The Kaiser's Memoirs

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Title: The Kaiser's Memoirs

Author: German Emperor William II

Translator: T. R. Ybarra

Release date: August 22, 2013 [eBook #43522]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024

Language: English

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THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

[Illustration: WILHELM II]

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

WILHELM II
Emperor of Germany 1888-1918

English Translation by Thomas R. Ybarra

Harper & Brothers Publishers
New York and London
1922

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

_First Edition_
K-W

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

I. BISMARCK 1

II. CAPRIVI 51

III. HOHENLOHE 59

IV. BÜLOW 95

V. BETHMANN 124

VI. MY CO-WORKERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION 171

VII. SCIENCE AND ART 196

VIII. MY RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH 208

IX. ARMY AND NAVY 223

X. THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 246

XI. THE POPE AND PEACE 263

XII. END OF THE WAR AND MY ABDICATION 272

XIII. THE ENEMY TRIBUNAL AND THE NEUTRAL TRIBUNAL 292

XIV. THE QUESTION OF GUILT 303

XV. THE REVOLUTION AND GERMANY'S FUTURE 337

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

CHAPTER I

Bismarck

Prince Bismarck's greatness as a statesman and his imperishable
services to Prussia and Germany are historical facts of such tremendous
significance that there is doubtless no man in existence, whatever his
party affiliations, who would dare to place them in question. For this
very reason alone it is stupid to accuse me of not having recognized
the greatness of Prince Bismarck. The opposite is the truth. I revered
and idolized him. Nor could it be otherwise. It should be borne in
mind with what generation I grew up--the generation of the devotees of
Bismarck. He was the creator of the German Empire, the paladin of my
grandfather, and all of us considered him the greatest statesman of his
day and were proud that he was a German. Bismarck was the idol in my
temple, whom I worshiped.

But monarchs also are human beings of flesh and blood, hence they, too,
are exposed to the influences emanating from the conduct of others;
therefore, looking at the matter from a human point of view, one will
understand how Prince Bismarck, by his fight against me, himself
destroyed, with heavy blows, the idol of which I have spoken. But my
reverence for Bismarck, the great statesman, remained unaltered.

While I was still Prince of Prussia I often thought to myself: "I hope
that the great Chancellor will live for many years yet, since I should
be safe if I could govern with him." But my reverence for the great
statesman was not such as to make me take upon my own shoulders, when
I became Emperor, political plans or actions of the Prince which I
considered mistakes. Even the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was, to my
way of thinking, a mistake, likewise the "Kulturkampf." Moreover, the
constitution of the Empire was drawn up so as to fit in with Bismarck's
extraordinary preponderance as a statesman; the big cuirassier boots
did not fit every man.

Then came the labor-protective legislation. I most deeply deplored the
dispute which grew out of this, but, at that time, it was necessary for
me _to take the road to compromise, which has generally been my road
both on domestic and foreign politics_. For this reason I could not
wage the open warfare against the Social Democrats which the Prince
desired. Nevertheless, this quarrel about political measures cannot
lessen my admiration for the greatness of Bismarck as a statesman; he
remains the creator of the German Empire, and surely no _one_ man need
have done more for his country than that.

Owing to the fact that the great matter of unifying the Empire was
always before my eyes, I did not allow myself to be influenced by the
agitations which were the commonplaces of those days. In like manner,
the fact that Bismarck was called the majordomo of the Hohenzollerns
could not shake my trust in the Prince, although he, perhaps, had
thoughts of a political tradition for his family. As evidence of this,
he felt unhappy, for instance, that his son Bill felt no interest in
politics and wished to pass on his power to Herbert.

HIS GRANDFATHER'S SUCCESSOR

The tragic element for me, in the Bismarck case, lay in the fact that I
became the successor of my grandfather--in other words, that I skipped
one generation, to a certain extent. And that is a serious thing. In
such a case one is forced to deal constantly with old deserving men,
who live more in the past than in the present, and cannot grow into the
future. When the grandson succeeds his grandfather and finds a revered
but old statesman of the stature of Bismarck, it is not a piece of good
luck for him, as one might suppose, and I, in fact, supposed. Bismarck
himself points that out in the third volume of his memoirs (p. 40),
when he speaks, in the chapter about Bötticher, of the oldish caution
of the Chancellor, and of the young Emperor.

And when Ballin had the Prince cast a glance over the new harbor of
Hamburg, Bismarck himself felt that a new era had begun which he no
longer thoroughly understood. On that occasion the Prince remarked, in
astonishment, "Another world, a new world!"

This point of view also showed itself on the occasion of the visit of
Admiral von Tirpitz at Friedrichsruh, at the time when he wished to win
the old Imperial Chancellor over to favoring the first Navy bill.

As for me personally, I have the satisfaction of recalling that
Bismarck intrusted to me in 1886 the very delicate Brest mission, and
said of me: "Some day that man will be his own Chancellor." This shows
that Bismarck must have had some belief in me.

I feel no grudge against him for the third volume of his reminiscences.
I released this volume after I had sought and obtained my rights. To
withhold the volume any longer would have been pointless, since the
main contents had become known already through indiscretions; were this
not true, there might have been varying opinions as to the advisability
in the choice of the time for publication. Bismarck would turn over
in his grave if he could know at what time the third volume appeared,
and what consequences it had. I should be honestly grieved if the
third volume had damaged the memory of the great Chancellor, because
Bismarck is one of the heroic figures whom the German people need for
their regeneration. My gratitude and reverence for the great Chancellor
cannot be impaired or extinguished by the third volume nor by anything
else whatever.

In the first half of the 'eighties I had been summoned to the Foreign
Office at the behest of Prince Bismarck; it was then presided over by
Count Herbert Bismarck. Upon reporting myself to the Prince he gave me
a short sketch of the personages employed at the Foreign Office, and
when he named Herr von Holstein, who was then one of the most prominent
collaborators of the Prince, it seemed to me that a slight warning
against this man ran through the Prince's words.

I got a room all to myself, and all the documents concerning the
preliminary history, origin, and conclusion of the alliance with
Austria (Andrassy) were laid before me in order that I might study
them. I went often to the home of the Prince and to that of Count
Herbert.

THE MAN WITH THE HYENA'S EYES

When I had thus become more intimate in the Bismarck circle I heard
more open talk about Herr von Holstein. I heard that he was very
clever, a good worker, inordinately proud, an odd sort of man, who
never showed himself anywhere and had no social relations, full of
distrust, much influenced by whims, and, besides all this, a good
hater, and, therefore, dangerous. Prince Bismarck called him "The Man
with the Hyena's Eyes," and told me that it would be well for me to
keep away from him. It was quite apparent that the bitter attitude
which the Prince showed later toward Holstein, his former collaborator,
was forming even at that time.

The Foreign Office was conducted with the strictest discipline by Count
Herbert, whose rudeness toward his employees particularly struck me.
The gentlemen there simply flew when they were summoned or dismissed
by the Count, so much so that a joking saying arose at the time that
"their coat tails stood straight out behind them." The foreign policy
was conducted and dictated by Prince Bismarck alone, after consultation
with Count Herbert, who passed on the commands of the Chancellor and
had them transformed into instructions. Hence _the Foreign Office was
nothing but an office of the great Chancellor_, where work was done
according to his directions. Able men, with independent ideas, were not
schooled and trained there.

This was in contrast to the General Staff under Moltke. There new
officers were carefully developed and trained to independent thinking
and action, in accordance with approved principles, and by dint of
preserving old traditions and taking into account all that modern times
had taught. At the Foreign Office there were only executive instruments
of a will, who were not informed as to the important interrelationship
of the questions turned over to them for treatment, and could not,
therefore, collaborate independently. The Prince loomed up like a huge
block of granite in a meadow; were he to be dragged away, what would be
found beneath would be mostly worms and dead roots.

I won the confidence of the Prince, who consulted me about many
things. For instance, when the Prince brought about the first German
colonial acquisitions (Gross and Klein Popo, Togo, etc.), I informed
him, at his wish, concerning the state of mind created in the public
and the navy by this move, and described to him the enthusiasm with
which the German people had hailed the new road. The Prince remarked
that the matter hardly deserved this.

Later on I spoke often with the Prince about the colonial question
and always found in him the intention to utilize the colonies as
commercial objects, or objects for swapping purposes, other than to
make them useful to the fatherland or utilize them as sources of raw
materials. As was my duty, I called the Prince's attention to the fact
that merchants and capitalists were beginning energetically to develop
the colonies and that, therefore--as I had learned from Hanseatic
circles--they counted upon protection from a navy. For this reason, I
pointed out that steps must be taken for _getting a fleet constructed_
in time, in order that German assets in foreign lands should not be
without protection; that, since the Prince had unfurled the German flag
in foreign parts, and the people stood behind it, there must also be a
navy behind it.

BISMARCK'S CONTINENTAL PREPOSSESSIONS

But the Prince turned a deaf ear to my statements and made use of
his pet motto: "If the English should land on our soil I should have
them arrested." His idea was that the colonies would be defended by
us at home. The Prince attached no importance to the fact that the
very assumption that the English could land without opposition in
Germany--since Heligoland was English--was unbearable for Germany, and
that we, in order to make a landing impossible from the start, needed a
sufficiently strong navy, and, likewise, Heligoland.

The political interest of the Prince was, in fact, concentrated
essentially upon continental Europe; England lay somewhat to one
side among the cares that burdened him daily, all the more so since
Salisbury stood well with him and had, in the name of England, hailed
with satisfaction the Double (_i. e._, Triple) Alliance, at the time
of its formation. The Prince worked primarily with Russia, Austria,
Italy, and Rumania, whose relations toward Germany and one another he
constantly watched over. As to the prudence and skill with which he
acted, Emperor William the Great once made a pointed remark to von
Albedyll, his chief of Cabinet.

The General found His Majesty much excited after a talk with Bismarck,
to such an extent that he feared for the health of the old Emperor. He
remarked, therefore, that His Majesty should avoid similar worry in
future; that, if Bismarck was unwilling to do as His Majesty wished,
His Majesty should dismiss him. Whereupon the Emperor replied that,
despite his admiration and gratitude toward the great Chancellor,
he had already thought of dismissing him, since the self-conscious
attitude of the Prince became at times too oppressive. But both he and
the country needed Bismarck too badly. Bismarck was the one man who
could juggle five balls of which at least two were always in the air.
That trick, added the Emperor, was beyond his own powers.

Prince Bismarck did not realize that, through the acquisition of
colonies for Germany, he would be obliged to look beyond Europe and
be automatically forced to act, politically, on a large scale--with
England especially. England, to be sure, was one of the five balls in
his diplomatic-statesmanly game, but she was merely one of the five,
and he did not grant her the special importance which was her due.

For this reason it was that the Foreign Office likewise was involved
entirely in the continental interplay of politics, had not the
requisite interest in colonies, navy, or England, and possessed no
experience in world politics. The English psychology and mentality, as
shown in the pursuit--constant, though concealed by all sorts of little
cloaks--of world hegemony, was to the German Foreign Office a book
sealed with seven seals.

SOURCE OF RUSSIAN ENMITY

Once Prince Bismarck remarked to me that his main object was to not
let Russia and England come to an understanding. I took the liberty of
observing that the opportunity to postpone such an understanding for
a long time lay ready to hand in 1877-78, when the Russians might have
been allowed to occupy Constantinople--had this been done, the English
fleet would have sailed in without further ado to defend Constantinople
and the Russo-English conflict would have been on. Instead, I
continued, the Treaty of San Stefano was forced upon the Russians and
they were compelled to turn about at the very gates of the city which
they had reached and saw before them, after frightful battles and
hardships.

This, I went on, had created an inextinguishable hatred in the Russian
army against us (as had been reported by Prussian officers who had
accompanied the Russian army on the Turkish campaign, especially Count
Pfeil); moreover, the above-mentioned treaty had been cast aside and
the Berlin Treaty substituted for it, which had burdened us even more
with the hostility of the Russians, who looked upon us as the enemy of
their "just interests in the East." Thus the conflict between Russia
and England, which the Prince desired, had been relegated far into the
future.

Prince Bismarck did not agree with this judgment of "his" Congress,
concerning the results of which he, as the "honest broker," was so
proud; he remarked earnestly that he had wished to prevent a general
conflagration and had been compelled to offer his services as a
mediator. When I, later on, told a gentleman at the Foreign Office
about this conversation, he replied that he had been present when
the Prince, after signing the Berlin Treaty, came into the Foreign
Office and received the congratulations of the officials assembled
there. After he had listened to them the Prince stood up and replied:
"Now I am driving Europe four-in-hand!" In the opinion of the said
gentleman the Prince was mistaken in this, since, even at that time,
there was the threat of a Russo-French friendship in place of the
Russo-Prussian--in other words, two horses were already to be counted
out of the four-in-hand. As Russia saw it, Disraeli's statecraft had
turned Bismarck's work as "honest broker" into the negotiation of an
Anglo-Austrian victory over Russia.

Despite considerable differences in our opinions, Prince Bismarck
remained friendly and kindly disposed to me, and, despite the great
difference in our ages, a pleasant relationship grew up between
us, since I, in common with all those of my generation, was an
ardent admirer of the Prince and had won his trust by my zeal and
frankness--nor have I ever betrayed that trust.

During the time of my assignment at the Foreign Office, Privy Councilor
Raschdau, among others, discoursed with me on commercial policy,
colonies, etc. In these matters, even at that early date, my attention
was called to our dependence upon England, due to the fact that we had
no navy and that Heligoland was in English hands. To be sure, there
was a project to extend our colonial possessions under the pressure of
necessity, but all this could happen only with England's permission.
This was a serious matter, and certainly an unworthy position for
Germany.

INTERCOURT POLITICS

My assignment at the Foreign Office brought a very unpleasant happening
in its wake. My parents were not very friendly toward Prince Bismarck
and looked with disfavor upon the fact that their son had entered into
the Prince's circle. There was fear of my becoming influenced against
my parents, of superconservatism, of all sorts of perils, which all
sorts of tale bearers from England and "liberal circles," who rallied
around my father, imputed against me. I never bothered my head with all
this nonsense, but my position in the house of my parents was rendered
much more difficult for me and, at times, painful. Through my work
under Prince Bismarck and the confidence reposed in me--often subjected
to the severest tests--I have had to suffer much in silence for the
sake of the Chancellor; he, however, apparently took this quite as a
matter of course.

I was on good terms with Count Herbert Bismarck. He could be a very
gay companion and knew how to assemble interesting men around his
table, partly from the Foreign Office, partly from other circles.
However, true friendship never ripened between us two. This was shown
particularly when the Count asked to go at the same time that his
father retired. My request that he stay by me and help me to maintain
tradition in our political policy elicited the sharp reply that he had
become accustomed to report to his father and serve him, wherefore it
was out of the question to demand that he come, with his dispatch case
under his arm, to report to anybody else than his father.

When Tsar Nicholas II, he who has been murdered, came of age, I was
assigned at the instigation of Prince Bismarck to confer upon the
heir-apparent at St. Petersburg the Order of the Black Eagle. Both the
Emperor and Prince Bismarck instructed me concerning the relationship
of the two countries and the two reigning dynasties with each other,
as well as concerning customs, personages, etc. The Emperor remarked
in conclusion that he would give his grandson the same piece of advice
that was given him, on the occasion of his first visit as a young man
to Russia, by Count Adlerberg, _viz._, "In general, there as well as
elsewhere, people prefer praise to criticism." Prince Bismarck closed
his remarks with these words: "In the East, all those who wear their
shirts outside their trousers are decent people, but as soon as they
tuck their shirts inside their trousers and hang a medal around their
necks, they become pig-dogs."

From St. Petersburg I repeatedly reported to my grandfather and to
Prince Bismarck. Naturally, I described, to the best of my knowledge,
the impressions which I got. I noticed especially that the old
Russo-Prussian relations and sentiments had cooled to a marked extent
and were no longer such as the Emperor and Prince Bismarck in their
talks with me had assumed. After my return, both my grandfather
and the Prince praised me for my plain, clear report, which was all
the pleasanter for me since I was oppressed by the feeling that,
in a number of things, I had been forced to disillusion these high
personages.

TO OFFER DARDANELLES TO RUSSIA

In 1886, at the end of August and beginning of September, after the
last meeting at Gastein of Emperor William the Great and Prince
Bismarck with Emperor Franz Josef, where I also was present at the
command of my grandfather, I was commissioned to report personally to
Tsar Alexander II concerning the decisions made there and to take up
with him the questions relating to the Mediterranean and Turkey. Prince
Bismarck gave me his instructions, sanctioned by Emperor William; they
dealt most especially with Russia's desire to reach Constantinople,
to which the Prince meant to raise no obstacles. On the contrary, I
received direct instructions to offer Russia Constantinople and the
Dardanelles (in other words, San Stefano and the Berlin Treaty had been
dropped!). There was a plan to persuade Turkey in a friendly way that
an understanding with Russia was desirable for her also.

The Tsar received me cordially at Brest-Litovsk and I was present there
at reviews of troops and fortress and defensive maneuvers, which, even
then, unquestionably bore an anti-German look.

To sum up my conversations with the Tsar, the following remark by him
is of importance: "If I wish to have Constantinople, I shall take
it whenever I feel like it, without need of permission or approval
from Prince Bismarck." After this rude refusal of the Bismarck offer
of Constantinople, I looked upon my mission as a failure and made my
report to the Prince accordingly.

When the Prince decided to make his offer to the Tsar, he must have
altered his political conceptions which had led to San Stefano and
the Congress of Berlin; or else, on account of the development of the
general political situation in Europe, he considered that the moment
had come for shuffling the political cards in another way or, as my
grandfather had put it, to "juggle" differently. Only a man of the
world importance and diplomatic ability of Prince Bismarck could embark
on such a course. Whether the Prince had planned his big political
game with Russia in such a way that he might, first, by means of the
Congress of Berlin, prevent a general war and cajole England, and then,
after having thus hindered Russia's Eastern aspirations, cater to these
aspirations later, by a stroke of genius, in an even more striking
manner, it is impossible for me to say--Prince Bismarck never told
anyone about his great political projects.

If the above is true, Bismarck, trusting absolutely to his
statesmanlike skill, must have reckoned upon bringing Germany all the
more into Russian favor because Russian aspirations were brought to
fulfillment by Germany alone--and that at a moment when the general
European political situation was less strained than in 1877-78.
In this case, nobody except Prince Bismarck could have played the
tremendous game to a successful end. And therein lies the weakness in
the superiority of great men. Had he also informed England of his offer
to the Tsar? England must have been opposed to it, as in 1878.

In any event, the Prince now adopted the policy which I had already
noted when I realized the disillusion of the Russians at having stood
before the gates of Constantinople without being allowed to enter.

PROPHECY OF RUSSIAN DOWNFALL

At Brest-Litovsk, in the course of the constant military preparations
of all kinds, I could easily see that the conduct of the Russian
officers toward me was essentially cooler and haughtier than on the
occasion of my first visit to St. Petersburg. Only the small group of
old generals, especially those at the Russian court, who dated from the
days of Alexander II, and who knew and esteemed Emperor William the
Great, still showed their reverence for him and their friendly feeling
toward Germany. In the course of a talk with one of them concerning
the relations between the two courts, armies, and countries, which I
had found undergoing a change in comparison with former times, the
old General said: "C'est ce vilain congrès de Berlin. Une grave faute
du Chancelier. Il a détruit l'ancienne amitié entre nous, planté la
méfiance dans les coeurs de la Cour et du Gouvernement, et fourni le
sentiment d'un grave tort fait à l'armée russe après sa campagne
sanglante de 1877, pour lequel elle veut sa revanche. Et nous voilà
ensemble avec cette maudite République Française, pleins de haine
contre vous et rempli d'idées subversives, qui en cas de guerre avec
vous, nous coûteront notre dynastie."[1]

A prophetic foreshadowing of the downfall of the reigning Russian
dynasty!

From Brest I went to Strassburg, where my grandfather was attending the
Imperial maneuvers. In spite of the failure of my mission I found calm
judgments of the political situation. My grandfather was pleased at
the cordial greetings from the Tsar, which, in so far as the personal
relationship of the two rulers was concerned, showed no change of
heart. Also, to my surprise, I received a letter from Prince Bismarck
wherein he expressed gratitude and appreciation to me for my actions
and my report. This meant all the more since my statements could not
have been agreeable to my grandfather and the Chancellor. The Congress
of Berlin had, especially in Russian military circles, done away with
the remnants of the brotherhood in arms still fostered among us and had
engendered a hatred against everything Prussian and German, stirred
up by association with French officers, which was increased by the
French until it developed into the desire of vengeance by means of
arms. That was the soil in which, later, the World War ambitions of our
foes found nourishment. "Revanche pour Sedan," combined with "Revanche
pour San Stefano." The words of the old General at Brest have remained
unforgettably engraved upon my memory; they induced me to bring about
my many meetings with Alexander III and Nicholas II, at which my
grandfather's wish, impressed upon me on his deathbed, that I watch
over our relations with Russia, has always been my guiding motive.

RELIEF AT CHANCELLOR'S DISMISSAL

In 1890, at the Narva maneuvers, I was obliged to describe minutely
to the Tsar the retirement of Prince Bismarck. The Tsar listened very
attentively. When I had finished, the usually very cool and reserved
sovereign, who seldom spoke about politics, spontaneously seized my
hand, thanked me for this token of my confidence, regretted that I
had been brought into such a situation and added, in exactly these
words: "Je comprends parfaitement ta ligne d'action; le Prince avec
toute sa grandeur n'était après tout rien d'autre que ton employé ou
fonctionnaire. Le moment où il réfusait d'agir selon tes ordres, il
fallait le renvoyer. Moi pour ma part je me suis toujours méfié de lui,
et je ne lui ai jamais cru un mot de ce qu'il faisait savoir ou me
disait lui-même, car j'étais sûr et savais qu'il me blaguait tout le
temps. Pour les rapports entre nous deux, mon cher Guillaume [this was
the first time that the Tsar so addressed me], la chute du Prince aura
les meilleures conséquences, la méfiance disparaîtra. J'ai confiance en
toi. Tu peux te fier à moi."[2]

I immediately wrote down this important talk at the time it occurred.
I am objective enough to ask myself to what extent the courtesy of
one ruler to another and possibly, in addition, the satisfaction at
the elimination of a statesman of Bismarck's importance, can have
influenced the Tsar, consciously or unconsciously, in making the
above-mentioned statement. Prince Bismarck's belief in the Tsar's trust
in him was, subjectively, undoubtedly genuine; and, moreover, there can
be no doubt as to the esteem in which Alexander III held Bismarck's
ability as a statesman.

In any event, the Tsar remained true to his word up to the day of his
death. This, to be sure, did little to change Russia's general policy,
but Germany, at least, was safe from an attack from that quarter. The
straightforward character of Alexander III guaranteed this--it became
otherwise under his weak son.

Whatever one's attitude may be toward Bismarck's Russian policy, one
thing must be acknowledged: the Prince, despite the Congress of Berlin
and the rapprochement of France to Russia, was able to avoid serious
friction. That is equivalent to saying that, reckoning from the time of
the Berlin Congress, he played a superior diplomatic and statesmanlike
game for twelve years (1878-90).

GERMANY AS PEACEMAKER

One must also lay stress upon the fact that it was a German statesman
who, in 1878, prevented a general war, even at the cost of weakening
the relations of Germany to Russia, in the justified belief that he
would succeed, being a statesman of genius who knew exactly what he was
aiming at, in strengthening these relations once more, or, at least,
in avoiding conflicts after he had overcome the crisis threatening all
Europe.

He succeeded in doing that for twelve years and his successors at the
helm of the ship of state succeeded in doing likewise for twenty-four
more years.

When I was a Prince I purposely held aloof from party politics,
concentrating my entire attention upon my duties in the different army
branches to which I was assigned. This afforded me satisfaction and
filled up my whole life. For this reason I avoided, while I was Prince
of Prussia, all attempts to drag me into party activities. Often enough
endeavors were made, under the cloak of harmless functions, teas and
the like, to ensnare me into political circles or for electioneering
purposes. But I always held aloof.

The outcome of the treacherous malady which killed Emperor Frederick
III was frankly told me in advance by German physicians called
into consultation as experts by the English physician, Sir Morell
Mackenzie. My deep grief and sorrow were all the greater because it
was almost impossible for me to speak alone with my beloved father.
He was guarded like a prisoner by the English physicians and, though
reporters from all countries could look upon the poor sick man from
the physicians' room, every kind of obstacle was placed in my path to
keep me from my father's side and even to prevent me from keeping in
constant touch with him by writing; my letters were often intercepted
and not delivered. Moreover, from among the group of watchers, an
infamous, organized campaign of slander was conducted in the newspapers
against me. Two journalists were especially active in this: one Herr
Schnidrowitz and M. Jacques St. Cère, of the _Figaro_--a German
Jew--who slandered him who was later Emperor in the most poisonous way
in France, until the "Petit Sucrier" trial put an end to his activities.

I gave the dying Emperor his last joy on earth when I had the Second
Infantry Brigade march past him, led by me in person. These were the
first and last troops seen by Frederick III as Emperor. He delighted
his son by writing on this occasion, on a little card, that he was
grateful for having had the pleasure of seeing these troops and proud
to call them his own. This event was a ray of light during the gloomy
ninety-nine days, which brought upon me also, as Crown Prince, much
grief, humiliation, and suspicion. In fulfillment of my duty during
this crisis, I kept a watchful eye upon all happenings in military,
official, and social circles, and was inwardly outraged at the signs of
slackness which I noted everywhere, most especially at the hostility
against my mother, which was becoming more and more noticeable.
Moreover, I was naturally deeply hurt at the constant campaign of
slander directed against me which depicted me as living in discord with
my father.

HE BECOMES EMPEROR

After Emperor Frederick III had closed his eyes forever, the heavy
burden of governing the Empire fell upon my youthful shoulders. First
of all I was confronted with the necessity of making changes in the
government personnel in various quarters. The military entourage of the
two emperors, as well as the body of officialdom, had grown too old.
The so-called "maison militaire" (military household of Emperor William
the Great) had been retained in its entirety by Emperor Frederick III,
without being required to discharge military duties. In addition, there
was the entourage of Emperor Frederick III. I proceeded to dismiss,
in the friendliest way, all those gentlemen who wished to go into
retirement; some of them received positions in the army, a few of the
younger remained in my service for the transition period.

During the ninety-nine days, while I was still Crown Prince, I had
silently concerned myself with those personages to whom I proposed
later to give appointments, since the physicians had left me no
doubt that my father had only a short time to live. I ignored court
or external considerations; nothing but previous achievements and
character moved me to my choice. I did away with the term "maison
militaire" and transformed it into "Main Headquarters of His
Majesty." In choosing my entourage I took the advice of only one man
in whom I reposed special confidence, my former chief and brigade
commander, General--afterward Adjutant General--von Versen, a man
of straightforward, knightly, rather harsh character, an officer of
the old Prussian school, a typical chip of the old block. During his
military service in line and guard regiments he had noted with an
observing eye the court influences and tendencies which had often
worked to the disadvantage of the officer corps in the old "maison
militaire." In this direction the circle of ladies of high position,
jokingly known among the officers as "trente et quarante" on account
of their age, also played a certain part. I wished to eliminate such
influences.

I appointed General von Wittich my First Adjutant General and General
von Hahnke, commander of the Second Infantry Guard Division, chief of
my Military Cabinet. The latter was a friend of Emperor Frederick III
and, while I was still serving with the First Infantry Guard Regiment,
he was my brigade commander. These two were men of military experience
and iron principles, who shared absolutely the sentiments of their
master, and remained bound to me to the end of their lives by the most
exemplary fidelity.

As the head of my court I appointed a man known to me from his youth,
the former Court Marshal of my father, Count August Eulenburg, who
remained at the head of the Ministry of the Royal House until his
death in June, 1921, at the age of eighty-two years. He was a man
of fine tact, uncommon ability, clear insight in court as well
as political matters, sincere character, and golden fidelity to
his King and his King's family. His manifold abilities would have
enabled him, to the same degree that they had made him known as Court
Marshal throughout Europe, to act with equal success as ambassador
or as Imperial Chancellor. Working with unswerving zeal, endowed
with winning politeness, he stood by me with helpful counsel in many
matters--dynastic, family, court, public life. He had to do with many
men, in all social strata and all walks of life, by all of whom he was
revered and esteemed, and he was treated by me likewise with friendship
and gratitude.

VICTORIA'S HAND IS FELT

After consultation with Prince Bismarck, Herr von Lucanus from the
Ministry of Public Worship and Instruction, was appointed chief of the
Civil Cabinet. Prince Bismarck observed jokingly that he was pleased
with this choice, since Herr von Lucanus was known to him as an able
and enthusiastic huntsman, which was always a good recommendation for
a civilian official; he added that a good huntsman was a regular good
fellow. Herr von Lucanus took over his post from His Excellency von
Wilmowski. He discharged his duties admirably and, being well endowed
in all pertaining to art, technical matters, science, and politics, he
was to me a counselor, untiring collaborator, and friend. He combined
with a healthy knowledge of men a strong dash of refined humor, which
is so often lacking in men of the Germanic race.

With Prince Bismarck I had stood on very good and trustful terms ever
since my assignment at the Foreign Office. Then, as well as before, I
revered the powerful Chancellor with all the ardor of my youth and was
proud to have served under him and to have the opportunity now to work
with him as my Chancellor.

The Prince, who was present during the last hours of the old Emperor
and had listened with me to the latter's political testament to his
grandson--_i. e._, his wish as to the special care to be lavished upon
relations with Russia--brought about my summer trip to St. Petersburg
as my first political act before the eyes of the world, in order to
emphasize our relationship to Russia in accordance with the last wish
of my dying grandfather. He also had "travel arrangements" drawn up
for me.

An obstacle was placed in the way of carrying out this plan by a
letter from Queen Victoria of England, who, upon hearing of the
projected visit to St. Petersburg, expressed to her eldest grandson,
in a good-humored but authoritative tone, her disapproval of the
contemplated journey. She said that a year of mourning must first
elapse, after which my first visit was due to her, since she was my
grandmother, and to England, it being the native country of my mother,
before other lands should be considered. When I placed this letter
before the Prince, he gave way to a violent fit of anger. He spoke
about "family dictation in England," of interference from that quarter
which must cease; the tone of the letter showed, he said, how the Crown
Prince and Emperor Frederick had been ordered about and influenced
by his mother-in-law, wife, etc. Thereupon the Prince wished to draw
up the text of a reply to the Queen. I remarked that I would prepare
the appropriate answer, steering the proper middle course between the
grandson and the Emperor, and that I would show it to the Prince before
dispatching it.

The answer paid heed in its outward form to the close relationship
between a grandson and his grandmother, who had carried him in her
arms when he was a baby and, in view of her age alone, commanded great
respect--but, in its essentials, it laid stress upon the position and
duty of the German Emperor, compelled to carry out unconditionally a
command of his dying father affecting Germany's most vital interests.
It stated that the grandson was obliged to respect this command of
his grandfather in the interest of the country, the representation of
which interests had now devolved upon him by the will of God, and that
his royal grandmother must leave to him the question of deciding in
what manner this was to be done. I added that, otherwise, I was her
loving grandson, who would always be grateful for any advice from his
grandmother, who had derived so much experience from her long reign;
but that I was, nevertheless, in matters affecting Germany, compelled
to retain my freedom of action; the visit to St. Petersburg, I said,
was politically necessary, and the command of my Imperial grandfather
was consonant with the close family relations between me and the
Russian Imperial house; therefore it would be carried out.

The Prince approved of the letter. The answer, which arrived after a
while, was surprising. The Queen agreed that her grandson was in the
right; he must act in accordance with the interests of his country; she
would be glad to see him, even if it were later on, at her own home.
From that day onward my relations with the Queen, who was feared even
by her own children, were of the best imaginable; from that day onward
she never treated her grandson except as a sovereign of equal rank with
herself!

On my first journeys I was accompanied by Count Herbert, as the
representative of the Foreign Office. He drew up the speeches and
conducted the political conferences, in so far as they were of an
official nature, in accordance with the instructions of his father.

CONFLICT ON TURKISH POLICY

Upon my return from Constantinople in 1889 I described to the Prince
at his request my impressions of Greece, where my sister Sophie was
married to the heir-apparent, Crown Prince Constantine, and also my
Constantinople impressions. In doing this, it struck me that Prince
Bismarck spoke quite disdainfully of Turkey, of the men in high
position there, and of conditions in that land. I thought I might
inspire him in part with essentially more favorable opinions, but my
efforts were of little avail. Upon asking the Prince the reason why
he held such an unfavorable opinion, he answered that Count Herbert
had reported very disapprovingly on Turkey. Prince Bismarck and Count
Herbert were never favorably inclined toward Turkey and they never
agreed with me in my Turkish policy--the old policy of Frederick the
Great.

During the last period of his tenure of office as Chancellor, Bismarck
declared that the maintenance of friendly relations with Russia, whose
Tsar reposed special trust in him, was the most important reason for
his remaining at his post. In this connection it was that he gave me
the first hints concerning the secret reinsurance treaty with Russia.
Up to then I had heard nothing about it, either from the Prince or
the Foreign Office, although it happened that I had concerned myself
especially with Russian matters.

When I assumed the reins of government owing to the early death of my
father, the generation of the grandson, as I have already remarked,
followed upon the generation of the grandfather, which meant that
the entire generation of Emperor Frederick was overleaped. This
generation, through its dealings with Crown Prince Frederick William,
was imbued with many liberal ideas and projects of reform which were
to be carried out under the direction of the Emperor Frederick. Upon
his death, this entire generation, especially the politicians, found
itself deceived in its hopes of exerting influence, and felt itself,
to a certain extent, in the position of an orphan. Those belonging
to it, despite the fact that they did not know my inner thoughts and
aims, adopted a distrustful and reserved attitude toward me, instead of
transferring their interest from the father to the son, for the purpose
of furthering the welfare of the fatherland.

There was one exception to this--a representative of the National
Liberals, Herr von Benda--a man still in the full bloom of youth. While
I was still Prince I had made his acquaintance at the great hare hunts
got up by Councilor Dietze at Barby. There Herr von Benda had won my
affection and confidence when I, surrounded by older men, had listened
to discussions on political, agricultural, and national-economic
questions. In the course of these, Herr von Benda held my attention
by means of his independent, interesting judgment. I accepted with
pleasure an invitation to Benda's country seat, Rudow, near Berlin, and
from this arose the custom of a regular yearly visit.

The hours spent in the family circle at Rudow stand out pleasantly in
my memory. His talented daughters used to regale us with music. The
political conversations there proved Herr von Benda to be a man of
great foresight, which, free from partisan considerations, gave him
an open mind as to the general needs of the state to an extent seldom
found among members of political parties. He gave me many a helpful
piece of advice for the future, drawn from the depths of his faithful,
genuinely Prussian heart, by which he was attached firmly to the family
of his sovereign; yet he was able to feel broad tolerance for other
parties.

HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD PARTIES

The later periods of my reign proved that I was not hostile to any
party, with the exception of the Ultra-Socialists; also, that I was
not anti-Liberal. My most important Finance Minister was the Liberal,
Miquel; my Minister of Commerce was the Liberal, Möller; the leader
of the Liberals, Herr von Bennigsen, was Chief President of Hanover.
I stood very close, especially in the second half of my reign, to
an elderly Liberal deputy, whose acquaintance I made through Herr
von Miquel. This man was Herr Seydel (Celchen), owner of an estate
in eastern Germany--a man with two clever eyes, which gazed forth
from a clean-shaven face. He worked with Miquel in railway and canal
questions, and was a thoroughly able, simple, practical man--a Liberal
with a streak of conservatism.

Naturally, I had numerous dealings and points of contact with the
Conservative party, since the gentlemen of the country nobility often
met me at court hunts and other hunts, or else came to court and served
in court positions. Through them I could become thoroughly informed on
all agrarian questions and learn where the farmer's shoe pinched him.

The Free Thinkers, under the "unswerving" leader, entered into no
relations with me; they limited themselves to opposition.

In my conversations with Benda and Bennigsen we often spoke of the
future of Liberalism, and, on one occasion, Benda made this interesting
observation: "It is not necessary and also not advisable to have the
Prussian heir-apparent dabble in Liberalism--we have no use for that
sort of thing. He must be essentially conservative, though he must,
at the same time, combine this with breadth, and avoid narrowness and
prejudice against other parties."

Bennigsen agreed with me when I spoke to him of the necessity of
having the National Liberals revise their program, which--originally
bearing the motto: "Maintenance of the German Empire and Freedom of
the Press"--had long since rallied the members around the Liberal
banner--in order that, by such revision, the proselytizing power of
the old brand of Prussian Liberalism should not be lost among the
people. Both the Prussian Liberals and the Conservatives, I continued,
made the mistake of remembering too well the old period of conflict of
1861-66; and, at elections and other political fights, they were prone
to fall back into the habits of those days. That period, I said, had
already passed into history and come to an end so far as our generation
was concerned; the present had begun for us with the year 1870 and the
new Empire; our generation had drawn a line under the year 1866; we
must build anew upon the foundations of the Empire; political parties
must shape their course also in this direction and not take over from
the past stuff that was outworn and, moreover, calculated to create
discord. Unfortunately, all this has not come to pass. Bennigsen made
a very telling point when he said: "Woe to the North German Liberals
if they come under the leadership of the South German Democrats, for
that will mean the end of real, genuine Liberalism! Then we shall get
the masked democracy arising from below, for which we have no use
hereabout."

The Conservative party, honorable and faithful to its King,
unfortunately has not always produced leaders of superior endowments
who were at the same time skillful, tactically trained politicians. The
agrarian wing was at times too strongly marked and was a burden to the
party. Moreover, memories of the period of conflict were still too
lively. I counseled union with the Liberals, but found little support.
I often pointed out that the National Liberals in the Empire were true
to the Empire and to the Emperor, for which reason they should be
thoroughly welcome to the Conservatives as allies; that I could not and
did not wish to govern without them in the Empire, and was absolutely
unwilling to govern against them; that North German conservatism was
misunderstood in some parts of the Empire because of differences in
historical development; and that, therefore, the National Liberals were
the natural allies. It was owing to these views of mine, for instance,
that I removed Court Preacher Stöcker, a man of brilliant achievement
as a social missionary, from his post, since he made a demagogical
provocative speech in South Germany, aimed against the Liberals there.

The Center party was welded together by the "Kulturkampf" and was
strongly anti-Protestant and hostile to the Empire. Notwithstanding
this, I had dealings with many important men of the party and managed
to interest them in practical collaboration for the good of all. In
this Schorlemer (the father) was especially helpful to me. He never
made a secret of his Prussian loyalty to his King. His son, the
well-known Minister of Agriculture, even joined the Conservative party.
In many matters the Center co-operated; at one period it possessed in
its old leader, Windthorst, the keenest politician in the legislature.
Nevertheless, in spite of all this, one could not help being aware of
the underlying Centerist conviction that the interests of the Roman
Church must always be maintained and never relegated to a secondary
place.

THE BREAK WITH BISMARCK

When I was Prince William I was placed for a long time under the Chief
President of the Province of Brandenburg, von Achenbach, in order that
I might learn about home administration, get experience in economic
questions, and, moreover, take an active part in the work. Spurred
on by the captivating discourses of Achenbach, I derived from this
period of my life a special interest in the economic side of the inner
development of the country, whereas the purely judicial side of the
administration interested me to a lesser degree. Improvements, canal
construction, highway building, forestry, improvement in all kinds of
transportation facilities, betterment of dwellings, introduction of
machines into agriculture and their co-operative development--all of
these were matters with which I busied myself later on; this being
especially true of hydraulic work and the development of the network
of railways, particularly in the badly neglected territory of Eastern
Germany.

I discussed all these matters with the Ministers of State after I
had ascended the throne. In order to spur them on, I allowed them
free rein in their various domains. But it turned out that this was
hardly possible so long as Prince Bismarck remained in office, since
he reserved for himself the main deciding voice in everything, thereby
impairing the independence of those working with him. I soon saw that
the Ministers, being entirely under Bismarck's thumb, could not come
out in favor of "innovations" or ideas of the "young master" of which
Bismarck disapproved.

The Ministry, in short, was nothing but a tool in the hands of
Bismarck, acting solely in accordance with his wishes. This state
of things was, in itself, natural enough, since a Premier of such
overwhelming importance, who had won for Prussia and Germany such great
political victories, naturally dominated his Ministers completely and
led them despotically. Nevertheless, I found myself in a difficult
position; the typical answer with which my suggestions were met was:
"Prince Bismarck does not want that done; we cannot get him to consent
to that; Emperor William I would not have asked such a thing; that is
not in accordance with tradition, etc." I understood more and more
that, in reality, I had no Ministry of State at my disposal; that the
gentlemen composing it, from long force of habit, considered themselves
officials of Prince Bismarck.

Here is an example to show the attitude of the Cabinet toward me in
those Bismarck days: The question came up of renewing the Socialist
law, a political measure devised by Prince Bismarck for fighting
socialism. A certain paragraph therein was to be toned down, in order
to save the law. Bismarck opposed the change. There were sharp
differences of opinion. I summoned a Crown Council. Bismarck spoke
in the antechamber with my adjutant; he declared that His Majesty
completely forgot that he was an officer and wore a sword belt; that
he must fall back upon the army and lead it against the Socialists,
in case the Socialists should resort to revolutionary measures; that
the Emperor should leave him a free hand, which would restore quiet
once for all. At the Crown Council Bismarck stuck to his opinion. The
individual Ministers, when asked to express their views, were lukewarm.
A vote was taken--the entire Ministry voted against me.

This vote showed me once more the absolute domination exerted by the
Chancellor over his Ministers. Deeply dissatisfied, I talked over the
matter with His Excellency Lucanus, who was as much struck as I was by
the situation. Lucanus looked up some of the gentlemen and took them to
task for their attitude, whereupon they made it clear that they were
"not in a position" to oppose the Prince and declared that it was quite
impossible for anybody to expect them to vote against the wishes of the
Prince.

HANDLING A COAL STRIKE

The great Westphalian coal workers' strike in the spring of 1889 took
the civil administration by surprise, causing great confusion and
bewilderment, especially among members of the Westphalian provincial
administration. From all sides came calls for troops; every mine owner
wanted, if possible, to have sentries posted outside his room. The
commanders of the troops which were summoned immediately made reports
on the situation as they had found it.

Among these was one of my former barrack comrades, belonging to the
Hussar Guard Regiment, von Michaelis by name, who was famous as a wit.
He rode, alone and unarmed, among the striking crowds of workers,
who--the early spring being remarkably warm--were camped upon the
hillsides, and soon managed, by his confidence-inspiring, jovial ways,
to set up a harmless intercourse with the strikers. By questioning them
he obtained much valuable information about the grievances--real and
imaginary--of the workers, as well as about their plans, hopes, and
wishes for the future. He soon won for himself general appreciation
and affection among the workers and handled them so well that complete
quiet reigned in his territory. When I, on account of nervous and
worried telegrams from the big industrial leaders and officials
received at the office of the Imperial Chancellor, inquired of
Michaelis how the situation stood, the following telegraphed answer
came from him: "Everything quiet excepting the Government officials."

A mass of material was collected, during the spring and summer, from
the announcements and reports received which showed clearly that
all was not well in industrial circles; that many a wish of the
workers was justified and, to say the least, entitled to sympathetic
investigation on the part both of the employers and of the officials.
The realization of this, which was confirmed in me when I questioned
my former private teacher, Privy Councilor Dr. Hinzpeter--a man
particularly well informed on social phenomena, especially those in his
own province--caused the resolve to ripen in me to summon the State
Council, include employers and employees in its deliberations, and
bring about, under my personal direction, a thorough investigation of
the labor question. I decided that in so doing guiding principles and
material were to be acquired which would serve the Chancellor and the
Prussian Government as a basis for working out appropriate projects for
new laws.

Inspired by such thought I went to His Excellency von Bötticher, who
at once prophesied opposition on the part of the Chancellor to such
action, and advised strongly against it. I stuck to my ideas, adducing
in support of them the maxim of Frederick the Great: "Je veux être un
Roi des gueux" ("I wish to be King of the rabble"). I said that it was
my duty to take care of those Germans who were used up by industry, to
protect their strength and better their chances of existence.

FURTHER CONFLICT WITH CHANCELLOR

The predicted opposition from Prince Bismarck was not long in coming.
There was much trouble and fighting before I put through what I wanted,
owing to the fact that some of the big industrial interests ranged
themselves on the side of the Chancellor. The State Council met,
presided over by me. At the opening session the Chancellor unexpectedly
appeared. He made a speech in which he ironically criticized and
disapproved the whole undertaking set in motion by me, and refused his
co-operation. Thereupon he walked out of the room.

After his departure the strange scene had its effect on the assemblage.
The fury and ruthlessness which the great Chancellor brought to the
support of his own policy and against mine, based upon his absolute
belief in the correctness of his own judgment, made a tremendous
impression upon me and all those present. Nevertheless, it stood to
reason that I was deeply hurt by what had occurred. The assemblage
proceeded to take up its work again and turned out a wealth of material
for the extension of that social legislation called into being by
Emperor William the Great, which is the pride of Germany, evincing, as
it does, a protective attitude toward the laboring classes such as is
not to be found in any other land on earth.

Thereupon I decided to summon a general social congress. Prince
Bismarck opposed this also. Switzerland was contemplating something
similar, and had thought of convening a congress at Berne. Roth,
the Swiss ambassador, hearing of my scheme, advised canceling the
invitations to Berne and accepting an invitation to Berlin. What he
wished occurred. Thanks to the generosity of Herr Roth, it was possible
to convene the congress at Berlin. The material collected as a result
of it was worked out and applied in the form of laws--only in Germany,
however.

Later on I talked with Bismarck concerning his project of fighting
the socialists, in case they resorted to revolutionary acts, with
cannon and bayonets. I sought to convince him that it was out of
the question for me, almost immediately after William the Great had
closed his eyes after a blessed reign, to stain the first years of my
Government with the blood of my own people. Bismarck was unmoved; he
declared that he would assume responsibility for his actions; that all
I need do was to leave the thing to him. I answered that I could not
square such a course with my conscience and my responsibility before
God, particularly as I knew perfectly well that conditions among the
laboring classes were bad and must be bettered at all costs.

The conflict between the views of the Emperor and the Chancellor
relative to the social question--_i. e._, the furtherance of the
welfare of the laboring classes of the population, with participation
therein by the state--was the real cause of the break between us,
and caused a hostility toward me, lasting for years, on the part of
Bismarck and a large part of the German nation that was devoted to him,
especially of the official class.

This conflict between the Chancellor and me arose because of his belief
that the social problem could be solved by severe measures and, if
the worst came to the worst, by means of soldiers; not by following
principles of general love for mankind or humanitarian nonsense which,
he believed, he would have to adopt in conformity to my views.

BISMARCK'S LABOR VIEWS

Bismarck was not a foe to the laboring classes--on that I wish to lay
stress, in view of what I have previously said. On the contrary! He
was far too great a statesman to mistake the importance of the labor
question to the state. But he considered the whole matter from the
standpoint of pure expediency for the state. The state, he believed,
should care for the laborer, as much and in whatever manner it deemed
proper; he would not admit of any co-operation of the workers in this.
Agitation and rebellion, he believed, should be severely suppressed; by
force of arms, if necessary. Government protection on the one hand, the
mailed fist on the other--that was Bismarck's social policy.

I, however, wished to win over the soul of the German workingman,
and I fought zealously to attain this goal. I was filled with the
consciousness of a plain duty and responsibility toward my entire
people--also, therefore, toward the laboring classes. What was theirs
by right and justice should become theirs, I thought; moreover, I
believed that this should be brought about, wherever the will or power
of the employers ceased, by the lord of the land and his Government, in
so far as justice or necessity demanded. As soon as I had recognized
the necessity for reforms, to some of which the industrial elements
would not consent, I took up the cudgels for the laboring classes,
impelled by a sense of justice.

I had studied history sufficiently to guard myself against the delusion
of believing in the possibility of making an entire people happy. I
realized clearly that it was impossible for one human being to make
a nation happy. The truth is that the only nation which is happy is
the one that is contented, or at least is willing to be contented; a
willingness which implies a certain degree of realization of what is
possible--a sense of the practical, in short. Unfortunately, there is
often a lack of this.

I was well aware that, in the unbounded demands of the Socialist
leaders, unjustified greed would be constantly developed anew. But,
for the very reason that I wished to be able to combat unjustified
aspirations with a clear conscience and in a convincing way, it
behooved me not to deny recognition and aid to justified aspirations.

GERMAN SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The policy that kept in view the welfare of the workers unquestionably
imposed a heavy burden upon all the industrial elements of Germany in
the matter of competition in the world market, through the well-known
laws for the protection of workingmen. This was especially true in
relation to an industrial system like the Belgian, which could,
without hindrance, squeeze the last drop out of the human reserves of
Belgium and pay low wages, without feeling any pangs of conscience or
compassion for the sinking morale of the exhausted, unprotected people.
By means of my social legislation I made such conditions impossible in
Germany, and I caused it to be introduced also in Belgium, during the
war, by General von Bissing, in order to promote the welfare of the
Belgian workers. First of all, however, this legislation is--to use a
sporting term--a handicap upon German industry in the battle of world
competition: it alienated many big leaders of industry, which, from
their point of view, was quite natural. But the lord of the land must
always bear in mind the welfare of the whole nation; therefore, I went
my way unswervingly.

Those workers, on the other hand, who blindly followed the Socialist
leaders, gave me no word of thanks for the protection created for them
nor for the work I had done. Between them and me lies the motto of the
Hohenzollerns, "Suum cuique." That means, "To each his own"--not, as
the Social Democrats would have it, "To everyone the same!"

I also harbored the idea of preventing to some extent competitive
warfare, at least in the industrial world of the European continent,
by bringing about a sort of quota-fixing in foreign lands, thereby
facilitating production and making possible a healthier mode of life
among the working classes.

There is great significance in the impression which foreign workers
get in studying Germany's social legislation. A few years before the
war people in England, under the pressure of labor troubles, awoke
to the conviction that better care must be taken of the workers.
As a result of this, commissions visited Germany, some of them
composed of workingmen. Guided by representative Germans, among them
Socialists, they visited the industrial regions, factories, benevolent
institutions, sanatoria of insurance companies, etc., and were
astonished at all the things they saw. At the farewell dinner given
them the English leader of the workingmen's deputation turned to Bebel
and made this concluding remark:

"After all we have seen of what is done in Germany for the workers, I
ask you: Are you people still Socialists?" And the Englishmen remarked
to a German that they would be quite satisfied if they could succeed,
after long fights in Parliament, in putting through one tenth of what
had already been accomplished years before in Germany toward bettering
the condition of the laboring classes.

I had observed with interest these visits of the English deputations
and marveled at their ignorance of German conditions. But I marveled
even more at a question asked by the English Government, through the
channel of the English Embassy, on the same subject, which betrayed an
absolutely amazing lack of knowledge of the progress made in Germany
in the province of social reform. I questioned the English ambassador,
remarking that England, having been represented in 1890 at the Berlin
Social Congress, must certainly have been informed, at least through
the Embassy, of the Reichstag debates, which had dealt in a detailed
way with the various social measures. The ambassador replied that the
same thing had also occurred to him and caused him to have the earlier
records of the Embassy investigated, whereupon it had transpired that
the Embassy had sent the fullest reports on the subject to London
and that thorough reports had been forwarded home concerning every
important stage in the progress of social reform; but, "because they
came from Germany, nobody ever read them; they were simply pigeon-holed
and remained there ever since; it is a downright shame; Germany does
not interest people at home."

Thus the Briton, with a shrug of his shoulders. Neither the British
King nor Parliament had enough conscience or time or desire to work for
the betterment of the working class. The "policy of encirclement" for
the annihilation of Germany, especially of its industry, and, thereby,
of its working population, was, in their eyes, far more important and
rewarding. On the 9th of November (1918) the German Radical Socialist
leaders, with their like-minded followers, joined forces with this
British policy of annihilation.

"WELFARE WORK" AT THE COURT

In a small way, in places where I had influence, as, for instance, in
the administration of my court and in the Imperial Automobile Club,
I laid stress upon the social point of view. For instance, I caused
a fund to be established, out of the tips paid for visiting palaces,
which was destined solely to the benefit of the domestic staff, and
which, in the course of time, reached a magnificent total. From this
fund the domestics and their families received money for trips to
bathing resorts, cost of taking cures, burial expenses, dowries for
their children, confirmation expenses, and similar payments.

When I, at the request of the newly founded Imperial Automobile Club,
took it under my protection, I accepted an invitation to a luncheon in
the beautiful rooms of the clubhouse, built by Ihne. In addition to
magnates like the Duke of Ratibor, the Duke of Ujest, etc., I found
there a number of gentlemen from Berlin's high financial circles, some
of whom behaved rather wildly. When the conversation turned to the
subject of drivers, I suggested establishing a fund which, in case of
accident, illness, or death befalling these men, should provide means
of livelihood for those whom they left behind. The suggestion met with
unanimous approval, and the fund has had most excellent results. Later
on I brought about the establishment of something similar for the
skippers and pilots attached to the Imperial Yacht Club at Kiel.

Special pleasure was afforded me by the Kaiser Wilhelm Children's
Home, founded by me at Ahlbeck, at which, in peace times, between May
and the end of September in each year, a large number of children
from the most poverty-stricken working people's districts in Berlin
were accommodated in successive detachments, each lot staying four
weeks. This home is still under the tried direction of the admirable
superintendent, Miss Kirschner, daughter of the former Chief
Burgomaster of Berlin, and it has achieved most brilliant results,
both in the physical and the psychical domain. Weakened, pale, needy
children were transformed there into fresh, blooming, happy little
beings, concerning whose welfare I often joyfully convinced myself by
personal visits.

For the very reason that I have spoken of my quarrel with Bismarck
as a result of labor questions, I wish to add to what I have already
said about his basic position in the matter--an example showing how
brilliantly the Prince behaved in something that concerned the workers.
In this, to be sure, he was impelled by nationalistic motives, but he
also realized at once that it was necessary to protect a large element
against unemployment, which caused him to intervene with the full
weight of his authority.

Sometime around 1886, while I was still Prince Wilhelm, I had learned
that the great Vulcan shipping concern at Stettin was confronted,
owing to lack of orders, with bankruptcy, and its entire force of
workmen, numbering many thousands, with starvation, which would mean a
catastrophe for the city of Stettin. Only by an order for the building
of a big ship could the Vulcan shipyards be saved.

Spurred on some time before by Admiral von Stosch, who wished to free
us once and for all from the English shipbuilders, the Vulcan people
had set to work courageously to build the first German armored ship,
christened by my mother in 1874 on her birthday, on which occasion I
was present. Ever since that time the warships built at the Vulcan
yards had always satisfied naval experts--the concern, however, seldom
built warships.

THE CHANCELLOR IN ACTION

The German merchant marine, on the other hand, had not dared to follow
the path courageously blazed by Admiral von Stosch. And now the brave
German shipyard company was faced with ruin, since the North German
Lloyd had refused its offer to build a passenger steamer, alleging
that the English, because of their years of shipbuilding traditions,
could build it better. It was a serious emergency. I hastened to Prince
Bismarck and laid before him the matter as I have described it above.

The Chancellor was furious; his eyes flashed, his fist came crashing
down on the table.

"What! Do you mean to say that these shopkeepers would rather have
their boats built in England than in Germany? Why, that is unheard of!
And is a good German shipyard to fail for such a reason? The devil take
this gang of traders!"

He rang the bell and a servant entered.

"Have Privy Councilor X come here immediately from the Foreign Office!"

In a few minutes--during which the Prince stamped up and down the
room--the man summoned appeared.

"Telegram to Hamburg, to our envoy--the Lloyd in Bremen is to have its
new ship built by the Vulcan Company in Stettin!"

The Privy Councilor vanished in hot haste, "with his coat tails
sticking straight out behind him." The Prince turned to me and said:
"I am greatly obliged to you. You have done the fatherland, and also
myself, an important service. Henceforth ships will be built only in
our yards--I'll take care to make this clear to the Hanseatic crowd.
You may telegraph to the Vulcan people that the Chancellor will
guarantee that the ship will be built in the Vulcan yards. May this be
the first of a whole lot of such ships! As for the workers whom you
have thus saved from unemployment, I hope that they will express their
thanks to you!"

I passed on the news to Privy Councilor Schlutow at Stettin and great
was the joy caused thereby. This was the first step upon the road
destined to lead to the construction of the magnificent German express
steamers.

When I went, after I had ascended the throne in 1888, to Stettin,
in order to place honorary insignia on the flags of my Pomeranian
Grenadiers, I also visited the Vulcan shipyards, at the invitation of
the directors. After my reception by the directors outside the yards,
the great doors were flung open and I walked inside. But, instead of
work and pounding hammers, I found deep silence. The entire body of
workmen was standing in a half circle, with bared heads; in the middle
stood the oldest workman of all, a man with a snow-white beard, bearing
a laurel wreath in his hand.

I was deeply moved. Schlutow whispered to me: "A little pleasure for
you, which the workmen themselves have thought up." The old workman
stepped forward and, in pithy, plain words, expressed to me the
gratitude of the workmen to me for having saved them, and, above all,
their wives and children, from hardship and hunger, by my appeal to
Bismarck about the building of the ship. As a token of their gratitude,
he asked my permission to hand over the laurel wreath. Most deeply
moved, I took the wreath and expressed my pleasure at receiving my
first laurels, without the shedding of a drop of blood, from the hands
of honest German workmen.

That was in the year 1888! In those days, the German laboring classes
knew how to appreciate the blessing of labor.

[1] "It is that confounded Congress of Berlin. A serious mistake on
the part of the Chancellor. He has destroyed the old friendship
between us, sown distrust in the hearts of the Court and the
Government, and engendered the idea of a great injustice done
the Russian army after its bloody 1877 campaign, for which it
wishes revenge. And here we are by the side of that damned French
Republic, full of hate for you and of subversive ideas, which, in
case of a war against you, will cost us our dynasty."

[2] "I understand perfectly your line of action; the Prince, with all
his greatness, was, after all, merely your employee or official.
As soon as he refused to follow your orders, it was necessary
to dismiss him. As for me, I always distrusted him, and I never
believed a word of what he had told me or said to me himself,
for I was sure and knew that he was hoaxing me all the time. As
to the relations between us two, my dear William, the downfall
of the Prince will have the best of results; distrust will
disappear. I have confidence in you. You can trust me."

CHAPTER II

Caprivi

When I began my reign, General von Caprivi was Chief of the Admiralty.
He was the last general to hold this post. I at once took energetically
in hand the development and reform--in fact, one may say the foundation
anew--of the Imperial German Navy, based on my preliminary studies in
England and at home. That was not to the liking of the General, who was
able, but rather self-willed, and not entirely devoid of pride.

Unquestionably he had rendered valuable services in mobilization,
improvement of the officer corps, and the improvement and development
of the torpedo-boat organization. On the other hand, the building of
ships and the replacement of worn-out material were in a deplorable
state, to the detriment of the fleet and to the dissatisfaction of
the shipbuilding industry, which was growing and looking about for
employment.

Being an old Prussian general, Caprivi's way of thinking was that of
his day--that of his comrades of 1864, 1865, 1870, 1871--in his eyes,
the army had always done everything and would continue to do so in
the future; therefore, no great demands for money to be devoted to the
navy should be imposed upon the country, since, should this be done,
there was danger that the sums destined to the army might be decreased
and its development thereby hampered. This idea, from which he was
not to be dissuaded, is false. The amounts granted did not flow into
a reservoir from which they might be directed, by the mere turning of
a valve, now into army, now into navy, channels. Whenever Caprivi was
unwilling to demand anything for naval construction, in order, by so
doing, to turn more money toward the army, things did not happen as he
foresaw. By his action the army received not one penny more, but merely
whatever the Minister of War asked for and received in accordance with
his budget.

There was need of creating a Secretaryship of State for the Navy which,
entirely independent of the Ministry of War, should have as its duty
to demand and obtain for the navy as much as was required for the
protection of our commerce and colonies. And that is what came to pass
later on.

Caprivi soon came to me with the request that I relieve him from
his post. He stated that he was not satisfied with it in itself;
that, moreover, I had all sorts of plans for the future affecting
the navy which he considered impossible of realization, in the first
place, because there existed no means of replacement for the officer
corps--at that time the yearly influx of cadets was between sixty and
eighty--and a large navy without a large officer corps was unthinkable.
In addition to this, he informed me, he had soon seen in the course of
the inspection tours of His Majesty that the Emperor knew more about
naval matters than he, the General, which placed him in an impossible
situation in relation to his subordinates.

In view of these circumstances, I parted with him, placing him in
command of an army corps. Following the motto, "The navy for the
seamen!" I chose, for the first time, an admiral as its chief, a step
which was received in maritime circles with great joy. The man chosen
was Admiral Count Monts.

BISMARCK'S SUCCESSOR

When I was soon afterward confronted with the rather unexpected
retirement of Prince Bismarck, I found the choice of his successor
a difficult one. Whoever it might be was sure to have a hard task,
without any prospect of appreciation for what he might achieve; he
would be looked upon as the usurper of a post to which he was not
entitled, and which he was not qualified to fill. Criticism, criticism,
nothing but criticism--that was sure to be the daily bread upon which
the new Chancellor must reckon; and he was also certain of becoming
the target for the hostility of all those who favored Prince Bismarck
as well as with that of the many who previously could not do enough in
opposition to him. There was bound to be a strong current of enmity
toward the new Chancellor, in which the old Prince himself would not
be the least serious factor.

After taking all this into consideration, it was decided to choose a
man belonging to Prince Bismarck's generation, who had held a leading
position in the wars and had already filled a Government position under
him. Hence Caprivi was chosen. His age was a guarantee that he would be
a careful and calm adviser for the "orphaned" young Emperor.

Very soon the question arose of the extension of the reinsurance treaty
with Russia. Caprivi declared that, out of consideration for Austria,
he was unable to renew it, since the threat against Austria contained
therein, when it became known in Vienna--as it almost unavoidably
would--was such as to lead to very disagreeable consequences. For
this reason the treaty lapsed. To my way of thinking, it had already
lost its main value from the fact that the Russians no longer stood
whole-heartedly behind it. I was confirmed in this view by a memorial
written by Count Berchem, Under Secretary of State, who had worked with
Prince Bismarck.

The Agrarian Conservatives opposed Caprivi as a man without landed
property and a violent fight raged around the commercial treaties.
These difficulties were greatly enhanced because Prince Bismarck,
ignoring his former maxims, took part in the fight against his
successor with all his characteristic energy. Thus arose the
opposition of the Conservatives against the Government and the
Crown, and the Prince in person sowed the seed from which later
grew the "misunderstood Bismarck" and that "Reichsverdrossenheit"
(unfriendliness to the Empire) so often taken up in the newspapers. The
"misunderstood Bismarck" created permanent opposition throughout my
reign against my suggestions and aims by means of quotations, speeches,
and writings, as well as by passive resistance and thoughtless
criticism. Everything that was done was painted in black colors,
made ridiculous, and criticized from top to bottom, by a press that
placed itself quite willingly at the disposal of the Prince and often
out-Bismarcked Bismarck in its behavior.

This phenomenon became most apparent at the time of the acquisition of
Heligoland. This island, lying close in front of the great waterways
leading to the principal Hanseatic commercial ports, was, in the
hands of the British, a constant menace to Hamburg and Bremen and
rendered impossible any project for building up a navy. Owing to this,
I had firmly resolved to win back this formerly German island to its
fatherland.

THE DEAL FOR HELIGOLAND

The way to cause England to give up the red rock of Heligoland was
found in the colonial domain. Lord Salisbury proved inclined to
exchange the "barren rock" for Zanzibar and Witu in East Africa.
From commercial sources and the reports of the commanders of German
cruisers and gunboats which were stationed there and cruised along
the coast of the recently acquired German East African colonies, I
knew that, as soon as Togo, Dar-es-Salaam, etc., rose to prosperity,
the importance of Zanzibar on the coast of Africa as the principal
port of transshipment would be a thing of the past, since, as soon as
the above-mentioned harbors were made deep enough and provided with
sufficient cargo-loading equipment for trading steamers, there would no
longer be any need of ferrying goods coming from the interior in dhows
to Zanzibar, in order to have them again loaded on vessels there, since
they could be loaded direct at the new harbors along the coast.

Therefore, I was convinced that we had, first, an acceptable asset
for swapping purposes, and, secondly, a good opportunity to avoid
colonial friction with England and come to a friendly understanding
with her. Caprivi agreed, the negotiations were concluded, and one
evening, shortly before dinner, I was able to tell the Empress and a
few intimates the exceedingly joyful tidings that Heligoland had become
German.

A first and very important extension of the Empire had been
achieved--without bloodshed--the first condition for the upbuilding of
the fleet was fulfilled, something which the natives of the Hanseatic
towns and the rest of the North Germans had wished for centuries had
come to pass. In silence, an important event had occurred.

Had Heligoland been acquired in the Chancellorship of Prince Bismarck,
it would probably have been valued very highly. Having happened under
Caprivi, it loosed a lot of criticism. It was merely Caprivi, the
usurper, who had had the audacity to sit in the Prince's chair, and
the "irresponsible," "ungrateful," "impulsive" young master who had
done such a thing! Had Bismarck only wished, he could have had the old
rock any day, but he never would have been so unskillful as to give up
to the English for it the very promising African possessions, and he
never would have allowed himself to be thus worsted. That was the sort
of thing heard almost everywhere. The newspapers of the Prince joined
loudly in this sort of criticism, to the great grief of the people of
the Hanseatic cities.

Curious indeed were the criticisms occasioned by the swapping of
Zanzibar and Witu, which appeared in the Bismarckian press, although
previously, when I worked under him, these newspapers had always
explained that he had not much belief in the value of colonies in
themselves and looked upon them merely as objects to be exchanged,
possibly, for something else, in deals with the British. His successor
acted according to these ideas in the Heligoland question, and was
most violently criticized and attacked. Not until the World War was
on did I see articles in the German press which unreservedly admitted
the acquisition of Heligoland to be an act of far-sighted politics
and added reflections as to what would doubtless have happened if
Heligoland had not become German.

The German nation has every reason to be thankful to Count Caprivi
for this achievement, since thereby the building of its navy and its
victory at the Skagerrak were made possible. As for the German navy, it
long ago acknowledged this.

The school law of Count Zedlitz aroused violent new conflicts. When
they led to Zedlitz's retirement, the cry arose among his adherents:
"If the Count goes, so must the Chancellor."

Caprivi left his post, in a calm, dignified manner. He tried honestly,
within the measure of his powers and abilities, to continue the
traditions of Prince Bismarck. In this he found little support among
the political parties, and, for this reason, all the more criticism and
hostility in the public and among those who, had they acted for the
right and the interests of the state, should have stood by him. Without
one word of apology, Caprivi, in noble silence, lived all the rest of
his life in almost solitary retirement.

CHAPTER III

Hohenlohe

Again I was confronted with the difficult task of choosing a
Chancellor. His position and activities were to be under somewhat about
the same auspices and subject to the same conditions as in the case
of his predecessor. But now there was more of a desire that he should
be a statesman, an older man, of course, qualified to inspire Prince
Bismarck with more confidence than a mere general could do.

It was assumed that a statesman would know better how to walk in the
footsteps of the Prince, politically speaking; and provide Bismarck
with less opportunity for criticism and attacks. These latter had
tended to create gradually among all Government officials, who dated
mostly from the period of Bismarck, an unmistakable nervousness and
dissatisfaction, by which the work of the entire governmental system
was impaired to an extent by no means inconsiderable. Moreover, it
lent to the opposition in the Reichstag a constantly renewed strength
drawn from elements previously faithful to the Government, and made
itself felt in a detrimental manner. Especially in the Foreign Office,
the spirit of Holstein, the supposed representative of the "old,
tried Bismarckian traditions," began to assert itself, so that the
unwillingness to collaborate with the Emperor became particularly
strong and the belief grew up that it was necessary to carry on,
independently, the policy of Bismarck.

After mature deliberation, I decided to intrust the post of Chancellor
to Prince Hohenlohe, who was then Governor of Alsace-Lorraine. At the
outbreak of the War of 1870 he had succeeded, as Bavarian Minister, in
getting Bavaria to enter the war on the side of Prussia. Ever since he
had been highly esteemed by Prince Bismarck on account of his fidelity
to the Empire. It was natural to expect that Bismarck's opposition
would cool off when confronted with such a successor. Thus, the choice
of Hohenlohe as Chancellor was strongly influenced by consideration for
Prince Bismarck and for the public opinion inspired by him.

Prince Hohenlohe was the typical old-style grand seigneur. He was
thoroughly urbane by nature and in his dealings with others: a man of
refined mind, with a slight touch of playful irony sometimes glinting
through, keen on account of his years, a level-headed observer and
judge of men. Despite the great difference in age between him and me he
got along very well with me, which was shown on the surface by the fact
that he was treated both by the Empress and by myself as our uncle, and
addressed as such, which brought about a certain atmosphere of intimate
confidence in our intercourse. In his talks with me, especially in
giving his opinion as to appointments of officials, he offered very
characteristic descriptions of the gentlemen being discussed, often
combined with philosophical observations which proved that he had
reflected deeply on life and humanity, and which were evidence of a
maturity and wisdom grounded on experience.

Something happened during the first period of Hohenlohe's régime as
Chancellor which throws an interesting light upon the relations between
France and Russia. Having, at the time of the fraternization between
Russia and France, received reliable information from the General
Staff as well as from our Embassy at Paris to the effect that France
contemplated withdrawing a portion of her troops from Algeria, in
order to shift them to southern France either against Italy or against
Alsace, I apprised Tsar Nicholas II of this news, adding the remark
that I should be obliged to adopt counter-measures unless the Tsar
could dissuade his ally from so provocative a step.

SOME DIPLOMATIC FENCING

At that time the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was Prince
Lobanoff, formerly ambassador at Vienna, well known for his pro-French
proclivities. During the summer of 1895 he had visited France and been
very cordially entertained. During the autumn, just as I was staying
for the hunting at Hubertusstock on the Schorfheide near Eberswalde,
Prince Lobanoff, on his return journey from Paris, requested to be
received in audience, at the behest of the Tsar. Upon being received
by me he described the calm and sensible frame of mind which he
had found in Paris and sought to quiet me, too, with regard to the
above-mentioned troop movements, which, according to him, were mere
empty rumor and chatter without any real basis. He added that he was
bringing to me the most quieting assurances, that there was no reason
for my feeling the slightest alarm. I thanked him heartily for his
report, remarking that the word "alarm" was not to be found in the
dictionary of a German officer; and I added that, if France and Russia
wished to make war, I could not prevent it.

Whereupon the Prince, piously casting up his eyes toward heaven, made
the sign of the cross and said: "Oh, la guerre! quelle idée; qui y
pense?--cela ne doit pas être" ("Oh, war! what an idea; who thinks
of such a thing? it must not be"). To that I replied that I, in any
event, was not thinking about it, but that an observer--and he need not
be very keen eyed--must assuredly consider the constant celebrations
and speeches, as well as the official and unofficial visits exchanged
between Paris and St. Petersburg, as significant symptoms which
could not be ignored, and which were calculated to arouse great
dissatisfaction in Germany; that, should it come to war, against my own
will and that of my people, I felt that, trusting in God and in my army
and people, it would be possible for Germany to get the better of both
opponents.

To this I added still another statement, reported to me from Paris,
which had been made by a Russian officer who was in France as a member
of an officers' deputation. Having been asked by a French comrade
whether the Russians believed that they could beat the Germans, the
gallant Slav replied: "Non, mon ami, nous serons battus à plate
couture, mais qu'est-ce que ça fait? Nous aurons la République" ("No,
my friend, we shall be thoroughly beaten, but what does that matter? We
shall get a republic").

At first the Prince eyed me, speechless, then, shrugging his shoulders,
he remarked: "Oh, la guerre, il ne faut pas même y penser" ("Oh,
war, one must not even think about it"). The officer had merely
expressed the general opinion of the Russian intelligentsia and social
circles. As far back as my first visit to St. Petersburg, in the early
'eighties, a grand duchess said to me at dinner, quite calmly: "Here we
sit all the time on a volcano. We expect the revolution any day! The
Slavs are not faithful, they are not at all monarchical, all of them
are republicans at heart; they disguise their sentiments, and they lie,
every one of them, all the time."

Three important events, related to foreign politics, came within the
period of Prince Hohenlohe's incumbency of the Chancellorship: the
opening, in 1895, of the Emperor William Canal (North Sea-Baltic
Canal), begun under Emperor William the Great, to which squadrons
or individual ships representing countries all over the world were
invited; the annexation, in 1897, of Tsing-tao; and, third, the
much-discussed Kruger dispatch.

THE SEIZURE OF TSING-TAO

Prince Hohenlohe played an especially important rôle in the annexation
of Tsing-tao. He, too, was of the opinion that Germany needed some
coaling stations for her ships, and that the demands of commercial
elements that the opportunity for opening up China to international
trade be not allowed to pass were justified. It was resolved that,
under unimpaired Chinese sovereignty and after payment of the likin
(octroi, or internal revenue tax), a trading port, with a marine
coaling station as protection, was to be founded, wherein it was
contemplated to allow China to co-operate to the utmost possible extent.

The station was to serve the ends of commerce, before all else, the
military measures being limited solely to the protection of the trading
center as it developed; they did not constitute an end in themselves or
a basis for further military enterprises.

Already several places had been considered, but these had proved,
upon more careful investigation, to be unfitted, mostly because they
had either bad connections or none at all with the interior regions,
were not promising from a commercial-political standpoint, or were
encumbered by privileges already granted to other foreign countries.
Finally it was agreed--because of the reports of Admiral Tirpitz,
who was, at that time, chief of the East Asiatic cruiser squadron,
and because of the opinion of the geographical expert, Freiherr von
Richthofen, who, having been questioned on the subject, had drawn
a most promising picture of the possibilities of development in
Shantung--to found a settlement on the bay of Kiao-Chau.

The Chancellor proceeded to collect data on the political questions
which arose as a result of this and which must be taken into
consideration. It was particularly necessary not to interfere with
Russia's designs, nor to disturb her. Further information was obtained,
some of it from our East Asiatic division; from this source favorable
reports came in as to anchorages and the ice-free nature of the bay
of Kiao-Chau, and as to the prospects, if a port were to be founded
there. From conversations among the officers of the Russian China
division, which had come to our ears in our intercourse with them, it
was learned that the Russian Admiral, in accordance with orders from
his Government, had anchored one winter in the bay, but had found it
so desolate and so atrociously lonesome--there were no tea houses
with Japanese geisha girls, which the Russians deemed absolutely
indispensable to winter quarters--that the Russian squadron would never
go back there any more.

It was also reported that the Russian Admiral had advised his
Government most earnestly against prosecuting any further its intention
of founding a settlement on this bay, since there was absolutely no
advantage to be derived from it. Hence, the Russians had no intention
of gaining a foothold there.

This last piece of news arrived at about the same time as the answer
from the Russian Foreign Minister, Count Muravieff, sent through the
German ambassador, relative to the sounding of Russian opinion, which
had been made pursuant to instructions from the Chancellor. Muravieff
set forth that Russia, to be sure, had no direct claims, based on
treaty with China, to the bay, but that she, nevertheless, laid claim
to it on the basis of the "droit du premier mouillage" ("right of first
anchorage"), since the Russian ships had anchored there before those
of any other fleet. This answer, it will be seen, ran counter to the
report of our East Asiatic division relative to the statements made by
the Russian Admiral.

When I, with Hollmann, met the Chancellor, in order to discuss the
Russian claim to Kiao-Chau, the Prince listened to the reading of
it with his little ironical smile, and remarked that he had been
unable to find any jurist at the Foreign Office who could tell him
anything about this wonderful claim. Was the navy in a position to
do so? Admiral Hollmann declared that he, in all his experience on
foreign service, had never heard of it; that it was nonsense and an
invention of Muravieff, whose only motive was unwillingness to have
some other nation settle on the shores of the bay. I advised that
Privy Councilor of the Admiralty Perels, one of the most famous living
experts on international maritime law and an acknowledged authority in
this domain, be asked to deliver an opinion, in order to clarify the
question. This was done. The opinion tore Muravieff's contention to
pieces, corroborated that of Hollmann, and completely did away with the
legend about the "right of first anchorage."

Months elapsed; my August, 1897, visit to Peterhof was imminent. In
agreement with the Prince, my uncle, I decided to discuss the entire
matter in person and frankly with the Tsar, and, if possible, put an
end to Muravieff's notes and evasions. The talk took place at Peterhof.
The Tsar stated that he had no interest in the territory south of the
Tientsin-Peking line, which meant that there was no reason why he
should place obstacles in our path in Shantung: that his interest was
concentrated upon the territory on the Yalu, around Port Arthur, etc.,
now that the English had made difficulties for him at Mokpo; that he
would, in fact, be pleased if Germany should locate herself in future
on the other side of the Gulf of Chih-li as Russia's welcome neighbor.

Afterward I had a talk with Muravieff. He employed all his arts,
wriggled back and forth in his statements, and finally brought up his
famous "right of first anchorage." That was all I wanted. I now passed
to the offensive myself, striking out at him squarely with the opinion
delivered by Perels. When I had told him, finally, as the Tsar desired,
the result of the conversations between us two sovereigns, the diplomat
was even more embarrassed, lost his assumed calm, and capitulated.

Thus was the soil prepared, politically speaking. In the autumn
came the news from Bishop Anzer of the murder of the two German
Catholic missionaries in Shantung. The entire German Catholic world,
particularly the "colonials" in the Centerist party, demanded energetic
measures. The Chancellor proposed to me immediate intervention. While I
was engaged in the winter hunting at Lotalingen, I consulted with him,
in one of the little towers of the castle there, as to what steps were
to be taken. The Prince proposed to intrust Prince Henry of Prussia,
who was present, with the command of the squadron that was to be sent
out to reinforce the East Asiatic Division. I informed my brother
of this in the presence of the Chancellor, whereat the Prince and
the other gentlemen present were highly pleased. The Chancellor sent
the news to the Foreign Office and to the new Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, Herr von Bülow, who was away on a journey.

Kiao-Chau was occupied in November, 1897. In December of that year
Prince Henry sailed, on board the _Deutschland_, with his squadron to
Eastern Asia, where he later took over the command of the entire East
Asiatic Division. On the 6th of March, 1898, the agreement with China
concerning Kiao-Chau was signed. At the same time, Mr. Chamberlain
in London brought up before the Japanese ambassador, Baron Kato, the
idea of the conclusion of an Anglo-Japanese alliance, in order to bar
Russia's advance in the East.

QUEST FOR COALING STATIONS

One will naturally inquire why, in the discussion of our audacious
move, there is no mention of England, since she was certainly deeply
interested therein. Preliminaries, however, had already been gone
into with England. In order to meet the necessity for German coaling
stations, I had intended to found, lease, or buy some in agreement
with England, so far as might be possible. In view of the fact that
my uncle, the Chancellor, was, as a member of the Hohenlohe family,
related to Queen Victoria, known to her personally for years and
highly esteemed by her, I hoped that this might tend to facilitate the
negotiations which were entered into with the English Government for
the above-noted purpose. My hope was disappointed. The negotiations
dragged along without any prospect of successful termination.

I took occasion, therefore, at the behest of the Chancellor, to discuss
the matter with the English ambassador at Berlin. I complained of
the treatment received from the English Government, which everywhere
opposed German wishes, even such as were justified. The ambassador
agreed frankly with this, and expressed his astonishment at England's
failure to meet Germany halfway, and at English shortsightedness,
since, when a young, rising nation like Germany, whose development,
after all, was not to be prevented, turned directly to England in
order to acquire territory with her consent, instead of going straight
ahead or allying itself with other nations, it was certainly more than
England could reasonably ask.

Moreover, he added that, since England already owned almost all the
world, she could certainly find a place where she might permit Germany
to establish a station; that he was unable to understand the gentlemen
in Downing Street; that in case Germany should not succeed in obtaining
England's approval, she would probably occupy, on her own account, such
places as were suited to her ends, since, after all, there was no law
against it.

I laid stress upon the fact that this agreed entirely with my own
view and, in conclusion, I summed up my standpoint once more for
the ambassador: I told him that Germany was the only country in the
world which, despite its colonial possessions and its rapidly growing
commerce, possessed no coaling stations; that we were quite willing to
acquire these with England's consent; that, should she refuse to show a
realization of our situation and fail to meet us halfway, we should be
compelled to turn to some other great power, in order, with its help,
to found settlements.

This talk, likewise, was fruitless. Finally, the negotiations with
England were broken off, without result, in a rather impolite manner.
Thereupon the Chancellor and I decided to appeal to Russia.

The occupation of Kiao-Chau aroused surprise and anger in the English
Government. Having refused us her support, England had definitely
reckoned on the belief that nobody would help Germany in attaining her
goal. Now things had turned out differently, and there was no lack of
recriminations from London. When the English ambassador took up this
tone he was referred to the conversation with me, and it was made clear
to him that it was solely the fault of his Government that it had come
to no understanding with Germany.

England's attitude of aloofness surprised us at that time. An
occurrence which, then, was unknown to me, may serve to throw light on
the matter.

FINDS SEED OF WORLD WAR[3]

In a book (_The Problem of Japan_) which appeared anonymously at The
Hague in 1918 and was said to have been written by an "Ex-Diplomat from
the Far East," an excerpt was published from a work of the American,
Professor Usher of Washington University at St. Louis. Usher, like his
former colleague, Prof. John Bassett Moore of Columbia University,
New York, has often been called into consultation as an adviser on
foreign relations by the State Department at Washington, since he had a
knowledge possessed by few other Americans on international questions
affecting the United States. Professor Usher, in his book published in
1913, made known, for the first time, the existence and contents of
an "agreement" or "secret treaty" between _England_, _America_, and
_France_, dating from the spring of 1897. In this it was agreed that,
in case Germany or Austria, or both of them, should begin a war for the
sake of "Pan-Germanism," the United States should at once declare in
favor of England and France and go to the support of these powers with
all its resources. Professor Usher cites at length all the reasons,
including those of a colonial character, which inevitably imposed upon
the United States the necessity of taking part, on the side of England
and France, in a war against Germany, which Professor Usher, in 1913,
prophesied as _imminent_!!

The unknown author of _The Problem of Japan_ went to the trouble of
publishing in tabulated form the agreements between England, France,
and America in 1897, in order thereby to show, in a way easily
understood, the extent of the reciprocal obligations. This chapter
is extraordinarily worth reading; it gives a good glimpse into the
preliminary history and _preparation of the World War_ on the part of
the _Entente_, which even at that time was uniting _against Germany_,
although not yet appearing under the name of Entente Cordiale. The
ex-diplomat remarks in this connection:

Here is a treaty that Professor Usher alleges to have been entered
into as long ago as 1897, in which every phase of activity and
participation in future events by England, France, and the United
States is provided for, including the conquest of the Spanish
dependencies, control over Mexico and Central America, the opening
of China, and the annexation of coaling stations. And all these
measures Professor Usher wishes us to believe were taken to defend
the world against Pan-Germanism.

It is unnecessary to remind Professor Usher, or anybody else, for
that matter, that Pan-Germanism, if we go so far as to assume that
such a thing actually exists, had certainly never been heard of
in 1897, at which time Germany had not yet adopted her program
for naval construction on a large scale, the same having been
bruited for the first time in 1898. If, therefore, it is true that
England, France, and the United States harbored the mutual designs
imputed to them by Professor Usher, and entered into an alliance to
accomplish them, it will scarcely do to attribute the conception
of the idea and the stimulus to its consummation to so feeble a
pretext as the rise of a Pan-Germanism.[4]

Thus the ex-diplomat.

This is truly amazing. A definite treaty of partition directed against
Spain, Germany, etc., arranged even to minute details, was planned
between Gauls and Anglo-Saxons, in a time of the profoundest peace,
and concluded without the slightest twinge of conscience, in order to
annihilate Germany and Austria and eliminate their competition from
the world market! _Seventeen years_ before the beginning of the World
War _this_ treaty was made by the united Anglo-Saxons and its goal was
systematically envisaged throughout this entire period! Now one can
understand the ease with which King Edward VII could pursue his policy
of encirclement; for years the principal actors had been united and
in readiness. When he christened the compact "Entente Cordiale," its
appearance was for the world, especially for Germany, an unpleasant
novelty, but in the countries on the other side it was merely the
official acknowledgment of facts long known there.

In view of this agreement, one can understand also the opposition
of England in 1897 to an agreement with Germany regarding coaling
stations, and the anger aroused because Germany managed, in agreement
with Russia, to gain a firm foothold in China, concerning the
exploitation of which land _without_ German participation a tripartite
treaty had already been made.

Usher talked out of school and conclusively proved _at whose door
lies the guilt for the World War_. The treaty directed against
Germany--sometimes called the "gentleman's agreement"--of the spring
of 1897, is the basis, the point of departure, for this war, which was
systematically developed by the Entente countries for seventeen years.
When they had succeeded in winning over Russia and Japan likewise for
their purposes, they struck the blow, after Serbia had staged the
Sarajevo murder and had thus touched the match to the carefully filled
powder barrel.

Professor Usher's statements are likewise a complete refutation of
all those who were impelled, during the war, to find the reason for
the entry of the United States in certain military acts on the part
of Germany, as, for instance, the _Lusitania_ case, the expansion of
U-boat warfare, etc. None of that is right. The recently published,
excellent book of John Kenneth Turner, _Shall It Be Again?_ points out,
on the basis of convincing proofs, that Wilson's alleged reasons for
going to war and war aims were not the real ones. America--or rather
President Wilson--was resolved probably from the start, certainly
from 1915, to range herself against Germany and to fight. She did the
latter, alleging the U-boat warfare as a pretext, in reality under the
influence of powerful financial groups, and yielding to the pressure
and prayers of her partner, France, whose resources in man power were
becoming more and more exhausted. America did not wish to leave a
weakened France along with England, whose annexation designs on Calais,
Dunkirk, etc., were well known to her.

It was a fateful thing for Germany--let this be stated here, in a
general way--that our Foreign Office was unable to meet the broad
policy of encirclement of England and the cunning of Russia and France
with an equal degree of diplomatic skill. This was partly because it
had not really been trained under Prince Bismarck; and therefore
when, after the retirement of the Prince and Count Herbert, the
all-dominating will and spirit were lacking, it was not up to the task
of conducting foreign affairs on its own independent initiative.

Moreover, it is difficult in Germany to train up good diplomats, since
our people lack the taste and endowment for diplomacy which have shone
forth brilliantly only from a few German minds, like Frederick the
Great and Bismarck. Unfavorable also to the Foreign Office were the
very frequent changes of Secretaries of State. Imperial Chancellors,
following the example of Bismarck, maintained their influence upon the
Foreign Office and suggested the Secretaries of State who should direct
its affairs. I acquiesced in the proposals of the Imperial Chancellors
as to these posts, since I admitted their right to choose themselves
their leading collaborators in the domain of foreign affairs. That
these frequent changes were not calculated to work toward the
continuity of political policy was a disadvantage that had to be taken
into account.

The Foreign Office was largely influenced by the axiom: "No
disagreeable quarrels with other powers"--"surtout pas d'histoires"
("above all, no yarns"), as the French general said to a company of
soldiers which, he had heard, wished to mutiny. One of the Secretaries
of State told me once when, in placing some matter before me, I had
called his attention to the apparently serious situation in connection
with some foreign question, that this simply must be righted, that the
Foreign Office based its acts primarily upon the maxim: "Let us have
quiet."

Given this attitude, one can also understand the answer which the
German representative gave to a German merchant in a South American
republic who had asked him for help and intercession with the
authorities, since his shop had been plundered and his property
stolen: "Oh, don't bother me with these things! We have established
such pleasant relations with this republic; any action undertaken in
your behalf would only serve to upset them." I need scarcely add that
whenever such a conception of duty came to my attention I removed the
official concerned from his post.

The Foreign Office enjoyed general unpopularity both among the people
and in the army. I worked continuously, during the tenure of office
of various Chancellors, for thorough reform, but in vain. Every new
Chancellor, especially if he himself did not come from the ranks of the
foreign service, needed the Foreign Office in order to work himself
into foreign affairs, and this took time. But once he had worked
himself in he was under obligation to the officials, and was reluctant
to make extensive changes, burdened as he was by other matters and
lacking detailed knowledge regarding the Foreign Office personnel,
particularly as he still believed that he needed the advice of those
who were "orientated."

DEVELOPMENT OF TSING-TAO

But let us return to Tsing-tao. Here everything was done to promote
commerce and industry, and done jointly with the Chinese; the flag
of the Chinese Empire, moreover, was hoisted over the Custom House at
Tsing-tao. The development there was such that the port, during the
years immediately preceding the war, ranked sixth among all Chinese
trading centers in the commercial register of the great Chinese
merchants and of the merchants' guild coming just after Tientsin.
Tsing-tao was a prospering German commercial colony, where many Chinese
worked side by side with Germans; it was, so to speak, a great sample
warehouse of German abilities and German achievements, to which the
Chinese, who formerly had not known Germany, her capabilities of
achievement, or her products, could repair for selection and emulation;
it was a contrast to the naval stations of Russia and England, which
were purely military, directed solely toward domination and conquest.

The rapid rise of Tsing-tao as a trading center aroused the envy of the
Japanese and English, but this did not prevent swarms of the latter
from journeying, with their families, to the splendid beach, enjoying
its cool air and the beautiful Strand Hotel, and devoting themselves
to playing polo and lawn tennis after they had escaped from the heat
of Hongkong, Canton, and Shanghai. Envy prompted England in 1914 to
demand that Japan should take Tsing-tao, although it was _de facto_
Chinese. Japan did this joyfully, promising to return it to China, but
it was not returned until the beginning of 1922, after much pressure,
although Japan had agreed with America that she was not to be allowed
to make any territorial changes in China without previous consultation
with Washington.

Thus a great German cultural work in foreign lands, which stood as a
model of the method and manner which a cultured nation should employ
in extending the advantages of its culture to another nation, was
annihilated by English commercial envy. Some day, when Hongkong has
gone the same way, England will repent of her act and bitterly reproach
herself for having abandoned her old maxim, in accordance with which
she has acted for so many years: "White men together against colored
men." When once Japan has made a reality out of her watchword, "Asia
for the Asiatics," and brought China and India under her sway, England
will cast her eyes about in search of Germany and the German fleet.

As to the "yellow peril," I had the following interview with the Tsar
later, after the Russo-Japanese War, at a meeting between us.

The Tsar was, at that time, visibly impressed by the growing power
of Japan and its constant menace to Russia and Europe, and requested
my opinion concerning this. I answered that if the Russians counted
themselves among the cultured nations of Europe they must be ready
to rally to the defense of these nations against the "yellow peril"
and to fight for and by the side of Europe for their own and Europe's
existence and culture; but that if the Russians, on the other hand,
considered themselves Asiatics they would unite with the "yellow
peril," and, joining forces with it, would assail Europe. The Tsar,
said I, must bear this in mind in providing for the defense of his land
and organizing his army.

When the Tsar asked me what course I thought the Russians would take, I
replied: "The second."

The Tsar was outraged and wished to know at once on what I based
this opinion. I answered that my opinion was based on Russia's
construction of railways and on the arraying of the Russian army along
the Prussian-Austrian frontier. Thereupon the Tsar protested that he
and his house were Europeans, that his country and his Russians would
certainly cleave to Europe, that he would look upon it as a matter of
honor to protect Europe from the "yellow men." To this I replied that
if this was the Tsar's attitude he must make his military preparations
conform to it without delay. The Tsar said nothing.

At all events, I sought to utilize Tsar Nicholas II's worry at the
growing power of Japan to the advantage of Germany and general European
culture. Russia, despite siding with Japan, was the first nation to
collapse among all those participating in the war.

REPROACHES FOR JAPAN

The able statesmen of Japan, of whom there are quite a number, must be
in some doubt as to whether they ranged their country on the right side
in the war. Yes, they will perhaps ask themselves whether it would not
have been more advantageous for Japan to have prevented the World War.
This would have been within her powers, had she ranged herself firmly
and unequivocally on the side of the Central Powers, from which in
former times she had learned so willingly and so much.

Had Japan adopted soon enough such an orientation in her foreign
policy, and, like Germany, fought by peaceful means for her share in
world trade and activity, I should have put the "yellow peril" away in
a corner and joyfully welcomed into the circle of peacefully inclined
nations the progressive Japanese nation, the "Prussians of the East."
Nobody regrets more than I that the "yellow peril" had not already lost
its meaning when the crisis of 1914 arose. The experience derived from
the World War may yet bring this about.

Germany's joint action with France and Russia at Shimonoseki was based
upon Germany's situation in Europe. Wedged in between on-marching
Russia, threatening Prussia's frontier, and France, fortifying her
borders anew with forts and groups of fortresses, confronted with a
friendship between these two nations resembling an alliance, Berlin
looked with anxiety into the future. The warlike preparations of the
two powers were far ahead of ours, their navies far more modern and
powerful than the German navy, which consisted of a few old ships
almost without fighting value. Therefore it seemed to us wise to
acquiesce in the suggestion of this strong group, in order that it
might not--should we decline--turn immediately to England and cause
the entry of the latter into the combination. This would have meant
the formation, at that time, of the combination of 1914, which would
have been a serious matter for Germany. Japan, on the other hand,
was about to go over anyhow to England, in her sympathies. Moreover,
Germany's making common cause with the Franco-Russian group offered
the possibility of achieving gradually a more trusting and less
strained relationship in Europe and of living side by side with our two
neighbors there in more friendliness, as a result of the common policy,
adopted in the Far East. The policy adopted by us at this juncture was
also consistently based on the maintenance of world peace.

In the entire Kiao-Chau question, Prince Hohenlohe, despite his age,
evinced a capacity for sticking steadily to his purpose and a degree of
resolution which must be reckoned as greatly to his credit.

Unfortunately in the matter of the Kruger dispatch his prudence and
his vision, so clear on other occasions, abandoned him: only by so
assuming is his obstinate insistence on the sending of this dispatch
to be understood. The influence of such an energetic and eloquent
personage as Herr von Marschall, former State Attorney, may have been
so powerful, the siren song of Herr von Holstein so convincing, that
the Prince yielded to them. In any event, he did his country an ill
turn in this matter, and damaged me seriously both in England and at
home.

THE KRUGER TELEGRAM[5]

Since the so-called Kruger dispatch made a big stir and had serious
political consequences, I shall tell the story of it in detail.

The Jameson raid caused great and increasing excitement in Germany.
The German nation was outraged at this attempt to overpower a little
nation, which was Dutch--and, hence, Lower Saxon-German in origin--and
to which we were sympathetic because of racial relationship. I was much
worried at this violent excitement, which also seized upon the higher
classes of society, foreseeing possible complications with England. I
believed that there was no way to prevent England from conquering the
Boer countries, should she so desire, although I also was convinced
that such a conquest would be unjust. But I was unable to overcome the
reigning excitement, and was even harshly judged by my intimates on
account of the attitude I adopted.

One day when I had gone to my uncle, the Imperial Chancellor, for a
conference, at which the Secretary of State for the Navy, Admiral
Hollmann, was present, Freiherr Marschall, one of the Secretaries of
State, suddenly appeared in high excitement, with a sheet of paper in
his hand. He declared that the excitement among the people--in the
Reichstag, even--had grown to such proportions that it was absolutely
necessary to give it outward expression, and that this could best be
done by a telegram to Kruger, a rough draft of which he had in his hand.

I objected to this, being supported by Admiral Hollmann. At first the
Imperial Chancellor remained passive in the debate. In view of the fact
that I knew how ignorant Freiherr Marschall and the Foreign Office were
of English national psychology, I sought to make clear to Freiherr
Marschall the consequences which such a step would have among the
English; in this, likewise, Admiral Hollmann seconded me. But Marschall
was not to be dissuaded.

Then, finally, the Imperial Chancellor took a hand. He remarked that
I, as a constitutional ruler, must not stand out against the national
consciousness and against my constitutional advisers; otherwise, there
was danger that the excited attitude of the German people, deeply
outraged in its sense of justice and also in its sympathy for the
Dutch, might cause it to break down the barriers and turn against me
personally. Already, he said, statements were flying about among the
people; it was being said that the Emperor was, after all, half an
Englishman, with secret English sympathies; that he was entirely under
the influence of his grandmother, Queen Victoria; that the dictation
emanating from England must cease once for all; that the Emperor must
be freed from English tutelage, etc.

SAYS HE SIGNED AGAINST HIS WILL

In view of all this, he continued, it was his duty as Imperial
Chancellor, notwithstanding he admitted the justification of my
objections, to insist that I sign the telegram in the general political
interest, and, above all else, in the interest of my relationship to my
people. He and also Herr von Marschall, he went on, in their capacity
of my constitutional advisers, would assume full responsibility for the
telegram and its consequences.

Sir Valentine Chirol, at that time correspondent of the _Times_,
wrote, in the _Times_ of September 11th, that Herr von Marschall,
directly after the sending of the dispatch, had stated to him that the
dispatch did not give the personal opinion of the Emperor, but was a
governmental act, for which the Chancellor and he himself assumed full
responsibility.

Admiral Hollmann, when the Imperial Chancellor appealed to him for
corroboration of this point of view and was asked by him to uphold it
to me, declined to do so with the remark that the Anglo-Saxon world
would unquestionably attribute the telegram to the Kaiser, since
nobody would believe that such a provocative thing could come from His
Majesty's elderly advisers, and all would consider it an "impulsive"
act of the "youthful" Emperor.

Then I again tried to dissuade the gentlemen from their project. But
the Imperial Chancellor and Marschall insisted that I sign, reiterating
that they would be responsible for consequences. It seemed to me that I
ought not to refuse after their presentation of the case. I signed.

Not long before his death Admiral Hollmann recalled the occurrence to
me in full detail, as it is described here.

After the Kruger dispatch was made public the storm broke in England,
as I had prophesied. I received from all circles of English society,
especially from aristocratic ladies unknown to me, a veritable flood of
letters containing every possible kind of reproach, some of the writers
not hesitating even at slandering me personally and insulting me.
Attacks and calumnies began to appear in the press, so that soon the
legend of the origin of the dispatch was as firmly established as the
amen at church. If Marschall had also announced in the Reichstag what
he stated to Chirol, I personally would not have been drawn into the
matter to such an extent.

In February, 1900, while the Boer War was in progress and while I was
with the fleet at Heligoland attending the maneuvers of ships of the
line, after having been present at the swearing in of recruits at
Wilhelmshafen I received news by telegraph from the Wilhelmstrasse,
_via_ Heligoland, that Russia and France had proposed to Germany to
make a joint attack on England, now that she was involved elsewhere,
and cripple her sea traffic. I objected and ordered that the proposal
be declined.

Since I assumed that Paris and St. Petersburg would present the matter
at London in such a way as to make it appear that Berlin had made
the above proposal to both of them, I immediately telegraphed from
Heligoland to Queen Victoria and to the Prince of Wales (Edward) the
fact of the Russo-French proposal, and its refusal by me. The Queen
answered expressing her hearty thanks, the Prince of Wales with an
expression of astonishment.

Later, Her Majesty let me know secretly that, shortly before the
receipt of my telegram from Heligoland concerning the proposal from
Paris and St. Petersburg, the false version of the matter foreseen
by me had indeed been told, and that she was glad to have been able,
thanks to my dispatch, to expose the intrigue to her Government and
quiet it as to the loyal attitude of Germany; she added that she would
not forget the service I had done England in troublous times.

DEAL WITH CECIL RHODES

When Cecil Rhodes came to me, in order to bring about the construction
of the Cape-to-Cairo Railway and Telegraph line through the interior
regions of German East Africa, his wishes were approved by me, in
agreement with the Foreign Office and the Imperial Chancellor; with
the proviso that a branch railway should be built _via_ Tabora, and
that German material should be used in the construction work on German
territory. Both conditions were acquiesced in by Rhodes most willingly.
He was grateful at the fulfillment of his pet ambition by Germany, only
a short time after King Leopold of Belgium had refused his request.

Rhodes was full of admiration for Berlin and the tremendous German
industrial plants, which he visited daily. He said that he regretted
not having been in Berlin before, in order to have learned about the
power and efficiency of Germany, and to have got into touch with the
German Government and prominent Germans in commercial circles. He said
he had wished, even before the Jameson raid, to visit Berlin, but had
been prevented in London at that time from so doing; that, had he been
able to inform us before of his plan to get permission to build the
Cape-to-Cairo line through the Boer countries, as well as through our
colonies, the German Government would probably have been able to help
him by bringing persuasion to bear upon Kruger, who was unwilling to
grant this permission; that "the stupid Jameson Raid" would never have
been made, in that case, and the Kruger dispatch never written--as to
that dispatch, he had never borne me a grudge on account of it.

He added that as we, in Germany, could not be correctly informed as
to aim and actual purposes, the said raid must have looked to us like
"an act of piracy," which naturally and quite rightly had excited the
Germans; that all he had wanted was to have such stretches of land as
were needed for his rail lines--such, in fact, as Germany had just
granted to him in the interior of her colonies--a demand which was not
unjust and would certainly have met with German support. I was not to
worry, he added, about the dispatch and not bother myself any more
about the uproar in the English press. Rhodes did not know about the
origin of the Kruger dispatch and wanted to console me, imagining that
I was its originator.

Rhodes went on to advise me to build the Bagdad Railway and open up
Mesopotamia, after having had irrigation simultaneously introduced
there. He said that this was Germany's task, just as his was the
Cape-to-Cairo line. In view of the fact that the building of this line
through our territory was also made dependent upon the cession to us of
the Samoan Islands, Rhodes worked actively in London toward having them
turned over to us.

In home politics, Prince Hohenlohe, as Chancellor, showed a mildness
which was not generally favorable. Owing to his long acquaintanceship
with Herr von Hertling, he was able to establish friendly relations
with the Vatican. His mildness and indulgence were also exercised
toward Alsace-Lorraine, in which, as an expert of long standing,
he showed particular interest. But he got little thanks for this,
since the French element, indirectly benefited thereby, behaved with
ever-increasing arrogance.

PEN SKETCH OF HOHENLOHE

Prince Hohenlohe loved to employ mediation, compromise, and
conciliation--toward the Socialists likewise--and he employed them on
some occasions when energetic measures would have been more fitting. He
hailed with much joy my Far East trip to Constantinople and Jerusalem.
He was pleased at the strengthening of our relations with Turkey and
considered the plan for the Bagdad Railway arising from them as a great
cultural work worthy of Germany.

He also gave his most enthusiastic approval to my visit to England in
1899, made by me with my wife and two sons at the desire of my royal
grandmother, who, growing steadily weaker on account of her years,
wished to see her oldest grandson once more. He hoped that this journey
might serve to efface somewhat the consequences of the Kruger dispatch
sent by him, and also to clarify some important questions by means of
conferences between me and English statesmen.

In order to avoid any unpleasantness from the English press, which,
angered by the Boer War and the partly unjustified attacks of certain
German newspapers, had been answering in like tone, the Queen had
commissioned the author of _The Life of the Prince Consort_, Sir
Theodore Martin, to inform the English press of Her Majesty's desire
that a friendly reception be accorded to her Imperial grandson. And
that is what indeed came to pass. The visit ran its course harmoniously
and caused satisfaction on all sides. I held important conferences with
various leading men.

Not once in the entire visit was the Kruger dispatch mentioned.
On the other hand, my royal grandmother did not conceal from her
grandson how unwelcome the whole Boer War was to her; she made no
secret of her disapproval and aversion for Mr. Chamberlain and all
that he represented, and thanked me again for my prompt and sharp
refusal of the Russo-French proposal to interfere and for my immediate
announcement of this proposal. One could easily see how much the Queen
loved her splendid army and how deeply she had been grieved by the
heavy reverses suffered by it at the outset of the war, which had
caused by no means negligible losses. Referring to these, the aged
Field Marshal Duke of Cambridge coined the fine phrase: "The British
nobleman and officer have shown that they can die bravely as gentlemen."

On my departure, the Queen bade me farewell with cordial and grateful
greetings to her "much-cherished cousin," the Imperial Chancellor,
whose ability and experience, she hoped, would continue to maintain
good relations between our two countries.

My report entirely satisfied Prince Hohenlohe as to the success of
my journey; at the same time, however, I was the object of the most
violent attacks from a certain section of the press and from many
excited "friends of the Boers." The German lacks the very thing with
which the English people has been inoculated, and to which it has
been trained by long political self-discipline: when a fight is on,
even though it be merely upon the field of diplomacy, the Englishman
unquestioningly follows the flag, in accordance with the proverb: "You
can't change the jockey while running."

In the autumn of 1900 Prince Hohenlohe retired from the Chancellorship,
since the work had become too arduous for a man of his advanced age.
Moreover, the constant quarrels and disputes of the political parties
with one another were disagreeable to him, and it went against the
grain with him to make speeches before them in the Reichstag. Equally
disagreeable to him was the press, part of which had taken the bit
between its teeth and imagined that it could conserve the Bismarckian
tradition by quoting sayings by Bismarck, and had greatly jeopardized
relations with England, especially during the Boer War.

CHANCELLOR'S RETIREMENT

The hope, aroused by the choice of Prince Hohenlohe as Chancellor and
his assumption of the office, that Prince Bismarck would place less
obstacles in his path, had been only partly fulfilled. The atmosphere
had been much relieved and Prince Bismarck brought to a much milder
frame of mind by my reconciliation with him, which had received
outward expression in his solemn entry into Berlin and his staying
at the old Hohenzollern palace, but his adherents and those rallying
around him for the sake of opposition were not to be dissuaded from
their activities. Moreover, the political representatives of the
people succeeded, while I was on my way to Friedrichsruh to celebrate
Bismarck's eightieth birthday, in refusing to pay homage to the old
Imperial Chancellor, a thing which naturally deeply hurt the sensitive
Prince Hohenlohe and filled him with indignation.

He, like myself, was deeply moved by the death of his great
predecessor, and we, together with the German people, sincerely mourned
Prince Bismarck as one of the greatest of the sons of Prussia and
Germany, in spite of the fact that he had not always made our task
easy. I insisted upon hurrying back from my trip to Norway in order
to pay honor to him who, as a faithful servant of his old master, had
helped the German nation to unity, and under whom I, when I was Prince,
had had the proud privilege of working.

It is said that one of the reasons why Prince Hohenlohe retired from
his post was the advice of his son Alexander, who was much at his
father's house; he was known in society as "the Crown Prince," and was
essentially different from his lovable father.

Prince Hohenlohe could look back upon a series of successes during
his term as Chancellor: the overcoming of the disputes concerning
the "Citizens' Book of Laws," the reform of the military punishment
procedure, the Naval law, the appointment of Waldersee to the command
in China at the time of the Boxer War, Tsing-tao, and the Yangtse
Treaty.

He bade me farewell on the 15th of October, 1900. Both of us were
greatly moved, for not only was the Chancellor and faithful co-worker
parting from his Emperor, but also the uncle from his nephew,
who looked up with grateful esteem to the old man. At the age of
seventy-five years--an age when others have long since retired to rest
and contemplation--he had not hesitated to obey the summons of the
Emperor to subject himself to even more exacting labors and devote his
time and strength to the German fatherland. When about to leave my
room, he grasped my hand once again with the request that I might grant
him, during the years of life still remaining to him (which he meant
to spend in Berlin), the same plain, faithful friendship which he had
so long noted and admired between me and Admiral von Hollmann. I shall
always preserve him faithfully in my memory.

[3] "Once the magnitude of Pan-Germanism dawned on the English and
French diplomats, once they became aware of the lengths to
which Germany was willing to go, they realized the necessity of
strengthening their position, and therefore made overtures to the
United States, which resulted, probably before the summer of the
year 1897, in an understanding between the three countries. There
seems to be no doubt whatever that no papers of any sort were
signed, that no pledges were given which circumstances would not
justify any one of the contracting parties in denying or possibly
repudiating. Nevertheless, an understanding was reached that in
case of a war begun by Germany or Austria for the purpose of
executing Pan-Germanism, the United States would promptly declare
in favor of England and France and would do her utmost to assist
them."--ROLAND G. USHER, _Pan-Germanism_, chap. x, p. 139.

[4] _The Problem of Japan_, by an Ex-Counselor of Legation in the Far
East, chap. viii, p. 136, note. Published by C. L. Langenhuysen,
Amsterdam and Rotterdam. 1918.

[5] Tremendous excitement was caused in England when the incident of
the Kruger message became known. On January 3, 1896, the German
Emperor telegraphed as follows to the President of the South
African Republic:

"I congratulate you most sincerely on having succeeded, with
your people, without calling on the help of foreign powers,
by opposing your own force to an armed band which broke into
your country to disturb the peace, in restoring quiet and in
maintaining the independence of your country against external
attack."

On January 6th, in conversation with Sir Frank Lascelles,
Baron von Marschall protested against the view of the English
press that it was an act of hostility against England and
an encroachment on English rights for the German Emperor to
congratulate the head of a friendly state on his victory over an
armed band that had invaded his land in defiance of international
law, and had been declared to be outside the pale of the law by
the English Government itself. But it was not recorded that he
disavowed the Kaiser's responsibility for it.

CHAPTER IV

Bülow

On the day after Prince Hohenlohe's farewell, the man summoned by me
as his successor--Count Bülow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
arrived. His choice for the post was eminently fitting, because he was
thoroughly cognizant of our foreign policy and, especially, of our
relations with England--which policy was becoming constantly livelier
and more complicated--and because he had already proved himself a
skillful orator and ready debater in the Reichstag. The fact that
the second of these qualities was lacking in his predecessor had
often been painfully noticeable. When Prince Hohenlohe's intention to
retire became known in the Imperial Council, the Bavarian ambassador
at Berlin, Count Lerchenfeld, very pointedly remarked to me that for
Heaven's sake I was not to choose another South German, since South
Germans were not fitted for the leading post at Berlin; North Germans
were naturally better able to fill it and, therefore, it would be
better for the Empire to select a North German.

I had been acquainted personally with Bülow for a long time, ever
since the period of his ambassadorship at Rome and his work as
Secretary of State. Then I had often visited him at his home and had
held many a conference with him in his garden. He came into closer
relationship with me when he accompanied me on my journey to the Far
East, where, in co-operation with the ambassador, Freiherr Marschall,
he assisted me in getting into personal touch with the leading men of
the Turkish Government. Hence, the relations of the new Chancellor with
me were already begun and, to a certain extent, established, since we
had for years discussed all political problems and spheres. Moreover,
he stood much nearer to me in age than his predecessors, most of whom
could have been my grandfather. He was the first "young Chancellor" of
Germany. And this made our common task easier for both of us.

When I was in Berlin, scarcely a day went by without my taking a
long morning walk with the Chancellor in the garden of the Imperial
Chancellor's palace, during which outstanding business was cleared up
and problems of actuality discussed. I often had a meal with him and
always found at his table, where I was most hospitably received by the
Count, his amiable wife and a group of the most interesting men, in
choosing whom the Count was a master. He was likewise unsurpassed in
skillfully conducting conversation and in the witty handling of the
various topics that arose. To me it was always a pleasure to be in the
company of the Chancellor and enjoy his bubbling wit, to exchange
views at his table with many professors, savants, and artists, as
well as Government officials of all sorts, in informal, unofficial
intercourse and stimulating exchange of ideas.

The Count was an excellent narrator of anecdotes, drawn both from books
and his own personal experience, which he told in several languages. He
liked to tell stories of the days when he was a diplomat, especially
about his stay at St. Petersburg.

BÜLOW A DISCIPLE OF BISMARCK

The Count's father was an intimate friend of Prince Bismarck and
had been one of his closest co-workers. Young Bülow also had begun
his career under the great Chancellor; he had been brought up on
Bismarckian ideas and traditions and strongly influenced by them, but,
nevertheless, had not adhered to them to such an extent as to lose his
independence.

In the course of one of the first talks which I had with Bülow as
Imperial Chancellor he informed himself concerning my ideas of how best
to handle the English and have dealings with them. I told him that I
considered absolute frankness the most important thing in dealing with
England and Englishmen; that the Englishman, in presenting his point of
view and working for his interests, was inconsiderate to the point of
brutality, for which reason he thoroughly understood anybody who acted
similarly toward him; that there must be no playing the diplomatic
game, or "finessing," with an Englishman, because it made him distrust
those with whom he was dealing and suspect that they were not honest
and wished secretly to cheat him; that such devious methods could be
successful only in dealing with Latin and Slavic nations; that, once
the Englishman had become suspicious, there was nothing more to be done
with him, despite the most honeyed words and most obliging concessions;
that the only advice, therefore, which I could give the Chancellor was
that he confine himself entirely to straightforwardness in his English
policy. I said this with particular emphasis, since "finessing" was
especially dear to the diplomatic character of Count Bülow and had
become second nature to him.

I also took occasion, during this talk, to warn the Chancellor against
Holstein. In spite of my warning--which was merely a repetition of
that given me before by Bismarck--Bülow worked a great deal, or was
obliged to work, with Holstein. This remarkable man had been able
gradually, especially since the time that the Foreign Office had been,
so to speak, orphaned by Bismarck's retirement, to create for himself a
position that became steadily more influential and to maintain it under
three Chancellors with such skill that he was considered indispensable.

Holstein was unquestionably possessed of great shrewdness, seconded by
a phenomenal memory and a certain talent for political combinations,
which, to be sure, often became a hobby in his case. His position
was also based largely on the fact that he was looked upon in many
quarters, especially among the older officials, as the "bearer of
the Bismarckian traditions," the man who upheld these in the teeth
of "the young master." His importance rested, above all, on his wide
personal knowledge in the entire domain of the foreign service. Since
he wielded, on account of this, an authoritative influence on all
proposals relative to the appointment of officials and hence, also, on
the careers of the younger officials, it may be easily understood why
he, little by little, had obtained for himself a dominating position at
the Foreign Office. But he sought more and more to obtain, at the same
time, a decisive influence upon the conduct of foreign policy; he had,
in fact, become the guiding spirit both of the Foreign Office and of
German foreign policy.

HOLSTEIN'S SECRET POWER

The serious thing about this was that he exerted his far-reaching
influence entirely from under cover and avoided all official
responsibility as an adviser. He preferred to remain in the dark and
exert his influence from there. He refused every responsible post--many
stood open to him--every honorary title, every promotion. He lived
in complete seclusion. For a long time I tried in vain to become
personally acquainted with him, for which purpose I used to invite him
to meals, but Holstein declined every time. Only once, in the course
of many years, did he consent to dine with me at the Foreign Office,
and it was characteristic of him that, whereas on this occasion all
the other gentlemen present wore full evening dress, he appeared in a
frock coat and excused himself on the plea that he had no dress coat.

The secrecy with which he surrounded himself in his work, so as not
to be held responsible for it, became apparent also at times in the
character of the memorials drawn up by him; they were unquestionably
ingenious and attractive, but often as involved and ambiguous as the
oracle of Delphi; there were occasions when, after a decision had been
made based on the contents of one of these documents, Herr von Holstein
would prove to a nicety that he meant exactly the opposite of what had
been thought.

I considered it a serious matter that an irresponsible counselor should
bring to bear such powerful influence, especially as he did so from
under cover and, hence, in doing it, eluded the officials who were in
duty bound to exert influence, and who were the responsible parties.
Often, especially in the von Richthofen era, it happened that I would
advise a foreign ambassador to discuss some political question, which
he had taken up with me, with the Secretary of State, and he would
reply: "J'en parlerai avec mon ami Holstein" ("I shall speak about
it with my friend Holstein"). The fact alone that an official of the
Foreign Office dealt with foreign ambassadors, going over the head of
his superior, did not seem right to me; but that he should be dubbed
by these foreigners "friend" seemed to me to go beyond what I deemed
advisable.

Matters had, in fact, developed gradually to such a stage that Holstein
conducted a good part of our foreign affairs. To be sure, he still
listened to the Chancellor in connection with them, but what the
Emperor thought or said about foreign affairs was rather unimportant.
If things turned out successfully, the Foreign Office reaped the
reward; if things went wrong, then it was the fault of the "impulsive
young master."

In spite of all this, Bülow, too, apparently thought Herr von Holstein
indispensable at first; he worked together with him for a long time,
until at last he, too, found unbearable the pressure which this strange
man exerted on everybody. To Herr von Tschirschky, during his tenure
of office as Secretary of State, belongs the merit of finally bringing
the unendurable situation to a head. On being questioned by me, he
declared that he considered it impossible that Herr von Holstein remain
at his post any longer, since he was embroiling the whole Foreign
Office, seeking to eliminate him, the Secretary of State, entirely, and
creating all kinds of obstacles, likewise, for the Chancellor.

DISMISSAL--AND AN ENEMY

Thereupon I ordered Herr von Tschirschky to prepare the way for the
dismissal of Herr von Holstein, which afterward took place, with the
approval of the Chancellor, after the latter had recovered from the
serious break-down in health which he had suffered meanwhile. Herr von
Holstein himself showed what manner of man he was by going at once
after his dismissal to Herr Harden and placing himself at the latter's
disposal for the campaign against the Emperor.

The year 1901 gave Count Bülow plentiful opportunities to show and
assert himself in dealings with England. Count Bülow still believed
strongly in the Bismarckian theory of having "two irons in the
fire"--_i. e._, in making friendly agreements with another country
while always remaining on good terms with Russia--in which he received
support from the many pretended adherents of Bismarck.

From the midst of the Jubilee celebration of the two hundredth
coronation anniversary, I was called to the deathbed of my grandmother,
Queen Victoria, by a dispatch announcing to me the serious condition
of the Queen. I hurriedly made the journey with my uncle, the Duke
of Connaught, who was at Berlin as the Queen's representative at the
festivities--he was the favorite son of the Queen and my particular
friend, and a son-in-law of Prince Frederick Charles--and I was
cordially received in London by the then Prince of Wales and the royal
family. As my carriage drove out at a trot from the railway station
a plainly dressed man stepped forward from the closely packed crowd
standing there in absolute silence, to the side of the carriage, bared
his head, and said: "Thank you, Kaiser." The Prince of Wales, later
Edward VII, added: "That is what they all think, and they will never
forget this coming of yours."

Nevertheless, they did forget it, and quickly.

After the Queen had quietly breathed her last in my arms, the curtain
fell for me upon many memories of childhood. Her death signified the
close of an epoch in English history and in Germany's relations with
England. I now got into touch, as far as possible, with prominent
personages, and noted everywhere a thoroughly sympathetic, friendly
spirit, which made no secret of the wish for good relations with
Germany.

At the farewell banquet impromptu speeches were made by King Edward
VII and myself, which were cordial in tone and content, and did not
fail to make an impression on their hearers. After the meal the English
ambassador at Berlin clasped my hand and said that my speech had
touched all his fellow countrymen's hearts, because what I said was
sincere and simple, as was fitting for Englishmen; that the speech
must at once be made public, since it would have an effect throughout
the country, which was grateful for my coming; and that this would be
useful to the relations between the two countries. I answered that it
was a matter for the British Government and the King to decide, that
personally I had no objections to having the speech made public.

Nevertheless, it was not made public, and the British people never
learned of my words, which were the sincere expression of my sentiments
and thoughts. In another talk later on with me at Berlin the same
ambassador deeply regretted this, but was unable to say what the reason
was for this omission.

In concluding my remarks on my stay in England I cannot pass over the
fact that a portion of the German press was unfortunately lacking both
in tactful appreciation of the grief of the English royal family and
people, as well as of the obligations which my family relationship and
political considerations imposed upon me.

After my return home from England I was able to report to the
Chancellor on the good impressions I had received, and particularly
that opinion in England was apparently in favor of an understanding and
of closer relations.

Bülow expressed himself as satisfied with the results of the journey,
after we had talked at length about it at Homburg, and consulted as
to how the situation created by the journey should be put to use. I
suggested that we should unquestionably come to a good agreement, if an
alliance--which I preferred--could not be brought about. In any event,
a firm agreement would suffice, I said, and would suit the English; in
the long run an alliance might always develop from it.

The opportunity for such an alliance came with unexpected promptness.
While I was at Homburg von der Höhe in the spring of 1901, Count
Metternich, who was with me as representative of the Foreign Office,
brought me a notification from Berlin that _Mr. Chamberlain_ had
inquired there as to whether Germany was ready for an _alliance with
England_. I immediately asked: "Against whom?"--since, if England so
suddenly offered to make an alliance in the midst of peace, it was
plain that she needed the German army, which made it worth while to
find out against whom the army was needed and for what reason German
troops were to fight, at England's behest, by her side. Thereupon the
answer came from London that they were needed against Russia, since
Russia was a menace both to India and to Constantinople.

The first thing I did was to call London's attention to the old
traditional brotherhood-in-arms between the German and Russian armies,
and the close family ties between the reigning dynasties of the two
countries; in addition, I pointed out the dangers of a war on two
fronts, in case France came in on the side of Russia, and also the
fact that we had acted jointly with France and Russia in the Far East
(Shimonoseki, 1895) and that there was no reason to unloose a conflict
with Russia at this time, when we were in the midst of peace; that the
superiority in number of the Russian army on a peace footing was very
great and the eastern frontiers of Prussia seriously threatened by the
grouping of the Russian forces; that England would not be in a position
to protect our eastern province from a Russian attack, since her fleet
could accomplish little in the Baltic and would be unable to sail into
the Black Sea; that, in case of our making common cause against Russia,
Germany would be the only one who would be in great danger, quite
independently of the possibility of the entry of France into the fight.

Chamberlain then informed us that a firm alliance should be made, by
which England would naturally bind herself to come to our aid.

BRITISH ALLIANCE FAILS

I had also pointed out that the validity of an alliance could only
be assured when the English Parliament had placed its approval upon
it, since the Ministry might be driven from office by the will of the
nation as expressed in Parliament, whereby signature of the Ministry
might be rendered null and void and the alliance invalidated, and that
we could look upon the Chamberlain suggestion, for the time being,
merely as a purely personal project of his own.

To this Chamberlain replied that he would get backing from Parliament
in due time and would find the way of winning the Unionists over to
his idea; that all needed now was the signature of Berlin. Matters
did not progress as far as that, because Parliament was not to be won
over to Chamberlain's plan; therefore the "plan" came to nothing. Soon
afterward England concluded her alliance with Japan (Hayashi). The
Russo-Japanese War broke out, in which Japan--owing to the fact that
it fitted in with her schemes--played the rôle of pawn for England's
interests, which rôle had originally been reserved for Germany. By
this war Russia was thrown from the east back to the west, where she
might concern herself again with the Balkans, Constantinople, and
India--which was to Japan's advantage--leaving to Japan a free hand in
Korea and China.

In 1905 came my journey to Tangier, undertaken much against my will.
It came about as follows: Toward the end of March I intended, as in
the previous year, to take a Mediterranean trip for the sake of my
health, for which I proposed to avail myself of some ship running empty
from Cuxhaven to Naples. The _Hamburg_ was destined by Ballin for this
purpose. At his request that I take along some other guests, since the
steamer was quite empty, I invited a number of gentlemen, among them
Privy Councilor Althoc, Admiral Mensing, Count Pückler, Ambassador von
Varnbuhler, Professor Schiemann, Admiral Hollmann, etc.

Soon after the proposed trip became known Bülow informed me that
there was a strong desire at Lisbon to have me stop there and pay the
Portuguese court a visit. To this I agreed. As the date of departure
approached, Bülow expressed the additional wish that I also stop at
Tangier and, by visiting that Moroccan port, strengthen the position of
the Sultan of Morocco in relation to the French.

This I declined, since it seemed to me that the Morocco question was
too full of explosive matter and I feared that such a visit would
work out disadvantageously rather than beneficially. Bülow returned
to the attack, without, however, persuading me of the necessity or
advisability of the visit.

AGAIN KAISER "GIVES IN"

During the journey I had several talks with Freiherr von Schoen, who
accompanied me as representative of the Foreign Office, as to the
advisability of the visit. We agreed that it would be better to drop
it. I telegraphed this decision to the Chancellor from Lisbon. Bülow
replied emphatically that I must take into consideration the view of
the German people and of the Reichstag, which had become interested in
the project, and that it was necessary that I stop at Tangier.

I gave in, with a heavy heart, for I feared that this visit, in view
of the situation at Paris, might be construed as a provocation and
cause an inclination in London to support France in case of war. Since
I suspected that Delcassé wished to make Morocco a pretext for war, I
feared that he might make use of the Tangier visit for this purpose.

The visit took place, after much difficulty had been experienced in the
open roadstead of Tangier, and it met with a certain amount of friendly
participation by Italian and Southern French anarchists, rogues, and
adventurers. A lot of Spaniards stood upon a small square, amid waving
banners and loud cries; these, according to a police official who
accompanied us, were an assembly of Spanish anarchists.

The first I learned about the consequences of my Tangier visit was
when I got to Gibraltar and was formally and frigidly received by the
English, in marked contrast to my cordial reception the year before.
What I had foreseen was justified by the facts. Embitterment and anger
reigned in Paris, and Delcassé tried to rouse the nation to war; the
only reason that he did not succeed was that both the Minister of War
and the Minister of the Navy declared France not yet ready.

The fact that my fears were justified was also corroborated later by
the conversation between Delcassé and the editor of _Le Gaulois_,
in which the Minister informed an astonished world that, in case of
war, England would have sided with France. Thus, even as far back as
that, I ran the risk, through the Tangier visit forced upon me, of
getting blamed for the unchaining of a world war. To think and act
constitutionally is often a hard task for a ruler upon whom in every
case responsibility is finally saddled.

In October, 1905, the Paris _Matin_ reported that Delcassé had declared
in the Council of Ministers that England had offered, in case of war,
to land 100,000 men in Holstein and seize the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal.
This English offer was repeated once more later on, with the suggestion
that it be affirmed in writing. And the well-known Jaurès, who was
murdered in accordance with the political ideas of Isvolsky upon the
outbreak of war in 1914, knew beforehand about the statements by
Delcassé published in the _Matin_.

The downfall of Delcassé and the accession of Rouvier to his post are
to be ascribed partly to the influence of the Prince of Monaco. During
the regatta week at Kiel the Prince had assured himself, by talks with
me, the Imperial Chancellor, and Government officials, of the sincerity
of our desire to compromise with France for the purpose of enabling us
to live at peace with each other. He stood well with the ambassador,
Prince Radolin, and worked actively toward a rapprochement between the
two countries.

The Prince of Monaco himself was of the opinion that Delcassé was a
menace to the maintenance of peace and hoped that he would soon fall
and be replaced by Rouvier, who was a prudent politician thoroughly
inclined to coming to an understanding with Germany. The Prince said
that he was on good terms with Rouvier personally and would willingly
place himself at the disposal of the German ambassador as a go-between.

NEGOTIATIONS FRUITLESS

Then came Delcassé's fall, and Rouvier became Minister. At once I
caused the initiation of the measures wherein I could count upon the
support of the Prince of Monaco. The Chancellor was instructed to
prepare a rapprochement with France. And I particularly told Prince
Radolin, who personally received his instructions in Berlin, to make
good use of the Rouvier régime for the purpose of eliminating all
possibilities of conflict between the two countries. I added that the
reports of the Prince of Monaco, with whom he was well acquainted,
would be useful to him in relations with Rouvier. Prince Radolin
proceeded with zeal and pleasure to the accomplishment of this
worth-while task.

At first the negotiations went well, so much so that I began to hope
that the important goal would be attained and the evil impression
caused by the Tangier visit effaced by an understanding. In the
meantime, the negotiations concerning Morocco were continued; they were
concluded, after endless trouble, by the summoning of the Algeciras
Conference, based upon the circular note of Prince Bülow, which
pointed out that the Most-Favored-Nation Clause No. 17 of the Madrid
Convention should remain in force and that the reforms in Morocco,
for which France alone was working, should be carried out, in so far
as necessary, only in agreement with the signatory powers of the
Madrid Conference. These events, which riveted general attention upon
themselves, relegated the special negotiations with Rouvier to the
background.

With regard to domestic policy, I had agreed with the Chancellor that
his main task was to be the restoration of order in the relations
between the parties in the Reichstag, which had got into a bad way
under Hohenlohe, and, above all, to rally the Conservatives, who had
been won over to the opposition by the Post-Bismarckians, once more to
the support of the Government. The Chancellor accomplished this task
with great patience and tenacity. He finally formed the famous "bloc,"
which arose from the great electoral defeat of the Socialists.

The Conservative party had many members who had direct relations with
the court, and also with me personally, so that it was easier for this
party than for any other to become informed as to my plans in political
and other matters and to discuss my ideas with me before they took
shape in projects for laws. I have not the impression that this was
done to the extent that was possible; I might perhaps have come into
agreement with the gentlemen, through informal conversations, in the
question of the building of the Central Canal--opposed, as is well
known, by the Conservatives--as well as in the less important matters
of the construction of the Cathedral and the Berlin Opera House, in
which I was deeply interested for the sake of the Church and of art.

I am saying nothing new if I remark that it was by no means easy to
deal with the gentlemen of the Conservative party. Through their
traditional services to the state they had acquired great experience
and independence of judgment, and had thus formed firm political
convictions, to which they held faithfully and in a genuinely
conservative manner. From their ranks great statesmen, eminent
Ministers, a brilliant officer corps, a model body of officials, had
largely been produced. Therefore, the consciousness of their own merit
was not without justification; in addition, their loyalty to their King
was unshakable. The King and the country both owed them gratitude.

FINDS FAULT WITH CONSERVATIVES

Their weakness lay in the fact that they were at times too
conservative--that is, they recognized too late the demands of the
time and began by opposing progress, although it might be progress
advantageous to themselves. One may understand this in view of their
past, but the fact remains that it worked to the detriment of their
relations with me, especially during my reign, when the development
of the Empire, particularly of industry and commerce, pushed rapidly
forward; and I desired--and was obliged--to place no obstacles in the
way of that development, but to promote it. When I said that it was not
always easy, for the reasons adduced, to deal with the Conservatives,
I am well aware that the same thing is maintained about me. Perhaps
this is because I stood close to the Conservatives on account of my
traditions, but was not a Conservative for party reasons. I was and
am, indeed, in favor of progressive conservatism, which preserves what
is vital, rejects what is outworn, and accepts that portion of the new
which is useful.

Let me add that in discussions I was able to endure the truth, even
when it was uncomfortable and bitter, better than people are aware,
provided it was told to me tactfully.

So that, when it is maintained that I and the Conservatives did not
get along in dealings with each other, the same reason was at the root
of the difficulty on both sides. It would have been better to arrive
oftener at an understanding with me in private conversations, for which
I was always ready. And in the canal question, on which we could not
agree, who was better qualified than the Conservative to understand and
appreciate the fact that I have never subscribed to the pretty couplet,
"Unser König absolut, wenn er unseren Willen tut" ("Absolute our King
may be, if he does what we decree")? For, had I acted according to
that principle--a very comfortable one for me--the Conservatives,
in view of their belief in a strong King who really governs, would
logically have been forced to oppose me. Surely the Conservatives must
have respected me for having matched their honorable axiom of manly
pride before the thrones of Kings with mine of kingly pride before the
Conservative party's throne, just as I did with regard to all other
parties.

In any event, the occasional differences with the Conservative party
and with individual Conservatives cannot make me forget the services
rendered by men of this very party to the House of Hohenzollern, the
Prussian state, and the German Empire.

Bülow finally did the great trick of bringing Conservatives and
Liberals together in Germany, thus getting a big majority for the
parties siding with the Government. In doing so, the great abilities
of the Chancellor, his skill, statecraft, and shrewd knowledge of men,
shone forth most brilliantly. The great service rendered by him in
achieving this success won him thorough appreciation and gratitude from
his country and from myself; and, in addition, an increase of my trust
in him. The boundless delight of the people of Berlin in the defeat of
the Social Democrats at the polls led to the nocturnal demonstration,
which I shall never forget, in front of my palace, in the course of
which my automobile had to force a way for itself, little by little,
amid a cheering crowd of many thousands surrounding it. The Lustgarten
was packed with great multitudes of people, at whose tumultuous request
the Empress and I had to appear on the balcony in order to receive
their homage.

The Chancellor was present at the visit of King Edward VII to Kiel.
Among the many guests was the former Chief Court Marshal of the
Empress, Frederick, Count Seckendorff, long acquainted with Edward
VII through his many visits to England, who reposed great trust in
the Count. This gentleman, at the behest of Bülow, with whom he was
friendly, arranged an interview between the King and the Chancellor.

It took place on board the royal English yacht after a breakfast to
which I and the Chancellor were invited. Both gentlemen sat for a long
time alone over their cigars. Afterward Bülow reported to me what had
transpired at the interview. In discussing the possible conclusion of
an alliance between Germany and England, the King, he told me, had
stated that such a thing was not at all necessary in the case of our
two countries, since there was no real cause for enmity or strife
between them. This refusal to make an alliance was a plain sign of the
English "policy of encirclement," which soon made itself felt clearly
and disagreeably at the Algeciras Conference. The pro-French and
anti-German attitude of England, which there came out into the open,
was due to special orders from King Edward VII, who had sent Sir D.
Mackenzie Wallace to Algeciras as his "supervising representative,"
equipped with personal instructions.

From hints given by the latter to his friends it turned out that it
was the King's wish to oppose Germany strongly and support France
at every opportunity. When it was pointed out to him that it might
be possible, after all, to take up later with Germany this or that
question and perhaps come to an understanding, he replied that,
first of all came the Anglo-Russian agreement; that, once that was
assured, an "arrangement" might be made with Germany also. The English
"arrangement" consisted in the encirclement of Germany.

HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH BÜLOW

The relations between me and the Chancellor remained trustful and
friendly throughout this period. He was present repeatedly at the Kiel
regatta. Here, he found occasion, among other matters, to confer with
the Prince of Monaco and a number of influential Frenchmen, who were
guests aboard the Prince's yacht, among whom doubtless the most eminent
was M. Jules Roche, the leading expert on European budgets, and a great
admirer of Goethe. He always carried a copy of _Faust_ in his pocket.

In April, 1906, came the unfortunate collapse in the Reichstag of the
overworked Chancellor. As soon as I received the news, I hurried there
and was glad that Privy Councilor Renvers could give me encouraging
news about Bülow's condition. While the Prince was recuperating
during the summer at Norderney, I went from Heligoland, which I had
been inspecting, on a torpedo boat to the island and surprised the
Chancellor and his wife at their villa. I spent the day in chatting
with the Chancellor, who had already recovered his health to an
encouraging degree and was browned by the sea air and sunlight.

In the late autumn of 1907 the Empress and I paid a visit to Windsor,
at the invitation of King Edward VII. We were most cordially received
by the English royal family and the visit went off harmoniously. After
this visit I went for a rest to the castle of Highcliffe, belonging
to General Stewart Worthley, situated on the south coast of England,
opposite The Needles.

Before my departure for England, the Chancellor, who was much pleased
at the English invitation, had long talks with me as to the best way
for getting on a better footing with England, and had suggested to
me a number of his desires and projects, to serve me as guides in my
conversations with Englishmen. During my visit I had frequent occasion
to discuss the subjects agreed upon and conduct conversations as
desired by the Chancellor. Cipher telegrams containing my reports on
these conversations went regularly to Berlin and I repeatedly received
from the Chancellor approving telegrams. I used to show these after
the evening meal to my intimates who accompanied me on my visit; these
men, among them the Chief Court Marshal Count Eulenburg and Prince Max
Egon Fürstenberg, read them and rejoiced with me at the harmonious
understanding between me and the Chancellor.

After my return from England I made a general report to the Chancellor,
whereupon he expressed to me his thanks for my having personally
troubled myself so much and worked so hard toward improving the
relations between the two countries.

DEFENDS FAMOUS INTERVIEW[6]

A year later came the incident about the so-called "interview,"
published in the _Daily Telegraph_. Its object was the improvement of
German-English relations. I had sent the draft submitted to me to the
Chancellor for examination through the representative of the Foreign
Office, Herr von Jenisch. I had called attention, by means of notes, to
certain portions which, to my way of thinking, did not belong therein
and should be eliminated. Through a series of mistakes on the part of
the Foreign Office, when the matter was taken up at my request, this
was not done.

A storm broke loose in the press. The Chancellor spoke in the
Reichstag, but did not defend the Kaiser, who was the object of attack,
to the extent that I expected, declaring, on the other hand, that he
wished to prevent in future the tendency toward "personal politics"
which had become apparent in the last few years. The Conservative party
took upon itself to address an open letter to the King through the
newspapers, the contents of which are known.

During these proceedings, I was staying first at Eckartsau, with Franz
Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, and later with Kaiser Franz
Joseph at Vienna, both of whom disapproved of the Chancellor's conduct.
From Vienna I went to Donaueschingen to visit Prince Fürstenberg, to
whom the press saw fit to address the demand that he should, being
an honest, upright man, tell the Emperor the truth for once. When we
talked over the whole matter, the Prince advised me to get together,
at the Foreign Office, the dispatches from Highcliffe in 1907, and the
answers to them, and have these laid before the Reichstag.

During this whole affair I underwent great mental anguish, which was
heightened by the sudden death before my eyes of the intimate friend
of my youth, Count Hülsen-Haeseler, chief of the Military Cabinet.
The faithful, self-sacrificing friendship and care of the Prince and
his family were most welcome to me in these bitter days. And letters
and demonstrations from the Empire, part of which sided with me and
severely censured the Chancellor, were a consolation to me during that
period.

After my return, the Chancellor appeared, lectured me on my political
sins, and asked that I sign the document that is already known, which
was afterward communicated to the press. I signed it in silence and in
silence I endured the attacks of the press against myself and the Crown.

The Chancellor struck a serious blow, by his conduct, at the firm
confidence and sincere friendship which had bound me before to him.
Undoubtedly Prince Bülow thought that, handling the matter as he did
both in the Reichstag and with me personally, he could best serve me
and the cause, especially as public excitement was running very high
at that time. In this I could not agree with him, all the more so
since his actions toward me in the _Daily Telegraph_ affair stood out
in too sharp contrast to the complaisance and recognition which Bülow
had previously manifested toward me. I had become so accustomed to the
amiability of the Prince that I found the treatment now accorded me
incomprehensible.

A BREAK WITH BÜLOW

The relationship between Emperor and Chancellor, excellent and amicable
up to that time, was, at all events, disturbed. I gave up personal
relations with the Chancellor and confined myself to official dealings.
After consultation with the Minister of the Royal Household and the
chief of the Cabinet, I resolved to follow Prince Fürstenberg's advice
as to getting together the Highcliffe dispatches, and charged the
Foreign Office with this task. It failed of accomplishment because the
dispatches in question were not to be found.

Toward the end of the winter the Chancellor requested an audience
with me. I walked up and down with him in the picture gallery of the
palace, between the pictures of my ancestors, of the battles of the
Seven Years' War, of the proclamation of the Empire at Versailles,
and was amazed when the Chancellor harked back to the events of the
autumn of 1908 and undertook to explain his attitude. Thereupon I took
occasion to talk with him about the entire past. The frank talk and
the explanations of the Prince satisfied me. The result was that he
remained in office.

The Chancellor requested that I dine with him that evening, as I had so
often done before, in order to show the outer world that all was again
well. I did so. A pleasant evening, enlivened by the visibly delighted
Princess with charming amiability, and by the Prince with his usual
lively, witty talk, closed that memorable day. Alluding to the Prince's
audience with me, a wag wrote later in a newspaper, parodying a famous
line: "The tear flows, Germania has me again."

By this reconciliation I also wished to show that I was in the
habit of sacrificing my own sensitiveness to the good of the cause.
Despite Prince Bülow's attitude toward me in the Reichstag, which
was calculated to pain me, I naturally never forgot his eminent gifts
as a statesman and his distinguished services to the fatherland. He
succeeded, by his skill, in avoiding a world war at several moments of
crisis, during the period indeed, when I, together with Tirpitz, was
building our protecting fleet. That was a great achievement.

A serious epilogue to the above-mentioned audience was provided by the
Conservatives. The Civil Cabinet informed the party leaders of the
Chancellor's audience and what happened there, with the request that
the party might now take back its "Open Letter." This request--which
was made solely in the interest of the Crown, not of myself
personally--was declined by the party. Not until 1916, when the war
was under way, did we get into touch again, through a delegate of the
party, at Great General Headquarters.

Just as the Conservatives did not do enough out of respect for the
Crown to satisfy me, so also the Liberals of the Left, the Democrats
and the Socialists, distinguished themselves by an outburst of fury,
which became, in their partisan press, a veritable orgy, in which
loud demands were made for the limitation of autocratic, despotic
inclinations, etc. This agitation lasted the whole winter, without
hindrance or objection from high Government circles. Only after the
Chancellor's audience did it stop.

Later, a coolness gradually arose between the Chancellor and
the political parties. The Conservatives drew away from the
Liberals--rifts appeared in the bloc. Centrists and Socialists--but,
above all, the Chancellor himself--brought about its downfall, as Count
Hertling repeatedly explained to me later--for the last time at Spa. He
was proud to have worked energetically toward causing Bülow's downfall.

When matters had reached an impossible pass, the Chancellor drew
the proper conclusions and recommended to me the choice of Herr
von Bethmann as the fifth Chancellor of the Empire. After careful
consultations, I decided to acquiesce in the wish of Prince Bülow, to
accept his request for retirement, and to summon the man recommended by
him as his successor.

[6] One of the most startling incidents of the Kaiser's reign was
the interview with him printed in the London _Daily Telegraph_
of Oct. 28, 1908. In it he said that "Englishmen, in giving rein
to suspicions unworthy of a great nation," were "mad as March
hares"; and that "the prevailing sentiment among large sections
of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly
to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in a minority in my
own land, but it is a minority of the best elements, just as it
is in England with respect to Germany." German opinion was, he
admitted, "bitterly hostile" to England during the Boer War, and,
that the German people, if he had permitted Boer delegates in
Berlin, "would have crowned them with flowers." He asserted that
he had formulated a plan of campaign in South Africa which Lord
Roberts adopted in substance.

The Kaiser was quoted in this interview as declaring Germany
needed a large fleet chiefly on account of the Far Eastern
situation.

The interview was republished in official German organs, and
caused as great a stir in Germany as in England. There were many
debates on it in the Reichstag and one or two "investigations."

CHAPTER V

Bethmann

I had been well acquainted since my youth with Herr von Bethmann
Hollweg. When I was in active service for the first time in 1877, as
Lieutenant in the Sixth Company of the First Infantry Guard Regiment,
it was quartered once at Hohenfinow, the home of old Herr von Bethmann,
father of the Chancellor. I was attracted by the pleasant family circle
there, which was presided over by Frau von Bethmann, a most worthy
lady, born of Swiss nationality, amiable and refined.

Often, as Prince and later as Emperor, I went to Hohenfinow to visit
the old gentleman, and I was received on every occasion by the young
head of the rural district administration; at that time neither of us
imagined that he would become Imperial Chancellor under me.

From these visits an intimate relationship sprang up little by little,
which served to increase steadily my esteem for the diligence, ability,
and noble character of Bethmann, which were much to my liking. These
qualities clung to him throughout his career.

As Chief President and as Imperial Secretary of State for the Interior
Bethmann gave a good account of himself, and, while occupying the
last-named post, made his appearance successfully before the Reichstag.

Co-operation with the Chancellor was easy for me. With Bethmann I kept
up my custom of daily visits whenever possible, and of discussing fully
with him, while walking in the garden of the Chancellor's palace, on
politics, events of the day, special bills, and occurrences and of
hearing reports from him. It was also a pleasure for me to visit the
Chancellor's home, since Bethmann's spouse was the very model of a
genuine German wife, one whose simple distinction earned the esteem
of every visitor, while her winning kindness of heart spread around
her an atmosphere of cordiality. During the Bethmann régime the custom
of holding small evening receptions, instituted by Prince Bülow and
most enjoyable to me, was continued, and this enabled me to keep on
associating informally with men of all circles and walks of life.

In the journeys which the Chancellor had to make in order to introduce
himself, he won esteem everywhere by his distinguished calm and sincere
methods of expression. Such foreign countries as were not hostile to us
considered him a factor making for political stability and peace, to
the maintenance and strengthening of which he devoted his most zealous
efforts. This was entirely to my liking.

In foreign politics he busied himself from the start with the position
of England in relation to Germany and with the "policy of encirclement"
of King Edward VII, which had made itself felt more and more since
Reval, and was a source of worry to Bethmann. This was likewise true
of the growing desire for revenge and enmity of France, and the
unreliability of Russia. During his régime as Chancellor it became
clear that Italy was no longer to be reckoned with militarily; the work
of Barrère in that country made "extra tours" chronic.

Upon assuming office, Herr von Bethmann found the situation with regard
to France cleared up to such an extent that the German-French Morocco
Agreement had been signed on February 9, 1909. By recognizing thereby
the political predominance of France in Morocco Prince Bülow had put
the finishing touch to the German political retreat from Morocco. The
standpoint which had determined the trip to Tangier and, in addition,
the Algeciras Conference, was thereby definitely abandoned. The great
satisfaction of the French Government over this victory was expressed
in a manner unwelcome to us by the conferring of the cross of the
Legion of Honor upon Prince Radolin and Herr von Schoen.

RECEIVES BRITISH ROYALTY

On the same day King Edward VII, with Queen Alexandra, made his first
official visit to the German Emperor and his wife at their capital
city of Berlin--eight years after his accession to the throne! Berlin
received the exalted gentleman with rejoicing (!!) and showed no signs
of dissatisfaction at his unfriendly policy.

The King did not look well; he was tired and aged, and suffered,
moreover, from a severe attack of catarrh. Nevertheless, he accepted
the invitation of the municipal authorities of Berlin to informal tea
at the City Hall. From his description, which was corroborated by
Berlin gentlemen, the function must have been satisfactory to both
parties.

I informed my uncle of the signing of the German-French Morocco
Agreement and the news seemed to please him. When I added, "I hope this
agreement will be a stepping stone to a better understanding between
the two countries," the King nodded his head approvingly and said, "May
that be so!" If the King had co-operated toward this, my project would
probably not have failed. Nevertheless, the visit of Their English
Majesties engendered a more friendly atmosphere for the time being,
which greeted Herr von Bethmann upon his assuming office.

During his term of office Herr von Bethmann had plenty of foreign
matters to handle, connected with the well-known events of 1909-14.
Concerning this period a mass of material has been published in
different quarters, for instance, in the book, _Causes of the World
War_, by Secretary of State von Jagow. In the _Belgian Documents_ the
attitude of the German Government in the various complications is
described from a neutral standpoint. I had based this attitude on the
following:

Caution on the one hand, on the other, support of our
Austro-Hungarian allies whenever there is a plain threat against
their position as a world power, combined with counsels of
moderation in action. Efforts in the rôle of "honest broker"
everywhere, activity as a go-between wherever peace seems
endangered. Firm assertion of our own interests.

In view of the "encirclement" ambitions of our opponents, we were in
duty bound, for the sake of self-preservation, to work steadily at
the same time toward building up our army and navy for purposes of
defense, because of the central location of Germany and her open,
unprotected frontiers. This period of history is also well described in
Stegemann's book, and Helfferich and Friedjung also depict the prewar
days interestingly.

"EDWARD THE ENCIRCLER"

The death of the "encircler," Edward VII--of whom it was said once, in
a report of the Belgian Embassy at Berlin, that "the peace of Europe
was never in such danger as when the King of England concerned himself
with maintaining it"--called me to London, where I shared with my close
relations, the members of the English royal family, the mourning into
which the passing of the King had thrown the dynasty and the nation.
The entire royal family received me at the railway station as a token
of their gratitude for the deference to family ties shown by my coming.

King George drove with me to Westminster Hall, where the gorgeously
decorated coffin reposed upon a towering catafalque, guarded by
household troops, troops of the line, and detachments from the
Indian and Colonial contingents, all in the traditional attitude of
mourning--heads bowed, hands crossed over the butts and hilts of their
reversed arms. The old, gray hall, covered by its great Gothic wooden
ceiling, towered imposingly over the catafalque, lighted merely by a
few rays of the sun filtering through narrow windows. One ray flooded
the magnificent coffin of the King, surmounted by the English crown,
and made marvelous play with the colors of the precious stones adorning
it.

Past the catafalque countless throngs of men, women, and children of
all classes and strata in the nation passed in silence, many with hands
folded to bid a reverent farewell to him who had been so popular as a
ruler. A most impressive picture, in its marvelous mediæval setting.

I went up to the catafalque, with King George, placed a cross upon it,
and spoke a silent prayer, after which my right hand and that of my
royal cousin found each other, quite unconsciously on our part, and met
in a firm clasp. This made a deep impression on those who witnessed it,
to such an extent that, in the evening, one of my relations said to me:
"Your handshake with our King is all over London: the people are deeply
impressed by it, and take it as a good omen for the future."

"That is the sincerest wish of my heart," I replied.

As I rode through London behind the coffin of my uncle I was a witness
of the tremendous and impressive demonstration of grief on the part
of the vast multitude--estimated at several millions--on streets,
balconies, and roofs, every one of whom was clad in black, every man
of whom stood with bared head, among all of whom reigned perfect order
and absolute stillness. Upon this somber, solemn background the files
of British soldiers stood out all the more gorgeously. In splendid
array marched the battalions of the English Guards: Grenadiers, Scots
Guards, Coldstreams, Irish Guards--in their perfectly-fitting coats,
white leather facings, and heavy bearskin headgear; all picked troops
of superb appearance and admirable martial bearing, a joy to any man
with the heart of a soldier. And all the troops lining the path of the
funeral cortège stood in the attitude of mourning already described.

During my stay I resided, at the special desire of King George, in
Buckingham Palace. The widow of the dead King, Queen Alexandra,
received me with moving and charming kindness, and talked much with me
about bygone days; my recollections stretched back to my childhood,
since I, while still a little boy, had been present at the wedding of
my dead uncle.

THE PICHON CONVERSATION

The King gave a banquet to the many princely guests and their suites,
as well as for the representatives of foreign nations, at which M.
Pichon was also present. He was introduced to me and, in conversation
with him, I told him of the wishes which the Imperial Chancellor had
communicated to me regarding our interests in Morocco and some other
political matters, which M. Pichon readily agreed to carry out. All
other combinations connected in various quarters with this talk, belong
in the domain of fancy.

Although the period between 1909 and 1914 demanded extraordinary
attention to foreign events, interior development was, nevertheless,
promoted zealously, and efforts made to meet the demands of commerce,
transportation, agriculture, and industry, which were growing rapidly.
Unfortunately endeavors in this direction were made much more difficult
by the discord among political parties.

The Chancellor wished to accomplish everything possible of
accomplishment. But his inclination to get to the bottom of problems
and his desire to deal only with what was, from his meticulous critical
standpoint, thoroughly matured, tended, in the course of time, to
hamper progress. It was difficult to bring him to make decisions
before he was thoroughly convinced of their being absolutely free from
objection. This made working with him tiresome and aroused in those not
close to him the impression of vacillation, whereas, in reality, it was
merely overconscientiousness carried too far.

In addition, the Chancellor eventually developed a strong and growing
inclination toward domination; in discussions this tended to make
him obstinate and caused him to lay down the law to those thinking
otherwise as dogmatically as a school teacher. This brought him many
enemies and often made things hard for me. A boyhood friend of the
Chancellor, to whom I spoke once about this, replied, with a smile,
that it had been so with him even in school; there Herr von Bethmann
had constantly taught and school-mastered his fellow students, of whom
my informant was one, so that finally his classmates had nicknamed
him "the governess." He added that this trait was a misfortune for
Bethmann, but that it had so grown into his very being that he would
never be able to get rid of it.

An example of this is Bethmann's relationship to Herr von Kiderlen,
whom he desired to have as Secretary of State, despite my emphatic
objections. Herr von Kiderlen was an able worker and a man of strong
character, who always sought to assert his independence. He had been
about one year in office when Herr von Bethmann came to me one day,
complained of Kiderlen's obstinacy and insubordination, and asked me
to appeal to his conscience. I declined, with the observation that the
Chancellor had chosen Kiderlen against my wishes and must now manage to
get along with him; that the maintenance of discipline at the Foreign
Office was a duty devolving upon the Chancellor, in which I had no
desire to interfere.

FINDS FAULT WITH BETHMANN

Meanwhile, Bethmann's inadequacy to the post of Chancellor became
evident. Deep down in his heart he was a pacifist and was obsessed
with the aberration of coming to an understanding with England. I can
perfectly well understand that a man of pacifist inclinations should
act thus in the hope of avoiding a war thereby. His object was entirely
in accord with my policy. The ways and means whereby Bethmann sought
to achieve it were, in my opinion, unsuitable. Nevertheless, I backed
his endeavors. But I certainly did not believe that real success would
result. It became ever more apparent, while he was Chancellor, that
he was remote from political realities. Yet he always knew everything
better than anybody else. Owing to this overestimation of his own
powers he stuck unswervingly to his ideas, even when things all turned
out differently from what he had expected.

His reports were always admirably prepared, brilliant in form, and,
hence, impressive and attractive. And in this there was an element of
danger. In his opinion there was always but one solution, the one which
he proposed! The apparent solidity and thoroughness of his reports and
suggestions, the illuminating treatment of the matters reported upon
from every angle, the references to experts, to foreign and native
statesmen and diplomats, etc., easily led to the impression that solely
the Bethmann solution was worthy of consideration. In spite of these
thorough preparations, he made mistake after mistake.

Thus he had an actual share in our misfortune. When I returned from my
Norwegian trip in 1914 he did not place his resignation in my hands,
to be sure, but he admitted that his political calculations had gone
wrong. Nevertheless, I left him in office, even after his Reichstag
speech and the English declaration of war of August 4, 1914, because I
considered it most serious to change the highest official in the Empire
at the most critical moment in German history. The unanimous attitude
of the nation in the face of the challenge from the Entente might have
been impaired by such action.

Moreover, both the Chancellor and the chief of the Civil Cabinet
maintained that they had the working classes behind them. I was loath
to deprive the working classes, which behaved in an exemplary manner in
1914, of the statesman whom, I had been told, they trusted.

The theory, constantly repeated to me in 1914 by the chief of the
Civil Cabinet and the representative of the Foreign Office, that
only Bethmann had the support of the working classes, was finally
supplemented further by reports to me that the Chancellor enjoyed the
confidence in foreign countries which was necessary to the conclusion
of peace. Thus it came about that Bethmann always stayed in office,
until, finally, the Crown Prince made the well-known investigation
among the party leaders which showed that the above-mentioned theory
was mistaken. This mistake was made all the clearer to me when I read,
at the time of Bethmann's dismissal--to which other factors also
contributed--the most unfavorable opinions of him, especially in the
Social Democratic and Democratic press.

I do not wish to blame Bethmann with these frank remarks, nor to
exonerate others; but, when such important matters are discussed,
personal considerations must be ignored. I never doubted the nobility
of Bethmann's sentiments.

May I be allowed to say a few words here concerning the reform in the
Prussian franchise, since the handling of this by Herr von Bethmann
is characteristic of his policy of vacillation. During the winter of
1914-15, when, following the brilliant summer campaign, the hard,
severe winter trench-fighting had brought military movements to a
standstill, the extraordinary achievements of all the troops and the
spirit which I had found among officers and men, both at the front and
in the hospitals, made such a profound impression on me that I resolved
to provide, for the tried, magnificent "Nation in Arms," something in
the political domain, when it returned home, which should prove that I
recognized what it had done and wished to give the nation joy.

I often touched upon this theme in conversations and suggested reforms
in the Prussian franchise; the man, said I, who returned home, after a
struggle like this, with the Iron Cross--perhaps of both classes--must
no longer be "classified" at the polls.

At this juncture a memorial was submitted to me by Herr von Loebell
which proposed a reform in the Prussian franchise on similar grounds.
The concise, clear, and convincing treatment of the subject pleased me
so much that I had a number of gentlemen read the memorial, which took
up, in its original form, only general points of view, without going
into detail, and I was pleased to see that it found approval with all
whom I questioned concerning it.

I had my thanks expressed to Herr von Loebell through the chief of the
Cabinet, von Valentini, and caused Loebell to work out the matter in
detail and make suggestions. This was done in the spring of 1915. The
memorial was very thorough and dealt with a number of possibilities
for the franchise, without advising any one system. It was approved
by me, and sent by the chief of the Cabinet to the Chancellor, with
the command that it be discussed, in the course of the year, by the
Ministers, and that their vote on it--possibly, also, some suggestions

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