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Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2

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Title: Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2

Author: George Grote


        
Release date: August 7, 2012 [eBook #40436]
                Most recently updated: November 27, 2024

Language: English

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Credits: Produced by Ed Brandon as part of the on-line Grote Project


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PLATO AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES, 3RD ED. VOLUME 2 ***




Produced by Ed Brandon as part of the on-line Grote Project








PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.




PLATO,

AND THE

OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.



BY

GEORGE GROTE,

AUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'.



_A NEW EDITION._

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. II.



LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1888.

_The right of Translation is reserved._




CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XII.

ALKIBIADES I. AND II.


Situation supposed in the dialogue. Persons--Sokrates and
Alkibiades   1

Exorbitant hopes and political ambition of Alkibiades   2

Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to Alkibiades in
his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What does he
intend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does he
know?   _ib._

Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on questions of
war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must fight those
whom it is better to fight--to what standard does better refer? To
just and unjust   3

How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or
distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one; he
always knew it, even as a boy   4

Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the multitude, as
he learnt to speak Greek.--The multitude cannot teach just and
unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it.
Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not
know himself   5

Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not generally
debate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to every
one--but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not coincident with
just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the expedient. He
asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do nothing but
question   6

Comment on the preceding--Sokratic method--the respondent
makes the discoveries for himself   _ib._

Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just, is
good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts honourably, both
does well, and procures for himself happiness thereby. Equivocal
reasoning of Sokrates   7

Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are
equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades is
to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. Eulogistic
description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must make
himself as good as possible   8

But good--for what end, and under what circumstances?
Abundant illustrative examples   9

Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his
ignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to
make such discovery in youth   10

Platonic Dialectic--its actual effect--its anticipated
effect--applicable to the season of youth   11

Know Thyself--Delphian maxim--its urgent importance--What
is myself? My mind is myself   _ib._

I cannot know myself, except by looking into another
mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice are the
conditions both of happiness and of freedom   11

Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and declares
that he will never quit Sokrates   12

Second Alkibiades--situation supposed   _ib._

Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts which
may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic
word: madmen, a particular variety under it   _ib._

Relation between a generic term, and the specific terms
comprehended under it, was not then familiar   13

Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits,
and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies
that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance   14

Mistake in predications about ignorance generally. We must
discriminate. Ignorance of _what?_ Ignorance of good, is always
mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always   _ib._

Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we
call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or
accomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what occasions
and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used   15

Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good
or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial   16

It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice,
until he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the
Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel
of Sokrates   _ib._

Different critical opinions respecting these two dialogues   17

Grounds for disallowing them--less strong against the
Second than against the First   18

The supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only
marks of inferiority   _ib._

The two dialogues may probably be among Plato's earlier
compositions   20

Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic
Memorabilia--Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men   21

Fitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for
idealising this feature in Sokrates   _ib._

Plato's manner of replying to the accusers of Sokrates.
Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of Sokrates   22

The purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology is
followed out in Alkibiades I. Warfare against the false persuasion of
knowledge   24

Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of bringing
Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance   25

Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties.
He exhorts to Justice and Virtue--but these are acknowledged
Incognita   26

Prolixity of Alkibiadês I.--Extreme multiplication of
illustrative examples--How explained   _ib._

Alkibiadês II. leaves its problem avowedly undetermined   27

Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the Gods for
favours undefined--his views about the semi-regular, semi-irregular
agency of the Gods--he prays to them for premonitory warnings   28

Comparison of Alkibiadês II. with the Xenophontic
Memorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus.
Sokrates not always consistent with himself   29

Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiadês II.--that knowledge is
not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is indispensable:
without that, the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than
beneficial   _ib._

Knowledge of Good--appears postulated and divined, in many
of the Platonic dialogues, under different titles   31

The Good--the Profitable--what is it?--How are we to know
it? Plato leaves this undetermined   _ib._


CHAPTER XIII.

HIPPIAS MAJOR--HIPPIAS MINOR.

Hippias Major--situation supposed--character of the
dialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias   33

Real debate between the historical Sokrates and Hippias in
the Xenophontic Memorabilia--subject of that debate   34

Opening of the Hippias Major**--Hippias describes the
successful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown
as well as the gain acquired by his lectures   35

Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans
did not admit his instructions--their law forbids   _ib._

Question, What is law? The law-makers always aim at the
Profitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they
fail to attain law. The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is
also unlawful   36

Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates with
that of the Xenophontic Sokrates   37

The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is
the only explanation which Plato ever gives and to this he does not
always adhere   38

Lectures of Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or
astronomy, &c., but upon the question--What pursuits are
beautiful, fine, and honourable for youth?   39

Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the
background, who has just been puzzling him with it--What is the
Beautiful?   _ib._

Hippias thinks the question easy to answer   40

Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. What is
Beauty, or the Beautiful?   _ib._

Hippias does not understand the question. He answers by
indicating one particularly beautiful object   _ib._

Cross-questioning by Sokrates--Other things also are
beautiful; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under
some particular circumstances--it is sometimes beautiful, sometimes
not beautiful   41

Second answer of Hippias--_ Gold_, is that by the
presence of which all things become beautiful--scrutiny applied to
the answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies   _ib._

Third answer of Hippias--questions upon it--proof given
that it fails of universal application   42

Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself--1. The
Suitable or Becoming--objections thereunto--it is rejected   43

2. The useful or profitable--objections--it will not hold   44

3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable--that
which is received through the eye and the ear   45

Objections to this last--What property is there common to
both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of these two
senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful?   _ib._

Answer--There is, belonging to each and to both in common,
the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures--upon this
ground they are called beautiful   46

This will not hold--the Profitable is the cause of Good,
and is therefore different from Good--to say that the beautiful is
the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has
been already declared inadmissible   _ib._

Remarks upon the Dialogue--the explanations ascribed to
Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates
are attempts to assign some general concept   47

Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to
Sokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the
Memorabilia   49

Concluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and Sokrates   51

Rhetoric against Dialectic   52

Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the
speculative and analytical philosophers   _ib._

Concrete Aggregates--abstract or logical Aggregates.
Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician   53

Antithesis of Absolute and Relative, here brought into
debate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty   54

Hippias Minor--characters and situation supposed   55

Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols
Achilles as better than Odysseus--the veracious and straightforward
hero better than the mendacious and crafty   56

This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the
mendacious man are one and the same--the only man who can answer
truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses,
_i. e._ the knowing man--the ignorant man cannot make sure of
doing either the one or the other   57

Analogy of special arts--it is only the arithmetician who
can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses
  _ib._

View of Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad. He
thinks that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains
that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent
purpose, whereas Odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose   58

Issue here taken--Sokrates contends that those who hurt,
or cheat, or lie wilfully, are better than those who do the like
unwillingly--he entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his
questions   _ib._

Questions of Sokrates--multiplied analogies of the special
arts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly,
whether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well
when he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses   59

It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his
mark only by design, than that of one who misses even when he intends
to hit   60

Dissent and repugnance of Hippias   _ib._

Conclusion--That none but the good man can do evil
wilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist
the reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion--Sokrates confesses
his perplexity   61

Remarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been inverted,
the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of the
sophistry and corruption of the Sophists   62

Polemical purpose of the dialogue--Hippias humiliated by
Sokrates   63

Philosophical purpose of the dialogue--theory of the
Dialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by
Plato   _ib._

The Hippias is an exemplification of this theory--Sokrates
sets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability to clear it
up. Confusion shown up in the Lesser Hippias--Error in the Greater   64

The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed
by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia   66

Aristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against it   67

Mistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too exclusively
on the intellectual conditions of human conduct   _ib._

They rely too much on the analogy of the special arts--they
take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of
praise and blame   68

Value of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be
suggestive, and that it shall bring before us different aspects of
the question under review   69

Antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic   70


CHAPTER XIV.

HIPPARCHUS--MINOS.

Hipparchus--Question--What is the definition of Lover of
Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth
nothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man
expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing:
in this sense, no man is a lover of gain   71

Gain is good. Every man loves good: therefore all men are
lovers of gain   72

Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the companion of
trying to deceive him--accusation is retorted upon Sokrates   73

Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the
Peisistratid--never deceive a friend. Eulogy of Hipparchus by
Sokrates   _ib._

Sokrates allows the companion to retract some of his answers.
The companion affirms that some gain is good, other gain is evil   74

Questions by Sokrates--bad gain is _gain_, as much as
good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which both are
called Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with a
smaller outlay, is gain. Objections--the acquisition may be
evil--embarrassment confessed   _ib._

It is essential to gain, that the acquisition made shall be
greater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the outlay.
The valuable is the profitable--the profitable is the good.
Conclusion comes back. That Gain is Good   75

Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good,
and that there is no evil gain--all men are lovers of gain--no man
ought to be reproached for being so the companion is compelled to
admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded   _ib._

Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion. What is
Law, or The Law? All law is the same, _quatenus_ law: what is
the common constituent attribute?   76

Answer--Law is,   1. The consecrated and binding customs.   2.
The decree of the city.   3. Social or civic opinion   _ib._

Cross-examination by Sokrates--just and lawfully-behaving
men are so through law; unjust and lawless men are so through the
absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful: lawlessness is
ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city--or bad social
opinion--cannot be law   77

Suggestion by Sokrates--Law is the _good_ opinion of
the city--but good opinion is true opinion, or the finding out of
reality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of
reality, though it does not always succeed in doing so   77

Objection taken by the Companion--That there is great
discordance of laws in different places--he specifies several cases
of such discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his prolixity,
and requests him to confine himself to question or answer   78

Farther questions by Sokrates--Things heavy and light, just and
unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are so, and are accounted
so everywhere. Real things are always accounted real. Whoever
fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful   _ib._

There are laws of health and of cure, composed by the few
physicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared by
them. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery, declared
by the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like manner, the
laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise men who
know how to rule   79

That which is right is the regal law, the only true and
real law--that which is not right, is not law, but only seems to be
law in the eyes of the ignorant   80

Minos, King of Krete--his laws were divine and excellent,
and have remained unchanged from time immemorial   _ib._

Question about the character of Minos--Homer and Hesiod
declare him to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians defame him
as a tyrant, because he was an enemy of Athens   81

That Minos was really admirable--and that he has found out truth and
reality respecting the administration of the city--we may be sure
from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered   _ib._

The question is made more determinate--What is it that the
good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of the
mind, as the physician measures out food and exercise for the body?
Sokrates cannot tell. Close   81

The Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each other, and
both of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished   82

Hipparchus--double meaning of [Greek: philokerdê\s] and
[Greek: ke/rdos]   _ib._

State or mind of the agent, as to knowledge, frequent
inquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found   83

Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain,
what is the meaning of the word _gain_**? None is found   _ib._

Purpose of Plato in the dialogue--to lay bare the
confusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for
clearing it up   84

Historical narrative and comments given in the dialogue
respecting Hipparchus--afford no ground for declaring the dialogue to
be spurious   _ib._

Minos. Question--What is the characteristic property
connoted by the word [Greek: No/mos] or law?   86

This question was discussed by the historical Sokrates,
Memorabilia of Xenophon   _ib._

Definitions of law--suggested and refuted. Law includes,
as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness, &c.
Bad decrees are not laws   86

Sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same--it is the declared
judgment and command of the Wise man upon the subject to which it
refers--it is truth and reality, found out and certified by him   87

Reasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound, but
Platonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of Plato--he
acknowledges nothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought to
_be_ Law   88

Plato worships the Ideal of his own mind--the work of
systematic constructive theory by the Wise Man   89

Different applications of this general Platonic view, in
the Minos, Politikus, Kratylus, &c. _Natural_ Rectitude of
Law, Government, Names, &c    _ib._

Eulogy on Minos, as having established laws on this divine
type or natural rectitude   90

The Minos was arranged by Aristophanes at first in a
Trilogy along with the Leges   91

Explanations of the word Law--confusion in its meaning   _ib._


CHAPTER XV.

THEAGES.

Theagês--has been declared spurious by some modern
critics--grounds for such opinion not sufficient   98

Persons of the dialogue--Sokrates, with Demodokus and
Theagês, father and son. Theagês (the son), eager to acquire
knowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a Sophist   99

Sokrates questions Theagês, inviting him to specify what he
wants   _ib._

Theagês desires to acquire that wisdom by which he can
govern freemen with their own consent   100

Incompetence of the best practical statesmen to teach any one else.
Theagês requests that Sokrates will himself teach him   _ib._

Sokrates declares that he is not competent to teach--that
he knows nothing except about matters of love. Theagês maintains that
many of his young friends have profited largely by the conversation
of Sokrates   101

Sokrates explains how this has sometimes happened--he
recites his experience of the divine sign or Dæmon   _ib._

The Dæmon is favourable to some persons, adverse to others.
Upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion profits by
the society of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt anything from
Sokrates, yet has improved much by being near to him   102

Theagês expresses his anxiety to be received as the
companion of Sokrates   103

Remarks on the Theagês--analogy with the Lachês   104

Chief peculiarity of the Theagês--stress laid upon the
divine sign or Dæmon   _ib._

Plato employs this divine sign here to render some
explanation of the singularity and eccentricity of Sokrates, and of
his unequal influence upon different companions   _ib._

Sokrates, while continually finding fault with other
teachers, refused to teach himself--difficulty of finding an excuse
for his refusal. The Theagês furnishes an excuse   106

Plato does not always, nor in other dialogues, allude to
the divine sign in the same way. Its character and working
essentially impenetrable. Sokrates a privileged person   _ib._


CHAPTER XVI.

ERASTÆ OR ANTERASTÆ--RIVALES.


Erastæ--subject and persons of the dialogue--dramatic
introduction--interesting youths in the palæstra   111

Two rival Erastæ--one of them literary, devoted to
philosophy--the other gymnastic, hating philosophy   _ib._

Question put by Sokrates--What is philosophy? It is the
perpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest sum
total   112

In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of exercise
which does good, but the proper, measured quantity. For the mind
also, it is not the maximum of knowledge, but the measured quantity
which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure?   _ib._

No answer given. What is the best conjecture? Answer of the
literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will yield to him the
greatest reputation as a philosopher--as much as will enable him to
talk like an intelligent critic, though not to practise   113

The philosopher is one who is second-best in several
different arts--a Pentathlus--who talks well upon each   _ib._

On what occasions can such second-best men be useful? There
are always regular practitioners at hand, and no one will call in the
second-best man when he can have the regular practitioner   114

Philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of learned
acquirements   _ib._

Sokrates changes his course of examination--questions put
to show that there is one special art, regal and political, of
administering and discriminating the bad from the good   115

In this art the philosopher must not only be second-best,
competent to talk--but he must be a fully qualified practitioner,
competent to act   _ib._

Close of the dialogue--humiliation of the literary Erastes   116

Remarks--animated manner of the dialogue   _ib._

Definition of philosophy--here sought for the first
time--Platonic conception of measure--referee not discovered   117

View taken of the second-best critical talking man, as
compared with the special proficient and practitioner   118

Plato's view--that the philosopher has a province special
to himself, distinct from other specialties--dimly indicated--regal
or political art   119

Philosopher--the supreme artist controlling other artists   120


CHAPTER XVII.

ION.

Ion. Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion among
modern critics as to its genuineness   124

Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for prizes at
the festivals. Ion has been triumphant   124

Functions of the Rhapsodes. Recitation--exposition of the
poets--arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent   125

The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived from
their recitation--powerful effect which they produced   _ib._

Ion both reciter and expositor--Homer was considered more
as an instructor than as a poet   126

Plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or emotional
working   _ib._

Ion devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions of
Sokrates to him--How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon
other poets? The poetic art is one   127

Explanation given by Sokrates--both the Rhapsode and the
Poet work, not by art and system, but by divine inspiration--fine
poets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration from
some God   _ib._

Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction
successive stages of iron rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then
act through him and through Ion upon the auditors   128

This comparison forms the central point of the dialogue. It is an
expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in the Apology   129

Platonic Antithesis: systematic procedure distinguished
from unsystematic: which latter was either blind routine, or madness
inspired by the Gods. Varieties of madness, good and bad   129

Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar fact in
Grecian life--privileged communications from the Gods to
Sokrates--his firm belief in them   130

Condition of the inspired person--his reason is for the
time withdrawn   131

Ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out of his mind   132

Homer talks upon all subjects--Is Ion competent to explain
what Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its
province?   _ib._

The Rhapsode does not know special matters, such as the
craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows the
business of the general, and is competent to command soldiers, having
learnt it from Homer   133

Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any knowledge of
what he says, but by divine inspiration   134

The generals in Greece usually possessed no professional
experience--Homer and the poets were talked of as the great
teachers--Plato's view of the poet, as pretending to know
everything, but really knowing nothing   _ib._

Knowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge   136

Illustration of Plato's opinion respecting the uselessness
of written geometrical treatises   _ib._


CHAPTER XVIII.

LACHES.

Lachês. Subject and persons of the dialogue--whether it is
useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of
arms. Nikias and Lachês differ in opinion   138

Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion--he replies that the point
cannot be decided without a competent professional judge   139

Those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving their
competence to judge--Sokrates avows his own incompetence   140

Nikias and Lachês submit to be cross-examined by Sokrates   141

Both of them give opinions offhand, according to their
feelings on the special case--Sokrates requires that the question
shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of education   141

Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man--this
man is never seen or identified   142

We must know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on
education--virtue, as a whole, is too large a question--we will
enquire about one branch of virtue--courage   _ib._

Question--what is courage? Laches answers by citing
one particularly manifest case of courage--mistake of not giving a
general explanation   143

Second answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of the
mind--Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and
incorrect--endurance is not always courage: even intelligent
endurance is not always courage   _ib._

Confusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is a sort
of Intelligence--the intelligence of things terrible and not
terrible. Objections of Lachês   144

Questions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future events,
not past or present, which are terrible; but intelligence of future
events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present   145

Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil
generally. But this definition would include the whole of virtue, and
we declared that courage was only a part thereof--it will not hold
therefore as a definition of courage   146

Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false persuasion
of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently about
courage without knowing what it is   _ib._

No solution given by Plato--apparent tendency of his mind,
in looking for a solution. Intelligence--cannot be understood without
reference to some object or end   147

Object--is supplied in the answer of Nikias. Intelligence--of
things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence is not
possessed by professional artists   148

Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, dimly
indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man--correlates with the
undiscovered Science of Ends   _ib._

Perfect condition of the intelligence--is the one
sufficient condition of virtue   149

Dramatic contrast between Lachês and Sokrates, as cross-examiners   150


CHAPTER XIX.

CHARMIDES.

Scene and personages of the dialogue. Crowded palæstra.
Emotions of Sokrates   153

Question, What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates to the temperate
Charmides. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or slowness   154

But Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and slowness
is, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the contrary.
Temperance cannot be slowness   _ib._

Second answer. Temperance is a variety of the feeling of
shame. Refuted by Sokrates   _ib._

Third answer. Temperance consists in doing one's own
business. Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle, and
refutes it. Distinction between making and doing   155

Fourth answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in self-knowledge.   _ib._

Questions of Sokrates thereupon. What good does
self-knowledge procure for us? What is the object known, in this case?
Answer: There is no object of knowledge, distinct from the knowledge
itself   156

Sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge, without a
given _cognitum_ as its object. Analogies to prove that
knowledge of knowledge is impossible   156

All knowledge must be relative to some object   157

All properties are relative--every thing in nature has its
characteristic property with reference to something else   _ib._

Even if cognition of cognition were possible, cognition of
non-cognition would be impossible. A man may know what he knows, but
he cannot know what he is ignorant of. He knows the fact _that_
he knows: but he does not know how much he knows, and how much he
does not know   158

Temperance, therefore, as thus defined, would be of
little or no value   159

But even granting the possibility of that which has just
been denied, still Temperance would be of little value. Suppose that
all separate work were well performed, by special practitioners, we
should not attain our end--Happiness   _ib._

Which of the varieties of knowledge contributes most to
well-doing or happiness? That by which we know good and evil   160

Without the science of good and evil, the other special
science will be of little or of no service. Temperance is not the
science of good and evil, and is of little service   161

Sokrates confesses to entire failure in his research. He
cannot find out what temperance is: although several concessions have
been made which cannot be justified   _ib._

Temperance is and must be a good thing: but Charmides
cannot tell whether he is temperate or not; since what temperance is
remains unknown   162

Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of praise and
devotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue. Dramatic ornament
throughout   _ib._

The Charmides is an excellent specimen of Dialogues of
Search. Abundance of guesses and tentatives, all ultimately
disallowed   163

Trial and Error, the natural process of the human mind.
Plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this part of
the mental process. Sokrates accepts for himself the condition of
conscious ignorance   164

Familiar words--constantly used, with much earnest
feeling, but never understood nor defined--ordinary phenomenon in
human society   165

Different ethical points of view in different Platonic
dialogues   167

Self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible   _ib._

In other dialogues, Sokrates declares self-knowledge to be
essential and inestimable. Necessity for the student to have
presented to him dissentient points of view   _ib._

Courage and Temperance are shown to have no distinct meaning,
except as founded on the general cognizance of good and evil   168

Distinction made between the special sciences and the
science of Good and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences are
of no use   _ib._

Knowledge, always relative to some object known. Postulate
or divination of a Science of Teleology   169

Courage and Temperance, handled both by Plato and by
Aristotle. Comparison between the two   170


CHAPTER XX.

LYSIS.

Analogy between Lysis and Charmides. Richness of dramatic
incident in both. Youthful beauty   172

Scenery and personages of the Lysis   _ib._

Origin of the conversation. Sokrates promises to give an example
of the proper way of talking to a youth, for his benefit   173

Conversation of Sokrates with Lysis   _ib._

Lysis is humiliated. Distress of Hippothalês   177

Lysis entreats Sokrates to talk in the like strain to
Menexenus   _ib._

Value of the first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis,
as an illustration of the Platonico-Sokratic manner   177

Sokrates begins to examine Menexenus respecting friendship.
Who is to be called a friend? Halt in the dialogue   178

Questions addressed to Lysis. Appeal to the maxims of the
poets. Like is the friend of like. Canvassed and rejected   _ib._

Other poets declare that likeness is a cause of aversion;
unlikeness, of friendship. Reasons _pro_ and _con_.
Rejected   179

Confusion of Sokrates. He suggests, That the Indifferent
(neither good nor evil) is friend to the Good   180

Suggestion canvassed. If the Indifferent is friend to the
Good, it is determined to become so by the contact of felt evil, from
which it is anxious to escape   180

Principle illustrated by the philosopher. His intermediate
condition--not wise, yet painfully feeling his own ignorance   181

Sokrates dissatisfied. He originates a new suggestion. The
Primum Amabile, or object originally dear to us, _per se_: by
relation or resemblance to which other objects become dear   _ib._

The cause of love is desire. We desire that which is akin
to us or our own   182

Good is of a nature akin to every one, evil is alien to every one.
Inconsistency with what has been previously laid down   183

Failure of the enquiry. Close of the dialogue   184

Remarks. No positive result. Sokratic purpose in analysing the familiar
words--to expose the false persuasion of knowledge   _ib._

Subject of Lysis. Suited for a Dialogue of Search. Manner
of Sokrates, multiplying defective explanations, and showing reasons
why each is defective   185

The process of trial and error is better illustrated by a
search without result than with result. Usefulness of the dialogue
for self-working minds   186

Subject of friendship, handled both by the Xenophontic
Sokrates, and by Aristotle   _ib._

Debate in the Lysis partly verbal, partly real.
Assumptions made by the Platonic Sokrates, questionable, such as the
real Sokrates would have found reason for challenging   188

Peculiar theory about friendship broached by Sokrates.
Persons neither good nor evil by nature, yet having a superficial
tinge of evil, and desiring good to escape from it   189

This general theory illustrated by the case of the
philosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful consciousness of ignorance
the attribute of the philosopher. Value set by Sokrates and Plato
upon this attribute   190

Another theory of Sokrates. The Primum Amabile, or
original and primary object of Love. Particular objects are loved
through association with this. The object is Good   191

Statement by Plato of the general law of mental association   _ib._

Theory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by Sokrates,
with numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. Generic
communion of Aristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler
analogical communion   192

Primum Amabile of Plato, compared with the Prima Amicitia
of Aristotle. Each of them is head of an analogical aggregate, not
member of a generic family   194

The Good and Beautiful, considered as objects of attachment   _ib._


CHAPTER XXI.

EUTHYDEMUS.

Dramatic and comic exuberance of the Euthydêmus. Judgments
of various critics   195

Scenery and personages   _ib._

The two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus: manner in
which they are here presented   196

Conversation carried on with Kleinias, first by Sokrates,
next by the two Sophists   _ib._

Contrast between the two different modes of interrogation   197

Wherein this contrast does not consist   198

Wherein it does consist   199

Abuse of fallacies by the Sophists--their bidding for the
applause of the by-standers _ibid._

Comparison of the Euthydêmus with the Parmenidês   200

Necessity of settling accounts with the negative, before
we venture upon the affirmative, is common to both: in the one the
process is solitary and serious; in the other, it is vulgarised and
ludicrous   201

Opinion of Stallbaum and other critics about the
Euthydêmus, that Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus represent the way in
which Protagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors   202

That opinion is unfounded. Sokrates was much more Eristic
than Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by continuous
speech or lecture   _ib._

Sokrates in the Euthydêmus is drawn suitably to the
purpose of that dialogue   203

The two Sophists in the Euthydêmus are not to be taken as
real persons, or representatives of real persons   204

Colloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias--possession of good things is
useless, unless we also have intelligence how to use them   _ib._

But intelligence--of what? It must be such intelligence,
or such an art, as will include both the making of what we want, and
the right use of it when made   205

Where is such an art to be found? The regal or political
art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? No answer can be
found. Ends in puzzle   206

Review of the cross-examination just pursued by Sokrates.
It is very suggestive--puts the mind upon what to look for   207

Comparison with other dialogues--Republic, Philêbus, Protagoras.
The only distinct answer is found in the Protagoras   208

The talk of the two Sophists, though ironically admired
while it is going on, is shown at the end to produce no real
admiration, but the contrary   _ib._

Mistaken representations about the Sophists--Aristotle's
definition--no distinguishable line can be drawn between the Sophist
and the Dialectician   210

Philosophical purpose of the Euthydêmus--exposure of
fallacies, in Plato's dramatic manner, by multiplication of
particular examples   211

Aristotle (Soph. Elench.) attempts a classification of
fallacies: Plato enumerates them without classification   212

Fallacies of equivocation propounded by the two Sophists
in the Euthydêmus   _ib._

Fallacies--_à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum
simpliciter_--in the Euthydêmus   213

Obstinacy shown by the two Sophists in their
replies--determination not to contradict themselves   214

Farther verbal equivocations   _ib._

Fallacies involving deeper logical principles--contradiction
is impossible.--To speak falsely is impossible   215

Plato's Euthydêmus is the earliest known attempt to set
out and expose fallacies--the only way of exposing fallacies is to
exemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the conclusion
proved is known _aliunde_ to be false and absurd   216

Mistake of supposing fallacies to have been invented and
propagated by Athenian Sophists--they are inherent inadvertencies and
liabilities to error, in the ordinary process of thinking. Formal
debate affords the best means of correcting them   217

Wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief, misguided by
one or other of these fallacies, attested by Sokrates, Plato, Bacon,
&c.,--complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by Mill   218

Value of formal debate as a means for testing and
confuting fallacies   221

Without the habit of formal debate, Plato could not have
composed his Euthydêmus, nor Aristotle the treatise De Sophisticis
Elenchis   _ib._

Probable popularity of the Euthydêmus at Athens--welcomed
by all the enemies of Dialectic   222

Epilogue of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to obviate this
inference by opponents--Conversation between Sokrates and Kriton   223

Altered tone in speaking of Euthydêmus--Disparagement of
persons half-philosophers, half-politicians   224

Kriton asks Sokrates for advice about the education of his
sons--Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher--tells him to search for
himself   225

Euthydêmus is here cited as representative of Dialectic
and philosophy   226

Who is the person here intended by Plato,
half-philosopher, half-politician? Is it Isokrates?   227

Variable feeling at different times, between Plato and
Isokrates   228


CHAPTER XXII.

MENON.

Persons of the Dialogue   232

Question put by Menon--Is virtue teachable? Sokrates confesses that
he does not know what virtue is. Surprise of Menon   _ib._

Sokrates stands alone in this confession. Unpopularity
entailed by it   233

Answer of Menon--plurality of virtues, one belonging to
each different class and condition. Sokrates enquires for the
property common to all of them   _ib._

Analogous cases cited--definitions of figure and colour   235

Importance at that time of bringing into conscious view,
logical subordination and distinctions--Neither logic nor grammar had
then been cast into system   _ib._

Definition of virtue given by Menon: Sokrates pulls it to pieces   236

Menon complains that the conversation of Sokrates confounds
him like an electric shock--Sokrates replies that he is himself in
the same state of confusion and ignorance. He urges continuance of
search by both   237

But how is the process of search available to any purpose? No man
searches for what he already knows: and for what he does not know,
it is useless to search, for he cannot tell when he has found it   _ib._

Theory of reminiscence propounded by Sokrates--anterior immortality
of the soul--what is called teaching is the revival and recognition
of knowledge acquired in a former life, but forgotten   _ib._

Illustration of this theory--knowledge may be revived by
skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly untaught. Sokrates
questions the slave of Menon   238

Enquiry taken up--Whether virtue is teachable? without
determining what virtue is   239

Virtue is knowledge--no possessions, no attributes, either
of mind or body, are good or profitable, except under the guidance of
knowledge   _ib._

Virtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet there
are opposing reasons, showing that it cannot be teachable. No
teachers of it can be found   239

Conversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests the
Sophists, and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can
teach virtue   240

Confused state of the discussion. No way of acquiring
virtue is shown   _ib._

Sokrates modifies his premisses--knowledge is not the only thing
which guides to good results--right opinion will do the same   _ib._

Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind,
and can never give rational explanations, nor teach others--good
practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the
Gods   241

All the real virtue that there is, is communicated by
special inspiration from the Gods   242

But what virtue itself is, remains unknown   _ib._

Remarks on the dialogue. Proper order for examining the
different topics, is pointed out by Sokrates   _ib._

Mischief of debating ulterior and secondary questions when
the fundamental notions and word are unsettled   _ib._

Doctrine of Sokrates in the Menon--desire of good alleged
to be universally felt--in what sense this is true   243

Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of
virtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what?   244

Subject of Menon; same as that of the Protagoras--diversity
of handling--Plato is not anxious to settle a question and
get rid of it   245

Anxiety of Plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of
research   246

Great question discussed among the Grecian
philosophers--criterion of truth--Wherein consists the process
of verification?   _ib._

None of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer
here made by Plato--that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal
experience   247

Plato's view of the immortality of the soul--difference
between the Menon, Phædrus, and Phædon   249

Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful
examination out of the unlettered mind--how far correct?   _ib._

Plato's doctrine about _à priori_ reasonings--different
from the modern doctrine   251

Plato's theory about pre-natal experience. He took no
pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience   252

Little or nothing is said in the Menon about the Platonic
Ideas or Forms   253

What Plato meant by Causal Reasoning--his distinction
between knowledge and right opinion   _ib._

This distinction compared with modern philosophical views   254

Manifestation of Anytus--intense antipathy to the Sophists
and to philosophy generally   255

The enemy of Sokrates is also the enemy of the
sophists--practical statesmen   256

The Menon brings forward the point of analogy between
Sokrates and the Sophists, in which both were disliked by the
practical statesmen   257


CHAPTER XXIII.

PROTAGORAS.

Scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue   259

Introduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippokrates to
become acquainted with Protagoras   260

Sokrates questions Hippokrates as to his purpose and
expectations from Protagoras   _ib._

Danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a Sophist
without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach   262

Remarks on the Introduction. False persuasion of knowledge
brought to light   263

Sokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of Kallias.
Company therein. Respect shown to Protagoras   264

Questions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the latter,
declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and his own
openness in avowing himself a sophist   _ib._

Protagoras prefers to converse in presence of the assembled
company   266

Answers of Protagoras. He intends to train young men as
virtuous citizens   _ib._

Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable. Reasons for
such doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is or not.   _ib._

Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a mythe   267

Mythe. First fabrication of men by the Gods. Prometheus and
Epimetheus. Bad distribution of endowments to man by the latter. It
is partly amended by Prometheus   267

Prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of
individual wants, but could not give them the social art--Mankind are
on the point of perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions
essential for society   268

Protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse. Justice and
the sense of shame are not professional attributes, but are possessed
by all citizens and taught by all to all   269

Constant teaching of virtue. Theory of punishment   270

Why eminent men cannot make their sons eminent   271

Teaching by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws,
dikastery, &c.   _ib._

All learn virtue from the same teaching by all. Whether a
learner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his own
individual aptitude   272

Analogy of learning vernacular Greek. No special teacher
thereof. Protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than others   273

The sons of great artists do not themselves become great
artists   274

Remarks upon the mythe and discourse. They explain the
manner in which the established sentiment of a community propagates
and perpetuates itself   274

Antithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether virtue is
to be assimilated to a special art   275

Procedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse of
Protagoras--he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some of
the fundamental assumptions   276

One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast continuous
discourse with short cross-examining question and answer   277

Questions by Sokrates--Whether virtue is one and
indivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are
homogeneous or heterogeneous?   _ib._

Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? How far
justice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an answer, "If
you please"   278

Intelligence and moderation are identical, because they
have the same contrary   279

Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to
distinguish different meanings of the same term   _ib._

Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated   280

Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to
test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry
prolixity   _ib._

Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as
inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates
rises to depart   281

Interference of Kallias to get the debate continued.
Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought
to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue   282

Claim of a special _locus standi_ and professorship
for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric   _ib._

Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and invites
Protagoras to question him   _ib._

Protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of
the poets, and questions about parts of a song of Simonides.
Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song   283

Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the
song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed
sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech   283

Character of this speech--its connection with the
dialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in
continuous speech   284

Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets.
Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from
themselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the
task of answering   285

Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really
feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion for this
purpose   287

The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says that
courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue   288

Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in
knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates
changes his attack   _ib._

Identity of the pleasurable with the good--of the painful
with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate   289

Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the
mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or
pain? Both agree that knowledge is dominant   290

Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge.
We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a
preponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures   291

Pleasure is the only good--pain the only evil. No man does
evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures
present and future--resolves itself into pleasure and pain   292

Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing
pleasures rightly--all the security of our lives depend upon it   293

To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase
for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance   294

Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which
conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable   295

Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of
things terrible and not terrible   _ib._

Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of
the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in
confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras.
Amicable reply of Protagoras   297

Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the least
allusion to Hippokrates   298

Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited: one
under the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of Sokrates   299

Order of ethical problems, as conceived by Sokrates   _ib._

Difference of method between him and Protagoras flows from
this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue is, without
enquiry   300

Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to
established public sentiments with which he is in harmony   301

Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the problem
which Protagoras had left out   _ib._

Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the
analytical cross-examiner   303

Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, though
he is described as brought to a contradiction   _ib._

Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is affirmed by
Plato himself elsewhere   _ib._

The harsh epithets applied by critics to Protagoras are
not borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same ground as the
common consciousness   304

Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the
song of Simonides   305

Ethical view given by Sokrates worked out at length
clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of
pleasures and pains of the agent   _ib._

Protagoras is at first opposed to this theory   306

Reasoning of Sokrates   307

Application of that reasoning to the case of courage   _ib._

The theory which Plato here lays down is more distinct and
specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues   308

Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is
too narrow, and exclusively prudential   309

Comparison with the Republic   310

The discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part
of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates   311

The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of
Protagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of
other persons besides the agent himself   312

Plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or
satisfactory, especially about courage   313

Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct.
That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato
as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists   314

Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency   315

Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the close
of the dialogue   316


CHAPTER XXIV.

GORGIAS.

Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the
historical Gorgias   317

Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and
Kalliklês   318

Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good
definition   _ib._

Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the
artisan of persuasion   319

The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon what
matters is he competent to advise?   319

The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, even
against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, among
the ignorant   320

Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes
up the debate with Sokrates   321

Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he
gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical
knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to
cookery. It is a branch under the general head flattery   _ib._

Distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of
the body and mind--and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the
same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure   322

Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetors have
any real power, because they do nothing which they really wish   323

All men wish for what is good for them. Despots and
Rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good for
them. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will, and
therefore have no real power   324

Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia--Polus
affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks
so--Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless
denies it   325

Sokrates maintains--1. That it is a greater evil to do
wrong, than to suffer wrong.   2. That if a man has done wrong, it is
better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished   326

Sokrates offers proof--Definition of Pulchrum and
Turpe--Proof of the first point   327

Proof of the second point   _ib._

The criminal labours under a mental distemper, which
though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure
for him. To be punished is best for him   328

Misery of the Despot who is never punished. If our friend
has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought
to keep him unpunished   329

Argument of Sokrates paradoxical--Doubt expressed by
Kalliklês whether he means it seriously   330

Principle laid down by Sokrates--That every one acts with
a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery   _ib._

Peculiar view taken by Plato of Good--Evil--Happiness   331

Contrast of the usual meaning of these words, with the
Platonic meaning   _ib._

Examination of the proof given by Sokrates--Inconsistency
between the general answer of Polus and his previous
declarations--Law and Nature   332

The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates,
will not hold   334

Worse or better--for whom? The argument of Sokrates does
not specify. If understood in the sense necessary for his inference,
the definition would be inadmissible   _ib._

Plato applies to every one a standard of happiness and
misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of Archelaus
is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it   335

If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in
which punishment is considered would be reversed   336

Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper
and bodily distemper--Material difference between the two--Distemper
must be felt by the distempered persons   337

Kalliklês begins to argue against Sokrates--he takes a
distinction between Just by Law and Just by nature--Reply of
Sokrates, that there is no variance between the two, properly
understood   338

What Kalliklês says is not to be taken as a sample of the
teachings of Athenian sophists. Kalliklês--rhetor and politician   339

Uncertainty of referring to Nature as an authority. It may
be pleaded in favour of opposite theories. The theory of Kalliklês is
made to appear repulsive by the language in which he expresses it   340

Sokrates maintains that self-command and moderation is
requisite for the strong man as well as for others. Kalliklês defends
the negative   343

Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man,
provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties
of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good are
identical?   344

Kalliklês maintains that pleasurable and good are
identical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad.
A scientific adviser is required to discriminate them   345

Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and
Sokrates in the Protagoras   _ib._

Views of critics about this contradiction   346

Comparison and appreciation of the reasoning of Sokrates
in both dialogues   _ib._

Distinct statement in the Protagoras. What are good and
evil, and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to proceed
in discriminating them. No such distinct statement in the Gorgias   347

Modern ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense--not
recognised by Plato in either of the dialogues   348

In both dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is
self-regarding as respects the agent: not considering the
pleasures and pains of other persons, so far as affected by
the agent   349

Points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in
substance the same, but differing in classification   _ib._

Kalliklês, whom Sokrates refutes in the Gorgias, maintains
a different argument from that which Sokrates combats in the
Protagoras   350

The refutation of Kalliklês by Sokrates in the Gorgias, is
unsuccessful--it is only so far successful as he adopts
unintentionally the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras   351

Permanent elements--and transient elements--of human
agency--how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues   353

In the Protagoras   _ib._

In the Gorgias   354

Character of the Gorgias generally--discrediting all the
actualities of life   355

Argument of Sokrates resumed--multifarious arts of
flattery, aiming at immediate pleasure   357

The Rhetors aim at only flattering the public--even the
best past Rhetors have done nothing else--citation of the four great
Rhetors by Kallikles   357

Necessity for temperance, regulation, order. This is the
condition of virtue and happiness   358

Impossible to succeed in public life, unless a man be
thoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force   359

Danger of one who dissents from the public, either for
better or for worse   _ib._

Sokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for himself--to
study permanent good, and not immediate satisfaction   360

Sokrates announces himself as almost the only man at Athens,
who follows out the true political art. Danger of doing this   361

Mythe respecting Hades, and the treatment of deceased
persons therein, according to their merits during life--the
philosopher who stood aloof from public affairs, will then be
rewarded   _ib._

Peculiar ethical views of Sokrates--Rhetorical or
dogmatical character of the Gorgias   362

He merges politics in Ethics--he conceives the rulers as
spiritual teachers and trainers of the community _id._

_Idéal_ of Plato--a despotic lawgiver or man-trainer,
on scientific principles, fashioning all characters pursuant to
certain types of his own   363

Platonic analogy between mental goodness and bodily
health--incomplete analogy--circumstances of difference   _ib._

Sokrates in the Gorgias speaks like a dissenter among a
community of fixed opinions and habits. Impossible that a dissenter,
on important points, should acquire any public influence   364

Sokrates feels his own isolation from his countrymen. He
is thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic   365

Antithesis between philosophy and rhetoric   _ib._

Position of one who dissents, upon material points, from
the fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen   366

Probable feelings of Plato on this subject--Claim put
forward in the Gorgias of an independent _locus standi_ for
philosophy, but without the indiscriminate cross-examination
pursued by Sokrates   367

Importance of maintaining the utmost liberty of discussion.
Tendency of all ruling orthodoxy towards intolerance   368

Issue between philosophy and rhetoric--not satisfactorily
handled by Plato. Injustice done to rhetoric. Ignoble manner in which
it is presented by Polus and Kalliklês   369

Perikles would have accepted the defence of rhetoric, as
Plato has put it into the mouth of Gorgias   370

The Athenian people recognise a distinction between the
pleasurable and the good: but not the same as that which Plato
conceived   371

Rhetoric was employed at Athens in appealing to all the
various established sentiments and opinions. Erroneous inferences
raised by the Kalliklês of Plato   373

The Platonic Idéal exacts, as good, some order, system,
discipline. But order may be directed to bad ends as well as to good.
Divergent ideas about virtue   374

How to discriminate the right order from the wrong. Plato
does not advise us   375

The Gorgias upholds the independence and dignity of the
dissenting philosopher   _ib._


CHAPTER XXV.

PHÆDON.

The Phædon is affirmative and expository   377

Situation and circumstances assumed in the Phædon. Pathetic
interest which they inspire   _ib._

Simmias and Kebês, the two collocutors with Sokrates. Their
feelings and those of Sokrates   378

Emphasis of Sokrates in insisting on freedom of debate, active
exercise of reason, and independent judgment for each reasoner   379

Anxiety of Sokrates that his friends shall be on their
guard against being influenced by his authority--that they shall
follow only the convictions of their own reason   380

Remarkable manifestation of earnest interest for reasoned
truth and the liberty of individual dissent   381

Phædon and Symposion--points of analogy and contrast   382

Phædon--compared with Republic and Timæus. No recognition
of the triple or lower souls. Antithesis between soul and body   383

Different doctrines of Plato about the soul. Whether all
the three souls are immortal, or the rational soul alone   385

The life and character of a philosopher is a constant
struggle to emancipate his soul from his body. Death alone enables
him to do this completely   386

Souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical men pass after
death into the bodies of different animals. The philosopher alone is
relieved from all communion with body   387

Special privilege claimed for philosophers in the Phædon
apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers   388

Simmias and Kebês do not admit readily the immortality of
the soul, but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by asking for proof.
Unabated interest of Sokrates in rational debate   390

Simmias and Kebês believe fully in the pre-existence of
the soul, but not in its post-existence. Doctrine--That the soul is a
sort of harmony--refuted by Sokrates   _ib._

Sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or wanderings
through which his mind had passed   391

First doctrine of Sokrates as to cause. Reasons why he
rejected it   _ib._

Second doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of
Anaxagoras   393

Disappointment because Anaxagoras did not follow out the
optimistic principle into detail. Distinction between causes
efficient and causes co-efficient   394

Sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic principle
for himself, nor find any teacher thereof. He renounced it, and
embraced a third doctrine about cause   395

He now assumes the separate existence of ideas. These
ideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain
attributes   396

Procedure of Sokrates if his hypothesis were impugned. He
insists upon keeping apart the discussion of the hypothesis and the
discussion of its consequences   397

Exposition of Sokrates welcomed by the hearers. Remarks
upon it   398

The philosophical changes in Sokrates all turned upon
different views as to a true cause   _ib._.

Problems and difficulties of which Sokrates first sought
solution   399

Expectations entertained by Sokrates from the treatise of
Anaxagoras. His disappointment. His distinction between causes and
co-efficients   400

Sokrates imputes to Anaxagoras the mistake of substituting
physical agencies in place of mental. This is the same which
Aristophanes and others imputed to Sokrates   401

The supposed theory of Anaxagoras cannot be carried out,
either by Sokrates himself or any one else. Sokrates turns to general
words, and adopts the theory of ideas   403

Vague and dissentient meanings attached to the word Cause.
That is a cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to his
inquisitive feelings   404

Dissension and perplexity on the question.--What is a
cause? revealed by the picture of Sokrates--no intuition to guide him
407

Different notions of Plato and Aristotle about causation,
causes regular and irregular. Inductive theory of causation,
elaborated in modern times   _ib._

Last transition of the mind of Sokrates from things to
words--to the adoption of the theory of ideas. Great multitude of
ideas assumed, each fitting a certain number of particulars   410

Ultimate appeal to hypothesis of extreme generality   411

Plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul rests
upon the assumption of the Platonic ideas. Reasoning to prove this   412

The soul always brings life, and is essentially living. It
cannot receive death: in other words, it is immortal   413

The proof of immortality includes pre-existence as well as
post-existence--animals as well as man--also the metempsychosis or
translation of the soul from one body to another   414

After finishing his proof that the soul is immortal,
Sokrates enters into a description, what will become of it after the
death of the body. He describes a [Greek: Nekui/a]   415

Sokrates expects that his soul is going to the islands of
the blest. Reply to Kriton about burying his body   416

Preparations for administering the hemlock. Sympathy of
the gaoler. Equanimity of Sokrates   _ib._

Sokrates swallows the poison. Conversation with the gaoler   417

Ungovernable sorrow of the friends present. Self-command
of Sokrates. Last words to Kriton, and death   _ib._

Extreme pathos, and probable trustworthiness of these
personal details   419

Contrast between the Platonic Apology and the Phædon   _ib._.

Abundant dogmatic and poetical invention of the Phædon
compared with the profession of ignorance which we read in the
Apology   421

Total renunciation and discredit of the body in the Phædon.
Different feeling about the body in other Platonic dialogues   422

Plato's argument does not prove the immortality of the
soul. Even if it did prove that, yet the mode of pre-existence and
the mode of post-existence, of the soul, would be quite undetermined   423

The philosopher will enjoy an existence of pure soul
unattached to any body   425

Plato's demonstration of the immortality of the soul did
not appear satisfactory to subsequent philosophers. The question
remained debated and problematical   426




PLATO.

CHAPTER XII

ALKIBIADES I. AND II.

ALKIBIADES I.--ON THE NATURE OF MAN.


[Side-note: Situation supposed in the dialogue.
Persons--Sokrates and Alkibiades.]

This dialogue is carried on between Sokrates and Alkibiades. It
introduces Alkibiades as about twenty years of age, having just
passed through the period of youth, and about to enter on the
privileges and duties of a citizen. The real dispositions and
circumstances of the historical Alkibiades (magnificent personal
beauty, stature, and strength, high family and connections, great
wealth already possessed, since his father had died when he was a
child,--a full measure of education and accomplishments--together
with exorbitant ambition and insolence, derived from such accumulated
advantages) are brought to view in the opening address of Sokrates.
Alkibiades, during the years of youth which he had just passed, had
been surrounded by admirers who tried to render themselves acceptable
to him, but whom he repelled with indifference, and even with scorn.
Sokrates had been among them, constantly present and near to
Alkibiades, but without ever addressing a word to him. The youthful
beauty being now exchanged for manhood, all these admirers had
retired, and Sokrates alone remains. His attachment is to Alkibiades
himself: to promise of mind rather than to attractions of person.
Sokrates has been always hitherto restrained, by his divine sign
or Dæmon, from speaking to Alkibiades. But this prohibition has now
been removed; and he accosts him for the first time, in the full
belief that he shall be able to give improving counsel, essential to
the success of that political career upon which the youth is about to
enter.[1]

[Footnote 1: Plato, Alkib. i. 103, 104, 105. Perikles is supposed to
be still alive and political leader of Athens--104 B.

I have briefly sketched the imaginary situation to which this
dialogue is made to apply. The circumstances of it belong to Athenian
manners of the Platonic age.

Some of the critics, considering that the relation supposed between
Sokrates and Alkibiades is absurd and unnatural, allege this among
their reasons for denying the authenticity of the dialogue. But if
any one reads the concluding part of the Symposion--the authenticity
of which has never yet been denied by any critic--he will find
something a great deal more abnormal in what is there recounted about
Sokrates and Alkibiades.

In a dialogue composed by Æschines Socraticus (cited by the rhetor
Aristeides--[Greek: Peri\ R(êtorikê=s], Or. xlv. p. 23-24),
expressions of intense love for Alkibiades are put into the mouth of
Sokrates. Æschines was [Greek: gnê/sios e(tai=ros Sôkra/tous], not
less than Plato. The different companions of Sokrates thus agreed in
their picture of the relation between him and Alkibiades.]

[Side-note: Exorbitant hopes and political ambition of
Alkibiades.]

You are about to enter on public life (says Sokrates to Alkibiades)
with the most inordinate aspirations for glory and aggrandisement.
You not only thirst for the acquisition of ascendancy such as
Perikles possesses at Athens, but your ambition will not be satisfied
unless you fill Asia with your renown, and put yourself upon a level
with Cyrus and Xerxes. Now such aspirations cannot be gratified
except through my assistance. I do not deal in long discourses such
as you have been accustomed to hear from others: I shall put to you
only some short interrogatories, requiring nothing more than answers
to my questions.[2]

[Footnote 2: Plato, Alkib. i. 106 B. [Greek: A)=ra e)rôtta=|s ei)/
tina e)/chô ei)pei=n lo/gon makro/n, oi(/ous dê\ a)kou/ein
ei)/thisai? ou) ga/r e)sti toiou=ton to\ e)mo/n.] I give here, as
elsewhere, not an exact translation, but an abstract.]

[Side-note: Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to
Alkibiades in his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What
does he intend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does
he know?]

_Sokr._--You are about to step forward as adviser of the public
assembly. Upon what points do you intend to advise them? Upon points
which you know better than they? _Alk._--Of course.
_Sokr._--All that you know, has been either learnt from others
or found out by yourself. _Alk._--Certainly. _Sokr._--But
you would neither have learnt any thing, nor found out any thing,
without the desire to learn or find out: and you would have felt no
such desire, in respect to that which you believed yourself to know
already. That which you now know, therefore, there was a time when
you believed yourself not to know? _Alk._--Necessarily so.
_Sokr._--Now all that you have learnt, as I am well aware,
consists of three things--letters, the harp, gymnastics. Do you
intend to advise the Athenians when they are debating about letters,
or about harp-playing, or about gymnastics? _Alk._--Neither of
the three. _Sokr._--Upon what occasions, then, do you propose to
give advice? Surely, not when the Athenians are debating about
architecture, or prophetic warnings, or the public health: for to
deliver opinions on each of these matters, belongs not to you but to
professional men--architects, prophets, physicians; whether they be
poor or rich, high-born or low-born? If not _then_, upon what
other occasions will you tender your counsel? _Alk._--When they
are debating about affairs of their own.

[Side-note: Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on
questions of war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must
fight those whom it is better to fight--to what standard does better
refer? To just and unjust.]

_Sokr._--But about what affairs of their own? Not about affairs
of shipbuilding: for of that you know nothing. _Alk._--When they
are discussing war and peace, or any other business concerning the
city. _Sokr._--You mean when they are discussing the question
with whom they shall make war or peace, and in what manner? But it is
certain that we must fight those whom it is best to fight--also
_when_ it is best--and _as long as_ it is best.
_Alk._--Certainly. _Sokr._--Now, if the Athenians wished
to know whom it was best to wrestle with, and when or how long it was
best which of the two would be most competent to advise them, you or
the professional trainer? _Alk._--The trainer, undoubtedly.
_Sokr._--So, too, about playing the harp or singing. But when
you talk about _better_, in wrestling or singing, what standard
do you refer to? Is it not to the gymnastic or musical art?
_Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--Answer me in like manner about war or
peace, the subjects on which you are going to advise your countrymen,
whom, and at what periods, it is _better_ to fight, and
_better_ not to fight? What in this last case do you mean by
_better_? To what standard, or to what end, do you refer?[3]
_Alk._--I cannot say. _Sokr._--But is it not a disgrace,
since you profess to advise your countrymen when and against whom
it is better for them to war,--not to be able to say to what end your
_better_ refers? Do not you know what are the usual grounds and
complaints urged when war is undertaken? _Alk._--Yes:
complaints of having been cheated, or robbed, or injured.
_Sokr._--Under what circumstances? _Alk._--You mean,
whether justly or unjustly? That makes all the difference.
_Sokr._--Do you mean to advise the Athenians to fight those who
behave justly, or those who behave unjustly? _Alk._--The
question is monstrous. Certainly not those who behave justly. It
would be neither lawful nor honourable. _Sokr._--Then when you
spoke about _better_, in reference to war or peace, what you
meant was _juster_--you had in view justice and injustice?
_Alk._--It seems so.

[Footnote 3: Plato, Alkib. i. 108 E--109 A.
[Greek: i)/thi dê/, kai\ to\ en tô=| polemei=n be/ltion kai\ to\ en
tô=| ei)rê/nên a)/gein, tou=to to\ be/ltion ti/ o)noma/zeis? ô(/sper
e)kei= e)ph' e)ka/stô| e)/leges to\ a)/meinon, o(/ti mousikô/teron,
kai\ e)pi\ tô=| e(terô|, o(/ti gumnastikô/teron; peirô= dê\ kai\
e)ntau=tha le/gein to\ be/ltion . . . . . pro\s ti/ teinei to\ e)n
tô=| ei)rê/nên te a)/gein a)/meinon kai\ to\ e)n tô=| polemei=n oi(=s
dei=?] _Alkib._ [Greek: A)lla\ skopô=n ou) du/namai
e)nnoê=sai.]]

[Side-note: How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern
or distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one; he
always knew it, even as a boy.]

_Sokr._--How is this? How do you know, or where have you learnt,
to distinguish just from unjust? Have you frequented some master,
without my knowledge, to teach you this? If you have, pray introduce
me to him, that I also may learn it from him. _Alk._--You are
jesting. _Sokr._--Not at all: I love you too well to jest.
_Alk._--But what if I had no master? Cannot I know about justice
and injustice, without a master? _Sokr._--Certainly: you might
find out for yourself, if you made search and investigated. But this
you would not do, unless you were under the persuasion that you did
not already know. _Alk._--Was there not a time when I really
believed myself not to know it? _Sokr._--Perhaps there may have
been: tell me _when_ that time was. Was it last year?
_Alk._--No: last year I thought that I knew. _Sokr._--Well,
then two years, three years, &c., ago? _Alk._--No: the case
was the same then, also, I thought that I knew. _Sokr._--But
before that, you were a mere boy; and during your boyhood you
certainly believed yourself to know what was just and unjust; for I
well recollect hearing you then complain confidently of other boys,
for acting unjustly towards you. _Alk._--Certainly: I was not
then ignorant on the point: I knew distinctly that they were acting
unjustly towards me. _Sokr._--You knew, then, even in your
boyhood, what was just and what was unjust? _Alk._--Certainly: I
knew even then. _Sokr._--At what moment did you first find it
out? Not when you already believed yourself to know: and what time
was there when you did not believe yourself to know?
_Alk._--Upon my word, I cannot say.

[Side-note: Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the
multitude, as he learnt to speak Greek.--The multitude cannot teach
just and unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it.
Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not
know himself.]

_Sokr._--Since, accordingly, you neither found it out for
yourself, nor learnt it from others, how come you to know justice or
injustice at all, or from what quarter? _Alk._--I was mistaken
in saying that I had not learnt it. I learnt it, as others do, from
the multitude.[4] _Sokr._--Your teachers are none of the best:
no one can learn from them even such small matters as playing at
draughts: much less, what is just and unjust. _Alk._--I learnt
it from them as I learnt to speak Greek, in which, too, I never had
any special teacher. _Sokr._--Of that the multitude are
competent teachers, for they are all of one mind. Ask which is a tree
or a stone,--a horse or a man,--you get the same answer from every
one. But when you ask not simply which are _horses_, but also
which horses are fit to run well in a race--when you ask not merely
about which are _men_, but which men are healthy or unhealthy--are
the multitude all of one mind, or all competent to answer?
_Alk._--Assuredly not. _Sokr._--When you see the multitude
differing among themselves, that is a clear proof that they are not
competent to teach others. _Alk._--It is so. _Sokr._--Now,
about the question, What is just and unjust--are the multitude all of
one mind, or do they differ among themselves? _Alk._--They
differ prodigiously: they not only dispute, but quarrel and destroy
each other, respecting justice and injustice, far more than about
health and sickness.[5] _Sokr._ How, then, can we say that the
multitude know what is just and unjust, when they thus fiercely
dispute about it among themselves? _Alk._--I now perceive that
we cannot say so. _Sokr._--How can we say, therefore, that
they are fit to teach others: and how can you pretend to know, who
have learnt from no other teachers? _Alk._--From what you say,
it is impossible.

[Footnote 4: Plato, Alkib. i. 110 D-E. [Greek: e)/mathon, oi)=mai,
kai\ e)gô\ ô(/sper kai\ oi( a)/lloi . . . . para\ tô=n pollô=n.]]

[Footnote 5: Plato, Alkib. i. 112 A. _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de\
dê\? nu=n peri\ tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn a)nthrô/pôn kai\
pragma/tôn, oi( polloi\ dokou=si/ soi o(mologei=n au)toi\ e(autoi=s
ê)\ a)llê/lois?] _Alkib._ [Greek: Ê(/kista, nê\ Di/', ô)=
Sô/krates.] _Sokr._ [Greek: Ti/ de/? ma/lista peri\ au)tô=n
diaphe/resthai?] _Alkib._ [Greek: polu/ ge.]]

_Sokr._--No: not from what _I_ say, but from what
_you_ say yourself. I merely ask questions: it is you who give
all the answers.[6] And what you have said amounts to this--that
Alkibiades knows nothing about what is just and unjust, but believes
himself to know, and is going to advise the Athenians about what he
does not know himself?

[Footnote 6: Plato, Alkib. i. 112-113.]

[Side-note: Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not
generally debate about just or unjust--which they consider plain to
every one--but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not
coincident with just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the
expedient. He asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do
nothing but question.]

_Alk._--But, Sokrates, the Athenians do not often debate about
what is just and unjust. They think that question self-evident; they
debate generally about what is expedient or not expedient. Justice
and expediency do not do not always coincide. Many persons commit
great crimes, and are great gainers by doing so: others again behave
justly, and suffer from it.[7] _Sokr_--Do you then profess to
know what is expedient or inexpedient? From whom have you learnt--or
when did you find out for yourself? I might ask you the same round of
questions, and you would be compelled to answer in the same manner.
But we will pass to a different point. You say that justice and
expediency are not coincident. Persuade _me_ of this, by
interrogating me as I interrogated you. _Alk._--That is beyond
my power. _Sokr._--But when you rise to address the assembly,
you will have to persuade _them_. If you can persuade them, you
can persuade me. Assume _me_ to be the assembly, and practise
upon me.[8] _Alk._--You are too hard upon me, Sokrates. It is
for you to speak and prove the point. _Sokr_--No: I can only
question: you must answer. You will be most surely persuaded when the
point is determined by your own answers.[9]

[Footnote 7: Plato, Alkib. i. 113 D. [Greek: Oi)=mai me\n o)liga/kis
A)thênai/ous bouleu/esthai po/tera dikaio/tera ê)\ a)dikôtera; ta\
me\n ga\r toiau=ta ê(gou=ntai dê=la ei)=nai], &c.]

[Footnote 8: Plato, Alkib. i. 114 B-C. This same argument is
addressed by Sokrates to Glaukon, in Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6, 14-15.]

[Footnote 9: Plato, Alkib. i. 114 E.
[Greek: Ou)kou=n ei) le/geis o(/ti tau=th' ou(/tôs e)/chei, ma/list'
a)\n ei)/ês pepeisme/nos?]]

[Side-note: Comment on the preceding--Sokratic method--the
respondent makes the discoveries for himself.]

Such is the commencing portion (abbreviated or abstracted) of
Plato's First Alkibiadês. It exhibits a very characteristic specimen
of the Sokratico-Platonic method: both in its negative and positive
aspect. By the negative, false persuasion of knowledge is exposed.
Alkibiades believes himself competent to advise about just and
unjust, which he has neither learnt from any teacher nor investigated
for himself--which he has picked up from the multitude, and supposes
to be clear to every one, but about which nevertheless there is so
much difference of appreciation among the multitude, that fierce and
perpetual quarrels are going on. On the positive side, Sokrates
restricts himself to the function of questioning: he neither affirms
nor denies any thing. It is Alkibiades who affirms or denies every
thing, and who makes all the discoveries for himself out of his own
mind, instigated indeed, but not taught, by the questions of his
companion.

[Side-note: Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is
just, is good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts
honourably, both does well, and procures for himself happiness
thereby. Equivocal reasoning of Sokrates.]

By a farther series of questions, Sokrates next brings Alkibiades to
the admission that what is just, is also honourable, good,
expedient--what is unjust, is dishonourable, evil, inexpedient: and
that whoever acts justly, and honourably, thereby acquires happiness.
Admitting, first, that an act which is good, honourable, just,
expedient, &c., considered in one aspect or in reference to some
of its conditions--may be at the same time bad, dishonourable,
unjust, considered in another aspect or in reference to other
conditions; Sokrates nevertheless brings his respondent to admit,
that every act, _in so far as it is just and honourable_, is
also good and expedient.[10] And he contends farther, that whoever
acts honourably, does well: now every man who does well, becomes
happy, or secures good things thereby: therefore the just, the
honourable, and the good or expedient, coincide.[11] The argument,
whereby this conclusion is here established, is pointed out by
Heindorf, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, as not merely inconclusive, but
as mere verbal equivocation and sophistry--the like of which,
however, we find elsewhere in Plato.[12]

[Footnote 10: Plato, Alkib. i. 115 B--116 A.
[Greek: Ou)kou=n tê\n toiau/tên boêthei/an kalê\n me\n le/geis kata\
tê\n e)pichei/rêsin tou= sô=sai ou(=s e)/dei; tou=to d' e)sti\n
a)ndri/a; . . . . kakê\n de/ ge kata\ tou\s thana/tous te kai\ ta\
e(/lkê. . . .

Ou)kou=n ô(=de di/kaion prosagoreu/ein e(ka/stên tô=n pra/xeôn;
ei)/per ê)=| kako\n a)perga/zetai kakê\n kalei=s, kai\ ê)=| a)gatho\n
a)gathê\n klête/on.

A)r' ou)=n kai\ ê)=| a)gatho\n kalo/n,--ê)=| de\ kako\n ai)schro/n?
Nai/.]

Compare Plato, Republic, v. p. 479, where he maintains that in every
particular case, what is just, honourable, virtuous, &c., is also
unjust, dishonourable, vicious, &c. Nothing remains unchanged,
nor excludes the contrary, except the pure, self-existent, Idea or
general Concept.--[Greek: au)to\-dikaiosu/nê], &c.]

[Footnote 11: Plato, Alkib. i. 116 E.]

[Footnote 12: The words [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein--eu)pragi/a] have a
double sense, like our "doing well". Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 175;
Steinhart, Einl. p. 149.

We have, p. 116 B, the equivocation between [Greek: kalô=s pra/ttein]
and [Greek: eu)= pra/ttein], also with [Greek: kakô=s pra/ttein], p.
134 A, 135 A; compare Heindorf ad Platon. Charmid. p. 172 A, p. 174
B; also Platon. Gorgias, p. 507 C, where similar equivocal meanings
occur.]

[Side-note: Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen
are equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades
is to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia.
Eulogistic description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must
make himself as good as possible.]

Alkibiades is thus reduced to a state of humiliating embarrassment,
and stands convicted, by his own contradictions and confession, of
ignorance in its worst form: that is, of being ignorant, and yet
believing himself to know.[13] But other Athenian statesmen are no
wiser. Even Perikles is proved to be equally deficient--by the fact
that he has never been able to teach or improve any one else, not
even his own sons and those whom he loved best.[14] "At any rate"
(contends Alkibiades) "I am as good as my competitors, and can hold
my ground against them." But Sokrates reminds him that the real
competitors with whom he ought to compare himself, are foreigners,
liable to become the enemies of Athens, and against whom he, if he
pretends to lead Athens, must be able to contend. In an harangue of
unusual length, Sokrates shows that the kings of Sparta and Persia
are of nobler breed, as well as more highly and carefully trained,
than the Athenian statesmen.[15] Alkibiades must be rescued from his
present ignorance, and exalted, so as to be capable of competing with
these kings: which object cannot be attained except through the
auxiliary interposition of Sokrates. Not that Sokrates professes to
be himself already on this elevation, and to stand in need of no
farther improvement. But he can, nevertheless, help others to attain
it for themselves, through the discipline and stimulus of his
interrogatories.[16]


[Footnote 13: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118.]

[Footnote 14: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-119.]

[Footnote 15: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 120-124.]

[Footnote 16: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124.]

[Side-note: But good--for what end, and under what
circumstances? Abundant illustrative examples.]

The dialogue then continues. _Sokr._--We wish to become as good
as possible. But in what sort of virtue? _Alk._--In that virtue
which belongs to good men. _Sokr._--Yes, but _good_, in
what matters? _Alk._--Evidently, to men who are good in
transacting business. _Sokr._--Ay, but what kind of business?
business relating to horses, or to navigation? If that be meant, we
must go and consult horse-trainers or mariners? _Alk._--No, I
mean such business as is transacted by the most esteemed leaders in
Athens. _Sokr._--You mean the intelligent men. Every man is
good, in reference to that which he understands: every man is bad, in
reference to that which he does not understand. _Alk._--Of
course. _Sokr._--The cobbler understands shoemaking, and is
therefore good at _that_: he does not understand weaving, and is
therefore bad at that. The same man thus, in your view, will be both
good and bad?[17] _Alk._--No: that cannot be. _Sokr._--Whom
then do you mean, when you talk of _the good_? _Alk._--I mean
those who are competent to command in the city. _Sokr._--But
to command whom or what--horses or men? _Alk._--To command
men. _Sokr._--But what men, and under what circumstances? sick
men, or men on shipboard, or labourers engaged in harvesting, or in
what occupations? _Alk._--I mean, men living in social and
commercial relation with each other, as we live here; men who live in
common possession of the same laws and government. _Sokr._--When
men are in communion of a sea voyage and of the same ship, how do we
name the art of commanding them, and to what purpose does it tend?
_Alk._--It is the art of the pilot; and the purpose towards which
it tends, is, bringing them safely through the dangers of the sea.
_Sokr._--When men are in social and political communion, to what
purpose does the art of commanding them tend? _Alk._--Towards
the better preservation and administration of the city.[18]
_Sokr._--But what do you mean by _better_? What is that,
the presence or absence of which makes _better_ or _worse_?
If in regard to the management of the body, you put to me the
same question, I should reply, that it is the presence of health, and
the absence of disease. What reply will you make, in the case of the
city? _Alk._--I should say, when friendship and unanimity among
the citizens are present, and when discord and antipathy are absent.
_Sokr._--This unanimity, of what nature is it? Respecting what
subject? What is the art or science for realising it? If I ask you
what brings about unanimity respecting numbers and measures, you will
say the arithmetical and the metrêtic art. _Alk._--I mean that
friendship and unanimity which prevails between near relatives,
father and son, husband and wife. _Sokr._--But how can there be
unanimity between any two persons, respecting subjects which one of
them knows, and the other does not know? For example, about spinning
and weaving, which the husband does not know, or about military
duties, which the wife does not know, how can there be unanimity
between the two? _Alk._--No: there cannot be. _Sokr._--Nor
friendship, if unanimity and friendship go together?
_Alk._--Apparently there cannot. _Sokr._--Then when men and women
each perform their own special duties, there can be no friendship
between them. Nor can a city be well administered, when each citizen
performs his own special duties? or (which is the same thing) when
each citizen acts justly? _Alk._--Not so: I think there may be
friendship, when each person performs his or her own business.
_Sokr._--Just now you said the reverse. What is this friendship
or unanimity which we must understand and realise, in order to become
good men?

[Footnote 17: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 125 B.

[Greek: O( au)to\s a)/ra tou/tô| ge tô=| lo/gô| kako/s te kai\
a)gatho/s.]

Plato slides unconsciously here, as in other parts of his reasonings,
_à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter_.]

[Footnote 18: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 126 A. [Greek: ti/ de/? ê)\n su\
kalei=s eu)bouli/an, ei)s ti/ e)stin?] _Alk._ [Greek: Ei)s to\
a)/meinon tê\n po/lin dioikei=n kai\ sô/zesthai.] _Sokr._
[Greek: A)meinon de\ dioikei=tai kai\ sô/zetai ti/nos paragignome/nou
ê)\ a)pogignomenou?]]

[Side-note: Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his
ignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to
make such discovery in youth.]

_Alk._--In truth, I am puzzled myself to say. I find myself in a
state of disgraceful ignorance, of which I had no previous suspicion.
_Sokr._--Do not be discouraged. If you had made this discovery
when you were fifty years old, it would have been too late for taking
care of yourself and applying a remedy: but at your age, it is the
right time for making the discovery. _Alk._--What am I to do,
now that I have made it? _Sokr._--You must answer my questions.
If my auguries are just, we shall soon be both of us better for the
process.[19]

[Footnote 19: Plato, Alkib. i. 127 D-E. _Alk._ [Greek: A)lla\
ma\ tou\s theou/s, ou)d' au)to\s oi)=da o(/ ti le/gô, kinduneu/ô de\
kai\ pa/lai lelêthe/nai e)mauto\n ai)/schist' e)/chôn.]

_Sokr._ [Greek: A)lla\ chrê\ thar)r(ei=n; ei) me\n ga\r au)to\
ê)=|sthou peponthô\s pentêkontae/tês, chalepo\n a)\n ê)=n soi
e)pimelêthê=nai sautou=; nu=n de\ ê)\n e)/cheis ê(liki/an, au)/tê
e)sti/n, e)n ê(=| dei= au)to\ ai)sthe/sthai.]

_Alk._ [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n to\n ai(stho/menon chrê\ poiei=n?]

_Sokr._ [Greek: _A)pokri/nesthai ta\ e)rôtô/mena_, kai\
e)a\n tou=to poiê=|s, a)\n theo\s e)the/lê|, ei)/ ti dei= kai\ tê=|
e)mê=| mantei/a| pisteu/ein, su/ te ka)gô\ beltio/nôs schê/somen.]]

[Side-note: Platonic Dialectic--its actual effect--its
anticipated effect--applicable to the season of youth.]

Here we have again, brought into prominent relief, the dialectic
method of Plato, under two distinct aspects: 1. Its actual effects,
in exposing the false supposition of knowledge, in forcing upon the
respondent the humiliating conviction, that he does not know familiar
topics which he supposed to be clear both to himself and to others.
2. Its anticipated effects, if continued, in remedying such defect:
and in generating out of the mind of the respondent, real and living
knowledge. Lastly, it is plainly intimated that this shock of
humiliation and mistrust, painful but inevitable, must be undergone
in youth.

[Side-note: Know Thyself--Delphian maxim--its urgent
importance--What is myself? My mind is myself.]

The dialogue continues, in short questions and answers, of which the
following is an abstract. _Sokr._--What is meant by a man
_taking care of himself_? Before I can take care of myself, I
must know what myself is: I must _know myself_, according to the
Delphian motto. I cannot make myself better, without knowing what
_myself_ is.[20] That which belongs to me is not _myself_:
my body is not myself, but an instrument governed by myself.[21] My
mind or soul only, is myself. To take care of myself is, to take care
of my mind. At any rate, if this be not strictly true,[22] my mind is
the most important and dominant element within me. The physician who
knows his own body, does not for that reason know himself: much less
do the husbandman or the tradesman, who know their own properties or
crafts, know themselves, or perform what is truly their own business.

[Footnote 20: Plato, Alkib. i. 129 B. [Greek: ti/n' a)\n tro/pon
eu(rethei/ê _au)to\ to\ au)to/_?]]

[Footnote 21: Plato, Alkib. i. 128-130. All this is greatly expanded
in the dialogue--p. 128 D: [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra o)/tan tô=n sautou=
e)pimelê=|, sautou= e)pime/lei?] This same antithesis is employed by
Isokrates, De Permutatione, sect. 309, p. 492, Bekker. He recommends
[Greek: au)tou= pro/teron ê)\ tô=n au)tou= poiei=sthai tê\n
e)pime/leian].]

[Footnote 22: Plato considers this point to be not clearly made out.
Alkib. i. 130.]

[Side-note: I cannot know myself, except by looking into
another mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice
are the conditions both of happiness and of freedom.]

Since temperance consists in self-knowledge, neither of these
professional men, as such, is temperate: their professions are of a
vulgar cast, and do not belong to the virtuous life.[23] How are
we to know our own minds? We know it by looking into another mind,
and into the most rational and divine portion thereof: just as the
eye can only know itself by looking into another eye, and seeing
itself therein reflected.[24] It is only in this way that we can come
to know ourselves, or become temperate: and if we do not know
ourselves, we cannot even know what belongs to ourselves, or what
belongs to others: all these are branches of one and the same
cognition. We can have no knowledge of affairs, either public or
private: we shall go wrong, and shall be unable to secure happiness
either for ourselves or for others. It is not wealth or power which
are the conditions of happiness, but justice and temperance. Both for
ourselves individually, and for the public collectively, we ought to
aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth and power. The evil and
unjust man ought to have no power, but to be the slave of those who
are better than himself.[25] He is fit for nothing but to be a slave:
none deserve freedom except the virtuous.

[Footnote 23: Plato, Alkib. i. 131 B.]

[Footnote 24: Plato, Alkib. i. 133.]

[Footnote 25: Plato, Alkib. i. 134-135 B-C.

[Greek: Pri\n de/ ge a)retê\n e)/chein, to\ a)/rchesthai a)/meinon
u(po\ tou= belti/onos ê)\ to\ a)/rchein a)ndri\, ou) mo/non paidi/
. . . . Pre/pei a)/ra tô=| kakô=| douleu/ein; a)/meinon ga/r.]]

[Side-note: Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and
declares that he will never quit Sokrates.]

_Sokr._--How do you feel your own condition now, Alkibiades. Are
you worthy of freedom? _Alk._--I feel but too keenly that I am
not. I cannot emerge from this degradation except by your society and
help. From this time forward I shall never leave you.[26]

[Footnote 26: Plato, Alkib. i. 135.]


ALKIBIADES II.


[Side-note: Second Alkibiades--situation supposed.]

The other Platonic dialogue, termed the Second Alkibiades, introduces
Alkibiades as about to offer prayer and sacrifice to the Gods.

[Side-note: Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts
which may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the
generic word: madmen, a particular variety under it.]

_Sokr._--You seem absorbed in thought, Alkibiades, and not
unreasonably. In supplicating the Gods, caution is required not to
pray for gifts which are really mischievous. The Gods sometimes grant
men's prayers, even when ruinously destructive; as they granted
the prayers of Oedipus, to the destruction of his own sons.
_Alk._--Oedipus was mad: what man in his senses would put up
such a prayer? _Sokr._--You think that madness is the opposite
of good sense or wisdom. You recognise men wise and unwise: and you
farther admit that every man must be one or other of the two,--just
as every man must be either healthy or sick: there is no third
alternative possible? _Alk._--I think so. _Sokr._--But each
thing can have but one opposite:[27] to be unwise, and to be mad, are
therefore identical? _Alk._--They are. _Sokr._--Wise men
are only few, the majority of our citizens are unwise: but do you
really think them mad? How could any of us live safely in the society
of so many mad-men? _Alk._--No: it cannot be so: I was mistaken.
_Sokr._--Here is the illustration of your mistake. All men who
have gout, or fever, or ophthalmia are sick; but all sick men have
not gout, or fever, or ophthalmia. So, too, all carpenters, or
shoemakers, or sculptors, are craftsmen; but all craftsmen are not
carpenters, or shoemakers, or sculptors. In like manner, all mad men
are unwise; but all unwise men are not mad. _Unwise_ comprises
many varieties and gradations of which the extreme is, being mad: but
these varieties are different among themselves, as one disease
differs from another, though all agree in being disease and one art
differs from another, though all agree in being art.[28]

[Footnote 27: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139 B.

[Greek: Kai\ mê\n du/o ge u(penanti/a e(ni\ pra/gmati pô=s a)\n
ei)/ê?]

That each thing has one opposite, and no more, is asserted in the
Protagoras also, p. 192-193.]

[Footnote 28: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 139-140 A-B.

[Greek: Kai\ ga\r oi( pure/ttontes pa/ntes nosou=sin, ou) me/nntoioi(
nosou=ntes pa/ntes pure/ttousin ou)de\ podagrô=sin ou)de/ ge
o)phthalmiô=sin; a)lla\ no/sos me\n pa=n to\ toiou=to/n e)sti,
diaphe/rein de/ phasin ou(\s dê\ kalou=men i)atros tê\n a)pergasi/an
au)tô=n; ou) ga\r pa=sai ou)/te o(/moiai ou)/te o(moi/ôs
diapra/ttontai, a)lla\ kata\ tê\n au)tê=s du/namin e(ka/stê.]]

[Side-note: Relation between a generic term, and the specific
terms comprehended under it, was not then familiar.]

(We may remark that Plato here, as in the Euthyphron, brings under
especial notice one of the most important distinctions in formal
logic--that between a generic between a term and the various specific
terms comprehended under it. Possessing as yet no technical language
for characterising this distinction, he makes it understood by an
induction of several separate but analogous cases. Because the
distinction is familiar now to instructed men, we must not suppose
that it was familiar then.)

[Side-note: Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed
benefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every
one fancies that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of
ignorance.]

_Sokr._--Whom do you call wise and unwise? Is not the wise man,
he who knows what it is proper to say and do--and the unwise man, he
who does not know? _Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--The unwise man
will thus often unconsciously say or do what ought not to be said or
done? Though not mad like Oedipus, he will nevertheless pray to the
Gods for gifts, which will be hurtful to him if obtained. You, for
example, would be overjoyed if the Gods were to promise that you
should become despot not only over Athens, but also over Greece.
_Alk._--Doubtless I should: and every one else would feel as I
do. _Sokr._--But what if you were to purchase it with your life,
or to damage yourself by the employment of it? _Alk._--Not on
those conditions.[29] _Sokr._--But you are aware that many
ambitious aspirants, both at Athens and elsewhere (among them, the
man who just now killed the Macedonian King Archelaus, and usurped
his throne), have acquired power and aggrandisement, so as to be
envied by every one: yet have presently found themselves brought to
ruin and death by the acquisition. So, also, many persons pray that
they may become fathers; but discover presently that their children
are the source of so much grief to them, that they wish themselves
again childless. Nevertheless, though such reverses are perpetually
happening, every one is still not only eager to obtain these supposed
benefits, but importunate with the Gods in asking for them. You see
that it is not safe even to accept without reflection boons offered
to you, much less to pray for boons to be conferred.[30] _Alk._--I
see now how much mischief ignorance produces. Every one thinks
himself competent to pray for what is beneficial to himself; but
ignorance makes him unconsciously imprecate mischief on his own head.

[Footnote 29: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141.]

[Footnote 30: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141-142.]

[Side-note: Mistake in predications about ignorance generally.
We must discriminate. Ignorance of _what?_ Ignorance of good, is
always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always.]

_Sokr._--You ought not to denounce ignorance in this unqualified
manner. You must distinguish and specify. Ignorance of what? and
under what modifications of persons and circumstances? _Alk._--How?
Are there _any_ matters or circumstances in which it is
better for a man to be ignorant, than to know? _Sokr._--You will
see that there are such. Ignorance of good, or ignorance of what is
best, is always mischievous: moreover, assuming that a man knows what
is best, then all other knowledge will be profitable to him. In his
special case, ignorance on any subject cannot be otherwise than
hurtful. But if a man be ignorant things of good, or of what is best,
in his case knowledge on other subjects will be more often hurtful
than profitable. To a man like Orestes, so misguided on the question,
"What is good?" as to resolve to kill his mother, it would be a real
benefit, if for the time he did not know his mother. Ignorance on
that point, in his state of mind, would be better for him than
knowledge.[31] _Alk._--It appears so.

[Footnote 31: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 144.]

[Side-note: Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground
do we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special
arts or accomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what
occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought
to be used.]

_Sokr._--Follow the argument farther. When we come forward to
say or do any thing, we either know what we are about to say and do,
or at least believe ourselves to know it. Every statesman who gives
counsel to the public, does so in the faith of such knowledge. Most
citizens are unwise, and ignorant of good as well as of other things.
The wise are but few, and by their advice the city is conducted. Now
upon what ground do we call these few, wise and useful public
counsellors? If a statesman knows war, but does not know whether it
is best to go to war, or at what juncture it is best--should we call
him wise? If he knows how to kill men, or dispossess them, or drive
them into exile,--but does not know upon whom, or on what occasions,
it is good to inflict this treatment--is he a useful counsellor? If
he can ride, or shoot, or wrestle, well,--we give him an epithet
derived from this special accomplishment: we do not call him wise.
What would be the condition of a community composed of bowmen,
horsemen, wrestlers, rhetors, &c., accomplished and excellent
each in his own particular craft, yet none of them knowing what is
good, nor when, nor on what occasions, it is good to employ their
craft? When each man pushes forward his own art and speciality,
without any knowledge whether it is good on the whole either for
himself or for the city, will not affairs thus conducted be reckless
and disastrous?[32] _Alk._--They will be very bad indeed.

[Footnote 32: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 145.]

[Side-note: Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of
the good or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial.]

_Sokr._--If, then, a man has no knowledge of good or of the
better--if upon this cardinal point he obeys fancy without
reason--the possession of knowledge upon special subjects will be
oftener hurtful than profitable to him; because it will make him more
forward in action, without any good result. Possessing many arts and
accomplishments, and prosecuting one after another, but without the
knowledge of good,--he will only fall into greater trouble, like a
ship sailing without a pilot. Knowledge of good is, in other words,
knowledge of what is useful and profitable. In conjunction with this,
all other knowledge is valuable, and goes to increase a man's
competence as a counsellor: apart from this, all other knowledge will
not render a man competent as a counsellor, but will be more
frequently hurtful than beneficial.[33] Towards right living, what we
need is, the knowledge of good: just as the sick stand in need of a
physician, and the ship's crew of a pilot. _Alk._--I admit your
reasoning. My opinion is changed. I no longer believe myself
competent to determine what I ought to accept from the Gods, or what
I ought to pray for. I incur serious danger of erring, and of asking
for mischiefs, under the belief that they are benefits.

[Footnote 33: Plato, Alkib. ii. 145 C:

[Greek: O(/stis a)/ra ti tô=n toiou/tôn oi)=den, e)a\n me\n
pare/pêtai au)tô=| ê( _tou= belti/stou e)pistê/mê--au(/tê d' ê)=n
ê( au)tê\ dê/pou ê(/per kai\ ê( tou= ô)pheli/mou_--phro/nimo/n ge
au)to\n phê/somen kai\ a)pochrô=nta xu/mboulou kai\ tê=| po/lei kai\
au)to\n au(tô=|; to\n de\ mê\ toiou=ton, ta)nanti/a tou/tôn.]
([Greek: Touou=ton] is Schneider's emendation for [Greek:
poiou=nta].) Ibid. 146 C: [Greek: Ou)kou=n phame\n pa/lin tou\s
pollou\s diêmartêke/nai tou= belti/stou, ô(s ta\ polla/ ge, oi)=mai,
a)/neu nou= do/xê| pepisteuko/tas?] Ibid. 146 E: [Greek: O(ra=|s
ou)=n, o(/te g' e)/phên kinduneu/ein to/ ge tô=n a)/llôn e)pistêmô=n
ktê=ma, e)a/n tis a)/neu tê=s tou= belti/stou e)pistê/mês kektême/nos
ê)=|, o)liga/kis me\n ô)phelei=n bla/ptein de\ ta\ plei/ô ton
e)/chont' au)to/.] Ibid. 147 A: [Greek: O( de\ dê\ tê\n kaloume/nên
poluma/theia/n te kai\ polutechni/an kektême/nos, o)rphano\s de\ ô)\n
tau/tês tê=s e)pistê/mês, a)go/menos de\ u(po\ mia=s e(ka/stês tô=n
a)/llôn, a)=r' ou)chi\ tô=| o)/nti dikai/ôs pollô=| cheimô=ni
chrê/setai, a(/t', oi)=mai, a)/neu kubernê/tou diatelô=n e)n
pela/gei], &c.]

[Side-note: It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his
sacrifice, until he has learnt what is the proper language to address
to the Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the
counsel of Sokrates.]

_Sokr._--The Lacedæmonians, when they offer sacrifice, pray
simply that they may obtain what is honourable and good, without
farther specification. This language is acceptable to the Gods,
more acceptable than the costly festivals of Athens. It has procured
for the Spartans more continued prosperity than the Athenians have
enjoyed.[34] The Gods honour wise and just men, that is, men who know
what they ought to say and do both towards Gods and towards men--more
than numerous and splendid offerings.[35] You see, therefore, that it
is not safe for you to proceed with your sacrifice, until you have
learnt what is the proper language to be used, and what are the
really good gifts to be prayed for. Otherwise your sacrifice will not
prove acceptable, and you may even bring upon yourself positive
mischief.[36] _Alk._--When shall I be able to learn this, and
who is there to teach me? I shall be delighted to meet him.
_Sokr._--There is a person at hand most anxious for your
improvement. What he must do is, first to disperse the darkness from
your mind, next, to impart that which will teach you to discriminate
evil from good, which at present you are unable to do. _Alk._--I
shall shrink from no labour to accomplish this object. Until then, I
postpone my intended sacrifice: and I tender my sacrificial wreath to
you, in gratitude for your counsel.[37] _Sokr._--I accept the
wreath as a welcome augury of future friendship and conversation
between us, to help us out of the present embarrassment.

[Footnote 34: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 148.]

[Footnote 35: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 150.]

[Footnote 36: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 150.]

[Footnote 37: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 151.]


* * * * *


[Side-note: Different critical opinions respecting these two
dialogues.]

The two dialogues, called First and Second Alkibiadês, of which I
have just given some account, resemble each other more than most of
the Platonic dialogues, not merely in the personages introduced, but
in general spirit, in subject, and even in illustrations. The First
Alkibiadês was recognised as authentic by all critics without
exception, until the days of Schleiermacher. Nay, it was not only
recognised, but extolled as one of the most valuable and important of
all the Platonic compositions; proper to be studied first, as a key
to all the rest. Such was the view of Jamblichus and Proklus,
transmitted to modern times; until it received a harsh contradiction
from Schleiermacher, who declared the dialogue to be both worthless
and spurious. The Second Alkibiadês was also admitted both by
Thrasyllus, and by the general body of critics in ancient times: but
there were some persons (as we learn from Athenæus)[38] who
considered it to be a work of Xenophon; perceiving probably (what is
the fact) that it bears much analogy to several conversations which
Xenophon has set down. But those who held this opinion are not to be
considered as of one mind with critics who reject the dialogue as a
forgery or imitation of Plato. Compositions emanating from Xenophon
are just as much Sokratic, probably even more Sokratic, than the most
unquestioned Platonic dialogues, besides that they must of necessity
be contemporary also. Schleiermacher has gone much farther: declaring
the Second as well as the First to be an unworthy imitation of
Plato.[39]

[Footnote 38: Athenæus, xi. p. 506.]

[Footnote 39: See the Einleitung of Schleiermacher to Alkib. i. part
ii. vol. iii. p. 293 seq. Einleitung to Alkib. ii. part i. vol. ii.
p. 365 seq. His notes on the two dialogues contain various additional
reasons, besides what is urged in his Introduction.]

[Side-note: Grounds for disallowing them--less strong against
the Second than against the First.]

Here Ast agrees with Schleiermacher fully, including both the First
and Second Alkibiades in his large list of the spurious. Most of the
subsequent critics go with Schleiermacher only half-way: Socher,
Hermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, recognise the First
Alkibiadês, but disallow the Second.[40] In my judgment,
Schleiermacher and Ast are more consistently right, or more
consistently wrong, in rejecting both, than the other critics who
find or make so capital a distinction between the two. The similarity
of tone and topics between the two is obvious, and is indeed admitted
by all. Moreover, if I were compelled to make a choice, I should say
that the grounds for suspicion are rather less strong against the
Second than against the First; and that Schleiermacher, reasoning
upon the objections admitted by his opponents as conclusive against
the Second, would have no difficulty in showing that his own
objections against the First were still more forcible. The long
speech assigned in the First Alkibiadês to Sokrates, about the
privileges of the Spartan and Persian kings,[41] including the
mention of Zoroaster, son of Oromazes, and the Magian religion,
appears to me more unusual with Plato than anything which I find in
the Second Alkibiadês. It is more Xenophontic[42] than Platonic.

[Footnote 40: Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 112. Stallbaum,
Prolegg. to Alkib. i. and ii. vol. v. pp. 171-304. K. F. Hermann,
Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Philos. p. 420-439. Steinhart,
Einleitungen to Alkib. i. and ii. in Hieronymus Müller's Uebersetzung
des Platon's Werke, vol. i. pp. 135-509.]

[Footnote 41: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 121-124.

Whoever reads the objections in Steinhart's Einleitung (p. 148-150)
against the First Alkibiadês, will see that they are quite as
forcible as what he urges against the Second; only, that in the case
of the First, he gives these objections their legitimate bearing,
allowing them to tell against the merit of the dialogue, but not
against its authenticity.]

[Footnote 42: See Xenoph. Oekonom. c. 4; Cyropæd. vii. 5, 58-64,
viii. 1, 5-8-45; Laced. Repub. c. 15.]

[Side-note: The supposed grounds for disallowance are in
reality only marks of inferiority.]

But I must here repeat, that because I find, in this or any other
dialogue, some peculiarities not usual with Plato, I do not feel
warranted thereby in declaring the dialogue spurious. In my judgment,
we must look for a large measure of diversity in the various
dialogues; and I think it an injudicious novelty, introduced by
Schleiermacher, to set up a canonical type of Platonism, all
deviations from which are to be rejected as forgeries. Both the First
and the Second Alkibiadês appear to me genuine, even upon the showing
of those very critics who disallow them. Schleiermacher, Stallbaum,
and Steinhart, all admit that there is in both the dialogues a
considerable proportion of Sokratic and Platonic ideas: but they
maintain that there are also other ideas which are not Sokratic or
Platonic, and that the texture, style, and prolixity of the Second
Alkibiadês (Schleiermacher maintains this about the First also) are
unworthy of Plato. But if we grant these premisses, the reasonable
inference would be, not to disallow it altogether, but to admit it as
a work by Plato, of inferior merit; perhaps of earlier days, before
his powers of composition had attained their maturity. To presume
that because Plato composed many excellent dialogues, therefore all
that he composed must have been excellent, is a pretension formally
disclaimed by many critics, and asserted by none.[42] Steinhart
himself allows that the Second Alkibiadês, though not composed by
Plato, is the work of some other author contemporary, an untrained
Sokratic disciple attempting to imitate Plato.[44] But we do not know
that there were any contemporaries who tried to imitate Plato:
though Theopompus accused him of imitating others, and called most of
his dialogues useless as well as false: while Plato himself, in his
inferior works, will naturally appear like an imitator of his better
self.

[Footnote 43: Stallbaum (Prolegg. ad Alcib. i. p. 186) makes this
general statement very justly, but he as well as other critics are
apt to forget it in particular cases.]

[Footnote 44: Steinhart, Einleitung, p. 516-519. Stallbaum and Boeckh
indeed assign the dialogue to a later period. Heindorf (ad Lysin, p.
211) thinks it the work "antiqui auctoris, sed non Platonis".

Steinhart and others who disallow the authenticity of the Second
Alkibiadês insist much (p. 518) upon the enormity of the
chronological blunder, whereby Sokrates and Alkibiadês are introduced
as talking about the death of Archelaus king of Macedonia, who was
killed in 399 B.C., in the same year as Sokrates, and four
years after Alkibiades. Such an anachronism (Steinhart urges) Plato
could never allow himself to commit. But when we read the Symposion,
we find Aristophanes in a company of which Sokrates, Alkibiades, and
Agathon form a part, alluding to the [Greek: dioi/kisis] of
Mantineia, which took place in 386 B.C. No one has ever made
this glaring anachronism a ground for disallowing the Symposion.
Steinhart says that the style of the Second Alkibiadês copies Plato
too closely (die ängstlich platonisirende Sprache des Dialogs, p.
515), yet he agrees with Stallbaum that in several places it departs
too widely from Plato.]

[Side-note: The two dialogues may probably be among Plato's
earlier compositions.]

I agree with Schleiermacher and the other recent critics in
considering the First and Second Alkibiadês to be inferior in merit
to Plato's best dialogues; and I contend that their own premisses
justify no more. They may probably be among his earlier productions,
though I do not believe that the First Alkibiadês was composed during
the lifetime of Sokrates, as Socher, Steinhart, and Stallbaum
endeavour to show.[45] I have already given my reasons, in a
previous chapter, for believing that Plato composed no dialogues at
all during the lifetime of Sokrates; still less in that of
Alkibiadês, who died four years earlier. There is certainly nothing
in either Alkibiadês I. or II. to shake this belief.

[Footnote 45: Stallbaum refers the composition of Alkib. i. to a time
not long before the accusation of Sokrates, when the enemies of
Sokrates were calumniating him in consequence of his past intimacy
with Alkibiades (who had before that time been killed in 404
B.C.) and when Plato was anxious to defend his master
(Prolegg. p. 186). Socher and Steinhart (p. 210) remark that such
writings would do little good to Sokrates under his accusation. They
place the composition of the dialogue earlier, in 406 B.C.
(Steinhart, p. 151-152), and they consider it the first exercise of
Plato in the strict dialectic method. Both Steinhart and Hermann
(Gesch. Plat. Phil. p. 440) think that the dialogue has not only a
speculative but a political purpose; to warn and amend Alkibiades,
and to prevent him from surrendering himself blindly to the
democracy.

I cannot admit the hypothesis that the dialogue was written in 406
B.C. (when Plato was twenty-one years of age, at most
twenty-two), nor that it had any intended bearing upon the real
historical Alkibiades, who left Athens in 415 B.C. at the
head of the armament against Syracuse, was banished three months
afterwards, and never came back to Athens until May 407 B.C.
(Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 13; i. 5, 17). He then enjoyed four months of
great ascendancy at Athens, left it at the head of the fleet to Asia
in Oct. 407 B.C., remained in command of the fleet for about
three months or so, then fell into disgrace and retired to
Chersonese, never revisiting Athens. In 406 B.C. Alkibiades
was again in banishment, out of the reach of all such warnings as
Hermann and Steinhart suppose that Plato intended to address to him
in Alkib. i.

Steinhart says (p. 152), "In dieser Zeit also, _wenige Jahre nach
seiner triumphirenden Rückkehr_, wo Alkibiades," &c. Now
Alkibiades left the Athenian service, irrevocably, within less
_than one year_ after his triumphant return.

Steinhart has not realised in his mind the historical and
chronological conditions of the period.]

[Side-note: Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic
Memorabilia--Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men.]

If we compare various colloquies of Sokrates in the Xenophontic
Memorabilia, we shall find Alkibiadês I. and II. very analogous to
them both in purpose and spirit. In Alkibiadês I. the situation
conceived is the same as that of Sokrates and Glaukon, in the third
book of the Memorabilia. Xenophon recounts how the presumptuous
Glaukon, hardly twenty years of age, fancied himself already fit to
play a conspicuous part in public affairs, and tried to force
himself, in spite of rebuffs and humiliations, upon the notice of the
assembly.[46] No remonstrances of friends could deter him, nor could
anything, except the ingenious dialectic of Sokrates, convince him of
his own impertinent forwardness and exaggerated self-estimation.
Probably Plato (Glaukon's elder brother) had heard of this
conversation, but whether the fact be so or not, we see the same
situation idealised by him in Alkibiadês I., and worked out in a way
of his own. Again, we find in the Xenophontic Memorabilia another
colloquy, wherein Sokrates cross-questions, perplexes, and
humiliates, the studious youth Euthydemus,[47] whom he regards as
over-confident in his persuasions and too well satisfied with
himself. It was among the specialties of Sokrates to humiliate
confident young men, with a view to their future improvement. He made
his conversation "an instrument of chastisement," in the language of
Xenophon: or (to use a phrase of Plato himself in the Lysis) he
conceived. "that the proper way of talking to youth whom you love,
was, not to exalt and puff them up, but to subdue and humiliate
them".[48]

[Footnote 46: Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6.]

[Footnote 47: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2.]

[Footnote 48: Xenoph. Mem. i. 4, 1. [Greek: skepsa/menoi mê\ mo/non
a(\ e)kei=nos] (Sokrates) [Greek: _kolastêri/ou e(/neka _tou/s
pa/nt' oi)ome/nous ei)de/nai e)rôtô=n ê)/legchen, a)lla\ kai\ a(\
le/gôn sunême/reue toi=s sundiatri/bousin], &c. So in the
Platonic Lysis, the youthful Lysis says to Sokrates "Talk to
Menexenus, [Greek: i(/n' au)to\n kola/sê|s]" (Plat. Lysis, 211 B).
And Sokrates himself says, a few lines before (210 E), [Greek: Ou(/tô
chrê\ toi=s paidikoi=s diale/gesthai, tapeinou=nta kai\ suste/llonta,
kai\ mê\ ô(/sper su\ chaunou=nta kai\ diathru/ptonta.]]

[Side-note: Fitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for
idealising this feature in Sokrates.]

If Plato wished to idealise this feature in the character of
Sokrates, no name could be more suitable to his purpose than that of
Alkibiades: who, having possessed as a youth the greatest personal
beauty (to which Sokrates was exquisitely sensible) had become in his
mature life distinguished not less for unprincipled ambition and
insolence, than for energy and ability. We know the real Alkibiadês
both from Thucydides and Xenophon, and we also know that Alkibiades
had in his youth so far frequented the society of Sokrates as to
catch some of that dialectic ingenuity, which the latter was expected
and believed to impart.[49] The contrast, as well as the
companionship, between Sokrates and Alkibiades was eminently
suggestive to the writers of Sokratic dialogues, and nearly all of
them made use of it, composing dialogues in which Alkibiades was the
principal name and figure.[50] It would be surprising indeed if Plato
had never done the same: which is what we must suppose, if we adopt
Schleiermacher's view, that both Alkibiadês I. and II. are spurious.
In the Protagoras as well as in the Symposion, Alkibiades figures;
but in neither of them is he the principal person, or titular hero,
of the piece. In Alkibiadês I. and II., he is introduced as the
solitary respondent to the questions of Sokrates--[Greek: kolastêri/ou
e(/neka]: to receive from Sokrates a lesson of humiliation such as
the Xenophontic Sokrates administers to Glaukon and Euthydemus,
taking care to address the latter when alone.[51]

[Footnote 49: The sensibility of Sokrates to youthful beauty is as
strongly declared in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (i. 3, 8-14), as in
the Platonic Lysis, Charmidês, or Symposion.

The conversation reported by Xenophon between Alkibiades, when not
yet twenty years of age, and his guardian Perikles, the first man in
Athens--wherein Alkibiades puzzles Perikles by a Sokratic
cross-examination--is likely enough to be real, and was probably the
fruit of his sustained society with Sokrates (Xen. Memor. i. 2, 40).]

[Footnote 50: Stallbaum observes (Prolegg. ad Alcib. i. p. 215, 2nd
ed.), "Ceterum etiam Æschines, Euclides, Phædon, et Antisthenes,
dialogos _Alcibiadis_ nomine inscriptos composuisse narrantur".

Respecting the dialogues composed by Æschines, see the first note to
this chapter.]

[Footnote 51: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 8.]

[Side-note: Plato's manner of replying to the accusers of
Sokrates. Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of
Sokrates.]

I conceive Alkibiadês I. and II. as composed by Plato among his
earlier writings (perhaps between 399-390 B.C.)[52] giving
an imaginary picture of the way in which "Sokrates handled every
respondent just as he chose" (to use the literal phrase of
Xenophon[53]): taming even that most overbearing youth, whom
Aristophanes characterises as the lion's whelp.[54] In selecting
Alkibiades as the sufferer under such a chastising process, Plato
rebuts in his own ideal style that charge which Xenophon answers with
prosaic directness--the charge made against Sokrates by his enemies,
that he taught political craft without teaching ethical sobriety; and
that he had encouraged by his training the lawless propensities of
Alkibiades.[55] When Schleiermacher, and others who disallow the
dialogue, argue that the inordinate insolence ascribed to Alkibiades,
and the submissive deference towards Sokrates also ascribed to him,
are incongruous and incompatible attributes,--I reply that such a
conjunction is very improbable in any real character. But this does
not hinder Plato from combining them in one and the same ideal
character, as we shall farther see when we come to the manifestation
of Alkibiades in the Symposion: in which dialogue we find a
combination of the same elements, still more extravagant and
high-coloured. Both here and there we are made to see that Sokrates,
far from encouraging Alkibiades, is the only person who ever succeeded
in humbling him. Plato attributes to the personality and conversation
of Sokrates an influence magical and almost superhuman: which Cicero
and Plutarch, proceeding probably upon the evidence of the Platonic
dialogues, describe as if it were historical fact. They represent
Alkibiades as shedding tears of sorrow and shame, and entreating
Sokrates to rescue him from a sense of degradation insupportably
painful.[56] Now Xenophon mentions Euthydemus and other young men as
having really experienced these profound and distressing
emotions.[56] But he does not at all certify the same about
Alkibiades, whose historical career is altogether adverse to the
hypothesis. The Platonic picture is an _idéal_, drawn from what
may have been actually true about other interlocutors of Sokrates,
and calculated to reply to Melêtus and his allies.

[Footnote 52: The date which I here suppose for the composition of
Alkib. i. (_i.e._ after the death of Sokrates, but early in the
literary career of Plato), is farther sustained (against those
critics who place it in 406 B.C. or 402 B.C. before
the death of Sokrates) by the long discourse (p. 121-124) of Sokrates
about the Persian and Spartan kings. In reference to the Persian
monarchy Sokrates says (p. 123 B), [Greek: e)pei/ pot' e)gô\ ê(/kousa
a)ndro\s a)xiopi/stou tô=n a)nabebêko/tôn para\ basile/a, o(\s e)/phê
parelthei=n chô/ran pa/nu pollê\n kai\ a)gathê/n--ê(\n kalei=n tou\s
e)pichôri/ous zô/nên tê=s basile/ôs gunaiko/s], &c. Olympiodorus
and the Scholiast both suppose that Plato here refers to Xenophon and
the Anabasis, in which a statement very like this is found (i. 4, 9).
It is plain, therefore, that _they_ did not consider the
dialogue to have been composed before the death of Sokrates. I think
it very probable that Plato had in his mind Xenophon (either his
Anabasis, or personal communications with him); but at any rate
visits of Greeks to the Persian court became very numerous between
399-390 B.C., whereas Plato can hardly have seen any such
visitors at Athens in 406 B.C. (before the close of the
war), nor probably in 402 B.C., when Athens, though relieved
from the oligarchy, was still in a state of great public prostration.
Between 399 B.C. and the peace of Antalkidas (387
B.C.), visitors from Greece to the interior of Persia became
more and more frequent, the Persian kings interfering very actively
in Grecian politics. Plato may easily have seen during these years
intelligent Greeks who had been up to the Persian court on military
or political business. Both the Persian kings and the Spartan kings
were then in the maximum of power and ascendancy--it is no wonder
therefore that Sokrates should here be made to dwell upon their
prodigious dignity in his discourse with Alkibiades. Steinhart (Einl.
p. 150) feels the difficulty of reconciling this part of the dialogue
with his hypothesis that it was composed in 406 B.C.: yet he
and Stallbaum both insist that it must have been composed before the
death of Sokrates, for which they really produce no grounds at all.]

[Footnote 53: Xen. Mem. i. 2, 14. [Greek: toi=s de\ dialegome/nois
au)tô=| pa=si chrô/menon e)n toi=s lo/gois o(/pôs bou/loito.]]

[Footnote 54: Aristoph. Ran. 1431. [Greek: ou) chrê\ le/ontos
sku/mnon e)n po/lei tre/phein.] Thucyd. vi. 15. [Greek: phobêthe/ntes
ga\r au)tou=] (Alkib.) [Greek: oi( polloi\ to\ me/gethos tê=s te
kata\ to\ e(autou= sô=ma paranomi/as e)s tê\n di/aitan, kai\ tê=s
dianoi/as ô(=n kath' e(\n e(/kaston, e)n o(/tô| gi/gnoito,
e)/prassen, ô(s turanni/dos e)pithumou=nti pole/mioi kathe/stasan],
&c.]

[Footnote 55: Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 17.]

[Footnote 56: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iii. 32, 77; Plutarch, Alkib. c.
4-6. Compare Plato, Alkib. i. p. 127 D, 135 C; Symposion, p. 215-216.]

[Footnote 57: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 39-40.]

[Side-note: The purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology
is followed out in Alkib. I. Warfare against the false persuasion of
knowledge.]

Looking at Alkibiadês I. and II. in this point of view, we shall find
them perfectly Sokratic both in topics proclaimed and in
manner--whatever may be said about unnecessary prolixity and common-place
here and there. The leading ideas of Alkibiadês I. may be found,
nearly all, in the Platonic Apology. That warfare, which Sokrates
proclaims in the Apology as having been the mission of his life,
against the false persuasion of knowledge, or against beliefs ethical
and æsthetical, firmly entertained without having been preceded by
conscious study or subjected to serious examination--is exemplified
in Alkibiadês I. and II. as emphatically as in any Platonic
composition. In both these dialogues, indeed (especially in the
first), we find an excessive repetition of specialising
illustrations, often needless and sometimes tiresome: a defect easily
intelligible if we assume them to have been written when Plato was
still a novice in the art of dialogic composition. But both dialogues
are fully impregnated with the spirit of the Sokratic process,
exposing, though with exuberant prolixity, the firm and universal
belief, held and affirmed by every one even at the age of boyhood,
without any assignable grounds or modes of acquisition, and amidst
angry discordance between the affirmation of one man and another. The
emphasis too with which Sokrates insists upon his own single function
of merely questioning, and upon the fact that Alkibiades gives all
the answers and pronounces all the self-condemnation with his own
mouth[58]--is remarkable in this dialogue: as well as the confidence
with which he proclaims the dialogue as affording the only, but
effective, cure.[59] The ignorance of which Alkibiades stands
unexpectedly convicted, is expressly declared to be common to him
with the other Athenian politicians: an exception being half allowed
to pass in favour of the semi-philosophical Perikles, whom Plato
judges here with less severity than elsewhere[60]--and a decided
superiority being claimed for the Spartan and Persian kings, who are
extolled as systematically trained from childhood.

[Footnote 58: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 112-113.]

[Footnote 59: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 127 E.]

[Footnote 60: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-120.]

[Side-note: Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of
bringing Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance.]

The main purpose of Sokrates is to drive Alkibiades into
self-contradictions, and to force upon him a painful consciousness of
ignorance and mental defect, upon grave and important subjects, while
he is yet young enough to amend it. Towards this purpose he is made
to lay claim to a divine mission similar to that which the real
Sokrates announces in the Apology[61] A number of perplexing
questions and difficulties are accumulated: it is not meant that
these difficulties are insoluble, but that they cannot be solved by
one who has never seriously reflected on them--by one who (as the
Xenophontic Sokrates says to Euthydemus),[62] is so confident of
knowing the subject that he has never meditated upon it at all. The
disheartened Alkibiades feels the necessity of improving himself and
supplicates the assistance of Sokrates:[63] who reminds him that he
must first determine what "Himself" is. Here again we find ourselves
upon the track of Sokrates in the Platonic Apology, and under the
influence of the memorable inscription at Delphi--_Nosce
teipsum_. Your mind is yourself; your body is a mere instrument of
your mind: your wealth and power are simple appurtenances or
adjuncts. To know yourself, which is genuine Sophrosynê or
temperance, is to know your mind: but this can only be done by
looking into another mind, and into its most intelligent compartment:
just as the eye can only see itself by looking into the centre of
vision of another eye.[64]

[Footnote 61: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124 C-127 E.]

[Footnote 62: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 36. [Greek: A)lla\ tau=ta me/n,
e)/phê o( Sôkra/tês, i)/sôs, dia\ to\ spho/dra posteu/ein ei)de/nai,
ou)d' e)/skepsai.]]

[Footnote 63: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 128-132 A.]

[Footnote 64: Plato, Alkib. i. p. 133.

A Platonic metaphor, illustrating the necessity for two separate
minds co-operating in dialectic colloquy.]

[Side-note: Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these
difficulties. He exhorts to Justice and Virtue--but these are
acknowledged Incognita.]

At the same time, when, after having convicted Alkibiades of
deplorable ignorance, Sokrates is called upon to prescribe
remedies--all distinctness of indication disappears. It is exacted only
when the purpose is to bring difficulties and contradictions to view:
it is dispensed with, when the purpose is to solve them. The conclusion
is, that assuming happiness as the acknowledged ultimate end,[65]
Alkibiades cannot secure this either for himself or for his city, by
striving for wealth and power, private or public: he can only secure
it by acquiring for himself, and implanting in his country-men,
justice, temperance, and virtue. This is perfectly Sokratic, and
conformable to what is said by the real Sokrates in the Platonic
Apology. But coming at the close of Alkibiadês I., it presents no
meaning and imparts no instruction: because Sokrates had shown in the
earlier part of the dialogue, that neither he himself, nor
Alkibiades, nor the general public, knew what justice and virtue
were. The positive solution which Sokrates professes to give, is
therefore illusory. He throws us back upon those old, familiar,
emotional, associations, unconscious products and unexamined
transmissions from mind to mind--which he had already shown to
represent the fancy of knowledge without the reality--deep-seated
belief without any assignable intellectual basis, or outward standard
of rectitude.

[Footnote 65: Plat. Alkibiad. i. p. 134.]

[Side-note: Prolixity of Alkibiadês I.--Extreme multiplication
of illustrative examples--How explained.]

Throughout the various Platonic dialogues, we find alternately two
distinct and opposite methods of handling--the generalising of the
special, and the specialising of the general. In Alkibiadês I, the
specialising of the general preponderates--as it does in most of the
conversations of the Xenophontic Memorabilia: the number of
exemplifying particulars is unusually great. Sokrates does not accept
as an answer a general term, without illustrating it by several of
the specific terms comprehended under it: and this several times on
occasions when an instructed reader thinks it superfluous and
tiresome: hence, partly, the inclination of some modern critics to
disallow the dialogue. But we must recollect that though a modern
reader practised in the use of general terms may seize the meaning at
once, an Athenian youth of the Platonic age would not be sure of
doing the same. No conscious analysis had yet been applied to general
terms: no grammar or logic then entered into education. Confident
affirmation, without fully knowing the meaning of what is affirmed,
is the besetting sin against which Plato here makes war: and his
precautions for exposing it are pushed to extreme minuteness. So,
too, in the Sophistês and Politikus, when he wishes to illustrate the
process of logical division and subdivision, he applies it to cases
so trifling and so multiplied, that Socher is revolted and rejects
the dialogues altogether. But Plato himself foresees and replies to
the objection; declaring expressly that his main purpose is, not to
expound the particular subject chosen, but to make manifest and
familiar the steps and conditions of the general classifying
process--and that prolixity cannot be avoided.[66] We must reckon upon
a similar purpose in Alkibiadês I. The dialogue is a specimen of that
which Aristotle calls Inductive Dialectic, as distinguished from
Syllogistic: the Inductive he considers to be plainer and easier,
suitable when you have an ordinary collocutor--the Syllogistic is the
more cogent, when you are dealing with a practised disputant.[67]

[Footnote 66: Plato, Politikus, 285-286.]

[Footnote 67: Aristotel. Topic. i. 104, a. 16. [Greek: Po/sa tô=n
lo/gôn ei)/dê tô=n dialektikô=n--e)/sti de\ to\ me\n e)pagôgê/, to\
de\ sullogismo/s . . . . e)/sti d' ê( me\n e)pagôgê\ pithanô/teron
kai\ saphe/steron kai\ kata\ tê\n ai)/sthêsin gnôrimô/teron kai\
toi=s polloi=s koino/n; o( de\ sullogismo\s biastikô/teron kai\ pro\s
tou\s a)ntilogikou\s e)nerge/steron.]]

[Side-note: Alkibiadês II. leaves its problem avowedly
undetermined.]

It has been seen that Alkibiadês I, though professing to give
something like a solution, gives what is really no solution at all.
Alkibiadês II., similar in many respects, is here different, inasmuch
as it does not even profess to solve the difficulty which had been
raised. The general mental defect--false persuasion of knowledge
without the reality--is presented in its application to a particular
case. Alkibiades is obliged to admit that he does not know what he
ought to pray to the Gods for: neither what is _good_, to be
granted, nor what is _evil_, to be averted. He relies upon
Sokrates for dispelling this mist from his mind: which Sokrates
promises to do, but adjourns for another occasion.

[Side-note: Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the
Gods for favours undefined--his views about the semi-regular,
semi-irregular agency of the Gods--he prays to them for premonitory
warnings.]

Sokrates here ascribes to the Spartans, and to various philosophers,
the practice of putting up prayers in undefined language, for good
and honourable things generally. He commends that practice. Xenophon
tells us that the historical Sokrates observed it:[68] but he tells
us also that the historical Sokrates, though not praying for any
special presents from the Gods, yet prayed for and believed himself
to receive special irregular revelations and advice as to what was
good to be done or avoided in particular cases. He held that these
special revelations were essential to any tolerable life: that the
dispensations of the Gods, though administered upon regular
principles on certain subjects and up to a certain point, were kept
by them designedly inscrutable beyond that point: but that the Gods
would, if properly solicited, afford premonitory warnings to any
favoured person, such as would enable him to keep out of the way of
evil, and put himself in the way of good. He declared that to consult
and obey oracles and prophets was not less a maxim of prudence than a
duty of piety: for himself, he was farther privileged through his
divine sign or monitor, which he implicitly followed.[69] Such
premonitory warnings were the only special favour which he thought it
suitable to pray for--besides good things generally. For special
presents he did not pray, because he professed not to know whether
any of the ordinary objects of desire were good or bad. He proves in
his conversation with Euthydêmus, that all those acquisitions which
are usually accounted means of happiness--beauty, strength, wealth,
reputation, nay, even good health and wisdom--are sometimes good
or causes of happiness, sometimes evil or causes of misery; and
therefore cannot be considered either as absolutely the one or
absolutely the other.[70]

[Footnote 68: Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, 2; Plat. Alk. ii. p. 143-148.]

[Footnote 69: These opinions of Sokrates are announced in various
passages of the Xenophontic Memorabilia, i. 1, 1-10--[Greek: e)/phê
de\ dei=n, a(\ me\n matho/ntas poiei=n e)/dôkan oi( theoi/,
mantha/nein; a(\ de\ mê\ dê=la toi=s a)nthrô/pois e)sti/, peira=sthai
dia\ mantikê=s para\ tô=n theô=n puntha/nesthai; tou\s theou\s ga/r,
oi(=s a)\n ô)=sin i(/leô|, sêmai/nein]--i. 3, 4; i. 4, 2-15; iv. 3,
12; iv. 7, 10; iv. 8, 5-11.]

[Footnote 70: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 31-32-36.[Greek: Tau=ta ou)=n
pote\ me\n ô)phelou=nta pote\ de\ bla/ptonta, ti/ ma=llon a)gatha\
ê)\ kaka/ e)stin?]]

[Side-note: Comparison of Alkibiadês II. with the Xenophontic
Memorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus.
Sokrates not always consistent with himself.]

This impossibility of determining what is good and what is evil, in
consequence of the uncertainty in the dispensations of the Gods and
in human affairs--is a doctrine forcibly insisted on by the
Xenophontic Sokrates in his discourse with Euthydêmus, and much akin
to the Platonic Alkibiadês II., being applied to the special case of
prayer. But we must not suppose that Sokrates adheres to this
doctrine throughout all the colloquies of the Xenophontic
Memorabilia: on the contrary, we find him, in other places, reasoning
upon such matters, as health, strength, and wisdom, as if they were
decidedly good.[71] The fact is, that the arguments of Sokrates, in
the Xenophontic Memorabilia, vary materially according to the
occasion and the person with whom he is discoursing: and the case is
similar with the Platonic dialogues: illustrating farther the
questionable evidence on which Schleiermacher and other critics
proceed, when they declare one dialogue to be spurious, because it
contains reasoning inconsistent with another.

[Footnote 71: For example, Xen. Mem. iv. 5, 6--[Greek: sophi/an to\
me/giston a)gatho/n], &c.]

We find in Alkibiadês II. another doctrine which is also proclaimed
by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia: that the Gods are not
moved by costly sacrifice more than by humble sacrifice, according to
the circumstances of the offerer:[72] they attend only to the mind of
the offerer, whether he be just and wise: that is, "whether he knows
what ought to be done both towards Gods and towards men".[73]

[Footnote 72: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 149-150; Xen. Mem. i. 3. Compare
Plato, Legg. x. p. 885; Isokrat. ad Nikok.]

[Footnote 73: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 149 E, 150 B.]

[Side-note: Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiadês II.--that
knowledge is not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is
indispensable: without that, the knowledge of other things is more
hurtful than beneficial.]

But we find also in Alkibiadês II. another doctrine, more remarkable.
Sokrates will not proclaim absolutely that knowledge is good, and
that ignorance is evil. In some cases, he contends, ignorance is
good; and he discriminates which the cases are. That which we
are principally interested in knowing, is _Good_, or The
_Best_--The _Profitable_:[74] phrases used as equivalent.
The knowledge of this is good, and the ignorance of it mischievous,
under all supposable circumstances. And if a man knows good, the more
he knows of everything else, the better; since he will sure to make a
good use of his knowledge. But if he does not know good, the
knowledge of other things will be hurtful rather than beneficial to
him. To be skilful in particular arts and accomplishments, under the
capital mental deficiency supposed, will render him an instrument of
evil and not of good. The more he knows--and the more he believes
himself to know--the more forward will he be in acting, and therefore
the greater amount of harm will he do. It is better that he should
act as little as possible. Such a man is not fit to direct his own
conduct, like a freeman: he must be directed and controlled by
others, like a slave. The greater number of mankind are fools of this
description--ignorant of good: the wise men who know good, and are
fit to direct, are very few. The wise man alone, knowing good,
follows reason: the rest trust to opinion, without reason.[75] He
alone is competent to direct both his own conduct and that of the
society.

[Footnote 74: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 145 C. [Greek: O(/stis a)/ra ti
tô=n toiou/tôn oi)=den, e)a\n me\n pare/pêtai au)tô=| ê( tou=
belti/stou e)pistê/mê--au)tê\ d' ê)=n ê( au)tê\ dê/pou ê(per kai\ ê(
tou= ô)pheli/mou]--also 146 B.]

[Footnote 75: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 146 A-D. [Greek: a)/neu nou=
do/xê| pepisteuko/tas.]]

The stress which is laid here upon the knowledge of good, as
distinguished from all other varieties of knowledge--the
identification of the good with the profitable, and of the knowledge
of good with reason ([Greek: nou=s]), while other varieties of
knowledge are ranked with opinion ([Greek: do/xa])--these are points
which, under one phraseology or another, pervade many of the Platonic
dialogues. The old phrase of Herakleitus--[Greek: Polumathi/ê no/on
ou) dida/skei]--"much learning does not teach reason"--seems to have
been present to the mind of Plato in composing this dialogue. The man
of much learning and art, without the knowledge of good, and
surrendering himself to the guidance of one or other among his
accomplishments, is like a vessel tossed about at sea without a
pilot.[76]

[Footnote 76: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 147 A. [Greek: o( de\ dê\ tê\n
kaloume/nên poluma/theia/n te kai\ polutechni/an kektême/nos,
o)rphano\s de\ ô)\n tau/tês tê=s e)pistê/mês, a)go/menos de\ u(po\
mia=s e(ka/stês tô=n a)/llôn], &c.]

[Side-note: Knowledge of Good--appears postulated and divined,
in many of the Platonic dialogues, under different titles.]

What Plato here calls the knowledge of Good, or Reason--the just
discrimination and comparative appreciation of Ends and
Means--appears in the Politikus and Euthydêmus, under the title of the
Regal or Political Art, of employing or directing[77] the results of all
other arts, which are considered as subordinate: in the Protagoras,
under the title of art of calculation or mensuration: in the
Philêbus, as measure and proportion: in the Phædrus (in regard to
rhetoric) as the art of turning to account, for the main purpose of
persuasion, all the special processes, stratagems, decorations,
&c., imparted by professional masters. In the Republic, it is
personified in the few venerable Elders who constitute the Reason of
the society, and whose directions all the rest (Guardians and
Producers) are bound implicitly to follow: the virtue of the
subordinates consisting in this implicit obedience. In the Leges, it
is defined as the complete subjection in the mind, of pleasures and
pains to right Reason,[78] without which, no special aptitudes are
worth having. In the Xenophontic Memorabilia, it stands as a Sokratic
authority under the title of Sophrosynê or Temperance:[79] and the
Profitable is declared identical with the Good, as the directing and
limiting principle for all human pursuits and proceedings.[80]

[Footnote 77: Plato, Politikus, 292 B, 304 B, 305 A; Euthydêmus, 291
B, 292 B. Compare Xenophon, Oekonomicus, i. 8, 13.]

[Footnote 78: Leges, iii. 689 A-D, 691 A.]

[Footnote 79: Xenoph. Memor. i. 2. 17; iv. 3. 1.]

[Footnote 80: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 6, 8; iv. 7, 7.]

[Side-note: The Good--the Profitable--what is it?--How are we
to know it? Plato leaves this undetermined.]

But what are we to understand by the _Good_, about which there
are so many disputes, according to the acknowledgment of Plato as
well as of Sokrates? And what are we to understand by the Profitable?
In what relation does it stand to the Pleasurable and the Painful?

These are points which Plato here leaves undetermined. We shall find
him again touching them, and trying different ways of determining
them, in the Protagoras, the Gorgias, the Republic, and
elsewhere. We have here the title and the postulate, but nothing
more, of a comprehensive Teleology, or right comparative estimate of
ends and means one against another, so as to decide when, how far,
under what circumstances, &c., each ought to be pursued. We shall
see what Plato does in other dialogues to connect this title and
postulate with a more definite meaning.






CHAPTER XIII.

HIPPIAS MAJOR--HIPPIAS MINOR.


[Side-note: Hippias Major--situation supposed--character of the
dialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias.]

Both these two dialogues are carried on between Sokrates and the
Eleian Sophist Hippias. The general conception of Hippias--described
as accomplished, eloquent, and successful, yet made to say vain and
silly things--is the same in both dialogues: in both also the
polemics of Sokrates against him are conducted in a like spirit, of
affected deference mingled with insulting sarcasm. Indeed the figure
assigned to Hippias is so contemptible, that even an admiring critic
like Stallbaum cannot avoid noticing the "petulans pene et proterva
in Hippiam oratio," and intimating that Plato has handled Hippias
more coarsely than any one else. Such petulance Stallbaum attempts to
excuse by saying that the dialogue is a youthful composition of
Plato:[1] while Schleiermacher numbers it among the reasons for
suspecting the dialogue, and Ast, among the reasons for declaring
positively that Plato is not the author.[2] This last conclusion I do
not at all accept: nor even the hypothesis of Stallbaum, if it be
tendered as an excuse for improprieties of tone: for I believe that
the earliest of Plato's dialogues was composed after he was
twenty-eight years of age--that is, after the death of Sokrates. It is
however noway improbable, that both the Greater and Lesser Hippias
may have been among Plato's earlier compositions. We see by the
Memorabilia of Xenophon that there was repeated and acrimonious
controversy between Sokrates and Hippias: so that we may probably
suppose feelings of special dislike, determining Plato to compose two
distinct dialogues, in which an imaginary Hippias is mocked and
scourged by an imaginary Sokrates.

[Footnote 1: Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Hipp. Maj. p. 149-150; also
Steinhart (Einleitung, p. 42-43), who says, after an outpouring of
his usual invective against the Sophist: "Nevertheless the coarse
jesting of the dialogue seems almost to exceed the admissible limit
of comic effect," &c. Again, p. 50, Steinhart talks of the banter
which Sokrates carries on with Hippias, in a way not less cruel
(grausam) than purposeless, tormenting him with a string of
successive new propositions about the definition of the Beautiful,
which propositions, as fast as Hippias catches at them, he again
withdraws of his own accord, and thus at last dismisses him (as he
had dismissed Ion) uninstructed and unimproved, without even leaving
behind in him the sting of anger, &c.

It requires a powerful hatred against the persons called Sophists, to
make a critic take pleasure in a comedy wherein silly and ridiculous
speeches are fastened upon the name of one of them, in his own day
not merely honoured but acknowledged as deserving honour by
remarkable and varied accomplishments--and to make the critic
describe the historical Hippias (whom we only know from Plato and
Xenophon--see Steinhart, note 7, p. 89; Socher, p. 221) as if he had
really delivered these speeches, or something equally absurd.

How this comedy may be appreciated is doubtless a matter of
individual taste. For my part, I agree with Ast in thinking it
misplaced and unbecoming: and I am not surprised that he wishes to
remove the dialogue from the Platonic canon, though I do not concur
either in this inference, or in the general principle on which it
proceeds, viz., that all objections against the composition of a
dialogue are to be held as being also objections against its
genuineness as a work of Plato. The Nubes of Aristophanes, greatly
superior as a comedy to the Hippias of Plato, is turned to an abusive
purpose when critics put it into court as evidence about the
character of the real Sokrates.

K. F. Hermann, in my judgment, takes a more rational view of the
Hippias Major (Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil. p. 487-647). Instead
of expatiating on the glory of Plato in deriding an accomplished
contemporary, he dwells upon the logical mistakes and confusion which
the dialogue brings to view; and he reminds us justly of the
intellectual condition of the age, when even elementary distinctions
in logic and grammar had been scarcely attended to.

Both K. F. Hermann and Socher consider the Hippias to be not a
juvenile production of Plato, but to belong to his middle age.]

[Footnote 2: Schleierm. Einleitung. p. 401; Ast, Platon's Leben und
Schriften, p. 457-459.]

[Side-note: Real debate between the historical Sokrates and
Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia--subject of that debate.]

One considerable point in the Hippias Major appears to have a bearing
on the debate between Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic
Memorabilia: in which debate, Hippias taunts Sokrates with always
combating and deriding the opinions of others, while evading to give
opinions of his own. It appears that some antecedent debates between
the two had turned upon the definition of the Just, and that on these
occasions Hippias had been the respondent, Sokrates the objector.
Hippias professes to have reflected upon these debates, and to be now
prepared with a definition which neither Sokrates nor any one else
can successfully assail, but he will not say what the definition is,
until Sokrates has laid down one of his own. In reply to this
challenge, Sokrates declares the Just to be equivalent to the Lawful
or Customary: he defends this against various objections of
Hippias, who concludes by admitting it.[3] Probably this debate, as
reported by Xenophon, or something very like it, really took place.
If so, we remark with surprise the feebleness of the objections of
Hippias, in a case where Sokrates, if he had been the objector, would
have found such strong ones--and the feeble replies given by
Sokrates, whose talent lay in starting and enforcing difficulties,
not in solving them.[4] Among the remarks which Sokrates makes in
illustration to Hippias, one is--that Lykurgus had ensured
superiority to Sparta by creating in the Spartans a habit of implicit
obedience to the laws.[5] Such is the character of the Xenophontic
debate.

[Footnote 3: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4, 12-25.]

[Footnote 4: Compare the puzzling questions which Alkibiades when a
youth is reported to have addressed to Perikles, and which he must
unquestionably have heard from Sokrates himself, respecting the
meaning of the word [Greek: No/mos] (Xen. Mem. i. 2, 42). All the
difficulties in determining the definition of [Greek: No/mos], occur
also in determining that of [Greek: No/mimon], which includes both
Jus Scriptum and Jus Moribus Receptum.]

[Footnote 5: Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 15.]

[Side-note: Opening of the Hippias Major--Hippias describes the
successful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown
as well as the gain acquired by his lectures.]

Here, in the beginning of the Hippias Major, the Platonic Sokrates
remarks that Hippias has been long absent from Athens: which absence,
the latter explains, by saying that he has visited many cities in
Greece, giving lectures with great success, and receiving high pay:
and that especially he has often visited Sparta, partly to give
lectures, but partly also to transact diplomatic business for his
countrymen the Eleians, who trusted him more than any one else for
such duties. His lectures (he says) were eminently instructive and
valuable for the training of youth: moreover they were so generally
approved, that even from a small Sicilian town called Inykus, he
obtained a considerable sum in fees.

[Side-note: Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the
Spartans did not admit his instructions--their law forbids.]

Upon this Sokrates asks--In which of the cities were your gains the
largest: probably at Sparta? _Hip._--No; I received nothing at
all at Sparta. _Sokr._--How? You amaze me! Were not your
lectures calculated to improve the Spartan youth? or did not the
Spartans desire to have their youth improved? or had they no money?
_Hip._--Neither one nor the other. The Spartans, like others,
desire the improvement of their youth: they also have plenty of
money: moreover my lectures were very beneficial to them as well
as to the rest.[6] _Sokr._--How could it happen then, that at
Sparta, a city great and eminent for its good laws, your valuable
instructions were left unrewarded; while you received so much at the
inconsiderable town of Inykus? _Hip._--It is not the custom of
the country, Sokrates, for the Spartans to change their laws, or to
educate their sons in a way different from their ordinary routine.
_Sokr._--How say you? It is not the custom of the country for
the Spartans to do right, but to do wrong? _Hip._--I shall not
say that, Sokrates. _Sokr._--But surely they would do right, in
educating their children better and not worse? _Hip._--Yes, they
would do right: but it is not lawful for them to admit a foreign mode
of education. If any one could have obtained payment there for
education, I should have obtained a great deal; for they listen to me
with delight and applaud me: but, as I told you, their law forbids.

[Footnote 6: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 283-284.]

[Side-note: Question, What is law? The law-makers always aim at
the Profitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they
fail to attain law. The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is
also unlawful.]

_Sokr._--Do you call law a hurt or benefit to the city?
_Hip._--Law is enacted with a view to benefit: but it sometimes
hurts if it be badly enacted.[7] _Sokr._--But what? Do not the
enactors enact it as the maximum of good, without which the citizens
cannot live a regulated life? _Hip._--Certainly: they do so.
_Sokr._--Therefore, when those who try to enact laws miss the
attainment of good, they also miss the lawful and law itself. How say
you? _Hip._--They do so, if you speak with strict propriety: but
such is not the language which men commonly use. _Sokr._--What
men? the knowing? or the ignorant? _Hip._--The Many.
_Sokr._--The Many; is it _they_ who know what truth is?
_Hip._--Assuredly not. _Sokr._--But surely those who do
know, account the profitable to be in truth more lawful than the
unprofitable, to all men. Don't you admit this? _Hip._--Yes, I
admit they account it so in truth. _Sokr._--Well, and it is so,
too: the truth is as the knowing men account it. _Hip._--Most
certainly. _Sokr._--Now you affirm, that it is more profitable
to the Spartans to be educated according to your scheme, foreign as
it is, than according to their own native scheme. _Hip._--I
affirm it, and with truth too. _Sokr._--You affirm besides,
that things more profitable are at the same time more lawful?
_Hip._--I said so. _Sokr._--According to your reasoning,
then, it is more lawful for the Spartan children to be educated by
Hippias, and more unlawful for them to be educated by their fathers--
if in reality they will be more benefited by you? _Hip._--But
they will be more benefited by me. _Sokr._--The Spartans
therefore act unlawfully, when they refuse to give you money and to
confide to you their sons? _Hip._--I admit that they do: indeed
your reasoning seems to make in my favour, so that I am noway called
upon to resist it. _Sokr._--We find then, after all, that the
Spartans are enemies of law, and that too in the most important
matters--though they are esteemed the most exemplary followers of
law.[8]

[Footnote 7: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 284 C-B.]

[Footnote 8: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 285.]


* * * * *

[Side-note: Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates
with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates.]

Perhaps Plato intended the above argument as a derisory taunt against
the Sophist Hippias, for being vain enough to think his own tuition
better than that of the Spartan community. If such was his intention,
the argument might have been retorted against Plato himself, for his
propositions in the Republic and Leges: and we know that the enemies
of Plato did taunt him with his inability to get these schemes
adopted in any actual community. But the argument becomes interesting
when we compare it with the debate before referred to in the
Xenophontic Memorabilia, where Sokrates maintains against Hippias
that the Just is equivalent to the Lawful. In that Xenophontic
dialogue, all the difficulties which embarrass this explanation are
kept out of sight, and Sokrates is represented as gaining an easy
victory over Hippias. In this Platonic dialogue, the equivocal use of
the word [Greek: no/mimon] is expressly adverted to, and Sokrates
reduces Hippias to a supposed absurdity, by making him pronounce the
Spartans to be enemies of law: [Greek: paranomou/s] bearing a double
sense, and the proposition being true in one sense, false in the
other. In the argument of the Platonic Sokrates, a law which does not
attain its intended purpose of benefiting the community, is no
law at all,--not lawful:[9] so that we are driven back again upon the
objections of Alkibiades against Perikles (in the Xenophontic
Memorabilia) in regard to what constitutes a law. In the argument of
the Xenophontic Sokrates, law means a law actually established, by
official authority or custom--and the Spartans are produced as
eminent examples of a lawfully minded community. As far as we can
assign positive opinion to the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias
Major, he declares that the profitable or useful (being that which
men always aim at in making law) is The Lawful, whether actually
established or not: and that the unprofitable or hurtful (being that
which men always intend to escape) is The Unlawful, whether
prescribed by any living authority or not. This (he says) is the
opinion of the wise men who know: though the ignorant vulgar hold the
contrary opinion. The explanation of [Greek: to\ di/kaion] given by
the Xenophontic Sokrates ([Greek: to\ di/kaion = to\ no/mimon]),
would be equivalent, if we construe [Greek: to\ no/mimon] in the
sense of the Platonic Sokrates (in Hippias Major) as an affirmation
that The Just was the generally useful--[Greek: To\ di/kaion = to\
koinê=| su/mphoron].

[Footnote 9: Compare a similar argument of Sokrates against
Thrasymachus--Republic, i. 339.]

[Side-note: The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable.
This is the only explanation which Plato ever gives and to this he
does not always adhere.]

There exists however in all this, a prevalent confusion between Law
(or the Lawful) as actually established, and Law (or the Lawful) as
it ought to be established, in the judgment of the critic, or of
those whom he follows: that is (to use the phrase of Mr. Austin in
his 'Province of Jurisprudence') Law as it would be, if it conformed
to its assumed measure or test. In the first of these senses, [Greek:
to\ no/mimon] is not one and the same, but variable according to
place and time--one thing at Sparta, another thing elsewhere:
accordingly it would not satisfy the demand of Plato's mind, when he
asks for an explanation of [Greek: to\ di/kaion]. It is an
explanation in the second of the two senses which Plato seeks--a
common measure or test applicable universally, at all times and
places. In so far as he ever finds one, it is that which I have
mentioned above as delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in this
dialogue: viz., the Just or Good, that which ought to be the measure
or test of Law and Positive Morality, is, the beneficial or
profitable. This (I repeat) is the only approach to a solution which
we ever find in Plato. But this is seldom clearly enunciated, never
systematically followed out, and sometimes, in appearance, even
denied.

* * * * *

[Side-note: Lectures of Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or
astronomy, &c., but upon the question--What pursuits are
beautiful, fine, and honourable for youth.]

I resume the thread of the Hippias Major. Sokrates asks Hippias what
sort of lectures they were that he delivered with so much success at
Sparta? The Spartans (Hippias replies) knew nothing and cared nothing
about letters, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy: but they took delight
in hearing tales about heroes, early ancestors, foundation-legends of
cities, &c., which his mnemonic artifice enabled him to
deliver.[10] The Spartans delight in you (observes Sokrates) as
children delight in old women's tales. Yes (replies Hippias), but
that is not all: I discoursed to them also, recently, about fine and
honourable pursuits, much to their admiration: I supposed a
conversation between Nestor and Neoptolemus, after the capture of
Troy, in which the veteran, answering a question put by his youthful
companion, enlarged upon those pursuits which it was fine,
honourable, beautiful for a young man to engage in. My discourse is
excellent, and obtained from the Spartans great applause. I am going
to deliver it again here at Athens, in the school-room of
Pheidostratus, and I invite you, Sokrates, to come and hear it, with
as many friends as you can bring.[11]

[Footnote 10: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 285 E.]

[Footnote 11: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 286 A-B.]

[Side-note: Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in
the background, who has just been puzzling him with it--What is the
Beautiful?]

I shall come willingly (replied Sokrates). But first answer me one
small question, which will rescue me from a present embarrassment.
Just now, I was shamefully puzzled in conversation with a friend, to
whom I had been praising some things as honourable and
beautiful,--blaming other things as mean and ugly. He surprised me by
the interrogation--How do you know, Sokrates, what things are beautiful,
and what are ugly? Come now, can you tell me, What is the Beautiful?
I, in my stupidity, was altogether puzzled, and could not answer the
question. But after I had parted from him, I became mortified and
angry with myself; and I vowed that the next time I met any wise man,
like you, I would put the question to him, and learn how to answer
it; so that I might be able to renew the conversation with my friend.
Your coming here is most opportune. I entreat you to answer and
explain to me clearly what the Beautiful is; in order that I may not
again incur the like mortification. You can easily answer: it is a
small matter for you, with your numerous attainments.

[Side-note: Hippias thinks the question easy to answer.]

Oh--yes--a small matter (replies Hippias); the question is easy to
answer. I could teach you to answer many questions harder than that:
so that no man shall be able to convict you in dialogue.[12]

[Footnote 12: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 286 C-D.]

Sokrates then proceeds to interrogate Hippias, in the name of the
absentee, starting one difficulty after another as if suggested by
this unknown prompter, and pretending to be himself under awe of so
impracticable a disputant.

[Side-note: Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something.
What is Beauty, or the Beautiful?]

All persons are just, through Justice--wise, through Wisdom--good,
through Goodness or the Good--beautiful, through Beauty or the
Beautiful. Now Justice, Wisdom, Goodness, Beauty or the Beautiful,
must each be _something_. Tell me what the Beautiful is?

[Side-note: Hippias does not understand the question. He
answers by indicating one particularly beautiful object.]

Hippias does not conceive the question. Does the man want to know
what is a beautiful thing? _Sokr._--No; he wants to know what is
_The Beautiful_. _Hip._--I do not see the difference. I
answer that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing. No one can deny
that.[13]

[Footnote 13: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 287 A.]

_Sokr._--My disputatious friend will not accept your answer. He
wants you to tell him, What is the Self-Beautiful?--that Something
through which all beautiful things become beautiful. Am I to tell
him, it is because a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing? He will
say--Is not a beautiful mare a beautiful thing also? and a beautiful
lyre as well? _Hip._--Yes;--both of them are so. _Sokr._--Ay,
and a beautiful pot, my friend will add, well moulded and rounded
by a skilful potter, is a beautiful thing too. _Hip._--How,
Sokrates? Who can your disputatious friend be? Some ill-taught
man, surely; since he introduces such trivial names into a dignified
debate. _Sokr._--Yes; that is his character: not polite, but
vulgar, anxious for nothing else but the truth. _Hip._--A pot,
if it be beautifully made, must certainly be called beautiful; yet
still, all such objects are unworthy to be counted as beautiful, if
compared with a maiden, a mare, or a lyre.

[Side-note: Cross-questioning by Sokrates--Other things also
are beautiful; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or
under some particular circumstances--it is sometimes beautiful,
sometimes not beautiful.]

_Sokr._--I understand. You follow the analogy suggested by
Herakleitus in his dictum--That the most beautiful ape is ugly, if
compared with the human race. So you say, the most beautiful pot is
ugly, when compared with the race of maidens. _Hip_--Yes. That
is my meaning. _Sokr._--Then my friend will ask you in return,
whether the race of maidens is not as much inferior to the race of
Gods, as the pot to the maiden? whether the most beautiful maiden
will not appear ugly, when compared to a Goddess? whether the wisest
of men will not appear an ape, when compared to the Gods, either in
beauty or in wisdom.[14] _Hip._--No one can dispute it.
_Sokr._--My friend will smile and say--You forget what was the
question put. I asked you, What is the Beautiful?--the
Self-Beautiful: and your answer gives me, as the Self-Beautiful,
something which you yourself acknowledge to be no more beautiful than
ugly? If I had asked you, from the first, what it was that was both
beautiful and ugly, your answer would have been pertinent to the
question. Can you still think that the Self-Beautiful,--that
Something, by the presence of which all other things become
beautiful,--is a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre?

[Footnote 14: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 289.]

[Side-note: Second answer of Hippias--_Gold_, is that by
the presence of which all things become beautiful--scrutiny applied
to the answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies.]

_Hip._--I have another answer to which your friend can take no
exception. That, by the presence of which all things become
beautiful, is Gold. What was before ugly, will (we all know), when
ornamented with gold, appear beautiful. _Sokr._--You little know
what sort of man my friend is. He will laugh at your answer, and ask
you--Do you think, then, that Pheidias did not know his profession as
a sculptor? How came he not to make the statue of Athênê all
gold, instead of making (as he has done) the face, hands, and feet of
ivory, and the pupils of the eyes of a particular stone? Is not ivory
also beautiful, and particular kinds of stone? _Hip._--Yes, each
is beautiful, where it is becoming. _Sokr._--And ugly, where it
is not becoming.[15] _Hip._--Doubtless. I admit that what is
becoming or suitable, makes that to which it is applied appear
beautiful: that which is not becoming or suitable, makes it appear
ugly. _Sokr._--My friend will next ask you, when you are boiling
the beautiful pot of which we spoke just now, full of beautiful soup,
what sort of ladle will be suitable and becoming--one made of gold,
or of fig-tree wood? Will not the golden ladle spoil the soup, and
the wooden ladle turn it out good? Is not the wooden ladle,
therefore, better than the golden? _Hip._--By Hêraklês,
Sokrates! what a coarse and stupid fellow your friend is! I cannot
continue to converse with a man who talks of such matters.
_Sokr._--I am not surprised that you, with your fine attire and
lofty reputation, are offended with these low allusions. But I have
nothing to spoil by intercourse with this man; and I entreat you to
persevere, as a favour to me. He will ask you whether a wooden
soup-ladle is not more beautiful than a ladle of gold,--since it is more
suitable and becoming? So that though you said--The Self-Beautiful is
Gold--you are now obliged to acknowledge that gold is not more
beautiful than fig-tree wood?

[Footnote 15: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 290.]

[Side-note: Third answer of Hippias--questions upon it--proof
given that it fails of universal application.]

_Hip._--I acknowledge that it is so. But I have another answer
ready which will silence your friend. I presume you wish me to
indicate as The Beautiful, something which will never appear ugly to
any one, at any time, or at any place.[16] _Sokr._--That is
exactly what I desire. _Hip._--Well, I affirm, then, that to
every man, always, and everywhere, the following is most beautiful. A
man being healthy, rich, honoured by the Greeks, having come to old
age and buried his own parents well, to be himself buried by his own
sons well and magnificently. _Sokr._--Your answer sounds
imposing; but my friend will laugh it to scorn, and will remind me
again, that his question pointed to the Beautiful
_itself_[17]--something which, being present as attribute in any
subject, will make that subject (whether stone, wood, man, God,
action, study, &c.) beautiful. Now that which you have asserted
to be beautiful to every one everywhere, was not beautiful to
Achilles, who accepted by preference the lot of dying before his
father--nor is it so to the heroes, or to the sons of Gods, who do
not survive or bury their fathers. To some, therefore, what you
specify is beautiful--to others it is not beautiful but ugly: that
is, it is both beautiful and ugly, like the maiden, the lyre, the
pot, on which we have already remarked. _Hip._--I did not speak
about the Gods or Heroes. Your friend is intolerable, for touching on
such profanities.[18] _Sokr._--However, you cannot deny that
what you have indicated is beautiful only for the sons of men, and
not for the sons of Gods. My friend will thus make good his reproach
against your answer. He will tell me, that all the answers, which we
have as yet given, are too absurd. And he may perhaps at the same
time himself suggest another, as he sometimes does in pity for my
embarrassment.

[Footnote 16: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 C-D.]

[Footnote 17: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 292 D.]

[Footnote 18: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 B.]

[Side-note: Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself--1.
The Suitable or Becoming--objections thereunto--it is rejected.]

Sokrates then mentions, as coming from hints of the absent friend,
three or four different explanations of the Self-Beautiful: each of
which, when first introduced, he approves, and Hippias approves also:
but each of which he proceeds successively to test and condemn. It is
to be remarked that all of them are general explanations: not
consisting in conspicuous particular instances, like those which had
come from Hippias. His explanations are the following:--

1. The suitable or becoming (which had before been glanced at). It is
the suitable or becoming which constitutes the Beautiful.[19]

[Footnote 19: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 293 E.]

To this Sokrates objects: The suitable, or becoming, is what causes
objects to _appear_ beautiful--not what causes them to _be
really_ beautiful. Now the latter is that which we are seeking.
The two conditions do not always go together. Those objects,
institutions, and pursuits which _are really_ beautiful (fine,
honourable) very often do not appear so, either to individuals or to
cities collectively; so that there is perpetual dispute and
fighting on the subject. The suitable or becoming, therefore, as it
is certainly what makes objects appear beautiful, so it cannot be
what makes them really beautiful.[20]

[Footnote 20: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 B-E.]

[Side-note: 2. The useful or profitable--objections--it will
not hold.]

2. The useful or profitable.--We call objects beautiful, looking to
the purpose which they are calculated or intended to serve: the human
body, with a view to running, wrestling, and other exercises--a
horse, an ox, a cock, looking to the service required from
them--implements, vehicles on land and ships at sea, instruments for
music and other arts all upon the same principle, looking to the end
which they accomplish or help to accomplish. Laws and pursuits are
characterised in the same way. In each of these, we give the name
Beautiful to the useful, in so far as it is useful, when it is
useful, and for the purpose to which it is useful. To that which is
useless or hurtful, in the same manner, we give the name Ugly.[21]

[Footnote 21: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 C-D.]

Now that which is capable of accomplishing each end, is useful for
such end: that which is incapable, is useless. It is therefore
capacity, or power, which is beautiful: incapacity, or impotence, is
ugly.[22]

[Footnote 22: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 E. [Greek: Ou)kou=n to\ dunato\n
e(/kaston a)perga/zesthai, ei)s o(/per dunato/n, ei)s tou=to kai\
chrê/simon; to\ de\ a)du/naton a)/chrêston? . . . . Du/namis me\n
a)/ra kalo/n--a)dunami/a de\ ai)schro/n?]]

Most certainly (replies Hippias): this is especially true in our
cities and communities, wherein political power is the finest thing
possible, political impotence, the meanest.

Yet, on closer inspection (continues Sokrates), such a theory will
not hold. Power is employed by all men, though unwillingly, for bad
purposes: and each man, through such employment of his power, does
much more harm than good, beginning with his childhood. Now power,
which is useful for the doing of evil, can never be called
beautiful.[23]

[Footnote 23: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 296 C-D.]

You cannot therefore say that Power, taken absolutely, is beautiful.
You must add the qualification--Power used for the production of some
good, is beautiful. This, then, would be the profitable--the cause or
generator of good.[24] But the cause is different from its effect:
the generator or father is different from the generated or son.
The beautiful would, upon this view, be the cause of the good. But
then the beautiful would be different from the good, and the good
different from the beautiful? Who can admit this? It is obviously
wrong: it is the most ridiculous theory which we have yet hit
upon.[25]

[Footnote 24: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 B.]

[Footnote 25: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 D-E. [Greek: ei) oi(=o/n t'
e)sti/n, e(kei/nôn ei)=nai (kinduneu/ei) geloio/teros tô=n
prô/tôn.]]

[Side-note: 3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable--that
which is received through the eye and the ear.]

3. The Beautiful is a particular variety of the agreeable or
pleasurable: that which characterises those things which cause
pleasure to us through sight and hearing. Thus the men, the
ornaments, the works of painting or sculpture, upon which we look
with admiration,[26] are called beautiful: also songs, music, poetry,
fable, discourse, in like manner; nay even laws, customs, pursuits,
which we consider beautiful, might be brought under the same
head.[27]

[Footnote 26: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 A-B.]

[Footnote 27: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 D.

Professor Bain observes:--"The eye and the ear are the great avenues
to the mind for the æsthetic class of influences; the other senses
are more or less in the monopolist interest. The blue sky, the green
woods, and all the beauties of the landscape, can fill the vision of
a countless throng of admirers. So with the pleasing sounds, &c."
'The Emotions and the Will.' ch. xiv. (The Æsthetic Emotions), sect.
2, p. 226, 3rd ed.]

[Side-note: Objections to this last--What property is there
common to both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of
these two senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful?]

The objector, however, must now be dealt with. He will ask us--Upon
what ground do you make so marked a distinction between the pleasures
of sight and hearing, and other pleasures? Do you deny that these
others (those of taste, smell, eating, drinking, sex) are really
pleasures? No, surely (we shall reply); we admit them to be
pleasures,--but no one will tolerate us in calling them beautiful:
especially the pleasures of sex, which as pleasures are the greatest
of all, but which are ugly and disgraceful to behold. He will
answer--I understand you: you are ashamed to call these pleasures
beautiful, because they do not seem so to the multitude: but I did not
ask you, what _seems_ beautiful to the multitude--I asked you, what
_is_ beautiful.[28] You mean to affirm, that all pleasures which
do not belong to sight and hearing, are not beautiful: Do you mean,
all which do not belong to both? or all which do not belong to
one or the other? We shall reply--To either one of the two--or to
both the two. Well! but, why (he will ask) do you single out these
pleasures of sight and hearing, as beautiful exclusively? What is
there peculiar in them, which gives them a title to such distinction?
All pleasures are alike, so far forth as pleasures, differing only in
the more or less. Next, the pleasures of sight cannot be considered
as beautiful by reason of their coming through sight--for that reason
would not apply to the pleasures of hearing: nor again can the
pleasures of hearing be considered as beautiful by reason of their
coming through hearing.[29] We must find something possessed as well
by sight as by hearing, common to both, and peculiar to them,--which
confers beauty upon the pleasures of both and of each. Any attribute
of one, which does not also belong to the other, will not be
sufficient for our purpose.[30] Beauty must depend upon some
essential characteristic which both have in common.[31] We must
therefore look out for some such characteristic, which belongs to
both as well as to each separately.

[Footnote 28: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 298 E, 299 A.

[Greek: Mantha/nô, a)\n i)/sôs phai/ê, kai\ e)gô/, o(/ti pa/lai
ai)schu/nesthe tau/tas ta\s ê(dona\s pha/nai kala\s ei)=nai, o(/ti
ou) dokei= toi=s a)nthrô/pois; a)ll' e)gô\ ou) tou=to ê)rô/tôn,
_o(\ dokei= toi=s polloi=s kalo\n ei)=nai_, a)ll' o(\, _ti
e)/stin_.]]

[Footnote 29: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 299 D-E.]

[Footnote 30: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 300 B. A separate argument between
Sokrates and Hippias is here as it were interpolated; Hippias affirms
that he does not see how any predicate can be true of both which is
not true of either separately. Sokrates points out that two men are
Both, even in number, while each is One, an odd number. You cannot
say of the two that they are one, nor can you say of either that he
is Both. There are two classes of predicates; some which are true of
either but not true of the two together, or _vice versâ_; some
again which are true of the two and true also of each one--such as
just, wise, handsome, &c. p. 301-303 B.]

[Footnote 31: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 302 C. [Greek: tê=| ou)si/a| tê=| e)p'
a)mpho/tera e(pome/nê| ô)=|mên, ei)/per a)mpho/tera/ e)sti kala/,
tau/tê| dei=n au)ta\ kala\ ei)=nai, tê=| de\ kata\ ta\ e(/tera
a)poleipome/nê| mê/. kai\ e(/ti nu=n oi)=omai.]]

[Side-note: Answer--There is, belonging to each and to both in
common, the property of being innocuous and profitable
pleasures--upon this ground they are called beautiful.]

Now there is one characteristic which may perhaps serve. The
pleasures of sight and hearing, both and each, are distinguished from
other pleasures by being the most innocuous and the best.[32] It is
for this reason that we call them beautiful. The Beautiful, then, is
profitable pleasure--or pleasure producing good--for the profitable
is, that which produces good.[33]

[Footnote 32: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. [Greek: o(/ti a)sine/statai
au(=tai tô=n ê(donô=n ei)si kai\ be/ltistai, kai\ a)mpho/terai kai\
e(kate/ra.]]

[Footnote 33: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. [Greek: le/gete dê\ to\ kalo\n
ei)=nai, _ê(donê\n ô)phe/limon_.]]

[Side-note: This will not hold--the Profitable is the cause of
Good, and is therefore different from Good--to say that the beautiful
is the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this
has been already declared inadmissible.]

Nevertheless the objector will not be satisfied even with this. He
will tell us--You declare the Beautiful to be Pleasure producing
good. But we before agreed, that the producing agent or cause is
different from what is produced or the effect. Accordingly, the
Beautiful is different from the good: or, in other words, the
Beautiful is not good, nor is the Good beautiful--if each of them is
a different thing.[34] Now these propositions we have already
pronounced to be inadmissible, so that your present explanation will
not stand better than the preceding.

[Footnote 34: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E--304 A. [Greek: Ou)/koun
ô)phe/limon, phê/sei, to\ poiou=n ta)gatho/n, to\ de\ poiou=n kai\
to\ poiou/menon, e(/teron nu=n dê\ e)pha/nê, kai\ ei)s to\n pro/teron
lo/gon ê(/kei u(mi=n o( lo/gos? _ou)/te ga\r to\ a)gatho\n a)\n
ei)/ê kalo\n ou)/te to\ kalo\n a)gatho/n, ei)/per a)/llo au)tô=n
e(ka/tero/n e)stin_.]

These last words deserve attention, because they coincide with the
doctrine ascribed to Antisthenes, which has caused so many hard words
to be applied to him (as well as to Stilpon) by critics, from Kolôtes
downwards. The general principle here laid down by Plato is--A is
something different from B, therefore A is not B and B is not A. In
other words, A cannot be predicated of B nor B of A. Antisthenes said
in like manner--[Greek: A)/nthrôpos] and [Greek: A)gatho\s] are
different from each other, therefore you cannot say [Greek:
A)/nthrôpos e)stin a)gatho/s]. You can only say [Greek: A)/nthrôpos
e)stin A)/nthrôpos]--A)gatho/s e)stin a)gatho/s].

I have touched farther upon this point in my chapter upon Antisthenes
and the other Viri Sokratici.]


* * * * *


[Side-note: Remarks upon the Dialogue--the explanations
ascribed to Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed
to Sokrates are attempts to assign some general concept.]

Thus finish the three distinct explanations of [Greek: To\ kalo\n],
which Plato in this dialogue causes to be first suggested by
Sokrates, successively accepted by Hippias, and successively refuted
by Sokrates. In comparing them with the three explanations which he
puts into the mouth of Hippias, we note this distinction: That the
explanations proposed by Hippias are conspicuous particular
exemplifications of the Beautiful, substituted in place of the
general concept: as we remarked, in the Dialogue Euthyphron, that the
explanations of the Holy given by Euthyphron in reply to Sokrates,
were of the same exemplifying character. On the contrary, those
suggested by Sokrates keep in the region of abstractions, and seek to
discover some more general concept, of which the Beautiful is only a
derivative or a modification, so as to render a definition of it
practicable. To illustrate this difference by the language of Dr.
Whewell respecting many of the classifications in Natural History, we
may say--That according to the views here represented by Hippias,
the group of objects called beautiful is given by Type, not by
Definition:[35] while Sokrates proceeds like one convinced that some
common characteristic attribute may be found, on which to rest a
Definition. To search for Definitions of general words, was (as
Aristotle remarks) a novelty, and a valuable novelty, introduced by
Sokrates. His contemporaries, the Sophists among them, were not
accustomed to it: and here the Sophist Hippias (according to Plato's
frequent manner) is derided as talking nonsense,[36] because, when
asked for an explanation of The Self-Beautiful, he answers by citing
special instances of beautiful objects. But we must remember, first,
that Sokrates, who is introduced as trying several general
explanations of the Self-Beautiful, does not find one which will
stand: next, that even if one such could be found, particular
instances can never be dispensed with, in the way of illustration;
lastly, that there are many general terms (the Beautiful being one of
them) of which no definitions can be provided, and which can only be
imperfectly explained, by enumerating a variety of objects to which
the term in question is applied.[37] Plato thought himself
entitled to objectivise every general term, or to assume a
substantive Ens, called a Form or Idea, corresponding to it. This was
a logical mistake quite as serious as any which we know to have been
committed by Hippias or any other Sophist. The assumption that
wherever there is a general term, there must also be a generic
attribute corresponding to it--is one which Aristotle takes much
pains to negative: he recognises terms of transitional analogy, as
well as terms equivocal: while he also especially numbers the
Beautiful among equivocal terms.[38]

[Footnote 35: See Dr. Whewell's 'History of the Inductive Sciences,'
ii. 120 seq.; and Mr. John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' iv. 8, 3.

I shall illustrate this subject farther when I come to the dialogue
called Lysis.]

[Footnote 36: Stallbaum, in his notes, bursts into exclamations of
wonder at the incredible stupidity of Hippias--"En hominis stuporem
prorsus admirabilem," p. 289 E.]

[Footnote 37: Mr. John Stuart Mill observes in his System of Logic,
i. 1, 5: "One of the chief sources of lax habits of thought is the
custom of using connotative terms without a distinctly ascertained
connotation, and with no more precise notion of their meaning than
can be loosely collected from observing what objects they are used to
denote. It is in this manner that we all acquire, and inevitably so,
our first knowledge of our vernacular language. A child learns the
meaning of Man, White, &c., by hearing them applied to a number
of individual objects, and finding out, by a process of
generalisation of which he is but imperfectly conscious, what those
different objects have in common. In many cases objects bear a
general resemblance to each other, which leads to their being
familiarly classed together under a common name, while it is not
immediately apparent what are the particular attributes upon the
possession of which in common by them all their general resemblance
depends. In this manner names creep on from subject to subject until
all traces of a common meaning sometimes disappear, and the word
comes to denote a number of things not only independently of any
common attribute, but which have actually no attribute in common, or
none but what is shared by other things to which the name is
capriciously refused. It would be well if this degeneracy of language
took place only in the hands of the untaught vulgar; but some of the
most remarkable instances are to be found in terms of art, and among
technically educated persons, such as English lawyers. _Felony_,
_e.g._, is a law-term with the sound of which all are familiar:
_but there is no lawyer who would undertake to tell what a felony
is, otherwise than by enumerating the various offences so called._
Originally the word _felony_ had a meaning; it denoted all
offences, the penalty of which included forfeiture of lands or goods,
but subsequent Acts of Parliament have declared various offences to
be felonies without enjoining that penalty, and have taken away that
penalty from others which continue nevertheless to be called
felonies, insomuch that the acts so called have now no property
whatever in common save that of being unlawful and punishable."]

[Footnote 38: Aristot. Topic, i. 106, a. 21. [Greek: Ta\ pollachô=s
lego/mena--ta\ pleonachô=s lego/mena]--are perpetually noted and
distinguished by Aristotle.]

[Side-note: Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to
Sokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the
Memorabilia.]

We read in the Xenophontic Memorabilia a dialogue between Sokrates
and Aristippus, on this same subject--What is the Beautiful, which
affords a sort of contrast between the Dialogues of Search and those
of Exposition. In the Hippias Major, we have the problem approached
on several different sides, various suggestions being proposed, and
each successively disallowed, on reasons shown, as failures: while in
the Xenophontic dialogue, Sokrates declares an affirmative doctrine,
and stands to it--but no pains are taken to bring out the objections
against it and rebut them. The doctrine is, that the Beautiful is
coincident with the Good, and that both of them are resolvable into
the Useful: thus all beautiful objects, unlike as they may be to the
eye or touch, bear that name because they have in common the
attribute of conducing to one and the same purpose--the security,
advantage, or gratification, of man, in some form or other. This is
one of the three explanations broached by the Platonic Sokrates, and
afterwards refuted by him, in the Hippias: while his declaration
(which Hippias puts aside as unseemly)--that a pot and a wooden
soup-ladle conveniently made are beautiful is perfectly in harmony
with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates, that a basket for carrying dung
is beautiful, if it performs its work well.[39] We must moreover
remark, that the objections whereby the Platonic Sokrates, after
proposing the doctrine and saying much in its favour, finds himself
compelled at last to disallow it--these objections are not produced
and refuted, but passed over without notice, in the Xenophontic
dialogue, wherein Sokrates affirms it decidedly.[40] The
affirming Sokrates, and the objecting Sokrates, are not on the
stage at once.

[Footnote 39: Xen. Mem. iii. 6, 2, 7; iv. 6, 8.

Plato, Hipp. Maj. 288 D, 290 D.

I am obliged to translate the words [Greek: to\ Kalo/n] by the
Beautiful or beauty, to avoid a tiresome periphrasis. But in reality
the Greek words include more besides: they mean also the _fine_,
the _honourable or that which is worthy of honour_, the
_exalted_, &c. If we have difficulty in finding any common
property connoted by the English word, the difficulty in the case of
the Greek word is still greater.]

[Footnote 40: In regard to the question, Wherein consists [Greek: To\
Kalo/n]? and objections against the theory of the Xenophontic
Sokrates, it is worth while to compare the views of modern
philosophers. Dugald Stewart says (on the Beautiful, 'Philosophical
Essays,' p. 214 seq.), "It has long been a favourite problem with
philosophers to ascertain the common quality or qualities which
entitle a thing to the denomination of Beautiful. But the success of
their speculations has been so inconsiderable, that little can be
inferred from them except the impo

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