
Gutenberg · ebook 42342
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Logarithm" to "Lord Advocate"
by Various · English · public domain in the US
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Logarithm" to "Lord Advocate" by Various is an English public-domain text held from Project Gutenberg (ebook #42342). (1) Numbers following letters (without space) like C2 were originally printed in subscript. Letter subscripts are preceded by an
LONG, GEORGE
LOGARITHM (from Gr. [Greek: logos], word, ratio, and [Greek: arithmos], number), in mathematics, a word invented by John Napier to denote a particular class of function discovered by him, and which may be defined as follows: if a, x, m are any three quantities satisfying the equation a^x = m, then a is called the base, and x is said to be the logarithm of m to the base a. This relation between x, a, m, may be expressed also by the equation x = log(a) m.
Properties.--The principal properties of logarithms are given by the equations
log(a) (mn) = log(a)m + log(a)n, log(a)(m/n) = log(a)m - log(a)n,
log(a)m^(r) = r log(a)m, log(a)[root r]m = (1/r)log(a)m,
which may be readily deduced from the definition of a logarithm. It follows from these equations that the logarithm of the product of any number of quantities is equal to the sum of the logarithms of the quantities, that the logarithm of the quotient of two quantities is equal to the logarithm of the numerator diminished by the logarithm of the denominator, that the logarithm of the rth power of a quantity is equal to r times the logarithm of the quantity, and that the logarithm of the rth root of a quantity is equal to (1/r)th of the logarithm of the quantity.
Logarithms were originally invented for the sake of abbreviating arithmetical calculations, as by their means the operations of multiplication and division may be replaced by those of addition and subtraction, and the operations of raising to powers and extraction of roots by those of multiplication and division. For the purpose of thus simplifying the operations of arithmetic, the base is taken to be 10, and use is made of tables of logarithms in which the values of x, the logarithm, corresponding to values of m, the number, are tabulated.
The logarithm is also a function of frequent occurrence in analysis, being regarded as a known and recognized function like sin x or tan x; but in mathematical investigations the base generally employed is not 10, but a certain quantity usually denoted by the letter e, of value 2.71828 18284....
Thus in arithmetical calculations if the base is not expressed it is understood to be 10, so that log m denotes log10 m; but in analytical formulae it is understood to be e.
The logarithms to base 10 of the first twelve numbers to 7 places of decimals are
log 1 = 0.0000000 log 5 = 0.6989700 log 9 = 0.9542425
log 2 = 0.3010300 log 6 = 0.7781513 log 10 = 1.0000000
log 3 = 0.4771213 log 7 = 0.8450980 log 11 = 1.0413927
log 4 = 0.6020600 log 8 = 0.9030900 log 12 = 1.0791812
The meaning of these results is that
1 = 10^0, 2 = 10^(0.3010300), 3 = 10^(0.4771213), ...
10 = 10^1, 11 = 10^(1.0413927), 12 = 10^(1.0791812).
The integral part of a logarithm is called the index or characteristic, and the fractional part the mantissa. When the base is 10, the logarithms of all numbers in which the digits are the same, no matter where the decimal point may be, have the same mantissa; thus, for example,
log 2.5613 = 0.4084604, log 25.613 = 1.4084604, log 2561300 =
6.4084604, &c.
In the case of fractional numbers (i.e. numbers in which the integral part is 0) the mantissa is still kept positive, so that, for example, log .25613 = 1.4084604, log .0025613 = 3.4084604, &c.
the minus sign being usually written over the characteristic, and not before it, to indicate that the characteristic only, and not the whole expression, is negative; thus _ 1.4084604 stands for -1 + .4084604.
The fact that when the base is 10 the mantissa of the logarithm is independent of the position of the decimal point in the number affords the chief reason for the choice of 10 as base. The explanation of this property of the base 10 is evident, for a change in the position of the decimal points amounts to multiplication or division by some power of 10, and this corresponds to the addition or subtraction of some integer in the case of the logarithm, the mantissa therefore remaining intact.
It should be mentioned that in most tables of trigonometrical functions, the number 10 is added to all the logarithms in the table in order to avoid the use of negative characteristics, so that the characteristic 9 denotes in reality ~1, 8 denotes ~2, 10 denotes 0, &c.
Logarithms thus increased are frequently referred to for the sake of distinction as tabular logarithms, so that the tabular logarithm = the true logarithm + 10.
In tables of logarithms of numbers to base 10 the mantissa only is in general tabulated, as the characteristic of the logarithm of a number can always be written down at sight, the rule being that, if the number is greater than unity, the characteristic is less by unity than the number of digits in the integral portion of it, and that if the number is less than unity the characteristic is negative, and is greater by unity than the number of ciphers between the decimal point and the first significant figure.
It follows very simply from the definition of a logarithm that
log(a) b × log(b) a = 1, log(b) m = log(a) m × (1/log(a) b).
The second of these relations is an important one, as it shows that from a table of logarithms to base a, the corresponding table of logarithms to base b may be deduced by multiplying all the logarithms in the former by the constant multiplier 1/log(a)b, which is called the modulus of the system whose base is b with respect to the system whose base is a.
The two systems of logarithms for which extensive tables have been calculated are the Napierian, or hyperbolic, or natural system, of which the base is e, and the Briggian, or decimal, or common system, of which the base is 10; and we see that the logarithms in the latter system may be deduced from those in the former by multiplication by the constant multiplier 1/log(e)10, which is called the modulus of the common system of logarithms. The numerical value of this modulus is 0.43429 44819 03251 82765 11289 ..., and the value of its reciprocal, log^(e) 10 (by multiplication by which Briggian logarithms may be converted into Napierian logarithms) is 2.30258 50929 94045 68401 79914 ....
The quantity denoted by e is the series,
1 1 1 1
1 + --- + --- + ----- + ------- + ...
1 1·2 1·2·3 1·2·3·4
the numerical value of which is,
2.71828 18284 59045 23536 02874 ....
The logarithmic Function.--The mathematical function log x or log(e)
x is one of the small group of transcendental functions, consisting
only of the circular functions (direct and inverse) sin x, cos x, &c.,
arc sin x or sin^{-1} x,&c., log x and e^(x) which are universally
treated in analysis as known functions. The notation log x is
generally employed in English and American works, but on the continent
of Europe writers usually denote the function by lx or lg x.
The
logarithmic function is most naturally introduced into analysis by the
equation
/ x dt
| log x = ---, (x > 0).
/ 1 t
This equation defines log x for positive values of x; if x <= 0 the
formula ceases to have any meaning. Thus log x is the integral
function of 1/x, and it can be shown that log x is a genuinely new
transcendent, not expressible in finite terms by means of functions
such as algebraical or circular functions. A connexion with the
circular functions, however, appears later when the definition of log
x is extended to complex values of x.
A relation which is of historical interest connects the logarithmic
function with the quadrature of the hyperbola, for, by considering the
equation of the hyperbola in the form xy = const., it is evident that
the area included between the arc of a hyperbola, its nearest
asymptote, and two ordinates drawn parallel to the other asymptote
from points on the first asymptote distant a and b from their point of
intersection, is proportional to log b/a.
The following fundamental properties of log x are readily deducible
from the definition
(i.) log xy = log x + log y.
(ii.) Limit of (x^(h)-1)/h = log x, when h is indefinitely diminished.
Either of these properties might be taken as itself the definition of
log x.
There is no series for log x proceeding either by ascending or
descending powers of x, but there is an expansion for log (1 + x),
viz.
log (1 + x) = x - 1/2 x^2 + 1/3 x^3 - 1/4 x^4 + ...;
the series, however, is convergent for real values of x only when x
lies between +1 and -1. Other formulae which are deducible from this
equation are given in the portion of this article relating to the
calculation of logarithms.
The function log x as x increases from 0 towards [oo] steadily
increases from -[oo] towards +[oo]. It has the important property that
it tends to infinity with x, but more slowly than any power of x, i.e.
that x^{-m} log x tends to zero as x tends to [oo] for every positive
value of m however small.
The exponential function, exp x, may be defined as the inverse of
the logarithm: thus x = exp y if y = log x. It is positive for all
values of y and increases steadily from 0 toward [oo] as y increases
from -[oo] towards +[oo]. As y tends towards [oo], exp y tends towards
[oo] more rapidly than any power of y.
The exponential function possesses the properties
(i.) exp (x + y) = exp x × exp y.
d
(ii.) --- exp x = exp x.
dx
(iii.) exp x = 1 +x + x²/2! + x³/3! + ...
From (i.) and (ii.) it may be deduced that
exp x = (1 + 1 + 1/2! + 1/3! + ... )^x
where the right-hand side denotes the positive xth power of the number
1 + 1 + 1/2! + 1/3! + ... usually denoted by e. It is customary,
therefore, to denote the exponential function by e^x and the result
e^x = 1 + x + x²/2! + x³/3! ...
is known as the exponential theorem.
The definitions of the logarithmic and exponential functions may be
extended to complex values of x. Thus if x = [xi] + i[eta]
/ x dt
log x = | ---
/ 1 t
where the path of integration in the plane of the complex variable t
is any curve which does not pass through the origin; but now log x is
not a uniform function, that is to say, if x describes a closed curve
it does not follow that log x also describes a closed curve: in fact
we have
log ([xi] + i[eta]) = log [root]([xi]² + [eta]²) + i([alpha] + 2n[pi]),
where [alpha] is the numerically least angle whose cosine and sine are
[xi]/[root]([xi]² + [eta]²) and [eta]/[root]([xi]² + [eta]²), and n
denotes any integer. Thus even when the argument is real log x has an
infinite number of values; for putting [eta] = 0 and taking [xi]
positive, in which case [alpha] = 0, we obtain for log [xi] the
infinite system of values log [xi] + 2n[pi]i. It follows from this
property of the function that we cannot have for log x a series which
shall be convergent for all values of x, as is the case with sin x and
cos x, for such a series could only represent a uniform function, and
in fact the equation
log(1 + x) = x - ½x^2 + {1/3}x^3 - ¼x^4 + ...
is true only when the analytical modulus of x is less than unity. The
exponential function, which may still be defined as the inverse of the
logarithmic function, is, on the other hand, a uniform function of x,
and its fundamental properties may be stated in the same form as for
real values of x. Also
exp ([xi] - i[eta]) = e^{[xi]}(cos [eta] + i sin [eta]).
An alternative method of developing the theory of the exponential
function is to start from the definition
exp x = 1 + x + x²/2! + x³/3! + ...,
the series on the right-hand being convergent for all values of x and
therefore defining an analytical function of x which is uniform and
regular all over the plane.
Invention and Early History of Logarithms.--The invention of logarithms has been accorded to John Napier, baron of Merchiston in Scotland, with a unanimity which is rare with regard to important scientific discoveries: in fact, with the exception of the tables of Justus Byrgius, which will be referred to further on, there seems to have been no other mathematician of the time whose mind had conceived the principle on which logarithms depend, and no partial anticipations of the discovery are met with in previous writers.
The first announcement of the invention was made in Napier's Mirifici Logarithmorum Canonis Descriptio ... (Edinburgh, 1614). The work is a small quarto containing fifty-seven pages of explanatory matter and a table of ninety pages (see NAPIER, JOHN). The nature of logarithms is explained by reference to the motion of points in a straight line, and the principle upon which they are based is that of the correspondence of a geometrical and an arithmetical series of numbers.
The table gives the logarithms of sines for every minute of seven figures; it is arranged semi-quadrantally, so that the differentiae, which are the differences of the two logarithms in the same line, are the logarithms of the tangents.
Napier's logarithms are not the logarithms now termed Napierian or hyperbolic, that is to say, logarithms to the base e where e = 2.7182818...; the relation between N (a sine) and L its logarithm, as defined in the Canonis Descriptio, being N = 10^7e^{-L/(l0^7)}, so that (ignoring the factors 10^7, the effect of which is to render sines and logarithms integral to 7 figures), the base is e^{-l}. Napier's logarithms decrease as the sines increase.
If l denotes the logarithm to base e (that is, the so-called "Napierian" or hyperbolic logarithm) and L denotes, as above, "Napier's" logarithm, the connexion between l and L is expressed by
L = 10^7 log(e) 10^7 - 10^7 l or e^(l) = 10^7 e^(-L/10^7)
Napier's work (which will henceforth in this article be referred to as the Descriptio) immediately on its appearance in 1614 attracted the attention of perhaps the two most eminent English mathematicians then living--Edward Wright and Henry Briggs. The former translated the work into English; the latter was concerned with Napier in the change of the logarithms from those originally invented to decimal or common logarithms, and it is to him that the original calculation of the logarithmic tables now in use is mainly due.
Both Napier and Wright died soon after the publication of the Descriptio, the date of Wright's death being 1615 and that of Napier 1617, but Briggs lived until 1631.
Edward Wright, who was a fellow of Caius College, Cambridge, occupies a conspicuous place in the history of navigation. In 1599 he published Certaine errors in Navigation detected and corrected, and he was the author of other works; to him also is chiefly due the invention of the method known as Mercator's sailing. He at once saw the value of logarithms as an aid to navigation, and lost no time in preparing a translation, which he submitted to Napier himself.
The preface to Wright's edition consists of a translation of the preface to the Descriptio, together with the addition of the following sentences written by Napier himself: "But now some of our countreymen in this Island well affected to these studies, and the more publique good, procured a most learned Mathematician to translate the same into our vulgar English tongue, who after he had finished it, sent the Coppy of it to me, to bee seene and considered on by myselfe.
I having most willingly and gladly done the same, finde it to bee most exact and precisely conformable to my minde and the originall. Therefore it may please you who are inclined to these studies, to receive it from me and the Translator, with as much good will as we recommend it unto you."
There is a short "preface to the reader" by Briggs, and a description of a triangular diagram invented by Wright for finding the proportional parts. The table is printed to one figure less than in the Descriptio.
Edward Wright died, as has been mentioned, in 1615, and his son, Samuel Wright, in the preface states that his father "gave much commendation of this work (and often in my hearing) as of very great use to mariners"; and with respect to the translation he says that "shortly after he had it returned out of Scotland, it pleased God to call him away afore he could publish it." The translation was published in 1616. It was also reissued with a new title-page in 1618.
Henry Briggs, then professor of geometry at Gresham College, London, and afterwards Savilian professor of geometry at Oxford, welcomed the Descriptio with enthusiasm. In a letter to Archbishop Usher, dated Gresham House, March 10, 1615, he wrote, "Napper, lord of Markinston, hath set my head and hands a work with his new and admirable logarithms.
I hope to see him this summer, if it please God, for I never saw book which pleased me better, or made me more wonder.[1] I purpose to discourse with him concerning eclipses, for what is there which we may not hope for at his hands," and he also states "that he was wholly taken up and employed about the noble invention of logarithms lately discovered." Briggs accordingly visited Napier in 1615, and stayed with him a whole month.[2] He brought with him some calculations he had made, and suggested to Napier the advantages that would result from the choice of 10 as a base, an improvement which he had explained in his lectures at Gresham College, and on which he had written to Napier.
Napier said that he had already thought of the change, and pointed out a further improvement, viz., that the characteristics of numbers greater than unity should be positive and not negative, as suggested by Briggs.
In 1616 Briggs again visited Napier and showed him the work he had accomplished, and, he says, he would gladly have paid him a third visit in 1617 had Napier's life been spared.
Briggs's Logarithmorum chilias prima, which contains the first published table of decimal or common logarithms, is only a small octavo tract of sixteen pages, and gives the logarithms of numbers from unity to 1000 to 14 places of decimals. It was published, probably privately, in 1617, after Napier's death,[3] and there is no author's name, place or date.
The date of publication is, however, fixed as 1617 by a letter from Sir Henry Bourchier to Usher, dated December 6, 1617, containing the passage--"Our kind friend, Mr Briggs, hath lately published a supplement to the most excellent tables of logarithms, which I presume he has sent to you." Briggs's tract of 1617 is extremely rare, and has generally been ignored or incorrectly described. Hutton erroneously states that it contains the logarithms to 8 places, and his account has been followed by most writers. There is a copy in the British Museum.
Briggs continued to labour assiduously at the calculation of logarithms, and in 1624 published his Arithmetica logarithmica, a folio work containing the logarithms of the numbers from l to 20,000, and from 90,000 to 100,000 (and in some copies to 101,000) to 14 places of decimals. The table occupies 300 pages, and there is an introduction of 88 pages relating to the mode of calculation, and the applications of logarithms.
There was thus left a gap between 20,000 and 90,000, which was filled up by Adrian Vlacq (or Ulaccus), who published at Gouda, in Holland, in 1628, a table containing the logarithms of the numbers from unity to 100,000 to 10 places of decimals. Having calculated 70,000 logarithms and copied only 30,000, Vlacq would have been quite entitled to have called his a new work. He designates it, however, only a second edition of Briggs's Arithmetica logarithmica, the title running Arithmetica logarithmica sive Logarithmorum Chiliades centum, ... editio secunda aucta per Adrianum Vlacq, Goudanum.
This table of Vlacq's was published, with an English explanation prefixed, at London in 1631 under the title Logarithmicall Arithmetike ... London, printed by George Miller, 1631. There are also copies with the title-page and introduction in French and in Dutch (Gouda, 1628).
Briggs had himself been engaged in filling up the gap, and in a letter to John Pell, written after the publication of Vlacq's work, and dated October 25, 1628, he says:--
"My desire was to have those chiliades that are wantinge betwixt 20
and 90 calculated and printed, and I had done them all almost by my
selfe, and by some frendes whom my rules had sufficiently informed,
and by agreement the busines was conveniently parted amongst us; but I
am eased of that charge and care by one Adrian Vlacque, an Hollander,
who hathe done all the whole hundred chiliades and printed them in
Latin, Dutche and Frenche, 1000 bookes in these 3 languages, and hathe
sould them almost all.
But he hathe cutt off 4 of my figures
throughout; and hathe left out my dedication, and to the reader, and
two chapters the 12 and 13, in the rest he hath not varied from me at
all."
The original calculation of the logarithms of numbers from unity to 101,000 was thus performed by Briggs and Vlacq between 1615 and 1628.
Vlacq's table is that from which all the hundreds of tables of logarithms that have subsequently appeared have been derived. It contains of course many errors, which were gradually discovered and corrected in the course of the next two hundred and fifty years.
The first calculation or publication of Briggian or common logarithms of trigonometrical functions was made in 1620 by Edmund Gunter, who was Briggs's colleague as professor of astronomy in Gresham College. The title of Gunter's book, which is very scarce, is Canon triangulorum, and it contains logarithmic sines and tangents for every minute of the quadrant to 7 places of decimals.
The next publication was due to Vlacq, who appended to his logarithms of numbers in the Arithmetica logarithmica of 1628 a table giving log sines, tangents and secants for every minute of the quadrant to 10 places; these were obtained by calculating the logarithms of the natural sines, &c. given in the Thesaurus mathematicus of Pitiscus (1613).
During the last years of his life Briggs devoted himself to the calculation of logarithmic sines, &c. and at the time of his death in 1631 he had all but completed a logarithmic canon to every hundredth of a degree. This work was published by Vlacq at his own expense at Gouda in 1633, under the title Trigonometria Britannica. It contains log sines (to 14 places) and tangents (to 10 places), besides natural sines, tangents and secants, at intervals of a hundredth of a degree.
In the same year Vlacq published at Gouda his Trigonometria artificialis, giving log sines and tangents to every 10 seconds of the quadrant to 10 places. This work also contains the logarithms of numbers from unity to 20,000 taken from the Arithmetica logarithmica of 1628.
Briggs appreciated clearly the advantages of a centesimal division of the quadrant, and by dividing the degree into hundredth parts instead of into minutes, made a step towards a reformation in this respect, and but for the appearance of Vlacq's work the decimal division of the degree might have become recognized, as is now the case with the corresponding division of the second.
The calculation of the logarithms not only of numbers but also of the trigonometrical functions is therefore due to Briggs and Vlacq; and the results contained in their four fundamental works--Arithmetica logarithmica (Briggs), 1624; Arithmetica logarithmica (Vlacq), 1628; Trigonometria Britannica (Briggs), 1633; Trigonometria artificialis (Vlacq), 1633--have not been superseded by any subsequent calculations.
In the preceding paragraphs an account has been given of the actual announcement of the invention of logarithms and of the calculation of the tables. It now remains to refer in more detail to the invention itself and to examine the claims of Napier and Briggs to the capital improvement involved in the change from Napier's original logarithms to logarithms to the base 10.
The Descriptio contained only an explanation of the use of the logarithms without any account of the manner in which the canon was constructed.
In an "Admonitio" on the seventh page Napier states that, although in that place the mode of construction should be explained, he proceeds at once to the use of the logarithms, "ut praelibatis prius usu, et rei utilitate, caetera aut magis placeant posthac edenda, aut minus saltem displiceant silentio sepulta." He awaits therefore the judgment and censure of the learned "priusquam caetera in lucem temerè prolata lividorum detrectationi exponantur"; and in an "Admonitio" on the last page of the book he states that he will publish the mode of construction of the canon "si huius inventi usum eruditis gratum fore intellexero." Napier, however, did not live to keep this promise.
In 1617 he published a small work entitled Rabdologia relating to mechanical methods of performing multiplications and divisions, and in the same year he died.
The proposed work was published in 1619 by Robert Napier, his second son by his second marriage, under the title Mirifici logarithmorum canonis constructio.... It consists of two pages of preface followed by sixty-seven pages of text. In the preface Robert Napier says that he has been assured from undoubted authority that the new invention is much thought of by the ablest mathematicians, and that nothing would delight them more than the publication of the mode of construction of the canon.
He therefore issues the work to satisfy their desires, although, he states, it is manifest that it would have seen the light in a far more perfect state if his father could have put the finishing touches to it; and he mentions that, in the opinion of the best judges, his father possessed, among other most excellent gifts, in the highest degree the power of explaining the most difficult matters by a certain and easy method in the fewest possible words.
It is important to notice that in the Constructio logarithms are called artificial numbers; and Robert Napier states that the work was composed several years (aliquot annos) before Napier had invented the name logarithm. The Constructio therefore may have been written a good many years previous to the publication of the Descriptio in 1614.
Passing now to the invention of common or decimal logarithms, that is, to the transition from the logarithms originally invented by Napier to logarithms to the base 10, the first allusion to a change of system occurs in the "Admonitio" on the last page of the Descriptio (1614), the concluding paragraph of which is "Verùm si huius inventi usum eruditis gratum fore intellexero, dabo fortasse brevi (Deo aspirante) rationem ac methodum aut hunc canonem emendandi, aut emendatiorem de novo condendi, ut ita plurium Logistarum diligentia, limatior tandem et accuratior, quàm unius opera fieri potuit, in lucem prodeat.
Nihil in ortu perfectum." In some copies, however, this "Admonitio" is absent. In Wright's translation of 1616 Napier has added the sentence--"But because the addition and subtraction of these former numbers may seeme somewhat painfull, I intend (if it shall please God) in a second Edition, to set out such Logarithmes as shall make those numbers above written to fall upon decimal numbers, such as 100,000,000, 200,000,000, 300,000,000, &c., which are easie to be added or abated to or from any other number" (p.
19); and in the dedication of the Rabdologia (1617) he wrote "Quorum quidem Logarithmorum speciem aliam multò praestantiorem nunc etiam invenimus, & creandi methodum, unà cum eorum usu (si Deus longiorem vitae & valetudinis usuram concesserit) evulgare statuimus; ipsam autem novi canonis supputationem, ob infirmam corporis nostri valetudinem, viris in hoc studii genere versatis relinquimus: imprimis verò doctissimo viro D. Henrico Briggio Londini publico Geometriae Professori, et amico mihi longè charissimo."
Briggs in the short preface to his Logarithmorum chilias (1617) states that the reason why his logarithms are different from those introduced by Napier "sperandum, ejus librum posthumum, abunde nobis propediem satisfacturum." The "liber posthumus" was the Constructio (1619), in the preface to which Robert Napier states that he has added an appendix relating to another and more excellent species of logarithms, referred to by the inventor himself in the Rabdologia, and in which the logarithm of unity is 0.
He also mentions that he has published some remarks upon the propositions in spherical trigonometry and upon the new species of logarithms by Henry Briggs, "qui novi hujus Canonis supputandi laborem gravissimum, pro singulari amicitiâ quae illi cum Patre meo L. M. intercessit, animo libentissimo in se suscepit; creandi methodo, et usuum explanatione Inventori relictis. Nunc autem ipso ex hâc vitâ evocato, totius negotii onus doctissimi Briggii humeris incumbere, et Sparta haec ornanda illi sorte quadam obtigisse videtur."
In the address prefixed to the Arithmetica logarithmica (1625) Briggs bids the reader not to be surprised that these logarithms are different from those published in the Descriptio:--
"Ego enim, cum meis auditoribus Londini, publice in Collegio
Greshamensi horum doctrinam explicarem; animadverti multo futurum
commodius, si Logarithmus sinus totius servaretur 0 (ut in Canone
mirifico), Logarithmus autem partis decimae ejusdem sinus totius,
nempe sinus 5 graduum, 44, m. 21, s., esset 10000000000. atque ea de
re scripsi statim ad ipsum authorem, et quamprimum per anni tempus, et
vacationem a publico docendi munere licuit, profectus sum Edinburgum;
ubi humanissime ab eo acceptus haesi per integrum mensem.
Cum autem
inter nos de horum mutatione sermo haberetur; ille se idem dudum
sensisse, et cupivisse dicebat: veruntamen istos, quos jam paraverat
edendos curasse, donec alios, si per negotia et valetudinem liceret,
magis commodos confecisset.
Istam autem mutationem ita faciendam
censebat, ut 0 esset Logarithmus unitatis, et 10000000000 sinus
totius: quod ego longe commodissimum esse non potui non agnoscere.
Coepi igitur, ejus hortatu, rejectis illis quos anteà paraveram, de
horum calculo serio cogitare; et sequenti aestate iterum profectus
Edinburgum, horum quos hic exhibeo praecipuos, illi ostendi, idem
etiam tertia aestate libentissime facturus, si Deus illum nobis tamdiu
superstitem esse voluisset."
There is also a reference to the change of the logarithms on the title-page of the work.
These extracts contain all the original statements made by Napier, Robert Napier and Briggs which have reference to the origin of decimal logarithms. It will be seen that they are all in perfect agreement.
Briggs pointed out in his lectures at Gresham College that it would be more convenient that 0 should stand for the logarithm of the whole sine as in the Descriptio, but that the logarithm of the tenth part of the whole sine should be 10,000,000,000. He wrote also to Napier at once; and as soon as he could he went to Edinburgh to visit him, where, as he was most hospitably received by him, he remained for a whole month.
When they conversed about the change of system, Napier said that he had perceived and desired the same thing, but that he had published the tables which he had already prepared, so that they might be used until he could construct others more convenient. But he considered that the change ought to be so made that 0 should be the logarithm of unity and 10,000,000,000 that of the whole sine, which Briggs could not but admit was by far the most convenient of all.
Rejecting therefore, those which he had prepared already, Briggs began, at Napier's advice, to consider seriously the question of the calculation of new tables. In the following summer he went to Edinburgh and showed Napier the principal portion of the logarithms which he published in 1624. These probably included the logarithms of the first chiliad which he published in 1617.
It has been thought necessary to give in detail the facts relating to the conversion of the logarithms, as unfortunately Charles Hutton in his history of logarithms, which was prefixed to the early editions of his Mathematical Tables, and was also published as one of his Mathematical Tracts, has charged Napier with want of candour in not telling the world of Briggs's share in the change of system, and he expresses the suspicion that "Napier was desirous that the world should ascribe to him alone the merit of this very useful improvement of the logarithms." According to Hutton's view, the words, "it is to be hoped that his posthumous work" ... which occur in the preface to the Chilias, were a modest hint that the share Briggs had had in changing the logarithms should be mentioned, and that, as no attention was paid to it, he himself gave the account which appears in the Arithmetica of
- There seems, however, no ground whatever for supposing that Briggs
meant to express anything beyond his hope that the reason for the alteration would be explained in the posthumous work; and in his own account, written seven years after Napier's death and five years after the appearance of the work itself, he shows no injured feeling whatever, but even goes out of his way to explain that he abandoned his own proposed alteration in favour of Napier's, and, rejecting the tables he had already constructed, began to consider the calculation of new ones.
The facts, as stated by Napier and Briggs, are in complete accordance, and the friendship existing between them was perfect and unbroken to the last. Briggs assisted Robert Napier in the editing of the "posthumous work," the Constructio, and in the account he gives of the alteration of the logarithms in the Arithmetica of 1624 he seems to have been more anxious that justice should be done to Napier than to himself; while on the other hand Napier received Briggs most hospitably and refers to him as "amico mihi longè charissimo."
Hutton's suggestions are all the more to be regretted as they occur as a history which is the result of a good deal of investigation and which for years was referred to as an authority by many writers. His prejudice against Napier naturally produced retaliation, and Mark Napier in defending his ancestor has fallen into the opposite extreme of attempting to reduce Briggs to the level of a mere computer.
In connexion with this controversy it should be noticed that the "Admonitio" on the last page of the Descriptio, containing the reference to the new logarithms, does not occur in all the copies. It is printed on the back of the last page of the table itself, and so cannot have been torn out from the copies that are without it. As there could have been no reason for omitting it after it had once appeared, we may assume that the copies which do not have it are those which were first issued.
It is probable, therefore, that Briggs's copy contained no reference to the change, and it is even possible that the "Admonitio" may have been added after Briggs had communicated with Napier. As special attention has not been drawn to the fact that some copies have the "Admonitio" and some have not, different writers have assumed that Briggs did or did not know of the promise contained in the "Admonitio" according as it was present or absent in the copies they had themselves referred to, and this has given rise to some confusion.
It may also be remarked that the date frequently assigned to Briggs's first visit to Napier is 1616, and not 1615 as stated above, the reason being that Napier was generally supposed to have died in 1618 until Mark Napier showed that the true date was 1617. When the Descriptio was published Briggs was fifty-seven years of age, and the remaining seventeen years of his life were devoted with steady enthusiasm to extend the utility of Napier's great invention.
The only other mathematician besides Napier who grasped the idea on which the use of logarithm depends and applied it to the construction of a table is Justus Byrgius (Jobst Bürgi), whose work Arithmetische und geometrische Progress-Tabulen ... was published at Prague in 1620, six years after the publication of the Descriptio of Napier. This table distinctly involves the principle of logarithms and may be described as a modified table of antilogarithms. It consists of two series of numbers, the one being an arithmetical and the other a geometrical progression: thus
0, 1,0000 0000
10, 1,0001 0000
20, l,0002 0001
. . . .
990, l,0099 4967
. . . .
In the arithmetical column the numbers increase by 10, in the geometrical column each number is derived from its predecessor by multiplication by 1.0001. Thus the number 10x in the arithmetical column corresponds to 10^8 (1.0001)^x in the geometrical column; the intermediate numbers being obtained by interpolation. If we divide the numbers in the geometrical column by 10^8 the correspondence is between 10x and (1.0001)^x, and the table then becomes one of antilogarithms, the base being (1.0001)^{1/10}, viz. for example (l.0001)^{1/10·990} = 1.00994967.
The table extends to 230270 in the arithmetical column, and it is shown that 230270.022 corresponds to 9.9999 9999 or 109 in the geometrical column; this last result showing that (1.0001)^{23027.022} =
- The first contemporary mention of Byrgius's table occurs on page 11
of the "Praecepta" prefixed to Kepler's Tabulae Radolphinae (1627); his words are: "apices logistici J. Byrgio multis annis ante editionem Neperianam viam praeiverent ad hos ipsissimos logarithmos. Etsi homo cunctator et secretorum suorum custos foetum in partu destituit, non ad usus publicos educavit." Another reference to Byrgius occurs in a work by Benjamin Bramer, the brother-in-law and pupil of Byrgius, who, writing in 1630, says that the latter constructed his table twenty years ago or more.[4]
As regards priority of publication, Napier has the advantage by six years, and even fully accepting Bramer's statement, there are grounds for believing that Napier's work dates from a still earlier period.
The power of 10, which occurs as a factor in the tables of both Napier and Byrgius, was rendered necessary by the fact that the decimal point was not yet in use. Omitting this factor in the case of both tables, the connexion between N a number and L its "logarithm" is
N = (e^-1)^L (Napier), L =(1.0001)^[(1/10)N] (Byrgius),
viz. Napier gives logarithms to base e^{-1}, Byrgius gives antilogarithms to base (1.0001)^{1/10}.
There is indirect evidence that Napier was occupied with logarithms as early as 1594, for in a letter to P. Crügerus from Kepler, dated September 9, 1624 (Frisch's Kepler, vi.
47), there occurs the sentence: "Nihil autem supra Neperianam rationem esse puto: etsi quidem Scotus quidam literis ad Tychonem 1594 scriptis jam spem fecit Canonis illius Mirifici." It is here distinctly stated that some Scotsman in the year 1594, in a letter to Tycho Brahe, gave him some hope of the logarithms; and as Kepler joined Tycho after his expulsion from the island of Huen, and had been so closely associated with him in his work, he would be likely to be correct in any assertion of this kind. In connexion with Kepler's statement the following story, told by Anthony wood in the Athenae Oxonienses, is of some importance:--
"It must be now known, that one Dr Craig, a Scotchman ... coming out
of Denmark into his own country, called upon Joh. Neper, Baron of
Mercheston, near Edinburgh, and told him, among other discourses, of a
new invention in Denmark (by Longomontanus, as 'tis said), to save the
tedious multiplication and division in astronomical calculations.
Neper being solicitous to know farther of him concerning this matter,
he could give no other account of it than that it was by proportional
numbers. Which hint Neper taking, he desired him at his return to call
upon him again.
Craig, after some weeks had passed, did so, and Neper
then showed him a rude draught of what he called Canon mirabilis
logarithmorum. which draught, with some alterations, he printing in
1614, it came forthwith into the hands of our author Briggs, and into
those of Will. Oughtred, from whom the relation of this matter came."
This story, though obviously untrue in some respects, gives valuable information by connecting Dr Craig with Napier and Longomontanus, who was Tycho Brahe's assistant. Dr Craig was John Craig, the third son of Thomas Craig, who was one of the colleagues of Sir Archibald Napier, John Napier's father, in the office of justice-depute. Between John Craig and John Napier a friendship sprang up which may have been due to their common taste for mathematics.
There are extant three letters from Dr John Craig to Tycho Brahe, which show that he was on the most friendly terms with him. In the first letter, of which the date is not given, Craig says that Sir William Stuart has safely delivered to him, "about the beginning of last winter," the book which he sent him.
Now Mark Napier found in the library of the university of Edinburgh a mathematical work bearing a sentence in Latin which he translates, "To Doctor John Craig of Edinburgh, in Scotland, a most illustrious man, highly gifted with various and excellent learning, professor of medicine, and exceedingly skilled in the mathematics, Tycho Brahe hath sent this gift, and with his own hand written this at Uraniburg, 2d November 1588." As Sir William Stuart was sent to Denmark to arrange the preliminaries of King James's marriage, and returned to Edinburgh on the 15th of November 1588, it would seem probable that this was the volume referred to by Craig.
It appears from Craig's letter, to which we may therefore assign the date 1589, that, five years before, he had made an attempt to reach Uranienburg, but had been baffled by the storms and rocks of Norway, and that ever since then he had been longing to visit Tycho. Now John Craig was physician to the king, and in 1590 James VI. spent some days at Uranienburg, before returning to Scotland from his matrimonial expedition.
It seems not unlikely therefore that Craig may have accompanied the king in his visit to Uranienburg.[5] In any case it is certain that Craig was a friend and correspondent of Tycho's, and it is probable that he was the "Scotus quidam."
We may infer therefore that as early as 1594 Napier had communicated to some one, probably John Craig, his hope of being able to effect a simplification in the processes of arithmetic. Everything tends to show that the invention of logarithms was the result of many years of labour and thought,[6] undertaken with this special object, and it would seem that Napier had seen some prospect of success nearly twenty years before the publication of the Descriptio.
It is very evident that no mere hint with regard to the use of proportional numbers could have been of any service to him, but it is possible that the news brought by Craig of the difficulties placed in the progress of astronomy by the labour of the calculations may have stimulated him to persevere in his efforts.
The "new invention in Denmark" to which Anthony Wood refers as having given the hint to Napier was probably the method of calculation called prosthaphaeresis (often written in Greek letters [Greek: prosthaphairesis]), which had its origin in the solution of spherical triangles.[7] The method consists in the use of the formula
sin a sin b = ½{cos (a - b) - cos (a + b)},
by means of which the multiplication of two sines is reduced to the addition or subtraction of two tabular results taken from a table of sines; and, as such products occur in the solution of spherical triangles, the method affords the solution of spherical triangles in certain cases by addition and subtraction only. It seems to be due to Wittich of Breslau, who was assistant for a short time to Tycho Brahe; and it was used by them in their calculations in 1582.
Wittich in 1584 made known at Cassel the calculation of one case by this prosthaphaeresis; and Justus Byrgius proved it in such a manner that from his proof the extension to the solution of all triangles could be deduced.[8] Clavius generalized the method in his treatise De astrolabio (1593), lib. i. lemma liii. The lemma is enunciated as follows:--
"Quaestiones omnes, quae per sinus, tangentes, atque secantes absolvi
solent, per solam prosthaphaeresim, id est, per solam additionem,
subtractionem, sine laboriosa numerorum multiplicatione divisioneque
expedire."
Clavius then refers to a work of Raymarus Ursus Dithmarsus as containing an account of a particular case. The work is probably the Fundamentum astronomicum (1588). Longomontanus, in his Astronomia Danica (1622), gives an account of the method, stating that it is not to be found in the writings of the Arabs or Regiomontanus. As Longomontanus is mentioned in Anthony Wood's anecdote, and as Wittich as well as Longomontanus were assistants of Tycho, we may infer that Wittich's prosthaphaeresis is the method referred to by Wood.
It is evident that Wittich's prosthaphaeresis could not be a good method of practically effecting multiplications unless the quantities to be multiplied were sines, on account of the labour of the interpolations.
It satisfies the condition, however, equally with logarithms, of enabling multiplication to be performed by the aid of a table of single entry; and, analytically considered, it is not so different in principle from the logarithmic method. In fact, if we put xy = [phi](X + Y), X being a function of x only and Y a function of y only, we can show that we must have X = Ae^(qx), y = Be^(qy); and if we put xy = [phi](X + Y) - [phi](X - Y), the solutions are [phi](X + Y) = ¼(x + y)², and x = sin X, y = sin Y, [phi](X + Y) = -½cos(X + Y). The former solution gives a method known as that of quarter-squares; the latter gives the method of prosthaphaeresis.
An account has now been given of Napier's invention and its publication, the transition to decimal logarithms, the calculation of the tables by Briggs, Vlacq and Gunter, as well as of the claims of Byrgius and the method of prosthaphaeresis. To complete the early history of logarithms it is necessary to return to Napier's Descriptio in order to describe its reception on the continent, and to mention the other logarithmic tables which were published while Briggs was occupied with his calculations.
John Kepler, who has been already quoted in connexion with Craig's visit to Tycho Brahe, received the invention of logarithms almost as enthusiastically as Briggs.
His first mention of the subject occurs in a letter to Schikhart dated the 11th of March 1618, in which he writes-"Extitit Scotus Baro, cujus nomen mihi excidit, qui praeclari quid praestitit, necessitate omni multiplicationum et divisionum in meras additiones et subtractiones commutata, nec sinibus utitur; at tamen opus est ipsi tangentium canone: et varietas, crebritas, difficultasque additionum subtractionumque alicubi laborem multiplicandi et dividendi superat." This erroneous estimate was formed when he had seen the Descriptio but had not read it; and his opinion was very different when he became acquainted with the nature of logarithms.
The dedication of his Ephemeris for 1620 consists of a letter to Napier dated the 28th of July 1619, and he there congratulates him warmly on his invention and on the benefit he has conferred upon astronomy generally and upon Kepler's own Rudolphine tables.
He says that, although Napier's book had been published five years, he first saw it at Prague two years before; he was then unable to read it, but last year he had met with a little work by Benjamin Ursinus[9] containing the substance of the method, and he at once recognized the importance of what had been effected.
He then explains how he verified the canon, and so found that there were no essential errors in it, although there were a few inaccuracies near the beginning of the quadrant, and he proceeds, "Haec te obiter scire volui, ut quibus tu methodis incesseris, quas non dubito et plurimas et ingeniosissimas tibi in promptu esse, eas publici juris fieri, mihi saltem (puto et caeteris) scires fore gratissimum; eoque percepto, tua promissa folio 57, in debitum cecidisse intelligeres." This letter was written two years after Napier's death (of which Kepler was unaware), and in the same year as that in which the Constructio was published.
In the same year (1620) Napier's Descriptio (1614) and Constructio (1619) were reprinted by Bartholomew Vincent at Lyons and issued together.[10]
Napier calculated no logarithms of numbers, and, as already stated, the logarithms invented by him were not to base e. The first logarithms to the base e were published by John Speidell in his New Logarithmes (London, 1619), which contains hyperbolic log sines, tangents and secants for every minute of the quadrant to 5 places of decimals.
In 1624 Benjamin Ursinus published at Cologne a canon of logarithms exactly similar to Napier's in the Descriptio of 1614, only much enlarged. The interval of the arguments is 10´´, and the results are given to 8 places; in Napier's canon the interval is 1', and the number of places is 7. The logarithms are strictly Napierian, and the arrangement is identical with that in the canon of 1614. This is the largest Napierian canon that has ever been published.
In the same year (1624) Kepler published at Marburg a table of Napierian logarithms of sines with certain additional columns to facilitate special calculations.
The first publication of Briggian logarithms on the continent is due to Wingate, who published at Paris in 1625 his Arithmétique logarithmétique, containing seven-figure logarithms of numbers up to 1000, and log sines and tangents from Gunter's Canon (1620). In the following year, 1626, Denis Henrion published at Paris a Traicté des Logarithmes, containing Briggs's logarithms of numbers up to 20,001 to 10 places, and Gunter's log sines and tangents to 7 places for every minute.
In the same year de Decker also published at Gouda a work entitled Nieuwe Telkonst, inhoudende de Logarithmi voor de Ghetallen beginnende van 1 tot 10,000, which contained logarithms of numbers up to 10,000 to 10 places, taken from Briggs's Arithmetica of 1624, and Gunter's log sines and tangents to 7 places for every minute.[11] Vlacq rendered assistance in the publication of this work, and the privilege is made out to him.
The invention of logarithms and the calculation of the earlier tables form a very striking episode in the history of exact science, and, with the exception of the Principia of Newton, there is no mathematical work published in the country which has produced such important consequences, or to which so much interest attaches as to Napier's Descriptio.
The calculation of tables of the natural trigonometrical functions may be said to have formed the work of the last half of the 16th century, and the great canon of natural sines for every 10 seconds to 15 places which had been calculated by Rheticus was published by Pitiscus only in 1613, the year before that in which the Descriptio appeared.
In the construction of the natural trigonometrical tables Great Britain had taken no part, and it is remarkable that the discovery of the principles and the formation of the tables that were to revolutionize or supersede all the methods of calculation then in use should have been so rapidly effected and developed in a country in which so little attention had been previously devoted to such questions.
For more detailed information relating to Napier, Briggs and Vlacq,
and the invention of logarithms, the reader is referred to the life of
Briggs in Ward's Lives of the Professors of Gresham College (London,
1740); Thomas Smith's Vitae quorundam eruditissimorum et illustrium
virorum (Vita Henrici Briggii) (London, 1707); Mark Napier's Memoirs
of John Napier already referred to, and the same author's Naperi
libri qui supersunt (1839); Hutton's History; de Morgan's article
already referred to; Delambre's Histoire de l'Astronomie moderne;
the report on mathematical tables in the Report of the British
Association for 1873; and the Philosophical Magazine for October
and December 1872 and May 1873.
It may be remarked that the date
usually assigned to Briggs's first visit to Napier is 1616 and not
1615 as stated above, the reason being that Napier was generally
supposed to have died in 1618; but it was shown by Mark Napier that
the true date is 1617.
In the years 1791-1807 Francis Maseres published at London, in six volumes quarto "Scriptores Logarithmici, or a collection of several curious tracts on the nature and construction of logarithms, mentioned in Dr Hutton's historical introduction to his new edition of Sherwin's mathematical tables ...," which contains reprints of Napier's Descriptio of 1614, Kepler's writings on logarithms (1624-1625), &c.
In 1889 a translation of Napier's Constructio of 1619 was published by Walter Rae Macdonald. Some valuable notes are added by the translator, in one of which he shows the accuracy of the method employed by Napier in his calculations, and explains the origin of a small error which occurs in Napier's table. Appended to the Catalogue is a full and careful bibliography of all Napier's writings, with mention of the public libraries, British and foreign, which possess copies of each. A facsimile reproduction of Bartholomew Vincent's Lyons edition (1620) of the Constructio was issued in 1895 by A.
Hermann at Paris (this imprint occurs on page 62 after the word "Finis").
It now remains to notice briefly a few of the more important events in the history of logarithmic tables subsequent to the original calculations.
Common or Briggian Logarithms of Numbers.--Nathaniel Roe's Tabulae
logarithmicae (1633) was the first complete seven-figure table that
was published. It contains seven-figure logarithms of numbers from 1
to 100,000, with characteristics unseparated from the mantissae, and
was formed from Vlacq's table (1628) by leaving out the last three
figures. All the figures of the number are given at the head of the
columns, except the last two, which run down the extreme columns--1 to
50 on the left-hand side, and 50 to 100 on the right-hand side. The
first four figures of the logarithms are printed at the top of the
columns.
There is thus an advance half way towards the arrangement now
universal in seven-figure tables. The final step was made by John
Newton in his Trigonometria Britannica (1658), a work which is also
noticeable as being the only extensive eight-figure table that until
recently had been published; it contains logarithms of sines, &c., as
well as logarithms of numbers.
In 1705 appeared the original edition of Sherwin's tables, the first
of the series of ordinary seven-figure tables of logarithms of numbers
and trigonometrical functions such as are in general use now. The work
went through several editions during the 18th century, and was at
length superseded in 1785 by Hutton's tables, which continued in
successive editions to maintain their position for a century.
In 1717 Abraham Sharp published in his Geometry Improv'd the
Briggian logarithms of numbers from 1 to 100, and of primes from 100
to 1100, to 61 places; these were copied into the later editions of
Sherwin and other works.
In 1742 a seven-figure table was published in quarto form by Gardiner,
which is celebrated on account of its accuracy and of the elegance of
the printing. A French edition, which closely resembles the original,
was published at Avignon in 1770.
In 1783 appeared at Paris the first edition of François Callet's
tables, which correspond to those of Hutton in England. These tables,
which form perhaps the most complete and practically useful collection
of logarithms for the general computer that has been published, passed
through many editions.
In 1794 Vega published his Thesaurus logarithmorum completus, a
folio volume containing a reprint of the logarithms of numbers from
Vlacq's Arithmetica logarithmica of 1628, and Trigonometria
artificialis of 1633. The logarithms of numbers are arranged as in an
ordinary seven-figure table. In addition to the logarithms reprinted
from the Trigonometria, there are given logarithms for every second
of the first two degrees, which were the result of an original
calculation. Vega devoted great attention to the detection and
correction of the errors in Vlacq's work of 1628.
Vega's Thesaurus
has been reproduced photographically by the Italian government. Vega
also published in 1797, in 2 vols. 8vo, a collection of logarithmic
and trigonometrical tables which has passed through many editions, a
very useful one volume stereotype edition having been published in
1840 by Hülsse. The tables in this work may be regarded as to some
extent supplementary to those in Callet.
If we consider only the logarithms of numbers, the main line of
descent from the original calculation of Briggs and Vlacq is Roe, John
Newton, Sherwin, Gardiner; there are then two branches, viz. Hutton
founded on Sherwin and Callet on Gardiner, and the editions of Vega
form a separate offshoot from the original tables. Among the most
useful and accessible of modern ordinary seven-figure tables of
logarithms of numbers and trigonometrical functions may be mentioned
those of Bremiker, Schrön and Bruhns. For logarithms of numbers only
perhaps Babbage's table is the most convenient.[12]
In 1871 Edward Sang published a seven-figure table of logarithms of
numbers from 20,000 to 200,000, the logarithms between 100,000 and
200,000 being the result of a new calculation. By beginning the table
at 20,000 instead of at 10,000 the differences are halved in
magnitude, while the number of them in a page is quartered.
In this
table multiples of the differences, instead of proportional parts, are
given.[13] John Thomson of Greenock (1782-1855) made an independent
calculation of logarithms of numbers up to 120,000 to 12 places of
decimals, and his table has been used to verify the errata already
found in Vlacq and Briggs by Lefort (see Monthly Not. R.A.S. vol.
34, p. 447). A table of ten-figure logarithms of numbers up to 100,009
was calculated by W. W. Duffield and published in the Report of the
U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey for 1895-1896 as Appendix 12, pp.
395-722.
The results were compared with Vega's Thesaurus (1794)
before publication.
Common or Briggian Logarithms of Trigonometrical Functions.--The
next great advance on the Trigonometria artificialis took place more
than a century and a half afterwards, when Michael Taylor published in
1792 his seven-decimal table of log sines and tangents to every second
of the quadrant; it was calculated by interpolation from the
Trigonometria to 10 places and then contracted to 7.
On account of
the great size of this table, and for other reasons, it never came
into very general use, Bagay's Nouvelles tables astronomiques
(1829), which also contains log sines and tangents to every second,
being preferred; this latter work, which for many years was difficult
to procure, has been reprinted with the original title-page and date
unchanged. The only other logarithmic canon to every second that has
been published forms the second volume of Shortrede's Logarithmic
Tables (1849).
In 1784 the French government decided that new tables
of sines, tangents, &c., and their logarithms, should be calculated in
relation to the centesimal division of the quadrant.
Prony was charged
with the direction of the work, and was expressly required "non
seulement à composer des tables qui ne laissassent rien à désirer
quant à l'exactitude, mais à en faire le monument de calcul le plus
vaste et le plus imposant qui eût jamais été exécuté ou même conçu."
Those engaged upon the work were divided into three sections: the
first consisted of five or six mathematicians, including Legendre, who
were engaged in the purely analytical work, or the calculation of the
fundamental numbers; the second section consisted of seven or eight
calculators possessing some mathematical knowledge; and the third
comprised seventy or eighty ordinary computers.
The work, which was
performed wholly in duplicate, and independently by two divisions of
computers, occupied two years. As a consequence of the double
calculation, there are two manuscripts, one deposited at the
Observatory, and the other in the library of the Institute, at Paris.
Each of the two manuscripts consists essentially of seventeen large
folio volumes, the contents being as follows:--
Logarithms of numbers up to 200,000 8 vols.
Natural sines 1 "
Logarithms of the ratios of arcs to sines from 0^q.00000
to 0^q.05000, and log sines throughout the quadrant 4 "
Logarithms of the ratios of arcs to tangents from
0^q.00000 to 0^q.05000, and log tangents throughout
the quadrant 4 "
The trigonometrical results are given for every hundred-thousandth of
the quadrant (10´´ centesimal or 3´´.24 sexagesimal). The tables were
all calculated to 14 places, with the intention that only 12 should be
published, but the twelfth figure is not to be relied upon. The tables
have never been published, and are generally known as the Tables du
Cadastre, or, in England, as the great French manuscript tables.
A very full account of these tables, with an explanation of the
methods of calculation, formulae employed, &c., was published by
Lefort in vol. iv. of the Annales de l'observatoire de Paris. The
printing of the table of natural sines was once begun, and Lefort
states that he has seen six copies, all incomplete, although including
the last page.
Babbage compared his table with the Tables du
Cadastre, and Lefort has given in his paper just referred to most
important lists of errors in Vlacq's and Briggs's logarithms of
numbers which were obtained by comparing the manuscript tables with
those contained in the Arithmetica logarithmica of 1624 and of 1628.
As the Tables du Cadastre remained unpublished, other tables
appeared in which the quadrant was divided centesimally, the most
important of these being Hobert and Ideler's Nouvelles tables
trigonométriques (1799), and Borda and Delambre's Tables
trigonométriques décimales (1800-1801), both of which are
seven-figure tables. The latter work, which was much used, being
difficult to procure, and greater accuracy being required, the French
government in 1891 published an eight-figure centesimal table, for
every ten seconds, derived from the Tables du Cadastre.
Decimal or Briggian Antilogarithms.--In the ordinary tables of
logarithms the natural numbers are all integers, while the logarithms
tabulated are incommensurable. In an antilogarithmic table, the
logarithms are exact quantities such as .00001, .00002, &c., and the
numbers are incommensurable.
The earliest and largest table of this
kind that has been constructed is Dodson's Antilogarithmic canon
(1742), which gives the numbers to 11 places, corresponding to the
logarithms from .00001 to .99999 at intervals of .00001.
Antilogarithmic tables are few in number, the only other extensive
tables of the same kind that have been published occurring in
Shortrede's Logarithmic tables already referred to, and in
Filipowski's Table of antilogarithms (1849). Both are similar to
Dodson's tables, from which they were derived, but they only give
numbers to 7 places.
Hyperbolic or Napierian logarithms (i.e. to base e).--The most
elaborate table of hyperbolic logarithms that exists is due to
Wolfram, a Dutch lieutenant of artillery. His table gives the
logarithms of all numbers up to 2200, and of primes (and also of a
great many composite numbers) from 2200 to 10,009, to 48 decimal
places. The table appeared in Schulze's Neue und erweiterte Sammlung
logarithmischer Tafeln (1778), and was reprinted in Vega's
Thesaurus (1794), already referred to.
Six logarithms omitted in
Schulze's work, and which Wolfram had been prevented from computing by
a serious illness, were published subsequently, and the table as given
by Vega is complete. The largest hyperbolic table as regards range was
published by Zacharias Dase at Vienna in 1850 under the title Tafel
der natürlichen Logarithmen der Zahlen.
Hyperbolic antilogarithms are simple exponentials, i.e. the
hyperbolic antilogarithm of x is e^x. Such tables can scarcely be said
to come under the head of logarithmic tables. See TABLES,
MATHEMATICAL: Exponential Functions.
Logistic or Proportional Logarithms.--The old name for what are now
called ratios or fractions are logistic numbers, so that a table of
log (a/x) where x is the argument and a a constant is called a table
of logistic or proportional logarithms; and since log (a/x) = log a -
log x it is clear that the tabular results differ from those given in
an ordinary table of logarithms only by the subtraction of a constant
and a change of sign. The first table of this kind appeared in
Kepler's work of 1624 which has been already referred to.
The object
of a table of log (a/x) is to facilitate the working out of
proportions in which the third term is a constant quantity a. In most
collections of tables of logarithms, and especially those intended for
use in connexion with navigation, there occurs a small table of
logistic logarithms in which a = 3600´´ (= 1° or 1^h), the table
giving log 3600 - log x, and x being expressed in minutes and seconds.
It is also common to find tables in which a = 10800´´ (= 3° or 3^h),
and x is expressed in degrees (or hours), minutes and seconds. Such
tables are generally given to 4 or 5 places.
The usual practice in
books seems to be to call logarithms logistic when a is 3600´´, and
proportional when a has any other value.
Addition and Subtraction, or Gaussian Logarithms.--Gaussian
logarithms are intended to facilitate the finding of the logarithms
of the sum and difference of two numbers whose logarithms are known,
the numbers themselves being unknown; and on this account they are
frequently called addition and subtraction logarithms. The object of
the table is in fact to give log (a ± b) by only one entry when log a
and log b are given.
The utility of such logarithms was first pointed
out by Leonelli in a book entitled Supplément logarithmique, printed
at Bordeaux in the year XI. (1802/3); he calculated a table to 14
places, but only a specimen of it which appeared in the Supplément
was printed. The first table that was actually published is due to
Gauss, and was printed in Zach's Monatliche Correspondenz, xxvi. 498
(1812). Corresponding to the argument log x it gives the values of log
(1 + x^-1) and log (1 + x).
Dual Logarithms.--This term was used by Oliver Byrne in a series of
works published between 1860 and 1870. Dual numbers and logarithms
depend upon the expression of a number as a product of 1.1, 1.01,
1.001 ... or of .9, .99, .999....
In the preceding résumé only those publications have been mentioned
which are of historic importance or interest.[14] For fuller details
with respect to some of these works, for an account of tables
published in the latter part of the 19th century, and for those which
would now be used in actual calculation, reference should be made to
the article TABLES, MATHEMATICAL.
Calculation of Logarithms.--The name logarithm is derived from the
words [Greek: logon arithmos], the number of the ratios, and the way
of regarding a logarithm which justifies the name may be explained as
follows. Suppose that the ratio of 10, or any other particular number,
to 1 is compounded of a very great number of equal ratios, as, for
example, 1,000,000, then it can be shown that the ratio of 2 to 1 is
very nearly equal to a ratio compounded of 301,030 of these small
ratios, or ratiunculae, that the ratio of 3 to 1 is very nearly
equal to a ratio compounded of 477,121 of them, and so on.
The small
ratio, or ratiuncula, is in fact that of the millionth root of 10 to
unity, and if we denote it by the ratio of a to 1, then the ratio of 2
to 1 will be nearly the same as that of a^{301,030} to 1, and so on;
or, in other words, if a denotes the millionth root of 10, then 2 will
be nearly equal to a^{301,030}, 3 will be nearly equal to a^{477,121},
and so on.
Napier's original work, the Descriptio Canonis of 1614, contained,
not logarithms of numbers, but logarithms of sines, and the relations
between the sines and the logarithms were explained by the motions of
points in lines, in a manner not unlike that afterwards employed by
Newton in the method of fluxions. An account of the processes by which
Napier constructed his table was given in the Constructio Canonis of
1619.
These methods apply, however, specially to Napier's own kind of
logarithms, and are different from those actually used by Briggs in
the construction of the tables in the Arithmetica Logarithmica,
although some of the latter are the same in principle as the processes
described in an appendix to the Constructio.
The processes used by Briggs are explained by him in the preface to
the Arithmetica Logarithmica (1624). His method of finding the
logarithms of the small primes, which consists in taking a great
number of continued geometric means between unity and the given
primes, may be described as follows. He first formed the table of
numbers and their logarithms:--
Numbers. Logarithms.
10 1
3.162277... 0.5
1.778279... 0.25
1.333521... 0.125
1.154781... 0.0625
each quantity in the left-hand column being the square root of the one
above it, and each quantity in the right-hand column being the half
of the one above it. To construct this table Briggs, using about
thirty places of decimals, extracted the square root of 10 fifty-four
times, and thus found that the logarithm of 1.00000 00000 00000 12781
91493 20032 35 was 0.00000 00000 00000 05551 11512 31257 82702, and
that for numbers of this form (i.e. for numbers beginning with 1
followed by fifteen ciphers, and then by seventeen or a less number of
significant figures) the logarithms were proportional to these
significant figures.
He then by means of a simple proportion deduced
that log (1.00000 00000 00000 1) = 0.00000 00000 00000 04342 94481
90325 1804, so that, a quantity 1.00000 00000 00000 x (where x
consists of not more than seventeen figures) having been obtained by
repeated extraction of the square root of a given number, the
logarithm of 1.00000 00000 00000 x could then be found by multiplying
x by .00000 00000 00000 04342....
To find the logarithm of 2, Briggs raised it to the tenth power, viz.
1024, and extracted the square root of 1.024 forty-seven times, the
result being 1.00000 00000 00000 16851 60570 53949 77. Multiplying the
significant figures by 4342 ... he obtained the logarithm of this
quantity, viz. 0.00000 00000 00000 07318 55936 90623 9336, which
multiplied by 2^47 gave 0.01029 99566 39811 95265 277444, the
logarithm of 1.024, true to 17 or 18 places. Adding the characteristic
3, and dividing by 10, he found (since 2 is the tenth root of 1024)
log 2 = .30102 99956 63981 195. Briggs calculated in a similar manner
log 6, and thence deduced log 3.
It will be observed that in the first process the value of the modulus
is in fact calculated from the formula.
h 1
-------- = ---------,
10^h - 1 log(e) 10
the value of h being 1/2^54, and in the second process log10 2 is in
effect calculated from the formula.
1 2^47
log(10) 2 = [2^(10/2^47) - 1] × --------- × ----.
log(e) 10 10
Briggs also gave methods of forming the mean proportionals or square
roots by differences; and the general method of constructing
logarithmic tables by means of differences is due to him.
The following calculation of log 5 is given as an example of the
application of a method of mean proportionals. The process consists in
taking the geometric mean of numbers above and below 5, the object
being to at length arrive at 5.000000. To every geometric mean in the
column of numbers there corresponds the arithmetical mean in the
column of logarithms. The numbers are denoted by A, B, C, &c., in
order to indicate their mode of formation.
Numbers. Logarithms.
A = 1.000000 0.0000000
B = 10.000000 1.0000000
C = [root](AB) = 3.162277 0.5000000
D = [root](BC) = 5.623413 0.7500000
E = [root](CD) = 4.216964 0.6250000
F = [root](DE) = 4.869674 0.6875000
G = [root](DF) = 5.232991 0.7187500
H = [root](FG) = 5.048065 0.7031250
I = [root](FH) = 4.958069 0.6953125
K = [root](HI) = 5.002865 0.6992187
L = [root](IK) = 4.980416 0.6972656
M = [root](KL) = 4.991627 0.6982421
N = [root](KM) = 4.997242 0.6987304
O = [root](KN) = 5.000052 0.6989745
P = [root](NO) = 4.998647 0.6988525
Q = [root](OP) = 4.999350 0.6989135
R = [root](OQ) = 4.999701 0.6989440
S = [root](OR) = 4.999876 0.6989592
T = [root](OS) = 4.999963 0.6989668
V = [root](OT) = 5.000008 0.6989707
W = [root](TV) = 4.999984 0.6989687
X = [root](WV) = 4.999997 0.6989697
Y = [root](VX) = 5.000003 0.6989702
Z = [root](XY) = 5.000000 0.6989700
Great attention was devoted to the methods of calculating logarithms
during the 17th and 18th centuries.
The earlier methods proposed were,
like those of Briggs, purely arithmetical, and for a long time
logarithms were regarded from the point of view indicated by their
name, that is to say, as depending on the theory of compounded ratios.
The introduction of infinite series into mathematics effected a great
change in the modes of calculation and the treatment of the subject.
Besides Napier and Briggs, special reference should be made to Kepler
(Chilias, 1624) and Mercator (Logarithmotechnia, 1668), whose
methods were arithmetical, and to Newton, Gregory, Halley and Cotes,
who employed series.
A full and valuable account of these methods is
given in Hutton's "Construction of Logarithms," which occurs in the
introduction to the early editions of his Mathematical Tables, and
also forms tract 21 of his Mathematical Tracts (vol. i., 1812). Many
of the early works on logarithms were reprinted in the Scriptores
logarithmici of Baron Maseres already referred to.
In the following account only those formulae and methods will be
referred to which would now be used in the calculation of logarithms.
Since
log(e)(1 + x) = x - ½x² + (1/3)x³ - ¼x^4 + &c.,
we have, by changing the sign of x,
log(e)(1 - x) = -x - ½x² - (1/3)x³ - ¼x^4 - &c.;
whence
1 + x
log(e) ----- = 2(x + (1/3)x³ + (1/5)x^5 + &c.),
1 - x
p - q
and, therefore, replacing x by -----,
p + q
p | p - q /p - q\³ /p - q\^5 |
log(e) --- = 2 | ----- + (1/3)( ----- ) + (1/5)( ----- ) + &c. |,
q | p + q \p + q/ \p + q/ |
in which the series is always convergent, so that the formula affords
a method of deducing the logarithm of one number from that of another.
As particular cases we have, by putting q = 1,
| p - 1 /p - 1\³ /p - 1\^5 |
log(e) p = 2 | ----- + (1/3)( ----- ) + (1/5)( ----- ) + &c. |,
| p + 1 \p + 1/ \p + 1/ |
and by putting q = p + 1,
| 1 1 1 |
log(e)(p + 1) - log(e)(p) = 2 | ------ + (1/3)--------- + (1/5)----------- + &c. |;
| 2p + 1 (2p + 1)³ (2p + 1)^5 |
the former of these equations gives a convergent series for log(e)p,
and the latter a very convergent series by means of which the
logarithm of any number may be deduced from the logarithm of the
preceding number.
From the formula for log(e)(p/q) we may deduce the following very
convergent series for log(e)2, log(e)3 and log(e)5, viz.:--
log(e)2 = 2( 7P + 5Q + 3R),
log(e)3 = 2(11P + 8Q + 5R),
log(e)5 = 2(16P + 12Q + 7R),
where
1 1 1
P = -- + (1/3) · ------ + (1/5) · ------ + &c.
31 (31)^3 (31)^5
1 1 1
Q = -- + (1/3) · ------ + (1/5) · ------ + &c.
49 (49)^3 (49)^5
1 1 1
R = --- + (1/3) · ------- + (1/5) · ------- + &c.
161 (161)^3 (161)^5
The following still more convenient formulae for the calculation of
log(e)2, log(e)3, &c. were given by J. Couch Adams in the Proc. Roy.
Soc., 1878, 27, p. 91. If
10 / 1 \ 25 / 4 \
a = log -- = -log ( 1 - -- ), b = log -- = -log ( 1 - --- ),
9 \ 10 / 24 \ 100 /
81 / 1 \ 50 / 2 \
c = log -- = log ( 1 + -- ), d = log -- = -log ( 1 - --- ),
80 \ 80 / 49 \ 100 /
126 / 8 \
e = log --- = log ( 1 + ---- ),
125 \ 1000 /
then
log 2 = 7a - 2b + 3c, log 3 = 11a - 3b + 5c, log 5 = 16a - 4b + 7c,
and
log 7 = ½(39a - 10b + 17c - d) or = 19a - 4b + 8c + e,
and we have the equation of condition,
a - 2b + c = d + 2e.
By means of these formulae Adams calculated the values of log(e)2,
log(e)3, log(e)5, and log(e)7 to 276 places of decimals, and deduced
the value of log(e)10 and its reciprocal M, the modulus of the
Briggian system of logarithms. The value of the modulus found by Adams
is
Mo = 0.43429 44819 03251 82765 11289
18916 60508 22943 97005 80366
65661 14453 78316 58646 49208
87077 47292 24949 33843 17483
18706 10674 47663 03733 64167
92871 58963 90656 92210 64662
81226 58521 27086 56867 03295
93370 86965 88266 88331 16360
77384 90514 28443 48666 76864
65860 85135 56148 21234 87653
43543 43573 17253 83562 21868
25
which is true certainly to 272, and probably to 273, places (Proc.
Roy. Soc., 1886, 42, p. 22, where also the values of the other
logarithms are given).
If the logarithms are to be Briggian all the series in the preceding
formulae must be multiplied by M, the modulus; thus,
log(10) (1 + x) = M (x - ½x² + (1/3)x³ - ¼x^4 + &c.),
and so on.
As has been stated, Abraham Sharp's table contains 61-decimal
Briggian logarithms of primes up to 1100, so that the logarithms of
all composite numbers whose greatest prime factor does not exceed this
number may be found by simple addition; and Wolfram's table gives
48-decimal hyperbolic logarithms of primes up to 10,009. By means of
these tables and of a factor table we may very readily obtain the
Briggian logarithm of a number to 61 or a less number of places or of
its hyperbolic logarithm to 48 or a less number of places in the
following manner. Suppose the hyperbolic logarithm of the prime number
43,867 required.
Multiplying by 50, we have 50 × 43,867 = 2,193,350,
and on looking in Burckhardt's Table des diviseurs for a number near
to this which shall have no prime factor greater than 10,009, it
appears that
2,193,349 = 23 × 47 × 2029;
thus
43,867 = (1/50)(23 × 47 × 2029 + 1),
and therefore
log(e) 43,867 = log(e) 23 + log(e) 47 + log(e) 2029 - log(e) 50
1 1 1
+ --------- - ½ ------------ + (1/3) ---------- - &c.
2,193,349 (2,193,349)² (193,349)³
The first term of the series in the second line is
0.00000 04559 23795 07319 6286;
dividing this by 2 ×2,193,349 we obtain
0.00000 00000 00103 93325 3457,
and the third term is
0.00000 00000 00000 00003 1590,
so that the series =
0.00000 04559 23691 13997 4419;
whence, taking out the logarithms from Wolfram's table,
log(e) 43,867 = 10.68891 76079 60568 10191 3661.
The principle of the method is to multiply the given prime (supposed
to consist of 4, 5 or 6 figures) by such a factor that the product may
be a number within the range of the factor tables, and such that, when
it is increased by 1 or 2, the prime factors may all be within the
range of the logarithmic tables. The logarithm is then obtained by use
of the formula
d d² d³
log(e)(x + d) = log(e)x + --- - ½ -- + (1/3) -- - &c.,
x x² x³
in which of course the object is to render d/x as small as possible.
If the logarithm required is Briggian, the value of the series is to
be multiplied by M.
If the number is incommensurable or consists of more than seven
figures, we can take the first seven figures of it (or multiply and
divide the result by any factor, and take the first seven figures of
the result) and proceed as before. An application to the hyperbolic
logarithm of [pi] is given by Burckhardt in the introduction to his
Table des diviseurs for the second million.
The best general method of calculating logarithms consists, in its
simplest form, in resolving the number whose logarithm is required
into factors of the form 1 - .1^(r)n, where n is one of the nine
digits; and making use of subsidiary tables of logarithms of factors
of this form. For example, suppose the logarithm of 543839 required to
twelve places. Dividing by 10^5 and by 5 the number becomes 1.087678,
and resolving this number into factors of the form 1 - .1^(r)n we find
that
543839 = 10^5 × 5(1-.1²8)(1-.1^(4)6)(1-.1^(5)6)(1-.1^(6)3)(1-.1^(7)3)
× (1-.1^(8)5)(1-.1^(9)7)(1-.1^(10)9)(1-.1^(11)3)(1-.1^(12)2),
where 1-1²8 denotes 1-.08, 1-.1^(4)6 denotes 1-.0006, &c., and so on.
All that is required therefore in order to obtain the logarithm of any
number is a table of logarithms, to the required number of places, of
.n, .9n, .99n, .999n, &c., for n = 1, 2, 3, ... 9.
The resolution of a number into factors of the above form is easily
performed. Taking, for example, the number 1.087678, the object is to
destroy the significant figure 8 in the second place of decimals; this
is effected by multiplying the number by 1-.08, that is, by
subtracting from the number eight times itself advanced two places,
and we thus obtain 1.00066376. To destroy the first 6 multiply by 1 -
.0006 giving 1.000063361744, and multiplying successively by 1 -
.00006 and 1 - .000003, we obtain 1.000000357932, and it is clear that
these last six significant figures represent without any further work
the remaining factors required.
In the corresponding antilogarithmic
process the number is expressed as a product of factors of the form 1
+ .1^(n)x.
This method of calculating logarithms by the resolution of numbers
into factors of the form 1 - .1^(r)n is generally known as Weddle's
method, having been published by him in The Mathematician for
November 1845, and the corresponding method for antilogarithms by
means of factors of the form 1 + (.1)^(r)n is known by the name of
Hearn, who published it in the same journal for 1847. In 1846 Peter
Gray constructed a new table to 12 places, in which the factors were
of the form 1-(.01)^(r)n, so that n had the values 1, 2, ... 99; and
subsequently he constructed a similar table for factors of the form 1
+ (.01)^(r)n.
He also devised a method of applying a table of Hearn's
form (i.e. of factors of the form 1 +.1^(r)n) to the construction of
logarithms, and calculated a table of logarithms of factors of the
form 1 + (.001)^(r)n to 24 places. This was published in 1876 under
the title Tables for the formation of logarithms and antilogarithms
to twenty-four or any less number of places, and contains the most
complete and useful application of the method, with many improvements
in points of detail.
Taking as an example the calculation of the
Briggian logarithm of the number 43,867, whose hyperbolic logarithm
has been calculated above, we multiply it by 3, giving 131,601, and
find by Gray's process that the factors of 1.31601 are
(1) 1.316 (5) 1.(001)^(4)002
(2) 1.000007 (6) 1.(001)^(5)602
(3) 1.(001)²598 (7) 1.(001)^(6)412
(4) 1.(001)³780 (8) 1.(001)^(7)340
Taking the logarithms from Gray's tables we obtain the required
logarithm by addition as follows:--
522 878 745 280 337 562 704 972 = colog 3
119 255 889 277 936 685 553 913 = log (1)
3 040 050 733 157 610 239 = log (2)
259 708 022 525 453 597 = log (3)
338 749 695 752 424 = log (4)
868 588 964 = log (5)
261 445 278 = log (6)
178 929 = log (7)
148 = log (8)
--------------------------------------------------------
4.642 137 934 655 780 757 288 464 = log(10)43,867
In Shortrede's Tables there are tables of logarithms and factors of
the form 1 ± (.01)^(r)n to 16 places and of the form 1 ± (.1)^(r)n to
25 places; and in his Tables de Logarithmes à 27 Décimales (Paris,
1867) Fédor Thoman gives tables of logarithms of factors of the form 1
± .1^(r)n. In the Messenger of Mathematics, vol. iii. pp. 66-92,
1873, Henry Wace gave a simple and clear account of both the
logarithmic and antilogarithmic processes, with tables of both
Briggian and hyperbolic logarithms of factors of the form 1 ± .1^(r)n
to 20 places.
Although the method is usually known by the names of Weddle and Hearn,
it is really, in its essential features, due to Briggs, who gave in
the Arithmetica logarithmica of 1624 a table of the logarithms of 1
+ .1^(r)n up to r = 9 to 15 places of decimals. It was first formally
proposed as an independent method, with great improvements, by Robert
Flower in The Radix, a new way of making Logarithms, which was
published in 1771; and Leonelli, in his Supplement logarithmique
(1802-1803), already noticed, referred to Flower and reproduced some
of his tables. A complete bibliography of this method has been given
by A.
J. Ellis in a paper "on the potential radix as a means of
calculating logarithms," printed in the Proceedings of the Royal
Society, vol. xxxi., 1881, pp. 401-407, and vol. xxxii., 1881, pp.
377-379. Reference should also be made to Hoppe's Tafeln zur
dreissigstelligen logarithmischen Rechnung (Leipzig, 1876), which
give in a somewhat modified form a table of the hyperbolic logarithm
of 1 + .1^(r)n.
The preceding methods are only appropriate for the calculation of
isolated logarithms. If a complete table had to be reconstructed, or
calculated to more places, it would undoubtedly be most convenient to
employ the method of differences. A full account of this method as
applied to the calculation of the Tables du Cadastre is given by
Lefort in vol. iv. of the Annales de l'Observatoire de Paris.
(J. W. L. G.)
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Dr Thomas Smith thus describes the ardour with which Briggs
studied the Descriptio: "Hunc in deliciis habuit, in sinu, in
manibus, in pectore gestavit, oculisque avidissimis, et mente
attentissima, iterum iterumque perlegit,..." Vitae quorundam
eruditissimorum et illustrium virorum (London, 1707).
[2] William Lilly's account of the meeting of Napier and Briggs at
Merchiston is quoted in the article NAPIER.
[3] It was certainly published after Napier's death, as Briggs
mentions his "librum posthumum." This liber posthumus was the
Constructio referred to later in this article.
[4] Frisch's Kepleri opera omnia, ii. 834. Frisch thinks Bramer
possibly relied on Kepler's statement quoted in the text ("Quibus
forte confisus Kepleri verbis Benj. Bramer...."). See also vol. vii.
p. 298.
The claims of Byrgius are discussed in Kästner's Geschichte der
Mathematik, ii. 375, and iii. 14; Montucla's Histoire des
mathématiques, ii. 10; Delambre's Histoire de l'astronomie
moderne, i. 560; de Morgan's article on "Tables" in the English
Cyclopaedia; Mark Napier's Memoirs of John Napier of Merchiston
(1834), p. 392, and Cantor's Geschichte der Mathematik, ii. (1892),
662. See also Gieswald, Justus Byrg als Mathematiker und dessen
Einleitung in seine Logarithmen (Danzig, 1856).
[5] See Mark Napier's Memoirs of John Napier of Merchiston (1834),
p. 362.
[6] In the Rabdologia (1617) he speaks of the canon of logarithms
as "a me longo tempore elaboratum."
[7] A careful examination of the history of the method is given by
Scheibel in his Einleitung zur mathematischen Bücherkenntniss,
Stück vii. (Breslau, 1775), pp. 13-20; and there is also an account
in Kästner's Geschichte der Mathematik, i. 566-569 (1796); in
Montucla's Histoire des mathématiques, i. 583-585 and 617-619; and
in Klügel's Wörterbuch (1808), article "Prosthaphaeresis."
[8] Besides his connexion with logarithms and improvements in the
method of prosthaphaeresis, Byrgius has a share in the invention of
decimal fractions. See Cantor, Geschichte, ii. 567. Cantor
attributes to him (in the use of his prosthaphaeresis) the first
introduction of a subsidiary angle into trigonometry (vol. ii. 590).
[9] The title of this work is--Benjaminis Ursini ... cursus
mathematici practici volumen primum continens illustr. & generosi Dn.
Dn. Johannis Neperi Baronis Merchistonij &c. Scoti trigonometriam
logarithmicam usibus discentium accommodatam ... Coloniae ...
CI[~C] I[~C]C XIX. At the end, Napier's table is reprinted, but to
two figures less. This work forms the earliest publication of
logarithms on the continent.
[10] The title is Logarithmorum canonis descriptio, seu
arithmeticarum supputationum mirabilis abbreviatio. Ejusque usus in
utraque trigonometria ut etiam in omni logistica mathematica,
amplissimi, facillimi & expeditissimi explicatio. Authore ac
inventore Ioanne Nepero, Barone Merchistonii, &c. Scoto. Lugduni....
It will be seen that this title is different from that of Napier's
work of 1614; many writers have, however, erroneously given it as the
title of the latter.
[11] In describing the contents of the works referred to, the
language and notation of the present day have been adopted, so that
for example a table to radius 10,000,000 is described as a table to 7
places, and so on. Also, although logarithms have been spoken of as
to the base e, &c., it is to be noticed that neither Napier nor
Briggs, nor any of their successors till long afterwards, had any
idea of connecting logarithms with exponents.
[12] The smallest number of entries which are necessary in a table of
logarithms in order that the intermediate logarithms may be
calculable by proportional parts has been investigated by J. E. A.
Steggall in the Proc. Edin. Math. Soc., 1892, 10, p. 35. This
number is 1700 in the case of a seven-figure table extending to
100,000.
[13] Accounts of Sang's calculations are given in the Trans. Roy.
Soc. Edin., 1872, 26, p. 521, and in subsequent papers in the
Proceedings of the same society.
[14] In vol. xv. (1875) of the Verhandelingen of the Amsterdam
Academy of Sciences, Bierens de Haan has given a list of 553 tables
of logarithms. A previous paper of the same kind, containing notices
of some of the tables, was published by him in the Verslagen en
Mededeelingen of the same academy (Afd. Natuurkunde) deel. iv.
(1862), p. 15.
LOGAU, FRIEDRICH, FREIHERR VON (1604-1655), German epigrammatist, was born at Brockut, near Nimptsch, in Silesia, in June 1604. He was educated at the gymnasium of Brieg and subsequently studied law. He then entered the service of the duke of Brieg. In 1644 he was made "ducal councillor." He died at Liegnitz on the 24th of July 1655. Logau's epigrams, which appeared in two collections under the pseudonym "Salomon von Golaw" (an anagram of his real name) in 1638 (Erstes Hundert Teutscher Reimensprüche) and 1654 (Deutscher Sinngedichte drei Tausend), show a marvellous range and variety of expression.
He had suffered bitterly under the adverse conditions of the time; but his satire is not merely the outcome of personal feeling. In the turbulent age of the Thirty Years' War he was one of the few men who preserved intact his intellectual integrity and judged his contemporaries fairly.
He satirized with unsparing hand the court life, the useless bloodshed of the war, the lack of national pride in the German people, and their slavish imitation of the French in customs, dress and speech. He belonged to the Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft under the name Der Verkleinernde, and regarded himself as a follower of Martin Opitz; but he did not allow such ties to influence his independence or originality.
Logau's Sinngedichte were edited in 1759 by G. E. Lessing and K. W.
Ramler, who first drew attention to their merits; a second edition
appeared in 1791. A critical edition was published by G. Eitner in
1872, who also edited a selection of Logau's epigrams for the
Deutsche Dichter des XVII. Jahrhunderts (vol. iii., 1870); there is
also a selection by H. Oesterley in Kürschner's Deutsche
Nationalliteratur, vol. xxviii. (1885). See H. Denker, Beiträge zur
literarischen Würdigung Logaus (1889); W. Heuschkel, Untersuchungen
über Ränders und Lessings Bearbeitung Logauscher Sinngedichte (1901).
LOGIA, a title used to describe a collection of the sayings of Jesus Christ ([Greek: logia Iêsou]) and therefore generally applied to the "Sayings of Jesus" discovered in Egypt by B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt.
There is some question as to whether the term is rightly used for this purpose. It does not occur in the Papyri in this sense. Each "saying" is introduced by the phrase "Jesus says" ([Greek: legei]) and the collection is described in the introductory words of the 1903 series as [Greek: logoi] not as [Greek: logia]. Some justification for the employment of the term is found in early Christian literature. Several writers speak of the [Greek: logia tou kuriou] or [Greek: ta kuriaka logia], i.e. oracles of (or concerning) the Lord.
Polycarp, for instance, speaks of "those who pervert the oracles of the Lord." (Philipp. 7), and Papias, as Eusebius tells us, wrote a work with the title "Expositions of the Oracles of the Lord." The expression has been variously interpreted. It need mean no more (Lightfoot, Essays on Supernatural Religion, 172 seq.) than narratives of (or concerning) the Lord; on the other hand, the phrase is capable of a much more definite meaning, and there are many scholars who hold that it refers to a document which contained a collection of the sayings of Jesus.
Some such document, we know, must lie at the base of our Synoptic Gospels, and it is quite possible that it may have been known to and used by Papias. It is only on this assumption that the use of the term Logia in the sense described above can be justified.
"The Sayings," to which the term Logia is generally applied, consist of (a) a papyrus leaf containing seven or eight sayings of Jesus discovered in 1897, (b) a second leaf containing five more sayings discovered in 1903, (c) two fragments of unknown Gospels, the former published in 1903, the latter in 1907. All these were found amongst the great mass of papyri acquired by the Egyptian Exploration Fund from the ruins of Oxyrhynchus, one of the chief early Christian centres in Egypt, situated some 120 m. S. of Cairo.
The eight "sayings" discovered in 1897 are as follows:--
- ... [Greek: kai tote diablepseis ekbalein to karphos to en tô
ophthalmô tou adelphou sou].
- [Greek: Legei Iêsous ean mê nêsteusête ton kosmon ou mê eurête tên
basileian tou theou. kai ean mê sabbatisête to sabbaton ouk opsesthe
ton patera].
- [Greek: Legei Iêsous e[s]tên en mesô tou kosmou kai en sarki
ôpsthên autois, kai euron pantas methuontas kai oudena euron dipsônta
en autois, kai ponei ê psychê mou epi tois huiois tôn anthrôpôn, hoti
typhloi eisin tê kardia autô[n] k[ai] ou ble[pousin]]....
- [Illegible: possibly joins on to 3] ... [Greek: [t]ên ptôcheian].
- [Greek: [Leg]ei [Iêsous hop]ou ean ôsin [b, ouk] e[isi]n atheoi kai
h[o]pou e[is] estin monos, [le]gô, egô eimi met aut[ou] egei[r]on ton
lithon kakei heurêseis me, schison to xylon kagô ekei eimi].
- [Greek: Legei Iêsous ouk estin dektos prophêtês en tê patridi
aut[o]u, oude iatpos poiei therapeias eis tous ginôskontas auton].
- [Greek: Legei Iêsous polisoi kodomêmenê ep' akron [o]rous hypsêlou
kai estêrigmenê oute pe[s]ein dynatai oute kry[b]ênai].
- [Greek: Legei Iêsous akoueis [e]is to hen ôtion sou to [de eteron
synekleisas]].
Letters in brackets are missing in the original: letters which are
dotted beneath are doubtful.
- "... and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote that is
in thy brother's eye."
- "Jesus saith, Except ye fast to the world, ye shall in no wise find
the kingdom of God; and except ye make the sabbath a real sabbath, ye
shall not see the Father."
- "Jesus saith, I stood in the midst of the world and in the flesh
was I seen of them, and I found all men drunken, and none found I
athirst among them, and my soul grieveth over the sons of men, because
they are blind in their heart, and see not...."
- "... poverty...."
- "Jesus saith, Wherever there are two, they are not without God, and
wherever there is one alone, I say, I am with him. Raise the stone and
there thou shalt find me, cleave the wood and there am I."
- "Jesus saith, A prophet is not acceptable in his own country,
neither doth a physician work cures upon them that know him."
- "Jesus saith, A city built upon the top of a high hill and
stablished can neither fall nor be hid."
- "Jesus saith, Thou hearest with one ear [but the other ear hast
thou closed]."
The "sayings" of 1903 were prefaced by the following introductory statement:--
[Greek: hoi toioi hoi logoi hoi [... hous elalêsen Iê(sou)s ho zôn
k[yrios? ... kai Thôma kai eipen [autois; pas hostis an tôn logôn
tout[ôn akousê thanatou ou mê geusêtai.]
"These are the (wonderful?) words which Jesus the living (Lord) spake
to ... and Thomas and he said unto (them) every one that hearkens to
these words shall never taste of death."
The "sayings" themselves are as follows:--
(1) [Greek: [legei Iê(sou)s· mê pausasthô ho zê[tôn...
heôs an heurê kai hotan heurê [thambêthêsetai
kai thambêtheis basileusei ka[i basileusas
anapaêsetai.]
(2) [Greek: legei I[ê(sous ... tines ...
hoi helkontes hêmas [eis tên basileian ei
hê basileia en oura[nô estin;
ta peteina tou our[anou kai tôn thêriôn ho
ti hypo tên gên est[in ê epi tês gês kai
hoi ichthyes tês thala[ssês houtoi hoi helkon-
tes hymas kai hê bas[ileia tôn ouranôn
entos hymôn [e]sti [kai hostis an heauton
gnô tautên heurê[sei...
heautous gnôsesthe [kai eidêsete hoti huioi
este humeis tou patros tou t[...
gnôs(es)the heautous en[...
kai hu eis este êpto[]
(3) [Greek: [ legei Iê(sou)s
ouk apoknêsei anth[rôpos...
rôn eperôtêsai pa[...
rôn peri tou topou tê[s...
sete hoti polloi esontai p[rôtoi eschatoi kai
hoi eschatoi prôtoi kai [...
sin.]
(4) [Greek: legei Iê(sou)s· [pan to mê empros-
then tês opseôs sou kai [to kekrummenon
apo sou apokalyph(th)êset{ai soi. ou gar es-
tin krypton ho ou phane[ron genêsetai
kai tethammenon ho o[uk egerthêsetai.]
(5) [Greek: [ex] etazousin auton ho[i mathêtai autou kai
[le]gousin; pôs nêsteu[somen kai pôs...
[ ... ] metha kai pôs [ ...
[ ... k]ai ti paratêrês{omen...
[ ... ]n? legei Iê(sou)s; [ ...
[ ... ]eitai mê poeit[e...
[ ... ]ês alêtheias an[ ...
[ ... ]n a[p]okekr[y...
[ ... ma] kari[os] estin [ ...
[ ... ]ô est[i...
[ ... ]in [ ... ]
- "Jesus saith, Let not him who seeks ... cease until he finds and
when he finds he shall be astonished; astonished he shall reach the
kingdom and having reached the kingdom he shall rest."
- "Jesus saith (ye ask? who are those) that draw us (to the kingdom
if) the kingdom is in Heaven? ... the fowls of the air and all beasts
that are under the earth or upon the earth and the fishes of the sea
(these are they which draw) you and the kingdom of Heaven is within
you and whosoever shall know himself shall find it. (Strive
therefore?) to know yourselves and ye shall be aware that ye are the
sons of the (Almighty?) Father; (and?) ye shall know that ye are in
(the city of God?) and ye are (the city?)."
- "Jesus saith, A man shall not hesitate ... to ask concerning his
place (in the kingdom. Ye shall know) that many that are first shall
be last and the last first and (they shall have eternal life?)."
- "Jesus saith, Everything that is not before thy face and that which
is hidden from thee shall be revealed to thee. For there is nothing
hidden which shall not be made manifest nor buried which shall not be
raised."
- "His disciples question him and say, How shall we fast and how
shall we (pray?) ... and what (commandment) shall we keep ... Jesus
saith ... do not ... of truth ... blessed is he ..."
The fragment of a lost Gospel which was discovered in 1903 contained originally about fifty lines, but many of them have perished and others are undecipherable. The translation, as far as it can be made out, is as follows:--
1-7. "(Take no thought) from morning until even nor from evening until
morning either for your food what ye shall eat or for your raiment
what ye shall put on. 7-13. Ye are far better than the lilies which
grow but spin not. Having one garment what do ye (lack)?... 13-15. Who
could add to your stature? 15-16. He himself will give you your
garment. 17-23. His disciples say unto him, When wilt thou be manifest
unto us and when shall we see thee? He saith, When ye shall be
stripped and not be ashamed ... 41-46. He said, The key of knowledge
ye hid: ye entered not in yourselves, and to them that were entering
in, ye opened not."
The second Gospel fragment discovered in 1907 "consists of a single vellum leaf, practically complete except at one of the lower corners and here most of the lacunae admit of a satisfactory solution." The translation is as follows:--
... before he does wrong makes all manner of subtle excuse. But give
heed lest ye also suffer the same things as they: for the evil doers
among men receive their reward not among the living only, but also
await punishment and much torment. And he took them and brought them
into the very place of purification and was walking in the temple. And
a certain Pharisee, a chief priest, whose name was Levi, met them and
said to the Saviour, Who gave thee leave to walk in this place of
purification, and to see these holy vessels when thou hast not washed
nor yet have thy disciples bathed their feet?
But defiled thou hast
walked in this temple, which is a pure place, wherein no other man
walks except he has washed himself and changed his garments neither
does he venture to see these holy vessels. And the Saviour straightway
stood still with his disciples and answered him, Art thou then, being
here in the temple, clean? He saith unto him, I am clean; for I washed
in the pool of David and having descended by one staircase, I ascended
by another and I put on white and clean garments, and then I came and
looked upon these holy vessels. The Saviour answered and said unto
him, Woe ye blind, who see not.
Thou hast washed in these running
waters wherein dogs and swine have been cast night and day and hast
cleansed and wiped the outside skin which also the harlots and
flute-girls anoint and wash and wipe and beautify for the lust of men;
but within they are full of scorpions and all wickedness. But I and my
disciples who thou sayest have not bathed have been dipped in the
waters of eternal life which come from.... But woe unto thee....
These documents have naturally excited considerable interest and raised many questions. The papyri of the "sayings" date from the 3rd century and most scholars agree that the "sayings" themselves go back to the 2nd. The year A.D. 140 is generally assigned as the terminus ad quem.
The problem as to their origin has been keenly discussed. There are two main types of theory. (1) Some suppose that they are excerpts from an uncanonical Gospel. (2) Others think that they represent an independent and original collection of sayings. The first theory has assumed three main forms. (a) Harnack maintains that they were taken from the Gospel according to the Egyptians. This theory, however, is based upon a hypothetical reconstruction of the Gospel in question which has found very few supporters.
(b) Others have advocated the Gospel of the Hebrews as the source of the "sayings," on the ground of the resemblance between the first "saying" of the 1903 series and a well-authenticated fragment of that Gospel. The resemblance, however, is not sufficiently clear to support the conclusion. (c) A third view supposes that they are extracts from the Gospel of Thomas--an apocryphal Gospel dealing with the boyhood of Jesus.
Beyond the allusion to Thomas in the introductory paragraph to the 1903 series, there seems to be no tangible evidence in support of this view. The second theory, which maintains that the papyri represent an independent collection of "sayings," seems to be the opinion which has found greatest favour. It has won the support of W. Sanday, H. B.
Swete, Rendel Harris, W. Lock, Heinrici, &c. There is a considerable diversity of judgment, however, with regard to the value of the collection. (a) Some scholars maintain that the collection goes back to the 1st century and represents one of the earliest attempts to construct an account of the teaching of Jesus.
They are therefore disposed to admit to a greater or less extent and with widely varying degrees of confidence the presence of genuine elements in the new matter. (b) Sanday and many others regard the sayings as originating early in the 2nd century and think that, though not "directly dependent on the Canonical Gospels," they have "their origin under conditions of thought which these Gospels had created." The "sayings" must be regarded as expansions of the true tradition, and little value is therefore to be attached to the new material.
With the knowledge at our disposal, it is impossible to reach an assured conclusion between these two views. The real problem, to which at present no solution has been found, is to account for the new material in the "sayings." There seems to be no motive sufficient to explain the additions that have been made to the text of the Gospels. It cannot be proved that the expansions have been made in the interests of any sect or heresy.
Unless new discoveries provide the clue, or some reasonable explanation can otherwise be found, there seems to be no reason why we should not regard the "sayings" as containing material which ought to be taken into account in the critical study of the teaching of Jesus.
The 1903 Gospel fragment is so mutilated in many of its parts that it is difficult to decide upon its character and value. It appears to be earlier than 150, and to be taken from a Gospel which followed more or less closely the version of the teaching of Jesus given by Matthew and Luke. The phrase "when ye shall be stripped and not be ashamed" contains an idea which has some affinity with two passages found respectively in the Gospel according to the Egyptians and the so-called Second Epistle of Clement.
The resemblance, however, is not sufficiently close to warrant the deduction that either the Gospel of the Egyptians or the Gospel from which the citation in 2 Clement is taken (if these two are distinct) is the source from which our fragment is derived.
The second Gospel fragment (1907) seems to be of later origin than the documents already mentioned. Grenfell and Hunt date the Gospel, from which it is an excerpt, about 200. There is considerable difficulty with regard to some of the details. The statement that an ordinary Jew was required to wash and change his clothes before visiting the inner court of the temple is quite unsupported by any other evidence. Nothing is known about "the place of purification" ([Greek: agneutêrion]) nor "the pool of David" ([Greek: limnê tou Daueid]).
Nor does the statement that "the sacred vessels" were visible from the place where Jesus was standing seem at all probable. Grenfell and Hunt conclude therefore--"So great indeed are the divergences between this account and the extant and no doubt well-informed authorities with regard to the topography and ritual of the Temple that it is hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that much of the local colour is due to the imagination of the author who was aiming chiefly at dramatic effect and was not really well acquainted with the Temple.
But if the inaccuracy of the fragment in this important respect is admitted the historical character of the whole episode breaks down and it is probably to be regarded as an apocryphal elaboration of Matt. xv. 1-20 and Mark vii. 1-23."
See the Oxyrhynchus Papyri, part i. (1897), part iv. (1904), part v.
(1908). (H. T. A.)
LOGIC ([Greek: logikê], sc. [Greek: technê], the art of reasoning), the name given to one of the four main departments of philosophy, though its sphere is very variously delimited. The present article is divided into
- The Problems of Logic, II. History.
I. The Problems of Logic.
Introduction.--Logic is the science of the processes of inference, what, then, is inference? It is that mental operation which proceeds by combining two premises so as to cause a consequent conclusion. Some suppose that we may infer from one premise by a so-called "immediate inference." But one premise can only reproduce itself in another form, e.g. all men are some animals; therefore some animals are men. It requires the combination of at least two premises to infer a conclusion different from both. There are as many kinds of inference as there are different ways of combining premises, and in the main three types:--
- Analogical Inference, from particular to particular: e.g.
border-war between Thebes and Phocis is evil; border-war between Thebes and Athens is similar to that between Thebes and Phocis; therefore, border-war between Thebes and Athens is evil.
- Inductive Inference, from particular to universal: e.g. border-war
between Thebes and Phocis is evil; all border-war is like that between Thebes and Phocis; therefore, all border-war is evil.
- Deductive or Syllogistic Inference, from universal to particular,
e.g. all border-war is evil; border-war between Thebes and Athens is border-war; therefore border-war between Thebes and Athens is evil.
In each of these kinds of inference there are three mental judgments capable of being expressed as above in three linguistic propositions; and the two first are the premises which are combined, while the third is the conclusion which is consequent on their combination. Each proposition consists of two terms, the subject and its predicate, united by the copula. Each inference contains three terms.
In syllogistic inference the subject of the conclusion is the minor term, and its predicate the major term, while between these two extremes the term common to the two premises is the middle term, and the premise containing the middle and major terms is the major premise, the premise containing the middle and minor terms the minor premise. Thus in the example of syllogism given above, "border-war between Thebes and Athens" is the minor term, "evil" the major term, and "border-war" the middle term.
Using S for minor, P for major and M for middle, and preserving these signs for corresponding terms in analogical and inductive inferences, we obtain the following formula of the three inferences:--
Analogical. | Inductive. | Deductive or Syllogistic.
| |
S^1 is P | S is P | Every M is P
S^2 is similar | Every M is | S is M
to S^1 | similar to S |
:. S^2 is P. |:. Every M is P. | :. S is P.
The love of unity has often made logicians attempt to resolve these three processes into one. But each process has a peculiarity of its own; they are similar, not the same. Analogical and inductive inference alike begin with a particular premise containing one or more instances; but the former adds a particular premise to draw a particular conclusion, the latter requires a universal premise to draw a universal conclusion.
A citizen of Athens, who had known the evils of the border-war between Thebes and Phocis, would readily perceive the analogy of a similar war between Thebes and Athens, and conclude analogously that it would be evil; but he would have to generalize the similarity of all border-wars in order to draw the inductive conclusion that all alike are evil.
Induction and deduction differ still more, and are in fact opposed, as one makes a particular premise the evidence of a universal conclusion, the other makes a universal premise evidence of a particular conclusion.
Yet they are alike in requiring the generalization of the universal and the belief that there are classes which are whole numbers of similars.
On this point both differ from inference by analogy, which proceeds entirely from particular premises to a particular conclusion. Hence we may redivide inference into particular inference by analogy and universal inference by induction and deduction. Universal inference is what we call reasoning; and its two species are very closely connected, because universal conclusions of induction become universal premises of deduction.
Indeed, we often induce in order to deduce, ascending from particular to universal and descending from universal to particular in one act as it were; so that we may proceed either directly from particular to particular by analogical inference, or indirectly from particular through universal to particular by an inductive-deductive inference which might be called "perduction." On the whole, then, analogical, inductive and deductive inferences are not the same but three similar and closely connected processes.
The three processes of inference, though different from one another, rest on a common principle of similarity of which each is a different application. Analogical inference requires that one particular is similar to another, induction that a whole number or class is similar to its particular instances, deduction that each particular is similar to the whole number or class.
Not that these inferences require us to believe, or assume, or premise or formulate this principle either in general, or in its applied forms: the premises are all that any inference needs the mind to assume. The principle of similarity is used, not assumed by the inferring mind, which in accordance with the similarity of things and the parity of inference spontaneously concludes in the form that similars are similarly determined ("similia similibus convenire").
In applying this principle of similarity, each of the three processes in its own way has to premise both that something is somehow determined and that something is similar, and by combining these premises to conclude that this is similarly determined to that. Thus the very principle of inference by similarity requires it to be a combination of premises in order to draw a conclusion.
The three processes, as different applications of the principle of similarity, consisting of different combinations of premises, cause different degrees of cogency in their several conclusions. Analogy hardly requires as much evidence as induction. Men speculate about the analogy between Mars and the earth, and infer that it is inhabited, without troubling about all the planets. Induction has to consider more instances, and the similarity of a whole number or class. Even so, however, it starts from a particular premise which only contains many instances, and leaves room to doubt the universality of its conclusions.
But deduction, starting from a premise about all the members of a class, compels a conclusion about every and each of necessity. One border-war may be similar to another, and the whole number may be similar, without being similarly evil; but if all alike are evil, each is evil of necessity. Deduction or syllogism is superior to analogy and induction in combining premises so as to involve or contain the conclusion.
For this reason it has been elevated by some logicians above all other inferences, and for this very same reason attacked by others as no inference at all.
The truth is that, though the premises contain the conclusion, neither premise alone contains it, and a man who knows both but does not combine them does not draw the conclusion; it is the synthesis of the two premises which at once contains the conclusion and advances our knowledge; and as syllogism consists, not indeed in the discovery, but essentially in the synthesis of two premises, it is an inference and an advance on each premise and on both taken separately.
As again the synthesis contains or involves the conclusion, syllogism has the advantage of compelling assent to the consequences of the premises. Inference in general is a combination of premises to cause a conclusion; deduction is such a combination as to compel a conclusion involved in the combination, and following from the premises of necessity.
Nevertheless, deduction or syllogism is not independent of the other processes of inference. It is not the primary inference of its own premises, but constantly converts analogical and inductive conclusions into its particular and universal premises. Of itself it causes a necessity of consequence, but only a hypothetical necessity; if these premises are true, then this conclusion necessarily follows. To eliminate this "if" ultimately requires other inferences before deduction.
Especially, induction to universals is the warrant and measure of deduction from universals. So far as it is inductively true that all border-war is evil, it is deductively true that a given border-war is therefore evil. Now, as an inductive combination of premises does not necessarily involve the inductive conclusion, induction normally leads, not to a necessary, but to a probable conclusion; and whenever its probable conclusions become deductive premises, the deduction only involves a probable conclusion. Can we then infer any certainty at all?
In order to answer this question we must remember that there are many degrees of probability, and that induction, and therefore deduction, draw conclusions more or less probable, and rise to the point at which probability becomes moral certainty, or that high degree of probability which is sufficient to guide our lives, and even condemn murderers to death. But can we rise still higher and infer real necessity? This is a difficult question, which has received many answers.
Some noölogists suppose a mental power of forming necessary principles of deduction a priori; but fail to show how we can apply principles of mind to things beyond mind. Some empiricists, on the other hand, suppose that induction only infers probable conclusions which are premises of probable deductions; but they give up all exact science.
Between these extremes there is room for a third theory, empirical yet providing a knowledge of the really necessary. In some cases of induction concerned with objects capable of abstraction and simplification, we have a power of identification, by which, not a priori but in the act of inducing a conclusion, we apprehend that the things signified by its subject and predicate are one and the same thing which cannot exist apart from itself.
Thus by combined induction and identification we apprehend that one and one are the same as two, that there is no difference between a triangle and a three-sided rectilineal figure, that a whole must be greater than its part by being the whole, that inter-resisting bodies necessarily force one another apart, otherwise they would not be inter-resisting but occupy the same place at the same moment.
Necessary principles, discovered by this process of induction and identification, become premises of deductive demonstration to conclusions which are not only necessary consequents on the premises, but also equally necessary in reality. Induction thus is the source of deduction, of its truth, of its probability, of its moral certainty; and induction, combined with identification, is the origin of the necessary principles of demonstration or deduction to necessary conclusions.
Analogical inference in its turn is as closely allied with induction.
Like induction, it starts from a particular premise, containing one or more examples or instances; but, as it is easier to infer a particular than a universal conclusion, it supplies particular conclusions which in their turn become further particular premises of induction.
Its second premise is indeed merely a particular apprehension that one particular is similar to another, whereas the second premise of induction is a universal apprehension that a whole number of particulars is similar to those from which the inference starts; but at bottom these two apprehensions of similarity are so alike as to suggest that the universal premise of induction has arisen as a generalized analogy.
It seems likely that man has arrived at the apprehension of a whole individual, e.g. a whole animal including all its parts, and thence has inferred by analogy a whole number, or class, e.g. of animals including all individual animals; and accordingly that the particular analogy of one individual to another has given rise to the general analogy of every to each individual in a class, or whole number of individuals, contained in the second premise of induction. In this case, analogical inference has led to induction, as induction to deduction.
Further, analogical inference from particular to particular suggests inductive-deductive inference from particular through universal to particular.
Newton, according to Dr Pemberton, thought in 1666 that the moon moves so like a falling body that it has a similar centripetal force to the earth, 20 years before he demonstrated this conclusion from the laws of motion in the Principia. In fact, analogical, inductive and deductive inferences, though different processes of combining premises to cause different conclusions, are so similar and related, so united in principle and interdependent, so consolidated into a system of inference, that they cannot be completely investigated apart, but together constitute a single subject of science. This science of inference in general is logic.
Logic, however, did not begin as a science of all inference. Rather it began as a science of reasoning ([Greek: logos]), of syllogism ([Greek: syllogismos]), of deductive inference. Aristotle was its founder. He was anticipated of course by many generations of spontaneous thinking (logica naturalis). Many of the higher animals infer by analogy: otherwise we cannot explain their thinking. Man so infers at first: otherwise we cannot explain the actions of young children, who before they begin to speak give no evidence of universal thinking.
It is likely that man began with particular inference and with particular language; and that, gradually generalizing thought and language, he learnt at last to think and say "all," to infer universally, to induce and deduce, to reason, in short, and raise himself above other animals. In ancient times, and especially in Egypt, Babylon and Greece, he went on to develop reason into science or the systematic investigation of definite subjects, e.g. arithmetic of number, geometry of magnitude, astronomy of stars, politics of government, ethics of goods.
In Greece he became more and more reflective and conscious of himself, of his body and soul, his manners and morals, his mental operations and especially his reason. One of the characteristics of Greek philosophers is their growing tendency, in investigating any subject, to turn round and ask themselves what should be the method of investigation. In this way the Presocratics and Sophists, and still more Socrates and Plato, threw out hints on sense and reason, on inferential processes and scientific methods which may be called anticipations of logic.
But Aristotle was the first to conceive of reasoning itself as a definite subject of a special science, which he called analytics or analytic science, specially designed to analyse syllogism and especially demonstrative syllogism, or science, and to be in fact a science of sciences. He was therefore the founder of the science of logic.
Among the Aristotelian treatises we have the following, which together
constitute this new science of reasoning:--
- The Categories, or names signifying things which can become
predicates;
- The De Interpretatione, or the enumeration of conceptions and
their combinations by (1) nouns and verbs (names), (2) enunciations
(propositions);
- The Prior Analytics, on syllogism;
- The Posterior Analytics, on demonstrative syllogism, or science;
- The Topics, on dialectical syllogism; or argument;
- The Sophistical Elenchi, on sophistical or contentious syllogism,
or sophistical fallacies.
So far as we know, Aristotle had no one name for all these
investigations. "Analytics" is only applied to the Prior and
Posterior Analytics, and "logical," which he opposed to
"analytical," only suits the Topics and at most the Sophistical
Elenchi; secondly, while he analyzed syllogism into premises, major
and minor, and premises into terms, subject and predicate, he
attempted no division of the whole science; thirdly, he attempted no
order and arrangement of the treatises into a system of logic, but
only of the Analytics, Topics and Sophistical Elenchi into a
system of syllogisms.
Nevertheless, when his followers had arranged
the treatises into the Organon, as they called it to express that it
is an instrument of science, then there gradually emerged a system of
syllogistic logic, arranged in the triple division--terms,
propositions and syllogisms--which has survived to this day as
technical logic, and has been the foundation of all other logics, even
of those which aim at its destruction.
The main problem which Aristotle set before him was the analysis of syllogism, which he defined as "reasoning in which certain things having been posited something different from them of necessity follows by their being those things" (Prior Analytics, i. 1). What then did he mean by reasoning, or rather by the Greek word [Greek: logos] of which "reasoning" is an approximate rendering? It was meant (cf. Post. An. i.
10) to be both internal, in the soul ([Greek: ho esô logos, en tê psychê]), and external, in language ([Greek: ho exo logos]): hence after Aristotle the Stoics distinguished [Greek: logos endiathetos] and [Greek: prophorikos]. It meant, then, both reason and discourse of reason (cf. Shakespeare, Hamlet, i. 2). On its mental side, as reason it meant combination of thoughts. On its linguistic side, as discourse it was used for any combination of names to form a phrase, such as the definition "rational animal," or a book, such as the Iliad.
It had also the mathematical meaning of ratio; and in its use for definition it is sometimes transferred to essence as the object of definition, and has a mixed meaning, which may be expressed by "account." In all its uses, however, the common meaning is combination. When Aristotle called syllogism [Greek: logos], he meant that it is a combination of premises involving a conclusion of necessity. Moreover, he tended to confine the term [Greek: logos] to syllogistic inference. Not that he omitted other inferences ([Greek: pisteis]).
On the contrary, to him (cf. Prior Analytics, ii. 24) we owe the triple distinction into inference from particular to particular ([Greek: paradeigma], example, or what we call "analogy"), inference from particular to universal ([Greek: epagôgê], induction), and inference from universal to particular ([Greek: syllogismos], syllogism, or deduction).
But he thought that inferences other than syllogism are imperfect; that analogical inference is rhetorical induction; and that induction, through the necessary preliminary of syllogism and the sole process of ascent from sense, memory and experience to the principles of science, is itself neither reasoning nor science. To be perfect he thought that all inference must be reduced to syllogism of the first figure, which he regarded as the specially scientific inference.
Accordingly, the syllogism appeared to him to be the rational process ([Greek: meta logou]), and the demonstrative syllogism from inductively discovered principles to be science ([Greek: epistêmê]). Hence, without his saying it in so many words, Aristotle's logic perforce became a logic of deductive reasoning, or syllogism. As it happened this deductive tendency helped the development of logic.
The obscurer premises of analogy and induction, together with the paucity of experience and the backward state of physical science in Aristotle's time would have baffled even his analytical genius. On the other hand, the demonstrations of mathematical sciences of his time, and the logical forms of deduction evinced in Plato's dialogues, provided him with admirable examples of deduction, which is also the inference most capable of analysis.
Aristotle's analysis of the syllogism showed man how to advance by combining his thoughts in trains of deductive reasoning. Nevertheless, the wider question remained for logic: what is the nature of all inference, and the special form of each of its three main processes?
As then the reasoning of the syllogism was the main problem of
Aristotle's logic, what was his analysis of it? In distinguishing
inner and outer reason, or reasoning and discourse, he added that it
is not to outer reason but to inner reason in the soul that
demonstration and syllogism are directed (Post. An. i. 10). One
would expect, then, an analysis of mental reasoning into mental
judgments ([Greek: kriseis]) as premises and conclusion.
In point of
fact, he analysed it into premises, but then analysed a premise into
terms, which he divided into subject and predicate, with the addition
of the copula "is" or "is not." This analysis, regarded as a whole and
as it is applied in the Analytics and in the other logical
treatises, was evidently intended as a linguistic analysis.
So in the
Categories, he first divided things said ([Greek: ta legomena]) into
uncombined and combined, or names and propositions, and then divided
the former into categories; and in the De interpretatione he
expressly excluded mental conceptions and their combinations, and
confined himself to nouns and verbs and enunciations, or, as we should
say, to names and propositions. Aristotle apparently intended, or at
all events has given logicians in general the impression, that he
intended to analyse syllogism into propositions as premises, and
premise into names as terms.
His logic therefore exhibits the curious
paradox of being an analysis of mental reasoning into linguistic
elements. The explanation is that outer speech is more obvious than
inner thought, and that grammar and poetic criticism, rhetoric and
dialectic preceded logic, and that out of those arts of language arose
the science of reasoning.
The sophist Protagoras had distinguished
various kinds of sentences, and Plato had divided the sentence into
noun and verb, signifying a thing and the action of a thing.
Rhetoricians had enumerated various means of persuasion, some of which
are logical forms, e.g. probability and sign, example and enthymeme.
Among the dialecticians, Socrates had used inductive arguments to
obtain definitions as data of deductive arguments against his
opponents, and Plato had insisted on the processes of ascending to and
descending from an unconditional principle by the power of giving and
receiving argument.
All these points about speech, eloquence and
argument between man and man were absorbed into Aristotle's theory of
reasoning, and in particular the grammar of the sentence consisting of
noun and verb caused the logic of the proposition consisting of
subject and predicate. At the same time, Aristotle was well aware that
the science of reasoning is no art of language and must take up a
different position towards speech as the expression of thought. In the
Categories he classified names, not, however, as a grammarian by
their structure, but as a logician by their signification.
In the De
interpretatione, having distinguished the enunciation, or
proposition, from other sentences as that in which there is truth or
falsity, he relegated the rest to rhetoric or poetry, and founded the
logic of the proposition, in which, however, he retained the
grammatical analysis into noun and verb. In the Analytics he took
the final step of originating the logical analysis of the proposition
as premise into subject and predicate as terms mediated by the copula,
and analysed the syllogism into these elements.
Thus did he become the
founder of the logical but linguistic analysis of reasoning as
discourse ([Greek: ho exô logos]) into propositions and terms.
Nevertheless, the deeper question remained, what is the logical but
mental analysis of reasoning itself ([Greek: ho esô logos]) into its
mental premises and conclusion?
Aristotle thus was the founder of logic as a science. But he laid too much stress on reasoning as syllogism or deduction, and on deductive science; and he laid too much stress on the linguistic analysis of rational discourse into proposition and terms. These two defects remain ingrained in technical logic to this day. But in the course of the development of the science, logicians have endeavoured to correct those defects, and have diverged into two schools. Some have devoted themselves to induction from sense and experience and widened logic till it has become a general science of inference and scientific method.
Others have devoted themselves to the mental analysis of reasoning, and have narrowed logic into a science of conception, judgment and reasoning. The former belong to the school of empirical logic, the latter to the school of conceptual and formal logic. Both have started from points which Aristotle indicated without developing them. But we shall find that his true descendants are the empirical logicians.
Aristotle was the first of the empiricists. He consistently maintained that sense is knowledge of particulars and the origin of scientific knowledge of universals. In his view, sense is a congenital form of judgment ([Greek: dynamis symphytos kritikê], Post. An. ii. 19); a sensation of each of the five senses is always true of its proper object; without sense there is no science; sense is the origin of induction, which is the origin of deduction and science. The Analytics end (Post. An. ii.
19) with a detailed system of empiricism, according to which sense is the primary knowledge of particulars, memory is the retention of a sensation, experience is the sum of many memories, induction infers universals, and intelligence is the true apprehension of the universal principles of science, which is rational, deductive, demonstrative, from empirical principles.
This empirical groundwork of Aristotle's logic was accepted by the
Epicureans, who enunciated most distinctly the fundamental doctrine
that all sensations are true of their immediate objects, and falsity
begins with subsequent opinions, or what the moderns call
"interpretation." Beneath deductive logic, in the logic of Aristotle
and the canonic of the Epicureans, there already lay the basis of
empirical logic: sensory experience is the origin of all inference and
science. It remained for Francis Bacon to develop these beginnings
into a new logic of induction.
He did not indeed accept the
infallibility of sense or of any other operation unaided. He thought,
rather, that every operation becomes infallible by method. Following
Aristotle in this order--sense, memory, intellect--he resolved the
whole process of induction into three ministrations:--
- The ministration to sense, aided by observation and experiment.
- The ministration to memory, aided by registering and arranging the
data, of observation and experiment in tables of instances of
agreement, difference and concomitant variations.
- The ministration to intellect or reason, aided by the negative
elimination by means of contradictory instances of whatever in the
instances is not always present, absent and varying with the given
subject investigated, and finally by the positive inference that
whatever in the instances is always present, absent and varying with
the subject is its essential cause.
Bacon, like Aristotle, was anticipated in this or that point; but, as
Aristotle was the first to construct a system of deduction in the
syllogism and its three figures, so Bacon was the first to construct a
system of induction in three ministrations, in which the requisites of
induction, hitherto recognized only in sporadic hints, were combined
for the first time in one logic of induction. Bacon taught men to
labour in inferring from particular to universal, to lay as much
stress on induction as on deduction, and to think and speak of
inductive reasoning, inductive science, inductive logic.
Moreover,
while Aristotle had the merit of discerning the triplicity of
inference, to Bacon we owe the merit of distinguishing the three
processes without reduction:--
- Inference from particular to particular by Experientia Literata, in
plano;
- Inference from particular to universal by Inductio, ascendendo;
- Inference from universal to particular by Syllogism, descendendo.
In short, the comprehensive genius of Bacon widened logic into a
general science of inference.
On the other hand, as Aristotle over-emphasized deduction so Bacon
over-emphasized induction by contending that it is the only process of
discovering universals (axiomata), which deduction only applies to
particulars. J. S. Mill in his Logic pointed out this defect, and
without departing from Baconian principles remedied it by quoting
scientific examples, in which deduction, starting from inductive
principles, applies more general to less general universals, e.g. when
the more general law of gravitation is shown to include the less
general laws of planetary gravitation.
Mill's logic has the great
merit of copiously exemplifying the principles of the variety of
method according to subject-matter. It teaches us that scientific
method is sometimes induction, sometimes deduction, and sometimes the
consilience of both, either by the inductive verification of previous
deductions, or by the deductive explanation of previous inductions.
It is also most interesting to notice that Aristotle saw further than
Bacon in this direction. The founder of logic anticipated the latest
logic of science, when he recognized, not only the deduction of
mathematics, but also the experience of facts followed by deductive
explanations of their causes in physics.
The consilience of empirical and deductive processes was an Aristotelian discovery, elaborated by Mill against Bacon. On the whole, however, Aristotle, Bacon and Mill, purged from their errors, form one empirical school, gradually growing by adapting itself to the advance of science; a school in which Aristotle was most influenced by Greek deductive Mathematics, Bacon by the rise of empirical physics at the Renaissance, and Mill by the Newtonian combination of empirical facts and mathematical principles in the Principia.
From studying this succession of empirical logicians, we cannot doubt that sense, memory and experience are the real origin of inference, analogical, inductive and deductive. The deepest problem of logic is the relation of sense and inference. But we must first consider the mental analysis of inference, and this brings us to conceptual and formal logic.
Aristotle's logic has often been called formal logic; it was really a technical logic of syllogism analysed into linguistic elements, and of science rested on an empirical basis. At the same time his psychology, though maintaining his empiricism, contained some seeds of conceptual logic, and indirectly of formal logic.
Intellectual development, which according to the logic of the Analytics consists of sense, memory, experience, induction and intellect, according to the psychology of the De Anima consists of sense, imagination and intellect, and one division of intellect is into conception of the undivided and combination of conceptions as one (De An. iii. 6). The De Interpretatione opens with a reference to this psychological distinction, implying that names represent conceptions, propositions represent combinations of conceptions.
But the same passage relegates conceptions and their combinations to the De Anima, and confines the De Interpretatione to names and propositions in conformity with the linguistic analysis which pervades the logical treatises of Aristotle, who neither brought his psychological distinction between conceptions and their combinations into his logic, nor advanced the combinations of conceptions as a definition of judgment ([Greek: krisis]), nor employed the mental distinction between conceptions and judgments as an analysis of inference, or reasoning, or syllogism: he was no conceptual logician.
The history of logic shows that the linguistic distinction between terms and propositions was the sole analysis of reasoning in the logical treatises of Aristotle; that the mental distinction between conceptions ([Greek: ennoiai]) and judgments ([Greek: axiômata] in a wide sense) was imported into logic by the Stoics; and that this mental distinction became the logical analysis of reasoning under the authority of St Thomas Aquinas.
In his commentary on the De Interpretatione, St Thomas, after citing from the De Anima Aristotle's "duplex operatio intellectus," said, "Additur autem et tertia operatio, scilicet ratiocinandi," and concluded that, since logic is a rational science (rationalis scientia), its consideration must be directed to all these operations of reason.
Hence arose conceptual logic; according to which conception is a simple apprehension of an idea without belief in being or not being, e.g. the idea of man or of running; judgment is a combination of conceptions, adding being or not being, e.g. man is running or not running; and reasoning is a combination of judgments: conversely, there is a mental analysis of reasoning into judgments, and judgment into conceptions, beneath the linguistic analysis of rational discourse into propositions, and propositions into terms.
Logic, according to this new school, which has by our time become an old school, has to co-ordinate these three operations, direct them, and, beginning with conceptions, combine conceptions into judgments, and judgments into inference, which thus becomes a complex combination of conceptions, or, in modern parlance, an extension of our ideas.
Conceptual logicians were, indeed, from the first aware that sense supplies the data, and that judgment and therefore inference contains belief that things are or are not. But they held, and still hold that sensation and conception are alike mere apprehensions, and that the belief that things are or are not arises somehow after sensation and conception in judgment, from which it passes into inference. At first, they were more sanguine of extracting from these unpromising beginnings some knowledge of things beyond ideas.
But at length many of them became formal logicians, who held that logic is the investigation of formal thinking, or consistent conception, judgment and reasoning; that it shows how we infer formal truths of consistency without material truth of signifying things; that, as the science of the form or process, it must entirely abstract from the matter, or objects, of thought; and that it does not tell us how we infer from experience.
Thus has logic drifted further and further from the real and empirical logic of Aristotle the founder and Bacon the reformer of the science.
The great merit of conceptual logic was the demand for a mental analysis of mental reasoning, and the direct analysis of reasoning into judgments which are the sole premises and conclusions of reasoning and of all mental inferences. Aristotle had fallen into the paradox of resolving a mental act into verbal elements. The Schoolmen, however, gradually came to realize that the result to their logic was to make it a sermocionalis scientia, and to their metaphysics the danger of nominalism.
St Thomas made a great advance by making logic throughout a rationalis scientia; and logicians are now agreed that reasoning consists of judgments, discourse of propositions. This distinction is, moreover, vital to the whole logic of inference, because we always think all the judgments of which our inference consists, but seldom state all the propositions by which it is expressed. We omit propositions, curtail them, and even express a judgment by a single term, e.g. "Good!" "Fire!".
Hence the linguistic expression is not a true measure of inference; and to say that an inference consists of two propositions causing a third is not strictly true. But to say that it is two judgments causing a third is always true, and the very essence of inference, because we must think the two to conclude the third in "the sessions of sweet silent thought." Inference, in short, consists of actual judgments capable of being expressed in propositions.
Inference always consists of judgments. But judgment does not always
consist of conceptions. It is not a combination of conceptions; it
does not arise from conceptions, nor even at first require conception.
Sense is the origin of judgment. One who feels pained or pleased, who
feels hot or cold or resisting in touch, who tastes the flavoured, who
smells the odorous, who hears the sounding, who sees the coloured, or
is conscious, already believes that something sensible exists before
conception, before inference, and before language; and his belief is
true of the immediate object of sense, the sensible thing, e.g. the
hot felt in touch.
But a belief in the existence of something is a
judgment and a categorical judgment of existence. Sense, then, outer
and inner, or sensation and consciousness, is the origin of sensory
judgments which are true categorical beliefs in the existence of
sensible things; and primary judgments are such true categorical
sensory beliefs that things exist, and neither require conception nor
are combinations of conceptions. Again, since sense is the origin of
memory and experience, memorial and experiential judgments are
categorical and existential judgments, which so far as they report
sensory judgments are always true.
Finally, since sense, memory and
experience are the origin of inference, primary inference is
categorical and existential, starting from sensory, memorial and
experiential judgments as premises, and proceeding to inferential
judgments as conclusions, which are categorical and existential, and
are true, so far as they depend on sense, memory and experience.
Sense, then, is the origin of judgment; and the consequence is that
primary judgments are true, categorical and existential judgments of
sense, and primary inferences are inferences from categorical and
existential premises to categorical and existential conclusions, which
are true so far as they arise from outer and inner sense, and proceed
to things similar to sensible things. All other judgments and
inferences about existing things, or ideas, or names, whether
categorical or hypothetical, are afterthoughts, partly true and partly
false.
Sense, then, because it involves a true belief in existence is fitted
to be the origin of judgment. Conception on the other hand is the
simple apprehension of an idea, particular or universal, but without
belief that anything is or is not, and therefore is unfitted to beget
judgment. Nor could a combination of conceptions make a difference so
fundamental as that between conceiving and believing. The most that it
could do would be to cause an ideal judgment, e.g. that the idea of a
centaur is the idea of a man-horse; and even here some further origin
is needed for the addition of the copula "is."
So far from being a cause, conception is not even a condition of all
judgments; a sensation of hot is sufficient evidence that hot exists,
before the idea of hot is either present or wanted. Conception is,
however, a condition of a memorial judgment: in order to remember
being hot, we require an idea of hot. Memory, however, is not that
idea, but involves a judgment that there previously existed the hot
now represented by the idea, which is about the sensible thing beyond
the conceived idea; and the cause of this memorial judgment is past
sense and present memory.
So sense, memory and experience, the sum of
sense and memory, though requiring conception, are the causes of the
experiential judgment that there exist and have existed many similar,
sensible things, and these sensory, memorial and experiential
judgments about the existence of past and present sensible things
beyond conceived ideas become the particular premises of primary
inference. Starting from them, inference is enabled to draw
conclusions which are inferential judgments about the existence of
things similar to sensible things beyond conceived ideas.
In rising,
however, from particular to universal inference, induction, as we have
seen, adds to its particular premise, S is P, a universal premise,
every M is similar to S, in order to infer the universal conclusion,
every M is P. This universal premise requires a universal conception
of a class or whole number of similar particulars, as a condition. But
the premise is not that conception; it is a belief that there is a
whole number of particulars similar to those already experienced.
The
generalization of a class is not, as the conceptual logic assumes, the
abstraction of a general idea, but an inference from the analogy of a
whole individual thing, e.g. a whole man, to a whole number of similar
individuals, e.g. the whole of men. The general idea of all men or the
combination that the idea of all men is similar to the idea of
particular men would not be enough; the universal premise that all men
in fact are similar to those who have died is required to induce the
universal conclusion that all men in fact die.
Universal inference
thus requires particular and universal conceptions as its condition;
but, so far as it arises from sense, memory, experience, and involves
generalization, it consists of judgments which do not consist of
conceptions, but are beliefs in things existing beyond conception.
Inference then, so far as it starts from categorical and existential
premises, causes conclusions, or inferential judgments, which require
conceptions, but are categorical and existential judgments beyond
conception.
Moreover, as it becomes more deductive, and causes
conclusions further from sensory experience, these inferential
judgments become causes of inferential conceptions. For example, from
the evidence of molar changes due to the obvious parts of bodies,
science first comes to believe in molecular changes due to
imperceptible particles, and then tries to conceive the ideas of
particles, molecules, atoms, electrons. The conceptual logic supposes
that conception always precedes judgment; but the truth is that
sensory judgment begins and inferential judgment ends by preceding
conception.
The supposed triple order--conception, judgment,
reasoning--is defective and false. The real order is sensation and
sensory judgment, conception, memory and memorial judgment, experience
and experiential judgment, inference, inferential judgment,
inferential conception. This is not all: inferential conceptions are
inadequate, and finally fail. They are often symbolical; that is, we
conceive one thing only by another like it, e.g. atoms by minute
bodies not nearly small enough. Often the symbol is not like. What
idea can the physicist form of intraspatial ether? What believer in
God pretends to conceive Him as He really is?
We believe many things
that we cannot conceive; as Mill said, the inconceivable is not the
incredible; and the point of science is not what we can conceive but
what we should believe on evidence. Conception is the weakest,
judgment the strongest power of man's mind. Sense before conception is
the original cause of judgment; and inference from sense enables
judgment to continue after conception ceases.
Finally, as there is
judgment without conception, so there is conception without judgment.
We often say "I understand, but do not decide." But this suspension of
judgment is a highly refined act, unfitted to the beginning of
thought. Conception begins as a condition of memory, and after a long
continuous process of inference ends in mere ideation. The conceptual
logic has made the mistake of making ideation a stage in thought prior
to judgment.
It was natural enough that the originators of conceptual logic, seeing
that judgments can be expressed by propositions, and conceptions by
terms, should fall into the error of supposing that, as propositions
consist of terms, so judgments consist of conceptions, and that there
is a triple mental order--conception, judgment, reasoning--parallel to
the triple linguistic order--term, proposition, discourse.
They
overlooked the fact that man thinks long before he speaks, makes
judgments which he does not express at all, or expresses them by
interjections, names and phrases, before he uses regular propositions,
and that he does not begin by conceiving and naming, and then proceed
to believing and proposing. Feeling and sensation, involving believing
or judging, come before conception and language.
As conceptions are
not always present in judgment, as they are only occasional
conditions, and as they are unfitted to cause beliefs or judgments,
and especially judgments of existence, and as judgments both precede
conceptions in sense and continue after them in inference, it follows
that conceptions are not the constituents of judgment, and judgment is
not a combination of conceptions. Is there then any analysis of
judgment?
Paradoxical as it may sound, the truth seems to be that
primary judgment, beginning as it does with the simplest feeling and
sensation, is not a combination of two mental elements into one, but
is a division of one sensible thing into the thing itself and its
existence and the belief that it is determined as existing, e.g. that
hot exists, cold exists, the pained exists, the pleased exists. Such a
judgment has a cause, namely sense, but no mental elements.
Afterwards come judgments of complex sense, e.g. that the existing hot
is burning or becoming more or less hot, &c.
Thus there is a
combination of sensations causing the judgment; but the judgment is
still a division of the sensible thing into itself and its being, and
a belief that it is so determined. Afterwards follow judgments arising
from more complex causes, e.g. memory, experience, inference.
But
however complicated these mental causes, there still remain these
points common to all judgment:--(1) The mental causes of judgment are
sense, memory, experience and inference; while conception is a
condition of some judgments. (2) A judgment is not a combination
either of its causes or of its conditions, e.g. it is not a
combination of sensations any more than of ideas. (3) A judgment is a
unitary mental act, dividing not itself but its object into the object
itself and itself as determined, and signifying that it is so
determined. (4) A primary judgment is a judgment that a sensible thing
is determined as existing; but later judgments are concerned with
either existing things, or with ideas, or with words, and signify that
they are determined in all sorts of ways. (5) When a judgment is
expressed by a proposition, the proposition expresses the results of
the division by two terms, subject and predicate, and by the copula
that what is signified by the subject is what is signified by the
predicate; and the proposition is a combination of the two terms; e.g.
border war is evil. (6) A complex judgment is a combination of two
judgments, and may be copulative, e.g. you and I are men, or
hypothetical, or disjunctive, &c.
Empirical logic, the logic of Aristotle and Bacon, is on the right way.
It is the business of the logician to find the causes of the judgments which form the premises and the conclusions of inference, reasoning and science. What knowledge do we get by sense, memory and experience, the first mental causes of judgment? What is judgment, and what its various kinds? What is inference, how does it proceed by combining judgments as premises to cause judgments as conclusions, and what are its various kinds? How does inference draw conclusions more or less probable up to moral certainty? How does it by the aid of identification convert probable into necessary conclusions, which become necessary principles of demonstration?
How is categorical succeeded by conditional inference?
What is scientific method as a system of inferences about definite subjects? How does inference become the source of error and fallacy? How does the whole process from sense to inference discover the real truth of judgments, which are true so far as they signify things known by sense, memory, experience and inference? These are the fundamental questions of the science of inference. Conceptual logic, on the other hand, is false from the start.
It is not the first business of logic to direct us how to form conceptions signified by terms, because sense is a prior cause of judgment and inference. It is not the second business of logic to direct us how out of conceptions to form judgments signified by propositions, because the real causes of judgments are sense, memory, experience and inference.
It is, however, the main business of logic to direct us how out of judgments to form inferences signified by discourse; and this is the one point which conceptual logic has contributed to the science of inference. But why spoil the further mental analysis of inference by supposing that conceptions are constituents of judgment and therefore of inference, which thus becomes merely a complex combination of conceptions, an extension of ideas?
The mistake has been to convert three operations of mind into three processes in a fixed order--conception, judgment, inference. Conception and judgment are decisions: inference alone is a process, from decisions to decision, from judgments to judgment. Sense, not conception, is the origin of judgment. Inference is the process which from judgments about sensible things proceeds to judgments about things similar to sensible things.
Though some conceptions are its conditions and some judgments its causes, inference itself in its conclusions causes many more judgments and conceptions. Finally, inference is an extension, not of ideas, but of beliefs, at first about existing things, afterwards about ideas, and even about words; about anything in short about which we think, in what is too fancifully called "the universe of discourse."
Formal logic has arisen out of the narrowness of conceptual logic. The science of inference no doubt has to deal primarily with formal truth or the consistency of premises and conclusion. But as all truth, real as well as formal, is consistent, formal rules of consistency become real rules of truth, when the premises are true and the consistent conclusion is therefore true. The science of inference again rightly emphasizes the formal thinking of the syllogism in which the combination of premises involves the conclusion.
But the combinations of premises in analogical and inductive inference, although the combination does not involve the conclusion, yet causes us to infer it, and in so similar a way that the science of inference is not complete without investigating all the combinations which characterize different kinds of inference. The question of logic is how we infer in fact, as well as perfectly; and we cannot understand inference unless we consider inferences of probability of all kinds.
Moreover, the study of analogical and inductive inference is necessary to that of the syllogism itself, because they discover the premises of syllogism. The formal thinking of syllogism alone is merely necessary consequence; but when its premises are necessary principles, its conclusions are not only necessary consequents but also necessary truths. Hence the manner in which induction aided by identification discovers necessary principles must be studied by the logician in order to decide when the syllogism can really arrive at necessary conclusions.
Again, the science of inference has for its subject the form, or processes, of thought, but not its matter or objects. But it does not follow that it can investigate the former without the latter. Formal logicians say that, if they had to consider the matter, they must either consider all things, which would be impossible, or select some, which would be arbitrary.
But there is an intermediate alternative, which is neither impossible nor arbitrary; namely, to consider the general distinctions and principles of all things; and without this general consideration of the matter the logician cannot know the form of thought, which consists in drawing inferences about things on these general principles.
Lastly, the science of inference is not indeed the science of sensation, memory and experience, but at the same time it is the science of using those mental operations as data of inference; and, if logic does not show how analogical and inductive inferences directly, and deductive inferences indirectly, arise from experience, it becomes a science of mere thinking without knowledge.
Logic is related to all the sciences, because it considers the common inferences and varying methods used in investigating different subjects.
But it is most closely related to the sciences of metaphysics and psychology, which form with it a triad of sciences. Metaphysics is the science of being in general, and therefore of the things which become objects apprehended by our minds. Psychology is the science of mind in general, and therefore of the mental operations, of which inference is one. Logic is the science of the processes of inference.
These three sciences, of the objects of mind, of the operations of mind, of the processes used in the inferences of mind, are differently, but closely related, so that they are constantly confused. The real point is their interdependence, which is so intimate that one sign of great philosophy is a consistent metaphysics, psychology and logic.
If the world of things is known to be partly material and partly mental, then the mind must have powers of sense and inference enabling it to know these things, and there must be processes of inference carrying us from and beyond the sensible to the insensible world of matter and mind. If the whole world of things is matter, operations and processes of mind are themselves material. If the whole world of things is mind, operations and processes of mind have only to recognize their like all the world over.
It is clear then that a man's metaphysics and psychology must colour his logic. It is accordingly necessary to the logician to know beforehand the general distinctions and principles of things in metaphysics, and the mental operations of sense, conception, memory and experience in psychology, so as to discover the processes of inference from experience about things in logic.
The interdependence of this triad of sciences has sometimes led to their confusion. Hegel, having identified being with thought, merged metaphysics in logic. But he divided logic into objective and subjective, and thus practically confessed that there is one science of the objects and another of the processes of thought. Psychologists, seeing that inference is a mental operation, often extemporize a theory of inference to the neglect of logic. But we have a double consciousness of inference.
We are conscious of it as one operation among many, and of its omnipresence, so to speak, to all the rest. But we are also conscious of the processes of the operation of inference. To a certain extent this second consciousness applies to other operations: for example, we are conscious of the process of association by which various mental causes recall ideas in the imagination. But how little does the psychologist know about the association of ideas, compared with what the logician has discovered about the processes of inference!
The fact is that our primary consciousness of all mental operations is hardly equal to our secondary consciousness of the processes of the one operation of inference from premises to conclusions permeating long trains and pervading whole sciences. This elaborate consciousness of inferential process is the justification of logic as a distinct science, and is the first step in its method.
But it is not the whole method of logic, which also and rightly considers the mental process necessary to language, without substituting linguistic for mental distinctions.
Nor are consciousness and linguistic analysis all the instruments of the logician. Logic has to consider the things we know, the minds by which we know them from sense, memory and experience to inference, and the sciences which systematize and extend our knowledge of things; and having considered these facts, the logician must make such a science of inference as will explain the power and the poverty of human knowledge.
GENERAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN LOGIC
There are several grounds for hope in the logic of our day. In the first place, it tends to take up an intermediate position between the extremes of Kant and Hegel. It does not, with the former, regard logic as purely formal in the sense of abstracting thought from being, nor does it follow the latter in amalgamating metaphysics with logic by identifying being with thought.
Secondly, it does not content itself with the mere formulae of thinking, but pushes forward to theories of method, knowledge and science; and it is a hopeful sign to find this epistemological spirit, to which England was accustomed by Mill, animating German logicians such as Lotze, Dühring, Schuppe, Sigwart and Wundt.
Thirdly, there is a determination to reveal the psychological basis of logical processes, and not merely to describe them as they are in adult reasoning, but to explain also how they arise from simpler mental operations and primarily from sense. This attempt is connected with the psychological turn given to recent philosophy by Wundt and others, and is dangerous only so far as psychology itself is hypothetical.
Unfortunately, however, these merits are usually connected with a less admirable characteristic--contempt for tradition, Writing his preface to his second edition in 1888, Sigwart says: "Important works have appeared by Lotze, Schuppe, Wundt and Bradley, to name only the most eminent; and all start from the conception which has guided this attempt.
That is, logic is grounded by them, not upon an effete tradition but upon a new investigation of thought as it actually is in its psychological foundations, in its significance for knowledge, and its actual operation in scientific methods." How strange! The spirit of every one of the three reforms above enumerated is an unconscious return to Aristotle's Organon.
Aristotle's was a logic which steered, as Trendelenburg has shown, between Kantian formalism and Hegelian metaphysics; it was a logic which in the Analytics investigated the syllogism as a means to understanding knowledge and science: it was a logic which, starting from the psychological foundations of sense, memory and experience, built up the logical structure of induction and deduction on the profoundly Aristotelian principle that "there is no process from universals without induction, and none by induction without sense." Wundt's comprehensive view that logic looks backwards to psychology and forward to epistemology was hundreds of years ago one of the many discoveries of Aristotle.
JUDGMENT
- Judgment and Conception.--The emphasis now laid on judgment, the
recovery from Hume's confusion of beliefs with ideas and the association of ideas, and the distinction of the mental act of judging from its verbal expression in a proposition, are all healthy signs in recent logic. The most fundamental question, before proceeding to the investigation of inference, is not what we say but what we think in making the judgments which, whether we express them in propositions or not, are both the premises and the conclusion of inference; and, as this question has been diligently studied of late, but has been variously answered, it will be well to give a list of the more important theories of judgment as follows:--
a. It expresses a relation between the content of two ideas, not a
relation of these ideas (Lotze).
b. It is consciousness concerning the objective validity of a
subjective combination of ideas, i.e. whether between the
corresponding objective elements an analogous combination exists
(Ueberweg).
c. It is the synthesis of ideas into unity and consciousness of their
objective validity, not in the sense of agreement with external
reality but in the sense of the logical necessity of their synthesis
(Sigwart).
d. It is the analysis of an aggregate idea (Gesammtvorstellung) into
subject and predicate; based on a previous association of ideas, on
relating and comparing, and on the apperceptive synthesis of an
aggregate idea in consequence; but itself consisting in an
apperceptive analysis of that aggregate idea; and requiring will in
the form of apperception or attention (Wundt).
e. It requires an idea, because every object is conceived as well as
recognized or denied; but it is itself an assertion of actual fact,
every perception counts for a judgment, and every categorical is
changeable into an existential judgment without change of sense
(Brentano, who derives his theory from Mill except that he denies the
necessity of a combination of ideas, and reduces a categorical to an
existential judgment).
f. It is a decision of the validity of an idea requiring will
(Bergmann, following Brentano).
g. Judgment (Urtheil) expresses that two ideas belong together:
"by-judgment" (Beurtheilung) is the reaction of will expressing the
validity or invalidity of the combination of ideas (Windelband,
following Bergmann, but distinguishing the decision of validity from
the judgment).
h. Judgment is consciousness of the identity or difference and of the
causal relations of the given; naming the actual combinations of the
data, but also requiring a priori categories of the understanding, the
notions of identity, difference and causality, as principles of
thought or laws, to combine the plurality of the given into a unity
(Schuppe).
i. Judgment is the act which refers an ideal content recognized as
such to a reality beyond the act, predicating an idea of a reality, a
what of a that; so that the subject is reality and the predicate the
meaning of an idea, while the judgment refers the idea to reality by
an identity of content (Bradley and Bosanquet).
k. Judgment is an assertion of reality, requiring comparison and ideas
which render it directly expressible in words (Hobhouse, mainly
following Bradley).
These theories are of varying value in proportion to their proximity to Aristotle's point that predication is about things, and to Mill's point that judgments and propositions are about things, not about ideas. The essence of judgment is belief that something is (or is not) determined, either as existing (e.g. "I am," "A centaur is not") or as something in particular (e.g. "I am a man," "I am not a monkey").
Neither Mill, however, nor any of the later logicians whose theories we have quoted, has been able quite to detach judgment from conception; they all suppose that an idea, or ideas, is a condition of all judgment. But judgment starts from sensation (Empfindung) and feeling (Gefühl), and not from idea (Vorstellung).
When I feel pleased or pained, or when I use my senses to perceive a pressure, a temperature, a flavour, an odour, a colour, a sound, or when I am conscious of feeling and perceiving, I cannot resist the belief that something sensible is present; and this belief that something exists is already a judgment, a judgment of existence, and, so far as it is limited to sense without inference, a true judgment.
It is a matter of words whether or not we should call this sensory belief a judgment; but it is no matter of choice to the logician, who regards all the constituents of inference as judgments; for the fundamental constituents are sensory beliefs, which are therefore judgments in the logical sense.
Sense is the evidence of inference; directly of analogical and inductive, directly or indirectly of deductive, inference; and therefore, if logic refuses to include sensory beliefs among judgments, it will omit the fundamental constituents of inference, inference will no longer consist of judgments but of sensory beliefs plus judgments, and the second part of logic, the logic of judgment, the purpose of which is to investigate the constituents of inference, will be like Hamlet without the prince of Denmark.
If, on the other hand, all the constituents of inference are judgments, there are judgments of sense; and the evidence of the senses means that a judgment of sense is true, while a judgment of inference is true so far as it is directly or indirectly concluded from judgments of sense. Now a sensory judgment, e.g. that a sensible pressure is existing, is explained by none of the foregoing theories, because it requires nothing but sensation and belief.
It requires no will, but is usually involuntary, for the stimulus forces one's attention, which is not always voluntary; not all judgment then requires will, as Wundt supposes. It requires no reference to reality beyond the sensible pressure, because it is merely a belief that this exists without inference of the external stimulus or any inference at all: not all judgment then requires the reference of subjective to objective supposed by Ueberweg, or the consciousness of logical necessity supposed by Sigwart.
It requires in addition to the belief that something exists, no consideration as to whether the belief itself be true, because a man who feels pressure believes in the thing without further question about the belief: not all judgment then requires a decision of validity, as Bergmann supposes. It requires nothing beyond the sensation and belief in the given existence of the given pressure: not all judgment then requires categories of understanding, or notions of identity, difference and causality, or even of existence, such as Schuppe supposes.
It requires no comparison in order to express it in words, for a judgment need not be expressed, and a sensory judgment of pressure is an irresistible belief that a real pressure exists, without waiting for words, or for a comparison which is wanted not to make a sensation a judgment, but to turn a judgment into language: not all judgment then requires comparison with a view to its expression, as supposed by Hobhouse.
Lastly, all the authors of the above-quoted theories err in supposing that all judgment requires conception; for even Mill thinks a combination of ideas necessary, and Brentano, who comes still nearer to the nature of sensory judgment when he says, "Every perception counts for a judgment," yet thinks that an idea is necessary at the same time in order to understand the thing judged.
In reality, the sensation and the belief are sufficient; when I feel a sensible pressure, I cannot help believing in its reality, and therefore judging that it is real, without any tertium quid--an idea of pressure, or of existence or of pressure existing--intervening between the sensation and the belief.
Only after sensation has ceased does an idea, or representation of what is not presented, become necessary as a substitute for a sensation and as a condition not of the first judgment that there is, but of a second judgment that there was, something sensible. Otherwise there would be no judgment of sensible fact, for the first sensation would not give it, and the idea following the sensation would be still farther off.
The sensory judgment then, which is nothing but a belief that at the moment of sense something sensible exists, is a proof that not all judgment requires conception, or synthesis or analysis of ideas, or decision about the content, or about the validity, of ideas, or reference of an ideal content to reality, as commonly, though variously, supposed in the logic of our day.
Not, however, that all judgment is sensory: after the first judgments of sense follow judgments of memory, and memory requires ideas. Yet memory is not mere conception, as Aristotle, and Mill after him, have perceived. To remember, we must have a present idea; but we must also have a belief that the thing, of which the idea is a representation, was (or was not) determined; and this belief is the memorial judgment.
Originally such judgments arise from sensory judgments followed by ideas, and are judgments of memory after sense that something sensible existed, e.g. pressure existed: afterwards come judgments of memory after inference, e.g. Caesar was murdered. Finally, most judgments are inferential.
These are conclusions which primarily are inferred from sensory and memorial judgments; and so far as inference starts from sense of something sensible in the present, and from memory after sense of something sensible in the past, and concludes similar things, inferential judgments are indirect beliefs in being and in existence beyond ideas.
When from the sensible pressures between the parts of my mouth, which I feel and remember and judge that they exist and have existed, I infer another similar pressure (e.g. of the food which presses and is pressed by my mouth in eating), the inferential judgment with which I conclude is a belief that the latter exists as well as the former (e.g. the pressure of food without as well as the sensible pressures within). Inference, no doubt, is closely involved with conception.
So far as it depends on memory, an inferential judgment presupposes memorial ideas in its data; and so far as it infers universal classes and laws, it produces general ideas. But even so the part played by conception is quite subordinate to that of belief. In the first place, the remembered datum, from which an inference of pressure starts, is not the conceived idea, but the belief that the sensible pressure existed.
Secondly, the conclusion in which it ends is not the general idea of a class, but the belief that a class, represented by a general idea, exists, and is (or is not) otherwise determined (e.g. that things pressing and pressed exist and move).
Two things are certain about inferential judgment: one, that when inference is based on sense and memory, inferential judgment starts from a combination of sensory and memorial judgment, both of which are beliefs that things exist; the other, that in consequence inferential judgment is a belief that similar things exist. There are thus three primary judgments: judgments of sense, of memory after sense, and of inference from sense.
All these are beliefs in being and existence, and this existential belief is first in sense, and afterwards transferred to memory and inference. Moreover, it is transferred in the same irresistible way: frequently we cannot help either feeling pressure, or remembering it, or inferring it; and as there are involuntary sensation and attention, so there are involuntary memory and inference. Again, in a primary judgment existence need not be expressed; but if expressed, it may be expressed either by the predicate, e.g. "I exist," or by the subject, e.g.
"I who exist think."
There are indeed differences between primary judgments, in that the sensory is a belief in present, the memorial in past, and the inferential in present, past and future existence. But these differences in detail do not alter the main point that all these are beliefs in the existing, in the real as opposed to the ideal, in actual things which are not ideas. In short, a primary judgment is a belief in something existing apart from our idea of it; and not because we have an idea of it, or by comparing an idea with, or referring an idea to, reality; but because we have a sensation of it, or a memory of it or an inference of it. Sensation, not conception, is the origin of judgment.
- Different Significations of Being in different Kinds of
Judgment.--As Aristotle remarked both in the De Interpretatione and in the Sophistici Elenchi, "not-being is thinkable" does not mean "not-being exists." In the latter treatise he added that it is a fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter to argue from the former to the latter; "for," as he says, "it is not the same thing to be something and to exist absolutely." Without realizing their debt to tradition, Herbart, Mill and recently Sigwart, have repeated Aristotle's separation of the copula from the verb of existence, as if it were a modern discovery that "is" is not the same as "exists." It may be added that they do not quite realize what the copula exactly signifies: it does not signify existence, but it does signify a fact, namely, that something is (or is not) determined, either absolutely in a categorical judgment, or conditionally in a conditional judgment.
Now we have seen that all primary judgments signify more than this fact; they are also beliefs in the existence of the thing signified by the subject. But, in the first place, primary judgments signify this existence never by the copula, but sometimes by the predicate, and sometimes by the subject; and, secondly, it does not follow that all judgments whatever signify existence. Besides inference of existence there is inference of non-existence, of things inconsistent with the objects of primary judgments.
Hence secondary judgments, which no longer contain a belief that the thing exists, e.g. the judgment, "not-being is thinkable," cited by Aristotle; the judgment, "A square circle is impossible," cited by Herbart; the judgment, "A centaur is a fiction of the poets," cited by Mill. These secondary judgments of non-existence are partly like and partly unlike primary judgments of existence. They resemble them in that they are beliefs in being signified by the copula.
They are beliefs in things of a sort; for, after all, ideas and names are things; their objects, even though non-existent, are at all events things conceivable or nameable; and therefore we are able to make judgments that things, non-existent but conceivable or nameable, are (or are not) determined in a particular manner.
Thus the judgment about a centaur is the belief, "A conceivable centaur is a fiction of the poets," and the judgment about a square circle is the belief, "A so-called square circle is an impossibility." But, though beliefs that things of some sort are (or are not) determined, these secondary judgments fall short of primary judgments of existence.
Whereas in a primary judgment there is a further belief, signified by subject or predicate, that the thing is an existing thing in the sense of being a real thing (e.g. a man), different from the idea of it as well as from the name for it; in a secondary judgment there is no further belief that the thing has any existence beyond the idea (e.g. a centaur), or even beyond the name (e.g. a square circle): though the idea or name exists, there is no belief that anything represented by idea or name exists.
Starting, then, from this fundamental distinction between judgments of existence and judgments of non-existence, we may hope to steer our way between two extreme views which emanate from two important thinkers, each of whom has produced a flourishing school of psychological logic.
On the one hand, early in the 19th century Herbart started the view that a categorical judgment is never a judgment of existence, but always hypothetical; on the other hand, in the latter part of the century Brentano started the view that all categorical judgments are existential. The truth lies between these contraries.
The view of Herbart and his school is contradicted by our primary judgments of and from sense, in which we cannot help believing existence; and it gives an inadequate account even of our secondary judgments in which we no longer indeed believe existence, but do frequently believe that a non-existent thing is (or is not) somehow determined unconditionally.
It is true, as Herbart says, that the judgment, "A square circle is an impossibility," does not contain the belief, "A square circle is existent"; but when he goes on to argue that it means, "If a square circle is thought, the conception of impossibility must be added in thought," he falls into a non-sequitur.
To be categorical, a judgment does not require a belief in existence, but only that something, existent or not, is (or is not) determined; and there are two quite different attitudes of mind even to a non-existent thing, such as a square circle, namely, unconditional and conditional belief.
The judgment, "A non-existent but so-called square circle is an impossibility," is an unconditional, or categorical judgment of non-existence, quite different from any hypothetical judgment, which depends on the conditions "if it is thought," or "if it exists," or any other "if." On the other hand, the view of Brentano and his school is contradicted by these very categorical judgments of non-existence; and while it applies only to categorical judgments of existence, it does so inadequately.
To begin with the latter objection, Brentano proposed to change the four Aristotelian forms of judgment, A, E, I, O, into the following existential forms:--
A. "There is not an immortal man."
E. "There is not a live stone."
I. "There is a sick man."
O. "There is an unlearned man."
This reconstruction, which merges subject and predicate in one expression, in order to combine it with the verb of existence, is repeated in similar proposals of recent English logicians. Venn, in his Symbolic Logic, proposes the four forms, xy = 0, xy = 0, xy> 0, xy> 0 (where y means "not-y"), but only as alternative to the ordinary forms.
Bradley says that "'S-P is real' attributes S-P, directly or indirectly, to the ultimate reality," and agrees with Brentano that "'is' never stands for anything but 'exists'"; while Bosanquet, who follows Bradley, goes so far as to define a categorical judgment as "that which affirms the existence of its subject, or, in other words, asserts a fact." Now it is true that our primary judgments do contain a belief in existence; but they do not all contain it in the same way, but are beliefs sometimes that something is determined as existing, and sometimes that something existing is particularly determined.
Brentano's forms do not express such a judgment of existence, as "All existing men are mortal": nor does Bradley's form, "Reality includes S-P." Metaphysically, all realities are parts of one ultimate reality; but logically, even philosophers think more often only of finite realities, existing men, dogs, horses, &c.; and children know that their parents exist long before they apprehend ultimate reality. The normal form, then, of a judgment of existence is either "S is a real P," or "A real S is P."
Hence the reconstruction of all categorical judgments by merging subject and predicate, either on Brentano's or on Bradley's plan, is a misrepresentation even of normal categorical judgments of existence.
Secondly, it is much more a misrepresentation of categorical judgments of non-existence. No existential form suits a judgment such as "A centaur is a fiction," when we do not believe that there is a centaur, or that reality includes a centaur. As Mill pointed out, it cannot be implied that a centaur exists, since the very thing asserted is that the thing has no real existence.
In a correspondence with Mill, Brentano rejoined that the centaur exists in imagination; Bradley says, "inside our heads." According to one, then, the judgment becomes "There is an imaginary centaur"; according to the other "Reality includes an imaginary centaur." The rejoinder, however, though partly true, is not to the point. The idea of the centaur does exist in our imagination, and inside our heads, and the name of it in our mouths.
But the point is that the centaur conceived and named does not exist beyond the idea of it and the name for it; it is not, like a man, a real thing which is neither the idea of it nor the name for it. No amount of subtlety will remove the difference between a categorical judgment of existence, e.g. "An existing man is mortal," and a categorical judgment of non-existence, e.g. "A conceivable centaur is a fiction," because in the former we believe and mean that the thing exists beyond the idea, and in the latter we do not.
If, contrary to usage, we choose to call the latter a judgment of existence, there is no use in quarrelling about words; but we must insist that new terms must in that case be invented to express so fundamental a difference as that between judgments about real men and judgments about ideal centaurs.
So long, however, as we use words in the natural sense, and call the former judgments of existence, and the latter judgments of non-existence, then "is" will not be, as Bradley supposes, the same as "exists," for we use "is" in both judgments, but "exists" only in the first kind. Bosanquet's definition of a categorical judgment contains a similar confusion. To assert a fact and to affirm the existence of a subject are not, as he makes out, the same thing: a judgment often asserts a fact and denies existence in the same breath, e.g.
"Jupiter is non-existent." Here, as usual in logic, tradition is better than innovation. All categorical judgment is an unconditional belief in the fact, signified by the copula, that a thing of some sort is (or is not) determined; but some categorical judgments are also beliefs that the thing is an existing thing, signified either by the subject or by the predicate, while others are not beliefs that the thing exists at all, but are only beliefs in something conceivable, or nameable, or in something or other, without particularizing what.
Judgment then always signifies being, but not always existence.
- Particular and Universal Judgments.--Aristotle, by distinguishing
affirmative and negative, particular and universal, made the fourfold classification of judgments, A, E, I and O, the fou
Edition notice Project Gutenberg source, credits & licence
The reading text above is the public-domain work. The Project Gutenberg header, production credits and licence are kept here as provenance rather than shown before the book.
Transcriber and production notes
Transcriber's notes:
Front matter as received (title page, contents)
(1) Numbers following letters (without space) like C2 were originally
printed in subscript. Letter subscripts are preceded by an
underscore, like C_n.
(2) Characters following a carat (^) were printed in superscript.
(3) Side-notes were relocated to function as titles of their respective
paragraphs.
(4) Macrons and breves above letters and dots below letters were not
inserted.
(5) [root] stands for the root symbol; [alpha], [beta], etc. for greek
letters.
(6) The following typographical errors have been corrected:
ARTICLE LOGARITHM: "... tangents and secants for every minute of
the quadrant to 10 places; these were obtained by calculating the
logarithms of the natural sines, &c. given in the Thesaurus
mathematicus of Pitiscus (1613)." 'these' amended from 'there'.
ARTICLE LOGARITHM: "The final step was made by John Newton in his
Trigonometria Britannica (1658) ..." 'Trigonometria' amended from
'Trigononometria'.
ARTICLE LOGIC: "S is not P." 'P' amended from 'M'.
ARTICLE LOGIC: "... Jevons proceeded to confuse analytic deduction
from consequence to ground with hypothetical deduction from ground
to consequence under the common term 'inverse deduction.'"
'consequence' amended from 'conseguence'.
ARTICLE LOGIC: "But in induction the given particulars are the
evidence by which we discover the universal, e.g. particular
magnets attracting iron are the origin of an inference that all do
..." 'attracting' amended from 'attracing'.
ARTICLE LOGIC: "... but which is to other regards deductive as
syllogism, is set up in contrast to syllogism 906 and enumeration
alike." 'contrast' amended from 'constrast'
ARTICLE LOGIC: "67a 39-63." '-63'-63' amended from '-b 3'.
ARTICLE LOIRE: "Owing to the extreme irregularity of the river in
different seasons these canals form the only certain navigable
way." 'extreme' amended from 'exteme'.
ARTICLE LOLLARDS: "He summed up their doctrines under eleven heads:
they condemn the having and using of images in the churches ..."
added 'of'.
ARTICLE LOMBARDY: "G. T. Rivoira in Origini dell' Architettura
Lombarda (2 vols. Rome, 1901-1907) ..." 'Architettura' amended from
'Architetturo'.
ARTICLE LONDONDERRY: "The scenery of the Roe valley, with the
picturesque towns of Limavady and Dungiven, is also attractive, and
the roads from the latter place to Draperstown and to Maghera ..."
'attractive' amended from 'atrractive'.
ARTICLE LONGOMONTANUS: "... Problemata duo Geometrica (1638) ..."
'Geometrica' amended from 'Goemetrica'.
ARTICLE LOOM: "... and, as appears from Grew (Mus. Reg. Soc. p.
69), it was formerly given to the little grebe or dabchick (P.
fluviatilis or minor)." 'as' amended from 'ns'.
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA
A DICTIONARY OF ARTS, SCIENCES, LITERATURE
AND GENERAL INFORMATION
ELEVENTH EDITION
VOLUME XVI, SLICE VIII
Logarithm to Lord Advocate
ARTICLES IN THIS SLICE:
LOGARITHM LONG, JOHN DAVIS
LOGAU, FRIEDRICH LONG BRANCH
LOGIA LONGCLOTH
LOGIC LONG EATON
LOGOCYCLIC CURVE, STROPHOID LONGEVITY
LOGOGRAPHI LONGFELLOW, HENRY WADSWORTH
LOGOS LONG FIVES
LOGOTHETE LONGFORD (county of Ireland)
LOGROÑO (province of Spain) LONGFORD (town of Ireland)
LOGROÑO (Spanish town) LONGHI, PIETRO
LOGROSCINO, NICOLA LONGINUS, CASSIUS
LOGWOOD LONG ISLAND
LOHARU LONG ISLAND CITY
LÖHE, JOHANN KONRAD WILHELM LONGITUDE
LOHENGRIN LONGLEY, CHARLES THOMAS
LOIN LONGMANS
LOIRE (river of France) LONGOMONTANUS, CHRISTIAN SEVERIN
LOIRE (department of France) LONGSTREET, JAMES
LOIRE-INFÉRIEURE LONGTON
LOIRET LONGUEVILLE
LOIR-ET-CHER LONGUEVILLE, ANNE GENEVIÈVE
LOISY, ALFRED FIRMIN LONGUS
LOJA LONGWY
LOKEREN LÖNNROT, ELIAS
LOKOJA LONSDALE, EARLS OF
LOLLARDS LONSDALE, WILLIAM
LOLLIUS, MARCUS LONS-LE-SAUNIER
LOLOS LOO
LOMBARD LEAGUE LOOE
LOMBARDO LOOM (water-birds)
LOMBARDS LOOM (weaving machine)
LOMBARDY LOÓN
LOMBOK LOOP
LOMBROSO, CESARE LOOSESTRIFE
LOMÉNIE, ÉTIENNE CHARLES DE LOOT
LOMOND, LOCH LOPES, FERNÃO
LOMONÓSOV, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH LOPEZ, CARLOS ANTONIO
LOMZA (government of Russian) LOPEZ DE GÓMARA, FRANCISCO
LOMZA (town of Russia) LOP-NOR
LONAULI LOQUAT
LONDON (Canada) LORAIN
LONDON (capital of England) LORALAI
LONDON CLAY LORCA
LONDONDERRY, EARLS OF LORCH (Prussian town)
LONDONDERRY, STEWART (VANE) LORCH (town of kingdom of Württemberg)
LONDONDERRY, ROBERT STEWART LORD, JOHN
LONDONDERRY (county of Ireland) LORD
LONDONDERRY (town of Ireland) LORD ADVOCATEHeader as received
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Logarithm" to "Lord Advocate"
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.
Title: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Logarithm" to "Lord Advocate"
Author: Various
Release date: March 15, 2013 [eBook #42342]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/42342
Credits: Produced by Marius Masi, Don Kretz and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.netFull Project Gutenberg licence
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
be renamed.
Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright
law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works,
so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United
States without permission and without paying copyright
royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part
of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™
concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark,
and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following
the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use
of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very
easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation
of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project
Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may
do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected
by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark
license, especially commercial redistribution.
START: FULL LICENSE
THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG™ LICENSE
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free
distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full
Project Gutenberg License available with this file or online at
www.gutenberg.org/license.
Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg
electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all
the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or
destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg electronic works in your
possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a
Project Gutenberg electronic work and you do not agree to be bound
by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person
or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be
used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few
things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg electronic works
even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See
paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project
Gutenberg electronic works if you follow the terms of this
agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg
electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection
of Project Gutenberg electronic works. Nearly all the individual
works in the collection are in the public domain in the United
States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the
United States and you are located in the United States, we do not
claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing,
displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as
all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope
that you will support the Project Gutenberg mission of promoting
free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg
works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the
Project Gutenberg name associated with the work. You can easily
comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the
same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg License when
you share it without charge with others.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are
in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States,
check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this
agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing,
distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any
other Project Gutenberg work. The Foundation makes no
representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any
country other than the United States.
1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other
immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg License must appear
prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg work (any work
on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the
phrase “Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed,
performed, viewed, copied or distributed:
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg™ License included with this eBook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws
of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is
derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not
contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the
copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in
the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are
redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply
either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or
obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg
trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is posted
with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any
additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms
will be linked to the Project Gutenberg License for all works
posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the
beginning of this work.
1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg
License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg.
1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
Gutenberg License.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including
any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access
to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg work in a format
other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official
version posted on the official Project Gutenberg website
(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense
to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means
of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain
Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the
full Project Gutenberg License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg works
unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
access to or distributing Project Gutenberg electronic works
provided that:
• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
the use of Project Gutenberg works calculated using the method
you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed
to the owner of the Project Gutenberg trademark, but he has
agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid
within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are
legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty
payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in
Section 4, “Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation.”
• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue
all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™
works.
• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of
any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of
receipt of the work.
• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.
1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different terms than
are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing
from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of
the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set
forth in Section 3 below.
1.F.
1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project
Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™
electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may
contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate
or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or
other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
cannot be read by your equipment.
1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the “Right
of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.
1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you
received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium
with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you
with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in
lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person
or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If
the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing
without further opportunities to fix the problem.
1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO
OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement
violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the
agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or
limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or
unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the
remaining provisions.
1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in
accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the
production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses,
including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of
the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this
or any Project Gutenberg work, (b) alteration, modification, or
additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg work, and (c) any
Defect you cause.
Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg
Project Gutenberg is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It
exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations
from people in all walks of life.
Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg’s
goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg collection will
remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
and permanent future for Project Gutenberg and future
generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see
Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.
Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit
501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification
number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by
U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws.
The Foundation’s business office is located at 41 Watchung Plaza #516,
Montclair NJ 07042, USA, +1 (862) 621-9288. Email contact links and up
to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website
and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact
Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread
public support and donations to carry out its mission of
increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest
array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations
($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
status with the IRS.
The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations
where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND
DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular state
visit www.gutenberg.org/donate.
While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
approach us with offers to donate.
International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation
methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other
ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To
donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.
Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
Gutenberg concept of a library of electronic works that could be
freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
distributed Project Gutenberg eBooks with only a loose network of
volunteer support.
Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed
editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in
the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not
necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper
edition.
Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
facility: www.gutenberg.org.
This website includes information about Project Gutenberg,
including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.Source: Project Gutenberg ebook #42342. Public-domain status is recorded per item; the licence text above is reproduced unchanged.