Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh: The History of the Ti-Ping Revolution (Volume II)
by Augustus F. Lindley · English · Gutenberg #39735 · 928,146 chars · public domain (US)
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Title: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh: The History of the Ti-Ping Revolution (Volume II)
Author: Augustus F. Lindley
Release date: May 19, 2012 [eBook #39735]
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK TI-PING TIEN-KWOH: THE HISTORY OF THE TI-PING REVOLUTION (VOLUME II) ***
Produced by Moti Ben-Ari and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net. (This file was
produced from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive.)
[Illustration: Chinese title]
TI-PING TIEN-KWOH;
THE HISTORY OF
THE TI-PING REVOLUTION,
INCLUDING
A Narrative of the Author's Personal Adventures.
BY
[Illustration: First character of author's Chinese name]
LIN-LE.
FORMERLY HONORARY OFFICER, CHUNG-WANG'S GUARDS; SPECIAL AGENT OF
THE TI-PING GENERAL-IN-CHIEF; AND LATE COMMANDER OF THE "LOYAL
AND FAITHFUL AUXILIARY LEGION."
VOLUME II.
LONDON:
DAY & SON (LIMITED), LITHOGRAPHERS & PUBLISHERS,
GATE STREET, LINCOLN'S INN FIELDS.
1866.
COX AND WYMAN,
ORIENTAL, CLASSICAL, AND GENERAL PRINTERS,
GREAT QUEEN STREET, LONDON, W.C.
CONTENTS OF VOL. II.
CHAPTER XV. PAGE
Chinese Custom-houses.--Attempts at Extortion.--An
Adventure.--Ruse de Guerre.--Its Success.--Peace
Negotiations.--Their abrupt Termination.--The Plot thickens.--A
Companion in Misfortune.--Negotiations renewed.--Their
Failure.--Hostilities.--Critical Position.--Danger
increases.--Attempted Rescue.--The Mud Fort Mandarin.--His
Fate.--The Civil Mandarin.--Rescued at last.--The _Williamette_ 425
CHAPTER XVI.
Hang-chow.--Ti-pings approach Shanghae.--Their Reception.--The
_Casus Belli._--The First Blow.--Filibuster Ward.--Admiral
Hope's Exploits.--Captures Hsiun-tang.--The
Consequences.--Hope's Policy condemned.--The real _Casus
Belli_.--Defence of Shanghae justified.--Inducements to oppose
the Ti-pings.--Official Reports.--Mr. Consul
Meadows.--Recognition of the Ti-pings.--The _Shanghae
Times_.--Mr. John's Report.--Edict of Religious
Toleration.--Report continued.--Mr. Muirhead's Report 445
CHAPTER XVII.
On Board the _Williamette_.--Blockade running.--Arrival at
Nankin.--Solemn Thanksgiving.--Domestic Arrangements.--Phillip's
Wife.--The Wooing.--The Dowry.--The Wedding.--Trade
established.--Imperialist Corruption.--Preparations for
leaving.--An Elopement.--The Journey.--The Surprise.--The
Repulse.--Arrival at Hang-chow.--Its capture.--The
Particulars.--Cum-ho.--The Chung-wang.--His mistaken Policy 475
CHAPTER XVIII.
Earl Russell's Despatch.--Its Effect.--"Taking the
Offensive."--Official Reports.--General Staveley.--Attacks the
Ti-pings.--General Ward.--Hope and Ward repulsed.--Che-poo
attacked.--Its Capture.--Loot Regulations.--Kah-ding
attacked.--Its Capture.--Ti-ping Loss.--Newspaper
Comments.--Tsing-poo besieged.--Inside the City.--Ti-ping
Losses.--Na-jaor besieged.--Cho-lin besieged.--Ti-ping
Bravery.--Cho-lin captured.--The Chung-wang.--Kah-ding
evacuated.--Consul Harvey's Despatch.--Despatch
reviewed.--Ningpo threatened.--Captain Dew at Ningpo.--His
Despatch.--The Reply.--Captain Dew's Rejoinder.--Preparation to
attack Ningpo.--Captain Dew's Inconsistency.--His
Ultimatum.--Official Despatches.--Ningpo attacked.--Ningpo
evacuated.--Newspaper Reports 498
CHAPTER XIX.
A Double Wedding.--Its Celebration.--The Honeymoon.--Its
Interruption.--Warlike Preparations.--Soong-kong
invested.--General Ching's Despatch.--Tsing-poo
recaptured.--Ti-ping Severity excused.--England's
Responsibility.--Curious Chinese Custom.--The Chung-wang's
Policy.--His Explanation.--The Ti-ping Court of Justice.--How
conducted.--Opium Smoking.--Its Effects.--Evidence
thereof.--Forbidden by Ti-ping Law.--Opium Trade 539
CHAPTER XX.
Ti-ping Disasters.--The Vampyre Fleet.--Important Letters.--Mr.
Roberts's Case.--Mr. Consul Harvey.--Letters
continued.--Misrepresentations.--Anti-Ti-ping Meeting.--The
Sherrard Osborne Theory.--The Fleet Afloat.--The "Lay" and
"Osborne" Agreement.--The Fleet repudiated.--Pecuniary Loss to
England.--A Resume.--General Burgevine.--Lieutenant Ridge.--Act
of Piracy.--A Tartar caught.--Exit of the Anglo-Chinese
Flotilla.--General Ward's Proceedings.--Progress of the
War.--Death of General Ward.--Captain Dew's Disgrace.--How
caused.--His Mode of Proceeding.--Its Effect upon
Trade.--Operations before Kah-ding.--"Wong-e-poo."--General
Burgevine dismissed from his Command.--Major Gordon takes
Command.--Sir F. Bruce's Despatches.--His Objections to Gordon's
Appointment.--Also to General Brown's Interference 562
CHAPTER XXI.
Personal Narrative continued.--Mr. Lobschied.--His Reception at
Nankin.--Press Publications.--Mr. Lobschied leaves
Nankin.--Operations before Tait-san.--The Assault.--Act of
Bravery.--Rout of the Imperialists.--Gordon's Art of
War.--Tait-san reinvested.--Siege of Tait-san.--Its
Capture.--Manchoo Atrocities.--Treatment of Ti-ping
Prisoners.--Mr. Sillar's Statement.--Quin-san
captured.--Gordon's Report.--Gordon reinforced.--The Chung-wang
recalled.--Critical Position of the Ti-pings.--The Chung-wang's
Retreat.--Difficulties encountered.--Reinforcements.--The Scene
of Battle.--Its Horrors.--Arrival at Nankin.--The Chung-wang's
Army.--General Attack.--The Repulse.--The Surprise.--The Night
Attack.--The Flight and Pursuit.--Death of Marie 598
CHAPTER XXII.
On the Wong-poo River.--Ningpo Sam.--The _China_.--Her
Passengers.--The Ta-hoo Lake.--Its Scenery.--The Canals of
Central China.--General
Burgevine.--Soo-chow.--Deserters.--Burgevine suspected.--The
Americo-Ti-ping Legions.--Burgevine's Policy.--Colonel
Morton.--The Mo-wang.--Arrival of the Chung-wang.--The Loyal and
Faithful Auxiliary Legion.--How regulated.--Affair at
Wo-kong.--Recruiting.--Plan of Operations.--A _coup de
main_.--Arrangement.--Interruptions.--Postponed 632
CHAPTER XXIII.
Renewed Attempt.--Its Success.--Narrow Escape.--British
Interference.--How explained.--Its Failure.--The _coup de main_
succeeds.--Groundless Alarm.--Route to Soo-chow.--Its
Difficulties.--Generous Conduct.--Arrival at
Wu-see.--Prize-Money.--Treachery.--Preparations for an
Attack.--Manoeuvring.--The Attack.--Warm Reception.--The Enemy
repulsed.--The Result.--Wu-see evacuated.--Return to
Shanghae.--Last Interview with the Chung-wang.--Manchoo
Cruelty.--Result of British Interference.--Evidence
thereof.--Newspaper Extracts.--Further Extracts.--England's
Policy.--Its Consequences.--Its Inconsistency.--Her Policy in
Japan.--Religious Character of the Ti-pings.--Their Christianity 658
CHAPTER XXIV.
Kar-sing-foo.--Christmas in Ti-pingdom.--Works of
Art.--Dangerous Companions.--Narrow Escape.--Retribution.--Adieu
to Ti-pingdom.--Mr. White's Case.--The Neutrality
Ordnance.--Order of July 9th, 1864.--Intended Return to
England.--Particulars of the Siege of Soo-chow.--Strength of the
Garrison.--The Assault described.--The Nar-wang's
Treachery.--Its Cause.--Major Gordon's Report.--The _Friend of
China_.--Gordon's Report continued.--Narrative by an
Eye-Witness.--The Soo-chow Tragedy.--Major Gordon.--His
Conduct.--Gordon's Letter to Sir F. Bruce.--Analysis
thereof.--Newspaper Extract.--Gordon's "Reasons"
refuted.--Analysis Continued.--Gordon's "Personal
Considerations."--His Motives explained.--Newspaper
Extracts.--Sir F. Bruce's Despatch.--Its Analysis.--Falsity of
Gordon's Statements.--How proved.--Extract from the
_Times_.--Deductions 694
CHAPTER XXV.
Operations Resumed.--Attack on Kin-tang.--The Battle of the
Brickbats.--Ti-ping Success.--Active
Operations.--Manoeuvring.--Hang-chow invested.--Fall of
Kar-sing-foo.--Gordon's Proceedings.--Chang-chow-foo.--Narrative
of the Siege.--Fall of Chang-chow.--The Foo-wang.--Manchoo
Cruelty.--Debate on the Chinese War.--Lord Palmerston's
Policy.--Its Errors.--Mr. Cobden's Policy.--Mr. Layard.--His
Inaccuracy.--Extracts from the Debate.--Result of Lord
Palmerston's Policy.--Fall of Nankin.--"Imperialist"
Account.--The Chung-wang's Capture.--Other Reports.--Digest of
Events.--The Chung-wang.--His Position in Nankin.--Events in the
City.--Newspaper Reports.--Doubts as to the Chung-wang's
Fate.--The Retreat from Nankin.--Newspaper Extracts.--The
Shi-wang's Proclamations.--Lee Shai-Yin's Address 743
CHAPTER XXVI.
Results of British Policy.--Its Effect on Trade.--The
Inspectorate System.--The Tien-tsin Treaty.--Present State of
China.--Rebellion in the Ascendant.--Proposed Remedy.--The
Mandarin Policy.--The Extradition Treaty.--The Mo-wang's
Case.--Its Injustice.--Its Illegality.--Burgevine's Case.--Our
Treatment by the Manchoos.--Russia's Policy in
China.--Contrasted with that of England.--Russian
Progress.--Statistics.--Acquisition of Territory by
Russia.--Her Approach to British India.--Russia's
Advantages.--Her Future Policy.--"Peking and the
Pekingese."--Its Author's
Misstatements.--Misquotations.--Examples thereof.--"Chinese
Miscellanies."--Ti-ping Movements.--The Future of the Ti-pings
Doubtful.--Latest Movements.--The Kan-wang.--Nien-fie
Victories.--Future Prospects.--Finis 788
APPENDIX A.
Decalogue 823
The Trimetrical Classic 827
Ode for Youth 832
APPENDIX B.
Export of Tea and Silk from China 838
APPENDIX C.
Memorandum of Ti-pings killed during the British Hostilities against
them 840
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
CHROMOLITHOGRAPHS.
Brought to Bay at the Mud Fort _to face page_ 440
A view in the inner apartments of the Chung-wang's
Palace--Miss Cum-ho and her two governesses " 479
Interior of an Opium Smoking Saloon " 559
Imperialist attack on the River Forts at Nankin " 629
View from the Summit of a Mountain in the Western
Tung-shan district on the Northern shore of the
Ta-hoo Lake, province of Keang-su " 637
Naval Engagement and Capture of Imperialist Gunboats
at Wu-see " 675
Map, Present state of China " 794
WOOD ENGRAVINGS.
The Mud Fort Mandarin _page_ 440
A View on the Journey to Soo-chow of a portion of country
near the City of Wu-se lately desolated by Imperialists. " 657
CHAPTER XV.
Chinese Custom-houses.--Attempts at Extortion.--An
Adventure.--Ruse de Guerre.--Its Success.--Peace
Negotiations.--Their abrupt Termination.--The Plot thickens.--A
Companion in Misfortune.--Negotiations renewed.--Their
Failure.--Hostilities.--Critical Position.--Danger
increases.--Attempted Rescue.--The Mud Fort Mandarin.--His
Fate.--The Civil Mandarin.--Rescued at last.--The _Williamette_.
The route by which I returned to the broad expanse of "The Son of the
Sea" was, if possible, more infested with so-called custom-houses than
that by which I had reached Sin-ya-meu. Every two or three _le_ some
wretched little bamboo-hut would make its appearance round a bend of the
creek, with a long pole and a dirty white rag on the end, containing
huge red and black characters, setting forth the official nature of the
den. Then sundry opium-stupified, villanous-looking mandarin soldiers
would rush from their pipes and gambling, catch up their rusty gingalls
and long bamboo spears, and loudly call upon my Chinese captain to
"soong mow" (let go the anchor), and pay a duty, or squeeze, into their
dirty hands. Upon such occasions P---- and myself would be compelled to
get on deck with our fowling-pieces, and drive the harpies off, when
they would sullenly retire to their opium and cards, muttering curses
upon the _Yang-quitzo_, and trusting for better prey next time.
This sort of thing may seem very like smuggling, but it was really far
from being so. The duty upon my cargo was levied at Sin-ya-meu, previous
to embarkation, and was paid to the customs officials; and from that
town to Kwa-chow the fifteen to twenty custom stations were every one
of them charging in excess of the legal duty. Chinese have frequently
informed me that the governor of a province lets these squeeze stations
out to subordinate mandarins, who then farm them at discretion. The
mandarins have _braves_ enough to enforce their extortion; all passing
junks are stopped until payment is made; and if the aggrieved people
should complain, their petition goes before the governor who thrives
upon the system. This is one of the many forms of Government corruption
throughout China; to many the extortionate _regime_ of the Manchoo must
appear incredible, though it is a fact pretty widely known, even by
those who are striving to uphold it.
Although during our dinner a couple of _braves_ succeeded in getting on
board from a squeeze barrier, which led to their tailor becoming
acquainted with our shoemaker during the process of summary ejectment,
myself and friend reached the great river without further mishap than an
occasional exposure to the ill-aimed gingall balls of some of the
baffled plunderers. At Kwa-chow, the entrance to the Grand Canal on the
northern bank of the Yang-tze, we passed through a large fleet of
Imperialist _Ti-mungs_, row-gunboats, and a big customs station; the
officials evidently wished to squeeze us, but, I imagine, the vicinity
of the treaty port Chin-kiang deterred them. Shooting into the yellow
waters once more, a fair wind carried us bravely over the strong adverse
current.
Winter having now set in, and the north-east monsoon commenced to blow
up the whole length of the Yang-tze-kiang, thus enabling vessels to sail
against the tide very well, we made considerable progress on our way to
Nankin before anchoring for the night. At daylight we were underweigh
and sailing merrily along, myself and P---- keeping regular watch and
watch--a course rendered necessary by the danger apprehended from the
numerous Imperialist gunboats and fortified positions in the
neighbourhood of Ti-pingdom.
Till noon we carried the breeze, but the day becoming hot the wind fell,
and so we were obliged to run close to the bank, land our crew with a
mast-head rope, and slowly track up stream. Just before dusk a light
breeze sprang up again, and getting the men on board we made sail to
round the "Mud Port," situated on the extreme point of the elbow formed
by the river at Nin-gan-shan. This fort, upon my passage down from
Nankin, was held by the Ti-pings; upon this occasion, to my sorrow, I
found the Imperialists in possession; its former garrison having
betrayed their charge, and sold it to the enemy.
We had barely rounded the point, making almost imperceptible headway,
when the wind failed, and the tide, at this point very strong, began to
carry us down stream. At this moment, five gunboats put off from the
shore and pulled directly towards my vessel. Upon nearing her, they
hailed and ordered us to anchor. I now perceived that they were
Imperialists, and, from the flags displayed, that they were of the
squeezing, or custom-house genus. P---- and myself immediately armed
ourselves, and ordered the _lowder_ to hold on his course. The tide was
fast drifting our vessel in to the bank, right under the guns of the
fort, and directly the men in the gunboats perceived this, and saw only
two foreigners on board, and that we mounted no guns, they surrounded us
and opened fire.
Our position was now decidedly unpleasant. We had drifted to within a
few yards of the bank, the guns in the fort were manned, several more
boats were putting off, filled with men, and the shore was lined with
soldiers, placing their gingalls and matchlocks, and making ready to
fire upon us. I well knew the unscrupulous nature of these plundering
Imperialists, that our duty-receipts from Sin-ya-meu would not be
regarded, and that they would most willingly cut our throats for the
value of five dollars. With the force opposed to us, and no chance to
make even a running fight, it would have been madness to have returned
the gunboats' fire with our rifles and fowling-pieces; we therefore took
it like lambs, and devoutly wished for a sudden puff of wind to waft us
from our perilous situation. Not a breath, not the very gentlest zephyr
came, excepting the wind caused by the shots that were flying all
around, some of which, better aimed than the majority, were smashing
into our poor old vessel, quite regardless of the consequences. The men
on shore and the guns of the fort now opened fire; while the gunboats,
finding we did not seem inclined to fight, appeared to be getting ready
to board.
At this critical juncture a fortunate thought came into my head. I had
my old uniform on board, and the idea formed was to use it to personate
a foreign official, and so endeavour to save our heads by giving the
imps an impression as to our importance, and a dread of the consequences
in case of molestation. Jumping into the cabin, I quickly reappeared
with uniform and sword. My friend P---- also had some uniform he had
worn in the Indian navy, so following my example, he dived into his
chest and then rushed on deck gorgeous in brass-bound array. We were not
a moment too soon with our device, for P---- had just got on deck when
one of our Chinese sailors was knocked over by a shot, and the rest,
taking fright, suddenly let go the anchor, and casting adrift the
halyards of the sails, let them go by the run; after which they ran and
hid themselves down below. I now hailed the nearest gunboat to come
alongside, telling my interpreter to state that we were foreign
officers, or mandarins, that we were followed by a man-of-war, and that
we were sailing about in the junk for pleasure.
When the _braves_ observed our uniform, and were invited to board, their
hitherto noisy courage seemed to vanish, and they would not come.
However, they ceased blazing their confounded guns at us, much to our
satisfaction, for although Chinese shot, with a tremendous whistling by
reason of its uneven casting, makes much more noise than effect, and
generally performs parabolas of singular eccentricity, _some_ strike the
object, especially when fired at a distance of only a few yards.
Our vessel was anchored within 30 feet of the bank, we were therefore
completely in the power of the imps, who mustered at least 600 strong at
that place. I again hailed the gunboat containing the man I imagined to
be the principal officer, to come alongside, and let me know what they
wanted; but the fellows seemed suspicious of some trap, and continued to
lay on their oars, all talking and yelling together at the top of their
individual voices, each trying to make himself heard above every one
else, in approved Chinese style.
At last the mandarin in charge of the fort made his appearance on the
bank, and after his attendants had shouted themselves hoarse, trying to
make his orders heard above the din, the jabbering in the gunboats
ceased, and the one I had hailed proceeded very slowly and cautiously to
come alongside. She contained a couple of officers, whom we got on
board, showing them our revolvers, and politely informing them, in pure
mandarin dialect, that if their men followed them, we should be under
the painful necessity of depositing a bullet or two in their yellow
carcasses. This had the desired effect, and the fierce-looking _braves_
were ordered to remain in their boats, much to their disgust, for their
fingers, no doubt, were itching to handle the valuables of the "foreign
devils."
When we had seated the two officials in our cabin, an old number of the
_Hong-Kong Daily Press_ was produced as our commission in the service of
His Majesty the Emperor of America, while a Manchester rug, of the stars
and stripes pattern, was displayed as our banner. To all this the
Chinamen "chin-chin'd" with the greatest respect, but they still
referred to the fact that our vessel carried a cargo, and declared their
chief's intention to squeeze a certain amount of dollars out of us. The
duty-passes we had received at Sin-ya-meu were then produced and the
officers took them ashore to their superior. They soon returned, and
requested me to accompany them to an interview with the head mandarin,
stating that he was determined to have some money, which he chose to
term "duty," for conscience' sake, I suppose, although it was certainly
a most unmitigated attempt at robbery.
Before landing, I made my conductors fully understand that, upon the
slightest attempt at treachery I should shoot _them_. I took my revolver
with me, and proceeded to the mandarin's presence, leaving P---- on
board, to preserve our effects from the plundering propensities of the
villanous mob into whose clutches we had fallen.
My interpreter A-ling, our cook, Ganymede, and the _lowder_, accompanied
me on shore as a retinue of state, somewhat suitable for the dignity of
representatives of our supposed emperor. The _Daily Press_ was carefully
carried in an old glove-box by A-ling, while the cook was deputed to
carry our cards (in the shape of two labels from bottles of Bass's pale
ale) to the mandarin; the boy carried presents, consisting of a couple
of empty eau-de-cologne bottles, an _Illustrated London News_, and a box
of damaged percussion caps; the _lowder_ brought up the rear with our
(Manchester) banner streaming from a tall bamboo. Although the soldiers
crowded round us they did not offer much annoyance; probably they were
awed by our stately bearing and procession. We reached the Yamun
(official residence), the pale-ale labels were duly delivered, and then
we were ushered into the august presence of the cruel, sensual,
dirty-looking mandarin, my followers imposingly taking up their position
behind me. The _Daily Press_ was displayed by A-ling, who, clever fellow
that he was, to show its importance, bent on one knee while presenting
it.
The display of the newspaper, the presents, and our uniform, seemed to
make a decided impression upon the mandarin, and we should probably have
been set free but for a _mal-a-propos_ circumstance that now occurred.
I had sent the _lowder_ down to the beach, loudly ordering him to look
out for the imaginary man-of-war steamer I gave our captors to
understand was following me, and to report her approach whenever she
came in sight. This had considerably subdued the mandarin's arrogant
tone, for he was evidently not well up in foreign affairs, and
provincial Chinese have a wonderful idea of the "fiery dragon ships" of
the "foreign devils." He was just commencing a set apology for the
mistake committed by his "ignorant _braves_," when in came our
pig-headed _lowder_, or rather, into the apartment he was kicked by a
couple of soldiers holding on to his tail, and most unmercifully
thumping, kicking, and bumping him along from behind.
It appeared that the wretch had got into conversation with some of the
_braves_ on the beach; they had asked him where our vessel was bound,
and he naively told them to Nankin, _the rebel capital_! They instantly
seized and dragged him before the mandarin. The long-winded apology came
to an abrupt termination, and the orator turned his attention to
examining the miserable _lowder_ as to our connection with the Ti-pings.
The stupid captain of our sailors now declared that he only _thought_ we
were going to touch at Nankin _en route_, to make some demand upon the
rebels with regard to the seizure of some foreign-owned junks. The
mandarin at last ordered him to be taken into the fort, and dismissed us
with an intimation that we must wait till the next morning to have a
duty levied upon our cargo, and to adjust the whole affair.
The _Daily Press_ was ceremoniously returned to the glove-box, the stars
and stripes were rolled up, and we were escorted back to our vessel by
the two officers. Upon getting on board, I found P---- all safe, and
promenading the deck like a moving armory, with a rifle over his
shoulder, a revolver and brace of horse-pistols in his belt, and a sword
by his side; while four gunboats were chained fast alongside, the crews
of which, with their heads poked over our bulwarks, were viciously
eyeing the Cerberus who prevented them from indulging their natural
propensities.
I found our vessel thoroughly secured by the imps, who had taken every
precaution to guard against a _coup-de-main_ upon our part. Chains were
rove through each ring-bolt on our deck and fastened on board the
gunboats, two of them being lashed on each side, full of armed men
watchful and on the alert. A long chain was passed from our bows to the
shore, and a number of matchlock men were encamped for the night right
abreast. Even had it been possible to strike a sudden blow and release
ourselves, as it was a dead calm they could have pulled after our vessel
and blown her to pieces, if they could not have mustered courage to
board us. There was nothing to do but to trust to the chapter of
accidents for a way out of the difficulty, and, if necessary, to sell
our lives dearly.
It was a matter of considerable surprise to myself and friend that the
Imperialists did not behave worse to us, for they neither yelled
"Yang-quitzo," threw stones, nor seemed so anxious to attack us as the
generality of Manchoo troops would have been. This we afterwards
accounted for by the fact that they had formerly been Ti-pings, and had
not quite forgotten that they had once been worshippers of Yesu, and had
looked upon strangers from the West as "foreign brethren." Their chief
had turned traitor to the Ti-ping cause, and betrayed the "Mud Fort" to
the Manchoo, in consideration of retaining his own followers, receiving
_carte blanche_ to squeeze all passing vessels, and being decorated with
a mandarin button and feathers. They were a savage-looking set, these
"Mud Fort" banditti, yet, bad as they seemed to be, were much better
than the usual style of Imperialists; had we fallen into the hands of
the latter we should have been treated with much indignity and violence,
if not killed.
We were aroused in the middle of the night by a tremendous hubbub, and,
running on deck, found it was the Mud Fort people engaged seizing
another unfortunate European vessel. Getting into our boat, I went on
board, and found she was a _Ningpo Boat_, from Shanghae to Hankow, and
that the only foreigner on board was an Englishman, to whom she
belonged. The soldiers hauled his vessel close in to the bank a little
below mine, and there made her fast in a similar manner. After talking
over our mutual misfortune, we agreed that in the morning I should land,
and endeavour to obtain our release; failing which, I was to get on
board his craft with P----; we were then to man her guns (she carried
two six-pounders), try to force both vessels adrift, and make a fight to
escape.
After a not particularly refreshing sleep, I again went on board the
_Ningpo Boat_, to settle our plan for the last time, preparatory to
putting it into execution. Upon returning to my own vessel, we carefully
loaded all our firearms; I then concealed my own revolver and a long
bowie knife under my uniform, took A-ling and our cook with me; the one
carrying the _Daily Press_, and the other two more pale-ale labels; and
proceeded on shore.
The imps had at daylight cast off the chains wherewith they secured our
vessel for the night; leaving, however, a couple of thick ropes
fastening her to the bank by head and stern; these P---- had prepared an
axe to cut in case of emergency. Our cabin was formed by a half-raised
deckhouse aft, on the top of this a few bags of charcoal were placed, so
as to form a sort of fortlet, inside which the arms, with a good supply
of ammunition, were hidden; the ropes were laid ready, fore and aft, to
make sail, and the _Ningpo Boat_ was hauled quite close to the bank, so
as to enable me to get on board her in event of hostilities, while P----
could pull to her in our boat.
As I walked away from the bank, and observed P----ensconce himself among
the bags of charcoal, my feelings were not of the most pleasant
description. However, there was no choice of conduct; so, making the
best of a bad affair, I proceeded straight for the den of the bandit
chief, assuming a stolid, immovable sort of Dogberry officiality,
peculiarly effective with the Chinese. Upon sending in our extemporized
cards, and being admitted to the mandarin's state hall (a dirty
apartment in a dirty house within the dirty fort), I was kept waiting
till noon for the appearance, from among his many wives and opium pipes,
of the owner.
Meanwhile, a breeze had sprung up, and was gradually increasing; so
that, although the delay proved rather discreditable as to my veracity
about the expected man-of-war, a chance of escape was apparent. If we
could not obtain our release by fair means, we might be able to get our
vessels clear, make sail, and keep up a running fight.
At length, half-stupified with opium, the mandarin made his appearance,
the remaining part of his senses seemingly concentrated into a dull
cunning sort of ferocity. His first act was to summon quite a number of
armed soldiers to his Yamun, who stationed themselves in and about the
building. Our wretched _lowder_ was then dragged forth, and presented a
pitiable sight. He had been tortured by having his ankle joints crushed
between logs of wood, and by placing smaller pieces between his fingers,
which were then pressed together by several men, causing intense agony,
and severely injuring the fingerbones. The torture had compelled him to
divulge all he knew of our proceedings at Nankin, besides a great deal
more which he did not know, but simply stated to anticipate the wish of
his interrogators and another squeeze of the wooden bars, failing a
satisfactory reply. He was now examined before me, and confessed that we
had left Nankin, and were returning thither. The mandarin then declared
that he must have 2,000 dollars, or else he would keep our vessel, and
send us into the interior _as Ti-ping prisoners for execution_.
For some time I argued against either proceeding, displaying the _Daily
Press_, the duty-passes I had received at Sin-ya-meu, and endeavouring
to convince the mandarin as to the serious consequences of exciting the
anger of the Emperor of America by molesting either myself and friend,
or the vessel seized during the night. At last, after the robber had
lowered his demand to 1,000 dollars, and while the discussion was
becoming very warm, a soldier brought a report to the mandarin, who
instantly issued some order to an attendant officer. What the tenor of
this might be I heard not, but my cook did, and it evidently alarmed
him, for, exclaiming, "More bettah, go just now," he rushed out of the
room and disappeared. A-ling immediately told the mandarin that he would
pay his so-called custom-house authorities a sum of 500 dollars, and
then, telling me not to stay any longer, left the Yamun, begging me to
accompany him. Making a bow to the angered official plunderer, I
leisurely walked forth, and, upon reaching the rear of the fort, quickly
passed through the gate, just as he appeared in his doorway, and gave a
sharp command to some of the attendant soldiers.
Before I had turned the angle of the fort and got within sight of my
vessel, half-a-dozen officers with drawn swords came running after me,
calling upon me to stop and return with them to the mandarin. A-ling,
stating he would run to the pseudo custom-house, a few hundred yards
distant, and bring with him the officials to receive the squeeze of 500
dollars that we had offered to pay, advised me to get on board as
quickly as possible.
I waited until my pursuers had reached to within a a few feet, and then,
suddenly drawing my revolver, jumped towards them with it levelled to
the foremost. They instantly turned tail and rushed back to the fort,
while I ran down towards the beach, holding the revolver above my head
to signalize P---- and the master of the _Ningpo Boat_ that danger was
at hand.
Ere I had reached more than half-way between the fort and the river, a
tremendous outcry arose from the former, accompanied by the blowing of
horns, the beating of gongs, and the noise of the Chinese drum. As I
ran, I turned my head in the direction of the uproar and observed the
mandarin, followed by a crowd of soldiery, rushing after me. Before I
could gain the beach, to my surprise, I saw the _Ningpo Boat_ land some
of her crew, cast off from the bank, and proceed to track up stream,
thus breaking the terms of the agreement upon which I had landed, and
cutting off my only chance of escape from the pursuing imps. When I did
reach the river bank, every boat had been warned away by the shouts and
gestures of the mob behind me, and the _Ningpo Boat_ was some distance
off the shore, and fast tracking away.
For a moment I gazed around, and found myself completely at the mercy of
my pursuers; in front ran the swift current of the Yang-tze--behind came
the savage yelling crowd of armed men.
I had just time to notice P---- on the top of our cabin deck, rifle in
hand, and hear him shout, while pointing to the receding _Ningpo Boat_:
"The coward has made terms with them and deserted us--jump up in the
boat on the beach; I will open fire on the imps if they attempt to seize
you, and I'll get you off with our boat if I have a chance; the imps
have stolen the oars, and our crew have stowed themselves away below!"
The boat my friend referred to was a large one hauled up slantingly on
the beach, one side touching the water of the river, and the other
turned towards my pursuers. She stood some four or five feet off the
ground; and climbing into her highest part, which was about level with
the edge of the river bank before it shelved down into the narrow beach
upon which she rested, I turned to face the enemy, after answering
P----, and telling him not to fire until I gave him the signal to do so
by commencing with my revolver.
By this time the horde of banditti were within a few yards, armed in
every fashion, and neither dressed as Imperialists nor Ti-pings, but
clad in a multitude of colours. The whole garrison of the place seemed
to be turned out, and with much gesticulation, and the usual terrifying
yelling of Chinese soldiery, rushed along after their leader. Bamboo
spears, gingalls, matchlocks, scythe-headed halberts, broad
three-pronged pikes, and large knives, were waving all about, and beyond
all I distinguished _the apparatus to which a prisoner is fastened when
barbarously put to death by "cutting into a thousand pieces_."
On they came, with their fiendish cry, "Tah! tah!" until right down to
the edge of the bank, where they formed a tumultuous crowd, brandishing
their arms, some opening their clothing and beating their breasts in
defiance, but all arrested by my levelled revolver. The mandarin used
his utmost exertions to urge them on, but one and all seemed disinclined
to become the _first_ to draw a bullet from the six-shooter. The men who
carried firearms in the front rank I sharply observed, and instantly
took aim at any one who attempted to handle his weapon offensively.
Meanwhile, upon either side, the men above and below my position got
down on the beach, and gradually advanced towards me, while those not
immediately covered by my revolver began firing their matchlocks.
I now, for the first time in my life, _really_ experienced fear. In
front and flank I saw nothing but a dense array of savage men thirsting
to slay me; beyond them were a corps of executioners erecting their
triangles in anticipation of having the cruel delight to slowly cut me
into pieces; and when I gave a sidelong glance behind (I dared not
attempt more, or the imps would have taken advantage and rushed forward)
the deep and turbid river met my view.
For a moment or two, during which the enemy might have cut down or
seized me without my being able to pull trigger, I became quite
nerveless, while an icy chill came over my heart and made me feel both
sick and helpless. Fortunately, I soon rallied. It is unpleasant to
mention such a fear as I had felt, much less to dwell upon it. Just as
the events of my life seemed striving together in a confused jumble for
the first place in a rapid mental panorama, my presence of mind
returned. I felt a sudden glow of enthusiasm for the Ti-ping cause,
through which I had got into the danger, and a determination to die, if
death it was to be, in a manner worthy of an Englishman before a mob of
Chinese.
To this day I am surprised at the sudden revulsion of feeling I
experienced. One moment I was powerless, trembling, and terrified; the
next, I was keenly alive to every incident in the scene, collectedly
watching each movement of my individual assailants, and confidently
prepared for any result.
At this moment P---- hailed me: "I have covered the mandarin; shall I
shoot him? I can cut her" (our vessel) "adrift. Jump into the river and
swim off, I will pick you up."
A little sooner I should have done this, but now I was prepared to take
advantage of the slightest chance of escape; the soldiers were still to
be kept back by my revolver; a peaceful termination of the difficulty
_might_ be obtained; but if I were to take to the water I should almost
certainly be shot like a dog in it, even if I were not swept away and
drowned by the swift current.
I shouted to P----, "Hold on yet. I think I can keep them at bay
myself." He had hitherto been supporting me with his rifle levelled at
the mandarin. "Try and take me off with the boat."
Although our vessel was lying some little distance above me and some 30
feet from the bank, and although the oars had been stolen from our boat,
P---- was a thorough sailor, and I trusted that he would find some means
of dropping it down to me with a line. I did not think so without
reason, for he replied to me:--
"Look out, then! I am going to put down my rifle. I will drop the boat
down to you; stand by to jump into her!"
Meanwhile, the imps seemed striving to work themselves into a frenzy,
when they would probably rush forward, receive my few shots, and
overpower me by numbers. The mandarin kept running to his men and trying
to make them point their matchlocks at me, but directly any one
attempted to do so, my revolver barrel stared him full in the face.
At last, I had the satisfaction to hear P----'s voice again:--
"Stand by, old fellow," he hailed; "I am just going to shove the boat
off from our inshore quarter with a line fast to her."
Without daring to turn my head for a moment, I replied: "All right,
shove her off, and hail me directly she comes close enough for a jump."
The suspense of the next minute or two was very great, then I heard my
friend shout: "Now, jump now if you can; I am covering the imps with my
rifle."
I gave a half glance over my shoulder, but, alas! the boat was too
distant. The rope had tautened too soon, and she had been swept into a
parallel line with our vessel, without reaching within twenty feet of my
position. Hauling her alongside, P---- and As-sam, our boy, got into
her, and shoving well off with a boat-hook, drifted down, endeavouring
to grapple the boat I stood in. Again she fell short, and was swept out
by the tide, amid a storm of bullets splashing all around her, from the
men behind, from whose fire I was sheltered by the front rank, but who
were easily able to shoot at the boat, and who managed to wound As-sam
in the arm.
P----, finding that without oars it was impossible to reach me with the
boat, reluctantly returned on board to his former position behind the
bags of charcoal, and there resumed his rifle. Just at the same time the
mandarin, finding his soldiers afraid to break the ominous pause by
attacking me and exposing their leaders to certain death, began to set
the example himself. He was certainly a far braver man than any of his
followers, for dashing forward, sword in hand, he got to the lowest end
of the boat and clambered into her, although I could easily have shot
him at any instant. Steadying himself, he began to advance towards me,
along the gunnel of the boat, which was open amidships and had a decked
bow and stern.
[Illustration: THE MUD FORT MANDARIN.]
It was now a most trying moment for me. The mandarin was already within
nine or ten feet, and another second would bring him to striking
distance. His life was entirely in my power; I could have shot him; but
the _first_ blow was only wanted to break the treacherous calm, and
cause the immediate slaughter of myself. I felt that my last chance of
life depended upon delay; two more seconds would decide it one way or
the other. The suspense of that smallest passage of time was
indescribable; many days of intense excitement and danger seemed crowded
into one moment. The short though terrible hesitation in my mind,
whether to shoot the mandarin, fire the remaining barrels of the
revolver at his followers, and then jump into the river and swim off, or
to delay another second, so as to lose not the merest chance of saving
my life, seemed to occupy an age of anxious and momentous thought. At
this crisis P---- spoke to me again:
[Illustration: London Published March 15^{th} 1866 by Day & Son,
Limited, Lithog^{rs} Gate Str. Lincoln's Inn Fields
Day & Son, Limited, Lith.
BROUGHT TO BAY AT THE MUD FORT.]
"Shoot the mandarin," he shouted. "I will cut the vessel adrift, sheer
her in, and try to pick you up. If I cannot quite reach you, take to the
water; you can easily get on board, and I'll protect you by opening fire
on the imps."
Rapidly glancing, as I fully expected for the last time, upon the clear
blue sky above, the bright sun shining upon and making the earth _so_
beautiful and attractive, and vividly recalling a far distant home and a
loved mother for my latest earthly thought, I took steady aim at the
mandarin's heart and pulled the trigger, shouting to P----, "Cut her
adrift, and be sharp about it!"
I naturally expected to hear the report of my pistol, and to see the
mandarin fall, while the soldiers would rush forward to avenge his
death. Although I am certain I gave the trigger a sufficient pull, the
hammer never fell and the mandarin at the moment, when another step
towards me would have brought his uplifted sword upon my head, suddenly
lost his balance and fell from the narrow gunnel of the boat to the
beach. I instantly hailed P---- to "hold on," and he returned to his
former position to watch the progress of events.
When the mandarin rolled on the beach, several of his officers seized
him and dragged him up the bank, regardless of the struggles he made to
return and attack me. Fortunately A-ling arrived upon the scene at this
moment, and going to the mandarin, told him that he would go on board
and bring the money required. While the leader of the robbers was being
brought to his fort, A-ling was taken on board our vessel, after
receiving my assent to procure the dollars from P----. Meanwhile the
soldiers remained in the same position around myself, while I
endeavoured to show them my indifference by producing a cigar and
lighting it.
After A-ling had paid the money into the coffers of the banditti, he
came to me with two inferior officers, and getting the soldiers to fall
back, induced me to descend from my position of vantage, believing all
danger was over. Although at first they seemed quiet enough and retired
from the boat, I had no sooner reached some little distance from it than
they crowded round me. Suddenly, and before I could use my revolver, I
was seized from behind by many hands, and while every incident of my
life rushed with supernatural rapidity and minuteness of detail through
my mind, I was forced upon my knees, when one of the soldiers raised a
long and heavy sword to behead me.
The steel flashed as it was raised above me, and commending myself to
God, I shivered while for a fearful moment awaiting the blow. Again,
however, I was saved from the very jaws of death. My would-be
executioner was thrust aside, and I believe that I fainted for a second
or two. I then found myself surrounded by a strange mandarin and his
attendants, A-ling, my cook, and a few of the more kindly disposed among
the robber band. A-ling informed me that the stranger was a "civil"
mandarin who had just arrived from a neighbouring city; that he had
happened to notice my gold band, and had opportunely rushed forward and
rescued me. Thus for the first time the uniform had done me good.
At first, after expressing my gratitude, I felt perfectly safe under the
protection of the fresh arrival, for I knew that the rank and authority
of a civil mandarin was far superior to that of a military one like the
commandant of the Mud Fort. However, upon the people around me moving a
little away, I saw three soldiers on the ground, two dead and one
severely wounded; for it appeared that P----, upon observing my seizure,
had opened fire on the crowd. It was now evening and the dusk was fast
approaching, and it was evident that not a moment should be lost in
getting away from the place. Two men had been killed, and their chief
would undoubtedly endeavour to avenge their death. After giving the
watch I wore as a memento to the mandarin who had so kindly saved me,
and being supplied with a boat by him, I at last got safely on board
with A-ling and the cook.
My friend P---- had barely gripped me by the hand and congratulated me
upon my escape, when we were startled by the blowing of the war-horns on
shore, and the clang of gongs. While we were hard at work getting our
vessel underweigh, the soldiers came rushing down to the beach again,
waving their flags and arms about, planting their gingalls, and swearing
vengeance for the death of their comrades. In a few minutes they opened
a heavy fire upon us, while a number of them ran along the bank in the
direction of a creek where their gunboats were moored.
The wind had fallen comparatively light, and we would not have been able
to escape from the smaller vessels of the enemy, when, to our great joy,
a steamer rounded the bend of the river below, and came into full view.
At this moment the gunboats were just shoving off from the shore, but
directly they observed the steamship only a few miles distant they
pulled up the creek again, while the men along the beach ceased firing
and ran into the fort, doubtless believing that the approaching vessel
was the man-of-war I had told them about.
When the steamer had arrived pretty near, I signalized her, and saw that
she was one of the American river boats. To my horror, when close
alongside she hoisted the Imperialist flag, and I then knew her to be
the _Williamette_, a vessel belonging to the Manchoo Government. When
right abeam she stopped and sent a boat to my vessel. Fortunately she
was manned with an American crew, and in consideration of the sum of 300
dollars, her captain, whose name, singularly enough, happened to be
Friend, Imperialist though he was, agreed to tow my vessel up to the
Nankin forts.
Before dark we had the satisfaction to bid adieu to the Mud Fort, as we
ploughed up the fast rolling yellow waters astern of the _Williamette_.
To our sorrow, however, we were just able to discern on the beach the
execution of our _lowder_, who was dragged down and decapitated there
before our eyes, while we were powerless to save the poor fellow.
CHAPTER XVI.
Hang-chow.--Ti-pings approach Shanghae.--Their Reception.--The
_Casus Belli_.--The First Blow.--Fillibuster Ward.--Admiral
Hope's Exploits.--Captures Hsiun-tang.--The
Consequences.--Hope's Policy condemned.--The real _Casus
Belli_.--Defence of Shanghae justified.--Inducements to oppose
the Ti-pings.--Official Reports.--Mr. Consul
Meadows.--Recognition of the Ti-pings.--The _Shanghae
Times_.--Mr. John's Report.--Edict of Religious
Toleration.--Report continued.--Mr. Muirhead's Report.
Hang-Chow, the provincial capital, was carried by assault upon the 29th
of December. The Chinese part of the garrison, unable to endure the
horrors of the close siege, after everything in the shape of food had
been consumed, and even human flesh exposed for sale in the
market-place, opened the gates of the outer city and surrendered to the
Ti-pings. The Manchoo troops defended themselves to the last, neither
giving nor accepting quarter, and when the walls of the inner city were
carried by the victorious insurgents, the Tartar general, Luy, and a
number of his men, sprang a mine and blew themselves up with their
citadel.
The capture of this important city and of the treaty port Ningpo having
placed the Ti-pings in possession of the whole Che-kiang province, with
the exception of Shanghae and a few miles around it, they resolved, upon
the termination of the year, as previously agreed to, to follow up the
enemy to this last stronghold.
Although, before his unsuccessful trip to Nankin, Admiral Hope had
seemed willing to treat with the Ti-pings, when he returned to Shanghae,
after finding it impossible to again deceive them, his conduct
underwent a marked change, as evinced by the eager way in which he
sought the opportunity to indulge his warlike propensities. This
opportunity was soon afforded him.
Immediately upon the expiration of the year, Chung-wang, the Ti-ping
Commander-in-Chief, moved an army towards Shanghae. No attack was made
upon the city, but this force gradually occupied every position in the
neighbourhood, till at length not an Imperialist soldier remained beyond
gunshot range of its walls. The Ti-pings again manifested their
extraordinary friendliness towards foreigners by not attacking the city,
and with similar forbearance and moderation to that evinced upon their
approach in 1860, endeavouring to open peaceable negotiation with the
foreign authorities. The leaders of the different _corps d'armee_ sent
in the usual nobly worded proclamations, relating to the oppression of
the Manchoo and their own mission to free and Christianize China; the
success hitherto vouchsafed to their cause by the "Heavenly Father"; the
earnest desire to enter into friendly relations with the "foreign
brethren"; their wish to continue all present trade and to open the
whole country up, &c.
Now, at this time the political position of England with regard to the
rebellion was as follows. By the written guarantee of Sir George Bonham,
by that of Admiral Hope, by that from the British representative at
Ningpo, and by many other acts, her national honour was pledged to
maintain a strict neutrality. The last orders to her officials in China
were, as already quoted:--
"Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain ... neutrality
between the two contending parties;" save British subjects from
punishment, "but otherwise you should abstain from all
interference in the civil war."
[Dated, Foreign Office, August 8, 1861.]
This was the standing order; the only later direction being Lord
Russell's suggestion: "But it _might_ be expedient to defend the treaty
ports _if_ the Chinese would consent not to use those ports for purposes
of aggression."
The way the British Consul, Admiral, and General, at Shanghae, abstained
from all interference was by converting that city into the grand
rendezvous of the Imperialist forces, and then helping them to defend
the Chinese city by garrisoning it with British troops; by conveying
Manchoo soldiery down the Yang-tze to Shanghae in English steamers; by
supplying the Imperialists with artillery, &c., while strictly
prohibiting any trade in the same articles with the other of the two
"contending parties"; and by attacking the Ti-pings when they found that
the Ti-pings would not attack them. That useful triumvirate--the sailor,
the soldier, and the diplomatist--placed the following construction upon
Lord Russell's ambiguous _ifs_ and _ands_. "It _might_ be expedient,"
they singularly understood to mean, it was expedient; and "_if_ the
Chinese, &c.," they converted into assisting and joining the Chinese
"_to use_ those ports for purposes of aggression." Consequently, in
direct violation of their public orders, but in conformity with the
conduct I have just stated, they issued the following reply to the
friendly overtures of the Ti-ping chiefs:--
"Whereas we, the Commanders of the French and British forces now
occupying the city and environs of Shanghae, have received
letters from Lion and Ho, persons styling themselves ...,
informing us that said Lion and Ho are intending to attack and
occupy Shanghae; and whereas we have no means of communicating
with the said Lion and Ho, or any of their people:--Therefore,
this is to give notice to whomsoever it may concern, that
Shanghae city and its environs, Woo-sung included, are at
present in the possession of the troops under our respective
commands, and that if Lion or Ho, or any persons claiming
fraternity with them, attempt to attack these places they will
do so at their peril."
Even this was insufficient to effect the desired object, namely, to
drive the Ti-pings to defiance, and force them to acts of retaliation.
When, therefore, it became apparent that, notwithstanding all the aid
afforded to the Imperialists, they could not succeed, and that
eventually Shanghae must be given up to the revolutionists, or become
annexed to France or England, the British Government threw off the mask,
and prepared for open hostilities.
Consul Medhurst, in a despatch to Admiral Hope, dated "Shanghae,
February 19, 1862," states the grounds upon which the good faith and
honour of England were to be openly violated.
"Granting, of course, that a _strictly neutral policy_ is at
present the only correct one, and that whatever is done in the
protection of this city and settlement must be undertaken with
_careful regard_ to that important axiom, it follows, I think,
that there are two points to be considered as bearing materially
on the present crisis. The first is, what resources we have in
the way of supplies for the city and settlement; and the second,
how far the present action of the Taepings so endangers those
supplies as to make it necessary for us to interfere with them
in our own defence."
The falsity of this shallow pretence for war becomes at once apparent.
In the first place, it was simply necessary to allow the Chinese city to
revert peaceably to the Ti-pings, when the inhabitants as well as they
would have had ample supplies. In the second place, the vast river and
sea communication of Shanghae was entirely open (excepting the Wong-poo
branch), while a fleet of some two hundred European steamers and ships
and several thousand large native junks crowded the anchorage, and could
easily have furnished a line of communication for any amount of
supplies. Evidence is abundant to prove what a mere pretence this _casus
belli_ was, but two reasons will be sufficient justification for so
designating it. First. If the Ti-pings, by surrounding Shanghae,
endangered its supplies, when they came with the most friendly feeling
for Europeans, they would certainly, if driven to become enemies and to
use the justifiable retaliation of enemies, have it in their power to
utterly destroy those supplies by devastating the whole neighbouring
country; therefore, in all human probability, an attack upon them would
render imminent the very crisis to avoid which it was thought
justifiable to violate a nation's pledges. Secondly. The following
extract from Admiral Hope's despatch shows that he conceived that Consul
Medhurst had not made a sufficient case. Upon the 21st of February,
1862, the Admiral struck the first blow. Upon the evening of the same
day, in his despatch to the Admiralty, he gave this reason for his open
violation of his own and his Government's faith:--
"These proceedings" (movements of the Ti-pings) "have been
conducted at a distance much too close to be consistent with the
_respect due to the occupation of the town_ by French and
English forces, or to leave its supplies of provisions and
native trade _unaffected_."
Is it to be supposed that any city could be captured or placed in a
state of siege without native trade or supplies being affected, or is it
to be argued that the Ti-pings should be crushed in consequence of the
natural results of their patriotic struggle?
The presence of the Ti-pings only "_affected_" the trade and supplies it
seems; when, had they been so disposed, they might have stopped the
entire, excepting what could have been obtained by water.
The only thing that affected the supplies of Shanghae so far as
Europeans and citizens were concerned, was the increase in the price,
which was quickly raised by the provision-dealers, who are always ready
to seize the smallest opportunity to make a little extra profit.
Probably Admiral Hope saw this, and its damaging bearing upon his
alleged _casus belli_; at all events, he thought fit to add another,
though equally flimsy.
"The tract of country enclosed within the line BC, which this
village, with others in their" (Ti-pings) "possession, entirely
commanded, is that from which the supplies of Shanghae are
chiefly drawn, and its proximity to the Woo-sung river was such
as to afford the PROSPECT of the Chinese traffic, also material
to the support of the town, being seriously impeded, if not
altogether stopped; and for these reasons I considered the case
to be one calling for my interference."
On these pretences war was made upon the Ti-pings. It will be noticed
that nothing material has ever been _proved_ against the revolutionists,
or urged as an established fact, sufficient to justify hostilities, or
even a remonstrance. The British officials in China and the Government
at home attempt to justify their course of action by mere conjecture as
to what they might do, but never do we find a plain or straightforward
accusation made against them for anything they _had done_.
Admiral Hope, in his attack upon the Ti-pings, associated himself with
one Ward, an American filibuster, in the service of the Manchoos.
Previous to this, and to the Admiral's unsuccessful attempt to juggle
the Ti-ping authorities into another agreement not to approach Shanghae,
the said Ward was persecuted and reviled very fiercely; but no sooner
did the Admiral and his colleagues think it necessary to pull in the
same boat, than the Yankee filibuster became their pattern and ally. The
whilom _rowdie_ companion of _ci-devant_ General Walker, of Nicaraguan
memory, mercenary leader of a band of Anglo-Saxon freebooters in Manchoo
pay, and sometime fugitive from English marines sent to weed his
ruffians of their countrymen, suddenly became the friend and ally of the
British and French Admirals, Generals, and Consuls. The surprise of Ward
can only have been equalled by his gratification upon finding his very
questionable presence, and still more doubtful pursuits, patronized and
imitated. No doubt, at first, he felt considerably elated and vastly
astonished at the idea of filibusting having become an honourable and
recognised profession; but soon, poor fellow! a black, or rather green,
shadow came across his uncertain dream of happiness and
respectability--he became jealous of his friend Admiral Hope, whose
talent and zeal for making war without declaring it or being authorized
so to do by any Government, he found surpassed even his own.
The village of Kao-kiau was garrisoned by a few hundred Ti-pings, and
several thousand country people, who had just joined them, the whole
mostly armed with bamboo spears. The force led against them by Admiral
Hope comprised 350 British seamen with a six-pound rocket-tube, and
about 600 disciplined Chinese, under Ward, besides which, the French
Admiral, Protet, commanded 160 Frenchmen, with a couple of field-pieces.
Of course, the ill-armed Ti-pings were unable to resist the European
artillery and arms of precision, and were consequently driven from the
village, with a loss of more than 100 men killed. This gallant exploit
was safely performed by the Anglo-Franco contingent, who, completely out
of range of the few wretched matchlocks of the Ti-pings, shot them down
at their ease with rifles and artillery, with a loss to themselves of
_only one_ French sailor, killed by a stray shot.
This murderous and cowardly deed was quickly followed up by the gallant
Admiral, who seemed unable to refrain from action, especially when it
could be indulged with comparative safety.
We have already noticed that one excuse Admiral Hope made to justify his
broken faith was the probability that the Ti-pings might injure the
supply of provisions. Strange to say, the Admiral did the very things he
pretended the rebels might have done. At the capture of Kao-kiau all
hands dispersed to loot whatever the Ti-pings had left behind; and,
quoting from the official report of the affair, "Large stores of grain
were discovered about the place, _the greater part of which were
burned_."
After the exploit of Kao-kiau, Admiral Hope, with a small party of
seamen and Ward's filibusters, went roving about the country for a week
in search of some one to fight. His warlike spirit was gratified at a
place named Hsiau-tang, in the vicinity of Ming-hong (nearly twenty
miles away from Shanghae), a fortified village occupied by several
thousand Ti-pings. Directly he found this place in the way, an order
was sent to Shanghae for reinforcements to attack it with. These having
arrived, upon the 1st of March, 1862, the whole force, consisting of 750
of Ward's disciplined Chinese, 350 British sailors and marines, and 35
artillery-men, with four light howitzers, one field-piece, and some
rocket-tubes, and 200 French, with two brass howitzers, moved forward to
the attack. Again, as at Kao-kiau, the murderous work was executed, and
the poorly-armed Ti-pings slaughtered with impunity. For more than an
hour they bravely held their mud and brick entrenchments, but at last
the crushing fire from the foreign artillery, and the sharp practice of
the Enfield rifles, carried the day. After standing to their few
gingalls to the last, amid a storm of shot and shell (all fresh from
British arsenals and paid for by British tax-payers), they were driven
from the lines of defence and through the village with immense
slaughter. As they retreated from the rear, the shell from the
irresistible foreign artillery "were thrown rapidly amongst them,
committing fearful havoc. Numbers also fell under the fire from the
rifles of the French and English sailors." In the centre of the village
the rear guard made a gallant effort to repulse their pursuers, but they
could not withstand the deadly volleys and bayonet charge of the
marines; and although their bravest men fell in heaps, while many
hand-to-hand conflicts took place, they were ultimately driven out with
a loss of 1,000 killed and 300 taken prisoners, the English and French
_not losing a single man_. A great massacre of the unfortunate
non-combatants was perpetrated by the Imperialist soldiery, who actually
forced very many of the living wounded into the flames of the burning
village. In one official report it is stated:--
"The streets and houses presented an awful spectacle, the bodies
in some places lying in heaps; and the plain beyond the village
was strewed with those shot down in the flight."
Another report states:--
"The rebels ran from the fortifications and came to a stand in
the main street.... Upon this, the field-piece from the
_Imperieuse_, in charge of Lieutenants Stuart and Richardson,
swept them down with grape and canister shot; after this their
retreat became a flight, when the party of marines and Chinese
detached to cut them off did considerable execution, some 900 or
1,000 having been killed and wounded."
The same report concludes with this sentence:--
"After all was over, _the village was set on fire_,[1] and the
foreign troops embarked for Shanghae."
What will those who falsely accuse the Ti-pings of devastating and
destroying say to this? They have declared that the Christian patriots'
"success in any locality is attended with its total destruction," &c.;
but it appears that these totally destroyed places were reserved for
Admiral Hope to burn down.
As this history progresses we shall find that although the Admiral made
the damaging effect which the presence of the Ti-pings _might_ have upon
supplies one element of his _casus belli_, _he_ actually destroyed the
very supply of grain which he dreaded might be affected by the rebels!
There is a more serious matter to be deplored with regard to the
numerous raids commenced and followed up by Admiral Hope, namely, the
cruel slaughter of so many hundreds of his fellow-men. We have reviewed
the unmeaning pretences invented by the Admiral and his co-adjutors, but
even should it be admitted they were valid, is it possible any
Englishman can be found willing to justify the massacre of thousands of
human beings, because, although ever friendly to them, they affected the
mercenary speculations of a few merchants? If, in order to maintain the
immediate profit of their mercantile adventurers, any Englishman can
attempt to justify or palliate these summary proceedings against the
unfortunate Ti-pings, then I say, far better should that unholy traffic
perish, cursed as it is by the slaughter of thousands of our
fellow-creatures, whose blood has cried aloud to Heaven for vengeance
upon their assailants.
Even the pretence that the revolutionists would have injured our
"commercial interests" falls to the ground by the testimony of the very
merchants themselves, for the leading mercantile house in China, Messrs.
Jardine, Matheson, & Co., in their business circular, dated "Kong-kong,
27th February, 1862," referring to Admiral Hope's first massacre of
Ti-pings, state:--
"During the interval that has elapsed since the date of our last
circular there is no particular change to notice in the state of
matters about Shanghae; but the policy the Allied Commanders are
adopting will, it is feared, lead to disastrous consequences....
_Our interests call for a strict neutrality_, but so far from
this course being pursued, our last advices report a combined
expedition of English and French marines and sailors in
conjunction with a force of Imperialists, commanded in person by
their respective Admirals, against a body of some 6,000 rebels,
which of course they defeated with great slaughter.... The whole
country being in the hands of the Taepings, should this
_suicidal_ policy be persisted in, must in the end materially
interfere with, if not ruin, all trade, as it cannot do
otherwise than exasperate a foe by no means to be despised."
What stronger condemnation of the policy pursued against the Ti-pings
can be made, coming, as it does, from the principal representative of
the very class whose interests it was pretended necessary to protect?
That this opinion of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, & Co. was correct has at
the present time been pretty well ascertained, for it did "in the end
materially interfere with" trade, as the fall off of silk _after_ the
expulsion of the Ti-pings from the producing district proves. This,
however, was not occasioned, as that firm expected, by the exasperation
of "a foe by no means to be despised," for the Ti-pings (with a
Christian humanity far excelling that possessed by their _civilized_
enemies) never retaliated either upon the trade (entirely in their
power) or the lives of Europeans. The decrease of silk was caused
entirely by the ruthless nature of the war carried by British officers
and Imperialists into the once happy districts of Ti-ping-tien-kwo. The
Ti-ping patriots were either fools or saints, for by their mad
forbearance they suffered themselves to be driven from their former
possessions with incalculable loss of life; whereas, a system of
retaliation on their part would have endangered the entire trade of the
district, and consequently have forced the enemy to relinquish
hostilities which so conclusively endangered the prospect of our
"commercial interests."
As the first mercantile house in China considered the policy of the
British Government "suicidal," we may safely pronounce the affected
anxiety for commercial interests a shallow pretext. What then remains to
constitute the real _casus belli_, unless it be "the temporary interest
arising out of the indemnities," and the great revenue arising out of
the vile opium traffic, the loss of which would have caused a deficit of
many millions in the British treasury?
The seeming inconsistency of allowing the Ti-pings to take Ningpo and
yet defending Shanghae against them is easily explained. At the capture
of the former city no British force was present, and although the seven
days' grace so cunningly obtained from the Ti-ping leaders seems to have
been employed in endeavouring to raise a sufficient force to oppose
their entrance, this, in the shape of H.M.S. _Scout_ and several other
vessels, arrived too late, having reached Ningpo some hours after its
fall. Then, as Admiral Hope very wisely observed with regard to the
policy of exasperating the Ti-pings, "We cannot afford to quarrel with
them, as at any moment they _might_ stop the whole trade of Shanghae."
Their wonderful forbearance had not at that time become assured;
directly it was, hostilities were commenced. Before taking up the sword
for good, it became necessary to try the temper of the Ti-pings. This
Admiral Hope effectually did by his arrogance at Nankin; his "every
obstruction" plan at Ningpo; his raids around Shanghae; an example
followed by the British and French authorities by their unwarrantable
notifications and defence of Shanghae Chinese city.
There are, in fact, very many reasons by which the defence of Shanghae
may be accounted for; but five of the most important will sufficiently
illustrate the principle of the whole.
Firstly. The British Government and its officials interfered in order to
save the indemnity and opium trade, which the capture of Shanghae by the
Ti-pings would have annihilated, and they were strongly supported by the
opium merchants, who, by this vile traffic, made their largest profits.
Secondly. A large number of the Shanghae foreign landholders approved of
the defence of the city, because it enabled them to obtain fresh lots at
their own prices from the Chinese proprietors. From the "minutes of a
meeting of land-renters, held at the British Consulate, Shanghae,
January 12, 1862," it appears that during a council of war with the
Manchoo authorities of the Chinese city (all in accordance with the
pledges of "strict neutrality," of course?)--
"The Taoutae undertook to do this also" (open a road to
facilitate military operations) "_by obliging the Chinese
renters interested to part with their land to the foreign
applicants whose names stood recorded first for purchase_."
Thirdly. A certain proportion of traders having taken advantage of the
Ti-ping movement to circulate unfounded reports as to its brigandage, in
order to monopolize the trade by frightening outsiders away, naturally
sanctioned the defence of Shanghae, as the capture of the city would
have exposed the trick by proving the Ti-pings were not brigands and
robbers.
Fourthly. Many land and house speculators opposed the success of the
insurgents for this reason. The foreign settlements in the vicinity of
the Chinese city had become crowded with fugitives awaiting the firm
establishment of Ti-ping jurisdiction in the interior; by numerous
lawless Chinamen attracted by the shadow of foreign protection and the
opportunity of establishing gambling hells and bagnios, _ad libitum_;
and by the manifold parasites and hangers-on of the Imperial authority
in its last stronghold. Therefore, while this state of affairs lasted,
the land speculators made prodigious wealth by the letting of their
property to the natives at almost fabulous rents, but the capture of the
city by the Ti-pings would have altered all this. The vile manner in
which many colossal fortunes have thus been obtained is lost sight of in
England by the glitter of the ingots.
Fifthly. A large proportion of partners in mercantile houses _upon the
spot_, expected to make their fortunes and retire to their home in three
years; but the occupation of Shanghae by the Ti-pings, and the natural
effect of the civil war, must have interfered with the import trade and
injured their immediate profits.
Upon these grounds British faith was dishonoured and a murderous war
waged against the unfortunate Ti-pings. Admiral Hope continued the work
of destruction with his artillery and rifles from a safe distance, until
his recall to England. Violation of good faith, misrepresentation, and
partial aggression, became superseded by regular hostilities, carried on
without any previous declaration of war, or even statement of grievance.
What would such manner of warfare be denominated in Europe?
Having reviewed the policy of the British Government, and the conduct of
its officials in China, it may be well to notice a few reports upon the
Ti-ping rebellion, well worthy of attention, even though ignored by the
British Ministry. These testimonies prove that the Ti-pings have not
been decimated because they were misunderstood by the British
Government, but that the latter were as well acquainted with their
Christianity, friendliness, political object, superiority to the
Manchoos, and generally improved character, as the writer of this
history, or the authors of the statements he quotes. Therefore, when the
evil policy of those who authorized the unnecessary and unjustifiable
hostilities upon the part of England shall become more generally
admitted, they cannot palliate their wickedness by pleading ignorance of
the true merits of the people. It is difficult to speak of this British
interference in any but the most forcible and unmeasured terms of
condemnation. Not a solitary excuse can be truly made for it; and when
the selfishness of that policy is thoroughly appreciated (which is
rapidly becoming the case), the atrocities committed by its sanction,
and their consequences, will be looked back upon with grief and sadness
by every loyal Englishman.
The first and most important of the above-mentioned reports was made by
Mr. Consul Meadows to Lord Russell. Mr. Meadows was better acquainted
with the Ti-pings than any other English official in existence. He was
the most talented in China, the most honourable and disinterested;
therefore, it may be that his statements were not regarded, and that his
presence at Shanghae became an inconvenience. This difficulty was soon
surmounted by the removal of Mr. Meadows from Shanghae to New-chwang,
very soon after his truthful and independent exposition of the Ti-ping
rebellion, and by naming as his successor a Consul who was more pliable.
The following despatch of Mr. Meadows bears date "February 19, 1861,"
and is worthy of most attentive perusal:--
"CONSUL MEADOWS TO LORD J. RUSSELL.--(Received April 12.)
"Shanghae, February 19, 1861.
"British trade and British-India trade with this country, and
the revenues derived from the one and the other, are among the
most important of British interests abroad. A necessary
condition to the flourishing of these is the existence of
order--of security to life and property--in this country; and
the existence of this order and security, again, requires the
existence of a strong national government. These propositions
are so well established that I merely state them.
"But the hitherto existing Imperial Government, that of the
Manchoo or Ta-tsing dynasty, which was already becoming weak
from internal causes, has received its death-blows from the
external action, first of British arms alone, and now of British
and French combined. No strong national government now exists
anywhere; and in large, and to us very important, portions of
the country, anarchy and insecurity prevail.
"It becomes, therefore, of the utmost importance to look around
us for some other power in the nation to take its place. If we
find any such other power, we must not only not attack it, but
must earnestly desire its speedy growth. An adherence, not less
wise than just, to the principle of non-intervention, together
with the due observance of the treaties with the Ta-tsing
Government, should prevent our taking direct positive steps to
aid that growth; but assuredly it would be a most suicidal
course, as regards those large interests to which I have
pointed, first to achieve the destruction of the government we
find existing, and then to proceed to prevent any other from
coming into existence.
"Now we have such another power in the Taepings, and such
another government in the government which they have established
at Nanking.
"It has been, and by many is still, denied that the Taepings
have any regular government, or can be considered a political
power.
"For one moment I will grant this, but only in order to point
out that after maintaining themselves for eleven years in arms
in China, and for eight in the centre of the empire, the
Taepings are manifestly a power of some sort, and to ask--Are
we, because this power does not come up to all that is expected
of it, are we, therefore, gratuitously to attack it, and either
greatly lessen or altogether destroy its chances of ever
realizing those expectations? What else have we got to look to
for the re-establishment of a government having power to
preserve order?
"But I entirely deny that the Taepings have no regular
government, and have no claim to be considered a political
power.
"Ten years ago, almost immediately after they rose in arms, they
threw off the characteristics of local insurgents, and
proclaimed themselves the irreconcilable enemies of the Ta-tsing
dynasty. From that time to this they have never left us in doubt
of their object. It has always been the great one of making
themselves the heads of the first state in Asia, and the
governors of the largest people in the world. So much has been
established, not only by their own published manifestoes, but by
the official documents of their enemies.
"As to their manner of pursuing that object, whether it is such
as befits a power assuming to be political, it would too much
prolong even this letter to meet in detail all the objections
of those foreigners who declaim against them.
"Speaking generally, these objections may be classed under two
heads. First, those which are based on the application to this
region and its peoples, of arguments drawn from the state of
society and modes of political action of Western Europe, in
defiance of the fact that these arguments are wholly
inapplicable to a state of civilization and a polity so
different; and secondly, those which are applied in entire
disregard of the parallel transactions in Western Europe itself,
a disregard of obvious analogies, which can only be the result
of great ignorance or of wilful prejudice.
"Among the former, are nearly all the objections to their
military discipline, tactics, and strategy, and to their
administrative forms, whether of a civil or a military nature.
"Among the latter, are objections such as that they do not fix
themselves in the places they take; that they take them and then
leave them again, &c.
"The obvious rejoinder, drawn from the history of Western Europe
is, how often, during the great rebellion in England, were
important cities and strong places taken and evacuated or
retaken? Did that prove that the English noblemen and gentlemen
who first headed that rebellion were unfit to establish a
government? Did it prove that Cromwell was neither a general nor
an administrator? And when, ten years ago, the Italians left
Milan to be reoccupied by its former oppressors, after these had
been once expelled, and also allowed the foreign dynasties to
reinstate themselves in their principalities, did that prove
that the Italian party which aimed at expelling all these
foreigners was not a political power?
"A stock argument against the Taepings was drawn from their
destruction of the suburbs of the cities they occupied. This,
however, was finally silenced when, on the approach of the
Taepings to Shanghae a few months ago, the British and French
garrison in that city fired all its suburbs, not excepting the
densely peopled and commercially important suburb between the
city and the river.
"Then, again, ruthless and wanton slaughter, not only of the
foreign Manchoos, but of their Chinese countrymen, has been
urged against the Taepings as a proof that they were a mere gang
of robbers and murderers. But was there during the revolutionary
struggle in France no mutual killing of the opposing parties of
Frenchmen? I mention only the Reign of Terror, and the
'Noyades,' and, leaving it to your Lordship's memory to add
further illustrative transactions, I ask, do such
well-established historical facts prove that the revolutionary
party were merely a large gang of robbers and murderers, and not
a political power?
"While, however, considering it an established fact in the
history of the Taepings that they, on taking Nanking, put the
whole of the Manchoos to death, not sparing even the women and
children; and while thinking it highly probable that they will
treat in the same way any other of the military colonies of the
Tartar conquerors of their country that may fall into their
power, I have long ago arrived at the full conviction that the
tales of the slaughter committed by them on their own countrymen
are not only exaggerated, but very grossly exaggerated.
"My own experience has furnished me with an instructive example
of gross exaggeration of the kind. In the beginning of
September, 1853, when, not the Taepings, but the Triad Society
rebels, suddenly rose and seized the city of Shanghae, I was
travelling alone from Ningpo to Shanghae, _via_ Chapoo. It was
on reaching this latter place, about sixty miles from Shanghae,
that I first got the news from the crew of my own river-craft,
which had come there to meet me. The insurrection having broken
out just as they had left, they themselves could give no
particulars about it. But from other vessels, and from the local
merchants and officials, I learnt that there had been a fearful
slaughter in the city of Shanghae; that the streets were covered
with dead bodies and blood; that the foreigners and the rebels
had been fighting; and that the whole of the foreign community
had retired in the shipping outside of Woo-sung. So uniform and
consistent were these reports, and so certain did it appear that
I should be unable to pass Shanghae out to Woo-sung, that I set
about studying the Chinese maps, with a view of finding a
succession of river-passages by which I might, keeping some
twenty or thirty miles distant, make my way through the country
inside of it, and so out into the Great River, and down that to
the reported position of the foreign shipping. But before
undertaking so serious a circuit I, of course, determined to
approach nearer to Shanghae city. As I did so, I found the
prevalent reports less and less alarming; and at length, when
about twelve miles distant, ascertained the fact--one well known
here at the time--that there had been no fighting whatever with
the foreigners, and that, in the whole city the slaughter and
bloodshed was limited to the killing of one man. Yet the current
and fully-believed reports only sixty miles off were exactly
like those we have so often heard of the slaughter committed by
the Taepings. We know, from the experience of British troops
during the last twenty years, that much loss of life usually
ensues on the forcible occupation of Chinese cities from men
destroying their families, and then themselves; from women,
young and old, committing suicide; and from an unreasoning
terror, that drives people into deep canals or rivers, in vain
attempts to cross them. In these very ways several lives were
nearly lost, a few months back, in the Chinese portion of this
settlement before an alarm subsided which was caused by a sudden
outcry that the Taepings were entering it, none being at the
time within twenty miles' distance.
"From these habits of the Chinese, we may infer that there has
been, in the many populous cities occupied by the Taepings in
this province, much loss of life among women and children, as
well as grown men--non-combatants; and the inference is
supported by the fact of foreigners who having visited such
cities seeing in the canals many unwounded bodies. But that the
Taeping troops have directly put to death a greater proportion
of their non-combatant countrymen, or have even refused quarter
to the armed, to a greater extent than have done revolutionary
parties in the civil wars of England and France, is, I am fully
satisfied, a prejudiced repetition on the part of inimical
foreigners of the interested calumnies of the Ta-tsing party.
"Some time back it had become a good conclusion that in the
tracts of country occupied by the Taepings there must be greater
security for life and property than in those occupied by the
Ta-tsings. We knew that the Taepings had long given up that
system of universal conscription on which they acted in 1853,
and which then made their approach a source of peculiar terror.
We knew that they depended on voluntary enrolment for the
support of their fighting force, and that they were earnestly
endeavouring to get the inhabitants generally of hamlets and
open towns to remain at their usual occupations. This being the
case, it was plain that the Taepings could preserve the public
peace better than the Ta-tsings. For the bulk of the leading
officials among the former were themselves not only fighting
men, but about the best fighting men that they had; men who owed
their position to their military qualities. To them there could,
among their own party, be no open defiance. There might be
nothing of that military drill and tactics which characterize
European armies, but that discipline, which consists in strict
obedience to orders could not fail to be there. On the other
hand, the bulk of the leading Ta-tsing officials, the mandarins,
were about the most inactive and timid, the most unwarlike of
their party, and were, we knew, compelled to employ, as their
chief fighting men, the ex-pirates of the south-eastern
coast-land, who, with their followers, would not content
themselves with their official pay, but would also, in defiance
of the wishes of their weak employers, exact money from, or
plunder outright, the peaceable populations whom they were hired
to protect.
"These inferences have been amply confirmed by recent
unquestionable experiences. Mr. John, an English missionary of
education and intelligence, went two or three months ago from
Shanghae to Soo-chow, and thence to Nanking, where he stayed for
seven days. Mr. John put the question to the Taeping officials
why it was that the walled cities held by them were so entirely
deserted by their former populations of tradesmen, artificers,
&c. He received answers to the effect that those cities had been
transformed into fortresses, necessary to be held for the
reconquest of the country from the Manchoos; that having been
once deserted, no population was readmitted, as, under the guise
of tradesmen, &c., they might gradually be filled with hostile
forces; but that, as soon as their own progress advanced their
frontier to other points, they themselves would be anxious to
see these places repeopled by a peaceful population. In the mean
time they were doing their best to protect, in the hamlets,
villages, and open towns, all who choose to remain in them, in
quiet submission to the Taeping rule.
"Now these explanations and statements were fully supported by
the nature of the circumstances and by what Mr. John saw
himself. He was altogether about a month in the country held by
the Taepings. He traversed a tract of that country of about 120
miles in extent (Tsing-poo to Nanking), and travelled by night
as well as by day, quite unarmed, and never molested. He found
the country people quietly pursuing their usual occupations;
and--a proof of the understanding between them and their Taeping
rulers--saw the soldiers of the latter moving from place to
place in large bodies without inspiring terror, and in parties
of three or two without being assailed. At Soo-chow, both Mr.
John and a well-educated and observant Chinese who accompanied
him, and whom I questioned closely, saw the veritable landed
gentry coming in parties to give in to the civil governor their
adhesion to the Taeping dynasty.
"What, on the other hand, is the state of the country on this
side of the Ta-tsing lines? Not only do the exactions of the
mandarins for military objects equal any similar demands that
can be made by the Taepings, but piracy and robbery are well
known to be everywhere rife. During an excursion, in the end of
October, of some ninety miles up the Yang-tze, I had myself full
opportunity of observing the prevalence of piracy and the alarm
of the country people; and reports came constantly in, on all
sides, showing that the reign of lawless violence is rather
increasing than diminishing.
"It is impossible to say how much of China proper the Taepings
hold altogether, clear of Ta-tsing authorities or troops. But in
proof of their right to be considered a political power, we have
the fact that their armies are operating successfully up into
Shang-tung in the North, down into Kwang-tung and Kwang-se in the
South, and in Sze-chuen in the West, while nothing prevents
their penetrating to the sea in the East but the presence of the
foreign forces at Shanghae.
"On the religion of the Taepings little need here be said.
Viewed as a piece of contemporary history, the fact of the rise
and progress, in this old seat of Confucianism and Buddhism, of
the Bible-spreading Taeping Christianity--be its exact character
what it may--is one of the most interesting spectacles that the
annals of the human race present; and if the Taepings succeed in
becoming the rulers of the Chinese people, it will prove one of
the most momentous. A foreign official agent, whose nature or
the limited extent of whose information permits of his viewing
that spectacle with indifference, must surely be adjudged
mentally unfitted for the career he has chosen. But except as a
deeply interesting piece of contemporary history, we have
nothing to do with it. If we aid the Taepings on account of
their professed creed, we propagate religion by the sword; if we
attack them on account of it, we engage in a religious
persecution.
"One circumstance, which does not directly interest us, remains
to be considered; the disposition of the Taepings towards us. On
this point, the testimony is continuous, always consistent, and
remarkably satisfactory. On three or four occasions, on which
foreign war-vessels have, without any previous communication,
steamed right up to the river batteries of the Taeping fortified
places, they have exercised the right--a right inherent in every
belligerent power--of endeavouring to keep off a suspicious and,
for their means of defence, formidable force. But so soon as
they have been told that it was not the hired foreign steamers
of their Ta-tsing enemies, but the Government vessels of neutral
foreigners that were before them, they have in every instance at
once ceased firing. Their superior officers have fully explained
that if foreign neutral vessels would send small unarmed boats
in advance, they would not be fired at; and whenever this has
been done, they have kept faith. As for the white flag of truce,
it is simply absurd to suppose that that purely conventional
signal of the Western world can be known to the commander of
every Taeping battery. But the Taepings have a complete
justification for disregarding it, even if they knew it; they
are fighting with an enemy who would not hesitate an instant
about sending in his own foreign steamers to open fire or effect
a hostile landing, with a white flag or a British ensign flying
at each mast-head. In no one of the numerous cases of one or
more unarmed foreigners advancing to the Taeping outposts, since
I first landed at Nanking in April, 1853, up till the most
recent visits of Shanghae traders to Soo-chow, have they been
received otherwise than peacefully; while in several cases those
who have visited them as prejudiced unfriends have been
converted into well-wishers by the friendliness of their
reception.
"They appeared in force before Shanghae six months ago, but I
have good reasons for feeling satisfied that they were deluded
into so doing by certain foreigners who wished to bring on an
irremediable hostility between them and us, and who had held out
to them the hope that we should give up the place to them. They
fired a few ineffectual shots at the Chinese troops who were
mingled with the British on the walls, and who kept discharging
their matchlocks. But they did not fire at all where there were
only British in front of them, and not one of the foreign
soldiers received a wound, though a number of the Taepings were
killed by our fire. Lastly, during the half-year that has
elapsed since they retired, foreigners have been received at
their places, if not with the same hopeful cordiality, as
peacefully and as civilly as before.
"We have a long succession of irrefragable proofs that the
Taepings do earnestly desire friendly commercial relations with
us. The fact is so well known that inimical foreigners have been
constrained to endeavour, with a curiously blind ingenuity, to
turn it against them. 'All that is mere pretence,' it has been
argued; 'if they felt sure they were strong enough to attack us
with advantage, they would do it.' In reply, I ask if it be so,
in how far do the Taepings differ in that respect from the
Russians, French, and Americans? Is the peaceful and civil
reception the English get from these nations the result of pure
friendliness or of policy? Would they attack us if they felt
sure they could do so with advantage? What are our Channel
fleets, our fortifications, and our 150,000 volunteers for?
"A few years back the aid of a small British army and naval
squadron, operating along a portion of the Great River, could
perhaps have enabled the Manchoos to suppress this particular
Chinese rising against their rule; but now it would require a
large fleet of steamers, operating throughout some 1,500 to
2,000 miles of the Great River and its larger branches, and some
20,000 troops, operating in three or four complete small armies
in different parts of the tract of country mentioned above as
being more or less in the occupation of Taeping forces, and
which extends about 800 to 900 miles from north to south, and
1,000 to 1,100 from east to west. It would prove one of the most
troublesome and costly wars that England ever engaged in; costly
as regarded the direct outlay, and still more costly as regarded
the consequences to our trade; for the region in question is
that which, practically speaking, produces the whole of our tea
and silk exports, and which consumes the larger portion of our
manufactured imports; and the effect of our hostilities in it
would be to overspread it with anarchy and desolation."
From this despatch it will be seen that every point upon which the
British Government has based its hostilities against the Ti-pings is
plainly disproved. The last paragraph may be regarded by some few
bigoted pro-Imperialists as an exaggeration; but when they glance at the
present state of China (1865), and see the Ti-pings still victoriously
disputing the supremacy of the Manchoo, when they look upon the very
diminished export of silk, and upon the rebellion rampant in every
province of China, they can hardly dispute that a "large fleet of
steamers" and 20,000 troops was correctly considered by Mr. Meadows
necessary to suppress the revolution.
As for the justice of the British intervention, it is hardly necessary
to speak any further. The belligerent character of the Ti-ping rebellion
was recognised immediately after its origin, simply because the British
remained neutral towards a Power carrying on war, and moreover, from the
fact that English representatives sought out and made guarantees of
neutrality with the Ti-ping authorities. But, while openly recognising
the belligerent rights of the revolutionists, the British Government has
invariably evaded a strict interpretation of its professions, and given
a tacit support to the Manchoos, thereby making themselves a party to
the war, and constituting themselves the allies of the latter Power.
The Ti-pings were fully entitled to equal rights with the Imperialists,
whether upon the high seas, neutral waters, at the treaty ports, or
elsewhere. They possessed a settled Government at Nankin, a vast
territory, and _several_ ports; and such being the case, should, and had
the British authorities acted honourably would, have enjoyed any and
every privilege given or allowed to the other party in the civil war.
When the Spanish colonies cast off their allegiance to Spain, when
Brazil revolted against Portugal, when Texas seceded from Mexico, when
Greece rebelled against its Turkish rulers, when the Southern States of
America seceded from the Union, when Santo Domingo rose against Spain,
when the Neapolitans revolted against their Government, in every one of
these, and countless other cases, each belligerent as a matter of right
received equal privileges from neutral Powers.
Had England and other neutral Powers acted according to their own laws,
they would have been bound to recognise the independence of the
Ti-pings, for the utter inability of the ousted Manchoo Government to
recover its authority within a reasonable time was apparent. More than
this, it was universally admitted that the Tartars, if unassisted by
foreigners, would be overthrown, and when such contingency became
certain, England was dragged in to assist them. The excuse about danger
to British lives and property from the occupation of the treaty ports by
the insurgents is proved false by the capture of Shanghae in 1853, and
the capture of Ningpo in 1861. The only other excuse of any moment is
the "_might_ injure trade" one; but is that to be considered a
sufficient justification? In all the cases of rebellion just cited,
England remained neutral; why then has she been made to assume to
herself, in China _only_, the right to interfere in internecine strife?
Why not interfere in America for the sake of trade and to prevent
so-called rebels from collecting duties? As principle has nothing to do
with the policy pursued in China, why should it elsewhere? Or why may it
not be boasted that England feared to interfere in America, and
therefore refrained; but acted differently in China, having no fear.
The _Shanghae Times_, a paper giving its general support to the
Government, in its issue of March 15, 1862, thus describes the
initiation of hostilities against the Ti-pings:--
"We believe that Admiral Hope is the first English officer of
the present century who has adopted the unsoldierly practice of
making war without having declared war. Having recognised the
Taepings as a Power, according to the usage of civilized
nations, he ought to have given them the alternative of retreat,
submission, or butchery, before commencing the latter. This he
did not. But as the Imperialists served him at Taku, he served
the Taepings at Ming-hong. Honourable men condemned the conduct
of the Imperial general at the Taku, and if the code of honour
has not changed since then, it has been _grossly_ violated in
the two recent attacks on the Taepings."
We have in a former chapter noticed the false assertion of the British
minister in China with regard to "all classes of observers" condemning
the religion of the revolutionists, and his equally unfounded statement
that the Revds. J. Edkins and Griffith John met with an "ungracious
reception." The following reports by the Rev. G. John (of the London
Missionary Society) will not only expose the truthlessness of Mr. Bruce,
but also multiply proofs as to the Christianity of the Ti-pings, the
evil policy of the British Government, and the astounding apathy of the
missionary body at large.
The Rev. Griffith John, in a report to the secretary of his society,
dated "Shanghae, December 6, 1860," states:--
"They" (the Ti-pings) "have created a vacuum, not only in the
temples, but also in the hearts of the people, which remains to
be filled. This is the missionary's work--_a work that might be
done immediately, were it not for the unaccountable policy of
the representatives of foreign Powers at this port_. My
principal object in going has been fully realized.
"My object was to obtain from the chief an edict of religious
toleration. This I have obtained. It gives full permission to
missionaries of every persuasion to enter into and live in the
insurgents' territory, for the purpose of carrying on missionary
work. The phraseology, in some parts, is bombastic, and
therefore objectionable; but the simple meaning is full
toleration to all Christians, whether Protestant or Catholic. 'I
see that the missionaries are sincere and faithful men, and that
they do not count suffering with Christ anything; and because of
this I esteem them very highly.' Such are the words of the
edict. Then comes a command to the chief officers to issue
orders to all the (insurgent) brethren to treat the missionaries
well. I showed the edict at Su-cheu, and asked the chiefs if
they would help me to get a house, a chapel, &c. 'Yes,' said
they, 'you come, and it will be all right.' I send you the
original of this edict, written by the young prince himself, and
bearing the seal of his father, and I intend to furnish you with
a translation by the first opportunity. _I firmly believe that
God is uprooting idolatry in the land, through the insurgents,
and that He will by means of them_, in connection with the
foreign missionary, plant Christianity in its stead. Let the
prayers of our brethren in England be more fervent than ever in
behalf of China. If these men succeed, the days of idolatry are
numbered in the land. I am fully convinced that, should they
succeed to establish order within the boundary of the Keang-su
province, it would be _nominally_ a Christian province before
the expiration of twenty years. The same observation will hold
good of all the other provinces."
This is the edict referred to by Mr. John:--
"'EDICT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION,' BY THE CHIEF OF THE CHINESE
INSURGENTS.[2]
"'Having received the decree of my Heavenly Father (God), of my
Heavenly adopted Father (Christ), and of my Father (the
Celestial King), I command all the King's officers, both civil
and military, and all the Brethren, to be acquainted with it.
The true doctrine of my Father (God), and of my adopted Father
(Christ), is the religion of Heaven. The religion of Christ
(Protestant religion), and the religion of the Lord of Heaven
(Roman Catholic religion), are included in it. The whole world,
together with my father and myself, are one family. Those who
lovingly and harmoniously observe the regulations of the
heavenly religion are permitted to come and visit (us). Now,
from the _memorial_ presented to us by my uncles, Kan, Tsan,
Chung, and others, I learn that the foreign teacher G. John and
his friends, esteeming the Kingdom of Heaven, and reverencing
and believing in my Father (God), and my adopted Father
(Christ), to whom be thanks for the bestowment upon us of
authority, power, and wonders, of which those who are far and
near have reverentially heard--have come for the express purpose
of seeing the light, of beholding God and Christ, and of
requesting permission to spread abroad the true doctrine.
Seeing, however, that the present time is a time of war, and
that the soldiers are scattered abroad in every direction, I am
truly afraid that the missionaries might be injured by following
the rabble soldiery, and that thus serious consequence might
ensue. Still, I truly perceive that these (missionaries) are
sincere and faithful men, and that they count it nothing to
suffer with Christ; and because of this I esteem them very
highly.
"'Let the kings inform all the officers and others, that they
must all act lovingly and harmoniously towards these men, and by
no means engender contention and strife. Let all know, that the
Father (God), my adopted Father (Christ), my father and myself,
are one family; and let these men (missionaries) be treated
exceedingly well.
"'Respect this.'
"NOTE.--The Kan-wang told us that the chief is anxious that his
son should feel an interest in the propagation of the Gospel,
and therefore directed him to write it....
"The expressions 'to the light,' and 'behold Christ and God,'
are explained in the fact that Nanking is the Jerusalem of the
Celestial dynasty. I asked the Kan-wang if the above edict opens
up the whole of the insurgents' territory--Nanking not
excepted--to missionary operations. He replied that it does....
"Thus, then, the above throws open the whole of the insurgents'
territory to missionary work, so far as the insurgents
themselves are concerned. Here and there the phraseology is
objectionable; still, this point is quite clear: they have done
this not in ignorance, but with their eyes quite open to the
difference which exists between them and ourselves."
In a letter, dated twelve days later than that already quoted from, Mr.
John gives this reason for not going to live among the Ti-pings:--
"When I returned from Nankin I fully intended to go to live in
that city, if practicable; but after much thought, _and some
consultation with those who are in authority_, I have come to
the conclusion that it would be premature to do so just now....
The river, I am told on good authority, is to be opened at once,
and the ports of Han-kow and Kin-kiang are to become consular
ports. Another expedition is about to go up the river, and then
it will be determined what is to be done with the insurgents.
They may be treated as friends, or, on the other hand, as foes.
If not as friends, I AM CONVINCED THAT IT WILL BE OUR FAULT,
because they cherish the kindliest feeling towards us, in spite
of our conduct towards them when they visited Shanghae."
We will conclude Mr. John's reports with three short extracts; the first
of which clearly shows what good might have been effected by the British
missionaries had they performed their duty; the second goes far to
establish the superiority of the Ti-pings over the Manchoos.
1. "The insurgents are making rapid strides, and are determined,
as you will learn from my journal, to uproot idolatry in the
land, _and to plant Christianity in its room_. The former they
will do with a strong hand, and the latter will not be left
undone, _if the Churches and missionaries are alive to their
duty in reference to this great movement_."
2. "They have doubtless gross defects; but in every
respect--religious, political, social, &c.--they are centuries
ahead of the Imperialists, and I cannot but wish them God
speed."
The third and last extract from Mr. John's reports is taken from one
dated "February 2, 1861," and fully shadows forth what England has _now_
been compelled to understand, and what every sensible person fully
comprehended long since. Mr. John states:--
"It is fortunate for us that the Tartars have their hands full
just now, _as the value of the recent treaty rests solely on the
weakness of the existing dynasty_. The Tartars hate us with an
insatiable hatred, and would, in spite of the treaty, recommence
warlike operations to-morrow had they the power. To break faith
with the _barbarian_ is not crime but virtue, according to their
creed, if his humiliation and expulsion might thereby be
effected. From the Manchoos we have nothing to hope, but
everything to fear. They are sworn enemies to Christianity and
civilization, and they have set their iron faces determinedly
against both. They _can_ do but little at present. The wonderful
progress of the insurrection in the South, during the last
year, and the repeated defeats and the complete discomfiture of
the Tartar hosts in the North, have thoroughly undermined the
Manchoo power. It must fall. There is no power in China to
uphold it. The Kwang-si insurrection, on the other hand, must
triumph, _if foreign Powers do not interfere_. The Manchoos
might as well attempt to blow the sun out of the heavens as to
quench this flame which their folly and tyranny have kindled....
"The insurgents themselves are still determinately opposed to
idolatry in all its features. At their approach the idols
vanish, and the priests of Buddh and Tau disappear. The downfall
of idolatry in the land seems to be bound up with their success.
Never did China present such a spectacle to the Christian world.
Will the Church, _unfaithful to her Head and false to herself_,
as the depository of the blessings of light and life for the
world, look on with indifference? Shall the four hundred
millions of China remain in their state of darkness and death,
_because of the worldliness and deadness_ of the people of God?"
To these questions the British Government appears to have returned an
affirmative answer.
A few extracts from a report of the Rev. W. Muirhead, in harmony with
the testimonies of other missionaries, both as to the death-blow
idolatry had received from the victorious arms of the Ti-pings, and the
general knowledge of Christianity possessed by them, shall close our
quoted evidence for the present. In the spring of 1861, Mr. Muirhead
spent a month among the Ti-pings at Nankin, and while there was
constantly engaged in preaching about the city, and thus describes his
experience:--
"Going about sometimes for several hours a day, I have been
abundantly encouraged by the number and attention of the
audiences. It seems as if there were a foundation to go upon,
from the amount of religious knowledge diffused among the
people. There is a response, if not in their hearts, at least in
their thoughts, to the tidings of mercy. They are made familiar
at every step with the name and compassion of the Heavenly
Father, _by the unprecedented practice of recording the fact
over every door_. When, therefore, the same truths are announced
in their hearing by a foreign missionary, _they give a ready
assent, and express their cordial approval_. How different is
all this from our experience in Shanghae and elsewhere! There we
have a hard and strong ground to work upon; ignorance and
_opposition_ prevail in abundant measure. Here, on the part
both of the military and civilians, there _is_ knowledge, and
there _is_ appreciation of the truth to a certain extent, which
renders the spiritual enforcement of it a more easy and pleasant
duty."
These extracts must naturally make one believe that the "all classes of
observers," so cunningly invented by Mr. Bruce and his ministerial
friends, consist of Mr. American Baptist Missionary Holmes.
The Kan-wang, the missionaries' friend, having left the city while Mr.
Muirhead was there, that event was mentioned in the following
language:--
"In prospect of his going out, I had occasion some time ago to
allude to his constant dependence on God, and to urge upon him
the duty of earnest prayer. But in this I was anticipated by a
previous request of his own, when, after describing the trials
and difficulties of his situation, he said to me: '_Mr.
Muirhead, pray for me!_' He has need of our prayers, and I trust
his request will be attended to by many friends at home."
Poor Kan-wang! The only prayers have been those devoutly entertained by
opium traders and "indemnity" interested people for the destruction of
him and his confederates.
Of the Ti-ping women Mr. Muirhead states:--
"While walking along the streets, the number of females that are
seen on the way is rather a novelty. They are in general well
dressed, and of very respectable appearance. Many are riding on
horseback, others are walking, and most of them have large feet.
Not a few stop to hear our preaching, and always conduct
themselves with perfect propriety. _This is new, as compared
with the former course of things, and the whole reminds one
partly of home life._ It will be a blessing if the revolution
should tend to break up the system of female exclusion, hitherto
practised."
We will conclude our extracts from Mr. Muirhead's report with the
following interesting account of a conversation between himself and a
young Ti-ping soldier:--
"And now a word or two, with regard to the character and
prospects of the movement. Those engaged in it speak not
boastfully, but calmly and confidently, of its success. They
acknowledge the difficulties in the way, yet believe in the Lord
God that they shall be established. They do not apprehend it
will be an easy thing to overcome their enemies; but fighting,
as they think, under the banners of the 'Heavenly Father' and
'Heavenly Brother,' they contemplate a happy issue as a matter
of course.
"As Kan-wang's followers were assembling in front of his palace,
a young man came upstairs. I asked him if he was going out to
join the army. He said yes. 'Was he not afraid of being wounded
or killed?' 'Oh, no,' he replied, 'the Heavenly Father will
befriend me.' 'Well, but suppose you should be killed, what
then?' 'Why, my soul will go to heaven.' 'How can you expect to
go to heaven? What merit have you to get there?' 'None, none in
myself. It is entirely through the merits of the Heavenly
Brother that this is to be done.' 'Who is the Heavenly Brother?'
'I am not very learned,' he said, 'and request instruction.' I
then began to tell him that He was the Son of the Heavenly
Father; but before I had finished the sentence, he replied
correctly. 'What great work did Christ do?' I asked. The young
man gave an explicit statement of the Saviour's work for
sinners, of his coming into the world, suffering and dying in
the room of sinful man, in order to redeem us from sin and
misery. I inquired if he believed all this. 'Assuredly,' was his
reply. 'When did you join the dynasty?' 'Last year.' 'Can you
read?' 'No.' 'Who instructed you in these things?' 'The
Tsan-wang.' 'What does he in the way of instructing his people?'
'He has daily service in his palace, and often preaches to them
alike at home and when engaged in the field.' 'What book does he
use?' 'He has a number belonging to the dynasty.' 'Do you know
the New Testament?' 'Yes, but cannot read it.' 'Can you repeat
the doxology of the Heavenly Father?' He went over it correctly.
It contains in simple language the fundamental tenets of
Christianity. 'Are there any special laws or commands connected
with the dynasty?' 'There are the ten commandments.' 'Repeat
them.' He went over a number of them, till he came to the sixth.
'Now,' I said, 'how is this command observed by you, seeing that
so much cruelty and wickedness are practised by your brethren
all around?' 'Oh,' he replied, 'in so far as fighting in the
open field is concerned, that is all fair play and cannot be
helped. It is not intended in the command.' 'No,' I remarked,
'that is not my meaning; but look at your brethren going
privately into the country and robbing and killing the innocent
people; what of that?' 'It is very bad, and such will only go to
hell.' 'What, notwithstanding their adherence to the dynasty,
and fighting under the same banners as yourself?' 'Yes, that is
no matter; when the laws of Christ and the Heavenly Father are
not attended to, these guilty individuals ought to die and go to
hell.' 'But is not this the case with a great number of your
adherents?' 'Alas! it is especially among our new recruits,
whose hearts are not impressed with the true doctrine.' 'In all
the public offices is care taken to instruct the soldiers and
civilians connected with them?' 'Yes, every man, woman, and
child of reasonable age in the capital, can repeat the doxology
of the Heavenly Father.' 'And what about those in the country?'
'Those who have short hair are not yet sufficiently taught, but
books are being distributed amongst them, in order that they may
learn those things."
Can this be called a "blasphemous and immoral" basis of religion? If
those who so designated it possessed but a tithe of the temporal
practice and spiritual faith of this illiterate young Ti-ping, they
would be happier men; but it must be admitted that their sentiments and
actions hardly induce such a belief.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _Vide_ p. 6, "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China,
1862."
[2] "The original is written by the young prince, in the name of his
father, on satin, with the vermilion pencil, and stamped with the seal
of the Taeping-wang, the Celestial king."
CHAPTER XVII.
On board the _Williamette_.--Blockade running.--Arrival at
Nankin.--Solemn Thanksgiving.--Domestic Arrangements.--Phillip's
Wife.--The Wooing.--The Dowry.--The Wedding.--Trade
established.--Imperialist Corruption.--Preparations for
leaving.--An Elopement.--The Journey.--The Surprise.--The
Repulse.--Arrival at Hang-chow.--Its capture.--The
particulars.--Cum-ho.--The Chung-wang.--His mistaken Policy.
Thanks to the impish steamer _Williamette_, we escaped any further
annoyance at the hands of her friends, for, according to agreement, she
towed us past all the Imperialist positions. Although I had paid rather
dear for this favour, the danger we had escaped at that atrocious Mud
Fort, and those troubles we avoided by towing past the unscrupulous
batteries and piratical squadrons of the enemy, made it well worth more.
Had we sailed to Nankin, our nights would have been far from pleasant,
sleep being rendered impossible from the unceasing watching for some
hostile demonstration, and the excitement attendant on the several
skirmishes which we must have had with the Manchoos.
The worry and excitement of running the Nankin blockade can only be
thoroughly appreciated by those who have experienced its perils. The
Ti-ping adherents certainly found few pleasures to reward them, and
their lot was very far indeed from being cast in pleasant places. Such
dangers as myself and many others have endured while assisting the cause
of these patriots have left an impression which even time cannot
efface.
Perchance, we are sailing peacefully and slowly along the broad
Yang-tze, dreaming of home or philosophizing upon the spread of liberty
and Christianity by our Ti-ping friends, when crash comes a discharge of
artillery from some Manchoo fort, as the first intimation that we were
within the meshes of those who would destroy all hope of improving China
or of realizing our own dreams, with equal indifference. This danger
passes over, and the wearied have sought for slumber, when those on
their anxious watch suddenly discover a squadron of the sometime pirate
_Ti-mungs_ hired to fight the battles of the Manchoo; and at the same
instant those below are startled by the broadsides fired at their
devoted vessel. After running the gauntlet of these heavily-armed
vessels, the sleepers, with rifles by their side and revolvers under
pillow, are subject to incessant disturbance from the attack of the
centipede gunboats, as the latter pull from sly corners and creeks, in
twos, tens, or twenties, and chase the passing ship, eager for the blood
of those on board, or the pleasure of looting their effects.
Many of the few Europeans who were engaged assisting the Ti-pings were
captured and barbarously killed by the Imperialists; yet, in spite of
these dangers, and the certain prospect of a cruel death if unfortunate
enough to fall into their hands, every man willingly incurred them, with
a full conviction that the cause was worthy of any risk or sacrifice.
Some have been found daring enough to allege that personal profit was
the motive which induced so many to incur suffering and danger in
support of the Ti-pings. The absurdity of such a statement is made clear
by the fact, that from 1860 to 1863 the principal supply of silk and tea
was derived by the merchants of China from the Ti-pings, and that it was
possible to carry on trade with the Imperialists with perfect safety,
and with as large, if not larger, profit.
The true reason why those engaged in assisting the Ti-pings preferred
that course, with all its troubles and dangers, is that, having once met
the revolutionists, the immense superiority of the latter to the
Manchoos had enlisted their sympathies and active support. Money, of
course, in many cases had a great deal to do with the transactions of
those who _traded_ among the Ti-pings; but others, I am certain, were
solely actuated by disinterested motives. He must, indeed, be a singular
specimen of a man who could really know and experience the society of
the Ti-pings, and not become a warm friend to them.
The _Williamette_ was a powerful steamer, and on the evening of the day
after she had taken us in tow, we had the satisfaction to be cast off
right in the mouth of the Nankin creek, while the good ship continued on
her way to Ngan-kin, whither she was bound with munitions of war freshly
obtained from the British arsenals in China, to be expended in the
slaughter of those who held England's pledge of strict neutrality.
Upon bringing up in the creek, I landed and paid my friend the Sz-wang a
visit. He gave me a hearty welcome, and immediately set his servants to
prepare a regular feast for myself and friend. I could not refuse the
kind hospitality of my worthy host, even impatient as I was to get into
the city and see Marie, who, he assured me, was in perfect health and
happiness, and a vast favourite among the ladies at the Ti-ping capital,
at the same time astonishing me by saying that Phillip had been married
since my departure from Nankin.
At last, while the dinner was progressing, and the Sz-wang had for a
moment been called away by a courier from the city, I left the table,
and, assisted by his eldest nephew, who was a great friend of mine, I
mounted one of his best horses and set off for Nankin, leaving my friend
P. to excuse me and relate our adventures and the intentions of the
so-called "foreign brethren" at Shanghae towards the Ti-pings; a point
upon which the Sz-wang always felt the deepest anxiety.
Upon reaching the Chung-wang's palace, I found a large number of chiefs
assembled in the "Heavenly Hall," and all greatly elated by despatches
just received from the Commander-in-Chief detailing the capture of the
seaport Ningpo. Anxious as I naturally felt to meet my betrothed, I was
yet obliged to join the chiefs in the solemn thanksgiving they were
about offering to the Great Giver of all victory. Upon this occasion, as
usual, whether after triumph or defeat, the Ti-pings attributed their
important success entirely to the will of "The Heavenly Father." Their
absorbing reliance upon God, because of their belief in the
righteousness and Christianity of their cause has often startled me by
its singular devotedness and simplicity. It was not only those who had
been of the original "Society of the Worshippers of God" in Kwang-si,
that were so fervent and hopeful, but all _bona fide_ Ti-pings, and even
many among the latest recruits were equally inspired. It is a well-known
fact that young boys, of twelve to fifteen years of age, are commonly
the bravest soldiers and most daring spirits in the ranks of the Ti-ping
soldiery. Formerly the very women fought by the side of their male
relatives; at the present time they still undergo the hard dangers of
the camp. Thus, upon consideration of all the facts bearing upon the
motive and practice of the Ti-pings, it cannot be difficult to
understand that some mighty inspiration has affected a large portion of
the Chinese in a remarkably striking manner. Some term the cause and
effect evil; others, not so self-conceited and hypercritical, say "it is
good." By some the great Ti-ping revolution has been considered a
religious fanaticism, an extensive leaguing together of banditti for the
sake of plunder; the fact being that the only religious enthusiasm is to
establish our Bible throughout China, and the only physical action an
endeavour to liberate that vast empire from what even their worst
opponents declare a hopelessly corrupt and oppressive Government!
[Illustration:
Day & Son, (Limited), Lith.
A VIEW IN THE INNER APARTMENTS OF THE CHUNG WANG'S PALACE]
When the thanksgiving prayers in the "Heavenly Hall" were brought to a
conclusion, I soon found my way to the inner apartments, and had the
happiness to find Marie looking, if possible, better and more handsome
than ever. She was delighted with the kindness of the Ti-ping ladies,
and particularly noticed their sincere piety and continual study of the
Holy Scriptures. Before long her inseparable companion, Miss Cum-ho,
appeared, and considerably amused us by her roundabout inquiries after
my friend L., who, much to her satisfaction, I stated might be shortly
expected.
While taking a stroll in the garden, Marie informed me that during my
absence she had been much annoyed by the importunate attentions of a
young chief, the son of the Tsan-wang, one of the principal members of
the Ti-ping Government. In fact, to so unpleasant an extent had his
sudden passion carried him that, upon two occasions, his emissaries had
attempted her abduction, the last attempt having taken place only a few
evenings before my return, and while she was walking in the palace
grounds alone. The young chief I knew by reputation as a wild and
unscrupulous character, but his father was a most influential personage;
therefore, though I might readily have avoided further trouble by
representing the affair to the authorities, I decided to take Marie with
me and join the Chung-wang at Hang-chow, rather than excite any bad
feeling by making a public case when it could be avoided. Ti-ping
justice was remarkably prompt and severe, and conviction of the chief
would very likely have led to decapitation. Before putting my plan into
execution, it was necessary to await the arrival of L. with our lorcha.
In the evening I found Phillip with his wife waiting to see me in the
old rooms at the back of the Chung-wang's palace. I had ample occasion
to congratulate him upon his choice, for the lady was by no means
wanting in personal beauty. She was a really fine girl, taller than the
generality of Chinese women, with very pretty and regular features,
light-complexioned and rosy-cheeked, and was quite black-eyed and
long-haired enough to please the greatest brunette admirer; besides
which she was fortunate enough to possess nice little feet, not deformed
according to Imperialist Chinese taste. How Phillip met her, and how she
became his wife, took place, as he informed me, in the following way:--
A week or two after my departure from Nankin, intelligence was received
of the capture of the city of Ngan-kin by the Imperialists, and the
defeat of the Ying-wang, who had been prevented effecting its relief
through the delay caused by his communication with the British
expedition up the Yang-tze. Reinforcements having been ordered from
Nankin to the north bank of the river, so as to co-operate in the
Ying-wang's retreat, Phillip accompanied them, taking charge of the few
pieces of artillery they carried.
One day, while with the foremost of the advanced guard, he became
engaged in an attack upon a fortified hamlet, which was obstinately
defended by some Manchoo troops, who were assisted by the inhabitants.
In such cases, of course, the Ti-pings treat the villagers as enemies,
making prisoners of those who escape the battle, and seizing their
effects.
While driving the Imperialists out of the palace, Phillip received a
slight though painful spear-wound in one of his hands, and, upon
entering a house to obtain some water, he saw his future wife for the
first time. The house was, apparently, one of the poorest in the
village, and the young woman, with her aged father and a little
servant-girl, constituted its only occupants. They were naturally much
alarmed by the conflict raging about them, and while the timid daughter
supplied him with a draught of water, her father threw himself at his
knees, _ketowing_ and imploring protection.
Phillip was considerably impressed by the charms of the celestial
damsel, and with his brave though tender heart sincerely pitied her
unprotected state, so he waited until the arrival of the main body of
the forces; and then, after obtaining from the chief in command a
protection _chop_, or paper, to affix to the door of the house, and
thereby make it inviolate, he continued on the march, leaving father and
daughter showering Chinese blessings upon his foreign head.
My friend had not proceeded very far when he reflected that a great
proportion of the rear guard (which in this case was a position of no
moment) was composed of quite new levies, many of whom had been
Imperialist _braves_, and had only lately been enlisted as Ti-pings, and
who, probably, still retained the old propensities to excess and plunder
strong within them. Thinking thus, and, I dare say, with a lively
remembrance of the daughter's pretty face--her equal not being seen
every day in China--he determined to ride back and protect the old man's
house, if necessary, till the last of the force had passed through the
village. During his return he had met a number of the recruits as
prisoners for looting houses and robbing country people, the punishment
for which would almost certainly be decapitation, and upon reaching the
place he found many were plundering and destroying all they could lay
hands on.
Phillip had scarcely noticed this when the little girl he had seen at
the house came running up to him, screaming and holding out her hands,
and with the blood pouring from a large gash across her cheek.
Fearing the worst, and blaming himself for not having made greater
haste, he left one of his men to attend to the poor child, and galloped
up to the house with the rest.
The building was beginning to smoke where some of the marauders had just
applied the torch, while, right across the threshold of his once happy
home, the apparently lifeless body of the old man lay before my friend.
Hearing the noise of voices inside the house, Phillip expecting at each
step to come across the daughter's corpse, drew his revolver and
entered. He arrived not a moment too soon, for, upon reaching the inner
chamber, he found the poor girl struggling in the hands of several
soldiers. The next instant and his pistol had effectually released her,
when she rushed fainting and dishevelled to his arms. Carrying her to
the outer apartment, he laid her on a couch, and then turned his
attention to the father. The latter still lived, but death was evidently
fast approaching as his life ebbed away from several ghastly wounds
inflicted by the heavy knives of the ruthless murderers.
The fire being extinguished by some of his men, Phillip got the poor old
man moved into the house, and, assisted by the sorrow-stricken daughter,
did all that was possible to save him. It was, however, soon apparent
that his end was drawing near; he seemed quite sensible, though for some
time unable to speak. At last, with a flickering revival before the
total eclipse of life's lamp, he pointed with one nerveless hand to the
wainscot, and ejaculated, "Tseen!--che-mo!" (Money!--take away the
wood!) Upon going to the spot indicated, Phillip found a crevice in the
panelling, and, using the blade of his sword, he managed to wrench away
a large piece, exposing a hollow containing a small bundle tied up in
blue Chinese cloth. While lifting this up he knew by its weight that it
must contain gold, and when he placed it by the side of the dying man,
the latter with difficulty managed to say "Gno--show--ne!"
(I--give--you). Then, calling his daughter, he with a last effort
stretched forth his arms, and, grasping her hand and that of the
stranger from the far West, and feebly endeavouring to place them
together, fell back, and in a little while expired.
After a distressing scene with the bereaved girl, Phillip was compelled
to order the interment, under a few inches of earth, of her father's
body. Immediately afterwards it was necessary to set out for the now
distant army, and when Phillip overtook it his future wife was with him,
as her fate would have been certain had she remained alone at the
desolated village, defenceless, with her gold and beauty, before the
incursions of Imperialist or Ti-ping marauders. There were many Ti-ping
women accompanying their husbands with the army, so the poor girl had
some of her own sex to comfort her. The expedition was not long away
from Nankin, and upon its return to the city, Phillip and the orphan
were married in the Ti-ping church, thus accomplishing not only what
they supposed to have been the wish of the dead father, but also what
accorded with their mutual inclination.
And so it was that my friend Phillip obtained a wife and a fortune with
her, for that heavy little bundle contained more than sixty gold bars,
each worth about 300 dollars. Phillip Bosse, or Boze, declared himself
so satisfied with his wife, his present affairs, and the Ti-pings, that
he vowed he would never leave them. He kept his word, for he died
amongst the patriots, and as his relatives in Greece may never otherwise
hear of his death, I give his name as I knew it; so that should this
book ever fall into their hands, they may at least have the melancholy
satisfaction to know where his body rests, and that he died like a
gallant and noble-hearted man, serving a righteous and a great cause.
A few days after my arrival at Nankin, my friend L. brought our lorcha
safely into the creek, accompanied by three other vessels of the same
class, the owners of which had availed themselves of the passes I had
given them from the Chang-wang. Each craft was deeply laden with rice
and other provisions. My own junk and lorcha, containing rice belonging
to the Ti-ping Government, we left in charge of certain officials, and
my friends all joined me in the city. Soon after the arrival of L.,
several vessels came in from Shanghae to trade; these were succeeded by
others, and a regular commerce sprang up and was continued for a year
or two. In a few months the trade had become so great that it was quite
common for more than thirty vessels (both foreign and Chinese-owned) to
arrive in one day. The large supplies received by this line of
communication were stored in the extensive Nankin granaries, and while
these were always kept full, the residue was distributed through the
town and villages of the district, the neighbouring country being much
impoverished by the continual warfare raging around the Ti-ping capital.
The fraudulent and corrupt revenue institutions of the Manchoo
Government have long been notorious. The enormous extortion practised
upon foreign trade until the wars with Great Britain compelled a more
regular tariff, and the plundering squeeze stations scattered over every
half-mile of Imperialist territory, each of which pilfer a sum from the
unfortunate owner of all passing merchandise, be he a foreigner who
ought to pass clear by virtue of the transit duty clauses of the treaty,
or a Chinaman who is legitimate prey, have made China a vast system of
independent official violence and rapacity.
No wonder the naturally astute Chinese appear so particularly cunning
and deceitful to Europeans! The possession of money is a sure attraction
for the mandarin vultures; so that beyond the pale of the foreign
settlements at the treaty ports, throughout the country, every native
merchant and civilian is bred up to habits of mendacity, and
particularly to conceal his real income and condition.
The endless ramifications of the Manchoo administrative extend from each
remote corner of China to the central power; and although every one of
the myriad feelers sucking away at the substance of the nation (in the
shape of mandarins, all appointed with merely nominal salary, but given
_carte blanche_ to obtain emolument after sending an annual stipulated
sum to the emperor), crams its individual self with spoil, the
squeezing and contracting of the Manchoo canker feeds the insatiable
core at Pekin. It is useless to think of curing or mitigating the evil,
though some have vainly advocated doing so. The only remedy must
necessarily be a change of dynasty, such as the Ti-pings would certainly
have effected had they not been wickedly opposed by foreigners. Every
branch of civil, military, social, political and religious organization
has become so hopelessly corrupted since the Manchoo era, that any
attempt to change or improve the deplorable results of their evil rule
might be carried on _ad infinitum_, only to result in certain failure.
But one course affords a prospect of cure and a consequent chance of
happiness for China: that is, a radical change of Government.
Let foreigners be righteous, and permit the native to expel the Tartar;
and the Chinese, when ruled by Chinese, will become benefited by western
civilization, and (if the Ti-ping should not become exterminated by
British intervention) in all probability Christianized.
In striking contrast to the excessively corrupt Imperialist customs, the
Ti-ping revenue organization was just, regular, and simple. Throughout
every part of Ti-ping-tien-kwoh but one custom-house was established at
each town or village where trade was carried on. The rate of tariff has
always been moderate, and the great advantage of the system consisted in
being able to clear goods by one payment, upon which a pass would be
given to take them free of further charge or hindrance to their
destination. The Ti-ping Government deserved no little credit for the
simplicity and effectiveness of their Board of Revenue, and it is mainly
due to that branch of their administration that the valuable silk trade
_increased_ and continued progressing so favourably during their
possession of the producing districts.
Not only can all who have traded at Nankin testify to the entire
superiority of the Ti-ping custom-house, but many silk and tea merchants
now revelling in England have to thank the admirable regulations and
forbearance of the revolutionists for their well-lined pockets. Every
customs establishment in the late Ti-ping territory was composed of a
superintendent, several deputies, and a very efficient staff of
surveyors, clerks, and weighers, and at places frequented by Europeans,
one or more interpreters were always found. Rice and other grain were
quite free of duty, and that upon dried and preserved provisions was
very low. All other produce and general merchandise were moderately
taxed, either by tariff or _ad valorem_. Such were the regulations,
which were not (like the Imperialist maritime customs) simply binding
upon foreign goods, but were applicable in an equal degree to the
property of natives.
Before putting into execution the design I had formed to depart suddenly
from Nankin, D., an old friend of mine, arrived from Hankow, where he
was established as the principal partner of a large mercantile firm. He
brought several vessels to trade with the city, and he came to an
arrangement by which he was to sail with Captain P., and another
European as mate, in our lorcha _Anglo Ti-ping_, the latter to convoy
his junks and our old one. D. was a perfect Chinese linguist, and to him
I am indebted for much valuable information.
I waited until P., in charge of the lorcha and her consorts, had sailed
up the river to obtain cargoes of rice, edible oil, bacon, salt fish,
and other articles of consumption, and then prepared to leave the city.
During a few days I sent Phillip and L. into the country to buy some
horses, and at last, together with our own, managed to muster fourteen
strong animals, which were then stabled at a remote part of the city,
close to the north-east gate. Since the return of my friend and
companion L., we had successfully concealed his presence from the female
part of the Chung-wang's household, with one exception, and by this
_ruse_ he had obtained several interviews with the lady of his
affections, the (according to his idea) incomparable Cum-ho. The result
of these meetings soon transpired.
At length the day came, the close of which was settled for our exit from
Nankin. Six picked men, belonging to an artillery corps we had formed of
some of the Chung-wang's troops, were selected to accompany myself and
comrades. The horses were particularly attended to, and our weapons were
well cleaned and then carefully loaded, for danger had warned us against
the risk of rusty locks and carelessly charged fire-arms. When all had
been arranged, L. informed me that he had determined to carry Cum-ho,
who had agreed to elope with him, to Hang-chow, and so induce her father
to sanction their marriage. I found it impossible to dissuade him from
doing so, and he assured me that the lady's mind was equally decided;
therefore, much as I feared the affair would injure our satisfactory and
friendly relations with the Chung-wang, I had no choice but to accede.
Cum-ho, in order to find an opportunity to join us, had paid a visit to
the Ying-wang's ladies, and as their dwelling was close by, she was only
accompanied by her own female attendant.
Just when the shadows of evening were cast in long dark lines from the
tall battlements and high pagodas of the city, we prepared to assemble
at the appointed rendezvous. Phillip, with the six Ti-ping soldiers, I
sent on to the stables, while L., with our boy As-sam, waited outside
the Ying-wang's palace for Miss Cum-ho; and I, taking A-ling, my trusty
interpreter, joined Marie in the Chung-wang's gardens. As the hour fixed
upon for a general meet drew near, myself and party, each carrying a
small quantity of baggage, left the gardens by a small door and
proceeded to the somewhat distant stables. Upon reaching the rendezvous,
I found Phillip had brought his wife with him, and also another horse
for her use. We had not long to wait for L., who, with his fair runaway
and her maid, arrived soon after myself. The horses were now led forth,
and we, numbering fifteen persons, having mounted, the word was given to
spur and away.
Upon reaching the city gate we were detained for a long while by the
warder, in consequence of the late hour, although I had taken care to
provide myself with the requisite pass from the proper authority to
permit my egress or ingress at any time. At last the surly guardians of
the portal turned out, shuffling their clothes about their backs with a
style peculiar to the Chinese, who generally sleep quite naked, and have
a curious way of drawing their arms from the sleeves of their clothing
when dressed, and shrugging them up next their body. After the
shuffling, stocking-pulling, and preliminary spitting (a great and
indispensable habit with Chinamen), had partially subsided, the sleepy
guards managed to draw back sundry huge wooden bars, to undo any amount
of rusty locks and bolts, and then the massive doors creaked slowly
open. While the gates of the city clanged together, we set off at a
gallop for the road leading south, to reach which we turned westward and
skirted a considerable part of the walls.
Chinese horses, though small, are wonderfully strong and enduring, and
it was not till the close of the day after our start that we came to a
regular halt, and only then because our fair companions were fatigued.
My literally fair readers need not take umbrage at this appellation, for
yellow-tinted celestial and dusky Portuguese as they were, their beauty
was undeniable, and their figures such that many a European dame might
justly envy. The rough riding through the mountain-passes on the
southern road from Nankin affected our hardy animals but very little;
and when our camp was pitched for the night under the shelter of the
wall of a ruined Buddhist temple, and they were picketed in a
semi-circle around, they set to work cropping the short grass as
leisurely as though they had just left the stable. We carried three
tents with our baggage, and these were pitched; one for the women; one
for my comrades, A-ling, and our boy; and the other for our six men.
A large fire was lighted, and we had nearly finished the supper served
up by As-sam, when crash came a volley of musketry among us, directed
from the crest of a small hill directly fronting and overlooking our
camp at a distance of some eighty or ninety yards. I had stupidly
neglected to choose the other side of the wall for our resting-place. Of
course, we instantly started to our feet and snatched up the arms at
hand, and while the Ti-pings shortened in the tether of our horses,
forming a close array of the well-trained, docile animals, fastened
together head and tail, the rest of our party placed the women directly
under the shelter of the living rampart. These measures were barely
effected when a body of more than fifty horsemen dashed round the hill
and charged upon our position. We had no difficulty in discovering them
to be Ti-pings, and when they came closer we saw the Tsan-wang's son was
at their head. Their first volley had fortunately been aimed far too
high; it may be that, fearing to injure the woman he pursued, the chief
had done this, trusting to cause an alarm, during which he might dash
forward and carry off the prize. Our reply to the advancing party was
not so bloodless as the commencement of their attack. My own comrades,
and even A-ling and As-sam, were capital marksmen, while the six men had
been selected for their approved courage and the well-known skill so
peculiar to Chinese when properly instructed.
Every man of our party was armed with either an Enfield or some other
rifle (two being Sharp's breech-loaders), and all were able to use them
with deadly accuracy; therefore, the number of the approaching foe gave
us but little dread, especially as we saw they were armed only with
short European-made double-barrelled guns and Chinese matchlocks. We
waited until they had galloped to within twenty yards, but receiving
only the war cry, "Tah! Tah!" in reply to our challenge, we then took
steady aim, and commenced firing upon them by successive volleys from
each half of our number. The affair was settled in a moment almost. The
leader and half a dozen of his men, with twice that number of horses,
were quickly rolling on the turf, for at that short distance the
difficulty would have been to miss them with our rifles. When their
charge was entirely repulsed we ceased firing, a dozen men came forward
on foot and carried off their fallen comrades and chief, and then they
all slowly disappeared in the direction of Nankin. During their advance
they had kept up an irregular fire, which, with the exception of grazing
the other arm of our boy, As-sam (one had been wounded at the Mud Fort),
and shooting away the ear of one of our horses, did no damage.
Upon the fortunate termination of the skirmish we dispatched the
remainder of our supper, turned in for the night upon the opposite side
of the wall, and kept three men on sentry till morning. Upon resuming
our journey, we soon came to a rich and thickly-populated country, and
during the next few days, while traversing the silk districts from end
to end, along the eastern shore of the Ta-hoo lake, _via_ the city of
Soo-chow, Kia-shing-foo, and the Grand Canal, I particularly noticed the
vast improvement that had taken place since my first visit to Soo-chow
some eight months ago. Everywhere around the traces of war (always
excepting the demolished Buddhist temples) had disappeared before the
progress of peace and plenty; and although I may be accused of
exaggeration, I do not hesitate to affirm that the establishment of
Ti-ping supremacy and administration over these, the most valuable
districts of China, had restored them to prosperity and happiness in a
shortness of time hitherto unparalleled in the case of either Chinese or
any other civil war desolation.
Although during my previous visit I had seen amply sufficient to
undeceive me as to the wickedly false allegations of Ti-ping
devastations, &c., still I was hardly prepared for the flourishing state
in which I found the _settled_ territory of the revolutionists. I knew
that the export of silk within the current year (1861) had already
increased to upwards of 20,000 bales more than during the corresponding
period of last year (when till May the districts were under Imperialist
rule); but then I imagined the great increase might be due to the wish
of holders to realize. I found, upon the contrary, that the improvement
was entirely due to the Ti-ping occupation. In less than two years the
districts under Ti-ping jurisdiction had produced silk representing a
sum of not less than L3,000,000 per annum more than previously! At each
of the many villages and at every peasant's cot, the happy-looking
people were engaged tending their silkworms for winter, reeling the last
cocoons, or tilling their fields.
Great as the prosperity of the country seemed, there was something even
more gratifying and interesting in the changed appearance and
disposition of the people. All the unfavourable characteristics of the
Manchoo-oppressed Chinese had vanished, and their natural character was
manifested in a way which illustrated their candour, hospitality to
foreigners, and native good temper.
After a twelve days' journey, the later part of the time in large canal
boats, we arrived within a day's march of Hang-chow. Leaving the water
route, we disembarked our horses and set forward in the direction of the
provincial capital, guided by the continual booming of heavy guns. Upon
reaching the crest of some high ground, the city lay before us in the
clear frosty air of a fine December morning. But, as we find the case
every day, the beauty of nature was marred by the passions and strife of
mankind. The extensive city was in flames in several quarters, and the
dense columns of smoke shrouded as with a pall the slaughter taking
place beneath. As we rode forward through the beautiful neighbouring
country, we were enabled gradually to discern dark masses of troops
rushing forward against the city amid the constant roar of artillery and
the rattling crash of smaller arms. It was evident that we had arrived
at the moment of a grand assault by the Ti-ping forces.
As our soldiers each declared that the Chung-wang's head-quarters were
to the west of the city, we made a considerable detour in that
direction. We had not proceeded far when a disorderly crowd came in
sight, hurrying away from the city. Directly they observed my party, the
greater number turned off and precipitately fled in another line of
retreat. As those who stood their ground were making ready with spears
and gingalls to give us a warm reception, and as we were not out like a
parcel of knights errant seeking adventure and fighting from pure love,
we wisely followed those who ran away, and succeeded in catching one of
the hindermost, to question as to the state of affairs in the city. At
first the man was terribly frightened, and we could make nothing of him;
then he became still more alarmed, and we found out all we wished. His
fear was the usual one accompanying the flight of disorganized
_undisciplined_ troops, which with Chinese becomes a wild panic; not
because the men fear death, for no people can meet it with the stolidity
and callousness with which they will suffer execution and torture, but
from the simple fact that they are not sufficiently disciplined to know
how to be killed in an orderly manner on the field of battle. They see a
chance of escape, and on one taking it the whole follow like a flock of
sheep.
Having ascertained from our prisoner, who with his friends were all
Imperialist soldiery from the garrison of Hang-chow, that the Ti-pings
had just captured the city, we set him at liberty, and then galloped for
the west gate. On the way we passed many fugitives fleeing in every
direction. Upon reaching the rear of the Ti-ping lines of
circumvallation, we found them almost denuded of troops, the few
remaining being fully occupied in guarding prisoners. We soon found the
Commander-in-Chief's head-quarters, but no Chung-wang was there. The
scanty number of soldiers on guard were in a great state of excitement
about the success of the siege, and we managed to elicit from them that
the Chung-wang had entered the city with his whole force, and was now
engaged attacking the Tartar quarter, an _imperium in imperio_, city
within city, being protected by its own walls, and with a central
citadel towering above all. Leaving the women in a house protected by
the main guard, with the remainder of my party I rode towards the city.
Upon entering by the nearest gate, we found the streets unoccupied,
except by the bodies of the slain; but the noise of battle guided us to
the spot where living men were busily engaged increasing the number of
the dead and dying.
Hang-chow, cut off from all communication with the outside world, every
line of supply severed by the besiegers, and famine raging among the
unfortunate garrison and inhabitants, fell to the investing army upon
the 29th of December, 1861. Early on that day the Chung-wang had
commenced a grand assault, conducted upon each gate of the city. After a
fiercely contested fight, the assaulting columns having gained some
advantages at the south and east gates, the Chinese portion of the
defenders at those points surrendered, probably induced to take that
step by the very short rations to which they had been reduced. When the
gates had been given up, the Ti-ping troops poured into the city with
such ardour that the Tartar bannermen were quickly driven within their
inner defence. Hundreds of the miserable citizens of the provincial
capital were starved to death during the siege, hundreds more, with
their families, committed suicide. The nature of war in China has
usually been so merciless, and the conduct of victorious troops at the
capture of a city so outrageous, that in many cases during the civil
war, and the wars with Great Britain, the people, probably imbued with a
dread of these consequences, have committed wholesale suicide when they
were not in the slightest danger of being molested.
I managed to find the Chung-wang just in time to join the last attack
upon the inner or Tartar city. The Commander-in-Chief, surrounded by his
officers, received myself and friends with evident signs of
satisfaction. His men had just been repulsed by the Manchoo troops, who
were fighting with the greatest bravery and determination. The Ti-pings
had eight or nine pieces of artillery turned against the wall of the
inner city; but these were established in one position, firing point
blank upon the rampart, so that when the assaulting parties moved
forward the guns became useless. I instantly advised the Chung-wang to
move two or three guns away upon each flank, so as to enfilade the
parapet and protect the advance of his stormers. This was quickly done,
and upon joining the leaders of the next assault, we had the
satisfaction to find it successful. The Tartar bannermen retreated to
the citadel in the centre of their city, fighting to the very last,
assisted by their women, who fought with them like men, and one of whom
inflicted a severe spear-wound upon Ling-ho, a Ti-ping general, when he
would have saved her life. The greater portion of the Chinese troops
garrisoning Hang-chow were captured, but the Manchoos fell almost to the
last man. Their loss during the capture of the city was very great, and
when at length they were driven into their citadel, Luy, their general,
blew the remnant into the air, the entire Tartar force, men, women, and
children, perishing in the ruins.
After the capture of Hang-chow, the anti-Ti-pings, who were in the habit
of howling over Ti-ping atrocities, though oblivious to those of the
Manchoo, indulged their distorted though vivid imaginations by
inveighing against such indiscriminate slaughter. It is true that a
great loss of life occurred, but not a man fell except in battle,
neither were any non-combatants killed except by starvation or their own
hands. It is a singular fact that those who have been loudest to exclaim
against Ti-ping cruelty, have always delighted in Imperialist
barbarities and success, the words being synonymous.
When the last note of conflict had died away, and the Chung-wang had
fixed his head-quarters within the city, I broached the subject of his
daughter's presence and her attachment to my friend. The time was
propitious, for it was the moment of a great triumph, and I suppose it
had put the Ti-ping generalissimo into an immensely good and benevolent
frame of mind, for he simply expressed his intention to take her back to
Nankin, and settle the affair upon our return to that city. In the
evening Cum-ho waited upon her father, having taken up her quarters with
the rest of our feminine fellow travellers in a house close to the large
building occupied by himself and staff.
On the morning of the first day of the new year, a large body of the
army was dispatched in the direction of Shanghae, under the command of
the Shi-wang, with orders to occupy every town and village up to the
walls of that port, and then to open negotiations with the British and
other authorities, who had so unjustly assumed to themselves the right
of holding a Chinese city for the Manchoo against the Chinese patriots.
During the next few weeks the Chung-wang busied himself establishing the
different offices of Ti-ping Government in Hang-chow, and completing his
plans for the occupation and retention of the remainder of the provinces
of Kiang-su and Che-kiang. At length the Commander-in-Chief, seldom more
than a month in any city (during his remarkably energetic and rapid
conduct of the Ti-ping operations), took his departure for Nankin, there
to mature further tactics as to the mode of prosecuting the war against
the Manchoo, and also to consult with his king the Tien-wang, and
receive further commands.
I had ample opportunity to notice the exceeding popularity the
Chung-wang had attained among the country people, for everywhere we
passed they turned out to welcome his arrival, and all I questioned
declared him to be a good and just man, who respected and protected the
rights of the meanest peasant of the land. Many of the Ti-ping chiefs
were popular with the civilians, some were disliked, all were considered
better than the Manchoo, but none were so beloved as the Chung-wang.
Before the troops had been marched towards Shanghae, a day of
thanksgiving was held at Hang-chow; and although the motive of the
Ti-ping is that of justice and Christianity, I could not help thinking
of the similar practice among Europeans, who never fail to return thanks
to God for triumph over their weaker brethren, whether their cause be
righteous or quite the reverse.
On our march to Nankin, the Chung-wang took a route which embraced all
the principal cities captured during the last year, including Hoo-chow,
Kar-shing-foo, Soo-chow, Wo-kong, Quin-san, Tat-san, &c., and at each
thanksgivings were offered up for the late important success. About this
time the Commander-in-Chief committed his first great error. His mistake
consisted in breaking up a large proportion of his forces into garrisons
for the numerous walled cities in Ti-ping possession, and in moving the
rest of his troops to other quarters.[3] It is true, he had nothing to
fear from the enemy, all their armies in the field (with the exception
of those operating against the Ying-wang, on the line of the Yang-tze
river, above Nankin) having been utterly dispersed; but no preparation
whatever was made to resist the probable hostility of England and
France, beyond such defence as the widely separated fortified towns
might be able to make. This neglect, when the British scheme of
intervention came into full play, proved fatal to the welfare of
Ti-pingdom. City after city was captured in detail by British
_artillery_ and troops; when, had the patriots only concentrated their
numerous but greatly scattered forces, the result might have proved very
different. I wearied myself, the Chung-wang, and many other chiefs, by
continually representing the danger in case of foreign hostility (which
I felt certain would be the result of Lord Elgin's policy in China), but
the poor Ti-pings seemed infatuated, and resolutely refused to believe
that the unbrotherly so-called "foreign brethren" entertained such
perfectly unprovoked and cruel intentions. Fatally have they been
undeceived! Deeply responsible have England and France become for the
consequences!
FOOTNOTE:
[3] This was, however, in accordance with the Tien-wang's orders.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Earl Russell's Despatch.--Its Effect.--"Taking the
Offensive."--Official Reports.--General Staveley.--Attacks the
Ti-pings.--General Ward.--Hope and Ward repulsed.--Che-poo
attacked.--Its Capture.--Loot Regulations.--Kah-ding
attacked.--Its Capture.--Ti-ping Loss.--Newspaper
Comments.--Tsing-poo besieged.--Inside the City.--Ti-ping
Losses.--Na-jaor besieged.--Cho-lin besieged.--Ti-ping
Bravery.--Cho-lin captured.--The Chung-wang.--Kah-ding
evacuated.--Consul Harvey's Despatch.--Despatch
reviewed.--Ningpo threatened.--Captain Dew at Ning-po.--His
Despatch.--The Reply.--Captain Dew's Rejoinder.--Preparation to
attack Ning-po.--Captain Dew's Inconsistency.--His
Ultimatum.--Official Despatches.--Ning-po attacked.--Ning-po
evacuated.--Newspaper Reports.
After hostilities had been commenced by Admiral Hope, and upon hearing
of the capture of Ningpo by the Ti-pings, Earl Russell endorsed the
violation of British faith by approving the hostile maintenance of
Shanghae and the other treaty ports against the Ti-ping belligerents, in
the following despatch to the Admiralty, dated, "Foreign Office, March
11, 1862":--
"I have, therefore, to signify to your Lordships the Queen's
commands that Vice-Admiral Hope should be instructed to defend
Shanghae, and to protect the other treaty ports not in the hands
of the rebels, so far as it is in the power of Her Majesty's
_naval forces_ to do so."
Before, however, these instructions were received (they bearing date
March 11, and occupying at least three months in reaching Mr. Bruce at
Pekin, and being by him communicated to Admiral Hope at Shanghae), the
war was carried far into the interior and thoroughly established,
although, in the first instance, it had been pretended that the
operations were only undertaken in defence of Shanghae.
Mr. Bruce having stated his opinion by the following passage in a
despatch, dated March 4, 1862:--"Shanghae is threatened, and its
supplies cut off, and the insurgents will be emboldened by our
passiveness and their success at Ningpo to press us still closer. I have
stated to Sir J. Hope that, in my opinion, we are perfectly justified in
taking the offensive against the insurgents;"--Lord Russell again
approves of the disobedience of his former orders, by stating in a
despatch, dated "Foreign Office, June 2, 1862:--"I have to convey to you
my approval of the views expressed in your despatch of the 4th of March,
with regard to the course to be pursued towards the Taepings." This
sanction for the British authorities in China to take "the offensive"
was, of course, tantamount to a declaration of war against the
revolutionists; yet Earl Russell and his co-adjutors preferred working
in secrecy, the approval of Parliament was not sought, neither did Her
Majesty's Ministers ever deign to trouble themselves by announcing their
policy. This, however, can hardly be a matter of surprise, considering
that they had no _casus belli_ to set forward as a justification--the
multitude of excuses sent home by those who violated solemn pledges in
China no more constituting one than a number of petty faults would
justify hanging a man in England.
Admiral Hope having reported his breach of faith and neutrality by the
murderous raid upon Kao-kiau, which he termed "certain _moral_ support;"
and having requested the shadow of the Ministers' countenance and
support in these words, "I therefore strongly recommend that the French
and English commanders should be required by yourself and M. Bourboulon
to free the country from the rebels within a line commencing at Kading
on the Yang-tze above Woo-sung, through Tsing-poo to Sung-kong on the
Woo-sung river, and thence across to a walled town opposite on the
Yang-tze;" he received full approval from Mr. Bruce to continue as he
had commenced, at his own goodwill and pleasure.
In his despatch, authorizing the very course he had previously stated
would be more calculated than any other "to lower our national
reputation," Mr. Bruce, with his usual bad memory and inconsistent
policy, states of Ti-pingdom and the people "that its sources are
exhausted; that neither money nor supplies are to be drawn from the
_deserts_ to which the provinces overrun by them are reduced;"
completely oblivious of the "85,000 bales" of silk he had declared, only
a few months previous, were drawn from the producing districts--the
_deserts_ of his vivid though forgetful imagination.
The report of the Admiral and the reply of the Minister each discuss the
radius project shortly established against the Ti-ping belligerent only,
and the further increase and support of Ward's and fresh legions of
mercenaries. This is the first official mention of those now notorious
schemes.
When the Kao-kiau massacre, the radius plan, and the organization of
foreign-disciplined filibustering corps, _a la_ Ward, were reported to
him, Earl Russell again followed the path already laid out by his
subordinates in China--a system of policy that could not be defended on
principle, and still worse in execution.[4] The officials in China
always acted directly against the spirit and letter of their _public_
instructions; then reported what they had done, and obtained the
sanction of the British Government.
Admiral Hope, immediately upon receiving the support of Mr. Bruce,
gathered together his well-armed sailors and marines, his big guns and
his little guns, and, assisted by the French Admiral, Protet, and
Brigadier-general Staveley in command of the British troops, eagerly
continued "taking the offensive" against the badly-armed Ti-pings. The
war upon those to whom England was pledged to observe neutrality--a war
never stated to the British Parliament--and, moreover, a war never even
declared to the Ti-pings themselves, was rapidly prosecuted. General
Staveley having assumed chief command of the allied Anglo-Franco-Manchoo
filibuster operations, did so entirely against the spirit of the orders
of his Government, for not until some months later did the approval of
Admiral Hope's conduct (bearing date, "Foreign Office, June 12, 1862")
reach China, and even these instructions only referred to the _naval
expeditions_, already authorized by the despatch of March 11, 1862.
Mr. Bruce admits this in a despatch to General Staveley, dated "Pekin,
April 23, 1862," although at the same time he prompts him to join the
Admiral's raids. He thus states:--
"It is clear that, at that date, Her Majesty's Government had
not resolved on doing more than aiding in the defence of the
treaty ports by means of the naval forces on the station."
Now, it is utterly impossible that Mr. Bruce can have received the
instructions to _employ_ the naval force so soon as the 23rd of April.
The first despatch of Lord Russell, authorizing Admiral Hope to defend
the treaty ports against the Ti-pings bears date March 11, and has
already been noticed; but even supposing it left England on the same
day, it could not have reached Pekin when Admiral Hope and General
Staveley had taken the offensive, and made incessant attacks upon every
Ti-ping position within some thirty miles of Shanghae. The last
instructions from Earl Russell were those suppositional ones, dated 7th
September, 1861:--
"It _might_ be expedient to defend the treaty ports, _if_ the
Chinese Government would consent not to use them."
Referring back to the only definite order of Her Majesty's Government at
the time of the unparalleled breaches of neutrality, we find it to be
that bearing date August 8, 1861:--
"Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain, as they have done
hitherto, _neutrality_ between the two contending parties in
China."
Thus, it cannot fail to be seen that hostilities were established
against the Ti-pings, not only in violation of the pledged faith of
England, but also in direct opposition to the _public_ orders of her
Government. Eventually the Government sanctioned and authorized a
continuance of these raids, although they carefully avoided making any
straightforward announcement of their policy. Their plan was always to
approve the aggressive action of the officials in China, but never to
order them publicly. The despatches approving General Staveley's
unjustifiable attack upon innocent men respectively bear date--"Foreign
Office, July 7, 1862," and "War Office, July 23." These documents,
however, which take the odium and responsibility of the massacres from
the active agents, and place them upon the British nation, could not
have reached Pekin, and been communicated to the naval and military
commanders at Shanghae, until late in September. We shall see what
unauthorized and unnecessary hostilities were perpetrated previous to
their arrival.
General Staveley, having assumed the principal command of the raiding
expeditions, finding that the friendly Ti-pings would not come and fight
him, went to fight them. Upon the 3rd of April a strong force of 2,207
British and French troops, with naval detachments under command of
Admirals Hope and Protet, and thirteen pieces of artillery, moved out
from Shanghae to continue "taking the offensive." The place doomed to
destruction was a large, and for Chinese warfare, strong, entrenched
Ti-ping camp at Wong-ka-dza, garrisoned by about 4,000 men. After a hot
day's march, the whole force, including some hundreds of Imperialists
dragging the guns, carrying portable bridges, extra loads of ammunition,
and every requisite appliance of modern warfare, arrived at a deserted
village within twelve miles from Shanghae, and about two from the
Ti-ping camp. Here they encamped for the night. Early on the following
morning the combined forces,[5] taking advantage of the cover afforded
by a thick mist, moved on the position of the Ti-pings, establishing
themselves within a few hundred yards of the defences just as the fog
cleared away. The entrenched camp consisted of some ten or twelve
stockades, each surrounded by a ditch, yet communicating with the
others. The Ti-pings, as usual, waited for those they invariably looked
upon as "foreign brethren" to take the offensive. They had not long to
wait. Having taken up a position fairly within range of their Enfield
rifles and artillery, but safely out of range of the useless gingalls
and matchlocks of the Ti-pings, the "foreign brethren" opened a
murderous fire upon the line of entrenchments. The devoted defenders
replied as well they could, without artillery or effective fire-arms,
and bravely held their stockades for nearly an hour, amid the storm of
shrapnel-shell, rifle-balls, &c., poured in upon them with terrible
effect. At length the irresistible foreign artillery drove them from the
stockades with heavy loss, and played upon their retreating columns with
deadly accuracy. During the attack and retreat the Ti-pings lost upwards
of 600 killed and wounded (the wounded falling into the hands of the
Imperialists were all put to death), while the allies had _one_ man
killed and another wounded.
Admiral Hope, who grounded his precious _casus belli_ upon the
_possible_ destruction of supplies _by the Ti-pings_, states in his
report of this and the following actions:--
"All these camps, which contained large quantities of rice
collected from the surrounding country, were burnt, AND THE
GRAIN DESTROYED."
A few days before the attack upon Wong-ka-dza, H.M. gunboat _Flamer_
attacked and destroyed a fleet of 300 Ti-ping boats, "_deeply laden with
rice and live stock_." Who, then, proved to be the devastator and
marauder; the uncivilized Chinese, or the civilized Christian? Yet the
principal pretence given for attacking the Ti-pings was that they
_might_ do what Admiral Hope and his colleagues so effectually _did_.
After chasing the fugitives so long as the Enfield would reach them, the
allied force gave up the pursuit, and retired to the village of Che-poo,
where they had rested the previous night. Meanwhile, those who escaped
from this slaughter met with another enemy, in the shape of a strong
contingent of the filibuster Ward's disciplined Chinese. This ally of
Admiral Hope, chagrined at having lost this opportunity, determined to
attack another fortified camp with his own men. The position assigned to
this respectable person during the first engagement was to cut off and
kill the Ti-pings as they fled from the fire of the British and French
artillery. Fortunately for those unoffending people he arrived too late.
When he did honour his worthy friends with his presence, history telleth
not whether they were tired, or engaged looting, or making merry; but
certain it is that they let him make his attack unassisted, except by
Admiral Hope.
This PAR NOBILE, on valorous deeds intent, heedless alike of mud, heat,
and fatigue, marched for several miles by intricate pathways, through
creeks, ditches, and swampy paddy-fields, to the rebel camp near the
village of Lu-ka-kong; and elated, doubtless, by the Admiral's narration
of his chivalrous deeds at Wong-ka-dza, and assured by his loss of only
one man, halted in front of the Ti-ping stockade.
Drawing his mercenary sword, and brushing back the Yankee locks, General
Ward gave the word to assault in a tone of assured victory. The
disciplined Chinamen, led by their foreign officers, rushed forward
bravely enough; but the Ti-pings had not been half destroyed by shot and
shell; neither at that time had they lost their best troops in conflict
with the British and French, nor the moral effect of their former
triumphs. Consequently, after three attempts to storm the stockade, when
five officers and seventy men were placed _hors de combat_, Admiral Hope
advanced to call off the men, and was rewarded with a Ti-ping bullet
lodged in the calf of his leg. Ward, having none of the resistless
artillery to mow down the patriotic Ti-pings, found them more than a
match for his men--disciplined, led by foreigners, and well armed as
they were. A retreat was therefore sounded, and the British Admiral was
ignominiously carried away upon a litter borne by sundry cursing
Celestials.
To avenge the glaring insult and audacity of those rebels who had dared
to deposit a bullet in the calf of a leg of a British Admiral, who was
doing his utmost to kill them, the next morning the allied forces
brought their artillery to bear, and without a single casualty succeeded
in driving the Ti-pings from this and several neighbouring
entrenchments, killing some 300, and burning and destroying the large
quantities of grain, as stated by Admiral Hope. Not only in this
instance, but very many others, the allies acted with far more wanton
destructiveness than ever the Ti-pings did.
The next attack upon the Ti-pings by the gallant allies came off on the
17th of April. Upon this occasion the redoubtable Admiral was unable to
act, in consequence of his injured limb. The place at which the combined
English, French, and mercenaries gathered fresh (Chinese) laurels, was
the village of Che-poo, with its defences, situated about 18 miles S.E.
of Shanghae. The attacking force mustered some 2,500 strong, with 14
pieces of artillery, the whole commanded by General Staveley and Admiral
Protet, assisted by Captain Borlase, R.N., and the filibuster Ward.[6]
These troops were embarked in a flotilla of British and French gunboats,
and carried up the Shanghae river, to cause as much devastation and
bloodshed as they had already created elsewhere.
It was a splendid morning, and the landscape seemed beautiful, as the
troops, after landing in the neighbourhood of Chee-poo, marched forward
on their mission. Through fields rich with the ungathered crops, which
it was pretended the Ti-pings might devastate, over seven or eight miles
of smiling and profusely-cultivated country they wound their way. Upon
arriving within a mile of the village, they halted for their guns to
come up, and rested preparatory to the coming attack.
The guns having arrived, at 2 p.m. were in position, and opened a most
destructive fire at 500 yards, and in half an hour the rebels were in
full retreat. The poor fellows endeavoured to face the overwhelming hail
of shot and shell; and, as one official report states, "returned a
desultory fire, _but without doing any mischief_, while the allies made
dreadful havoc amongst them." Driven from their works by the
irresistible artillery, the Ti-pings retreated in three columns in the
direction of the walled city, Chan-za, when, as the official report
states, "the Royal artillery and naval guns were brought to bear upon
the retreating mass with terrible effect." The loss of the Ti-pings, out
of a total strength of less than 4,000, amounted to more than 600 killed
and 300 taken prisoners, who were, of course, cruelly executed by the
Manchoo mandarins; the allied loss was _nil_!
The Ti-pings had not expected any attack upon that day, and when the
camp was entered, their dinners were found smoking in the cups, while
half-finished letters were lying on the chiefs' table.
The report published in the _Shanghae Daily Shipping List_ states:--
"As the houses were _ransacked_, great quantities of valuable
jewels, gold, silver, dollars, and costly dresses were found,
which was fair (?) _loot_ to the officers and men. One
blue-jacket found 1,600 dollars, and several soldiers upwards of
500 each, while many picked up gold bangles, earrings, and other
ornaments and pearls set with precious stones. _It was a
glorious day of looting for everybody_, and we hear that one
party, who discovered the Ti-ping treasury chest with several
thousand dollars in it, after loading himself to his heart's
content, was obliged to give some of them away to lighten his
pockets, which were heavier than he could well bear--a marked
case of _l'embarras des richesses_. The rebel stud of ponies was
well supplied also, and many of the soldiers rode back with
their booty."
All this _looting_ and butchery of unresisting men (it would be absurd
to term the defence of the Ti-pings, resulting in one Englishman
wounded, but hundreds of themselves killed--a resistance according to
military _parlance_) was executed, we must particularly remember,
because their cause, which had for its sole object expulsion of the
foreign Manchoo and establishment of Christianity, _might_ interfere
with British commercial interests, and that "temporary one arising out
of the indemnities!"
The _Shanghae Daily Shipping List_, just quoted from, was the paid
official organ of the British Government, and when it stated the above,
it may easily be imagined what the disgraceful scene really was. This
journal, under a variety of style and title, has been repeatedly quoted
in the Blue Books upon China, issued by Her Majesty's Government, as the
opinion of the press in China. Its truthfulness may fairly be estimated
from the following comparison of a statement which appeared in its
columns upon the massacre at Wong-ka-dza, and another upon the one at
Che-poo. Both places are situated in the same tract of country, and only
a few miles apart. In its detail of the first affair, the official
organ, speaking of the slaughter of the Ti-pings, terms it:--
"A just retaliation on those wretches who had made their smiling
land _a scene of misery and desolation_."
Reporting the second affair, it states:--
"_The aspect of the country looked charming_, as the expedition
threaded its way among _cultivated fields covered with the green
crops_ sown by the industrious inhabitants."
Like all other unscrupulous sources of opposition to the revolutionists,
the _Shanghae Daily Shipping List_ is sufficiently condemned by its own
words. It needeth not a partizan to advocate Ti-pingdom; any person not
blinded by prejudice or dollars, and who will take the trouble to study
both sides of the question with proverbial English fair-play, cannot
fail to become favourably interested in the insurgents, simply through
the rabid diatribes which prove the bigotry of opponents and the
inadvertent contradictions which prove their falseness.
In order to avoid quarrelling about the plunder, General Staveley and
the Admirals entered into the following agreement with regard to the
future freebooting exploits. Immediately after the heavily laden heroes,
sailors, soldiers, marines, and all had deposited their _loot_ in safe
quarters, the triumviri, in solemn conclave, assembled upon the 22nd of
April, and made the following formal regulations:--
"Previous to the capture of Kah-ding and the other towns from
the rebels, proper arrangements shall be made ... to collect
whatever may be of value, in order to its fair distribution
amongst the troops, to whom the same is to be made known before
the commencement of the operations."
Eager to try the merit of their regulated loot hunting, on the 27th of
April, the allies again set forth to attack the Ti-pings. Upon this
occasion their looting propensities were indulged in at the town of
Kah-ding, situate about 30 miles to the N.W. of Shanghae. The allied
force consisted of nearly 4,000 men, with 30 pieces of artillery,[7]
assisted by an army of Imperialist _braves_, under the command of Le, a
Chinese general.
The advance guard of the allies having been arrested by two small
stockades, defending the water approach to Kah-ding, upon the morning of
the 29th, the artillery was brought into play and the defenders of the
outwork driven back upon the city, losing some 50 men during their
resistance and retreat, the European enemy following in rapid pursuit up
to the walls of Kah-ding without a single casualty.
The last day of April was spent by the allies in reconnoitering the city
and landing the heavy guns, which had been brought in boats from
Shanghae. Before dawn on the morning of May the 1st, the whole of the
guns were in position, and the troops safely under cover in the ruined
suburbs, ready to pick off the defenceless Ti-pings with their
far-reaching rifles. The country traversed during the preceding days is
thus spoken of in the _China Mail_, a paper bitterly hostile to the
insurgents:--
"After marching along a good road, and through _a beautiful
country with fine thriving crops_, the troops reached the
southern suburb of Kah-ding."
Daylight of the 1st of charming May was ushered in by the roar of a
large park of foreign artillery. Kah-ding, although a walled town, was
undefended with cannon, and its garrison of some 5,000 or 6,000 men
were, for the most part, armed with bamboo spears. The European troops
having invested three of the city gates, the fourth, the only way of
retreat for the besieged, was watched by the Imperialist _braves_,
commissioned to cut up the Ti-pings as they fled from the British and
French artillery. To the concentrated and terrific fire of thirty pieces
of large ordnance, the defenders of the city replied with a brisk though
totally ineffective discharge of gingalls. The storm of iron poured upon
them soon silenced their fire and drove them from the walls, and with a
loss of several hundred, they fled from the town, cutting their way
through the Imperialist troops, who watched their only line of retreat.
In order to delay the storming of the city, and so afford time for its
evacuation, a small body of the Ti-ping soldierly nobly remained and
sacrificed themselves for their comrades. This devoted band, numbering
about 130, held their post at the south gate, the principal point of
attack, until the European stormers were on the walls, three little
2-pound Chinese guns on the gate tower having been worked till the
parapet, overthrown by the crushing fire of the siege train, fell upon
and buried the gunners beneath the _debris_.
Driven back by the overwhelming advance of the storming party, the
heroic few retired to the north gate, through which the garrison had
made their escape; here to a man they fell, while courageously placing
themselves between the foe and their retreating comrades. The greater
number of them were mere boys, and from the richness of their dress,
evidently of good position among their friends. Three little fellows,
each armed with a small matchlock, were seen by a friend of mine to rush
forward directly a large shell would knock down a portion of the parapet
and fire off their puny weapons at the foe. They were too small to reach
the loop-holes, and so waited till the 32-pound shot of the besiegers
made a hole for them to use. To avoid the deadly rifles they never used
the same hole twice, but nevertheless were all killed, for my friend,
when passing round the walls, found their bodies lying close together
and crushed by a mass of fallen stonework.
The _China Mail_, in its account of the assault, states:--
"The scene was now most picturesque. A shell had set fire to
part of the city close at hand; the early morning sun was
shining pleasantly upon the fields, _rich with ungathered
crops_, and the French band played as the troops scaled the
walls."
The loss of the Ti-pings at the capture of Kah-ding was nearly 500
killed in the city; 2,000 slaughtered while escaping from the murderous
artillery, by the Manchoo troops under Le, who had the bodies mutilated,
and offered to produce their ears to General Staveley; and about 1,000
taken prisoners, who, although captured by the assistance of British
soldiers, perished in the Manchoo execution shambles.
The stolen property agreement proved very useful at the capture of
Kan-ding, nearly 200,000 dollars' worth having been seized in that city
without the loss of a single life to the brave allies.
The _China Mail_, in its issue, "15th May, 1862," although mistakenly
considering the Ti-ping revenue (obtained from taxation, silk, &c.) as
"the poor people's property," very rightly condemns the wholesale system
of brigandage practised by the allies. After referring to the
"mercenary" and "sordid" nature of the intervention, it states:--
"There is another matter of regret, and that is, that while we
are stigmatizing the rebels as robbers and bandits, we should
take their treasures and divide it among ourselves."
Again it continues:--
"It would be difficult to say which are the more shameless
robbers of the two, the Taepings who spoil the people, or the
English forces who retake the spoil and share it among
themselves, while those originally robbed are famishing in
Shanghae. It may well be questioned whether the whole history of
warfare can record a parallel example of forgetfulness, utter
forgetfulness, of all propriety to this loot-hunting game which
Admiral Hope is now engaged in. An expedition against the rebels
is now shown to be so harmless to those engaged in it that we
may expect to hear of gentlemen giving their wives and sisters a
picnic in front of the next town that is besieged, when we have
no doubt that much amusement could be had among the engineers
and artillery by allowing the girls to point the guns. And this
is the sort of warfare in which the heart of the jaded and
harassed soldier is to be cheered with _loot_!... There is every
reason to believe that England's chivalry is likely to be kept a
profound secret from the people of China so long as her affairs
are under the present guidance."
Such is the opinion of a journal always hostile to the Ti-pings.
Having loaded their boats with plunder, and placed a garrison of some
500 European troops in Kah-ding, the British and French warriors
returned to Shanghae and vain-gloriously displayed their evilly acquired
riches about the rum-shops of that model settlement, while their worthy
allies, the _braves_, made a gallant and triumphant entry, with
trophies of Ti-ping heads, cruelly hacked from the men vanquished by
British and French artillery. When these heads became unpleasant to
parade about the foreign settlement, and the _loot_ became exhausted, or
the allied commanders eager for more, the combined forces were mustered
together for another desolating raid into a country that would have been
happy and peaceful but for their wicked interference.
The city of Tsing-poo, situated close upon 32 miles to the west of
Shanghae, although falsely represented by officialdom as "in the
neighbourhood," was next selected for sack and pillage.
Starting from Shanghae in British gunboats (which, by the by, always
returned towing long tiers of loot laden boats) upon the 7th of May, the
expedition, after being placed in country boats about twenty miles up
the river, arrived before Tsing-poo on the evening of the second day.
General Staveley was Commander-in-chief, assisted by the French Admiral,
while the English Admiral, in spite of his wound, was present as an
admiring non-effective.
The combined force comprised 2,613 British and French troops, with
nearly forty pieces of artillery; about 1,800 of Ward's filibusters; and
an Imperialist army of 5,000 to 7,000 men, under their general, Le.[8]
Tsing-poo was garrisoned by some 4,000 Ti-pings, very few of whom
escaped.
Before daylight on the 12th of May, the besieging forces, with guns and
ladders, covering and storming parties, were in position. They moved up
silently in the dead of night and early morning, and were in their
places by 4 a.m. Then came a short half-hour of the peculiar suspense
before battle, while all those valiant British and French well-armed
troops lay flat on their faces, safely under cover, and breathing not a
word, for fear the doomed Ti-pings _might_ by a singular piece of good
fortune manage to hurt some of them. By this time, however, the warm
summer day was dawning, and the beleaguered garrison, discovering the
formidable array against them, opened fire with the few small guns they
possessed, sending their uneven roundshot whizzing over the heads of the
crouching enemy.
Almost at the same moment the besiegers opened fire from their numerous
and overwhelming artillery. Armstrong guns, naval 32-pounders, French
rifled guns and mortars (with one French 68-pounder, rifled piece,
mounted on board a light draught gunboat) in breaching and enfilading
batteries, commenced a terrific bombardment of the south gate and wall.
The city, during the night, had been surrounded by the Chinese _braves_;
no hope of escape presented itself, and the besieged fought as desperate
men will fight for their lives. Amid the torrent of shells, shrapnel,
Moorsom, conical, diaphragm, Armstrong, and other scientific engines of
destruction crashing and continuously exploding among them, they bravely
stood to their four or five 2-pounders, and resolutely manned their
walls under the fearful and murderous fire. The poor Ti-pings, in order
to protect themselves from the irresistible foreign shell, or "twice eye
shot," as the Cantonese in their _pidgeon_ English term it, had built a
sort of stockade all round the city wall; this, with the parapet, formed
a passage, which was covered in with a beamed and tiled roof. Instead of
affording safety to them, however, this work added to the
destructiveness of the enemy's fire, though it would have been better
for the doomed men to have been killed outright by British shot than be
captured and tortured to death in the execution grounds of the Manchoos.
A battery of four Armstrong guns enfilading the wall sent almost every
shell through the roof, to burst between the parapet and stockade,
thereby inflicting fearful havoc among the crowded defenders.
After about an hour's bombardment, two practicable breaches were
effected by the besiegers; the English and French storming parties then
advanced, protected by strong covering parties, who kept up a deadly
rifle fire on the besieged, while the field-pieces being dragged forward
enfiladed the parapet and breaches, mowing them down by dozens as they
courageously crowded behind their broken wall to repel the stormers. The
two snake flags of the Chief were planted on the summit of the breach,
while his bravest men surrounding him did their utmost to drive the
assaulting column back. The carnage at this point was immense; the
defenders no sooner rushed into view than withering volleys of musketry
and a storm of grape and canister destroyed them. The principal Ti-ping
chiefs were killed at the head of their men; still, a smart fire from
jingalls was kept up till the stormers gained the top of the breach and
effected a lodgement; and then, it is sufficient to say, the defenders
were attacked with the British bayonet. Even when driven from the wall,
several hundred of the Ti-ping soldiery rallied at its foot, and
fruitlessly sacrificed themselves in attempting to expel the successful
enemy.
The Ti-pings lost upwards of 1,000 men in their obstinate defence, the
Allies 2 killed and 10 wounded! About 2,000 were taken prisoners, the
greater part of whom supplied the Shanghae execution ground, while the
remnant of the garrison succeeded in cutting their way through the
hostile lines. Not more than half of the prisoners were fighting men.
Whether the most Christian and civilized allies had not obtained
sufficient loot, or killed enough fellow-creatures to satisfy them, I am
unable safely to state, but I opine that in neither particular were they
satiated. At all events, after sacking Tsing-poo and delivering up their
unfortunate captives to the tender mercies of the merciless
Imperialists, General Staveley and his co-adjutors started off in quest
of further glory, dollars, and Ti-pings. These noble crusaders at
length came to the fortified village of Na-jaor, where one of the
_triumviri_ met with his death.
Na-jaor was simply a village, but a wall having been built around it, a
small outwork erected, and the whole surrounded by dykes and dry
ditches, with _chevaux de frize_ and pallisades between them, it would
have been a difficult place to capture without artillery. The outwork
mounted three small guns, and a few others were divided between the
usual square flanking defences of a Chinese wall. The garrison of this
place can scarcely have numbered 1,000, all told.
The Armstrong guns and other artillery of the British and French opened
fire and shelled the defenders out of the small redoubt, upon the
afternoon of the 17th of May. While this was going on the garrison of
the village made a spirited sortie, but, with only an armament of bamboo
spears and rusty jingalls, were of course driven back with great loss.
At last the fire of the besieged seemed silenced, while their wall was
breached and crumbling in every direction. The s
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