of combination for mutual protection.
Their piracies, which were chiefly directed to the coasts of Messenia, caused the Messenians to seize the opportunity of Demosthenes being in their neighbourhood in B.C. 426, with a considerable Athenian army, to persuade him to invade the Aetolians, who were always on the look-out to attack Naupactus, a town which the Athenians had held since B.C. 455,[105] and which was naturally an object of envy to them as commanding the entrance to the Corinthian gulf.
But when Demosthenes attempted the invasion, he found to his cost that the Aetolians knew how to combine, and he had to retire beaten with severe loss.[106] The separate tribes in Aetolia seem soon afterwards to have had, if they had not already, some form of central government; for we find them negotiating with Agesilaus in B.C.
390, with the same object of obtaining Naupactus,[107] when the Athenians had lost it, and it had fallen into the hands of the Locrians.[108] The Aetolians appear to have gradually increased in importance: for we find Philip making terms with them and giving them the coveted Naupactus in B.C. 341, which had at some time previous come into the possession of the Achaeans.[109] But their most conspicuous achievement, which caused them to take a position of importance in Greece, was their brilliant defeat of the invading Gauls at Delphi in B.C.
279.[110] By this time their federal constitution must in some shape have been formed.
The people elected a Strategus in a general meeting, usually held at Thermus, at the autumn equinox, to which apparently all Aetolians were at liberty to come, and at which questions of peace and war and external politics generally were brought forward; though meanwhile the Strategus appears to have had the right of declaring and carrying on war as he chose. There was also a hipparch and a secretary (21, 32); and a senate called Apocleti (20, 1); and a body called Synedri (C. I.
G. 2350), which seem to have been judicial, and another called Nomographi (13, 1, C. I. G. 3046), who were apparently an occasional board for legislation. They produced some writers, but their works are lost.
Accordingly, as Professor Mahaffy observes, “we know them entirely from their enemies.” Still the acknowledged principle on which they acted, ἄγειν λάφυρον ἀπὸ λαφύρου[111]—that is, that where spoils were going, whether from friend or foe, they were justified in taking a part, speaks for itself, and is enough to stamp them as at least dangerous and unpleasant neighbours.
[Sidenote: Achaean league.]
The Achaeans have a different and more interesting history.
The original Achaean league consisted of a federation of twelve cities and their respective territory (μέρος): Pellene, Aegira, Aegae, Bura, Helice, Aegium, Rhypes, Patrae, Pharae, Olenus, Dyme, Tritaea.[112] This league was of great antiquity, but we know nothing of its history, or how it differed from other leagues, such as I have already mentioned, in adding political to religious unity. In B.C.
454 it submitted to Athens; but was restored to its original position in the same year on the signing of the thirty years’ truce between Sparta and Athens;[113] and though the Athenians demanded that their authority over it should be restored to them in B.C. 425, when they had caught the Spartan army at Sphacteria, no change appears to have been made.[114] Thucydides certainly seems to speak of it, not as entirely free, but as in some special manner subject to the supremacy of Sparta.
Polybius, however, claims for them, at an early period, a peculiar and honourable place in Greek politics, as being distinguished for probity and honour. Thus they were chosen as arbitrators in the intestine of Magna Graecia (about B.C. 400-390); and again, after the battle of Leuctra (B.C. 371) to mediate between Sparta and Thebes.[115] They must therefore, between B.C. 425-390, have obtained a virtual independence. They shared, however, in the universal decline of Hellenic activity during the Macedonian period (B.C. 359 to about B.C.
285), and Polybius complains that they were systematically depressed by the intrigues of Sparta and Macedonia; both which powers took care to prevent any Achaean of promising ability from attaining influence in the Peloponnese.[116] The same influence was exerted to estrange the Achaean cities from each other. They were garrisoned by Macedonian troops, or fell under the power of tyrants; and to all appearance the league had fared as other such combinations had fared before, and had been resolved into its original elements.
[Sidenote: Revival of the league, B.C. 284-280.]
But the tradition of the old union did not die out entirely. Eight of the old cities still existed in a state of more or less vigour.
Olenus and Helice had long ago disappeared by encroachments of the sea (before B.C. 371), and their places had not been filled up by others.
Two other towns, Rhypes and Aegae, had from various causes ceased to be inhabited, and their places had been taken in the league (before the dissolution) by Leontium and Caryneia. There were therefore ten cities which had once known the advantages and disadvantages of some sort of federal union; as well as the misfortunes which attached to disunion, aggravated by constant interference from without.
[Sidenote: B.C. 284. First union of Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, Pharae.]
[Sidenote: Adherence of Aegium, B.C. 279.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 279-255.]
[Sidenote: Margos of Caryneia first sole Strategus, B.C. 255.]
The first step in an attempt to resuscitate the league was taken in the 124th Olympiad (B.C. 284-280). Macedonia was at the time weakened by the troubles of a disputed succession: Pyrrhus was absorbed in his futile Italian expedition: a change in the sovereign of Egypt opened a way to a possible change of policy at Alexandria: and the death of Lysimachus gave the monarchs something else to do than to trouble themselves about the Peloponnese. At this period four of the Achaean towns, Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae, formed a league for mutual help.
This proving, after a trial of five years, to have some stability, it was joined by Aegium, from which the Macedonian garrison was expelled. At intervals, of which we are not informed, this was again joined by Bura and Caryneia. These seven cities continued to constitute the entire league for twenty-five years; the federal magistrates consisting of two Strategi, elected by each city in turns, and a secretary. As to the doings of the league during this period we are entirely in the dark.
The next step that we hear of is the abolition of the dual presidency and the election of Margos of Caryneia as sole Strategus. We are not told the reasons of the change; but it is clear that a divided command might often give room for delay, when delay was fatal; and for the conflict of local interests, where the interests of the community should be the paramount consideration. At any rate the change was made: and Margos, who had been a loyal servant of the league, was the first sole Strategus. His immediate successors we do not know.
The next fact in the history of the league was the adherence of Sicyon, a powerful town and the first of any, not in the number of the old Achaean federation, to join. This therefore was a great step in the direction of extending the federation over the Peloponnese; and it was the work of the man destined to do much in moulding the league into the shape in which it attained its greatest effectiveness, Aratus of Sicyon.
He found it weak; its cities poor and insignificant; with no aid from rich soil or good harbourage to increase its wealth or property;[117] he left it, not indeed free from serious dangers and difficulties,—in part the result of his own policy in calling in the aid of the Macedonians, in part created by the persistent hostility of Aetolia and Sparta,—but yet possessed of great vitality, and fast becoming the most powerful and influential of all the Greek governments; although at no time can it be spoken of as Panhellenic without very considerable exaggeration.
Aratus had been brought up in exile at Argos, after the murder of his father Cleinias (B.C. 271); and, when twenty years of age, by a gallant and romantic adventure, had driven out the tyrant Nicocles from Sicyon (B.C. 251).
He became the chief magistrate of his native town, which he induced to join the Achaean league, thus causing, as I have said, the league to take its first step towards embracing all the Peloponnese. It seems that for five years Aratus remained chief magistrate of Sicyon, but a private citizen of the league. In B.C. 245 (though of the exact year we have no positive information), he appears to have been first elected Strategus of the league. But it was not until his second year of office, B.C.
243-242, that he began putting in practice the policy which he proposed to himself,—the expulsion of the Macedonian garrisons and the despots from the cities of the Peloponnese, with the view of their joining the league. He began with the Acrocorinthus. Corinth, freed from the foreign garrison, joined the league, and was followed soon after by Megara[118] (B.C. 240). From this time Aratus was Strategus of the league in alternate years to the time of his death, the federal law not allowing two consecutive years of office.[119]
[Sidenote: Cleomenic war, B.C. 227-221.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 226-221.]
The death of Antigonus Gonatas (B.C. 239) led to a new departure.
Hitherto the Aetolians had been in league with the Macedonians to vex and harry the Achaeans. The two leagues now made peace, and the Aetolians aided the Achaeans in their resistance to Gonatas’s successor, Demetrius (B.C. 239-229). Still the despots in many of the Peloponnesian towns held out, trusting to the support of Demetrius.
When he died (B.C. 229) there was a general movement among them to abdicate and join their cities to the league. Lydiades of Megalopolis had done so during Demetrius’s lifetime; and now Aristomachus of Argos, Xeno of Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius did the same. The rapid extension of the Achaean league, however, could not fail to excite the jealousy of the Aetolians, to whose league belonged certain Arcadian cities such as Mantinea, Tegea, and Orchomenus.
These they imagined to be threatened by the policy of Aratus, which was apt to proceed on the line that even a forcible attachment of a Peloponnesian town to the league was in reality a liberation of its people from a constraining power. The Spartan jealousy was aroused by the same fear.
And then, as Polybius puts it, the Aetolians connived at the extension of Spartan power, even at the expense of cities in league with themselves, in order to strengthen Cleomenes in his attitude of opposition to the Achaeans.[120] Aratus, however, resolved to wait for some definite act of hostility before moving. This was supplied by Cleomenes building a fort (the Athenaeum) at Belbina, in the territory of Megalopolis, a league city. Upon this the league necessarily proclaimed war with Sparta.
Thus does Polybius, a warm friend of the league, state the case in its behalf. The league, he argues, had been growing by the voluntary adherence of independent towns: it had shown no sign of an intention to attack Laconian territory, or towns in league with Aetolia: while Cleomenes had committed an act of wanton aggression and provocation by building a hostile fort in its territory.
But what the other side had to say may be gathered from Plutarch’s life of Cleomenes, founded principally on the work of Phylarchus the panegyrist of Cleomenes.[121] Here the case is put very differently. Aratus, according to him, had made up his mind that a union of the Peloponnesus was the one thing necessary for the safety of the league.
In a great measure he had been already successful; but the parts which still stood aloof were Elis, Laconia, and the cities of Arcadia which were under the influence of Sparta.[122] He therefore harassed these last by every means in his power; and the erection or fortification of the Athenaeum at Belbina by Cleomenes was in truth only a measure of necessary defence.
Aratus, indeed, held that some of these Arcadian cities had been unfairly seized by Cleomenes, with the connivance of the Aetolians;[123] but to this Cleomenes might reply that, if the league claimed the right of extending its connexion with the assent, often extorted, of the various cities annexed, the same right could not justly be denied to himself.
A series of military operations took place during the next five years, in which Cleomenes nearly always got the better of Aratus; who, able and courageous in plots and surprises, was timid and ineffective in the field. The one important blow struck by Aratus, that of seizing Mantinea, was afterwards nullified by a counter-occupation of it by the Lacedaemonians; and in spite of troubles at home, caused by his great scheme of reform, Cleomenes was by B.C. 224 in so superior a position that he could with dignity propose terms to the league.
He asked to be elected Strategus, therefore.[124] At first sight this seemed a means of effecting the desired union of the Peloponnese; and as such the Achaeans were inclined to accept the proposal. Aratus, however, exerted all his influence to defeat the measure: and, in spite of all his failures, his services to the league enabled him to convince his countrymen that they should reject the offer; and he was himself elected Strategus for the twelfth time in the spring of B.C.
- Aratus has been loudly condemned for allowing a selfish jealousy
to override his care for the true interests of his country, in thus refusing a prospect of a united Achaia, in which some one besides himself should be the leading man.[125] But I think there is something to be said on the other side. What Aratus had been working for with a passionate eagerness was a union of free democratic states. Cleomenes, in spite of his liberal reforms at home, was a Spartan to the back bone. Aratus would have no manner of doubt that a league, with Sparta supreme in it, would inevitably become a Spartan kingdom.
The forces of Sparta would be used to crush dissenting cities; and soon to put down the free institution which would always be disliked and feared by the Spartan government. Security from Macedonian influence, if it were really obtained,—and that was far from certain,—would be dearly purchased at the price of submission to Spartan tyranny, which would be more galling and oppressive in proportion as it was nearer and more unremitting.
With these views Aratus began to turn his eyes to the Macedonian court, as the only possible means of resisting the encroaching policy of Cleomenes.
The character of Antigonus Doson, who was then administering Macedonia, gave some encouragement to hope for honest and honourable conduct on his part; and after some hesitation Aratus took the final step of asking for his aid.[126] I do not expect to carry the assent of many readers when I express the opinion that he was right; and that the Greek policy towards Macedonia had been from the first a grievous error,—fostered originally by the patriotic eloquence of Demosthenes, and continued ever since by that ineradicable sentiment for local autonomy which makes Greek history so interesting, but inevitably tended to the political annihilation of Greece.
Had some modus vivendi been found with the series of very able sovereigns who ruled Macedonia, a strong Greek nation might have been the result, with a central government able to hold its own even in the face of the great “cloud in the West,” which was surely overshadowing Greek freedom. But this was not to be. The taste for local freedom was too strong; and showed itself by constant appeals to an outside power against neighbours, which yet the very men who appealed to it would not recognise or obey.
The Greeks had to learn that nations cannot, any more than individuals, eat their cake and have it too. Local autonomy, and the complete liberty of every state to war with its neighbours as it chooses, and of every one to speak and act as he pleases, have their charms; but they are not compatible with a united resistance to a great centralised and law-abiding power.
And all the eloquence of all the Greek orators rolled into one could not make up for the lack of unity, or enable the distracted Greeks to raise an army which might stand before a volley of Roman pila or a charge of Roman legionaries.
The help asked of Antigonus Doson was given with fatal readiness; but it had to be purchased by the admission of a Macedonian garrison into the Acrocorinthus, one of those “fetters of Greece,” the recovery of which had been among Aratus’s earliest and most glorious triumphs.
The battle of Sellasia (B.C. 221) settled the question of Spartan influence. Cleomenes fled to Alexandria and never returned. Sparta was not enslaved by Antigonus; who on the contrary professed to restore her ancient constitution,—probably meaning that the Ephoralty destroyed by Cleomenes was to be reconstituted, and the exiles banished by him recalled. Practically she was left a prey to a series of unscrupulous tyrants who one after the other managed to obtain absolute power, Lycurgus (B.C. 220-210), Machanidas, B.C. 210-207; Nabis, B.C.
207-192; who, though differing in their home administrations, all agreed in using the enmity of the Aetolians in order to harass and oppress the Achaeans in every possible way.
[Sidenote: B.C. 213. Death of Aratus.]
Aratus died in B.C. 213. The last seven years of his life were embittered by much ill success in his struggles with the Aetolians; and by seeing Philip V., of whose presence in the Peloponnese he was the main cause, after rendering some brilliant services to the league, both in the Peloponnese and the invasion of Aetolia, develop some of the worst vices of the tyrant; and he believed himself, whether rightly or wrongly, to be poisoned by Philip’s order: “This is the reward,” he said to an attendant when he felt himself dying, “of my friendship for Philip.”[127]
The history of the league after his death followed the same course for some years. The war with the Aetolians went on, sometimes slackly, sometimes vigorously, as Philip V. was or was not diverted by contests with his barbarian neighbours, or by schemes for joining the Carthaginian assaults upon the Roman power.
[Sidenote: B.C. 208-183, Philopoemen.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 193.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 195-194.]
The next phase of vigorous action on the part of the league is that which corresponds with the career of Philopoemen, who had already shown his energy and skill at the battle of Sellasia. He was elected Hipparch in B.C. 210, and Strategus in B.C. 209. In his first office he did much to reorganise the Achaean cavalry and restore them to some discipline,[128] and he extended this as Strategus to the whole army.[129] His life’s work, however, was the defeating and either killing or confining to their frontier the tyrants of Sparta.
But while he was absent from the country after B.C. 200 a new element appeared in the Peloponnese. In 197 the battle of Cynoscephalae put an end for ever to Macedonian influence, and Flamininus proclaimed the liberty of all Greece in B.C. 195 at the Nemean festival. But Nabis was not deposed; he was secured in his power by a treaty with Rome; and when Philopoemen returned from Crete (B.C. 193), he found a fresh war on the point of breaking out owing to intrigues between that tyrant and the Aetolians.
They suggested, and he eagerly undertook to make, an attempt to recover the maritime towns of which he had been deprived by the Roman settlement.[130][Sidenote: 193-192.] Nabis at once attacked Gythium: and seemed on the point of taking it and the whole of the coast towns, which would thus have been lost to the league. Philopoemen, now again Strategus (B.C. 192), failed to relieve Gythium; but by a skilful piece of generalship inflicted so severe a defeat on Nabis, as he was returning to Sparta, that he did not venture on further movements beyond Laconia; and shortly afterwards was assassinated by some Aetolians whom he had summoned to his aid.
[Sidenote: 189-187.]
But the comparative peace in the Peloponnese was again broken in B.C. 189 by the Spartans seizing a maritime town called Las; the object being to relieve themselves of the restraint which shut them from the sea, and the possible attacks of the exiles who had been banished by Nabis, and who were always watching an opportunity to effect their return. Philopoemen (Strategus both 189 and 188 B.C.) led an army to the Laconian frontier in the spring of B.C.
188, and after the execution of eighty Spartans, who had been surrendered on account of the seizure of Las, and of the murder of thirty citizens who were supposed to have Achaean proclivities—Sparta submitted to his demand to raze the fortifications, dismiss the mercenaries, send away the new citizens enrolled by the tyrants, and abolish the Lycurgean laws, accepting the Achaean institutions instead. This was afterwards supplemented by a demand for the restoration of the exiles banished by the tyrants.
Such of the new citizens (three thousand) as did not leave the country by the day named were seized and sold as slaves.[131]
[Sidenote: B.C. 188.]
[Sidenote: 188-183.]
Sparta was now part of the Achaean league, which at this time reached its highest point of power; and its alliance was solicited by the most powerful princes of the east. It is this period which Polybius seems to have in mind in his description of the league at its best, as embracing the whole of the Peloponnese.[132][Sidenote: Lycortas Strategus, B.C. 184-182.] And it was in this third period of the existence of the renewed league that his father Lycortas came to the front, and he himself at an early age began taking part in politics.
[Sidenote: B.C. 179.]
But the terms imposed on Sparta were essentially violent and unjust, and, as it turned out, impolitic. Cowed into submission, she proved a thorn in the side of the league. The exiles continually appealed to Rome; and after Philopoemen’s death (B.C. 183) the affairs of the league began more and more to come before the Roman Senate.
As usual, traitors were at hand ready to sell their country for the sake of the triumph of their party; and Callicrates, sent to Rome to plead the cause of the league,[133] employed the opportunity to support himself and his party by advising the Senate to give support to “the Romanisers” in every state. This Polybius regards as the beginning of the decline of the league.
And the party of moderation, to which he and his father Lycortas belonged, and which wished to assert the dignity and legal rights of their country while offering no provocation to the Romans, were eventually included under the sweeping decree which caused them, to the number of a thousand, to be deported to Italy. We have already seen, in tracing the life of Polybius, how the poor remnants of these exiles returned in B.C. 151, embittered against Rome, and having learnt nothing and forgotten nothing.
And how the old quarrels were renewed, until an armed interference of Rome was brought upon them; and how the victory of Mummius at Corinth (B.C. 146), and the consequent settlement of the commissioners, finally dissolved the league into separate cantons, nominally autonomous, but really entirely subject to Rome.[134]
The constitution of the league presents many points of interest to the student of politics, and has been elaborately discussed by more than one English scholar. I shall content myself here with pointing out some of the main features as they are mentioned by Polybius.[135]
The league was a federation of free towns, all retaining full local autonomy of some form or other of democracy, which for certain purposes were under federal laws and federal magistrates, elected in a federal assembly which all citizens of the league towns might if they chose attend. All towns of the league also used the same standards in coinage and weights and measures (2, 37).
The assembly of the league (σύνοδος) met for election of the chief magistrate in May of each year, at first always at Aegium, but later at the other towns of the league in turn (29, 23); and a second time in the autumn.[136] And besides these annual meetings, the Strategus, acting with his council of magistrates, could summon a meeting at any time for three days (e.g. at Sicyon, 23, 17); and on one occasion we find the assembly delegating its powers to the armed levy of league troops, who for the nonce were to act as an assembly (4, 7).
Side by side with this general assembly was a council (βουλή), the functions and powers of which we cannot clearly ascertain.
It seems to have acted as representing the general assembly in foreign affairs (4, 26; 22, 12); and, being a working committee of the whole assembly, it sometimes happened that when an assembly was summoned on some subject which did not rouse popular interest, it practically was the assembly (29, 24). Its numbers have been assumed to be one hundred and twenty, from the fact that Eumenes offered them a present of one hundred and twenty talents, the interest of which was to pay their expenses. But this, after all, is not a certain deduction (22, 10).
The officers of the league were: First, a President or Strategus who kept the seal of the league (4, 7), ordered the levy of federal troops, and commanded it in the field. He also summoned the assemblies, and brought the business to be done before them, which was in the form of a proposal to be accepted or rejected, not amended. He was not chairman of the assembly, but like an English minister or a Roman consul brought on the proposals.
He was assisted by a kind of cabinet of ten magistrates from the several towns, who were called Demiurgi (δημιουργοὶ 23, 5).[137] This was their technical name: but Polybius also speaks of them under the more general appellation of οἱ ἄρχοντες (5, 1), οἱ συνάρχοντες (23, 16), αἱ ἀρχαὶ (22, 13), αἱ συναρχίαι (27, 2).
Whether the number ten had reference to the ten old towns of the league or not, it was not increased with the number of the towns; and, though we are not informed how they were elected, it seems reasonable to suppose that they were freely selected without reference to the towns from which they came, as the Strategus himself was. There was also a vice-president, or hypo-strategus, whose position was, I think, wholly military.
He did not rule in absence of the Strategus, or succeed him in case of death, that being reserved for the Strategus of the previous year; but he took a certain command in war next the Strategus (5, 94; 4, 59). Besides these we hear of a Hipparch to command the league cavalry (5, 95; 7, 22), an office which seems to have been regarded as stepping-stone to that of Strategus.
This proved a bad arrangement, as its holder was tempted to seek popularity by winking at derelictions of duty among the cavalry who were voters.[138] There was also a Navarch to command the regular squadron of federal ships (5, 94), who does not seem to have been so important a person.
There are also mentioned certain judges (δίκασται) to administer the federal law. We hear of them, however, performing duties closely bordering on politics; for they decided whether certain honorary inscriptions, statues, or other marks of respect to king Eumenes should be allowed to remain in the Achaean cities (28, 7).
The Strategus, on the order of the assembly, raised the federal army (4, 7). The number of men raised differed according to circumstances.
A fairly full levy seems to have been five thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry (4, 15). But the league also used mercenaries to a great extent. And we hear of one army which was to consist of eight thousand mercenary infantry, with five hundred mercenary cavalry; and in this case the Achaean levy was only to be three thousand infantry, with three hundred cavalry (5, 91).
The pay of the mercenaries and other league expenses were provided for by an εἰσφορά or contribution from all the states (5, 31, 91). The contributing towns appear to have been able to recover their payments as an indemnification for damage which the federal forces had failed to avert (4, 60).
The regular federal squadron of ships for guarding the sea-coasts appears to have consisted of ten triremes (2, 9; δεκαναία μακρῶν πλοίων 22, 10).
Such was the organisation of the Federal Government. It was in form purely democratic, all members of thirty years old being eligible for office, as well as possessing a vote in the assemblies. But a mass assembly where the members are widely scattered inevitably becomes oligarchic. Only the well-to-do and the energetic will be able or will care to come a long journey to attend. And as the votes in the assembly were given by towns, it must often have happened that the votes of many towns were decided by a very small number of their citizens who were there. No doubt, in times of great excitement, the attendance would be large and the vote a popular one.
But the general policy of the league must have been directed by a small number of energetic men, who made politics their profession and could afford to do so.
ROMAN CAMP FOR TWO LEGIONS
CONTAINING 4,068,289 SQUARE FEET
REAR (ἡ ὄπισθεν ἐπιφάνεια).
+---------------------------- -----------------------------+
| 200 Porta Praetoria.
200 |
| ft. ft. |
| +----+--------------+ +---------------+----+ |
| | | EP | | EP' | | |
| | V +--------------+ 50 +---------------+ V' | |
| | | EE | ft.| EE' | | |
| +----+--------------+ +---------------+----+ |
| 50 |
| +---+--+ +------+ +---+---+ ft. |
| |PE |PP| | | |PP'|PE'| |
| +---+--+ F | P* | Q +---+---+ |
|700 |PE |PP| | | |PP'|PE'| |
|ft. +---+--+ +------+ +---+---+ |
| ...... ...... |
| T-----------------------------------------------T' |
Porta Porta
Principalis 100 ft.
Principalis
Dextra. Principia.
Sinistra.
| +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ |
| |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| |
| +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ |
| |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| |
| +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ |
|200 ft. |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'|200 ft.|
| +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ |
| |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| |
| +PS +ES+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ |
| |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| |
| +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ |
| Via Quintana.
50 ft. |
| +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ |
| |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| |
| +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ |
| |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| |
| +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ |
| |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| |
| +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ |
| |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| |
| +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ | 2017
| |PS |ES| |H|P| |T|E| |E'|T'| |P'|H'| |ES'|PS'| | ft.
| +---+--+ +-+-+ +-+-+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +---+---+ |
| 50ft.
50ft. 50ft. 50ft. 50ft. |
| 200 |
| ft. Porto Decumana. |
+---------------------------- -----------------------------+
2017 ft. FRONT (τὸ πρόσωπον).
P*. Praetorium.
T T'. Tents of the Tribuni Militum of two legions.
E E'. Equites of two legions.
P P'. Principes ” ”
H H'. Hastati ” ”
T T'. Triarii ” ”
ES ES'. Equites of Socii of two legions.
PS PS'. Pedites ” ” ”
PE PE'. Equites of the Praetorian Cohort of two legions.
PP PP'. Pedites ” ” ” ” ”
EP EP'. Pedites extraordinarii of two legions.
EE EE'. Equites ” ” ”
Q. Quaestorium.
F. Forum or market-place.
V V'. Foreigners or volunteers.
THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS
BOOK I
[Sidenote: Introduction. The importance and magnitude of the subject.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 219-167.]
+1.+ Had the praise of History been passed over by former Chroniclers it would perhaps have been incumbent upon me to urge the choice and special study of records of this sort, as the readiest means men can have of correcting their knowledge of the past. But my predecessors have not been sparing in this respect.
They have all begun and ended, so to speak, by enlarging on this theme: asserting again and again that the study of History is in the truest sense an education, and a training for political life; and that the most instructive, or rather the only, method of learning to bear with dignity the vicissitudes of fortune is to recall the catastrophes of others. It is evident, therefore, that no one need think it his duty to repeat what has been said by many, and said well.
Least of all myself: for the surprising nature of the events which I have undertaken to relate is in itself sufficient to challenge and stimulate the attention of every one, old or young, to the study of my work. Can any one be so indifferent or idle as not to care to know by what means, and under what kind of polity, almost the whole inhabited world was conquered and brought under the dominion of the single city of Rome, and that too within a period of not quite fifty-three years?
Or who again can be so completely absorbed in other subjects of contemplation or study, as to think any of them superior in importance to the accurate understanding of an event for which the past affords no precedent.
[Sidenote: Immensity of the Roman Empire shown by comparison with Persia, Sparta, Macedonia. 1. Persia.]
[Sidenote: 2. Sparta. B.C. 405-394.]
[Sidenote: 3. Macedonia.]
+2.+ We shall best show how marvellous and vast our subject is by comparing the most famous Empires which preceded, and which have been the favourite themes of historians, and measuring them with the superior greatness of Rome. There are but three that deserve even to be so compared and measured: and they are these. The Persians for a certain length of time were possessed of a great empire and dominion.
But every time they ventured beyond the limits of Asia, they found not only their empire, but their own existence also in danger. The Lacedaemonians, after contending for supremacy in Greece for many generations, when they did get it, held it without dispute for barely twelve years. The Macedonians obtained dominion in Europe from the lands bordering on the Adriatic to the Danube,—which after all is but a small fraction of this continent,—and, by the destruction of the Persian Empire, they afterwards added to that the dominion of Asia.
And yet, though they had the credit of having made themselves masters of a larger number of countries and states than any people had ever done, they still left the greater half of the inhabited world in the hands of others. They never so much as thought of attempting Sicily, Sardinia, or Libya: and as to Europe, to speak the plain truth, they never even knew of the most warlike tribes of the West. The Roman conquest, on the other hand, was not partial.
Nearly the whole inhabited world was reduced by them to obedience: and they left behind them an empire not to be paralleled in the past or rivalled in the future. Students will gain from my narrative a clearer view of the whole story, and of the numerous and important advantages which such exact record of events offers.
[Sidenote: B.C. 220-217. The History starts from the 140th Olympiad, when the tendency towards unity first shows itself.]
+3.+ My History begins in the 140th Olympiad. The events from which it starts are these. In Greece, what is called the Social war: the first waged by Philip, son of Demetrius and father of Perseus, in league with the Achaeans against the Aetolians. In Asia, the war for the possession of Coele-Syria which Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator carried on against each other. In Italy, Libya, and their neighbourhood, the conflict between Rome and Carthage, generally called the Hannibalian war. My work thus begins where that of Aratus of Sicyon leaves off.
Now up to this time the world’s history had been, so to speak, a series of disconnected transactions, as widely separated in their origin and results as in their localities. But from this time forth History becomes a connected whole: the affairs of Italy and Libya are involved with those of Asia and Greece, and the tendency of all is to unity.
This is why I have fixed upon this era as the starting-point of my work. For it was their victory over the Carthaginians in this war, and their conviction that thereby the most difficult and most essential step towards universal empire had been taken, which encouraged the Romans for the first time to stretch out their hands upon the rest, and to cross with an army into Greece and Asia.
[Sidenote: A sketch of their previous history necessary to explain the success of the Romans.]
Now, had the states that were rivals for universal empire been familiarly known to us, no reference perhaps to their previous history would have been necessary, to show the purpose and the forces with which they approached an undertaking of this nature and magnitude.
But the fact is that the majority of the Greeks have no knowledge of the previous constitution, power, or achievements either of Rome or Carthage. I therefore concluded that it was necessary to prefix this and the next book to my History. I was anxious that no one, when fairly embarked upon my actual narrative, should feel at a loss, and have to ask what were the designs entertained by the Romans, or the forces and means at their disposal, that they entered upon those undertakings, which did in fact lead to their becoming masters of land and sea everywhere in our part of the world.
I wished, on the contrary, that these books of mine, and the prefatory sketch which they contained, might make it clear that the resources they started with justified their original idea, and sufficiently explained their final success in grasping universal empire and dominion.
[Sidenote: The need of a comprehensive view of history as well as a close study of an epoch.]
+4.+ There is this analogy between the plan of my History and the marvellous spirit of the age with which I have to deal. Just as Fortune made almost all the affairs of the world incline in one direction, and forced them to converge upon one and the same point; so it is my task as an historian to put before my readers a compendious view of the part played by Fortune in bringing about the general catastrophe.
It was this peculiarity which originally challenged my attention, and determined me on undertaking this work. And combined with this was the fact that no writer of our time has undertaken a general history. Had any one done so my ambition in this direction would have been much diminished.
But, in point of fact, I notice that by far the greater number of historians concern themselves with isolated wars and the incidents that accompany them: while as to a general and comprehensive scheme of events, their date, origin, and catastrophe, no one as far as I know has undertaken to examine it. I thought it, therefore, distinctly my duty neither to pass by myself, nor allow any one else to pass by, without full study, a characteristic specimen of the dealings of Fortune at once brilliant and instructive in the highest degree.
For fruitful as Fortune is in change, and constantly as she is producing dramas in the life of men, yet never assuredly before this did she work such a marvel, or act such a drama, as that which we have witnessed.
And of this we cannot obtain a comprehensive view from writers of mere episodes. It would be as absurd to expect to do so as for a man to imagine that he has learnt the shape of the whole world, its entire arrangement and order, because he has visited one after the other the most famous cities in it; or perhaps merely examined them in separate pictures.
That would be indeed absurd: and it has always seemed to me that men, who are persuaded that they get a competent view of universal from episodical history, are very like persons who should see the limbs of some body, which had once been living and beautiful, scattered and remote; and should imagine that to be quite as good as actually beholding the activity and beauty of the living creature itself.
But if some one could there and then reconstruct the animal once more, in the perfection of its beauty and the charm of its vitality, and could display it to the same people, they would beyond doubt confess that they had been far from conceiving the truth, and had been little better than dreamers. For indeed some idea of a whole may be got from a part, but an accurate knowledge and clear comprehension cannot. Wherefore we must conclude that episodical history contributes exceedingly little to the familiar knowledge and secure grasp of universal history.
While it is only by the combination and comparison of the separate parts of the whole,—by observing their likeness and their difference,—that a man can attain his object: can obtain a view at once clear and complete; and thus secure both the profit and the delight of History.
[Sidenote: B.C. 264-261. I begin my preliminary account in the 129th Olympiad, and with the circumstances which took the Romans to Sicily.]
+5.+ I shall adopt as the starting-point of this book the first occasion on which the Romans crossed the sea from Italy. This is just where the History of Timaeus left off; and it falls in the 129th Olympiad. I shall accordingly have to describe what the state of their affairs in Italy was, how long that settlement had lasted, and on what resources they reckoned, when they resolved to invade Sicily. For this was the first place outside Italy in which they set foot.
The precise cause of their thus crossing I must state without comment; for if I let one cause lead me back to another, my point of departure will always elude my grasp, and I shall never arrive at the view of my subject which I wish to present. As to dates, then, I must fix on some era agreed upon and recognised by all: and as to events, one that admits of distinctly separate treatment; even though I may be obliged to go back some short way in point of time, and take a summary review of the intermediate transactions.
For if the facts with which one starts are unknown, or even open to controversy, all that comes after will fail of approval and belief. But opinion being once formed on that point, and a general assent obtained, all the succeeding narrative becomes intelligible.
[Sidenote: B.C. 387-386. The rise of the Roman dominion may be traced from the retirement of the Gauls from the city. From that time one nation after another in Italy fell into their hands.]
[Sidenote: The Latini.]
[Sidenote: The Etruscans, Gauls, and Samnites.]
[Sidenote: Pyrrhus, B.C. 280.]
[Sidenote: Southern Italy.]
[Sidenote: Pyrrhus finally quits Italy, B.C. 274.]
+6.+ It was in the nineteenth year after the sea-fight at Aegospotami, and the sixteenth before the battle at Leuctra; the year in which the Lacedaemonians made what is called the Peace of Antalcidas with the King of Persia; the year in which the elder Dionysius was besieging Rhegium after beating the Italian Greeks on the River Elleporus; and in which the Gauls took Rome itself by storm and were occupying the whole of it except the Capitol.
With these Gauls the Romans made a treaty and settlement which they were content to accept: and having thus become beyond all expectation once more masters of their own country, they made a start in their career of expansion; and in the succeeding period engaged in various wars with their neighbours.
First, by dint of valour, and the good fortune which attended them in the field, they mastered all the Latini; then they went to war with the Etruscans; then with the Celts; and next with the Samnites, who lived on the eastern and northern frontiers of Latium. Some time after this the Tarentines insulted the ambassadors of Rome, and, in fear of the consequences, invited and obtained the assistance of Pyrrhus. This happened in the year before the Gauls invaded Greece, some of whom perished near Delphi, while others crossed into Asia.
Then it was that the Romans—having reduced the Etruscans and Samnites to obedience, and conquered the Italian Celts in many battles—attempted for the first time the reduction of the rest of Italy. The nations for whose possessions they were about to fight they affected to regard, not in the light of foreigners, but as already for the most part belonging and pertaining to themselves. The experience gained from their contests with the Samnites and the Celts had served as a genuine training in the art of war.
Accordingly, they entered upon the war with spirit, drove Pyrrhus from Italy, and then undertook to fight with and subdue those who had taken part with him. They succeeded everywhere to a marvel, and reduced to obedience all the tribes inhabiting Italy except the Celts; after which they undertook to besiege some of their own citizens, who at that time were occupying Rhegium.
[Sidenote: The story of the Mamertines at Messene, and the Roman garrison at Rhegium, Dio. Cassius fr.]
+7.+ For misfortunes befell Messene and Rhegium, the cities built on either side of the Strait, peculiar in their nature and alike in their circumstances.
[Sidenote: 1. Messene.]
[Sidenote: Agathocles died, B.C. 289]
Not long before the period we are now describing some Campanian mercenaries of Agathocles, having for some time cast greedy eyes upon Messene, owing to its beauty and wealth, no sooner got an opportunity than they made a treacherous attempt upon that city. They entered the town under guise of friendship, and, having once got possession of it, they drove out some of the citizens and put others to the sword.
This done, they seized promiscuously the wives and children of the dispossessed citizens, each keeping those which fortune had assigned him at the very moment of the lawless deed. All other property and the land they took possession of by a subsequent division and retained.
[Sidenote: 2. Rhegium, Livy Ep. 12.]
[Sidenote: Pyrrhus in Sicily, B.C. 278-275.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 271. C. Quintus Claudius, L. Genucius Clepsina, Coss.]
The speed with which they became masters of a fair territory and city found ready imitators of their conduct. The people of Rhegium, when Pyrrhus was crossing to Italy, felt a double anxiety. They were dismayed at the thought of his approach, and at the same time were afraid of the Carthaginians as being masters of the sea. They accordingly asked and obtained a force from Rome to guard and support them.
The garrison, four thousand in number, under the command of a Campanian named Decius Jubellius, entered the city, and for a time preserved it, as well as their own faith. But at last, conceiving the idea of imitating the Mamertines, and having at the same time obtained their co-operation, they broke faith with the people of Rhegium, enamoured of the pleasant site of the town and the private wealth of the citizens, and seized the city after having, in imitation of the Mamertines, first driven out some of the people and put others to the sword.
Now, though the Romans were much annoyed at this transaction, they could take no active steps, because they were deeply engaged in the wars I have mentioned above. But having got free from them they invested and besieged the troops. They presently took the place and killed the greater number in the assault,—for the men resisted desperately, knowing what must follow,—but took more than three hundred alive.
These were sent to Rome, and there the Consuls brought them into the forum, where they were scourged and beheaded according to custom: for they wished as far as they could to vindicate their good faith in the eyes of the allies. The territory and town they at once handed over to the people of Rhegium.
[Sidenote: Effect of the fall of the rebellious garrison of Rhegium on the Mamertines.]
+8.+ But the Mamertines (for this was the name which the Campanians gave themselves after they became masters of Messene), as long as they enjoyed the alliance of the Roman captors of Rhegium, not only exercised absolute control over their own town and district undisturbed, but about the neighbouring territory also gave no little trouble to the Carthaginians and Syracusans, and levied tribute from many parts of Sicily. But when they were deprived of this support, the captors of Rhegium being now invested and besieged, they were themselves promptly forced back into the town again by the Syracusans, under circumstances which I will now detail.
[Sidenote: The rise of Hiero. He is elected General by the army, B.C. 275-274.]
Not long before this the military forces of the Syracusans had quarrelled with the citizens, and while stationed near Merganè elected commanders from their own body. These were Artemidorus and Hiero, the latter of whom afterwards became King of Syracuse. At this time he was quite a young man, but had a certain natural aptitude for kingcraft and the politic conduct of affairs.
Having taken over the command, and having by means of some of his connexions made his way into the city, he got his political opponents into his hands; but conducted the government with such mildness, and in so lofty a spirit, that the Syracusans, though by no means usually acquiescing in the election of officers by the soldiers, did on this occasion unanimously approve of Hiero as their general. His first step made it evident to close observers that his hopes soared above the position of a mere general.
[Sidenote: Secures support of Leptines by marrying his daughter.]
[Sidenote: His device for getting rid of mutinous mercenaries.]
[Sidenote: Fiume Salso.]
[Sidenote: Hiero next attacks the Mamertines and defeats them near Mylae, B.C. 268.]
+9.+ He noticed that among the Syracusans the despatch of troops, and of magistrates in command of them, was always the signal for revolutionary movements of some sort or another. He knew, too, that of all the citizens Leptines enjoyed the highest position and credit, and that among the common people especially he was by far the most influential man existing.
He accordingly contracted a relationship by marriage with him, that he might have a representative of his interests left at home at such times as he should be himself bound to go abroad with the troops for a campaign. After marrying the daughter of this man, his next step was in regard to the old mercenaries. He observed that they were disaffected and mutinous: and he accordingly led out an expedition, with the ostensible purpose of attacking the foreigners who were in occupation of Messene.
He pitched a camp against the enemy near Centuripa, and drew up his line resting on the River Cyamosorus.
But the cavalry and infantry, which consisted of citizens, he kept together under his personal command at some distance, on pretence of intending to attack the enemy on another quarter: the mercenaries he thrust to the front and allowed them to be completely cut to pieces by the foreigners; while he seized the moment of their rout to affect a safe retreat for himself and the citizens into Syracuse. This stroke of policy was skilful and successful.
He had got rid of the mutinous and seditious element in the army; and after enlisting on his own account a sufficient body of mercenaries, he thenceforth carried on the business of the government in security. But seeing that the Mamertines were encouraged by their success to greater confidence and recklessness in their excursions, he fully armed and energetically drilled the citizen levies, led them out, and engaged the enemy on the Mylaean plain near the River Longanus.
He inflicted a severe defeat upon them: took their leaders prisoners: put a complete end to their audacious proceedings: and on his return to Syracuse was himself greeted by all the allies with the title of King.
[Sidenote: Some of the conquered Mamertines appeal to Rome for help.]
[Sidenote: The motives of the Romans in acceding to this prayer,—jealousy of the growing power of Carthage.]
+10.+ Thus were the Mamertines first deprived of support from Rhegium, and then subjected, from causes which I have just stated, to a complete defeat on their own account. Thereupon some of them betook themselves to the protection of the Carthaginians, and were for putting themselves and their citadel into their hands; while others set about sending an embassy to Rome to offer a surrender of their city, and to beg assistance on the ground of the ties of race which united them. The Romans were long in doubt.
The inconsistency of sending such aid seemed manifest. A little while ago they had put some of their own citizens to death, with the extreme penalties of the law, for having broken faith with the people of Rhegium: and now so soon afterwards to assist the Mamertines, who had done precisely the same to Messene as well as Rhegium, involved a breach of equity very hard to justify.
But while fully alive to these points, they yet saw that Carthaginian aggrandisement was not confined to Libya, but had embraced many districts in Iberia as well; and that Carthage was, besides, mistress of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrhenian seas: they were beginning, therefore, to be exceedingly anxious lest, if the Carthaginians became masters of Sicily also, they should find them very dangerous and formidable neighbours, surrounding them as they would on every side, and occupying a position which commanded all the coasts of Italy.
Now it was clear that, if the Mamertines did not obtain the assistance they asked for, the Carthaginians would very soon reduce Sicily. For should they avail themselves of the voluntary offer of Messene and become masters of it, they were certain before long to crush Syracuse also, since they were already lords of nearly the whole of the rest of Sicily. The Romans saw all this, and felt that it was absolutely necessary not to let Messene slip, or allow the Carthaginians to secure what would be like a bridge to enable them to cross into Italy.
[Sidenote: The Senate shirk the responsibility of decision. The people vote for helping the Mamertines.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 264. Appius Claudius Caudex. M. Fulvius Flaccus, Coss.]
[Sidenote: Hiero joins Carthage in laying siege to the Mamertines in Messene. Appius comes to the relief of the besieged, B.C. 264.]
[Sidenote: After vain attempts at negotiation, Appius determines to attack Hiero.]
[Sidenote: Hiero is defeated, and returns to Syracuse.]
+11.+ In spite of protracted deliberations, the conflict of motives proved too strong, after all, to allow of the Senate coming to any decision; for the inconsistency of aiding the Messenians appeared to them to be evenly balanced by the advantages to be gained by doing so.
The people, however, had suffered much from the previous wars, and wanted some means of repairing the losses which they had sustained in every department. Besides these national advantages to be gained by the war, the military commanders suggested that individually they would get manifest and important benefits from it. They accordingly voted in favour of giving the aid.
The decree having thus been passed by the people, they elected one of the consuls, Appius Claudius, to the command, and sent him out with instructions to cross to Messene and relieve the Mamertines. These latter managed, between threats and false representations, to oust the Carthaginian commander who was already in possession of the citadel, invited Appius in, and offered to deliver the city into his hands.
The Carthaginians crucified their commander for what they considered to be his cowardice and folly in thus losing the citadel; stationed their fleet near Pelorus; their land forces at a place called Synes; and laid vigorous siege to Messene.
Now at this juncture Hiero, thinking it a favourable opportunity for totally expelling from Sicily the foreigners who were in occupation of Messene, made a treaty with the Carthaginians. Having done this, he started from Syracuse upon an expedition against that city. He pitched his camp on the opposite side to the Carthaginians, near what was called the Chalcidian Mount, whereby the garrison were cut off from that way out as well as from the other. The Roman Consul Appius, for his part, gallantly crossed the strait by night and got into Messene.
But he found that the enemy had completely surrounded the town and were vigorously pressing on the attack; and he concluded on reflection that the siege could bring him neither credit nor security so long as the enemy commanded land as well as sea. He accordingly first endeavoured to relieve the Mamertines from the contest altogether by sending embassies to both of the attacking forces. Neither of them received his proposals, and at last, from sheer necessity, he made up his mind to hazard an engagement, and that he would begin with the Syracusans.
So he led out his forces and drew them up for the fight: nor was the Syracusan backward in accepting the challenge, but descended simultaneously to give him battle. After a prolonged struggle, Appius got the better of the enemy, and chased the opposing forces right up to their entrenchments. The result of this was that Appius, after stripping the dead, retired into Messene again, while Hiero, with a foreboding of the final result, only waited for nightfall to beat a hasty retreat to Syracuse.
[Sidenote: Encouraged by this success, he attacks and drives off the Carthaginians.]
+12.+ Next morning, when Appius was assured of their flight, his confidence was strengthened, and he made up his mind to attack the Carthaginians without delay. Accordingly, he issued orders to the soldiers to despatch their preparations early, and at daybreak commenced his sally. Having succeeded in engaging the enemy, he killed a large number of them, and forced the rest to fly precipitately to the neighbouring towns.
These successes sufficed to raise the siege of Messene: and thenceforth he scoured the territory of Syracuse and her allies with impunity, and laid it waste without finding any one to dispute the possession of the open country with him; and finally he sat down before Syracuse itself and laid siege to it.
[Sidenote: Such preliminary sketches are necessary for clearness, and my readers must not be surprised if I follow the same system in the case of other towns.]
Such was the nature and motive of the first warlike expedition of the Romans beyond the shores of Italy; and this was the period at which it took place. I thought this expedition the most suitable starting-point for my whole narrative, and accordingly adopted it as a basis; though I have made a rapid survey of some anterior events, that in setting forth its causes no point should be left obscure.
I thought it necessary, if we were to get an adequate and comprehensive view of their present supreme position, to trace clearly how and when the Romans, after the disaster which they sustained in the loss of their own city, began their upward career; and how and when, once more, after possessing themselves of Italy, they conceived the idea of attempting conquests external to it. This must account in future parts of my work for my taking, when treating of the most important states, a preliminary survey of their previous history.
In doing so my object will be to secure such a vantage-ground as will enable us to see with clearness from what origin, at what period, and in what circumstances they severally started and arrived at their present position. This is exactly what I have just done with regard to the Romans.
[Sidenote: Subjects of the two first books of the Histories. 1. War in Sicily or first Punic War, B.C. 264-241. 2. The Mercenary or “inexpiable” war, B.C. 240-237. 3. Carthaginian movements in Spain, B.C. 241-218. 4. Illyrian war, B.C. 229-228. 5. Gallic war, B.C. 225-221. 6. Cleomenic war, B.C. 227-221.]
+13.+ It is time to have done with these explanations, and to come to my subject, after a brief and summary statement of the events of which my introductory books are to treat. Of these the first in order of time are those which befell the Romans and Carthaginians in their war for the possession of Sicily. Next comes the Libyan or Mercenary war; immediately following on which are the Carthaginian achievements in Spain, first under Hamilcar, and then under Hasdrubal. In the course of these events, again, occurred the first expedition of the Romans into Illyria and the Greek side of Europe; and, besides that, their struggles within Italy with the Celts.
In Greece at the same time the war called after Cleomenes was in full action. With this war I design to conclude my prefatory sketch and my second book.
[Sidenote: The first Punic war deserves more detailed treatment, as furnishing a better basis for comparing Rome and Carthage than subsequent wars.]
To enter into minute details of these events is unnecessary, and would be of no advantage to my readers. It is not part of my plan to write a history of them: my sole object is to recapitulate them in a summary manner by way of introduction to the narrative I have in hand. I will, therefore, touch lightly upon the leading events of this period in a comprehensive sketch, and will endeavour to make the end of it dovetail with the commencement of my main history.
In this way the narrative will acquire a continuity; and I shall be shown to have had good reason for touching on points already treated by others: while by such an arrangement the studiously inclined will find the approach to the story which has to be told made intelligible and easy for them. I shall, however, endeavour to describe with somewhat more care the first war which arose between the Romans and Carthaginians for the possession of Sicily.
For it would not be easy to mention any war that lasted longer than this one; nor one in which the preparations made were on a larger scale, or the efforts made more sustained, or the actual engagements more numerous, or the reverses sustained on either side more signal.
Moreover, the two states themselves were at the precise period of their history when their institutions were as yet in their original integrity, their fortunes still at a moderate level, and their forces on an equal footing. So that those who wish to gain a fair view of the national characteristics and resources of the two had better base their comparison upon this war rather than upon those which came after.
[Sidenote: This is rendered more necessary by the partisan misrepresentations of Philinus and Fabius Pictor.]
+14.+ But it was not these considerations only which induced me to undertake the history of this war. I was influenced quite as much by the fact that Philinus and Fabius, who have the reputation of writing with the most complete knowledge about it, have given us an inadequate representation of the truth. Now, judging from their lives and principles, I do not suppose that these writers have intentionally stated what was false; but I think that they are much in the same state of mind as men in love.
Partisanship and complete prepossession made Philinus think that all the actions of the Carthaginians were characterised by wisdom, honour, and courage: those of the Romans by the reverse. Fabius thought the exact opposite. Now in other relations of life one would hesitate to exclude such warmth of sentiment: for a good man ought to be loyal to his friends and patriotic to his country; ought to be at one with his friends in their hatreds and likings.
But directly a man assumes the moral attitude of an historian he ought to forget all considerations of that kind. There will be many occasions on which he will be bound to speak well of his enemies, and even to praise them in the highest terms if the facts demand it: and on the other hand many occasions on which it will be his duty to criticise and denounce his own side, however dear to him, if their errors of conduct suggest that course.
For as a living creature is rendered wholly useless if deprived of its eyes, so if you take truth from History what is left is but an idle unprofitable tale. Therefore, one must not shrink either from blaming one’s friends or praising one’s enemies; nor be afraid of finding fault with and commending the same persons at different times. For it is impossible that men engaged in public affairs should always be right, and unlikely that they should always be wrong.
Holding ourselves, therefore, entirely aloof from the actors, we must as historians make statements and pronounce judgment in accordance with the actions themselves.
[Sidenote: Philinus’s misrepresentations.]
+15.+ The writers whom I have named exemplify the truth of these remarks.
Philinus, for instance, commencing the narrative with his second book, says that the “Carthaginians and Syracusans engaged in the war and sat down before Messene; that the Romans arriving by sea entered the town, and immediately sallied out from it to attack the Syracusans; but that after suffering severely in the engagement they retired into Messene; and that on a second occasion, having issued forth to attack the Carthaginians, they not only suffered severely but lost a considerable number of their men captured by the enemy.” But while making this statement, he represents Hiero as so destitute of sense as, after this engagement, not only to have promptly burnt his stockade and tents and fled under cover of night to Syracuse, but to have abandoned all the forts which had been established to overawe the Messenian territory.
Similarly he asserts that “the Carthaginians immediately after their battle evacuated their entrenchment and dispersed into various towns, without venturing any longer even to dispute the possession of the open country; and that, accordingly, their leaders seeing that their troops were utterly demoralised determined in consideration not to risk a battle: that the Romans followed them, and not only laid waste the territory of the Carthaginians and Syracusans, but actually sat down before Syracuse itself and began to lay siege to it.” These statements appear to me to be full of glaring inconsistency, and to call for no refutation at all.
The very men whom he describes to begin with as besieging Messene, and as victorious in the engagements, he afterwards represents as running away, abandoning the open country, and utterly demoralised: while those whom he starts by saying were defeated and besieged, he concludes by describing as engaging in a pursuit, as promptly seizing the open places, and finally as besieging Syracuse. Nothing can reconcile these statements. It is impossible. Either his initial statement, or his account of the subsequent events, must be false.
In point of fact the latter part of his story is the true one. The Syracusans and Carthaginians did abandon the open country, and the Romans did immediately afterwards commence a siege of Syracuse and of Echetla, which lies in the district between the Syracusan and Carthaginian pales. For the rest it must necessarily be acknowledged that the first part of his account is false; and that whereas the Romans were victorious in the engagements under Messene, they have been represented by this historian as defeated.
Through the whole of this work we shall find Philinus acting in a similar spirit: and much the same may be said of Fabius, as I shall show when the several points arise.
I have now said what was proper on the subject of this digression.
Returning to the matter in hand I will endeavour by a continuous narrative of moderate dimensions to guide my readers to a true knowledge of this war.
[Sidenote: B.C. 264.]
[Sidenote: (Continuing from chap. xii.), B.C. 263, Manius Valerius Maximus, Manius Otacilius Crassus, Coss. The Consuls with four legions are sent to Sicily. A general move of the Sicilian cities to join them.
Hiero submits.]
+16.+ When news came to Rome of the successes of Appius and his legions, the people elected Manius Otacilius and Manius Valerius Consuls, and despatched their whole army to Sicily, and both Consuls in command. Now the Romans have in all, as distinct from allies, four legions of Roman citizens, which they enrol every year, each of which consists of four thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry: and on their arrival most of the cities revolted from Syracuse as well as from Carthage, and joined the Romans.
And when he saw the terror and dismay of the Sicilians, and compared with them the number and crushing strength of the legions of Rome, Hiero began, from a review of all these points, to conclude that the prospects of the Romans were brighter than those of the Carthaginians. Inclining therefore from these considerations to the side of the former, he began sending messages to the Consuls, proposing peace and friendship with them.
The Romans accepted his offer, their chief motive being the consideration of provisions: for as the Carthaginians had command of the sea, they were afraid of being cut off at every point from their supplies, warned by the fact that the legions which had previously crossed had run very short in that respect. They therefore gladly accepted Hiero’s offers of friendship, supposing that he would be of signal service to them in this particular.
The king engaged to restore his prisoners without ransom, and to pay besides an indemnity of a hundred talents of silver.
The treaty being arranged on these terms, the Romans thenceforth regarded the Syracusans as friends and allies: while King Hiero, having thus placed himself under the protection of the Romans, never failed to supply their needs in times of difficulty; and for the rest of his life reigned securely in Syracuse, devoting his energies to gaining the gratitude and good opinion of the Greeks. And in point of fact no monarch ever acquired a greater reputation, or enjoyed for a longer period the fruits of his prudent policy in private as well as in public affairs.
[Sidenote: The Carthaginians alarmed at Hiero’s defection make great efforts to increase their army in Sicily.]
[Sidenote: They select Agrigentum as their headquarters.]
+17.+ When the text of this treaty reached Rome, and the people had approved and confirmed the terms made with Hiero, the Roman government thereupon decided not to send all their forces, as they had intended doing, but only two legions. For they thought that the gravity of the war was lessened by the adhesion of the king, and at the same time that the army would thus be better off for provisions. But when the Carthaginian government saw that Hiero had become their enemy, and that the Romans were taking a more decided part in Sicilian politics, they conceived that they must have a more formidable force to enable them to confront their enemy and maintain their own interests in Sicily.
Accordingly, they enlisted mercenaries from over sea—a large number of Ligurians and Celts, and a still larger number of Iberians—and despatched them to Sicily. And perceiving that Agrigentum possessed the greatest natural advantages as a place of arms, and was the most powerful city in their province, they collected their supplies and their forces into it, deciding to use this city as their headquarters for the war.
[Sidenote: B.C. 262.]
[Sidenote: The new Consuls, Lucius Postumius Megellus and Quintus Mamilius Vitulus, determined to lay siege to Agrigentum.]
[Sidenote: The Carthaginians make an unsuccessful sally.]
On the Roman side a change of commanders had now taken place. The Consuls who made the treaty with Hiero had gone home, and their successors, Lucius Postumius and Quintus Mamilius, were come to Sicily with their legions. Observing the measure which the Carthaginians were taking, and the forces they were concentrating at Agrigentum, they made up their minds to take that matter in hand and strike a bold blow.
Accordingly they suspended every other department of the war, and bearing down upon Agrigentum itself with their whole army, attacked it in force; pitched their camp within a distance of eight stades from the city; and confined the Carthaginians within the walls. Now it was just harvest-time, and the siege was evidently destined to be a long one: the soldiers, therefore, went out to collect the corn with greater hardihood than they ought to have done.
Accordingly the Carthaginians, seeing the enemy scattered about the fields, sallied out and attacked the harvesting-parties. They easily routed these; and then one portion of them made a rush to destroy the Roman entrenchment, the other to attack the pickets. But the peculiarity of their institutions saved the Roman fortunes, as it had often done before. Among them it is death for a man to desert his post, or to fly from his station on any pretext whatever.
Accordingly on this, as on other occasions, they gallantly held their ground against opponents many times their own number; and though they lost many of their own men, they killed still more of the enemy, and at last outflanked the foes just as they were on the point of demolishing the palisade of the camp. Some they put to the sword, and the rest they pursued with slaughter into the city.
+18.+ The result was that thenceforth the Carthaginians were somewhat less forward in making such attacks, and the Romans more cautious in foraging.
[Sidenote: The Romans form two strongly-entrenched camps.]
[Sidenote: A relief comes from Carthage to Agrigentum.]
[Sidenote: Hanno seizes Herbesus.]
[Sidenote: The Romans faithfully supported by Hiero.]
Finding that the Carthaginians would not come out to meet them at close quarters any more, the Roman generals divided their forces: with one division they occupied the ground round the temple of Asclepius outside the town; with the other they encamped in the outskirts of the city on the side which looks towards Heracleia.
The space between the camps on either side of the city they secured by two trenches,—the inner one to protect themselves against sallies from the city, the outer as a precaution against attacks from without, and to intercept those persons or supplies which always make their way surreptitiously into cities that are sustaining a siege. The spaces between the trenches uniting the camps they secured by pickets, taking care in their disposition to strengthen the several accessible points.
As for food and other war material, the other allied cities all joined in collecting and bringing these to Herbesus for them: and thus they supplied themselves in abundance with necessaries, by continually getting provisions living and dead from this town, which was conveniently near. For about five months then they remained in the same position, without being able to obtain any decided advantage over each other beyond the casualties which occurred in the skirmishes.
But the Carthaginians were beginning to be hard pressed by hunger, owing to the number of men shut up in the city, who amounted to no less than fifty thousand: and Hannibal, who had been appointed commander of the besieged forces, beginning by this time to be seriously alarmed at the state of things, kept perpetually sending messages to Carthage explaining their critical state, and begging for assistance.
Thereupon the Carthaginian government put on board ship the fresh troops and elephants which they had collected, and despatched them to Sicily, with orders to join the other commander Hanno. This officer collected all his war material and forces into Heracleia, and as a first step possessed himself by a stratagem of Herbesus, thus depriving the enemy of their provisions and supply of necessaries.
The result of this was that the Romans found themselves in the position of besieged as much as in that of besiegers; for they were reduced by short supplies of food and scarcity of necessaries to such a condition that they more than once contemplated raising the siege. And they would have done so at last had not Hiero, by using every effort and contrivance imaginable, succeeded in keeping them supplied with what satisfied, to a tolerable extent, their most pressing wants. This was Hanno’s first step. His next was as follows.
[Sidenote: Hanno tempts the Roman cavalry out and defeats them.]
[Sidenote: After two months, Hanno is forced to try to relieve Agrigentum,]
[Sidenote: but is defeated in a pitched battle, and his army cut to pieces.]
[Sidenote: Hannibal escapes by night; and the Romans enter and plunder Agrigentum.]
+19.+ He saw that the Romans were reduced by disease and want, owing to an epidemic that had broken out among them, and he believed that his own forces were strong enough to give them battle: he accordingly collected his elephants, of which he had about fifty, and the whole of the rest of his army, and advanced at a rapid pace from Heracleia; having previously issued orders to the Numidian cavalry to precede him, and to endeavour, when they came near the enemies’ stockade, to provoke them and draw their cavalry out; and, having done so, to wheel round and retire until they met him.
The Numidians did as they were ordered, and advanced up to one of the camps. Immediately the Roman cavalry poured out and boldly charged the Numidians: the Libyans retired, according to their orders, until they reached Hanno’s division: then they wheeled round; surrounded, and repeatedly charged the enemy; killed a great number of them, and chased the rest up to their stockade. After this affair Hanno’s force encamped over against the Romans, having seized the hill called Torus, at a distance of about a mile and a quarter from their opponents.
For two months they remained in position without any decisive action, though skirmishes took place daily. But as Hannibal all this time kept signalling and sending messages from the town to Hanno,—telling him that his men were impatient of the famine, and that many were even deserting to the enemy owing to the distress for food,—the Carthaginian general determined to risk a battle, the Romans being equally ready, for the reasons I have mentioned. So both parties advanced into the space between the camps and engaged.
The battle lasted a long time, but at last the Romans turned the advanced guard of Carthaginian mercenaries. The latter fell back upon the elephants and the other divisions posted in their rear; and thus the whole Punic army was thrown into confusion. The retreat became general: the larger number of the men were killed, while some effected their escape into Heracleia; and the Romans became masters of most of the elephants and all the baggage.
Now night came on, and the victors, partly from joy at their success, partly from fatigue, kept their watches somewhat more carelessly than usual; accordingly Hannibal, having given up hope of holding out, made up his mind that this state of things afforded him a good opportunity of escape. He started about midnight from the town with his mercenary troops, and having choked up the trenches with baskets stuffed full of chaff, led off his force in safety, without being detected by the enemy.
When day dawned the Romans discovered what had happened, and indeed for a short time were engaged with Hannibal’s rear; but eventually they all made for the town gates. There they found no one to oppose them: they therefore threw themselves into the town, plundered it, and secured a large number of captives, besides a great booty of every sort and description.
[Sidenote: This success inspires the Senate with the idea of expelling the Carthaginians from Sicily.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 261.]
+20.+ Great was the joy of the Roman Senate when the news of what had taken place at Agrigentum arrived. Their ideas too were so raised that they no longer confined themselves to their original designs.
They were not content with having saved the Mamertines, nor with the advantages gained in the course of the war; but conceived the idea that it was possible to expel the Carthaginians entirely from the island, and that if that were done their own power would receive a great increase: they accordingly engaged in this policy and directed their whole thoughts to this subject. As to their land forces they saw that things were going on as well as they could wish.
For the Consuls elected in succession to those who had besieged Agrigentum, Lucius Valerius Flaccus and Titus Otacilius Crassus, appeared to be managing the Sicilian business as well as circumstances admitted. Yet so long as the Carthaginians were in undisturbed command of the sea, the balance of success could not incline decisively in their favour.
For instance, in the period which followed, though they were now in possession of Agrigentum, and though consequently many of the inland towns joined the Romans from dread of their land forces, yet a still larger number of seaboard towns held aloof from them in terror of the Carthaginian fleet.
Seeing therefore that it was ever more and more the case that the balance of success oscillated from one side to the other from these causes; and, moreover, that while Italy was repeatedly ravaged by the naval force, Libya remained permanently uninjured; they became eager to get upon the sea and meet the Carthaginians there.
It was this branch of the subject that more than anything else induced me to give an account of this war at somewhat greater length than I otherwise should have done. I was unwilling that a first step of this kind should be unknown,—namely how, and when, and why the Romans first started a navy.
[Sidenote: The Romans boldly determine to build ships and meet the Carthaginians at sea.]
[Sidenote: A Carthaginian ship used as a model.]
It was, then, because they saw that the war they had undertaken lingered to a weary length, that they first thought of getting a fleet built, consisting of a hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. But one part of their undertaking caused them much difficulty. Their shipbuilders were entirely unacquainted with the construction of quinqueremes, because no one in Italy had at that time employed vessels of that description. There could be no more signal proof of the courage, or rather the extraordinary audacity of the Roman enterprise.
Not only had they no resources for it of reasonable sufficiency; but without any resources for it at all, and without having ever entertained an idea of naval war,—for it was the first time they had thought of it,—they nevertheless handled the enterprise with such extraordinary audacity, that, without so much as a preliminary trial, they took upon themselves there and then to meet the Carthaginians at sea, on which they had for generations held undisputed supremacy.
Proof of what I say, and of their surprising audacity, may be found in this. When they first took in hand to send troops across to Messene they not only had no decked vessels but no war-ships at all, not so much as a single galley: but they borrowed quinqueremes and triremes from Tarentum and Locri, and even from Elea and Neapolis; and having thus collected a fleet, boldly sent their men across upon it. It was on this occasion that, the Carthaginians having put to sea in the Strait to attack them, a decked vessel of theirs charged so furiously that it ran aground, and falling into the hands of the Romans served them as a model on which they constructed their whole fleet.
And if this had not happened it is clear that they would have been completely hindered from carrying out their design by want of constructive knowledge.
[Sidenote: B.C. 260. Cn. Cornelius Scipio Asina, C. Duilius, Coss.]
[Sidenote: Cornelius captured with the loss of his ships.]
[Sidenote: The rest of the Roman fleet arrive and nearly capture Hannibal.]
+21.+ Meanwhile, however, those who were charged with the shipbuilding were busied with the construction of the vessels; while others collected crews and were engaged in teaching them to row on dry land: which they contrived to do in the following manner. They made the men sit on rower’s benches on dry land, in the same order as they would sit on the benches in actual vessels: in the midst of them they stationed the Celeustes, and trained them to get back and draw in their hands all together in time, and then to swing forward and throw them out again, and to begin and cease these movements at the word of the Celeustes.
By the time these preparations were completed the ships were built.
They therefore launched them, and, after a brief preliminary practice of real sea-rowing, started on their coasting voyage along the shore of Italy, in accordance with the Consul’s order.
For Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who had been appointed by the Roman people a few days before to command the fleet, after giving the ship captains orders that as soon as they had fitted out the fleet they should sail to the Straits, had put to sea himself with seventeen ships and sailed in advance to Messene; for he was very eager to secure all pressing necessaries for the naval force. While there some negotiation was suggested to him for the surrender of the town of Lipara.
Snatching at the prospect somewhat too eagerly, he sailed with the above-mentioned ships and anchored off the town. But having been informed in Panormus of what had taken place, the Carthaginian general Hannibal despatched Boōdes, a member of the Senate, with a squadron of twenty ships. He accomplished the voyage at night and shut up Gnaeus and his men within the harbour.
When day dawned the crews made for the shore and ran away, while Gnaeus, in utter dismay, and not knowing in the least what to do, eventually surrendered to the enemy. The Carthaginians having thus possessed themselves of the ships as well as the commander of their enemies, started to rejoin Hannibal. Yet a few days afterwards, though the disaster of Gnaeus was so signal and recent, Hannibal himself was within an ace of falling into the same glaring mistake.
For having been informed that the Roman fleet in its voyage along the coast of Italy was close at hand, he conceived a wish to get a clear view of the enemy’s number and disposition. He accordingly set sail with fifty ships, and just as he was rounding the “Italian Headland” he fell in with the enemy, who were sailing in good order and disposition. He lost most of his ships, and with the rest effected his own escape in a manner beyond hope or expectation.
[Sidenote: The “corvi” or “crows” for boarding.]
+22.+ When the Romans had neared the coasts of Sicily and learnt the disaster which had befallen Gnaeus, their first step was to send for Gaius Duilius, who was in command of the land forces. Until he should come they stayed where they were; but at the same time, hearing that the enemy’s fleet was no great way off, they busied themselves with preparations for a sea-fight.
Now their ships were badly fitted out and not easy to manage, and so some one suggested to them as likely to serve their turn in a fight the construction of what were afterwards called “crows.” Their mechanism was this. A round pole was placed in the prow, about twenty-four feet high, and with a diameter of four palms. The pole itself had a pulley on the top, and a gangway made with cross planks nailed together, four feet wide and thirty-six feet long, was made to swing round it.
Now the hole in the gangway was oval shaped, and went round the pole twelve feet from one end of the gangway, which had also a wooden railing running down each side of it to the height of a man’s knee. At the extremity of this gangway was fastened an iron spike like a miller’s pestle, sharpened at its lower end and fitted with a ring at its upper end. The whole thing looked like the machines for braising corn.
To this ring the rope was fastened with which, when the ships collided, they hauled up the “crows,” by means of the pulley at the top of the pole, and dropped them down upon the deck of the enemy’s ship, sometimes over the prow, sometimes swinging them round when the ships collided broadsides.
And as soon as the “crows” were fixed in the planks of the decks and grappled the ships together, if the ships were alongside of each other, the men leaped on board anywhere along the side, but if they were prow to prow, they used the “crow” itself for boarding, and advanced over it two abreast. The first two protected their front by holding up before them their shields, while those who came after them secured their sides by placing the rims of their shields upon the top of the railing.
Such were the preparations which they made; and having completed them they watched an opportunity of engaging at sea.
[Sidenote: Victory of Duilius at Mylae, B.C. 260.]
+23.+ As for Gaius Duilius, he no sooner heard of the disaster which had befallen the commander of the navy than handing over his legions to the military Tribunes he transferred himself to the fleet. There he learnt that the enemy was plundering the territory of Mylae, and at once sailed to attack him with the whole fleet. No sooner did the Carthaginians sight him than with joy and alacrity they put to sea with a hundred and thirty sail, feeling supreme contempt for the Roman ignorance of seamanship.
Accordingly they all sailed with their prows directed straight at their enemy: they did not think the engagement worth even the trouble of ranging their ships in any order, but advanced as though to seize a booty exposed for their acceptance. Their commander was that same Hannibal who had withdrawn his forces from Agrigentum by a secret night movement, and he was on board a galley with seven banks of oars which had once belonged to King Pyrrhus.
When they neared the enemy, and saw the “crows” raised aloft on the prows of the several ships, the Carthaginians were for a time in a state of perplexity; for they were quite strangers to such contrivances as these engines. Feeling, however, a complete contempt for their opponents, those on board the ships that were in the van of the squadron charged without flinching.
But as soon as they came to close quarters their ships were invariably tightly grappled by these machines; the enemy boarded by means of the “crows,” and engaged them on their decks; and in the end some of the Carthaginians were cut down, while others surrendered in bewildered terror at the battle in which they found themselves engaged, which eventually became exactly like a land fight.
The result was that they lost the first thirty ships engaged, crews and all. Among them was captured the commander’s ship also, though Hannibal himself by an unexpected piece of luck and an act of great daring effected his escape in the ship’s boat. The rest of the Carthaginian squadron were sailing up with the view of charging; but as they were coming near they saw what had happened to the ships which were sailing in the front, and accordingly sheered off and avoided the blows of the engines.
Yet trusting to their speed, they managed by a manœuvre to sail round and charge the enemy, some on their broadside and others on their stern, expecting by that method to avoid danger. But the engines swung round to meet them in every direction, and dropped down upon them so infallibly, that no ships could come to close quarters without being grappled. Eventually the Carthaginians turned and fled, bewildered at the novelty of the occurrence, and with a loss of fifty ships.
[Sidenote: Further operations in Sicily.]
[Sidenote: Hamilcar.]
[Sidenote: Segesta and Macella.]
[Sidenote: Hannibal in Sardinia.]
+24.+ Having in this unlooked-for manner made good their maritime hopes the Romans were doubly encouraged in their enthusiasm for the war. For the present they put in upon the coast of Sicily, raised the siege of Segesta when it was reduced to the last extremity, and on their way back from Segesta carried the town Macella by assault.
But Hamilcar, the commander of the Carthaginian land forces happened, after the naval battle, to be informed as he lay encamped near Panormus that the allies were engaged in a dispute with the Romans about the post of honour in the battles: and ascertaining that the allies were encamped by themselves between Paropus and Himeraean Thermae, he made a sudden attack in force as they were in the act of moving camp and killed almost four thousand of them.
After this action Hannibal sailed across to Carthage with such ships as he had left; and thence before very long crossed to Sardinia, with a reinforcement of ships, and accompanied by some of those whose reputation as naval commanders stood high. But before very long he was blockaded in a certain harbour by the Romans, and lost a large number of ships; and was thereupon summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified. This came about because the first thing the Romans did upon getting a navy was to try to become masters of Sardinia.
[Sidenote: B.C. 259.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 258. Coss. A. Atilius Calatinus, C. Sulpicius, Paterculus.]
[Sidenote: Hippana and Myttistratum.]
[Sidenote: Camarina.]
During the next year the Roman legions in Sicily did nothing worthy of mention. In the next, after the arrival of the new Consuls, Aulus Atilius and Gaius Sulpicius, they started to attack Panormus because the Carthaginian forces were wintering there. The Consuls advanced close up to the city with their whole force, and drew up in order of battle. But the enemy refusing to come out to meet them, they marched away and attacked the town of Hippana.
This they carried by assault: but though they also took Myttistratum it was only after it had stood a lengthened siege owing to the strength of its situation. It was at this time, too, that they recovered Camarina, which had revolted a short time previously. They threw up works against it, and captured it after making a breach in its walls. They treated Henna, and sundry other strong places which had been in the hands of the Carthaginians, in the same way; and when they had finished these operations they undertook to lay siege to Lipara.
[Sidenote: Fighting off Tyndaris.]
[Sidenote: Coss. C. Atilius Regulus, Cn. Cornelius, Blasio II. B.C. 257.]
+25.+ Next year Gaius Atilius, the Consul, happened to be at anchor off Tyndaris, when he observed the Carthaginian fleet sailing by in a straggling manner. He passed the word to the crews of his own ships to follow the advanced squadron, and started himself before the rest with ten ships of equal sailing powers. When the Carthaginians became aware that while some of the enemy were still embarking, others were already putting out to sea, and that the advanced squadron were considerably ahead of the rest, they stood round and went to meet them.
They succeeded in surrounding and destroying all of them except the Consul’s ship, and that they all but captured with its crew. This last, however, by the perfection of its rowers and its consequent speed, effected a desperate escape. Meanwhile the remaining ships of the Romans were sailing up and gradually drawing close together. Having got into line, they charged the enemy, took ten ships with their crews, and sunk eight. The rest of the Carthaginian ships retired to the Liparean Islands.
[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 257-256.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 256. Coss. L. Manlius, Vulso Longus, M. Atilius Regulus II. (Suff.).]
The result of this battle was that both sides concluded that they were now fairly matched, and accordingly made more systematic efforts to secure a naval force, and to dispute the supremacy at sea. While these things were going on, the land forces effected nothing worth recording; but wasted all their time in such petty operations as chance threw in their way. Therefore, after making the preparations I have mentioned for the approaching summer, the Romans, with three hundred and thirty decked ships of war, touched at Messene; thence put to sea, keeping Sicily on their right; and after doubling the headland Pachynus passed on to Ecnomus, because the land force was also in that district.
The Carthaginians on their part put to sea again with three hundred and fifty decked ships, touched at Lilybaeum, and thence dropped anchor at Heracleia Minoa.
[Sidenote: Preparations for the Battle of Ecnomus.]
[Sidenote: Roman forces. 330 ships, with average of 420 men (300 rowers + 120 marines) = 138,600 men.]
[Sidenote: Carthaginian numbers, 150,000 men.]
+26.+ Now it was the purpose of the Romans to sail across to Libya and transfer the war there, in order that the Carthaginians might find the danger affecting themselves and their own country rather than Sicily.
But the Carthaginians were determined to prevent this. They knew that Libya was easily invaded, and that the invaders if they once effected a landing would meet with little resistance from the inhabitants; and they therefore made up their minds not to allow it, and were eager rather to bring the matter to a decisive issue by a battle at sea. The one side was determined to cross, the other to prevent their crossing; and their enthusiastic rivalry gave promise of a desperate struggle.
The preparations of the Romans were made to suit either contingency, an engagement at sea or a disembarkation on the enemy’s soil. Accordingly they picked out the best hands from the land army and divided the whole force which they meant to take on board into four divisions.
Each division had alternative titles; the first was called the “First Legion” or the “First Squadron,”—and so on with the others. The fourth had a third title besides. They were called “Triarii,” on the analogy of land armies. The total number of men thus making up the naval force amounted to nearly one hundred and forty thousand, reckoning each ship as carrying three hundred rowers and one hundred and twenty soldiers.
The Carthaginians, on the other hand, made their preparations almost exclusively with a view to a naval engagement. Their numbers, if we reckon by the number of their ships, were over one hundred and fifty thousand men. The mere recital of these figures must, I should imagine, strike any one with astonishment at the magnitude of the struggle, and the vast resources of the contending states. An actual view of them itself could hardly be more impressive than the bare statement of the number of men and ships.
[Sidenote: The Roman order at Ecnomus.]
Now the Romans had two facts to consider: First, that circumstances compelled them to face the open sea; and, secondly, that their enemies had the advantage of fast sailing vessels. They therefore took every precaution for keeping their line unbroken and difficult to attack.
They had only two ships with six banks of oars, those, namely, on which the Consuls Marcus Atilius and Lucius Manlius respectively were sailing. These they stationed side by side in front and in a line with each other. Behind each of these they stationed ships one behind the other in single file—the first squadron behind the one, and the second squadron behind the other.
These were so arranged that, as each ship came to its place, the two files diverged farther and farther from each other; the vessels being also stationed one behind the other with their prows inclining outwards. Having thus arranged the first and second squadrons in single file so as to form a wedge, they stationed the third division in a single line at its base; so that the whole finally presented the appearance of a triangle. Behind this base they stationed the horse-transports, attaching them by towing-ropes to the ships of the third squadron.
And to the rear of them they placed the fourth squadron, called the Triarii, in a single line, so extended as to overlap the line in front of them at both extremities. When these dispositions were complete the general appearance was that of a beak or wedge, the apex of which was open, the base compact and strong; while the whole was easy to work and serviceable, and at the same time difficult to break up.
[Sidenote: The disposition of the Carthaginian fleet.]
[Sidenote: ch. 19.]
[Sidenote: ch. 25.]
[Sidenote: The battle.]
+27.+ Meanwhile the Carthaginian commanders had briefly addressed their men. They pointed out to them that victory in this battle would ensure the war in the future being confined to the question of the possession of Sicily; while if they were beaten they would have hereafter to fight for their native land and for all that they held dear. With these words they passed the word to embark.
The order was obeyed with universal enthusiasm, for what had been said brought home to them the issues at stake; and they put to sea in the full fervour of excited gallantry, which might well have struck terror into all who saw it. When their commanders saw the arrangement of the enemies’ ships they adapted their own to match it.
Three-fourths of their force they posted in a single line, extending their right wing towards the open sea with a view of outflanking their opponents, and placing their ships with prows facing the enemy; while the other fourth part was posted to form a left wing of the whole, the vessels being at right angles to the others and close to the shore. The two Carthaginian commanders were Hanno and Hamilcar. The former was the general who had been defeated in the engagement at Agrigentum.
He now commanded the right wing, supported by beaked vessels for charging, and the fastest sailing quinqueremes for outflanking, the enemy. The latter, who had been in the engagement off Tyndaris, had charge of the left wing. This officer, occupying the central position of the entire line, on this occasion employed a stratagem which I will now describe. The battle began by the Romans charging the centre of the Carthaginians, because they observed that it was weakened by their great extension.
The ships in the Carthaginian centre, in accordance with their orders, at once turned and fled with a view of breaking up the Roman close order. They began to retire with all speed, and the Romans pursued them with exultation. The consequence was that, while the first and second Roman squadrons were pressing the flying enemy, the third and fourth “legions” had become detached and were left behind,—the former because they had to tow the horse-transports, and the “Triarii” because they kept their station with them and helped them to form a reserve.
But when the Carthaginians thought that they had drawn the first and second squadron a sufficient distance from the main body a signal was hoisted on board Hamilcar’s ship, and they all simultaneously swung their ships round and engaged their pursuers. The contest was a severe one. The Carthaginians had a great superiority in the rapidity with which they manœuvred their ships. They darted out from their line and rowed round the enemy: they approached them with ease, and retired with despatch.
But the Romans, no less than the Carthaginians, had their reasons for entertaining hopes of victory: for when the vessels got locked together the contest became one of sheer strength: their engines, the “crows,” grappled all that once came to close quarters: and, finally, both the Consuls were present in person and were witnesses of their behaviour in battle.
+28.+ This was the state of affairs on the centre. But meanwhile Hanno with the right wing, which had held aloof when the first encounter took place, crossing the open sea, charged the ships of the Triarii and caused them great difficulty and embarrassment: while those of the Carthaginians who had been posted near the land manœuvred into line, and getting their ships straight, charged the men who were towing the horse-transports. These latter let go the towing-ropes, grappled with the enemy, and kept up a desperate struggle.
[Sidenote: Three separate battles.]
[Sidenote: First with Hamilcar’s squadron.]
[Sidenote: Second squadron under Regulus.]
So that the engagement was in three separate divisions, or rather there were three sea-fights going on at wide intervals from each other. Now in these three engagements the opposing parties were in each case fairly matched, thanks to the original disposition of the ships, and therefore the victory was in each case closely contested. However the result in the several cases was very much what was to be expected where forces were so equal. The first to engage were the first to separate: for Hamilcar’s division at last were overpowered and fled.
But while Lucius was engaged in securing his prizes, Marcus observing the struggle in which the Triarii and horse-transports were involved, went with all speed to their assistance, taking with him all the ships of the second squadron which were undamaged. As soon as he had reached and engaged Hanno’s division, the Triarii quickly picked up courage, though they were then getting much the worst of it, and returned with renewed spirits to the fight. It was now the turn for the Carthaginians to be in difficulties.
They were charged in front and on the rear, and found to their surprise that they were being surrounded by the relieving squadron. They at once gave way and retreated in the direction of the open sea.
[Sidenote: Third squadron relieved by Regulus and Manlius.]
While this was going on, Lucius, who was sailing back to rejoin his colleague, observed that the third squadron had got wedged in by the Carthaginians close in shore. Accordingly he and Marcus, who had by this time secured the safety of the transports and Triarii, started together to relieve their imperilled comrades, who were now sustaining something very like a blockade. And the fact is that they would long before this have been utterly destroyed had not the Carthaginians been afraid of the “crows,” and confined themselves to surrounding and penning them in close to land, without attempting to charge for fear of being caught by the grappling-irons.
The Consuls came up rapidly, and surrounding the Carthaginians captured fifty of their ships with their crews, while some few of them managed to slip away and escape by keeping close to the shore.
[Sidenote: General result.]
Such was the result of the separate engagements. But the general upshot of the whole battle was in favour of the Romans. Twenty-four of their vessels were destroyed; over thirty of the Carthaginians. Not a single Roman ship was captured with its crew; sixty-four of the Carthaginians were so taken.
[Sidenote: Siege of Aspis. (Clupea.)]
+29.+ After the battle the Romans took in a fresh supply of victual, repaired and refitted the ships they had captured, bestowed upon the crews the attention which they had deserved by their victory, and then put to sea with a view of continuing their voyage to Libya.
Their leading ships made the shore just under the headland called the Hermaeum, which is the extreme point on the east of the Gulf of Carthage, and runs out into the open sea in the direction of Sicily.
There they waited for the rest of the ships to come up, and having got the entire fleet together coasted along until they came to the city called Aspis. Here they disembarked, beached their ships, dug a trench, and constructed a stockade round them; and on the inhabitants of the city refusing to submit without compulsion, they set to work to besiege the town. Presently those of the Carthaginians who had survived the sea-fight came to land also; and feeling sure that the enemy, in the flush of their victory, intended to sail straight against Carthage itself, they began by keeping a chain of advanced guards at outlying points to protect the capital with their military and naval forces.
But when they ascertained that the Romans had disembarked without resistance and were engaged in besieging Aspis, they gave up the idea of watching for the descent of the fleet; but concentrated their forces, and devoted themselves to the protection of the capital and its environs.
[Sidenote: Aspis taken.]
[Sidenote: M. Atilius Regulus remains in Africa, winter of B.C. 256-255.]
Meanwhile the Romans had taken Aspis, had placed in it a garrison to hold it and its territory, and had besides sent home to Rome to announce the events which had taken place and to ask for instructions as to the future,—what they were to do, and what arrangements they were to make. Having done this they made active preparations for a general advance and set about plundering the country.
They met with no opposition in this: they destroyed numerous dwelling houses of remarkably fine construction, possessed themselves of a great number of cattle; and captured more than twenty thousand slaves whom they took to their ships. In the midst of these proceedings the messengers arrived from Rome with orders that one Consul was to remain with an adequate force, the other was to bring the fleet to Rome.
Accordingly Marcus was left behind with forty ships, fifteen thousand infantry, and five hundred cavalry; while Lucius put the crowd of captives on board, and having embarked his men, sailed along the coast of Sicily without encountering any danger, and reached Rome.
+30.+ The Carthaginians now saw that their enemies contemplated a lengthened occupation of the country. They therefore proceeded first of all to elect two of their own citizens, Hasdrubal son of Hanno, and Bostarus, to the office of general; and next sent to Heracleia a pressing summons to Hamilcar. He obeyed immediately, and arrived at Carthage with five hundred cavalry and five thousand infantry. He was forthwith appointed general in conjunction with the other two, and entered into consultation with Hasdrubal and his colleague as to the measures necessary to be taken in the present crisis. They decided to defend the country and not to allow it to be devastated without resistance.
[Sidenote: B.C. 256-255. The operations of Regulus in Libya.]
[Sidenote: Defeat of the Carthaginians near Adys.]
A few days afterwards Marcus sallied forth on one of his marauding expeditions. Such towns as were unwalled he carried by assault and plundered, and such as were walled he besieged. Among others he came to the considerable town of Adys, and having placed his troops round it was beginning with all speed to raise siege works. The Carthaginians were both eager to relieve the town and determined to dispute the possession of the open country. They therefore led out their army; but their operations were not skilfully conducted.
They indeed seized and encamped upon a piece of rising ground which commanded the enemy; but it was unsuitable to themselves. Their best hopes rested on their cavalry and their elephants, and yet they abandoned the level plain and cooped themselves up in a position at once steep and difficult of access. The enemy, as might have been expected, were not slow to take advantage of this mistake.
The Roman commanders were skilful enough to understand that the best and most formidable part of the forces opposed to them was rendered useless by the nature of the ground. They did not therefore wait for them to come down to the plain and offer battle, but choosing the time which suited themselves, began at daybreak a forward movement on both sides of the hill. In the battle which followed the Carthaginians could not use their cavalry or elephants at all; but their mercenary troops made a really gallant and spirited sally.
They even forced the first division of the Romans to give way and fly: but they advanced too far, and were surrounded and routed by the division which was advancing from the other direction. This was immediately followed by the whole force being dislodged from their encampment.
The elephants and cavalry as soon as they gained level ground made good their retreat without loss; but the infantry were pursued by the Romans. The latter however soon desisted from the pursuit. They presently returned, dismantled the enemy’s entrenchment, and destroyed the stockade; and from thenceforth overran the whole country-side and sacked the towns without opposition.
[Sidenote: Tunes.]
Among others they seized the town called Tunes. This place had many natural advantages for expeditions such as those in which they were engaged, and was so situated as to form a convenient base of operations against the capital and its immediate neighbourhood. They accordingly fixed their headquarters in it.
[Sidenote: Distress at Carthage, which is heightened by an inroad of Numidians.]
[Sidenote: Spring of B.C. 255. Regulus proposes harsh terms.]
[Sidenote: The terms rejected.]
+31.+ The Carthaginians were now indeed in evil case. It was not long since they had sustained a disaster at sea: and now they had met with one on land, not from any failure of courage on the part of their soldiers, but from the incompetency of their commanders. Simultaneously with these misfortunes, they were suffering from an inroad of the Numidians, who were doing even more damage to the country than the Romans.
The terror which they inspired drove the country folk to flock for safety into the city; and the city itself had to face a serious famine as well as a panic, the former from the numbers that crowded into it, the latter from the hourly expectation of a siege. But Regulus had different views.
The double defeat sustained by the Carthaginians, by land as well as by sea, convinced him that the capture of Carthage was a question of a very short time; and he was in a state of great anxiety lest his successor in the Consulship should arrive from Rome in time to rob him of the glory of the achievement. He therefore invited the Carthaginians to make terms. They were only too glad of the proposal, and sent their leading citizens to meet him.
The meeting took place: but the commissioners could not bring their minds to entertain his proposals; they were so severe that it was almost more than they could bear to listen to them at all. Regulus regarded himself as practically master of the city, and considered that they ought to regard any concession on his part as a matter of favour and pure grace.
The Carthaginians on the other hand concluded that nothing worse could be imposed on them if they suffered capture than was now enjoined.
They therefore returned home without accepting the offers of Regulus, and extremely exasperated by his unreasonable harshness. When the Carthaginian Senate heard the conditions offered by the Roman general, though they had almost relinquished every hope of safety, they came to the gallant and noble resolution that they would brave anything, that they would try every possible means and endure every extremity, rather than submit to terms so dishonourable and so unworthy of their past history.
[Sidenote: Arrival of the Spartan Xanthippus in Carthage.]
+32.+ Now it happened that just about this time one of their recruiting agents, who had some time before been despatched to Greece, arrived home. He brought a large number of men with him, and among them a certain Lacedaemonian named Xanthippus, a man trained in the Spartan discipline, and of large experience in war.
When this man was informed of their defeat, and of how it had taken place, and when he had reviewed the military resources still left to the Carthaginians, and the number of their cavalry and elephants, he did not take long to come to a decided conclusion. He expressed his opinion to his friends that the Carthaginians had owed their defeat, not to the superiority of the Romans, but to the unskilfulness of their own commanders.
The dangerous state of their affairs caused the words of Xanthippus to get abroad quickly among the people and to reach the ears of the generals; and the men in authority determined to summon and question him.
He appeared, and laid his views before the magistrates; in which he showed to what they owed their present disasters, and that if they would take his advice and keep to the flat parts of the country alike in marching, encamping, and giving battle, they would be able with perfect ease to secure safety for themselves and to defeat their opponents in the field. The generals accepted the suggestion, resolved to follow his advice, and there and then put their forces at his command.
Among the multitude the observation of Xanthippus was passed from mouth to mouth, and gave rise, as was to be expected, to a good deal of popular rumour and sanguine talk. This was confirmed when he had once handled the troops. The way in which he got them into order when he had led them outside the town; the skill with which he manœuvred the separate detachments, and passed the word of command down the ranks in due conformity to the rules of tactics, at once impressed every one with the contrast to the blundering of their former generals.
The multitude expressed their approbation by loud cheers, and were for engaging the enemy without delay, convinced that no harm could happen to them as long as Xanthippus was their leader. The generals took advantage of this circumstance, and of the extraordinary recovery which they saw had taken place in the spirits of the people. They addressed them some exhortations befitting the occasion, and after a few days’ delay got their forces on foot and started.
Their army consisted of twelve thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and nearly a hundred elephants.
[Sidenote: The new strategy of the Carthaginians.]
[Sidenote: The dispositions for the battle.]
+33.+ The Romans at once noticed a change. They saw that the Carthaginians chose level country for their line of march, and flat places for their encampments. This novelty puzzled and rather alarmed them, yet their prevailing feeling was an eager desire to come to close quarters with the enemy. They therefore advanced to a position about ten stades from them and employed the first day in pitching a camp there.
Next day, while the chief officers of the Carthaginians were discussing in a council of war what dispositions were called for, and what line of strategy they were to adopt, the common soldiers, in their eagerness for the engagement, collected in groups, shouted out the name of Xanthippus, and showed that their opinion was in favour of an immediate forward movement.
Influenced by the evident enthusiasm and eagerness of the army, and by the appeals of Xanthippus that they should not let the opportunity slip, the generals gave orders to the men to get ready, and resigned to Xanthippus the entire direction of affairs, with full authority to act as he thought most advantageous.
He at once acted upon this authority. He ordered out the elephants, and placed them in a single line in front of the whole army. The heavy phalanx of the Carthaginians he stationed at a moderate interval in the rear of these. He divided the mercenaries into three corps. One he stationed on the right wing; while the other two, which consisted of the most active, he placed with the cavalry on both wings. When the Romans saw that the enemy were drawn up to offer them battle they readily advanced to accept it.
They were however alarmed at the elephants, and made special arrangements with a view to resist their charge. They stationed the velites in the van, and behind them the legionaries, many maniples deep, while they divided the cavalry between the two wings. Their line of battle was thus less extended than usual, but deeper. And though they had thereby made a sufficient provision against the elephants, yet being far out-numbered in cavalry, their provision in that part of the field was altogether inadequate.
At length both sides had made their dispositions according to their respective plans of operation, and had placed their several men in the posts assigned to them: and now they were standing drawn up in order, and were each of them watching for the right moment for beginning the attack.
[Sidenote: The battle.]
[Sidenote: The Romans are beaten and annihilated.]
[Sidenote: Regulus made prisoner.]
+34.+ No sooner had Xanthippus given the order to the men on the elephants to advance and disperse the lines in front of them, and to his cavalry to outflank both wings and charge the enemy, than the Roman army—clashing their shields and spears together after their usual custom, and simultaneously raising their battle-cry—charged the enemy.
The Roman cavalry being far out-numbered by the Carthaginians were soon in full retreat on both wings. But the fortune of the several divisions of the infantry was various. Those stationed on the left wing—partly because they could avoid the elephants and partly because they thought contemptuously of the mercenaries—charged the right wing of the Carthaginians, succeeded in driving them from their ground, and pursued them as far as their entrenchment. Those stationed in front of the elephants were less fortunate.
The maniples in front were thrown into utter confusion by the crushing weight of the animals: knocked down and trampled upon by them they perished in heaps upon the field; yet owing to its great depth the main body remained for a time unbroken. But it was not for long.
The maniples on the rear found themselves outflanked by the cavalry, and were forced to face round and resist them: those on the other hand who forced their way to the front through the elephants, and had now those beasts on their rear, found themselves confronted by the phalanx of Carthaginians, which had not yet been in action and was still in close unbroken order, and so were cut to pieces. This was followed by a general rout.
Most of the Romans were trampled to death by the enormous weight of the elephants; the rest were shot down in their ranks by the numerous cavalry: and there were only a very few who attempted to save themselves by flight. But the flatness of the country was unfavourable to escape in this manner. Some of the fugitives were destroyed by the elephants and cavalry; while only those who fled with the general Regulus, amounting perhaps to five hundred, were after a short pursuit made prisoners with him to a man.
On the Carthaginian side there fell about eight hundred of the mercenaries, those namely who had been stationed opposite the left wing of the Romans. On the part of the Romans about two thousand survived.
These were those whom I have already described as having chased the Carthaginian right wing to their entrenchment, and who were thus not involved in the general engagement. The rest were entirely destroyed with the exception of those who fled with Regulus. The surviving maniples escaped with considerable difficulty to the town of Aspis. The Carthaginians stripped the dead, and taking with them the Roman general and the rest of their prisoners, returned to the capital in a high state of exultation at the turn their affairs had now taken.
[Sidenote: Eurip. fr.]
+35.+ This event conveys many useful lessons to a thoughtful observer.
Above all, the disaster of Regulus gives the clearest possible warning that no one should feel too confident of the favours of Fortune, especially in the hour of success. Here we see one, who a short time before refused all pity or consideration to the fallen, brought incontinently to beg them for his own life. Again, we are taught the truth of that saying of Euripides—
One wise man’s skill is worth a world in arms.
For it was one man, one brain, that defeated the numbers which were believed to be invincible and able to accomplish anything; and restored to confidence a whole city that was unmistakably and utterly ruined, and the spirits of its army which had sunk to the lowest depths of despair. I record these things in the hope of benefiting my readers.
There are two roads to reformation for mankind—one through misfortunes of their own, the other through those of others: the former is the most unmistakable, the latter the less painful. One should never therefore voluntarily choose the former, for it makes reformation a matter of great difficulty and danger;
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This book was published in two volumes, of which this is the first. The second volume was released as Project Gutenberg ebook #44126, available at https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44126. Bold characters are enclosed in plus (+) signs. Gesperrt text is enclosed in equal (=) signs. THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS [Illustration] THE HISTORIES OF POLYBIUS TRANSLATED FROM THE TEXT OF F. HULTSCH BY EVELYN S. SHUCKBURGH, M.A. LATE FELLOW OF EMMANUEL COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE IN TWO VOLUMES VOL. I LONDON MACMILLAN AND CO. AND NEW YORK 1889 _All rights reserved_ TO F. M. S. IN GRATITUDE FOR MUCH PATIENT HELP
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