The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914
by Edwin A. Pratt · English · Gutenberg #42438 · 913,094 chars · public domain (US)
The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.
Title: The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest, 1833-1914
Author: Edwin A. Pratt
Release date: March 30, 2013 [eBook #42438]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/42438
Credits: Produced by Moti Ben-Ari and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net. (This file was
produced from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive.)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER IN WAR AND CONQUEST, 1833-1914 ***
THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER
IN WAR AND CONQUEST
1833-1914
THE
RISE OF RAIL-POWER
IN WAR AND CONQUEST
1833-1914
WITH A BIBLIOGRAPHY
BY
EDWIN A. PRATT
Author of "A History of Inland Transport,"
"Railways and their Rates," etc.
LONDON
P. S. KING & SON, LTD.
ORCHARD HOUSE
WESTMINSTER
1915
CONTENTS.
CHAP. PAGE
I A NEW FACTOR 1
II RAILWAYS IN THE CIVIL WAR 14
III RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN WAR 26
IV CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR 40
V PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS IN WAR 54
VI TROOPS AND SUPPLIES 62
VII ARMOURED TRAINS 67
VIII RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT 81
IX PREPARATION IN PEACE FOR WAR 98
X ORGANISATION IN GERMANY 103
XI RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY 122
XII FRANCE AND THE WAR OF 1870-71 138
XIII ORGANISATION IN FRANCE 149
XIV ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND 175
XV MILITARY RAILWAYS 205
XVI RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR 232
XVII THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 260
XVIII STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY 277
XIX A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE 296
XX DESIGNS ON ASIATIC TURKEY 331
XXI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 345
APPENDIX
INDIAN FRONTIER RAILWAYS 357
THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA 368
BIBLIOGRAPHY 376
INDEX 398
PREFATORY NOTE.
The extent to which railways are being used in the present War of the
Nations has taken quite by surprise a world whose military historians,
in their accounts of what armies have done or have failed to do on the
battle-field in the past, have too often disregarded such matters of
detail as to how the armies got there and the possible effect of good or
defective transport conditions, including the maintenance of supplies
and communications, on the whole course of a campaign.
In the gigantic struggle now proceeding, these matters of detail are
found to be of transcendant importance. The part which railways are
playing in the struggle has, indeed--in keeping with the magnitude of
the struggle itself--assumed proportions unexampled in history. Whilst
this is so it is, nevertheless, a remarkable fact that although much has
been said as to the conditions of military unpreparedness in which the
outbreak of hostilities in August, 1914, found the Allies, there has, so
far as I am aware, been no suggestion of any inability on the part of
the railways to meet, at once, from the very moment war was declared,
all the requirements of military transport. In this respect, indeed, the
organisation, the preparedness, and the efficiency throughout alike of
the British and of the French railways have been fully equal to those of
the German railways themselves.
As regards British conditions, especially, much interest attaches to
some remarks made by Sir Charles Owens, formerly General Manager of
the London and South Western Railway Company, in the course of an
address delivered by him to students of the London School of Economics
on October 12, 1914. He told how, some five or six years ago, he had
met at a social function the Secretary of State for War, who, after
dinner, took him aside and asked, "Do you think in any emergency which
might arise in this country the railways would be able to cope with it
adequately?" To this question Sir Charles replied, "I will stake my
reputation as a railway man that the country could not concentrate men
and materials half so fast as the railways could deal with them; but the
management of the railways must be left in the hands of railway men."
We have here an affirmation and a proviso. That the affirmation was
warranted has been abundantly proved by what the British railways have
accomplished in the emergency that has arisen. The special significance
of the proviso will be understood in the light of what I record in the
present work concerning the control of railways in war.
Taking the railways of all the countries, whether friends or foes,
concerned in the present World-War, and assuming, for the sake of
argument, that all, without exception, have accomplished marvels in the
way of military transport, one must, nevertheless, bear in mind two
important considerations:--
(1) That, apart from the huge proportions of the scale upon which,
in the aggregate, the railways are being required to serve military
purposes, the present conflict, in spite of its magnitude, has thus far
produced no absolutely new factor in the employment of railways for war
except as regards the use of air-craft for their destruction.
(2) That when hostilities were declared in August, 1914, the subject
of the employment of railways for the purposes of war had already been
under the consideration of railway and military experts in different
countries for no fewer than eighty years, during which period, and
as the result of vast study, much experience, and many blunders in
or between wars in various parts of the world, there had been slowly
evolved certain fixed principles and, also, subject to constant
amendments, a recognised and comprehensive organisation which, accepted
more or less completely by the leading nations, with modifications to
suit their national circumstances and conditions, was designed to meet
all contingencies, to provide, as far as human foresight could suggest,
for all possible difficulties, and be capable of application instantly
the need for it might arise.
The time has not yet come for telling all that the railways have thus
far done during the war which has still to be fought out. That story, in
the words of a railway man concerned therein, is at present "a sealed
book." Meanwhile, however, it is desirable that the position as defined
in the second of the two considerations given above should be fully
realised, in order that what the railways and, so far as they have
been aided by them, the combatants, have accomplished or are likely to
accomplish may be better understood when the sealed book becomes an open
one.
If, as suggested at the outset, the world has already been taken by
surprise even by what the railways are known to have done, it may be
still more surprised to learn (as the present work will show) that
the construction of railways for strategical purposes was advocated
in Germany as early as 1833; that in 1842 a scheme was elaborated for
covering Germany with a network of strategical railways which, while
serving the entire country, would more especially allow of war being
conducted on two fronts--France and Russia--at the same time; and that
in the same year (1842) attention was already being called in the French
Chamber to the "aggressive lines" which Germany was building in the
direction of France, while predictions were also being made that any new
invasion of France by Germany would be between Metz and Strasburg.
If, again, it is found that a good deal of space is devoted in the
present work to the War of Secession, criticism may, perhaps, be
disarmed by the explanation that the American Civil War was practically
the beginning of things as regards the scientific use of railways for
war, and that many of the problems connected therewith were either
started in the United States or were actually worked out there,
precedents being established and examples being set which the rest of
the world had simply to follow, adapt or perfect. The possibility of
carrying on warfare at a great distance from the base of supplies by
means of even a single line of single-track railway; the creation of
an organised corps for the restoration, operation or destruction of
railways; the control of railways in war by the railway or the military
interests independently or jointly; the question as to when the railway
could be used to advantage and when it would be better for the troops
to march; the use of armoured trains; the evolution of the ambulance or
the hospital train--all these, and many other matters besides, are to
be traced back to the American Civil War of 1861-65, and are dealt with
herein at what, it is hoped, will be found not undue length.
As for the building up of the subsequent organisation in
Europe--Germany, France and England being the countries selected
for special treatment in relation thereto--this, also, has had to
be described with some regard for detail; and, incidentally, it is
shown (1) that the alleged perfection of Germany's arrangements when
she went to war with France in 1870-71 is merely one of the fictions
of history, so far as her military rail-transport was concerned; (2)
that France learned the bitter lesson taught her by the deplorable and
undeniable imperfections of her own transport system--or no-system--on
that occasion, and at once set about the creation of what was to become
an organisation of the most complete and comprehensive character; and
(3) that the "beginning of things" in England, in the way of employing
railways for the purposes of war, was the direct outcome of the
conditions of semi-panic created here in 1859 by what was regarded as
the prospect of an early invasion of this country by France, coupled
with the then recognised deficiencies of our means of national defence.
Military railways, as employed in the Crimean War, the Abyssinian
Campaign, the Franco-German War, the Russo-Turkish War and the Sudan
are described; a detailed account is given of the use of railways in
the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War; and this is followed by a
description of the strategical railways constructed in Germany for the
purpose of facilitating war on the possessions of her neighbours.
Chapters XIX and XX deal with the building of railways which,
whether avowedly strategical or what I have described as
"economic-political-strategical," are intended to effect the purposes
of conquest, with or without the accompaniment of war. The former of
these two chapters, which shows how, with the help of railways, Germany
proposed to transform the African continent into an African Empire of
her own, should be found deserving of notice, and especially so in view
of the statements quoted (p. 311) as having been made by German officers
in what was then German South-West Africa, to the effect that the main
objective of Germany in going to war would be the conquest of Africa,
"the smashing up of France and Great Britain" being regarded only as
"incidents" which, followed by seizure of the possessions of the smaller
Powers, would make Germany the supreme Power in Africa, and lead to the
whole African continent becoming a German possession.
From Chapter XX the reader will learn how Germany proposed to employ
railways for the furthering of her aims against, not only Asiatic
Turkey, but Egypt and India, as well.
The subsidiary articles on "Indian Frontier Railways" and "The Defence
of Australia" have no direct bearing on that _evolution_ of rail-power
in warfare with which it is the special purpose of the present volume
to deal; but in the belief that they are of interest and importance in
themselves, from the point of view of the general question, they have
been given in an Appendix. The difficulties and other conditions under
which the Sind-Pishin State Railway, designed to serve strategical
purposes, was built to the frontiers of Afghanistan are unexampled in
the history either of railways or of war. As regards Australia, the
gravity of the position there was well indicated by Lord Kitchener when
he wrote of the lines running inland that they were "of little use for
defence, although possibly of considerable value to an enemy who would
have temporary command of the sea."
At the end of the volume there is a Bibliography of books, pamphlets
and review or other articles relating to the use of railways for the
purposes of war. In the first instance this compilation was based on
a "List of References" prepared by the American Bureau of Railway
Economics; but, while many items on that list have here been omitted, a
considerable number of others have been inserted from other sources. The
Bibliography is not offered as being in any way complete, but it may,
nevertheless, be of advantage to students desirous of making further
researches into the matters of history here specially treated.
The assistance rendered in other ways by the American Bureau of Railway
Economics in the preparation of the present work has been most helpful.
In the writing of the chapters concerning German designs on Africa, Asia
Minor, etc., the resources of the well-arranged and admirably-indexed
library of the Royal Colonial Institute have been of great service. I
have, also, to express cordial acknowledgments to the General Managers
and other officers of various leading railway companies for information
given respecting the organisation of railways in this country for
military purposes.
EDWIN A. PRATT.
_November, 1915._
The Rise of Rail-Power in War and Conquest
CHAPTER I
A NEW FACTOR
While the original purpose of railways was to promote the arts of
peace, the wide scope of their possibilities in the direction, also, of
furthering the arts of war began to be realised at a very early date
after their success in the former capacity had been assured in Great
Britain.
Already the canal system had introduced an innovation which greatly
impressed the British public. In December, 1806, a considerable body of
troops went by barge on the Paddington Canal from London to Liverpool,
_en route_ for Dublin, relays of fresh horses for the canal boats being
provided at all the stages in order to facilitate the transport; and in
referring to this event _The Times_ of December 19, 1806, remarked:--"By
this mode of conveyance the men will be only seven days in reaching
Liverpool, and with comparatively little fatigue, as it would take them
above fourteen days to march that distance."
But when, on the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, in
1830, a British regiment was conveyed thereon, in two hours, a journey
of thirty-four miles, which they would have required two days to
accomplish on foot, far-seeing men became still more impressed, and
began to realise that there had, indeed, been introduced a new factor
destined to exercise a powerful influence on the future conduct of war.
The geographical position of the United Kingdom led, in those early
days, to greater importance being attached to the conveniences of
railways as a means of transport than to their actual strategical and
tactical advantages; and the issue by the War Office, in 1846, of a
"Regulation Relative to the Conveyance of Her Majesty's Forces, their
Baggage and Stores, by Rail," may have appeared to meet the requirements
of the immediate situation, so far as this country was concerned.
On the Continent of Europe, however, the rivalry of nations divided from
one another only by a more or less uncertain or varying frontier, and
still powerfully influenced by the recollection of recent conflicts,
resulted in much greater attention being paid to the possibilities of
the new development.
The first definite proposals for the use of railways for strategical
purposes were advanced, as early as 1833, by Friedrich Wilhelm Harkort,
a Westphalian worthy who came to be better known in his native land
as "Der alte Harkort." A participant in the Napoleonic wars, he had
subsequently shown great energy and enterprise in the development of
steam engines, hydraulic presses, iron-making, and other important
industries in Germany; he had been the first writer in that country to
give an account--as he did in 1825--of the progress England was making
in respect to railways and steamships; and he had, in 1826, placed a
working model of a railway in the garden of the Elberfeld Museum. These
various efforts he followed up, in 1833, by bringing forward in the
Westphalian Landtag a scheme for the building of a railway to connect
the Weser and the Lippe. Later in the same year he published "Die
Eisenbahn von Minden nach Köln," in which he laid special stress on the
value to Germany of the proposed line from a military point of view.
With the help of such a railway, he argued, it would be possible to
concentrate large bodies of troops at a given point much more speedily
than if they marched by road; he made calculations as to what the actual
saving in time, as well as in physical strain, would be in transporting
Prussian troops from various specified centres to others; and he
proceeded:--
Let us suppose that we had a railway and a telegraph line
on the right bank of the Rhine, from Mainz to Wesel. Any
crossing of the Rhine by the French would then scarcely be
possible, since we should be able to bring a strong defensive
force on the spot before the attempt could be developed.
These things may appear very strange to-day; yet in the womb
of the future there slumbers the seed of great developments in
railways, the results of which it is, as yet, quite beyond our
powers to foresee.
Harkort's proposals gave rise to much vigorous controversy in Germany.
The official classes condemned as "nonsensical fancies" his ideas, not
only as to the usefulness of railways for the conveyance of troops, but,
also, as to the utility of railways for any practical purposes whatever;
and contemporary newspapers and periodicals, in turn, made him the butt
of their ridicule.
The pros and cons of the use of railways for military purposes were,
none the less, actively discussed in numerous pamphlets and treatises.
Just as, in France, General Rumigny, adjutant to Louis-Philippe, had
already foreshadowed the possibility of a sudden invasion by a German
army reaching the frontier by rail, so, also, in Germany, in the words
of one writer at this period, "anxious spirits shudder at the thought
that, some fine spring morning, a hundred thousand Frenchmen, thirsting
for war, will suddenly invade our peaceful valleys at bird-like speed,
thanks to the new means of locomotion, and begin their old game (_das
alte Spiel_) over again." On the other hand there were military
sceptics--such as the author of a pamphlet "Uber die Militärische
Benutzung der Eisenbahnen" (Berlin, 1836)--who, basing their
calculations on locomotive performances up to that date, asserted that,
although the railway might be of service in the conveyance of supplies,
guns and ammunition, it would be of no advantage in the transport of
troops. These, they declared, would get to their destination sooner if
they marched.[1]
The most noticeable of the various publications issued in Germany at
this period was a book by Carl Eduard Pönitz ("Pz."), which appeared
at Adorf, Saxony, in 1842, under the title of "Die Eisenbahnen
als militärische Operationslinien betrachtet, und durch Beispiele
erlaütert." The writer of this remarkable book (of which a second
edition was issued in 1853) gave a comprehensive survey of the whole
situation in regard to railways and war, so far as the subject could
be dealt with in the light of railway developments and of actual
experiences of troop movements by rail down to that time; and he argued
strongly in favour of the advantages to be derived from the employment
of railways for military purposes. He even suggested that, in the event
of an inadequate supply of locomotives, or of operations having to be
conducted in a mountainous country where locomotives could not be used
for heavy traffic, the troops might still use their own horses to draw
the coaches and wagons along the railway lines, so that the men would
arrive fresh and fit for immediate fighting at the end of their journey.
Describing railways as the most powerful vehicle for the advancement of
"Kultur" since the invention of printing, Pönitz showed how Belgium and
Saxony were the two countries which had taken the initiative in railway
construction on the Continent of Europe; and his references to the
former country are especially deserving of being recalled, in view of
recent events. He pointed to the good example which had been set by the
"far-sighted and energetic" King of the Belgians, and continued:--
Although, in a land torn asunder by revolutionary factions,
many wounds were still bleeding; and although the newly-created
kingdom was threatened by foes within and without and could
organise means of resistance only with great difficulty, there
was, nevertheless, taken in hand a scheme for the construction
of a network of railways designed to extend over the entire
country, while at the present moment the greater part of
that scheme has, in fact, been carried out. In this way King
Leopold has raised up for himself a memorial the full value
and significance of which may, perhaps, be appreciated only by
generations yet to come.
While Belgium was thus shown to have been setting a good example, the
only railways which Prussia then had in actual operation (apart from
the Berlin-Stettin and the Berlin-Breslau lines, which had been begun,
and others which had been projected) were the Berlin-Potsdam and the
Berlin-Magdeburg-Leipzig lines; though Saxony had the Leipzig-Dresden
line, and Bavaria the Nüremberg-Fürth and the Munich-Augsburg lines.
Pönitz, however, excused the backwardness of Prussia on the ground
that if her Government had refused, for a long time, to sanction
various projected railways, or had imposed heavy obligations in
regard to them, such action was due, not to prejudice, but to "a wise
foresight"--meaning, presumably, that Prussia was waiting to profit by
the experience that other countries were gaining at their own cost.
Having dealt with all the arguments he could advance in favour of the
general principle of employing railways for military purposes, Pönitz
proceeded to elaborate a scheme for the construction of a network of
strategical lines serving the whole of Germany, though intended, more
especially, to protect her frontiers against attack by either France
or Russia. Without, he said, being in the secrets of international
politics, he thought he might safely presume that Germany's only fear of
attack was from one of these two directions; and, although the relations
of the Great Powers of Europe were then peaceful, a continuance of those
conditions could not, of course, be guaranteed. So, he proceeded--
We have to look to these two fronts; and, if we want
to avoid the risk of heavy losses at the outset, we needs
must--also at the outset--be prepared to meet the enemy there
with an overwhelming force. Every one knows that the strength of
an army is multiplied by movements which are rapid in themselves
and allow of the troops arriving at the end of their journey
without fatigue.
In a powerful appeal--based on motives alike of patriotism, of national
defence and of economic advantage--that his fellow-countrymen should
support the scheme he thus put forward, Pönitz once more pointed to
Belgium, saying:--
The youngest of all the European States has given us an
example of what can be done by intelligence and good will.
The network of Belgian railways will be of as much advantage
in advancing the industries of that country as it will be in
facilitating the defence of the land against attack by France.
It will increase alike Belgium's prosperity and Belgium's
security. And we Germans, who place so high a value on our
intelligence, and are scarcely yet inclined to recognise the
political independence of the Belgian people, shall we remain so
blind as not to see what is needed for our own safety?
Pönitz could not, of course, anticipate in 1842 that the time would
come when his country, acting to the full on the advice he was then
giving, would have her strategic railways, not only to the French and
the Russian, but, also, to the Belgian frontier, and would use those in
the last-mentioned direction to crush remorselessly the little nation
concerning which he himself was using words of such generous sympathy
and approbation.
The ideas and proposals put forward by Pönitz (of whose work a French
translation, under the title of "Essai sur les Chemins de Fer,
considérés commes lignes d'opérations militaires," was published by L.
A. Unger in Paris, in 1844) did much to stimulate the discussion of the
general question, while the military authorities of Germany were moved
to make investigations into it on their own account, there being issued
in Berlin, about 1848 or 1850, a "Survey of the Traffic and Equipment of
German and of neighbouring foreign Railways for military purposes, based
on information collected by the Great General Staff."[2]
In France, also, there were those who, quite early in the days of the
new means of transport, predicted the important service it was likely to
render for the purposes of war no less than for those of peace.
General Lamarque declared in the French Chamber of Deputies in 1832, or
1833, that the strategical use of railways would lead to "a revolution
in military science as great as that which had been brought about by the
use of gunpowder."
At the sitting of the Chamber on May 25, 1833, M. de Bérigny, in urging
the "incontestable" importance of railways, said:--
From the point of view of national defence, what advantages
do they not present! An army, with all its material, could, in a
few days, be transported from the north to the south, from the
east to the west, of France. If a country could thus speedily
carry considerable masses of troops to any given point on its
frontiers, would it not become invincible, and would it not,
also, be in a position to effect great economies in its military
expenditure?
In a further debate on June 8, 1837, M. Dufaure declared that railways
had a greater mission to fulfil than that of offering facilities to
industry or than that of conferring benefits on private interests. Was
it a matter of no account, he asked, that they should be able in one
night to send troops to all the frontiers of France, from Paris to
the banks of the Rhine, from Lyons to the foot of the Alps, with an
assurance of their arriving fresh and ready for combat?
Then, in 1842, M. Marschall, advocating the construction of a line from
Paris to Strasburg, predicted that any new invasion of France by Germany
would most probably be attempted between Metz and Strasburg. He further
said:--
It is there that the German Confederation is converging
a formidable system of railways from Cologne, Mayence and
Mannheim.... Twenty-four hours will suffice for our neighbours
to concentrate on the Rhine the forces of Prussia, Austria and
the Confederation, and on the morrow an army of 400,000 men
could invade our territory by that breach of forty leagues
between Thionville and Lauterburg, which are the outposts of
Strasburg and Metz. Three months later, the reserve system
organised in Prussia and in some of the other German States
would allow of a second Army being sent of equal force to the
other. The title of "aggressive lines" given by our neighbours
to these railways leave us with no room for doubt as to their
intentions. Studies for an expedition against Paris by way of
Lorraine and Champagne can hardly be regarded as indicative of a
sentiment of fraternity.
France, however, had no inclination at that time to build railways
designed to serve military purposes, whether from the point of view of
aggression or even from that of national defence; so that in a letter to
his brother Ludwig, written April 13, 1844, von Moltke, then a member
of the General Staff of the Fourth Army Corps of the Prussian Army,
declared that whilst Germany was building railways, the French Chamber
was only discussing them. This was so far the case that when, later on,
Germany had nearly 3,300 miles of railway France was operating only a
little over 1,000 miles.
Apart from the experiences, on quite a small scale, which had been
obtained on the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, the earliest example
of what railways could do in the transport of large bodies of troops
was afforded in 1846, when Prussia's Sixth Army Corps--consisting
of over 12,000 men, together with horses, guns, road vehicles and
ammunition--was moved by rail, upon two lines, to Cracow. In 1849 a
Russian corps of 30,000 men, with all its equipment, was taken by rail
from its cantonments in Poland to Göding, Moravia, whence it effected a
junction with the Austrian army. There was, also, a certain movement of
German troops by rail to Schleswig-Holstein in the troubles of 1848-50;
but of greater importance than these other instances was the transport
of an Austrian army of 75,000 men, 8,000 horses and 1,000 vehicles from
Vienna and Hungary to the Silesian frontier in the early winter of 1850.
It is true that, owing to the combined disadvantages of single-line
railways, inadequate staff and rolling stock, unfavourable weather, lack
of previous preparations and of transport regulations, and delays from
various unforeseen causes, no fewer than twenty-six days were occupied
in the transport, although the journey was one of only about 150 miles.
It was, also, admitted that the troops could have marched the distance
in the same time. All the same, as told by Regierungsrat Wernekke,[3]
the movement of so large a body of troops by rail at all was regarded
as especially instructive. It was the cause of greater attention being
paid to the use of railways for military purposes, while it further led
(1) to the drawing up, in May, 1851, of a scheme for the construction
throughout the Austrian monarchy of railways from the special point
of view of strategical requirements; and (2) to a reorganisation of
the methods hitherto adopted for the transport of troops by rail, the
result being that the next considerable movement in Austria--in the year
1853--was conducted with "unprecedented regularity and efficiency," and
this, also, without any cessation of the ordinary traffic of the lines
concerned.
In 1851 a further striking object lesson of the usefulness of railways
was afforded by the moving of a division of 14,500 men, with nearly
2,000 horses, 48 guns and 464 vehicles, from Cracow to Hradish,
a distance of 187 miles, in two days. Reckoning that a large column
of troops, with all its impedimenta, would march twelve miles per
day, and allowing for one day's rest in seven, the movement would, in
this instance, have occupied fifteen days by road instead of two days
by rail.
It was in the _Italian campaign of 1859_ that railways first played a
conspicuous part in actual warfare, both strategically and tactically.
"In this campaign," said Major Millar, R.A., V.C., of the Topographical
Staff, in two lectures delivered by him at the Royal United Service
Institution in 1861[4]--
Railways assisted the ordinary means of locomotion hitherto
employed by armies. By them thousands of men were carried
daily through France to Toulon, Marseilles, or the foot of
Mont Cenis; by them troops were hastened up to the very fields
of battle; and by them injured men were brought swiftly back
to the hospitals, still groaning in the first agony of their
wounds. Moreover, the railway cuttings, embankments and bridges
presented features of importance equal or superior to the
ordinary accidents of the ground, and the possession of which
was hotly contested. If you go to Magenta you will see, close
to the railway platform on which you alight, an excavation full
of rough mounds and simple black crosses, erected to mark the
resting-places of many hundred men who fell in the great fight.
This first employment of railways in close connection with vast
military operations would alone be enough to give a distinction
to this campaign in military history.
The French railways, especially, attained a remarkable degree of
success. In eighty-six days--from April 19 to July 15--they transported
an aggregate of 604,000 men and over 129,000 horses, including nearly
228,000 men and 37,000 horses sent to Culox, Marseilles, Toulon,
Grenoble and Aix by lines in the south-east. The greatest movements
took place during the ten days from April 20 to April 30, when the
Paris-Lyons Company, without interrupting the ordinary traffic, conveyed
an average per day of 8,421 men and 512 horses. On April 25, a maximum
of 12,138 men and 655 horses was attained. During the eighty-six days
there were run on the lines of the same company a total of 2,636 trains,
including 253 military specials. It was estimated that the 75,966 men
and 4,469 horses transported by rail from Paris to the Mediterranean
or to the frontiers of the Kingdom of Sardinia between April 20 and
April 30 would have taken sixty days to make the journey by road. In
effect, the rate of transit by rail was six times greater than the rate
of progress by marching would have been, and this, again, was about
double as fast as the best achievement recorded up to that time on the
German railways. The Chasseurs de Vincennes are described as leaving
the station at Turin full of vigour and activity, and with none of the
fatigue or the reduction in numbers which would have occurred had they
made the journey by road.
As against, however, the advantage thus gained by the quicker transport
of the French troops to the seat of war, due to the successful manner
in which the railways were operated, there had to be set some serious
defects in administrative organisation. When the men got to the end
of their rail journey there was a more or less prolonged waiting for
the food and other necessaries which were to follow. There were grave
deficiencies, also, in the dispatch of the subsequent supplies. On June
25, the day after the defeat of the Austrians, the French troops had
no provisions at all for twenty-four hours, except some biscuits which
were so mouldy that no one could eat them. Their horses, also, were
without fodder. In these circumstances it was impossible to follow up
the Austrians in their retreat beyond the Mincio.
Thus the efficiency of the French railways was to a large extent
negatived by the inefficiency of the military administration; and in
these respects France had a foretaste, in 1859, of experiences to be
repeated on a much graver scale in the Franco-German War of 1870-71.
As regards the Austrians, they improved but little on their admittedly
poor performance in 1850, in spite of the lessons they appeared to
have learned as the result of their experiences on that occasion.
Government and railways were alike unprepared. Little or no real attempt
at organisation in time of peace had been made, and, in the result,
trains were delayed or blocked, and stations got choked with masses
of supplies which could not be forwarded. At Vienna there was such a
deficiency of rolling stock--accelerated by great delays in the return
of empties--that many of the troop trains for the South could not be
made up until the last moment. Even then the average number of men they
conveyed did not exceed about 360. At Laibach there was much congestion
because troops had to wait there for instructions as to their actual
destination. Other delays occurred because, owing to the heavy gradients
of the Semmering Pass, each train had to be divided into three sections
before it could proceed. Between, again, Innsbruck and Bozen the railway
was still incomplete, and the First Corps (about 40,000 men and 10,000
horses) had to march between these two points on their journey from
Prague to Verona. Notwithstanding this fact, it was estimated that they
covered in fourteen days a journey which would have taken sixty-four
days if they had marched all the way. From Vienna to Lombardy the Third
Army Corps (20,000 men, 5,500 horses, with guns, ammunition and 300
wagons) was carried by rail in fourteen days, the rate of progress
attained being four and a half times greater than by road marching,
though still inferior by one and a half times to what the French
troop-trains had accomplished.
On both sides important reinforcements were brought up at critical
periods during the progress of the war. Referring to the attacks by
the allies on Casteggio and Montebello, Count Gyulai, the Austrian
General, wrote:--"The enemy soon displayed a superior force, which was
continually increased by arrivals from the railway"; and the special
correspondent of _The Times_, writing from Pavia on May 21, 1859, said:--
From the heights of Montebello the Austrians beheld a
novelty in the art of war. Train after train arrived by railway
from Voghera, each train disgorging its hundreds of armed men
and immediately hastening back for more. In vain Count Stadion
endeavoured to crush the force behind him before it could be
increased enough to overpower him.
Then, also, the good use made of the railways by the allies in carrying
out their important flanking movement against the Austrians at Vercelli
gave further evidence of the fact that rail-power was a new force which
could be employed, not alone for the earlier concentration of troops at
the seat of war, but, also, in support of strategic developments on the
battle-field itself. Commenting on this fact the _Spectateur Militaire_
said, in its issue for September, 1869:--
Les chemins de fer ont joué un rôle immense dans cette
concentration. C'est la première fois que, dans l'histoire
militaire, ils servent d'une manière aussi merveilleuse et
entrent dans les combinaisons stratégiques.
While these observations were fully warranted by the results
accomplished in regard to concentration, reinforcements and tactical
movements by rail, the campaign also brought out more clearly than
ever before the need, if railways were to fulfil their greatest
possible measure of utility in time of war, of working out in advance
all important details likely to arise in connection with the movement
of troops, instead--as in the case of the Austrians, at least--of
neglecting any serious attempt at organisation until the need arose for
immediate action.
From all these various points of view the Italian campaign of 1859
marked a further important stage in the early development of that new
factor which the employment of railways for the purposes of warfare
represented; though far greater results in the same direction were to
be brought about, shortly afterwards, by the American Civil War of
1861-65. Not only does the real development of rail-power as a new arm
in war date therefrom, but the War of Secession was to establish in a
pre-eminent degree (1) the possibility, through the use of railways,
of carrying on operations at a considerable distance from the base
of supplies; (2) the need of a special organisation to deal alike
with restoration of railway lines destroyed by the enemy and with the
interruption, in turn, of the enemy's own communications; and (3) the
difficulties that may arise as between the military element and the
technical (railway) element in regard to the control and operation of
railways during war. To each of these subjects it is proposed to devote
a separate chapter.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] In 1847 one of the leading military writers in Germany published a
pamphlet in which he sought to prove that the best-organised railway
could not carry 10,000 Infantry a distance equal to sixty English miles
in twenty-four hours. As for the conveyance of Cavalry and Artillery by
train, he declared that this would be a sheer impossibility.
[2] "Uebersicht des Verkehrs und der Betriebsmittel auf den inländischen
und den benachbarten ausländischen Eisenbahnen für militärischen Zwecke;
nach dem beim grossen Generalstabe vorhanden Materialen zusammen
gestellt."
[3] "Die Mitwirkung der Eisenbahn an den Kriegen in Mitteleuropa."
"Archiv für Eisenbahnwesen," Juli und August, 1912.
[4] "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," vol. v, pp.
269-308. London, 1861.
CHAPTER II
RAILWAYS IN THE CIVIL WAR
Such were the conditions under which the War of Secession in the United
States was fought that without the help of railways it could hardly have
been fought at all.
The area of the military operations, from first to last, was equal in
extent almost to the whole of Europe. The line of separation between the
rival forces of North and South was fully 2,000 miles. Large portions
of this region were then unexplored. Everywhere, except in the towns,
it was but thinly populated. Civilisation had not yet progressed so far
that an advancing army could always depend on being able to "live on the
country." There were occasions when local supplies of food and forage
were so difficult of attainment that an army might be wholly dependent
on a base hundreds of miles distant from the scene of its operations.
Of roads and tracks throughout this vast area there were but few, and
these were mostly either indifferent or bad, even if they did not become
positively execrable in wet weather or after a considerable force of
troops had passed along them. In the low-lying districts, especially,
the alluvial undrained soil was speedily converted by the winter floods
into swamps and lakes. Further difficulties in the movement of troops
were offered by pathless forests as large as an English county; and
still others by the broad rivers or the mountain ranges it might be
necessary to cross.
Apart from the deficient and defective roads and tracks, the transport
facilities available for the combatants were those afforded by coastal
services, navigable rivers, canals and railways. Of these it was the
railways that played the most important rôle.
The American railway lines of those days had, generally speaking,
been constructed as cheaply as possible by the private enterprise
which--though with liberal grants of land and other advantages--alone
undertook their provision, the main idea being to supply a railway of
some sort to satisfy immediate wants and to improve it later on, when
population and traffic increased and more funds were available. The
lines themselves were mostly single track; the ballasting was too often
imperfect; iron rails of inadequate weight soon wore down and got out
of shape; sleepers (otherwise "ties"), which consisted of logs of wood
brought straight from the forests, speedily became rotten, especially in
low-lying districts; while, in the early 'Sixties lumber, used either in
the rough or smoothed on two sides, was still the customary material for
the building of bridges and viaducts carrying the railways across narrow
streams, broad rivers or widespread valleys.
All the same, these railways, while awaiting their later betterment,
extended for long distances, served as a connecting link of inestimable
advantage between the various centres of population and production, and
offered in many instances the only practicable means by which troops
and supplies could be moved. They fulfilled, in fact, purposes of such
vital importance from a strategical point of view that many battles
were fought primarily for the control of particular railways, for the
safeguarding of lines of communication, or for the possession, more
especially, of important junctions, some of which themselves became the
base for more or less distant operations.
The North, bent not simply on invasion but on reconquest of the States
which had seceded, necessarily took the offensive; the South stood
mostly on the defensive. Yet while the population in the North was far
in excess of that in the South, the initial advantages from a transport
point of view were in favour of the South, which found its principal
ally in the railways. Generals in the North are, indeed, said to have
been exceedingly chary, at first, in getting far away from the magazines
they depended on for their supplies; though this uneasiness wore off in
proportion as organised effort showed how successfully the lines of
rail communication could be defended.
In these and other circumstances, and especially in view of the
paramount importance the railway system was to assume in the conduct of
the war, the Federal Government took possession of the Philadelphia,
Wilmington and Baltimore Railway on March 31, 1861. This preliminary
measure was followed by the passing, in January, 1862, by the United
States House of Representatives, of "An Act to authorise the President
of the United States in certain cases to take possession of railroad and
telegraph lines, and for other purposes."
The President, "when in his judgment the public safety may require it,"
was "to take possession of any or all the telegraph lines in the United
States; ... to take possession of any or all the railroad lines in the
United States, their rolling stock, their offices, shops, buildings
and all their appendages and appurtenances; to prescribe rules and
regulations for the holding, using, and maintaining of the aforesaid
telegraph and railroad lines, and to extend, repair and complete the
same in the manner most conducive to the safety and interest of the
Government; to place under military control all the officers, agents
and employés belonging to the telegraph and railroad lines thus taken
possession of by the President, so that they shall be considered as a
post road and a part of the military establishment of the United States,
subject to all the restrictions imposed by the Rules and Articles of
War." Commissioners were to be appointed to assess and determine the
damages suffered, or the compensation to which any railroad or telegraph
company might be entitled by reason of such seizure of their property;
and it was further enacted "that the transportation of troops, munitions
of war, equipments, military property and stores, throughout the United
States, should be under the immediate control and supervision of the
Secretary of War and such agents as he might appoint."
Thus the Act in question established a precedent for a Government
taking formal possession of, and exercising complete authority and
control over, the whole of such railways as it might require to employ
for the purposes of war; although, in point of fact, only such lines,
or portions of lines, were so taken over by the War Department as were
actually required. In each instance, also, the line or portion of line
in question was given back to the owning company as soon as it was no
longer required for military purposes; while at the conclusion of the
war all the lines taken possession of by the Government were formally
restored to their original owners by an Executive Order dated August 8,
1865.
Under the authority of the Act of January 31, 1862, the following
order was sent to Mr. Daniel Craig McCallum, a native of Johnstone,
Renfrewshire, Scotland, who had been taken to America by his parents
when a youth, had joined the railway service, had held for many years
the position of general superintendent of the Erie Railroad, and was
one of the ablest and most experienced railway men then in the United
States:--
WAR DEPARTMENT.
Washington City, D.C.,
_February 11, 1862_.
_Ordered_, That D. C. McCallum be, and he is hereby,
appointed Military Director and Superintendent of Railroads in
the United States, with authority to enter upon, take possession
of, hold and use all railroads, engines, cars, locomotives,
equipments, appendages and appurtenances that may be required
for the transport of troops, arms, ammunition and military
supplies of the United States, and to do and perform all acts
and things that may be necessary and proper to be done for the
safe and speedy transport aforesaid.
By order of the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
McCallum commenced his duties with the staff rank of Colonel, afterwards
attaining to that of Brev.-Brig.-General. The scope of the authority
conferred on him, under the War Department order of February 11, 1862,
was widened a year later, when he was further appointed general manager
of all railways in possession of the Federal Government, or that might
from time to time be taken possession of by military authority, in the
departments of the Cumberland, the Ohio, the Tennessee, and of Arkansas,
forming the "Military Division of the Mississippi."
The total mileage of the lines taken over by the Federal Government
during the course of the war was 2,105, namely, in Virginia, 611
miles; in the military division of the Mississippi, 1,201; and in
North Carolina, 293. Much more was involved, however, for the Federal
Government than a mere transfer to themselves of the ownership and
operation of these lines for the duration of the war.
One of the greatest disadvantages of the American railways at the
time of the Civil War lay in their differences of gauge. The various
companies had built their lines with gauges chosen either to suit local
conditions or according to the views of their own engineers, with little
or no consideration for the running of through traffic on or from other
lines. There were, in fact, at that time gauges of 6 ft., 5 ft. 6 in.,
5 ft., 4 ft. 10 in., 4 ft. 9 in., 4 ft. 8½ in. (the standard English
gauge), and various narrower gauges besides. These conditions prevailed
until 1866, when the companies adopted a uniform gauge of 4 ft. 8½ in.
During the Civil War the lack of uniformity was in full force, and
military transport by rail was greatly complicated in consequence. More
than one-half of the lines taken over and operated had a gauge of 5 ft.,
and the remainder had a gauge of 4 ft. 8½ in., except in the case of
one short line, which was 5 ft. 6 in. As locomotives and rolling stock
adapted to one gauge were unsuited to any other, the obligations falling
upon the Director and General Manager of the Federal Military Railways
included that of taking up the lines of certain companies which had
adopted the 5 ft. gauge, and relaying them with the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge,
so that the same rolling stock could be used as on lines connecting with
them.
Incidentally, therefore, the Civil War in America taught the lesson that
the actual value of rail-power as influencing warfare in one and the
same country, or on one and the same continent, may vary materially
according to whether there is uniformity or diversity of railway gauge.
In certain instances the lines taken possession of were in so
defective a condition that it was imperatively necessary to relay
them, apart altogether from any question of gauge. When McCallum was
appointed General Manager of Military Railways for the Division of
the Mississippi, the main army was at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and its
supplies were being received from Nashville, 151 miles distant, over
the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. This was necessarily the main
line of supply during the subsequent campaigns from Chattanooga towards
Atlanta, and from Knoxville towards South-western Virginia; yet McCallum
says of it, in the Final Report he presented to the Secretary of War in
1866:--
The track was laid originally in a very imperfect manner,
with a light U-rail on wooden stringers which were badly decayed
and caused almost daily accidents by spreading apart and letting
the engines and cars drop through them.
In still other instances, lines which, though begun, were not finished,
had to be completed; in others new lines had to be constructed
throughout, or extensive sidings provided; so that once more we see
that it was not then simply a question of the Federal Government taking
possession of and operating an existing complete and efficient system of
railways.
Whatever, again, the condition of the lines when taken over, the
railways of both combatants were subjected to constant attack by the
other side with a view to the interruption of communications, the
destruction of railway track, railway bridges, rolling stock and other
railway property being enormous.
Reviewing the general situation at this time, McCallum says in his
report:--
In the beginning of the war military railroads were an
experiment; and though some light as to their management had
been gleaned by the operations of 1862 and 1863, yet so little
progress had been made that the attempt to supply the army of
General Sherman in the field, construct and reconstruct the
railroad in its rear, and keep pace with its march, was regarded
by those who had the largest experience, and who had become
most familiar with the subject, as the greatest experiment of
all. The attempt to furnish an army of 100,000 men and 60,000
animals with supplies from a base 360 miles distant by one line
of single-track railroad, located almost the entire distance
through the country of an active and vindictive enemy, is
without precedent in the history of warfare; and to make it
successful required an enormous outlay for labour and a vast
consumption of material, together with all the forethought,
energy, patience and watchfulness of which men are capable.
To meet the various conditions which had thus arisen, McCallum
was authorised by the Federal Government to create two distinct
departments, destined to bring about a still further development in the
application of rail-power to war by establishing precedents which the
leading countries of the world were afterwards to follow more or less
completely, according to their own circumstances and requirements.
The departments were known respectively as the "Transportation
Department," embracing the operation and maintenance of all the lines
brought under use by the army of the North; and the "Construction
Corps," which was to repair the damage done by wrecking parties of the
enemy, maintain lines of communication, and reconstruct, when necessary,
railways captured from the enemy as the Federals advanced.
Concerning the Construction Corps, and the great work accomplished by it
in keeping the lines open, details will be given in the chapter which
follows.
In regard to the Transportation Department, it may be of interest
to state that this was placed by McCallum in charge of a General
Superintendent of Transportation on United States Railroads in the
Military Division of the Mississippi. For each of the principal lines
there was appointed a Superintendent of Transportation who, acting under
the control of the General Superintendent, was held responsible for the
movement of all trains and locomotives; and these superintendents, in
turn, had under their direction one or more Masters of Transportation,
whose business it was to be constantly moving about over the sections of
line placed under their charge, and see that the railway employés were
attending properly to their duties.
At each of the principal stations there was an Engine Dispatcher who
was required to see that the locomotives were kept in good order and
ready for immediate use whenever required, to exercise control over the
drivers and firemen, and to assign the requisite "crew" to each engine
sent out.
Maintenance of road and structures for each line (as distinct from
the reconstruction work left to the Construction Department) was in
charge of a Superintendent of Repairs, assisted by such supervisors,
road-masters and foremen as he needed to control and direct his working
staff; and maintenance of rolling stock was delegated to (1) a Master
Machinist, responsible for repairs to locomotives, and (2) a Master of
Car Repairs.
These various officers were independent of each other, and all of
them reported direct to the General Superintendent. The maximum force
employed at any one time in the Transportation Department of the
Military Division of the Mississippi (as distinct from the military
lines in Virginia and elsewhere) was about 12,000 men.
A sufficient staff of competent railwaymen for the operation of the
Military Railways was difficult to get, partly because of the inadequate
supply of such men in the United States at that period, and partly
because those still at work on railways not taken over for military
purposes were unwilling to give up what they found to be exceptionally
good posts; but of the men whose services he was able to secure McCallum
speaks in terms of the highest commendation.
Having got his Department and Construction Corps into working order,
McCallum had next to turn his attention to ensuring an adequate supply
of locomotives and cars, with the necessary shops, tools and materials
for keeping them in working order. Here the Secretary of War again
came to his help, issuing, on March 23, 1864, an Order addressed to
locomotive manufacturers in which he stated that Colonel McCallum had
been authorised by the War Department to procure locomotives without
delay for the railways under his charge, and proceeded:--
In order to meet the wants of the Military Department of
the Government, you will deliver to his order such engines as
he may direct, whether building under orders for other parties
or otherwise, the Government being accountable to you for the
same. The urgent necessity of the Government for the immediate
supply of our armies operating in Tennessee renders the engines
indispensable for the equipment of the lines of communication,
and it is hoped that this necessity will be recognised by you as
a military necessity, paramount to all other considerations.--By
order of the President.
In January, 1864, McCallum had estimated that he would require 200
locomotives and 3,000 cars for the lines to be operated from Nashville,
and towards this number he then had only 47 locomotives and 437 cars
available. There was thus a substantial shortage which had to be
made good; but the manufacturers, inspired by "a spirit of zealous
patriotism," responded heartily to the appeal made to them, putting
their full force on to the completion of further supplies. These were
furnished with a speed that surpassed all previous records.
Then, to maintain the locomotives and cars in good condition--more
especially in view of the constant attempts made by the enemy to destroy
them--extensive machine and car shops were built at Nashville and
Chattanooga. Those at Nashville--the terminal station for 500 miles
of railway running south, east or west--had, at times, as many as 100
engines and 1,000 cars awaiting repair.
Next to that insufficiency of engines and rolling stock which hampered
the movements of both combatants came the difficulty in the way of
obtaining further supplies of rails, whether for new lines or to take
the place of those which had either worn out or been so bent and twisted
by the enemy that they could not be used again without re-rolling.
For the Confederates, cut off by the advance of General Grant to the
south and west from their sources of supply, the want of iron for new
rails was declared to be a worse evil than was the lack of gold for the
Federals.
One expedient resorted to by the Federal Government, on finding they
could not procure from the manufacturers all the rails they wanted, was
to pull up the railway lines that were not wanted for military purposes
and use their rails for relaying those that were. Altogether the rails
on over 156 miles of track in Virginia and the Military Division of the
Mississippi were thus taken up and utilised elsewhere. Later on the
Federal Construction Corps erected at Chattanooga some "very superior"
rolling mills, equipped with all the latest improvements in the way of
machinery and mechanical appliances; though these mills did not actually
get to work until April 1, 1865. Their production of new rails during
the course of six months from that date was 3,818 tons, this supply
being in addition to nearly 22,000 tons which the Federal Government
obtained by purchase.
These details may convey some idea of all that was involved in the
utilisation of rail-power in the American Civil War under such
development of railway construction as had then been brought about.
Great, however, as was the outlay, the forethought, the energy, the
patience and the watchfulness spoken of by McCallum, the results were no
less valuable from the point of view of the Federals, who could hardly
have hoped to achieve the aim they set before themselves--that of saving
the Union--but for the material advantages they derived from the use of
the railways for the purposes of the campaign.
Some of the achievements accomplished in the movement of troops from
one part of the theatre of war to another would have been creditable
even in the most favourable of circumstances; but they were especially
so in view alike of the physical conditions of many of the lines, the
inadequate supply of rolling stock, and the risks and difficulties to be
met or overcome.
One of these achievements, carried out in September, 1863, is thus
narrated in an article on "Recollections of Secretary Stanton,"
published in the _Century Magazine_ for March, 1887:--
The defeat of Rosecrans, at Chickamauga, was believed at
Washington to imperil East Tennessee, and the Secretary [of War]
was urged to send a strong reinforcement there from the Army
of the Potomac. General Halleck (General-in-Chief of the Army
of the United States) contended that it was impossible to get
an effective reinforcement there in time; and the President,
after hearing both sides, accepted the judgment of Halleck. Mr.
Stanton put off the decision till evening, when he and Halleck
were to be ready with details to support their conclusions.
The Secretary then sent for Colonel McCallum, who was neither
a lawyer nor a strategist, but a master of railway science. He
showed McCallum how many officers, men, horses, and pieces of
artillery, and how much baggage, it was proposed to move from
the Rapidan to the Tennessee, and asked him to name the shortest
time he would undertake to do it in if his life depended on
it. McCallum made some rapid calculations, jotted down some
projects connected with the move, and named a time within that
which Halleck had admitted would be soon enough if it were
only possible; this time being conditioned on his being able
to control everything that he could reach. The Secretary was
delighted, told him that he would make him a Brigadier-General
the day that the last train was safely unloaded; put him on his
mettle by telling him of Halleck's assertion that the thing
was beyond human power; told him to go and work out final
calculations and projects and to begin preliminary measures,
using his name and authority everywhere; and finally instructed
him what to do and say when he should send for him by and
by to come over to the department. When the conference was
resumed and McCallum was introduced, his apparently spontaneous
demonstration of how easily and surely the impossible thing
could be done convinced the two sceptics, and the movement was
ordered, and made, and figures now in military science as a
grand piece of strategy.
The feat thus accomplished was that of conveying by rail 23,000 men,
together with artillery, road vehicles, etc., a distance of about 1,200
miles in seven days. It was estimated that if the troops had had to
march this distance, with all their impedimenta, along such roads as
were then available, the journey would have taken them three months. By
doing it in one week they saved the situation in East Tennessee, and
they gave an especially convincing proof of the success with which "a
grand piece of strategy" could be carried out through the employment of
rail transport.
In December, 1864, General Schofield's corps of 15,000 men, after
fighting at Nashville in the midst of ice and snow, was, on the
conclusion of the campaign in the west, transferred from the valley of
the Tennessee to the banks of the Potomac, moving by river and rail down
the Tennessee, up the Ohio and across the snow-covered Alleghanies,
a distance of 1,400 miles, accomplished in the short space of eleven
days. In 1865 the moving of the Fourth Army Corps of the Federals from
Carter's Station, East Tennessee, to Nashville, a distance of 373 miles,
involved the employment of 1,498 cars.
What, in effect, the Civil War in America did in furthering the
development of the rail-power principle in warfare was to show that,
by the use of railways, (1) the fighting power of armies is increased;
(2) strategical advantages unattainable but for the early arrival of
reinforcements at threatened points may be assured; and (3) expeditions
may be undertaken at distances from the base of supplies which would
be prohibitive but for the control of lines of railway communication;
though as against these advantages were to be put those considerations
which also arose as to destruction and restoration, and as to the
control of railways in their operation for military purposes.
CHAPTER III
RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN WAR
One of the earliest and most obvious criticisms advanced against the
use of railways in war was based on the vulnerability of the iron
road. The destruction of a bridge, the tearing up of a few rails or
the blocking of a tunnel would, it was argued, suffice to cause an
interruption in the transport of troops or supplies which might be of
serious consequence to the combatants prejudiced thereby, though of
corresponding advantage to the other side. By means of such interruption
the concentration of troops on the frontier might be delayed; an army
might be divided into two or more parts, and exposed to the risk of
defeat in detail; the arrival of reinforcements urgently wanted to
meet a critical situation might be prevented until it was too late for
them to afford the desired relief; a force advancing into an enemy's
country might have its rail connection severed and be left to starve
or to surrender at discretion; invaders would find that the force they
were driving before them had taken the precaution to destroy their
own railways as they retreated; or, alternatively, lines of railway
constructed to the frontier, and depended upon to facilitate invasion of
neighbouring territory, might--unless destroyed--be of material service
to the enemy, should the latter become the invaders instead of the
invaded.
While these and other possibilities--foreshadowed more especially in
the controversies which the whole subject aroused in Germany in the
'Forties--were frankly admitted, it was argued that, however vulnerable
railways might be as a line of communication, it should be quite
possible either to defend them successfully or to carry out on them
such speedy repairs or reconstruction as would, generally speaking,
permit of an early resumption of traffic; though experience was to show
that these safeguards could only be assured through a well-planned and
thoroughly efficient organisation prepared to meet, with the utmost
dispatch and the highest degree of efficiency, all the requirements in
the way of railway repairs or railway rebuilding that were likely to
arise.
The earliest instance of an attempt to delay the advance of an enemy
by interrupting his rail communications was recorded in 1848, when the
Venetians, threatened with bombardment by the Austrians, destroyed
some of the arches in the railway viaduct connecting their island city
with the mainland. Then in the _Italian campaign of 1859_ the allies
and the Austrians both resorted to the expedient of destroying railway
bridges or tearing up the railway lines; although the allies were able,
in various instances, to repair so speedily the damage done by the
Austrians that the lines were ready for use again by the time they were
wanted.
It was the _American Civil War_ that was to elevate railway destruction
and restoration into a science and to see the establishment, in the
interests of such science, of an organisation which was to become a
model for European countries and influence the whole subsequent course
of modern warfare.
The destruction of railways likely to be used by the North for its
projected invasion of the Confederate States was, from the first,
a leading feature in the strategy of the South. Expeditions were
undertaken and raids were made with no other object than that of
burning down bridges, tearing up and bending rails, making bonfires of
sleepers, wrecking stations, rendering engines, trucks and carriages
unserviceable, cutting off the water supply for locomotives, or in
various other ways seeking to check the advance of the Northerners.
Later on the Federals, in turn, became no less energetic in resorting to
similar tactics in order either to prevent pursuit by the Confederates
or to interrupt their communications.
For the carrying out of these destructive tactics use was generally made
either of cavalry, accompanied by civilians, or of bodies of civilians
only; but in some instances, when it was considered desirable to destroy
lengths of track extending to twenty or thirty miles, or more, the
Confederates put the whole of their available forces on to the work.
At the outset the methods of destruction were somewhat primitive; but
they were improved upon as the result of practice and experiment.
Thus, in the first instance, timber bridges or viaducts were destroyed
by collecting brushwood, placing this around the arches, pouring tar or
petroleum upon the pile, and then setting fire to the whole. Afterwards
the Federals made use of a "torpedo," eight inches long, and charged
with gunpowder, which was inserted in a hole bored in the main timbers
of the bridge and exploded with a fuse. It was claimed that with two or
three men working at each span the largest timber bridge could be thrown
down in a few minutes.
Then the method generally adopted at first for destroying a railway
track was to tear up sleepers and rails, place the sleepers in a heap,
put the rails cross-ways over them, set fire to the sleepers, and heat
the rails until they either fell out of shape or could be twisted around
a tree with the help of chains and horses. But this process was found
to require too much time and labour, while the results were not always
satisfactory, since rails only slightly bent could be restored to
their original shape, and made ready for use again, in much less time
than it had taken for the fire to heat and bend them. A Federal expert
accordingly invented an ingenious contrivance, in the form of iron
U-shaped "claws," which, being turned up and over at each extremity,
were inserted underneath each end of a rail, on opposite sides, and
operated, with the help of a long wooden lever and rope, by half a dozen
men. In this way a rail could be torn from the sleepers and not only
bent but given such a spiral or corkscrew twist, while still in the cold
state, that it could not be used again until it had gone through the
rolling mills. By the adoption of this method, 440 men could destroy
one mile of track in an hour, or 2,200 men could, in the same time,
destroy five miles.
The most effective method for rendering a locomotive unfit for service
was found to be the firing of a cannon ball through the boiler.
Carriages and wagons which might otherwise be used by the enemy, and
could not be conveniently carried off, were easily destroyed by fire.
In one period of six months the Federals disposed of 400 in this way.
Stations, water-tanks, sleepers, fuel and telegraph poles were also
destroyed or rendered useless by fire or otherwise.
In the first year of the war--1861--the Confederates gave the Federals a
foretaste of much that was to come by destroying forty-eight locomotives
on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and making a complete wreck of 100
miles of the North Missouri Railroad track and everything thereon.
Much more serious than this, however, from a strategical point of
view, was the wholesale destruction carried out by the Confederates,
in April, 1862, on the Fredericksburg Railway, connecting Richmond
and Washington, the immediate result of the mischief done being to
prevent an impending combination between the Federal armies of the
Potomac and the Rappahannock, neither of which could act without the
other, while neither could join the other unless it could make use
of rail communication. There was much that required to be done, for
the Confederates had carried out their work in a most thorough-going
fashion. Several indispensable railway bridges had been destroyed; three
miles of track had been torn up, the rails being carried south and the
sleepers burned; and wharves and buildings had been burned or wrecked.
The whole transportation service, in fact, had been reduced to a state
of chaos.
At the urgent request of the Secretary of War, the work of restoration
was undertaken by Mr. Herman Haupt, a railway engineer who had already
distinguished himself more especially as a builder of bridges, and was
now to establish a further record as the pioneer of those Construction
Corps of which so much was to be heard later on in connection with
railways and war.
In carrying out the necessary repairs the only help which Haupt could
obtain, at first, was that of soldiers detailed from the Federal ranks.
Many of these men were entirely unaccustomed to physical labour; others
were sickly, inefficient, or unwilling to undertake what they did not
regard as a soldier's duties, while the Army officers sent in a fresh
lot daily until Haupt's remonstrances led to their allotting certain
men to form a "Construction Corps." Other difficulties which presented
themselves included an insufficient supply of tools, occasional scarcity
of food, and several days of wet weather; yet the work advanced so
rapidly that the Akakeek bridge, a single span of 120 ft., at an
elevation of 30 ft., was rebuilt in about fifteen working hours; the
Potomac Creek bridge, 414 ft. long with an elevation of 82 ft. above
the water, and requiring the use of as much roughly-hewn timber as
would have extended a total length of six and a half miles, if put end
to end, was completed in nine days;[5] and the three miles of track
were relaid in three days, included in the work done in that time being
the preparation of more than 3,000 sleepers from lumber cut down for
the purpose in woods a mile and a half distant from the track. General
McDowell subsequently said, concerning the Potomac bridge:--
When it is considered that in the campaigns of Napoleon
trestle bridges of more than one story, even of moderate
height, were regarded as impracticable, and that, too, for
common military roads, it is not difficult to understand why
distinguished Europeans should express surprise at so bold a
specimen of American military engineering. It is a structure
which ignores all rules and precedents of military science as
laid down in the books. It is constructed chiefly of round
sticks cut from the woods, and not even divested of bark; the
legs of the trestles are braced with round poles. It is in four
stories--three of trestle and one of crib work.
While constructed in so apparently primitive a fashion, the bridge was,
General McDowell further said, carrying every day from ten to twenty
heavy railway trains in both directions, and had withstood several
severe freshets and storms without injury.
Thus early, therefore, in the more active phases of the Civil War,
evidence was being afforded that, although the railways on which so
much depended might be readily destroyed, they could, also, be rapidly
restored; and subsequent experience was to offer proofs still more
remarkable in support of this fact.
On May 28, 1862, Haupt was appointed Chief of Construction and
Transportation in the Department of the Rappahannock, with the rank of
Colonel. He was raised to the rank of Brigadier-General in the following
year, and did much excellent construction and other work for the
Government, though mainly in Virginia, down to September, 1863. In his
"Reminiscences" he relates that the supplies of repair or reconstruction
materials, as kept on hand by the Federals, included the interchangeable
parts of bridge trusses, in spans of 60 ft., and so prepared that, taken
on flat cars, by ox-teams or otherwise, to the place where they were
wanted, and hoisted into position by machinery arranged for the purpose,
they could, without previous fitting, be put together with such rapidity
that one of his foremen claimed to be able to build a bridge "about as
fast as a dog could trot." When the Massaponix bridge, six miles from
Fredericksburg, was burned down one Monday morning, a new one was put
up in its place in half a day--a feat which, he says, led some of the
onlookers to exclaim, "The Yankees can build bridges quicker than the
Rebs can burn them down." In May, 1862, five bridges over Goose Creek
which the "Rebs" had destroyed were reconstructed in a day and a half.
In the following month five other bridges, each with a span of from 60
ft. to 120 ft., were renewed in one day. At the Battle of Gettysburg
Lee's troops destroyed nineteen bridges on the Northern Central Railroad
and did much havoc on the branch lines leading to Gettysburg; but the
Construction Corps was hard at work on the repairs whilst the battle
was still being waged, and rail communication with both Washington and
Baltimore had been re-established by noon of the day after Lee's retreat.
In some instances railway bridges underwent repeated destruction and
reconstruction. By June, 1863, the bridge over Bull Run, for instance,
had been burned down and built up again no fewer than seven times. Many
of the bridges, also, were swept away by floods, and this even for a
second or a third time after they had been rebuilt. Precautions thus
had to be taken against the destructive forces of Nature no less than
against those of man.
Haupt's pioneer Construction Corps in Virginia was succeeded by the
one set up on much broader lines by McCallum when, in February, 1864,
he became General Manager of railways in the Military Division of the
Mississippi. This corps eventually reached a total of 10,000 men.
"The design of the corps," wrote McCallum, in his final report, "was
to combine a body of skilled workmen in each department of railroad
construction and repairs, under competent engineers, supplied with
abundant materials, tools and mechanical appliances." The corps was
formed into divisions the number of which varied from time to time, in
different districts, according to requirements. In the military division
of the Mississippi the corps comprised six divisions, under the general
charge of the chief engineer of the United States military railroads
for that military division, and consisted at its maximum strength of
nearly 5,000 men. In order to give the corps entire mobility, and to
enable it to move independently and undertake work at widely different
points, each of the six divisions was made a complete unit, under
the command of a divisional engineer, and was, in turn, divided into
sub-divisions or sections, with a supervisor in charge of each. The
two largest and most important sub-divisions in any one division were
those of the track-layers and the bridge-builders. A sub-division was,
again, composed of gangs, each with a foreman, while the gangs were
divided into squads, each with a sub-foreman.[6] Under this method of
organisation it was possible to move either the entire division or any
section thereof, with its tools, camp requirements and field transport,
in any direction, wherever and whenever needed, and by any mode of
conveyance--rail, road, with teams and wagons, or on foot.
To facilitate the operations of the corps, supplies of materials were
kept at points along or within a short distance of the railway lines,
where they would be comparatively safe and speedily procurable in
case of necessity. At places where there was special need for taking
precautionary measures, detachments of the corps were stationed in
readiness for immediate action, while on important lines of railway
Federals and Confederates alike had, at each end thereof, construction
trains loaded with every possible requisite, the locomotives attached
to them keeping their steam up in order that the trains could be
started off instantly on the receipt of a telegram announcing a further
interruption of traffic.
At Nashville and Chattanooga the Federals built extensive storehouses
where they kept on hand supplies of materials for the prompt carrying
out of railway repairs of every kind to any extent and in whatever
direction.
On the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway itself the Construction Corps,
from February, 1864, to the close of the war, relaid 115 miles of
track, put in nineteen miles of new sidings, eight miles apart and each
capable of holding from five to eight long freight trains, and erected
forty-five new water tanks.
The reconstruction of this particular line was more especially needed
in connection with General Sherman's campaign in Georgia and the
Carolinas--a campaign which afforded the greatest and most direct
evidence up to that time alike of the possibilities of rail-power
in warfare, of the risks by which its use was attended, and of the
success with which those risks could be overcome by means of efficient
organisation.
In that struggle for Atlanta which preceded his still more famous march
to the sea, Sherman had with him a force of 100,000 men, together with
23,000 animals. His base of supplies, when he approached Atlanta, was
360 miles distant, and the continuance of his communications with that
base, not only for the procuring of food, clothing, fodder, ammunition
and every other requisite, but for the transport to the rear of sick
and wounded, refugees, freedmen and prisoners, depended on what he
afterwards described as "a poorly-constructed single-track railroad"
passing for 120 miles of its length through the country of an extremely
active enemy. Yet Sherman is said to have made his advance in perfect
confidence that, although subject to interruptions, the railway in his
rear would be "all right"; and this confidence was fully warranted by
the results accomplished.
Early in September, 1864, the Confederate General, Wheeler, destroyed
seven miles of road between Nashville and Murfreesboro', on the
Nashville and Chattanooga Railway, and in the following December Hood
destroyed eight miles of track and 530 ft. of bridges between the same
stations; yet the arrangements of the Federal Construction Corps allowed
of the repairs being carried out with such promptness that in each
instance the trains were running again in a few days.
The Confederate attacks on the Western and Atlantic Railway, running
from Chattanooga at Atlanta, a distance of 136 miles, were more
continuous and more severe than on any other line of railway during
the war; but, thanks again to the speed with which the repair and
reconstruction work was done, the delays occasioned were, as a rule, of
only a few hours, or, at the most, a few days' duration. One especially
remarkable feat accomplished on this line was the rebuilding, in four
and a half days, of the Chattahochee bridge, near Atlanta--a structure
780 ft. long, and 92 ft. high. Hood, the Confederate General, thought
still further to check Sherman's communications by passing round the
Federal army and falling upon the railway in its rear. He succeeded
in tearing up two lengths of track, one of ten miles, and another of
twenty-five miles, in extent, and destroying 250 ft. of bridges; but
once more the work of restoration was speedily carried out, McCallum
saying in reference to it:--
Fortunately the detachments of the Construction Corps which
escaped were so distributed that even before Hood had left the
road two strong working parties were at work, one at each end of
the break at Big Shanty, and this gap of ten miles was closed,
and the force ready to move to the great break of twenty-five
miles in length, north of Resaca, as soon as the enemy had left
it. The destruction by Hood's army of our depôts of supplies
compelled us to cut nearly all the cross-ties required to relay
this track and to send a distance for rails. The cross-ties were
cut near the line of the road and many of them carried by hand
to the track, as the teams to be furnished for hauling them did
not get to the work until it was nearly complete. The rails used
on the southern end of the break had to be taken up and brought
from the railroads south of Atlanta, and those for the northern
end were mostly brought from Nashville, nearly 200 miles distant.
Notwithstanding all the disadvantages under which the labour
was performed, this twenty-five miles of track was laid, and the
trains were running over it in seven and a half days from the
time the work was commenced.
Concluding, however, that it would be unwise to depend on the railway
during his further march to the sea, Sherman collected at Atlanta, by
means of the restored lines, the supplies he wanted for 600,000 men,
sent to the rear all the men and material no longer required, and
then, before starting for Savannah, destroyed sixty miles of track
behind him in so effectual a manner that it would be impossible for the
Confederates--especially in view of their own great lack, at this time,
of rails, locomotives and rolling stock--to repair and utilise the
lines again in any attempted pursuit. It was, in fact, as much to his
advantage now to destroy the railways in his rear as it had previously
been to repair and rebuild them.
All through Georgia, for the 300 miles from Atlanta to Savannah (where
he was able to establish communications with the Federal fleet), Sherman
continued the same tactics of railway destruction; and he resumed them
when his army, now divided into three columns, turned northward to
effect a junction with Grant at Richmond.
On this northward march, also, there was no need for Sherman to make a
direct attack on Charleston. By destroying about sixty miles of track
in and around Branchville--a village on the South Carolina Railroad
which formed a junction where the line from Charleston branched off in
the directions of Columbia and Augusta respectively--one of Sherman's
columns severed Charleston from all its sources of supply in the
interior, and left the garrison with no alternative but to surrender.
Commenting on this event, Vigo-Rouissillon remarks, in his "Puissance
Militaire des États-Unis d'Amérique":--
Ainsi il avait suffi de la destruction ou de la possession
de quelques kilomètres de chemin de fer pour amener la chute de
ce boulevard de l'insurrection, qui avait si longtemps résisté
aux plus puissantes flottes du Nord. Exemple frappant du rôle
reservé dans nos guerres modernes à ce precieux et fragile moyen
de communication.
In the aggregate, Sherman's troops destroyed hundreds of miles of
railway track in their progress through what had previously been
regarded as a veritable stronghold of the enemy's country; though
meanwhile the Construction Corps had repaired and reopened nearly 300
miles of railway in North Carolina and had built a wharf, covering an
area of 54,000 square feet, at the ocean terminus of the Atlantic and
North Carolina Railroad in order both to facilitate Sherman's progress
northwards, by the time of his reaching the lines in question, and to
enable him to obtain supplies from the fleet. The railways, in fact,
contributed greatly to the brilliant success of Sherman's campaign, and
hence, also, to the final triumph of the Federal cause.
The total length of track laid or relaid by the Federal Construction
Corps during the continuance of the war was 641 miles, and the lineal
feet of bridges built or rebuilt was equal to twenty-six miles. The
net expenditure, in respect alike to construction and transportation,
incurred by the department in charge of the railways during their
control by the Government for military purposes was close on $30,000,000.
From this time the interruption of railway communication became a
recognised phase of warfare all the world over; and, not only have
numerous treatises been written on the subject in various languages, but
the creation of special forces to deal alike with the destruction and
the restoration of railways has become an important and indispensable
feature of military organisation. These matters will be dealt with more
fully in subsequent chapters; but it may be of interest if reference
is made here to the experiences of _Mexico_, as further illustrating
the universality of practices with which, in her case, at least, no
effective measures had been taken to deal.
"How Mexican Rebels Destroy Railways and Bridges" was told by Mr. G.
E. Weekes in the _Scientific American_ for September 13, 1913, and the
subject was further dealt with by Major Charles Hine in a paper on "War
Time Railroading in Mexico," read by him before the St. Louis Railway
Club, on October 10, 1913. The term "rebels" applies, of course, in
Mexico to the party that is against the particular President who is in
office for the time being; and in the revolutionary period lasting from
1910 to 1913 the "rebels" of the moment found plenty to do in the way
of destroying railways not only, as in other countries, in order to
retard the advance of their pursuers, but, also, to spite the national
Government, who control about two-thirds of the stock in the railways of
the Republic.
Altogether, the mischief done by one party or the other during the
period in question included the destruction of many hundreds of miles of
track; the burning or the dynamiting of hundreds of bridges, according
as these had been built of timber or of steel; and the wrecking of many
stations and over 50 per cent. of the rolling stock on the national
lines.
Concerning the methods adopted in the carrying out of this work, Mr.
Weekes, who had the opportunity of seeing track and bridge destruction
in full progress, says:--
Up to the past six months track destruction had been
accompanied either by the use of a wrecking crane, which lifted
sections of rails and ties (sleepers) bodily and piled them up
ready for burning, or by the slower process of the claw-bar,
wrench and pick. But a Constitutionalist expert devised a new
system.
A trench is dug between two ties, through which a heavy
chain is passed around two opposite rails and made fast in the
centre of the track. To this one end of a heavy steel cable is
hooked, the other end being made fast to the coupling on the
engine pilot. At the signal the engineman starts his locomotive
slowly backward, and as they are huge 220-ton "consolidations,"
with 22-inch by 30-inch cylinders, one can easily imagine that
something has to give. And it does! The rails are torn loose
from the spikes that hold them to the ties and are dragged
closely together in the centre of the road bed. The ties are
loosened from the ballast and dragged into piles, while in many
cases the rails are badly bent and twisted by the force applied.
A gang of men follows the engine, piling ties on top of the line
and leaving others beneath them. These are then saturated with
oil and a match applied. In a short time the ties are consumed
and the rails left lying on the ground twisted and contorted
into all sorts of shapes and of no further use until after they
have been re-rolled.
As for the bridges, those of timber were saturated with oil and burned,
while in the case of steel bridges rows of holes were bored horizontally
in the lower part of the piers and charged with dynamite, which was then
exploded by means of fuses connected with batteries of the type used in
Mexican coal mines.
Another favourite method adopted for interfering with transportation
by rail was that of attacking a train, compelling it to stop, taking
possession of the locomotive, and burning the cars.
There is no suggestion by either of the authorities mentioned above
of any well-organised Construction Corps in Mexico repairing damage
done on the railway almost as quickly as it could be effected by the
destroyers. Mr. Weekes believed, rather, that it would take years to
restore the roads to the condition they were in before the rebellion
against President Diaz, and he further declared that it would cost
the national lines of Mexico many millions of dollars to replace the
destroyed rolling stock, bridges, stations, etc.
FOOTNOTES:
[5] In May, 1864, when this bridge had been again destroyed, it was
rebuilt, ready for trains to pass over, in forty working hours.
[6] A division, completely organised, consisted of 777 officers and
men, as follows:--Division engineer, assistant engineer, rodman,
clerk, and 2 messengers (6). Sub-division I: Supervisor of bridges and
carpenters' work, clerk and time-keeper, commissionary (taking charge
of transport and issue of rations), quartermaster (in charge of tools,
camp equipment, etc.), surgeon, hospital steward, 6 foremen (1 for
each 50 men), 30 sub-foremen (1 for each 10 men), 300 mechanics and
labourers, blacksmith and helper, and 12 cooks (356). Sub-division II:
Supervisor of track, and remainder of staff as in Sub-division I (356).
Sub-division III: Supervisor of water stations, foreman, 12 mechanics
and labourers, and cook (15). Sub-division IV: Supervisor of masonry,
foreman, 10 masons and helpers, and cook (13). Sub-division V: Foreman
of ox-brigade, 18 ox-drivers, and cook (20). Train crew: 2 conductors, 4
brakesmen, 2 locomotive engineers, 2 firemen, and cook (11).
CHAPTER IV
CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR
Curtailment of the efficiency of railways during war may be due to
friend no less than to foe; and there have been occasions when, of the
two, it is the friend who has caused the greater degree of trouble,
hindrance and interruption.
These conditions have arisen mainly from three causes--(1) questions of
control; (2) irregularities in the employment of railway material; and
(3) absence or inadequacy of organisation for military rail-transport
purposes.
When the use of railways becomes an essential factor in the conduct of
war, it may appear only natural that the military authority charged with
the duty of furthering or defending national interests should, through
the Government concerned, have power to command the transport facilities
of all railway lines the use of which may be necessary for the movement
of troops or other military purposes.
Yet, while the soundness of the principle here involved is beyond
dispute, there is much to be said as to the circumstances and conditions
under which a military control of railways should be exercised.
It is, in the first place, especially necessary to bear in mind that the
railway, as a means of transport, must needs be regarded from a point of
view wholly different from that which would apply to ordinary roads. On
the latter any sort of vehicle can be used, and there are, generally,
alternative roads along which traffic can pass, in case of need.
Railroads are not only available exclusively for vehicles constructed
to run upon them, but the degree of their usefulness is limited by
such considerations as the number of separate routes to a given
destination; the important matters of detail as to whether the lines are
single track or double track and whether they are on the level or have
heavy gradients; the number of locomotives and the amount of rolling
stock available; the extent of the station and siding accommodation;
the provision or non-provision of adequate facilities for loading and
unloading; and, in war time, the damage or destruction of a particular
line or lines by the enemy. The amount of traffic it is possible to
convey between certain points in a given time may thus be wholly
controlled by the physical conditions of the railway concerned, and such
conditions may be incapable of modification by the railway staffs, in
case of a sudden emergency, however great their desire to do everything
that is in their power.
In the next place, all these physical conditions may vary on different
railway systems, and even on different sections of the same system.
It does not, therefore, necessarily follow that military requirements
which can be complied with on one line or in one district can be
responded to as readily, if at all, under another and totally different
set of conditions elsewhere; though it is conceivable that a military
commander or officer who fails to realise this fact may, if he is
left to deal direct with the railway people, become very angry indeed
at non-compliance with his demands, and resent protests that what he
asks for cannot be done at one place although it may have been done at
another.
Then a railway must be regarded as a delicate piece of transportation
machinery which can easily be thrown out of order, and is capable
of being worked only by railwaymen as skilled in the knowledge of
its mechanism, and as experienced in the details of its complicated
operation, as military officers themselves are assumed to be in the
technicalities of their own particular duties. The Chief Goods Manager
of a leading line of railway who offered to take the place of a General
at the seat of war would arouse much mirth in the Army at his own
expense. It is, nevertheless, quite conceivable that the General would
himself not be a complete success as a Chief Goods Manager. In the
earliest days of railways it was assumed that the men best qualified
both to manage them and to control the large staffs to be employed would
be retired Army officers. This policy was, in fact, adopted for a time,
though it was abandoned, after a fair trial, in favour of appointing
as responsible railway officers men who had undergone training in
the railway service, and were practically acquainted alike with its
fundamental principles and its technical details.
In the operation of this delicate and complicated piece of machinery
dislocation of traffic may result from a variety of causes, even
when such operation is conducted by men of the greatest experience
in railway working; but the risk, alike of blocks and interruptions
and of accidents involving loss of life or destruction of valuable
property must needs be materially increased if military commanders, or
officers, themselves having no practical knowledge of railway working,
and influenced only by an otherwise praiseworthy zeal for the interests
of their own service, should have power either to force a responsible
railwayman to do something which he, with his greater technical
knowledge, knows to be impracticable, or to hamper and interfere with
the working of the line at a time of exceptional strain on its resources.
Under, again, a misapprehension of the exact bearing of the principle
of military control of railways for military operations in time of
war, there was developed in various campaigns a tendency on the part
of commanders and subordinate officers (1) to look upon railways and
railwaymen as subject to their personal command, if not, even, to their
own will, pleasure and convenience, so long as the war lasted; (2)
to consider that every order they themselves gave should be at once
carried out, regardless either of orders from other directions or of
any question as to the possibility of complying therewith; and (3) to
indulge in merciless denunciations, even if not in measures still more
vigorous, when their orders have not been obeyed.
Apart from other considerations, all these things have a direct bearing
on the efficiency of the railway itself as an instrument in the
carrying on of warfare; and it is, therefore, a matter of essential
importance to our present study to see how the difficulties in question
had their rise, the development they have undergone, and the steps that
have been taken to overcome or to guard against them.
It was once more in the _American Civil War_ that the control problem
first arose in a really acute degree.
The fundamental principle adopted for the operation of the railways
taken possession of by the Federal Government for military purposes
was that they should be conducted under orders issued by the Secretary
of War or by Army commanders in or out of the field. It was for the
Quartermaster's department to load all material upon the cars, to direct
where such material should be taken, and to arrange for unloading and
delivery; but _because_ the Government had taken possession of the
railways; _because_ the Quartermaster's department was to discharge the
duties mentioned; and _because_ the railways were to be used during the
war for the transport of troops and of Army supplies, therefore certain
of the officers came to the conclusion that the whole operation of the
particular lines in which they were concerned should be left either to
themselves individually or to the Quartermaster's department.
Among those holding this view was General Pope, who, on taking over the
command of the Rappahannock Division, on June 26, 1862, disregarded
the position held by Herman Haupt as "Chief of Construction and
Transportation" in that Division, gave him no instructions, and left him
to conclude that the Army could get on very well without his assistance
as a mere railwayman. Thereupon Haupt went home. Ten days afterwards
he received from the Assistant-Secretary of War a telegram which
said:--"Come back immediately. Cannot get on without you. Not a wheel
moving." Haupt went back, and he found that, what with mismanagement of
the lines and the attacks made on them by Confederates, not a wheel was,
indeed, moving in the Division. His own position strengthened by his now
being put in "exclusive charge of all the railways within the limits
of the Army of Virginia," he was soon able to set the wheels running
again; and from that time General Pope exercised a wise discretion in
leaving the details of railway transportation to men who understood them.
Then there was a General Sturgis who, when Haupt called on him one
day, received him with the intimation, "I have just sent a guard to
your office to put you under arrest for disobedience of my orders in
failing to transport my command." It was quite true. Haupt had failed
to obey his orders. Sturgis wanted some special trains to convey 10,000
men, with horses and baggage, the short distance of eighteen miles.
The railway was a single-track line; it had only a limited equipment
of engines and cars; there was the prospect of further immediate
requirements in other directions, and Haupt took the liberty of thinking
that he had better keep his transportation for more pressing needs than
a journey to a prospective battle-field only eighteen miles away--the
more so as if the men were attacked whilst they were in the train they
would be comparatively helpless, whereas if they were attacked when on
the road--doing what amounted to no more than a single day's march--they
would be ready for immediate defence. These considerations suggest that,
of the two, the railwayman was a better strategist than the General.
Sturgis followed up his intimation to Haupt by taking military
possession of the railway and issuing some orders which any one
possessing the most elementary knowledge of railway operation would have
known to be impracticable. Meanwhile Haupt appealed by telegraph to the
Commander-in-Chief, who replied:--"No military officer has any authority
to interfere with your control over railroad. Show this to General
Sturgis, and, if he attempts to interfere, I will arrest him." Told what
the Commander-in-Chief said in his message, Sturgis exclaimed, "He does,
does he? Well, then, take your damned railroad!"
Haupt found it possible to put at the disposal of Sturgis, early the
following morning, the transportation asked for; but at two o'clock
in the afternoon the cars were still unoccupied. On the attention of
Sturgis being called to this fact he replied that he had given his
orders but they had been disobeyed. Thereupon the cars were withdrawn
for service elsewhere--the more so since no other traffic could pass
until they had been cleared out of the way. The net results of the
General's interference was that traffic on the lines was deranged for
twenty-four hours, and 10,000 men were prevented from taking part in an
engagement, as they might have done had they gone by road.
Of the varied and almost unending irregularities which occurred in the
working of the lines as military railways during the progress of the
same war a few other examples may be given.
One prolific source of trouble was the detention or appropriation
of trains by officers who did not think it necessary to communicate
first with the Superintendent of the Line. A certain General who did
inform the Superintendent when he wanted a train was, nevertheless, in
the habit of keeping it waiting for several hours before he made his
appearance, traffic being meanwhile suspended, in consequence.
Special consideration was even claimed for officers' wives, as well as
for the officers themselves. On one occasion Haupt was much disturbed by
the non-arrival of a train bringing supplies which were urgently wanted
for a body of troops starting on a march, and he went along the line to
see what had happened. Coming at last to the train, which had pulled
up, he made inquiries of the engine-driver, who told him that he had
received instructions to stop at a certain point so that an officer's
wife, who was coming in the train to see her husband on the eve of an
engagement, could go to a neighbouring town to look out for rooms for
herself. At that moment the lady put in an appearance. She took her seat
again and the train then proceeded; but her side-trip in search of rooms
meant a delay of three hours alike for this one train and for three
others following behind.
The impression seems to have prevailed, also, that officers were at
liberty to make any use of the trains they pleased for the conveyance
of their own belongings. To check the abuses thus developed, Haupt was
compelled to issue, on June 25, 1862, the following notice:--
Assistant Quartermasters and Commissaries are positively
forbidden to load on to cars on any of the Military Railroads of
the Department of the Rappahannock any freights which are not
strictly and properly included in Quarter and Commissary stores.
They shall not load or permit to be loaded any articles for the
private use of officers, or other persons, whatever their rank
or position.
Officers, again, there were who, regardless of all traffic
considerations, would order a train to pull up at any point they thought
fit along the main line in order that they could examine the passes and
permits of the passengers, instead of doing this at a terminal or other
station. In still another instance a paymaster adopted as his office a
box car standing on a main line. He placed in it a table, some chairs, a
money-chest and his papers--finding it either more comfortable or more
convenient than a house alongside--and proceeded with the transaction
of all his Army business in the car. Invited to withdraw, on the
ground that he was holding up the traffic, he refused to leave, and
he persisted in his refusal until troops were called up to remove his
things for him.
Defective arrangements in regard to the forwarding of supplies were
another cause of traffic disorganisation. The railwayman made from time
to time the most strenuous efforts in getting to the extreme front large
consignments of articles either in excess of requirements or not wanted
there at all. After blocking the line for some days, the still-loaded
cars might be sent back again, no fewer than 142 of such cars being
returned on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad in the course of a single
day. If the excessive supplies so sent were unloaded at the front, they
might have to be loaded into the cars again when the Army moved; or, as
was frequently the case in exposed positions, they might be seized or
destroyed by the enemy. Under a well-organised system an adequate stock
of supplies would, of course, have been kept in stores or on sidings at
some point in the rear, only such quantities being forwarded to the
advanced front as were really needed.
At the railway stations there were frequent disputes between the
responsible officers as to which should have the first use of such
troop trains as were available, and Haupt found it necessary to ask the
Commander-in-Chief to delegate some one who would decide in what order
the troops should be forwarded.
Much trouble arose because, in their anxiety to send off as many wounded
as they could, medical officers detained their trains for such periods
as dislocated the service, instead of despatching at schedule time the
men they had ready, and then asking for an extra train for the remainder.
In other respects, also, the arrangements for the transport of the
sick and wounded were defective. Telegraphing on this subject to the
Assistant Secretary of War on August 22, 1862, Haupt said:--
I fear that I may be compelled to-night to do what may
appear inhuman--turn out the sick in the street. Doctors will
persist in sending sick, often without papers, to get them
off their hands, and we cannot send forward the troops if we
must run our trains to Washington with sick to stand for hours
unloaded. My first care is to send forward troops, next forage
and subsistence.
Still more serious were the irregularities due to delays in the
unloading of trucks and the return of empties. The amount of rolling
stock available was already inadequate to meet requirements; but the
effect of the shortage was rendered still worse by reason of these
delays, due, in part, to the too frequent insufficiency of the force
available for unloading a train of supplies with the expedition that
should have been shown, and in part to the retention of the cars for
weeks together as storehouses; though the main cause, perhaps, was
the inability of military men, inexperienced in railway working, to
appreciate, as railwaymen would do, the need of getting the greatest
possible use out of rolling stock in times of emergency, and not
allowing it to stand idle longer than absolutely necessary.
How such delays interfered with the efficiency of the railways was
indicated in one of Haupt's oft-repeated protests, in which he wrote:--
If all cars on their arrival at a depôt are immediately
loaded or unloaded and returned, and trains are run to schedule,
a single-track road, in good order and properly equipped, may
supply an army of 200,000 men when, if these conditions are not
complied with, the same road will not supply 30,000.
On July 9, 1863, he telegraphed to General M. C. Meigs:--
I am on my way to Gettysburg again. Find things in great
confusion. Road blocked; cars not unloaded; stores ordered
to Gettysburg--where they stand for a long time, completely
preventing all movement there--ordered back without unloading;
wounded lying for hours without ability to carry them off. All
because the simple rule of promptly unloading and returning cars
is violated.
As for the effect of all these conditions on the military situation as
a whole, this is well shown in the following "Notice," which, replying
to complaints that railwaymen had not treated the military officers with
proper respect, Haupt addressed "To agents and other employés of the
United States Military Railroad Department":--
While conscious of no disposition to shield the employés or
agents of the Military Railroads from any censure or punishment
that is really merited, justice to them requires me to state
that, so far, examination has shown that complaints against them
have been generally without proper foundation, and, when demands
were not promptly complied with, the cause has been inability,
arising from want of proper notice, and not indisposition.
Officers at posts entrusted with the performance of certain
local duties, and anxious, as they generally are, to discharge
them efficiently, are not always able, or disposed, to look
beyond their own particular spheres. They expect demands on
railway agents to be promptly complied with, without considering
that similar demands, at the same time, in addition to the
regular train service and routine duties, may come from
Quartermasters, Commissaries, medical directors, surgeons,
ordnance officers, the Commanding General, the War Department
and from other sources. The Military Railroads have utterly
failed to furnish transportation to even one-fifth of their
capacity when managed without a strict conformity to schedule
and established rules. Punctuality and discipline are even more
important to the operation of a railroad than to the movement of
an army; and they are vital in both.
It is doubtful if even the Confederate raiders and wreckers had, by
their destructive tactics, diminished the efficiency of the Union
railways to the extent of the four-fifths here attributed to the
irregularities and shortcomings of the Federals themselves. The clearest
proof was thus afforded that, if the new arm in warfare which rail-power
represented was to accomplish all it was capable of doing, it would have
to be saved from friends quite as much as from foes.
Haupt, as we have seen, suffered much from officers during the time
he was connected with the Military Railroads in Virginia. He had the
sympathetic support of the Commander-in-Chief, who telegraphed to him
on one occasion (August 23, 1862), "No military officer will give any
orders to your subordinates except through you, nor will any of them
attempt to interfere with the running of trains"; and, also, of the
Assistant Secretary of War, who sought to soothe him in a message which
said:--"Be patient as possible with the Generals. Some of them will
trouble you more than they will the enemy." But the abuses which arose
were so serious that, in the interest of the military position itself,
they called for a drastic remedy; and this was provided for by the issue
of the following Order:--
War Department,
Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington,
_November 10, 1862_.
SPECIAL ORDER.
Commanding officers of troops along the United States
Military Railroads will give all facilities to the officers
of the road and the Quartermasters for loading and unloading
cars so as to prevent any delay. On arrival at depôts, whether
in the day or night, the cars will be instantly unloaded, and
working parties will always be in readiness for that duty, and
sufficient to unload the whole train at once.
Commanding officers will be charged with guarding the track,
sidings, wood, water tanks, etc., within their several commands,
and will be held responsible for the result.
Any military officer who shall neglect his duty in this
respect will be reported by the Quartermasters and
officers of the railroad, and his name will be stricken from the
rolls of the Army.
Depôts will be established at suitable points under the
direction of the Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac,
and properly guarded.
No officer, whatever may be his rank, will interfere with
the running of the cars, as directed by the superintendent of
the road. Any one who so interferes will be dismissed from the
service for disobedience of orders.
By order of the Secretary of War.
J. C. KELTON.
Commenting on this Order, General McCallum says in his report that
it was issued "in consequence of several attempts having been made
to operate railroads by Army or departmental commanders which had,
without exception, proved signal failures, disorganising in tendency and
destructive of all discipline"; and he proceeds:--
Having had a somewhat extensive railroad experience, both
before and since the rebellion, I consider this Order of the
Secretary of War to have been the very foundation of success;
without it the whole railroad system, which had proved an
important element in conducting military movements, would have
been, not only a costly but ludicrous failure. The fact should
be understood that the management of railroads is just as much a
distinct profession as is that of the art of war, and should be
so regarded.
In _Europe_, Germany and Austria-Hungary were the first countries to
attempt to solve problems that seemed to go to the very foundations of
the practical usefulness of rail-transport in war. Various exhaustive
studies thereon were written by railway or military authorities, and
it may be of interest here to refer, more especially, to the views
expressed by an eminent German authority, Baron M. M. von Weber, in "Die
Schulung der Eisenbahnen," published in 1870.[7]
Railway irregularities peculiar to war service were stated by this
writer to be mainly of three kinds:--(i) Delays from unsatisfactory
arrangements of the service and from the misemployment of rolling
stock; (ii) temporary interruption of traffic owing to the crowding of
transport masses at the stations or sidings; (iii) unsuitableness of the
stations and conveyances for the required military services. The special
reasons for the first of these causes he defined as (_a_) the absence
of sufficient mutual comprehension between the military and the railway
officials; (_b_) the strict limitation of the efficiency of individual
railway authorities to their own lines only; (_c_) the ignorance of
the entire staff of each line with regard to the details and service
regulations of the neighbouring lines; and (_d_) the impracticability
of employing certain modes of carrying on business beyond the circuit
to which they belong. It should, however, be borne in mind that these
criticisms of authorities and their staffs relate to the conditions of
the German railway system in 1870, at which time, as told by H. Budde,
in "Die französischen Eisenbahnen im Kriege 1870-71," there were in
Germany fifteen separate Directions for State railways; five Directions
of private railways operated by the State; and thirty-one Directions of
private railways operated by companies--a total of fifty-one controlling
bodies which, on an average, operated only 210 miles of line each.
On the general question von Weber observed:--
The value in practice of mutual intelligence between
military and railway officials has hitherto been far too
slightly regarded.
Demands for services from military authorities,
impracticable from the very nature of railways in general or
the nature of the existing lines in particular, have occasioned
confusion and ill-will on the part of the railway authorities
and conductors. On the other hand the latter have frequently
declared services to be impracticable which were really not so.
All this has arisen because the two parties in the
transaction have too little insight into the nature and
mechanism of their respective callings, and regard their powers
more as contradictory than co-operative, so that they do not,
and cannot, work together.
If, on the contrary, the nature of the railway service,
with its modifications due to differences in the nature of
the ground, the locality, and the organisation of transport
requirements, is apparent to the military officer, even in a
general way; if he appreciates the fact that the same amount of
transport must be differently performed when he passes from a
level line to a mountain line, from a double line to a single
line, from one where the signal and telegraph system are in use
to one in which these organs of safety and intelligence are
destroyed; if he can judge of the capability of stations, the
length of track, and arrangements for the loading, ordering
and passing of trains, etc., he will, with this knowledge,
and his orders being framed in accordance with it, come much
sooner and with greater facility to an understanding with the
railway executives than if his commands had to be rectified by
contradiction and assertion, frequently carried on under the
influence of excited passions, or attempted to be enforced by
violence.
The railway official, also, who has some acquaintance with
military science, who understands from practical experience and
inspection, not confined to his own line, the capabilities of
lines and stations in a military point of view, will, at his
first transaction with the military authorities, enter sooner
into an understanding with them than if he were deficient
in this knowledge, and will find himself in a position to
co-operate, and not be coerced.
Here the suggestion seems to be that the individual Army officer and the
individual railway executive, or railway official, should each become
sufficiently acquainted with the technicalities of the other's business
to be able to conduct their relations with mutual understanding. It
would, however, be too much to expect that this plan could be carried
out as regards either the military element in general or the railway
element in general.
The real need of the situation was, rather, for some intermediary
organisation which, including both elements, would provide the machinery
for close co-operation between the Army on the one side and the railway
on the other, guiding the Army as to the possibilities and limitations
of the railway, and constituting the recognised and sole medium
through which orders from the Army would be conveyed to the railway,
no individual commander or officer having the right to give any direct
order to the railway executives or staffs on his own responsibility, or
to interfere in any way with the working of the railways, except in some
such case of extreme emergency as an attack by the enemy on a railway
station.
All these problems were to form the subject of much more controversy,
together with much further practical experience, in various other
countries--and notably in France during the war of 1870-71--before,
as will be told in due course, they were solved by the adoption of
elaborate systems of organisation designed to provide, as far as
possible, for all contingencies.
FOOTNOTE:
[7] See Bibliography.
CHAPTER V
PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS IN WAR
The liability of railway lines to interruption or destruction--whether
by bodies of cavalry sent across the frontier for that purpose, and
aiming at damage on a large scale; by smaller raiding parties operating
in the rear of an advancing army; or by individuals acting on their own
account in a hostile country--rendered necessary from an early date
in the railway era the adoption of protective measures of a type and
character varying according to circumstances; while these, in turn,
introduced some further new features into modern warfare.
Under the orders given by General McDowell for the guarding of railways
in the Department of the Rappahannock, in the _American Civil War_,
twelve sentinels were posted along each mile of track; block-houses were
constructed at each bridge, at cross-roads, and at intervals along the
track; pickets were thrown forward at various points; bushes and trees
were cleared away from alongside the line, and the men at each post had
flags and lanterns for signalling. General Sherman took similar measures
to guard his rail communications between Nashville and Atlanta.
Precautions such as these were directed mainly against the enemy in the
field; but an early example was to be afforded of how a civil population
may either concern themselves or be concerned against their will in the
maintenance of rail communication for military purposes. This position
is well shown in the following proclamation, issued July 30, 1863, by
Major-General G. G. Meade from the head-quarters of the Army of the
Potomac at a time when attempts to throw troop trains off the railway
lines were a matter of daily occurrence:--
The numerous depredations committed by citizens or rebel
soldiers in disguise, harboured and concealed by citizens, along
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and within our lines, call
for prompt and exemplary punishment. Under the instructions of
the Government, therefore, every citizen against whom there is
sufficient evidence of his having engaged in these practices
will be arrested and confined for punishment, or put beyond the
lines.
The people within ten miles of the railroad are notified
that they will be held responsible, in their persons and
property, for any injury done to the road, trains, depôts or
stations by citizens, guerillas or persons in disguise; and
in case of such injury they will be impressed as labourers to
repair all damages.
If these measures should not stop such depredations, it will
become the unpleasant duty of the undersigned, in the execution
of his instructions, to direct that the entire inhabitants of
the district of country along the railroad be put across the
lines, and their property taken for Government uses.
On the Manassas Gap Railway General Auger further sought to protect
Federal army trains against guerilla attacks by placing in a conspicuous
position in each of such trains some of the leading Confederates
residing within Union lines, so that, should any accident happen to the
train, they would run the risk of being among the victims.
In the _Austro-Prussian War of 1866_ the principle of punishing
the civil population for attacks on the railway lines underwent a
further development. Captain Webber says in reference to the line
through Turnau, Prague and Pardubitz to Brünn[8]: "The Prussians
were fortunate in being able to preserve the line intact from injury
by the inhabitants, partly by the number and strength of the guards
posted along it, and partly from the terror of reprisals which they
had inspired." Captain Webber suggests that, in the face of an active
enemy, and in a country where the population was hostile, it would
have been impossible to depend on the railway as a principal line of
communication; but the significance of his expression, "the terror of
reprisals," as denoting the policy adopted by Prussia so far back as
1866, will not be lost on those who are only too well acquainted with
more recent developments of the same policy by the same country.
The number of men per mile required for guarding a line of rail
communication is declared by Captain John Bigelow, in his "Principles of
Strategy" (Philadelphia, 1894), to be exceedingly variable, depending
as it does upon the tactical features of the country and the temper of
the inhabitants. According, he says, to the estimate of the Germans for
the conditions of European warfare, the number will average about 1,000
men for every stretch of fifteen miles. At this rate an army sixty miles
from its base requires about 4,000 men for the protection of each line
of communication.
With the help of figures such as these one may, perhaps, understand
the more readily how it is that a Commander-in-Chief, of merciless
disposition, and wanting to retain the active services of every soldier
he possibly can in the interests of an early and successful advance
will, by spreading a feeling of "terror" among the civil population,
seek to reduce to as low a figure as circumstances will permit
the number of men he must leave behind to guard his lines of rail
communication.
These considerations will be found to apply with the greater force
when it is remembered that in the _Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71_ the
Prussians had to adopt an especially elaborate system for safeguarding
their lines of communication with Germany during the time they occupied
French territory. At each railway station they placed a guard formed of
detachments of the Landwehr, while small detachments were stationed in
towns and villages in the neighbourhood. In each signal-box a detachment
of troops was stationed, and the whole line of railway was patrolled
from posts established along it at distances of every three or four
miles. Altogether, the Germans are said to have employed, on over 2,000
miles of French railway lines controlled by them, as many as 100,000
troops for protective purposes only; and even then the _franc-tireurs_
were able to cause many interruptions.
Under a Prussian regulation dated May 2, 1867, it was laid down that
after the restoration of any lines taken possession of in an enemy's
territory, notice should be given that in the event of any further
damage being done to the railway, the locality would be subject to a
fine of at least 500 thalers, the belongings of the inhabitants would be
liable to seizure, and the local authorities might be arrested.
As a further precautionary measure in the war of 1870-71, the Germans
took a hint from the example of the Union Generals in the American Civil
War by compelling a leading citizen of the district passed through to
ride on the engine of each train run by them on French soil. In defence
of this practice, the German General Staff say in their handbook on "The
Usages of War"[9]:--
Since the lives of peaceable inhabitants were, without any
fault on their part, thereby exposed to grave danger, every
writer outside Germany has stigmatised this measure as contrary
to the law of nations and as unjustified towards the inhabitants
of the country. As against this unfavourable criticism it must
be pointed out that this measure, which was also recognised on
the German side as harsh and cruel, was only resorted to after
declarations and instructions of the occupying authorities had
proved ineffective, and that in the particular circumstances
it was the only method which promised to be effective against
the doubtless unauthorised, indeed the criminal, behaviour of
a fanatical population. Herein lies its justification under
the laws of war, but still more in the fact that it proved
completely successful, and that wherever citizens were thus
carried on the trains ... the security of traffic was assured.
Writing under date December 16, 1870, Busch offered the following
justification for the course adopted:--
They were taken, not to serve as a hindrance to French
heroism, but as a precaution against treacherous crime. The
railway does not carry merely soldiers, ammunition and other
war material against which it may be allowable to use violent
measures; it also conveys a great number of wounded, doctors,
hospital attendants, and other perfectly harmless persons. Is a
peasant or _franc-tireur_ to be allowed to endanger hundreds of
those lives by removing a rail or laying a stone upon the line?
Let the French see that the security of the railway trains is no
longer threatened and the journeys made by those hostages will
be merely outings, or our people may even be able to forgo such
precautionary measures.
In the _South African War_, Field-Marshal Earl Roberts issued at
Pretoria, on June 19, 1900, a proclamation one section of which
authorised the placing of leading men among the Boers on the locomotives
of the trains run by the British on the occupied territory; but this
particular section was withdrawn eight days afterwards.
The English view of the practice in question is thus defined in the
official "Manual of Military Law" (Chap. XIV, "The Laws and Usages of
War," par. 463):--
Such measures expose the lives of inhabitants, not only
to the illegitimate acts of train wrecking by private enemy
individuals, but also to the lawful operations of raiding
parties of the armed forces of the belligerent, and cannot,
therefore, be considered a commendable practice.
To guard against the attacks made on the railway lines in the Orange
Free State and the Transvaal during the British occupation, entrenched
posts were placed at every bridge exceeding a 30-feet span; constant
patrolling was maintained between these posts; and the block-houses
introduced (in 1901) by Lord Kitchener were erected along all the
railway lines, at distances of about 2,000 yards. Each block-house,
also, was garrisoned by about ten men, and each was surrounded by wire
entanglements which, together with various kinds of alarm fences, were
also placed between the block-houses themselves in order both to impede
the approach of the enemy and to warn the garrison thereof.
_Block-houses_ are to-day regarded as one of the chief means of
protecting railways against attacks. Their construction and equipment
are dealt with by Major W. D. Connor, of the Corps of Engineers, U.S.A.,
in "Military Railways" (Professional Papers, No. 32, Corps of Engineers,
U.S. Army, Washington, 1910).
Supplementary to the adoption of this block-house system, in time of
war, is the practice followed in various Continental countries, in
time of peace, of building _permanent fortresses_, in solid masonry,
alongside railway bridges crossing important rivers. In some instances
the fortress is so constructed that the railway lines pass through the
centre of it. Not only, as a rule, are these fortresses extremely solid
and substantial, but they may be provided with bomb-proof covers and
be stocked with a sufficient supply of provisions to be able to stand,
if necessary, a fairly prolonged siege. One can assume, also, that the
garrison would have under its control facilities arranged in advance for
the destruction of the bridge, as a last resort, in case of need.
The theory is that such fortresses and their garrisons should be of
especial advantage, on the outbreak of war, in checking any sudden
invasion and allowing time for the completion of defensive measures.
Their construction in connection with all the principal railway bridges
crossing the Rhine was especially favoured in Prussia after the war of
1870-1.
Similar fortresses, or "interrupting forts," as the Germans call them,
are also built for the protection of important tunnels, junctions,
locomotive and carriage works, etc.
Another method adopted for the safeguarding of railway lines in war is
the use of _armoured trains_; though in practice these are also employed
for the purposes of independent attacks on the enemy, apart altogether
from any question of ensuring the safety of rail communication.[10]
For the _protection of locomotives and rolling stock_, and to prevent
not only their capture but their use by the enemy, the most efficacious
method to adopt is, of course, that of removing them to some locality
where the enemy is not likely to come.
When, in 1866, Austria saw that she could not hold back the Prussian
invader, she took off into Hungary no fewer than 1,000 locomotives and
16,000 wagons from the railways in Bohemia and Saxony. Similar tactics
were adopted by the Boers as against ourselves in the war in South
Africa. On the British troops crossing into the Orange Free State,
from Cape Colony, they found that the retreating enemy had withdrawn
all their rolling stock, as well as all their staffs from the railway
stations, leaving behind only a more or less damaged line of railway.
Subsequently, when the forces occupied Pretoria, they certainly did find
there sixteen locomotives and 400 trucks; but the station books showed
that in the previous forty-eight hours no fewer than seventy trains,
many of them drawn by two engines, had been sent east in the direction
of Delagoa Bay.
When it is not practicable to withdraw locomotives and rolling stock
which it is desired the enemy shall not be able to use, the obvious
alternative is that measures should be taken either to remove vital
parts or to ensure their destruction. Certain of the methods adopted
during the Civil War in America were especially efficacious in attaining
the latter result. In some instances trains were started running and
then--driver and fireman leaping off the engine--were left to go into
a river, or to fall through a broken viaduct. In other instances two
trains, after having had a good supply of explosives put in them, would
be allowed to dash into one another at full speed. Many locomotives
had their boilers burst, and wagons were set on fire after having been
filled up with combustibles.
Still another method which has been adopted with a view to preventing
an enemy from using the railways he might succeed in capturing is that
of constructing them with a _different gauge_. The standard gauge of
the main-line railways in France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Denmark,
Austria-Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Roumania and Turkey (like that,
also, of railways in Great Britain, Canada and the United States), is
4ft. 8½in., allowing trains to pass readily from one country to the
other with the same rolling stock; but the gauge of the Russian railways
is 5ft., necessitating a transshipment from one train to another when
the frontier is reached. Similar conditions are found in Spain and
Portugal, where the standard gauge is 5ft. 6in.[11]
Russia adopted her broader gauge so that, in case of invasion, the
invader should not be able to run his rolling-stock over her lines, as
Germany, for instance, would be able to do in the case of the railways
of Belgium and France. Thus far, therefore, Russia strengthened her
position from the point of view of defence; but she weakened it as
regards attack, since if she should herself want, either to become the
invader or to send troop trains over neighbouring territory to some
point beyond, she would be at a disadvantage. In the Russo-Turkish War
of 1877-78, when the Russian forces passed through Roumania on their way
to Turkey, the difference in gauge between the Russian and the Roumanian
railways caused great delay and inconvenience by reason of the necessary
transfer of troops, stores, guns, ammunition, torpedo boats, etc., at
the frontier.
It should, also, be remembered that the reduction of a broad gauge to a
narrow one is a much simpler matter, from an engineering point of view,
than the widening of a narrower gauge into a broad one. In the former
case the existing sleepers, bridges, tunnels, platforms, etc., would
still serve their purpose. In the latter case fresh sleepers might have
to be laid, bridges and tunnels widened or enlarged, and platforms and
stations altered, use of the broader-gauge rolling stock thus involving
an almost complete reconstruction of the railway lines. To this extent,
therefore, the balance of advantage would seem to be against the country
having the broader gauge. The conclusion may, at least, be formed that
such a country is far more bent on protecting her own territory than on
invading that of her neighbours.
The course adopted by Germany for overcoming the difficulty which, in
the event of her seeking to invade Russia, the difference of railway
gauge in that country would present, will be told in Chapter XVIII.
FOOTNOTES:
[8] "Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in 1866." By Capt. Webber, R.E.
Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, N.S., vol. xvi. Woolwich, 1868.
[9] "The German War Book. Being the Usages of War on Land"; issued by
the Great General Staff of the German Army. London, 1915.
[10] The subject of armoured trains will be dealt with more fully in
Chapters VII and XVI.
[11] See "Field Service Pocket Book, 1914," pp. 151-2.
CHAPTER VI
TROOPS AND SUPPLIES
In the earlier controversies as to the use of railways in war, attention
was almost entirely concentrated on questions relating to the movement
of large masses of troops, the saving of time to be effected, and the
strategic advantages to be gained. These considerations quickly passed
from the theoretical to the practical, and when the results attained
were put against such facts as, for instance, the one that in 1805
Napoleon's Grand Army of 200,000 men took forty-two days to march the
700 kilometres (435 miles) between Ulm on the Danube and the French camp
at Boulogne, there was no longer any possibility of doubt as to the
services that railways might render from these particular points of view.
_Quicker transport_ was, however, only one consideration. There was the
further important detail that the movement of troops by rail would bring
them to their point of concentration, not only sooner, but in _more
complete numbers_, than if they had to endure the fatigues of prolonged
marches by road.
According to German authorities, the falling-out of infantry and cavalry
when marching along good roads under conditions of well-maintained
discipline and adequate food supplies averages three per cent. in cool
and dry weather, and six per cent. in hot or wet weather; while in
unfavourable conditions as regards roads, weather and supplies, the
diminution may be enormous. When, in the autumn of 1799, Suvóroff made
his famous march over the St. Gothard, he lost, in eleven days, no
fewer than 10,000 men owing to the hardships of the journey. In his
invasion of Russia, in 1812, Napoleon's losses in men who succumbed to
the fatigues and trials they experienced on the road were out of all
proportion to the casualties due to actual fighting. It was, too, a
saying of Blücher's that "he feared night marches worse than the enemy."
An English authority, Lieut.-Col. R. Home, C.B., R.E., wrote in a
paper on "The Organisation of the Communications, including Railways,"
published in Vol XIX. of the Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution (1875):--
If an army of moderate size, say 50,000 men, simply marches
one hundred miles without firing one shot or seeing an enemy the
number of sick to be got rid of is very great.
Experience has shown that in a good climate, with abundant
food, easy marches, and fair weather, the waste from ordinary
causes in a ten days' march of such a force would be between
2,000 and 2,500 men, while the number of galled, footsore
or worn-out horses would also be very large. A few wet days
or a sharp engagement would raise the number of both very
considerably. An inefficient man or horse at the front is a
positive disadvantage.
Another equally important detail relates to the _provision of supplies_
for the troops and animals thus transported by rail both more quickly
and with less fatigue.
In all ages the feeding of his troops in an enemy's country has been
one of the gravest problems a military commander has had to solve;
and though, in some instances, vast armies have succeeded in drawing
sufficient support from the land they have invaded, there have been
others in which an army intending to "live upon the country" has failed
to get the food it needed, and has had its numbers depleted to the
extent of thousands as the result of sheer starvation. This was the
experience of Darius, King of Persia, who, in 513 B.C., crossed the
Bosporus, on a bridge of boats, with an army of 700,000, followed the
retreating Scythians, and lost 80,000 of his men in wild steppes where
no means existed for feeding them. When, also, Alexander the Great was
withdrawing from India, in 325 B.C., two-thirds of his force died on
the desert plains of Beluchistan from thirst or hunger. Lack of the
supplies from which he found himself entirely cut off was, again, a main
cause of the disaster that overtook Napoleon in his Russian campaign.
Even fertile or comparatively fertile lands, satisfying the needs of
their inhabitants in time of peace, may fail to afford provisions for
an invading army, either because of the great number of the latter or
because the retreating population have destroyed the food supplies
they could not take with them into the interior whether for their own
sustenance or with a view to starving the invaders.
Should the invading army succeed in "living on the country," the effect
of leaving the troops to their own resources, in the way of collecting
food, may still be not only subversive of discipline but of strategic
disadvantage through their being scattered on marauding expeditions at a
time when, possibly, it would be preferable to keep them concentrated.
General Friron, chief of the staff of Marshal Masséna, wrote concerning
Napoleon's campaign in Portugal:--
The day the soldier became convinced that, for the future,
he would have to depend on himself, discipline disappeared
from the ranks of the army. The officer became powerless in
the presence of want; he was no longer disposed to reprimand
the soldier who brought him the nourishment essential to his
existence, and who shared with him, in brotherly goodwill, a
prey which may have cost him incalculable dangers and fatigues.
The extent to which a combination of physical fatigue and shortness of
supplies in an inhospitable country may interfere with the efficiency of
an army is well shown by Thiers ("Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire")
in regard to the conditions at the very outset of Napoleon's Russian
campaign. The French troops arriving on the Niemen--at which point they
were merely on the frontiers of Russia--were already overcome by the
long marches they had made. They had no bread, no salt, and no spirits;
their craving for food could no longer be satisfied by meat without salt
and meal mixed with water. The horses, too, were out of condition for
want of proper food. Behind the army a great number of soldiers dropped
out of the ranks and had lost their way, while the few people they met
in a scantily-populated district could speak nothing but Polish, which
the wearied and famished men were unable to understand. Yet, under the
conditions of former days, it was by troops thus exhausted by marches of
hundreds of miles, done on, possibly, a starvation diet, that battles
involving the severest strain on human energy were fought.
When "living on the country" is no longer practicable, the only
alternative for an army is, of course, that of sending supplies after it
for the feeding of the troops; but when, or where, this has had to be
done by means of ordinary road services, it has involved--together with
the transport of artillery, ammunition and stores--(1) the employment
of an enormous number of vehicles and animals, greatly complicating
the movements of the army; and (2) a limitation of the distance within
which a campaign can be waged by an army depending entirely on its own
resources.
The latter of these conditions was the direct consequence of the former;
and the reason for this was shown by General W. T. Sherman in an article
contributed by him to the _Century Magazine_ for February, 1888 (pp.
595-6), in the course of which he says:--
According to the Duke of Wellington, an army moves upon its
belly, not upon its legs; and no army dependent on wagons can
operate more than a hundred miles from its base because the
teams going and returning consume the contents of their wagons,
leaving little or nothing for the maintenance of men and animals
at the front who are fully employed in fighting.
There was, again, the risk when food supplies followed the army by road
either of perishables going bad _en route_, owing to the time taken in
their transport by wagon, or of their suffering deterioration as the
result of exposure to weather, the consequence in either case being a
diminution in the amount of provisions available for feeding the army.
All these various conditions have been changed by the railway, the use
of which for the purposes of war has, in regard to the forwarding of
supplies, introduced innovations which are quite as important as those
relating to the movement of troops--if, indeed, the former advantages
are not of even greater importance than the latter.
Thanks to the railway, an army can now draw its supplies from the
whole of the interior of the home country--provided that the lines of
communication can be kept open; and, with the help not only of regular
rail services but of stores and magazines _en route_ those supplies can
be forwarded to railhead in just such quantities as they may be wanted.
Under these conditions the feeding of an army in the field should
be assured regardless alike of the possible scanty resources of the
country in which it is engaged and of its own distance from the base of
supplies.
CHAPTER VII
ARMOURED TRAINS
In the issue of the now defunct London periodical, _Once a Week_, for
August 13, 1859, there was published an article on "English Railway
Artillery: A Cheap Defence against Invasion," in which it was said,
among other things:--
We have hitherto regarded the rail merely as a vehicle
of transport, to carry materials which are not to be set in
work till off the rails. If we look at the rail as part of an
instrument of warfare, we shall be startled at the enormous
means we have at hand, instantly available, from mercantile
purposes, to convert to engines of war.
The writer was William Bridges Adams (1797-1872), an authority on
railways who had grown up with them, had introduced into their operation
many inventions and improvements (including the fish-joint still used
for connecting rails), and was the author of various books and papers on
railways, transport, and other subjects. His new idea, as set forth in
the article in question, was specially directed to the utilisation of
railways for defending the shores of Great Britain against an invader;
and in developing this idea he was, also, as far as can be traced, the
first to suggest the employment of armoured trains.
The immediate reason alike for the writing of the article and for the
making of the suggestion was that in 1859 Great Britain appeared to be
faced by the prospect of invasion by France,--a prospect which, in view
of the then admittedly defective condition of the national defences,
led to the creation of the Volunteer Corps, to the appointment of a
Royal Commission to inquire into the question of coast defence, and
to suggestions being put forward by many different authorities as to
what should be done. Among those suggestions was one by the writer in
question for supplementing any system of coast defence that might be
adopted by the mounting of guns on railway trucks protected by armour,
such trucks being moved from point to point along the coast railways to
meet, as far as possible, the needs of the military situation.
Heavy artillery, wrote Adams, though the most formidable implement of
modern warfare, had the disadvantage of requiring many horses to draw
it. So the problem arose as to how the horses could be dispensed with.
This could best be done, he thought, by putting artillery on "our true
line of defence,--our rails," and having it drawn, or propelled, by a
locomotive. "Mount," he said, "a gun of twenty tons weight on a railway
truck, with a circular traversing platform, and capable of throwing
a shot or shell weighing one hundred to one and a half a distance of
five miles. A truck on eight wheels would carry this very easily, and
there would be no recoil." Such a battery would be "practically a
moving fortress," and, used on the coast railways, which he regarded as
constituting lines of defence, would be "the cheapest of all possible
fortresses--absolutely a continuous fortress along the whole coast."
Communication with coast railways at all strategical points should,
however, be facilitated by the placing of rails along the ordinary
highways. After giving some technical details as to the construction
alike of coast railways and road tramways, he proceeded:--
With these roads communicating with the railroads, the whole
railway system becomes applicable to military purposes.
The railway system is so especially adapted for defence, and
so little adapted to invaders, that it should become at once a
matter of experiment how best to adapt Armstrong or other guns
to its uses. The process of fitting the engines with shot-proof
walls to protect the drivers against riflemen would be very
easy.... Nothing but artillery could damage the engines or
moving batteries, and artillery could not get near them if it
were desirable to keep out of the way.
One gun transportable would do the work of ten which are
fixtures in forts, and there would be no men to take prisoners,
for no forts would be captured.
The more this system is thought of the more the conviction
will grow that it is the simplest mode of rendering the country
impenetrable to invaders at a comparatively trifling cost.
It will be seen that the scheme here proposed included three separate
propositions--(1) the use of railways, as "engines of war," for coast
defence; (2) the mounting of Armstrong or other guns on railway trucks
from which they could be discharged for the purposes of such defence;
and (3) the providing of the engines with "shot-proof walls" for the
protection of the drivers. A similar protection for the men operating
the guns on the trucks was not then, apparently, considered necessary;
but we have here what was clearly the germ of the "armoured train."
Among the other suggestions advanced on the same occasion were some for
the employment of railways in general for strategical purposes, and more
especially for the defence of London; and here, again, the employment of
armoured trains was advocated.
"A Staff Officer," writing in _The Times_ of July 16, 1860, declared
that the most efficacious and the most economical line of defence which
London could have would be a circular railway forming a complete cordon
around the Metropolis at a distance of fifteen miles from the centre,
and having for its interior lines of operation the numerous railways
already existing within that radius. On this circular railway there
should be "Armstrong and Whitworth ordnance mounted on large iron-plated
trucks" fitted with traversing platforms in the way already recommended
by W. Bridges Adams, the trucks themselves, however, and not only the
locomotives, being protected by "shot-proof shields." The circular
railway was to be constructed primarily for strategical purposes; but
during peace the line would be available for ordinary traffic, and in
this way it could be made to yield at least some return on the capital
expenditure.
The writer of this letter, Lieut. Arthur Walker, then an officer of the
79th Highlanders and the holder of a staff appointment at the School
of Musketry, Fleetwood, followed up the subject by reading a paper
on "Coast Railways and Railway Artillery" at a meeting of the Royal
United Service Institution on January 30, 1865.[12] On this occasion
he specially advocated the use of "moveable batteries" for coast
defence in conjunction with railways constructed more or less within
a short parallel distance of the entire coast line. Field artillery,
he recommended, should be mounted on a truck the sides of which would
be "encased in a cuirass of sufficient thickness," while the engine
and tender would also be "protected by an iron cuirass, and placed
between two cupolas for further protection." He considered that "to
attempt to land in face of such an engine of war as this would be simply
impossible." Moving batteries of this kind would be "the cheapest of
all possible fortresses.... We have nothing to do but to improvise
well-adapted gun-carriages for our rails." At the same meeting Mr. T.
Wright, C.E., gave details of a proposed railway train battery for
coast, frontier and inland defence which was designed to carry ten,
twenty or forty guns or mortars.
Another early advocate of the use of railways as an actual instrument
of warfare was Colonel E. R. Wethered, who, in 1872, wrote to the War
Office suggesting that heavy ordnance should be mounted on wheeled
carriages so constructed that they could be moved along any of the
railways, from point to point. In this way the three-fold advantage
would be gained of (1) utilising the railway system for purposes of
national defence; (2) rendering possible a concentration of artillery
with overwhelming force at any given spot, and, (3) by the use of these
moveable carriages for the conveyance of the guns, exposing the men to
less risk.
Colonel Wethered further communicated to _The Times_ of May 25, 1877,
a letter on "Portable Batteries" in which he declared that if, before
an enemy could effect a landing, we were to provide the means of
concentrating, with unerring certainty, on any given points of the
coast, a crushing force of artillery, with guns of heavier calibre than
even the warships of the invader could command, it would be impossible
for the vessels of an invading force to approach near enough to effect
the landing of their men. He continued:--
My proposal is to take the full advantage which our railway
system, in connection with our insular position, affords, and
provide powerful moveable batteries which can be sent fully
equipped in fighting order direct by railway to any required
point; and the recent experimental trials of the 81-ton gun
have proved that the heaviest ordnance can be moved and fought
on railway metals with considerable advantage.... In connection
with our present main lines of railway, which probably would
require strengthening at certain points, I would construct
branch lines or sidings leading to every strategical point
of our coast and into every fort, as far as possible, with
requisite platforms.... These branch lines during peace would,
doubtless, be of some small commercial value.... I would mount
as many of our heaviest guns as practicable on railway gun
carriages so that they could be moved by rail from one face of a
front to another, and from one place to another.
He also recommended that guns thus mounted, fully equipped, and ready
for use, should be kept at three large central depôts which might be
utilised for the defence of London. At each of them he would station (1)
Militia and Volunteer Artillery able not only to work the guns but to
construct, repair or destroy railway lines, and (2) a locomotive corps
specially trained in the working of traffic under war conditions.
By reading a paper at the Royal United Service Institution on April
24, 1891, on "The Use of Railways for Coast and Harbour Defence,"[13]
Lieut. E. P. Girouard, R.E. (now Major-General Sir E. Percy C. Girouard,
K.C.M.G.), made what was, at that time, an important contribution to a
subject on which there was then still much to be learned. Sketching a
detailed scheme comprising the employment of all the coastal railways
for the purposes of national defence, he emphasised the value of
Britain's "enormous railway power" as the strong point of her defensive
position, whether regarded from the point of view of (1) railway mileage
open as compared with the square mile of coastal area to be defended,
or (2) the length of coast line compared with the railway mileage at or
near that coast line, and, therefore, locally available for its defence.
"Why," he asked, "should we not turn to account the enormous advantage
which our great railway power gives us to concentrate every available
gun at a threatened point in the right and the proper time, which the
proper utilisation of our railways can and will do, thereby practically
doubling or quadrupling our available gun power?"
Whilst the subject had thus been under discussion in the United Kingdom,
America, in her _Civil War of 1861-65_, had set the rest of the world an
example by actually introducing armoured-protected gun-carrying trucks
into modern warfare.
Writing from Washington, under date August 29, 1862, to Colonel Herman
Haupt, then Chief of Construction and Transportation in the Department
of Rappahannock, Mr. P. H. Watson, Assistant-Secretary of War,
said:--"An armour-clad car, bullet proof, and mounting a cannon, has
arrived here and will be sent down to Alexandria." A later message, on
the same date added:--"After you see the bullet-proof car, let me know
what you think of it. I think you ought at once to have a locomotive
protected by armour. Can you have the work done expeditiously and well
at Alexandria, or shall I get it done at Philadelphia or Wilmington?"
The car was duly received; but Haupt's comments in respect to it, as
recorded in his "Reminiscences," show that he was not greatly impressed
by the innovation. "P. H. Watson, Assistant-Secretary of War, sent me,"
he says, "an armour-clad, bullet-proof car, mounting a cannon. The
kindness was appreciated, but the present was an elephant. I could not
use it, and, being in the way, it was finally side-tracked on an old
siding in Alexandria."
It would seem, however, that other armour-clad cars were brought into
actual use during the course of the Civil War.
In the _Railway Age Gazette_ (Chicago) for January 22, 1915, Mr.
Frederick Hobart, associated editor of the New York _Engineer and Mining
Journal_, writes, from personal knowledge, of two armoured cars which
were in use in the Civil War. One of these, formed by heavy timbers
built up on a flat car, was put together in the shops of the Atlantic
and North Carolina Railroad Company at Newberne, N.C., in 1862, about
two months after the city had been captured by the Burnside expedition.
The armour consisted of old rails spiked on the outside of the planking
composing the sides and front of the car. Along the sides there were
slits for musketry fire, and at the front end there was a port hole
covered with a shutter behind which a gun from one of the field
batteries was mounted. The second car was similarly constructed, but was
armed with a naval howitzer. The cars were run ahead of the engine, and
were used in reconnoitring along the railroad line west of Newberne. Mr.
Hobart adds that he was quite familiar with the cars, having assisted in
the design and construction of both.
In the _Century Magazine_ for September, 1887 (page 774), there is given
an illustration ("from a photograph") of an armour-clad car described as
"the Union Railroad Battery" which was, apparently, used in connection
with the springing of the mine in front of Petersburg on July 30, 1864.
The car is shown to have consisted of a low truck with, at one end, a
sloping armour plate coming down almost to the rails, and having a hole
through which the gun placed behind it on the truck could be fired. The
sides of the truck were protected from the top of the sloping armour
downwards, but the back was open. The car was, of course, designed to be
pushed in front of the locomotive.
Mr. L. Lodian, also, contributed to the issue of the American
periodical, _Railway and Locomotive Engineering_, for May, 1915, a
communication, under the title of "The Origin of Armoured Railroad
Cars Unquestionably the Product of the American Civil War," in which,
claiming that "our own Civil War" originated those cars, he said:--
Attached is a picture of one in use on the old
Philadelphia-Baltimore Railroad. The illustration appeared in
Frank Leslie's illustrated periodical on May 18, 1864. No better
proof could be furnished of the authenticity of the fact that
such a car was in use at that time.... There appears to be no
great variation even to-day in armoured car design from the
initial effort of half a century ago. Pictures are appearing
in numerous periodicals, at the period of writing, of those in
use by the European belligerents, and in general appearance
and outline they are about the same as the original, the chief
variation in their use being that the war-going locomotive is
also sheathed in armour, whereas that in use in the sixties was
entirely unprotected, except in front, and then only by reason
of the mailclad car being placed in front to do the fighting.
As against this suggestion, there is the undoubted fact that in the
American Civil War the plan was adopted of having the locomotives
of ordinary troop or supply trains protected by armour-plating as a
precaution against attack when there was no armoured car in front of
them. Writing to the Director of Military Railroads on October 8, 1862,
Haupt said:--
I have been thinking over the subject of locomotives. It
is one which, at the present time, and in view of the future
requirements of the service, demands especial attention.
Experience has shown that on engines men are targets for
the enemy; the cabs where they are usually seated have been
riddled by bullets, and they have only escaped by lying on the
footboard. It will be necessary to inspire confidence in our men
by placing iron cabins (bullet proof) upon all or nearly all our
engines, and the necessity will increase as we penetrate further
into the enemy's country.
Again, it is desirable that the smaller and more delicate
portions of the apparatus should be better protected than at
present, and I would be pleased if you would give to the plans,
of which I spoke to you recently, a careful consideration. It
seems to me that they are peculiarly well adapted to military
service.
Haupt adds that "protected locomotives and bullet-proof cabs were soon
after provided, as recommended"; and elsewhere in his "Reminiscences" he
says, on the same subject:--
The bullet-proof cabs on locomotives were very useful--in
fact, indispensable. I had a number of them made and put on
engines, and they afforded protection to engineers and firemen
against the fire from guerillas from the bushes that lined the
road.
In the _Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71_ guns mounted on four
armour-plated trucks, fitted up in the workshops of the Orléans Company,
under the supervision of M. Dupuy de Lorme, Engineer-in-Chief for Naval
Construction, were taken into action on four occasions during the siege
of Paris, namely, at Choisy-le-Roi, for the sortie preceding the one
from Champigny; near Brie-sur-Marne, to support the Champigny sortie;
at Le Bourget, for one of the attempts to recapture that position; and
at La Malmaison, to support the Montretout sortie. The wagons were
protected by a covering which consisted of five plates of wrought
iron, each two-fifths of an inch thick, and giving, therefore, a total
thickness of two inches. The two engines used were also protected by
armour-plating. One or two of the wagons were struck by field-gun shells
without, however, sustaining further damage than the denting of their
plates. The engines escaped damage altogether. On going into action the
armoured wagons were followed by another bullet-proof engine conveying a
party of men with tools and materials to repair any interruption of the
lines that might interfere with the return of the trains; but the only
damage done was so slight that it was remedied in about a quarter of an
hour.[14]
Further use was made of armoured trains in the _Egyptian Campaign of
1882_. One that was put together to assist in the defensive works at
Alexandria is declared in the official history of the campaign[15] to
have "proved most serviceable." Two of the trucks, fitted with iron
plating and sand bags as a protecting cover, carried one Nordenfelt and
two Gatling guns. A 9-pr. was also placed on one of the trucks, together
with a crane by means of which it could be lowered out immediately.
Other trucks, rendered bullet proof by sand bags and boiler-plating,
and carrying a force of 200 bluejackets, with small arms, completed the
fighting force. On July 28, the train took part in a reconnaissance sent
out to ascertain the extent of the damage which had been done to the
railway lines near Arabi's outpost. Shots were fired at the train by the
enemy, but without effect. The reconnaissance was a complete success
inasmuch as it enabled such repairs to be done to the railway as gave
the use of a second line between Ramleh and Alexandria.
So useful had the train been found that it was now further improved
by adding to it a 40-pr. on a truck protected by an iron mantlet. The
locomotive was put in the middle of the train and was itself protected
by sand bags and railway iron. Thus strengthened, the train went into
action in the reconnaissance in force carried out from Alexandria
on August 5, and "the most interesting incident of the engagement,"
according to the official account, "was the good service done by the
40-pr. from the armoured train."
Early in the morning of September 13 the train, consisting of five
wagons, and having, on this occasion, one Krupp gun and one Gatling in
addition to the 40-pr., was sent to support the attack on Tel el-Kebir.
It was followed by another train having 350 yards of permanent-way
materials, with all the necessary tools and appliances for the prompt
carrying out of any repairs that might be necessary. Owing, however, to
the hazy and uncertain light and to the ever-increasing clouds of smoke
that hung over the battle-field, it was impossible to fire the 40-pr.
In the futile attempt made in 1885 to construct a railway from Suakin
to Berber, in support of the _Nile Expedition of 1884-85_, resort was
had to an armoured train for the purpose of protecting the line from
the constant attacks to which it was subjected by the enemy. The train
carried a 20-pr. B.L., which could be fired only either in prolongation
of the line or at a slight angle from it.
At the Camp of Exercise in _Delhi_ in January, 1886, some important
experiments were carried out with a view to testing the practicability
of firing guns at right angles to an ordinary line of railway, the
result being to establish the fact that a 40-pr. R.B.L. could be fired
with perfect safety broadside from (_a_) small empty wagons mounted
on four wheels; (_b_) small empty wagons weighted up to four tons;
and (_c_) empty eight-wheel bogies. These experiments were especially
successful when account is taken of the fact that no attempt was made to
reduce in any way the energy of recoil.
Other experiments, begun in 1885, were successfully conducted during a
succession of years both by the French Government and by private firms
in _France_ in the transport and the firing of guns from railway trucks
with a view to obtaining definite data on the subject, more especially
in relation to firing at right angles to the line.
In _Italy_ a distinguished officer raised the question in the Italian
Parliament, in 1891, as to whether Sicily should not be defended by
means of a coast railway and armoured trains.
Some experiments carried out at _Newhaven, Sussex_, in 1894, were the
more interesting because the results attained were due to the combined
efforts of Artillery Volunteers and of the London, Brighton and South
Coast Railway Company.
Under the Volunteer mobilization scheme of 1891 there were some 300
members of the 1st Sussex Artillery Volunteers to whom no special
duties had been allotted, and there happened to be, at Shoreham, a
40-pr. Armstrong B.L. gun which was then serving no particular purpose.
Inspired by these two facts, the Secretary of the Committee for National
Defence suggested, in November, 1891, that negotiations should be opened
with the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway Company with a view
to their mounting the 40-pr. on a specially prepared truck, designed
to form part of an armoured train, experiments in firing the gun from
the truck--in order to test the efficiency of this expedient for the
purposes of coast defence--being afterwards carried out by the Artillery
Volunteers whose services were available for the purpose.
On being approached, the directors of the railway company readily
consented to the fitting up of the truck being carried out at their
engineering and carriage works; they contributed towards the expenses,
and members of their staff entered with great cordiality into the
scheme, Mr. R. J. Billington, the locomotive superintendent, being the
first to suggest the mounting of the gun on a turntable to be fixed on
the truck,--a "bold departure," as it was regarded at the time, and one
expected to produce excellent results. The railway staff were the more
interested, also, in the proposed experiments because a large proportion
of the members of the 1st Sussex Artillery Volunteers consisted of men
employed at the Brighton Company's works.
In commenting upon these facts, Col. Charles Gervaise Boxall, the
commanding officer, said in a paper on "The Armoured Train for Coast
Defence," read by him at a meeting of officers and N.C.O.'s of the
Brigade, held at Newhaven Fort, Sussex, on May 14, 1894:--
When one considers that a railway company is neither
a philanthropic institution nor a patriotic society, the
generous support given to this experiment by so powerful a
body as the directors of the London, Brighton and South Coast
Railway Company is in itself some considerable evidence of
the importance they themselves ascribe to this effort in the
direction of the maintenance of coast defence and protection
from invasion.
Preliminary experiments with the gun were conducted on May 5, 1894,
and they conclusively showed, Col. Boxall said, "that the gun will
require no traversing to correct variation caused by the recoil, while
the muzzle of the gun can be directed to any part of its circumference
by handspike traversing within half a minute." He was evidently proud
of the results even of these preliminary trials. They were the first
occasion on which a heavy gun had been fired broadside on the permanent
way of an English railway, and the truck was the first armour-plated one
on which a turntable, a recoil cylinder, and other inventions introduced
had been employed. So, he further declared:--
We do confidently submit that, having proved that such a
gun as this can be mounted so as to be transportable to any
part of our railway system at a moment's notice, brought into
action, and fired with accuracy either end on, broadside, or in
any other direction, without danger of capsizing, and without
injury to the permanent way, we have become pioneers of a new
departure in artillery which must lead to results of the highest
importance.
This was written prior to the full trials, which took place at Newhaven
on May 19, 1894, in the presence of a distinguished company of military
men and others. An account of the event will be found in _The Times_
of May 21, 1894. The gun and its carriage are described as standing on
a turntable platform pivoted on the centre of the truck, and revolving
on a central "racer." The gun detachments were protected by a plating
six feet high round three sides of the turntable, and the gun was fired
through an aperture in the plating. Drawn by an ordinary locomotive,
the truck on which the gun was mounted was accompanied by two carriages
conveying the Volunteer Artillerymen who were to serve the gun. Several
rounds were fired at a target some 2,500 yards distant, and "the
armoured train passed through the searching and severe ordeal most
successfully, the jar caused being so slight that a stone placed on the
rails remained unmoved by the firing." The truck, it is further stated,
had been provided with some cross girders which could be run out and
supported on blocks in order to secure a broad base when the gun was
fired at right angles to the line, and there was a further arrangement
for connecting the truck to the rails by strong clips; but the truck
remained sufficiently steady without any need for making use of these
appliances.
Finally, as will be told more fully in Chapter XVI, the _South African
Campaign of 1899-1902_ definitely established the usefulness of armoured
trains as an "instrument of war," and led both to the creation of an
efficient organisation for their employment on the most scientific and
most practical lines and to the establishment of certain principles
in regard to such important matters of detail as uses and purposes,
administration, staff, armament, tactics, etc. Published in the
"Detailed History of the Railways in the South African War" which was
issued by the Royal Engineers' Institute, Chatham, in 1905, these
principles were adopted in the _United States_ with modifications to
suit American conditions, and, so modified, are reproduced in Major
William D. Connor's handbook on "Military Railways," forming No. 32
of the Professional Papers of the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. An
excellent treatment of the subject, from a technical point of view,
will be found in a paper, by Capt. H. O. Nance, on "Armoured Trains,"
published, with photographs and drawings, in "Papers of the Corps of
Royal Engineers," Fourth Series, Vol. I., Paper 4 (Chatham, 1906).
FOOTNOTES:
[12] _See_ the "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution" Vol.
IX., pp. 221-31, 1865.
[13] "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," Vol. XXXV., 1891.
[14] For detailed description, with diagrams, of the trains here in
question, _see_ "Armour-plated Railway Wagons used during the late
Sieges of Paris," by Lieut. Fraser, R.E. Papers of the Corps of Royal
Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX, 1872.
[15] "Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt." Prepared by
the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Revised edition. London, 1908.
CHAPTER VIII
RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT
According to statistics which have been compiled in relation to wars
alike in ancient and in modern times, for every ten men among the
armies in the field who have died from wounds received in battle there
have been from thirty-five to forty who died from sickness or disease.
Writing in the _Journal des Sciences Militaires_, Dr. Morache, a surgeon
in the French Army, has said that while the total number of deaths among
combatants taking part in the Crimean War was 95,000, no fewer than
70,000 were due to typhus, scurvy, cholera or other diseases. In the
Italian campaign of 1859 the French lost 5,498 men, of whom 2,500 died
from sickness. On the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War the Russians
had 51,000 of their troops sick, the ravages of typhus having been
especially severe.
These conditions have been materially aggravated by the gathering
together of great numbers of sick and wounded into overcrowded hospitals
situate on or near to the theatre of war and destined inevitably to
become hot-beds of disease and pestilence far more dangerous to human
life, under these conditions, than even the most deadly weapons which
the art of war had invented for use on the battle-field itself.
Nor was it the armies alone that suffered. Returning troops spread the
seeds of disease among the civil population, causing epidemics that
lingered, in some instances, for several years and carried off many
thousands of non-combatants, in addition to the great number of victims
among the combatants themselves. In a volume of 866 pages, published by
Dr. E. Gurlt, under the title of "Zur Geschichte der Internationellen
und Freiwilligen Krankenpflege im Kriege" (Leipzig, 1873), will be found
many terrible details concerning the ravages in France, Germany and
Austria of the typhus which Napoleon's troops brought back with them on
the occasion of their disastrous retreat from Russia.
The most practicable means of mitigating, if not of avoiding, these
various evils is to be found in the prompt removal of the sick and
wounded from the theatre of war, and their distribution in smaller
units, not simply among a group of neighbouring towns, but over an
area extending to considerable distances inland. The adoption of this
remedy only became possible, however, with a provision of adequate rail
facilities, and even then many years were to elapse before an efficient
system of railway ambulance transport was finally evolved.
The objects which the use of the railway in these directions was to
attain were alike humanitarian and strategical.
To the sick and wounded among the troops, prompt removal and widespread
distribution among hospitals in the interior meant (1) that they avoided
the risks to which they would have been subjected in the aforesaid
overcrowded and pestilential hospitals near the fighting line, where
slight injuries might readily develop dangerous symptoms, and contagious
disease complete the conditions leading to a fatal issue; (2) that,
apart from these considerations, it would be possible to give them a
greater degree of individual attention if they were distributed among a
large number of hospitals away from the scene of the fighting; (3) that
more conservative methods of surgery became practicable when operations
of a kind not to be attempted either on the battle-field or in temporary
hospitals (from which the inmates might have to be suddenly removed,
owing to some change in the strategical position) could be delayed until
the sufferer's arrival at some hospital in the interior, where better
appliances and better facilities would be available, and where, after
the operation, the patient would be able to remain undisturbed until
he was cured; (4) that these improved conditions might more especially
permit of the avoidance of amputations otherwise imperatively necessary;
and (5) that, on the whole, the wounded soldier was afforded a better
chance of effecting a speedy recovery and of saving both life and limb
than would be possible if railways were not available.
To the army in the field the innovation meant that with the speedy
removal of the sick and wounded it would be relieved of the great
source of embarrassment caused by the presence and dependence upon it
of so many inefficients;[16] depôt and intermediate hospitals could
be reduced to the smallest proportions, and would thus occasion less
inconvenience if, owing to a retreat or a change in the strategical
position, they were brought within the sphere of military operations;
with the delegation of so many of the sick and wounded to the care of
civil practitioners in the interior, fewer of the divisional, brigade
and regimental medical officers would require to be detached from the
marching column; a smaller supplementary medical staff would suffice;
a considerable reduction could be effected in the stocks of ambulance
supplies kept on hand at the front; while important strategical
advantages would be gained through (1) the greater freedom of movement
which the army would secure; (2) the decreased risk of the number of
efficients being reduced through the outbreak of epidemics; and (3) the
prospect of a large proportion of the sick and wounded being enabled to
rejoin the fighting force on their making a speedy recovery from their
illness or their wounds.
The earliest occasion on which the railway was made use of for the
conveyance of sick and wounded from a scene of actual hostilities to the
rear was on the occasion of the _Crimean War_, when the little military
line between Balaklava and the camp before Sebastopol, of which an
account will be given in Chapter XV, was so employed. The facilities
afforded were, however, of the most primitive character. Only the
wagons used for the transport of supplies to the front--wagons, that is
to say, little better than those known as "contractors' trucks"--were
available, and there were no means of adapting them to the conveyance
of sufferers who could not be moved otherwise than in a recumbent
position. Sitting-up cases could, therefore, alone be carried; but what
was to develop into a revolution in the conditions of warfare was thus
introduced, all the same.
In the _Italian war of 1859_ both the French and the Austrians made use
of the railways for the withdrawal of their sick and wounded, and, in
his "Souvenir de Solferino," Jean Henri Dumant, the "Father" of the Red
Cross Movement, speaks of the transportation of wounded from Brescia to
Milan by train to the extent of about 1,000 a night. No arrangements for
their comfort on the journey had been made in advance, and the changes
in the military situation were so rapid, when hostilities broke out,
that no special facilities could be provided then. All that was done
was to lay down straw on the floor of the goods or cattle trucks used
for the conveyance of some of the more serious cases. The remainder
travelled in ordinary third-class carriages, and their sufferings on the
journey, before they reached the long and narrow sheds put up along the
railway lines at Milan or elsewhere to serve as temporary hospitals,
must often have been very great. They may, nevertheless, have escaped
the fate of those who died, not from their wounds, but from the fevers
quickly generated in the overcrowded hospitals at the front, where there
was, besides, a general deficiency of ambulance requirements of all
kinds. The good resulting from the removal by train is, indeed, said to
have been "immense."
These experiences in the campaign of 1859 led to a recommendation
being made in the following year by a _German_ medical authority, Dr.
E. Gurlt,[17] that railway vehicles should be specially prepared for
the conveyance of the sick and wounded in time of war. The plan which
he himself suggested for adoption was the placing of the sufferers in
hammocks suspended from hooks driven into the roof of the goods van or
carriage employed, mattresses being first put on the hammocks, when
necessary. By this means, he suggested, the sufferers would travel much
more comfortably than when seated in the ordinary passenger carriages,
or when lying on straw in the goods wagons or cattle trucks.
Dr. Gurlt's pamphlet served the good purpose of drawing much attention
to the subject, and his proposals were duly subjected to the test of
experiment. They failed, however, on two grounds,--(1) because the roofs
of the goods vans, designed for shelter only, were not sufficiently
strong to bear the weight of a number of men carried in the way
suggested; and (2) because the motion of the train caused the hammocks
to come into frequent contact with the sides of the wagon, to the
serious discomfort of the occupants.
In November of the same year (1860) the Prussian War Minister, von Roon,
appointed a Commission to enquire into the whole subject of the care
of the sick and wounded in time of war, and the question of transport
by rail was among the various matters considered. As a result of these
investigations, the Minister issued, on July 1, 1861, an order to the
effect that in future the less seriously wounded should travel in
ordinary first, second or third-class carriages, according to the degree
of comfort they required, care being taken to let them have corner
seats; while for those who were seriously ill, or badly wounded, there
were to be provided sacks of straw having three canvas loops on each
side for the insertion of poles by means of which the sacks and the
sufferers lying upon them could be readily lifted in or out of the goods
wagons set apart for their conveyance. In these wagons they were to be
placed on the floor in such a way that each wagon would accommodate
either seven or eight. In the event of a deficiency of sacks, loose
straw was to be used instead. The door on one side of the truck was to
be left open for ventilation. A doctor and attendants were to accompany
each train, and they were to have a supply of bandages, medicines and
appliances. Of the last-mentioned a list of five articles was appended
as obligatory. The medical officer was to visit the wagons during the
stoppages, and the attendants on duty in the wagons were to carry flags
so that, when necessary, they could signal both for the train to pull
up and for the doctor to come to the sufferers.
This was as far as Prussia had got by 1861, when the arrangements stated
were regarded as quite sufficient to meet the requirements of the
situation. Real progress was to come, rather, from the other side of the
Atlantic.
In the early days of the _War of Secession_ (1861-65) the arrangements
for the conveyance by rail of the sick and wounded from the
battle-fields of the Eastern States to the hospitals in the large
cities were still distinctly primitive. Those who could sit up in the
ordinary cars were conveyed in them. Those who could not sit up, or
would be injured by so doing, were carried to the railway, by hand, on
the mattresses or stretchers they had occupied in the hospitals to which
they had first been taken. At the station the mattresses were placed on
thick layers of straw or hay strewn over the floors of the freight cars
in which supplies had been brought to the front. Large window spaces
were cut in the sides or ends of the cars to provide for ventilation.
On some occasions, when hay or straw was not available, pine boughs or
leaves were used instead. As only the floor space was occupied no more
than about ten patients could be carried comfortably in each car, though
as many as twenty were occasionally crowded in. The wide doors of the
box cars readily permitted of the beds being lifted in or out. Medical
officers, with supplies, accompanied each train. On arrival at New
York, Washington, Philadelphia, Harrisburg, or other destination, the
sufferers were taken out and carried, still on the same mattresses or
stretchers, to the hospitals there.
Large numbers of sick or wounded were conveyed by rail under one or
other of these conditions, and the work was done with great expedition.
Between the morning of June 12 and the evening of June 14, 1863, over
9,000 wounded, victims of the Federal disaster at Chancellorsville,
were taken by the single-track Aquia Creek railroad from Aquia Creek to
Washington. Many even of the severely wounded declared they had suffered
no inconvenience from the journey. After the battle of Gettysburg, July
1-3, 1863, more than 15,000 wounded had been sent by rail from the
field hospitals to Baltimore, New York, Harrisburg or Philadelphia by
July 22. An even more rapid distribution was effected after the battles
of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania when, with a few exceptions, the
transfer to the hospitals in the cities mentioned was effected in the
course of a few days. Following on the battle of Olustree (February 20,
1864), the serious cases were removed on the Mobile Railway by freight
cars bedded with pine boughs, palmetto leaves and a small quantity of
straw, each patient having a blanket, in addition.
As an improvement on these methods of transport, the plan was adopted
of fixing rows of upright wooden posts, connecting floor and ceiling,
on each side of a car as supports for two or three tiers of rough
wooden bunks, a central gangway through the car being left. In this
way the available space in the car was much better utilised than
with the straw-on-floor system. Next, in place of the bunks, came an
arrangement by which the stretchers whereon the patients lay could be
securely lashed to the uprights; while this was followed, in turn, by
the insertion of wooden pegs into the uprights and the placing on them
of large and strong india-rubber rings into which the handles of the
stretchers could readily be slipped, and so suspended. The first car so
arranged came into use in March, 1863.
Meanwhile the Philadelphia Railroad Company had, at the end of 1862,
fitted up an ambulance car on the principle of a sleeping car, but so
planned that the stretchers on which the sufferers lay could be made to
slide in or out of the wooden supports. This particular car was capable
of accommodating fifty-one patients, in addition to a seat at each end
for an attendant. Other innovations introduced on the car were (1) a
stove at which soups could be warmed or tea made; (2) a water tank, and
(3) a locker.
What the introducers of these improvements mainly prided themselves
upon was the fact that the patient could remain, throughout the entire
journey from field hospital to destination, on the stretcher he had been
placed on at the start. The adoption of this principle necessitated,
however, uniformity in the dimensions of the stretchers in order that
these could always be accommodated on the ambulance-car fittings.
The next important development was reached when the ambulance _car_,
run in connection with ordinary trains, and used for exceptionally
severe cases, was succeeded by the ambulance _train_. Here came further
innovations, the nine or ten "ward-cars," of which such a train mainly
consisted in the Eastern States, being supplemented by others fitted
up as dispensary and store-room, kitchen, and quarters for surgeon,
attendants, and staff of train, besides carrying all necessary
appliances and provisions for the journey.
What was now specially aimed at was to make the train as close an
approach to an actual hospital on wheels as circumstances would
permit. "At present," wrote the Medical Director of the Department of
Washington, "the sick and wounded are transferred in cars ill-adapted
for the purpose and with difficulty spared from the other pressing
demands; and lives are lost on the route not infrequently which, in all
probability, might be saved by a more comfortable and easy method of
transportation." The train he caused to be constructed consisted of ten
ward-cars, one car for the surgeon and attendants, one as a dispensary
and store-room, and one as a kitchen, etc. The ward-cars, arranged on
an improved principle, each accommodated thirty recumbent and twenty or
thirty seated patients. The train was to run regularly on the Orange and
Alexandria Railroad between the theatre of war and the base hospitals at
Alexandria and Washington. It was either to supplement or to supersede
the freight cars with their bedding of straw, hay or leaves. If only
from the point of view of the inadequate supply of rolling stock, a car
fitted up to accommodate fifty or sixty patients offered an obvious
advantage, in the speedy removal and distribution of sick and wounded,
over a car, without fittings, in which the floor space alone could be
utilised.
Several complete trains of the type stated were soon running on the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad, within the Union lines, and the
hospital train thus became an established institution in modern warfare.
It was, however, in connection with the chief army in the West, the Army
of the Cumberland, operating under General George H. Thomas, that the
useful purposes which could be served by hospital trains became most
conspicuous.
The need for them in the West was even greater than in the East,
because the distances to be covered were greater and lay, also, to a
considerable extent, in enemy country.
In the fall of 1863 and the winter of 1864, as narrated in the "Medical
and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion," the chief army of the
West was concentrated principally along the line of railroads leading
from Nashville, Tennessee, to the South-west, viâ Chattanooga, Tenn.,
and onwards towards Atlanta, Georgia. At the outset the sick and wounded
who could travel in ordinary passenger cars to points in the North were
so taken. Severe cases had to remain in the nearest available hospital
depôt. In addition to the discomfort suffered by the former in having
to travel in cars not suited to invalids, they were liable to frequent
and prolonged delays on the single-track lines by reason of the constant
passing of supply trains proceeding to the front; and not unfrequently
the detentions were at points where nothing could be obtained for
feeding the sufferers or making them comfortable, while even if rations
could be drawn the train afforded no means of cooking them. So it was
resolved to have a train which would be the equivalent of an ambulating,
self-contained hospital, capable of carrying both recumbent and
sitting-up patients and supplying all their wants on the journey.
On August 11, 1863, instructions were sent from the
Assistant-Surgeon-General's Office to the Medical Officer of the Army
of the Cumberland directing him "to take immediate measures to fit up a
special train for hospital purposes, with every possible comfort," to
run between Nashville, Ten., and Louisville, Ken. General Thomas, in
turn, accorded the fullest authority to the Medical Officer to select
for the purpose the best locomotives and the best cars to be found among
the railway rolling stock, and to have new cars fitted up whenever
necessary. He further directed that the most experienced drivers,
conductors and other necessary railway employés should be selected for
the conduct of the hospital-train service.
Three of these trains were ready by the spring of 1864, and they ran
regularly--each taking a section of the journey--between Atlanta and
Louisville, a distance of 472 miles. They consisted, apparently, in
part of specially-built and in part of adapted rolling stock, the
large open American passenger cars, with their greater freedom from
internal fittings than ordinary European railway carriages, lending
themselves specially to the purpose. In the converted passenger cars
the carrying of the stretchers through the end doors was avoided by
removing two windows and the panelling underneath them from the side of
the car, and making an opening 6 ft. in width which could be closed by
a sliding door. Each train provided five ward-cars (converted passenger
cars) for lying-down patients; a surgeon's car (a passenger car from
which the seats had been removed, with partitions and fittings for the
accommodation of the doctor and his helpers); a dispensary car (in which
an ample supply of medicines, instruments and appliances was carried);
an ordinary passenger car for sitting-up patients or convalescents; a
kitchen car (divided into kitchen, dining-room and store-room); and
a conductor's car. The kitchen car was supplied with a small cooking
range, boilers, and other requisites for the feeding of from 175 to
200 patients. The cars were warmed and lighted in winter, and special
attention was paid to ventilation, so that Dr. F. L. Town, of the
United States Army, was able to report of them:--"In visiting these
hospital trains, the air is found sweet and pure, the wards are neat
and inviting; and it may unhesitatingly be said that men on hospital
trains are often as comfortable and better fed and attended than in many
permanent hospitals." The trains had distinguishing signals which were
recognised by the Confederates, and none of them were ever fired on or
molested in any way.
One, at least, of the trains was despatched daily from the vicinity of
the field hospitals. The services render
Showing first 200,000 characters. Full text: gutenberg.org/ebooks/42438