Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy, Vol. 1 of 2
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Title: Lord Lyons: A Record of British Diplomacy, Vol. 1 of 2
Author: Baron Thomas Wodehouse Legh Newton
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LORD LYONS: A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY, VOL. 1 OF 2 ***
LORD LYONS
VOLUME I
[Illustration: _Lord Lyons,
from a photograph taken at Boston, U.S. in 1860._]
LORD LYONS
A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY
BY
LORD NEWTON
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOLUME I
WITH PORTRAITS
LONDON
EDWARD ARNOLD
1913
_All rights reserved_
PREFACE
It was the practice of the late Lord Lyons to preserve carefully the
whole of his correspondence, whether official, semi-official, or
private, and upon his death this accumulation of papers passed into the
possession of his nephew, the present Duke of Norfolk.
I have been able to draw to some extent upon my own diary and
recollections of the five years (1881-1886) during which I served as a
member of Lord Lyons's staff at the Paris Embassy, but that period
represents only a very small portion of his official career, and it is
from the above mentioned papers that this work has been almost entirely
compiled. All the material was placed unreservedly at my disposal, and I
desire to make full acknowledgment of this mark of confidence. I desire
also to express my gratitude to the numerous persons who have readily
given their consent to the publication of important letters in which
they possess a proprietary interest: notably to Emily Lady Ampthill,
Lord Clarendon, Lord Derby, Lady Granville, Lady Ermyntrude Malet, Lord
Rosebery, the Hon. Rollo Russell, Lord Salisbury, and Lord Sanderson.
I am indebted to Mr. J. F. Marshall and Mr. Alan Parsons for their
assistance in sifting the enormous mass of documents found at Norfolk
House, and to the Hon. Arnold Keppel for a service rendered at a
subsequent period. Finally, I have to thank Mrs. Wilfrid Ward for an
interesting contribution entitled "Lord Lyons in private life,"
containing personal details only available to a near relative.
NEWTON.
_October, 1913._
CONTENTS OF VOL. I
CHAPTER I
PAGE
EARLY LIFE
Early Life--Enters Diplomatic Service, 1839--Appointed unpaid
attaché at Athens--Unfavourable prospects--Paid attaché at
Rome, 1853--Condition of the Papal States--Life at Rome--Appointed
Secretary of Legation at Florence--Question of the
'Tavola di Stato'--Sent to Naples to deal with the case of the
_Cagliari_--Success of his mission and appointment as Minister
at Florence--Succeeds to peerage on death of his father--Appointed
Minister at Washington, 1858 1
CHAPTER II
WASHINGTON
1859-1860
Arrival at Washington--Effect produced in America by the Franco-Austrian
War--Feeling in America with regard to England--San
Juan and Mexico--Rising passions between Northern and
Southern States--Disclaimer of matrimonial intentions--Accompanies
Prince of Wales on Canadian tour--Delight of President
Buchanan at receiving a letter from Queen Victoria--Prince
of Wales's visit to the United States 12
CHAPTER III
OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR--THE 'TRENT' CASE
1860-1861
Crisis caused by election of President Lincoln--Mr. Seward as
Secretary of State: his threatening language--Capture of Fort
Sumter--Desirability of England and France acting in conjunction--Danger
of an attack upon Canada--Growth of ill-feeling
towards England--Effect of battle of Bull's Run--Mr. Seward
on the essential difference between American policy and that
of Foreign Nations--Seizure of a Foreign Office bag--British
Consuls and the Confederate Government--The Trent incident:
seizure of Messrs. Mason and Slidell--Lord Lyons's decision to
maintain complete reserve--H.M. Government urged to provide
for defence of Canada--Attitude of American public--Instructions
of Her Majesty's Government--Mr. Seward's reception of
the despatch--Liberation of Messrs. Mason and Slidell--Lord
Lyons's consideration acknowledged by Mr. Seward--Advantage
of occasional silence 29
CHAPTER IV
COURSE OF THE CIVIL WAR
1862-1865
Course of the Civil War--Mr. Seward's altered policy towards
England--Visit of the French Minister, M. Mercier, to the Confederate
Headquarters--Lord Lyons declines to accompany him--Rumoured intention
of France and England to mediate--Breakdown in health owing to
overwork--Failure of French attempt at intervention--Dissatisfaction in
Northern States--Indiscretion of a British Consul--Arbitrary
proceedings of American cruisers--Lord Russell and the
_Alabama_--Grievances of foreigners resident in the United
States--Liability of British subjects to military service--Method of
recruiting the Northern armies--Hardships of 'Volunteers'--The Bounty
System--Surprising proposal by Mr. Seward--Reciprocity negotiations:
Lord Lyons's objections to a Canadian representative--Difficulty of
obtaining redress for aggrieved British subjects--Lord Lyons directed
to proceed to Canada and to report on its defence--Return to
Washington--Breakdown in health--The work at the Washington
Legation--Proceeds to England--Retires temporarily from Diplomatic
service owing to ill-health 79
CHAPTER V
CONSTANTINOPLE
1865-1867
Offer and Acceptance of Constantinople Embassy--Sir Henry
Bulwer--Comparative calm at Constantinople--Arrogance of
French Ambassador, M. de Moustier--Lord Stratford de Redcliffe
on Turkey--Sultan Abdul Aziz and his passion for ironclads--The
Principalities: Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen
chosen as Hereditary Prince--Difficulties relating to his
Investiture--Crete: The Fortress of Belgrade--Lord Stanley on
Greece--Russian policy towards Turkey--Pro-Russian proclivities
of Napoleon III.--Projected visit of the Sultan to France and
England--Mr. Hammond's apprehensions with regard to the
Sultan--The Dragoman system at Constantinople--Appointed
Ambassador at Paris 144
CHAPTER VI
THE SECOND EMPIRE
1867-1869
Arrival at Paris--The Empress on the Roman Question--The Emperor's
desire for a Conference--Mr. Odo Russell on erroneous French impressions
with regard to the Papacy--Prince Napoleon on the probability of war
with Germany--Credulity of the Emperor of Russia--Visit of Prince
Napoleon to Germany: his impressions--Difficulties of Napoleon
III.--General uneasiness in France and depression of Emperor--Suggested
offer of throne of Spain to Duke of Edinburgh--Lord Clarendon's
conversations with the King of Prussia and Moltke--Lord Clarendon and
Napoleon III.--Lord Clarendon at the Foreign Office--Views of the Crown
Prince of Prussia--Emperor's love of Conferences--The Luxemburg Railway
affair--Apprehensions in England and Belgium of French designs--Views
of Queen Victoria and Gladstone--Confidential instructions to Lord
Lyons--Desire of Empress to visit India--Lord Lyons requested to vote
on party question in House of Lords--Formation of Constitutional
Administration under Emile Ollivier--Distrust of the Emperor 177
CHAPTER VII
SECRET PROPOSALS FOR DISARMAMENT
1870
Attempt by Lord Clarendon, at request of Count Daru, to induce
the Prussian Government to partially disarm--Emile Ollivier
on disarmament--Memorandum by Lord Clarendon communicated
to Bismarck--Objections raised by Bismarck--Count
Daru on Bismarck's arguments--Intended reduction of the
French army--Second attempt by Lord Clarendon--Bismarck's
final answer 246
CHAPTER VIII
THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR
1870
Internal situation in France--Further military reduction sanctioned--The
Plébiscite: general uneasiness--Official satisfaction at result
of Plébiscite--Sycophantic diplomatists--Gramont appointed
Foreign Minister--Official views respecting the value of British
colonies--Accurate prophecy by Lord Clarendon--Death of Lord
Clarendon: Lord Granville Foreign Secretary--The Hohenzollern
Candidature--Explosion of Chauvinism--Lord Lyons's explanation
of the manner in which the war was forced upon the Emperor
Napoleon--Conduct of the Empress during the early stages of the
war--Fall of the Empire: Thiers and Jules Favre--Thiers's
mission--Malet's mission to Bismarck--Consent of Bismarck to receive
a representation of the Provisional Government 280
CHAPTER IX
THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
1870-1871
Departure from Paris to join Provisional Government at Tours--Chaudordy
on cession of territory--Attempt of Gustave Flourens to overthrow the
Government at Paris--Thiers's interviews with Bismarck--Bismarck and
_Les militaires_--Gladstone on cession of territory--Denunciation
by Russia of Black Sea clauses in Treaty of Paris--Question of
Bismarck's connivance--French and German grievances against
England--Lord Lyons joins Provisional Government at Bordeaux--Difficulty
in securing a French Representation at Black Sea Conference--Revival of
French hopes at close of 1870--Bombardment of Paris--Thiers willing to
cede territory: his superiority to Jules Favre--Armistice--General
election--Thiers's conduct of the Peace Negotiations--Peace conditions
accepted--Outbreak of the Commune: Lord Lyons and other diplomatists go
to Versailles--Malet and Paschal Grousset--Murder of the Archbishop of
Paris and the hostages--Suppression of the Commune--Return to Paris.
322
LIST OF PLATES IN VOL. I
FACING PAGE
LORD LYONS _Frontispiece_
_From a photograph taken at Boston, U.S., in 1860_
WILLIAM HENRY SEWARD 32
PRINCE NAPOLEON 194
LORD LYONS
A RECORD OF BRITISH DIPLOMACY
CHAPTER I
EARLY LIFE
Born in 1817, Richard Bickerton Pemell Lyons, second Baron and first
Viscount and Earl Lyons, eldest son of the distinguished Admiral Sir
Edmund (subsequently first Baron Lyons), was apparently destined like
his younger brother for a naval career, since at the age of ten he was
already serving as an honorary midshipman. A sailor's life, however,
must have been singularly uncongenial to a person of pronounced
sedentary tastes whom nature had obviously designed for a bureaucrat; in
after years he never alluded to his naval experiences, and it was
probably with no slight satisfaction that the navy was exchanged for
Winchester. From Winchester he proceeded to Christ Church, Oxford, where
he took his degree in 1838, being apparently at that period a quiet,
well-behaved, hard-working youth, living carefully upon a modest
allowance, and greatly attached to his parents and family.
In the following year he entered the diplomatic service as unpaid
attaché at Athens, where his father occupied the position of Minister.
In 1844 he became a paid attaché at Athens, and passed thirteen
uneventful years at that post.
At this stage of his career, prospects looked far from promising; he
had started later than usual, being twenty-two at the period of his
entry into the service; younger men were senior to him; he had had no
opportunity of distinguishing himself at Athens, and as he laments in a
letter to the Foreign Secretary, Lord Malmesbury, written in April,
1852, he felt 'mortified and humiliated that a man six years younger
than himself had been passed over him as Secretary to the Legation in
which he had served for thirteen years.' Promotion indeed seemed so
remote that, having reached the age of thirty-five, he seriously
contemplated abandoning diplomacy altogether.
As a matter of fact, there was no cause for uneasiness. In 1852 he was
transferred as paid attaché to Dresden, and early in the following year
received the gratifying intimation that Lord John Russell, who had been
struck with his capacity, had appointed him paid attaché at Rome. 'What
I mean for him,' wrote Lord John Russell, 'is to succeed Mr. Petre, and
to conduct the Roman Mission, with £500 a year. If there were any post
of Secretary of Legation vacant I should gladly offer it to him, as I
have a very good opinion of him.' The importance of the post at Rome
consisted in the fact that, whereas technically dependent on the Tuscan
Mission at Florence, it was virtually semi-independent, and might
easily form an excellent stepping-stone to higher and more important
appointments if activity and discretion were displayed.
In June, 1853, Lyons started for his new post carrying despatches, and
as an illustration of the conditions of travel upon the continent at
that period, it is worth noticing that the expenses of his journey to
Rome amounted to no less a sum than £102 3_s_. 3_d_., inclusive of the
purchase and sale of a carriage, although no man was ever less prodigal
of public money. Nor is there any record of any official objection to
this somewhat alarming outlay.
In 1853 the Pontifical Government, exercising its sway over some
3,000,000 inhabitants of the Roman States, was in possession of no
inconsiderable portion of the Italian peninsula, and presented the
remarkable spectacle of a country jointly occupied by two foreign armies
whose task it was to protect the Pope against his own subjects. With
this object, 10,000 Austrians were stationed in the Ancona district, and
10,000 French troops in Rome, the latter paying their own expenses, but
the former constituting a heavy charge upon the Holy Father with his
embarrassed revenue and increasing deficit. The foreign policy of the
Government was in the hands of Cardinal Antonelli, and not long after
his arrival Lyons was able to write that in spite of 'his peculiar
position' (unaccredited to the Government in Rome), and that in some
quarters England is regarded as the natural enemy of the Papacy, I have
found that notwithstanding a very strong opinion to the contrary, at
Rome, as at most other places, one succeeds best by transacting one's
business in the most plain and straightforward manner, and through the
most direct channels. By acting on this principle and by being very
quiet and unobtrusive, I think I have in part allayed the suspicions
which are felt towards us always more or less at Rome, and I am
certainly on a better footing with Cardinal Antonelli than I had
at all expected to be.
The business between His Majesty's Government and that of Rome was not
of an overpowering nature, and was chiefly concerned with the proposed
establishment of regular diplomatic relations; with the alleged
intention of the Papal Government to create a Hierarchy in Scotland, and
with the inconvenient zeal of ardent Protestants in the Papal dominions.
As regards the establishment of diplomatic relations it seems highly
doubtful whether the Papal Government really desired to see a new
Protestant Mission at Rome: Cardinal Antonelli disclaimed any intention
of creating Roman Catholic Bishops in Scotland, but the religious
activity of British subjects in the Pope's dominions was a constant
source of petty troubles. It must be admitted, however, that it was
singularly easy to fall out with the Papal Government. The importation
of Bibles was forbidden, the distribution of tracts was punished with
imprisonment; one man of English extraction was incarcerated for a
lengthy period because, according to his own statements, he had not
communicated with sufficient regularity; and there were over 600
political prisoners in gaol at Rome at the same time.
As for the official relations between England and the Papal Government
they were friendly enough, and when the Crimean war broke out, feeling
at the Vatican was strongly anti-Russian, for it was believed that
whereas the Roman Catholic Church had nothing to fear from Protestants
and Mussulmans, the Greek schism was a real and threatening danger.
The following letter addressed to his brother, Captain Lyons, gives a
not uninteresting description of the life led in Rome by an unmarried
diplomatist without much private means, and incidentally shows the deep
affection which he entertained for his family.
* * * * *
Rome, January 3rd, 1855.
You may imagine what a relief to me it was, after reading your
letter of the 18th, to see Admiral Dundas' arrival at Constantinople
announced in the Malta paper. Your letter of the 3rd is almost,
indeed I think quite, the most interesting I ever read. The only
drawback to the delight all these letters are to me, is that you
were still lying up. That I hope is over, and that you will be very
prudent about it. We have now a weekly post from Constantinople and
Malta, which is a great comfort. Mention all the details you can in
your letters about the siege and operations by sea and land. The
Malta papers bring nothing that can be depended upon. Besides the
intense interest, it is a great advantage to me diplomatically to
have good intelligence to communicate here, and is a great help to
getting information, which is useful to me, on Roman matters.
Details about Sir E. and yourself are always the most precious
things you can write, and they cannot be too numerous or too minute.
My _ménage_ consists of two men. I am obliged to have two, in order
not to have to open the door myself, if I send one out. I have a
good-sized sitting room, much better furnished than most Roman
Lodgings, a second sitting room, which serves as Anteroom, and
Breakfast Room, good Bedroom and a Dressing Room. I have very little
sun, which I think an advantage, though in general it is thought the
greatest of disadvantages--I breakfast at home, and dine with some
of the other Diplomatists at a little quiet Table d'Hôte, where
there is a very good dinner. In winter I dine out three or four
times a week, and always spend the evening in society. I never do
anything at all in the way of hospitality. With the immense number
of English here, it would be impossible for me to get on, unless I
made this rule. In summer I had some men occasionally to play at
Whist, all of course Foreigners. I have taken my present lodging to
the end of June. My hope is to go to England for two or three months
about that time. I pay between 14 and £15 sterling a month for my
apartment. It is in a capital situation--and a second floor. It is
an admirable country for long rides, but very bad for short ones.
The pavement of the Town is so slippery that it is dangerous to ride
over it--most of the gates are at a very great distance, and after
you pass them, you have a mile or two of stone wall, before you get
out into the open country--which is beautiful and excellent for
riding. The result is that I never do ride. Being almost the only
Englishman here who has anything to do, beyond sight seeing and
amusement, my hours do not suit my Countrymen. My great friend is a
Count Gozze, Austrian Secretary of Legation. He is an old Dresden
friend of mine. Rome is a very rainy place, which obliges me often
to hire a carriage to go out in the evening. The hired carriages are
good, but dear, about nine shillings for an evening. Lord Walpole is
here--no one else I think that you know. I have scribbled all this
because you ask me, and because little details about the writer (if
one really cares for him) are generally the most interesting parts
of letters, written where there are no great events going on. You
would think me oldwomanish if I mentioned half my anxieties about
you and my Father.
A few months later, the brother, Captain Lyons, an exceptionally
promising and gallant naval officer, died of wounds received before
Sebastopol.
In 1856 promotion came in the shape of the secretaryship of Legation at
Florence, but he continued to be employed in Rome, and stood
twenty-second on a list of twenty-four secretaries of Legation. His
prospects of further advance did not appear reassuring, and in March
1857, he writes to his father (now a peer), 'My chance at present seems
to rest almost entirely on Lord Clarendon's disposition to give
practical effect to the good opinion he expresses of me. I should trust
with more confidence to that, if he had not promoted six secretaries of
Legation before me during my residence here, and afterwards offered me
as promotion the post of Secretary of Legation at Florence. Had it not
been for your visit to England at the critical moment, I should now have
been no more than simple Secretary of Legation, doing nothing at
Florence.'
In the autumn of 1857, Lord Normanby, Minister at Florence, having gone
on leave, Lyons was sent to take his place, and, instead of having
nothing to do, found himself at once involved in one of those trivial
questions which so deeply exercised the diplomacy of a former
generation, but which are now of rare occurrence.
Earlier in the year the Pope had paid a visit to Tuscany, and during his
stay at Florence a banquet was held in his honour, to which the members
of the diplomatic corps were invited. Much to their indignation they
were not accommodated at the Tavola di Stato or Sovereign Table, where
His Holiness was seated, and Lord Normanby, the British Minister, a
K.G., Ex-Viceroy, and social magnate, considered that an apology was
due from the Tuscan Government. Unfortunately for Lord Normanby, his
colleagues, having previously agreed to support him, backed out of their
undertaking, and the task of extracting an apology fell upon Lyons, for
Lord Normanby had departed uttering dark threats that he would not
return unless the apology was forthcoming. The Foreign Office took up
the matter seriously, and for no less than three months an animated
controversy was carried on, in the course of which 'The Tuscan
authorities showed themselves so thoroughly wrongheaded that every time
the subject was mentioned they said or did something which made it more
difficult for them to go back,' and Lord Clarendon administered to them
'a severe rebuke.' Finally, whether owing to the severe rebuke or not,
some sort of expression of regret was obtained; the injured Lord Normanby
returned to his post, and Lyons resumed his duties at Rome. Whence he
writes on March 6, 1858:--
The question of Reforms in the Papal Administration, which was so
much agitated during the Pope's journey and immediately afterwards,
appears to be entirely forgotten. The repressive measures which have
been adopted in France since the attempt on the Emperor[1] would
seem to render it difficult for H.M. to urge other sovereigns to
Liberal reforms. The mode in which the intelligence of the attempt
was received at Rome was shocking. One can hardly say that any class
expressed horror: the lower people openly declared their regret that
the crime had not been successful, and the middle classes took
little pains to conceal that they shared this feeling. In fact the
policy which is supposed to be adopted by France of coquetting with
the Liberal Party, without doing anything serious in their favour,
has alienated the sympathies of this part of Italy.
Reforms of a simple character were evidently urgently needed in the
Papal Administration, for just about this time a Canadian bishop and
other British tourists were openly plundered on the main road between
Rome and Civita Vecchia.
The turning point in Lyons's fortunes may be said to have arrived when
early in March he received orders from Lord Malmesbury to proceed to
Naples to inquire into the case of the _Cagliari_.
The _Cagliari_ was a mail steamer plying between Genoa, Sardinia and
Tunis, and on June 25, a number of Mazzinians who had taken passage in
her seized the master and the crew, altered the course of the vessel,
landed at the Island of Ponza in Neapolitan territory, where they
liberated three hundred political prisoners, and subsequently proceeded
to Sapri, in the neighbourhood of Salerno. Here they again disembarked,
expecting the inhabitants to rise in their favour, but encountered a
superior force of Neapolitan troops who killed or captured the whole
party, whilst the _Cagliari_ was seized by Neapolitan warships as
she was making her way ostensibly to Naples. Some weeks later it was
ascertained that amongst the prisoners in Naples were two English
engineers, Watt and Park by name, and it was stated that these two men
were entirely ignorant of the conspiracy, and had been forced by the
conspirators to work the engines under threats of being summarily
shot if they refused. Under the circumstances, as was only natural,
application was made by the British Government that they should at least
have a fair trial, and that the acting Vice-Consul at Naples should be
permitted to visit them in gaol.
Diplomatic relations between England and the Neapolitan Government
having been suspended for some years, Lord Clarendon wrote himself
direct to Signor Carafa, the Neapolitan Foreign Minister, in November,
urging the necessity of dealing with the case in an equitable spirit,
but with incredible perverseness and stupidity the Neapolitan Government
continued to refuse upon one pretext or another either to release the
men or to bring them to trial, or even to permit the Vice-Consul to
visit them. In March, 1858, Watt and Park were still in gaol, and had
been subjected to such abominable treatment that the health of both
was completely broken down, and Watt had become partially insane. Under
these circumstances, a change of government having in the meanwhile
occurred in England, Lord Malmesbury directed Lyons to proceed at once
to Naples and inquire into the case. Although the whole question had
been considerably complicated, partly owing to a note of Sir James
Hudson to the Sardinian Government having been unaccountably altered by
a member of his staff, and partly owing to a rooted belief on the part
of high Neapolitan legal authorities that engineers were responsible for
a ship's course, the Lyons Mission soon bore fruit, and the two
unfortunate Englishmen were both set free, nominally on bail, before the
end of the month, it having become evident to every one that they were
absolutely innocent. But the Neapolitan Government was by no means out
of its difficulties. It was pointed out that as two innocent men had
been imprisoned for nine months, and treated with great barbarity during
the greater part of the time, they were entitled to an indemnity which
was fixed at £3000. Worse was to follow, for, egged on by the Sardinian
Government, the British Government put forward a demand that the
_Cagliari_ should be surrendered on the ground that its capture had
been illegally effected. Both these demands were refused, and finally,
in May, 1858, a special messenger was sent to Naples instructing Lyons
to leave unless within ten days the Neapolitan Government consented to
accept mediation, and stating that England would make common cause with
Sardinia under certain circumstances.
The message could not have been an agreeable one to deliver, and what
the Neapolitan Government disliked more than anything else was the
appearance of yielding to Sardinia. 'Ah! s'il n'y avait que l'Angleterre!'
had always been the expression used by Signor Carafa; but his Government
had placed itself hopelessly in the wrong, and Lyons was able to report
that the indemnity would be paid, and that the _Cagliari_ had been
placed 'at his disposal.' It was an additional satisfaction to him to
add that: 'Far from threatening, I did not even go so far as my
instructions warranted, for I did not say that His Majesty's Government
proposed that the mediator should retire at the end of three months, nor
did I tell Signor Carafa that I was myself ordered to go back to Rome if
the mediation should be refused at the expiration of ten days.'
In spite of the unpleasant nature of this affair, Lyons contrived to
remain on the very best of terms with the Neapolitan Ministers with whom
he had to deal, and Lord Malmesbury was so favourably impressed with his
tact and skill that he at once appointed him Minister at Florence. His
professional future was now assured; but far greater honours were in
store for him, for in November, 1858, came the offer of the Washington
Legation, an offer which, with characteristic modesty, he accepted with
considerable misgivings as to his competence. Nor could it be said that
success had arrived with unusual rapidity, for he was already forty-one.
In the same month he succeeded to the peerage on the death of his
father. His mother had died some years previously; his brother had
perished in the Crimea, and the only remaining near relatives were his
two sisters, one of whom was married to the Duke of Norfolk, and the
other to a Bavarian gentleman, Baron von Würtzburg.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Napoleon III.
CHAPTER II
WASHINGTON
(1859-1860)
In February, 1859, Lord Lyons, accompanied by some members of his staff
(a novelty to one who hitherto had been obliged to work unaided) was
despatched to Washington in H.M.S. _Curaçoa_, and owing to the limited
coal capacity of that vessel, the voyage occupied no less than forty-two
days, a period which must have been singularly disagreeable to a man who
in spite of some years' naval service always suffered from sea sickness.
The new Minister was received with marked courtesy by the U.S.
authorities, and presented his letter of credence on April 12, Mr.
Buchanan being President at the time, and General Cass occupying the
position of Secretary of State.
Although the Presidential message of the previous December had
contained some rather ominous passages with regard to the relations
between England and the United States, the sentiments now expressed
were friendly in character and showed a disposition to settle pending
difficulties in an amicable spirit.
The first letter of importance addressed by Lord Lyons to Lord
Malmesbury deals with the effect produced in the United States
by the outbreak of war between France and Austria.
* * * * *
Washington, May 24, 1859.
I had intended to write a despatch respecting the effect produced
in the U.S. by the War in Europe, but we are so short of hands in
the Chancery, that it is as much as we have been able to do to get
through the regular matters of business which must be treated
officially. I can however give you in a very few words an account of
the state of feeling here, which is probably just what you would
have expected it to be.
The sympathies are all with France and against Austria, but they do
not seem very strong; one sentiment however does appear to be both
strong and universal--the desire to take advantage of the state of
things in Europe to carry out American Views on this side of the
Atlantic; in short to get hold of Mexico and Cuba. The present wish
of the President is, I think, both to be and to appear to be on the
best terms with us. He is careful to vindicate us, in the newspaper
which is his organ, against all imputation of insincerity in Central
American Affairs. The Departments are particularly attentive to all
the smaller matters I have to bring before them, and apparently
anxious to do what I ask. But here I am afraid the practical effect
of their goodwill is likely to end. The Government is so weak that I
do not think it would venture, even in a small matter, to do
anything for us which would expose it to the least unpopularity. I
feel my way cautiously, endeavouring to be very plain and firm upon
clear British Questions, and to avoid doubtful topics as much as
possible.
The immediate object of the President with regard to Mexico appears
to be to avoid the ridicule which would be heaped upon him if the
Government of Juarez were to fall immediately after the American
Cabinet had at last made up their mind to recognize it. Instructions
are, I am told, on the point of being sent to Mr. McLane to
negotiate a treaty with Mexico, partly, it is said, with the object
of giving Juarez a little moral support, partly perhaps to get so
advantageous a Treaty from him, as to engage public opinion here to
declare itself more strongly in favour of his being upheld by the
U.S. Whether Mr. McLane will be instructed (as Mr. Forsyth was) to
propose to purchase part of the Mexican territory, I am unable to
say.
I am very much obliged by your sending out Mr. Warre, and am
impatiently expecting him. It is absolutely necessary to have a good
man here to direct the Chancery; I think too this mission would be a
very good school for a young man who really wished to learn his
business, and I should welcome any one who was industrious, and
wrote a thoroughly good legible hand.
It is particularly desirable that the Staff should be complete,
because if the Minister is to have any knowledge of the Country and
people, it is indispensable that he should visit, from time to time,
the principal cities. This is not like a European State, in which
politics and business are centred in the Capital, and can be studied
more advantageously there than elsewhere. No political men make
Washington their principal residence, in fact they cannot do so, as
it sends no members to Congress, either to the Senate or the House
of Representatives. Commerce it has none. It is in fact little more
than a large village--and when Congress is not sitting it is a
deserted village.
Another letter dated May 30, shows that he was under no illusion as to
the feelings entertained by a large section of the American public,
while fully conscious of the difficulties with which the United States
Government, however well intentioned, was forced to contend.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Malmesbury._
Washington, May 30, 1859.
You will anticipate from my private letter of the 24th my answer to
your inquiry as to what would be the animus of this Government if
England became involved in the present war.
The first notion both of Government and People would be to take
advantage of the circumstance to take their full swing upon this
side of the Atlantic, and especially so far as the people are
concerned to get hold of Cuba and Mexico. The wiser heads see
very distinctly the imprudence of fresh acquisitions of territory,
and the great danger to the Union of introducing large Bodies of
Citizens of Spanish and mixed Races. I believe this to be the
feeling of the present Administration, but no administration
disregards the popular cry.
So far as I can learn, the American acquisitiveness is directed
rather South than North, and is disposed to be content for the
present, with what is most easy to lay hold of. Except on the part
of the most rancorous of the Irish here there does not appear to
be much desire of exciting disturbances in Canada or any of our
Colonies.
I think that if we were engaged in war the Americans would be
(particularly with reference to neutral rights at sea) punctilious,
exacting and quarrelsome to a degree. There is hardly any amount of
violence to which a captain of an American man of war, if he were
clearly in superior force, might not be expected to resort, in order
to prevent American merchantmen being interfered with. And however
outrageous in itself and opposed to International Law the conduct of
the American officers might be, it would meet with enthusiastic
applause from the multitude, and consequently the Government would
not dare to disavow it. This admiration of bullying and violent
proceedings on their own side, which appears to be universal among
the populace here, and the want of firmness on the part of the
Government in withstanding it, seem to me to constitute some of the
greatest difficulties we should have to contend with in keeping at
peace with America when we were at war with other Powers.
I do not think the general sympathies of the Americans need be taken
much into the account. The violent feelings aroused at particular
conjunctures by the events of the war, or by special matters of
dispute, are what will sway the mob, and therefore control the
Government. The upper classes here have certainly in general a
strong sympathy with England; they are proud of her position in the
world, they are anxious for her good opinion, they admire her
political institutions, and are extremely discontented with those of
their own country. But the upper classes keep aloof from political
life, and have little influence in public affairs. The mass of the
Irish Emigrants appear to regard England with bitter hatred, their
numbers give them weight in elections, but their moral power is
small. I should hardly say that the Bulk of the American people are
hostile to the old country but I think they would rather enjoy
seeing us in difficulties. Those even who are most friendly like to
gratify their pride by the idea of our being reduced to straits and
of their coming to our rescue.
I conceive that the wish both of Government and people would certainly
at first be to remain neutral, and reap all the advantages to their
commerce which could not fail to result from that situation, and
their interest in remaining at peace with us is so apparent and so
immense, that it could not fail to tell for some time. But the
People are irritable, excitable, and have a great longing to play
the part of a first-rate power.
The Government would no doubt endeavour to maintain neutrality, but
it would follow public feeling, and probably become exacting,
captious, and (to use a term more expressive than classical)
'bumptious' to a very irritating extent. A great deal would depend
upon firmness on our side. If they thought they could attain their
ends by threats and bluster, there would be no limit to their
pretensions. Perhaps the best way to deal with them would be to
gratify their vanity by treating them in matters of form as great
people, being careful to communicate with them respecting our views
and intentions in something the same manner as if they were really a
considerable military power: to avoid interfering in matters in
which we are not sufficiently interested to make it worth while to
raise serious questions, and above all in matters directly affecting
British interests and British Rights to be clear and distinct in our
language, and firm and decided in our conduct, to convince them that
when we are in the right and in earnest, we are more unyielding, not
less so than formerly--in short to avoid as much as possible raising
questions with them, but not to give way upon those we raise.
I need not remind you that these are the crude ideas of a man who
has been only seven weeks in the country, and who has necessarily
passed them in a small, and at this season, almost deserted town,
which is merely the nominal Capital.
I am anxiously looking out for Mr. Warre, whose arrival you announce
that I may soon expect. It would add much to the efficiency of the
Mission, and be a great comfort to me to have an additional unpaid
attaché, provided he were industrious, desirous to improve, and
capable of writing a good hand.
The change of Government which took place in England during the summer
substituted Lord John Russell for Lord Malmesbury at the Foreign Office,
and following the example of his predecessor, Lord John desired to be
supplied with confidential information by private letters.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._
Washington, July 11, 1859.
At present the President and his Cabinet appear to desire both to
be, and to be thought by the Public to be on the best terms with us.
They are however so weak in Congress, that I doubt whether they
would venture to do anything for us which would be the least
unpopular. It is not therefore to be hoped that they will make any
effort to open to us the Coasting Trade, to extend the provisions of
the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada, to make a Copyright Convention,
or, in short, take any liberal course in commercial matters. Nor
indeed is it likely to be in their power to carry any measures
tending to put us on equal terms with themselves in these respects.
The Democratic spirit in this country appears to be all in favour
of Protection and Exclusive Privileges. Happily the interest of
the South is against a high Customs Tariff; and this checks the
Protectionist Tendencies of the Manufacturing North.
Mr. Dallas will have communicated to you the Statement which has
been for months preparing here, of the views of this Government
respecting neutral rights. The Cabinet, I understand, hope that they
shall obtain great credit with the people for their efforts to
establish American views on this point. They are very anxious to
obtain our co-operation, and imagine, I think, that they may induce
us to claim now concessions to Neutrals which would result in being
a considerable restraint to our assertion for ourselves of
Belligerent rights if we should become involved in war.
I think that our Relations with the U.S. require more than ever--at
this moment--caution and firmness. Caution--to avoid raising
questions with them, without a positive necessity; firmness--to make
them feel that they cannot take advantage of the State of affairs in
Europe to obtain undue advantages in matters directly affecting
British Interests or British Rights. For my own part I endeavour to
speak firmly and distinctly upon all matters which fall within the
proper province of the British Minister in this country and to avoid
all doubtful topics.
* * * * *
The Americans, both Government and People, are I think very much
pleased by attentions and civilities, and very prone to fancy
themselves slighted. This quality may be sometimes turned to good
account, and should certainly be borne in mind when it is necessary
to keep them in good humour.
One of the many questions which had for some time engaged the attention
of the two Governments was the disputed ownership of the island of San
Juan on the Pacific coast, and this case afforded an instance in which
the Government of the United States was hampered by an agent whom it was
not inclined to disavow. The culprit was a certain General Harney who
in a high-handed manner occupied the island without authorization,
and conducted himself in a generally offensive manner, but although
President Buchanan was considerably embarrassed by his action, he was
too much afraid of the press and the mob to order the withdrawal of
the troops. For some time there appeared to be a chance of an actual
collision, and Lord John Russell showed considerable irritation.
* * * * *
_Lord John Russell to Lord Lyons._
Abergeldie, Sept. 21, 1859.
The affair of San Juan is very annoying. It is of the nature of the
U.S. citizens to push themselves where they have no right to go, and
it is of the nature of the U.S. Government not to venture to disavow
acts they cannot have the face to approve.
The best way perhaps would be that we should seize some other island
to which we have as little right as the Americans to San Juan. But
until we know the answer of the American Government to your note and
the proceedings of Governor Douglas, we can hardly give you
instructions.
If you could contrive a convention with the U.S. by which each Power
should occupy San Juan for three or six months, each to protect
person and property till the boundary question is settled, it will
be the best arrangement that can be made for the present.
As a matter of fact the U.S. Government showed itself more reasonable
than had been expected: a superior officer, General Scott, was sent to
settle matters, Harney, to use Lord John Russell's expression, was 'left
in the mud,' and after a joint occupation and protracted negotiations
the question of the ownership of San Juan was referred to the arbitration
of the King of Prussia, who gave his award in favour of the United
States some years later.
San Juan, however, was but one amongst a multitude of questions
requiring solution, and the great difficulty which Lord Lyons had to
contend with was--to use his own words, 'The idea that, happen what may,
England will never really declare war with this country has become so
deeply rooted that I am afraid nothing short of actual hostilities would
eradicate it.' One of these questions concerned the Slave Trade.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._
Dec 6, 1859.
You will see by my despatches of this date, that there is very
little prospect of any satisfactory result from our remonstrance
concerning the Slave Trade. Lamentable as it is, I am afraid the
President goes beyond public opinion already in the measures he
takes against it. In the South the rendering it legal has many
avowed advocates, and it is to be feared that some of the professed
Abolitionists of the North derive too much profit from dabbling
themselves in the trade to desire any efficient measures for its
suppression. The greater part of the vessels engaged in it seem to
be fitted out at New York. The state of feeling at this moment in
the South upon the whole question of slavery is shocking. The
Harper's Ferry affair seems to have excited Southern passions to an
indescribable degree. The dissolution of the Confederation is but
one of the measures which are loudly advocated. There are plans for
the re-enslavement of all the emancipated negroes and for the
purging the South of all whites suspected of Abolitionist
tendencies. The difficulty which we shall have in obtaining decent
treatment for coloured British subjects will be almost insuperable.
* * * * *
Another source of trouble between us and the Southern States may
arise from the measures which they are taking to drive out all
persons suspected of unorthodox notions on slavery, and the orthodox
notion seems to be that slavery is a divine institution. In many
parts of the South, Vigilance Committees are formed who turn people
out at a moment's notice, without any pretext even of law. If any
attempt is made to treat British subjects in this manner, I trust
you will approve of my encouraging the Consuls to insist upon the
law being observed in their case, and to resist any endeavour to
inflict banishment or any other penalty upon an Englishman, except
in due form of law. But it will require a great deal of prudence
and discretion to act in each case, for a fair trial is a thing
impossible in this country of election judges and partisan juries
when party feeling is excited, and any redress we may exact for the
wrong to England, will be too late for the individual in the hands
of Lynch Law Assassins.
The great hope is that the excitement is too violent to last, but
before it subsides, it may do incalculable harm to these states and
raise very painful and awkward questions for us.
If the hope expressed in the last paragraph was fallacious, the
forebodings as to the possible tribulations of British subjects proved
before long to be only too well founded.
Asked by Lord John Russell for his opinion on the position of affairs in
Mexico, he points out _inter alia_, that--
The actual annexation of Mexico to this Confederation raises
immediately one of those questions between the Northern and Southern
States which have already gone a great way to dissolve the Union
altogether. The Southern States desire the addition of territory
_south_, with a view to extending slavery and adding to the
Pro-Slavery votes in the U.S. Senate. To this the North is
conscientiously opposed on religious grounds, to say nothing of the
indignation it feels at the notion of its own vast superiority in
wealth and population being swamped in the Senate. Even now, since
every State sends equally two senators, whatever may be its
population, the North has not the influence it ought to have in the
Senate which is the more important branch of the Legislature. As
the religious sentiment in the North approaches very nearly to
fanaticism, and as the Southern feeling on the point has become
furious passion, there is little chance of their coming to an
agreement upon a matter which calls these feelings into play. In
this particular question the South have on their side the national
vanity which seems always childishly gratified by any addition to
the already enormous extent of the territory. In the meantime the
course of events seems to be bringing about the gradual annexation
of Mexico. The Mexicans in the northern part of their country have
fallen to that point, that they can neither maintain order on the
frontier nor hold their own against the savage Indians within it.
They will (to use an American expression) be 'squatted out' of their
country whenever and wherever any considerable number of the more
energetic race choose to settle. But this is a very different thing
from the sudden incorporation of a vast territory and of a large
population totally different in race, language, religion and
feeling, and (so far as the experiment has been tried) utterly
incapable of maintaining order among themselves under the U.S.
system of government. All the wiser and more conservative
politicians in this country deprecate as an unmitigated evil the
sudden annexation of Mexico; nor are such men willing to undertake
a protectorate of Mexico. This they say would be an enormous
innovation upon their whole political system which has never
admitted of any other connexion than that of perfectly equal
sovereign states, bound by a Federal tie on terms the same for all.
The Presidential Message of December, 1859, was noticeable for an
earnest appeal to the North and South to cultivate feelings of mutual
forbearance.
The message also made clear the policy of the President towards Mexico;
in accordance with the principles of the Monroe doctrine, European
intervention in that country was repudiated, and American intervention
recommended.
A passage referring to San Juan while obviously intended to exculpate
General Harney, paid a handsome tribute to the moderation and discretion
shown by the British Admiral (Baynes) commanding on the Pacific
station; and the President in conversation expressed the hope that the
approaching close of his administration would leave 'a clear score' with
England. No doubt President Buchanan was sincere in his expressions,
but unfortunately, early in 1860, signs were not wanting, that in the
distracted state of the country owing to the rising passions between
North and South, many people believed that a foreign war would be the
best means of promoting unity, nor was there much doubt as to which
foreign country would be selected for the experiment.
Washington has already been disrespectfully alluded to as little better
than a large village, and as bearing little resemblance to an ordinary
capital, but it is evident that Lord Lyons found plenty of enjoyment
there. He was on excellent terms personally with the State officials and
his diplomatic colleagues; liked the members of his staff, and above all
rejoiced in the fact that there was plenty of work to be done--a good
deal more, indeed, than the ordinary person would have approved of. One
of his few complaints is that he is much beset by the inventors of
implements of war. 'I have not the slightest knowledge practical or
theoretical respecting implements of war, and should consequently never
be justified in recommending one more than another to the authorities at
home. I absolutely decline to see, touch, or have brought into my house
any explosive material, I should not feel easy at having even in a
garret such a box as you (the Consul at New York) have received for Her
Majesty. I should be inclined to ask for authority from England to sink
it in the Atlantic Ocean.'
'I am getting on tolerably well here, I hope, on the whole, and have no
complaints to make of the Americans,' he admits in letters to other
correspondents, and adds: 'I am afraid marriage is better never than
late. The American women are undoubtedly very pretty, but my heart is
too old and too callous to be wounded by their charms. I am not going to
be married either to the fascinating accomplished niece of the
President, or to the widow of a late Foreign Minister, or to any other
maiden or relict to whom I am given by the newspapers.'
These sentiments sound rather rash even at the age of forty-two, but
they remained unchanged. It would be incorrect to describe him as a
misogynist, but he successfully withstood all attempts to marry him.
In after years, an exalted personage (neither Queen Victoria nor the
Empress Eugenie) was so insistent upon the advisability of his espousing
one of her ladies-in-waiting, that she eventually couched her proposal
in the form of an ultimatum. Lord Lyons asked for and obtained a delay
of twenty-four hours, and decided upon consideration to refuse. In view
of an event which occurred not long afterwards the decision proved to be
a prudent one, and probably confirmed him in the suspicions which he
appeared to entertain of the opposite sex.
It had been decided that the Prince of Wales should make a tour in
Canada in the summer of 1860, and the Duke of Newcastle, at that time
Colonial Secretary, consulted Lord Lyons as to the advisability of
H.R.H. paying a visit to America. The latter, upon consideration,
pronounced in favour of it. He did not arrive at this decision without
some hesitation. It was feared by persons of experience that the
disaffected Irish in New York and elsewhere might make themselves
disagreeable; the Prince's time was limited, and he would obviously
be unable to make an extended tour, and so might involuntarily cause
offence, whilst it was highly probable that the necessity for preserving
a strictly non-official character might also give rise to difficulties.
On the other hand, President Buchanan extended an invitation in such
cordial terms that it would have been ungracious to decline.
Lord Lyons joined the Prince of Wales in Canada in August, and the tour
must have been an agreeable change even to a person of his sedentary
inclinations. Since his arrival at Washington, fifteen months before, he
had never slept or been six miles outside the town. 'Whenever,' he
explains to a friend, 'I have planned a journey, I have been stopped by
invasions of islands in the Pacific or some other "difficulty" as a
dispute is called here.' It may be surmised, however, that such
obstacles were much less objectionable to him than they would have been
to any one else; he hated travel, openly avowed that he loathed
sight-seeing, and welcomed the opportunity of 'getting Niagara and the
Lakes done this way; it will be a good thing over.'
It was eventually decided that the Prince's visit to the States should
take place in September, and the announcement was not only received
with unbounded satisfaction, but caused prodigious excitement. 'The
President was moved from the usual staid solemnity of his demeanour by
his gratification at receiving an answer from Her Majesty written with
her own hand. At the close of our interview he hurried off with it in
great delight (no doubt to show it to his niece) saying: "It is indeed
something to have an autograph letter from Queen Victoria!"[2] Nor was
the President's gratification confined to the family circle, for he
asked and obtained permission to publish the royal letter which had
afforded so much satisfaction. As soon as the news became known
invitations of every kind at once began to pour in from all quarters,
and offerings of the most varied description made their appearance at
the Legation, which included such objects as equestrian sugar statues of
H.R.H., pots of ointment for the Queen, books of sermons for "Baron
Renfrew," and a set of plates for the "Prince of Whales." Innumerable
requests arrived too for interviews, autographs, and mementos, amongst
which may be cited an application for a photograph from a citizen of
Lowell "for his virgin wife."'
It was, of course, unfortunately necessary to decline the invitations,
for the itinerary had been settled beforehand, and it had been wisely
decided that the Prince should never stay with any private individual,
but always be lodged at an hotel at his own expense, that he should
refuse to receive addresses and deputations, and should neither hear nor
make public speeches. It was also considered desirable that receptions
of British subjects should not be encouraged, and that he should not
attend any demonstration of his fellow-countrymen so as not to excite
any feeling of jealousy.
As for the gifts which were proffered in great profusion, they were
regretfully declined in accordance with the usual practice of the Royal
Family.
In spite of the nominally private character of the Prince of Wales's
tour in the United States, most careful arrangements were found to be
necessary wherever he made a stay. At New York, in particular, which
city appears to be, beyond all others, interested in Royal personages,
the programme could hardly have been of a more elaborate nature had an
Emperor been visiting an Imperial Sire and Brother; even the ladies with
whom H.R.H. was expected to dance, having been selected long in advance.
The chief difficulty in New York and elsewhere seems to have been the
prohibition of speeches at banquets. The Americans, overflowing with
hospitable enthusiasm, were only too anxious to display their friendship
in public utterances, but the British Government had wisely decided that
nineteen was too early an age at which to begin making speeches in a
foreign country, and the rule of silence was rigidly adhered to.
The Prince of Wales's tour, although necessarily brief, included,
besides Washington, some of the principal cities in the States, and
judging from the contemporary correspondence, was attended by singularly
few untoward incidents, proving, in fact, successful beyond expectation.
The happy effect produced by this visit was described in an official
despatch, and private letters corroborate the favourable impression
created.
'I have more completely realized, as the Americans say, the wonderful
success of the Prince of Wales's tour than I did when it was in
progress. I have now had time to talk quietly about it with men
whose opinion is worth having, and also to compare newspapers of various
shades of politics. I am glad to see that the incognito and other
restrictions maintained are represented as a peculiar compliment to
the Americans as showing a desire to associate with them on more equal
terms than would be possible with subjects.'[3]
'The Prince of Wales's tour in the U.S. went off completely to the
satisfaction of all parties from the beginning to the end. It was rather
hard work for me, as he never went out without me, nor I without him,
and I had quantities of letters to write and people to see and keep in
good humour. Nevertheless H.R.H. himself and all the people with him
were so agreeable, that on the whole I enjoyed the tour very much while
it was going on. I look back to it with unmixed satisfaction.'[4]
Much of the success, although he was too modest to allude to it, was
probably due to his own carefulness and forethought.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] Lord Lyons to Lord J. Russell, July 9.
[3] Lord Lyons to the Duke of Newcastle, Oct. 29.
[4] Lord Lyons to Mr. Griffith, Nov. 10.
CHAPTER III
OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR--THE 'TRENT' CASE
(1860-1861)
Before the close of 1860 the relations between North and South had
reached the critical stage: the mutterings of the coming storm grew
louder, and when it became clear, in November, that Abraham Lincoln was
to be the new President, secession advanced with rapid strides, while
conviction became general that a collision was inevitable.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Duke of Newcastle._
Dec. 10, 1860.
It is difficult to believe that I am in the same country which
appeared so prosperous, so contented, and one may say, so calm when
we travelled through it. The change is very great even since I wrote
to you on the 29th October. Our friends are apparently going ahead
on the road to ruin with their characteristic speed and energy.
The President (Buchanan) is harassed beyond measure. It is a very
unfortunate moment for our negotiations, but the present state of
things makes me more than ever anxious to get the San Juan question
safely landed beyond the reach of the incoming administration.
The approaching rule of Lincoln entailed the disquieting probability of
the appointment of Mr. Seward as Secretary of State.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._
Washington, Jan. 7, 1861.
It is considered almost certain that Mr. Seward is to be Mr.
Lincoln's Secretary of State. This will be regarded as a defiance
of the South, unless (as is expected) Mr. Seward comes out with a
conciliatory speech in the Senate. With regard to Great Britain, I
cannot help fearing that he will be a dangerous Foreign Minister.
His view of the relations between the United States and Great
Britain has always been that they are a good material to make
political capital of. He thinks at all events that they may be
safely played with without any risk of bringing on a war. He has
even to me avowed his belief that England will never go to war with
the United States. He has generally taken up any cry against us, but
this he says he has done from friendship, to prevent the other
Party's appropriating it and doing more harm with it than he has
done. The temptation will be great for Lincoln's party, if they be
not actually engaged in a civil war, to endeavour to divert the
public excitement to a foreign quarrel. I do not think Mr. Seward
would contemplate actually going to war with us, but he would be
well disposed to play the old game of seeking popularity here by
displaying violence towards us. I don't think it will be so good a
game for him as it used to be, even supposing we give him an
apparent triumph, but I think he is likely to play it.
This makes me more than ever anxious to settle the San Juan
question.
The forebodings came true. Mr. Seward, a lawyer, who had aimed at the
Presidency himself, became Secretary of State, and caused the British
Government and the diplomatists at Washington many uncomfortable
moments.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._
Washington, March 26, 1861.
Mr. Seward came to me on the evening of the 20th ultimo, and asked
me to let him speak to me very confidentially....
Mr. Seward observed that he considered it all important to ward off
a crisis during the next three months; that he had good hopes that
if this could be effected a counter revolution would take place in
the South; that he hoped and believed it would begin in the most
distant State, Texas, where indeed he saw symptoms of it already. It
might be necessary towards producing this effect to make the
Southern States feel uncomfortable in their present condition by
interrupting their commerce. It was however most important that the
new Confederacy should not in the mean time be recognized by any
Foreign Power.
I said that certainly the feelings as well as the interests of Great
Britain would render H.M.'s Government most desirous to avoid any
step which could prolong the quarrel between North and South, or be
an obstacle to a cordial and speedy reunion between them if that
were possible. Still I said, if the U.S. determined to stop by force
so important a commerce as that of Great Britain with the
cotton-growing States, I could not answer for what might happen.
Mr. Seward asked whether England would not be content to get cotton
through the Northern Ports, to which it could be sent by land.
I answered that cotton although by far the most important article of
the Trade was not the only point to be considered. It was however a
matter of the greatest consequence to England to procure cheap
cotton. If a considerable rise were to take place in the price of
cotton, and British ships were to be at the same time excluded from
the Southern Ports, an immense pressure would be put upon H.M.'s
Government to use all the means in their power to open those Ports.
If H.M.'s Government felt it to be their duty to do so, they would
naturally endeavour to effect their object in a manner as consistent
as possible first with, their friendly feelings towards both
Sections of this Country, and secondly with the recognized
principles of International Law. As regards the latter point in
particular, it certainly appeared that the most simple, if not the
only way, would be to recognize the Southern Confederacy. I said a
good deal about my hopes that Mr. Seward would never let things come
to this, with which it is unnecessary to trouble you.
I thought that Mr. Seward, although he did not give up the point,
listened with complacency to my arguments against interference with
Foreign Commerce. He said more than once that he should like to take
me to the President to discuss the subject with him. The conclusion
I came to was that the questions of a forcible collection of the
duties in the Southern Ports, and of a blockade of those Ports were
under discussion in the Cabinet, but that Mr. Seward was himself
opposed to those measures, and had good hopes that his opinion would
prevail.
It would appear however that a change took place in the interval
between this conversation and yesterday. Mr. Seward, the principal
Members of the Cabinet, the Russian Minister, M. de Stoeckl, and the
French Minister, Mons. Mercier, with some other people dined with
me. After dinner, Mr. Seward entered into an animated conversation
with my French and Russian Colleagues, and signed to me to join
them. When I came up I found him asking M. Mercier to give him a
copy of his Instructions to the French Consuls in the Southern
States. M. Mercier made some excuse for refusing, but said that what
the instructions amounted to was that the Consuls were to do their
best to protect French Commerce 'sans sortir de la plus stricte
neutralité.' Mr. Seward then asked me to give him a copy of my
instructions to H.M.'s Consuls. I, of course, declined to do so, but
I told him that the purport of them was that the Consuls were to
regard questions from a commercial not a political point of view,
that they were to do all they could to favour the continuance of
peaceful commerce short of performing an act of recognition without
the orders of Her Majesty's Government.
[Illustration: William Henry Seward.
London: Edward Arnold]
Mr. Seward then alluded to the Peruvian Papers, and speaking as he
had done all along very loud, said to my French and Russian
Colleagues and me, 'I have formed my opinion on that matter, and I
may as well tell it to you now as at any other time. I differ with
my Predecessor as to _de facto_ Authorities. If one of your Ships
comes out of a Southern Port without the Papers required by the laws
of the U.S., and is seized by one of our Cruisers and carried into
New York and confiscated, we shall not make any compensation.' My
Russian Colleague, M. de Stoeckl, argued the question with Mr.
Seward very good humouredly and very ably. Upon his saying that a
Blockade to be respected must be effective, Mr. Seward replied that
it was not a blockade that would be established; that the U.S.
Cruisers would be stationed off the Southern Coast to collect
duties, and enforce penalties for the infraction of the U.S. Customs
Laws. Mr. Seward then appealed to me. I said that it was really a
matter so very serious that I was unwilling to discuss it; that his
plan seemed to me to amount in fact to a paper blockade of the
enormous extent of coast comprised in the Seceding States; that the
calling it an enforcement of the Revenue Laws appeared to me to
increase the gravity of the measure, for it placed Foreign Powers in
the Dilemma of recognizing the Southern Confederation, or of
submitting to the interruption of their Commerce.
Mr. Seward then went off into a defiance of Foreign Nations, in a
style of braggadocio which was formerly not uncommon with him, but
which I had not heard before from him since he had been in office.
Finding he was getting more and more violent and noisy, and saying
things which it would be more convenient for me not to have heard, I
took a natural opportunity of turning, as host, to speak to some of
the ladies in the room.
M. de Stoeckl and M. Mercier inferred, as I do, that within the last
two days the opinion of the more violent party in the Cabinet had
prevailed, at all events for the moment, and that there is a danger
that an interference with Foreign Trade may take place at any
moment. I hope that it may still be prevented by the fear of its
producing a recognition of the Southern Confederacy. But I am afraid
we must be prepared for it.
It may perhaps be well, with a view to the effect on this
Government, that the Commissioners who are on their way to Europe
from the Southern States should not meet with too strong a rebuff in
England or in France. Such a rebuff would be a great encouragement
to violent measures. In fact, notwithstanding my contradictions, the
Senate, and indeed, I fear, the President is not uninfluenced by the
bold assertions made by some Members of the violent Party that they
have positive assurances from Y.L. and other Members of H.M.'s
Government that _under no circumstances whatever_ will Great
Britain recognize the independence of the South.
M. Mercier thinks it advisable that he and I should have a
discretionary Power to recognize the South. This seems to me to be
going too fast. I should feel a good deal embarrassed by having such
a power in my pocket, unless the contingency in which it was to be
used should be most clearly stated. What does appear to be of
extreme importance is that England and France should act in concert.
Lincoln had been inaugurated as President in March, and in the following
month the long-awaited collision occurred at Charleston, when the
Confederates opened fire upon and captured Fort Sumter. The forts in
Charleston harbour had by common consent become the test case, and the
capture of Fort Sumter signalized the fact that a population of little
over 5 millions of white men had had the audacity to challenge over 22
millions of their fellow-countrymen.
Charleston, by the way, besides its importance in American history,
seems to have been a place where slavery was a very thorough-going
institution, judging from the following advertisement in the _Mercury_,
of March 25th, 1861.
* * * * *
NOTICE. TEN DOLLARS REWARD.
Runaway on Friday night, March 23rd, my woman 'Silvey,' about forty
years of age, of a light brown complexion, and has spots on her
face as if done with powder, and limps a little, and speaks very low
when spoken to. She formerly belonged to the Rev. Mr. Keith, and of
late to Johnson the tailor, in King Street, near George Street. When
she left she had a chain around her ankles to keep her from going
off, but she went anyhow. Apply to P. Buckheit, north-west corner of
Line and Meeting Streets.
Mr. W. H. Russell, the well-known correspondent, was in Charleston a few
days after the fall of Fort Sumter, and wrote as follows:----
* * * * *
Charleston, April 19, 1861.
I arrived here the night before last _viâ_ Baltimore, Norfolk and
Wilmington. North Carolina was in revolt--that is, there was no
particular form of authority to rebel against, but the shadowy
abstractions in lieu of it were treated with deserved contempt by
the 'citizens,' who with flint muskets and quaint uniforms were
ready at the various stations to seize on anything, particularly
whisky, which it occurred to them to fancy. At Wilmington I sent a
message to the electric telegraph office for transmission to New
York, but the 'citizens' of the Vigilance Committee refused to
permit the message to be transmitted and were preparing to wait upon
me with a view of asking me what were my general views on the state
of the world, when I informed them peremptorily that I must decline
to hold any intercourse with them which I the more objected to do in
that they were highly elated and excited by the news from Sumter. I
went over the works with General Beauregard: the military injury
done to Sumter is very trifling, but Anderson's defence, negative as
it was, must be regarded as exceedingly creditable to him.
* * * * *
In a week's time the place will be a hard nut to crack. One thing
is certain: nothing on earth will induce the people to return to the
Union. I believe firmly their present intention is to march upon
Washington, if it were merely as a diversion to carry the war away
from their interior.
War having now actually broken out, the question of the blockade of the
Southern ports became all important for England.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._
Washington, April 15, 1861.
I am getting very uneasy about the intention of the Government with
regard to stopping intercourse with Southern Ports. Now that war has
begun it seems difficult to suppose that they will abstain from
taking advantage of their one great superiority, which is their
navy. I suppose that a regular blockade would be less objectionable
than any such measures as closing the Southern Ports as Ports of
entry, or attempting to collect duties for the U.S. by ships
stationed off them. The rules of a blockade are to a great extent
determined and known, and our ships could at all events resort to
any Ports before which the U.S. did not establish a regular
effective blockade. But if the U.S. are to be permitted to seize any
ship of ours wherever they can find her within their jurisdiction on
the plea that by going to a Southern port she has violated the U.S.
custom laws, our commerce will be exposed to vexations beyond
bearing, and all kinds of new and doubtful questions will be raised.
In fact, this, it seems to me, would be a paper blockade of the
worst kind. It would certainly justify Great Britain and France in
recognizing the Southern Confederacy and sending their fleets to
force the U.S. to treat British and French vessels as neutrals in
conformity with the law of nations.
Just as Mr. Seward was confident that he had prevailed in the
Cabinet, the President and the violent party suddenly threw over his
policy. Having determined not to resign, he pretends to be pleased,
and one of his colleagues says of him that in order to make up for
previous lukewarmness he is now the fiercest of the lot. It is a
great inconvenience to have him as the organ of communication from
the U.S. Government. Repeated failures have not convinced him that
he is not sure to carry his point with the President and the
Cabinet. He is therefore apt to announce as the fixed intentions
of his Government what is in reality no more than a measure which he
himself supports.
I am in constant apprehension of some foolish and violent proceeding
of the Government with regard to Foreign Powers. Neither the
President nor any man in the Cabinet has a knowledge of Foreign
Affairs; they have consequently all the overweening confidence in
their own strength which popular oratory has made common in this
country. I believe the best chance of keeping them within bounds
will be to be very firm with them, particularly at first, and to act
in concert with France, if that be possible.
As I have mentioned in my despatches, information coming from the
Southern Commissioners sent to negotiate with the Government here,
it may be as well to mention that they did not seek any intercourse
with me, and that I never had any communication with them, direct or
otherwise. I do not know that I should have thought it necessary to
refuse to communicate with them, if it had been proposed to me, but
the fact is as I have just said.
The policy of acting in conjunction with France was adopted with
considerable success, as will appear later, but hitherto the British
Government had not given any very clear lead, Lord John Russell
contenting himself with the view that he relied upon 'the wisdom,
patience, and prudence of the British Minister to steer safely through
the danger of the crisis.' It was absolutely necessary, however, to deal
with the Blockade Question, and the Cabinet consulted the Law Officers
of the Crown, with the result that the Southern States were recognized
as belligerents.
* * * * *
_Lord John Russell to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, May 6, 1861.
I cannot give you any official instructions by this mail, but the
Law Officers are of opinion that we must consider the Civil War
in America as regular war--_justum bellum_--and apply to it all
the rules respecting blockade, letters of Marque which belong to
neutrals during a war. They think moreover it would be very
desirable if both parties would agree to accept the Declaration of
Paris regarding the flag covering the goods and the prohibition of
privateers.
You will of course inform our naval officers that they must conform
to the rules respecting Blockade, of which they are I believe in
possession. The matter is very serious and very unfortunate.
An important conversation took place on May 17, between Lord J. Russell
and Mr. Adams, the new American Minister in London, in which the latter
went so far as to state that Lord John Russell's language to his
predecessor, Mr. Dallas, had been construed in an unfavourable light in
the United States, and that he was afraid that his own mission might
come to an end unless the unfavourable impression was corrected. He
further complained of the recognition of the South as a belligerent.
Lord John Russell in reply declined to give an undertaking that, apart
from belligerent rights, England would never recognize the Southern
States, but he endeavoured to make it clear that, if anything, popular
sympathy in England was with the North, and that H.M. Government were
only desirous of maintaining a strict neutrality. Any one reading the
correspondence of the period cannot fail to realize that Lord John
Russell was perfectly sincere in his expressed wish to preserve perfect
impartiality, in spite of the querulous and acrimonious tone which
occasionally characterized his communications.
Lord Lyons, on his side, was only too anxious to avoid the slightest
semblance of anything which might cause offence to the United States
Government. He was constantly impressing upon the various Consuls that,
strict neutrality being the policy of H.M. Government, they must not be
led away by their sympathies, but confine themselves to obeying orders.
He vetoed the requests for warships, which they occasionally clamoured
for, in the traditional consular spirit, and urged caution upon the
British naval Commanders and the Canadian authorities. Fortunately, both
Admiral Milne and Sir Edmund Head, the Governor-General of Canada, were
prudent and tactful men, who ably co-operated with him. With both of
these he corresponded confidentially, and made no secret of the
apprehensions which he entertained.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Sir E. Head._
Washington, May 22, 1861.
You will perhaps consider the notion that the U.S. should at this
moment provoke a war with a great Power as preposterous, and _à
priori_ it must seem incredible to any one. Nevertheless I am
so seriously alarmed by what I see passing around me here and
especially by the conduct of the Cabinet that I have thought it my
duty to call the attention of our Government to the danger which I
conceive to exist. To avert it is the main object of all I do here.
I am afraid however that things are coming to a point at which my
diplomacy will be completely at fault.
* * * * *
I could write a great deal to explain my reasons for fearing that if
a war be not imminent the risk is at any rate so great that it ought
at once to be guarded against. My mind is almost unremittingly
employed in devising means to maintain the peace. In this, even more
than in ordinary cases, I think the best safeguard will be found in
being evidently prepared for war. Nothing is so likely to prevent an
attack as manifest readiness to prevent one. I have thought it right
to state to H.M. Government my opinion that it is not even now too
soon to put Canada into a complete state of defence and to provide
both in the West Indies and on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts the
means of resisting attack in case of war or of making our neutrality
respected if peace can be maintained.
Canada is, as you know, looked upon here as our weak point. There
are in the Cabinet men who are no doubt as ignorant of the state of
feeling in Canada as they were of that in the Southern States and
who believe that there is a strong American feeling in Canada. You
will not have forgotten that Mr. Seward, during the Presidential
canvass, publicly advocated the annexation of Canada as a
compensation for any loss which might be occasioned by the
disaffection of the South. The people calculate here (I am afraid
not without reason) upon being effectively aided in an inroad upon
Canada by the Irish Secret Societies which have been formed
especially in the State of New York nominally for the purpose of
invading Ireland.
I can hardly hope that you will not think the antecedent
improbability of this country's rushing to its ruin by adding
Foreign to Civil war so great as to prove that I must be led away by
visionary apprehensions. However this may be, it may be convenient
to you to know what my knowledge of men and things here has brought
me to believe and what I have in consequence written home.
Our Government has taken the only position sanctioned by
International law and by precedent. It observes absolute neutrality
and impartiality between the contending parties, recognizing, as it
is bound to do, both as invested with belligerent rights. No other
course was open to it, except that of an offensive alliance with one
side against the other. The North have certainly not asked for such
an alliance and would doubtless reject an offer of it with disdain.
And yet they choose to be in a fury because we do not try to occupy
some untenable position as their partisans.
No one defines our position more clearly than their own great
authority Wheaton.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._
Washington, May 21, 1861.
One of the great difficulties I have to contend with in my endeavour
to keep this Government within such bounds as may render the
maintenance of peace possible is the persuasion which prevails even
with sensible men that _no_ outrage will compel England to make
war with the North. Such men, although seeing the inexpediency and
impropriety of Mr. Seward's treatment of the European Powers, still
do not think it worth while to risk their own mob popularity by
declaring against it. If they thought there was really any danger
they would no doubt do a great deal to avert it.
Of these men the most distinguished is Mr. Sumner. He has
considerable influence in Foreign Questions and holds the important
office of Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. He
is in correspondence with many people in England, and I believe with
the Duke and Duchess of Argyll. I think no greater service could be
rendered to the cause of peace than to make Mr. Sumner aware of the
real perils to which Mr. Seward and the Cabinet are exposing the
country. If some means cannot be devised of checking them, they will
carry not only arrogance but practical vexations to a pitch which
will render the maintenance of peace impossible. If Mr. Sumner's
correspondence from England convinced him that there was real danger
in Mr. Seward's proceedings, he might do a good deal to put a stop
to them. I think I have done something to shake his confidence, but
I believe he still relies to a great degree upon assurances he
received from England under circumstances wholly different from
those which now so unhappily exist.
Only a few years earlier, a British Minister, Sir John Crampton (like
Lord Sackville, in 1888), had been offered as a sacrifice to the Irish
vote, and received his passport, and it began to look as if this
spirited action might be repeated.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._
Washington, June 4, 1861.
The present game of the violent party appears to be to discover or
invent some shade of difference in the conduct of England and France
in order to use violent language, or even to take violent measures
against England without necessarily involving themselves in a
quarrel with France also. The plan most in vogue at this moment
seems to be to send me my passport. After their experience in the
case of Sir J. Crampton they look upon this as a measure which would
gain them most applause by its appearance of vigour without exposing
them to any real danger. They have not yet hit upon any fault to
find with me personally, except that I _must_ have written
unfriendly despatches to my government, because my government has
taken a course which they do not like. The whole is no doubt an
attempt to carry a point by bluster which will perhaps fail if it be
encountered with mild language and very firm conduct. For my own
part I conceive my best line will be to avoid giving any possible
reason for complaint against myself personally and to keep things as
smooth as I can. If H.M. Government concede nothing to violent
language it will _probably_ subside, but there is such a dementia
in some of the people here that we must not be surprised at any act of
violence they may commit.
Mr. Seward will be furious when he finds that his adherence to the
Declaration of Paris will not stop the Southern privateering. This
is one of the difficulties of making the proposals respecting
maritime law. But the great trouble will be the fuss which the
Southern government will make about receiving a communication from
England and France. It will be a great advantage to have a discreet
and able man like Mr. Bunch to employ in the South. I trust it may
be possible to grant him some compensation for the risk and loss to
which he is exposed by remaining there.
Another long letter of June 10 illustrates the tension of the situation,
and again urges the necessity of attending to the defence of Canada.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord John Russell._
Washington, June 10, 1861.
I owe you more than common thanks for your private letter of the
25th.
Mr. Adams' Report of his first conversation with you appears to have
produced a good impression on the Cabinet. This I learn from Mr.
Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, who dined with me the day
before yesterday. I have not seen Mr. Seward since they arrived. It
is too dangerous to talk to him on such subjects for me to bring
them up unnecessarily.
I hope we may see some moderation in the tone of the Newspapers.
The people in the North are beginning to be aware of the immense
encouragement which their predictions of a war with England have
given to their Southern Foe. I understand that the effect at
Richmond of the repeated assertions in the Northern Papers of the
hostility of England to the North has been prodigious.
I have written so much officially on the risk of a sudden
Declaration of War against England by the U.S. that I have nothing
to add on that subject. That such an act of madness is so far from
impossible, that we ought to be prepared for it at any moment, I
am thoroughly convinced. I am doing all I can to avoid awkward
questions--for to give way upon any such question would be still
more dangerous to peace than to make a firm stand. The safe course
therefore is to prevent questions arising, if possible. But the
first thing to be done towards obtaining anything like permanent
security is to remove the temptation to attack Canada.
I am a little nervous about our Company of Marines on San Juan. I
don't know that I can suggest any precautions to Governor Douglas
which would not be more likely to do harm than good. I have besides
no means of sending him a letter, which would not be liable to
be read on the way. I can communicate with the Admiral in the
Pacific in cypher, but I do not know where he may be. Under any
circumstances the Government here would of course be able to send
intelligence of war having broken out to the Pacific sooner than I
could.
M. Mercier, the French Minister here, appears to be very frank and
cordial with me. The instructions which he read to me insist very
strongly upon his acting in entire concert with me. I think he may
perhaps have received a confidential Despatch desiring him to
proceed cautiously, for he is going at a much slower pace than his
language a short time ago would have led one to expect. His giving
Mr. Seward a copy of the Exposition of the French Jurists on the
question of Belligerent Rights, as he did before of M. Thouvenel's
account of his conversation with Mr. Sanford, seems to show a
straightforward desire to make this Government acquainted with
the real sentiments and intentions of the Emperor. The language
M. Mercier uses to me and to his other Colleagues, as well as
that which he uses to Americans in my presence, is in direct
contradiction to the reports that France will assist the North,
which are so assiduously repeated and commented upon in the American
Newspapers. I am very willing to let him take the lead in our
communications about the Declaration of Paris. It would be playing
the game of the enemies to peace with England for me to go faster in
these matters than the French Minister.
Among other difficulties in the way of making your communication to
the Southern Consuls, is that of getting it safely to them. All
regular communication with the South is cut off. I suppose the
Government here would give either M. Mercier or me a Pass for a
special Messenger if we asked for one--but it may be desirable to
afford as little evidence as possible of our being connected with
the communication. The Southern Government will no doubt do all in
their power to give importance and publicity to the communication.
This Government will very probably withdraw the Exequaturs of the
Consuls who make it. The withdrawal would not be altogether free
from inconvenience to us, as it would interfere with the Consuls'
holding intercourse with the Blockading Squadrons, which it is
sometimes of importance that they should be able to do.
I think the English and French Governments will find it necessary to
make the Cabinet of Washington clearly understand that they _must_
and _will_ hold unofficial communication with the Southern
Government on matters concerning the interests of their subjects.
The announcement should if possible be made _collectively_, and in
such a form as to preclude the Cabinet's pretending to find a
difference between the conduct of France and England. The Government
of the U.S. can perform none of the duties of a Government towards
Foreigners in the Seceded States; and it is a preposterous
pretension to insist upon excluding Foreign Governments from
intercourse with the authorities however illegitimate, to whom their
Subjects must in fact look for protection.
The inactivity of the Troops on both sides would be satisfactory, if
one could hope that there was still any chance of the question's
being solved without any serious fighting. As it is, one would be
glad that something should be done as soon as possible to enable an
opinion to be formed on the relative strength and spirit of the
Armies. I believe that the real secret is that from want of training
in the men, and total lack of waggons, horses and other means of
transport, neither Government can move troops in any considerable
numbers except by railroad. I can see as yet no signs of the spirit
of conquest in the North flagging, or of the South losing courage.
The Financial Difficulty will be the great one on both sides. The
Southern men are said to serve without pay--but this Government has
fixed the pay of the volunteers and militiamen at the same rate as
that of the regular army, eleven dollars (about 45 shillings) a
month, for a private, in addition to clothes and rations.
I must do the little I can to influence the Senators and
Representatives when they come up next month; but there is only too
much reason to fear that fierceness against England will be popular,
and that the Legislators will vie with each other in manifesting it.
What I think they are most likely to do is to give the President
authority to declare war with us, without waiting for the sanction
of Congress.
* * * * *
Since I wrote what precedes I have been informed privately that in
Mr. Dayton's Report of his audience of the Emperor, there is a
rather ambiguous phrase put into the Emperor's mouth, respecting His
Majesty's desire to contribute to put an end to the dispute between
North and South. My informant says that the President and Mr. Seward
_really_ interpret the phrase as signifying that the Emperor would
be willing to assist the North to subdue the South--and that it is
from this supposition that Mr. Seward does not send M. Mercier back
the 'Exposition' and enter into the discussion about neutral Rights.
Mr. Seward is naturally puzzled by the apparent discrepancy between
the Emperor's language and that of His Majesty's Minister here. The
men in the State Department who are accustomed to business look, it
seems, upon the Emperor's words, even as reported by Mr. Dayton, as
no more than a vague assurance of goodwill, pointing to mediation
rather than to anything else. I will endeavour to get M. Mercier to
set the President and Mr. Seward right as soon as possible, for the
delusion is a very dangerous one for England, and a much more
dangerous one for the U.S.
The ill-feeling towards England continued to grow worse as time went on,
and apparently was due largely to sentiment. The success of the South in
founding a practically independent government was so galling to the
North that anything which implied the admission of a self-evident fact,
such as the recognition of the Southern States as belligerents, was
inexpressibly galling. Fortunately, England and France were acting in
unison, and even Mr. Seward's ingenuity was unable to show that there
was any difference between the attitude of the two countries. Writing on
June 24, Lord Lyons reported that he had discovered that Mr. Seward had
prepared a despatch which was all but a direct announcement of war, and
that it was only the intervention of the President and of the more
reasonable members of the Cabinet which prevented its being sent to the
American Minister in London. The great qualities of President Lincoln,
by the way, do not appear to have been recognized at this early period,
for competent judges pronounced that although well-meaning and
conscientious, he gave no proof of possessing any natural talents to
compensate for his ignorance of everything but Illinois village
politics.
Towards the end of July the military inactivity, due to causes mentioned
earlier, came to an end, and the historic fight of Bull's Run took place
on the 21st.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, July 22, 1861.
It is too soon to form any speculations on the result of the defeat
of yesterday. Neither General Scott nor the Government had
calculated on the possibility of anything like it, and as for the
people of the North, they talked at all events as if the victory was
already theirs. If the North have anything like the spirit to which
they lay claim, they will rise with more resolution than ever to
avenge the defeat. The test will be the conduct of the Militia
Regiments. The three months' term of service of most of them has
just expired: some had gone home and the rest were on the point of
following--leaving the war to be carried on by the Volunteers and
the Regular Army. If the Militia regiments remain and others come
up, we may conclude that the warlike spirit of the North is
unbroken. If they do not, there may be a chance of peace. For this
battle will not facilitate recruiting for the army and the
Volunteers--and unless the Capitalists are urged by patriotism or
squeezed by mob pressure, the loans will fail and the money to pay
the Volunteers will not be forthcoming.
I am myself inclined to hope that Congress may show some dignity
and good sense. The general opinion is that it will be violent and
childish--vote men and money on paper by millions--slay its Southern
enemies by treason bills--and ruin them by confiscation acts--decree
the immediate and unconditional abolition of slavery in the Southern
States--the closing of the Ports, and what not.
Amongst other results of Bull's Run was the production of the following
minute by Lord Palmerston. If his judgment on the temper of the North
was completely wrong, his other observations might be profitably studied
by the numerous persons in this country who hold the view that efficient
military forces can be improvised whenever an emergency arises.
* * * * *
MINUTE OF LORD PALMERSTON.
Aug. 15, 1861.
The defeat at Bull's Run or rather at Yankee's Run proves two
things. First, that to bring together many thousand men and put
uniforms upon their backs and muskets in their hands is not to make
an army: discipline, experienced officers and confidence in the
steadiness of their comrades are necessary to make an army fight and
stand: secondly, that the Unionist cause is not in the hearts of the
mass of the population of the North. The Americans are not cowards:
individually they are as reckless of their own lives as of the lives
of others: ..., and it is not easy to believe that if they had felt
they were fighting for a great national interest they would have run
away as they did from the battle, or that whole regiments would have
quietly marched away home just before the fight was to begin. The
Truth is, the North are fighting for an Idea chiefly entertained by
professional politicians, while the South are fighting for what they
consider rightly or wrongly vital interests.
The defects and weaknesses disclosed by this defeat produced much
contemptuous criticism upon the military inefficiency of the United
States. In reality there was no cause for surprise. In April, 1861, the
entire regular army of the United States only amounted to 16,000
officers and men. Many of the officers had taken sides with the South.
Not one of them had ever had the opportunity of commanding any
considerable number of troops, and public opinion was so entirely
uninstructed concerning military questions that every local politician
considered himself competent to become a colonel, or even a general. But
what Bull's Run showed more conclusively than anything else, was that
the task of subjugating the South was infinitely greater than had
been anticipated, and that the confident boastings of enthusiastic
Northerners were as foolish as they were unjustified. We, however, as
a nation, had not then, and have now, little cause to jeer at the
Americans for their failure: we had embarked, only a few years earlier,
upon the Crimean Campaign almost equally unprepared for a serious
struggle, and less than forty years later, in 1899, one of our most
eminent military authorities undertook to finish off the Boers before
the date of the Lord Mayor's Banquet.
About this time Anglo-American relations showed a slight improvement,
although Mr. Seward, in a characteristic outburst, took occasion to
point out that 'the policy of Foreign Governments was founded upon
considerations of interest and of commerce, while that of the United
States was based on high and eternal considerations of principle and the
good of the human race; that the policy of foreign nations was regulated
by the government which ruled them, while that of the United States was
directed by the unanimous and unchangeable will of the people.' Yet he
had clearly become more peaceable, and this welcome tendency was perhaps
due to the British Government having increased the Canadian garrisons in
response to the urgent pressure of Lord Lyons and the Canadian
authorities.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Sir E. Head._
Washington, Aug. 2, 1861.
The intentions of the Government are at this moment more peaceful
than they have been. But I do not yet see any reason to modify the
views I expressed in my previous confidential letters. The present
change has been mainly produced by our preparations for defence and
by the quiet firmness with which we have maintained the position we
took up with regard to Belligerent Rights. I think it as necessary
as ever to complete our preparations for defence, and I find that
the knowledge that we are making such preparations calms instead of
irritating this people.
There is nothing very surprising in raw levies being seized with
such a panic as that which led to the flight from Bull's Run. The
want of spirit before and since shown by the Militia regiments is a
worse sign. Two went away, on their term expiring, one may say from
the battlefield itself. The defeat, and even the danger of
Washington being taken, have been unable to induce any whose time is
up to remain. The Government considers that we are now safe again
from an attack here, but for some days our reliance was only upon
its not entering into the enemy's plan to come here.
As day after day passes without an onward movement of the Southern
troops, the war spirit seems to revive in the North. But it will
require a decided Northern victory to bring back the enthusiasm and
the unanimity which appeared on the fall of Fort Sumter. A peace
party is beginning to show itself timidly and weakly, but much more
openly than it would have dared to do two months ago.
We have nearly got through another Tariff Bill without a serious
attack upon the Reciprocity Treaty, thanks more to the haste, I am
afraid, than the good will of the Legislators. It will be a
wonderful tariff, whichever of the plans now before Congress is
adopted.
Mr. Seward some weeks ago took credit to himself for having recalled
Mr. Ashman on finding that his mission was ill looked on. This gave
me a good opportunity of telling him that H.M. Government
considered that they had a good right to complain of his having been
sent at all without proper communication being previously made to
them and to me.
I have applied for the discharge of the two minors about whom you
wrote to me officially. I am not sure of getting it. My applications
for discharge from the Army and Navy have become necessarily so
numerous that they are not viewed with favour.
Such elaborate pains had been taken to prevent anything in the least
likely to irritate the Government of the United States, that it was all
the more annoying when an incident occurred which gave excuse for
complaint.
The Consuls in the Southern States were permitted to send their
despatches in Foreign Office bags through the lines on the reasonable
condition that no advantage was to be taken of the privilege in order to
provide information which might be of use to the enemies of the United
States Government. The rule was rigidly observed at the Legation, and
the Consuls had been repeatedly warned not to infringe it in any way;
but in an evil hour, Mr. Bunch, the British Consul at Charleston, a
capable and industrious official, committed his bag to a friend, who,
unknown to the Consul, also took charge of about two hundred private
letters. The messenger was arrested by the United States authorities,
and imprisoned. The letters, of course, were seized, but so also was the
Foreign Office bag, addressed to Lord Russell, and a Foreign Office bag
has always been considered as one of the most sacred objects upon earth.
The United States Government, professing that a most serious offence had
been committed, and taking advantage of an error in the passport of the
messenger, sent the bag over to London by special messenger, and
demanded the recall of the unfortunate Consul Bunch. The opportunity, in
short, was too good to be lost. When the bag was eventually opened, in
Downing Street, it was found to contain nothing but despatches and a few
letters from British governesses and servants who had been permitted to
make use of it in consequence of the discontinuance of the post. In
fact, it was an essentially trivial matter, but the tension between the
two countries was so great that Lord Russell thought that it might
possibly lead to a rupture of official relations, and sent the following
instructions:--
* * * * *
_Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._
Abergeldie Castle, Sept. 13, 1861.
It is not very probable, but it is possible that the complaint
against Bunch may be a preliminary to the breaking off of official
intercourse between the two countries.
Your name has been kept out of the correspondence on both sides,
but if the Envoys are to be withdrawn, you will be sent away from
Washington.
In that case I wish you to express in the most dignified and guarded
terms that the course taken by the Washington Government must be the
result of a misconception on their part, and that you shall retire
to Canada in the persuasion that the misunderstanding will soon
cease, and the former friendly relations be restored.
It is very desirable to obtain an explanation from Consul Bunch, and
you may authorize Admiral Milne, after due notice, to Mr. Seward, to
send a gunboat to Charleston for the purpose.
Consul Bunch, in spite of his troubles, remained for over a year in
Charleston after this incident. Eventually the American Government
revoked his exequatur, and he made a semi-state return to England in a
man-of-war.
In the late autumn, Mr. Seward began to show signs of returning to his
earlier manner, and it was plain enough that he had only been seeking to
gain time by his moderation. He now maintained that any communication
between a Foreign Government and the Confederate Government was an
offence against the United States, and it became more and more necessary
for England and France to come to some distinct agreement as to what the
nature and extent of those communications should be. Mr. Seward's
contention was obviously absurd. South Carolina had seceded nearly a
year previously. State after State had followed its example; the United
States Government had not made the slightest progress in restoring its
authority, and exercised no power or influence in any portion of the new
Confederation. On the other hand, there was a _de facto_ government in
that Confederation which was obeyed without question and exercised the
functions of government with perfect regularity. It was clear that a
government which was without the means of protecting British subjects
had no right to prevent us from holding necessary and informal
communications with the only power to which British subjects could look
for protection and redress of grievances. Cases of British subjects
being compulsorily enlisted, of British goods being seized on board
vessels captured by Southern privateers, and instances of a similar
nature were of constant occurrence. It was preposterous that under these
conditions British Consuls should be expected to refrain from
communication with the Confederate authorities. Fortunately, although
the British interests involved were infinitely the more important,
French interests were affected too, and upon this, as upon most other
difficult questions, Lord Lyons received the hearty and loyal support of
his French colleague, M. Mercier.
On November 8, an incident of the gravest nature occurred, which seemed
likely to render futile all the laborious efforts which had been made to
keep the peace between England and the United States.
The English mail steamer _Trent_, one day out from Havannah, was met by
the American warship _San Jacinto_ and stopped by a shell fired across
her bows. She was then boarded by a party of marines, and the officer in
command of the party demanded a list of the passengers. The production
of the list having been refused, the officer stated that he knew the
Confederate delegates to Europe, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, to be on
board, and insisted upon their surrender. Whilst the discussion was in
progress, Mr. Slidell made his appearance and disclosed his identity.
Thereupon, in defiance of the protests of the captain of the _Trent_ and
of the Government mail agent, Mr. Slidell and Mr. Mason, together with
their secretaries, were seized and carried off by force to the _San
Jacinto_, and taken as prisoners to New York.
The news arrived in England on November 27, and, naturally, caused the
greatest excitement and indignation. It was felt that the limits of
concession had been reached, that a stand must now be made if we ever
intended to maintain our national rights, and, as a proof that they were
in earnest, the Government decided upon the immediate despatch of 8000
men to Canada.
The first private letter from Lord Lyons was written on November 19.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, Nov. 19, 1861.
I have written so much officially on this unfortunate affair of
Mason and Slidell that I have hardly left myself time to thank you
for your kind private letter of the 2nd.
I am told confidently that orders were given at Washington which led
to the capture on board the _Trent_, and that they were signed by
Mr. Seward without the knowledge of the President. I do not vouch
for the truth of this. I am afraid he is not sorry to have a
question with us like this, in which it is difficult for France to
take a part.
Lord Lyons had made up his mind from the first that, as it was
impossible for him to form a correct opinion as to what had actually
occurred, the only thing to do was to maintain an attitude of complete
reserve. In the absence of authentic information, he felt that on the
one hand it would be unsafe to ask for a reparation which might be
inadequate; on the other hand he was reluctant to make a demand which
might be unnecessarily great. Consequently, he resolved to take no steps
until he received instructions from home, refused to say a word on the
subject either officially or unofficially, and instructed the Consuls to
maintain silence.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, Nov. 22, 1861.
I have all along been expecting some such blow as the capture on
board the _Trent_. Turn out how it may, it must I fear produce an
effect on public opinion in both countries which will go far to
disconcert all my peaceful plans and hopes. I am so worn out with
the never-ending labour of keeping things smooth, under the
discouragement of the doubt whether by so doing I am not after all
only leading these people to believe that they may go all lengths
with us with impunity that I am sometimes half tempted to wish that
the worst may have come already. However I do not allow this feeling
to influence my conduct, and I have done nothing which can in the
least interfere with any course which you may take concerning the
affair of the _Trent_.
If the effect on the people and Government of this country were the
only thing to be considered, it would be a case for an extreme
measure one way or the other. If the capture be unjustifiable we
should ask for the immediate release of the prisoners, promptly,
imperatively, with a determination to act at once, if the demand
were refused. If, on the other hand, the capture be justifiable,
we should at once say so and declare that we have no complaint to
make on the subject. Even so, we should not escape the evil of
encouraging the Americans in the belief that we shall bear anything
from them. For they have made up their minds that they have insulted
us, although the fear of the consequences prevents their giving vent
to their exultation. They would not however consider it so manifest
a proof of yielding on our part if we at once declared that we had
nothing to complain of, as if we did complain without obtaining full
reparation. Of course, however, I am well aware that public opinion
in this country is not the only thing to be thought of in this
question. While maintaining entire reserve on the question itself, I
have avoided any demonstration of ill-humour. My object has been, on
the one hand, not to prevent the Government being led by its present
apprehensions to take some conciliatory step, and on the other hand
not to put H.M. Government or myself in an awkward position, if it
should after all appear that we should not be right to make the
affair a serious ground of complaint.
Congress will meet on December 2nd, which will not diminish the
difficulty of managing matters here. It is supposed that General
McClellan will be obliged to attempt some forward movement, in
order that he and the Government may be able to meet the fiery
legislators. They hoped the Beaufort affair would have been
sufficient, but like all they do, the effect is so much weakened,
first by the preposterous boastings beforehand, and secondly by the
fabulous accounts of the success first given, that something new
must if possible be provided.
The Finances are kept in an apparently prosperous condition, by
postponing all but the most pressing payments. In this manner the
New York Banks are not pressed to pay up the sums they have taken of
the Loan. The people are so enamoured of their last brilliant
discovery in political economy that it was seriously intended to
raise the Morrill Tariff, in order that no money might go out of the
country and nothing be imported but 'gold and silver to carry on the
war with.' The Cabinet has now however, I understand, determined to
recommend that the Morrill Tariff be not touched. One cannot help
hoping that some one may be reasonable enough to suggest the idea of
a Revenue Tariff.
General McClellan's own plan is said to be to gain a great victory,
and then, with or without the sanction of Congress and the
President, to propose the most favourable terms to the South if it
will only come back. It is a curious sign of the confusion into
which things are falling, that such a plan is coolly discussed. I
mean that part of it which consists in the General's acting without
the consent of the President and Congress.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, Nov. 25, 1861.
The people here are extremely frightened about the capture on board
the _Trent_. The New York money market gives signs of this. Another
indication is the moderation of the newspapers, which is for them
wonderful. They have put in more correct accounts of my language (or
rather silence). I rather suspect that this must have been done on a
hint from Mr. Seward. As a general rule I abstain from noticing
anything the newspapers say about me. On this occasion in particular
contradiction from me would have been almost as dangerous as
affirmation, so I left the assertions to take their chance.
The Consuls in the South do not behave well about forwarding private
letters. There is a fresh case which I report to-day. Mr. Seward
has, I think, behaved properly about it. I am afraid I shall be
obliged to ask you to support me by some severe act, if my last
instruction is not obeyed.
I write, as indeed I act, as if our relations with this Government
were to be unchanged. Let the affair of the capture on board the
_Trent_ turn out how it may, I am not confident that I shall long
be able to do so.
Writing on the same date to Admiral Milne, he repeats that nothing
whatever has passed between him and the U.S. Government on the subject
of the _Trent_, and adds: 'I suppose I am the only man in America who
has expressed no opinion whatever either on the International Law
question, or on the course which our Government will take.' Such
reticence appears almost superhuman.
The attitude, however, of an important section of the American public
was anything but reticent. Captain Wilkes sprang at once into the
position of a national hero. Congress passed a vote of thanks to him; he
was banqueted, toasted, serenaded, and shortly became an admiral. A
member of the Government, Mr. Welles, Secretary of the Navy, noted for
his hostility to England, distinguished himself by officially
congratulating Captain Wilkes upon his heroic action; intimating at the
same time that the 'generous forbearance' he had shown in not capturing
the _Trent_ could not be treated as a precedent in subsequent cases of
the infraction of neutral obligations. The Governor of Boston also
distinguished himself by the following statement at a public banquet:
'That there may be nothing left to crown this exaltation, Commodore
Wilkes fired his shot across the bows of the ship that bore the British
lion at its head,' while many other prominent citizens followed his
example.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, Nov. 29, 1861.
The Consuls in the South are crying out for ships again. This is the
solution for every difficulty in the Consular mind, as my experience
in the Mediterranean taught me long ago; though what the ships were
to do, except fire a salute in honour of the Consul, I could never
discover. I had some trouble, as you may perhaps recollect, in
checking the Consular ardour to send ships up the Potomac to my own
relief last spring. Sir A. Milne objects strongly to sending ships
to the Southern Ports, unless with a specific object and definite
instructions, and I think he is quite right. It is quite true that a
town _may_ be bombarded some day by the United States forces: that
British subjects may have their throats cut by the negroes in a
servile insurrection, or be tarred and feathered by a Vigilance
Committee. But we cannot keep a squadron at every point to protect
them, and I do not know what points are particularly threatened.
I shall do all in my power to keep things smooth until I receive
your orders about the _Trent_ affair. This can in any event do no
harm. There is a story here that, in a recent hypothetical case, the
Law Officers of the Crown decided in favour of the right of the
United States to take Mason and Slidell out of a British ship or
postal packet. I do not know whether Mr. Adams has written this to
Mr. Seward, but I am inclined to think that the Government believe
it to be true.
The uncertainty as to the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown
rendered it all the more necessary to keep quiet and wait for orders,
and the situation was rendered a little easier on account of there being
no mention of the _Trent_ in the Presidential Message. Mr. Galt,
the Canadian Finance Minister, happened to be in Washington at the
beginning of December, and had an interesting conversation with
President Lincoln, who disclaimed for himself and the Cabinet all
thought of aggression against Canada. The President also stated that he
himself had been opposed to Mr. Seward's circular putting the coasts
into a state of defence, but had been overruled. On being asked what the
recommendation to make fortifications and depôts of arms on the Great
Lakes meant, he only said, 'We must say something to satisfy the
people.' About the Mason and Slidell case, he remarked, 'Oh, that'll be
got along with!' He further volunteered the observation that if he could
not within a reasonable period get hold of Virginia, Kentucky, and
Missouri, and keep Maryland, he should tell the American people to give
up the contest, for it would be 'too big' for them.
The impression produced upon Mr. Galt was that President Lincoln himself
was honest and sincere in what he said, but that he was very far from
being master of his Cabinet. Mr. Galt returned to Canada, bearing a
letter to Lord Monck, the new Governor-General, urging the necessity of
preparing for defence, and also an ingenious arrangement for warning the
Canadian Government in case of emergency, without having recourse to
cypher telegrams, which might arouse the suspicions of the Americans.
On December 13, intelligence was received in America of the arrival in
England of the first news of the capture of Mason and Slidell, the
submarine cable, of course, not being at that time in operation. A great
fall in all securities immediately took place.
At midnight on the 18th, the Queen's messenger bearing the fateful
despatches from Lord Russell arrived at the British Legation at
Washington.
The principal despatch, dated November 30, 1861, had been drawn up after
consideration by the Cabinet, and the purport of it was that the United
States Government were informed that International Law and the rights of
Great Britain had been violated, that H.M. Government trusted that the
act would be disavowed, the prisoners set free and restored to British
protection. Should this demand be refused, Lord Lyons was instructed to
leave Washington.
The draft of this despatch was submitted to the Queen, and, in the
opinion of the Prince Consort, the wording was of somewhat too
peremptory a character. The suggestions of the Prince Consort were
embodied in a memorandum quoted by Sir Theodore Martin in his book, and
the object of them was to remove any expressions in the despatch which
might unduly affront a sensitive nation, and at the same time enable it
to retreat from a false position without loss of credit or dignity. The
Prince was suffering from a mortal illness at the time, and was dead
within a fortnight; it was the last occasion upon which he took any part
in public affairs, but never, probably, did he render a greater service
to the country of his adoption than when he persuaded the Cabinet to
modify the wording of this momentous despatch. As amended in accordance
with the Prince Consort's suggestions, the crucial passages ran as
follows:--
Her Majesty's Government, bearing in mind the friendly relations
which have long subsisted between Great Britain and the United
States, are willing to believe that the United States's naval
officer who committed this aggression was not acting in compliance
with any authority from his Government, or that if he conceived
himself to be so authorized, he greatly misunderstood the
instructions which he had received.
For the Government of the United States must be fully aware that
the British Government could not allow such an affront to the
national honour to pass without full reparation, and Her Majesty's
Government are unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate
intention of the Government of the United States unnecessarily to
force into discussion between the two Governments a question of so
grave a character, and with regard to which the whole British nation
would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feeling.
Her Majesty's Government, therefore, trust that when this matter
shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of
the United States, that Government will, of its own accord, offer to
the British Government such redress as alone would satisfy the
British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen, and
their delivery to your Lordship, in order that they may again be
placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the
aggression which has been committed.
Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose
them to him.
It will be observed that in the above there is nothing of an aggressive
or minatory nature, but in a further despatch of the same date, Lord
Lyons was instructed to allow Mr. Seward a delay of seven days, if the
latter asked for it. If at the end of seven days no answer was returned,
or any answer which was not a compliance with the demands of Her
Majesty's Government, then the British Minister was directed to leave
Washington with all the members of his staff and the archives, and to
repair forthwith to London.
Accompanying the despatches was a private letter from Lord Russell to
Lord Lyons.
* * * * *
Pembroke Lodge, Dec. 1, 1861.
The despatches which were agreed to at the Cabinet yesterday and
which I have signed this morning impose upon you a disagreeable
task.
My wish would be that at your first interview with Mr. Seward you
should not take my despatch with you, but should prepare him for it,
and ask him to settle with the President and his Cabinet what course
they would propose.
The next time you should bring my despatch and read it to him fully.
If he asks you what will be the consequence of his refusing compliance
I think you should say that you wish to leave him and the President
quite free to take their own course, and that you desire to abstain
from anything like menace. I think the disposition of the Cabinet is
to accept the liberation of the captive commissioners and to be
rather easy about the apology: that is to say if the Commissioners
are delivered to you and allowed to embark in a packet for England,
and an apology or explanation is sent through Mr. Adams that might
be taken as a substantial compliance. But if the Commissioners are
not liberated, no apology will suffice.
M. Thouvenel promises to send off a despatch on Thursday next giving
our cause moral support, so that you may as well keep the despatch
itself a day or two before you produce it, provided you ask at once
for an interview with Seward.
The feeling here is very quiet but very decided. There is no party
about it: all are unanimous.
The best thing would be if Seward could be turned out, and a
rational man put in his place. I hear it said that the Americans
will not fight, but we must not count upon that.
I have every reliance that you will discharge your task in the
temper of firmness and calmness which befits a British
representative.
Mr. Hammond, the permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, whose
judgment was in after years shown to be far from infallible, expressed
the opinion that Messrs. Mason and Slidell would be immediately
executed, so that there might be an answer ready whenever their release
was demanded. A warship was ordered to proceed from Halifax to New York
to receive the members of the Legation in case an unfavourable reply
should be received from the American Government.
On December 7, Lord Russell wrote again privately to Lord Lyons.
* * * * *
Foreign Office, Dec. 7, 1861.
I have been going over in my mind the possible evasive answers of
Mr. Seward, falling short of substantial compliance with our
demands, in order to give you some contingent instructions.
But the result is that I fear I should embarrass you more by such a
course, than by leaving you to the exercise of your own excellent
judgment.
What we want is a plain Yes, or a plain No to our very simple
demands, and we want that plain Yes or No within seven days of the
communication of the despatch.
The devices for avoiding the plain course are endless, and the
ingenuity of American lawyers will seek perhaps to entangle you in
endless arguments on Vattel, Wheaton and Scott.
Here are two plain answers. If the _Trent_ had been brought into
Boston harbour, the Prize Court must have condemned the captors to
pay costs for illegal detention. This, at least, is our opinion.
But Captain Wilkes superseded the authority of the Courts instituted
and recognized by the Law of Nations. Seeing that there was no
chance that any Court of Justice, or any law could justify the
capture of the four Americans, Captain Wilkes has set aside all
Courts of Justice and all law, and has taken into his own hands, by
virtue of his cannons and cutlasses, the solution of a question
which demanded if raised at all, a regular, a solemn and a legal
decision.
These are the grounds therefore upon which our demands are based and
upon which they should be urged.
P.S.--I have just received your letter of the 22nd. If you receive
the Confederate prisoners under the protection of the British flag,
we shall be satisfied. But if that is not to be obtained, you will
only have to obey your instructions and withdraw.
Mr. Hammond, a very unfortunate prophet, predicted that 'the Americans
will never give way. The humiliation will be too great, and after all
their boastings against Europe, they will scarcely be satisfied to yield
to the common reprobation with which the act has been received. We hear,
too, that the President himself is most determined against concession,
having rejected peremptorily General McClellan's conciliatory advice.'
It must be admitted, however, that if Mr. Hammond was wrong, plenty of
other people shared his views on both sides of the Atlantic.
Lord Russell's despatch having arrived at Washington late at night on
December 18, Lord Lyons called upon Mr. Seward on the 19th, and
acquainted him with its general tenour. Mr. Seward received the
communication seriously and with dignity, nor did he manifest any
dissatisfaction. At the conclusion of the interview, he asked to be
given the following day for consideration, and also for communication
with the President. He thought that on the 21st he would be able to
express an opinion upon the communication, and in the meanwhile
expressed his gratification at the friendly and conciliatory manner in
which it had been made by the British Representative.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, Dec. 19, 1861.
Before I left Mr. Seward he said that there was one question which
he would put to me 'informally,' but which it was most important
that I should answer. Was any time fixed by my instructions within
which the U.S. Government must reply? I told him that I did not like
to answer the question; that what of all things I wished to avoid
was the slightest appearance of a menace. He said I need not fear
that; he only wished me to tell him privately and confidentially. I
said that on that understanding, I would tell him that the term was
seven days. He then said that much time would be lost if I did not
let him have a copy of your despatch 'unofficially and informally';
that so much depended upon the wording of it, that it was impossible
to come to a decision without reading it. I told him that the only
difficulty I had about giving it to him at once officially was that
the seven days would at once begin to run. He said that was very
true, but I might let him have it on the understanding that no one
but himself and the President should know that I had done so. I was
very glad to let him have it on these terms. It will give time for
the Packet (which is indeed already due) to arrive with M.
Thouvenel's Despatch to M. Mercier, and in the meantime give Mr.
Seward who is now on the peace side of the Cabinet time to work with
the President before the affair comes before the Cabinet itself. I
sent the Despatch to him in an envelope marked 'Private and
Confidential.' Almost immediately afterwards he came here. He told
me he was pleased to find that the Despatch was courteous and
friendly, and not dictatorial or menacing. There was however one
question more which he must ask me, without an answer to which he
could not act, but at the same time he must have the answer only in
strict confidence between himself and me. I had told him in
confidence that I was to wait seven days for an answer on the
subject of the redress we required. Supposing he was within the
seven days to send me a refusal, or a proposal to discuss the
question? I told him that my instructions were positive and left me
no discretion. If the answer was not satisfactory, and particularly
if it did not include the immediate surrender of the Prisoners, I
could not accept it.
I was not sorry to tell him this in the way I did. I avoided all
menace which could be an obstacle to the U.S. yielding, while I did
the only thing which will make them yield if they ever do, let them
know that we were really in earnest.
I don't think it likely they will give in, but I do not think it
impossible they may do so, particularly if the next news from
England brings note of warlike preparations, and determination on
the part of the Government and people.
Mr. Seward has taken up all my time, which is my excuse for this
scrawl. I shall be able to write to you to-morrow.
The second interview took place on the 21st, and the following letter
explains the reasons for allowing Mr. Seward an additional two days--a
happy expedient, which probably contributed in great measure to the
ultimate solution of the difficulty--and also graphically depicts the
general uncertainty and alarm which prevailed.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, Dec. 23, 1861.
I have followed, I think to the letter, in my communications with
Mr. Seward on the _Trent_ affair, the plan laid down in your private
letter of the 1st. The packet is unfortunately so late that M.
Mercier will not receive the promised instruction from M. Thouvenel
until to-morrow, but I could not have again put off communicating
your despatch to Mr. Seward without an appearance of vacillation
which would have been fatal. No time was practically lost by my
consenting to the delay from Saturday to Monday, for whether the
seven days expired on Saturday next or Monday next, I should have
been equally unable to announce the result to you sooner than by the
packet which will sail from New York on Wednesday, the 1st January.
I feel little or no doubt that I shall have an answer of some kind
before the seven days are over. What it will be depends very much
upon the news which will be brought by the packet to-morrow. If it
convinces the people here that it is surrender or war, without any
hope of a diversion in their favour by France, our terms will
perhaps be complied with. If there is any hope left that there will
be only a rupture of Diplomatic Relations, or that we shall accept
the mediation of France, no concession will be made. There is no
doubt that both government and people are very much frightened, but
still I do not think anything but the first shot will convince the
bulk of the population that England will really go to war.
M. Mercier went of his own accord to Mr. Seward the day before
yesterday and expressed strongly his own conviction that the choice
lay only between a compliance with the demands of England and war.
He begged Mr. Seward to dismiss all idea of assistance from France,
and not to be led away by the vulgar notion that the Emperor would
gladly see England embroiled with the United States in order to
pursue his own plans in Europe without opposition. He said that if
he could be of use, by making these sentiments known to Senators and
other influential people, he was quite ready to do so. Mr. Seward
asked him whether he had received special instructions from his
Government on the subject. M. Mercier said no, but that he expected
some immediately, and that he had no doubt whatever what they would
be. Mr. Seward did not accept his offer to prepare influential men
here for giving way, but merely said, 'Let us wait and see what your
instructions really turn out to be.'
It is announced that General Scott is more than halfway across the
Atlantic on his way here, I suppose in the hope of appearing again
on the stage as the Grand Pacificator. If he gives the sanction of
his name to a compliance with our terms he will certainly render the
compliance easier to the Government and less unpalatable to the
people. But I cannot foresee any circumstances, under which I should
be justified in departing from your instructions. Unless I receive
an announcement that the prisoners will be surrendered to _us_, and
at least not a refusal to make an apology before noon on this day
week, no other course will be open to me than to demand my passports
and those of all the members of the Legation and go away at once. In
case of a non-compliance, or of the time elapsing without any
answer, it will probably be desirable for me to take myself, the
Secretary of Legation, and the greater part of the Attachés off at
once, leaving, if necessary, one or two of the junior attachés to
pack up the archives and follow as quickly as possible. It is a case
in which, above all others, delay will be dangerous. I am so
convinced that unless we give our friends here a good lesson this
time, we shall have the same trouble with them again very soon,
under less advantageous circumstances, that even my regard for them
leads me to think it all important that they should receive the
lesson. Surrender or war will have a very good effect upon them, but
anything less will make them more self-confident than ever, and lead
them on to their ruin.
I do not think there is any danger of the Government's deliberately
taking any step to precipitate hostilities upon my departure. On the
contrary, if they let me go, it will be in the hope that the
interruption of diplomatic relations will be all they have to fear
from us. But they have so little control over their officers, that I
think we must be prepared for acts of violence from subordinates, if
they have the chance of performing them, in cases where no immediate
danger is incurred. I shall suggest to the Governors and Naval
Officers to take reasonable precautions against such acts. A
filibustering expedition of the Irish on the frontiers of Canada, to
damage the canals, or something of that sort, may also be on the
cards.
It is generally believed that the Government will insist on an
immediate advance of the Grand Army of the Potomac, in the hope of
covering a surrender to England with (to use President Lincoln's
phraseology) a 'sugar coating' of glory, in another quarter if
possible.
You will perhaps be surprised to find Mr. Seward on the side of
peace. He does not like the look of the spirit he has called up. Ten
months of office have dispelled many of his illusions. I presume
that he no longer believes in the existence of a Union Party in the
South, in the return of the South to the arms of the North in case
of a foreign war; in his power to frighten the nations of Europe by
great words; in the ease with which the U.S. could crush rebellion
with one hand and chastise Europe with the other; in the notion that
the relations with England in particular are safe playthings to be
used for the amusement of the American people. He sees himself in a
very painful dilemma. But he knows his countrymen well enough to
believe that if he can convince them that there is a real danger
of war, they may forgive him for the humiliation of yielding to
England, while it would be fatal to him to be the author of a
disastrous foreign war. How he will act eventually, I cannot say.
It will be hard for him to face present unpopularity, and if the
President and Cabinet throw the whole burden on his shoulders, he
may refuse to bear it. I hope that without embarrassing him with
official threats, I have made him aware himself of the extreme
danger of refusing our terms.
Since I have been writing this letter, M. Mercier has come in and
related to me more in detail the conversation he had with Mr. Seward
the day before yesterday. In addition to what I have already
mentioned, he says that he told Mr. Seward that it would be
impossible for France to blame England for precisely the same course
that she would herself have pursued in similar circumstances: that
of course he could not pretend to give advice on a question
concerning national honour without being asked to do so, but that it
might be of advantage to the U.S. Government for him to dispel
illusions which might exercise a baneful influence on its
determination.
M. Mercier reports the conversation to-day to his Government. I
think it as well, at all events for the present, not to put it into
an official despatch, but it might perhaps be well that Lord Cowley
should know that I am disposed to speak in very high terms of the
moral support given to my demands by M. Mercier.
I am told that the Senate is still more angry about the combined
expedition against Mexico than about the _Trent_ affair. They will
hardly be so absurd as to manifest their displeasure in such a way
as to add France and Spain to their adversaries.
P.S.--I have kept M. Mercier _au courant_ of all my communications,
confidential as well as official, with Mr. Seward, but I have given
no information as to either to any one else.
There was now nothing to be done but to sit and wait for the American
reply. It arrived on December 27, in the shape of a note from Mr. Seward
of the most portentous length abounding in exuberant dialectics, but the
gist of which was contained in the two following short paragraphs:--
'The four persons in question are now held in military custody at Fort
Warren in the State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully liberated.
'Your lordship will please indicate a time and place for receiving
them.'
The question of peace or war had hung in the balance for weeks, but the
victory was complete, and British diplomacy achieved a success which was
not equalled until Fashoda supplied a somewhat similar case in 1897.
So far from being intoxicated with his remarkable triumph, as would have
been the case with some diplomatists, Lord Lyons communicated the news
to Lord Russell in matter-of-fact terms which were typical of his calm
and practical nature.
* * * * *
Washington, Dec. 27, 1861.
It is of course impossible for me to give an opinion upon the
argumentation in Mr. Seward's voluminous note. Time barely admits of
its being read and copied before the messenger goes. But as the four
prisoners are given up, immediately and unconditionally, it is quite
clear to my mind that you will not wish me to decide the question
of peace or war without reference to you. A rupture of diplomatic
relations, not followed by war, would be worse than war itself, for
after that, nothing but actual hostilities would ever convince the
Americans that there was any limit to our forbearance.
I hope, however, that the Note will, on further examination, be
deemed sufficient. In that case it might not be unadvisable to give
credit to Mr. Seward, in speaking to Mr. Adams, and the more so
perhaps because Mr. Adams is, or at all events was, devoted to Mr.
Seward and his policy. I cannot say that my general opinion of Mr.
Seward has undergone any change; but without inquiring into his
motives, I must allow him the merit of having worked very hard and
exposed his popularity to very great danger.
I shall not be able to give you any information to-day as to the
effect produced upon the public. Mr. Seward has begged me to keep
the answer a secret until to-morrow. He intends to publish it in the
newspapers here to-morrow, and has sent a copy to New York to be
published simultaneously there. In the latter case it will be
conveyed to the public in Europe, as well as to you, by the same
packet which takes this letter. Mr. Seward told me he 'had been
through the fires of Tophet' in order to get the prisoners
surrendered.
I have seen with very great satisfaction that you have informed Mr.
Adams, in answer to the remonstrances about Mr. Bunch, that H.M.
Government must and will hold communication with the Confederate
Government. I am also extremely glad that the instructions to the
Consuls on the subject have been sent to the Admiral to forward, not
to me. In fact, if we are able to maintain peace with the U.S. it
will be very desirable to separate the Consuls in the South as much
as possible from this Legation. It will hardly be possible for me to
keep well with the Government here, if I am supposed to have the
direction of communication with the enemy's Government.
I think it very important, with a view to the preservation of peace,
that advantage should be taken of the opportunity to put Canada into
a state of defence; and indeed (as I said in a despatch which I
wrote in May last) to provide for the security of all our
possessions on both sides of this Continent. While Canada, in
particular, is apparently defenceless, the Americans will never
believe that we contemplate the possibility of war. And it must
never be forgotten that when they make peace with the South, they
may have a large army to provide with employment, and an immense
amount of popular dissatisfaction and humiliation to find a safety
valve for.
My intention is to propose to Mr. Seward that I shall send a
man-of-war or a British mail packet to Boston to receive the
prisoners. I should propose that they should go in the first
instance to Halifax. But I should suggest to the Captain to consult
their wishes as far as possible, but certainly _not_ to take them to
a Confederate port. Neither of the ships of war at New York would, I
suppose, be large enough to take them across the Atlantic, but I do
not think I ought to refuse to provide them with a passage to
Europe, if they ask for one. This seems due to them, inasmuch as it
was the failure of the British flag to afford them protection which
lost them their passage on board the _Trent_. Of course if they go
in a mail packet, I shall take precautions against any risk of an
'heroic' Captain applying the doctrines maintained here and bringing
the packet before an American Prize Court for adjudication. In any
case I shall give a caution to the Commander of the ship which takes
them, that they are not to be received with honours or treated
otherwise than as distinguished _private_ gentlemen.
Those who have not seen the Americans near, will probably be much
more surprised than I am at the surrender of the prisoners. I was
sure from the first that they would give in, if it were possible to
convince them that war was really the only alternative. My
difficulty has been to make them aware that it was surrender or war,
without making such threats as would render the humiliation too
great to be borne. This was the object of my confidential
communications with Mr. Seward before I gave him your despatch.
The main point having been gained, it remained to settle how the
surrender of the prisoners could best be carried out without causing
unnecessary ill-feeling and arousing a popular agitation which might
drive the United States Government into committing some high-handed
action in order to maintain itself. It was finally decided that, in
order to avoid the trouble which Mr. Seward feared from the inhabitants
of Boston, they should embark at Provincetown. They were accordingly
conveyed in an American ship from Fort Warren to Provincetown, and there
embarked on a British warship for Halifax, it having been expressly
stipulated that the transfer should not take place at night. From
Halifax they proceeded subsequently to Europe.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, Dec. 31, 1861.
The Americans are putting the best face they can upon the surrender
of Slidell and Mason, and as far as has depended upon me I have done
everything to make the pill as easy to swallow as possible. But I
cannot disguise from myself that the real cause of the yielding was
nothing more nor less than the military preparations made in
England. They are horribly out of humour and looking out for some
mode of annoying us without danger to themselves. There is a talk of
discriminative duties on British goods, of a non-intercourse Act,
and other absurdities. What is more serious is a proposal, which it
is said will be introduced into Congress next week, to repeal the
Act for carrying into effect the Reciprocity Treaty. This would be a
direct breach of the treaty, and would of course be an indisputable
_casus belli_. It has often been suggested before, in the old belief
that we should bear anything rather than go to war with the U.S. I
hope they have had a lesson which will make them wiser.
I cannot help fearing that it is as necessary as ever, nay more than
ever necessary, to be prepared to give a warm reception whether to
regular invaders or to filibusters from the U.S. who may make an
attempt upon Canada. In fact I am not reassured respecting the
maintenance of peace. For the present we have some security in Mr.
Seward. For he must do his best to maintain peace or he will have
made the sacrifice in the case of Mason and Slidell in vain. As in
that case, so in others, he sees now that besides the utter ruin of
the country, a war with us would give the ascendancy to the ultra
party who are opposed to him in the Cabinet and in Congress. He
fears too, and with great reason, that it would throw the country
into a state of anarchy, in which chiefs of a totally different
frame of mind from him would have the upper hand. But he may be
swept away, or, if he find it impossible to hold his position or his
own principles, turn round and play a desperate game with the
ultras. I have given him the opportunity of offering amends
spontaneously in three rather awkward matters, and, as you will see
by my despatches, he has been prompt in seizing it.
On reading his enormous note at leisure, I find that it is much more
of an apology than I thought from the hurried perusal which was all
I had time to give to it before I sent it off to you. But with your
letters before me, I should have taken much less _ad referendum_;
for the surrender of the prisoners is after all the main question.
On the other hand, I should not have gone out of my way to declare,
on my own responsibility, that the note was perfectly satisfactory,
unless it had contained a formal apology in plain words.
I have a better opinion of the Boston mob than Mr. Seward has, and
should have had very little fear of the prisoners being insulted, if
I had taken them from Fort Warren directly on board a British
man-of-war. I am not sorry however to spare the Bostonians (who are
among the most friendly to us of the Americans) what they might
consider a mortifying and humiliating spectacle. I have at Mr.
Seward's request not made the name of the place at which the
prisoners are to be transferred generally known. Indeed, I found
that many people were going to Boston to be present on the occasion,
and there is no advantage in having a crowd or a sensation about it.
It is sad to record that some of the American clergy showed a most
unchristianlike spirit in connection with the termination of the _Trent_
case; the following remarkable prayer uttered in the Senate affording an
instructive example:--
* * * * *
Thirty-Seventh Congress--Second Session.
In Senate--Monday, December 30, 1861.
[Prayer by Revd. Dr. Sunderland.]
O Thou, just Ruler of the world, in this hour of our trial, when
domestic treason stabs at the nation's heart, and foreign arrogance
is emboldened to defeat the public justice of the world, we ask help
of Thee for our rulers and our people, that we may patiently,
resolutely, and with one heart abide our time; for it is indeed a
day of darkness and reproach--a day when the high principle of human
equity, constrained by the remorseless sweep of physical and armed
force, must for the moment succumb under the plastic forms of soft
diplomacy. Yet, in the face of this, will we not be shaken in our
conviction that Thou art ever with him who, in the interest of human
liberty and the Christian faith, by all the means in his power works
righteousness and defends the truth.
O God, give to this our nation honesty, unity and courage; bring
this unnatural rebellion to a speedy end; and then prepare us to
assert upon a broader scale, and with a vaster force, the
inalienable rights and responsibilities of man: through Jesus
Christ. Amen.
Upon the whole, except for occasional manifestations of ill-humour, such
as, for instance, a resolution in the House of Representatives in favour
of creating a great navy to 'defend the seas from the sway of an
arbitrary trident,' the surrender was taken quietly, and Mr. Seward
handsomely acknowledged the great consideration which had been shown by
Lord Lyons in his conduct of the negotiations.
Congratulations now began to pour in upon him, and Lord Russell wrote
that nothing could have been better than his conduct, and that his
patience, forbearance, and friendly discretion had gone far to secure
the favourable result obtained. Another communication from Lord Russell
intimated that the Queen, 'taking into consideration the judgment and
conciliatory temper which you have shown in your negotiations at
Washington, especially in regard to the _Trent_, has directed that you
should be raised to the rank of G.C.B.
In acknowledging these congratulations, Lord Lyons disclaimed having
performed any brilliant or striking service. The only merit which he
attributed to himself was that of having laboured quietly and sedulously
to smooth over difficulties and to carry out the instructions he
received from the Foreign Office. Writing to Mr. Hammond, he explained
that he had resisted the temptation 'to do something' 'which always
besets one when one is anxious about a matter'; and that from the first
he had been convinced that the more quiet he kept the better would be
the chance of the instructions from home producing their effect. To
other correspondents he expressed the view that it was the British
military preparations which had turned the scale in favour of peace.
It would, of course, be an exaggeration to attribute solely to Lord
Lyons the credit of having successfully prevented the calamity of a war
between England and the United States. That credit is in reality due to
others as well as to himself: to the Home Government for their prompt
and decisive precautions, to the Prince Consort for his timely
interposition, to the French Government for their loyal support at a
critical moment, and to the good sense eventually displayed by the
Americans themselves. But no one reading the _Trent_ correspondence can
fail to realize that the issue of peace or war depended to a great
extent upon the method in which the British representative at Washington
carried out his task, and that the slightest error in judgment on his
part would have rendered the conflict inevitable.
In after years Lord Lyons frequently expressed the opinion that if there
had then been telegraphic communication across the Atlantic it would
have been impossible to avert war, and it is more than likely that he
was correct, although it is improbable that many people realized it at
the time.
It is also evident that a judicious silence may occasionally be of
inestimable value. It not unfrequently happens that taciturnity is
mistaken for profundity--
'O, my Antonio, I do know of those,
That therefore only are reported wise
For saying nothing.'
and many a diplomatist and many a politician has gained a reputation for
excessive sagacity by possessing sufficient good sense to conceal his
ignorance by maintaining silence, but the restraint which enabled Lord
Lyons to refrain from saying a single word upon a question over which
the whole population of the United States was buzzing for six or seven
weeks was little else than an inspiration.
CHAPTER IV
COURSE OF THE CIVIL WAR
(1862-1865)
Although the immediate danger of war between England and America had at
all events temporarily vanished, and the United States Government had
put a good face upon the matter, it was only natural that a soreness
should remain; nor did the slowness of military operations tend to
restore that government to a more equable frame of mind. Much of the
enthusiasm which marked the outbreak of hostilities had already
evaporated, but the hatred of the South had continued to grow in
intensity, and although the latter was undoubtedly suffering great
hardships and privations, there was no sign of failing courage, and
every prospect of a long and bitter contest. The difficulty of finding
men for the Northern army continued to increase; the prospect of having
to raise twenty or thirty millions sterling in taxes from a people
unaccustomed to pay any apparent taxes at all for Federal purposes was
particularly unpleasant, more especially as there appeared to be no
immediate probability of a striking military success; and it was not
surprising that the country showed signs of great depression. Under
these circumstances, a marked division of parties in the North began to
show itself. One, which may be termed the Revolutionary Party, was in
favour of prosecuting the war at all hazards and by all means; of
proclaiming the immediate abolition of slavery in the South; promoting a
servile insurrection there; turning out the Cabinet, and even deposing
the President if he proved to be an obstacle; keeping Congress
permanently in session to spur on the Government, and the Generals,
maintaining a paper currency by inflicting heavy penalties for
depreciating it, and so on. The Foreign Policy of this party consisted
in a return to reckless conduct and language towards Europe in general,
and an attempt to obtain the support of France against England.
On the other side, however, were now ranged the President, Mr. Seward,
and the more moderate men. Mr. Seward had now, strange to say, become a
kind of guarantee for peace, for after the concessions he had made, a
foreign war would have been fatal to his reputation, and it was only
fair to assume that his conversion to a more moderate course was
genuine. Still there was danger to England from both sides. If the party
of violence should show itself reckless enough to risk anything, the
moderate party might conceivably provoke a foreign war either as an
excuse for giving up the contest with the South, or to divert popular
irritation after having abandoned the contest as hopeless.
Meanwhile, Mr. Seward's demeanour towards England had changed so much
that, early in 1862, his friendliness had become actually embarrassing.
Quite a considerable force, according to British standards, amounting to
something like 12,000 men, had been already despatched, or were under
orders to proceed to Canada, and Mr. Seward now made the surprising
offer that these troops and stores should be landed at Portland, a port
in the United States, and sent overland to Canada. However well meant
the invitation, it would manifestly have been most imprudent to accept
it. It must have been plain to the densest understanding that these
troops and stores were only being sent to Canada in order that we might
be prepared, if unhappily a rupture should take place between England
and the United States. Therefore, if troops and stores so conveyed were
eventually used against the United States, there would have been a
violent outcry of treachery against us throughout the country. The
danger, too, of some unpleasant incident occurring during the landing or
during the passage of the trains with which it would be impossible to
deal, was so obvious, that the invitation was declined with thanks. Too
much love is sometimes almost more inconvenient in diplomacy than
hatred.
Mr. Seward's anxiety, at this time, however, to show himself a friend to
England continued, and he took particular care to point out, in proof of
his new attitude, that up till the last moment (December 26) he had been
the only person in the Government who was in favour of the surrender of
Slidell and Mason, and that President Lincoln had been opposed to
surrender and was in favour of arbitration only. In fact, Mr. Seward
appeared to be seized with the desire of overwhelming not only England,
but France as well, with demonstrations of friendship and confidence,
and it is perhaps not uncharitable to assume that two reasons were
contributory causes to this agreeable change of tactics. One of these
was that the appearance of a good understanding with these two Powers
would exercise a beneficial influence upon the money market; the other
was the fear of one or both of them recognizing the South and breaking
up the blockade. Probably Mr. Seward's fears of French interference were
increased by a visit paid by M. Mercier, in the spring, to Richmond, the
Confederate Headquarters. M. Mercier, whether instructed from home or
not, was bent upon this visit, which the United States Government could
not prevent, but which they could hardly be expected to view with
favour, and after the manner of French diplomatists of the period, he
was probably unable to resist the temptation of trying to effect a
striking _coup_, although there was not the slightest reason to suspect
him of any disloyalty to his English colleague. Lord Lyons wisely
declined to accompany him, and prophesied that he would end by getting
into trouble, which proved to be the case, for the journey naturally
gave rise to all sorts of comments. As will be seen from the following
letter, both M. Mercier and Mr. Seward drew incorrect conclusions from
the information derived during this visit; the former being convinced
that the subjugation of the South was an impossibility, and the latter
confidently believing that the end of the war was close at hand.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, April 23, 1862.
M. Mercier came back from Richmond yesterday. He went soon after his
arrival to see Mr. Seward and came afterwards to me. He is persuaded
that the confidence and the resolution of the Confederates are
increased rather than diminished by recent events. If they are
worsted anywhere they will still not surrender. They will destroy
their stores of cotton and tobacco, and all other property which
they cannot remove. They will retire into the interior of their
country and defy the North to follow them. They will endure any
privations and sufferings rather than be again united to the North.
Their unanimity and devotion to the cause are wonderful. They are
not carrying on a war in the usual manner for dominion as the North
is: they consider themselves to be fighting for their homes and
their liberty, and are making and are ready to make any sacrifices.
Such is the impression which M. Mercier says was made upon him by
what he saw and heard.
I asked him whether he had obtained any specific information as to
the extent of the naval and military resources of the Confederates.
He said that they admitted that they were in want of arms and
ammunition, and said that but for this they could keep a very much
larger army in the field. They had no difficulty about men. On the
contrary, they had more than they could arm. They had another
'Merrimac' nearly ready at Norfolk: they had an iron-plated vessel
on the James River: they had iron-plated vessels nearly ready at New
Orleans. If they lost New Orleans and all the seaboard, they would
be as far from being subdued as ever.
I inquired of M. Mercier whether he had entered upon any particular
matter of business with the members of the Confederate Government.
He said he had avoided the appearance of having come to transact
business: that the French tobacco would be spared if the rest was
burnt, provided it could be distinguished and separated from that
belonging to private persons.
I asked M. Mercier if anything had passed on the subject of the
position of the Consuls. He said that if the idea of calling upon
them to take out exequaturs from the Confederate Government had ever
been entertained, it was now abandoned; there appeared to be a very
good disposition towards foreigners in general; less good perhaps
towards the English as a nation than others, perhaps because more
had been expected from that country than from any other, and the
disappointment had consequently been greater. On the other hand, the
Confederate leaders professed to have abandoned all expectation of
succour from Europe: indeed, they declared that all they desired was
such an interruption of the blockade as would enable them to get
arms.
M. Mercier said that he was more than ever convinced that the
restoration of the old Union was impossible; that he believed the
war would, if the Powers of Europe exercised no influence upon it,
last for years; that he thought that in the end the independence of
the South must be recognized, and that the governments of Europe
should be on the watch for a favourable opportunity of doing this in
such a manner as to end the war. The present opportunity would,
however, he thought, be peculiarly unfavourable.
I did not express any opinion as to the policy to be eventually
pursued by France or England, but I entirely agreed with M. Mercier
that there was nothing to do at the present moment but watch events.
This morning Mr. Seward spoke to me about M. Mercier's journey. He
said that M. Mercier had, probably without being altogether aware of
it himself, obtained very valuable information for the U.S.
Government. He himself was quite convinced from M. Mercier's account
of what had passed, that the Confederates were about to make a last
effort: that they had their last armies in the field; and that their
last resources were brought into action. Their talking of retiring
into the interior was idle. If the U.S. were undisputed masters of
the border states, including Tennessee, and of the sea coast, there
would be no occasion for any further fighting. Anybody who liked to
retire into the interior was welcome to do so and stay there till he
was tired. Mr. Seward went on to say that he had had some difficulty
in preventing M. Mercier's journey making an unfavourable impression
upon the public. With this view he had caused it to be mentioned in
the papers that M. Mercier had had a long interview with him on his
return from Richmond; he had in the evening taken M. Mercier to the
President, which also he should put in the newspapers: to-night he
was to dine with M. Mercier to meet the captain of the French ship
of war which had brought M. Mercier back: to-morrow the President
would pay a visit to that ship.
I suppose the truth lies somewhere between M. Mercier's views of the
prospects of the South and Mr. Seward's. Mr. Seward was of course
anxious to weaken any impression M. Mercier's language may have made
upon me.
The Slave Trade Treaty has met with much more general approval than
I expected. It has excited quite an enthusiasm among the
Anti-Slavery party. I have never seen Mr. Seward apparently so much
pleased. Mr. Sumner, who has had the management of it in the Senate,
was moved to tears when he came to tell me that it had passed
unanimously.
As had been foreseen and pointed out to M. Mercier, the most
unsatisfactory result of his visit was the impression it produced that
France was disposed to act independently of England, but there is no
evidence to show that such were the intentions of the French Government
at the time, and M. Mercier himself always showed himself to be a most
frank and honest colleague.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, May 16, 1862.
The Government here is very much disquieted by the rumoured
intentions of England and France with regard to intervention. This
is not altogether without advantage, as they are more disposed to be
considerate, or, at all events, civil, when they have doubts about
us, than when they feel sure of us. They are more civil to France
than to England partly because they are more doubtful about her, and
partly because they never will have, do what she will, the same
bitterness against her as they have against England. Mr. Seward is
encouraged by some of his English correspondents to believe that the
Mexican affair will produce a serious disagreement between England
and France.
M. Mercier thinks it quite within the range of possibility that the
South may be victorious both in the battles in Virginia and in
Tennessee. He is at all events quite confident that whether
victorious or defeated they will not give in, and he is certainly
disposed to advise his Government to endeavour to put an end to the
war by intervening on the first opportunity. He is however very much
puzzled to devise any mode of intervention which would have the
effect of reviving French trade and obtaining cotton. I shall
suppose he would think it desirable to go to great lengths to stop
the war, because he believes that the South will not give in until
the whole country is made desolate, and that the North will very
soon be led to proclaim immediate emancipation, which would stop the
cultivation of cotton for an indefinite time.
I listen and say little when he talks of intervention. It appears to
me to be a dangerous subject of conversation. There is a good deal
of truth in M. Mercier's anticipations of evil, but I do not see my
way to doing any good.
* * * * *
The credit of the Government has been wonderfully kept up, but it
would not stand a considerable reverse in the field. It is possible
under such circumstances that a peace party might arise, and perhaps
just _possible_ that England and France might give weight to such a
party. However, all this is a mere speculation. We are (as usual) on
the eve of a crisis which is to clear up everything.
A threatened breakdown in health, due chiefly to overwork, forced Lord
Lyons reluctantly to apply for leave to return to England before the
severe heat of a Washington summer had set in, and in making the
application he pointed out that during the three years which had elapsed
since his arrival in the United States he had only been absent for four
nights from Washington, with the exception of the two months during
which he was officially in attendance on the Prince of Wales. The work
in fact was incessant, the staff of the Legation scanty, and things were
not made easier by the autocratic Hammond, who suddenly recalled one of
the attachés to London, that enlightened bureaucrat being apparently
quite incapable of realizing that a young man's time might be more
profitably employed at Washington during the Civil War than in preparing
for some perfunctory and trumpery examination which could perfectly well
have been undertaken at any subsequent period. The appeals to the
autocrat of the Foreign Office for assistance are as pathetic as they
are moderate. 'I conjure you to send me out two or at least one good
working attaché as soon as possible. Brodie is completely out of health;
Warre is always prostrated by the abominable heat of this place; Monson
can do a great deal, but his constitution is not of iron; and as for
myself I cannot do much Chancery work in addition to my proper duties.
Indeed, I shall soon break down. What you see of our work gives a very
small idea of the amount of it. It seems to me that everybody North and
South who gets into trouble discovers that he or she is a
non-naturalized British subject.'
Nor were any high qualifications demanded. Geniuses were not in request.
'What we want is a good steady industrious copier, _well conducted in
private life_. I have no objection to quite a young one; such a man as
Jenner would suit me perfectly. Anderson, Monson, and I are all
sufficiently well up in ordinary Chancery management to make it
unnecessary to have more genius or more experience than is required for
copying.'
Writing to his old chief Lord Normanby, the confession is made that
Washington 'is a terrible place for young men; nothing whatever in the
shape of amusement for them, little or no society of any kind now; no
theatre, no club. I have no time to think whether I am amused or not.'
Being constitutionally incapable of exaggeration, this last statement
may be accepted as literally accurate.
Leave for three months having been granted, the sanguine Mr. Seward did
not fail to draw hopeful conclusions from the circumstance, and there
appeared to be no sign of immediate trouble in the near future.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, June 9, 1862.
I was so unwell yesterday that I was unable to do anything, which
has prevented my sending you by this mail some general information
on the prospects of the war and some other matters.
I did not think that Mr. Seward would object to my going. He has, in
fact, taken up the idea with so much enthusiasm that I have been
obliged to endeavour to check his anticipation of the wonders I am
to effect, or rather to make him understand that my own views, not
his, are those which I must express to you.
I take his willingness that I should go as a sign that he does not
expect serious trouble, for I think that he would rather be in my
hands than those of a man new to him if he did.
I am afraid that there are three things to which we must not blind
ourselves:
1. That we have a very small chance of getting cotton from this
country for a long time to come.
2. That there is no Union feeling in the South.
3. That the war has become one of separation or subjugation.
* * * * *
_Lord Lyons to Lord Russell._
Washington, June 13, 1862.
I had quite an affectionate parting with the President this morning.
He told, as is his wont, a number of stories more or less decorous,
but all he said having any bearing on political matters was: 'I
suppose my position makes people in England think a great deal more
of me than I deserve, pray tell 'em that I mean 'em no harm.' He
does not pay much attention to foreign affairs, and I suppose did
not like to talk about them without Mr. Seward. I am to hear Mr.
Seward's last words at New York on Tuesday evening. I embark the
following morning, and hope to pay my respects to you in person a
few days after this letter reaches you.
It is quite time for me to get away from this place. The heat to-day
is overpowering.
Lord Lyons arrived in London about the end of June, and a letter to Mr.
Stuart who had been left in charge of the Legation at Washington shows
that he was considerably alarmed at the hostile feeling prevailing
throughout the country against the North, largely due to the inability
to obtain cotton, but also embittered by the tone of the American press.
As an instance of this feeling, alluding to the rumour that McClellan
had suffered a serious defeat, he adds: 'I am afraid no one but me is
sorry for it.' McClellan's misfortunes certainly provoked demonstrations
of pleasure in the House of Commons during an ill-timed debate which
took place in July, and a celebrated speech by Gladstone in which he
asserted that 'Jefferson Davies and the leaders of the South have made
an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made, what
is more than either--they have made a nation,' certainly tended to show
that however impartial the Cabinet intended to be, the sympathies of
England were to a great extent with the South.
During his stay in England he was in constant communication with the
Cabinet, and the general belief of ministers was that whilst extremely
reluctant to interfere in any way in the American contest, interference
might be forced upon them. Mediation was again in the air, and M.
Mercier and the French Government thought that an opportunity had
arrived for proposing it.
Lord Lyons, after having been detained by Lord Russell for the purpose
of additional consultations, set out again for Washington in October
accompanied by the late Sir Edward Malet, who remained for a
considerable period on his staff, and became one of his closest friends.
In fact, with the exception of the late Mr. George Sheffield, who was
already acting as his private secretary, and of the late Sir Michael
Hubert, who subsequently acted in the same capacity, it is doubtful
whether any other person of his acquaintance ever reached the same
degree of intimacy or shared his confidence to an equal extent.
The visit to England had in no sense changed the policy of the British
Government towards the United States, and there were no fresh
instructions with regard to mediation, intervention, recognition of the
South, and the numerous other matters which occupied attention. Nor had
any essential change taken place in the situation in America, and Lord
Lyons, immediately after his return expressed the opinion that foreign
intervention, short of the use of force, would only make matters worse.
The indefatigable M. Mercier, however, in whose thoughts intervention
was always uppermost, was full of a new plan, although, with the violent
party predominant in the Cabinet, the moment did not appear propitious.
M. Mercier's idea was that France, with the consent and support of
England, should offer mediation alone. He thought that the difficulty
which the irritation against England threw in the way of mediation might
thus be avoided, while the fact of England supporting France would give
to France the weight of both Powers. According to his information,
Russia, probably from a desire to separate France and England, was
disposed to join France in offering good offices, but, independently of
other considerations, the presence of Russia might be an obstacle to the
success of his plan. It would take away from the offer of mediation the
element of intimidation, which, though kept in the background, must be
felt by the United States to exist. The mediation of all the European
Powers (France, England, Russia, and perhaps Prussia) would be a
different matter. It might have the effect of reconciling the pride of
the United States to negotiation with the South, and might, in certain
conjunctions, be usefully employed. But it would be more easy for the
Government of the United States to reject an offer from the four Powers
than from England and France, or from France only. England and France
had an obvious and pressing interest in putting an end to hostilities
and the means of supporting their counsels by their navies.
Such was M. Mercier's plan, but he received little encouragement from
his British colleague, who had anticipated something of the kind, and
with habitual caution declined to pronounce any opinion until he had
received instructions from home. As a matter of fact, he had foreseen
this proposal when in England, and had obtained an assurance from Lord
Russell that it should be discussed by the Cabinet.
The two following letters from Lord Russell to Lord Lyons show that
M. Mercier was really in accordance with his own Government.
* * * * *
Woburn Abbey, Nov. 1, 1862.
The Emperor of the French wishes to offer peace to both parties, and
he says both parties will agree to peace, the one on the ground of
Union and the other on the ground of Separation! I fear we are no
nearer to peace, if so near, as we were a year ago.
Seward's avowal to Mr. Stuart that he looks to mutual extermination
and the superior numbers of the North, in order to restore the
Union!!! is the most horrible thing I ever heard.
Cobden, I fear, is right when he says that to preach peace to them
is like speaking to mad dogs. I am much less sanguine than I was,
but I shall be glad to hear your views on your return. Russia must
be a party to any thing done by us and France--if we do anything.
* * * * *
Woburn Abbey, Nov. 8, 1862.
Flahault has been instructed to propose to us in conjunction with
Russia to ask North and South to suspend their war for six months. I
have not seen the despatch.
We shall consider our answer on Tuesday next.
The Emperor's proposal was declined by the British Government, and at
first peremptorily declined also by the Russian Government, but as soon
as the latter perceived, by a speech made by Lord Palmerston at the
Guildhall, that there was no chance of an acceptance of the proposal by
England a circular was issued, stating that if France persisted in her
intention, the Russian Minister at Washington would be instructed to
give it moral if not official support. Thus, as on many other occasions,
did Louis Napoleon's elaborate scheme vanish into space.
One fresh difficulty which had arisen in the meantime was the diminished
influence of Mr. Seward with the President and his ministers. He
had become much more conciliatory in his dealings with foreign
representatives, but was apparently unable to carry his points with
other departments, and had fallen in public estimation by signing the
Abolition Proclamation which had been imposed upon him, in opposition to
all his views by the Radical party in the Cabinet. Towards the end of
the year it seemed quite probable that he would have to resign, and the
contingency was viewed with consternation, for although Mr. Seward had
very pronounced faults, he now represented the Moderate party, and his
departure would signify the surrender of President Lincoln to the Ultra
Radical party, prepared to risk everything, even to a foreign war, in
order to maintain itself in power.
Upon the whole, there was every excuse for dissatisfaction with their
Government on the part of the Northern public. After about two years'
fighting the two main armies of the North and South remained in much the
same position, but, if anything, the balance of gain appeared to rest
with the South. New Orleans, it is true, had been captured, but the
invasion of Virginia had failed, and Richmond was as unapproachable as
ever. The North were the attacking party, and if they failed to advance
it was equivalent to a defeat. Disappointment and discouragement had
succeeded to confidence and enthusiasm, and if the contest imposed much
severer hardships upon the Confederates than upon their opponents, there
was no sign of faltering, and their spirit remained as high as ever.
Before the end of 1862 the prices of ordinary articles in the
Confederate States had already greatly increased. As early as October,
according to the consular reports, the price of tea at Savannah was
sixteen dollars a pound; brown sugar sixty cents; loaf sugar
unobtainable, and the commonest brown soap seventy-five cents. At
Charleston, coal was unprocurable; black cloth fetched fifty-three
dollars a yard; shoes cost thirty-four dollars a pair; beer thirty
dollars a dozen; sugar a dollar a pound; butter a dollar and a half, and
the pound sterling was worth fourteen dollars. In view of these figures
it would be interesting to learn the cost of a banquet given by General
Ripley in December 1862, to some French officers at Charleston, at which
Consul Bunch, of revoked exequatur fame, was present, and which must
surely have been the most sumptuous meal ever partaken of in a besieged
town since the days of Belshazzar.
* * * * *
BILL OF FARE.
Oysters on Shell.
FISH.
Salmon, Anchovy sauce.
SOUP.
Green Turtle. Oyster.
RELEVÉES.
Fillet of Beef, braisé with Mushrooms,
Capon, with Truffes à la Regence.
BOILED.
Leg of Mutton, Caper sauce,
Turkey, Celery sauce.
COLD.
Boned Turkey, garnished with Jelly,
Chicken Salad, à la Française,
Game Pattie, with truffles, decorated with Jelly.
ENTRÉES.
Sweet Breads, larded en croustade, sauce petits pois,
Fillets of Teal Duck, bigare, sauce Italienne,
Quails, braisés, sauce Champignons,
Snipe, broiled on Toast,
Fillets of Venison, sautés, sauce Poivrade,
Fried Oysters.
RELISHES.
Sardines, Olives, Celery, Assorted Pickles,
Horseradish, Pickled Onions, Cranberry Jelly,
Worcestershire sauce.
VEGETABLES.
Baked Sweet Potatoes, New Irish Potatoes, Mashed Potatoes,
Spinach, Cauliflowers, Turnips, Rice.
ROAST.
Turkey, stuffed with truffles, Saddle of Mutton,
Baked Ham, Madeira sauce.
GAME.
Wild Duck, Wild Turkey, Venison, with Jelly.
PASTRY.
Plum Pudding, Brandy sauce.
Apple and Mince pies, Omelette Soufflée, Lady Fingers,
Vanilla Kisses, Sponge Cake, Cup Custard, Madeira Jelly.
DESSERT.
Apples, Nuts, Coffee, etc.
If, however, the South was feeling the effects of privation, the North
had no cause to rejoice. In September, 1862, Lincoln had issued the
preliminary proclamation of Emancipation, but the hope that it would
consolidate the North had not been realized. The second proclamation
appeared on January 1, 1863, and had no greater success, serving only to
exasperate the South still further and increasing the divisions in the
North. The Democratic party was afraid to declare openly for peace, but
disguised efforts in favour of it were now made, and it was sought to
induce some of the State Legislatures to pass resolutions in favour of
an armistice and a convention. Men of all shades of politics had lost
heart, but the most probable cause of peace seemed to be the
impossibility of raising or keeping together a great army unless the
national spirit could be raised by some striking military successes,
meanwhile the division of feeling in the North had reached such a
pitch that the patriots who had formerly clamoured for a foreign war to
reunite North and South were now calling for a foreign war to reunite
the North itself.
The general demoralization induced M. Mercier to make yet another
attempt at mediation. Upon this occasion he was approached by the
well-known journalist, Mr. Horace Greeley, whose object it was to
ascertain whether the Emperor Napoleon could be relied upon as a real
friend to the United States in case of his being accepted as a mediator,
a 'real friend,' meaning, of course, one who would insist upon the
restoration of the Union. M. Mercier's fresh attempt met with no greater
success than before, nor was it surprising, for his action was based
upon an entire misconception.
Being firmly convinced that the restoration of the Union was impossible,
he failed to realize that this must be the basis of all negotiations,
and although most people were heartily sick of the war and were not
prepared to refuse to the South all terms short of unconditional
surrender, they had not been brought to the point of acquiescing in a
cession of territory.
The French proposal, with which we had been careful not to associate
ourselves, was, of course, declined by the American Government. Mr.
Seward re-established some of his popularity by the character of his
answer; distrust of the Emperor Napoleon increased, and the only party
which benefited in any way was England, for the increase in ill-feeling
towards France had the result of diminishing to some extent the
animosity against us, and M. Mercier himself was now almost as much
attacked in the press as the British Minister had been in the past.
Early in the year, an incident occurred which might have had unpleasant
consequences had it not been promptly dealt with. In spite of the
endless embarrassments created by the blockade, the British Government
was sincerely anxious not to give the United States Government any
ground for complaint, and the Consuls had been continually enjoined by
Lord Lyons to adhere closely to the recognized rules of International
Law where a state of blockade existed. To his consternation he now
learnt that the Consul at Mobile proposed to send away from that port a
quantity of specie in a British man-of-war. 'I should be very much
alarmed,' he wrote, 'if I thought it likely that he would find a captain
of man-of-war as foolish as himself. I really could not answer for peace
if, in addition to the irritation about the _Alabama_, should come the
fury which would be excited, if it were shown that our men-of-war had
carried Confederate gold through the blockade. No proof that the money
was intended for, or even that it had been actually paid to, British
bondholders would ever convince people here that it had not been used to
purchase munitions of war.' Unfortunately a simple-minded captain had
been discovered by the Consul, and before it was possible to communicate
with him the specie had been shipped. This action, which was due solely
to stupidity, was impossible to defend, and would have provided the
American Government with a first-class grievance; clearly the best thing
to do was to anticipate any complaints, and consequently the Consul was
wisely dismissed before the matter became really public. The promptitude
with which this regrettable incident was dealt with contrasts favourably
with the difficulty which was experienced in persuading the American
Government to deal adequately with grievances arising out of the
proceedings of their own officials.
At this period of the war innumerable complaints were received from
British Governors, Naval officers and Consuls with regard to the
arbitrary proceedings of United States cruisers, and it was plain that
these proceedings were largely due to the exasperation caused by the
exploits of the _Alabama_, and by the rumours that similar vessels were
being built in England for the Confederates. This exasperation was
perfectly natural, but not altogether reasonable, for it never seems to
have occurred to the Americans that the fault lay partly with their own
Navy. Great pressure was put upon President Lincoln to issue letters of
marque, and had privateers made their appearance and exercised
belligerent rights against neutral merchantmen, the difficulty of
preserving peace would have been increased tenfold. Mr. Seward was known
to be strongly in favour of the policy of issuing letters of marque, and
the matter was brought to the attention of Mr. Adams by Lord Russell,
who always appeared somewhat unnecessarily disposed to suspect Mr.
Seward of hostile intentions.
* * * * *
_Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._
Chesham Place, March 14, 1863.
I don't think Mr. Seward means to quarrel with us, but perhaps he
will bluster rather more when he has lost the support of Congress.
Adams told me that the privateers, if sanctioned at all, were not
intended to interfere with nice questions of International Law, but
only to encounter the _Alabama_ and other vessels of that sort.
If this be so I doubt if they will be fitted out at all, but if
they are fitted out I think they will not keep their hands off
English merchant ships.
We have no thoughts of recognizing at present. If you are asked our
intentions by Seward, say that our opinion is that the Republican
Party ought not to leave the glorious work of peace to the
Democrats, but as a Neutral Power, our intention and wish is to let
the war work itself out, as it is sure to do by the moral exhaustion
of the war spirit.
Our procession and wedding went off splendidly. The Princess of
Wales is charming and would make New York stand on tiptoe to behold
her.
In a further conversation with Mr. Adams he made the significant remarks
that if the contemplated privateers sought for Confederate merchant
ships they would not find any, and that if they interfered with neutral
vessels and the law of blockade they would probably involve their own
and the British Government in 'very awkward questions.'
Lord Russell, in spite of his sincere and often proclaimed desire to
remain absolutely impartial, hardly seems at this time to have realized
the disastrous consequences of not having prevented the departure of the
_Alabama_ and similar vessels.
* * * * *
_Lord Russell to Lord Lyons._
Foreign Office, March 28, 1863.
The outcry in America about the _Oreto_ and the _Alabama_ is much
exaggerated, but I must feel that her roaming the ocean with English
guns and English sailors to burn, sink and destroy the ships of a
friendly nation, is a scandal and a reproach. I don't know very well
what we can do, but I should like myself to refer the question of
indemnity to an impartial arbiter.
When things are more advanced towards a termination, I think this
might be done. It would be dangerous to do it at present, or even
to hold out hopes of it. I will think further of it, and if I remain
in the same mind, will submit the question to the Cabinet.
The _Peterhoff_ and the _Magicienne_ are now before the Law
Officers. I will send you instructions about them next week. The
seizures by Admiral Wilkes seem like a plan to embroil our two
countries. He always protests that such is not his object, but his
acts do not agree with his words.
I should like anything better than being obliged to take the part of
the Confederates. But then President Lincoln must not be getting up
war
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