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Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4

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Title: Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4

Author: Plotinus

Translator: Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie


        
Release date: June 13, 2013 [eBook #42933]
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Language: English

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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLOTINOS: COMPLETE WORKS, V. 4 ***

VOLUME IV.

WORKS OF PLOTINOS.




    PLOTINOS
    Complete Works

    In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods;

    With
    BIOGRAPHY by PORPHYRY, EUNAPIUS, & SUIDAS,
    COMMENTARY by PORPHYRY,
    ILLUSTRATIONS by JAMBLICHUS & AMMONIUS,
    STUDIES in Sources, Development, Influence;
    INDEX of Subjects, Thoughts and Words.

    by
    KENNETH SYLVAN GUTHRIE,

    Professor in Extension, University of the South, Sewanee;
    A.M., Sewanee, and Harvard; Ph.D., Tulane, and Columbia.
    M.D., Medico-Chirurgical College, Philadelphia.

    VOL. IV

    Eustochian Books, 46-54; Comment.

    COMPARATIVE LITERATURE PRESS

    P.O. Box 42, ALPINE, N.J., U.S.A.




    Copyright, 1918, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie.
    All Rights, including that of Translation, Reserved.

    Entered at Stationers' Hall, by
    George Bell and Sons, Portugal Street, Lincoln's Inn, London.




FIRST ENNEAD, BOOK FOUR.

Whether Animals May Be Termed Happy.[1]


DEFINITIONS OF HAPPINESS.

1. The (Aristotelian) ideal of living well and happiness are
(practically) identical. Should we, on that account, grant even to
animals the privilege of achieving happiness? Why might we not say
that they live well, if it be granted them, in their lives, to follow
the course of nature, without obstacles? For if to live well consist
either in pleasure (pleasant passions, as the Epicureans taught), or in
realizing one's own individual aim (the Stoic ideal), then this living
well is, in either case, possible for animals, who can both enjoy
pleasure, and accomplish their peculiar aim. Thus singing birds live a
life desirable for them, if they enjoy pleasure, and sing conformably
to their nature. If further we should define happiness as achieving
the supreme purpose towards which nature aspires (the Stoic ideal), we
should, even in this case, admit that animals share in happiness when
they accomplish this supreme purpose. Then nature arouses in them no
further desires, because their whole career is completed, and their
life is filled from beginning to end.


WHETHER PLANTS MAY BE TERMED HAPPY.

There are no doubt some who may object to our admitting to happiness
living beings other than man. They might even point out that on this
basis happiness could not be refused to even the lowest beings, such
as plants: for they also live, their life also has a purpose, by
which they seek to fulfil their development. However, it would seem
rather unreasonable to say, that living beings other than humans
cannot possess happiness by this mere reason that to us they seem
pitiable. Besides, it would be quite possible to deny to plants what
may be predicated of other living beings, on the grounds that plants
lack emotion. Some might hold they are capable of happiness, on the
strength of their possessing life, for a being that lives can live
well or badly; and in this way we could say that they possess or
lack well-being, and bear, or do not bear fruits. If (as Aristippus
thought), pleasure is the goal of man, and if to live well is
constituted by enjoying it, it would be absurd to claim that no living
beings other than man could live well. The same argument applies if we
define happiness as (a state of imperturbable tranquility, by Epicurus
called) ataraxy;[2] or as (the Stoic ideal,[3] of) living conformably
to nature.


LIVING WELL NEED NOT BE EXTENDED EVEN TO ALL ANIMALS.

2. Those who deny the privilege of living well to plants, because these
lack sensation, are not on that account obliged to grant it to all
animals. For, if sensation consist in the knowledge of the experienced
affection, this affection must already be good before the occurrence of
the knowledge. For instance, the being must be in a state conformable
to nature even though ignorant thereof. He must fulfil his proper
function even when he does not know it. He must possess pleasure before
perceiving it. Thus if, by the possession of this pleasure, the being
already possesses the Good, he thereby possesses even well-being. What
need then is there to join thereto sensation, unless indeed well-being
be defined as sensation and knowledge (of an affection or state of the
soul) rather than in the latter affection and state of the soul itself?


EVEN THEY WHO DEFINE HAPPINESS AS SENSATION SEEK HIGHER HAPPINESS.

The Good would thus be reduced to no more than sensation, or the
actualization of the sense-life. In this case, to possess it, it is
sufficient to perceive irrespective of the content of that perception.
Other persons might assert that goodness results from the union of
these two things: of the state of the soul, and of the knowledge
the soul has of it. If then the Good consist in the perception of
some particular state, we shall have to ask how elements which, by
themselves, are indifferent could, by their union, constitute the
good. Other theories are that the Good consists in some particular
state, or in possession of some particular disposition, and conscious
enjoyment of the presence of the Good. These would, however, still have
to answer the question whether, for good living, it be sufficient that
the being knows he possesses this state; or must he know not only that
this state is pleasant, but also that it is the Good? If then it be
necessary to realize that it is the Good, the matter is one no longer
of the function of sensation, but of a faculty higher than the senses.
To live well, in this case, it will no longer be sufficient to possess
pleasure, but we shall have to know that pleasure is the Good. The
cause of happiness will not be the presence of pleasure itself, but
the power of judging that pleasure is a good. Now judgment is superior
to affection; it is reason or intelligence, while pleasure is only an
affection, and what is irrational could not be superior to reason. How
would reason forget itself to recognize as superior what is posited
in a genus opposed to it? These men who deny happiness to plants,
who explain it as some form of sensation, seems to us, in spite of
themselves, to be really seeking happiness of a higher nature, and to
consider it as this better thing which is found only in a completer
life.


NOT EVEN REASON IS A SUFFICIENT EXPLANATION OF LIVING WELL.

There is a greater chance of being right in the opinion that happiness
consists in the reasonable life, instead of mere life, even though
united to sensation. Still even this theory must explain why happiness
should be the privilege of the reasonable animal. Should we add to
the idea of an animal the quality of being reasonable, because reason
is more sagacious, more skilful in discovering, and in procuring the
objects necessary to satisfy the first needs of nature? Would you
esteem reason just as highly if it were incapable of discovering,
or procuring these objects? If we value reason only for the objects
it aids us in getting, happiness might very well belong to the very
irrational beings, if they are, without reason, able to procure
themselves the things necessary to the satisfaction of the first
needs of their nature. In this case, reason will be nothing more than
an instrument. It will not be worth seeking out for itself, and its
perfection, in which virtue has been shown to consist, will be of
little importance. The opposite theory would be that reason does not
owe its value to its ability to procure for us objects necessary to
the satisfaction of the first needs of nature, but that it deserves
to be sought out for itself. But even here we would have to explain
its function, its nature, and set forth how it becomes perfect. If it
were to be improvable, it must not be defined as the contemplation
of sense-objects, for its perfection and essence (being) consist in
a different (and higher) function. It is not among the first needs
of nature, nor among the objects necessary to the satisfaction of its
needs; it has nothing to do with them, being far superior. Otherwise,
these philosophers would be hard pressed to explain its value. Until
they discover some nature far superior to the class of objects with
which they at present remain, they will have to remain where it suits
them to be, ignorant of what good living is, and both how to reach that
goal, and to what beings it is possible.


HAPPINESS DEPENDS EXCLUSIVELY ON INTERIOR CHARACTERISTICS.

3. Dismissing these theories, we return to our own definition of
happiness. We do not necessarily make life synonymous with happiness
by attributing happiness to a living being. Otherwise, we would be
implying that all living beings can achieve it, and we would be
admitting to real complete enjoyment thereof all those who possessed
that union and identity which all living beings are naturally capable
of possessing. Finally, it would be difficult to grant this privilege
to the reasonable being, while refusing it to the brute; for both
equally possess life. They should, therefore, be capable of achieving
happiness--for, on this hypothesis, happiness could be no more than a
kind of life. Consequently, the philosophers who make it consist in the
rational life, not in the life common to all beings, do not perceive
that they implicitly suppose that happiness is something different
from life. They are then obliged to say that happiness resides in a
pure quality, in the rational faculty. But the subject (to which they
should refer happiness) is the rational life, since happiness can
belong only to the totality (of life joined to reason). They therefore,
really limit the life they speak of to a certain kind of life; not
that they have the right to consider these two kinds of life (life in
general, and rational life) as being ranked alike, as both members of
a single division would be, but another kind of distinction might be
established between them, such as when we say that one thing is prior,
and the other posterior. Since "life" may be understood in different
senses, and as it possesses different degrees, and since by mere verbal
similarity life may be equally predicated of plants and of irrational
animals, and since its differences consist in being more or less
complete, analogy demands a similar treatment of "living well." If, by
its life, a being be the image of some other being, by its happiness
it will also be the image of the happiness of this other being. If
happiness be the privilege of complete life, the being that possesses a
complete life will also alone possess happiness; for it possesses what
is best since, in the order of these existences, the best is possession
of the essence (being) and perfection of life. Consequently, the Good
is not anything incidental, for no subject could owe its good to a
quality that would be derived from elsewhere. What indeed could be
added to complete life, to render it excellent?


THE GOOD CONSISTS IN INTELLIGENCE.

Our own definition of the Good, interested as we are not in its cause,
but in its essence, is that the perfect life, that is genuine and real,
consists in intelligence. The other kinds of life are imperfect. They
offer no more than the image of life. They are not Life in its fulness
and purity. As we have often said they are not life, rather than its
contrary. In one word, since all living beings are derived from one
and the same Principle, and since they do not possess an equal degree
of life, this principle must necessarily be the primary Life, and
perfectness.


HAPPINESS MUST BE SOMETHING HUMAN.

4. If man be capable of possessing perfect Life, he is happy as soon as
he possesses it. If it were otherwise, if the perfect life pertained
to the divinities alone, to them alone also would happiness belong.
But since we attribute happiness to men, we shall have to set forth
in what that which procures it consists. I repeat, what results from
our former considerations, namely, that man has perfect Life when,
besides the sense-life, he possesses reason and true intelligence.
But is man as such stranger to the perfect Life, and does he possess
it as something alien (to his essential being)? No, for no man lacks
happiness entirely, either actually or even potentially. But shall we
consider happiness as a part of the man, and that he in himself is the
perfect form of life? We had better think that he who is a stranger to
the perfect Life possesses only a part of happiness, as he possesses
happiness only potentially; but that he who possesses the perfect Life
in actuality, and he who has succeeded in identifying himself with it,
alone is happy. All the other things, no more than envelope him (as
the Stoics would say), and could not be considered as parts of him,
since they surround him in spite of himself. They would belong to him
as parts of himself, if they were joined to him by the result of his
will. What is the Good for a man who finds himself in this condition?
By the perfect life which he possesses, he himself is his own good. The
principle (the Good in itself) which is superior (to the perfect Life)
is the cause of the good which is in him; for we must not confuse the
Good in itself--and the good in man.


WE KNOW WE HAVE REACHED HAPPINESS WHEN WE NO MORE DESIRE ANYTHING.

That the man who has achieved perfect Life possesses happiness is
proved by his no longer desiring anything. What more could he desire?
He could not desire anything inferior; he is united to the best; he,
therefore, has fulness of life. If he be virtuous he is fully happy,
and fully possesses the Good, for no good thing escapes him. What he
seeks is sought only by necessity, less for him than for some of the
things which belong to him. He seeks it for the body that is united to
him; and though this body be endowed with life, what relates to his
needs is not characteristic of the real man. The latter knows it, and
what he grants to his body, he grants without in any way departing
from his own characteristic life. His happiness will, therefore, not
be diminished in adversity, because he continues to possess veritable
life. If he lose relatives or friends, he knows the nature of death,
and besides those whom it strikes down know it also if they were
virtuous. Though he may allow himself to be afflicted by the fate of
these relatives or friends, the affliction will not reach the intimate
part of his nature; the affliction will be felt only by that part of
the soul which lacks reason, and whose suffering the man will not share.


MEN MUST SEEK THEIR HAPPINESS IN THAT OF EACH OF THE PARTS OF THEIR
NATURE.

5. It has often been objected that we should reckon with the bodily
pains, the diseases, the obstacles which may hinder action, cases of
unconsciousness, which might result from certain philtres and diseases
(as the Peripatetics objected[4]). Under these conditions, they say,
the sage could not live well, and be happy--without either mentioning
poverty and lack of recognition. All these evils, not forgetting the
famous misfortunes of Priam,[5] justify serious objections. Indeed,
even if the sage endured all these evils (as indeed he easily does),
they would none the less be contrary to his will; and happy life must
necessarily be one that conforms to our will. The sage is not only
a soul endowed with particular dispositions; the body also must be
comprised within his personality (as also thought the Pythagorean
Archytas[6]). This assertion seems reasonable so far as the passions
of the body are felt by the man himself, and as they suggest desires
and aversions to him. If then pleasure be an element of happiness, how
could the man afflicted by the blows of fate and by pains still be
happy, even if he were virtuous? To be happy, the divinities need only
to enjoy perfect life; but men, having their soul united to a lower
part, must seek their happiness in the life of each of these two parts
that compose him, and not exclusively in one of the two, even though
it were the higher. Indeed, as soon as one of them suffers, the other
one, in spite of its superiority, finds its actions hindered. Otherwise
we shall have to regard neither the body, nor the sensations that flow
from it; and to seek only what by itself could suffice to procure
happiness, independently of the body.


NECESSARY THINGS ARE THOSE WHOSE POSSESSION IS UNCONSCIOUS.

6. If our exposition of the subject had defined happiness as exemption
from pain, sickness, reverses, and great misfortunes, (we would
have implied that) it would be impossible for us to taste happiness
while exposed to one of those evils. But if happiness consist in the
possession of the real good, why should we forget this good to consider
its accessories? Why, in the appreciation of this good, should we
seek things which are not among the number of its elements? If it
consisted in a union of the true goods with those things which alone
are necessary to our needs, or which are so called, even without being
such, we should have to strive to possess the latter also. But as the
goal of man must be single and not manifold--for otherwise it would
be usual to say that he seeks his ends, rather than the more common
expression, his end--we shall have to seek only what is most high and
precious, what the soul somehow wishes to include. Her inclination and
will cannot aspire to anything which is not the sovereign good. Reason
only avoids certain evils, and seeks certain advantages, because it
is provoked by their presence; but it is not so led by nature. The
principal tendency of the soul is directed towards what is best; when
she possesses it, she is satisfied, and stops; only then does she enjoy
a life really conformable to her will. Speaking of will strictly,[7]
and not with unjustifiable license, the task of the will is not to
procure things necessary to our needs (?) Of course we judge that it is
suitable to procure things that are necessary, as we in general avoid
evils. But the avoiding of them is no aim desirable in itself; such
would rather be not to need to avoid them. This, for instance, occurs
when one possesses health and is exempt from suffering. Which of these
advantages most attracts us? So long as we enjoy health, so long as we
do not suffer, it is little valued. Now advantages which, when present,
have no attraction for the soul, and add nothing to her happiness, and
which, when absent, are sought as causes of the suffering arising from
the presence of their contraries, should reasonably be called necessity
rather than goods, and not be reckoned among the elements of our goal.
When they are absent and replaced by their contraries, our goal remains
just what it was.


EVILS WHICH THE WISE MAN CAN SUPPORT WITHOUT DISTURBANCE OF HIS
HAPPINESS.

7. Why then does the happy man desire to enjoy the presence of
these advantages, and the absence of their contraries? It must be
because they contribute, not to his happiness, but to his existence;
because their contraries tend to make him lose existence, hindering
the enjoyment of the good, without however removing it. Besides,
he who possesses what is best wishes to possess it purely, without
any mixture. Nevertheless, when a foreign obstacle occurs, the good
still persists even in spite of this obstacle. In short, if some
accident happen to the happy man against his will, his happiness
is in no way affected thereby. Otherwise, he would change and lose
his happiness daily; as if, for instance, he had to mourn a son, or
if he lost some of his possessions. Many events may occur against
his wish without disturbing him in the enjoyment of the good he has
attained. It may be objected that it is the great misfortunes, and
not trifling accidents (which can disturb the happiness of the wise
man). Nevertheless, in human things, is there any great enough not to
be scorned by him who has climbed to a principle superior to all, and
who no longer depends on lower things? Such a man will not be able to
see anything great in the favors of fortune, whatever they be, as in
being king, in commanding towns, or peoples; in founding or building
cities, even though he himself should receive that glory; he will
attach no importance to the loss of his power, or even to the ruin
of his fatherland. If he consider all that as a great evil, or even
only as an evil, he will have a ridiculous opinion. He will no longer
be a virtuous man; for, as Jupiter is my witness, he would be highly
valuing mere wood, or stones, birth, or death; while he should insist
on the incontestable truth that death is better than the corporeal
life (as held by Herodotus). Even though he were sacrificed, he would
not consider death any worse merely because it occurred at the feet
of the altars. Being buried is really of small importance, for his
body will rot as well above as below ground (as thought Theodorus of
Cyrene).[8] Neither will he grieve at being buried without pomp and
vulgar ostentation, and to have seemed unworthy of being placed in a
magnificent tomb. That would be smallness of mind. If he were carried
off as a captive, he would still have a road open to leave life, in the
case that he should no longer be allowed to hope for happiness. (Nor
would he be troubled if the members of his family, such as sons (?) and
daughters (and female relatives?) were carried off into captivity. If
he had arrived to the end of his life without seeing such occurrences
(we would indeed be surprised). Would he leave this world supposing
that such things cannot happen? Such an opinion would be absurd. Would
he not have realized that his own kindred were exposed to such dangers?
The opinion that such things could happen will not make him any less
happy. No, he will be happy even with that belief. He would still be so
even should that occur; he will indeed reflect that such is the nature
of this world, that one must undergo such accidents, and submit. Often
perhaps men dragged into captivity will live better (than in liberty);
and besides, if their captivity be insupportable, it is in their power
to release themselves. If they remain, it is either because their
reason so induces them--and then their lot cannot be too hard; or it
is against the dictates of their reason, in which case they have none
but themselves to blame. The wise man, therefore, will not be unhappy
because of the folly of his own people; he will not allow his lot to
depend on the happiness or misfortunes of other people.


NO MISFORTUNE IS TOO GREAT TO BE CONQUERED BY VIRTUE.

8. If the griefs that he himself undergoes are great, he will support
them as well as he can; if they exceed his power of endurance, they
will carry him off (as thought Seneca[9]). In either case, he will
not, in the midst of his sufferings, excite any pity: (ever master
of his reason) he will not allow his own characteristic light to be
extinguished. Thus the flame in the lighthouse continues to shine, in
spite of the raging of the tempest, in spite of the violent blowing
of the winds. (He should not be upset) even by loss of consciousness,
or even if pain becomes so strong that its violence could almost
annihilate him. If pain become more intense, he will decide as to
what to do; for, under these circumstances, freedom of will is not
necessarily lost (for suicide remains possible, as thought Seneca[10]).
Besides, we must realize that these sufferings do not present
themselves to the wise man, under the same light as to the common man;
that all these need not penetrate to the sanctuary of the man's life;
which indeed happens with the greater part of pains, griefs and evils
that we see being suffered by others; it would be proof of weakness to
be affected thereby. A no less manifest mark of weakness is to consider
it an advantage to ignore all these evils, and to esteem ourselves
happy that they happen only after death,[11] without sympathizing with
the fate of others, and thinking only to spare ourselves some grief.
This would be a weakness that we should eliminate in ourselves, not
allowing ourselves to be frightened by the fear of what might happen.
The objection that it is natural to be afflicted at the misfortunes
of those who surround us, meets the answer that, to begin with, it is
not so with every person; then, that it is part of the duty of virtue
to ameliorate the common condition of human nature, and to raise it
to what is more beautiful, rising above the opinions of the common
people. It is indeed beautiful not to yield to what the common people
usually consider to be evils. We should struggle against the blows of
fortune not by affected ignoring (of difficulties, like an ostrich),
but as a skilful athlete who knows that the dangers he is incurring
are feared by certain natures, though a nature such as his bears them
easily, seeing in them nothing terrible, or at least considering them
terrifying only to children. Certainly, the wise man would not have
invited these evils; but on being overtaken by them he opposes to them
the virtue which renders the soul unshakable and impassible.


WISDOM IS NONE THE LESS HAPPY FOR BEING UNCONSCIOUS OF ITSELF.

9. It may further be objected that the wise man might lose
consciousness, if overwhelmed by disease, or the malice of magic.
Would he still remain happy? Either he will remain virtuous, being
only fallen asleep; in which case he might continue to be happy, since
no one claims he must lose happiness because of sleep, inasmuch as
no reckoning of the time spent in this condition is kept, and as he
is none the less considered happy for life. On the other hand, if
unconsciousness be held to terminate virtue, the question at issue is
given up; for, supposing that he continues to be virtuous, the question
at issue was, whether he remain happy so long as he remains virtuous.
It might indeed still be objected that he cannot be happy if he remain
virtuous without feeling it, without acting in conformity with virtue.
Our answer is that a man would not be any less handsome or healthy for
being so unconsciously. Likewise, he would not be any less wise merely
for lack of consciousness thereof.


THOUGH HAPPINESS IS ACTUALIZED WISDOM WE DO NOT LOSE IT WHEN
UNCONSCIOUS. WE DO NOT LOSE IT BECAUSE WE OURSELVES ARE ACTUALIZATIONS
OF INTELLIGENCE.

Once more it may be objected that it is essential to wisdom to be
self-conscious, for happiness resides only in actualized wisdom. This
objection would hold if reason and wisdom were incidentals. But if
the hypostatic substance of wisdom consist in an essence (being),
or rather, in being itself, and if this being do not perish during
sleep, nor during unconsciousness, if consequently the activity of
being continue to subsist in him; if by its very nature this (being)
ceaselessly watch, then the virtuous man must even in this state (of
sleep or unconsciousness), continue to exercise his activity. Besides,
this activity is ignored only by one part of himself, and not by
himself entirely. Thus during the operation of the actualization of
growth,[12] the perception of its activity is not by his sensibility
transmitted to the rest of the man. If our personality were constituted
by this actualization of growth, we would act simultaneously with
it; but we are not this actualization, but that of the intellectual
principle, and that is why we are active simultaneously with this
(divine intellectual activity).


INTELLIGENCE IS NOT DEPENDENT ON CONSCIOUSNESS.

10. The reason that intelligence remains hidden is just because it
is not felt; only by the means of this feeling can this activity be
felt; but why should intelligence cease to act (merely because it
was not felt)? On the other hand, why could the soul not have turned
her activity towards intelligence before having felt or perceived
it? Since (for intelligence) thinking and existence are identical,
perception must have been preceded by some actualization. It seems
impossible for perception to arise except when thought reflects upon
itself, and when the principle whose activity constitutes the life of
the soul, so to speak, turns backwards, and reflects, as the image of
an object placed before a brilliant polished mirror reflects itself
therein. Likewise, if the mirror be placed opposite the object, there
is no more image; and if the mirror be withdrawn or badly adjusted,
there is no more image, though the luminous object continue to act.
Likewise, when that faculty of the soul which represents to us the
images of discursive reason and of intelligence is in a suitable
condition of calm, we get an intuition--that is, a somewhat sensual
perception thereof--with the prior knowledge of the activity of the
intelligence, and of discursive reason. When, however, this image
is troubled by an agitation in the mutual harmony of the organs,
the discursive reason, and the intelligence continue to act without
any image, and the thought does not reflect in the imagination.
Therefore we shall have to insist that thought is accompanied by an
image without, nevertheless, being one itself. While we are awake,
it often happens to us to perform praiseworthy things, to meditate
and to act, without being conscious of these operations at the moment
that we produce them. When for instance we read something, we are not
necessarily self-conscious that we are reading, especially if our
attention be fully centered on what we read. Neither is a brave man
who is performing a courageous deed, self-conscious of his bravery.
There are many other such cases. It would therefore seem that the
consciousness of any deed weakens its energy, and that when the action
is alone (without that consciousness) it is in a purer, livelier and
more vital condition. When virtuous men are in that condition (of
absence of self-consciousness), their life is more intense because it
concentrates in itself instead of mingling with feeling.


THE ONLY OBJECT OF THE VIRTUOUS WILL IS THE CONVERSION OF THE SOUL
TOWARDS HERSELF.

11. It has sometimes been said that a man in such a condition does
not really live. (If such be their honest opinion), they must be told
that he does live, even if they be incapable of understanding his
happiness and his life. If this seem to them incredible, they should
reflect whether their own admission that such a man lives and is
virtuous, does not imply that under those circumstances he is happy.
Neither should they begin by supposing that he is annihilated, only
later to consider whether he be happy. Neither should they confine
themselves to externalities after having admitted that he turns his
whole attention on things that he bears within himself; in short, not
to believe that the goal of his will inheres in external objects.
Indeed, such considering of external objects as the goal of the will of
the virtuous man, would be tantamount to a denial of the very essence
(being) of happiness; likewise, insisting that those are the objects he
desires. His wish would undoubtedly be that all men should be happy,
and that none of them should suffer any evil; but, nevertheless, he is
none the less happy when that does not happen. Other people, again,
would say that it was unreasonable for the virtuous man to form such
an (impossible) wish, since elimination of evils here below is out of
the question.[13] This, however, would constitute an admission of our
belief that the only goal of the virtuous man's will is the conversion
of the soul towards herself.[14]


THE PLEASURES CLAIMED FOR THE VIRTUOUS MAN ARE OF A HIGHER KIND.

12. We grant, however, that the pleasures claimed for the virtuous man
are neither those sought by debauchees, nor those enjoyed by the body.
Those pleasures could not be predicated of him without degrading his
felicity. Nor can we claim for him raptures of delight--for what would
be their use? It is sufficient to suppose that the virtuous man tastes
the pleasures attached to the presence of goods, pleasures which must
consist neither in motions, nor be accidental. He enjoys the presence
of those (higher) goods because he is present to himself; from that
time on he lingers in a state of sweet serenity. The virtuous man,
therefore, is always serene, calm, and satisfied. If he be really
virtuous, his state cannot be troubled by any of the things that we
call evils. Those who in the virtuous life are seeking for pleasures of
another kind are actually seeking something else than the virtuous life.


IN THE VIRTUOUS MAN THE PART THAT SUFFERS IS THE HIGHER; THEREFORE HE
REALLY DOES NOT SUFFER AS DO THOSE WHO SUFFER CHIEFLY PHYSICALLY.

13. The actions of the virtuous man could not be hindered by fortune,
but they may vary with the fluctuations of fortune. All will be equally
beautiful, and, perhaps, so much the more beautiful as the virtuous
man will find himself placed amidst more critical circumstances. Any
acts that concern contemplation, which relate to particular things,
will be such that the wise man will be able to produce them, after
having carefully sought and considered what he is to do. Within
himself he finds the most infallible of the rules of conduct, a rule
that will never fail him, even were he within the oft-discussed bull
of Phalaris. It is useless for the vulgar man to repeat, even twice
or thrice,[15] that such a fate is sweet; for if a man were to utter
those words, they are uttered by that very (animal) part that undergoes
those tortures. On the contrary, in the virtuous man, the part that
suffers is different from that which dwells within itself, and which,
while necessarily residing within itself, is never deprived of the
contemplation of the universal Good.


MAN BECOMES WISE BY ESTABLISHING A SPIRITUAL PREPONDERANCE.

14. Man, and specially the virtuous man, is constituted not by the
composite of soul and body,[16] as is proved by the soul's power to
separate herself from the body,[17] and to scorn what usually are
called "goods." It would be ridiculous to relate happiness to the
animal part of man, since happiness consists in living well, and living
well, being an actualization, belongs to the soul, exclusively. Not
even does it extend to the entire soul, for happiness does not extend
to that part of the soul concerned with growth, having nothing in
common with the body, neither as to its size, nor its possible good
condition. Nor does it depend on the perfection of the senses, because
their development, as well as that of the organs, weights man down,
and makes him earthy. Doing good will be made easier by establishing a
sort of counter-weight, weakening the body, and taming its motions, so
as to show how much the real man differs from the foreign things that
(to speak as do the Stoics), surround him. However much the (earthy)
common man enjoy beauty, greatness, wealth, command over other men,
and earthly luxuries, he should not be envied for the deceptive
pleasure he takes in all these advantages. To begin with, the wise
man will probably not possess them; but if he do possess them, he
will voluntarily diminish them, if he take due care of himself. By
voluntary negligence he will weaken and disfigure the advantages of
his body. He will abdicate from dignities. While preserving the health
of his body, he will not desire to be entirely exempt from disease and
sufferings. If he never experienced these evils, he will wish to make
a trial of them during his youth. But when he has arrived at old age,
he will no longer wish to be troubled either by pains, or pleasures,
or anything sad or agreeable that relates to the body; so as not to be
forced to give it his attention. He will oppose the sufferings he will
have to undergo with a firmness that will never forsake him. He will
not believe that his happiness is increased by pleasures, health or
rest, nor destroyed nor diminished by their contraries. As the former
advantages do not augment his felicity, how could their loss diminish
it?


TWO WISE MEN WILL BE EQUALLY HAPPY, IN SPITE OF DIFFERENCES OF FORTUNE.

15. Let us now imagine two wise men, the first of whom possesses
everything that heart can wish for, while the other is in a contrary
position. Shall they be said to be equally happy? Yes, if they be
equally wise. Even if the one possessed physical beauty, and all
the other advantages that do not relate either to wisdom, virtue,
contemplation of the good, or perfect life; what would be the use of
all that since he who possesses all these advantages is not considered
as really being happier than he who lacks them? Such wealth would
not even help a flute-player to accomplish his object! We, however,
consider the happy man only from the standpoint of the weakness of our
mind, considering as serious and frightful what the really happy man
considers indifferent. For the man could not be wise, nor consequently
happy, so long as he has not succeeded in getting rid of all these
vain ideas, so long as he has not entirely transformed himself, so
long as he does not within himself contain the confidence that he is
sheltered from all evil. Only then will he live without being troubled
by any fear. The only thing that should affect him, would be the fear
that he is not an expert in wisdom, that he is only partly wise. As to
unforeseen fears that might get the better of him before he had had
the time to reflect, during a moment of abstraction of attention, the
wise man will hasten to turn them away, treating that which within
himself becomes agitated as a child that has lost its way through
pain. He will tranquilize it either by reason, or even by a threat,
though uttered without passion. Thus the mere sight of a worthy person
suffices to calm a child. Besides, the wise man will not hold aloof
either from friendship nor gratitude. He will treat his own people as
he treats himself; giving to his friends as much as to his own person;
and he will give himself up to friendship, without ceasing to exercise
intelligence therein.


THE WISE MAN REMAINS UNATTACHED.

16. If the virtuous man were not located in this elevated life of
intelligence; if on the contrary he were supposed to be subject to
the blows of fate, and if we feared that they would overtake him, our
ideal would no longer be that of the virtuous man such as we outline
it; we would be considering a vulgar man, mingled with good and evil,
of whom a life equally mingled with good and evil would be predicated.
Even such a man might not easily be met with, and besides, if we did
meet him, he would not deserve to be called a wise man; for there would
be nothing great about him, neither the dignity of wisdom, nor the
purity of good. Happiness, therefore, is not located in the life of
the common man. Plato rightly says that you have to leave the earth to
ascend to the good, and that to become wise and happy, one should turn
one's look towards the only Good, trying to acquire resemblance to Him,
and to live a life conformable to Him.[18] That indeed must suffice
the wise man to reach his goal. To the remainder he should attach no
more value than to changes of location, none of which can add to his
happiness. If indeed he pay any attention to external things scattered
here and there around him, it is to satisfy the needs of his body so
far as he can. But as he is something entirely different from the
body, he is never disturbed at having to leave it; and he will abandon
it whenever nature will have indicated the time. Besides, he always
reserves to himself the right to deliberate about this (time to leave
the world by suicide).[19] Achievement of happiness will indeed be his
chief goal; nevertheless, he will also act, not only in view of his
ultimate goal, or himself, but on the body to which he is united. He
will care for this body, and will sustain it as long as possible. Thus
a musician uses his lyre so long as he can; but as soon as it is beyond
using, he repairs it, or abandons playing the lyre, because he now can
do without it. Leaving it on the ground, he will look at it almost with
scorn, and will sing without its accompaniment. Nevertheless it will
not have been in vain that this lyre will have been originally given to
him; for he will often have profited by its use.




THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK TWO.

Of Providence.[20]


EPICURUS TAUGHT CHANCE AND THE GNOSTICS AN EVIL CREATOR.

1. When Epicurus[21] derives the existence and constitution of the
universe from automatism and chance, he commits an absurdity, and
stultifies himself. That is self-evident, though the matter have
elsewhere been thoroughly demonstrated.[22] But (if the world do
not owe its origin to chance) we will be compelled to furnish an
adequate reason for the existence and creation of all these beings.
This (teleological) question deserves the most careful consideration.
Things that seem evil do indeed exist, and they do suggest doubts about
universal Providence; so that some (like Epicurus[23]) insist there
is no providence, while others (like the Gnostics[24]), hold that the
demiurgic creator is evil. The subject, therefore, demands thorough
investigation of its first principles.


PARTICULAR AND UNIVERSAL PROVIDENCE ASSUMED AS PREMISES.

Let us leave aside this individual providence, which consists in
deliberating before an action, and in examining whether we should or
should not do something, or whether we should give or not give it. We
shall also assume the existence of the universal Providence, and from
this principle we shall deduce the consequences.


PROVIDENCE IS NOT PARTICULAR BECAUSE THE WORLD HAD NO BEGINNING.

We would acknowledge the existence of a particular Providence, such as
we mentioned above, if we thought that the world had had a beginning of
existence, and had not existed since all eternity. By this particular
Providence we mean a recognition, in the divinity, of a kind of
prevision and reasoning (similar to the reasoning and prevision of the
artist who, before carrying out a work, deliberates on each of the
parts that compose it[25]). We would suppose that this prevision and
reasoning were necessary to determine how the universe could have been
made, and on what conditions it should have been the best possible.
But as we hold that the world's existence had no beginning, and that
it has existed since all time, we can, in harmony with reason and our
own views, affirm that universal Providence consists in this that
the universe is conformed to Intelligence, and that Intelligence is
prior to the universe, not indeed in time--for the existence of the
Intelligence did not temporarily precede that of the universe--but (in
the order of things), because, by its nature, Intelligence precedes the
world that proceeds from it, of which it is the cause, type[26] and
model, and cause of unchanged perpetual persistence.


HOW INTELLIGENCE CONTINUES TO MAKE THE WORLD SUBSIST.

This is how Intelligence continues to make the world subsist. Pure
Intelligence and Being in itself constitute the genuine (intelligible)
World that is prior to everything, which has no extension, which
is weakened by no division, which has no imperfection, even in its
parts, for none of its parts are separated from its totality. This
world is the universal Life and Intelligence. Its unity is both
living and intelligent. In it each part reproduces the whole, its
totality consists of a perfect harmony, because nothing within it is
separate, independent, or isolated from anything else. Consequently,
even if there were mutual opposition, there would be no struggle.
Being everywhere one and perfect, the intelligible World is permanent
and immutable, for it contains no internal reaction of one opposite
on another. How could such a reaction take place in this world, since
nothing is lacking in it? Why should Reason produce another Reason
within it, and Intelligence produce another Intelligence[27] merely
because it was capable of doing so? If so, it would not, before having
produced, have been in a perfect condition; it would produce and enter
in motion because it contained something inferior.[28] But blissful
beings are satisfied to remain within themselves, persisting within
their essence. A multiple action compromises him who acts by forcing
him to issue from himself. The intelligible World is so blissful that
even while doing nothing it accomplishes great things, and while
remaining within itself it produces important operations.


THE SENSE-WORLD CREATED NOT BY REFLECTION, BUT BY SELF-NECESSITY.

2. The sense-world draws its existence from that intelligible World.
The sense-world, however, is not really unitary; it is indeed multiple,
and divided into a plurality of parts which are separated from each
other, and are mutually foreign. Not love reigns there, but hate,
produced by the separation of things which their state of imperfection
renders mutually inimical. None of its parts suffices to itself.
Preserved by something else, it is none the less an enemy of the
preserving Power. The sense-world has been created, not because the
divinity reflected on the necessity of creating, but because (in the
nature of things) it was unavoidable that there be a nature inferior to
the intelligible World, which, being perfect, could not have been the
last degree of existence.[29] It occupied the first rank, it had great
power, that was universal and capable of creating without deliberation.
If it had had to deliberate, it would not, by itself, have expressed
the power of creation. It would not have possessed it essentially.
It would have resembled an artisan, who, himself, does not have the
power of creating, but who acquires it by learning how to work. By
giving something of itself to matter, Intelligence produced everything
without issuing from its rest or quietness. That which it gives is
Reason, because reason is the emanation of Intelligence, an emanation
that is as durable as the very existence of Intelligence. In a seminal
reason all the parts exist in an united condition, without any of
them struggling with another, without disagreement or hindrance. This
Reason then causes something of itself to pass into the corporeal mass,
where the parts are separated from each other, and hinder each other,
and destroy each other. Likewise, from this unitary Intelligence,
and from the Reason that proceeds thence, issues this universe whose
parts are separate and distinct from each other, some of the parts
being friendly and allied, while some are separate and inimical. They,
therefore, destroy each other, either voluntarily or involuntarily,
and through this destruction their generation is mutually operated.
In such a way did the divinity arrange their actions and experiences
that all concur in the formation of a single harmony,[30] in which
each utters its individual note because, in the whole, the Reason that
dominates them produces order and harmony. The sense-world does not
enjoy the perfection of Intelligence and Reason: it only participates
therein. Consequently, the sense-world needed harmony, because it was
formed by the concurrence of Intelligence and necessity.[31] Necessity
drives the sense-world to evil, and to what is irrational, because
necessity itself is irrational; but Intelligence dominates necessity.
The intelligible World is pure reason; none other could be such. The
world, which is born of it, had to be inferior to it, and be neither
pure reason, nor mere matter; for order would have been impossible
in unmingled matter. The sense-world, therefore, is a mixture of
matter and Reason; those are the elements of which it is composed. The
principle from which this mixture proceeds, and which presides over
the mixture, is the Soul. Neither must we imagine that this presiding
over the mixture constitutes an effort for the Soul; for she easily
administers the universe, by her presence.[32]


THE WORLD SHOULD NOT BE BLAMED FOR ITS IMPERFECTIONS.

3. For not being beautiful this world should not be blamed; neither
for not being the best of corporeal worlds; nor should the Cause,
from which it derives its existence, be accused. To begin with,
this world exists necessarily. It is not the work of a reflecting
determination. It exists because a superior Being naturally begets it
in His own likeness. Even if its creation were the result of reflective
determination, it could not shame its author; for the divinity made the
universe beautiful, complete and harmonious. Between the greater and
lesser parts He introduced a fortunate accord. A person who would blame
the totality of the world from consideration of its parts is therefore
unjust. He should examine the parts in their relation to the totality,
and see whether they be in accord and in harmony with it. Then the
study of the whole should continue down to that of the least details.
Otherwise criticism does not apply to the world as a whole, but only
to some of its parts. For instance, we well know how admirable, as
a whole, is man; yet we grant that there would be justification for
criticism of a separate hair, or toe, or some of the vilest animals, or
Thersites, as a specimen of humanity.


THE WORLD'S TESTIMONY TO ITS CREATOR.

Since the work under consideration is the entire world, we would, were
our intelligence attentively to listen to its voice, hear it exclaim
as follows: "It is a divinity who has made Me, and from the divinity's
hands I issued complete, including all animated beings, entire and
self-sufficient, standing in need of nothing, since everything is
contained within Me; plants, animals, the whole of Nature, the
multitude of the divinities, the troupe of guardians, excellent souls,
and the men who are happy because of virtue. This refers not only
to the earth, which is rich in plants and animals of all kinds; the
power of the Soul extends also to the sea. Nor are the air and entire
heaven inanimate. They are the seat of all the excellent Souls, which
communicate life to the stars, and which preside over the circular
revolution of the heaven, a revolution that is eternal and full of
harmony, which imitates the movement of Intelligence by the eternal and
regular movement of the stars around one and the same centre, because
heaven has no need to seek anything outside of itself. All the beings
I contain aspire to the Good; all achieve Him, each according to its
potentiality. Indeed, from the Good depends the entire heaven,[33]
my whole Soul, the divinities that inhabit my various parts, all the
animals, all the plants, and all my apparently inanimate beings. In
this aggregation of beings some seem to participate only in existence,
others in life, others in sensation, others in intelligence, while
still others seem to participate in all the powers of life at one
time;[34] for we must not expect equal faculties for unequal things, as
for instance sight for the fingers, as it is suitable to the eye; while
the finger needs something else; it needs its own form, and has to
fulfil its function."


OPPOSITION AMONG INANIMATE BEINGS.

4. We should not be surprised at water extinguishing fire, or at
fire destroying some other element. Even this element was introduced
to existence by some other element, and it is not surprising that
it should be destroyed, since it did not produce itself, and was
introduced to existence only by the destruction of some other element
(as thought Heraclitus and the Stoics[35]). Besides, the extinguished
fire is replaced by another active fire. In the incorporeal heaven,
everything is permanent; in the visible heaven, the totality, as well
as the more important and the most essential parts, are eternal.
The souls, on passing through different bodies, (by virtue of their
disposition[36]), themselves change on assuming some particular form;
but, when they can do so, they stand outside of generation, remaining
united to the universal Soul. The bodies are alive by their form, and
by the whole that each of them constitutes (by its union with a soul),
since they are animals, and since they nourish themselves; for in
the sense-world life is mobile, but in the intelligible world it is
immobile. Immobility necessarily begat movement, self-contained life
was compelled to produce other life, and calm being naturally exhaled
vibrating spirit.


OPPOSITION AMONG ANIMALS.

Mutual struggle and destruction among animals is necessary, because
they are not born immortal. Their origin is due to Reason's embracing
all of matter, and because this Reason possessed within itself all the
things that subsist in the intelligible World. From what other source
would they have arisen?


OPPOSITION AMONG HUMANS.

The mutual wrongs of human beings may however very easily all be caused
by the desire of the Good (as had been thought by Democritus[37]).
But, having strayed because of their inability to reach Him, they
turned against each other. They are punished for it by the degradation
these evil actions introduced within their souls, and, after death,
they are driven into a lower place, for none can escape the Order
established by the Law of the universe (or, the law of Adrastea[38]).
Order does not, as some would think, exist because of disorder, nor
law on account of lawlessness; in general, it is not the better that
exists on account of the worse. On the contrary, disorder exists only
on account of order, lawlessness on account of law, irrationality on
account of reason, because order, law and reason, such as they are here
below, are only imitations (or, borrowings). It is not that the better
produced the worse, but that the things which need participation in the
better are hindered therefrom, either by their nature, by accident,
or by some other obstacle (as Chrysippus thought that evils happen
by consequence or concomitance). Indeed, that which succeeds only in
acquiring a borrowed order, may easily fail to achieve it, either
because of some fault inherent in its own nature, or by some foreign
obstacle. Things hinder each other unintentionally, by following
different goals. Animals whose actions are free incline sometimes
towards good, sometimes towards evil (as the two horses in Plato's
Phaedrus).[39] Doubtless, they do not begin by inclining towards evil;
but as soon as there is the least deviation at the origin, the further
the advance in the wrong road, the greater and more serious does the
divergence become. Besides, the soul is united to a body, and from
this union necessarily arises appetite. When something impresses us at
first sight, or unexpectedly, and if we do not immediately repress the
motion which is produced within us, we allow ourselves to be carried
away by the object towards which our inclination drew us. But the
punishment follows the fault, and it is not unjust that the soul that
has contracted some particular nature should undergo the consequences
of her disposition (by passing into a body which conforms thereto).
Happiness need not be expected for those who have done nothing to
deserve it. The good alone obtain it; and that is why the divinities
enjoy it.


LACK OF HAPPINESS SHOULD BE BLAMED ON THE SOUL THAT DOES NOT DESERVE IT.

5. If then, even here below, souls enjoy the faculty of arriving at
happiness, we should not accuse the constitution of the universe
because some souls are not happy; the fault rather lies with their
weakness, which hinders them from struggling courageously enough in
the career where prizes are offered to virtue. Why indeed should we
be astonished that the spirits which have not made themselves divine
should not enjoy divine life? Poverty and diseases are of no importance
to the good, and they are useful to the evil (as thought Theognis).[40]
Besides, we are necessarily subject to diseases, because we have a
body. Then all these accidents are not useless for the order and
existence of the universe. Indeed, when a being is dissolved into its
elements, the Reason of the universe uses it to beget other beings,
for the universal Reason embraces everything within its sphere of
activity. Thus when the body is disorganized, and the soul is softened
by her passions, then the body, overcome by sickness, and the soul,
overcome by vice, are introduced into another series and order. There
are things, like poverty and sickness, which benefit the persons who
undergo them. Even vice contributes to the perfection of the universe,
because it furnishes opportunity for the exercise of the divine
justice. It serves other purposes also; for instance, it increases the
vigilance of souls, and excites the mind and intelligence to avoid the
paths of perdition; it also emphasizes the value of virtue by contrast
with the evils that overtake the wicked. Of course, such utilities
are not the cause of the existence of evils; we only mean that, since
evils exist, the divinity made use of them to accomplish His purposes.
It would be the characteristic of a great power to make even evils
promote the fulfilment of its purposes, to cause formless things to
assist in the production of forms. In short, we assert that evil is
only an omission or failure of good. Now a coming short of good must
necessarily exist in the beings here below, because in them good is
mingled with other things; for this thing to which the good is allied
differs from the good, and thus produces the lack of good. That is why
"it is impossible for evil to be destroyed":[41] because things are
successively inferior, relatively to the nature of the absolute Good;
and because, being different from the Good from which they derive their
existence, they have become what they are by growing more distant from
their principle.


IN SPITE OF APPARENT MISFORTUNE TO THE GOOD NO HARM CAN HAPPEN TO THEM.

6. It is constantly objected that fortune maltreats the good, and
favors the evil in opposition to the agreement that ought to exist
between virtue and happiness. The true answer to this is that no
harm can happen to the righteous man, and no good to the vicious
man.[42] Other objectors ask why one man is exposed to what is contrary
to nature, while the other obtains what conforms thereto. How can
distributive justice be said to obtain in this world? If, however, the
obtaining of what conforms to nature do not increase the happiness of
the virtuous man, and if being exposed to what is contrary to nature
do not diminish the wickedness of the vicious man, of what importance
(as thought Plato[43]), are either of these conditions? Neither will it
matter if the vicious man be handsome, or the virtuous man ugly.


THE SLAVERY OF THE GOOD AND VICTORY OF THE EVIL SEEM TO ACCUSE
PROVIDENCE.

Further objections assert that propriety, order and justice demand the
contrary of the existing state of affairs in the world, and that we
could expect no less from a Providence that was wise. Even if it were
a matter of moment to virtue or vice, it is unsuitable that the wicked
should be the masters, and chiefs of state, and that the good should
be slaves; for a bad prince commits the worst crimes. Moreover, the
wicked conquer in battles, and force their prisoners to undergo the
extremities of torments. How could such facts occur if indeed a divine
Providence be in control? Although indeed in the production of some
work (of art), it be especially the totality that claims attention,
nevertheless, the parts must also obtain their due, especially when
they are animated, living and reasonable; it is just that divine
Providence should extend to everything, especially inasmuch as its
duty is precisely to neglect nothing. In view of these objections we
shall be forced to demonstrate that really everything here below is
good, if we continue to insist that the sense-world depends on supreme
Intelligence, and that its power penetrates everywhere.


PERFECTION MUST NOT BE SOUGHT IN THINGS MINGLED WITH MATTER.

7. To begin with, we must remark that to show that all is good in the
things mingled with matter (and therefore of sense), we must not expect
to find in them the whole perfection of the World which is not soiled
by matter, and is intelligible; nor should we expect to find in that
which holds the second rank characteristics of that which is of the
first. Since the world has a body, we must grant that this body will
have influence on the totality, and expect no more than that Reason
will give it that which this mixed nature was capable of receiving.
For instance, if we were to contemplate the most beautiful man here
below, we would be wrong in believing that he was identical with the
intelligible Man, and inasmuch as he was made of flesh, muscles and
bones, we would have to be satisfied with his having received from
his creator all the perfection that could be communicated to him to
embellish these bones, muscles and flesh, and to make the ("seminal)
reason" in him predominate over the matter within him.


EVIL IS ONLY A LOWER FORM OF GOOD.

Granting these premises, we may start out on an explanation of the
above mentioned difficulties. For in the world we will find remarkable
traces of the Providence and divine Power from which it proceeds.
Let us take first, the actions of souls who do evil voluntarily; the
actions of the wicked who, for instance, harm virtuous men, or other
men equally evil. Providence need not be held responsible for the
wickedness of these souls. The cause should be sought in the voluntary
determinations of those souls themselves. For we have proved that the
souls have characteristic motions, and that while here below they are
not pure, but rather are animals (as would naturally be the case with
souls united to bodies).[44] Now, it is not surprising that, finding
themselves in such a condition, they would live conformably to that
condition.[45] Indeed, it is not the formation of the world that made
them descend here below. Even before the world existed, they were
already disposed to form part of it, to busy themselves with it, to
infuse it with life, to administer it, and in it to exert their power
in a characteristic manner, either by presiding over its (issues),
and by communicating to it something of their power, or by descending
into it, or by acting in respect to the world each in its individual
manner.[46] The latter question, however, does not refer to the subject
we are now considering; here it will be sufficient to show that,
however these circumstances occur, Providence is not to be blamed.


IT IS A MATTER OF FAITH THAT PROVIDENCE EMBRACES EVERYTHING HERE BELOW,
EVEN THE MISFORTUNES OF THE JUST.

But how shall we explain the difference that is observed between the
lot of the good and the evil? How can it occur that the former are
poor, while others are rich, and possess more than necessary to satisfy
their needs, being even powerful, and governing cities and nations?
(The Gnostics and Manicheans) think that the sphere of activity of
Providence does not extend down to the earth.[47] No! For all of the
rest (of this world) conforms to (universal) Reason, inasmuch as
animals and plants participate in Reason, Life and Soul. (The Gnostic)
will answer that if Providence do extend to this earth, it does not
predominate therein. As the world is but a single organism, to advance
such an objection is the part of somebody who would assert that the
head and face of man were produced by Nature, and that reason dominated
therein, while the other members were formed by other causes, such as
chance or necessity, and that they were evil either on this account, or
because of the importance of Nature. Wisdom and piety, however, would
forbid the admission that here below not everything was well, blaming
the operation of Providence.


HOW SENSE-OBJECTS ARE NOT EVIL.

8. It remains for us to explain how sense-objects are good and
participate in the (cosmic) Order; or at least, that they are not
evil. In every animal, the higher parts, such as the face and head,
are the most beautiful, and are not equalled by the middle or lower
parts. Now men occupy the middle and lower region of the universe. In
the higher region we find the heaven containing the divinities; it is
they that fill the greater part of the world, with the vast sphere
where they reside. The earth occupies the centre and seems to be one
of the stars. We are surprised at seeing injustice reigning here below
chiefly because man is regarded as the most venerable and wisest being
in the universe. Nevertheless, this being that is so wise occupies but
the middle place between divinities and animals, at different times
inclining towards the former or the latter. Some men resemble the
divinities, and others resemble animals; but the greater part continue
midway between them.


THE GOOD MAY NEGLECT NATURAL LAWS WHICH CARRY REWARDS.

It is those men who occupy this middle place who are forced to undergo
the rapine and violence of depraved men, who resemble wild beasts.
Though the former are better than those whose violence they suffer,
they are, nevertheless, dominated by them because of inferiority in
other respects, lacking courage, or preparedness.[48] It would be no
more than a laughing matter if children who had strengthened their
bodies by exercise, while leaving their souls inviolate in ignorance,
should in physical struggle conquer those of their companions, who
had exercised neither body nor soul; if they stole their food or soft
clothing. No legislator could hinder the vanquished from bearing the
punishment of their cowardliness and effeminacy, if, neglecting the
gymnastic exercises which had been taught them, they did not, by their
inertia, effeminacy and laziness, fear becoming fattened sheep fit to
be the prey of wolves? They who commit this rapine and violence are
punished therefor first because they thereby become wolves and noxious
beasts, and later because (in this or some subsequent existence) they
necessarily undergo the consequences of their evil actions (as thought
Plato[49]). For men who here below have been evil do not die entirely
(when their soul is separated from their bodies). Now in the things
that are regulated by Nature and Reason, that which follows is always
the result of that which precedes; evil begets evil, just as good
begets good. But the arena of life differs from a gymnasium, where the
struggles are only games. Therefore, the above-mentioned children which
we divided into two classes, after having grown up in ignorance, must
prepare to fight, and take up arms, an display more energy than in the
exercises of the gymnasium. As some, however, are well armed, while the
others are not, the first must inevitably triumph. The divinity must
not fight for the cowardly; for the (cosmic) law decrees that in war
life is saved by valor, and not by prayers.[50] Nor is it by prayers
that the fruits of the earth are obtained; they are produced only by
labor. Nor can one have good health without taking care of it. If
the evil cultivate the earth better, we should not complain of their
reaping a better harvest.[51] Besides, in the ordinary conduct of life,
it is ridiculous to listen only to one's own caprice, doing nothing
that is prescribed by the divinities, limiting oneself exclusively to
demanding one's conservation, without carrying out any of the actions
on which (the divinities) willed that our preservation should depend.


DEATH IS BETTER THAN DISHARMONY WITH THE LAWS OF THE UNIVERSE.

Indeed it would be better to be dead than to live thus in contradiction
with the laws that rule the universe. If, when men are in opposition
to these laws, divine Providence preserved peace in the midst of
all follies and vices, it would deserve the charge of negligence in
allowing the prevalence of evil. The evil rule only because of the
cowardice of those who obey them; this is juster than if it were
otherwise.


PROVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO THE POINT OF SUPPRESSING OUR OWN
INITIATIVE.

9. Nor should the sphere of Providence be extended to the point of
suppressing our own action. For if Providence did everything, and
Providence alone existed, it would thereby be annihilated. To what,
indeed, would it apply? There would be nothing but divinity! It
is indeed incontestable that divinity exists, and that its sphere
extends over other beings--but divinity does not suppress the latter.
For instance, divinity approaches man, and preserves in him what
constitutes humanity; that is, divinity makes him live in conformity
to the law of Providence, and makes him fulfil the commandments of
that law. Now, this law decrees that the life of men who have become
virtuous should be good both here below and after their death; and
that the evil should meet an opposite fate. It would be unreasonable
to expect the existence of men who forget themselves to come and save
the evil, even if the latter addressed prayers to the divinity. Neither
should we expect the divinities to renounce their blissful existence to
come and administer our affairs; nor that the virtuous men, whose life
is holy and superior to human conditions, should be willing to govern
the wicked. The latter never busy themselves with promoting the good
to the governing of other men, and themselves to be good (as thought
Plato[52]). They are even jealous of the man who is good by himself;
there would indeed be more good people if virtuous men were chosen as
chiefs.


THOUGH MEN ARE ONLY MEDIOCRE THEY ARE NEVER ABANDONED BY PROVIDENCE.

Man is therefore not the best being in the universe; according to his
choice he occupies an intermediate rank. In the place he occupies,
however, he is not abandoned by Providence, which ever leads him
back to divine things by the numerous means it possesses to cause
the triumph of virtue. That is the reason why men have never lost
rationality, and why, to some degree, they always participate in
wisdom, intelligence, art, and the justice that regulates their mutual
relations. Even when one wrongs another, he is still given credit
for acting in justice to himself, and he is treated according to his
deserts.[53] Besides, man, as a creature, is handsome, as handsome as
possible, and, by the part he plays in the universe, he is superior to
all the animals that dwell here below.


IT IS RIDICULOUS TO COMPLAIN OF THE LOWER NATURE OF ANIMALS.

No one in his senses would complain of the existence of animals
inferior to man, if, besides, they contribute towards the embellishment
of the universe. Would it not be ridiculous to complain that some
of them bite men, as if the latter had an imprescriptible right to
complete security? The existence of these animals is necessary; it
procures us advantages both evident and still unknown, but which will
be revealed in the course of time. Thus there is nothing useless
in animals, either in respect to themselves, or to man.[54] It is,
besides, ridiculous to complain because many animals are wild, when
there are even men who are such; what should surprise us most is that
many animals are not submissive to man, and defend themselves against
him.[55]


IF UNJUST ACTS ARE PRODUCED ASTROLOGICALLY THEN DIVINE REASON IS TO
BLAME.

10. But if men be evil only in spite of themselves, and involuntarily,
it would be impossible to say that those who commit injustices, and
those who suffer them are responsible (the former for their ferocity,
and the latter for their cowardice.[56] To this we answer that if the
wickedness of the former (as well as the cowardice of the latter) be,
necessarily, produced by the course of the stars, or by the action of
a principle of which it is only the effect, then it is explained by
physical reasons. But if it be the very Reason of the universe that
produces such things, how does it not thereby commit an injustice?


EVEN INVOLUNTARINESS DOES NOT AFFECT SPONTANEITY THAT IS RESPONSIBLE.

Unjust actions are involuntary only in this sense that one does not
have the will to commit a fault; but this circumstance does not hinder
the spontaneity of the action. However, when one acts spontaneously,
one is responsible for the fault; one would avoid responsibility for
the fault only if one were not the author of the action. To say that
the wicked are such necessarily, does not mean that they undergo
an external constraint, but that their character is constituted by
wickedness. The influence of the course of the stars does not destroy
our liberty, for, if every action in us were determined by the exterior
influence of such agents, everything would go on as these agents
desired it; consequently, men would not commit any actions contrary
to the will of these agents. If the divinities alone were the authors
of all our actions, there would be no impious persons; therefore,
impiety is due to men. It is true that, once the cause is given, the
effects will follow, if only the whole series of causes be given. But
man himself is one of these causes; he therefore does good by his own
nature, and he is a free cause.


EVEN THE SHADOWS ARE NECESSARY TO THE PERFECTION OF A PICTURE.

11. Is it true that all things are produced by necessity, and by the
natural concatenation of causes and effects, and that, thus, they are
as good as possible? No! It is the Reason which, governing the world,
produces all things (in this sense that it contains all the "seminal
reasons"), and which decrees that they shall be what they are. It is
Reason that, in conformity with its rational nature, produces what
are called evils, because it does not wish everything to be equally
good. An artist would not cover the body of a pictured animal with
eyes.[57] Likewise, Reason did not limit itself to the creation of
divinities; it produced beneath them guardians, then men, then animals,
not by envy (as Plato remarks[58]); but because its rational essence
contains an intellectual variety (that is, contains the "seminal
reasons" of all different beings). We resemble such men as know little
of painting, and who would blame an artist for having put shadows in
his picture; nevertheless, he has only properly disposed the contrasts
of light. Likewise, well-regulated states are not composed of equal
orders. Further, one would not condemn a tragedy, because it presents
personages other than heroes, such as slaves or peasants who speak
incorrectly.[78] To cut out these inferior personages, and all the
parts in which they appear, would be to injure the beauty of the
composition.[59]


IT IS REASONABLE FOR THE REASON TO ASSIGN SOULS TO DIFFERENT RANKS IN
THE UNIVERSE.

12. Since it is the Reason (of the world) which produced all things
by an alliance with matter, and by preserving its peculiar nature,
which is to be composed of different parts, and to be determined by
the principle from which it proceeds (that is, by Intelligence), the
work produced by Reason under these conditions could not be improved
in beauty. Indeed, the Reason (of the world) could not be composed of
homogeneous and similar parts; it must, therefore, not be accused,
because it is all things, and because all its parts differ from others.
If it had introduced into the world things which it had not previously
contained, as for instance, souls, and had forced them to enter into
the order of the world without considering their nature, and if it
had made many become degraded, Reason would certainly be to blame.
Therefore, we must acknowledge that the souls are parts of Reason,
and that Reason harmonizes them with the world without causing their
degradation, assigning to each that station which is suitable to her.


DIVINE JUSTICE EXTENDS ALSO INTO PAST AND FUTURE.

13. There is a further consideration that should not be overlooked,
namely: that if you desire to discover the exercise of the distributive
Justice of the divinity, it is not sufficient to examine only the
present; the past and future must also be considered. Those who, in a
former life, were slave-owners, if they abused their power, will be
enslaved; and this change would be useful to them. It impoverishes
those who have badly used their wealth; for poverty is of service
even to virtuous people. Likewise, those who kill will in their turn
be killed; he who commits homicide acts unjustly, but he who is its
victim suffers justly. Thus arises a harmony between the disposition
of the man who is maltreated, and the disposition of him who maltreats
him as he deserved. It is not by chance that a man becomes a slave,
is made prisoner, or is dishonored. He (must himself) have committed
the violence which he in turn undergoes. He who kills his mother will
be killed by his son; he who has violated a woman will in turn become
a woman in order to become the victim of a rape. Hence, the divine
Word[80] called Adrastea.[60] The orderly system here mentioned really
is "unescapeable," truly a justice and an admirable wisdom. From the
things that we see in the universe we must conclude that the order
which reigns in it is eternal, that it penetrates everywhere, even
in the smallest thing; and that it reveals an admirable art not only
in the divine things, but also in those that might be supposed to
be beneath the notice of Providence, on account of their minuteness.
Consequently, there is an admirable variety of art in the vilest
animal. It extends even into plants, whose fruits and leaves are so
distinguished by the beauty of form, whose flowers bloom with so much
grace, which grow so easily, and which offer so much variety. These
things were not produced once for all; they are continually produced
with variety, because the stars in their courses do not always exert
the same influence on things here below. What is transformed is not
transformed and metamorphosed by chance, but according to the laws of
beauty, and the rules of suitability observed by divine powers. Every
divine Power acts according to its nature, that is, in conformity with
its essence. Now its essence is to develop justice and beauty in its
actualizations; for if justice and beauty did not exist here, they
could not exist elsewhere.


THE CREATOR IS SO WISE THAT ALL COMPLAINTS AMOUNT TO GROTESQUENESS.

14. The order of the universe conforms to divine Intelligence without
implying that on that account its author needed to go through the
process of reasoning. Nevertheless, this order is so perfect that he
who best knows how to reason would be astonished to see that even with
reasoning one could not discover a plan wiser than that discovered as
realized in particular natures, and that this plan better conforms to
the laws of Intelligence than any that could result from reasoning.
It can never, therefore, be proper to find fault with the Reason
that produces all things because of any (alleged imperfections) of
any natural object, nor to claim, for the beings whose existence has
begun, the perfection of the beings whose existence had no beginning,
and which are eternal, both in the intelligible World, and in this
sense-world. That would amount to wishing that every being should
possess more good than it can carry, and to consider as insufficient
the form it received. It would, for instance, amount to complaining,
that man does not bear horns, and to fail to notice that, if Reason had
to spread abroad everywhere, it was still necessary for something great
to contain something less, that in everything there should be parts,
and that these could not equal the whole without ceasing to be parts.
In the intelligible World every thing is all; but here below each thing
is not all things. The individual man does not have the same properties
as the universal Man. For if the individual beings had something which
was not individual, then they would be universal. We should not expect
an individual being as such to possess the highest perfection; for
then it would no longer be an individual being. Doubtless, the beauty
of the part is not incompatible with that of the whole; for the more
beautiful a part is, the more does it embellish the whole. Now the part
becomes more beautiful on becoming similar to the whole, or imitating
its essence, and in conforming to its order. Thus a ray (of the supreme
Intelligence) descends here below upon man, and shines in him like a
star in the divine sky. To imagine the universe, one should imagine a
colossal statue[79] that were perfectly beautiful, animated or formed
by the art of Vulcan, whose ears, face and breast would be adorned with
shimmering stars disposed with marvelous skill.[62]


OBJECTION OF INTERNECINE WAR AMONG ANIMALS AND MEN.

15. The above considerations suffice for things studied each in itself.
The mutual relation, however, between things already begotten, and
those that are still being begotten from time to time, deserves to
attract attention, and may give rise to some objections, such as the
following: How does it happen that animals devour each other, that
men attack each other mutually, and that they are always in ceaseless
internecine warfare?[62] How could the reason (of the universe) have
constituted such a state of affairs, while still claiming that all is
for the best?


RESPONSIBILITY CANNOT BE SHIFTED FROM REASON WHICH IS RESPONSIBLE.

It does not suffice here to answer:[63] "Everything is for the
best possible. Matter is the cause that things are in a state of
inferiority; evils could not be destroyed." It is true enough, indeed,
that things had to be what they are, for they are good. It is not
matter which has come to dominate the universe; it has been introduced
in it so that the universe might be what it is, or rather, it is caused
by reason (?). The principle of things is, therefore, the Logos, or
Reason[64] (of the universe), which is everything. By it were things
begotten, by it were they co-ordinated in generation.


NECESSITY OF INTERNECINE WARFARE.

What then (will it be objected) is the necessity of this natural
internecine warfare of animals, and also of men? First, animals have to
devour each other in order to renew themselves; they could not, indeed,
last eternally, even if they were not killed. Is there any reason to
complain because, being already condemned to death, as they are, they
should find an end which is useful to other beings? What objection can
there be to their mutually devouring each other, in order to be reborn
under other forms? It is as if on the stage an actor who is thought to
be killed, goes to change his clothing, and returns under another mask.
Is it objected that he was not really dead? Yes indeed, but dying
is no more than a change of bodies, just as the comedian changes his
costume, or if the body were to be entirely despoiled, this is no more
than when an actor, at the end of a drama, lays aside his costume, only
to take it up again when once more the drama begins. Therefore, there
is nothing frightful in the mutual transformation of animals into each
other. Is it not better for them to have lived under this condition,
than never to have lived at all? Life would then be completely absent
from the universe, and life could no longer be communicated to other
beings. But as this universe contains a multiple life, it produces
and varies everything during the course of its existence; as it were
joking with them, it never ceases to beget living beings, remarkable
by beauty and by the proportion of their forms. The combats in which
mortal men continually fight against each other, with a regularity
strongly reminding of the Pyrrhic dances (as thought Plato[65]),
clearly show how all these affairs, that are considered so serious, are
only children's games, and that their death was nothing serious. To die
early in wars and battles is to precede by only a very little time the
unescapable fate of old age, and it is only an earlier departure for
a closer return. We may be comforted for the loss of our possessions
during our lifetime by observing that they have belonged to others
before us, and that, for those who have deprived us thereof, they form
but a very fragile possession, since they, in turn, will be bereft
thereof by others; and that, if they be not despoiled of their riches,
they will lose still more by keeping them.[66] Murders, massacres, the
taking and pillaging of towns should be considered as in the theatre we
consider changes of scene and of personages, the tears and cries of the
actors.[67]


ALL THESE CHANGES OF FORTUNE AFFECT ONLY THE OUTER MAN IN ANY CASE.

In this world, indeed, just as in the theatre, it is not the soul,
the interior man, but his shadow, the exterior man, who gives himself
up to lamentations and groans, who on this earth moves about so much,
and who makes of it the scene of an immense drama with numberless
different acts (?) Such is the characteristic of the actions of a man
who considers exclusively the things placed at his feet, and outside
of him, and who does not know that his tears and serious occupations
are any more than games.[68] The really earnest man occupies himself
seriously only with really serious affairs, while the frivolous man
applies himself to frivolous things. Indeed, frivolous things become
serious for him who does not know really serious occupations, and
who himself is frivolous. If, indeed, one cannot help being mixed up
in this child's play, it is just as well to know that he has fallen
into child's play where one's real personality is not in question. If
Socrates were to mingle in these games, it would only be his exterior
man who would do so. Let us add that tears and groans do not prove that
the evils we are complaining of are very real evils; for often children
weep and lament over imaginary grievances.


DOES THIS POINT OF VIEW DESTROY SIN AND JUSTICE?

16. If the above considerations be true, what about wickedness,
injustice, and sin? For if everything be well, how can there be
agents who are unjust, and who sin? If no one be unjust, or sinful,
how can unhappy men exist? How can we say that certain things conform
to nature, while others are contrary thereto, if everything that is
begotten, or that occurs, conforms to nature? Last, would that point
of view not do away entirely with impiety towards the divinity, if it
be the divinity that makes things such as they are, if the divinity
resemble a poet, who would in his drama introduce a character whose
business it was to ridicule and criticize the author?


THIS PROBLEM SOLVED BY REASON BEING DERIVED FROM INTELLIGENCE.

Let us, therefore, more clearly define the Reason (of the universe),
and let us demonstrate that it should be what it is. To reach our
conclusion more quickly, let us grant the existence of this Reason.
This Reason (of the universe) is not pure, absolute Intelligence.
Neither is it the pure Soul, but it depends therefrom. It is a ray of
light that springs both from Intelligence and from the Soul united to
Intelligence. These two principles beget Reason, that is, a rational
quiet life.[69] Now all life is an actualization, even that which
occupies the lowest rank. But the actualization (which constitutes
the life of Reason) is not similar to the actualization of fire. The
actualization of the life (peculiar to Reason), even without feeling,
is not a blind movement. All things that enjoy the presence of Reason,
and which participate therein in any manner soever, immediately receive
a rational disposition, that is, a form; for the actualization which
constitutes the life (of the Reason) can impart its forms, and for that
actualization motion is to form beings. Its movement, like that of a
dancer, is, therefore, full of art. A dancer, indeed, gives us the
image of that life full of art; it is the art that moves it, because
the art itself is its life. All this is said to explain the nature of
life, whatever it be.


THE UNITY OF REASON IS CONSTITUTED BY THE CONTRARIES IT CONTAINS.

As reason proceeds from Intelligence and Life, which possesses both
fulness and unity, Reason does not possess the unity and fulness of
Intelligence and Life. Consequently, Reason does not communicate the
totality and universality of its essence to the beings to which it
imparts itself. It, therefore, opposes its parts to each other, and
creates them defective; whereby, Reason constitutes and begets war and
struggle. Thus Reason is the universal unity, because it could not be
the absolute unity. Though reason imply struggle, because it consists
of parts, it also implies unity and harmony. It resembles the reason of
a drama, whose unity contains many diversities. In a drama, however,
the harmony of the whole results from its component contraries being
co-ordinated in the unity of action, while, in universal Reason, it is
from unity that the struggle of contraries arises. That is why we may
well compare universal Reason to the harmony formed by contrary sounds,
and to examine why the reasons of the beings also contain contraries.
In a concert, these reasons produce low and high sounds, and, by
virtue of the harmony, that constitutes their essence, they make these
divers sounds contribute to unity, that is, to Harmony[70] itself,
the supreme Reason of which they are only parts.[71] In the same way
we must consider other oppositions in the universe, such as black and
white, heat and cold, winged or walking animals, and reasonable and
irrational beings. All these things are parts of the single universal
Organism. Now if the parts of the universal Organism were often in
mutual disagreement, the universal Organism, nevertheless, remains
in perfect accord with itself because it is universal, and it is
universal by the Reason that inheres in it. The unity of this Reason
must therefore be composed of opposite reasons, because their very
opposition somehow constitutes its essence. If the Reason (of the
world) were not multiple, it would no longer be universal, and would
not even exist any longer. Since it exists, Reason must, therefore,
contain within itself some difference; and the greatest difference is
opposition. Now if Reason contain a difference, and produce different
things, the difference that exists in these things is greater than that
which exists in Reason. Now difference carried to the highest degree is
opposition. Therefore, to be perfect, Reason must from its very essence
produce things not only different, but even opposed.


THE WHOLE IS GOOD THOUGH COMPOSED OF GOOD AND EVIL PARTS.

17. If Reason thus from its essence produce opposed things, the
things it will produce will be so much the more opposed as they are
more separated from each other. The sense-world is less unitary than
its Reason, and consequently, it is more manifold, containing more
oppositions. Thus, in individuals, the love of life has greater force;
selfishness is more powerful in them; and often, by their avidity,
they destroy what they love, when they love what is perishable. The
love which each individual has for himself, makes him appropriate all
he can in his relations with the universe. Thus the good and evil are
led to do opposite things by the Art that governs the universe; just
as a choric ballet would be directed. One part is good, the other
poor; but the whole is good. It might be objected that in this case no
evil person will be left. Still, nothing hinders the existence of the
evil; only they will not be such as they would be taken by themselves.
Besides, this will be a motive of leniency in regard to them, unless
Reason should decide that this leniency be not deserved, thereby making
it impossible.[72]


FOUNDED ON THE PUN ON LOGOS, AS CHARACTER, ROLE AND REASON, THE EVILS
ARE SHOWN TO PLAY THEIR PART BADLY IN THE DRAMA OF LIFE.

Besides, if this world contain both bad and good people, and if the
latter play the greater part in the world, there will take place
that which is seen in dramas where the poet, at times, imposes his
ideas on the actors, and again at others relies on their ingenuity.
The obtaining of the first, second or third rank by an actor does
not depend on the poet. The poet only assigns to each the part he is
capable of filling, and assigns to him a suitable place. Likewise (in
the world), each one occupies his assigned place, and the bad man, as
well as the good one, has the place that suits him. Each one, according
to his nature and character, comes to occupy the place that suits him,
and that he had chosen, and then speaks and acts with piety if he be
good, and impiously, if he be evil. Before the beginning of the drama,
the actors already had their proper characters; they only developed
it. In dramas composed by men, it is the poet who assigns their parts
to the actors; and the latter are responsible only for the efficiency
or inefficiency of their acting; for they have nothing to do but
repeat the words of the poet. But in this drama (of life), of which
men imitate certain parts when their nature is poetic, it is the soul
that is the actor. This actor receives his part from the creator, as
stage-actors receive from the poet their masks, garments, their purple
robe, or their rags. Thus in the drama of the world it is not from
chance that the soul receives her part.


LIKE GOOD AND BAD ACTORS, SOULS ARE PUNISHED AND REWARDED BY THE
MANAGER.

Indeed, the fate of a soul conforms to her character, and, by going
through with her part properly, the soul fulfils her part in the drama
managed by universal Reason. The soul sings her part, that is, she
does that which is in her nature to do. If her voice and features be
beautiful, by themselves, they lend charm to the poem, as would be
natural. Otherwise they introduce a displeasing element, but which
does not alter the nature of the work.[73] The author of the drama
reprimands the bad actor as the latter may deserve it, and thus fulfils
the part of a good judge. He increases the dignity of the good actor,
and, if possible, invites him to play beautiful pieces, while he
relegates the bad actor to inferior pieces. Likewise, the soul which
takes part in the drama of which the world is the theatre, and which
has undertaken a part in it, brings with her a disposition to play well
or badly. At her arrival she is classed with the other actors, and
after having been allotted to all the various gifts of fortune without
any regard for her personality or activities, she is later punished or
rewarded. Such actors have something beyond usual actors; they appear
on a greater scene; the creator of the universe gives them some of his
power, and grants them the freedom to choose between a great number of
places. The punishments and rewards are so determined that the souls
themselves run to meet them, because each soul occupies a place in
conformity with her character, and is thus in harmony with the Reason
of the universe.[74]


THE SOUL MUST FIT HERSELF TO HER SPECIAL PART IN THE GREAT SCHEME.

Every individual, therefore, occupies, according to justice, the
place he deserves, just as each string of the lyre is fixed to the
place assigned to it by the nature of the sounds it is to render. In
the universe everything is good and beautiful if every being occupy
the place he deserves, if, for instance, he utter discordant sounds
when in darkness and Tartarus; for such sounds fit that place. If the
universe is to be beautiful, the individual must not behave "like a
stone" in it; he must contribute to the unity of the universal harmony
by uttering the sound suitable to him (as thought Epictetus[75]). The
sound that the individual utters is the life he leads, a life which is
inferior in greatness, goodness and power (to that of the universe).
The shepherd's pipe utters several sounds, and the weakest of them,
nevertheless, contributes to the total Harmony, because this harmony
is composed of unequal sounds whose totality constitutes a perfect
harmony. Likewise, universal Reason though one, contains unequal parts.
Consequently, the universe contains different places, some better, and
some worse, and their inequality corresponds to the inequality of the
soul. Indeed, as both places and souls are different, the souls that
are different find the places that are unequal, like the unequal parts
of the pipe, or any other musical instrument. They inhabit different
places, and each utters sounds proper to the place where they are, and
to the universe. Thus what is bad for the individual may be good for
the totality; what is against nature in the individual agrees with the
nature in the whole. A sound that is feeble does not change the harmony
of the universe, as--to use another example--one bad citizen does not
change the nature of a well-regulated city; for often there is need of
such a man in a city; he therefore fits it well.


UNIVERSAL REASON TRIES TO PATCH UP "GAGS" BY UNDISCIPLINED ACTORS.

18. The difference that exists between souls in respect to vice and
virtue has several causes; among others, the inequality that exists
between souls from the very beginning. This inequality conforms to the
essence of universal Reason, of which they are unequal parts, because
they differ from each other. We must indeed remember that souls have
three ranks (the intellectual, rational, and sense lives), and that
the same soul does not always exercise the same faculties. But, to
explain our meaning, let us return to our former illustration. Let
us imagine actors who utter words not written by the poet; as if the
drama were incomplete, they themselves supply what is lacking, and fill
omissions made by the poet. They seem less like actors than like parts
of the poet, who foresaw what they were to say, so as to reattach the
remainder so far as it was in his power.[76] In the universe, indeed,
all things that are the consequences and results of bad deeds are
produced by reasons, and conform to the universal Reason. Thus, from
an illicit union, or from a rape, may be born natural children that
may become very distinguished men; likewise, from cities destroyed by
perverse individuals, may rise other flourishing cities.


THIS ILLUSTRATION OF DRAMA ALLOWS BOTH GOOD AND EVIL TO BE ASCRIBED TO
REASON.

It might indeed be objected that it is absurd to introduce into the
world souls some of which do good, and others evil; for when we
absolve universal Reason from the responsibility of evil, we are also
simultaneously taking from it the merit for the good. What, however,
hinders us from considering deeds done by actors as parts of a drama,
in the universe as well as on the stage, and thus to derive from
universal Reason both the good and the evil that are done here below?
For universal Reason exercises its influence on each of the actors
with so much the greater force as the drama is more perfect, and as
everything depends on it.[77]


INTRODUCTION TO THE NEXT BOOK.

But why should we at all impute evil deeds to universal Reason? The
souls contained in the universe will not be any more divine for that.
They will still remain parts of the universal Reason (and consequently,
remain souls): for we shall have to acknowledge that all reasons are
souls. Otherwise if the Reason of the universe be a Soul, why should
certain "reasons" be souls, and others only ("seminal) reasons"?




THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.

Continuation of That on Providence.


SOULS SHOW KINSHIP TO WORLD-SOUL BY FIDELITY TO THEIR OWN NATURE.

1. The question (why some reasons are souls, while others are reasons
merely, when at the same time universal Reason is a certain Soul),
may be answered as follows. Universal Reason (which proceeds from the
universal Soul) embraces both good and bad things, which equally belong
to its parts; it does not engender them, but exists with them in its
universality. In fact, these "logoses" (or reasons) (or, particular
souls), are the acts of the universal Soul; and these reasons being
parts (of the universal Soul) have parts (of the operations) as their
acts (or energies). Therefore, just as the universal Soul, which
is one, has different parts, so this difference occurs again in
the reasons and in the operations they effect. Just as their works
(harmonize), so do the souls themselves mutually harmonize; they
harmonize in this, that their very diversity, or even opposition, forms
an unity. By a natural necessity does everything proceed from, and
return to unity; thus creatures which are different, or even opposed,
are not any the less co-ordinated in the same system, and that because
they proceed from the same principle. Thus horses or human beings are
subsumed under the unity of the animal species, even though animals of
any kind, such as horses, for example, bite each other, and struggle
against each other with a jealousy which rises to fury; and though
animals of either species, including man, do as much. Likewise, with
inanimate things; they form divers species, and should likewise be
subsumed under the genus of inanimate things; and, if you go further,
to essence, and further still, to super-Essence (the One). Having
thus related or subsumed everything to this principle, let us again
descend, by dividing it. We shall see unity splitting, as it penetrates
and embraces everything simultaneously in a unique (or all-embracing
system). Thus divided, the unity constitutes a multiple organism; each
of its constituent parts acts according to its nature, without ceasing
to form part of the universal Being; thus is it that the fire burns,
the horse behaves as a horse should, and men perform deeds as various
as their characters. In short, every being acts, lives well or badly,
according to its own nature.


APPARENT CHANCE REALLY IS THE PLAN OF A DIVINE GENERAL PROVIDENCE.

2. Circumstances, therefore, are not decisive of human fortune; they
themselves only derive naturally from superior principles, and result
from the mutual concatenation of all things. This concatenation,
however, derives from the (Stoic) "predominant (element in the
universe"), and every being contributes to it according to its nature;
just as, in an army, the general commands, and the soldiers carry out
his orders cooperatively. In the universe, in fact, everything has been
strategically ordered by Providence, like a general, who considers
everything, both actions and experiences,[81] victuals and drink,
weapons and implements, arranging everything so that every detail finds
its suitable location. Thus nothing happens which fails to enter into
the general's plan, although his opponents' doings remain foreign to
his influence, and though he cannot command their army. If indeed,
Providence were[82] "the great Chief over all," to whom the universe
is subordinated, what could have disarranged His plans, and could have
failed to be intimately associated therewith?


WE CANNOT QUESTION OUR ORDER IN THE HIERARCHY OF NATURE.

3. Although I am able to make any desired decision, nevertheless my
decision enters into the plan of the universe, because my nature has
not been introduced into this plan subsequently; but it includes me and
my character. But whence originates my character? This includes two
points: is the cause of any man's character to be located in Him who
formed him, or in that man himself? Must we, on the other hand, give
up seeking its cause? Surely: just as it is hopeless to ask why plants
have no sensation, or why animals are not men; it would be the same as
asking why men are not gods. Why should we complain that men do not
have a more perfect nature, if in the case of plants and animals nobody
questions or accuses either these beings themselves, nor the power
which has made them? (This would be senseless, for two reasons): if we
say that they might have been better, we are either speaking of the
qualities which each of them is capable of acquiring by himself; and
in this case we should blame only him who has not acquired them--or,
we are speaking of those qualities which he should derive not from
himself, but from the Creator, in which case it would be as absurd to
claim for man more qualities than he has received, than it would be to
do so in the case of plants or animals. What we should examine is not
if one being be inferior to another, but if it be complete within its
own sphere; for evidently natural inequalities are unavoidable. This
again depends on conformity to nature, not that inequalities depend on
the will of the principle which has regulated all things.


THE CAUSE OF OUR IMPERFECTIONS IS DISTANCE FROM THE SUPREME.

The Reason of the Universe, indeed, proceeds from the universal Soul;
and the latter, in turn, proceeds from Intelligence. Intelligence,
however, is not a particular being; it consists of all (intelligible
beings),[83] and all the beings form a plurality. Now, a plurality of
being implies mutual differences between them, consisting of first,
second and third ranks. Consequently, the souls of engendered animals
are rather degradations of souls, seeming to have grown weaker by
their procession. The (generating) reason of the animal, indeed,
although it be animated, is a soul other than that from which proceeds
universal Reason. This Reason itself loses excellence in the degree
that it hastens down to enter into matter, and what it produces is
less perfect. Nevertheless, we may well consider how admirable a work
is the creature, although it be so far distant from the creator. We
should, therefore, not attribute to the creator the (imperfections of
the) creature; for any principle is superior to its product. So we may
assert that (the principle even of imperfect things) is perfect; and,
(instead of complaining), we should rather admire His communication of
some traits of His power to beings dependent from Him. We have even
reason to be more than grateful for His having given gifts greater
than they can receive or assimilate; and as the gifts of Providence
are superabundant, we can find the cause (of imperfection) only in the
creatures themselves.


DOUBLENESS OF SOUL, REASONS AND PROVIDENCE.

4. If man were simple--that is, if he were no more than what he had
been created, and if all his actions and passions derived from the
same principle--we would no more exercise our reason to complain for
his behoof than we have to complain for that of other animals. But
we do have something to blame in the man, and that in the perverted
man. We have good grounds for this blame, because man is not only that
which he was created, but has, besides, another principle which is
free (intelligence, with reason). This free principle, however, is not
outside of Providence, and the Reason of the universe, any more than
it would be reasonable to suppose that the things above depended on
the things here below. On the contrary, it is superior things which
shed their radiance on inferior ones, and this is the cause of the
perfection of Providence. As to the Reason of the universe, it itself
is double also; one produces things, while the other unites generated
things to intelligible ones. Thus are constituted two providences: a
superior one, from above (intellectual Reason, the principal power of
the soul[84]), and an inferior one, the (natural and generative power,
called) reason, which derives from the first; and from both results the
concatenation of things, and universal Providence (or, Providence, and
destiny).


MEN'S BETTER NATURE IS NOT DOMINANT BECAUSE OF THEIR SUB-CONSCIOUS
NATURE.

Men (therefore, not being only what they were made) possess another
principle (free intelligence with reason); but not all make use of
all the principles they possess; some make use of the one principle
(their intelligence), while others make use of the other (principle
of reason), or even of the lower principle (of imagination and
sensation).[85] All these principles are present in the man, even
when they do not react on him; and even in this case, they are not
inert; each fulfils its peculiar office; only they do not all act
simultaneously upon him (or, are not perceived by his consciousness).
It may seem difficult to understand how this may be the case with all
of them present, and it might seem easier to consider them absent;
but they are present in us, in the sense that we lack none of them;
although we might consider them absent in the sense that a principle
that does not react on a man might be considered absent from him. It
might be asked why these principles do not react on all men, since
they are part of them? We might, referring chiefly to this (free,
intelligent, reasonable) principle, say that first, it does not belong
to animals; second, it is not even (practiced) by all men. If it be not
present in all men, so much the more is it not alone in them, because
the being in whom this principle alone is present lives according to
this principle, and lives according to other principles only so far as
he is compelled by necessity. The cause (which hinders intelligence
and reason from dominating us) will have to be sought in the (Stoic)
substrate of the man, either because our corporeal constitution
troubles the superior principle (of reason and intelligence), or
because of the predominance of our passions.

(After all), we have not yet reached any conclusion, because this
substrate of man is composed of two elements: the ("seminal)
reason,"[86] and matter; (and either of them might be the cause). At
first blush, it would seem that the cause (of the predominance of our
lower natures) must be sought in matter, rather than in the ("seminal)
reason"; and that which dominates in us is not ("seminal) reason," but
matter and organized substrate. This, however, is not the case. What
plays the part of substrate in respect of the superior principle (of
free intelligence and reason), is both the ("seminal) reason," and that
which is generated thereby, conforming to that reason; consequently,
the predominant element in us is not matter, any more than our
corporeal constitution.


HUMAN CHARACTER MAY BE RESULT OF FORMER LIVES.

Besides, our individual characters might be derived from
pre-existences. In this case we would say that our ("seminal) reason"
has degenerated as a result of our antecedents, that our soul has lost
her force by irradiating what was below her. Besides, our ("seminal)
reason" contains within itself the very reason of our constituent
matter, a matter which it discovered, or conformed to its own
nature.[87] In fact, the ("seminal) reason" of an ox resides in no
matter other than that of an ox. Thus, as said (Plato[88]), the soul
finds herself destined to pass into the bodies of animals other than
men, because, just like the ("seminal) reason," she has altered, and
has become such as to animate an ox, instead of a man. By this decree
of divine justice she becomes still worse than she was.


CAUSES OF DETERIORATION.

But why did the soul ever lose her way, or deteriorate? We have often
said that not all souls belong to the first rank; some belong to a
second, or even third rank, and who, consequently, are inferior to
those of the first. Further, leaving the right road may be caused
by a trifling divergence. Third, the approximation of two differing
things produces a combination which may be considered a third
somewhat, different from the other two components. (Thus even in
this new element, or "habituation") the being does not lose the
qualities he received with his existence; if he be inferior, he has
been created inferior from the very origin; it is what he was created,
he is inferior by the very virtue of his nature; if he suffer the
consequences thereof, he suffers them justly. Fourth, we must allow for
our anterior existence, because everything that happens to us to-day
results from our antecedents.


THIS PROVIDENCE IS THE NORMATIVE, CURATIVE, SANATIVE ELEMENT OF LIFE.

5. From first to last Providence descends from on high, communicating
its gifts not according to the law of an equality that would be
numeric, but proportionate, varying its operations according to
locality (or occasion). So, in the organization of an animal, from
beginning to end, everything is related; every member has its peculiar
function, superior or inferior, according to the rank it occupies; it
has also its peculiar passions, passions which are in harmony with
its nature, and the place it occupies in the system of things. So,
for instance, a blow excites responses that differ according to the
organ that received it; the vocal organ will produce a sound; another
organ will suffer in silence, or execute a movement resultant from
that passion; now, all sounds, actions and passions form in the animal
the unity of sound, life and existence.[89] The parts, being various,
play different roles; thus there are differing functions for the feet,
the eyes, discursive reason, and intelligence. But all things form
one unity, relating to a single Providence, so that destiny governs
what is below, and providence reigns alone in what is on high. In
fact, all that lies in the intelligible world is either rational or
super-rational, namely: Intelligence and pure Soul. What derives
therefrom constitutes Providence, as far as it derives therefrom, as
it is in pure Soul, and thence passes into the animals. Thence arises
(universal) Reason, which, being distributed in unequal parts, produces
things unequal, such as the members of an animal. As consequences from
Providence are derived the human deeds which are agreeable to the
divinity. All such actions are related (to the plan of Providence);
they are not done by Providence; but when a man, or another animate or
inanimate being performs some deeds, these, if there be any good in
them, enter into the plan of Providence, which everywhere establishes
virtue, and amends or corrects errors. Thus does every animal maintain
its bodily health by the kind of providence within him; on the occasion
of a cut or wound the ("seminal) reason" which administers the body of
this animal immediately draws (the tissues) together, and forms scars
over the flesh, re-establishes health, and invigorates the members that
have suffered.


THE PLANS OF PROVIDENCE LIKENED TO THE FOREKNOWLEDGE OF A PHYSICIAN.

Consequently, our evils are the consequences (of our actions); they are
its necessary effects, not that we are carried away by Providence, but
in the sense that we obey an impulsion whose principle is in ourselves.
We ourselves then indeed try to reattach our acts to the plan of
Providence, but we cannot conform their consequences to its will; our
acts, therefore, conform either to our will, or to other things in
the universe, which, acting on us, do not produce in us an affection
conformed to the intentions of Providence. In fact, the same cause does
not act identically on different beings, for the effects experienced
by each differ according to their nature. Thus Helena causes emotions
in Paris which differ from those of Idumeneus.[90] Likewise, the
handsome man produces on a handsome man an effect different from that
of the intemperate man on the intemperate; the handsome and temperate
man acts differently on the handsome and temperate man than on the
intemperate; and than the intemperate on himself. The deed done by
the intemperate man is done neither by Providence, nor according to
Providence.[91] Neither is the deed done by the temperate man done by
Providence; since he does it himself; but it conforms to Providence,
because it conforms to the Reason (of the universe). Thus, when a man
has done something good for his health, it is he himself who has done
it, but he thereby conforms to the reason of the physician; for it is
the physician who teaches him, by means of his art, what things are
healthy or unhealthy; but when a man has done something injurious to
his health, it is he himself who has done it, and he does it against
the providence of the physician.


PREDICTION DOES NOT WORK BY PROVIDENCE, BUT BY ANALOGY.

6. If then (the bad things do not conform to Providence), the diviners
and astrologers predict evil things only by the concatenation which
occurs between contraries, between form and matter, for instance, in a
composite being. Thus in contemplating the form and ("seminal) reason"
one is really contemplating the being which receives the form; for one
does not contemplate in the same way the intelligible animal, and the
composite animal; what one contemplates in the composite animal is the
("seminal) reason" which gives form to what is inferior. Therefore,
since the world is an animal, when one contemplates its occurrences,
one is really contemplating the causes that make them arise, the
Providence which presides over them, and whose action extends in an
orderly manner to all beings and events; that is, to all animals, their
actions and dispositions, which are dominated by Reason and mingled
with necessity. We thus contemplate what has been mingled since the
beginning, and what is still continually mingled. In this mixture,
consequently, it is impossible to distinguish Providence from what
conforms thereto, nor what derives from the substrate (that is, from
matter, and which, consequently, is deformed, and evil). This is not
a human task, not even of a man who might be wise or divine; such a
privilege can be ascribed only to God.


FACTS OF LIFE ARE LETTERS THAT CAN BE READ.

In fact, the function of the diviner is not to distinguish the cause,
but the fact; his art consists in reading the characters traced by
nature, and which invariably indicate the order and concatenation of
facts; or rather, in studying the signs of the universal movement,
which designate the character of each being before its revelation in
himself. All beings, in fact, exercise upon each other a reciprocal
influence, and concur together in the constitution and perpetuity of
the world.[92] To him who studies, analogy reveals the march of events,
because all kinds of divination are founded on its laws; for things
were not to depend on each other, but to have relations founded on
their resemblance.[93] This no doubt is that which[94] is meant by the
expression that "analogy embraces everything."


ANALOGY DEMANDED BY THE UNITY OF GOD.

Now, what is this analogy? It is a relation between the worse and the
worse, the better and the better, one eye and the other, one foot and
the other, virtue and justice, vice and injustice. The analogy which
reigns in the universe is then that which makes divination possible.
The influence which one being exercises on another conforms to the
laws of influence which the members of the universal Organism must
exercise upon each other. The one does not produce the other; for all
are generated together; but each is affected according to its nature,
each in its own manner. This constitutes the unity of the Reason of the
universe.


EVIL IS INSEPARABLE FROM THE GOOD.

7. It is only because there are good things in the world, that there
are worse ones. Granting the conception of variety, how could the
worse exist without the better, or the better without the worse? We
should not, therefore, accuse the better because of the existence of
the worse; but rather we should rejoice in the presence of the better,
because it communicates a little of its perfection to the worse. To
wish to annihilate the worse in the world is tantamount to annihilating
Providence itself;[95] for if we annihilate the worse, to what could
Providence be applied? Neither to itself, nor to the better; for when
we speak of supreme Providence, we call it supreme in contrast with
that which is inferior to it.


THE PARABLE OF THE VINE AND THE BRANCHES.

Indeed, the (supreme) Principle is that to which all other things
relate, that in which they all simultaneously exist, thus constituting
the totality. All things proceed from the Principle, while it remains
wrapt in itself. Thus, from a single root, which remains wrapt in
itself, issue a host of parts, each of which offers the image of their
root under a different form. Some of them touch the root; others
trend away from it, dividing and subdividing down to the branches,
twigs, leaves and fruits; some abide permanently (like the branches);
others swirl in a perpetual flux, like the leaves and fruits. These
latter parts which swirl in a perpetual flux contain within themselves
the ("seminal) reasons" of the parts from which they proceed (and
which abide permanently); they themselves seem disposed to be little
miniature trees; if they engendered before perishing, they would
engender only that which is nearest to them. As to the parts (which
abide permanently), and which are hollow, such as the branches, they
receive from the root the sap which is to fill them; for they have
a nature different (from that of the leaves, flowers, and fruits).
Consequently, it is the branches' extremities that experience
"passions" (or modifications) which they seem to derive only from the
contiguous parts. The parts contiguous to the Root are passive on one
end, and active on the other; but the Principle itself is related to
all. Although all the parts issue from the same Principle,[96] yet they
differ from each other more as they are more distant from the root.
Such would be the mutual relations of two brothers who resemble each
other because they are born from the same parents.




FIFTH ENNEAD, BOOK THREE.

The Self-Consciousnesses, and What is Above Them.[97]


IS KNOWLEDGE DEPENDENT ON THE COMPOSITENESS OF THE KNOWER?

1. Must thought, and self-consciousness imply being composed of
different parts, and on their mutual contemplation? Must that which is
absolutely simple be unable to turn towards itself, to know itself? ls
it, on the contrary, possible that for that which is not composite to
know itself? Self-consciousness, indeed, does not necessarily result
from a thing's knowing itself because it is composite, and that one of
its parts grasps the other; as, for instance, by sensation we perceive
the form and nature of our body. In this case the whole will not be
known, unless the part that knows the others to which it is united also
knows itself; otherwise, we would find the knowledge of one entity,
through another, instead of one entity through itself.


A SIMPLE PRINCIPLE CAN HAVE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS.

While, therefore, asserting that a simple principle does know itself,
we must examine into the possibility of this.[98] Otherwise, we would
have to give up hope of real self-knowledge. But to resign this would
imply many absurdities; for if it be absurd to deny that the soul
possesses self-knowledge, it would be still more absurd to deny it of
intelligence. How could intelligence have knowledge of other beings,
if it did not possess the knowledge and science of itself? Indeed,
exterior things are perceived by sensation, and even, if you insist, by
discursive reason and opinion; but not by intelligence. It is indeed
worth examining whether intelligence does, or does not have knowledge
of such external things. Evidently, intelligible entities are known
by intelligence. Does intelligence limit itself to knowledge of these
entities, or does it, while knowing intelligible entities, also know
itself? In this case, does it know that it knows only intelligible
entities, without being able to know what itself is? While knowing that
it knows what belongs to it, is it unable to know what itself, the
knower, is? Or can it at the same time know what belongs to it, and
also know itself? Then how does this knowledge operate, and how far
does it go? This is what we must examine.


THE SENSE-POWER OF THE SOUL DEALS ONLY WITH EXTERIOR THINGS.

2. Let us begin by a consideration of the soul. Does she possess
self-consciousness? By what faculty? And how does she acquire it? It
is natural for the sense-power to deal only with exterior objects; for
even in the case in which it feels occurrences in the body, it is still
perceiving things that are external to it, since it perceives passions
experienced by the body over which it presides.[99]


FUNCTIONS OF THE DISCURSIVE REASON OF THE SOUL.

Besides the above, the soul possesses the discursive reason, which
judges of sense-representations, combining and dividing them. Under
the form of images, she also considers the conceptions received from
intelligence, and operates on these images as on images furnished by
sensation. Finally, she still is the power of understanding, since
she distinguishes the new images from the old, and harmonizes them by
comparing them; whence, indeed, our reminiscences are derived.


CAN DISCURSIVE REASON TURN UPON ITSELF?

That is the limit of the intellectual power of the soul. Is it,
besides, capable of turning upon itself, and cognizing itself, or
must this knowledge be sought for only within intelligence? If we
assign this knowledge to the intellectual part of the soul; we will
be making an intelligence out of it; and we will then have to study
in what it differs from the superior Intelligence. If again, we
refuse this knowledge to this part of the soul, we will, by reason,
rise to Intelligence, and we will have to examine the nature of
self-consciousness. Further, if we attribute this knowledge both to
the inferior and to the superior intelligences, we shall have to
distinguish self-consciousness according as it belongs to the one
or to the other; for if there were no difference between these two
kinds of intelligence, discursive reason would be identical with pure
Intelligence. Does discursive reason, therefore, turn upon itself?
Or does it limit itself to the comprehension of the types received
from both (sense and intelligence); and, in the latter case, how does
it achieve such comprehension? This latter question is the one to be
examined here.


THE HIGHEST PART OF DISCURSIVE REASON RECEIVES IMPRESSIONS FROM
INTELLIGENCE.

3. Now let us suppose that the senses have perceived a man, and have
furnished an appropriate image thereof to discursive reason. What will
the latter say? It may say nothing, limiting itself to taking notice
of him. However, it may also ask itself who this man is; and, having
already met him, with the aid of memory, decide that he is Socrates. If
then discursive reason develop the image of Socrates, then it divides
what imagination has furnished. If discursive reason add that Socrates
is good, it still deals with things known by the senses; but that which
it asserts thereof, namely, his goodness, it has drawn from itself,
because within itself it possesses the rule of goodness. But how does
it, within itself, possess goodness? Because it conforms to the Good,
and receives the notion of it from the Intelligence that enlightens
itself; for (discursive reason), this part of the soul, is pure, and
receives impressions from Intelligence.[101]


WHY DISCURSIVE REASON SHOULD BELONG TO THE SOUL RATHER THAN TO
INTELLIGENCE.

But why should this whole (soul-) part that is superior to sensation
be assigned to the soul rather than to intelligence? Because the power
of the soul consists in reasoning, and because all these operations
belong to the discursive reason. But why can we not simply assign to
it, in addition, self-consciousness, which would immediately clear
up this inquiry? Because the nature of discursive reason consists in
considering exterior things, and in scrutinizing their diversity, while
to intelligence we attribute the privilege of contemplating itself, and
of contemplating its own contents. But what hinders discursive reason,
by some other faculty of the soul, from considering what belongs to
it? Because, in this case, instead of discursive reason and reasoning,
we would have pure Intelligence. But what then hinders the presence
of pure Intelligence within the soul? Nothing, indeed. Shall we then
have a right to say that pure Intelligence is a part of the soul? No
indeed; but still we would have the right to call it "ours." It is
different from, and higher than discursive reason; and still it is
"ours," although we cannot count it among the parts of the soul. In one
respect it is "ours," and in another, is not "ours;" for at times we
make use of it, and at other times we make use of discursive reason;
consequently, intelligence is "ours" when we make use of it; and it
is not "ours" when we do not make use of it. But what is the meaning
of "making use of intelligence"? Does it mean becoming intelligence,
and speaking in that character, or does it mean speaking in conformity
with intelligence? For we are not intelligence; we speak in conformity
with intelligence by the first part of discursive reason, the part that
receives impressions from Intelligence. We feel through sensation, and
it is we who feel. Is it also we who conceive and who simultaneously
are conceived? Or is it we who reason, and who conceive the
intellectual notions which enlighten discursive reason? We are indeed
essentially constituted by discursive reason. The actualizations of
Intelligence are superior to us, while those of sensation are inferior;
as to us, "we" are the principal part of the soul, the part that forms
a middle power between these two extremes, now lowering ourselves
towards sensation, now rising towards Intelligence.[102] We acknowledge
sensibility to be ours because we are continually feeling. It is not
as evident that intelligence is ours, because we do not make use of it
continuously, and because it is separated, in this sense, that it is
not intelligence that inclines towards us, but rather we who raise our
glances towards intelligence. Sensation is our messenger, Intelligence
is our king.[99]


WE CAN THINK IN CONFORMITY WITH INTELLIGENCE IN TWO WAYS.

4. We ourselves are kings when we think in conformity with
intelligence. This, however, can take place in two ways. Either
we have received from intelligence the impressions and rules which
are, as it were, engraved within us, so that we are, so to speak,
filled with intelligence; or we can have the perception and intuition
of it, because it is present with us. When we see intelligence, we
recognize that by contemplation of it we ourselves are grasping other
intelligible entities. This may occur in two ways; either because,
by the help of this very power, we grasp the power which cognizes
intelligible entities; or because we ourselves become intelligence.
The man who thus knows himself is double. Either he knows discursive
reason, which is characteristic of the soul, or, rising to a superior
condition, he cognizes himself and is united with intelligence. Then,
by intelligence, that man thinks himself; no more indeed as being man,
but as having become superior to man, as having been transported into
the intelligible Reason, and drawing thither with himself the best part
of the soul, the one which alone is capable of taking flight towards
thought, and of receiving the fund of knowledge resulting from his
intuition. But does discursive reason not know that it is discursive
reason, and that its domain is the comprehension of external objects?
Does it not, while doing so, know that it judges? Does it not know that
it is judging by means of the rules derived from intelligence, which
itself contains? Does it not know that above it is a principle which
possesses intelligible entities, instead of seeking (merely) to know
them? But what would this faculty be if it did not know what it is,
and what its functions are? It knows, therefore, that it depends on
intelligence, that it is inferior to intelligence, and that it is the
image of intelligence, that it contains the rules of intelligence as
it were engraved within itself, such as intelligence engraves them, or
rather, has engraved them on it.


MAN IS SELF-CONSCIOUS BY BECOMING INTELLIGENCE.

Will he who thus knows himself content himself therewith? Surely
not. Exercising a further faculty, we will have the intuition of
the intelligence that knows itself; or, seizing it, inasmuch as it
is "ours" and we are "its," we will thus cognize intelligence, and
know ourselves. This is necessary for our knowledge of what, within
intelligence, self-consciousness is. The man becomes intelligence when,
abandoning his other faculties, he by intelligence sees Intelligence,
and he sees himself in the same manner that Intelligence sees itself.


INTELLIGENCE IS NOT DIVISIBLE; AND, IN ITS EXISTENCE, IS IDENTICAL WITH
THOUGHT.

5. Does pure Intelligence know itself by contemplating one of its
parts by means of another part? Then one part will be the subject, and
another part will be the object of contemplation; intelligence will
not know itself. It may be objected that if intelligence be a whole
composed of absolutely similar parts, so that the subject and the
object of contemplation will not differ from each other; then, by the
virtue of this similitude, on seeing one of its parts with which it is
identical, intelligence will see itself; for, in this case, the subject
does not differ from the object. To begin with, it is absurd to suppose
that intelligence is divided into several parts. How, indeed, would
such a division be carried out? Not by chance, surely. Who will carry
it out? Will it be the subject or object? Then, how would the subject
know itself if, in contemplation, it located itself in the object,
since contemplation does not belong to that which is the object?
Will it know itself as object rather than as subject? In that case
it will not know itself completely and in its totality (as subject
and object); for what it sees is the object, and not the subject of
contemplation; it sees not itself, but another. In order to attain
complete knowledge of itself it will, besides, have to see itself
as subject; now, if it see itself as subject, it will, at the same
time, have to see the contemplated things. But is it the (Stoic[104])
"types" (or impressions) of things, or the things themselves, that
are contained in the actualization of contemplation? If it be these
impressions, we do not possess the things themselves. If we do possess
these things, it is not because we separate ourselves (into subject
and object). Before dividing ourselves in this way, we already saw and
possessed these things. Consequently, contemplation must be identical
with that which is contemplated, and intelligence must be identical
with the intelligible. Without this identity, we will never possess
the truth. Instead of possessing realities, we will never possess any
more than their impressions, which will differ from the realities;
consequently, this will not be the truth. Truth, therefore, must not
differ from its object; it must be what it asserts.


THOUGHT IS IDENTICAL WITH THE INTELLIGIBLE WHICH IS AN ACTUALIZATION.

On one hand, therefore, intelligence, and on the other the intelligible
and existence form but one and the same thing, namely, the primary
existence and primary Intelligence, which possesses realities, or
rather, which is identical with them. But if the thought-object and
the thought together form but a single entity, how will the thinking
object thus be able to think itself? Evidently thought will embrace
the intelligible, or will be identical therewith; but we still do not
see how intelligence is to think itself. Here we are: thought and the
intelligible fuse into one because the intelligible is an actualization
and not a simple power; because life is neither alien nor incidental
to it; because thought is not an accident for it, as it would be for
a brute body, as for instance, for a stone; and, finally, because
the intelligible is primary "being." Now, if the intelligible be an
actualization, it is the primary actualization, the most perfect
thought, or, "substantial thought." Now, as this thought is supremely
true, as it is primary Thought, as it possesses existence in the
highest degree, it is primary Intelligence. It is not, therefore,
mere potential intelligence; there is no need to distinguish within
it the potentiality from the actualization of thought; otherwise,
its substantiality would be merely potential. Now since intelligence
is an actualization, and as its "being" also is an actualization, it
must fuse with its actualization. But existence and the intelligible
also fuse with their actualization. Therefore[105] intelligence, the
intelligible, and thought will form but one and the same entity.
Since the thought of the intelligible is the intelligible, and as the
intelligible is intelligence, intelligence will thus think itself.
Intelligence will think, by the actualization of the thought to which
it is identical, the intelligible to which it also is identical.
It will think itself, so far as it is thought; and in so far as it
is the intelligible which it thinks by the thought to which it is
identical.[106]


SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS MORE PERFECT IN INTELLIGENCE THAN IN THE SOUL.

6. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that there is a principle which must
essentially know itself. But this self-consciousness is more perfect in
intelligence than in the soul. The soul knows herself in so far as she
knows that she depends on another power; while intelligence, by merely
turning towards itself, naturally cognizes its existence and "being."
By contemplating realities, it contemplates itself; this contemplation
is an actualization, and this actualization is intelligence; for
intelligence and thought[107] form but a single entity. The entire
intelligence sees itself entire, instead of seeing one of its parts
by another of its parts. Is it in the nature of intelligence, such as
reason conceives of it, to produce within us a simple conviction? No.
Intelligence necessarily implies (certitude), and not mere persuasion;
for necessity is characteristic of intelligence, while persuasion is
characteristic of the soul. Here below, it is true, we rather seek to
be persuaded, than to see truth by pure Intelligence. When we were in
the superior region, satisfied with intelligence, we used to think, and
to contemplate the intelligible, reducing everything to unity. It was
Intelligence which thought and spoke about itself; the soul rested, and
allowed Intelligence free scope to act. But since we have descended
here below, we seek to produce persuasion in the soul, because we wish
to contemplate the model in its image.


THE SOUL MUST BE TAUGHT SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS BY CONVERSION.

We must, therefore, teach our soul how Intelligence contemplates
itself. This has to be taught to that part of our soul which,
because of its intellectual character, we call reason, or discursive
intelligence, to indicate that it is a kind of intelligence, that
it possesses its power by intelligence, and that it derives it from
intelligence. This part of the soul must, therefore, know that it
knows what it sees, that it knows what it expresses, and that, if it
were identical with what it describes, it would thereby know itself.
But since intelligible entities come to it from the same principle
from which it itself comes, since it is a reason, and as it receives
from intelligence entities that are kindred, by comparing them with
the traces of intelligence it contains, it must know itself. This
image it contains must, therefore, be raised to true Intelligence,
which is identical with the true intelligible entities, that is, to
the primary and really true Beings; for it is impossible that this
intelligence should originate from itself. If then intelligence remain
in itself and with itself, if it be what it is (in its nature) to be,
that is, intelligence--for intelligence can never be unintelligent--it
must contain within it the knowledge of itself, since it does not
issue from itself, and since its function and its "being" (or, true
nature) consist in being no more than intelligence.[106] It is not
an intelligence that devotes itself to practical action, obliged
to consider what is external to it, and to issue from itself to
become cognizant of exterior things; for it is not necessary that an
intelligence which devotes itself to action should know itself. As it
does not give itself to action--for, being pure, it has nothing to
desire--it operates a conversion towards itself, by virtue of which
it is not only probable, but even necessary for it to know itself.
Otherwise, what would its life consist of, inasmuch as it does not
devote itself to action, and as it remains within itself?


WHATEVER INTELLIGENCE MAY BE THOUGHT TO DO, IT MUST KNOW ITSELF.

7. It may be objected that the Intelligence contemplates the divinity.
If, however, it be granted, that the Intelligence knows the divinity,
one is thereby forced to admit that it also knows itself; for it
will know what it derives from the divinity, what it has received
from Him, and what it still may hope to receive from Him. By knowing
this, it will know itself, since it is one of the entities given
by the divinity; or rather, since it is all that is given by the
divinity. If then, it know the divinity, it knows also the powers of
the divinity, it knows that itself proceeds from the divinity, and
that itself derives its powers from the divinity. If Intelligence
cannot have a clear intuition of the divinity, because the subject and
object of an intuition must be the same, this will turn out to be a
reason why Intelligence will know itself, and will see itself, since
seeing is being what is seen. What else indeed could we attribute to
Intelligence? Rest, for instance? For Intelligence, rest does not
consist in being removed from itself, but rather to act without being
disturbed by anything that is alien. The things that are not troubled
by anything alien need only to produce their own actualization,
especially when they are in actualization, and not merely potential.
That which is in actualization, and which cannot be in actualization
for anything foreign, must be in actualization for itself. When
thinking itself, Intelligence remains turned towards itself, referring
its actualization to itself. If anything proceed from it, it is
precisely because it remains turned towards itself that it remains in
itself. It had, indeed, to apply itself to itself, before applying
itself to anything else, or producing something else that resembled it;
thus fire must first be fire in itself, and be fire in actualization,
in order later to impart some traces of its nature to other things.
Intelligence, in itself, therefore, is an actualization. The soul,
on turning herself towards Intelligence, remains within herself; on
issuing from Intelligence, the soul turns towards external things. On
turning towards Intelligence, she becomes similar to the power from
which she proceeds; on issuing from Intelligence, she becomes different
from herself. Nevertheless, she still preserves some resemblance to
Intelligence, both in her activity and productiveness. When active,
the soul still contemplates Intelligence; when productive, the soul
produces forms, which resemble distant thoughts, and are traces of
thought and Intelligence, traces that conform to their archetype; and
which reveal a faithful imitation thereof, or which, at least, still
preserve a weakened image thereof, even if they do occupy only the last
rank of beings.


WHAT INTELLIGENCE LOOKS LIKE IN THE INTELLIGIBLE.

8. What qualities does Intelligence display in the intelligible
world? What qualities does it discover in itself by contemplation? To
begin with, we must not form of Intelligence a conception showing a
figure, or colors, like bodies. Intelligence existed before bodies.
The "seminal reasons" which produce figure and color are not identical
with them; for "seminal reasons" are invisible. So much the more are
intelligible entities invisible; their nature is identical with that
of the principles in which they reside, just as "seminal reasons" are
identical with the soul that contains them. But the soul does not see
the entities she contains, because she has not begotten them; even
she herself, just like the "reasons," is no more than an image (of
Intelligence). The principle from which she comes possesses an evident
existence, that is genuine, and primary; consequently, that principle
exists of and in itself. But this image (which is in the soul) is not
even permanent unless it belong to something else, and reside therein.
Indeed, the characteristic of an image is that it resides in something
else, since it belongs to something else, unless it remain attached to
its principle. Consequently, this image does not contemplate, because
it does not possess a light that is sufficient; and even if it should
contemplate, as it finds its perfection in something else, it would
be contemplating something else, instead of contemplating itself. The
same case does not obtain in Intelligence; there the contemplated
entity and contemplation co-exist, and are identical. Who is it,
therefore, that declares the nature of the intelligible? The power
that contemplates it, namely, Intelligence itself. Here below our eyes
see the light because our vision itself is light, or rather because
it is united to light; for it is the colors that our vision beholds.
On the contrary, Intelligence does not see through something else,
but through itself, because what it sees is not outside of itself.
It sees a light with another light, and not by another light; it,
is therefore, a light that sees another; and, consequently, it sees
itself. This light, on shining in the soul, illuminates her; that is,
intellectualizes her; assimilates her to the superior light (namely,
in Intelligence). If, by the ray with which this light enlightens
the soul, we judge of the nature of this light and conceive of it as
still greater, more beautiful, and more brilliant, we will indeed
be approaching Intelligence and the intelligible world; for, by
enlightening the soul, Intelligence imparts to her a clearer life. This
life is not generative, because Intelligence converts the soul towards
Intelligence; and, instead of allowing the soul to divide, causes the
soul to love the splendor with which she is shining. Neither is this
life one of the senses, for though the senses apply themselves to
what is exterior, they do not, on that account, learn anything beyond
(themselves). He who sees that superior light of the verities sees
much better things that are visible, though in a different manner.
It remains, therefore, that the Intelligence imparts to the soul the
intellectual life, which is a trace of her own life; for Intelligence
possesses the realities. It is in the life and the actualization which
are characteristic of Intelligence that here consists the primary
Light, which from the beginning,[108] illumines itself, which reflects
on itself, because it is simultaneously enlightener and enlightened; it
is also the true intelligible entity, because it is also at the same
time thinker and thought. It sees itself by itself, without having
need of anything else; it sees itself in an absolute manner, because,
within it, the known is identical with the knower. It is not otherwise
in us; it is by Intelligence that we know intelligence. Otherwise,
how could we speak of it? How could we say that it was capable of
clearly grasping itself, and that, by it, we understand ourselves? How
could we, by these reasonings, to Intelligence reduce our soul which
recognizes that it is the image of Intelligence, which considers its
life a faithful imitation of the life of Intelligence, which thinks
that, when it thinks, it assumes an intellectual and divine form?
Should one wish to know which is this Intelligence that is perfect,
universal and primary, which knows itself essentially, the soul has to
be reduced to Intelligence; or, at least, the soul has to recognize
that the actualization by which the soul conceives the entities of
which the soul has the reminiscence is derived from Intelligence. Only
by placing herself in that condition, does the soul become able to
demonstrate that inasmuch as she is the image of Intelligence she, the
soul, can by herself, see it; that is, by those of her powers which
most exactly resemble Intelligence (namely, by pure thought); which
resembles Intelligence in the degree that a part of the soul can be
assimilated to it.


WE CAN REACH A CONCEPTION OF INTELLIGENCE BY STRIPPING THE SOUL OF
EVERY FACULTY EXCEPT HER INTELLECTUAL PART.

9. We must, therefore, contemplate the soul and her divinest part
in order to discover the nature of Intelligence. This is how we may
accomplish it: From man, that is from yourself, strip off the body;
then that power of the soul that fashions the body; then sensation,
appetite, and anger, and all the lower passions that incline you
towards the earth. What then remains of the soul is what we call the
"image of intelligence," an image that radiates from Intelligence, as
from the immense globe of the sun radiates the surrounding luminary
sphere. Of course, we would not say that all the light that radiates
from the sun remains within itself around the sun; only a part of this
light remains around the sun from which it emanates; another part,
spreading by relays, descends to us on the earth. But we consider
light, even that which surrounds the sun, as located in something else,
so as not to be forced to consider the whole space between the sun and
us as empty of all bodies. On the contrary, the soul is a light which
remains attached to Intelligence, and she is not located in any space
because Intelligence itself is not spatially located. While the light
of the sun is in the air, on the contrary the soul, in the state in
which we consider her here, is so pure that she can be seen in herself
by herself, and by any other soul that is in the same condition.
The soul needs to reason, in order to conceive of the nature of
Intelligence according to her own nature; but Intelligence conceives of
itself without reasoning because it is always present to itself. We, on
the contrary, are present both to ourselves and to Intelligence when we
turn towards it, because our life is divided into several lives. On the
contrary, Intelligence has no need of any other life, nor of anything
else; what Intelligence gives is not given to itself, but to other
things; neither does Intelligence have any need of what is inferior
to it; nor could Intelligence give itself anything inferior, since
Intelligence possesses all things; instead of possessing in itself the
primary images of things (as in the case of the soul), Intelligence is
these things themselves.


ELEVATION OF THE SOUL MAY BE GRADUAL, IF UNABLE TO ATTAIN IMMEDIATE
ELEVATION.

If one should find himself unable to rise immediately to pure thought,
which is the highest, or first, part of the soul, he may begin by
opinion, and from it rise to Intelligence. If even opinion be out
of the reach of his ability, he may begin with sensation, which
already represents general forms; for sensation which contains the
forms potentially may possess them even in actualization. If, on the
contrary, the best he can do is to descend, let him descend to the
generative power, and to the things it produces; then, from the last
forms, one may rise again to the higher forms, and so on to the primary
forms.


THE TRANSCENDENT FIRST PRINCIPLE HAS NO NEED OF SEEING ITSELF.

10. But enough of this. If the (forms) contained by Intelligence are
not created forms--otherwise the forms contained in us would no longer,
as they should, occupy the lowest rank--if these forms in intelligence
really be creative and primary, then either these creative forms and
the creative principle fuse into one single entity, or intelligence
needs some other principle. But does the transcendent Principle, that
is superior to Intelligence (the One), itself also need some other
further principle? No, because it is only Intelligence that stands in
need of such an one. Does the Principle superior to Intelligence (the
transcendent One) not see Himself? No. He does not need to see Himself.
This we shall study elsewhere.


THE CONTEMPLATION OF INTELLIGENCE DEMANDS A HIGHER TRANSCENDING UNITY.

Let us now return to our most important problem. Intelligence needs
to contemplate itself, or rather, it continually possesses this
contemplation. It first sees that it is manifold, and then that it
implies a difference, and further, that it needs to contemplate,
to contemplate the intelligible, and that its very essence is to
contemplate. Indeed, every contemplation implies an object; otherwise,
it is empty. To make contemplation possible there must be more than
an unity; contemplation must be applied to an object, and this object
must be manifold; for what is simple has no object on which it could
apply its action, and silently remains withdrawn in its solitude.
Action implies some sort of difference. Otherwise, to what would
action apply itself? What would be its object? The active principle,
must, therefore, direct its action on something else than itself, or
must itself be manifold to direct its action on itself. If, indeed,
it direct its action on nothing, it will be at rest; and if at rest,
it will not be thinking. The thinking principle, therefore, when
thinking, implies duality. Whether the two terms be one exterior
to the other, or united, thought always implies both identity and
difference. In general, intelligible entities must simultaneously be
identical with Intelligence, and different from Intelligence. Besides,
each of them must also contain within itself identity and difference.
Otherwise, if the intelligible does not contain any diversity, what
would be the object of thought? If you insist that each intelligible
entity resembles a ("seminal) reason," it must be manifold. Every
intelligible entity, therefore, knows itself to be a compound, and
many-colored eye. If intelligence applied itself to something single
and absolutely simple, it could not think. What would it say? What
would it understand? If the indivisible asserted itself it ought first
to assert what it is not; and so, in order to be single it would have
to be manifold. If it said, "I am this," and if it did not assert that
"this" was different from itself, it would be uttering untruth. If
it asserted it as an accident of itself, it would assert of itself
a multitude. If it says, "I am; I am; myself; myself;" then neither
these two things will be simple, and each of them will be able to say,
"me;" or there will be manifoldness, and, consequently, a difference;
and, consequently, number and diversity. The thinking subject must,
therefore, contain a difference, just as the object thought must also
reveal a diversity, because it is divided by thought. Otherwise, there
will be no other thought of the intelligible, but a kind of touch, of
unspeakable and inconceivable contact, prior to intelligence, since
intelligence is not yet supposed to exist, and as the possessor of
this contact does not think. The thinking subject, therefore, must
not remain simple, especially, when it thinks itself; it must split
itself, even were the comprehension of itself silent. Last, that which
is simple (the One) has no need of occupying itself with itself. What
would it learn by thinking? Is it not what it is before thinking
itself? Besides, knowledge implies that some one desires, that some
one seeks, and that some one finds. That which does not within itself
contain any difference, when turned towards itself, rests without
seeking anything within itself; but that which develops, is manifold.


HOW INTELLIGENCE BECAME MANIFOLD.

11. Intelligence, therefore, becomes manifold when it wishes to
think the Principle superior to it. By wishing to grasp Him in his
simplicity, it abandons this simplicity, because it continues to
receive within itself this differentiated and multiplied nature. It
was not yet Intelligence when it issued from Unity; it found itself
in the state of sight when not yet actualized. When emanating from
Unity, it contained already what made it manifold. It vaguely aspired
to an object other than itself, while simultaneously containing a
representation of this object. It thus contained something that it
made manifold; for it contained a sort of impress produced by the
contemplation (of the One); otherwise it would not receive the One
within itself. Thus Intelligence, on being born of Unity, became
manifold, and as it possessed knowledge, it contemplated itself. It
then became actualized sight. Intelligence is really intelligence
only when it possesses its object, and when it possesses it as
intelligence. Formerly, it was only an aspiration, only an indistinct
vision. On applying itself to the One, and grasping the One, it becomes
intelligence. Now its receptivity to Unity is continuous, and it is
continuously intelligence, "being," thought, from the very moment it
begins to think. Before that, it is not yet thought, since it does not
possess the intelligible, and is not yet Intelligence, since it does
not think.


THE ONE IS THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL WITHOUT BEING LIMITED THEREBY.

That which is above these things is their principle, without being
inherent in them. The principle from which these things proceed cannot
be inherent in them; that is true only of the elements that constitute
them. The principle from which all things proceed (the One) is not
any of them; it differs from all of them. The One, therefore, is not
any of them; it differs from all of them. The One, therefore, is not
any of the things of the universe: He precedes all these things, and
consequently, He precedes Intelligence, since the latter embraces all
things in its universality. On the other hand, as the things that are
posterior to Unity are universal, and as Unity thus is anterior to
universal things, it cannot be any one of them. Therefore, it should
not be called either intelligence or good, if by "good" you mean any
object comprised within the universe; this name suits it only, if
it indicate that it is anterior to everything. If Intelligence be
intelligence only because it is manifold; if thought, though found
within Intelligence, be similarly manifold, then the First, the
Principle that is absolutely simple, will be above Intelligence; for if
He think, He would be Intelligence; and if He be Intelligence, He would
be manifold.


NO MANIFOLDNESS OF ANY KIND CAN EXIST IN THE FIRST.

12. It may be objected, that nothing would hinder the existence of
manifoldness in the actualization of the First, so long as the "being,"
or nature, remain unitary. That principle would not be rendered
composite by any number of actualizations. This is not the case for
two reasons. Either these actualizations are distinct from its nature
("being"), and the First would pass from potentiality to actuality; in
which case, without doubt, the First is not manifold, but His nature
would not become perfect without actualization. Or the nature ("being")
is, within Him identical to His actualization; in which case, as the
actualization is manifold, the nature would be such also. Now we do
indeed grant that Intelligence is manifold, since it thinks itself;
but we could not grant that the Principle of all things should also be
manifold. Unity must exist before the manifold, the reason of whose
existence is found in unity; for unity precedes all number. It may
be objected that this is true enough for numbers which follow unity,
because they are composite; but what is the need of a unitary principle
from which manifoldness should proceed when referring (not to numerals,
but) to beings? This need is that, without the One, all things would be
in a dispersed condition, and their combinations would be no more than
a chaos.


PERMANENT ACTUALIZATIONS ARE HYPOSTASES.

Another objection is, that from an intelligence that is simple,
manifold actualizations can surely proceed. This then admits the
existence of something simple before the actualizations. Later, as
these actualizations become permanent, they form hypostatic forms of
existence. Being such, they will have to differ from the Principle
from which they proceed, since the Principle remains simple, and that
which is born of it must in itself be manifold, and be dependent
thereon. Even if these actualizations exist only because the Principle
acted a single time, this already constitutes manifoldness. Though
these actualizations be the first ones, if they constitute second-rank
(nature), the first rank will belong to the Principle that precedes
these actualizations; this Principle abides in itself, while these
actualizations constitute that which is of second rank, and is composed
of actualizations. The First differs from the actualizations He begets,
because He begets them without activity; otherwise, Intelligence
would not be the first actualization. Nor should we think that the
One first desired to beget Intelligence, and later begat it, so that
this desire was an intermediary between the generating principle and
the generated entity. The One could not have desired anything; for
if He had desired anything, He would have been imperfect, since He
would not yet have possessed what He desired. Nor could we suppose
that the One lacked anything; for there was nothing towards which He
could have moved. Therefore, the hypostatic form of existence which is
beneath Him received existence from Him, without ceasing to persist
in its own condition. Therefore, if there is to be a hypostatic form
of existence beneath Him He must have remained within Himself in
perfect tranquility; otherwise, He would have initiated movement; and
we would have to conceive of a movement before the first movement,
a thought before the first thought, and its first actualization
would be imperfect, consisting in no more than a mere tendency.
But towards what can the first actualization of the One tend, and
attain, if, according to the dictates of reason, we conceive of that
actualization originating from Him as light emanates from the sun?
This actualization, therefore, will have to be considered as a light
that embraces the whole intelligible world; at the summit of which we
shall have to posit, and over whose throne we shall have to conceive
the rule of the immovable One, without separating Him from the Light
that radiates from Him. Otherwise, above this Light we would have to
posit another one, which, while remaining immovable, should enlighten
the intelligible. Indeed the actualization that emanates from the
One, without being separated from Him, nevertheless, differs from
Him. Neither is its nature non-essential, or blind; it, therefore,
contemplates itself, and knows itself; it is, consequently, the first
knowing principle. As the One is above Intelligence, it is also above
consciousness; as it needs nothing, neither has it any need of knowing
anything. Cognition (or, consciousness), therefore, belongs only to the
second-rank nature. Consciousness is only an individual unity, while
the One is absolute unity; indeed individual unity is not absolute
Unity, because the absolute is (or, "in and for itself"), precedes the
("somehow determined," or) individual.


THE SUPREME IS ABSOLUTELY INEFFABLE.

13. This Principle, therefore, is really indescribable. We are
individualizing it in any statement about it. That which is above
everything, even above the venerable Intelligence, really has no name,
and all that we can state about Him is, that He is not anything. Nor
can He be given any name, since we cannot assert anything about Him.
We refer to Him only as best we can. In our uncertainty we say, "What
does He not feel? is He not self-conscious? does He not know Himself?"
Then we must reflect that by speaking thus we are thinking of things,
that are opposed to Him of whom we are now thinking. When we suppose
that He can be known, or that He possesses self-consciousness, we are
already making Him manifold. Were we to attribute to Him thought, it
would appear that He needed this thought. If we imagine thought as
being within Him, thought seems to be superfluous. For of what does
thought consist? Of the consciousness of the totality formed by the two
terms that contribute to the act of thought, and which fuse therein.
That is thinking oneself, and thinking oneself is real thinking; for
each of the two elements of thought is itself an unity to which nothing
is lacking. On the contrary, the thought of objects exterior (to
Intelligence) is not perfect, and is not true thought. That which is
supremely simple and supremely absolute stands in need of nothing. The
absolute that occupies the second rank needs itself, and, consequently,
needs to think itself. Indeed, since Intelligence needs something
relatively to itself, it succeeds in satisfying this need, and
consequently, in being absolute, only by possessing itself entirely.
It suffices itself only by uniting all the elements constituting its
nature ("being"), only by dwelling within itself, only by remaining
turned towards itself while thinking; for consciousness is the
sensation of manifoldness, as is indicated by the etymology of the word
"con-scious-ness," or, "conscience." If supreme Thought occur by the
conversion of Intelligence towards itself, it evidently is manifold.
Even if it said no more than "I am existence," Intelligence would say
it as if making a discovery, and Intelligence would be right, because
existence is manifold. Even though it should apply itself to something
simple, and should say, "I am existence," this would not imply
successful grasp of itself or existence. Indeed, when Intelligence
speaks of existence in conformity with reality, intelligence does not
speak of it as of a stone, but, merely, in a single word expresses
something manifold. The existence that really and essentially deserves
the name of existence, instead of having of it only a trace which
would not be existence, and which would be only an image of it, such
existence is a multiple entity. Will not each one of the elements of
this multiple entity be thought? No doubt you will not be able to think
it if you take it alone and separated from the others; but existence
itself is in itself something manifold. Whatever object you name, it
possesses existence. Consequently, He who is supremely simple cannot
think Himself; if He did, He would be somewhere, (which is not the
case). Therefore He does not think, and He cannot be grasped by thought.


WE COME SUFFICIENTLY NEAR TO HIM TO TALK ABOUT HIM.

14. How then do we speak of Him? Because we can assert something about
Him, though we cannot express Him by speech. We could not know Him, nor
grasp Him by thought. How then do we speak of Him, if we cannot grasp
Him? Because though He does escape our knowledge, He does not escape us
completely. We grasp Him enough to assert something about Him without
expressing Him himself, to say what He is not, without saying what He
is; that is why in speaking of Him we use terms that are suitable to
designate only lower things. Besides we can embrace Him without being
capable of expressing Him, like men who, transported by a divine
enthusiasm, feel that they contain something superior without being
able to account for it. They speak of what agitates them, and they thus
have some feeling of Him who moves them, though they differ therefrom.
Such is our relation with Him; when we rise to Him by using our pure
intelligence, we feel that He is the foundation of our intelligence,
the principle that furnishes "being" and other things of the kind; we
feel that He is better, greater, and more elevated than we, because He
is superior to reason, to intelligence, and to the senses, because He
gives these things without being what they are.


RADIATION OF MULTIPLE UNITY.

15. How does He give them? Is it because He possesses them, or because
He does not possess them? If it be because He does not possess them,
how does He give what He does not possess? If it be because He does
possess them, He is no longer simple. If He give what He does not
possess, how is multiplicity born of Him? It would seem as if only
one single thing could proceed from Him, unity; and even so one might
wonder how anything whatever could be born of that which is absolutely
one. We answer, in the same way as from a light radiates a luminous
sphere (or, fulguration[109]). But how can the manifold be born from
the One? Because the thing that proceeds from Him must not be equal to
Him, and so much the less, superior; for what is superior to unity,
or better than Him? It must, therefore, be inferior to Him, and,
consequently, be less perfect. Now it cannot be less perfect, except
on condition of being less unitary, that is, more manifold. But as it
must aspire to unity, it will be the "manifold one." It is by that
which is single that that which is not single is preserved, and is
what it is; for that which is not one, though composite, cannot receive
the name of existence. If it be possible to say what each thing is, it
is only because it is one and identical. What is not manifold is not
one by participation, but is absolute unity; it does not derive its
unity from any other principle; on the contrary it is the principle to
which other things owe that they are more or less single, according as
they are more or less close to it. Since the characteristic of that
which is nearest to unity is identity, and is posterior to unity,
evidently the manifoldness contained therein, must be the totality of
things that are single. For since manifoldness is therein united with
manifoldness, it does not contain parts separated from each other,
and all subsist together. Each of the things, that proceed therefrom,
are manifold unity, because they cannot be universal unity. Universal
unity is characteristic only of their principle (the intelligible
Being), because itself proceeds from a great Principle which is one,
essentially, and genuinely. That which, by its exuberant fruitfulness,
begets, is all; on the other hand, as this totality participates
in unity, it is single; and, consequently, it is single totality
(universal unity).


THE SUPREME PRODUCES MANIFOLDNESS BECAUSE OF ITS CATEGORIES.

We have seen that existence is "all these things;" now, what are they?
All those of which the One is the principle. But how can the One be
the principle of all things? Because the One preserves their existence
while effecting the individuality of each of them. Is it also because
He gives them existence? And if so, does He do so by possessing them?
In this case, the One would be manifold. No, it is by containing them
without any distinction yet having arisen among them. On the contrary,
in the second principle they are distinguished by reason; that is,
they are logically distinguished, because this second principle is an
actualization, while the first Principle is the power-potentiality[107]
of all things; not in the sense in which we say that matter is
potential in that it receives, or suffers, but in the opposite sense
that the One produces. How then can the One produce what it does not
possess, since unity produces that neither by chance nor by reflection?
We have already said that what proceeds from unity must differ from it;
and, consequently, cannot be absolutely one; that it must be duality,
and, consequently, multitude, since it will contain (the categories,
such as) identity, and difference, quality, and so forth.[110] We have
demonstrated that that which is born of the One is not absolutely one.
It now remains for us to inquire whether it will be manifold, such as
it is seen to be in what proceeds from the One. We shall also have to
consider why it necessarily proceeds from the One.


THE GOOD MUST BE SUPERIOR TO INTELLIGENCE AND LIFE.

16. We have shown elsewhere that something must follow the One,
and that the One is a power, and is inexhaustible; and this is so,
because even the last-rank entities possess the power of begetting.
For the present we may notice that the generation of things reveals
a descending procession, in which, the further we go, the more does
manifoldness increase; and that the principle is always simpler than
the things it produces.[111] Therefore, that which has produced the
sense world is not the sense-world itself, but Intelligence and the
intelligible world; and that which has begotten Intelligence and
the intelligible world is neither Intelligence nor the intelligible
world, but something simpler than them. Manifoldness is not born of
manifoldness, but of something that is not manifold. If That which
was superior to Intelligence were manifold, it would no longer be the
(supreme) Principle, and we would have to ascend further. Everything
must, therefore, be reduced to that which is essentially one, which
is outside of all manifoldness; and whose simplicity is the greatest
possible. But how can manifold and universal Reason be born of the One,
when very evidently the One is not a reason? As it is not a reason,
how can it beget Reason? How can the Good beget a hypostatic form of
existence, which would be good in form? What does this hypostatic form
of existence possess? Is it identity? But what is the relation between
identity and goodness? Because as soon as we possess the Good, we seek
identity and permanence; and because the Good is the principle from
which we must not separate; for if it were not the Good, it would be
better to give it up. We must, therefore, wish to remain united to the
Good. Since that is the most desirable for Intelligence, it need seek
nothing beyond, and its permanence indicates its satisfaction with
the entities it possesses. Enjoying, as it does, their presence in a
manner such that it fuses with them, it must then consider life as the
most precious entity of all. As Intelligence possesses life in its
universality and fulness, this life is the fulness and universality of
the Soul and Intelligence. Intelligence, therefore, is self-sufficient,
and desires nothing; it contains what it would have desired if it had
not already possessed such desirable object. It possesses the good that
consists in life and intelligence, as we have said, or in some one of
the connected entities. If Life and Intelligence were the absolute
Good, there would be nothing above them. But if the absolute Good be
above them, the good of Intelligence is this Life, which relates to
the absolute Good, which connects with it, which receives existence
from it, and rises towards it, because it is its principle. The Good,
therefore, must be superior to Life and Intelligence. On this condition
only does the life of Intelligence, the image of Him from whom all life
proceeds, turn towards Him; on this condition only does Intelligence,
the imitation of the contents of the One, whatever be His nature, turn
towards Him.


THE SUPREME AS SUPERESSENTIAL AND SUPEREXISTENT.

17. What better thing is there then than this supremely wise Life,
exempt from all fault or error? What is there better than the
Intelligence that embraces everything? In one word, what is there
better than universal Life and universal Intelligence? If we answer
that what is better than these things is the Principle that begat
them, if we content ourselves with explaining how it begat them,
and to show that one cannot discover anything better, we shall,
instead of progressing in this discussion, ever remain at the same
point. Nevertheless, we need to rise higher. We are particularly
obliged to do this, when we consider that the principle that we seek
must be considered as the "Self-sufficient supremely independent
of all things;" for no entity is able to be self-sufficient, and
all have participated in the One; and since they have done so, none
of them can be the One. Which then is this principle in which all
participate, which makes Intelligence exist, and is all things? Since
it makes Intelligence exist, and since it is all things, since it
makes its contained manifoldness self-sufficient by the presence of
unity, and since it is thus the creative principle of "being" and
self-sufficiency, it must, instead of being "being," be super-"being"
and super-existence.


ECSTASY IS INTELLECTUAL CONTACT WITH SUDDEN LIGHT.

Have we said enough, and can we stop here? Or does our soul still feel
the pains of parturition? Let her, therefore, produce (activity),
rushing towards the One, driven by the pains that agitate her. No,
let us rather seek to calm her by some magic charm, if any remedy
therefor exist. But to charm the soul, it may perhaps be sufficient to
repeat what we have already said. To what other charm, indeed, would
it suffice to have recourse? Rising above all the truths in which we
participate, this enchantment evanesces the moment we speak, or even
think. For, in order to express something, discursive reason is obliged
to go from one thing to another, and successively to run through every
element of its object. Now what can be successively scrutinized in
that which is absolutely simple? It is, therefore, sufficient to reach
Him by a sort of intellectual contact. Now at the moment of touching
the One, we should neither be able to say anything about Him, nor have
the leisure to speak of Him; only later is it possible to argue about
Him. We should believe that we have seen Him when a sudden light has
enlightened the soul; for this light comes from Him, and is Himself. We
should believe that He is present when, as another (lower) divinity,
He illumines the house of him who calls on this divinity,[112] for it
remains obscure without the illumination of the divinity. The soul,
therefore, is without light when she is deprived of the presence of
this divinity, when illumined by this divinity, she has what she
sought. The true purpose of the soul is to be in contact with this
light, to see this light in the radiance of this light itself, without
the assistance of any foreign light, to see this principle by the
help of which she sees. Indeed, it is the principle by which she is
enlightened that she must contemplate as one gazes at the sun only
through its own light. But how shall we succeed in this? By cutting off
everything else.[113]




THIRD ENNEAD, BOOK FIVE.[114]

Of Love, or "Eros."


LOVE AS GOD, GUARDIAN AND PASSION.

1. Is Love a divinity, a guardian, or a passion of the human soul? Or
is it all three under different points of view? In this case, what is
it under each of these points of view? These are the questions we are
to consider, consulting the opinions of men, but chiefly those of the
philosophers. The divine Plato, who has written much about love, here
deserves particular attention. He says that it is not only a passion
capable of being born in souls, but he calls it also a guardian, and he
gives many details about its birth and parents.[115]


PASSIONAL LOVE IS TWOFOLD.

To begin with passion, it is a matter of common knowledge that the
passion designated as love is born in the souls which desire to unite
themselves to a beautiful object. But its object may be either a
shameful practice, or one (worthy to be pursued by) temperate men,
who are familiar with beauty. We must, therefore, investigate in a
philosophical manner what is the origin of both kinds of love.


LOVE IS RECOGNITION OF HIDDEN AFFINITY.

The real cause of love is fourfold: the desire of beauty; our soul's
innate notion of beauty; our soul's affinity with beauty, and our
soul's instinctive sentiment of this affinity.[116] (Therefore as
beauty lies at the root of love, so) ugliness is contrary to nature
and divinity. In fact, when Nature wants to create, she contemplates
what is beautiful, determinate, and comprehended within the
(Pythagorean) "sphere" of the Good. On the contrary, the (Pythagorean)
"indeterminate"[115] is ugly, and belongs to the other system.[117]
Besides, Nature herself owes her origin to the Good, and, therefore,
also to the Beautiful. Now, as soon as one is attracted by an object,
because one is united to it by a secret affinity, he experiences for
the images of this object a sentiment of sympathy. We could not explain
its origin, or assign its cause on any other hypothesis, even were we
to limit ourselves to the consideration of physical love. Even this
kind of love is a desire to procreate beauty,[118] for it would be
absurd to insist that that Nature, which aspires to create beautiful
things, should aspire to procreate that which is ugly.


EARTHLY BEAUTY IS AN IMAGE OF INTELLIGIBLE BEAUTY.

Of course, those who, here below, desire to procreate are satisfied in
attaining that which is beautiful here below: namely, the beauty which
shines in images and bodies; for they do not possess that intelligible
Beauty which, nevertheless, inspires them with that very love which
they bear to visible beauty. That is the reason why those who ascend
to the reminiscence of intelligible Beauty love that which they behold
here below only because it is an image of the other.[119] As to those
who fail to rise to the reminiscence of the intelligible Beauty,
because they do not know the cause of their passion, they mistake
visible beauty for that veritable Beauty, and they may even love it
chastely, if they be temperate: but to go as far as a carnal union is
an error, in any case. Hence, it happens that only he who is inspired
by a pure love for the beautiful really loves beauty, whether or not he
have aroused his reminiscence of intelligible Beauty.


BEAUTY IS IMMORTAL.

They who join to this passion as much of a desire for immortality
as our mortal nature admits, seek beauty in the perpetuity of the
procreation which renders man imperishable. They determine to
procreate and produce beauty according to nature; procreating because
their object is perpetuity; and procreating beautifully because they
possess affinity with it. In fact, perpetuity does bear affinity to
beauty; perpetual nature is beauty itself; and such also are all its
derivatives.


PASSIONAL LOVE MAY BE ELEVATING, THOUGH OPEN TO MISLEADING TEMPTATIONS.

Thus he who does not desire to procreate seems to aspire to the
possession of the beautiful in a higher degree. He who desires to
procreate does no doubt desire to procreate the beautiful; but his
desire indicates in him the presence of need, and dissatisfaction with
mere possession of beauty; He thinks he will be procreating beauty,
if he begets on that which is beautiful. They who wish to satisfy
physical love against human laws, and nature, no doubt have a natural
inclination as principle of a triple passion; but they lose their
way straying from the right road for lack of knowledge of the end to
which love was impelling them, of the goal of the aspiration (roused
by) the desire of generation, and of the proper use of the image of
beauty.[120] They really do ignore Beauty itself. They who love
beautiful bodies without desiring to unite themselves to them, love
them for their beauty only. Those who love the beauty of women, and
desire union with them, love both beauty and perpetuity, so long as
this object is not lost from sight. Both of these are temperate, but
they who love bodies for their beauty only are the more virtuous. The
former admire sensual beauty, and are content therewith; the latter
recall intelligible beauty, but, without scorning visible beauty,
regard it as an effect and image of the intelligible Beauty.[121] Both,
therefore, love beauty without ever needing to blush. But, as to those
(who violate laws human and divine), love of beauty misleads them to
falling into ugliness; for the desire of good may often mislead to a
fall into evil. Such is love considered as a passion of the soul.


THE PLATONIC MYTH OF LOVE.

2. Now let us speak of the Love which is considered a deity not only
by men in general, but also by the (Orphic) theologians, and by Plato.
The latter often speaks of Love, son of Venus, attributing to him the
mission of being the chief of the beautiful children (or, boys); and
to direct souls to the contemplation of intelligible Beauty, or, if
already present, to intensify the instinct to seek it. In his "Banquet"
Plato says that Love is born (not of Venus, but) of Abundance and
Need,[122] ... on some birthday (?) of Venus.


INTERPRETATION OF THE PLATONIC MYTH.

To explain if Love be born of Venus, or if he were only born
contemporaneously with his mother, we shall have to study something
about Venus. What is Venus? Is she the mother of Love, or only his
contemporary? As answer hereto we shall observe that there are two
Venuses.[123] The second (or Popular Venus) is daughter of Jupiter
and Dione, and she presides over earthly marriages. The first Venus,
the celestial one, daughter of Uranus (by Plato, in his Cratylus,
interpreted to mean "contemplation of things above"), has no mother,
and does not preside over marriages, for the reason that there are none
in heaven. The Celestial Venus, therefore, daughter of Kronos,[124]
that is, of Intelligence, is the divine Soul, which is born pure of
pure Intelligence, and which dwells above.[125] As her nature does not
admit of inclining earthward, she neither can nor will descend here
below. She is, therefore, a form of existence (or, an hypostasis),
separated from matter, not participating in its nature. This is the
significance of the allegory that she had no mother. Rather than a
guardian, therefore, she should be considered a deity, as she is pure
Being unmingled (with matter), and abiding within herself.


LOVE, LIKE HIGHER SOUL, OR LIGHT, IS INSEPARABLE FROM ITS SOURCE.

In fact, that which is immediately born of Intelligence is pure in
itself, because, by its very proximity to Intelligence, it has more
innate force, desiring to unite itself firmly to the principle that
begat it, and which can retain it there on high. The soul which is thus
suspended to Intelligence could not fall down, any more than the light
which shines around the sun could separate from the body from which it
radiates, and to which it is attached.


WHO CELESTIAL VENUS IS.

Celestial Venus (the universal Soul, the third principle or
hypostasis[126]), therefore, attaches herself to Kronos (divine
Intelligence, the second principle), or, if you prefer to Uranos
(the One, the Good, the first Principle), the father of Kronos. Thus
Venus turns towards Uranos, and unites herself to him; and in the
act of loving him, she procreates Love, with which she contemplates
Uranus. Her activity thus effects a hypostasis and being. Both of them
therefore fix their gaze on Uranus, both the mother and the fair child,
whose nature it is to be a hypostasis ever turned towards another
beauty, an intermediary essence between the lover and the beloved
object. In fact, Love is the eye by which the lover sees the beloved
object; anticipating her, so to speak; and before giving her the
faculty of seeing by the organ which he thus constitutes, he himself
is already full of the spectacle offered to his contemplation. Though
he thus anticipates her, he does not contemplate the intelligible in
the same manner as she does, in that he offers her the spectacle of the
intelligible, and that he himself enjoys the vision of the beautiful,
a vision that passes by him (or, that coruscates around him, as an
aureole).


LOVE POSSESSES DIVINE BEING.

3. We are therefore forced to acknowledge that Love is a hypostasis
and is "being," which no doubt is inferior to the Being from which it
(emanates, that is, from celestial Venus, or the celestial Soul), but
which, nevertheless, still possesses "being." In fact, that celestial
Soul is a being born of the activity which is superior to her (the
primary Being), a living Being, emanating from the primary Being, and
attached to the contemplation thereof. In it she discovers the first
object of her contemplation, she fixes her glance on it, as her good;
and finds in this view a source of joy. The seen object attracts her
attention so that, by the joy she feels, by the ardent attention
characterizing her contemplation of its object, she herself begets
something worthy of her and of the spectacle she enjoys. Thus is
Love born from the attention with which the soul applies herself to
the contemplation of its object, and from the very emanation of this
object; and so Love is an eye full of the object it contemplates, a
vision united to the image which it forms. Thus Love (Eros) seems to
owe its name to its deriving its existence from vision.[127] Even when
considered as passion does Love owe its name to the same fact, for
Love-that-is-a-being is anterior to Love-that-is-not-a-being. However
much we may explain passion as love, it is, nevertheless, ever the love
of some object, and is not love in an absolute sense.


CELESTIAL LOVE MUST ABIDE IN THE INTELLIGIBLE WITH THE CELESTIAL SOUL.

Such is the love that characterizes the superior Soul (the celestial
Soul). It contemplates the intelligible world with it, because Love
is the Soul's companion, being born of the Soul, and abiding in the
Soul, and with her enjoys contemplation of the divinities. Now as we
consider the Soul which first radiates its light on heaven as separate
from matter, we must admit that the love which is connected with her,
is likewise separate from matter. If we say that this pure Soul really
resides in heaven, it is in the sense in which we say that that which
is most precious in us (the reasonable soul) resides in our body, and,
nevertheless, is separate from matter. This love must, therefore,
reside only there where resides this pure Soul.


THERE IS A LOWER LOVE, CORRESPONDING TO THE WORLD-SOUL.

But as it was similarly necessary that beneath the celestial Soul there
should exist the world-Soul,[128] there must exist with it another
love, born of her desire, and being her eye.[129] As this Venus belongs
to this world, and as it is not the pure soul, nor soul in an absolute
sense, it has begotten the Love which reigns here below, and which,
with her, presides over marriages. As far as this Love himself feels
the desire for the intelligible, he turns towards the intelligible the
souls of the young people, and he elevates the soul to which he may be
united, as far as it is naturally disposed to have reminiscence of the
intelligible. Every soul, indeed, aspires to the Good, even that soul
that is mingled with matter, and that is the soul of some particular
being; for it is attached to the superior Soul, and proceeds therefrom.


ALL SOULS HAVE THEIR LOVE, WHICH IS THEIR GUARDIAN.

4. Does each soul include such a love in her being, and possess it
as a hypostatic (form of existence)? Since the world-Soul possesses,
as hypostasis (form of existence), the Love which is inherent in her
being, our soul should also similarly possess, as hypostatic (form of
existence), a love equally inherent in our being. Why should the same
not obtain even with animals? This love inherent to the being of every
soul is the guardian considered to be attached to each individual.[130]
It inspires each soul with the desires natural for her to experience;
for, according to her nature, each soul begets a love which harmonizes
with her dignity and being. As the universal Soul possesses universal
Love, so do individual souls each possess her individual love. But as
the individual souls are not separated from the universal Soul, and
are so contained within her that their totality forms but a single
soul,[131] so are individual loves contained within the universal Love.
On the other hand, each individual love is united to an individual
soul, as universal Love is united to the universal Soul. The latter
exists entire everywhere in the universe, and so her unity seems
multiple; she appears anywhere in the universe that she pleases, under
the various forms suitable to her parts, and she reveals herself, at
will, under some visible form.


THE HIGHER LOVE IS DEITY, THE LOWER IS A GUARDIAN.

We shall have to assume also a multiplicity of Venuses, which, born
with Love, occupy the rank of guardians. They originate from the
universal Venus, from which derive all the individual "venuses," with
the loves peculiar to each. In fact, the soul is the mother of love;
now Venus is the Soul, and Love is the Soul's activity in desiring
the Good. The love which leads each soul to the nature of the Good,
and which belongs to her most exalted part, must also be considered
a deity, inasmuch as it unites the soul to the Good. The love which
belongs to the soul mingled (with matter), is to be considered a
Guardian only.


IT IS AN ERROR TO CONSIDER THE LOVE AS IDENTICAL WITH THE WORLD.

5. What is the nature of this Guardian, and what is, in general, the
nature of guardians, according to (Plato's treatment of the subject in)
his "Banquet"? What is the nature of guardians? What is the nature of
the Love born of Need (Penia) and Abundance (Poros), son of Prudence
(Metis), at the birth of Venus?[132]

(Plutarch)[133] held that Plato, by Love, meant the world. He should
have stated that Love is part of the world, and was born in it. His
opinion is erroneous, as may be demonstrated by several proofs. First,
(Plato) calls the world a blessed deity, that is self-sufficient;
however, he never attributes these characteristics to Love, which
he always calls a needy being. Further, the world is composed of a
body and a Soul, the latter being Venus; consequently, Venus would
be the directing part of Love; or, if we take the world to mean
the world-Soul, just as we often say "man" when we mean the human
soul,[134] Love would be identical with Venus. Third, if Love, which
is a Guardian, is the world, why should not the other Guardians (who
evidently are of the same nature) not also be the world? In this case,
the world would be composed of Guardians. Fourth, how could we apply to
the world that which (Plato) says of Love, that it is the "guardian of
fair children"? Last, Plato describes Love as lacking clothing, shoes,
and lodging. This could not be applied to the world without absurdity
or ridicule.


ALL GUARDIANS ARE BORN OF NEED AND ABUNDANCE.

6. To explain the nature and birth of Love, we shall have to expound
the significance of his mother Need to his father Abundance, and to
show how such parents suit him. We shall also have to show how such
parents suit the other Guardians, for all Guardians, by virtue of their
being Guardians, must have the same nature, unless, indeed, Guardians
have only that name in common.


DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DEITIES AND GUARDIANS.

First, we shall have to consider the difference between deities and
guardians. Although it be common to call Guardians deities, we are here
using the word in that sense it bears when one says that Guardians and
deities belong to different species. The deities are impassible, while
the Guardians, though eternal, can experience passions; placed beneath
the deities, but next to us, they occupy the middle place between
deities and men.[135]


A GUARDIAN IS THE VESTIGE OF A SOUL DESCENDED INTO THE WORLD.

But how did the Guardians not remain impassible? How did they
descend to an inferior nature? This surely is a question deserving
consideration. We should also inquire whether there be any Guardian in
the intelligible world, whether there be Guardians only here below,
and if deities exist only in the intelligible world. (We shall answer
as follows.) There are deities also here below; and the world is,
as we habitually say, a deity of the third rank, inasmuch as every
supra-lunar being is a divinity. Next, it would be better not to call
any being belonging to the intelligible world a Guardian; and if we
locate the chief Guardian (the Guardian himself) in the intelligible
world, we had better consider him a deity. In the world of sense, all
the visible supra-lunar deities should be called second-rank deities,
in that they are placed below the intelligible deities, and depend
on them as the rays of light from the star from which they radiate.
Last, a Guardian should be defined as the vestige of a soul that had
descended into the world. The latter condition is necessary because
every pure soul begets a deity, and we have already said[136] that the
love of such a soul is a deity.


WHY ALL GUARDIANS ARE NOT LOVES.

But why are not all the Guardians Loves? Further, why are they not
completely pure from all matter? Among Guardians, those are Loves,
which owe their existence to a soul's desire for the good and the
beautiful; therefore, all souls that have entered into this world each
generate a Love of this kind. As to the other Guardians, which are
not born of human souls, they are engendered by the different powers
of the universal Soul, for the utility of the All; they complete and
administer all things for the general good. The universal Soul, in
fact, was bound to meet the needs of the universe by begetting Guardian
powers which would suit the All of which she is the soul.


WHY THE GUARDIANS ARE NOT FREE FROM MATTER.

How do Guardians participate in matter, and of what matter are they
formed? This their matter is not corporeal, otherwise they would be
animals with sensation. In fact, whether they have aerial or fire-like
bodies,[137] they must have had a nature primitively different (from
pure Intelligence) to have ultimately united each with his own body,
for that which is entirely pure could not have immediately united
with a body, although many philosophers think that the being of every
Guardian, as guardian, is united to an air-like or fire-like body. But
why is the being of every Guardian mingled with a body, while the being
of every deity is pure, unless in the first case there be a cause which
produces the mingling (with matter)? This cause must be the existence
of an intelligible matter,[138] so that whatever participates in it
might, by its means, come to unite with sense-matter.


SOUL IS A MIXTURE OF REASON AND INDETERMINATION.

7. Plato's account of the birth of Love[132] is that Abundance
intoxicated himself with nectar, this happening before the day of
wine, which implies that Love was born before the sense-world's
existence. Then Need, the mother of Love, must have participated in
the intelligible nature itself, and not in a simple image of the
intelligible nature; she, therefore, approached (the intelligible
nature) and found herself to be a mixture of form and indeterminateness
(or, intelligible matter).[139] The soul, in fact, containing a
certain indeterminateness before she had reached the Good, but
feeling a premonition of her existence, formed for herself a confused
and indeterminate image, which became the very hypostasis (or,
form of existence) of Love. Thus, as here, reason mingles with the
unreasonable, with an indeterminate desire, with an indistinct (faint
or obscure) hypostatic (form of existence). What was born was neither
perfect nor complete; it was something needy, because it was born from
an indeterminate desire, and a complete reason. As to (Love, which is)
the thus begotten reason, it is not pure, since it contains a desire
that is indeterminate, unreasonable, indefinite; nor will it ever be
satisfied so long as it contains the nature of indetermination. It
depends on the soul, which is its generating principle; it is a mixture
effected by a reason which, instead of remaining within itself, is
mingled with indetermination. Besides, it is not Reason itself, but its
emanation which mingles with indetermination.


LOVE IS A GADFLY.

Love, therefore, is similar to a gad-fly;[140] needy by nature,
it still remains needy, whatever it may obtain; it could never be
satisfied, for this would be impossible for a being that is a mixture;
no being could ever be fully satisfied if by its nature it be incapable
of attaining fulness; even were it satisfied for a moment, it could
not retain anything if its nature 

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