South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 4 (of 8)
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Title: South Africa and the Transvaal War, Vol. 4 (of 8)
Author: Louis Creswicke
Release date: February 4, 2012 [eBook #38768]
Most recently updated: January 8, 2021
Language: English
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SOUTH AFRICA AND THE
TRANSVAAL WAR
[Illustration: THE QUEEN LISTENING TO A DISPATCH FROM THE FRONT.
From the Picture by S. Begg]
SOUTH AFRICA
AND THE
TRANSVAAL WAR
BY
LOUIS CRESWICKE
AUTHOR OF "ROXANE," ETC.
WITH NUMEROUS ILLUSTRATIONS AND MAPS
IN SIX VOLUMES
VOL. IV.--FROM LORD ROBERTS' ENTRY INTO THE FREE
STATE TO THE BATTLE OF KARREE
EDINBURGH: T. C. & E. C. JACK
MANCHESTER: KENNETH MACLENNAN, 75 PICCADILLY
1900
Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & CO.
At the Ballantyne Press
CONTENTS----VOL. IV.
PAGE
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE vii
CHAPTER I
THE VOTE OF CENSURE 1
KIMBERLEY 14
GENERAL FRENCH'S RIDE, FEBRUARY 12 TO 15 30
STRATEGY _versus_ TACTICS 37
THE HERDING OF CRONJE, FEBRUARY 16 TO 18 49
THE BATTLE OF PAARDEBERG, FEBRUARY 18 54
TRAPPED 62
THE SURRENDER OF CRONJE 71
CHAPTER II
MAFEKING, DECEMBER AND JANUARY 80
CHAPTER III
AT POPLAR GROVE 95
THE FIGHT AT DRIEFONTEIN, MARCH 10 101
AT BLOEMFONTEIN, MARCH 13 108
CHAPTER IV
MAFEKING, FEBRUARY 112
CHAPTER V
AT CHIEVELEY AGAIN 121
LADYSMITH, FEBRUARY 1 TO 26 129
THE BATTLE OF PIETERS, FEBRUARY 20 TO 27 134
EXPECTATION 151
THE RELIEF OF LADYSMITH, FEBRUARY 28 153
THE FORMAL ENTRY, MARCH 3 156
CHAPTER VI
CHANGES IN CAPE COLONY, FEBRUARY AND MARCH 163
AT BETHULIE, MARCH 12 171
CHAPTER VII
BLOEMFONTEIN UNDER BRITISH RULE 174
THE BATTLE OF KARREE 192
CHAPTER VIII
MAFEKING IN MARCH 194
COLONEL PLUMER'S OPERATIONS 204
LIST OF STAFF 213
APPENDIX 215
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS----VOL. IV.
MAP ILLUSTRATING THE MOVEMENTS FOR THE RELIEF OF
KIMBERLEY AND THE CAPTURE OF BLOEMFONTEIN _At Front_
1. _COLOURED PLATES_
PAGE
THE QUEEN LISTENING TO A DISPATCH FROM THE FRONT _Frontispiece_
THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY 12
THE ROYAL LANCASTERS 16
WEST YORKSHIRE AND YORKSHIRE REGIMENTS 88
THE INNISKILLING DRAGOONS 104
SOUTH AFRICAN LIGHT HORSE, BRABANT'S HORSE, AND
DUKE OF EDINBURGH'S VOLUNTEER RIFLES 120
STRATHCONA'S HORSE 184
THE CAPE TOWN HIGHLANDERS 200
2. _FULL-PAGE PLATES_
PAGE
THE DASH FOR KIMBERLEY--THE 10TH HUSSARS CROSSING
KLIP DRIFT 32
THE LAST STAND MADE BY THE BOERS BEFORE KIMBERLEY 36
CAPTURE OF A BOER CONVOY BY GENERAL FRENCH'S TROOPS 40
THE BATTLE OF PAARDEBERG 56
CRONJE'S STRONGHOLD 64
CRONJE SURRENDERS TO LORD ROBERTS 72
CRONJE'S FORCE ON THEIR MARCH SOUTH 80
SHELL FROM THE NAVAL BRIGADE DISPERSING BOERS 96
THE FORMAL SURRENDER OF BLOEMFONTEIN 108
SLEEPLESS MAFEKING 112
THE RELIEF OF LADYSMITH--THE LAST RUSH AT HLANGWANE HILL 128
IN BELEAGUERED LADYSMITH--WATCHING FOR BULLER FROM
OBSERVATION HILL 152
HINDOO REFUGEES FROM THE TRANSVAAL IN CAMP AT CAPE TOWN 168
CONVEYING WOUNDED TO WYNBERG HOSPITAL CAMP 172
THE BRITISH OCCUPATION OF BLOEMFONTEIN--AN EVENING CONCERT
IN MARKET SQUARE BY THE PIPERS OF THE HIGHLAND BRIGADE 176
COLONEL PLUMER'S GALLANT ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE MAFEKING
FROM THE NORTH 208
3. _FULL-PAGE PORTRAITS_
PAGE
THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, K.G. 8
LIEUT.-GENERAL THOMAS KELLY-KENNY, C.B. 24
GENERAL CRONJE 48
MAJOR-GENERAL A. FITZROY HART, C.B. 136
MAJOR-GENERAL H. J. T. HILDYARD, C.B. 144
BRIGADIER-GENERAL THE EARL OF DUNDONALD, C.B. 156
LIEUT.-GENERAL HON. N. G. LYTTELTON, C.B. 160
MR. M. T. STEYN, LATE PRESIDENT ORANGE FREE STATE 192
4. _MAPS AND ENGRAVINGS IN THE TEXT_
PAGE
SHELL PICKED UP IN KIMBERLEY STREETS 15
"LONG CECIL" MADE AT DE BEERS MINES 21
PLACARD ERECTED BY MR. RHODES 27
TYPICAL UNDERGROUND DWELLING AT KIMBERLEY 36
10TH HUSSARS WITH NORDENFELDT GUN 46
PLAN OF PAARDEBERG 57
GUNS CAPTURED AT PAARDEBERG 68
BOER TRENCHES AT PAARDEBERG 78
MARKET SQUARE, MAFEKING 85
GUN MADE IN MAFEKING 87
DIRECTING AN ARMY FROM A MILITARY BALLOON 102
FACSIMILE OF "THE MAFEKING MAIL" 114
SCENE OF FIGHTING AT MONTE CRISTO 125
BALLOON MAP--BATTLE OF PIETERS AND RELIEF OF LADYSMITH 135
SIGNAL APPARATUS OF H.M.S. "FORTE" 146
KING'S POST, LADYSMITH 151
MAP OF OPERATIONS ON ORANGE RIVER 165
SIGNAL STATION AT BLOEMFONTEIN 182
NATIVE CHURCH, MAFEKING 199
MAP SHOWING ADVANCE TO MAFEKING 205
LOBATSI RAILWAY STATION 212
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE----VOL. IV.
FEBRUARY 1900.
12-13.--General French, following up Hannay's movement, crossed Riet
River, and next day with a strong force marched twenty-five miles into
the Free State, seized Klip Drift on the Modder River, occupied the
hills to the north, and captured three of the enemy's laagers, with
supplies.
13-14.--6th (Kelly-Kenny's) Division on north bank of the Riet River at
Waterfall Drift.
14.--Lord Roberts advanced to Dekiel's Drift.
15.--General French reached and relieved Kimberley, captured Boer laager
and supplies, and forced the enemy to withdraw.
The Boers evacuated Majersfontein and Spyfontein, retreating to
Koodoosrand Drift.
16.--General Kelly-Kenny, in pursuit of Cronje retiring east with 10,000
men on Bloemfontein, captured 78 waggons with stores, 2 waggons with
Mauser rifles, and 8 waggons with shell belonging to Cronje's column.
Capture of Cingolo Hill by Sir Redvers Buller's force.
Lord Roberts occupied Jacobsdal.
Flight of Cronje's force and occupation of Majersfontein by the Guards.
17.--Cronje's force overtaken and surrounded at Paardeberg. General
Brabant engaged the enemy near Dordrecht.
Successful reconnaissance by Colonel Henderson from Arundel.
18.--Severe fighting at Paardeberg, where Cronje was being gradually
surrounded.
Capture of Monte Cristo. General Lyttelton's Division, by a brilliant
converging movement, drove the Boers across the river.
19.--Capture of Hlangwane by the Fusilier Brigade. The Boers evacuated
the hill, and left a large camp behind them.
Bombardment of Cronje's position began. Boer reinforcements driven back.
Cronje asked for armistice, but Lord Kitchener demanded his surrender;
Cronje refused, and was then bombarded heavily.
Reoccupation of Dordrecht. General Brabant entered the town in the
morning, the Boers taking to flight.
20.--General Hart occupied Colenso.
Lord Roberts defeated Boer reinforcements at Paardeberg.
21.--5th Division crossed the Tugela at Colenso.
23.--Advance on Ladysmith continued. The Boers' position at Grobler's
Kloof attacked.
The cordon round Cronje began to close in.
Captain Hon. R. H. L. J. de Montmorency, V.C. (21st Hussars), killed
while doing magnificent work with his Scouts near Stormberg.
26.--Finding the passage of the river near Colenso commanded by strong
entrenchments, Sir Redvers Buller sent his guns and baggage back to the
south side of the Tugela, and found a new crossing.
26-27.--Colesberg and Rensberg, having been evacuated by the Boers, were
occupied by General Clements, while Jamestown was occupied by General
Brabant.
27 (on anniversary of Majuba, 1881).--Cronje, with 44 commandants and
other officers of all grades, and over 3500 men, surrendered
unconditionally to Lord Roberts.
Sir Redvers Buller's force captured the Boer position at Pieters. This
action opened the road to Ladysmith. Boers retired north to Ladysmith.
28.--Relief of Ladysmith after 120 day's investment.
MARCH 1900.
1.--Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchener visited Kimberley and attended a
meeting in the Town Hall.
2.--Cronje and his staff, having been moved to Simonstown under a guard
of City Imperial Volunteers, were put on board H.M.S. _Doris_, and sent
to St. Helena.
3.--General Buller formally entered Ladysmith.
Skirmish near Osfontein. General French came in contact with a Boer
force, who tried to get away, but were held to their position by the
British force.
4-5.--General Brabant advanced from Dordrecht against Labuschagne, and
was completely successful.
5.--General Gatacre occupied Stormberg without opposition.
7.--Lord Roberts dispersed Boers near Poplar Grove.
General Gatacre reached Burghersdorp.
8.--General Clements occupied Norval's Pont.
10.--The Boers dispersed near Driefontein, fifteen miles east of Poplar
Grove.
11.--Presidents Kruger and Steyn received reply from the Prime Minister
refusing to entertain their absurd overtures for peace.
12.--General French (with cavalry, R.H.A., and Mounted Infantry) arrived
before Bloemfontein, and captured two hills which command the railway
and town.
General French captured the railway near Bloemfontein.
General Gatacre approached Bethulie.
13.--Lord Roberts occupied Bloemfontein. His despatch ran:--"The British
flag now flies over the Presidency vacated last evening by Mr. Steyn,
late President of the Orange Free State. The inhabitants gave the troops
a cordial welcome."
14.--General Pretyman, C.B., appointed Military Governor of
Bloemfontein.
15.--General Gatacre occupied Bethulie.
Boers attacked Colonel Plumer's camp and were repulsed.
16.--Fighting at Fourteen Streams.
19.--Lord Kitchener occupied Prieska, and received the submission of
rebels.
20.--Rouxville occupied by Major Cumming.
21.--Smithfield occupied by British troops.
23.--Party of English officers shot near Bloemfontein.
27.--General Clements occupied Fauresmith, and arrested the landrost.
Death of General Joubert.
29.--Action at Karree Siding. Boer position taken.
Wepener occupied by Brabant's Horse under Colonel Dalgety.
30.--Colonel Broadwood with Cavalry Brigade and two batteries Royal
Horse Artillery at Thabanchu retired on waterworks pressed by the enemy.
31.--Loss of convoy and six guns at Koorn Spruit.
Action at Ramathlabama for the relief of Mafeking, and Colonel Plumer's
small force repulsed by the Boers.
[Illustration: MAP ILLUSTRATING THE MOVEMENTS FOR THE RELIEF OF
KIMBERLEY AND THE CAPTURE OF BLOEMFONTEIN
EDINBURGH AND LONDON T. C. & E. C. JACK.]
SOUTH AFRICA AND THE TRANSVAAL WAR
CHAPTER I
THE TURNING OF THE TIDE
_February 27, 1900._
"Storm, strong with all the bitter heart of hate,
Smote England, now nineteen dark years ago,
As when the tide's full wrath in seaward flow
Smites and bears back the swimmer. Fraud and fate
Were leagued against her: fear was fain to prate
Of honour in dishonour, pride brought low,
And humbleness whence holiness must grow,
And greatness born of shame to be so great.
The winter day that withered hope and pride
Shines now triumphal on the turning tide
That sets once more our trust in freedom free,
That leaves a ruthless and a truthless foe
And all base hopes that hailed his cause laid low,
And England's name a light on land and sea."
--ALGERNON CHARLES SWINBURNE.
THE VOTE OF CENSURE
The terrible events of the month of December had produced a disquieting
effect upon the public mind. Agitated questions were asked on all
subjects connected with the series of catastrophes, and the replies were
so unsatisfactory that one and all became sensible that the actions of
those in power were not sufficiently in unison with public sentiment,
and even the keenest supporters of the Government numbly experienced a
loss of confidence in those at the helm. It was felt that some one must
be to blame for the miserable condition of affairs, the hideous series
of defeats that had made Great Britain an object of ridicule on the
Continent. For the forwarding of our troops "in driblets," for the
ineffectiveness of our guns in comparison with Boer weapons, for the
uselessness of the carbine in competition with the Mauser, for the
scarcity of horses, for the preparedness of the Boers, for the
unpreparedness of the British, for the under-estimation of the strength
of the enemy, and for many other things which tended to bring about the
national disaster, various members of the Government were blamed.
Charges of incapacity were levelled at the Secretary of State for War,
the War Office, and the Committee of National Defence. Even the stoutest
Tories were found declaiming against the attitude of lethargy--flippancy,
some said--adopted by those in whose hands the fate of the nation rested.
Mr. Balfour, in certain speeches somewhat ill-advisedly delivered at a
critical moment, had contrived almost to wound people who were already
deeply wounded by humiliation and anxiety. His mood had not been in
sympathy with the public mood. He had endeavoured to brush away the stern
problems facing him by minimising their seriousness, by affecting to
believe that the Government was, like Caesar's wife, beyond reproach. His
attitude implied that the Cabinet could do no wrong, and that the
misfortunes and errors (if errors there were) were due to a concatenation
of circumstances for which neither the Government at home nor the
generals abroad could be held responsible. In consequence of this
attitude, on one side Mr. Balfour was blamed, on another, Mr.
Chamberlain. The Colonial Secretary was accused of the policy of
"bluffing with a weak hand," while the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as
was inevitable, came in for his share of obloquy. It was the cheeseparing
principle that was at the bottom of it all; cheeseparing and red-tape
were responsible for debility and delay of all kinds, and political
inertia had undoubtedly spelt defeat. The clamour was reasonable and
just. It was felt that prudence and energy should have served as fuel to
stoke the engine of public affairs, not as a brake to be put on in the
face of disaster. On all hands the public of one consent cried for a new
broom and "a great co-ordinating guiding mind," and the universal clamour
awoke the Government to a consciousness that there are times and seasons
in the history of nations when party recriminations and crystallised
party etiquette must give way before the stress of a great national
need--the need to preserve at all costs the honour and the reputation of
the Empire in face of the whole world.
Accordingly, the opening debate of the Session was one which cannot be
passed over. The Queen's Speech struck a note of decision that was at
once comforting and in sympathy with her people. Thus it ran: "I have
witnessed with pride and the heartiest gratification the patriotism,
eagerness, and spontaneous loyalty with which my subjects in all parts
of my dominions have come forward to share in the common defence of
their Imperial interests. I am confident that I shall not look to them
in vain when I exhort them to sustain and renew their exertions until
they have brought this struggle for the maintenance of the Empire and
the assertion of its supremacy in South Africa to a victorious
conclusion."
The Earl of Kimberley commented on the ignorance of the Government
regarding the military preparations that for years had been going on in
the Transvaal, and indulged in criticisms which might have been weighty
had his hearers not been tickled by the strange irony of fate which
converted into critic one of the authors of the humiliating drama which
had been left to shape itself from the disastrous _scena_ of 1881.
To these criticisms the Prime Minister--somewhat broken by domestic
bereavement--offered but a weak and depressing reply. "How," he asked,
in regard to the Boer preparations, "could the Government know what was
going on?"
"I believe, as a matter of fact, though this must not be taken
as official, that the guns were generally introduced in the
boilers of locomotives, and that the munitions of war were
introduced in piano-cases and tubs. But we had no power of
search, we had no power of knowing what munitions of war were
sent out. We certainly had no power of supervising their
importation into the Transvaal. It is a very remarkable
peculiarity of the public opinion of this country that people
always desire to eat their cake and have it. They rejoice very
much with a spirit of complacency that we have a very small
Secret Service Fund. Information is a matter of money and
nothing else. If you want much information you must give much
money; if you give little money you will get little
information; and considering the enormous sums which are spent
by other Powers, not least by the Transvaal Republic, in secret
service--which I was told on high diplomatic authority has been
L800,000 in one year--and comparing this with the ludicrously
small sums which have for a great number of years been
habitually spent by English Governments, it is impossible for
us to have the omniscience which the noble Earl seems to regard
as a necessary attribute of Her Majesty's Government."
Further on he said:
"We must all join together to exercise all the power that we
can give in order to extricate ourselves from a situation that
is full of humiliation and not free from danger, though I do
not say the danger may not be easily exaggerated. Many a
country has commenced a great war with difficulties of this
kind. We have only to look back at what the Northern States of
America went through at the opening of the Civil War to see how
easy it would be to draw a mistaken inference from the reverses
which we have met at the opening of this war. We have every
ground to think that if we set ourselves heartily to work and
exert all the instruments of power we possess we shall bring
this war to a satisfactory conclusion. I think we must defer
the pleasing task of quarrelling among ourselves until that
result has been obtained. We have a work that now appeals to us
as subjects of the Queen, as Englishmen, and it must throw into
shadow the ancient claims which party expediency has on the
action of all our statesmen."
This speech concluded, Lord Rosebery suddenly sprang up, and delivered
himself with thrilling emphasis of sentiments which went at once to the
heart of the nation. Deeply he deplored the Prime Minister's speech,
which made it hard for "the man in the street" to support the policy of
the Government.
The country, he insisted, had a right to know if there was adequate
information given to the Government before the crisis of the Transvaal
affair, or even sufficient to guide them in their diplomacy or their
negotiation. "That is a point which the nation will insist on knowing,
whether in this House or the other. If you had not sufficient
information, dismiss your Intelligence Department, dismiss Mr. Conyngham
Greene and your consular agents wherever they had touch with this
matter--at Lourenco Marques or elsewhere. If you did know of it, you
have a heavy responsibility to bear. The noble Marquis asks, 'How could
we see through a deal board?' I suppose he meant by that to allude to
the pianoforte cases in which, with more knowledge than he gave himself
credit for, he unofficially states that the ammunition was brought into
Pretoria."
Passing on to the question of Secret Service money, he declared that the
Government was in possession of a very commanding majority in the House,
and that if they had the responsibility of Government they were bound to
ask for what funds, whether Secret Service or other, which they might
think necessary for the safety of the Empire.
"They cannot," he pursued, "devolve that responsibility on
others by speaking of the working of the British Constitution.
I ask noble Lords to analyse the speech of the noble Marquis,
which is still ringing in their ears. It is the speech of a
Minister explaining a disastrous position. He practically has
only given two explanations of that situation. They are, first,
that the Government had not enough Secret Service money to
obtain information, and, secondly, the mysterious working of
the British Constitution. I suppose that there are foreign
representatives in the gallery listening to this debate, and I
suppose that the speech of the Prime Minister will be flashed
to-night all over Europe, and Europe, which is watching with a
keen and not a benevolent interest the proceedings of our
armies in South Africa, will learn that the causes of our
disasters are one avoidable and the other inevitable. The
avoidable one is the inadequate amount of the Secret Service
Fund, and the inevitable one the secular working of the British
Constitution."
Leaving the question of unpreparedness, he came to the great point, and
asked what the Government intended to do.
"There is a paragraph in the Queen's Speech which I rejoice to
see, of a somewhat didactic character in its first sentence,
but not without interest in its second. 'The experience of a
great war must necessarily afford lessons of the greatest
importance to the military administration of the country. You
will not, I am convinced, shrink from any outlay that may be
required to place our defensive preparations on a level with
the responsibilities which the possession of so great an Empire
has laid on us.' The noble Marquis made no reference to that
paragraph, except to say that he does not think we shall see
compulsory service in the life of the youngest peer present. I
do not affirm or question that proposition, but I can say I do
not think it is so immeasurably remote as the noble Marquis
considers that some form of compulsory service may have to be
introduced to meet the growing exigencies of the Empire. I am
sure that neither from this nor from any other sacrifice will
the nation recoil to preserve the predominance of our Empire.
We have sent away from our island a vast mass of troops which
usually garrison it. Situated as we are in the centre of a
universe by no means friendly to us, that we should not have a
hint from the First Minister of the Crown what military
measures the Government propose to take in face of the
disasters we have met with, and what sacrifices we must
inevitably be called on to make to redress them, is one of the
most extraordinary features of the working of the British
Constitution on which the noble Marquis has laid such great
stress. I agree with him in saying that the country will carry
this thing through. It will carry it through in spite of all
the impediments, both of men and of methods, that have shackled
it in the past; but I venture to say that it will have to be
inspired by a loftier tone and by a truer patriotism than we
have heard from the Prime Minister to-night."
Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons, was as damping to popular hopes as
the Prime Minister in the House of Lords. Regarding the all-important
subject of the under-estimation of the Boer strength, he somewhat airily
said:
"It will be asked, How comes it, then, that this great
under-estimate of the Boer strength was made if we knew
approximately what the Boer armaments were, and what Boers were
likely to take the field? I do not know that I have got any
very satisfactory answer to give to that question. It is a
purely and strictly military problem, and, as history shows, it
is a kind of problem very difficult to answer satisfactorily.
You can gauge the military strength of a European nation with a
fixed army, with all their modern military apparatus, and with
all their military statistics at your disposal; but when you
come to problems of States whose military organisation is not
of that elaborate kind, great mistakes have been made in the
past, and I doubt not great mistakes will be made in the
future. They certainly have been made by almost every military
nation of whom we have any record. But if this is regarded as
an attack upon the military experts of the War Office, it is
surely an unfair attack, because soldiers, who are not
especially given to agreeing with one another, were absolutely
unanimous upon this point. I do not believe you will be able to
quote the opinion of a single soldier of any position whatever,
or of no position, delivered before, say, July 31 or August 31
last, indicating any opinion which will show that the force
which we in the first instance sent out would not be amply
sufficient, or more than amply sufficient, for all purposes.
(Cries of "What about Butler?") The right hon. gentlemen put a
question to me about Sir W. Butler. We had not the slightest
trace at the War Office in any communication, public,
semi-public, or private--no communication of any sort, kind, or
description, which indicated that in Sir W. Butler's opinion
the force we sent out was not sufficient--I was going to say
doubly sufficient--for any work that it might be called upon to
perform."
Indeed, the whole tenor of the speech was generally regarded as
unsatisfactory and dispiriting. It was felt that, as Lord Rosebery
expressed it, the Government must be left to "muddle through" somehow.
People who hung anxiously on the lips of the Government for definite
statements regarding future resolute action were disappointed, and
waited wearily the conclusion of the debate.
On February 1, Sir Charles Dilke drew vigorous comparisons between the
present and former campaigns. In regard to our lack of artillery he
said:
"All our generals had told us that direct artillery fire had
failed against the Boer entrenchments. It had been known for
years past that direct artillery fire would be likely to fail
against strong entrenchments; yet we sent twenty-one batteries
of field-artillery to South Africa before the first one of the
three howitzer batteries was despatched. It was one of the
strongest charges which he and others had brought against the
War Office for some years, that our army was more badly
supplied with field-artillery than any other army in the world.
It was not even comparable with the field-artillery of
Switzerland and Roumania. In regard to our guns, the Leader of
the House had stated in a speech at Manchester that we had guns
in South Africa sufficient for three army corps of regular
troops. He should like to know on whose authority the right
hon. gentleman made that statement. The first force sent to
South Africa from India was supplied with guns, not on that
scale, but still in fairly decent and respectable measure. The
forces of Lord Methuen and Sir Redvers Buller fell altogether
short of even the scale adopted for the Indian Contingent. Both
these generals had themselves called attention to their
deficiency in this respect. We had not even now got artillery
on anything like the scale laid down by the right hon.
gentleman, and we could not have it in South Africa, because we
had not got it in the world. In these circumstances he could
only characterise the statement of the Leader of the House as
entirely erroneous and misleading, and altogether a blunder.
With regard to the batteries which were even now being sent
out, many of them were manned by reservists and by garrison
artillerymen, who had had no experience in the handling of
modern field-guns."
Proceeding to the question of lack of cavalry, he argued:
"With regard to cavalry as with regard to artillery, the first
force was well supplied, but the forces of Lord Methuen and
General Buller were very deficient in that respect. In that
connection the First Lord had made an attack on the critics of
the War Office. He said they had not seen, or if they had seen
had not insisted on, a novel fact in the present war, namely,
that for the first time in the history of the world they had
seen an army composed entirely of mounted infantry. The right
hon. gentleman had only to read Sir William Butler's 'Life of
General Colley,' where he would find very marked attention
drawn to that matter. As to the Defence Committee of the
Cabinet, of which the right hon. gentleman was a member, though
he himself had been spoken of as the author of that body, he
must admit that it had failed. It was instituted after a
correspondence in which he himself, his hon. friend (Mr. Arnold
Foster), and Mr. Spenser Wilkinson took part, and it was not
new to the present Government. It was instituted in the time of
Lord Rosebery's Government as a Committee of the Cabinet, but
it had been proclaimed to the world in the time of the present
Government. It had failed on account of the slackness of those
who attended the deliberations of the Committee. It had not
been worked as the authors of the proposal thought it might
have been worked in the interests of the Empire. The Committee
ought to have foreseen these difficulties with respect to
mounted men; they were foreseen by military men. Though
political differences occurred between Sir A. Milner and Sir W.
Butler, Sir A. Milner consulted General Butler on the military
aspect of the situation, and General Butler's opinions were
known to the Government, or should have been. They were known
to Sir A. Milner at any rate and were not concealed by him when
he was in this country a year ago. According to his (Sir C.
Dilke's) information, which reached him immediately after the
statement had been made to Sir A. Milner, General Sir W. Butler
declared that 60,000 men would be required in Cape Colony and
25,000 men in Natal. Leaving that, however, what was the
attitude of the Cabinet with regard to the need for cavalry?
They telegraphed to the Colonies to refuse mounted men. They
gave their reasons in the telegram of October 3: 'In view of
the numbers already available, infantry most and cavalry least
serviceable.' On December 16 they telegraphed to the Colonies,
'Mounted men preferred.' After all the loss of life that had
taken place, and the months of checks and reverses, they had
discovered what competent soldiers had discovered before the
war, and must have told them, that mounted men were essential
for a campaign of this kind."
In reply, the Under-Secretary of State for War made the first telling
and apposite statement which had been furnished for the Government
during the course of the proceedings. His exposition was
straightforwardness itself. Though merely the mouthpiece of the
Government, Mr. Wyndham gave utterance to definite statements which
created a very favourable impression throughout the country, and served
at once to wipe away the taste of foregone pronouncements. He said:
"Every one to his dying day would look back with regret on the
great many disasters which had followed, but no one could ever
know what would have happened if the other course had been
adopted. It was very easy to conceive that if Sir G. White had
not stayed at Ladysmith and Sir R. Buller had not gone to his
relief disaster might have been developed in another line, and
that there might have been that universal rising of the Cape
Dutch which, thank Heaven, had not occurred. When it was stated
that Lord Methuen had not sufficient cavalry and artillery with
him, it must be remembered that Lord Methuen was hurried off to
the Orange River, and, as a matter of fact, he arrived on the
frontier in fewer days than the German army reached the French
frontier, and he had not with him the cavalry, which had been
diverted for the relief of Ladysmith and other purposes. On the
morrow after Nicholson's Nek three more battalions were sent
from home, though none had been asked for, and Lord Landsowne
offered a sixth division. In reply, he was told that
preparation was desirable, but that there was no immediate need
for its despatch. The situation was again changed by the
reverses at Stormberg and Magersfontein and the check at
Colenso. Thereupon the sixth division was ordered to embark
without any communication from South Africa, and at the same
time the seventh division was ordered to be mobilised. On
December 15, the day after his check at Colenso, Sir R. Buller
asked for the seventh division, the mobilisation of which had
already been ordered, and for 8000 mounted irregulars from
this country. Lord Landsowne replied that the seventh division
would embark on January 4, which it did. Next day the first
step was taken in connection with the raising of the Imperial
Yeomanry, and volunteers were invited to come forward in order
to fill the places left vacant by the raising from each
battalion of one company of mounted infantry. The patriotism of
the Militia was also appealed to, and fourteen battalions were
now serving in South Africa, while others were on the way. A
great military authority once said, 'When a battalion is asked
for, send a brigade.' That had been the course pursued by Lord
Landsowne."
In regard to the number of our guns, Mr. Wyndham continued his argument
in the following terms:--
"As the right hon. baronet had pressed for information with
regard to the number of guns which had been despatched to South
Africa, it would not be out of place to tell the House that we
had sent and were sending 36 siege train heavy guns; there were
already there 38 mobile naval guns, and in addition to these
there were 36 5-inch howitzers carrying a heavy shell charged
with 50 lbs. of lyddite, in all 110 guns, some of them with a
range of 10,000 yards, and all capable of throwing heavy
shells. Besides these there were 54 horse-artillery guns and
234 field-artillery guns, in all, counting the howitzers, 324
guns capable of accompanying troops in the field. Including the
two mountain batteries, there were altogether 410 guns in South
Africa, without reckoning the guns that were going out with the
Volunteers and the Colonials, which would bring the number up
to 452."
[Illustration: THE MARQUIS OF SALISBURY, K.G.
PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY.
Photo by Russell & Sons, London.]
Then taking the subject of mounted troops, he went on:--
"On the question of mounted troops, it had been said that the
Government announced to the world their conviction that
unmounted troops were the kind of troops most suitable to South
African warfare. The word 'mounted' was never used. However, he
would not insist on that, but he did think that those who had
quoted this opinion so often should consider when they were
used, because then they would see that they gave no indication
that the Government held the opinion attributed to them. As a
matter of fact, since the outbreak of the war the Government
had sent out a larger proportion of mounted troops than was
usually contemplated, because they believed that mounted troops
were especially suited to go to Africa. The time at which the
phrase was used that infantry was most wanted and cavalry least
wanted was on October 3, before the ultimatum was sent, before
the war began, and at a time when Sir R. Buller was satisfied
that an army corps, a cavalry division, and the necessary
troops for the line of communication, giving 50,000 men in
addition to the 25,000 already in South Africa, was an adequate
force. When the question of the Colonial Contingents was first
raised, Queensland offered 250 and New Zealand 200 mounted
infantry, and the 108 New South Wales Lancers then in this
country volunteered, making in all 558 mounted men. No specific
offer was received from the other Colonies, but they expressed
a wish that they might be allowed to take some part in the
campaign. He thereon consulted Sir R. Buller as to the number
that should be asked for in order that each Colony might be
represented more or less in proportion to their respective
populations. Sir Redvers stated that it would be easier to give
the Colonial troops an immediate place at the front if they
were invited to contribute manageable units of 125 men each. If
the original offers of the Colonies had been accepted, there
would have been 1375 more mounted men at the front at an
earlier date, when no one contemplated that the force sent out
would be insufficient for its task. The Colonial Legislatures
have not changed their note in consequence of the
disappointments and reverses which have been experienced, but
have made further offers--an example which might well have been
followed nearer home. Altogether there had been accepted from
the Colonies 2075 unmounted and 4678 mounted men. The
proportion of mounted to unmounted troops in South Africa at
four different periods were: In the original garrison, 7600
unmounted and 2000 mounted; on October 9, the day of the
ultimatum, 12,600 unmounted and 3400 mounted; on January 1,
83,600 unmounted and 19,800 mounted; while the total number of
troops in South Africa, not including the Fourth Cavalry
Brigade, were 142,800 unmounted and 37,800 mounted, and in the
next fortnight or three weeks there would be out there 180,600
of all arms."
Sir Edward Grey said:--
"He was giving the right hon. gentleman some instances of the
value of the support from his side. The primary object of the
policy which had ended in the war was not to drive the Boers
from British territory, as they were not then on it. The
primary object was not to plant the British flag at Pretoria
and Johannesburg. These two things might be the result of the
war, but they were not the primary objects of the Government
policy. The objects which he wished to see attained, and which
he would pledge himself to give the utmost support to the
Government in attaining, were, first, equal rights between all
white men in South Africa, and by that he meant that never
again should a situation arise in any part of the British
sphere in which a modern industrial community should be placed
under the heel of an antiquated minority which was dominated by
prejudice and governed by corruption. The second object was
that never again in South Africa should it be possible for
arsenals to be formed or an accumulation of military material
under any control except British control. That was the end to
be attained, and to that end the Government would have
support."
On the 3rd of February Mr. Bryce expressed his opinions. He affected to
disbelieve that there had been any Dutch conspiracy to drive the British
from South Africa, and considered that, owing to the menace of the
Government in the arrangement of negotiations, the meek Boer had no
resource but to prepare for war.
Mr. Goschen admitted the gravity of the situation and the responsibility
of the Government _en masse_. The Cabinet, he decided, must stand or
fall together. The Admiralty, in acceptation of its responsibility, had
assisted the army with heavy guns without weakening its resources.
Lastly, he touched enthusiastically on the exhibition of Colonial
loyalty:--
"Before concluding I must say a word with reference to the
Colonists. They have been supporting us with unstinted loyalty
and unstinted generosity. There has been a spirit shown by the
Colonies of affection to the mother country which has been the
admiration of the world. May we not suggest that that unstinted
loyalty and that unstinted generosity is to some extent a
reward for the consideration which has been shown the Colonies
for some time past; and is it not right to remember that for
years there has not been a Secretary for the Colonies who has
so endeavoured to win the affection of the Colonies as the
right hon. gentleman who now holds that office? You tax us with
not having shown foresight and judgment. At all events our
treatment of the Colonies has ensured, not their loyalty--that
will always be there--but the enthusiastic impulse of the
Colonies to come to the assistance of the mother country. We
have a great work to do; we want to do that work, and now hon.
gentlemen opposite move an amendment the only object of which
could be to damage and weaken the Government, who are the
instruments of the national will. If hon. gentlemen opposite do
not wish to take our places and to bear the burden which rests
on our shoulders, is it wise to endeavour to shake the
confidence of the country in the men who must continue this
war, and gather together all the forces of the Empire to bring
it to a successful conclusion? Supposing there should be a
division which could be called a bad division for the
Government, what would the cheers which would greet that
division mean? They would mean, 'We have succeeded in damaging
and weakening the Government.' The time may come when we will
be damaged. If the war is not successful, sweep us away as men
who have no judgment, but do not lame the arm of the Executive
Government when they have such a work on hand as we have got to
do. There has been patriotic co-operation between us and some
of the Liberal Party. We thank them for it. I believe this is a
Parliamentary bad dream--an interlude between the patriotic
attitude of these gentlemen a few weeks ago and the patriotic
attitude which I hope we may look forward to when this debate
closes. They have assured the country they will support us in
going forward. I thank them for that, for it is more important
than the petty criticisms to which we have been treated. We are
the trustees of the nation for the work that has to be done.
The nation will support us, I believe; and so long as we
receive that support, God willing, we will fulfil our task."
Sir E. Clarke, among other things, said:--
"He did not believe the annexation of the Transvaal and the
Orange Free State would be of the slightest benefit to the
country. The annexation of the two Republics would compel us to
very greatly increase our already enormous military
expenditure, and it would not give us any advantage
commensurate with the difficulties of administration. He had no
desire to press his own views, which were singular, and
certainly not popular, on that side of the House. He only
pleaded that this question might be left open, and that
Ministers might not pledge themselves to a course which would
involve so great a sacrifice. While he agreed generally with
the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility, he considered that the
real responsibility for the war lay with the Colonial
Secretary. The Prime Minister, in whom all England put the
greatest confidence, having many other things to deal with, and
being distressed by domestic anxieties, might not have been
able to attend so closely as he otherwise would have done to
South African affairs; but it could not be gainsaid that there
were two men, one in this country and the other in South
Africa, who must be associated with the beginning of the war.
He wished that the highest sentiments of patriotism would
induce those two men to leave to others the positions they now
occupied. He believed that the difficulties involved in a
solution of the questions arising out of the war would be
increased by the fact that the lines of communication and
action in South Africa were in the hands of the Colonial
Secretary and Sir A. Milner. He had not a word to say about the
honesty of these two gentlemen; but if, for a few weeks or a
few months, in this grave national crisis and time of deep
anxiety, others could take their places--if the Prime Minister
himself would take under his own control the communications of
the Colonial Office with South Africa, and if Lord Rosebery
would give his services to the country, and go out to South
Africa to assist in a solution of the difficulties, it would be
a sacrifice not too great to ask even from the greatest men
among us, and one for which the country would be very grateful.
He had said that he was not going to make a controversial
speech. He did not think he had. If he had, it had been with no
intention of personal attack or party bitterness, but with the
deep conviction that in deciding on the great issues with which
Parliament had to deal we had to consider not only the things
of to-day but the things of the future."
Mr. Chamberlain's speech on the 5th of February was an advance on former
proceedings. Sir William Harcourt dilated on the indomitable energy of a
free people fighting for their independence, praised the gallantry of
the troops, and blamed the Government for being led by the opinions of
the authors of the Jameson Raid, to which the Colonial Secretary made
dignified reply. Finally he questioned--
"How do we meet the charge of mistakes? Not by denying the
mistakes, but by saying what we have done and what we are doing
to repair them. You say we sent too few troops. We are pouring
troops into South Africa, and, as you have been told, in a few
weeks you will have an army of 200,000. You said we were
forgetful of the need for mounted men. We have been increasing
the number of horse infantry until in a very short time the
number of mounted men in the British forces will be almost as
great, if not as great, as the total number of mounted men in
the Boer army. You say our artillery is deficient and not heavy
enough. We have sent battery after battery, until now you have
an unexampled force of that arm. We have at the same time added
a number of heavier guns. When the war began, no doubt the
needs of the war were under-estimated at that time; it is part
of the same mistake. We failed to respond as we ought to have
done to the splendid offers that came from our Colonies. We
accepted enough to show how much we valued their assistance,
but we hesitated to put on them any greater strain than
necessary. But what is happening now? They are multiplying
their forces, and every offer is gratefully and promptly
appreciated and accepted. And we shall have in this war before
it is over an army of Colonials called to the aid of Her
Majesty who will outnumber the British army at Waterloo and
nearly equal to the total British force in the Crimea."
In conclusion he said:--
"In Africa these two races, so interesting, so admirable, each
in its own way, though different in some things, will now, at
any rate, have learned to respect one another. I hear a great
deal about the animosity which will remain after the war, but I
hope I am not too sanguine when I say that I do not believe in
it. When matters have settled down, when equal rights are
assured to both the white races, I believe that both will enjoy
the land together in settled peace and prosperity. Meanwhile,
we are finding out the weak spots in our armour, and trying to
remedy them. We are finding out the infinite potential
resources of the Empire; we are advancing steadily, if slowly,
to the realisation of that great federation of our race which
will inevitably make for peace, liberty, and justice."
On the following night Mr. Asquith, on Talleyrand's principle--that
speech is given us to hide our thoughts--dilated interestingly on the
position, his sympathies oscillating between the Opposition, the
Government, and Mr. Kruger. Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman declared it to
be the duty of the Opposition to press Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice's
amendment to a division. He inferred that the conspiracy of the Cape
Dutch was a chimera, and went so far as to suggest that when our
military supremacy was asserted in South Africa the question of
settlement might be left to decide itself _sine die_! Said he: "Provided
that our territories are free and our military supremacy asserted, what
matters it at what time or what place a settlement is arrived at?"
In his reply Mr. Balfour distinguished himself. He said that it was
discovered that the War Office has more than fulfilled its promises, and
appealed to the members of the Opposition who sympathised with the
justice of the war to reflect before voting for the amendment. It was
necessary to help the soldiers at the front by proving to them that they
were supported by a united country, and that every hostile vote might
induce or encourage our opponents to prolong the contest. He concluded
by saying:--
"Can they contemplate with equanimity that their first action
in a session of Parliament meeting under such circumstances
should be a weakening of the Government, whose hands they
profess to desire to strengthen--whose hands I believe they
genuinely desire to strengthen--in every succeeding operation
connected with this war? Can they contemplate with equanimity
the reflection that possibly their votes may lengthen the war,
and, by lengthening it, may increase that tragic list of losses
with which we are already too familiar? If in giving their vote
they add one fraction to the chances of a European
complication, one fraction of a chance that an unnecessary life
may be lost or a family thrown into mourning, can they easily
reconcile that with their duty towards their own principles and
to that country of which they are, I believe, as devoted
servants as we on this side of the House? I think it is a
violation of every Parliamentary tradition that men who desire
to keep in office a Government should vote for an amendment
which, if carried, will turn out that Government, and that it
is contrary to every patriotic instinct to vote in a minority
against the Government. The size of that minority will affect
the whole course of European policy, the whole course of the
war. I have stated the problem as it presents itself to my
mind. I know that you are men of conscience and honour, and I
must leave it to you to decide the problem, each man in his own
case as his conscience and honour dictate. To the House at
large I can only make one appeal. It is that we, who are the
representatives of the country, may rise to the height reached
by those whom we represent. I ask no more, and I can ask no
more, of the House than that they should imitate, for they
cannot exceed, the courage, steadfastness, resolution, and
firmness under adversity, and the calmness of temper with
which our countrymen all over the world have dealt with the
situation in its entirety. If the House of Commons do, as no
doubt they will, imitate, for they cannot better, the conduct
of those who have sent them here, then who can doubt that the
clouds by which we are at present surrounded will in a short
time be dissipated and the Empire will issue from the struggle
in which it is now engaged stronger, not only in its own
consciousness of strength, but in the eyes of the civilised
world."
[Illustration: SERGEANT OF THE IMPERIAL YEOMANRY.
Photo by Gregory & Co., London.]
In the end, by 352 to 139--a majority of 213--the vote of censure on the
Government moved by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice was defeated. The decision
adequately expressed the feelings of the country. It must be remembered
that many of the Government supporters were in South Africa,
consequently a total poll of 491 represented a heavy vote. The following
list serves to show the number of members of both Houses who had
sacrificed party spirit to patriotic convictions, and had proceeded to
the front:--
HOUSE OF LORDS.--Earl of Airlie, commanding 12th Lancers; Earl
of Albemarle, lieutenant-colonel, City of London Imperial
Volunteers; Lord Basing, major, 1st Dragoons; Lord Castletown,
special service, South Africa; Lord Chesham, commanding a
battalion of Imperial Yeomanry; Earl Cowley, lieutenant,
Imperial Yeomanry; Lord Denman, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry;
Earl of Dudley, D.A.A.G. for Imperial Yeomanry; Earl of
Dundonald, C.B., major-general, commanding 3rd Brigade (Natal)
Cavalry Division; Earl of Dunraven, captain, Imperial Yeomanry;
Earl of Erroll, special service, South Africa; Earl of Essex,
second in command of battalion of Imperial Yeomanry; Earl of
Fingal, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Lord Kitchener of
Khartoum, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., Chief of the Staff; Earl of
Leitrim, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Earl of Longford,
captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Lord Lovat, captain, Lord Lovat's
Corps; Duke of Marlborough, staff captain for Imperial
Yeomanry; Lord Methuen, K.C.V.O., C.B., commanding 1st Division
in South Africa; Duke of Norfolk, K.G., captain, Imperial
Yeomanry; Lord Roberts of Kandahar, K.P., G.C.B., G.C.I.E.,
G.C.S.I., V.C., Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief; Lord
Romilly, special service, South Africa; Lord Rosmead, major,
6th Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers; Duke of Roxburghe,
lieutenant, Royal Horse Guards; Earl of Scarborough, second in
command of battalion of Imperial Yeomanry; Earl Sondes,
lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Duke of Westminster, A.D.C. to
Governor; Lord Wolverton, second lieutenant, Somersetshire
Yeomanry Cavalry; Lord Zouche, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry.
HOUSE OF COMMONS.--Mr. W. Allen, trooper, Imperial Yeomanry;
Hon. A. B. Bathurst, captain, 4th Battalion Gloucester
Regiment; Colonel A. M. Brookfield, commanding battalion of
Imperial Yeomanry; Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. W. Chaloner,
commanding battalion of Imperial Yeomanry; Hon. T. H. Cochrane,
captain, 4th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; Lord
A. F. Compton, captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Viscount Cranborne,
commanding 4th Battalion Bedford Regiment; Mr. W.
Bromley-Davenport, captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Sir J.
Dickson-Poynder, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Viscount
Folkestone, major, 1st Wilts Volunteer Rifle Corps; Mr. W. R.
Greene, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Hon. J. Guest,
lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Mr. G. Kemp, captain, Imperial
Yeomanry; Mr. E. H. Llewellyn, major, 4th battalion Somerset
Light Infantry; Mr. H. L. B. McCalmont, commanding 6th
battalion Royal Warwick Regiment; Mr. F. B. Mildmay,
lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Viscount Milton, lieutenant,
Imperial Yeomanry; Mr. D. V. Pirie, with Remounts Department,
South Africa; Lord Stanley, special service, South Africa; Lord
Edmund Talbot, special service, South Africa; Viscount
Valentia, A.A.G. for Imperial Yeomanry; Major W. H.
Wyndham-Quin, captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Major the Hon. H. V.
Duncombe, adjutant, Imperial Yeomanry; Sir Elliott Lees,
captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Sir S. Scott, lieutenant, Imperial
Yeomanry.
KIMBERLEY
There was little bombardment after the 25th of November, and though not
living on the fat of the land, the garrison was not short of provisions.
Mr. Rhodes, with characteristic forethought, now caused the formation of
a committee to inquire into the resources of those dependent on the men
killed, with a view to compensating them for their loss, and in other
ways exerted himself for the welfare of sufferers in the town.
Considerable friction occurred between the civil and military
authorities. The clashing of wills was inevitable in so small an area,
for Colonel Kekewich represented military power, while Mr. Rhodes could
be no other than he is, and ever has been--a power in himself. It was
unfortunate that two such forces should have been placed in collision,
but it remains to the credit of both that, in spite of the tension of
the situation, they should have co-operated to the end to save the town
from the common enemy, and protect the interests and lives of all who,
but for this co-operation, might have suffered much more intensely than
they did.
Early on the morning of the 9th of December a force with a battery under
Colonel Chamier--to whom the efficient and mobile condition of the
artillery was due--made a reconnaissance to the north. The Lancashire's
Mounted Infantry and two guns were posted on Otto's Kopje while the Cape
Police protected the Dam Wall. The Kimberley Light Horse in the centre
extemporised some rifle-pits out of some prospectors' huts in order to
cover retreat when necessary.
The enemy were screened by the debris of a wall at Kamfeens, but when
the boom of the British gun burst out and a shell roared in their midst,
they hurriedly sought cover in their foremost rifle-pits, whence with
great energy they "sniped" in the direction of the officers who were
superintending the operations. Meanwhile tremendous barking of cannon
and pinging of rifles continued, the Boers having got the range of Otto
Kopje to perfection. The troops had an exceedingly hard time, but
continued their operations till dusk. They lost only one killed and four
wounded.
On the wise principle that it is safer to act early on the aggressive if
you do not want to have to act late on the defensive, the smart little
force indulged in more military movements.
[Illustration: SHELL PICKED UP IN KIMBERLEY STREETS. Photo by Alf. S.
Hosking, Cape Town.]
Colonel Kekewich's general plan for the defence of Kimberley was based
on the principle of always keeping the enemy on the move and constantly
in fear of attack from an unexpected quarter, but the immediate object
of the numerous sorties and demonstrations in force now made by the
garrison was to assist the operations of Lord Methuen. The Colonel
explained that, "when the advance of the Relief Column from the Orange
River commenced, and I was put in possession of information concerning
the probable date of its arrival at Kimberley, I adopted such measures
as I hoped would cause the retention of a large force of the enemy in my
immediate neighbourhood, and thus enable the Relief Column to deal with
the Boer force in detail." As the portions of mounted corps were
continually employed, the work which fell on the detachment, 1st Batt.
Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, Cape Police, Diamond Fields Horse,
Kimberley Light Horse, and the Diamond Fields Artillery, was very
arduous; but the bravery and dash of these troops was unending. Colonel
Murray, of the Loyal North Lancashire, was invaluable in many
capacities, and Captain O'Brien of the same regiment, in command of a
section of the defences, was unfailing in energy and zeal. Cool as the
proverbial cucumber were Major Rodger of the Diamond Fields Horse and
Major May of the Diamond Fields Artillery. The motto of these officers
was the reverse of that of the notable _gens d'armes_, for they were
"always there when wanted," and generally in the fore-front. The
officers of the Kimberley Regiment, too, were conspicuous for courage,
coolness, and sagacity. They knew as by intuition what was wanted and
did it. From Colonel Finlayson, who commanded the regiment, to
Surgeon-Major Smith, who tended the wounded in the field, there was none
who did not contribute to the stock of efficiency which was placed at
the disposal of the Colonel.
On the 20th of December, the mounted detachments under Colonel Peakman,
with maxims and 7-pounders under Colonel May, started off in the pitch
darkness of 2 A.M., and marched through Kenilworth in the direction of
the wreck of Webster's Farm, and on towards Tollpan in the Free State.
British cannonading then took place, the Kimberley guns shelling Tollpan
Homestead at 2500 yards' range, and the Boer gun on Klippiespan ridge
returning the compliment with interest. Fortunately the hostile shells
burrowed deep in the sandy soil, and consequently little damage was
done. The Boers were found to be very comfortably situated at the three
corners of a six-mile triangle--at Coetgie, Scholtz, and
Alexandersfontein--commanding three separate sources of water supply.
This reconnaissance was of importance, as the positions of the enemy's
guns and outposts were determined, and the garrison was enabled to be on
guard against raiders and snipers, and to protect itself, its patrols,
and cattle from the fire of the enemy. In the matter of protecting the
cattle from the tricks of the Dutchmen, as in many other ways, Mr. Fynn,
manager of the De Beers farms, did splendid service. This gentleman was
Mr. Rhodes's right-hand man, and as a natural consequence of the honour
he enjoyed rose to every occasion that offered, now managing a corps of
scouts, now superintending the conveyance of food, now dealing with
truculent natives, and always conducting his varied avocations with
immense energy and tact.
[Illustration: Lieutenant. Captain. Adjutant.
THE ROYAL LANCASTERS.
Photo by Gregory & Co., London.]
On the 22nd of December a good deal of martial activity took place. At
cockcrow a detachment of mounted forces, with artillery and infantry,
went west for the purpose of reconnoitring Voornitzright and part of
Weldermstkuil. On the right were the Diamond Fields Horse under Major
Rodger, supported by a company of the North Lancashire Regiment under
Lieutenant de Putron. Presently an animated cannonade began between the
enemy's artillery from Kamferdam and the Diamond Fields Artillery guns
on Otto's Kopje. In the centre Colonel Peakman, with the Kimberley Light
Horse and Cape Police, proceeded along Lazaretto Ridge. There, before
retreating, he made the necessary discoveries--firstly, that the Boer
patrols were then the only occupants of the place, and secondly, that
the enemy's reinforcements were advancing behind Wimbledon Ridge.
Meanwhile Colonel Chamier on the left, with R.A. guns and an escort
under Major Snow, was exchanging salutations with the Boer guns
posted in the earthwork in the centre of Wimbledon Ridge. This
occupation was pursued for some time, during which the enemy were found
to be rapidly approaching. Directly the guns were limbered up some 500
Boers came on the scene, and began to pour a fierce fire from the
earthworks at the foot of the Ridge upon the Kimberley troops, who
retired to cover. The object of the reconnaissance was gained, however,
for it proved in what an inconceivably short space of time the enemy
could summon his reinforcements, and, moreover, that three of his guns
were yet in the neighbourhood of the town.
On Christmas Eve congratulations were received by flashlight signals
from the Military Secretary at Cape Town:--
"Convey to Colonel Kekewich and all the garrison and
inhabitants of Kimberley his Excellency's best wishes for their
good luck on Christmas Day and in the coming New Year."
Colonel Kekewich replied:--
"Kindly inform the Military Secretary that I and the garrison
and inhabitants of Kimberley thank his Excellency for his kind
message. We also wish respectfully to offer our very best
wishes for Christmas and New Year."
This little interchange of compliments caused infinite pleasure to those
whose days were one unvarying round of trial and suspense. The weather
was exceedingly hot; at times the thermometer registered 105 deg. in the
shade, and life without absolute necessities in torrid weather is trying
even to the patience of the active. To those whose intercourse with the
world was confined to flashlight signals, it was barren in the extreme.
But with much pluck they thus announced their sentiments in a journal
called the _Diamond Fields Advertiser_, which still maintained a
languishing existence: "Excepting two or three of our inhabitants who
shared the terrible privations of the siege of Paris, few of us have
ever spent such a Christmas before, and few will ever care to spend such
a Christmas again. The scarcity of turkeys and plum-pudding at this time
of traditional plenty need only distress the gourmand. The majority of
the people of Kimberley are happily made of sterner stuff, and do not
look for luxuries in a time of siege." They were nevertheless not
utterly plum-puddingless. Mr. Rhodes, with characteristic forethought,
had caused to be cooked in the Sanatorium some two score of these
bombshells to digestion, and had distributed them in each of the camps.
Here they were devoured with much merrymaking and a general interchange
of felicitations, which went on by telephone from one camp to another.
From the Mounted Camp to the Royal Artillery: "Best wishes and longer
range to your guns." From the gunners, in return, while they kept one
ear open for movement in the direction of the Boers' "Susannah:" "May
our range be always long enough for us to be guardian-angels to the
Mounted Corps."
On the following day the artillery was at work responding to the salutes
of the Boers, who commenced to fire with great activity after their
Christmas rest. They dropped some thirty-five shells in the direction of
the fort, and received nineteen well-directed replies. Two of the mines
were fired by the thunderstorm of the previous night, but no one was
injured. Food now was becoming more and more scarce, and those connected
with the distribution of provisions had to exercise much forethought and
economy.
The task of arranging for the victualling and supply of the garrison and
40,000 people in the town was undertaken by Major Gorle, Army Service
Corps, and the zeal and resource which he brought to bear on his onerous
duties were applauded on all sides. Of course there were found persons
who, on the take-everything-from-everybody-else-and-give-it-all-to-me
principle, thought they were badly treated, but these were the exception
rather than the rule. The arrangements for milk were made by a special
civil committee, consisting of Mr. Oliver, the Mayor, whose courage and
energy in keeping up the spirits of the people were wonderful, Mr.
Judge, and four visiting surgeons of Kimberley Hospital, Doctors Ashe,
Watkins, Mackenzie, and Stoney. These made themselves notable for the
untiring energy with which they devoted themselves to their incessant
duties. They kept a sharp eye on the milk, serving it out cautiously at
the depot, and only to those who had a medical certificate that they
required it. The Colonel was very appreciative of the help given by most
of his civilian coadjutors, for, in reference to the difficulties of his
position, he stated in his despatch: "It will be realised that, under
the peculiar circumstances in which the defence of the scattered town,
containing over 40,000 inhabitants and much valuable machinery, was
entrusted in the first instance to a force consisting of about 570
Imperial troops and 630 Colonial troops, my efforts would have been of
no avail had it not been for the valuable assistance and advice which
many citizens afforded me in a military as well as a civil capacity."
Mr. Henderson, Captain Tyson of the Kimberley Club, and Dr. Smart
collaborated with the ruling spirit of the place, organising relief
committees, distributing thousands of pints of soup per diem, and
apportioning such fruit and vegetables as were to be had for the good of
those who were most sorely in need. That green stuffs were scarce may be
gathered from the fact that the allowance for nine people for half a
week was a bunch of five carrots, four liliputian parsnips, and several
beets (duodecimo editions). The garrison, later on, were glad of
mangel-wurzels, when quantity rather than quality came to be
appreciated.
The Boers were now beginning to build redoubts on Dronfield Kopjes,
about a mile east of the railway and in a northerly direction, showing
that whatever withdrawals might be going on from besieged places
elsewhere, the City of Mines would receive its due of attention up to
the last. The Boer prisoners inside the town presented quite a
rejuvenated appearance, owing to the delicate attentions of Mr. Rhodes.
Christmas saw them provided with new outfits, and a general air of
cleanliness and health pervaded them. The invalids in hospital, both
British and Boers, were visited frequently by the Colossus, whose
generosity in the matter of delicacies, which were now very scarce, was
highly appreciated.
Much of the Kimberley news was obtained through the energy and
acuteness, almost amounting to genius, of the despatch-runners. Of
these, Mr. Lumming of Douglas succeeded in getting in and out of the
town with missives for and from Mr. Rhodes, always at tremendous risk.
The Boers had offered a large reward for his capture. On one occasion,
so as to evade observation in a district swarming with the enemy, he had
to travel quadruped fashion on hands and knees for some thirty miles.
Tales of the despatch-runners' ingenuity in all parts of the Colony were
many. One Kaffir boy, though caught by the Boers and stripped by them,
carried his despatch safely, it having been packed in a quill and hid in
his nostril, while another--a canny Scot--concealed his treasure in the
inmost recesses of a hard-boiled egg.
On the morning of the 27th of January the mounted troops under the
indefatigable Colonel Peakman at an early hour reconnoitred the Boer
position near the Premier mine. The Boers were indulging in a last
little doze, when some shells were neatly dropped into their laager. The
alarum was effective. They were up and doing in no time, and set to work
firing with the utmost vigour, but their shots were not accurate and
much waste of ammunition took place. It may be remembered that Colonel
Peakman, Kimberley Light Horse, after the death of Colonel Turner was
selected for the command of the mounted troops in Kimberley. A tower of
strength of himself, he was surrounded by a gallant crew, among whom
were Major Scott, V.C., Captains Ap-Bowen and Mahoney (both severely
wounded on the 25th of November), Captains Robertson and Rickman. There
were also in the corps several lieutenants conspicuous for dash and
daring, notably Lieutenants Hawker (wounded 22nd November), Harris, and
Chatfield. Of the Colonel an amusing tale was told, which, if not
_vero_, was certainly _bentrovato_, and served to cheer up those who
needed to salt the monotonous flavour of daily life. It fell to the duty
of Colonel Peakman to introduce horse-flesh at the officers' mess, a
ticklish task, and one that required considerable tact. When the dish
was served, the Colonel said, "Gentlemen, as I was unable to get the
whole of our ration in beef, a part of it had to be taken in
horse-flesh. Here is the beef," said he, carving at the joint opposite
him, "that at the other end of the table is the horse. Any one who
prefers it may help himself." No one accepted the invitation, and after
there had been a great run on the beef, the Colonel suddenly said, "By
Jove, I'm mistaken; of course _this_ joint is the horse, the other is
the beef!" Thus the palates of the heroes of the Kimberley Light Horse
were educated to the fare that was shortly to become unvaried.
Later on, a chunk of donkey occasionally replaced the equine morsel, and
cats, it was noticed, began to be less in evidence. There were
whispers--hints---- But to proceed to facts.
On the 29th a tussle took place between the foe and a man named Sheppy,
who, with twelve mounted natives, was herding a thousand De Beers horses
and mules. The cattle-drivers were at work when out from the bushes
rushed a hundred Boers. These at once opened fire, but the herdsmen
managed to return it and effect their escape.
The transformation of diamond-diggers into warriors was an entire
novelty, of which Kimberley boasted not a little. The entire community
of the De Beers Company were now soldiers of the Queen, receiving the
same rate of pay as before, with food in addition. The total white
population in the town was 14,000, and of these 6000 were employes of
the mine, men from Natal. The Company worked wonders--of course under
the auspices of the ruling genius of Kimberley. They stuck at nothing,
from assisting with food supplies--distributing soup in gallons--to
providing for the employment of upwards of 4000 natives in making
improvements in the town. Sanitation too they undertook when contractors
failed, and, when the supply of water was cut off at the main reservoir
by the enemy, they came to the rescue by providing another source of
water supply.
Owing to the excellent management and regulation of stores, the
community had hitherto been enabled to live at normal prices, and food
had been within the reach of all. But now the pinch of the siege began
to be felt. Luxuries such as eggs, vegetables, &c., were naturally
scarce, but horse-flesh even grew to be limited, for there was little
forage left. The tramcars ceased to work, and Dr. Ashe predicted that
presently there would be "no carts save military ones and the doctors'
and the hearse!"
People had to take their meat allowance half in beef and half in
horse-flesh, and the over-fastidious were but meagrely nourished. These,
however, soon came to "take their whack" of horse-flesh gladly, and some
even declared that horse, by any other name, would be quite appetising!
Conversation largely consisted of speculations regarding food or its
absence, and once or twice there was a rub with the military. Dr. Ashe
expressed himself frankly when confronted with red-tape difficulties,
addressed the Colonel--of course, minding p's and q's, for people had to
look to the dotting of i's and crossing of t's in those days--and
suggested that, "in matters which affected the health and feeding of the
people," the doctors thought that, in virtue of their knowledge of town,
climate, and people, they might be consulted. The objection to the
red-tape difficulty being proved sound, the Colonel at once altered the
routine, but, said Dr. Ashe, "he flatly declined to ask any opinion from
the general body of doctors, as they might have ideas which would affect
the military situation."
[Illustration: "LONG CECIL," MADE AT THE DE BEERS MINES. Photo by D.
Barnett, War Correspondent.]
The new gun, "Long Cecil," manufactured in De Beers, was greatly prized.
It distinguished itself on its debut by plumping a shell in the centre
of the Kamfersdam head-laager exactly over the position of the
Dutchmen's gun. Bombardment continued spasmodically, sometimes at night,
the shells entering several houses and "making hay" of the furniture;
but wantonly barbarous was the attack on the laager containing the women
and children, which took place on the 23rd of January. One of the little
innocents was killed and another probably maimed for life. On the 24th
more bombardment began as early as four in the morning, and firing
continued all day. The worst feature in the affair was the
attack--deliberate and premeditated it appeared--on the hospital, which
caused general grief and indignation. There was no excuse for such
inhumanity, as the place was distinguished by two Red Cross flags.
Very lamentable was this habit of the Boers to violate the sacred rules
of the Geneva Convention, for it alienated even those who were in
sympathy with their cause. They could not plead ignorance of the rules
of warfare, for at one time they ignored these rules to play the
barbarian, while at another they utilised them to act the poltroon. The
history of the Convention may not be generally known. It was promoted in
1864 and subsequently signed by all the Continental Powers. It was
decided that--
1. Ambulances and military hospitals were to be recognised as neutral,
and as such to be protected and respected by all belligerents.
2. The _personnel_ of these hospitals and ambulances, including the
_intendance_, the sanitary officers, officers of the administration, as
well as military and civil chaplains, were to be benefited by the
neutrality.
3. The inhabitants of the country rendering help to the sick and wounded
were to be respected and free from capture.
4. The sick and wounded were to be attended to without distinction of
nation.
5. A flag and a uniform were to be adopted for the hospitals,
ambulances, and convoys of invalids; an armlet or badge for the
_personnel_ of the ambulances and hospitals.
6. The badge was to consist of a red cross on a white ground.
Committees were formed throughout Europe and America to carry out this
convention, and the Society worked under the title of the "International
Society of Aid for the Sick and Wounded." It played its first important
part in 1870 in the Franco-German War, before which time battlefields
had been scenes of almost inhuman torture.
Now, in consequence of the brutal disregard of a world-appreciated
agreement, the Boers--in many ways men of fine character--were placing
themselves beneath contempt. Their conduct also to the loyalists and
non-belligerents was also causing exasperation.
The ministers of all denominations--Wesleyan, Presbyterian, Baptist,
Congregational, and Jewish--all united in condemning the Boer Government
and its methods. They were especially scandalised at the inhumanity of
the Dutch commandoes, who intermittently poured shells not only into the
heart of the town, but into the suburbs, where women and children were
known to congregate, while leaving for the most part unmolested the
forts occupied by the citizen-soldiers. Homes were destroyed mothers and
children stricken down, and some killed. These might have been looked
upon as the accidents of war had it not been confessed in Boer papers
that such acts were deliberately committed and vaunted.
Spasmodic bombardment took place during the evening of the 24th, and
continued through the night, striking some buildings--the hospital and
other defenceless positions--and maiming a woman and her child. Another
child was killed. Profound admiration was expressed by all in the
achievements of "Long Cecil," and the utility of the new long-range
weapon was highly appreciated. Indeed, Mr. Rhodes viewed this Kimberley
masterpiece with quite a paternal eye, and his pleasure in firing it was
considerable.
Enough could not be said of the splendid valour and pertinacity of the
townspeople, who co-operated in the warlike proceedings as though they
had been to the manner born. Though the fortification belt was some
twelve miles in circumference, at all points it was protected by these
amateurs of the sword, who, under no military obligations whatever till
sworn in on the immediate emergency, rose to the occasion with a
chivalric warmth that was as perfectly amazing as it was admirable.
Devotion to the Sovereign Lady who rules the Empire was never more
steadfastly shown and more ardently maintained.
The zeal and the "go" of the Cape Police was notable. Among the most
prominent of the corps were Colonel Robinson, gallant Major Elliot and
Major Ayliff (wounded on December 3), who was brave as he was tactful.
Perpetually useful and conspicuously gallant were Captains Colvin,
Crozier, White, and Cummings. Their duties, most difficult, were almost
interminable.
Life was monotonous in the extreme. From the town it was possible on
clear days to view the Modder River balloon, and the occasional sight of
it afforded a stimulus to the drooping spirits of the inhabitants. Its
rotund form floating so peacefully high in air seemed like a harbinger
of hope promising and consoling, and teaching the lesson of patience and
perseverance that overcome all things! Of course, it was only the
sentimentalists of the community who thus interpreted the language of
the aerial monster, but these, like the people who find sermons in
stones, promptly took heart, and bore their trials with renewed dignity
and pluck. Both these qualities were in great demand, for the Boers and
their tactics were exhausting to the patience of the most forbearing.
Their pertinacity was great. At one moment they would pour shells into
the town, making hearts palpitate or stand still in horror at the
gruesome fracas; at others they would persistently "snipe" from hidden
corners and bushes, and render movements in the open, to say the least
of it--inconvenient.
Sniping always continued, though, for a day or two, no serious
bombardment took place. Indeed, there was reason to believe that a Boer
gun was _hors de combat_. The report came in that "Susannah" had burst.
There was general jubilation. Later on it filtered out that "Susannah"
was "all serene," but this was doubted. The sanguine hoped against hope.
We are ready enough to believe what we wish to be true, and finally, for
want of something to discuss, the question of "Has she burst, or has she
not burst?" was bandied about in the tone of a popular riddle.
Unfortunately "Susannah" was intact, as subsequent experience proved.
Not only was "Susannah" herself again, but it was reported that a
considerable Boer reinforcement had arrived in the neighbourhood, and
that three guns from Spyfontein were being ranged in attitude to defy
"Long Cecil," whose prowess was more decided than pleasant. Still the
inhabitants bore up very creditably, and enlivened themselves
continually with concerts or entertainments of some kind. The
programmes, it must be noted, were always marked "weather and Boers
permitting"--a modern adaptation of the customary _D.V._
The Boer spies took a lively interest in all that concerned Mr. Rhodes,
and hopes were entertained that before long some one would receive the
price of his capture. But this gentleman pursued his avocations in the
town and its suburbs with unabated interest, arranging for the comfort
of the refugees, and evincing paternal solicitude in the laying out of
new suburbs, and the construction of a regular row of bomb-proof
shelters, which were being excavated at Kenilworth. People now became
great connoisseurs on the virtue of brick, old and new, and began to
mistrust corrugated iron as affording less protection from the artillery
fire of the enemy. They became judges also of shell--of the
peculiarities of shrapnel and ring shells--and sapiently discussed the
merits of time fuses and percussion fuses. Food, however, was the prime
subject of conversation--a subject of "devouring" interest, some one
said. The refugee fund now amounted to L3000, owing to the united
subscriptions of Mr. Rhodes and the De Beers Company. It was none too
much, as the demand on its resources was some L600 weekly.
[Illustration: LIEUT.-GENERAL THOMAS KELLY-KENNY, C.B.
Photo by C. Knight, Aldershot.]
The Colossus, regardless of the fate that hung over the town, continued
to make plans and projects for the development of the place. On a high
plateau he purposed to create a new suburb, and the name will doubtless
bear a relationship to the great events of 1900. A column was in course
of erection to commemorate the siege, but the tale of bombardment, writ
large on many of the buildings, is one that will scarcely be forgotten,
and forms memorial enough. Some curious damage was done, a shrapnel
shell electing to penetrate the wall of a draper's shop and wound a
feminine dummy and smash a wax effigy of a boy used as a clothes model.
Fortunately few human beings suffered. Great precautions were taken for
the safety of the inhabitants, and a look-out was kept, so as to give
warning by whistle whenever the smoke of the enemy's guns breathed a
hint of coming destruction. A calculation was made as to the sum total
expended by guns, British and Dutch, and it was discovered that
Kimberley had fired 1005 shells, while the besiegers had spent three
times that number. The total loss of life attributable to shell fire
amounted at this date to about twelve killed.
Affairs within the town were now growing almost as bellicose as affairs
without it. Continued friction generates heat, and of this throughout
the siege there had been more and more as time went on. It was quite
evident that Kimberley was not sufficiently large to afford an arena for
the combat of brains _versus_ military discipline, and that the patience
of the besieged was nearing the snapping-point. Indeed there was doubt
as to whether operations for the relief of Kimberley would be pursued,
and it is averred that the Commander-in-Chief sent a message to Mr.
Rhodes, saying, "Hope I shall not be compelled to leave you in the
lurch." Naturally the Kimberley barometer fell to zero. Then came
rumours of the coming of Lord Roberts, but these scarcely served to
allay the general impatience.
A curious incident occurred on the 29th. Some thirty-five Zulus took
their departure. They had been ordered by their chief to leave the town,
but when they obeyed they had promptly to return, as they encountered
the Boers, who threatened to shoot them.
At this time food was becoming more and more scarce; even horse-flesh
was distributed with caution. Milk was obtainable only by the invalids,
and some four hundred babes died for want of proper nourishment. It was
pathetic to see people standing at the Town Hall waiting eagerly to take
their turn for the scanty portion of meat that could be provided for
them. The ceremony of the drawing of meat rations had an aspect almost
comic in its desperate seriousness. Matutinally at 5.30 A.M. might be
seen a vast concourse of persons scampering in hot haste to gain a front
place. So animated was the early bird to catch its morning worm, that it
was up and doing before the regulated hour, 5.30 (fixed by
proclamation), before which time people were forbidden to leave their
houses. The police put a stop to this superactivity, and hungry persons
were seen from five to the half-hour waiting patiently at their gates
till the exact moment should arrive when they could make a dash for a
place in the tremendous crush which, two by two, gathered outside the
market.
Marvellous was the rapidity with which this vast crowd, at hint of a
shell, would drop to earth. As by some mechanical process there would
come a bang, and then, like a card castle, the whole procession would
drop flat. The Boers, knowing, most probably, that this was an eventful
period of the morning, would invariably start off about six with a
boisterous "good-morrow."
Gradually the rations grew shorter and shorter and shorter. They now
consisted mainly of horse-meat, served out every second day, mealie
meal, stamped mealies, with a sparse allowance of tea, coffee, and
bread. For those who had children under three years of age one tin of
milk was allowed. With this strong children could get along well, but
there were many weakly ones, and these waned and waned till the baby
funerals became pathetically frequent.
The Dutchmen were exceedingly ingenious in the invention of tricks and
traps. One of these was to move a waggon with sixteen fat oxen in charge
of but two men into the open Vlei below Tarantaal Ridge, and there to
leave it, apparently unguarded, for two hours. They thought that this
bait would lure forth the cattle-guard, but they were disappointed, for
the authorities were too acute to allow them to get "a bite." They knew
that in rear of the Vlei was a deep sand-drift, behind which a large
body of men might be comfortably concealed, and consequently left waggon
and cattle severely alone.
After this began the bombardment by a new Boer gun--a diabolical
instrument, whose perfections were hymned by an artillery expert, who
declared it to be one of the most perfect pieces of ordnance ever made!
A correspondent in the _Daily Telegraph_ described the terrifying effect
produced on the nerves of the sick and the weakly. He went on: "The
shock caused by the firing of this gun was distinctly perceptible five
feet under ground at a distance of five miles, and the miniature
earthquake thus created was clearly registered by the new seismograph at
Kenilworth, the pendulum of which remained perfectly stationary during
the firing of the smaller guns, or the passage of the most heavily laden
trains or vehicles at very close quarters."
The 9th of February was a terrible day. There was crashing and booming
from morning till night, and no one dared venture abroad. One inhabitant
had his child killed under his very eyes and his wife mortally stricken
down. Towards sundown a shell struck the Grand Hotel, killing Mr.
Labram, the De Beers chief engineer, whose valuable brains had been the
salvation of the place. He had constructed armoured engines, armoured
trains, and had completed his ingenious labours by constructing the huge
4.1-inch gun, with carriage and shells complete--a triumph of science
considering the conditions under which the achievement was attempted.
Now he was gone, and Kimberley was vastly the poorer.
The bombardment was growing daily more severe. Each time the Boers fired
their 100-pounder gun a bugle was blown from the conning tower and all
ran to cover. There would be an interval of seven minutes between every
shell, and the bombardment would last for about two hours. Then the
Boers would take a rest, and, after a breathing spell, begin again. By
the kindness of Mr. Rhodes the mines now became harbours of refuge for
thousands of women and children, who, huddled together in the 1200-feet
level, were thus protected from the shells which were launched in the
midst of the town. Those days in dark diamondiferous caverns were full
of strange experiences. There, over a thousand shrinking beings found
asylum, bedding, food, and such comfort as could be secured for them.
There, babes were born into the world--human diamonds brought into the
daylight from the grottoes of the millionaires--babes which surely
should take some strange part in the drama of the century. It was an
underground village swarming with the weak and the distressed, a
feminine populace, kept from panic and despair by the man who, large
enough to make empires, yet proved himself capable of sympathy with the
small sorrows and quakings of the sick and the fearful.
[Illustration: PLACARD ERECTED BY MR. RHODES. Photo by F. H. Hancox,
Kimberley.]
The experiences of a lady who enjoyed the hospitality of the mine were
scarcely exhilarating. She said: "We went down the mine, but only stayed
one day. Of course, one felt safe, but it was so miserable; still, it
was another siege experience, the crowds of people down there. On the
1000-feet level were 500 persons alone, and the buzz of tongues, and
the children crying, and the noises altogether, besides the damp, were
horrible; although Mr. Rhodes and those working under him did all in
their power to make things as comfortable as possible. Hot coffee, soup,
bread, milk for the children, everything obtainable was sent down; and
some thousands of people were fed free of charge from the Saturday night
till the following Friday morning.... Those people who run down Mr.
Rhodes should have been here during the four months of the siege. The
soup-kitchen was another of his institutions, threepence a pint for good
soup, and those who had no money got it free."
Now that the nerve-destroying capabilities of the Boers' 100-pounder gun
were proved, and Mr. Rhodes and other citizens were conscious of the
immense amount of danger to town and life that must result from the
bombardment, the Colossus, in conjunction with the Mayor and others,
forwarded to Colonel Kekewich a letter which he begged might be
heliographed to headquarters. The letter ran:--
"KIMBERLEY, _February 10_.
"On behalf of the inhabitants of this town, we respectfully
desire to be informed whether there is an intention on your
part to make an immediate effort for our relief. Your troops
have been for more than two months within a distance of little
over twenty miles from Kimberley, and if the Spytfontein hills
are too strong for them, there is an easy approach over a level
flat. This town, with a population of over 45,000 people, has
been besieged for 120 days, and a large portion of the
inhabitants has been enduring great hardships. Scurvy is
rampant among the natives; children, owing to lack of proper
food, are dying in great numbers, and dysentery and typhoid are
very prevalent. The chief food of the whites have been bread
and horse-flesh for a long time past, and of the blacks meal
and malt only. These hardships, we think you will agree, have
been borne patiently and without complaint by the people.
During the last few days the enemy have brought into action
from a position within three miles of us a 6-inch gun throwing
a 100-lb. shell, which is setting fire to our buildings and is
daily causing death among the population. As you are aware, the
military guns here are totally inadequate to cope with this new
gun. The only weapon which gives any help is one of local
manufacture. Under these circumstances, as representing this
community, we feel that we are justified in asking whether you
have any immediate intention of instructing your troops to
advance to our relief. We understand large reinforcements have
recently arrived in Cape Town, and we feel sure that your men
at Modder River have at the outside 10,000 Boers opposed to
them. You must be the judge as to what number of British troops
would be required to deal with this body of men, but it is
absolutely necessary that relief should be afforded to this
place."
To this Lord Roberts replied:--
"I beg you represent to the Mayor and Mr. Rhodes as strongly as
you possibly can the disastrous and humiliating effect of
surrender after so prolonged and glorious a defence. Many days
cannot possibly pass before Kimberley will be relieved, as we
commence active operations to-morrow. Future military
operations depend in a large measure on your maintaining your
position a very short time longer."
A great deal of gossip hung round the suppression of the _Diamond Fields
Advertiser_, but the whole affair was merely a storm in the ink-pot
resulting from the clashing of opinions civil and military. After the
publication of a leading article on the 10th of February, an article
with which Mr. Rhodes was entirely in accord, the military censor
addressed the following letter to the editor:--
"ARMY HEADQUARTERS, KIMBERLEY, _February 10, 1900_.
"Sir,--Since the _Diamond Fields Advertiser_ has now on two
occasions printed leading articles on the military situation
which are extremely injurious to the interests of the army and
the defence of this town, without previously submitting the
same to the military censor, I am directed to inform you that
from this date the proof of the _Diamond Fields Advertiser_
must be submitted to me before the copies of any daily number,
leaflet, or other form of publication is issued to the public.
"I am further requested to inform you, in your own interests,
that on the two occasions referred to you have committed the
most serious offences dealt with by the Army Act, under which
Act you are liable to be tried.--Yours faithfully, W. A.
O'MEARA, Major, Military Censor."
The military censor was within his rights. The editor, after the manner
of editors, did not care to be muzzled, so the _Diamond Fields
Advertiser_ was temporarily suspended.
The editorial chair at the time was not an enviable berth, owing to the
invasion of shells from the 100-pounder gun, therefore the holiday may
have been beneficial in more ways than one.
The new gun, mounted on the kopje at Kamferdam, was determined to make
life hideous, and so incessantly swept the neighbourhood that a state of
panic began to prevail even among those who had hitherto borne
themselves with unconcerned front. In addition to this perpetual tornado
of horror the pinch of famine was becoming sharper, and the question of
relief seemed to be growing into one of "now or never." Despair seized
on many. They began to count the days, and wonder when it would all end,
and whether indeed it would ever end at all! Two days--three days--five
days--the 15th of February! Then, dramatically, as in a fairy tale or a
stage play, came the rumour of help, the whisper that French, the
gallant, the energetic, the invincible, was coming, as on the wings of
the wind--coming to restore freedom to those who, in their tedious
imprisonment, were fainting with hope deferred. In an instant all was
changed. The rumour became reality. Colonel Kekewich and his staff rode
forth, and it was as though the good fairy had waved a wand. In an
instant the dismal streets seemed to grow gaudy with flags, to flutter
and flare as with the hues of the butterfly. Panic ceased, and gave way
to almost hysterical joy. People laughed, chaffed, threw up their hats.
The mines disgorged their human wealth--some thousand of women and
children, who came forth alacrious, with swinging step and loudly
babbling--babbling like mountain torrents let loose from the ice of
winter! It was a scene for painter, not for penman; for who shall
describe wrinkles of anxiety swept suddenly away, pangs of hunger
allayed by thrills of glad excitation, nervous exhaustion magically
forgotten, and all this simply because there was dust in the
distance--the dust of coming feet--the dust of the British cavalry
sweeping nearer and nearer on a glorious errand of deliverance!
Five minutes later the looked-for moment had arrived. Anticipation had
given way to fact--the 124 days' siege was at an end. Yet there were
some who could scarce believe their ears. A man, hearing that General
French had arrived, approached a trooper who was holding a horse outside
the Club, and asked if the good news was true. "Yes," was the reply;
"I'm 'is horderly; this is 'is 'at, and over there is 'is 'orse!" And
the Kimberley man stared at the three objects before him as though he
could never take his fill of satisfaction.
GENERAL FRENCH'S RIDE
And now, as the conjuror says, to explain how it was all done. The
object of the combined movements was to turn Cronje's position, which
extended west and east from Majersfontein to Koodoesberg Drift on the
one side towards Klip Drift on the Modder on the other, to relieve
Kimberley, and, if possible, cut off the retreat of the Boers to
Bloemfontein and invest the whole force. This stupendous programme was
unfolded to General French and his A.A.G. Colonel Douglas Haig at the
time already mentioned, when the great cavalry leader mysteriously ran
down from Colesberg to the Cape. Here the plans for the future campaign
were discussed, and here General French agreed to embark on an
enterprise which had it failed in a single particular might have brought
about "such a disaster as would have shaken England's dominion in South
Africa to its very foundation." This is the opinion of Captain Cecil
Boyle, a splendid young officer, who, when asked to join General
French's staff as galloper, was almost overcome with joy. But the plan
did not fail: indeed it succeeded beyond expectation, and the relief of
Kimberley, accomplished solely by the mounted troops--said to be the
largest force ever commanded by a British General--was a feat scarcely
to be excelled in the annals of warfare. This feat was performed between
the 11th and the 15th of February, during which the Division experienced
hardships of every kind. Horses and men were worked incessantly,
without a day's rest and in a broiling sun, which literally baked every
portion of the human frame exposed to it, and grilled the eyeballs,
causing the most acute suffering to man and beast. Supplies and forage
ran short, and the horses were reduced to 11/2 lb. of corn a day, while
the men lived finally from hand to mouth, killing and eating as they
went along, now a sheep, now a goat, and presently nothing but boiled
mealie cobs. Water was so scarce, and the sufferings of the animals so
terrible, that when a stream was once encountered, the brutes, wild with
an anguish of delight, tore towards it in their frantic career, becoming
absolutely beyond control, and carrying their riders straight into the
river. Some in this way were drowned. Many horses died of exhaustion. At
the end, out of 8000, only 5400 remained. But all discomforts were
forgotten in the success of the achievement, which from first to last
was conducted with admirable _finesse_ and consummate dash. Indeed this
marvellous ride is looked upon by those who could technically criticise
the difficulty and daring of the enterprise as one of the finest
achievements of British arms.
On the 11th of February the great cavalry division under General French
started. With marvellous rapidity, and with a vast amount of mystery,
the troops had gathered together in the neighbourhood of Enslin or
Graspan, and commenced to move south-east on the now celebrated march
for the relief of Kimberley. So swiftly was everything planned, and so
dexterously was it accomplished, that even the wary Cronje, whose spies
were everywhere, was incapable of believing that the detested rooineks
were advancing with the rapidity of a cyclone for the purpose of
sweeping him and his burghers from their comfortable positions. But a
clean sweep they made nevertheless. Before the British advance Dutchmen
fled precipitately from their farms, leaving their sweet mealie pap _in
statu quo_, and all their effects exactly as they had been using them.
They carried to Cronje wild rumours of British multitudes approaching,
and preparing to make a last frontal attack upon Majersfontein, rumours
which exactly suited Lord Roberts' strategic plan. Cronje instantly
primed himself for the reception of the British, strengthening his
fortifications and keeping his eye on the west, where he knew the
Highland Brigade was operating. This again was precisely what Lord
Roberts had intended him to do.
Meanwhile, in the light of the stars, the great cavalry division with
its batteries of artillery was on the move, rumbling cautiously through
the mysterious, Boer-haunted regions under the guidance of the Hon.
Major Lawrence, Chief of the Intelligence Department, and travelling
many miles before sunrise on its important journey to Ramdam. Here
horses were watered, men rested, details and remounts from Orange River
picked up. On the morning of Monday the 12th, the troops were again on
the move, starting at 3 A.M., and endeavouring to cover as many miles as
possible before the sun should rise and make the whole earth into a
scorching, blistering wilderness. But now, in return for the cool night
air, they had to contend with jetty obscurity. Very slow, therefore, was
their progress. When helped by the dawn they got along faster, and soon
the whole division reached Waterval. Here extra precautions were taken,
for none knew how many Dutchmen might be ensconced in the surrounding
kopjes or whether the drift might be swarming with Boers. But they were
not long left in doubt. A Boer shell greeted the troops with such nicety
of range that the General and his staff barely escaped. Colonel Eustace,
R.H.A., immediately turned his attention to the hostile gun, and shortly
silenced it, but the enemy still held on.
Dekiel's Drift is commanded by kopjes, having on the bank an
octopus-armed donga which cuts deeply into the soil. At this drift the
Boers endeavoured to make a stand, but the Mounted Infantry and Roberts'
Horse were too much for them. Unfortunately, Captain Majendie, second in
command of the latter regiment, was shot from Drift Kopje, in the shadow
of which his remains were interred. There was no time for expression of
mourning and regret; the Boers had to be routed, and presently, finding
their rear threatened, they went streaming away from their strong
position, taking with them their guns. After this the drift was taken
possession of, and in the rays of the setting sun the disciplined
hosts--brigade after brigade--crossed the Riet River, keeping possession
of both banks.
Horses and men were wearied out, scorched, and famishing, and there was
a general sense of relief when at last they were joined by Lord
Kitchener and staff and the Sixth Division, with convoys of provisions
and fodder. At dawn on Tuesday a great deal had to be done--breakfast
finished, nose-bags filled, &c., before it was possible to order the
advance. Day was well developed by the time the brigades had started,
and now came the exceeding trials of their march. The level veldt was
like a mirror to a brazen sky, and all through the sweltering hours when
the sun blazed its strongest, men and horses, shadeless, parched, and
sparsely fed, moved on mile after mile on their imperative errand
without pause and without relief. Even a beautiful well of water, which
tempted them to distraction, had to be passed by untouched. It was
necessary to reserve it for the infantry, who were following on the
morrow. So dry, dejected, yet determined, they went on and on, crossed
the districts of Poortje, Zwart Kopjes, Kromkuil, and made a brief halt
at Wegdraai. From thence they swung along past pans and kopjes and
plains, due north to Klip Drift.
[Illustration: THE DASH FOR KIMBERLEY--THE 10th HUSSARS CROSSING KLIP
DRIFT.
Drawing by John Charlton, from a Sketch by G. D. Giles, War Artist.]
Captain Boyle, in the _Nineteenth Century_, gave a fresh and spirited
account of their movements on this important and critical march.
"The distance covered in extended order was great, and to save the
artillery horses Major Lawrence directed the columns by a slight
_detour_ north-easterly, leaving Jacobsdal some seven or eight miles to
our left. The heat was now intense, and was further increased by the
accidental burning of the veldt over a large area, thereby destroying
our field-cable, as we learnt afterwards. From flank to flank the
distance was so great that at times the General's gallopers could not
move their horses out of a walk, though the message was important, and
everywhere men and horses alike suffered from sun and thirst.
"General Gordon's brigade, far away on the left, was ordered to bring up
its left shoulders to meet what looked like an attack on the right, but
the guns of the 1st Brigade put the enemy to flight, and the march was
resumed in slightly different order. The left brigade, under General
Gordon, was ordered to advance; the centre brigade, under General
Broadwood, was deployed to the right; and the right brigade, under
Colonel Alexander, was ordered to follow in the rear. From a little
stone-covered knoll the General and his staff scanned the distant river
and its banks eight miles off, and instantly determined to push on for
the drift. 'Move up the whole division,' and the three gallopers started
back with the order to the brigades, which had been halted meanwhile.
General Gordon on the left, with the 9th and 16th Lancers and his guns,
and General Broadwood on the right, with the 12th Lancers, Household
Composite, and 10th Hussars, moved off at once; but Colonel Alexander's
brigade was far in the rear--he had already lost sixty horses, and the
rest could move but slowly. The artillery horses could scarcely drag
their guns and waggons, but still the General determined to force the
drift; and I believe this decision was one of the most critical in the
relief of Kimberley, for, had we not gained the drift directly our
presence was known, the enemy would most certainly have fortified a very
strong natural position. But the General's mind was made up, and he was
quick to act. Throwing Gordon on to the left to effect a crossing, and
Broadwood some five miles away on his right, the advance to the river
was made so swiftly that the enemy were absolutely surprised. After
shelling for some time, Gordon crossed and went in pursuit. Only four
guns out of twelve could come into action in the centre, but with such
effect that the enemy shortly retreated over the hills. By this time
General Broadwood had crossed on the right, and his brigade trumpeter
sounded the 'pursue.' The general rout was now complete--camp, waggons,
everything was in our hands. New bread was lying about on the veldt and
dough-tins ready to be placed on the fire, with such haste had the Boers
left their position.
"My horse had died with my last message to the 1st Brigade, and I
trudged on over the level veldt partly on foot, partly on ammunition
waggons, over the last five miles, crossed the Modder River with the
four guns of P and G Batteries, and went to congratulate the General,
who was sitting on the north bank, on his splendid achievement; for by
this last forced march of nearly ten miles he had won half his way to
Kimberley. Little incidents after the rout were full of the humour that
hangs around everything grave. One of the staff plunged into the river
and caught some geese, but some one else ate them; a pig ran the
gauntlet through the camp--amidst roars of laughter, even from the
serious General--of lances, bayonets, knives, sticks, boots,
water-bottles, anything to hand, and at length was caught by a lucky
trooper, who shared his feast that night with his friends. A waggon of
fresh fruit was taken, sufficient to make thirsty men's mouths water,
but some thought the grapes were sour. Why the Boers retreated in such a
hurry is difficult to understand, for the position and drift were very
strong and easy to defend, especially against a spent foe; and, but for
the quickness of the advance over the open veldt, which took the Boers
completely by surprise, the division would have encountered a very nasty
opposition."
The Dutchmen were pursued with splendid animation by General Gordon's
jaded brigade, who succeeded, worn out as they were, in capturing some
ambulance waggons and some Boer doctors; while General Broadwood's
brigade, also worn out, chased the Boers into the far distance till
absolute exhaustion forced the abandonment of the pursuit. So at the
drift the cavalry division enjoyed its terribly needed repose. They had
gone through an appalling ordeal, but it had been wonderfully
surmounted, and the command of river both at Klip Drift and Klip Kraal,
some miles to the east, had been secured.
On the 14th the Boers still continued to buzz about after the fashion of
mosquitoes--now advancing, now retiring, worrying and annoying, but
never coming boldly to the attack.
They made strong efforts to fathom the movements and designs of the
British, but without success. Colonel Gorringe, Chief of Lord
Kitchener's Staff, now arrived, and announced that Lord Kitchener and
General Kelly-Kenny were advancing by night from Dekiel Drift, whereupon
Captain Laycock, A.D.C., rode out and succeeded by midnight in
conducting these officers safely to camp. In the small hours the Sixth
Division, after a hard and really glorious march, which must be
described anon, arrived. Thus his left flank being secured, General
French was free to pursue his impetuous ride. This he did after handing
over to the infantry the positions he had gained. While the cavalry
division moved out, Kelly-Kenny's division--as in the game of "general
post"--quickly shifted to the vacant place, thus making any return of
the fleeing Boers impossible.
The three cavalry brigades then drew up in columns of brigade masses,
with the seven batteries of horse-artillery on their left, where the
strongest attack from the laager near Kimberley was expected. How far
the Boers were aware and prepared for the British move was uncertain,
but it was decided that at all costs the cavalry would cut through them.
Operations began with the shelling and capture of two laagers on the
north side of the river, and the way being thus cleared of the enemy,
the division made its way to a point where it was met by the contingent
from the Modder River. The force, now increased by Scots Greys,
Household Cavalry, and two Lancer Regiments, numbered some 10,000 men,
seven batteries of horse-artillery and three field-batteries.
Scarcely had the brigades proceeded before the Boers opened fire, and
soon men and gunners fell, and horses riderless and pairs devoid of
drivers were seen rushing madly over the plain. From a kopje on the
right came the rattle and roar of musketry, which was replied to by the
guns of the horse-artillery. There was no doubt now that a horde of
Boers were hiding in front, and that the way forward was only to be
gained by a desperate plunge. There was no hesitation. General Gordon
and his gallant men were ordered to charge and clear the right front,
and the thing was done. Away went the 9th and 12th Lancers, galloping
for all they were worth, on and on like a flash of avenging lightning.
At sight of the human avalanche the Boers, who had been "raining hell"
from their trenches, suddenly threw up Mausers and hands; but it was too
late, the whirlwind was upon them, and over a hundred Dutchmen bit the
dust. Others ran helter-skelter, a whimpering and shouting rabble!
Now came the greatest sight that military men have witnessed for
years--the rush of the legions across the great plain of
Alexandersfontein. This vast area, about three to five miles square, is
surrounded by menacing kopjes, which harboured Boers rendered desperate
by surprise and consternation. Across the open the Lancer regiments and
Scots Greys as advance guard, with the rest of the force deployed at ten
yards' intervals, rushed like a hurricane, a sirocco in the desert.
Boers still showered down their lead, but the cavalry, heedless,
thundered along, throwing up a volume of dust, while kopje after kopje
was swept by the mounted infantry. The enemy was dispersed on every
side.
Five long miles the race of the centaurs continued--centaurs galloping
as if for dear life--Carabineers and Greys leading the main body, the
12th Lancers on the left, the Household Composite Regiment with the 9th
Lancers on the right--a regal show, and one worth a lifetime to have
witnessed.
[Illustration: TYPICAL UNDERGROUND DWELLING AT KIMBERLEY.]
At De Villiers the exhausted warriors watered their horses and strove to
gather together the poor brutes for a final effort. Many were
sun-stricken, others had simply used themselves up. The speed that was
to outwit Cronje had to be paid for in horse-flesh. But, owing to that
speed, much loss of human life was spared. Lieutenant Sweet Escott (16th
Lancers) had fallen early in the day, but considering the fire of the
enemy it was a marvel that only one officer had been killed. One man was
also slain, and there were about thirty wounded.
[Illustration: THE LAST STAND MADE BY THE BOERS BEFORE KIMBERLEY--CHARGE
OF BRITISH CAVALRY IN THE ENGAGEMENT AT KLIP DRIFT.
Drawing by W. S. Small, from a Sketch by G. D. Giles, War Artist.]
At two o'clock the troops were halted at the base of a small kopje, from
the crown of which it was possible to descry the chimneys of Kimberley
in the distance. It was as though they had sighted the Promised Land. Up
went a mighty cheer from a thousand throats, ringing almost against the
vault of the burnished heaven, and echoing far and wide among the
threatening Boer-haunted kopjes! Kimberley was on the eve of relief.
The trial, the trouble, the turmoil were over! The triumph was won! On
went the Division, riding now with all their might, and at sight of them
the enemy, hot-foot, commenced to gallop into space. Soon the Division
was within sight of the suburbs, and their guns were addressing
themselves to a Boer laager on the east of the town. The extra uproar
struck fresh alarm in the people of Kimberley, who had been driven
distraught by the Boer's 100-pounders, and a message was flashed out,
"The Boers are shelling the town." Then came the answer--the glorious
answer--"_It is General French coming to the relief of Kimberley_." The
news to the imprisoned multitude seemed incredible. They dreaded lest it
might be a new wile of the Dutchman, and, to make assurance doubly sure,
flashed out a fresh query. But by sunset the British troops had
appeared: the whole force, battered, bronzed, but jubilant, was
galloping into Beaconsfield.
STRATEGY _VERSUS_ TACTICS
Some one has said that strategy is a permanent science whose principles
are immutable, while tactics vary with the variations of weapons and
modes of warfare. The first example of this permanent science was
presented only when Lord Roberts came to South Africa, but so complete
and skilful, and withal so subtle, was the initial demonstration, that
its fruits within ten days of his arrival at the front were ready to
drop to his hand. Looking back, the plan of Lord Roberts' operations
appears simple in the extreme, but at the time only masterly conception
and accuracy of execution could have ensured success for so complicated
a programme. To appreciate its subtlety and its neat execution, it
becomes necessary to follow the other portions of the programme,
beginning from the entry into the Free State of the enormous army that
was massed on its borders by Monday the 12th. On that day three
divisions of infantry, the 6th, 7th, and 9th, General French's division,
two brigades of mounted infantry under Colonels Hannay and Ridley
respectively, the artillery under General Marshall, consisting of three
brigade divisions of horse-artillery, two brigade divisions of
field-artillery, one howitzer battery, and a Naval Contingent of four
4.7-inch and four 12-pounders, marched from Graspan and Honeynest Kloof
through Ramdam. The total field force amounted to 23,000 infantry and
11,000 mounted men, with 98 guns, and a transport of over 700 waggons
drawn by nearly 9000 mules and oxen. Later on the artillery was
reinforced by the arrival of a battery of 6-inch howitzers, throwing
100-lb. shells, and three Vickers-Maxim quick-firers and the Brigade of
Guards, which had remained opposite the Boer trenches at Majersfontein.
The following table serves to show roughly the disposition of the
troops:--
FIELD-MARSHAL LORD ROBERTS' FORCE
FIRST DIVISION.--(Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen).--1st
(Pole-Carew's) Brigade--3rd Grenadier Guards; 1st Coldstream
Guards; 2nd Coldstream Guards; 1st Scots Guards. 9th
(Douglas's) Brigade--1st Northumberland Fusiliers; 1st Loyal
North Lancashire (half); 2nd Northamptonshire; 2nd Yorkshire
Light Infantry; 18th, 62nd, 75th Field Batteries.
SIXTH DIVISION.--(Lieutenant-General Kelly-Kenny).--12th
Brigade--2nd Worcestershire, 1st Royal Irish, 2nd Bedfordshire,
2nd Wiltshire (half battalions). 13th Brigade (Knox's)--2nd
East Kent; 1st Oxfordshire Light Infantry; 1st West Riding; 2nd
Gloucester; 76th, 81st, and 82nd Field Batteries; 38th Company
Royal Engineers.
SEVENTH DIVISION.--(Lieutenant-General Tucker).--14th
Brigade--2nd Norfolk; 2nd Lincoln; 1st King's Own Scottish
Borderers; 2nd Hants. 15th Brigade--2nd Cheshire; 1st East
Lancashire; 2nd South Wales Borderers; 2nd North Stafford;
83rd, 84th, and 85th Field Batteries; 9th Company Royal
Engineers.
NINTH DIVISION.--(Major-General Sir H. Colvile).--3rd
(Highland) Brigade (MacDonald's)--1st Argyll and Sutherland;
1st Highland Light Infantry; 2nd Seaforth Highlanders; 2nd
Royal Highlanders (Black Watch). 18th Brigade--1st Essex; 1st
Yorkshire; 1st Welsh; 2nd Royal Warwick.
CAVALRY DIVISION.--(Major-General (Local Lieutenant-General)
French).--1st Brigade (Broadwood)--10th Hussars; 12th Lancers;
Household Cavalry. 2nd Brigade (Porter)--6th Dragoon Guards;
6th Dragoons (two squadrons); 2nd Dragoons; New Zealanders;
Australians. 3rd Brigade (Gordon)--9th Lancers; 16th Lancers;
Horse Artillery; G, P, O, R, Q, T, U Batteries.
TROOPS WITH LORD ROBERTS.--Gordon Highlanders; 2nd Duke of
Cornwall's Light Infantry; 2nd Shropshire Light Infantry;
Canadian Regiment; Roberts' Horse; Kitchener's Horse; City of
London Imperial Volunteers (Mounted Infantry Company); 2nd,
38th, 39th, 44th, and 88th Field Batteries; A Battery R.H.A.;
37th and 65th Howitzer Batteries; three Naval 4.7-in. guns;
part of Siege Train.
It will be seen by the above that General Colvile had been appointed to
the command of the Ninth Division, while Colonel Pole-Carew was
transferred from the command of the Ninth Brigade to that of the Guards
Brigade, and was succeeded in the former post by Colonel Douglas, late
Chief of the Staff to Lord Methuen.
Having viewed this force, it becomes somewhat interesting to note how
smoothly wheel turned within wheel. The movement began by the
concentration of General French's division at Ramdam. On the morning of
the 12th the infantry appeared, and General French moved on, crossed
Dekiel's Drift on Tuesday the 13th, and captured Klip Drift and Drieput
Drift, on the Modder River. Following him closely on the 12th came the
divisions of General Tucker and General Kelly-Kenny. The latter division
was accompanied by Lord Kitchener and his staff. The negotiation of the
first drift, which was almost impassable for transport, next occupied
the ingenuity and tested the perseverance of the troops. The drifts,
like the kopjes, are the almost unconquerable bogies of South Africa.
They are the natural defences of the country, offering obstruction on
every hand, and, however boldly you may storm the kopje, you must with
infinite patience negotiate the drift. This is no small undertaking, for
drifts, in a way, partake of the paradoxical character of
individuals--the weaker the person, the more difficult is he to manage;
the more insignificant the river, the greater the perverseness of the
drift. It resolves itself in both cases into a question of narrowness.
Small streams and small minds are banked up too high to allow moving
room in their midst. The result of an attempt to advance is congestion
of a painful kind. At this particular drift it was found impossible for
the team of mules to lug the formidable waggon-loads up the north bank,
and at last the feat had to be accomplished by adding relays of oxen to
assist in the tremendous labour. Finally, by 4 A.M. the next morning the
troops got across, General Tucker's division marching to within some
three miles of Jacobsdal, and hugging the river all the way, so as to
run no risk of being without water. General Kelly-Kenny followed,
marching from Waterval Drift to Wegdraai on the morning of the 14th, and
proceeding thence at 5 P.M. on the same day to Klip Drift, which was
reached in the middle of the night. The rapidity with which this rush on
his heels was accomplished enabled General French, who had been awaiting
the arrival of the infantry, to proceed on his flying swoop for the
relief of Kimberley. This, as we know, was accomplished on Thursday the
15th of February. Meanwhile the wheels of the strategic machinery were
going round. A small cavalry patrol had entered Jacobsdal, which town
was found to be full of wounded, including many of our own invalids from
Rensburg. On the way back the mounted infantry were attacked, and
Colonel Henry was fired on by a party of Dutchmen who were concealed in
the vicinity of the river, and so sudden was the attack that nine men
were wounded. Colonel Henry, Major Hatchell, and ten men were missing. A
battery of artillery shelled the environs of the place, and put to
flight such Boers as were hanging about, whereupon the British remained
masters of the situation. Thus it will be seen that while the Dutchmen
were fleeing from Jacobsdal, from Alexandersfontein, and from the
neighbourhood of Kimberley, for fear of being cut off, they had
surrounding them Lord Methuen at Majersfontein, General Tucker at
Jacobsdal, General Kelly-Kenny at the Klip and Rondeval Drifts, General
French on the north, and General Colvile wheeling around, ready to suit
his movements to any emergency. In this manner Cronje found the teeth of
a trap preparing to close on him, and recognised that there was no
alternative but to "make a bolt for it."
Thus the first part of the programme was accomplished. Kimberley was
automatically relieved; Cronje was on the run. But his running was no
easy matter. Since Lord Roberts' strategy had come into play, there was
a prospect of a neck-and-neck race between the mobile Boer and the
mobile Briton, and success depended on General French's ability not only
to rout but to head off the retreat of the Dutchman. That the British
cavalry commander should outmatch him in celerity was a contingency
which had not occurred to Cronje; that he should advance independently
of the rail, and start off across the Riet to trek to the Modder, was
described by one of his countrymen as distinctly "un-British." Whether
this epithet was used to denote admiration or contempt we cannot say.
Certain it was that the wily persecutor of Mafeking and Kimberley
thought that the secret of the art of trekking was confined to himself
and his rabble, until he discovered, too late, that the equally wily
French with his disciplined legions was ready to ride over him. On the
16th of February the astonished commandant, with a horde of 10,000
Boers, was scudding in full retreat towards Bloemfontein. On all sides
were Boer laagers in a state of abandonment--stores, tents, food,
Bibles, raiment--everything had been left by the amazed and
panic-stricken Dutchmen. Dronfield, Saltpan, Scholtz Nek, and Spyfontein
were now evacuated. Under cover of darkness the investing hordes had
taken to their heels, leaving behind them even herds of cattle and
ammunition, in their desire to gain a loophole of escape. But they soon
found that, wherever they might go, there was the rumour of British
opposition, an armed and avenging race advancing!
The fact was that the trekking of the Boer hordes had been adroitly
discovered by Lord Kitchener, who, having detected an unusual haze of
dust in the distance, at once gave orders for the mounted infantry not
to follow French, but to pursue the enemy. Accordingly, to quote the
_Times_ correspondent, who was present:--
"The mounted infantry rode in pursuit across the plain, endeavouring to
get to the north of the convoy, while General Knox's Brigade was pushed
along the north bank of the river, which makes a large bend to the north
between Klip Drift and Klipkraal Drift, to strike the convoy on its
southern flank. Cronje sent on his waggons to Drieputs Farm, at the
north-eastern end of the bend, where they laagered at about eleven, and
maintained a running fight with our troops all day. The skill with which
the Boers conducted this rear-guard action extorted unqualified praise
from all our officers. As the detachments on the extreme right of the
Boer line were driven back by our mounted infantry, they rode round
behind their centre and took up fresh positions on their left against
the 81st Battery and Knox's Brigade, which were advancing along the
north bank of the river. At midday the Boers attempted to hold three low
kopjes two miles north-east of Klip Drift, but were driven back to a
stronger position at Drieputs."
[Illustration: CAPTURE OF A BOER CONVOY BY GENERAL FRENCH'S TROOPS NEAR
KIMBERLEY.
Drawing by Stanley L. Wood, from a Sketch by an Officer.]
Fighting went on throughout the day. At seven o'clock on the evening of
the 16th it became almost possible to see the end; the artillery had
commenced the vigorous shelling of the laager, and all the divisions
moving on the great axis were now aware that Lord Roberts' strategic
plan was likely--how soon they knew not--to be crowned with success.
But we must here break off to eulogise the wonderful activity of
Kelly-Kenny's division, which acquitted itself so honourably. The march
from Graspan to Brandvallei beyond Klip Drift, a distance 553/4 miles, was
accomplished in five marching days. The Light Brigade on the eve of the
battle of Talavera did sixty-two English miles in twenty-six hours,
losing only seventeen stragglers by the way. They accomplished this feat
by adopting the peculiar step invented by Sir John Moore, three paces
walking alternating with three paces running, which enabled them, when
tracks were suitable, to cover six miles an hour! No such evolutions as
these were possible, owing to the torrid weather and the necessity to
take precautions against exposure in the open veldt during midday. The
temperature may be imagined when it is stated that in one day about
sixty-six soldiers sun-stricken fell out of the ranks. On the morning of
the 12th of February the infantry marched some nine and a half miles
from Graspan to Ramdam, and from thence on the 13th moved to Waterval
Drift. On the 14th they proceeded to Wegdraai, and on to Klip Drift,
which was reached in the small hours of the 15th. Here, notwithstanding
their fatigues, the 13th Brigade at once engaged with the enemy's
rearguard, and exhibited splendid fighting qualities, which in the
circumstances were remarkable even for Englishmen. The West Riding,
Gloucesters, Buffs, and Oxfords had a warm time during the whole of the
16th, as the enemy from kopjes beyond the river in the region of
Klipkraal assailed them for nearly eight hours, assisted by a pom-pom
which caused considerable loss. Though a furious sandstorm later on
permitted the Boers under cover of night to get away, abandoning
seventy-eight waggons, the next morning the invincible Sixth Division
started in pursuit. Captain Trevor (1st East Kent Regiment), Lieutenant
Shipway (2nd Gloucester Regiment), and Colonel M'Donnell, R.A., were
wounded in the course of the engagement. Major Evelegh, Oxford Light
Infantry, while proceeding to join his battalion in the Sixth Division
with a small convoy and escort, was surrounded by a large party of
Boers, and after a gallant defence was forced to surrender.
Fighting and marching without ceasing, the infantry went to Brandvallei
and thence to Paardeberg, where they arrived at 9.30 P.M. on the 17th,
in time to take a brief rest prior to the operations which have yet to
be described, and in which they took such a prominent part. The
marching, considering the tremendous heat and the difficulty of
obtaining water, was a feat of which General Kelly-Kenny might justly
have felt proud. Though plodding along incessantly through the heavy
burning sand under a sun which baked and frizzled even through their
uniforms, these men maintained patience and cheerfulness in a rare
degree. The whole force was animated by complete faith in their
commander, and moved unanimously like some magnificent piece of
machinery, scarce taking time to eat or sleep in the zest of their
persistent pursuit of the enemy. And they were not alone in their
zealous performance of their share in the great scheme. The nicety and
precision of the transport arrangements may be imagined when we remember
that at one time four divisions were moving independently of their base,
making marches across the arid waterless tracks, and carrying with them
the necessaries of life for a healthy working multitude. A new regime
had begun, and the mobility of our columns had grown equal to that of
the Boers, while the railway had been relegated to a subordinate place
in the strategical plan.
Colonel Graham, in his "Art of War," declares that "to organise the
means of transport for an army acting at a long distance from its
principal magazines, in a country where it is entirely dependent on its
own supplies, is a problem difficult of solution." Now, the solution of
this problem was due to the wonderful talent of Lord Kitchener, who was
earning his right to be looked upon as the greatest military organiser
of his generation. But his gigantic effort did not increase the
popularity of the late Sirdar. He ran counter to too many private
interests. The army is too intersected with grooves to be crossed
without a few nasty jars, and it was scarcely possible for so young and
successful a general and a peer--one possessed of almost criminal good
luck and amazing moral as well as physical courage--to be looked upon by
his contemporaries-in-arms with excessive approval. The secret of
discord was given in a nutshell by Mr. Ralph of the _Daily Mail_. He
wrote:--"His first conspicuous act when in South Africa was the
withdrawal of the transport service from separated commands in order
that it should be managed by the Army Service Corps. Thus it came about
that every brigadier and colonel saw a certain amount of his power
shifted to what he considered a subordinate branch of the service. A
goodish degree of latitude in the enjoyment of comforts and extras,
which had been made possible when these officers controlled the waggons,
was also curtailed. The army wailed and gnashed its teeth, but I confess
I always thought that reason and right were on Lord Kitchener's side in
this matter. Lord Kitchener's plan was the only one by which an
insufficient number of waggons and teams could be utilised for all that
they were worth."
The mobility of an army depends on the reduction of transport, and to
the task of organising transport sufficient to ensure the mobility of
100,000 men the hero of Omdurman applied himself with his customary
thoroughness. He conceived the gigantic ambition of doing away with all
distinctions of transport, regimental, departmental, ammunition, or
ambulance, and merging them in an immense whole, thus creating a single
general corps, and it was doubtless to this conception and the able way
that the scheme--with the assistance of Colonel Richardson--was carried
out, that Lord Roberts owed the expedition of his march to Bloemfontein
and the further success which resulted from his sure and swift rushes
onward. Ordinarily speaking, in the army each unit is allowed its own
transport. For instance, colonel, adjutant, and orderly-room are
allotted by regulation a tent apiece. Every three officers share a tent,
every fourteen men another. Staff-sergeants, batmen, and other details
are proportionately provided for. Mounted officers are allowed 80 lbs.
baggage, double the amount allowed for "smaller fry." Without going into
minute particulars, we may reckon that a brigade would move with 70
waggons and a division with about 180. To reduce the huge encumbrance of
say some 2000 waggons, with their complement of oxen and drivers, was a
stupendous labour, from which, with its consequences, this military
Hercules did not shrink. Each unit was taken in hand, and its
excrescences--regulation excrescences, we may call them--were cut down,
peeled of all superfluities, much to the disgust of the staff officers
and various other personages who stickle for their rights, and resent
any innovation that threatens to dock off an iota of the creature
comforts that belong to them by the divine right of red-tape and
red-book regulations.
Not only were the rules of transport revised, but special hints tending
to the development of the initiative of the private soldier were issued
to the troops. Herewith is appended the notable document which may be
said to have marked the beginning of the new era:--
CAPE TOWN, _February 5, 1900_.
The following notes by the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief
are communicated for the guidance of all concerned.--By order,
KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM, _Chief of Staff_.
NOTES FOR GUIDANCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN WARFARE
_Cavalry_
1. On reconnaissances or patrols not likely to be prolonged
beyond one day, the cavalry soldier's equipment should be
lightened as much as possible, nothing being taken that can
possibly be dispensed with.
2. It has been brought to my notice that our cavalry move too
slowly when on reconnaissance duty, and that unnecessary long
halts are made, the result being that the enemy, although
starting after the cavalry, are able to get ahead of it. I
could understand this if the country were close and difficult,
but between the Modder and the Orange Rivers its general
features are such as to admit of small parties of cavalry,
accompanied by field-guns, being employed with impunity.
_Artillery_
3. If the enemy's guns have, in some instances, the advantage
of ours in range, we have the advantage of theirs in mobility,
and we should make use of them by not remaining in position the
precise distance of which from the enemy's batteries has
evidently been fixed beforehand. Moreover, it has been proved
that the Boers' fire is far less accurate at unknown distances.
In taking up positions, compact battery formations should be
avoided, the guns should be opened out, or it may be desirable
to advance by sections or batteries. Similarly retirements
should be carried out, at considerably increased intervals, by
alternate batteries or sections, if necessary, and care should
be taken to travel quickly through the dangerous zone of
hostile artillery fire.
The following plan, frequently adopted by the Boers, has
succeeded in deceiving our artillery on several occasions.
Suppose A to be a gun emplacement, the gun firing smokeless
powder. Simultaneously with the discharge of the gun at A a
powder flash of black powder will be exploded at B, a hill in
rear, leading us to direct our projectile on B. Careful
calculation with a watch, however, will defeat this plan.
_Infantry_
4. The present open formation renders it difficult for officers
to exercise command over their men, except such as may be in
their immediate vicinity. A remedy for this would appear to be
a system of whistle calls, by which a company lying in extended
order could obey orders as readily as if in quarter column. I
invite suggestions for such a system of whistle calls as would
be useful.
5. It is difficult to recognise officers as equipped at
present, and it seems desirable they should wear a
distinguishing mark of some kind, either on the collar at the
back of the neck or on the back of the coat.
6. Soldiers, when under fire, do not take sufficient advantage
of the sandy nature of the soil to construct cover for
themselves. If such soil is scraped, even with a canteen tin, a
certain amount of cover from rifle fire can be obtained in a
short time.
7. The distribution of ammunition to the firing line is one of
the most difficult problems of modern warfare. One solution,
which has been suggested to me, is for a portion of the
supports gradually to creep forward until a regular chain of
men is established from the supports (where the ammunition
carts should be) right up to the firing line. The ammunition
could then be gradually worked up by hand till it reached the
firing line, where it could be passed along as required. This
would, no doubt, be a slow method of distributing ammunition,
but it appears to be an improvement on the present method,
which is almost impossible to carry out under fire.
8. Reports received suggest that the Boers are less likely to
hold entrenchments on the plain with the same tenacity and
courage as they display when defending kopjes, and it is stated
that this applies especially to night-time, if they know that
British infantry are within easy striking distance from them.
How far this is true time only can show.
ROBERTS, _Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa_.
To return, however, to the great advance. Much of the travelling was
done by night, in order to save the oxen from the trying temperature of
the day, though even during the night the heat was equal to that of an
ordinary British midsummer. In addition to the painful toil of motion
over the heavy, sandy, rugged leagues, there was the hourly danger of
attack. Cronje had made known his need for reinforcements, and at the
time, from the south, Andries Cronje was moving, and from the north,
Commandants Snyman and Fournie, while from other quarters and in the
direction of Ladysmith there was the belief that Boer hordes might be
advancing. There was only one encounter with the Dutchmen, but it ended
in a mishap that was a serious one, for the results were felt for days
afterwards, and helped to try the heroism of the troops who engaged in
the movement to the uttermost. A convoy of 180 waggons, one-quarter of
the total transport, containing forage and provisions, was lost at
Waterval Drift. An interesting picture of the terrible passage of the
drift was given by a sapper who accompanied the convoy:--
"It was a pitiful sight to see the poor infantry fellows played out,
some dropping with a slight sunstroke, and the cattle dropping dead in
all directions. We moved sometimes by day and sometimes by night.
Night-time was the best on account of the oxen working much better in
the cool of night. Nothing occurred of note with us--but our fellows
were fighting every day in front on their way to Kimberley--till we got
to Riet River or Drift, which was a terrible pass in the river. Miles
and miles of transport had to pass through a narrow passage across the
drift, and it took a terrible time for one waggon to pass over, let
alone the hundreds that had to pass. We were lucky to get across and
encamp below a hill for the night. Next day they still continued to pass
the drift, in fact they had been at it all night, and still hundreds of
waggons to come on. The Boers evidently knew of this obstacle, and a
party came up from the south and had vengeance on the column, as they
couldn't on the fighting line. It was a lucky thing for us we were
clear, or else we might have found our baggage gone and ourselves put
over the border (i.e. sent to Pretoria or shot). The Boers took up
position in the hills and shelled the waggon convoy. The nigger drivers
are terrible cowards, and all fled to the hills or kopjes near at hand,
leaving the waggons and oxen to the mercy of the Boers. Some of the oxen
we succeeded in driving back into our camp on the other side of the
river. The good old New Zealanders (who have proved of great use and
very daring in this campaign) rode over to where the nigger drivers
were, and threatened to blow their brains out if they didn't return to
the waggons, which they did after the Boers had left off shelling for a
bit, after doing a terrible lot of damage. Lord Bobs came up just as
they were going to try and get some of the waggons away, and said 'Let
them go.' Our loss proved to be over L100,000, which I am glad to say we
recovered later. The Boers thought this convoy was lost purposely, and
when we arrived here we found the whole of it except what had been sent
to our prisoners at Pretoria."
[Illustration: TROOP OF THE 10TH HUSSARS WITH NORDENFELDT GUN. Photo by
H. Johnston, London.]
The unpleasant adventures of E Squadron of Kitchener's Light Horse, who
were taken as prisoners to Pretoria, make a separate narrative of
themselves, as they took place while the main body was moving on to the
relief of Kimberley.
The squadron was attached to General French's column, and took part in
the engagement at Riet River. On its way to the relief of Kimberley, a
halt was made at a farm a short distance from Modder River, and part of
E squadron was detached to hold a well of water until the arrival of
another column, expected in four hours, and then to advance along with
them. The relieving column never arrived. Squadron E held the position
for four days without food against a large force of Boers. They (E
Squadron) occupied an old farmhouse. They loopholed the walls, and
although continuously harassed by the Boer fire, they managed to
maintain their position and the post they were placed in charge of.
During that time they had to subsist on water only, and that brackish.
Their horses were dying daily, as there was not a blade of grass on the
veldt, and the stench was abominable. On the third day of the siege a
poor goat that had wandered near the besieged was immediately captured
and devoured. On the fourth day they commandeered one of the enemy's
horses, which they intended to slaughter, their own being too emaciated
for that purpose. But the Boers, having been reinforced, gave them no
time to do the butchering. On the evening of the fourth day a messenger
bearing a letter from General de Wet arrived, demanding surrender within
ten minutes. The Boer force consisted of 500 men and two 12-pounders.
The officers consulted together, and decided, in view of the hopeless
condition of their little garrison of fifty all told, worn out and
starving and their horses dead, to accept the inevitable.
While all this was going on, and Cronje was making the discovery that he
might be completely outflanked, and that the position of the Boer army
at Spyfontein must become untenable, Lord Roberts was entering into
Jacobsdal. The place was orderly and quiet. The three churches were full
of patients, the town having been used mainly as an hospital. The
invalids, for the most part, were sufferers from enteric, the result of
too much Modder River. After a long and painful intimacy with the
grilling veldt, the sight of houses and civilised dwellings struck
gratefully on the eyes of the incoming troops. A store was hailed as a
veritable godsend. Some one bought a tin of oatmeal, and walked off with
it as one who had secured a prize; some one else gave a goodly price for
a pot of pickles, and came away licking his lips like a modern
Eliogabalus. The rejoicing was no mean emotion, for the unfortunate men,
with the appetites of athletes, had been existing on lovers' fare. One
of the famished but cheery fellows wrote: "We marched into Jacobsdal,
and as soon as we arrived we thronged the stores for provisions. I made
the following purchases for three of us:--
_s._ _d._
Three two-pound loaves at 1s. each 3 0
Three tins of condensed milk at 1s. each 3 0
Two tins of syrup at 1s. 3d. each 2 6
One small packet of cocoa 0 9
One tin of Quaker oats 1 3
One pound of sugar 0 6
--------
11 0
Then we gorged ourselves to make up for three weeks' semi-starvation.
The most prominent building of Jacobsdal is the church, which stands in
the centre of the town. The town itself lies in a hollow--Sleepy Hollow
would be an apt title for the place just now. Most of the houses,
including the church, are at present converted into hospitals, and the
female population are acting as nurses. Most of them are in mourning for
relatives lost during the campaign." Later, the troops moved on and
encamped at a farm which had also been used as an hospital. Sights
pathetic were only too common--our own sick and wounded in various
stages of suffering, and outside, to use a "Tommy's" description, "some
poor devils wrapped in sheets ready to be put to bed for the last time!"
[Illustration: GENERAL CRONJE.
From a Photo by M. Plumbe.]
Lord Roberts visited the large German hospital, and expressed himself
well pleased with the splendid cleanliness of the place and the general
evidences of good management. Among the sufferers was found Colonel
Henry, who had been taken prisoner on the 14th. Strangely enough, all
the inhabitants of the place evinced satisfaction at the arrival of the
British, particularly on making the discovery that it was not the habit
of the British troops to loot and destroy, as they had been led by the
Burghers to believe was the case. They were now made acquainted with the
proclamation which Lord Roberts issued to the Burghers of the Orange
Free State when his force invaded their territory. It was printed both
in English and Dutch:--
"The British troops under my command having entered the Orange
Free State, I feel it my duty to make known to all Burghers the
cause of our coming, as well as to do all in my power to put an
end to the devastation caused by this war, so that, should they
continue the war, the inhabitants of the Orange Free State may
not do so ignorantly, but with full knowledge of their
responsibility before God for the lives lost in the campaign.
"Before the war began the British Government, which had always
desired and cultivated peace and friendship with the people of
the Orange Free State, gave a solemn assurance to President
Steyn that, if the Orange Free State remained neutral, its
territory would not be invaded, and its independence would be
at all times fully respected by Her Majesty's Government.
"In spite of that declaration, the Government of the Orange
Free State was guilty of a wanton and unjustifiable invasion of
British territory.
"The British Government believes that this act of aggression
was not committed with the general approval and free will of a
people with whom it has lived in complete amity for so many
years. It believes that the responsibility rests wholly with
the Government of the Orange Free State, acting, not in the
interests of the country, but under mischievous influences from
without. The British Government, therefore, wishes the people
of the Orange Free State to understand that it bears them no
ill-will, and, so far as is compatible with the successful
conduct of the war and the re-establishment of peace in South
Africa, it is anxious to preserve them from the evils brought
upon them by the wrongful action of their Government.
"I therefore warn all Burghers to desist from any further
hostility towards Her Majesty's Government and the troops
under my command, and I undertake that any of them who may so
desist, and who are found staying in their homes and quietly
pursuing their ordinary occupations, will not be made to suffer
in their persons or property on account of their having taken
up arms in obedience to the order of their Government. Those,
however, who oppose the forces under my command, or furnish the
enemy with supplies or information, will be dealt with
according to the customs of war.
"Requisitions for food, forage, fuel, or shelter made on the
authority of the officers in command of Her Majesty's troops,
must be at once complied with; but everything will be paid for
on the spot, prices being regulated by the local market rates.
If the inhabitants of any district refuse to comply with the
demands made on them, the supplies will be taken by force, a
full receipt being given.
"Should any inhabitant of the country consider that he or any
member of his household has been unjustly treated by any
officer, soldier, or civilian attached to the British army, he
should submit his complaint, either personally or in writing,
to my headquarters or to the headquarters of the nearest
general officer. Should the complaint on inquiry be
substantiated, redress will be given.
"Orders have been issued by me prohibiting soldiers from
entering private houses or molesting the civil population on
any pretext whatever, and every precaution has been taken
against injury to property on the part of any person belonging
to or connected with the army.
"ROBERTS, _Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa_."
THE HERDING OF CRONJE
To return to General French. The cavalry division bivouacked outside the
town of Kimberley, but their repose was limited. At 3 A.M. on the
morning of the 16th they were up and doing. The enemy in the north was
giving trouble. Some sharp fighting took place, during which Lieutenants
Brassey (9th Lancers) and P. Bunbury were killed. This early activity
was tough work for the already weary troops, who had been fifteen hours
without a meal. Indeed, it was generally remarked that the relievers
looked sorrier specimens of humanity than the relieved. The Colonial
troops, the Queensland and New Zealand Contingents, and the New South
Wales Lancers, considering all things, were wonderfully fit after having
played a conspicuous part in the operations. These troops had joined
General French's column from the regions of the Orange and Modder
Rivers. The New South Wales Lancers rode on the extreme right flank of
the first brigade, and their ambulance corps, under Lieutenant Edwards,
kept up with the column, and was complimented on being the first
ambulance to cross the Modder River. Like the rest of the troops, they
had taken their share of small rations, merely nominal rest,
sun-scorching, and maddening thirst, and yet were full of zeal--"keen as
mustard," as some one said--to engage in the herding of Cronje and
effect his capture. Worn out as they were, they had sprung to attention
on a rumour brought in by a despatch-rider to the effect that Cronje had
evacuated Majersfontein and was in full retreat.
At midnight on the 16th, no confirmation of this news had been received.
The jaded troops, and still more jaded horses--mere skeletons in horse's
skins--were preparing for real repose, when all was changed! A telegram
arrived from Lord Kitchener saying that Cronje, with 10,000 men, was in
full retreat from Majersfontein, with all his waggons and equipment and
four guns, along the north bank of the Modder River towards
Bloemfontein; that he had already fought a rearguard action with him;
and that if French, with all available horses and guns, could head him
and prevent his crossing the river, the infantry from Klip Drift would
press on and annihilate or take the whole force prisoners.
Here was a surprise! Pleasant yet unpleasant, for shattered men in the
last stage of fatigue. But General French--whom some one has described
as possessing the shape of a brick, with all the solid and excellent
qualities of one--rose to the occasion. He was on the point of going to
sleep, but there was no thought of rest now. Arrangements had to be
made, horses weeded--out of a division of 5000 only one brigade was fit
to move!--more borrowed from the Kimberley Light Horse, whose
holiday-time had come, and other preparations hurriedly set on foot to
ensure an immediate rush--a swoop that should be as swift and successful
as it was startling!
One may imagine the midnight picture. The dark immensity of veldt--the
dust-driven, sweltering veldt--and Cronje, miles ahead with his horde,
the remnant of his convoy, his women and children, fleeing along the
north bank of the Modder, harassed by the Sixth Division, threatened by
the Seventh and Ninth, and yet longing to cross the river, to get safely
to Koodoosrand Drift, where he hourly expected reinforcements would come
to his succour. French, dead beat after glorious work accomplished,
rising from the first hospitable pillow he had seen for days--springing
suddenly to action, ordering, organising, deciding how to effect the
great swoop on Koodoosrand Drift and head off the fugitive. There was no
time for the buckling on of mental and moral armour; only the warrior at
soul could have been ready for such a situation. But such an one was
here. He gave swift orders. In three hours' time General Broadwood and
his brigade and three batteries of artillery--the only ones available
out of seven--sallied forth towards the east, in the dusk of the
morning. Their destination--Koodoosrand Drift--was some forty miles off,
and once here Cronje's last loophole of escape would be gone! The
General and his staff followed at 4.15 A.M., riding at full speed, and
catching up the brigade about fifteen miles off.
The whole nature of their errand and the proposed movement was a
surprise, for this manoeuvre had not entered into General French's
original calculations.
When the General had seen the Sixth Division safely at Klip Drift and
secured his left flank, he proceeded on his rush to Kimberley. Of other
movements save his own he was ignorant. Even as he and the troops were
riding into the town, Cronje, who had discovered the futility of his
position at Majersfontein and the danger of it, was trekking madly across
the front of the Sixth Division. On the morning of the 16th Lord
Kitchener, hearing that the Majersfontein laager and the Modder River camp
were deserted, and seeing a cloud of dust in the distance, had guessed
what was happening, and immediately altered his plans to meet the
emergency. As we are aware, he instantly gave orders for the mounted
infantry not to follow French, but to pursue and attack the Boer convoy,
while he telegraphed later to French, with the results just described.
General French grasped the position at a glance. He knew no time was to be
lost, and soon Broadwood's brigade, with horses that could barely move,
was pushing on as fast as spurs could insist. The early morning dusk broke
into the green and grey and gold of dawn; birds flew frightened hither and
thither; foxes rushed to their holes; springbok and hares tempted the
sportsmen, but never a glance to right or left was wasted. All eyes were
strained to the east, to the momentous east, and the wooded banks of the
distant river. Nearer and ever nearer they came--specks were seen on the
horizon--men?--horses?--the enemy moving?--scudding away before he could
be cornered? No--Yes? A moment of excitement, anguish--joy! The General
had mounted a kopje, reconnoitred, and discovered the truth. It was
Cronje's force--the remnants of his convoy some 4000 yards off--the convoy
streaming down into the drifts that lead to Petrusberg and thence to
Bloemfontein! They must never reach that destination! Kitchener's
words--"Head him and prevent his crossing the river"--so simple in sound,
so complex in execution, thrilled every heart. Quickly the guns were got
into action--grandly--almost magically--the first shot plumped--bang! in
front of the leading waggon just as the convoy was preparing to descend
the drift! What a reveille! Cronje, as we know, was rushing from the
clutches of the Sixth Division at Drieputs. Breathless, he gathered
himself together. Suddenly he found himself assailed by a new force--a new
terror! He divined in a moment what had happened. It was French, the
ubiquitous French--French redivivus, as it were--who was putting the
finishing touch to the chapter of disaster. Poor Captain Boyle, in his
letter to the _Nineteenth Century_, thus described the great Dutchman's
plight:--
"His only chance now was to sacrifice his guns and convoy, and cut his
way across the river under the heavy fire of our guns. Immediately on
the first shell bursting in the laager, about thirty Boers galloped out
to seize a kopje on our right, afterwards called Roberts' Hill; but the
10th Hussars in a neck-and-neck race had the legs of them, and seizing
the hill in advance, beat them off with their carbine and Maxim fire.
The Boers from their laager answered our shell fire for a short time
with great accuracy from two or three guns. But these were quickly
silenced, and shell after shell from Artillery Hill fell plump into the
laager. Finally, our second battery was moved to a little distance from
Roberts' Hill and opened fire from the southern slope on to a kopje to
which the Boers had retired. All that afternoon at intervals our guns
poured shells into the laager, but no response came, and we spent our
time watching the Boers, now 3000 yards away, entrenching themselves in
the open and along the river-bank. Their waggons caught fire and the
ammunition exploded, and as they realised their position more and more,
so must their hearts have sunk. Anxiously must they have waited for the
first sign of the infantry gathering round, as anxiously as we did in
our turn watching from the high kopjes.
"The cavalry, worn out as they were and without food, had to hold the
kopjes and water their horses in turn some five miles off. They got what
grazing they could in the kopjes as they lay there, for no corn had come
on from Kimberley, and neither men nor horses had had any food except
the three days' rations with which they originally started from Klip
Drift the Thursday before, a good deal of which had been shaken off the
saddles or lost in the long gallop up the plain to Kimberley. The
General, the men, the horses, all alike had to live on what was found at
Kamilfontein--a few mealies, a few onions, and the crumbs of biscuits in
our pockets were all we had until some Free Staters' sheep and cattle
were rounded and killed. Had it not been for this plentiful supply of
meat, the men must have fared very badly for the next three days. No
transport came in until Monday night, and the horses had but 11/2 lb. of
corn in three days. The men were put on half rations of biscuits even
after the transport arrived.
"Meanwhile, on Saturday afternoon about 5 P.M. Broadwood sent word to
French that in the far distance he observed the dust rising, which he
took for Kelly-Kenny's division. French returned to Roberts' Hill, and,
until the sun set, anxiously awaited the arrival of the infantry--but
they marched but slowly. From 6 P.M. till 7 P.M. we opened fire again
from our batteries to show Lord Kitchener our exact positions." The
splendid work done by the Royal Horse Artillery was described by another
eye-witness. He said: "I will give you an idea of what good gunners we
have in the Artillery. General French said to one of the gunners, 'See
those three waggons over there? (a distance of about 31/2 miles); see what
you can do with them.' The gunner fired three shell, and the waggons
were no more."
We must now watch the progress of the other portions of the force who
were actively engaged in taking their share in the huge undertaking.
Colonel Stephenson's brigade, on the night of the 16th (while General
French was learning the great news), had re-crossed the river at Klip
Drift, and on the morning of the 17th (at the same hour as Broadwood's
brigade was moving from Kimberley) had marched to the south of the river
with the same intention--that of heading off Cronje at Paardeberg and
Koodoosrand Drift. Thus, with Broadwood's brigade on one side, and
Stephenson's on the other, Cronje's prospects of escape were scarcely
worth a dime. The _Times'_ correspondent, talking of Colonel
Stephenson's troops on the morning of the fateful 17th, said:--
"They were joined about ten at Klipkraal Drift by Knox's brigade, which
marched along the northern bank. The mounted infantry, pushing on,
reached Paardeberg Drift that evening, and encamped on rising ground
close to the south bank. The infantry, leaving Klipkraal at six in the
evening, made a night march for Paardeberg Drift, but, missing their
way, slightly passed the Drift and bivouacked on some rising ground
nearly two miles beyond, separated from the river by a smooth plain
shelving gently down to it. The mistake was a fortunate one, as it
brought the infantry almost opposite to the place where Cronje had
determined to cross. Cronje had left Drieputs during the night after the
battle, abandoning seventy-eight waggons, and pushed on along the north
bank of the river during Saturday for Koodoosrand Drift. Soon after
passing north of Paardeberg Drift he heard that French had already
returned from Kimberley, and was holding a line of high kopjes running
north-west from Koodoosrand Drift, and completely commanding the drift.
Wheeling his waggons to the right across the plain, he laagered on the
north bank of the river at Wolveskraal Farm. This was opposite to a
drift of the same name, about half-way between Paardeberg and
Koodoosrand Drifts, being about four miles in a straight line from each.
Here he intended to cross on Sunday morning. But already, during the
night, he became aware of the presence of the mounted infantry south of
Paardeberg Drift, and decided that he could not get his convoy away
without fighting. Probably Cronje did not realise that Kelly-Kenny's
infantry could have already marched up and occupied the rising ground
not three thousand yards south of Wolveskraal Drift; still less could he
know that General Colvile's division (whose endurance had been
extraordinary) was but a few miles behind, and was to reach Paardeberg
Drift before daybreak. If Cronje had known this, there is little doubt
that he would have promptly sacrificed all his transport and all his
guns in order to get his men away and escape from the trap into which he
was now caught. As it was, he sent a great part of his force to line the
river-bed all the way down to Paardeberg Drift, in order to act as a
rear-guard and check any attempt to interfere with his crossing
Wolveskraal Drift at his leisure."
Later on, the Ninth Division, with the Highland Brigade, who had made a
forced march from Jacobsdal, arrived on the scene just in time to see
the Boers sending up rockets to show their position to expected
reinforcements. And there is little doubt that Cronje, unable to realise
the expeditious advance of "lumbering Britons," mistook General
Colvile's troops for the longed-for relief.
Among the missing from near Paardeberg were Lieutenants Romilly (Duke of
Cornwall's Light Infantry) and Metge (Welsh Regiment), and Captains
Arnold and Vaughan of Kitchener's Horse.
Here we have the position of affairs as they stood on the night of the
17th and on the morning of the 18th, when the trap so ingeniously set
for Cronje commenced to close little by little--north, south, east, and
west. Everywhere he turned the detestable rooineks menaced him, and he
who so lately had eaten his breakfast to the tune of his 100-pounder
gun, that belched ruin and mutilation over the whole region of
Kimberley, was now constrained to breakfast to a new and disagreeable
inversion of an identical melody!
THE BATTLE OF PAARDEBERG
On Sunday, the 18th of February, the most exciting action of the war
took place. It was costly as it was momentous, for it served to decide
the fate of the fleeing Dutchman. The scene of the drama was not
unpicturesque. From the Paardeberg to the Koodoosrand Drift the Modder
flowed along a deep hollow from thirty to a hundred yards in depth. To
either side the forks of small dongas radiated, while the high banks
were fringed with the feathery foliage of the mimosa and willow. Donga
and tree stump afforded excellent cover for the slim adversary, sniper
or scout. The river travelled from Koodoosrand Drift west-south-west,
deviating southwards on either side of the Wolveskraal Drift. A vast
expanse of veldt, some two thousand yards wide, shelved down towards the
south bank of the river, fringed by higher ground; and this grassy plain
extending eastwards joined a circle of kopjes now known as Kitchener's
Hill. On the opposite, the north bank of the river, was another similar
plain, dotted with minor kopjes to within a thousand yards of the river,
and beyond them was the higher hump of Paardeberg Hill.
The action began at dawn. Firing grew hotter and hotter with the growth
of the morning, and soon pandemonium was let loose. While part of the
mounted infantry was forcing the rearguard up the river another part was
manoeuvring on the right front and flank of the enemy. The Dutchmen
meanwhile from King's Kop turned on a quick-firing Hotchkiss gun, which
swept the flat country from the kop to the southern bank of the river.
The antagonists had both posted themselves on the north bank of the
river--both banks of which were level, and this expanse afforded no
cover for movements. Over this expanse the Ninth Brigade had to move,
struggling through a zone of fire towards the concealed enemy.
Cronje by this time had realised that his position was critical--almost
hopeless. Bringing his fine military qualities to bear on the situation,
he decided to make the best of a bad job, and entrench himself with all
the skill possible. He held about one square mile of the river-bed on
either side of Wolveskraal Drift, and beyond that he knew were
encircling kopjes, each one concealing its multitude of rooineks. On the
east, slowly creeping up, were the menacing numbers of Tucker's
Division; on the west the vast crowds of the mounted infantry and the
Sixth Division; on the south were field-guns little more than a mile
off, threatening to shower destruction from Gun Hill, while on the north
were Naval guns and howitzers. Indeed, everywhere was fate frowning,
obdurate, vengeful. But the Dutchman retained his pluck and his wits. He
even believed that with everything against him he might yet employ the
same tactics which had nonplussed Lord Methuen at Modder River. He still
retained a poor opinion of his adversary, and his delusion lent him
confidence. He hurriedly built trenches, that in themselves were
masterpieces of defensive art, and took up his headquarters in the
centre, in a red brick house--a species of travellers' hostelry, which
may be found near all drifts in South Africa. Here at night Mrs. Cronje
joined him. During the day she was placed in the women's shelter at the
east side of the area, which shelter was protected by waggons and
trenches all along the bed of the river. Talking of these trenches, the
correspondent of the _Times_ declared that "the skill with which they
were constructed as defences against both rifle and shell fire was
worthy of the highest praise. All except those of the outer lines of
pickets were made so narrow and deep that it seems as though they were
in many cases entered from one end rather than the top, as any such
ingress must even in a week's time have considerably widened the neck of
the excavation. At the top they were perhaps eighteen inches wide, at
the bottom about three feet, and by crouching down the most complete
protection was afforded from bursting shell.
"Every natural protection, such as the ramifications of the dongas
which eat into the banks on both sides of the river, had been utilised,
though the bombardment from both sides compelled them to abandon their
first hasty breastworks cut into the actual top of the bank, which was
here from about fifty to a hundred yards from the river itself, and
thirty feet in height.
"For the first time here the 'T' trenches, of which much has been said
during the present campaign, were used. They did not seem to present the
least advantage over the ordinary shapes, except that in an exposed
angle they may have provided additional protection against an enfilading
fire."
Cronje's first object in entrenching himself in the bed of the river was
to arrest the further advance of the mounted infantry, who had taken
possession of the bed of the river west of his position. In this he was
successful. Worn, harassed, and almost helpless, he determined to make a
desperate stand, hoping against hope to gain time till some help from
without should arrive. But this help never reached him. A grand
enveloping movement commenced, and Cronje, brought to bay, found himself
face to face with what proved to be his Sedan.
By this time he and his followers were snugly ensconced in bush and
donga and scrub round the laager, and from the trees around they
vigorously sniped and poured volleys at the advancing troops. In the
advance to the attack the Highland Brigade was on the left, General
Knox's brigade in the centre and on the right, while General Smith
Dorrien's brigade, after crossing the river by Paardeberg Drift, moved
along the north bank. The Highland Brigade had a terrific duty. The
Boers, from their position in the bed of the river and on both sides of
it, commanded the left of the Brigade, and as the kilted mass moved
forward in the open poured upon them a deadly fire, which forced them to
lie prone for the rest of the day. Here at noon, when bullets were
humming their loudest, General Hector Macdonald was wounded. He had
dismounted, and was directing the movements of the brigade, when
overtaken by a shot which penetrated thigh and foot. Despite this
unlucky accident and a tremendous spell of hard fighting, the brigade
exhibited splendid pluck and tenacity. They were destitute of cover, but
maintained their position with astonishing fortitude, and this after the
long forced march they had made from Jacobsdal, and while enduring the
tortures of maddening thirst, which could not be assuaged. A heavy
thunderstorm mercifully overtook them in the course of the afternoon and
raindrops large as gooseberries clattered down their relieving moisture
on the parched and exhausted troops.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF PAARDEBERG.
Drawing by Sidney Paget from a Sketch by W. B. Wollen, R.I.]
On the north bank of the river was Cronje's laager, an environment of
waggons, carts, ammunition, and stores. While General Smith Dorrien's
force, among which were the Canadians, Gordons, and Shropshires,
attempted to charge into the laager, they too were vigorously shelled by
the enemy, who, undefeatable, held on valiantly to a kopje on the south
bank of the river. Here they posted a Vickers-Maxim and other deadly
weapons, and in a measure divided our force in two. The Seaforths and
the Cornwall Regiment made a splendid charge with the bayonet, and drove
the Boers from their cover round the drift, but in the glorious rush
both the Colonel and Adjutant of the Cornwalls were stricken down.
Ninety-six of the men were wounded, but they now held the north-west
side of the enemy's position.
[Illustration: PLAN OF THE BOER LAAGERS AND TRENCHES AND THE BRITISH
POSITIONS AT PAARDEBERG. (By an Officer of the Royal Field Artillery.)]
On the east the Sixth Division was hard at work tackling a horde of
Boers, who made a last despairing lunge in order to burst through the
entangling forces and push for the south bank of the river. The effort
was stubborn as it was desperate, but they were defeated by the dash of
the West Riding Regiment, who pressed forward with the bayonet and
succeeded in seizing the drift. Many splendid fellows were wounded and
slain in the collision. Meanwhile the artillery continued to direct
their incessant thunder against the laager, pouring in a deluge of
destruction from all quarters, and forcing the Dutchmen to shrink within
the space, little more than a mile square, into which they had so
hurriedly scrambled.
General Kelly-Kenny having possessed himself of both Klip Drift and
Koodoosrand Drift, the Boers were now enclosed east and west. But here,
crunched in a veritable death-trap, they fought tenaciously. Worn,
harassed, and weakened by their hurried march, they yet held a stubborn
front to our assaulting troops, and from the cramped region of their
laager did as much damage as it was possible to do. The Canadians, who
had behaved with conspicuous gallantry in the attack on the laager, lost
nineteen killed and sixty-three wounded. A description of the fight as
seen from their point of view was given by a private in the 1st
Contingent:--
"We left Klip Drift on the Modder River at 6 P.M. Saturday, and
marched all night until seven on Sunday morning, covering 23
miles. During the march we could hear the guns ahead. I was
orderly man for Sunday, so, removing my pack, I went to the
river for water. Just a little way up the river a brisk fire
opened up. When I got back to our lines I found them issuing a
ration of rum. I had mine, and it just braced me up.
"By this time the engagement was pretty brisk. Our brigade was
ordered on the left of the river, which we crossed at a ford
just in rear of the camp. The Shropshires crossed first, then
followed the Canadians and Gordons. The water was up to our
necks. Some went deeper and had to swim. We crossed in fours,
holding on to each other, formed up in column and advanced a
short distance, when we extended to seven paces in skirmishing
order. C Company formed to support A Company.
"By this time the bullets were coming pretty thickly, and we
had some very narrow squeaks. We reinforced A Company at 500
yards and opened fire. The Boer fire was heavy, and some of our
boys had been hit, but we soon subdued the fire. Their position
was in the river, and we were lying out in the open, no cover
of any kind except a few anthills. We could see very little to
fire at except the fire from their guns. Our line was in a
crescent shape, the right on the river, and the left extended
along about 500 yards. In the afternoon our troops were ordered
to cease fire. As soon as we stopped they started sniping,
which made us hug the ground.
"Shortly after joining the firing line Captain Arnold of A
Company was struck. The Boers started a murderous fire on the
stretcher-bearers who carried him away, a trick they did all
day long. Towards evening the left was ordered to reinforce the
right. It was a daring move, but we did it by running down in
threes and fours. At dark all the forces retired, and quite a
few men volunteered to search for the wounded. I was out all
night until four the next morning, when I laid down played out.
I never want to witness such terrible sights as I saw that
night again. Whenever we showed ourselves in the moonlight the
sharpshooters would fire at us. We were all up early next
morning, but the Boers had retired farther up the river. So we
collected our wounded and buried the dead. I was helping a
hospital sergeant, and he sent two of us up the river to search
for wounded. We found a few, and also came across a wounded
Boer, whom we bandaged and took back to camp. We also came
across a few dead. We questioned the Boer, and he said that
they had retired during the night, carrying their wounded and
throwing the dead into the river. After dinner, which we had
about four, we went out on outpost duty. During the night there
was quite a little firing going on. This morning we advanced
towards the position again, and about ten o'clock retired for
some breakfast and advanced again. Although under fire all day
we did not fire, but the artillery certainly played Cain with
them."
Captain Arnold's wound was mortal, but Lieutenant Mason, who was also
shot, was not dangerously hurt.
A Colonial, writing from the front at Paardeberg, said that fighting
"went on during the day until about five o'clock, when the Cornwalls
arrived in support. The officer commanding this battalion seemed to
think that too much time had already been spent in fighting the Boers,
so ordered the charge. The result was fatal to the Cornwalls, as they
had to retire. The Canadians, acting under the orders of the commanding
officer of the Cornwalls as senior officer, also charged, and with a
like result; but the Canadians, in place of retiring, simply lay down
and remained. It was during this charge that most of the fatalities
occurred. The unfortunate commanding officer of the Cornwalls was
killed, and Captain Arnold and Lieutenant Mason of the Canadians
wounded. The Brigadier subsequently expressed his regret that the charge
took place, but at the same time warmly congratulated the Canadians on
their behaviour, as did Lord Roberts also."
Of gallantry and daring there was no end. From dawn till sunset raged a
battle of appalling fierceness, of magnificent persistency. From drift
to drift the hollows reverberated with the perpetual roll of musketry,
the brawling of multifarious guns, the hoarse cheers of charging troops,
the shouts of the unflinching enemy. Curling smoke burst in wreaths and
garlands from the sides of the hills and rose against the purple of
thunder-clouds; flaring tongues of vengeful flame danced and forked
their reflections of heaven's lightnings; spouts and torrents of water
poured from the sky, mingling with the heroical blood of Britain's best,
that trickled in rivulets, north, south, east, and west of the scene,
and traced far and wide the history of sacrifice on the now sacred
ground. For all this, the position of the contending parties remained
unchanged--Cronje defiant and enclosed, the British lion crouching,
watching.
At dusk the scene was weirdly, terrifically picturesque. From the south
and north sides of the river shells hurtled through the air, falling and
exploding along the river-bed, now setting fire to a waggon, now a cart,
and filling the gloom with lurid panoramas of flame and an awe-striking,
ceaseless din. Once an ammunition waggon was struck. Then the blaze and
crackling which followed, intermingling as they did with the roar of
artillery and the rattle of rifles, made a fitting concert for Hades.
And to the tune of this demoniacal intermezzo the cordon round the enemy
was gradually closing, his last chances of escape were one by one being
sealed, the last links in Lord Roberts' strategical chain were being
forged.
At night there was peace. The Modder might have been the placid purling
Thames winding along between fringed and sloping banks to the bosom of
the sea. But there was none to admire the pretty scene. All were worn
out, and glad to drop to sleep where they had fought, while the
bearer-parties--"body-snatchers," as they were jocosely styled--picked
their way in the darkness, doing their deeds of mercy with zealous,
unflagging perseverance. During this time many deserters from the enemy
came in. They had seen the hopelessness of their case, and had been
urging, uselessly, the implacable Cronje to surrender.
The following is the list of those who were killed and wounded during
the fight:--
_Killed_:--Mounted Infantry--Colonel Hannay.[1] 2nd
Warwick--Lieutenant Hankay. Duke of Cornwall's Light
Infantry--Lieutenant-Colonel Aldworth,[2] Captain E. P.
Wardlaw, Captain Newbury. Seaforth Highlanders--Second
Lieutenant M'Clure. Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders--Lieutenant Courtenay. West Riding
Regiment--Lieutenant Siordet. 1st Yorkshire--Second Lieutenant
Neave. Oxford Light Infantry--Lieutenant Bright, Second
Lieutenant Ball-Acton. _Wounded_:--Staff--Major-General Knox
(13th Brigade), Major-General Hector MacDonald (3rd Brigade).
Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry--Captain J. H. Maunder,
Lieutenant H. W. Fife, Second Lieutenant J. W. C. Fife, Second
Lieutenant R. M. Grigg. Seaforth Highlanders--Captain G. C.
Fielden, Captain E. A. Cowans, Captain G. M. Lumsden,
Lieutenant J. P. Grant, Second Lieutenant D. P. Monypenny (died
of wounds), Second Lieutenant A. R. Moncrieff. 1st Gordon
Highlanders--Second Lieutenant W. B. J. Nutford. Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders--Lieutenant C. N. Macdonald, Lieutenant
G. Thorpe, Second Lieutenant G. A. Akers-Douglas, Second
Lieutenant F. G. S. Cunningham. Black Watch--Lieutenant-Colonel
A. M. Carthew-Yorkstoun, Major Hon. H. E. Maxwell, Major T. M.
N. Berkeley, Captain J. G. H. Hamilton, Lieutenant J. G. Grieve
(N.S.W. forces attached). West Riding Regiment--Captain F. J.
de Gex, Captain H. D. E. Greenwood. 1st
Yorkshire--Lieutenant-Colonel H. Bowles, Major Kirkpatrick,
Lieutenant C. V. Edwards, Captain A. C. Buckle (South Stafford
attached). Oxford Light Infantry--Major Day, Captain Watt,
Lieutenant Hammich. East Kent Regiment--Captain Geddes.
Shropshire Light Infantry--Captain Gubbins, Captain Smith,
Lieutenant English, Second Lieutenant Kettlewell.
Canadians--Captain H. M. Arnold (since died of wounds),
Lieutenant J. C. Mason, Lieutenant Armstrong. R.A.M.C.--Captain
J. E. C. Canter. Lieutenant G. H. Goddard. East Surrey--Captain
A. H. S. Hart. 2nd Lincoln--Second Lieutenant Dockray
Waterhouse. 1st Yorkshire--Second Lieutenant W. G. Turbet. 2nd
Oxford Light Infantry--Captain Fanshawe, Lieutenant Stapleton.
2nd Bedford--Captain R. W. Waldy, Lieutenant Selous. 2nd
Norfolk--Lieutenant Cramer-Roberts. 1st
Welsh--Lieutenant-Colonel Banfield, Major Ball. 2nd East
Kent--Captain Godfrey-Faussett, accidentally shot (died
February 21). 1st West Riding--Captain Taylor, Captain Harris.
Roberts' Horse--Lieutenant A. Grant. Argyll and
Sutherland--Captain N. Malcolm, D.S.O. 1st Gordon
Highlanders--Lieutenant Ingilby. 1st Welsh Regiment--Major
Harkness, Lieutenant F. A. Jones, Lieutenant Veal. Mounted
Infantry--Lieutenant-Colonel Tudway (1st Essex). 1st
Essex--Captain Milward, Second Lieutenant Thomson.
_Missing_:--Captain Lennox, 81st Field Battery R.A.
The following table gives the distribution of the losses among
officers:--
_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._ _Total._
Staff -- 2 -- 2
2nd Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry 3 4 -- 7
2nd Seaforth Highlanders 1 6 -- 7
1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 1 4 -- 5
1st West Riding Regiment 1 2 -- 3
1st Yorkshire Regiment 1 4 -- 5
1st Oxfordshire Light Infantry 2 3 -- 5
2nd East Kent Regiment -- 1 -- 1
1st Gordon Highlanders -- 1 -- 1
2nd Royal Highlanders -- 4 -- 4
2nd Shropshire Light Infantry -- 4 -- 4
Royal Canadian Regiment -- 2 -- 2
Royal Army Medical Corps -- 2 -- 2
81st Battery R.A. -- -- 1 1
--- --- --- ---
Total 9 39 1 49
The heaviness of this list and the evenness with which the casualties
were shared bear witness to the dash and daring displayed by all the
battalions engaged.
A good deal of comment subsequently took place regarding the methods
adopted during this day's warfare, and many were of opinion that the
attempt to take the position by assault was unnecessarily wasteful of
life. Considering the positions of the various regiments on the morning
of the battle, it seemed as though the encircling of the enemy and
forcing him to submission by a slow process of pressure would have
served equally well to bring about the inevitable end. But again it has
been urged that there was at the time no knowing how soon reinforcements
might come to the assistance of Cronje, or what results might accrue
from permitting the Boers--at the time breathless and weary--to gather
themselves together for fresh resistance. Delay was evidently the one
thing that Cronje was playing for, and Lord Kitchener, on his side, was
averse from risks which might bring about the failure of the vital
undertaking.
TRAPPED
The enemy had little rest. The small hours were spent in constructing
entrenchments round the laager. All owned that their stubborn energy was
admirable, but further active resistance on the part of Cronje was now
beginning to be regarded by all--even his own people--as an act of
suicide and murder. "It was magnificent, but it was not war," as the
Frenchman said. The Mounted Infantry and a battery of artillery next
morning turned their attention to an offending kopje, whence the Boers
could yet pour their equivalent for "cold water" on the British plans,
and while circling round the position were accosted with a morning
salutation from the rifles of the Federals on the summit of the hill.
Fortunately the fusillade was launched with more vigour than accuracy,
and there were no casualties. Pursuing their investigations, the troops
discovered a good defensive position and seized it.
Early in the morning Cronje sent a white flag, demanding twenty-four
hours' armistice for the purpose of burying his dead. This most probably
being part of a wary plot to gain time for reinforcements to come to the
rescue, a reply was sent back from Lord Kitchener to the effect that it
was impossible to grant the request, which must await the arrival of the
Commander-in-Chief. Lord Roberts was then on his way from Jacobsdal, and
when the matter was referred to him, he at once sent a message refusing
to accede to the proposition. General Cronje's reply, being roughly
translated, implied that he wished to surrender, but when Lord Kitchener
requested him to surrender in person, it was discovered that he had no
notion of capitulation--unconditional surrender being the terms offered.
Lord Roberts then ordered the resumption of the bombardment.
About midday came the rumour that French was at hand, and that he was
taking his share of the great hemming-in movement, but the cavalry
division was then nowhere in view. Lord Roberts arrived later, and
addressed the troops, who welcomed him with cheers. Meanwhile the 18th,
62nd, and 75th field-batteries and the 65th (howitzer) battery
surrounded the laager, and commenced an avalanche of destruction, the
howitzers battering the river-bed with an enfilading fire, the fumes of
lyddite rendering the surrounding air green with noxious vapour. Waggon
after waggon of ammunition exploded with infernal uproar, shrapnel and
lyddite danced diabolically over the river-bed and laager, yet there
were no signs of surrender--not the flutter of a white flag in the
direction where remained the obdurate man who, his last chance gone,
refused to bow to the inevitable. Prisoners now and then, worn out and
disgusted, came in, their rifles slung, and gave themselves up. In the
laager were sixty women and girls, they said, and Cronje, "disconsolate
and defiant, sat holding Mrs. Cronje's hand and comforting her in the
river-bed." Meanwhile Broadwood's brigade had appeared, exhausted and
starving. The cavalry had come along the river-bank to Paardeberg in
order to reach the forage and the convoy which was accompanying the
infantry divisions from Klip Drift. Their state was lamentable, for it
must be remembered that General Broadwood had galloped off during the
night of the 16th almost provisionless. His brigade had borne the brunt
of the fray, for General Gordon had only been able to follow later with
some 120 horses out of his whole brigade. Colonel Porter's brigade
marched later still, owing to some accident with the telegraph. The work
of relieving Kimberley and heading Cronje had cost the cavalry some 990
horses out of a total of 4800.
The loss of life, however, had not been excessive considering the strain
and the engagements that had taken place between the 14th and 16th, but
some goodly young officers were missing. Lieutenant Carbutt (R.H.A.),
Lieutenant Brassey (9th Lancers), Lieutenant Hesketh (16th Lancers), and
Lieutenant the Hon. M'Clintock Banbury (Scots Greys), were among the
killed. Among the wounded were Captain Humfreys (Q Battery), Lieutenant
Houston (P Battery), Lieut. Barnes (Q Battery), Captain Gordon and
Lieut. Durand (9th Lancers), Captain Tuson (16th Lancers), Lieut.
Fordyce and Second Lieut. Long (Scots Greys), Lieut. Johnson
(Inniskilling Dragoons), Lieut. Gray (Roberts' Horse). The fatigued
remnant of the cavalry division now engaged in tackling the
reinforcements that Cronje had so ardently expected.
In consequence of the huge circumference of the British circle, it was
almost impossible to chronicle the innumerable small but brilliant
actions which were continually taking place, and which in the excitement
of the investment were almost overlooked. On the night of the 19th the
Gloucesters performed a dashing though futile feat. In the afternoon
they neared a kopje in which the Dutchmen were ensconced. They bided
their time, and just as the shades of night began to fall rushed on the
enemy with bayonets and drove them off with considerable loss. The
positions taken were evacuated, however, during the night.
On the 20th the Boers before dawn were again hard at work increasing
their entrenchments all round their laager, but their plucky labours
were impeded by continual shells which were launched now and again to
prevent the work from being carried to completion. Meanwhile from the
east came the echo of artillery, a rumour of battle which proved that
the untiring French was actively engaged in standing between the Boer
reinforcements and Cronje, who still held out gallantly in the fond yet
forlorn hope of their ultimate arrival. He was humanely offered many
chances to give in, but since he stoutly refused them all, measures were
taken by Lord Roberts to bring the fighting to a speedy conclusion.
But the doggedly valiant attitude of the enemy was not lost on his
assailants. It had been impossible to withhold from Cronje a certain
admiration for the masterful manoeuvres which extricated him from his
impossible position at Majersfontein, or for the stubborn resistance
with which his force, outwitted, harassed by the mounted infantry, and
fighting a skilful rearguard action, had succeeded in getting at least
thirty-five miles to Koodoosrand Drift. It was now equally impossible to
overlook the magnificent energy of the man, who, with his means of
flight at an end, his 50,000 lbs. of ammunition sacrificed, his stores
captured, his oxen exhausted to the death, with almost certain defeat
staring him in the face, could turn and fight an action both ferocious
and sanguinary. Moreover, by the sheer magnetism of his personality he
forced his followers to show a bold front and maintain a desperate,
almost fatuous, courage in the face of the most terrific shelling that
the century has known.
[Illustration: CRONJE'S STRONGHOLD ON THE MODDER RIVER.
Drawing by H. C. Seppings Wright, from a Sketch by Frederic Villiers,
War Artist.]
Little by little the enclosing circle began to grow narrower. The
infantry--the Cornwalls assisted by the Engineers--again set to work to
push the enemy still farther back into the river, but otherwise little
advance was made. The position was now sufficiently terrible for the
enemy. Cronje's trap was about a mile square, while commanding it in
every direction were guns multifarious; bushes and banks and ravines
were swept by cataracts of shrapnel, while volumes of greenish-yellow
smoke from bursting lyddite curved and twisted around the river-bed,
then carried their noxious vapour to the serene sapphire of the heavens.
In the clear atmosphere the reiterations of Maxims filled up the pauses
between the steady booming of artillery, while now and again the
impotent despairing splutter of rifles from the enemy's laager mingled
with the stertorous rampage.
On the fourth day of Cronje's resistance what might have been an
unfortunate incident occurred. The Gloucester and Essex regiments by an
accident had bivouacked on the north side of the river too close to the
enemy's laager. The result was that on the first gleam of daylight they
were discovered by the Dutchmen, who treated them to a volley by way of
reveille. Luckily the firing was not at all up to the Boer mark and the
regiments came off scot-free.
During the day General Smith Dorrien's force on the north worked towards
the doomed laager while General Knox's brigade held the containing lines
on the south side of the river. In the east General French was keeping
an eye on a swarm of Boers who were hoping to come to the rescue of
Cronje. These held a strong position on a kopje which seemed to be
specially constructed by nature for defensive purposes. Still, when
General Broadwood's brigade and a battery of horse-artillery turned
their attention to the summit and scoured it thoroughly, the Dutchmen
helter-skelter fled. Unluckily for them, their precipitate action took
them straight into the arms of General French, who having headed them
towards the drift, now gave them so warm a reception that numbers bit
the dust. Some escaped, but fifty were taken prisoners. Forage,
provisions, and equipment were also seized, though the corpses of the
slain were carried off, so that the tale of loss could not be told.
The capture of the kopje was an excellent move, as it was a useful
position whence to
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