Warren Commission (05 of 26): Hearings Vol. V (of 15)
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Title: Warren Commission (05 of 26): Hearings Vol. V (of 15)
Author: United States. Warren Commission
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK WARREN COMMISSION (05 OF 26): HEARINGS VOL. V (OF 15) ***
INVESTIGATION OF
THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
HEARINGS
Before the President's Commission
on the Assassination
of President Kennedy
PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER 11130, an Executive order creating a
Commission to ascertain, evaluate, and report upon the facts relating
to the assassination of the late President John F. Kennedy and the
subsequent violent death of the man charged with the assassination and
S.J. RES. 137, 88TH CONGRESS, a concurrent resolution conferring upon
the Commission the power to administer oaths and affirmations, examine
witnesses, receive evidence, and issue subpenas
_Volume_ V
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON: 1964
For sale in complete sets by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office Washington, D.C., 20402
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN, _Chairman_
SENATOR RICHARD B. RUSSELL
SENATOR JOHN SHERMAN COOPER
REPRESENTATIVE HALE BOGGS
REPRESENTATIVE GERALD R. FORD
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
MR. JOHN J. McCLOY
J. LEE RANKIN, _General Counsel_
_Assistant Counsel_
FRANCIS W. H. ADAMS
JOSEPH A. BALL
DAVID W. BELIN
WILLIAM T. COLEMAN, Jr.
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG
BURT W. GRIFFIN
LEON D. HUBERT, Jr.
ALBERT E. JENNER, Jr.
WESLEY J. LIEBELER
NORMAN REDLICH
W. DAVID SLAWSON
ARLEN SPECTER
SAMUEL A. STERN
HOWARD P. WILLENS[A]
[A] Mr. Willens also acted as liaison between the Commission and the
Department of Justice.
_Staff Members_
PHILLIP BARSON
EDWARD A. CONROY
JOHN HART ELY
ALFRED GOLDBERG
MURRAY J. LAULICHT
ARTHUR MARMOR
RICHARD M. MOSK
JOHN J. O'BRIEN
STUART POLLAK
ALFREDDA SCOBEY
CHARLES N. SHAFFER, Jr.
Biographical information on the Commissioners and the staff can be found
in the Commission's _Report_.
Preface
The testimony of the following witnesses is contained in volume V:
Alan H. Belmont, assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Jack Revill and V. J. Brian of the Dallas police, who
testified concerning conversations Revill had with James Patrick Hosty,
Jr., a special agent of the FBI; Robert A. Frazier, a firearms expert
with the FBI; Drs. Alfred Olivier, Arthur Dziemian, and Frederick W.
Light, Jr., wound ballistics experts with the U.S. Army laboratories
at Edgewood Arsenal, Md.; J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; John A. McCone, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency; Richard M. Helms, Deputy Director for Plans of the
Central Intelligence Agency; Thomas J. Kelley, Leo J. Gauthier, and
Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt, who testified concerning efforts to reconstruct
the facts of the assassination; Mrs. John F. Kennedy; Jack Ruby;
Henry Wade, district attorney of Dallas; Sgt. Patrick T. Dean, of the
Dallas police, who testified concerning a conversation with Ruby;
Waggoner Carr, attorney general of Texas; Richard Edward Snyder, John
A. McVickar, Abram Chayes, Bernice Waterman, and Frances G. Knight, of
the U.S. Department of State; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Mrs. Lee
Harvey Oswald; Harris Coulter, an interpreter with the Department of
State; Robert Alan Surrey, a Dallas citizen who testified regarding his
relationship with General Walker; James J. Rowley, Chief of the U.S.
Secret Service; Robert Carswell, special assistant to the Secretary
of the Treasury; Bernard William Weissman, who testified concerning
an advertisement signed by him which appeared in the Dallas Morning
News on November 22, 1963; Robert G. Klause, a Dallas citizen who
testified regarding a "Wanted For Treason" handbill; Mark Lane, a New
York attorney; President Lyndon B. Johnson and Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson;
Llewellyn E. Thompson, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and
Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon.
Contents
Page
Preface v
Testimony of--
Alan H. Belmont. 1
Jack Revill 33
V. J. Brian 47
Robert A. Frazier 58, 165
Alfred Olivier 74
Arthur J. Dziemian 90
Frederick W. Light, Jr 94
J. Edgar Hoover 97
John A. McCone and Richard M. Helms 120
Thomas J. Kelley 129, 175
Leo J. Gauthier 135
Lyndal L. Shaneyfelt 138, 176
Mrs. John F. Kennedy 178
Jack Ruby 181
Henry Wade 213
Patrick T. Dean 254
Waggoner Carr 258
Richard Edward Snyder 260
John A. McVickar 299, 318
Abram Chayes 307, 327
Bernice Waterman 346
Hon. Dean Rusk 363
Frances G. Knight 371
Mrs. Lee Harvey Oswald (resumed) 387, 410
Harris Coulter 408
Robert Alan Surrey 420
James J. Rowley 449
Robert Carswell 486
Bernard William Weissman, accompanied by
Thomas A. Flannery, Esq 487
Robert G. Klause 535
Mark Lane (resumed) 546
President Lyndon B. Johnson 561
Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson 564
Llewellyn E. Thompson 567
C. Douglas Dillon 573
COMMISSION EXHIBITS INTRODUCED
Exhibit No.: Page
825 16
833 10
834 14
835 15
836 32
837 32
838 47
839 58
840 66
841 69
842 72
843 73
844 88
845 88
846 88
847 88
848 88
849 88
850 88
851 88
852 88
853 88
854 88
855 88
856 88
857 88
858 88
859 88
860 88
861 89
862 89
863 111
864 115
865 115
866 120
867 120
868 123
869 123
870 121
871 130
872 131
873 131
874 131
875 134
876 135
877 135
878 136
879 136
880 136
881 136
882 137
883 137
884 138
885 171
886 171
887 171
888 171
889 171
890 171
891 171
892 171
893 171
894 171
895 171
896 171
897 171
898 171
899 171
900 171
901 171
902 171
903 171
904 178
905 178
906 178
907 178
908 299
909 299
910 299
911 325
912 299
913 299
914 299
915 299
916 299
917 299
918 299
919 299
920 299
921 299
922 299
923 299
924 299
925 299
926 299
927 299
928 299
929 299
930 299
931 299
932 299
933 299
934 299
935 299
936 299
937 299
938 299
939 299
940 299
941 325
942 325
943 326
944 326
945 326
946 299
947 299
948 346
949 346
950 346
951 336
952 335
953 346
954 345
955 343
956 345
957 362
958 326
959 326
960 340
961 362
962 362
963 362
964 362
965 362
966 362
967 362
968 362
969 362
970 362
971 362
973 362
974 362
975 362
976 362
977 362
978 362
979 362
980 362
981 362
982 362
983 362
984 371
985 371
986 371
987 404
988 404
989 371
990 403
991 403
992 404
993 410
994 413
995 421
996 448
997 448
998 448
999 448
1000 448
1002 448
1003 448
1004 448
1005 448
1006 448
1007 448
1008 448
1009 448
1010 448
1011 448
1012 448
1013 448
1014 448
1015 448
1016 448
1017 448
1018 454
1019 461
1020 462
1021 463
1022 463
1023 465
1024 469
1025 469
1026 471
1027 471
1028 476
1029 483
1030 483
1031 532
1032 532
1033 532
1033-A 532
1034 532
1035 532
1036 532
1036-A 532
1037 532
1037-A 532
1037-B 532
1038 532
1038-A 532
1039 532
1040 532
1041 532
1042 532
1043 532
1044 532
1045 532
1046 532
1047 532
1048 532
1049 532
1050 532
1051 532
1052 532
1053-A 576
1053-B 577
1053-C 582
1053-D 583
1053-E 585
Hearings Before the President's Commission
on the
Assassination of President Kennedy
_Wednesday, May 6, 1964_
TESTIMONY OF ALAN H. BELMONT
The President's Commission met at 9:25 a.m. on May 6, 1964, at 200
Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.
Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Representative Gerald
R. Ford, John J. McCloy, and Allen W. Dulles, members.
Also present were J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel; David W. Belin,
assistant counsel; Norman Redlich, assistant counsel; Samuel A. Stern,
assistant counsel; and Charles Murray, observer.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, the Commission will come to order.
Mr. Belin, you had something you wanted the record to show in
connection with our testimony yesterday.
Mr. BELIN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you present it to the Commission now, please.
Mr. BELIN. Yes, sir. We have a report from an FBI document that states
that Roy Truly when interviewed on November 22, advised that "it is
possible Oswald did see him with a rifle in his hands within the past
few days," that is as of November 22, "as a Mr. Warren Caster, employed
by Southwestern Publishing Co., which company has an office in the same
building, had come to his office with two rifles, one was a .22 caliber
rifle which Caster said he had purchased for his son, and the other
a larger more high-powered rifle which Caster said he had purchased
with which to go deer hunting if he got a chance," and Truly said that
he examined the high-powered rifle and raised it to his shoulder and
sighted over it and then returned it to Caster and Caster left with
both rifles.
Then Truly went on to state that he does not own a rifle and has had
no other rifle in his hands or in his possession for a long period of
time. Now because of the problem that did arise, I believe the staff
will promptly go down to Dallas to take the deposition of both Mr.
Truly and Mr. Caster to fully get this in deposition form and find out
where these rifles were as of November 22.
The CHAIRMAN. And their caliber, and so forth.
Mr. BELIN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; I think that is desirable. You ought to do that.
Mr. Belmont, the purpose of today's hearing is to take your testimony
concerning the general procedures of the FBI and explain their
relationship to the case of Lee Harvey Oswald.
Would you please rise and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear
the testimony you are about to give before this Commission will be the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. BELMONT. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Will you be seated, please.
Mr. STERN, will you conduct the examination, please?
Mr. STERN. Thank you, sir. Would you state your full name for the
record, please?
Mr. BELMONT. Alan H. Belmont.
Mr. STERN. And your address, Mr. Belmont?
Mr. BELMONT. 2711 North Yucatan Street, Arlington, Va.
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, what was your education at the college level?
Mr. BELMONT. Graduate of Stanford University in California, with an
A.B. degree, majoring in accounting.
Mr. STERN. What year?
Mr. BELMONT. 1931.
Mr. STERN. What was your employment briefly before joining the Federal
Bureau of Investigation?
Mr. BELMONT. I joined the Bureau, the FBI, in 1936, and in the interim
I worked for public accountants and as a public accountant myself in
California.
Mr. STERN. Would you describe, please, for the Commission briefly your
experience in the Federal Bureau of Investigation since 1936?
Mr. BELMONT. I entered the FBI November 30, 1936, and after the period
of training, was assigned to Birmingham, Ala., as my first office.
I transferred to Chicago in about August 1937, and remained there
until the summer of 1938 when I was transferred to Washington, D.C.,
headquarters.
In January of 1941 I was transferred to New York as supervisor of
applicant and criminal investigative matters, remained there until
the fall of 1942, when I was made assistant agent in charge of our
Chicago office. In January of 1943 I was made agent in charge of our
Cincinnati office and remained there until the summer of 1944 when I
was transferred to New York as assistant agent in charge of criminal
matters in New York.
Subsequently, I was placed in charge of all security work in New York
for a number of years and was transferred to Washington in charge of
the domestic intelligence division in February 1950. I headed that
division until about June of 1961 when I was made assistant to the
director in charge of all investigative work of the FBI and that is my
present position.
Mr. STERN. Could you describe the organization of the FBI with two
purposes in mind: First, to fix your position in the organization.
Second, to provide a framework for describing the investigation of the
case of Lee Harvey Oswald.
Mr. BELMONT. The headquarters of the FBI is, of course, or the FBI is
headed by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover as Director. Directly under him is Mr.
Clyde Tolson, Associate Director. There are 10 divisions broken down in
particular types of administration.
Mr. DULLES. May I say if any of this is classified, highly classified,
you had better let us know because then we could go off the record.
Mr. BELMONT. There is nothing classified here.
Mr. DULLES. Right. I know that you would have that in mind.
Mr. BELMONT. Thank you.
Basically, the division of the 10 divisions at headquarters is
between administrative and investigative. The 10th division is the
inspection division and reports directly to Mr. Hoover. I am in charge
of the investigative divisions which are comprised of the general
investigative divisions handling general criminal work, the special
investigative division handling special inquiries of applicant nature,
and our aggressive approach to organized crime.
The laboratory division handles all examinations of a scientific
nature, and the domestic intelligence division handles all types of
security work. I am in charge of those four divisions, and thus am in
charge and responsible for our investigative work.
Our field offices, numbering 55, are geographically located in
accordance with the amount of work in a particular area. Each division
in the field is headed by a special agent in charge, assisted by an
assistant special agent in charge. They are responsible for the proper
conduct of the work within their divisions. They are answerable to Mr.
Hoover. They are also supervised, of course, in the particular area of
the work concerned by the division at headquarters.
Depending on----
Mr. DULLES. May I ask is that 55 in the United States?
Mr. BELMONT. United States and its possessions.
Mr. DULLES. And Puerto Rico?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. DULLES. It doesn't include your legal----
Mr. BELMONT. Legal attachés abroad?
Mr. DULLES. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. No; they are under the direct supervision of our
headquarters.
Depending on the size of the division in the field, we will have a
supervisory staff in order to properly supervise the work of the agents
in the field.
Mr. STERN. Can you describe the establishment of a typical case,
indicating the meaning of the terms office of origin and auxiliary
office?
Mr. BELMONT. A case is opened by the FBI upon the receipt of
information indicating a matter within the jurisdiction of the FBI.
We restrict our investigations to those matters which are within our
jurisdiction.
The office of origin is the office where the major part of the work
is to be done. Thus it should be the controlling office of the
investigation.
Normally, if an individual is under investigation, it will be the
office where he resides. There will be in many cases investigation to
be conducted by other offices. Those offices that have investigations
in that case are considered auxiliary offices, and will cover the
investigation sent to it, sent to them, by the office of origin or
by another auxiliary office if a lead develops within that area that
requires attention elsewhere.
I may say that the office of origin can be changed and is changed if
during the investigation it becomes apparent that the focus of the
investigation has shifted to another area.
It is logical, therefore, that that office which bears the brunt of the
investigation should be in possession of all the material pertinent
to the investigation and should be charged with the supervision and
running of the investigation and the direction of it.
In the event the office of origin is changed at any given time, the
previous office of origin will forward to the new office of origin all
material pertaining to the case so that it will have a complete file
and the necessary knowledge to run the case.
Mr. STERN. Can you tell us a bit more about how information is
maintained and how it flows through the system from headquarters to
office of origin, to the auxiliary office or in the other directions
that are possible?
Mr. BELMONT. Since the information is maintained in a standard and
uniform filing system in both our field offices and our headquarters
so that there is complete uniformity in the handling of information,
our main filing system is at headquarters. Consequently, we need here
all pertinent information in any case. Consequently, the reports and
information developed during a case are sent to our headquarters for
filing.
It is pertinent to observe that we conduct close to 2 million name
checks a year for other agencies and departments of the Federal
Government. Consequently, we must have here all pertinent information
so that a name check will reflect the information in possession of the
Bureau.
When a report is prepared in our field office--an investigation, and
there are leads or investigation to be performed in another office,
copies of this report are designated for that office, together with
the lead or the investigation to be covered. Upon receipt of that the
office gathers the background information from the report and proceeds
with the investigation.
Mr. STERN. This is the auxiliary office?
Mr. BELMONT. The auxiliary office.
If there is a matter of urgency rather than wait for an investigative
report, the information will be transmitted by more rapid means, such
as teletype. All of our offices have teletypes; radio, our offices have
a radio system; telephone.
Mr. DULLES. Is that teletype from the office to Washington only, or is
there some interoffice teletypes?
Mr. BELMONT. Each office is connected with each other office by
teletype.
Mr. DULLES. It is; all over the country?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; permitting rapid communication.
Mr. DULLES. That is, New Orleans and Dallas would have teletype between
these two offices?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. What kind of radio communication, Mr. Belmont, did you
say?
Mr. BELMONT. We have an emergency radio communication so that both for
normal use, in the matter of expense, to reduce expenses, and for an
emergency, our offices can communicate with headquarters and with each
other.
The CHAIRMAN. On your own transmission system?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; that is correct. We feel that in any type of an
emergency we must, because of our heavy responsibilities----
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. Be able to communicate. As a matter of fact, during the
recent disaster in Alaska, one of the few means of communication with
the mainland was our radio system.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that so?
Mr. BELMONT. And we assisted in passing messages down from Alaska.
We have a communication called AIRTEL which is simply a communication
in letter form on a particular form which upon receipt is regarded as a
matter of urgency and requires special handling.
So that you will understand that, in an effort to cut expenses, we
determined that a matter which could not wait for a report or a letter
was normally sent by teletype, which is a relatively expensive means of
communication.
By sending an AIRTEL which would be recognized for special handling,
the office could receive the same information by mail with a delay of
perhaps 12 hours and it would still receive the urgent handling that we
require for that particular thing. That is the purpose of the AIRTEL.
Mr. STERN. I think we might turn now to a description of your role
in the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald, both before and after the
assassination.
Mr. BELMONT. As the individual in charge of all investigative
operations, the Lee Harvey Oswald investigation is my responsibility,
the same as any other investigative case in the Bureau.
Mr. STERN. Did you have any particular involvement that you can recall
in the investigation of his case before November 22--personally?
Mr. BELMONT. No; this case was not of the importance or urgency that it
was considered necessary to call to my personal attention for personal
direction. You must bear in mind that during the fiscal year 1963 the
FBI handled something in the nature of 636,000 investigative matters.
Necessarily, then, those matters which would be called to my personal
attention for personal handling would have to be on a selective basis.
Mr. STERN. Have you been personally involved in the investigation since
the assassination?
Mr. BELMONT. I have indeed.
Mr. McCLOY. Before we get to this, how many cases of defections to the
Soviet Union would you be investigating in the course of a fiscal year?
Mr. BELMONT. I couldn't give you an exact figure on that. It is our
system to investigate any individual where there is information or
evidence that indicates a necessity for investigation within our
jurisdiction. I do know that we have investigated, and currently are
investigating, defectors not only to the Soviet Union but in other
areas of the world.
Mr. McCLOY. They also would not come per se to your attention, your
personal attention?
Mr. BELMONT. Depending on the case. If there is a matter which has some
urgency or there is a question of policy, it would and does come to my
attention, and indeed comes to the attention of Mr. Hoover.
I would not seek to give you any impression that I am not advised of
many cases, I am. I am kept daily advised, as is Mr. Hoover, of all
matters of policy or urgency or where there is a question of procedure.
That is inherent in our system of close supervision.
Mr. McCLOY. What I am getting at is, I think, is the matter of
defection just out of its own character of such significance that it
becomes a matter of out of the ordinary importance to the Bureau when
you learn of it.
Mr. BELMONT. Again, Mr. McCloy, I have no way of knowing the extent to
which those particular cases would be called to my attention.
As shown in the Oswald case itself, we do take cognizance of these.
Immediately upon the publicity on Oswald, there was a case opened. I
do know that I see many such cases and where there is an indication
of possible damage to the country through the leak of information,
classified or in some other instance where there is a question of
policy or urgency it is immediately called to my attention. I can only
say in general I do see many such cases.
Mr. McCLOY. Well, we had testimony here yesterday that in a
preassassination investigation of Oswald that they learned he was a
defector, they had interviews with him, and then they marked the case
closed.
At one stage it was reopened and then it was closed again because, as I
gather it, there was no indication other than his defection that would
lead to their, to the agents, feeling that this man was capable of
violence or that he was a dangerous character in any sense.
I gather that whether or not he was thought to be a dangerous character
or whether he was capable of violence would be settled by the man in
the field office, in the office that had charge, the man who was in
charge of the office that was dealing with that case locally, is that
right?
Mr. BELMONT. That is a judgment that he would render, but that judgment
would be passed on by our headquarters staff.
Mr. McCLOY. Passed on by Washington?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, indeed. In this instance by the domestic intelligence
division.
Mr. McCLOY. In this case then the decision to close that case, I am
talking always about the preassassination business, was approved or
tacitly approved by the Washington staff.
Mr. BELMONT. Not tacitly approved. Approved.
Mr. McCLOY. Approved. Well, you mark the paper approved or you just
accept it, accept the file with a notation "return for closing."
Mr. BELMONT. When the closing report comes to our headquarters, it is
reviewed by our supervisory staff, and if we do not agree with the
action then the field office is notified to continue the investigation.
That is a decision of substance.
Mr. McCLOY. Well, I can understand that but I gather when the report
comes in you simply let the report lie unless you feel from your
examination of it that it justified further action. You don't notify
the field office, do you, that the closing of the case is approved?
Mr. BELMONT. No, Mr. McCloy. With the volume of work that we have that
would be an unnecessary move.
Mr. McCLOY. I can understand that.
Mr. BELMONT. It is, however, thoroughly understood through our service,
through the system that we follow, that if that report comes in and
it is reviewed and it is filed here, if there is disagreement as to
the handling of the closing of the case or any other matter pertaining
to the investigation, the seat of government will then go out with
instructions to the field.
Mr. McCLOY. All right.
Mr. DULLES. Could I ask one question further on that point?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.
Mr. DULLES. As I recall from the testimony of your people yesterday,
with regard to the situation in Dallas and later in New Orleans, that
after the case was marked closed in Dallas, there was this incident in
New Orleans of the distribution of the Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets,
and then a case there, a live case, an open case was started.
Now, it wasn't quite clear to me yesterday from all the testimony, I
missed a bit of it, unfortunately, as to whether the opening of a new
case in New Orleans, because of the new incident, would operate to
reopen it or change the closed status of the case in Dallas, and the
case was then transferred from New Orleans to Dallas later. If you
could clear that up for us I think it would be helpful.
Mr. BELMONT. The agent, Fain at the time, who handled the case, closed
the case after two interviews with Oswald, arriving at the conclusion
that the purpose of our investigation of Oswald which was to determine
whether he had been given an assignment by Soviet intelligence, had
been served. He closed the case, as he felt there was no further action
to be taken. The purpose had been satisfied. Headquarters agreed.
In March 1963 Agent Hosty received information in Dallas to the effect
that Oswald had been in communication with The Worker, the east coast
Communist newspaper. He therefore reinstituted the case, and sent out a
lead to check Oswald's employment. He also received information, as I
recall it, that Oswald had been in communication with the Fair Play for
Cuba Committee, so there were two incidents that aroused his interest.
In June 1963 our New Orleans office likewise received information that
Oswald had communicated with The Worker or was on a subscription list
for The Worker. So that the case was revived in Dallas by Hosty.
Mr. DULLES. That was even before what we call the New Orleans incident?
Mr. BELMONT. Correct.
Mr. DULLES. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. And he learned that Oswald had left Dallas, the residence
was then picked up in New Orleans, and the case was revived. So that
actually there was a joint revival of the case.
Then on August 9, 1963, Oswald was arrested by the New Orleans police
in connection with a disturbance of the peace in passing out these
pamphlets, which further aroused our interest. So that the reopening
of the case after the closing was due to these incidents that I have
mentioned.
Mr. DULLES. Thank you. So that at the time of the assassination, this
was an open and not a closed case as regards the Dallas office.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct. At the time that Oswald was found to be
living in New Orleans, and this was definitely established that he
was actually residing there, the Dallas office in accordance with the
procedure that I mentioned, transferred the case to New Orleans as
office of origin.
Subsequently, the case was again transferred back to Dallas when it was
determined that Oswald was again residing in the Dallas area.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Stern.
Mr. STERN. We were getting, Mr. Belmont, to the question of whether
you had been personally involved in the investigation since the
assassination.
Mr. BELMONT. I said I have indeed.
Mr. STERN. Yes. As a part of that you have reviewed in detail the
investigation made prior to the assassination?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. Have you participated in or supervised the preparation of
reports and other correspondence to the Commission in response to
questions from the Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. I show you a letter with attached memorandum which has been
marked for identification Commission Exhibit No. 833. Can you identify
this document, Mr. Belmont?
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 833 for
identification.)
Mr. BELMONT. This is a letter transmitted on April 6, 1964, to Mr.
Rankin by the FBI with enclosure answering a number of questions which
the Commission posed to the FBI.
Mr. STERN. Did you supervise the preparation of this letter?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. And you have reviewed it and are familiar with it?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. We have covered in your answers to Mr. Dulles and Mr. McCloy
a good deal of the material in here.
I would like briefly to touch upon several of the questions, the more
important questions, regarding the nature of the FBI's interest in
Lee Harvey Oswald at various times, and I would like you to refer to
each question that I indicate but not read your answer. Paraphrase
it. I think we have had a good deal of the specific detail but what
I am interested in is a description from your examination of the
investigation as it was carried on, of the nature of the FBI interest
in Oswald.
I would like to turn to the first question in which we asked----
The CHAIRMAN. You mean by that that you could get, we could get, a
better idea from paraphrasing the answer than we could get from the
exact answer itself?
Mr. STERN. I think he might be able to highlight the answer. We have
the exact answer on the record, and I thought it might----
The CHAIRMAN. Well, highlight it, if there is anything in addition I
would think that would be relevant and pertinent. But to ask him to
paraphrase that which he has done with great meticulousness would seem
to me to be abortive and would take a lot of our time, and I don't see
what it would prove. If you have anything in addition that you want to
ask him, if you want to ask him if there is anything in addition he has
not put in there, that is all right. But to just ask him to paraphrase
answers that have been done with great care would seem to me to be
confusing the record, and serve no purpose.
Mr. STERN. I might ask, Mr. Belmont, whether there is anything you
would like to add or amplify in these questions?
Mr. BELMONT. I believe the answers speak for themselves, although in
view of Mr. McCloy's questions a little while ago, I would be very
happy to make clear our approach to this matter. For example, the
fact that our interest in defectors, in this case, is shown by the
fact that in early November 1959 we opened a file on Oswald based on
the newspaper publicity as to his defection. And the fact that he had
applied to renounce his citizenship. We checked our files then to see
was this a man we had a record on, and found that we had a fingerprint
record solely based on his enlistment in the Marines.
We had no other record on him but we placed a stop or a flash notice
in our fingerprint files, at that time so that if he should come back
into the country unbeknownst to us and get into some sort of trouble
we would be immediately notified. That is our opening interest in the
case with the thought in mind that should he come back to the country
we would want to know from him whether he had been enlisted by Soviet
intelligence in some manner.
That is our procedure because of our experience that these things have
happened, and we consider it our responsibility to settle that issue
whenever we can.
Mr. STERN. Could you explain, Mr. Belmont, this procedure of placing a
stop in the files that you just referred to?
Mr. BELMONT. We merely notify our identification division to place what
we call a flash notice in the man's fingerprint file, which means that
should he be arrested and the fingerprints be sent to the FBI, that the
appropriate division, in this case the domestic intelligence division,
would be notified that the man had been arrested, for what and where he
was arrested, thus enabling us to center our attention on him.
Our next interest in this man arose as a result of the fact that his
mother had sent, I believe, $25 to him in Moscow, so we went to her in
April 1960 and we talked to her. At that time she told us that he had
told her that he would possibly attend the Albert Schweitzer College in
Switzerland.
So as a followup, we had our legal attache in Paris make inquiry to see
whether he had enrolled in this college. The resultant check showed
that while they had expected him and a deposit had been placed that he
did not show up at the college.
Mr. STERN. I think that is all covered in quite adequate detail in the
answer to the first question.
Mr. DULLES. I have one question I would like to put to you on the first
question and answer in your letter of April 6, in Exhibit 833--the
Bureau's letter of April 6. You refer, first, to the fact that the
first news you got about Oswald was from a news service item, and then
later on at the bottom of the second full paragraph you state, "A file
concerning Oswald was prepared and as communications were received from
other U.S. Government agencies those communications were placed in his
file."
The record may show the other communications, I guess our record does
show, but do you feel that you adequately were advised by the State
Department as this case developed or by the CIA or other agencies that
might have known about it?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes. We received a number of communications from other
agencies, and we set up a procedure whereby we periodically checked the
State Department passport file to be kept advised of his activities or
his dealings with the Embassy in Moscow so that on a periodic basis we
were sure we had all information in the State Department file.
We received communications from the Navy, and from other agencies.
Mr. DULLES. Is there any general procedure with respect to Americans
abroad who get into trouble. Do you get informed so in case they come
back you can take adequate precautionary measures? Is that established
SOP?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, Mr. Dulles. We do receive such information, and if we
pick up the information initially as we did here, from press reports or
otherwise, we go to the other agencies and ask them whether they have
any information and establish an interest there so that if they have
not voluntarily furnished us the information they will do so upon our
request.
Mr. DULLES. Thank you.
Mr. STERN. On page 3, Mr. Belmont, in the answer to question No. 3, the
second paragraph, could you tell us why the FBI preferred to interview
Oswald after he had established residence and why it was not preferable
to interview him upon his arrival in New York?
Mr. BELMONT. This is a matter of experience. Generally speaking when
an individual such as Oswald arrives back in the country and the
press is there, there is an unusual interest in him. Immigration and
Naturalization Service has a function to perform, and we prefer, unless
there is a matter of urgency, to let the individual become settled in
residence. It is a much better atmosphere to conduct the interview, and
to get the information that we seek. If it is a matter of urgency, we
will interview him immediately upon arrival.
Mr. STERN. On page 4, Mr. Belmont, in your answer to question No. 6,
was it ordinary procedure for Agent Fain to re-interview Oswald so soon
after his first interview under the circumstances? Is there anything
unusual about that?
Mr. BELMONT. There is nothing unusual whatsoever. Agent Fain
interviewed Oswald on June 26, 1963--1962, I believe it was, was it not?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; 1962.
Mr. BELMONT. And was not satisfied that he had received all the
information he wanted nor that it was a matter that should be closed at
that time.
Therefore, he set out a lead to re-interview Oswald, and after an
appropriate period he went back and re-interviewed him. This is within
the prerogative of the investigative agent, and certainly if he was not
satisfied with the first interview it was his duty and responsibility
to pursue the matter until he was satisfied.
Mr. STERN. In your answer to question No. 5, does the response of
Oswald to the question why he went to Russia seem typical to you of the
returned defector, or unusual?
Mr. BELMONT. There is no such thing as a typical response. Each case is
an individual case, and is decided on its merits and on the background
of the individual, and the circumstances surrounding it.
Mr. STERN. Would it be usual for the defector to agree to advise you if
he got a contact? Are they generally that cooperative?
Mr. BELMONT. We ask them because we want to know, and the purpose of
our interview with him was to determine whether he had been recruited
by the Soviet intelligence, and we asked him whether he would tell us
if he was contacted here in this country. He replied he would. Whether
he meant it is a question. However, you must bear in mind that this
man, I believe it was when he was interviewed in July of 1961 in the
American Embassy, the interviewing official there said it was apparent
that he had learned his lesson the hard way, and that he had a new
concept of the American way of life, and apparently had decided that
Russia was not for him.
When we interviewed him likewise he told us that he had not enjoyed
his stay in Russia. He likewise commented that he had not enjoyed his
stay in the Marines. So that in direct answer to your question, it is
customary for us in such a case as this, to ask the man if he will
report a contact, and it is customary for him to say yes, because
frankly, he would be putting himself in a rather bad light if he didn't
say yes.
Mr. STERN. Turning to----
Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question there: Do I correctly read your
report and those of your agents to the general effect that you had no
evidence that there was any attempt to recruit Oswald in the United
States?
Mr. BELMONT. No evidence whatsoever.
Mr. STERN. Question 8, Mr. Belmont, on page 5, sets out the information
from a report by Agent Hosty regarding alleged Fair Play for Cuba
Committee activity by Oswald while he was still residing in Dallas.
Have you found that an investigation was conducted to determine whether
that was accurate and do you think it should have been investigated?
Mr. BELMONT. As to whether he was active with the Fair Play for Cuba
Committee in Dallas? We did check. We have rather excellent coverage
of such activities. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that
he was active with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Dallas. And,
as a matter of fact, I can go a step further and say that following
his dissemination of pamphlets and his activities in New Orleans, our
inquiry of our sources who are competent to tell us what is going on in
the organizations such as Fair Play for Cuba Committee, advised that
he was not known to them in New Orleans. So that his activities in New
Orleans were of his own making, and not as a part of the organized
activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
Mr. McCLOY. On that point, Mr. Belmont, where did he get his material,
the printed material that he was distributing? Must he not have gotten
that from some headquarters?
Mr. BELMONT. It is my recollection that he had that printed up himself.
The CHAIRMAN. That is right.
Mr. McCLOY. All of it, so far as you know, was self-induced, so to
speak?
Mr. BELMONT. Correct.
Mr. STERN. Does your answer imply, Mr. Belmont, that there were Fair
Play for Cuba activities in Dallas and New Orleans that you knew about?
Mr. BELMONT. No; we do not have information of Fair Play for Cuba
activities in Dallas nor any organized activity in New Orleans. So that
this letter that you refer to, which was undated, was, as in so many
things that Oswald wrote, not based on fact.
Mr. STERN. On page 7 in the answer to question 12, you refer to the
inconsistencies and contradictions between the information Oswald gave
to Agent Quigley when he interviewed him in the New Orleans jail and
the facts as they were known to the FBI before that, and say that "in
the event the investigation of Oswald warranted a further interview,
these discrepancies would have been discussed with him."
Can you explain why the fact of these inconsistencies and
contradictions and perhaps outright lies to Agent Quigley was not
itself reason for a further interview?
Mr. BELMONT. Let me turn this just a little bit and say why should we
re-interview him?
Our interest in this man at this point was to determine whether his
activities constituted a threat to the internal security of the
country. It was apparent that he had made a self-serving statement to
Agent Quigley. It became a matter of record in our files as a part of
the case, and if we determined that the course of the investigation
required us to clarify or face him down with this information, we would
do it at the appropriate time.
In other words, he committed no violation of the law by telling
us something that wasn't true, and unless this required further
investigation at that time, we would handle it in due course, in accord
with the whole context of the investigation.
Mr. STERN. Do you know whether the fact of these contradictions was
called to the attention of the Dallas office at the time of Oswald's
return to Dallas?
Mr. BELMONT. The entire file, of course, or the pertinent serials were
sent to Dallas at the time that the case was transferred back to Dallas
so they would have that information.
Mr. STERN. I gather what you are saying is they would note the
contradictions from the reports?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. In the answer to question 14 on page 8, again in connection
with these inconsistencies, the letter reads "These inconsistencies
were considered in subsequent investigation."
Can you expand on that and tell us how they were considered?
Mr. BELMONT. That is right along the line of my previous explanation
to you, namely, that they were recorded in the file. In the event it
was desired to talk to him further at a future date, they would be
considered as to whether we desired to have him further explain.
Mr. STERN. On page 12, in response to question 22, which asked for
an explanation of the reason for the investigation to ascertain his
whereabouts, the letter reads, "In view of Oswald's background and
activities the FBI had a continuing interest in him."
What was the nature of that continuing interest at that time?
Mr. BELMONT. On August 21, 1963, because of his activities in
distributing these pamphlets, and his arrest in New Orleans,
headquarters here in Washington sent a letter to the New Orleans and
Dallas offices instructing them to pursue the investigation. In other
words, in evaluating this information we felt it desirable that we
further explore his activities to determine whether they were inimical
to the internal security of the country. So that we had this continuing
interest based on our evaluation, and so instructed our field offices.
Mr. STERN. Mr. Chairman, I believe the answers to the other questions
give us a complete enough record.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well.
Mr. STERN. May this exhibit which has been marked 833 for
identification be admitted?
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted in evidence under that number.
(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 833
for identification, was received in evidence.)
Mr. McCLOY. Is there anything else, Mr. Belmont, that you may want to
add? You have already been asked this question as you went through all
these questions and answers, but is there anything else you would like
to add in view of your answers this morning in further elaboration of
the answers that have been given?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; unless the Commission has further questions at
this point, I believe that the questions are answered properly and
sufficiently.
Mr. McCLOY. You think that if you are interviewing a defector which is
something that provokes your interest, and I guess the mere fact of
defection and return to the United States would do so, and if you found
that defector was lying to you, you think that without something in
addition to that there would be no further necessity of examining him.
Is that a fair question? Let me put it another way.
Mr. BELMONT. I have just a little difficulty following you.
Mr. McCLOY. Here is my point. Here was a defector who comes within the
category of interesting cases naturally.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCLOY. And you question him and you find he is lying to you. At
that stage, as I understand your testimony, you say without something
more you don't necessarily go any further, is that right?
Mr. BELMONT. No; that is not correct. We had talked to this man twice
in detail concerning the question of possible recruitment by Soviet
intelligence. We had checked his activities. He was settling down. He
had a wife and a child. He had, according to what he had told us, in
our interview with him, he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. The
State Department evaluation of him in Moscow was that he had learned
his lesson and, as a matter of fact, he had made some statement to the
effect that he now recognized the value of the American way of life,
along those lines.
So that we had pretty well settled that issue. At the time that we
interviewed him in the jail in New Orleans, we had again been following
his activities because of his communications, his contacts with The
Worker and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and our interest there was
to determine whether he was a dangerous subversive. The interview in
the jail was very apparently a self-serving interview in an attempt
to explain his activities in the New Orleans area, and if I recall
correctly, he took the position that the policy as directed against
Cuba was not correct, and that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was
merely addressing itself to the complaints of Cuba, and was not in
effect a subversive organization.
If, Mr. McCloy, during those first two interviews where we were
pursuing this matter of him being a defector and his recruitment, he
had lied to us, and the agent was not satisfied we would have pursued
it to the bitter end. Or if during any other time information came to
our attention which indicated a necessity to pursue that further we
would have pursued it to the bitter end.
Mr. McCLOY. You speak of this as a self-serving interview. Do you think
that he sought the interview with you, with Mr. Quigley eventually,
because he had known of the prior contacts that he had had with the
FBI, and he simply wanted to keep out of trouble?
Mr. BELMONT. I don't know why he asked to see an agent. I simply do not
know why.
Mr. McCLOY. I think that is all.
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter marked for identification
Commission Exhibit No. 834. Can you identify that for the Commission,
please?
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for
identification.)
Mr. BELMONT. This is a letter dated May 4, 1964, addressed to the
Commission which sets forth in summary the contents of the headquarters
file on Oswald prior to the assassination.
Mr. STERN. Do you have that file with you?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. STERN. Would you explain generally to the Commission what materials
there are in that file that for security reasons you would prefer not
to disclose?
Mr. BELMONT. The file contains the identity of some of our informants
in subversive movements. It contains information as to some of the
investigative techniques whereby we were able to receive some of the
information which has been made available to the Commission.
Mr. STERN. I think that is enough, Mr. Belmont, on that.
Mr. McCLOY. You didn't have anything further to add to that, did you?
Mr. BELMONT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. I think as to those things if it is agreeable to the
other members of the Commission, we will not pursue any questioning
that will call for an answer that would divulge those matters that you
have just spoken of.
Mr. BELMONT. I would like to make it clear, Mr. Chairman, that--I think
that is very kind of you--I would like to make it clear that Mr. Hoover
has expressed a desire to be of the utmost help to the Commission,
and to make any information available that will be helpful to the
Commission. I think your observation is very much worthwhile.
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, have you reviewed the actual file and this
letter of May 4 which summarizes each document in the file?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. STERN. And to your knowledge, is this an accurate summary of each
piece of information in the file?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. STERN. The file is available to the Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. STERN. If they want to look at any item in it?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. The file does not include that security matter that you
mentioned, or does it?
Mr. BELMONT. This file is as it is maintained at the Bureau with all
information in it.
The CHAIRMAN. With all information in it?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; this is the actual file.
The CHAIRMAN. I see.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Belmont, are you willing to leave the file a reasonable
time in case any of the Commissioners desire to examine it personally?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. We will return it.
The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we do want it on those conditions. If we want
to get anything from it don't you think, Mr. Rankin, that we ought
to make it known here while the witness is here. I personally don't
care to have this information that involves our security unless it is
necessary, and I don't want to have documents in my possession where it
could be assumed that I had gotten that information and used it, so I
would rather, I would rather myself confine our questions to this file
to the testimony of Mr. Belmont. Then if we want it, if we want any of
those things, it then becomes a matter to discuss here in the open, and
not just in privacy.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chairman, I felt it made a better record if the file is
available only to the Commissioners in case they do want to examine it,
and then it will be taken back and the staff will not examine it.
The CHAIRMAN. I think he has stated that the file will be made
available to us whenever we want it.
Mr. RANKIN. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. If we do want it to read it that is one thing. For
myself, I think we can get what we want from examining the witness,
and then if there is any portion of it that comes into play why we can
determine the question here, but I really would prefer not to have a
secret file, I mean a file that contains matters of that kind in our
possession.
Mr. RANKIN. There is one factor that I wanted to get before the
Commission and in the record, and that is that you had all the
information that the FBI had in regard to this matter, and I thought
that was important to your proceedings, so that we would not retain
such a file, and we had an accurate summary but that it is available
so that the Commission can be satisfied that nothing was withheld from
it in regard to this particular question. That was the purpose of the
inquiry.
Mr. DULLES. I assume, Mr. Belmont, if later other testimony arises that
would make us desire to refer to this file we could consult it in your
offices or you would make it available to us?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I think I would personally rather have it done on that
basis. What do you think, Mr. McCloy?
Mr. McCLOY. I was just glancing at the file, and it seems to have the
regular, the usual type of reports that we have seen. But there is a
good bit of elaboration in those, in that file of the summary which
is here. This summary I don't think can purport to be a complete
description of the documents that are in here, as I glance through them
here.
I just happened to see a good bit of detail in here which doesn't have
anything to do with the security problem we talked about, but I would
think that probably it would be wise for some member of the Commission
or members of the Commission as a whole, to run through that file in
order to be sure that we have seen the material elements of the file
that we would not perhaps, might not, be able to get from this letter
of May 4.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, there are so many of these questions in here that
are obviously matters that we would have no more concern with than just
to know about them.
Start from the very beginning, a news clipping from the Corpus Christi
Times, dated October 2, 1959. Now if that excites any interest on the
part of any member, why we could say, "Well, could you show us that?"
Then the next is the United Press release, dated October 31 at Moscow,
and a great many of these.
Now, I wonder if it wouldn't be better for us to look over all of these
various things, items that are in the file, and then if there are any
that happen to excite our interest, we can ask Mr. Belmont about it.
If it is a matter that involves security, we could then discuss it and
make our determination as to whether we wanted to see it. I would think
that when we are dealing with things that are as sensitive as the FBI
has to deal with in that respect, that that would be adequate; that is
my opinion of it.
But if the rest of the Commission feel that they want to see it
notwithstanding the security measure, I would, of course, have no
objection.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, what I was trying to deal with was a
claim by someone that the Commission never saw all there was in the
hands of the FBI about Lee Harvey Oswald, and we recognize that some
of these items should not be considered important by anyone, as we look
at the matter, but we wanted you to be able to satisfy the public and
the country that whatever there was that the FBI had, the Commission
had it, and we didn't think that in light of the security problems
the whole file should be a part of the files of the Commission. And
we tried to present here a summary, even of items that did not seem
important, but we did want the record in such condition that the
Commission could say in its report, "We have seen everything that they
have." I think it is important to the case.
Mr. McCLOY. I notice, Mr. Belmont, in running through this file, a note
here that symbols are used in instances where the identities of the
sources must be concealed.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir.
Mr. McCLOY. If that is so----
Mr. BELMONT. In some instances.
Mr. McCLOY. Only in some instances. There are other cases where that is
not the case.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; that is right.
Mr. McCLOY. There is a great deal of narrative in here about Oswald and
his relations with the Embassy. Maybe it is elsewhere in the record.
Mr. BELMONT. I would presume that you have received that from the other
agencies. Those are copies of communications that the other agencies
sent to us.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, why couldn't we go over this list and see what
items we would be interested in and then we can determine, can we not,
whether we want----
Mr. McCLOY. I am not so sure, you can look through this yourself, I am
not so sure if from reading just that short summary you get the full
impact of all the narrative that is in the various reports. There is a
good bit here. For example, one page I have here about this business of
beating his wife and the drinking. There is a good bit of detail.
Mr. BELMONT. Mr. McCloy, you have that record.
The CHAIRMAN. We have the record, I have read the records myself.
Mr. McCLOY. Maybe we have that one.
Mr. BELMONT. Any investigative report you have.
Mr. McCLOY. Is there any investigative report in here that we have not
got?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. We are trying to develop, Mr. Chief Justice and
Commissioners, that you have everything that the FBI had, this is their
total file in regard to this matter of Lee Harvey Oswald so that there
is nothing withheld from you as far as the FBI is concerned. That is
part of what we are trying to develop this morning, in addition to the
items themselves.
Mr. DULLES. I wonder if the staff, Mr. Rankin, could not go over this
and check over those items we have from other sources and what the FBI
has already furnished us so what we deal with with respect to this file
are only items that are not in the Commission's records, already. That
would cut this down by half, I would imagine or more.
Mr. RANKIN. Yes; we could do that for you.
Mr. DULLES. Then we could have this available possibly at a later date
just to check over the other items against your files to see if there
is any information there that we really need.
The CHAIRMAN. You could come back, couldn't you, Mr. Belmont?
Mr. BELMONT. I am at your disposal.
The CHAIRMAN. I think that would be better. I think, Mr. Rankin, your
purpose is entirely laudable here, but I think we do have to use some
discretion in the matter, and you say that you want it so we can say we
have seen everything. Well, the same people who would demand that we
see everything of this kind would also demand that they be entitled to
see it, and if it is security matters we can't let them see it. It has
to go back to the FBI without their scrutiny.
So unless, I would say, unless there is something that we think
here is vital to this situation, that it isn't necessary for us to
see the whole file, particularly in view of the fact that we have
practically--we have all the reports, he says we have all the reports
that are in that file, and it just seems like thrashing old straw to go
over it and over it again.
Mr. McCLOY. Do we have copies of all these telegrams that are in here
from the Embassy?
Mr. BELMONT. You are looking at----
Mr. McCLOY. Not Embassy; here is one from Mexico. Do we have that? We
don't have these in our files, for example.
Mr. BELMONT. This is subsequent to the assassination. You see your area
of interest at this point is information, all information we had prior
to the assassination. I did not remove from this file the items that
started to come in subsequent to the assassination, you see.
Mr. McCLOY. My feeling is that somebody on the Commission should
examine that file. I can't come to any other conclusion after reading
it all, because I don't know what is in it, what is in our record,
and what is in that file. There is a good bit of material there that
is narrative, which I think would be relevant. Certainly, I don't
believe we can be possibly criticized for deleting or not producing
a file which contains the type of information that you are speaking
of. We are just as interested in protecting the security of your
investigative processes as you are. But I don't think that when it is
on the record that we have this file, that may contain material that
was not in our files, and we are given the opportunity to examine it,
without disclosing these confidential matters that we ought not to have
somebody go through it.
Mr. DULLES. I agree with that but I think we could save time if we
checked off first what we have already and that would cut out about
half of that file probably.
Mr. McCLOY. I think in a rapid glance through it, I think just about
half of it.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you do that then, get those and let's see.
All right, proceed, Mr. Stern.
Mr. STERN. I think perhaps we ought to leave the entire matter of the
file then until we can give you the information.
The CHAIRMAN. That is right.
Mr. STERN. May we admit for the purposes of the record this list at
this time, Mr. Chief Justice, which has been marked No. 834?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. There are no security matters in this?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as Exhibit No. 834.
(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 834
for identification, was received in evidence.)
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, can you identify this letter dated February 6
with an attached affidavit which has been marked for identification as
Commission Exhibit No. 835?
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 835, for
identification.)
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; this is a letter dated February 6, 1964, to the
Commission from the FBI to which is attached an affidavit by Director
J. Edgar Hoover.
Mr. STERN. What is the subject?
Mr. BELMONT. Stating flatly that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an
informant of the FBI.
Mr. DULLES. Would you define informant. Obviously in the sense he knew
some information as previously indicated from the previous interviews.
I mean for the record, would you just define what you mean by an
informant in this sense?
Mr. BELMONT. An informant in this sense is an individual who has agreed
to cooperate with the FBI and to furnish information to the FBI either
for or without payment.
Mr. STERN. Thank you.
Mr. BELMONT. This would not, of course, include the cooperative citizen
to whom we go, and who frequently and frankly discloses any information
in his possession, but rather someone who joins an organization or
seeks out information at the direction and instance of the FBI relative
to subversive or criminal matters. In other words, I want to make it
clear we do not regard patriotic citizens as informants.
Mr. STERN. I take it you also would not have regarded Lee Oswald as an
informant from the contacts with him that you have told us about and
the other agents have told us about?
Mr. BELMONT. Indeed not; in no way could he be considered an informant;
in no way.
Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation of the
information contained here?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. STERN. And you are familiar with it?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; I am.
Mr. STERN. And to your knowledge, does it accurately and completely
state the Bureau's practice in recruiting a prospective informant?
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to the information
covered in there with respect to your practices regarding informants?
Mr. BELMONT. No; only in my personal knowledge this is a correct
statement and Lee Harvey Oswald was not an informant of the FBI.
Mr. STERN. Did you ever use the term "agent" to apply to anyone other
than an employee, a special agent employee of the FBI?
Mr. BELMONT. No; we do not.
Mr. DULLES. Could I ask you, Mr. Belmont, whether Mr. Fain's separation
from the FBI had anything whatever to do with the Oswald case or in his
handling of the Oswald case?
Mr. BELMONT. No; indeed not. Mr. Fain came to the retirement age and
decided he wanted to retire, which is his privilege, and he retired and
is presently working in Texas and very happy, I understand.
Mr. DULLES. Thank you.
Mr. BELMONT. He retired in good graces, good standing, so far as the
FBI is concerned.
The CHAIRMAN. And a year before the assassination.
Mr. BELMONT. Frankly, I don't recall.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it was August 1962, he testified.
Mr. STERN. You have already covered this, Mr. Belmont, but just so that
the record is completely clear on this point, was Lee Oswald ever an
agent of the FBI?
Mr. BELMONT. Lee Oswald was never an agent of the FBI.
Mr. STERN. The letter of February 6, 1964, from Mr. Hoover, alludes to
testimony furnished the Commission by District Attorney Wade. Have you
subsequently been advised that Mr. Wade had not testified before the
Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; we received a letter from the Commission advising us
that the incident referred to was an informal discussion rather than
actual testimony before the Commission.
Mr. STERN. And also to complete the record, have you been advised that
Mr. Wade was not suggesting that he believed the rumor about Oswald
as an informant, but felt obliged to call it to the attention of the
Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. The Commission's letter so advised us.
Mr. STERN. Mr. Chairman, may this be admitted with No. 835?
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted under that number.
(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 835
for identification, was received in evidence.)
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated February 12, 1964,
a number of affidavits by special agents, attached to it. It was
identified yesterday, parts of it were identified yesterday and it
therefore carries the number for identification 825. Can you identify
this letter for us?
Mr. BELMONT. In order to be sure--I beg your pardon. This is a letter
dated February 12, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI, to which is
attached affidavits of FBI personnel who had reason to contact Lee
Harvey Oswald and who were in a supervisory capacity over the agents
who contacted Oswald.
Mr. STERN. Did you supervise the preparation of this material?
Mr. BELMONT. These affidavits were prepared, of course, by the men
themselves. I have read the affidavits, and they were compiled as an
enclosure and sent over with this letter.
Mr. STERN. You have reviewed them in preparation for your testimony
before the Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. STERN. To your knowledge, are they accurate?
Mr. BELMONT. They are accurate, to my knowledge, yes.
Mr. STERN. Are they complete?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. They do not omit any significant fact you know of?
Mr. BELMONT. No.
Mr. STERN. In connection with the material they cover?
Mr. BELMONT. No.
Mr. STERN. Unless there are any questions on that, Mr. Chairman, I
suggest we admit this document.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted as No. 825.
(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 825
for identification, was received in evidence.)
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated March 31, 1964, from
Director Hoover to Mr. Rankin, the General Counsel of the Commission,
with a series of attachments. Can you identify this which has been
marked for identification as No. 836. Can you identify this for the
Commission?
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 836 for
identification.)
Mr. BELMONT. This is a letter dated March 31, 1964, to the Commission
from the FBI to which is attached the instructions contained in our
manuals as to the type of information which should be disseminated to
Secret Service and our relations or liaison with Secret Service.
Mr. STERN. It was prepared in response to a request from the Commission?
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. STERN. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation?
Mr. BELMONT. I did.
Mr. STERN. Have you reviewed it recently?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. STERN. Is it complete with respect to the matters covered?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; it is.
Mr. STERN. Is there anything you would like to add to it with respect
to the matters covered?
Mr. BELMONT. Well----
Mr. DULLES. May I just interrupt here a moment. Is this inquiry
directed to the question of whether it is now adequate or whether this
is complete as of the time of the assassination? I think we have two
questions there to consider.
Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Dulles, this letter outlines our relations with Secret
Service and the material that is attached covers both the instructions
to our agents prior to the assassination and the current instructions.
Mr. DULLES. Subsequent to the assassination?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. Yes.
Mr. STERN. What were the criteria you employed and instructed your
agents to employ before the assassination in determining what
information should be reported to the Secret Service regarding threats
against the President, members of his family, the President-elect, and
the Vice President?
Mr. BELMONT. These are contained in detail in the attachments which
represent sections of our manual of instructions which are available to
all of our personnel in the field as well as the seat of Government,
and also in the FBI handbook which is in possession of the individual
agent in the field. These instructions require that any information
indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety
of the persons mentioned by you must be referred immediately by the
most expeditious means of communications to the nearest office of the
Secret Service. Further, that our headquarters in Washington must be
advised by teletype of the information and the fact that it has been
furnished to Secret Service.
Mr. STERN. Specifically, the kind of information you were interested
in, that is before the assassination?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes. Specifically the kind?
Mr. STERN. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. Any information indicating the possibility of a threat
against the President and Vice President and members of the family.
Mr. STERN. Have you broadened----
Mr. BELMONT. I may say, sir----
Mr. STERN. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. That this practice was assiduously followed, and you will
find that the files of the Secret Service are loaded with information
over the years that we have furnished them. That was a practice
religiously followed and a practice voluntarily followed without
request. In other words, we do not have a written request for this type
of information but rather considered it our responsibility and duty to
furnish this information.
Mr. STERN. Did you ever participate in or do you know of any discussion
with the Secret Service before the assassination regarding the kind of
information they were interested in?
Mr. BELMONT. We had close liaison with Secret Service, and I have no
doubt that in oral discussions that the question came up. I wasn't
present but I would assume it has come up, particularly as we were
constantly furnishing information. We have no written criteria, you
might say, as to what should be furnished.
Mr. STERN. That is, established by the Secret Service.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. STERN. And you yourself never participated in any discussion of----
Mr. BELMONT. No; I did not.
Mr. STERN. This liaison function.
Mr. BELMONT. This is something we have done for years on the basis that
we consider it our responsibility not only as far as the President
goes. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have also followed the same policy
relative to other high officials when it appears desirable.
Mr. STERN. Have you subsequent to the assassination augmented your
instructions to special agents in this respect?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes. On December 26, 1963, we prepared additional
instructions reiterating those already in effect, and adding other
dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the
President.
The CHAIRMAN. Where do those new ones appear in the exhibit, Mr.
Belmont?
Mr. BELMONT. They appear as an attachment--working from the back, I
think, Mr. Chairman, I can help you most.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. BELMONT. Eight pages from the back it starts, it reads, "Manual of
Instructions Section 83."
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I have it.
Mr. BELMONT. The first page is the same information that we previously
furnished to Secret Service involving threats.
The CHAIRMAN. The first page is intact, as it was before.
Mr. BELMONT. There may be some slight changes in wording but
essentially it is the same dealing with possible threats.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, I wonder if it would be possible for the
Commission's convenience to date each one of these papers as of a
certain date. It is quite difficult going through it now without
referring to the letter in each case to determine whether the
instructions are as of the date of the assassination or as of the
present date?
Mr. BELMONT. We can do that without any difficulty. I would be glad to
do it with the staff, or can I help you here?
Mr. DULLES. Well, I think we can do that later but I think it would
be useful when this goes into the record for our later reference in
studying this to have those dates available to us on each one of the
attachments.
Mr. BELMONT. Very good.
Mr. DULLES. Thank you.
Mr. BELMONT. Coming back to this item you inquired about, sir,
the other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security
of the President is set forth on pages 2 and 3 of this inclusion
in our manual, and it extends the dissemination to "subversives,
ultrarightists, racists, and fascists, (_a_) possessing emotional
instability or irrational behavior, (_b_) who have made threats of
bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State or local
government or officials of a foreign government, (_c_) who express
or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who
have been involved in bombing or bomb-making or whose past conduct
indicates tendencies toward violence, and (_d_) whose prior acts or
statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized
government." That was prepared in an effort to provide additional, and
a voluntary effort, without request, to provide additional information
that might be helpful to avoid such an incident as happened November
22, 1963.
Mr. STERN. This did not come about, this change did not come about,
through any request from the Secret Service or discussion with the
Secret Service?
Mr. BELMONT. No. We made these changes, as I say, in an effort to
provide any additional information in the light of what happened that
might be of assistance to Secret Service and might assist in protecting
the President.
Mr. DULLES. I wonder, Mr. Belmont, whether you would consider possibly
changing in section (_d_) the word "and" to "or" whose prior acts or
statements depict propensity for violence" and then it now reads "and
hatred against organized government". There have been cases, I believe,
where the propensity for violence had not been previously noted but the
hatred of organized government has.
Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change that.
Mr. DULLES. I just suggest for your consideration, I don't wish to
rewrite it.
Mr. BELMONT. We would be happy to change it, Mr. Dulles.
Mr. STERN. Following Mr. Dulles' thought, in the line above that, Mr
Belmont, should that "and" before (_d_) be "and" or "or"? Do you mean
these----
Mr. BELMONT. We do not mean that all of these items must be coupled
together if that is your thought.
Mr. STERN. That is right.
Mr. BELMONT. We will be happy to change the "and" before (d) to an "or".
Mr. STERN. This means any of the broad classifications of people,
subversives, ultrarightists, racists or fascists who meet any of these
four tests.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. STERN. Can you give the Commission some notion of the increase in
volume which the broadening of your criteria has brought about? By
volume, I mean the volume of your references to the Secret Service.
Mr. BELMONT. I do not have an exact figure, however, I do know that
more than 5,000 additional names have gone over to Secret Service under
these criteria.
The CHAIRMAN. In what period of time?
Mr. BELMONT. Since we put them out.
The CHAIRMAN. I see.
Mr. BELMONT. Which was December 26.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. McCLOY. Have you included defectors in this list?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we do include defectors.
Mr. STERN. You mean as of December 26, 1963?
Mr. BELMONT. Correct.
Mr. STERN. Has the expansion of your criteria led to any problem or
difficulty for you or for individuals or do you anticipate any problem
or difficulty under the expanded criteria?
Mr. BELMONT. It seems to me that there is a necessity to balance
security against freedom of the individual. This is a country of laws
and a government of law, and not a government of men. Inevitably the
increase in security means an increase in the control of the individual
and a diminishment, therefore, of his individual liberties. It is
a simple matter to increase security. But every time you increase
security you diminish the area of the rights of the individual. In
some countries the problem of a visiting dignitary is met without much
difficulty. Persons who are suspect or may be considered dangerous
are immediately rounded up and detained while the individual is in the
country. The authorities have no problem because in those countries
there is not a free society such as we enjoy, and the people who are
detained have no redress. The FBI approaches this whole field of
security--I am not boring you with this, am I?
The CHAIRMAN. No, indeed. This is tremendously important.
Mr. BELMONT. The FBI approaches this whole field of security and its
tremendous responsibilities to protect the internal security of the
country as a sacred trust. In carrying out our investigations and our
work in the security field, we do it in such a manner under the law
that we strengthen rather than weaken the free society that we enjoy.
It is for that reason that our men are trained carefully, thoroughly,
and supervised carefully, to insure that their approach to the entire
security field, which inevitably touches on control of thought, is
handled with extreme care. Our activities are directed to meet the
terrific responsibility we have for the internal security of the
country, but to meet it under the law. We feel that to place security
as such above the rights of the individual or to increase these
controls beyond what is absolutely essential is the first step toward
the destruction of this free society that we enjoy.
We have been asked many times why we don't pick up and jail all
Communists. The very people who ask those questions don't realize that
if action, unrestrained action, is taken against a particular group
of people, a precedent is set which can be seized on in the future by
power-hungry or unscrupulous authorities as a precedent, and which
inevitably will gnaw away at this free society we have, and sooner or
later will be applied to the very individuals who are seeking this
action. Up until the time of the assassination we religiously and
carefully and expeditiously furnished to Secret Service immediately
on a local basis as well as on a national basis, headquarters basis,
any and all information that in any way was indicated to be a possible
threat against the President. This permitted Secret Service to take
such action as was required against these individuals who had by
their action set the stage for appropriate restraint or observation
based on something they did. Therefore, they were not in a position
to complain legitimately because they had by some word or deed set
in motion a threat against the President of the United States. Since
the assassination, as I have testified, we have broadened the area of
dissemination in an effort to be helpful. It stands without question
that we could have said, "No; we won't go any further." But we felt
that it was our responsibility to do whatever we could do and, hence,
we have broadened these criteria, and we have distributed thousands of
pieces of information on individuals to Secret Service.
(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford enters the
hearing room.)
We are not entirely comfortable about this, because under these
broadened criteria after all we are furnishing names of people who have
not made a threat against the President, people who have expressed
beliefs, who have belonged or do belong to organizations which believe
in violent revolution or taking things into their own hands. Unless
such information is handled with judgment and care, it can be dangerous.
For example, we know that in one city when the President recently
visited, the police went to these people and told them, "You stay in
the house while the President is here or if you go out, we will go with
you." We know that these people have threatened to consult attorneys,
have threatened to make a public issue of the matter on the theory that
this is restraint that is not justified as they have made no threats
against the President. Now, when you examine this a bit further, we
give these names to Secret Service. Secret Service must do something
with those names, and Secret Service solicits the assistance of the
police, quite properly. But I don't need, I think, to paint this
picture any further, that when you get away from a specific act or deed
of threats against the President, and you go into the broader area of
what, perhaps, a man is thinking and, therefore, he may be a threat,
and you take action against the man on the basis of that, there is a
danger.
That is why, despite the fact that we have given this additional
information and will continue to do so, we are uneasy. Again, if I
may be permitted to continue, this is inherent in the entire approach
of the FBI to the security field. We go as far in our investigations
as is necessary. But we go no further. We do not harass people.
We do not conduct an investigation of a man for what he may be
thinking. We attempt to the very best of our ability to carry out
this responsibility for internal security without adopting tactics
of harassment or unwarranted investigation, and we will not pursue
a security matter beyond that which is essential to carry out our
responsibilities. Now, I say that because that is the broad field of
our policy, and I say it with complete sincerity, because I know. I
have been in this work with the FBI both in the actual investigative
field and in the policymaking and supervisory field for 27 years, and
I know the policies and the procedures that are followed, and the care
with which this problem is approached, and I agree with it fully.
Mr. McCLOY. You are going to impose a pretty heavy burden on the Secret
Service when you dump them with the 5,000 more names than they have
been used to having.
Mr. BELMONT. It will be more than 5,000, sir. This will continue.
Mr. McCLOY. From your knowledge of the situation, do you feel that
the Secret Service is equipped to cope with this added burden? Is it
something that you feel----
Mr. BELMONT. The Secret Service, as it has in the past, is required
to call on the police for assistance in this field when the President
visits a city. I do not know the exact complement of personnel of
Secret Service, but they are a relatively small organization.
Mr. McCLOY. It may be they will have to reorganize some of their
procedures to cope with this, won't they?
Mr. BELMONT. I do not know.
Mr. McCLOY. You have got a pretty broad classification here. "All
investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of
subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (_a_) possessing
emotional instability or irrational behavior." That may include a
good many people in the United States and maybe some members of this
Commission--I am speaking for myself. There is irrational behavior that
I have been guilty of many times. [Laughter.] This doesn't mean you
are going to send everybody over there, but the names that--all those
under your classification, all of those in your opinion come under that
classification unless you feel they have some, there is some, reason
behind it. In other words, you are selective in this list. You purport
to be selective in the numbers that you are going to convey to, the
names you are going to convey to, the Secret Service.
Mr. BELMONT. We endeavor to use good judgment, sir. Now, as you
indicate there are what, 190 million people in this country, and who
knows when someone may adopt abnormal behavior.
You cannot tell tomorrow who will pose a risk. This is an effort to be
as helpful as possible and, as we have in the past, we will use our
best judgment. But this will broaden considerably the type of people
and the number of people who go to the Secret Service.
Mr. McCLOY. That is what I am getting at really, Mr. Belmont. You are
not saying that all those people that you characterize here under
this paragraph 2 will ipso facto be sent over to the Secret Service
every time the President makes a move. This simply says that all
investigative personnel should be alert in that situation; am I right
in that?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir. If you will follow in the next paragraph, we say,
"If cases are developed falling within the above categories, promptly
furnish Secret Service locally a letterhead memorandum" with the
information.
Mr. McCLOY. So without any further ado all the people in your list who
are in that category will be transferred over to the Secret Service
when there is an occasion, when the President travels?
Mr. BELMONT. No. This is a continuing procedure. In other words, during
our investigations we come across someone who is in this area or
category, and this is a requirement that that man's name go to Secret
Service with a brief description of him, and Secret Service then has
that filed and is in a position to know that that individual has been
referred to them.
Mr. McCLOY. Well, that brings up again the comment that I originally
made. This does put a big burden of investigation and judgment on
the Secret Service, one which they have not heretofore presumably had
placed on their shoulders.
Mr. BELMONT. I think you are correct.
Mr. McCLOY. The reason I am asking these questions is because by
implication, at least, one of our directives is to look into this
situation for the future protection of the President, and we want to
see that we have got something that is practical as well as cautious.
Mr. DULLES. Do the memoranda attached, Mr. Belmont, to this exhibit
indicate what classes were so identified for investigation under the
procedures existing at the time of the assassination and what change
has been made, how it has been extended?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir. If you----
Mr. DULLES. By the definitions under paragraph 2 of the Manual of
Instructions.
Mr. BELMONT. The previous page and the paragraph right above No. 2 sets
forth the same information that we acted on prior to the assassination.
Mr. DULLES. That is paragraph 1?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. The Manual of Instructions, section 83.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. What are the various categories given now at the top of
page 2 of this exhibit which have been added?
Mr. BELMONT. At the top of page 2, sir, that is the information that
should be included in the notification to headquarters as to who the
individual is and the background information that was furnished to
Secret Service so that we, too, can disseminate to Secret Service here.
Representative FORD. Under the new criteria would Oswald's name have
gone to the Secret Service automatically?
Mr. BELMONT. Well, Congressman, right now we are including all
defectors automatically.
Now, the question whether Oswald meets these criteria here as set
forth is a question of judgment. As I say, right now we do furnish all
defectors.
Representative FORD. Defectors are for the time being at least a
special category other than what is set forth here unless for some
other reason they would fall into one of these categories.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. McCLOY. Do you under that category send forward all Communists?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
Mr. McCLOY. All Communists, yes.
Mr. DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether or not it would be wise
for the record at this point to read into the record, in view of the
importance of this, this paragraph which we are now discussing and
which, as I understand it, contains the new definition of investigative
cases?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we can put it into the record.
Mr. DULLES. Mr. Belmont, as I understand it, the new criteria are set
forth in paragraph 2 on page 2 of the Manual of Instructions, section
83; is that correct?
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Mr. McCLOY. Which, as I counted, is the 12th page of the Commission's
Exhibit No. 836; is that right, Mr. Stern?
Mr. STERN. That is right number of the exhibit.
Mr. McCLOY. 836, and I think it is the 12th page.
Mr. DULLES. For convenient reference I suggest that when this be
included that we add the dates and the page numbers.
Mr. STERN. I think the witness can do this immediately.
The CHAIRMAN. We will give a copy of it to the reporter and he may copy
it and incorporate it later in the record.
(Paragraph 2 reads as follows:)
"Other dissemination to Secret Service concerning security of the
President. All investigative personnel should be alert for the
identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists
(_a_) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (_b_)
who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees
of Federal, State, or local government or officials of a foreign
government, (_c_) who express or have expressed strong or violent
anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb
making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and
(_d_) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and
hatred against organized government."
Mr. DULLES. Do I understand you, Mr. Belmont, to say, as drafted
you would not consider that defectors automatically fell under this
paragraph 2, but it is your practice to notify the Secret Service about
defectors?
Mr. BELMONT. We do notify Secret Service of any defectors coming to our
attention.
Mr. DULLES. And by defectors, I guess we mean here maybe a redefector,
meaning those who have gone to Russia and have come back or maybe those
who have gone and not come back.
Mr. BELMONT. If they haven't come back----
Mr. DULLES. They are not a danger.
Mr. BELMONT. They are not within our cognizance and we don't notify
Secret Service.
Mr. DULLES. These would be defectors who have gone to the Soviet Union
and who then come back to the United States and tried to defect while
they were over there.
Mr. McCLOY. Not necessarily, not exclusively the Soviet Union, of
course.
Mr. DULLES. Communist countries, I would say.
Representative FORD. Just to get an order of magnitude, how many are
there? Is this a sizable number?
Mr. BELMONT. I don't have a figure, Mr. Ford. You have had defectors in
Korea from the military. You have had defectors----
Mr. McCLOY. Germany.
Mr. BELMONT. Berlin. When these are military personnel they are within
the cognizance of the military, so that it is very difficult for me to
give you a figure.
When we become interested is when they return to this country and
warrant action by us from an internal security standpoint.
As in the Oswald case, we started our action based on newspaper
publicity that he had attempted to or indicated his intention to,
renounce his citizenship in Moscow. But I do not have a figure because
many of these people are members of the armed services and I would
hesitate to give you an estimate.
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, do these terms "subversives, ultrarightists,
racists, and Fascists" have a particular meaning of art in FBI
parlance? Can you tell us how you use these terms in this regulation or
what these mean to you and to your agents.
Mr. BELMONT. I will have to refer you to the dictionary, I think, Mr.
Stern. A subversive is an individual who is active in the Communist
Party or front groups associated with it or one of the other groups
that we term subversive, such as the Socialist Workers Party.
The ultrarightists----
Mr. DULLES. Socialist Workers Party is a Trotskyite Party, is it not?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
The ultrarightists, I believe here we attempt to spell out those people
who are so far to the right that they do not consider themselves
subject to the law and the proper procedures, and take things into
their own hands.
The racists, I think, are--that speaks for itself, individuals who will
go beyond the bounds of propriety in seeking their goals, and who adopt
violence.
The Fascists----
Mr. McCLOY. I was wondering how you were going to define that one.
Mr. BELMONT. Is to give you the opposite end of the spectrum of
subversives.
Mr. DULLES. Do we have anarchists in this country at the present time?
There used to be an old anarchist society in the old days.
Mr. BELMONT. That used to be, but it is dissolved. There is no
organization. I venture to say we have individual anarchists at this
time.
Mr. DULLES. No organized anarchist organization.
Mr. BELMONT. No.
Mr. STERN. Mr. Belmont, in view of the quite important considerations
you mentioned before, the danger of interfering with individual
liberty, would it be possible within your organization to have the
agents recommend to headquarters here and have someone at a higher
level examine the recommendation before it is made to the Secret
Service? This is, as I understand it, a continuing program and not one
that comes into effect only when the President schedules a trip. This
would operate without respect to scheduled trips by the President.
Would that be possible? Would it fit your operation? Do you think it
might help any?
Mr. BELMONT. Well, what is your thought behind that, Mr. Stern? In
other words, so that names of persons won't indiscriminately be sent on
a local level?
Mr. STERN. Precisely. These categories are, after all, fairly gross.
They use large terms which can mean different things to different
people. The considerations you mention, I think, are quite real and
important. Would it help any to do something of the sort?
Mr. BELMONT. I think we will find that our agents are using good
judgment in this matter. The danger involved in referring these matters
to headquarters for a decision as to dissemination is the delay in
time and, you will note, we stress the time element that when such
information comes into the possession of our agents, immediate steps
must be taken to transmit this information to Secret Service by the
most expeditious means possible.
This might be of assistance to you. This information which we send to
Secret Service in the field is placed in a control file, a separate
file in the field, and is subject, under instructions, to inspection
by our inspectors as they visit our field offices to insure that this
requirement is being carried out properly; and they will examine the
type of material that is being sent over.
Each field office is thoroughly inspected about once a year, and that
is one of the requirements that they go through this to make sure this
instruction is being properly carried out.
Mr. McCLOY. I have no further questions. I have some general questions
I would like to get to at the end, but I have to leave early this
afternoon.
Mr. RANKIN. I have one question I wanted to interject, Mr. Chairman,
and that is as to statements, Mr. Belmont, about subversives, including
persons who are members of Communist front groups. You mean to say that
that includes any person who is a member of a Communist front group
because, as you know, many leading citizens have been members of such
groups.
Mr. BELMONT. Now, Mr. Rankin, I wouldn't carry it by any means that
far. It would be dependent upon the front group, the extent of activity
in it, and the activities of the individual. By no means would we
classify someone as a subversive who was connected with a front group
by name or----
Mr. DULLES. By front groups you mean those on the Attorney General's
list; you are taking that as a criterion of a front group?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; not necessarily that, sir. There are other groups
that we consider front groups.
Mr. DULLES. I see.
Mr. BELMONT. I am glad you raised that because each case would have to
be considered on its own individual merits as to what is the extent of
the activity and the purpose and intent of the activity.
Mr. RANKIN. You recognize in the work in this field that there are many
Americans who are interested in certain causes and purposes and front
groups in connection with them who are loyal Americans, don't you?
Mr. BELMONT. I have no doubt of that whatsoever.
Mr. RANKIN. I just wanted to get that in the record.
Mr. BELMONT. I also know many loyal Americans, unfortunately, who
don't look behind some of these groups to determine their intents
and purposes, and allow their names to be used where they would not
otherwise do so if they took the time and trouble to check into what
the organization was.
Mr. RANKIN. So you don't lump them all under the term "subversive,"
that is what I was trying to get at.
Mr. BELMONT. Right.
The CHAIRMAN. I suppose some join before an organization is
infiltrated, too.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. They find themselves in a mousetrap then.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir; that is right.
Mr. McCLOY. In other words, you would expect your agents to exert some
selection before they would send these names over to the Secret Service.
Mr. BELMONT. Our agents use judgment in the pursuance of this work, and
they would continue to use judgment in the selection of people who meet
this criterion. Otherwise if you carried this to the extreme you would
get out of hand completely. So that there is judgment applied here and
our agents are capable of applying the judgment.
Representative FORD. What has been the reaction of the Secret Service
to this greater flow of information that they have received?
Mr. BELMONT. They have taken it. There has been no official reaction,
to my knowledge.
Representative FORD. Have they objected to the greater burden?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I would like to say, I don't know whether you
are going to cover this, Mr. Stern, that our relations with the Secret
Service are excellent. We work closely together.
As a matter of fact, since the assassination, at the request of
Mr. Rowley, we have furnished agents to assist on occasion in the
protection of the President, which is primarily a function of Secret
Service, but as a cooperative gesture we have on a number of occasions
made agents available at the request of Mr. Rowley. I think the figure
runs to something like 139 agents--yes, 139 agents that we have made
available.
We do have a very close liaison with Secret Service both at the seat
of Government and in our field offices. We have a supervisor here at
the seat of Government whose duty it is to stay directly in touch
with Secret Service, to cut redtape and produce results both for
Secret Service and for the FBI; to see that the problems are handled
immediately. He has direct access to Mr. Rowley, and we have on a
number of occasions at the request of Secret Service, sent one of our
agents with the Secret Service when the President travels abroad,
particularly where we have a representative in the countries being
visited, because our relations with the law enforcement officials in
those countries have been built up over the years, and we are thus
in a position to assist Secret Service in establishing the necessary
security measures and the flow of information to serve their purpose.
In addition, when the President travels abroad we alert all of our
offices to advise us of any information which may pertain to the travel
of the President, and we set up a supervisor back here to receive
that information and cable it or get it immediately to our man who is
accompanying the President when he makes this trip.
This is done, this agent going with Secret Service is done, at the
invitation and request of Secret Service.
Representative FORD. 169 agents of the FBI who have assisted since the
assassination. Did Secret Service make a specific request for their
help in these instances?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; Mr. Rowley advised that he needed help, it was
offered to him by Mr. Hoover, and when the President is going to visit
a city and Secret Service does not have sufficient personnel in that
particular city to cover what they consider is necessary, they need
specialized help from us, they will make the request to us and we will
authorize our local agent in charge to make those men, the designated
number, available to the Secret Service representative, who then uses
their services while the President is there.
Representative FORD. I gather that prior to the assassination such
requests, specific requests, had not come from Secret Service to the
Bureau.
Mr. BELMONT. No. There were never any such requests before.
Mr. STERN. At the level at which the requests have been made so far,
have they proved to be a difficult burden for the FBI?
Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Stern, any time that we have a pending caseload of
something like 115,000 investigative matters, which is what we have,
and our agents are assigned about 20 to 25 cases apiece across the
country, ranging from matters of immediate urgency to matters which
can be handled in due time, and whenever our agents are putting in an
average of over 2 hours overtime a day voluntarily, the loan of 139 men
will be felt.
Representative FORD. 169.
Mr. BELMONT. I believe it was 139, sir. I think the letter says 139.
Mr. STERN. 139 on 16 separate occasions.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes. I do not wish to overplay this. We are not
complaining.
We do feel that at such time as Secret Service is able to increase
its personnel or meet this problem within the organization that it is
properly their problem. But meanwhile we are following this procedure
and we are not complaining.
Mr. DULLES. I had hoped, Mr. Chairman, that at some time while Mr.
Belmont was here, we could ask him to just briefly define for us, going
back to the assassination day, a clear definition of the respective
functions of the FBI and the Secret Service prior to and immediately
after the assassination. There seemed to have been at one time a little
confusion there. Naturally in a situation of this kind it always
happens, but I am not absolutely clear in my mind as to----
Mr. BELMONT. At the time of the assassination?
Mr. DULLES. Yes. Just before, I mean what your responsibilities were
just before the assassination, and just after as contrasted with the
functions of the Secret Service.
Mr. BELMONT. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting
the President and his family, and the Vice President and so on. That is
a basic responsibility.
Mr. DULLES. And you have no auxiliary function to that----
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.
Mr. DULLES. Except to furnish names and suspects, as you have indicated.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct. We have no function there. That is a
primary responsibility and function of Secret Service.
Now, we do have what we have considered our responsibility, to furnish
to Secret Service any indication of a threat to the President, and that
we have done religiously.
After the assassination the President ordered us into an investigation
of the assassination which changed the picture as far as this
particular case was concerned.
Mr. DULLES. You mean President Johnson, immediately after the
assassination?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. And there was a period there, there was a period though,
after the assassination and before President Johnson took the oath of
office--did this order come to you during that period or after he had
taken the oath of office?
Mr. BELMONT. It was very rapid, probably within a day.
Mr. DULLES. I see. It wasn't immediately after.
Mr. BELMONT. No.
Mr. DULLES. It wasn't this period I am speaking of.
Mr. BELMONT. You see, Mr. Dulles, the Federal Government still has no
jurisdiction over the assassination of the President. That was a murder
and was within the province of the local police who immediately took
hold of it and started the investigation.
Mr. DULLES. I realize that.
Mr. BELMONT. And started the investigation and it was theirs.
Mr. DULLES. You were only in there by courtesy. What you did was by
courtesy of the local authorities.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we went to the Dallas Police Department and
immediately went into action because of what had happened, and there
was no time for us to stand on priorities. But we felt we should be
of the utmost assistance, and we sent men to the police department to
assist in the interview and do anything else we could. This wasn't a
time, of course, to sit back and say, "This isn't our job."
Mr. DULLES. I understand.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Belmont, just one question. Do you know of any
legislation in recent years that might have been introduced in the
Congress to make an attack upon the President a Federal offense?
Mr. BELMONT. I do know that there is legislation presently pending.
The CHAIRMAN. Since the assassination?
Mr. BELMONT. Since the assassination.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. But had it been considered in recent years? I know
it had at the time of other assassinations, but so far as you know were
there any recent legislation to that effect?
Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Chairman, I must plead ignorance. I haven't done
research on it, and I just don't know.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, we can find that out very easily.
Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman, just the other day in the House of
Representatives a bill was approved giving Federal officials the right
to take certain action when a chief of state from a foreign country was
within the United States; a broadening of their authority when they had
a suspicion or they had some reason to believe that an attack was being
made on a foreign dignitary.
At the time it went through the House I thought of the same question
you just raised, and I wondered whether there were any specific
legislative matters pending before any committee on this particular
point.
Mr. BELMONT. I am sure there is a pending bill because my recollection
is that it was called to our attention--I cannot pinpoint it for
you--but I think there is pending legislation now in this matter.
Mr. McCLOY. I noticed in some Law Review article recently reference to
the fact that previous bills had been introduced but had gone into the
wastebasket.
The CHAIRMAN. That is true.
Mr. McCLOY. In respect of other incidents.
The CHAIRMAN. When the emotion died down.
Mr. McCLOY. When the emotion died down, that is true.
I have some further questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you finished, Mr. Stern?
Mr. STERN. I want to get one thing established that came up yesterday.
Mr. Belmont, yesterday the Commission was interested in determining, if
possible, when Agent Hosty recorded the interviews that he had taken on
October 29, November 1, and November 5. He wasn't certain, except that
he thought it had been done after the assassination. Have you caused a
check to be made on that?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; we checked with our Dallas office, and they do not
have a specific record of when that information was recorded.
Mr. STERN. Was it recorded in substantially the same form in some
contemporaneous communication?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; within a day or two, I think on November 4, if I
recall correctly, the fact that Hosty had talked to the neighbor of
Mrs. Paine and had located Marina Oswald, was sent in by AIRTEL.
Mr. STERN. You might refer to Commission Exhibit 834, page 9, items 64
and 67, just so the record is straight.
Mr. BELMONT. Item 64 is an AIRTEL from the Dallas office to the
headquarters dated October 30, wherein Hosty reported this interview
that he had had with the neighbor of Mrs. Paine.
On November 4 the Dallas office reported by AIRTEL the results of his
contact with Mrs. Paine on November 1, so that the results of his
interviews were incorporated at that time, October 30, November 4,
but the actual insert for the report was not prepared until some time
later. To the best of Hosty's recollection it was after the 22d and
prior to December 2, but he was already on record by these AIRTELS.
Mr. STERN. Thank you, Mr. Belmont.
I have no further questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McCloy.
Mr. McCLOY. I have one or two questions.
Mr. Belmont, you do know the charge has been made by some that Oswald
was what is called a secret agent. Do you have any information whatever
that would cause you to believe that Oswald was or could have been an
agent or an informant of the FBI?
Mr. BELMONT. I have covered that in some considerable detail, Mr.
McCloy, and I will make a positive statement that Oswald was not, never
was, an agent or an informant of the FBI.
Mr. McCLOY. In the course of your investigation do you have any reason
to make you believe that he was an agent of any other country?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; we have no reason to believe that he was an agent
of any other country.
Mr. McCLOY. Or any other agency of the United States?
Mr. BELMONT. Or any other agency of the United States.
Mr. McCLOY. You said this morning, I believe, or at least I guess Mr.
Hosty said, that the assassination of the President and any leads in
connection with it are still of constant concern to the FBI.
Do you feel there are any areas as of the present time that you feel at
the present time require or justify further investigation other than
routine checkups that have not already been undertaken?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; frankly, I don't. I will say that from the
requests we have received from the Commission, you have explored
this most thoroughly. We do not have any unexplored areas in this
investigation that should be explored. There are some pending requests
that you have made, and we are running them out as rapidly as we can.
Mr. McCLOY. Maybe this isn't a fair question to ask you, but, after
all, you have had a long record of criminal investigation, and you have
had a long exposure to investigation in this case.
As a result of your investigation do you feel that there is any
credible evidence thus far which would support a conclusion or an
opinion that the death of the President was the result of a conspiracy
or anything other than the act of a single individual?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; we have no evidence, and I could support no
conclusion that this was other than an act of Oswald.
Mr. McCLOY. Now, the investigation does lead you to the conclusion that
he was the President's assassin?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCLOY. Did you ever at any time have any connection whatever--you
or the agency--have anything to do with the Walker, General Walker,
case?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; that was a matter handled by the Dallas police. I
am drawing on my recollection of it now, but, as I recall it, after the
incident, we offered to examine the bullets that were recovered----
Mr. McCLOY. Bullets.
Mr. BELMONT. And the police apparently wanted to retain them, so that
we did not conduct the examination of the bullets until subsequent to
the assassination itself.
Mr. McCLOY. Until recently.
Mr. BELMONT. No; we had no connection with it, with that investigation.
Mr. McCLOY. In your investigation of the President's assassination, did
you have occasion, after the event, to make an investigation of Ruby's
background or Ruby's relationship to Oswald?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; we went into that very thoroughly.
Mr. McCLOY. Have we got all your reports on that?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCLOY. Have you come to any conclusions or opinions in regard to
Ruby and his connection with Oswald, if any?
Mr. BELMONT. The reports, of course, speak for themselves. But in
summation, we did not come up with anything of a solid nature, that is
anything that would stand up to indicate that there was any association
between Ruby and Oswald. We had numerous allegations which we ran out
extensively and carefully, but there is nothing, no information, that
would stand up to show there was an association between them.
Mr. McCLOY. Maybe this is in the record, but do you--by reason of your
very close association with this investigation, I venture to ask this
question--do you, from your knowledge of the investigation find--was
there any evidence in regard to Ruby's propensity for violence before
this shooting took place in the police headquarters in Dallas?
Mr. BELMONT. Did we have any information of that character and of that
nature?
Mr. McCLOY. Yes; I am not talking before it happened, but as a result
of your investigation did you turn up any other indications of any
violence on the part of Ruby?
Mr. BELMONT. I hesitate to attempt to evaluate the information that we
gathered from hundreds and hundreds of people that we talked to during
the investigation of Ruby after the assassination. I just don't feel
that I am in a position to render a judgment as to his character or his
impulsiveness, the degree of impulsiveness, whether he was capable----
Mr. McCLOY. Whether he was prone to violent action.
Mr. BELMONT. I just don't feel really competent. I have no doubt that
a conclusion can be drawn from reports; of course, that was one of the
basic issues at the trial.
Representative FORD. Was there any evidence that the FBI found to the
effect that Ruby was a Communist?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.
Representative FORD. None whatsoever?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir.
Representative FORD. Was there any evidence found by the FBI to the
effect that Ruby was connected with in any way whatsoever so-called
rightist groups?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I do not recall anything of that nature.
Mr. McCLOY. No association that you know of as a result of the
investigation of Ruby with any foreign government or agency of a
foreign government?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; you understand, you are asking me questions, and
I am replying on the basis of my best recollection, but I am giving you
an answer from my knowledge of the case.
Mr. McCLOY. That is what we were seeking, no more than that, because
your impressions would be valuable.
Mr. BELMONT. The reason I say that there may be someone we interviewed
who made a statement about Ruby and it was run out, and it was found to
be false. Congressman Ford, you asked me if he was a Communist. I would
say we have no evidence of that.
Mr. McCLOY. Do you feel that in view of the evidence that Oswald was
a defector, that he engaged in this Fair Play for Cuba business, that
he lied in his communications with the FBI, that Mr. Hosty should have
been alerted by locating Oswald in the School Book Depository early
in November, that he should have been alerted to informing the Secret
Service of that?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I do not. You must take this matter in its proper
context. I pointed out to you previously that this man came back from
Russia; he indicated that he had learned his lesson, was disenchanted
with Russia, and had a renewed concept--I am paraphrasing, a renewed
concept--of the American free society.
We talked to him twice. He likewise indicated he was disenchanted with
Russia. We satisfied ourselves that we had met our requirement, namely
to find out whether he had been recruited by Soviet intelligence. The
case was closed.
We again exhibited interest on the basis of these contacts with
The Worker, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which are relatively
inconsequential.
His activities for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, we
knew, were not of real consequence as he was not connected with any
organized activity there.
The interview with him in jail is not significant from the standpoint
of whether he had a propensity for violence.
Mr. McCLOY. That is the Quigley interview you are talking about?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes; it was a self-serving interview.
The visits with the Soviet Embassy were evidently for the purpose of
securing a visa, and he had told us during one of the interviews that
he would probably take his wife back to Soviet Russia some time in the
future. He had come back to Dallas. Hosty had established that he had
a job, he was working, and had told Mrs. Paine that when he got the
money he was going to take an apartment when the baby was old enough,
he was going to take an apartment, and the family would live together.
He gave evidence of settling down. Nowhere during the course of this
investigation or the information that came to us from other agencies
was there any indication of a potential for violence on his part.
Consequently, there was no basis for Hosty to go to Secret Service and
advise them of Oswald's presence. Hosty was alert, as was the Dallas
office, to furnish information to Secret Service on the occasion of the
President's visit.
It is my recollection that Hosty actually participated in delivering
some material to Secret Service himself, and helped prepare a
memorandum on another matter that was sent over there. So that most
certainly the office was alert. The agent in charge had alerted his
agents, even on the morning of the visit, as he had previously done a
week or 10 days before the visit.
So that, in answer to your question, I cannot even through the process
of going back and seeking to apply this against what happened,
justifiably say that Hosty should have given this information under the
existing conditions and with the history of this matter, that he was in
a position to give it to the Secret Service. Now, most certainly----
Mr. McCLOY. We wish he had.
Mr. BELMONT. Of course.
Representative FORD. Mr. Chairman, I have a call from the floor of the
House. I wonder if I could ask Mr. Belmont a question.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, indeed.
Representative FORD. In response to a question by Mr. McCloy, you
categorically said that Federal Bureau of Investigation under no
circumstances had employed Oswald as an informant, as an agent or in
any other way whatsoever.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Representative FORD. You would be in a position to know specifically
that information?
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Representative FORD. You also said, as I recall, that you had found no
credible information or evidence thus far that Oswald was connected in
any way whatsoever with another country as an agent. Is that about what
you said or do you wish to reaffirm it in another way?
Mr. BELMONT. I will affirm what you said.
Representative FORD. There is a difference, however, between your
knowledge as to whether the FBI had hired Oswald, you can be very
categorical about that.
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct.
Representative FORD. You can only----
Mr. BELMONT. Say based on the evidence that we have or which developed
or all information that we received, there was no indication that
Oswald was in any way connected or within the service of a foreign
government.
Representative FORD. But there is a difference in the way you can
answer those two questions.
Mr. BELMONT. There is a difference, yes; there is a difference
because in the one case we know, in the other case we rely on all the
information and evidence available.
Representative FORD. But as far as a foreign government is concerned,
you only know what you have been able to find out?
Mr. BELMONT. That is correct, sir.
Representative FORD. There is always the possibility in the second
case, involving a foreign government, that something might come up at
some other time.
Mr. BELMONT. There is always the possibility. We have no indication of
it. There is always the possibility; yes, sir.
Representative FORD. But you cannot be as categorical about the future
in the second case as you were in the first case.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir; you are right.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?
Mr. DULLES. Do you have some more?
Mr. McCLOY. I think I have got all the questions I wanted to ask.
(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford leaves the
hearing room.)
Mr. DULLES. I have two or three questions.
As you know, Mr. Belmont, there have been a wide variety of rumors
that have been spread abroad very particularly with regard to the
assassination.
I have before me, just received last night, a book just being published
in England, it is coming out in the next day or 2, called "Who Killed
Kennedy," by Thomas G. Buchanan, published in London by Secker and
Warburg. I have not had an opportunity yet to read the book. I have
read a good deal of the background material on which it is based.
I would like to ask though when this book is available to you, and we
will make a copy available to you and see that you get one promptly,
whether you would have the Bureau read this, an appropriate person in
the Bureau familiar with the case or yourself, and possibly give us
your views with regard to certain of the allegations here within your
particular competence.
Mr. BELMONT. As I understand it, Mr. Dulles, this is probably a
compilation of the articles that he wrote in the French press.
Mr. DULLES. Express; yes.
Mr. BELMONT. Which, I believe, we sent over to the Commission as we
received them.
Mr. DULLES. That is correct.
Mr. BELMONT. And from my recollection of perusing those articles, they
are filled with false statements, innuendoes, incorrect conclusions,
misinformation, and certainly what I would term false journalism. In
other words, he has stated as fact or as a correct conclusion many
things which the Commission's investigation has disproved completely.
We will be glad to read the book and to furnish you with a general
comment on it. But to take down each statement in there and go into it
would probably result in a critique of 500 pages.
Mr. DULLES. We do not want that. I don't think we need that.
Mr. BELMONT. Where actually many of these allegations have already been
resolved by the Commission, I am sure. We will be glad to read it and
give you a----
Mr. DULLES. I think that would be useful for the Commission to have,
Mr. Chairman. Do you agree?
The CHAIRMAN. Very well; yes. If you find any factual matters in there
that contradict your findings, we would expect you to call it to our
attention.
Mr. BELMONT. Most certainly, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. But otherwise I don't think we want a review of the book.
That is your idea, is it?
Mr. DULLES. Not a review of the book, but if there are allegations
there, any evidence you can factually deny, that would be helpful to
have it.
Mr. McCLOY. Do you have any record of Buchanan? Do you know anything
about Buchanan's background?
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I do not recall.
Mr. DULLES. I wish you would check.
Mr. BELMONT. We can send you a letter.
The CHAIRMAN. We have the record.
Mr. McCLOY. He seems to be very much Ivy League, Lawrenceville School
and Yale.
Mr. DULLES. He was at one time, I believe, he admitted to being a
Communist at one time. He was at one time employed by the Washington
Star, I am advised, and I believe, according to the information I have,
that he was terminated by the Star some years ago.
Mr. BELMONT. I thought he had been in touch with the Commission.
The CHAIRMAN. He came in, he did come in here, and made a statement
which we have recorded. His testimony wasn't taken. He just walked in
off the street.
Mr. DULLES. I have one or two more questions, Mr. Chairman.
I believe, Mr. Belmont, that you probably have furnished us already
with information with regard to any contacts that Oswald might have
had, individuals whom he knew, persons who might have been accused of
being accomplices of his, but if there is anybody there or any persons
in your file whom Oswald knew who have not been communicated to us, we
would certainly like to have them to be sure we have looked into that
field exhaustively, anybody who, according to your records, Oswald knew.
Mr. BELMONT. I am sure we have explored that fully, and we have
reported it to the Commission fully.
Mr. DULLES. All right; good.
Mr. BELMONT. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. In view of your deep study of the case, have you reached
any views of your own or are there any views of the Bureau, as to
Oswald's motivation in the act that he committed?
Mr. BELMONT. Again I don't feel competent to give you an answer. There
is an indication from the exploration of his background that he wanted
to be somebody. He wanted to be known as someone. Whether this caused
him to do this terrible thing I don't know. I think if it were possible
to peer into Oswald's mind, that would really be the only way you could
get your question answered.
Mr. DULLES. Have you and the Bureau made any comparative study of the
various assassination attempts and assassinations of other Presidents
and people in high authority in this Government to see whether any
pattern at all runs through these various attempts other than attempts
where there is clearly a plot, as in the case of the attack on
President Truman, and probably also in the case of President Lincoln? I
am thinking chiefly of the assassination of President McKinley and the
attempted assassination of President-elect Roosevelt in 1933.
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; we have not made a study of that nature. I would
imagine that Secret Service has made a study.
Mr. DULLES. They have made a study. I didn't know whether you had made
one also.
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; we have not.
Mr. DULLES. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Belmont, I have here in my hand a sheet that appeared
on the newsstands over the weekend. It is supposed to be the National
Enquirer. I believe it is out of New York, and it contains a page and
a third about the assassination of the President and certain actions
of the FBI, and so forth, and for the record I should like to read a
portion of it and merely ask you if, in your opinion----
Mr. BELMONT. All right, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And with your knowledge there is any truth to any part of
it. You, of course, are acquainted with that paper.
Mr. BELMONT. No, sir; I am not. In fact, someone told me it was, it
came from, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and I was shocked that something
like that would be in that paper. I found it was not the Philadelphia
Inquirer.
(Discussion off the record.)
The CHAIRMAN. I think, in view of the relationship you have had in this
whole matter, I would like to have your testimony in the record on it.
Mr. BELMONT. Very good, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. There is no date on this paper, and I am told it appeared
in three different days in three different formats with different
headlines, but the same item. It is said to be by John Henshaw,
Enquirer Washington Bureau Chief.
"Washington--The hottest story making the rounds here is that the U.S.
Justice Department prevented the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack
Ruby BEFORE the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Oswald and
the man who killed him, Ruby, were suspected of being partners in crime
7 months before the President's death.
"The incredible details of the story are so explosive that officials
won't even answer 'no comment' when queried about it. But the story
being discussed by top-level Government officials reveals:
"1. That the Justice Department deliberately kept Oswald and Ruby out
of jail before the assassination.
"2. That Dallas cops suspected Oswald of being the gunman and Ruby
the paymaster in a plot to murder former Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker--7
months before the President was assassinated.
"3. That the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was using Ruby to recruit
commandoes for raids against Castro's Cuba. To prevent this explosive
information from being disclosed, the CIA asked the Justice Department
to step in and stop the Dallas police from arresting Jack Ruby, as well
as Oswald.
"A top-secret document--a letter signed by a high official of the
Justice Department--was sent in April 1963 from the Dallas Police
Department to Dallas Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry requesting the
Dallas police NOT to arrest Oswald and Ruby in connection with the
attempted slaying of General Walker.
"After a sniper shot at, but missed, General Walker in Dallas, April
10, 1963, Dallas police suspected that Oswald was the sniper and Ruby
the payoff man.
"The cops were set to arrest the pair. But they never got the
chance because of the heavy pressure brought to bear by the Justice
Department. And so Oswald and Ruby were allowed to remain free. And 7
months later, on last November 22 in Dallas, Oswald was able to kill
the President of the United States.
"The top-secret document--a copy of it is reportedly in the hands of
the Presidential Commission investigating the assassination--bares a
web of intrigue that involves the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
along with the Justice Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.
"It is so politically explosive that the Presidential Commission,
headed by Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren, has even withheld it
from one of its own members, Senator Richard Russell (D., Ga.).
"It is feared that Senator Russell, who leads the South in the fight
against the civil rights bill, might use the document as a weapon
against the Justice Department and its chief, Attorney General Robert
Kennedy, a leader in the fight for civil rights.
"The document--requesting the cops not to arrest Ruby and
Oswald--contradicts the FBI report on the assassination and the
subsequent murder of Oswald."
My question is, do you have any information that would lead you to
believe that any of those allegations are true?
Mr. BELMONT. My answer, sir, is that that is utter fantastic nonsense,
and I have no information to indicate that any of the allegations are
true.
The CHAIRMAN. I think we had better mark this and introduce it in
evidence. There is much more to the article, but it is explanatory of
this, but I thought that was sufficiently a direct allegation that we
ought to note it in the testimony. So will you give that a number, Mr.
Stern.
Mr. STERN. It will be numbered 837.
The CHAIRMAN. 837. It is introduced in evidence as No. 837.
Mr. STERN. May we also have admitted, Mr. Chief Justice, Exhibit No.
836, the letter of March 31, 1964, which Mr. Belmont has identified.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted under that number.
(The documents referred to were marked for identification as Commission
Exhibits Nos. 836 and 837 and were received in evidence.)
The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further, gentlemen?
Mr. McCLOY. May I suggest that we get a copy of the paper which does
have the date on it. I forget what date it was.
Mr. BELMONT. Mr. Rankin, I understand you have sent it over to us, so
we will be glad to answer your letter.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Belmont, we appreciate your cooperation, and we
thank you for your courtesy.
(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the President's Commission recessed.)
_Wednesday, May 13, 1964_
TESTIMONY OF LT. JACK REVILL
The President's Commission met at 10 a.m. on May 13, 1964, at 200
Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.
Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Representative Gerald
R. Ford; and Allen W. Dulles, members.
Also present were J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel; Norman Redlich,
assistant counsel; Arlen Specter, assistant counsel; and Charles
Murray, observer.
The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant Revill, the purpose of today's hearing is to
hear your testimony and that of Detective V. J. Brian with particular
regard to alleged conversation with Special Agent James P. Hosty, Jr.,
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, claimed to have occurred on
November 22, 1963, in the afternoon, and also concerning the facts
surrounding the discussion of Commission Exhibits 710 and 711.
What are those--those are the affidavits?
Mr. RANKIN. That is his affidavit and Detective Brian's.
The CHAIRMAN. Those are the affidavits that you made in that regard.
Would you please rise and raise your right hand and be sworn?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before
this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth so help you God?
Lieutenant REVILL. I do, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination.
Mr. RANKIN. Lieutenant Revill, will you state your name and place of
residence for the record, please?
Mr. REVILL. My name is Jack Revill. I reside at 5617 Madowics, Dallas,
Tex.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you have an official connection with the police
department of Dallas?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I do.
Mr. RANKIN. What is that?
Mr. REVILL. I am presently a lieutenant of police of the Dallas Police
Department.
Mr. RANKIN. How long have you occupied that position?
Mr. REVILL. I was promoted to lieutenant June 26, 1958.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you have any particular area of responsibility?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I am presently in charge of the criminal
intelligence section.
Mr. RANKIN. Have you been in charge of that section since November 22
of 1963?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I have.
Mr. RANKIN. What are the functions of your work in that job?
Mr. REVILL. My unit--our primary responsibility is to investigate
crimes of an organized nature, subversive activities, racial matters,
labor racketeering, and to do anything that the chief might desire. We
work for the chief of police. I report to a captain who is in charge of
the special service bureau.
Mr. RANKIN. Who is that?
Mr. REVILL. Capt. Pat Gannaway.
Mr. RANKIN. How long have you reported to him?
Mr. REVILL. In my present capacity?
Mr. RANKIN. Yes.
Mr. REVILL. Since I have been assigned to the criminal intelligence
section.
Mr. RANKIN. So that was for all times since and on November 22, 1963?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; this is true.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you know James P. Hosty, Jr.?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I do.
Mr. RANKIN. How long have you known him?
Mr. REVILL. I have known Jim, Mr. Hosty, since 1959, when I took over
the intelligence section.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you see him on November 22?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I did.
Mr. RANKIN. Where.
Mr. REVILL. In the basement of the city hall.
Mr. RANKIN. Just before you saw Special Agent Hosty, where had you been?
Mr. REVILL. I had been at the Texas School Book Depository.
Mr. RANKIN. What did you do there?
Mr. REVILL. We conducted a systematic search of the building, evacuated
the people working in the building, and took names, addresses, and
phone numbers of all of these people before they were permitted to
leave.
Mr. RANKIN. Was anyone working with you there?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Who?
Mr. REVILL. Numerous people.
Mr. RANKIN. I see. Was Detective Brian with you there?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir. I had taken Detective Brian with me from the
Trade Mart, Dallas Trade Mart, upon hearing of the shots being fired at
Mr. Kennedy. I took Detective Brian and two other officers assigned to
my unit, Detective R. W. Westphal and Detective Tarver, O. J. Tarver.
Mr. RANKIN. How did you come back to the police department?
Mr. REVILL. By automobile.
Mr. RANKIN. By car?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Was anyone with you?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir, I had Detectives Brian, Tarver, and Westphal.
Mr. RANKIN. They were all in the car with you?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. And which way did you enter the building?
Mr. REVILL. The Main Street ramp into the basement of the city hall.
Mr. RANKIN. About what time of the day?
Mr. REVILL. It must have been about 2:45, 2:50.
Mr. RANKIN. All of these officers were with you?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Where did you see Special Agent Hosty?
Mr. REVILL. If I might explain that, I followed Mr. Hosty into the
basement of the city hall. He drove into the basement, parked his car,
I did the same, and Mr. Hosty departed from his car, ran over to where
I was standing, Detective Brian and I.
The other two officers, Westphal and Tarver, as well as I recall, had
remained in the rear talking to some other officers. I don't know who
they were. At that time everything was mass confusion, and we were all
upset.
Mr. RANKIN. Will you explain to the Commission where you parked the car
with reference to the point where you saw Agent Hosty?
Mr. REVILL. I got out of my car, and we have two attendants assigned to
the basement, two Negro attendants, and one of these individuals parked
my vehicle for me, I don't know where he parked it. But as I got out of
the car, Mr. Hosty ran toward me----
Mr. RANKIN. Now, about the parking, excuse me.
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Is that a part of the basement area of the police
department?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; it is.
Mr. RANKIN. All right; proceed.
Mr. REVILL. And Mr. Hosty ran over to me and he says, "Jack"--now as I
recall these words--"a Communist killed President Kennedy."
I said, "What?"
He said, "Lee Oswald killed President Kennedy."
I said, "Who is Lee Oswald?"
He said, "He is in our Communist file. We knew he was here in Dallas."
At that time Hosty and I started walking off, and Brian, as well as
I recall, sort of stayed back, and as we got onto the elevator or
just prior to getting on the elevator Mr. Hosty related that they had
information that this man was capable of this, and at this I blew up at
him, and I said, "Jim"----
Mr. RANKIN. What did he say in regard to his being capable?
Mr. REVILL. This was it. They had--"We had information that this man
was capable"----
Mr. RANKIN. Of what?
Mr. REVILL. Of committing this assassination. This is what I understood
him to say.
Mr. RANKIN. Are those his exact words?
Mr. REVILL. As well as I recall. Give him the benefit of the doubt; I
might have misunderstood him. But I don't believe I did, because the
part about him being in Dallas, and the fact that he was a suspected
Communist, I understand by the rules of the Attorney General they
cannot tell us this, but the information about him being capable,
I felt that we had taken a part in the security measures for Mr.
Kennedy, and if such, if such information was available to another law
enforcement agency, I felt they should have made it known to all of us,
and I asked Hosty where he was going at that time. By this time we were
on the elevator and he said he was going up to homicide and robbery to
tell Captain Fritz the same thing. I said, "Do you know Captain Fritz?"
and he said he had never met him. I said, "All right, I will take you
up and introduce you to Captain Fritz." So Detective Brian and I and
Hosty went to the third floor of the city hall and went to Captain
Fritz' office, the homicide and robbery bureau. We didn't see Captain
Fritz, he may or may not have been there. His office door was closed.
Mr. DULLES. What time of the day, could you give me the approximate
time?
Mr. REVILL. Between 2:30 and 3 o'clock, and I have the reason for
saying this because of the typing of this report here. Our secretary
got off at 4 o'clock.
Mr. DULLES. And Chief Curry had not yet returned, had he?
Mr. REVILL. I don't know where he was.
Mr. DULLES. You didn't know about that?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you say anything about this to Captain Fritz?
Mr. REVILL. I did not talk to Captain Fritz, as I said, I didn't see
him. I introduced Mr. Hosty to Lieutenant Ted Wells, who is one of
the lieutenants assigned to the homicide and robbery bureau and also
present at that time was another special agent, Mr. Bookhout, and
Hosty, there was confusion within this office, so Brian and I, after
introducing Mr. Hosty to Wells, left and went back to the special
service bureau office.
Mr. RANKIN. And you didn't say anything to the inspector about it?
Mr. REVILL. The inspector?
Mr. RANKIN. Lieutenant Wells.
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. RANKIN. You didn't tell him this important information?
Mr. REVILL. Hosty was going up to tell him the same thing.
Mr. RANKIN. Did he tell you that?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he told me that.
Mr. RANKIN. And Hosty told you then that he was going up to tell him
that they knew he was capable of being the assassin?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; being at that time I was out of touch with
everything, being in the building, I had put no connection between the
shooting of Tippit and the President.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you know that Oswald had been arrested?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; at that time I did not.
Mr. RANKIN. You just knew about the someone by the name of Lee, didn't
you?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; Lee. And this was told to me by a colored
employee of the School Book Depository. Myself and Lieutenant Frank
Dyson took charge of the search of the building and we must have had
75 or 80 men in the building assisting in this search. I talked to a
Negro----
Mr. DULLES. Were you in charge of that?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I was in charge of that phase of the search.
I talked to a Negro by the name of Givens, and we had handled this
person in the past for marijuana violations and I recognized him and in
talking to him I asked him if he had been on the sixth floor, and as
well as I recall, and Detective Brian was present at this same time he
said, yes, that he had observed Mr. Lee, over by this window. Well,
I asked him who Mr. Lee was, he said, "It is a white boy." He didn't
know his full name. So, I turned this Givens individual over to one
of our Negro detectives and told him to take him to Captain Fritz for
interrogation, and while going to the city hall, or the police station
I passed this detective and Givens, and they came into the homicide
and robbery bureau shortly after Hosty and I did, so I am sure Captain
Fritz did talk to Mr. Givens.
Mr. RANKIN. When did you learn that Oswald had been arrested?
Mr. REVILL. I really don't know, sir. Because time, we were all shocked
that this thing had happened in our city and I personally felt that
maybe a sense of responsibility, maybe we could have done more to
prevent this thing. I just don't know when I heard that he had been
arrested.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you know it by the time you went to Lieutenant Wells'
office?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not. He may have been in the office at that
time.
Mr. RANKIN. You didn't know that Oswald was already in the police
department?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not. I had been in this building since word
came of the shots being fired until about 2:30, 2:35, and at that time
I decided that my unit could possibly do more at our office where we
kept all of our files, cataloging these people, the suspects that were
running through my mind at that time. So, I was, I put out a call for
all of the intelligence unit personnel to meet me at the office and I
got no reply to this because they were all up in the special service
bureau. We had been assigned to the Trade Mart, and two or three of my
officers had taken into custody four or five of these picket carriers,
and we did this more for protection than anything else because after
the word came of the assassination, well, I am afraid they would have
been mobbed, and they were all up in the special service bureau booking
these prisoners at the time, and I decided we would stop by the special
service bureau office, to report back to my captain and see if there
was something we could do there. And as I pulled into the basement this
conversation took place with Mr. Hosty.
Mr. RANKIN. And the particular words about Oswald being capable of
being an assassin those were told you by Agent Hosty in the elevator?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; either just outside the elevator and as we got on.
He never mentioned this again because I guess I lost my temper at him
for withholding this type of information.
Mr. RANKIN. I see. Did you do anything about losing your temper, did
you say anything?
Mr. REVILL. No; Jim Hosty and I are friends, and this has hurt me that
I have involved Hosty into this thing, because he is a good agent, he
is one of the agents there that we can work with; that has been most
cooperative in the past, and I worked with him just like he is one of
us.
Mr. RANKIN. You went to the third floor on the elevator?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Who else went with you?
Mr. REVILL. Detective Brian and Hosty, the elevator was--had several
people on it. I don't recall who they were.
Mr. RANKIN. Was Detective Brian on that elevator?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he was.
Mr. RANKIN. At that same time?
Mr. REVILL. He went to the third floor with me.
Mr. RANKIN. And you are sure Agent Hosty was on the elevator with you?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he was.
Mr. RANKIN. And you are sure you were on the elevator?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Now, will you tell us exactly what you said to Hosty and
also what he said to you?
Mr. REVILL. After hearing about the information that they were
purported to have had----
Mr. RANKIN. Have you told us all the information that Hosty told you?
Mr. REVILL. As well as I recall; yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Now, did you say anything to him about it?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. What?
Mr. REVILL. I asked him why he had not told us this, and the best, my
recollection is that he said he couldn't. Now, what he meant by that I
don't know. Because in the past our relations had been such that this
type of information, it surprised me they had not, if they had such
information he had not brought it or hadn't made it available to us.
Mr. RANKIN. And you are certain you went up there on the elevator
together?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; took him to the third floor and introduced him to
Lieutenant Wells.
Mr. RANKIN. Are you sure you didn't go up the stairs together.
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; we went to the third floor on the elevator.
Mr. RANKIN. You are positive?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; because we caught the elevator in the basement,
and there would have been no reason to walk up the stairs.
Mr. RANKIN. If Agent Hosty said you went up the stairs rapidly
together, that would be untrue?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; this would be untrue.
Mr. DULLES. Did you go in that same driveway that the car went in that
was to take Oswald out?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. That driveway; and you took that elevator right to the left
as you went in there?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; we go straight into the doors into the elevator
that goes up to the third floor.
Mr. DULLES. Yes.
Mr. REVILL. Third and fourth floor.
Representative FORD. May I ask a question to reconstruct this a bit?
Both Detective Brian and yourself came in one car?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Representative FORD. And you had two other officers with you?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Representative FORD. More or less the same time Mr. Hosty came in?
Mr. REVILL. We followed Mr. Hosty into the basement.
Mr. DULLES. Each in a car?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he was in a car and we were in mine.
Representative FORD. Your first contact with Mr. Hosty was in the
basement there?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Representative FORD. What did he say there?
Mr. REVILL. He come running up to me, and he said, "Jack, a Communist
killed President Kennedy." I said, "What? What are you talking about?"
He said, "Lee Harvey Oswald killed President Kennedy," and at that I
said "Who is Lee Harvey Oswald?" And then he told me about him having
him in their security files, and then that, "We had information that he
was capable of this." By "we" I assumed he meant the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Representative FORD. Then Brian, Hosty, and yourself walked to the
elevator?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Representative FORD. And the three of you took the elevator up to the
third floor?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. It is about 10 feet as I remember it.
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; it is more than that.
Mr. DULLES. It is a different elevator. It is not the one that take
prisoners down?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; it is the swinging doors, you go through the
swinging doors.
Mr. DULLES. It is another elevator?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Representative FORD. At what point in the sequence did you blow up, as
you say?
Mr. REVILL. When he told me about the capability. By blowing up----
Representative FORD. Was that standing in the basement near the car or
was it over toward the elevator?
Mr. REVILL. We were walking over toward the elevator during this
conversation and as far as blowing up, this is semantics. I wanted to
know why they had not given us this information.
Representative FORD. What is his reaction to that?
Mr. REVILL. "We couldn't." I do not know what he meant by that.
Representative FORD. When you use words like "We couldn't" that "Oswald
was a Communist" this is what I am trying to find out. You mean these
are the precise words he said or are these your interpretations of what
he said?
Mr. REVILL. The time involved it could be my interpretation, to give
him the benefit of the doubt, because as I said Hosty is a friend of
mine, and the last thing I wanted to do was to cause this man any
trouble, because of our relations in the past.
Representative FORD. Have you ever had any doubt in the interval
between that time and now that what your recollection is is accurate or
inaccurate, fair or unfair?
Mr. REVILL. As far as I am concerned I have; this report is honest,
and it was made within an hour after he made the thing. And since this
assassination I have gone over in my mind could I have misunderstood
him. I sometimes wish or hoped that I have. But this is in essence what
he said to me. It might not be exactly the "we's" the "I's" but in
essence it is what Mr. Hosty said.
Representative FORD. At one point as I recall your testimony, you
said Hosty said that Oswald was a Communist. A few minutes after that
testimony I think you said that Hosty suspected he was a Communist.
Now, did you say that deliberately or did you just----
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; if I said that I was wrong.
Representative FORD. Was that just confusion?
Mr. REVILL. As I mentioned earlier he come hurrying up to me and he
said, "Jack, a Communist killed the President." I said, "What?" He
said, "Lee Harvey Oswald, a Communist killed the President," and then
he went into the fact that they had known he was there, and then at
the conclusion of our, not the conclusion because we continued to
discuss this thing going up on the elevator, he made the statement that
they had information that he was capable of this. He might have said
probably or possibly capable of it, I don't recall, because in Dallas
that day, the town died, and I know I was sick that this thing happened
in my city, and I felt that maybe we could have done something else to
prevent it.
Mr. DULLES. You stress the word "capable", that sticks in your mind,
does it?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. He didn't say might have done it?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; capable.
Mr. DULLES. Normally would information of this kind have passed to you
directly from the FBI or through the Secret Service in the event--of
course, there hadn't been other Presidential visits, I guess, so there
was no precedent but I was wondering in the case of a Presidential
visit would it normally have come to you directly from the Secret
Service rather than directly from the FBI?
Mr. REVILL. Well, in the past Mr. Kennedy had visited Mr. Rayburn
there and this information had never been made known to us and usually
the information we got from the FBI and you have got to realize the
relations are good, was on a personal basis, working with Mr. Hosty and
the other agent assigned to their security section and men assigned to
their criminal section, it was a share and share alike thing because
I have 11 men, and we just augmented their force really with the
information we gathered.
Mr. DULLES. Had you had a meeting with the FBI, a general meeting, to
go over security problems prior to this time, prior to the President's
visit?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I personally had taken part in no meetings.
Mr. DULLES. With the FBI?
Mr. REVILL. With the FBI.
Mr. DULLES. Or Secret Service?
Mr. REVILL. Or Secret Service.
Mr. DULLES. Why was this?
Mr. REVILL. This I do not know. This was handled at a higher level.
It is my understanding meetings were held and my captain who is my
immediate supervisor was involved in these meetings but----
Mr. DULLES. You were not present at these meetings?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I was not.
Mr. DULLES. But the meetings you think were held?
Mr. REVILL. This is my understanding; yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Lieutenant Revill, have you seen the original of that
Exhibit 709?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I have.
Mr. RANKIN. Is that the report that you referred to when you were
answering questions?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I brought a copy.
Mr. RANKIN. And Congressman Ford?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; there was just one copy made of this and this is
the copy I retained. The original went to Chief Curry. And on this,
Chief Curry called me and he would like me to swear that this was a
true and correct statement, and this I did.
Mr. RANKIN. By that you are referring to the statement sworn to and
subscribed before me this 7th day of April 1964?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Now, will you tell us how you happened to make this report,
Exhibit 709?
Mr. REVILL. Why I made the report?
Mr. RANKIN. How did it happen that you made it?
Mr. REVILL. After Mr. Hosty had related these circumstances to me, and
after taking him to the third floor, I reported this incident to my
captain, Captain Gannaway.
Mr. RANKIN. When was this?
Mr. REVILL. Within minutes after I left Mr. Hosty at the homicide and
robbery bureau.
Mr. RANKIN. What did you say to him?
Mr. REVILL. I told him what had happened, what had transpired.
Mr. RANKIN. Just describe what you said to him.
Mr. REVILL. About meeting Mr. Hosty in the basement?
Mr. RANKIN. Just tell us what you said.
Mr. REVILL. About Mr. Hosty, following Mr. Hosty in the basement, that
he came up to me, and stated that a Communist had killed the President,
and that a Lee Harvey Oswald, they had him in their security files, and
that they knew he was in Dallas, and that he was capable, that they had
information he was capable of this. To this----
Mr. RANKIN. Did you say anything about what you have said?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I don't recall. I might have.
Mr. RANKIN. You don't recall that at all?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I don't.
Mr. RANKIN. Did your captain ask you whether you said anything about
that?
Mr. REVILL. I don't recall him asking me that; no, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Did he say anything to you about it?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he did. He told me to put this on paper.
Mr. RANKIN. That is all he said?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; and to which I told him that I hated to do that
because of Mr. Hosty, that he might have been stating a personal
opinion. He said, "You put it on paper and give it to me and I will
take it to Chief Curry," and this I did.
Within 30 minutes to an hour after the thing happened.
Mr. RANKIN. Neither one of you said anything about this being strange
that Agent Hosty would say anything like this?
Mr. REVILL. I do not recall, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. You didn't say anything like that?
Mr. REVILL. I don't recall making such a statement.
Mr. RANKIN. And he didn't say anything like that to you that you
recalled?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir.
Representative FORD. Did you write this out in longhand?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; and then I dictated it to one of the stenos in
the office. And she was to, this is what I mentioned earlier the time
element, she was to, she got off at 4 o'clock and this was before she
went home for the day.
Mr. DULLES. This is on November 22 you are talking about?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. Did you sign it on November 22 or at a later date?
Mr. REVILL. The same time.
Mr. DULLES. But you swore to it on the 7th day of April 1964?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. You swore that was your signature?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; at the time I was hoping it would never come up.
Mr. RANKIN. Why?
Mr. REVILL. Because of the relations that we had with the Bureau.
Mr. RANKIN. You thought this was a bad thing for the Bureau?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I did.
Mr. RANKIN. For them to admit to you that they knew----
Mr. REVILL. Not the admitting but to withhold it.
Mr. RANKIN. To withhold the information?
Mr. REVILL. Yes.
Mr. RANKIN. They thought this man was capable of being an assassin?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. And yet you say that Agent Hosty just blurted that out?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he did.
Mr. RANKIN. Have you told us all that you remember about it?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; all that I remember.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you make this----
Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question that comes right along with that?
Did he say anything to you about his having been in Russia and
redefected?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir.
Mr. DULLES. That did not come up in this conversation?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you ask him how he knew he was a Communist?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. DULLES. Why not?
Mr. REVILL. I don't know.
Representative FORD. In the statement that you gave on November 22
which you have signed, you say?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Representative FORD. "The subject was arrested for the murder of J.
D. Tippit and is a prime suspect in the assassination of President
Kennedy."
Mr. REVILL. This I found out after reporting to my office, I didn't
know what time this happened.
Representative FORD. In other words, you learned this subsequent to
going with Hosty?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Representative FORD. And then coming back to your own office?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; some of the officers assigned to the Special
Service Bureau on--were involved in the arrest, Detectives Carroll and
I talked to Agent Bob Barrett, I ran into him in the hall and he had
told me about the arrest of Oswald. I think he was present at the time.
Representative FORD. That is how you learned about this?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. At what time of day did you make this actual statement and
sign it approximately?
Mr. REVILL. Approximately 3:30, 3:35.
Mr. DULLES. 3:35 on the 22d of November?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. This is the actual statement that you then signed and then
you swore to it, and the notary's signature was put on on the 22d of
April?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; the notary's was on April 7, I believe.
Mr. DULLES. 7th day of April, I mean, 7th day of April.
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; but this is the report that I signed on the 22d.
Mr. DULLES. This is the actual report that you signed on the 22d?
Mr. REVILL. On the 22d. This is a copy, I believe.
Mr. DULLES. Yes; this is a copy I have in my hand.
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. The original of this was made on November 22?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. And signed on November 22d?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; it was.
Mr. DULLES. And later sworn to on April 7?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; this is correct.
Mr. DULLES. April 7, 1964.
Mr. RANKIN. Is all the information on 709 given by you?
Mr. REVILL. Is this 709?
Mr. RANKIN. Yes.
Mr. REVILL. All of the information, what do you mean by this, sir?
Mr. RANKIN. All of the language and everything on that exhibit, did you
give that to some stenographer to write?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I wrote it out. My stenographer, she is a clerk
typist, and--I roughed it out and then she typed it for me.
Mr. RANKIN. Now, the words "subject" Lee Harvey Oswald.
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Was that given by you on the slip of paper you wrote out?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I wrote it out in longhand.
Mr. RANKIN. And the words 605 Elsbeth Street, was that given by you?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; this is the address we were given or I was given
by some of the officers involved in the arrest.
Mr. RANKIN. Who gave that to you?
Mr. REVILL. I believe Detective Carroll, Carroll or Detective Taylor,
they were both there.
Mr. RANKIN. And was that at the time you made this out that you were
given that information?
Mr. REVILL. Shortly before I made this out.
Mr. RANKIN. You didn't even know where he lived then?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not. I had never heard of him.
Mr. RANKIN. You know that is wrong, don't you?
Mr. REVILL. The 605?
Mr. RANKIN. Yes.
Mr. REVILL. I don't know.
Mr. RANKIN. Is it wrong?
Mr. REVILL. Yes; it is.
Mr. DULLES. As of the time.
Mr. REVILL. That is what they gave me.
Mr. RANKIN. You found that out?
Mr. DULLES. This is an address he once lived at.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you know that?
Mr. DULLES. This is correct. I want to find out what he knows about it.
Mr. REVILL. Is this a--is this an incorrect address on Mr. Oswald where
he was living at the time?
Mr. RANKIN. If you check it up I think you will find--it is an
incorrect address at the time. I think you will also find that 602
Elsbeth Street is where he lived at one time.
Mr. REVILL. Now, where they got this address----
Mr. RANKIN. You never checked that?
Mr. REVILL. I personally have not checked it but I am sure it has been
checked.
Mr. RANKIN. I see.
Mr. REVILL. But this is the address I was given.
Mr. RANKIN. Now, you say here that you were told that the subject was a
member of the Communist Party. Is that right?
Mr. REVILL. This might be my interpretation of Mr. Hosty saying a
Communist killed the President and we had him in our security files.
Mr. RANKIN. You are an expert in this field, aren't you? You are
working in the subversive field?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; but as far as an expert, I wouldn't say I am an
expert.
Mr. RANKIN. You know the difference between membership and a person
being a Communist, don't you?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. And you know it is a very real difference?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; there is a difference.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you know which Mr. Hosty told you?
Mr. REVILL. He did not say that he was a member. This was my
connotation of what he said that a Communist, that "We had him in our
security files."
Mr. DULLES. Could I ask a question? Where did you get this address that
you put on of 605 Elsbeth Street, do you recall?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; from Detective E. B. Carroll or Detective Taylor.
Mr. DULLES. Are they subordinates?
Mr. REVILL. No; they are detectives assigned to the special service
bureau. One of them works the narcotics squad and one of them is
assigned to the vice unit.
Mr. DULLES. You never ascertained where they got it?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; this might be the address that they got from
Oswald, I do not know. I never even thought about it until you brought
up the point that this is not the address.
Mr. DULLES. Can you find out where they got this address?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I can.
Mr. DULLES. I think that would be useful. I would like to know that. I
would like to know where they got this address also.
Mr. REVILL. It would have been the same day because this was made
within an hour----
Mr. RANKIN. You didn't put down on this statement anything about what
you said, did you?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. RANKIN. Why didn't you?
Mr. REVILL. All I was doing was reporting what Mr. Hosty said to me.
Mr. RANKIN. Is that the way you make all your reports just one side?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. You never say what you said?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I do not put our opinions or our interpretation in
the report.
Mr. RANKIN. You don't even say what you asked?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. You just put the answer down?
Mr. REVILL. Put what was given to me; yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. And that is the way all the police department reports are
made?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I don't know whether this is the way they are all
made. This is the way we do it in our unit.
Mr. RANKIN. After you made this report, do you know what happened to it?
Mr. REVILL. I gave it to the captain, my captain, Captain Gannaway.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you know whether it was given to the Commission when the
police reports were furnished to the Commission?
Mr. REVILL. This I do not know, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. I will tell you that it was not given to the Commission. Do
you know any reason why it was withheld?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I do not.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you know any reason why it should have been withheld
until Chief Curry came here?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I do not.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you have anything to do with that being withheld?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I gave it to my superior, and what he did with it,
I do not know.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you ever have any discussions about withholding it?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. You did want to protect Agent Hosty, you say?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. And you hoped the information would not get out?
Mr. REVILL. By hoping----
The CHAIRMAN. He didn't say exactly that, Mr. Rankin. He said he hoped
he wouldn't have to use it against Hosty as I understood him to say.
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; my opinion, and this was my personal opinion that
it would not serve any purpose. In your scope of the investigation,
yes, I can see where it would, but I hated to get involved in a
controversy with the FBI, because of our past relations.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you recently have a conversation with Lieutenant
Hopkins of Fort Worth?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Where was that?
Mr. REVILL. Lieutenant Hopkins and I went to Sacramento, Calif., to a
law enforcement intelligence unit conference and shared a room.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you discuss this matter with him?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; it broke in the papers while we were there.
Mr. RANKIN. What did you say to him about it?
Mr. REVILL. About the report? About this report?
Mr. RANKIN. Yes.
Mr. REVILL. I told him about the conversation with Mr. Hosty and
about according to the news release, the news stories, this thing
was released, and the newspaper reporters and television people in
Sacramento made it impossible for me to remain at the conference so I
returned to Dallas. I was there for 1 day and returned the next, the
next evening.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you say anything about the report being inaccurate?
Mr. REVILL. Inaccurate?
Mr. RANKIN. Yes.
Mr. REVILL. No, sir.
Representative FORD. What was the date of this conference in Sacramento?
Mr. REVILL. April 22, 23, and 24, I believe. It was on a Thursday,
Friday, and Saturday. It could have been the 23d, 24th, and 25th but I
returned on Friday evening.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you examine the newspaper report of your report,
Exhibit 709?
Mr. REVILL. Did I examine it? Yes, sir; I read several newspaper
reports of it.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you give the reports to the newspapers?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you have anything to do with giving it to the
newspapers?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; this would have been the last thing I would have
done.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you know who did?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I do not.
Representative FORD. What prompted you to discuss this information with
the other officer from Fort Worth?
Mr. REVILL. I started getting long-distance telephone calls on the
evening, it must have been the 23d, it was Thursday night, I got two
long-distance phone calls, and Lieutenant Hopkins and I were sharing a
double room and, of course----
The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant who?
Mr. REVILL. Lieutenant Hopkins of the Fort Worth Police Department. H.
F. Hopkins.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. REVILL. And I discussed it with him.
Representative FORD. Who was calling you long distance, what relevance
does that have to it?
Mr. REVILL. To my discussing it with him?
Representative FORD. Yes.
Mr. REVILL. The long-distance phone calls were about this report, the
Associated Press and the United Press.
Representative FORD. I see. They had heard about it, they called you
long distance and you discussed it with Hopkins who was in the room
with you?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. That is all that I have, Mr. Chief Justice.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything further, or you?
Mr. DULLES. Tippit was not under your jurisdiction, was he?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; he was not.
The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, I am not familiar with the newspaper report
that you are speaking of. What, in substance, did it say?
Mr. REVILL. There were several articles written. The Dallas papers
carried articles on it and the Sacramento, Calif., paper carried an
article on it. In essence it had to do with this conversation that
Hosty and I had and about this report and somewhere, someplace some
newspaper reporter must have seen a copy of this because he knew how
many paragraphs they had in it and he quoted, I believe, the last
paragraph of the report verbatim, and this is what concerned me, that a
report such as this would fall into their hands.
Now, who the reporter is, there were several reporters that were
curious about the thing, and I don't even recall which newspaper
carried the verbatim paragraph about Agent Hosty's conversation.
The CHAIRMAN. And that is what caused you and Lieutenant Hopkins to
have a discussion?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Did he bring the matter up to you or did you bring it up
to him?
Mr. REVILL. I might have brought it up to him because I was concerned
that this thing had been released.
The CHAIRMAN. What was your conversation concerning that?
Mr. REVILL. That I had received these calls, the first one must have
been around 2 o'clock in the morning, California time, from the
Associated Press. It was a lady writer, and she asked about this and
I told her that any statement would have to be made by Chief Curry,
and she trapped me really. She made a false statement that Hosty was
supposed to have said something else and I said no, that is not so. He
did not make a statement, and then there was my comment. From that it
looked like I had written them out a press release.
The CHAIRMAN. Looks like what?
Mr. REVILL. It appears as if I had written out a press release from the
comment in the newspapers but that was the only statement I made that
Hosty had not made such statement, it was a fabrication, he knew he was
capable, but he did not make such a statement. Hosty did not make such
a statement.
The CHAIRMAN. Then you discussed that with Mr. Hopkins?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall just what Mr. Hopkins asked you and what
you told him about this report?
Mr. REVILL. Well, when I received the first call, I was in the coffee
shop, it was 2 o'clock in the morning, we had been out with two of
the Sacramento County Sheriff's officers and I got the call and after
getting the call I went to the room and Hopkins had been awakened by
this phone call, and I told him about the call, and then from there on,
I had numerous long-distance calls, and I answered the one with the
UPI, and then I decided I would not talk to people. Because I couldn't
see where it would help anything.
The CHAIRMAN. Did he ask you if the substance of this report was true,
I am speaking now of Exhibit 709, the one we have been talking about.
Mr. REVILL. Mr. Hopkins had never seen this report. I just told him
what had transpired between Hosty and I and told him that a report had
been made, and this is what they were calling on.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you at any time in talking to him repudiate anything
that was in this report?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir. The only thing I repudiated was the fact that this
reporter had said that Hosty had made a statement and I said no, this
is not true, about them not believing that he would do it, and I think
I told Hopkins that.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Anything more?
Mr. DULLES. I have nothing more.
The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, thank you very much, sir, for your help here.
Mr. REVILL. Thank you, sir. I am just sorry it happened.
The CHAIRMAN. You have told us what the truth of the situation is, you
could do no more and no less.
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
(Discussion off the record.)
The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, just a question or two, we forgot to ask, Mr.
Rankin, would you ask them, please?
Mr. RANKIN. You said you made some handwritten notes about this 709
exhibit.
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. When you gave them to the typist--do you know what happened
to those notes?
Mr. REVILL. They were destroyed, I am sure.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you know what her name is who typed 709?
Mr. REVILL. Mary Jane Robertson.
Mr. RANKIN. Is she still with the police department?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. What position is she in now?
Mr. REVILL. She is a clerk-typist in the special service bureau.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you know where the original of 709 is?
Mr. REVILL. With Chief Curry, I assume. Well, let's see. You have a
copy; I would assume he has got it.
Mr. DULLES. Wasn't a copy made at the time?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I have it.
Mr. DULLES. The actual copy, you have?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; it is in my little briefcase.
Mr. RANKIN. So that original would be available to us?
Mr. DULLES. You have it here now?
Mr. REVILL. I have a copy.
Mr. DULLES. A carbon copy?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. He showed us a copy of his testimony.
Representative FORD. Do you know how many copies were made?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; one and one; an original and one.
Representative FORD. And you kept one copy and one went to Captain
Gannaway?
Mr. REVILL. No; both copies went to Captain Gannaway who is my
immediate superior and he later gave me back the carbon and the
original went to Chief Curry.
Representative FORD. And you have had the one copy in your possession
since how long?
Mr. REVILL. Probably a week or two after this thing happened, and I
have had it in the Lee Harvey Oswald file.
Representative FORD. You have had this copy in your files in the police
department?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Representative FORD. Since about December 1 or thereabouts?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; thereabouts.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you number those items in the file?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And the order in which they come in?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir. Now, this particular report was put in the Lee
Harvey Oswald file, and he was given an intelligence number, A & T, if
I may get this copy I will explain to you----
The CHAIRMAN. Yes; would you do so, please?
Mr. REVILL. Excuse me just a moment. You see, he was given A & T 2965,
page 34, as it appears in his file. This is indexed with a card with
this file number and page number.
The CHAIRMAN. May I ask, would the next item in that file be numbered
35?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; it would.
The CHAIRMAN. And the one directly preceding it would be 33?
Mr. REVILL. Thirty-three; yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I see, and you have the rest of your file which would
indicate that?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I don't have it with me.
The CHAIRMAN. No; but you have it in your records.
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And that could be produced if we wanted it?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; it is the complete file we have now on Lee Harvey
Oswald.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. RANKIN. May we have----
Mr. DULLES. Could I just see that?
Mr. RANKIN. Could we make a copy of that?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I put another piece in there because it is on
onion skin.
Mr. RANKIN. We could make a photostatic copy quickly and return this to
you.
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I would like to number this in the next
order of exhibits and offer it in evidence, if I may, this copy, the
photostatic copy.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. DULLES. Just as a security matter, would you kindly look in the
file and see if by any chance your original longhand notes could have
been put in the file, at this place in the file?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I can, but I am sure they were not, because this
was not made at my office. You see, we are removed physically from the
police department, the intelligence unit, and this was made at the
special service bureau office.
Mr. DULLES. I see, not in your own office.
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; we are an integral part of the special service
bureau office but our files are maintained elsewhere, and this was made
at the special service bureau office.
Representative FORD. When you sat down to write out this statement,
just describe where you did it and how you did it, what kind of paper
you used and so forth.
Mr. REVILL. Well, we use the white pads like this, and I wrote it out
on the pad, and in the special service bureau office and it was made in
Lieutenant Dyson's office, he was out, and I used his desk, and then I
took it to Mrs. Robertson, and she typed it.
Representative FORD. Did you consult with Detective Brian?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir.
Representative FORD. During the time you were preparing it?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir.
Representative FORD. Or subsequent to its preparation?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I did not. At the time I couldn't have told you
who was with me or who overheard this thing because there was so much
confusion in the elevator and going to the elevator.
Representative FORD. But Brian was with you on the elevator?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he was with me in the automobile and on the
elevator.
Representative FORD. Was he up in Gannaway's office with you, too?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; he works for me.
Representative FORD. He was with you at the time you went to Gannaway's
office?
Mr. REVILL. The special service bureau office; yes, sir.
Representative FORD. But he didn't see this at anytime?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; I say he didn't, I don't know whether he ever saw
it or not. He might have seen it when I was working on it and I gave
both of the copies to the captain.
The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, did that entire Oswald file that you have
just told us about come to the Commission, do you know?
Mr. REVILL. I don't know. Now what we did, we made up several large
books, and it is my understanding that a copy of one of these was given
to the Attorney General Waggoner and he was in turn to furnish it to
this Commission, this I was told by Captain Gannaway.
Mr. RANKIN. When was that?
Mr. REVILL. This was a month or two ago.
Mr. RANKIN. Yes; but not when you first gave the files.
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; because this happened on the same day.
The CHAIRMAN. Should that file have included this?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; it didn't. There were only two pieces made of it,
one copy and the original made of this.
The CHAIRMAN. I see. What I am getting at, when the department sent
their reports to us, did they send copies of this file that Exhibit 709
is in?
Mr. REVILL. The Lee Harvey Oswald file?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.
Mr. REVILL. I don't believe they did, because much of this is, pertains
to newspaper articles, and information that we picked up such as leads
where Ruby and Oswald were seen together, we ran all these things down,
and then we would make a report of the lead, or the findings, and a
copy of it would go in their files.
The CHAIRMAN. I see.
Mr. REVILL. But this one here, was not placed in that book?
Mr. DULLES. In the original of Commission Exhibit No. 709 that you have
just given us prior to the notary public's inscription, subscription to
it, there is red ink underlining of Lee Harvey Oswald and James Hosty.
When was that put on this copy?
Mr. REVILL. I don't know, sir. Captain Gannaway must have done that
because he had the thing and then later gave it to me. Now, the reason
for it being underlined, I don't know. On the original--yes; I do.
Mr. DULLES. Would that be for filing purposes?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; I do. Normally we retain the original copy of
every report for our file copy, but I did not have the file copy or the
original report so our clerk in indexing this underscored the name and
the address and she made cards for the index files.
Mr. DULLES. That was a card, also, under the file of James Hosty?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. His name is also underlined in red?
Mr. REVILL. His name indexed; yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. In your original copy of Exhibit 709?
Mr. REVILL. No, sir; not the original copy, because the original----
Mr. DULLES. The carbon copy, excuse me, the carbon copy of 709.
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. And I assume that Commission's Exhibit No. 709 which is a
photostat is a photostat of the original rather than of the carbon copy?
Mr. REVILL. Yes, sir; and I don't know who made the photostat, I did
not. I assume Chief Curry had it made.
Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Reporter, we are giving the number 838 to the carbon
copy of Exhibit 709 that Lieutenant Revill has just produced.
The CHAIRMAN. You propose to take a photostat of this and return this
report to the lieutenant?
Mr. RANKIN. If we may, Mr. Chief Justice, this is the only copy that I
have.
The CHAIRMAN. You should have it back.
Mr. REVILL. That is fine.
The CHAIRMAN. We will take a photostat and return this to you then.
Mr. REVILL. I appreciate that.
The CHAIRMAN. It may be admitted in that manner.
(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 838 for
identification, and received in evidence.)
The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all. Thank you, again, lieutenant.
Mr. REVILL. I will attempt to find out on that address, and I shall let
Mr. Sorrels know, with Secret Service.
Mr. RANKIN. Yes; that will be fine.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF V. J. BRIAN
The CHAIRMAN. Come right in, sir. Detective Brian, the purpose of
today's hearing is to hear the testimony of Lieutenant Revill and
yourself with particular regard to an alleged conversation with Special
Agent James P. Hosty, Jr. of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
claimed to have occurred on November 22, 1963, in the afternoon and
also concerning the facts surrounding the discussion of Commission
Exhibits Nos. 709 and 711. 709 is the affidavit of Lieutenant Revill,
and 711 is the affidavit that you made concerning that matter.
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you raise your right hand and be sworn, please?
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this
Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth, so help you God?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Please be seated.
Mr. Rankin will conduct the examination.
Mr. BRIAN. My name is Brian.
Mr. RANKIN. Where do you live?
Mr. BRIAN. In Dallas, Tex.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you have some connection with the police department in
Dallas?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; I am a detective in the criminal intelligence
section.
Mr. RANKIN. How long have you occupied that position?
Mr. BRIAN. Since June of 1955.
Mr. RANKIN. What is your function as a detective for the criminal
intelligence section?
Mr. BRIAN. To gain, obtain information and keep records and files, and
usually when an important Government official comes to town we guard
them or help assist guard them, and furnish information for other
agencies outside of the Dallas Police Department and have liaison, and
general criminal investigation work.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you have anything to do with the Lee Harvey Oswald case?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. When was the first time that you had anything to do with
that matter?
Mr. BRIAN. Well, we started interrogating people and talking to people
immediately after the assassination.
Mr. RANKIN. About what time of the day?
Mr. BRIAN. In the middle of the afternoon, probably----
Mr. RANKIN. November 22, 1963?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir. The first thing that we done, I was, I personally
that day was, assigned at the Dallas Trade Mart where the President was
to speak, I was on the side of the speaker stand when he was to come
in, and they came in and got us and told us that he had been shot, and
the President of the United States had been shot, and that a man in the
Book Depository down there and told us to go down there and see if we
could get him out, and four of us detectives down there got in a car
and we went to the Book Depository and we arrived there a short time, I
don't know what time it was, a short time after the shooting occurred.
Mr. RANKIN. Who were the four you are describing now?
Mr. BRIAN. Lieutenant Revill, myself, a detective, O. J. Tarver, and a
detective, Roy W. Westphal.
Mr. RANKIN. What did you do there?
Mr. BRIAN. We searched the Book Depository for a couple of hours. We
spent about 2 hours, I would guess, approximately 2 hours down there
searching the Depository.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you find anything at that time?
Mr. BRIAN. No, sir. I was there on the floor when the man found shells
over in a corner when--where the assassin was hidden at. But other than
that, I wasn't present when anything was found.
Mr. RANKIN. Will you just describe that event when you saw those shells?
Mr. BRIAN. Well, a police sergeant, Jerry Hill, hollered, I was on the
opposite side of the sixth floor, hollered that he had, this is where
he shot from, and shells were laying there, and I walked from where I
was at over to the other corner of the building and looked, and that
is about the extent of my investigation there because they called the
crime laboratory and everybody else to get down there and they got an
officer to guard the place and not let nobody get around and we went on
searching the building.
Mr. RANKIN. What did you see, how many shells did you see?
Mr. BRIAN. I am going to guess.
Mr. RANKIN. We don't want you to guess. If you can tell us your
recollection, that is all.
Mr. BRIAN. Well, the first time I went over there, I believe I saw two,
but I am not sure, but I went back again later and there were three
shells there.
Mr. RANKIN. Now after that, did you leave the Depository Building?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; after we spent considerable time, we went from the
top floor down to the bottom floor, back up, going through it, and we
finally wound up on the second floor taking all the acoustic tile out
of the ceiling looking up to see if anybody was hidden up there, and I
believe that was the last thing we did in the building. By that time,
there were a number of people in the building.
Mr. RANKIN. You were making a complete search of each floor, were you?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; I was with, I mean there were a number of officers
there. I didn't do it by myself, there were a number of us there and we
were searching it.
Mr. RANKIN. Then you left the building?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you leave with some other officers?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; Lieutenant Revill, myself, and Tarver and Westphal
all went back to the car and left to go to city hall.
Mr. RANKIN. Then you got back to the city hall. What did you do?
Mr. BRIAN. We drove into the basement and parked.
Mr. RANKIN. What time of the day was that, can you tell us?
Mr. BRIAN. Probably around 2 o'clock or somewhere in that. I don't
really know to be truthful because I didn't pay any attention to the
time but it was around 2 o'clock, I would guess.
Mr. RANKIN. And the four of you were together at that time?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. What happened at that point?
Mr. BRIAN. We got out of the car, and as we got out of the car----
Mr. DULLES. Was the car already inside the building or in the driveway
there?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Let me explain. City hall basement, as some of you all know----
Mr. DULLES. I was just there so I want to know.
Mr. BRIAN. We came around the ramp and we parked in the basement. We
were parked in the basement, and we got out, and started around, there
is a railing there, we started around the railing and at that time Jim
Hosty was coming across the basement, at a fast trot, or moving fairly
fast----
Mr. RANKIN. Special Agent Hosty of the Bureau?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
And he came across there and I know him, and I had known him for a good
while to speak to him.
Mr. RANKIN. Where were you with reference to Lieutenant Revill at that
point?
Mr. BRIAN. I think I was on his, probably his right-hand side.
Mr. RANKIN. Close to him?
Mr. BRIAN. Fairly close; yes, sir.
And so we walked over to meet, kind of cornered, you cross paths and we
walked up there to meet Jim, and he said, he came up there and he said,
that Lee Oswald, a Communist, killed the President, and then Revill
said, "What?" He said, Lee Oswald, a Communist, killed the President.
He was in--nervous--in a hurry, and was just talking.
And then he said, he said that he knew that he was a Communist and he
knew he worked in the Book Depository, and then Lieutenant Revill said
something else to him, I am not--I don't know what he said, and they
walked off in front of me going in around and in through the door over
to the elevator to go up, and then we accompanied Agent Hosty up to
Captain Fritz' office which is on the----
Mr. DULLES. Was the elevator there at the basement floor when you took
it or did you have to wait?
Mr. BRIAN. We had to wait just a very short time on it. It wasn't
standing open waiting; no, sir.
We had to wait on it just a very short time, I believe, and we went up
to the third floor, and Hosty and Lieutenant Revill went in there and
talked. I went to the door and just stepped inside and waited and then
we went back downstairs to our office which is on two, right underneath
Captain Fritz' office.
Mr. DULLES. You accompanied them to the third floor and then you came
down?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. DULLES. In the elevator?
Mr. BRIAN. That I am not sure.
Mr. DULLES. Or did you get out and come down the stairs?
Mr. BRIAN. I am not sure.
Mr. DULLES. But you weren't with Lieutenant Revill any further?
Mr. BRIAN. When we came back down to our office, we came back down, I
am not sure whether we rode the elevator or not. It is a short trip
down and I am--I would be afraid to say whether we walked, rode, or
how we got down, but we went into Captain Gannaway's office and Revill
told, Lieutenant Revill told the Captain what Hosty had said, so he
said, "Write a report."
Mr. RANKIN. What did he say at that time? What did he tell the Captain
that Agent Hosty had said?
Mr. BRIAN. He told him, short and very quick, that they knew that
Oswald was a Communist and that he was in the Book Depository, and he
said, "Write a report and get it back to me right now."
And he went right back and wrote a report.
I forgot about the whole incident, I didn't think it would be important
and I didn't--well, in fact, I didn't have time to because when I got
back there they had a list of names they were going to start checking
out and they handed me six of them and says, "Start going and checking
here and here and here and checking these people."
So I never did dwell on it again.
Mr. RANKIN. In this conversation down in the basement, have you told us
all that Agent Hosty said that you recall?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. And have you told us all that Lieutenant Revill said that
you recall?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Have you told us all that Lieutenant Revill told to Captain
Gannaway that you recall?
Mr. BRIAN. Well, let's see. I believe that I have, yes, sir.
When--Captain Gannaway's office, as you go in the door and turn right
and his office is in there and if I recall correctly I didn't go all
the way in his office, he did and I stood in the door, and I really
didn't make a mental note of what happened and things were moving at a
rather fast pace, and I believe that I did; yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. You have made an affidavit about this, have you not?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; I made a report to Chief Curry.
Mr. RANKIN. And you swore to that?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Is Exhibit 711 a photostatic copy of your report that you
made that you have just described?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Did you swear to that report on the date that it bears?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. April 20, 1964?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. You read the Exhibit 711 right now, didn't you?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Is it correct?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Are there any additions or corrections that you wish to
make to it?
Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I was just going to ask if you fixed the date on which he
dictated that or wrote it, whichever he did.
Mr. RANKIN. I haven't, but I will.
Will you tell us on what date you wrote or dictated Exhibit 711?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; the day before, I believe it was the day before,
Chief Curry came up here. It was either a day or 2 days before April
20th is what it says on there. That is the date that I made the report,
the day or 2 days before Chief Curry came up here.
Will you tell us on what date you wrote or dictated Exhibit 711?
Mr. BRIAN. I didn't think--well, Captain Gannaway told Lieutenant
Revill to write a report about the thing the date it happened, and he
did, or I assumed he did, and I guess that he did. I haven't----
Mr. RANKIN. Have you ever seen that report?
Mr. BRIAN. I have seen it, but I haven't read it. That is unusual but I
haven't. I didn't think the incident was really important, that is the
reason why I didn't dwell on it, and I am sure it is now or I wouldn't
be up here.
But they, a few days before Chief Curry was to come up here they said
they wanted a report, you know, to what I had heard in the basement
and this and that and the other, and I said, "Well, I better write one
then."
I just assumed it was all taken care of, and so I wrote one on the
20th, I wrote that report on the 20th and swore to it and turned it in
and he brought it up here.
Mr. DULLES. You made no contemporaneous memoranda, that is on November
22 you made no notes or memoranda of this?
Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.
Mr. DULLES. So the report of April 20 you dictated on or about April 20
is based on your memory?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Exhibit 711, your report, was that written out in longhand
or dictated to a girl?
Mr. BRIAN. No, sir; I typed it myself on the typewriter. We don't have
a stenographer in our office to dictate to.
Mr. RANKIN. You did type the part about the notary and so forth on the
bottom?
Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Do you know who did that?
Mr. BRIAN. I believe Bill Biggio.
Mr. RANKIN. Who is he?
Mr. BRIAN. He is a detective who works the desk there, who is a notary
who notarized it.
Mr. RANKIN. Now, before you made Exhibit 711 did anyone give you
Lieutenant Revill's report to examine?
Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. Compare your report with?
Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.
Mr. RANKIN. And you have never read that?
Mr. BRIAN. I don't recall reading it; no, sir. I sure don't. I probably
looked at it but as far as sitting down and reading it, I have never
read the report, I don't believe.
Mr. RANKIN. So if there is any differences between your report and his
you are not familiar with them?
Mr. BRIAN. No, sir.
Representative FORD. Subsequent to November 22 and prior to April 20,
when you prepared this Exhibit 711, did you ever talk to Lieutenant
Revill about the incident?
Mr. BRIAN. Yes, sir; I sure did. He couldn't remember who was with him
down in the basement, and it rocked on there and had rocked on there,
and somewhere it came out that somebody said he was lying about it and
he was telling us, he said, "I am telling you the truth". "You don't
have to tell me, I know you are; I was standing there with you."
And he said, "You were the one who was with me?"
And I said, "Yes, I was with you."
And I assumed he knew that I was with him. That is when he talked to
Chief Curry and Chief Curry come back and said he needed the report
from me, too.
Representative FORD. When did this conversation take place?
Mr. BRIAN. The date I don't have any idea. Probably 2 or 3 weeks, I
will tell you----
Mr. DULLES. 2 or 3 weeks what? After November 22?
Mr. BRIAN. No, sir; before the date I wrote the report, because I
messed around there for another couple of weeks and then I walked in
the office one day and he said, "Chief Curry wants it today," and I
said, "All right, I will write it," and I sat down and wrote it, and
I believe the next day or the day after that he brought it, came up
here, and all this come out in
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