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Life and Correspondence of David Hume, Volume 1

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Title: Life and Correspondence of David Hume, Volume 1

Author: John Hill Burton

Contributor: David Hume


        
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID HUME, VOLUME 1 ***

Transcriber's Notes: Variations in spelling and hyphenation have been
left as in the original. Words in italics in the original are surrounded
by _underscores_. A row of asterisks represents a thought break. Letters
superscripted in the original are surrounded by {braces}. Ellipses match
the original. A complete list of corrections follows the text.

The original has two different kinds of blockquotes: one uses a smaller
font than the main text, and the other has wider margins. In this text,
the blockquotes in a smaller font have wider margins, and the other
blockquotes have two blank lines before and after the quotation. An
explanation of the different kinds of quotations can be found at the end
of the "ADVERTISEMENT".

The Index that was printed at the end of Volume II. of this series has
been included at the end of this Volume for reference purposes.




                           LIFE AND

                      CORRESPONDENCE OF

                         DAVID HUME.


              [Illustration: Bust of David Hume]




                             LIFE

                             AND

                        CORRESPONDENCE

                              OF

                         DAVID HUME.

       FROM THE PAPERS BEQUEATHED BY HIS NEPHEW TO THE
            ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH; AND OTHER
                      ORIGINAL SOURCES.


                  BY JOHN HILL BURTON, ESQ.
                          ADVOCATE.


                          VOLUME I.


                          EDINBURGH:
             WILLIAM TAIT, 107, PRINCE'S STREET.
                          MDCCCXLVI.




                          EDINBURGH:
        Printed by WILLIAM TAIT, 107, Prince's Street.




                 TO THE PRESIDENT AND COUNCIL

                              OF

               THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF EDINBURGH,

             THIS WORK IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

                              BY

             THEIR MOST OBEDIENT HUMBLE SERVANT,

                        J. H. BURTON.




ADVERTISEMENT.


In this work, an attempt has been made to connect together a series of
original documents, by a narrative of events in the life of him to whom
they relate; an account of his literary labours; and a picture of his
character, according to the representations of it preserved by his
contemporaries. The scantiness of the resources at the command of
previous biographers, and the extent and variety of the new materials
now presented to the world, render unnecessary any other apology for the
present publication. How far these materials have been rightly used,
readers and critics must judge; but I may be perhaps excused for
offering a brief explanation of the spirit in which I desired to
undertake the task; and the responsibility I felt attached to the duty,
of ushering before the public, documents of so much importance to
literature.

The critic or biographer, who writes from materials already before the
public, may be excused if he give way to his prepossessions and
partialities, and limit his task to the representation of all that
justifies and supports them. If he have any misgivings, that, in
following the direction of his prepossessions, he may not have taken the
straight line of truth, he may be assured, that if the cause be one of
any interest, an advocate, having the same resources at his command,
will speedily appear on the other side. But when original manuscripts
are for the first time to be used, it is due to truth, and to the desire
of mankind to satisfy themselves about the real characters of great men,
that they should be so presented as to afford the means of impartially
estimating those to whom they relate. We possess many brilliant
Eulogiums of the leaders of our race--many vivid pictures of their
virtues and their vices--their greatness or their weakness. But if a
humbler, it is perhaps a no less useful task, to represent these
men--their character, their conduct, and the circumstances of their
life, precisely as they were; rejecting nothing that truly exemplifies
them, because it is beneath the dignity of biography, or at variance
with received notions of their character and the tendency of their
public conduct. The desire to have a closer view of the fountain head
whence the outward manifestations of a great intellect have sprung, is
but one of the many examples of man's spirit of inquiry from effects to
their causes; and the desire will not be gratified by reproducing the
object of inquiry in all the pomp and state of his public intercourse
with the world, and keeping the veil still closed upon his inner nature.
It is difficult to write with mere descriptive impartiality, and without
exhibiting any bias of opinion, on matters which are, at the same time,
the most deeply interesting to mankind, and the objects of their
strongest partialities. Though the task that was before me was simply to
describe, and never to controvert, I do not profess to have avoided all
indications of opinion in the departments of the work which have the
character of original authorship. I have the satisfaction, however, of
reflecting, that the documents, which are the real elements of value in
this work, are impartially presented to the reader, and that nothing is
omitted which seemed to bear distinctly on the character and conduct of
David Hume.

I now offer a few words in explanation of the nature of these original
documents. The late Baron Hume had collected together his uncle's
papers, consisting of the letters addressed to him, the few drafts or
copies he had left of letters written by himself, the letters addressed
_by_ him to his immediate relations, and apparently all the papers in
his handwriting, which had been left in the possession of the members of
his family. To these the Baron seems to have been enabled to add the
originals of many of the letters addressed by him to his intimate
friends, Adam Smith, Blair, Mure, and others. The design with which this
interesting collection was made, appears to have been that of preparing
a work of a similar description to the present; and it is a misfortune
to literature that this design was not accomplished. On the death of
Baron Hume, it was found that he had left this mass of papers at the
uncontrolled disposal of the Council of the Royal Society of Edinburgh.
This learned body, after having fully considered the course proper to be
adopted in these circumstances, determined that they would permit the
papers to be made use of by any person desirous to apply them to a
legitimate literary purpose, who might enjoy their confidence. Having
for some time indulged in a project of writing a life of Hume, postponed
from time to time, on account of the imperfect character of the
materials at my disposal, I applied to the Council of the Royal Society
for access to the Hume papers; and after having considered my
application with that deliberation which their duty to the public as
custodiers of these documents seemed to require, they acceded to my
request. The ordinary form of returning thanks for the privilege of
using papers in the possession of private parties, appears not to be
applicable to this occasion; and I look on the concession of the Council
as conferring on me an honour, which is felt to be all the greater, that
it was bestowed in the conscientious discharge of a public duty.

The Hume papers, besides a manuscript of the "Dialogues on Natural
Religion," and of a portion of the History, fill seven quarto volumes of
various thickness, and two thin folios. In having so large a mass of
private and confidential correspondence committed to their charge, the
Council naturally felt that they would be neglecting their duty, if they
did not keep in view the possibility that there might be in the
collection, allusions to the domestic conduct or private affairs of
persons whose relations are still living; and that good taste, and a
kind consideration for private feelings should prevent the accidental
publication of such passages. On inspection, less of this description of
matter was found than so large a mass of private documents might be
supposed to contain. There is no passage which I have felt any
inclination to print, as being likely to afford interest to the reader,
of which the use has been denied me; and I can therefore say that I have
had in all respects full and unlimited access to this valuable
collection. Before leaving this matter, I take the opportunity of
returning my thanks for the kind and polite attention I have received
from those gentlemen of the Council, on whom the arrangements for my
getting access to these papers, imposed no little labour and sacrifice
of valuable time.

A rumour has obtained currency regarding the contents of these papers,
which seems to demand notice on the present occasion.

It is stated in _The Quarterly Review_,[xi:1] that "those who have
examined the Hume papers--which we know only by report--speak highly of
their interest, but add, that they furnish painful disclosures
concerning the opinions then prevailing amongst the clergy of the
northern metropolis: distinguished ministers of the gospel encouraging
the scoffs of their familiar friend, the author of 'the Essay upon
Miracles;' and echoing the blasphemies of their associate, the author of
the 'Essay upon Suicide!'" I have the pleasing task of removing the
painful feelings which, as this writer justly observes, must attend the
belief in such a rumour, by saying that I could not find it justified
by a single sentence in the letters of the Scottish clergy contained in
these papers, or in any other documents that have passed under my eye. I
make this statement as an act of simple justice to the memory of men to
whose character, being a member of a different church, I have no
partisan attachment: and I may add that, in the whole course of my
pretty extensive researches in connexion with Hume and his friends, I
found no reason for believing that letters containing evidence of any
such frightful duplicity ever existed.

Among these papers, a variety of letters, chiefly from eminent
foreigners, though interesting in themselves, were entitled to no place
in the body of this work, as illustrative of the life and character of
Hume. These I had intended to print in an appendix, believing that,
though not directly connected with my own project, the lovers of
literature would not readily excuse me for neglecting the opportunity
afforded by my access to these papers, for adding to the stock of the
letters of celebrated men. But the work, according to its original scope
and design, continuing to increase under my hands, I found that if it
contained the documents specially referred to in the text, its bulk
would be sufficiently extended, and I have determined to let the other
papers here alluded to follow in a separate volume, which will contain
letters to Hume from D'Alembert, Turgot, Diderot, Helvétius, Franklin,
Walpole, and other distinguished persons.

The reader will find that many original documents printed in this
collection have been obtained from other sources than the Hume papers.
My acknowledgments are particularly due to the Earl of Minto, for the
liberality with which he allowed me the uncontrolled use of the large
and valuable collection of correspondence between Hume and Sir Gilbert
Elliot. For the letters in the Kilravock collection I am indebted to
Cosmo Innes, Esq., sheriff of Morayshire; and I obtained access to those
addressed to Colonel Edmondstoune, through the polite intervention of
George Dundas, Esq., sheriff of Selkirkshire. I am obliged to the
kindness of Lord Murray for much assistance in obtaining materials and
information for this work; and to Robert Chambers, Esq., who has been
accustomed from time to time, to preserve such letters and other
documents connected with Scottish biography, as came under his notice, I
have to offer my thanks for the whole of his collections regarding Hume,
which he generously transferred to me.

In the use of printed books, where the Advocates' Library, to which I
have professional access, has failed me, I have found the facilities for
consulting the select and well arranged collection of the Writers to the
Signet of great service.

I owe acknowledgments to many friends for useful advice in the conduct
of the work. To one especially, who, after having long occupied a
distinguished place in the literature of his country, permits his
friends still to enjoy the social exercise of those intellectual
qualities that have delighted the world, I am indebted for such critical
counsel as no other could have given, and few would have had the
considerate kindness to bestow, were they able.

Of the two portraits engraved for this work, that which will, probably,
most strikingly attract attention, is taken from a bust, of coarse and
unartistic workmanship, but bearing all the marks of a genuine likeness.
It was moulded by a country artist, at the desire of Hume's esteemed
friend, Professor Ferguson; and I am under obligations to his son, Sir
Adam, for the privilege of using it on this occasion, and to Sir George
Mackenzie, for having kindly mentioned its existence, and exerted
himself in its recovery, after it had been long lost sight of. The
medallion, from which the other portrait is taken, is in the possession
of Charles Kirkpatrick Sharpe, Esq., by whom I was presented with the
engraved plate, from which the fac simile of a letter, addressed by Hume
to his collateral ancestor, is printed.

_Edinburgh, February, 1846._

     *.* It may be right to explain, that the two sizes of type,
     used in this work, were first adopted with the design of
     presenting all letters addressed to Hume, all extracts, and
     all letters from him with which the public is already
     familiar, in the smaller type, in order that the reader coming
     to a document with which he is already acquainted, might see
     at once where it ends. This arrangement was accidentally
     broken through, several letters having been printed in the
     larger that should have appeared in the smaller type.


FOOTNOTES:

[xi:1] No. LXXIII. p. 555.




CONTENTS OF VOLUME FIRST.


ILLUSTRATIONS TO VOL. I.

  Portrait of Hume from a Medallion,                   _Frontispiece_.

  Fac simile of a letter by Hume,                             Page 178


CHAPTER I.

1711-1734. ÆT. 0-23.

  Birth--Parentage--His own account of his Ancestors--Local
  associations of Ninewells--Education--Studies--Early
  Correspondence--The Ramsays--Specimen of his early Writings--
  Essay on Chivalry--Why he deserted the Law--Early ambition to
  found a School of Philosophy--Letter to a Physician describing
  his studies and habits--Criticism on the Letter--Supposition
  that it was addressed to Dr. Cheyne--Hume goes to Bristol.         1


CHAPTER II.

1734-1739. ÆT. 23-27.

  Hume leaves Bristol for France--Paris--Miracles at the Tomb of
  the Abbé Paris--Rheims--La Flêche--Associations with the Abbé
  Pluche and Des Cartes--Observations on French Society and
  Manners --Story of La Roche--Return to Britain--Correspondence
  with Henry Home--Publication of the first and second volume of
  the Treatise of Human Nature--Character of that Work--Its
  influence on Mental Philosophy.                                   48


CHAPTER III.

1739-1741. ÆT. 27-29.

  Letters to his friends after the publication of the first and
  second volume of the Treatise--Returns to Scotland--Reception
  of his Book--Criticism in "The Works of the Learned"--Charge
  against Hume of assaulting the publisher--Correspondence with
  Francis Hutcheson--Seeks a situation--Connexion with Adam
  Smith--Publication of the third volume of the Treatise--
  Account of it--Hume's notes of his reading--Extracts from his
  Note-books.                                                      105


CHAPTER IV.

1741-1745. ÆT. 30-34.

  Publication of the Essays, Moral and Political--Their
  Character--Correspondence with Home and Hutcheson--Hume's
  Remarks on Hutcheson's System--Education and Accomplishments
  of the Scottish Gentry--Hume's Intercourse with Mure of
  Caldwell and Oswald of Dunnikier--Opinions on a Sermon by Dr.
  Leechman--Attempts to succeed Dr. Pringle in the Chair of Moral
  Philosophy in Edinburgh.                                         136


CHAPTER V.

1745-1747. ÆT. 34-36.

  Hume's Residence with the Marquis of Annandale--His Predecessor
  Colonel Forrester--Correspondence with Sir James Johnstone and
  Mr. Sharp of Hoddam--Quarrel with Captain Vincent--Estimate of
  his Conduct, and Inquiry into the Circumstances in which he was
  placed--Appointed Secretary to General St. Clair--Accompanies
  the expedition against the Court of France as Judge-Advocate--
  Gives an Account of the Attack on Port L'Orient--A tragic
  Incident.                                                        170


CHAPTER VI.

1746-1748. ÆT. 35-37.

  Hume returns to Ninewells--His domestic Position--His attempts
  in Poetry--Inquiry as to his Sentimentalism--Takes an interest
  in Politics--Appointed Secretary to General St. Clair on his
  mission to Turin--His journal of his Tour--Arrival in Holland--
  Rotterdam--The Hague--Breda--The War--French Soldiers--Nimeguen
  --Cologne--Bonn--The Rhine and its scenery--Coblentz--Wiesbaden
  --Frankfurt--Battle of Dettingen--Wurzburg--Ratisbon--Descent
  of the Danube--Observations on Germany--Vienna--The Emperor and
  Empress Queen--Styria--Carinthia--The Tyrol--Mantua--Cremona--
  Turin.                                                           225


CHAPTER VII.

1748-1751. ÆT. 37-40.

  Publication of the "Inquiry concerning Human Understanding"--
  Nature of that Work--Doctrine of Necessity--Observations on
  Miracles--New Edition of the "Essays, Moral and Political"--
  Reception of the new Publications--Return Home--His Mother's
  Death--Her Talents and Character--Correspondence with Dr.
  Clephane--Earthquakes--Correspondence with Montesquieu--
  Practical jokes in connexion with the Westminster Election--
  John Home--The Bellman's Petition.                               271


CHAPTER VIII.

1751-1752. ÆT. 40-41.

  Sir Gilbert Elliot--Hume's intimacy with him--Their Philosophical
  Correspondence--Dialogues on Natural Religion--Residence in
  Edinburgh--Jack's Land--Publication of the "Inquiry concerning
  the Principles of Morals"--The Utilitarian Theory--Attempt to
  obtain the Chair of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow--Competition
  with Burke--Publication of the "Political Discourses"--The
  foundation of Political Economy--French Translations.            319


CHAPTER IX.

1752-1755. ÆT. 41-44.

  Appointment as keeper of the Advocates' Library--His Duties--
  Commences the History of England--Correspondence with Adam
  Smith and others on the History--Generosity to Blacklock
  the Poet--Quarrel with the Faculty of Advocates--Publication of
  the First Volume of the History--Its reception--Continues the
  History--Controversial and Polemical attacks--Attempt to subject
  him, along with Kames, to the Discipline of Ecclesiastical
  Courts--The leader of the attack--Home's "Douglas"--The first
  Edinburgh Review.                                                367


APPENDIX.

  Fragments of a Paper in Hume's handwriting, describing the
  Descent on the Coast of Brittany, in 1746, and the causes of
  its failure.                                                     441

  Letters from Montesquieu to Hume,                                456

  ---- the Abbé le Blanc to Hume,                                  458

  Documents relating to the Poems of Ossian,                       462

   Essay on the Genuineness of the Poems,                          471




THE LIFE

OF

DAVID HUME.




CHAPTER I.

1711-1734. ÆT. 0-23.

     Birth--Parentage--His own account of his Ancestors--Local
     associations of Ninewells--Education--Studies--Early
     Correspondence--The Ramsays--Specimen of his early Writings--
     Essay on Chivalry--Why he deserted the Law--Early ambition to
     found a School of Philosophy--Letter to a Physician describing
     his studies and habits--Criticism on the Letter--Supposition
     that it was addressed to Dr. Cheyne--Hume goes to Bristol.


David Hume was born at Edinburgh, on the 26th of April,[1:1] 1711. He
was the second son of Joseph Hume, or Home, proprietor of the estate of
Ninewells, in the parish of Chirnside, in Berwickshire. His mother was a
daughter of Sir David Falconer of Newton, who filled the office of Lord
President of the Court of Session from 1682 to 1685, and is known to
lawyers as the collector of a series of decisions of the Court of
Session, published in 1701. His son, the brother of Hume's mother,
succeeded to the barony of Halkerton in 1727. Mr. Hume the elder, was a
member of the Faculty of Advocates.[1:2] He appears, however, if he
ever intended to follow the legal profession as a means of livelihood,
to have early given up that view, and to have lived, as his eldest son
John afterwards did, the life of a retired country gentleman.

It is an established rule, that all biographical attempts of
considerable length, shall contain some genealogical inquiry regarding
the family of their subject. The present writer is relieved both of the
labour of such an investigation, and the responsibility of adjusting it
to the appropriate bounds, by being able to print a letter in which the
philosopher has himself exhibited the results of an inquiry into the
subject.


DAVID HUME _to_ ALEXANDER HOME _of Whitfield_.

"_Edinburgh, 12th April, 1758._

"DEAR SIR,--I was told by Mrs. Home, when she was in town, that you
intended to make some researches into our family, in order to give them
to Mr. Douglas, who must insert them, or the substance of them, into his
account of the Scottish nobility.[2:1] I think that your purpose is very
laudable, and is very obliging to us all; and for this reason I shall
inform you of what I know of the matter. These hints will at least serve
to point out to you more authentic documents.

"My brother has no very ancient charters: the oldest he has, are some
charters of the lands of Horndean. There he is designated Home, or Hume,
of Ninewells. The oldest charters of Ninewells are lost. It was always
a tradition in our family, that we were descended from Lord Home, in
this manner. Lord Home gave to his younger son the lands of Tinningham,
East Lothian. This gentleman proved a spendthrift and dissipated his
estate, upon which Lord Home provided his grandchild, or nephew, in the
lands of Ninewells as a patrimony. This, probably, is the reason why, in
all the books of heraldry, we are styled to be cadets of Tinningham; and
Tinningham was undoubtedly a cadet of Home. I was told by my grand-aunt,
Mrs. Sinclair of Hermiston, that Charles earl of Home told her, that he
had been looking over some old papers of the family, where the Lord Home
designs Home of Ninewells either his grandson or nephew, I do not
precisely remember which.

"The late Sir James Home of Blackadder showed me a paper, which he
himself had copied a few days before from a gravestone in the churchyard
of Hutton: the words were these--'Here lies John Home of Bell, son of
John Home of Ninewells, son of John Home of Tinningham, son of John Lord
Home, founder of Dunglas.'

"I find that this Lord Home, founder of Dunglas, was the very person
whom Godscroft says went over to France with the Douglas, and was father
to Tinningham: so thus the two stories tally exactly. He was killed
either in the battle of Crevant or Verneuil, gained by the Duke of
Bedford, the regent, against the French. Douglas fell in the same
battle. I think it was the battle of Verneuil. All the French and
English histories, as well as the Scotch, contain this fact. This Lord
Home was your ancestor, and ours, lived in the time of James the First
and Second of Scotland, Henrys the Fifth and Sixth of England.

"I have asked old Bell the descent of his family. He said he was really
sprung from Ninewells, but that the lands fell to an heiress who married
a brother of Polwarth's.

"By Godscroft's account, Tinningham was the third son of Home in the
same generation that Wedderburn was the second, so that the difference
of antiquity is nothing, or very inconsiderable.

"The readiest way of vouching these facts would be for you to take a
jaunt to the churchyard of Hutton, and inquire for Bell's monument, and
see whether the inscription be not obliterated; for it is above
twenty-five years ago that I saw the paper in Sir James Home's hand, and
he told us, at that time, that the inscription was somewhat difficult to
be read. If it be still legible it would be very well done to take a
copy of it in some authentic manner, and transmit it to Mr. Douglas, to
be inserted in his volume. If it be utterly effaced, the next, but most
difficult task would be to search for the paper above-mentioned in the
family of Home: it must be some time about the year 1440 or 1450. If
both these means fail, we must rest upon the tradition.

"I am not of the opinion of some, that these matters are altogether to
be slighted. Though we should pretend to be wiser than our ancestors,
yet it is arrogant to pretend that we are wiser than the other nations
of Europe, who, all of them, except perhaps the English, make great
account of their family descent. I doubt that our morals have not much
improved since we began to think riches the sole thing worth
regarding.[4:1]

"If I were in the country I should be glad to attend you to Hutton, in
order to make the inquiry I propose. I doubt whether my brother will
think of doing it: he has such an extreme aversion to every thing that
savours of vanity, that he would not willingly expose himself to
censure; but this is a justice that one owes to their posterity, for we
are not certain that these matters will be always so little regarded.

"I shall farther observe to you, that the Lord Home, founder of Dunglas,
married the heiress of that family, of the name of Pepdie, and from her
we always bear the Pepingos in our arms.

"I find in Hall's Chronicle that the Earl of Surrey, in an inroad upon
the Merse, made during the reign of Henry the Eighth, after the battle
of Flouden, destroyed the castles of Hedderburn, West Nisgate, and
Blackadder, and the towers of East Nisgate, and Winwalls. The names, you
see, are somewhat disfigured; but I cannot doubt but he means Nisbet and
Ninewells: the situation of the places leads us to that conjecture.

"I have reason to believe, notwithstanding the fact, as Ninewells lay
very near Berwick, our ancestors commonly paid contributions to the
governor of that place, and abstained from hostilities and were
prevented from ravages. There is, in Hayne's State Papers, a very
particular account of the ravages committed by an inroad of the English,
during the minority of Queen Mary.[6:1] Not a village, scarce a single
house in the Merse, but what is mentioned as burnt or overthrown, till
you come to Whitwater. East of the river, there was not one destroyed.
This reason will perhaps explain why, in none of the histories of that
time, even the more particular, there is any mention made of our
ancestors; while we meet with Wedderburn, Aiton, Manderston,
Cowdenknows, Sprot, and other cadets of Home.

"I have learned from my mother, that my father, in a lawsuit with
Hilton, claimed an old apprizing upon the lands of Hutton-Hall, upon
which there had been no deed done for 140 years. Hilton thought that it
must necessarily be expired; but my father was able to prove that,
during that whole time there had not been forty years of majority in the
family. He died soon after, and left my mother very young; so that there
was near 160 years during which there was not forty years of
majority.[6:2] Now we are upon this subject, I shall just mention to
you a trifle, with regard to the spelling of our name. The practice of
spelling Hume is by far the most ancient and most general till about the
Restoration, when it became common to spell Home contrary to the
pronunciation. Our name is frequently mentioned in Rymer's Foedera,
and always spelt Hume. I find a subscription of Lord Hume in the memoirs
of the Sidney family, where it is spelt as I do at present. These are a
few of the numberless authorities on this head.

"I wish the materials I give you were more numerous and more
satisfactory; but such as they are, I am glad to have communicated them
to you.--I am," &c.[7:1]


A competent authority in such matters gives the following partly
heraldic, partly topographical account of the Humes and their
territory:--

"Hume of Ninewells, the family of the great historian, bore 'Vert a lion
rampant, argent, within a bordure or, charged with _nine wells_, or
springs, barry-wavy and argent.'

"The estate of Ninewells is so named from a cluster of springs of that
number. Their situation is picturesque. They burst forth from a gentle
declivity in front of the mansion, which has on each side a semicircular
rising bank, covered with fine timber, and fall, after a short time,
into the bed of the river Whitewater, which forms a boundary in the
front. These springs, as descriptive of their property, were assigned to
the Humes of this place, as a difference in arms from the chief of their
house."[8:1]

The scenes amidst which Hume passed his boyhood, and many of the years
of his later life, have subsequently, in the light of a national
literature, become a classic land, visited by strangers, with the same
feeling with which Hume himself trod the soil of Mantua. In his own
days, the elements of this literature were no less in existence; but it
was not part of his mental character to find any pleasing associations
in spots, remarkable only for the warlike or adventurous achievements
they had witnessed. Intellect was the material on which his genius
worked: with it were all his associations and sympathies; and what had
not been adorned by the feats of the mind had no charm in his eye. Had
he been a stranger of another land, visiting at the present, or some
later day, the scenes of the Lay and of Marmion, they would, without
doubt, like the land of Virgil, have lit in his mind some sympathetic
glow; but the scenes illustrated solely by deeds of barbarous warfare,
and by a rude illiterate minstrelsy, had nothing in them to rouse a
mind, which was yet far from being destitute of its own peculiar
enthusiasm. He had often, in his history, to mention great historical
events that had taken place in the immediate vicinity of his paternal
residence, and in places to which he could hardly have escaped, if he
did not court occasional visits. About six miles from Ninewells, stands
Norham castle. Three or four miles farther off, are Twisel bridge, where
Surrey crossed the Till to engage the Scots, and the other localities
connected with the battle of Flodden. In the same neighbourhood is
Holiwell Haugh, where Edward I. met the Scottish nobility, when he
professed himself to be the arbiter of the disputes between Bruce and
Baliol. In his notices of these spots, in connexion with the historical
events which he describes, he betrays no symptom of having passed many
of his youthful days in their vicinity, but is as cold and general as
when he describes Agincourt or Marston Moor; and it may safely be said,
that in none of his historical or philosophical writings does any
expression used by him, unless in those cases where a Scoticism has
escaped his vigilance, betray either the district or the country of his
origin.[9:1] Hume tells us, in his short autobiography, "My family was
not rich, and being myself a younger brother, my patrimony, according to
the mode of my country, was of course very slender. My father, who
passed for a man of parts, died when I was an infant, leaving me, with
an elder brother and a sister, under the care of our mother, a woman of
singular merit, who, though young and handsome, devoted herself entirely
to the rearing and education of her children." He says no more of his
education, than that he "passed through the ordinary course of education
with success." In a document which will be immediately quoted at length,
we find him speaking of having received the usual college education of
Scotland, which terminates when the student is fourteen or fifteen years
old. It is probable that he studied at the University of Edinburgh, in
the matriculation book of which the name of "David Home" appears, as
intrant of the class of William Scott, Professor of Greek, on 27th
February, 1723. Holding the year to commence on 1st January, which was
then the practice in Scotland, though not in England, he would be at
that time nearly twelve years old. The name does not appear in any of
the subsequent matriculation lists: it was probably not then the
practice for the student to be entered more than once, at the
commencement of his curriculum; and neither the name of Hume, nor of
Home, occurs in the list of graduates.

Of his method of studying, and of his habits of life, after he left the
university, as of his literary aspirations and projects, we fortunately
possess some curious notices in his correspondence. The earliest letter
written by Hume, known to be extant, is in a scroll which has been
apparently preserved by himself. It is addressed to Michael Ramsay, with
whom it will be seen, from the letters quoted in the course of this
work, that the friendship formed, when both were young, remained
uninterrupted and vigorous during their mature years. I have been unable
to discover any thing of the history of this Michael Ramsay, beyond what
may be gathered from the internal evidence supplied by the
correspondence. He must have been destined for the English Church, but
he appears not to have taken orders; as in a letter from Hume, which,
though undated, must have been written at an advanced period of both
their lives, he is addressed "Michael Ramsay, Esq." Writing on 5th June,
1764, he says to Hume, "I continue in the old wandering way in which I
have passed so much of my life, and in which it is likely I shall end
it." He appears to have had many connexions well to do in the world, and
to have died before the year 1779, leaving his papers in the possession
of a nephew having his own Christian name of Michael; which was also, it
may be observed, the name of the Chevalier Ramsay, of whom Hume's
correspondent was perhaps a relation.[12:1]


HUME _to_ MICHAEL RAMSAY.

"_July 4, 1727._

"D{R} M.--I received all the books you writ of, and your Milton among
the rest. When I saw it, I perceived there was a difference betwixt
preaching and practising: you accuse me of niceness, and yet practise it
most egregiously yourself. What was the necessity of sending your
Milton, which I knew you were so fond of? Why, I lent your's and can't
get it. But would you not, in the same manner, have lent your own? Yes.
Then, why this ceremony and good breeding? I write all this to show you
how easily any action may be brought to bear the countenance of a fault.
You may justify yourself very well, by saying it was kindness; and I am
satisfied with it, and thank you for it. So, in the same manner, I may
justify myself from your reproofs. You say that I would not send in my
papers, because they were not polished nor brought to any form: which
you say is nicety. But was it not reasonable? Would you have me send in
my loose incorrect thoughts? Were such worth the transcribing? All the
progress that I made is but drawing the outlines, on loose bits of
paper: here a hint of a passion; there a phenomenon in the mind
accounted for: in another the alteration of these accounts; sometimes a
remark upon an author I have been reading; and none of them worth to any
body, and I believe scarce to myself. The only design I had of
mentioning any of them at all, was to see what you would have said of
your own, whether they were of the same kind, and if you would send any;
and I have got my end, for you have given a most satisfactory reason for
not communicating them, by promising they shall be told _vivâ voce_--a
much better way indeed, and in which I promise myself much satisfaction;
for the free conversation of a friend is what I would prefer to any
entertainment. Just now I am entirely confined to myself and library for
diversion since we parted.

               ----ea sola voluptus,
     Solamenque mali--[14:1]

And indeed to me they are not a small one: for I take no more of them
than I please; for I hate task-reading, and I diversify them at
pleasure--sometimes a philosopher, sometimes a poet--which change is not
unpleasant nor disserviceable neither; for what will more surely engrave
upon my mind a Tusculan disputation of Cicero's De Ægritudine Lenienda,
than an eclogue or georgick of Virgil's? The philosopher's wise man and
the poet's husbandman agree in peace of mind, in a liberty and
independency on fortune, and contempt of riches, power, and glory. Every
thing is placid and quiet in both: nothing perturbed or disordered.

     At secura quies, et nescia fallere vita----
     Speluncæ, vivique laci; at frigida Tempe,
     Mugitusque boum, mollesque sub arbore somnos
     Non absint.[14:2]

"These lines will, in my opinion, come nothing short of the instruction
of the finest sentence in Cicero: and is more to me, as Virgil's life is
more the subject of my ambition, being what I can apprehend to be more
within my power. For the perfectly wise man, that outbraves fortune, is
surely greater than the husbandman who slips by her; and, indeed, this
pastoral and saturnian happiness I have in a great measure come at just
now. I live like a king, pretty much by myself, neither full of action
nor perturbation,--_molles somnos_. This state, however, I can foresee
is not to be relied on. My peace of mind is not sufficiently confirmed
by philosophy to withstand the blows of fortune. This greatness and
elevation of soul is to be found only in study and contemplation--this
can alone teach us to look down on human accidents. You must allow [me]
to talk thus, like a philosopher: 'tis a subject I think much on, and
could talk all day long of. But I know I must not trouble you. Wherefore
I wisely practise my rules, which prescribe to check our appetite; and,
for a mortification, shall descend from these superior regions to low
and ordinary life; and so far as to tell you, that John has bought a
horse: he thinks it neither cheap nor dear. It cost six guineas, but
will be sold cheaper against winter, which he is not resolved on as yet.
It has no fault, but bogles a little. It is tolerably well favoured, and
paces naturally. Mamma bids me tell you, that Sir John Home is not going
to town; but he saw Eccles in the country, who says he will do nothing
in that affair, for he is only taking off old adjudications, so it is
needless to let him see the papers. He desires you would trouble
yourself to inquire about the Earle's affairs, and advise us what to do
in this affair.

"If it were not breaking the formal rule of connexions I have prescribed
myself in this letter--and it did not seem unnatural to raise myself
from so low affairs as horses and papers, to so high and elevate things
as books and study--I would tell you that I read some of Longinus
already, and that I am mightily delighted with him. I think he does
really answer the character of being the great sublime he describes. He
delivers his precepts with such force, as if he were enchanted with the
subject; and is himself an author that may be cited for an example to
his own rules, by any one who shall be so adventurous as to write upon
his subject."[16:1]


This is certainly a remarkable letter to have been written by a youth
little more than sixteen years old. If it had been written by one less
distinguished by the originality of his mature intellect, it might be
looked upon as one of those illustrations of the faculty of imitation,
for which some young persons display peculiar powers; but its grave and
high-toned philosophical feeling is evidently no echo of other people's
words, but the deeply felt sentiments of the writer. In some measure,
perhaps, he deceived himself in believing that he had attuned his mind
to pastoral simplicity, and had weeded it of all ambitious longings. If
he had a sympathy with Virgil, it was not, as he has represented, with
the poet's ideas of life, but with his realizations of it; not with the
quiet sphere of a retired and unnoticed existence, but with the lustre
of a well-earned fame. Through the whole, indeed, of the memorials of
Hume's early feelings, we find the traces of a bold and far-stretching
literary ambition; and though he believed that he had seared his mind to
ordinary human influences, it was because this one had become so
engrossing as to overwhelm all others. "I was seized very early," he
tells us, in his 'own life,' "with a passion for literature, which has
been the ruling passion of my life, and a great source of my
enjoyments." Joined to this impulse, we find a practical philosophy
partaking far more of the stoical than of that sceptical school with
which his metaphysical writings have identified him; a morality of
self-sacrifice and endurance, for the accomplishment of great ends. In
whatever light we may view his speculative opinions, we gather from the
habits of his life, and from the indications we possess of his passing
thoughts, that he devotedly acted up to the principle, that his genius
and power of application should be laid out with the greatest prospect
of permanent advantage to mankind. He was an economist of all his
talents from early youth: no memoir of a literary man presents a more
cautious and vigilant husbandry of the mental powers and acquirements.
There is no instance of a man of genius who has wasted less in idleness
or in unavailing pursuits. Money was not his object, nor was temporary
fame; though, of the means of independent livelihood, and a good repute
among men, he never lost sight: but his ruling object of ambition,
pursued in poverty and riches, in health and sickness, in laborious
obscurity and amidst the blaze of fame, was to establish a permanent
name, resting on the foundation of literary achievements, likely to live
as long as human thought endured, and mental philosophy was studied.

There is among Hume's papers a fragment of "An Historical Essay on
Chivalry and Modern Honour." It is evidently a clean copy from a
corrected scrawl, written with great precision and neatness, and no
despicable specimen of caligraphy. From the pains that appear to have
been bestowed on the penmanship, and from many rhetorical defects and
blemishes which do not appear in any of his published works, it may be
inferred that this is a production of very early years, and properly
applicable to this period of his life; although its matured thought, and
clear systematic analysis, might, in other circumstances, have indicated
it as the fruit of a mind long and carefully cultivated. It is scarcely
necessary to frame an excuse for quoting such a document on the present
occasion. It could not be legitimately incorporated with his works;
because, whatever is given to the public in that shape, is presumed to
consist of those productions which the author himself, or those entitled
to represent him, have thought fit to lay before the public, as the
efforts by which the full stretch and compass of his intellectual powers
are to be tested. From such collections, the editor who performs his
functions with a kind and respectful consideration for the reputation of
the illustrious dead, will exclude whatever is characterized by the
crudeness of youth, or the feebleness of superannuation. To the
reputation of Hume it would be peculiarly unjust to publish among his
acknowledged and printed works, any productions of extreme youth;
because, from his earliest years to an advanced period of his life, his
mind was characterized by constant improvement, and he was every now and
then reaching a point from which he looked back with regret and
disapprobation at the efforts of earlier years.

But in a biographical work, where the chief object is the tracing the
history of the author's mind, not the representation of its matured
efforts, these early specimens of budding genius have their legitimate
place, and receive that charitable consideration for the circumstances
in which they were written, which their author's reputation demands.

The essay commences with a sketch of the decline of virtue, and the
prevalence of luxury among the Romans; and describes their possession of
the arts which they had learned in their better days, when not seconded
by bravery and enterprise, as furnishing, like the fine clothes of a
soldier, a temptation to hostile cupidity. He then represents the
conquerors adapting themselves, after the manner peculiar to their own
barbarous state, to the habits and ideas of the civilized people whom
they had subdued. He represents the conquered people as sunk in
indolence, but imperfectly preserving the arts and elegancies
transmitted to them by their ancestors; and the conquerors full of
energy and activity, as the sources of whatever impulse was thereafter
given to thought or action. They "came with freshness and alacrity to
the business; and being encouraged both by the novelty of these subjects
and by the success of their arms, would naturally ingraft some new kind
of fruit on the ancient stock." He then proceeds with the following
train of reflections:--


"'Tis observable of the human mind, that when it is smit with any idea
of merit or perfection beyond what its faculties can attain, and in the
pursuit of which it uses not reason and experience for its guide, it
knows no mean, but as it gives the rein, and even adds the spur, to
every florid conceit or fancy, runs in a moment quite wide of nature.
Thus we find, when, without discretion, it indulges its devote terrors,
that working in such fairy-ground, it quickly buries itself in its own
whimsies and chimeras, and raises up to itself a new set of passions,
affections, desires, objects, and, in short, a perfectly new world of
its own, inhabited by different beings, and regulated by different laws
from this of ours. In this new world 'tis so possessed that it can
endure no interruption from the old; but as nature is apt still on every
occasion to recall it thither, it must undermine it by art, and retiring
altogether from the commerce of mankind, if it be so bent upon its
religious exercise, from the mystic, by an easy transition, degenerate
into the hermite. The same thing is observable in philosophy, which
though it cannot produce a different world in which we may wander, makes
us act in this as if we were different beings from the rest of mankind;
at least makes us frame to ourselves, though we cannot execute them,
rules of conduct different from those which are set to us by nature. No
engine can supply the place of wings, and make us fly, though the
imagination of such a one may make us stretch and strain and elevate
ourselves upon our tiptoes. And in this case of an imagined merit, the
farther our chimeras hurry us from nature, and the practice of the
world, the better pleased we are, as valuing ourselves upon the
singularity of our notions, and thinking we depart from the rest of
mankind only by flying above them. Where there is none we excel, we are
apt to think we have no excellency; and self-conceit makes us take every
singularity for an excellency.

"When, therefore, these barbarians came first to the relish of some
degree of virtue and politeness beyond what they had ever before been
acquainted with, their minds would necessarily stretch themselves into
some vast conceptions of things, which, not being corrected by
sufficient judgment and experience, must be empty and unsolid. Those who
had first bred these conceptions in them could not assist them in their
birth, as the Grecians did the Romans; but being themselves scarce half
civilized, would be rather apt to entertain any extravagant misshapen
conceit of their conquerors, than able to lick it into any form. 'Twas
thus that that monster of romantic chivalry, or knight-errantry, by the
necessary operation of the principles of human nature, was brought into
the world; and it is remarkable that it descended from the Moors and
Arabians, who, learning somewhat of the Roman civility from the province
they conquered, and being themselves a southern people, which are
commonly observed to be more quick and inventive than the northern, were
the first who fell upon this vein of achievement. When it was once
broken upon it ran like wild-fire over all the nations of Europe, who,
being in the same situation with these nations, kindled with the least
spark.

"What kind of monstrous birth this of chivalry must prove, we may learn
from considering the different revolutions in the arts, particularly in
architecture, and comparing the Gothic with the Grecian models of it.
The one are plain, simple, and regular, but withal majestic and
beautiful, which when these barbarians unskilfully imitated, they ran
into a wild profusion of ornaments, and by their rude embellishments
departed far from nature and a just simplicity. They were struck with
the beauties of the ancient buildings; but, ignorant how to preserve a
just mean, and giving an unbounded liberty to their fancy in heaping
ornament upon ornament, they made the whole a heap of confusion and
irregularity. For the same reason, when they would rear up a new scheme
of manners, or heroism, it must be strangely overcharged with ornaments,
and no part exempt from their unskilful refinements; and this we find to
have been actually the case, as may be proven by running over the
several parts of it."


He then inquires into the reason, why courage is the principal virtue of
barbarous nations, and why they esteem deeds of heroism, however useless
or mischievous, as far more meritorious than useful efforts of
government or internal organization. He contrasts the heroism of the
barbarous periods of the ancient world, with those of the dark ages of
modern Europe; and finding the former selfish and aggrandizing, while
the latter is characterized by the more generous features of chivalry,
he thus accounts for this characteristic.


"The method by which these courteous knights acquired this extreme
civility of theirs, was by mixing love with their courage. Love is a
very generous passion, and well fitted both to that humanity and
courage they would reconcile. The only one that can contest with it is
friendship, which, besides that it is too refined a passion for common
use, is not by many degrees so natural as love, to which almost every
one has a great propensity, and which it is impossible to see a
beautiful woman, without feeling some touches of. Besides, as love is a
capricious passion, it is the more susceptible of these fantastic forms,
which it must take when it mixes with chivalry. Friendship is a solid
and serious thing, and, like the love of their country in the Roman
heroes, would dispel and put to flight all the chimeras, inseparable
from this spirit of adventure. So that a mistress is as necessary to a
cavalier or knight-errant, as a god or saint to a devotee. Nor would he
stop here, or be contented with a submiss reverence and adoration to one
of the sex, but would extend in some degree the same civility to the
whole, and by a curious reversement of the order of nature, make them
the superior. This is no more than what is suitable to that infinite
generosity of which he makes profession. Every thing below him he treats
with submission, and every thing above him, with contumacy. Thus he
carries these double symptoms of generosity which Virgil makes mention
of into extravagance.

     Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.

Hence arises the knight-errant's strong and irreconcileable aversion to
all giants, with his most humble and respectful submission to all
damsels. These two affections of his, he unites in all his adventures,
which are always designed to relieve distressed damsels from the
captivity and violence of giants.

"As a cavalier is composed of the greatest warmth of love, tempered with
the most humble submission and respect, his mistress's behaviour is in
every point the reverse of this; and what is conspicuous in her temper
is the utmost coldness along with the greatest haughtiness and disdain;
until at last, gratitude for the many deliverances she has met with, and
the giants and monsters without number that he has destroyed for her
sake, reduces her, though unwilling, to the necessity of commencing a
bride. Here the chastity of women, which, from the necessity of human
affairs, has been in all ages and countries an extravagant point of
honour with them, is run into still greater extravagance, that none of
the sexes may be exempt from this fantastic ornament.

"Such were the notions of bravery in that age, and such the fictions by
which they formed models of it. The effects these had on their ordinary
life and conversation was, first, an extravagant gallantry and adoration
of the whole female sex, and romantic notions of extraordinary
constancy, fidelity, and refined passion for one mistress. Secondly, the
introduction of the practice of single combat. How naturally this sprung
up from chivalry may easily be understood. A knight-errant fights, not
like another man full of passion and resentment, but with the utmost
civility mixed with his undaunted courage. He salutes you before he cuts
your throat; and a plain man, who understood nothing of the mystery,
would take him for a treacherous ruffian, and think that, like Judas, he
was betraying with a kiss, while he is showing his generous calmness and
amicable courage. In consequence of this, every thing is performed with
the greatest ceremony and order; and whenever either chance or his
superior bravery make either of them victorious, he generously gives his
antagonist his life, and again embraces him as his friend. When these
fantastic practices have come in use, the amazed world, who, merely
because there is nothing real in all this, must certainly imagine there
is a great deal, could not but look upon such a courteous enmity as the
most heroic and sublime thing in nature; and instead of punishing any
murder that might ensue, as the law directs in such cases, would praise
and applaud the murderer."[25:1]


Perhaps the reader of these passages will have come to the conclusion
that the powers of reason displayed in them are as bold and original as
the imagination is meagre and servile. The reflections on Gothic
architecture are the commonplace opinions of the day, uttered by one who
was singularly destitute of sympathy with the human intellect, in its
early efforts to resolve itself into symmetry and elegance; whose mind
shrunk from the contemplation of any work of man that did not bear the
stamp of high intellectual culture. The same want of sympathy with man
in his rude and grand, though inharmonious efforts, here attends both
the chivalric manners and the solemn architecture of the dark ages. Of
the former, he has made a cold, clear, unsympathizing, perhaps accurate
estimate. The latter, unless a large proportion of the architectural
enthusiasts of the present day have raised the taste of the age upon
false foundations, he utterly misappreciated.

It must have been about his seventeenth year that Hume commenced, and
abruptly relinquished the practical study of the law,--a curious episode
in his history, which he thus describes in his "own life:" "My studious
disposition, my sobriety, and my industry, gave my family a notion that
the law was a proper profession for me; but I found an insurmountable
aversion to every thing but the pursuits of philosophy and general
learning; and while they fancied I was poring upon Voet and Vinnius,
Cicero and Virgil were the authors which I was secretly devouring."

But this by no means gives the reader a full and faithful impression of
his motives. The passage calls up the vision of a contemplative, gentle,
unambitious youth, shrinking from the arid labours that lead to wealth
and distinction, and content to dream away his life in obscurity with
the companionship of his favourite books. The document already referred
to, and immediately to be quoted, shows that far other thoughts were in
his mind; that he did not shrink from the professional labours of the
bar, to sink into studious ease, but rejected them to encounter higher
and more arduous toils--that he did not drop passively from the path of
ambition opened to him, but deserted it for a higher and more
adventurous course. He had indeed already before him the prospect of
being a discoverer in philosophy, and his mind, crowded with the images
of his new system, could see nothing else in life worthy of pursuit.

Without this clue, Hume's aversion to the study of the law would have
been a problem not to be easily solved. Had he lived in the present day,
when the mass of statute and precedent that have accumulated even within
the narrow domain of Scottish law, have completely precluded those
luxurious digressions into the field of speculation and theory, which
characterized the legal practice of our ancestors, one might readily
comprehend the aversion of his fastidiously cultivated logical mind to
such hard and coarse materials. But a lawyer's library, in his days,
consisted of the classics, the philosophers of mind, and the civilians.
The advocate often commenced his pleadings with a quotation from the
young philosopher's favourite poet Virgil, and then digressed into a
speculative inquiry into the general principles of law and government:
the philosophical genius of Themis long soaring sublime, until at last,
folding her wings, she rested on some vulgar question about dry multures
or an irritancy of a tailzie, to the settlement of which the wide
principles so announced were applied. Surely that science, within the
boundaries of which the speculative spirit of Lord Kames had room for
its flights, could not have been rejected on the ground that it cramped
and restrained the faculty of generalizing.[28:1] Yet in a letter to
Smith, of 12th April, 1759, which shows that Hume retained his antipathy
to the study to an advanced period of his life, he says, "I am afraid of
Kames' Law Tracts. A man might as well think of making a fine sauce by a
mixture of wormwood and aloes, as an agreeable composition by joining
metaphysics and Scottish law. However, the book I believe has merit,
though few people will take the pains of inquiring into it."

In truth there appear to have been in Hume all the elements of which a
good lawyer is made: clearness of judgment, power of rapidly acquiring
knowledge, untiring industry, and dialectic skill; and, if his mind had
not been preoccupied, he might have fallen into that gulf in which many
of the world's greatest geniuses lie buried--professional eminence, and
might have left behind him a reputation limited to the traditional
recollections of the Parliament House, or associated with important
decisions. He was through life an able, clear-headed man of business,
and I have seen several legal documents written in his own hand and
evidently drawn by himself. They stand the test of general professional
observation; and their writer, by preparing documents of such a
character on his own responsibility, showed that he had considerable
confidence in his ability to adhere to the forms adequate for the
occasion. He talks of it as "an ancient prejudice industriously
propagated by the dunces in all countries, that _a man of genius is
unfit for business_;"[29:1] and he showed, in his general conduct
through life, that he did not choose to come voluntarily under this
proscription.

His writings, however, bear but slight traces of his juridical studies.
In analysing the foundations of our notions of property, he criticises
some of the subtleties of the early civilians, but shows no more
intimate acquaintance with their works than any well-informed scholar of
the day might be supposed to exhibit. He shows no pleasure in dwelling
on matters connected with this study, but rather appears disposed to
release himself and his reader from a subject so little congenial to his
taste. The particular law of Scotland is one of those subjects to which
he would be careful to avoid a reference, as carrying with it that tone
of provincial thought and education which he was always anxious to
avoid. It may be perhaps an unfortunate result of this early prejudice
against the study of jurisprudence, that in after life he failed to
acquire that knowledge of the progress of the law of England, which
would have made his history much less amenable than it has been to
censorious criticism.

It is now time that the reader should be possessed of the document above
alluded to, as throwing much light on Hume's early studies and habits of
life; and it is here presented, without any introductory explanation, as
it first appeared to me in going through the papers in the possession of
the Royal Society.


_A Letter to a Physician._

"SIR,--Not being acquainted with this handwriting, you will probably
look to the bottom to find the subscription, and not finding any, will
certainly wonder at this strange method of addressing to you. I must
here in the beginning beg you to excuse it, and, to persuade you to read
what follows with some attention, must tell you, that this gives you an
opportunity to do a very good-natured action, which I believe is the
most powerful argument I can use. I need not tell you, that I am your
countryman, a Scotsman; for without any such tie, I dare rely upon your
humanity even to a perfect stranger, such as I am. The favour I beg of
you is your advice, and the reason why I address myself in particular to
you, need not be told,--as one must be a skilful physician, a man of
letters, of wit, of good sense, and of great humanity, to give me a
satisfying answer. I wish fame had pointed out to me more persons, in
whom these qualities are united, in order to have kept me some time in
suspense. This I say in the sincerity of my heart, and without any
intention of making a compliment; for though it may seem necessary,
that, in the beginning of so unusual a letter, I should say some fine
things, to bespeak your good opinion, and remove any prejudices you may
conceive at it, yet such an endeavour to be witty, would ill suit with
the present condition of my mind; which, I must confess, is not without
anxiety concerning the judgment you will form of me. Trusting, however,
to your candour and generosity, I shall, without further preface,
proceed to open up to you the present condition of my health, and to do
that the more effectually, shall give you a kind of history of my life,
after which you will easily learn why I keep my name a secret.

"You must know then that, from my earliest infancy, I found always a
strong inclination to books and letters. As our college education in
Scotland, extending little further than the languages, ends commonly
when we are about fourteen or fifteen years of age, I was after that
left to my own choice in my reading, and found it incline me almost
equally to books of reasoning and philosophy, and to poetry and the
polite authors. Every one who is acquainted either with the philosophers
or critics, knows that there is nothing yet established in either of
these two sciences, and that they contain little more than endless
disputes, even in the most fundamental articles. Upon examination of
these, I found a certain boldness of temper growing in me, which was not
inclined to submit to any authority in these subjects, but led me to
seek out some new medium, by which truth might be established. After
much study and reflection on this, at last, when I was about eighteen
years of age, there seemed to be opened up to me a new scene of thought,
which transported me beyond measure, and made me, with an ardour natural
to young men, throw up every other pleasure or business to apply
entirely to it. The law, which was the business I designed to follow,
appeared nauseous to me, and I could think of no other way of pushing my
fortune in the world, but that of a scholar and philosopher. I was
infinitely happy in this course of life for some months; till at last,
about the beginning of September, 1729, all my ardour seemed in a moment
to be extinguished, and I could no longer raise my mind to that pitch,
which formerly gave me such excessive pleasure. I felt no uneasiness or
want of spirits, when I laid aside my book; and therefore never imagined
there was any bodily distemper in the case, but that my coldness
proceeded from a laziness of temper, which must be overcome by
redoubling my application. In this condition I remained for nine months,
very uneasy to myself, as you may well imagine, but without growing any
worse, which was a miracle. There was another particular, which
contributed, more than any thing, to waste my spirits and bring on me
this distemper, which was, that having read many books of morality, such
as Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch, and being smit with their beautiful
representations of virtue and philosophy, I undertook the improvement of
my temper and will, along with my reason and understanding. I was
continually fortifying myself with reflections against death, and
poverty, and shame, and pain, and all the other calamities of life.
These no doubt are exceeding useful, when joined with an active life,
because the occasion being presented along with the reflection, works it
into the soul, and makes it take a deep impression; but in solitude they
serve to little other purpose, than to waste the spirits, the force of
the mind meeting with no resistance, but wasting itself in the air, like
our arm when it misses its aim. This, however, I did not learn but by
experience, and till I had already ruined my health, though I was not
sensible of it. Some scurvy spots broke out on my fingers the first
winter I fell ill, about which I consulted a very knowing physician, who
gave me some medicine that removed these symptoms, and at the same time
gave me a warning against the vapours, which, though I was labouring
under at that time, I fancied myself so far removed from, and indeed
from any other disease, except a slight scurvy, that I despised his
warning. At last, about April 1730, when I was nineteen years of age, a
symptom, which I had noticed a little from the beginning, increased
considerably; so that, though it was no uneasiness, the novelty of it
made me ask advice; it was what they call a ptyalism or wateryness in
the mouth. Upon my mentioning it to my physician, he laughed at me, and
told me I was now a brother, for that I had fairly got the disease of
the learned. Of this he found great difficulty to persuade me, finding
in myself nothing of that lowness of spirit, which those who labour
under that distemper so much complain of. However upon his advice I went
under a course of bitters, and anti-hysteric pills, drank an English
pint of claret wine every day, and rode eight or ten Scotch miles. This
I continued for about seven months after.

"Though I was sorry to find myself engaged with so tedious a distemper,
yet the knowledge of it set me very much at ease, by satisfying me that
my former coldness proceeded not from any defect of temper or genius,
but from a disease to which any one may be subject. I now began to take
some indulgence to myself; studied moderately, and only when I found my
spirits at their highest pitch, leaving off before I was weary, and
trifling away the rest of my time in the best manner I could. In this
way, I lived with satisfaction enough; and on my return to town next
winter found my spirits very much recruited, so that, though they sank
under me in the higher flights of genius, yet I was able to make
considerable progress in my former designs. I was very regular in my
diet and way of life from the beginning, and all that winter made it a
constant rule to ride twice or thrice a-week, and walk every day. For
these reasons, I expected, when I returned to the country, and could
renew my exercise with less interruption, that I would perfectly
recover. But in this I was much mistaken; for next summer, about May
1731, there grew upon me a very ravenous appetite, and as quick a
digestion, which I at first took for a good symptom, and was very much
surprised to find it bring back a palpitation of heart, which I had felt
very little of before. This appetite, however, had an effect very
unusual, which was to nourish me extremely; so that in six weeks' time,
I passed from the one extreme to the other; and being before tall, lean,
and raw-boned, became on a sudden the most sturdy, robust,
healthful-like fellow you have seen, with a ruddy complexion and a
cheerful countenance. In excuse for my riding, and care of my health, I
always said that I was afraid of consumption, which was readily believed
from my looks, but now every body congratulated me upon my thorough
recovery. This unnatural appetite wore off by degrees, but left me as a
legacy the same palpitation of the heart in a small degree, and a good
deal of wind in my stomach, which comes away easily, and without any bad
_goût_, as is ordinary. However, these symptoms are little or no
uneasiness to me. I eat well; I sleep well; have no lowness of spirits,
at least never more than what one of the best health may feel from too
full a meal, from sitting too near a fire, and even that degree I feel
very seldom, and never almost in the morning or forenoon. Those who live
in the same family with me, and see me at all times, cannot observe the
least alteration in my humour, and rather think me a better companion
than I was before, as choosing to pass more of my time with them. This
gave me such hopes, that I scarce ever missed a day's riding, except in
the winter time; and last summer undertook a very laborious task, which
was to travel eight miles every morning, and as many in the forenoon, to
and from a mineral well of some reputation. I renewed the bitter and
anti-hysteric pills twice, along with anti-scorbutic juice, last
spring, but without any considerable effect, except abating the symptoms
for a little time.

"Thus I have given you a full account of the condition of my body; and
without staying to ask pardon, as I ought to do, for so tedious a story,
shall explain to you how my mind stood all this time, which on every
occasion, especially in this distemper, have a very near connexion
together. Having now time and leisure to cool my inflamed imagination, I
began to consider seriously how I should proceed in my philosophical
inquiries. I found that the moral philosophy transmitted to us by
antiquity laboured under the same inconvenience that has been found in
their natural philosophy, of being entirely hypothetical, and depending
more upon invention than experience: every one consulted his fancy in
erecting schemes of virtue and of happiness, without regarding human
nature, upon which every moral conclusion must depend. This, therefore,
I resolved to make my principal study, and the source from which I would
derive every truth in criticism as well as morality. I believe it is a
certain fact, that most of the philosophers who have gone before us,
have been overthrown by the greatness of their genius, and that little
more is required to make a man succeed in this study, than to throw off
all prejudices either for his own opinions or for those of others. At
least this is all I have to depend on for the truth of my reasonings,
which I have multiplied to such a degree, that within these three years,
I find I have scribbled many a quire of paper, in which there is nothing
contained but my own inventions. This, with the reading most of the
celebrated books in Latin, French, and English, and acquiring the
Italian, you may think a sufficient business for one in perfect health,
and so it would had it been done to any purpose; but my disease was a
cruel encumbrance on me. I found that I was not able to follow out any
train of thought, by one continued stretch of view, but by repeated
interruptions, and by refreshing my eye from time to time upon other
objects. Yet with this inconvenience I have collected the rude materials
for many volumes; but in reducing these to words, when one must bring
the idea he comprehended in gross, nearer to him, so as to contemplate
its minutest parts, and keep it steadily in his eye, so as to copy these
parts in order,--this I found impracticable for me, nor were my spirits
equal to so severe an employment. Here lay my greatest calamity. I had
no hopes of delivering my opinions with such elegance and neatness, as
to draw to me the attention of the world, and I would rather live and
die in obscurity than produce them maimed and imperfect.

"Such a miserable disappointment I scarce ever remember to have heard
of. The small distance betwixt me and perfect health makes me the more
uneasy in my present situation. It is a weakness rather than a lowness
of spirits which troubles me, and there seems to be as great a
difference betwixt my distemper and common vapours, as betwixt vapours
and madness. I have noticed in the writings of the French mystics, and
in those of our fanatics here, that when they give a history of the
situation of their souls, they mention a coldness and desertion of the
spirit, which frequently returns; and some of them, at the beginning,
have been tormented with it many years. As this kind of devotion depends
entirely on the force of passion, and consequently of the animal
spirits, I have often thought that their case and mine were pretty
parallel, and that their rapturous admirations might discompose the
fabric of the nerves and brain, as much as profound reflections, and
that warmth or enthusiasm which is inseparable from them.

"However this may be, I have not come out of the cloud so well as they
commonly tell us they have done, or rather began to despair of ever
recovering. To keep myself from being melancholy on so dismal a
prospect, my only security was in peevish reflections on the vanity of
the world and of all human glory; which, however just sentiments they
may be esteemed, I have found can never be sincere, except in those who
are possessed of them. Being sensible that all my philosophy would never
make me contented in my present situation, I began to rouse up myself;
and being encouraged by instances of recovery from worse degrees of this
distemper, as well as by the assurances of my physicians, I began to
think of something more effectual than I had hitherto tried. I found,
that as there are two things very bad for this distemper, study and
idleness, so there are two things very good, business and diversion; and
that my whole time was spent betwixt the bad, with little or no share of
the good. For this reason I resolved to seek out a more active life, and
though I could not quit my pretensions in learning but with my last
breath, to lay them aside for some time, in order the more effectually
to resume them. Upon examination, I found my choice confined to two
kinds of life, that of a travelling governor, and that of a merchant.
The first, besides that it is in some respects an idle life, was, I
found, unfit for me; and that because from a sedentary and retired way
of living, from a bashful temper, and from a narrow fortune, I had been
little accustomed to general companies, and had not confidence and
knowledge enough of the world to push my fortune, or to be serviceable
in that way. I therefore fixed my choice upon a merchant; and having got
recommendation to a considerable trader in Bristol, I am just now
hastening thither, with a resolution to forget myself, and every thing
that is past, to engage myself, as far as is possible, in that course of
life, and to toss about the world, from the one pole to the other, till
I leave this distemper behind me.

"As I am come to London in my way to Bristol, I have resolved, if
possible, to get your advice, though I should take this absurd method of
procuring it. All the physicians I have consulted, though very able,
could never enter into my distemper; because not being persons of great
learning beyond their own profession, they were unacquainted with these
motions of the mind. Your fame pointed you out as the properest person
to resolve my doubts, and I was determined to have somebody's opinion,
which I could rest upon in all the varieties of fears and hopes,
incident to so lingering a distemper. I hope I have been particular
enough in describing the symptoms to allow you to form a judgment; or
rather, perhaps, have been too particular. But you know it is a symptom
of this distemper, to delight in complaining and talking of itself. The
questions I would humbly propose to you are: Whether, among all those
scholars you have been acquainted with, you have ever known any affected
in this manner? Whether I can ever hope for a recovery? Whether I must
long wait for it? Whether my recovery will ever be perfect, and my
spirits regain their former spring and vigour, so as to endure the
fatigue of deep and abstruse thinking? Whether I have taken a right way
to recover? I believe all proper medicines have been used, and therefore
I need mention nothing of them."

The history of this eventful period in the mental biography of Hume, is
very briefly narrated in his "own life." Alluding to his adoption of the
life of a student, he says, "My very slender fortune, however, being
unsuitable to this plan of life, and my health being a little broken by
my ardent application, I was tempted, or rather forced, to make a very
feeble trial for entering into a more active scene of life. In 1734, I
went to Bristol, with some recommendations to eminent merchants, but in
a few months found that scene totally unsuitable to me."


I am sure the reader will sympathize with me in esteeming it a high
privilege to be the humble instrument of ushering into the world so
curious a piece of literary autobiography as that which he has just
perused. We are here admitted into the confessional. So secret is the
communication of thought by the writer to the receiver, that the latter,
who was made acquainted with so much of the internal meditations of the
former, was not to be allowed to know with what outward man this mind of
which he obtained a description was connected. The individual mind was
fully and minutely described--to what individual man this mind belonged
was to be preserved a profound secret. The writer shrunk from the
admission of any man to a participation with him in his
self-conferences, and he planned that by keeping his name a secret, the
link which would connect this knowledge of the inner to an acquaintance
with the outer man should be broken. We have surely in this an argument
in favour of the candour and explicitness of his narrative. He felt that
to be known, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, by the person he
addressed, would be a restraint on the freedom of his revelations--he
threw off this restraint, and we are entitled to infer that his letter
is a piece of full and candid self-examination. Every word of it, as it
was originally written, is here printed, and it will perhaps be admitted
that there is not one word of it that does not do honour to its writer.
To Aristotle and others it is attributed that they taught esoteric
doctrines to a chosen few--doctrines not to be promulgated to the world
at large, because they were likely to have a dangerous influence on
minds not skilfully trained for their reception. For any vestiges of
these hidden doctrines the world searches, anticipating that in them
will be found a nearer approach to that which the philosopher believed
in his own mind, as distinct from that which he desired to inculcate on
others. In all ages there has been a natural and a praiseworthy
curiosity to know the hidden thoughts of great teachers. Mankind in
general admit, that truth is what is valuable in all philosophy, and if
a man entertained thoughts in his own mind in any way different from
those which he taught, it has been a conclusion certainly quite
legitimate, that truth is more likely to be found in the former than in
the latter. But certainly there can hardly be found any other instance
in which a document, so likely to be the honest impress of a
philosopher's own mind, has been laid before the world; and it is an
attestation of the sincerity with which the opinions then in the course
of formation in his mind were believed.

But, independently of the philosophical value of the document, to be
thus admitted into the secrecy of the thoughts of a man ambitious of
high literary distinction, and who has attained his object, is a rare
privilege. The revelation, notwithstanding its foreboding tone, is
calculated to give far more pleasure than pain. The future, which seemed
to the desponding philosopher for a moment so dark, we know to have
brightened on him. Hume was of the happy few who lived to see their airy
castles substantially realized. Comparing what it reveals of the inner
man, with the subsequent history of his achievements, the picture
supplied by this fragment of autobiography is a happy one. We sympathize
with the aspiring dreams of the young man, without feeling that they
were afterwards doomed to disappointment. The immediate occasion of his
earnest appeal is undoubtedly one of despondency; but it was preceded by
hope, as we know it was followed by success; and notwithstanding this
passing cloud, it may fairly be pronounced, that though Hume enjoyed
through life more than the average portion of human happiness, he had no
moments of purer felicity than those in which, in the retirement of his
paternal home, he was sketching the airy outline of his subsequent
career.

Perhaps the feature that will most forcibly strike the reader, is the
evidence of the deep-rooted ambition to found a philosophical
reputation, that seems to have filled the mind of the writer of this
document. The consciousness that the receiver of the paper must at once
perceive this circumstance, and the desire not to let a stranger
penetrate his aspiring thoughts, must have been the reasons of his
desire for secrecy: it was natural that one who had not entered the
lists to struggle for literary distinction, should wish to conceal how
strong and inextinguishable was his desire to obtain the prize. The
intensity of his anxiety on this subject seems to have made him, in
relation to his mind, what the ordinary hypochondriac is as to his
physical constitution. The desire to preserve the elements of
distinction was so intense, that it disturbed him with vain fears for
their disappearance. Feeling within him, at times, the consciousness of
possessing an original genius,--that it should depart from him, and that
his lot should be cast among that of ordinary mortals, with good
physical health and commonplace abilities, appeared to him the most
awful calamity which fate could have in store for him. Of the excellent
physical health which accompanied these unpleasant variations of his
mental capacity, he speaks with an almost sardonic scorn, as one who, in
the bitterness of being bereft of what is all in all to him, talks of
some paltry trifle which fortune in her sarcastic malice has chosen to
leave untouched. In short, the manner in which he speaks of the
departure of his cunning, must almost necessarily convey to the reader a
considerable portion of that ludicrous character which is always
presented by a scene in which a man appears to be dreadfully anxious
about the safety of that which either is of no importance, or is not in
danger.

It may be a question whether this strange letter was ever sent to its
destination, as the version from which it is here printed is not a rough
draught, but a neatly written copy, such as might have been prepared for
transmission. But this does not afford so full a presumption in Hume's
case, as it would in that of the average of literary men, as he seems to
have felt a sort of enjoyment in his earlier years in having his papers
neatly written out. The first name that suggested itself as that of the
person to whom the paper was addressed was Arbuthnot, whose fine genius
was just then flickering in the socket. But a more full consideration
showed to my satisfaction that it must have been destined for Dr. George
Cheyne, and that it was suggested by that eminent physician's
publication, in the preceding year, of "The English Malady; or, a
Treatise of Nervous Diseases of all kinds, as Spleen, Vapours, Lowness
of Spirits, Hypochondriacal Distempers, &c." There is a certain unison
of tone between Hume's letter and this book, that, added to other
coincidences, strongly impresses on the mind their connexion with each
other; and though it is perhaps necessary, before this is fully seen, to
enter into the whole tenor and tone of Cheyne's book, the reader will
perhaps find the following passage sufficient to render the conjecture
probable:--

"It is a common observation, (and I think has great probability on its
side,) that fools, weak or stupid persons, heavy and dull souls, are
seldom much troubled with vapours or lowness of spirits. The
intellectual faculty, without all manner of doubt, has material and
animal organs, by which it mediately works, as well as the animal
functions. What they are, and how they operate, as I believe very few
know, so it is very little necessary to know them for my present
purpose. As a philosophical musician may understand proportions and
harmony, and yet never be in a condition to gratify a company with a
fine piece of music, without the benefit of sounds from proper organs,
so the intellectual operations (as long as the present union between
soul and body lasts) can never be performed in the best manner without
proper instruments. The works of imagination and memory, of study,
thinking, and reflecting, from whatever source the principle on which
they depend springs, must necessarily require bodily organs. Some have
these organs finer, quicker, more agile, and sensible, and perhaps more
numerous than others; brute animals have few or none, at least none that
belong to reflection; vegetables certainly none at all. There is no
account to be given how a disease, a fall, a blow, a debauch, poisons,
violent passions, astral and aerial influences, much application, and
the like, should possibly alter or destroy these intellectual operations
without this supposition. It is evident, that in nervous distempers, and
a great many other bodily diseases, these faculties and their operations
are impaired, nay, totally ruined and extinguished to all appearance;
and yet, by proper remedies, and after recovery of health, they are
restored and brought to their former state. Now, since this present age
has made efforts to go beyond former times, in all the arts of
ingenuity, invention, study, learning, and all the contemplative and
sedentary professions, (I speak only here of our own nation, our own
times, and of the better sort, whose chief employments and studies these
are,) the organs of these faculties being thereby worn and spoiled, must
affect and deaden the whole system, and lay a foundation for the
diseases of lowness and weakness. Add to this, that those who are
likeliest to excel and apply in this manner, are most capable and most
in hazard of following that way of life which I have mentioned, as the
likeliest to produce these diseases. Great wits are generally great
epicures, at least, men of taste. And the bodies and constitutions of
one generation are still more corrupt, infirm, and diseased, than those
of the former, as they advance in time and the use of the causes
assigned."

Then there are the farther coincidences, that Cheyne was a Scotsman,
that he was an eminent man in his profession, and that he had bestowed
some attention on mental philosophy. "I passed my youth," he tells us,
"in close study, and almost constant application to the abstracted
sciences, wherein my chief pleasure consisted." "Having," he elsewhere
says, "had a liberal education, with the instruction and example of
pious parents, (who at first had designed me for the church,) I had
preserved a firm persuasion of the great and fundamental principles of
all virtue and morality: viz. the existence of a supreme and infinitely
perfect Being, the freedom of the will, the immortality of the spirits
of all intellectual beings, and the certainty of future rewards or
punishments. These doctrines I had examined carefully, and had been
confirmed in, from abstracted reasonings, as well as from the best
natural philosophy, and some clearer knowledge of the material system of
the world in general, and the wisdom, fitness, and beautiful contrivance
of particular things animated and inanimated; so that the truth and
necessity of these principles was so riveted in me, (which may be seen
by the first edition of my 'Philosophical Principles,' published some
years before that happened,[45:1]) as never after to be shaken in all my
wanderings and follies."[45:2] It may be mentioned also, as a
circumstance likely to bring Cheyne's work early under Hume's
observation, that it contains a long statement of the case of Dr.
William Cranstoun, an eminent medical man then residing at Jedburgh, in
the same district of country with Ninewells.


FOOTNOTES:

[1:1] Old Style.

[1:2] He is entered in the list of members on 23d June, 1705, as "Mr.
Joseph Hume of Ninewalls." It thus appears that the orthography of the
name adopted by his son, and which will be found to have been so much
the subject of dispute, was not a novelty to the family.

[2:1] Both the "Peerage" and the "Baronage" of Scotland, by Robert
Douglas, are well known to Scottish genealogical antiquaries. The former
was published in 1764. The latter, in which there is a brief account of
the Ninewells' family, in 1798.

[4:1] In connexion with this, it is not uninteresting to view Hume's
opinions on the philosophy of family pride. He says, in the Treatise of
Human Nature, Book ii. p. i. sect. 9.--"'Tis evident that, when any one
boasts of the antiquity of his family, the subjects of his vanity are
not merely the extent of time and number of ancestors, but also their
riches and credit, which are supposed to reflect a lustre on himself on
account of his relation to them. He first considers these objects; is
affected by them in an agreeable manner; and then returning back to
himself, through the relation of parent and child, is elevated with the
passion of pride, by means of the double relation of impressions and
ideas. Since, therefore, the passion depends on these relations,
whatever strengthens any of the relations must also increase the
passion, and whatever weakens the relations must diminish the passion.
Now 'tis certain the identity of the possession strengthens the relation
of ideas arising from blood and kindred, and conveys the fancy with
greater facility from one generation to another, from the remotest
ancestors to their posterity, who are both their heirs and their
descendants. By this facility the impression is transmitted more entire,
and excites a greater degree of pride and vanity."

[6:1] The document is quoted in Book ii. of Robertson's History of
Scotland.

[6:2] A tragic incident occurred in the year 1683, in which Hume of
Ninewells, and Johnston of Hilton, were victims to the revengeful
passions of a brother of the Earl of Home, vented under circumstances of
singular treachery and inhospitality. It is thus narrated in Law's
Memorials, p. 259. "December, 1683, about the close of that moneth, the
Earl himself being from home, the Lairds of Hilton and Nynhools came to
make a visit to the Earl of Home his house, and went to dice and cards
with Mr. William Home, the Earl's brother. Some sharp words fell amongst
them at their game, which were not noticed, as it seemed to them; yet,
when the two gentlemen were gone to their bed-chambers, the foresaid Mr.
William comes up with his sword and stabs Hilton with nine deadly
wounds, in his bed, that he dies immediately; and wounds Nynhools
mortally, so that it was thought he could not live, and immediately took
horse and fled into England--a treacherous and villanous act done to two
innocent gentlemen, the fruits of dicing and card gaming."

"Joseph Johnstone of Hilton was stabbed by Mr. William, brother to
Charles earle of Hume. Hilton being of a lofty temper, had given Mr.
Hume bad words in his own house of Hilton, and a box on the ear. . . .
And William Hume made his escape to England, on Hilton's horse. He was
after killed himself in the wars abroad."--Lord Fountainhall's Diary, p.
33.

The editor of Law, Mr. Kirkpatrick Sharpe, appends the following farther
notices of this incident:--

"Before his death he is said to have returned to Scotland, smitten with
remorse, and anxious to obtain pardon of a near male relation of
Johnstone's, then residing in Edinburgh. This gentleman, in the dusk of
the evening, was called forth to the outside stairs of the house, to
speak with a stranger muffled in a cloak. As he proceeded along the
passage, the door being open, he recognised the murderer; and
immediately drawing his sword, rushed towards him, on which the other
leapt nimbly down from the stairs into the street, and was never again
seen in Scotland." These events were made the subject of an amusing
sketch in _Chambers's Edinburgh Journal_, No. 569.

[7:1] Copy MS. communicated by Dr. Vallange, Portobello.

[8:1] Hist. and Allus. Arms, p. 400, where the information is derived
from Douglas's Baronage.

[9:1] Unless such allusions as the following be held as an exception:
"The north of England abounds in the best horses of all kinds which are
perhaps in the world. In the neighbouring counties, north side of the
Tweed, no good horses of any kind are to be met with." Essay on National
Characters. But he speaks fully as distinctly and specifically of local
matters in France or Spain.

The remarks in the text may probably be considered superfluous, being
applicable to by far the greater portion of literary men--as those who
have attempted to trace, from the internal evidence of their works, the
birthplaces of authors not commemorated by their contemporaries, can
testify. Thomson, also a borderer, and a poet of rural life, has
scarcely any allusion that bears a distinct reference to the scenery of
his childhood, and celebrates the heroism of almost every land but his
own. In that age, however, to be national in Scotland was to be
provincial in Britain; and unless an author chose to aim at the
restricted reputation of a Ramsay or a Pennecuik, he must carefully shun
allusions to his native country. But the very existence of this, as a
general characteristic, seems to render it worthy of notice in this
instance, which must certainly be held, like Thomson's, a peculiarly
marked illustration of this feature in literary history. Hume had
frequently to record events which had taken place close to his home; and
the whole of the surrounding district was full of traditional lore,
about the wild life of the borderers in the seventeenth century, which
would have afforded valuable materials for his history, and some of his
other works, had he been one of those who derive their knowledge from
men as well as from books. But these volumes will afford ample
opportunity for observing, that he required to place no great restraint
on his pen to keep it free of provincial allusions; and that, even in
his most familiar letters, though he often speaks of the friends of his
youth, he says nothing of the places in which he spent his early days.

[12:1] Among the Hume Papers in the possession of the Royal Society of
Edinburgh, there is a letter from the chevalier, addressed to "Monsieur
de Ramsay, à l'Hôtel de Provence, Rue de Condé, Faubourg St. Germain,"
dated 1st September, 1742. The receiver of this letter was probably the
correspondent of Hume, to whom it may have been sent, under the
impression that he was the person connected with the Vindication of the
Duchess of Marlborough, a book now well known to have been put into
shape by Hooke, the historian of Rome. The letter is in English; and it
shows that there are works of genius which the author of "The Travels of
Cyrus" had not taste to appreciate. He says:--

"I have read the first book of 'The History of Joseph Andrews,' but
don't believe I shall be able to finish the first volume. Dull burlesque
is still more insupportable than dull morality. Perhaps my not
understanding the language of low life in an English style is the reason
of my disgust; but I am afraid your Britannic wit is at as low an ebb as
the French. I hope to find some more amusement in my Lady Duchess of
Marlborough's adventures. They say a friend of ours has some hand in
them. I pity his misfortune, if he is obliged to stoop below his fine
genius and talents, to please an old rich dowager, that neither deserves
apology nor praise, and that would be too much honoured for her merit by
an ingenious fine satyr. I long to be in a condition to travel, that I
may see and embrace you, make acquaintance with your amiable young Lord,
and assure you both of the tender zeal, friendship, and attachment with
which I am your most humble and most obedient servant,

"The Ch. RAMSAY."

Perhaps the criticism on Fielding may not be thought inconsistent with
the man who pronounced Locke a shallow writer.

[14:1] Virg. Æn. iii. 660.

[14:2]

     At secura quies, et nescia fallere vita,
     Dives opum variarum: at latis otia fundis,
     Speluncæ, vivique lacus; at frigida Tempe,
     Mugitusque boum, mollesque sub arbore somni
     Non absunt.

                                Virg. Georg. ii. 467 et seq.

In the course of the correspondence which follows, there will be found
several quotations from the Latin classics. Hume's handwriting is so
distinct, that we can seldom have any doubt of the individual letters
written by him. At the same time, as he appears to have always quoted
from memory, there is sometimes a greater difference than even that
exhibited above, between the original and his version of it. I have
thought, that were I to attempt to correct his quotations, I would be
removing valuable data from which the reader may form an estimate of his
mental powers and his education. It will perhaps be allowed, that in
some instances he shows a fertile invention in substituting words for
those which his memory has failed to retain; while in others, as in the
above quotation, the fastidious critics of England will perhaps detect
traces of the more slovenly classical education of Scotland. In his
published works, Hume appears to have anxiously collated his quotations.
But in his letters he seems to have been always more anxious about the
judicious choice of his own expressions, than the accurate transcription
of the words of others. His letters appear to have been carefully
composed. He wrote in constant dread of falling into slovenly
colloquialisms of style, and was not ashamed to leave on his letters the
marks of this anxiety, in corrections and interlineations. This
peculiarity must be admitted to be at variance with the received canon
of the learned world, which excuses mistakes and clumsy expressions in
the vernacular language of a writer, but has no mercy for irregularities
in the use of the dead languages.

[16:1] From a scroll in the MSS. bequeathed by Baron Hume to the Royal
Society of Edinburgh.

An account of these MSS. will be found in the Preface. Henceforth, for
the sake of brevity, they will be referred to thus--MS. R.S.E. A part of
the above letter has been already printed in the _Literary Gazette_ for
1821, p. 762.

[25:1] It may be interesting to compare these extracts with his method
of treating the same subject at a later period of his life. The
following is taken from his Essay on the Feudal and Anglo-Norman
Government and Manners, in the two volumes of his History, first
published in 1762.

"The feudal institutions, by raising the military tenants to a kind of
sovereign dignity, by rendering personal strength and valour requisite,
and by making every knight and baron his own protector and avenger,
begat that martial pride and sense of honour, which, being cultivated
and embellished by the poets and romance writers of the age, ended in
chivalry. The virtuous knight fought not only in his own quarrel, but in
that of the innocent, of the helpless, and, above all, of the fair, whom
he supposed to be for ever under the guardianship of his valiant arm.
The uncourteous knight, who, from his castle, exercised robbery on
travellers, and committed violence on virgins, was the object of his
perpetual indignation; and he put him to death without scruple, or
trial, or appeal, whenever he met with him. The great independence of
men made personal honour and fidelity the chief tie among them, and
rendered it the capital virtue of every true knight, or genuine
professor of chivalry. The solemnities of single combat, as established
by law, banished the notion of every thing unfair or unequal in
rencounters, and maintained an appearance of courtesy between the
combatants till the moment of their engagement. The credulity of the age
grafted on this stock the notions of giants, enchanters, spells, and a
thousand wonders, which still multiplied during the time of the
crusades, when men, returning from so great a distance, used the liberty
of imposing every fiction on their believing audience. These ideas of
chivalry infected the writings, conversations, and behaviour of men
during some ages; and even after they were in a great measure banished
by the revival of learning, they left modern _gallantry_, and the _point
of honour_, which still maintain their influence, and are the genuine
offspring of those ancient affectations."

[28:1] Perhaps few authors afford so many curious illustrations of the
substitution of fanciful analogy for the severe logic of a practical
lawyer, as Lord Kames--_e. g._ when, in his essays on British
antiquities, he identifies hereditary descent with the law of
gravitation, and the inclination of the mind to continue downwards in a
straight line, as a stone falls from a height; so that, "in tracing out
a family, the mind descends by degrees from the father, first to the
eldest son, and so downwards in the order of age:" pleasant enough
speculations, yet not likely to serve any good purpose in practical law.

[29:1] Essay on Eloquence.

[45:1] Philosophical Principles of Natural Religion, 1705, 8vo.

[45:2] The English Malady, p. 330-331. I have run my eye over Cheyne's
"Natural Method of Curing Diseases of the Body and Mind," 1742,
8vo,--the only work I am aware of his having published subsequently to
the date of Hume's letter, but I have found in it no trace of a
reference to Hume's case. Cheyne's works are perhaps better known to the
public in general, than any medical books of the same period, and their
curious discursive contents amply repay perusal. Their science is of
course held to be completely superseded, but the unscientific reader
cannot help thinking that there is much sagacious good counsel in his
advice, notwithstanding the eccentric garrulity with which it is
uttered. His account of his own experiences, in experimenting on
himself, is the most interesting department of his medical observations.
He describes every thing with a sort of rude eloquence, infinitely more
pleasing to an ordinary reader than scientific precision; and the
recklessness with which he appears to have submitted his own carcass to
the most violent changes of regimen, inclines one to think that he had
applied towards it the _fiat experimentum in compore vili_. He tells us
that he was disposed to "corpulence by the whole race of one side" of
his family. In the quotation given above, he represents himself as
having been studious in his youth. He began to practise his profession
in London, of which he says--"The number of fires, sulphurous and
bituminous; the vast expense of tallow and foetid oil in candles and
lamps, under and above ground; the clouds of stinking breaths and
perspiration, not to mention the ordure of so many diseased, both
intelligent and unintelligent animals; the crowded churches,
churchyards, and burying places, with putrifying bodies, the sinks,
butcher houses, stables, dunghills, and the necessary stagnation,
fermentation, and mixture of all variety of all kinds of atoms, are more
than sufficient to putrify, poison, and infect the air, for twenty miles
round it." Having come from the fresh air of the country into so hopeful
an atmosphere, he seems to have resolved that his habit of living should
be an equally great contrast to his previous studious abstinence. "Upon
my coming to London, I all of a sudden changed my whole manner of
living. I found the bottle-companions, the younger gentry, and
free-livers, to be the most easy of access, and most quickly susceptible
of friendship and acquaintance,--nothing being necessary for that
purpose but to be able to eat lustily, and swallow down much liquor; and
being naturally of a large size, a cheerful temper, and tolerable lively
imagination; and having, in my country retirement, laid in store of
ideas and facts,--by these qualifications I soon became caressed by
them, and grew daily in bulk, and in friendship with these gay gentlemen
and their acquaintances. I was tempted to continue this course, no
doubt, from a liking, as well as to force a trade, which method I had
observed to succeed with some others: and thus constantly dining and
supping in taverns, and in the houses of my acquaintances of taste and
delicacy, my health was in a few years brought into great distress, by
so sudden and violent a change. I grew excessively fat, short-breathed,
lethargic, and listless."

The consequences were "a constant, violent headach, giddiness, lowness,
anxiety, and terror," and he went about "like a malefactor condemned, or
one who expected every moment to be crushed by a ponderous instrument of
death hanging over his head." These evil symptoms prompted him to
abandon suppers and restrict himself to a small quantity of animal food
and of fermented liquors. He very naturally found that on this abrupt
change all his "bouncing, protesting, and undertaking companions"
forsook him, and "dropped off like autumnal leaves," leaving him to
vegetate in temperate dreariness, while they "retired to comfort
themselves with a cheer-up cup," so that he pathetically tells us, "I
was forced to retire into the country quite alone, being reduced to the
state of Cardinal Wolsey, when he said, that if he had served his Maker
as faithfully and warmly as he had his prince, he would not have
forsaken him in that extremity."

It would be difficult to follow out the multitudinous course of remedies
he adopted, commencing with "volatiles, foetids, bitters, chalybeats,
and mineral waters," and how he took twenty grains of "what is called
the prince's powder," and "had certainly perished under the operation,
but for an over-dose of laudanum after it," having thus experienced
something like the good fortune of the man of Thessaly who leaped into a
quickset hedge. Under these circumstances he felt his body "melting away
like a snow-ball in summer." Having tried the Bath waters, he appears to
have somewhat revived, whereupon by increasing his quantity of "animal
food and strong liquors," he was "heated so," that he "apprehended a
hectic." His next change was to a milk diet, in which experiment he was
confirmed by a visit to Dr. Taylor of Croydon, its apostle, whom he
found "at home, at his full quart of cow's milk, which was all his
dinner." He found in consequence of this change, that he "increased in
spirits, strength, appetite and gaiety," until, the old Adam struggling
within him, he "began to find a craving and insufferable longing for
more solid and toothsome food, and for higher and stronger liquors."
Hereupon we have him getting more generous in his diet, but still, as he
counts it, "sober, moderate, and plain," in so far as he "drank not
above a quart or three pints at most of wine any day." Under this
regimen, he says, "I swelled to such an enormous size, that upon my last
weighing I exceeded thirty-two stones." Then came fits of various kinds,
and a dreary period of hypochondria, with recurrences to the low diet
system, and then such startling revulsions from it as the following: "I
resolved to change my half pint of port at dinner, into the same
quantity of Florence. I ate, at the same time, a good deal of more
butter with my vegetables, and plenty of old rich cheese; and likewise
nuts extremely--I procured from abroad and at home, great plenty of all
kinds, as filberts, walnuts, chestnuts, almonds, &c., eating them in
great quantities after dinner by way of dessert," but in pity to the
digestive sympathies of the reader this subject must be dropped. Dr.
Cheyne is--not the martyr, but the hero of dyspepsia, and Mrs. Radcliffe
could not have drawn him through a longer series of horrors than his
inventive genius seems to have created for himself.




CHAPTER II.

1734-1739. ÆT. 23-27.

     Hume leaves Bristol for France--Paris--Miracles at the Tomb of
     the Abbé Paris--Rheims--La Flêche--Associations with the Abbé
     Pluche and Des Cartes--Observations on French Society and
     Manners--Story of La Roche--Return to Britain.--Correspondence
     with Henry Home--Publication of the first and second volume of
     The Treatise of Human Nature--Character of that Work--Its
     Influence on mental Philosophy.


We have no account of Hume's sojourn in Bristol, except his own very
brief statement, that "in a few months," he "found that scene totally
unsuitable" to him.[48:1] He must have proceeded to France about the
middle of the year 1734, and he thus describes in his "own life," his
motives and intentions. "I went over to France, with a view of
prosecuting my studies in a country retreat; and I there laid that plan
of life, which I have steadily and successfully pursued. I resolved to
make a very rigid frugality supply my deficiency of fortune, to
maintain unimpaired my independency, and to regard every object as
contemptible, except the improvement of my talents in literature."

His subsequent letters show that he proceeded in the first instance to
Paris, where he remained for a short time. Not long before his arrival
there, some occurrences had taken place which were afterwards
prominently referred to in his philosophical writings. A Jansenist,
distinguished by his sanctity and the wide circle of his charities--the
Abbé Paris, having died, a tomb was erected over his remains in the
cemetery of St. Médard. Thither the poor, whom the good man had
succoured in life, repaired to bless his memory and pray for the state
of his soul. But it was discovered that this devotion was speedily
rewarded; for the sick were cured, the blind saw, all manner of miracles
were performed; and the evidence of their genuineness was considered so
satisfactory, that the Jesuits were never able to impugn them--an
instance which it might be well for every one to recall to mind who is
told of phenomena out of the ordinary course of nature being
authenticated by the testimony of respectable and enlightened people. At
length, this series of miracles became offensive to the
government--there was no saying how far the matter might proceed. It was
resolved that there should be no more miracles performed at the tomb of
the Abbé Paris: the gates of the cemetery were closed, and the miracles
necessarily came to an end. This occurred in the year 1732, just two
years before Hume's visit; and it will easily be imagined that the
references to these wonderful events which he would hear in
conversation, suggested many trains of thought to the young philosopher.
It was not long afterwards, and probably while all this was very fresh
in his memory, that the principal theory of his Essay on Miracles was
suggested to him. In that Essay he says:

"Many of the miracles of Abbé Paris were proved immediately by witnesses
before the officialty or bishop's court at Paris, under the eye of
Cardinal Noailles, whose character for integrity and capacity was never
contested even by his enemies.

"His successor in the archbishopric was an enemy to the Jansenists, and
for that reason promoted to the see by the court. Yet twenty-two rectors
or curés of Paris, with infinite earnestness, press him to examine those
miracles, which they assert to be known to the whole world, and
indisputably certain. But he wisely forbore."

And farther on:--

"No less a man than the Duc de Chatillon, a duke and peer of France, of
the highest rank and family, gives evidence of a miraculous cure,
performed upon a servant of his, who had lived several years in his
house with a visible and palpable infirmity.

"I shall conclude with observing, that no clergy are more celebrated for
strictness of life and manners than the secular clergy of France,
particularly the rectors or curés of Paris, who bear testimony to these
impostures."

An illustration of his notice of what was passing around him in Paris,
occurs in the following passage in his "Natural History of Religion."

"I lodged once at Paris in the same hotel with an ambassador from Tunis,
who, having passed some years at London, was returning home that way.
One day I observed his Moorish excellency diverting himself under the
porch, with surveying the splendid equipages that drove along; when
there chanced to pass that way some Capucin friars, who had never seen
a Turk, as he, on his part, though accustomed to the European dresses,
had never seen the grotesque figure of a Capucin: and there is no
expressing the mutual admiration with which they inspired each other.
Had the chaplain of the embassy entered into a dispute with these
Franciscans, their reciprocal surprise had been of the same nature. Thus
all mankind stand staring at one another; and there is no beating it
into their heads, that the turban of the African is not just as good or
as bad a fashion as the cowl of the European.--'He is a very honest
man,' said the Prince of Sallee, speaking of De Ruyter; 'it is a pity he
were a Christian.'"

After leaving Paris, he resided at Rheims in the province of Champagne,
about eighty miles north-east of the metropolis. Thence he addressed to
his friend Michael Ramsay the following letter, full of observation and
thought.


HUME _to_ MICHAEL RAMSAY.

"_Rheims, September 12, 1734._

"MY DEAR MICHAEL,--I suppose you have received two letters from me,
dated at Paris, in one of which was enclosed a letter to my Lord Stair.
I am now arrived at Rheims, which is to be the place of my abode for
some considerable time, and where I hope both to spend my time happily
for the present, and lay up a stock for the future. It is a large town,
containing about forty thousand inhabitants, and has in it about thirty
families that keep coaches, though, by the appearance of the houses, you
would not think there was one. I am recommended to two of the best
families in town, and particularly to a man, who they say is one of the
most learned in France.[52:1] He is just now in the country, so that I
have not yet seen him; though, if I had seen him, it would be some time
before I could contract a friendship with him, not being yet sufficient
master of the language to support a conversation; which is a great
vexation to me, but which I hope in a short time to get over. As I have
little more than this to say about business, I shall use the freedom to
entertain you with any idle thoughts that come into my head, hoping at
least you will excuse them, if not be pleased with them, because they
come from an absent friend.

"When I parted from Paris, the Chevalier Ramsay gave me as his advice,
to observe carefully, and imitate as much as possible, the manners of
the French. For, says he, though the English, perhaps, have more of the
real politeness of the heart, yet the French certainly have the better
way of expressing it. This gave me occasion to reflect upon the matter,
and in my humble opinion it is just the contrary: viz., that the French
have more real politeness, and the English the better method of
expressing it. By real politeness I mean softness of temper, and a
sincere inclination to oblige and be serviceable, which is very
conspicuous in this nation, not only among the high but low; in so much
that the porters and coachmen here are civil, and that, not only to
gentlemen, but likewise among themselves; so that I have not yet seen
one quarrel in France, though they are every where to be met with in
England.[53:1] By the expressions of politeness, I mean those outward
deferences and ceremonies which custom has invented, to supply the
defect of real politeness or kindness, that is unavoidable towards
strangers, or indifferent persons, even in men of the best dispositions
in the world. These ceremonies ought to be so contrived, as that, though
they do not deceive nor pass for sincere, yet still they please by their
appearance, and lead the mind by its own consent and knowledge into an
agreeable delusion. One may err by running into either of the two
extremes; that of making them too like truth or too remote from it:
though we may observe, that the first is scarce possible, because
whenever any expression or action becomes customary, it can deceive
nobody. Thus, when the Quakers say, 'your friend,' they are as easily
understood, as another, that says, 'your humble servant.' The French err
in the contrary extreme, that of making their civilities too remote from
truth, which is a fault, though they are not designed to be believed;
just as it is a transgression of rules in a dramatic poet to mix any
improbabilities with his fable, though 'tis certain that, in the
representation, the scenes, lights, company, and a thousand other
circumstances, make it impossible he can ever deceive.

"Another fault I find in the French manners, is that, like their clothes
and furniture, they are too glaring. An English fine gentleman
distinguishes himself from the rest of the world, by the whole tenor of
his conversation, more than by any particular part of it; so that though
you are sensible he excels, you are at a loss to tell in what, and have
no remarkable civilities and compliments to pitch on as a proof of his
politeness. These he so smooths over, that they pass for the common
actions of life, and never put you to[55:1] trouble of returning thanks
for them. The English politeness is always greatest where it appears
least.

"After all, it must be confessed that the little niceties of French
behaviour, though troublesome and impertinent, yet serve to polish the
ordinary kind of people, and prevent rudeness and brutality. For in the
same manner as soldiers are found to become more courageous in learning
to hold their muskets within half an inch of a place appointed; and your
devotees feel their devotion increase by the observance of trivial
superstitions, as sprinkling, kneeling, crossing, &c.; so men insensibly
soften towards each other in the practice of these ceremonies. The mind
pleases itself by the progress it makes in such trifles, and while it is
so supported, makes an easy transition to something more material. And I
verily believe it is for this reason that you scarce ever meet with a
clown or an ill-bred man in France.

"You may perhaps wonder that I, who have stayed so short time in France,
and who have confessed that I am not master of their language, should
decide so positively of their manner. But you will please to observe,
that it is with nations as with particular men, where one trifle
frequently serves more to discover the character, than a whole train of
considerable actions. Thus, when I compare our English phrase of 'humble
servant,' which likewise we omit upon the least intimacy, with the
French one of 'the honour of being your most humble servant,' which they
never forget,--this, compared with other circumstances, lets me clearly
see the different humours of the nations. This phrase, of the honour of
doing or saying such a thing to you, goes so far, that my washing-woman
to-day told me, that she hoped she would have the honour of serving me
while I staid at Rheims; and what is still more absurd, it is said by
people to those who are very much their inferiors.

"Before I conclude my letter, I must tell you that I hope you will
excuse my rudeness, if I use the freedom (?)[56:1] to desire of you
that, the next time you do me the honour of writing to me, you will be
so good as to sit down a day before the post goes away; for I cannot
help being afraid that, in your haste, you have omitted many things,
which otherwise I would have had the honour and satisfaction of hearing
from you. When you are so good as to condescend to write, please to
direct so:--'A Monsieur--Monsieur David Hume, gentilhomme, Ecossois,
chez Monsieur Mesier, au Peroquet verd, proche la porte au Ferron,
Rheims.'"[56:2]


Hume states, in his "own life," that he passed "three years" very
agreeably in France. We find from a letter to Principal Campbell,[57:1]
that two of these years were spent at La Flêche, and that he had some
communication with the members of the Jesuits' College there. He says,
"It may perhaps amuse you to learn the first hint, which suggested to me
that argument which you have so strenuously attacked. I was walking in
the cloisters of the Jesuits' College of La Flêche, a town in which I
passed two years of my youth, and engaged in a conversation with a
Jesuit of some parts and learning, who was relating to me, and urging
some nonsensical miracle performed lately in their convent, when I was
tempted to dispute against him; and as my head was full of the topics of
my Treatise of Human Nature, which I was at that time composing, this
argument immediately occurred to me, and I thought it very much
gravelled my companion; but at last he observed to me, that it was
impossible for that argument to have any solidity, because it operated
equally against the Gospel as the Catholic miracles;--which observation
I thought proper to admit as a sufficient answer. I believe you will
allow, that the freedom at least of this reasoning makes it somewhat
extraordinary to have been the produce of a convent of Jesuits, though
perhaps you may think the sophistry of it savours plainly of the place
of its birth."

This same Jesuits' College of La Flêche, is familiar to the
philosophical reader as the seminary in which Des Cartes was educated.
The place which Hume had just left, has been seen to be associated with
the birth and residence of a distinguished opponent of the Cartesian
theory. We now find him perfecting his work in that academic solitude,
where Des Cartes himself was educated, and where he formed his theory of
commencing with the doubt of previous dogmatic opinions, and framing for
himself a new fabric of belief. The coincidence is surely worthy of
reflective association, and it is perhaps not the least striking
instance of Hume's unimaginative nature, that in none of his works,
printed or manuscript, do we find an allusion to the circumstance, that
while framing his own theories, he trod the same pavement that had
upwards of a century earlier borne the weight of one whose fame and
influence on human thought was so much of the same character as he
himself panted to attain.

It is to Hume's early sojourn in France that we must assign the time and
the scene of Mackenzie's pleasant fiction, called the "Story of La
Roche," published in the Mirror of 1779. It is generally admitted that
the writer's materials were merely the character and habits of the
philosopher, and that there was no groundwork for the narrative in any
incident that had actually occurred. But the story must be taken as the
observations of an acute perception, and a finely adjusted taste, upon
Hume's character; and our reliance on the accuracy of the picture is
enhanced by the circumstance that Smith, deceived by its air of reality,
expressed his wonder that Hume had never told him of the incident.[58:1]

The opening description is in these words:--

"More than forty years ago, an English philosopher, whose works have
since been read and admired by all Europe, resided at a little town in
France. Some disappointments in his native country had first driven him
abroad, and he was afterwards induced to remain there, from having found
in this retreat, where the connexions even of nature and language were
avoided, a perfect seclusion and retirement, highly favourable to the
development of abstract subjects, in which he excelled all the writers
of his time.

"Perhaps in the structure of such a mind as Mr. ----'s, the fine and
more delicate sensibilities are seldom known to have place; or, if
originally implanted there, are in a great measure extinguished by the
exertions of intense study and profound investigation. Hence the idea of
philosophy and unfeelingness being united, has become proverbial; and,
in common language, the former word is often used to express the latter.
Our philosopher had been censured by some, as deficient in warmth and
feeling: but the mildness of his manners has been allowed by all; and it
is certain, that if he was not easily melted into compassion, it was at
least not difficult to awaken his benevolence."

The impression of the actions of a kind, charitable, and tolerant
disposition, conveyed by the circumstances of the narrative, cannot be
represented without incorporating it in full; and it will probably be
thought that one or two passing sketches of character, such as the
above, are all that should be taken into a work like the present, from a
book accessible to every reader. Thus, when the housekeeper comes with
the account of the distresses of the poor protestant clergyman and his
daughter:

"Her master laid aside the volume in his hand, and broke off the chain
of ideas it had inspired. His night-gown was exchanged for a coat, and
he followed his gouvernante to the sick man's apartment."

Again,--

"La Roche found a degree of simplicity and gentleness in his companion,
which is not always annexed to the character of a learned or a wise man.
His daughter, who was prepared to be afraid of him, was equally
undeceived. She found in him nothing of that self-importance which
superior parts, or great cultivation of them, is apt to confer. He
talked of every thing but philosophy or religion; he seemed to enjoy
every pleasure and amusement of ordinary life, and to be interested in
the most common topics of discourse: when his knowledge or learning at
any time appeared, it was delivered with the utmost plainness, and
without the least shadow of dogmatism."

And not less distinctly are the following sentences the echo of
Mackenzie's own observations of the character and habits of the
philosopher, that they are put in the varied shape of dialogue and
narrative.

"You regret, my friend," said [La Roche,] "when my daughter and I talk
of the exquisite pleasure derived from music, you regret your want of
musical powers and musical feelings; it is a department of soul, you
say, which nature has almost denied you, which, from the effects you see
it have on others, you are sure must be highly delightful. Why should
not the same thing be said of religion? Trust me, I feel it in the same
way, an energy, an inspiration, which I would not lose for all the
blessings of sense or enjoyments of the world. . . . . . And it would
have been inhuman in our philosopher to have clouded, even with a doubt,
the sunshine of this belief.

"His discourse was very remote from metaphysical disquisition or
religious controversy. Of all men I ever knew, his ordinary conversation
was the least tinctured with pedantry or liable to dissertation. With La
Roche and his daughter it was perfectly familiar. The country round
them, the manners of the villagers, the comparison of both with those of
England, remarks on the works of favourite authors, or the sentiments
they conveyed, and the passions they excited, with many other topics in
which there was an equality, or alternate advantage among the speakers,
were the subjects they talked on."

Nor can one, after having quoted so much, avoid giving the concluding
sentence, in which the philosopher contemplates the old clergyman's
grief for the loss of his daughter, and at the same time that he
perceives its bitterness and intensity, is made aware of the
consolations which the bereaved old man finds in religion, and "rejoices
that such consolation" is his.

"Mr. ----'s heart was smitten; and I have heard him long after confess,
that there were moments when the remembrance overcame him even to
weakness; when, amidst all the pleasures of philosophical discovery, and
the pride of literary fame, he recalled to his mind the venerable figure
of the good La Roche, and wished that he had never doubted."

The account of his sojourn in France is thus given in his "own
life:"--"During my retreat in France, first at Rheims, but chiefly at La
Flêche, in Anjou, I composed my 'Treatise of Human Nature.' After
passing three years very agreeably in that country, I came over to
London in 1737."

We must now follow him to London, where we find him occupied in carrying
his "Treatise of Human Nature," through the press. One of his early
friends was his namesake Henry Home, afterwards Lord Kames, who
pursued, but with unequal step, the same path with himself. Home was
fifteen years the elder of the two, and had joined the bar in 1723. He
had already published some of his professional works; but it was at a
subsequent period of his life, and when he perhaps became emulous of the
fame of his friend, that he attempted works in ethics, metaphysics, and
criticism. During many years of continued intimacy, these two
distinguished men enjoyed each other's mutual respect; but, in their
early intercourse, when his senior had for some time occupied a
prominent position in the eye of the public, we naturally find Hume
writing about his great project in a tone of modest deference.


HUME _to_ HENRY HOME.

"_London, December 2, 1737._

"DEAR SIR,--I am sorry I am not able to satisfy your curiosity by giving
you some general notion of the plan upon which I proceed. But my
opinions are so new, and even some terms I am obliged to make use of,
that I could not propose, by any abridgment, to give my system an air of
likelihood, or so much as make it intelligible. It is a thing I have in
vain attempted already, at a gentleman's request in this place, who
thought it would help him to comprehend and judge of my notions, if he
saw them all at once before him. I have had a greater desire of
communicating to you the plan of the whole, that I believe it will not
appear in public before the beginning of next winter. For, besides that
it would be difficult to have it printed before the rising of the
parliament, I must confess I am not ill pleased with a little delay,
that it may appear with as few imperfections as possible. I have been
here near three months, always within a week of agreeing with my
printers; and you may imagine I did not forget the work itself during
that time, where I began to feel some passages weaker for the style and
diction than I could have wished. The nearness and greatness of the
event roused up my attention, and made me more difficult to please, than
when I was alone in perfect tranquillity in France. But here I must tell
you one of my foibles. I have a great inclination to go down to Scotland
this spring to see my friends; and have your advice concerning my
philosophical discoveries; but cannot overcome a certain shamefacedness
I have to appear among you at my years, without having yet a settlement,
or so much as attempted any. How happens it that we philosophers cannot
as heartily despise the world as it despises us? I think in my
conscience the contempt were as well founded on our side as on the
other.

"Having a franked letter, I was resolved to make use of it; and
accordingly enclose some '_Reasonings concerning Miracles_,'[63:1] which
I once thought of publishing with the rest, but which I am afraid will
give too much offence, even as the world is disposed at present. There
is something in the turn of thought, and a good deal in the turn of
expression, which will not perhaps appear so proper, for want of knowing
the context: but the force of the argument you'll be judge of, as it
stands. Tell me your thoughts of it. Is not the style too diffuse?
though, as that was a popular argument, I have spread it out much more
than the other parts of the work. I beg of you to show it to nobody,
except to Mr. Hamilton, if he pleases; and let me know at your leisure
that you have received it, read it, and burnt it. Your thoughts and mine
agree with respect to Dr. Butler, and I would be glad to be introduced
to him. I am at present castrating my work, that is, cutting off its
nobler parts; that is, endeavouring it shall give as little offence as
possible, before which, I could not pretend to put it into the Doctor's
hands. This is a piece of cowardice, for which I blame myself, though I
believe none of my friends will blame me. But I was resolved not to be
an enthusiast in philosophy, while I was blaming other enthusiasms. If
ever I indulge myself in any, 'twill be when I tell you that I am, dear
Sir, yours."[64:1]


Butler, to whom Hume is thus found desiring an introduction, had, in the
immediately preceding year, published "The Analogy of Religion, Natural
and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature;" and it appears
that Hume courted the attention of the author of that clear logical work
to those speculations of his own, which, in the opinion of the world in
general, have so opposite a tendency to that of the "Analogy." The
following letter, acknowledging an introduction from Home, and dated 4th
March, 1738, tells its own tale.


"I shall not trouble you with any formal compliments or thanks, which
would be but an ill return for the kindness you have done me in writing
in my behalf, to one you are so little acquainted with as Dr. Butler;
and, I am afraid, stretching the truth in favour of a friend. I have
called upon the Doctor, with a design of delivering him your letter,
but find he is at present in the country. I am a little anxious to have
the Doctor's opinion. My own I dare not trust to; both because it
concerns myself, and because it is so variable, that I know not how to
fix it. Sometimes it elevates me above the clouds; at other times, it
depresses me with doubts and fears; so that, whatever be my success, I
cannot be entirely disappointed. Somebody has told me that you might
perhaps be in London this spring. I should esteem this a very lucky
event; and notwithstanding all the pleasures of the town, I would
certainly engage you to pass some philosophical evenings with me, and
either correct my judgment, where you differ from me, or confirm it
where we agree. I believe I have some need of the one, as well as the
other; and though the propensity to diffidence be an error on the better
side, yet 'tis an error, and dangerous as well as disagreeable.--I am,
&c.

"I lodge at present in the Rainbow Coffeehouse, Lancaster Court."[65:1]


The transactions between authors and booksellers are seldom accompanied
by any formidable array of legal formalities; but Hume and his
publishers seem to have thought it necessary to bind each other in the
most stringent manner, to the performance of their respective
obligations, by "articles of agreement, made, concluded, and agreed,
upon the 26th day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand
seven hundred and thirty-eight, and in the twelfth year of the reign of
our sovereign lord King George the Second,--between David Hume of
Lancaster Court of the one part, and John Noone of Cheapside, London,
bookseller, of the other part." By this very precise document, it is
provided, that "the said David Hume shall and will permit and suffer the
said John Noone to have, hold, and enjoy, the sole property, benefit,
and advantage of printing and publishing the first edition of the said
book, not exceeding one thousand copies thereof." The author, in return,
receives £50, and twelve bound copies of the book.[66:1] The transaction
is on the whole creditable to the discernment and liberality of Mr.
Noone. It may be questioned, whether, in this age, when knowledge has
spread so much wider, and money is so much less valuable, it would be
easy to find a bookseller, who, on the ground of its internal merits,
would give £50 for an edition of a new metaphysical work, by an unknown
and young author, born and brought up in a remote part of the empire.
These articles refer to the first and second of the three volumes of the
"Treatise of Human Nature;" and they were accordingly published in
January, 1739. They include "Book I. Of the Understanding," and "Book
II. Of the Passions."

It has been generally and justly remarked, that the Treatise is among
the least systematic of philosophical works--that it has neither a
definite and comprehensive plan, nor a logical arrangement. It was,
indeed, so utterly deficient in the former--there was so complete a want
of any projected scope of subject which the author was bound to exhaust
in what he wrote--that an attempt to divide and subdivide the matter
after it had been written, according to a logical arrangement, would
only, as a sort of _experimentum crucis_, have exposed the imperfect
character of the original plan. The author, therefore, very discreetly
allowed his matter to be arranged as the subjects of which he treated
had respectively suggested themselves, and bestowed on his work a title
rather general than comprehensive,--a title, of which all that can be
said of its aptness to the subject is, that no part of his book can be
said to be wholly without it, while he might have included an almost
incalculable multitude of other subjects within it. He called it simply
"A Treatise of Human Nature;" and by a subsidiary title, explanatory
rather of his method than definitive of his matter, he called it "an
attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral
subjects."

The purely metaphysical,[67:1] and, at the same time, the most original
portion of the work, and that which has most conspicuously rendered
itself a constituent part of the literature of intellectual philosophy,
is "Book I. Of the Understanding." "Book II. Of the Passions," contains
mixed metaphysics and ethics, with occasional notices of phenomena,
which, though Hume does not, other writers would be likely to connect
with physiological inquiries. The third book, "Of Virtue and Vice in
General," published a year later, is of an ethical character, being an
inquiry into the origin and proper system of morals, and an application
of the system to government and politics.

The "Treatise of Human Nature" afforded materials for the criticism of
two very distinct classes of writers. The one consisted of men imbued
with a spirit of inquiry kindred to that of Hume, and a genius capable
of appreciating his services in the cause of truth; who, as the teachers
of systems of which they were themselves the architects, had to attack
or to defend the principles promulgated in the Treatise, according as
these differed from or corresponded with their own. It is in the
writings of these men that the true immortality of Hume as a philosopher
consists. Whether they find in him great truths to acknowledge, or
subtle and plausible errors to attack, they are the vital evidence of
the originality of his work, of the genius that inspired it, and of its
great influence on human thought and action. The other class of critics
are those who, in pamphlets, or works more ambitious but not rising in
real solidity above that fugitive class, or in occasional digressions
from other topics, have endeavoured to prejudice the minds of their
readers against the principles of the Treatise, by exaggeration, or by
the misapplication of their metaphysical doctrines to the proceedings of
every-day life,--a set of literary efforts of quick production and as
quick decay.

To the former class of authors, it is of course not within the scope of
the present writer's ambition to belong, and he sees no occasion to
attempt to imitate the latter. In a work, however, which professes to
give a life of David Hume, it is necessary to say something about the
"Treatise of Human Nature;" and as a preliminary to such an attempt, it
may be well to mark the boundaries within which the writer conceives
that the duty he has assumed calls on him for a description of the work,
neither impugning nor defending any of the opinions it sets forth.

It seems to be right that some attempt should be made to describe the
character and strength of the author's intellect, and the method of its
operations; and to give a view of the fundamental characteristic
principles by which he professes to distinguish his own philosophy from
that of other writers on metaphysical subjects. An attempt should also
be made to tell in what respect Hume has made incidental suggestions
which have either been admitted as new truths in metaphysics, or have,
as original but perhaps fallacious suggestions, afforded to other
thinkers the means of establishing truths. These being the general
objects to be kept in view, there is no intention to take them in any
precise order, or to exhaust them in remarks on this one work. To
attempt an analysis of the work would be out of place. There can be no
more repulsive matter for reading than condensed metaphysics; and
probably there is nothing less instructive than those abridgments,
which, necessarily suppressing the author's discursive arguments, appeal
almost entirely to the memory. To seize on and give a descriptive rather
than an analytical account of the prominent features of the system, will
be the chief aim of these remarks. Moreover, the Treatise bears on
subjects which are nearly all recalled in its author's subsequent works;
and while there are some things in the critical history of Hume's
opinions which may be appropriately viewed in connexion with his first
publication, there are others which it may be more expedient to examine
when he is found reconsidering the subjects in his later works; and
again, others which may be viewed in a general attempt to describe the
extent of his literary achievements.

The Treatise has been already spoken of as embracing two great objects,
metaphysics and ethics; or three, if politics be considered as distinct
from ethics. The great leading principle of the metaphysical department,
and a principle which is never lost sight of in any part of the book,
is, that the materials on which intellect works are the _impressions_
which represent immediate sensation, whether externally as by the
senses, or internally as by the passions, and _ideas_ which are the
faint reflections of these impressions. Thus to speak colloquially, when
I see a picture, or when I am angry with some one, there is an
_impression_; but when I think about this picture in its absence, or
call to recollection my subsided anger, what exists in either case is an
_idea_. Hume looked from words to that which they signified, and he
found that where they signified any thing, it must be found among the
things that either are or have been impressions. The whole varied and
complex system of intellectual machinery he found occupied in the
representation, the combination, or the arrangement of these raw
materials of intellectual matter. If I say I see an object, I give
expression to the fact, that a certain impression is made on the retina
of my eye. If I convey to the person I am speaking to an accurate notion
of what I mean, I awaken in his mind ideas left there by previous
impressions, brought thither by his sense of sight.[70:1] Thus, in the
particular case of the external senses, when they are considered as in
direct communication between the mind and any object, there are
impressions: when the senses are not said to be in communication with
the object, the operations of the mind in connexion with it, are from
vestiges which the impressions have left on the mind; and these vestiges
are called ideas, and are always more faint than the original
impressions themselves. And a material circumstance to be kept in view
at the very threshold of the system is, that there is no specific and
distinct line drawn between impressions and ideas. Their difference is
in degree merely--the former are stronger, the latter weaker. There is
no difference in kind; and there is sometimes doubt whether that which
is supposed to be an impression may not be a vivid idea, and that which
is supposed to be an idea a faint impression.

When Hume examined, with more and more minuteness, the elements of the
materials on which the mind works, he could still find nothing but these
impressions and ideas. Looking at language as a machinery for giving
expression to thought, he thus established for himself a test of its
adaptation to its right use,--a test for discovering whether in any
given case it really served the purpose of language, or was a mere
unmeaning sound. As he found that there was nothing on which thought
could operate but the impressions received through sensation, or the
ideas left by them, he considered that a word which had not a meaning to
be found in either of these things, had no meaning at all. He looked
upon ideas as the goods with which the mind was stored; and on these
stores, as being of the character of impressions, while they were in the
state of coming into the mind. When any one, then, in reasoning, or any
other kind of literature, spoke of any thing as existing, the principle
of his theory was, that this storehouse of idealized impressions should
be searched for one corresponding to the term made use of. If such an
impression were not found, the word was, so far as our human faculties
were concerned, an unmeaning one. Whether there was any existence
corresponding to its meaning, no one could say: all that the sceptical
philosopher could decide was, that, so far as human intellect was put in
possession of materials for thought, it had nothing to warrant it in
saying, that this word represented any thing of which that intellect had
cognizance.

This limitation of the material put at the disposal of the mind, was
largely illustrated in the course of the work; and the illustrations
assumed some such character as this:--Imaginative writers present us
with descriptions of things which never, within our own experience, have
existed,--of things which, we believe, never have had existence. Yet,
however fantastic and heterogeneous may be the representations thus
presented to our notice, there is no one part, of which we form a
conception, that is any thing more than a new arrangement of ideas that
have been left in the mind by impressions deposited there by sensation.
The most extravagant of eastern or classical fictions there find their
elements. If it be a three-headed dog, a winged horse, a fiery dragon,
or a golden palace, that is spoken of, the reader who forms a conception
of the narrative puts it together with the ideas left in his mind by
impressions conveyed through the external senses. If a spectre is said
to be raised, it may be spoken of as not denser than the atmosphere, yet
the attributes that bring a conception of it to the intellect are the
form and proportions of a human being,--expression, action, and
habiliments: all elements the ideas of which the mind has received
through the impressions of the senses. If words were used in a book of
fiction which did not admit of being thus realized by the mind putting
together a corresponding portion of the ideas stored up within
it--supplying, as it were, the described costume from this
wardrobe--then, according to Hume's philosophy, the word would be a
sound without meaning. He maintained a like rule as to books of
philosophy. If the authors used terms which were not thus represented in
the storehouse of the matter of thought and language, they were not
reasoning on what they knew; they were not using words as the signs of
things signified, but printing unmeaning collections of letters, or
uttering senseless sounds.

The system, if it were to be classed under the old metaphysical
divisions, was one of nominalism. Such words as shape, colour, hardness,
roughness, &c. the author of the Treatise could only admit to have a
meaning in as far as they signified ideas in the mind; and these ideas
could only be there as the relics of impressions derived through the
senses. Thus, general terms, such as the categories of Aristotle, could
have no existence except in so far as they represented and called up
particulars. Of the abstract term colour, our notion is derived solely
from the ideas left in the mind by the actual impressions made through
the senses. Heat, cold, and largeness, so far as these words represent
what is really in the mind, have no other foundation.

The application of this system to the mathematics, and to natural
philosophy, was so startling as to afford to some readers almost a
_reductio ad absurdum_. The infinite divisibility of matter was
arraigned by Hume as so far from being a truth, that it was not even
capable of being conceived by the mind, which had never yet received any
impressions through the senses corresponding to the expression. Every
man had seen matter divided--some into smaller fragments than others;
but where our ideas, derived from actual experiment, stopped in
minuteness of division, the conception of divisibility stopped also. The
truth of geometrical demonstration, as applicable to practice, he did
not deny; but he maintained, or rather seemed to maintain, for his
reasoning here is of a highly subtle order, that we have a conception of
these operations only in as far as they concur with really existing
things, or, more properly speaking, with the ideas in the mind conveyed
thither by the senses. Of the point, which has no breadth, depth, or
length; of the straight line, which is deficient in the first and
second, and not in the last of these qualities, he denied that we could
have an idea, unless that idea were just as much the representative of
an actual existence as any other idea is.

Infinity of space was an expression to which he had an objection on
similar grounds; it had no idea corresponding to it lodged in the mind.
Of space finite in various quantities, the mind possessed ideas stored
up from repeated impressions, and by adding these ideas together, more
or less vastness in the conception of finite space was afforded. But any
thing beyond this definitive increase, attested as it was by the senses,
the mind had no means of conceiving. Whatever might be in another
intellectual world, there was no idea corresponding to infinity of space
in the mind of man. It thence followed, that space unoccupied was a
conception of which the mind was incapable, because the impressions
originally conveyed to the mind were the medium through which the
conception of space existed, and where there were no ideas of such
impressions, an aggregate idea of space was wanting. In the same manner
it was held, that it was in a succession of impressions, with ideas
corresponding, that the conception of time consisted, and that without
such a succession, time would be a thing unknown and unconceived. Our
ideas of numbers he found to be but the collected ideas of the
impressions of the units of which the senses have received distinct
impressions; and in confirmation of this he appealed to the distinctness
of our notion of small numbers, which our mind has been accustomed to
find represented by units, and our imperfect conception of those large
numbers, which we have never had presented to us in detail. How readily
we have a notion of six, but how imperfectly the mind receives the
conception of six millions; how clearly we perceive, in units, the
difference between six and twelve, but how imperfect is our notion of
the difference between six millions and twelve millions.[75:1]

All human consciousness being of these two materials, impressions and
ideas, the answer to the question, What knowledge have we of an external
world, resolved itself into this, that there were certain impressions
and ideas which we supposed to relate to it--further we knew not. When
we turn, according to this theory, from the external world, and, looking
into ourselves, ask what certainty we have of separate self-existence,
we find but a string of impressions and ideas, and we have no means of
linking these together into any notion of a continuous existence. Such
is that boasted thing the human intellect, when its elements are
searched out by a rigid application of the sceptical philosophy of Hume.
Not a thing separate and self-existent, which was, and is, and shall
continue; but a succession of mere separate entities, called in one view
impressions, in another ideas.[76:1]

It may make this brief sketch more clear, to notice a circumstance in
the history of philosophy, which, perhaps, serves better in an
incidental manner to mark the boundaries of the field of Hume's inquiry,
than many pages of discursive description. The transcendentalists took
him up as having examined the materials solely, on which pure reason
operates; not pure reason itself. They said that he had examined the
classes of matter which come before the judge, but had omitted to
describe the judge himself, the extent of his jurisdiction, and his
method of enforcing it. They maintained, that all these things, which
with Hume appeared to be the constituent elements of philosophy, were
nothing but the materials on which philosophy works,--that to presume
them to be of service presupposed a reason which could make use of
them,--that Hume himself, while thus speculating and telling us that his
mind consisted but of a string of ideas, left behind by certain
impressions, was himself making use of that pure reason which was in him
before the ideas or impressions existed, and was through that power
adapting the impressions and ideas to use. He characterized his system
as "an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into
moral subjects:" but they said that there was another and a preliminary
matter of inquiry--the faculty, to speak popularly, which suggested what
experiments should be made, and judged of their results.

Hume may be found indirectly lamenting the fate of his own work on
metaphysics, in his remarks on other works of a kindred character; and
in these criticisms we have a clue to the expectations he had formed. In
his well-known rapid criticism on the literature of the epoch of the
civil wars, he says of Hobbes: "No author in that age was more
celebrated both abroad and at home than Hobbes. In our times, he is much
neglected: a lively instance how precarious all reputations founded on
reasoning and philosophy! A pleasant comedy which paints the manners of
the age, and exposes a faithful picture of nature, is a durable work,
and is transmitted to the latest posterity. But a system, whether
physical or metaphysical, owes commonly its success to its novelty; and
is no sooner canvassed with impartiality, than its weakness is
discovered."

Like the majority of literary prophecies dictated by feeling and not by
impartial criticism, this one, whether as it refers to "The Leviathan,"
of which it is ostensibly uttered, or to the "Treatise of Human Nature,"
the fate of which doubtless suggested it, has proved untrue. The
influence of Hobbes has revived, as that of the Treatise remained
undiminished from the time when it was first fully appreciated. And in
both cases their influence has arisen from that element which seems
alone to be capable of giving permanent value to metaphysical thought.
It is not that in either case the fundamental theory of the author is
adopted, as the disciples of old imbibed the system of their masters,
but that each has started some novelties in thought, and, either by
themselves sweeping away prevailing fallacies, or suggesting to others
the means of doing so, have cleared the path of philosophy. As a general
system, the philosophy of Hobbes has been perhaps most completely
rejected at those times when its incidental discoveries and suggestions
made it most serviceable to philosophy, and were the cause of its being
most highly esteemed. "Harm I can do none," says Hobbes, when speaking
of the metaphysicians who preceded him, "though I err not less than
they, for I leave men but as they are, in doubt and dispute." There is
indeed nothing in the later history of metaphysical writing to show that
the triumphs in that department of thought are to stretch beyond the
establishment of incidental truths, the removal of fallacies, and the
suggestion of theories that may teach men to think. The field is a
republic: incidental merit has its praise, and is allowed its
pre-eminence; but no one mind, it may safely be pronounced, holds in it
that monarchical sway which Adam Smith retains over the empire of
political economy. The ancient systems anterior to Christianity allowed
of such empire. The pupil did not follow his master merely in this and
that incidental truth developed, but adopted the system in all its
details and proportions as his system and his creed. In later times it
would probably be found that the most devoted admirers of great writers
on metaphysics do not adopt their opinions in the mass; and it seems
that men must now go elsewhere than to the produce of human reason, for
the grand leading principles of the philosophy of belief and disbelief.

To those who hold that the writings of the great metaphysicians are thus
to be esteemed on account, not of their fundamental principles, but of
the truths they bring out in detail, a new theory is like a new road
through an unfrequented country, valuable, not for itself, but for the
scenery which it opens up to the traveller's eye. The thinker who adopts
this view, often wonders at the small beginnings of philosophical
systems--wonders, perhaps, at the circumstance of Kant having believed
that his own system started into life at one moment as he was reading
Hume's views of Cause and Effect. But the solution is ready at hand. We
feel that the philosopher of Königsberg had in his mind the impulses
that would have driven him into a new path had no Hume preceded him. We
owe it to the Essay on Cause and Effect that it was the starting-point
at which he left the beaten track; but, had it not attracted his
attention, his path would have been as original, though not, perhaps, in
the same direction. And so of Hume himself. If the main outline of his
theory had never occurred to him, he would still have been a great
philosopher; for in some form or other he would have found his way to
those incidental and subsidiary discoveries, which are admitted to have
reality in them by many who repudiate his general theory.

Of all the secondary applications of the leading principle of the
Treatise, none has perhaps exercised so extensive an influence on
philosophy, as this same doctrine of cause and effect. Looking to those
separate phenomena, of which in common language we call the one the
cause of the other, and the other the effect of that cause, he could see
no other connexion between them than that the latter immediately
followed the former. He found that the mind, proceeding on the inductive
system, when it repeatedly saw two phenomena thus conjoined, expected,
when that which had been in use to precede the other made its
appearance, that the other would follow; and he found that by repeated
experiment this expectation might be so far strengthened, that people
were ready to stake their most important temporal interests on the
occurrence of the phenomenon called the effect, when that called the
cause had taken place. But if there were any thing else but this
conjunction, of which a knowledge was demanded--if the unsatisfied
investigator sought for some power in the one phenomenon which enabled
it to be the fabricator of the other--the sceptical reasoner would
answer, that for all he could say to the contrary such a thing might be,
but he had no clue to that knowledge--no impression of any such quality
passed into his intellect through sensation--his mind had no material
committed to it by which the existence or non-existence of any such
thing could be argued.

The vulgar notion of this theory was, that it destroyed all our notions
of regularity and system in the order of nature; that it made no
provision for unseen causes, and contemplated only the application of
the doctrines of cause and effect to things which were palpably seen
following each other. But the inventor of the theory never questioned
the regularity of the operations of nature as established by the
inductive philosophy; he only endeavoured to show how far and within
what limits we could acquire a cognizance of the machinery of that
regularity. He denied not that when the spark was applied, the gunpowder
would ignite, or that when the ball was dropped, it would proceed to the
earth with the accelerated motion of gravitation; but he denied that we
could see any other connexion between the cause and effect in either
case, than that of uniform sequence. When it was scientifically adopted,
the theory was found to be productive of the most important results. The
view that when any effect was observed, that phenomenon which was most
uniform in its precedence was the one entitled to be termed the cause,
was a salutary incentive to close and patient investigation, by laying
before the philosopher the simple, numerical question--what was that
phenomenon which, by the uniformity of its precedence, was entitled to
be termed the cause?[81:1] The test became of the simplest kind; and, if
the experimentalist had at a particular time considered some phenomenon
as a cause,--if the farther progress of patient and unprejudiced inquiry
showed that another, by the occurrence of instances in which it
preceded the effect while the former did not, had a preferable title to
be termed the cause, the mind in its unbiassed estimate of numbers at
once admitted the claim. But when, according to the antagonist
system,[82:1] it became settled that any given phenomenon had in it the
power of bringing into existence another, that power was viewed as a
quality of the object. When things are admitted to have qualities, it is
not easy for the mind at once to assent to their non-existence and to
admit that others have the proper title to these qualities. Analogy, the
great source of fallacies, comes to increase the difficulty, by a
confusion of what are termed the qualities of bodies, and those
endowments with which we invest our fellow-creatures. In this respect
Hume's theory of cause and effect has been of great service to inductive
philosophy.

It was an objection to it that it made no allowance for unseen causes;
but it was part of its author's system, that the uniformity which our
observation teaches us, proceeds unseen in those cases to which our
observation cannot penetrate. It was part of the theory, that where
there is a want of the absolute uniformity in the sequence of two
phenomena, they are not respectively cause and effect. This principle is
of vital importance in physical science. It is a notion with the vulgar,
and one that sometimes perhaps lurks unseen in scientific operations,
that the cause sometimes does not produce its effect by reason of some
failure in the operating power. It is from a vague amplification of this
heresy, that the popular notion of chance is derived. Hume's theory
nips the bud of such a fallacy by denying, whenever there is a break in
the sequence, that the phenomena which have in other instances followed
each other, really are cause and effect. It is perhaps in the
unscientific application of therapeutics, that the popular fallacy is
most widely and most dangerously exemplified. The whole of the
complexity of that wondrous science consists in the immediate causes and
effects being unseen--in the phenomena immediately conjoined not being
ascertained, but in attempts being made to estimate them through the
connexion between those external causes to which the internal causes may
have had the relation of effects, and those external effects of which
these internal effects may have been the causes. The character of unseen
causes was aptly illustrated by Hume himself, from the throwing of a
die. The vulgar mind can see no cause and effect in the operation,
because there is a series of causes and effects, which are hidden from
the sight, in the interior of the box; but the philosopher knows not the
less, that those laws of motion, which induction has established to him
as truths, are taking place; and that there is no turn made by the die,
which is not as much the effect of some cause, as the turning of the
hands of a watch, or the parallel motion in a steam engine.

It is one of the peculiar features of the history of mental philosophy,
that there is scarcely ever a new principle, associated with the name of
a great author, but it is shown that it has been anticipated, in some
oracular sentence, probably by an obscure writer. Joseph Glanvill is
pretty well known as the author of "Saducismus Triumphatus," a
vindication of the belief in witches and apparitions, which must have
been perused by all the curious in this species of lore. Glanvill was
the author of various tracts on biblical subjects, but it was not
generally known that he wrote a book on sceptical philosophy, called
"Scepsis Scientifica, or, Confest Ignorance the Way to Science," until
it was unearthed by the persevering inquiries of Mr. Hallam. In that
book there is the passage, "all knowledge of causes is _deductive_, for
we know none by simple intuition, but through the medium of their
effects; so that we cannot conclude any thing to be the cause of another
but from its continual accompanying it, for the causality itself is
_insensible_."[84:1] This is an addition to the many instances where
writers have almost, as it were by chance, laid down principles, of
which they show, by neglecting to follow them to their legitimate
conclusions, that they have not understood their full meaning; if it do
not rather illustrate the view already noticed, that in metaphysics our
assent is secured, not to general propositions as such, but to their
particular applications; and that it is not in the laying down of first
principles that important truths are exhibited to the world, but in
those subsidiary expositions by which the discoverer endeavours to show
their application.

The subsequent history of Hume's theory of Cause and Effect, is a marked
illustration of the danger of bringing forward as an argument against
theories purely metaphysical, the statement that they are dangerous to
religion. It is difficult to see where there is a difference between
adducing that argument in the sphere of natural philosophy, from which
it has been long scouted by common consent, and bringing it forward as
an answer to the theories of the metaphysician. In either case it is a
threat, which, in the days of Galileo, bore the terror of corporal
punishment, and in the present day carries the threat of unpopularity,
to the person against whom it is used.[86:1] If any one should suppose
that he finds lurking in the speculations of some metaphysical writer,
opinions from which it may be inferred that he is not possessed of the
hopes and consolations of the Christian, humanity to the unhappy author
should suggest that he ought rather to be pitied than condemned, and
respect for the religious feelings of others should teach that there is
no occasion to endeavour, by a laborious pleading, to demonstrate that a
man who has said nothing against religion is in reality an enemy to
Christianity. They are surely no enlightened friends to religion, who
maintain that the suppression of inquiry as to the material or the
immaterial world, is favourable to the cause of revealed truth. The
blasphemer who raises his voice offensively and contentiously against
what his fellow citizens hold sacred, invokes the public wrath, and is
no just object of sympathy. The extent of his punishment is regretted
only when, by its vindictive excess, it is liable to excite retaliatory
attacks from the same quarter. But the speculative philosopher, who does
not directly interfere with the religion of his neighbours, should be
left to the peaceful pursuit of his inquiries; and those who, instead of
meeting him by fair argument, cry out irreligion, and call in the mob to
their aid, should reflect first, whether it is absolutely certain that
they are right in their conclusion, that his inquiries, if carried out,
would be inimical to religion--whether some mind more acute and
philosophical than their own, may not either finally confute the
sceptical philosopher's argument, or prove that it is not inimical to
religion; and secondly, whether they are not likely to be themselves the
greatest foes to religion, by holding that it requires such defence, and
the practical blasphemers, by proclaiming that religion is in danger?

Kant, the most illustrious opponent of Hume, in allusion to those who
have appealed against him to our religious feelings, asks, what the man
is doing that we should meddle with him; says he is but trying the
strength of human reason, and bids us leave him to combat with those who
are giving him specimens of the fabric on which to try his skill--tells
us to wait and see who will produce one too strong to be broken to
pieces--and not cry treason, and appeal to the angry multitude, who are
strangers to these refined reasonings, to rush in. Shall we ask reason
to give us lights, and prescribe beforehand what they are to show
us?[88:1] "The observation of human blindness and weakness," says Hume
himself, "is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every turn,
in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it." A solemn saying, and
characteristic of one who has done more than any other man to show the
feebleness of poor human reason, and to teach man that he is not all
sufficient to himself.

Those revelations in astronomy and geology, the first glimmerings of
which made the timid if not doubting friends of their cause tremble,
have enlarged year by year in rapid progression; but revealed religion
is not less firm on her throne; and many of those who held that Hume's
theory of Cause and Effect was inimical to revelation, lived to see how
startlingly that argument could be turned against themselves. It has
been well observed by Dugald Stewart, that this theory is the most
effectual confutation of the gloomy materialism of Spinoza, "as it lays
the axe to the very root from which Spinozism springs." "The cardinal
principle," he says, "on which the whole of that system turns is, that
all events, physical and moral, are _necessarily_ linked together as
causes and effects; from which principle all the most alarming
conclusions adopted by Spinoza follow as unavoidable and manifest
corollaries. But if it be true, as Mr. Hume contends, and as most
philosophers now admit, that physical causes and effects are known to us
merely as _antecedents_ and _consequents_; still more if it be true that
the word _necessity_, as employed in this discussion, is altogether
unmeaning and insignificant, the whole system of Spinoza is nothing
better than a rope of sand, and the very proposition which it professes
to demonstrate is incomprehensible by our faculties."[89:1]

It will be remembered how signally, in the question in the General
Assembly of the Church of Scotland, as to Sir John Leslie's
professorship, the argument of irreligion was retaliated; and it was
shown that, in the theory of an existing machinery in nature enabling
the universe to proceed in its regular course, the cause having within
it the adequate power for producing its effect, the omnipresence of a
Deity was dispensed with, and there was substituted for the
all-pervading influence of a superior wisdom, a mere material machine,
having within itself the elements of its own regular motion. Thus, in
instances where writers have claimed credit for having aided the cause
of religion by carrying out the principles of natural theology, this
merit has in many cases, and among certain classes of devout religious
thinkers, been sternly denied them; and it has been said that their
labours are rather adverse than favourable to revealed religion,
because, through their tendency to make people believe in an established
order in nature, by which causes produce their effects according to a
fixed system, they have the effect of making mankind forget the
existence of a revealed, omnipresent Deity, whose all-competent
superintendence regulates the world, and they supply a religion
independent of the religion of revelation.

Perhaps in this little history we may find an illustration of the view,
that the greatest service which the Treatise has done to philosophy is
that purely incidental one of teaching human reason its own weakness--of
showing how easily the noblest fabric of human thought may be
undermined, by a destroying agency of power not greater than that of the
constructive genius which has raised it. In this respect it has done to
philosophy the invaluable service of teaching philosophers their own
fallibility. In all the departments of thought, and not only in the
world of thought but in that of action, the spirit of human
infallibility is the greatest obstacle to truth and goodness. Whether it
appear to protect a system which the thinker has framed for himself, or
assume the more modest shape of maintaining, that among conflicting
systems he has made choice of that which is absolutely and certainly
right, while all others which in any way differ from it are as
absolutely and certainly wrong; this offspring of the pride of human
intellect is an equally dangerous enemy of human improvement; and to
have contributed to its downfal is of itself no small achievement for
one mind.

Such are a few remarks on the matter of the first part of the "Treatise
of Human Nature"--given not by any means as an analysis of the doctrines
there taught, but merely as an attempt to characterize them by their
prominent features. It will naturally be expected that a similar attempt
should be made to characterize the form in which these doctrines were
promulgated. As to the style of the Treatise, it possesses the
clearness, flexibility, and simplicity that distinguish the maturity of
its author's literary career, though not quite in all the perfection in
which they afterwards attended his pen. There are occasional
Scoticisms--a defect which he took infinite pains to cure, but of which
he was never entirely rid. He uses a few obsolete and now harsh sounding
forms of expression, from which he afterwards abstained: such as the
elliptical combination 'tis, for it is. Here, and in the first editions
of his History, he frequently neglects the increment on the perfect
tense, as by saying, "I have forgot," instead of, I have forgotten; "I
have wrote," instead of I have written.

The Treatise has that happy equality of flight, which distinguishes the
author's maturer productions. There is no attempt to soar, and none of
those ambitious inequalities which often deform the works of young
authors. His imagination and language seem indeed to have been kept
permanently chained down by the character of his inquiries. His constant
aim is to make his meaning clear; and in the subtleties of a new and
intricate system of metaphysics, he seems to have felt that there lay
upon him so heavy a responsibility to make use on all occasions of the
clearest and simplest words, that any flight of imagination or eloquence
would be a dangerous experiment.

There is a corresponding absence of pedantic ornament. A young writer
who has read much, is generally more anxious to show his learning and
information than his own power of thought. With many the defect lasts
through maturer years, and they write as if to find a good thing in some
unknown author, were more meritorious than to have invented it.
Montesquieu, whom Hume has been accused of imitating, carried this
defect to a vice, and often distorted the order of his reasoning, that
he might introduce an allusion to something discovered in the course of
his peculiar learning. That Hume had read much in philosophy before he
undertook his great work, cannot be doubted, but he does not drag his
readers through the minutiæ of his studies, and is content with giving
them results. In many respects, indeed, one would have desired to know
more of his appreciation of his predecessors. The name of Aristotle is,
it is believed, not once mentioned in the work, and there are only some
indirect allusions to him, and these not very respectful, in casual
remarks on the opinions of the Peripatetics. One would have expected
from Hume a kindred sympathy with the great master of intellectual
philosophy, and a respectful appreciation of one whose inquiries were
conducted with a like acute severity, but whose mind took so much more
wide and comprehensive a grasp of the sources of human knowledge.

It has been often observed, that a person so original in his opinions as
Hume, ought to have made a new nomenclature for the new things which he
taught. But he has no philosophical nomenclature; he appears indeed to
have despised that useful instrument of method, and means of
communicating clear ideas to learners. This want has prevented his
system from being clearly and fully learned by the student, while it has
at the same time probably made his works less repulsive to the general
reader. He seems indeed hardly to have been conscious of the advantage
to all philosophy, of uniformity of expression. Using the words "force,"
"vivacity," "solidity," "firmness," and "steadiness," all with the same
meaning, he speaks of this usage as a "variety of terms which may seem
so unphilosophical;" and then observes, more in the style of one who is
tired of philosophical precision than of a philosopher, "Provided we
agree about the thing, 'tis needless to dispute about the terms."

This is a kindred defect to that absence of method which has been
already taken notice of. A fixed nomenclature is a beacon against
repetition and discursiveness. But the Treatise has no pretension to be
a work of which he who omits paying attention to any part, thereby drops
a link in a chain, the loss of which will make the whole appear broken
and inconsistent. There are, it is true, places where the essential
parts of the author's philosophy are developed, the omission of which
would render that which follows hard to be understood, but in general
each department of the work is intelligible in itself. Its author
appears to have composed it in separate fragments; holding in view,
while he was writing each part, the general principle of his theory, but
not taking it for granted that the reader is so far master of that
principle, as not to require it to be generally explained in connexion
with the particular matter under consideration. He seems indeed rather
desirous to dwell on it, as something that the reader may have seen in
the earlier part of the work, but may have neglected to keep in his mind
while he reads the other parts. Perhaps the true model of every
philosophical work is to be found in the usual systems of geometry,
where, whatever is once proposed and proved, is held a fixed part of
knowledge, and is never repeated; but as far as psychological reasoning
is from the certainty of geometrical, so distant perhaps, will ever be
the precision of its method from that of geometry.

It may safely be pronounced, that no book of its age presents itself to
us at this day, more completely free from exploded opinions in the
physical sciences. With the exception perhaps of occasional allusions to
"animal spirits," as a moving influence in the human body, the author's
careful sifting sceptical mind seems, without having practically tested
them, to have turned away from whatever doctrines were afterwards
destined to fall before the test of experiment and induction. It was not
that he was so much of a natural philosopher himself as to be able to
test their truth or falsehood, but that with a wholesome jealousy,
characteristic of the mind in which the Disquisition on Miracles was
working itself into shape, he avoided them as things neither coming
within the scope of his own analysis, nor bearing the marks of having
been satisfactorily established by those whose more peculiar province it
was to investigate their claims to be believed. At a later date, his
friend D'Alembert admitted judicial astrology and alchemy as branches of
natural philosophy in his "Systême Figuré des Connoissances Humaines."
Cudworth, and even the scrutinizing Locke, dealt gravely with matters
doomed afterwards to be ranked among popular superstitions, and Sir
Thomas Browne, in some respects a sceptic, eloquently defended more
"vulgar errors" than he exposed. Hobbes was, in the midst of the darkest
scepticism, a practical believer in the actual presence of the spirits
of the air; and Johnson, whose name, however, it may scarcely be fair to
class in this list, as he did not profess, except for conversational
triumph, to be a reducer and demolisher of unfounded beliefs, along
with his partial admission of the existence of spectres, has left behind
him many dogmatic announcements of physical doctrines, which the
progress of science has now long buried under its newer systems.

It is by no means maintained that Hume was beyond his age--or even on a
par with its scientific ornaments, in physical knowledge; but merely
that he showed a judicious caution in distinguishing, in his published
work, those parts of physical philosophy which had been admitted within
the bounds of true and permanent science, from those which were still in
a state of mere hypothesis. His knowledge of physical science was
probably not very extensive. A small portion of a collection of his
notes on subjects that attracted his attention bear on this subject. The
collection from which they are taken will be noticed in the next
chapter; but as those which are set apart from the others, and are
headed "Natural Philosophy," seem to have been written at an earlier
period than the rest of the collection, and are appropriate to the
present subject, they are here given. It is not expected that they will
awaken in the natural philosopher any great respect for the extent of
Hume's inquiries in this department of knowledge.


NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

"A ship sails always swiftest when her sides yield a little.

"Two pieces of timber, resting upon one another, will bear as much as
both of them laid across at the distance of their opening.

"Calcined antimony more heavy than before.[95:1]

"A proof that natural philosophy has no truth in it, is, that it has
only succeeded in things remote, as the heavenly bodies; or minute, as
light.

"'Tis probable that mineral waters are not formed by running over beds
of minerals, but by imbibing the vapours which form these minerals,
since we cannot make mineral waters with all the same qualities.

"Hot mineral waters come not a-boiling sooner than cold water.

"Hot iron put into cold water soon cools, but becomes hot again.

"There falls usually at Paris, in June, July, and August, as much rain
as in the other nine months.

"This seems to be a strong presumption against medicines, that they are
mostly disagreeable, and out of the common use of life. For the weak and
uncertain operation of the common food, &c. is well known by experience.
These others are the better objects of quackery."


The system of philosophy to which the foregoing remarks apply, was
published when its author was twenty-six years old, and he completed it
in voluntary exile, and in that isolation from the counsel and sympathy
of early friends, which is implied by a residence in an obscure spot in
a foreign country. While he was framing his metaphysical theory, Hume
appears to have permitted no confidential adviser to have access to the
workings of his inventive genius; and as little did he take for granted
any of the reasonings and opinions of the illustrious dead, as seek
counsel of the living. Nowhere is there a work of genius more completely
authenticated, as the produce of the solitary labour of one mind; and
when we reflect on the boldness and greatness of the undertaking, we
have a picture of self-reliance calculated to inspire both awe and
respect. The system seems to be characteristic of a lonely mind--of one
which, though it had no enmity with its fellows, had yet little sympathy
with them. It has few of the features that characterize a partaker in
the ordinary hopes and fears, the joys and sorrows, of humanity; little
to give impulse to the excitement of the enthusiast; nothing to dry the
tear of the mourner. It exposes to poor human reason her own weakness
and nakedness, and supplies her with no extrinsic support or protection.
Such a work, coming from a man at the time of life when our sympathies
with the world are strongest, and our anticipations brightest, would
seem to indicate a mind rendered callous by hardship and disappointment.
But it was not so with Hume. His coldness and isolation were in his
theories alone; as a man he was frank, warm, and friendly. But the same
impulses which gave him resolution to adopt so bold a step, seem at the
same time to have armed him with a hard contempt for the opinions of the
rest of mankind. Hence, though his philosophy is sceptical, his manner
is frequently dogmatical, even to intolerance; and while illustrating
the feebleness of all human reasoning, he seems as if he felt an innate
infallibility in his own. He afterwards regretted this peculiarity; and
in a letter, written apparently at an advanced period of life, we find
him deprecating not only the tone of the Inquiry, but many of its
opinions. He says:--


"Allow me to tell you, that I never asserted so absurd a proposition as
_that any thing might arise without a cause_. I only maintained that our
certainty of the falsehood of that proposition proceeded neither from
intuition nor demonstration, but from another source. _That Cæsar
existed_, that there is such an island as Sicily,--for these
propositions, I affirm, we have no demonstration nor intuitive
proof,--would you infer that I deny their _truth_, or even their
certainty? There are many different kinds of certainty; and some of them
as satisfactory to the mind, though perhaps not so regular as the
demonstrative kind.

"Where a man of sense mistakes my meaning, I own I am angry; but it is
only with myself, for having expressed my meaning so ill, as to have
given occasion to the mistake.

"That you may see I would no way scruple of owning my mistakes in
argument, I shall acknowledge (what is infinitely more material) a very
great mistake in conduct, viz. my publishing at all the 'Treatise of
Human Nature,' a book which pretended to innovate in all the sublimest
paths of philosophy, and which I composed before I was five-and-twenty;
above all, the positive air which prevails in that book, and which may
be imputed to the ardour of youth, so much displeases me, that I have
not patience to review it. But what success the same doctrines, better
illustrated and expressed, may meet with, _adhuc sub judice lis est_.
The arguments have been laid before the world, and by some philosophical
minds have been attended to. I am willing to be instructed by the
public; though human life is so short, that I despair of ever seeing the
decision. I wish I had always confined myself to the more easy parts of
erudition; but you will excuse me from submitting to a proverbial
decision, let it even be in Greek."[98:1]


The reader, who passes from the first book of the Treatise, on "the
Understanding," to the second, on "the Passions," will, in many
instances, feel like one who is awakened from a dream, or as if, after
penetrating in solitude and darkness into the unseen world of thought,
he had come forth to the cheerful company of mankind, and were holding
converse with a shrewd and penetrating observer of the passing world. As
Hume was never totally insensible to the elements of social enjoyment,
but had indeed an ample sympathy with the joys and sorrows of his fellow
men, he appears occasionally, in the midst of his most subtle
speculations, to experience a desire to burst from the dark prison of
solitude, into which he had voluntarily immured himself, and bask in the
sunshine of the world. "Man," he says, in his Treatise, "is the creature
of the universe who has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted
for it by the most advantages. We can form no wish which has not a
reference to society. A perfect solitude is, perhaps, the greatest
punishment we can suffer. Every pleasure languishes when enjoyed apart
from company, and every pain becomes more cruel and intolerable." In a
remarkable passage, in which, after having long proceeded in enthusiasm
with his solitary labours, he seems to have stopped for a moment, and
recalling within himself the feelings and sympathies of an ordinary man,
to have reflected on the scope and tendency of the system in which he
was involving himself, he thus expresses himself, regarding its gloomy
tendency, and the effect it has in destroying, in the mind of its
fabricator, those stays of satisfactory belief in which it is so
comfortable for the wearied intellect to find a resting-place:--

     Before I launch out into those immense depths of philosophy
     which lie before me, I find myself inclined to stop a moment
     in my present station, and to ponder that voyage which I have
     undertaken, and which undoubtedly requires the utmost art and
     industry to be brought to a happy conclusion. Methinks I am
     like a man, who, having struck on many shoals, and having
     narrowly escaped shipwreck in passing a small frith, has yet
     the temerity to put out to sea in the same leaky
     weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far as
     to think of compassing the globe under these disadvantageous
     circumstances. My memory of past errors and perplexities makes
     me diffident for the future. The wretched condition, weakness,
     and disorder of the faculties, I must employ in my inquiries,
     increase my apprehensions. And the impossibility of amending
     or correcting these faculties, reduces me almost to despair,
     and makes me resolve to perish on the barren rock, on which I
     am at present, rather than venture myself upon that boundless
     ocean which runs out into immensity. This sudden view of my
     danger strikes me with melancholy; and, as 'tis usual for that
     passion, above all others, to indulge itself, I cannot forbear
     feeding my despair with all those desponding reflections which
     the present subject furnishes me with in such abundance.

     I am first affrighted and confounded with that forlorn
     solitude in which I am placed in my philosophy, and fancy
     myself some strange uncouth monster, who, not being able to
     mingle and unite in society, has been expelled all human
     commerce, and left utterly abandoned and disconsolate. Fain
     would I run into the crowd for shelter and warmth, but cannot
     prevail with myself to mix with such deformity. I call upon
     others to join me, in order to make a company apart, but no
     one will hearken to me. Every one keeps at a distance, and
     dreads that storm which beats upon me from every side. I have
     exposed myself to the enmity of all metaphysicians, logicians,
     mathematicians, and even theologians; and can I wonder at the
     insults I must suffer? I have declared my disapprobation of
     their systems; and can I be surprised if they should express a
     hatred of mine and of my person? When I look abroad, I foresee
     on every side dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny, and
     detraction. When I turn my eye inward, I find nothing but
     doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and
     contradict me; though such is my weakness, that I feel all my
     opinions loosen and fall of themselves, when unsupported by
     the approbation of others. Every step I take is with
     hesitation, and every new reflection makes me dread an error
     and absurdity in my reasoning.

     For with what confidence can I venture upon such bold
     enterprises, when, beside those numberless infirmities
     peculiar to myself, I find so many which are common to human
     nature? Can I be sure that, in leaving all established
     opinions, I am following truth? and by what criterion shall I
     distinguish her, even if fortune should at last guide me on
     her footsteps? After the most accurate and exact of my
     reasonings, I can give no reason why I should assent to it,
     and feel nothing but a _strong_ propensity to consider objects
     _strongly_ in that view under which they appear to me.[101:1]

Occasionally, seduced by some impulse of playful candour, we find him
giving us admission as it were into the chamber of his thoughts, and
desiring that some one would drag him into the common circle of the
world. When there, he consents for a short time to comport himself as a
man, is social and sympathetic with his kind, and pleased with what is
passing around; when anon the ambition which had prompted his solitary
musings stirs his soul, tells him that in active life and the world at
large, the sphere of his true greatness is not placed, and prompts him
to reimprison himself, and pursue the great aim of his existence.

     But what have I here said, that reflections very refined and
     metaphysical have little or no influence upon us? This opinion
     I can scarce forbear retracting, and condemning from my
     present feeling and experience. The _intense_ view of these
     manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has
     so wrought upon me, and heated my brain, that I am ready to
     reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion
     even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or
     what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what
     condition shall I return? Whose favour shall I court, and
     whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom
     have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am
     confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself
     in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environed with
     the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of the use of every
     member and faculty.

     Most fortunately it happens, that since Reason is incapable of
     dispelling these clouds, Nature herself suffices to that
     purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and
     delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some
     avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which
     obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of
     backgammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and
     when, after three or four hours' amusement, I would return to
     these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and
     ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them
     any farther.

     Here, then, I find myself absolutely and necessarily
     determined to live, and talk, and act like other people in the
     common affairs of life. But notwithstanding that my natural
     propensity, and the course of my animal spirits and passions
     reduce me to this indolent belief in the general maxims of the
     world, I still feel such remains of my former disposition,
     that I am ready to throw all my books and papers into the
     fire, and resolve never more to renounce the pleasures of life
     for the sake of reasoning and philosophy. For those are my
     sentiments in that splenetic humour which governs me at
     present. I may, nay I must yield to the current of nature, in
     submitting to my senses and understanding; and in this blind
     submission I show most perfectly my sceptical disposition and
     principles. But does it follow that I must strive against the
     current of nature, which leads me to indolence and pleasure;
     that I must seclude myself, in some measure, from the commerce
     and society of men, which is so agreeable; and that I must
     torture my brain with subtilties and sophistries, at the very
     time that I cannot satisfy myself concerning the
     reasonableness of so painful an application, nor have any
     tolerable prospect of arriving by its means at truth and
     certainty? Under what obligation do I lie of making such an
     abuse of time? And to what end can it serve, either for the
     service of mankind, or for my own private interest? No: if I
     must be a fool, as all those who reason or believe any thing
     _certainly_ are, my follies shall at least be natural and
     agreeable. Where I strive against my inclination, I shall have
     a good reason for my resistance; and will no more be led
     a-wandering into such dreary solitudes, and rough passages, as
     I have hitherto met with.

     These are the sentiments of my spleen and indolence; and
     indeed I must confess, that philosophy has nothing to oppose
     to them, and expects a victory more from the returns of a
     serious good-humoured disposition, than from the force of
     reason and conviction. In all the incidents of life, we ought
     still to preserve our scepticism. If we believe that fire
     warms, or water refreshes, 'tis only because it costs us too
     much pains to think otherwise. Nay, if we are philosophers, it
     ought only to be upon sceptical principles, and from an
     inclination which we feel to the employing ourselves after
     that manner. Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with
     some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does
     not, it never can have any title to operate upon us.

     At the time, therefore, that I am tired with amusement and
     company, and have indulged a _reverie_ in my chamber, or in a
     solitary walk by a river side, I feel my mind all collected
     within itself, and

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