Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3
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Title: Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3
Author: George Grote
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLATO AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES, 3RD ED. VOLUME 3 ***
PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
PLATO,
AND THE
OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
BY
GEORGE GROTE
AUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'.
_A NEW EDITION._
IN FOUR VOLUMES.
VOL. III.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1888.
_The right of Translation is reserved._
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XXVI.
PHÆDRUS--SYMPOSION.
These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. Phædrus is the
originator of both 1
Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in
Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of women in
Greece _ib._
Eros, considered as the great stimulus to improving philosophical
communion. Personal Beauty, the great point of approximation
between the world of sense and the world of Ideas. Gradual
generalisation of the sentiment 4
All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they pursue it
by various means. The name _Eros_ is confined to one special case
of this large variety 5
Desire of mental copulation and procreation, as the only
attainable likeness of immortality, requires the sight of personal
beauty as an originating stimulus 6
Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few privileged
minds, when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty in general.
This is the most absorbing sentiment of all 7
Purpose of the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic view of Eros
with several different views of it previously enunciated by the
other speakers; closing with a panegyric on Sokrates, by the
drunken Alkibiades 8
Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus,
Aristophanes, Agathon 9
Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He describes
Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Dæmon between Gods and men,
constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining it 9
Analogy of the erotic aspiration with that of the philosopher, who
knows his own ignorance and thirsts for knowledge 10
Eros as presented in the Phædrus--Discourse of Lysias, and
counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros--Sokrates is seized
with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on Eros 11
Panegyric--Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros is a variety
of madness, but distinguishes good and bad varieties of madness,
both coming from the Gods. Good madness is far better than
sobriety _ib._
Poetical mythe delivered by Sokrates, describing the immortality
and pre-existence of the soul, and its pre-natal condition of
partial companionship with
Gods and eternal Ideas 12
Operation of such pre-natal experience upon the Intellectual
faculties of man--Comparison and combination of particular
sensations indispensable--Reminiscence 13
Reminiscence is kindled up in the soul of the philosopher by the
aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great link between the
world of sense and the world of Ideas 14
Elevating influence ascribed, both in Phædrus and Symposion, to
Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of poetical fancy
and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory 15
Differences between Symposion and Phædrus. In-dwelling conceptions
assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the latter 17
Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion _ib._
Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively in
Symposion 18
Eros recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as affording the
initiatory stimulus to philosophy--Not so recognised in Phædon,
Theætêtus, and elsewhere _ib._
Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the
Symposion--Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome
youths 19
Perfect self-command of Sokrates--proof against every sort of
trial 20
Drunkenness of others at the close of the Symposion--Sokrates is
not affected by it, but continues his dialectic process 21
Symposion and Phædon--each is the antithesis and complement of the
other 22
Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon _ib._
Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic Symposion 24
Platonic Symposion more ideal and transcendental than the
Xenophontic 25
Second half of the Phædrus--passes into a debate on Rhetoric. Eros
is considered as a subject for rhetorical exercise 26
Lysias is called a logographer by active politicians. Contempt
conveyed by the word. Sokrates declares that the only question is,
Whether a man writes well or ill 27
Question about teaching the art of writing well or speaking well.
Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does the successful
Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack? 28
Theory of Sokrates--that all art of persuasion must be founded
upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of resemblance to
the truth _ib._
Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of Lysias and
his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates defined what he
meant by it: Lysias did not define 29
Logical processes--Definition and Division--both of them
exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates _ib._
View of Sokrates--that there is no real Art of Rhetoric, except
what is already comprised in Dialectic--The rhetorical teaching is
empty and useless 30
What the Art of Rhetoric ought to be--Analogy of Hippokrates and
the medical Art 31
Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic classification of
minds with all their varieties, and of discourses with all their
varieties. The Rhetor must know how to apply the one to the other,
suitably to each particular case 32
The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of real truth,
as well as that which his auditors believe to be truth. He is not
sufficiently rewarded for this labour 33
Question about Writing--As an Art, for the purpose of instruction,
it can do little--Reasons why. Writing may remind the reader of
what he already knows _ib._
Neither written words, nor continuous speech, will produce any
serious effect in teaching. Dialectic and cross-examination are
necessary 34
The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who can really
teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a writer 37
Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to become a
philosopher 38
Date of the Phædrus--not an early dialogue _ib._
Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses--His theory of
Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic _ib._
His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already assured--it
assumes that all the doubts have been already removed 39
The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches minds
unoccupied and willing to learn _ib._
The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with minds
pre-occupied--guiding them methodically from error to truth 40
He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and the means of
persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know how to fit on
the one to the other in each particular case 41
Plato's _Idéal_ of the Rhetorical Art--involves in part
incompatible conditions--the Wise man or philosopher will never be
listened to by the public _ib._
The other part of the Platonic _Idéal_ is grand but
unattainable--breadth of psychological data and classified
modes of discourse 42
Plato's ideal grandeur compared with the rhetorical
teachers--Usefulness of these teachers for the wants of an
accomplished man 44
The Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly: Plato
conceived it too widely. The principles of an Art are not required
to be explained to all learners 45
Plato includes in his conception of Art, the application thereof
to new particular cases. This can never be taught by rule 46
Plato's charge against the Rhetorical teachers is not made out
47
Plato has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglecting his greater
works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for a
private circle 47
No fair comparison can be taken between this exercise of Lysias
and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the Phædrus 48
Continuous discourse, either written or spoken, inefficacious as a
means of instruction to the ignorant 49
Written matter is useful as a memorandum for persons who know--or
as an elegant pastime 50
Plato's didactic theories are pitched too high to be realised 51
No one has ever been found competent to solve the difficulties
raised by Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the negative vein
of philosophy _ib._
Plato's _idéal_ philosopher can only be realised under the
hypothesis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated into
full reminiscence here 52
Different proceeding of Plato in the Timæus 53
Opposite tendencies co-existent in Plato's mind--Extreme of the
Transcendental or Absolute--Extreme of specialising adaptation to
individuals and occasions 54
CHAPTER XXVII.
PARMENIDES.
Character of dialogues immediately preceding--much transcendental
assertion. Opposite character of the Parmenides 56
Sokrates is the juvenile defendant--Parmenides the veteran censor
and cross-examiner. Parmenides gives a specimen of exercises to be
performed by the philosophical aspirant _ib._
Circumstances and persons of the Parmenides 57
Manner in which the doctrine of Parmenides was impugned. Manner in
which his partisan Zeno defended him 58
Sokrates here impugns the doctrine of Zeno. He affirms the
Platonic theory of ideas separate from sensible objects, yet
participable by them 60
Parmenides and Zeno admire the philosophical ardour of Sokrates.
Parmenides advances objections against the Platonic theory of
Ideas 60
What Ideas does Sokrates recognise? Of the Just and Good? Yes. Of
Man, Horse, &c.? Doubtful. Of Hair, Mud, &c.? No _ib._
Parmenides declares that no object in nature is mean to the
philosopher 61
Remarks upon this--Contrast between emotional and scientific
classification _ib._
Objections of Parmenides--How can objects participate in the
Ideas. Each cannot have the whole Idea, nor a part thereof 62
Comparing the Idea with the sensible objects partaking in the
Idea, there is a likeness between them which must be represented
by a higher Idea--and so on _ad infinitum_ 63
Are the Ideas conceptions of the mind, and nothing more?
Impossible 64
The Ideas are types or exemplars, and objects partake of them by
being likened to them. Impossible 65
If Ideas exist, they cannot be knowable by us. We can know only
what is relative to ourselves. Individuals are relative to
individuals: Ideas relative to Ideas _ib._
Forms can be known only through the Form of Cognition, which we do
not possess 66
Form of cognition, superior to our Cognition, belongs to the Gods.
We cannot know them, nor can they know us _ib._
Sum total of objections against the Ideas is grave. But if we do
not admit that Ideas exist, and that they are knowable, there can
be no dialectic discussion 67
Dilemma put by Parmenides--Acuteness of his objections 68
The doctrine which Parmenides attacks is the genuine Platonic
theory of Ideas. His objections are never answered in any part of
the Platonic dialogues _ib._
Views of Stallbaum and Socher. The latter maintains that Plato
would never make such objections against his own theory, and
denies the authenticity of the Parmenidês 69
Philosophers are usually advocates, each of a positive system of
his own 70
Different spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search _ib._
The Parmenidês is the extreme manifestation of the negative
element. That Plato should employ one dialogue in setting forth
the negative case against the Theory of Ideas is not unnatural
71
Force of the negative case in the Parmenidês. Difficulties about
participation of sensible objects in the world of Ideas _ib._
Difficulties about the Cognizability of Ideas. If Ideas are
absolute, they cannot be cognizable: if they are cognizable, they
must be relative. Doctrine of Homo Mensura 72
Answer of Sokrates--That Ideas are mere conceptions of the mind.
Objection of Parmenides correct, though undeveloped 73
Meaning of Abstract and General Terms, debated from ancient times
to the present day--Different views of Plato and Aristotle upon it
76
Plato never expected to make his Ideas fit on to the facts of
sense: Aristotle tried to do it and partly succeeded 78
Continuation of the Dialogue--Parmenides admonishes Sokrates that
he has been premature in delivering a doctrine, without sufficient
preliminary exercise 79
What sort of exercise? Parmenides describes: To assume
provisionally both the affirmative and the negative of many
hypotheses about the most general terms, and to trace the
consequences of each _ib._
Impossible to do this before a numerous audience--Parmenides is
entreated to give a specimen--After much solicitation he agrees
80
Parmenides elects his own theory of the _Unum_, as the topic for
exhibition--Aristoteles becomes respondent _ib._
Exhibition of Parmenides--Nine distinct deductions or
Demonstrations, first from _Unum Est_--next from _Unum non Est_
81
The Demonstrations in antagonising pairs, or Antinomies.
Perplexing entanglement of conclusions given without any
explanation _ib._
Different judgments of Platonic critics respecting the Antinomies
and the dialogue generally 82
No dogmatical solution or purpose is wrapped up in the dialogue.
The purpose is negative, to make a theorist keenly feel all the
difficulties of theorising 85
This negative purpose is expressly announced by Plato himself. All
dogmatical purpose, extending farther, is purely hypothetical, and
even inconsistent with what is declared 87
The Demonstrations or Antinomies considered. They include much
unwarranted assumption and subtlety. Collection of unexplained
perplexities or [Greek: a)pori/ai] 88
Even if Plato himself saw through these subtleties, he might still
choose to impose and to heap up difficulties in the way of a
forward affirmative aspirant 89
The exercises exhibited by Parmenides are exhibited only as
illustrative specimens of a method enjoined to be applied to many
other Antinomies 91
These Platonic Antinomies are more formidable than any of the
sophisms or subtleties broached by the Megaric philosophers
_ib._
In order to understand fully the Platonic Antinomies, we ought to
have before us the problems of the Megarics and others.
Uselessness of searching for a positive result 93
Assumptions of Parmenides in his Demonstrations convey the minimum
of determinate meaning. Views of Aristotle upon these
indeterminate predicates, Ens, Unum, &c. 94
In the Platonic Demonstrations the same proposition in words is
made to bear very different meanings 95
First demonstration ends in an assemblage of negative conclusions.
_Reductio ad Absurdum_, of the assumption--Unum non Multa 96
Second Demonstration 97
It ends in demonstrating _Both_, of that which the first
Demonstration had demonstrated _Neither_ 98
Startling paradox--Open offence against logical canon--No logical
canon had then been laid down 99
Demonstration third--Attempt to reconcile the contradiction of
Demonstrations I. and II. 100
Plato's imagination of the Sudden or Instantaneous--Breaches or
momentary stoppages in the course of time _ib._
Review of the successive pairs of Demonstrations or Antinomies in
each, the first proves the Neither, the second proves the Both
101
The third Demonstration is mediatorial but not satisfactory--The
hypothesis of the Sudden or Instantaneous found no favour 102
Review of the two last Antinomies. Demonstrations VI. and VII.
103
Demonstration VII. is founded upon the genuine doctrine of
Parmenides 104
Demonstrations VI. and VII. considered--Unwarrantable steps in the
reasoning--The fundamental premiss differently interpreted, though
the same in words 105
Demonstrations VIII. and IX.--Analysis of Demonstration VIII.
106
Demonstration VIII. is very subtle and Zenonian 107
Demonstration IX. _Neither_ following _Both_ _ib._
Concluding words of the Parmenides--Declaration that he has
demonstrated the Both and the Neither of many different
propositions 108
Comparison of the conclusion of the Parmenides to an enigma of the
Republic. Difference. The constructor of the enigma adapted its
conditions to a foreknown solution. Plato did not _ib._
CHAPTER XXVIII.
THEÆTETUS.
Subjects and personages in the Theætêtus 110
Question raised by Sokrates--What is knowledge or Cognition? First
answer of Theætêtus, enumerating many different cognitions.
Corrected by Sokrates 111
Preliminary conversation before the second answer is given.
Sokrates describes his own peculiar efficacy--mental obstetric--He
cannot teach, but he can evolve knowledge out of pregnant minds
112
Ethical basis of the cross-examination of Sokrates--He is
forbidden to pass by falsehood without challenge 113
Answer of Theætêtus--Cognition is sensible perception: Sokrates
says that this is the same doctrine as the _Homo Mensura_ laid
down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with the
doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedoklês, &c., all except
Parmenides _ib._
Plato here blends together three distinct theories for the purpose
of confuting them; yet he also professes to urge what can be said
in favour of them. Difficulty of following his exposition 114
The doctrine of Protagoras is completely distinct from the other
doctrines. The identification of them as one and the same is only
constructive--the interpretation of Plato himself 115
Explanation of the doctrine of Protagoras--_Homo Mensura_ 116
Perpetual implication of Subject with Object--Relate and Correlate
118
Such relativity is no less true in regard to the ratiocinative
combinations of each individual, than in regard to his percipient
capacities _ib._
Evidence from Plato proving implication of Subject and Object, in
regard to the intelligible world 121
The Protagorean measure is even more easily shown in reference to
the intelligible world than in reference to sense 122
Object always relative to Subject--Either without the other,
impossible. Plato admits this in Sophistes 126
Plato's representation of the Protagorean doctrine in intimate
conjunction with the Herakleitean 126
Relativity of sensible facts, as described by him _ib._
Relations are nothing in the object purely and simply without a
comparing subject 127
Relativity twofold--to the comparing Subject--to another object,
besides the one directly described _ib._
Statement of the doctrine of Herakleitus--yet so as to implicate
it with that of Protagoras 128
Agent and Patient--No absolute Ens 129
Arguments derived from dreams, fevers, &c., may be answered 130
Exposition of the Protagorean doctrine, as given here by Sokrates
is to a great degree just. You cannot explain the facts of
consciousness by independent Subject and Object 131
Plato's attempt to get behind the phenomena. Reference to a double
potentiality--Subjective and Objective 133
Arguments advanced by the Platonic Sokrates against the
Protagorean doctrine. He says that it puts the wise and foolish on
a par--that it contradicts the common consciousness. Not every
one, but the wise man only, is a measure 135
In matters of present sentiment every man can judge for himself.
Where future consequences are involved special knowledge is
required 136
Plato, when he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras, states that
doctrine without the qualification properly belonging to it. All
belief relative to the condition of the believing mind 137
All exposition and discussion is an assemblage of individual
judgments and affirmations. This fact is disguised by elliptical
forms of language 139
Argument--That the Protagorean doctrine equalises all men and
animals. How far true. Not true in the sense requisite to sustain
Plato's objection 141
Belief on authority is true to the believer himself--The efficacy
of authority resides in the believer's own mind 142
Protagorean formula--is false, to those who dissent from it 143
Plato's argument that the wise man alone is a measure--Reply to it
_ib._
Plato's argument as to the distinction between present sensation
and anticipation of the future 145
The formula of Relativity does not imply that every man believes
himself to be infallible _ib._
Plato's argument is untenable--That if the Protagorean formula be
admitted, dialectic discussion would be annulled--The reverse is
true--Dialectic recognises the autonomy of the Individual mind
146
Contrast with the Treatise De Legibus--Plato assumes infallible
authority--sets aside dialectic 148
Plato in denying the Protagorean formula, constitutes himself the
measure for all. Counter proposition to the formula _ib._
Import of the Protagorean formula is best seen when we state
explicitly the counter-proposition 150
Unpopularity of the Protagorean formula--Most believers insist
upon making themselves a measure for others, as well as for
themselves. Appeal to Abstractions 150
Aristotle failed in his attempts to refute the Protagorean
formula--Every reader of Aristotle will claim the right of
examining for himself Aristotle's canons of truth 152
Plato's examination of the other doctrine--That knowledge is
Sensible Perception. He adverts to sensible facts which are
different with different Percipients 153
Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The conditions
of unanimity are best found among select facts of sense--weighing,
measuring, &c. 154
Arguments of Sokrates in examining this question. Divergence
between one man and another arises, not merely from different
sensual impressibility, but from mental and associative difference
155
Argument--That sensible Perception does not include
memory--Probability that those who held the doctrine meant to include
memory 157
Argument from the analogy of seeing and not seeing at the same
time _ib._
Sokrates maintains that we do not see _with_ our eyes, but that
the mind sees _through_ the eyes: that the mind often conceives
and judges by itself without the aid of any bodily organ 159
Indication of several judgments which the mind makes by itself--It
perceives Existence, Difference, &c. 160
Sokrates maintains that knowledge is to be found, not in the
Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons add
computations of the mind respecting them 161
Examination of this view--Distinction from the views of modern
philosophers 162
Different views given by Plato in other dialogues 163
Plato's discussion of this question here exhibits a remarkable
advance in analytical psychology. The mind rises from Sensation,
first to Opinion, then to Cognition 164
Plato did not recognise Verification from experience, or from
facts of sense, as either necessary or possible 168
Second definition given by Theætêtus--That Cognition consists in
right or true opinion _ib._
Objection by Sokrates--This definition assumes that there are
false opinions. But how can false opinions be possible? How can we
conceive Non-Ens: or confound together two distinct realities?
_ib._
Waxen memorial tablet in the mind, on which past impressions are
engraved. False opinion consists in wrongly identifying present
sensations with past impressions 169
Sokrates refutes this assumption. Dilemma. Either false opinion is
impossible, or else a man may know what he does not know 170
He draws distinction between possessing knowledge, and having it
actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught pigeons
turned into it and flying about _ib._
Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of Theætêtus--That there may be
non-cognitions in the mind as well as cognitions, and that false
opinion may consist in confounding one with the other. Sokrates
rejects this 171
He brings another argument to prove that Cognition is not the same
as true opinion. Rhetors persuade or communicate true opinion; but
they do not teach or communicate knowledge 172
New answer of Theætêtus--Cognition is true opinion, coupled with
rational explanation 173
Criticism on the answer by Sokrates. Analogy of letters and words,
primordial elements and compounds. Elements cannot be explained:
compounds alone can be explained _ib._
Sokrates refutes this criticism. If the elements are unknowable,
the compound must be unknowable also 174
Rational explanation may have one of three different meanings. 1.
Description in appropriate language. 2. Enumeration of all the
component elements in the compound. In neither of these meanings
will the definition of Cognition hold _ib._
Third meaning. To assign some mark, whereby the thing to be
explained differs from everything else. The definition will not
hold. For rational explanation, in this sense, is already included
in true opinion 175
Conclusion of the dialogue--Summing up by Sokrates--Value of the
result, although purely negative 176
Remarks on the dialogue. View of Plato. False persuasion of
knowledge removed. Importance of such removal _ib._
Formation of the testing or verifying power in men's minds, value
of the Theætêtus, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing his own
suggestions 177
Comparison of the Philosopher with the Rhetor. The Rhetor is
enslaved to the opinions of auditors 178
The Philosopher is master of his own debates 179
Purpose of dialogue to qualify for a life of philosophical Search
_ib._
Difficulties of the Theætêtus are not solved in any other Dialogue
180
Plato considered that the search for Truth was the noblest
occupation of life 182
Contrast between the philosopher and the practical
statesman--between Knowledge and Opinion 183
CHAPTER XXIX.
SOPHISTES--POLITIKUS.
Persons and circumstances of the two dialogues 185
Relation of the two dialogues to the Theætêtus 187
Plato declares that his first purpose is to administer a lesson in
logical method: the special question chosen, being subordinate to
that purpose 188
Method of logical Definition and Division _ib._
Sokrates tries the application of this method, first, upon a
vulgar subject. To find the logical place and deduction of the
Angler. Superior classes above him. Bisecting division 189
Such a lesson in logical classification was at that time both
novel and instructive. No logical manuals then existed 190
Plato describes the Sophist as analogous to an angler. He traces
the Sophist by descending subdivision from the acquisitive genus
of art 191
The Sophist traced down from the same, by a second and different
descending subdivision 192
Also, by a third 193
The Sophist is traced down, from the genus of separating or
discriminating art 194
In a logical classification, low and vulgar items deserve as much
attention as grand ones. Conflict between emotional and scientific
classification 195
The purifier--a species under the genus discriminator--separates
good from evil. Evil is of two sorts; the worst sort is,
Ignorance, mistaking itself for knowledge 197
Exhortation is useless against this worst mode of evil.
Cross-examination, the shock of the Elenchus, must be brought to bear
upon it. This is the sovereign purifier _ib._
The application of this Elenchus is the work of the Sophist,
looked at on its best side. But looked at as he really is, he is a
juggler who teaches pupils to dispute about every thing--who palms
off falsehood for truth 198
Doubt started by the Eleate. How can it be possible either to
think or to speak falsely? 199
He pursues the investigation of this problem by a series of
questions _ib._
The Sophist will reject our definition and escape, by affirming
that to speak falsely is impossible. He will require us to make
out a rational theory, explaining Non-Ens 200
The Eleate turns from Non-Ens to Ens. Theories of various
philosophers about Ens _ib._
Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about Non-Ens 201
Whether Ens is Many or One? If Many, how Many? Difficulties about
One and the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot solve them 201
Theories of those who do not recognise a definite number of Entia
or elements. Two classes thereof 202
1. The Materialist Philosophers. 2. The Friends of Forms or
Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real Entia _ib._
Argument against the Materialists--Justice must be something,
since it may be either present or absent, making sensible
difference--But Justice is not a body 203
At least many of them will concede this point, though not all Ens
is common to the corporeal and the incorporeal. Ens is equivalent
to potentiality 204
Argument against the Idealists--who distinguish Ens from the
generated, and say that we hold communion with the former through
our minds, with the latter through our bodies and senses _ib._
Holding communion--What? Implies Relativity. Ens is known by the
mind. It therefore suffers or undergoes change. Ens includes both
the unchangeable and the changeable 205
Motion and rest are both of them Entia or realities. Both agree in
Ens. Ens is a _tertium quid_--distinct from both. But how can
anything be distinct from both? 206
Here the Eleate breaks off without solution. He declares his
purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as Non-Ens _ib._
Argument against those who admit no predication to be legitimate,
except identical. How far Forms admit of intercommunion with each
other _ib._
No intercommunion between any distinct forms. Refuted. Common
speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis 207
Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms--inadmissible _ib._
Some Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is the only
admissible doctrine. Analogy of letters and syllables _ib._
Art and skill are required to distinguish what Forms admit of
intercommunion, and what Forms do not. This is the special
intelligence of the Philosopher, who lives in the bright region of
Ens: the Sophist lives in the darkness of Non-Ens 208
He comes to enquire what Non-Ens is. He takes for examination five
principal Forms--Motion--Rest--Ens--Same--Different _ib._
Form of Diversum pervades all the others 209
Motion is different from Diversum, or is not Diversum. Motion is
different from Ens--in other words, it is Non-Ens. Each of these
Forms is both Ens and Non-Ens 210
By Non-Ens, we do not mean anything contrary to Ens--we mean only
something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, as well as
Ens _ib._
The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have shown
both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is 211
The theory now stated is the only one, yet given, which justifies
predication as a legitimate process, with a predicate different
from the subject 212
Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into intercommunion
with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment 213
Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and
a verb--it must be proposition of _Something_. False propositions,
involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to the particular subject
_ib._
Opinion, Judgment, Fancy, &c., are akin to Proposition, and may be
also false, by coming into partnership with the Form Non-Ens 214
It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is theoretically
possible, and that there may be a profession, like that of the
Sophist, engaged in producing it _ib._
Logical distribution of Imitators--those who imitate what they
know, or what they do not know--of these last, some sincerely
believe themselves to know, others are conscious that they do not
know, and designedly impose upon others 215
Last class divided--Those who impose on numerous auditors by long
discourse, the Rhetor--Those who impose on select auditors, by
short question and answer, making the respondent contradict
himself--the Sophist 215
Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a
Sophist 216
These characteristics may have belonged to other persons, but they
belonged in an especial manner to Sokrates himself _ib._
The conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the taking of a
fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person 217
The art which Plato calls "the thoroughbred and noble Sophistical
Art" belongs to Sokrates and to no one else. The Elenchus was
peculiar to him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not Sophists in this
sense 218
Universal knowledge--was professed at that time by all
Philosophers--Plato, Aristotle, &c. 219
Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the Sophistês. He says that
the Sophist is a disputatious man who challenges every one for
speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who
maintains false propositions to be impossible 220
Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens--No predications except identical
221
Misconception of the function of the copula in predication _ib._
No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No analysis or
classification of propositions before the works of Aristotle 222
Plato's declared purpose in the Sophistês--To confute the various
schools of thinkers--Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists,
&c. 223
Plato's refutation throws light upon the doctrine of Antisthenes
_ib._
Plato's argument against the Materialists 224
Reply open to the Materialists _ib._
Plato's argument against the Idealists or Friends of Forms. Their
point of view against him 225
Plato argues--That to know, and be known, is action and passion, a
mode of relativity 226
Plato's reasoning--compared with the points of view of both
_ib._
The argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the Absolute,
and a full establishment of the Relative 227
Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the
Theætêtus _ib._
The Idealists maintained that Ideas or Forms were entirely
unchangeable and eternal. Plato here denies this, and maintains
that ideas were partly changeable, partly unchangeable 228
Plato's reasoning against the Materialists _ib._
Difference between Concrete and Abstract, not then made
conspicuous. Large meaning here given by Plato to
Ens--comprehending not only objects of Perception, but objects of
Conception besides 229
Narrower meaning given by Materialists to Ens--they included only
Objects of Perception. Their reasoning as opposed to Plato _ib._
Different definitions of Ens--by Plato--the Materialists, the
Idealists 231
Plato's views about Non-Ens examined _ib._
His review of the select Five Forms 233
Plato's doctrine--That Non-Ens is nothing more than different from
Ens _ib._
Communion of Non-Ens with proposition--possible and explicable
235
Imperfect analysis of a proposition--Plato does not recognise the
predicate _ib._
Plato's explanation of Non-Ens is not satisfactory--Objections to
it 236
Plato's view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of
contradiction 239
Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato--How
do we know that one is true, the other false? _ib._
Necessity of accepting the evidence of sense 240
Errors of Antisthenes--depended partly on the imperfect formal
logic of that day 241
Doctrine of the Sophistês--contradicts that of other Platonic
dialogues 242
The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are those
who held the same doctrine as Plato himself espouses in Phædon,
Republic, &c. 246
The Sophistês recedes from the Platonic point of view, and
approaches the Aristotelian 247
Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some propositions
true, others false 249
Plato in the Sophistês has undertaken an impossible task--He could
not have proved, against his supposed adversary, that there _are_
false propositions _ib._
What must be assumed in all dialectic discussion 251
Discussion and theorising presuppose belief and disbelief,
expressed in set forms of words. They imply predication, which
Antisthenes discarded 252
Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated in the
Sophistês 253
Recommendation of logical bipartition 254
Precepts illustrated by the Philêbus _ib._
Importance of founding logical Partition on resemblances perceived
by sense 255
Province of sensible perception--is not so much narrowed by Plato
here as it is in the Theætêtus 256
Comparison of the Sophistês with the Phædrus 257
Comparison of the Politikus with the Parmenidês 258
Variety of method in dialectic research--Diversity of Plato 259
CHAPTER XXX.
POLITIKUS.
The Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistês 260
Views of Plato on mensuration. Objects measured against each
other. Objects compared with a common standard. In each Art, the
purpose to be attained is the standard _ib._
Purpose in the Sophistês and Politikus is--To attain dialectic
aptitude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to judge
whether the means employed are suitable 261
Plato's defence of the Politikus against critics. Necessity that
the critic shall declare explicitly what his standard of
comparison is 262
Comparison of Politikus with Protagoras, Phædon, Philêbus, &c.
_ib._
Definition of the statesman, or Governor. Scientific competence.
Sokratic point of departure. Procedure of Plato in subdividing
263
King during the Saturnian period, was of a breed superior to the
people--not so any longer 264
Distinction of causes Principal and Causes Auxiliary. The King is
the only Principal Cause, but his auxiliaries pretend to be
principal also 266
Plato does not admit the received classification of government. It
does not touch the point upon which all true distinction ought to
be founded--Scientific or Unscientific 267
Unscientific governments are counterfeits. Government by any
numerous body must be counterfeit. Government by the one
scientific man is the true government 268
Fixed laws, limiting the scientific Governor, are mischievous, as
they would be for the physician and the steersman. Absurdity of
determining medical practice by laws, and presuming every one to
know it 269
Government by fixed laws is better than lawless government by
unscientific men, but worse than lawless government by scientific
men. It is a second-best _ib._
Comparison of unscientific governments. The one despot is the
worse. Democracy is the least bad, because it is least of a
government 270
The true governor distinguished from the General, the Rhetor, &c.
They are all properly his subordinates and auxiliaries 271
What the scientific Governor will do. He will aim at the formation
of virtuous citizens. He will weave together the energetic virtues
with the gentle virtues. Natural dissidence between them 272
If a man sins by excess of the energetic element, he is to be
killed or banished: if of the gentle, he is to be made a slave.
The Governor must keep up in the minds of the citizens an
unanimous standard of ethical orthodoxy 272
Remarks--Sokratic Ideal--Title to govern mankind derived
exclusively from scientific superiority in an individual person
273
Different ways in which this ideal is worked out by Plato and
Xenophon. The man of speculation and the man of action _ib._
The theory in the Politikus is the contradiction to that theory
which is assigned to Protagoras in the Protagoras 274
Points of the Protagorean theory--rests upon common sentiment
275
Counter-Theory in the Politikus. The exigencies of the Eleate in
the Politikus go much farther than those of Protagoras 276
The Eleate complains that under the Protagorean theory no adverse
criticism is allowed. The dissenter is either condemned to silence
or punished _ib._
Intolerance at Athens, not so great as elsewhere. Plato complains
of the assumption of infallibility in existing societies, but
exacts it severely in that which he himself constructs 277
Theory of the Politikus--distinguished three gradations of polity.
Gigantic individual force the worst 278
Comparison of the Politikus with the Republic. Points of analogy
and difference 279
Comparison of the Politikus with the Kratylus. Dictatorial,
constructive, science or art, common to both: applied in the
former to social administration--in the latter to the formation
and modification of names 281
Courage and Temperance are assumed in the Politikus. No notice
taken of the doubts and difficulties raised in Lachês and
Charmidês 282
Purpose of the difficulties in Plato's Dialogues of Search--To
stimulate the intellect of the hearer. His exposition does not
give solutions 284
CHAPTER XXXI.
KRATYLUS.
Persons and subjects of the dialogue Kratylus--Sokrates has no
formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others 285
Argument of Sokrates against Hermogenes--all proceedings of nature
are conducted according to fixed laws--speaking and naming among
the rest 286
The name is a didactic instrument; fabricated by the law-giver
upon the type of the Name-Form, and employed as well as
appreciated, by the philosopher 287
Names have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one thing and not
another 289
Forms of Names, as well as Forms of things nameable--essence of
the Nomen, to signify the Essence of its Nominatum _ib._
Exclusive competence of a privileged lawgiver, to discern these
essences, and to apportion names rightly 290
Counter-Theory, which Sokrates here sets forth and impugns--the
Protagorean doctrine--Homo Mensura 291
Objection by Sokrates--That Protagoras puts all men on a level as
to wisdom and folly, knowledge and ignorance 292
Objection unfounded--What the Protagorean theory really
affirms--Belief always relative to the believer's mind _ib._
Each man believes others to be wiser on various points than
himself--Belief on authority--not inconsistent with the
affirmation of Protagoras 293
Analogy of physical processes (cutting and burning) appealed to by
Sokrates--does not sustain his inference against Protagoras 294
Reply of Protagoras to the Platonic objections 295
Sentiments of Belief and Disbelief, common to all men--Grounds of
belief and disbelief, different with different men and different
ages 295
Protagoras did not affirm, that Belief depended upon the will or
inclination of each individual but that it was relative to the
circumstances of each individual mind 297
Facts of sense--some are the same to all sentient subjects, others
are different to different subjects. Grounds of unanimity 298
Sokrates exemplifies his theory of the Absolute Name or the
Name-Form. He attempts to show the inherent rectitude of many
existing names. His etymological transitions 299
These transitions appear violent to a modern reader. They did not
appear so to readers of Plato until this century. Modern
discovery, that they are intended as caricatures to deride the
Sophists 302
Dissent from this theory--No proof that the Sophists ever proposed
etymologies 304
Plato did not intend to propose mock-etymologies, or to deride any
one. Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither Hermogenes
nor Kratylus understand the etymologies as caricature 306
Plato intended his theory as serious, but his exemplifications as
admissible** guesses. He does not cite particular cases as proofs of
a theory, but only as illustrating what he means 308
Sokrates announces himself as Searcher. Other etymologists of
ancient times admitted etymologies as rash as those of Plato 310
Continuance of the dialogue--Sokrates endeavours to explain how it
is that the Names originally right have become so disguised and
spoiled 312
Letters, as well as things, must be distinguished with their
essential properties, each must be
adapted to each 313
Essential significant aptitude consists in resemblance _ib._
Sokrates assumes that the Name-giving Lawgiver was a believer in
the Herakleitean theory 314
But the Name-Giver may be mistaken or incompetent--the rectitude
of the name depends upon his knowledge 315
Changes and transpositions introduced in the name--hard to follow
315
Sokrates qualifies and attenuates his original thesis 316
Conversation of Sokrates with Kratylus; who upholds that original
thesis without any qualification _ib._
Sokrates goes still farther towards retracting it 317
There are names better and worse--more like, or less like to the
things named: Natural Names are the best, but they cannot always
be had. Names may be significant by habit, though in an inferior
way 318
All names are not consistent with the theory of Herakleitus: some
are opposed to it 319
It is not true to say, That Things can only be known through their
names 320
Unchangeable Platonic Forms--opposed to the Herakleitean flux,
which is true only respecting
sensible particulars _ib._
Herakleitean theory must not be assumed as certain. We must not
put implicit faith in names 321
Remarks upon the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum
and others, that it is intended to deride Protagoras and other
Sophists _ib._
Theory laid down by Sokrates _à priori_, in the first part--Great
difficulty, and ingenuity necessary, to bring it into harmony with
facts 322
Opposite tendencies of Sokrates in the last half of the dialogue--he
disconnects his theory of Naming from the Herakleitean doctrine
324
Ideal of the best system of naming--the Name-Giver ought to be
familiar with the Platonic Ideas or Essences, and apportion his
names according to resemblances among them 325
Comparison of Plato's views about naming with those upon social
institutions. Artistic, systematic construction--contrasted with
unpremeditated unsystematic growth 327
Politikus compared with Kratylus 328
Ideal of Plato--Postulate of the One Wise Man--Badness of all
reality 329
Comparison of Kratylus, Theætêtus, and Sophistês, in treatment of
the question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility of false
propositions 331
Discrepancies and inconsistencies of Plato, in his manner of
handling the same subject 332
No common didactic purpose pervading the Dialogues--each is a
distinct composition, working out its own peculiar argument
_ib._
CHAPTER XXXII.
PHILEBUS.
Character, Personages, and Subject of the Philêbus 334
Protest against the Sokratic Elenchus, and the purely negative
procedure 335
Enquiry--What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy
life? Good and Happiness--correlative and co-extensive. Philêbus
declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence _ib._
Good--object of universal choice and attachment by men, animals,
and plants--all-sufficient--satisfies all desires _ib._
Pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite cognitions
are so likewise 336
Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description?
Appeal to individual choice 337
First Question submitted to Protarchus--Intense Pleasure, without
any intelligence--He declines to accept it 338
Second Question--Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence
purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer--_No_ _ib._
It is agreed on both sides, That the Good must be a Tertium Quid.
But Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence is more cognate
with it than Pleasure 339
Difficulties about Unum et Multa. How can the One be Many? How can
the Many be One? The difficulties are greatest about Generic
Unity--how it is distributed among species and individuals _ib._
Active disputes upon this question at the time 340
Order of Nature--Coalescence of the Finite with the Infinite. The
One--The Finite Many--The Infinite Many _ib._
Mistake commonly made--To look only for the One, and the Infinite
Many, without looking for the intermediate subdivisions 341
Illustration from Speech and Music 342
Plato's explanation does not touch the difficulties which he had
himself recognised as existing 343
It is nevertheless instructive, in regard to logical division and
classification 344
At that time little thought had been bestowed upon classification
as a logical process _ib._
Classification--unconscious and conscious 345
Plato's doctrine about classification is not necessarily connected
with his Theory of Ideas _ib._
Quadruple distribution of Existences. 1. The Infinite. 2. The
Finient 3. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause or Agency
346
Pleasure and Pain belong to the first of these four
Classes--Cognition or Intelligence belongs to the fourth 347
In the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence with
Pleasure, Intelligence is the more important of the two
constituents _ib._
Intelligence is the regulating principle--Pleasure is the
Indeterminate, requiring to be regulated 348
Pleasure and Pain must be explained together--Pain arises from the
disturbance of the fundamental harmony of the system--Pleasure
from the restoration of it _ib._
Pleasure presupposes Pain 349
Derivative pleasures of memory and expectation belonging to mind
alone. Here you may find pleasure without pain _ib._
A life of Intelligence alone, without pain and without pleasure,
is conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is second-best
_ib._
Desire belongs to the mind, presupposes both a bodily want, and
the memory of satisfaction previously had for it. The mind and
body are here opposed. No true or pure pleasure therein 350
Can pleasures be true or false? Sokrates maintains that they are
so 351
Reasons given by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true opinions,
are true pleasures. The just man is favoured by the Gods, and will
have true visions sent to him _ib._
Protarchus disputes this--He thinks that there are some pleasures
bad, but none false--Sokrates does not admit this, but reserves
the question 352
No means of truly estimating pleasures and pains--False estimate
habitual--These are the false pleasures _ib._
Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and gradual
changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as pleasure
or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure 353
Opinion of the pleasure-hating philosophers--That pleasure is no
reality, but a mere juggle. There is no reality except pain, and
the relief from pain 354
Sokrates agrees with them in part, but not wholly _ib._
Theory of the pleasure-haters--We must learn what pleasure is by
looking at the intense pleasures--These are connected with
distempered body and mind 355
The intense pleasures belong to a state of sickness; but there is
more pleasure, on the whole, enjoyed in a state of health 356
Sokrates acknowledges some pleasures to be true. Pleasures of
beautiful colours, odours, sounds, smells, &c. Pleasures of
acquiring knowledge _ib._
Pure and moderate pleasures admit of measure and proportion 357
Pleasure is generation, not substance or essence: it cannot
therefore be an End, because all generation is only a means
towards substance--Pleasure therefore cannot be the Good _ib._
Other reasons why pleasure is not the Good 358
Distinction and classification of the varieties of Knowledge or
Intelligence. Some are more true and exact than others, according
as they admit more or less of measuring and computation _ib._
Arithmetic and Geometry are twofold: As studied by the philosopher
and teacher: As applied by the artisan 359
Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions. Analogy
between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are gradations of
truth and purity 360
Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for Rhetoric.
Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior in usefulness and
celebrity: but he claims superiority for Dialectic, as satisfying
the lover of truth _ib._
Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal
manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable
essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained 361
Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure separately, is the
Good, but a mixture of the two--Intelligence being the most
important. How are they to be mixed? _ib._
We must include all Cognitions--not merely the truest, but the
others also. Life cannot be carried on without both 362
But we must include no pleasures except the true, pure, and
necessary. The others are not compatible with Cognition or
Intelligence--especially the intense sexual pleasures _ib._
What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is Measure,
Proportion, Symmetry. To these Reason is more akin than Pleasure
363
Quintuple gradation in the Constituents of the Good. 1. Measure.
2. Symmetry. 3. Intelligence. 4. Practical Arts and Right
Opinions. 5. True and Pure Pleasures 364
Remarks. Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of an Idea,
but a quasi-unity of analogy 365
Discussions of the time about Bonum. Extreme absolute view,
maintained by Eukleides: extreme relative by the Xenophontic
Sokrates. Plato here blends the two in part; an Eclectic doctrine
_ib._
Inconvenience of his method, blending Ontology with Ethics 366
Comparison of Man to the Kosmos (which has reason, but no emotion)
is unnecessary and confusing 367
Plato borrows from the Pythagoreans, but enlarges their doctrine.
Importance of his views in dwelling upon systematic classification
368
Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended--yet
feebly applied--in this dialogue 369
What is the Good? Discussed both in Philêbus and in Republic.
Comparison 370
Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known,
while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself wavers
about it; gives different explanations, and sometimes professes
ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently _ib._
Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined: but the
answer in the Philêbus does not satisfy those tests 371
Inconsistency of Plato in his way of putting the question--The
alternative which he tenders has no fair application 372
Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly compared--Pleasure is
an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be compared with
Pleasure, except some other End 373
The Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of pleasure and
diminution of pain, postulated Intelligence as the governing
agency 374
Pleasures of Intelligence may be compared, and are compared by
Plato, with other pleasures, and declared to be of more value.
This is arguing upon the Hedonistic basis 375
Marked antithesis in the Philêbus between pleasure and avoidance
of pain 377
The Hedonists did not recognise this distinction--They included
both in their acknowledged End _ib._
Arguments of Plato against the intense pleasures--The Hedonists
enforced the same reasonable view 378
Different points of view worked out by Plato in different
dialogues--Gorgias, Protagoras, Philêbus--True and False Pleasures
379
Opposition between the Gorgias and Philêbus, about Gorgias and
Rhetoric 380
Peculiarity of the Philêbus--Plato applies the same principle of
classification--true and false--to Cognitions and Pleasures 382
Distinction of true and false--not applicable to pleasures _ib._
Plato acknowledges no truth and reality except in the
Absolute--Pleasures which he admits to be true--and why 385
Plato could not have defended this small list of Pleasures, upon
his own admission, against his opponents--the Pleasure-haters, who
disallowed pleasures altogether 387
Sokrates in this dialogue differs little from these
Pleasure-haters 389
Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics--defect of the Philêbus
391
Directive sovereignty of Measure--how explained and applied in the
Protagoras _ib._
How explained in Philêbus--no statement to what items it is
applied 393
Classification of true and false--how Plato applies it to
Cognitions 394
Valuable principles of this classification--difference with other
dialogues 395
Close of the Philêbus--Graduated elements of Good 397
Contrast between the Philêbus and the Phædrus, and Symposion, in
respect to Pulchrum, and intense Emotions generally 398
CHAPTER XXXIII.
MENEXENUS.
Persons and situation of the dialogue 401
Funeral harangue at Athens--Choice of a public orator--Sokrates
declares the task of the public orator to be easy--Comic
exaggeration of the effects of the harangue 401
Sokrates professes to have learnt a funeral harangue from Aspasia,
and to be competent to recite it himself. Menexenus entreats him
to do so 402
Harangue recited by Sokrates 403
Compliments of Menexenus after Sokrates has finished, both to the
harangue itself and to Aspasia _ib._
Supposed period--shortly after the peace of Antalkidas _ib._
Custom of Athens about funeral harangues. Many such harangues
existed at Athens, composed by distinguished orators or
logographers--Established type of the harangue 404
Plato in this harangue conforms to the established type--Topics on
which he insists 405
Consolation and exhortation to surviving relatives 407
Admiration felt for this harangue, both at the time and afterwards
407
Probable motives of Plato in composing it, shortly after he
established himself at Athens as a teacher--His competition with
Lysias--Desire for celebrity both as rhetor and as dialectician
_ib._
Menexenus compared with the view of rhetoric presented in the
Gorgias--Necessity for an orator to conform to established
sentiments 409
Colloquial portion of the Menexenus is probably intended as
ridicule and sneer at Rhetoric--The harangue itself is serious,
and intended as an evidence of Plato's ability 410
Anachronism of the Menexenus--Plato careless on this point 411
CHAPTER XXXIV.
KLEITOPHON.
Persons and circumstances of Kleitophon 413
Conversation of Sokrates with Kleitophon alone: he alludes to
observations of an unfavourable character recently made by
Kleitophon, who asks permission to explain _ib._
Explanation given. Kleitophon expresses gratitude and admiration
for the benefit which he has derived from long companionship with
Sokrates 414
The observations made by Sokrates have been most salutary and
stimulating in awakening ardour for virtue. Arguments and
analogies commonly used by Sokrates _ib._
But Sokrates does not explain what virtue is, nor how it is to be
attained. Kleitophon has had enough of stimulus, and now wants
information how he is to act 415
Questions addressed by Kleitophon with this view, both to the
companions of Sokrates and to Sokrates himself 416
Replies made by the friends of Sokrates unsatisfactory _ib._
None of them could explain what the special work of justice or
virtue was 417
Kleitophon at length asked the question from Sokrates himself. But
Sokrates did not answer clearly. Kleitophon believes that Sokrates
knows, but will not tell 417
Kleitophon is on the point of leaving Sokrates and going to
Thrasymachus. But before leaving he addresses one last entreaty,
that Sokrates will speak out clearly and explicitly 418
Remarks on the Kleitophon. Why Thrasyllus placed it in the eighth
Tetralogy immediately before the Republic, and along with Kritias,
the other fragment 419
Kleitophon is genuine, and perfectly in harmony with a just theory
of Plato 420
It could not have been published until after Plato's death _ib._
Reasons why the Kleitophon was never finished. It points out the
defects of Sokrates, just as he himself confesses them in the
Apology 421
The same defects also confessed in many of the Platonic and
Xenophontic dialogues 422
Forcible, yet respectful, manner in which these defects are set
forth in the Kleitophon. Impossible to answer them in such a way
as to hold out against the negative Elenchus of a Sokratic pupil
423
The Kleitophon represents a point of view which many objectors
must have insisted on against Sokrates and Plato 424
The Kleitophon was originally intended as a first book of the
Republic, but was found too hard to answer. Reasons why the
existing first book was substituted _ib._
CHAPTER XXVI.
PLATO.
CHAPTER XXVI.
PHÆDRUS--SYMPOSION.
[Side-note: These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato.
Phædrus is the originator of both.]
I put together these two dialogues, as distinguished by a marked
peculiarity. They are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. They have
one great and interesting subject common to both: though in the
Phædrus, this subject is blended with, and made contributory to,
another. They agree also in the circumstance, that Phædrus is, in
both, the person who originates the conversation. But they differ
materially in the manner of handling, in the comparisons and
illustrations, and in the apparent purpose.
[Side-note: Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment
prevalent in Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of
women in Greece.]
The subject common to both is, Love or Eros in its largest sense,
and with its manifold varieties. Under the totally different vein
of sentiment which prevails in modern times, and which recognises
passionate love as prevailing only between persons of different
sex--it is difficult for us to enter into Plato's eloquent
exposition of the feeling as he conceives it. In the Hellenic
point of view,[1] upon which Plato builds, the attachment of man
to woman was regarded as a natural impulse, and as a domestic,
social, sentiment; yet as belonging to a common-place rather than
to an exalted mind, and seldom or never rising to that pitch of
enthusiasm which overpowers all other emotions, absorbs the whole
man, and aims either at the joint performance of great exploits or
the joint prosecution of intellectual improvement by continued
colloquy. We must remember that the wives and daughters of
citizens were seldom seen abroad: that the wife was married very
young: that she had learnt nothing except spinning and weaving:
that the fact of her having seen as little and heard as little as
possible, was considered as rendering her more acceptable to her
husband:[2] that her sphere of duty and exertion was confined to
the interior of the family. The beauty of women yielded
satisfaction to the senses, but little beyond. It was the
masculine beauty of youth that fired the Hellenic imagination with
glowing and impassioned sentiment. The finest youths, and those
too of the best families and education, were seen habitually
uncovered in the Palæstra and at the public festival-matches;
engaged in active contention and graceful exercise, under the
direction of professional trainers. The sight of the living form,
in such perfection, movement, and variety, awakened a powerful
emotional sympathy, blended with aesthetic sentiment, which in the
more susceptible natures was exalted into intense and passionate
devotion. The terms in which this feeling is described, both by
Plato and Xenophon, are among the strongest which the language
affords--and are predicated even of Sokrates himself. Far from
being ashamed of the feeling, they consider it admirable and
beneficial; though very liable to abuse, which they emphatically
denounce and forbid.[3] In their view, it was an idealising
passion, which tended to raise a man above the vulgar and selfish
pursuits of life, and even above the fear of death. The devoted
attachments which it inspired were dreaded by the despots, who
forbade the assemblage of youths for exercise in the palæstra.[4]
[Footnote 1: Schleiermacher (Einleit. zum Symp. p. 367) describes
this view of Eros as Hellenic, and as "gerade den anti-modernen
and anti-christlichen Pol der Platonischen Denkungsart". Aristotle
composed [Greek: The/seis E)rôtikai\] or [Greek: E)rôtika/s],
Diogenes Laert. v. 22-24. See Bernays, Die Dialoge des
Aristoteles, p. 133, Berlin, 1863.
Compare the dialogue called [Greek: E)rôtiko/s], among the works
of Plutarch, p. 750 seq., where some of the speakers, especially
Protogenes, illustrate and enlarge upon this Platonic construction
of Eros--[Greek: a)lêthinou= de\ E)/rôtos ou)d' o(tiou=n tê=|
gunaikôni/tidi me/testin], &c. (750 C, 761 B, &c.)
In the Treatise De Educatione Puerorum (c. 15, p. 11 D-F) Plutarch
hesitates to give a decided opinion on the amount of restriction
proper to be imposed on youth: he is much impressed with the
authority of Sokrates, Plato, Xenophon, Æschines, Kebês, [Greek:
kai\ to\n pa/nta cho/ron e)kei/nôn tô=n a)ndrô=n, oi( tou\s
a)/r)r(enas e)doki/masan e)/rôtas], &c. See the anecdote about
Episthenes, an officer among the Ten Thousand Greeks under
Xenophon, in Xenophon, Anabasis, vii. 4, 7, and a remarkable
passage about Zeno the Stoic, Diog. Laert. vii. 13. Respecting the
general subject of [Greek: paiderasti/a] in Greece, there is a
valuable Excursus in Bekker's Charikles, vol. i. pp. 347-377,
Excurs. ii. I agree generally with his belief about the practice
in Greece, see Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 33, 70. Bekker quotes
abundant authorities, which might be farther multiplied if
necessary. In appreciating the evidence upon this point, we cannot
be too careful to keep in mind what Sokrates says (in the
Xenophontic Symposion, viii. 34) when comparing the Thebans and
Eleians on one side with the Athenians and Spartans on the
other--[Greek: E)kei/nois me\n ga\r tau=ta no/mima, ê(mi=n de\
e)ponei/dista.] We must interpret passages of the classical
authors according to their fair and real meanings, not according
to the conclusions which we might wish to find proved.
If we read the oration of Demosthenes against Neæra (which is full
of information about Athenian manners), we find the speaker
Apollodôrus distributing the relations of men with women in the
following manner (p. 1386)--[Greek: to\ ga\r sunoikei=n tou=t'
e)sti/n, o(\s a)\n paidopoiê=tai kai\ ei)sa/gê| ei)/s te tou\s
dêmo/tas kai\ tou\s phra/toras tou\s ui(ei=s, kai\ ta\s
thugate/ras e)kdidô=| ô(s au)tou= ou)/sas toi=s a)ndra/si. Ta\s
me\n ga\r e(tai/ras, ê(donê=s e(/neka e)/chomen--ta\s de\
pallaka/s, tê=s kath' ê(me/ran therapei/as tou= sô/matos--ta\s de\
gunai=kas, tou= paidopoiei=sthai gnêsi/ôs, kai\ tô=n e(/ndon
phu/laka pi/stên e)/chein.]
To the same purpose, the speaker in Lysias ([Greek: U(pe\r tou=
E)ratosthe/nous pho/nou]--sect. 7), describing his wife,
says--[Greek: e)n me\n ou)=n tô=| prô/tô| chro/nô| pasô=n ê)=n
belti/stê; kai\ ga\r oi)kono/mos deinê\ kai\ pheidôlo\s a)gathê\
kai\ a)kribô=s pa/nta dioikou=sa.]
Neither of these three relations lent itself readily to the
Platonic vein of sentiment and ideality: neither of them led to
any grand results either in war--or political ambition--or
philosophical speculation; the three great roads, in one or other
of which the Grecian ideality travelled. We know from the Republic
that Plato did not appreciate the value of the family life, or the
purposes for which men marry, according to the above passage cited
from Demosthenes. In this point, Plato differs from Xenophon, who,
in his Oeconomicus, enlarges much (in the discourse of
Ischomachus) upon the value of the conjugal union, with a view to
prudential results and good management of the household; while he
illustrates the sentimental and affectionate side of it, in the
story of Pantheia and Abradates (Cyropædia).]
[Footnote 2: See the Oeconomicus of Xenophon, cap. iii. 12, vii.
5.]
[Footnote 3: The beginning of the Platonic Charmidês illustrates
what is here said, pp. 154-155; also that of the Protagoras and
Lysis, pp. 205-206.
Xenophon, Sympos. i. 8-11; iv. 11, 15. Memorab. i. 3, 8-14 (what
Sokrates observes to Xenophon about Kritobulus). Dikæarchus
(companion of Aristotle) disapproved the important influence which
Plato assigned to Eros (Cicero, Tusc. D. iv. 34-71).
If we pass to the second century after the Christian Era, we find
some speakers in Athenæus blaming severely the amorous sentiments
of Sokrates and the narrative of Alkibiades, as recited in the
Platonic Symposium (v. 180-187; xi. 506-508 C). Athenæus remarks
farther, that Plato, writing in this strain, had little right to
complain (as we read in the Republic) of the licentious
compositions of Homer and other poets, and to exclude them from
his model city. Maximus Tyrius, in one of his four discourses
(23-5) on the [Greek: e)rôtikê\] of Sokrates, makes the same remark as
Athenæus about the inconsistency of Plato in banishing Homer from
the model city, and composing what we read in the Symposion; he
farther observes that the erotic dispositions of Sokrates provoked
no censure from his numerous enemies at the time (though they
assailed him upon so many other points), but had incurred great
censure from contemporaries of Maximus himself, to whom he
replies--[Greek: tou\s nuni\ katêgo/rous] (23, 6-7). The
comparisons which he institutes (23, 9) between the sentiments and
phrases of Sokrates, and those of Sappho and Anakreon, are very
curious.
Dionysius of Halikarnassus speaks of the [Greek: e)gkô/mia] on
Eros in the Symposion, as "unworthy of serious handling or of
Sokrates". (De Admir. Vi Dic. Demosth. p. 1027.)
But the most bitter among all the critics of Plato, is
Herakleitus--author of the Allegoriæ Homericæ. Herakleitus repels,
as unjust and calumnious, the sentence of banishment pronounced by
Plato against Homer, from whom all mental cultivation had been
derived. He affirms, and tries to show, that the poems of
Homer--which he admits to be full of immorality if literally
understood--had an allegorical meaning. He blames Plato for not having
perceived this; and denounces him still more severely for the
character of his own writings--[Greek: e)r)r(i/phthô de\ kai\
Pla/tôn o( ko/lax, O(mê/rou sukopha/ntês--Tou\s de\ Pla/tônos
dialo/gous, a)/nô kai\ ka/tô paidikoi\ kathubri/zousin e)/rôtes,
ou)damou= de ou)chi tê=s a)r)r(e/nos e)pithumi/as mesto/s e)stin
o( a)nê/r] (Herakl. All. Hom., c. 4-74, ed. Mehler, Leiden,
1851).]
[Footnote 4: Plato, Sympos. 182 C. The proceedings of Harmodius
and Aristogeiton, which illustrate this feeling, are recounted by
Thucydides, vi. 54-57. These two citizens were gratefully
recollected and extensively admired by the Athenian public.]
[Side-note: Eros, considered as the great stimulus to improving
philosophical communion. Personal Beauty, the great point of
approximation between the world of sense and the world of Ideas.
Gradual generalisation of the sentiment.]
Especially to Plato, who combined erotic and poetical imagination
with Sokratic dialectics and generalising theory--this passion
presented itself in the light of a stimulus introductory to the
work of philosophy--an impulse at first impetuous and
undistinguishing, but afterwards regulated towards improving
communion and colloquy with an improvable youth. Personal beauty
(this is[5] the remarkable doctrine of Plato in the Phædrus) is
the main point of visible resemblance between the world of sense
and the world of Ideas: the Idea of Beauty has a brilliant
representative of itself among concrete objects--the Ideas of
Justice and Temperance have none. The contemplation of a beautiful
youth, and the vehement emotion accompanying it, was the only way
of reviving in the soul the Idea of Beauty which it had seen in
its antecedent stage of existence. This was the first stage
through which every philosopher must pass; but the emotion of love
thus raised, became gradually in the better minds both expanded
and purified. The lover did not merely admire the person, but also
contracted the strongest sympathy with the feelings and character,
of the beloved youth: delighting to recognise and promote in him
all manifestations of mental beauty which were in harmony with the
physical, so as to raise him to the greatest attainable perfection
of human nature. The original sentiment of admiration, having been
thus first transferred by association from beauty in the person to
beauty in the mind and character, became gradually still farther
generalised; so that beauty was perceived not as exclusively
specialised in any one individual, but as invested in all
beautiful objects, bodies as well as minds. The view would
presently be farther enlarged. The like sentiment would be
inspired, so as to worship beauty in public institutions, in
administrative arrangements, in arts and sciences. And the mind
would at last be exalted to the contemplation of that which
pervades and gives common character to all these
particulars--Beauty in the abstract--or the Self-Beautiful--the Idea
or Form of the Beautiful. To reach this highest summit, after mounting
all the previous stages, and to live absorbed in the contemplation of
"the great ocean of the beautiful," was the most glorious
privilege attainable by any human being. It was indeed attainable
only by a few highly gifted minds. But others might make more or
less approach to it: and the nearer any one approached, the
greater measure would he ensure to himself of real good and
happiness.[6]
[Footnote 5: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249 E, 250 B-E.]
[Footnote 6: Plato, Sympos. pp. 210-211.
Respecting the Beautiful, I transcribe here a passage from
Ficinus, in his Argument prefixed to the Hippias Major, p. 757.
"Unumquodque è singulis pulchris, _pulchrum hoc_ Plato vocat:
formam in omnibus, pulchritudinem; speciem et ideam supra omnia,
ipsum pulchrum. Primum sensus attingit opinioque. Secundum ratio
cogitat. Tertium mens intuetur.
"Quid ipsum Bonum? Ipsum rerum omnium principium, actus purus,
actus sequentia cuncta vivificans. Quid ipsum Pulchrum? Vivificus
actus e primo fonte bonorum effluens, Mentem primo divinam idearum
ordine infinité decorans, Numina deinde sequentia mentesque
rationum serie complens, Animas tertio numerosis discursibus
ornans, Naturas quarto seminibus, formis quinto materiam."]
[Side-note: All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they
pursue it by various means. The name _Eros_ is confined to one
special case of this large variety.]
Such is Plato's conception of Eros or Love and its object. He
represents it as one special form or variety of the universal law
of gravitation pervading all mankind. Every one loves, desires, or
aspires to _happiness_: this is the fundamental or primordial law
of human nature, beyond which we cannot push enquiry. Good, or
good things, are nothing else but the means to happiness:[7]
accordingly, every man, loving happiness, loves good also, and
desires not only full acquisition, but perpetual possession of
good. In this wide sense, love belongs to all human beings: every
man loves good and happiness, with perpetual possession of
them--and nothing else.[8] But different men have different ways of
pursuing this same object. One man aspires to good or happiness by
way of money-getting, another by way of ambition, a third by
gymnastics--or music--or philosophy. Still no one of these is said
to love, or to be under the influence of Eros. That name is
reserved exclusively for one special variety of it--the impulse
towards copulation, generation, and self-perpetuation, which
agitates both bodies and minds throughout animal nature. Desiring
perpetual possession of good, all men desire to perpetuate
themselves, and to become immortal. But an individual man or
animal cannot be immortal: he can only attain a quasi-immortality
by generating a new individual to replace himself.[9] In fact even
mortal life admits no continuity, but is only a succession of
distinct states or phenomena: one always disappearing and another
always appearing, each generated by its antecedent and generating
its consequent. Though a man from infancy to old age is called the
same, yet he never continues the same for two moments together,
either in body or mind. As his blood, flesh, bones, &c., are in
perpetual disappearance and renovation, always coming and going--so
likewise are his sensations, thoughts, emotions, dispositions,
cognitions, &c. Neither mentally nor physically does he ever
continue the same during successive instants. The old man of this
instant perishes and is replaced by a new man during the next.[10]
As this is true of the individual, so it is still more true of the
species: continuance or immortality is secured only by perpetual
generation of new individuals.
[Footnote 7: Plato, Sympos. pp. 204-205. [Greek: Phe/re, o( e)rô=n
tô=n a)gathô=n, ti/ e)ra=|? Gene/sthai, ê)=n d' e)gô/, au)tô=|.
Kai\ ti/ e)/stai e)kei/nô| ô(=| a)\n ge/nêtai ta)gatha/? Tou=t'
eu)porô/teron, ê)=n d' e)gô/, e)/chô a)pokri/nasthai, o(/ti
eu)dai/môn e)/stai. Ktê/sei ga/r, e)/phê, a)gathô=n, oi(
eu)dai/mones eu)dai/mones; Kai\ ou)ke/ti prosdei= e)re/sthai,
i(/na ti/ de\ bou/letai eu)dai/môn ei)=nai o( boulo/menos, a)lla\
te/los dokei= e)/chein ê( a)po/krisis. . . . Tau/tên dê\ tê\n
bou/lêsin kai\ to\n e)/rôta tou=ton, po/tera koino\n ei)=nai
pa/ntôn a)nthrô/pôn, kai\ pa/ntas ta)gatha\ bou/lesthai au)toi=s
ei)=nai a)ei/, ê)\ pô=s le/geis? Ou(/tôs, ê)=n d' e)gô/, koino\n
ei)=nai pa/ntôn.]]
[Footnote 8: Plato, Sympos. p. 206 A. [Greek: ô(s ou)de/n ge
a)/llo e)sti\n ou)= e)rô=sin a)/nthrôpoi ê)\ tou= a)gathou=.]]
[Footnote 9: Plato, Sympos. p. 207 C.]
[Footnote 10: Plato, Sympos. pp. 207-208.]
[Side-note: Desire of mental copulation and procreation, as the
only attainable likeness of immortality, requires the sight of
personal beauty as an originating stimulus.]
The love of immortality thus manifests itself in living beings
through the copulative and procreative impulse, which so
powerfully instigates living man in mind as well as in body.
Beauty in another person exercises an attractive force which
enables this impulse to be gratified: ugliness on the contrary
repels and stifles it. Hence springs the love of beauty--or
rather, of procreation in the beautiful--whereby satisfaction is
obtained for this restless and impatient agitation.[11] With some,
this erotic impulse stimulates the body, attracting them towards
women, and inducing them to immortalise themselves by begetting
children: with others, it acts far more powerfully on the mind,
and determines them to conjunction with another mind for the
purpose of generating appropriate mental offspring and products.
In this case as well as in the preceding, the first stroke of
attraction arises from the charm of physical, visible, and
youthful beauty: but when, along with this beauty of person, there
is found the additional charm of a susceptible, generous,
intelligent mind, the effect produced by the two together is
overwhelming; the bodily sympathy becoming spiritualised and
absorbed by the mental. With the inventive and aspiring
intelligences--poets like Homer and Hesiod, or legislators like
Lykurgus and Solon--the erotic impulse takes this turn. They look
about for some youth, at once handsome and improvable, in
conversation with whom they may procreate new reasonings
respecting virtue and goodness--new excellences of
disposition--and new force of intellectual combination, in both
the communicants. The attachment between the two becomes so strong
that they can hardly live apart: so anxious are both of them to
foster and confirm the newly acquired mental force of which each
is respectively conscious in himself.[12]
[Footnote 11: Plato, Sympos. p. 206 E. [Greek: o(/then dê\ tô=|
kuou=nti/ te kai\ ê)/dê spargô=nti pollê\ ê( pto/êsis ge/gone
peri\ to\ kalo\n dia\ to\ mega/lês ô)di=nos a)polu/ein to\n
e)/chonta. E)sti\ ga\r ou) tou= kalou= o( e)/rôs, a)lla\--tê=s
gennê/seôs kai\ tou= to/kou e)n tô=| kalô=|.]]
[Footnote 12: Plato, Sympos. p. 209.]
[Side-note: Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few
privileged minds, when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty
_in genere_. This is the most absorbing sentiment of all.]
Occasionally, and in a few privileged natures, this erotic impulse
rises to a still higher exaltation, losing its separate and
exclusive attachment to one individual person, and fastening upon
beauty in general, or that which all beautiful persons and
beautiful minds have in common. The visible charm of beautiful
body, though it was indispensable as an initial step, comes to be
still farther sunk and undervalued, when the mind has ascended to
the contemplation of beauty _in genere_, not merely in bodies and
minds, but in laws, institutions, and sciences. This is the
highest pitch of philosophical love, to which a few minds only are
competent, and that too by successive steps of ascent: but which,
when attained, is thoroughly soul-satisfying. If any man's vision
be once sharpened so that he can see beauty pure and absolute, he
will have no eyes for the individual manifestations of it in gold,
fine raiment, brilliant colours, or beautiful youths.[13] Herein
we have the climax or consummation of that erotic aspiration which
first shows itself in the form of virtuous attachment to
youth.[14]
[Footnote 13: Plato, Symposion, p. 211.]
[Footnote 14: Plato, Symposion, p. 211 B. [Greek: o(/tan dê/ tis
a)po\ tô=nde dia\ to\ o)rthô=s paiderastei=n e)paniô\n e)kei=no
to\ kalo\n a)/rchêtai kathora=|n, schedo\n a)/n ti a(/ptoito tou=
te/lous], &c.]
[Side-note: Purpose of the Symposion, to contrast this Platonic
view of Eros with several different views of it previously
enunciated by the other speakers; closing with a panegyric on
Sokrates, by the drunken Alkibiades.]
It is thus that Plato, in the Symposion, presents Love, or erotic
impulse: a passion taking its origin in the physical and mental
attributes common to most men, and concentrated at first upon some
individual person--but gradually becoming both more intense and
more refined, as it ascends in the scale of logical generalisation
and comes into intimate view of the pure idea of Beauty. The main
purpose of the Symposion is to contrast this Platonic view of Eros
or Love--which is assigned to Sokrates in the dialogue, and is
repeated by him from the communication of a prophetic woman named
Diotima[15]--with different views assigned to other speakers. Each
of the guests at the Banquet--Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus,
Aristophanes, Agathon, Sokrates--engages to deliver a panegyric on
Eros: while Alkibiades, entering intoxicated after the speeches
are finished, delivers a panegyric on Sokrates, in regard to
energy and self-denial generally, but mainly and specially in the
character of Erastes. The pure and devoted attachment of Sokrates
towards Alkibiades himself--his inflexible self-command under the
extreme of trial and temptation--the unbounded ascendancy which he
had acquired over that insolent youth, who seeks in every
conceivable manner to render himself acceptable to Sokrates--are
emphatically extolled, and illustrated by singular details.
[Footnote 15: Plat. Sympos. p. 201 D. [Greek: gunaiko\s mantikê=s
Dioti/mas, ê( tau=ta/ te sophê\ ê)=n kai\ a)/lla polla/, kai\
A)thênai/ois pote\ thusame/nois pro\ tou= loimou= de/ka e)/tê
a)nabolê\n e)poi/êse tê=s no/sou, ê)\ dê\ kai\ e)me\ ta\ e)rôtika\
e)di/daxen.]
Instead of [Greek: gunaiko\s mantikê=s], which was the old
reading, Stallbaum and other editors prefer to write [Greek:
gunaiko\s Mantinikê=s], also 211 D. I cannot but think that
[Greek: mantikê=s] is right. There is no pertinence or fit
meaning in [Greek: Mantinikê=s], whereas the word [Greek:
mantikê=s] is in full keeping with what is said about the special
religious privileges and revelations of Diotima--that she procured
for the Athenians an adjournment of the plague for ten years. The
Delphian oracle assured the Lydian king Kroesus that Apollo had
obtained from the [Greek: Moi=rai] a postponement of the ruin of
the Lydian kingdom for three years, but that he could obtain from
them no more (Herodot. i. 91).]
[Side-note: Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias,
Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon.]
Both Phædrus[16] and Pausanias, in their respective encomiums upon
Eros, dwell upon that God as creating within the human bosom by
his inspirations the noblest self-denial and the most devoted
heroism, together with the strongest incentives to virtuous
behaviour. Pausanias however makes distinctions: recognising and
condemning various erotic manifestations as abusive, violent,
sensual--and supposing for these a separate inspiring Deity--Eros
Pandêmus, contrasted with the good and honourable Eros Uranius[17]
or Coelestis. In regard to the different views taken of Eros by
Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon--the first is medical,
physiological, cosmical[18]--the second is comic and imaginative,
even to exuberance--the third is poetical or dithyrambic:
immediately upon which follows the analytical and philosophical
exposition ascribed to Sokrates, opened in his dialectic manner by
a cross-examination of his predecessor, and proceeding to
enunciate the opinions communicated to him by the prophetess
Diotima.
[Footnote 16: Sydenham conceives and Boeckh (ad Plat. Legg. iii.
694) concurs with him, that this discourse, assigned to Phædrus,
is intended by Plato as an imitation of the style of Lysias. This
is sufficiently probable. The encomium on Eros delivered by
Agathon, especially the concluding part of it (p. 197), mimics the
style of florid effeminate poetry, overcharged with balanced
phrases ([Greek: i)so/kôla, a)nti/theta]), which Aristophanes
parodies in Agathon's name at the beginning of the
Thesmophoriazusæ, Athenæus, v. 187 C.]
[Footnote 17: Plato, Sympos. pp. 180-181.]
[Footnote 18: Respecting this view of Eros or Aphrodite, as a
cosmical, all-pervading, procreative impulse, compare Euripides,
Frag. Incert. 3, 6, assigned by Welcker (Griech. Trag. p. 737) to
the lost drama--the first Hippolytus; also the beautiful
invocation with which the poem of Lucretius opens, and the
fragmentary exordium remaining from the poem of Parmenides.]
[Side-note: Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He
describes Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Dæmon between
Gods and men, constantly aspiring to divinity, but not attaining
it.]
Sokrates treats most of the preceding panegyrics as pleasing
fancies not founded in truth. In his representation (cited from
Diotima) Eros is neither beautiful, nor good, nor happy; nor is he
indeed a God at all. He is one of the numerous intermediate body
of Dæmons, inferior to Gods yet superior to men, and serving as
interpreting agents of communication between the two.[19] Eros is
the offspring of Poverty and Resource (Porus).[20] He represents
the state of aspiration and striving, with ability and energy,
after goodness and beauty, but never actually possessing them: a
middle condition, preferable to that of the person who neither
knows that he is deficient in them, nor cares to possess them: but
inferior to the condition of him who is actually in possession.
Eros is always Love of something--in relation to something yet
unattained, but desired: Eros is to be distinguished carefully
from the object desired.[21] He is the parallel of the
philosopher, who is neither ignorant nor wise: not ignorant,
because genuine ignorance is unconscious of itself and fancies
itself to be knowledge: not wise, because he does not possess
wisdom, and is well aware that he does not possess it. He is in
the intermediate stage, knowing that he does not possess wisdom,
but constantly desiring it and struggling after it. Eros, like
philosophy, represents this continual aspiration and advance
towards a goal never attained.[22]
[Footnote 19: Plato, Sympos. pp. 202-203.]
[Footnote 20: What Sokrates says here in the Symposion about Eros
is altogether at variance with what Sokrates says about Eros in
Phædrus, wherein we find him speaking with the greatest reverence
and awe about Eros as a powerful God, son of Aphroditê (Phædrus,
pp. 242 D, 243 D, 257 A).]
[Footnote 21: Plato, Symposion, pp. 199-200. [Greek: O( E)/rôs
e)/rôs e)sti\n ou)deno\s ê(\ tino/s? Pa/nu me\n ou)=n
e)/stin. . . . Po/teron o( E)/rôs e)kei/nou ou(= e)/stin e)/rôs,
e)pithumei= au)tou= ê)\ ou)/? Pa/nu ge. . . . A)na/gkê to\
e)pithumou=n e)pithumei=n ou)= e)ndee/s e)stin, ê)\ mê\
e)pithumei=n, e)a\n mê\ e)ndee\s ê)=|.]]
[Footnote 22: Plato, Sympos. p. 204 A. [Greek: Ti/nes ou)=n oi(
philosophou=ntes, ei) mê/te oi( sophoi\ mê/te oi( a)mathei=s?
. . . Oi( metaxu\ tou/tôn a)mphote/rôn, ô(=n au)= kai\ o( E)/rôs.
E)sti\ ga\r dê\ tô=n kalli/stôn ê( sophi/a, E)/rôs d' e)sti\n
e)/rôs peri\ to\ kalo/n; ô(/ste a)nagkai=on E)/rôta philo/sophon
ei)=nai, philo/sophon de\ o)/nta metaxu\ ei)=nai sophou= kai\
a)mathou=s.]]
[Side-note: Analogy of the erotic aspiration with that of the
philosopher, who knows his own ignorance and thirsts for
knowledge.]
It is thus that the truly Platonic conception of Love is brought
out, materially different from that of the preceding
speakers--Love, as a state of conscious want, and of aspiration or
endeavour to satisfy that want, by striving after good or
happiness--Philosophy as the like intermediate state, in regard to
wisdom. And Plato follows out this coalescence of love and philosophy
in the manner which has been briefly sketched above: a vehement
impulse towards mental communion with some favoured youth, in the
view of producing mental improvement, good, and happiness to both
persons concerned: the same impulse afterwards expanding, so as to
grasp the good and beautiful in a larger sense, and ultimately to
fasten on goodness and beauty in the pure Idea: which is
absolute--independent of time, place, circumstances, and all variable
elements--moreover the object of the one and supreme science.[23]
[Footnote 23: Plato, Symposion, pp. 210-211.]
[Side-note: Eros as presented in the Phædrus--Discourse of Lysias,
and counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros--Sokrates is
seized with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on
Eros.]
I will now compare the Symposion with the Phædrus. In the first
half of the Phædrus also, Eros, and the Self-Beautiful or the pure
Idea of the Beautiful, are brought into close coalescence with
philosophy and dialectic--but they are presented in a different
manner. Plato begins by setting forth the case against Eros in two
competing discourses (one cited from Lysias,[24] the other
pronounced by Sokrates himself as competitor with Lysias in
eloquence) supposed to be addressed to a youth, and intended to
convince him that the persuasions of a calm and intelligent friend
are more worthy of being listened to than the exaggerated promises
and protestations of an impassioned lover, from whom he will
receive more injury than benefit: that the inspirations of Eros
are a sort of madness, irrational and misguiding as well as
capricious and transitory: while the calm and steady friend,
unmoved by any passionate inspiration, will show himself worthy of
permanent esteem and gratitude.[25] By a sudden revulsion of
feeling, Sokrates becomes ashamed of having thus slandered the
divine Eros, and proceeds to deliver a counter-panegyric or
palinode upon that God.[26]
[Footnote 24: Plato, Phædrus, p. 230 seq.]
[Footnote 25: Plato, Phædrus, p. 237 seq.]
[Footnote 26: Eros, in the Phædrus, is pronounced to be a God, son
of Aphroditê (p. 242 E); in the Symposion he is not a God but a
Dæmon, offspring of Porus and Penia, and attendant on Aphroditê,
according to Diotima and Sokrates (p. 203).]
[Side-note: Panegyric--Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros
is a variety of madness, but distinguishes good and bad varieties
of madness, both coming from the Gods. Good madness is far better
than sobriety.]
Eros (he says) is, mad, irrational, superseding reason and
prudence in the individual mind.[27] This is true: yet still Eros
exercises a beneficent and improving influence. Not all madness is
bad. Some varieties of it are bad, but others are good. Some arise
from human malady, others from the inspirations of the Gods: both
of them supersede human reason and the orthodoxy of established
custom[28]--but the former substitute what is worse, the latter
what is better. The greatest blessings enjoyed by man arise from
madness, when it is imparted by divine inspiration. And it is so
imparted in four different phases and by four different Gods:
Apollo infuses the prophetic madness--Dionysus, the ritual or
religious--The Muses, the poetical--and Eros, the erotic.[29] This
last sort of madness greatly transcends the sober reason and
concentration upon narrow objects which is so much praised by
mankind generally.[30] The inspired and exalted lover deserves
every preference over the unimpassioned friend.
[Footnote 27: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265-266. [Greek: to\ a)/phron
tê=s dianoi/as e(/n ti koinê=| ei)=dos. . . . to\ tê=s paranoi/as
ô(s e(\n e)n ê(mi=n pephuko\s ei)=dos.] Compare p. 236 A.]
[Footnote 28: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265 A. [Greek: Mani/as de/ ge
ei)/dê du/o; tê\n me/n, u(po\ nosêma/tôn a)nthrôpi/nôn, tê\n de/,
u(po\ thei/as e)xallagê=s tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn nomi/môn gignome/nên.]
Compare 249 D.]
[Footnote 29: Plato, Phædrus, p. 244 A. [Greek: ei) me\n ga\r ê)=n
a(plou=n to\ mani/an kako\n ei)=nai, kalô=s a)\n e)le/geto; nu=n
de\ ta\ me/gista tô=n a)gathô=n ê(mi=n gi/gnetai dia\ mani/as,
thei/a| me/ntoi do/sei didome/nês.]
Compare Plutarch, [Greek: E)rôtiko/s], c. 16. pp. 758-759, &c.]
[Footnote 30: Plato, Phædrus, p. 245 B. [Greek: mêde/ tis ê(ma=s
lo/gos thorubei/tô deditto/menos ô(s pro\ tou= kekinême/nou to\n
sô/phrona dei= proairei=sthai phi/lon.]
P. 256 E; [Greek: ê( de\ a)po\ tou= mê\ e)rô=ntos oi)keio/tês,
sôphrosu/nê| thnêtê=| kekrame/nê, thnêta/ te kai\ pheidôla\
oi)konomou=sa, a)neleutheri/an u(po\ plê/thous e)panoume/nên ô(s
a)retê\n tê=| phi/lê|** psuchê=| e)ntekou=sa], &c.]
[Side-note: Poetical mythe delivered by Sokrates, describing the
immortality and pre-existence of the soul, and its pre-natal
condition of partial companionship with Gods and eternal Ideas.]
Plato then illustrates, by a highly poetical and imaginative
mythe, the growth and working of love in the soul. All soul or
mind is essentially self-moving, and the cause of motion to other
things. It is therefore immortal, without beginning or end: the
universal or cosmic soul, as well as the individual souls of Gods
and men.[31] Each soul may be compared to a chariot with a winged
pair of horses. In the divine soul, both the horses are excellent,
with perfect wings: in the human soul, one only of them is good,
the other is violent and rebellious, often disobedient to the
charioteer, and with feeble or half-grown wings.[32] The Gods, by
means of their wings, are enabled to ascend up to the summit of
the celestial firmament--to place themselves upon the outer
circumference or back of the heaven--and thus to be carried round
along with the rotation of the celestial sphere round the Earth.
In the course of this rotation they contemplate the pure essences
and Ideas, truth and reality without either form or figure or
colour: they enjoy the vision of the Absolute--Justice,
Temperance, Beauty, Science. The human souls, with their defective
wings, try to accompany the Gods; some attaching themselves to one
God, some to another, in this ascent. But many of them fail in the
object, being thrown back upon earth in consequence of their
defective equipment, and the unruly character of one of the
horses: some however succeed partially, obtaining glimpses of
Truth and of the general Ideas, though in a manner transient and
incomplete.
[Footnote 31: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 245-246. Compare Krische, De
Platonis Phædro, pp. 49-50 (Göttingen, 1848).
Plato himself calls this panegyric in the mouth of Sokrates a
[Greek: muthiko/s tis u(/mnos] (Phædr. p. 265 D).]
[Footnote 32: The reader will recollect Homer, Iliad, xvi. 152,
where the chariot and horses of Patroklus are described, when he
is about to attack the Trojans; the mortal horse Pedasus is
harnessed to it alongside of the two immortal horses Xanthus and
Balius.]
[Side-note: Operation of such pre-natal experience upon the
Intellectual faculties of man--Comparison and combination of
particular sensations indispensable--Reminiscence.]
Those souls which have not seen Truth or general Ideas at all, can
never be joined with the body of a man, but only with that of some
inferior animal. It is essential that some glimpse of truth should
have been obtained, in order to qualify the soul for the condition
of man:[33] for the mind of man must possess within itself the
capacity of comparing and combining particular sensations, so as
to rise to one general conception brought together by reason.[34]
This is brought about by the process of reminiscence; whereby it
recalls those pure, true, and beautiful Ideas which it had
partially seen during its prior extra-corporeal existence in
companionship with the Gods. The rudimentary faculty of thus
reviving these general Conceptions--the visions of a prior state
of existence--belongs to all men, distinguishing them from other
animals: but in most men the visions have been transient, and the
power of reviving them is faint and dormant. It is only some few
philosophers, whose minds, having been effectively winged in their
primitive state for ascent to the super-celestial regions, have
enjoyed such a full contemplation of the divine Ideas as to be
able to recall them with facility and success, during the
subsequent corporeal existence. To the reminiscence of the
philosopher, these Ideas present themselves with such brilliancy
and fascination, that he forgets all other pursuits and interests.
Hence he is set down as a madman by the generality of mankind,
whose minds have not ascended beyond particular and present
phenomena to the revival of the anterior Ideas.
[Footnote 33: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249-250. [Greek: pa=sa me\n
a)nthrô/pou psuchê\ phu/sei tethe/atai ta\ o)/nta--ê)\ ou)k a)\n
ê)=lthen ei)s to/de** to\ zô=on; a)namimnê/skesthai d' e)k tô=nde
e)kei=na ou) r(a/|dion a(pa/sê|], &c.]
[Footnote 34: Plato, Phædrus, p. 249 B. [Greek: Ou) ga\r ê(/ ge
mê/ pote i)dou=sa tê\n a)lê/theian ei)s to/de ê(/xei to\ schê=ma.
Dei= ga\r a)/nthrôpon xunie/nai kat' ei)=dos lego/menon, e)k
pollô=n i)o\n ai)sthê/seôn ei)s e(\n logismô=| xunairou/menon.
Tou=to de/ e)stin a)na/mnêsis e)kei/nôn, a(/ pot' ei)=den ê(mô=n
ê( psuchê\ sumporeuthei=sa theô=| kai\ u(peridou=sa a(\ nu=n
ei)=nai/ phamen, kai\ a)naku/psasa ei)s to\ o)\n o)/ntôs.]]
[Side-note: Reminiscence is kindled up in the soul of the
philosopher by the aspect of visible Beauty, which is the great
link between the world of sense and the world of Ideas.]
It is by the aspect of visible beauty, as embodied in
distinguished youth, that this faculty of reminiscence is first
kindled in minds capable of the effort. It is only the embodiment
of beauty, acting as it does powerfully upon the most intellectual
of our senses, which has sufficient force to kindle up the first
act or stage of reminiscence in the mind, leading ultimately to
the revival of the Idea of Beauty. The embodiments of justice,
wisdom, temperance, &c., in particular men, do not strike forcibly
on the senses, nor approximate sufficiently to the original Idea,
to effect the first stroke of reminiscence in an unprepared mind.
It is only the visible manifestation of beauty, which strikes with
sufficient shock at once on the senses and the intellect, to
recall in the mind an adumbration of the primitive Idea of Beauty.
The shock thus received first develops the reminiscent faculty in
minds apt and predisposed to it, and causes the undeveloped wings
of the soul to begin growing. It is a passion of violent and
absorbing character; which may indeed take a sensual turn, by the
misconduct of the unruly horse in the team, producing in that case
nothing but corruption and mischief--but which may also take a
virtuous, sentimental, imaginative turn, and becomes in that case
the most powerful stimulus towards mental improvement in both the
two attached friends. When thus refined and spiritualised, it can
find its satisfaction only in philosophical communion, in the
generation of wisdom and virtue; as well as in the complete
cultivation of that reminiscent power, which vivifies in the mind
remembrance of Forms or Ideas seen in a prior existence. To attain
such perfection, is given to few; but a greater or less
approximation may be made to it. And it is the only way of
developing the highest powers and virtues of the mind; which must
spring, not from human prudence and sobriety, but from divine
madness or erotic inspiration.[35]
[Footnote 35: Plato, Phædrus, p. 256 B. [Greek: ou(= mei=zon
a)gatho\n ou)/te sôphrosu/nê a)nthrôpi/nê ou)/te thei/a mani/a
dunatê\ pori/sai a)nthrô/pô|.]--245 B: [Greek: e)p' eu)tuchi/a
tê=| megi/stê| para\ theô=n ê( toiau/tê mani/a di/dotai.]
The long and highly poetical mythe, of which I have given some of
the leading points, occupies from c. 51 to c. 83 (pp. 244-257) of
the dialogue. It is adapted to the Hellenic imagination, and
requires the reader to keep before him the palæstræ of Athens, as
described in the Lysis, Erastæ, and Charmidês of Plato--visited
both by men like Sokrates and by men like Kritias (Xenoph. Memor.
i. 2, 29).]
Such is the general tenor of the dialogue Phædrus, in its first
half: which presents to us the Platonic love, conceived as the
source and mainspring of exalted virtue--as the only avenue to
philosophy--as contrasted, not merely with sensual love, but also
with the sobriety of the decent citizen who fully conforms to the
teaching of Law and Custom. In the Symposion, the first of these
contrasts appears prominently, while the second is less noticed.
In the Phædrus, Sokrates declares emphatically that madness, of a
certain sort, is greatly preferable to sobriety: that the
temperate, respectable, orthodox citizen, is on the middle line,
some madmen being worse than he, but others better: that madness
springing from human distemper is worse, but that when it springs
from divine inspiration, it is in an equal degree better, than
sobriety: that the philosophical _oestrus_, and the reminiscence
of the eternal Ideas (considered by Plato as the only true and
real Entia), is inconsistent with that which is esteemed as
sobriety: and is generated only by special inoculation from Eros
or some other God. This last contrast, as I have just observed, is
little marked in the Symposion. But on the other hand, the
Symposion (especially the discourse of Sokrates and his repetition
of the lessons of Diotima), insists much more upon the
generalisation of the erotic impulse. In the Phædrus, we still
remain on the ground of fervent attachment between two
individuals--an attachment sentimental and virtuous, displaying
itself in an intercourse which elicits from both of them active
intelligence and exalted modes of conduct: in the Symposion, such
intercourse is assimilated explicitly to copulation with
procreative consequences, but it is represented as the first stage
of a passion which becomes more and more expanded and
comprehensive: dropping all restriction to any single individual,
and enlarging itself not merely to embrace pursuits, and
institutions, but also to the plenitude and great ocean of Beauty
in its largest sense.
[Side-note: Elevating influence ascribed, both in Phædrus and
Symposion, to Eros Philosophus. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of
poetical fancy and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory.]
The picture here presented by Plato, of the beneficent and
elevating influence of Eros Philosophus, is repeated by Sokrates
as a revelation made to him by the prophetess Diotima. It was much
taken to heart by the Neo-Platonists.[36] It is a striking
manifestation of the Platonic characteristics: transition from
amorous impulse to religious and philosophical
mysticism--implication of poetical fancy with the conception of the
philosophising process--surrender of the mind to metaphor and
analogy, which is real up to a certain point, but is forcibly
stretched and exaggerated to serve the theorising purpose of the
moment. Now we may observe, that the worship of youthful masculine
beauty, and the belief that contemplation of such a face and form
was an operative cause, not only raising the admiration but also
quickening the intelligence of the adult spectator, and serving as
a provocative to instructive dialogue--together with a decided
attempt to exalt the spiritual side of this influence and
depreciate the sensual--both these are common to Plato with
Sokrates and Xenophon. But what is peculiar to Plato is, that he
treats this merely as an initial point to spring from, and soars
at once into the region of abstractions, until he gets clear of
all particulars and concomitants, leaving nothing except Beauty
Absolute--[Greek: to\ Kalo\n--to\ au)to\-kalo\n]--the "full sea of
the beautiful". Not without reason does Diotima express a doubt
whether Sokrates (if we mean thereby the historical Sokrates)
could have followed so bold a flight. His wings might probably
have failed and dropped him: as we read in the Phædrus respecting
the unprepared souls who try to rise aloft in company with the
Gods. Plato alone is the true Dædalus equal to this flight, borne
up by wings not inferior to those of Pindar[37]--according to the
comparison of Dionysius of Halikarnassus.
[Footnote 36: Porphyry, Vit. Plotini, 23.
Plato's way of combining, in these two dialogues--so as to pass by
an easy thread of association from one to the other--subjects
which appear to us unconnected and even discordant, is certainly
remarkable. We have to recognise material differences in the turn
of imagination, as between different persons and ages. The
following remark of Professor Mohl, respecting the Persian lyric
poet Hafiz, illustrates this point. "Au reste, quand même nous
serions mieux renseignés sur sa vie, il resterait toujours pour
nous le singulier spectacle d'un homme qui tantôt célèbre
l'absorption de l'âme dans l'essence de Dieu, tantôt chante le vin
et l'amour, sans grossièreté, il est vrai, mais avec un laisser
aller et un naturel qui exclut toute idée de symbolisme--et qui
généralement glisse de l'une dans l'autre de ces deux manières de
sentir, qui nous paraissent si différentes, sans s'apercevoir
lui-même qu'il change de sujet. Les Orientaux ont cherché la solution
de cette difficulté dans une interprétation mystique de toutes ses
poésies; mais les textes s'y refusent. Des critiques modernes ont
voulu l'expliquer en supposant une hypocrisie de l'auteur, qui lui
aurait fait mêler une certaine dose de piété mystique, à ses vers
plus légers, pour les faire passer: mais ce calcul parait étranger
à la nature de l'homme. Je crois qu'il faut trouver le mot de
l'énigme dans l'état général des esprits et de la culture de son
temps: et la difficulté pour nous est seulement de nous
réprésenter assez vivement l'état des esprits en Perse à cette
époque, et la nature de l'influence que le Soufisme y exerçait
depuis des siècles sur toutes les classes cultivées de la
nation."--Mohl (Rapport Annuel à la Société Asiatique, 1861, p.
89.)]
[Footnote 37: Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. in Demosth., p. 972,
Reiske.]
Various remarks may be made, in comparing this exposition of
Diotima in the Symposion with that which we read in the Phædrus
and Phædon.
[Side-note: Differences between Symposion and Phædrus. In-dwelling
conceptions assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the
latter.]
First, in the Phædrus and Phædon (also in the Timæus and
elsewhere), the pre-existence of the soul, and its antecedent
familiarity, greater or less, with the world of Ideas,--are
brought into the foreground; so as to furnish a basis for that
doctrine of reminiscence, which is one of the peculiar
characteristics of Plato. The Form or Idea, when once disengaged
from the appendages by which it has been overgrown, is said to be
recognised by the mind and welcomed as an old acquaintance. But in
the Symposion, no such doctrine is found. The mind is described as
rising by gradual steps from the concrete and particular to the
abstract and general, by recognising the sameness of one attribute
as pervading many particulars, and by extending its comparisons
from smaller groups of particulars to larger; until at length one
and the same attribute is perceived to belong to all. The mind is
supposed to evolve out of itself, and to generate in some
companion mind, certain abstract or general conceptions,
correlating with the Forms or Concepta without. The fundamental
postulate here is, not that of pre-existence, but that of
in-dwelling conceptions.
[Side-note: Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in
Symposion.]
Secondly, in the Phædrus and Phædon, the soul is declared to be
immortal, _à parte post_ as well as _à parte ante_. But in the
Symposion, this is affirmed to be impossible.[38] The soul yearns
for, but is forbidden to reach, immortality: or at least can only
reach immortality in a metaphorical sense, by its prolific
operation--by generating in itself as long as it lasts, and in
other minds who will survive it, a self-renewing series of noble
thoughts and feelings--by leaving a name and reputation to survive
in the memory of others.
[Footnote 38: Plato, Sympos. pp. 207-208.]
[Side-note: Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively
in Symposion.]
Thirdly, in Phædrus, Phædon, Republic, and elsewhere, Plato
recognises many distinct Forms or Ideas--a world or aggregate of
such Entia Rationis[39]--among which Beauty is one, but only one.
It is the exalted privilege of the philosophic mind to come into
contemplation and cognition of these Forms generally. But in the
Symposion, the Form of Beauty ([Greek: to\ kalo\n]) is presented
singly and exclusively--as if the communion with this one Form
were the sole occupation of the most exalted philosophy.
[Footnote 39: Plat. Repub. v. 476. He recognises Forms of [Greek:
a)/dikon, kako/n, ai)schro/n], as well as Forms of [Greek:
di/kaion, a)gatho/n, kalo/n], &c.]
[Side-note: Eros recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as
affording the initiatory stimulus to philosophy--Not so recognised
in Phædon, Theætêtus, and elsewhere.]
Fourthly, The Phædrus and Symposion have, both of them in common,
the theory of Eros as the indispensable, initiatory, stimulus to
philosophy. The spectacle of a beautiful youth is considered
necessary to set light to various elements in the mind, which
would otherwise remain dormant and never burn: it enables the
pregnant and capable mind to bring forth what it has within and to
put out its hidden strength. But if we look to the Phædon,
Theætêtus, Sophistês, or Republic, we shall not find Eros invoked
for any such function. The Republic describes an elaborate scheme
for generating and developing the philosophic capacity: but Eros
plays no part in it. In the Theætêtus, the young man so named is
announced as having a pregnant mind requiring to be disburthened,
and great capacity which needs foreign aid to develop it: the
service needed is rendered by Sokrates, who possesses an obstetric
patent, and a marvellous faculty of cross-examination. Yet instead
of any auxiliary stimulus arising from personal beauty, the
personal ugliness of both persons in the dialogue is emphatically
signified.
I note these peculiarities, partly of the Symposion, partly of the
Phædrus along with it--to illustrate the varying points of view
which the reader must expect to meet in travelling through the
numerous Platonic dialogues.
[Side-note: Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the
Symposion--Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome
youths.]
In the strange scene with which the Symposion is wound up, the
main purpose of the dialogue is still farther worked out. The
spirit and ethical character of Eros Philosophus, after having
been depicted in general terms by Diotima, are specially
exemplified in the personal history of Sokrates, as recounted and
appreciated by Alkibiades. That handsome, high-born, and insolent
youth, being in a complete state of intoxication, breaks in
unexpectedly upon the company, all of whom are as yet sober: he
enacts the part of a drunken man both in speech and action, which
is described with a vivacity that would do credit to any
dramatist. His presence is the signal for beginning to drink hard,
and he especially challenges Sokrates to drink off, after him, as
much wine as will fill the large water-vessel serving as cooler;
which challenge Sokrates forthwith accepts and executes, without
being the least affected by it. Alkibiades instead of following
the example of the others by delivering an encomium on Eros,
undertakes to deliver one upon Sokrates. He proceeds to depict
Sokrates as the votary of Eros Philosophus, wrapped up in the
contemplation of beautiful youths, and employing his whole time in
colloquy with them--yet as never losing his own self-command, even
while acquiring a magical ascendency over these companions.[40]
The abnormal exterior of Sokrates, resembling that of a Satyr,
though concealing the image of a God within--the eccentric
pungency of his conversation, blending banter with seriousness,
homely illustrations with impressive principles--has exercised an
influence at once fascinating, subjugating, humiliating. The
impudent Alkibiades has been made to feel painfully his own
unworthiness, even while receiving every mark of admiration from
others. He has become enthusiastically devoted to Sokrates, whom
he has sought to attach to himself, and to lay under obligation,
by tempting offers of every kind. The details of these offers are
given with a fulness which cannot be translated to modern readers,
and which even then required to be excused as the revelations of a
drunken man. They present one of the boldest fictions in the Greek
language--if we look at them in conjunction with the real
character of Alkibiades as an historical person.[41] Sokrates is
found proof against every variety of temptation, however seductive
to Grecian feeling. In his case, Eros Philosophus maintains his
dignity as exclusively pure, sentimental, and spiritual: while
Alkibiades retires more humiliated than ever. We are given to
understand that the like offers had been made to Sokrates by many
other handsome youths also--especially by Charmides and
Euthydemus--all of them being treated with the same quiet and
repellent indifference.[42] Sokrates had kept on the
vantage-ground as regards all:--and was regarded by all with
the same mixture of humble veneration and earnest attachment.
[Footnote 40: Plato, Sympos. p. 216 C-D.]
[Footnote 41: Plato, Sympos. p. 219. See also, respecting the
historical Alkibiades and his characte, Thucyd. vi. 15; Xenoph.
Memor. i. 1; Antisthenes, apud Athenæum, xii. 534.
The invention of Plato goes beyond that of those ingenious men who
recounted how Phrynê and Lais had failed in attempts to overcome
the continence of Xenokrates, Diog. L. iv. 7: and the saying of
Lais, [Greek: ô(s ou)k a)p' a)ndro/s, a)ll' a)p' a)ndri/antos,
a)nastai/ê.] Quintilian (viii. 4, 22-23) aptly enough compares the
description given by Alkibiades--as the maximum of testimony to
the "invicta continentia" of Sokrates--with the testimony to the
surpassing beauty of Helen, borne by such witnesses as the Trojan
[Greek: dêmoge/rontes] and Priam himself (Hom. Iliad iii. 156).
One of the speakers in Athenæus censures severely this portion of
the Platonic Symposion, xi. 506 C, 508 D, v. 187 D. Porphyry (in
his life of Plotinus, 15) tells us that the rhetor Diophanes
delivered an apology for Alkibiades, in the presence of Plotinus;
who was much displeased, and directed Porphyry to compose a
reply.]
[Footnote 42: Plato, Symp. p. 222 B.
In the Hieron of Xenophon (xi. 11)--a conversation between the
despot Hieron and the poet Simonides--the poet, exhorting Hieron
to govern his subjects in a mild, beneficent, and careful spirit,
expatiates upon the popularity and warm affection which he will
thereby attract to himself from them. Of this affection one
manifestation will be (he says) as follows:--[Greek: ô(/ste ou)
mo/non philoi=o a)/n, a)lla\ kai\ e)rô=|o, u(p' a)nthrô/pôn; _kai\
tou\s kalou\s ou) peira=|n, a)lla\ peirô/menon u(p' au)tô=n
a)ne/chesthai a)/n se de/oi_], &c.
These words illustrate the adventure described by Alkibiades in
the Platonic Symposion.
Herakleides of Pontus, Dikæarchus, and the Peripatetic Hieronymus,
all composed treatises [Greek: Peri\ E)rôtos], especially [Greek:
peri\ paidikô=n e)rô/tôn] (Athenæ. xiii. 602-603).]
[Side-note: Perfect self-command of Sokrates--proof against every
sort of trial.]
Not merely upon this point but upon others also, Alkibiades
recounts anecdotes of the perfect self-mastery of Sokrates: in
endurance of cold, heat, hunger, and fatigue--in contempt of the
dangers of war, in bravery on the day of battle--even in the power
of bearing more wine than any one else, without being intoxicated,
whenever the occasion was such as to require him to drink: though
he never drank much willingly. While all his emotions are thus
described as under the full control of Reason and Eros
Philosophus--his special gift and privilege was that of
conversation--not less eccentric in manner, than potent,
soul-subduing,[43] and provocative in its effects.
[Footnote 43: Plato, Sympos. pp. 221-222.
Alkibiades recites acts of distinguished courage performed by
Sokrates, at the siege of Potidæa as well as at the battle of
Delium.
About the potent effect produced by the conversation of Sokrates
upon his companions, compare Sympos. p. 173 C-D.
In the Xenophontic Apology (s. 18), Sokrates adverts to the
undisturbed equanimity which he had shown during the long blockade
of Athens after the battle of Ægospotami, while others were
bewailing the famine and other miseries.]
[Side-note: Drunkenness of others at the close of the
Symposion--Sokrates is not affected by it, but continues his dialectic
process.]
After the speech of Alkibiades is concluded, the close of the
banquet is described by the primary narrator. He himself, with
Agathon and Aristophanes, and several other fresh revellers,
continue to drink wine until all of them become dead drunk. While
Phædrus, Eryximachus, and others retire, Sokrates remains. His
competency to bear the maximum of wine without being disturbed by
it, is tested to the full. Although he had before, in acceptance
of the challenge of Alkibiades, swallowed the contents of the wine
cooler, he nevertheless continues all the night to drink wine in
large bowls, along with the rest. All the while, however, he goes
on debating his ordinary topics, even though no one is
sufficiently sober to attend to him. His companions successively
fall asleep, and at day-break, he finds himself the only person
sober,[44] except Aristodemus (the narrator of the whole scene),
who has recently waked after a long sleep. Sokrates quits the
house of Agathon, with unclouded senses and undiminished
activity--bathes--and then visits the gymnasium at the Lykeion;
where he passes all the day in his usual abundant colloquy.[45]
[Footnote 44: In Sympos. p. 176 B, Sokrates is recognised as
[Greek: dunatô/tatos pi/nein], above all the rest: no one can be
compared with him. In the two first books of the Treatise De
Legibus, we shall find much to illustrate what is here said (in
the Symposion) about the power ascribed to him of drinking more
wine than any one else, without being at all affected by it. Plato
discusses the subject of strong potations ([Greek: me/thê]) at
great length; indeed he seems to fear that his readers will think
he says too much upon it (i. 642 A). He considers it of great
advantage to have a test to apply, such as wine, for the purpose
of measuring the reason and self-command of different men, and of
determining how much wine is sufficient to overthrow it, in each
different case (i. 649 C-E). You can make this trial (he argues)
in each case, without any danger or harm; and you can thus escape
the necessity of making the trial in a real case of emergency.
Plato insists upon the [Greek: chrei/a tê=s me/thês], as a genuine
test, to be seriously employed for the purpose of testing men's
reason and force of character (ii. p. 673). In the Republic, too
(iii. p. 413 E), the [Greek: phu/lakes] are required to be tested,
in regard to their capacity of resisting pleasurable temptation,
as well as pain and danger.
Among the titles of the lost treatises of Theophrastus, we find
one [Greek: Peri\ Me/thês] (Diog. L. v. 44). It is one of the
compliments that the Emperor Marcus Antoninus (i. 16) pays to his
father--That he was, like Sokrates, equally competent both to
partake of, and to abstain from, the most seductive enjoyments,
without ever losing his calmness and self-mastery.]
[Footnote 45: Plato, Sympos. p. 223.]
[Side-note: Symposion and Phædon--each is the antithesis and
complement of the other.]
The picture of Sokrates, in the Symposion, forms a natural
contrast and complement to the picture of him in the Phædon;
though the conjecture of Schleiermacher[46]--that the two together
are intended to make up the Philosophus, or third member of the
trilogy promised in the Sophistês--is ingenious rather than
convincing. The Phædon depicts Sokrates in his last conversation
with his friends, immediately before his death; the Symposion
presents him in the exuberance of life, health, and cheerfulness:
in both situations, we find the same attributes
manifested--perfect equanimity and self-command, proof against every
variety of disturbing agency--whether tempting or terrible--absorbing
interest in philosophical dialectic. The first of these two
elements, if it stood alone, would be virtuous sobriety, yet not
passing beyond the limit of mortal virtue: the last of the two
superadds a higher element, which Plato conceives to transcend the
limit of mortal virtue, and to depend upon divine inspiration or
madness.[47]
[Footnote 46: Einleitung zum Gastmahl, p. 359 seq.]
[Footnote 47: Plato, Phædrus, p. 256 C-E. [Greek: sôphrosu/nê
thnêtê/--e)rôtikê\ mani/a: sôphrosu/nê a)nthrôpi/nê--thei/a
mani/a.] Compare p. 244 B.]
[Side-note: Symposion of Plato compared with that of Xenophon.]
The Symposion of Plato affords also an interesting subject of
comparison with that of his contemporary Xenophon, as to points of
agreement as well as of difference.[48] Xenophon states in the
beginning that he intends to describe what passed in a scene where
he himself was present; because he is of opinion that the
proceedings of excellent men, in hours of amusement, are not less
worthy of being recorded than those of their serious hours. Both
Plato and Xenophon take for their main subject a festive banquet,
destined to celebrate the success of a young man in a competitive
struggle. In Plato, the success is one of mind and genius--Agathon
has gained the prize of tragedy: in Xenophon, it is one of bodily
force and skill--Autolykus victor in the pankration. The Symposion
of Xenophon differs from that of Plato, in the same manner as the
Memorabilia of Xenophon generally differ from the Sokratic
dialogues of Plato--that is, by approaching much nearer to common
life and reality. It describes a banquet such as was likely enough
to take place, with the usual accompaniments--a professional
jester, and a Syracusan ballet-master who brings with him a
dancing-girl, a girl to play on the flute and harp, and a handsome
youth. These artists contribute to the amusement of the company by
music, dancing, throwing up balls and catching them again, jumping
into and out of a circle of swords. All this would have occurred
at an ordinary banquet: here, it is accompanied and followed by
remarks of pleasantry, buffoonery and taunt, interchanged between
the guests. Nearly all the guests take part, more or less: but
Sokrates is made the prominent figure throughout. He repudiates
the offer of scented unguents: but he recommends the drinking of
wine, though moderately, and in small cups. The whole company are
understood to be somewhat elevated with wine, but not one of them
becomes intoxicated. Sokrates not only talks as much fun as the
rest, but even sings, and speaks of learning to dance, jesting on
his own corpulence.[49] Most part of the scene is broad farce, in
the manner, though not with all the humour, of Aristophanes.[50]
The number and variety of the persons present is considerable,
greater than in most of the Aristophanic plays.[51] Kallias,
Lykon, Autolykus, Sokrates, Antisthenes, Hermogenes, Nikeratus,
Kritobulus, have each his own peculiarity: and a certain amount of
vivacity and amusement arises from the way in which each of them
is required, at the challenge of Sokrates, to declare on what it
is that he most prides himself. Sokrates himself carries the
burlesque farther than any of them; pretending to be equal in
personal beauty to Kritobulus, and priding himself upon the
function of a pander, which he professes to exercise. Antisthenes,
however, is offended, when Sokrates fastens upon him a similar
function: but the latter softens the meaning of the term so as to
appease him. In general, each guest is made to take pride in
something the direct reverse of that which really belongs to him;
and to defend his thesis in a strain of humorous parody.
Antisthenes, for example, boasts of his wealth. The Syracusan
ballet-master is described as jealous of Sokrates, and as
addressing to him some remarks of offensive rudeness; which
Sokrates turns off, and even begins to sing, for the purpose of
preventing confusion and ill-temper from spreading among the
company:[52] while he at the same time gives prudent advice to the
Syracusan about the exhibitions likely to be acceptable.
[Footnote 48: Pontianus, one of the speakers in Athenæus (xi.
504), touches upon some points of this comparison, with a view of
illustrating the real or supposed enmity between Plato and
Xenophon; an enmity not in itself improbable, yet not sufficiently
proved.
Athenæus had before him the Symposion of Epikurus (not preserved)
as well as those of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle (xv. 674); and
we learn from him some of its distinctive points. Masurius (the
speaker in Athenæus, v. init.) while he recognises in the Symposia
of Xenophon and Plato a dramatic variety of characters and
smartness--finds fault with both, but especially with Plato, for
levity, rudeness, indecency, vulgarity, sneering, &c. The talk was
almost entirety upon love and joviality. In the Symposion of
Epikurus, on the contrary, nothing was said about these topics;
the guests were fewer, the conversation was grave and dull, upon
dry topics of science, such as the atomic theory ([Greek:
prophê/tas a)to/môn], v. 3, 187 B, 177 B. [Greek: E)pi/kouros de\
sumpo/sion philoso/phôn mo/non pepoi/êtai]), and even upon bodily
ailments, such as indigestion or fever (187 C). The philosophers
present were made by Epikurus to carry on their debate in so
friendly a spirit, that the critic calls them "flatterers praising
each other"; while he terms the Platonic guests "sneerers
insulting each other" ([Greek: muktêristô=n a)llê/lous
tôthazo/ntôn], 182 A), though this is much more true about the
Xenophontic Symposion than about the Platonic. He remarks farther
that the Symposion of Epikurus included no libation or offering to
the Gods (179 D).
It is curious to note these peculiarities in the compositions (now
lost) of a philosopher like Epikurus, whom many historians of
philosophy represent as thinking about nothing but convivial and
sexual pleasure.]
[Footnote 49: Xenophon, Sympos. vii. 1; ii. 18-19. [Greek:
proga/stôr], &c.]
[Footnote 50: The taunt ascribed to the jester Philippus, about
the cowardice of the demagogue Peisander, is completely
Aristophanic, ii. 14; also that of Antisthenes respecting the bad
temper of Xanthippê, ii. 10; and the caricature of the movements
of the [Greek: o)rchêstri\s] by Philippus, ii. 21. Compare also
iii. 11.]
[Footnote 51: Xen. Symp. c. 4-5.]
[Footnote 52: Xen. Symp. vi. [Greek: Au)tê\ me\n ê( paroini/a
ou(/tô katesbe/sthê], vii. 1-5.
Epiktêtus insists upon this feature in the character of Sokrates--his
patience and power of soothing angry men (ii. 12-14).]
[Side-note: Small proportion of the serious, in the Xenophontic
Symposion.]
Though the Xenophontic Symposion is declared to be an alternate
mixture of banter and seriousness,[53] yet the only long serious
argument or lecture delivered is by Sokrates; in which he
pronounces a professed panegyric upon Eros, but at the same time
pointedly distinguishes the sentimental from the sensual. He
denounces the latter, and confines his panegyric to the
former--selecting Kallias and Autolykus as honourable examples of it.[54]
[Footnote 53: Xen. Symp. iv. 28. [Greek: a)nami\x e)skôpsa/n te
kai\ e)spou/dasan], viii. 41.]
[Footnote 54: Xen. Symp. viii. 24. The argument against the
sensual is enforced with so much warmth that Sokrates is made to
advert to the fact of his being elate with wine--[Greek: o(/ te
ga\r oi)=nos sunepai/rei, kai\ o( a)ei\ su/noikos e)moi\ e)/rôs
kentri/zei ei)s to\n a)nti/palon e)/rôta au)tou=
par)r(êsia/zesthai.]
The contrast between the customs of the Thebans and Eleians, and
those of the Lacedæmonians, is again noted by Xenophon, Rep.
Laced. ii. 13. Plato puts (Symp. 182) a like contrast into the
mouth of Pausanias, assimilating the customs of Athens in this
respect to those of Sparta. The comparison between Plato and
Xenophon is here curious; we see how much more copious and
inventive is the reasoning of Plato.]
The Xenophontic Symposion closes with a pantomimic scene of
Dionysus and Ariadnê as lovers represented (at the instance of
Sokrates) by the Syracusan ballet-master and his staff. This is
described as an exciting spectacle to most of the hearers, married
as well as unmarried, who retire with agreeable emotions. Sokrates
himself departs with Lykon and Kallias, to be present at the
exercise of Autolykus.[55]
[Footnote 55: Xen. Symp. viii. 5, ix. 7. The close of the
Xenophontic Symposion is, to a great degree, in harmony with
modern sentiment, though what is there expressed would probably be
left to be understood. The Platonic Symposion departs altogether
from that sentiment.]
[Side-note: Platonic Symposion more ideal and transcendental than
the Xenophontic.]
We see thus that the Platonic Symposion is much more ideal, and
departs farther from common practice and sentiment, than the
Xenophontic. It discards all the common accessories of a banquet
(musical or dancing artists), and throws the guests altogether
upon their own powers of rhetoric and dialectic, for amusement. If
we go through the different encomiums upon Eros, by Phædrus,
Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Diotima--we shall
appreciate the many-coloured forms and exuberance of the Platonic
imagination, as compared with the more restricted range and
common-place practical sense of Xenophon.[56] All the Platonic
speakers are accomplished persons--a man of letters, a physician,
two successful poets, a prophetess: the Xenophontic personages,
except Sokrates and Antisthenes, are persons of ordinary capacity.
The Platonic Symposion, after presenting Eros in five different
points of view, gives pre-eminence and emphasis to a sixth, in
which Eros is regarded as the privileged minister and conductor to
the mysteries of philosophy, both the lowest and the highest: the
Xenophontic Symposion dwells upon one view only of Eros (developed
by Sokrates) and cites Kallias as example of it, making no mention
of philosophy. The Platonic Symposion exalts Sokrates, as the
representative of Eros Philosophus, to a pinnacle of elevation
which places him above human fears and weaknesses[57]--coupled
however with that eccentricity which makes the vulgar regard a
philosopher as out of his mind: the Xenophontic Symposion presents
him only as a cheerful, amiable companion, advising temperance,
yet enjoying a convivial hour, and contributing more than any one
else to the general hilarity.
[Footnote 56: The difference between the two coincides very much
with that which is drawn by Plato himself in the Phædrus--[Greek:
thei/a mani/a] as contrasted with [Greek: sôphrosu/nê thnêtê\] (p.
256 E). Compare Athenæus, v. 187 B.]
[Footnote 57: Plato, Phædrus, p. 249 D. [Greek: nouthetei=tai me\n
u(po\ tô=n pollô=n ô(s parakinô=n, e)nthousia/zôn de\ le/lêthe
tou\s pollou\s. . . . ai)ti/an e)/chei ô(s manikô=s
diakei/menos.]]
Such are the points of comparison which present themselves between
the same subject as handled by these two eminent contemporaries,
both of them companions, and admirers of Sokrates: and each
handling it in his own manner.[58]
[Footnote 58: Which of these two Symposia was the latest in date
of composition we cannot determine with certainty: though it seems
certain that the latest of the two was not composed in imitation
of the earliest.
From the allusion to the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of Mantineia (p. 193
A) we know that the Platonic Symposion must have been composed
after 385 B.C.: there is great probability also, though not full
certainty, that it was composed during the time when Mantineia was
still an aggregate of separate villages and not a town--that is,
between 385-370 B.C., in which latter year Mantineia was
re-established as a city. The Xenophontic Symposion affords no mark
of date of composition: Xenophon reports it as having been himself
present. It does indeed contain, in the speech delivered by
Sokrates (viii. 32), an allusion to, and a criticism upon, an
opinion supported by Pausanias [Greek: o( A)ga/thônos tou=
poiêtou= e)rastê/s], who discourses in the Platonic Symposion: and
several critics think that this is an allusion by Xenophon to the
Platonic Symposion. I think this opinion improbable. It would
require us to suppose that Xenophon is inaccurate, since the
opinion which he ascribes to Pausanias is not delivered by
Pausanias in the Platonic Symposion, but by Phædrus. Athenæus (v.
216) remarks that the opinion is not delivered by Pausanias, but
he does not mention that it _is_ delivered by Phædrus. He remarks
that there was no known written composition of Pausanias himself:
and he seems to suppose that Xenophon must have alluded to the
Platonic Symposion, but that he quoted it inaccurately or out of
another version of it, different from what we now read. Athenæus
wastes reasoning in proving that the conversation described in the
Platonic Symposion cannot have really occurred at the time to
which Plato assigns it. This is unimportant: the speeches are
doubtless all composed by Plato. If Athenæus was anxious to prove
anachronism against Plato, I am surprised that he did not notice
that of the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of Mantineia mentioned in a
conversation supposed to have taken place in the presence of
Sokrates, who died in 399 B.C.
I incline to believe that the allusion of Xenophon is not intended
to apply to the Symposion of Plato. Xenophon ascribes one opinion
to Pausanias, Plato ascribes another; this is noway inconceivable.
I therefore remain in doubt whether the Xenophontic or the
Platonic Symposion is earliest. Compare the Præf. of Schneider to
the former, pp. 140-143.]
[Side-note: Second half of the Phædrus--passes into a debate on
Rhetoric. Eros is considered as a subject for rhetorical
exercise.]
I have already stated that the first half of the Phædrus differs
materially from the second; and that its three discourses on the
subject of Eros (the first two depreciating Eros, the third being
an effusion of high-flown and poetical panegyric on the same
theme) may be better understood by being looked at in conjunction
with the Symposion. The second half of the Phædrus passes into a
different discussion, criticising the discourse of Lysias as a
rhetorical composition: examining the principles upon which the
teaching of Rhetoric as an Art either is founded, or ought to be
founded: and estimating the efficacy of written discourse
generally, as a means of working upon or instructing other minds.
[Side-note: Lysias is called a logographer by active politicians.
Contempt conveyed by the word. Sokrates declares that the only
question is, Whether a man writes well or ill.]
I heard one of our active political citizens (says Phædrus)
severely denounce Lysias, and fasten upon him with contempt, many
times over, the title of a logographer. Active politicians will
not consent to compose and leave behind them written discourses,
for fear of being called Sophists.[59] To write discourses
(replies Sokrates) is noway discreditable: the real question is,
whether he writes them well.[60] And the same question is the only
one proper to be asked about other writers on all subjects--public
or private, in prose or in verse. How to speak _well_,
and how to write _well_--is the problem.[61] Is there any art or
systematic method, capable of being laid down beforehand and
defended upon principle, for accomplishing the object _well_? Or
does a man succeed only by unsystematic knack or practice, such as
he can neither realise distinctly to his own consciousness, nor
describe to others?
[Footnote 59: Plato, Phædrus, p. 257 C.]
[Footnote 60: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 257 E, 258 D.
The two appellations--[Greek: logogra/phos] and [Greek:
sophistê/s]--are here coupled together as terms of reproach, just
as they stand coupled in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 417. It is
plain that both appellations acquired their discreditable import
mainly from the collateral circumstance that the persons so
denominated took money for their compositions or teaching. The
[Greek: logogra/phos] wrote for pay, and on behalf of any client
who could pay him. In the strict etymological sense, neither of
the two terms would imply any reproach.
Yet Plato, in this dialogue, when he is discussing the worth of
the reproachful imputation fastened on Lysias, takes the term
[Greek: logogra/phos] only in this etymological, literal sense,
omitting to notice the collateral association which really gave
point to it and made it serve the purpose of a hostile speaker.
This is the more remarkable, because we find Plato multiplying
opportunities, even on unsuitable occasions, of taunting the
Sophists with the fact that they took money. Here in the Phædrus,
we should have expected that if he noticed the imputation at all,
he would notice it in the sense intended by the speaker. In this
sense, indeed, it would not have suited the purpose of his
argument, since he wishes to make it an introduction to a
philosophical estimate of the value of writing as a means of
instruction.
Heindorf observes, that Plato has used a similar liberty in
comparing the [Greek: logogra/phos] to the proposer of a law or
decree. "Igitur, quum solemne legum initium ejusmodi esset,
[Greek: e)/doxe tê=| boulê=|], &c., Plato aliter longé quam vulgo
acciperetur, neque sine calumniâ quâdam, interpretatus est" (ad p.
258).]
[Footnote 61: Plato, Phædrus, p. 259 E. [Greek: o(/pê| kalô=s
e)/chei le/gein te kai\ gra/phein, kai\ o(/pê| mê/,
skepte/on.]--p. 258 D. [Greek: ti/s o( tro/pos tou= kalô=s te
kai\ mê\ gra/phein.]]
[Side-note: Question about teaching the art of writing well or
speaking well. Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does
the successful Rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack?.]
First let us ask--When an orator addresses himself to a listening
crowd upon the common themes--Good and Evil, Just and Unjust--is
it necessary that he should know what is really and truly good and
evil, just and unjust? Most rhetorical teachers affirm, that it is
enough if he knows what the audience or the people generally
believe to be so: and that to that standard he must accommodate
himself, if he wishes to persuade.[62]
[Footnote 62: Plato, Phædrus, p. 260 A.]
[Side-note: Theory of Sokrates--that all art of persuasion must be
founded upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of
resemblance to the truth.]
He may persuade the people under these circumstances (replies
Sokrates), but if he does so, it will be to their misfortune and
to his own. He ought to know the real truth--not merely what the
public whom he addresses believe to be the truth--respecting just
and unjust, good and evil, &c. There can be no genuine art of
speaking, which is not founded upon knowledge of the truth, and
upon adequate philosophical comprehension of the
subject-matter.[63] The rhetorical teachers take too narrow a view of
rhetoric, when they confine it to public harangues addressed to
the assembly or to the Dikastery. Rhetoric embraces all guidance
of the mind through words, whether in public harangue or private
conversation, on matters important or trivial. Whether it be a
controversy between two litigants in a Dikastery, causing the
Dikasts to regard the same matters now as being just and good,
presently as being unjust and evil: or between two dialecticians
like Zeno, who could make his hearers view the same subjects as
being both like and unlike--both one and many--both in motion and
at rest: in either case the art (if there be any art) and its
principles are the same. You ought to assimilate every thing to
every thing, in all cases where assimilation is possible: if your
adversary assimilates in like manner, concealing the process from
his hearers, you must convict and expose his proceedings. Now the
possibility or facility of deception in this way will depend upon
the extent of likeness between things. If there be much real
likeness, deception is easy, and one of them may easily be passed
off as the other: if there be little likeness, deception will be
difficult. An extensive acquaintance with the real resemblances of
things, or in other words with truth, constitutes the necessary
basis on which all oratorical art must proceed.[64]
[Footnote 63: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 260-261.]
[Footnote 64: Plato, Phædrus, p. 262.]
[Side-note: Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of
Lysias and his own. Eros is differently understood: Sokrates
defined what he meant by it: Lysias did not define.]
Sokrates then compares the oration of Lysias with his own two
orations (the first depreciating, the second extolling, Eros) in
the point of view of art; to see how far they are artistically
constructed. Among the matters of discourse, there are some on
which all men are agreed, and on which therefore the speaker may
assume established unanimity in his audience: there are others on
which great dissension and discord prevail. Among the latter (the
topics of dissension), questions about just and unjust, good and
evil, stand foremost:[65] it is upon these that deception is most
easy, and rhetorical skill most efficacious. Accordingly, an
orator should begin by understanding to which of these two
categories the topic which he handles belongs: If it belongs to
the second category (those liable to dissension) he ought, at the
outset, to define what he himself means by it, and what he intends
the audience to understand. Now Eros is a topic on which great
dissension prevails. It ought therefore to have been defined at
the commencement of the discourse. This Sokrates in his discourse
has done: but Lysias has omitted to do it, and has assumed Eros to
be obviously and unanimously apprehended by every one. Besides,
the successive points in the discourse of Lysias do not hang
together by any thread of necessary connection, as they ought to
do, if the discourse were put together according to rule.[66]
[Footnote 65: Plato, Phædrus, p. 263 B. Compare Plato, Alkibiad.
i. p. 109.]
[Footnote 66: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 263-265.]
[Side-note: Logical processes--Definition and Division--both of
them exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates.]
Farthermore, in the two discourses of Sokrates, not merely was the
process of _logical definition_ exemplified in the case of Eros--but
also the process of _logical division_, in the case of Madness
or Irrationality. This last extensive genus was divided first into
two species--Madness, from human distemper--Madness, from divine
inspiration, carrying a man out of the customary orthodoxy.[67]
Next, this last species was again divided into four branches or
sub-species, according to the God from whom the inspiration
proceeded, and according to the character of the inspiration--the
prophetic, emanating from Apollo--the ritual or mystic, from
Dionysus--the poetic, from the Muses--the amatory, from Eros and
Aphroditê.[68] Now both these processes, definition and division,
are familiar to the true dialectician or philosopher: but they are
not less essential in rhetoric also, if the process is performed
with genuine art. The speaker ought to embrace in his view many
particular cases, to gather together what is common to all, and to
combine them into one generic concept, which is to be embodied in
words as the definition. He ought also to perform the
counter-process: to divide the genus not into parts arbitrary and
incoherent (like a bad cook cutting up an animal without regard to
the joints) but into legitimate species;[69] each founded on some
positive and assignable characteristic. "It is these divisions and
combinations (says Sokrates) to which I am devotedly attached, in
order that I may become competent for thought and discourse: and
if there be any one else whom I consider capable of thus
contemplating the One and the Many as they stand in nature--I
follow in the footsteps of that man as in those of a God. I call
such a man, rightly or wrongly, a Dialectician."[70]
[Footnote 67: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265 A. [Greek: u(po\ thei/as
e)xallagê=s tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn nomi/môn.]]
[Footnote 68: Plato, Phædrus, p. 265.]
[Footnote 69: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265-266. 265 D: [Greek: ei)s
mi/an te i)de/an sunorô=nta a)/gein ta\ pollachê= diesparme/na,
i(/n' e(/kaston o(rizo/menos dê=lon poi=ê| peri\ ou(= a)\n a)ei\
dida/skein e)the/lê|.] 265 E: [Greek: to\ pa/lin kat' ei)/dê
du/nasthai te/mnein kat' a)/rthra, ê(=| pe/phuke, kai\ mê\
e)picheirei=n katagnu/nai me/ros mêde/n, kakou= magei/rou tro/pô|
chrô/menon.]
Seneca, Epist. 89, p. 395, ed. Gronov. "Faciam ergo quod exigis,
et philosophiam in partes, non in frusta, dividam. Dividi enim
illam, non concidi, utile est."]
[Footnote 70: Plato, Phædrus, p. 266 B. [Greek: Tou/tôn dê\
e)/gôge au)to/s te e)rastê/s, ô)= Phai=dre, tô=n diaire/seôn kai\
sunagôgô=n, i(/n' oi(=o/s te ô)= le/gein te kai\ phronei=n; e)a/n
te/ tin' a)/llon ê(gê/sômai dunato\n ei)s e(\n kai\ e)pi\ polla\
pephuko\s o(ra=|n, tou=ton diô/kô kato/pisthe met' i)/chnion
ô(/ste theoi=o. kai\ me/ntoi kai\ tou\s duname/nous au)to\ dra=|n
ei) me\n o)rthô=s ê)\ mê\ prosagoreu/ô, theo\s oi)=de; kalô= de\
ou)=n me/chri tou=de dialektikou/s.]]
This is Dialectic (replies Phædrus); but it is not Rhetoric, as
Thrasymachus and other professors teach the art.
[Side-note: View of Sokrates--that there is no real Art of
Rhetoric, except what is already comprised in Dialectic--The
rhetorical teaching is empty and useless.]
What else is there worth having (says Sokrates), which these
professors teach? The order and distribution of a discourse:
first, the exordium, then recital, proof, second proof,
refutation, recapitulation at the close: advice how to introduce
maxims or similes: receipts for moving the anger or compassion of
the dikasts. Such teaching doubtless enables a speaker to produce
considerable effect upon popular assemblies:[71] but it is not the
art of rhetoric. It is an assemblage of preliminary
accomplishments, necessary before a man can acquire the art: but
it is not the art itself. You must know when, how far, in what
cases, and towards what persons, to employ these
accomplishments:[72] otherwise you have not learnt the art of
rhetoric. You may just as well consider yourself a physician
because you know how to bring about vomit and purging--or a
musician, because you know how to wind up or unwind the chords of
your lyre. These teachers mistake the preliminaries or antecedents
of the art, for the art itself. It is in the right, measured,
seasonable, combination and application of these preliminaries, in
different doses adapted to each special matter and audience--that
the art of rhetoric consists. And this is precisely the thing
which the teacher does not teach, but supposes the learner to
acquire for himself.[73]
[Footnote 71: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 267-268.]
[Footnote 72: Plato, Phædrus, p. 268 B. [Greek: e)re/sthai ei)
prosepi/statai kai\ ou(sti/nas dei= kai\ o(po/te e(/kasta tou/tôn
poiei=n, kai\ me/chri o(po/sou?]]
[Footnote 73: Plato, Phædrus, p. 269.]
[Side-note: What the Art of Rhetoric ought to be--Analogy of
Hippokrates and the medical Art.]
The true art of rhetoric (continues Sokrates) embraces a larger
range than these teachers imagine. It deals with mind, as the
medical researches of Hippokrates deal with body--as a generic
total with all its species and varieties, and as essentially
relative to the totality of external circumstances. First,
Hippokrates investigates how far the body is, in every particular
man, simple, homogeneous, uniform: and how far it is complex,
heterogeneous, multiform, in the diversity of individuals. If it
be one and the same, or in so far as it is one and the same, he
examines what are its properties in relation to each particular
substance acting upon it or acted upon by it. In so far as it is
multiform and various, he examines and compares each of the
different varieties, in the same manner, to ascertain its
properties in relation to every substance.[74] It is in this way
that Hippokrates discovers the nature or essence of the human
body, distinguishing its varieties, and bringing the medical art
to bear upon each, according to its different properties. This is
the only scientific or artistic way of proceeding.
[Footnote 74: Plato, Phædrus, p. 270 D. [Greek: A)=r' ou)ch ô(=de
dei= dianoei=sthai peri\ o(touou=n phu/seôs? Prô=ton me\n,
a(plou=n ê)\ polueide/s e)stin, ou(= peri\ boulêso/metha ei)=nai
au)toi\ technikoi\ kai\ a)/llon dunatoi\ poiei=n? e)/peita de/,
e)a\n me\n a(plou=n ê)=|, skopei=n tê\n du/namin au)tou=, ti/na
pro\s ti/ pe/phuken ei)s to\ dra=|n e)/chon ê)\ ti/na ei)s to\
pathei=n u(po\ tou=? e)a\n de\ plei/ô ei)/dê e)/chê|, tau=ta
a)rithmêsa/menos, o(/per e)ph' e(no/s, tou=t' i)dei=n e)ph'
e(ka/stou, tô=| ti/ poiei=n au)to\ pe/phuken ê)\ tô=| ti/ pathei=n
u(po\ tou=?]]
[Side-note: Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic
classification of minds with all their varieties, and of
discourses with all their varieties. The Rhetor must know how to
apply the one to the other, suitably to each particular case.]
Now the true rhetor ought to deal with the human mind in like
manner. His task is to work persuasion in the minds of certain men
by means of discourse. He has therefore, first, to ascertain how
far all mind is one and the same, and what are the affections
belonging to it universally in relation to other things: next, to
distinguish the different varieties of minds, together with the
properties, susceptibilities, and active aptitudes, of each:
carrying the subdivision down until he comes to a variety no
longer admitting division.[75] He must then proceed to distinguish
the different varieties of discourse, noting the effects which
each is calculated to produce or to hinder, and the different ways
in which it is likely to impress different minds.[76] Such and
such men are persuadable by such and such discourses--or the
contrary. Having framed these two general classifications, the
rhetor must on each particular occasion acquire a rapid tact in
discerning to which class of minds the persons whom he is about to
address belong: and therefore what class of discourses will be
likely to operate on them persuasively.[77] He must farther know
those subordinate artifices of speech on which the professors
insist; and he must also be aware of the proper season and limit
within which each can be safely employed.[78]
[Footnote 75: Plato, Phædrus, p. 277 B. [Greek: o(risa/meno/s te
pa/lin kat' ei)/dê me/chri tou= a)tmê/tou te/mnein e)pistêthê=|.]]
[Footnote 76: Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 A. [Greek: _Prô=ton_, pa/sê|
a)kribei/a| gra/psei te kai\ poiê/sei psuchê\n i)dei=n, po/teron
e(\n kai\ o(/moion pe/phuken ê)\ kata\ sô/matos morphê\n
polueide/s; tou=to ga/r phamen _phu/sin_ ei)=nai deiknu/nai.
_Deu/teron_ de/ ge, o(/tô| ti/ poiei=n ê)\ pathei=n u(po\ tou=
pe/phuken.
_Tri/ton_ de\ dê\ diataxa/menos ta\ lo/gôn te kai\ psuchê=s ge/nê
kai\ ta\ tou/tôn pathê/mata, di/eisi ta\s ai)ti/as, prosarmo/ttôn
e(/kaston e(ka/stô|, kai\ dida/skôn oi(/a ou)=sa u(ph' oi(/ôn
lo/gôn di' ê(\n ai)ti/an e)x a)na/gkês ê( me\n pei/thetai, ê( de\
a)peithei=.]]
[Footnote 77: Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 D. [Greek: dei= mê\ tau=ta
i(kanô=s noê/santa, meta\ tau=ta theô/menon au)ta\ e)n tai=s
pra/xesin o)/nta te kai\ pratto/mena, _o)xe/ôs_ tê=| ai)sthê/sei
du/nasthai e)pakolouthei=n], &c.]
[Footnote 78: Plato, Phædrus, p. 272 A. [Greek: tau=ta de\ ê)/dê
pa/nt' e)/chonti, _proslabo/nti kairou\s tou= po/te lekte/on kai\
e)pischete/on_, brachulogi/as te au)= kai\ e)leeinologi/as kai\
deinô/seôs, e(ka/stôn te o(/s' a)\n ei)/dê ma/thê| lo/gôn, tou/tôn
_tê\n eu)kairi/an te kai\ a)kairi/an diagno/nti_, kalô=s te kai\
tele/ôs e)sti\n ê( te/chnê a)peirgasme/nê, _pro/teron d' ou)/_.]]
[Side-note: The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of
real truth, as well as that which his auditors believe to be
truth. He is not sufficiently rewarded for this labour.]
Nothing less than this assemblage of acquirements (says Sokrates)
will suffice to constitute a real artist, either in speaking or
writing. Arduous and fatiguing indeed the acquisition is: but
there is no easier road. And those who tell us that the rhetor
need not know what is really true, but only what his audience will
believe to be true--must be reminded that this belief, on the part
of the audience, arises from the likeness of that which they
believe, to the real truth. Accordingly, he who knows the real
truth will be cleverest in suggesting apparent or quasi-truth
adapted to their feelings. If a man is bent on becoming an artist
in rhetoric, he must go through the process here marked out: yet
undoubtedly the process is so laborious, that rhetoric, when he
has acquired it, is no adequate reward. We ought to learn how to
speak and act in a way agreeable to the Gods, and this is worth
all the trouble necessary for acquiring it. But the power of
speaking agreeably and effectively to men, is not of sufficient
moment to justify the expenditure of so much time and labour.[79]
[Footnote 79: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 273-274.]
[Side-note: Question about Writing--As an Art, for the purpose of
instruction, it can do little--Reasons why. Writing may remind the
reader of what he already knows.]
We have now determined what goes to constitute genuine art, in
speaking or in writing. But how far is writing, even when art is
applied to it, capable of producing real and permanent effect? or
indeed of having art applied to it at all? Sokrates answers
himself--Only to a small degree. Writing will impart amusement and
satisfaction for the moment: it will remind the reader of
something which he knew before, if he really did know. But in
respect to any thing which he did not know before, it will neither
teach nor persuade him: it may produce in him an impression or
fancy that he is wiser than he was before, but such impression is
illusory, and at best only transient. Writing is like painting--one
and the same to all readers, whether young or old, well or ill
informed. It cannot adapt itself to the different state of mind of
different persons, as we have declared that every finished speaker
ought to do. It cannot answer questions, supply deficiencies,
reply to objections, rectify misunderstanding. It is defenceless
against all assailants. It supersedes and enfeebles the memory,
implanting only a false persuasion of knowledge without the
reality.[80]
[Footnote 80: Plato, Phædrus, p. 275 D-E. [Greek: tau)to\n de\
kai\ oi( lo/goi (oi( gegramme/noi); do/xais me\n a)\n ô(/s ti
phronou=ntas au)tou\s le/gein e)a\n de/ ti e(/rê| tô=n legome/nôn
boulo/menos mathei=n, e(/n ti sêmai/nei mo/non tau)to\n a)ei/.
O(/tan de\ a(/pax graphê=|, kulindei=tai me\n pantachou= pa=s
lo/gos o(moi/ôs para\ toi=s e)pai+/ousin, ô(s d' au)tô=s par'
oi(=s ou)de\n prosê/kei, kai\ ou)k e)pi/statai le/gein oi(=s dei=
ge kai\ mê/.]]
[Side-note: Neither written words, nor continuous speech, will
produce any serious effect in teaching. Dialectic and
cross-examination are necessary.]
Any writer therefore, in prose or verse--Homer, Solon, or
Lysias--who imagines that he can by a ready-made composition, however
carefully turned,[81] _if simply heard or read without
cross-examination or oral comment_, produce any serious and permanent
effect in persuading or teaching, beyond a temporary
gratification--falls into a disgraceful error. If he intends to
accomplish any thing serious, he must be competent to originate
spoken discourse more effective than the written. The written word
is but a mere phantom or ghost of the spoken word: which latter is
the only legitimate offspring of the teacher, springing fresh and
living out of his mind, and engraving itself profoundly on the
mind of the hearer.[82] The speaker must know, with discriminative
comprehension, and in logical subdivision, both the matter on
which he discourses, and the minds of the particular hearers to
whom he addresses himself. He will thus be able to adapt the
order, the distribution, the manner of presenting his subject, to
the apprehension of the particular hearers and the exigencies of
the particular moment. He will submit to cross-examination,[83]
remove difficulties, and furnish all additional explanations which
the case requires. By this process he will not indeed produce that
immediate, though flashy and evanescent, impression of suddenly
acquired knowledge, which arises from the perusal of what is
written. He will sow seed which for a long time appears buried
under ground; but which, after such interval, springs up and
ripens into complete and lasting fruit.[84] By repeated dialectic
debate, he will both familiarise to his own mind and propagate in
his fellow-dialogists, full knowledge; together with all the
manifold reasonings bearing on the subject, and with the power
also of turning it on many different sides, of repelling
objections and clearing up obscurities. It is not from writing,
but from dialectic debate, artistically diversified and adequately
prolonged, that full and deep teaching proceeds; prolific in its
own nature, communicable indefinitely from every new disciple to
others, and forming a source of intelligence and happiness to
all.[85]
[Footnote 81: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 277-278. [Greek: ô(s oi(
r(apsô|dou/menoi (lo/goi) a)/neu a)nakri/seôs kai\ didachê=s
peithou=s e(/neka e)le/chthêsan], &c.]
[Footnote 82: Plato, Phædrus, p. 276 A. [Greek: a)/llon o(rô=men
lo/gon tou/tou a)delpho\n gnê/sion tô=| tro/pô| te gi/gnetai, kai\
o(/sô| a)mei/nôn kai\ dunatô/teros tou/tou phu/etai? . . . . O(/s
met' e)pistê/mês gra/phetai e)n tê=| tou= mantha/nontos psuchê=|,
dunato\s me\n a)mu=nai e(autô=|, e)pistê/môn de\ le/gein te kai\
siga=|n pro\s ou(\s dei=. To\n tou= ei)do/tos lo/gon le/geis
zô=nta kai\ e)/mpsuchon, ou(= o( gegramme/nos ei)/dôlon a)/n ti
le/goito dikai/ôs], &c. 278 A.]
[Footnote 83: Plato, Phædrus, p. 278 C. [Greek: ei) me\n ei)dô\s
ê(=| ta)lêthe\s e)/chei sune/thêke tau=ta (ta\ suggra/mmata) kai\
e)/chôn boêthei=n, ei)s e)/legchon i)ô\n peri\ ô(=n e)/grapse,
kai\ le/gôn au)to\s dunato\s ta\ gegramme/na phau=la a)podei=xai],
&c.]
[Footnote 84: Plato, Phædrus, p. 276 A.]
[Footnote 85: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 276-277.]
This blending of philosophy with rhetoric, which pervades the
criticisms on Lysias in the Phædrus, is farther illustrated by the
praise bestowed upon Isokrates in contrast with Lysias. Isokrates
occupied that which Plato in Euthydêmus calls "the border country
between philosophy and politics". Many critics declare (and I
think with probable reason[86]) that Isokrates is the person
intended (without being named) in the passage just cited from the
Euthydêmus. In the Phædrus, Isokrates is described as the intimate
friend of Sokrates, still young; and is pronounced already
superior in every way to Lysias--likely to become superior in
future to all the rhetors that have ever flourished--and destined
probably to arrive even at the divine mysteries of philosophy.[87]
[Footnote 86: See above, vol. ii. ch. xxi. p. 227.]
[Footnote 87: Plato, Phædrus, p. 279 A.]
When we consider that the Phædrus was pretty sure to bring upon
Plato a good deal of enmity--since it attacked, by name, both
Lysias, a resident at Athens of great influence and ability, and
several other contemporary rhetors more or less celebrated--we can
understand how Plato became disposed to lighten this amount of
enmity by a compliment paid to Isokrates. This latter rhetor, a
few years older than Plato, was the son of opulent parents at
Athens, and received a good education; but when his family became
impoverished by the disasters at the close of the Peloponnesian
war, he established himself as a teacher of rhetoric at Chios:
after some time, however, he returned to Athens, and followed the
same profession there. He engaged himself also, like Lysias, in
composing discourses for pleaders before the dikastery[88] and for
speakers in the assembly; by which practice he acquired both
fortune and reputation. Later in life, he relinquished these
harangues destined for real persons on real occasions, and
confined himself to the composition of discourses (intended, not
for contentious debate, but for the pleasure and instruction of
hearers) on general questions--social, political, and
philosophical: at the same time receiving numerous pupils from
different cities of Greece. Through such change, he came into a
sort of middle position between the rhetoric of Lysias and the
dialectic of Plato: insomuch that the latter, at the time when he
composed the Phædrus, had satisfaction in contrasting him
favourably with Lysias, and in prophesying that he would make yet
greater progress towards philosophy. But at the time when Plato
composed the Euthydêmus, his feeling was different.[89] In the
Phædrus, Isokrates is compared with Lysias and other rhetors, and
in that comparison Plato presents him as greatly superior: in the
Euthydêmus, he is compared with philosophers as well as with
rhetors, and is even announced as disparaging philosophy
generally: Plato then declares him to be a presumptuous half-bred,
and extols against him even the very philosopher whom he himself
had just been caricaturing. To apply a Platonic simile, the most
beautiful ape is ugly compared with man--the most beautiful man is
an ape compared with the Gods:[90] the same intermediate position
between rhetoric and philosophy is assigned by Plato to Isokrates.
[Footnote 88: Dion. Hal. De Isocrate Judicium, p. 576. [Greek:
desma\s pa/nu polla\s dikanikô=n lo/gôn periphe/resthai/ phêsin
u(po\ tô=n bibliopôlô=n A)ristote/lês], &c.
Plutarch, Vit. x. Oratt. pp. 837-838.
The Athenian Polykrates had been forced, by loss of property, to
quit Athens and undertake the work of a Sophist in Cyprus.
Isokrates expresses much sympathy for him: it was a misfortune
like what had happened to himself (Orat. xi. Busiris 1). Compare
De Permutation. Or. xv. s. 172.
The assertion made by Isokrates--that he did not compose political
and judicial orations, to be spoken by individuals for real causes
and public discussions--may be true comparatively, and with
reference to a certain period of his life. But it is only to be
received subject to much reserve and qualification. Even out of
the twenty-one orations of Isokrates which we possess, the last
five are composed to be spoken by pleaders before the dikastery.
They are such discourses as the logographers, Lysias among the
rest, were called upon to furnish, and paid for furnishing.]
[Footnote 89: Plato, Euthydêm. p. 306. I am inclined to agree with
Ueberweg in thinking that the Euthydêmus is later than the
Phædrus. Ueberweg, Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften, pp.
256-259-265.]
[Footnote 90: Plato, Hipp. Major, p. 289.]
From the pen of Isokrates also, we find various passages
apparently directed against the viri Socratici including Plato
(though without his name): depreciating,[91] as idle and
worthless, new political theories, analytical discussions on the
principles of ethics, and dialectic subtleties; maintaining that
the word philosophy was erroneously interpreted and defined by
many contemporaries, in a sense too much withdrawn from practical
results: and affirming that his own teaching was calculated to
impart genuine philosophy. During the last half of Plato's life,
his school and that of Isokrates were the most celebrated among
all that existed at Athens. There was competition between them,
gradually kindling into rivalry. Such rivalry became vehement
during the last ten years of Plato's life, when his scholar
Aristotle, then an aspiring young man of twenty-five, proclaimed a
very contemptuous opinion of Isokrates, and commenced a new school
of rhetoric in opposition to him.[92] Kephisodôrus, a pupil of
Isokrates, retaliated; publishing against Aristotle, as well as
against Plato, an acrimonious work which was still read some
centuries afterwards. Theopompus, another eminent pupil of
Isokrates, commented unfavourably upon Plato in his writings: and
other writers who did the same may probably have belonged to the
Isokratean school.[93]
[Footnote 91: Isokrates, Orat. x. 1 (Hel. Enc.); Orat. v.
(Philipp.) 12; Or. xiii. (Sophist.) 9-24; Orat. xv. (Permut.)
sect. 285-290. [Greek: philosophi/an me\n ou)=n ou)k oi)=mai dei=n
prosagoreu/ein tê\n mêde\n e)n tô=| paro/nti mê/te pro\s to\
le/gein mê/te pro\s to\ pra/ttein ô(/phelou=san--tê\n kaloume/nên
u(po/ tinôn philosophi/an ou)k ei)=nai phêmi/], &c.]
[Footnote 92: Cicero, De Oratore, iii. 35, 141; Orator. 19, 62;
Numenius, ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang. xiv. 6, 9. See Stahr,
Aristotelia, i. p. 63 seq., ii. p. 44 seq.
Schroeder's Quæstiones Isocrateæ (Utrecht, 1859), and Spengel's
work, Isokrates und Plato, are instructive in regard to these two
contemporary luminaries of the intellectual world at Athens. But,
unfortunately, we can make out few ascertainable facts. When I
read the Oration De Permut., Or. xv. (composed by Isokrates about
fifteen years before his own death, and about five years before
the death of Plato, near 353 B.C.), I am impressed with the belief
that many of his complaints about unfriendly and bitter criticism
refer to the Platonic School of that day, Aristotle being one of
its members. See sections 48-90-276, and seq. He certainly means
the Sokratic men, and Plato as the most celebrated of them, when
he talks of [Greek: oi( peri\ ta\s e)rôtê/seis kai\ a)pokri/seis,
ou(\s a)ntilogikou\s kalou=sin--oi( peri\ ta\s e)/ridas
spouda/zontes]--those who are powerful in contentious dialectic,
and at the same time cultivate geometry and astronomy, which
others call [Greek: a)doleschi/a] and [Greek: mikrologi/a]
(280)--those who exhorted hearers to virtue about which others knew
nothing, and about which they themselves were in dispute. When he
complains of the [Greek: perittolo/giai] of the ancient Sophists,
Empedokles, Ion, Parmenides, Melissus, &c., we cannot but suppose
that he had in his mind the Timæus of Plato also, though he avoids
mention of the name.]
[Footnote 93: Athenæus, iii. p. 122, ii. 60; Dionys. Hal. Epistol.
ad Cn. Pomp. p. 757.]
[Side-note: The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who
can really teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a
writer.]
This is the true philosopher (continues Sokrates)--the man who
alone is competent to teach truth about the just, good, and
honourable.[94] He who merely writes, must not delude himself with
the belief that upon these important topics his composition can
impart any clear or lasting instruction. To mistake fancy for
reality hereupon, is equally disgraceful, whether the mistake be
made by few or by many persons. If indeed the writer can explain
to others orally the matters written--if he can answer all
questions, solve difficulties, and supply the deficiencies, of
each several reader--in that case he is something far more and
better than a writer, and ought to be called a philosopher. But if
he can do no more than write, he is no philosopher: he is only a
poet, or nomographer, or logographer.[95]
[Footnote 94: Plato, Phædrus, p. 277 D-E.]
[Footnote 95: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 278-279.]
[Side-note: Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to
become a philosopher.]
In this latter class stands Lysias. I expect (concludes Sokrates)
something better from Isokrates, who gives promise of aspiring one
day to genuine philosophy.[96]
[Footnote 96: Respecting the manner in which Plato speaks of
Isokrates in the Phædrus, see what I have already observed upon
the Euthydêmus, vol. ii. ch. xxi. pp. 227-229.]
* * * * *
[Side-note: Date of the Phædrus--not an early dialogue.]
I have already observed that I dissent from the hypothesis of
Schleiermacher, Ast, and others, who regard the Phædrus either as
positively the earliest, or at least among the earliest, of the
Platonic dialogues, composed several years before the death of
Sokrates. I agree with Hermann, Stallbaum, and those other
critics, who refer it to a much later period of Plato's life:
though I see no sufficient evidence to determine more exactly
either its date or its place in the chronological series of
dialogues. The views opened in the second half of the dialogue, on
the theory of rhetoric and on the efficacy of written compositions
as a means of instruction, are very interesting and remarkable.
[Side-note: Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses--His
theory of Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic.]
The written discourse of Lysias (presented to us as one greatly
admired at the time by his friends, Phædrus among them) is
contrasted first with a pleading on the same subject (though not
directed towards the attainment of the same end) by Sokrates
(supposed to be improvised on the occasion); next with a second
pleading of Sokrates directly opposed to the former, and intended
as a recantation. These three discourses are criticised from the
rhetorical point of view,[97] and are made the handle for
introducing to us a theory of rhetoric. The second discourse of
Sokrates, far from being Sokratic in tenor, is the most exuberant
effusion of mingled philosophy, poetry, and mystic theology, that
ever emanated from Plato.
[Footnote 97: Plato, Phædrus, p. 235 A.]
[Side-note: His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already
assured--it assumes that all the doubts have been already
removed.]
The theory of rhetoric too is far more Platonic than Sokratic. The
peculiar vein of Sokrates is that of confessed ignorance, ardour
in enquiry, and testing cross-examination of all who answer his
questions. But in the Phædrus we find Plato (under the name of
Sokrates) assuming, as the basis of his theory, that an expositor
shall be found who _knows_ what is really and truly just and
unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable--distinct
from, and independent of, the established beliefs on these
subjects, traditional among his neighbours and
fellow-citizens:[98] assuming (to express the same thing in other
words) that all the doubts and difficulties, suggested by the
Sokratic cross-examination, have been already considered, elucidated,
and removed.
[Footnote 98: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 259 E, 260 E, and 262 B.]
[Side-note: The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process,
teaches minds unoccupied and willing to learn.]
The expositor, master of such perfect knowledge, must farther be
master (so Plato tells us) of the arts of logical definition and
division: that is, he must be able to gather up many separate
fragmentary particulars into one general notion, clearly
identified and embodied in a definition: and he must be farther
able to subdivide such a general notion into its constituent
specific notions, each marked by some distinct characteristic
feature.[99] This is the only way to follow out truth in a manner
clear and consistent with itself: and truth is equally honourable
in matters small or great.[100]
[Footnote 99: Plato, Phædrus, p. 266.]
[Footnote 100: Plato, Phædrus, p. 261 A.
That truth upon matters small and contemptible deserves to be
sought out and proved as much as upon matters great and sublime,
is a doctrine affirmed in the Sophistês, Politikus, Parmenidês:
Sophist. pp. 218 E, 227 A; Politik. 266 D; Parmenid. 130 E.]
Thus far we are in dialectic: logical exposition proceeding by way
of classifying and declassifying: in which it is assumed that the
expositor will find minds unoccupied and unprejudiced, ready to
welcome the truth when he lays it before them. But there are many
topics on which men's minds are, in the common and natural course
of things, both pre-occupied and dissentient with each other. This
is especially the case with Justice, Goodness, the Honourable,
&c.[101] It is one of the first requisites for the expositor to be
able to discriminate this class of topics, where error and
discordance grow up naturally among those whom he addresses. It is
here that men are liable to be deceived, and require to be
undeceived--contradict each other, and argue on opposite sides:
such disputes belong to the province of Rhetoric.
[Footnote 101: Plato, Phædrus, p. 263 A.]
[Side-note: The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with
minds pre-occupied--guiding them methodically from error to
truth.]
The Rhetor is one who does not teach (according to the logical
process previously described), but persuades; guiding the mind by
discourse to or from various opinions or sentiments.[102] Now if
this is to be done _by art_ and methodically--that is, upon
principle or system explicable and defensible--it pre-supposes
(according to Plato) a knowledge of truth, and can only be
performed by the logical expositor. For when men are deceived, it
is only because they mistake what is like truth for truth itself:
when they are undeceived, it is because they are made to perceive
that what they believe to be truth is only an apparent likeness
thereof. Such resemblances are strong or faint, differing by many
gradations. Now no one can detect, or bring into account, or
compare, these shades of resemblance, except he who knows the
truth to which they all ultimately refer. It is through the slight
differences that deception is operated. To deceive a man, you must
carry him gradually away from the truth by transitional stages,
each resembling that which immediately precedes, though the last
in the series will hardly at all resemble the first: to undeceive
him (or to avoid being deceived yourself), you must conduct him
back by the counter-process from error to truth, by a series of
transitional resemblances tending in that direction. You cannot do
this like an artist (on system and by pre-determination), unless
you know what the truth is.[103] By anyone who does not know, the
process will be performed without art, or at haphazard.
[Footnote 102: Plato, Phædrus, p. 261 A. [Greek: ê( r(êtorikê\
te/chnê psuchagôgi/a tis dia\ lo/gôn], &c.]
[Footnote 103: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 262 A-D, 273 D.]
[Side-note: He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and
the means of persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know
how to fit on the one to the other in each particular case.]
The Rhetor--being assumed as already knowing the truth--if he
wishes to make persuasion an art, must proceed in the following
manner:--He must distribute the multiplicity of individual minds
into distinct classes, each marked by its characteristic features
of differences, emotional and intellectual. He must also
distribute the manifold modes of discourse into distinct classes,
each marked in like manner. Each of these modes of discourse is
well adapted to persuade some classes of mind--badly adapted to
persuade other classes: for such adaptation or non-adaptation
there exists a rational necessity,[104] which the Rhetor must
examine and ascertain, informing himself which modes of discourse
are adapted to each different class of mind. Having mastered this
general question, he must, whenever he is about to speak, be able
to distinguish, by rapid perception,[105] to which class of minds
the hearer or hearers whom he is addressing belong: and
accordingly, which mode of discourse is adapted to their
particular case. Moreover, he must also seize, in the case before
him, the seasonable moment and the appropriate limit, for the use
of each mode of discourse. Unless the Rhetor is capable of
fulfilling all these exigencies, without failing in any one point,
his Rhetoric is not entitled to be called an Art. He requires, in
order to be an artist in persuading the mind, as great an
assemblage of varied capacities as Hippokrates declares to be
necessary for a physician, the artist for curing or preserving the
body.[106]
[Footnote 104: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 270 E, 271 A-D. [Greek: Tri/ton
de\ dê\ diataxa/menos ta\ lo/gôn te kai\ psuchê=s ge/nê, kai\ ta\
tou/tôn pathê/mata, di/eisi ta\s ai)ti/as, prosarmo/ttôn e(/kaston
e(ka/stô|, kai\ dida/skôn oi(/a ou)=sa u(ph' oi(/ôn lo/gôn di'
ê(\n ai)ti/an e)x a)na/gkês ê( me\n pei/thetai, ê( de\
a)peithei=.]]
[Footnote 105: Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 D-E. [Greek: dei= dê\ tau=ta
i(kanô=s noê/santa, meta\ tau=ta theô/menon au)ta\ e)n tai=s
pra/xesin o)/nta te kai\ pratto/mena, _o)xe/ôs tê=| ai)sthê/sei
du/nasthai e)pakolouthei=n_, ê)\ mêde\ ei)de/nai pô ple/on au)tô=n
ô(=n to/te ê)/koue lo/gôn xunô/n.]]
[Footnote 106: Plato, Phædrus, p. 270 C.]
[Side-note: Plato's _Idéal_ of the Rhetorical Art--involves in part
incompatible conditions--the Wise man or philosopher will never be
listened to by the public.]
The total, thus summed up by Plato, of what is necessary to
constitute an Art of Rhetoric, is striking and comprehensive. It
is indeed an _idéal_, not merely unattainable by reason of its
magnitude, but also including impracticable conditions. He begins
by postulating a perfectly wise man, who knows all truth on the
most important social subjects; on which his country-men hold
erroneous beliefs, just as sincerely as _he_ holds his true
beliefs. But Plato has already told us, in the Gorgias, that such
a person will not be listened to: that in order to address
auditors with effect, the rhetor must be in genuine harmony of
belief and character with them, not dissenting from them either
for the better or the worse: nay, that the true philosopher (so we
read in one of the most impressive portions of the Republic) not
only has no chance of guiding the public mind, but incurs public
obloquy, and may think himself fortunate if he escapes
persecution.[107] The dissenter will never be allowed to be the
guide of a body of orthodox believers; and is even likely enough,
unless he be prudent, to become their victim. He may be permitted
to lecture or discuss, in the gardens of the Academy, with a few
chosen friends, and to write eloquent dialogues: but if he
embodies his views in motions before the public assembly, he will
find only strenuous opposition, or something worse. This view,
which is powerfully set forth by Sokrates both in the Gorgias and
Republic, is founded on a just appreciation of human societies:
and it is moreover the basis of the Sokratic procedure--That the
first step to be taken is to disabuse men's minds of their false
persuasion of knowledge--to make them conscious of ignorance--and
thus to open their minds for the reception of truth. But if this
be the fact, we must set aside as impracticable the postulate
advanced by Sokrates here in the Phædrus--of a perfectly wise man
as the employer of rhetorical artifices. Moreover I do not agree
with what Sokrates is here made to lay down as the philosophy of
Error:--that it derives its power of misleading from resemblance
to truth. This is the case to a certain extent: but it is very
incomplete as an account of the generating causes of error.
[Footnote 107: Plato, Gorg. p. 513 B, see supra, ch. xxiv.;
Republic, vi. pp. 495-496.]
[Side-note: The other part of the Platonic _Idéal_ is grand but
unattainable--breadth of psychological data and classified modes
of discourse.]
But the other portion of Plato's sum total of what is necessary to
an Art of Rhetoric, is not open to the same objection. It involves
no incompatible conditions: and we can say nothing against it,
except that it requires a breadth and logical command of
scientific data, far greater than there is the smallest chance of
attaining. That Art is an assemblage of processes, directed to a
definite end, and prescribed by rules which themselves rest upon
scientific data--we find first announced in the works of
Plato.[108] A vast amount of scientific research, both inductive
and deductive, is here assumed as an indispensable foundation--and
even as a portion--of what he calls the Art of Rhetoric: first, a
science of psychology, complete both in its principles and
details: next, an exhaustive catalogue and classification of the
various modes of operative speech, with their respective
impression upon each different class of minds. So prodigious a
measure of scientific requirement has never yet been filled up: of
course, therefore, no one has ever put together a body of precepts
commensurate with it. Aristotle, following partially the large
conceptions of his master, has given a comprehensive view of many
among the theoretical postulates of Rhetoric; and has partially
enumerated the varieties both of persuadable auditors, and of
persuasive means available to the speaker for guiding them.
Cicero, Dionysius of Halikarnassus, Quintilian, have furnished
valuable contributions towards this last category of data, but not
much towards the first: being all of them defective in breadth of
psychological theory. Nor has Plato himself done anything to work
out his conception in detail or to provide suitable rules for it.
We read it only as an impressive sketch--a grand but unattainable
_idéal_--"qualem nequeo monstrare et sentio tantum".
[Footnote 108: I repeat the citation from the Phædrus, one of the
most striking passages in Plato, p. 271 D.
[Greek: e)/peidê\ lo/gou du/namis tugcha/nei psuchagôgi/a ou)=sa,
to\n me/llonta r(êtoriko\n e)/sesthai a)na/gkê ei)de/nai psuchê\
o(/sa ei)/dê e)/chei. e)/stin ou)=n to/sa kai\ to/sa, kai\ toi=a
kai\ toi=a; o(/then oi( me\n toioi/de, oi( de\ toioi/de
gi/gnontai. tou/tôn de\ dê\ diê|rême/nôn, lo/gôn au)= to/sa kai\
to/sa e)/stin ei)/dê, toio/nde e(/kaston. oi( me\n ou)=n toioi/de
u(po\ tô=n toiô=nde logôn dia\ tê/nde tê\n aiti/an e)s ta\ toia/de
eu)peithei=s, oi( de\ toioi/de dia\ ta/de duspeithei=s], &c. Comp.
p. 261 A.
The relation of Art to Science is thus perspicuously stated by Mr.
John Stuart Mill, in the concluding chapter of his System of
Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Book vi. ch. xii. § 2):
"The relation in which rules of Art stand to doctrines of Science
may be thus characterised. The Art proposes to itself an end to be
attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the Science. The
Science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be
studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends
it back to Art with a theorem of the combinations of circumstances
by which it could be produced. Art then examines these
combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them are or
are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. The
only one of the premisses, therefore, which Art supplies, is the
original major premiss, which asserts that the attainment of the
given end is desirable. Science then lends to Art the proposition
(obtained by a series of inductions or of deductions) that the
performance of certain actions will attain the end. From these
premisses Art concludes that the performance of these actions is
desirable; and finding it also practicable, converts the theorem
into a rule or precept."]
[Side-note: Plato's ideal grandeur compared with the rhetorical
teachers--Usefulness of these teachers for the wants of an
accomplished man.]
Indeed it seems that Plato himself regarded it as unattainable--and
as only worth aiming at for the purpose of pleasing the Gods,
not with any view to practical benefit, arising from either speech
or action among mankind.[109] This is a point to be considered,
when we compare his views on Rhetoric with those of Lysias and the
other rhetors, whom he here judges unfavourably and even
contemptuously. The work of speech and action among mankind, which
Plato sets aside as unworthy of attention, was the express object
of solicitude to Lysias, Isokrates, and rhetors generally: that
which they practised efficaciously themselves, and which they
desired to assist, cultivate, and improve in others: that which
Perikles, in his funeral oration preserved by Thucydides,
represents as the pride of the Athenian people
collectively[110]--combination of full freedom of preliminary contentious
debate, with energy in executing the resolution which might be ultimately
adopted. These rhetors, by the example of their composed speeches
as well as by their teaching, did much to impart to young men the
power of expressing themselves with fluency and effect before
auditors, either in the assembly or in the dikastery: as Sokrates
here fully admits.[111] Towards this purpose it was useful to
analyse the constituent parts of a discourse, and to give an
appropriate name to each part. Accordingly, all the rhetorical
teachers (Quintilian included) continued such analysis, though
differing more or less in their way of performing it, until the
extinction of Pagan civilisation. Young men were taught to learn
by heart regular discourses,[112]--to compose the like for
themselves--to understand the difference between such as were well
or ill composed--and to acquire a command of oratorical means for
moving or convincing the hearer. All this instruction had a
practical value: though Plato, both here and elsewhere, treats it
as worthless. A citizen who stood mute and embarrassed, unable to
argue a case with some propriety before an audience, felt himself
helpless and defective in one of the characteristic privileges of
a Greek and a freeman: while one who could perform the process
well, acquired much esteem and influence.[113] The Platonic
Sokrates in the Gorgias consoles the speechless men by
saying--What does this signify, provided you are just and virtuous?
Such consolation failed to satisfy: as it would fail to satisfy the
sick, the lame, or the blind.
[Footnote 109: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 273-274. [Greek: ê(\n ou)ch
e(/neka tou= le/gein kai\ pra/ttein pro\s a)nthrô/pous dei=
diaponei=sthai to\n sô/phrona, a)lla\ tou= theoi=s kecharisme/na
me\n le/gein du/nasthai], &c. (273 E).]
[Footnote 110: Thucyd. ii. 39-40-41.]
[Footnote 111: Plato, Phædrus, p. 288 A.]
[Footnote 112: See what is said by Aristotle about [Greek: ê(
Gorgi/ou pragmatei/a] in the last chapter of De Sophisticis
Elenchis.]
[Footnote 113: I have illustrated this point in my History of
Greece, by the example of Xenophon in his command of the Cyreian
army during its retreat.
His democratical education, and his powers of public speaking,
were of the greatest service not only in procuring influence to
himself, but also in conducting the army through its many perils
and difficulties.
See Aristot. Rhet. i. 1, 3, p. 1355, b. 1.]
[Side-note: The Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly:
Plato conceived it too widely. The principles of an Art are not
required to be explained to all learners.]
The teaching of these rhetors thus contributed to the security,
dignity, and usefulness of the citizens, by arming them for public
speech and action. But it was essentially practical, or empirical:
it had little system, and was founded upon a narrow theory. Upon
these points Plato in the Phædrus attacks them. He sets little
value upon the accomplishments arming men for speech and action
([Greek: lektikou\s kai\ praktikou\s ei)=nai])--and he will not
allow such teaching to be called an Art. He explains, in
opposition to them, what he himself conceived the Art of Rhetoric
to be, in the comprehensive way which I have above described.
But if the conception of the Art, as entertained by the Rhetors,
is too narrow--that of Plato, on the other hand, is too wide.
First, it includes the whole basis of science or theory on which
the Art rests: it is a Philosophy of Rhetoric, expounded by a
theorist--rather than an Art of Rhetoric, taught to learners by a
master. To teach the observance of certain rules or precepts is
one thing: to set forth the reasons upon which those rules are
founded, is another--highly important indeed, and proper to be
known by the teacher; yet not necessarily communicated, or even
communicable, to all learners. Quintilian, in his Institutio
Rhetorica, gives both:--an ample theory, as well as an ample
development of rules, of his professional teaching. But he would
not have thought himself obliged to give this ample theory to all
learners. With many, he would have been satisfied to make them
understand the rules, and to exercise them in the ready observance
thereof.
[Side-note: Plato includes in his conception of Art, the
application thereof to new particular cases.--This can never be
taught by rule.]
Secondly, Plato, in defining the Art of Rhetoric, includes not
only its foundation of science (which, though intimately connected
with it, ought not to be considered as a constituent part), but
also the application of it to particular cases; which application
lies beyond the province both of science and of art, and cannot be
reduced to any rule. "The Rhetor" (says Plato) "must teach his
pupils, not merely to observe the rules whereby persuasion is
operated, but also to know the particular persons to whom those
rules are to be applied--on what occasions--within what limits--at
what peculiar moments, &c.[114] Unless the Rhetor can teach thus
much, his pretended art is no art at all: all his other teaching
is of no value." Now this is an amount of exigence which can never
be realised. Neither art nor science can communicate that which
Plato here requires. The rules of art, together with many
different hypothetical applications thereof, may be learnt: when
the scientific explanation of the rules is superadded, the learner
will be assisted farther towards fresh applications: but after
both these have been learnt, the new cases which will arise can
never be specially foreseen. The proper way of applying the
general precepts to each case must be suggested by conjecture
adapted to the circumstances, under the corrections of past
experience.[115] It is inconsistent in Plato, after affirming that
nothing deserves the name of art[116] except what is
general--capable of being rationally anticipated and prescribed
beforehand--then to include in art the special treatment required
for the multiplicity of particular cases; the analogy of the medical
art, which he here instructively invokes, would be against him on this
point.
[Footnote 114: Plato, Phædr. pp. 268 B, 272 A.]
[Footnote 115: What Longinus says about critical skill is
applicable here also--[Greek: pollê=s e)/sti pei/ras teleutai=on
e)pige/nnêma.] Isokrates (De Permut. Or. xv. sect. 290-312-316)
has some good remarks about the impossibility of [Greek:
e)pistê/mê] respecting particulars. Plato, in the Gorgias, puts
[Greek: te/chnê], which he states to depend upon reason and
foreknowledge, in opposition to [Greek: e)mpeiri/a] and [Greek:
tribê/], which he considers as dependant on the [Greek: phu/sis
stochastikê/]. But in applying the knowledge or skill called Art to
particular cases, the [Greek: phu/sis stochastikê\] is the best
that can be had (p. 463 A-B). The conception of [Greek: te/chnê]
given in the Gorgias is open to the same remark as that which we
find in the Phædrus. Plato, in another passage of the Phædrus,
speaks of the necessity that [Greek: phu/sis, e)pistê/mê], and
[Greek: mele/tê], shall concur to make an accomplished orator.
This is very true; and Lysias, Isokrates, and all the other
rhetors whom Plato satirises, would have concurred in it. In his
description of [Greek: te/chnê] and [Greek: e)pistê/mê], and in
the estimate which he gives of all that it comprises, he leaves no
outlying ground for [Greek: mele/tê]. Compare Xenophon, Memor.
iii. 1, 11; also Isokrates contra Sophistas, a. 16; and a good
passage of Dionysius Halik. De Compos. Verborum, in which that
rhetor remarks that [Greek: kairo\s] or opportunity neither has
been nor can be reduced to art and rule.]
[Footnote 116: Plato, Gorgias, pp. 464-465.]
[Side-note: Plato's charge against the Rhetorical teachers is not
made out.]
While therefore Plato's view of the science or theory of Rhetoric
is far more comprehensive and philosophical than any thing given
by the rhetorical teachers--he has not made good his charge
against them, that what they taught as an art of Rhetoric was
useless and illusory. The charge can only be sustained if we
grant--what appears to have been Plato's own feeling--that the
social and political life of the Athenians was a dirty and corrupt
business, unworthy of a virtuous man to meddle with. This is the
argument of Sokrates (in the Gorgias,[117] the other great
anti-rhetorical dialogue), proclaiming himself to stand alone and
aloof, an isolated, free-thinking dissenter. As representing his
sincere conviction, and interpreting Plato's plan of life, this
argument deserves honourable recognition. But we must remember
that Lysias and the rhetorical teachers repudiated such a point of
view. They aimed at assisting and strengthening others to perform
their parts, not in speculative debate on philosophy, but in
active citizenship; and they succeeded in this object to a great
degree. The rhetorical ability of Lysias personally is attested
not merely by the superlative encomium on him assigned to
Phædrus,[118] but also by his great celebrity--by the frequent
demand for his services as a logographer or composer of discourses
for others--by the number of his discourses preserved and studied
after his death. He, and a fair proportion of the other rhetors
named in the Phædrus, performed well the useful work which they
undertook.
[Footnote 117: Plato, Gorg. 521 D.]
[Footnote 118: Plato, Phædr. p. 228 A.]
[Side-note: Plato has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglecting his
greater works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for
a private circle.]
When Plato selects, out of the very numerous discourses before him
composed by Lysias, one hardly intended for any real
auditors--neither deliberative, nor judicial, nor panegyrical, but an
ingenious erotic paradox for a private circle of friends--this is
no fair specimen of the author. Moreover Plato criticises it as if
it were a philosophic exposition instead of an oratorical
pleading. He complains that Lysias does not begin his discourse by
defining--but neither do Demosthenes and other great orators
proceed in that manner. He affirms that there is no organic
structure, or necessary sequence, in the discourse, and that the
sentences of it might be read in an inverted order:[119]--and this
remark is to a certain extent well-founded. In respect to the
skilful marshalling of the different parts of a discourse, so as
to give best effect to the whole, Dionysius of Halikarnassus[120]
declares Lysias to be inferior to some other orators--while
ascribing to him marked oratorical superiority on various other
points. Yet Plato, in specifying his objections against the erotic
discourses of Lysias, does not show that it offends against the
sound general principle which he himself lays down respecting the
art of persuasion--That the topics insisted on by the persuader
shall be adapted to the feelings and dispositions of the
persuadend. Far from violating this principle, Lysias kept it in
view, and employed it to the best of his power--as we may see, not
merely by his remaining orations, but also by the testimonies of
the critics:[121] though he did not go through the large
preliminary work of scientific classification, both of different
minds and different persuasive apparatus, which Plato considers
essential to a thorough comprehension and mastery of the
principle.
[Footnote 119: Plato, Phædrus, pp. 263-264.]
[Footnote 120: Dionysius (Judicium De Lysiâ, pp. 487-493) gives an
elaborate criticism on the [Greek: pragmatiko\s charaktê\r] of
Lysias. The special excellence of Lysias (according to this
critic) lay in his judicial orations, which were highly persuasive
and plausible: the manner of presenting thoughts was ingenious and
adapted to the auditors: the narration of facts and details,
especially, was performed with unrivalled skill. But as to the
marshalling of the different parts of a discourse, Dionysius
considers Lysias as inferior to some other orators--and still more
inferior in respect to [Greek: deinotê\s] and to strong emotional
effects.]
[Footnote 121: Dionys. Hal. (Ars Rhetorica, p. 381) notices the
severe exigencies which Plato here imposes upon the Rhetor,
remarking that scarcely any rhetorical discourse could be produced
which came up to them. The defect did not belong to Lysias alone,
but to all other rhetors also--[Greek: o(po/te ga\r _kai\ Lusi/an_
e)le/gchei, pa=san tê\n ê(mete/ran r(êtorikê\n e)/oiken
e)le/gchein.] Demosthenes almost alone (in the opinion of
Dionysius) contrived to avoid the fault, because he imitated
Plato.]
[Side-note: No fair comparison can be taken between this exercise
of Lysias and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the
Phædrus.]
The first discourse assigned by Plato to Sokrates professes to be
placed in competition with the discourse of Lysias, and to aim at
the same object. But in reality it aims at a different object: it
gives the dissuasive arguments, but omits the persuasive--as
Phædrus is made to point out: so that it cannot be fairly compared
with the discourse of Lysias. Still more may this be said
respecting the second discourse of Sokrates: which is of a
character and purpose so totally disparate, that no fair
comparison can be taken between it and the ostensible competitor.
The mixture of philosophy, mysticism, and dithyrambic poetry,
which the second discourse of Sokrates presents, was considered by
a rhetorical judge like Dionysius as altogether inconsistent with
the scope and purpose of reasonable discourse.[122] In the
Menexenus, Plato has brought himself again into competition with
Lysias, and there the competition is fairer:[123] for Plato has
there entirely neglected the exigencies enforced in the Phædrus,
and has composed a funeral discourse upon the received type; which
Lysias and other orators before him had followed, from Perikles
downward. But in the Phædrus, Plato criticises Lysias upon
principles which are a medley between philosophy and rhetoric.
Lysias, in defending himself, might have taken the same ground as
we find Sokrates himself taking in the Euthydêmus. "Philosophy and
politics are two distinct walks, requiring different aptitudes,
and having each its own practitioners. A man may take whichever he
pleases; but he must not arrogate to himself superiority by an
untoward attempt to join the two together."[124]
[Footnote 122: See the Epistol. of Dion. Halikarn. to Cneius
Pompey--De Platone--pp. 755-765.]
[Footnote 123: Plato, Menexen. p. 237
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