Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
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Title: Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
Author: George Grote
Release date: August 7, 2012 [eBook #40438]
Most recently updated: October 23, 2024
Language: English
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Credits: Produced by Ed Brandon as part of the on-line Grote Project
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLATO AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES, 3RD ED. VOLUME 4 ***
PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
PLATO,
AND THE
OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
BY
GEORGE GROTE
AUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'.
_A NEW EDITION._
IN FOUR VOLUMES.
VOL. IV.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1888.
_The right of Translation is reserved._
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXXV.
PLATONIC REPUBLIC--ABSTRACT.
Declared theme of the Republic--Expansion and multiplication of
the topics connected with it 1
Personages of the dialogue 2
Views of Kephalus about old age _ib._
Definition of Justice by Simonides--It consists in rendering to
every man what is owing to him _ib._
Objections to it by Sokrates--There are cases in which it is not
right to restore what is owing, or to tell the truth 3
Explanation by Polemarchus--Farther interrogations by
Sokrates--Justice renders what is proper and suitable: but how?
in what cases, proper? Under what circumstances is Justice useful? 4
The just man, being good for keeping property guarded, must also
be good for stealing property--Analogies cited 5
Justice consists in doing good to friends, evil to enemies--But
how, if a man mistakes who his friends are, and makes friends of
bad men? 6
Justice consists in doing good to your friend, if really a good
man: hurt to your enemy, with the like proviso. Sokrates affirms
that the just man will do no hurt to any one. Definition of
Simonides rejected _ib._
Thrasymachus takes up the dialogue--Repulsive portrait drawn of
him 7
Violence of Thrasymachus--Subdued manner of Sokrates--Conditions
of useful colloquy _ib._
Definition given by Thrasymachus--Justice is that which is
advantageous to the more powerful. Comments by Sokrates. What if
the powerful man mistakes his own advantage? 8
Correction by Thrasymachus--if the Ruler mistakes, he is _pro
tanto_ no Ruler--The Ruler, _quâ_ Ruler--_quâ_
Craftsman--is infallible 9
Reply by Sokrates--The Ruler, _quâ_ infallible Craftsman,
studies the interest of those whom he governs, and not his own
interest _ib._
Thrasymachus denies this--Justice is the good of another. The just
many are worse off than the unjust One, and are forced to submit
to his superior strength 10
Position laid for the subsequent debate and exposition 11
Arguments of Sokrates--Injustice is a source of weakness--Every
multitude must observe justice among themselves, in order to avoid
perpetual quarrels. The same about any single individual: if he is
unjust, he will be at war with himself, and perpetually weak
_ib._
Farther argument of Sokrates--The just man is happy, the unjust
man miserable--Thrasymachus is confuted and silenced. Sokrates
complains that he does not yet know what Justice is _ib._
Glaukon intimates that he is not satisfied with the proof, though
he agrees in the opinion expressed by Sokrates. Tripartite
distribution of Good--To which of the three heads does Justice
belong? 12
Glaukon undertakes to set forth the case against Sokrates, though
professing not to agree with it _ib._
Pleading of Glaukon. Justice is in the nature of a compromise for
all--a medium between what is best and what is worst 13
Comparison of the happiness of the just man derived from his
justice alone, when others are unjust to him with that of the
unjust man under parallel circumstances 14
Pleading of Adeimantus on the same side. He cites advice given by
fathers to their sons, recommending just behaviour by reason of
its consequences 15
Nobody recommends Justice _per se_, but only by reason of its
consequences 16
Adeimantus calls upon Sokrates to recommend and enforce Justice on
its own grounds, and to explain how Justice in itself benefits the
mind of the just man 17
Relation of Glaukon and Adeimantus to Thrasymachus 18
Statement of the question as it stands after the speeches of
Glaukon and Adeimantus. What Sokrates undertakes to prove
_ib._
Position to be proved by Sokrates--Justice makes the just man
happy _per se_, whatever be its results 20
Argument of Sokrates to show what Justice is--Assumed analogy
between the city and the individual _ib._
Fundamental principle, to which communities of mankind owe their
origin--Reciprocity of want and service between individuals--No
individual can suffice to himself _ib._
Moderate equipment of a sound and healthy city--Few wants 22
Enlargement of the city--Multiplied wants and services. First
origin of war and strife with neighbours--It arises out of these
multiplied wants _ib._
Separate class of soldiers or Guardians. One man cannot do well
more than one business. Character required in the
Guardians--Mildness at home with pugnacity against enemies 23
Peculiar education necessary, musical as well as gymnastical 23
Musical education, by fictions as well as by truth. Fictions
addressed to the young: the religious legends now circulating are
often pernicious: censorship necessary 24
Orthodox type to be laid down: all poets are required to conform
their legends to it. The Gods are causes of nothing but good:
therefore they are causes of few things. Great preponderance of
actual evil _ib._
The Guardians must not fear death. No terrible descriptions of
Hades must be presented to them: no intense sorrow, nor violent
nor sensual passion, must be recounted either of Gods or Heroes
25
Type for all narratives respecting men 26
Style of narratives. The poet must not practise variety of
imitation: he must not speak in the name of bad characters
_ib._
Rhythm and Melody regulated. None but simple and grave music
allowed: only the Dorian and Phrygian moods, with the lyre and
harp _ib._
Effect of musical training of the mind--makes youth love the
Beautiful and hate the Ugly 27
Training of the body--simple and sober. No refined medical art
allowed. Wounds or temporary ailments treated; but sickly frames
cannot be kept alive 28
Value of Gymnastic in imparting courage to the mind--Gymnastic and
Music necessary to correct each other 29
Out of the Guardians a few of the very best must be chosen as
Elders or Rulers--highly educated and severely tested _ib._
Fundamental creed required to be planted in the minds of all the
citizens respecting their breed and relationship 30
How is such a fiction to be accredited in the first instance?
Difficulty extreme, of first beginning; but if once accredited, it
will easily transmit itself by tradition 31
Guardians to reside in barracks and mess together; to have no
private property or home; to be maintained by contribution from
the people 32
If the Guardians fail in these precautions, and acquire
private interests, the city will be ruined 32
Complete unity of the city, every man performing his own special
function 33
The maintenance of the city depends upon that of the habits,
character, and education of the Guardians 34
Religious legislation--Consult the Delphian Apollo _ib._
The city is now constituted as a good city--that is, wise,
courageous, temperate, just. Where is its Justice? _ib._
First, where is the wisdom of the city? It resides in the few
elder Rulers _ib._
Where is the Courage? In the body of Guardians or Soldiers 35
Where is the Temperance? It resides in all and each, Rulers,
Guardians, and People. Superiors rule and Inferiors obey
_ib._
Where is the Justice? In all and each of them also. It consists in
each performing his own special function, and not meddling with
the function of the others 36
Injustice arises when any one part of the city interferes with the
functions of the other part, or undertakes double functions 37
Analogy of the city to the individual--Each man is tripartite,
having in his mind Reason, Energy, Appetite. These three elements
are distinct, and often conflicting _ib._
Reason, Energy, Appetite, in the individual--analogous to Rulers,
Guardians, Craftsmen in the city. Reason is to rule Appetite.
Energy assists Reason in ruling it 39
A man is just when these different parts of his mind exercise
their appropriate functions without hindrance _ib._
Justice and Injustice in the mind--what health and disease are in
the body 40
Original question now resumed--Does Justice make a man happy, and
Injustice make him miserable, apart from all consequences?
Answer--Yes _ib._
Glaukon requires farther explanation about the condition of the
Guardians, in regard to sexual and family ties 41
Men and women will live together and perform the duties of
Guardians alike--They will receive the same gymnastic and musical
training 41
Nature does not prescribe any distribution of functions between
men and women. Women are inferior to men in every thing. The best
women are equal to second-best men 42
Community of life and relations between the male and female
Guardians. Temporary marriages arranged by contrivance of the
Elders. No separate families _ib._
Regulations about age, for procreation--Children brought up under
public authority 44
Perfect communion of sentiment and interest among the
Guardians--Causes of pleasure and pain the same to all, like parts
of the same organism _ib._
Harmony--absence of conflicting interest--assured scale of equal
comfort--consequent happiness--among the Guardians 45
In case of war both sexes will go together to battle--Rewards to
distinguished warriors 46
War against Hellenic enemies to be carried on mildly--Hellens are
all by nature kinsmen 47
Question--How is the scheme practicable? It is difficult, yet
practicable on one condition--That philosophy and political power
should come into the same hands _ib._
Characteristic marks of the philosopher--He contemplates and knows
Entia or unchangeable Forms, as distinguished from fluctuating
particulars or Fientia 48
Ens alone can be known--Non-Ens is unknowable. That which is
midway between Ens and Non-Ens (particulars) is matter only of
opinion. Ordinary men attain nothing beyond opinion 49
Particulars fluctuate: they are sometimes just or beautiful,
sometimes unjust or ugly. Forms or Entia alone remain constant
50
The many cannot discern or admit the reality of Forms--Their minds
are always fluctuating among particulars 51
The philosopher will be ardent for all varieties of knowledge--His
excellent moral attributes--He will be trained to capacity for
active life _ib._
Adeimantus does not dispute the conclusion, but remarks that it is
at variance with actual facts--Existing philosophers are either
worthless pretenders, or when they are good, useless 52
Sokrates admits the fact to be so--His simile of the able
steersman on shipboard, among a disobedient crew 53
The uselessness of the true philosopher is the fault of the
citizen, who will not invoke his guidance 54
The great qualities required to form a philosopher, become sources
of perversion, under a misguiding public opinion _ib._
Mistake of supposing that such perversion arises from the
Sophists. Irresistible effect of the public opinion generally, in
tempting or forcing a dissenter into orthodoxy 55
The Sophists and other private teachers accept the prevalent
orthodoxy, and conform their teaching to it 56
The people generally hate philosophy--A youth who aspires to it
will be hated by the people, and persecuted even by his own
relatives 57
The really great minds are thus driven away from the path of
philosophy--which is left to empty pretenders 58
Rare cases in which a highly qualified philosopher remains--Being
at variance with public opinion, he can achieve nothing, and is
lucky if he can obtain safety by silence _ib._
The philosopher must have a community suitable to him, and worthy
of him 59
It must be such a community as Sokrates has been describing--But
means must be taken to keep up a perpetual succession of
philosophers as Rulers 60
Proper manner of teaching philosophy--Not to begin at a very early
age _ib._
If the multitude could once see a real, perfect, philosopher, they
could not fail to love him: but this never happens 61
Course of training in the Platonic city, for imparting philosophy
to the Rulers. They must be taught to ascend to the Idea of Good.
But what is Good? _ib._
Ancient disputes upon this point, though every one yearns after
Good. Some say Intelligence; some say Pleasure. Neither is
satisfactory 62
Adeimantus asks what Sokrates says. Sokrates says that he can not
answer: but he compares it by a metaphor to the Sun 63
The Idea of Good rules the ideal or intelligible world, as the Sun
rules the sensible or visible world 64
To the intelligible world there are applicable two distinct modes
of procedure--the Geometrical--the Dialectic. Geometrical
procedure assumes diagrams 65
Dialectic procedure assumes nothing. It departs from the highest
Form, and steps gradually down to the lowest, without meddling
with any thing except Forms 66
Two distinct grades of Cognition--Direct or
Superior--Nous--Indirect or Inferior--Dianoia _ib._
Two distinct grades of Opinion also in the Sensible World--Faith
or Belief--Conjecture 67
Distinction between the philosopher and the unphilosophical
public, illustrated by the simile of the Cave, and the captives
imprisoned therein _ib._
Daylight of philosophy contrasted with the firelight and shadows
of the Cave 69
Purpose of a philosophical training, to turn a man round from
facing the bad light of the Cave to face the daylight of
philosophy, and to see the eternal Forms _ib._
Those who have emerged from the Cave into full daylight amidst
eternal Forms, must be forced to come down again and undertake
active duties--Their reluctance to do this 70
Studies serving as introduction to philosophy--Arithmetic, its
awakening power--shock to the mind by felt contradiction
_ib._
Perplexity arising from the One and Many, stimulates the mind to
an intellectual effort for clearing it up 72
Geometry conducts the mind to wards Universal Ens _ib._
Astronomy--how useful--not useful as now taught--must be studied
by ideal figures, not by observation 73
Acoustics, in like manner--The student will be thus conducted
to the highest of all studies--Dialectic: and to the region of
pure intelligible Forms 74
Question by Glaukon--What is the Dialectic Power? Sokrates
declares that he cannot answer with certainty, and that Glaukon
could not follow him if he did 75
He answers partially--It is the consummation of all the sciences,
raising the student to the contemplation of pure Forms, and
especially to that of the highest Form--_Good_ _ib._
The Synoptic view peculiar to the Dialectician 76
Scale and duration of various studies for the Guardians, from
youth upwards _ib._
All these studies, and this education, are common to females as
well as males 77
First formation of the Platonic city--how brought about:
difficult, but not impossible 78
The city thus formed will last long, but not for ever. After a
certain time, it will begin to degenerate. Stages of its
degeneracy _ib._
1. Timocracy and the timocratical individual. 2 Oligarchy, and the
oligarchical individual 79
3. Democracy, and the democratical individual 80
4. Passage from democracy to despotism. Character of the despotic
city 81
Despotic individual corresponding to that city 82
The city has thus passed by four stages, from best to worse.
Question--How are Happiness and Misery apportioned among them?
_ib._
Misery of the despotised city 83
Supreme Misery of the despotising individual _ib._
Conclusion--The Model city and the individual corresponding to it,
are the happiest of all--That which is farthest removed from it,
is the most miserable of all 84
The Just Man is happy in and through his Justice, however he may
be treated by others. The Unjust Man, miserable 84
Other arguments proving the same conclusion--Pleasures of
Intelligence are the best of all pleasures _ib._
They are the only pleasures completely true and pure. Comparison
of pleasure and pain with neutrality. Prevalent illusions 86
Most men know nothing of true and pure pleasure. Simile of the
Kosmos--Absolute height and depth 87
Nourishment of the mind partakes more of real essence than
nourishment of the body--Replenishment of the mind imparts fuller
pleasure than replenishment of the body 88
Comparative worthlessness of the pleasures of Appetite and
Ambition, when measured against those of Intelligence 89
The Just Man will be happy from his justice--He will look only to
the good order of his own mind--He will stand aloof from public
affairs, in cities as now constituted 90
Tenth Book--Censure of the poets is renewed--Mischiefs of
imitation generally, as deceptive--Imitation from imitation 91
Censure of Homer--He is falsely extolled as educator of the
Hellenic world. He and other poets only deceive their hearers 92
The poet chiefly appeals to emotions--Mischiefs of such eloquent
appeals, as disturbing the rational government of the mind
_ib._
Ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry--Plato fights for
philosophy, though his feelings are strongly enlisted for poetry
93
Immortality of the soul affirmed and sustained by argument--Total
number of souls always the same _ib._
Recapitulation--The Just Man will be happy, both from his justice
and from its consequences, both here and hereafter 94
CHAPTER XXXVI.
REPUBLIC--REMARKS ON ITS MAIN THESIS.
Summary of the preceding chapter 95
Title of the Republic, of ancient date, but only a partial
indication of its contents 96
Parallelism between the Commonwealth and the Individual 96
Each of them a whole, composed of parts distinct in function and
unequal in merit 97
End proposed by Plato. Happiness of the Commonwealth. Happiness
of the individual. Conditions of happiness 98
Peculiar view of Justice taken by Plato 99
Pleadings of Glaukon and Adeimantus _ib._
The arguments which they enforce were not invented by the
Sophists, but were the received views anterior to Plato 100
Argument of Sokrates to refute them. Sentiments in which it
originates. Panegyric on Justice 101
Different senses of justice--wider and narrower sense 102
Plato's sense of the word Justice or Virtue--self-regarding 104
He represents the motives to it, as arising from the internal
happiness of the just agents 105
His theory departs more widely from the truth than that which he
opposes. Argument of Adeimantus discussed 106
A Reciprocity of rights and duties between men in social
life--different feelings towards one and towards the other 109
Plato's own theory, respecting the genesis of society, is based on
reciprocity 111
Antithesis and correlation of obligation and right. Necessity of
keeping the two ideas together, as the basis of any theory
respecting society 112
Characteristic feature of the Platonic
Commonwealth--specialization of services to that function for
which each man is fit--will not apply to one individual separately 114
Plato has not made good his refutation--the thesis which he
impugns is true 116
Statement of the real issue between him and his opponents 117
He himself misrepresents this issue--he describes his opponents as
enemies of justice _ib._
Farther arguments of Plato in support of his thesis. Comparison of
three different characters of men 118
His arguments do not go to the point which he professes to aim at
120
Exaggerated parallelism between the Commonwealth and the
individual man 121
Second Argument of Plato to prove the happiness of the just
man--He now recalls his previous concession, and assumes that the just
man will receive just treatment and esteem from others
_ib._
Dependence of the happiness of the individual on the society in
which he is placed 123
Inconsistency of affirming general positions respecting the
happiness of the just man, in all societies without distinction
124
Qualified sense in which only this can be done 125
Question--Whether the just man is orthodox or dissenter in his
society?--important in discussing whether he is happy 126
Comparison of the position of Sokrates at Athens, with that of his
accusers _ib._
Imperfect ethical basis on which Plato has conducted the
discussion in the Republic 127
Plato in Republic is preacher, inculcating useful beliefs--not
philosopher, establishing scientific theory. State of Just and
Unjust Man in the Platonic Commonwealth 129
Comparative happiness of the two in actual communities. Plato is
dissatisfied with it--This is his motive for recasting society on
his own principles 130
Confusion between the preacher and the philosopher in the Platonic
Republic 131
Remarks on the contrast between ethical theory and ethical
precepts _ib._
CHAPTER XXXVII.
REPUBLIC--REMARKS ON THE PLATONIC COMMONWEALTH.
Double purpose of the Platonic Republic--ethical and political
133
Plato recognises the generating principle of human
society--reciprocity of need and service. Particular direction
which he gives to this principle 133
The four cardinal virtues are assumed as constituting the whole of
Good or Virtue, where each of these virtues resides 134
First mention of these, as an exhaustive classification, in
ethical theory. Plato effaces the distinction between Temperance
and Justice 135
All the four are here assumed as certain and determinate, though
in former dialogues they appear indeterminate and full of unsolved
difficulties 137
Difficulties left unsolved, but overleaped by Plato 138
Ethical and political theory combined by Plato, treated apart by
Aristotle _ib._
Platonic Commonwealth--only an outline--partially filled up 139
Absolute rule of a few philosophers--Careful and peculiar training
of the Guardians _ib._
Comparison of Plato with Xenophon--Cyropædia--OEconomicus 141
Both of them combine polity with education--temporal with
spiritual 142
Differences between them--Character of Cyrus _ib._
Xenophontic genius for command--Practical training--Sokratic
principles applied in Persian training 144
Plato does not build upon an individual hero. Platonic training
compared with Xenophontic 146
Platonic type of character compared with Xenophontic, is like the
Athenian compared with the Spartan 147
Professional soldiers are the proper modern standard of comparison
with the regulations of Plato and Xenophon 148
Music and Gymnastic--multifarious and varied effects of music
149
Great influence of the poets and their works on education
_ib._
Plato's idea of the purpose which poetry and music _ought_ to
serve in education 151
He declares war against most of the traditional and consecrated
poetry, as mischievous _ib._
Strict limits imposed by Plato on poets 153
His view of the purposes of fiction--little distinction between
fiction and truth. His censures upon Homer and the tragedians
154
Type of character prescribed by Plato, to which all poets must
conform, in tales about Gods and Heroes 155
Position of Plato as an innovator on the received faith and
traditions. Fictions indispensable to the Platonic Commonwealth
156
Difficulty of procuring first admission for fictions. Ease with
which they perpetuate themselves after having been once admitted
158
Views entertained by Kritias and others, that the religious
doctrines generally believed had originated with law-givers, for
useful purposes 159
Main points of dissent between Plato and his countrymen, in
respect to religious doctrine 161
Theology of Plato compared with that of Epikurus--Neither of them
satisfied the exigencies of a believing religious mind of that day
_ib._
Plato conceives the Gods according to the exigencies of his own
mind--complete discord with those of the popular mind 163
Repugnance of ordinary Athenians in regard to the criticism of
Sokrates on the religious legends 165
Aristophanes connects the idea of immorality with the freethinkers
and their wicked misinterpretations _ib._
Heresies ascribed to Sokrates by his own friends--Unpopularity of
his name from this circumstance 168
Restrictions imposed by Plato upon musical modes and reciters
_ib._
All these restrictions intended for the emotional training of the
Guardians 169
Regulations for the life of the Guardians, especially the
prohibition of separate property and family _ib._
Purpose of Plato in these regulations _ib._
Common life, education, drill, collective life, and duties, for
Guardians of both sexes. Views of Plato respecting the female
character and aptitudes 171
His arguments against the ordinary doctrine 172
Opponents appealed to nature as an authority against Plato. He
invokes Nature on his own side against them 173
Collective family relations and denominations among the
Guardians 174
Restrictions upon sexual intercourse--Purposes of such
restrictions 175
Regulations about marriages and family 176
Procreative powers of individual Guardians required to be held at
the disposal of the rulers, for purity of breed 177
Purpose to create an intimate and equal sympathy among all the
Guardians, but to prevent exclusive sympathy of particular members
178
Platonic scheme--partial communism 179
Soldiership as a separate profession has acquired greater
development in modern times 180
Spartan institutions--great impression which they produced upon
speculative Greek minds 181
Plans of these speculative minds compared with Spartan--Different
types of character contemplated 182
Plato carries abstraction farther than Xenophon or Aristotle 183
Anxiety shown by Plato for the good treatment of the Demos,
greater than that shown by Xenophon and Aristotle _ib._
In Aristotle's theory, the Demos are not considered as members of
the Commonwealth, but as adjuncts 184
Objection urged by Aristotle against the Platonic Republic, that
it will be two cities. Spiritual pride of the Guardians, contempt
for the Demos _ib._
Plato's scheme fails, mainly because he provides no training for
the Demos 186
Principle of Aristotle--That every citizen belongs to the city,
not to himself--applied by Plato to women 187
Aristotle declares the Platonic Commonwealth impossible--In what
sense this is true 189
The real impossibility of the Platonic Commonwealth, arises from
the fact that discordant sentiments are already established 191
Plato has strong feelings of right and wrong about sexual
intercourse, but referring to different objects 192
Different sentiment which would grow up in the Platonic
Commonwealth respecting the sexual relations 193
What Nature prescribes in regard to the relations of the two
sexes--Direct contradiction between Plato and Aristotle 194
Opinion of Plato respecting the capacities of women, and the
training proper for women, are maintained in the Leges, as well as
in the Republic. Ancient legends harmonising with this opinion
195
In a Commonwealth like the Platonic, the influence of Aphroditê
would probably have been reduced to a minimum 197
Other purposes of Plato--limitation of number of Guardians--common
to Aristotle also 198
Law of population expounded by Malthus--Three distinct checks to
population--alternative open between preventive and positive
_ib._
Plato and Aristotle saw the same law as Malthus, but arranged the
facts under a different point of view 202
Regulations of Plato and Aristotle as to number of births and
newborn children _ib._
Such regulations disapproved and forbidden by modern sentiment.
Variability of ethical sentiment as to objects approved or
disapproved 203
Plato and Aristotle required subordination of impulse to reason
and duty--they applied this to the procreative impulse, as to
others 204
Training of the few select philosophers to act as chiefs 205
Comprehensive curriculum for aspirants to philosophy--consummation
by means of Dialectic 206
Valuable remarks on the effects of these preparatory studies 207
Differences between the Republic and other dialogues--no mention
of reminiscence nor of the Elenchus _ib._
Different view taken by Plato in the Republic about Dialectic--and
different place assigned to it 208
Contradiction with the spirit of other dialogues Parmenidês,
&c. 209
Contradiction with the character and declarations of Sokrates
210
The remarks here made upon the effect of Dialectic upon youth
coincide with the accusation of Melêtus against Sokrates
211
Contrast between the real Sokrates, as a dissenter at Athens, and
the Platonic Sokrates, framer and dictator of the Platonic
Republic _ib._
Idea of Good--The Chiefs alone know what it is--If they did not
they would be unfit for their functions 212
What is the Good? Plato does not know; but he requires the Chiefs
to know it. Without this the Republic would be a failure 213
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
TIMÆUS AND KRITIAS.
Persons and scheme of the Timæus and Kritias 215
The Timæus is the earliest ancient physical theory, which we
possess in the words of its author 216
Position and character of the Pythagorean Timæus _ib._
Poetical imagination displayed by Plato. He pretends to nothing
more than probability. Contrast with Sokrates, Isokrates, Xenophon
217
Fundamental distinction between Ens and Fientia 219
Postulates of Plato. The Demiurgus--The Eternal Ideas--Chaotic
Materia or Fundamentum. The Kosmos is a living being and a God
220
The Demiurgus not a Creator--The Kosmos arises from his operating
upon the random movements of Necessity. He cannot controul
necessity--he only persuades _ib._
Meaning of Necessity in Plato 221
Process of demiurgic construction--The total Kosmos comes
logically first, constructed on the model of the [Greek:
Au)tozô=on] 223
Body of the Kosmos, perfectly spherical--its rotations 225
Soul of the Kosmos--its component ingredients--stretched from
centre to circumference _ib._
Regular or measured Time--began with the Kosmos 227
Divine tenants of the Kosmos. Primary and Visible Gods--Stars and
Heavenly Bodies 229
Secondary and generated Gods--Plato's dictum respecting them. His
acquiescence in tradition 230
Remarks on Plato's Canon of Belief 231
Address and order of the Demiurgus to the generated Gods 233
Preparations for the construction of man. Conjunction of three
souls and one body _ib._
Proceedings of the generated Gods--they fabricate the cranium, as
miniature of the Kosmos, with the rational soul rotating within it
235
The cranium is mounted on a tall body--six varieties of
motion--organs of sense. Vision--Light 236
Principal advantages of sight and hearing. Observations of the
rotation of the Kosmos 237
The Kosmos is product of joint action of Reason and Necessity. The
four visible and tangible elements are not primitive 238
Forms or Ideas and Materia Prima--Forms of the Elements--Place, or
Receptivity _ib._
Primordial Chaos--Effect of intervention by the Demiurgus 240
Geometrical theory of the elements--fundamental triangles--regular
solids _ib._
Varieties of each element 242
Construction of man imposed by the Demiurgus upon the secondary
Gods. Triple Soul. Distribution thereof in the body 243
Functions of the heart and lungs. Thoracic soul 245
Abdominal Soul--difficulty of controuling it--functions of the
liver _ib._
The liver is made the seat of the prophetic agency. Function of
the spleen 246
Length of the intestinal canal, in order that food might not be
frequently needed 247
Bone--Flesh--Marrow _ib._
Nails--Mouth--Teeth. Plants produced for nutrition of man 248
General view of Diseases and their Causes 249
Diseases of mind--wickedness is a disease--no man is voluntarily
wicked _ib._
Badness of mind arises from body 250
Preservative and healing agencies against disease--well-regulated
exercise, of mind and body proportionally 250
Treatment proper for mind alone, apart from body--supremacy of the
rational soul must be cultivated 251
We must study and understand the rotations of the Kosmos--this is
the way to amend the rotations of the rational soul 252
Construction of women, birds, quadrupeds, fishes, &c., all
from the degradation of primitive man _ib._
Large range of topics introduced in the Timæus 254
The Demiurgus of the Platonic Timæus--how conceived by other
philosophers of the same century _ib._
Adopted and welcomed by the Alexandrine Jews, as a parallel to the
Mosaic Genesis 256
Physiology of the Platonic Timæus--subordinate to Plato's views of
ethical teleology. Triple soul--each soul at once material and
mental 257
Triplicity of the soul--espoused afterwards by Galen 258
Admiration of Galen for Plato--his agreement with Plato, and his
dissension from Plato--his improved physiology 259
Physiology and Pathology of Plato--compared with that of Aristotle
and the Hippokratic treatises 260
Contrast between the admiration of Plato for the constructors of
the Kosmos, and the defective results which he describes 262
Degeneration of the real tenants of Earth from their primitive
type 263
Close of the Timæus. Plato turns away from the shameful results,
and reverts to the glorification of the primitive types 264
Kritias: a fragment 265
Prooemium to Timæus. Intended Tetralogy for the Republic. The
Kritias was third piece in that Tetralogy _ib._
Subject of the Kritias. Solon and the Egyptian priests. Citizens
of Platonic Republic are identified with ancient Athenians 266
Plato professes that what he is about to recount is matter of
history, recorded by Egyptian priests 268
Description of the vast island of Atlantis and its powerful kings
_ib._
Corruption and wickedness of the Atlantid people 269
Conjectures as to what the Platonic Kritias would have been--an
ethical epic in prose _ib._
Plato represents the epic Kritias as matter of recorded history
270
CHAPTER XXXIX.**
LEGES AND EPINOMIS.**
Leges, the longest of Plato's works--Persons of the dialogue 272
Abandonment of Plato's philosophical projects prior to the Leges
273
Untoward circumstances of Plato's later life--His altered tone in
regard to philosophy _ib._
General comparison of Leges with Plato's earlier works 275
Scene of the Leges, not in Athens, but in Krete. Persons Kretan
and Spartan, comparatively illiterate 277
Gymnastic training, military drill, and public mess, in Krete and
Sparta 279
Difference between Leges and Republic, illustrated by reference to
the Politikus 280
Large proportion of preliminary discussions and didactic
exhortation in the Leges 281
Scope of the discussion laid down by the Athenian speaker--The
Spartan institutions are framed only for war--This is narrow and
erroneous 282
Principles on which the institutions of a state ought to be
defended--You must show that its ethical purpose and working is
good 284
Religious and ethical character postulated by Plato for a
community _ib._
Endurance of pain enforced as a part of the public discipline at
Sparta 285
Why are not the citizens tested in like manner, in regard to
resistance against the seductions of pleasure? _ib._
Drunkenness forbidden at Sparta, and blamed by the Spartan
converser. The Athenian proceeds to inquire how far such
unqualified prohibition is justifiable 286
Description of Sokrates in the Symposion--his self-command under
abundant potations 287
Sokrates--an ideal of self-command, both as to pain and as to
pleasure 288
Trials for testing the self-controul of the citizen, under the
influence of wine. Dionysiac banquets, under a sober president
289
The gifts of Dionysus may, by precautions, be rendered
useful--Desultory manner of Plato _ib._
Theory of ethical and æsthetical education--Training of the
emotions of youth through the influence of the Muses, Apollo, and
Dionysus. Choric practice and ceremonies 290
Music and dancing--imitation of the voice and movements of brave
and virtuous men. Youth must be taught to take delight in this
291
Bad musical exhibitions and poetry forbidden by the lawgiver.
Songs and dances must be consecrated by public authority. Prizes
at the musical festivals to be awarded by select judges 292
The Spartan and Kretan agree with the Athenian, that poets must be
kept under a strict censorship. But they do not agree as to what
the poets are required to conform to _ib._
Ethical creed laid down by the Athenian--Poets required to conform
to it 294
The Spartan and Kretan do not agree with him 296
Chorus of Elders are required to set an example in keeping up the
purity of the music prescribed 297
The Elders require the stimulus of wine, in order to go through
the choric duties with spirit _ib._
Peculiar views of Plato about intoxication 298
General ethical doctrine held by Plato in Leges 299
Pleasure--Good--Happiness--What is the relation between them?
_ib._
Comparison of the doctrine laid down in Leges 300
Doctrine in Leges about Pleasure and Good--approximates more
nearly to the Protagoras than to Gorgias and Philêbus 301
Comparison of Leges with Republic and Gorgias 302
Plato here mistrusts the goodness of his own proof. He falls back
upon useful fiction 303
Deliberate ethical fiction employed as means of governing 304
Importance of music and chorus as an engine of teaching for Plato.
Views of Xenophon and Aristotle compared 305
Historical retrospect as to the growth of cities--Frequent
destruction of established communities, with only a small remnant
left 307
Historical or legendary retrospect--The Trojan war--The return of
the Herakleids 308
Difficulties of government--Conflicts about command--Seven
distinct titles to command exist among mankind, all equally
natural, and liable to conflict 309
Imprudence of founding government upon any one of these titles
separately--Governments of Argos and Messênê ruined by the
single principle--Sparta avoided it 310
Plato casts Hellenic legend into accordance with his own political
theories 311
Persia and Athens compared--Excess of despotism. Excess of liberty
312
Cyrus and Darius--Bad training of sons of kings _ib._
Changes for the worse in government of Athens, after the Persian
invasion of Greece 313
This change began in music, and the poets introduced new modes of
composition--they appealed to the sentiment of the people, and
corrupted them 314
Danger of changes in the national music--declared by Damon, the
musical teacher 315
Plato's aversion to the tragic and comic poetry at Athens 316
This aversion peculiar to himself, not shared either by
oligarchical politicians, or by other philosophers 317
Doctrines of Plato in this prefatory matter 318
Compared with those of the Republic and of the Xenophontic
Cyropædia 319
Constructive scheme--Plato's new point of view 320
New Colony to be founded in Krete--its general conditions
_ib._
The Athenian declares that he will not merely promulgate
peremptory laws, but will recommend them to the citizens by
prologues or hortatory discourses 321
General character of these prologues--didactic or rhetorical
homilies 322
Great value set by Plato himself upon these prologues. They are to
serve as type for all poets. No one is allowed to contradict
them 323
Contrast of Leges with Gorgias and Phædrus 324
Regulations for the new colony--About religious worship, the
oracles of Delphi and Dodona are to be consulted 325
Perpetuity of number of citizens, and of lots of land, one to
each, inalienable and indivisible 326
Plato reasserts his adherence to the principle of the Republic,
though the repugnance of others hinders him from realising it
327
Regulations about land, successions, marriages, &c. The number
of citizens must not be allowed to increase 328
Position of the city and akropolis--Distribution of the territory
and citizens into twelve equal sections or tribes 329
Movable property--Inequality therein reluctantly allowed, as far
as four to one, but no farther 330
Census of the citizens--four classes, with graduated scale of
property. No citizen to possess gold or silver. No loans or
interest. No debts enforced by law 331
Board of thirty-seven Nomophylakes--general supervisors of the
laws and their execution--how elected 332
Military commanders--General council of 360--complicated mode of
election _ib._
Character of the electoral scheme--Plato's views about wealth--he
caters partly for the oligarchical sentiment, partly for the
democratical 333
Meetings of council--other magistrates--Agoranomi--Astynomi,
&c. 335
Defence of the territory--rural police--Agronomi, &c.
_ib._
Comparison with the Lacedæmonian Kryptia 336
Priests--Exêgêtæ--Property belonging to temples 337
Superintendence of Music and Gymnastic. Educational function
_ib._
Grave duties of the Minister of Education--precautions in electing
him 338
Judicial duties 339
Private Causes--how tried _ib._
Public Causes must be tried directly by the citizens--strong
feeling among Greeks about this 340
Plato's way of meeting this feeling--intermediate inquiry and
report by a special Commissioner 340
What laws the magistrates are to enforce--Many details must be
left to the Nomophylakes 341
Marriage-Laws--Rich husbands to choose poor wives--No
dowries--costly marriage festivals are forbidden 342
Laws about slavery. Slaves to be well fed, and never treated with
cruelty or insolence. The master must not converse with them
_ib._
Circular form for the city--Temples in the centre--No walls round
it 344
Mode of life prescribed to new-married couples They are to take
the best care about good procreation for the city _ib._
Board of superintending matrons 345
Age fixed for marriage. During the first ten years the couple are
under obligation to procreate for the city--Restrictions during
these ten years _ib._
How infants are to be brought up--Nurses--Perpetual regulated
movements useful for toning down violent emotions 346
Choric and orchestic movements, their effect in discharging strong
emotions 347
Training of boys and girls 348
Musical and literary teaching for youth--Poetry, songs, music,
dances, must all be fixed by authority, and never
changed--Mischief done by poets aiming to please 349
Boys and girls to learn letters and the lyre, from ten to thirteen
years of age. Masters will teach the laws and homilies of the
lawgiver, and licensed extracts from the poets 350
The teaching is to be simple, and common to both sexes 351
Rudiments of arithmetic and geometry to be taught 352
Astronomy must be taught, in order that the citizens may not
assert libellous falsehoods respecting the heavenly bodies 354
Hunting--how far permitted or advised 355
Large general sense which Plato gives to the word hunting 356
Number of religious sacrifices to be determined by lawgiver 357
Military muster of the whole citizen population once in each
month--men, women, and children 358
Gymnastic training must have reference to war, not to
athletic prizes 358
Regulation of sexual intercourse. Syssitia or public mess 359
Regulations about landed property--Boundaries--Limited power of
fining by magistrates 360
Regulations about artisans--Distribution of the annual landed
produce 361
Admission of resident Metics--conditions attached 362
Offences and penal judicature--Procedure of the Dikasts
_ib._
Sacrilege, the gravest of all crimes. High Treason 363
Theft punished by _poena dupli_. General exhortation
founded by Plato upon this enactment 364
All unjust men are unjust involuntarily.--No such thing as
voluntary injustice. Injustice depends upon the temper of the
agent--Distinction between damage and injury 365
Damage may be voluntary or involuntary--Injustice is shown often
by conferring corrupt profit upon another--Purpose of punishment,
to heal the distemper of the criminal _ib._
Three distinct causes of misguided proceedings. 1. Painful
stimulus. 2. Pleasurable stimulus. 3. Ignorance 366
The unjust man is under the influence either of the first or
second of these causes, without controul of Reason. If he acts
under controul of Reason, though the Reason be bad, he is not
unjust 367
Reasoning of Plato to save his doctrine--That no man commits
injustice voluntarily _ib._
Peculiar definition of injustice. A man may do great voluntary
hurt to others, and yet not be unjust, provided he does it under
the influence of Reason, and not of Appetite 368
Plato's purpose in the Laws is to prevent or remedy not only
injustice but misconduct 369
Varieties of homicide--modes of dealing with them penally 370
Homicide involuntary--Homicide under provocation _ib._
Homicide voluntary 371
Homicide between kinsmen 372
Homicide justifiable--in what cases _ib._
Infliction of wounds _ib._
Infliction of blows 373
Plato has borrowed much from Attic procedure, especially in regard
to Homicide--Peculiar view of Homicide at Athens, as to procedure
374
Impiety or outrage offered to divine things or places 375
All impiety arises from one or other of three heresies. 1. No
belief in the Gods. 2. Belief that the Gods interfere very little.
3. Belief that they may be appeased by prayer and sacrifice 376
Punishment for these three heretical beliefs, with or without
overt act _ib._
Heretic, whose conduct has been virtuous and faultless, to be
imprisoned for five years, perhaps more _ib._
Heretic with bad conduct--punishment to be inflicted 377
No private worship or religious rites allowed. Every citizen must
worship at the public temples _ib._
Uncertain and mischievous action of the religious sentiment upon
individuals, if not controuled by public authority 378
Intolerant spirit of Plato's legislation respecting uniformity of
belief 379
The persons denounced by Plato as heretics, and punished as such,
would have included a majority of the Grecian world 381
Proëm or prefatory discourse of Plato, for these severe laws
against heretics 383
The third variety of heresy is declared to be the worst--the
belief in Gods persuadable by prayer and sacrifice 384
Heretics censured by Plato--Sokrates censured before the Athenian
Dikasts 385
Kosmological and Kosmogonical theory announced in Leges 386
Soul--older, more powerful in the universe than Body. Different
souls are at work in the universe--the good soul and the bad soul
_ib._
Plato's argument is unsatisfactory and inconsistent 388
Reverence of Plato for uniform circular rotation 389
Argument of Plato to confute the second class of heretics
_ib._
Contrary doctrine of Plato in Republic 390
Argument of Plato to refute the third class of heretics 391
General belief in Greece about the efficacy of prayer and
sacrifice to appease the Gods 392
Incongruities of Plato's own doctrine 393
Both Herodotus and Sokrates dissented from Plato's doctrine 394
Great opposition which Plato's doctrine would have encountered in
Greece 395
Local infallibility was claimed as a rule in each community,
though rarely enforced with severity: Plato both claims it more
emphatically, and enforces it more rigorously 396
Farther civil and political regulations for the Magnetic
community. No evidence that Plato had studied the working of
different institutions in practice 397
Modes of acquiring property--legitimate and illegitimate
_ib._
Plato's general regulations leave little room for disputes about
ownership 398
Plato's principles of legislation, not consistent--comparison of
them with the Attic law about Eranoi 399
Regulations about slaves, and about freedmen 400
Provisions in case a slave is sold, having a distemper upon him
401
Retailers. Strict regulations about them. No citizen can be a
retailer _ib._
Frauds committed by sellers--severe punishments on them 402
Comparison with the lighter punishment inflicted by Attic law
403
Regulations about Orphans and Guardians: also about Testamentary
powers 404
Plato's general coincidence with Attic law and its sentiment 406
Tutelage of Orphans--Disagreement of Married Couples--Divorce
_ib._
Neglect of Parents 407
Poison--Magic--Incantations--Severe punishment _ib._
Punishment is inflicted with a view to future prevention or
amendment 408
Penalty for abusive words--for libellous comedy. Mendicity
forbidden 409
Regulations about witnesses on judicial trials _ib._
Censure of forensic eloquence, and the teachers of it. Penalties
against contentious litigation 410
Many of Plato's laws are discharges of ethical antipathy. The
antipathy of Melêtus against Sokrates was of the same character
411
Penalty for abuse of public trust--wrongful appropriation of
public money--evasion of military service 412
Oaths. Dikasts, Judges, Electors, are to be sworn: but no parties
to a suit, or interested witnesses, can be sworn 413
Regulations about admission of strangers, and foreign travel of
citizens 414
Suretyship--Length of prescription for ownership, &c. 415
Judicial trial--three stages. 1. Arbitrators.
2. Tribe-Dikasteries. 3. Select Dikastery _ib._
Funerals--proceedings prescribed--expense limited _ib._
Conservative organ to keep up the original scheme of the lawgiver.
Nocturnal Council for this purpose--how constituted _ib._
This Council must keep steadily in view the one great end of the
city--Mistakes made by existing cities about the right end 417
The one end of the city is the virtue of its citizens--that
property which is common to the four varieties of Virtue--Reason,
Courage, Temperance, Justice _ib._
The Nocturnal** Council must comprehend this unity of Virtue,
explain it to others, and watch that it be carried out in detail
418
They must also adopt, explain, and enforce upon the citizens, an
orthodox religious creed. Fundamental dogmas of such creed 419
Leges close, without describing the education proper for the
Nocturnal Counsellors. _Epinomis_ supplying this defect 420
The Athenian declares his plan of education--Arithmetic, Geometry,
Astronomy _ib._
Theological view of Astronomy--Divine Kosmos--Soul more ancient
and more sovereign than Body 421
Improving effects of the study of Astronomy in this spirit 422
Study of arithmetic and geometry: varieties of proportion 423
When the general forms of things have thus been learnt, particular
individuals in nature must be brought under them _ib._
Question as to education of the Nocturnal Council is answered in
the Epinomis 424
Problem which the Nocturnal Council are required to solve,
What is the common property of Prudence, Courage, Temperance,
Justice, by reason of which each is called Virtue? 425
The only common property is that all of them are essential to the
maintenance of society, and tend to promote human security and
happiness _ib._
Tendency of the four opposite qualities to lessen human happiness
426
A certain measure of all the four virtues is required. In judging
of particular acts instigated by each, there is always a tacit
reference to the hurt or benefit in the special case _ib._
Plato places these four virtues in the highest scale of Expetenda
or Bona, on the ground that all the other Bona are sure to flow
from them 428
In thus directing the attention of the Council to the common
property of the four virtues, Plato enforces upon them the
necessity of looking to the security and happiness of their
community as the paramount end 429
But he enjoins also other objectionable ends _ib._
Intolerance of Plato--Comparison of the Platonic community with
Athens _ib._
PLATO.
CHAPTER XXXV.
PLATONIC REPUBLIC--ABSTRACT.
The Republic is the longest of all the Platonic dialogues, except
the dialogue De Legibus. It consists of ten books, each of them as
long as any one of the dialogues which we have passed in review.
Partly from its length--partly from its lofty pretensions as the
great constructive work of Plato--I shall give little more than an
abstract of it in the present chapter, and shall reserve remark
and comment for the succeeding.
[Side-note: Declared theme of the Republic--Expansion and
multiplication of the topics connected with it.]
The professed subject is--What is Justice? Is the just man happy
in or by reason of his justice? whatever consequences may befall
him? Is the unjust man unhappy by reason of his injustice? But the
ground actually travelled over by Sokrates, from whose mouth the
exposition proceeds, is far more extensive than could have been
anticipated from this announced problem. An immense variety of
topics, belonging to man and society, is adverted to more or less
fully. A theory of psychology or phrenology generally, is laid
down and advocated: likewise a theory of the Intellect,
distributed into its two branches: 1. Science, with the Platonic
Forms or Ideas as Realities corresponding to it; 2. Opinion, with
the fluctuating semi-realities or pseudo-realities, which form its
object. A sovereign rule, exercised by philosophy, is asserted as
indispensable to human happiness. The fundamental conditions of a
good society, as Plato conceived it, are set forth at considerable
length, and contrasted with the social corruptions of various
existing forms of government. The outline of a perfect education,
intellectual and emotional, is drawn up and prescribed for the
ruling class: with many accompanying remarks on the objectionable
tendencies of the popular and consecrated poems. The
post-existence, as well as the pre-existence of the soul, is affirmed
in the concluding books. As the result of the whole, Plato
emphatically proclaims his conviction, that the just man is happy
in and through his justice, quite apart from all consideration of
consequences--yet that the consequences also will be such as to
add to his happiness, both during life as well as after death: and
the unjust man unhappy in and through his injustice.[1]
[Footnote 1: Plat. Repub. i. pp. 328 A, 350 D, 354 A.]
[Side-note: Personages of the dialogue.]
The dramatic introduction of the dialogue (which is described as
held during the summer, immediately after the festival of the
Bendideia in Peiræus), with the picture of the aged Kephalus and
his views upon old age, is among the richest and most spirited in
the Platonic works: but the discussion does not properly begin
until Kephalus retires, leaving it to be carried on by Sokrates
with Polemarchus, Glaukon, Adeimantus, and Thrasymachus.
[Side-note: Views of Kephalus about old age.]
"Old age has its advantages to reasonable men (says Kephalus). If
I have lost the pleasures of youth, I have at the same time lost
the violent desires which then overmastered me. I now enjoy
tranquillity and peace. Without doubt, this is in part owing to my
wealth. But the best that wealth does for me is, that it enables
me to make compensation for deceptions and injustice, practised on
other men in my younger days--and to fulfil all vows made to the
Gods. An old man who is too poor to render such atonement for past
falsehood and injustice, becomes uneasy in his mind as death
approaches; he begins to fear that the stories about Hades, which
he has heard and ridiculed in his youth, may perhaps prove
true."[2]
[Footnote 2: Plato, Repub. i. pp. 330-331.
Compare the language of Cato, more rhetorical and exaggerated than
that of Kephalus, in Cic. De Senect. c. 13-14.]
[Side-note: Definition of Justice by Simonides--It consists
in rendering to every man what is owing to him.]
"Is that your explanation of justice (asks Sokrates): that it
consists in telling truth, and rendering to every one what you
have had from him?" The old man Kephalus here withdraws;
Polemarchus and the others prosecute the discussion. "The poet
Simonides (says Polemarchus) gives an explanation like to that
which you have stated--when he affirms, That just dealing consists
in rendering to every man what is owing to him."
[Side-note: Objections to it by Sokrates--There are cases in
which it is not right to restore what is owing, or to tell the
truth.]
"I do not know what Simonides means," replies Sokrates. "He cannot
mean that it is always right to tell the truth, or always right to
give back a deposit. If my friend, having deposited arms with me,
afterwards goes mad, and in that state demands them back, it would
not be right in me either to restore the arms, or to tell the
truth, to a man in that condition. Therefore to say that justice
consists in speaking truth and in giving back what we have
received, cannot be a good definition."[3]
[Footnote 3: Plato, Repub. i. p. 331 C-D.
The historical Sokrates argues in the same manner (in the
Memorabilia of Xenophon. See his conversation with Euthydemus, iv.
2; and Cicero, De Offic. iii. 25, 94-95).]
Polemarchus here gives a peculiar meaning to the phrase of
Simonides: a man owes good to his friends--evil to his enemies:
and he ought to pay back both. Upon this Sokrates comments.[4]
[Footnote 4: Sokrates here remarks that the precepts--Speak truth;
Restore what has been confided to you--ought not to be considered
as universally binding. Sometimes justice, or those higher grounds
upon which the rules of justice are founded, prescribe that we
should disobey the precepts. Sokrates takes this for granted, as a
matter which no one will dispute; and it is evident that what
Plato had here in his mind was, the obvious consideration that to
tell the truth or restore a weapon deposited, to one who had gone
mad, would do no good to any one, and might do immense mischief:
thus showing that general utility is both the foundation and the
limiting principle of all precepts respecting just and unjust.
That this is present to the mind of Plato appears evident from his
assuming the position as a matter of course; it is moreover
Sokratic, as we see by the Memorabilia of Xenophon.
But Plato, in another passage of the Republic, clothes this
Sokratic doctrine in a language and hypothesis of his own. He sets
up Forms or Ideas, _per se_. The Just,--The Unjust,--The
Honourable,--The Base, &c. He distinguishes each of these from
the many separate manifestations in which it is specialised. The
Form, though one reality in itself, appears manifold when embodied
and disguised in these diversified accompaniments. It remains One
and Unchanged, the object of Science and universal infallible
truth; but each of its separate manifestations is peculiar to
itself, appears differently to different minds, and admits of no
higher certainty than fallible opinion. Though the Form of Justice
always remains the same, yet its subordinate embodiments ever
fluctuate; there is no given act nor assemblage of acts which is
always just. Every just act (see Republic, v. pp. 476 A-479 A) is
liable under certain circumstances to become unjust; or to be
invaded and overclouded by the Form of Injustice. The genuine
philosopher will detect the Form of Justice wherever it is to be
found, in the midst of accompaniments however discrepant and
confused, over all which he will ascend to the region of universal
truth and reality. The unphilosophical mind cannot accomplish this
ascent, nor detect the pure Form, nor even recognise its real
existence: but sees nothing beyond the multiplicity of diverse
particular cases in which it is or appears to be embodied.
Respecting these particular cases there is no constant or
universal truth, no full science. They cannot be thrown into
classes to which the superior Form constantly and unconditionally
adheres. They are midway between reality and non-reality: they are
matters of opinion more or less reasonable, but not of certain
science or unconditional affirmation. Among mankind generally, who
see nothing of true and absolute Form, the received rules and
dogmas respecting the Just, the Beautiful, &c., are of this
intermediate and ambiguous kind: they can neither be affirmed
universally, nor denied universally; they are partly true, partly
false, determinable only by opinion in each separate case. Plato,
Repub. v. p. 479 C-D: [Greek: ou)/t' ei)=nai ou)/te mê\ ei)=nai
ou)de\n au)tô=n dunato\n pagi/ôs noê=sai, ou)/te a)mpho/tera
ou)/te ou)de/teron . . . Ta\ tô=n pollô=n polla\ no/mima, kalou=
te pe/ri kai\ tô=n a)/llôn, metaxu/ pou kulindei=tai tou= te mê\
o)/ntos kai\ tou= o)/ntos ei)likrinô=s.]
Of the distinction here drawn in general terms by Plato, between
the pure unchangeable Form, and the subordinate classes of
particulars in which that Form is or appears to be embodied, the
reasoning above cited respecting truth-telling and giving back a
deposit is an example.]
[Side-note: Explanation by Polemarchus--Farther
interrogations by Sokrates--Justice renders what is proper and
suitable: but how? in what cases, proper? Under what circumstances
is Justice useful?]
_S._--Simonides meant to say (you tell me) that Justice
consists in rendering benefits to your friends, evil to your
enemies: that is, in rendering to each what is proper and
suitable. But we must ask him farther--Proper and suitable--how?
in what cases? to whom? The medical art is that which renders what
is proper and suitable, of nourishment and medicaments for the
health of the body: the art of cookery is that which renders what
is proper and suitable, of savoury ingredients for the
satisfaction of the palate. In like manner, the cases must be
specified in which justice renders what is proper and suitable--to
whom, how, or what?[5] _P._--Justice consists in doing good
to friends, evil to enemies. _S._--Who is it that is most
efficient in benefiting his friends and injuring his enemies, as
to health or disease? _P._--It is the physician. _S._--Who,
in reference to the dangers in navigation by sea? _P._--The
steersman. _S._--In what matters is it that the just man
shows his special efficiency, to benefit friends and hurt
enemies?[6] _P._--In war: as a combatant for the one and
against the other. _S._--To men who are not sick, the
physician is of no use nor the steersman, to men on dry land:
Do you mean in like manner, that the just man is useless to those
who are not at war? _P._--No: I do not mean that. Justice is
useful in peace also. _S._--So also is husbandry, for raising
food--shoemaking, for providing shoes. Tell me for what want or
acquisition justice is useful during peace? _P._--It is
useful for the common dealings and joint transactions between man
and man. _S._--When we are engaged in playing at draughts,
the good player is our useful co-operator: when in laying bricks
and stones, the skilful mason: much more than the just man. Can
you specify in what particular transactions the just man has any
superior usefulness as a co-operator? _P._--In affairs of
money, I think. _S._--Surely not in the employment of money.
When you want to buy a horse, you must take for your assistant,
not the just man, but one who knows horses: so also, if you are
purchasing a ship. What are those modes of jointly employing
money, in which the just man is more useful than others?
_P._--He is useful when you wish to have your money safely
kept. _S._--That is, when your money is not to be employed,
but to lie idle: so that when your money is useless, then is the
time when justice is useful for it. _P._--So it seems.
_S._--In regard to other things also, a sickle, a shield, a
lyre when you want to use them, the pruner, the hoplite, the
musician, must be invoked as co-operators: justice is useful only
when you are to keep them unused. In a word, justice is useless
for the use of any thing, and useful merely for things not in use.
Upon this showing, it is at least a matter of no great worth.[7]
[Footnote 5: Plato, Republic, i. p. 332 D. [Greek: ê( ou)=n dê\
ti/si ti/ a)podidou=sa te/chnê dikaiosu/nê a)\n kaloi=to?]]
[Footnote 6: Plato, Republic, i. p. 332 E. [Greek: o( di/kaios e)n
ti/ni pra/xei kai\ pro\s ti/ e)/rgon dunatô/tatos phi/lous
ô)phelei=n kai\ e)chthrou\s bla/ptein?]]
[Footnote 7: Plat. Repub. i. pp. 332-333. 333 E: [Greek: Ou)k a)\n
ou)=n pa/nu ge/ ti spoudai=on ei)/ê ê( dikaiosu/nê, ei) pro\s ta\
a)/chrêsta chrê/simon o)\n tugcha/nei?]]
[Side-note: The just man, being good for keeping property
guarded, must also be good for stealing property--Analogies
cited.]
But let us pursue the investigation (continues Sokrates). In
boxing or in battle, is not he who is best in striking, best also
in defending himself? In regard to disease, is not he who can best
guard himself against it, the most formidable for imparting it to
others? Is not the general who watches best over his own camp,
also the most effective in surprising and over-reaching the enemy?
In a word, whenever a man is effective as a guard of any thing, is
he not also effective as a thief of it? _P._--Such seems the
course of the discussion. _S._--Well then, the just man turns
out to be a sort of thief, like the Homeric Autolykus.
According to the explanation of Simonides, justice is a mode of
thieving, for the profit of friends and damage of enemies.[8]
_P._--It cannot be so. I am in utter confusion. Yet I think
still that justice is profitable to friends, and hurtful to
enemies.
[Footnote 8: Plat. Repub. i. p. 334 B. [Greek: e)/oiken ou)=n ê(
dikaiosu/nê . . . kleptikê/ tis ri)=nai, e)p' ô)phelei/a| me/ntoi
tô=n phi/lôn, kai\ e)pi\ bla/bê| tô=n e)chthrô=n.]]
[Side-note: Justice consists in doing good to friends, evil
to enemies--But how, if a man mistakes who his friends are, and
makes friends of bad men?]
_S._--Whom do you call friends: those whom a man believes to
be good,--or those who really are good, whether he believes them
to be so or not: and the like, in reference to enemies?
_P._--I mean those whom he believes to be good. It is natural that
he should love _them_ and that he should hate those whom he
believes to be evil. _S._--But is not a man often mistaken in
this belief? _P._--Yes: often. _S._--In so far as a man
is mistaken, the good men are his enemies, and the evil men his
friends. Justice, therefore, on your showing, consists in doing
good to the evil men, and evil to the good men. _P._--So it
appears. _S._--Now good men are just, and do no wrong to any
one. It is therefore just, on your explanation, to hurt those who
do no wrong. _P._--Impossible! that is a monstrous doctrine.
_S._--You mean, then, that it is just to hurt unjust men, and
to benefit just men? _P._--Yes; that is something better.
_S._--It will often happen, therefore, when a man misjudges
about others, that justice will consist in hurting his friends,
since they are in his estimation the evil men: and in benefiting
his enemies, since they are in his estimation the good men. Now
this is the direct contrary of what Simonides defined to be
justice.[9]
[Footnote 9: Plato, Republic, i. p. 334 D.]
[Side-note: Justice consists in doing good to your friend, if
really a good man: hurt to your enemy, with the like proviso.
Sokrates affirms that the just man will do no hurt to any one.
Definition of Simonides rejected.]
"We have misconceived the meaning of Simonides (replies
Polemarchus). He must have meant that justice consists in
benefiting your friend, assuming him to be a good man: and in
hurting your enemy, assuming him to be an evil man." Sokrates
proceeds to impugn the definition in this new sense. He shows that
justice does not admit of our hurting any man, either evil or
good. By hurting the evil man, we only make him more evil than he
was before. To do this belongs not to justice, but to
injustice.[10] The definition of justice--That it consists in
rendering benefit to friends and hurt to enemies--is not suitable
to a wise man like Simonides, but to some rich potentate like
Periander or Xerxes, who thinks his own power irresistible.[11]
[Footnote 10: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 335-336.]
[Footnote 11: Here is a characteristic specimen of searching
cross-examination in the Platonic or Sokratic style: citing
multiplied analogies, and requiring the generalities of a
definition to be clothed with particulars, that its sufficiency
may be proved in each of many successive as well as different
cases.]
[Side-note: Thrasymachus takes up the dialogue--Repulsive
portrait drawn of him.]
At this turn of the dialogue, when the definition given by
Simonides has just been refuted, Thrasymachus breaks in, and takes
up the conversation with Sokrates. He is depicted as angry,
self-confident to excess, and coarse in his manners even to the length
of insult. The portrait given of him is memorable for its dramatic
vivacity, and is calculated to present in an odious point of view
the doctrines which he advances: like the personal deformities
which Homer heaps upon Thersites in the Iliad.[12] But how far it
is a copy of the real man, we have no evidence to inform us.
[Footnote 12: Homer, Iliad B 216. Respecting Thrasymachus the
reader should compare Spengel--[Greek: Sunagôgê\ Technô=n]--pp.
94-98: which abates the odium inspired by this picture in the
Republic.]
[Side-note: Violence of Thrasymachus--Subdued manner of
Sokrates--Conditions of useful colloquy.]
In the contrast between Sokrates and Thrasymachus, Plato gives
valuable hints as to the conditions of instructive colloquy. "What
nonsense is all this!" (exclaims Thrasymachus). "Do not content
yourself with asking questions, Sokrates, which you know is much
easier than answering: but tell us yourself what Justice is: give
us a plain answer: do not tell us that it is what is right--or
profitable--or for our interest--or gainful--or advantageous: for
I will not listen to any trash like this." "Be not so harsh with
us, Thrasymachus" (replies Sokrates, in a subdued tone). "If we
have taken the wrong course of inquiry, it is against our own
will. You ought to feel pity for us rather than anger." "I
thought" (rejoined Thrasymachus, with a scornful laugh) "that you
would have recourse to your usual pretence of ignorance, and would
decline answering." _S._--How can I possibly answer, when you
prescribe beforehand what I am to say or not to say? If you ask
men--How much is twelve? and at the same time say--Don't tell
me that it is twice six, or three times four, or four times
three--how can any man answer your question? _T._--As if the two
cases were similar! _S._--Why not similar? But even though
they be not similar, yet if the respondent thinks them so, how can
he help answering according as the matter appears to him, whether
we forbid him or not? _T._--Is that what you intend to do?
Are you going to give me one of those answers which I forbade?
_S._--Very likely I may, if on consideration it appears to me
the proper answer.[13] _T._--What will you say if I show you
another answer better than all of them? What penalty will you then
impose upon yourself? _S._--What penalty?--why, that which
properly falls upon the ignorant. It is their proper fate to learn
from men wiser than themselves: that is the penalty which I am
prepared for.[14]
[Footnote 13: Plato, Repub. i. p. 337 C. [Greek: Ei) d' ou)=n
_kai\ mê\ e)/stin o(/moion, phai/netai de\ tô=| e)rôtêthe/nti
toiou=ton, ê(=tto/n ti au)to\n oi)/ei a)pokrinei=sthai to\
phaino/menon e(autô=|_, e)a/n te ê(mei=s a)pagoreu/ômen, e)a/n
te mê/? A)/llo ti ou)=n, e)/phê, kai\ su\ ou(/tô poiê/seis? ô(=n
e)gô\ a)pei=pon, tou/tôn ti a)pokrinei=? Ou)k a)\n thauma/saimi,
ê)=n d' e)gô/, _ei)/ moi skepsame/nô| ou(/tô_ do/xeien.]
This passage deserves notice, inasmuch as Plato here affirms, in
very plain language, the Protagorean doctrine, which we have seen
him trying to refute in the Theætêtus and Kratylus,--"Homo
Mensura,--Every man is a measure to himself. That is true or false
to every man which appears to him so."
Most of Plato's dialogues indeed imply this truth; for no man
makes more constant appeal to the internal assent or dissent of
the individual interlocutor. But it is seldom that he declares it
in such express terms.]
[Footnote 14: Plato, Republic, i. p. 337 D.]
[Side-note: Definition given by Thrasymachus--Justice is
that which is advantageous to the more powerful. Comments by
Sokrates. What if the powerful man mistakes his own advantage?]
After a few more words, in the same offensive and insolent tone
ascribed to him from the beginning, Thrasymachus produces his
definition of Justice:--"Justice is that which is advantageous to
the more powerful". Some comments from Sokrates bring out a fuller
explanation, whereby the definition stands amended:--"Justice is
that which is advantageous to the constituted authority, or to
that which holds power, in each different community: monarchy,
oligarchy, or democracy, as the case may be. Each of these
authorities makes laws and ordinances for its own interest:
declares what is just and unjust: and punishes all citizens who
infringe its commands. Justice consists in obeying these commands.
In this sense, justice is everywhere that which is for the
interest or advantage of the more powerful."[15] "I too believe"
(says Sokrates) "that justice is something advantageous, in a
certain sense. But whether you are right in adding these words--'to
the more powerful'--is a point for investigation.[16] Assuming
that the authorities in each state make ordinances for their own
advantage, you will admit that they sometimes mistake, and enact
ordinances tending to their own disadvantage. In so far as they do
this, justice is not that which is advantageous, but that which is
disadvantageous, to the more powerful.[17] Your definition
therefore will not hold."
[Footnote 15: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 338-339.]
[Footnote 16: Plato, Republic, i. p. 339 B. [Greek: e)peidê\ ga\r
xumphe/ron ge/ ti ei)=nai kai\ e)gô\ o(mologô= to\ di/kaion, su\
de\ prosti/thês kai\ au)to\ phê\s ei)=nai _to\ tou=
krei/ttonos_, e)gô\ de\ a)gnoô=, skepte/on dê/.]]
[Footnote 17: Plato, Republic, i. p. 339 E.]
[Side-note: Correction by Thrasymachus--if the Ruler
mistakes, he is _pro tanto_ no Ruler--The Ruler, _quâ_
Ruler--_quâ_ Craftsman--is infallible.]
Thrasymachus might have replied to this objection by saying, that
he meant what the superior power conceived to be for its own
advantage, and enacted accordingly, whether such conception was
correct or erroneous. This interpretation, though indicated by a
remark put into the mouth of Kleitophon, is not farther
pursued.[18] But in the reply really ascribed to Thrasymachus, he
is made to retract what he had just before admitted--that the
superior authority sometimes commits mistakes. In so far as a
superior or a ruler makes mistakes (Thrasymachus says), he is not
a superior. We say, indeed, speaking loosely, that the ruler falls
into error, just as we say that the physician or the steersman
falls into error. The physician does not err _quâ_ physician,
nor the steersman _quâ_ steersman. No craftsman errs
_quâ_ craftsman. If he errs, it is not from his craft, but
from want of knowledge: that is, from want of craft.[19] What the
ruler, as such, declares to be best for himself, and therefore
enacts, is always really best for himself: this is justice for the
persons under his rule.
[Footnote 18: Plato, Republic, i. p. 340 B.]
[Footnote 19: Plato, Republic, i. p. 340 E. [Greek: e)pilipou/sês
ga\r e)pistê/mês o( a(marta/nôn a(marta/nei, e)n ô(=| ou)/k e)sti
dêmiourgo/s; ô(/ste dêmiourgo\s ê)\ sopho\s ê)\ a)/rchôn ou)dei\s
a(marta/nei to/te o(/tan a)/rchôn ê)=|.]]
[Side-note: Reply by Sokrates--The Ruler, _quâ_
infallible Craftsman, studies the interest of those whom he
governs, and not his own interest.]
To this subtle distinction, Sokrates replies by saying (in
substance), "If you take the craftsman in this strict meaning, as
representing the abstraction Craft, it is not true that his
proceedings are directed towards his own interest or advantage.
What he studies is, the advantage of his subjects or clients,
not his own. The physician, as such, has it in view to cure his
patients: the steersman, to bring his passengers safely to
harbour: the ruler, so far forth as craftsman, makes laws for the
benefit of his subjects, and not for his own. If obedience to
these laws constitutes justice, therefore, it is not true that
justice consists in what is advantageous to the superior or
governing power. It would rather consist in what is advantageous
to the governed."[20]
[Footnote 20: Plato, Republic, i. p. 342.]
[Side-note: Thrasymachus denies this--Justice is the good of
another. The just many are worse off than the unjust One, and are
forced to submit to his superior strength.]
Thrasymachus is now represented as renouncing the abstraction
above noted,[21] and reverting to the actualities of life. "Such
talk is childish!" (he exclaims, with the coarseness imputed to
him in this dialogue). "Shepherds and herdsmen tend and fatten
their flocks and herds, not for the benefit of the sheep and oxen,
but for the profit of themselves and the proprietors. So too the
genuine ruler in a city: he regards his subjects as so many sheep,
looking only to the amount of profit which he can draw from
them.[22] Justice is, in real truth, the good of another; it is
the profit of him who is more powerful and rules--the loss of
those who are weaker and must obey. It is the unjust man who rules
over the multitude of just and well-meaning men. They serve him
because he is the stronger: they build up his happiness at the
cost of their own. Everywhere, both in private dealing and in
public function, the just man is worse off than the unjust. I mean
by the unjust, one who has the power to commit wrongful seizure on
a large scale. You may see this if you look at the greatest
injustice of all--the case of the despot, who makes himself happy
while the juster men over whom he rules are miserable. One who is
detected in the commission of petty crimes is punished, and gets a
bad name: but if a man has force enough to commit crime on the
grand scale, to enslave the persons of the citizens, and to
appropriate their goods--instead of being called by a bad name, he
is envied and regarded as happy, not only by the citizens
themselves, but by all who hear him named. Those who blame
injustice, do so from the fear of suffering it, not from the fear
of doing it. Thus then injustice, in its successful efficiency, is
strong, free, and over-ruling, as compared with justice. Injustice
is profitable to a man's self: justice (as I said before) is what
is profitable to some other man stronger than he."[23]
[Footnote 21: Plato, Republic, p. 345 B-C.]
[Footnote 22: Plato, Republic, p. 343 B.
A similar comparison is put into the mouth of Sokrates himself by
Plato in the Theætêtus, p. 174 D.]
[Footnote 23: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 343-344.]
[Side-note: Position laid for the subsequent debate and
exposition.]
Thrasymachus is described as laying down this position in very
peremptory language, and as anxious to depart immediately after
it, if he had not been detained by the other persons present. His
position forms the pivot of the subsequent conversation. The two
opinions included in it--(That justice consists in obedience
yielded by the weak to the orders of the strong, for the advantage
of the strong--That injustice, if successful, is profitable and
confers happiness: justice the contrary)--are disputed, both of
them, by Sokrates as well as by Glaukon.[24]
[Footnote 24: Plato, Repub. i. pp. 345 A-348 A.]
[Side-note: Arguments of Sokrates--Injustice is a source of
weakness--Every multitude must observe justice among themselves,
in order to avoid perpetual quarrels. The same about any single
individual: if he is unjust, he will be at war with himself, and
perpetually weak.]
Sokrates is represented as confuting and humiliating Thrasymachus
by various arguments, of which the two first at least are more
subtle than cogent.[25] He next proceeds to argue that injustice,
far from being a source of strength, is a source of weakness--That
any community of men, among whom injustice prevails, must be in
continual dispute; and therefore incapable of combined action
against others--That a camp of mercenary soldiers or robbers, who
plunder every one else, must at least observe justice among
themselves--That if they have force, this is because they are
unjust only by halves: that if they were thoroughly unjust, they
would also be thoroughly impotent--That the like is true also of
an individual separately taken, who, so far as he is unjust, is in
a perpetual state of hatred and conflict with himself, as well as
with just men and with the Gods: and would thus be divested of all
power to accomplish any purpose.[26]
[Footnote 25: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 346-350.]
[Footnote 26: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 351-352 D.]
[Side-note: Farther argument of Sokrates--The just man is
happy, the unjust man miserable--Thrasymachus is confuted and
silenced. Sokrates complains that he does not yet know what
Justice is.]
Having thus shown that justice is stronger than injustice,
Sokrates next offers an argument to prove that it is happier or
confers more happiness than injustice. The conclusion of this
argument is--That the just man is happy, and the unjust
miserable.[27] Thrasymachus is confuted, and retires humiliated
from the debate. Yet Sokrates himself is represented as
dissatisfied with the result. "At the close of our debate" (he
says) "I find that I know nothing about the matter. For as I do
not know what justice is, I can hardly expect to know whether it
is a virtue or not; nor whether the man who possesses it is happy
or not happy."[28]
[Footnote 27: Plato, Republic, i. pp. 353-354 A.]
[Footnote 28: Plato, Republic, i. fin. p. 354 C. [Greek: ô(/ste
moi ge/gonen e)k tou= dialo/gou mêde\n ei)de/nai; o(po/te ga\r to\
di/kaion mê\ oi)=da o(\ e)sti, scholê=| ei)/somai ei)/te a)retê/
tis ou)=sa tugcha/nei ei)/te kai\ ou)/, kai\ po/teron o( e)/chôn
au)to\ ou)k eu)dai/môn e)sti\n ê)\ eu)dai/môn.]]
[Side-note: Glaukon intimates that he is not satisfied with
the proof, though he agrees in the opinion expressed by Sokrates.
Tripartite distribution of Good--To which of the three heads does
Justice belong?]
Here Glaukon enters the lists, intimating that he too is
dissatisfied with the proof given by Sokrates, that justice is
every way better than injustice: though he adopts the conclusion,
and desires much to hear it fully demonstrated. "You know" (he
says), "Sokrates, that there are three varieties of Good--1. Good,
_per se_, and for its own sake (apart from any regard to
ulterior consequences): such as enjoyment and the innocuous
pleasures. 2. Good both in itself, and by reason of its ulterior
consequences: such as full health, perfect vision, intelligence,
&c. 3. Good, not in itself, but altogether by reason of its
consequences: such as gymnastic training, medical treatment,
professional business, &c. Now in which of these branches do
you rank Justice?" _S._--I rank it in the noblest--that is--in
the second branch: which is good both in itself, and by reason
of its consequences. _G._--Most persons put it in the third
branch: as being in itself difficult and laborious, but deserving
to be cultivated in consequence of the reward and good name which
attaches to the man who is reputed just.[29] _S._--I know
that this is the view taken by Thrasymachus and many others: but
it is not mine. _G._--Neither is it mine.
[Footnote 29: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 357.]
[Side-note: Glaukon undertakes to set forth the case against
Sokrates, though professing not to agree with it.]
Yet still I think that you have not made out your case against
Thrasymachus, and that he has given up the game too readily. I
will therefore re-state his argument, not at all adopting his
opinion as my own, but simply in order to provoke a full
refutation of it from you, such as I have never yet heard from any
one. First, I shall show what his partisans say as to the nature
and origin of justice. Next, I shall show that all who practise
justice, practise it unwillingly; not as good _per se_, but
as a necessity. Lastly, I shall prove that such conduct on their
part is reasonable. If these points can be made out, it will
follow that the life of the unjust man is much better than that of
the just.[30]
[Footnote 30: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 358.]
[Side-note: Pleading of Glaukon. Justice is in the nature of
a compromise for all--a medium between what is best and what is
worst.]
The case, as set forth first by Glaukon, next by Adeimantus,
making themselves advocates of Thrasymachus--is as follows. "To do
injustice, is by nature good: to suffer injustice is by nature
evil: but the last is greater as an evil, than the first as a
good: so that when men have tasted of both, they find it
advantageous to agree with each other, that none shall either do
or suffer injustice. These agreements are embodied in laws; and
what is prescribed by the law is called lawful and just. Here you
have the generation and essence of justice, which is intermediate
between what is best and what is worst: that is, between the power
of committing injustice with impunity, and the liability to suffer
injustice without protection or redress. Men acquiesce in such
compromise, not as in itself good, but because they are too weak
to commit injustice safely. For if any man were strong enough to
do so, and had the dispositions of a man, he would not make such a
compromise with any one: it would be madness in him to do so.[31]
[Footnote 31: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 358-359.]
"That men are just, only because they are too weak to be unjust,
will appear if we imagine any of them, either the just or the
unjust, armed with full power and impunity, such as would be
conferred by the ring of Gyges, which rendered the wearer
invisible at pleasure. If the just man could become thus
privileged, he would act in the same manner as the unjust: his
temper would never be adamantine enough to resist the temptations
which naturally prompt every man to unlimited satisfaction of
his desires. Such temptations are now counteracted by the force of
law and opinion; but if these sanctions were nullified, every man,
just or unjust, would seize every thing that he desired, without
regard to others. When he is just, he is so not willingly, but by
compulsion. He chooses that course not as being the best for him
absolutely, but as the best which his circumstances will permit.
[Side-note: Comparison of the happiness of the just man
derived from his justice alone, when others are unjust to him with
that of the unjust man under parallel circumstances.]
"To determine which of the two is happiest, the just man or the
unjust, let us assume each to be perfect in his part, and then
compare them. The unjust man must be assumed to have at his
command all means of force and fraud, so as to procure for himself
the maximum of success; _i.e._, the reputation of being a
just man, along with all the profitable enormities of injustice.
Against him we will set the just man, perfect in his own
simplicity and righteousness; a man who cares only for being just
in reality, and not for seeming to be so. We shall suppose him,
though really just, to be accounted by every one else thoroughly
unjust. It is only thus that we can test the true value of his
justice: for if he be esteemed just by others, he will be honoured
and recompensed, so that we cannot be sure that his justice is not
dictated by regard to these adventitious consequences. He must be
assumed as just through life, yet accounted by every one else
unjust, and treated accordingly: while the unjust man, with whom
we compare him, is considered and esteemed by others as if he were
perfectly just. Which of the two will have the happiest life?
Unquestionably the unjust man. He will have all the advantages
derived from his unscrupulous use of means, together with all that
extrinsic favour and support which proceeds from good estimation
on the part of others: he will acquire superior wealth, which will
enable him both to purchase partisans, and to offer costly
sacrifices ensuring to him the patronage of the Gods. The just
man, on the contrary, will not only be destitute of all these
advantages, but will be exposed to a life of extreme suffering and
torture. He will learn by painful experience that his happiness
depends, not upon being really just, but upon being accounted just
by others."[32]
[Footnote 32: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 361-362.]
[Side-note: Pleading of Adeimantus on the same side. He
cites advice given by fathers to their sons, recommending just
behaviour by reason of its consequences.]
Here Glaukon concludes. Adeimantus now steps in as second counsel
on the same side, to the following effect:[33] "Much yet remains
to be added to the argument. To make it clearer, we must advert to
the topics insisted on by those who oppose Glaukon--those who
panegyrise justice and denounce injustice. A father, who exhorts
his sons to be just, says nothing about the intrinsic advantages
of justice _per se_: he dwells upon the beneficial
consequences which will accrue to them from being just. Through
such reputation they will obtain from men favours, honours,
commands, prosperous alliances--from the Gods, recompenses yet
more varied and abundant. If, on the contrary, they commit
injustice, they will be disgraced and ill-treated among men,
severely punished by the Gods. Such are the arguments whereby a
father recommends justice, and dissuades injustice, he talks about
opinions and after consequences only, he says nothing about
justice or injustice in themselves. Such are the allegations even
of those who wish to praise and enforce justice. But there are
others, and many among them, who hold an opposite language,
proclaiming unreservedly that temperance and justice are difficult
to practise--injustice and intemperance easy and agreeable, though
law and opinion brand them as disgraceful. These men affirm that
the unjust life is for the most part more profitable than the
just. They are full of panegyrics towards the wealthy and
powerful, however unprincipled; despising the poor and weak, whom
nevertheless they admit to be better men.[34] They even say that
the Gods themselves entail misery upon many good men, and confer
prosperity on the wicked. Then there come the prophets and
jugglers, who profess to instruct rich men, out of many books,
composed by Orpheus and Musæus, how they may by appropriate
presents and sacrifices atone for all their crimes and die
happy.[35]
[Footnote 33: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 362-367.]
[Footnote 34: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 364 A-B.]
[Footnote 35: Plato, Republic, p. 364 C-E.]
"When we find that the case is thus stated respecting justice,
both by its panegyrists and by its enemies--that the former extol
it only from the reputation which it procures, and that the
latter promise to the unjust man, if clever and energetic, a
higher recompense than any such reputation can obtain for
him--what effect can we expect to be produced on the minds of young
men of ability, station, and ambition? What course of life are they
likely to choose? Surely they will thus reason: A just life is
admitted to be burdensome--and it will serve no purpose, unless I
acquire, besides, the reputation of justice in the esteem of
others. Now the unjust man, who can establish such reputation,
enjoys the perfection of existence. My happiness turns not upon
the reality, but upon the seeming: upon my reputation with
others.[36] Such reputation then it must be my aim to acquire. I
must combine the real profit of injustice with the outside show
and reputation of justice. Such combination is difficult: but all
considerable enterprises are difficult: I must confederate with
partisans to carry my point by force or fraud. If I succeed, I
attain the greatest prize to which man can aspire. I may be told
that the Gods will punish me; but the same poets, who declare the
existence of the Gods, assure me also that they are placable by
prayer and sacrifice: and the poets are as good authority on the
one point as on the other.[37] Such" (continues Adeimantus) "will
be the natural reasoning of a powerful, energetic, aspiring, man.
How can we expect that such a man should prefer justice, when the
rewards of injustice on its largest scale are within his
reach?[38] Unless he be averse to injustice, from some divine
peculiarity of disposition--or unless he has been taught to
abstain from it by the acquisition of knowledge,--he will treat
the current encomiums on justice as ridiculous. No man is just by
his own impulse. Weak men or old men censure injustice, because
they have not force enough to commit it with success: which is
proved by the fact than any one of them who acquires power,
immediately becomes unjust as far as his power reaches.
[Footnote 36: Plat. Rep. ii. pp. 365 E, 366 A.]
[Footnote 37: Plat. Rep. ii. p. 365 B-D.]
[Footnote 38: Plat. Rep. ii. p. 366 B-D.]
[Side-note: Nobody recommends Justice _per se_, but
only by reason of its consequences.]
"The case as I set it forth" (pursues Adeimantus) "admits of no
answer on the ground commonly taken by those who extol justice and
blame injustice, from the earliest poets down to the present
day.[39] What they praise is not justice _per se_, but
the reputation which the just man obtains, and the consequences
flowing from it. What they blame is not injustice _per se_,
but its results. They never commend, nor even mention, justice as
it exists in and moulds the internal mind and character of the
just man; even though he be unknown, misconceived and detested, by
Gods as well as by men. Nor do they ever talk of the internal and
intrinsic effects of injustice upon the mind of the unjust man,
but merely of his ulterior prospects. They never attempt to show
that injustice itself, in the mind of the unjust man, is the
gravest intrinsic evil: and justice in the mind of the just man,
the highest intrinsic good: apart from consequences on either
side. If you had all held this language from the beginning, and
had impressed upon us such persuasion from our childhood, there
would have been no necessity for our keeping watch upon each other
to prevent injustice. Every man would have been the best watch
upon himself, through fear lest by becoming unjust he might take
into his own bosom the gravest evil.[40]
[Footnote 39: Plat. Rep. ii. p. 366 D-E. [Greek: pa/ntôn u(mô=n,
o(/soi e)paine/tai phate\ dikaiosu/nês ei)=nai, a)po\ tô=n e)x
a)rchê=s ê(rô/ôn a)rxa/menoi, o(/sôn lo/goi leleimme/noi, me/chri
tô=n nu=n a)nthrô/pôn, ou)dei\s pô/pote e)/psexen a)diki/an ou)d'
e)pê/|nese dikaiosu/nên a)/llôs ê)\ do/xas te kai\ tima\s kai\
dôrea\s ta\s a)p' au)tô=n duna/mei e)n tê=| tou= e)/chontos
psuchê=| e)no\n kai\ lantha/non theou/s te kai\ a)nthrô/pous,
ou)dei\s pô/pote ou)/t' e)n poiê/sei ou)/t' e)n i)di/ois lo/gois
e)pexê=lthen i(kanô=s tô=| lo/gô|], &c. Compare p. 362 E.
Whoever reads this, will see that Plato does not intend (as most
of his commentators assert) that the arguments which Sokrates
combats in the Republic were the invention of Protagoras,
Prodikus, and other Sophists of the Platonic century.]
[Footnote 40: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 A. [Greek: ei) ga\r
ou)/tôs e)le/geto e)x a)rchê=s u(po\ pa/ntôn u(mô=n, kai\ e)k
ne/ôn ê(ma=s e)pei/thete, ou)k a)n a)llê/lous e)phula/ttomen mê\
a)dikei=n, a)ll' au)to\s au(tou= ê)=n e(/kastos phu/lax, dediô\s
mê\ a)dikô=n tô=| megi/stô| kakô=| xu/noikos ê)=|.]]
[Side-note: Adeimantus calls upon Sokrates to recommend and
enforce Justice on its own grounds, and to explain how Justice in
itself benefits the mind of the just man.]
"Here therefore is a deficiency in the argument on behalf of
justice, which I call upon you,[41] Sokrates, who have employed
all your life in these meditations, to supply. You have declared
justice to be good indeed for its consequences, but still more of
a good from its own intrinsic nature. Explain how it is good, and
how injustice is evil, in its own intrinsic nature: what effect
each produces on the mind, so as to deserve such an appellation.
Omit all notice of consequences accruing to the just or unjust
man, from the opinion, favourable or otherwise, entertained
towards him by others. You must even go farther: you must suppose
that both of them are misconceived, and that the just man is
disgraced and punished as if he were unjust--the unjust man
honoured and rewarded as if he were just. This is the only way of
testing the real intrinsic value of justice and injustice,
considered in their effects upon the mind. If you expatiate on the
consequences--if you regard justice as in itself indifferent, but
valuable on account of the profitable reputation which it
procures, and injustice as in itself profitable, but dangerous to
the unjust man from the hostile sentiment and damage which it
brings upon him--the real drift of your exhortation will be, to
make us aspire to be unjust in reality, but to aim at maintaining
a reputation of justice along with it. In that line of argument
you will concede substantially the opinion of Thrasymachus--That
justice is another man's good, the advantage of the more powerful:
and injustice the good or profit of the agent, but detrimental to
the weaker."[42]
[Footnote 41: Plat. Rep. ii. p. 367 E. [Greek: dio/ti pa/nta to\n
bi/on ou)de\n a)/llo skopô=n dielê/luthas ê)\ tou=to] (_you_,
Sokrates).]
[Footnote 42: Plat. Republic, ii. p. 367 C-D.]
[Side-note: Relation of Glaukon and Adeimantus to
Thrasymachus.]
With the invocation here addressed to Sokrates, Adeimantus
concludes his discourse. Like Glaukon, he disclaims participation
in the sentiments which the speech embodies. Both of them,
professing to be dissatisfied with the previous refutation of
Thrasymachus by Sokrates, call for a deeper exposition of the
subject. Both of them then enunciate a doctrine, resembling
partially, though not entirely, that of Thrasymachus--but without
his offensive manner, and with superior force of argument. They
propose it as a difficult problem, which none but Sokrates can
adequately solve. He accepts the challenge, though with apparent
diffidence: and we now enter upon his solution, which occupies the
remaining eight books and a half of the Republic. All these last
books are in fact expository, though in the broken form of
dialogue. The other speakers advance scarce any opinions for
Sokrates to confute, but simply intervene with expressions of
assent, or doubt, or demand for farther information.
[Side-note: Statement of the question as it stands after the
speeches of Glaukon and Adeimantus. What Sokrates undertakes to
prove.]
I here repeat the precise state of the question, which is very apt
to be lost amidst the mæanderings of a Platonic dialogue.
First, What is Justice? Sokrates had declared at the close of
the first book, that he did not know what Justice was; and that
therefore he could not possibly decide, whether it was a virtue or
not:--nor whether the possessor of it was happy or not.
Secondly, To which of the three classes of good things does
Justice belong? To the second class--_i. e._ things good
_per se_, and good also in their consequences? Or to the
third class--_i. e._ things not good _per se_, but good
only in their consequences? Sokrates replies (in the beginning of
the second book) that it belongs to the second class.
Evidently, these two questions cannot stand together. In answering
the second, Sokrates presupposes a certain determination of the
first; inconsistent with that unqualified ignorance, of which he
had just made profession. Sokrates now professes to know, not
merely that Justice is a good, but to what class of good things it
belongs. The first question has thus been tacitly dropped without
express solution, and has given place to the second. Yet Sokrates,
in providing his answer to the second, includes implicitly an
answer to the first, so far as to assume that Justice is a good
thing, and proceeds to show in what way it is good.
Some say that Justice is good (_i.e._ that it ensures, or at
least contributes to, the happiness of the agent), but not _per
se_: only in its ulterior consequences. Taken _per se_, it
imposes privation, loss, self-denial; diminishing instead of
augmenting the agent's happiness. But taken along with its
results, this preliminary advance is more than adequately repaid;
since without it the agent would not obtain from others that
reciprocity of justice, forbearance, and good treatment without
which his life would be intolerable.
If this last opinion be granted, Glaukon argues that Justice would
indeed be good for weak and middling agents, but not for men of
power and energy, who had a good chance of extorting the benefit
without paying the antecedent price. And Thrasymachus, carrying
this view still farther, assumes that there are in every society
men of power who despotise over the rest; and maintains that
Justice consists, for the society generally, in obeying the orders
of these despots. It is all gain to the strong, all loss to the
weak. These latter profit by it in no other way than by saving
themselves from farther punishment or ill usage on the part of the
strong.
[Side-note: Position to be proved by Sokrates--Justice makes
the just man happy _per se_, whatever be its results.]
Sokrates undertakes to maintain the opposite--That Justice is a
good _per se_, ensuring the happiness of the agent by its
direct and intrinsic effects on the mind: whatever its ulterior
consequences may be. He maintains indeed that these ulterior
consequences are also good: but that they do not constitute the
paramount benefit, or the main recommendation of Justice: that the
good of Justice _per se_ is much greater. In this point of
view, Justice is not less valuable and necessary to the strong
than to the weak. He proceeds to show, what Justice is, and how it
is beneficial _per se_ to the agent, apart from consequences:
also, what Injustice is, and how it is injurious to the agent
_per se_, apart from consequences.[43]
[Footnote 43: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 368 seq.]
[Side-note: Argument of Sokrates to show what Justice
is--Assumed analogy between the city and the individual.]
He begins by affirming the analogy between an entire city or
community, and each individual man or agent. There is justice (he
says) in the entire city--and justice in each individual man. In
the city, the characteristics of Justice are stamped in larger
letters or magnified, so as to be more easily legible. We will
therefore first read them in the city, and then apply the lesson
to explain what appears in smaller type in the individual man.[44]
We will trace the steps by which a city is generated, in order
that we may see how justice and injustice spring up in it.
[Footnote 44: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 368-369.]
It is in this way that Plato first conducts us to the formation of
a political community. A parallel is assumed between the entire
city and each individual man: the city is a man on a great
scale--the man is a city on a small scale. Justice belongs both to
one and to the other. The city is described and analysed, not merely
as a problem for its own sake, but in order that the relation
between its constituent parts may throw light on the analogous
constituent parts, which are assumed to exist in each individual
man.[45]
[Footnote 45: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 A. [Greek: tê\n tou=
mei/zonos o(moio/têta e)n tê=| tou= e)la/ttonos i)de/a|
e)piskopou=ntes.]]
[Side-note: Fundamental principle, to which communities of
mankind owe their origin--Reciprocity of want and service between
individuals--No individual can suffice to himself.]
The fundamental principle (Sokrates affirms) to which cities
or communities owe their origin, is, existence of wants and
necessities in all men. No single man is sufficient for himself:
every one is in want of many things, and is therefore compelled to
seek communion or partnership with neighbours and auxiliaries.
Reciprocal dealings begin: each man gives to others, and receives
from others, under the persuasion that it is better for him to do
so.[46] Common needs, helplessness of individuals apart,
reciprocity of service when they are brought together--are the
generating causes of this nascent association. The simplest
association, comprising the mere necessaries of life, will consist
only of four or five men: the husbandman, builder, weaver,
shoemaker, &c. It is soon found advantageous to all, that each
of these should confine himself to his own proper business: that
the husbandman should not attempt to build his own house or make
his own shoes, but should produce corn enough for all, and
exchange his surplus for that of the rest in their respective
departments. Each man has his own distinct aptitudes and
dispositions; so that he executes both more work and better work,
by employing himself exclusively in the avocation for which he is
suited. The division of labour thus becomes established, as
reciprocally advantageous to all. This principle soon extends
itself: new wants arise: the number of different employments is
multiplied. Smiths, carpenters, and other artisans, find a place:
also shepherds and herdsmen, to provide oxen for the farmer, wool
and hides for the weaver and the shoemaker. Presently a farther
sub-division of labour is introduced for carrying on exchange and
distribution: markets are established: money is coined: foreign
merchants will import and export commodities: dealers, men of weak
body, and fit for sedentary work, will establish themselves to
purchase wholesale the produce brought by the husbandman, and to
sell it again by retail in quantities suitable for distribution.
Lastly, the complement of the city will be made up by a section of
labouring men who do jobs for hire: men of great bodily strength,
though not adding much to the intelligence of the community.[47]
[Footnote 46: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369.]
[Footnote 47: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 371.
It is remarkable that in this first outline of the city Plato
recognises only free labour, not slave labour.]
[Side-note: Moderate equipment of a sound and healthy
city--Few wants.]
Such is the full equipment of the sound and healthy city, confined
to what is simple and necessary. Those who compose it will have
sufficient provision of wheat and barley, for loaves and cakes--of
wine to drink--of clothing and shoes--of houses for shelter, and
of myrtle and yew twigs for beds. They will enjoy their cheerful
social festivals, with wine, garlands, and hymns to the Gods. They
will take care not to beget children in numbers greater than their
means, knowing that the consequence thereof must be poverty or
war.[48] They will have, as condiment, salt and cheese, olives,
figs, and chestnuts, peas, beans, and onions. They will pass their
lives in peace, and will die in a healthy old age, bequeathing a
similar lot to their children. Justice and injustice, which we are
seeking for, will be founded on a certain mode of mutual want and
dealing with each other.[49]
[Footnote 48: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 372 B-C. [Greek: ou)ch
u(pe\r tê\n ou)si/an poiou/menoi tou\s pai=das, eu)labou/menoi
peni/an ê)\ po/lemon.]]
[Footnote 49: Plato, Republ. ii. p. 372 A. [Greek: e)n au)tô=n
tou/tôn chrei/a| tini\ tê=| pro\s a)llê/lous.]]
You feed your citizens, Sokrates (observes Glaukon), as if you
were feeding pigs. You must at least supply them with as many
sweets and condiments as are common at Athens: and with beds and
tables besides.
[Side-note: Enlargement of the city--Multiplied wants and
services. First origin of war and strife with neighbours--It
arises out of these multiplied wants.]
I understand you (replies Sokrates): you are not satisfied with a
city of genuine simplicity: you want a city luxurious and
inflated. Well then--we will suppose it enlarged until it
comprehends all the varieties of elegant and costly enjoyment:
gold, silver, and ivory: musicians and painters in their various
branches: physicians: and all the crowd of attendants required for
a society thus enlarged. Such extension of consumption will carry
with it a numerous population, who cannot be maintained from the
lands belonging to the city. We shall be obliged to make war upon
our neighbours and seize some of their lands. They too will do the
same by us, if they have acquired luxurious habits. Here we see
the first genesis of war, with all its consequent evils: springing
from the acquisition of wealth, beyond the limit of necessity.[50]
Having war upon our hands, we need soldiers, and a
considerable camp of them. Now war is essentially a separate craft
and function, requiring to be carried on by persons devoted to it,
who have nothing else to do. We laid down from the beginning, that
every citizen ought to confine himself exclusively to that
business for which he was naturally fit; and that no one could be
allowed to engage in two distinct occupations. This rule is above
all things essential for the business of war. The soldier must
perform the duties of a soldier, and undertake no others.[51]
[Footnote 50: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 373.]
[Footnote 51: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 374.]
[Side-note: Separate class of soldiers or Guardians. One man
cannot do well more than one business. Character required in the
Guardians--Mildness at home with pugnacity against enemies.]
The functions of these soldiers are more important than those of
any one else. Upon them the security of the whole community
depends. They are the Guardians of the city: or rather, those few
seniors among them, who are selected from superior merit and
experience, and from a more perfect education to exercise command,
are the proper Guardians: while the remaining soldiers are their
Auxiliaries.[52] These Guardians, or Guardians and their
Auxiliaries, must be first chosen with the greatest care, to
ensure that they have appropriate natural dispositions: next,
their training and education must be continued as well as
systematic. Appropriate natural dispositions are difficult to
find: for we require the coincidence of qualities which are rarely
found together. The Auxiliaries must be mild and gentle towards
their fellow citizens, passionate and fierce towards enemies. They
must be like generous dogs, full of kindness towards those whom
they know, angrily disposed towards those whom they do not
know.[53]
[Footnote 52: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 414 B.]
[Footnote 53: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376.]
[Side-note: Peculiar education necessary, musical as well as
gymnastical.]
Assuming children of these dispositions to be found, we must
provide for them the best training and education. The training
must be twofold: musical, addressed to the mind: gymnastical,
addressed to the body--pursuant to the distribution dating from
ancient times.[54] Music includes all training by means of words
or sounds: speech and song, recital and repetition, reading
and writing, &c.
[Footnote 54: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376 E. [Greek: Ti/s ou)=n ê(
paidei/a? ê)\ chalepo\n eu(rei=n belti/ô tê=s u(po\ tou= pollou=
chro/nou eu(rême/nês e)/sti de/ pou ê( me\n e)pi\ sô/masi
gumnastikê/, ê( d' e)pi\ psuchê=| mousikê/.]
This appeal of Plato to antiquity and established custom deserves
notice.]
[Side-note: Musical education, by fictions as well as by
truth. Fictions addressed to the young: the religious legends now
circulating are often pernicious: censorship necessary.]
The earliest training of every child begins from the stories or
fables which he hears recounted: most of which are false, though
some among them are true. We must train the child partly by means
of falsehood, partly by means of truth: and we must begin first
with the falsehood. The tenor of these fictions, which the child
first hears, has a powerful effect in determining his future
temper and character. But such fictions as are now currently
repeated, will tend to corrupt his mind, and to form in him
sentiments and opinions adverse to those which we wish him to
entertain in after life. We must not allow the invention and
circulation of stories at the pleasure of the authors: we must
establish a censorship over all authors; licensing only such of
their productions as we approve, and excluding all the rest,
together with most of those now in circulation.[55] The fables
told by Homer, Hesiod, and other poets, respecting the Gods and
Heroes, are in very many cases pernicious, and ought to be
suppressed. They are not true; and even were they true, ought not
to be mentioned before children. Stories about battles between the
Gods and the Giants, or quarrels among the Gods themselves, are
mischievous, whether intended as allegories or not: for young
hearers cannot discriminate the allegorical from the literal.[56]
[Footnote 55: Plato, Republ. ii. p. 377 C. [Greek: ô(=n de\ nu=n
le/gousi tou\s pollou\s e)kblête/on.]
Compare the animadversions in Sextus Empiricus about the
mischievous doctrines to be found in the poets, adv. Mathematicos,
i. s. 276-293.]
[Footnote 56: Plato, Republ. p. 378 D.]
[Side-note: Orthodox type to be laid down: all poets are
required to conform their legends to it. The Gods are causes of
nothing but good: therefore they are causes of few things. Great
preponderance of actual evil.]
I am no poet (continues the Platonic Sokrates), nor can I pretend
to compose legends myself: but I shall lay down a type of
theological orthodoxy, to which all the divine legends in our city
must conform. Every poet must proclaim that the Gods are good, and
therefore cannot be the cause of anything except good. No poet can
be allowed to describe the Gods (according to what we now read in
Homer and elsewhere) as dispensing both good and evil to mankind.
The Gods must be announced as causes of all the good which
exists, but other causes must be found for all the evil: the Gods
therefore are causes of comparatively few things, since bad things
are far more abundant among us than good.[57] No poetical tale can
be tolerated which represents the Gods as assuming the forms of
different persons, and going about to deceive men into false
beliefs.[58] Falsehood is odious both to Gods and to men: though
there are some cases in which it is necessary as a precaution
against harm, towards enemies, or even towards friends during
seasons of folly or derangement.[59] But none of these exceptional
circumstances can apply to the Gods.
[Footnote 57: Plato, Republ. ii. p. 379 C. [Greek: Ou)d' a)/ra o(
theo/s, e)peidê\ a)gatho/s, pa/ntôn a)\n ei)/ê ai)/tios, ô(s oi(
polloi\ le/gousin, a)ll' o)li/gôn me\n toi=s a)nthrô/pois
ai)/tios, pollô=n de\ a)nai/tios; polu\ ga\r e)la/ttô ta)gatha\
tô=n kakô=n ê(mi=n. Kai\ tô=n me\n a)gathô=n ou)de/na a)/llon
ai)tiate/on, tô=n de\ kakô=n a)/ll' a)/tta dei= zêtei=n ta\
ai)/tia, a)ll' ou) to\n theo/n.]]
[Footnote 58: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 380-381.
Dacier blames Plato for this as an error, saying, that God may
appear, and has appeared to men, under the form of an Angel or of
some man whom he has created after his own image (Traduction de
Platon, tom. i. p. 172).]
[Footnote 59: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 382 C.]
[Side-note: The Guardians must not fear death. No terrible
descriptions of Hades must be presented to them: no intense
sorrow, nor violent nor sensual passion, must be recounted either
of Gods or Heroes.]
It is indispensable to inspire these youthful minds with courage,
and to make them fear death as little as possible. But the
terrific descriptions, given by the poets, of Hades and the
underworld, are above all things likely to aggravate the fear of
death. Such descriptions must therefore be interdicted, as neither
true nor useful. Even if poetically striking, they
are all the more pernicious to be listened to by youths
whom we wish to train up as spirited free-men, fearing enslavement
more than death.[60] We must also prohibit the representations of
intense grief and distress, imputed by Homer to Heroes or Gods, to
Achilles, Priam, or Zeus, for the death of friends and relatives.
A perfectly reasonable man will account death no great evil,
either for himself or for his friend: he will be, in a peculiar
degree, sufficient to himself for his own happiness, and will
therefore endure with comparative equanimity the loss of friends,
relatives, or fortune.[61] We must teach youth to be ashamed of
indulging in immoderate grief or in violent laughter.[62] We must
teach them also veracity and temperance, striking out all
those passages in Homer which represent the Gods or Heroes as
incontinent, sensual, furiously vindictive, reckless of
obligation, or money-loving.[63] The poets must either not recount
such proceedings at all, or must not ascribe them to Gods and
Heroes.
[Footnote 60: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 386-387.]
[Footnote 61: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 387 D-E.]
[Footnote 62: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 388 B-E.]
[Footnote 63: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 390-391.]
[Side-note: Type for all narratives respecting men.]
We have thus prescribed the model to which all poets must
accommodate their narratives respecting Gods and Heroes. We ought
now to set out a similar model for their narratives respecting
men. But this is impossible, until our present investigation is
brought to a close: because one of the worst misrepresentations
which the poets give of human affairs, is, when they say that
there are many men unjust, yet happy--just, yet still
miserable:--that successful injustice is profitable, and that justice
is a benefit to other persons, but a loss to the agent. We affirm
that this is a misrepresentation; but we cannot assume it as such at
present, since the present enquiry is intended to prove that it is
so.[64]
[Footnote 64: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 392 C.]
[Side-note: Style of narratives. The poet must not practise
variety of imitation: he must not speak in the name of bad
characters.]
From the substance of these stories we pass to the style and
manner. The poet will recount either in his own person, by simple
narrative: or he will assume the characters and speak in the names
of others, thus making his composition imitative. He will imitate
every diversity of character, good and bad, wise and foolish. This
however cannot be tolerated in our city. We can permit no
imitation except that of the reasonable and virtuous man. Every
man in our city exercises one simple function: we have no
double-faced or many-faced citizens. We shall respectfully dismiss
the poet who captivates us by variety of characters, and shall be
satisfied with the dry recital of simple stories useful in their
tendency, expressing the feeling of the reasonable man and no
other.[65]
[Footnote 65: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 396-398.]
[Side-note: Rhythm and Melody regulated. None but simple and
grave music allowed: only the Dorian and Phrygian moods, with the
lyre and harp.]
We must farther regulate the style of the Odes and Songs,
consistent with what has been already laid down. Having prescribed
what the sense of the words must be, we must now give directions
about melody and rhythm. We shall permit nothing but simple music,
calculated less to please the ear, than to inspire grave,
dignified, and resolute sentiment. We shall not allow either the
wailing Lydian, or the soft and convivial Ionic mood: but only the
Phrygian and Dorian moods. Nor shall we tolerate either the fife,
or complicated stringed instruments: nothing except the lyre and
harp, with the panspipe for rural abodes.[66] The rhythm or
measure must also be simple, suitable to the movements of a calm
and moderate man. Both good rhythm, graceful and elegant speaking,
and excellence of sense, flow from good and virtuous dispositions,
tending to inspire the same dispositions in others:[67] just as
bad rhythm, ungraceful and indecorous demeanour, defective
proportion, &c., are companions of bad speech and bad
dispositions. Contrasts of this kind pervade not only speech and
song, but also every branch of visible art: painting,
architecture, weaving, embroidery, pottery, and even the natural
bodies of animals and plants. In all of them we distinguish grace
and beauty, the accompaniments of a good and sober
disposition--from ungracefulness and deformity, visible signs of
the contrary disposition. Now our youthful Guardians, if they are
ever to become qualified for their functions, must be trained to
recognise and copy such grace and beauty.[68] For this purpose our
poets, painters, architects, and artisans, must be prohibited from
embodying in their works any ungraceful or unseemly type. None
will be tolerated as artists, except such as can detect and embody
the type of the beautiful. Our youth will thus insensibly contract
exclusive familiarity, both through the eye and through the ear,
with beauty in its various manifestations: so that their minds
will be brought into harmonious preparation for the subsequent
influence of beautiful discourse.[69]
[Footnote 66: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 398-399.]
[Footnote 67: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 400 A.]
[Footnote 68: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 400-401.]
[Footnote 69: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 401 C-D.]
[Side-note: Effect of musical training of the mind--makes
youth love the Beautiful and hate the Ugly.]
This indeed (continues Sokrates) is the principal benefit arising
from musical tuition, that the internal mind of a youth becomes
imbued with rhythm and harmony. Hence he learns to commend and be
delighted with the beautiful, and to hate and blame what is ugly;
before he is able to render any reason for his sentiments: so that
when mature age arrives, his sentiments are found in unison
with what reason enjoins, and already predisposed to welcome
it.[70] He becomes qualified to recognise the Forms of Temperance,
Courage, Liberality, Magnanimity, and their embodiments in
particular persons. To a man brought up in such sentiments, no
spectacle can be so lovely as that of youths combining beauty of
mental disposition with beauty of exterior form. He may indeed
tolerate some defects in the body, but none in the mind.[71] His
love, being genuine and growing out of musical and regulated
contemplations, will attach itself to what is tempered and
beautiful; not to the intense pleasures of sense, which are
inconsistent with all temperance. Such will be the attachments
subsisting in our city, and such is the final purpose of musical
training--To generate love of the Beautiful.[72]
[Footnote 70: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 402 A.]
[Footnote 71: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 402 D-E.]
[Footnote 72: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 403 C. [Greek: dei= de/ pou
teleuta=|n ta\ mousika\ ei)s ta\ tou= kalou= e)rôtika/.]]
[Side-note: Training of the body--simple and sober. No
refined medical art allowed. Wounds or temporary ailments treated;
but sickly frames cannot be kept alive.]
We next proceed to gymnastic training, which must be simple, for
the body--just as our musical training was simple for the mind. We
cannot admit luxuries and refinements either in the one or in the
other. Our gymnastics must impart health and strength to the body,
as our music imparts sobriety to the mind.[73] We shall require
few courts of justice and few physicians. Where many of either are
needed, this is a proof that ill-regulated minds and
diseased bodies abound. It would be a disgrace to our Guardians if
they could not agree on what is right and proper among themselves,
without appealing to the decision of others. Physicians too are
only needed for wounds or other temporary and special diseases. We
cannot admit those refinements of the medical art, and that
elaborate nomenclature and classification of diseases, which the
clever sons of Æsculapius have invented, in times more recent than
Æsculapius himself.[74] He knew, but despised, such artifices;
which, having been devised chiefly by Herodikus, serve only to
keep alive sickly and suffering men--who are disqualified for all
active duty through the necessity of perpetual attention to
health,--and whose lives are worthless both to themselves and to
the city. In our city, every man has his distinct and special
function, which he is required to discharge. If he be disqualified
by some temporary ailment, the medical art will be well employed
in relieving and restoring him to activity: but he has no leisure
to pass his life as a patient under cure, and if he be permanently
unfit to fill his place in the established cycle of duties, his
life ought not to be prolonged by art, since it is useless to
himself and useless to the city also.[75] Our medical treatment
for evils of the body, and our judicial treatment for evils of the
mind, must be governed by analogous principles. Where body and
mind are sound at bottom, we must do our best to heal temporary
derangements: but if a man has a body radically unsound, he must
be suffered to die--and if he has a mind unsound and incurable, he
must be put to death by ourselves.[76]
[Footnote 73: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 404 B.]
[Footnote 74: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 405 D. [Greek: phu/sas te
kai\ kata/r)r(ous nosê/masin o)no/mata ti/thesthai a)nagka/zein
tou\s kompsou\s A)sklêpia/das, ou)k ai)schro\n dokei=? Kai\ ma/l',
e)/phê, ô(s a)lêthô=s kaina\ tau=ta kai\ a)/topa nosêma/tôn
o)no/mata. Oi(=a, ô(s oi)=mai, ou)k ê)=n e)p' A)sklêpiou=.] Also
406 C.]
[Footnote 75: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 406 C. [Greek: ou)deni\
scholê\ dia\ bi/ou ka/mnein i)atreuome/nô|.] 406 D: [Greek: ou)
scholê\ ka/mnein ou)de\ lusitelei= ou(/tô zê=n, nosê/mati to\n
nou=n prose/chonta, tê=s de\ prokeime/nês e)rgasi/as a)melou=nta.]
407 D-E: [Greek: a)lla\ to\n mê\ duna/menon e)n tê=|
kathestêkui/a| perio/dô| zê\n, mê\ oi)/esthai dei=n therapeu/ein,
ô(s ou)/te au(tô=| ou)/te po/lei lusitelê=.] P. 408 A.]
[Footnote 76: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 409-410.]
[Side-note: Value of Gymnastic in imparting courage to the
mind--Gymnastic and Music necessary to correct each other.]
Gymnastic training does some good in strengthening the body, but
it is still more serviceable in imparting force and courage to the
mind. As regards the mind, gymnastic and music form the
indispensable supplement one to the other. Gymnastic by itself
makes a man's nature too savage and violent: he acquires no relish
for knowledge, comes to hate discourse, and disdains verbal
persuasion.[77] On the other hand, music by itself makes him soft,
cowardly, and sensitive, unfit for danger or hardship. The
judicious combination of the two is the only way to form a
well-balanced mind and character.[78]
[Footnote 77: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 411 D. [Greek: Misolo/gos
dê\ o( toiou=tos gi/gnetai kai\ a)/mousos, kai\ peithoi= me\n dia\
lo/gôn ou)de\n e)/ti chrê=tai], &c.]
[Footnote 78: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 410-411.]
[Side-note: Out of the Guardians a few of the very best must
be chosen as Elders or Rulers--highly educated and severely
tested.]
Such must be the training, from childhood upwards, of these
Guardians and Auxiliaries of our city. We must now select from
among these men themselves, a few to be Governors or chief
Guardians; the rest serving as auxiliaries. The oldest and best of
them must be chosen for this purpose, those who possess in the
greatest perfection the qualities requisite for Guardians.
They must be intelligent, capable, and solicitous for the welfare
of the city. Now a man is solicitous for the welfare of that which
he loves. He loves those whose interests he believes to be the
same as his own; those whose well-being he believes to coincide
with his own well-being[79]--the contrary, with the contrary. The
Guardians chosen for Chiefs must be those who are most thoroughly
penetrated with such sympathy; who have preserved most tenaciously
throughout all their lives the resolution to do every thing which
they think best for the city, and nothing which they do not think
to be best for it. They must be watched and tested in temptations
pleasurable as well as painful, to see whether they depart from
this resolution. The elders who have best stood such trial, must
be named Governors.[80] These few will be the chief Guardians or
Rulers: the remaining Guardians will be their auxiliaries or
soldiers, acting under their orders.
[Footnote 79: Plato, Republ. iii. p. 412 C. [Greek: Ou)kou=n
phroni/mous te ei)s tou=to dei= u(pa/rchein kai\ dunatou\s kai\
e)/ti kêdemo/nas tê=s po/leôs? E)/sti tau=ta. Kê/doito de/ g' a)/n
tis ma/lista tou/tou o(\ tugcha/noi philô=n. A)na/gkê. Kai\ mê\n
tou=to/ g' a)\n ma/lista philoi=, ô(=| xumphe/rein ê(goi=to ta\
au)ta\ kai\ e(autô=| kai\ o(/tan ma/lista e)kei/nou me\n eu)=
pra/ttontos oi)/oito xumbai/nein kai\ e(autô=| ei)= pra/ttein, mê\
de/, tou)nanti/on.]]
[Footnote 80: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 413-414.
Refer to De Leg. (I. p. 633-636-637) about resisting pleasure as
well as pain.]
[Side-note: Fundamental creed required to be planted in the
minds of all the citizens respecting their breed and
relationship.]
Here then our city will take its start; the body of Guardians
marching in arms under the orders of their Chiefs, and encamping
in a convenient acropolis, from whence they may best be able to
keep order in the interior and to repel foreign attack.[81] But it
is indispensable that both they and the remaining citizens should
be made to believe a certain tale,--which yet is altogether
fictitious and of our own invention. They must be told that they
are all earthborn, sprung from the very soil which they inhabit:
all therefore brethren, from the same mother Earth: the
auxiliaries or soldiers, born with their arms and equipments. But
there was this difference (we shall tell them) between the
different brethren. Those fit for Chiefs or Rulers, were born with
a certain mixture of gold in their constitution: those fit for
soldiers or Guardians simply, with a like mixture of silver: the
remainder, with brass or iron. In most individual cases, each
of these classes will beget an offspring like themselves. But
exceptions will sometimes happen, in which the golden man will
have a child of silver, or brass,--or the brazen or iron man, a
child of nobler metal than his own. Now it is of the last
importance that the Rulers should keep watch to preserve the
purity of these breeds. If any one of their own children should
turn out to be of brass or iron, they must place him out among the
husbandmen or artisans: if any of the brazen or iron men should
chance to produce a child of gold, they must receive him among
themselves, since he belongs to them by his natural constitution.
Upon the maintenance of these distinct breeds, each in its
appropriate function, depends the entire fate of the city: for an
oracle has declared that it will perish, if ever iron or brazen
men shall become its Guardians.[82]
[Footnote 81: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 415 D.]
[Footnote 82: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 414-415.]
[Side-note: How is such a fiction to be accredited in the
first instance? Difficulty extreme, of first beginning; but if
once accredited, it will easily transmit itself by tradition.]
It is indispensable (continues Sokrates) that this fiction should
be circulated and accredited, as the fundamental, consecrated,
unquestioned, creed of the whole city, from which the feeling of
harmony and brotherhood among the citizens springs. But how can we
implant such unanimous and unshaken belief, in a story altogether
untrue? Similar fables have often obtained implicit credence in
past times: but no such case has happened of late, and I question
whether it could happen now.[83] The postulate seems extravagant:
do _you_ see by what means it could be realised?--I see no
means (replies Glaukon) by which the fiction could be first passed
off and accredited, among these men themselves: but if it were
once firmly implanted, in any one generation, I do not doubt that
their children and descendants would inherit and perpetuate
it.[84] We must be satisfied with thus much (replies Sokrates):
assuming the thing to be done, and leaving the process of
implanting it to spontaneous and oracular inspiration.[85] I
now proceed with the description of the city.
[Footnote 83: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 414 B. [Greek: Ti/s a)\n
ou)=n ê(mi=n mêchanê\ ge/noito tô=n pseudô=n tô=n e)n de/onti
gignome/nôn, ô(=n dê\ nu=n e)le/gomen, gennai=o/n ti e(\n
pseudome/nous pei=sai ma/lista me\n kai\ au)tou\s tou\s
a)/rchontas, ei) de\ mê/, tê\n a)/llên po/lin? . . . Mêde\n
kaino/n, a)lla\ Phoinikiko/n ti, pro/teron me\n ê)/dê pollachou=
gegono/s, ô(/s phasin oi( poiêtai\ kai\ pepei/kasin, e)ph' ê(mô=n
de\ ou) gegono\s ou)d' oi)=da ei) geno/menon a)/n, pei=sai de\
suchnê=s peithou=s.]]
[Footnote 84: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 415 C-D [Greek: Tou=ton
ou)=n to\n mu=thon o(/pôs a)\n peisthei=en, e)/cheis tina\
mêchanê/n? Ou)damô=s, e)/phê, o(/pôs g' a)\n au)toi\ ou(=toi;
o(/pôs me/nt' a)\n oi( tou/tôn ui(ei=s kai\ oi( e)/peita, oi(/ t'
a)/lloi a)/nthrôpoi oi( u(/steron.]]
[Footnote 85: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 415 D. [Greek: Kai\ tou=to
me\n dê\ e(/xei o(/pê| a)\n au)to\ ê( phê/mê a)ga/gê|.]
[Side-note: Guardians to reside in barracks and mess
together; to have no private property or home; to be maintained by
contribution from the people.]
The Rulers and their auxiliaries the body of Guardians must be
lodged in residences, sufficient for shelter and comfort, yet
suitable for military men, and not for tradesmen. Every
arrangement must be made for rendering them faithful guardians of
the remaining citizens. It would be awful indeed, if they were to
employ their superior strength in oppressing instead of protecting
the flock entrusted to them. To ensure their gentleness and
fidelity, the most essential guarantee is to be found in the good
musical and gymnastic training which they will have received. But
this alone will not suffice. All the conditions of their lives
must be so determined, that they shall have the least possible
motive for committing injustice towards the other citizens. None
of them must have any separate property of his own, unless in
special case of proved necessity: nor any house or store cupboard
from which others are excluded. They must receive, from the
contributions of the remaining citizens, sufficient subsistence
for the health and comfort of military men, but nothing beyond.
They must live together in their camp or barrack, and dine
together at a public mess-table. They must not be allowed either
to possess gold and silver, or to drink in cups of those metals,
or to wear them as appendages to clothing, or even to have them
under the same roof. They must be told, that these metals, though
not forbidden to the other citizens, are forbidden to them,
because they have permanently inherent in their mental
constitution the divine gold and silver, which would be corrupted
by intermixture with human.[86]
[Footnote 86: Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 416-417.]
[Side-note: If the Guardians fail in these precautions, and
acquire private interests, the city will be ruined.]
If these precautions be maintained, the Guardians may be secure
themselves, and may uphold in security the entire city. But if the
precautions be relinquished--if the Guardians or Soldiers acquire
separate property in lands, houses, and money--they will then
become householders and husbandmen instead of Guardians or
Soldiers: hostile masters, instead of allies and protectors to
their fellow-citizens. They will hate their fellow-citizens, and
be hated by them in return: they will conspire against them, and
will be themselves conspired against. In this manner they will
pass their lives, dreading their enemies within far more than
their enemies without. They, and the whole city along with them,
will be perpetually on the brink of destruction.[87]
[Footnote 87: Plato, Republic, iii. p. 417 A-B.]
[Side-note: Complete unity of the city, every man performing
his own special function.]
But surely (remarks Adeimantus), according to this picture, your
Guardians or Soldiers, though masters of all the city, will be
worse off than any of the other citizens. They will be deprived of
those means of happiness which the others are allowed to enjoy.
Perhaps they will (replies Sokrates): yet I should not be
surprised if they were to be the happiest of all. Be that as it
may, however, my purpose is, not to make _them_ especially
happy, but to make the whole city happy. The Guardians can enjoy
only such happiness as consists with the due performance of their
functions as Guardians. Every man in our city must perform his
appropriate function, and must be content with such happiness as
his disposition will admit, subject to this condition.[88] In
regard to all the citizens without exception, it must be the duty
of the Guardians to keep out both riches and poverty, both of
which spoil the character of every one. No one must be rich, and
no one must be poor.[89] In case of war, the constant discipline
of our soldiers will be of more avail than money, in making them
efficient combatants against other cities.[90] Moreover, other
cities are divided against themselves: each is many cities, and
not one: poor and rich are at variance with each other, and
various fractions of each of these classes against other
fractions. Our city alone, constituted as I propose, will be
really and truly One. It will thus be the greatest of all cities,
even though it have only one thousand fighting men. It may be
permitted to increase, so long as it will preserve its complete
unity, but no farther.[91] Farthermore, each of our citizens is
one and not many: confined to that special function for which he
is qualified by his nature.
[Footnote 88: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 420-421.]
[Footnote 89: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 421 E.]
[Footnote 90: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 422 B.]
[Footnote 91: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 423 A.]
[Side-note: The maintenance of the city depends upon
that of the habits, character, and education of the Guardians.]
It will devolve upon our Guardians to keep up this form of
communion unimpaired; and they will have no difficulty in doing
so, as long as they maintain their own education and training
unimpaired. No change must be allowed either in the musical or
gymnastic training: especially not in the former, where changes
are apt to creep in, with pernicious effect.[92] Upon this
education depends the character and competence of the Guardians.
They will provide legislation in detail, which will be good, if
their general character is good--bad, on the contrary supposition.
If their character and the constitution of the city be defective
at the bottom, it is useless for us to prescribe regulations of
detail, as we would do for sick men. The laws in detail cannot be
good, while the general constitution of the city is bad. Those
teachers are mistaken who exhort us to correct the former, but to
leave the latter untouched.[93]
[Footnote 92: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 424 A.]
[Footnote 93: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 425-426.]
[Side-note: Religious legislation--Consult the Delphian
Apollo.]
In regard to religious legislation--the raising of temples,
arrangement of sacrifices, &c.--we must consult Apollo at
Delphi, and obey what he directs. We know nothing ourselves about
these matters, nor is there any other authority equally
trustworthy.[94]
[Footnote 94: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 427 B. [Greek: ta\ ga\r dê\
toiau=ta ou)/t' e)pista/metha ê(mei=s], &c.]
[Side-note: The city is now constituted as a good city--that
is, wise, courageous, temperate, just. Where is its Justice?]
Our city is now constituted and peopled (continues Sokrates). We
mast examine it, and see where we can find Justice and
Injustice--reverting to our original problem, which was, to know what
each of them was, and which of the two conferred happiness. Now assuming
our city to be rightly constituted, it will be perfectly good:
that is, it will be wise, courageous, temperate, and just. These
four constituents cover the whole: accordingly, if we can discover
and set out Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance--that which remains
afterwards will be Justice.[95]
[Footnote 95: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 427-428.]
[Side-note: First, where is the wisdom of the city? It
resides in the few elder Rulers.]
First, we can easily see where Wisdom resides. The city includes
in itself a great variety of cognitions, corresponding to all the
different functions in which its citizens are employed. But it is
not called _wise_, from its knowledge of husbandry, or of
brazier's and carpenter's craft: since these are specialties which
cover only a small fraction of its total proceedings. It is called
_wise_, or well-advised, from that variety of intelligence or
cognition which directs it as a whole, in its entire affairs: that
is, the intelligence possessed by the chief Guardians or Rulers.
Now the number of persons possessing this variety of intelligence
is smaller than the number of those who possess any other variety.
The wisdom of the entire city resides in this very small presiding
fraction, and in them alone.[96]
[Footnote 96: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 428-429.]
[Side-note: Where is the Courage? In the body of Guardians
or Soldiers.]
Next, we can also discern without difficulty in what fraction of
the city Courage resides. The city is called courageous from the
valour of those Guardians or Soldiers upon whom its defence rests.
These men will have learnt, in the course of their training, what
are really legitimate objects of fear, and what are not legitimate
objects of fear. To such convictions they will resolutely adhere,
through the force of mind implanted by their training, in defiance
of all disturbing impulses. It is these right convictions,
respecting the legitimate objects of fear, which I (says Sokrates)
call true political courage, when they are designedly inculcated
and worked in by regular educational authority: when they spring
up without any rational foundation, as in animals or slaves, I do
not call them Courage. The Courage of the entire city thus resides
in its Guardians or Soldiers.[97]
[Footnote 97: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 429-430.]
[Side-note: Where is the Temperance? It resides in all and
each, Rulers, Guardians, and People. Superiors rule and Inferiors
obey.]
Thirdly, wherein resides the Temperance of the city? Temperance
implies a due relation, proportion, or accord, between different
elements. The temperate man is called superior to himself: but
this expression, on first hearing, seems unmeaning, since the man
must also be inferior to himself. But the expression acquires a
definite meaning, when we recognise it as implying that there are
in the same man's mind better and worse elements: and that when
the better rules over the worse, he is called superior to himself,
or temperate--when the worse rules over the better, he is called
inferior to himself, or intemperate. Our city will be temperate,
because the better part of it, though smaller in number, rules
over the worse and inferior part, numerically greater. The
pleasures, pains, and desires of our few Rulers, which are
moderate and reasonable, are preponderant: controuling those of
the Many, which are miscellaneous, irregular, and violent. And
this command is exercised with the perfect consent and good-will
of the subordinates. The Many are not less willing to obey than
the Few to command. There is perfect unanimity between them as to
the point--Who ought to command, and who ought to obey? It is this
unanimity which constitutes the temperance of the city: which thus
resides, not in any one section of the city, like Courage and
Wisdom, but in all sections alike: each recognising and
discharging its legitimate function.[98]
[Footnote 98: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 431-432.]
[Side-note: Where is the Justice? In all and each of them
also. It consists in each performing his own special function, and
not meddling with the function of the others.]
There remains only Justice for us to discover. Wherein does the
Justice of the city reside? Not far off. Its justice consists in
that which we pointed out at first as the fundamental
characteristic of the city, when we required each citizen to
discharge one function, and one alone--that for which he was best
fitted by nature. That each citizen shall do his own work, and not
meddle with others in their work--that each shall enjoy his own
property, as well as do his own work--this is true Justice.[99] It
is the fundamental condition without which neither temperance, nor
courage, nor wisdom could exist; and it fills up the good
remaining after we have allowed for the effects of the preceding
three.[100] All the four are alike indispensable to make up the
entire Good of the city: Justice, or each person (man, woman,
freeman, slave, craftsman, guardian) doing his or her own
work--Temperance, or unanimity as to command and obedience between
Chiefs, Guardians, and the remaining citizens--Courage, or the
adherence of the Guardians to right reason, respecting what is
terrible and not terrible--Wisdom, or the tutelary superintendence
of the Chiefs, who protect each person in the enjoyment of his
own property.[101]
[Footnote 99: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 432-433. 433 A: [Greek:
Kai\ mê\n o(/ti ge to\ ta\ au(tou= pra/ttein kai\ mê\
polupragmonei=n dikaiosu/nê e)sti/, kai\ tou=to a)/llôn te pollô=n
a)kêko/amen, kai\ au)toi\ polla/kis ei)rê/kamen.]
433 E. [Greek: ê( tou= oi)kei/ou te kai\ e(autou= e(/xis te kai\
pra=xis dikaiosu/nê a)\n o(mologoi=to.]]
[Footnote 100: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 433 B. [Greek: dokei= moi
to\ u(po/loipon e)n tê=| po/lei ô(=n e)ske/mmetha, sôphrosu/nês
kai\ a)ndrei/as kai\ phronê/seôs, tou=to ei)=nai o(\ pa=sin
e)kei/nois tê\n du/namin pa/reschen ô(/ste e)ggene/sthai, kai\
e)ggenome/nois ge sôtêri/an pare/chein, e(/ôs per a)\n e)nê=|.]]
[Footnote 101: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 433 D.]
[Side-note: Injustice arises when any one part of the city
interferes with the functions of the other part, or undertakes
double functions.]
As justice consists in each person doing his own work, and not
meddling with that of another--so injustice occurs, when a person
undertakes the work of another instead of his own, or in addition
to his own. The mischief is not great, when such interference
takes place only in the subordinate functions: when, for example,
the carpenter pretends to do the work of the shoemaker, or _vice
versâ_; or when either of them undertake both. But the mischief
becomes grave and deplorable, when a man from the subordinate
functions meddles with the higher--when a craftsman, availing
himself of some collateral support, wealth or party or strength,
thrusts himself into the functions of a soldier or auxiliary--or
when the Guardian, by similar artifice, usurps the functions of a
Chief--or when any one person combines these several functions all
at once in himself. Herein consists the true injustice, ruinous to
the city: when the line of demarcation is confounded between these
three classes--men of business, Guardians, Chiefs. That each of
these classes should do its own work, is Justice: that either of
them should meddle with the work of the rest, and especially that
the subordinate should meddle with the business of the superior,
is Injustice, with ruin following in its train.[102] It is from
these opposite characteristics that the titles Just or Unjust will
be rightfully bestowed upon our city.
[Footnote 102: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 434 B-C. [Greek: ê( triô=n
a)/ra o)/ntôn genô=n polupragmosu/nê kai\ metabolê\ ei)s a)/llêla,
megi/stê te bla/bê tê=| po/lei kai\ o)rtho/tat' a)\n
prosagoreu/oito ma/lista kakourgi/a . . . Kakourgi/an de\ tê\n
megi/stên tê=s e(autou= po/leôs ou)k a)diki/an phê/seis ei)=nai? . . .
chrêmatistikou=, e)pikourikou=, phulakikou=, ge/nous
oi)keiopragi/a, . . . dikaiosu/nê t' a)\n ei)/ê, kai\ tê\n po/lin
dikai/an pa/rechoi.]]
[Side-note: Analogy of the city to the individual--Each man
is tripartite, having in his mind Reason, Energy, Appetite. These
three elements are distinct, and often conflicting.]
We must now apply, as we undertook to do, the analogy of the city
to the individual. The just man, so far forth as justice is
concerned, cannot differ from the just city. He must therefore
have in his own individual mind three distinct parts, elements, or
classes, corresponding to the three classes above distinguished in
the city. But is it the fact that there are in each man three such
mental constituents--three different classes, sorts, or varieties,
of mind?
To settle this point as it ought to be settled, would require
a stricter investigation than our present dialogue will permit:
but we may contribute something towards it.[103] It is manifest
that there exist different individuals in whom reason, energy
(courage or passion), and appetite, are separately and unequally
developed: thus in the Thracians there is a predominance of energy
or courage--in the Phoenicians of appetite--in the Athenians, of
intellect or reason. The question is, whether we employ one and
the same mind for all the three--reason, energy, and appetite; or
whether we do not employ a different mind or portion of mind, when
we exercise reason--another, when we are under the influence of
energy--and a third, when we follow appetite.[104]
[Footnote 103: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 435 C.
Schleiermacher (in the Introduction to his translation of the
Republic, p. 71) considers that this passage of the Republic is
intended to note as a desideratum the exposition in the Timæus;
wherein the constituent elements of mind or soul are more fully
laid down, and its connection with the fundamental elements of the
Kosmos.]
[Footnote 104: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 436 A.]
To determine this question, we must consider that the same thing
cannot at the same time do or suffer opposites, in the same
respect and with reference to the same thing. The same thing or
person cannot at the same time, and in the same respect, both
stand still and move. This may be laid down as an universal truth:
but since some may not admit it to be so, we will at any rate
assume it as an hypothesis.[105] Now in reference to the mind, we
experience at the same time various movements or affections
contrary to each other: assent and dissent--desire and aversion--the
attracting any thing to ourselves, and the repelling it from
ourselves: each of these is different from and contrary to the
other. As a specimen of desires, we will take thirst. When a man
is in this condition, his mind desires nothing else but to drink;
and strains entirely towards that object. If there be any thing
which drags back his mind when in this condition, it must be
something different from that which pulls him forward and attracts
him to drink. That which attracts him, and that which repels him,
cannot be the same: just as when the archer at the same time pulls
his bow towards him and pushes it away from him, it is one of his
hands that pulls and another that pushes.[106] Now it often
happens that a man athirst refuses to drink: there is something
within him that prompts him to drink, and something still more
powerful that forbids him. These two cannot be the same: one of
them is different from the other: that which prompts is appetite,
that which forbids is reason. The rational element of the mind is
in like manner something different or distinguishable from all the
appetites, which tend towards repletion and pleasure.
[Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 437 A.]
[Footnote 106: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 439 A-B.]
[Side-note: Reason, Energy, Appetite, in the individual--analogous
to Rulers, Guardians, Craftsmen in the city. Reason is
to rule Appetite. Energy assists Reason in ruling it.]
Here then we have two distinct species, forms, or kinds, existing
in the mind.[107] Besides these two, however, there is a third,
distinct from both: Energy, Passion, Courage, which neither
belongs to Appetite nor to individual Reason. Each of these three
acts apart from, and sometimes in contrariety to, each of the
others.[108] There are thus three distinct elements or varieties
of mind in the individual--Reason, Energy, Appetite: corresponding
to the three constituent portions of the city--The Chiefs or
Rulers--The Guardians or Soldiers--The Craftsmen, or the remaining
Community.[109] The Wisdom of the city resides in its Elders: that
of the individual in his Reason. The Courage of the city resides
in its Guardians or Soldiers: that of the individual in his
Energy. But in the city as well as in the individual, it is the
right and privilege of the rational element to exercise command,
because it alone looks to the welfare and advantage of the whole
compound:[110] it is the duty of the two other elements--the
energetic and the appetitive--to obey. It is moreover the special
function of the Guardians in the city to second the Chiefs in
enforcing obedience upon the Craftsmen: so also in the individual,
it is the special function of Energy or Courage to second Reason
in controuling Appetite.
[Footnote 107: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 439 E. [Greek: Tau=ta me\n
toi/nun du/o ê(mi=n ô(ri/sthô ei)/dê e)n psuchê=| e)no/nta],
&c.]
[Footnote 108: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 440-441.]
[Footnote 109: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 441 C. [Greek: ta\ au)ta\
me\n e)n po/lei, ta\ au)ta\ d' e)n e(no\s e(ka/stou tê=| psuchê=|
ge/nê e)nei=nai, kai\ i)/sa to\n a)rithmo/n.] 443 D: [Greek: ta\
e)n tê=| psuchê=| ge/nê], &c.]
[Footnote 110: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 441 E, 442 C. [Greek:
tô=| me\n logistikô=| a)/rchein prosê/kei, sophô=| o)/nti kai\
e)/chonti tê\n u(pe\r a(pa/sês tê=s psuchê=s promê/theian . . . .
Sopho\n de/ ge (e(/na e(/kaston kalou=men) e)kei/nô| tô=| smikrô=|
me/rei, tô=| o(\ ê)=rche/ t' e)n au)tô=| kai\ tau=ta parê/ggellen,
e)/chon au)= ka)kei=no e)pistê/mên e)n au(tô=| tê\n tou=
xumphe/rontos e(ka/stô| te kai\ o(/lô| tô=| koinô=| sphô=n au)tô=n
triô=n o)/ntôn.]]
[Side-note: A man is just when these different parts of his
mind exercise their appropriate functions without hindrance.]
These special functions of the separate parts being laid down,
Justice as well as Temperance will appear analogous in the
individual and in the city. Both Justice and Temperance reside in
all the parts equally: not in one of them exclusively, as Wisdom
and Courage reside. Justice and Temperance belong to the
subordinate as well as to the dominant parts. Justice exists when
each of the parts performs its own function, without encroaching
on the function of the others: Temperance exists when all the
parts are of one opinion as to the title of the higher or rational
element to exercise command.[111]
[Footnote 111: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 442 C, 443 B.]
A man as well as a city is just, when each of his three sorts or
varieties of mind confines itself to its own legitimate function:
when Reason reigns over and controuls the other two, and when
Energy seconds Reason in controuling Appetite. Such a man will not
commit fraud, theft, treachery, perjury, or any like
proceedings.[112] On the contrary, injustice exists when the parts
are in conflict with each other: when either of them encroaches on
the function of the other: or when those parts which ought to be
subordinate rise in insurrection against that which ought to be
superior.
[Footnote 112: Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 442-443.]
[Side-note: Justice and Injustice in the mind--what health
and disease are in the body.]
Justice is in the mind what health is in the body, when the parts
are so arranged as to controul and be controuled pursuant to the
dictates of nature. Injustice is in the mind what disease is in
the body, when the parts are so arranged as to controul and be
controuled contrary to the dictates of nature. Virtue is thus the
health, beauty, good condition of the mind: Vice is the disease,
ugliness, weakness, of the mind.[113]
[Footnote 113: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 444 B-C.]
[Side-note: Original question now resumed--Does Justice make
a man happy, and Injustice make him miserable, apart from all
consequences? Answer--Yes.]
Having thus ascertained the nature of justice and injustice, we
are now in a condition (continues Sokrates) to reply to the
question proposed for investigation--Is it profitable to a man to
be just and to do justice _per se_, even though he be not
known as just either by Gods or men, and may thus be debarred from
the consequences which would ensue if he were known? Or is it
profitable to him to be unjust, if he can contrive to escape
detection and punishment? We are enabled to answer the first
question in the affirmative, and the second question in the
negative. As health is the greatest good, and sickness the
greatest evil, of body: so Justice is the greatest good, and
injustice the greatest evil, of mind. No measure of luxury,
wealth, or power, could render life tolerable, if we lost our
bodily health: no amount of prosperity could make life tolerable,
without mental health or justice. As bodily health is good _per
se_, and sickness evil _per se_, even apart from its
consequences: so justice also is good in itself, and injustice
evil in itself, apart from its consequences.[114]
[Footnote 114: Plato, Republic, iv. p. 445 A.]
[Side-note: Glaukon requires farther explanation about the
condition of the Guardians, in regard to sexual and family ties.]
Sokrates now assumes the special question of the dialogue to be
answered, and the picture of the just or perfect city, as well as
of the just or perfect individual, to be completed. He is next
proceeding to set forth the contrasts to this picture--that is,
the varieties of injustice, or the various modes of depravation
and corruption--when he is arrested by Polemarchus and Adeimantus:
who call upon him to explain more at large the position of the
body of Guardians or Soldiers in the city, in regard to women,
children, and the family.[115]
[Footnote 115: Plato, Republic, v. p. 449 C.]
[Side-note: Men and women will live together and perform the
duties of Guardians alike--They will receive the same gymnastic
and musical training.]
In reply, Sokrates announces his intention to make such provision
as will exclude separate family ties, as well as separate
property, among these Guardians. The Guardians will consist both
of men and women. The women will receive the same training, both
musical and gymnastical, as the men.[116] They will take part both
in the bodily exercises of the palæstra, in the military drill,
and in the combats of war. Those who deride these naked exercises
as preposterous for the female sex, should be reminded (Sokrates
says) that not long ago it was considered unseemly among the
Greeks (as it still is among many of the _barbari_) for men
to expose their naked bodies in the palæstra: but such repugnance
has been overpowered by the marked usefulness of the practice: the
Kretans first setting the example, next the Lacedæmonians;
lastly all other Greeks doing the same.[117] We maintain the
principle which we laid down in the beginning, that one person
should perform only one duty--that for which he is best qualified.
But there is no one function, or class of functions, for which
women as such are peculiarly qualified, or peculiarly
disqualified. Between women generally, and men generally, in
reference to the discharge of duties, there is no other
difference, except that men are superior to women in every
thing:[118] the best women will be on a level only with the
second-best men, but they will be superior to all men lower than
the second best. But among women, as among men, there are great
individual differences: one woman is fit for one duty, another for
another: and in our city, each must be employed for the duty
suitable to her individual disposition. Those who are best
qualified by nature for the office of Guardians, must be allotted
to that office: they must discharge it along with the men, and
must be trained for it by the same education as the men, musical
and gymnastical.
[Footnote 116: Plato, Republic, v. p. 452 A.]
[Footnote 117: Plato, Republic, v. p. 452 D.]
[Footnote 118: Plato, Republic, v. p. 455 C-D.]
[Side-note: Nature does not prescribe any distribution of
functions between men and women. Women are inferior to men in
every thing. The best women are equal to second-best men.]
If an objector accuses us of proposing arrangements contrary to
nature, we not only deny the force of the objection, but we retort
the charge. We affirm that the arrangements now existing in
society, which restrict all women to a limited number of domestic
and family functions, are contrary to nature--and that ours are
founded upon the genuine and real dictates of nature.[119] The
only difference admissible between men and women, in the joint
discharge of the functions of Guardians, is, that the easier
portion of such functions must in general be assigned to women,
and the more difficult to men, in consequence of the inferiority
of the feminine nature.[120]
[Footnote 119: Plato, Republic, v. p. 456 C. [Greek: kata\ phu/sin
e)ti/themen to\n no/mon; a)lla\ ta\ nu=n para\ tau=ta gigno/mena
para\ phu/sin ma=llon, ô(s e)/oike, gi/gnetai.]]
[Footnote 120: Plato, Republic, v. p. 457 B.]
[Side-note: Community of life and relations between the male
and female Guardians. Temporary marriages arranged by contrivance
of the Elders. No separate families.]
These intermingled male and female Guardians, in the discharge of
their joint functions, will live together in common barracks and
at common mess-tables. There must be no separate houses or
separate family-relations between them. All are wives or
husbands of all: no youth must know his own father, no mature man
must know his own son: all the mature men and women are fathers or
mothers of all the younger: all of the same age are brothers and
sisters.[121] We do not intend, however, that the copulation
between them shall take place in a promiscuous and arbitrary
manner: we shall establish laws to regulate the intermarriages and
breeding.[122] We must copy the example of those who regulate the
copulation of horses, dogs, and other animals: we must bring
together those who will give existence to the best offspring.[123]
We must couple, as often as we can, the men who are best, with the
women who are best, both in mind and body; and the men who are
least good, with the women who are least good. We must bring up
the offspring of the former couples--we must refuse to bring up
the offspring of the latter.[124] And such results must be
accomplished by underhand arrangements of the Elder Chiefs; so as
to be unknown to every one else, in order to prevent discontent
and quarrel among the body of the Guardians. These Elders will
celebrate periodical festivals, in which they will bring together
the fitting brides and bridegrooms, under solemn hymns and
sacrifices. They must regulate the number of marriages in such
manner as to keep the total list of Guardians as much as possible
without increase as well as without diminution.[125] The Elders
must make an artful use of the lot, so that these couplings shall
appear to every one else the effect of chance. Distinguished
warriors must be rewarded with a larger licence of copulation with
different women, which will produce the farther advantage of
having as many children as possible born from their
procreation.[126] All the children as soon as born must be
consigned to the Chiefs or Elders, male and female, who will
conceal in some convenient manner those who are born either from
the worst couples or with any bodily imperfection: while they
place the offspring of the best couples in special outbuildings
under the charge of nurses. Those mothers who are full of milk
will be brought here to give suck, but every precaution will be
taken that none of them shall know her own child: wet-nurses will
also be provided in addition, to ensure a full supply: but all the
care of the children will devolve on the public nurses, not on the
mothers.[127]
[Footnote 121: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 457-458.]
[Footnote 122: Plato, Republic, v. p. 458 E.]
[Footnote 123: Plato, Republic, v. p. 459 A.]
[Footnote 124: Plato, Republic, v. p. 459 D-E. [Greek: dei= me\n
e)k tô=n ô(mologême/nôn tou\s a)ri/stous tai=s a)ri/stais
suggi/gnesthai ô(s pleista/kis, tou\s de\ phaulota/tous tai=s
phaulota/tais tou)nanti/on, kai\ tô=n me\n ta\ e)/kgona tre/phein,
tô=n de\ mê/, ei) me/llei to\ poi/mnion o(/, ti a)kro/taton
ei)=nai; kai\ tau=ta pa/nta gigno/mena lantha/nein plê\n au)tou\s
tou\s a)/rchontas, ei) au)= ê( a)ge/lê tô=n phula/kôn o(/, ti
ma/lista a)stasi/astos e)/stai.]]
[Footnote 125: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 A.]
[Footnote 126: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 B.]
[Footnote 127: Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 C-D.]
[Side-note: Regulations about age, for procreation--Children
brought up under public authority.]
The age for such intermarriages, destined to be procreative for
the benefit of the city, must be from thirty to fifty-five, for
men--from twenty to forty, for women. No man or woman, above or
below these limits of age, will be allowed to meddle with the
function of intermarriage and procreation for the public; which
function must always be conducted under superintendence of the
authorities, with proper sacrifice and prayers to the Gods. Nor
will any man, even within the licensed age, be allowed to approach
any woman except by assignment from the authorities. If any
infringement of this law should occur, the offspring arising from
it will be pronounced spurious and outcast.[128] But when the
above limits of age are passed, both men and women may have
intercourse with whomsoever they please, except fathers with
daughters or sons with mothers: under condition, however, that no
offspring shall be born from such intercourse, or that if any
offspring be born, it shall be exposed.[129]
[Footnote 128: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 A-B.]
[Footnote 129: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 C.]
How is the father to know his own daughter (it is asked), or the
son his own mother? They cannot know (replies Sokrates): but each
couple will consider every child born in the seventh month or
tenth month after their marriage, as their child, and will address
him or her by the appellation of son or daughter. The fathers and
mothers will be fathers and mothers of all the children born at
that time: the sons and daughters will be in filial relation to
all the couples brought together at the given antecedent
period.[130]
[Footnote 130: Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 D.]
[Side-note: Perfect communion of sentiment and interest
among the Guardians--Causes of pleasure and pain the same to all,
like parts of the same organism.]
The main purpose of such regulations, in respect to family as in
respect to property, is to establish the fullest communion between
all the Guardians, male and female--and to eliminate as much
as possible the feeling of separate interest in any fraction of
them. The greatest evil to any city is, that which pulls it to
pieces and makes it many instead of one: the greatest good to it
is that which binds it together and makes it one. Now what is most
efficacious in binding it together, is, community of the causes of
pleasure and pain: when each individual feels pleasure from the
same causes and on the same occasions as all the rest, and pain in
like manner. On the other hand, when the causes of pleasure and
pain are distinct, this tends to dissolution; and becomes fatal if
the opposition is marked, so that some individuals are much
delighted, and others much distressed, under the same
circumstances. That city is the best arranged, wherein all the
citizens pronounce the words _Mine_ and _Not Mine_, with
reference to the same things: when they coalesce into an unity
like the organism of a single individual. To him a blow in the
finger is a blow to the whole man: so also in the city, pleasure
or pain to any one citizen ought to communicate itself by sympathy
as pleasure and pain to all.[131]
[Footnote 131: Plato, Republic, v. p. 462 D.]
[Side-note: Harmony--absence of conflicting interest--assured
scale of equal comfort--consequent happiness--among the
Guardians.]
Now the Guardians under our regulations will present as much as
possible this community of _Mine_ and _Not Mine_, as
well as of pleasures and pains--and this exclusion of the separate
individual _Mine_ and _Not Mine_, as well as of separate
pleasures and pains. No individual among them will have either
separate property or separate family relationship: each will have
both one and the other in common with the rest.[132] No one will
have property of his own to be increased, nor a family of his own
to be benefited, apart from the rest: all will be as much as
possible common recipients of pleasure and pain.[133] All the
ordinary causes of dispute and litigation will thus be excluded.
If two Guardians of the same age happen to quarrel, they must
fight it out: this will discharge their wrath and prevent worse
consequences--while at the same time it will encourage attention
to gymnastic excellence.[134] But no younger Guardian will
raise his hand against an older Guardian, whom he is taught to
reverence as his father, and whom every one else would protect if
attacked. If the Guardians maintain harmony among themselves, they
will easily ensure it among the remaining inhabitants. Assured of
sufficient but modest comforts, the Guardians will be relieved
from all struggles for the maintenance of a family, from the arts
of trade, and from subservience to the rich.[135] They will escape
all these troubles, and will live a life happier than the envied
Olympic victor: for they will gain the victory in an enterprise
more illustrious than he undertakes, and they will receive from
their fellow-citizens fuller maintenance and higher privilege than
what is awarded to him, as well as honours after death.[136] Their
lives are not to be put in comparison with those of the farmer or
the shoemaker. They must not indeed aspire to any happiness
incompatible with their condition and duty as Guardians. But that
condition will itself involve the highest happiness. And if any
silly ambition prompts them to depart from it, they will assuredly
change for the worse.[137]
[Footnote 132: Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 B.]
[Footnote 133: Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 D. [Greek: pa/ntas ei)s
to\ dunato\n o(mopathei=s lu/pês te kai\ ê(donê=s ei)=nai.]]
[Footnote 134: Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 E.]
[Footnote 135: Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 C. [Greek: tô=n kakô=n . . .
ô(=n a)pêllagme/noi a)\n ei)=en, kolakei/as te plousi/ôn
pe/nêtes a)pori/as te kai\ a)lgêdo/nas], &c.]
[Footnote 136: Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 D. [Greek: Pa/ntôn te
dê\ tou/tôn a)palla/xontai, zê/sousi/ te tou= makaristou= bi/ou,
o(\n oi( O)lumpioni=kai zô=si, makariô/teron.]]
[Footnote 137: Plato, Republic, v. p. 466 A-C.]
[Side-note: In case of war both sexes will go together to
battle--Rewards to distinguished warriors.]
Such is the communion of sexes which must be kept up for the
duties of Guardians, and for the exigencies of military defence.
As in other races of animals, males and females must go out to
fight, and each will inspire the other with bravery. The children
must be taken out on horseback to see the encounters from a
distance, so that they may be kept clear of danger, yet may
nevertheless be gradually accustomed to the sight of it.[138] If
any one runs away from the field, he must be degraded from the
rank of Guardian to that of husbandman or craftsman. If any man
suffers himself to be taken prisoner, he is no loss: the enemy may
do what they choose with him. When any one distinguishes himself
in battle, he shall be received on his return by garlands and by
an affectionate welcome from the youth.[139] Should he be slain
in battle, he shall be recognised as having become a Dæmon or
Demigod (according to the Hesiodic doctrine), and his sepulchre
shall be honoured by appropriate solemnities.[140]
[Footnote 138: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 466-467.]
[Footnote 139: Plato, Republic, v. p. 468 B.]
[Footnote 140: Plato, Republic, v. p. 469 B.]
[Side-note: War against Hellenic enemies to be carried on
mildly--Hellens are all by nature kinsmen.]
In carrying on war, our Guardians will observe a marked difference
in their manner of treating Hellenic enemies and barbaric enemies.
They will never enslave any Hellenic city, nor hold any Hellenic
person in slavery. They will never even strip the body of an
Hellenic enemy, except so far as to take his arms. They will never
pile up in their temples the arms, nor burn the houses and lands,
of Hellenic enemies. They will always keep in mind the members of
the Hellenic race as naturally kindred with each other, and bound
to aid each other in mutual defence, against Barbaric aliens who
are the natural enemies of all of them.[141] They will not think
themselves authorised to carry on war as Hellens now do against
each other, except when their enemies are Barbaric.
[Footnote 141: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 470-471.]
Enough of this, Sokrates, replies Glaukon. I admit that your city
will have all the excellencies and advantages of which you boast.
But you have yet to show me that it is practicable, and how.[142]
[Footnote 142: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 471-472.]
[Side-note: Question--How is the scheme practicable? It is
difficult, yet practicable on one condition--That philosophy and
political power should come into the same hands.]
The task which you impose (says Sokrates) is one of great
difficulty: even if you grant me, what must be granted, that every
reality must fall short of its ideal type.[143] One condition, and
one only, is essential to render it practicable: a condition which
you may ridicule as preposterous, but which, though not probable,
is certainly supposable. Either philosophers must acquire the
ruling power, or else the present rulers of mankind must
themselves become genuine philosophers. In one or other of these
two ways philosophy and political power must come into the into
the same hands. Unless such condition be fulfilled, our city can
never be made a reality, nor can there ever be any respite of
suffering to the human race.[144]
[Footnote 143: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 472-473.]
[Footnote 144: Plato, Republic, v. p. 473 D.]
The supremacy which you claim for philosophers (replies
Glaukon), will be listened to with repugnance and scorn. But
at least you must show who the philosophers are, on whose behalf
you invoke such supremacy. You must show that it belongs to them
by nature both to pursue philosophy, and to rule in the various
cities: and that by nature also, other men ought to obey them as
well as to abstain from philosophy.[145]
[Footnote 145: Plato, Republic, v. p. 474 A-B.]
[Side-note: Characteristic marks of the philosopher--He
contemplates and knows Entia or unchangeable Forms, as
distinguished from fluctuating particulars or Fientia.]
The first requisite for a philosopher (replies Sokrates) is, that
he shall love and pursue eagerly every sort of knowledge or
wisdom, without shrinking from labour for such purpose. But it is
not sufficient that he should be eager about hearing tragedies or
learning the minor arts. Other men, accomplished and curious, are
fond of hearing beautiful sounds and discourses, or of seeing
beautiful forms and colours. But the philosopher alone can see or
distinguish truth.[146] It is only he who can distinguish the
genuine Form or Idea, in which truth consists, from the particular
embodiments in which it occurs. These Forms or Ideas exist,
eternal and unchangeable. Since Pulchrum is the opposite of Turpe,
they must be two, and each of them must be One: the same about
Just and Unjust, Good and Evil; each of these is a distinct Form
or Idea, existing as One and Unchangeable by itself, but
exhibiting itself in appearance as manifold, diverse, and
frequently changing, through communion with different objects and
events, and through communion of each Form with others.[147] Now
the accomplished, but unphilosophical, man cannot see or recognise
this Form in itself. He can see only the different particular
cases and complications in which it appears embodied.[148] None
but the philosopher can contemplate each Form by itself, and
discriminate it from the various particulars in conjunction with
which it appears. Such philosophers are few in number, but they
are the only persons who can be said truly to live. Ordinary and
even accomplished men--who recognise beautiful things, but
cannot recognise Beauty in itself, nor even follow an instructor
who points it out to them--pass their lives in a sort of dream or
reverie: for the dreamer, whether asleep or awake, is one who
believes what is similar to another thing to be not merely
similar, but to be the actual thing itself.[149] The philosopher
alone, who embraces in his mind the one and unchangeable Form or
Idea, along with, yet distinguished from, its particular
embodiments, possesses knowledge or science. The unphilosophical
man, whose mind embraces nothing higher than variable particulars,
does not know--but only opines, or has opinions.[150]
[Footnote 146: Plato, Republic, v. pp. 474-475. [Greek: tou\s tê=s
a)lêthei/as philothea/monas] (p. 475 E).]
[Footnote 147: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 A. [Greek: E)peidê/
e)stin e)nanti/on kalo\n ai)schrô=|, du/o au)tô\ ei)=nai . . .
Ou)kou=n e)peidê\ du/o, kai\ e(\n e)ka/teron? . . . Kai\ peri\
dikai/ou kai\ a)di/kou kai\ a)gathou= kai\ kakou= kai\ pa/ntôn
tô=n ei)dô=n pe/ri, o( au)to\s lo/gos, au)to\ me\n e(\n e(/kaston
ei)=nai, tê=| de\ tô=n pra/xeôn kai\ sôma/tôn kai\ a)llê/lôn
koinôni/a| pantachou= phantazo/mena polla\ phai/nesthai
e(/kaston?]]
[Footnote 148: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.]
[Footnote 149: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.]
[Footnote 150: Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 D. [Greek: Ou)kou=n
tou/tou me\n tê\n dia/noian ô(s gignô/skontos _gnô/mên_ a)\n
o)rthô=s phai=men ei)=nai, tou= de\ _do/xan_, ô(s
doxa/zontos.]]
[Side-note: Ens alone can be known--Non-Ens is unknowable.
That which is midway between Ens and Non-Ens (particulars) is
matter only of opinion. Ordinary men attain nothing beyond
opinion.]
This latter, the unphilosophical man, will not admit what we say.
Accordingly, we must prove it to him. You cannot know without
knowing Something: that is, Some Ens: for Non-Ens cannot be known.
That which is completely and absolutely Ens, is completely and
absolutely cognizable: that which is Non-Ens and nowhere, is in
every way uncognizable. If then there be anything which is at once
Ens and Non-Ens, it will lie midway between these two: it will be
something neither absolutely and completely cognizable, nor
absolutely and completely uncognizable: it belongs to something
between ignorance and science. Now science or knowledge is one
thing, its object is, complete Ens. Opinion is another thing, its
object also is different. Knowing and Opining belong, like Sight
and Hearing, to the class of Entia called Powers or Faculties,
which we and others possess, and by means of which--that is, by
means of one or other of them--we accomplish everything that we do
accomplish. Now no one of these powers or faculties has either
colour or figure, whereby it may be recognised or distinguished
from others. Each is known and distinguished, not by what it is in
itself, but by what it accomplishes, and by the object to which it
has special relation. That which has the same object and
accomplishes the same result, I call the same power or faculty:
that which has a different object, and accomplishes a different
result, I call a different power or faculty. Now Knowing,
Cognition, Science, is one of our faculties or powers, and the
strongest of all: Opining is another, and a different one. A
marked distinction between the two is, that Knowing or Cognition
is infallible--Opining is fallible. Since Cognition is one power
or faculty, and Opining another--the object of one must be
different from the object of the other. But the object of
Cognition is, the Complete Ens: the object of Opining must
therefore be, not the Complete Ens, but something different from
it. What then is the object of Opining? It is not Complete Ens,
but it is still Something. It is not Non-Ens, or Nothing; for
Non-Ens or Nothing is not thinkable or opinable: you cannot think
or opine, and yet think or opine nothing. Whoever opines or thinks,
must opine or think something. Ens is the object of Cognition,
Non-Ens is the object of non-Cognition or Ignorance: Opination or
Opinion is midway between Cognition and Ignorance, darker than the
former, but clearer than the latter. The object of opination is
therefore something midway between Ens and Non-Ens.
[Side-note: Particulars fluctuate: they are sometimes just
or beautiful, sometimes unjust or ugly. Forms or Entia alone
remain constant.]
But what is this Something, midway between Ens and Particulars
Non-Ens, and partaking of both--which is the object of Opination?
To make out this, we must revert to the case of the
unphilosophical man. We have described him, as not believing in
the existence of the Form or Idea of Beauty, or Justice _per
se_; not enduring to hear it spoken of as a real Ens and Unum;
not knowing anything except of the many diverse particulars,
beautiful and just. We must remind him that every one of these
particular beautiful things will appear repulsive also: every one
of these just and holy particulars, will appear unjust and unholy
also. He cannot refuse to admit that each of them will appear
under certain circumstances beautiful and ugly, just and unjust,
holy and unholy. In like manner, every particular double will
appear also a half: every light thing will appear heavy: every
little thing great. Of each among these many particulars, if you
can truly predicate any one quality about it, you may with equal
truth predicate the opposite quality also. Each of them both is,
and is not, the substratum of all these different and opposite
qualities. You cannot pronounce them to be either one or the
other, with fixity and permanence: they are at once both and
neither.
[Side-note: The many cannot discern or admit the reality of
Forms--Their minds are always fluctuating among particulars.]
Here then we find the appropriate object of Opination: that which
is neither Ens nor Non-Ens, but something between both.
Particulars are the object of Opination, as distinguished from
universal Entities, Forms, or Ideas, which are the object of
Cognition. The many, who disbelieve or ignore the existence of
these Forms, and whose minds dwell exclusively among
particulars--cannot know, but only opine. Their usages and creeds,
as to beautiful, just, honourable, float between positive Ens and
Non-Ens. It is these intermediate fluctuations which are caught up by
their opining faculty, intermediate as it is between Cognition and
Ignorance. It is these also, the objects of Opination, which they
love and delight in: they neither recognise nor love the objects
of Cognition or Knowledge. They are lovers of opinion and its
objects, not lovers of Knowledge. The philosopher alone recognises
and loves Knowledge and the objects of Knowledge. His mind dwells,
not amidst the fluctuating, diverse, and numerous particulars, but
in contemplation of the One, Universal, permanent, unchangeable,
Form or Idea.
[Side-note: The philosopher will be ardent for all varieties
of knowledge--His excellent moral attributes--He will be trained
to capacity for active life.]
Here is the characteristic difference (continues Sokrates) which
you required me to point out, between the philosopher and the
unphilosophical man, however accomplished. The philosopher sees,
knows, and contemplates, the One, Real, unchangeable, Form or
Idea: the unphilosophical man knows nothing of this Form _per
se_, and sees only its multifarious manifestations, each
perpetually variable and different from all the rest. The
philosopher, having present to his mind this type--and
approximating to it, as far as may be, the real institutions and
practices--will be the person most competent to rule our city:
especially as his education will give him farthermore--besides
such familiarity with the Form or Type--as large a measure of
experience, and as much virtue, as can fall to the lot of the
unphilosophical man.[151] The nature and disposition of the
true philosopher, if improved by education, will include all the
virtue and competence of the practical man. The philosopher is
bent on learning everything which can make him familiar with
Universal Forms and Essences in their pure state, not floating
amidst the confusion of generated and destroyed realities: and
with Forms and Essences little as well as great, mean as well as
sublime.[152] Devoted to knowledge and truth--hating falsehood--he
has little room in his mind for the ordinary desires: he is
temperate, indifferent to money, free from all meanness or
shabbiness. A man like him, whose contemplations stretch over all
time and all essence, thinks human life a small affair, and has no
fear of death. He will be just, mild in his demeanour, quick in
apprehension, retentive in memory, elegant in his tastes and
movements. All these excellences will be united in the
philosophers to whom we confide the rule of our city.[153]
[Footnote 151: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 484.]
[Footnote 152: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 485 A.]
[Footnote 153: Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 485-486.]
[Side-note: Adeimantus does not dispute the conclusion, but
remarks that it is at variance with actual facts--Existing
philosophers are either worthless pretenders, or when they are
good, useless.]
It is impossible, Sokrates (remarks Adeimantus), to answer in the
negative to your questions. Nevertheless we who hear and answer,
are not convinced of the truth of your conclusion. Unskilled as we
are in the interrogatory process, we feel ourselves led astray
little by little at each successive question; until at length,
through the accumulated effect of such small deviations, we are
driven up into a corner without the power of moving, like a bad
player at draughts defeated by one superior to himself.[154] Here
in this particular case your conclusion has been reached by steps
to which we cannot refuse assent. Yet if we look at the facts, we
see something quite the reverse as to the actual position of
philosophers. Those who study philosophy, not simply as a branch
of juvenile education but as a continued occupation throughout
life, are in most cases strange creatures, not to say thoroughly
unprincipled: while the few of them who are most reasonable,
derive nothing from this pursuit which you so much extol, except
that they become useless in their respective cities.[155]
[Footnote 154: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 487 B. [Greek: Pro\s me\n
tau=ta soi ou)dei\s a)\n oi(=o/s t' ei)/ê a)nteipei=n; a)lla\ ga\r
toio/nde ti pa/schousin oi( a)kou/ontes e(ka/stote a)\ nu=n
le/geis; ê(gou=ntai di' a)peiri/an tou= e)rôta=|n te kai\
a)pokri/nesthai u(po\ tou= lo/gou par' e(/kaston to\ e)rô/têma
smikro\n parago/menoi, a)throisthe/ntôn tô=n smikrô=n e)pi\
teleutê=s tô=n lo/gôn, me/ga to\ spha/lma kai\ e)nanti/on toi=s
prô/tois a)naphai/nesthai], &c.
This is an interesting remark on the effect produced upon many
hearers by the Sokratic and Platonic dialogues,--puzzling,
silencing, and ultimately stimulating the mind, but not satisfying
or convincing, rather raising suspicions as to the trustworthiness
of the process, which suspicions have to be turned over and
scrutinised by subsequent meditation.]
[Footnote 155: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 487 D.]
[Side-note: Sokrates admits the fact to be so--His simile of
the able steersman on shipboard, among a disobedient crew.]
Yes (replies Sokrates), your picture is a correct one. The
position of true and reasonable philosophers, in their respective
cities, is difficult and uncomfortable. Conceive a ship on her
voyage, under the management of a steersman distinguished for
force of body as well as for skill in his craft, but not clever in
dealing with, or acting upon other men. Conceive the seamen all
quarrelling with each other to get possession of the rudder; each
man thinking himself qualified to steer, though he has never
learnt it--nor had any master in it--nor even believes it to be
teachable, but is ready to massacre all who affirm that it is
teachable.[156] Imagine, besides, these seamen importuning the
qualified steersman to commit the rudder to them, each being ready
to expel or kill any others whom he may prefer to them: and at
last proceeding to stupify with wine or drugs the qualified
steersman, and then to navigate the vessel themselves according to
their own views; feasting plentifully on the stores. These men
know nothing of what constitutes true and able steersmanship. They
extol, as a perfect steersman, that leader who is most
efficacious, either by persuasion or force, in seizing the rudder
for them to manage: they despise as useless any one who does not
possess this talent. They never reflect that the genuine steersman
has enough to do in surmounting the dangers of his own especial
art, and in watching the stars and the winds: and that if he is to
acquire technical skill and practice adequate to such a purpose,
he cannot at the same time possess skill and practice in keeping
his hold of the rudder whether the crew are pleased with him or
not. Such being the condition of the ship and the crew, you see
plainly that they will despise and set aside the true steersman as
an useless proser and star-gazer.[157]
[Footnote 156: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 488.]
[Footnote 157: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 488 D-E.]
[Side-note: The uselessness of the true philosopher is
the fault of the citizen, who will not invoke his guidance.]
Now the crew of this ship represent the citizens and leaders of
our actual cities: the steersman represents the true philosopher.
He is, and must be, useless in the ship: but his uselessness is
the fault of the crew and not his own. It is not for the true
steersman to entreat permission from the seamen, that they will
allow him to command; nor for the wise man to solicit employment
at the doors of the rich. It is for the sick man, whether he be
poor or rich, to ask for the aid of the physician; and for every
one who needs to be commanded, to invoke the authority of the
person qualified to command. No man really qualified will submit
to ask command as a favour.[158]
[Footnote 158: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 B. [Greek: tê=s me/ntoi
a)chrêsti/as tou\s mê\ chrôme/nous ke/leue ai)tia=sthai, a)lla\
mê\ tou\s e)pieikei=s. Ou) ga\r e)/chei phu/sin kubernê/tên
nautô=n dei=sthai a)/rchesthai u(ph' au(tou=], &c.]
Thus, Adeimantus (continues Sokrates), I have dealt with the first
part of your remark, that the true philosopher is an useless man
in cities as now constituted: I have shown you this is not his
fault--that it could not be otherwise,--and that a man even of the
highest aptitude, cannot enjoy reputation among those whose turn
of mind is altogether at variance with his own.[159]
[Footnote 159: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 D. [Greek: e)/k te
toi/nun tou/tôn kai\ e)n tou/tois ou) r(a/|dion eu)dokimei=n to\
be/ltiston e)pitê/deuma u(po\ tô=n ta)nanti/a e)pitêdeuo/ntôn.]]
I shall now deal with your second observation--That while even the
best philosophers are useless, the majority of those who cultivate
philosophy are worthless men, who bring upon her merited
discredit. I admit that this also is correct; but I shall prove
that philosophy is not to be blamed for it.[160]
[Footnote 160: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 E. [Greek: o(/ti ou)de\
tou/tou philosophi/a ai)ti/a, peirathô=men dei=xai.]]
[Side-note: The great qualities required to form a
philosopher, become sources of perversion, under a misguiding
public opinion.]
You will remember the great combination of excellent dispositions,
intellectual as well as moral, which I laid down as indispensable
to form the fundamental character of the true philosopher. Such a
combination is always rare. Even under the best circumstances
philosophers must be very few. But these few stand exposed, in our
existing cities, to such powerful causes of corruption, that they
are prevented from reaching maturity, except by some happy
accident. First, each one of those very qualities, which, when
combined, constitute the true philosopher,--serves as a cause
of corruption, if it exists by itself and apart from the rest.
Next, what are called good things, or external advantages, act in
the same manner--such as beauty, strength, wealth, powerful
connections, &c. Again, the stronger a man's natural aptitudes
and the greater his external advantages,--the better will he
become under favourable circumstances, the worse will he become,
if circumstances are unfavourable. Heinous iniquity always springs
from a powerful nature perverted by bad training: not from a
feeble nature, which will produce no great effects either for good
or evil. Thus the eminent predispositions,--which, if properly
improved, would raise a man to the highest rank in virtue,--will,
if planted in an unfavourable soil, produce a master-mind in deeds
of iniquity, unless counteracted by some providential
interposition.
[Side-note: Mistake of supposing that such perversion arises
from the Sophists. Irresistible effect of the public opinion
generally, in tempting or forcing a dissenter into orthodoxy.]
The multitude treat these latter as men corrupted by the Sophists.
But this is a mistake. Neither Sophists nor other private
individuals produce mischief worth mentioning. It is the multitude
themselves, utterers of these complaints, who are the most active
Sophists and teachers: it is they who educate and mould every
individual, man and woman, young and old, into such a character as
they please.[161] When they are assembled in the public assembly
or the dikastery, in the theatre or the camp--when they praise
some things and blame others, with vociferation and vehemence
echoed from the rocks around--how irresistible will be the
impression produced upon the mind of a youth who hears them! No
private training which he may have previously received can hold
out against it. All will be washed away by this impetuous current
of multitudinous praise or blame, which carries him along with it.
He will declare honourable or base the same things as they declare
to be so: he will adopt the character, and follow the pursuits,
which they enjoin. Moreover, if he resists such persuasive
influence, these multitudinous teachers and Sophists have
stronger pressure in store for him.[162] They punish the
disobedient with disgrace, fine, and even death. What other
Sophist, or what private exhortation, can contend successfully
against teachers such as these? Surely none. The attempt to do so
is insane. There neither is, nor has been, nor will be, any
individual human disposition educated to virtue in opposition to
the training of the multitude:[163] I say _human_, as
distinguished from _divine_, of which I make exception: for
in the existing state of society, any individual who is preserved
from these ascendant influences to acquire philosophical
excellence, owes his preservation to the divine favour.
[Footnote 161: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 A. [Greek: ê)\ kai\ su\
ê(gei=, ô(/sper oi( polloi/, diaphtheirome/nous tina\s ei)=nai
u(po\ sophistô=n ne/ous, diaphthei/rontas de/ tinas sophista\s
i)diôtikou/s, o(/, ti kai\ a)/xion lo/gon, a)ll' ou)k au)tou\s
tou\s tau=ta le/gontas megi/stous me\n ei)=nai sophista/s?
paideu/ein de\ teleô/tata kai\ a)perga/zesthai oi(/ous bou/lontai
ei)=nai kai\ ne/ous kai\ presbute/rous kai\ a)/ndras kai\
gunai=kas?]]
[Footnote 162: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 C-D. [Greek: Kai\
phê/sein te ta\ au)ta\ tou/tois kala\ kai\ ai)schra\ ei)=nai, kai\
e)pitêdeu/sein a(/per a)\n ou(=toi, kai\ e)/sesthai toiou=ton . . .
Kai\ mê\n ou(/pô tê\n megi/stên a)na/gkên ei)rê/kamen. Poi/an?
E(\n e)/rgô| prostithe/asi, lo/gô| mê\ pei/thontes, ou(=toi oi(
paideutai/ te kai\ sophistai/. Ê)\ ou)k oi)=stha o(/ti to\n mê\
peitho/menon a)timi/ais te kai\ chrê/masi kai\ thana/tois
kola/zousin? Kai\ ma/la, e)/phê, spho/dra.]]
[Footnote 163: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 D.]
[Side-note: The Sophists and other private teachers accept
the prevalent orthodoxy, and conform their teaching to it.]
Moreover, though the multitude complain of these professional
teachers as rivals, and decry them as Sophists--yet we must
recollect that such teachers inculcate only the opinions received
among the multitude themselves, and extol these same opinions as
wisdom.[164] The teachers know nothing of what is really
honourable and base,--good and evil,--just and unjust. They
distribute all these names only with reference to the opinions of
the multitude:--pronouncing those things which please the
multitude to be good, and those which displease to be
evil,--without furnishing any other rational account. They call
things necessary by the name of just and honourable; not knowing
the material difference between what is good and what is necessary,
nor being able to point out that difference to others. Thus
preposterous are the teachers, who count it wisdom to suit the
taste and feelings of the multitude, whether in painting or in
music or in social affairs. For whoever lives among them, publicly
exhibiting either poetry or other performances private or
official, thus making the multitude his masters beyond the strict
limits of necessity--the consequence is infallible, that he must
adapt his works to that which they praise. But whether the works
which he executes are really good and honourable, he will be
unable to render any tolerable account.[165]
[Footnote 164: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 493 A. [Greek: e(/kaston
tô=n mistharnou/ntôn i)diôtô=n, ou(\s dê\ ou(=toi sophista\s
kalou=si kai\ a)ntite/chnous ê(gou=ntai, mê\ a)/lla paideu/ein ê)\
tau=ta ta\ tô=n pollô=n do/gmata, a(\ doxa/zousin o(/tan
a)throisthô=si, kai\ sophi/an tau/tên kalei=n.]]
[Footnote 165: Plato, Republic, vi. p. 493 C-D.]
[Side-note: The people generally hate philosophy--A youth
who aspires to it will be hated by the people, and persecuted even
by his own relatives.]
It is therefore the multitude, or the general voice of society--not
the Sophists or private teachers, mere echoes of that general
voice--which works upon and moulds individuals. Now the multitude
cannot tolerate or believe in the existence of those Universals or
Forms which the philosopher contemplates. They know only the many
particulars, not the One Universal. Incapable of becoming
philosophers themselves, they look upon the philosopher with
hatred: and this sentiment is adopted by all those so-called
philosophers who seek to please them.[166] Under these
circumstances, what chance is there that those eminent
predispositions, which we pointed out as the foundation of the
future philosopher, can ever be matured to their proper result? A
youth of such promise, especially if his body be on a par with his
mind, will be at once foremost among all his fellows. His
relatives and fellow-citizens, eager to make use of him for their
own purposes, and anxious to appropriate to themselves his growing
force, will besiege him betimes with solicitations and
flatteries.[167] Under these influe
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