
Gutenberg · ebook 40861
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1
by United States. Constitutional Convention · English · public domain in the US
The Pinckney Draft 22
Hamilton's Principal Speech 154
[Illustration]
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THE RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION.
James Madison's contemporaries generally conceded that he was the leading statesman in the convention which framed the Constitution of the United States; but in addition to this he kept a record of the proceedings of the convention which outranks in importance all the other writings of the founders of the American Republic. He is thus identified, as no other man is, with the making of the Constitution and the correct interpretation of the intentions of the makers. His is the only continuous record of the proceedings of the convention.
He took a seat immediately in front of the presiding officer, among the members, and took down every speech or motion as it was made, using abbreviations of his own and immediately afterwards transcribing his notes when he returned to his lodgings. A few motions only escaped him and of important speeches he omitted none. The proceedings were ordered to be kept secret, but his self-imposed task of reporter had the unofficial sanction of the convention.
Alexander Hamilton corrected slightly Madison's report of his great speech and handed him his plan of government to copy. The same thing was done with Benjamin Franklin's speeches, which were written out by Franklin and read by his colleague Wilson, the fatigue of delivery being too great for the aged Franklin, and Madison also copied the Patterson plan. Edmund Randolph wrote out for him his opening speech from his notes two years after the convention adjourned.[1]
[1] Madison to Randolph, April 21, 1789.
In the years after the convention Madison made a few alterations and additions in his journal, with the result that in parts there is much interlineation and erasure, but after patient study the meaning is always perfectly clear. Three different styles of Madison's own penmanship at different periods of his life appear in the journal, one being that of his old age within five years of his death. In this hand appears the following note at the end of the journal: "The few alterations and corrections made in the debates which are not in my handwriting were dictated by me and made in my presence by John C.
Payne."[2] The rare occasions where Payne's penmanship is distinguishable are indicated in the notes to this edition.
[2] Mrs. Madison's brother.
The importance attached by Madison to his record is shown by the terms of his will, dated April 15, 1835, fourteen months before his death:
"I give all my personal estate ornamental as well as useful,
except as herein after otherwise given, to my dear Wife; and
I also give to her all my manuscript papers, having entire
confidence in her discreet and proper use of them, but subject
to the qualification in the succeeding clause.
Considering the
peculiarity and magnitude of the occasion which produced the
Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, the Characters who composed
it, the Constitution which resulted from their deliberations,
its effects during a trial of so many years on the prosperity of
the people living under it, and the interest it has inspired
among the friends of free Government, it is not an unreasonable
inference that a careful and extended report of the proceedings
and discussions of that body, which were with closed doors, by a
member who was constant in his attendance, will be particularly
gratifying to the people of the United States, and to all who
take an interest in the progress of political science and the
course of true liberty.
It is my desire that the Report as made
by me should be published under her authority and direction."[3]
[3] Orange County, Va., MSS. records.
This desire was never consummated, for Mrs. Madison's friends advised her that she could not herself profitably undertake the publication of the work, and she accordingly offered it to the Government, by which it was bought for $30,000, by act of Congress, approved March 3, 1837. On July 9, 1838, an act was approved authorizing the Joint Committee on the Library to cause the papers thus purchased to be published, and the Committee intrusted the superintendence of the work to Henry D. Gilpin, Solicitor of the Treasury. The duplicate copy of the journal which Mrs.
Madison had delivered was, under authority of Congress, withdrawn from the State Department and placed in Mr. Gilpin's hands. In 1840 (Washington: Lantree & O'Sulivan), accordingly, appeared the three volumes, The Papers of James Madison Purchased by Order of Congress, edited by Henry D. Gilpin. Other issues of this edition, with changes of date, came out later in New York, Boston, and Mobile.
This issue contained not only the journal of the Constitutional Convention, but Madison's notes of the debates in the Continental Congress and in the Congress of the Confederation from February 19 to April 25, 1787, and a report Jefferson had written of the debates in 1776 on the Declaration of Independence, besides a number of letters of Madison's. From the text of Gilpin a fifth volume was added to Elliot's Debates in 1845, and it was printed in one volume in Chicago, 1893.
Mr. Gilpin's reading of the duplicate copy of the Madison journal is thus the only one that has hitherto been published.[4] His work was both painstaking and thorough, but many inaccuracies and omissions have been revealed by a second reading from the original manuscript journal written in Madison's own hand, just as he himself left it; and this original manuscript has been followed with rigid accuracy in the text of the present edition.
[4] Volume iii of The Documentary History of the United States
(Department of State, 1894) is a presentation of a literal
print of the original journal, indicating by the use
of larger and smaller type and by explanatory words the
portions which are interlined or stricken out.
The editor has compared carefully with Madison's report, as the notes will show, the incomplete and less important records of the convention, kept by others. Of these, the best known is that of Robert Yates, a delegate in the convention from New York, who took notes from the time he entered the convention, May 25, to July 5, when he went home to oppose what he foresaw would be the result of the convention's labors.
These notes were published in 1821 (Albany), edited by Yates's colleague in the convention, John Lansing, under the title, Secret Proceedings and Debates of the Convention Assembled at Philadelphia, in the Year 1787, for the Purpose of Forming the Constitution of the United States of America. This was afterwards reprinted in several editions and in the three editions of The Debates on the Federal Constitution, by Jonathan Elliot (Washington, 1827-1836).
Madison pronounced Yates's notes "Crude and broken." "When I looked over them some years ago," he wrote to J. C.
Cabell, February 2, 1829, "I was struck with the number of instances in which he had totally mistaken what was said by me, or given it in scraps and terms which, taken without the developments or qualifications accompanying them, had an import essentially different from what was intended." Yates's notes were colored by his prejudices, which were strong against the leaders of the convention, but, making allowance for this and for their incompleteness, they are of high value and rank next to Madison's in importance.
Rufus King, a delegate from Massachusetts, kept a number of notes, scattered and imperfect, which were not published till 1894, when they appeared in King's Life and Correspondence of Rufus King (New York:
Putnam's).
William Pierce, a delegate from Georgia, made some memoranda of the proceedings of the convention, and brief and interesting sketches of all the delegates, which were first printed in The Savannah Georgian, April, 18-28, 1828, and reprinted in The American Historical Review for January, 1898.
The notes of Yates, King, and Pierce are the only unofficial record of the convention extant, besides Madison's, and their chief value is in connection with the Madison record, which in the main they support, and which occasionally they elucidate.
December 30, 1818, Charles Pinckney wrote to John Quincy Adams that he had made more notes of the convention than any other member except Madison, but they were never published and have been lost or destroyed.[5]
[5] See p. 22, n.
In 1819 (Boston) was published the Journal, Acts and Proceedings of the Convention, etc., under the supervision of John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, by authority of a joint resolution of Congress of March 27,
- This was the official journal of the convention, which the
Secretary, William Jackson, had turned over to the President, George Washington, when the convention adjourned, Jackson having previously burned all other papers of the convention in his possession. March 16, 1796, Washington deposited the papers Jackson had given him with the Secretary of State, Timothy Pickering. They consisted of three volumes,--the journal of the convention, the journal of the proceedings of the Committee of the Whole of the convention, and a list of yeas and nays, beside a printed draft of the Constitution as reported August 6th, showing erasures and amendments afterwards adopted, and the Virginia plan in different stages of development.
In preparing the matter for publication Secretary Adams found that for Friday, September 14, and Saturday, September 15, the journal was a mere fragment, and Madison was applied to and completed it from his minutes.
From General B. Bloomfield, executor of the estate of David Brearley, a delegate in the convention from New Jersey, Adams obtained a few additional papers, and from Charles Pinckney a copy of what purported to be the plan of a constitution submitted by him to the convention. All of these papers, with some others, appeared in the edition of 1819, which was a singularly accurate publication, as comparison by the present editor of the printed page with the original papers has shown.
The Pinckney plan, as it appeared in this edition of the journal, was incorporated by Madison into his record, as he had not secured a copy of it when the convention was sitting.
But the draft furnished to Secretary Adams in 1818, and the plan presented by Pinckney to the convention in 1787 were not identical, as Madison conclusively proved in his note to his journal, in his letter to Jared Sparks of November 25, 1831, and in several other letters, in all of which he showed that the draft did not agree in several important respects with Pinckney's own votes and motions in the convention, and that there were important discrepancies between it and Pinckney's Observations on the Plan of Government, a pamphlet printed shortly after the convention adjourned.[6]
[6] See P. L. Ford's Pamphlets on the Constitution, 419.
It is, indeed, inconceivable that the convention should have incorporated into the constitution so many of the provisions of the Pinckney draft, and that at the same time so little reference should have been made to it in the course of the debates; and it is equally extraordinary that the contemporaries of Pinckney did not accord to him the chief paternity of the Constitution, which honor would have belonged to him if the draft he sent to Mr. Adams in 1818 had been the one he actually offered the convention in the first week of its session.
The editor has made a careful examination of the original manuscripts in the case. They consist (1) of Mr. Pinckney's letter to Mr. Adams of December 12, 1818, written from Winyaw, S. C., while Pinckney was temporarily absent from Charleston, acknowledging Mr. Adams's request for the draft, (2) his letter of December 30, written from Charleston, transmitting the draft, and (3) the draft. The penmanship of all three papers is contemporaneous, and the letter of December 30 and the draft were written with the same pen and ink.
This may possibly admit of a difference of opinion, because the draft is in a somewhat larger chirography than the letter, having been, as befitted its importance, written more carefully. But the letter and the draft are written upon the same paper, and this paper was not made when the convention sat in
- There are several sheets of the draft and one of the letter, and
all bear the same water-mark--"Russell & Co. 1797." The draft cannot, therefore, claim to be the original Pinckney plan, and was palpably made for the occasion, from Mr. Pinckney's original notes doubtless, aided and modified by a copy of the Constitution itself. Thirty years had elapsed since the close of the Constitutional Convention when the draft was compiled, and its incorrectness is not a circumstance to occasion great wonder.[7]
[7] See p. 19, n.
Correspondence on the subject of the convention, written while it was in session, was not extensive, but some unpublished letters throwing light upon contemporaneous opinion have been found and are quoted in the notes.
The editor desires to record his obligation for assistance in preparing these volumes to his friend, Montgomery Blair, Esq., of Silver Spring, Md.
GAILLARD HUNT.
CHERRY HILL FARM, VA.,
September, 1902.
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CHRONOLOGY OF JAMES MADISON.
1787.
- Prepares the "Virginia plan" in conjunction with the
May 6-25. Virginia delegates.
May 14. Attends the first gathering of the delegates.
May 30. Moves postponement of question of representation by free
population.
Moves that congressional representation be proportioned
to the importance and size of the States.
Makes his first speech on this subject.
May 31. Advocates representation in one house by popular
election.
Opposes uniting several States into one district for
representation in Senate.
Doubts practicability of enumerating powers of national
legislature.
Suggests the impossibility of using force to coerce
individual States.
June 1. Moves that the powers of the Executive be enumerated.
June 2. Objects to giving Congress power to remove the President
upon demand of a majority of the State legislatures.
June 4. Favors giving power to more than a majority of the
national legislature to overrule an Executive negative
of a law.
June 5. Opposes election of judges by both branches of Congress.
Advocates submission of constitution to conventions of
the people.
Favors inferior judicial tribunals.
June 6. Speaks for popular representation in the House.
Seconds motion to include a portion of the Judiciary
with the Executive in revisionary power over laws.
June 7. Speaks for proportional representation in both houses
of Congress.
June 8. Seconds motion to give Congress power to negative State
laws.
Suggests temporary operation of urgent laws.
June 12. Seconds motion to make term of Representatives three
years.
Thinks the people will follow the convention.
Favors a term of seven years for Senators.
June 13. Moves defining powers of Judiciary.
Objects to appointment of judges by whole legislature.
Thinks both houses should have right to originate money
bills.
Advocates a national government and opposes the "Jersey
plan."
June 21. Speaks in favor of national supremacy.
Opposes annual or biennial elections of Representatives.
June 22. Favors fixing payment of salaries by a standard.
June 23. Proposes to debar Senators from offices created or
enhanced during their term.
Speaks for the proposition.
June 25. Wishes to take up question of right of suffrage.
June 26. Speaks for a long term for Senators.
Opposes their payment by the States.
June 28. Speaks for proportional representation.
June 29. Insists that too much stress is laid on State
sovereignty.
June 30. Contends against equal State representation in the
Senate.
Speaks again on subject, but would preserve State
rights.
July 2. Opposes submission of the question to a special
committee.
July 5. Opposes compromise report of committee.
July 6. Thinks part of report need not be postponed.
July 7. Thinks question of representation ought to be settled
before other questions.
July 9. Suggests free inhabitants as basis of representation in
one house, and all inhabitants as basis in the other
house.
July 10. Moves increase of Representatives.
July 11. Favors representation based on population.
July 14. Urges proportional representation as necessary to
protect the smaller States.
July 17. Advocates national power of negative over State laws.
Thinks the branches of government should be kept
separate.
Thinks monarchy likely to follow instability.
Thinks there should be provision for interregnum between
adoption and operation of constitution.
Moves national guarantee of States against domestic
violence.
July 18. Seconds motion forbidding a State to form any but a
republican government.
JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1787.
Monday May 14^{th} 1787 was the day fixed for the meeting of the deputies in Convention for revising the federal System of Government. On that day a small number only had assembled. Seven States were not convened till,
Friday 25 of May, when the following members appeared to wit:
From Massachusetts, Rufus King. N. York, Robert Yates,[8] Alex^r Hamilton. N. Jersey, David Brearly, William Churchill Houston, William Patterson. Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, Thomas Fitzsimons, James Wilson, Governeur Morris. Delaware, George Read, Richard Basset,[9] Jacob Broome. Virginia, George Washington, Edmund Randolph, John Blair,[10] James Madison, George Mason, George Wythe, James McClurg. N.
Carolina, Alexander Martin, William Richardson Davie, Richard Dobbs Spaight, Hugh Williamson. S. Carolina, John Rutlidge, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler. Georgia, William Few.[11]
[8] William Pierce, delegate from Georgia, made an estimate
of each member of the convention, the only contemporary
estimate thus far brought to light. Yates did not speak in
the Convention.
"M^r Yates is said to be an able Judge. He is a Man of great
legal abilities, but not distinguished as an Orator. Some of
his Enemies say he is an anti-federal Man, but I discovered
no such disposition in him. He is about 45 years old, and
enjoys a great share of health."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist.
Rev., iii., 327. For more about Pierce's Notes, see p.
45, n.
[9] "M^r Bassett is a religious enthusiast, lately turned
Methodist, and serves his Country because it is the will of
the people that he should do so. He is a Man of plain sense,
and has modesty enough to hold his Tongue. He is Gentlemanly
Man and is in high estimation among the Methodists. Mr.
Bassett is about 36 years old."--Pierce's Notes, Id.,
iii., 330. He did not speak in the Convention.
[10] "Mr. Blair is one of the most respectable Men in Virginia,
both on account of his Family as well as fortune. He is one
of the Judges of the Supreme Court in Virginia, and
acknowledged to have a very extensive knowledge of the Laws.
M^r Blair is however, no Orator, but his good sense,
and most excellent principles, compensate for other
deficiencies. He is about 50 years of age."--Pierce's Notes,
Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 331. He did not speak in the
Convention.
[11] "M^r Few possesses a strong natural Genius, and from
application has acquired some knowledge of legal
matters;--he practises at the bar of Georgia, and speaks
tolerably well in the Legislature. He has been twice a
Member of Congress, and served in that capacity with
fidelity to his State, and honor to himself. Mr. Few is
about 35 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 333.
He did not speak in the Convention.
The credentials of Connecticut and Maryland required but one
deputy to represent the state; of New York, South Carolina,
Georgia, and New Hampshire, two deputies; of Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, and North Carolina, three;
of Pennsylvania, four.--Journal of the Federal Convention,
16 et seq.; Documentary History of the Constitution, i.,
10 et seq.
M^r Robert Morris[12] informed the members assembled that by the instruction & in behalf, of the deputation of Pen^a he proposed George Washington, Esq^r late Commander in chief for president of the Convention. M^r Jn^o Rutlidge seconded the motion; expressing his confidence that the choice would be unanimous, and observing that the presence of Gen^l Washington forbade any observations on the occasion which might otherwise be proper.
[12] "Robert Morris is a merchant of great eminence and wealth;
an able Financier, and a worthy Patriot. He has an
understanding equal to any public object, and possesses an
energy of mind that few Men can boast of. Although he is not
learned, yet he is as great as those who are. I am told that
when he speaks in the Assembly of Pennsylvania, that he
bears down all before him. What could have been his reason
for not Speaking in the Convention I know not,--but he never
once spoke on any point. This Gentleman is about 50 years
old."--Pierce's Notes, Am.
Hist: Rev., iii., 328.
[Illustration]
[Illustration]
General Washington[13] was accordingly unanimously elected by ballot, and conducted to the Chair by M^r R. Morris and M^r Rutlidge; from which in a very emphatic manner he thanked the Convention for the honor they had conferred on him, reminded them of the novelty of the scene of business in which he was to act, lamented his want of better qualifications, and claimed the indulgence of the House towards the involuntary errors which his inexperience might occasion.
[13] "Gen^l Washington is well known as the Commander in chief
of the late American Army. Having conducted these States to
independence and peace, he now appears to assist in framing
a Government to make the People happy.
Like Gustavus Vasa,
he may be said to be the deliverer of his Country;--like
Peter the great he appears as the politician and the
States-man; and like Cincinnatus he returned to his farm
perfectly contented with being only a plain Citizen, after
enjoying the highest honor of the confederacy,--and now only
seeks for the approbation of his Country-men by being
virtuous and useful. The General was conducted to the Chair
as President of the Convention by the unanimous voice of its
Members. He is in the 52^d year of his age."--Pierce's
Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 331.
(The nomination came with particular grace from Pe[~nn]a, as Doc^r Franklin alone could have been thought of as a competitor. The Doc^r was himself to have made the nomination of General Washington, but the state of the weather and of his health confined him to his house.)
M^r Wilson[14] moved that a Secretary be appointed, and nominated M^r Temple Franklin.
[14] "Mr. Wilson ranks among the foremost in legal and political
knowledge. He has joined to a fine genius all that can set
him off and show him to advantage. He is well acquainted
with Man, and understands all the passions that influence
him. Government seems to have been his peculiar Study, all
the political institutions of the World he knows in detail,
and can trace the causes and effects of every revolution
from the earliest stages of the Greecian commonwealth down
to the present time. No man is more clear, copious, and
comprehensive than Mr. Wilson, yet he is no great Orator.
He
draws the attention not by the charm of his eloquence, but
by the force of his reasoning. He is about 45 years
old."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 329.
Col Hamilton[15] nominated Major Jackson.
[15] "Col^o Hamilton is deservedly celebrated for his talents.
He is a practitioner of the Law, and reputed to be a
finished Scholar. To a clear and strong judgment he unites
the ornaments of fancy, and whilst he is able, convincing,
and engaging in his eloquence the Heart and Head sympathize
in approving him. Yet there is something too feeble in his
voice to be equal to the strains of oratory;--it is my
opinion he is rather a convincing Speaker, that [than] a
blazing Orator.
Col^o Hamilton requires time to think,--he
enquires into every part of his subject with the searchings
of phylosophy, and when he comes forward he comes highly
charged with interesting matter, there is no skimming over
the surface of a subject with him, he must sink to the
bottom to see what foundation it rests on.--His language is
not always equal, sometimes didactic like Bolingbroke's, at
others light and tripping like Stern's. His eloquence is not
so defusive as to trifle with the senses, but he rambles
just enough to strike and keep up the attention.
He is about
33 years old, of small stature, and lean. His manners are
tinctured with stiffness, and sometimes with a degree of
vanity that is highly disagreable."--Pierce's Notes, Id.,
iii., 327.
On the ballot Maj^r Jackson had 5 votes & M^r Franklin 2 votes.
On reading the credentials of the deputies it was noticed that those from Delaware were prohibited from changing the Article in the Confederation establishing an equality of votes among the States.[16]
[16] "... So also and Provided, that such Alterations or
further Provisions, or any of them, do not extend to that
part of the Fifth Article of the Confederation of the said
States, finally ratified on the first day March, in the Year
One thousand seven hundred and eighty one, which declares
that 'In determining Questions in the United States in
Congress Assembled each State shall have one
Vote.'"--Documentary History of the Constitution (Dept. of
State), i., 24.
The appointment of a Committee, consisting of Mess^{rs} Wythe, Hamilton & C. Pinckney, on the motion of Mr. Pinckney, to prepare standing rules & orders was the only remaining step taken on this day.
MONDAY MAY 28.----
From Mass^{ts} Nat: Gorham & Caleb Strong. From Connecticut Oliver Elseworth. From Delaware, Gunning Bedford. From Maryland James M^cHenry.
From Penn^a B. Franklin, George Clymer, Th^s Mifflin & Jared Ingersol, took their seats.[17]
[17] "Entre nous. I believe the Eastern people have taken ground
they will not depart from respecting the Convention.--One
legislature composed of a lower-house triennially elected
and an Executive & Senate for a good number of years.--I
shall see Gerry & Johnson, as they pass & may perhaps give
you a hint."--William Grayson to Madison, New York, May 24,
1787, Mad. MSS.
M^r Wythe[18] from the Committee for preparing rules made a report which employed the deliberations of this day.
[18] "M^r Wythe is the famous Professor of Law at the University
of William and Mary. He is confessedly one of the most
learned legal Characters of the present age. From his close
attention to the study of general learning he has acquired a
compleat knowledge of the dead languages and all the
sciences. He is remarked for his exemplary life, and
universally esteemed for his good principles.
No Man it is
said understands the history of Government better than M^r
Wythe,--nor any one who understands the fluctuating
condition to which all societies are liable better than he
does, yet from his too favorable opinion of Men, he is no
great politician. He is a neat and pleasing Speaker, and a
most correct and able Writer. Mr. Wythe is about 55 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 331.
M^r King[19] objected to one of the rules in the Report authorizing any member to call for the yeas & nays and have them entered on the minutes.
He urged that as the acts of the Convention were not to bind the Constituents, it was unnecessary to exhibit this evidence of the votes; and improper as changes of opinion would be frequent in the course of the business & would fill the minutes with contradictions.
[19] "M^r King is a Man much distinguished for his eloquence and
great parliamentary talents. He was educated in
Massachusetts, and is said to have good classical as well as
legal knowledge. He has served for three years in the
Congress of the United States with great and deserved
applause, and is at this time high in the confidence and
approbation of his Country-men. This Gentleman is about
thirty three years of age, about five feet ten inches high,
well formed, an handsome face, with a strong expressive Eye,
and a sweet high toned voice.
In his public speaking there
is something peculiarly strong and rich in his expression,
clear, and convincing in his arguments, rapid and
irresistible at times in his eloquence but he is not always
equal. His action is natural, swimming, and graceful, but
there is a rudeness of manner sometimes accompanying it. But
take him tout en semble, he may with propriety be ranked
among the luminaries of the present Age."--Pierce's Notes,
Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 325.
Col. Mason[20] seconded the objection; adding that such a record of the opinions of members would be an obstacle to a change of them on conviction; and in case of its being hereafter promulged must furnish handles to the adversaries of the Result of the Meeting.
[20] "Mr. Mason is a Gentleman of remarkable strong powers, and
possesses a clear and copious understanding. He is able and
convincing in debate, steady and firm in his principles, and
undoubtedly one of the best politicians in America. M^r
Mason is about 60 years old, with a fine strong
constitution."--Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 331.
The proposed rule was rejected nem. contrad certe. The standing rules[21] agreed to were as follows:[22]
[21] Previous to the arrival of a majority of the States, the
rule by which they ought to vote in the Convention had been
made a subject of conversation among the members present. It
was pressed by Governeur Morris and favored by Robert Morris
and others from Pennsylvania, that the large States should
unite in firmly refusing to the small states an equal vote,
as unreasonable, and as enabling the small States to
negative every good system of Government, which must, in the
nature of things, be founded on a violation of that
equality.
The members from Virginia, conceiving that such an
attempt might beget fatal altercations between the large &
small States, and that it would be easier to prevail on the
latter, in the course of the deliberations, to give up their
equality for the sake of an effective Government, than on
taking the field of discussion to disarm themselves of the
right & thereby throw themselves on the mercy of the larger
States, discountenanced and stifled the project.--Madison's
Note.
[22] In the MS. Madison adds: "[See the Journal & copy here the
printed rules]," and they were copied by him from the
Journal of the Federal Convention (1819). They have been
compared with the MS. journal and found to be correct.
Viz.
A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies of not less than seven States; and all questions shall be decided by the greater number of these which shall be fully represented; but a less number than seven may adjourn from day to day.
Immediately after the President shall have taken the chair, and the members their seats, the minutes of the preceding day shall be read by the Secretary.
Every member, rising to speak, shall address the President; and whilst he shall be speaking, none shall pass between them, or hold discourse with another, or read a book, pamphlet or paper, printed or manuscript--and of two members rising at the same time, the President shall name him who shall be first heard.
A member shall not speak oftener than twice, without special leave, upon the same question; and not the second time, before every other, who had been silent, shall have been heard, if he choose to speak upon the subject.
A motion made and seconded, shall be repeated, and if written, as it shall be when any member shall so require, read aloud by the Secretary, before it shall be debated; and may be withdrawn at any time, before the vote upon it shall have been declared.
Orders of the day shall be read next after the minutes, and either discussed or postponed, before any other business shall be introduced.
When a debate shall arise upon a question, no motion, other than to amend the question, to commit it, or to postpone the debate shall be received.
[23]A question which is complicated, shall, at the request of any member, be divided, and put separately on the propositions of which it is compounded.
[23] An undecided line is drawn through the page in the MS. from
here to the end of the rules; but not, as it would appear,
to strike them out, as they were actually adopted by the
Convention.
The determination of a question, altho' fully debated, shall be postponed, if the deputies of any State desire it until the next day.
A writing which contains any matter brought on to be considered, shall be read once throughout for information, then by paragraphs to be debated, and again, with the amendments, if any, made on the second reading; and afterwards the question shall be put on the whole, amended, or approved in its original form, as the case shall be.
Committees shall be appointed by ballot; and the members who have the greatest number of ballots, altho' not a majority of the votes present, shall be the Committee. When two or more members have an equal number of votes, the member standing first on the list in the order of taking down the ballots, shall be preferred.
A member may be called to order by any other member, as well as by the President; and may be allowed to explain his conduct or expressions supposed to be reprehensible. And all questions of order shall be decided by the President without appeal or debate.
Upon a question to adjourn for the day, which may be made at any time, if it be seconded, the question shall be put without a debate.
When the House shall adjourn, every member shall stand in his place, until the President pass him.
A letter from sundry persons of the State of Rho. Island addressed to the Honorable The Chairman of the General Convention was presented to the Chair by Mr. Gov^r Morris,[24] and being read, was ordered to lie on the table for further consideration.[25]
[24] "M^r Governeur Morris is one of those Genius's in whom
every species of talents combine to render him conspicuous
and flourishing in public debate:--He winds through all the
mazes of rhetoric, and throws around him such a glare that
he charms, captivates, and leads away the senses of all who
hear him. With an infinite streach of fancy he brings to
view things when he is engaged in deep argumentation, that
render all the labor of reasoning easy and pleasing. But
with all these powers he is fickle and inconstant,--never
pursuing one train of thinking,--nor ever regular.
He has
gone through a very extensive course of reading, and is
acquainted with all the sciences. No Man has more wit,--nor
can any one engage the attention more than M^r Morris. He
was bred to the Law, but I am told he disliked the
profession, and turned Merchant. He is engaged in some great
mercantile matters with his namesake, M^r Rob^t Morris. This
Gentleman is about 38 years old, he has been unfortunate in
losing one of his Legs, and getting all the flesh taken off
his right arm by a scald, when a youth."--Pierce's Notes,
Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 329.
[25] "NEWPORT June 18th 1787
"Sir--
"The inclosed address, of which I presume your Excellency
has received a duplicate, was returned to me from New York
after my arrival in this State. I flattered myself that our
Legislature, which convened on monday last, would have
receded from the resolution therein refer'd to, and have
complied with the recommendation of Congress in sending
deligates to the federal convention. The upper house, or
Governor, & Council, embraced the measure, but it was
negatived in the house of Assembly by a large majority,
notwithstanding the greatest exertions were made to support
it.
"Being disappointed in their expectations, the minority in
the administration and all the worthy citizens of this
State, whose minds are well informd regreting the
peculiarities of their Situation place their fullest
confidence in the wisdom & moderation of the national
council, and indulge the warmest hopes of being favorably
consider'd in their deliberations. From these deliberations
they anticipate a political System which must finally be
adopted & from which will result the Safety, the honour, &
the happiness of the United States.
"Permit me, Sir, to observe, that the measures of our
present Legislature do not exhibit the real character of the
State. They are equally reprobated, & abhored by Gentlemen
of the learned professions, by the whole mercantile body, &
by most of the respectable farmers and mechanicks. The
majority of the administration is composed of a licentious
number of men, destitute of education, and many of them,
Void of principle.
From anarchy and confusion they derive
their temporary consequence, and this they endeavor to
prolong by debauching the minds of the common people, whose
attention is wholly directed to the Abolition of debts both
public & private. With these are associated the disaffected
of every description, particularly those who were unfriendly
during the war. Their paper money System, founded in
oppression & fraud, they are determined to Support at every
hazard. And rather than relinquish their favorite pursuit
they trample upon the most sacred obligations.
As a proof of
this they refused to comply with a requisition of Congress
for repealing all laws repugnant to the treaty of peace with
Great Britain, and urged as their principal reason, that it
would be calling in question the propriety of their former
measures.
"These evils may be attributed, partly to the extreme
freedom of our own constitution, and partly to the want of
energy in the federal Union: And it is greatly to be
apprehended that they cannot Speedily be removed but by
uncommon and very serious exertions. It is fortunate however
that the wealth and resources of this State are chiefly in
possion of the well Affected, & that they are intirely
devoted to the public good.
"I have the honor of being Sir,
"with the greatest Veneration & esteem,
"Your excellencys very obedient &
"most humble servant--
["J. M. VARNUM.]
"His excellency
"GEN^l WASHINGTON."
The letter was inadvertently unsigned, but it was well known
to come from General Varnum. The enclosure was as follows:
"PROVIDENCE, May 11. 1787.
"GENTLEMEN:
"Since the Legislature of this State have finally declined
sending Delegates to Meet you in Convention for the purposes
mentioned in the Resolve of Congress of the 21^{st} February
1787, the Merchants Tradesmen and others of this place,
deeply affected with the evils of the present unhappy times,
have thought proper to Communicate in writing their
approbation of your Meeting, And their regret that it will
fall short of a Compleat Representation of the Federal
Union.--
"The failure of this State was owing to the Nonconcurrence
of the Upper House of Assembly with a Vote passed in the
Lower House, for appointing Delegates to attend the said
Convention, at their Session holden at Newport on the first
Wednesday of the present Month.--
"It is the general Opinion here and we believe of the well
informed throughout this State, that full power for the
Regulation of the Commerce of the United States, both
Foreign & Domestick ought to be vested in the National
Council.
"And that Effectual Arrangements should also be made for giving
Operation to the present powers of Congress in their
Requisitions upon the States for National purposes.--
"As the Object of this Letter is chiefly to prevent any
impressions unfavorable to the Commercial Interest of this
State, from taking place in our Sister States from the
Circumstance of our being unrepresented in the present
National Convention, we shall not presume to enter into any
detail of the objects we hope your deliberations will
embrace and provide for being convinced they will be such as
have a tendency to strengthen the Union, promote Commerce,
increase the power & Establish the Credit of the United
States.
"The result of your deliberations tending to these
desireable purposes we still hope may finally be Approved
and Adopted by this State, for which we pledge our Influence
and best exertions.--
"In behalf of the Merchants, Tradesmen &c.
"We have the Honour to be with perfect Consideration & Respect
"Your most Obedient &
"Most Humble Servant's
"JOHN BROWN JABEZ BOWEN }
THO^S LLOYD HALSEY NICHO^S BROWN }
JOS. NIGHTINGALE JOHN JENCKES }
LEVI HALL WELCOME ARNOLD } Comtee.
## PHILIP ALLEN WILLIAM RUSSELL }
## PAUL ALLEN JEREMIAH OLMY }
## WILLIAM BARTON }
"The Hon^{ble} the Chairman of the General Convention
## "PHILADELPHIA"
--Const. MSS.
Both letters are printed in the Documentary History of the
Constitution, i., 277 and 275.
M^r Butler moved that the House provide ag^{st} interruption of business by absence of members,[26] and against licentious publications of their proceedings--to which was added by--M^r Spaight[27]--a motion to provide that on the one hand the House might not be precluded by a vote upon any question, from revising the subject matter of it, When they see cause, nor, on the other hand, be led too hastily to rescind a decision, which was the result of mature discussion.--Whereupon it was ordered that these motions be referred for the consideration of the Committee appointed to draw up the standing rules and that the Committee make report thereon.
[26] "Mr. Butler is a character much respected for the many
excellent virtues which he possesses. But as a politician or
an Orator, he has no pretensions to either. He is a
Gentleman of fortune, and takes rank among the first in
South Carolina. He has been appointed to Congress, and is
now a Member of the Legislature of South Carolina. M^r
Butler is about 40 years of age; an Irishman by
birth."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 333.
[27] "Mr. Spaight is a worthy Man, of some abilities, and
fortune. Without possessing a Genius to render him
brilliant, he is able to discharge any public trust that his
Country may repose in him. He is about 31 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 332.
Adj^j till tomorrow 10. OClock.
TUESDAY MAY 29.
John Dickenson and Elbridge Gerry, the former from Delaware, the latter from Mass^{ts} took their seats. The following rules were added, on the report of M^r Wythe from the Committee--
That no member be absent from the House, so as to interrupt the
representation of the State, without leave.
That Committees do not sit whilst the House shall be or ought to
be, sitting.
That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the
sitting of the House without leave of the House.
That members only be permitted to inspect the journal.
That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise
published or communicated without leave.
That a motion to reconsider a matter which has been determined
by a majority, may be made, with leave unanimously given, on the
same day on which the vote passed; but otherwise not without one
day's previous notice: in which last case, if the House agree to
the reconsideration, some future day shall be assigned for that
purpose.
M^r C. Pinkney[28] moved that a Committee be appointed to superintend the Minutes.
[28] "Mr. Charles Pinckney is a young Gentleman of the most
promising talents. He is, altho' only 24 y^s of age, in
possession of a very great variety of knowledge. Government,
Law, History, and Phylosophy are his favorite studies, but
he is intimately acquainted with every species of polite
learning, and has a spirit of application and industry
beyond most Men. He speaks with great neatness and
perspicuity, and treats every subject as fully, without
running into prolixity, as it requires.
He has been a Member
of Congress, and served in that Body with ability and
eclat."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 333.
M^r Gov^r Morris objected to it. The entry of the proceedings of the Convention belonged to the Secretary as their impartial officer. A committee might have an interest & bias in moulding the entry according to their opinions and wishes.
The motion was negatived, 5 noes, 4 ays.
Mr. Randolph[29] then opened the main business.[30]
[29] "Mr. Randolph is Governor of Virginia,--a young Gentleman in
whom unite all the accomplishments of the Scholar, and the
Statesman. He came forward with the postulata, or first
principles, on which the Convention acted, and he supported
them with a force of eloquence and reasoning that did him
great honor. He has a most harmonious voice, a fine person
and striking manners. Mr. Randolph is about 32 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 332.
[30] In the MS. in Randolph's hand: "[here insert his speech
including his resolutions]." The speech also is in
Randolph's hand, having been furnished by him.
He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, rather than those, who were of longer standing in life and political experience, to open the great subject of their mission. But, as the convention had originated from Virginia, and his colleagues supposed that some proposition was expected from them, they had imposed this task on him.
He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, and the necessity of preventing the fulfilment of the prophecies of the American downfal.
He observed that in revising the foederal system we ought to inquire 1. into the properties, which such a government ought to possess, 2. the defects of the confederation, 3. the danger of our situation & 4. the remedy.
- The Character of such a government ought to secure 1. against foreign
invasion: 2. against dissensions between members of the Union, or seditions in particular States: 3. to procure to the several States various blessings, of which an isolated situation was incapable: 4. to be able to defend itself against encroachment: & 5. to be paramount to the state constitutions.
- In speaking of the defects of the confederation he professed a high
respect for its authors, and considered them as having done all that patriots could do, in the then infancy of the science, of constitutions, & of confederacies,--when the inefficiency of requisitions was unknown--no commercial discord had arisen among any States--no rebellion had appeared as in Mass^{ts}--foreign debts had not become urgent--the havoc of paper money had not been foreseen--treaties had not been violated--and perhaps nothing better could be obtained from the jealousy of the states with regard to their sovereignty.
He then proceeded to enumerate the defects. 1. that the confederation produced no security against foreign invasion; congress not being permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by their own authority--Of this he cited many examples; most of which tended to shew, that they could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations to be punished: that particular states might by their conduct provoke war without controul; and that neither militia nor draughts being fit for defence on such occasions, enlistments only could be successful, and these could not be executed without money.
2, that the foederal government could not check the quarrels between states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power nor means to interpose according to the exigency.
3, that there were many advantages, which the U. S. might acquire, which were not attainable under the confederation--such as a productive impost--counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations--pushing of commerce ad libitum,--&c &c.
4, that the foederal government could not defend itself against encroachments from the states.
5, that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions, ratified as it was in many of the states.
- He next reviewed the danger of our situation, appealed to the sense
of the best friends of the U. S. the prospect of anarchy from the laxity of government every where; and to other considerations.
- He then proceeded to the remedy; the basis of which he said must be
the republican principle.
He proposed as conformable to his ideas the following resolutions, which he explained one by one.
- Resolved that the articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected
& enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely, "common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare."
- Res^d therefore that the rights of suffrage in the National
Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases.
- Res^d that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches.
- Res^d that the members of the first branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States every ---- for the term of ----; to be of the age of ---- years at least, to receive liberal stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belong to the functions of the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space of ---- after its expiration; to be incapable of re-election for the space of ---- after the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject to recall.
- Resol^d that the members of the second branch of the National
Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of ---- years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure their independency; to receive liberal stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service; and to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the term of service; and for the space of ---- after the expiration thereof.
- Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating
Acts; that the National Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union; and to call forth the force of the Union ag^{st} any member of the Union failing to fulfil its duty under the articles thereof.
- Res^d that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the
National Legislature for the term of ---- years, to receive punctually at stated times, a fixed compensation for the services rendered, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the Magistracy, existing at the time of increase or diminution, and to be ineligible a second time; and that besides a general authority to execute the national laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation.
- Res^d that the Executive and a convenient number of the National
Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by ---- of the members of each branch.
- Res^d that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or
more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution.
That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all Piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy: cases in which foreigners or Citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the collection of the National revenues; impeachments of any national officers, and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.
- Resolv^d that provision ought to be made for the admission of States
lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government & Territory or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the National Legislature less than the whole.
- Res^d that a Republican Government & the territory of each State,
except in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government & territory, ought to be guarantied by the United States to each State.
- Res^d that provision ought to be made for the continuance of
Congress and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the completion of all their engagements.
- Res^d that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the
Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.
- Res^d that the Legislative Executive & Judiciary powers within the
several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union.
- Res^d that the amendments which shall be offered to the
Confederation, by the Convention ought at a proper time, or times, after the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of Representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the people to consider & decide thereon.
He concluded with an exhortation, not to suffer the present opportunity of establishing general peace, harmony, happiness and liberty in the U.
S. to pass away unimproved.[31]
[31] This abstract of the speech was furnished to J. M. by
M^r Randolph and is in his handwriting. As a report of it
from him had been relied on, it was omitted by J.
M.--Madison's Note. The fifteen resolutions, constituting
the "Virginia Plan," are in Madison's handwriting.
It was then Resolved--That the House will tomorrow resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole House to consider of the state of the American Union--and that the propositions moved by M^r Randolph be referred to the said Committee.
M^r Charles Pinkney laid before the House the draft of a federal Government which he had prepared, to be agreed upon between the free and independent States of America.[32]--M^r P. plan ordered that the same be referred to the Committee of the Whole appointed to consider the state of the American Union.[33]
[32] Robert Yates, delegate from New York, kept notes of the
proceedings of the Convention, until he left July 5th, with
his colleague, John Lansing. They wrote a joint letter to
Governor Clinton afterwards, giving their reasons: "We were
not present at the completion of the new constitution; but
before we left the convention, its principles were so well
established as to convince us, that no alteration was to be
expected to conform it to our ideas of expediency and
safety."--Secret Proceedings of the Federal Convention,
10.
Yates's notes are quoted here, whenever they are at
variance with Madison's. He gives Pinckney's motion as
follows: "Mr. C. Pinckney, a member from South Carolina,
then added, that he had reduced his ideas of a new
government to a system, which he read, and confessed that it
was grounded on the same principle as of the above [the
Randolph] resolutions."--Id., 97.
[33] Charles Pinckney wrote to John Quincy Adams:
"WINGAW NEAR GEORGETOWN December 12 1818
"SIR
"I have just had the honour to receive your
favour--Being at present absent from Charleston on a
visit to my planting interest in this neighbourhood
I shall in consequence of your letter shorten my
stay here considerably & return to Town for the
purpose of complying with your request as soon as
possible--From an inspection of my old papers not
long ago I know it was then easily in my power to
have complied with your request--I still hope it is
& as soon as I return to my residence in Charleston
will again, or as quickly as I can write you on it
to prevent delay.
"The Draught of the Constitution proposed by me was
divided into a number of articles & was in complete
detail--the resolutions offered by M^r Randolph were
merely general ones & as far as I recollect they
were both referred to the same Committee.
"With great respect & esteem" &c.
--Dept. of State MSS., Miscellaneous Letters.
Three weeks later he wrote again:
"SIR
"On my return to this City as I promised I examined
carefully all the numerous notes & papers which I
had retained relating to the federal
Convention--among them I found several rough
draughts of the Constitution I proposed to the
Convention--although they differed in some measure
from each other in the wording & arrangement of the
articles--yet they were all substantially the
same--they all proceeded upon the idea of throwing
out of view the attempt to amend the existing
Confederation (then a very favorite idea of a
number) & proceeding de novo--of a Division of the
Powers of Government into legislative executive &
judicial & of making the Government to operate
directly upon the People & not upon the States.
My
Plan was substantially adopted in the sequel except
as to the Senate & giving more power to the
Executive than I intended--the force of vote which
the small & middling states had in the Convention
prevented our obtaining a proportional
representation in more than one branch & the great
powers given to the President were never intended to
have been given to him while the Convention
continued in that patient & coolly deliberative
situation in which they had been for nearly the
whole of the preceding five months of their session
nor was it until within the last week or ten days
that almost the whole of the Executive Department
was altered--I can assure you as a fact that for
more than Four months & a half out of five the power
of exclusively making treaties, appointing for the
Ministers & judges of the Supreme Court was given to
the Senate after numerous debates & consideration of
the subject both in Committee of the whole & in the
house--this I not only aver but can prove by printed
Documents in my possession to have been the case--&
should I ever have the pleasure to see you &
converse on the subject will state to you some
things relative to this business that may be new &
perhaps surprising to you--the veil of secrecy from
the Proceedings of the Convention being removed by
Congress & but very few of the members alive would
make disclosures now of the secrets there acted less
improper than before--With the aid of the journal &
the numerous notes & memorandums I have preserved
should now be in my power to give a View of the
almost insuperable difficulties the Convention had
to encounter & of the conflicting opinions of the
members I believe should have attempted it had I not
always understood M^r Madison intended it--he alone
I believe possessed & retained more numerous &
particular notes of their proceedings than myself.
I
will thank you sir to do me the honour to send me or
to get the President to direct a copy of the Journal
of the Convention to be sent me as also of the
Secret Journals of Congress should it be considered
not improper in me to make the request.
"I have already informed you I have several rough
draughts of the Constitution I proposed & that they
are all substantially the same differing only in
words & the arrangement of the Articles--at the
distance of nearly thirty two years it is impossible
for me now to say which of the 4 or 5 draughts I
have was the one but enclosed I send you the one I
believe was it--I repeat however that they are
substantially the same differing only in form &
unessentials--It may be necessary to remark that
very soon after the Convention met I changed &
avowed candidly the change of my opinion on giving
the power to Congress to revise the State Laws in
certain cases & in giving the exclusive Power to the
Senate to declare War thinking it safer to refuse
the first altogether & to vest the latter in
Congress--I will thank you to acknowledge by a line
the receipt of the Draught & this.
"With very great respect & esteem
"I have the honour to be your most
"Obedient servant
"CHARLES PINCKNEY.
"December 30 1818
"In Charleston."--Const. MSS.
The plan is written upon paper of the same size as the
letter, and with the same ink. It is undoubtedly
contemporaneous with the letter.
Madison wrote the following note to accompany his journal:
"The length of the Document laid before the
Convention, and other circumstances having prevented
the taking of a copy at the time, that which is here
inserted was taken from the paper furnished to the
Secretary of State, and contained in the Journal of
the Convention published in 1819.
On comparing the
paper with the Constitution in its final form, or in
some of its Stages; and with the propositions, and
speeches of M^r Pinckney in the Convention, it would
seem that considerable errour must have crept into
the paper; occasioned possibly by the loss of the
Document laid before the convention (neither that
nor the Resolutions offered by M^r Patterson being
among the preserved papers) and by a consequent
resort for a copy to the rough draught, in which
erasures and interlineations following what passed
in the convention, might be confounded with the
original text, and after a lapse of more than thirty
years, confounded also in the memory of the author.
"There is in the paper a similarity in some cases,
and an identity in others, with details,
expressions, and definitions, the results of
critical discussions and modifications that can not
be ascribed to accident or anticipation.
"Examples may be noticed in Article VIII of the
paper; which is remarkable also for the
circumstance, that whilst it specifies the functions
of the President, no provision is contained in the
paper for the election of such an officer, nor
indeed for the appointment of any executive
magistracy; notwithstanding the evident purpose of
the author to provide an entire plan of a Federal
Government.
"Again, in several instances where the paper
corresponds with the Constitution, it is at variance
with the ideas of M^r Pinckney, as decidedly
expressed in his propositions, and in his arguments,
the former in the Journal of the Convention, the
latter in the report of its debates: Thus in Art:
VIII of the paper, provision is made for removing
the President by impeachment; when it appears that
in the convention, July 20. he was opposed to any
impeachability of the Executive magistrate: In Art:
III, it is required that all money-bills shall
originate in the first Branch of the Legislature;
which he strenuously opposed Aug: 8 and again Aug:
11: In Art: V members of each House are made
ineligible to, as well as incapable of holding, any
office under the union &c. as was the case at one
Stage of the Constitution; a disqualification highly
disapproved and opposed by him Aug: 14.
"A still more conclusive evidence of errour in the
paper is seen in Art: III, which provides, as the
Constitution does, that the first Branch of the
Legislature shall be chosen by the people of the
several States; whilst it appears that on the 6^{th}
of June, a few days only after the Draft was laid
before the convention, its author opposed that mode
of choice, urging & proposing in place of it, an
election by the Legislatures of the several States.
"The remarks here made tho' not material in
themselves, were due to the authenticity and
accuracy aimed at, in this Record of the proceedings
of a Publick Body, so much an object, sometimes, of
curious research, as at all times, of profound
interest."--Mad. MSS.
This note, as given in Gilpin's Madison Papers (1840),
is freely edited. The Pinckney plan is given here as
Pinckney sent it to Adams. Chief-Justice Charles C. Nott, of
the U. S. Court of Claims, informs the editor that
correspondence with Pinckney's descendants reveals the fact
that none of the notes to which he alludes in his letters
are extant.
The letter of December 30, 1818, and plan, are printed in
The Documentary History of the Constitution, i., 309 et
seq.
[Illustration: CHARLES PINCKNEY'S LETTER.
(Reduced.)]
[Illustration: THE PINCKNEY DRAFT.
(Reduced.)]
We the People of the States of New Hampshire Massachusetts Rhode Island & Providence Plantations Connecticut New York New Jersey Pennsylvania Delaware Maryland Virginia North Carolina South Carolina & Georgia do ordain, declare & establish the following Constitution for the government of ourselves & Posterity.
ARTICLE 1:
The Style of this Government shall be The United States of America & the Government shall consist of supreme legislative Executive & judicial Powers.
2
The Legislative Power shall be vested in a Congress to consist of two separate Houses--one to be called the House of Delegates & the other the Senate who shall meet on the ---- ---- Day of ---- in every year.
3
The members of the House of Delegates shall be chosen every ---- year by the people of the several States & the qualification of the electors shall be the same as those of the electors in the several States for their legislatures--each member shall have been a citizen of the United States for ---- years; and shall be of ---- years of age & a resident in the State he is chosen for.----Until a census of the people shall be taken in the manner herein after mentioned the House of Delegates shall consist of ---- to be chosen from the different States in the following proportions: for New Hampshire, ----; for Massachusetts, ---- for Rhode Island, ---- for Connecticut, ---- for New York, ---- for New Jersey, ---- for Pennsylvania, ---- for Delaware, ---- for Mary^{ld}, ---- for Virginia, ---- for North Carolina, ---- for South Carolina, ---- for Georgia, ---- & the Legislature shall hereafter regulate the number of delegates by the number of inhabitants according to the Provisions herein after made, at the rate of one for every ---- thousand.--All money bills of every kind shall originate in the house of Delegates & shall not be altered by the Senate.
The House of Delegates shall exclusively possess the power of impeachment & shall choose it's own officers & vacancies therein shall be supplied by the executive authority of the State in the representation from which they shall happen.
4
The Senate shall be elected & chosen by the House of Delegates which House immediately after their meeting shall choose by ballot ---- Senators from among the Citizens & residents of New Hampshire ---- from among those of Massachusetts ---- from among those of Rhode Island ---- from among those of Connecticut ---- from among those of New York ---- from among those of New Jersey ---- from among those of Pennsylvania ---- from among those of Delaware ---- from among those of Maryland ---- from among those of Virginia ---- from among those of North Carolina ---- from among those of South Carolina & ---- from among those of Georgia ----
The Senators chosen from New Hampshire Massachusetts Rhode Island & Connecticut shall form one class--those from New York New Jersey Pennsylvania & Delaware one class--& those from Maryland Virginia North Carolina South Carolina & Georgia one class.
The House of Delegates shall number these Classes one two & three & fix the times of their service by Lot--the first class shall serve for ---- years--the second for ---- years & the third for ---- years--as their times of service expire the House of Delegates shall fill them up by elections for ---- years & they shall fill all vacancies that arise from death or resignation for the time of service remaining of the members so dying or resigning.
Each Senator shall be ---- years of age at least--shall have been a Citizen of the United States 4 years before his election & shall be a resident of the State he is chosen from. The Senate shall choose its own Officers.
5
Each State shall prescribe the time & manner of holding elections by the People for the house of Delegates & the House of Delegates shall be the judges of the elections returns & Qualifications of their members.
In each house a Majority shall constitute a Quorum to do business--Freedom of Speech & Debate in the legislature shall not be impeached or Questioned in any place out of it & the Members of both Houses shall in all cases except for Treason Felony or Breach of the Peace be free from arrest during their attendance at Congress & in going to & returning from it--Both Houses shall keep journals of their Proceedings & publish them except on secret occasions & the yeas & nays may be entered thereon at the desire of one ---- of the members present.
Neither house without the consent of the other shall adjourn for more than ---- days nor to any Place but where they are sitting.
The members of each house shall not be eligible to or capable of holding any office under the Union during the time for which they have been respectively elected nor the members of the Senate for one year after.
The members of each house shall be paid for their services by the States which they represent.
Every bill which shall have passed the Legislature shall be presented to the President of the United States for his revision--if he approves it he shall sign it--but if he does not approve it he shall return it with his objections to the house it originated in which house if two thirds of the members present, notwithstanding the President's objections agree to pass it, shall send it to the other house with the President's objections, where if two thirds of the members present also agree to pass it, the same shall become a law--& all bills sent to the President & not returned by him within ---- days shall be laws unless the Legislature by their adjournment prevent their return in which case they shall not be laws.
6^{th}
The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay & collect Taxes Duties Imposts & excises
To regulate Commerce with all nations & among the several States.
To borrow money & emit bills of Credit
To establish Post offices.
To raise armies
To build & equip Fleets
To pass laws for arming organizing & disciplining the Militia of the United States
To subdue a rebellion in any State on application of its legislature
To coin money & regulate the Value of all coins & fix the Standard of Weights & measures
To provide such Dock Yards & arsenals & erect such fortifications as may be necessary for the United States & to exercise exclusive Jurisdiction therein
To appoint a Treasurer by ballot
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court
To establish Post & military Roads
To establish & provide for a national University at the Seat of the Government of the United States
To establish uniform rules of Naturalization
To provide for the establishment of a Seat of Government for the United States not exceeding ---- miles square in which they shall have exclusive jurisdiction
To make rules concerning Captures from an Enemy
To declare the law & Punishment of piracies & felonies at sea & of counterfeiting Coin & of all offences against the Laws of Nations
To call forth the aid of the Militia to execute the laws of the Union enforce treaties suppress insurrections and repel invasions
And to make all laws for carrying the foregoing powers into execution.
The Legislature of the United States shall have the Power to declare the Punishment of Treason which shall consist only in levying War against the United States or any of them or in adhering to their Enemies. No person shall be convicted of Treason but by the testimony of two witnesses.
The proportion of direct taxation shall be regulated by the whole number of inhabitants of every description which number shall within ---- years after the first meeting of the Legislature & within the term of every ---- year after be taken in the manner to be prescribed by the Legislature
No Tax shall be laid on articles exported from the States--nor capitation tax but in proportion to the Census before directed
All Laws regulating Commerce shall require the assent of two thirds of the members present in each house--The United States shall not grant any title of Nobility--The Legislature of the United States shall pass no Law on the subject of Religion, nor touching or abridging the Liberty of the Press nor shall the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus ever be suspended except in case of Rebellion or Invasion.
All acts made by the Legislature of the United States pursuant to this Constitution & all Treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the land & all Judges shall be bound to consider them as such in their decisions.
7
The Senate shall have the sole & exclusive power to declare War & to make treaties & to appoint Ambassadors & other Ministers to foreign nations & Judges of the Supreme Court.
They shall have the exclusive power to regulate the manner of deciding all disputes & controversies now subsisting or which may arise between the States respecting Jurisdiction or Territory.
8
The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a President of the United States of America which shall be his style & his title shall be His Excellency. He shall be elected for ---- years & shall be reeligible.
He shall from time to time give information to the Legislature of the state of the Union & recommend to their consideration the measures he may think necessary--he shall take care that the laws of the United States be duly executed: he shall commission all the officers of the United States & except as to Ambassadors other ministers and Judges of the Supreme Court he shall nominate & with the consent of the Senate appoint all other officers of the United States.
He shall receive public Ministers from foreign nations & may correspond with the Executives of the different States. He shall have power to grant pardons & reprieves except in impeachments--He shall be Commander in chief of the army & navy of the United States & of the Militia of the several States & shall receive a compensation which shall not be increased or diminished during his continuance in office.
At entering on the Duties of his office he shall take an oath faithfully to execute the duties of a President of the United States.--He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the house of Delegates & Conviction in the Supreme Court of Treason bribery or Corruption--In case of his removal death resignation or disability the President of the Senate shall exercise the duties of his office until another President be chosen--& in case of the death of the President of the Senate the Speaker of the House of Delegates shall do so.
9
The Legislature of the United States shall have the Power and it shall be their duty to establish such Courts of Law Equity & Admiralty as shall be necessary--The Judges of the Courts shall hold their offices during good behaviour & receive a compensation, which shall not be increased or diminished during their continuance in office--One of these Courts shall be termed the Supreme Court whose jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the laws of the United States or affecting ambassadors other public Ministers & Consuls--to the trial of impeachment of officers of the United States--to all cases of Admiralty & maritime jurisdiction--In cases of impeachment affecting ambassadors and other public Ministers this Jurisdiction shall be original & in all other cases appellate----
All criminal offences (except in cases of impeachment) shall be tried in the State where they shall be committed--the trials shall be open & public & shall be by Jury.
10
Immediately after the first census of the people of the United States the House of Delegates shall apportion the Senate by electing for each State out of the citizens resident therein one Senator for every ---- members each State shall have in the House of Delegates--Each State shall be entitled to have at least one member in the Senate.
11
No State shall grant letters of marque & reprisal or enter into treaty or alliance or confederation nor grant any title of nobility nor without the Consent of the Legislature of the United States lay any impost on imports--nor keep troops or Ships of War in time of peace--nor enter into compacts with other States or foreign powers or emit bills of Credit or make any thing but Gold Silver or Copper a tender in payment of debts nor engage in War except for self defence when actually invaded or the danger of invasion be so great as not to admit of a delay until the Government of the United States can be informed thereof--& to render these prohibitions effectual the Legislature of the United States shall have the power to revise the laws of the several States that may be supposed to infringe the Powers exclusively delegated by this Constitution to Congress & to negative & annul such as do.
12
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges & immunities of Citizens in the several States--Any person charged with Crimes in any State fleeing from justice to another shall on demand of the Executive of the State from which he fled be delivered up & removed to the State having jurisdiction of the offence.
13
Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislature & to the records & judicial Proceedings of the Courts & magistrates of every State.
14
The Legislature shall have power to admit new States into the Union on the same terms with the original States provided two thirds of the members present in both Houses agree.
15
On the application of the legislature of a State the United States shall protect it against domestic insurrection.
16
If two thirds of the Legislatures of the States apply for the same the Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for the purpose of amending the Constitution--or should Congress, with the Consent of two thirds of each house, propose to the States amendments to the same--the agreement of two thirds of the Legislatures of the States shall be sufficient to make the said amendments parts of the Constitution.
The Ratification of the conventions of ---- States shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution.[34]
[34] "... What will be the result of their meeting I cannot with
any certainty determine, but I hardly think much good can
come of it; the people of America don't appear to me to be
ripe for any great innovations & it seems they are
ultimately to ratify or reject: the weight of Gen^l
Washington as you justly observe is very great in America,
but I hardly think it is sufficient to induce the people to
pay money or part with power.
"The delegates from the Eastw^d are for a very strong
government, & wish to prostrate all y^e State legislatures,
& form a general system out of y^e whole; but I don't learn
that the people are with them, on y^e contrary in
Massachusetts they think that government too strong, & are
about rebelling again, for the purpose of making it more
democratical: In Connecticut they have rejected the
requisition for y^e present year decidedly, & no Man there
would be elected to the office of a constable if he was to
declare that he meant to pay a copper towards the domestic
debt:--R.
Island has refused to send members--the cry there
is for a good government after they have paid their debts in
depreciated paper:--first demolish the Philistines (i. e.
their creditors) then for propiety.
"N. Hampshire has not paid a shilling, since peace, & does
not ever mean to pay on to all eternity:--if it was
attempted to tax the people for y^e domestic debt 500 Shays
would arise in a fortnight.--In N. York they pay well
because they can do it by plundering N. Jersey &
Connecticut.--Jersey will go great lengths from motives of
revenge and Interest: Pensylvany will join provided you let
the sessions of the Executive of America be fixed in
Philad^a & give her other advantages in trade to compensate
for the loss of State power.
I shall make no observations on
the Southern States, but I think they will be (perhaps from
different motives) as little disposed to part with efficient
power as any in the Union...."--William Grayson to James
Monroe, New York, May 29, 1787. Monroe MSS.
Adjourned.
WEDNESDAY MAY 30.
Roger Sherman (from Connecticut) took his seat.
The House went into Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union.
M^r Gorham was elected to the Chair by Ballot.
The propositions of M^r Randolph which had been referred to the Co[~m]ittee being taken up. He moved on the suggestion of M^r G. Morris, that the first of his propositions to wit "Resolved that the articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected & enlarged, as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely, common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare,--should be postponed, in order to consider the 3 following:
- that a union of the States merely federal will not accomplish
the objects proposed by the articles of Confederation, namely
common defence, security of liberty, & gen^l welfare.
- that no treaty or treaties among the whole or part of the
States, as individual Sovereignties, would be sufficient.
- that a national Government ought to be established
consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary.
The motion for postponing was seconded by M^r Gov^r Morris and unanimously agreed to.
Some verbal criticisms were raised ag^{st} the first proposition, and it was agreed on motion of M^r Butler seconded by M^r Randolph, to pass on to the third, which underwent a discussion, less however on its general merits than on the force and extent of the particular terms national & supreme.
M^r Charles Pinkney wished to know of M^r Randolph, whether he meant to abolish the State Govern^{ts} altogether. M^r R. replied that he meant by these general propositions merely to introduce the particular ones which explained the outlines of the system he had in view.
M^r Butler said he had not made up his mind on the subject, and was open to the light which discussion might throw on it. After some general observations he concluded with saying that he had opposed the grant of powers to Cong^s heretofore, because the whole power was vested in one body. The proposed distribution of the powers into different bodies changed the case, and would induce him to go great lengths.
Gen^l Pinkney[35] expressed a doubt whether the act of Cong^s reco[~m]ending the Convention, or the Commissions of the Deputies to it, could authorize a discussion of a system founded on different principles from the federal Constitution.
[35] "M^r Ch^s Cotesworth Pinckney is a Gentleman of Family and
fortune in his own State. He has received the advantage of a
liberal education, and possesses a very extensive degree of
legal knowledge. When warm in a debate he sometimes speaks
well,--but he is generally considered an indifferent Orator.
Mr. Pinckney was an Officer of high rank in the American
Army, and served with great reputation through the War. He
is now about 40 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist.
Rev., iii., 333.
M^r Gerry[36] seemed to entertain the same doubt.
[36] "M. Gerry's character is marked for integrity and
perseverance. He is a hesitating and laborious
speaker;--possesses a great degree of confidence and goes
extensively into all subjects that he speaks on, without
respect to elegance or flower of diction. He is connected
and sometimes clear in his arguments, conceives well, and
cherishes as his first virtue, a love for his Country. Mr.
Gerry is very much of a Gentleman in his principles and
manners;--he has been engaged in the mercantile line and is
a Man of property.
He is about 37 years of age."--Pierce's
Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 325.
M^r Gov^r Morris explained the distinction between a federal and national, supreme, Gov^t; the former being a mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties; the latter having a compleat and compulsive operation. He contended that in all Communities there must be one supreme power, and one only.
M^r Mason observed that the present confederation was not only deficient in not providing for coercion & punishment ag^{st} delinquent States; but argued very cogently that punishment could not in the nature of things be executed on the States collectively, and therefore that such a Gov^t was necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and would punish those only whose guilt required it.
M^r Sherman[37] who took his seat today, admitted that the Confederation had not given sufficient power to Cong^s and that additional powers were necessary; particularly that of raising money which he said would involve many other powers. He admitted also that the General & particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be concurrent. He seemed however not to be disposed to make too great inroads on the existing system; intimating as one reason, that it would be wrong to lose every amendment, by inserting such as would not be agreed to by the States.
[37] "M^r Sherman exhibits the oddest shaped character I
ever remember to have met with. He is awkward, un-meaning,
and unaccountably strange in his manner. But in his train of
thinking there is something regular, deep, and
comprehensive; yet the oddity of his address, the vulgarisms
that accompany his public speaking, and that strange new
England cant which runs through his public as well as his
private speaking make everything that is connected with him
grotesque and laughable;--and yet he deserves infinite
praise,--no Man has a better Heart or a clearer Head.
If he
cannot embellish he can furnish thoughts that are wise and
useful. He is an able politician and extremely artful in
accomplishing any particular object;--it is remarked that he
seldom fails. I am told he sits on the Bench in Connecticut,
and is very correct in the discharge of his Judicial
functions.
In the early part of his life he was a
Shoe-maker;--but despising the lowness of his condition, he
turned Almanack maker, and so progressed upwards to a Judge.
He has been several years a Member of Congress, and
discharged the duties of his Office with honor and credit to
himself, and advantage to the State he represented. He is
about 60."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 326.
It was moved by M^r Read,[38] 2^{ded} by M^r Ch^s Cotesworth Pinkney, to postpone the 3^d proposition last offered by M^r Randolph viz that a national Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive and Judiciary, in order to take up the following,--viz. "Resolved that in order to carry into execution the Design of the States in forming this Convention, and to accomplish the objects proposed by the Confederation a more effective Government consisting of a Legislative, Executive and Judiciary, ought to be established." The motion to postpone for this purpose was lost:
Yeas. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, S. Carolina--4.
Nays. N. Y. Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina--4.
[38] "M^r Read is a Lawyer and a Judge;--his legal abilities
are said to be very great, but his powers of Oratory are
fatiguing and tiresome to the last degree;--his voice is
feeble and his articulation so bad that few can have
patience to attend to him. He is a very good Man, and bears
an amiable character with those who know him. Mr. Read is
about 50, of a low stature, and a weak
constitution."--Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 330.
On the question as moved by M^r Butler, on the third proposition it was resolved in Committee of whole that a national govern^t ought to be established consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive & Judiciary,--Mass^{ts} being ay.--Connect.--no. N. York divided (Col.
Hamilton ay. M^r Yates no.) Pen^a ay. Delaware ay. Virg^a ay. N. C. ay.
S. C. ay.
The following Resolution, being the 2^d of those proposed by M^r Randolph was taken up, viz.--"that the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases."
M^r Madison[39] observing that the words, "or to the number of free inhabitants," might occasion debates which would divert the Committee from the general question whether the principle of representation should be changed, moved that they might be struck out.
[39] "Mr. Madison is a character who has long been in public
life; and what is very remarkable every Person seems to
acknowledge his greatness. He blends together the profound
politician, with the Scholar. In the management of every
great question he evidently took the lead in the Convention,
and tho' he cannot be called an Orator, he is a most
agreeable, eloquent, and convincing Speaker. From a spirit
of industry and application which he possesses in a most
eminent degree, he always comes forward the best informed
Man of any point in debate.
The affairs of the United
States, he perhaps, has the most correct knowledge of, of
any Man in the Union. He has been twice a Member of
Congress, and was always thought one of the ablest Members
that ever sat in that Council. Mr. Maddison is about 37
years of age, a Gentleman of great modesty,--with a
remarkable sweet temper. He is easy and unreserved among his
acquaintance, and has a most agreeable style of
conversation."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 331.
M^r King observed that the quotas of contribution which would alone remain as the measure of representation, would not answer, because waving every other view of the matter, the revenue might hereafter be so collected by the General Gov^t that the sums respectively drawn from the States would not appear, and would besides be continually varying.
M^r Madison admitted the propriety of the observation, and that some better rule ought to be found.
Col. Hamilton moved to alter the resolution so as to read "that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned to the number of free inhabitiants." M^r Spaight 2^{ded} the motion.
It was then moved that the Resolution be postponed, which was agreed to.
M^r Randolph and M^r Madison then moved the following resolution--"that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned."
It was moved and 2^{ded} to amend it by adding "and not according to the present system"--which was agreed to.
It was then moved & 2^{ded} to alter the resolution so as to read "that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought not to be according to the present system."
It was then moved & 2^{ded} to postpone the Resolution moved by M^r Randolph & M^r Madison, which being agreed to:
M^r Madison, moved, in order to get over the difficulties, the following resolution--"that the equality of suffrage established by the articles of Confederation ought not to prevail in the national Legislature, and "that an equitable ratio of representation ought to be substituted."
This was 2^{ded} by M^r Gov^r Morris, and being generally relished, would have been agreed to; when,
M^r Reed moved that the whole clause relating to the point of Representation be postponed; reminding the Com^e that the deputies from Delaware were restrained by their co[~m]ission from assenting to any change of the rule of suffrage, and in case such a change should be fixed on, it might become their duty to retire from the Convention.
M^r Gov^r Morris observed that the valuable assistance of those members could not be lost without real concern, and that so early a proof of discord in the Convention as the secession of a State, would add much to the regret; that the change proposed was however so fundamental an article in a national Gov^t, that it could not be dispensed with.
M^r Madison observed that whatever reason might have existed for the equality of suffrage when the Union was a federal one among sovereign States, it must cease when a National Governm^t should be put into the place. In the former case, the acts of Cong^s depended so much for their efficacy on the cooperation of the States, that these had a weight both within & without Congress, nearly in proportion to their extent and importance.
In the latter case, as the acts of the Gen^l Gov^t would take effect without the intervention of the State legislatures, a vote from a small State w^d have the same efficacy & importance as a vote from a large one, and there was the same reason for different numbers of representatives from different States, as from Counties of different extents within particular States.
He suggested as an expedient for at once taking the sense of the members on this point and saving the Delaware deputies from embarrassment, that the question should be taken in Committee, and the clause on report to the House, be postponed without a question there. This however did not appear to satisfy Mr.
Read.
By several it was observed that no just construction of the Act of Delaware, could require or justify a secession of her deputies, even if the resolution were to be carried thro' the House as well as the Committee. It was finally agreed however that the clause should be postponed: it being understood that in the event the proposed change of representation would certainly be agreed to, no objection or difficulty being started from any other quarter than from Delaware.
The motion of Mr. Read to postpone being agreed to,
The Committee then rose. The Chairman reported progress, and the House having resolved to resume the subject in Committee to-morrow,
Adjourned to 10 O Clock.
THURSDAY MAY 31[40]
[40] "This day the state of New Jersey was represented, so that
there were now ten states in Convention."--Yates, Secret
Proceedings, etc., 99. But in the Journal of the Federal
Convention (1819), as in Madison's account, New Jersey is
entered as present May 25th. On May 30 two votes are
recorded by Madison and in the Journal without New Jersey.
It is probable that an error was made in the Journal and
that Madison followed it.
William Pierce, from Georgia took his seat.[41]
[41] Rufus King kept a few notes of the proceedings of the
convention from May 31st to August 8th. They are meagre, but
corroborate Madison's report. See King's Life and
Correspondence of Rufus King, i., 587.
Pierce also kept a few rough notes of the proceedings which
were printed in the Savannah Georgian, April 19, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, and 28, 1828, and reprinted in The American
Historical Review, iii., 317 et seq. They throw little
additional light on the debates, but wherever they do are
quoted here, as are King's.
In Committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph's propositions.
The 3^d Resolution "that the national Legislature ought to consist of two branches" was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Doc^r Franklin who was understood to be partial to a single House of Legislation.
Resol: 4. first clause, "that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States," being taken up,
M^r Sherman opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought to be by the State Legislatures. The people he said, immediately should have as little to do as may be about the Government. They want information and are constantly liable to be misled.
M^r Gerry. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy.
The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots.
In Mass^{ts} it had been fully confirmed by experience that they are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute. One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for those employed in the administration of Governm^t. It would seem to be a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the popular clamour in Mass^{ts} for the reduction of salaries and the attack made on that of the Gov^r though secured by the spirit of the Constitution itself.
He had he said been too republican heretofore: he was still however republican, but had been taught by experience the danger of the levelling spirit.
M^r Mason argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the Gov^t. It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons--It ought to know & sympathize with every part of the community; and ought therefore to be taken not only from different parts of the whole republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it, which had in several instances particularly in Virg^a, different interests and views arising from difference of produce, of habits &c &c.
He admitted that we had been too democratic but was afraid we s^d incautiously run into the opposite extreme. We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people. He had often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of humanity & policy, considering that however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a few years, not only might but certainly would, distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of Society.
Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights and happiness of the lowest than of the highest orders of Citizens.
M^r Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished to give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long subsist without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government this confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it wrong to increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the electors of the national Legislature. All interference between the general and local Governm^{ts} should be obviated as much as possible.
On examination it would be found that the opposition of States to federal measures had proceeded much more from the officers of the States, than from the people at large.
M^r Madison considered the popular election of one branch of the national Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government. He observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body of electors.
That if the first branch of the general legislature should be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the first--the Executive by the second together with the first; and other appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations, but thought it might be pushed too far.
He wished the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive & judiciary branches of the Government. He thought too that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures.
M^r Gerry did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from the British Constitution were often fallacious when applied to our situation which was extremely different. Experience he said had shewn that the State legislatures drawn immediately from the people did not always possess their confidence. He had no objection however to an election by the people if it were so qualified that men of honor & character might not be unwilling to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to think the people might nominate a certain number out of which the State legislatures should be bound to choose.[42]
[42] "Mr. Strong would agree to the principle, provided it would
undergo a certain modification, but pointed out
nothing."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 318.
M^r Butler thought an election by the people an impracticable mode.
On the question for an election of the first branch of the national Legislature, by the people,
Mass^{ts} ay. Connec^t div^d. N. York ay. N. Jersey no. Pen^a ay.
Delaw^r div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Georg^a ay.
The remaiñg Clauses of Resolution 4^{th} relating to the qualifications of members of the National Legislature, being posp^d nem. con., as entering too much into detail for general propositions.
The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5. "that the second, (or senatorial) branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the first branch out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures."
M^r Spaight contended that the 2^d branch ought to be chosen by the State Legislatures and moved an amendment to that effect.[43]
[43] "M^r King observed that the Question called for was
premature, and out of order,--that unless we go on regularly
from one principle to the other we shall draw out our
proceedings to an endless length."--Pierce's Notes, Am.
Hist. Rev., iii., 318.
M^r Butler apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands of the States as was proposed, tended to destroy all that balance and security of interests among the States which it was necessary to preserve; and called on M^r Randolph the mover of the propositions, to explain the extent of his ideas, and particularly the number of members he meant to assign to this second branch.
M^r Rand^f observed that he had at the time of offering his propositions stated his ideas as far as the nature of general propositions required; that details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with propriety have been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to the number of the second branch, he should say that it ought to be much smaller than that of the first; so small as to be exempt from the passionate proceedings to which numerous assemblies are liable. He observed that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the U.
S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their origin every man had found it in the turbulance and follies of democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for ag^{st} this tendency of our Governments: and that a good Senate seemed most likely to answer the purpose.[44]
[44] "Butler said that until the number of the Senate could be
known it would be impossible for him to give a vote on
it."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 318.
M^r King reminded the Committee that the choice of the second branch as proposed (by M^r Spaight) viz. by the State Legislatures would be impracticable, unless it was to be very numerous, or the idea of proportion among the States was to be disregarded. According to this idea, there must be 80 or 100 members to entitle Delaware to the choice of one of them.--M^r Spaight withdrew his motion.
M^r Wilson opposed both a nomination by the State Legislatures, and an election by the first branch of the national Legislature, because the second branch of the latter, ought to be independent of both. He thought both branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the people, but was not prepared with a specific proposition. He suggested the mode of chusing the Senate of N. York to wit of uniting several election districts for one branch, in chusing members for the other branch, as a good model.
M^r Madison observed that such a mode would destroy the influence of the smaller States associated with larger ones in the same district; as the latter would chuse from within themselves, altho' better men might be found in the former. The election of Senators in Virg^a where large & small counties were often formed into one district for the purpose, had illustrated this consequence. Local partiality, would often prefer a resident within the County or State, to a candidate of superior merit residing out of it. Less merit also in a resident would be more known throughout his own State.[45]
[45] "M^r Butler moved to have the proposition relating to the
first branch postponed, in order to take up another,--which
was that the second branch of the Legislature consist of
blank.
"M^r King objected to the postponement for the reasons which he had offered before."--Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 319.
M^r Sherman favored an election of one member by each of the State Legislatures.[46]
[46] According to Pierce, Mason spoke after Sherman, and
Pinckney's motion is given more fully by Pierce than by
Madison.
"M^r Mason was of opinion that it would be highly improper to draw the Senate out of the first branch; that it would occasion vacancies which would cost much time, trouble, and expense to have filled up,--besides which it would make the members too dependent on the first branch.
"M^r Ch^s Pinckney said he meant to propose to divide the Continent into four Divisions, out of which a certain number of persons sh^d be nominated, and out of that nomination to appoint a senate."--Pierce's Notes, Amer. Hist. Rev., iii., 319.
M^r Pinkney moved to strike out the "nomination by the State Legislatures;" on this question.
[47]Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pen^a no. Del.
div^d V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg no.
[47] This question is omitted in the printed Journal,
& the votes applied to the succeeding one, instead
of the votes as here stated.--Madison's Note.
On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of nominations by the State Legislatures, Mass. ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no.
N. Jersey, no. Pen^a no. Del. no. Virg^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. G^a no.
So the clause was disagreed to & a chasm left in this part of the plan.
The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which the national Legislature ought to legislate was next taken into discussion: On the question whether each branch sh^d originate laws, there was an unanimous affirmative without debate. On the question for transferring all the Legislative power of the existing Cong^s to this Assembly, there was also a silent affirmative nem. con.
On the proposition for giving "Legislative power in all cases to which the State Legislatures were individually incompetent,"
M^r Pinkney & M^r Rutledge[48] objected to the vagueness of the term incompetent, and said they could not well decide how to vote until they should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this definition.[49]
[48] "Mr. Rutledge is one of those characters who was highly
mounted at the commencement of the late revolution;--his
reputation in the first Congress gave him a distinguished
rank among the American Worthies. He was bred to the Law,
and now acts as one of the Chancellors of South Carolina.
This Gentleman is much famed in his own State as an Orator,
but in my opinion he is too rapid in his public speaking to
be denominated an agreeable Orator. He is undobotedly a man
of abilities, and a Gentleman of distinction and fortune.
Mr. Rutledge was once Governor of South Carolina.
He is
about 48 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, Amer. Hist. Rev.,
iii., 333.
[49] According to Pierce: "M^r Sherman was of opinion that
it would be too indefinitely expressed,--and yet it would be
hard to define all the powers by detail. It appeared to him
that it would be improper for the national Legislature to
negative all the Laws that were connected with the States
themselves.
"M^r Madison said it was necessary to adopt some general
principles on which we should act,--that we were wandering
from one thing to another without seeming to be settled in
any one principle.
"M^r Wythe observed that it would be right to establish
general principles before we go into detail, or very shortly
Gentlemen would find themselves in confusion, and would be
obliged to have recurrence to the point from whence they sat
out.
"M^r King was of opinion that the principles ought first to
be established before we proceed to the framing of the Act.
He apprehends that the principles only go so far as to
embrace all the power that is given up by the people to the
Legislature, and to the federal Government, but no farther.
"M^r Randolph was of opinion that it would be impossible to
define the powers and the length to which the federal
Legislature ought to extend just at this time.
"M^r Wilson observed that it would be impossible to
enumerate the powers which the federal Legislature ought to
have."--Pierce's Notes, Id., iii., 319, 320.
M^r Butler repeated his fears that we were running into an extreme in taking away the powers of the States, and called on Mr. Randolph for the extent of his meaning.
M^r Randolph disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the national Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an inroad on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not think any considerations whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion was fixed on this point.
M^r Madison said that he had brought with him into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered; but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he should shrink from nothing which should be found essential to such a form of Gov^t as would provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the community. This being the end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to.
On the question for giving powers, in cases to which the States are not competent--Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t div^d. (Sherman no. Elseworth ay.)
N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. Carolina ay.
Georg^a ay.
The other clauses giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among the States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the Nat. Leg. the articles of union, down to the last clause, (the words "or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union," being added after the words "contravening &c. the articles of the Union," on motion of D^r Franklin) were agreed to with^t debate or dissent.
The last clause of Resolution 6, authorizing an exertion of the force of the whole ag^{st} a delinquent State came next into consideration.
M^r Madison, observed that the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted, the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively and not individually.--A union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use of force ag^{st} a State, would look more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would be framed as might render this resource unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed. This motion was agreed to, nem. con.
The Committee then rose & the House
Adjourned.[50]
[50] "When the Convention first opened at Philadelphia,
there were a number of propositions brought forward as great
leading principles for the new Government to be established
for the United States. A copy of these propositions was
given to each Member with an injunction to keep everything a
profound secret.
One morning, by accident, one of the
Members dropt his copy of the propositions, which being
luckily picked up by General Mifflin was presented to
General Washington, our President, who put it in his pocket.
After the debates of the Day were over, and the question for
adjournment was called for, the General arose from his seat,
and previous to his putting the question addressed the
Convention in the following manner,--
"'Gentlemen
"'I am sorry to find that some one Member of this Body, has
been so neglectful of the secrets of the Convention as to
drop in the State House, a copy of their proceedings, which
by accident was picked up and delivered to me this Morning.
I must entreat Gentlemen to be more careful, lest our
transactions get into the News Papers, and disturb the
public repose by premature speculations.
I know not whose
Paper it is, but there it is [throwing it down on the
table,] let him who owns it take it.' At the same time he
bowed, picked up his Hat, and quitted the room with a
dignity so severe that every Person seemed alarmed; for my
part I was extremely so, for putting my hand in my pocket I
missed my copy of the same Paper, but advancing up to the
Table my fears soon dissipated; I found it to be in the hand
writing of another Person. When I went to my lodgings at the
Indian Queen, I found my copy in a coat pocket which I had
pulled off that Morning.
It is something remarkable that no
Person ever owned the Paper."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist.
Rev., iii., 324.
FRIDAY JUNE 1^{ST} 1787
William Houston from Georgia took his seat.
The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution 7. "that a national Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national Legislature for the term of ---- years &c. to be ineligible thereafter, to possess the Executive powers of Congress &c."
M^r Pinkney was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace & war &c. which would render the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an elective one.
M^r Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a single person. M^r C.
Pinkney seconded the motion, so as to read "that a National Ex. to consist of a single person, be instituted."
A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman asking if he should put the question, Doc^r Franklin[51] observed that it was a point of great importance and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments on it before the question was put.
[51] "D^r Franklin is well known to be the greatest phylosopher
of the present age;--all the operations of nature he seems
to understand,--the very heavens obey him, and the Clouds
yield up their Lightning to be imprisoned in his rod. But
what claim he has to the politician, posterity must
determine. It is certain that he does not shine much in
public Council,--he is no Speaker, nor does he seem to let
politics engage his attention. He is, however, a most
extraordinary Man, and he tells a story in a style more
engaging than anything I ever heard.
Let his Biographer
finish his character. He is 82 years old, and possesses an
activity of mind equal to a youth of 25 years of
age."--Pierce's Notes, Amer. Hist. Rev., iii., 328.
M^r Rutlidge animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves precluded by having frankly disclosed their opinions from afterwards changing them, which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was for vesting the Executive power in a single person, tho' he was not for giving him the power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest responsibility and administer the public affairs best.
M^r Sherman said he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, which was the depository of the supreme will of the Society. As they were the best judges of the business which ought to be done by the Executive department, and consequently of the number necessary from time to time for doing it, he wished the number might not be fixed, but that the legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more as experience might dictate.
M^r Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among others that of war & peace &c. The only powers he considered strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature.[52]
[52] According to King, Madison followed Wilson: "Madison agreed
with Wilson in the Definition of Executive power. Ex vi
termini. Executive power does not include the Power of War
and Peace. Executive Power shd. be limited and defined. If
large, we shall have the Evils of Elective Monarchies.
Perhaps the best plan will be a single Executive of long
duration, with a Council and with Liberty to dissent on his
personal Responsibility."--King's Life and Correspondence
of Rufus King, i., 588.
According to Pierce:
"M^r Madison was of opinion that an Executive formed of one
Man would answer the purpose when aided by a Council, who
should have the right to advise and record their
proceedings, but not to control his authority."--Pierce's
Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 320.
M^r Gerry favored the policy of annexing a Council to the Executive in order to give weight & inspire confidence.[53]
[53] King gives Gerry's remarks: "Gerry. I am in favor of a
Council to advise the Executive: they will be organs of
information respecting Persons qualified for various
offices. Their opinions may be recorded, so as to be liable
to be called to account & impeached--in this way, their
Responsibility will be certain, and for misconduct their
Punishment sure."
Dickinson followed Gerry: "Dickinson. A limited yet
vigorous Executive is not republican, but peculiar to
monarchy--the royal Executive has vigour, not only by power,
but by popular Attachment & Report--an Equivalent to popular
Attachment may be derived from the Veto on the Legislative
acts. We cannot have a limited monarchy--our condition does
not permit it. Republics are in the beginning and for a time
industrious, but they finally destroy themselves because
they are badly constituted.
I dread the consolidation of the
States, & hope for a good national Govt. from the present
Division of the States with a feeble Executive.
"We are to have a Legislature of two branches, or two
Legislatures, as the sovereign of the nation--this will work
a change unless you provide that the judiciary shall aid and
correct the Executive. The first Branch of the Legislature,
the H. of Representatives, must be on another plan. The
second Branch or Senate may be on the present scheme of
representing the States--the Representatives to be
apportioned according to the Quotas of the States paid into
the general Treasury.
The Executive to be removed from
office by the national Legislature, on the Petition of seven
States."--King's Life and Correspondence of Rufus King,
i., 588 et seq.
M^r Randolph strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the foetus of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be governed by the British Govenm^t as our prototype. He did not mean however to throw censure on that Excellent fabric. If we were in a situation to copy it he did not know that he should be opposed to it; but the fixt genius of the people of America required a different form of Government. He could not see why the great requisites for the Executive department, vigor, dispatch & responsibility could not be found in three men, as well as in one man. The Executive ought to be independent.
It ought therefore in order to support its independence to consist of more than one.
M^r Wilson said that unity in the Executive instead of being the fetus of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated that he was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable to the situation of this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the manners so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic would do for it.
M^r Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was postponed by common consent, the Committee seeming unprepared for any decision on it; and the first part of the clause agreed to, viz--"that a National Executive be instituted."[54]
[54] Williamson followed Wilson, according to King:
"Williamson--There is no true difference between an
Executive composed of a single person, with a Council, and
an Executive composed of three or more persons."--King's
Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, i., 590.
M^r Madison thought it would be proper, before a choice sh^d be made between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to fix the extent of the Executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature Executive, and must be given to that departm^t whether administered by one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a single officer.
He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before the Committee as related to the powers of the Executive sh^d be struck out & that after the words "that a national Executive ought to be instituted" there be inserted the words following viz.
"with power to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers "not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature," as may from time to time be delegated by the national Legislature." The words "not legislative nor judiciary in their nature" were added to the proposed amendment, in consequence of a suggestion by Gen^l Pinkney that improper powers might otherwise be delegated.
M^r Wilson seconded this motion.
M^r Pinkney moved to amend the amendment by striking out the last member of it; viz: "and to execute such other powers not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature as may from time to time be delegated." He said they were unnecessary, the object of them being included in the "power to carry into effect the national laws."
M^r Randolph seconded the motion.
M^r Madison did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words, "to appoint to offices &c. the whole being perhaps included in the first member of the proposition. He did not however see any inconveniency in retaining them, and cases might happen in which they might serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions.
In consequence of the motion of M^r Pinkney, the question on M^r Madison's motion was divided; and the words objected to by M^r Pinkney struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y., N. J., Pen^a, Del., N. C., & Geo. ag^{st} Mass., Virg^a & S. Carolina the preceding part of the motion being first agreed to; Connecticut divided all the other States in the affirmative.
The next clause in Resolution 7, relating to the mode of appointing, & the duration of, the Executive being under consideration,
M^r Wilson said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He would say however at least that in theory he was for an election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York & Mass^{ts}, shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large, was both a convenient & successful mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety.
M^r Sherman was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which was to be executed. An independence of the Executive on the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was any such thing.
M^r Wilson moves that the blank for the term of duration should be filled with three years, observing at the same time that he preferred this short period, on the supposition that a re-eligibility would be provided for.
M^r Pinkney moves for seven years.
M^r Sherman was for three years, and ag^{st} the doctrine of rotation as throwing out of office the men best qualified to execute its duties.
M^r Mason was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a re-eligibility as the best expedient both for preventing the effect of a false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue with the Legislature for a re-appointment.
M^r Bedford[55] was strongly opposed to so long a term as seven years.
He begged the Committee to consider what the situation of the Country would be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for such a period and it should be found on trial that he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his appointment. An impeachment he said would be no cure for this evil, as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine years.
[55] "Mr. Bedford was educated for the Bar, and in his
profession I am told, has merit. He is a bold and nervous
Speaker, and has a very commanding and striking manner;--but
he is warm and impetuous in his temper, and precipitate in
his judgment. Mr. Bedford is about 32 years old, and very
corpulent."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 330.
On the question for seven years,
Mass^{ts} divid^{d.} Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pen^a ay.
Del. ay. Virg^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geor. no.
There being 5 ays, 4 noes, & 1 div^d, a question was asked whether a majority had voted in the Affirmative? The President decided that it was an affirmative vote.
The mode of appointing the Executive was the next question.
M^r Wilson renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as of the States;
Col. Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes however that M^r Wilson might have time to digest it into his own form.--the clause, "to be chosen by the National Legislature"--was accordingly postponed.--
M^r Rutlidge suggests an election of the Executive by the second branch only of the national Legislature.
The Committee then rose and the House
Adjourned.
SATURDAY JUNE 2^D IN COMMITTEE OF WHOLE
William Sam^l Johnson from Connecticut, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, from Mary^d, & John Lansing J^r from N. York, took their seats.
It was mov^d & 2^{ded} to postpone ye Resol: of M^r Randolph respecting the Executive, in order to take up the 2^d branch of the Legislature; which being negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. S. C. Geo: ag^{st} N. Y. Pen^a Mary^d. The mode of appointing the Executive was resumed.
M^r Wilson made the following motion, to be substituted for the mode proposed by Mr.
Randolph's resolution, "that the Executive Magistracy shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided into ---- districts: & that the persons qualified to vote in each district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature elect ---- members for their respective districts to be electors of the Executive Magistracy, that the said Electors of the Executive magistracy meet at ---- and they or any ---- of them so met shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body ---- person-- in whom the Executive authority of the national Government shall be vested."
M^r Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an election by the national Legislature.
M^r Gerry, opposed the election by the National legislature. There would be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature & the candidates w^d bargain & play into one another's hands, votes would be given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter, of recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or to their friends. He liked the principle of M^r Wilson's motion, but fears it would alarm & give a handle to the State partizans, as tending to supersede altogether the State authorities.
He thought the Community not yet ripe for stripping the States of their powers, even such as might not be requisite for local purposes. He was for waiting till the people should feel more the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the suffrages of the States, instead of Electors, or letting the Legislatures nominate, and the electors appoint. He was not clear that the people ought to act directly even in the choice of electors, being too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to deceptions.
M^r Williamson[56] could see no advantage in the introduction of Electors chosen by the people who would stand in the same relation to them as the State Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be attended with great trouble and expence.
[56] "Mr. Williamson is a Gentleman of education and talents. He
enters freely into public debate from his close attention to
most subjects, but he is no Orator. There is a great degree
of good humour and pleasantry in his character; and in his
manners there is a strong trait of the Gentleman. He is
about 48 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, Amer. Hist. Rev.,
iii., 332.
On the question for agreeing to M^r Wilson's substitute, it was negatived: Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y.[57] no. P^a ay. Del. no.
Mar^d ay. Virg^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo^a no.
[57] New York, in the printed Journal, divided.--Madison's Note.
On the question for electing the Executive by the national Legislature for the term of seven years, it was agreed to, Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t ay.
N. Y. ay. Pen^a no. Del. ay. Mary^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Geo. ay.
Doc^r Franklin moved that what related to the compensation for the services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute--"whose necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive no salary, stipend fee or reward whatsoever for their services." He said that being very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he had been unwilling to trust to that for the observations which seemed to support his motion and had reduced them to writing, that he might with the permission of the Committee read instead of speaking them. M^r Wilson made an offer to read the paper, which was accepted. The following is a literal copy of the paper:
Sir,
It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of
any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to
the honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first
reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it
success. In this particular of salaries to the Executive branch
I happen to differ; and as my opinion may appear new and
chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and
from a sense of duty that I hazard it.
The Committee will judge
of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may
possibly change mine.--I think I see inconveniences in the
appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but on the
contrary, great advantages.
Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on
the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of
power, and the love of money. Separately each of these has great
force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the
same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects.
Place before the eyes of such men, a post of honour that shall
be at the same time a place of profit, and they will move
heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it
is that renders the British Government so tempestuous.
The
struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions
which are perpetually dividing the Nation, distracting its
Councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless & mischievous wars,
and often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of
peace.
And of what kind are the men that will strive for this
profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the
heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties,
tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the
wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men
fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the
men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their
selfish pursuits.
These will thrust themselves into your
Government and be your rulers.--And these too will be mistaken
in the expected happiness of their situation: For their
vanquished competitors of the same spirit, and from the same
motives will perpetually be endeavouring to distress their
administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to
the people.
Besides these evils, Sir, tho' we may set out in the beginning
with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of
long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed
augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more
to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give
more to them. Hence as all history informs us, there has been in
every State & Kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the
Governing & Governed; the one striving to obtain more for its
support, and the other to pay less.
And this has alone
occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either
in dethroning of the Princes, or enslaving of the people.
Generally indeed the ruling power carries its point, the
revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see that they
are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the
people are discontented with the oppression of taxes; the
greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his
partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all
resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure.
There is
scarce a king in an hundred who would not, if he could, follow
the example of Pharoah, get first all the people's money, then
all their lands, and then make them and their children servants
for ever. It will be said, that we don't propose to establish
Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind
to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from
Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than
five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among
Citizens, and that they like.
I am apprehensive therefore,
perhaps too apprehensive, that the Government of these States,
may in future times, end in a Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I
think may be long delayed, if in our proposed System we do not
sow the seeds of contention, faction & tumult, by making our
posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear that tho' we
do employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number
will in time be set aside, it will only nourish the foetus of a
King, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly
expressed it, and a King will the sooner be set over us.
It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian Idea, and
that we can never find men to serve us in the Executive
department, without paying them well for their services. I
conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present
themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The
high Sheriff of a County in England is an honorable office, but
it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive and therefore
not sought for. But yet, it is executed and well executed, and
usually by some of the principal Gentlemen of the County.
In
France, the office of Counsellor, or Member of their Judiciary
Parliaments is more honorable. It is therefore purchased at a
high price: There are indeed fees on the law proceedings, which
are divided among them, but these fees do not amount to more
than three Per Cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore as
legal interest is there at five PerC^t they in fact pay two
PerC^t for being allowed to do the Judiciary business of the
Nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the
burden of paying them any salaries for their services.
I do not
however mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our
Judiciary department. I only bring the instance to shew that the
pleasure of doing good & serving their Country and the respect
such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some
minds to give up a great portion of their time to the Public,
without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction.
Another instance is that of a respectable Society who have made
the experiment, and practised it with success more than one
hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule
with them, that they are not to go to law; but in their
controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly and
yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear
the parties, and spend much time in composing their differences.
In doing this, they are supported by a sense of duty, and the
respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed,
but it is never made profitable by salaries, fees or
perquisites.
And indeed in all cases of Public service the less
the profit the greater the honor.
To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen, the great and
most important of our offices, that of General of our armies
executed for eight years together without the smallest salary,
by a Patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise; and
this through fatigues and distresses in common with the other
brave men his military friends & companions, and the constant
anxieties peculiar to his station? And shall we doubt finding
three or four men in all the U.
States, with public spirit
enough to bear sitting in peaceful Council for perhaps an equal
term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that
our laws are duly executed. Sir, I have a better opinion of our
Country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number
of wise and good men to undertake and execute well and
faithfully the office in question.
Sir. The saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is
not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing
them are what I apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the
amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted I must be contented
with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly and
done my duty.
The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton, with the view he said merely of bringing so respectable a proposition before the Committee, and which was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of weight. No debate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the consideration of the members. It was treated with great respect, but rather for the author of it, than from any apparent conviction of its expediency or practicability.
M^r Dickinson moved,[58] "that the Executive be made removable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of individual States." It was necessary he said to place the power of removing somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the Great officers of State. He did not know how provision could be made for removal of them in a better mode than that which he had proposed. He had no idea of abolishing the State Governments as some gentlemen seemed inclined to do. The happiness of this Country in his opinion required considerable powers to be left in the hands of the States.
[58] "Mr. Dickinson has been famed through all America for his
Farmers Letters; he is a Scholar, and said to be a Man of
very extensive information. When I saw him in the Convention
I was induced to pay the greatest attention to him whenever
he spoke. I had often heard that he was a great Orator, but
I found him an indifferent Speaker.
With an affected air of
wisdom he labors to produce a trifle,--his language is
irregular and incorrect,--his flourishes, (for he sometimes
attempts them,) are like expiring flames, they just shew
themselves and go out;--no traces of them are left on the
mind to chear or animate it. He is, however, a good writer
and will be ever considered one of the most important
characters in the United States. He is about 55 years old,
and was bred a Quaker."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev.,
iii., 329.
M^r Bedford seconded the motion.
M^r Sherman contended that the national Legislature should have power to remove the Executive at pleasure.
M^r Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a violation of the fundamental principle of good Government.
M^r Madison & M^r Wilson observed that it would leave an equality of agency in the small with the great States; that it would enable a minority of the people to prevent y^e removal of an officer who had rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it would open a door for intrigues ag^{st} him in States where his administration tho' just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay court to particular States whose leading partizans he might fear, or wish to engage as his partizans. They both thought it bad policy to introduce such a mixture of the State authorities, where their agency could be otherwise supplied.
M^r Dickinson considered the business as so important that no man ought to be silent or reserved. He went into a discourse of some length, the sum of which was, that the Legislative, Executive, & Judiciary departments ought to be made as independ^t as possible; but that such an Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent with a republic: that a firm Executive could only exist in a limited monarchy.
In the British Gov^t itself the weight of the Executive arises from the attachments which the Crown draws to itself, & not merely from the force of its prerogatives. In place of these attachments we must look out for something else. One source of stability is the double branch of the Legislature. The division of the Country into distinct States formed the other principal source of stability. This division ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left with the States.
This was the ground of his consolation for the future fate of his Country. Without this, and in case of a consolidation of the States into one great Republic, we might read its fate in the history of smaller ones. A limited Monarchy he considered as one of the best Governments in the world. It was not certain that the same blessings were derivable from any other form. It was certain that equal blessings had never yet been derived from any of the republican form. A limited Monarchy however was out of the question.
The spirit of the times--the state of our affairs forbade the experiment, if it were desireable. Was it possible moreover in the nature of things to introduce it even if these obstacles were less insuperable. A House of Nobles was essential to such a Gov^t could these be created by a breath, or by a stroke of the pen? No. They were the growth of ages, and could only arise under a complication of circumstances none of which existed in this Country. But though a form the most perfect perhaps in itself be unattainable, we must not despair.
If antient republics have been found to flourish for a moment only & then vanish for ever, it only proves that they were badly constituted; and that we ought to seek for every remedy for their diseases. One of these remedies he conceived to be the accidental lucky division of this Country into distinct States; a division which some seemed desirous to abolish altogether.
As to the point of representation in the national Legislature as it might affect States of different sizes, he said it must probably end in mutual concession. He hoped that each State would retain an equal voice at least in one branch of the National Legislature, and supposed the sums paid within each State would form a better ratio for the other branch than either the number of inhabitants or the quantum of property.[59]
[59] According to Pierce: "M^r Madison said it was far from being
his wish that every executive Officer should remain in
Office, without being amenable to some Body for his
conduct."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist. Rev., iii., 321.
A motion being made to strike out, "on request by a majority of the Legislatures of the individual States," and rejected, Connecticut, S.
Carol: & Geo. being ay, the rest no: the question on M^r Dickinson's motion for making Executive removable by Nat^l Legislature at request of majority of State Legislatures was also rejected all the States being in the negative Except Delaware which gave an affirmative vote.
The Question for making y^e Executive ineligible after seven years, was next taken and agreed to: Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. P^a div^d.
Del. ay. Mary^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.[60]
[60] In printed Journal Geo. ay.--Madison's Note.
M^r Williamson 2^{ded} by M^r Davie[61] moved to add to the last clause, the words--"and to be removable on impeachment & conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty"--which was agreed to.
[61] "Mr. Davey is a Lawyer of some eminence in his State. He is
said to have a good classical education, and is a Gentleman
of considerable literary talents. He was silent in the
Convention, but his opinion was always respected. Mr. Davy
is about 30 years of age."--Pierce's Notes, Am. Hist.
Rev., iii., 332.
M^r Rutlidge & M^r C. Pinkney moved that the blank for the n^o of persons in the Executive be filled with the words "one person." He supposed the reasons to be so obvious & conclusive in favor of one that no member would oppose the motion.
M^r Randolph opposed it with great earnestness, declaring that he should not do justice to the Country which sent him if he were silently to suffer the establishm^t of a Unity in the Executive department. He felt an opposition to it which he believed he should continue to feel as long as he lived. He urged 1. that the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy. 2. that a unity was unnecessary a plurality being equally competent to all the objects of the department. 3. that the necessary confidence would never be reposed in a single Magistrate.
4. that the appointments would generally be in favor of some inhabitant near the center of the Community, and consequently the remote parts would not be on an equal footing. He was in favor of three members of the Executive to be drawn from different portions of the country.
M^r Butler contended strongly for a single magistrate as most likely to answer the purpose of the remote parts. If one man should be appointed he would be responsible to the whole, and would be impartial to its interests. If three or more should be taken from as many districts, there would be a constant struggle for local advantages. In Military matters this would be particularly mischievous. He said his opinion on this point had been formed under the opportunity he had had of seeing the manner in which a plurality of military heads distracted Holland when threatened with invasion by the imperial troops.
One man was for directing the force to the defence of this part, another to that part of the Country, just as he happened to be swayed by prejudice or interest.
The motion was then postp^d, the Committee rose & the House Adj^d.
MONDAY JUNE 4. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
The Question was resumed on motion of M^r Pinkney, 2^{ded} by M^r Wilson, "shall the blank for the number of the Executive be filled with a single person?"
M^r Wilson was in favor of the motion. It had been opposed by the gentleman from Virg^a (Mr. Randolph) but the arguments used had not convinced him. He observed that the objections of M^r R. were levelled not so much ag^st the measure itself, as ag^{st} its unpopularity. If he could suppose that it would occasion a rejection of the plan of which it should form a part, though the part were an important one, yet he would give it up rather than lose the whole. On examination he could see no evidence of the alledged antipathy of the people.
On the contrary he was persuaded that it does not exist. All know that a single magistrate is not a King. One fact has great weight with him. All the 13 States tho agreeing in scarce any other instance, agree in placing a single magistrate at the head of the Govern^t. The idea of three heads has taken place in none. The degree of power is indeed different; but there are no co-ordinate heads. In addition to his former reasons for preferring a Unity, he would mention another.
The tranquillity not less than the vigor of the Gov^t he thought would be favored by it.
Among three equal members, he foresaw nothing but uncontrouled, continued, & violent animosities; which would not only interrupt the public administration; but diffuse their poison thro' the other branches of Gov^t, thro' the States, and at length thro' the people at large. If the members were to be unequal in power the principle of opposition to the Unity was given up. If equal, the making them an odd number would not be a remedy. In Courts of Justice there are two sides only to a question. In the Legislative & Executive departm^{ts} questions have commonly many sides. Each member therefore might espouse a separate one & no two agree.[62]
[62] According to Pierce, King followed Wilson:
"Mr. King was of opinion that the Judicial ought not to join
in the negative of a Law, because the Judges will have the
expounding of those Laws when they come before them; and
they will no doubt stop the operation of such as shall
appear repugnant to the Constitution."--Pierce's Notes, Am.
Hist. Rev., iii., 322.
M^r Sherman. This matter is of great importance and ought to be well considered before it is determined. M^r Wilson he said had observed that in each State a single magistrate was placed at the head of the Gov^t.
It was so he admitted, and properly so, and he wished the same policy to prevail in the federal Gov^t. But then it should be also remarked that in all the States there was a Council of advice, without which the first magistrate could not act. A council he thought necessary to make the establishment acceptable to the people. Even in G. B. the King has a Council; and though he appoints it himself, its advice has its weight with him, and attracts the Confidence of the people.
M^r Williamson asks M^r Wilson whether he means to annex a Council.
M^r Wilson means to have no Council, which oftener serves to cover, than prevent malpractices.
M^r Gerry was at a loss to discover the policy of three members for the Executive. It w^d be extremely inconvenient in many instances, particularly in military matters, whether relating to the militia, an army, or a navy. It would be a general with three heads.
On the question for a single Executive it was agreed to Mass^{ts} ay.
Con^t ay. N. Y. no. Pen^a ay. Del. no. Mary^d no. Virg^a ay. (M^r R. & M^r Blair no--Doc^r McC^g M^r M. & Gen. W. ay. Col. Mason being no, but not in the house, M^r Wythe ay. but gone home). N. C. ay. S. C. ay.
Georg^a ay.
First Clause of Proposition 8^{th} relating to a Council of Revision taken into consideration.
M^r Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of it, as they will have a sufficient check ag^{st} encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality. In some States the Judges had actually set aside laws as being ag^{st} the Constitution. This was done too with general approbation. It was quite foreign from the nature of y^e office to make them judges of the policy of public measures.
He moves to postpone the clause in order to propose "that the National Executive shall have a right to negative any Legislative act which shall not be afterwards passed by ---- parts of each branch of the national Legislature."
M^r King seconds the motion, observing that the Judges ought to be able to expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation.
M^r Wilson thinks neither the original proposition nor the amendment goes far enough. If the Legislative Exetv & Judiciary ought to be distinct & independent, The Executive ought to have an absolute negative. Without such a self-defence the Legislature can at any moment sink it into non-existence. He was for varying the proposition in such a manner as to give the Executive & Judiciary jointly an absolute negative.
On the question to postpone in order to take M^r Gerry's proposition into consideration it was agreed to, Mass^s ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay.
P^a ay. Del. no. Mary^d no. Virg^a no. N. C ay. S. C. ay. G^a ay.
Mr. Gerry's proposition being now before Committee, M^r Wilson & M^r Hamilton move that the last part of it (viz. "w^{ch} s^l not be afterw^{ds} passed "unless by ---- parts of each branch of the National legislature") be struck out, so as to give the Executive an absolute negative on the laws. There was no danger they thought of such a power being too much exercised. It was mentioned by Col: Hamilton that the King of G. B. had not exerted his negative since the Revolution.
M^r Gerry sees no necessity for so great a controul over the legislature as the best men in the Community would be comprised in the two branches of it.
Doc^r Franklin, said he was sorry to differ from his colleague for whom he had a very great respect, on any occasion, but he could not help it on this. He had had some experience of this check in the Executive on the Legislature, under the proprietary Government of Pen^a. The negative of the Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law whatever could be passed without a private bargain with him.
An increase of his salary, or some donation, was always made a condition; till at last it became the regular practice, to have orders in his favor on the Treasury, presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might actually receive the former before he should sign the latter.
When the Indians were scalping the western people, and notice of it arrived, the concurrence of the Governor in the means of self-defence could not be got, till it was agreed that his Estate should be exempted from taxation: so that the people were to fight for the security of his property, whilst he was to bear no share of the burden. This was a mischevous sort of check. If the Executive was to have a Council, such a power would be less objectionable. It was true, the King of G.
B. had not, as was said, exerted his negative since the Revolution; but that matter was easily explained. The bribes and emoluments now given to the members of parliament rendered it unnecessary, every thing being done according to the will of the Ministers. He was afraid, if a negative should be given as proposed, that more power and money would be demanded, till at last eno' would be gotten to influence & bribe the Legislature into a compleat subjection to the will of the Executive.
M^r Sherman was ag^{st} enabling any one man to stop the will of the whole. No one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom. He thought we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom in revising the laws, but not permit him to overrule the decided and cool opinions of the Legislature.
M^r Madison supposed that if a proper proportion of each branch should be required to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would answer the same purpose as an absolute negative. It would rarely if ever happen that the Executive constituted as ours is proposed to be, would have firmness eno' to resist the legislature, unless backed by a certain part of the body itself. The King of G. B. with all his splendid attributes would not be able to withstand y^e unanimous and eager wishes of both houses of Parliament. To give such a prerogative would certainly be obnoxious to the temper of this Country; its present temper at least.
M^r Wilson believed as others did that this power would seldom be used.
The Legislature would know that such a power existed, and would refrain from such laws, as it would be sure to defeat. Its silent operation would therefore preserve harmony and prevent mischief. The case of Pen^a formerly was very different from its present case. The Executive was not then as now to be appointed by the people. It will not in this case as in the one cited be supported by the head of a Great Empire, actuated by a different & sometimes opposite interest. The salary too is now proposed to be fixed by the Constitution, or if D^r F.'s idea should be adopted all salary whatever interdicted.
The requiring a large proportion of each House to overrule the Executive check might do in peaceable times; but there might be tempestuous moments in which animosities may run high between the Executive and Legislative branches, and in which the former ought to be able to defend itself.
M^r Butler had been in favor of a single Executive Magistrate; but could he have entertained an idea that a compleat negative on the laws was to be given him he certainly should have acted very differently. It had been observed that in all countries the Executive power is in a constant course of increase. This was certainly the case in G. B. Gentlemen seemed to think that we had nothing to apprehend from an abuse of the Executive power. But why might not a Cataline or a Cromwell arise in this Country as well as in others.
M^r Bedford was opposed to every check on the Legislature, even the Council of Revision first proposed. He thought it would be sufficient to mark out in the Constitution the boundaries to the Legislative Authority, which would give all the requisite security to the rights of the other departments. The Representatives of the people were the best Judges of what was for their interest, and ought to be under no external controul whatever. The two branches would produce a sufficient controul within the Legislature itself.
Col. Mason observed that a vote had already passed he found [he was out at the time] for vesting the executive powers in a single person. Among these powers was that of appointing to offices in certain cases. The probable abuses of a negative had been well explained by D^r F. as proved by experience, the best of all tests. Will not the same door be opened here.
The Executive may refuse its assent to necessary measures till new appointments shall be referred to him; and having by degrees engrossed these into all his own hands, the American Executive, like the British, will by bribery & influence, save himself the trouble & odium of exerting his negative afterwards. We are M^r Chairman going very far in this business. We are not indeed constituting a British Government, but a more dangerous monarchy, an elective one.
We are introducing a new principle into our system, and not necessary as in the British Gov^t where the Executive has greater rights to defend. Do gentlemen mean to pave the way to hereditary Monarchy? Do they flatter themselves that the people will ever consent to such an innovation? If they do I venture to tell them, they are mistaken. The people never will consent. And do gentlemen consider the danger of delay, and the still greater danger of a rejection, not for a moment but forever, of the plan which shall be proposed to them.
Notwithstanding the oppression & injustice experienced among us from democracy; the genius of the people is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted. He could not but consider the federal system as in effect dissolved by the appointment of this Convention to devise a better one. And do gentlemen look forward to the dangerous interval between extinction of an old, and the establishment of a new Governm^t and to the scenes of confusion which may ensue. He hoped that nothing like a Monarchy would ever be attempted in this Country.
A hatred to its oppressions had carried the people through the late Revolution. Will it not be eno' to enable the Executive to suspend offensive laws, till they shall be coolly revised, and the objections to them overruled by a greater majority than was required in the first instance. He never could agree to give up all the rights of the people to a single magistrate: If more than one had been fixed on, greater powers might have been entrusted to the Executive.
He hoped this attempt to give such powers would have its weight hereafter as an argument for increasing the number of the Executive.
Doc^r Franklin. A Gentleman from S. C., (M^r Butler) a day or two ago called our attention to the case of the U. Netherlands. He wished the gentleman had been a little fuller, and had gone back to the original of that Gov^t. The people being under great obligations to the Prince of Orange whose wisdom and bravery had saved them, chose him for the Stadtholder. He did very well. Inconveniences however were felt from his powers; which growing more & more oppressive, they were at length set aside.
Still however there was a party for the P. of Orange, which descended to his son who excited insurrections, spilt a great deal of blood, murdered the de Witts, and got the powers revested in the Stadtholder. Afterwards another Prince had power to excite insurrections & make the Stadtholdership hereditary. And the present Stadth^{der} is ready to wade thro' a bloody civil war to the establishment of a monarchy. Col. Mason had mentioned the circumstance of appointing officers. He knew how that point would be managed.
No new appointment would be suffered as heretofore in Pens^a unless it be referred to the Executive; so that all profitable offices will be at his disposal. The first man put at the helm will be a good one. No body knows what sort may come afterwards. The Executive will be always increasing here, as elsewhere, till it ends in a Monarchy.
On the question for striking out so as to give Executive an absolute negative,--Mass^{ts} no. Con^t no. N. Y. no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg^a no.
M^r Butler moved that the Resol^n be altered so as to read--"Resolved that the National Executive have a power to suspend any Legislative act for the term of ----."
Doct^r Franklin seconds the motion.
M^r Gerry observed that a power of suspending might do all the mischief dreaded from the negative of useful laws; without answering the salutary purpose of checking unjust or unwise ones.
On question "for giving this suspending power" all the States, to wit Mass^{ts} Con^t N. Y. P^a Del. Mary^d Virg^a N. C. S. C. Georgia, were No.
On a question for enabling two thirds of each branch of the Legislature to overrule the revisionary check, it passed in the affirmative sub silentio; and was inserted in the blank of M^r Gerry's motion.
On the question on M^r Gerry's motion which gave the Executive alone without the Judiciary the revisionary controul on the laws unless overruled by 2/3 of each branch; Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay.
P^a ay. Del. ay. Mary^d no. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
It was moved by M^r Wilson 2^{ded} by M^r Madison--that the following amendment be made to the last resolution--after the words "National Ex." to add "& a convenient number of the National Judiciary."[63]
[63] Before the motion, according to King's notes:
"Madison--The judiciary ought to be introduced in the
business of Legislation--they will protect their department,
and united with the Executive make its negatives more
strong.
There is weight in the objections to this
measure--but a check on the Legislature is necessary,
Experience proves it to be so, and teaches us that what has
been thought a calumny on a republican Govt. is nevertheless
true--In all Countries are diversity of Interests, the Rich
& the Poor, the Dr. & Cr., the followers of different
Demagogues, the Diversity of religious Sects--the Effects of
these Divisions in Ancient Govts. are well known, and the
like causes will now produce like effects.
We must therefore
introduce in our system Provisions against the measures of
an interested majority--a check is not only necessary to
protect the Executive power, but the minority in the
Legislature. The independence of the Executive, having the
Eyes of all upon him will make him an impartial judge--add
the Judiciary, and you greatly increase his respectability."
After the motion: "Dickinson opposed--You shd. separate the
Departments--you have given the Executive a share in
Legislation; and it is asked why not give a share to the
judicial power. Because the Judges are to interpret the
Laws, and therefore shd. have no share in making them--not
so with the Executive whose causing the Laws to be Executed
is a ministerial office only. Besides we have experienced in
the Br. Constitution which confers the Power of a negative
on the Executive."--King's Life and Correspondence of Rufus
King, i., 592.
An Objection of order being taken by M^r Hamilton to the introduction of the last amendment at this time, notice was given by M^r W. & M^r M., that the same w^d be moved to-morrow,--whereupon Wednesday (the day after) was assigned to reconsider the amendment of M^r Gerry.
It was then moved & 2^{ded} to proceed to the consideration of the 9^{th} resolution submitted by M^r Randolph--when on motion to agree to the first clause namely "Resolved, that a National Judiciary be established," It passed in the affirmative nem. con.
It was then moved & 2^{ded} to add these words to the first clause of the ninth resolution namely--"to consist of one supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals," which passed in the affirmative.
The Comm^e then rose and the House
Adjourned.
TUESDAY JUNE 5. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
Governor Livingston from New Jersey, took his seat.
The words, "one or more" were struck out before "inferior tribunals" as an amendment to the last clause of Resol^n 9^{th}. The Clause--"that the National Judiciary be chosen by the National Legislature," being under consideration.
M^r Wilson opposed the appointm^t of Judges by the National Legisl:
Experience shewed the impropriety of such appointm^{ts} by numerous bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the necessary consequences. A principal reason for unity in the Executive was that officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person.
M^r Rutlidge was by no means disposed to grant so great a power to any single person. The people will think we are leaning too much towards Monarchy. He was against establishing any national tribunal except a single supreme one. The State tribunals are most proper to decide in all cases in the first instance.
Doc^r Franklin observed that two modes of chusing the Judges had been mentioned, to wit, by the Legislature and by the Executive. He wished such other modes to be suggested as might occur to other gentlemen; it being a point of great moment. He would mention one which he had understood was practised in Scotland. He then in a brief and entertaining manner related a Scotch mode, in which the nomination proceeded from the Lawyers, who always selected the ablest of the profession in order to get rid of him, and share his practice among themselves. It was here he said the interest of the electors to make the best choice, which should always be made the case if possible.
Mr. Madison disliked the election of the Judges by the Legislature or any numerous body. Besides the danger of intrigue and partiality, many of the members were not judges of the requisite qualifications. The Legislative talents which were very different from those of a Judge, commonly recommended men to the favor of Legislative Assemblies. It was known too that the accidental circumstances of presence and absence, of being a member or not a member, had a very undue influence on the appointment.
On the other hand He was not satisfied with referring the appointment to the Executive, He rather inclined to give it to the Senatorial branch, as numerous eno' to be confided in--as not so numerous as to be governed by the motives of the other branch; and as being sufficiently stable and independent to follow their deliberate judgments. He hinted this only and moved that the appointment by the Legislature might be struck out, & a blank left to be hereafter filled on maturer reflection. M^r Wilson second it.
On the question for striking out, Mass^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pen^a ay.
Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
Mr. Wilson gave notice that he should at a future day move for a reconsideration of that clause which respects "inferior tribunals."
M^r Pinkney gave notice that when the clause respecting the appointment of the Judiciary should again come before the Committee he should move to restore the "appointment by the national Legislature."
The following clauses of Resol: 9. were agreed to viz "to hold their offices during good behaviour, and to receive punctually at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution."
The remaining clause of Resolution 9. was postponed.
Resolution 10 was agreed to,--viz--that provision ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the U.
States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government & territory, or otherwise with the consent of a number of voices in the National Legislature less than the whole.
The 11. Propos: "for guaranteeing to States Republican Gov^t & territory" &c. being read M^r Patterson[64] wished the point of representation could be decided before this clause should be considered, and moved to postpone it, which was not opposed, and agreed to,--Connecticut & S. Carolina only voting ag^{st} it.
[64] "M^r Patterson is one of those kind of Men whose powers
break in upon you, and create wonder and astonishment. He is
a Man of great modesty, with looks that bespeak talents of
no great extent,--but he is a Classic, a Lawyer, and an
Orator;--and of a disposition so favorable to his
advancement that every one seemed ready to exalt him with
their praises. He is very happy in the choice of time and
manner of engaging in a debate, and never speaks but when he
understands his subject well.
This Gentleman is about 43 Y.
of age, of a very low stature."--Pierce's Notes, Amer.
Hist. Rev., iii., 328.
Propos. 12 "for continuing Cong^s till a given day and for fulfilling their engagements," produced no debate.
On the question, Mass. ay. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J.[65] ay. Pa.
ay. Del. no. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. G. ay.
[65] Note in Madison's writing: New Jersey omitted in
printed Journal.
Propos: 13. "that provision ought to be made for hereafter amending the system now to be established, without requiring the assent of the Nat^l Legislature", being taken up,
M^r Pinkney doubted the propriety or necessity of it.
M^r Gerry favored it. The novelty & difficulty of the experiment requires periodical revision. The prospect of such a revision would also give intermediate stability to the Gov^t. Nothing had yet happened in the States where this provision existed to prove its impropriety.--The proposition was postponed for further consideration: the votes being, Mas: Con. N. Y. P^a Del. Ma. N. C. ay. Virg^a S. C. Geo. no.
Propos. 14. "requiring oath from the State officers to support National Gov^t" was postponed after a short uninteresting conversation: the votes.
Con. N. Jersey M^d Virg. S. C. Geo. ay. N. Y. P^a Del. N. C. no.
Massachusetts divided.
Propos. 15. for "recommending Conventions under appointment of the people to ratify the new Constitution" &c. being taken up,
M^r Sherman thought such a popular ratification unnecessary: the articles of Confederation providing for changes and alterations with the assent of Cong^s and ratification of State Legislatures.
M^r Madison thought this provision essential. The articles of Confed^n themselves were defective in this respect, resting in many of the States on the Legislative sanction only. Hence in conflicts between acts of the States, and of Cong^s especially where the former are of posterior date, and the decision is to be made by State tribunals, an uncertainty must necessarily prevail, or rather perhaps a certain decision in favor of the State authority.
He suggested also that as far as the articles of Union were to be considered as a Treaty only of a particular sort, among the Governments of Independent States, the doctrine might be set up that a breach of any one article, by any of the parties, absolved the other parties from the whole obligation. For these reasons as well as others he thought it indispensable that the new Constitution should be ratified in the most unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people themselves.
M^r Gerry observed that in the Eastern States the Confed^n had been sanctioned by the people themselves. He seemed afraid of referring the new system to them. The people in that quarter have at this time the wildest ideas of Government in the world. They were for abolishing the Senate in Mass^{ts} and giving all the other powers of Gov^t to the other branch of the Legislature.
M^r King supposed that the last article of y^e Confed^n Rendered the legislature competent to the ratification. The people of the Southern States where the federal articles had been ratified by the Legislatures only, had since impliedly given their sanction to it. He thought notwithstanding that there might be policy in varying the mode. A Convention being a single house, the adoption may more easily be carried thro' it, than thro' the Legislatures where there are several branches.
The Legislatures also being to lose power, will be most likely to raise objections. The people having already parted with the necessary powers it is immaterial to them, by which Government they are possessed, provided they be well employed.
M^r Wilson took this occasion to lead the Committee by a train of observations to the idea of not suffering a disposition in the plurality of States to confederate anew on better principles, to be defeated by the inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few States. He hoped the provision for ratifying would be put on such a footing as to admit of such a partial union, with a door open for the accession of the rest.[66]
[66] (This hint was probably meant in terrorem to the smaller
States of N. Jersey & Delaware. Nothing was said in reply to
it.)--Madison's Note.
M^r Pinkney hoped that in case the experiment should not unanimously take place, nine States might be authorized to unite under the same Governm^t.
The propos. 15. was postponed nem. con^t.
M^r Pinkney & M^r Rutlidge moved that to-morrow be assigned to reconsider that clause of Propos: 4: which respects the election of the first branch of the National Legislature--which passed in affirmative,--Con.: N. Y., P^a Del. M^d, V^a, ay.--6 Mas.: N. J.: N. C.:
S. C.: Geo.: no. 5.
Mr. Rutlidge hav^g obtained a rule for reconsideration of the clause for establishing inferior tribunals under the national authority, now moved that that part of the clause in the propos. 9. should be expunged: arguing that the State tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgm^{ts}: that it was making an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction of the States and creating unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the new system. Mr. Sherman 2^{ded} the motion.
M^r Madison observed that unless inferior tribunals were dispersed throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in many cases, appeals would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that besides, an appeal would not in many cases be a remedy. What was to be done after improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under the biassed directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an undirected jury? To remand the cause for a new trial would answer no purpose. To order a new trial at the Supreme bar would oblige the parties to bring up their witnesses, tho' ever so distant from the seat of the Court.
An effective Judiciary establishment commensurate to the legislative authority, was essential. A Government without a proper Executive & Judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body, without arms or legs to act or move.
M^r Wilson opposed the motion on like grounds. He said the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to the national Government, as it related to cases not within the jurisdiction of particular states, & to a scene in which controversies with foreigners would be most likely to happen.
M^r Sherman was in favor of the motion. He dwelt chiefly on the supposed expensiveness of having a new set of Courts, when the existing State Courts would answer the same purpose.
M^r Dickinson contended strongly that if there was to be a National Legislature, there ought to be a national Judiciary, and that the former ought to have authority to institute the latter.
On the question for M^r Rutlidge's motion to strike out "inferior tribunals"
Mass^{ts} divided. Con^t ay. N. Y. div^d. N. J. ay. P^a no.
Del. no. M^d no. V^a no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Wilson & M^r Madison then moved, in pursuance of the idea expressed above by Mr. Dickinson, to add to the Resol: 9. the words following "that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals." They observed that there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not establish them. They repeated the necessity of some such provision.
M^r Butler. The people will not bear such innovations. The States will revolt at such encroachments. Supposing such an establishment to be useful, we must not venture on it. We must follow the example of Solon who gave the Athenians not the best Gov^t he could devise, but the best they w^d receive.
M^r King remarked as to the comparative expence, that the establishment of inferior tribunals w^d cost infinitely less than the appeals that would be prevented by them.
On this question as moved by M^r W. & M^r M.
Mass. ay. C^t no. N. Y. div^d. N. J.[67] ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
[67] In printed Journals N. Jersey, no.--Madison's Note.
The Committee then rose & the House adjourned to 11 OC tom^w.
WEDNESDAY JUNE 6^{TH} IN COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE.
M^r Pinkney according to previous notice & rule obtained, moved "that the first branch of the national Legislature be elected by the State Legislatures, and not by the people;" contending that the people were less fit Judges in such a case, and that the Legislatures would be less likely to promote the adoption of the new Government, if they were to be excluded from all share in it.
M^r Rutlidge 2^{ded} the motion.
M^r Gerry.[68] Much depends on the mode of election. In England the people will probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the proportion having a right of suffrage. Our danger arises from the opposite extreme: hence in Mass^{ts} the worst men get into the Legislature. Several members of that Body had lately been convicted of infamous crimes. Men of indigence, ignorance & baseness, spare no pains, however dirty to carry their point ag^{st} men who are superior to the artifices practised. He was not disposed to run into extremes.
He was as much principled as ever ag^{st} aristocracy and monarchy. It was necessary on the one hand that the people should appoint one branch of the Gov^t in order to inspire them with the necessary confidence. But he wished the election on the other to be so modified as to secure more effectually a just preference of merit. His idea was that the people should nominate certain persons in certain districts, out of whom the State Legislatures sh^d make the appointment.
[68] "Mr. Gerry.--If the national legislature are appointed by
the state legislatures, demagogues and corrupt members will
creep in."--Yates's Secret Debates in Forming the
Constitution, 105.
M^r Wilson. He wished for vigor in the Gov^t, but he wished that vigorous authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority. The Gov^t ought to possess not only 1^{st} the force, but 2^{dly} the mind or sense of the people at large. The Legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole Society.
Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively. The opposition was to be expected he said from the Governments, not from the Citizens of the States. The latter had parted as was observed (by M^r King) with all the necessary powers; and it was immaterial to them, by whom they were exercised, if well exercised. The State officers were to be the losers of power. The people he supposed would be rather more attached to the national Gov^t than to the State Gov^{ts} as being more important in itself, and more flattering to their pride. There is no danger of improper elections if made by large districts.
Bad elections proceed from the smallness of the districts which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office.
M^r Sherman. If it were in view to abolish the State Gov^{ts} the elections ought to be by the people. If the State Gov^{ts} are to be continued, it is necessary in order to preserve harmony between the National & State Gov^{ts} that the elections to the former sh^d be made by the latter. The right of participating in the National Gov^t would be sufficiently secured to the people by their election of the State Legislatures.
The objects of the Union, he thought were few, 1. defence ag^{st} foreign danger, 2. ag^{st} internal disputes & a resort to force, 3. Treaties with foreign nations 4. regulating foreign commerce, & drawing revenue from it. These & perhaps a few lesser objects alone rendered a Confederation of the States necessary. All other matters civil & criminal would be much better in the hands of the States. The people are more happy in small than in large States. States may indeed be too small as Rhode Island, & thereby be too subject to faction.
Some others were perhaps too large, the powers of Gov^t not being able to pervade them. He was for giving the General Gov^t power to legislate and execute within a defined province.
Col. Mason. Under the existing Confederacy, Cong^s represent the States and not the people of the States: their acts operate on the States, not on the individuals. The case will be changed in the new plan of Gov^t. The people will be represented; they ought therefore to choose the Representatives. The requisites in actual representation are that the Rep^s should sympathize with their constituents; sh^d think as they think, & feel as they feel; and that for these purposes sh^d even be residents among them.
Much he s^d had been alledged ag^{st} democratic elections. He admitted that much might be said; but it was to be considered that no Gov^t was free from imperfections & evils; and that improper elections in many instances were inseparable from Republican Gov^{ts}. But compare these with the advantage of this Form in favor of the rights of the people, in favor of human nature. He was persuaded there was a better chance for proper elections by the people, if divided into large districts, than by the State Legislatures.
Paper money had been issued by the latter when the former were against it. Was it to be supposed that the State Legislatures then w^d not send to the Nat^l legislature patrons of such projects, if the choice depended on them.
M^r Madison considered an election of one branch at least of the Legislature by the people immediately, as a clear principle of free Gov^t and that this mode under proper regulations had the additional advantage of securing better representatives, as well as of avoiding too great an agency of the State Governments in the General one. He differed from the member from Connecticut (Mr. Sherman) in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the principal ones that required a National Gov^t.
Those were certainly important and necessary objects; but he combined with them the necessity of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these were evils which had more perhaps than anything else, produced this convention. Was it to be supposed that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of it practised in some of the States.
The gentleman (M^r Sherman) had admitted that in a very small State, faction & oppression w^d prevail. It was to be inferred then that wherever these prevailed the State was too small. Had they not prevailed in the largest as well as the smallest tho' less than in the smallest; and were we not thence admonished to enlarge the sphere as far as the nature of the Gov^t would Admit. This was the only defence ag^{st} the inconveniences of democracy consistent with the democratic form of Gov^t.
All civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects, Factions, & interests, as they happened to consist of rich & poor, debtors & creditors, the landed, the manufacturing, the commercial interests, the inhabitants of this district or that district, the followers of this political leader or that political leader--the disciples of this religious Sect or that religious Sect. In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger. What motives are to restrain them?
A prudent regard to the maxi
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Front matter as received (title page, contents)
The Journal of the
Debates in the Convention
Which Framed
The Constitution of the
United States
May-September, 1787
As Recorded by
James Madison
Edited by
Gaillard Hunt
In Two Volumes
Volume I.
G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York and London
The Knickerbocker Press
1908
The Knickerbocker Press, New York
[Illustration]
CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.
PAGE
The Records of the Constitutional Convention (Introduction
by the Editor) vii
Chronology xix
Journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 1
[Illustration]
[Illustration]
LIST OF FAC-SIMILES.
FACING
PAGE
First Page of Madison's Journal, actual size 2
Charles Pinckney's Letter 20Header as received
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Title: The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 1
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James Madison
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