The Story of the Zulu Campaign
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Title: The Story of the Zulu Campaign
Author: Waller Ashe
Edmund Verney Wyatt-Edgell
Release date: June 15, 2013 [eBook #42956]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE STORY OF THE ZULU CAMPAIGN ***
Transcriber's Note:
Minor spelling and typographical errors have been corrected without
note. Variant spellings, mostly proper nouns, have been retained:
_Inyezane_, _Inyesani_, _Inyezani_, _Ingesani_, etc. The oe ligature
is represented by [oe].
THE STORY
OF
THE ZULU CAMPAIGN.
BY
MAJOR ASHE (LATE KING'S DRAGOON GUARDS),
AUTHOR OF "THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS OF FRANCE," ETC.
AND
CAPTAIN THE HON. E. V. WYATT-EDGELL
(17TH LANCERS, KILLED AT ULUNDI).
_DEDICATED BY SPECIAL PERMISSION TO HER IMPERIAL MAJESTY_
THE EMPRESS EUGÉNIE.
WITH MAP.
London:
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE, & RIVINGTON,
CROWN BUILDINGS, 188, FLEET STREET.
1880.
[_All rights reserved._]
LONDON:
Gilbert and Rivington, Printers,
St. John's Square.
TO HER IMPERIAL MAJESTY
THE EMPRESS EUGÉNIE
_THIS RECORD OF THE ZULU WAR IS, BY GRACIOUS PERMISSION, HUMBLY
DEDICATED, AS A POOR TRIBUTE AND OFFERING_.
In Memoriam.
Worthy of the Race of Guzman, and of the soldier of Lodi and Arcola,
while recalling memories of him who gave to the gods of the Tiber the
gift most precious to Rome--Human Valour--PRINCE LOUIS NAPOLEON'S name
will live in the hearts of all his English comrades, as a type of pure
chivalry, of knightly generosity, and as a rainbow of Hope over two
great western powers, for centuries at war, but now allied in
friendship.
PREFACE.
Some apology or explanation may be deemed requisite, for delaying the
publication of this "Story of the Zulu War" for more than a year after
its conclusion. The little book itself was written very shortly after
the capture of the king, Cetywayo, and the tardiness of its appearance
has been, to a certain extent, intentional on my part.
Although it may seem ungracious and, perhaps, ungrateful to cavil at the
war criticisms and descriptions which, by every post and telegram, adorn
the pages of contemporaneous journalism, I would submit that the
practice of writing _ex cathedrâ_ on war topics the day after an
engagement, is too early to allow us to examine motives as well as
facts, so that we may form conclusions to which we can only justly
arrive, when "Time, the corrector, where our judgments err," has
softened prejudice and exposed partisan feeling. The worst and most
valueless criticisms on Waterloo were given to the world immediately
after the fight of Mont St. Jean. The most unreliable, and indeed
erroneous, opinions in regard to the splendid errors of Inkerman and
Balaklava, appeared before the Crimean war was ended, and many a hero,
elevated by the verdict of contemporaneous eulogy to a temporary
pedestal in the Temple of Fame, has since been dethroned by the calmer
and more honest judgment of a later generation. When the Emperor
Napoleon called us a "nation of shopkeepers," he, perhaps,
intentionally, paid us a compliment; for peace, commerce, and
prosperity, have, as a rule, I venture to hold, been more regarded in
our islands than projects of violence, warfare, or conquest; and this
with us has ever been an honourable characteristic of the Spirit of our
present Age.
But as Sir Bartle Frere, one of England's greatest, wisest, and most
humane administrators, was well aware, the great and time-honoured law
of self-defence sometimes compels a State, like an individual, to resort
to arms, and the Appeal of Battle, when all peaceful modes of
arrangement have been vainly tried, becomes occasionally unavoidable.
Then, and perhaps only then, we may be allowed, even by the Peace
Society and the Acolytes who trim the lamps for Mr. John Bright, to take
an interest in and feel proud of the disciplined courage, the love of
honour, and the sense of duty of which we read in the campaigns, where
those who are near and dear to us have fought and fallen under the
British flag. Then the commanders we may have known as subalterns, but
whose names are now in all circles as veritable "Household Words;" whose
careers we have watched with proud, yet kindly sympathy, and whose
triumphs we have seemed as countrymen to share; whose powers of
intellect and prescience array, regulate, and wield at will the grim and
stern materials at command; whose daring, and yet coolness in the midst
of death, acts like a talisman upon the rank and file--whose
providence, when one path fails, is ever ready for fresh resources and
designs--are not these the men of whom we may say with Tacitus,--
_"Ratio et consilium propriæ Ducis artes"?_
and of this class, I venture to think, were Lord Chelmsford and his
lieutenants. And when we are ourselves in the "sere and yellow leaf," or
have joined, mayhap, that "larger majority" which Gladstonian tactics
and energy cannot hope to rival, our children and children's children,
when they read of such names as Bartle Frere, Chelmsford, Wood, Pearson,
Buller, and Piet Uys, may look back to English History and see that our
"island mastiffs" have not become degenerate, either in courage or
generosity, since the days of Harold, the Black Prince, or that knightly
Sydney who fell at Zutphen!
Some experience of the Kaffir tribes and their characteristics, of the
physical and geographical difficulties which attend upon a campaign in
South Africa,--dating, indeed, as far back as a score of years ago, and
the interest which I have since taken in colonies where, as an Adjutant,
I passed some very happy years among Boers, Bôk, and Kaffirs, had at the
commencement of the late war prompted me to follow its various phases,
with a view to write the story of the campaign. In this purpose I was
encouraged by the offers of many old comrades who were about to start
with their regiments for the seat of war, and who promised me by each
available opportunity the assistances of their several journals, notes,
and sketches.
"But one I would select from that proud throng,
· · · · ·
And partly that bright names will hallow song,
And his was of the bravest."
And to those who have known that most accomplished gentleman and gallant
soldier, young, brave, cheery, and _débonnaire_, Edmund Wyatt-Edgell, I
need not say how delighted I was at his undertaking to correspond with
me, and, as far as time and opportunity permitted, to keep me _au
courant_ with the march of events. From the time of his arrival at Natal
to the fatal day on which he fell, he fulfilled that promise, and if any
merit be due to the narrative I now present to public notice, it will, I
believe, come through those descriptions which I received from my dead
comrade and friend--_Sit tibi terra levis!_
Another motive, or perhaps more than one, "pricked the sides of my
intent," and invited me to wield the pen upon a soil where erst I had
drawn a "regulation" sword. In the "unvexed silence of a student's
cell," i.e., London chambers, I could only watch the progress of the
campaign, without hoping to share in its toils or its dangers. I might
envy, but I could not participate--
"For who can view the ripen'd rose, nor seek
To wear it?"
In default of this, I could, however, follow in spirit the adventures,
by flood and field, of more than a score of old comrades and companions
in arms, who were winning honour and renown in a land not unfamiliar to
me. In the hasty and, with all deference I say it, somewhat ignorant
criticism of those amateur mentors who tell us how battles ought or
ought not to be won, and who, from the calm solitudes of Fleet Street,
would make or mar a military reputation, I venture to believe, was much
injustice done to the Commander-in-chief of our forces in South Africa.
"A man must serve his time to every trade
Save censure. Critics all are ready made."
And I was the more convinced of this partisan and hostile feeling from
the knowledge that, west of Temple Bar, and especially in the regions
where veterans do most congregate, in the clubs and haunts alike of
_vieilles moustaches_ and military neophytes, from the "Senior" to the
"Naval and Military," criticism was far less pronounced, and experience,
as it invariably is, was more moderate in stricture and charitable in
argument than elsewhere.
Lastly, the tragic fate of England's young chivalrous and knightly
guest, which formed such a terrible episode of the war and draped our
colours with mourning, even in the hour of victory, made a deep
impression upon my mind, and caused me insensibly to marvel at the
unworthy sentiments to which a large portion of the English public and
the English press at that time gave utterance. Political feeling seemed
then, as it now seems in poor Ireland, to override all sense of manly
honour, generosity, hospitality, or common decency. The slaughter, for
it was nothing less, of the princely and noble lad, who came to the
shores of his country's hereditary foe, as a messenger of hope, alliance
and future friendship, who had been taught by his father to love and
study our English laws and customs, and who, in his abandonment in that
fatal donga, must have felt shame for the comrades to whom his safety
was entrusted; the sacrifice, I say, of this pure and devoted spirit,
seemed to me to call for some record, less evanescent than a passing
note or a newspaper article. If I have spoken strongly of the living in
my sorrow for the dead, as a soldier I can but plead in vindication,
that, in all my remembrance of the records of our English army I can
recall no instance, save the one I have quoted, where an officer wearing
our royal uniform and holding a royal commission, galloped away in front
of his escort, and allowed a comrade to be done to death in unknightly
fashion!
In conclusion I may say that this little work, although written _con
amore_ and from details furnished to me by my friend, Captain the Hon.
E. V. Wyatt-Edgell, and others, lays no claim to historical value, but
assumes to be merely the _impressions de voyage_ of those who were
actors in the scenes described.
WALLER ASHE.
Hare Court, Temple,
_Nov. 1880._
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
Origin of Zulus--Their tribes--Senzagacone--Chaka--His
wars--Innovations--Administration--Standing
army--Death--Position of Zulus amongst kindred tribes--First
contact with whites--The Boers--The English--Panda--His reign
and death--Accession of Cetywayo--His promises to the
English--Breaches of faith--The boundary question--Its origin
and nature--The case of Sirayo--Its history--The Middle Drift
affair--Other causes of war--The Ultimatum sent--Official
declaration of war--State of the British forces--Cetywayo's
army and its organization--Their tactics. 1
CHAPTER II.
Plan of campaign--Native levies--Special service officers--The
advance--Pearson's column--Glyn's column--Wood's
column--Utrecht--First brush with the enemy--Difficulties of
transport--Action on Inyezani--Pearson at Ekowe--Glyn's
advance--Durnford's failure--Isandhlwana--Description of
camp--The battle--Details--Reconnaissance and return of Lord
Chelmsford--Rorke's Drift--Causes of Isandhlwana--Remarks. 24
CHAPTER III.
Ekowe described--The fort--Guard for the frontier--Raid on
Dabulamanzi's Kraal--Another raid--Life in Ekowe--Wood at
Potter's Kraal--Capture of Baglusini--Skirmish and capture
of cattle--Destruction of Manyanyoba Kraal--Colonel
Rowlands--Capture of Makatees Kop--Junction with Wood--Camp
at Kambula--Coming in of Oham--Disaster at Intombi
Drift--Death of Moriarty--Rescue of Oham's wives and
people--Events that led to the attack on Umbelini--The
Zlobani--The attack--Details--Death of Campbell--Narrow
escape of Wood--Death of Weatherly--St. Helena and H.M.S.
"Shah." 67
CHAPTER IV.
Effects of Zlobani--Description of Kambula Camp--Desperate Zulu
attack thereon--Description of the battle--Deaths of
Lieutenants Bright and Nicholson--Gallant rescue by Captain
Woodgate--Force and commanders of the Zulu attack--Their
losses--The English losses--Fortifications at Kambula
Kop--Block House--Arrival of despatches--Exciting scene. 132
CHAPTER V.
Organization of column for relief of Ekowe--The
march--Heliographic signals--Camp at Ginghilovo--Disposition
of the troops--Zulu advance--The battle--English
victory--Death of Colonel Northey--English losses--Zulu force
and loss--Relief of Ekowe--Meeting of Pearson and
Chelmsford--State of Ekowe garrison--Barrow's cavalry raid on
Dabulamanzi's kraal--British sentry firing on British troops. 156
CHAPTER VI.
End of first period of the Zulu war--Organization of fresh
advance--Reinforcements from England--Scene in
Durban--Disembarkation of troops--Cavalry camp at Berea--Lord
Chelmsford's arrival at Durban--His reception--Review of
Lancers and King's Dragoon Guards at Cato Manor--Plan of new
campaign--Composition of No. 1 column--Composition of No. 2
column--Cask bridge over Amatikula--Forts Crealock and
Chelmsford--Wood's reconnaissance to Blood River--Description
of Blood River and its scenery--Appearance of Buller's Light
Horse--Removal of Wood's Kambula camp--Grandier's capture and
escape--His tale--Description of Dabulamanzi and
Cetywayo--Death of Dabulamanzi. 184
CHAPTER VII.
Lord Chelmsford with Wood at Kambula--Patrol by Buller--Capture
of cattle--Scene from Kambula Kop--Zulu attack on
patrol--Removal of Wood's camp to Mayegwhana--Wood's
force--Scarcity of drivers and voorlopers--Newdigate at
Conference Hill--Fort and depôt at Conference Hill--Work of
No. 1 column--Exciting incident with a convoy--Distribution
of troops--Forts on the Tugela, Inyezani, and at
Ginghilovo--System of guards and precautions against
surprises--All ready for the advance--Recapitulation of
military situation--Newdigate's forts at Landsman's
Drift--Arrangements for garrisons in rear of advance--The
Lower Tugela command--Patrol by Wood and Buller in direction
of Isandhlwana--Second patrol by Buller--Zulu attack--The
Prince Imperial on patrol--Reconnaissance in force to
Isandhlwana and burial of the dead. 221
CHAPTER VIII.
Advance of the 2nd column--Landsman's Drift to Kopje
Allein--Description of camp--Plan of campaign--Discovery of
Port Durnford--It becomes the base of 1st division--Troops
composing 1st column--Crealock's journey to Durnford. 256
CHAPTER IX.
Death of the Prince Imperial--Lieutenant Carey's
account--Discrepancies in and comments thereon--Feeling in
the camp--Expedition under General Marshall to search for the
body--Description of the spot--Recovery of the
body--Court-martial on Carey. 268
CHAPTER X.
March of the 2nd column--Kopje Allein--Climate of the
locality--Sickness among the troops--Evil effects of
Cardwell's system--Embassy from Zulu chiefs--Cavalry
skirmish--Death of Adjutant Frith--Difficulties of
transport--Reinforcement of Wood--Appointment of Sir Garnet
Wolseley--Opinion of the troops thereon--Alleged
inhumanities--The helioscope. 295
CHAPTER XI.
Advance of 1st column--Description of route--Forts Crealock and
Chelmsford--Causes of delay--Sickness of troops and its
origin--Capture of cattle--Proposals for peace by
Umsintwanga--His interview with Crealock--Surrender of
Umguelumgwizi--Advance of 2nd division--Details of troops
composing it--A fortified kraal--Fort built by Wood on the
Umlatoosi--Patrol by Buller--Burning of five kraals in the
Usipexi district--Amhlabatini--Depôt there described--Envoys
from Cetywayo--Advance to White Umvolosi--Wood's camp--Lord
Chelmsford's ultimatum to Cetywayo. 311
CHAPTER XII.
Raid across the Umvolosi by Buller--Gallant rescue of a
sergeant by Lord William Beresford--Buller's losses--Umvolosi
crossed by the main body--Formation of troops into
square--Total numbers--Firing of kraals--Advance of Zulus
from Ulundi--The Zulu attack--Repulse of Zulus--Pursuit by
Cavalry--Death of Wyatt-Edgell--Losses of both
sides--Withdrawal of English army--Effects of the battle of
Ulundi--Surrender of 700 Zulus to Crealock--Cause of retreat
after Ulundi--Resignation of Lord Chelmsford--His farewell
parade--Epitome of work done by 1st column, and why it was
not present at Ulundi--Ondini burnt by Barrow. 337
CHAPTER XIII.
Arrival of Sir Garnet Wolseley--Reception at Durban--Changes
made by Wolseley--His plans for the future--Attempt to land
at Port Durnford and its failure--Sir Garnet at St.
Paul's--Grand council of Zulu chiefs--Resignation of General
Crealock--His farewell to his troops at Camp Umlalasi--Fêtes
in honour of Lord Chelmsford--Wolseley at
Pietermaritzburg--Disturbances in Pondoland and
Transvaal--Wolseley at Rorke's Drift--McLeod and the
Swazis--Their appearance and habits--Wolseley at
Intanjaneni--Surrender of guns by Mbelebele--Adhesion of
various chiefs. 359
CHAPTER XIV.
Plans for the capture of Cetywayo--The Jantjis--Vijn's
appearance at Victoria--His narrative--Its
consequences--Despatch of Major Barrow and Lord Gifford in
pursuit of the king--Their march--Description of country
traversed--Gifford and Maurice sent on by Barrow--Marches and
countermarches--Physical characteristics of country; its
flora and fauna--Visit to kraal of friendly Zulus--Capture of
two of the king's attendants--Women of the king's household
captured--Captain and twenty Basutos join Lord
Gifford--Gifford's stratagem to obtain information of the
king's hiding-place--Cetywayo's refuge discovered--Forced
night-march--Message to Major Marter--His arrival on the
scene--Capture of the king. 379
* * * * *
NOTES 406
THE STORY OF THE ZULU CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER I.
Origin of Zulus--Their tribes--Senzagacone--Chaka--His
wars--Innovations--Administration--Standing army--Death--Position of
Zulus amongst kindred tribes--First contact with whites--The
Boers--The English--Panda--His reign and death--Accession of
Cetywayo--His promises to the English--Breaches of faith--The
boundary question--Its origin and nature--The case of Sirayo--Its
history--The Middle Drift affair--Other causes of war--The Ultimatum
sent--Official declaration of war--State of the British
forces--Cetywayo's army and its organization--Their tactics.
The Emashlabatini country was originally occupied by a small tribe
called the Abanguni; of its more ancient kings little is known beyond
that they seem to have been of peaceful habits, making no wars, but
breeding cattle; also that the name of one was Zulu. In their own
country the appellation of Abanguni in course of time died out, though
still used by their neighbours, and for it was substituted Abakwa-Zulu
(sons of Zulu), Zulu and Undabezita. The tribe was composed of several
families or clans, each having its own chieftain. In the time of
Cetywayo's reign the names of these clans and their respective chiefs
were as follows:--The Uhutilezi, a family having two branches; Umnyama,
Cetywayo's prime minister, was chief of one, and Umtyubane of the other;
the Ubixela and Umgazi, who were divisions of one family, the former
owning Umvumhlana as chief, the latter Sigodi--subsequently slain at
Isandhlwana--whose predecessor was Panda's prime minister Masipula, and
his successor Mapoko; the Umtombelo and Umblalosi, also two branches of
one family, whose respective chiefs were Mabanda and Segetwayo; the
Uquabe, whose chief was named Rouhlo; the Uzimgu, whose chieftain
rejoiced in the appellation of Unfanawenklela; the Fakazi, whose chief
was Umkasana; the Umtanzi, with a chieftain Umbono by name; and the
Igazi, whose head was Umkanyile; the Amagungebe, their chief was the
notorious Sirayo; the Ukanyile, whose chief was Upagatwayo; the Ulanga,
their chief Umhlaka; the Umpingose, whose chief was Ganse; and the
Umhloben, a scattered family having no head.
The word Zulu, or Undabezita, was invariably employed in addressing any
member of these families, whatever his rank or station might happen to
be.
The first king of whom any particulars are known was Senzagacone, son of
Ufaina. When this king began to reign he had no legitimate offspring: he
had, however, a natural son by Unamdi, daughter of Umkeki, chief of the
Langmene tribe, named Chaka (the bastard). He afterwards married this
Unamdi, by whom he had a daughter Nuncoba, but no sons. She being his
favourite wife, the king, according to the custom of the country, "gave
her for a son," his natural son Chaka, thus legitimating him. When Chaka
was fifteen, his father, thinking he might become troublesome, sent to
kill him; but Chaka, being warned, fled to Dingiswayo, chief of the
Umtwetwa, where he remained until the king's death, though on the
occasion of his legitimation an invitation was given him to return to
the paternal kraal.
Meanwhile Chaka had become an Induna of great influence and popularity
in the land of his refuge; so when on the death of Senzagacone the Zulu
tribe sent to him requesting him to be their king, and he consented, all
the tribes through which he passed on his way to the Zulus accompanied
him; and the whole of the Zulu clans assembled to meet him, and he was
made king with great rejoicings. In the interim between Senzagacone's
death and Chaka's accession, Umkaibye (paternal aunt of Chaka) ruled the
Zulus and arranged for Chaka's return. It was now that the jealousy long
smouldering between the Umdwandwe and the Umtwetwa, the two most
powerful tribes in that part of Africa, broke into an open quarrel.
Uzwidi, chief of the former, attacked and utterly routed the latter,
killing their chief, Dingiswayo, Chaka's friend and protector. The
worsted tribe naturally applied to Chaka for help. Thereupon Uzwidi
immediately marched to attack the Zulus, and a great battle ensued on
the south of the White Umvolosi. The result was that the left wing of
either army was victorious; but both lost so heavily that they retired
to their respective countries.
On his retreat, Chaka was attacked by the Langmeni, but failing in their
assault, this tribe then deserted their own country and joined the
Umdwandwe. Having defeated another coast tribe which assailed him, Chaka
occupied both these countries, leaving the Emashlabatini district waste
and uninhabited.
Uzwidi had now gathered a fresh army, which Chaka, by a night march,
surprised and defeated between Kwagmagwasa and the Umhlatuzi river. He
then retreated, but was rapidly followed up by Uzwidi, who had soon
regathered his forces, and who succeeded in capturing much Zulu cattle
and slaying a number of men, women, and children, surprised in their
kraals by the swiftness of his advance. He then again retreated. Uzwidi
now made a great and final effort to crush his adversary. All the tribes
around were pressed into his service, and the result was that he soon
had an army--collected from ten tribes--far superior in point of numbers
to the Zulu force, which represented only two tribes. Chaka therefore
retreated before Uzwidi's advance, and eventually occupied a strong
position on the Inkankla range. Here he awaited his opponent's onset. In
place of the old missile weapon, Chaka had armed his men with a shorter
and stronger assegai, intended for use at close quarters; he therefore
gave them strict orders not to throw their assegais but to charge the
foe and fight them hand to hand. He also skilfully placed his force
amidst broken ground, so that it was impossible for the enemy to attack
in a compact and organized body. The battle, as usual, began in the
early morn and continued till after midday. The Zulus, carrying out
their leader's instructions, waited till the assault was delivered, and
then charged so vigorously on the foe that they swept everything before
them. Chaka following up this defeat utterly dissipated the Umdwandwe
army. Uzwidi fled beyond his own country, which Chaka annexed, and thus
became the chief potentate in that part of Africa, levying tribute from
all the tribes around him. Chaka now waged several wars. First he
attacked and despoiled the Mangwani, a tribe on the Drakenberg; then he
fell upon and extirpated the clan of Zulukanafu, a chief residing to the
north of that range. Soon after he sent an army against the Pondos,
which captured a considerable amount of cattle and then retreated.
Again, in the following year, there was a similar expedition, and the
Pondos sued for peace, which was granted. By this time Chaka claimed to
rule over the entire country, from the sea to the Pondola, to the
Drakenberg, and to the land of the Pondos. His next object was to
consolidate his power. Accordingly, the petty kings under his rule were
no longer recognized as such, but became tributary chieftains; if any
one of these was remiss in payment of his tribute, an "impi" was sent
"to eat him" up. From time to time Chaka would also call up these chiefs
to his royal kraal, where he would receive them with marks of
distinction, and ask their advice on state matters. Another important
step to weaken the power of the chiefs, and at the same time to augment
his own, was the establishment of a standing army. Military service was
made compulsory on all males, each being told off to a certain regiment
according to his age. Thus a man ceased to serve under the chief of his
own clan, but belonged to a king's regiment, which was composed of men
of all tribes. Similar divisions were also made amongst the females,
who had to marry into regiments at the king's commands, though on a
marriage cattle was still handed over to the bride's father or brother.
Furthermore, regiments were not allowed wives till they were entitled to
wear "head-rings," and this did not occur till men had reached forty
years of age. Chaka's next war was against the Swazis, whom he defeated
and made to pay tribute.
In the following year an immense expedition was despatched against the
Sotshangana, a people dwelling across the Somba Mountains, beyond
Delagoa Bay.
So large was this army that Zululand was almost denuded of warriors, an
event which was taken advantage of by Dingaan and five more of the
king's brothers, to treacherously fall upon Chaka, whom they slew,
together with his chief councillor, Umxamana.
The benefits conferred on his people by Chaka can hardly be
over-estimated; he had raised them from a small tribe to a nation, and
that nation a dominant one. As the Quirites were amongst the component
tribes of the earlier Roman kingdom, so were the Zulus or Undabezita
amongst the various tribes subject to the central Zulu authority, and
curiously enough this resemblance extends still further; the Quirites
were subdivided into gentes, or families, each with a distinctive name,
and in a precisely similar manner, as has been before stated, the
Undabezita were divided into sub-tribes or clans, each with its own
gentile or family name. Nor were his people ungrateful to the memory of
their first great king, for after the time of Chaka, the bastard, that
name was never employed in its original signification, but to the
present day a substitute, "Umlandhwana," is always used by a Zulu to
express that idea.
That Chaka was not averse to civilization and white men was evinced by
his treatment of Fynn and five others who were rescued from a shipwreck
in St. Lucia Bay. He even went so far as to accompany Fynn the whole way
to Durban, to see him embark on a ship sent round from Cape Town for
him, and to send at considerable expenditure in the shape of cattle two
envoys to England, which he contemplated visiting himself, if their
report should prove favourable. But this latter project failed in
consequence of the king's murder, and the messengers got no further than
Cape Town.
A year or two after his departure Fynn returned, and with Chaka's
sanction established a trading-station at Durban (1824). Once Fynn and
some white men, being called upon for aid, assisted Chaka to punish a
refractory tribe. When Chaka's army for the second time invaded the
Pondos, it was through Fynn's representations that they would come into
collision with the white men that the army proceeded no further.
On the army returning from the Sotshangana expedition, Panda, a brother
of Chaka, was requested to assume the chief authority, but he declined,
so Dingaan became king. Dingaan commenced his reign by killing all his
brothers, except Panda, and all the late king's most trusted ministers.
This caused great uneasiness amongst the chiefs, one of whom named
Umquetu wishing therefore to withdraw from Dingaan's rule, departed with
all his clan and cattle to the south. Coming into collision with the
Pondos they were extirpated; hereupon Dingaan despatched an army to
recover the cattle, which he regarded as his, from the Pondos. About the
same time another chief, Umzilikazi, also revolted, and withdrew himself
to the spot where Pretoria now stands. An expedition was in a similar
manner despatched against him, and after capturing nearly all his
cattle, returned therewith to the king.
Meanwhile the Boers had appeared on the scene at Natal, and they now
claimed from Dingaan a considerable quantity of the cattle captured from
Umzilikazi, alleging it had been originally stolen from them. To this
Dingaan replied by bidding them recover some cattle that a petty chief
had taken from him. Having done this and imprisoned the captured chief
at Maritzburg, the Boers again applied for their own cattle, and a party
under the command of one Peter Retief was sent to Dingaan. There now
ensued a game of "diamond cut diamond," the Boers trying to outwit the
king and capture him in his kraal, and Dingaan acting in much the same
way to the Boers. The exact course of events is unknown, but for certain
in the result Retief and his party were surprised and slain (Feb. 5th,
1838). Dingaan then invaded Natal, slaughtered many of the Boers, and
captured much cattle. His forces penetrated as far as Ladismith, whence,
after a heavy repulse in an attack on the Dutch laager, they retired
home. Encounters from time to time continued to occur between the Zulus
and the Boers with varying success to either side, till at length a
peace was patched up. Panda showed himself so active in this war as to
excite Dingaan's jealousy, in consequence of which he, with all his
people went over and joined the Boers. Soon after this (Jan. 1840) the
Boers, in conjunction with Panda, invaded Zululand. The great fight
occurred at Magongo, on the Umkusi river. Dingaan was utterly defeated,
and retiring with a few attendants beyond the Bomba range, was killed by
the Swazis. Panda now became king, and peace was made between the Zulus
and Boers, the former ceding to the latter the Natal territory as far as
the Tugela.
It was about this time that there occurred a struggle at Natal between
the English and Dutch, in which the latter, being worsted, retired to
the Utrecht district, where they received permission from Panda to
dwell; Utrecht, it is said, being assigned as their outside limit.
Panda waged no more external wars, but lived peaceably in his kraal,
breeding cattle. Most conspicuous amongst the sons of Panda were
Cetywayo and Umbulazi; these two, having quarrelled, waged a sort of
civil war one against the other, and in the result Umbulazi was defeated
and killed. Amongst the army of Umbulazi were John Dunn and about thirty
other white men armed with rifles. Cetywayo then quarrelled with another
brother, and the same state of disorder continued till Panda's death,
which occurred in October, 1872.
Cetywayo being thereupon accepted as king by the Zulu nation, applied to
the English Government to recognize him. Accordingly, Sir
Theophilus--then Mr.--Shepstone was sent as envoy, and publicly crowned
Cetywayo at the Umlambongmenya kraal, on which occasion he spoke thus to
the assembled Zulus: "Here is your king. You have recognized him as
such, and I now do also, in the name of the Queen of England. Your kings
have often met violent deaths at the hands of their people, but if you
kill this one, we shall surely require his blood of you." He then went
on to say, "that as the English had recognized him as king, they would
expect him to give all men a fair trial before condemnation. Even a
witch should be let off, and merely sent away to another district." To
this the Zulus returned that they would kill any man who went with the
king's women, any man who ran away with another's wife, any thief of
cattle, royal or otherwise; that a witch should not be put to death on a
first accusation, but should any persist in witchcraft, he should be
killed. And to this Shepstone signified his assent. The chiefs then rose
in a body and said, "We will so govern the country under our King
Cetywayo, and we look to England to support him as the king of the Zulu
nation." Shepstone replied that he hoped the Zulus would live peaceably
under the new king, whom England would expect to adhere to the terms to
which he had just assented.
But these promises were broken on more than one occasion. Cetywayo
having called up his army, and finding them tardy in response, and many
absentees on the plea of illness, forthwith sent a regiment to slay all
those thus absent, saying, "Sick men are no good; I will save the
doctors the trouble of attending them." Again, one of the divisions of
females being ordered to marry a certain regiment, objected that they
were too few. Another regiment was named, and further objections raised.
Then an impi was sent to punish these women, and a great number were
killed. Great abuses in the practice of "smelling out" by witch-doctors
also prevailed, though in this respect Cetywayo appears slightly better
than his predecessors.
It is now time to turn attention to what is called the Boundary
Question.
It has been previously stated that in Panda's time the Boers had settled
in the Utrecht district. From time to time cattle undoubtedly was passed
between the Boers and the Zulu king. The former assert that it was the
price for the absolute ownership of the land they occupied, whilst on
behalf of Cetywayo it is urged that it was merely a tribute from the
Boers, whose outside limit had been fixed at Utrecht. Be this as it may,
there kept occurring at frequent intervals outrages, robberies, and
reprisals on either side, Sirayo, whose kraal was nearest the border,
being the most prominent actor in these scenes.
Umbelini also now appeared, to further complicate matters. Originally a
Swazi, he had fled from his native land, and settled in Zululand,
together with his uncle Umbeliani and his people. This uncle joined the
Boers, taking his cattle with him. Land was assigned to Umbeliani by the
Boers close to where Umbelini was dwelling. No sooner, therefore, had
the former built himself a kraal than the latter attacked and destroyed
it. Thus ensued a contest between the Boers and Umbelini. The Boers
drove Umbelini from his stronghold, but failed to capture him. He,
retreating, erected a new kraal on the Dumbe range, north of the
Zlobani, whence he continued to make raids into Swaziland and the
Transvaal, which had now become British soil.
At Cetywayo's coronation this vexed question of the boundary had been
referred to Mr. Shepstone, and he, in accordance with a promise then
given, subsequently met the Zulu envoys at Conference Hill to hear their
claims in this matter. They then claimed the Buffalo river as their
original and proper boundary. In reply, Mr. Shepstone said that he
considered this was asking too much; but that a fair line would be the
Blood river and the old hunting road running close by the Kambula Kop to
the Pongola or Zulu side of Luneberg. He would, however, examine the
question more closely before coming to a final decision, which, when
arrived at, would be communicated to them.
During all this time the Zulu army had been growing more and more
restless, and the younger men especially were clamorous for an
opportunity of "washing" their spears. For this sole purpose they
contemplated a raid on the Swazis, then in alliance with England. But on
Cetywayo's applying to the British Government for its sanction to this
project, it naturally declined to allow its allies to be thus wantonly
attacked.
There also existed amongst the Zulu an intense antipathy to the Boers;
and Cetywayo, after his capture, himself admitted that had the Transvaal
not been annexed, it was a mere question of time how soon a war broke
out between his people and the Dutch settlers; nor can this afford much
ground for wonder, when the characteristics of a Boer are had well in
mind. The typical Boer is doubtless a pattern of hospitality, simplicity
of heart, fondness for his home and family, and of those general
domestic attributes which are so dear to an Englishman. But in his
relations and contact with the native races and real owners of the soil,
the Dutch Boer seems to lose all sense of reason and justice, and to
remember only those early and blood-stained annals of pioneering, when
the white man and the black neither gave nor asked for quarter in their
struggle for supremacy in the land. Indeed his intolerance of a native
is so intense that he cannot be induced to look upon him as a human
being, but he regards the unfortunate aboriginal as a wild beast to be
hunted and shot down. But the Boer has his fairer side, although his
type has as yet been unchangeable. As he existed when he ruled in Cape
Colony in 1808, so he now exists in the present day in his settlements
in the interior. He is uneducated, uncultivated, unprogressive, and
obstinate; but he developes qualities under adverse circumstances which
must command English respect. He is certainly domestic as far as his own
family circle is concerned, but, at the same time, the reverse of
gregarious in regard to the world in general. When he first commences to
farm and settle he likes to possess not less than 6000 and not more than
20,000 acres of good undulating "veldt." When he has obtained this, he
starts in his waggon with his wife, his children, his scanty supply of
goods and chattels, his cattle and sheep, and his only literature, the
family Bible. He selects a good spring of water, being careful that no
neighbour is located within at least ten miles. He builds his house with
one large central hall, with the kitchen in rear, and four or five
bedrooms opening out of the hall, all on the ground floor, and sometimes
with a wide verandah outside. Kraals for his cattle, fences to his
garden, and enclosures of 50 or 100 acres, are quickly run up; and so
fertile is the soil and so favourable the climate, that in four or five
years his garden will be full of oranges, lemons, citrons, peaches,
apricots, figs, apples, pears, and vines. His herds and flocks multiply,
his wheat and Indian corn thrive, and thus he lives in a rude but
grateful abundance. His sons arrive at manhood and marry; his daughters
are sought as wives, and if the land is good and plenty they remain and
farm near, and for each generation and new family a new house is built a
few hundred yards from the original. More acres with each generation are
brought under the plough, and the man who is a good farmer, good father,
and good husband cannot be brought to see that he must not covet his
neighbour's land when that neighbour happens to be a black man! Without
sentiment, without tenderness, and without a particle of enthusiasm, and
with the most circumscribed intellectual horizon, he has a stubborn
practicability which is admirably suited for the work of a pioneer, but
which never developes into a power of civilization amongst savage
tribes.
As has been shown in the preceding narrative the relations between the
Zulu king and the English Government had been growing more and more
tense. Two conspicuous outrages in the early part of 1878 at length
brought matters to a climax. These two events were the Sirayo affair,
and the Middle Drift difficulty. To understand the Sirayo business it is
necessary to enter somewhat into detail. Sirayo and his tribe had a
quarrel with one of the royal tribes--the Ischeni. This, like many
another tribal dispute common enough in Zululand, never grew to an
"assegai" matter, but encounters frequently occurred, in which sticks
only were used, and the object of the rival factions was to drive off
the opponent's cattle. The result of this, and a "law-suit" between the
parties, settled by the king, was that Sirayo lost all his cattle.
Shortly after this, one of Sirayo's wives, who had already been put
aside on account of having a son whose legitimacy was suspected, being
again in the family-way, fled with her paramour into Natal. Another
wife, in a similar condition, also accompanied her. Nothing was done at
the time, but Sirayo's sons subsequently learning that these women were
in kraals close to the border, having collected an armed band, crossed
the river Buffalo in broad daylight, seized one of the women, recrossed
the stream, and then killed her. The Natal Kaffirs armed and threatened
a rescue, but made no attack on Sirayo's party, who, on the same night,
made another incursion, and the second woman suffered the same fate as
the first.
Thereupon the English demanded the surrender of Sirayo's sons. Cetywayo
sent to Sirayo advising him to hand over cattle instead of his sons.
Sirayo replied that in consequence of the Ischeni dispute he had no
cattle; that he was aware that his sons had transgressed; and that he
was sorry. Again the English insisted on the surrender of the two young
men. To this Cetywayo replied that they were very young, and therefore
their conduct should be excused, and mercy shown to them. He added, that
beyond all doubt they had done wrong; that the English had good cause
for anger, and that he himself was displeased with Sirayo for not
sending either his sons or cattle.
The Middle Drift affair occurred thus:--At the very beginning of 1878
the English were constructing a road from Kranz Kop to the middle drift
of the Tugela. The men at work on this were interrupted, and driven away
from their task by the Zulus living in the district, and Smith, the road
engineer, who had landed on the island at this drift, was seized,
stripped of all his clothing, and much maltreated by the same people.
Reparation was demanded by the Government for this outrage. Furthermore,
from June, 1877, it was evident that Cetywayo was instigating Secocoeni
to hostilities; and even allowing that part of this chief's claim for
compensation was just, it was necessary that the former chief should be
made to understand that while arbitration was going on the law could not
be broken by either side. With great tact, Sir T. Shepstone kept the
peace until the Galeka and Gaika war was over, when Lord Chelmsford and
his forces were freed, and it became possible to support words by
action. Such were the events which led to the sending of an ultimatum by
Sir Bartle Frere.
In the beginning of December, 1878, therefore, Messrs. John Shepstone,
Brownlie, Walker, Fynn, and Fyney were selected to be the messengers to
Cetywayo, to whom they were to communicate a message, of which the
following was the purport:--The boundary-line was to be drawn from the
junction of the Buffalo and Blood rivers to the Magedala Mountains, and
thence on to the district of Roundhill and the source of the Pongolo.
All the farmers on the frontier and disputed territory who could produce
any tangible evidence of damage or loss due to Zulu menace or warlike
demonstration were to receive a moderate but fixed compensation. A fine
of 500 head of cattle and the surrender of the guilty members of the
tribe was imposed upon Usirayo's (Sirayo) people, and twenty days only
allowed for the payment of the penalty; 100 head of cattle to be paid
for the outrage upon Lieut. Smith; Umbelini, who had given so much
trouble, to be handed over to and dealt with by the Transvaal
Government; the whole of King Cetywayo's large army at once to be
disbanded; freedom of marriage to be allowed when the parties thereto
were of age; justice to be impartially administered; missionaries to be
allowed to return to the Zulu country; British Residents to be
appointed; all disputes between Europeans to be referred to the king and
the resident; and, finally, no expulsion from Zulu territory to be
carried into effect without the distinct approval of the resident.
It was further intimated to the king that unless he showed his
compliance with these terms, on or before December 31st, then on January
1st, 1879, the British army would commence the invasion of his land, and
would enforce them at the point of the bayonet. The advance, it has been
said, originally was to have been made on the 1st; but his Excellency
the High Commissioner, allowing for the possibility of letters being
delayed by the swollen state of the river, the Tugela being then in
flood, extended his term of grace to the 11th. A _Gazette_ extraordinary
was published on January 6th, containing a declaration from Sir Bartle
Frere, demanding from Cetywayo unqualified submission, stating that the
general would after the 11th instant demand redress, and that the Zulu
people were to be protected. The following was its form:--
"NOTIFICATION BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
"In July last two armed bodies of Zulus, retainers of the Chief
Usirago, led by his sons and brothers, entered Natal and took away
by force refugee women, who were claiming protection from the
resident magistrate of Umsinga. These women were dragged across the
border, and, it is believed, murdered. These acts of outrage were
promptly brought to Cetywayo's notice by his Excellency the
Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, but no explanation or redress could be
obtained from Cetywayo. Twenty-one days were allowed to the Zulu
king to surrender the three sons and brother of the Chief Usirago
for trial, and as this term expired on 31st December, 1878, the High
Commissioner entertains no hope that it is the intention of the Zulu
king to afford the redress which her Majesty's Government has a
right to demand.
"Therefore I hereby make known, for the information of Cetywayo and
all the Zulu people, that I have placed the further prosecution of
this and all other demands for redress and reparation in the hands
of his Excellency the Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford, commanding
her Majesty's Forces in South Africa, with the request that he will
take such steps as he may find necessary to protect the British
territory from further aggression, and to compel the Zulu king to
comply with all the demands made on him for satisfaction due to the
British Government, or for the greater security of the British
territory, or for the better and more peaceable government of the
Zulu people. Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford will carefully
notify to all Zulu chiefs and people who may come within his reach
that the commands of the British Government are made on Cetywayo, as
much in the interests of the Zulu people as of the English nation,
and that till the 11th January the Lieut.-General will be willing to
receive and to transmit to me any intimation of the unqualified
acceptance by Cetywayo of all the terms offered to him. If such
intimation of unqualified and complete acceptance be received by the
Lieut.-General before the 11th January no further hostile movement
will be made, unless rendered necessary by the action of the Zulu
forces, and up to the above date Lord Chelmsford will be ready to
consider any steps which the Zulu king may propose for the purpose
of giving real and permanent effect to the demands of the British
Government. But unless all these terms be fully complied with by the
above date, the Lieut.-General will no longer be bound by the terms
of the 11th December, but will take such measures as the forces
under his command will permit for compelling the submission of the
Zulu king; always bearing in mind that the British Government has no
quarrel with the Zulu nation, and that the future good government
and well-being of the Zulus is as much an object of the steps now
taken as the safety and protection of the British territories of
Natal and the Transvaal. And I do hereby warn all residents and
inhabitants of her Majesty's possessions and colonies in South
Africa, of whatever race, to be guided by this, my notification,
and I do strongly charge and command all her Majesty's officers,
ministers, and subjects, and all others whom it may concern, to
govern themselves and to act accordingly, and to take due notice of
and to pay due regard to the tenor thereof.
"H. B. E. FRERE,
High Commissioner.
"Pietermaritzburg, Natal, Jan. 4, 1879."
During the whole of December Lord Chelmsford had been indefatigable in
collecting and organizing the military forces at his command. The result
was that at this date (Jan. 11th) the return in the order-book was as
follows:--
GENERAL STATE OF THE FIELD FORCES.
NO. 1 COLUMN (Headquarters, Thring's Post, Lower Tugela).
Commandant--Colonel C. K. Pearson, the Buffs.
Naval Brigade--170 bluejackets and marines of H.M.S. "Active" (with
one Gatling and two 7-pounder guns), under Captain Campbell, R.N.
Royal Artillery--Two 7-pounder guns and rocket battery, under Lieut.
W. N. Lloyd, R.A.
Infantry--2nd battalion 3rd Buffs, under Lieut.-Col. H. Parnell.
Mounted Infantry--100 men under Captain Barrow, 19th Hussars.
Volunteers--Durban Rifles, Natal Hussars, Stanger Rifles, Victoria
Rifles, Alexandra Rifles. Average, forty men per corps, all
mounted.
Native Contingent--1000 men, under Major Graves, the Buffs.
NO. 2 COLUMN (Headquarters, Helpmakaar, near Rorke's Drift).
Commandant--Colonel Glyn, 1st battalion 24th Regiment.
Royal Artillery--N battery 5th brigade Royal Artillery (with
7-pounder guns), under Major A. Harness, R.A.
Infantry--Seven companies 1st battalion 24th Regiment and 2nd
battalion 24th Regiment, under Lieut.-Col. Degacher.
Natal Mounted Police--Commanded by Major Dartnell.
Volunteers--Natal Carabineers, Buffalo Border Guard, Newcastle
Mounted Rifles. All mounted; average forty men.
Native Contingent--1000 men, under Commandant Lonsdale, late 74th
Highlanders.
NO. 3 COLUMN (Headquarters, Utrecht).
Commandant--Colonel Evelyn Wood, V.C., C.B., 90th Regiment.
Royal Artillery--11th battery 7th brigade R.A. (with four 7-pounder
guns) under Major E. Tremlett, R.A.
Infantry--1st battalion 13th Regiment and 90th Regiment.
Mounted Infantry--100 men, under Major J. C. Russell, 12th Lancers.
Frontier Light Horse--200 strong, under Major Redvers Buller, C.B.,
60th Rifles.
Volunteers--The Kaffrarian Vanguard, Commandant Schermbrucker, 100
strong.
Native Contingent--The Swazis, our native allies, some 5000 strong.
An idea of the numbers and nature of Cetywayo's force may be gathered
from the report of the Government Intelligence Department made at this
time.
"The Zulu army, as at present constituted, is drawn from the entire male
population, as every male between the ages of fifteen and sixty-five is
called upon to serve, without any exemption. The military force consists
of fourteen corps or regiments, divided into wings right and left, and
the latter into companies. The companies, however, are not of equal
strength, but vary immensely, even from ten to 200, according to the
numerical strength of the corps to which they belong. In fact, the
companies and regiments would more correctly be termed families or
clans, and each corps possesses its own military headquarters, or
kraal, with the following hierarchy, namely, one commanding officer,
chief, or Iduna-Yesibaya; one second in command, major, or
Iduna-Yohlangoti, who has charge of the left wing; two wing officers,
and company officers according to the need of the battalion. As a rule,
all these officers are in command of men of the same ages as themselves,
and the method of recruiting is as follows:--At stated and periodical
intervals, generally from two to five years, a general levy takes place,
when all the youths who happen at that time to have attained the age of
fifteen are formed into a regiment and undergo a year's probation,
during which time they are supposed to pass from boyhood to manhood. As
the regiment becomes disciplined and seasoned it receives large drafts
from other corps, so that as the elders die out young men come in to
fill up the ranks. The entire Zulu army consists of thirty-three
regiments, married and unmarried. No one in Zululand, male or female, is
allowed to marry without the king's permission, and this permission is
never granted until the men are about forty years of age. They then have
to shave the crown of the head, and to put a ring round it, and carry a
white shield, in contradistinction to the unmarried regiments, who do
not shave their heads and carry coloured shields. Many of these
regiments are too young for active service, others are too old,
consequently it is estimated that only about twenty-five regiments would
be able to take the field, and these would muster perhaps 40,000. Of
these 4500 are between fifty and sixty years of age; 3400 are between
forty and fifty; 10,000 between thirty and forty; and 22,000 between
twenty and thirty. We have heard a great deal about the drill of these,
but their movements, as far as we can learn, are few and very simple,
but very quickly performed in their own way. They form circles of
regiments in order to outflank the enemy. From this formation they break
into columns of regiments or companies, and from these into skirmishing
order, with supports and reserves. The sole commissariat of the Zulu
army consists of three or four days' grain, carried by the lads who
follow each corps, and, if necessary, a herd of cattle driven with each
column."
CHAPTER II.
Plan of campaign--Native levies--Special service officers--The
advance--Pearson's column--Glyn's column--Wood's
column--Utrecht--First brush with the enemy--Difficulties of
transport--Action on Inyezani--Pearson at Ekowe--Glyn's
advance--Durnford's failure--Isandhlwana--Description of camp--The
battle--Details--Reconnaissance and return of Lord
Chelmsford--Rorke's Drift--Causes of Isandhlwana--Remarks.
The plan of the campaign now commenced was to advance into Zululand in
four columns, each column complete in itself, having its own artillery,
cavalry, and independent leader. Each column was also to keep up
communications with the columns on flank, thus creating, as it were, the
effect of an advance in one extended line.
By this means it was intended to thoroughly sweep the entire Zulu
territory, and at the same time to prevent any large body of the enemy
from slipping between the columns, and so getting to the rear and
delivering a counter-attack on the colonies.
In addition to the regular European forces, large native levies had been
raised, amounting in all to 7400. It is a great error to suppose that
these were without arms, dress, or discipline. On the contrary, a great
many of them came to us well armed with serviceable-looking rifles,
evidently of Birmingham or Sheffield make, while some of the
older-fashioned fire-arms had the Tower mark.
Nor were they clothed only with the conventional blanket. On the
contrary, their uniform was neat, and, at the same time, workmanlike,
and consisted of a corduroy tunic, or rather patrol jacket, and
breeches, with long boots of untanned leather, and a broad-leafed
_sombrero_ as a head-dress.
Several native corps were rapidly formed, in the following manner:--The
commandant and his staff officers were British officers, the captains
mostly retired British officers, colonists, or settlers; the
non-commissioned officers, white settlers of different nationalities,
and the privates usually Kaffirs.
Among the English officers who received commands in this native
contingent were Captain Nolan (Pioneers), Major Bengough, Captain
Russell (Rocket Battery), Captain Ulich de Burgh (5th West York
Militia), Captain Cherry (32nd Foot), and Lieutenant Hon. H. Gough.
Colonel Durnford had command of the whole column, which was to be
entirely native so far as the rank and file were concerned, and to be
composed of all the three arms--artillery, cavalry, and infantry.
There was also a considerable contingent of European Volunteers--more
especially of mounted men, whose total reached close on 1000.
Conspicuous amongst these were the Volunteer Hussars and Alexandra
Mounted Rifles, the Durban Mounted Rifles, Captain Raaf's Diamond Field
and Free State Horse, and a contingent of mounted Boers under Piet Uys,
who gallantly responded to Colonel Wood's spirited and soldierlike
appeal. These Boers were a splendid body of men, most of them crack
shots with the rifle, and although somewhat fierce and uncompromising
towards their ancient enemies, the Zulus, proved of invaluable service
through their knowledge of localities.
The following "special service" officers, sent out from England, had
also arrived and entered on their respective duties:--Captain Cherry
(32nd Light Infantry), was placed in command of the 3rd battalion Natal
Contingent; Captain Gardner (14th Hussars), was sub-director of
transports at headquarters, as well as Captain Huntley (10th Regiment),
who was posted to the River Mooi; Captains Essex (76th), and Hon. H.
Campbell (Coldstream Guards), were also directors of transports. Major
Hopton had this duty at Pietermaritzburg. Captain Brunker, of the
Cameronians (26th), had the command of a squadron of Light Horse.
Captain Barton (7th Regiment), was staff officer to Colonel Durnford;
Captains Pelly Clark (103rd Regiment), Spratt (29th), and Lieutenant
Lawrence (18th), were all employed on transport duty at Durban, where,
as most of the ammunition and stores were landed, their office was no
sinecure. Captain Macgregor (29th Regiment), was staff officer to
Colonel Pearson, and Captain Hart (31st Regiment) was on the staff of
Lord Chelmsford.
Meanwhile Cetywayo's term of grace had expired; the 11th of January had
come and gone without any sign from the Zulu monarch. On the following
day the war had begun, and the Tugela was successfully crossed. By four
o'clock on the 12th the Buffs, four companies of the 99th, the Victoria
Mounted Rifles, the native Sappers, the 1st Natal Native Contingent, and
the Naval Brigade were well over the Lower Tugela, near Fort
Buckingham. The pontoon worked remarkably well, making three trips an
hour. Four small boats were also employed. A herd of cattle was brought
into the camp by the vedettes, who also reported that a large Zulu force
was in position about twenty miles off, and also at Ondini. It has been
mentioned that four columns would be formed from out of the three (whose
details have been given above), and these four were now advancing into
Zululand in a line which partly described a crescent, of which the left
extremity rested on Luneberg and the Pongolo, the right upon the Lower
Drift of the Tugela, close to the sea, while the inner half of the
circle was represented by the boundaries of Natal and the Transvaal.
The centre may be considered as being at Fort Pearson, where there was a
strongly entrenched camp on the summit of a rising or bluff overlooking
the river Tugela. The column moving from Fort Pearson consisted of 1500
regular infantry, that is to say, eight companies of the Buffs, under
Colonel Parnell; six companies of the 99th, under Colonel Welman; one
company Royal Artillery and two 7-pounder guns, drawn by mules under
Lieutenant Lloyd; one Naval Brigade of 276 bluejackets and Marines,
under Captain Campbell, from her Majesty's ships "Active" and "Tenedos,"
with three Gatlings; 200 Mounted Infantry, under Captain Barrow, and 200
Mounted Volunteers (Durban Mounted Rifles), under Captain W. Shepstone;
the Alexandra Mounted Rifles, Captain Arbuthnot; Victoria Mounted
Rifles, Captain Saner; Stanger Mounted Rifles, Captain Addison; the
Natal Hussars, Captain Norton. Colonel Pearson, of the Buffs, was in
command of the column, and had to co-operate with him a native
contingent of 2000 men, under Major Graves, as well as two companies of
the 99th posted at Stanger and Durban. The total strength of Colonel
Pearson's column may, therefore, be set down at 2200 Europeans and 2000
natives.
The second or right centre column moved from Kranz Kop, a most
formidable position, supported by Fort Buckingham. This was the scene of
operations in 1861. The heights are commanding and look over a wide
field of country. The position is unassailable except from the Natal
side, and this was strongly fortified. Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanded
this district and attack, and had with him now the 1st Regiment Native
Contingent, which then consisted of three fine battalions, with three
rocket tubes, under Lieutenant Russell, and 250 mounted natives, making
altogether 3300 natives, officered by 200 European officers.
Following the line of advance to the left, and occupying about fifty or
sixty miles of frontier, we come to column three, the left centre
attack, commanded by Colonel Glyn. Take any good map and you will remark
how the boundary winds serpentine fashion in its length from Fort
Buckingham to Rorke's Drift and Helpmakaar. Helpmakaar made an excellent
base to Rorke's Drift. Being situated on a lofty plateau, it formed an
admirable place for a permanent encampment. It also had depôts at
Greytown on the one side and Ladismith on the other. Colonel Glyn had
with him seven companies of the 1st battalion 24th and eight companies
of the 2nd battalion 24th, six 7-pounder guns with Kaffrarian carriages
under Colonel Harness, a squadron of mounted infantry under Captain
Browne, the Natal Mounted Police (150 men), the Natal Carabineers under
Captain Shepstone, the Buffalo Border Guard (Captain Robson), the
Newcastle Mounted Rifles (Captain Bradstreet), also the native
contingent (2nd Regiment), 2000 strong, under Commandant Lonsdale,
officered by 200 whites. From Rorke's Drift, about five miles over the
river is Ungusdana, and thence on the traveller comes to the Intalalala
river, which is about fifteen miles inland. The country all about the
district is rugged and broken, and calculated to afford positions of
great defensive strength. Colonel Glyn was, if possible, to bear a
little to his left flank after crossing the boundary with a view to
communication being opened with Wood's right flank. To effect this
connexion, however, there was a sad need of cavalry.
We now come to the extreme left of the advance, whose headquarters were
Utrecht, and which was thus composed:--Colonel Evelyn Wood, V.C., C.B.,
90th Light Infantry, commanding No. 4 Column; Staff Orderly Officer,
Lieutenant Lysons, 90th Infantry; Principal Staff Officer, Captain Hon.
R. G. E. Campbell, Coldstream Guards; general Staff duties, Captain
Woodgate, 4th Regiment; transport duties, Captain Vaughan, R.A.; senior
commissary officer, Commissary Hughes; commissary of ordnance, Assistant
Commissary Philimore; subdistrict paymaster, Paymaster M'Donald; senior
medical officer, Surgeon-Major Cuffe. Corps--Royal Artillery, six
7-pounders, Major Tremlett, R.A.; 1st-13th Light Infantry,
Lieutenant-Colonel Gilbert, 13th; 90th Light Infantry, Brevet
Lieutenant-Colonel Cherry, 90th; Frontier Light Horse, Brevet
Lieut.-Colonel Buller, C.B., 60th; Wood's Irregulars, 700 men,
Commandant Henderson. In addition, a few Boers were coming in, and more
were expected.
Utrecht is the most southerly part of the Transvaal, and lies upon the
border of both Natal and Zululand. It is separated from the former by
the Buffalo river, and, after crossing the Blood river, a few marches
bring one to the territories of King Cetywayo. From the lowest, or most
southerly portions of Utrecht, just where the Buffalo and Blood rivers
form a junction, to the port of Durban, on the coast of Natal, is but
100 miles, and the capital city is about thirty miles from Newcastle,
the most northern of Natal towns. The two districts are connected by a
tolerably fair road and a drift over the Buffalo river. Utrecht, in a
strategical point of view, wedged in as it were between Natal and
Zululand, cannot be equalled by any position of a similar nature. The
interior of this district extends away to the summit of the Drakenberg
range, one of which reaches an altitude of 4000 feet. Most of the
Utrecht land lies in what is called the "terrace country," and has the
advantage of the most splendid bracing air, added to which are mountain
ridge and peak, precipice, wooded gorge, and grass-land, and scenery
whose characteristics are of a grander and nobler nature than that of
the Cape Colony. The portion of the Drakenberg which runs through
Utrecht has its eastern front and glacis looking towards the sea, which
is about eighty miles distant, and as each terrace or range slopes down
the character of the country changes, presenting many of the features
of the upper portions of the Cape Colony, that is to say, broad
undulating downs in one part and immense flats covered with bush on the
other. All the principal rivers and streams of Utrecht and their
tributaries flow eastward to the Indian Ocean. On one boundary there is
the Pongola, and on the other the Buffalo, while the Blood river passes
through it with a south-eastern flow, and the Pifan does the same, but
with an inclination to the north-east. From the wild highlands between
these two streams issue the head waters of the Umoolosi, which traverses
Zululand and empties itself into St. Lucia Bay.
Wood's column marched from Utrecht on the 7th, so as to be on the
borderland in order to operate with the right-hand column on the
appointed day. General Lord Chelmsford had given orders that Colonel
Wood was to be at a certain point on the 10th, and consequently
arrangements were made to carry out these instructions. It was known
that Sirayo would probably oppose the crossing of Colonel Glyn at
Rorke's Drift, and Colonel Wood had been told, if possible, to get
sufficiently near to operate on the enemy's right and rear should such
an attempt be made. Leaving a small guard at his camps at Sandspruit,
the rest of Wood's force paraded in the lightest possible order at 1.30
p.m. on the 10th, and marched from two that afternoon until six p.m. A
halt was then made until 1.30 a.m., when by the light of a glorious moon
the advance was pursued. A mounted advanced guard was thrown out,
flanking patrols were organized and told off, and the troops moved in
the greatest silence, not a word in the ranks being allowed to be
spoken. At 3 a.m., a short halt took place, and the chief ordered
forward a reconnaissance, consisting of Buller's Light Horse, two
7-pounder guns under Major Tremlett, and twenty-four picked shots from
the 13th and 90th Regiments respectively. These men were to be carried
in some of the mule waggons, and were accompanied by the 700 irregulars,
horse and foot. Colonel Wood accompanied this advanced force, leaving
the remaining (main) body in charge of Colonel Gilbert, who was ordered
to follow at a fixed time. The advanced body arrived within ten miles of
Rorke's Drift at 7.30 a.m., and by eight the camp fires were lit and the
men comfortably having their breakfasts on the banks of a small stream;
the mounted men having at once off-saddled, the infantry piled arms, and
the horses and mules turned out to graze under a strong guard.
About nine o'clock the general, Lord Chelmsford, cantered up to the
camp, accompanied by his staff and an escort of 100 mounted infantry and
some Natal mounted police. The general seemed delighted at the celerity
with which his orders had been carried out, as in eighteen hours Wood's
party had covered twenty-seven miles, and the men and horses were as
fresh as paint. A long consultation took place with the general, and
then the order was issued for the return to the main body; but this was
not found necessary, as Colonel Gilbert met them after about ten miles.
In this day, or rather twenty-four hours, the men had marched thirty-one
miles, and were not fated, on camp being pitched, to enjoy the fruits of
their labour and toil, for soon after they were settled for the evening
a heavy thunderstorm came suddenly over the tents, and in a quarter of
an hour they were up to their ankles in a perfect river of water. The
tents went down in all directions, and in many cases poles were snapped.
The next day, however, a patrol of Buller's horse was paraded soon after
daybreak, as scouts had brought in information that a large number of
cattle were to be seen in the neighbouring kloof. Soon after leaving
camp Buller's men were fired upon, but the Zulus did not stand their
ground, and by the afternoon they had brought in nearly 1000 cattle.
Captain Barton, who had gone out later in the day with another party,
marched twenty miles in the direction of Umkanga's kraal, where in the
skirmish which resulted 550 cattle were taken, and seven of the Zulus
were killed and wounded. On the following morning a strong
reconnaissance was made in the direction of the Bushee Valley. The Zulus
were in considerable force, and their general tried to induce the
English skirmishers to follow him to ground of his own choosing. Colonel
Wood, however, kept his men well in hand, and contented himself by
sending forward two companies of the 13th Light Infantry, Colonel
Gilbert's fine corps, and menacing the Zulu flank with some score or
more horsemen, who, galloping to a favouring eminence, made capital
practice at the Zulu main body with their rifles at 700 and 800 yards.
The Zulus still continued to creep up in rear, getting what cover they
could from the bushes, and a sharp fire was kept up on both sides. As
the men in skirmishing order pushed the enemy gradually before them, the
mounted force harassed them on either flank, sometimes galloping round
to the right and left to obtain vantage-ground and cover, and then
dismounting in sections, and acting as infantry, while the main body was
kept carefully out of sight in the dense mimosa which was found in the
rear. The bush, as they advanced, gradually became more dense, and the
path scarcely allowed them to move in fours by a steep descent into a
wooded valley. Instinctively it was guessed that here would be the main
body of the foe, and this turned out to be the case, for away to the
left front, on a tall "copjie" or circular hill, about twenty mounted
Zulus were to be seen, evidently the commander and his staff giving
orders and directing the operations of the columns in the plain. The
firing had now become general, but the soldiers were not allowed to
waste their ammunition, and nearly every shot told with fatal effect.
Colonel Wood had taken the precaution to strengthen his flanks as he
advanced, and as the enemy could not tell how strong he was, the main
body being still invisible, they were completely puzzled by the daring
of the mounted men, who seemed ubiquitous. The guns were found rather a
nuisance; one of the carriages broke down, and the limber had to be left
behind, while the gun itself was secured. The head of the first line of
skirmishers had now made good their way through the kloof with slight
loss, and the Zulus attempted in vain to get round to its rear, but
found all hopes of such a man[oe]uvre utterly futile--as the flanking
parties were on the _qui-vive_. It was now Wood's turn to push them, and
he used the opportunity. Two more companies were advanced at the double
to force the centre of the Zulu line, and in a few moments we had cut
it in two. In the meanwhile one of the light field-pieces had obtained a
favourable position, and had got the enemy's range exactly, but the
execution done was not what could have been obtained with a good honest
nine or twelve-pounder. The pursuit was carried on for about a mile, and
the Zulus were scattered in all directions, but the commander was too
wary to allow his men to go too far, and the recall was sounded, and in
a short time brought back the excited fellows, puffing and blowing, to
rejoin the main body.
For some days this column continued to advance steadily without meeting
any serious opposition. Having moved on from the Blood River, Wood's
force encamped at Bemba's Kop till the 20th January. The country over
which they had passed since they left Utrecht may be described as a
succession of large rolling plains, interspersed in all directions by
watercourses (_dongas_), which radiate from the bases of the
table-topped mountains rising at intervals throughout this part of the
country. These watercourses are as a rule about twelve to fourteen feet
deep, and serve to irrigate the country, which seems prosperous and
well-populated. What would be called a road in England does not exist in
Zululand. The tracks made by the traders with their waggons answer the
purpose. These tracks are, however, tolerably good, and experience
proved that artillery could be moved almost anywhere, except in wet
weather. Waggons could pass each other at almost any part of the main
road from Utrecht to Ulundi, except at that portion leading across the
Inhlazatye Mountain, which runs along a narrow ledge, and where it
ascends the Intendeka table-land. Wherever the troops moved they came
across numerous kraals, each kraal containing from eight to fifteen
huts, and each hut ten to fifteen men. From Bemba's Kop they moved on
the 20th to Wolpoint, as nearly as possible seven miles west of the
White Umbolosi, and thence went on to Tunguin's Neck, where a laager was
planned and completed. After a reconnaissance made by Colonel Wood on
the 22nd, in which his troops had a slight skirmish with a small body of
Zulus, suffering no casualties, and inflicting a slight loss upon them,
he halted on the 23rd, and sent out strong patrols in the direction of
the Ingwazini River. These men rode over an open plain admirably suited
for cavalry operations, but found nothing but some deserted kraals and
the dead bodies of some Zulus, who, it was subsequently discovered, were
wounded at Isandula the previous day. On their return the party were
fortunate enough to discover the whereabouts of a strong body, some 4000
to 5000 Zulu warriors, who, it was imagined, were merely the nucleus of
a force intended to surprise Wood's column. They were posted in a
well-chosen position at a place called Tintas Hill, and when they moved
down in his direction the following day, Wood had concealed a portion of
his force so well, that he got them between two fires, and in about half
an hour had killed about sixty or seventy of them, his own casualties
being only two men wounded. It was during this action that information
was brought by Captain Alan Gardner, who gallantly rode without any
escort from Helpmakaar to Utrecht, notifying the terrible disaster of
the 22nd, and the destruction of No. 3 Column. This news caused Colonel
Wood to change his plans, and after a halt of a couple of hours, he
turned back towards the Umbolosi, where his little force arrived at
seven a.m. on the 25th. On Sunday (26th) he moved on to Ugaba Ka Hawana,
where good camping-ground and a defensive position were chosen, and
where the minor essentials of wood and water were in plenty.
Colonel Pearson, who commanded No. 1 Column on the extreme right, had
also been prosecuting his advance with the greatest vigour, and the
results were in every way satisfactory, though already the tremendous
difficulties of commissariat and transport had made themselves
unpleasantly evident. This force assembled near Fort Stanger, and
crossed the Lower Tugela on the 12th, having as nearly as possible 1500
regular troops, consisting of eight companies of the old Buffs, under
Colonel Parnell; six companies of the 99th, under Colonel Welman; one
company Royal Engineers, and two 7-pounder guns. A naval brigade,
however, which might be considered as a little army in itself, went with
them, and were under Colonel Pearson's command. This force consisted of
270 bluejackets and marines, under Captain Campbell, of her Majesty's
ships "Active" and "Tenedos," with three of the new-pattern Gatling. Two
hundred mounted infantry and 200 colonial mounted riflemen also formed
part of the column, while the whole force was supplemented by Major
Griffiths and about 2000 men of the Native Contingent. The crossing of
the river was at first impeded by the rains, and another delay occurred
at the lower drift, where the river was at least 400 yards wide, but all
these difficulties were overcome, and after a week's delay a flying
column was sent forward on the 18th in the direction of Ekowe, which is
a mission-station not quite forty miles inland, and distant nearly
seventy from the king's kraal at Ulundi. It was the intention of Colonel
Pearson to establish here an entrenched post as a _point d'appui_ to the
invading army. On the following day the colonel was followed by the rear
division, escorting the heavy baggage, necessary though inconvenient
_impedimenta_, as it contained stores and ammunition. The column of
waggons extended for five miles, and it took the officers in charge all
their time and the services of three horses each during the day to
supervise its progress from inspan till outspan. Again, two days later,
came the commissariat, and here imagination fails to describe the
difficulties encountered. The subject of transport is one that must be
considered in any future operations in Africa. The waggons must be
stronger than those employed; the animals should be proof against
sickness caused by climate, the tulip plant, and the tsetse fly, and
this can be avoided by choosing one's own season for marching. The
employment of mules would be much preferable to that of oxen, although
in many books the converse is stated, the Dutch being infatuated in
regard to the superior qualities of the latter. Mules, for instance,
have this advantage over oxen. They can travel twenty-five miles a day
with ease, while twelve or fifteen a day with oxen is considered good
work; but, on the other hand, it must be remembered that a mule costs
twice as much as an ox, apart from the cost of feeding. The mule must,
of course, be fed on forage carried for him or bought on the road,
while the ox will feed on the veldt, except during the three winter
months, when his services are not often required. Two kinds of mules can
be procured about Pretoria--the Montevidean and the home-bred animal.
The latter is generally preferred, although no doubt the former is most
tractable. There is an immense trouble in selecting oxen for
campaigning, as none but those bred in the sour veldt of Natal or
Zululand are of any use for such rough food and hard work; and, as a
rule, these will live where others would die. The usual load is 7000
lbs., placed on a waggon weighing 3000 lbs., and drawn by sixteen or
eighteen oxen. The cost for oxen averages about 9_l._ each, but during
this war they went up to 18_l._, and even 25_l._ Each waggon, with
dissel-boom and yokes complete, costs at least 180_l._ The cost of mules
will average 20_l._ each, and mule waggons 100_l._, with harness at
5_l._ for each animal.
The road, after crossing the river Tugela, crosses no less than four
streams, and before reaching Ekowe passes through a broken bushy
country. On the 22nd, the day on which Isandula was attacked, Colonel
Pearson had a sharp engagement with the enemy at a place called by the
natives Inyezane, about four or five miles beyond his camping-ground of
the 21st. Major Barrow had been sent forward along a fertile valley
which led to the Inyezane, when Colonel Pearson received a despatch from
him, saying that he had selected a tolerably good place for camping,
which he had carefully guarded by vedettes. On receiving this
information the colonel at once rode on to the spot, and although he did
not quite approve of the ground, as being too full of bush for an
outspan, he decided to allow the waggons to be outspanned for two hours
on account of there being no water near at hand. This was done to rest
and feed the oxen, and to allow the men to have their morning meal.
About eight o'clock, just as the waggons had begun to park, and while
the officers were busy in directing the posting of pickets, scouts, and
sentries, the advanced company of the Native Contingent, which had been
scouting in front under Captain Hart, discovered the Zulus in force
rapidly advancing over the slopes and attempting to gain the bushes on
both flanks. They came on in skirmishing and extended order in the
finest style, rushing from bush to bush in a steady but stealthy manner
until within 100 or 150 yards of the outposts. Captain Hart's men, being
in the open, had to bear the brunt of a heavy fire, and not without
casualties, as they lost one officer, four non-commissioned officers,
and four privates almost at once. These poor fellows, it is feared, were
sacrificed, inasmuch as they did not understand the order to retire and
seek cover, and concluded that it was their duty to remain in the open.
The Naval Brigade was now ordered into action, and most ably they
acquitted themselves. Two 7-pounders and two 24-pounder Naval Brigade
rockets were smartly brought into action on a knoll at the base of the
pass, but commanding the valley from which the flank attack was made.
Meanwhile two companies of the Buffs and A and B companies of the Naval
Brigade opened a heavy and well-directed fire upon the enemy, and
effectually held him in check. This coign of vantage was occupied by
Colonel Pearson, whence he directed the movements of his troops during
the fight. All this time the waggons continued to park, and while the
fire was kept up by Commander Campbell, Lieutenant Lloyd, with his guns,
and Lieutenant Martin with the Buffs, two other companies of the same
regiment which had been employed in guarding waggons were moved down,
ready to clear the bush as soon as it was well shelled and swept with
rockets and musketry. Colonel Pearson selected Captain Macgregor to
undertake this duty, with the assistance of Captains Harrison and Wyld,
who, getting their men into skirmishing order, and bringing their
shoulders gradually forward as steadily as if man[oe]uvring at a
field-day, sent the Zulu braves flying discomfited before them, and
exposed them once more in the open to the hail of shot and shell which
swept the plain. Colonel Welman, 99th Regiment, now took advantage of
this favourable moment, when the enemy was demoralized, to send forward
Captain Wynne and Major Barrow with the infantry. These, with
skirmishers and flankers on the left, and supported by two
half-companies of the Buffs and 99th, now moved forward at a steady
pace.
The Zulus, however, were not beaten, though evidently puzzled, and
Campbell, who was in charge of the Naval Brigade, saw that they were
making a flank movement on the left. This officer at once obtained
permission from Colonel Pearson to take a portion of his men and drive
out a body of Zulus who had obtained possession of a kraal about 400
yards from the knoll. Captain Hart, with part of his Native Contingent,
gallantly supported this movement. They managed to obtain possession of
the high ground to the left of the Ekowe road, and effectually checked
the enemy in their movement on the British left.
But the gallant sailor Campbell was not satisfied with this partial
success, and sent for further permission to follow up his _coup_ by
driving on the foe to a more respectable distance. Colonel Parnell, of
the Buffs, who up to this time had been acting as a sort of reserve with
Captain Foster's company at the foot knoll, where Colonel Pearson
remained throughout the action, had now an opportunity of mingling in
the fray. Smartly deploying his men, he advanced at the double, and
forming up on the right of the bluejackets, swept the heights beyond the
kraal which a few moments before were crowned with savage warriors. This
decided the action, as the Zulus, thoroughly distracted, fled in all
directions, the guns making capital practice wherever a group collected.
The last round from the rocket-tubes seemed to carry destruction and
confusion amongst them, and was fired a little before ten a.m.
Colonel Pearson and Colonel Parnell both had their horses shot under
them, and several officers remarked that the fire of the Zulus was
principally directed at the English leaders. The regiments opposed to
Pearson were composed of the Umxapu, Umdhlanefu, and Ingulubi, and as
near as could be judged, and from the information subsequently received,
numbered about 5000 men. Of these at the very least 300 were slain,
while the number of wounded, as a rule carried away into the bush, could
not have been less than double that. Pearson's loss was eight killed and
sixteen wounded, and of these were six officers and non-commissioned
officers of the Native Contingent. The following day two companies of
the Buffs, two companies Native Contingent, and a few mounted men were
sent off to the help of Colonel Ely, 99th Regiment, who with three
companies of his regiment was bringing up a convoy, much wanted, of
seventy waggons of stores and ammunition, while on Saturday, the 18th,
Major Coates started with fifty extra waggons to bring up more supplies.
On the day after the Inyezane engagement Pearson arrived at Ekowe. The
position was a strong one, and he immediately set to work to make it
still more formidable. Water was close to the fort, and well under its
fire.
At this juncture news of the Isandhlwana disaster reached Colonel
Pearson. After consultation with his officers, he decided to remain
where he was, feeling confident that even without further supplies or
reinforcements he could hold his position for at least a couple of
months. All his waggons came in safety to the fort except five, which
broke down and had to be abandoned. The mounted men and Native
Contingent were sent back to save food, and there thus remained 1200
British troops, having 320 rounds per man.
The first failure in the carrying out of Lord Chelmsford's plans
occurred to No. 4 Column, and proved the initial step to the crowning
disaster of Isandhlwana. The right centre column, which should have
operated simultaneously with Colonel Wood's force, was unfortunately
composed almost entirely of natives, and these fellows did not succeed
in getting over at the point directed in orders. As this column could
not be brought over the river, a portion of it was left behind to keep
open communications and guard the frontier, while the remainder, under
Colonel Durnford, was moved up to Rorke's Drift to reinforce Colonel
Glyn's command. The following day (12th) Colonel Glyn had his first
brush with the enemy. Lord Chelmsford had joined this column, and after
crossing the Tugela ordered out a reconnaissance by the Bashee Valley
and along the road leading to Izpizi. Glyn took with him three companies
of the 1st battalion 24th and one battalion 3rd Regiment Natal Native
Contingent, while the mounted men, crossing the valley, went rapidly
along the road leading over the Ngudu mountains, where high cliffs close
in the gorge for more than three miles. Cattle and armed Zulus were seen
on the heights, and some of the 24th and the natives were ordered to
bear round to the right flank and cut them off. The skirmish which
followed lasted about twenty minutes, and was a very smart affair. It
resulted in the taking of the fastnesses and the precipitate flight of
the Zulus, who suffered a loss of ten killed, three wounded, and nine
prisoners taken, together with a quantity of cattle, horses, and sheep.
Colonel Glyn's loss was two privates Natal Contingent killed, one
officer of the same, Lieutenant Purvis, severely wounded; Corporal
Mayer, Natal Native Contingent, severe wound in thigh. Four companies of
the 2nd battalion 24th, and four companies of the 2nd battalion 3rd
Regiment Natal Native Contingent, under Colonel Degacher, were now
ordered by the General to advance up the Bashee and attack Usirayo's
kraal, a place called Loxie, about two or three miles farther on. This
place, situated in a wild and mountainous gorge or krantz, interspersed
with caves, guarded by huge boulders, was completely explored by these
men. In the meantime Russell and his mounted men had ascended to the
summit of the Ngudu mountain, where they were fired upon at a distance
of 90 or 100 yards. Sixteen of the Zulus were killed, and a very heavy
thunderstorm came on during the fight. No signs could be observed of any
Zulu force in reserve, and this was explained by the subsequent news
that Usirayo had made a precipitate flight in the direction of the
king's kraal. On the following day communications were opened between
Wood's column and that of Colonel Glyn. The General's movements from the
first appear to have been hampered by baggage and transport
arrangements, and a similar reason delayed Colonel Pearson. Lord
Chelmsford was present with this column when it moved from Rorke's
Drift, and saw the site which was chosen by Colonel Glyn at Insalwana,
ten miles on the road to the Indeni forest. He then left Colonel Glyn in
charge of the camp, and on the same day moved, with a portion of the
force, ten miles further on, to reconnoitre the country in front.
Returning to camp that evening, without having had time to fully
explore, the General, the following morning, sent out two separate
reconnoitring columns, under the command respectively of Major Dartnell,
who took with him the Mounted Police and Natal Volunteers, of which he
is commandant, and Commandant Lonsdale with two battalions of his Native
Contingent. Dartnell went along the same road as that explored by the
General the previous day, while Lonsdale moved along the southern slope
of the Inhlazatye range, towards a hill called Malaka's Kop. If
possible a junction between these two bodies was to be effected; and, as
soon as information could be obtained as to the situation of the enemy
and the strategical features of the locality, both were to return to the
headquarter camp. By some extraordinary oversight, neither of these
reconnoitring columns seems to have been supplied with rations, while it
was usual on such expeditions for the men to take preserved meat and
three days' biscuit in their haversacks, supposing that mule transport
cannot be had. On the afternoon of the Tuesday Major Dartnell sent an
officer to the headquarter camp, to inform the General that he could not
advance beyond the Insangu river, a small stream near Inkankla Mountain,
as the Zulus were posted there in force. Dartnell, therefore, sent an
orderly to call up Lonsdale with his Native Contingent, and sent to Lord
Chelmsford to request a reinforcement of regulars to enable him to
attack the enemy. His lordship did not consider it advisable to comply
with this demand, as the daylight was almost gone, and the distance was
long. A supply of biscuit was, however, sent out to the exploring party,
who bivouacked at the foot of the Inhlazatye. During the night, however,
Major Dartnell appears to have become aware of his critical position,
and at half-past two on the morning of the 22nd (Wednesday), Colonel
Glyn received a letter from him, saying that the Zulus had been strongly
reinforced, and were now in his front in great strength. Instead of
recalling the column, or at once pushing forward troops to its
assistance, a delay took place, and a staff officer was despatched to
ask Dartnell what he wished done. After some further lapse of time the
General ordered Colonel Glyn to march to Major Dartnell's assistance
with the 2nd battalion 24th Regiment, consisting of six companies, the
mounted infantry, and four of Harness's guns. As this detachment would
considerably weaken the camp, the General at the same time sent off two
expresses to Colonel Durnford, who had been left at Rorke's Drift,
telling him to move up at once to Isandula with his 500 native troops,
250 of whom were mounted. The General then decided to accompany Colonel
Glyn's force, and Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine, 1-24th, was left in
charge of the camp, with orders to defend it, pending the arrival of
Durnford's natives. The actual fighting strength of Pulleine's force
consisted of 2 officers, 78 men, and 2 guns R.A.; 1-24th Regiment, 15
officers, 334 men; 2-24th Regiment, 5 officers, 90 men; mounted
Europeans, 5 officers, 204 men; Native Contingent, 19 officers, 391 men;
Natal Pioneers, 1 officer, 10 men; while Durnford, when he arrived very
soon after, brought with him 18 officers and 450 men, thus making an
aggregate of 772 Europeans and 850 natives, or in all 1622 combatants.
On his arrival at the camp, Colonel Durnford, being the senior officer,
of course immediately assumed the command.
To the right understanding of what follows it is necessary to give a
somewhat detailed account of the situation. The leading feature of the
plain on the southern slopes of which the English camp was placed is the
Isandhlwana, or Lion Hill. To the west it rises abruptly, forming the
head of the crouching animal it resembles in shape; after forming the
back it descends sharply to the east. At both ends are necks or ridges
connecting the hill with the smaller undulations of which the more level
part of the country consists. The road from Rorke's Drift passes over
the western ridge, while on the north facing the camp was a deep ravine
and watercourse. To the immediate right was a small copse; beyond this
the ground was much broken, irregular krantzes and hills all covered
with huge boulders continuing as far as the Buffalo river. To the left
of the camp, at the distance of rather more than a mile, ran a long
ridge towards the south, connecting it with the great Isandhlwana hill,
having on its summit a plateau which, towards the east, opened on to an
open and extensive valley. On the extreme left of the camp, looking
towards the ridge, were pitched the tents of the Natal Native
Contingent; between these and the next two battalions intervened a space
of rather less than 300 yards; occupying the centre were the British
regular Infantry, just above whom came the headquarters camp of Lord
Chelmsford, and in close proximity the headquarters of the column. On
the right were the guns and mounted corps lining the edge of the road.
Soon after it came over the neck at the back of the camp the ground rose
considerably, until the bottom of the precipitous Isandhlwana was
reached: the camp therefore literally had its back to a wall.
At six a.m. on the 22nd, a company of the Natal Natives was ordered to
scout towards the left, the enemy having appeared in that direction.
Whilst these were away Durnford arrived, about nine o'clock, with a
rocket battery under Colonel Russell, R.A., 250 mounted natives, and 250
native foot. News was now brought in that the Zulus in very large
numbers were driving the pickets before them. A later messenger--a
native without uniform, supposed by some to be a Zulu purposely sent
with false intelligence--brought the news that the Zulus had divided
into three columns, one of which it was supposed was about to attack
Colonel Durnford's baggage, still on the road from Rorke's Drift, the
other to harass Lord Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn's party in their rear,
whilst the third was to hover round and watch the camp. Finally came the
news "Zulus retiring in all directions." Colonel Durnford thereupon
asked Colonel Pulleine to lend him a couple of the 24th companies, but
he declined, saying his orders were to guard the camp, and he could not,
under the circumstances, let them go without a positive command.
Durnford then determined to go on with his own force, which he divided
into three, one part being sent up the hill to the left (east), one to
the left front, and the third to the rear, in the direction of Rorke's
Drift, to act as an escort for the baggage not yet arrived. The rocket
battery was of the party that proceeded to the front under Colonel
Durnford in person, to a distance of four or five miles from the camp,
but being unable to keep pace with the mounted force was soon left
behind.
The body of troops despatched to the left became engaged with the enemy
almost immediately, and firing was soon heard all along the crest of the
hill. In about an hour Durnford's mounted men re-appeared over the
hills, hotly pursued by swarms of Zulus; at the same time the horsemen
to the front were also driven back. These, after retiring steadily in
skirmishing order for about two miles, came upon the remains of the
rocket battery, which had been cut off and broken up, whilst a hand to
hand engagement was going on with those who remained. It appears that
Russell, whilst advancing with his battery, perceived a body of the
enemy on his left, he fired three rockets with some effect; then the
Zulus fired a volley, upon which the Native Contingent of infantry
retreated, the mules were frightened, and disorder ensued. Taking
advantage of this, the enemy charged down the hill, a _mêlée_ ensued,
and Russell was killed. As the mounted men retired towards them, the
Zulus retreated to their cover, and they, after making a final stand in
a spruit about a mile and a half in front of the camp, were eventually
driven in.
As the cavalry on the left was being pushed rapidly back, Captain Mostyn
was ordered to advance with two companies of 1-24th on the eastern neck
of the Isandhlwana, where at a distance of about a mile and a half the
Zulus were advancing in large numbers along the north of the
Isandhlwana, to outflank the camp on the right, and with this wing of
the foe they at once became engaged.
Meanwhile the Zulu left rapidly, and the centre steadily, though more
slowly, pushed forward, despite the artillery fire poured into them.
Orders were now given for three companies of the 1-24th to occupy ground
near the Native Contingent camp, facing the hill over which the Zulu
force was streaming. These three companies were supported to their right
front by the Natal Native Contingent.
Immediately to the right of the Native Contingent tents came the guns,
at a distance of about four hundred yards from the left, and rather more
from the right, which was composed of two companies, 24th Regiment and
the Mounted Corps, and which occupied the extreme right of the camp and
rested on the road. The infantry, in extended order, were by this time
engaged along the whole line, and were firing rapidly and steadily.
Though the enemy fell in hundreds they kept advancing in apparently
undiminished numbers. As rank after rank of the foremost were swept down
others pressed on, till at length the companies of the 1-24th above
mentioned had been driven back to within 300 yards of that portion of
the camp occupied by the Native Contingent. A number of the native
infantry now began a hasty retreat to the camp; their officers
endeavoured to restrain them, but without effect. Captain Essex pointed
this out to Colonel Durnford, who ordered him to take men to that
portion of the field, and endeavour to hold the enemy in check. But
before this could be executed the natives rushed back in the utmost
disorder, thus laying open the right and rear of the companies of the
first battalion of the 24th on the left and rear, and the enemy dashing
forward at once poured in through this part of the line. In a moment all
was disorder, and but few had time to fix bayonets before the Zulus were
amongst them, using their assegais with terrible effect. Then followed a
scene of utter confusion; horse and foot, black and white, English and
Zulu, friend and foe, in a struggling, fighting crowd, pushed gradually
through the camp towards the road, where the Zulu right already barred
the way. Every man endeavoured to escape towards the Buffalo river, but
this was almost an impossibility even for mounted men. The ground was
rugged, broken with water-washes, boulder-strewn: ground over which an
active native Zulu could progress even faster than a horse. In front ran
the river, swift, deep, and fordless, sharp rocks, and deep water
alternating. Not half of those who escaped from the camp succeeded in
crossing this obstacle: many were drowned, many assegaied, some few
shot, and so the pursuit continued right into Natal. The guns moved from
right to left across the camp, and endeavoured to get on the Rorke's
Drift road. This being occupied by the enemy, they turned off to the
left, and coming to grief in a donga had to be abandoned. Major Smith,
though wounded, managed to reach the Buffalo, but was there shot.
Lieuts. Melvill and Coghill, seeing all was lost, made an attempt to
escape on horseback with the colours of the 24th. Coghill succeeded in
getting safely across the Buffalo, but Melvill was struck by a shot just
as he was reaching the far bank of the river. Coghill, with heroic
devotion, turned back to assist his less fortunate comrade--alas! only
to share his fate. Their bodies were subsequently discovered in close
proximity, and around them a group of dead Zulus. The colours which they
had so desperately defended were also found in the bed of the river,
saved from the degradation of capture and contamination by the hands of
savages.
In this sad affair there perished twenty-six Imperial officers and 600
non-commissioned officers and men. The loss of the Colonial forces was
not less terrible, twenty-four officers being included in the list.
The following is a detailed list of the victims of that sad
day:--1-24th, Col. Pulleine, Major White; Captains Degacher, Wardell,
Mostyn, Younghusband; Lieuts. Hodson, Cavaye, Atkinson, Daly, Anstey,
Porteous, Melvill, Quarter-Master Pullen, and five entire companies:
2-24th, Lieuts. Pope, Austin, Dyer, Griffiths, Quarter-Master
Bloomfield, and ninety men. Royal Engineers, Colonel Durnford, Lieut.
McDowell, Captain G. Shepstone (political assistant to Col. Durnford),
Lieut. Coghill, A.D.C. (to Sir Bartle Frere), Surgeon-Major Shepherd.
The Mounted Police Carabineers and Volunteers lost forty-three out of
seventy-one, including Captain Bradstreet, Lieut. F. J. D. Scott, and
Quarter-Master Hitchcock. The Mounted Infantry lost thirty out of
thirty-four. The N Battery 5th Brigade, Royal Artillery, under Major
Stuart Smith, was destroyed (Lieut. Curling escaped), as also the Rocket
Battery under Major Russell, R.A. 1st Battalion 3rd Regiment, N.N.C.,
lost in officers, Captains Robert Krohn and James Lonsdale, Lieuts.
Avery, Holcraft, and Jameson; Surgeon F. Bull, Quarter-Master John
McCormick. 2nd Battalion 3rd Regiment, N.N.C., lost Captains Erskine,
Barry, and Murray; Lieuts. Pritchard, Young, Gibson, Standish Vereker,
and Rivers, Quarter-Master A. Chambers. The loss of material is put down
at 102 waggons, 1400 oxen, 2 guns, 400 shot and shell, 1200 rifles,
250,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 60,000_l._ worth of commissariat
supplies, a rocket trough, and a number of tents.
Four special-service officers, viz. Captain Alan Gardner, 14th Hussars
and Essex 75th Regiment, and Lieuts. Smith, Dorien, 95th, and Cochrane,
32nd, together with Lieut. Curling, R.A., succeeded in escaping, and
rode away to Helpmakaar, where a laager was immediately formed. The same
night, as no other messenger could be found, and it was feared Wood's
column might be cut off in rear, Captain Gardner started to give him
timely warning. Riding all night, he reached Utrecht about four o'clock
next day, thence despatching a messenger to Colonel Wood, he himself
returned to Helpmakaar.
The following account is of great interest as having been given by a
Zulu deserter:--
"The Zulu army, consisting of the Ulundi corps about 3000 strong, the
Nokenke 2000, the Nkobamakosi, including the Uve, 5000 strong, the
Umcityu 4000 strong, the Nodwengu 2000 strong, the Umbonambi 3000, and
the Udkloko 1000--a total of 20,000 men in all--after an address from
the king left the Nodwengu military kraal on January 17th, and proceeded
on their march towards Rorke's Drift. On the 20th they halted for the
night close by the Isipezi hill, and on the 21st, keeping to the
eastward, they occupied a valley running north and south under the spurs
of the Ngutu hill, which concealed that of Isandhlwana, distant about
four miles nearly due west. The order of encampment was--on the right,
the Nodwengu, Nokenke and Umcityu; in the centre, the Nkobamakosi and
Umbonambi; on the left, the Ulundi and Udkloko corps. On the morning of
the 22nd there was no intention of making an attack on account of some
superstition as to the state of the moon, and they were sitting down
resting when firing was heard by the Zulus on the right. This was at
first supposed by them to be an attack on the centre, but a move being
made in that direction this proved not to be the case; and it was soon
found out that this was the whites engaged with Matyana's people some
ten miles off to the left front. Just after the Zulus had resumed their
position, and again sat down, a herd of cattle came past their line
driven down by some of their scouts from the right. Just when these were
opposite the Umcityu regiment a body of mounted men on the hill to the
west were seen galloping and evidently trying to cut them off. When
several hundred yards off, seeing the Umcityu, they dismounted, fired a
volley, and retired. The Umcityu at once jumped up and charged. This
example was followed by the Nokenke and Nodwengu on the right, as well
as by the Nkobamakosi and Umbonambi in the centre, whilst the Undi and
Udkloko formed a circle--as is customary with the Zulus when a force is
about to engage--and remained in their position. With these were the two
chief officers Mavamingwana and Tyugwayo, who after a short pause led
away these centre troops in a north-westerly direction, and keeping to
the north of the Isandhlwana performed a turning movement, unseen by the
English through the nature of the ground. Thus the original Zulu left
became the extreme right, the right the centre, and the centre the left.
The two regiments forming the latter--the Nkobamakosi and
Umbonambi--made a turning movement along the front of the camp to the
English right, but became engaged before they could complete it. The Uve
battalion of the Nkobamakosi had to retire till reinforced; and the
Umbonambi suffered heavily from the artillery fire. Meanwhile the Zulu
centre, consisting of the Umcityu (left centre) and Nokenke and
Nodwengu (higher up on the right) under the hill, were making a direct
attack on the left of the camp. The Umcityu suffered very severely from
both artillery and musketry fire; the Nokenke from musketry fire alone;
while the Nodwengu suffered least. When the camp was carried the
regiments became all mixed up together; some pursued the fugitives to
the Buffalo; the remainder plundered the camp: but the Undi and Udkloko
made the best of their way to Rorke's Drift, in order to plunder the
post there."
It is now time to turn attention to the remainder of the troops that had
left the camp before this sad event occurred.
The force under Colonel Glyn, accompanied by Lord Chelmsford, moved off
at early dawn, and had reached Major Dartnell by 6.15 a.m. The General
at once took command, and ordered out scouting parties of mounted men to
gain intelligence of the positions and strength of the enemy, who soon
after showed in some force on the opposing heights parallel to the
Inhlazatye Mountains. A general advance of the troops was made, and the
enemy retired slowly, but without firing. The guns and 24th Regiment
meanwhile moved up the valley, their left being protected by the Mounted
Infantry, while the Mounted Police and Volunteers guarded the right
flank. The main body of the enemy drew back in regular order and took up
a position with great skill on the spurs of the Isipisi Mountain,
distant about six miles, but Captain Shepstone, with his Natal
Carabineers, managed to cut off about 300 of the stragglers and
destroyed fifty of them. At nine a.m. a messenger, whose horse was
panting and covered with foam, arrived before Colonel Glyn with a brief
despatch from Colonel Pulleine, notifying that musketry firing was heard
on the left front of the camp. Lord Chelmsford at once sent a staff
officer, Lieutenant Milne, to an eminence from whence the camp and
valley of Insalwana could be seen, and it seems that a delay of an hour
took place while this officer was vainly scanning the horizon. The
actual scene of conflict where Colonel Durnford was engaged with the
Zulu army was five miles away, and hidden by some hills intervening
between Lord Chelmsford's position and the British camp. The General,
therefore, seems to have felt no apprehensions in regard to the safety
of the camp, and continued his operations against the supposed main body
of the Zulus.
About two o'clock Lord Chelmsford was on the banks of the Amange stream,
selecting a fit spot for a camp, he having already in the morning sent
Captain Gardner back to Colonel Pulleine with an order to that officer
to forward the camping materials of the party out on reconnaissance.
While thus engaged a native on horseback galloped down from the opposite
ridge saying that an attack was being made on the camp, and that he had
seen heavy firing and heard the big guns. Lord Chelmsford immediately
hastened to the crest of the hill, whence through a glass the camp could
be plainly seen. All, however, seemed quiet: the sun was shining on the
white tents; no signs of firing were seen, and the bodies of men moving
about in the camp were put down to be English soldiers and friendly
natives. Knowing how careful were his dispositions and how positive his
orders for the defence of the camp, one and all of Lord Chelmsford's
escort came to the conclusion that an attack had been made and repulsed.
It was then decided that the headquarters camp should move to the spot
selected on the Amange stream, whilst the General himself, who was
anxious to know the details of the attack, should proceed back to camp.
The Carabineers and the Mounted Infantry accompanied him: the 1st
battalion 24th Regiment, the four guns, the Mounted Police and 2nd
battalion of 3rd Regiment Native Contingent were left to form the new
camp. During the first seven miles of the journey nothing occurred to
excite the General's suspicion. Certainly some of the tents had
disappeared, but then this was in accordance with the orders given in
the morning. When about four miles from the camp he fell in with the
Natal Native Contingent, which had been ordered to return many hours
previously, but which seeing the camp attacked by forces superior to its
own had wisely halted. In about half-an-hour they were met by a solitary
horseman coming at a foot pace from the direction of the camp.
Commandant Lonsdale, for it was he, rode up to the General and uttered
the astounding words "The camp is in possession of the enemy." It
appears that Lonsdale, who had been ill, being very tired was quietly
returning from Glyn's column to the camp. He had crossed the small
water-wash to the south of the camp and was jogging slowly along in a
sort of lethargy, from which he was roused by the discharge of a rifle
close to him. Looking up, he saw a native, who had evidently just fired,
and him he imagined to be one of his own contingent indulging in
reckless firing; so he pursued his way. Sitting in and around the tents
were groups of red-coats, so he still kept on till within a bare ten
yards of the tents. He then saw a great black Zulu come out of one with
a blood-besmeared assegai in his hand. Gazing more carefully, he saw
that black men, and black men only, were the wearers of the red-coats.
The truth flashed on him: turning his pony sharp round he galloped off
before the enemy knew what he was about. Not less than 150 shots were
fired at him as he did so, but, providentially, he escaped to warn the
General, who, without such warning, his staff and troops with him, would
have walked unsuspiciously into the trap, and the whole force would
probably have perished to a man.
The General at once sent back to hurry up Colonel Glyn and his force,
while Colonel Russell was sent on to reconnoitre the camp, which was
found to be as Commandant Lonsdale had reported. On Colonel Glyn's
arrival the whole force was disposed in fighting order, and moved
rapidly across the plain, but could not arrive in the vicinity of the
camp until after dark. All was found a wreck--corpses, broken tents,
dead horses, oxen, and other _débris_ were strewed around; and the men,
most of whom were without ammunition, and had not tasted food for
forty-eight hours, were ordered to bivouac amidst the crowd of
blood-stained relics which marked the day's slaughter. Our soldiers had
covered more than thirty miles on the previous day without food or
ammunition, and if resolutely attacked by the entire force of Zulus
might have shared the fate of their comrades. The next morning,
therefore, before daylight a sad retreat was effected to Rorke's Drift,
where the first glad tidings were heard of the glorious defence which
had been made by Chard and Bromhead, with their handful of men.
It came about thus. Lieutenant Chard, with one sergeant and six men, had
been left in charge of the ponts over the Tugela at this point. Close by
was a commissariat depôt in charge of Lieutenant Bromhead and a company
of the 24th Regiment. About three o'clock on January 22nd news of the
disaster at Isandhlwana reached this officer, together with a note,
saying that the enemy were advancing in force against his post, which
was to be held at all costs. Chard immediately withdrew his small party,
and in concert with Bromhead arranged for the loopholing and barricading
the store-building and hospital, and for connecting the defences of the
two by building walls of mealie-bags. At 3.30 an officer of Durnford's
Horse with about 100 men came in, and was asked to send them out as
vedettes; these, when pressed, to fall back and assist in the defence of
the buildings. At 4.30 this officer returned with the news that the
enemy was close at hand, that his men would not obey orders, but had
galloped off to Helpmakaar. About the same time Captain Stephenson and
his detachment of natives also withdrew. It was at once perceived that
the line of defence was now too extended for the small force left, and
an inner entrenchment of biscuit-boxes was made, and this had been
completed to a wall two boxes high, when suddenly 600 of the enemy
turned the hill to the south. They advanced at a run against the
southern wall, and notwithstanding a tremendous fire reached to within
fifty yards of it. Being here encountered by a cross-fire from the store
they were stopped. Taking advantage, however, of some shelter afforded
by the cookhouse and ovens, they kept up heavy musketry volleys thence,
whilst the main body moved on to the left round the hospital, whence
they made a rush upon the north-west wall and breastwork of mealie-bags.
Meanwhile the mass of the advancing foe lined a ledge of rocks and
filled the caves overlooking the English position at a distance of 100
yards to the south, whence they too kept up a constant fire. Another
party to the left occupied a garden in a hollow in the road, and also
the bush beyond, which time had not permitted to be cut down. The enemy
could thus advance close to the English works, and were soon in
possession of one whole side of the wall, whilst on the other in a line
extending from the hospital all along the wall to the bush they made a
series of determined onsets. But each attack was met and splendidly
repulsed with the bayonet, Corporal Schiess (N.N.C.) especially
distinguishing himself. The fire from the ledge of rock and caves at
length became so galling, that it was necessary to retire behind the
inner line of biscuit-boxes.
All this time the enemy had been trying to force the hospital, and at
length they did set fire to the roof. The garrison defended the place
room by room, bringing out all the sick who could be moved before they
retired. Privates Williams, Hook, R. Jones, and W. Jones, 24th Regiment,
were the last to leave, holding the doorway against the Zulus with their
bayonets, their ammunition being quite expended. Five sick men, owing to
the smoke and want of interior communication, had unfortunately to be
left to their fates. Two heaps of mealie-bags were now converted into a
sort of redoubt, and a second line of fire was thus obtained all round.
Darkness now came on, and after several more furious attacks had been
repulsed the defenders had ultimately to retire to the middle, and then
to the inner wall of the kraal, east of the position they had at first
held. The attacks continued all night, the soldiers firing with the
utmost coolness, and never wasting a shot. At four a.m., January 23rd,
firing ceased, and by daybreak the enemy were disappearing over the hill
to the south-west. The ground was then patrolled, the arms of the dead
Zulus collected, and the position strengthened as far as possible. About
seven a.m. a large body of the enemy was again seen on the hill to the
south-west, and a friendly Kaffir, who had come in shortly before, was
sent to Helpmakaar to ask for assistance. However, about eight a.m. the
British 3rd column began to appear, whereupon the enemy, who had been
again advancing, fell back as the troops advanced, and Rorke's Drift
Post had been saved.
The number of English engaged in this action was eight officers and 131
non-commissioned officers and men; of these fifteen were killed and
twelve wounded, two subsequently dying of their hurts. The attacking
Zulu force consisted of two regiments--the Undi and Udkloko--in all a
total of something less than 4000. Of these 370 lay dead around the post
on the morning that Lord Chelmsford so opportunely arrived.
Surgeon Reynolds, Acting Commissary Officer Dalton, and Assistant
Commissary Dunne were throughout conspicuous for their gallantry and
coolness. Lieutenants Chard, R.E., and Bromhead, 24th Regiment,
subsequently received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament for their
heroic conduct, and were advanced to the rank of majors.
So much has been said and written as to the cause of, and so many people
have been held responsible for the Isandhlwana disaster that the subject
cannot here be passed over in silence.
The living no less than the dead have a claim to a full share of justice
and truth; but remembering that the mouths of one party--"les morts qui
ne reviennent pas"--are closed, we should be extremely careful in
drawing any conclusion from acts which, could the testimony of the
fallen be obtained, it would not only explain and excuse, but amply
justify.
The court of inquiry held at Helpmakaar found itself unable to form from
the available evidence any positive judgment; but the facts disclosed
point irresistibly to a negative conclusion. Had the troops acted on the
defensive, the camp would not have been lost.
Still there may have been cogent--nay irresistible reasons which caused
Colonel Durnford to push forward his forces. Were Colonel Pulleine
alive, he might give equally good reasons for acceding to Durnford's
urgent request and sending out the reinforcements.
The British regular infantry advanced successfully, retired slowly and
in unbroken order; they were still firing rapidly, coolly, and with
great effect. Things though desperate were by no means hopeless.
Suddenly the native levies, "though their officers tried to restrain
them, rushed back in the utmost disorder," thus exposing the flank and
rear of the regulars. "Few of the men had time to fix bayonets before
the enemy were amongst them, using their assegais with terrible effect."
Here is the answer to "How did it happen?" The natives on one side--the
Zulu--were regarded too lightly; on the other, fighting for the English
with too great confidence. "Why," it will be asked, "were not the
waggons laagered? Whose duty was it to see this done?" Lord Chelmsford
had issued a standing order at the very commencement of the campaign,
that this was to be the first consideration in all camps. Lord
Chelmsford, accompanied Colonel Glyn from Rorke's Drift, saw the site
chosen at Isandhlwana, and then immediately started on a reconnaissance
which lasted till after nightfall. Doubtless Lord Chelmsford supposed
Colonel Glyn had done what was necessary. On the following morning with
the first streak of dawn Colonel Glyn was ordered to proceed to Major
Dartnell's assistance, and Lord Chelmsford determined to accompany him,
after despatching an express to Colonel Durnford ordering him up "to
strengthen the camp." Doubtless Colonel Glyn supposed that Colonel
Pulleine would see to laagering the waggons. Colonel Pulleine was in
command of the camp a bare three hours, and doubtless, knowing how brief
his tenure of office was to be, preferred to let things remain as they
were till his successor's arrival. Colonel Durnford had not been a
single half-hour in camp before the action was commenced.
It is asked why did not the troops form squares? Hastings, we are told,
had Harold's men only remained in their position, would have been a
Saxon victory--Torres Vedras a disgrace instead of a glory had the
British troops been rashly taunted into leaving their trenches: and
Waterloo a more glowing theme for Beranger's lyre had Napoleon been able
to entice the patient English squares to forsake their adamantine
formation. But why was Colonel Durnford to form squares? How was he to
imagine that such an immense force was arrayed against him when the
Commander-in-chief had with him a superior force to that left in the
camp avowedly to operate against the enemy's main body? For such his
information and personal observation led him to believe was the force
against whom he and Major Dartnell were acting.
Colonel Durnford was no novice in South African war; like Cæsar, he had
the gift of the pen no less than the sword; he had both written and
fought well. Colonel Pulleine was an experienced officer of no mean
reputation, and by whatever device they were deceived, we may be sure
that it was no ordinary one, and that few would have stood where they
fell.
Again, who could have anticipated the attack? We have it from the lips
of a Zulu that the onset was unpremeditated, and the result of accident.
With all humbleness, let it be confessed that--
"Our indiscretion sometimes serves us well
When our deep plots do fail; and that should teach us
There's a divinity that shapes our ends
Rough hew them as we will."
Another question, often asked, is, "Why did not Lord Chelmsford,
immediately on his return, make a counter-attack on the enemy." First of
all he had to wait for Colonel Glyn and the main body to come up to
him. Meanwhile darkness had come on. When Glyn arrived he did advance
with his troops formed up for action, and with the intention of
re-taking the camp, which he had every reason to suppose was occupied by
the enemy. The event proved they had abandoned it. Was not this a good
reason for striking a blow? Let the facts of the case be well borne in
mind. Lord Chelmsford knew that there was a large force in his rear; the
force that had sacked the camp was supposed, and reasonably enough, to
be on the right flank. In front were the bright watchfires of another
force, and the blazing hospital at Rorke's Drift, which, together with
Helpmakaar, there was every ground to believe had been captured and
looted by the foe; in a word, his force was surrounded. The men had only
fifty rounds of ammunition apiece; they had been twenty-four hours
without food; they were physically exhausted by eighteen hours'
continuous marching, and no less morally by the loss of their camp;
their probabilities of escape were distant. How could a general lead
troops in such a condition against a foe flushed and elated with spoil
and recent victory?
CHAPTER III.
Ekowe described--The fort--Guard for the frontier--Raid on
Dabulamanzi's Kraal--Another raid--Life in Ekowe--Wood at Potter's
Kraal--Capture of Baglusini--Skirmish and capture of
cattle--Destruction of Manyanyoba Kraal--Colonel Rowlands--Capture
of Makatees Kop--Junction with Wood--Camp at Kambula--Coming in of
Oham--Disaster at Intombi Drift--Death of Moriarty--Rescue of Oham's
wives and people--Events that led to the attack on Umbelini--The
Zlobani--The attack--Details--Death of Campbell--Narrow escape of
Wood--Death of Weatherly--St. Helena and H.M.S. "Shah."
We must now return to Pearson, whom we left entrenching himself at
Ekowe.
The position is a most commanding one, being almost on the summit of the
Tyoe range, and more than 2000 feet above the sea level; and for beauty
of site could scarcely be surpassed. To the north, about a mile and a
half, is the Umlalazi river, at that time rather full from the late
rains, and beyond this stream are long undulating grassy plains, almost
devoid of bush, with the exception here and there of a few wild and
dwarf date-palms, and lichens in the hollows. Behind, to the south, is
the Umkukusi range, and a hilly but open country, while on the west is a
very broken and difficult country, bounded by the Hintza forest. Away to
the east, right to the coast at Port Durnford, is about forty miles of
undulating and here and there hilly country. About 1200 yards to the
south-east there is a rocky eminence at least 600 feet higher than the
fort, and from this place a magnificent view of Port Durnford and the
mouth of the Umlalazi can be seen. The sea is not more than twenty-two
miles off, in a line as the crow flies. The original building was
formerly a Norwegian mission station, and when the present war began it
was abandoned by the missionaries and plundered by the Zulus. The
buildings, when Pearson arrived, consisted of three moderately-sized
brick erections, thatched originally with straw, but subsequently
covered with a less inflammable material. In addition to these
buildings, which were utilized as stores, there was a small church,
built of the native-made sun-dried bricks, and covered, as most of these
edifices are in that country, with corrugated galvanized iron. The
church was turned into an hospital, while the tower made a capital
look-out, from whence could be seen the next post, and which afterwards
proved of such service in the way of signalling. Pearson now began to
suffer the inconveniences of a regular siege; his communications were
cut, and it was found that of the twelve messengers belonging to the
Natal Native Contingent sent from Ekowe with letters during the first
week in February, only one arrived, the others having been intercepted
and killed on their way. The fort soon completely changed its character
under the incessant labour bestowed upon it by Pearson's men, under the
vigilant supervision of their chief. It now became a six-angled
enclosure, about sixty yards wide, having a ditch eighteen feet in
depth, while its breadth was twelve feet. At the bottom it was studded
profusely with assegai heads securely planted, and the parapets,
carefully rivetted, were proof not only against any musketry fire, but
field artillery. From its southern angles ran out two well-built curtain
walls, enclosing a fine kraal for cattle and horses. These curtains were
well protected by the fire of the angles from which they sprung, while
the kraal itself had its own massive gateway and drawbridge. At the end
of the kraal, or cattle enclosure, furthest from the angular fort, was
constructed from the remains of a dilapidated magazine, a kind of
irregular redoubt, which also had a deep ditch and thick mud walls,
defended by a quantity of powerful thorns laid along the parapet. It was
most fortunate that this force brought with them a large supply of
well-selected entrenching tools, consisting of shovels, picks, spades,
billhooks, axes, and crowbars. Day by day, whenever their time could be
spared from patrol and outpost duty, the men were employed in making
entanglements of rows of felled trees, as well as constructing fascines,
filling sandbags, turning out gabions, loopholes, and _abattis_. All
these obstacles possessed the usual requisites. They were under the
close fire of the fort, were covered from the enemy's fire, and gave him
no cover; while they were all made so substantially that they could not
be cut down or removed without immense difficulty. The piquet duties
were rather severe, and each piquet had to furnish two or three double
sentries in reliefs, patrols, and links. They were posted under the best
circumstances obtainable, being sheltered from the enemy, having a good
range in front, with every advantage in retreating if attacked in force.
Each face or front of the fort was cleared up to 800 yards; shelter
trenches were made for the first line of defence; cover was left for the
supports and reserves; ranges were marked and measures taken for the
artillery and rifle fire, and all precautionary arrangements made in
regard to the supply and storage of provisions, forage, water, and
ammunition.
The water was good, and not brackish at that time of the year. It was
taken from a bright stream well under the fire of the fort, and fed by a
capital spring, also under fire of one of the seven-pounders. The church
and the storehouses were also carefully loopholed, and sandbags
furnished to make the defences more secure. These three strong loopholed
buildings, forming part of the _enceinte_, were rendered more formidable
by double planking, backed crossways by iron barrel hoops, while fine,
damp, heavy sand from the neighbouring hill was employed in filling
bags, made from old provision sacks.
Every man in the fort had his proper place assigned to him, and at
exercise it was found that with three minutes' notice each detachment
was in its place. The Buffs were told off to the two northern faces, on
which side there was a well-made _caponnière_ thrown up in the
re-entering angle. At the west angle of this fort one gun and a
detachment of the Royal Artillery were posted, while on the east salient
were two guns and a somewhat stronger number of men. Here there was a
small outlet for water-parties, guarded on the flank by a little
loopholed building, and commanded in the rear by a strong building with
a thatched roof. The rocket tubes were placed under charge of the Royal
Marines, on the south-west front, and could, if necessary, sweep the
trek oxen laager, and slaughter oxen laager outside the fort on that
side. The principal gateway was on the west face, and was guarded by a
company of the Buffs, who loopholed the church tower in their rear to
fall back upon, and to act as a commanding flanking fire. The front,
facing due south, was served by the 99th, with one gun at the salient
angle, a _caponnière_ in the centre, guarded by a Gatling, and with a
thirteen feet stockade at the opposing angle. Another strong building,
also thatch roof, commanded this front. Not a day passed but some
improvement was made in strengthening these works, and this as much for
prudence against possible attack, as to keep the men occupied and free
from the lassitude attendant upon long confinement. It should also be
mentioned that torpedoes had been laid down by the bluejackets for three
miles along the bed of the Tugela, so that if the Zulus attempted to
cross near any of the posts of observation they might be somewhat
astonished.
The ration daily used to be two pounds of beef--fresh killed and tough
as leather--a couple of commissariat biscuits--hard as flint--a very
small complement of coffee or tea, sugar, and one spoonful of lime
juice, which every man had to take whether he liked it or not; preserved
potatoes, compressed vegetables, and an occasional ration of beans, made
a little variety now and then. During the last days of the siege the
meat and biscuit ration was reduced. A day's routine was as
follows:--The men rose with the _réveille_ at four a.m. for a parade of
all hands and fatigue duties for a couple of hours, weather permitting:
the breakfast bugle sounded at eight, and fatigues were again performed
from 9.30 till noon; dinner bugle at 1.30, and rest and recreation till
4.30, and finally "retreat" at 6.30, when no one was to be outside the
walls. The men amused themselves with quoits, cricket, and athletics,
some of the Buffs being good "all round;" while all the officers,
especially the colonel, encouraged these pastimes by example as well as
precept. After all, the life was not more monotonous than that on board
ship. There was no lack of ammunition, as Colonel Ely on march to Ekowe
had to abandon only ten waggons, and these were looted. The rest,
however, arrived safely. The garrison also from time to time received
valuable and most reassuring information regarding the disposition and
whereabouts of their friends along the line of the Tugela, and in their
rear. At Fort Pearson, which might be said to be the principal base of
operations, and which commanded the river and lower drift from the Natal
side, there were sufficient men of the Naval Brigade to work the two
guns there. They had also the European officers and the non-commissioned
officers of the disbanded native corps. Then, to keep up communications,
the Mounted Volunteers of Coast District were posted at intervals along
the river, between Fort Pearson and Kranz Kop. Another fort on the Zulu
bank of the Tugela was called "Fort Tenedos," in compliment to the
detachment which formed its garrison. Major Barrow, with a squadron of
mounted infantry, and Lieutenant Kingscote, with a smart body of
marines and bluejackets, formed the defensive force. At Rorke's Drift
there were now five companies of the 2nd battalion of the 24th Regiment.
A strongly entrenched position had also been formed on a commanding site
called Macdonald's Farm, on a rocky eminence overlooking the Tugela.
Ditches ten feet deep were cut, parapets seven feet high thrown up, the
farmhouse itself strengthened, and all the garden walls loopholed. The
garrison consisted of the Stanger Mounted Rifles, and some native
auxiliaries, who proved most trustworthy as scouts and messengers.
Captain Lucas, whose admirable powers of organization were quite
proverbial amongst the colonists, and whose frontier experiences were of
long standing, was strongly posted at a bend of the river between the
farm and Thring's Post, and had with him a useful body of natives.
Thring's Post came next on the list, and here there were a couple of
hundred of well-mounted and well-armed volunteers divided into
squadrons, or corps of fifty men. Thring's Post is on the Imyamazana
Mountain, and is about twenty-seven miles from Fort Pearson. The
volunteers, knowing the country well, were employed in keeping up by
constant patrols communications with Fort Pearson and Fort Cherry.
News also reached them that Wood had been reinforced, and was more than
holding his own. There was, therefore, little anxiety felt for the
security of the frontier, and everything strengthened Colonel Pearson in
his determination to remain in his position instead of attempting to cut
his way out.
The health of the Ekowe garrison continued very good. The hospital, it
has been said, was the old church of the mission-station. At the end of
the second week in March there were only twenty-five men on the
sick-list, and many of these almost convalescent. They had, however,
lost two of their number lately, namely, poor Williams of the Buffs, and
another great favourite, young Coker, the mid-shipman, who fought his
Gatling so well at Inyanezi. Both these fine fellows were ill but a
short time, and succumbed to fever. They were buried with the usual
honours just outside the fort.
Lieutenant Rowden, 98th Regiment, who was nominated by Colonel Pearson
commander of the mounted scouts, performed his difficult and dangerous
task to perfection. He had by the end of February successfully explored
the country in the direction of the Isangweni military kraal, which was
not far from Ondini, and about three miles from Ekowe. He reported that
there were 1500 men there, and more collecting. The 1500 were composed
of the married regiment Isangu, whose average age is fifty-four, and
whose services in former wars had been most distinguished. The country
between the fort and Isangweni was an undulating table-land, running
parallel to the forests on either side, and admirably suited for
cavalry. Another brother of Cetywayo, named Dabulamanzi, had a fortified
kraal not far from that of Isangweni, and Pearson determined to attack
both those places as soon as he was in a position to move upon them.
The second week of March had now come to an end, and it was deemed
advisable to vary the monotony of life in the fort by one or two
offensive expeditions. The most important of these, both as to the
numbers engaged and its effects, was the foray on Dabulamanzi's kraal.
The forces detailed for this expedition consisted of fifty men of the
Buffs, the same number of the 99th, and twenty-five of the Naval
Brigade, with their Gatling, and a small body of mounted scouts, under
the active Lieutenant Rowden (98th). Starting about five a.m., the party
descended the slopes that led to the river, and continued its march
along a valley running north-east, and gradually narrowing. The track in
some places was crossed by difficult spruits, and was scarcely defined;
but their guides were well acquainted with the landmarks, although the
pathways were often obliterated by thorns and bush. The track was also
frequently commanded by spurs and bluffs projecting overhead, but these
were carefully explored by the mounted men, and no enemy could be seen.
A considerable watershed was reached about eight miles from Ekowe, and
here, in a favourable and secluded position, was made the first
off-saddle for half an hour. The country about here was entirely denuded
of fodder, but the horsemen had been fortunately directed to bring a few
mealies for their mounts. On resuming the march they crossed the bottom
of a deep sandy nullah with very precipitous sides, which they were
forced to follow, as it was the only practicable track. About a mile and
a half further on the advanced patrols sent back to inform the officer
of the main body that there was a camping-ground or temporary kraal
about three miles and a half north, where there was sufficient water and
grass. The orders were therefore given to push on for this point, and in
about forty-five minutes it was reached. It was now sundown, and their
chief, having decided that it was inexpedient to march during the
night, orders were issued for the usual precautions to be taken, and to
bivouac till daybreak.
During the night, however, no one slept, as they had several alarms, and
it became evident from certain indications known to the experienced in
Zulu camping-out, that they were being reconnoitred by the enemy, though
in all probability not in sufficient force to deliver an attack. As,
however, it was quite possible that messengers would be despatched to
the neighbouring kraals, it was deemed advisable to strengthen the
position, in case of their being surrounded before the morning. Taking
one of the guides, who said he knew the neighbourhood, from having
frequently hunted here, one of the officers and a couple of men were
sent to make a reconnaissance round the bivouac. This party at once
started without making any noise, and entering on the old watercourse
worked their way up towards the summit of the kloof. Large, indeed
enormous, blocks of stone were lying about in various directions, and
the water during the heavy rains had so far worked its way among these
rocks that several hollows were scooped out so as to form caves large
enough to hold one or two human beings. These places had evidently been
recently occupied, remains of mealies and the charred wood of a recent
fire indicating the use to which the shelter had been applied. Ascending
the kloof still farther, and keeping well under cover of the bush, these
scouts walked along what at first seemed an old war-path, and this being
examined it was evident that it had been worn by human beings, and not
long since. On following this path, it led to a small piece of
table-land not much larger than an ordinary mess-tent or marquee, and
this platform was formed by a solid piece of rock rising, not unlike the
Pieter Bot at Mauritius, to a couple of hundred feet above where the
explorers were standing. To the eye of a soldier the place was
impregnable, and as the scouts scanned the country round by the fitful
gleams of occasional moonlight they saw that twenty well-armed and
steady men could hold the rock against an army. The face of the rock had
been scooped out, and, either by time or human labour, a sort of cave or
shelter afforded additional protection. Upon leaving the rock and
descending the ravine to carry the intelligence to the column in
bivouac, these patrols were startled to see the outlines of several dark
figures moving in the neighbouring bush. Making all possible speed,
therefore, the messengers hurried back, and at the news received every
man stood to his arms. They had not long to wait, for the enemy soon
appeared, drawn out in clear relief against the grey of the early dawn,
which was now coming on. Bodies of Zulus on the opposite ridges, which
could not have been seen lower down, were now observed, while a few
cattle were being rapidly hurried away in the distance. The Zulu scouts
were evidently puzzled at the white men's proceedings, the more so as
before leaving the kop one of the guides had tied his handkerchief to an
overhanging branch, thus giving the enemy the idea that a detachment had
been left to occupy the post. This error on the part of their
antagonists served the troops materially, as, by hurrying forward at a
quick pace, they were enabled to gain the kop, and with some
considerable difficulty get their Gatling to the summit. Their horses,
of course, could not ascend, but halfway up there was an excellent
position, where grass and water were found, and here the animals were
tethered in the usual manner--by the head and knee. When daylight
enabled them to examine the surrounding country with field-glasses, they
could see the neighbouring kraals of the chief Dabulamanzi and his
neighbour, Ungakamatue, and it was evident that the alarm had been
given. Several extraordinary movements attracted their attention. Armed
bodies of natives were seen to be leaving the villages in various
directions, as if going upon messages of importance. Aware of the
celerity of movement of the Zulus, and the enormous distances their
soldiers can cover in a few hours, this activity was not reassuring, as
it was concluded that reinforcements were being sent for, for the
purpose of intercepting the retreat to the fort of Ekowe. The English
commander, however, was not long in choosing his plan of operations. It
would never do to sustain a siege on the rock or kop, which, however
defensible if provisioned, was sure to be taken by starvation in the
long-run. The Dabulamanzi kraal had evidently been weakened by the
absence of men harvesting, and it did not seem more than a mile from
where the troops were. One of the guides remembered a cattle-track
which, by a circuitous route, led back on the eastern side to Ekowe, and
as the road they had arrived by was certain to be now ambushed, it was
deemed advisable to make a dash at the kraal, and return with what spoil
they could obtain in the new direction. Having cut some long canes, some
of the soldiers fixed them securely between the ledges of the rocks,
and attached to them some coloured clothes, which they hoped would lead
to the belief that they still occupied the kop. These precautions having
been taken, the troops moved silently down through the dense bushes on
the reverse side of the cliff, and succeeded in getting away without
being observed by the Zulus, who evidently seemed principally anxious
about their cattle. Part of the mounted force went in front to explore
the bush, while the rest remained in rear to follow and reconnoitre. On
coming again to the valley, they moved still more rapidly until they
came to a little rise, which, on surmounting, they found led to a deep
kloof, the mouth of which was almost closed by the proximity of the
hills, on either side rising to about 600 feet in height. These
curious-looking hills appeared to be a series of ledges of rocks, with
lines of dykes--probably of volcanic origin--cropping up, and forming
the most natural-looking breastworks, behind which a determined party of
men might destroy any attacking party. Having waited to collect the tail
of the column, they descended the rise, and sending out a few men to
scout on the ridge skirting the hill on their right, the commander led
the main body under cover of this range towards the mouth of the kloof,
which the guides said was the main entrance to the kraal. When about 200
yards from the mouth of the gorge, the enemy commenced firing upon the
advanced files from behind a formidable-looking dyke, and seeing that
one of the horses had been badly wounded in the quarter, an officer sent
up a dozen men to the top of the range to extend as a covering party.
These had barely been posted in a good position, when a perfect shower
of bullets fell amongst the main body, the only casualty being, however,
one man struck by an almost spent bullet. It being thus seen that they
were out of range as far as any material injury could be effected, the
men were directed to keep moving along the flank, while the Buffs
advanced along the valley in a parallel line, closing to their centres
as they neared the mouth of the kloof. At the same time, the men of the
Naval Brigade (twenty-five) were detached with their Gatling towards the
foot of the left-hand hill, to see if there was a path by which the
kraal could be taken in reverse. This left-hand hill seemed to be the
key of the position, as it looked down upon the kraal itself. The 99th
were all this time held in reserve to prevent the troops being taken in
reverse should the enemy's reinforcements come up. While the English
were effecting these movements the Zulus, whose forces did not seem to
be augmenting, kept up what would have been a hot cross-fire had they
been armed with Martinis, but which was perfectly innocuous at 700
yards.
A bugle-call now gave notice to the skirmishers to close in, and when
this was effected the mounted men dashed through the kloof, followed by
the Buffs and the 99th at the double. The Naval Brigade meanwhile was
seen working its way in the most energetic manner round the left flank
and ready to effect a junction with the others at the foot of the mound
on which stood the outer defences of the kraal. A general stampede of
men, women, and cattle now took place, the soldiers being specially
warned not to fire at the two latter, and only at the former in return.
In ten minutes the outer and inner circles of the kraal were fired,
care having been taken to see that no living creature was hidden within.
As the Zulus generally store their mealies (Indian corn) underground in
the cattle enclosures, there was not time to look for any supplies, but
they managed to carry off a few large packages which were found in two
huts, as well as some millet (Kaffir corn). They also collected all the
cattle they could find, not many having been left, and getting them
together in the centre of the column, moved away by the path mentioned
by their guides. These movements were conducted so quickly, that they
were on the homeward march within half an hour of the time they had
entered the kraal. About half a mile from the kraal the kloof separated
into two narrow gullies, the ledges of rock between them being
inaccessible, and as it was known that these paths made a junction some
two miles on, it was decided to use them both, to enable the troops to
march more quickly. The Buffs accordingly took one trek, and the 99th
detachment the other, both uniting again without any casualty later on.
The English attack was undoubtedly a complete surprise, inasmuch as the
bulk of the people belonging to the kraal were away, and could not be
recalled in time to defend their village. Had the British column
possessed a larger force of mounted men, they could have intercepted and
carried back the cattle which they saw the attendants driving off. As it
was, however, it was not safe or prudent to risk the chances of
communications with the fort being cut off by delaying to pursue these
animals.
The column had made good about ten miles of the return march when they
discovered that their retreat had been found out; straight in front of
them also were wooded krantzes and dark ravines, where an army of Zulus
might have been concealed, but pioneers having been sent out reported
that all was safe in that direction. Upon this they used the utmost
speed to gain the friendly covert, as they saw that if pursued there was
the best chance of eluding the vigilance of their enemies; or if unable
to do this, they would have the opportunity of fighting them to the best
advantage. As the troops moved quickly on, they entered the forest and
lost sight of the Zulus, who seemed in force, and were apparently
retracing their steps for some mysterious object. They were not,
however, kept long in doubt as to their proceedings, for upon sending on
scouts to an eminence where they could see without being seen, it was
found that the whole Zulu force, apparently some 2000 strong, was upon
the crest of the hill over which they had passed. An advanced party of
skirmishers were running very rapidly, their shields held aloft, and
their assegais waving over their heads. They had discovered the trick
played upon them, and the ruse of the coloured cloths planted upon the
kop. When, however, they could not discover the spoor upon the direct
trek by which the English party had come, they lost a considerable
amount of time in casting about to make out their real direction. At
last, however, when crossing a bit of open veldt, the keen-sighted Zulus
observed their cattle being carried away, at least five miles from them.
The rage of the pursuers, and their contempt for the marching qualities
of British soldiers--compared to their own speed and powers of
endurance--no doubt made them confident of overtaking them; but the
latter had little apprehension of the result, even if this were
effected. They knew that as soon as their foes came within range, they
could pick them off at 1000 or 1200 yards, and the little column had
been specially furnished with several crack marksmen to whom this
distance was no difficulty. They continued their march therefore
steadily, and did not abandon the cattle, which, strange to say, gave
little trouble, and were kept at a good pace by some of the mounted men,
whose anticipation of a full beef ration on their return, from the
spoil, made them doubly zealous in their duties. In about an hour the
Zulus had gained considerably upon them; they were imprudent enough to
move in close order. The evening was, however, now drawing on, and in
another hour the troops should be under the guns of the fort. A mist,
which had been for some time hanging about the streams and the kloof,
prevented the exact progress of the pursuers being seen, but the pursued
were not long without intimation of their whereabouts. The rear-guard
were attracted, when about three miles from the fort, by what seemed to
be dark objects moving between some rocks about half a mile on their
left rear. So fitful was the view obtained, however, that the men were
uncertain whether they were Zulus or some of the larger species of
baboon, which often come out of their holes and caves to look at any
human creature passing by. A steady watch was, however, maintained, and
before many minutes they could plainly see that a large body of the
enemy had, by the most tremendous pedestrian feat, succeeded in getting
almost on a level with them, in a position to assail them in flank. The
column had not long to wait, for as they came to a portion of the trek
they could not avoid, on account of the proximity of a deep morass on
the right, the pursuers, deeming them within range, treated them to a
volley which rattled up to about fifty paces short of their flank. Ten
of the mounted men, all excellent shots, were now sent out to cover the
attacked flank, and, as far as they could, to harass the enemy. The
ground was difficult and broken, but this was no impediment to these
gallant fellows, who, gaining a commanding position 500 yards from the
Zulus, and where there was admirable cover, dismounted, and kept up such
a galling fire that the Zulus retreated, as if waiting for their main
body to come up. As the mist rolled away, they could distinctly be seen
carrying off their dead and wounded with improvised stretchers of
branches of mimosa. A running fire was now kept up, the English shot
taking deadly effect, while no casualty occurred to their men. For more
than half an hour this went on, until the fort was sighted, and as the
Zulu main body had not come up, the flanking party drew quietly off.
The sun was sinking in the horizon as the returning soldiers received
their well-earned welcome from their beleaguered comrades, who were
beginning to be somewhat anxious as to their safe return.
Pearson's next raid was a most brilliant affair. It was found out from
reliable sources that a body of Zulus had charge of a convoy of cattle,
intended for the king's kraal at Ulundi. Deeming the Ekowe garrison as
of no account for more than defensive purposes, the Zulu general had
merely detailed 400 or 450 men to form the escort, which was known to
be on its march not more than seven miles to the north-west of Ekowe,
not far from the Inyezani river. Now here Pearson had an opportunity of
achieving two objects at one stroke. He wished to explore the land and
salient features of the country towards Inyezani, in order to see
whether a road could be made by which the dense bush of Hintza could be
avoided, while, at the same time, he could inflict a lesson upon the
Zulus, and possibly obtain some cattle. The foray was not to be on such
a grand scale as that made on Dabulamanzi's kraal, but it was intended
to be equally important for military purposes. Twenty men of the Naval
Brigade, all the small force of acting engineers, forty of the Buffs,
twenty of the 99th, and the mounted scouts were placed under orders to
parade before daylight on Friday, 21st March. No Gatling was to
accompany, as the utmost celerity of movement was required, and if the
expedition did not succeed in its first dash an immediate retreat upon
the guns was to be made. On leaving the fort at 3.30 a.m., the road by
which the band advanced was found to be good, although here and there
commanded from the neighbouring mountains. About two miles from Ekowe a
bluff runs out from the spur of the range of hills which had often
served as a reconnoitring point, and this was immediately occupied by
the mounted men, who had orders to keep up signalling both with the fort
and the rest of the expedition. Continuing on its march, the column came
to the Inyezani river, which for several miles runs between two
remarkable mountains, the bases of which are clothed with luxuriant
forest growths, while above spring sheer precipices 1000 and 1100 feet
high. The formation seemed to be sandstone and limestone, affording
excellent material for building purposes. Before reaching these dark
solitudes the river passes through a country undulating and fertile, and
the horizon is closed by higher hills, covered in the most part by
forest. These forest-trees are of fine growth and of the most valuable
description. The banks of the river are fringed by a quantity of
bamboo-looking reeds, which serve as wattles in the district, and which
are about the thickness of a finger, and some ten or twelve feet high.
Tracks of hippopotami are occasionally seen, and it is known that such
are in the neighbourhood. The river here is about 200 yards broad, while
the depth averages twenty-five feet. The expedition now noticed a few
deserted kraals on the right bank, while those on the left were found to
be in ruins, as if lately destroyed. At eight a.m. a herd of cattle was
seen some two miles off, and rapidly skirting the base of a friendly
hill the troops managed to cut in between these animals and a body of
Zulus, who appeared to be bivouacking in front of some neighbouring
caves, where fires were lit and cooking was going on. The mounted men,
who were observing these movements, now descended from the bluff where
they had been watching, and coming up rapidly at a canter, made a dash
at the Zulus, to cover the infantry retreat, which they effected with
the capture of some thirty-five fine cattle. A desultory fire was kept
up upon them from the hills during their return, and the enemy, who
seemed to be gradually augmented, at one narrow gorge managed to get
within range, slightly wounding two or three of the rear-guard. By noon
on the same day the men with the captured cattle were safely discussing
their frugal dinner, consisting of an extra half-ration in honour of the
event, within the old fort, which they were already beginning to look
upon as a friend from whom they were soon to part.
In spite of the rapidity of the raid, the necessary observations were
made by the officers deputed for this duty, and a rough sketch of the
ground passed over gave all the information requisite for the
construction of the projected road. This work, which was forthwith taken
in hand, had a most satisfactory effect upon the spirits of the garrison
generally. The working parties were occasionally driven in, but not
without inflicting loss upon the enemy, whose attention was much taken
up in guarding and patrolling the main road by which Pearson came.
Wood, it has been mentioned, fell back upon receiving the news of
Isandhlwana; but this retrograde movement was of short duration, and
from that time till all was ready for the relief of Ekowe, his was the
only column acting on the offensive.
From the 25th January to the 1st February his marches and countermarches
afford little matter of interest. On the 28th he moved on to a new
camping-ground, called Potter's Store, and there obtained full
particulars of the Maglisini or Baglusini Kraal. This place Colonel Wood
had for some time known as one of the principal rallying-points and
depôts of supplies for the Zulu armies. Large quantities of "mealies"
(Indian corn) and grain of other sorts were known to have been
accumulated at this magazine, while cattle in large droves had been
seen on their way to the depôt. Under these circumstances it was
necessary to proceed with caution, as, had any ostentatious preparations
been made for an advance in the direction of the magazine, it is more
than probable Wood's object would only have been gained at a severe
cost. In this view it was determined that a cavalry raid should be made
by the mounted troops under Piet Uys, with his Burghers, and Colonel
Buller, with his dashing corps of Frontier Light Horse. From the camp
near Potter's Store to the Baglusini stronghold was at least thirty
miles. A plain suitable to the passage of cavalry intervened before the
Manzana river was reached, and Colonel Buller saw no reason why the
distance should not be covered in one day. The kraals of Umbelini and of
Inyatini were also in the same neighbourhood, therefore the utmost
caution and secrecy were necessary in making preparations for the
attack. The weather had been most unfavourable for some days, but
fortunately cleared up, and became settled on the 1st of February. On
that morning Colonel Buller, having selected on the previous day 106 of
his best mounted men and thirty-three of the Dutch Contingent under Piet
Uys, their commandant, paraded his men under the supervision of Colonel
Wood, and explained to them clearly the feat they were about to attempt,
not concealing the danger which they would have to incur in the
performance of a most difficult and dangerous duty. The scene was a most
dramatic one, as the camp lanterns lit up the faces of the bronzed and
stalwart volunteers who formed the devoted band. Each man was
exceedingly well horsed, and no precaution had been neglected in the
careful overhauling of arms, accoutrements, and saddlery. Biscuit and,
for those who cared, a little ration of rum were served out, and with a
hearty "God-speed" from their comrades, who half envied their chances of
adventure, the little troop of 141 gallant fellows started long before
the earliest streak of dawn. The utmost silence was ordered and
maintained, while the ground for some miles was so favourable that the
horses' hoofs were scarcely heard as they cantered over the light and
springy veldt. Distances on horseback are so differently estimated out
in South Africa and at home in England, that when the ground is
favourable, very long, and to European experience almost impossible,
marches are constantly made without distress to horse or rider. In the
present instance two short off-saddles only were indulged in; the first
not far from the centre of the flat, and the next after the Manzana
river had been safely crossed. The country now became more broken and
the pace was reduced to a walk, but before the sun was well up the goal
was in sight, and the herds of cattle were seen calmly feeding on the
slopes. No suspicion would seem to have been excited, and it is more
than probable that the very smallness of the attacking force, and its
being all composed of the mounted branch, contributed to the success of
the affair. The kraal was exceedingly well built, and seen from a
distance of 1200 or 1000 yards it was doubtful whether it held a large
guard or not. Cautiously yet swiftly advancing, Colonel Buller felt his
way, with a few of his best shots thrown out as vedettes. These men soon
encountered some scattered Zulus, who did not seem at all prepared for
any hostile demonstration, but on retiring towards the hills they were
reinforced by several other larger bodies, who had evidently been sent
out to reconnoitre. After a few shots had been fired, a sudden and
simultaneous advance was made on two sides of the kraal, and almost
without resistance on the part of its defenders the kraal was captured.
Two hundred and fifty well-built huts were counted by Buller's men, who,
losing not a moment, collected no less than four hundred head of cattle,
and a large quantity of grain, and then set fire to the magazine. Six
Zulus were killed in the capture of the place, and although more than
one body of them were seen hovering about in the vicinity, numbering
severally 100 to 200 and 300 men, no opposition was offered to the
rear-guard or patrols.
Wood then again moved his camp to the White Umvolosi. His position here
was a remarkably strong one, and from it he commanded the passage of the
White Umvolosi, the Pewana, while his day and night patrols held the
disputed territory south of the Pongolo. A raid was next made in the
direction of the Insulwa Kraal. The men got upon the road about seven
a.m., and steady marching for about three miles brought them opposite
the spot where, a few days before, a large force of Zulus had been seen
engaged at drill. A scout who had been sent out on the right front came
galloping back with the news that the Zulu cattle were in considerable
numbers at the lower end of the valley, while he also added that the
guard over these animals was not much larger than the English party.
Piet Uys at once concerted with a couple of his smart non-commissioned
officers, and decided, as they were exceedingly well mounted, to ride
for the kloof which formed the exit to the valley. To execute this
man[oe]uvre was the work of ten minutes, during which they were hidden
from sight of the Zulus by a tall ledge of scarped rocks which almost
divided the valley. In the meanwhile the remainder moved steadily on at
a walk, so as not to alarm their prey. In rather more than half an hour
they had so far gained upon the cattle that they could make a tolerable
guess as to their probable number, which was estimated at a couple of
hundreds. The main body had now arrived at a place which Piet Uys and
his Dutchmen seemed intimately acquainted with, and the Zulu cattle and
guard could be seen on a ridge running parallel to the one they
themselves were upon. Below was a deep kloof leading to the river. Some
of Buller's Horse were now sent round to the opposite side, to drive the
enemy down the kloof to the main party, while they continued to march
down the ridge to meet these men as they came on. But they had not
advanced very far when, as was expected, a much larger force appeared on
the neighbouring heights, but the cliff was so precipitous they could
not join their comrades. The seven-pounder was now brought into action,
and sent a couple of shells right in amongst them, one of the rounds
being a capital shot. Advancing still, the English leader saw that the
enemy lately on the heights had managed, by making a détour, to get to
the cover of a dense mimosa bush on his left. This move was answered by
several rounds of canister, which it was afterwards found were not
without effect. The foes were thus driven out into the open, and at one
moment it seemed as though they were going to fight; the Boers, however,
who had been detached to the neck of the valley now served their
comrades by an excellent ruse. They had taken with them one of the bugle
boys of the 13th, mounted on a wiry Kaffir pony, and the main party now
heard coming across the valley the echoes of his bugle sounding the
advance. The Zulus could not make out the meaning of this sound, and
evidently imagined that the English commander had posted at least the
wing of a regiment to intercept them. The consequence was, that the
moment the main body cantered forward with a bold front, the cattle were
abandoned; and they were left masters of the field, taking 170 head and
some few wounded prisoners. Two villages were left in flames behind the
retiring troops, who, as the crackling and flashing approached the bush
where the hills met the plain, could see individual forms of black
warriors shouting and gesticulating from out of the dust and smoke, wild
with impotent rage at the loss of their kraal and cattle. The ridges
beyond the gullies still afforded considerable shelter, and the English
party were continually fired upon as they returned with their spoil; but
it was evident that the Zulus had not any long-range weapons, as it
could be seen from the splashes of dust how far short their bullets were
falling. Ten of Buller's men were now sent on to cover the passage of
the guns through the drift, and in about twenty minutes, and under the
protection of the rear-guard, it was passed over in safety.
On the 15th, Wood was fortunate enough to destroy the great military
kraal of Manyanyoba. Several reconnaissances had been made by Colonel
Wood's directions, and from the local knowledge of one of Piet Uys's
men, Colonel Buller was enabled to carry out the instructions of his
chief with a success fully equal to the most sanguine expectations. The
stronghold in question was situated on the Intomba river, and had always
been considered by Cetywayo and his Indunas as a place of more than
ordinary strength. At ten p.m. on the 14th the men were got under arms,
and the column was composed of a strong detachment of Buller's Horse and
fifty of the Burgher Volunteers under Piet Uys, whose services had on
more than one occasion been most handsomely mentioned by Colonel Wood.
The men paraded without lights, bugles, or the slightest sound, and
moved off silently into the bush, without even the jingle of a sabre or
the clank of a chain. Their march was accompanied by one gun, the wheels
of which were, however, carefully wrapped with cloth and bound with raw
hide. This was not only a protection against sound, but a preventive to
injury to spokes and axles from the sharp boulders and rocks in the bed
of the drift. The column left the camp by moonlight, crossing the usual
ford, and were fortunate enough to gain the shelter of the bush without
being seen or heard in the neighbouring villages. After a couple of
hours' marching they reached a wide plain, where there was a broad
watercourse, but sufficiently shallow to be easily forded. Here the gun,
as the early grey of the morning came on in the sky, was brought into
position, and here the final instructions were given to the men. As the
daylight grew more marked there could be seen in front a long unbroken
range of mountains, varying in height from 900 to 1000 feet. This range
ran along the valley leading to the smaller kraals in the distance. Half
the cavalry were now sent away by Colonel Buller to the left, with
instructions to gain the bush, and wait dismounted until the shells were
heard. They were then to dash forward at a swinging canter and cut off
the cattle to be seen feeding on the slopes, which man[oe]uvre would, if
carried out, drive them into the hands of Piet Uys and his men posted on
the right. Just as the sun began to appear above the horizon the gunners
managed to hit off the range to a nicety, and the second shell crashed
and burst right into the centre of the interior circle where the cattle
were placed at night, and which is usually surrounded by the
beehive-shaped huts where the Zulus live. It was at once perceived that
this shot had caused the wildest commotion, as it was immediately
followed by smoke and flame, figures rushing about through the village,
the bellowing of oxen, and the shouts of men. As the horsemen advanced
at a gallop towards the kraal, the enemy, firing a random and hasty
volley, fled up the sides of the mountain, where cavalry could not
follow. All the huts and stores along the base of the mountain were now
destroyed without much resistance, although as soon as the Zulus got a
little vantage-ground on the cliffs, they turned, and replied to the
English fire. Four hundred head of cattle and a quantity of sheep and
goats were brought off by Buller's men, who behaved with the most
admirable coolness and steadiness. The fight had lasted about half an
hour, when indications of reinforcements to the Zulus were observed.
Seeing that nothing more was to be gained, and that he might lose the
cattle, Colonel Buller gave the order to make good the retreat, covered
by skirmishers and a rear-guard. This movement was skilfully effected
without loss, and the column reached the camp early in the afternoon,
having been about eight or nine hours in the saddle.
Meanwhile, to strengthen Wood's hands, the Commander-in-chief had
ordered Colonel Rowlands to join that general. Rowlands at this time had
with him, at his entrenched camp at New Derby, only a wing of the 80th,
a couple of guns, and 200 Swazis. Raaf's Horse and Weatherly's Borderers
were, however, expected daily to reinforce him. In the meantime,
Rowlands was not allowing the grass to grow under the feet of his men,
for, on the same day that Wood destroyed the Manyanyoba Kraal he left
his camp at Derby and marched on to the Talako range, where he knew the
enemy were in the numerous caves hidden by dense bush. The operations
were entirely successful. Five large kraals, some of them of great
natural strength, were burnt to the ground, 197 cattle, seventy goats,
and forty-five sheep were captured. Magalini, the chief, was killed,
with ten of his men, while defending one of the caves. One Zulu prisoner
was taken, and forty women and a number of children came in and claimed
protection. Six of the Swazi allies, under Fairlie, were wounded, and
one horse killed.
On a still more recent occasion Colonel Rowlands had shown even greater
activity. On the 20th February intelligence was brought to his camp that
a small force of Zulus had been left in charge of supplies at Makatees
Kop, a natural fortress close to Elozo, and intended as a depôt for
future operations. The place was by no means easy of access, and
apparently innumerable difficulties were mentioned to dissuade the
colonel from any hostile attempt. On the date just named (20th) the
detachment sent forward as a sort of advanced guard by Colonel Rowlands
reached one of the mission-stations still left on the border. There was
a laager consisting of a simple stone enclosure, bastioned, however, and
loopholed, and situated on the bank of a running stream of bright and
clearly sparkling water. In the dead of night the sentries were heard to
challenge, and the sergeant on guard at once called his men to arms.
This alarm, however, proved to be merely the return of some mounted
Boers who had been sent on to reconnoitre on the previous day, and the
information they brought in was important. The kraal which they had been
seeking was about twenty miles off and supposed to be only held by about
fifty Zulus, belonging to the regiment of Nkobamakosi, and part of the
Undi or Royal corps. A large number of cattle were not supposed to be
yet there, but some were coming in daily, and it was considered
advisable to break this link in the enemy's communications. In the early
morning, preceded by a few horsemen (many were coming in as volunteers
to both Rowlands' and Wood's column), and marching with only their
haversacks full of rations for two days, the little expedition started
for a duty uncertain and believed to be full of risk. Eight European
officers, 275 natives, partly Swazi allies, and some volunteer horse,
the whole under command of Captain Harvey, staff officer, formed the
reconnaissance; but, as it turns out, a smaller force would have
sufficed. From the post or laager at the mission-station the road lay up
a narrow valley, from which, after an ascent of about 200 feet, it
stretched out on to a wide grassy plain ten miles in length. On the left
of this could be plainly seen a number of Zulus tending sheep and cattle
on the hills. Crossing part of the Iwangovini district, and fording a
drift on the Inpongo river, the Iembe mountain could be seen always to
the right; while the Eloso, a rocky height, loomed in front. At the
bottom of a steep, rocky, and heavily bush-grown gorge, fourteen miles
from the laager, a halt and short off-saddle were made, and every
precaution taken against surprise. From this point to the stronghold the
pathway was most difficult, and the men had to proceed with the greatest
caution, in case of an ambush, which was half suspected. Two columns of
smoke, one from a steep krantz on the left and another lower down on the
right, were noticed, but these were afterwards found to be abandoned
camping-grounds of the enemy, who fancied the British force was much
stronger than it really was. On nearing the kraal, and on turning an
angle of the gully, the column came in sight of the first village, which
was as usual fortified in the Zulu fashion. As the foremost files dashed
on, a couple of shots rang out and some assegais were thrown, causing a
couple of casualties amongst the Swazis, who, however, showed a bold
front, and, gallantly led by the European officers, carried the kraal by
a rush. The results of this skirmish may not appear of great importance,
but, taken in conjunction with Wood's recent successes, they had a most
useful effect upon both the minds of the regular soldiers and those of
the colonial volunteers.
The junction of Rowlands' column with Wood's was the next eventful
incident in the history of the latter force. It was found, of course,
impossible for Wood with so small a column and with so few cavalry to
keep an efficient and reliable watch over the lengthy border he had to
defend, and the result was that a Zulu force managed to effect a raid in
the German settlements over the Pongolo. Commandant Schermbrucker had
hitherto done remarkably well in keeping his line of defence intact, but
his want of mounted men seriously hampered him, and enabled the Zulus to
elude his vigilance. A serious raid happened on the 11th February; but
Schermbrucker came up with the marauders as they were retiring with
their booty, recaptured some of the cattle taken, and killed about a
dozen of the enemy. On the 13th a large Zulu force managed to cross the
Pongolo, and steal past the fort and laager of Luneberg. This was in the
dead of night, and by daybreak they had burnt a number of huts belonging
to natives friendly to or in the employment of the Dutch. The savages
rushed in thousands upon the kraals and single huts, setting the roofs
on fire and massacring old people, women, and children who could not
escape. They deliberately tortured to death about a score of old men,
killed in the most brutal manner at least fifty women and an equal
number of children, while they left several young women fearfully
stabbed with assegais. All this took place within five miles of the
fort; and as fire-arms were not employed, the attention of the sentries
was not aroused. Early in the morning one of the wounded managed to
effect his escape, and brought this terrible news to the laager, and
measures were immediately taken to follow and punish the band. Patrols
were ordered out, and the utmost diligence exerted to overtake the
enemy, who, it was known, was overladen with spoil. Before the Tombe
river was reached, the leading patrol came up with a portion of the
enemy's rear-guard, and a very pretty fight took place. The Zulus
numbered about 450, but they were embarrassed by the cattle they had
charge of, and this did not allow them to make a good stand. The
consequence was that the Boer patrol killed twenty of their foes, put
the remainder to flight, and won back a number of the stolen cattle. The
rest, however, managed to escape over the Tombe, and the patrol were
wisely ordered not to pursue. These raids were principally due to the
activity of both Umbelini and Manyanyoba, and were the immediate cause
of the expedition to attack and burn the kraals of the chiefs on the
Intombe river. It should be mentioned that Umbelini was a Swazi refugee,
and not even a legitimate chieftain of that tribe, but was regarded by
the real headmen as a mere adventurer and pretender. Manyanyoba's
people, again, were not Zulus, but the _débris_ or remnants of various
tribes conquered by Chaka and Dingaan. They wandered about in a starving
condition, landless, and without flocks or wealth of any kind, until
Cetywayo, from compassion, allowed them to settle north of the Pongolo,
and on the banks of the Tombe river. This very land was mentioned in the
ultimatum sent by Sir Bartle Frere to the king, who had no right
whatever to cede any portion of it.
Wood next moved his camp to the Kambula Kop, and there entrenched
himself in a position of great natural strength. There now occurred an
event of considerable importance. Oham, brother of Cetywayo, had always
declared himself opposed to war, had openly stated his opinion in Zulu's
councils, and had ever since the outbreak of hostilities been making
overtures of friendship to the British. These, however, had been but
lightly treated, as suspicions of their honesty were entertained by the
powers that were. How groundless were these suspicions the event proved.
On the 2nd inst. Oham came into the camp of Captain M'Leod, the
political agent on the border of Swaziland, arrived at Derby on the 4th,
and came on thence to Wood at Kambula a couple of days back, and
declared his complete submission to her Majesty's Government.
Immediately before leaving his kraal in Zululand the chief took the
precaution to try and save some of his best cattle, and he subsequently
sent a thousand head of his finest herds into the Swazi county; but they
fell into Dutch hands, and some of the Boers, obtaining possession of
them, had the audacity to brand them as their property before M'Leod
could arrive to claim them. Oham had with him between 300 and 400 of his
people, and was accompanied by his eldest son, an intelligent lad of
fifteen, who soon made himself an object of great interest in Wood's
camp, and a favourite with the soldiers. Immediately on his arrival he
had an interview with, and was received with great respect by Colonel
Wood, who was informed by him that he would have surrendered some time
back but for two reasons. In the first place, he was under a system of
espionage by the orders of the king, with whom he had never been on good
terms since he openly, before the Indunas, spoke against the warlike
attitude and aggressive tone of his brother; and, secondly, when he did
make his first overtures for submission, he was told that he was not
believed by the English, and would be cast into prison, and sent to
Robbin Island as a convict.
Oham was a black ikehla (head-ringed man), resembling both his father,
the late Mpanda, or Panda, and his brother Cetywayo, and although a
large man, his body and muscles were firm, not flabby like those of so
many other big Zulus. After the usual salutations he thus opened his
interview with Wood:--
"Sir, chief, and great warrior, whom I respect, because you fight
against men, and do not kill women or children, I came here to your camp
from a desire to see you, and to ask you to intercede for me and my
people, who have never wished to make war upon you, but to live in peace
and goodwill, and hunt the wild deer together. I have left more than two
thousand of my people ready and most anxious to come in and submit to
you, surrendering their arms and cattle, and giving their sons as
hostages, if you will guarantee their safety."
The chief, who had a dignified manner and an honest expression of
countenance, was then informed that he and his people should receive
every consideration, and as much protection as was consistent with the
safe advance of the English troops into Zululand. He then assured Wood
that the Zulu army was considerably demoralized, and that, the people
having gone back to their kraals, Cetywayo found it no easy task to
collect a really effective fighting force. With some difficulty,
indeed, the king had managed to get together a strong impi, composed of
the Udhlambedhlu, or "Ill-tempered" Regiment, whose kraal was at
Udhlambedhlweni, about six miles east of the Usixepe, to exercise a
surveillance over Oham and his people. This corps, however, was formed
originally from a clan, or tribe, which were Dingaan's chief and
favourite regiment, and although in a measure loyal to their then ruler,
they were somewhat indignant at the duty imposed upon them, when they
would infinitely prefer the chances of raiding and plunder, which the
present unsettled state of the border presented. Now, when Wood was at
Utrecht the previous autumn, a letter was sent by the Landdrost Rudolph
to the Secretary for Native Affairs, in which he mentioned the arrival
of Gwegwana, the favourite messenger of Uhamo or Oham, with letters from
that chief to the following effect, which Oham now repeated to Colonel
Wood:--"I am sent back by Uhamo to hear what answer his father, Somtseu
(Sir Theophilus Shepstone), has sent to his message brought by me on the
10th October last. Uhamo is very anxious to know what is going to take
place in the land now that Cetywayo has called the whole of Zululand
together, and Uhamo has refused liberty to his people to assemble at
'Ondi,' and will openly tell Cetywayo that if he (Cetywayo) makes war
upon the English, he (Uhamo) will not join him, because Cetywayo's
people, Sirayo and Umbelini, have, by their overt acts, brought the
country into its present state of trouble and disgrace. Moreover, the
building by Cetywayo's orders of a military kraal on the Pongolo, and
the claims made by him of a portion of the Transvaal beyond the Blood
River, which had been, as Uhamo repeatedly told Cetywayo, ceded many
years ago to the Transvaal people, and other acts, had never received
any countenance from Uhamo, who now asks, Why does Cetywayo want to
quarrel with the English, who have ever been his friends, and who,
indeed, placed him on his present throne?"
In his second interview with Colonel Wood, Oham was still more explicit
and demonstrative. He expressed himself with much indignation at his
brother's countenancing such a despicable character as Umbelini, who,
neither a pure Zulu nor a Swazi, had all the vices and none of the good
qualities of either; and he added that the degradation which his brother
had brought upon the race of Chaka by such an unworthy alliance has
caused him to lose much of his former popularity. Oham also added that,
in case of the continuance of the war, rather than be compelled to fight
against his old friends the English he would at all hazards bring his
people bodily over to that Government, and under these circumstances
claim their protection. "Uhamo loves peace as his father Panda did,"
said the chief in conclusion, and his open and honest-looking eyes
seemed to corroborate this expression.
We now come to another sad event, which though less in magnitude, is in
many points similar to the Isandhlwana disaster. Major Tucker, the chief
officer at Luneberg, gives this account of the affair:--Captain
Moriarty, with a company of the 80th, was ordered to march from Luneberg
on the 7th March, for the purpose of bringing in twenty waggons from
Derby, variously loaded, which had arrived at the Intombi Drift.
Earlier in the month Major Tucker sent down to the Drift, which was not
more than four miles off, a small escort to await the arrival of these
waggons. Believing, however, the position a perilous one, owing to the
proximity to Umbelini's kraal, on the 5th he ordered it to return. On
the 7th, however, the waggons, which had all but been captured on the
way down, did arrive at the Drift, and Moriarty was again sent with
seventy men of his company to act as escort and assist in getting the
convoy across the stream, which was considerably swollen by the
continued rains. The Drift was only four miles from the stronghold of
the renegade Swazi freebooter, Umbelini, who had of late given so much
trouble, and Moriarty had orders to neglect no precaution, and above all
to laager his waggons and keep an incessant and vigilant look-out. It
was ascertained from survivors that the waggons were actually parked,
but in a somewhat loose and careless fashion, and that no earthworks
were thrown up around the camp. For several days the river continued in
strong flood, and consequently no crossing could be effected. On the
11th it was reported by the native waggon-drivers that Umbelini's people
were gathering in the neighbourhood. The camp was pitched in a most
dangerous position, with its face towards some high ground, covered here
and there with dense bush, while its rear was resting upon the swollen
river, across which Lieutenant Harward and thirty-four men were posted.
No particular precautions appear to have been taken, with the exception
of a sentry being posted about fifteen paces from the front of the camp,
on the Derby side. When first warned by the drivers, Moriarty ordered
the men to stand to their arms, but only for a short time. On the
morning of the 12th, at four o'clock, a shot was heard from the
unfortunate sentry, who had barely time to call "Guard, turn out!" when
dense masses of the savages were seen not more than two hundred yards
from the camp. Their front extended for several miles, and they could
not, by the lowest estimate, have been less than 4000 or 5000 strong.
Lieutenant Harward, who had been on the _qui-vive_, and who had
carefully placed his thirty-five men under cover of his solitary waggon,
at once called his detachment to arms, and made what dispositions he
could to open fire upon the enemy's flank. In less than ten minutes,
however, the whole valley was swarming with the savages, who at once
proceeded in their usual manner to surround and overlap the camp and
waggons. In less time than it takes to tell, the camp was in their
hands, and the majority of the soldiers were assegaied, many of them
before they could leave their tents. The fight, or rather butchery,
which ensued was soon over, and, in spite of a well-directed and
well-sustained fire from the Luneberg bank of the river, the enemy
followed up the men, and assegaied them as they endeavoured to swim the
river. Harward, seeing the enemy crossing the river in large numbers,
gave the order to his men to retire slowly. Then, jumping on the back of
his horse, he galloped away at full speed to Luneberg, where he reported
what had happened. The savages continued to cross the stream, and coming
on in dense masses, for a short time a hand-to-hand fight took place,
ending however in the little band being broken up.
Eight men, and the sergeant of Harward's detachment, by taking advantage
of shelter afforded by an old and dismantled kraal wall at some little
distance from the stream, and by their cool and determined shooting,
succeeded in saving their lives and getting to Luneberg. Ten men only
were saved from Moriarty's party, while he, with a civilian, Surgeon
Cobbin, was slain.
The camp was evidently wrongly placed, and was clearly taken by
surprise. Major Tucker went out from Luneberg in person, with a small
party of horsemen, followed by 150 of the 80th, to see what could be
recovered, and the bodies of the dead were brought over the river and
buried, while twenty-five of the enemy's dead were discovered, and a
couple of wounded taken prisoners. From these men it was ascertained
that Umbelini himself was in command, having with him some men belonging
to our old antagonist Manyanyoba. Mcame, a powerful induna, had been
asked to join in the foray, but refused. When Tucker and his handful of
horsemen arrived on the banks of the river, the enemy were seen to be
retreating, but they could not be followed until the infantry came up.
Curious to remark, the waggons were not taken, and many of them were
only half plundered by the savages, who seemed most anxious to decamp
with what spoil they had secured.
For his conduct in this affair Lieutenant Harward was subsequently tried
by court-martial. The ground of complaint was his having galloped off on
his horse--the only one present on the scene--leaving his men engaged in
a desperate engagement. The loss of the camp, or anything of a similar
nature, was in no way charged against him. His defence was that he had
ridden off to obtain assistance from the nearest point--that this was
his duty--and that he could not send a soldier in his place, as none of
them could ride. In the event the Court acquitted him. But in May of the
ensuing year (1880), the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief issued the
following special general order relative to a court-martial recently
held on an officer in South Africa:--
"At a general court-martial recently held, an officer was arraigned upon
the following charges,--First. Having misbehaved before the enemy, in
shamefully abandoning a party of the regiment under his command when
attacked by the enemy, and in riding off at speed from his men. Second.
Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline in having
at the time and place mentioned in the first charge, neglected to take
proper precautions for the safety of a party of the regiment under his
command when attacked. The Court recorded a verdict of 'Not Guilty' on
both charges. The main facts of the case were not in dispute. The
officer rode away from his men to a station distant four and a half
miles, at a moment of extreme danger, when to all appearance the small
party under his command were being surrounded and overwhelmed by the
enemy. The charge alleged misbehaviour--that is, cowardice in so doing;
the defence averred that it was to procure reinforcements, and either by
their actual arrival, or by the imminence of their arrival, to ward off
destruction. In acquitting the prisoner, they have found that he was not
guilty of cowardice. The proceedings of the Court were submitted to the
General commanding, who recorded the following minute:--'Disapproved and
not confirmed. Lieutenant ... to be released from arrest, and to return
to his duty.' The confirming officer has further recorded his reasons
for withholding his approval and confirmation in the following
terms:--'Had I released this officer without making any remarks upon the
verdict in question, it would have been a tacit acknowledgment that I
concurred in what appears to me a monstrous theory, viz., that a
regimental officer who is the only officer present with a party of
soldiers actually and seriously engaged with the enemy can, under any
pretext whatever, be justified in deserting them, and by so doing
abandoning them to their fate. The more helpless the position in which
an officer finds his men, the more it is his bounden duty to stay and
share their fortune, whether for good or ill. It is because the British
officer has always done so that he occupies the position in which he is
held in the estimation of the world, that he possesses the influence he
does in the ranks of our army. The soldier has learnt to feel that, come
what may, he can, in the direst moment of danger, look with implicit
faith to his officer, knowing that he will never desert him under any
possible circumstances. It is to this faith of the British soldier in
his officers that we owe most of the gallant deeds recorded in our
military annals; and it is because the verdict of this court-martial
strikes at the root of this faith that I feel it necessary to mark
officially my emphatic dissent from the theory upon which the verdict
has been founded.' In communicating to the army the result of this
court-martial, the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief desires to signify
his entire approval of the views expressed by the confirming officer in
respect of the principles of duty which have always actuated British
officers in the field, and by which his Royal Highness feels assured
they will continue to be guided. This general order will, by his
Highness's command, be read at the head of every regiment in her
Majesty's service.--By Command, H. ELLICE, A.-G."
It was about this time that Oham, whose actions had now clearly proved
his sincerity, and the value of his friendship to the British, having
made an earnest request to Colonel Wood that his wives and family might
be rescued from the power of Cetywayo, the colonel sent off about twenty
of the chief's men to collect them. To carry out the remainder of the
project, some days after, (on the 14th), a strong detachment of Buller's
men and the Burghers under Piet Uys, with 200 of Oham's people, left the
camp at daybreak, and guided by James Rorke and Calverly, marched to the
caves of Nhlangwine, which were situated rather more than twelve miles
east of the source of the Unkassi, and not less than forty-five miles
from Kambula. The caves were reached at 9.30 p.m., the last of the march
of seven miles being very difficult travelling, and taking three hours
to surmount. A few Zulus in charge of cattle were shot, and the animals
which had belonged to Oham were taken possession of. As has been said,
it was scarcely daybreak when the little column started. They rode along
for a considerable time in complete silence, the men being allowed to
smoke their pipes, but not to speak above a whisper. At first they
followed the spoor of some cattle, which indicated the road by which
Oham and his people had come to the camp, and then turning more in a
northerly direction, followed the course of some small streams which
flowed from the hills upon the left. The moon shone brightly, and
enabled them to see clearly for some distance before them. Many strange
sounds were heard, the growl of some beast of prey or the scream of the
night-birds disturbed by the clank of the horses' hoofs, or the
occasional rattle of a chain. The rapidity with which the column
cantered over the soft and springy veldt, the dead and ominous silence
maintained by all hands, and the steady and business-like mode in which
they pursued their course, neither turning to the right nor the left,
gave the journey a singularly weird character. As soon as the first
morning's light began to appear the guides, who rode in front, turned
into a ravine covered with dense brushwood and trees, and, having
ascended this for about three miles, they found it was possible to ride
out of it in three different directions, besides the one by which they
had entered, and thus a retreat could be effected if any attack were
made. Here it was decided to make the first off-saddle and partake of
breakfast. At a signal from their leader, and without any word of
command, the horsemen dismounted, slackened girths, and took off
saddles, while the bits were removed from the horses' mouths and the
animals allowed, Cape fashion, to take the customary roll in the grass.
This luxury to a Cape horse seems indispensable, and without it he will
r
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