"The System," As Uncovered by the San Francisco Graft Prosecution

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Title: "The System," As Uncovered by the San Francisco Graft Prosecution

Author: Franklin Hichborn

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK "THE SYSTEM," AS UNCOVERED BY THE SAN FRANCISCO GRAFT PROSECUTION ***

Transcriber's Note

Footnotes have been gathered at the end of each chapter.

There are numerous apparent spelling or typographical errors, including
those that appear in the copious quoted material. These have been
corrected, and are noted in the detailed notes at the end of this text.

Italics are represented here using the underscore character as _italic_.
Bold text uses the equal character as =bold=.

"THE SYSTEM"

AS UNCOVERED BY

The San Francisco Graft Prosecution

FRANKLIN HICHBORN

(Author of "The Story of the California Legislature of 1909"; "The
Story of the California Legislature of 1911"; and "The Story of the
California Legislature of 1913.")

"It is well enough, my fellow-citizens, to meet as we do to-night,
and to applaud the sentiments of patriotism, and to echo the
voice of indignation uttered upon this rostrum. But another and
more imperative duty devolves upon every one of us individually,
and that is to give his and her moral support to the officers of
the law. We must not content ourselves by merely adopting a set
of resolutions, and then going home and forgetting about it,
placing all responsibility upon the constituted authorities.
This is not a case of the constituted authorities. It is the
case of the people of San Francisco. And unless the people of
San Francisco do their individual duty in supporting the
prosecution, the officials of the courts and of the law must
fail in their efforts."--_Walter Macarthur at the mass meeting
called at the time of the attempted assassination of Heney._

San Francisco
Press of The James H. Barry Company
1915

FRANKLIN HICHBORN'S
BOOKS ON
CALIFORNIA POLITICS

Story of the California Legislature of 1909 $1.25

Story of the California Legislature of 1911 1.50

Story of the California Legislature of 1913 1.50

"The System," as Uncovered by the San Francisco
Graft Prosecution 1.50

CONTENTS

Chapter Page

I. The Union Labor Party Movement 11

II. The Ruef Board of Supervisors 22

III. The San Francisco Ruef Ruled 30

IV. San Francisco After the Fire of 1906 49

V. Graft Prosecution Opens 73

VI. Ruef's Fight to Take the District Attorney's Office 87

VII. Oliver Grand Jury Impaneled 96

VIII. Ruef Loses Fight for District Attorney's Office 107

IX. Ruef and Schmitz Indicted 110

X. Fight to Evade Trial 121

XI. Ruef a Fugitive 130

XII. The Trapping of the Supervisors 139

XIII. Confessions of the Bribe-taking Supervisors 154

XIV. The Source of the Bribe Money 168

XV. Ruef Pleads Guilty to Extortion 186

XVI. Schmitz Convicted of Extortion 208

XVII. Schmitz Ousted from Office 215

XVIII. The Real Fight Begins 240

XIX. The Glass Trials and Conviction 269

XX. The Ford Trials and Acquittals 279

XXI. The San Francisco Election of 1907 300

XXII. Higher Courts Free Schmitz and Ruef 320

XXIII. The Defense Becomes Arrogant 335

XXIV. Jury Fixing Uncovered 357

XXV. The Shooting of Heney 370

XXVI. The Calhoun Trial 388

XXVII. The San Francisco Election of 1909 405

XXVIII. Dismissal of the Graft Cases 425

XXIX. Ruef's Last Refuge Fails 440

XXX. Conclusion 455

APPENDIX.

Judge Lawlor's Ruling in Motion to Dismiss
Graft Cases i

How the Supervisors Were Bribed vii

Gallagher's Order Removing Langdon from
Office of District Attorney xii

The Ruef "Immunity Contract" xix

"Immunity Contract" Given Supervisors xxi

District Attorney Langdon's Plan for Reorganizing
the Municipal Government xxii

Roosevelt's Letter to Spreckels on the Graft
Situation xxv

Governor Johnson's Statement Regarding Ruef's
Imprisonment xxviii

Schmitz's Attempt to Control San Francisco's
Relief Funds xxxiii

Receipts and Disbursements of the Graft Prosecution xxxiv

PREFACE.

A tethered bull does not know that he is tied until he attempts to go
beyond the rope's limits.

A community does not feel the grip of the "System" until it attempts
resistance. Then it knows.

San Francisco during the Ruef-Schmitz regime was no more under the heel
of the "System" than when other "bosses" dominated; no more so than
to-day; no more so than other communities have been and are.

The political "boss" is merely the visible sign of the "System's"
existence. However powerful he may appear, he is, after all, but agent
for the "System." The "boss" develops power, does the "System's" work
until he is repudiated by the people, when another "boss," usually in
the name of "reform," takes his place.

But the second "boss" serves the same "System." Ruef entered San
Francisco politics as a "reformer." He supplanted other "bosses." But
Ruef in his turn served the "System" they had served.

San Francisco, when Ruef had reached his point of greatest possible
power, rose against him. The "System" was not immediately concerned.
Ruef had lived his day; the hour for another "boss" to succeed him had
come. But San Francisco proposed to get at those back of the "boss"; to
get at the "System." And then San Francisco found the "System" more
powerful than herself; more powerful than the State of California.

And San Francisco was beaten down, humiliated, made to understand that
within her borders the laws could not be enforced against those to whom
the "System" granted immunity from punishment.

To secure evidence against bribe-givers, the State granted immunity to
bribe-takers who confessed their crimes and joined with the State to
bring larger criminals to justice. And the "System's" agents cried
outrage that bribe-takers should go free of punishment.

But the "System" granted immunity from punishment to those who had
bribed. And the apologists for the "System" will tolerate no criticism
of this sort of immunity.

Other communities have risen against the "System's" agents, the
"bosses," and the "bosses" have given place to other agents. But few
communities, if any, have attacked the "System" as did San Francisco.
Had they done so, unquestionably they would have found themselves as
ineffective against corruption as San Francisco has been shown to be.

The "System" is confined to no particular State or locality; it
permeates our entire public life. Judge Lindsey in Colorado calls it
"The Beast." In California we call it "The Southern Pacific Machine,"
for in California the Southern Pacific Company was its chief
beneficiary. Other communities call it the "Organization." The bull does
not discover his rope until he strains at it; the community knows little
or nothing of the overpowering "System" until it resists. San Francisco
resisted and discovered.

The mere bribing of a board of supervisors was not extraordinary. Our
newspapers furnish us daily with sorry recital of bribe-taking public
officials discovered in other communities. But the effective, searching
resistance to bribe-giving which San Francisco offered was
extraordinary. It was a new thing in American politics. It compelled the
"System" to show its real strength, and that, too, was new in American
politics, and extraordinary, also.

The "System" at San Francisco had taken the usual precautions which
ordinarily ensure it against successful opposition, or even question. It
had, through its agents, selected the candidates for public office,
including the District Attorney. With the District Attorney loyal to the
"System" the "System" was secure against attack. And even were the
District Attorney to resist the "System," still was the "System" secure,
for the "System" could deny the District Attorney, through the public
officials it controlled, the funds necessary for successful opposition.

But here again extraordinary circumstances worked for the "System's"
confusion. Not only had the "System" been mistaken in the caliber of the
man whom it had permitted to be nominated for District Attorney, but
patriotic citizens guaranteed the expenses of effective attack through
the District Attorney's office.

Nevertheless, the "System" would ordinarily have been able to laugh at
the attack, and render it abortive, by compelling the citizens who were
backing the District Attorney to withdraw their support.

Even at San Francisco, the supporters of the District Attorney felt the
force of such attack. Those who supported the Prosecution found
themselves harassed in their business ventures, and snubbed in the
social circles in which they had moved. When Heney, stricken down in the
discharge of his duty, lay at the point of death, a minister of the
gospel prayed for the wounded Prosecutor's recovery. Immediately from
the pews came silent expression of disapproval. That pastor refused to
be intimidated, refused to join with his fashionable congregation
against the Prosecution. He was eventually compelled to resign his
pastorate. Rudolph Spreckels, while accounting for every dollar that the
Graft Prosecution had expended, asked to be excused from naming those
who had subscribed to the fund, lest they be attacked. Ordinarily, those
citizens whose instincts had led them to guarantee the District Attorney
their support, would have been forced to abandon him.

But at San Francisco, a few citizens, in spite of ridicule, abuse,
social ostracism and business opposition, stood firm for civic
righteousness. This made San Francisco's attack upon the "System"
possible and stirred the "System" to extraordinary resistance.

The "System," seeing itself threatened, went to the relief of the
"boss," its agent, whom even its chief beneficiaries despised. The
"boss," through his puppet in the Mayor's chair, declared the office of
the District Attorney vacant, and appointed himself to fill the vacancy.
The boldness of the move startled the whole community. But the act
merely demonstrated the extremes to which the "System" was prepared to
go. It was not extraordinary in comparison with what was to follow.
Later on, witnesses were to be concealed, intimidated, gotten out of the
State; their kidnaping even being attempted. The managing editor of a
newspaper opposing the "System" was to be taken on the street in
daylight, hurried across the country to a suburban town, forced into a
stateroom of an outgoing train, and sent on his way to a distant city.
The home of the pivotal witness against the "System"-protected
defendants was to be dynamited, the witness and other inmates of the
building miraculously escaping with their lives. A public prosecutor
was, while conducting one of the "System"-attacking trials, to be
shot down in open court. A prisoner at the bar was to arise to denounce
the judge on the bench as a partisan and a scoundrel. Thugs were
to invade court-rooms while trials were going on, to intimidate
"System"-threatening prosecutors and witnesses; men were to be trapped
as they offered bribes to trial jurors; agents of the Prosecution were
to be bribed to turn over to the defending element the Prosecution's
papers and reports. An agent of the Prosecution in the employ of the
Defense, working in the interest of the Defense, was to sit at the
Prosecutor's side during the selection of a trial jury, to advise the
Prosecutor of the character of the men under examination for jurors, and
with such advice mislead and confuse.

No; bribe-giving at San Francisco was not so extraordinary as the events
which grew out of attempt to punish for bribe-giving.

And now, as we look upon San Francisco beaten, and retarded in her
development because of that beating, the hopelessness of her opposition
to the "System" is the most startling thing of all. We see now, that
with a District Attorney intent upon doing his duty, with funds ample
for vigorous prosecution guaranteed, with trial judges of integrity and
ability on the bench, none of the accused, so long as he remained loyal
to the "System"--so long as he did not "snitch"--was in real danger of
suffering the law-provided punishment for the crimes uncovered against
him.

Ruef carefully weighed the ability of the Prosecution to save him,
against the power of the "System" to punish or to save, and knowing the
power of the "System" as few other men knew it, Ruef betrayed the
Prosecution and cast his lot with the "System." The outcome would have
justified his judgment but for a series of unusual events which none
could have foreseen. The most extraordinary incident of the whole Graft
Prosecution, we can now, with the "System" uncovered before us, see, was
that Abe Ruef went to the penitentiary. With full knowledge of the
power, resources and methods of the "System," it is not at all
extraordinary that guilty men under its protection should escape
punishment. But it is extraordinary--due only to a chain of
extraordinary happenings--that one of its agents, who continued
faithful, who didn't "snitch," finds himself in prison and unable to get
out.

The San Francisco Graft Prosecution uncovered the "System" as it has
been uncovered in no other American city, for San Francisco made the
hardest, most persistent, and longest continued attack that a
municipality has ever made upon it. California has profited greatly
because of the uncovering, for while uncovered, the "System" may be
proceeded against intelligently, not in the courts, but at the
ballot-box. California has been quick to profit by the opportunity which
the uncovering of the "System" has offered.

In preparing this volume for the press it is my purpose--so far as lies
in my power to do so--_to keep the cover off_.

_FRANKLIN HICHBORN._

Santa Clara, Calif., Dec. 25, 1912.

CHAPTER I.

THE UNION LABOR PARTY MOVEMENT.

Eugene E. Schmitz[1] was elected Mayor of San Francisco in November,
1901. He had been nominated by the Union-Labor party. This party was
organized after labor disturbances which had divided San Francisco into
militant factions, with organized labor on the one side and organized
capital on the other.[2]

The convention which had nominated Schmitz was made up in the main of
delegates who had affiliations with labor unions and were in close
sympathy with the labor-union movement.

But this did not mean that the new party had the unanimous approval of
the labor unions, or of the rank and file of organized labor. A
considerable faction, with P. H. McCarthy, president of the State
Building Trades Council, even then a dominating figure in San Francisco
labor circles, at its head, advised against the movement, and opposed
the new party candidates not only in 1901, but in 1903 when Schmitz was
a candidate for re-election.

On the other hand, the new party had in the beginning the support of the
Coast Seamen's Journal, published at San Francisco, and one of the most
influential labor publications on the Pacific Coast. It had, too, the
advocacy of several earnest Labor leaders.

Very frankly, such leaders questioned the ultimate consequences of the
movement, expressing fears which time was to justify. But to them the
situation offered no alternative. Their support and influence went to
the new party as an expedient of the times, not as the beginning of a
permanent political organization.

But the movement, once started, got beyond their control. During the
first five years of Union-Labor party activities in San Francisco many
of these original supporters were forced, first into silence and finally
into open repudiation of the methods of the Union-Labor party
administration.

In the meantime, members of the McCarthy faction, which had resisted the
organization of the party, and had opposed it at the 1901 and 1903
elections, became its strong partisans. This element supported the party
ticket at the 1905 election; and in 1907, and again in 1909, when
McCarthy was himself the Union-Labor party candidate for Mayor.

But the Union-Labor party ticket which McCarthy headed did not have the
united support of labor leaders who had organized the movement. Indeed,
labor leaders whom the McCarthy faction in 1901 called "scabs" for
organizing the Union-Labor party, were, by the same men who had
condemned them in 1901, denounced as "scabs" during the 1909 campaign
for not supporting the Union-Labor party candidates.

From the beginning, the Union-Labor party had the support of elements
outside the labor-union movement. Much of this support came from
citizens who, regardless of their attitude on trade-unionism, were
dissatisfied with the old parties. The situation offered exceptional
opportunity for the political manipulator. But the one man with the
political vision to see the possibilities of the third-party movement,
was not a member of a labor union. He was a lawyer who had already
attained some prominence in San Francisco politics--Abraham Ruef.[3]

Ruef was quick to see the potentialities of the political Frankenstein
which groping labor leaders had brought into being. He knew that _they_
could not control their creation; he knew that _he_ could. He did not
overestimate his powers. He managed the new party's 1901 campaign.[4]
Under his direction, success was won for a cause that had been deemed
hopeless. The genius of Abraham Ruef made Eugene E. Schmitz Mayor of San
Francisco.[5]

In practical acknowledgment of Ruef's services, Schmitz issued an open
letter, in which he stated himself privileged to consider Ruef his
friendly counsellor.[6] The issuance of that letter made Ruef the
recognized political representative of the Union-Labor party
administration, a position which he held until the estrangement of
himself and Schmitz under the strain of the graft prosecution.[7]

But the government of San Francisco did not pass entirely under control
of the Union-Labor party until four years after Schmitz's elevation to
the Mayoralty.

During the era of Union-Labor party power in San Francisco, the Mayor
and the eighteen members of the Board of Supervisors were elected every
two years.[8] Schmitz, under Ruef's management, was re-elected in 1903.
But the Union-Labor party failed at that election, as it had in 1901,
to elect a majority of the Board of Supervisors. Many of the
commissions, on the other hand, through appointments by the mayor, had,
by 1903, passed completely under Union-Labor party control.

Gradually, the opinion grew in San Francisco that the management of the
departments was unsatisfactory, if not corrupt. This opinion, in 1905,
when Schmitz was for a third time the Union-Labor party candidate for
Mayor, found expression in fusion of the Republican and Democratic
parties to bring about the defeat of the Union-Labor party nominees.

This fusion was in the name of municipal reform. The organizers of the
movement were in the main opposed to machine political methods. When,
however, the movement gave evidence of vitality and strength, the
political agents of public service corporations became identified with
its leadership.[9] The new leaders were soon in practical control.
Public-service corporations were largely instrumental in financing the
movement. Testimony was brought out before the Grand Jury which
conducted the graft investigations, that nearly every public-service
corporation in San Francisco contributed to the fusion fund, the
average of the contributions being $2,500 for each corporation.[10]

On the other hand, the public-service corporations contributed liberally
toward the election of the Ruef-backed, Union-Labor party
candidates.[11] Ruef was already on the pay-roll of the law departments
of many of them. Thus, generally speaking, it made little difference to
the corporations whether the "reform" fusion candidates or the Ruef
Union-Labor party candidates were elected. The corporations had
captained each side, and in a large measure had financed each side.

The inevitable difficulties of a campaign, financed and officered by
public-service corporations, to correct municipal ills for which the
corporations were in large measure responsible, were encountered from
the beginning. For the head of the reform or fusion ticket, men who had
been prominent in the organization of the anti-Ruef crusade were
suggested, only to be rejected by the corporation allies who had after
the reform group's preliminary successes become identified with the
movement.

Finally, after several names had been canvassed, John S. Partridge, an
attorney of good ability, and repute, but scarcely known outside the
immediate circle in which he moved, was agreed upon as Mr. Schmitz's
opponent. Both the Democrat and the Republican party nominated Mr.
Partridge, and with him a complete fusion ticket, including supervisors.

Partridge had a clear field against Schmitz, but his candidacy failed to
carry the confidence, or to awake the enthusiasm which brings success at
the polls.

The Union-Labor administration was openly denounced as corrupt. Francis
J. Heney,[12] fresh from his success in prosecuting the Oregon land
fraud cases, went so far as to declare in a speech before one of the
largest political gatherings ever assembled in San Francisco that he
knew Ruef to be corrupt,[13] and, given opportunity, could prove it.

The public generally believed Heney's charges to be justified. But of
approximately 98,000 registered voters only 68,878 voted for Mayor, and
of these, 40,191 voted for Schmitz. Partridge received only 28,687[14]
votes, being defeated by a majority of 11,504.

Not only was Schmitz re-elected by overwhelming majority, but the entire
Ruef-selected Union-Labor party ticket was elected with him.

Ruef, as Mayor Schmitz's recognized political adviser, and political
agent for the Union-Labor party, found himself in control of every
branch and department of the San Francisco municipal government.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Schmitz, previous to his election, was employed as a musician in
a San Francisco theater. His connection with organized labor
came through membership in the Musicians' Union. He had no
intention of aspiring to the Mayor's chair until Ruef suggested
it to him.

[2] The San Francisco labor strike of 1901 arose out of the refusal
of the organized teamsters to deliver goods to a non-union
express agency. The Employers' Association refused to treat with
the men collectively. Other organizations went out in sympathy.

James D. Phelan, who was then Mayor, was the intermediary
between the teamsters and their employees. He advocated
recognition. The negotiations failed. During the progress of the
strike there were constant disturbances. A steamship company,
for example, employed prizefighters in the guise of workingmen
to seek positions as strikebreakers, and when interfered with to
belabor the pickets. Assaults were made upon non-union teamsters
carrying supplies to and from railway stations. The Chief of
Police, in order to preserve peaceful traffic, placed two
policemen upon each truck. Labor leaders asked not only that the
police be withdrawn from the trucks, but from the waterfront.
This action the Mayor refused to take, on the ground that it was
his duty to preserve public order, and that it was in the
interest of all to avert rather than suppress trouble. A meeting
of representatives of the several factions was held at the
Mayor's office, September 23, 1901. The story was circulated
that the Mayor had said at the meeting that if the workmen did
not want to be clubbed let them go to work. Both sides now admit
the statement was not made. Joseph S. Tobin, Henry U.
Brandenstein, Lawrence J. Dwyer and Peter J. Curtis, who were
present, have set forth in affidavit that "Mayor Phelan did not
say at said conference, as has been alleged, referring to the
workingmen's strike, that 'if they don't want to be clubbed let
them go to work,' nor did he make any statement of like import."
At the time, however, feeling was running so high at San
Francisco that the most extravagant stories were believed.
Opponents of the administration--those representing capital as
well as those advocating recognition of the unions--seized upon
every opportunity to discredit. Crafty adventurers of the type
of Abe Ruef lost no chance to work distrust and confusion. Out
of the turmoil came the Union Labor party.

[3] Ruef graduated from the University of California and from the
University of California law school with exceptional honors. He
was at twenty-one a practicing attorney. With Franklin K. Lane,
the present Secretary of the Interior, Dean John H. Wigmore of
the Northwestern University, and others, he organized a club for
civic reform. His first political convention, he tells us in his
Confessions, showed him that representative government was a
farce. He resolved to devote himself to his law practice. But
almost immediately we find him an "errand boy" for Martin Kelly
and Phil Crimmins, powerful "bosses" in their day, but now
practically forgotten. Ruef continued with Kelly and Crimmins
for ten years. He drifted with the machine, securing excellent
training for his future career. His opportunity came in 1901,
when, in its effort to throw off the yoke of the bosses, the
State secured the enactment of a new primary law. Under this law
Ruef took his first step to secure control of the State
political machine. He seized upon the new law as a vehicle to
organize a "reform" movement. His organization took the name
Republican Primary League. He secured a large following. He was
becoming powerful. He tells us in his Confessions that during
this period he was invited to dine at the homes of men of
political and social importance, among them William F. Herrin,
chief counsel of the Southern Pacific Company, and Patrick
Calhoun, president of the United Railroads. But as yet, Ruef had
little real influence in the "organization." Then came the labor
unrest, and the Union Labor party movement. Ruef managed to
combine the Republican Primary League with the Union Labor party
movement. This combination was the basis of his campaign for the
election of Schmitz.

[4] Ruef also provided much of the funds employed in the first
Schmitz campaign. In a statement published May 16, 1907, Ruef
said: "When Schmitz first ran for Mayor I made his campaign for
him, and put up $16,000. My friends told me I was a fool. I
guess I was."

[5] Out of the 52,168 votes cast for Mayor, at the 1901 election,
Schmitz received 21,776. His opponents--Wells (Republican) and
Tobin (Democrat)--divided 30,392 between them, Wells receiving
17,718 and Tobin 12,674. Up to the present time (1914) the
Union-Labor party has four times been successful in San
Francisco mayoralty elections. But only once, in 1905, has its
candidate been elected by majority vote. Changes in the San
Francisco Charter, ratified at the 1911 session of the State
Legislature, place the election of municipal officials on a
non-partisan basis, and prevent election by plurality vote.
Henceforth all officials must be elected by majority vote.

[6] Schmitz's letter announcing his obligation to Ruef was as
follows:

"My Dear Ruef: Now that the election is over and I am to be
the Mayor of our native city, I wish to express to you and
through you to all your loyal friends and the faithful
Republicans who supported my cause, my profound appreciation
of the generous, whole-souled, substantial and effective
support accorded me in the exciting campaign which has just
closed. Viewed from your prominent position in the Republican
party, I know the seriousness of the step which you took when
you voluntarily and unconditionally offered me your valuable
aid, and I cannot in words properly give utterance to my deep
feeling in this regard. I can only say that your action is
worthy of yourself, and that no higher praise can be accorded
you.

"I have now for some fifteen years enjoyed your acquaintance
and friendship and your services as my attorney in many
capacities, and I say without hesitation or flattery that I
have yet to find a more honorable, a more loyal, a more able
attorney, or a truer friend.

"I feel that I owe a great deal of my success in this
campaign to you and your friends, and I shall not permit
myself at any time to forget it.

"Though you have never asked or even suggested it, I shall,
with the utmost confidence and with a sentiment of absolute
security, feel myself privileged at all times to consider you
as my friendly counsellor and to call upon you whenever I may
require assistance in the solution of any of the perplexing
and complicated questions which must necessarily arise in the
conduct of so vast and important an office.

"I trust that you will not hesitate to say that I may do so.
Again and again thanking you and your friends, I am,

"Very sincerely yours,
"E. E. SCHMITZ."

[7] Ruef at once availed himself of the opportunities which his
position offered. He accepted regular "retainers" from
public-service corporations. He testified before the Grand Jury
that he was employed by the United Railroads through Tirey L.
Ford, just after the first election of Schmitz, at $500 per
month, and that he gave receipts to Ford for this money, during
Schmitz's first term of office, but received the money always in
Ford's office in currency; but that after the second election of
Schmitz, he (Ruef) refused to give any more receipts for this
money, although he continued to receive it from Ford the same as
before with receipts, and that after the third election his
salary was increased to $1,000 per month, which was paid in the
same way by Ford without any receipts.

Ruef further testified that he was employed by the Pacific
States Telephone and Telegraph Company, immediately after
Schmitz's first election, through T. V. Halsey, and that Halsey
paid him $1,200 per month in currency without any receipt.

E. S. Pillsbury, general counsel of the Pacific States Telephone
and Telegraph Company, testified that he never heard of Ruef's
employment until after the indictments were returned against
Halsey, and that he, Pillsbury, attended to all of the legal
business of the company during the entire time Ruef was under
employment. Pillsbury received only $1,000 per month for his own
services, and testified that he would have objected to the
payment to Ruef of a larger salary than he was getting.

Pillsbury was a stockholder to the amount of $500,000 in his own
right, and was a member of the executive committee of the board
of directors of the company.

At the trial of The People vs. Tirey L. Ford, No. 817, I. W.
Hellman, one of the most prominent of California bankers and at
one time a director of the United Railroads, testified: "Some
five years ago (the Ford trial was in 1907, which would make the
date about 1902) Mr. Holland, who was then the president of the
United Railways, came to me to ask my advice whether Mr. Ruef
should be employed as an attorney for the United Railways,
stating that by employing him peace could be secured with the
labor unions, that he had great influence with them, and there
would be general peace, and it was to the benefit of the
railways company to have such peace. Mr. Ruef then was an
attorney of high repute, recognized as a good lawyer, and I said
if that could be accomplished it would be for the benefit of the
railway company as well as for the public, and I advised yes.
Whether he has been employed or not I do not know, because I
afterward sold my interest in the company and I never have
inquired whether he had been employed or not."

In this connection, it is interesting to note that Ruef in his
latest confession, the publication of which was begun in the San
Francisco Bulletin in May, 1912, states that his employment by
corporations as attorney did not begin until after the second
Schmitz election--that is to say, in 1903. Hellman's testimony
would indicate that his employment by the United Railroads dates
from 1902. Compare with footnote 77, page 74.

[8] Under amendments to the San Francisco Charter, ratified by the
Legislature of 1911, the Mayor and Supervisors are now elected
to four-year terms.

[9] George F. Hatton, Southern Pacific lobbyist and politician, and
political manager for United States Senator George C. Perkins,
was one of the principal leaders of the 1905 "reform" movement.
He was at one time retained as an attorney by the Empire
Construction Company, affiliated with the Home Telephone
Company, which was seeking a franchise to establish a telephone
system in San Francisco in competition with the Pacific States
Telephone and Telegraph Company. The Home Telephone Company
contributed to the "reform" campaign fund. Through the "reform"
Board of Supervisors, who were to be elected, and whose campaign
was thus financed, the Home Company was to get its franchise.
But the "reform" candidates were defeated, the Schmitz-Ruef
Union-Labor party candidates were elected. The Home Telephone
Company thereupon proceeded to secure its franchise by employing
Ruef.

[10] William Thomas, of the law firm of Thomas, Gerstle & Frick,
attorneys for the Home Telephone Company, testified before the
Grand Jury that his company had contributed $8,000 to the
"reform" campaign fund. The testimony indicated that this money
was used at the primaries. Louis Sloss, one of the leaders of
the "reform" movement, testified that after the primaries,
Detweiler, who was at the head of the Home Telephone Company
enterprise, sent his personal check for $800 additional.
Fairfax H. Wheelan, one of the leaders of the "reform"
movement, testified before the Grand Jury that the Pacific
States Telephone and Telegraph Company, in the name of T. V.
Halsey, subscribed $2,000 to the fund; and the United
Railroads, concealing its identity under the name "Cash,"
$2,000 more.

[11] Dr. Charles Boxton was one of the Union-Labor party Supervisors
elected in 1905. At the second trial of Louis Glass,
vice-president of the Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph
Company, for bribery, Boxton testified that during the
campaign, T. V. Halsey, political agent for the company, met
him on the street and gave him a sealed envelope, saying: "If
that will be of any use to you use it."

Boxton found the envelope to contain $1,000 in United States
currency.

[12] Francis J. Heney when five years old went to San Francisco with
his parents. He was educated at the public schools of that
city, the University of California, and Hastings Law School.
After being admitted to practice he lived for a time in
Arizona, where he served as Attorney-General. On his return to
San Francisco in 1895, he confined himself to civil practice
until, at the solicitation of United States Attorney-General
Knox, he undertook the prosecution of the Oregon Land Fraud
cases. He was at the close of successful prosecution of these
cases, when invited by Rudolph Spreckels, Phelan and others, to
participate in the prosecution of the San Francisco graft
cases.

[13] Heney's statement was prophetic. The published account of his
speech (see Chronicle, November 6, 1905) was as follows:

"If I had control of the District Attorney's office, I would
indict Abe Ruef for felony and send him to the penitentiary,
where he belongs, for I have personal knowledge that he is
corrupt.

"If you elect these people, the graft of this city will become
so great that the citizens of San Francisco will ask me to come
back and prosecute him. When the time comes I will do as the
people request as a matter of civic duty."

Heney's charge brought caustic reply from Ruef. In an open
letter to Heney, published November 7, 1905, Ruef said:

"Francis J. Heney:--In the published reports of your speech at
Mechanics Pavilion last Saturday night you are represented as
saying: 'I say to you, moreover, that I personally know that
Abraham Ruef is corrupt, and I say to you that whenever he
wants me to prove it in court I will do so.'

"I am not a candidate for office, but as a man I do not propose
to leave your false statement undenied.

"In the past I have paid little attention to anything said by
hostile papers concerning myself, feeling that the public fully
understood the despicable motives underlying the utterances of
their proprietors. In your case a different situation presents
itself. You have recently acquired considerable repute as a
prosecuting attorney for the United States Government. Your
statements, if unchallenged, may be given some credence by
those not familiar with the true condition of affairs.

"In making the statement that you personally know that I am
corrupt you lied. You cannot personally know that which does
not exist.

"In making the statement at a time and place which allowed no
opportunity for a legal showing before the date of the election
which you seek to influence, you showed the same courage which
put a bullet into the body of Dr. J. C. Handy of Tucson, Ariz.,
in 1891, for whose killing you were indicted for murder, and
upon trial were acquitted because you were the only witness to
the deed.

"You say whenever I want you to prove it in court you will do
so.

"I want you to try to prove it, and at once. I demand that you
begin at once. I know you cannot prove what does not exist. Why
you should wait upon my desire, why you should depend upon my
wish to proceed with the performance of what must be to every
good citizen a public duty, I do not know.

"But as you declare that you will proceed only with my consent,
I give you here and now full consent and authority to proceed,
and I go further and ask that you do so.

"I regret that your recent identification with the Citizens'
Alliance and with the corporations anxious to encompass the
defeat of a candidate in a political campaign should have made
you so far forget the regard for truth, justice and decency
which should characterize men in our profession, as to have
induced you to take the chance of ruining for life the
reputation and standing of one who is not rightfully amenable
to your charge, and who has not otherwise heretofore given you
the slightest private or personal provocation for your savage
and mendacious attack.

"A. RUEF.
"San Francisco, November 6th."

[14] To hold that only 28,687 electors of San Francisco wished a
change in the administration of San Francisco would be unjust.
Many who were opposed to Ruef's domination remained away from
the polls, through dissatisfaction with the management of the
fusion movement. Of the more than 40,000 who voted for the
Union Labor ticket, were thousands of union men who were
opposed to the Schmitz-Ruef element. But Ruef cleverly injected
the Citizens' Alliance issue, and the organized labor element
was, because of this, made to vote practically solidly for the
Ruef-selected candidates. The fact that voting machines were
used in every precinct in San Francisco for the first time
contributed to this. Members of labor unions did not understand
the working of the machines, and were afraid to attempt to vote
anything but the straight ticket. This dissatisfied organized
labor element, two years later, contributed in no small degree
to the election of Mayor E. R. Taylor and the re-election of
District Attorney William H. Langdon, thereby making possible
continuation until 1910 of the graft prosecution.

CHAPTER II.

THE RUEF BOARD OF SUPERVISORS.

No observer of San Francisco politics, not even Ruef himself, had
expected the entire Union-Labor party ticket to be elected. The election
of the Supervisors was the greatest surprise of all. Ruef, with his
political intimates, had selected the Supervisorial candidates, but more
with a view to hold the organized labor vote for Schmitz than with idea
of the fitness of the candidates for the duties involved in managing the
affairs of a municipality of 500,000 population.[15] Not one of the
eighteen elected was a man of strong character.[16] Several were of
fair, but by no means exceptional ability. Of this type were Gallagher,
an attorney of some prominence who acted as go-between between Ruef and
the Supervisors; Wilson, who was a sort of second man to Gallagher, and
Boxton, a dentist.

But for the most part they were men who had led uneventful lives as
drivers of delivery wagons, bartenders and clerks. Without an exception,
they saw in their unexpected elevation to the Board of Supervisors
opportunity to better their condition. Some of them would not, perhaps,
have sought bribes; few of them knew just how they could employ their
office to their best advantage; but from the hour of their election the
idea of personal advancement was uppermost in the minds of the majority
of the members of the Schmitz-Ruef Board of Supervisors.[17] Their
ignorance of the requirements of their office, their failure to
appreciate their large responsibilities, and above all their ill-defined
ambitions made them promise of easy prey for the agents of the
public-service corporations, who were playing for special privileges
worth millions.

None realized this better than Ruef. From the beginning, he recognized
that the likelihood of individual members of the board yielding to
temptation to petty gain[18] threatened his own larger purposes. He let
it be known that he would himself personally prosecute any one of them
whom he discovered to be "grafting." Ruef was emphatic in his position
that the Supervisors should have no financial dealings with those
seeking special-privilege advantages. He even defined regular procedure
for dealing with persons and corporations that might elect to catch the
easiest way to accomplish their purposes by the use of bribe money. To
this end he arranged:

(1) That Supervisor James L. Gallagher[19] should represent him on the
board. The Supervisors at once accepted Gallagher, and dealt with him
as Ruef's recognized agent.

(2) Finally Ruef arranged for a regular weekly caucus[20] to be held
each Sunday night, on the eve of the regular meeting day of the board,
Monday.

The public was not admitted to these caucuses. Those who were admitted
were Ruef, Mayor Schmitz, George B. Keane,[21] clerk of the Board of
Supervisors, who also acted as secretary of the caucus, and the eighteen
Supervisors.

At these meetings, which were held every Sunday evening, Ruef was the
dominating figure. Supervisor Wilson, testifying at the graft trials,
stated that Ruef took the position of "chief counsel and adviser for the
board in matters that were to come before the board."

Keane, as secretary of the caucus, took full notes[22] of the
proceedings and sent written notices[23] of the meetings to each of
those who were admitted.

The first of these caucuses was held shortly before the Schmitz-Ruef
board took office. The organization of the board was provided by the
Supervisors authorizing Ruef and Schmitz to make up the committees. Ruef
undertook the task. He prepared the committee lists, and submitted his
selections to Schmitz and Gallagher. Schmitz and Gallagher suggested
unimportant changes. The committees were then announced to the
Supervisors at the next caucus. There were objections raised, but these
objections, with one exception, were denied in all important
particulars. The organization of the Schmitz-Ruef Board of Supervisors
was thus perfected.

Ruef's way seemed clear. The committee organization of the Board of
Supervisors was his own. The Supervisors were to hold no open meeting
until they had met with him in secret caucus to ascertain his wishes.
The official clerk of the board, who was also secretary of the caucus,
was his tried henchman. Gallagher, the ablest of the Supervisors,
flattered at being made his representative, and further bound by
mercenary ties, was ready to do his slightest bidding. And never had
entrenched boss more fruitful field for exploitation.

But scarcely had the new administration been installed, than a weak
point developed in Ruef's position. District Attorney William H.
Langdon, who had been elected on the Ruef ticket, gave evidence that he
proposed to enforce the law, regardless of the effect upon the
administration of which he was a part, or upon Ruef's plans and
interests.

The first intimation the public had of Langdon's independent attitude
came when gambling games in which Ruef was popularly supposed to be
interested were raided under the personal direction of the District
Attorney. Langdon had first attempted to close the places through the
police department. Failing, he had attended to the matter himself.[24]
The gamblers appealed to Ruef, but Ruef was helpless. Langdon would not
be turned from his purpose. The gamblers and capitalists interested in
gambling establishments charged Langdon with political ingratitude.

But those who were laboring for the development, and were opposing the
exploitation of San Francisco, saw in Langdon's course the first sign
that Abraham Ruef was not to have undisputed sway in San Francisco.[25]
With Langdon in the District Attorney's office it was still possible
that the laws could be enforced--even against Abraham Ruef. The raiding
of the gambling dens marked the beginning of the division in San
Francisco, with those who approached the Ruef administration with bribe
money on the one side, and those who resisted with the check of law
enforcement on the other.

FOOTNOTES:

[15] At Ruef's trial for offering a bribe to Supervisor Furey,
Supervisor James L. Gallagher testified that conferences for
selecting the Union Labor party ticket, from Sheriff down, were
held at Ruef's office. Gallagher testified of one of these
conferences:

"The matter of the nominees for Supervisors was mentioned, and all
that I recollect about it is that it was stated that there
should be a good representation of prominent Union-Labor men on
the ticket, and Mr. Ruef stated that he had that in mind, and
that that would be done, and it was also stated that the members
on the Board of Supervisors that were Union-Labor adherents
should be nominated." See The People vs. Abraham Ruef, No.
1437--Transcript on Appeal, Part 3, Vol. 3, page 1278.

[16] The eighteen members of the Ruef-Schmitz Board of Supervisors
were James L. Gallagher, attorney at law; Cornelius J.
Harrigan, grocer; James T. Kelly, piano polisher; Thomas F.
Lonergan, driver of a bakery delivery wagon; Max Mamlock,
electrician; P. M. McGushin, saloonkeeper; F. P. Nicholas,
carpenter; Jennings J. Phillips, employed in newspaper
circulation department; L. A. Rea, painter; W. W. Sanderson,
employed in grocery store; E. I. Walsh, shoemaker; Andrew M.
Wilson, employing drayman; George Duffey, contracting plumber;
Charles Boxton, dentist; M. W. Coffey, hackman; Daniel G.
Coleman, clerk; Sam Davis, orchestra musician; John J. Furey,
blacksmith and saloonkeeper.

At the time the graft prosecution opened, Wilson had resigned
his position as Supervisor to take up his work as State
Railroad Commissioner, an office to which he was elected in
1906; and Duffey to be president of the Municipal Commission of
Public Works, to which office he was appointed by Mayor
Schmitz.

[17] Supervisor E. I. Walsh in a sworn statement made to Heney,
March 8, 1907, testified:

"Q. And what was agreed upon there (in caucus) as to programme?
A. I couldn't say what was agreed upon with them.

"Q. Wasn't it arranged that every man should be treated alike
as to money? A. It wasn't openly suggested that way; it might
have been said among the members that way.

"Q. That was the understanding you had. A. Yes, sir.

"Q. That you would be all treated equally and fairly? A. I
presume that was the way it was understood."

Supervisor Lonergan had been promised by Supervisor Wilson
$8000 for voting to give the United Railroads a permit to
operate its lines under the trolley system. At a second meeting
Wilson stated the amount would be $1000 only. Of the scene on
this occasion, Lonergan testified at the trial in the case of
the People vs. Ford. No. 817:

"Q. What did he (Wilson) say on that occasion? A. There was
only $4000 in it for me.

"Q. What did you say. A. I asked him what the hell kind of work
that was and what did he mean by it. And he shook his head and
said that if I didn't like it, all right; something to that
effect."

[18] Evidence of Ruef's distrust of his Supervisors was brought out
at many points in the graft trials. When he discovered that
individual Supervisors were, without his knowledge, taking
bribes from the Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Company,
he stated to Dr. Joseph S. Poheim:

"I see they have been trying to take my Supervisors away from
me, but I have fixed them; I would like to see one of them
throw me down." (See Transcript, People vs. Ruef, 1437, Part 3,
Vol. 9, p. 4018.) In the midst of the troubles brought upon him
by the graft prosecution, Ruef complained that "These fellows
(the Supervisors) would eat the paint off a house, and in order
to hold them together I had to descend to their level and take
them in with me."

Ruef was also jealous of Schmitz's activity. When he learned
that Schmitz had promised franchises independent of him, he
directed Supervisor Wilson to oppose them. "Butt in on this
Parkside business," he said to Wilson. "Mr. Schmitz has
promised the Ocean Shore and the Parkside; he is destroying my
political influence; these people ought to be made to come and
see me."

[19] Gallagher was by far the ablest member of the Ruef-Schmitz
Board of Supervisors. He was by profession an attorney at law.
In that capacity he had served first as Assistant City
Attorney, and finally as City Attorney. For a time he was law
partner with Hon. James G. Maguire, whose opposition, as member
of Congress from California, to the Pacific railroads refunding
measures, won him a national reputation. Maguire was candidate
for Governor on the Democratic ticket in 1898, but was
defeated. Gallagher had served as Supervisor previous to his
election in 1905, and was one of the most experienced members
of the Schmitz-Ruef board.

At Ruef's trial on the charge of offering a bribe to Supervisor
Furey, Gallagher testified that soon after his election in
1905, Ruef told him there would be a number of matters coming
before the Board of Supervisors in which the corporations and
other large concerns would be interested; that there would be a
number of large deals coming before the board in which he
wanted him (Gallagher) to represent him on the board. Gallagher
accepted the agency.

[20] Gallagher testified before the Oliver Grand Jury of the nature
of these caucuses. From his testimony the following is taken:

"Q. They (the Supervisors) voted in the caucus and you knew how
the vote would be. A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And they would be bound by the caucus vote. A. That was
understood that a man would vote at the caucus in the way he
would vote at the meeting.

"Q. You were understood to represent Mr. Ruef and Mr. Ruef's
views. A. That was generally understood by members of the
board.

"Q. And whatever way you went meant programme. A. I believe Mr.
Ruef told a number of them so, and that circulated among the
others; it was generally understood by them."

[21] Keane's lasting loyalty to Ruef makes him one of the most
interesting characters of the graft cases. He entered Ruef's
employ in 1898 as a law clerk. He remained in Ruef's office
until January, 1902, when Mayor Schmitz took office. Keane was
then made secretary to the Mayor. He served in that capacity
until January, 1906, when Ruef gained control of the Board of
Supervisors. Ruef then made him clerk of the board. At Ruef's
trial for offering a bribe to Supervisor Furey, Gallagher
testified that Ruef told him that Keane should be clerk.
Gallagher notified the other members of Ruef's decision, and
that closed the incident. Keane was, however, much more than a
mere clerk. Supervisor Wilson testified at the Ruef trial for
offering a bribe to Furey, that he (Wilson) owed his nomination
to Keane. Keane was elected to the State Senate where his
loyalty to Ruef in foul as well as fair weather made him a
conspicuous and somewhat notorious character. At present
writing, Keane is foremost in the movement to bring about
Ruef's release from State prison.

[22] At Ruef's trial on the charge of offering a bribe to Supervisor
Furey, Keane testified that these notes had been destroyed in
the great fire of April 18-19-20, 1906. Keane testified further
that Ruef was a constant attendant at the caucuses; that
Schmitz was an occasional visitor; that Supervisor Gallagher
presided.

[23] Notices of the caucus meetings were sent to Ruef precisely as
though he had been a member of the Board of Supervisors. At
Ruef's trial for offering a bribe to Supervisor Furey, the
following letter of notification was introduced as evidence:

"San Francisco, June 21st, 1906.

"Hon. A. Ruef, San Francisco--Dear Sir: I respectfully beg
leave to notify you that the Board of Supervisors will meet in
caucus on Sunday evening, June 24th, at 8 o'clock p. m., at
Hamilton Hall, Steiner street, near Geary. Your attendance is
respectfully requested.

"Yours truly, GEORGE B. KEANE, Clerk."

[24] The San Francisco Chronicle in its issue of March 8, 1906, said
of the District Attorney's raids on the gamblers:

"The political push and the underworld generally are astonished
at District Attorney Langdon's unexpected outbreak. He has
descended upon them like a thunderbolt out of a clear sky. For
the moment even wrath is less in evidence than surprise. It was
not expected. It is not what was paid for. It is like being
murdered by one's dearest friend. There is a complete reversal
of the usual experience of mankind. In most cities the lid is
on and weighed down before election but lifted and thrown away
as soon as the votes are counted. To be allowed to run wide
open before election and to be closed down and nailed up as
soon as the new official is fairly seated is outside of all
precedent. And all that after the most liberal contributions.
There is a feeling in criminal circles that somebody is guilty
of obtaining money under false pretenses. The District Attorney
is the one official for whose friendship the lawbreakers have
the most earnest longings, and behind their closed doors the
idle gamblers are trying to figure out what 'lay' this dreadful
Langdon is really on, and by what trade he has been induced to
ignore all the promises expressed or implied, which those
assumed to be able to speak for him dispersed so freely when
votes were in demand.

"As for the public, it was for none of these things. Among the
decent portion of society the 'motives' of the District
Attorney do not arouse even passing curiosity. What does
interest them is the present vigor of his work, and the
probability of his keeping it up."

[25] Ruef had consented to Langdon's nomination for District
Attorney, because he considered that Langdon's intimate
acquaintance with the teachers and pupils of the San Francisco
public schools would help the ticket. For the three years
preceding the campaign Langdon had been Superintendent of
Schools at San Francisco. Ruef told Langdon after the election
that he had no idea that any one other than Schmitz could be
elected on the Union-Labor party ticket that year. When during
the campaign Langdon began to develop strength in the contest
for District Attorney, Ruef sent him a check for $200 for
"campaign expenses," saying that the money had been contributed
by Tirey L. Ford of the United Railroads. Langdon returned the
check to Ruef with the statement that he preferred to pay his
own campaign expenses. During the campaign at every meeting he
addressed, Langdon made the statement: "The laws are on the
statute books; all may know them. I pledge myself to the
enforcement of these laws." To be sure, few if any paid much
attention to what Langdon meant, but that was no fault of
Langdon's. Everybody was to learn from the hour that he assumed
the duties of his office that he meant just what he said.
Rudolph Spreckels testified at the Calhoun trial that when
Langdon's raids on the gambling dens were made public he felt
that "we had a District Attorney who was desirous of doing his
duty." The raids were made in February, 1906. Spreckels, Heney,
Phelan, Older and others were already considering plans for the
exposure and check of the reign of Ruef.

CHAPTER III.

THE SAN FRANCISCO RUEF RULED.

The decade ending 1910 was for California an era of extraordinary
enterprise and development. A third transcontinental railroad, the
Western Pacific, was completed; vast land-holdings as large as 40,000
acres in a body were cut up into small tracts and sold to settlers;
waters brought to the land by vast irrigation enterprises increased the
land's productiveness three and even ten fold; petroleum fields,
enormously rich, were opened up and developed; the utilization of the
falling waters of mountain streams to generate electric power, brought
cheap light and power and heat to farm as well as to city factory. The
Spanish war had brought thousands of troops to the coast. Practically
all of them passed through San Francisco. This particular activity had
its influence on local conditions. The State's population increased from
1,485,053 in 1900 to 2,377,549 in 1910.

Up to the time of the San Francisco fire, April 18, 1906, San Francisco,
of the cities of the State, profited most by this development. San
Francisco bank clearances, for example, increased from $1,029,582,594.78
for the year ending December 31, 1900, to $1,834,549,788.51 for the year
ending December 31, 1905, a gain of 80 per cent.

San Francisco's increase in population during those five years, can, of
course, only be estimated. On the basis of the registration for the
1905 municipal election, approximately 98,000, San Francisco had, at the
time of the 1906 disaster, a population of about 500,000, an increase
from the population of 342,782 shown by the 1900 census of practically
50 per cent. in five years.[26]

The rapid increase in population, the sustained prosperity of the
community, and its prospective development made San Francisco one of the
most promising fields for investment in the country.

The public service corporations were quick to take advantage of the San
Francisco opportunity. Those corporations already established sought to
strengthen their position; new corporations strove for foothold in the
promising field. Thus, we find the Home Telephone Company, financed by
Ohio and Southern California capitalists, seeking a franchise to operate
a telephone system in opposition to the Pacific States Telephone and
Telegraph Company, which was already established. And we find the
Pacific States Company taking active part in municipal politics to
prevent the Home franchise or any other opposition telephone franchise
being granted. The corporation holding the light and power monopoly,
the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, had by the time of the third
Schmitz inaugural, practical control of the San Francisco field. But
it was face to face with a clamor for reduction of gas rates. The
company was charging one dollar a thousand for gas. The Union-Labor
party platform of 1905 pledged the Board of Supervisors to a
seventy-five-cents-per-thousand rate.

Another matter of tremendous importance to the growing municipality was
that of the supply of water. The Spring Valley Water Company had a
monopoly of this necessity, but demand for municipal water to be brought
from the Sierras was strong. A committee of experts had been appointed
to pass upon the various sources of supply. Ruef appeared before them as
spokesman for the Supervisors. The experts resigned when it was made
clear to them that instead of being permitted to make an adequate study
of all available sources of supply they were to report upon the Bay
Cities project alone.[27] After the ousting of the Schmitz-Ruef
administration the Bay Cities project was ignored and bonds authorized
to bring water from Hetch-Hetchy valley. The Spring Valley Water
Company, however, has been successful in blocking this project, and in
1914, San Francisco seems almost as far away from realizing her ambition
for a supply of pure water as in 1905-6 when Ruef and his followers were
at the height of their power.

The public-service problem which was attracting the most attention at
the time of the great fire, was that of street-car transportation. The
principal lines had passed into the hands of the United Railroads.[28]
The corporation had, at the time of Schmitz's election in 1905,
practically a monopoly of the San Francisco street-car service.

The company's principal lines were operated by the cable system. But
fully five years before the fire, all traction officials as well as the
general public, recognized that San Francisco had outgrown the cable
road. It was admitted that electric lines must be substituted for the
cable, but there was sharp division as to the character of the electric
lines which should be installed. The officials of the United Railroads
proposed the overhead trolley method of propulsion; the public, so far
as it could find expression, declared for the underground conduit
system.[29] In taking this position, the public was in reality backing
up the municipal engineers, who had been sent to Eastern States to
investigate electric transportation systems, and who had found in favor
of the conduit and against the trolley.[30]

The San Francisco Merchants' Association, however, apparently
dissatisfied with the reports of the engineers employed by the
municipality, employed Mr. William Barclay Parsons to report on the
relative merits of the trolley and the conduit systems.

Mr. Parsons took issue with the city's engineers, and recommended the
trolley as against the conduit.[31] The directors of the Merchants'
Association thereupon declared for the trolley system.

Criticism of this action of the directors was followed by submission of
the question to a referendum vote of the Association membership. The
members voted in opposition to the directors, declaring against the
trolley and for the conduit.[32]

But the most determined opposition to the installation of the trolley
system came from improvement clubs, whose purpose was to promote the
best development of San Francisco.

Prominent among these organizations were the Improvement and Adornment
Association,[33] the Sutter Street Improvement Club[34] and the Pacific
Avenue Improvement Club. The membership of these organizations
consisted of some of the largest owners of San Francisco properties. The
leaders were comparatively young men, natives of San Francisco, whose
interests were inseparably wrapped up in the community, and who aimed
to promote the best possible development of the city of their birth and
fortunes.

Prominent in this group were Rudolph Spreckels[35] and James D.
Phelan,[36] rated among the heaviest property-owners of San Francisco.
These men were ready to join with the United Railroads in any plan which
proposed the highest development of the street-car service.[37] On the
other hand, they were prepared to oppose any attempt to exploit the
service to the detriment of San Francisco.[38]

A conference of the directors of the Improvement and Adornment
Association with officials of the United Railroads was finally
arranged.[39] The meetings were held in March, 1906, less than a month
before the great fire. There were, before the attempted adjustment was
abandoned, several sessions.

The citizens urged Patrick Calhoun, president of the United Railroads,
to give up his trolley design for Market and Sutter streets. As a
compromise, he substantially agreed to build the underground conduit as
far as Powell on Sutter, and as far as Valencia on Market, picking up
the trolley on Valencia, McAllister, Hayes and Haight streets. The
Adornment Committee directors wanted the conduit system on Sutter street
extended as far as possible, and held out for Van Ness avenue. Calhoun
would not consent to install the conduit beyond Powell.

In the midst of this deadlock, the San Francisco Chronicle published
what purported to be reports of the several conferences. Up to that time
there had been no publication of the meetings.

Following the Chronicle publication, Calhoun, in a letter to members of
the Adornment Association, declared the information contained in the
Chronicle article to be inaccurate,[40] and offered to let the people
decide whether they wanted a conduit system on Market street to
Valencia, and on Sutter street to Powell, or a uniform all-trolley
system throughout the city.

Mr. Calhoun's suggestion seemed reasonable until he stated in an
interview that by the people he meant the Board of Supervisors.

He was asked how he proposed to ascertain the wishes of the people.

"I should suggest," he is reported as replying, "that the matter be
referred to the decision of the Board of Supervisors. The Board of
Supervisors is a public body selected by the people, and represents the
ideas and wishes of the people of the city."

The reply was not well received. The Supervisors were even then under
suspicion of corruption. Less than a fortnight before, March 10, the
Examiner had called the board's action on an ordinance which was
supported by the Home Telephone Company "suspicious," and had stated
that the board had "made the mistake of acting as a bribed Board of
Supervisors would have acted."[41]

Later on, the Supervisors themselves confessed to having been bribed to
grant the telephone franchise. The public, not at all blind to what was
going on, believed, even at the time Mr. Calhoun made his suggestion,
although there was no proof, that the Supervisors had been bribed.

San Francisco was opposed to any plan that would put trolley cars on the
city's best streets. Submission of the issue to the people would have
been popular. Mr. Calhoun's proposal that it be left to the Supervisors
was met with suspicion, and open distrust of Mr. Calhoun's motives.

In answer to the criticism which Mr. Calhoun's suggestion had aroused,
Mr. Calhoun, in a second letter to the Adornment Association, withdrew
his offer to submit the question to the people, and announced the
intention of his company to proceed with preparation of a plan for a
uniform trolley system to be installed wherever the grades would
permit.[42]

This second letter was made public in March, 1906, less than a month
before the fire. The position taken by the United Railroads was
generally condemned.[43] But the opposition took more practical form
than mere denunciation. A group of capitalists, headed by Claus
Spreckels, father of Rudolph Spreckels, Rudolph Spreckels and James D.
Phelan, announced their intention to organize a street-railroad company,
to demonstrate the practicability of operating electric cars in San
Francisco, under the conduit system.

The plan was given immediate endorsement both by press and general
public. The project was explained in detail to Mayor Schmitz, who in a
published statement gave the enterprise his unqualified approval.[44]
But when the incorporators sought further interview with Mayor Schmitz,
they found themselves unable to secure a hearing.

The company, under the name of the Municipal Street Railways of San
Francisco, was formed with Claus Spreckels, James D. Phelan, George
Whittell, Rudolph Spreckels and Charles S. Wheeler as incorporators. The
capital stock of the company was fixed at $14,000,000. Of this,
$4,500,000 was subscribed, ten per cent. of which, $450,000, was paid
over to the treasurer.[45]

With this $450,000 an experimental line, under the conduit system, was
to be built on Bush street.[46]

The articles of incorporation provided that the franchises acquired
under them should contain provisions for the acquisition by the City and
County of San Francisco of the roads thus built.[47]

The new company filed its articles of incorporation with the Secretary
of State at Sacramento on April 17, 1906.

In the early morning of the day following, April 18, came the San
Francisco earthquake and fire. For the moment the public forgot all
differences in the common disaster. But the lines of division between
exploiter and builder could not be wiped out, not even by the
destruction of the city. The contest, which had, without any one
realizing its full significance, been fast coming to a head before the
fire, was to take definite shape after the disaster.

FOOTNOTES:

[26] Patrick Calhoun, in a letter to the press, dated March 21,
1906--less than a month before the great fire--stated that the
time was near when the San Francisco street-car system would
have to serve a million people. The 1910 census, taken four
years after the fire, gave San Francisco a population of
416,912.

[27] Ruef testified before the Grand Jury that the water deal would
have been the most important pulled off by the Board of
Supervisors. He testified that he had told Gallagher to tell
the members of the Board there would be more money in it than
had been received in any other deal. Ruef gave Gallagher to
understand that the amount to be divided would be as much as
$1,000,000.

[28] The United Railroads was controlled by Eastern capital. Before
the entrance of the United Railroads into the San Francisco
field, California capital had dominated in purely local public
utilities.

[29] The public's opposition to the overhead trolley system was that
the poles and wires would be a disfigurement of what were
regarded as the best streets; that the wires were dangerous,
and would interfere with the work of firemen in fighting fires;
that San Francisco was as much entitled as Washington and New
York to the best system. Rudolph Spreckels at the trial of
Patrick Calhoun for offering a bribe, testified as to his own
opposition:

"I believed that the overhead trolley was unsightly; that it
increased the risk of fire; that it was dangerous; that it was
noisy and unsightly. I believed from my own observation of the
operation of the underground conduit system in other cities
that it was preferable, that it was more sightly, just as
rapid, and in every way more in keeping with a city of the size
and importance of San Francisco. Having been born here, and
having large property interests I felt it my duty, as I always
have, and hope I always shall, to protect the interests of this
community and to protect the interests of its citizens and its
property owners. That was my purpose in opposing that franchise
and that grant."

[30] As early as 1901, C. E. Grunsky, at that time City Engineer,
was directed by the Board of Supervisors to gather data on the
operation of electric roads under the conduit system. Grunsky's
findings were to the effect that conduit-electric roads were
rapidly replacing other types of street railroads.

The city also employed J. C. H. Stutt as consulting engineer,
and sent him to New York and Washington to inspect and report
upon the conduit systems in operation in those cities.

He reported that the system was giving satisfaction in both
cities, and in many cases was being substituted for the
trolley. Engineer Stutt in comparing the two systems said:

"As between the overhead system and the conduit-electric
system, it is natural for private corporations to prefer the
overhead trolley system on account of the first cost of roadbed
construction, which is more than twice as great for the conduit
system. The conduit system leaves the street open with the view
unobstructed by poles, conductors, feed, guard and supporting
wires and without the menace to the public and especially to
the firemen, always inherent in the bare overhead electric
conductor."

This report was widely quoted during the
overhead-trolley-conduit agitation that was a feature of a
greater part of Mayor Schmitz's administrations.

[31] Mr. Parsons found for the overhead trolley on the following
general grounds:

(1) That a uniform system was necessary.

(2) That the lines must be extended to the suburbs.

(3) That operation by overhead trolley is more satisfactory than by
the conduit system.

(4) That the greater part of the roads could be operated under
trolley only.

[32] Several questions were presented. The following is the vote as
given in the Merchants' Association Review, the organization's
official publication, for February, 1906:

"TOTAL VOTE OF MEMBERS, 364.

"1--Do you favor Mr. Parsons's view of a uniform system of
overhead trolley lines throughout the entire city,
including a central line of ornamental trolley poles, with
lights furnished by the Railroad company between the tracks
on Market Street, and a trolley line with ornamental poles
and lights furnished by the Railroad upon Sutter Street?

"Votes received--Yes, 121; No, 204.

"2--Do you favor an overhead trolley system throughout the city
except on Market Street?

"Votes received--Yes, 67; No, 212.

"3--Do you favor an underground conduit system for Market
Street and for the streets with cable lines leading into
Market Street in the central downtown district and in the
adjacent residence district, the remainder of the system to
be overhead trolley?

"Votes received--Yes, 198; No, 84.

"4--Irrespective of what shall be done on any other streets,
which system do you favor for Sutter Street: (a) an
underground conduit, or (b) an overhead trolley line if
equipped with ornamental poles and lights furnished free by
the Railroad company, or (c) an improved cable system?

Underground
Conduit Trolley Cable

"First Choice 217 93 5
"Second Choice 42 83 62
"Third Choice 7 14 94

"5--Do you favor changing the cable lines on Nob Hill to
electric lines by tunneling the hill and constructing a
winding driveway with parks on California Street, as
proposed in Mr. Parsons's report?

"Votes received--Yes, 158; No, 140."

This vote was taken after an extended debate at a banquet
given by the Association in which Patrick Calhoun, president
of the United Railroads, argued for the trolley system, and
Frank J. Sullivan, president of the Sutter Street Improvement
Club, spoke for the conduit.

[33] The Improvement and Adornment Association employed D. H.
Burnham to draw plans for the development of San Francisco.
These plans, while drawn to attain a maximum of utility, were
intended to secure a maximum of beauty as well. Streets were
to be widened, boulevards built, parks established. The
carrying out of these plans would have made San Francisco one
of the most beautiful cities of the world. Their preparation
cost the association $17,500. Mr. Burnham volunteered his own
services.

[34] The objection of the Sutter Street Improvement Club to the
overhead trolley was set forth in the following statement,
issued less than a month before the great fire of 1906:

"The Sutter Street Improvement Club is unalterably opposed to
the construction of an overhead trolley line on the Sutter
Street system. We desire that the public should have no
misconception of our position. We propose to contest to the end
any attempt to get an overhead trolley on the entire Sutter
Street system, and for that purpose we pledge ourselves, and
promise to provide the necessary counsel to maintain our
position in the courts. We want the public with us in this
fight, as the fight is being made in the interests of the whole
people.

"Our own investigations make us absolutely certain that if the
public understands the true situation, it will not be misled by
the specious arguments of the United Railroads. The conduit
electric system, despite what the United Railroads and its
representatives may say, is practicable, safe, efficient and
superior to an overhead trolley. We are further satisfied that
the company is seeking, by an offer of $200,000 which they
offer to the people, to save itself an expense of several
million dollars, which the conduit electric system would cost,
if it should be required to reconstruct all its lines using the
conduits; but we believe--and we are certain that the citizens
of San Francisco will agree with us in this--that since the
United Railroads, through the watering of its stock, has
already made many millions of dollars out of its properties,
and is now taking, and will take many millions of profits from
our people, that it can afford to contribute to San Francisco
the cost of the most attractive and efficient system of
electric railroads. The United Railroads has put forward many
arguments which have been and are easily met:

"First: It contended, as the public will remember, that the
conduit electric system was impracticable on account of the
accumulation of rain water in its conduits. This claim it has
been forced to abandon.

"Second: It proclaimed loudly that the added cost of
construction of an electric conduit was such that the life of
its franchise would not justify the outlay. Now, they have
abandoned this claim, and assert that it is not the cost of
construction, but that there are other reasons.

"Third: They have declared that a uniform system was desirable.
They now admit that a completely uniform system is
impracticable, owing to grades, making it necessary to operate
some lines by cable. Their only contention now is that the
overhead trolley system is more efficient than either the cable
or conduit electric system.

"Mr. C. E. Grunsky is our authority for the statement that in
making the change from the conduit electric to the trolley, in
passing from city to suburbs, there are no objectionable
features, nor danger. Sir Alex. B. W. Kennedy, consulting
engineer to the London County Council, in recommending the
adoption of the conduit electric system for London's municipal
street railways, said: 'There is no difficulty in arranging the
cars so that they can be run from the underground (conduit) to
the overhead and vice versa, either with no stoppage at all at
the point of change, or with a stopping of only a few seconds.
There is no engineering difficulty whatever in using a mixed
tramway system, i.e., partly underground (conduit) and partly
overhead.'

"We would suggest that the public compare the present overhead
trolley system, operated by the United Railroads these many
years in this city and county, with the service rendered by the
California Cable Railway. There is no overhead trolley system
in San Francisco to-day which surpasses the service given by
the California Street Company.

"It is claimed that the public will be given a speedier and
more efficient service if the overhead trolley is permitted. We
ask the thousands of citizens who have been compelled to wait
for overhead trolley cars, and to stand up in those overhead
vehicles, whether or not the overhead trolley has thus afforded
them satisfactory service? If we may judge the future by the
experience with the overhead trolley of the past, it means
fewer cars (hence less expense to the United Railroads),
overcrowding and discomfort of passengers. The only advantage
which thus far has come from the system seems to be to the
company itself. It employs fewer men as a result of that
system, but the comfort and convenience of the public have not
been substantially bettered by it as against the cable.

"Before asking our people to give them an overhead trolley
system throughout the whole city, the United Railroads would do
well to show on some one of their overhead trolley lines now in
operation a frequent, efficient and satisfactory service to the
public. We do not want for San Francisco an extension and
perpetuation of the unsightly, noisy, dangerous, uncomfortable
and inefficient system of overhead trolleys as operated by the
United Railroads to-day.

"Citizens of San Francisco: Be not deceived by the selfish and
specious arguments put forward by the United Railroads. If the
public will stand together, we will win out in this fight; and,
if it should be necessary to that end, the supporters of our
organization will put before our citizens a plan for building a
complete conduit electric system of railroads for San
Francisco, to be built, in the first instance, by our people,
but with a provision giving to the city an option to purchase
the same at any time in the future at actual cost and interest,
so that municipal ownership of the said system may result just
as soon as the city is ready for it.

"All that we ask is that the people stand fast, and save their
city from what we believe would be a calamity from which it
would not recover in the next twenty-five years.

"Respectfully.

"Frank J. Sullivan, Rudolph Spreckels, Julius Rosenstirn, Geo.
W. Merritt, W. D. McCann, Houghton Sawyer. Edward P. E. Troy,
Secretary."

[35] Rudolph Spreckels is a native of San Francisco. At seventeen he
was employed in his father's (Claus Spreckels) sugar refinery
at Philadelphia. The Spreckels refinery was at the time in a
life-and-death struggle with the "Sugar Trust." Young Spreckels
was given his first lessons in the methods employed by the
"trust" elements to crush competition. His Philadelphia
training in large degree prepared him for the work which later
he was to do at San Francisco. At twenty-two he became
president of the Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Company, owners
of one of the largest sugar plantations of the Hawaiian
Islands. The venture had been a losing one. Spreckels put it on
a paying basis within a year, and sold it at large profit.
Before he was twenty-five he had become a millionaire in his
own right. He has been engaged in business at San Francisco for
many years, but only when moved by corrupt conditions to take
up the fight for honest government did he become active in
politics. He financed the graft prosecution. He has since taken
active part in California politics, but has steadfastly refused
to accept public office, preferring to do his work as a private
citizen.

[36] James D. Phelan is a native of San Francisco. He is one of the
largest owners of real estate in San Francisco and in
California. From his youth he has taken keen interest in public
affairs. He was chairman of the Charter convention of 1900
which framed San Francisco's present municipal Charter. He was
Mayor of San Francisco from 1896 to 1902. After the San
Francisco fire he headed the Relief Committee and was largely
instrumental in directing the work of rehabilitation. President
Roosevelt designated him by proclamation to receive funds for
the relief work, and to use the United States Mint as
depository. In 1900 the Democratic minority in the State
Legislature gave him complimentary vote for United States
Senator. In 1914 he was elected to the United States Senate,
being the first Federal Senator from California to be elected
by direct vote of The People. Senator Phelan has for many years
been close friend and business associate of Rudolph Spreckels.
He was one of the heaviest backers of the graft prosecution.

[37] Rudolph Spreckels testified at the trial of Patrick Calhoun:

"I suggested to Mr. Calhoun one thing, that if it was a
question of the length of the franchise, of the length of life
of the present franchise, standing between the people getting
the system which I believed it was entitled to, I would
personally be glad to do whatever was in my power to have the
Charter amended so that they might enjoy a longer term of
franchise, to work out the difference in cost; but that I
believed it was all important that San Francisco should have
the very best of street-car service obtainable."

United Railroads officials objected to the conduit system on
the ground that the conduits would fill with water. Spreckels
suggested that property owners agree to drain the conduits
without expense to the United Railroads, thus demonstrating
their practicability, on the understanding that if the conduit
system were found to be practical it should be installed. But
in this the United Railroad officials would not acquiesce. (See
testimony taken at the Calhoun trial.) The following is taken
from Charles S. Wheeler's testimony given at the Calhoun trial:

"Mr. Heney: Q. Did not the property owners on Sutter street and
the property owners on Pacific avenue, Mr. Rudolph Spreckels
and Mr. Phelan in particular, state that they would not oppose
the United Railroads obtaining a franchise or permit for the
underground conduit on Sutter street?

"Mr. Stanley Moore: That is objected to, if your Honor please,
as calling for the conclusion of the witness and the mental
mind and statement and hearsay of other persons.

"Mr. Heney. I am not asking for their mental mind. I am asking
about direct statements at these meetings of committees of the
Board of Supervisors.

"The Court: I will overrule the objection.

"Mr. Stanley Moore. We take an exception.

"A. I have [heard] both of them make such statements; Mr.
Phelan in substance before the Board of Supervisors, and I have
heard Mr. Spreckels make it in the Supervisors' chambers." (See
Transcript of Testimony, page 3197.)

[38] Patrick Calhoun, president of the United Railroads, had several
conferences with Rudolph Spreckels on the questions involved in
the street-car situation. Of these conferences Spreckels
testified at the Calhoun trial:

"Mr. Calhoun stated that he was very anxious to obtain the
overhead trolley privilege, that he understood that I was
actively opposing it, and he wanted to know whether I was open
to conviction on the subject. I told him that my mind was
entirely free, that if he could prove to my satisfaction that
the underground conduit was not feasible that I would have no
objection. I told him that the arguments that he had presented,
namely, that the Sutter street system could not be converted
into an underground conduit system because of the accumulation
of water at some number of points--I think 16 were
mentioned--was hardly worth while urging since Mr. Holland, a
former president of the United Railroads, had, together with
Mr. Chapman, urged that reason, and I related to Mr. Calhoun
that I had questioned Mr. Chapman and Mr. Holland at length in
regard to it and had satisfied myself that their reasons then
urged were not legitimate or reasonable; that during the
conversation with Mr. Holland I had asked him to state all of
the reasons that he had for desiring the overhead and urging
against the installation of the underground conduit; that Mr.
Holland and Mr. Chapman had both assured me that the only
reason was the fact that it was an engineering impossibility;
that the accumulation of water in the conduits during the rainy
season would prevent the successful operation of the cars, that
there would be repeated interruptions and general
dissatisfaction as the result. I then proposed to Mr. Holland,
I said: 'If that is the only reason and you can convince me
that that is true I have no objection to withdrawing my
opposition, but I want to propose this: Suppose I, or the
property owners on the system involved, agree to pay the
expense of the proper drainage of those conduits, and succeed
for a period of twelve months in treating the conduit drained
at those points you indicate, and succeed during that entire
term to keep them free from water, so that you and your
engineers will be obliged to admit that there was not one hour
during the twelve months during which you could not
successfully operate an underground system, will you then agree
to install that system?' Mr. Holland and Mr. Chapman looked at
one another and finally said 'Well, no, we cannot do that.'
Then I said: 'Gentlemen, you are wasting my time and your own
because your argument is not the truth and is not the only
reason you are urging, or that is prompting you to object to
putting in that system.'

"Mr. Holland then proceeded and asked me how I proposed to
insure that result and I told him I was not an engineer, but
that common sense told me and indicated to me that it might be
possible to carry off the water at those points through an
ordinary stone sewer-pipe and distribute the accumulated waters
to the various streets running parallel to Sutter street, and
in that way carrying it off and keeping the conduits free from
water. Mr. Calhoun said: 'Well, there are other reasons--the
question of a uniform system.' He urged very strongly that it
would be a very desirable thing to avoid transferring, or it
would be an exceedingly nice thing if a man could go to his
home without transferring, and have a uniform system of cars
operating over all of the system. I told Mr. Calhoun it was
hardly a possible thing, that no man would want to stand at any
street corner and wait for fifteen or twenty cars to go by
until some one car of a particular brand would come along which
would take him to the particular part of the city he cared to
go to. Then Mr. Calhoun wanted to know if the matter couldn't
be compromised, whether I would be satisfied, if the United
Railroads would agree to construct an underground conduit
system on Sutter street from Market to Powell. He wanted to
know also about constructing an underground conduit on Market
street, and I told him no, that this did not enter into my
calculations, that I was looking to the welfare of the city of
San Francisco, that it did not involve merely getting what I
wanted in front of the particular properties in which I was
personally interested, and I told him that the reasons that had
been urged against the granting of an overhead trolley--that it
was unsightly, dangerous and noisy and not the most modern
system, was my objection, and that it held good for the entire
city and not alone on the streets in which I was interested as
a property owner. Mr. Calhoun urged further the desirability of
the overhead trolley, that it had given satisfaction elsewhere,
and I suggested that he might first make the street cars then
operated by the overhead trolley in San Francisco a success and
satisfactory to the people; that I felt that it was far from a
success, and personally, as one of the largest property-owners
on Ellis street, I would emphatically prefer the ordinary cable
system to the electric lines that they were then operating. Mr.
Calhoun asked for another appointment and it was had I think on
the following morning, a meeting at the same place, at the
Canadian Bank of Commerce; I think our meeting on that occasion
was held in the office of the manager, Mr. Kains.

"Q. What was said there? A. I will not be absolutely certain as
to whether all that I have related occurred at the first
interview, or whether some that I will relate as having
occurred now, did not occur on the first interview. The two
meetings were close together, and the subjects that I will
relate may have occurred, some of them in the previous meeting
and some in the latter. Mr. Calhoun proceeded to ask me about
Pacific avenue. He said: 'Would you be satisfied if we agreed
to operate the underground conduit system on Sutter to Powell,
on Market to Valencia, running it, if we changed the system on
the Pacific avenue line--to agree to put in the conduit there,
otherwise maintaining the cable?' And he also proposed that it
might be a nice thing to withdraw the entire street railway
system from Pacific avenue, making of that street a boulevard,
and placing overhead trolley on Broadway where there was no car
line. He said, 'Of course, Mr. Spreckels, you are an owner of
carriages and automobiles, and I suppose you don't use the
street-cars, and it would be more desirable from the standpoint
of a property owner to have your residence under those
circumstances on a boulevard than on a street having a
street-car service with the attending objections.' I told Mr.
Calhoun that my fight was not a selfish one, that I did have
carriages and automobiles, that I did not use the street-cars
and had no need for them, but that I had in mind the rights of
other people living on the street--that there were many people
living on the street who were not so fortunate as I, who did
not own carriages and did not own automobiles and had
undoubtedly been brought to buy their property on Pacific
avenue because of the fact that it had a street-car service
there. Mr. Calhoun also in one of these interviews said that he
would tunnel Powell street hill commencing at Sutter and make
that the most important transferring point in San Francisco. I
asked Mr. Calhoun at the time whether it was because I was
interested in property at the corner of Sutter and Powell. Mr.
Calhoun expressed surprise and said he didn't know that I was
an owner of property there. I think that in substance was the
conversation as I remember it."

[39] Patrick Calhoun, Tirey L. Ford and Thornwell Mullally were
among the officials representing the United Railroads at the
conference. At the meeting, first mention of $200,000 in
connection with the proposed chance in the street-car system
was made. Citizens had contended that the objection of the
United Railroads in opposing the conduit system was the
difference in the initial cost of installation. This point came
up, and President Calhoun stated that he would, if the trolley
system were allowed, give the difference between the cost of
installing the two systems, for any public purpose. This
difference, Calhoun stated, would be about $200,000. Turning to
James D. Phelan, of the Adornment Committee, Calhoun stated
that the money could be used in extending the so-called Park
Panhandle, part of the Burnham plans, and a matter in which
Phelan was greatly interested. Phelan replied that San
Francisco would not accept money for any such purpose, and was
able to construct the Park Panhandle if the people wanted it.
(See testimony of James D. Phelan at the trial of The People
vs. Patrick Calhoun for offering a bribe, page 2750.)

[40] The Chronicle in its issue of March 23, in referring to Mr.
Calhoun's letter practically charged him with lack of good
faith. The Chronicle said:

The alleged 'inaccuracy' of the Chronicle's interesting report
of the compromise reached by the United Railroads and the
Society for the Adornment of the City proves to be that the
electric conduit in Sutter street is to stop at Powell street
instead of extending to Polk street, as proposed, and which is
the least which should have been accepted if any compromise
whatever was to be made. We shall be greatly surprised if when
the changes are finally made there is not a great deal less
conduit than Mr. Calhoun now seems to agree to. We gravely
doubt whether Mr. Calhoun expects to construct a foot of
conduit in this city. However, he does agree to do so under
certain conditions and we shall see what we shall see.... It
does look as though some settlement of the matter would be
reached, as the United Railroads have receded from their
iron-clad determination not to consider the electric conduit at
all. When that is accomplished we shall speedily see the last
of the cables south of California street, a consummation as
devoutly wished by the people as was the introduction of the
cable in place of the horse-car a quarter of a century ago."

[41] It was openly charged that money had been used to put this
franchise through the preliminary steps necessary for its
granting. The Examiner in its issue of March 10, some five
weeks before the fire, said:

"The Supervisors owe it to themselves to bring back the
telephone franchise order for further consideration. Since the
hasty vote on the ordinance last Monday ugly rumors have been
the measure. The regard of the Supervisors for the good name of
the Board demands that they should clear the record of the
SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES that surround the vote on the order.

"The present Board of Supervisors was elected on a platform
that pledged its members to a municipal ownership programme.
Among the purposes specifically announced was the ACQUISITION
OF A TELEPHONE PLANT to be owned and operated by the city.

"Yet the FIRST ACT OF THE BOARD in dealing with a public
utility question is to favor an ordinance granting a franchise
for fifty years to a private corporation without proper
compensation to the city and WITHOUT ANY CONTRACT that would
enable the city to buy out the plant at a just appraisement
when the time comes to acquire a municipal telephone system.

"The bill was introduced after a brief hearing and passed to
print on the 26th of February. On the 5th of March it was
passed to a vote in the Board of Supervisors without
discussion. One of the members of the Board who rose to explain
his vote was shut off with such indignity that he left the
Supervisors' chamber. Nor, indeed, did all the members know
what they were voting on; for one of the Supervisors later in
the session asked if the telephone franchise was not to be
called up, and was surprised to be told that it had already
been passed upon.

"This sort of 'gum-shoe' legislation will not do for San
Francisco. It inevitably rouses the suspicions of crookedness
that have been hawked about the streets since Monday last.

"A telephone franchise is not a matter to be treated lightly.
It is an affair of more moment than passing a street or even of
fixing a water rate. It deserves the deepest consideration, for
the division of service between two companies creates a
confusion in business that should be taken carefully into
account. It is only the wretched service given by the old
company that has brought the backing of a certain popular
support to the advent of a new company. The manner in which the
obvious evils of a division of service can be lessened requires
much more thought than has yet been given, and many changes in
the ordinance should be made unless the last state of the San
Francisco telephone service is to be worse than the first.

"It is the duty of the Supervisors to recall the ordinance,
answer the rumors of crooked work by seeing that everything is
carried on above board and in the open, and treat the franchise
in accordance with their anti-election pledges to the people.
They cannot afford to rest under appearance of evil that now
surrounds the late vote on the order.

"We do not wish to believe that any undue influence was used,
but the Supervisors must have heard the rumors that are
frequent in the streets, and they must realize that they have
made the mistake of acting as a bribed Board of Supervisors
would have acted. They have broken their pledge, but happily it
is not too late for them to correct the gross error."

[42] Mr. Calhoun's second letter, as introduced as evidence at his
trial for offering a bribe (page 2775, Transcript, The People
vs. Calhoun), was as follows:

"San Francisco, March 23.--Messrs. James D. Phelan, R. B. Hale,
Herbert E. Law, Rufus P. Jennings and others--My dear Sirs: You
will recall that the only condition on which I consented to
even consider the introduction of an underground conduit on
Market street from the ferries to Valencia, and on Sutter from
Market to Powell, was to secure harmony and unanimity of action
in the development of San Francisco. You will further recall
that I distinctly stated that 'if all sides to this controversy
are not willing to faithfully and loyally abide by what the
people of San Francisco may determine on this subject, the
United Railroads prefers to urge, in the interest of the
development of San Francisco, a uniform system of overhead
trolley operation.'

"The development of the last few days, the threatened
litigation against my company, and the action of the
Sutter-Street Improvement Club, demonstrate that harmony and
unanimity of action, so much to be desired, cannot be obtained,
and that the United Railroads cannot expect all parties to the
controversy 'to faithfully and loyally abide by what the people
of San Francisco may determine on this subject.' On the
contrary, if the people should elect to put an overhead on
Sutter street, the address of the Sutter-Street Improvement
Club distinctly states 'we pledge ourselves and promise to
provide the necessary counsel to maintain our position in the
courts.'

"In view of these facts, I desire to inform you that the United
Railroads will proceed to prepare a plan for the improvement of
the transportation of San Francisco. The essential feature of
which plan will be a modern, up-to-date, efficient and uniform
system of electric propulsion, through the introduction of the
overhead trolley system wherever the grades of the streets of
the city will permit. When this plan is perfected it will be
presented to the proper authorities of the city for their
consideration. We will be very glad to go over it with you.
Under the circumstances, it will be useless for me now to
furnish the preliminary plan of which we spoke.

"In conclusion, permit me to express my appreciation of the
motives which led you to seek a conference with me, and the
earnest desire of every gentleman who participated in that
conference to reach a basis of harmonious action in order that
the development of San Francisco might not be obstructed and
delayed.

"Very truly yours, PATRICK CALHOUN, President."

[43] The Chronicle commented upon Mr. Calhoun's new position as
follows:

"The letter written by Patrick Calhoun of the United Railroads
to the committee of citizens who have sought to induce him to
change his attitude on the subject of overhead trolleys was not
in good taste. It exhibited corporative arrogance in its most
exasperating form. Mr. Calhoun is too well bred, or perhaps too
cautious a man to tell the public to be damned, but every line
of his communication breathes the spirit of the insolent
utterance of William K. Vanderbilt, and the community will take
it that way....

"There is an ill-concealed menace in Mr. Calhoun's declaration
that the United Railroads has a plan in preparation which, when
perfected, 'will be presented to the proper authorities of the
city for their consideration.' As he plainly tells us that this
plan provides for an 'efficient and uniform system of electric
propulsion through the introduction of the overhead trolley
system wherever the grades of the city will permit,' the
announcement is equivalent to a notification that 'the proper
authorities of the city' will be appealed to for permission to
carry out such a scheme, whether the people like it or not. His
defiant attitude suggests that he feels pretty sure that the
authorities will be on the side of the United Railroads against
the people, but he may be mistaken on that score. There is a
point beyond which even complaisant authorities would not wish
to press the matter to oblige a corporation which shows so
little regard for the desires and needs of a community from
which it extracts over eight million dollars annually." (See
San Francisco Chronicle, March 25, 1906.)

[44] Mayor Schmitz in his statement, said:

"If Claus Spreckels can see his way clear to carry out his
great purpose, the fact stands that he must be known more than
ever as he has been known in the past, as the greatest public
benefactor of the West. I will say, if he can see his way
clear, reservedly, for I doubt that any citizen of this city
or State can point to any understanding that he has announced
he would accomplish, that he has failed to accomplish. Not
only is his determination, but within his control is the money
to carry out his determination, and I have yet failed to find
the man that can say that any object can fail of
accomplishment when determination and money walk hand in hand.

"If Mr. Spreckels can carry out his announced desire to
network San Francisco with railroads operated by the
underground conduit system, I can only say that through his
wonderful ambitions of purpose San Francisco will take a
stride forward that is wonderful to contemplate. Such action
upon the part of Mr. Spreckels would place San Francisco not
only in advance of any city in America, but would place it in
advance of any city in the world in the battle for public
control of utilities operated for the public benefit. The
offer of Mr. Spreckels is not only one that must awaken the
amazement, but the approbation of every public-spirited
citizen. While the rest of the great cities of the world (as
well as San Francisco before Mr. Spreckels made his offer) are
puzzling to find means through which they can accomplish the
great purpose of municipal ownership, Mr. Spreckels has come
forward and has offered, for the good of the people, to
demonstrate the efficiency of a system that will mean that not
only shall the beauty of San Francisco be not sacrificed, but
that the public desire for rapid transit shall be fulfilled.
Backed with the millions he controls, his offer is
significant, and is one that we cannot contemplate lightly.

"As Chief Executive of the city I can only express the hope
that something will happen that will permit Mr. Spreckels to
carry out his object. At one stride this would place San
Francisco at the head of the world in the titanic struggle now
waging between the people and the corporations for the control
of those utilities in which the people are interested for
comfort and the corporations for profit. Great as is his
offer, it adds not only enthusiasm, but rekindles hope in my
always expressed desire that my administration would mark the
first victory of the municipality in its fight to control
those things that are theirs.

"The people are on the eve of winning for themselves those
things that are theirs. If the offer of Mr. Spreckels can be
carried out, and I see no reason why it cannot, the battle is
ended. Not only will San Francisco be the victor, but from the
battle she will emerge, her beauty unmarred and her railways
standing as exemplifications of the fact that what in science
is possible is capable of actual and practical
accomplishment." (See San Francisco Call, March 24, 1906.)

But in spite of this approval, after the organization of the
new company was assured, Rudolph Spreckels found the Mayor's
door closed to him when he attempted to secure an interview.
(See Rudolph Spreckels' testimony at the Calhoun trial.)

[45] The purposes of the incorporators were brought out at the
graft trials. At the Calhoun trial, when James D. Phelan,
former Mayor of San Francisco, and one of the incorporators,
was under cross-examination, Calhoun's attorney referred to
other public utility ventures in which Claus Spreckels had
been interested, and asked:

"Q. You knew of the matter of the rival gas or competing gas
lines, and the rival and competing electric lines, and the
rival and competing steam railroads down the valley at the
time you went into the corporation to put in the People's
Street Railroad? A. I knew, and I know the effect they had;
they reduced rates in both cases; and if our system
accomplished the purpose of bringing Mr. Calhoun's railroad to
a realization of the public desire to have a conduit system,
our purpose would have been accomplished. It was the last
resort. I looked upon it, as an incorporator, as the last
resort. We had negotiated in a friendly way for months, and I
saw the fruit of all the conferences fade away and believed
that arrangements had been made by Mr. Calhoun with the city
administration, and the only resort left to us to do was to
build a road of our own to demonstrate that it was practicable
and possibly profitable--a conduit system."

[46] As early as April 3, 1906, a petition was circulated for
signatures among residents and property owners on Bush street,
asking the Board of Supervisors to grant a franchise to
operate street-cars on Bush street under the electric-conduit
system.

[47] The San Francisco Examiner of March 31, 1906, set forth that
"an important feature (of the plans for competing street
railways) was that the city should have the right at the end
of ten years or any shorter period that might be preferred, to
take over the system and operate the same itself, the terms of
the transfer to be such as would be just both to the builders
and to the municipality."

Among the purposes for which the Municipal Street Railways of
San Francisco was formed, was set forth in the articles of
incorporation the following: "To accept and acquire franchises
for street railroads, elevated railroads and subways,
containing provisions for the acquisition thereof by the City
and County of San Francisco, or such other conditions as may
be lawfully inserted therein."

CHAPTER IV.

SAN FRANCISCO AFTER THE FIRE.

The great San Francisco fire was brought under control Friday, April 20,
1906. The Sunday following, the first step was taken toward getting the
scattered Board of Supervisors together. George B. Keane, clerk of the
board, is authority for the statement that the meeting place was in a
room back of Supervisor McGushin's saloon.[48] The ashes of the burned
city were still hot; the average citizen was thinking only of the next
meal and shelter for the night for himself and dependents. But the
public-service corporations were even then active in furthering plans
which had been temporarily dropped while San Francisco was burning.

At the McGushin-saloon meeting, Keane found with the Supervisors Mr.
Frick of the law firm of Thomas, Gerstle & Frick. Mr. Frick was on hand
to represent the petitioners for the Home Telephone franchise, which, at
the time of the disaster was pending before the board.

For months previous to the fire, no subject affecting a San Francisco
public-service corporation had, with the single exception of the United
Railroads' scheme for substituting electric for cable service, created
more discussion than the Home Telephone application for franchise.
There had been allegations that the progress which, previous to the
fire, the Home Company had made toward securing its franchise, had been
paid for,[49] but for weeks after the fire few citizens had time to
think about it. The people forgot for the time the issues which had
before the disaster divided the city. But the agents for the
public-service corporations did not forget. We find a representative of
the Home Telephone Company picking his way over the hot ashes of the
burned city to McGushin's saloon to meet the Supervisors that the
interests of his company might be preserved. The developments of the
graft prosecution indicate that even as the Home Company was seeking out
the Supervisors, the United Railroads was getting into touch with
Ruef.[50]

But if the corporations were quick to avail themselves of the situation
to secure privileges denied them before the fire, they were also active
in the work of rehabilitation--so far as such activity served their
plans and purposes.

This was well illustrated by the course of the United Railroads. Within
a fortnight after the fire, that corporation had established efficient
service over a number of its electric lines. For a time, passengers were
carried without charge. On April 29 and 30, however, fares were
collected from men, but not from women and children. With the beginning
of May, fares were collected from all persons. For a time, in a glare of
much publicity, the United Railroads contributed these collections to
the fund for the relief of the stricken city.

The Home Telephone Company had no plant to restore nor authority to
establish one; but on Ruef's suggestion it, too, contributed to the fund
for the relief of the stricken city--$75,000.[51]

The United Railroads' activity in restoring its electric roads, was in
curious contrast to its failure to take advantage of the possibilities
offered by its cable systems. As some excuse for this inactivity, the
corporation's representatives alleged that the cable slots had been
closed by the earthquake, making restoration of the cable roads
impractical.

The alleged closing of the slots was even used as argument against the
conduit electric system.[52] But as a matter of fact, there were many
to testify that the damage done the cable slots was not from the
earthquake, although the slots in the burned district had been warped
more or less by the heat of the fire. But this damage was easily
remedied. On the Geary-street road, for example, cars were run for an
hour or more after the earthquake. The fire warped the Geary-street
cable slot, but this was easily and cheaply remedied by a force of men
with cold chisels and hammers.[53]

Statements from officials of the United Railroads, now of record,
indicate that the company's cable lines suffered no greater damage than
did other cable systems. An affidavit of Frank E. Sharon, for example,
who before the fire was superintendent of cables and stables belonging
to the United Railroads, made in the adjustment of fire losses sustained
by that corporation, sets forth that the company's principal cable power
house and repair shops situate on Valencia street were damaged but
little by the earthquake.[54] Although the buildings were damaged by
the fire, the damage to the contents, including the machinery by which
the cable cars were operated, was, according to statements made by the
United Railroads in fire-loss adjustment, comparatively small. The
company placed the sound value upon this machinery and contents, after
the earthquake, but preceding the fire, at $70,308.80. The salvage was
placed at $60,933.80, leaving a total fire loss of $9,375.[55]

The cable cars, with few exceptions, were saved. The most serious loss
of cars was on the Powell-street system, where sixty-four were
destroyed. Only one Valencia-street car was burned. After both
earthquake and fire, the United Railroads had available at least 150
cable cars for its Market and Powell-street systems. This does not
include the cable cars available on the Hayes and McAllister roads. The
power-houses of these two last-named systems were not destroyed by fire.
The allegation has been made that the McAllister-street cable was kept
running for several hours after the earthquake.

But whatever the possibilities for the restoration of the United
Railroads' cable properties, no steps were taken toward that end.
Instead, trolley wires were strung over the tracks of cable systems.
Street-car service was one of the greatest needs of the first few weeks
following the fire. Statements that cable properties could not be
restored were generally believed; the trolley service was accepted as a
matter of expediency; few thought, however, that it was to be
permanent.[56]

Within two weeks after the fire, the United Railroads had trolley wires
strung over the cable tracks on Market street. The little objection made
to this course went unheeded. The Market-street trolley cars, two weeks
after the fire, were as welcome to The People of San Francisco as were
the temporary shacks which were being erected upon the sites of the old
city's finest buildings. Market-street trolley cars gave as
sorely-needed transportation as the shacks gave needed shelter.

The opening of the Market-street trolley line was made subject for
rejoicing throughout the city. In the midst of this good feeling toward
his company, President Calhoun gave out that if allowed to place
overhead wires on Sutter and Larkin streets, he would place 2,000 men at
work and have both these lines in operation within thirty days.[57]

But the era of good feeling was not of long duration. On May 14, less
than a month after the fire, the Supervisors received a communication
signed by President Calhoun as President of the United Railroads,
setting forth that if the board would permit the use on the cable lines
of the standard electric system in use on the company's other lines, the
United Railroads would be glad to put all of their lines in commission
as rapidly as could be accomplished by the most liberal expenditure of
money and the largest possible employment of men.[58]

That very day, the Supervisors took the initial step toward granting to
the United Railroads a blanket permit, authorizing that corporation to
substitute the trolley system for all its cable lines.

Immediately, San Francisco's opposition to the trolley system was
revived. All classes joined in condemning the action of the board. The
Sutter Street Improvement Club, representing large down-town interests
and property holders, adopted resolutions demanding that the Supervisors
refuse to grant the permit. The San Francisco Labor Council,
representing over 100 affiliated unions, with a membership of more than
30,000 wage earners, declared as strongly against such action. The press
charged the United Railroads with taking advantage of the city's
distress to force the trolley upon her.[59]

Then came explanations and defense. Mayor Schmitz in public interviews
set forth that the proposed permit was not a permanent measure, nor
under its provisions could the United Railroads indefinitely operate
trolley cars in Market street.[60] The Labor Council which had at first
adopted resolutions condemning the policy of granting the permit,
adopted resolutions of confidence in the "present city administration."
President Calhoun himself solicited citizens to attend the meeting of
the board at which a vote was to be taken on the proposed permit, to
urge action favorable to the United Railroads.[61]

Long before the board met to take final action it was recognized that in
spite of opposition the permit would be granted.[62] And it was
granted. On May 21, the Supervisors passed the ordinance which gave the
United Railroads authority to convert its cable systems, wherever grades
would permit, into trolley lines. For this privilege, no money
compensation, nor promise of compensation, was made the city.[63]

Demand that Mayor Schmitz veto the ordinance granting these
extraordinary privileges followed. Nevertheless, the Mayor affixed his
signature to the trolley permit-granting ordinance.

Fair expression of the feeling this action engendered will be found in
the San Francisco papers of the latter part of May, 1906. "Mayor Eugene
E. Schmitz," said the Examiner, for example, "has betrayed the trust
reposed in him by the people, violated his solemn pledge in favor of an
underground conduit system, and joined Abe Ruef and the United Railroads
in the shameless work of looting the city at the time of her greatest
need."

The Ruef-Schmitz administration protested at the criticism. The
eighteen Supervisors, seventeen of whom were within a year to confess
that they had accepted bribes and all of whom were to be involved in the
scandal, joined in a letter[64] to the Examiner, announcing that such
criticism was unwarranted, and injured the city. The letter contained
veiled threat that questioning of the Supervisors' motives would not be
tolerated. The threat, however, intimidated nobody. Criticism of Ruef
and the administration continued.

But in spite of the hostility toward him, Ruef controlled the San
Francisco delegates who were named that year to attend the Republican
State convention. The convention met at Santa Cruz. Ruef held the
balance of power. He was the most sought man there. He had the
nomination for Governor in his hands. He gave it to James N.
Gillett.[65]

While the convention was in session, a dinner was given the State
leaders of the Republican party at the home of Major Frank McLaughlin,
then Chairman of the Republican State Central Committee. Ruef was one of
the select few present. A flash-light picture of that banquet board
shows him seated in the place of honor at the center of the table, the
remaining guests with the exception of the host, McLaughlin, who is
seated at Ruef's side, standing.

At Ruef's back stands James N. Gillett, who had just received, with
Ruef's assistance, the party nomination for Governor, his hand resting
upon Ruef's shoulder. Others in this flash-light group are George
Hatton, political manipulator, whose connection with the 1905 mayoralty
campaign in San Francisco has already been noted; J. W. McKinley, head
of the Southern Pacific Law Department at Los Angeles, who was chairman
of the convention; Rudolph Herold, a politician prominent in the
counsels of the old "Southern Pacific machine"; Justice F. W. Henshaw of
the California Supreme Bench, who was nominated at the convention for
re-election;[66] Walter F. Parker, political agent for the Southern
Pacific Company; Warren R. Porter, who had just received the nomination
for Lieutenant-Governor; Congressman J. R. Knowland, prominent in the
counsels of the "machine" that at the time dominated the State, and
Judge F. H. Kerrigan of the Appellate Bench, whose decision in favor of
the Southern Pacific Company while on the Superior Bench, in the
so-called San Joaquin Valley railroad rate case, made him a conspicuous
figure in California public life.[67]

The group represented the most effective forces at the time in
California politics. Ruef, at the Santa Cruz convention, reached the
height of his power. He left Santa Cruz planning a State organization
that would make him as great a factor in State politics as he was at the
metropolis.

But on his return to San Francisco, Ruef found himself harassed by
criticism and beset by opposition. At every point in the municipal
administration, with the exception of the District Attorney's office,
was suggestion of graft and incompetency. The police department could
not, or would not, control the criminal element. Merchants, in the
middle of the day, were struck down at their places of business and
robbed. Several were fatally injured in such attacks, being found dying
and even dead behind their counters. Street robberies were of daily
occurrence.

In the acres of ash-strewn ruins, was junk worth hundreds of thousands
of dollars. The police seemed utterly powerless to protect this
property. It became the loot of unchecked bands of thieves.

A reign of terror prevailed. Citizens feared to appear on the streets at
night. Merchants charged that their business was seriously injured by
these conditions. On all sides, blame was placed upon the Schmitz
administration which Ruef was known to control.[68]

Then again, Ruef's toll from the tolerated gambling, saloon and social
evil interests was getting too heavy for his own safety.[69] The public
was given hint of this when the newspapers quoted George Renner, a
prominent businessman, as asserting that a liquor license could be
secured if the applicant "put the matter into Ruef's hands and paid a
fat little fee." Ruef, in his reply, stated that the liquor people were
nuisances anyhow. Ruef had long acted as attorney for the California
Liquor Dealers' Association. The Association, after Ruef's flippant
characterization of the liquor people, boldly dispensed with his
services and employed another attorney, Herbert Choynski, in his stead.
Choynski made no effort to placate Ruef. On the contrary, he gave out
interviews to the press charging that Ruef had received $500,000 for the
trolley permit, and that each Supervisor had been given $4000 or $5000
for his vote.

This story was given some credit, although few realized the amount of
truth it contained.

The Supervisors were spending money freely. Men, who in private life had
earned less than $100 a month, and as Supervisors were receiving only
that amount, gave evidence of being generously supplied with funds.
Supervisor Coffey, a hack driver, took a trip to Chicago. Lonergan,
driver of a delivery wagon, announced plans for a tour of Ireland with
his wife and children. Wilson planned a trip through the Eastern States.
The official head of the administration, Mayor Schmitz, left on a trip
to Europe, leaving Supervisor Gallagher as acting Mayor.[70] Reports
printed in San Francisco papers of Schmitz, the orchestra player, as
guest of the most expensive European hotels, did not tend to lessen the
opposition to the administration.

The general dissatisfaction with the administration finally found
expression in a mass meeting intended to inaugurate a movement to rid
the community of Ruef's influence.[71] The meeting was called in the
name of various promotion associations and improvement clubs. It was to
have been held in the rooms of the California Promotion Association, a
temporary shack that had been erected in Union Square, a public park in
the business district. But the crowd which gathered was so great that
the meeting had to be held in the park itself.

When the committee in charge met to complete final preparations,
preliminary to calling the meeting to order, Ruef and Acting Mayor
Gallagher, with astonishing assurance, appeared before the committee and
offered their co-operation in the work in hand. Their presence does not
appear to have been welcome. Nevertheless, before the resolutions which
the committee had under consideration were read before the crowd, all
harsh references to Ruef and the municipal administration had been
expurgated. In effect, the expurgated resolutions called upon commercial
organizations, clubs, labor unions and similar bodies to form a
committee of 100 for public safety.

In the meeting which followed the expurgation of the resolutions, the
organizers of the movement lost control. Their counsel was for
moderation in a situation where all elements were at work.

The crowd was made up of Ruef claquers who shouted everybody down;
members of Labor Unions who had been led to believe that the purpose of
the gathering was to break down the unions; and of radicals who were for
proceeding immediately to clean up the town. Those responsible for the
gathering appeared appalled at its magnitude, and showed themselves
unable to cope with the situation.

William A. Doble presided. Samuel M. Shortridge, an attorney who was to
play a prominent part in the graft trials, stood at Doble's side and
acted as a sort of director of the proceedings. The expurgated
resolutions were read by the President of the Merchants' Association, E.
R. Lillienthal. The ayes were called for and the resolutions declared to
have been adopted. The next moment announcement was made that the
meeting stood adjourned.

An angry demonstration followed. The people had met to discuss
lawlessness. They refused to be put off. The adjourned meeting refused
to adjourn. There were cries of =Drive Ruef out of Town=. One speaker, A.
B. Truman, denounced Ruef as a grafter. For the moment an outbreak
seemed imminent. At this crisis, Acting Mayor Gallagher appeared.

"I would suggest," he announced,[72] "that you disperse to your
respective homes."

Citizens who did not care to participate in what threatened to become a
riot began leaving the park. But Ruef's henchmen did not leave.

Ruef, who had cowered in fright when the crowd was denouncing him, was
concealed in a room in the so-called Little St. Francis Hotel, which
after the fire had been erected in Union Square Park. From his hiding
place he could see the crowd without being seen. At the right time, he
appeared on the steps of the building which were used for the speaker's
stand. His followers, now in a majority, cheered him wildly. The next
moment, Ruef was in control of the meeting which had been called to
protest against the conditions in San Francisco, for which the
administration, of which he was the recognized head, was held to be
accountable.[73] The first serious attempt to oust Ruef from his
dictatorship had failed.

But while the protestants against prevailing conditions were hot with
the disappointments of this failure, District Attorney Langdon issued a
statement that he had determined to seize the opportunity presented by
the impanelment of a new Grand Jury to inaugurate a systematic and
thorough investigation into charges of official graft and malfeasance in
office. To assist in this work, he announced, Francis J. Heney had been
requested to become a regular deputy in the District Attorney's office,
and had accepted. That the investigation might not be handicapped by
lack of funds, Mr. Langdon stated Rudolph Spreckels had guaranteed that
he would personally undertake the collection from public-spirited
citizens of a fund to provide for the expenses necessary to make the
investigation thorough.[74] It became known that William J. Burns, who
had been associated with Heney in the Oregon land-fraud cases, had been
retained to direct the investigation, and that for several months his
agents had been quietly at work.

The effect of these announcements was immediate. All talk of "vigilante
committee" and "lynching" ceased. The case of The People of San
Francisco vs. the Schmitz-Ruef Administration was to be presented in an
orderly way in the courts.

And the united press of San Francisco, legitimate business interests,
and a great majority of the people welcomed the alternative.

FOOTNOTES:

[48] See Keane's testimony in The People vs. Ruef, No. 1437, Part 3,
vol. 1, page 455.

[49] See footnote 41, page 43.

[50] Supervisor Gallagher testified in the case of The People vs.
Ruef, No. 1437, that about a week before the fire "Mr. Ruef
stated that the United Railroads wanted to secure a permit to
use electricity upon their lines and asked me to speak to the
members of the Board of Supervisors about it and let him know
whether it could go through the Board, and about what amount of
money it would take. I told him that I would do so." (See
Transcript on Appeal, page 850.) Similar testimony, to show
that the United Railroads was dealing with Ruef during the
month preceding the fire, was brought out at trials of other
defendants in the "graft" cases. This would make the date of
Ruef's activity on behalf of the United Railroads about the
time of Mr. Calhoun's announcement that he would proceed to
present plans for the trolley system, to the "proper
representatives" of the People (the Supervisors), who were even
then, through Ruef, receiving bribe money from public-service
corporations.

Gallagher testified further (see same transcript, page 853)
that within a week after the fire Ruef stated to him that the
United Railroads still wanted its electric permit, and directed
that Gallagher find out whether such a permit could be put
through the Board. Gallagher testified that he saw members, put
the question to them, and reported back to Ruef that in his
judgment the permit could be put through by paying each member
of the Board the amount which Ruef had specified, $4,000.

[51] Supervisor Gallagher testified at graft trials that Ruef had
told him the payment of this $75,000 to the Relief Fund was a
good thing, as it would tend to shut off adverse criticism. But
the Home Company people had asked that the money be not turned
over to the Relief Fund until such time as the ordinance
granting the franchise had been approved or the matter
definitely determined.

[52] As early as May 5, C. E. Loss, a railroad contractor, came out
with the proposition that the city should abandon all idea of
conduit systems, because the cable slots had been closed by the
earthquake. In this, Loss was disputed by City Engineer Thomas
P. Woodward. Woodward, in an interview printed in the Examiner
on May 5, 1906, said:

"I think Mr. Loss was mistaken when he said the earthquake
closed the cable slots. I have not made a careful examination
of the various roadbeds in San Francisco, but from what I have
seen as I have gone about the city, I am inclined to think that
no injury was done the cable slots by the earthquake.

"The lines on Sacramento, California, Geary, Sutter and Haight
streets appear to be all right outside the burned district.
Where the metal was subjected to the intense heat, the slots
are warped out of shape, and in some places closed."

Loss's allegations called forth the following editorial comment
in the Examiner of May 5th:

"Even an earthquake shock and a conflagration do not long
obscure the vision of certain wealthy gentlemen where there is
a chance to turn a calamity to their individual account.

"Before the catastrophe, San Francisco had indicated with great
emphasis to the United Railroads that it would not permit the
reconstruction of the cable system into an overhead trolley,
but would insist upon a modern up-to-date conduit electric
railroad, the safety, utility and efficiency of which had been
demonstrated in New York and other Eastern cities.

"The emergency created by the destruction of the traffic
systems in the city has compelled permission for a temporary
trolley line because it could be constructed more quickly than
any other.

"It is not intended, and the United Railroads must be made to
realize that it will not be permitted, that the unsightly poles
and dangerous wires will be allowed to cumber the new and more
beautiful San Francisco, any more than it will be permitted
that the rough shacks and sheds which temporarily shelter the
people in parks and streets and otherwise vacant lots shall
remain after the emergency which called them into being has
ceased."

[53] A. D. Shepard, vice-president and secretary of the Geary-street
Railroad Company, gave the following statement to the Examiner
as to the condition of the Geary-street roadbed:

"We can run cars as far as the road goes, but the power-house
is not ready for business. The smokestack at Geary and Buchanan
streets must be built up to comply with the ordinance of the
city before we can get a permit to build fires under the
boilers. The smokestack should be repaired by the end of this
week, and cars will probably be run over the road then. I
cannot say just what day we will begin to run cars. All depends
upon the smokestack and the Board of Public Works.

"Our line was not injured by the earthquake, and we ran cars
for some time after the shake. It was the fire that drove us
out of business. The heat warped the slot, making it narrow in
places and wide in other spots, but this is easily remedied."
(See Examiner, May 30, 1906.)

[54] Sharon's affidavit was introduced at the graft trials. It was
as follows:

"State of California, City and County of San Francisco--ss.

"Frank E. Sharon, being first duly sworn according to law,
deposes and says: That he was for many years prior to April 18,
1906, the superintendent of cables and stables belonging to the
United Railroads of San Francisco, and situate at the corner of
Market and Valencia streets; that on the property situate at
said Market and Valencia streets were located what is known as
the Market and Valencia Power House and Shops, consisting of
power-house, stables, machine shops, special machine shops,
mill, offices, store-rooms, sheds, etc.; that he was such
superintendent on April 18, 1906; that on the morning of April
18, 1906, immediately following the earthquake he proceeded to
the above described premises, arriving there at about 8 a. m.;
that none of the buildings above described were materially
damaged by the earthquake; that the walls of all the buildings
were standing and intact; that the roofs of all the buildings
were on and uninjured by the earthquake, with the exception of
the roof of a portion of what is known as the power-house,
which was damaged by reason of a small portion of the chimney
adjoining the power-house on the west falling thereon; that the
greater portion of said brick from the top of said chimney fell
toward the south or east into the driveway; that extending from
the base of said chimney to the crown thereof and on the east
and west side thereof are cracks which were in said chimney for
many years prior to the earthquake of April 18, 1906, which
cracks were opened somewhat by said earthquake; and the boilers
in said power-house were not injured to any extent and steam
was kept under said boilers for some time after the earthquake;
that in his judgment the building as a whole was intact and the
machinery not injured in any material part of the earthquake;
that the building caught fire from the adjoining buildings on
the east and southeast late in the afternoon of April 18, 1906;
said buildings were not dynamited nor backfired for any
purpose.
"F. E. SHARON.

"Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of August, A.
D. 1906.
"CHARLES R. HOLTON.

"Notary Public in and for the City and County of San Francisco,
State of California."

[55] The loss included $25 damage to two engines which cost new
$24,000; $2,000 damage to six boilers, new cost $30,000; $210
water-tank, cost new $350; $500 damage to pipes, valves and
fittings, which cost new $10,500; material in store-room worth
$2,000, a total loss; $4,800 loss of two tension carriages used
for taking up slack of the cable. These tension carriages could
very easily have been restored. This loss, $4,800, and the
$2,000 stock loss, deducted from the total of $9,375, leaves a
total loss of $2,575 to the machinery of a plant estimated to
have cost $115,842.

[56] As late as November 13, 1906, seven months after the fire, the
San Francisco Call published an editorial article on the
trolley permits which showed that even then their nature was
not fully understood. The Call said:

"The insolent disregard of public rights in the streets by the
United Railroads is inspired, of course, by ulterior purpose to
entrench the corporation in the possession of privileges,
permits or franchises granted at a time of stress and confusion
whose legality may and probably will be questioned later.

"The Call does not desire to assume an attitude of hindering or
hampering progress. We recognize fully that every new
street-car line adds materially to the value of property within
its tributary territory. In a word, the growth of a city or a
neighborhood is, to a considerable degree, dependent on
facilities for urban transit.

"But it does not follow from these considerations that
franchises should be granted for nothing to any and every
applicant who is able to construct a street railway. The right
to use the streets is the most valuable privilege possessed by
a municipality. It should be made to yield a corresponding
revenue.

"All this might seem so obvious as scarcely to require
statement, but in practice the principles here laid down have
been virtually disregarded in San Francisco. In no instance was
there more flagrant disregard of public rights than in the
wholesale grants of permits or franchises to construct overhead
trolley lines made after the fire.

"The United Railroads at the time professed to regard these
permits as merely temporary, but that profession was not very
long maintained. The company now declares that many, if not
all, of these permits amount to absolute franchises in view of
the capital invested in making the necessary changes. That is
the explanation of the outrageous disregard of public rights
shown in tearing up some five or six miles of streets at once
and in different parts of town. This process is obviously
wasteful as a financial proposition, and is calculated besides
to arouse general indignation. We find these weighty
considerations disregarded on the advice of the corporation's
lawyers, to bolster up an invalid claim to the possession of
franchises obtained by trick and device in an hour of public
confusion.

"What the extent of the corporation's claim under these permits
may be we are not advised, and there is no immediate means of
finding out as long as the administration which granted these
hole-and-corner permits remains in power. The same influences
that made the Mayor and Supervisors so complaisant to the will
of the United Railroads are still operative. It was only the
other day that another permit for a street-car line was
granted, and granted illegally. This administration stays
bought.

"Therefore, the streets are torn up in a dozen different parts
of town and left in that condition untouched for months with
the full consent of the administration. But this political
condition is not permanent. Some of these people will go to
jail. They will all be ousted at the next election. San
Francisco has had enough of them.

"The United Railroads is endeavoring to fortify one wrong by
committing another. These things will not be forgotten in a
hurry. We are convinced that the corporation is pursuing a
shortsighted policy. Costly litigation must ensue to test the
validity and extent of the overhead trolley permits. The people
will not consent to see their most valuable property traded
away by a lot of conscienceless boodlers, and if it should
prove that the United Railroads has been able to make two
wrongs constitute one right, it is very certain that a movement
of irresistible force will follow for a reduction of street-car
fares.

"We are convinced that it will pay the United Railroads to be
fair and decent with the people of San Francisco. The present
policy is neither fair nor decent. The service is bad, public
rights in the streets are outraged, and, worst of all, the
corporation is the most malign, corrupting influence in the
politics of our municipal government. There will come a
reckoning."

[57] See statement printed in San Francisco Examiner, May 4, 1906.

[58] Calhoun's letter to the Supervisors read:

"United Railroads of San Francisco.
"President's Office.
"San Francisco, May 14, 1906.

"To the Honorable Board of Supervisors of the City of San
Francisco--Gentlemen: The United Railroads of San Francisco
respectfully represents that, notwithstanding its urgent and
earnest efforts to provide adequate street railway
transportation on the lines being operated, constant pressure
is being applied and innumerable requests are being presented
to it to increase its transportation facilities.

"The company is anxious to please the people, and is willing to
do its part in the immediate upbuilding of the Greater San
Francisco, but owing to the unavailability of material and
machinery for operating its cable systems, as well as the great
length of time necessary to rebuild destroyed power-houses and
reconstruct its cable conduits, a long time would necessarily
elapse before the cable systems could be operated so as to give
the required relief to traffic congestion.

"If your Honorable Board will permit the use on the cable lines
of a standard electric system such as is now used on the
company's other lines, we will be glad to put all of our lines
in commission, and will agree to have them in complete
operation wherever grades will permit as rapidly as the most
liberal expenditure of money and the largest possible
employment of men will accomplish. The necessary expenditure
for labor and materials to do this work will run into the
millions, and will afford much-needed employment to several
thousand deserving men.

"We believe the prompt reconstruction of your lines of
transportation will inspire confidence in all investing capital
and greatly aid in the prompt rebuilding of your city.

"We submit these suggestions for your consideration at the
request of many of our citizens from every walk of life.

"Respectfully,
"PAT. CALHOUN, President."

[59] The trolley permit was passed to print on May 14. The Examiner,
in its issue of May 15, said:

"The United Railroads, with the rapacity for which it has ever
been noted, is seeking to capitalize the city's woe to its own
advantage.

"Before the disaster of April 18 it had been balked in its
purpose to make San Francisco a trolley town. The protests of
citizens who knew that the underground system is better than
the cheap, unsightly trolley system and had been proved safer,
had blocked the United Railroads project. And it seemed certain
that the scheme to cumber Market street and Sutter street with
poles and wires was definitely stopped.

"The emergency which demanded the swiftest possible
establishment of a transportation system, gave the United
Railroads its opportunity to revive the discreditable scheme.
As an emergency service nobody could object to the overhead
trolleys. But it was understood that the service was absolutely
temporary in its character and should only obtain during the
pendency of present conditions.

"Yesterday, however, there appeared out of the void of
forbidden things an ordinance that was hastily passed to print,
granting a franchise to the United Railroads to trolleyize its
whole system.

"It was expected evidently that this iniquitous measure could
be sneaked through under cover of the present stress and
excitement without people realizing until it was too late what
had been done.

"When the scheme was flushed it was still attempted to make it
appear that this was a temporary measure, a representation
absolutely varying with the language of the ordinance.

"But the scheme has not succeeded yet.

"It was to be expected that, like the looters who have to be
kept from other people's property by soldiers and police, San
Francisco's misfortune would bring out a horde of corporate
ghouls eager to snatch privileges during the time of disorder.
But it was likewise to be expected that the city
administration, which has been so alert to protect private
property, would be equally alert to protect the precious
possessions of the city.

"The railroads can only do what the city permits, and a strong
official scrutiny of the ordinance which was yesterday passed
to print should result in its final defeat.

"No matter what other claims an administration may have to the
gratitude and respect of the citizens of San Francisco, it
cannot afford to be known as the administration that put
trolley poles on Market street."

[60] The day that the ordinance granting the trolley permit was
ordered printed, Mayor Schmitz stated in an interview as
published in the Examiner:

"The proposed franchise is merely a temporary measure. It does
not mean that the United Railroads can indefinitely operate
their cars by the overhead trolley in Market street, or in the
streets formerly occupied by cable roads. It is necessary now
to have transportation. The cable roads cannot be repaired, I
am told, for some time. Meanwhile, the franchise to string
overhead wires has been granted. It can be revoked."

[61] At the Calhoun trial, William H. Sanderson testified to having
been introduced to Calhoun by Ruef at a public meeting, a few
days before the trolley permit was granted. He was then asked:

"Q. What, if any, conversation then ensued between yourself,
Mr. Ruef and Mr. Calhoun? A. Well, I stated--Mr. Calhoun was at
that time sitting at a large table in the room, where the
committee had held its session, and he rose out of his seat,
and the three of us held a conversation following that
introduction. I stated to Mr. Calhoun--I asked him when the
people of North Beach were or might expect railroad facilities,
that the population was coming back to that portion of the
city, and that other portions of the city were provided with
facilities, and that we were compelled to walk through miles of
burned district in order to get anywhere; and Mr. Calhoun said
in reply, that if the people of San Francisco desired railroad
facilities, they should co-operate with the railroad company
that was here to provide them with the same; and I said to Mr.
Calhoun that I thought that we were ready to do anything that
the company desired us to do, and asked him what in particular
he wished us to do, and he said: 'There is that trolley
privilege matter before the Supervisors; that comes up next
Monday, and you people of San Francisco ought to come down
before that Board, that the people of San Francisco, or you,
are vitally interested in the matter of this trolley permit.'
Mr. Ruef then said: 'Come down before the Board next Monday,
Sanderson, and make a talk on behalf of your organization in
favor of the trolley permit. We will see that you get the
privilege of the floor. A number of citizens of San Francisco
will be there, and we propose to show the press that the people
of San Francisco are behind this permit.' I said to Mr.
Calhoun: 'The papers tell me that this is a very valuable
franchise and you ought to pay the city something for it.' And
Mr. Calhoun said in substance that he thought that the company
would be paying all that the privileges was worth if it built
the road. Then I suggested to him that perhaps that sentiment
which objected to the disfigurement of Market street and Sutter
street by the erection of poles and wires, ought to be placated
to some extent, and I asked him why he would not at least put
the feed-wires under ground; and he said that that would entail
an expense which the company at that time was not or did not
think it advisable to meet. And then I asked him why he would
not put the poles 200 feet apart instead of 100 as--or 200 feet
apart, as was done in European cities, and he said that the
100-foot system was the more advisable in his opinion. And then
Mr. Ruef said to me: 'The passage of this permit will mean
immediate work for 5,000 men. We will be able to take them out
of the camps and put them at work.' And I said to Mr. Ruef:
'That is all very well, Mr. Ruef, but it seems to me that there
is another side to this question--a political side. The people
of San Francisco are at last all behind your administration.
What they need in this crisis is leadership, and we will have
to take such leadership as you give us; and now that everybody
is with you, and even the Bulletin has quit, it is not good
policy on your part to stir up another newspaper war. The
Examiner has been your friend ever since Schmitz was first
elected, and it will not swallow the trolley proposition in its
present form, and it is charging your administration with
corruption. If it persists in its fight it will eventually
break your back. It seems to me that it would be a
comparatively easy matter to placate this opposition by
exacting some compensation for this permit, either in the way
of cash or by way of a percentage of the proceeds of the road,
or you might limit it as to time; give them a permit for five
or ten years. You have them at your mercy and they are bound to
accept whatever terms you prescribe.' Mr. Ruef then said: 'To
hell with the Examiner, no public man can afford to swallow
that paper. This thing will go through on Monday. It is all
settled.' And then I said: 'You don't need me then,' and Mr.
Calhoun said: 'I don't think we do, Mr. Sanderson.' That is all
the conversation, or that is substantially all the conversation
that took place in regard to that matter."

[62] Said the Examiner in its issue of May 16, 1906: "It looks very
much as if Patrick Calhoun, Thornwell Mullally and their pals
of the United Railroads had sneaked up behind San Francisco
just as she lay wounded from earthquake and conflagration. In
the guise of helping her, they were caught picking her pocket.
If the Supervisors aid and abet them, the people will be
warranted in setting up their effigies in lasting bronze, a
group of everlasting infamy, with the inscription: 'THESE MEN
LOOTED SAN FRANCISCO AT THE TIME OF THE GREAT FIRE OF 1906.'"

[63] Of the failure to exact pay for the franchise, the Examiner of
May 17, 1906, said:

"Mayor Schmitz and the Board of Supervisors must know, and if
they do not know they are now informed, that the franchises
they propose to give away to the United Railroads are worth a
great deal of money to the city of San Francisco, and they
certainly do know that the city never was so greatly in need of
money as now. To give away so much of value at such a time is
so hideous a crime that it will leave a scar upon the
reputation of everybody concerned in it, no matter what that
reputation has been up to the time of the infamy."

[64] The Supervisors' letter to the Examiner was as follows:

"San Francisco, Cal., May 26, 1906.

"To 'The San Francisco Examiner,' City--Gentlemen: The Board of
Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco, regretting
the hostile stand which your journal has in these distressing
times assumed toward the rebuilding of our destroyed city, by
indiscriminately attacking every vested interest and all
intending investments of capital in this city, respectfully
submits for your consideration the propriety of joining with
instead of assailing those who are in good faith and with their
energy and ability striving to restore and rebuild our beloved
city.

"Irrespective of any personal feeling caused by your wanton
attacks on his Honor the Mayor, and on this Board, we ask of
you, as citizens of San Francisco and as the legislative branch
of our government, to cease your thoughtless and dangerous
efforts to drive away from our city every interest which has
expressed its intention to assist in our rebuilding and which
has manifested a practical confidence in our future. Otherwise,
the day will certainly not be far distant when the people,
realizing the result of your course, will seek to protect the
city against its further continuance.

"In all good faith for the city's interests and without any
personal rancor, these suggestions are submitted to your
careful attention.

"Respectfully, James L. Gallagher, Max Mamlock, Chas. Boxton,
L. A. Rea, F. P. Nicholas, Andrew M. Wilson, Geo. F. Duffey, J.
J. Furey. M. W. Coffey, Daniel G. Coleman, C. J. Harrigan, J.
J. Phillips, P. M. McGushin, E. I. Walsh, Sam Davis, Jas. T.
Kelly, Thomas F. Lonergan, W. W. Sanderson."

[65] Ruef, in his story of his political career, "The Road I
Traveled," states that in an interview with William F. Herrin,
chief of the Southern Pacific law department, previous to the
primary campaign, the necessary expenses of the primary
campaign and of the primary election were discussed. Herrin,
according to Ruef's account, agreed not to oppose the Ruef
tickets. "As agreed prior to the primary," Ruef goes on to say
in his narrative: "Herrin paid me $14,000 for the purpose of
securing for his organization the certainty of the votes of the
San Francisco delegation." See San Francisco Bulletin, August
31, 1912.

[66] Henshaw was re-elected. After Ruef had been convicted and the
Appellate Court had refused to grant him a new trial, Henshaw,
before the briefs had been filed in the matter of the appeal
from the Appellate to the Supreme Court, signed an order
granting Ruef a new hearing. See Chapter XXIX.

[67] See decisions in Edson vs. The Southern Pacific Co., 133 Cal.
Reports and 144 Cal. Reports.

[68] Nor was this criticism confined to San Francisco; it was
general throughout the State. The Sacramento Bee, in describing
the conditions prevailing at San Francisco, said:

"In the hold-ups which are now terrorizing the people of San
Francisco the citizens are seeing the effects of a loose or
dishonest municipal administration. The form of lawlessness now
prevailing in San Francisco follows upon bad local government
as inevitably as night follows day."

[69] Definite figures, alleged to be the graft schedule enforced in
the San Francisco tenderloin after the fire, were published.
The Chronicle of April 24, 1907, said on this score:

"After the great disaster of last April, or so soon as the new
tenderloin began to build up and the Barbary Coast district
began to establish itself, a schedule of prices for protected
vice was formulated. This schedule has been rigidly adhered to.
In the case of houses of ill-fame, the proprietors were
required to pay the policemen on the beat the sum of $5, the
sergeants $15, the captains $25, and the chief of police $75 to
$100 every week for the privilege of conducting their nefarious
business. The gambling houses were assessed according to their
ability to pay, but the average price for police protection,
according to Heney, was about the same as the houses of
prostitution. The dives along Pacific street and in the Barbary
Coast district were required to pay $50 every week to the
police captain and the chief, those two functionaries
presumably dividing the money. The sporting saloons where women
of the night life congregate were taxed a similar amount."

[70] Ruef advised strongly against Schmitz leaving San Francisco. In
an interview printed in the San Francisco Call, May 16, 1907,
the day after he had plead guilty to a charge of extorting
money from French restaurant dives, Ruef said:

"The great mistake of this whole thing began with the Mayor's
trip to Europe. The Mayor had been proclaimed as the man of the
hour after the disaster of last April. He was suddenly seized
with the desire of making a trip to Europe, where he expected
to be received as one of the crowned heads. He thought his fame
would spread throughout the world and he hoped to be lionized
abroad and, incidentally, gain social prestige. The whole thing
was a mistake. I begged him not to go. I pointed out to him
that the city was in ruins and the place for the Mayor was at
home. He persisted, and all my pleadings were in vain."

[71] At a preliminary meeting of the organizers of this movement,
held in the office of the California Canners, October 10, 1906,
responsibility for the state of affairs in San Francisco was
charged to Ruef. It was stated at this meeting, and given out
to the press, that convincing evidence had been secured against
Ruef which warranted his prosecution.

[72] Acting Mayor Gallagher was emphatic in declaring that no
vigilance committee should disgrace San Francisco. The interior
press, which was following the San Francisco situation closely
and from an independent standpoint, advised Mayor Gallagher
that the best way to prevent organization of such a committee
would be to enforce the laws. Said the Stockton Record:

"If Acting Mayor Gallagher and his associates wish to abate the
agitation in favor of a committee of safety for San Francisco,
they should do less talking and take more energetic action
against the thug element. The police department of the
afflicted city is now virtually on trial. It is even under
suspicion of offenses graver than that of inefficiency. One or
two more crimes of violence with well-known people as victims
will fire the public indignation of San Francisco to a point
where incapable officers will be forced aside and an authority
created to meet the grave emergency confronting respectable
citizenry."

The Stockton Independent went even further. Said that paper of
the San Francisco situation:

"Acting Mayor Gallagher of San Francisco declares there shall
be no vigilance committee and no lynching in San Francisco. If
he and the police are unable to prevent daily murders, or
attempted murders, by single criminals, how can he prevent good
citizens in hundreds of thousands from lynching those criminals
if they catch them? Perhaps some of the purblind members of the
police force may be among the first to be lynched."

[73] After Ruef's capture of the Union Square meeting, Rev. P. C.
Macfarlane, pastor of the First Christian Church at Alameda,
said in a sermon (October 21, 1906) of the San Francisco
situation:

"Let a few resolute, clean-handed business men of San Francisco
who are not cowards, who are not quitters or grafters, get
together and make a purse of twenty, fifty or a hundred
thousand dollars, then employ the ablest attorney to be had and
set quietly to work to find the graft and punish the grafters.
They could make chapel exercises on Sunday afternoon in San
Quentin look like a political rally in San Francisco inside of
two years.

"Thus Eugene E. Schmitz stands before the world as a man who
tried to reform and could not. He is a moral inebriate. He is a
welcher. He is a wanderer on the face of the globe, a man
without country, expatriated by his own cowardice. This is Dr.
Jekyll.

"But there are some who see in Schmitz Mr. Hyde. These do not
give the Mayor credit for even a spasm of virtue and say that
the great work of the morning of April 18 was done by General
Funston and prominent citizens of their own volition. These
people say that he has now gone from San Francisco, taking with
him vast sums of money gained through the granting of the
trolley franchise, plotted even while the embers smoldered, and
that he will never return.

"The United Railroads is universally believed to have acquired
its trolley franchises by corrupt means. It is said that
prominent merchants will crane and crook and bow and scrape to
get a nod of recognition from Abe Ruef. Ruef has used the
advantages given him by the state of affairs to corrupt the
greatest city in California. Ruef owns the Board of
Supervisors. The Police Commissioners belong to him. The
saloon-keeper who wants a license, a corporation that wants a
favor from the Board of Supervisors, has only to retain Ruef as
an attorney at a fee sufficiently large."

Dr. Macfarlane gave expression to what many thoughtful men were
thinking, but of which few with interests at San Francisco
dared to admit openly.

[74] Mr. Langdon's statement was published October 21, 1906. It was
in full as follows:

"In view of the present extraordinary conditions prevalent in
the City and County of San Francisco, the unusual increase in
crime, which threatens to grow worse as the winter sets in, and
in view of the numerous charges of official graft and
malfeasance in office, I have determined to seize the
opportunity presented, by the impanelment of a new grand jury,
which has been set down for next Wednesday by Hon. Thomas F.
Graham, the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court in the City
and County of San Francisco, to inaugurate a systematic and
thorough investigation into these conditions. It is my official
duty to do so, and in pursuance of that duty and in view of the
magnitude of the task, I have decided to seek the best
assistance obtainable. It is my purpose to set at rest these
charges of official graft by either proving them false or
convicting those who are guilty. If the charges be untrue,
their falsity should be demonstrated to the world, so as to
remove the impressions which have been circulated to the injury
of the credit and fair name of the city. If they be true we
should show to the country that there is enough strength,
virtue and civic pride in our people to enable the regularly
constituted machinery of justice to re-establish conditions on
a clean, righteous and just basis, without resort to any
extraordinary expedients outside the law. This is to be an
honest, fair, thorough and searching investigation. We shall
protect no man. We shall persecute no man, but we shall
prosecute every man who is guilty, regardless of position or
standing in the city. In order that we may have the benefit of
expert services in this work I have requested Mr. Francis J.
Heney, who has won national fame for his work in the
prosecution of the Oregon land fraud cases, to become a regular
deputy in my office. Mr. Heney has accepted. It is unfortunate
that this work should be commenced during a political campaign,
but the conditions in San Francisco to-day require that radical
action be taken at once, and though I may be charged with
instituting this investigation at this particular juncture for
political advantage, I must ask the public to judge me by the
results attained, which will be the best answer.

"I am not unmindful of the great difficulties involved in this
investigation. It will be both laborious and costly. The money
available under the appropriations made to the District
Attorney's office and the grand jury is, of course, utterly
inadequate. Often previous investigations by other grand juries
have been made abortive because of this lack of necessary funds
to meet expenses. In the present instance we shall not suffer
this severe handicap. I am authorized to announce that Mr.
Rudolph Spreckels has guaranteed that he will personally
undertake the collection from public-spirited citizens of a
fund to provide for the expenses necessary to make the
investigation thorough and so that good results may ensue. The
city is in deep affliction consequent upon the dreadful
calamities of last spring; it is in danger from certainly
increasing invasion of desperate criminals from all over the
world; some of the public departments are undoubtedly in bad
hands, and I appeal to my fellow-citizens to give this
investigation their moral support, so that the innocent may be
protected, so that the guilty may be punished, and so that San
Francisco may be helped to her feet and started again on the
high road of prosperity in her material conditions, and have
restored decency, efficiency, honesty and honor in her public
affairs.
"WILLIAM H. LANGDON, District Attorney."

CHAPTER V.

GRAFT PROSECUTION OPENS.

Three days after the announcement of his plans, District Attorney
Langdon appointed Heney to a regular deputyship. But even before Langdon
had taken office, as early as December, 1905, Fremont Older, editor of
the San Francisco Bulletin, had suggested to Heney that he undertake the
prosecution of those responsible for conditions in San Francisco.

The Bulletin had been the most fearless and consistent of the opponents
of the Schmitz-Ruef regime.[75] After Ruef's complete triumph at the
November election in 1905, he boasted that he would break the Bulletin
with libel suits. With every department of government in his control,
Ruef appeared to be in a position where, even though he might not be
able to make good his threat, he could cause the Bulletin much annoyance
if not great financial loss.

Older went on to Washington to engage Heney to defend the paper, should
Ruef attempt to make his boast good. Heney gave Ruef's threats little
credence. "I would be very glad to defend you," he told Older, "but I am
afraid I'll never get a chance to earn that fee."[76]

Incidentally Older stated that he believed a fund could be raised to
prosecute the corrupters of the San Francisco municipal government, and
asked Heney if he would undertake the prosecution, if such a fund could
be secured.

Heney replied that he would be glad to undertake it, but stated that at
least $100,000 would be required. And even with this amount, Heney
pointed out to Older, all efforts would be futile, unless the District
Attorney were genuinely in sympathy with the movement to better
conditions.

On Heney's return to California early in 1906, Older brought him and
Rudolph Spreckels[77] and James D. Phelan together. Heney and Spreckels
met for the first time. Phelan vouched for Langdon's[78] integrity and
honesty of purpose. Indeed, Langdon was already giving evidence of his
independence of the Ruef organization. Up to that time no attempt had
been made to raise the funds necessary to conduct a practical
investigation. Phelan stated that he would subscribe $10,000 and
Spreckels agreed to give a like amount. Spreckels undertook to look the
field over and expressed confidence that he could get twenty men who
would subscribe $5000 each, making the $100,000 which Heney had declared
to be necessary for the undertaking. The question of Heney's fee was
then raised.[79]

"If there be anything left out of the $100,000 we will talk about fee,"
Heney replied. "But I don't think there will be anything left and I will
put up my time against your money."

It was practically settled at this meeting that Heney should devote
himself to the prosecution of corruptionists against whom evidence might
be secured. He returned to Washington early in March to wind up his
affairs there. Before he could return to San Francisco, came the
earthquake and fire.

Heney got back to San Francisco April 25, one week after the disaster.
He had another conference with Spreckels.[80] Spreckels told him that he
wanted the investigation begun at the earliest possible moment, and that
he (Spreckels) would himself guarantee the expenses which might be
incurred.[81] Heney notified Burns, and as early as June[82] Burns had
begun the investigation that was to result in the downfall of Ruef, and
the scattering of his forces.

By the middle of the following October, Heney had so arranged his
affairs as to be free to devote himself to the San Francisco
investigation. His appointment as Deputy District Attorney followed.

In view of one of the principal defenses advanced by Ruef and his
allies, namely, that the graft prosecution was undertaken to injure the
United Railroads, these dates are important. The services for which the
bribe money which got the United Railroads into difficulties was paid,
were not rendered until May 21, 1906, long after final arrangements had
been made for Burns to conduct the investigation and Heney to assist in
the prosecution. The actual passing of the United Railroads bribe money
was not completed until late in August[83] of that year. Burns was at
work, and had received pay for his services before the bribe-giving for
which United Railroad officials were prosecuted had taken place.[84]

Langdon's announcement that he would appoint Heney as a Deputy District
Attorney, to assist in investigating into charges of official
corruption, brought upon him the condemnation of the municipal
administration and of the leaders of the Union-Labor party. P. H.
McCarthy and O. A. Tveitmoe, who, from opposing the Union-Labor party
movement in 1901-3 had, by the time the Graft Prosecution opened, become
prominent in its councils, were particularly bitter in their
denunciations. At a Ruef-planned mass meeting held at the largest
auditorium in the city October 31, 1906, for the purpose of organizing a
league for the protection of the administration, Langdon was dubbed
"traitor to his party," a man "who has gone back on his friends," "the
Benedict Arnold of San Francisco."

Heney was denounced as "the man from Arizona." On the other hand Mayor
Schmitz was called "the peerless champion of the people's rights," and
Ruef, "the Mayor's loyal, able and intrepid friend."

Thomas Egan, one of the organizers of the Union-Labor party, stated of
the graft prosecution: "This movement, led by Rudolph Spreckels and
engineered by James D. Phelan, conceived in iniquity and born in shame,
is for the purpose of destroying the labor organizations and again to
gain control of the government of our fair city."

Ruef, in an earnest address, insisted upon his innocence of wrongdoing.
"As sure as there is a God in heaven," he announced solemnly, "they have
no proof as they claim."[85]

Acting Mayor Gallagher issued a statement in which he took the same
ground as had Egan at the Dreamland Rink mass meeting, that the
prosecution was a movement on the part of the Citizens' Alliance to
disrupt the labor unions.[86]

From another angle, officials of public service corporations charged
those identified with the investigation with being in league with the
labor unions. In one of his statements to the public, Patrick Calhoun,
president of the United Railroads, set forth that, "I confidently expect
to defeat alike the machinations of Rudolph Spreckels, his private
prosecutor, with his corps of hired detectives, and Mr. Cornelius,
president of the Carmen's Union, the leader of anarchy and lawlessness,
and to see fairly established in this community the principles of
American liberty, and the triumphs of truth and justice."[87]

Then, too, there were points at which the two supposed extremes,
corporation magnates and Labor-Union politicians, touched in their
opposition to the prosecution. At a meeting held on November 2, 1906,
less than two weeks after Heney's appointment, John E. Bennett,
representing the Bay Cities Water Company, read a paper in which Heney
and Langdon were denounced as the agents of the Spring Valley Water
Company. The Chronicle, in its issue of November 3, charged that the
paper read by Mr. Bennett was type proof of a pamphlet that was to be
widely distributed, and that the proof sheets had been taken to the
meeting by George B. Keane, secretary of the Board of Supervisors.[88]

On the other hand, practically the entire press of the city,[89] the
general public and many of the labor unions gave the prosecution
unqualified endorsement, welcoming it as opportunity, in an orderly way,
either to establish beyond question, or to disprove, the charges against
the administration of incompetency and corruption.[90] Rudolph
Spreckels's statement, that "this is no question of capital and labor,
but of dishonesty and justice,"[91] was generally accepted as true
expression of the situation.

Those directly connected with allegations or suggestion of irregular
practices, issued statements disclaiming any knowledge of irregularity
or corruption. General Tirey L. Ford, chief counsel of the United
Railroads, in a published interview,[92] stated that no political boss
nor any person connected with the municipal administration had
benefited financially to the extent of one dollar in the trolley permit
transaction, and that had any one profited thereby, he (Ford) in his
official capacity would have known of it. Those connected with the
administration were as vigorous in their denials.[93] Many of them
expressed satisfaction at the prospect of an investigation. Supervisor
Kelly went so far as to suggest that the municipality give $5000 to
assist in the inquiry. "Let us," said Supervisor Lonergan, "get to the
bottom of this thing. These cracks about graft have been made right
along, and we should have them proved or disproved at once."

But in spite of this brave front, the developments of the years of
resistance of the graft prosecution show the few days following Heney's
appointment as Assistant District Attorney to have been a period of
intense anxiety to Ruef and his immediate advisers. Ruef held daily
consultations with Acting Mayor Gallagher, Clerk Keane, and his
attorney, Henry Ach. The public knew little of these consultations, but
a rumor became current that Mayor Gallagher would suspend District
Attorney Langdon from office. Little credence was given this, however.
Nevertheless, on the night of October 25 Acting Mayor Gallagher
suspended Langdon from office, and appointed Abraham Ruef to be District
Attorney to conduct the graft investigations.[94]

The following morning the San Francisco Call, under a large picture of
Ruef, printed the words: "THIS MAN'S HAND GRIPS THE THROAT OF SAN
FRANCISCO."

FOOTNOTES:

[75] The persecution of the Bulletin during this period was
characteristic of Ruef's methods and reflected the state of
lawlessness which prevailed in San Francisco. R. A. Crothers,
proprietor of the paper, was assaulted and badly beaten. The
newsboys organized into a union. The boys were sincere enough,
but the movement was in reality engineered from the tenderloin.
Soon a strike of newsboys against the Bulletin was inaugurated.
Copies of the paper were snatched from the hands of citizens
who purchased it. Bulletin carriers and agents were assaulted.
Tugs of its delivery wagons were cut. When the paper was
delivered to stores, sticks and stones were thrown in after it.
The police did not interfere. The manifestations of lawlessness
went unchecked. Libel suits were brought against the Bulletin.
Business boycotts were attempted against it.

[76] See address made by Heney before Citizens' League of Justice in
October, 1908.

[77] Rudolph Spreckels, although connected with large enterprises,
had steadfastly refused to employ Ruef as an attorney, or to
join with him in any way. Given control of the San Francisco
Gas Company, for example, although he was importuned to do so,
Spreckels refused to employ Ruef as attorney for that company.
Spreckels testified at the trial of The People vs. Patrick
Calhoun, that he had first realized the necessity of proceeding
against Ruef and the Ruef-Schmitz administration when Ruef
proposed to him to organize a syndicate to purchase San
Francisco municipal bonds. Spreckels testified that Ruef set
forth his plan as follows:

"He (Ruef) asked me if I would get together a syndicate for the
purpose of bidding on these bonds; that he would guarantee that
if I did get up such a syndicate, our bid would be a successful
bid; that we would not be obliged to bid above par, and that he
would guarantee that we would be the successful bidders. My
reply to Mr. Ruef was that I could not understand how anybody
could make such an agreement or promise, and how did he propose
to make such a statement--to carry out what he had stated. He
said: 'Why, that is a simple matter. You know my connection
with the Labor Unions and the Labor Union party. Just at the
time that the bids are about to come in, I will arrange to tie
up this town; we will have the biggest strike that the
community has ever known, and I would like to see any of your
bankers or your capitalistic friends bid on the bonds under
those circumstances, excepting yourself, those that are in the
know'--words to that effect, was his expression. I said to Mr.
Ruef: 'Do you mean to say, Mr. Ruef, that for the purpose of
making money you would bring about a strike which might entail
even bloodshed, for the mere sake of making money?' And Mr.
Ruef flushed up and said: 'Oh, no; I was only joking.' And he
soon withdrew from my office."

It is interesting to compare Spreckels' attitude toward Ruef
with that of I. W. Hellman, as shown by Hellman's testimony at
the trial of Tirey L. Ford. See footnote 7, page 15.

[78] Heney, in his address on the work of the Graft Prosecution,
October, 1908, paid Langdon the following high tribute:

"Mr. Langdon, as soon as we laid the matter before him and
convinced him it was in good faith and not to serve private
interests, said: 'Yes, I will appoint Mr. Heney assistant in my
office and give him full sway to make a thorough investigation,
on one condition, and that is that I am kept personally in
touch with everything going on at all times. I am District
Attorney and I propose to be District Attorney and to act upon
my own judgment.' And there never has been a time that Mr.
Langdon didn't have absolute sway over all matters, and did not
wholly consent to what was done, and he has had the final say
in everything, and I wish to say that there is more credit due
to him than to any of us. He had a greater personal sacrifice
to make.

"The first thing he had to take into consideration was that he
had gone into office as the candidate of the Labor party, and
he knew he would be called a traitor and denounced if it
appeared that any man who had been on the same ticket as he had
been elected upon had been grafting. He had to possess more
moral than physical courage, and a higher kind of moral
courage, and that courage was exercised to the credit of San
Francisco as well as to the credit of Mr. Langdon."

[79] The Graft Defense labored without success to make it appear
that Heney was compensated for his service. Out of the
Prosecution fund, the expenses--rental, clerical hire,
etc.--of offices, so far as they were maintained especially
for the work of the Graft Prosecution, were paid. These were
known as "Heney's offices." When Rudolph Spreckels was on the
stand at the Calhoun trial, he testified under Heney's
announcement that the Defense could ask him any question it
chose and no objection would be made. Earl Rogers, for
Calhoun, endeavored to make it appear that Heney was getting
pay.

"Mr. Spreckels," Rogers asked, "in addition to paying Mr.
Heney's office expenses, amounting to five or six hundred
dollars a month, have you paid other expenses for Mr. Heney?"

"No, sir," Spreckels replied.

Heney, the testimony all through shows, received not a dollar
to compensate him for his services to the city; moreover, it
shows that he had given up business which would have brought
him large fees, that he might be free to conduct the Graft
Prosecution. See transcript Calhoun trial, pages 3837 and on,
3746, 3743, etc.

The efforts of well-compensated attorneys for the Defense to
make it appear that Heney was paid for his work, furnish one of
the amusing features of the graft trials.

[80] The conference was held on May 10 or 11. This was four days
before the Supervisors took the preliminary steps toward
granting the United Railroads its overhead trolley permit, and
several months before the bribe money was paid.

[81] See testimony of Rudolph Spreckels at trial of The People vs.
Patrick Calhoun, No. 1436.

[82] Al McKinley was the first detective put to work for the Graft
Prosecution. On May 25, 1906, Chief Burns detailed him to
watch Ruef. Later, June 19, 1906, Burns directed Robert Perry
to shadow Ruef. Perry did so until nearly a year later, when
Ruef was placed in the custody of an elisor.

[83] That prosecution of officials of the United Railroads was not
thought of when the graft prosecution was begun, was brought
out at the trial of The People vs. Patrick Calhoun, No. 1436.
The following, for example, is taken from Rudolph Spreckels'
testimony:

"Mr. Heney--Q. At the time that Mr. Phelan agreed to contribute
the $10,000, Mr. Spreckels, what did you say, if anything,
about contributing yourself? A. That was in the first meeting,
I think, Mr. Heney, and I told him that I was ready and willing
to contribute a similar amount: that I believed it would be
possible to get others to join and contribute.

"Q. At that time was anything said by any person about
prosecuting Mr. Calhoun? A. Absolutely no.

"Q. Or any person connected with the United Railroads Company?
A. The discussion was entirely confined to the administration,
the corrupt

"Q. At that time did you have any purpose or intention of
prosecuting Mr. Calhoun? A. I had not.

"Q. Did you have any reason to believe that Mr. Calhoun at that
time had committed any crime? A. I had no indication of such a
crime.

"Mr. Moore--Was that time fixed, Mr. Heney?

"Mr. Heney--Yes, it was fixed; the first conversation, and he
has fixed it as nearly as he could.

"The Court--Have you in mind the testimony on that point, Mr.
Moore? There was some reference to it in an earlier part of the
examination.

"Mr. Heney--Q. When you had the talk with Mr. Heney in April,
1906, did you say anything about prosecuting Mr. Calhoun, or
anybody connected with the United Railroads? A. I did not.

"Q. Did you at any time tell Mr. Heney that you desired to have
him prosecute Mr. Patrick Calhoun? A. I did not, at any time.

"Q. Did you tell him at any time that you desired to have him
prosecute any person connected with the United Railroads
Company? A. I did not." See transcript The People vs. Patrick
Calhoun, No. 1436, page 3730.

[84] Rudolph Spreckels testified at the trial of The People vs.
Patrick Calhoun, No. 1436:

"Mr. Perry was employed to get information in regard to Mr.
Abraham Ruef and the city administration as early as June,
1906, and his efforts and of one other man employed at that
time were directed toward that and that only."

[85] See San Francisco newspapers, November 1, 1906.

[86] Gallagher's statement was in full as follows:

It seems to me that these assaults that are being made upon
Mayor Schmitz are exceedingly reprehensible. It is strange that
the gentlemen who are making the attacks did not see fit to
make them while Mayor Schmitz was here. Especially does this
apply to Langdon, who, by reason of past association with Mayor
Schmitz, and favors received by him from the Mayor, should have
been the last man to attempt to besmirch the Mayor in his
absence. I am satisfied that all these attacks upon the
administration officials have their origin in the
long-continued attempt on behalf of the Citizens' Alliance to
disrupt the labor organizations of the city. An administration
that is friendly to organized labor is an impassable obstacle
in the way of such a purpose. The enormous amount of labor of
all kinds that will have to be performed in this city during
the next few years has undoubtedly prompted the organizers of
the old Citizens' Alliance to renew their assaults upon the
officials elected by the Union Labor party in the hope that
they may thereby themselves secure control of the municipal
administration and thus work out their own will in the matter
of the conditions under which labor shall perform the task of
rebuilding this city.

"So far as I am concerned personally, I consider that the
disruption of the labor organization would be a great sacrifice
of the interests of all of the people. The city must be built
up; but the Citizens' Alliance and all organizations and
individuals in sympathy with it may as well understand, first
as last, that the work will only be done through organized
labor, and not by the employment of pauper labor in competition
with the mechanics and artisans of the labor unions.

"That this view of the situation is well recognized by the
labor organizations of the city is shown by the action of the
Building Trades Council last night in approving and indorsing
my action in removing Mr. Langdon."

[87] Contained in a statement published May 18, 1907. See San
Francisco papers of that date.

[88] The nature of the attacks upon the supporters of the
Prosecution is shown by the proceedings in the libel suit
brought by the San Francisco First National Bank against the
Oakland Tribune. Rudolph Spreckels was president of the bank;
the Tribune was one of the stanchest of the opponents of the
prosecution. The Tribune charged that the Graft Prosecution
had for one of its objects the unloading of the Spring Valley
Water Company's plant upon San Francisco, and that the First
National Bank was burdened with Spring Valley securities.
Among other things the article set forth:

"The recent disclosures of the methods by which it was soug

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