The Egyptian campaigns, 1882 to 1885
by Charles Royle · English · Gutenberg #41744 · 1,409,223 chars · public domain (US)
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Title: The Egyptian campaigns, 1882 to 1885
Author: Charles Royle
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS, 1882 TO 1885 ***
THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS.
THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS
1882 TO 1885.
_NEW AND REVISED EDITION,
CONTINUED TO DECEMBER, 1899._
BY
CHARLES ROYLE,
Late of the Royal Navy,
Barrister-at-Law, Judge of the Egyptian Court of Appeal.
ILLUSTRATED BY MAPS AND PLANS.
LONDON
HURST AND BLACKETT, LIMITED
13, GREAT MARLBOROUGH STREET
1900.
_ALL RIGHTS RESERVED_
PREFACE.
In the new and revised Edition of "THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS," the history
of the military operations in Egypt has been brought down to the present
time, so as to include all the recent fighting in the Soudan. This has
been accompanied by a slight alteration in the title of the Book, as
well as by the elimination of such details contained in the original
work as are no longer of general interest. The space thus gained has
been utilized for the purpose of bringing before the reader the chief
events of a military character which have occurred in the interval which
has elapsed since the Book first appeared.
It has been the object of the Author to make the work in its present
form a complete narrative of the rise and fall of the Arabist and
Mahdist movements, as well as a history of England's intervention in
Egypt, this last a subject on which many persons entertain somewhat
vague and indistinct ideas.
C. R.
CAIRO,
December, 1899.
CONTENTS.
CHAP. PAGE.
I. EGYPTIAN FINANCE 1
II. ISMAIL PASHA 7
III. THE MILITARY MOVEMENT 12
IV. TRIUMPH OF THE ARMY 17
V. FOREIGN INTERVENTION 23
VI. CRITICAL POSITION 32
VII. THE RIOTS AT ALEXANDRIA 44
VIII. THE ALEXANDRIA BOMBARDMENT 60
IX. OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOMBARDMENT 75
X. THE DAY AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT 85
XI. ALEXANDRIA DURING THE BOMBARDMENT 90
XII. EVENTS ON SHORE 98
XIII. THE SITUATION 106
XIV. MILITARY OPERATIONS 114
XV. THE CONFERENCE 120
XVI. THE PORTE AND THE POWERS 127
XVII. WOLSELEY'S MOVE TO THE CANAL 131
XVIII. DE LESSEPS AND THE CANAL 137
XIX. SEIZURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL 144
XX. TEL-EL-MAHUTA TO MAHSAMEH 153
XXI. KASSASSIN 159
XXII. TEL-EL-KEBIR 168
XXIII. CAPTURE OF CAIRO AND COLLAPSE OF THE
REBELLION 180
XXIV. ENGLAND AND THE PORTE 193
XXV. RESTORATION OF TEWFIK AND EXILE OF ARABI 198
XXVI. THE SOUDAN AND THE MAHDI 210
XXVII. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FUTURE 220
XXVIII. OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MAHDI 232
XXIX. THE DESTRUCTION OF HICKS' ARMY 243
XXX. ABANDONMENT OF THE SOUDAN: OSMAN DIGNA 250
XXXI. BAKER'S DEFEAT AT EL TEB 259
XXXII. GORDON'S MISSION 267
XXXIII. SOUAKIM EXPEDITION 272
XXXIV. GRAHAM'S VICTORY AT EL TEB 277
XXXV. GRAHAM'S VICTORY AT TAMAAI 290
XXXVI. THE GORDON RELIEF EXPEDITION 309
XXXVII. PROGRESS TO DONGOLA 315
XXXVIII. ADVANCE TO KORTI 325
XXXIX. STEWART'S DESERT MARCH 333
XL. THE BATTLE OF ABU KLEA 341
XLI. THE ADVANCE ON METAMMEH 347
XLII. GORDON'S JOURNALS 355
XLIII. WILSON'S VOYAGE TO KHARTOUM 361
XLIV. THE FALL OF KHARTOUM 371
XLV. THE RETREAT FROM GUBAT 386
XLVI. THE NILE COLUMN 393
XLVII. WOLSELEY AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE
CAMPAIGN 401
XLVIII. THE SOUAKIM EXPEDITION OF 1885 408
XLIX. THE ATTACK ON McNEILL'S ZERIBA 416
L. GRAHAM'S ADVANCE AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE
EASTERN SOUDAN 430
LI. EVACUATION 437
LII. CONTINUATION 443
LIII. THE MAHDIST INVASION 447
LIV. FINANCE, THE SUEZ CANAL, AND THE ARMY OF
OCCUPATION 453
LV. THE EASTERN SOUDAN 459
LVI. THE NILE FRONTIER 466
LVII. WAD-EN-NEJUMI AND COLLAPSE OF THE INVASION 474
LVIII. THE EASTERN SOUDAN AGAIN 486
LIX. IN LOWER EGYPT 494
LX. THE DONGOLA EXPEDITION 501
LXI. THE RECONQUEST OF DONGOLA 512
LXII. THE ADVANCE TO BERBER 519
LXIII. ON THE RIVER--KASSALA 524
LXIV. FROM THE NILE TO THE ATBARA 530
LXV. THE BATTLE OF THE ATBARA 541
LXVI. THE ADVANCE ON OMDURMAN 551
LXVII. THE BATTLE OF OMDURMAN 559
LXVIII. THE CAPTURE OF OMDURMAN 574
LXIX. FASHODA 584
LXX. DESTRUCTION OF THE KHALIFA 590
CONCLUSION 595
THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS.
CHAPTER I.
EGYPTIAN FINANCE.
Towards the close of the year 1875, Ismail Pasha, then Khedive of Egypt,
had about got to the end of his resources. His liabilities on loans,
contracted either in his own name or in that of his Government, amounted
to £55,332,609; in addition to this there was a "Floating Debt" of
£21,334,960--and £1,000,000--due for the expenses of the war with
Abyssinia. The Treasury Bills were being daily protested, the salaries
of the Government officials were in arrear, and everything pointed to
impending bankruptcy.
This was the situation when Ismail sold to the British Government the
shares in the Suez Canal Company which he had inherited from his
predecessor, Said Pasha.[1]
By the transaction, which was due to the genius of the late Lord
Beaconsfield, England made an excellent investment of capital. She also
acquired an important interest in the great maritime highway to India,
and indirectly in Egypt herself.
Attentive observers regarded what had taken place as only a prelude to a
more intimate connection of England with Egyptian affairs, and the
financial mission of Mr. Cave, an important Treasury official,
undertaken about the same period, naturally strengthened this
impression, notwithstanding Lord Derby's declaration that sending the
mission to Egypt "was not to be taken to imply any desire on the part of
Her Majesty's Government to interfere in the internal affairs of that
country."
There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Foreign Secretary in
the matter. The policy of Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet, as well as that
of Mr. Gladstone, which succeeded it, was originally one of
non-intervention, and it was only the force of circumstances which led
to its modification. England's first wish was that no Power should
interfere in Egypt; her second, that in the event of interference
becoming necessary, England should not be left out in the cold. When
this is borne in mind, the attitude which Her Majesty's Ministers from
time to time assumed in regard to Egyptian affairs becomes comparatively
intelligible.
In confirmation of the preceding, the reader will observe that, although
one of the causes which eventually led to England's action in the valley
of the Nile was her mixing herself up with questions of Egyptian
finance, all attempts to induce her to move in this direction met for a
long time with failure.
When Mr. Cave's report, and, later on, that of Messrs. Goschen and
Joubert, revealed the embarrassed condition of the country, and the
necessity for the adoption of the financial scheme set forth in the
Decrees of May and November, 1876, Her Majesty's Government declined to
take any part in the arrangement. They even refused to nominate the
Englishmen who were to fill the various posts created by the Decrees.
The French, Italian and Austrian members of the Commission of the Public
Debt were nominated by their respective Governments as early as May,
1876, but their British colleague up to the end of the year remained
unappointed. France, on the other hand, throughout the whole of the
negotiations, appears to have been singularly ready to come to the
front, and when in December, 1876, the Duke Decazes, the French Minister
of Foreign Affairs, was asked to nominate one of the Controllers of
Finance, he declared "that he felt no difficulty whatever on the
subject." Lord Derby, however, persisted in his policy of abstention,
and eventually the Khedive was under the necessity of himself appointing
the Englishmen required.
At last the financial scheme came into operation, and, combined with
other reforms, for some time seemed likely to secure to Egypt and her
creditors a fair share of the blessings intended. This, however, was not
destined to last. As early as June, 1877, it became evident that the
revenues set apart to meet the Interest and Sinking Fund of the Public
Debt were insufficient. In fact, the estimates on which the Decrees were
founded proved simply fallacious--a deficit of no less than £820,000
appeared in the revenues assigned to the service of the Unified Debt,
and of £200,000 on those set apart for the Privileged Debt. Moreover,
there was strong reason to suppose that considerable portions of the
receipts were being secretly diverted from their legitimate channel by
Ismail and his agents.
At the same period serious difficulty arose in satisfying the judgments
obtained against the Government in the newly-established Mixed
Tribunals. These courts, having been instituted by treaties with the
Powers, partook largely of an international character, and when the
European creditors, on issuing execution, found that it was resisted by
force, they sought the aid of their respective Consuls-General.
The Honourable H. C. Vivian, then British Consul-General in Cairo, a
diplomatist who took a prominent part in this stage of Egypt's history,
had, as England's representative, to remonstrate with the Khedive. The
advice which Mr. Vivian gave, that the amounts of these judgments should
be paid, was excellent, but, under the circumstances, about as practical
as if he had counselled His Highness to take steps to secure an annual
high Nile.
Early in 1878, when things were going from bad to worse, Mr. Vivian
wrote that the whole government of the country was thrown out of gear by
financial mismanagement, and that affairs were becoming so entangled as
to challenge the interference of foreign Governments. This very sensible
opinion was backed up by M. Waddington, who had become French Minister
of Foreign Affairs, and who, addressing Lord Derby on the financial and
political situation, made the significant observation that if England
and France did not exert themselves at once, the matter would slip out
of their hands. This suggestion, pointing obviously to the probable
intervention of other Powers, was not without effect, and the British
Foreign Secretary in reply went a little further than he had yet done,
and stated that "Her Majesty's Government would be happy to co-operate
with that of France in any useful measure not inconsistent with the
Khedive's independent administration of Egypt."
This was followed by Mr. Vivian pressing upon the Khedive the necessity
for "a thorough and exhaustive inquiry into the finances of the
country."
This constituted a fresh departure in the policy of England with regard
to the Egyptian question, and, as will be seen, ultimately led to that
complete interference in Egyptian affairs which the British Cabinet had
so much desired to avoid.
Of course, Ismail had to yield, and the famous Commission of Inquiry
instituted by the Decree of 30th March, 1878, assembled in Cairo under
the presidency of Mr. (afterwards Sir C.) Rivers Wilson, and revealed
the most startling facts relating to the finances of Egypt. The
Commission had no easy task before it, and it only attained its object
through the dogged resolution of its chairman, backed by the moral
support of the representatives of the Powers.
At the outset, the late Cherif Pasha, the Khedive's Minister of Foreign
Affairs and of Justice, refused point-blank to obey the Decree, and
submit to be personally examined by the Commission.
As Cherif was a statesman who will be frequently referred to in the
following pages, it may be opportune to briefly describe him. He was
then about sixty years of age, and, like most of those who have held the
highest posts in Egypt, of Circassian origin. He was amongst the
favoured individuals who had been sent to France by Mehemet Ali to be
educated. He gradually passed through nearly every post in the State
with that facility which is so frequently seen in Egypt, where a man is
one day a station-master on the railway, the next a Judge in the
Tribunals, and eventually a Master of Ceremonies, or a Cabinet Minister.
Cherif had pleasing manners, spoke French fluently, and was in every
respect a gentleman. A Mahomedan by religion, he was, from an early
period in Ismail's reign, a prominent character in Egyptian history. He
soon became a rival of Nubar Pasha (referred to further on), and he and
Nubar alternated as the Khedive's Prime Ministers for many years.
Of a naturally indolent character, Cherif always represented the
_laissez aller_ side of Egyptian politics. With an excellent temper, and
a supremely apathetic disposition, he was always willing to accept
almost any proposition, provided it did not entail upon him any personal
exertion, or interfere with his favourite pastime, a game of billiards.
Cherif's notion in refusing to appear before the Commission was of a
two-fold character. Educated with Oriental ideas, and accustomed to
regard Europeans with suspicion, it is not unlikely that he resented the
appointment of the Commission as an unwarrantable intrusion on the part
of the Western Powers.
"Here," thought he, "were a number of people coming to make disagreeable
inquiries, and to ask indiscreet questions. Others might answer them;
he, for his part, could not, and for two reasons: first, because he
couldn't if he would; and second, because he wouldn't if he could. Was
he, at his time of life, to be asked to give reasons for all he had
done? It was ridiculous; all the world knew that he had no reasons."[2]
Probably, also, Cherif had his own motives for not wishing to afford too
much information. Though enjoying a deservedly high reputation for
honesty, he belonged to what must be regarded as the "privileged class"
in the country. For years this class had benefited by certain partial
immunities from taxation, and these advantages the work of the
Commission threatened to do away with. Further, Cherif's love of ease
and comfort, and absence of energy, indisposed him to give himself
unnecessary trouble about anything in particular. Be this as it may,
Cherif, though expressing his readiness to reply in writing to any
communications which the Commission might address to him, declined to do
more.
The Decree, however, provided that every functionary of State should be
bound to appear before the Commission. This might have placed a less
astute Minister in a dilemma. Cherif at once evaded the difficulty by
resigning office, rightly calculating on again returning to power when
the Commission should have become a thing of the past. Riaz Pasha, then
second Vice-President of the Commission, succeeded Cherif as Minister,
and the inquiry proceeded without him.[3]
It will not have escaped notice that in authorizing Rivers Wilson, who
held a high post in the Office of the National Debt, to sit on the
Commission, and in granting him leave of absence for the purpose, the
British Government had allowed itself to advance one stage further in
its Egyptian policy. The significance of the event was only partially
disguised by Lord Derby's cautious intimation that "the employé of the
British Government was not to be considered as invested with any
official character."
In April of the same year, whilst the Commission was still sitting, it
became evident that there would be a deficit of £1,200,000 in the amount
required to pay the May coupon of the Unified Debt. Further influences
were brought to bear, and Mr. Vivian was instructed to join the French
Consul-General in urging upon the Khedive the necessity of finding the
requisite funds at whatever cost to himself. Ismail pointed out that
this could only be done by ruinous sacrifices, which he promised should
nevertheless be made if it was insisted on. The representatives of
England and France remained firm, and the bondholders got their money.
By what means this was accomplished it is needless to inquire. Rumours
of frightful pressure being put on the unfortunate fellaheen, of forced
loans and other desperate expedients, were prevalent in Cairo, and were
probably only too well founded. It is said that even the jewellery of
the ladies of Ismail's harem was requisitioned in order to make up the
sum required.
Meanwhile the inquiry proceeded.
It would require too much space to give at length the details of the
report which the Commission presented. Suffice it to say that it showed
confusion and irregularity everywhere. Taxes were collected in the most
arbitrary and oppressive manner, and at the most unfavourable periods of
the year. The land tenures were so arranged that the wealthier
proprietors evaded a great portion of the land tax, and the _corvée_, or
system of forced labour, was applied in a way which was ruinous to the
country. Further, the Khedive and his family had amassed, at the expense
of the State, colossal properties, amounting, in fact, to as much as
one-fifth of the whole cultivable land of Egypt, and this property the
Commission declared ought to be given up. On every side the most
flagrant abuses were shown to prevail. In conclusion, it was found that
the arrangements made by the Financial Decrees of 1876 could not
possibly be adhered to, and that a fresh liquidation was inevitable.
Ismail, after every effort to make better terms for himself, yielded to
Rivers Wilson's requisitions, and accepted the conclusions of the
Commission. He acquiesced with as good grace as he could in making over
to the State the landed property of himself and family. He went even
further, and in August, 1878, approved the formation of a Cabinet under
the presidency of Nubar Pasha, with Rivers Wilson as Minister of
Finance and M. de Blignières (the French member of the Commission of the
Public Debt) as Minister of Public Works. At the same time, as if to
show Europe that he had seriously entered on the path of reform, the
Khedive proclaimed his intention to renounce personal rule and become a
Constitutional sovereign, governing only through his Council of
Ministers.
CHAPTER II.
ISMAIL PASHA.
Any history of Egyptian affairs at the time of the events referred to in
the present chapter would be incomplete without a sketch of Ismail Pasha
himself. He was then forty-six years of age, short in stature, and
heavily and squarely built. He was corpulent in figure, of dark
complexion, and wore a reddish brown beard closely clipped. With one eye
startlingly bright and the other habitually almost closed, he gave one
the idea of a man of more than ordinary intelligence.
Speaking French fluently, and possessed of a peculiarly fascinating
manner, Ismail exercised an almost mesmeric influence on those who came
in contact with him. His business capacity was unbounded, and not the
smallest detail, from the purchase of a coal cargo to the sale of a
year's crop of sugar, was carried out without his personal direction. He
was entitled to the denomination of Merchant Prince more than any one
who ever bore the title, combining the two characters profitably for a
long time, but in attempting to add to them that of a financier also he
ended by wrecking his country.
The three great passions of Ismail were, his ambition to render Egypt
independent of the Porte, his desire to accumulate landed property, and
his mania for building palaces. His prodigality was unbounded, and as a
result the indebtedness of Egypt was raised in fifteen years from
£3,292,000, at which his predecessor left it, to over £90,000,000 at the
time now referred to.
To do Ismail justice, it must be admitted that a large part of this
money was spent in the construction of railways, canals, and other
improvements, and in beautifying Cairo, which it was his aim to convert
into a sort of Oriental Paris. But after allowing for all this, and for
the two millions sterling spent in the _fêtes_ which attended the
opening of the Suez Canal, there is still a large balance left
unaccounted for.
One of the great defects of Ismail's character was his absolute
insincerity. When his reckless administration had brought his country to
the brink of ruin, he instituted the system of financial control set
forth in the Decrees of 1876. It must not be supposed that he ever meant
that the system should be carried into effect, or at most that it should
be more than a temporary expedient. When he promulgated reforms and
enlisted a number of Europeans in his service, did he intend that the
reforms should become realities, or that the European officials should
exercise the functions nominally intrusted to them? Not for an instant.
All that he desired was to throw dust in the eyes of Europe. For a while
he succeeded, but it was not to last. After a time it dawned on the
Powers that they were being played with, and from that moment Ismail's
downfall was assured.
In nominally transforming himself into a Constitutional ruler, Ismail
was only following out his habitual policy. The change, at any rate,
looked well on paper. It would, he expected, possess a further
advantage--Ismail, by his personal rule, had brought Egypt to the brink
of ruin, and by posing as a Constitutional Sovereign, he hoped to
transfer his responsibility to his ministers.
The nomination of Rivers Wilson to the post of Egyptian Minister of
Finance was so unprecedented an event that it required all the care of
the Marquis of Salisbury, who had now succeeded Lord Derby, to attenuate
its political importance. To save appearances it was arranged that Her
Majesty's Ministers should do nothing more than give their consent to
the appointment.
As a consequence of the installation of Constitutional government, with
European Ministers in the Cabinet, the English and French Controllers
were deemed unnecessary, and the Dual Control was declared suspended. On
the adoption of the new order of things, a hint was given to the Khedive
that Her Majesty's Government relied on his steady support being given
to the new Cabinet, and that the position of himself and his Dynasty
might become seriously compromised in the event of a contrary course
being adopted.
It would have been well for the Khedive had he taken the advice given.
Unfortunately, he was too much steeped in Eastern intrigue, and too fond
of the authority which he had nominally surrendered, to bend to the new
order of things.[4]
The earliest symptom of this was the military outbreak which took place
in Cairo on the 18th February, 1879, when 400 officers and 2,000
discharged soldiers mobbed Nubar Pasha and the European members of his
Cabinet at the Ministry of Finance. The ostensible grievance was the
non-payment of their salaries; the real one was the reduction in the
army, a measure which had been forced on the Khedive by his new
advisers. Both Nubar and Wilson were actually assaulted, and the cry of
"Death to the Christians" was raised. What further events might have
taken place it is hard to say, but, all at once, Ismail personally
appeared on the scene, and as if by magic order was restored.
Everything tended to show that Ismail himself had arranged this little
comedy; but be this as it may, he speedily took advantage of it to
inform the Consuls-General that the new state of things was a failure,
and that he could no longer retain his position without either power or
authority. Finally he declared that unless a change were made he would
not be answerable for the consequences. This was followed by the
resignation of his Prime Minister, Nubar, and the despatch of British
and French vessels of war to Alexandria.
The progress made in the direction of British interference in Egyptian
affairs will not fail to strike the reader.
Ismail's motive in bringing about the military disturbance of the 18th
February was to demonstrate, in the same manner as Arabi Pasha did later
on, that he was the only real power in the country. In doing this,
however, he played a dangerous game, and one which shortly after cost
him his vice-regal throne.
For the moment, a _modus vivendi_ was found in the appointment of his
son Prince Tewfik (afterwards Khedive) as Prime Minister, _vice_ Nubar,
and the Western Powers accepted the solution, at the same time giving
Ismail another warning, namely, that any further disturbance would be
regarded as the result of his action, and the consequences to him would
be very serious.
The financial difficulties of the country now became so grave, that a
Decree suspending payment of the interest of the Debt was issued at the
end of March, by the advice of the Ministers. Then Ismail all at once
turned round and declared that the measure was unnecessary, and proposed
a financial scheme of his own. How far this could be reconciled with his
declaration that he was a Constitutional ruler is not clear. This event
was followed by the arbitrary dismissal of his Ministers and the
formation of a purely native Cabinet under Cherif Pasha. So secretly had
the change been brought about, that the former Ministers only discovered
it when, on going to their offices, they found their places already
occupied by their successors.
This veritable _coup d'état_ placed the English and French
representatives in a position of some difficulty. On the one hand, the
right of the Khedive to change his Ministers, even under the reformed
regime, could not be contested; on the other, the change was of so
radical a nature, and so much opposed to the moral obligations which he
had contracted with the Western Powers, that it could hardly be
permitted. The two Consuls-General therefore waited on the Khedive, and
plainly told him that the precipitate dismissal of Ministers whose
services he had solicited from the Governments of England and France
constituted an act of grave discourtesy, and warned him of the necessity
of adopting the course which they recommended to him. Ismail had by this
time become so used to warnings of this character, that the intimation
produced but little effect. On the contrary, he at once ordered the army
to be increased to 60,000 men, and followed this up by a Decree of the
22nd April, 1879, reducing the interest of the Debt, and otherwise
modifying the arrangements made by the Financial Decrees of 1876.
It was scarcely to be expected that Ismail's action, conceived in
defiance of all Europe, would be tolerated, but it might, nevertheless,
but for another circumstance, namely, the continued non-payment of the
sums due on the judgments of the Tribunals. Both England and France
addressed strong representations to the Porte on the subject. Though
anxious that Ismail should be taken to task, neither Power was prepared
to go so far as to demand his deposition. At length the hands of both
were forced by a statesman who had more will and less hesitation,
namely, Prince Bismarck. He plainly intimated that if England and France
did not demand Ismail's removal, Germany would. This decided the matter,
and the two Powers, seeing the danger of the matter being taken out of
their hands, summoned up sufficient resolution to apply to the Sultan
for the removal of the man who had so long trifled with them.
Meanwhile intrigues of all kinds had been going on at Constantinople.
Ismail was privately sounded on the subject, and was given his choice,
either to abdicate or to be deposed. He was reluctant to come to any
decision, and in this he was strengthened by the information which he
received from his agent, Ibraim Pasha, at Constantinople. The latter,
from time to time, misled his unfortunate principal. When things looked
at their very worst, Ibraim repeatedly assured Ismail that if only
sufficient money were transmitted to Stamboul, everything would yet be
made right. Animated by this hope, the deluded Khedive sent fabulous
sums to the Sultan, up to the moment when the latter threw him over. It
is not, therefore, to be wondered at, that, when the storm actually
burst, and the news of his deposition arrived, he was simply
thunderstruck. At four in the morning of the 25th June, 1879, the
English and French Consuls-General sought out Cherif Pasha, and made him
accompany them to the Palace, and after some difficulty succeeded in
finding Ismail. They then communicated to him despatches from
Constantinople, and insisted on his abdication as the only means of
saving his Dynasty. Ismail at first refused point-blank, but later on,
he qualified his refusal by stating that he would only yield to a formal
order from the Porte itself.
The _dénouement_ was not far off, for, only a few hours later, a
telegram arrived, addressed to "Ismail Pasha, late Khedive of Egypt,"
informing him that the Sultan had deposed him, and nominated his son
Tewfik in his place.
There was nothing for the fallen ruler to do but to bow to the
inevitable, although he did not acquiesce with good grace. He showed
himself most _exigeant_ as to the conditions on which he would consent
to leave Egypt. He wished for a large sum in ready money. He wanted
Smyrna selected as his place of residence. He wished to take with him
all his followers, including a harem of at least three hundred women. He
also demanded that an Egyptian steamer should be placed at his disposal.
In fact, he asked so many things that the Consuls-General were at their
wits' end to know what to do. The great object was to get rid of him at
any price, and he was, in effect, told that he could have almost
anything he wanted if he would only go at once.
Eventually the parties came to terms, Ismail was given the money he
demanded, he was allowed to choose Naples in place of Smyrna as a
residence, and at the end of the month, accompanied by seventy ladies of
his harem, he quitted Alexandria in the Khedivial yacht "_Maharoussa_"
under a royal salute from the batteries and ships of war.[5]
CHAPTER III.
THE MILITARY MOVEMENT.
No sooner was Egypt rid of Ismail Pasha, than the Firman of investiture
of Tewfik was solemnly read at the Citadel in Cairo with great state and
ceremony.
The Powers having insisted on the restoration of the Control, Major
Baring (afterwards Lord Cromer) and M. de Blignières were appointed
Controllers-General by the English and French Governments respectively,
on the 4th September. Riaz Pasha, on the 23rd, became Prime Minister.
Riaz is a statesman who has played an important part in Egypt for many
years, and is therefore deserving of a passing notice. He is of
Circassian family and of Hebrew extraction, possesses a strong will,
tenacious perseverance, and business-like habits, and he has always been
remarkable for his independence. Riaz is a master of detail, and has all
the ins and outs of Egyptian administration at his fingers' ends, and he
was, therefore, all the more fitted for taking public affairs in hand at
this period. His experience as President of the Council of Ministers in
past times rendered his services especially valuable. Gifted with
natural foresight, he was shrewd enough to see that, when the Control
was re-established, England and France seriously intended to take
Egyptian affairs in hand, and he accepted the situation accordingly.
This led him to work cordially with the Controllers, with the happy
result that, during the two years that his Ministry lasted, Egypt
attained an unprecedented degree of prosperity.
In April, 1880, what was styled the Commission of Liquidation was
appointed, and under its advice the Public Debt was subjected to various
modifications, and other financial changes were made, including a
reduction of taxation and other reforms.
How long this pleasant state of things would have lasted it is
impossible to say, had not trouble arisen in another direction, and the
military revolt under Arabi supervened and upset all previous
calculations.
In order to understand the nature and causes of this movement, it is
necessary to know something of the Egyptian military organization at the
time referred to. The army, which had achieved such great things under
Mehemet Ali, had gradually declined under his successors, and when
Ismail came to power was represented by a total force of 10,000 fighting
men. Ismail raised the number to 45,000, but the Firman of Tewfik's
investiture limiting the number to 18,000, the force had to be reduced
to that number. The soldiers were all brought into the ranks by the
system of conscription. Those recruited from the Soudan were men
possessed of considerable endurance and warlike qualities, but those
taken from the other districts, that is, the ordinary fellah or
agricultural class, had no taste for war. This is not to be wondered at
when the character and habits of the latter are considered. The Egyptian
fellah is a type in himself. Possessed of no national pride or patriotic
aspirations, he cares nothing about politics, and still less for
fighting. All that he asks is to be let alone, to till in peace and
quietness his little plot of land on the banks of his beloved Nile. Do
not vex him too much with forced labour, or tax him beyond his means,
and he remains peaceful and fairly law-abiding from the moment of his
birth till the day comes for him to be carried out to the little
cemetery, the white tombs of which brighten the borders of the desert.
In the preceding observations the Egyptian soldier is spoken of as he
was at the period under consideration. What he is capable of becoming,
when placed under English officers, and properly trained under humane
and just treatment, subsequent events will show.
Amongst the soldiers at the time of the occurrence of Arabi's outbreak
there was a fair amount of subordination, and but little jealousy
prevailed. Amongst the officers, however, the state of things was
entirely different. The majority of them were of Egyptian or fellah
origin, whilst the others were of Turkish or Circassian extraction. The
latter, as belonging to the same race as the reigning family, naturally
constituted the dominant caste; when there was a campaign in the Soudan,
or any other unpleasant duty to be taken in hand, the fellah officers
were selected for it. When, on the other hand, it was a question of
taking duty in Cairo or Alexandria, the Circassians were employed.
Naturally, a good deal of jealousy was thus created, though, as long as
Ismail was in power, it was not openly manifested, and discipline was
maintained, except where it answered that ruler's purpose (as in the
case of the demonstration against Nubar and Rivers Wilson) that it
should be otherwise. With the young and inexperienced Tewfik, however,
things were different--a spirit of insubordination developed itself, and
the two sets of officers entered upon a struggle for the mastery.
Among the prominent fellah officers was a certain Ali Fehmi, who was a
favourite of the Khedive, and in command of the Guards at the Palace. In
this capacity he was frequently called on to convey orders to Osman
Pasha Rifki, the Minister of War. Osman was a Circassian, and felt hurt
at receiving orders from a fellah officer. By what means the change was
effected is uncertain, but eventually Ali fell into disfavour, and
became one of a group of discontented officers belonging to the same
class. There were two others, Abdel-el-Al, and Ahmed Arabi,
subsequently known as Arabi Pasha. These three, afterwards known as "The
Colonels," were joined by Mahmoud Sami Pasha, a politician, and, thus
associated, they formed the leaders of what began to be known as "The
National Party."
As Arabi forms one of the chief actors in the events which followed,
some details relating to him may not be out of place here.
In person, Arabi was a big, burly specimen of the fellah type--his
features were large and prominent, and his face, though stern, had a
good-natured expression. He was born about the year 1840, in the
Province of Charkieh, in Lower Egypt. His father was a fellah possessing
a few acres of land, and working it himself. Arabi was one of four sons,
and he got such education as could be afforded by the village school. In
due time he was drafted by conscription into the army, and became an
officer. At Said Pasha's death he was a captain, and one of the officers
of the Guard at the Palace at Cairo. He was once rather boisterous under
the Palace windows, and Ismail Pasha, exclaiming that he was more noisy
than the big drum, and less useful, ordered him to be removed and to
receive punishment.
This was his first grievance against Ismail, and it induced Arabi to
join a secret society of native officers. The objects which this society
proposed to itself were the abolition of the invidious favouritism shown
to Circassian officers, and the deposition of Ismail, the sovereign.
War broke out between Egypt and Abyssinia; Arabi was in charge of the
transports at Massowah, and a charge of corruption being made against
him, he fell into disgrace. This fact strengthened his dislike to
Ismail, and, with time lying idle on his hands, he took to attending
lectures at the religious university, known as the Mosque El Azhar, in
Cairo, where he acquired a certain degree of eloquence superior to that
of most persons in his position. After a time, Ismail, always working to
increase the army, allowed him to join a regiment, and he resumed his
connection with the secret society, and soon became the head of it.
One of its members informed the Khedive of the aims and intentions of
the society, upon which Ismail sent for some of the chiefs, and Arabi
and his confederates waited on him. They went as his enemies in fear
and trembling, and left as his friends; seventy native officers were, in
one day, made lieutenant-colonels, including Arabi and his companions.
Arabi, in addition, received the high honour of having one of the
Khedivial slaves as his wife.
When the question of the deposition of Ismail came to the front, Arabi
took a formal oath to defend him with his life, but this did not prevent
him, forty-eight hours after, going to do obeisance to Tewfik as the new
Khedive of Egypt. The latter let it be known that there was a tacit
amnesty for the past, and made Arabi a full colonel.
Of Arabi's mental gifts it is impossible to form a high estimate.
Ignorant of any language but his own, his forte seemed to be the
enunciating of any number of quotations from the Koran, quite regardless
of their relevancy. He had, however, original ideas at times, and must
be credited, at all events, with the quality of sincerity. To Europeans
and European influences he was strongly opposed. On one occasion he
presided at a meeting of natives assembled for the purpose of founding a
free school at Zag-a-zig. He pointed out the changes which European
civilization had wrought in Egypt, and observed that, "before the native
was brought in contact with Europe, he was content to ride on a donkey,
to wear a blue gown, and to drink water, whereas now he must drive in a
carriage, wear a Stambouli coat, and drink champagne. Europeans," he
said, "are ahead of us, but why? Is it because they are stronger,
better, or more enduring than we? No; it is only because they are better
taught. Let us, then, be educated, and the boasted supremacy of the
Christians will disappear." The result of this appeal was a large
subscription, and the school was established.
Mahmoud Sami Pasha, unlike his associates, was not a fellah, but of
Turkish descent. He was a man of consummate cunning, and of great
personal ambition; basing his calculations on the power of the military
movement, and not believing in the disposition of the English and French
to resist it, he proposed to use the simple-minded Arabi and his friends
as a means of bringing himself into power.
The crisis was brought about by agitators among the fellaheen officers,
who objected to a proposed reduction of the army; petitions on the
subject were presented, not only to the Minister of War, but to the
Khedive himself, setting forth all their grievances, and demanding that
an Egyptian should be appointed Minister of War. Osman Rifki, the actual
Minister of War, could not brook this, and at a Cabinet Council, at
which Mahmoud Sami was present, it was decided to put the three
ringleaders, Ali Fehmi, Abdel-el-Al, and Arabi, under arrest.
According to Arabi, a steamer was in readiness to take the prisoners
away, and iron boxes were prepared in which they were to be placed and
dropped into the Nile, but of this there is no proof beyond his
statement. Mahmoud Sami took care to warn "the Colonels" of what was
going to happen, and it was arranged that if they did not by a certain
time return from Kasr-el-Nil Barracks, to which they were summoned, the
soldiers of their respective regiments should march down and liberate
them.
It turned out exactly as provided for. On arriving at the barracks on
the 1st February, 1881, "the Colonels" found themselves before a
court-martial, but hardly had the proceedings begun before a turbulent
crowd of soldiery broke in, upset the tables and chairs, ill-treated the
members of the court, and carried off the prisoners in triumph to the
Palace. Here the three colonels interviewed the Khedive, and demanded
the substitution of Mahmoud Sami for Osman Rifki as Minister of War, an
increase of the army to 18,000 men, and the establishment of a new
system of promotion, which should exclude favouritism to the Circassian
officers.
Tewfik having no force wherewith to resist, yielded all that was asked
of him, and there the matter for the time ended.
CHAPTER IV.
TRIUMPH OF THE ARMY.
Matters progressed for some time pretty quietly after the events
referred to in the previous chapter, but in July, 1881, two incidents
occurred which were followed by important results.
A native artilleryman was run over and killed in the streets of
Alexandria. His comrades bore the dead body to the Palace and forced an
entrance in defiance of the orders of their officers. They were tried,
and the ringleaders were condemned to severe sentences. Next, nineteen
Circassian officers brought charges against the colonel of their
regiment, Abdel-el-Al, already mentioned. The charges were inquired into
and found to be unfounded, whereupon the nineteen officers were removed
from the active list of the army, but were restored subsequently by
order of the Khedive.
These measures gave great umbrage to "the Colonels," who believed that
the order was given with a view to encourage the insubordination of the
officers towards them; and a letter was written by "the Colonels" to the
Minister of War, contrasting the leniency shown towards the nineteen
officers with the severity towards the soldiers in the case of the
artilleryman.
The Khedive by this time had become completely dissatisfied with his new
Minister of War, and alarmed at the bearing of "the Colonels." He
determined to see if energetic measures would not be successful, and
appointed his brother-in-law, Daoud Pasha, a Circassian, to the Ministry
of War, in the place of Mahmoud Sami. Measures were at the same time
taken for getting the disaffected regiments out of Cairo.
These steps were viewed with the greatest possible dissatisfaction by
Arabi and his colleagues. Not only so, but they began to entertain
considerable fear for their own personal safety. A story had got abroad
that the Khedive had obtained a secret "Fetwah," or Decree, from the
Sheikh-el-Islam, condemning them to death for high treason. There was no
foundation for the story, but it was currently believed. Under these
circumstances, all the chief officers signed a declaration of loyalty to
the Khedive and his Government. Their next step was to organize the
demonstration of the 9th September, 1881.
The immediate origin of the disturbance was the order given by the
Minister of War for the removal from Cairo to Alexandria of the regiment
of which Arabi was the Colonel.
On the 9th September the Minister of War received a communication from
Arabi, informing him that the troops in Cairo were going at half-past
three in the afternoon to the Palace of Abdin to obtain from the Khedive
the dismissal of the Ministry, the convocation of the National Assembly,
and the increase of the army to 18,000 men.
When the terms of Arabi's communication were laid before the Khedive at
his palace at Koobah, none of the Ministers were present. In the absence
of the British Consul-General, Tewfik consulted the British Controller,
Mr. (afterwards Sir Auckland) Colvin, who invited the Khedive to take
the initiative himself.
Two regiments were said to be faithful. Colvin advised the Khedive to
summon them to Abdin Square with all the military police available, to
place himself at their head, and when Arabi arrived to arrest him.
Colvin accompanied the Khedive to the Abdin Barracks, where the first
regiment of the Guard turned out and made the warmest protestations of
loyalty. The same thing occurred with the soldiers at the Citadel,
though it was ascertained that the troops there had, previously to the
Khedive's arrival, been signalling to Arabi's regiment at Abbassieh. The
Khedive then announced his intention of driving to the Abbassieh
Barracks, some three miles distant. It was already past the time fixed
for the demonstration, and Colvin urged him instead to proceed at once
to Abdin, taking with him the Citadel regiment. Tewfik, however,
wavered. Either he desired to assure himself of the support of more of
his soldiers, or more probably he desired to put off the critical moment
as long as possible. He persisted in driving to Abbassieh. It was a long
drive, and when he arrived there he found that Arabi had marched with
his regiment to Cairo. The opportunity sought of anticipating his
movements was, therefore, lost. The carriages were turned round, and on
entering Cairo took a long _détour_, and arrived at Abdin Palace by a
side door. The Khedive at first desired to enter the Palace, but, on
Colvin's entreaty, consented to come out into the square. They went
together, followed by half-a-dozen native and European officers. The
place was filled with soldiers, some 4,000 in number, with thirty guns
placed in position.
The Khedive advanced firmly towards a little group of officers and men
(some of whom were mounted) in the centre. Colvin said to him, "When
Arabi presents himself, tell him to give up his sword and follow you.
Then go the round of the regiments, address each separately, and give
them the 'order to disperse.'" The soldiers all this time were standing
in easy attitudes, chatting, laughing, rolling up cigarettes, and eating
pistachio nuts, looking, in fact, as little like desperate mutineers as
could well be imagined. They apparently were there in obedience only to
orders, and, without being either loyal or disloyal, might almost be
regarded as disinterested spectators.
Arabi approached on horseback: the Khedive called out to him to
dismount. He did so, and came forward on foot with several others, and a
guard with fixed bayonets, and saluted. As he advanced, Colvin said to
the Khedive, "Now is your moment, give the word!" He replied, "We are
between four fires. We shall be killed." Colvin said, "Have courage!"
Tewfik again wavered, he turned for counsel to a native officer at his
side, and repeated, "What can I do? We are between four fires." He then
told Arabi to sheathe his sword. Arabi did so at once, his hand
trembling so with nervousness that he could scarcely get the weapon back
into its scabbard. The moment was lost. Instead of following Colvin's
advice, and arresting Arabi on the spot, a step which would at once have
put an end to the whole disturbance, the Khedive then walked towards him
and commenced to parley.
He demanded what was the meaning of the demonstration. Arabi replied by
enumerating his demands, adding that the army had come there on behalf
of the people to enforce them, and would not retire until they were
conceded. The Khedive addressed Colvin, and said, "You hear what he
says?" Colvin answered that it was not befitting for the sovereign to
discuss questions of this kind with colonels, and suggested his retiring
to the Palace, leaving others to speak to the military leaders. The
Khedive did so, and Colvin remained for about an hour, explaining to
them the gravity of the situation for themselves, and urging them to
withdraw the troops whilst there was yet time.
At this moment Mr. (afterwards Sir Charles) Cookson, Acting British
Consul-General, arrived, and Colvin left the continuation of the
negotiations to Her Majesty's representative. The latter pointed out to
Arabi the risk which he and those with him incurred by the menacing
attitude they had assumed. He told him that if they persisted in
assuming the government of the country, the army must be prepared to
meet the united forces of the Sublime Porte and of the European Powers,
both of whom were too much interested in the welfare and tranquillity of
Egypt to allow the country to descend through a military government to
anarchy. Arabi answered that the army was there to secure the liberties
of the Egyptian people. Cookson replied that the Khedive and Europe
could not recognize a mere military revolt as the expression of the will
of the people, and added that even now, if the troops were withdrawn,
any representations presented in the proper manner would be attended to,
and he would guarantee Arabi's personal safety and that of his
associates.
Arabi, though civil, firmly refused to take the course proposed. He
insisted on the adoption of the three points demanded. Cookson then
communicated the result of the interview to the Khedive, adding that he
was convinced that the only concession to which any real importance was
attached was the dismissal of the Ministry. His Highness, after a
conference with Riaz Pasha, consented to this, on the understanding that
the other points demanded should be in suspense until the Porte could be
communicated with.
Arabi accepted these terms, insisting only that no member of the
Khedive's family should be included in the new Cabinet, and that the
Minister of War should not be a Circassian. On these conditions Arabi
promised to withdraw the troops. This, however, was not effected until
an order had been signed announcing the dismissal of the Ministry and
the nomination of Cherif Pasha as the new Premier.
After this, Arabi entered the Palace and made his submission to the
Khedive, and the soldiers, with their bands playing and amid loud cheers
for the "Effendina" (Sovereign), retired to their barracks. By eight
o'clock all was over, and Cairo, which had been much excited, had
relapsed into its ordinary tranquillity.
With regard to the outbreak--the third, it will be remarked, of its
kind--it was on a larger scale than any previously organized, and was,
as events showed, correspondingly more successful. The rebellious troops
were, indeed, quieted, as on former occasions, but only by concessions
which went far to place the whole government of the country under
irregular military control.
With regard to the attitude assumed by the Khedive on the occasion,
considerable allowance must be made. Tewfik in the life-time of his
father had never, or at all events until the latest period of Ismail's
reign, been allowed to come to the front. He was, therefore, the less
fitted for dealing with a crisis of so formidable a character as that
of the 9th September. Born of one of Ismail's female slaves in the year
1853, Tewfik was never a favourite with his father, and when his
brothers were sent to Europe to be educated, he himself was kept in
Cairo and lived in quiet obscurity. Whilst they were made much of, both
at home and abroad, Tewfik remained quietly cultivating his farm at
Koobah.[6]
The difference in developing the character and dispositions of the
Princes was natural enough, and yet the late ruler of Egypt was in many
respects in no way inferior to the other members of his family. He
possessed a remarkable degree of intelligence, and although a strict
Mahomedan he was the husband of only one wife, to whom he was devotedly
attached. Determined to avoid, in bringing up his children, the error
perpetrated towards himself, he sent his sons to Europe to be educated.
In appearance he somewhat resembled his father, being short and inclined
to stoutness.
Unlike Ismail, however, Tewfik was wanting in energy and determination.
With either Ismail, or his grandfather, Mehemet Ali, the demonstration
of the 9th September would have been impossible. With Ismail--supposing
such an event could have taken place--the end would not have been far
off. The fate of Ismail Pasha Saddyk, Minister of Finance, known as the
"Mofettish," sufficiently shows the means by which Arabi would have been
disposed of.[7]
With Mehemet Ali the procedure would have been yet more summary. The
report of a pistol would have been heard, and Arabi would have rolled
lifeless on the square of Abdin. A volley of musketry would have
dispersed his followers, and the incident would have been closed.
Tewfik, with his genial kindly disposition, was not the man to adopt
either of the above expedients, and, as has been seen, Arabi triumphed.
CHAPTER V.
FOREIGN INTERVENTION.
Difficulty was at first experienced in getting Cherif Pasha to undertake
the formation of a Ministry. His idea was that it was inconsistent with
a due regard for his own reputation for him to pose before the world as
the accomplice of the mutinous soldiery, and at one time, after an
interview with Arabi, Cherif positively declined. Meanwhile, meetings of
the officers were held in which the most violent appeared to have the
upper hand, and the belief that they had nothing to fear from Turkish
intervention emboldened them to reject an ultimatum of Cherif, which was
that, on condition of his undertaking the government, and guaranteeing
the safety of the leaders, they should withdraw their regiments to
certain posts assigned to them.
Public opinion, more particularly amongst the Europeans, became much
alarmed, and the Khedive declared himself ready to yield everything in
order to save public security.
On the 13th September, however, things took an unexpected turn for the
better. Arabi, at the suggestion of Mahmoud Sami, who hoped to render
Cherif impossible, and to get himself nominated in his place, summoned
to Cairo the members of the Chamber of Notables. Cherif had acquired a
good deal of popularity among the class to which the Notables belonged,
and at their first meeting he found arguments to induce them to adopt a
tone hostile to Arabi and his friends, whom they told to attend to the
army, and mind their own business. The Notables went even further, and
signed an address to Cherif entreating him to form a Ministry, and
giving their personal guarantee that if he consented, the army should
yield absolute submission to his orders. Arabi, it will be remembered,
had all along professed to act on behalf of the Egyptian people, and the
attitude of the Notables was a severe check to him, or rather to Mahmoud
Sami, who was pulling the wires. This last individual, seeing that the
Notables were playing into the hand of Cherif, at once declared himself
the partisan of the latter and of the Chamber, and as a consequence Sami
was reappointed Minister of War in the Cabinet which Cherif was
eventually persuaded to form.
On the 14th of September the new Ministry was gazetted, and steps were
taken for the dispersal of the disaffected regiments in the provinces.
On the 6th of October Arabi and his regiment left Cairo for the military
station of El Ouady, in the Delta. Before he left he was received by the
Khedive, whom he assured of his respect and entire devotion. When one
remembers how often Arabi had gone through this ceremony, one can hardly
help thinking that Tewfik must, by this time, have begun to get a little
tired of it. Before leaving, Arabi made speeches to the troops, in
which he exhorted them "to remain united, and to draw even more tightly,
if possible, those bonds of fraternity of which they had already given
such striking examples." Finally, after pointing out--it must be
presumed by way of a joke--that obedience in a soldier was the first of
virtues, he declared that as long as he possessed a drop of blood, or a
living breath, both should belong to his beloved sovereign.
Meanwhile the elections for the Chamber of Notables, which had been
convoked by the Khedive for the 23rd of December, were proceeding. The
Chamber was called together under an old law of Ismail's time, made in
1866, under which the Notables possessed but very limited functions.
They were, in fact, simply a consultative body, with power only to
discuss such matters as might be brought before them by the advisers of
the Government.
There is no doubt that, apart from the military movement, there was a
widespread feeling of discontent in the country at this time. Ismail's
merciless exactions, and the pressure of foreign money-lenders, had
given rise to a desire to limit the power of the Khedive, and, above
all, to abolish the Anglo-French Control, which was considered as ruling
the country simply for the benefit of the foreign bondholders. The
Control was further hated by the large landowners, because the law of
liquidation (with which the Controllers in the minds of the people were
associated) had in a measure sacrificed their claims for compensation in
respect of the cancelling of a forced loan known as the "Moukabeleh,"
and it was still more detested by the Pashas and native officials,
because it interfered with the reckless squandering of public money, and
the many opportunities for corruption by which they had so long
benefited.
In addition to this, there was a great deal of irritation at the
increasing number of highly paid European officials which the reformed
regime inaugurated in the latter days of Ismail involved. The people
began to suspect that what was occurring was only part of a plan for
handing the country over to Europeans. The examples lately set by
England with regard to Cyprus, and by France in Tunis, were, it must be
owned, but little calculated to inspire confidence in the political
morality of either of these two Powers.
The prevailing irritation was kept alive by the native press, which
began to indulge in the most violent abuse of Europeans. The army, too,
continued to show signs of insubordination in many ways. To add to the
difficulties of the situation, the colonels of the regiments which had
been expressly sent away into the provinces had acquired the
inconvenient habit of coming back to the capital, and joining in the
many intrigues on foot.
Next followed a demand by the Minister of War for an augmentation of the
War Budget, in order to increase the army to the maximum allowed by the
Sultan's Firman.
Under these circumstances the Chamber of Notables assembled on the 25th
of December, 1881.
The earliest trouble arose from the demand of the Notables that the law
under which they were assembled should be modified so as to give them
power to vote the Budget so far as it related to such of the revenues as
were not assigned to the Public Debt.
The claim of the Chamber, though plausible enough at first sight, was
really, if granted, calculated to infringe all the international
arrangements for the Debt. It was obvious that if the Chamber had the
power and chose to vote an extravagant Budget so far as related to the
_unassigned_ revenues, the administration of the country could not be
carried on, national bankruptcy might ensue, and the collection of the
assigned revenues would become impossible.
The Chamber, however, not only refused to give way on the question of
the Budget, but it demanded that the law should be further amended by
giving the Notables other privileges, namely, the right to control the
acts of public functionaries, to initiate legislation, and to hold the
Ministers responsible to the Chamber. By getting the Notables to make
these demands, which he knew could not be accepted, Mahmoud Sami's
object was to bring about a crisis which could only end in the downfall
of Cherif's Cabinet. He had already persuaded Cherif to make Arabi
Sub-Minister of War, under the pretext of securing him on the side of
the Ministry, and so neutralizing the influence which the army was
exercising over the Chamber. In reality the appointment only afforded
Mahmoud Sami and Arabi increased facilities for intriguing against
Cherif. The result was soon seen.
The amendments to the law giving the Chamber increased power were
inadmissible on many grounds. Were there no other objection, there was
the insurmountable one that the Sultan had already refused a
Constitution to other parts of his dominions, and would certainly oppose
its being granted to Egypt. To put it shortly, the amendments after
being submitted to the English and French Governments were declared
unacceptable.
This at once brought about a crisis, and the Chamber, on the 2nd
February, sent a deputation to the Khedive to require him to summon a
new Ministry.
At this period it was reported to the English and French Governments
that activity was being displayed in putting all the coast
fortifications in an efficient state, and that the strength of the army
was being augmented under the provisions of the new War Budget.
These circumstances, taken in conjunction with the political events
above recorded, led the English and French Governments to conclude that
if the Khedive was to be maintained in power, the time was coming for
them to think about doing something in Egypt. On the 20th of January,
1882, Sir Edward Malet wrote that "armed intervention had become
necessary if the refusal to allow the Chamber to vote the Budget was to
be agreed to, and yet it was impossible to do otherwise, as the measure
only formed part of a complete scheme of revolution." As far back as
December, 1881, M. Gambetta, then at the head of the French Ministry,
had suggested that England and France should take "joint action in Egypt
to strengthen the authority of the Khedive, and to cut short intrigues
at Constantinople, as well as to make the Porte feel that any undue
interference on its part would not be tolerated."
This proposal shortly after resulted in the famous Joint Note
communicated by the English and the French representatives to the
Khedive in Cairo, on the 8th January, 1882. The document was to the
effect that the English and French Governments considered the
maintenance of His Highness upon the throne in the terms laid down by
the Sultan's Firmans, and officially recognized by the two Governments,
as alone able to guarantee for the present and the future good order and
prosperity in Egypt, in which England and France were equally
interested. It continued to say that "the two Governments, being closely
associated in the resolve to guard by their united efforts against all
cause of complication, internal or external, which might menace the
order of things established in Egypt, did not doubt that the assurance
publicly given of their intention in this respect would tend to divert
the dangers to which the Government of the Khedive might be exposed, and
which would certainly find England and France united to oppose them."
The parentage of the Joint Note is attributable to the French
Government, which, up to this time, seemed bent on retaining the lead
which it had from the first taken in regard to Egyptian affairs. The
wording of the document had been altered more than once to suit the late
Lord Granville, then Foreign Secretary, who appears to have been not
quite sure how far he was getting out of his depth in regard to Egyptian
matters.
It was under the influence of some such misgiving that Lord Lyons, the
British Ambassador in Paris, was instructed on the 6th January, 1882, in
communicating to the French Government England's assent to the Note, to
make the reservation that she must not be considered as thereby
committing herself to _any particular mode of action_, if action should
be found necessary. In reply, M. Gambetta, by a despatch dated the
following day, stated that he observed with pleasure "that the only
reservation of the Government of the Queen was as to the _mode of
action_ to be employed, and that this was a reservation in which he
participated."
When one sees how, later on, when action became necessary, the attitude
of the two countries became reversed, the extreme reluctance of the
English Government to move at this time seems curious enough, especially
when it is contrasted with the continued readiness of France to come
forward in the interval. The explanation is that M. Gambetta, with his
clear statesman-like intellect, foreseeing that some sort of
intervention would become necessary, was determined that it should be
limited to that of England and France to the exclusion of Turkey, and so
long as he remained in power boldly shaped his policy with that object.
The English Government, on the other hand, had throughout no real
settled policy with regard to Egypt. Their first idea was to have no
intervention at all; they hoped that things would mend of themselves.
When they found that this was not likely to be the case, the idea of a
Turkish intervention found favour. France, however, was resolutely
opposed to this, and to allow the latter Power to take isolated action,
as indeed she appeared disposed to do if thwarted, was open to serious
objections. To avoid such a catastrophe the English Government found
themselves under the necessity of following, for the time being, the
masterly lead of M. Gambetta. However this may have been, England, by
taking part in the Joint Note, assumed a definite position relative to
Egypt, and, throwing off all hesitation as to "interference with the
internal affairs of the country," pledged herself jointly with France to
support the Khedive against all enemies from within or without.
The first to take offence at the Joint Note was naturally enough the
Sultan, who caused Lord Granville to be informed that the Porte
considered that sending the Khedive any such communication except
through itself was highly improper. The Sultan added that, "To protect
the immunities granted to Egypt, and to preserve the order and
prosperity of that province, was the sincere wish and interest of the
Porte, whose efforts had till then always been directed to that end, and
that there were no circumstances in Egypt which could serve as a motive
for any foreign assurances of the kind made." Finally, the Turkish
Ambassador requested that the two Powers would give an explanation of
what they meant. At the same time the Sultan sent a Circular to the
other Powers, protesting against the action of England and France.
Lord Granville now began to doubt whether he had not gone a little too
far, and drafted an answer to the Porte of an apologetic character. The
tone of the proposed reply was somewhat of the kind that a schoolboy
taken to task for an act of impertinence towards his master might be
expected to give. Substantially, it was that the two Powers did not
mean anything at all.
The despatch, as originally drafted, began by disclaiming any doubt
whatever as to the sovereignty of the Sultan over Egypt. It proceeded to
declare that there was no change in the policy of Her Majesty's
Government, which was as anxious as ever for the continuance of the
sovereignty of the Porte, and for the maintenance of the liberties and
administrative independence secured to Egypt by the Sultan's Firmans.
Having paid the Porte these little compliments, the despatch disclaimed
all ambitious views with regard to the country (of which, by the way,
the Sultan had been careful never to accuse the two Powers), but said
that they could never be indifferent to events which might plunge Egypt
into anarchy, and that it was only with a view to warding off such a
catastrophe that Her Majesty's Government thought it advisable, in
conjunction with the French Government, to forward a declaration showing
the accord of the two in carrying out the policy described. The despatch
finally pointed out that the form of the Note was not a new one, and
that similar declarations had been on special occasions made to the
Khedive without calling forth any remonstrance from the Porte.
Gambetta, however, viewed the matter in a different spirit. Having once
gone forward he was not disposed to draw back. He had, moreover, the
interests of the large body of French bondholders to protect. He at
first objected that no explanation of the Joint Note at all was
necessary, and that any attempt to explain it would only tend to
encourage the military party. Seeing, however, that Lord Granville was
determined to send some reply, Gambetta insisted on certain
modifications in the despatch. Amongst them he suggested that the
assertion of the Porte, that there were no circumstances that could
justify the steps taken by England and France, should be answered, and
proposed that it should be pointed out, first, that the authority of the
Khedive had been modified and diminished; second, that the Chamber of
Notables had arrogated to itself the right of interfering with matters
expressly exempted from its jurisdiction by the Khedive's Decree; and
third, that the Chamber had aimed at setting aside arrangements to which
Egypt was bound by international engagements with England and France.
Lord Granville once more yielded to what he had begun to recognize as
the superior mind of the French statesman, and Gambetta's amendments
were agreed to.
It was not until the 2nd February, however, that the reply to the
Porte's remonstrance was actually sent off.
In the meantime the Gambetta Ministry had fallen, and from this moment
dates a marked change in the attitude of the French Republic with regard
to Egypt. M. de Freycinet, the successor to Gambetta, though agreeing to
the amended reply to the Porte, cautiously inquired what meaning was to
be attached to the reservation as to "taking action" made by Her
Majesty's Government in assenting to the original Note.
Lord Granville, no longer under the influence of Gambetta, and
apparently anxious to recede as far as possible from the somewhat bold
position which he had been induced to adopt, answered, contrary to the
plain words in which the reservation had been expressed, that Her
Majesty's Government reserved to themselves the right to determine, not
merely the _particular mode of action_ to be adopted in Egypt, but
whether any action at all was necessary.
De Freycinet, who, it must be admitted, was equally glad to back out,
then plainly declared that he was disinclined to any armed intervention
in Egypt, whether by France and England together, or by either
separately. This announcement must have been a surprise to the British
Government, which, after being led by France into sending the Joint
Note, now began to discover that in the event of its becoming necessary
to take any steps to carry it into effect, England could no longer count
on her as an ally.
Under these circumstances, and feeling that the time when action would
have to be taken might not be far off, Lord Granville addressed a
Circular to the other Powers, requesting them to enter upon an exchange
of views as to the best mode of dealing with the Egyptian Question.
The effect of the Joint Note upon the Porte has been stated. It only
remains to consider its effect upon the Khedive and the Notables. The
Khedive received the assurances of protection given by England and
France gratefully enough. It was not so, however, with his Ministers,
who, on the Note being communicated on the 8th January, wanted, like the
Sultan, to know what it meant. Sir Edward Malet, in reply, assured them
that the Note was merely intended to convey to the Khedive the
assurance of the friendship of the Powers, and that in point of fact it
did not really mean much.
It is obvious that to produce any good effect on the Chamber and the
National Party it was necessary that the Note should have been backed by
the display of force, and this unfortunately was just what was wanting.
In short, England and France launched their threat without being
prepared to follow it up by immediate action. It created great
indignation on the part of the military leaders and in the Chamber;
Arabi declared point-blank that any intervention on the part of England
and France was inadmissible. Later on, when it was seen that the two
Powers were not really to act, but, on the contrary, were busy doing all
they could to attenuate the step they had taken, the feeling of
indignation gave way to one of contempt, very natural under the
circumstances.
Amongst those who misled the chiefs of the National Party none were so
conspicuous as two Englishmen, namely, the late Sir William Gregory, an
ex-Colonial Governor, and Mr. Wilfred S. Blunt. Both these gentlemen
had, whilst spending some months in Egypt, conceived a violent sympathy
for the National movement. They had witnessed during their stay in the
country numerous instances of misrule and oppression, and they regarded
Arabi and his friends as the leaders of a genuine popular effort to
secure political liberty and good government.
In addition to the assurances which they received from Sir William
Gregory and Mr. Blunt, the leaders of the National Party were led to
believe, and as has been seen not without reason, that England and
France were not really agreed to do anything, much less to take any
decisive step in the way of intervention; that the two Powers were
jealous of each other, and that the Joint Note might be safely
disregarded. The Arabists further clung to the hope that even were
France and England allied, the other Powers would prevent their
interference, and the protests which four of them, namely, Germany,
Austria, Russia, and Italy, made at the time against any foreign
interference in Egypt without their consent, certainly tended to confirm
this view.
This was the condition of affairs on the 2nd February, when, as already
stated, the deputation from the Chamber requested the Khedive to summon
a new Ministry. Tewfik had by this time become thoroughly alarmed. The
tonic effect produced by the Joint Note had quite gone off, and he was
beginning to doubt how far he could rely on support from England and
France. He realized that by placing himself under the tutelage of the
Western Powers he was injuring himself with the Porte, and he had daily
proofs afforded him of his growing unpopularity with his subjects. Under
these circumstances he saw nothing for it but to yield. At the
suggestion of the Chamber, the intriguer Mahmoud Sami was directed to
form a new Ministry, which he lost no time in doing, in conjunction with
his confederate Arabi, who now filled the important post of Minister of
War.
CHAPTER VI.
CRITICAL POSITION.
Although the Ministry of Mahmoud Sami was forced upon the Khedive, the
position of the latter was at the time so hopeless that one must not be
surprised at his endeavouring to make the best of it and put a good face
upon the matter. Accordingly, on the 4th of February, 1882, Tewfik, in
true Oriental style, wrote to his new Premier that, in accepting the
task of forming a Cabinet, he had given a fresh proof of his devotion
and patriotism, and the letter ended by approving of the programme which
the new Premier had drawn up.
The programme in question referred to the arrangements for the Public
Debt, including the Control. It spoke of the necessity for judicial and
other reforms, and then passed on to the burning question of the Chamber
of Notables, and stated that the first act of the Ministry would be to
obtain sanction for the proposed law for the Chamber. This law, it was
stated, would respect all rights and obligations, whether private or
international, and would wisely determine the responsibility of
Ministers towards the Chamber as well as the discussion of laws.
Mahmoud Sami's programme elicited from the English and French
Controllers a memorandum, in which they very sensibly observed that it
mattered very little whether or not the intention of attacking the
Control was asserted, as by the very force of circumstances it became
ineffectual when the Controllers found themselves no longer in the
presence of the Khedive and of Ministers freely appointed by him, but of
a Chamber and an army. It added that the Chamber, under the influence of
certain military chiefs, did not hesitate to claim rights incompatible
with the social condition of the country; it had gone so far as to
compel the Khedive to change the Ministry which had his confidence, and,
under pressure of certain officers, to impose on him the late Minister
of War as Prime Minister, and concluded with the significant words: "The
Khedive's power no longer exists."
After this it is not surprising that the Controllers resigned office.
Sir Auckland Colvin was requested by the British Government to remain at
his post and maintain "an attitude of passive observation." His French
colleague was replaced by M. Brédif. There is no doubt that the
Controllers' view of the situation was only too just. With Arabi as
Minister of War, and his co-conspirator, Mahmoud Sami, President of the
Council the country was simply under a military dictatorship.
Meanwhile, the reserves of the Artillery were called in and distributed
amongst the coast fortifications, recruiting in the provinces was being
actively carried on, ninety Krupp guns were ordered from Europe, and
Arabi was created a Pasha by the Sultan.
The National Party had now become complete masters of the situation.
Notwithstanding this, a collision might for some little time have been
averted but for an incident which occurred shortly after.
The differences between the Circassians and the native-born Egyptians in
the army have been already touched upon. One peculiarity of the Arab
race is a revengeful disposition. Arabi and his friends had, as already
stated, met with rough usage at the hands of the Circassian party. Hence
it followed that the first idea of the former on getting into power was
to avenge themselves on their old enemies. This was carried out by the
wholesale arrest of fifty Circassian officers, and of Osman Pasha Rifki,
former Minister of War, on a charge of conspiracy to assassinate Arabi.
It was also alleged that the plot comprised the deposition of the
Khedive and the restoration of Ismail Pasha.
The prisoners were tried in secret by a court martial appointed by the
military leaders, and, of course, found guilty. They were, it is said,
subjected to torture to induce them to confess, and persons of
respectability testified that they heard at night shrieks of pain coming
from the place where the prisoners were confined. The sentence passed on
forty of them, including Osman, was that of exile for life to the
remotest limits of the Soudan. This was equivalent to a sentence of
death as regards most of the prisoners.
It was necessary that the sentences should be confirmed by Decree of the
Khedive, and he consulted Sir Edward Malet as to the course to be taken.
The story of the plot was, there is reason to believe, purely imaginary.
With some little hesitation, and after conferring with the diplomatic
agents of the Powers, the Khedive boldly determined to exercise his
prerogative without reference to his Ministers, and signed a Decree
commuting the sentences to simple banishment from Egypt, without loss of
rank and honours.
This was a defiance of Mahmoud Sami, to which he was not disposed to
submit. On the 10th May, the Khedive summoned the Consuls-General, and
informed them that the President of the Council had insisted that this
Decree should be changed by condemning the prisoners to be struck off
the strength of the army, and had threatened that his refusal would be
followed by a general massacre of foreigners. The significance of this
threat coming from Mahmoud Sami, the Minister who was in power when just
a month later--namely, on the 11th June--a massacre of foreigners _did_
take place in Alexandria, will probably be remarked.
The Chamber of Notables had ceased to sit on the 26th March, when the
session closed; but Mahmoud Sami now announced that since the Khedive
and his Ministers could not agree, and as it was impossible for the
Ministry to resign, they had determined themselves to convoke the
Chamber, and to lay the case before it, and that he did not intend to
hold any further communication with the Khedive until the difference
between them had been decided by the Chamber. He added that in the
meantime the Ministry would answer for the public safety.
The alarm in Cairo now began to be general. It was open warfare between
the Khedive, and his Ministry supported by the army. The National Party
made no secret of their intention to depose the Khedive as soon as the
Chamber assembled.
The Notables, when the day for assembly arrived, began to show a
disinclination to support the National Party. They had commenced to
realize that they had already gone further than they had intended, and
also that they were being merely used as tools by Arabi and his
colleagues.
At first they refused to meet at all, on the ground that they had not
been convoked by the Khedive, but only by the Ministry. They were,
however, induced to assemble, and on the 13th May they met at the house
of Sultan Pasha, the President of the Chamber. Here Mahmoud Sami read an
indictment against the Khedive, charging him principally with not
governing through his Ministers, and with compromising the liberties of
Egypt. On the 14th the Ministers were so little sure of the support of
the Notables, that Mahmoud Sami and Arabi went to the Palace, and, in
the names of themselves and their colleagues, offered to resign if the
Khedive would guarantee public order. His Highness answered, that such a
condition was a most unusual one, and that it would be the business of
the Ministry to see that public order was not troubled; he added that
the only persons likely to cause trouble were Arabi and his associates.
On the 15th, the English and French Consuls-General gave notice to Arabi
that if there was a disturbance of public order, he would find Europe
and Turkey, as well as England and France, against him, but that if, on
the other hand, he remained loyal to the Khedive, his acts and person
would be favourably regarded.
Arabi, in reply, stated that he would guarantee order only as long as he
remained Minister, except that in the event of a fleet arriving he could
not answer for the public safety. The same day the two Consuls-General
announced to the Khedive that an Anglo-French fleet was hourly expected
at Alexandria. This was followed by the Ministers going in a body to the
Palace and making a complete submission to the Khedive.
A reconciliation of the Khedive with his Ministers was accepted by the
former only on the earnest representations of the Notables and the
Consuls-General, in order that tranquillity might not be disturbed, the
idea was to keep the Ministry in office as a temporary measure, in order
that there might be some one to treat with when the fleets should
arrive.
Notwithstanding the improved aspect of affairs, the alarm in Cairo
continued, and crowds of people daily left the city. To allay the panic,
Mahmoud Sami and Arabi declared that they would guarantee the
preservation of order on the arrival of the fleets.
On the 19th and 20th of May the much-talked-of "fleets" arrived at
Alexandria. They consisted only of the British ironclad _Invincible_
with two gunboats, and the French ironclad _La Gallisonière_, also
accompanied by two gun-vessels. The remainder of the allied squadron was
left at Suda Bay, in the island of Crete.
The despatch of the English and French ships to Alexandria by two
Powers, each professing to be "disinclined to armed intervention in
Egypt," was so important a step that it may be interesting to go back a
little to consider the means by which it was brought about. Lord
Granville, immediately after the Abdin demonstration of the 9th
September, had intimated to the French Government as his idea of a
remedy for the military insubordination prevailing the sending of a
Turkish General to Egypt. M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, objected that this might lead to further steps, and
possibly to the permanent occupation of the country by Turkish troops.
The French Minister expressed himself in favour of a "joint military
control," consisting of an English and a French General, to restore
discipline in the Egyptian Army. Nothing was done to carry out either
suggestion.
In March, 1882, when the struggle between the Khedive and the Chamber
was at its height, Lord Granville suggested that England and France
should send two "technical advisers" to assist the representatives of
the two Powers in settling the details of the financial matters then
pending. The proposal was so ludicrously absurd under existing
circumstances, that it says much for the politeness of the French
Minister that he took the trouble to give a serious reply. He objected
that the measure would give offence to the other Powers, as an attempt
on the part of England and France to effect a separate settlement of
Egyptian affairs, and also that it would tend to lower the
Consuls-General in their own eyes and in those of the Egyptians.
Again baffled, Lord Granville, in April, 1882, could think of nothing
better than that the Sultan should be asked "to send a General with full
powers to restore discipline in the Egyptian Army, with the
understanding that he was not to exercise those powers in any way
without the concurrence of an English and a French General, who would be
associated with him."
This proposal also fell through, the French Government objecting that
the sending of a Turkish General at all would tend sooner or later to
the sending of Turkish troops, which was not desirable.
The despatch of a Turkish Commissioner of some kind continued to be
talked about, when, on the 7th May, 1882, Sir Edward Malet wrote to the
Foreign Office that the Khedive's Ministers would certainly resist by
force the arrival of any Commissioner from Turkey. After this, Lord
Granville was for a time forced to abandon his favourite hobby of
Turkish intervention. Sir Edward Malet's despatch contained the
following significant passage:--
"I believe that some complication of an acute nature must
supervene before any satisfactory solution of the Egyptian
question can be attained, and that it would be wiser to hasten
it than to endeavour to retard it, because the longer
misgovernment lasts the more difficult it is to remedy the evils
which it has caused."
This very sensible opinion had its effect, for, on the 11th May, Lord
Granville was so far able to make up his mind as to say that the English
Government were willing to send two ironclads to Alexandria to protect
European residents. This announcement, however, was only made after the
idea had been suggested by the French Minister. Even at this period,
Lord Granville could not help referring regretfully to his original idea
of sending the three Generals (an expedient about as hopeful as sending
three flower-pots with water to extinguish a fire), and in reply to M.
de Freycinet, his Lordship said that he could still think of nothing
better.
The French Government, in agreeing to the despatch of the Anglo-French
fleet, appeared resolved to abandon the cautious attitude which it had
assumed on M. de Freycinet taking office. The French Premier, on the
11th May, informed the Chamber of Deputies that in its Egyptian policy
the Ministry had two objects, first, to preserve "the preponderating
influence of France in Egypt"; and, second, to maintain the independence
of Egypt, as established by the Firmans; and added that the means which
would be employed to carry out this policy would be an intimate alliance
with England.
M. de Freycinet, on the 12th May, informed Her Majesty's Ambassador in
Paris, that as the Khedive had been acting under the advice of England
and France, the French Government considered it the bounden duty of the
two Powers to support His Highness _as far as circumstances would
allow_, and that France would co-operate loyally and without _arrière
pensée_ with England in that sense. M. de Freycinet, with some sense of
humour, added that sending the three Generals would be inopportune.
On the 13th the English Government notified their concurrence in the
views of France with regard to the Khedive, and welcomed the
co-operation of the French Government. Lord Granville, at the same time,
expressed the readiness of himself and his colleagues to defer to the
objections raised to the mission of the three Generals.
It now became known that the Notables were assembling in Cairo, and that
the Ministry of Mahmoud Sami was about to propose the deposition of the
Khedive. It was also reported that Mahmoud Sami proposed to declare
himself "Governor-General of Egypt by the national will."
These alarming reports caused the preparations for the departure of the
ships to be hastened, and, at the same time, with a view to keep the
ground clear, the two Western Powers sent an intimation to the Porte
desiring it to abstain for the moment from all intervention in Egypt.
The instructions to the British Admiral were as follows:--
"Communicate with the British Consul-General on arrival at
Alexandria, and in concert with him propose to co-operate with
naval forces of France to support the Khedive and protect
British subjects and Europeans, _landing a force, if required_,
for latter object, such force not to leave protection of ships'
guns without instructions from home."
The French Admiral's instructions were somewhat different, and tend to
show that the two Powers were not completely agreed as to the means to
be employed to support Tewfik. His instructions were in these words:--
"On arrival at Alexandria communicate with the Consul-General,
who will, if necessary, indicate to you what you will have to do
to give a _moral_ support to the Khedive. You will abstain,
until you have contrary instructions, from any material act of
war, unless you are attacked or have to protect the safety of
Europeans."
The British and French Consuls-General, on the arrival of the fleets,
advised the Khedive to take advantage of the favourable opportunity to
dismiss the existing Ministry, and to form a new Cabinet under Cherif
Pasha, or any other person inspiring confidence. Negotiations were
simultaneously opened with Arabi in order to induce him, with the other
rebel leaders, to retire from the country, in return for which they were
to be guaranteed their property, rank, and pay.
None of these plans succeeded. The Khedive recognized the futility of
dismissing a Ministry that insisted on remaining in power. Mahmoud Sami
replied that the Ministry would not retire so long as the squadrons were
kept at Alexandria, and Arabi declared that he must refuse either to
retire from his position, or to leave the country.
On the 25th May, the representatives of England and France handed to
Mahmoud Sami, as President of the Council of Ministers, an ultimatum in
the form of a Dual Note, demanding the retirement of Arabi from the
country, the withdrawal of "the Colonels" into the interior, and the
resignation of Sami's Ministry. The Note added that the two Governments
would, if necessary, insist on the fulfilment of these conditions.
The Ministers, on receipt of the "Dual Note," waited on the Khedive to
ask his opinion as to the answer that should be given, and His Highness
distinctly told them that he accepted its conditions. They urged a
reference to the Porte, on which the Khedive told them that it was an
internal question, and that it was strange that they, who had complained
that he had failed to uphold the privileges of Egypt, should suggest
such a course. On the 26th the Ministers resigned, alleging as a reason
that the Khedive, in accepting the conditions of England and France, had
acquiesced in foreign interference in Egypt.
The Khedive promptly accepted the resignation of the Ministry, and sent
for Cherif Pasha to form a new Cabinet. Cherif refused on the ground
that no Government was possible while the military chiefs remained.
On the 27th an event occurred in Alexandria which tended to bring
matters still more to a crisis. The officers of the regiments and the
police force in that city held a secret meeting, and telegraphed to the
Khedive direct that they would not accept the resignation of Arabi, and
gave the Khedive twelve hours to reply, after which the officers
declared that they would not be responsible for public tranquillity.
On receipt of this message, the Khedive summoned to his presence the
chief personages of State, the principal members of the Chamber, and the
head officers of the Cairo garrison, and placed the situation before
them.
Toulba Pasha, one of Arabi's strongest supporters, interrupted the
Khedive in his speech, and stated that the army absolutely rejected the
Dual Note, and awaited the decision of the Porte, which was the only
authority they recognized. On the same day Arabi, at the head of a
hundred officers, met the chief persons of Cairo and the Notables, and
demanded the deposition of the Khedive, threatening death to the
recalcitrant. Nevertheless almost all present, excepting the officers,
persisted in supporting their sovereign. Arabi and the officers demanded
of the Khedive a decree reinstating Arabi as Minister of War. Amongst
those present, Sultan Pasha and some of the Notables warned the Khedive
of what had taken place, and told him his life was not safe unless he
reinstated Arabi. The Khedive consulted the English and French
Consuls-General, who advised him not to comply.
In the afternoon of the same day, a deputation consisting of the Coptic
Patriarch, the Chief Rabbi, the Notables, and others, waited on the
Khedive, begging him to reinstate Arabi, adding, that though he might be
ready to sacrifice his own life, he ought not to sacrifice theirs, and
that Arabi had threatened them all with death if they did not obtain the
Khedive's assent to his reappointment. In his perplexity, the Khedive,
in order to prevent bloodshed, yielded, and issued a memorandum stating
that at the repeated requests of the population, and with the desire of
maintaining order and the tranquillity of the country, he reinstated
Arabi.
Although one may be disposed to blame Tewfik for his conduct on this
occasion, it must be owned that his position at the moment was a
critical one. The despatch of the fleets on which he had been led to
rely had turned out a ridiculous fiasco. Instead of ten vessels, there
were only two accompanied by four gunboats, and no troops for landing.
The lamentable weakness of the demonstration only excited the ridicule
of the military party. It was beyond doubt that the guard at the Palace
had been doubled, and that orders had been given to the sentries not to
allow Tewfik to leave the Palace unless the deputation received a
favourable reply, and to fire on him if he insisted on going out. All
the outlets of the Palace were carefully watched, and a mob was
collected for the purpose of rushing into the Palace and ill-treating
him, if the prayer of the deputation were refused. It was also announced
that there was to be a military demonstration at five in the afternoon,
and that it was the intention of the army to depose the Khedive. Under
these circumstances, and seeing how little material aid he had from
England and France, it is not surprising that he yielded.
One of the first acts of Arabi on resuming office was to publish a
declaration that now he had been reinstated, he guaranteed the security
of the life and property of all the inhabitants of Egypt irrespective of
nationality or religion. This assurance was not made before it was
required.
For several days past a feeling of uneasiness had prevailed, especially
in Alexandria; when the military and police in that city made their
demand for Arabi's reinstatement, Mr. Cookson, the British Consul, asked
the Governor, Omar Pasha Loutfi, if he could answer for the safety of
Europeans. He replied that he had exhausted every effort to calm the
officers and soldiers, but had entirely failed, and that he could not
answer for their conduct, although he saw no reason to apprehend any
disturbance.
In the prevailing state of things, the Consul thought it his duty to
confer with Admiral Seymour as to the best means of protecting British
subjects in case of a general attack upon Europeans, and was informed
that the Admiral was not prepared to land any force, although he would
protect the embarkation of women and children and others who might seek
refuge on board ships in the harbour. The Admiral sent an officer with
the Consul, and a spot for embarkation was selected.
This arrangement was communicated to the British residents at a meeting
held at the Consulate the same day (the 28th).
The European population now became seriously alarmed, and on the 29th a
memorial was drawn up by the British residents, calling upon Her
Majesty's Government to provide efficient means for the protection of
their lives. It pointed out that--
"During the twenty-four hours, from the 26th to the 27th,
Alexandria was in continual danger of being stormed by the
soldiery, who, it was reported, actually had cartridges served
out to them to be used against Europeans." "There was," it said,
"every reason to believe that the perils which had come without
warning would recur again, and against them," it continued,
"Europeans were absolutely defenceless. They had not even the
means of flight, as in order to reach the ships in harbour they
would have to run the gauntlet through the streets. The small
squadron in port could only silence the forts, and when these
forts were disabled, then would commence a period of great
danger for Europeans, who would be at the mercy of soldiers
exasperated by defeat, whilst the English Admiral could not risk
his men ashore, as his whole available force for those
operations did not exceed 300 men." The memorial concluded by
stating that "every day's delay increased the dangerous temper
of the soldiery and their growing defiance of discipline."
Mr. Cookson at once telegraphed the contents of the memorial to the
Foreign Office, where it was carefully placed amongst the archives.
The history of events has now been brought down to the 29th May, on
which date Admiral Seymour reported that the Egyptians were raising
earthworks opposite his flagship, the _Invincible_, then lying in the
inner harbour at Alexandria, and suggested that his squadron should be
strengthened by the despatch of three of the ships of war which had been
left at Suda Bay.
In a later telegram he added that when the earthworks were armed, the
position of the unarmoured vessels of his squadron would be untenable,
if fired on without warning. In reply, the Admiral was directed to
arrange with the French Admiral to dispose the ironclads so as to
silence the batteries if they opened fire.
On the 30th May, the British ironclad _Monarch_, and two gun-vessels,
the _Cygnet_ and the _Coquette_, as well as three French vessels of
war--the _Alma_, the _Thétis_ and the _Hirondelle_--were ordered from
Suda Bay to Alexandria, where they arrived between the 2nd and 5th June.
The rest of the British Squadron in Suda Bay were directed to cruise off
the coast of Egypt, and to communicate with Alexandria for orders from
time to time.
Arabi, on being applied to on the subject of the earthworks, answered
that repairs only were being effected, and refused to order them to be
discontinued. It was useless to remonstrate with the Khedive, whose
orders that all warlike preparations should be stopped had already been
disregarded. The Sultan was therefore appealed to, and he sent an order
to Arabi to desist from further armament. Arabi gave the necessary
instructions, and the new works, on which two guns were already mounted,
were discontinued.
The Khedive, on his part, applied to the Sultan, and requested that an
Imperial Commissioner should be sent to Egypt. On the 3rd June it was
known that Dervish Pasha, a Marshal of the Ottoman Empire, had left
Constantinople for Alexandria as special Envoy from the Sultan, and his
arrival was awaited with anxiety by both the Khedive and the Arabists.
The following observations, taken from one of the highest authorities on
Egyptian matters,[8] throw a light on Dervish Pasha's mission.
"The Sultan's aim naturally was not to reinforce, but to
counteract Anglo-French influence in Egypt. By accepting his
intervention England and France confessed themselves worsted,
and opened the door for a host of intrigues. His Majesty was not
slow to take advantage of the opportunity and tried to play a
complicated double game. Dervish Pasha, the First Commissioner,
was instructed to support the Khedive, and if possible
intimidate the leaders of the military party, while Ahmet Essad,
the Second Commissioner, was instructed to conciliate Arabi and
his friends, and assure them that they had in the Sultan a sure
friend and ally. The Third Commissioner's duty was to act as a
spy on his two colleagues, and he in his turn was closely
watched by a secretary, who sent secret reports direct to
Constantinople."
On Dervish's arrival in Cairo, on the 7th of June, he was greeted by the
acclamations of a mob of the lowest class of natives, who shouted before
his carriage the praises of Arabi, and denounced the Christians.
"Dervish was known before his arrival to be accessible to
Egyptian arguments, and there can be no doubt that they were
boldly asked for and liberally given. Upon his arrival he showed
marked favour to the Arabi party. Then he had a long interview
with the Khedive, and then his conduct suddenly became very
satisfactory to the Palace. Mahmoud Sami had arranged that the
petitions from all the provinces should be brought to the
Commissioner by deputation. Dervish received them graciously,
placed the petitions in a pile on the divan, begged the
deputation to consider all grievances settled by his arrival,
and dismissed them. The Ministers came next. Mahmoud Sami
entered with effusion, and introduced his colleagues. Dervish
remained seated, continued his conversation with his secretary,
and then made a casual remark to Sami on the beautiful situation
of the Palace of Ghezireh. The Ministers looked dumfounded, but
Dervish, continuing his conversation, begged his secretary to
repeat to him the story of the massacre of the Mamelukes by
Mehemet Ali at the Citadel,[9] which he could see from the
window where he sat. When the suggestive story was completed,
the Envoy, with one of his pleasantest smiles, remarked to
Arabi, 'The one man who escaped was a lucky dog,' and with a
remark on the weather dismissed them."[10]
After this slap in the face the Ministers left, feeling that there was
no alternative between complete submission to the Khedive and absolute
defiance of the Sultan.
Before two days elapsed, events occurred at Alexandria which
demonstrated that Arabi was the only power in Egypt, and brought Dervish
to his feet as a suppliant.
What those events were, will be recorded in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VII.
THE RIOTS AT ALEXANDRIA.
For some days previous to Sunday, the 11th June, 1882, the demeanour of
the natives towards the European population of Alexandria had been
growing more and more unfriendly; and there were many indications that
some disturbance, the precise nature of which no one was able to
discover, was impending.
The forenoon of the 11th passed off quietly enough and without any
unaccustomed incident, and the European population attended the churches
and places of worship as usual.
Between two and three in the afternoon the tranquillity of the town was
disturbed by shouts and yells from some two thousand natives, who were
suddenly seen swarming up the Rue des Soeurs, the Rue Mahmoudieh, and
the adjacent streets, crying, "Death to the Christians!" Others came
soon after from the Attarin and the Ras-el-Tin quarters; and the riot,
which appears to have broken out in three places almost at the same
time, became general.
The crowd rushed on, striking with their "naboots" all the Europeans
whom they could meet, knocking them down and trampling them under foot.
Shots were fired; the soldiers and police interfered; but, in most
instances, only with the object of making the butchery more complete.
Many Europeans, flying for refuge to the police stations, were there
slaughtered in cold blood. Shops and houses were broken into and
pillaged, and for four and a half hours, until the soldiers arrived on
the scene, the usually quiet and prosperous city of Alexandria
experienced a fair share of the horrors of war.
The signal for the massacre was a feigned Arab funeral procession, in
which natives marched wearing green turbans, and which passed between 10
a.m. and noon through the main streets of Alexandria.[11]
The next thing which occurred was a disturbance which broke out about 1
p.m. between Europeans and natives in the neighbourhood of a
coffee-house called the "Café Crystal," in the Rue des Soeurs.
Of the precise origin of the riot it is difficult to speak with
certainty. It has been stated that it originated in a dispute between a
Maltese and a native coachman or donkey-boy, in which the Maltese, being
beaten with a stick, retaliated with his knife, and, according to one
account, killed his adversary. Another version is that two natives
attempted to break into the shop of a Maltese with whom they had
previously quarrelled, and were violently resisted by the owner. Both
accounts are involved in doubt, and the better opinion is that whatever
may have been the origin of the alleged quarrel, it was only a pretext
for what was to ensue. Anyhow, about the time last mentioned, Mr.
Cookson, the British Consul, was summoned by the local police to assist
in quelling a disturbance between Maltese and natives in the quarter of
the Caracol Labban, a police-station in the Rue des Soeurs. He found
there the Governor and Sub-Prefect of Police, and, after waiting more
than an hour, under the impression that they had succeeded in calming
the excitement, Mr. Cookson returned to the Consulate. This was not,
however, until he had been struck by one of the stones which were flying
about.
About 3 p.m. he found a messenger, purporting to come from the Governor,
to summon him with all the other Consuls to a meeting at the same
Caracol as before.
There is good reason to believe that no such request was ever made by
Omar Pasha Loutfi, and that the messages sent were part of a
preconceived scheme to decoy the Consuls into the streets, where they
would be in the power of the mob. It is a singular thing that there were
considerable intervals of time between the delivery of the messages, not
warranted by the positions of the different Consulates, as if the
intention was for the Consuls to arrive separately. Mr. Cookson,
accompanied only by a janissary in uniform, drove immediately towards
the Caracol. He found marks of recent conflict in the streets and groups
of excited natives moving about. On approaching within about ninety
yards of the Caracol, at a place where four roads met, he was first
assailed with stones and then felled to the ground with a blow from a
"naboot." When the Consul recovered consciousness, he was lying in the
street surrounded by a crowd, one or two members of which, including a
native officer, were trying to protect him, whilst others were striking
at him. Fortunately he was able to escape with his life to the Caracol,
where he remained till about 4 p.m., when he was brought by a circuitous
route to the Consulate.[12]
It has been stated that the inaction of the police at the different
Caracols was due to the fact that the day previous all the officers and
sub-officers in charge had been convoked, and told that the men were to
remain at their posts under any circumstances, without interfering even
in the event of an outbreak happening.
Almost at the same time and place, the other members of the Consular
body, as they arrived on the scene, were similarly attacked.
All this time the Governor was at the door of the Caracol, giving orders
to the mustaphazin (military police) to disperse the mob, though his
orders were never executed. In fact, the mustaphazin were quite beyond
his control, and at times openly cursed and reviled him when he tried to
interfere on behalf of the Europeans.
Whilst the fighting went on, the Arabs, the police, and the soldiers
occupied their time in breaking open and plundering the shops and houses
on the line of route, tearing down doors and shutters, and using the
materials as well as the legs of tables and chairs as weapons of
offence.
The rioting gradually extended up the Rue des Soeurs, towards the
Place Mehemet Ali (the great square), the Europeans here and there
firing at times from the terraces and balconies of the houses, and the
soldiers and the mob replying with firearms and stones.
At an early period of the fray, one of the mustaphazin was killed by a
shot from a house, and his body being taken to an adjoining Caracol, his
comrades became so exasperated, that they butchered every European who
sought refuge there.
In the streets, the conduct of the mustaphazin was almost equally bad.
When they did interfere, they did so in a half-hearted, indifferent
manner. In the great majority of cases, where they did not join in the
killing themselves, they encouraged their countrymen to do so. There is
reason to believe that the mustaphazin did a large proportion of the
killing, as they were armed with sword-bayonets. The natives, on the
other hand, had in most cases only heavy sticks, with which they stunned
and bruised their victims.
A considerable number of Bedouins were observed amongst the mob, which
emerged from the Rue des Soeurs by the side streets leading into the
adjoining quarters. The Bedouins were armed with their long guns, with
which they shot down passing Europeans. One of a group of Bedouins,
stationed opposite the European hospital to intercept the fugitives, was
seen to shoot a man who was running past, and crouching down, in the
hope of escaping observation.
About 4 p.m. a second mob came down from a different part of the town
known as the Attarin quarter, and similar fighting went on, the natives
attacking every European who came in their path. Amongst other victims
was a little boy five years old, apparently a Maltese, who was killed
with a naboot in front of the Austrian Post Office.
At half-past five, the portion of the Rue des Soeurs where the
disturbance began was almost deserted, the ground being strewn with
_débris_ of wood and glass, and the windows shattered, many of them by
bullets. Further up, and opposite the Lazarist College, in the same
street, but nearer the Place Mehemet Ali, the crowd from the Attarin
quarter mingled with the other mob were continuing the work of
destruction. They hunted down every European they saw; one they fell
upon and killed with sticks and pieces of wood at the very door of the
college itself. All this while the mustaphazin, some thirty or forty in
number, in front of the college, were observed firing off their rifles
without any apparent motive. The street at this part was now filled with
rioters. A number of Europeans found refuge at the college, the doors of
which were bolted and barred by the inmates. From the terrace above
these were able to look down on the work of destruction.
About 5.30 a European in black clothes, and apparently of good social
position, covered with blood and with his trousers torn to rags, was
seen running backwards and forwards, as if distracted. Just as he
reached the corner of the Rue des Soeurs, a point guarded by two
mustaphazin, a band of natives armed with sticks emerged from the
street, rushed at once on him and beat him on the head. The two
mustaphazin not only did not prevent the Arabs from ill-treating their
victim, but, on the contrary, were seen to seize the wretched man by the
arm, and laughing, thrust him into the midst of the band which was
assailing him. Whether he subsequently escaped or not is unknown. One of
these mustaphazin being remonstrated with, candidly replied, "We are
ordered to do it."
In one spot in the Rue des Soeurs the bodies of three Europeans were
found lying in a heap. One had a bullet-hole in the head, another was
stabbed through the chest, and another with his skull fractured was
lying on his face with his shoes and stockings stripped off.
The mob now turned their attention to indiscriminate pillage. The shops
in the square itself were broken into and the kiosks wrecked. Next,
crowds of looters were observed going back in the direction of Gabari,
laden with goods from the neighbouring shops. These the mustaphazin
allowed to pass without opposition; indeed, several of their own number
were themselves carrying the stolen goods. Soldiers were seen to take
from Europeans, whose lives they spared, their watches and such
valuables as they had about them.
In the Strada Nuova both police and soldiers were observed encouraging
the mob to break open shops, and each time this was done the police and
soldiers entered first, and had the first choice.
In another quarter two native policemen were observed attacking even a
native, who was carrying gold articles and a quantity of money, when a
mounted soldier appeared on the scene, and he and the policemen shared
the plunder between them, leaving the thief to go empty away. In their
selection of objects of plunder the mob were far from particular. One
soldier was seen walking down the street with a glass chandelier on his
head. Another was seen riding down the street on a toy horse. The
tobacco shops suffered more severely than any others; wherever one of
these was seen, it was invariably broken into and the contents
distributed among the crowd. Wearing apparel, also, was in great
request, and one of the native officers was observed sitting on the
pavement exchanging the trousers he was wearing for a new pair stolen
from a neighbouring shop. In the few cases where a native had not
succeeded in obtaining any plunder for himself, he invariably turned to
one of his more fortunate comrades and helped himself to his stock. One
man who was carrying off some dozens of slippers was stopped by no less
than three of his fellow-countrymen, who made him wait whilst they
selected those which fitted them best.
Whilst this was occurring similar scenes of violence were being
perpetrated in another part of the town, namely, in the streets leading
from the Place Mehemet Ali to the Marina and to Ras-el-Tin.
On that Sunday a considerable number of Europeans had been to visit the
ships in the harbour. On their return, between 4 and 5 p.m., they found
the Marina Street, Frank Street, and the adjoining thoroughfares in the
possession of a mob armed with naboots. What happened may be learned
from the case of an English missionary, Mr. H. P. Ribton, one of the
victims. Ribton, accompanied by his little daughter and two friends,
was amongst those who had been afloat in the afternoon. On landing from
the ships they found the city gate, leading from the Marina into the
town, closed; but they were allowed to pass through by a door in the
police-office. The shops were shut, and the streets were filled with
soldiers. Ribton and party were in the rear of some other Europeans who
had landed with them. Suddenly the police called out in Arabic, "Quick!
quick!" and all the Europeans commenced running. In a moment or two
those in front wheeled round, crying that the mob were coming. Mr.
Ribton and his friends turned at the same time, but the police with
fixed bayonets drove them back, and in an instant they found themselves
face to face with the mob, who had already overwhelmed the Europeans in
front.
The mob consisted of the lowest class of Arabs in the city; they were
armed, like the rest, with clubs, with which they beat their victims to
death. As soon as the latter fell the Arabs dragged them out to the back
streets, stripped their bodies and flung them into the sea.
The missionary and his two male companions in vain attempted to shield
his daughter from the blows. Though Ribton himself was twice felled to
the ground he again staggered to his feet, attempting to save his
daughter. The third time he fell he rose no more, and when afterwards
his body was found his head was so battered as to be unrecognizable.[13]
Ribton's two friends were killed by his side. His daughter was seized by
a native soldier, who, throwing her across his shoulders, carried her
off to the Arab quarter. Here she was rescued by a friendly Sheikh, who
had heard her screams, and who kept her in his house till nightfall,
when he sent her home disguised in native clothes.
Some of the most atrocious acts of violence were perpetrated in
immediate proximity to the Zaptieh, where is situated the Prefecture of
Police. Here soldiers and mob, mixed together, pursued the Europeans who
were passing on their way to the Marina in the hope of escaping to the
ships. Whenever a European appeared in sight the mob cried out in
Arabic, "Oh, Moslems! Kill him! Kill the Christian!"
The master of a Greek merchant ship was forced by the police to descend
from his carriage, and bayoneted on the spot. A French subject, who was
being pursued by the mob, applied to a soldier for protection. The
latter responded by taking deliberate aim at him with his rifle and
bringing him to the ground. A mustaphazin was seen holding a young man
from behind, whilst a soldier shot him dead; his body was then
maltreated and thrown into the sea.
A man on guard at the Zaptieh, or chief police office, was seen to shoot
down a European who was running away from the mob, who speedily battered
him to death.
Some officers of H.M.S. _Superb_, Lieutenants Saule and Dyrssen, Dr.
Joyce and Mr. Pibworth, engineer, about 6 p.m., seeing the mob rushing
towards them, attempted to obtain shelter at the Caracol Midan. The man
on duty refused to admit them. They then ran to the Danish Consulate
close by, where they were offered an asylum by the Consul. As their ship
was going to sea at 7 p.m., the officers were unwilling to stop, and,
taking advantage of a carriage which had been secured, they proceeded
towards the Marina by Frank Street. When about half-way down they found
themselves in the centre of the mob, who, howling and shouting, seized
the horses' heads and commenced striking the officers with their sticks;
several brandished knives, and one of them stabbed Mr. Pibworth,
wounding him mortally, and attempted to stab the others. They then
jumped from the carriage and managed to run through the crowd, receiving
several blows in doing so. Mr. Pibworth was removed to the police
station, where he died half-an-hour afterwards. A fireman of the S.S.
_Tanjore_, who was in a carriage with five of his companions, also on
his way to the harbour, was stopped about 4 p.m. by the mob in the open
piece of ground near the Zaptieh, and ordered to alight. They were then
surrounded and beaten by the natives, some of the party receiving wounds
from the swords of the mustaphazin drawn up there. The party tried their
best to escape, but the fireman was dragged by the arm into the Zaptieh.
Two minutes later he saw one of his companions brought in by a soldier.
Almost at the same moment the guard on duty at the gate drew his sword
and struck the man twice, splitting his skull with the first stroke, and
severing his head from his body with the second. The fireman was
detained for three hours, and, according to his statement, all who were
brought in during that time were slaughtered.
Witnesses living near the Zaptieh spoke of the cries and groans which
came from the building at this period, and another witness has stated
that from a window opposite he counted no less than thirteen bodies of
Europeans being dragged out and taken down a side street towards the
sea.[14]
The rioting in the Rue des Soeurs, near the Caracol, was at its height
at 4.30 p.m., and that in Frank Street about 5.30 or 6, when the two
mobs of rioters marched on until they united in the great square or
Place Mehemet Ali.
The brutality of the mob extended even to the Arab children. One of them
was seen to go up to the dead body of a European and fire off a toy-gun
at his head, and the shoe-blacking boys in the Place Mehemet Ali were
observed to beat out the brains of the wounded who lay groaning on the
pavement.
Whilst this was going on, the troops, to the number of about 7,000,
remained at the different barracks under arms, waiting instructions to
act. The Governor, about four in the afternoon, had asked the Military
Commandant of the town to place at his disposal a battalion of the
regiment at Ras-el-Tin; but the messenger returned, saying the colonel
required an order in writing before he could move. The Governor then
sent the written order demanded, and also despatched an order to the
colonel of the regiment at Rosetta Gate to send a battalion of his
troops into the town without delay. He also, to prevent the disorder
spreading to the Place Mehemet Ali and the Place de l'Eglise, ordered a
company of mustaphazin to each of those places.
The mustaphazin, this time, obeyed, but the soldiers still remained
drawn up at the barracks. In spite of the Governor's request, they
refused to march without an order from the Minister of War. Much
valuable time was thus wasted.
Now came Arabi's opportunity. Arabi, it will be remembered, had, a few
days before, been treated by Dervish Pasha as an ignoble rebel against
the Sultan, and made to feel his inferiority. When the news of the riot
was telegraphed to Cairo the great Envoy himself was sent to fetch
Arabi, and had, almost on his knees, to beg him to intervene. Arabi
consented, and the desired despatch was sent by telegraph from Cairo,
and a little after 6 p.m. the soldiers began to march. As they advanced,
the mob gradually fell back, and then dispersed as if by magic; and the
tramping, shouting, and yelling suddenly ceased, and there was silence
in the streets save for the groans of the wounded.
The behaviour of the troops was strictly in accordance with discipline.
They had their orders to put an end to the disturbance, and they did so.
One of them being asked if the massacre was finished, naively replied,
"Yes; the order has come to cease striking."
In the course of the afternoon, hundreds of Europeans rushed for
protection to the different Consulates, where they remained with the
gates closed and guarded. Every moment increased the number of
fugitives. The British Consulate was literally crammed with officers,
civilians, ladies and children.
Telephonic communication was open with Admiral Seymour on board the
_Helicon_. The Admiral had himself been on shore that afternoon, and
narrowly escaped the rioters. His movements at this critical moment were
marked by great indecision. His first idea appears to have been to land
an armed force for the protection of the Europeans, for at 5.32 p.m. the
_Helicon_ made the general signal to the fleet, "Prepare to land armed
boats." This order, however, was annulled five minutes later. The
captains of the English men-of-war were then signalled to assemble on
board the Flag-ship, when, after consultation, it was decided, as the
only course open, to send boats round to the Eastern Harbour under cover
of the guns of H.M.S. _Superb_, to be in readiness to embark those who
had taken refuge in the Consulate; and boats were sent to the Arsenal
and other landing-places to bring off the officers who remained on
shore.
It had been arranged that the _Superb_ was to take up a position off the
Eastern Harbour, near the European quarter, and to have a force of
seamen and marines ready for immediate service on shore, sending her
boats as near as possible to the beach, with a view to the removal from
the town of all the women and children whom they might be able to find.
The landing party, to be used only in case of need, was, on a signal
being made, to clear the streets leading to the English Consulate.
Between 8 and 9 p.m. the Governor, to whom the arrangements were
communicated, begged that the boats might not be sent, as their
appearance would, in his opinion, excite the troops beyond control. He
also stated that the disturbance had now been suppressed, and that he
could guarantee the safety of everybody. Under these circumstances, it
was decided that the instructions to the _Superb_ should be
countermanded. This, however, appears not to have been communicated to
that vessel.
The night passed off badly enough at the Consulate, which was crowded
with terrified fugitives. There were, however, no serious alarms until
about 11.30, when an event happened which might have brought about a
catastrophe.
One of the _Superb's_ armed boats, mistaking a bright light on the shore
for the signal arranged in the event of the boats being required to
land, answered the supposed signal with a blue light, and thus disclosed
her position near the shore, hitherto concealed by the darkness. In an
instant the bugles sounded the alarm, there was a call to arms all over
the town, and a rush made by the troops towards the beach, showing that
the Governor's fears were well founded, and that had the boats touched
the shore, the troops, already much excited, would have been quite
beyond the control of their officers. There was not a moment to be lost.
A peremptory order was sent from the Consulate to the officer in charge
of the boats to withdraw out of sight, and the soldiers, seeing no signs
of a landing, retired to their posts.
The rest of the night passed quietly and without incident. The
population mostly remained indoors, and detachments of soldiers with
fixed bayonets guarded the various Consulates and stationed themselves
at the corners of all the principal streets. But for these
circumstances, and for the broken _débris_ from the wrecked shops and
houses, there was little to indicate that anything unusual had taken
place.
There are no means of arriving accurately at the numbers killed on the
11th June, but they have been estimated, by competent persons, at one
hundred and fifty Europeans, besides natives.[15] Many of the latter are
known to have been carried off to the houses at nightfall and then
secretly buried. The European doctors who visited the hospitals on the
following day found forty-nine bodies--forty-four of which were
Europeans. Thirty-seven were so battered as to be unrecognizable.
Seventy-one persons were also found wounded; of these, thirty-six were
Europeans, two Turks, and thirty-three natives. Of those killed or
wounded, some had received stabs on their bodies, but the majority had
their injuries inflicted by naboots. One witness speaks to having seen
several cartloads of bodies thrown, at night, into the sea near the
Western Harbour, and it is quite possible that many were so disposed of.
In a fluctuating population, such as that of Alexandria, it is obvious
that many persons might disappear and never be inquired for.
The Governor, on the 12th, visited the sacked and looted quarters of the
town, and took note of the houses injured. He also arrested and
imprisoned between two and three hundred natives who had taken part in
the riot of the previous day.
On the same day, the women and children, who had taken refuge at the
British Consulate, embarked under an escort provided by the Governor.
Thousands of other Europeans of all nationalities also went afloat, and
during the whole day the streets were blocked with fugitives. At first
these were cursed and spat upon by the natives as they passed, but later
on they were allowed to go by unmolested.
In Cairo a meeting was held at which the Khedive, Dervish Pasha, the
Ministers, and the Consuls-General were present. This was to obtain a
reply to a demand of the Consular body that measures should be taken to
insure the safety of Europeans. Arabi promptly undertook to stop all
inflammatory preaching, and to obey all orders given him by the Khedive.
The Khedive engaged himself to issue orders immediately with the object
of restoring public tranquillity. Dervish Pasha, on his part, consented
to accept joint responsibility with Arabi for the execution of the
orders of the Khedive.
It was then decided to increase the number of patrols and to reinforce
the police stations by troops. Yacoub Pasha Sami, Under-Secretary of
War, was sent from Cairo with two regiments of infantry and some
artillery. Guards with their arms were placed at the corners of the
streets, and at night they lay down on the ground in the Place Mehemet
Ali and other open spaces. In the course of the day a proclamation was
issued by the Consular body to the Europeans, pointing out that the
disorder had been suppressed by the army, and that its chiefs guaranteed
public tranquillity. It further called upon the European population to
remain in their dwellings, and to abstain from carrying firearms. The
effect of the proclamation in reassuring the inhabitants was simply nil,
and many persons who might otherwise have remained on shore betook
themselves to the ships.
On the 13th the Khedive and Dervish Pasha arrived from Cairo. Their
reception was anything but enthusiastic.
Alexandria remained quiet, the streets being still patrolled by soldiers
night and day. The general flight of Europeans continued. The number
seeking refuge on board the ironclads was so great that the ships would
have been useless in the event of their having to act. Three hundred
were on board the _Invincible_, the same number on board the _Monarch_,
and all the smaller men-of-war were similarly crowded. On the Admiral's
representation, merchant-steamers were chartered by the British
Government, and employed to take the refugees to Malta; one of the
Poste-Khedive steamers was, subsequently, taken up as a temporary
refuge, and some hundreds of persons were placed on board. Other
steamers were thronged with passengers leaving for Cyprus,
Constantinople, and other places; fabulous prices were charged the
fugitives by the boatmen who took them off to the various vessels.
A Commission of Inquiry was next instituted by the Egyptian Government,
with a view to discover the authors of the events of the 11th June. The
President of the Commission, oddly enough, was Omar Pasha Loutfi,
Governor of Alexandria, the official who was responsible for the
maintenance of order on the day in question, and who was therefore
himself, to some extent, on his trial. The Commission assembled, and
evidence was taken from the wounded and others. An English barrister
attended as the delegate of the British Consulate. Before the inquiry
had proceeded far it developed into mutual recriminations, and a pretext
was afforded to the Egyptian Government for bringing counter charges
against Europeans. Eventually such determined opposition was raised by
the Egyptian members to the institution of a satisfactory inquiry that
the British delegate had to be withdrawn, and the Commission collapsed.
On the 20th of June a new Ministry under Ragheb Pasha, an old and infirm
statesman, was formed. In this, as before, Arabi figured as Minister of
War. The men forming the Cabinet were not such, however, as to inspire
confidence. Many of them were pronounced Arabists, and the rest were
about fair specimens of the usual Egyptian Minister.
Arabi, who had come to Alexandria at this time, now made a point of
showing himself a good deal in public, driving out every evening,
sometimes in the same carriage with the Khedive, and always attended by
a cavalry escort. On these occasions great crowds of natives assembled,
and showed unmistakably the interest they took in the _de facto_ ruler
of Egypt.
That Arabi and the Sultan were in accord at this time is unquestionable.
But if any doubt existed it was removed by the fact that on the 25th
June the Sultan decorated with the Grand Cordon of the Medjidieh the man
who had plunged his country into anarchy. The Order was presented by the
Khedive personally, who (Arabi declares) expressed his satisfaction and
gratitude for his faithful services and attention to duty.
The attitude of Tewfik, on this as on other occasions, appears at first
sight inexplicable. It is only to be accounted for on the hypothesis
that His Highness, having just reason to doubt how far he could
calculate on the sincerity of England and France, or on receiving help
from them, was unwilling to cut himself altogether adrift from the
National Party.
It is due to Arabi to say that during the period which elapsed between
the day of the massacre and the subsequent bombardment perfect order was
maintained in Alexandria. It was not so in the interior, however, and on
the 26th June it was reported that ten Greeks and three Jews were
massacred at Benha, an important town in the Delta. In other provincial
towns, Europeans were openly insulted by the natives, and soon began to
join the fugitives to Europe. At Rosetta and Damietta, things grew so
threatening that even the European lighthouse-keepers had to be
withdrawn, and their duties confided to natives.
At Alexandria, the British Consul, disabled by the wounds which he
received on the 11th June, had to leave for Europe. The Vice-Consul,
incapacitated by age, and suffering from the shock brought about by
recent events, had also to depart. Most of the Consular clerks and
employés likewise found it necessary to quit their posts, and Sir Edward
Malet, overtaken at a critical moment by severe illness, had to betake
himself to Europe. In this emergency, Mr. Cartwright was called upon to
discharge the duties of Consul-General, assisted by the knowledge and
local experience of Sir Auckland Colvin.
On the 29th June, Mr. Cartwright wrote to Lord Granville as follows:--
"The exodus of Europeans and the preparations for flight, after
seeming temporarily to have abated, continue with increased
vigour. The hotels are closing; the shipping agents have
transferred their offices to the neighbourhood of the port; and
the banks which still remain open are preparing to transfer
their staff to the ships. It is impossible to describe the
collapse and ruin which have overtaken the country.... A large
number of respectable natives are leaving. The departure of
Turkish families is taking larger proportions, while 200
destitute Jews and Rayahs have been sent away at the expense of
the Government itself."
Thrown out of employment by the exodus of Europeans, the greatest
distress prevailed, and it was estimated that nearly 30,000 persons were
left destitute in Alexandria alone.
Thus matters went on, until the measures taken by the Government in
adding to the armament of the forts led to actual hostilities. On the
part of the Europeans, a sort of stunned feeling prevailed; there was,
with a few exceptions, absolute panic. On the side of the natives, there
was a vague feeling of disquietude. They realized that they had
irretrievably committed themselves, and imagined that the day of
retribution was drawing nigh.
Ships of war continued to arrive from all parts, until a squadron of
twenty-six vessels belonging to the navies of England, France, Italy,
Austria, Russia, the United States, Spain, Greece, and Turkey, lay off
Alexandria.
Meanwhile, the crowd of fugitives continued to embark. The French and
Greek Governments sent transports to remove their subjects _en masse_,
and ships laden with British refugees left for Malta as fast as the
vessels could fill up. Europeans arrived from Cairo and the interior,
and the trains were thronged with passengers, many of whom rode on the
roofs and steps of the railway carriages. As many as 4,000 arrived on
one day, the 15th.
Alexandria, at this period, presented a curious spectacle. Beyond the
business of transporting the fugitives, there was nothing else done. The
shops were shut, and the doors barred and padlocked. The banks were
occupied in putting up iron shutters, and blocking up their windows. The
few business firms which remained hired steamers in the harbour and
removed their books and effects on board, so as to be ready for any
eventuality. The streets in the European quarter presented a deserted
appearance, the Arab soldiers being almost the only persons seen about.
In Cairo things were but little better, the whole of the foreign
population had taken flight, together with most of the well-to-do
natives.[16]
The events of the 11th June created a profound sensation in England.
That a large number of unoffending Europeans, living in a civilized or
quasi-civilized country, should have been without provocation suddenly
attacked and slaughtered, was bad enough. But that this should have
occurred at a moment when eight British ships of war, and nine others
belonging to other Powers, were there, for the avowed purpose of
protecting European life and property, was worse still.
The opportunity was not lost upon the Opposition. Indignation meetings
were held throughout the United Kingdom, in which the conduct of Mr.
Gladstone's Administration was denounced in the strongest terms. Lord
Salisbury, as the leader of the Opposition in the House of Lords, was
particularly vehement in his condemnation of a policy which had resulted
in British subjects being "butchered under the very guns of the fleet,
which had never budged an inch to save them."
On board the vessels of the British fleet, a similar feeling of
indignation prevailed. When the bodies of the officer and seamen
massacred were on the 13th June taken out to sea for burial, officers
and men alike clamoured for revenge. It was felt that an insult had been
offered to the British flag, which ought to be avenged.
Public feeling at home became fully aroused, and Her Majesty's
Government caused it to be intimated that it was their intention to
demand reparation for the loss of life and property which had occurred.
To strengthen the Mediterranean fleet, the Channel Squadron, consisting
of the _Minotaur_, _Achilles_, _Agincourt_, _Northumberland_ and
_Sultan_, was despatched to Malta on the 15th, and placed under the
temporary command of Admiral Seymour. More energetic measures still were
in contemplation, but it was deemed unwise to decide upon them until the
great body of Europeans should have had time to clear out of Egypt.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE ALEXANDRIA BOMBARDMENT.
On the 1st of July, 1882, matters had become so threatening that the
Consular archives and such of the staff as remained were removed on
board a Peninsular and Oriental steamer, chartered as a place of refuge
for the British subjects whose duties compelled them to remain in Egypt.
The same day Admiral Seymour telegraphed that there were upwards of
10,000 men in the forts and barracks of Alexandria, and that Arabi hoped
to get the allied fleets into a trap by sinking stone barges at the
harbour mouth.
On the 3rd, Seymour received the following instructions:--
"Prevent any attempt to bar channel into port. If work is
resumed on earthworks or fresh guns mounted, inform Military
Commander that you have orders to prevent it; and if not
immediately discontinued destroy earthworks and silence
batteries if they open fire."
On the 4th, Dervish Pasha made a final attempt to get rid of Arabi and
his party by diplomacy. The Turkish Envoy invited the Minister of War to
go to Constantinople "to live with the Sultan and other friends." Arabi,
to his credit, refused to desert his followers, and replied that the
people would not suffer him to leave, and that as they were attached to
him he could not abandon them.
The same day a telegram was sent to the Admiral as follows:--
"Acquaint Military Governor that any attempt to bar the channel
will be considered as a hostile act, which will be treated
accordingly. Concert with Consul-General as to notice to
Europeans if occasion arises. Before taking any hostile step,
invite co-operation of French Admiral; but you are not to
postpone acting on your instructions because French decline to
join."
The Admiral replied:--
"Two additional guns placed in Pharos Castle last night. Parapet
facing sea-wall was also strengthened. Consul-General would
prefer I postponed operations until Thursday morning to allow
time for people to quit Cairo. No change in the works bearing on
the harbour. French Admiral has asked for orders."
Seymour had now taken steps for strengthening the fleet, by ordering the
ironclad _Sultan_ from Malta. He had also received intelligence that two
battalions had been ordered to Cyprus from Malta in ships of the Channel
Squadron. He had, moreover, in concert with the Acting Consul-General,
succeeded in getting nearly the whole of the European residents out of
the country. It only remained to see how far, in the event of action
becoming necessary, he could count on the support of the Power which had
joined England in presenting the celebrated Joint Note.
On the question being put to M. de Freycinet by Lord Lyons, the French
Foreign Minister replied that his Government had decided "not to
instruct Admiral Conrad to associate himself with the English Admiral in
stopping by force the erection of batteries or the placing of guns at
Alexandria." The reasons given were, that such a step would be an act of
war, which could not be resorted to without the consent of the
Legislature, and that if the Government applied to the Chamber for
sanction, they did not feel sure of obtaining it.
On the 6th, the French Ambassador called on Lord Granville and informed
him, that in the event of a bombardment taking place, the French ships
would go to Port Saïd.
On the same day, Admiral Seymour, finding that the warlike preparations
on shore were continuing, wrote to the Military Commandant of
Alexandria, that unless such proceedings were discontinued, it would
become his duty to open fire on the works in course of construction.
The following reply was received:--
"_To the Admiral of the British Fleet._
"MY FRIEND ENGLISH ADMIRAL,
"I had the honour to receive your letter of the 6th July, in
which you state that you had been informed that two guns had
been mounted and that other works are going on on the
sea-shore, and in reply I assure you that these assertions are
unfounded, and that this information is like the intimation
given to you about the blocking up of the entrance to the
harbour, of the falseness of which you were convinced. I rely
on your feelings of humanity, and beg you to accept my
respects.
"(Signed) TOULBA,
"Commandant of Forces."
The Khedive during this period retained great self-possession. He
realized perfectly the difficulties of his position, and sent for Sir
Auckland Colvin, to whom he explained that should a bombardment be
resolved upon he was determined to remain faithful to Egypt. He could
not, he said, desert those who had stood by him during the crisis, nor
could he, merely to secure his personal safety, abandon Egypt when
attacked by a foreign Power. In the event of a bombardment taking place,
His Highness announced his intention of retiring to a palace on the
Mahmoudieh Canal, and added that the more rapidly the affair was
conducted, the less danger there would be for himself personally.
On the 9th, Admiral Seymour telegraphed to the Admiralty that "there was
no doubt about the armament. Guns were being mounted in Fort Silsileh.
He should give foreign consuls notice at daylight to-morrow, and
commence action twenty-four hours after, unless forts on the isthmus and
those commanding the entrance to the harbour were surrendered."
The information upon which Seymour proposed to act was partly a
declaration made by Lieutenant Dorrien, of the _Invincible_, and which
(omitting immaterial parts) was as follows:--
"On the morning of the 9th day of July, 1882, at about 7.30
a.m., I drove through the Rosetta Gate, and ... reached the old
quarantine station, where I ... proceeded on foot to the fort
marked on Admiralty Chart 'Tabia-el-Silsileh,' and when within
fifty yards of the said fort I observed inside two working
parties of Arabs about 200 strong, under the superintendence of
soldiers, parbuckling two smooth-bore guns--apparently
32-pounders--towards their respective carriages and slides,
which were facing in the direction of the harbour, and which
seemed to have been lately placed ready for their reception."
On the 10th, the Admiralty telegraphed to the Admiral directing him to
substitute for the word "surrendered" the words "temporarily surrendered
for the purposes of disarmament."
The same day, the Admiral sent his ultimatum to the Military Commandant,
in the terms following:--
"I have the honour to inform your Excellency that as hostile
preparations, evidently directed against the squadron under my
command, were in progress during yesterday at Forts Pharos and
Silsileh, I shall carry out the intention expressed to you in my
letter of the 6th instant, at sunrise to-morrow, the 11th
instant, unless previous to that hour you shall have temporarily
surrendered to me, for the purpose of disarming, the batteries
on the isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the
harbour of Alexandria."
The actual danger to Admiral Seymour's ships from the Egyptian
preparations was at this time simply nil, and even were it otherwise he
had only to make a slight change in the position of his vessels to place
them completely out of harm's way. At the same time, the bombardment
which he threatened, had, after the events of the 11th of June, become,
in a certain sense, a necessity, if only to restore European prestige in
Egypt: moreover, it formed the first step towards shattering the power
of Arabi and his army, which was now, to a great extent, concentrated in
Alexandria.
In hurrying on the bombardment, the Admiral was probably influenced not
a little by the desire to allay the growing impatience of the officers
and men under his command. Ever since the murder of an officer and two
men of the fleet, on the day of the riot, a good deal of dissatisfaction
was expressed at the continued inaction of the naval force, not only by
the seamen, but by the officers as well.
It was foreseen that the arrival of British troops was only a question
of days, and the bluejackets naturally desired that, as what had taken
place was an insult to the fleet, to the fleet should be given the work
of avenging it. They were unwilling, as they put it, that they should be
employed merely "to carry Sir Garnet Wolseley's baggage on shore."
The Admiral himself, whilst sharing these sentiments, may not
unnaturally have had in his mind the fact that the Channel Squadron,
under Admiral Dowell, was on its way to share in the honours of the day.
On the receipt of Admiral Seymour's ultimatum, a Cabinet Council was
held at Ras-el-Tin, presided over by the Khedive in person. It was
decided to send a deputation to the Admiral, to inform him that no new
guns were being mounted in the forts, and to tell him that he was at
liberty to send one of his officers, if he desired to test the truth of
this statement. The deputation came back with the answer that the
Admiral insisted on the disarmament of the forts.
The Council again met in the afternoon, and decided that the Silsileh
Fort and Fort Pharos, and the guns placed in them on the _Eastern_
Harbour, could not constitute any threat towards the vessels which were
in the _Western_ Harbour, and that the President of the Council should
write to the Admiral in the terms of the despatch mentioned below. It
was at the same time resolved that in the event of the Admiral
persisting in opening fire, the forts should not answer until the fifth
shot, when they were to reply.
"_Alexandria, July 10th, 1882._
"ADMIRAL,
"As I had the honour to promise in the conversation I had with
you this morning, I have submitted to His Highness the Khedive,
in a meeting of the Ministers and principal dignitaries of the
State, the conditions contained in the letter you were good
enough to address this morning to the Commandant of the place,
according to the terms of which you will put into execution
to-morrow, the 11th instant, at daybreak, the intentions
expressed in your letter of the 6th instant to the Commandant
of the place, if before that time the batteries on the isthmus
of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the port of Alexandria
are not temporarily surrendered to you, to be disarmed.
"I regret to announce to you that the Government of His
Highness does not consider this proposition as acceptable. It
does not in the least desire to alter its good relations with
Great Britain, but it cannot perceive that it has taken any
measures which can be regarded as a menace to the English fleet
by works, by the mounting of new guns, or by other military
preparations.
"Nevertheless, as a proof of our spirit of conciliation, and of
our desire, to a certain extent, to accede to your demands, we
are disposed to dismount three guns in the batteries you have
mentioned, either separated or together.
"If in spite of this offer you persist in opening fire, the
Government reserves its freedom of action and leaves with you
the responsibility of this act of aggression."[17]
The previous day the Acting British Consul-General visited the Khedive
and urged his removal to Ramleh, a suburb about four miles to the east
of Alexandria. On the 10th Sir Auckland Colvin called to say farewell to
His Highness, and used every argument to induce him to embark in one of
the British vessels, but in vain. Tewfik remained firm, and announced
his intention of standing by his country.
At seven in the evening all the Consuls-General were warned to withdraw
their subjects. The acting British Consul-General and Sir Auckland
Colvin embarked on board the _Monarch_, and the few remaining British
residents betook themselves to the P. & O. s.s. _Tanjore_.[18]
In the course of the day all the merchant vessels in the harbour left,
and these were followed by the foreign men-of-war. One by one the latter
steamed slowly out, and as they passed the British flag-ship her band
struck up the different national airs. The last ship to leave was the
Austrian frigate _Landon_, and when darkness closed in, the English
ships of war were alone in the harbour of Alexandria.
At 9.20 p.m. the Admiral, in the _Invincible_, with the _Monarch_ in
company, weighed anchor, and steamed to a position outside the harbour.
All lights were extinguished, and perfect silence was maintained as the
ships cautiously felt their way through the water. At 10.10 both vessels
came to an anchor off Mex, where their consort, the _Penelope_, was
already lying.
In the meantime, all the ships, including the larger ironclads _Sultan_,
_ Superb_, _Temeraire_, _Alexandra_, and _Inflexible_, which were lying
in the offing, had struck their upper masts, sent down top-gallant and
royal yards, and got everything ready for action. In this state they
remained for the night.
In order to give the reader an idea of the comparative strength of the
opposing forces, it is necessary, in the first place, to give a short
description of the fortifications of Alexandria and their armaments.
Alexandria is situated on a strip of land between the Mediterranean and
Lake Mareotis; a considerable portion of the town stands on a
promontory, which, jutting out from the rest towards the north-west, is
bounded on the north-east by the new or Eastern Harbour, and on the
south-west by the old or Western Harbour.
The fortifications, which were intended to protect the city from an
attack, not only by sea, but also from the direction of Lake Mareotis,
are said to have been planned in Paris, and executed under the direction
of French engineers. The whole of the works were originally well built,
but had fallen much out of repair.
The material used was a soft limestone but little calculated to
withstand modern artillery. The parapets were of sand, covered with a
thin coating of cement. The scarps and counterscarps were reveted with
stonework. The rifled guns, without exception, fired through embrasures,
and nearly all the smooth-bore guns fired over parapets.
The buildings were none of them bomb-proof; nor, except in the case of
Fort Pharos, were there any casemated or covered batteries. The forts on
the sea face of Alexandria may be summed up as follows:--
West of Alexandria--Forts Marabout, Adjemi, and Marza-el-Kanat.
South-west of Alexandria--Citadel of Mex, Old Fort of Mex, and Mex
Lines.
South of Alexandria--Forts Kamaria, Omuk Kubebe, Saleh Aga, and a small
battery between the two last named works.
North of Alexandria--Lighthouse or Ras-el-Tin Fort, Lines of Ras-el-Tin
(including the Hospital Battery), Fort Adda, Fort Pharos, and Fort
Silsileh.
Of the above, Fort Adjemi took no part in the subsequent bombardment.
The British squadron consisted of the ironclads _Alexandra_, _Superb_,
_Sultan_, _Temeraire_, _Inflexible_, _Monarch_, _Invincible_, and
Penelope, the torpedo-vessel _Hecla_, the despatch boat _Helicon_, the
gun-vessels _Condor_ and _Bittern_, and the gunboats _Beacon_, _Cygnet_,
and _Decoy_. The battleships, with the exception of the _Invincible_ and
_Penelope_, were the most powerful then in the British navy. Their size
and armament may be briefly summarized:--
The _Alexandra_, Captain C. F. Hotham, 9,490 tons, 8,610 h.p., 674 men,
2 11-inch 25-ton and 10 10-inch 18-ton guns.
The _Superb_, Captain Thomas Le Hunt-Ward, 9,170 tons, 6,580 h.p., 620
men, 8 18-ton and 4 12-1/2-ton guns.
The _Sultan_, Captain W. J. Hunt Grubbe, 9,290 tons, 7,720 h.p., 620
men, 8 18-ton and 4 12-1/2-ton guns.
The _Temeraire_, Captain H. F. Nicholson, 8,450 tons, 7,520 h.p., 530
men, 4 25-ton and 4 18-ton guns.
The _Inflexible_, Captain John Fisher, 11,407 tons, 8,010 h.p., 440 men,
4 80-ton guns (in two turrets).
The _Monarch_, Captain Henry Fairfax, 8,320 tons, 7,840 h.p., 530 men, 4
25-ton, 2 9-inch 12-ton and 1 7-inch 6-1/2-ton guns.
The _Invincible_, Captain R. H. Molyneux, 6,010 tons, 4,830 h.p., 480
men, 10 9-inch 12-ton and 4 64-pounder guns.
The _Penelope_, Captain St. G. D. A. Irvine, 4,390 tons, 4,700 h.p., 230
men, 8 8-inch 9-ton and 3 40-pounder guns.
The _Hecla_, torpedo vessel, 6,400 tons, 1,760 h.p., 251 men, and 6
guns.
The _Helicon_, despatch vessel, 1,000 tons, carrying 2 20-pounder guns.
The _Condor_ and _Bittern_, gun-vessels, 805 tons, 100 men, 1 7-inch and
2 40-pounder guns each.
The _Beacon_, gunboat, 603 tons, 80 men, 1 7-inch and 1 64-pounder gun.
The _Cygnet_ and _Decoy_, gunboats, 455 and 430 tons, 60 men, 2
64-pounder and 2 20-pounder guns each.
In addition to the armament above given, the eight ironclads each
carried from six to eight 20-pounder rifled breech-loading guns, and,
with the exception of the _Penelope_, from eight to twelve machine guns.
There were also 880 supernumerary seamen and marines on board the fleet,
making the total force 5,728 men.
The relative strength of the opposing forces may be seen from the
following tables:--
The ordnance _mounted_ in the forts was as follows:--
-----------------+----------+-------------+----------+-------
Fort or Battery. | R. Guns. | S. B. Guns. | Mortars. | Total.
-----------------+----------+-------------+----------+-------
Fort Silsileh | 2 | 3 | 1 | 6
" Pharos | 8 | 37 | 4 | 49
" Adda | 5 | 14 | 5 | 24
Ras-el-Tin Lines | 9 | 30 | 10 | 49
Lighthouse Fort, | | | |
or Ras-el-Tin | 6 | 28 | 3 | 37
Fort Saleh Aga | ... | 12 | ... | 12
Battery | ... | 4 | ... | 4
Fort Omuk Kubebe | 2 | 16 | 2 | 20
" Kamaria | ... | 5 | 1 | 6
Mex Sea Lines | ... | 24 | ... | 24
" Fort | 5 | 9 | 5 | 19
Fort Marabout | 3 | 8 | ... | 11
+----------+-------------+----------+-------
TOTAL | 40 | 190 | 31 | 261
-----------------+----------+-------------+----------+-------
The guns on board the ironclads are shewn in the following table:--
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
RIFLED GUNS.
-----------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------
SHIPS. | in. | in. | in. | in. | in. | in. | in. | pr. | pr. | Total.
| 16 | 12 | 11 | 10 | 9 | 8 | 7 | 64 | 40 |
-----------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------
Alexandra | | | 2 | 10 | | | | | | 12
Inflexible | 4 | | | | | | | | | 4
Superb | | | 16 | | | | | | 16 |
Sultan | | | | 8 | 4 | | | | | 12
Temeraire | | | 4 | 4 | | | | | | 8
Invincible | | | | | 10 | | | 4 | | 14
Monarch | | 4 | | | 2 | | 1 | | | 7
Penelope | | | | | | 8 | | | 3 | 11
-----------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------
TOTAL | 4 | 4 | 6 | 38 | 16 | 8 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 84
-----------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-------
This does not include the six to eight 20-pounder guns and eight to
twelve machine guns carried by each vessel.
Admiral Seymour's plan for the bombardment comprised two separate
attacks: one by the _Sultan_, _Superb_, _Alexandra_, _Inflexible_, and
_Temeraire_ from outside the breakwater, the other by the _Invincible_,
_Monarch_, and _Penelope_ inside the reefs.
The three first-mentioned vessels, supported by the fire from the after
turret of the _Inflexible_, which was anchored off the Corvette Pass,
were directed to destroy the batteries on the Ras-el-Tin peninsula, and
then to move to the eastward and attack Forts Pharos and Silsileh. The
_Invincible_, _Monarch_, and _Penelope_, aided by the fire from the
_Inflexible's_ forward turret and by the _Temeraire_, which took up a
position off the Boghas Pass, were ordered to open fire on the guns in
the Mex Lines. The gun-vessels and gunboats were directed to remain
outside until a favourable opportunity should offer for moving in to the
attack on Mex.
At 7 a.m. the Admiral, whose flag was flying from the _Invincible_,
signalled to the _Alexandra_ to fire a shell into the recently armed
works on Ras-el-Tin, known as the Hospital Battery, and followed this by
a general signal to the fleet, "Attack the enemy's batteries." Upon this
immediate action began between all the ships, in the positions assigned
to them, and the whole of the forts commanding the entrance to the
harbour.
A steady cannonade was maintained both by the attacking and defending
forces, and for the next few hours the roar of the guns and the shrieks
of passing shot and shell were alone audible. The spectacle as seen from
the offing was imposing in the extreme. On the one side were the most
powerful ships of modern times, all in fighting trim, with upper masts
and yards struck, some slowly steaming ahead, others at anchor, but all
pouring deadly broadsides into the Egyptian batteries. On the other were
the forts, standing out bright and clear in the sunshine, vomiting forth
volleys of fire and smoke in the direction of the attacking squadron.
The weather was fine and the sea smooth, both of which circumstances
were to the advantage of the attacking force. On the other hand, the
wind and sun were in the enemy's favour, and the smoke, which rose like
a thick wall, at times prevented those on board the ships seeing the
result of their fire.
At 9.40 the _Sultan_, _Superb_, and _Alexandra_, of the outside
squadron, which had previously been under way and turning in succession
at a range of about 1,500 yards, came to an anchor off the Lighthouse
Fort. The batteries had proved stronger than had been anticipated, and
the Egyptian gunners were making very good practice. The firing of the
ships at the same time was less effective than could be wished. Under
these circumstances, and to obtain the exact range, the three ships
adopted a stationary position, and from this moment their fire steadily
improved.
A little after 10 o'clock the harem buildings of Ras-el-Tin Palace were
set on fire and partly destroyed by a shell.
At 10.30 the _Alexandra_ had one of her heavy guns dismounted and
rendered unserviceable. Shortly after the _Inflexible_ weighed anchor
and joined the _Sultan_, _Superb_, and _Alexandra_, and by 12.30 p.m.
the combined fire of the four ships had nearly silenced all the guns in
the Ras-el-Tin Forts. It should be mentioned that, in addition to
helping these three vessels, the _Inflexible_ had at the same time been
engaging the Mex Forts, and doing great execution with her 80-ton guns.
The remaining vessel of the outside squadron, the _Temeraire_, was
meanwhile supporting the attack of the inside squadron on the Mex
batteries at a range of from 3,500 to 4,000 yards, and making great
havoc with her guns. Unfortunately, in taking up her position, she had
got too close to the shoal water of the Boghas Pass, and in swinging
round had grounded on the reef. The gunboat _Condor_ promptly went to
the assistance of the huge ironclad, and eventually the ship was got off
without injury.
Although the batteries at Ras-el-Tin had, as above stated, practically
ceased firing, some heavy guns in Fort Adda still kept up a desultory
cannonade.
At 12.30 p.m. the _Sultan_ signalled to the _Inflexible_, whose work was
now finished both at Ras-el-Tin and Mex, "Adda and Pharos are the only
ones not silenced, all our filled shell are expended, and if you are
going that way, one or two shells from your heavy guns would do much
good, if you don't mind." At 12.35 the _Sultan_ added, "Please silence
Adda as well." The _Inflexible_ then stood across to Fort Adda, and at
12.40 opened fire. Shortly after, the _Temeraire_ was signalled, "Assist
_Inflexible_ in destroying Pharos and Silsileh." The _Temeraire_ then
weighed and steamed over to the position indicated, and assisted in
shelling both forts.
About 1.30 p.m. a lucky shell from the _Superb_, whose practice was very
good, blew up the magazine of Fort Adda. The explosion was terrific, and
huge pieces of _débris_ were thrown into the air, whilst a dense cloud
of smoke for some seconds hid the works from view. The fort at once
ceased firing, and when the smoke cleared away it was seen that the
garrison had retreated from the blackened ruins.
As early as 1.30, the ships were beginning to run short of ammunition,
and the _Sultan_ signalled to the _Alexandra_, "How many filled shell
have you?" and received the answer "Twenty." At one o'clock the
_Alexandra_ signalled that she had only thirty common shell left, and
was answered by the _Sultan_ that she had none at all, and that the
_Alexandra_ had better use common shell as the _Sultan_ was doing.
At 1.35, with the exception of the Hospital Fort, where one rifled gun
continued firing, all the batteries from Fort Adda westward being
silenced, the _Superb_ signalled the fact to the _Sultan_, and suggested
getting under way. The _Sultan_ replied in the affirmative, adding, "Can
you touch up Pharos? _Temeraire_ now on her way to assist _Inflexible_
at Pharos. I have no shell filled, nor has _Alexandra_." The _Superb_
accordingly proceeded towards Fort Pharos and opened fire.
At 2.0 the _Sultan_ signalled to the _Inflexible_, which was engaging
the Hospital Battery and Fort Pharos, "Proceed to Pharillon" (Silsileh).
At 2.55 a shot from the Hospital Battery struck the _Inflexible_ aloft,
carrying away the slings of the mainyard.
At 5 the Hospital Battery fired its last shot.
At 5.10 the _Inflexible_ proceeded across to engage Fort Silsileh, all
the other forts from Ras-el-Tin eastward having been silenced.
At 5.15 the general signal, "Cease firing," was made, followed at 6.5
by, "Anchor in same position as last night."
While the off-shore squadron was thus occupied, the other division of
the fleet under the Admiral's immediate command was not idle. The
_Invincible_ at anchor, with the _Monarch_ and _Penelope_ under weigh
inside the reefs, assisted by the _Inflexible_ and _Temeraire_, in the
Corvette and Boghas Channels, were engaging from a distance of 1,300 to
1,500 yards the batteries and lines of Mex, also the Forts of
Marza-el-Kanat and Omuk Kubebe at various ranges. The enemy replied
briskly both from rifled and smooth bore guns. At 8.45 one of the
_Monarch's_ shells exploded the powder magazine at Marza-el-Kanat. At
8.27 the Admiral signalled to her, "Close nearer the forts, keeping as
close to them as possible." By 9 a.m. the enemy's guns, except four at
Fort Mex, were silenced. These four nevertheless gave considerable
trouble to the ships, for it was difficult to hit upon their exact
position, placed as they were almost on a level with the water, and only
dimly and occasionally seen through the smoke.
About an hour before this Lord Charles Beresford, in the _Condor_,
stationed as repeating ship, saw that the 10-inch rifled guns in Fort
Marabout were playing with great accuracy, at a range of 4,200 yards,
upon the ships engaged off Fort Mex, the shots falling only from 10 to
30 yards short. Steaming within range of his 7-inch gun, he chose with
great skill a position, 1,200 yards off, upon which the enemy's guns
could not be brought to bear, and engaged the fort single-handed for two
hours. The _Condor's_ excellent practice soon checked the fire from Fort
Marabout, and elicited from the Admiral, who sent the other gunboats to
his aid, the signal, "Well done, _Condor_." It is satisfactory to be
able to add that during this operation no casualties occurred on any of
the vessels engaged.[19]
At 10.35 the flag-ship signalled to the _Monarch_, "Steam close in to
the batteries we have silenced and drop a few shells into them at close
range." This was followed by, "Go as close to forts as water will
permit." The _Monarch_ then steamed in shore and poured in a tremendous
fire from all her guns. At 11.30, there being no return fire, she, as
well as the _Invincible_, ceased firing.
At 11.40, the gunboats having returned from Marabout, the _Monarch_,
which remained under way, was signalled to support them in an attempt to
destroy the Mex works, but ordered not to fire unless fired upon. All
the gunboats were at the same time signalled to close in to the
batteries, and, remaining under way, to destroy their rifled guns. The
_Condor_, ten minutes after, signalled that she had only twenty-one
shells for each gun left, and received the order to cease firing. The
gunboats, supported by the _Monarch_, continued to fire on the works.
At 11.58, the _Monarch_ observing soldiers running back into the
batteries, permission was given her to reopen fire.
Permission was also given to the _Penelope_ to fire at the rifled guns
in the batteries with her 40-pounders. At 12.20 p.m. the _Monarch_
ceased firing, signalling that she had driven about 200 soldiers out of
the works. At 12.50 p.m. the _Penelope_ was ordered to get under way,
and taking advantage of her light draught, to try to dismount the guns
at Mex. She then weighed and proceeded in towards Mex Fort, firing at
intervals. At 1.10 the windmills in the neighbourhood of the forts were
seen to be full of soldiers, and the _Monarch_ was ordered to open fire
on them with her light guns.
About 2 p.m. the Admiral, seeing that the gunners of the western battery
of Mex had abandoned their guns, and that the supports had probably
retired also, landed a party, under cover of the gun-vessels and
gunboats, who destroyed with gun-cotton two 10-inch rifled guns, and
spiked six smooth-bore guns in the right hand battery. The party
returned without a casualty beyond the loss of one of their boats, which
got capsized on the rocks, on an alarm (happily unfounded) being raised
that some soldiers were approaching to attack the little force.
At 3.25 the _Penelope_ signalled to the Admiral that Fort Kamaria had
its guns manned, though, from her inshore position, the ship's guns
would not bear on them. The Admiral, in consequence, directed the
_Penelope_ to change her position and open fire on the fort. About the
same time soldiers were observed transporting light guns into one of the
Mex batteries, and the _Monarch_ was signalled to attack again. Both
vessels promptly responded, and, steaming into position, poured in a
devastating fire on the points indicated. At 5.30, there being no reply
from the enemy, the inside squadron ceased firing. This concluded the
operations of the day.
The casualties on board the ships were but slight, amounting only to
five killed and twenty-eight wounded--a fact to be attributed partly to
the protection afforded by the armour plating of the ships principally
engaged, and partly to the inaccurate fire of the enemy's batteries.[20]
A courageous act was reported from the _Alexandra_. In the course of the
bombardment a lighted shell from one of the Egyptian batteries fell on
the main deck of the vessel. Mr. Israel Harding, gunner, rushed for the
missile all burning as it was, and immersed it in a bucket of water.[21]
The Egyptians, it must be allowed, were overmatched both in the size and
number of the guns brought into action, but the way in which they
responded to the heavy fire was marvellous. When the _Inflexible's_
1,700 lb. projectiles struck the scarp of the Lighthouse Fort
immediately underneath an embrasure they threw up a cloud of dust and
fragments of stone as high as the Lighthouse itself. To the looker-on,
it seemed impossible to live under such a fire, yet after a few minutes
the dust would clear away, and the gun's crew would pluckily send
another shell back at their huge opponent.
The Egyptian forces were under the immediate command of Toulba Pasha.
From the best sources of information accessible, it is gathered that the
defences contained no less than 2,000 artillerymen, and of infantry and
civilian volunteers there was no lack.
The disposition of these troops has not been accurately ascertained, but
it is known that Mex was commanded by an adjutant-major, who had with
him one captain, three lieutenants, and 150 men. Of this small number
one lieutenant was mortally wounded, 50 men were killed, and 48 wounded.
Fort Omuk Kubebe, as already mentioned, was subjected to the
_Inflexible's_ fire during the forenoon. Its garrison consisted of 75
artillerymen, aided by a considerable number of native volunteers.
Eighteen of these were wounded. In all, along the southern or inside
line, from Saleh Aga to Marabout, 65 men were killed, and from 150 to
200 wounded.
In the northern line of defences at Ras-el-Tin, and also in Fort Adda,
at least 50 men are believed to have been killed and 150 wounded, but
the record is very vague. Stray pieces of shell are reported by the
chief of police to have killed and wounded between 150 and 200 citizens,
but this statement must be accepted for what it is worth.[22]
It is only fair to the other side to give the Egyptian narrative of the
bombardment. The account published in the Arab paper _El Taif_, in
Cairo, was as follows:
"WAR NEWS.--On Tuesday, 25 Shaban, 1299, at twelve o'clock in
the morning (July 11th, 7 a.m.). The English opened fire on the
forts of Alexandria, and we returned the fire. At 10 a.m. an
ironclad foundered off Fort Adda. At noon two vessels were sunk
between Fort Pharos and Fort Adjemi. At 1.30 p.m. a wooden
man-of-war of eight guns was sunk.
"At 5 p.m. the large ironclad was struck by a shell from Fort
Pharos, the battery was injured, and a white flag was
immediately hoisted by her as a signal to cease firing at her,
whereupon the firing ceased on both sides, having lasted for
ten hours without cessation. Some of the walls of the forts
were destroyed, but they were repaired during the night. The
shots and shells discharged from the two sides amounted to
about 6,000, and this is the first time that so large a number
of missiles has been discharged in so short a time.
"At 11 a.m. on Wednesday the English ships again opened fire
and were replied to by the forts, but after a short time the
firing ceased on both sides, and a deputation came from Admiral
Seymour and made propositions to Toulba Pasha, which he could
not accept.
* * * * *
"No soldiers ever stood so firmly to their posts under a heavy
fire as did the Egyptians under the fire of twenty-eight ships
during ten hours.
* * * * *
"At 9 a.m. on Thursday an English man-of-war was seen to put a
small screw in place of the larger one which she had been
using, and it was then known that her screw had been carried
away by a shot from the forts. On examining other ships it was
observed that eight had been severely battered on their sides,
and that one had lost her funnel."
CHAPTER IX.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOMBARDMENT.
The bombardment of the forts of Alexandria was an occurrence of such
importance, and so rare are bombardments in recent naval annals, that a
few general observations will probably not be without interest.
The most obvious mode of attack on fortifications would be for the ships
to form in line ahead and steam past the batteries, each ship delivering
her fire in succession as her guns would bear. Having thus passed the
line of defence, the ships would turn and repeat the process with the
other broadside. By manoeuvring in this manner, the forts (which have
the advantage of a fixed gun-carriage), would labour under the
disadvantage of having a moving target to fire at. On this principle for
two and a-half hours the bombardment of the forts from Ras-el-Tin to
Pharos was conducted by the _Sultan_, _Superb_, and _Alexandra_. From
the fact that at 9.40 a.m. this mode of attack was changed for one which
consisted in the systematic concentration of fire on individual forts,
from ships more or less stationary, it may be concluded that the former
plan was found faulty.
It is submitted that the best principle in practice is the consecutive
silencing of individual batteries, and not a general, and so to speak
collective, bombardment. In support of this principle it may be
mentioned that from the time of the adoption of the second plan the fire
of the ships improved very much in accuracy. This also had the further
advantage of being accompanied by a simultaneous diminution in the
accuracy of the fire of the enemy: as is shown by the circumstance that
the majority of the hits received by the _Sultan_, _Superb_, and
_Alexandra_ were sustained before 9.40--the time when these vessels
came to an anchor and adopted the concentration principle.
That the fire of the ships would improve as soon as the vessels became
stationary is intelligible enough, and is accounted for by the exact
range being then attainable, but that the enemy should have made worse
practice against a fixed than against a moving target appears a little
difficult to understand. The naval officers engaged have, with some
sense of humour, suggested that the vessels in manoeuvring from time
to time steamed across the line of the Egyptian fire and so got struck.
The explanation, however, is probably to be found in the increased state
of demoralization of the artillerymen as soon as the ships anchored and
made more accurate practice.
In the inshore squadron the flag-ship _Invincible_ was anchored for the
most part 1,300 yards from Mex, and was kept broadside to the wind on
one side, and to the batteries on the other, by a kedge carried out to
windward. The _Monarch_ and _Penelope_ remained under way, passing and
repassing the forts. The _Penelope_ adopted the plan of steaming out
three-quarters of a mile towards the reef, and then drifting towards the
shore broadside on until within about 700 yards, whilst the _Monarch_
kept more way on, moving in a line parallel with the shore. The fire
from these two ships was throughout less effective than that from the
_Invincible_, which was at anchor.
The range at which the fleet generally engaged seems to have been
needlessly great. The outside squadron could have got to within 1,000
yards of the Lighthouse Fort and 800 yards abreast of the Ras-el-Tin
lines, to within 500 yards of Fort Adda and 200 yards of Fort Pharos,
whilst the inshore division could easily have got within 400 yards of
all the batteries in the neighbourhood of Mex. It can hardly be doubted
that the boldness of this move would have been rewarded by the more
speedy and extensive dismounting of the guns, which was confessedly the
chief object of the attack, and would have allowed the machine guns in
the vessels' tops to be used with greater effect.
It must be remembered that the target in each case was the muzzle of a
gun, a mere pin's head at the distance at which the ships were engaged,
and that a successful hit meant either good luck or phenomenally good
shooting. This hammering away at long range was tolerably successful,
but the length of the action was a disappointment to those who expected
short work to be made of the Egyptians, while, as has been seen, it
drained the stock of ammunition to a dangerously low ebb.
The enormous disproportion between the damage sustained by the ships and
batteries respectively may be accounted for, partly by the inferior
construction of the works, and partly also by the inferior practice of
the gunners by whom they were manned. There were other faults in the
defence. For example: the batteries were so placed as to be unable,
except at Fort Pharos, to support one another; there was no bomb-proof
cover; there was too small a stock of ammunition in readiness; and the
men who should have been employed as reliefs for manning the rifled guns
wasted their efforts with the smooth bores, which were practically
useless.
With regard to the fire of the fleet generally, a variety of opinions
has been expressed. One authority states that, with the exception of the
_Inflexible_ and _Temeraire_, the English gunners did not greatly
distinguish themselves. Many of the shells of the _Monarch_,
_Inflexible_, and _Superb_ fell short.[23] The fire also was said to
have been too slow, thus giving the enemy's artillerists time to recover
themselves. The fire of the _Inflexible_ was stated to have been
particularly disappointing in this respect. That of the _Alexandra_ was
much more rapid than that of the others, as her much greater expenditure
of ammunition shows.
A naval officer of experience has expressed the opinion that,
considering the nature of the works attacked, an old line-of-battle
ship, with her numerous though much smaller guns, would have been more
effective than the modern ships which took part in the bombardment. If
one considers the great size and weight of the majority of the
projectiles used, as well as the capacity of the shell and the
consequent amount of their bursting charges, one can hardly fail to be
astonished at the small effect produced on the sand parapets, especially
when it is remembered that the latter were in many cases, according to
modern theory, too weak to afford any real protection. It is a fact, and
one on which too much stress cannot be laid, that in only one instance
was any one of the parapets pierced by a shell from the fleet, and that
Fort Mex was the only battery which could not have been sufficiently
repaired during the night to resume the action on the following day. One
remarkable feature of the fire from the fleet was the enormous number of
shells which failed to explode, and this has never been satisfactorily
accounted for.
The expenditure of ammunition by the squadron appears from the following
table:--
(A) Common.
(B) Palliser.
(C) Shrapnel.
(D) Segment.
(E) Empty Shell.
(F) Shot.
(G) Case.
(H) TOTAL.[24]
(I) Martini-Henry.
(J) Nordenfeldt.
(K) Gatling.
(L) Rockets.
-----------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+---
SHIP. | (A)|(B)| (C)|(D)|(E)|(F)|(G)|| (H) || (I) | (J) | (K) |(L)
-----------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+---
Alexandra | 379| 23| 1| | | 4| || 407 || | 4000 | 340|
Superb | 257| 83| 25| 34| | 12| || 411 || | 1161 | 880|
Sultan | 247| 24| 3| 44| 10| 10| || 338 || | 1800 | 2000|
Penelope | 241| | 45| 32| | 62| || 380 || 5000 | 1672 | |
Monarch | 227| 5| 129| | | 6| || 367 || 1800 | 3440 | 2680| 21
Temeraire | 139| 70| 13| 6| | | || 228 || | 160 | |
Invincible | 221| | 25| | 2| 2| || 250 || 2000 | 2000 | 1000|
Inflexible | 139| 21| 11| 37| | | || 208 || | 2000 | |
Beacon | 21| | | 1| 61| 18| || 101 || 320 | | | 3
Condor | 162| | 8| | 31| | || 201 || 1000 | | 200| 13
Bittern | 66| 7| 1| | | 12| 3 || 89 || | | |
Cygnet | 72| | | | 71| | || 143 || | | |
Decoy | 69| | | | | | || 69 || 40 | | |
Helicon | 6| | | | | | || 6 || | | |
+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+---
TOTAL |2246|233| 261|154|175|126| 3 ||3198 ||10,160|16,233| 7100| 37
-----------+----+---+----+---+---+---+---++-----++------+------+-----+---
The hits received by the fleet were as follows:--
_Alexandra._ Twenty-four shot and shell penetrated the ship above the
armour-plating. Several shot and shell struck the armour; of these, some
made indentations on the plates from five inches to one inch in depth.
The foremost funnel was struck in three places. The total number of hits
was about sixty.
_Sultan._ Number of hits, twenty-seven, of which two struck the armour,
denting two plates, and starting one. One shot went through the after
funnel. The holes made in the side were as follows:--One sixteen inches
by twelve inches; another fifteen inches in diameter; and a third
fourteen inches in diameter. A hole sixteen inches by ten was made
through the mainmast.
_Superb._ Fourteen hits, of which seven were on the hull, and seven on
the upper works and spars. A 10-inch shell struck the port side, and,
bursting, tore a hole in the side ten feet by four feet, within three
feet of the water-line. The armour-plating on the port side was struck
by two shells, of which one indented the armour three inches, and the
other burst, starting a plate, and breaking fourteen rivet-heads. Some
of the rigging was shot away, and a hole twelve inches in diameter was
made in the foremast. Two other holes in the side were as follows:--One
ten inches in diameter, four feet above the water-line; the other twelve
inches in diameter (made by a 10-inch shot), five feet above the
water-line.
_Penelope._ Eight hits, of which three were on the armour, making little
or no indentation. Of the others, one passed through the after embrasure
on the starboard side; another hit the starboard quarter gallery; the
third struck a 9-pounder gun, carried off the sight and damaged the
carriage; the fourth hit the mainyard, port side; and the fifth struck
the muzzle of one of the 8-inch guns, then broke up and destroyed the
transom plate of the carriage. The gun and carriage were put out of
action.
_Invincible._ Eleven hits, six of which passed through the side. A large
dent was made in the armour by a shot which also started a plate.
_Inflexible._ About six hits altogether. One shot struck the unarmoured
part of the hull, and, penetrating, damaged the bollards and did other
injury. Other shots damaged the upper-works, but the armour-plating was
not struck.
The _Monarch_, _Temeraire_, _Hecla_, and gunboats received no hits at
all.
With regard to the effects of the bombardment on the various forts, it
is proposed to give a short account, taking them in the same order in
which they were first presented to the reader.[25]
1. _Fort Marabout._--A small store was burnt. There were several hits on
the scarp, but none of the guns were in any way injured.
2. _Fort Adjemi._--Uninjured.
3. _Marza-el-Kanat._--No injury was done to the fort, but a store of
gun-cotton was exploded.
4. The citadel of Mex had several breaches made in the works, but no
guns were dismounted.
5. _Old Fort of Mex._--Parapets were uninjured, but the buildings in the
rear were almost swept away. A small store in front of magazine was
levelled to the ground. The large store was riddled with shot, but the
magazine was untouched. The barracks were much damaged. The fort was
found to contain many fragments of shell, and the loss of life among the
defenders was probably considerable. The damage to the guns was as
follows:--A 10-inch Armstrong gun was struck in the second coil by a
shell which cut a groove of an oval shape in the metal; the coil was
shaken out of place and cracked, but the gun was left serviceable. A
9-inch Armstrong gun was struck by a shell, and received an oval graze
1·25 inch in depth. In the right portion of the battery, a 10-inch S.B.
and two 8-inch Armstrong guns were struck by shrapnel bullets, and the
fifth gun from the left, an 8-inch Armstrong, was struck on the coil by
a shell. The blow dismounted gun, carriage and slide. The metal of the
gun was ripped off for eighteen inches, and the trunnion ring was also
started by the force of the blow. The remaining guns (36-pounders) were
uninjured.
_Left Flank Battery._--Left gun(10-inch S.B.). This gun was hit on the
right of the carriage by a splinter, the gun was uninjured. No.3 gun
(10-inch S.B.).--This was hit by a shell on the muzzle, gun uninjured.
6. The Mex Lines, armed with S.B. guns, were not fought, and the works
escaped injury.
7. _Fort Kamaria_ was not much injured. A 10-inch S.B. gun was
dismounted by a shell.
In view of the tremendous fire to which Fort Mex was subjected,
and the comparatively short range at which all the ships except
the _Temeraire_ engaged it, it is almost impossible to believe
that not a single gun here was disabled or dismounted during the
action proper. The 8-inch gun which was dismounted was bowled
over by the _Penelope_ long after the fort had ceased firing,
and from a distance stated to be about 300 yards. The successful
shot was the thirtieth of this series, and was aimed by the
gunnery lieutenant.
"This fort was the only one which could not have resumed action
on the following day, in consequence of the injury done by the
landing-party by exploding gun-cotton and spiking the
guns."[26]
8. _Omuk Kubebe._--The effects of the bombardment were considerable,
though they were due less to the number of hits than to the size and
weight of the 16-inch shells which caused most of the injuries. The
effect of three of these shells from the _Inflexible_ was worthy of
note. One shell having burst on the top of the scarp made an almost
practicable breach. Two others, within a few feet of each other, hit the
parapet, 24 feet thick, and almost pierced it. They appear to have
struck the exterior slope, and having cut a trough in the parapet about
11 feet in width, burst after penetrating 17 feet, and formed craters 16
feet in diameter, and 5 feet and 4 feet 6 inches in depth, respectively.
With regard to the ordnance, the only damage was the destruction of a
36-pounder S.B. gun.
9. _Saleh Aga._--One 10-inch and one 6·5 S.B. gun were dismounted, and
one of the 6·5-inch S.B. guns was destroyed, though not dismounted.
10. The adjoining battery received only slight injuries.
11. _Lighthouse Fort, or Fort Ras-el-Tin._--The barracks to the north of
the fort were riddled with shell, and in many parts left in ruins. The
parapets on the west side were so scored with shell that it was
difficult to estimate the number of hits, but at no point had they been
pierced. The scarp also suffered severely, both at the bastions and on
the curtain; and the right face of the bastion was much marked by
shrapnel bullets. On the west front the parapet showed about
twenty-three hits, and the scarp twenty-four; two stores were burnt, and
the rifled-shell store was riddled with shell. The Lighthouse itself was
hit by several shells, and the buildings round its base were reduced to
ruins. Right gun (9-inch).--This gun was sent back to the end of the
slide, and breaking the ties was tilted up on its breech with the
muzzle in the air. Left gun (9-inch).--This was struck by two shells,
and gun and carriage were both destroyed. The former was hit on the
trunnion ring, which had been partially carried away, the carriage was
in pieces, and the brackets were torn off and broken. The gun was thrown
about twelve feet to the rear and crushed several of the gunners, ten
bodies having been found beneath it. In the left bastion, a 10-inch
Armstrong gun was hit on the muzzle, but the tube was not damaged. The
sockets of the levers were broken by use, the tackle shot away, and the
shot-crane broken and useless. A 9-inch gun was run back and tilted up
on the breech in the same manner as the 9-inch gun in the right bastion.
An 8-inch gun was struck in reverse by shells. The gun and carriage were
capsized on the left side, but uninjured. One truck of the slide was cut
away. The Lighthouse Fort suffered more severely than either Pharos or
Adda, since there was not one of the rifled guns which could bear on the
fleet left fit for service.
12. _The Lines of Ras-el-Tin._--(Left or Harem Battery.) The effects of
the bombardment on the fort were small, but the loss of life must have
been considerable, as many shells burst in it. The rear face of the
tower was in ruins. Right gun (8-inch Armstrong).--A 9-inch Palliser
shell struck the lower side of the gun and burst on the breast of the
carriage with the following results: the gun beyond being indented for a
distance of 8 inches in length was uninjured, but had been thrown about
10 feet from its original position. Both brackets of the carriage were
torn away. The entire carriage was a wreck. Centre gun (8-inch
Armstrong).--The right-front truck of the carriage was broken, and the
gun was struck by a splinter on the chase. The gun and the carriage,
however, suffered no serious injury, though the left bracket of the
latter was pierced by a splinter. The centre battery in the interior was
almost uninjured, though the parapet was deeply scored in all directions
by shells. The embrasure of the left gun (9-inch) was choked up by the
ruins of the cheeks, whilst the revetment on each side of the neck was
swept away. The condition of the guns was as follows:--10-inch Armstrong
gun.--The right-front truck of the carriage was carried away, and the
buffers of the slide were much damaged by the recoil of the gun. 9-inch
Armstrong gun.--The gun and carriage were uninjured except that the
lever of the elevating gear was bent, and the holdfast was rising off
the pin. 9-inch left gun.--This was hit on the left trunnion by a shell
which tore off the cap square, and also by a second shell, on the right
bracket six inches in the rear of the trunnion. The gun and carriage
were, however, practically uninjured. This battery in the early reports
of the bombardment was miscalled the Moncrieff Battery, but there was in
it no gun mounted on that system. The Moncrieff gun, 180 yards to the
westward, was hit on the left side by a splinter of a shell, and a bolt
in the rear of the left bracket was also cut out by a Nordenfeldt
bullet. Beyond this it was unhurt, and remained perfectly serviceable.
_The Hospital Battery._--The effects of the bombardment here were
overwhelming. The entire gun portions were so entirely destroyed that
it was difficult to discover where the original crest had been.
The injuries to the guns were as follows:--Right gun (7-inch
Armstrong).--The cheeks of the embrasure were driven in on the gun, and
the trucks were jammed, otherwise the gun and carriage were uninjured.
The former was, however, scored with forty-nine hits from a 10-inch
shrapnel shell, the greatest depth of any hit being 5 inches. Left gun
(7-inch Armstrong).--A shell burst under the front racer on the left
side of this gun, tore it up and bent it into a vertical plane, twisting
the truck and forcing it off the racer. The slide was also jammed by the
ruins of the revetment. The gun-carriage and slide were otherwise
uninjured, and were left fit for service.[27]
13. _Fort Adda._--The barracks and stores, especially on the east side
of the fort, were very much injured, but the batteries were not
materially damaged. The only shell which entered, that on the southern
half of the western side, blew up the magazine. The loss of life from
the explosion was probably very great, and the entire space between the
magazine and the gate was covered with stones, timber, and broken shell.
The injury to the guns was as follows:--A 10-inch S.B. gun was
dismounted by a shell which threw the gun and carriage to a distance of
about 15 feet from the slide. Another 10-inch S.B. gun was similarly
dismounted, whilst a third was struck on the left side of the platform
by a shell which had previously cut off the cascabel of the second gun
to the left; the beams of the platform were completely shattered, and
the gun with its carriage was overturned and wrecked.
14. _Fort Pharos._--The west tower and front were breached in many
places; the minaret was partly knocked down, and the whole of the west
front of the keep, with its two turrets, were in ruins. The south-east
corners of the fort were also much shattered by the shells which passed
over the west front. The stores and barracks suffered severely, and the
destruction of so much masonry must have added considerably to the moral
effect of the fire of the ships. With regard to the sea front, the
parapet was hit in several places (seven in all), but only in three
cases did a shell enter the battery. The corners of the traverse to the
right of the 8-inch Armstrong guns were carried away by two shells; a
third shell pierced the sole of the embrasure of the 10-inch Armstrong
gun, and threw the large granite block which formed the sill on to the
platform of the gun, so the gun might be said to be out of action. Of
the S.B. guns, one heavy 10-inch on the west tower was dismounted, by a
16-inch shell from the _Inflexible_, one 10-inch gun on the west front
was capsized and put out of action, and it is not unlikely that another,
with its carriage, fell into the crater formed by a shell.
On the rear face, a 36-pounder, having been hit on the cascabel by a
chance shell, was thrown completely over the parapet, and left standing
on its muzzle at a distance of 30 feet from its original position.
Another gun was also unserviceable, owing to the partial destruction of
its carriage by a shell. But it was in the casemates below that the fire
of the ships inflicted the greatest injury. The front wall of the
casemates, which is faced with masonry two feet in thickness, was in
many places torn away under the stress of fire, leaving only six feet of
rubble as a protection to the guns. Through the latter the heavy shells
pierced with ease. The results were as follows:--Under west tower,
casemate penetrated, gun not disabled. In casemates Nos. 1 to 12, just
one half of the guns were disabled. Of the casemates on the right sea
front, No. 17 was the only one in which there was no gun hit. The loss
of life in the casemates must have been out of all proportion to the
effect produced by the feeble guns (six 5-inch S.B.) mounted within.
On the scarp of casemates Nos. 1 to 12 there were about 13 hits, of
which seven pierced the wall.
15. _Fort Silsileh._--The fire does not appear to have in any way
injured the guns or stores of this fort, though fragments of at least
two shells lay around the rifled guns.
The total number of guns di
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