G. H. Q. (Montreuil-Sur-Mer) by "G.S.O."
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Title: G. H. Q. (Montreuil-Sur-Mer) by "G.S.O."
Author: Frank Fox
Release date: September 5, 2013 [eBook #43644]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK G. H. Q. (MONTREUIL-SUR-MER) BY "G.S.O." ***
G. H. Q.
(MONTREUIL-SUR-MER).
[Illustration]
G. H. Q.
(MONTREUIL-SUR-MER)
BY
"G. S. O."
WITH A MAP AND THIRTY-TWO ILLUSTRATIONS.
[Illustration]
LONDON:
PHILIP ALLAN & CO.,
QUALITY COURT, CHANCERY LANE, W.C.
1920.
PRINTED BY
WHITEHEAD BROS., WOLVERHAMPTON.
TO
THE PEOPLE AT HOME
WHOSE UNBENDING RESOLUTION
AND UNGRUDGING GENEROSITY
UPHELD THE SOLDIERS' CONFIDENCE
THIS BOOK IS GRATEFULLY
DEDICATED BY THE
AUTHOR.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER PAGE
I.--BEFORE G.H.Q. WENT TO MONTREUIL 1
The first stages of the War--"Trench War," a good
German invention--The Battle of Eyes--Waiting for
the Big Push--The Loos disappointment--Moving G.H.Q.
to Montreuil.
II.--MONTREUIL AND THE MONTREUILLOIS 16
How the Montreuillois once learned to hate the
English--Early history of the famous town--Its link
with the early Roman-British Empire--A border town
in the Anglo-French Wars--When G.H.Q. was bombed.
III.--G.H.Q. AT WORK 29
The Functions of G.H.Q.--The varying conditions to
be met--The working hours--The organisation of a
branch--The Chief's system.
IV.--G.H.Q. AT PLAY 47
The walks on the Ramparts--The "Monks" of Montreuil
had little time for sport--Precautions against
"joy-riding"--The jolly Officers' Club--Watching the
Map--Ladies at G.H.Q.
V.--THE MUNITIONS OF THE WAR 66
The Shell shortage--When relief came--The dramatic
Tanks--Bombs--Some ammunition figures--The ingenious
inventor.
VI.--THE MEDICAL SERVICES 80
The magic-workers of the war--Fighting the
Germans--Concerning the Victorian primness of
conversation and the present popularity of "v.d." as
a theme for small talk--The Army and "v.d."--The
etiquette of hospitals and the ways of matrons--The
war against Trench Feet--Mustard gas in 1918.
VII.--THE ANIMALS OF THE FORCE 98
A happy lot--The mud season in Flanders--The effects
of mustard gas--The character of the mule--Forage
difficulties--The French object to our horse
ration--The Americans side with us--The animal
record in 1918.
VIII.--THE FINANCIAL SERVICES 116
The generosity of the British People--G.H.Q. was not
a spendthrift--The Pay system--Curiosities of
banking in the field--Claims of the civilian
inhabitants--The looted rabbit.
IX.--THE ECONOMY SERVICES 129
What the German submarines taught us--The Salvage
Organisation--O.C. Rags, Bones and
Swill--Agriculture's good work and hard luck--The
Forestry Directorate--Soldiers learn economy in a
stern school.
X.--THE COMFORTS OF THE FORCE--SPIRITUAL AND OTHER 144
The Padres--The semi-religious organisations--E.F.C.
Comforts--Studying the Fighting man--The Great Beer
Save.
XI.--THE LABOUR AUXILIARIES 155
The queer ways of the Chinks--How to bury a Chinaman
properly--The Q.M.A.A.C.s and their fine
record--Other types of Labour auxiliaries--The
Labour Directorate.
XII.--G.H.Q. AND THE "NEW ARMY" 169
What G.H.Q. thought of the "Temporaries"--Old
prejudices and their reason--The material of the
"New Armies"--Some "New Army" Officers who did not
play the game--The Regular Army Trade Union accepts
its "dilutees."
XIII.--G.H.Q. AND THE DOMINION ARMIES 183
Our Parliament at the Club--A discussion of the
Dominions, particularly of Australia--Is the
Englishman shy or stand-offish?--How the "Anzacs"
came to be--The Empire after the War.
XIV.--EDUCATING THE ARMY 197
The beginning of an interesting movement--The work
of a few enthusiasts--The unexpected peace--Humours
of lectures to the Army--Books for the Army--The
Army Printery.
XV.--THE WINTER OF OUR DISCONTENT 209
The disappointments of 1916 and 1917--The collapse
of Russia--The Cambrai Battle--The German
propaganda--Fears of irresolution at
Home--Reassurances from Home--Effects of the
Submarine war--An economical reorganisation at
G.H.Q.--A new Quartermaster General--Good effects of
cheerfulness at Home.
XVI.--ENTER THE AMERICANS 235
How the Germans were misled about the
Americans--Early American fighters--The arrivals in
May, 1918--American equipment--Our relations with
the Americans and what they thought of us--The
Portuguese.
XVII.--THE GERMAN SPRING OF 1918 254
Was G.H.Q. at fault?--Where we could best afford to
lose ground--Refugees complicate the
situation--Stark resolution of the French--All
Pas-de-Calais to be wrecked if necessary--How our
railways broke down--Amiens does not fall.
XVIII.--THE MOTOR LORRY THAT WAITED 272
How a motor lorry waited at the Ecole Militaire to
take away the maps to the Coast--The Motor Lorry
Reserve--An "appreciation" of the position--Germany
lost the War in the first three months--Some notes
of German blunders.
XIX.--THE UNITY OF COMMAND 283
Was it necessary?--Was a French Generalissimo
inevitable?--Our share in the guiding of the last
phase of the campaign--Points on which the British
had their way.
XX.--THE COMING OF VICTORY 293
The June Position--German attempts to pinch out our
lines of supplies--The attacks on hospitals--The
glorious last 14 weeks--G.H.Q.'s share.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
TO FACE PAGE
THE CHIEF _Frontispiece_
THE BOULOGNE GATE 1
THE CAVÉE SAINT FIRMIN 14
OUTSIDE THE RAMPARTS 20
THE MARKET 26
LT.-GEN. THE HON. SIR H. A. LAWRENCE 30
LT.-GEN. SIR G. H. FOWKE 38
THE GRANDE PLACE 42
THE RAMPARTS 48
THE THEATRE 50
IN THE OFFICERS' CLUB 54
THE PLACE GAMBETTA 60
THE FOSSE 72
A BY-WAY 80
A ROYAL VISIT: DECEMBER, 1918 90
THE EAST RAMPARTS 102
THE ARMY COMMANDERS 110
MAJOR-GEN. SIR C. A. BRAY 122
MAJOR-GEN. L. B. FRIEND 126
AN ARMY POSTER 132
BRIG.-GEN. THE EARL OF RADNOR 136
AT FORESTRY H.Q. 140
BRIG.-GEN. E. G. WACE 168
THE BOULOGNE GATE (FROM THE TOWN) 182
MAJOR-GEN. C. BONHAM-CARTER 198
LIEUT.-COL. D. BORDEN TURNER 202
CAPTAIN H. P. HANSELL 204
ON THE RAMPARTS 210
LIEUT.-GEN. SIR TRAVERS CLARKE 226
THE ECOLE MILITAIRE 272
AT THE CHIEF'S CHATEAU 284
"SOMEWHERE IN FRANCE" 292
MAP AT END
FOREWORD.
That fantastic life at G.H.Q., so greatly detached from the normal--the
life of the men whose words had power to send Armies into and out of
action, to give this Division rest and surcease from the agony of the
struggle, to assign to that Division the stress of a new effort; the men
into whose hands the nation poured millions without stint and at whose
call the whole world moved to spin or dig or forge--will it be of
interest now to recall some of its memories, to attempt an intimate
picture of its routine?
Fantastic the life was truly. One man of imagination, who had done his
work in the line so well as to win a reputation for great courage and
administrative ability, and had carried through with a quiet skill and a
simple dutifulness the responsibilities of the "small family" of a
regiment, found, when he was transferred to G.H.Q., that the sense of
responsibility was too great for his temperament. He was not a very
important cog of the machine. But the feeling that the motion which his
hand started set going so great a series of actions got on his nerves
to the extent that he could neither sleep nor eat with comfort, nor
decide the simplest matter without torturing doubt as to whether it were
right or wrong. He "moved on" within a few days.
Fortunately that sense of vision was rare. The average man was content
to "carry on" with his task with what good judgment Heaven gave him,
deciding as the established routine, or the common-sense shift of a new
emergency, dictated.
But looking back, reflecting on all the woeful results that might have
sprung from a careless blunder, from too great haste, from too
deliberate hesitation, from over fear or over confidence, it is to be
seen how fantastic, how abnormal was the life centred in that little
walled town of Montreuil, the focus of a spider's web of wires, at one
end of which were the soldiers in their trenches, at the other the
workers of the world at their benches. Yet we ate, drank, slept, played
a little and talked, very much as if we were workers in some commercial
house, directing coffee from a plantation to a warehouse and then to a
breakfast table, instead of dealing in blood and tears, drawing without
stint on human life and human hope so that the idea of Right and Liberty
might be saved in the world.
It is well that Imagination went to sleep, or was lacking. For so the
work could be done and the war directed to its safe conclusion. But a
record of the life we lived seems now, in retrospect, almost indecorous.
It is as if we should not have munched food, talked trivialities, while
before our eyes and under our hands was played out the greatest tragedy
Man has known; as if it would have been more fitting if we had gone from
uneasy couches, tight-lipped and anxious, to our desks, haunted always
by a sense of doom.
It was not like that. And, such as it was, I attempt to record it--a
serious enough life in any sense of the word, monkish in its denial of
some pleasures, rigid in discipline, exacting in work, but neither
austere nor anxious--such a life as studious boys might live in a Public
School, if there can be imagined a Public School in which sport was
reduced to the minimum essential to keep one fit for hard "swotting."
But a life with some relaxations, and some pleasures, cheerful, actually
light-hearted.
Questions of the conduct of the war must obtrude somewhat in this book,
but it will be only in so much as they are a necessary background to the
story of the life of G.H.Q.--of G.H.Q. in its later phase when it had
moved from St. Omer to Montreuil and had become what it was in the final
result, a capable Board of Directors of as glorious a company of
soldiers as the world has known. There will be no attempt at a history
of the war, no battle pictures, which are usually vain efforts to
measure the immeasurable. Yet it is hoped that the reader will get from
it some idea of the character and the complexities of the struggle.
Already fogs of controversy are obscuring many of the facts of the war.
There is a controversy whether the first Commander-in-Chief should have
been recalled when he was; about the merits of the second
Commander-in-Chief; about the "unity of command" decision; about the
relative merits of a strategy which would concentrate everything for a
supreme effort in France and a strategy which would seek a "back door"
to the German citadel; about the actual cause and duration of the shell
shortage. In accordance with our British custom we are mostly taking
sides, following some leader and putting our faith in his views, and all
his views, implicitly. Thus are formed parties. I claim with honesty,
and perhaps with correctness, not to belong to any of the parties. I
have set down these observations on G.H.Q. without a thought of whether
they may support this view or that view on the conduct of the war.
THE AUTHOR.
[Illustration: THE BOULOGNE GATE]
CHAPTER I.
BEFORE G.H.Q. WENT TO MONTREUIL.
The first stages of the War--"Trench War," a good German invention--The
Battle of Eyes--Waiting for the Big Push--The Loos disappointment--Moving
G.H.Q. to Montreuil.
It was the task of General Headquarters to try to see the War as a
whole, to obtain a knowledge not only of the strictly military situation
but, to an extent, also of the moral and the political situation of the
enemy and of our own forces. In the later stages of the campaign that
task was being done, _pace_ all the critics, with an efficiency that was
wonderful, seeing that before the Great War the British nation did not
allow its Army any chance at all of war practice on a big scale. Our
Generals, whatever skill they might have won in studying the theory of
war, had had no opportunity to practise big movements. They were very
much in the position of men trained in the running of a small provincial
store who were asked suddenly to undertake the conduct of one of the
mammoth "universal providers."
It is of G.H.Q. in the later stages of the war that I write, not G.H.Q.
of the earlier stages, when our Army was finding its feet. But a slight
generalisation regarding those earlier stages is necessary to an
understanding of the subsequent growth of the Army organisation and of
its Board of Directors at G.H.Q.
The small Army which crossed to France in 1914 was organised as an
Expeditionary Force for a war of movement. It did gallant work in the
first phase, as all have admitted. When the war of movement stopped and
the struggle settled down to the War of the Trenches, though that gave a
good opportunity of recruiting, it brought up an entirely new set of
problems, for which our organisation had made no provision at all and in
which British natural gifts did not have the best chance of display.
Indeed our training system at home refused in 1914-15 to "recognise"
Trench War. The New Armies were trained on the same lines as the old
Regular Army, but of course more hurriedly, more intensively, less
efficiently. They learned Trench Warfare--an almost entirely different
game--when they got out to the Front. A reversal of the process--to have
taught the much simpler Trench Warfare in the home camps and left the
teaching of movement warfare to training intervals in France--was an
obviously more economical system, and it was that adopted at a later
stage.
When a considered history of the war comes to be written, probably it
will give to the German High Command high praise for this period of
"Trench War." It was the one conspicuously good invention of the enemy.
It enabled him almost completely to stop the war in the one theatre
where he had to meet troops superior to his own, whilst his forces
ranged round Europe winning cheap victories and finally (though too late
as it proved) vanquishing opposition elsewhere. There is no doubt that
the Trench War device baffled our side for a time. I like the story of
Marshal Joffre explaining the position to an American war correspondent
and adding:
"You see there is nothing to be done."
"No. I suppose nobody could do anything?"
"Nobody."
"Not even Napoleon?"
But Marshal Joffre paused at that, and after a moment's reflection said:
"Yes, I suppose Napoleon could do something."
Finally the "something" came in the shape of the "Tank."
When Field Marshal Earl Haig took over the chief command he adopted the
system of frequent "raids" to give to the Trench War some of the
character of moving war, and that proved a highly useful step. Still,
this Trench War was not of the genius of our people; and it was very
dull. If I were seeking the fit adjective which could be applied to it
in its superlative it would certainly not be "exciting" nor yet
"dangerous." The life was exciting and it was dangerous--a little. It
was, however, neither very exciting nor very dangerous. But it was very,
very curious. Trench war had its moments, its hours of high emotion, of
intense excitement, of crowding dangers. Its routine--on the Western
front--was laborious, almost to the point of tediousness, demanding a
sober and constant carefulness in detail, and--provided you watched the
minutes and the winds, the twigs and the sky, had eyes, ears, and nerves
always on the alert--it was reasonably safe.
Trench War exciting? No; you could not allow it to be. The moments were
rare (to the majority of officers they never came) when the call was for
a gallant shout and a forward rush in which leadership took its most
obvious and its easiest form. The hours were always when, with cool,
suspicious, deducting mind, you were watching a sector, awaiting the
enemy's raiding attack or directing your own. Stalking and being
stalked, it was interesting, absorbing, but you could not allow it to be
exciting, or you would not do your work properly. War was robbed, in
that phase of the struggle, of most of its fascinations by the
spectacled Germans who had spent the previous half-century in the
counting house, the laboratory, and the cellar, preparing to destroy the
humanities of civilisation. Trench War was a grubbing kind of business.
Dangerous? Naturally, to an extent. But not nearly so dangerous as one
might judge from the lurid accounts of imaginative writers. It had its
hours of peril, of horror. But it was not all the time dangerous. For
six days out of seven, on an average, a soldier, if he observed the
strictest caution, was "following a dangerous trade," nothing more. On
the seventh day--I speak in averages--he had his risk about doubled. On
very rare occasions he had to take the risk of a fireman who goes into a
blazing house to rescue a child, or a policeman who stops a madly
bolting horse. Ordinarily one had to be careful "to watch the traffic;"
that was all. If you wished to take a long lingering look at the enemy's
trench you used a periscope. For a brief glance (to get a wide field of
view) you looked over the parapet. There were differing estimates of the
length of time it was safe to show your head over the parapet. Some said
five seconds, others twenty-five.
"The German is slow in the up-take," remarked the officer who insisted
that twenty-five seconds was quite a safe time to look over the parapet.
Behind the parapet it was almost as safe--and on dry days as
pleasant--as on a marine parade. A solid fortification of sandbags,
proof against any blow except that of a big high-explosive shell,
enclosed on each side a walk, drained, paved, lined with dug-outs, in
places adorned with little flower beds. I write, of course, of the
Trench War in its "settled" stage--not of those grim struggles around
Ypres in the Autumn of 1914.
Not exciting, not as dangerous as one would imagine, the Trench War was
more curious, more "uncanny," than it is possible to describe. Try to
imagine the huge ditch, some 300 miles long, from the North Sea to the
Swiss lakes, which was our trench, facing another ditch which was their
trench, all lined with Eyes, thousands, millions of Eyes. All day, all
night, these Eyes stare and stare. At night the hands serving them break
up the dark with star shells, and the brains behind them welcome the
day, only because it makes the scrutiny of Death more easy. On the front
edge of each ditch the Eyes are thick in line; farther back, in every
possible post of observation, are groups of Eyes, and Eyes soar up into
the air now and again to stare into the secrets concealed on the other
side. There are Eyes of infantry, Eyes of artillery, Eyes of airmen. The
scrutiny never pauses for an instant. Let an Eye blink a moment and it
may mean catastrophe, a stealthy rush on a trench or a flood of
poisoning gas. The great dark gutter stretching across Belgium and
France was fringed with staring Eyes; and every Eye had to record its
message to G.H.Q.
Carefulness, tedious, monotonous carefulness, absolute punctuality, and
grave attention to every detail--these were the warrior qualities in the
Trench War period. The minutes had to be watched, the grass watched lest
you trod down a path and gave away some secret to the Eyes yonder. All
the minute details of life were hedged in with precautions and
penalties.
This tedious Trench War was not the game for British blood, though on
the whole it was done well, especially after Loos when the raiding
policy was instituted. But it was tedious; and very clearly it was
impossible to win while it lasted. For victory the Germans had to be
turned out of those trenches. So, during the tedium of the Trench War we
would comfort ourselves with the thought that very soon the Big Push
must come. Often the most definite news came that it was fixed for the
next month. This very definite news was usually traced back to some
signaller who had overheard something on the telephone. Perhaps
Divisional H.Q. had a Member of Parliament (doing a "Cook's tour" of the
Front) to dinner and peremptory messages were going down to the Coast
asking for lobsters to be sent up. Now a guileless signaller would never
imagine that Generals and the like were interested in lobster. If he
thought of their diet at all he probably imagined they lived on trench
maps--of which the consumption was certainly huge. Thus the signaller,
hearing strange peremptory messages about lobsters, might conclude that
this was some very secret code, and, the Big Push being in all our
thoughts, that it would have reference to that most certainly. But for
many months it was not the Big Push; it was only the lobster, which was
the standard of gaiety and dissipation at a Mess Dinner.
At the time of the Loos attack it did really seem that the Big Push had
come. But we were disappointed. Perhaps at the Front we were as
impatient at the result as the people at home, but we could soothe our
impatience with the thought of the greatness of the technical
difficulties of arranging an advance with a battle-line hundreds of
miles in length, all entrenched (difficulties which did not occur to
those gentlemen who wrote weekly expert articles, to show how it should
be done). It was clear that if we could push forward a little at certain
vital points, a rich reward would be reaped. We knew that what would
seem the obvious thing--to press along the whole line and break through
in the weak parts--would have only landed us in a number of advanced
salients which would be hard, or impossible, to defend when they came
under enfilade fire. There were scores of places in which the German
would willingly have let us through; to destroy the advanced party
afterwards. We had to aim to push in wedges at our own selected points
where the salient thus formed could be defended and could seriously
threaten a German line of communication. It was not easy, for the number
of those points was limited and the German knew them all.
Loos showed very plainly what we were "up against." There was a long
pause for further preparation, a pause which seemed unendurably long at
the time when the French were taking such a hammering at Verdun and we
were going on with tedious Trench War and still more tedious
preparations behind the lines.
Criticism of the British military effort at this stage of the war was
fairly general and sometimes very hostile. Some assumed that we had
tried our last blow at Loos and that we would never do more than hold a
trench sector until the French could finish the war. At Home there were
critics who argued that the British military effort would have been more
wisely directed if, in the first stage of the war, the British
Expeditionary Force had been kept at home and used as the nucleus for
training a great continental army, ignoring the pressing circumstances
of August, 1914.
Undoubtedly in that way a great British Army could have been far more
quickly raised. Undoubtedly, too, the task of forming the new British
Army was very seriously handicapped by the draining away to France of
practically all the fully-trained men of military age in Great Britain.
But with a choice of two courses Great Britain took the more daring and
the more generous one; and that in human affairs is generally the better
one. The material help which the Five Divisions of the British Army gave
to the French was not negligible. The moral help was much greater. The
lack of those Divisions might have lost Paris to the French and left the
Germans in control of all France north and east of the Seine; and that
event might have ended the war--it would certainly have prejudiced
seriously the French recovery.
The risk taken by Great Britain in stripping her own territory of its
only efficient army was not inconsiderable. Direct attack by Germany was
seriously feared then. A bolder German naval policy, indeed, might have
secured an invasion of England. Plans were drawn up in England at one
time on the supposition of a German descent on our coasts being
successful in its first stages, and it was proposed to meet this by
converting a wide coastal section of England into a desert.
Criticism was to be silenced in time, for presently we were to open that
giant battle which was not to finish until November, 1918, and which
was then to finish with the British Army the most important force in the
Field.
G.H.Q. moved to Montreuil on March 31st, 1916. On the same date, it may
be said, the British Army in France came to man's estate. It had been up
to this an "auxiliary army" holding a small section of the front, and a
"training army" getting ready to take over--as ultimately it did take
over--the main burden of the war; for, counting its captures of
prisoners and guns from August, 1918, to November 11th, 1918, the
British Army's share in the final victory was almost equal to that of
the French, American and Belgian forces combined.
G.H.Q. came to Montreuil because St. Omer, the old G.H.Q. town, was no
longer suitable as the centre for the vast operations pending. It had
served well enough when we formed the left wing of the French battle
line. Now we were to be the spear-head of the thrust against Germany.
Look back upon the little British Army of at first four and then five
Divisions, which in 1914 took rank alongside the French by Mons, and
fell back fighting until the rally of the Marne; and then upon the Army
of 1916 of ten times the strength, which was directed from Montreuil.
The growth shows as marvellous, and especially so to those who
understand how an army in the field is comparable to an iceberg at sea,
of which the greater part is unseen. For every rifleman in the trenches
and gunner in the gun-pits there are at least three other people working
to keep him supplied with food, clothing, ammunition, and on
communications. So an Army's growth demands a growth behind the line
three times as great as that in the line. And this growth is not merely
a matter of the multiplication of riflemen and gunners and auxiliaries,
a heaping up of men. It must be an organic growth to be effective at
all; an adding one by one of highly complex and yet homogeneous units.
A "Division" is the integral unit of any Army, and a Division must have
in the field its infantry battalions, cavalry or cyclist companies,
field batteries, signallers (with "wireless," telephone and telegraph
service), engineers, transport and supply services, medical and
ambulance services. All told, it numbered about 17,000 officers and men
at the close of the war, but in 1914 the strength of a Division was
nearer to 20,000. And this body of 20,000 was not a mob, nor a crowd,
nor yet even a simple organization such as a band of factory employees.
It was a nation in microcosm, its constituent numbers covering almost
the whole of the activities of life. It had to be organised to fight, to
keep up communications, to manufacture and repair, to feed itself and
its horses, to keep good health conditions in its camps and to succour
its sick and wounded. Besides fighting men it had doctors, vets.,
sanitary engineers, mechanics of all kinds, chemists, electricians.
Behind the line the Division's supports, its munition and clothing
factories, its food providers, had to be organised just as carefully.
Nothing can be made without making mistakes, and in the carrying out of
this giant task of making the Army of the British Empire there were many
mistakes of detail. It is in the nature of the human mind to see such
mistakes in high relief, as the human eye sees small patches of stone
stand out from a vast field of snow. But, making the worst that can be
made of the mistakes, if they are seen in proper perspective they cannot
blur the dazzling brilliance of a marvellous achievement.
Most of the mistakes, moreover, were direct consequences of that
innocence of warlike intention and that passion for human right and
liberty which was common to Great Britain as to the rest of Western
Europe, and on which, clearly, the German Powers had counted as
sufficient to paralyse effective resistance to their deliberate and
designed preparation. Hindering those good qualities of peacefulness
proved to be, but not paralysing. After all, the task was done. That
most dangerous first rush of German militarism was stayed. The powerful
beast was kept within bounds whilst weapons were forged for his
destruction. In vain were all his efforts, backed by the skill of half a
century of preparation and Spartan discipline.
* * * * *
Montreuil was chosen as G.H.Q. for a wide variety of reasons. It was on
a main road from London to Paris--the two chief centres of the
campaign--though not on a main railway line, which would have been an
inconvenience. It was not an industrial town and so avoided the
complications alike of noise and of a possibly troublesome civil
population.[1] It was from a telephone and motor transit point of view
in a very central situation to serve the needs of a Force which was
based on Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, and Havre, and had its front
stretching from the Somme to beyond the Belgian frontier.
[Footnote 1: The population of Montreuil in 1906 was 2,883.]
A great general, asked to define in a phrase what was wanted for a
Headquarters, said "A central remoteness." It was urged that this seemed
an oxymoron. "Well then, if you like, a remote centrality." The finality
of that allowed of no further argument. Montreuil provided both a
central position and a position remote from the disturbances and
distractions of traffic, of a large population, of gay social interests.
The great Ecole Militaire offered accommodation for the chief offices.
There was sufficient billeting accommodation in the town houses and
the neighbouring chateaux.
[Illustration: THE 'CAVÉE' SAINT FIRMIN]
G.H.Q. of course was never a great camp. Its total military population
was never more than 5,000, including those G.H.Q. troops who were needed
for guards and who were drawn first from the Artists' Rifles, then from
the Honourable Artillery Company, then from the Newfoundland Regiment,
and finally from the Guernsey Regiment. Accommodation at Montreuil was
reinforced somewhat by hutments in 1917-18, but on the whole the town
was big enough for its purpose.
CHAPTER II.
MONTREUIL AND THE MONTREUILLOIS.
How the Montreuillois once learned to hate the English--Early history of
the famous town--Its link with the early Roman-British Empire--A border
town in the Anglo-French Wars--When G.H.Q. was bombed.
Military convenience alone dictated the choice of Montreuil as the site
of the General Headquarters of the British Expeditionary Force in France
as soon as that Force reached to such a strength as to take its full
share in the campaign. But the choice might well have been influenced by
a sentimental desire to make this town, which was so intimately
associated with the old enmity between England and France, the centre of
the Great Reconciliation. Montreuil and the Montreuillois for many
centuries cordially hated England, and not without good reason. In
April, 1369, they chased the English from the town with hoots of "_A la
queue, à la queue les Anglais._" After 550 years, in April, 1919, they
saw the British G.H.Q. leave Montreuil with what different feelings!
Very curious is the way in which Montreuil has been linked up with
Anglo-French history. In the days of the Roman occupation of Gaul the
Roman Empire had a naval station close to, or actually on, the great
fortress rock which guarded the mouth of the Canche and which was then a
peninsula jutting out into the sea. This station, no doubt, Julius Cæsar
used in his expedition against Britain. Later Carausius, a Roman Briton,
revolted against the Roman Empire and, by winning the command of the
Channel with his Fleet, maintained for a time an independent Britain. He
assumed the state of Cæsar and founded a Roman-British Empire. The
_Classis Britannica_ of the Roman Empire had had its chief station at or
near Montreuil. With the revolt of Carausius there was no longer a
"British Fleet" of the Roman Empire, and the _Classis Samarica_ (the
Fleet of the Somme) was organised to hold the coasts of Gaul for the
Roman Power against the British rebel, Carausius. This Fleet of the
Somme had a station on the Canche, at or near Montreuil. Doubtless in
those very early years of the Christian era there was many a naval
action between the British sea forces and those of the Romans stationed
on the Canche.
Of any actual Roman buildings on the hill of Montreuil there exists
to-day no trace. But it may be accepted as certain that the Gauls had
fortified this great hill at the mouth of the Canche and that the Roman
Conquerors did not neglect its strategical advantages. It is well within
the bounds of the historic imagination to picture Carausius, the man who
first taught England that her fate depended on the holding of the Narrow
Seas, looking with vain hostility on a well-fortified Roman naval
station at Montreuil which often sent harassing expeditions against his
coast. In later years of Anglo-French enmity Montreuil was
Montreuil-sur-mer only in name, for the sea had retreated ten miles, and
Etaples was the port at the mouth of the Canche; but in the Roman days
and for some centuries after, Montreuil was a good harbour for trade or
for war.
When the barbarian invasions overwhelmed the Roman Empire, Montreuil
disappeared from history until the Seventh Century, when the monk St.
Saulve (subsequently Bishop of Amiens) built a monastery on the great
hill. From this monastery, without much doubt, the name of Montreuil
comes; for in all old French manuscripts it is spelt "Monstereul," which
is an easy step from "Monasteriolum," "the place of the monastery." In
St. Saulve's day Montreuil appears to have been a bold promontory at the
edge of the sea, with the River Canche running close to its base and a
thriving village at its foot. According to some accounts, St. Saulve's
first monastery was built on the ruins of an earlier castle; if so it
would probably have been a castle of Roman origin.
Montreuil became a famous shrine, and reports came from it of many
miracles. The Saints Omer, Riquier, Bertin and Josse, whose names are
kept on record in St. Omer and other neighbouring towns and villages,
were monks of the Montreuil monastery. There is a Forest of Josse just
near Montreuil, and I regret to say that some American officers were
persuaded to believe that it got its name from being the site of a
Chinese Labour Joss-house, to the lessening of the glory of St. Josse.
With the ravages of the pirate Northmen another period of darkness falls
upon the town of Montreuil until the 9th century, when the famous Count
Hildgood (that is to say "hold-good," a stubborn man in the fight)
resolved to make head against the Northmen, and in defence of his county
of Ponthieu built on Montreuil Hill a strong fortress. Traces of this
fortress still exist in the town. The Hotel de France (which was a
meeting place for officers of G.H.Q. when a dinner away from Mess
formalities was desired) stands on part of the site of "Hold-good's"
fortress.
Count Hildgood was something of a statesman as well as a soldier, and
encouraged a civilian population to collect at the foot of his fortress,
and used the glory of St. Saulve's monastery to attract to the place
other religious communities from Brittany and elsewhere. Montreuil
became thus a famous strong-point. It developed on the familiar lines of
a mediæval city with its well-established local rights, those of "the
peers of the peerage of Montreuil." The ravages of the Northmen in the
surrounding country continued, but Montreuil was too strong for them and
grew into a city of refuge, giving hospitality to many religious refugee
communities even from as far away as Brittany.
It remained without dispute a part of the county of Ponthieu until 939,
when, as related by the monkish historian Richer, it was coveted by the
Count of Flanders and captured through the treachery of the governor,
Robert le Chepier. (One of the towers of the existing fortifications
still bears his name). The children of the Count of Ponthieu were taken
captives and sent to the English Court to be held as prisoners--giving
rise to one of the first of the many grudges that the good Montreuillois
had against England. The Count of Ponthieu appealed for help to the then
Duke of Normandy (William of the Long Sword). The help was given,
Montreuil was wrested from the Flemings, and handed back to the Count of
Ponthieu according to some accounts, held by the Normans according to
other accounts, which have a greater air of reasonableness, for the
Normans were good at taking and slow at giving back.
[Illustration: OUTSIDE THE RAMPARTS]
But all disputes as to the possession of Montreuil between the Counts
of Ponthieu and Flanders and the Duke of Normandy were settled by the
King of France, Hugo Capet, who made the town part of the Royal Domain
of France and built a great fortified château by the side of the old
citadel. A part of this château still remains, "the Tower of Queen
Bertha," so-called from the unhappy fate of Bertha, Queen of Philip I.
of France. She was the daughter of the Count Florent I. of Holland, and
had borne Philip three children when he became enamoured of the wife of
the Count of Anjou and shut his own wife up to die in Montreuil. To
quote the old chronicle: "Il la mist en prison en un fort chastel qui a
nom Monstereul-sur-la-mer." The poor lady seems to have been most
harshly treated, and was left dependent on the charity of the townsfolk
for her food. The children of Montreuil recall the story to this day
when begging for money for the churches with the cry "Give, give, to
your Queen."
By this time the Norman Conquest had given England a place in European
politics. The 13th Century brought Montreuil under the English Crown.
Jeanne, Countess of Ponthieu and Montreuil, had married the King of
Castille and Leon. Their daughter Eleonora of Castille married Edward
I., King of England, and part of her dowry was Montreuil. Edward I. came
over in 1279 to take over his new possession, and promised the
Montreuillois to safeguard all their local rights and privileges. But
the good folk of the town did not like the English of that day, and
disputes were constant. They rejoiced when war broke out between France
and England (a war in which the French had the Scots as allies and the
English the Flemings); for the King of France exempted Montreuil from
her feudal duty to the English King.
That war was stopped by the intervention of Pope Boniface, and a Peace
Conference assembled at Montreuil. One of the peace conditions was that
the Prince of Wales should marry the daughter of the King of France, and
this marriage was celebrated with great magnificence at Boulogne, the
young princess passing through Montreuil to the wedding. She received as
her pin-money from her husband the revenues of Ponthieu and Montreuil.
But that marriage did not make for peace. On the contrary its fruits
were a new series of wars interrupted by an occasional truce or brief
peace. Crécy and Agincourt were both fought almost in sight of
Montreuil. The district round was ravaged again and again by the English
forces, and several times the town itself was besieged in vain. After
Crécy, Edward tried to take it and failed. An incident of one of the
peace treaties was the visit of Chaucer, the poet, to Montreuil as an
English plenipotentiary. An incident of one of the wars was the passage
through Montreuil of the funeral procession of King Henry V.
So through the years Montreuil was in the very heart of the struggle
between English and French. It was in a manner the border town between
the territory in France which was admitted to be English, and the
disputed territory. Thus it learned a deep hatred of the English. Often
as a condition of peace it was handed over to English domination; never
was it content with that destiny. Finally, the ambition of the English
Kings to add France to their realms--an ambition which was as bad for
England as it was for France--was definitely frustrated. Montreuil,
passionately French in spirit, "the most faithful town in all Picardy,"
as Henry of Navarre called it, was no more to be vexed either by English
governors or English marauders.
But Montreuil cherished its dislike of the English, and probably had
never been so happy for centuries as when in 1804 it was the
headquarters of the left wing of Napoleon's Army for the invasion of
England. General Ney was the officer in command at Montreuil, and his
brilliant receptions brought back to the town some of its Middle Ages
pomp. It was from Montreuil that in 1804 General Ney addressed to
Napoleon a memorial begging him to take the Imperial Crown for the sake
of France. Napoleon himself visited Montreuil more than once, and a
house in which he slept is still shown in the Place Verte.
Little or nothing of this was in the minds of our Staff in deciding upon
Montreuil as a site for G.H.Q. It was convenient (as its choice in old
times for Peace Conferences between England and France clearly shows) to
London and to Paris. It was off any main traffic route, and promised
quiet for telephone services. The feelings of the inhabitants were
presumed to be friendly, and the presumption was justified, though
curiously enough there was in 1918 a slight revival of the old
anti-English feelings, and I even heard whispered again "_à la queue les
Anglais_." It all arose from what must be admitted to have been rather
an undignified incident.
There used to be a fable--no one was fonder of giving it circulation
than the Red Tabs--that there was a mutual agreement between the Germans
and ourselves that G.H.Q. on both sides was to be spared from air raids.
"The arrangement is a classic instance of our stupidity," the Red Tab
humorist would remark, "for the German scores both ways."
"How is that?"
"Well, his Staff is spared, which is valuable to him. And our Staff is
spared, which is also valuable to him."
Staff officers, B.E.F., could afford to pass on gibes like that in
1917-18 when British Staff work was the model which the new American
armies set themselves to imitate.
But as a matter of fact in the summer of 1918 G.H.Q. was bombed pretty
regularly by the enemy. Those who lived there had unhappy proof of that.
There were several deaths from bombs in and near the town. After the
first bombing attacks orders were issued that no soldier, except
sentries and officers on night duty, was to be allowed to sleep in
Montreuil. The whole garrison was to go into the woods at night, or to
take refuge in the deep dug-outs which were tunnelled under the city.
Hardly a night passed without a bombing raid, until the tide of battle
turned and the German bomber had neither heart nor means for nocturnal
wanderings.
There was no doubt that a good motive inspired the orders for the
nightly evacuation of the town by officers and soldiers except those
actually on duty. It was thought that the Germans had discovered G.H.Q.
and had resolved one night to "wipe it out." A really determined raid
concentrated on a small walled town might have effected that. But the
nightly march out of the troops did not impress favourably the
inhabitants, who mostly had to stay. Some of them openly jeered; others
made less parade of their feelings, but had them all the same.
"Where are the English?"
"The English are in the woods of Wailly."
That was a favourite street-corner gibe.
Most officers who did not get direct orders to leave the town of nights
kept to their billets, but all the rank and file were marched out, or
rather driven out by motor lorries. The Officers' Club closed early of
evenings so that the Q.M.A.A.C.s might be evacuated to a camp outside
the town. At this camp they evidently did not have the same conveniences
as in the town for dressing their hair and so on; and they had to start
off very early in the morning to be in time to wait at breakfast.
Tempers as well as coiffures were a little ragged in consequence.
[Illustration: THE MARKET]
One advantage that we won from the bomb 'scare' (if that word is
justified) was that it gave a stimulus to archæological research in the
town. There was at G.H.Q. at the time, as a Major, R.E., that fine
"sport" Professor David of Sydney University. Professor David has a
great celebrity as a geologist. His birth year was 1858, so he is not
exactly a youngster except in heart. But the spirit of adventure and
patriotism which sent him out to the South Pole with the Shackleton
Expedition in 1907-1909 sent him from Australia to this war. He did
useful work with an Australian Tunnelling Company in connection with the
famous Messines mine, and his knowledge as a geologist was afterwards
of great use to G.H.Q. in matters of mines, of water supply, and the
like. Now he was asked to take in hand the task of providing good
under-ground dug-outs for the Montreuil garrison. His researches
disclosed some very interesting old galleries or quarries under the
citadel. Passages were cut through to these from points in the Ramparts,
and I believe that even the good citizens of Montreuil did not disdain
to take advantage of the English "dug-outs" when the German bombs began
to fall.
All the same, when that nightly march out of the town was dropped we
were all very glad; and our relations with the townspeople were restored
to their old serenity.
At the worst the hostile section was not a very large one. Many officers
who were at G.H.Q. have memories of warm personal friendships with some
of the French residents, who did all that was in their power to make
them feel that France was a second home. At one residence (where I was
billetted for a time, that of M. Laurent and his wife) the lady had
established a homely little _salon_, which was quite a student's centre
not only for officers but for other ranks. Mme. Laurent spoke English
well, and it was her hobby to teach French to any willing pupil of the
British Army and to interest soldiers in the history of the old town.
There were many others who took the same kindly interest in our mental
welfare.
The good Montreuillois of 1919 certainly did not hate the English as
their ancestors had done. They considered that the five years since 1914
had washed out all old injuries.[2]
[Footnote 2: See Appendix.]
CHAPTER III.
G.H.Q. AT WORK.
The Functions of G.H.Q.--The varying conditions to be met--The working
hours--The organisation of a branch--The Chief's system.
To the very end of the war, no doubt, an occasional young regimental
officer could be found who knew exactly what G.H.Q. did: "They swanked
about in Red Tabs and cars: had a gorgeous 'mike,' and, to keep up a
show of work, issued all kinds of fool orders which nobody in the
trenches had any time to read."
This theory of the functions of G.H.Q. had quite a vogue in "regimental
circles" at one time. It was not, of course, founded on any mental
process or it would be deeply interesting to investigate how these
gentlemen came to think that ammunition and supplies could arrive
fortuitously, that a concentration of troops or of Tanks could "just
happen."
[Illustration: LIEUT-GENERAL THE HON. SIR H. A. LAWRENCE (Chief of
the General Staff)]
But, apart from that sort of thoughtless talk, there was, even among
senior officers, some lack of knowledge as to what exactly the hermits
of Montreuil did. They knew of them as issuing General Routine Orders in
the name of the Commander-in-Chief (some 5,000 of these G.R.O.s were
issued in the course of the war); as circulating, more privately, secret
orders and instructions, and perhaps of making occasional appearances on
the battle-field, though probably the majority of regimental officers
never saw a G.H.Q. officer. In brief summary, the more important
functions of G.H.Q. were:
1. G.H.Q. was the link between the B.E.F. and the British
Government. The War Cabinet sitting in London was the supreme
authority. The Secretary of State for War was its spokesman and,
with the War Office Staff, its adviser. The Commander-in-Chief was
the Army's spokesman and, with his G.H.Q., the negotiator with the
Secretary of State for War. In the final result the B.E.F. had to
do what it was ordered to do by the Secretary of State, but the
Commander-in-Chief was usually consulted beforehand, and had always
the right of discussion and of remonstrance. The relations between
the Home Government and the Army were recognised as the most
important matter dealt with by G.H.Q., and War Office letters had a
special priority. No one except the Commander-in-Chief communicated
directly with the War Office.
2. G.H.Q. was the link between the British Army in the Field and
the Allied armies--the French, American, Belgian and
Portuguese. Relations between these were maintained through
Military Missions, we keeping a Mission with the G.H.Q. of the
Allied Army, they keeping Missions with our G.H.Q. There was, quite
apart from big questions of operations, discussion of which was
confined to the Chief of the General Staff and the heads of the
foreign Missions, an immense amount of technical transport, supply
and finance work between the Allies. There was hardly an officer of
G.H.Q. who did not in some detail come into relations with the
foreign Missions.
3. G.H.Q. had to decide the strategy of the campaign in its
relation to the British sector. After the unity of Command there
was a somewhat lessened responsibility in this matter, but the work
was practically the same. The Commander-in-Chief, in consultation
with his Chief of Staff, his Quartermaster-General and his
Adjutant-General, decided when and with what forces we should
attack, when adopt a defensive policy. To come to those decisions a
close and constant study was necessary by the various branches of
G.H.Q. of the state of the enemy's forces, our own numbers and
_morale_, our possibilities of transport and supply.
4. G.H.Q. had to arrange the supply, from Home and from its own
workshops and local civilian workshops, of all the wonderful
equipment of the forces, from a Tank and a 15-inch howitzer to a
tin of dubbin; all the ammunition and all the food supplies to man
and beast. There came to the ports of France every month for the
B.E.F. about 800,000 tons of stuff. The men to be fed totalled over
2,000,000 and the animals to be fed about 500,000. A month's supply
of ammunition weighed about 260,000 tons.
5. G.H.Q. managed a transport system which used constantly about
half a million horses and mules and about 20,000 motor lorries,
running over 9,000,000 motor miles per month; which carried on its
light railways about 544,000 tons a month and ran every day 250
trains on broad gauge lines.
6. G.H.Q. was constantly building new railways and new roads, and
developing new harbour facilities. It ran big canal and sea
services, forestry and agricultural services, repair shops,
laundries, etc., on a gigantic scale.
7. G.H.Q managed the vast medical services for wounded and sick,
the veterinary services, the laboratories for the defence of our
men and animals against poison gas and for the gas
counter-offensive. It was responsible for the organisation of the
Chaplains' services, for educational work and the amusement of the
men.
Such was the work of G.H.Q. It was carried on under these varying
conditions:
1. Maintaining a stabilised position. This was comparatively easy.
Wastage of men, horses and material could be calculated with some
certainty and replaced by a routine process.
2. Preparing for a big attack. This made the greatest strain on
Transport and Supply, and the necessary conditions of secrecy added
complications and difficulties. In preparing an offensive the
Traffic more than doubled per Division. The necessary making of new
railways and new roads and the accumulation of defence material to
fortify a new line were responsible for most of this. But the
accumulation of a big head of ammunition was also a factor. On a
quiet sector two Divisions could get along with about three trains
daily. For the purposes of a big attack ten Divisions might be
concentrated on that sector and those ten Divisions in the
preparatory stage of the attack would need about 33 supply trains a
day, and during the offensive about 27 trains a day. Put the
problem into terms of civil railway administration. Tell the
manager of the London to Brighton line that next week he must carry
15 times the normal traffic for a number of days and that it is
extremely important that people observing his termini and his lines
should not notice anything unusual.
3. Resisting a big attack. The most difficult element of this was
its unexpectedness. The total provision needed for it was less than
for an offensive. The amount of supplies necessary to go up by
train per Division from Base would be 25 per cent. less than in the
case of the preparation of a big attack. We always carried a good
reserve stock of ammunition, food, and engineering stores close
behind the line, and a further reserve of ammunition already loaded
on trains at appropriate railway centres. In case of emergency,
ammunition could start moving up in just the time necessary to
hitch a locomotive on to a standing train. Experience of the German
offensive in 1918 showed that we carried near the front line too
great reserves, and we lost a good deal of food, stores and
ammunition in consequence. That big attack indeed disclosed several
chinks in our armour. It showed that in some cases during Trench
War units had allowed themselves to become immobile. (To give one
example, many Casualty Clearing Stations had burdened themselves
with surgical stores and equipment which should be reserved for
stationary hospitals. Thus burdened, they were tempted to evacuate
too soon). There were weaknesses, too, in Ammunition Columns, and
the railway system was not nearly elastic enough. But we pulled
through, largely because the British officer and soldier has always
a bit in reserve and never thinks so quickly or acts so bravely as
when in a tight corner.
4. Carrying on a general offensive. This was the supreme test of
the British Staff from August, 1918, to November, 1918. It called
for an effort that put in the category of easy things all that had
gone before. The effort was gloriously successful. The British Army
succeeded where the German Army in 1914, under far more favourable
circumstances, had failed.
I have given only the most important of the functions of G.H.Q. and a
very inadequate idea of the conditions under which it had to carry on
its tasks, yet for all this there were only 300 officers at Montreuil
and 240 officers at the outlying directorates.
It did not leave much chance for idleness! At G.H.Q., in my time, in my
branch, no officer who wished to stay was later than 9 a.m. at his desk;
most of the eager men were at work before then. We left at 10.30 p.m. if
possible, more often later. On Saturday and Sunday exactly the same
hours were kept. "An hour for exercise" in the afternoon was supposed
to be reserved, in addition to meal-hours; but it was not by any means
always possible. During the worst of the German offensive in the spring
of 1918 Staff officers toiled from 8.30 a.m. to midnight, with half-hour
intervals for meals. I have seen a Staff officer faint at table from
sheer pressure of work, and dozens of men, come fresh from regimental
work, wilt away under the fierce pressure of work at G.H.Q.
The extreme character of the strain at G.H.Q. used to be recognised by a
special allowance of leave. A short leave every three months was, for a
long time, the rule. With pressure of work, that rule fell in abeyance,
and a G.H.Q. Staff Officer was lucky to get a leave within six months.
In the case of the big men at the head of the departments leave was
something to be talked of, dreamt of, but never realised. Compared with
conditions at G.H.Q. regimental work was care-free and pleasant.
G.H.Q. was organised in this fashion. At the head was the
Commander-in-Chief and his personal staff consisting of an Assistant
Military Secretary, a Private Secretary, a Medical Officer, an Officer
in charge of escorts and five A.D.C.s. Attached to this personal staff
were an American and a French Staff Officer. There was one officer of
the Dominions on the Chief's personal staff, Captain Botha, a son of
the late General Botha, Prime Minister of South Africa. With his
personal staff the Commander-in-Chief was quartered at a château near
Montreuil.
One rarely saw "the Chief." He seldom had occasion to come to the
offices in the Ecole Militaire, and it was only the highest officers who
had to go to confer with him. But his presence was always felt. There
was no more loyal band of brothers than the Grand Staff of the British
Army in 1918, and the humblest member at G.H.Q. expressed the spirit of
the Commander-in-Chief, and, within his sphere, was trying to do exactly
as the Commander-in-Chief would do. When "the Chief" did appear at
Montreuil all felt they had the right to desert work for five minutes to
go to a window to catch a glimpse of him as he passed from one side of
the Ecole Militaire to the other, or stopped in the great courtyard to
chat for a moment with one of his officers.
Under the Chief the staff was divided into branches. There was the
"Military Secretary's Branch," a small branch under Major-General H. G.
Ruggles-Brise, whose duties were to look after honours, promotions, etc.
There was the General Staff Branch, under Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir H.
A. Lawrence, divided into the Operations Section, under Major-General J.
H. Davidson (having charge of the actual strategy and tactics in the
campaign); the Staff Duties Section, under Major-General G. P. Dawnay;
and the Intelligence Section, under Brigadier-General G. S. Clive
(having charge of the collection of information as to the enemy's
movements, dispositions, intentions, etc.). There was the
Adjutant-General's Branch, under Lieutenant-General Sir G. H. Fowke
(having charge of discipline). There was the Quartermaster-General's
Branch, under Lieutenant-General Sir Travers Clarke (having charge of
supply and transport). Finally there were certain officers with special
duties attached to G.H.Q. but not directly under any of these branches,
such as the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, the Inspector of Machine
Gun Units, the Engineer-in-Chief, the officers in charge of Mines and
Searchlights, the Inspector of Training, the Chief Chaplains, the
Provost Marshal, and the Deputy Judge Advocate-General.
[Illustration: LIEUT-GENERAL SIR G. H. FOWKE (Adjutant-General, B.E.F.)]
Of the branches of the Staff, the Quartermaster-General's was far the
greatest, for under it came all the transport and supply services. This
was the formidable list:
Director of Agricultural Production (Brig.-Gen. the Earl of
Radnor).
Director of Army Postal Services (Brig.-Gen. Price).
Deputy Controller of E.F. Canteens (Col. E. Benson).
Director of Engineering Stores (Brig.-Gen. Sewell).
Director of Forestry (Brig.-Gen. Lord Lovat).
Director of Hirings and Requisitions, and President of Claims
Commission (Major-Gen. Rt. Hon. L. B. Friend).
Controller of Labour (Brig.-Gen. Wace).
Director of Ordnance Services (Major-Gen. Sir C. M. Mathew).
Paymaster-in-Chief (Major-Gen. Sir C. A. Bray).
Director of Remounts (Brig.-Gen. Sir F. S. Garrett).
Controller of Salvage (Brig.-Gen. Gibb).
Director of Supplies (Major-Gen. Carter).
Director of Motor Transport (Major-Gen. Boyce).
Director-General of Transportation (Major-Gen. Crookshank).
Director of Veterinary Services (Major-Gen. Moore).
Vice-Chairman Imperial War Graves Commission (Major-Gen. Ware).
Director of Works (Major-Gen. Sir A. M. Stuart).
Nor does that finish the list, for subsidiary directorates under the
Director-General of Transportation were:
Director of Construction (Brig.-Gen. Stewart).
Director of Docks (Brig.-Gen. Wedgewood).
Director of Inland Water Transport (Brig.-Gen. Luck).
Director of Light Railways (Brig.-Gen. Harrison).
Director of Railway Traffic (Brig.-Gen. Murray).
Director of Roads (Brig.-Gen. Maybury).
The Transportation Directorate was, so to speak, a sub-branch of the
Staff. It had a great standard-gauge railway system which kept 900
locomotives running, which in one day could send 196 trains from the
Bases to railheads (this irrespective of trains on lateral lines) and in
one week once moved 439,801 troops and in one month 1,539,410 troops.
Its railway system was constantly being pushed forward, being
duplicated, and being furnished with "avoiding lines." Further,
Transportation had a light railway system which carried 174,923 tons a
week. Those were only two of its activities. On inland waterways,
Transportation carried 293,593 tons a month, and it worked, in addition,
a coastal barge traffic, a cross-Channel barge service, and a
cross-Channel Ferry. Of roads, it maintained about 4,106 miles and was
always making new ones; and it took 4,400 tons of material--much of it
imported by sea--to make a mile of new road.
These figures are impressive enough in themselves and yet give little
real sense of the full task of the Transportation Services. That can
only be realised when it is kept in mind that practically all the work
had to be carried out under conditions of shock and violent movement. It
was not a matter of peacefully carrying on a routine business. At every
point there was a constant liability to interruption and destruction by
enemy action. At every hour there was some new development requiring
some change of method, of destination. The vast machine had to be as
elastic as it was powerful.
Yet that was only one sub-branch of the Staff.
It will be of interest to note how all the directorates of the Q Branch
of the Staff were co-ordinated so that the man at the top could keep
control and yet not be smothered under a mass of detail. Under the head
(Lieutenant-General Sir Travers Clarke) of this Branch of the Staff were
two deputies (Major-General Ford and Major-General May). Under these
deputies were five Brigadier-Generals, and under them nine
Lieutenant-Colonels, and these Lieutenant-Colonels divided between them
82 subjects. A table showing the distribution of these subjects was
circulated throughout the Staff, and most matters got to the right
officer from the beginning, and if they were of a routine nature were
dealt with at once without further reference. Very important matters, or
new questions arising, went up to one of the Deputies and were referred,
or not, to the Q.M.G. as the circumstances dictated. Attached to the
Branch and directly under its head was an officer who had charge of all
orders and all publications. Nothing could be sent out as an order from
the Q.M.G. Branch, or nothing printed as an instruction from the Branch,
until it had gone through his hands; and it was his duty to see that one
section of the Branch did not tread on the toes of another, that orders
and publications did not overlap, and that an order in which several
directorates were interested was drafted in accordance with the views of
all of them.
Other Branches of the Staff did not call for such elaborate
organisation, for their duties were not so various. But all worked on
very much the same plan--of delegating authority so that once a line of
action on any particular point was decided upon, a comparatively junior
staff officer could "carry on" without worrying his superiors by
frequent references.
A G.H.Q. officer was distinguished not only by his red staff badges but
by a red and blue arm-band. An "attached officer," _i.e._, an officer
who was working with the staff as a learner or a helper and was perhaps
graded for pay, etc., as a staff officer, did not wear these
distinctions until he was actually appointed to the Staff.
[Illustration: THE GRANDE PLACE]
The red and blue arm-band was a chromatic outrage--its glaring colours
of course had a purpose--and quite spoiled the appearance of a tunic.
But it was dearly prized and as a rule was worn on leave, though it had
then no usefulness. In the field the distinguishing arm-band was of
great use, to indicate to officers and men the officials to whom they
could appeal in case of need. There were all sorts of arm-bands with
various colour symbols and initials in addition to the G.H.Q. one. A
list of them will indicate the complexity of the task of a modern army
in the field. Special arm-bands of different designs were authorised to
distinguish:
General Headquarters.
Army Headquarters.
Army Corps Headquarters.
Corps Machine Gun Officers.
R.A.F. Headquarters.
Cavalry Divisional Headquarters.
Divisional Headquarters.
Tank Corps Staff.
Tank Headquarters.
Tank Brigade.
Cavalry Brigade.
Infantry Brigade.
Cavalry Divisional Artillery Headquarters.
Divisional Artillery Headquarters.
G.H.Q. Troops Headquarters.
Lines of Communication.
Provost Marshal and his assistants.
Signal Service.
Military Police.
Railway Transport Officers.
Embarkation Staff.
Staff, Directorate of Light Railways.
" " Roads.
" " Docks.
" " Transportation.
" " Inland Water Transport.
" " Broad Gauge Railways.
Light Railways District Superintendent.
" Inspector.
" Yardmaster.
" Controlman.
" Guard.
Officers, Staff Inspector War Trophies.
Servants to Military Attaches.
Stretcher bearers.
All medical personnel.
Press correspondents and servants.
Train Conducting Officers.
Checkers.
Town Majors.
Traffic Control.
Agents de Police Special.
Instructors of Machine Gun School, Lewis Gun School,
and Machine Gun Corps Base Depôt.
H.Q. Corps Heavy Artillery.
Special Brigade.
Area Commandants.
Billet and Camp Wardens.
Corps Chemical Advisers.
Divisional Gas Officers.
Instructors of Divisional Gas Schools.
Camouflage Officers attached to Corps.
Salvage Corps.
Civilian Platelayers.
Intelligence Police.
Sanitary Sections.
Belgian Civ. Rly. Staff.
M.L.O. Staff at Ports.
N.C.O.s and men of Intelligence Corps.
N.C.O.s and men of Dock Directorate.
Sentries on Examining Posts.
Interpreters, Indian Labour Corps.
Interpreters, Chinese Labour Corps.
The Military Police were supposed to be able to keep all these in memory
and an officer in the field had to know the chief ones; and he took care
to know at least that for G.H.Q., for it represented the ultimate source
of honour and blame. Nothing important could happen to him except
through G.H.Q., and that ugly red and blue arm-band always demanded
attention, sometimes, no doubt, mixed with a little resentment, because
of the idea that G.H.Q. had nothing much to do except to bother the
unhappy regimental officer.
We all tried to "live up to" our arm-bands in the crude
stained-glass-window colours. The Commander-in-Chief set a high example
by choosing his men carefully, giving them their particular jobs and
trusting them. He was not one of those fussy souls who want to oversee
every detail. The men who worked under him knew that whilst they did
their work conscientiously and carefully he would back them against any
niggling criticism and against any back-biting. It was a good policy
judged by its results. G.H.Q., B.E.F., France, in the summer of 1918 had
probably reached as high a summit of soldierly scientific skill as the
grand Staff of any Army in the world. The business of improvisation
which had been begun in 1914 was finished, actually finished. From
G.H.Q. was directed day by day a fighting force which met the chief
brunt of the last German attack, held it; then, while it absorbed a
great flood of recruits and helped to equip and train the American Army,
prepared to take the chief part in the final victorious offensive.
CHAPTER IV.
G.H.Q. AT PLAY.
The walks on the Ramparts--The "Monks" of Montreuil had little time for
sport--Precautions against "joy-riding"--The jolly Officers'
Club--Watching the Map--Ladies at G.H.Q.?
There was precious little play-time at G.H.Q. But there was some. It was
spent very innocently; not to say stodgily. A walk on the Ramparts was
the chief recreation of the great majority of the officers.
What a boon those Ramparts were! Within a minute from the Ecole
Militaire one could get on the broad walk which crowned the old walls
and could follow it round the whole circuit of the town for a mile or
more. From every point there was a rich and ample prospect; southward
over the swelling downs and little copses towards the forest of Crécy;
westward over a richer and more luxuriant plain towards the sea;
northward across the woods and marshes of the Canche; eastward along the
valley of the river and its bordering hills. On a fine day at the coming
up and the going down of the sun, and every hour between, there was a
constant festival of light and colour. Stormy and rainy skies gave
another beauty to the wide prospect. To see a storm march up in grand
procession and pass with its sombre pomp was a fearful joy; and there
was a wild beauty, too, in looking out from the walls on the beating of
the obstinate rains against hill and plain. Painters from all over the
world used to come to Montreuil to attempt to put on canvas the glow of
its summer scenes, the wild grandeur of its winters. No day was without
its special beauty, and the beauty was ever renewed afresh.
In the early spring the chinks and crannies of the old walls burst into
bloom of gillyflowers which hung them with tapestries of gold and red
and brown, contrasting gaily with the bright green foliage of the trees
growing at the base of the Ramparts and throwing their branches up to
their very top. As the season advanced the birds came to build in the
trees, and you might peep down into their nests and hear their indignant
chirrups at being so closely overlooked. With summer and autumn came new
colours, but always splendour and glow and movement. The country around
carried that wide variety of crops in which the French peasant's thrifty
and careful culture delights. There were beans and oats and wheat and
corn and flax and mustard and bits of pasturage, and of fodder crops,
weaving their many colours into a delightful carpet pattern which
changed with every day of the year and almost with every hour of the
day.
[Illustration: THE RAMPARTS]
Had it not been for those Rampart walks the toilsome life of G.H.Q. at
Montreuil would have been hardly possible. The road from anywhere to
anywhere, if time allowed, was by the Ramparts. Going from the Ecole
Militaire to the Officers' Club was three minutes by the street, seven
minutes by the Ramparts, and most went by the Ramparts unless work was
hideously pressing. For those with a little more time to spare there
were enchanting rambles around the base of the Ramparts along the Canche
valley or in the old fosses of the fortifications.
Riding was not a common exercise. Horses were scarce. Very few officers
had their own chargers; and those who had could not find time to
exercise them properly. So most of the horses at G.H.Q. were pooled, and
an officer having time and inclination took what horse was available.
There were many pleasant rides, the favourite one being a shady stretch
along the bank of the river.
At one point of the fortifications an old fosse had been converted into
hard tennis courts, and these were used a little, but not much. It seems
tiresome to be always repeating the same fact but really there was not
time to follow tennis or any other sport. At the Officers' Club there
was not such a thing as a billiard table; and I never saw a game of
cards played there. In some of the private messes there was a feeble
attempt to keep up a Bridge or a Poker circle. But to begin to play at
cards at 11 p.m. with the knowledge that the office is calling for a
clear rested brain by nine the next morning, needs far more than
ordinary enthusiasm. I can remember playing cards only three nights
during all my time at Montreuil.
There was a theatre at Montreuil, usually given up to cinema shows but
occasionally visited by the variety companies which were organised for
the amusement of the troops and occasionally also converted into a
lecture hall. It was well patronised on special occasions, but in the
course of a year made little total demand on officers' time. When, as
was usually the case, the theatre was given up to "the pictures" it was
filled by "other ranks." The non-commissioned officers and privates who
were clerks in the various departments had generally just as little
leisure as their officers, but some of the military population had more
time to spare; what section I do not know, for even the grooms and the
batmen had not easy places. Officers junior to the rank of
lieutenant-colonel were not allowed a batman to themselves, but one
soldier acted for two or three officers and had various fatigue duties
in addition.
[Illustration: THE THEATRE]
Just outside the town, G.H.Q. Recreation Ground provided a lumpy
football ground and a still more lumpy cricket ground. Both our national
games languished, however, for the stock reason--want of time. There
were teams, and occasional matches, and sometimes an enthusiastic
sportsman would send an urgent whip round to call attention to our
deplorable neglect of the games that made England great. He would get a
few half-hearted promises of reform, but there was no hope in fighting
against the great obstacle. It was like a college in which every one was
a "swotter."
So the 300 or so Monks of Montreuil lived their laborious lives. The
balance of G.H.Q. staff, some 250, scattered about the environs of
Montreuil with their offices at Paris Plage or Le Touquet or the Forest
of Crécy, could follow a somewhat milder discipline. They were "Second
Echelon" mostly. Current operations had not much concern for them and it
was possible to take horse-back exercise, to keep up football and
cricket and even tennis and golf. At Le Touquet, which was a well-known
pleasure centre before the war, there were good golf links and some
excellent tennis courts. On occasions the Commander-in-Chief decided to
think out his problems over a round of golf, and a little bungalow was
maintained at Le Touquet for his convenience.
Paris Plage was a splendid beach, but so far as G.H.Q. officers were
concerned its attractions were wasted. Occasionally an officer having
business at one of the Directorates near by would spare an hour for a
swim, but it was not possible on a hot Saturday or Sunday to suspend the
battle, or the preparation for the battle, in progress and adjourn as a
body to the seaside. Not only time but transport was lacking. The only
means of getting down to the beach--a distance of about twelve
miles--was by motor-car, and regulations against "joy-riding" were
strict. Not only were there regulations; there were also precautions to
see that the regulations were kept. A car could go out from G.H.Q.
garage only on an order from the officer in charge of cars, and it was
his business to get a chit as to what was the reason for the journey.
Occasionally police patrols would be stationed on the roads with
instructions to stop every car and examine its papers. This was excused
as a precaution against espionage. It was designed more to be a
precaution against waste of petrol or "joy-riding," as a few officers
found to their cost.
So the life of the Montreuil officer resolved itself ordinarily into
this simple routine: he worked and he walked on the Ramparts. But there
was one fine relief to tedium for the majority--a dinner-party every
night. The big generals, because they had to, and a few unwise souls,
because they chose to, favoured private messes and confronted at dinner
at night the same men as they met in the office all day; and, without a
doubt, found it rather monotonous. The majority of the officers messed
at the Officers' Club, which had a couple of hundred members and could
rival the old reputation of the House of Commons as "the finest Club in
Europe."
The qualification for joining the Officers' Club was to be an officer of
the British Army or of an Allied Army stationed at Montreuil. The
subscription was five francs per month, and for that and a ridiculously
small sum per day the Club gave members three square meals a day and
afternoon tea. The Club kept up a good cellar, and to the very last,
when good wine was almost unprocurable in London or Paris except at
exorbitant prices, the Officers' Club, Montreuil, could sell a vintage
claret or burgundy at nine francs a bottle, a decent wine at five francs
a bottle, and champagne at fifteen francs a bottle. The Expeditionary
Force Canteens were the caterers, and aimed at only a nominal profit.
Once a week there was a fixed guest night and a band, but members could
bring guests at any time. Waiting was done by Q.M.A.A.C.s, neat deft
little ladies who brought a hint of home to the exiles.
Custom was against forming coteries. So there were constantly differing
dinner-parties, and the conversation was rich in variety and interest.
The backbone of the Mess were the Regular Army officers, the majority of
them colonels, with a sprinkling of brigadiers, a few majors and a few
captains. The majority in the Mess, however, were temporary officers, a
few of senior rank, mostly staff captains or attached officers. There
were always some visitors, a politician or some other personage from
home, staff officers from the War Office or from the various Armies,
regimental officers having business at G.H.Q., guests from the various
private messes at Montreuil.
Talk ranged from the most serious shop to the most airy nothings. There
were experts there in almost every department of human knowledge, men
who had seen many cities and known the minds of many men. The
representatives of the Allied nations gave an extra note of variety. You
might sit at the same table with an American one night, an Italian
another, or a Frenchman or Belgian or Portuguese. The majority of men
present were distinguished men either in the Service or in some civil
profession or business. Travel, science, art and literature, were all
well represented.
[Illustration: IN THE OFFICERS' CLUB]
Smoking was prohibited in the Officers' Club until a certain hour, and
the Q.M.A.A.C. waitresses had no difficulty in seeing that the rule was
kept by all ranks. At an earlier date, when a sergeant-major with men
orderlies had charge of the waiting, discipline on this point was not
so easily maintained. Any junior officer lighting up before the hour was
promptly checked. But a sergeant-major found it difficult to take
"disciplinary action" against an officer of General rank. One evening a
very lofty general indeed, a visitor to the Mess, started a huge cigar
at 8 o'clock. Smoking was not allowed until 8.20. The sergeant-major was
a man of resource. Bringing in a ladder, he mounted to the Mess clock
and solemnly set it on to 8.20. A General was smoking, therefore it must
be 8.20.
As I have said, they fed us very well at the Mess. But of course we
grumbled at the food and found one point of criticism in the fish.
Montreuil being practically a seaside town, the fish was naturally not
good, authority having transferred to this English colony in France the
invariable tradition of British seaside resorts to send all the fresh
fish away and consume the refuse. Our fish was always plaice, and it was
often plaice that had known better days. One wag spoke of it as the
"vintage plaice," professed to know that it had been "laid down" the
year the war started, and that the "bins" would not be exhausted until
the war ended.
But the plaice was never a really serious grievance. It gave
opportunity, but not valid cause, to grumble, and discussion of it died
away after an officer one night quoted mock heroically:
Ah, friend--had this indubitable fact
Haply occurred to poor Leonidas
How had he turned tail on Thermopulai!
It cannot be that even his few wits
Were addled to the point that, so advised,
Preposterous he had answered--"Cakes are prime,
Hearth-sides are snug, sleek dancing-girls have worth,
And yet for country's sake, to save our gods
Their temples, save our ancestors their tombs,
Save wife and child and home and liberty,--I
would chew sliced-salt-fish, bear snow--nay, starve
If need were--and by much prefer the choice!"
After dinner the routine was to go and look at the map before settling
down again to work. Military Intelligence, in one of its rooms, kept
up-to-date hour-by-hour a map of the fighting front, and after dinner we
would crowd to this room to see the latest official news put up on the
map and to hear the latest unofficial stories which embroidered the
news. One evening, as a great advance on our part was marked up on the
map, the clerk, moving the flag-pins, announced:
"They say the enemy cleared out so quickly that they left the hospitals
behind, and the Australian corps has captured 50 German nurses. They
report that they are looking well after them."
A titter went round the group of officers. It happened to be the night
after the story had circulated--a story which President Wilson has since
adopted among his family of anecdotes--that the Australians, having the
Americans to co-operate with, had had to remonstrate with them for their
undue rudeness to the Germans. The Australians had a reputation for
being quite direct enough in their method of teaching the Boche not to
be a Boche.
The titter, perhaps, had an injurious inference to some ears, for a
General officer remarked, a little sternly:
"Gentlemen, the Australians are a gallant race. The German--er--ladies
will be quite safe with them."
So, of course, it proved. It was fiction that any Colonial troops showed
an undue sternness to prisoners. The average German knew that he was
quite safe in the hands of any British unit--whether it was from
Australia, Canada, or the Motherland.
The after-dinner peep at the map was a great finish to dinner. When the
Armistice was signed officers were disconsolate for the loss of their
ten minutes in the M.I. room. "I miss," said one, "our pleasant daily
habit of advancing ten kilomètres on a front of fifty kilomètres."
No, life at G.H.Q. was sober and strenuous, but it was not dull or
tedious. If a man has good work to do, lovely aspects of Nature to look
upon, interesting company at his meals, he has all the real essentials
of contentment; well, most of them.
* * * * *
Ladies at G.H.Q.? An almost accurate chapter might be written on this
point on the lines adopted in that exhaustive and conscientious book on
Iceland, which had a brief chapter:
_The Snakes of Iceland._
There are no snakes in Iceland.
There were no ladies at G.H.Q., not at any rate in the sense that would
be in the mind of the average inquirer. On the too rare occasions when I
was able to get a leave from G.H.Q., or was sent over to London on a
task, the civilians I encountered in London exhibited a considerable
interest in the ladies that were thought to haunt G.H.Q.
This was by no manner of means an entirely or indeed a mainly feminine
curiosity. Many people have an ineradicable idea that an Army on a
campaign ravages the hearts of all the female population of the occupied
territory, as well as drawing on the beauty of its own land to recruit
charming camp followers. I can recall, on returning from a small war
some time before 1914, attending a dinner-party in London and being
tremendously flattered at the fact that as soon as the ladies went
upstairs all the men (some of them very distinguished men) crowded
round me in a spirit of inquiry. With all the resources at my disposal I
framed in my mind a brief and vivid appreciation of the campaign.
But--they did not want to know why the Turkish Army failed or the
Serbian Army succeeded. Someone rather well known in London had got into
a scrape in the course of the campaign, and there were some very
scandalous details alleged. My eager inquirers wanted to know all those
scandalous details, and were obviously disappointed to learn that there
was no reasonable foundation for them, and at once lost all interest in
the campaign. My "appreciation" had not the chance to be uttered.
Probably they concluded I was rather an unintelligent person not to have
discovered all the horrid details. Certainly those to whom I told the
truth about the ladies and G.H.Q. thought I was either very sly or very
unobservant. Indeed one very hearty old gentleman, with a great passion
for horrid details, patted me on the back publicly.
"That's right, that's right. I admire you for sticking to your friends.
But of course we do not believe you."
Categorically, it is _not_ a fact that "beautiful leaders of British
society" constantly graced G.H.Q. with their presence. In the very early
stages of the war some of the "Smart Set" considered it rather the
thing to get over to the battlefields and make a week-end sensation of a
glimpse at the Calvary of Civilisation. They usually got over through
the influence of political friends, and most often by way of the Belgian
section of the Front, which was not so sternly guarded as the British or
French sections. Military authority discountenanced these
visits--however "fashionable" and beautiful the visitors--and soon put a
stop to them. After 1914, except nurses and Q.M.A.A.C.s it was very rare
for a woman to enter British Army areas. Those few who did come had very
definite business and were expected to attend very strictly to that
business and then to move off.
There was a suspicion that some few, a very few, "workers" were in
France not so much for work as because they found it amusing. These got
no further than the Base ports as a rule, and were not officially
encouraged. The vast majority of the women workers in France were there
for patriotism's sake, attended strictly to their business, and had no
time (or inclination, presumably) for frivolity.
All this is very disappointing, I am aware. But it is true. The life we
lived at G.H.Q. was truly monastic. We never saw an English woman unless
she were a nurse or Q.M.A.A.C. or some other uniformed fellow-officer or
fellow-soldier.
[Illustration: THE PLACE GAMBETTA]
Nor was there any idle local feminine society to take the thoughts of
officers from the stern tasks of war. Montreuil was very, very prim and
dull even for a small French provincial town. There may still be some
people whose ideas of French social life are based on those quarters of
Paris whose theatres, books, newspapers, restaurants, manners are shaped
by the wishes (or fancied wishes) of the floating population of visitors
and of a small section of idle and worthless French. But I fancy that in
these days such people are few; and most people know that the average of
French life is not at all like Montmartre or the Latin Quarter, which
are less typical of France than, say, Piccadilly Circus is of England.
For thorough straight-laced respectability there is nothing to beat a
small French provincial town.
Montreuil was the most respectable place one could imagine before the
war. It sheltered a small colony of artists in the summer, attracted by
the wonderful panoramas from the ramparts; but they came to work, and
did not bring with them what is supposed to be the atmosphere of the
Latin Quarter. The local population was exceedingly decorous and rather
inclined to be clerical in sympathy, for Montreuil was a great centre
for schools.
During our occupation of the town as the home of G.H.Q. there might be
noted occasionally the arrival from Paris, or elsewhere, of some gay
young lady or couple of ladies who, having heard that the British Army
had its headquarters there, had decided, from motives of patriotism, of
_camaraderie_, or from less admirable motives, to come and enliven the
dullness of the place. Departure would follow with ungallant
promptitude. The same day, or the next, the lady would move away, with a
gendarme to see that she did not miss her train.
The monastic severity of life at G.H.Q. relaxed a little, I think, when
the immediate environs of Montreuil were passed. Then you had got out of
the area of First Echelon G.H.Q. and were in that of the Second Echelon,
which was largely made of subsidiary services not so directly concerned
with the administration of the fighting Army. Life was a little less
strenuous, and perhaps Aphrodite was not altogether neglected for Ares.
Here conditions reflected the average attitude of the British Army
administration in the matter of morals, which was practically that of
British civilian life, with somewhat more precaution and guardianship
but no grandmotherly supervision. The female personnel of the Army was
very carefully safeguarded. The male personnel, if it were absolutely
bent on it, could find opportunities for mischief in some of the Base
towns. G.H.Q. itself--partly perhaps because of the necessity of extreme
safeguards against espionage--was expected to lead a strictly single
life; to conform to the perfect standard that was supposed to rule in
the Provost Marshal's branch. That rigour, of course, was dictated not
by an exceptional prudery in the P.M. authorities but by military
convenience. Ordinarily, outside of G.H.Q. and the Provost Marshal's
branch, there was a margin allowed for human error.
Paris Plage, the jolly beach at the mouth of the Canche near Montreuil,
was for a long time "out-of-bounds" to all British troops. Paris Plage
had, in pre-war days, rather a "Montmartre" reputation in Paris. It was
the beach for the cheap tripper. It was the beach to which the
hardworking _bourgeois_ of the city who had to stick to his bureau
during the summer sent his wife, and came down to see her on Sundays. It
was also the beach for the Don Juan of modest means to visit with his
temporary Juanita. Not this Paris reputation reacting on the traditional
British hypocrisy caused the long-standing ban on Paris Plage, but
practical sanitary reasons. It had not then a good reputation from the
point of view of health. But as the size and the activities of G.H.Q.
increased and it was necessary to find places for new departments near
Montreuil, Paris Plage had to be utilised. After being subjected to a
drastic sanitary inquisition it was thrown open to the troops and became
the headquarters of several minor departments.
But of course the old gay life did not return. It was no longer a suburb
of Montmartre. Still it preserved a certain air of rakishness. Going
through there in a car one day with another staff officer we noticed a
little shop in the windows of which were displayed very coquettishly two
or three filmy articles of feminine _dessous_. A lightning glance
through the door showed that there was quite a bevy of fair shop
assistants--about three assistants to each item of merchandise. In the
window there was this simple device, in English:
CHEQUES CASHED.
We dared not investigate further. A G.H.Q. car is so clearly
recognisable as such that it could not stop outside, and the subterfuge
of drawing up at the Directorate of Inkstands and making a
reconnaissance on foot we felt to be _infra dig_. It was only possible
to pass the shop slowly on the return journey, and to look out for it
the next month when going that way again. It was still open, still bore
its artless device. It was a little bit of the old life of Paris Plage
that had escaped the shocks of war.
In very truth we were a dull lot from one point of view. Even the
conversation at meals was ordinarily wanting in that type of anecdote
which--as Walpole said when he was asked why it was rife at his table,
where sat the greatest men of Europe, who should have had something
better to talk about--is popular "because every man understands it."
Perhaps the propriety of our conversation was partly due to the fact
that there was nearly always a padre within earshot. Perhaps I may dare
the explanation of the general absence of "sex interest" in our lives,
that here were gathered together a band of men with very exacting and
very important work to do, and that they simply had not time nor
inclination to bother about what is usually an amusement of idle lives.
CHAPTER V.
THE MUNITIONS OF THE WAR.
The Shell shortage--When relief came--The dramatic Tanks--Bombs--Some
ammunition figures--The ingenious inventor.
As soon as any subject is involved in political discussion the facts
about it are apt to be distorted in the interests of some particular
view. The "Shell shortage" in the early stages of the war has become in
a sense a political issue; and that I do not intend to discuss. But some
facts about munitions supply must be given--for that was the very pivot
of the war--irrespective of what political case they help or harm.
The British Force at the outset of the war suffered from a shell and gun
shortage as compared with its enemy, because it had been trained and
equipped for a different type of warfare from that which actually came.
It had very little high explosive shell, and what it had was rarely
"high explosive" in the real sense of the term. The patient search for a
foolproof fuse had been so successful that our H.E. shell was
comparatively inoffensive when it reached the enemy's lines. It
spluttered off rather than shattered off. All this was put right in
time. But the difficulties which the Munitions Supply Department had to
face at the outset were enormous. There were, considered in the lights
of the needs of this war, practically no shells, no guns, and no
machinery for making them. Essential material was lacking in many cases,
and the only source of quick supply was Germany, which alone in the
world had organised for war.
But all difficulties were overcome. How great the growth some
comparative figures will show. The production of high explosive in 1914
was almost negligible. The year's supply would not keep the guns of 1918
going for a day. In 1915 we began to produce high explosive on a large
scale, and in amounts which made the 1914 output seem contemptible, but
still in quite inadequate quantities. In 1916 we had increased the 1915
amount sevenfold. In 1917 we had increased that 1916 amount fourfold.
From March, 1915, to March, 1917, the increase was twenty-eight fold. Of
machine-guns we made samples in 1914 and we began to manufacture
quantities in 1915. In 1917 we made twenty times as many as in 1915. Of
aeroplanes the figures mounted in steep flights. In 1916 we seemed to be
producing vastly. In 1917 the rate of production for the first six
months had increased fourfold as compared with the previous year, and
another great acceleration was in progress.
In the end we were enormously superior to any other Army in the field in
the matter of munitions. To the very day of the Armistice improvements
in the quality and rate of productions were still going on in
preparation for the Spring, 1919, campaign, which it was anticipated
would end the war. The German threw up the sponge before then. If he had
waited he would have been literally blown out of his trenches and his
chief cities.
In one sense, of course, we never had enough, but if I were asked to
name a date on which a serious shortage of munitions ceased I should say
September 19th, 1915, on the eve of the battle of Loos. On that date, a
year after Trench War began, word was passed around to the batteries of
the British line in a phrase copied from the provision shops of London:
"Ammunition is cheap to-day." Every gun-pit stocked up with shell. The
gates of the dumps were opened and shell fairly poured out. Battery
Commanders, who knew the days when one shell per gun per day was the
limit allowed, saw with joy thousands of shells, and, as they began
eagerly to fire them off, thousands more coming.
On the 23rd of September a regular bombardment of the whole German line
facing the British line began. The artillery was undertaking the
preliminary work of wire-cutting and parapet pounding. The 18-pounders
with shrapnel, the howitzers with high explosive, started at dawn, and
all through the day systematically smashed away at the German's
defences. That went on for two more days. The fourth day we intensified
our shell-fire. Along many sections of the Front the German wire was
down, and the parapet of the German trench breached. The enemy increased
his artillery fire, too, attacking our trenches and searching for our
observing stations and batteries, but on the whole getting the worst of
the artillery duel. On the morning of the 25th the final artillery duel
began. It was the greatest artillery bombardment in history up to that
date, though afterwards so eclipsed by the records of the Somme, the
Ancre and of Messines as to be remembered as a mere splutter. But at the
time it was vastly impressive.
The morning was dull but the flashes of guns were so continuous as to
give a light which was almost unbroken. It flickered, but it never
failed. The earth itself quivered and shook with the repeated shocks of
the guns. The air became a tattered hunted thing, torn wisps of it blown
hither and thither by the constant explosions.
The Battle of Loos did not give us the break-through we expected, but,
in so far as my observation is worth anything, the reason was not lack
of munitions. Loos showed that the task was a more complicated one than
merely smashing down the front line of enemy trenches. "Trench War" was
resumed, whilst the British Army prepared for the next phase opening in
July, 1916, with the first Battle of the Somme. By then munitions supply
had grown gigantically and in the mechanics of war we were far ahead of
the Germans. This was not only in artillery but in infantry equipment
and in our unique weapon the "Tank," which was the mechanical
contrivance having the most decisive results on the issue of the war.
These appeared in September, 1916, two years after "Trench War" had
begun, and were ultimately destined to make that sort of war impossible,
a task which the German poison gas had failed to accomplish.
As a race we are never consciously dramatic, or I would have imagined on
that September 1916 morning that the arrival of the Tanks on the Somme
front had been carefully timed and stage-managed. The morning was dull
and misty. Over the seared and terrible land little wisps of fog rose
and fell. All likeness to our gentle mother earth had been battered out
of the fields, which were rubbish-heaps of churned-up débris of bodies,
dust, weapons--hideously pock-marked by the eruption of the shells.
Where had been villages were dirtier patches of desolation. Where had
been woods, groups of splintered stumps. It was an abomination of
desolation, like as when the earth was first formed out of the void. In
the midst of this desolation out of the mist came, crawling uncouthly,
the Tanks, like prehistoric saurians.
The German forces were obviously frightened by the Tanks, which climbed
over their trenches, and impervious to rifle bullets, smashed up
machine-gun emplacements and redoubts. But that Tank of 1916 was nothing
like the perfected machine of 1918. Its rear steering wheel was a
weak-spot liable to be shot away. Its pace was too slow for it to keep
up with charging infantry. No real tactics had been evolved for its use.
But, such as it was, that Tank at first brought alarm to more than the
enemy. In going to and from the battle front it "got the wind up" many a
British dug-out. Here is an artillery officer's yarn of the first "Tank
night":
"Our 'Mess' was a roofed-over shell-hole a mile or so in front of
Martinpuich. The roof would keep out shrapnel bits but was no use
against a direct hit from a shell. I was Orderly Dog for the night and
it was my business to take action, when, outside, a strange spluttering,
growling, scratching, spitting sound broke into the steady barking of
the guns. It was like a thousand cats, a hundred dogs, and a sea-sick
elephant or two scrambling and squabbling together in a dust-hole. I
went to investigate. A Tank wandering home was within ten yards of our
Mess, heading straight for it. With all the _insouciance_ I could
command at such a crisis I begged the Tank to stop; urged that our roof
was designed to keep out splinters only and was neither shell-proof nor
Tank-proof; pointed out that if it persisted in its course seven
artillery officers, some of whom had wives and children, and all of whom
had mothers, would be pulped. Then I became calmer and told the Tank
that there was some wine in the Mess and even some whisky and soda, if
the Tank would now stop and have a drink. Fortunately a Tank is a slow
mover and my cooler arguments had effect by the time it had got within
five yards of our roof-tree. Then it backed water and we were safe. The
Tank is a noble animal, but it adds a little to the anxieties of life
underground."
[Illustration: THE FOSSE]
"The Tank" was the great mechanical find of the war, and it was an
all-British find. High authority had many fine name-proposals for the
useful monsters, but Tommy took the matter into his own hands and coined
the word "Tank," and "Tank" it remained. Those who are interested in
matters of language may note that the French do not use the word "Tank"
but describe a "Tank" as a _char d'assaut_, which is accurate, but has a
weak look. It is an illustration of their jealous and admirable care
of their language. They will not allow foreign words to intrude if that
can be avoided. We, on the other hand, are quite careless about our
language. The orders of our Army in France were bespattered with French
words and phrases for which there were quite good English equivalents.
(_Gare régulatrice_ for "distributing station" is one of the many scores
of cases in point.) It is a pity that we are so careless in regard to
our mother tongue. I made an effort once to persuade G.H.Q. that British
Army orders and instructions should be put out in English without any
foreign admixture, but met with little sympathy. The intrusion of French
words was not so bad, but German words had an almost equal degree of
hospitality.
* * * * *
But to return to our munitions. The hand bomb was a weapon which by 1914
we had allowed to fall out of use. The British Grenadiers no longer
threw grenades. But Trench War brought back the bomb as a weapon, and
our bomb was soon better than the German bomb. At the first Somme battle
(1916) we showed a definite superiority in bomb supply and bomb use.
This development was altogether in our favour. The bomb--beastly weapon
as it is, and beastly as are the wounds it inflicts--lends its favour to
the quicker brain, the prompter courage, the keener leadership. The
football field and the cricket green both give a good foundation for the
murderous art of bombing. As soon as we had the bombs our bombing
superiority grew with every day.
An instance to illustrate bombing: For the taking of the village of
Contalmaison (1916) a preliminary task was the capture of Horse Shoe
trench. The attack on this was prospering when it was held up at a
critical point by the unmasking of a German machine gun on our right
flank. To the fire of this gun we were fully exposed, and its effect was
murderous. A young cricketer rose to the occasion. Single-handed he
rushed the gun with a bag of bombs, got to his distance and destroyed it
with a couple of "hot returns from the outfield."
In using ammunition the B.E.F. put up some startling records. On August
8th, 1918, when our big final thrust began there were used 15,598 tons
in a single day. On September 29th, 1918, there were used 23,706 tons.
Here are some other big figures:
Date. Battle. Amount.
1/7/16 Somme 12,776 tons
9/4/17 Vimy 24,706 "
3/6/17 Arras 17,162 "
7/6/17 Messines 20,638 "
31/7/17 Ypres 22,193 "
20/9/17} Polygon Wood 42,156 "
21/9/17}
In the depôts in France we kept a reserve of 258,000 tons of ammunition,
and the issues in a normal month ran to about that figure though it
varied a good deal month by month. Thus the average expenditure during
the last months of 1918 was: May, 5,478 tons daily; June, 4,748 tons
daily; July, 5,683 tons daily; August, 9,046 tons daily; September,
8,576 tons daily; October, 4,748 tons daily; November, 3,158 tons daily.
On November 11th, the last day of the war, we used 233 tons of
ammunition.
Different varieties of ammunition had widely different rates of use. The
gigantic 15-inch howitzer on some days did not fire a single round. It
was a "big day" when it fired fifty rounds. It was just as well that it
was not a gun which indulged in thousands of rounds, for a ten-ton
broad-gauge railway truck would only take twelve rounds for it. The
18-pounder field guns would shoot 100,000 rounds on a normal day, and on
a heavy day would use 200,000 rounds. The cost of ammunition was, in a
time of heavy fighting, up to £3,000,000 _per day_.
A heavy item in munitions was for defence against poison gas and for our
own poison gas service. We entered with extreme reluctance into the
ghastly business, but once we started we soon made the German sorry that
he had brought that element into the war. Our gases were more potent and
more plentiful than his. For lack of material he could not give his men
perfect gas protectors, while to our men we could and did.
The last loathsome trick of the enemy in this direction was the
introduction of mustard gas, a powerful corrosive which was discharged
from shells. The use of mustard gas by the enemy raised a number of
problems for Supplies as apart from the Medical Staffs. The disinfection
with chloride of lime of ground contaminated with the gas, a prompt
change of clothing and bath treatment for men affected, proved
efficacious in dealing with mustard gas. There was, too, safety in
protective overalls of oilskin. Mustard gas affected the Veterinary
Service heavily, there being many casualties to horses and mules through
passing over ground infected with the gas.
* * * * *
The inventive spirit was naturally strong in the Army, and some of the
most useful of the new ideas in the way of munitions or equipment came
from men in the Field. These ideas were tested in the Army workshops,
and occasionally there was a certain amount of waste owing to the same
idea, or nearly the same idea, being experimented with simultaneously in
more than one Army. So an Army Order from Home recalled the King's
Regulation that War Office approval must be obtained before experimental
work was done in regard to any invention. But this, it was urged from
G.H.Q., would act prejudicially to the interests of the Force in France,
since many very useful inventions regarding stores and material had come
from officers and men of the Force and it was not in the best interests
of the public to put any obstacles in the way of future inventions. This
was recognised, and a subsequent Army Order gave authority to the
Commander-in-Chief of any Expeditionary Force to authorise trials of
inventions; but precautions were taken in regard to duplication and
overlapping.
There were not in the Field so many foolish inventors as at Home. No
such merry idea came to G.H.Q. as that anti-submarine device with which
the Admiralty was plagued--a liquid air shell which on being exploded
anywhere in the vicinity of a submarine formed an extensive iceberg
(through the lowering of the surrounding temperature by a release of the
liquid air from pressure). On this iceberg the submarine would be
brought to the surface. The next step would be easy: open with an oyster
knife, sprinkle with pepper and salt and a dash of lemon juice, and
serve.
The B.E.F. had never anything quite so naive as that. Its limit was the
inventor who claimed to be able to project an X-ray from an electric
battery so that it would kill anything within 1,000 yards. This
invention would have been a great war-stopper. It would have been only
necessary to set up a sufficient number of the projectors along our
Front, switch on the current and march on to Berlin. It was offered at a
time when inventions were rather the fashion, and it needed courage to
scoff at even the most curious notion. So it actually got to the stage
of a trial with a High Authority present. The inventor set up his
projector; an animal was let loose within its deadly range and, surely
enough, dropped dead. Unfortunately for the inventor a medical scoffer
subjected the animal to a _post mortem_ examination and found that it
had evidently resolved on suicide, for it had taken a large dose of
strychnine. This discouraged further trials of the X-ray device.
The inventor with a "wireless" device for exploding enemy magazines also
cropped up. You projected a wireless ray and it blew up a dump. This
invention could be very convincingly demonstrated within your own lines.
All that was necessary was to provide in the dump a certain amount of
loose explosive, a fulminate, and a receiver tuned to receive your
wireless message. We were not on sufficiently good terms with the
Germans to persuade them to arrange their ammunition depôts in this way
for our convenience.
There was a close _liaison_ kept up between the B.E.F. and the Ministry
of Munitions. When Mr. Winston Churchill was Minister of Munitions he
was over in France so frequently that a small château was kept up for
him at G.H.Q. He was wont to come into the Officers' Club for his meals.
There was always an air about him that he would have liked to be in the
jack-boots of his famous ancestor and give the world a spectacle of
another Marlborough winning victories in Flanders.
CHAPTER VI.
THE MEDICAL SERVICES.
The magic-workers of the war--Fighting the Germans--Concerning the
Victorian primness of conversation and the present popularity of "v.d."
as a theme for small talk--The Army and "v.d."--The etiquette of
hospitals and the ways of matrons--The war against Trench Feet--Mustard
gas in 1918.
Probably more than half the men at G.H.Q. had been "crocked" at one time
or another during the campaign, from wounds or one of those fevers of
the battlefield born of mud and filth and fatigue. Some came to work on
the Staff whilst still under medical treatment, and there was a local
hospital at Montreuil which was a boon to those out-patients needing
massage for their scars or quinine for their fevers.
Apart from the doctors of this hospital only the very big men of the
medical services appeared ever at G.H.Q. It was a pleasure not easily
won to persuade them to talk over their work. But when they did talk,
what wonders they had to tell of!
[Illustration: A BY-WAY]
Socrates in prison, when the fetters were taken off his legs, as he
rubbed them to make the blood run freely again, speculated on how
pleasure always followed pain, so that the two seemed to be linked
together by some unbreakable bond. One would like to hear Socrates
to-day, as his limb, injured in Flanders, was rubbed back to usefulness,
talking to his masseur on the good that will follow the evil of the
Great War as surely as if the two had been linked together and one was
the consequence of the other. Matter for a fine homily there from the
stubborn old hero with the divinely clear mind!
Those optimists who thought that a new heaven and a new earth would come
at the end of the war, and that even all politicians would become
sincere, alert, and vigorous in the public service, were perhaps not
reasonable and may be disappointed in some measure; but no one can
observe closely the phenomena of the war without being sure that from
its sacrifices and lessons much good will come. The dreadful fire that
had to be kindled to burn out the cancer of Germanism burned out evil
too in the nations that were the instruments of vengeance. Peoples who
went into war iron will come out steel ultimately; for the war, as well
as being preservative, will prove regenerative.
There is no better proof of this than in the tale of our campaigns
against the germs, those pitiless enemies who are always attacking
human content and happiness. It was a wonderful part of the war, that
defensive and offensive against Disease, with its trench systems which
hold up foes whom we cannot destroy with our present weapons; its
Intelligence Department, spying with a thousand microscopes into the
designs and dispositions of the enemy; its clever diplomatic service,
always raising up allies in our blood against germ invasion; its long
illustrious roll of heroes who have given up life or health to hold
positions against odds or to go out on forlorn hopes.
In this the benefits springing out from the Great War show splendid and
palpable. In the process of beating the Germans we made such great
advances in the war against the germs that we greet peace as a
definitely healthier people, organised to save, in a generation or two,
for service in this world, more than the total of all those who went to
a Higher Service from the fields of France and Belgium.
Because the war has given a sounder national discipline, because it has
cleared so many obstacles from the path of medical organisation, the
world's death-rate, according to sound calculations, will in future
years show a substantial decrease. The toll taken by the Germans will be
more than made up by the lives saved from the germs. The British
Medical Service, following in the path of the victorious British Army,
and wielding an authority that it never knew before, carried on a war
against disease in Europe, Asia, and Africa that is now saving thousands
of lives, and will save millions in the ultimate result. Enteric,
cholera, dysentery, scurvy, small-pox, beri-beri, malaria, phthisis were
fought successfully. Even that national British disease, rheumatism, was
pushed back from some of its trenches and compelled to surrender not a
few of its ridges.
Fascinating as a fairy tale, absorbing as a good detective story,
stimulating as the records of a stubborn battle, will be the record of
British medical work in the Great War when it comes to be written. It
will not be a story merely of drains and drugs and dressings, but also
of kindly amulets and beneficent golden fishes; of wicked germs who
chalk their throats to deceive with soft talk little red corpuscles; of
fairy princes who destroy wicked enchantments with spells from tiny
glass tubes. Those attentive gentlemen experimenting with neck ribbons
smeared with potent charms have not come to their second childhood; they
are on the track of the perfect cimicifuge which will keep lice off the
body and, keeping off lice, will reduce the range of typhus and other
diseases. A great tank of little live fish sent out to a malaria Front
does not mean that we are relapsing into the old Chinese school of
medicine (which prescribed a live mouse to be swallowed whole as a
remedy for one complaint), but that these little fish love to eat the
eggs of the anopheles mosquito, which spreads malaria. It lays its eggs
in ponds; the fish eat the eggs; the eggs don't hatch; the mosquitoes
don't come; and there is less malaria.
If your mind is more attracted by detective stories than by fairy tales,
turn to a bacteriological laboratory and watch the tracking down of the
Hidden Hand that is responsible for odious diseases; for example, that
one known popularly as spotted fever, a very deadly disease of
over-crowding. A cunning criminal is the spotted fever germ, and he has
not yet been quite fully identified and convicted. A victim of spotted
fever has in his throat and spinal fluid the causative germ; but this
germ hides behind a smoke cloud of other germs and must be placed quite
definitely before it can be destroyed. It was found that it is a germ
shaped like a double bean, that it is to be distinguished from other
germs of the same shape by the fact that its hide is impervious to a
certain stain which those other germs will absorb. It was further found
that this spotted fever germ would not increase and multiply at a warmth
of 23 degrees C., whilst otherwise similar germs would. There certain
knowledge stopped for a time. Other double-bean, non-staining,
non-growing at 23 degrees C. germs existed, among whom the real criminal
lived and hid. Finally, four bad brother germs were found and are now
being dealt with, and the disease is no longer a serious menace.
The divine purpose for good that runs stubbornly through life and has
made it impossible for the murderous German plans to thrive in spite of
all our neglects and stupidities, crops up insistently in the story of
the British medical campaign in this war. Thus, chlorine gas came into
the field first as the poison gas of the Germans; it remained in the
field on the British side chiefly as a means for purifying water.
* * * * *
One interesting result of the war which we noticed at G.H.Q. was the
abandonment of the Early Victorian primness in conversation in England.
Soldiers going home on leave noticed it from 1916 onwards; and on the
balance of the evidence I do not think they were at all responsible for
it. They would go away from Boulogne, after an extra careful bath and
the putting on of a clean tunic, with a steady resolution to put away
from their thoughts and their tongues all the coarseness of the camp;
and find themselves at their first dinner party in England tackled by
some young lady in her teens on the subject of lice; or by some matron
not yet in the thirties on the subject of venereal disease at the Front.
They would come back often with a distinct feeling of shame-shock, to
welcome the comparative reticence of Mess conversation.
It was my duty once to see the representative of an organisation that
wished to have lectures delivered to all the soldiers on the subject of
"v.d." To my surprise the representative proved to be a lady--and a
young and attractive lady at that. She plunged into her subject without
the least trace of embarrassment. She wanted lectures, with pictures, in
every recreation hut of the B.E.F., France, and was firm to brush away
the objection that "the men might not like it," and scornful of the
reservation that if the lectures were permitted they were not to be
"parade lectures," _i.e._, the men were not to be compelled to attend.
Finally, discovering that though the lady wanted "pictures" she had not
the pictures but expected the Army to supply them, I took refuge in a
subterfuge. "Very sorry, very sorry indeed, but there is no Vote out of
which we can get the pictures."
But the lady was insistent. She knew that there were cinematographs
provided for the soldiers.
"Oh, but that is not my department. That is Amusements."
"Very well," she said firmly. "I'll see Amusements."
And she went away to convince some other Staff Officer that universal
lectures on v.d., with pictures, would be an appreciated Amusement.
I do not know where the idea sprang from that v.d. was very common in
the Army. So far as my observation went, and from what inquiries I made
of medical officers, the opposite was the case. Among the officers with
whom I came into touch during the campaign--many hundreds in the
aggregate--I only heard of one case. Among the men of my battery before
I was on the Staff I never heard of one case during 18 months of
regimental life.
The Army's standard of health in this respect was better than that of
the average of the civilian population. There were some tragic
outbreaks--one in Cairo, another (of much less seriousness) with Amiens
as its focus--but on an average the record was good.
British ideas did not favour the degrees of regulation and interference
in this matter that other countries tolerate. But the soldier had some
safeguards which the civilian had not. For instance it was the duty of
the Assistant Provost Marshal of a Division, whenever a man reported
sick from v.d., to go to the hospital, interview the patient and try to
find out the _fons et origo_. If his mission were successful the person
responsible was promptly expelled from the Army area.
One of the Dominion Corps adopted the method of advising prophylactic
precautions (and supplying the means of prophylaxis). The British Army
on a whole did not follow that course, though in the later stages of the
campaign the means of prophylaxis were available if applied for.
But enough on that point. It was the surgical rather than the medical
side of the R.A.M.C. that interested G.H.Q. So many had "taken a knock"
and put in a spell at a hospital. Opinion was practically unanimous that
"Hospital" was a place of real human sympathy as well as devoted skill,
and that "sister" was the best pattern of womankind.
It is etiquette in the Army to call her always "Sister," though
technically "sister" is an intermediate grade between "nurse" and
"matron." Matron is a great dignitary. She has, in the language of the
Bar, "taken silk," and when her silk gown rustles into the room it is
etiquette for officers to stand up, provided they have legs and strength
to stand up. Otherwise you "come to attention" by smiling as well as you
can; a respectful, cheerful, but not an hilarious or free-and-easy
smile. It should convey the message that you are having the time of your
life in the best possible of hospitals under the best possible of
matrons. The Sister whose patient you are will be very much hurt if you
do not smile properly at Matron. "Sister" is of many different grades of
skill, but of an almost unvarying grade of devotion, the highest.
A "strafer," in hospital language, is a Sister who by ten years or so of
hard anxious work and self-denial has reached to the height of an office
boy's wage and a professional skill which saves lives daily and cuts
weeks off one's stay in hospital. You are always glad when she has gone
away from your wound, but at the back of your gladness is the knowledge
that you want her for next dressing. A good "strafer" goes over a wound
with the enthusiasm of a thrush with a large family going over a lawn
for worms. She examines, searches, squeezes, probes, looking out for
shed pieces of bone, for "proud flesh," for odd corners where
inflammatory matter might lurk. She is looking for mischief, and any
mischief found is promptly "strafed." If it is bad she calls in the
doctor; if it is minor she has her own little armoury of
mischief-breakers, scissors, pincers, nitrate of silver, and the like.
Matrons are easily offended. At a certain hospital in France the King
was half expected as a visitor. The Matron at once had a bad attack of
decoration fever. As I was a lightly-wounded that time I assisted her
policy of deceiving his Majesty into thinking that the hospital was
always a fairy bower by going out and "finding" some flowers. Then
Matron had clean quilts on all the beds, and the order went forth that
these were to be kept creaseless and smooth. But one patient would
persist in crooking up his knees. Matron argued with him. He disloyally
pleaded that he was much more comfortable that way. Now, having got the
flowers for the ward, I thought I had the right to give advice as a sort
of accomplice, and I suggested mildly: "Better break his knees, Matron."
She was offended. Then the King did not come after all; and I think she
was inclined to blame me for that.
But matrons are not altogether an evil; like the Staff and adjutants and
brigade majors, they are at the worst necessary evils, at the best quite
good sorts. But there is one matron-habit that should be dealt with
sternly by regulation. If a very pretty nurse were posted to a hospital,
Matron generally tried to assign her to the sick sisters' ward.
Obviously that was bad strategy. The prettiness of their nurse would
have no cheering effect on sick sisters, but to sick officers a pretty
sister irresistibly suggests the wisdom of getting well quickly.
Fortunately the supply of pretty sisters is too great to allow of their
all being absorbed in wards for sick sisters.
[Illustration: A ROYAL VISIT, DECEMBER 1918]
What reconciles one to Matron is the discovery sooner or later that,
despite silk gown and awe-inspiring manner, she is at heart still
"Sister," ready with skilful aid and encouraging sympathy in case of
need. It is a nice etiquette that makes the title "Sister" general, for
it is just sisterly affection which makes the atmosphere of a military
hospital so cheering and recreating.
Distinctions of rank are abrogated in a military hospital to a large
extent. The officer of general rank has a special quarter where he meets
only other highnesses; but, for the rest, colonel and "pip-squeak" (the
odious term which is vainly designed to lessen the self-importance of
the second lieutenant) usually fraternise in a common cheerfulness.
There are no rank badges on pyjamas. But one distinction has
intruded--that between surgical cases and medical cases. The medical
case must bear himself very humbly if he gets into a ward where there
are surgical cases. Even that kindly authority "Sister" will in some
unguarded moment, unless she is very, very careful, refer to him as
"_only_ a medical case."
One medical case, taught cunning by circumstances, discovered when he
was being moved from one hospital to another that a special sort of
headache he suffered from could be relieved by a large, impressive
bandage. With this head adornment he successfully deceived us at ----
Hospital. A rumour went around that he was a trepanned case, and as
Rumour stalked from bed to bed the size of the silver plate in his skull
grew and grew until it was almost the size of a dinner plate. His
shameful secret was at length discovered; he was only a fever or a heart
or something, and, whilst we were all sorry for him, he no longer
disputed favour with our ward pet--a delightfully cheerful pip-squeak
whose body was so be-stitched that we felt sure they had a sewing
machine in the operating room for him.
It is etiquette in a military hospital to be very much interested in
one's neighbour's wounds and to affect to hold lightly one's own. It is
very bad form to hint that your lot is more severe than his lot.
"Oh, I am all right, thanks," (you say in answer to his first advances);
"except for a bit of my liver and a few yards of lung blown away, I'm as
fit as can be. But that looks an awful leg of yours."
"Not at all, not at all. It is almost certain now to stay on. But it
must be horribly interesting to have a body wound."
And so the ghoulish chat goes on.
Quite half of G.H.Q. had hospital reminiscences to exchange; indeed a
spell in hospital with a bad wound was often the clinching argument
leading to "red tabs" if an officer were qualified for the distinction;
and Medical Boards in England were quite willing to certify a man as
fit for France if he was marked for a Staff Appointment even though his
category was "light duty."
* * * * *
"Trench Feet" gave the Medical Services more trouble than any other
single disease, and almost as much trouble as the shells of the enemy.
In the winter of 1915 a pilgrim to Flanders (supposing him to have a
military permit) might have observed in the rest camps behind the
British lines companies of men with bare feet, and officers bending down
anointing them. And he might have perhaps concluded that this was some
religious ritual of humiliation, such as the theatrical washing of
beggars' feet by the late Austrian Emperor once a year. But such a
conclusion would have been wrong. The proceeding was religious
certainly, in the highest sense, but in no way theatrical. It was
"Trench Feet" treatment.
The disease known as "Trench Feet" was one of the most serious
developments which the Army on the Western Front had to face when the
Germans, beaten in the field, "dug in," and Trench War began. The
struggle with the disease was a long and strenuous one, taxing to the
utmost the resources of the British Army Medical Service.
The causes of the disease were not plain at the outset, and inquiry
proved them to be various. Everybody knows that it is uncomfortable
and, to a certain extent, unhealthy to stand for too long at a time.
(The social legislation that shop employees must be allowed seats is an
indication of this). The soldier in the trenches must often stand for
long periods. That makes him to some extent liable to foot trouble.
Again, tight boots and tight bandages round the legs are bad for the
blood circulation, and can make foot trouble without any other cause.
The soldier used to be rather careless as to whether his boots were of a
proper fit, and he was apt to bind his puttees too tightly.
Here were the beginnings of "Trench Feet." To have the feet wet, to have
the feet cold for long spells, will cause chilblains, _i.e._, local
inflammations showing first as red itching lumps, afterwards if
neglected, developing into open sores. Long periods of standing, and any
constriction of the circulation from tight boots or tight puttees, help
cold and damp to cause chilblains; and chilblains used to be almost
invariably neglected by the soldier. Then came the final aggravating
cause--the filth of the Flanders mud getting into the sores of the
broken chilblains, and, behold, a typical case of Trench Feet.
In the early days cases were often of dreadful severity, sometimes
leading to amputation. In one of my billets at Montreuil was a French
soldier who had lost both his feet from this cause. Later, both
treatment of the disease and, more important, the prevention of it,
were so perfected that really bad cases were rare.
The story of the fight against "Trench Feet" is one of the many fine
stories of the war. In the main it was, of course, a story of medical
skill and devotion, but also it was a story of unstinted generosity on
the part of the War Office, and of admirable and intelligent service on
the part of regimental officers. The medical staff told me that it would
have been impossible to carry on to success the campaign against "Trench
Feet" if they had not been intelligently and perseveringly backed up by
regimental officers, and if the War Office had not poured out very many
thousands of pounds sterling for the furtherance of every approved
preventive measure.
Preventive measures covered a wide field; precautions against tight
boots and tight puttees; increased provisions of socks; increased
bathing facilities; provision of waterproof rubber boots for men while
in the trenches (these boots were of the high wader type); paving of the
trenches with "duck-boards" which gave a dry standing; more frequent
reliefs in wet trenches. These were material provisions. To second them
there was an active propaganda in personal hygiene, and here the
regimental officer and non-commissioned officer were enlisted to help
the medical staff to make the men understand that the smallest sign of a
chilblain was to be met with prompt treatment. A whale oil ointment was
provided both as a prophylactic and as a curative for mild chilblains.
When necessary this was reinforced by spirituous lotions. On officers
was put the responsibility of seeing that their men's feet were kept
clean and well anointed with oil, and that any breach of the skin tissue
was promptly treated. So officers became chiropodists, and you might see
enthusiastic company commanders assisting their men to wash and anoint
their feet, to show them how it should be done.
The winter of 1917-1918 put to a severe test the precautions against
"Trench Feet," for in almost every part of the Western Front the British
had pushed the Germans back, and there was no longer the old organised
trench system. Nevertheless the British hospital records show that the
disease was held. It was still a trouble; but, thanks to the plentiful
supply of comforts and preventatives, and to the scrupulous care
demanded by regimental and medical officers, it was no longer a grave
menace.
* * * * *
The fight against mustard gas in 1918 was another fine achievement of
the Medical Services. But this subject of the medicine of the war calls
for a volume to itself. Let me only add here that the successful medical
results won in this war were largely due to the fact that--contrary to
the system of other wars--the doctor had a real influence and power at
G.H.Q. In his own department he was supreme. So were solved successfully
the vast medical problems which the Great War presented. The greatest
armies known to history grappled in a continuous and furious struggle,
not for a day or a night or a week, but for months. The wounds caused by
hand grenades and high explosive shells were often of terrible extent.
The battlefield to a depth of five miles was under constant shell fire,
and transport of the wounded for that distance was therefore always
under fire, and roads were torn up almost as soon as made. Conditions of
infection were extraordinarily favourable. Traffic regulation had to
overcome the most serious obstacles, since railways, roads and tracks
had to provide for the constant reinforcements, for the frequent passage
to and fro of relieving Divisions, for food and water for men and
horses, and also for ammunition unprecedented in quantity.
CHAPTER VII.
THE ANIMALS OF THE FORCE.
A happy lot--The mud season in Flanders--The effects of mustard gas--The
character of the mule--Forage difficulties--The French object to our
horse ration--The Americans side with us--The animal record in 1918.
No two officials at G.H.Q. had a better right to be proud of their
departments than the Director of Veterinary Services (Major-General
Moore) and the Director of Remounts (Brigadier-General Sir F. S.
Garratt). These two were responsible for the welfare of the half million
animals of the B.E.F., and there was never a collection of war animals
that had a better time.
It was a commonplace of German criticism of Great Britain's military
position before 1914 that the possibilities of a big quickly-trained
British Army were negligible, because, whilst rank and file might be
raised quickly enough, three things could not be improvised in a hurry:
knowledge of staff work, of gunnery, and of horse-mastery. The German
now knows that he was wrong, and in no particular was he more wrong
than in regard to horse-mastery. It is admitted over all the Continent
of Europe that horse-mastery in the "improvised" British Army reached
the highest standard of the campaign.
In this matter the horse markets of Europe spoke after the Armistice
with no uncertain voice. When the British Army was disposing of its
superfluous horses, everybody rushed to buy them. Prices touched a truly
extraordinary level. The unhappy taxpayer amid all his burdens saw a
golden stream flowing into the Treasury, because his Army was a humane,
conscientious, and skilful horsemaster. The military advantage to
transport through keeping the Army's animals fit and well is so obvious
that it need not be dwelt upon. The advantage to the _morale_ of the men
is not so generally appreciated, but was none the less real. It helped
to keep our men in good heart that the animals who worked with them, and
for them, were in good heart and condition. To British men with their
fine tradition of humanity to animals it would have been demoralising to
have seen their brutes hungry and suffering. Finally, the world markets
came forward with their evidence that the British Army policy of
kindness to its animals was not only good for transport and good for
_morale_ but also good for business.
By the Spring of 1919 we had sold out of the Army 252,676 animals
(horses and mules), of which 235,715 were sold for work and 16,961 for
meat. The total realised was £8,493,920, of which £8,081,607 was
realised from the working animals and £412,313 for those animals which,
because of old age or disablement, it was more merciful to send to the
slaughter-house. In addition a small item of £18,696 had been realised
from by-products, for our Army administrators, whatever might be thought
to the contrary, did study economy, and the animal which fell by the
wayside was usually put to some use. At least its hide was saved, and,
if transport were available, its fat and bones also figured in a
"salvage" return.
This money was mostly foreign money, too. It was the policy of the Army
not to "profiteer" in the United Kingdom. Indeed, within our home
borders it was rather to help the small farmer with cheap animals than
to seek to get the best out of the market.
* * * * *
The mobilisation of the horse strength of Great Britain in 1914 was
wonderfully assisted by the willing and instructed patriotism of
farmers, landowners, and hunting men. It yielded far better results than
were anticipated. One calculation makes it that 17 per cent. of the
total civilian horse strength of the country was mobilised.
But, of course, there was a tremendous gap between this result and the
needs of the New Armies. A wise prescience at the very outset decided to
reinforce horse strength with mule strength. Before the end of 1914
mules imported from abroad were being tried as substitutes for horses in
the Army. Some of the experiments did not give promising results. The
mule, for example, did not prove possible in gun teams. But it
established itself in a very wide range of general utility and
materially helped to win the war.
The improvisation of remount depôts and of training centres for horses
and for men who for the first time had to handle horses was the first
big problem. The winter of 1914-15 was a hard time. But extraordinary
results were won by the cordial co-operation of the "horsey" men of the
country. The hunting, coaching, and racing stables were great pillars of
strength. By the spring of 1915 the position in the United Kingdom was
good.
In the winter of 1915-16 most of the difficulty had to be faced by the
B.E.F., France. We had a great concentration of troops in Flanders. The
mounted units were made up in the main of men new to horse-management.
The animals had to be nursed through a winter in what was the wickedest
country conceivable for horses. Stable accommodation was, of course,
absent. Not 1 per cent. could be housed in existing stables. Labour and
material were lacking for the building of new stables. Most of the
animals spent the winter in the open. The mud was a cruel enemy. In that
highly manured country a horse standing out in the mud had its hoofs
attacked at once. A "greasy heel" soon became a purulent sore.
The "Mud Season" opens in Flanders in October and lasts until June; and
Flanders mud has a body and aroma all its own. A great French Marshal of
a by-gone age committed himself without reserve to the opinion that
"Flanders was no place to fight in." Thomas Atkins, as he pushed
obstinately and irresistibly through the mud towards some pill-box
objective, has endorsed that high strategical judgment. Perhaps in a
future war, if there is going to be a future war, Flanders will be a
closed area and no Army will be allowed to go there to fight under
penalty of a _procès-verbal_. That should be done if only for the sake
of the horses.
[Illustration: THE EAST RAMPARTS]
As every civilian stay-at-home knows, the Army is an entirely foolish
organisation with no knowledge of practical affairs. But I doubt whether
any civil organisation would have carried the same number of horses
through the same conditions with the same small percentage of losses.
The Army did not tackle the problem in any hide-bound way. A good deal
was left to the initiative and enthusiasm of individual officers.
Some general principles were set down. Within the boundaries of those
principles there was wide scope for personal ingenuity, and as the good
thing that one officer worked out soon became the property of all the
Division, a very high standard of horse-management was reached.
Will it shock some old retired officers to hear that authority, the
highest authority, abolished the clipping of horses that year in
Flanders? Horse-clipping was once a sacred institution, with its fixed
dates and ritual, in the Army. That year in Flanders horse-clipping was
abolished, and the horses became wild and woolly but withal happy. I
used to love to see their flowing locks streaming in the cold wind as
they stood out in the lines, coated like St. Bernard dogs, and quite
comfortable. "Stables" became more arduous as horse-coats became longer,
but the horses flourished in the open with just break-winds, and
sometimes thatch rain-shelter overhead. I would never want to see a
finer lot of horses than those of the early Spring of 1916. They were
hairy and they were lean, and they would eat their nosebags, if given a
minute's grace after the feed was finished; but they were full of heart
and of work.
The enemy was the mud. We found that if the horses were given good
standings and their feet kept out of the mud the rain did not trouble
them at all, and the wind troubled them little. But once off the pavé
roads all Flanders was semi-liquid, and the problem at horse-lines was
first to secure a solid "standing," next to secure a solid road in and
out to that standing, and finally to secure a solid road to and from a
solid watering place. A unit that built for its horses elegant brick
standings in the middle of a field, and forgot the rest, found after the
first rain that its lines were surrounded by a sea of mud. Then the
horses had to be given temporary refuge in the paved street of an
evacuated town, whilst a saddened unit faced scorn and obloquy and the
necessity of constructing another brick standing on another site, _not_
an island site this time.
Standings were usually made of bricks, and the Army requisitioned all
the brick yards in the occupied area. Shell-ruined villages were another
source of brick supply. Rubble brick was of no use for standings; the
bricks had to be set properly; rubble was lost in the soil within a day.
One officer got excellent results by preparing a well-sloped bed;
enclosing it with great logs, treating it with a thin layer of straw,
and close-setting the bricks over that. It seemed a poor use to put
straw to, but that stand lasted out the winter wonderfully well.
The difficulty of getting good accessible watering places was very
great. Water, of course, there was in abundance, but the horses would
ordinarily have to go up to their bellies in mud to get at it. To set up
troughs accessible by some firm road was necessary, and the site of the
troughs had to be soundly paved. One Pioneer officer settled his
watering problem ingeniously. He had secured a pump and some hose, and
he sank a little well just on the edge of his horse-lines, and was able
to water by troughs set up on the brick standing. Watering by bucket was
forbidden except on the road, for the reason that there was never any
certainty by bucket watering that a horse would get enough to drink, and
a horse kept short of water for long is soon a lost horse.
Losses from enemy action were not very high among the horses until the
last phase. There was, on the whole, little cavalry work except at the
end of the campaign and at its very beginning. Our air supremacy usually
saved horse-lines in the rear of our lines from very severe shelling.
But horse and mule losses increased greatly when the enemy began to use
mustard gas. That proved deadly to animals. The ground where a mustard
gas shell had fallen was infected for many hours afterwards. If horses
were picketed on it, or even passed over it, casualties were high. The
irritant poison of the gas attacked their skins wherever the hair was
thin, and caused the most dreadful wounds. Precaution, however, was
prompt, and an effective curative treatment was found in a dressing,
the chief ingredient of which was chloride of lime.
From the spring of 1918 the British Army horse had to suffer severe
attacks from the air. We had by then established a very great transport
superiority, and the enemy devoted a good deal of his air strength to
bombing attacks on our horse-lines, with a view to lessening our
transport strength. At first these attacks were very deadly. But the
position was soon met. Horse-lines were cleverly concealed. The animals
were separated into small groups. The lines were protected by bomb-proof
traverses of earthwork, which localised the effects of explosions.
In the summer of 1918 the wastage of animals had been cut down to the
lowest percentage reached in the whole campaign. This meant that battle
losses were being compensated for by a very low sickness rate, achieved
by careful and skilful horse-mastership. The British Army, which had
been always an army of horse-lovers, was now also an Army of skilled
horse-masters, and in spite of bombing raids, of long-distance shelling,
and of poison gas, the death rate kept dwindling. At this time forage
difficulties were acute, but there had been close organisation to grow
fodder in Army and Line of Communication areas, and our animals always
had a decent ration.
But it was through the unsparing work of the men, with brain and hand,
that the horses were so happily situated. The public at Home can never
express sufficient gratitude for that work--work which had little
glamour or hope of reward, but which was as necessary to victory as that
of rifleman and gunner.
The final triumph of our Army horse administration was in the summer of
1918, when it was able to take up a big part of the burden of horsing
the American units arriving in France. That, again, was a factor of
victory. Without transport or gun-horses the American troops could not
have given their magnificent help in the last stages of the campaign.
In the sum the story of the British Army horse in the Great War is a
thrilling one. Our Home horse-lovers opened the chapter gloriously. The
British Navy followed up by making it possible to transport remounts
from all parts of the world. Then the men of the Old Army and of the New
Armies showed what grit and resource and kindness could do. So we rode
home to victory.
The record of the animals of the B.E.F. should do something to dissipate
the marked prejudice against the mule in Great Britain. People here do
not understand its virtues as a draught animal. Granted that the mule is
not suitable for heavy draught work and may prove a serious nuisance on
a farm if it cannot be kept within its proper bounds--for a mule has an
omnivorous appetite--still there is a very wide field of usefulness for
this animal in city work, such as bread and milk and parcel carriage and
light van work generally; also as a transport animal for the small
farmer. The mule eats much less than the horse, has a longer working
life, is less liable to disease, needs less attention. The mule's rough
commonsense, which teaches him to be very careful of himself, is a
positive advantage. Given decent treatment, a mule is a reliable,
good-natured, and likeable animal. He has not the same charming manners
as a well-trained horse, but he has plenty of character, and it is
mostly good character.
The wicked mule does exist, but he is the exception, not the rule. One
champion wicked mule I can recall. He was as big as a horse, black in
colour, and on the near side had a blood-shot fiery eye which was a good
danger signal. On the off-side he had a white eye. This was a deceptive
white-flag signal, for the beast kicked with equal viciousness on both
sides. Likewise he bit from all points of the compass. The one thing
that soured his life was the fact that he couldn't sting with his tail.
To groom Belial--that was his name--he had to be put in slings. But he
was an easy animal to shoe. Hold a shoe with the nails fixed in the
proper position, and the animal would attach itself firmly to the shoe
with one kick. An occasional Belial excepted, the mules were a pleasant
lot.
The mule is a hard worker but a sensible worker. He will not try to
overtax his strength, and he goes on strike firmly if asked to do too
much. "I may be a bit of an ass," the animal tells you, "but none of
this heroic business of the Arab steed breaking his heart with a mighty
effort for _me_."
This attitude is not poetic, but it is practical. And the mule
compensates by standing mud better, eating less, and putting up with
poorer food than the horse. The mule, however, is very particular about
what he drinks. Water that the horse will swallow greedily the mule will
turn up his Roman nose at. If you are watering mules and horses at the
same stream, the mules must have first drink, for they will not touch
the muddied water, though horses have no objection to it.
G.H.Q. during the last stages of the campaign had a hard task to keep
the animals of the B.E.F. properly fed. At the outset of the War the
horse ration erred, if anything, on the generous side, and a good deal
of it wandered into the mangers of the civilian animals of the country,
much to their contentment. As the war dragged its exhausting length
along, money became scarce, food supplies scarcer still, and transport
facilities scarcest of all. Then the ration of the animals had to be
cut to a point which represented just sufficient and nothing more. Even
so, it was a much better ration than the French gave their horses, and
there were repeated efforts by the French Authorities to persuade us to
come down to their animal ration. Those efforts naturally had a much
greater chance of success when the union of the command made Marshal
Foch the Generalissimo of all the Armies in France.
But our High Command was stubborn in its championship of the animals.
There was a very strong representation of the cavalry on the Staff; and,
besides, the British as a race have a sentiment about animals which is
not shared to the full by the Latin races. The average British soldier
would as soon go short of food himself as see his animals hungry. At one
time the British War Cabinet yielded to the strong representations that
were being made that the British Army wasted resources and transport in
its feeding of the animals, and ordered a heavy reduction of the horse
ration. Even then the British Command in the Field did not give up the
cause for lost, continued to argue the matter, and by pointing out that
a vast amount of extra work was just then being thrown upon the animals
by the reduction of Field Artillery ammunition teams from six horses to
four, secured a compromise decision which made a much smaller reduction
in the ration.
[Illustration: THE ARMY COMMANDERS]
The French Authorities without a doubt honestly believed they were in
the right and that we were "coddling" our brutes, for they made another
effort to get "unity of animal ration" as a kind of logical sequel to
"unity of command." This time they made an agreement with the Americans
that the latter should come down to their scale of animal ration.
Without a full knowledge of what they were doing, the Americans agreed
at first; and it looked as if the British horse also would have to have
his ration reduced. But with more complete knowledge of the facts the
American Army reversed its previous decision and decided that it could
not come down below the British animal ration. A whinny of joy would
have gone round the British horse lines at this decision if it had been
promulgated in horse language, for it saved the situation. I am honestly
of opinion that it had its effect, too, in bringing the campaign to its
triumphant conclusion. In the last stages between August and November,
1918, I do not think that the rapid pursuit of the enemy would have been
possible if the horse ration had been reduced further than it was in
July, 1918. As it was, that reduction put a stop to the decline in the
sickness rate and caused it to increase slightly.
G.H.Q. did its best to make up for the reduced ration by organising
local growth of fodder crops wherever there was a chance, and there was
instituted an Inspectorate of Horse Feeding and Economies. The
I.Q.M.G.S. had to oversee all animals, except those on charge of
Director Remounts and Director Veterinary Services, to advise on all
matters of forage, to seek means of economy and generally to supervise
the "horse-mastery" of units.
Horse-masters can best judge the rights of the fodder position for
themselves by noting the actual animal ration. Taking an average of
25,000 horses, light _and_ heavy, the weight of the rations at the time
of the controversy was:
lbs.
American 23.6
British 22.2
French 16.1
Twenty-two pounds weight of food per day is not excessive for a horse
doing hard work; and that was the _average_. After the heavy horses had
their higher ration the light horses had to be content with less.
Probably the French never saw our point of view and suspected that there
was not much more than English obstinacy in this determined stand for
the welfare of the dumb beasts. But the controversy was carried on with
good humour all the same, and in the end "those curious English" had
their own way.
Whenever questions such as this arose between the Allied Forces it
proved in practice that the Americans usually had the deciding voice.
Perhaps it may be recorded without hurting anyone's feelings that the
American as a matter of instinct was inclined usually to take the French
side, because his stronger sympathy was in that direction; after
experience he was inclined usually to take the British side, for his
manner of thinking was more on our lines.
The animal record for the last year of the war was a fine one. The
sickness rate was brought down to a figure practically as low as that of
a big stable under peace conditions, and this--the result of good
horse-mastery--helped to make up for battle casualties and casualties
from bombs. (It was in January, 1918, that the enemy first instituted a
definite policy of searching out our horse-lines and subjecting them to
aeroplane attack in order to cripple our lines of supply). In June,
1918, the sickness rate was actually lower than at any period in the
history of the force (7.7 per cent. as against 12.05 per cent. in May,
1917). Losses of animals in battle showed a marked reduction. The
general reduction in losses was partly due to a decrease in the losses
from enemy bombs, as a great deal of work had then been done to conceal
and protect horse-lines from aircraft attack.
In July, 1918, the horse situation was even better, and the sickness
rate for the month was 7.5 per cent. (compared with 7.7 per cent. in
June and 8.73 per cent. in May). Unfortunately it was necessary that
month to reduce the hay ration by one lb. per day. (A more considerable
reduction proposed was abandoned, as I have pointed out). The shortage
in the supply of animals as compared with requirements, a shortage
principally due to the needs of the new American units, was met by
various expedients. Nearly 25,000 animals were made available by
reductions of the horse strength of artillery units. A further 14,000
were saved by giving 6-inch howitzer and some 60-pounder batteries
mechanical transport. Another means of economy in horse-flesh was worked
out--the setting up of a "Category B" in animals. Those which were not
quite fit for arduous work with a fighting unit were withdrawn to units
whose demands on them were less exacting.
In August, 1918, when our great attack began, the animals with the Force
had heavy losses. Battle casualties were high, partly because of the
large employment of cavalry, partly because of the intensive war from
the air against horse-lines. The precautions against this kind of attack
which we had developed could not be kept up during the rapid advance,
and horses in the fighting line suffered severely from bombs as well as
shell fire. But that was part of the necessary price of victory. What
was a matter for real regret, however, was the increase in the sick rate
which accompanied the revival of intensive operations. We all felt sorry
that the forage ration had been reduced, even though slightly, for there
was reason to think that even this slight reduction in the forage ration
had made it impossible in some cases to keep the animals up to the best
standard of condition. Very hard work was being done on a ration which
was cut very fine.
After November 11th, when the Armistice was signed, our animal sickness
rate was only 9 per cent., and later, as we began to sell off our
animals, the advantage of humane treatment told in the market rates.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE FINANCIAL SERVICES.
The generosity of the British People--G.H.Q. was not a spendthrift--The
Pay system--Curiosities of banking in the field--Claims of the civilian
inhabitants--The looted rabbit.
The financial side of the B.E.F. was one of the triumphs of G.H.Q. "Yes,
in spending money," someone may remark, thinking gloomily over his
Income Tax assessment. But the triumph I refer to is in the dealing with
vast sums with so little loss from peculation or from mistake.
An Army in the Field should not be pinched for money if it is to work
with confidence and economy of life. Very often in the history of war a
"ragged Army" has done wonders, and the praise of those wonders has led
to some minds confusing raggedness with heroism, thinking that desperate
impoverishment is a good thing for an Army. It might have been sometimes
in the old days, when the sack of the enemy's country was the reward of
victory and it was a case of fight or perish. In modern times it is a
sound principle of warfare that the better an Army is supplied with the
means of warfare the less will be the cost of life in achieving its
purpose.
The soldiers of the British Army in France have reason to feel grateful
to the people of Great Britain that there was never any sparing of money
at the expense of their comfort and safety. No Army at any known period
of the world's history was more lavishly provided for in food, clothing,
munitions and pay. To illustrate on one point only, that of munitions.
In the British Army 100,000 men in a day used 410 tons of munitions, in
the French Army the same number of men in a day used 246 tons. Part of
the disparity might be accounted for by superior economy on the part of
the French. Most of it was due to the fact that the British people were
able to supply, and did supply, their troops with far greater quantities
of shell, etc., so as to take as much of the burden of war as possible
off the flesh and blood of the soldier.
The taxpayer for his part can be comforted with the knowledge that, so
far as the Army in the Field was concerned, there was an honest effort
to guard against waste. Of course war is a wasteful business,
essentially, and no possible precaution can guard against some losses.
Often the position is that a great amount of material has to be devoted
to a certain purpose though it is very likely to be wasted, because the
alternative is to incur a greater risk of life. It was always the
British system, a system which Parliament insisted upon equally with the
Generals in the Field, that any sacrifice of money and material was to
be preferred to a useless sacrifice of life.
In peace times the Finance Branch of the War Office had a long-standing
reputation for artful meanness. It was accused of working on the
principle that an officer in the Army was always possessed of abundant
private means and therefore never really wanted any Army money, and that
a private soldier was clearly a fool and a failure for being in the Army
at all and therefore deserved little or no consideration. If he were
allowed money to spare he would waste it on dissipation.
Certainly F. Branch War Office showed itself time and again very sharp
at construing the Pay Warrant to the benefit of the Treasury, but it was
never quite as bad as that. In the Field the spirit of economy had to
give place to the spirit of efficiency and of _morale_. Nevertheless, a
very tight check was kept on the money-bags to prevent dishonesty or
extravagance. The Financial Adviser at G.H.Q. was a potentate of great
ability and of enormous authority. No order which involved the spending
of money could go out without being referred to him and winning his
approval. He had the right of access to the Commander-in-Chief at all
times. It was said that since as a civilian he did not get prompt and
full respect from sentries, or from officers who did not understand his
position as Chancellor of the Army Exchequer, he was made a General in a
single day, and that when he first walked abroad as a General and
sentries presented arms to him he was greatly perturbed, thinking that
this might be the first step in an outbreak of personal violence. But
that was by way of _persiflage_. All officers who came into contact with
him recognised a man of ability and of sympathy.
It was the Army Pay Department that most closely touched the lives of
the soldiers in France. It had to pay a total of about two and a half
million people of all kinds--officers who were either affluent or
careful and gave no trouble at all; officers who were neither and whose
impecuniosity had to be guarded against; a very few officers who were
actually dishonest; "other ranks" in whose pay there were infinite
complications due to separation allowances and the like; and furthermore
the women of the various auxiliary corps, the Labour Corps of various
nationalities, civilian auxiliaries and the like. As the war progressed
"Pay" had to act as money-changer, dealing with almost all the
currencies of the world, and as a Savings Bank and as liquidator of all
kinds of claims and as a third party in those highly convenient
transactions in which an officer bought clothes and other necessities
from "Ordnance" at a price which was sometimes less than half that
charged by London stores.
The Army Pay Department in the Field was not the final paymaster. It
gave advances on account only, leaving the final adjustment to the Pay
office at Home. But during the war and up to the end of 1918 (by which
time demobilisation had broken up most of the units in France) it had
paid out nearly four thousand million francs, and its total losses from
forgeries, war losses, bad money, etc., were quite insignificant. At one
period in 1918 when an analysis was made, it was found that the bad
money passed off on to the Pay Department had averaged only eight francs
per week.
The financial arrangements of the old Regular Army had to be modified
very considerably, especially in regard to officers, as the war
continued, though at first an attempt was made to apply them in their
entirety. The Army Pay Agents soon found out that a number of the new
officers who had come into the service had little or no sense of
financial responsibility, and the Pay Department had to tighten the
reins considerably. Exceedingly liberal arrangements had been made at
the outset to meet the convenience of officers. Thus any Branch of the
Bank of France would cash an officer's cheque up to £5, and any Field
Cashier--each Division had a Field Cashier--would cash his chit to the
same amount. Also, he might draw his allowances by cheque monthly, and
this cheque was good at any Field Cashier's office.
Some early developments were startling. There is a tale of one officer
(he was in a position which gave him a wide range of movement)
collecting £125 in one day before going on leave. He had a "good leave"
presumably, but he had at the time only £3 due to him at his Army
Agent's, and it took some time for him to make up the balance on his pay
as lieutenant. To meet the case of gentlemen "raising the wind" on this
scale there was instituted an "Officer's Advance Book," the conditions
of obtaining and using which were gradually tightened, so that it was
only possible for an officer below "field" rank to obtain three advances
in a month of 125 francs each. That still left one loop-hole for
improvidence or dishonesty--cashing cheques at a Bank of France after
drawing the three advances. But not very many officers could get to a
bank except during a "leave," and a certain "overrunning of the
constable" was expected then and could be adjusted afterwards. Officers
who consistently drew beyond their means after warning were looked upon
as having dishonest intentions and were put on a "black list." They
could not draw cheques, and were deprived of their "Advance Books" until
they were in credit again.
There was no serious amount of financial delinquency. At the worst the
"black list" just crept over the 100 limit. One incorrigible
spendthrift, having been deprived of his Advance Book, tried to obtain
another from a Field Cashier in another centre on the plea that his
previous book "had been captured by the enemy."
It was very human, the Pay Department, for all its strictness, and in my
experience never refused an officer who was going on leave a "bit extra"
if he had a good financial name. One of its very kind customs was to
arrange for wounded officers evacuated to "Blighty" to be met in England
by Pay Agents who pressed on them change of a little cheque to meet
possible incidental expenses in hospital. It had, too, a nice habit of
watching the tactical situation and acting accordingly. After the great
German onrush of the Spring of 1918 many hundreds of officers were
destitute, their kits abandoned to the enemy. Pay Department promptly
relaxed all its rules to enable them to outfit again promptly; and, of
course, there was ultimately reimbursement to the officers of the value
of their kits. Up to the conclusion of the war "Pay" reimbursed nearly
20,000 officers for loss of kit.
[Illustration: Photo by J Russell & Sons
MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CLAUDE A. BRAY (Paymaster-in-chief, B.E.F.)]
"Pay" changed any sort of money into French currency; and it had to deal
with many varieties. Serbian, Egyptian, Nova Scotian, Greek, Kruger
money (from South Africa), Australian bank notes, Italian, Russian,
American, Canadian, local French "Bank of Commerce" notes (which were
monetised in some cases by the Bank of France), Mexican dollars--all
came to its counter and were duly honoured. But it turned up its nose at
American Confederate Bank notes and assignats of the First French
Republic (both useless except for wall paper).
Various currency problems had to be solved by "Pay." The Bank of France
was always in a state of worry over the huge consumption of 5 francs
notes by the British Army. These were the most favoured units for paying
the men; they seemed to disappear from currency at a quick rate, and
they were expensive to print. The situation was improved by the adoption
of the suggestion of "Pay" that a 10-francs note should be issued.
Probably the Bank of France would have been quite content if they had
thought that the 5 francs notes were destroyed. But they knew that they
were being hoarded up by the French peasants, who absorbed every bit of
silver as soon as it was put into circulation, and, after silver,
favoured for their hoards notes of small denominations. At the time of
the German advance in the Spring of 1918 "Pay" had a curious
illustration of the hoarding ways of these French peasants. That advance
let loose a flood of silver coinage. The people who lived in districts
which might have to be evacuated changed their hoarded silver for notes,
which would be more handy to carry away.
"Pay" at an early stage of the war put forward an interesting
proposal--the issue of International Army Notes in various denominations
which would be good in any one of the Allied Countries. The proposal was
never carried through, but its idea is being revived in the financial
world to-day by the proposal for an International Bank to take over some
or all of the war debts of the Allies and issue a paper currency good in
any one of the Allied Countries.
The encouragement of thrift among the soldiers was part of the work of
"Pay." In August, 1915, it secured soldier subscriptions to the War Loan
to the extent of £25,200. The next year it established Savings Banks,
and in 1918 it set up agencies at all Army Post Offices for the sale of
War Savings Certificates. But its greatest achievement in the way of
thrift was the Chinese Savings Bank, which was started in August, 1918,
and in a fortnight had deposits of 400,000 francs.
The last welcome task of "Pay" was to establish Field Cashiers in
Germany and to fix a rate of exchange for German money, which was
started at five marks=2s. 8d.
The Claims Commission (established in December, 1914) was another branch
of the financial organisation. Its business was to decide upon claims
for damage done by the British Army to the property of civilians, French
or Belgian. The British Army paid for everything, even to an orchard
tree that an Army mule had nibbled at. Claims made were sometimes
ridiculous in character and in extent. In my regimental experience I
remember a market gardener claiming 200 francs on account of damage done
by a horse which had wandered into his potato patch for a few minutes.
The claim was very amicably settled on the spot by the payment in cash
of two francs. On an average, "Claims" paid about one fourth of the
total asked for, and the civilian population did very well indeed on
that.
In the very early days of the war the civil population of France, filled
with relief and gratitude at the arrival of the British Force, of whose
coming they had almost despaired, greeted officer and soldier with the
most generous hospitality. Indeed as the "Old Contemptibles" marched
through Boulogne women stripped off their rings to give them to the
marching soldiers. Wine, fruit, and other delicacies were pressed on
everybody without payment. That generous enthusiasm could not last
through a four years' war, but to the very end the best of the French
population recognised a duty of hospitality to their British guests. It
was only natural, however, that many of the peasants and small traders,
hard hit by the war, should take advantage of their opportunities to
make profit out of our Army. This was particularly noticeable after the
coming of the Colonial troops, who were just as lavish in spirit as the
British Tommies and had a good deal more pay to spend.
[Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL L. B. FRIEND (President of Claims
Commission)]
The Claims Commission, which in the later stages of the war had its
headquarters at Paris Plage and Le Touquet, did its work to the
satisfaction of everybody. At first its responsibilities were confined
to paying claims for damage done. Later it took over all the financial
adjustments in connection with the hiring and the requisition of
civilian land and property. Its tasks called for a great deal of tact
and a wide variety of resourcefulness. In the Spring of 1918 the
abandonment in evacuated areas by civilians of wine and portable
property caused trouble. The events at Amiens illustrate the position.
As soon as the city came under enemy shell fire the civil authorities
left, and with them most of the respectable inhabitants. Less
respectable people remained, and probably were guilty of some excesses.
The British Army Authorities, however, were prompt in taking over
control, and on April 3rd the city was quiet and orderly. But very
serious reports of damage by British troops were put into circulation.
On investigation by the Claims Department the actual cases resolved
themselves into two: in one house three doors had been broken down; in
the other case the British Army had stolen a rabbit "which had been
abandoned by its owners." These were the only two charges definitely
preferred. But it was, seemingly, a fact that in some villages outside
of Amiens regrettable incidents arose from the fleeing civilians
abandoning stores of wine or disposing of them to the troops at
sacrifice prices. The French Authorities were asked to assist in
forbidding the importation by civilians of intoxicants into threatened
areas.
Towards the end of the war some of the French towns which had been
sheltering large numbers of British troops raised the question of the
payment of octroi duties on the goods consumed by the troops. As I
suppose is well known, French towns have local customs duties (called
octroi because the right to collect them for local purposes was
originally a concession from the King). All food, etc., coming into the
town pays a small tax. Supplies for the British Army did not pay this
tax, and the towns complained of the loss thus caused to their municipal
revenues. G.H.Q. willingly conceded the payment of octroi. A lump sum
was allowed for the past period, and an arrangement made for the future
payment of so much per head every half year for each soldier billetted
within the town boundaries. The _per capita_ charge varied greatly. A
few French towns refused to make any claim, saying that they were well
content to make that concession to their British guests.
On the whole the financial record of the British Army in France is
something to be proud of. We paid justly--sometimes generously--for
everything, and no civilian was left with a legitimate grievance.
CHAPTER IX.
THE ECONOMY SERVICES.
What the German submarines taught us--The Salvage Organisation--O.C.
Rags, Bones and Swill--Agriculture's good work and hard luck--The
Forestry Directorate--Soldiers learn economy in a stern school.
There is a sort of grim pleasantry in the fact that the German submarine
war, which was to bring Great Britain to her knees, only brought her to
a school of economy where she learned some lessons which will be very
useful in the future, once the after-the-war phase of reckless
extravagance has passed away. When the cumulative effect of the
unlimited submarine war made itself felt in 1918 it did not stop
operations, though it may claim some of the responsibility for the
extent of the German success in the Spring of that year, which might
have been much more limited if we had had full supplies of wire and
other defence material. What it did do was to set G.H.Q. to devising
valuable economies.
The German was in effect too late with this, as with his other desperate
steps. At the outset of the war, with an inferior sea power, Germany
had yet the chance of using sea forces with great, and perhaps decisive,
effect by raids on the British supply routes with light cruisers and
converted merchantmen. She had prepared for this but neglected the one
necessary act of forethought and daring by not sending out to sea her
commerce destroyers. Such a sea policy would, of course, have been
ruthless; but it could have been made effective without violation of sea
law and without outrages on neutrals. After August, 1914, Germany sought
vainly to repair her initial lack of sound naval sense by the submarine
naval war, in which every canon of sea law and every sentiment of
justice and humanity were violated. The more the submarine war showed
signs of failing the more atrocious and reckless it became, until in its
final shape it set almost all the world against the German Empire. Yet
withal the U-boat atrocities went for nothing. The German people must
see now that their Prussian masters put them very much in the position
of the innkeeper of the old creepy German story. He and his wife
resolved to kill in his sleep and rob a chance traveller who had come to
their inn. They killed him and found that his purse was empty and that
he was their own long-lost son.
On the debit side, as a result of the German submarine war we had in
1918 a lack of certain material--particularly of chocolate, biscuits,
and tinned fruits in the canteens. On the credit side we had those fine
economy organisations, Salvage, Agriculture and Forestry, the effect of
which was not only to make savings at the time but also to teach the
soldier a fuller appreciation of his civil duties.
"Salvage" explained itself very clearly in its official publication:
"The world shortage of almost every kind of raw material used for
war supplies makes Salvage an important Administrative Service.
Without a well-organised and thorough Salvage system, the full
maintenance of our Force in the Field would be made difficult.
"The co-ordination of all Salvage work is in the hands of the
Controller of Salvage at G.H.Q. His duties include the inspection
of executive Salvage work, the arrangements for the disposal of
Salvage material, the investigation of methods for recovering
bye-products, and keeping of statistical records showing the amount
of material salved and disposed of and the resultant gain to the
State.
"The Salvage Organisation is not intended to take the place of, or
in any way discourage, a consistent effort on the part of every
supply department to recover for repair and re-issue its own
articles and its own empties. It is intended to supplement that
effort; to collect and put to use what would otherwise become
derelict; to ensure that nothing utilisable is allowed to go to
waste.
"To this end it is necessary to arrange, in the first place, for
the collection of unserviceable or derelict material, and, in the
second, for its disposal so that it may be brought again into use
with the least delay and to the best advantage."
[Illustration: AN ARMY POSTER.]
"Salvage," in order to secure a practical interest in its work, used to
issue statements to the soldiers showing how salved articles were
utilised. Some examples:
Clothing: Cleaned and repaired
locally. If beyond repair,
sent to the United
Kingdom as rags.
Sacking: Sent to the United
Kingdom.
Entrenching tools: Heads cleaned and
sharpened. If irreparable,
disposed of as scrap.
Steel helmets: Cleaned and relined. If
irreparable, indiarubber
pads in lining removed
and utilised for lining
serviceable helmets. Chin
strap sold as old leather,
and helmet disposed of as
scrap steel.
Rubber (gum boots, Sent to Paris for classification
tyres, etc.): and repair. If
irreparable, sent to the
United Kingdom.
Mess tins, camp Cleaned in caustic soda,
kettles, field reblocked, resoldered if
kitchen boilers: necessary, and retinned.
If irreparable, disposed
of as scrap steel.
Water-bottles: Old felt removed--bottles
cleaned, recovered with
new felt and recorked.
Old felt sent to the United
Kingdom. Water-bottles
not fit for re-issue as such
are used for packing small
quantities of oil or paint
for the Front.
Web equipment, Broken into component
cotton bandoliers, parts--dry-cleaned on
etc.: motor-driven brushes,
darned and repaired. If
irreparable, sent to the
United Kingdom as cotton
rags, after brass or metal
fittings have been removed.
Leather equipment, Broken down into component
harness, saddlery, parts, washed with
etc.: soft soap in lukewarm
water, dried in a drying
cupboard at 100 deg. F.,
treated with fish-oil and
repaired. If irreparable,
sent to United Kingdom
as old leather after brass
or metal fittings have been
removed.
Boots: Classified, repaired and
passed through fish-oil
baths. The uppers of
irreparable boots as far as
possible made into shoe
laces or heel lifts and used
for filling.
"Salvage" had to suffer much from kindly "ragging." It was known as
"Rags and Bones," and as "Swill." It was the favoured sport of the
humourist to devise new salvage dodges, one of which I recall as holding
the record for sheer asininity. It drew attention to the fact that the
little circles of paper, punched out of folios so that they could be put
on files, might be collected and sold as confetti!
But with all this "ragging," G.H.Q. had a very real respect and liking
for Brigadier-General Gibbs and his Salvage Corps, and recognised fully
the solid and practical patriotism which made them devote a passionate
interest to the recovery of solder from old tins, to collecting waste
paper, old boots, nails, horseshoes, rags and buttons. "There is
nothing of the débris of the battlefield which we cannot put to some
use," General Gibbs announced; and by his personal enthusiasm he made
Salvage collection quite a popular sport in the Army.
Some of the items of salvage value from a return will show the wide
range of the department: swill for piggeries, value 16,000 francs;
solder from old tins, value 91,000 francs; cotton waste, 14,000 francs;
tin-plate (won by unrolling old biscuit tins, etc.), 61,000 francs; old
lead, 10,000 francs; various bye-products 7,000,000 francs. The old rags
collected did a great deal to help the cloth shortage at Home, as they
made the best kind of shoddy. The old bones collected helped to find the
glycerine for explosives.
But perhaps the moral effect of the Salvage department was even more
valuable than its excellent material results. War is a wretchedly
wasteful business and must inculcate in soldiers a spirit of waste. But
in the final phase of this campaign every soldier had brought home to
him most urgently the wisdom of saving and the real value of what seemed
to be waste bye-products. Many of them must have learned the lesson and
carried it home with them to the advantage of the general community.
Agriculture was another economy organisation that we owed to the German
submarine war. It had begun in a small way towards the end of 1917;
indeed its germ was alive before then, for from the first our units had
helped the French with labour and horses during harvest time, and some
units enjoying a certain security of tenure had established flower and
vegetable gardens. But in December, 1917, the world's food position
suggested an earnest effort to utilise spare labour and spare land
within army areas in France to grow food. Major-General Ellison and Dr.
Keeble came over to G.H.Q. from the War Office, and a scheme was drawn
up to cultivate 50,000 acres of land. In January, 1918, an Agriculture
Directorate was formed under Brigadier-General the Earl of Radnor, and
search was made for a suitable area for a big farm. The quest was not a
simple one. We could not poach on land that the French might want. We
wished to avoid selecting an area which might be needed for a manoeuvre
ground for our troops in the carrying out of the next Big Push. In
seeking to avoid these two rocks we landed on a worse one. The area
selected around Roye-Nesle was the area which the Germans were going to
over-run in their Spring offensive. All unconscious of that, we began
ploughing in February, 1918. The Home authorities had supplied an
abundance of excellent machinery, and labour was quickly collected and
trained. By March 21st we had got up to a record of ploughing 300
acres per day and a total of 4,742 acres had been turned over. Then
the German came.
[Illustration: BRIG-GENERAL THE EARL OF RADNOR (Director of Agricultural
Production)]
By a fine feat of organisation and courage the Agriculture Directorate
saved most of its machinery. Some of the agricultural tractors came in
useful as aids to the heavy artillery in the retreat. Others, charging
for home at their best speed, were mistaken for German Tanks and in one
or two cases fired on by our troops.
Despite that unlucky experience with the big farm, Agriculture put to
its credit some useful work. It had promoted vegetable gardens in Base
Camps, and the total area of those gardens was 7,496 acres and their
products did much to help out the rations. Soon, too, "Agriculture"
found that though it had not sown on its big farm it might still reap in
other quarters. The German onrush had brought a great area of French
cultivated land within army areas, some of it actually within the zone
of fire. Since every ear of wheat was precious, Agriculture organised to
save this part of the French harvest, and actually reaped the product of
18,133 acres. It was gallant work, done mostly by fighting men in the
intervals between their turns in the trenches. Sometimes the area to be
reaped was under the fire and the observation of the enemy, and the crop
was cut at night. The enemy used gas shells to prevent this work, and
the reapers had to work in gas masks. One area of six acres of corn was
so close to the enemy trenches that the idea of saving it seemed a
desperate one. But volunteers were found, and one night seventeen men
with scythes cleared the whole six acres, in the three hours of darkness
that were available. I own that such acts of heroism impress me more
than deeds done in the heat and ardour of battle.
In the Autumn of 1918 the enemy were in full run for the Rhine, and the
Agriculture Directorate resolved to make another attempt at cultivating
a big farm. An area of 20,000 acres was chosen, this time near Corbie.
The site had been desolated by the Somme battles, and the work of
preliminary clearing (which was done by Prisoners of War) was the
hardest part of its preparation for agriculture. But when ploughing
began with tractors other unexpected difficulties cropped up. The big
armour-piercing shell with delay-action fuse, when it missed the
emplacement for which it was designed and struck the ground, penetrated
to a great depth, exploded there, and often formed a big subterranean
cavern without showing any crater on the surface. A heavy tractor going
over one of these caverns would break through and disappear. Digging it
out would then be a laborious task.
When the Armistice came the Corbie farm was, in accordance with the
wishes of the French Government, passed over to it. So the Agriculture
Directorate never got in a big crop of its own sowing. But it had done
excellent work on its farm gardens and in saving the French crop within
the battle area.
Forestry was another department which we owed to the German submarine
war. In 1916 shipping losses were already so great as gravely to
prejudice the prospects of bringing in timber from Scandinavia. It was
Scandinavia which felt the earliest effects from the submarine campaign;
Norway, especially, which with fine courage had refused to allow its
mercantile shipping to take refuge in harbour.
The Norwegian paper _Tidens Tegn_ published an optimistic statistical
review of the position as regards Germany's submarine war on October
9th, 1917. This, covering a wide period and dealing with a mercantile
service which the German pursued with particular venom, attracted great
attention at the time. Pointing out that for the week ending October 9th
not one Norwegian vessel was sunk by German submarines, the _Tidens
Tegn_ commented that this was the first time for a year that such a
thing could be said. It gave then in detail the record of U-boats'
ravages on Norwegian shipping from May, 1917, until October, 1917, the
record showing a steady decrease of losses. But the sad truth was that
the Norwegian shipping had suffered such terrible losses that there was
not much left of it to destroy.
As early as November, 1916, owing to the difficulties in getting
Scandinavian timber, we had decided to draw our timber supplies chiefly
from the French forests and from Switzerland, Spain, and Great Britain.
Our Forestry Department started with a Canadian lumber-men's unit.
Brig.-Gen. Lord Lovat was Director. In October, 1917, a fresh agreement
was made with the French Government for the exploitation of French
forests for the benefit of the Allied Armies. The magnitude of the
operations can be gauged from the fact that the Forestry Directorate
grew to 425 officers and 11,000 of other ranks, and employed in addition
about 6,000 prisoners of war. But perhaps the public, with Whitehall
departments in its mind's eye, may object that employment figures are no
sound indication of work accomplished. But the production figures admit
of no cavil. From November, 1917, to November, 1918, the Forestry
Department produced from French forests 2,065,074 tons of timber. This
was four-fifths of the total needs of the Army. Reference will be found
in a subsequent chapter to our shortage of barbed wire in the Winter and
Spring of 1918. Forestry did a great deal to fill the gap, producing
90,000 tons of defensive pickets between February and May, 1918.
[Illustration: AT FORESTRY H. Q., THE KING AND A MASCOT]
In addition to its productive work Forestry was a valuable Directorate
in the teaching of economy in forest exploitation. If the lessons it
inculcated are not wasted, British forestry should benefit greatly in
the future.
* * * * *
Salvage, Agriculture, and Forestry were the three chief "Economy
Directorates" of G.H.Q.; and if their spirit can be carried back into
civil life by the demobilised soldier it will prove of real value in
making up for the economic wastage of the war, vast as that has been. I
wonder if those people who are celebrating peace with a long-drawn-out
carnival of slackness and extravagance recognise as clearly as we were
made to do at G.H.Q. in 1918 the extent to which the world is short of
everything! Of course it is difficult for those who are not accustomed
to give close attention to the problems of production to appreciate how
deeply a world war of four years' duration affects every industry; and
especially so when on one side the war was waged on the principle of
destroying everything that could be got at, whether it was military or
civil property, whether it was an enemy or a neutral possession.
Germany, making a ruthless and unlimited war on "sink without trace"
lines, forced practically the whole world to band against her in
self-defence; and over practically the whole world labour and capital
were largely withdrawn from production for purposes of defence.
In the days when the builders of Jerusalem worked with the trowel in one
hand and the sword in the other, it may be concluded that progress was
slow. For years a great deal of the world had the rifle in one hand and
the gas mask in the other, figuratively or literally. It could do little
in the way of normal production, because its chief energies were taken
up with defence.
In regard to any industry, trace step by step the effect of a war such
as this war. The first and most palpable loss is that of the labour
directly withdrawn for armies and navies. That would be serious enough
if it were the sole loss. But it was only one of many losses. A modern
industry depends as much almost on capital as on labour. Capital was
withdrawn from production and devoted to destruction at an appalling
rate. That meant that industry was starved of machinery, of
communications, of nutriment generally. Like a human body deprived of
proper nourishment, it began to suffer from debility. Every neglect to
replace machinery, to repair roads or to open up necessary new roads,
every draft, too, made on the administrative staff, is just as much a
weakening of an industry as the direct loss of hand workers. A healthy
industry should be able to withstand for some time these losses, just as
a healthy human body should be able to withstand some period of
privation and even of actual starvation. But there is a limit to the
power of endurance in both cases. It is quite clear that in many world
industries (and most particularly in those industries which are
connected with the great staples of human comfort, the food industries,
the clothing industries, the transport industries) that limit was
reached long before the war was over, and the world began to suffer from
a constitutional enfeeblement of its powers of production; something
more serious than the temporary interruption of production, something
which makes now a restoration of prosperity difficult and tedious.
All this is so true as to be truism. But it does not seem to be so
clearly recognised by the people who stayed at home as by the people who
went to war. Perhaps as the returned soldier makes his influence felt
more strongly he will have his value in bringing the nation to a sense
of the duty of economy. It was not possible to have two views about the
need of economy when you had to forage the battlefield for old bits of
metal and rags.
CHAPTER X.
THE COMFORTS OF THE FORCE--SPIRITUAL AND OTHER.
The Padres--The semi-religious organisations--E.F.C. Comforts--Studying
the Fighting man--The Great Beer Save.
"There has never been an army that had more chaplains, or that needed
them less." That was the verdict of one American observer on the British
Army--a sound one. The British Army was notably well supplied with
chaplains--"padres" as the soldier knows them; but this was not in
answer to a call for spiritual leaders to combat a special degree of
wickedness. Quite the contrary. The Army was a very well-behaved,
sober-minded institution on the whole, as if it recognised the solemnity
of its task and fitted its conduct accordingly. To this fact the French
population can bear witness. The French villagers among whom the British
soldiers have been quartered came to a view of them which was once
eloquently expressed: "They are lions in the trenches and lambs in the
villages."
So the padre went out for duty with the troops having no task of leading
a forlorn hope against ramping wickedness. His trouble was rather in the
other direction. "I don't see how I can have the 'front' to preach to
these men," said a padre attached to an Artillery Division one day: "I'd
rather they preached to me."
It really was a difficult task--that of the padre at the Front, and only
the best type of clergyman made a success of it. His attitude to life
had to be manly, his character brave. But the padre who ran risks just
for the sake of running them was often more of a bother than a help. The
best padre's spirit was that of the careful soldier who will face any
danger that comes in the way of duty, but will not go looking for danger
in a spirit of bravado. The padre could make two mistakes. He could take
things too easily and just be a parson available to conduct Divine
service when he was wanted to; or he could try to do too much, to
interfere too much and become a nuisance in the fighting line. The good
padre struck the happy mean. He had the knack of being there when he was
wanted, but he recognised that the Army's first duty was to fight, and
he did not get in the way of its fighting activities. Above all he did
not try to arrange a church parade for the morning after tired troops
from the line had reached rest billets.
One of the most successful padres in France was known as "the Lost
Sheep." He had a Mess to which he was properly attached and this Mess
was responsible for having a comfortable billet for him. But he was
rarely "At home." He wandered all over the district
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