From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America
by James Longstreet · English · Gutenberg #38418 · 1,430,795 chars · public domain (US)
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Title: From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs of the Civil War in America
Author: James Longstreet
Release date: December 27, 2011 [eBook #38418]
Most recently updated: January 8, 2021
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX: MEMOIRS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA ***
Produced by David Edwards and the Online Distributed
Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was
produced from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive.)
[Illustration: James Longstreet]
FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX
MEMOIRS OF THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA
BY JAMES LONGSTREET,
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL CONFEDERATE ARMY
_ILLUSTRATED WITH PLATES, MAPS, PORTRAITS, AND ENGRAVINGS
SPECIALLY PREPARED FOR THIS WORK_
PHILADELPHIA
J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY
1896
COPYRIGHT, 1895, BY
J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY.
_All Rights reserved._
ELECTROTYPED AND PRINTED BY J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY, PHILADELPHIA,
U.S.A.
THIS WORK IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED TO THE
OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE FIRST CORPS OF THE ARMY
OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA
TO THE LIVING AND THE DEAD
In Memory of
THEIR BRAVE DEEDS, THEIR TOILS, THEIR TRIBULATIONS,
AND THEIR TRIUMPHS
PREFACE.
Immediately after the surrender of the Confederate armies engaged in the
war between the States, General Lee undertook to write of the campaigns of
the Army of Northern Virginia while under his command, and asked such
assistance as I could give in supplying reports, despatches, and letters
of his, the originals of which had been lost or destroyed. Under the
impression that they could not be put to better use, such as were then in
hand were packed and sent him. He gave up the work, and after a few years
his death made it impossible that the world should ever receive the
complete story of the Confederate campaigns in Virginia from the noble
mind that projected and controlled them.
Possibly, had I not expected our commander to write the history of those
campaigns, I should have written it myself a decade or so earlier than I
have done. But, personally, I am not sorry that I write of the war thirty
years after its close, instead of ten or twenty.
While I am so constituted, temperamentally, that I could view then almost
exactly as I do now the great struggle in which I bore a part, I do not
know that others, in any considerable number, might have so regarded it at
the earlier periods to which I refer.
I believe that now, more fully than then, the public is ready to receive,
in the spirit in which it is written, the story which I present.
It is not my purpose to philosophize upon the war, but I cannot refrain
from expressing my profound thankfulness that Providence has spared me to
such time as I can see the asperities of the great conflict softened, its
passions entering upon the sleep of oblivion, only its nobler--if less
immediate--results springing into virile and vast life. I believe there is
to-day, _because of the war_, a broader and deeper patriotism in all
Americans; that patriotism throbs the heart and pulses the being as
ardently of the South Carolinian as of the Massachusetts Puritan; that the
Liberty Bell, even now, as I write, on its Southern pilgrimage, will be as
reverently received and as devotedly loved in Atlanta and Charleston as in
Philadelphia and Boston. And to stimulate and evolve this noble sentiment
all the more, what we need is the resumption of fraternity, the hearty
restoration and cordial cultivation of neighborly, brotherly relations,
faith in Jehovah, and respect for each other; and God grant that the happy
vision that delighted the soul of the sweet singer of Israel may rest like
a benediction upon the North and the South, upon the Blue and the Gray.
The spirit in which this work has been conceived, and in which I have
conscientiously labored to carry it out, is one of sincerity and fairness.
As an actor in, and an eyewitness of, the events of 1861-65, I have
endeavored to perform my humble share of duty in passing the materials of
history to those who may give them place in the records of the
nation,--not of the South nor of the North,--but in the history of the
United Nation. It is with such magnified view of the responsibility of
saying the truth that I have written.
I yield to no one as a champion of the Southern soldier wherever he may
have fought and in whatever army, and I do not think I shall be charged
more now than in war-time with "underestimating the enemy." Honor to all!
If I speak with some particularity of the First Corps of the Army of
Northern Virginia, it must be ascribed in part to the affection of a
commander, and in part to my desire to relieve its brave officers and men
in the ranks from unjust aspersions. After General Lee's death, various
writers on the Southern cause combined with one accord to hold the First
Corps and its commander responsible for all adversity that befell the
army. I being under the political ban, and the political passions and
prejudices of the times running high, they had no difficulty in spreading
their misrepresentations South and North until some people, through their
mere reiteration, came to accept them as facts. I simply present the facts
concerning the First Corps in all fulness and fairness, attested by
indisputable authorities, that the public may judge between it and its
detractors.
In the accounts of battles and movements, the official War Records supply
in a measure the place of lost papers, and afford a great mass of most
trustworthy statistics. I am under obligations to General E. P. Alexander,
General G. M. Sorrel, Colonel Osman Latrobe, Colonel J. W. Fairfax,
Colonel T. J. Goree, Colonel Erasmus Taylor, and Colonel J. C. Haskell for
many interesting suggestions.
To Major George B. Davis and Mr. L. J. Perry, of the War Records office, I
am under obligations for invaluable assistance; as also to Mr. Alfred
Matthews, of Philadelphia, for material aid in revising the manuscript of
these memoirs.
THE AUTHOR.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
THE ANTE-BELLUM LIFE OF THE AUTHOR.
Birth--Ancestry--School-Boy Days--Appointment as Cadet at the
United States Military Academy--Graduates of Historic Classes--
Assignment as Brevet Lieutenant--Gay Life of Garrison at
Jefferson Barracks--Lieutenant Grant's Courtship--Annexation
of Texas--Army of Observation--Army of Occupation--Camp Life in
Texas--March to the Rio Grande--Mexican War 13
CHAPTER II.
FROM NEW MEXICO TO MANASSAS.
The War-Cloud--The Journey Northward--Appointed
Brigadier-General--Report to General Beauregard--Assigned to
Command at the Scene of the First Conflict--Personnel of the
Confronting Forces--Description of the Field of Manassas, or
Bull Run--Beauregard and McDowell of the same West Point
Class--Battle of Blackburn's Ford--Early's Mistake--Under Fire
of Friend and Foe 29
CHAPTER III.
BATTLE OF MANASSAS, OR BULL RUN.
Commanders on both Sides generally Veterans of the Mexican
War--General Irvin McDowell's Preconceived Plan--Johnston
reinforces Beauregard and approves his Plans--General Bernard
E. Bee--Analysis of the Fight--Superb Work of the Federal
Artillery--Christening of "Stonewall Jackson"--McDowell's
Gallant Effort to recover Lost Power--Before he was shorn of
his Artillery he was the Samson of the Field--The Rout--
Criticism of McDowell--Tyler's Reconnoissance--Ability of the
Commanding Generals tested 42
CHAPTER IV.
THE CONFEDERATES HOVERING AROUND WASHINGTON.
An Early War-Time Amenity--The Author invited to dine with the
Enemy--"Stove-pipe Batteries"--J. E. B. Stuart, the Famous
Cavalryman--His Bold Dash on the Federals at Lewinsville--
Major-General G. W. Smith associated with Johnston and
Beauregard in a Council--Longstreet promoted Major-General--
Fierce Struggle at Ball's Bluff--Dranesville a Success for the
Union Arms--McClellan given the Sobriquet of "The Young
Napoleon" 59
CHAPTER V.
ROUND ABOUT RICHMOND.
The Defences of the Confederate Capital--Army of Northern
Virginia at Centreville--Aggressive Action--Council with the
President and Secretary of War--Mr. Davis's High Opinion of
McClellan--Operations on the Peninsula--Engagements about
Yorktown and Williamsburg--Severe Toil added to the Soldiers'
Usual Labors by a Saturated Soil 64
CHAPTER VI.
THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.
The Attack on Fort Magruder--Hancock occupies Two Redoubts--The
Slaughter in Early's Brigade--The Fifth North Carolina Regiment
and Twenty-Fourth Virginia mercilessly exposed--A Hard-Fought
Engagement--A Confederate Victory--McClellan not on the Field
the Greater Part of the Day--Hancock called "The Superb" by
McClellan--Johnston pays High Tribute to Longstreet 72
CHAPTER VII.
SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS.
A New Line of Defence--Positions of the Confronting Armies--
Fitz-John Porter--Terrific Storm on the Eve of Battle--General
Johnston's Orders to Longstreet, Smith, and Huger--Lack of
Co-operation on the Confederate Side, and Ensuing Confusion--
Fatalities among Confederate Officers--Kearny's Action--Serious
Wounding of General Johnston at the Close of the Battle--
Summary and Analysis of Losses 81
CHAPTER VIII.
SEQUELAE OF SEVEN PINES.
The Forces under Command of G. W. Smith after Johnston was
wounded--The Battle of the 1st--Longstreet requests
Reinforcements and a Diversion--Council held--McLaws alone
sustains Longstreet's Opposition to retiring--Severe Fighting--
Pickett's Brave Stand--General Lee assigned to Command--He
orders the withdrawal of the Army--Criticism of General Smith--
Confederates should not have lost the Battle--Keyes's
Corroboration 103
CHAPTER IX.
ROBERT E. LEE IN COMMAND.
The Great General's Assignment not at first assuring to the
Army--Able as an Engineer but limited as to Field Service--He
makes the Acquaintance of his Lieutenants--Calls a Council--
Gains Confidence by saying Nothing--"A Little Humor now and
then"--Lee Plans a Simultaneous Attack on McClellan's Front and
Rear--J. E. B. Stuart's Daring Reconnoissance around the Union
Army 112
CHAPTER X.
FIGHTING ALONG THE CHICKAHOMINY.
Retreat--Lee's Bold Initiative--Lee and his Lieutenants
planning Battle--The Confederates' Loss at Mechanicsville--
Gaines's Mill--A. P. Hill's Fight--Longstreet's Reserve
Division put in--McClellan's Change of Base--Savage Station--
Longstreet engages McClellan's Main Force at Frayser's Farm (or
Glendale)--President Davis on the Field--Testimony of Federal
Generals--Fierce Bayonet Charges--"Greek meets Greek"--Capture
of General McCall--McClellan's Masterly Retreat 120
CHAPTER XI.
BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.
Last Stand in the Great Retreat--Strength of McClellan's
Position--The Confederates make Poor Use of their Artillery--A
Mistake and Defeat for Lee's Army--The Campaign as a Whole a
Great Success, but it should have been far greater--McClellan's
Retreat showed him well equipped in the Science of War--Review
of the Campaign--Jackson's and Magruder's Misunderstanding--
Moral Effect of the Gunboats on the James River--"There should
be a Gunboat in Every Family" 141
CHAPTER XII.
HALLECK AND POPE IN FEDERAL COMMAND.
Centres of Activity gravitate towards Orange and Culpeper
Counties--Pope's Unsoldierly Preliminary Orders--Jackson's and
Pope's Encounter at Cedar Mountain--Confidence in and Esteem
for General Lee--The Confederate Commander's Plans for cutting
off Pope miscarry--Capture of Captain Fitzhugh with Important
Orders--Longstreet puts General Toombs under Arrest--General
Pope withdraws 153
CHAPTER XIII.
MAKING READY FOR MANASSAS AGAIN.
General Lee modifies his Order of March--Continuous
Skirmishing--Cavalry Commander Stuart gets into General Pope's
Head-quarters and captures his Personal Equipment--His Uniform
Coat and Hat shown along the Confederate Lines--Jackson's
Superb Flank Movement--Confederates capture Trains, Supplies,
Munitions, and Prisoners--Hooker and Ewell at Bristoe Station--
Jackson first on the Old Field of Bull Run--Longstreet's
Command joins passing Thoroughfare Gap--Pope practically throws
Responsibility for Aggressive Action on McDowell--Preliminary
Fighting--General Pope surprised by Jackson--Pope's Orders to
Fitz-John Porter 163
CHAPTER XIV.
SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS (BULL RUN).
Battle opened by the Federals on Jackson's Right, followed by
Kearny--Longstreet's Reconnoissance--Stuart, the Cavalry
Leader, sleeps on the Field of Battle--Pope thought at the
Close of the 29th that the Confederates were retreating--Second
Day--Fitz-John Porter struck in Flank--Longstreet takes a Hand
in the Fight late in the Day--Lee under Fire--The Federal
Retreat to Centreville--That Point turned--Pope again
dislodged--"Stonewall" Jackson's Appearance and Peculiarities--
Killing of "Fighting Phil" Kearny--Losses--Review of the
Campaign 180
CHAPTER XV.
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.
General Lee continues Aggressive Work--From Foraged Fields of
Virginia into a Bounteous Land--Longstreet objected to the
Movement on Harper's Ferry--Lee thinks the Occasion Timely for
Proposal of Peace and Independence--Confederates singing
through the Streets of Fredericktown--McClellan's Movements--
Cautious Marches--Lee's Lost Order handed to the Federal Chief
at Frederick 199
CHAPTER XVI.
"THE LOST ORDER"--SOUTH MOUNTAIN.
How the Federals found the Despatch--With every Advantage
McClellan "made haste slowly"--Lee turns back to meet him at
South Mountain--Longstreet preferred that the Stand should be
made at Sharpsburg--The Battle at the Pass--Many killed--
General Garland of the Confederate and General Reno of the
Union Side--A Future President among the Wounded--Estimate of
Forces engaged 212
CHAPTER XVII.
PRELIMINARIES OF THE GREAT BATTLE.
Confederates retreat from South Mountain--Federals follow and
harass them--Franklin and Cobb at Crampton's Pass--A Spirited
Action--Fighting around Harper's Ferry--Its Capitulation--The
Confederates take Eleven Thousand Prisoners--Jackson rejoins
Lee--Description of the Field of Antietam--McClellan posts his
Corps--Lee's Lines advantageously placed--Hooker's Advance on
the Eve of Battle should have been resisted 227
CHAPTER XVIII.
BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM.
Bloodiest Single Day of the War--Comparison of Casualties--
Hooker opens the Fight against Jackson's Centre--Many Officers
among the Fallen early in the Day--McLaws and Walker in time to
meet Sumner's Advance under Sedgwick--Around Dunker Chapel--
Richardson's Splendid Advance against the Confederate Centre
the Signal of the Bursting of another Storm--Longstreet's and
D. H. Hill's Troops stood before it--Fall of General G. B.
Anderson--General Richardson mortally wounded--Aggressive
Spirit of his Command broken--Wonderful Cannon-shot--General
D. H. Hill's Third Horse killed under him 239
CHAPTER XIX.
BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG, OR ANTIETAM (CONTINUED).
Closing Events of the Great Struggle--Burnside crosses the
Bridge he made famous--Toombs made Gallant Defence, but was
outnumbered and dislodged--The Confederate Brigades from
Harper's Ferry under A. P. Hill in Time for the Final Crisis--
Burnside's Advance arrested by them--The Battle against
Burnside "appeared to spring from the Earth"--"Lee's old War
Horse"--The Killing of a Kinsman at the Bridge seriously
affects General D. R. Jones--The Sharp Fight at Shepherdstown--
Confederates retreat--Casualties of the Battle--Confederate
Losses in the Campaign--Neither McClellan's Plan nor Execution
was strong 256
CHAPTER XX.
REVIEW OF THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.
Confederate Expectations--General Lee's Salutatory to the
People of Maryland--The "Lost Despatch"--McClellan's
Movements--Turn in the Tide of War--A Miracle great as the
throwing down of the Walls of Jericho--In Contempt of the Enemy
the Confederate Army was dispersed--Harper's Ferry a
"Man-Trap"--It diverted the Army from the Main Issue--Lee and
McClellan compared and contrasted--Tribute to the Confederate
Private Soldier 279
CHAPTER XXI.
REORGANIZATION AND REST FOR BOTH ARMIES.
The Confederates appoint Seven Lieutenant-Generals--The Army of
Northern Virginia organized in Corps--General McClellan
relieved, and General Burnside appointed Commander of the Army
of the Potomac--A Lift for the South--McClellan was growing--
Burnside's "Three Grand Divisions"--The Campaign of the
Rappahannock--Getting Ready for Fredericksburg--Longstreet
occupies Fredericksburg--The Town called to surrender by
General Sumner--Exodus of the Inhabitants under a Threat to
shell the Town 290
CHAPTER XXII.
BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.
Description of the Field--Marye's Heights--Position of the
Troops of Longstreet's Command--General Jackson called down
from Orange Court-House, and Preparations made for a Determined
Stand--Signal Guns at Three o'clock in the Morning announce the
Long-Expected Battle--Burnside's Bridge-Builders thrice driven
back from their Work--The Crossing finally made by Boats--
Federals under Hot Fire enter Fredericksburg--How they obtained
their Foothold on the West Bank of the Rappahannock--Gallant
Officers and Men--Ninety-seven killed or wounded in the Space
of Fifty Yards--General Burnside's Plan of Battle--Strength of
the Contending Forces 297
CHAPTER XXIII.
BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG (CONTINUED).
The Battle-field veiled by a Heavy Fog--Terrific Fighting of
the 13th of December--Forlorn Hope of the Federals--General
Meade's Division of Franklin's Command makes the First
Advance--General French leads against the Confederate Left--
Hancock follows--General Cobb killed--The Sunken Road and Stone
Wall below Marye's Hill--Desperate Advances and Determined
Repulses--Humphreys's Heroic Assault--The Stone Wall "a Sheet
of Flame"--General Jackson loses his Opportunity to advance--
The Charge of Meade's Divisions compared with that of Pickett,
Pettigrew, and Trimble's Columns at Gettysburg--Forty Per Cent.
killed in charging Lines here, and Sixty Per Cent. at
Gettysburg--Total Losses--Peace to be declared because Gold had
gone to 200--Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia 306
CHAPTER XXIV.
PREPARING FOR THE SPRING OF '63.
Burnside's Abortive Moves--The "Mud March"--General Hooker
supersedes Burnside--The Confederates strengthen their Position
for the Winter--Longstreet ordered to Petersburg--Secretary of
War Seddon and the Author talk of General Grant and the
Confederate Situation on the Mississippi and in the West--
Longstreet makes a Radical Proposition for Confederate
Concentration in Tennessee, thus to compel Grant to abandon
Vicksburg--The Skilful Use of Interior Lines the Only Way of
equalizing the Contest--Battle of Chancellorsville, Lee's
Brilliant Achievement--Criticism--Death of "Stonewall"
Jackson--The Resolve to march Northward--The Army reorganized
in Three Corps--Ewell and A. P. Hill appointed
Lieutenant-Generals 322
CHAPTER XXV.
INVASION OF PENNSYLVANIA.
Plan of the Confederate March North--General Lee hoped to draw
Troops from the South and develop Important Results North of
the Potomac--He wanted Beauregard sent to support the
Movement--The Authorities in Richmond failed to comprehend--The
Value of the "Interior Lines" not appreciated--Spirited Cavalry
Fight at Brandy Station between Stuart's and Pleasonton's
Commands--Engagement of Ewell and Milroy at Winchester--The
Question of Authority for the Cavalry Movements--
Lieutenant-Colonel Fremantle of the Coldstream Guards, British
Army, as a Guest and Observer--The Confederate Advance reaches
Pennsylvania Soil--General Lee issues Orders for a March on
Harrisburg--Municipal Authorities of York and Gettysburg
surrender to General John B. Gordon 334
CHAPTER XXVI.
GETTYSBURG--FIRST DAY.
Information of Federal Force and Positions brought by the Scout
Harrison--General Lee declines to credit it--General Longstreet
suggests a Change of Direction in Conformance with the
Revelation--General Meade had succeeded Hooker in Command Five
Days before Battle--Positions on the Eve of the First Day--
Confederate Cavalry "not in sight"--"The Eyes of the Army"
sadly needed--A Description of the Famous Battle-field--
Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill engage the Federals--Death of
General John F. Reynolds--The Fight on Seminary Ridge--General
Hancock in Federal Command on the Field--Concerning the Absent
Cavalry and Information given by the Scout--Conditions at the
Close of the First Day's Fight 346
CHAPTER XXVII.
GETTYSBURG--SECOND DAY.
The Confederate Commander reviews the Field and decides on Plan
of Battle--Positions on the Morning of July 2--Night March of
the Federal Sixth Corps--It was excelled by Law's Brigade of
Confederates--The Battle was opened after Mid-day--General Hood
appeals for Permission to turn the Federal Left--Failure to
make the Flanking Movement by the Confederate Right was a
Serious Mistake--Hood, in his usual Gallant Style, led his
Troops forward among the Rocks--Desperate Charges against an
Earnest Adversary--Hood wounded--General Law succeeds him in
command of the Division--"Little Round Top" an Important
Point--"The Citadel of the Field"--It was a Fight of Seventeen
Thousand Confederates against twice their Number--Quiet along
the Lines of other Confederate Commands--"A Man on the Left who
didn't care to make the Battle win"--Evidence against the
Alleged Order for "Battle at Sunrise"--The "Order" to Ewell was
Discretionary--Lee had lost his Balance 362
CHAPTER XXVIII.
GETTYSBURG--THIRD DAY.
The Stroke of Arms that shook the Continent--Longstreet opposed
the Attack as planned and made--The Confederate Column of
Assault--It was weak in Numbers but strong in Spirit--
Tremendous Artillery Combat begins the Day's Fighting--Charge
of Generals Pickett, Trimble, and Pettigrew--Armistead falls by
the Side of the Federal Guns--The Federal Cavalry Charge of
General Farnsworth--The Commander falls with Five Mortal
Wounds--Could the Assaulting Column have been safely augmented
from Longstreet's Right?--Testimony as to that Point--Where
rested the Responsibility for Disaster?--Criticism of the
Battle as a Whole--Cemetery Hill stronger than Marye's Hill at
Fredericksburg--Controverted Points--Casualties of the Three
Days' Fight--Organization of the Forces engaged 385
CHAPTER XXIX.
THE WAVE ROLLS BACK.
Confederates retreat from Gettysburg--The Federals pursue--
Crossing the Potomac under Difficulties--Kilpatrick's Cavalry
Dash on Pettigrew's Command--General Lee thought to rest his
Army in the Valley of Virginia, but Meade followed too fast--
Engagements that harassed the Retreat--General Lee wished to be
relieved of Command, but President Davis would not consent to
the Appointment of Joseph E. Johnston or General Beauregard 426
CHAPTER XXX.
LONGSTREET MOVES TO GEORGIA.
The Author reverts to the Perils and Opportunities in the
West--Proposes to the Secretary of War to reinforce against
Rosecrans from the Army of Northern Virginia--Makes Plan known
to General Lee--The Move finally effected--Difficulties of
Transportation--A Roundabout Route--General Longstreet narrowly
escapes capture when seeking Bragg's Head-quarters--General
Bragg assigns Longstreet to Command of the Left--Instructions
for the Battle of Chickamauga--The Armies in Position--Federals
in Command of Generals Rosecrans, Crittenden, McCook, and
George H. Thomas 433
CHAPTER XXXI.
BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.
Tactical Features--The Battle opened by Direct Attack on the
Federals in the Early Morning of September 20--Repeated and
Determined Front Assaults--Brigadiers Helm killed and Adams
wounded--The Union Commands lay behind Defences--Hood's
Brigades surged through the Forest against the Covered Infantry
and Artillery--Hood wounded--Longstreet suggests a Plan for
Progressive Action--Halting Tactics at High Tide of Success--
The Confederate Left fought a Separate Battle--General Thomas
retreats--First Confederate Victory in the West, and one of the
Bloodiest Battles of the War--Forces engaged--Losses 445
CHAPTER XXXII.
FAILURE TO FOLLOW SUCCESS.
Longstreet differs with General Bragg as to Movements of
Pursuit--The Confederates on Lookout Mountain--Federals gain
Comfortable Positions around it--Superior Officers of Bragg's
Command call for his Removal--Bragg seeks Scapegoats--President
Davis visits the Army--Tests the Temper of the Officers towards
Bragg--He offers the Command to Longstreet--He declines--His
Reasons--General Bragg ignores Signal-Service Reports and is
surprised--General Joe Hooker's Advance--Night Attack on
Lookout Mountain--Colonel Bratton's Clever Work--Review of the
Western Movement and Combination--It should have been effected
in May instead of September--Inference as to Results had the
First Proposition been promptly acted upon 461
CHAPTER XXXIII.
THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN.
General Bragg's Infatuation--General Grant in Command of the
Federal Forces--Longstreet ordered into East Tennessee--His
Plans for the Campaign--Poorly supported by his Superior--
Foraging for Daily Rations--General Burnside's Forces--Advance
upon Knoxville--Affairs at Lenoir's and Campbell's Stations--
Engagement near Knoxville an Artillery Combat--Reprehensible
Conduct of Officers--Allegement that One was actuated by
Jealousy--Federals retire behind their Works--Laying the
Confederate Lines about Knoxville 480
CHAPTER XXXIV.
BESIEGING KNOXVILLE.
Closing on the Enemy's Lines--A Gallant Dash--The Federal
Positions--Fort Loudon, later called Fort Sanders--Assault of
the Fort carefully planned--General McLaws advises Delay--The
Order reiterated and emphasized--Gallant Effort by the Brigades
of Generals Wofford, Humphreys, and Bryan at the Appointed
Time--A Recall ordered, because carrying the Works was reported
impossible--General Longstreet is ordered by the President to
General Bragg's Relief--Losses during the Assault and the
Campaign 497
CHAPTER XXXV.
CUT OFF FROM EAST AND WEST.
Impracticability of joining General Bragg--Wintering in East
Tennessee--General Longstreet given Discretionary Authority
over the Department by President Davis--Short Rations--Minor
Movements of Hide-and-Seek in the Mountains--Longstreet's
Position was of Strategic Importance--That Fact fully
appreciated by President Lincoln, Secretary Stanton, and
Generals Halleck and Grant--"Drive Longstreet out of East
Tennessee and keep him out"--Generals Robertson and McLaws--The
Charges against them and Action taken--Honorable Mention for
Courage and Endurance--The Army finally fares sumptuously on
the Fat Lands of the French Broad 509
CHAPTER XXXVI.
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE FIELD.
Longstreet again considers Relief from Service--General Grant
at Knoxville--Shoeless Soldiers leave Bloody Trails on Frozen
Roads--A Confederate Advance--Affair at Dandridge--Federals
retreat--Succession of Small Engagements--General Grant urges
General Foster's Army to the Offensive--General Foster
relieved--General Schofield in Command of Federals--General
Grant's Orders--General Halleck's Estimate of East Tennessee as
a Strategic Field--Affair of Cavalry--Advance towards
Knoxville--Longstreet's Command called back to Defensive for
Want of Cavalry 524
CHAPTER XXXVII.
LAST DAYS IN TENNESSEE.
Longstreet's Army at Bull's Gap--U. S. Grant made
Lieutenant-General--Richmond Authorities awake to the Gravity
of the Situation--Longstreet's Proposition for Campaign--
Approved by General Lee--Richmond Authorities fail to adopt
it--General Bragg's Plan--A Memorable and Unpleasant Council at
the Capital--Orders from President Davis--The Case of General
Law--Longstreet ordered to the Army of Northern Virginia--
Resolutions of Thanks from Confederate Congress 542
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS.
Campaign of 1864--General Grant in the Field--Strength of the
Armies--Their Positions--Description of the Wilderness--The
Battle opened--A Brisk Day's Fighting--Longstreet's Command
faces Hancock's on the Morning of the Second Day--An
Effective Flank Movement--General Wadsworth mortally wounded--
General Jenkins falls under Fire of Friends, and Longstreet is
seriously wounded--Carried from the Field on a Litter--Tribute
to General Jenkins--Criticism and Controversy 551
CHAPTER XXXIX.
AGAIN IN FRONT OF RICHMOND.
Longstreet absent on Leave, nursing his Wounds--Hears of the
Death of Cavalry Leader J. E. B. Stuart--Returns to Virginia--
Assigned to Command on the North Side of James River--Affair on
the Williamsburg Road--Lee's Apprehension of Grant's March into
Richmond--Closing Scenes of the Campaign of 1864 about the
Confederate Capital--General Benjamin F. Butler's Move against
Fort Fisher--Remote Effects on the Situation in Virginia 572
CHAPTER XL.
TALK OF PEACE.
Second Federal Move against Fort Fisher and Wilmington Harbor--
Confederate Disaffection--Act of Congress appointing a Supreme
Commander of the Armies--Montgomery Blair's Peace Conference--
Longstreet has a Meeting with General Ord, Commander of the
Army of the James--Military Convention proposed--Correspondence
between General Grant and General Lee--Longstreet's Suggestions
for Measures in the Critical Juncture near the Close of the War 582
CHAPTER XLI.
BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS.
Various Affairs of the Closing Campaign--The Massing of Grant's
Forces--Sortie against Fort Steadman--Captured but quickly
retaken--General Grant's Move around the Confederate Right--
General Lee anticipates with Aggressive Work--Sheridan makes
Battle with his Whole Force at Five Forks--Desperate Situation
of the Confederates--Disparity of Numbers--Splendid Stand and
Battle of Generals Pickett and Ransom--Colonel Pegram mortally
wounded--W. H. F. Lee, the "Noble Son of a Noble Sire"--Corse's
Division--Pickett's Generalship--Casualties 590
CHAPTER XLII.
PETERSBURG.
The Fierce Concerted Assault by the Federals--Death of A. P.
Hill--General Lee announces to Richmond Authorities that he
must retreat--Reception of the News by President Davis at
Church Service--Federals take Forts Gregg and Whitworth--The
Retreat harassed by Continuous Fighting--Longstreet saves High
Bridge, a Vital Point--Ewell and Others compelled to
surrender--General Mahone's Account of Interesting Scenes--
Magnitude of the Disaster--"Is the Army dissolving?"--General
Reed mortally wounded--Panic occurs, but Order is restored--
General Gregg and Part of his Cavalry Command captured by
Rosser and Mumford 603
CHAPTER XLIII.
APPOMATTOX.
Some of General Lee's Officers say to him that "Further
Resistance is Hopeless"--Longstreet does not approve--General
Grant calls for Surrender--"Not yet"--The Confederate Chieftain
asks Terms--His Response to his Officers as represented by
General Pendleton--Correspondence of Generals Lee and Grant--
Morning of April 9--General Lee rides to meet the Federal
Commander, while Longstreet forms the Last Line of Battle--
Longstreet endeavors to recall his Chief, hearing of a Break
where the Confederate Troops could pass--Custer demands
Surrender of Longstreet--Reminded of Irregularity, and that he
was "in the Enemy's Lines"--Meeting with General Grant--
Capitulation--Last Scenes 618
CHAPTER XLIV.
POST-BELLUM PENDANT.
Old Friends and their Kindness--General Grant--His
Characteristic Letter of Introduction to President Johnson--In
Business in New Orleans--Political Unfriendliness--Cause of
Criticism of Military Career--Appointed Surveyor of Customs--
The Old Nurse 632
APPENDIX.
Letters of General Robert E. Lee and General Longstreet 639
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
PAGE
General James Longstreet (1895) _Frontispiece._
Colonel John B. Richardson 37
Colonel T. J. Goree 47
General J. E. B. Stuart 60
General R. E. Lee 112
General Thomas J. Jackson 166
Battle at Thoroughfare Gap 174
Defeat of the Federal Troops by Longstreet's Corps (Second
Manassas) 188
General Lafayette McLaws 231
Colonel John W. Fairfax 250
The Battle of Antietam (Burnside's Bridge) 263
General James Longstreet (1862) 290
The Battle of Fredericksburg (from the Battery on Lee's Hill) 308
Colonel Osmun Latrobe 316
Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Lyon Fremantle 343
The Confederate Scout Harrison 346
Gettysburg (Second Day's Battle) 374
General E. P. Alexander 388
General George E. Pickett 392
William Blake 408
Retreat from Gettysburg (Accident during the Night-Crossing of the
Potomac on a Pontoon Bridge) 430
Colonel R. J. Moses 451
Battle of Chickamauga (Confederates flanking the Union Forces) 454
The Assault on Fort Sanders, Knoxville 506
General G. M. Sorrel 518
The Wounding of General Longstreet (Battle of the Wilderness) 564
Colonel Erasmus Taylor 572
General Charles W. Field 577
The Last Line of Battle (Appomattox) 624
Fac-simile of Letter from General R. E. Lee 638
LIST OF MAPS.
PAGE
First Battle of Bull Run 42
Battle of Seven Pines 96
Battle of Mechanicsville 124
Battle of Malvern Hill 142
Second Battle of Bull Run (Opening) 186
Second Battle of Bull Run (Nightfall) 196
Battle of Sharpsburg 246
Battle of Fredericksburg 298
Strategic Map of the Theatre of War, May, 1863 328
Battle of Gettysburg 362
Position of Confederate First Corps, Gettysburg, Third Day 399
Battle of Chickamauga 446
Confederates around Chattanooga 462
Siege of Knoxville 498
Battle of the Wilderness 556
Battle of Five Forks 601
FROM MANASSAS TO APPOMATTOX.
CHAPTER I.
THE ANTE-BELLUM LIFE OF THE AUTHOR.
Birth--Ancestry--School-Boy Days--Appointment as Cadet at the United
States Military Academy--Graduates of Historic Classes--Assignment as
Brevet Lieutenant--Gay Life of Garrison at Jefferson
Barracks--Lieutenant Grant's Courtship--Annexation of Texas--Army of
Observation--Army of Occupation--Camp Life in Texas--March to the Rio
Grande--Mexican War.
I was born in Edgefield District, South Carolina, on the 8th of January,
1821. On the paternal side the family was from New Jersey; on my mother's
side, from Maryland. My earliest recollections were of the Georgia side of
Savannah River, and my school-days were passed there, but the appointment
to West Point Academy was from North Alabama. My father, James Longstreet,
the oldest child of William Longstreet and Hannah Fitzrandolph, was born
in New Jersey. Other children of the marriage, Rebecca, Gilbert, Augustus
B., and William, were born in Augusta, Georgia, the adopted home. Richard
Longstreet, who came to America in 1657 and settled in Monmouth County,
New Jersey, was the progenitor of the name on this continent. It is
difficult to determine whether the name sprang from France, Germany, or
Holland. On the maternal side, Grandfather Marshall Dent was first cousin
of John Marshall, of the Supreme Court. That branch claimed to trace their
line back to the Conqueror. Marshall Dent married a Magruder, when they
migrated to Augusta, Georgia. Father married the eldest daughter, Mary
Ann.
Grandfather William Longstreet first applied steam as a motive power, in
1787, to a small boat on the Savannah River at Augusta, and spent all of
his private means upon that idea, asked aid of his friends in Augusta and
elsewhere, had no encouragement, but, on the contrary, ridicule of his
proposition to move a boat without a pulling or other external power, and
especially did they ridicule the thought of expensive steam-boilers to be
made of iron. To obviate costly outlay for this item, he built boilers of
heavy oak timbers and strong iron bands, but the Augusta marines were
incredulous, as the following from the city papers of the times will
indicate:
"Can you row the boat ashore,
Billy boy, Billy boy;
Can you row the boat ashore,
Gentle Billy?
Can you row the boat ashore,
Without paddle or an oar,
Billy boy?"
Full of confidence, the inventor thought to appeal to the governor, and
his letter is still preserved in the State archives:
"AUGUSTA, GEORGIA, September 26, 1790.
"SIR,--I make no doubt but you have often heard of my steamboat, and
as often heard it laughed at, but in this I have only shared the fate
of other projectors, for it has uniformly been the custom of every
country to ridicule the greatest inventions until they had proved
their utility. In not reducing my scheme to active use it has been
unfortunate for me, I confess, and perhaps the people in general; but,
until very lately, I did not think that artists or material could be
had in the place sufficient. However, necessity, that grand mother of
invention, has furnished me with an idea of perfecting my plan almost
entirely of wooden material, and by such workmen as may be had here;
and, from a thorough confidence of its success, I have presumed to ask
your assistance and patronage. Should it succeed agreeably to my
expectations, I hope I shall discover that sense of duty which such
favors always merit; and should it not succeed, your reward must lay
with other unlucky adventures.
"For me to mention all of the advantages arising from such a machine
would be tedious, and, indeed, quite unnecessary. Therefore I have
taken the liberty to state, in this plain and humble manner, my wish
and opinion, which I hope you will excuse, and I shall remain, either
with or without your approbation,
"Your Excellency's most obedient and humble servant,
"WM. LONGSTREET.
"GOVERNOR TELFAIR."
He failed to secure the necessary aid, and the discovery passed into the
possession of certain New Yorkers, who found the means for practicable
application, and now steam is the goddess that enlightens the world.
My father was a planter. From my early boyhood he conceived that he would
send me to West Point for army service, but in my twelfth year he passed
away during the cholera epidemic at Augusta. Mother moved to North Alabama
with her children, whence in my sixteenth year I made application through
a kinsman, Congressman Reuben Chapman, for appointment as cadet, received
the coveted favor, and entered with the class that was admitted in 1838.
As cadet I had more interest in the school of the soldier, horsemanship,
sword exercise, and the outside game of foot-ball than in the academic
courses. The studies were successfully passed, however, until the third
year, when I failed in mechanics. When I came to the problem of the
pulleys, it seemed to my mind that a soldier could not find use for such
appliances, and the pulleys were passed by. At the January examination I
was called to the blackboard and given the problem of the pulleys. The
drawing from memory of recitation of classmates was good enough, but the
demonstration failed to satisfy the sages of the Academic Board. It was
the custom, however, to give those who failed in the general examination
a second hearing, after all of the classes were examined. This gave me two
days to "cram" mechanics, and particularly on pulleys. But the professors
were too wily to introduce them a second time, and took me through a
searching examination of the six months' course. The bridge was safely
passed, however, and mechanics left behind. At the June examination, the
end of the academic year, I was called to demonstrate the pulleys. The
professor thought that I had forgotten my old friend the enemy, but I
smiled, for he had become dear to me,--in waking hours and in dreams,--and
the cadet passed easily enough for a maximum mark.
The cadets had their small joys and sometimes little troubles. On one
occasion a cadet officer reported me for disobedience of orders. As the
report was not true, I denied it and sent up witnesses of the occasion.
Dick Garnett, who fell in the assault of the 3d, at Gettysburg, was one
witness, and Cadet Baker, so handsome and lovable that he was called
Betsy, was the other. Upon overlooking the records I found the report
still there, and went to ask the superintendent if other evidence was
necessary to show that the report was not true. He was satisfied of that,
but said that the officer complained that I smiled contemptuously. As that
could only be rated as a single demerit, I asked the benefit of the smile;
but the report stands to this day, Disobedience of orders and _three_
demerits. The cadet had his revenge, however, for the superintendent was
afterwards known as _The Punster_.
There were sixty-two graduating members of the class of 1842, my number
being sixty. I was assigned to the Fourth United States Infantry as brevet
lieutenant, and found my company with seven others of the regiment at
Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, in the autumn of 1842.
Of the class graduating the year that we entered were G. T. Beauregard and
Irvin McDowell, who, twenty-three years later, commanded the hostile
armies on the plains of Manassas, in Virginia. Braxton Bragg and W. J.
Hardee were of the same class.
The head man of the next class (1839) was I. I. Stevens, who resigned from
the army, and, after being the first governor of Washington Territory,
returned to military service, and fell on the sanguinary field of
Chantilly on the 1st of September, 1862. Next on the class roll was Henry
Wager Halleck, who was commander-in-chief of the United States armies from
July, 1862, to March, 1864. W. T. Sherman and George H. Thomas, of the
Union army, and R. S. Ewell, of the Confederate army, were of the same
class (1840). The class of 1841 had the largest list of officers killed in
action. Irons, Ayers, Ernst, Gantt, Morris, and Burbank were killed in the
Mexican War. N. Lyon, R. S. Garnett, J. F. Reynolds, R. B. Garnett, A. W.
Whipple, J. M. Jones, I. B. Richardson, and J. P. Garesche fell on the
fields of the late war.
Of the class of 1842 few were killed in action, but several rose to
distinguished positions,--Newton, Eustis, Rosecrans, Lovell, Van Dorn,
Pope, Sykes, G. W. Smith, M. L. Smith, R. H. Anderson, L. McLaws, D. H.
Hill, A. P. Stewart, B. S. Alexander, N. J. T. Dana, and others.
But the class next after us (1843) was destined to furnish the man who was
to eclipse all,--to rise to the rank of general, an office made by
Congress to honor his services; who became President of the United States,
and for a second term; who received the salutations of all the powers of
the world in his travels as a private citizen around the earth; of noble,
generous heart, a lovable character, a valued friend,--Ulysses S. Grant.
I was fortunate in the assignment to Jefferson Barracks, for in those days
the young officers were usually sent off among the Indians or as near the
borders as they could find habitable places. In the autumn of 1842 I
reported to the company commander, Captain Bradford R. Alden, a most
exemplary man, who proved a lasting, valued friend. Eight companies of the
Third Infantry were added to the garrison during the spring of 1843, which
made garrison life and society gay for the young people and interesting
for the older classes. All of the troops were recently from service in the
swamps and Everglades of Florida, well prepared to enjoy the change from
the war-dance of the braves to the hospitable city of St. Louis; and the
graceful step of its charming belles became a joy forever.
Of the class of 1843, Ulysses S. Grant joined the Fourth Regiment as
brevet lieutenant, and I had the pleasure to ride with him on our first
visit to Mr. Frederick Dent's home, a few miles from the garrison, where
we first met Miss Julia Dent, the charming woman who, five years later,
became Mrs. Grant. Miss Dent was a frequent visitor at the garrison balls
and hops, where Lieutenant Hoskins, who was something of a tease, would
inquire of her if she could tell where he might find "the small lieutenant
with the large epaulettes."
In May, 1844, all of our pleasures were broken by orders sending both
regiments to Louisiana, near Fort Jessup, where with other troops we were
organized as "The Army of Observation," under General Zachary Taylor.
In March, 1845, I was assigned as lieutenant in the Eighth Regiment, and
joined my company at St. Augustine, Florida. The soldier's life of those
days was not encouraging to those of active aspirations; but influences
were then at work that were beginning to brighten the horizon a little.
The new republic of Texas was seeking annexation with the United States,
which would endanger the peace between them and the republic of Mexico.
Annexation of Texas became the supreme question of the canvass of 1844.
James K. Polk was the nominee of the Democratic and annexation party, and
Henry Clay was on the other side as the Whig nominee. Polk was elected,
and his party prepared to signalize its triumph by annexation as soon as
it came into power; but in the last days of President Tyler's
administration, through skilful management of Secretary of State John C.
Calhoun, joint resolutions of annexation were passed by both houses of
Congress, subject to concurrence of the Congress of the new republic.
Strange as it may seem, the resolutions that added to the territory of the
United States more than the New England and Middle States combined, and
which eventually led to extension to the Pacific coast and hundreds of
miles north, only passed the lower house by twenty-two majority, and the
Senate by a majority of two.
When the resolution was passed, the minister from Mexico to our
government, General Almonte, demanded his passports, and diplomatic
relations between the governments ceased. On July 4, 1845, the Texas
Congress accepted and ratified the resolutions of annexation by unanimous
vote, and Texas was a State of the Union.
General Taylor's little army of observation was ordered to Corpus Christi,
Texas, and became "The Army of Occupation." All other available forces
were ordered to join him, including General Worth and his forces in
Florida. At the time there were in the line of the army eight regiments of
infantry, four of artillery, and two of dragoons, stationed along the
northern frontier from Fort Kent in the northeast of Maine to the west end
of Lake Superior, and along the western frontier from Fort Snelling to
Fort Leavenworth, and southward to Fort Jessup in Louisiana.
By the middle of October, 1846, three thousand eight hundred and sixty men
of all arms had concentrated at Corpus Christi. Seven companies of the
Second Dragoons had marched from Fort Jessup to San Patricio on the Nueces
River, about twenty-eight miles up from Corpus Christi; the other three
companies were halted at San Antonio, Texas. Near our camps were extensive
plains well adapted to military manoeuvres, which were put to prompt use
for drill and professional instruction. There were many advantages too in
the way of amusement, game on the wild prairies and fish in the broad gulf
were plentiful, and there was the salt water for bathing. On one occasion
during the winter a violent north wind forced the waters over the beach,
in some places far enough to disturb our camps, and when they receded,
quantities of fish were found in the little puddles left behind, and
turtles more than enough to supply the army.
The officers built a theatre, depending upon their own efforts to
reimburse them. As there was no one outside the army except two rancheros
within a hundred miles, our dramatic company was organized from among the
officers, who took both male and female characters. In farce and comedy we
did well enough, and soon collected funds to pay for the building and
incidental expenses. The house was filled every night. General Worth
always encouraging us, General Taylor sometimes, and General Twiggs
occasionally, we found ourselves in funds sufficient to send over to New
Orleans for costumes, and concluded to try tragedy. The "Moor of Venice"
was chosen, Lieutenant Theoderic Porter[1] to be the Moor, and Lieutenant
U. S. Grant to be the daughter of Brabantio. But after rehearsal Porter
protested that male heroines could not support the character nor give
sentiment to the hero, so we sent over to New Orleans and secured Mrs.
Hart, who was popular with the garrisons in Florida. Then all went well,
and life through the winter was gay.
Formal diplomatic relations between the republics were suspended, but
quasi negotiations were continued, seeking a course by which war might be
averted. The authorities of Mexico were not averse to the settlement
according to the claims of Texas,--the Rio Grande frontier,--but the
political affairs of the country were such that they could not agree.
Excitement in the United States increased as the suspense continued. But
the authorities, having confidence in their negotiations or wishing to
precipitate matters, ordered General Taylor to march across to the Rio
Grande at Matamoras in the spring of 1846. The execution of the order
precipitated war.
The move from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande made necessary a change of
base from St. Joseph's Island to Point Isabel and Brazos Santiago, near
the mouth of the Rio Grande. Supplies were sent by sea, under charge of
Major Munroe, with a siege train and field battery, and the army took up
its march on the 9th of March, 1846, the advance under General Twiggs,
consisting of the dragoons and Ringgold's field battery. The army was well
instructed, under good discipline, and fully prepared for field work, the
weather was fine, and the firm turf of the undulating prairies made the
march easy. Wild horses and cattle, and deer and antelope, were often seen
in the distance as they scampered away to hide themselves. On the 19th the
head of the column approached Arroyo Colorado, one hundred and thirty
miles from Corpus Christi. The arroyo was about three feet deep, of salt
water. Mexican lancers were on the southern side, and gave notice that
they had orders to resist our further advance. On the 21st the army was up
and deployed along the high banks of the arroyo, the field batteries in
position. General Worth was ordered to make the crossing, and rode at the
head of the column. We looked with confidence for a fight and the flow of
blood down the salt water before we could cross, but the Mexicans had no
artillery, and could not expose their cavalry to the fire of our
batteries; they made their formal protest, however, that the crossing
would be regarded as a declaration of war.
On the 24th of March the column reached the road leading from Point Isabel
to Matamoras. General Taylor ordered Worth to march the greater part of
the army towards Matamoras and halt at the first good camping-ground, and
rode towards Point Isabel to meet the detachment ordered there under Major
Munroe. He found them already landed, and the Mexicans fired their little
hamlets and fled. After ordering construction of protection for his
supplies and defensive works for the troops, General Taylor returned to
the army, and rode with General Worth towards the Rio Grande. As the army
approached the river the Mexicans on the Matamoras side made some display
of forces, manned their works on that side, and prepared to resist us,
under the impression that we would cross at once. General Worth was sent
over, and was met by General La Vega, on the part of General Mejia,
commanding on that side. He was told that Mexico had not declared war,
that the American consul was in the exercise of his functions; but Worth's
request to see the consul was refused, which was denounced as a
belligerent act, and he cautioned General La Vega against passing Mexicans
to the north side of the river.
Camps were pitched in range of the Mexican works about Matamoras, grounds
staked for constructing defensive works, and large details put out to work
on them. The Mexican forces at this time were three thousand, and they
were soon joined by two thousand more.
Political affairs with them were confused. President Herrera was thought
to favor the claims of Texas to the Rio Grande border. General Paredes
made pronunciamento, overthrew the president's government, and had
authority as war president. He sent General Ampudia to the frontier to
take charge, but the appointment was not satisfactory on the border, and
General Arista was assigned. There was discord over there between the
authorities and the generals, while General Taylor was too far from his
government to be bothered. His army was all that he could wish, except in
numbers.
Marauding parties came over occasionally and made trouble about the
ranches on the American side. One party killed Colonel Cross, our chief
quartermaster, on the 10th of April. Scouting parties were sent out to
look for the intruders. Lieutenant Theoderic Porter, in command of one
party, and one of his men were caught in ambush and killed. Captain
Walker, of the Texan Rangers, while out on a scout lost his camp guard of
five men, surprised and killed, and later Captains Thornton and Hardee, of
the dragoons, were met at Rancho Carricitos by a large cavalry force and
some infantry under General Torrijon, who took captive or killed the
entire party. Captains Thornton and Hardee and Lieutenant Kane were made
prisoners. The other commissioned officer of the command, George T. Mason,
of my class, refused to surrender; being a superior swordsman, he tried to
cut his way out, and was killed. This affair was taken as open war, and
General Taylor called on the governors of Texas and Louisiana--under his
authority from Washington--for volunteers of infantry and cavalry.
The capture of Thornton and Hardee created great excitement with the
people at home. Fanning's massacre and the Alamo at San Antonio were
remembered, and it was reported of General Ampudia, who on a recent
occasion had captured a general in Yucatan, that he boiled his head in
oil. So it was thought he would give no quarter; but in a day or two we
heard from the officers that they received great kindness from their
captors, and that General Ampudia had ordered that his government should
allow them their full pay and every liberty consistent with their
safe-keeping. They declined, however, to accept pay, and were held as the
guests of Generals Arista and Ampudia.
On the 1st of May our tents were struck, wagons parked, assembly sounded,
and the troops were under arms at three A.M., marched at four o'clock, and
bivouacked within ten miles of Point Isabel. No one was advised of the
cause of movements, but all knew that our general understood his business.
He had been informed that General Arista, with his movable forces, had
marched to Rancho de Longoreno, some leagues below us on the river,
intending to cross and cut us off from the base at Point Isabel. Major
Jacob Brown was left in charge of the works opposite Matamoras with the
Seventh Regiment of Infantry, Captain Sands's company of artillery, and
Bragg's field battery.
By some accident provision was not made complete for Arista to make prompt
crossing of the river, and that gave General Taylor time to reach his
base, reinforce it, and draw sufficient supplies. Advised of our move by
General Mejia, at Matamoras, General Arista was thrown into doubt as to
whether our move was intended for Matamoras, and sent back part of his
forces for its defence. Finding, however, that Taylor had gone to Point
Isabel, Arista crossed the river and put his line athwart our return march
at Palo Alto. To hasten Taylor's return, he ordered General Mejia, at
Matamoras, to open his batteries on our troops at Fort Brown, and make
serious demonstrations against them.
General Taylor started on his return on the 7th of May. We had heard the
artillery-fire upon comrades left at the forts, and were anxiously looking
for the order. It was received with cheers, and a good march was made, but
the night was awful. The mosquitoes seemed as thick as the blades of grass
on the prairie, and swarmed and buzzed in clouds, and packs of
half-famished wolves prowled and howled about us. There was no need for
the sound of reveille. The wolves and mosquitoes, and perhaps some solemn
thoughts, kept us on the _qui vive_. Arista's army was known to be in line
of battle only a few miles off. About one o'clock we halted to fill the
canteens, and marched to meet the enemy. The columns were
deployed,--Fifth Infantry on the right, Ringgold's battery, Third
Infantry, a two-gun battery of eighteen-pounders, the Fourth Infantry,
battalion of artillery acting as infantry, Duncan's field battery and
Eighth Infantry, Captains Charles May and Croghan Ker, with squadrons of
dragoons, looking to the trains; the Third and Fourth Infantry, the Third
Brigade, under Colonel John Garland. That brigade, with the Fifth
Regiment, the heavy guns, and Ringgold's, were of the right wing, General
Twiggs commanding. Other forces of the left were under Colonel William G.
Belknap, Eighth Infantry, and Duncan's Battery.
As the lines deployed, Lieutenant J. E. Blake, of the Topographical
Engineers, dashed forward alone, made a close inspection of the enemy's
line with such lightning speed that his work was accomplished before the
enemy could comprehend his purpose, rode back and reported to the
commanding general. He was one of the heroes of the day, but his laurels
were enjoyed only a few hours. As he took his pistol off at night he threw
it upon the ground, and an accidental explosion of one of the charges gave
him a mortal wound.
The line advanced until the puff of smoke from one of the enemy's guns
rose, and the ball bounded over the prairie, passed over our heads, and
wounded a teamster far in our rear. Our infantry was ordered down and our
artillery into practice. It was an artillery combat more than a battle,
and held until night. The Mexican cavalry made a charge against the Fifth
Regiment, and finding our front of square too strong repeated on another
front, but were repulsed. Presently the grass took fire, and the winds so
far favored us as to sweep the smoke in the enemy's faces, and when it
passed we found the Mexican line had been drawn back a little. May's
squadron was sent there, and General Taylor advanced the right of his
line, but night closed in before decisive work could be done. The armies
were near enough during the night to hear the moans of the wounded. Major
Ringgold was mortally wounded, also Captain John Page, of the Fourth
Infantry, but less than fifty of our troops were lost.
Early the next morning a few of the Mexican troops could be seen, but when
the sun rose to light the field it was found vacant. A careful
reconnoissance revealed that the enemy was in retreat, and the dragoons
reported them in march towards our comrades at Fort Brown.
General Taylor remained on the field a few hours to have the killed and
wounded of both sides cared for, but sent the dragoons, light infantry,
and Ringgold's battery in pursuit, the latter under Lieutenant Randolph
Ridgely. The light infantry was of two battalions, under Captain George A.
McCall and Captain C. F. Smith. The route of march was through a dense
chaparral on both sides of the road, the infantry finding their way as
best they could through the chaparral, the dragoons and Texas Rangers
moving on the road, and far off from our flanks, wherever they could find
ways of passage. The company to which I was attached was of Smith's
battalion, on the right of the road. After a considerable march the
battalion came to the body of a young Mexican woman. She had ceased to
breathe, but blood heat was still in her body, and her expression
life-like. A profusion of black hair covered her shoulders and person, the
only covering to her waist. This sad spectacle, so unlike our thoughts of
battle, unnerved us a little, but the crush through the thorny bushes soon
brought us back to thoughts of heavy work, and then came reports of
several guns and of grapeshot flying over our heads and tearing through
the wood. A reconnoissance found General Arista's army on the south bank
of a stream, Resaca de la Palma, which at this season had dried into
lagoons with intervening passes. The road crossed at a wide gap between
two extensive lagoons. The most of the enemy's artillery was near the
road, the infantry behind the lagoons, with improvised breast defences of
pack-saddles and other articles that could be found to stop musket-balls.
The lagoons were about a hundred feet wide and from two to three feet
deep.
The position was so strong that General Arista thought it would not be
attacked. He left General La Vega in command at the road, and made his
head-quarters some distance in rear, holding his cavalry in hand to look
for any flank move, unpacked his mule-train, and turned the animals out to
graze. General Taylor received reports of our adventures and
reconnoissance when he rode up, deployed his army for battle, and ordered
it forward. In the dense chaparral it was not possible to hold the
regiments to their lines, and in places the companies were obliged to
break files to get along. All of the enemy's artillery opened, and soon
his musketry. The lines closed in to short work, even to bayonet work at
places. Lieutenant-Colonel McIntosh had a bayonet thrust through his mouth
and neck.[2] Lieutenant R. M. Cochran, Fourth Regiment, and T. L.
Chadbourne, of the Eighth, were killed; C. R. Gates and C. D. Jordan, of
the Eighth, were severely wounded. The latter, a classmate, was
overpowered and about to be slaughtered when rescued by Lieutenant George
Lincoln, of the Eighth, who slew with his sword one of the assailants.
Finding the enemy's strong fight, in defence, by his artillery, General
Taylor ordered Captain May to charge and capture the principal battery.
The squadron was of his own and S. P. Graham's troops. The road was only
wide enough to form the dragoons in column of fours. When in the act of
springing to their work, Ridgely called, "Hold on, Charlie, till I draw
their fire," and loosed his six guns upon the battery at the road.
The return was prompt, but General Taylor, not noting the cause of delay,
repeated the order. Ridgely's work, however, was done, and May's spurs
pressing his horses had them on the leap before the order reached his
ears. In a minute he was at the guns sabring the gunners, and wheeling
right and left got possession of the batteries. General La Vega was found
at one of his batteries trying to defend it with his sword against one of
May's dragoons, but was forced to get in between the wheels of his guns to
avoid the horse's heels as they pressed him, when his rank was recognized
and he was called to surrender.
As May made his dash the infantry on our right was wading the lagoon. A
pause was made to dip our cups for water, which gave a moment for other
thoughts; mine went back to her whom I had left behind. I drew her
daguerreotype from my breast-pocket, had a glint of her charming smile,
and with quickened spirit mounted the bank in time to send some of the
mixed infantry troops to relieve May of his charge of the captive knight.
As a dragoon and soldier May was splendid. He stood six feet four without
boots, wore his beard full and flowing, his dark-brown locks falling well
over his shoulders. His appearance as he sat on his black horse Tom, his
heavy sabre over General La Vega, was grand and picturesque. He was
amiable of disposition, lovable and genial in character.
Not so grand of stature, or beard, or flowing locks, Randolph Ridgely was
as accomplished a soldier and as charming a companion,--a fitting
counterpart in spirit and dash.
I have gone thus far into the Mexican War for the opportunity to mention
two valued friends, whose memory returning refreshes itself. Many gallant,
courageous deeds have since been witnessed, but none more interesting than
Ridgely's call for the privilege to draw upon himself the fire that was
waiting for May.
CHAPTER II.
FROM NEW MEXICO TO MANASSAS.
The War-Cloud--The Journey Northward--Appointed
Brigadier-General--Report to General Beauregard--Assigned to Command
at the Scene of the First Conflict--Personnel of the Confronting
Forces--Description of the Field of Manassas, or Bull Run--Beauregard
and McDowell of the same West Point Class--Battle of Blackburn's
Ford--Early's Mistake--Under Fire of Friend and Foe.
I was stationed at Albuquerque, New Mexico, as paymaster in the United
States army when the war-cloud appeared in the East. Officers of the
Northern and Southern States were anxious to see the portending storm pass
by or disperse, and on many occasions we, too, were assured, by those who
claimed to look into the future, that the statesman would yet show himself
equal to the occasion, and restore confidence among the people. Our mails
were due semi-monthly, but during winter seasons we were glad to have them
once a month, and occasionally had to be content with once in six weeks.
When mail-day came the officers usually assembled on the flat roof of the
quartermaster's office to look for the dust that in that arid climate
announced the coming mail-wagon when five or ten miles away; but affairs
continued to grow gloomy, and eventually came information of the attack
upon and capture of Fort Sumter by the Confederate forces, which put down
speculation and drew the long-dreaded line.
A number of officers of the post called to persuade me to remain in the
Union service. Captain Gibbs, of the Mounted Rifles, was the principal
talker, and after a long but pleasant discussion, I asked him what course
he would pursue if his State should pass ordinances of secession and call
him to its defence. He confessed that he would obey the call.
It was a sad day when we took leave of lifetime comrades and gave up a
service of twenty years. Neither Union officers nor their families made
efforts to conceal feelings of deepest regret. When we drove out from the
post, a number of officers rode with us, which only made the last farewell
more trying.
Passing Fort Craig, on the opposite side of the Rio Grande, we pitched our
camp for the night. A sergeant of the Mounted Rifle Regiment came over to
see me, and stated that he was from Virginia, and thought that he could go
with us to his native State, and at the same time asked that several other
soldiers who wished to return to their States might go as my escort. I
explained that private soldiers could not go without authority from the
War Department; that it was different with commissioned officers, in that
the latter could resign their commissions, and when the resignations were
accepted they were independent of military authority, and could, as other
citizens, take such action as they might choose, but that he and his
comrades had enlisted for a specified term of years, and by their oaths
were bound to the term of enlistment; that I could not entertain the
proposition.
We stayed overnight at Fort Fillmore, in pleasant meeting with old
comrades, saddened by the reflection that it was the last, and a prelude
to occurrences that must compel the ignoring of former friendships with
the acceptance of opposing service.
Speaking of the impending struggle, I was asked as to the length of the
war, and said, "At least three years, and if it holds for five you may
begin to look for a dictator," at which Lieutenant Ryan, of the Seventh
Infantry, said, "If we are to have a dictator, I hope that you may be the
man."
My mind was relieved by information that my resignation was accepted, to
take effect on the 1st of June. In our travel next day we crossed the line
into the State of Texas. From the gloomy forebodings of old friends, it
seemed at El Paso that we had entered into a different world. All was
enthusiasm and excitement, and songs of "Dixie and the South" were borne
upon the balmy air. But the Texas girl did not ascend to a state of
incandescent charm until the sound of the first notes of "The Bonny Blue
Flag" reached her ear. Then her feet rose in gleeful springs, her limbs
danced, her hands patted, her eyes glowed, her lips moved, though she did
not care to speak, or listen to any one. She seemed lifted in the air,
thrilled and afloat, holding to the "Single Star" in joyful hope of
Southern rights.
Friends at El Paso persuaded me to leave my family with them to go by a
train that was to start in a few days for San Antonio, and to take the
faster route by stage for myself.
Our travelling companions were two young men, returning to their Northern
homes. The ride of our party of four (including the driver) through the
Indian country was attended with some risk, and required vigilance, to be
assured against surprise. The constant watchfulness and possible danger
over a five-hundred-miles travel drew us near together, and in closer
communion as to our identity and future movements, and suggested to the
young men that it would be best to put themselves under my care, trusting
that I would see them safely through the Confederate lines. They were of
the laboring class, and had gone South to find employment. They were
advised to be careful, and talk but little when among strangers. Nothing
occurred to cause apprehension until we reached Richmond, Texas, where, at
supper, I asked for a glass of milk, and was told there was none.
"What!" said one of my companions, "haven't the keows come up?"
Signal was telegraphed under the table to be on guard. The _nom de plume_
of the Texas bovine escaped attention, and it passed as an enjoyable
_lapsus linguae_.
At Galveston we took a small inland sailing-craft, but were a little
apprehensive, as United States ships were reported cruising outside in
search of all vessels not flying the Stars and Stripes. Our vessel,
however, was only boarded once, and that by a large Spanish mackerel that
made a misleap, fell amidships, and served our little company with a
pleasant dinner. Aboard this little vessel I first met T. J. Goree, an
intelligent, clever Texan, who afterwards joined me at Richmond, and
served in faithful duty as my aide-de-camp from Bull Run to Appomattox
Court-House.
At New Orleans, my companions found safe-conduct to their Northern lines,
and I journeyed on to Richmond. Relatives along the route, who heard of my
approach, met me at the stations, though none suggested a stop overnight,
or for the next train, but after affectionate salutations waved me on to
join "Jeff Davis, for Dixie and for Southern rights."
At every station old men, women, and children assembled, clapping hands
and waving handkerchiefs to cheer the passengers on to Richmond. On
crossing the Virginia line, the feeling seemed to culminate. The windows
and doors of every farm-house and hamlet were occupied, and from them came
hearty salutations that cheered us on to Richmond. The spirit electrified
the air, and the laborers of the fields, white and black, stopped their
ploughs to lift their hats and wave us on to speedy travel. At stations
where meals were served, the proprietors, in response to offers to settle,
said, "Meals for those going on to join Jeff Davis are paid."
On the 29th of June, 1861, I reported at the War Department at Richmond,
and asked to be assigned for service in the pay department, in which I had
recently served (for when I left the line service, under appointment as
paymaster, I had given up all aspirations of military honor, and thought
to settle down into more peaceful pursuits). On the 1st of July I
received notice of my appointment as brigadier-general, with orders to
report at Manassas Junction, to General Beauregard.
I reported on the 2d, and was assigned to command of the First, Eleventh,
and Seventeenth Regiments of Virginia Volunteers, to be organized as a
brigade. The regiments were commanded respectively by Colonels ---- Moore,
Samuel Garland, and M. D. Corse, all active, energetic, and intelligent
officers, anxious to acquire skill in the new service in which they found
themselves. Lieutenant Frank Armstead was assigned to duty at brigade
head-quarters, as acting assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Peyton
T. Manning as aide-de-camp. Dr. J. S. D. Cullen, surgeon of the First
Virginia Regiment, became medical director. The regiments were stationed
at Manassas Junction.
On the 6th they were marched out, formed as a brigade, and put through the
first lessons in evolutions of the line, and from that day to McDowell's
advance had other opportunities to learn more of the drill and of each
other. General Beauregard had previously settled upon the stream of Bull
Run as his defensive-aggressive line, and assigned his forces accordingly.
A brigade under Brigadier-General R. S. Ewell was posted at Union Mills
Ford, on the right of the Confederate lines; one under Brigadier-General
D. R. Jones at McLean's Ford; Brigadier-General Bonham's brigade was
placed on outpost duty at Fairfax Court-House with orders to retire, at
the enemy's approach, to Mitchell's Ford, and Brigadier-General P. St.
George Cocke was to hold the fords between Mitchell's and the Stone
Bridge, the latter point to be defended by a regiment and a battalion of
infantry, and a battery, under Brigadier-General N. G. Evans.
Between Mitchell's and McLean's Fords, and about half a mile from each, is
Blackburn's Ford. The guard at that point was assigned to my command,--the
Fourth Brigade,--which was ordered to be ready, at a moment's warning, to
march to position, and prepare for battle. In the mean time I was to study
the ground and familiarize myself with the surroundings and avenues of
approach and retreat. Bull Run rises from the foot-hills of the Blue Ridge
and flows southeast through deeps and shallows into the Potomac, about
forty miles south of Alexandria. The swell of the tide-waters up to Union
Mills gives it the depth and volume of water of a river. Blackburn's Ford
is in a great bend of the river, the north bank holding the concave of the
turn. On the convex side was a strip of alluvial soil about seventy feet
wide, covered by large forest-trees and some tangled undergrowth. Outside
and extending some three hundred yards from the edge of the woodland was
an arable field upon a pretty ascending plain, beyond which was a second
growth of pine and oak. On the north bank stood a bluff of fifteen feet,
overhanging the south side and ascending towards the heights of
Centreville. Below Blackburn's Ford the bluff extended, in more or less
ragged features, far down to the southeast. Just above my position the
bluff graded down in even decline to Mitchell's Ford, the position
assigned for Bonham's brigade, the latter being on the concave of the
river, six hundred yards retired from my left and at the crossing of the
direct road between Centreville and Manassas Junction. At the Junction
well-constructed battery epaulements were prepared for defence.
The bluff of the north bank was first designated as my most suitable
ground, and I was ordered to open the front, lay out and construct
trenches, to be concealed by green pine-boughs. The regiments were from
Richmond, Lynchburg, and Alexandria,--more familiar with the amenities of
city life than with the axe, pick, spade, or shovel. They managed,
however, to bring down as many as half a dozen spreading second-growth
pines in the course of two days' work, when General Beauregard concluded
that the advanced position of the brigade would mar his general plan, and
ordered the line to be taken along the river bank of the south side, under
the woodland, and close under the bluff, a position only approvable as
temporary under accepted rules of warfare, but this proved a favorable
exception between the raw forces of the contending armies. In addition to
the two brigades on my right, the Sixth Brigade, under Colonel Jubal A.
Early, was posted (with artillery) near the fords. As proximate but
separate commands, stood General Theo. Holmes, thirty miles off to the
right, with a brigade, a battery, and cavalry, at and about Acquia Creek,
and General J. E. Johnston, sixty miles away, over the Blue Ridge
Mountains. Holmes's should have been an outpost, but he had ranked
Beauregard in the old service, and as a point of etiquette was given a
separate command. Johnston's command should have been an outlying
contingent, but he had been assigned to the Shenandoah Valley when,
because threatened with immediate invasion, it was of first importance.
Beauregard was subsequently assigned to Manassas Junction, which, under
later developments, became the strategic point. As Johnston was his
senior, another delicate question arose, that was not solved until the
tramp of McDowell's army was heard on the Warrenton Turnpike.
The armies preparing for the first grand conflict were commanded by West
Point graduates, both of the class of 1838,--Beauregard and McDowell. The
latter had been assigned to command of the Federal forces at Washington,
south of the Potomac, in the latter part of May, 1861. The former had
assumed command of the Confederates at Manassas Junction about the 1st of
June.
McDowell marched on the afternoon of the 16th of July at the head of an
army of five divisions of infantry, supplemented by nine field batteries
of the regular service, one of volunteers, besides two guns operating
separately, and seven companies of regular cavalry. In his infantry
columns were eight companies of regulars and a battalion of marines, an
aggregate of thirty-five thousand men.
Beauregard stood behind Bull Run with seven brigades, including Holmes,
who joined on the 19th, twenty-nine guns, fourteen hundred cavalry,--an
aggregate of twenty-one thousand nine hundred men, all volunteers. To this
should be added, for the battle of the 21st, reinforcements aggregating
eight thousand five hundred men, under General Johnston, making the sum of
the aggregate, thirty thousand four hundred.
The line behind Bull Run was the best between Washington and the Rapidan
for strategy, tactics, and army supplies.
General Beauregard gave minute instructions to his brigade commanders of
his position and general plan, which in itself was admirable. Bonham was
to retire from Fairfax Court-House, as the enemy advanced, and take his
place behind Mitchell's Ford on the Centreville and Manassas Junction
road. It was proposed that he should engage his rear-guard so as to try to
bring on the battle against him, as he approached his crossing of Bull
Run, when the brigades along the Run on his right should cross, wheel to
the left and attack on the enemy's left and rear.
We had occasional glimpses behind the lines about Washington, through
parties who managed to evade the eyes of guards and sentinels, which told
of McDowell's work since May, and heard on the 10th of July that he was
ready to march. Most of us knew him and of his attainments, as well as of
those of Beauregard, to the credit of the latter, so that on that point we
were quite satisfied. But the backing of an organized government, and an
army led by the foremost American war-chief, that consummate
strategist, tactician, and organizer, General Scott, together with the
splendid equipment of the field batteries, and the presence of the force
of regulars of infantry, gave serious apprehension.
[Illustration: John B. Richardson. Captain Washington Artillery of New
Orleans; whose battery fired the first gun at Manassas, July, 1861, and
claims the last gun at Appomattox.]
On the 16th of July notice came that the advance of McDowell's army was
under definite orders for the next day. My brigade was at once ordered
into position at Blackburn's Ford, and all others were ordered on the
alert. Cocke's detachments were recalled from the fords between Mitchell's
and Stone Bridge, and Evans was left to hold the bridge. Bonham withdrew
from Fairfax Court-House as McDowell advanced. He retired behind the Run
at Mitchell's Ford, his vedettes following after exchanging shots with the
enemy's advance on the 18th. Early that morning a section of the
Washington Artillery was posted on a rear line behind Blackburn's Ford,
and trailed across towards the left, so as to flank fire against the
direct advance upon Bonham at Mitchell's Ford.
At eight o'clock A.M. on the 18th, McDowell's army concentrated about
Centreville, his immediate objective being Manassas Junction. From
Centreville the Warrenton Turnpike bears off a little south of west,
crossing Bull Run at Stone Bridge (four miles). The Manassas Junction road
due south crosses at Mitchell's Ford (three miles). Other farm roads
turned to the fords above and below Mitchell's. His orders to General
Tyler, commanding the advance division, were to look well to the roads on
the direct route to Manassas Junction and _via_ the Stone Bridge, to
impress an advance upon the former, but to have care not to bring on a
general engagement. At the same time he rode towards his left to know of
the feasibility of a turning move around the Confederates' right. There
were three moves by which it was supposed he could destroy the
Confederates,--first, by turning their right; second, by direct and
forcible march to the Junction; third, by turning their left. McDowell's
orders to his leading divisions indicated that he had settled down to a
choice as to the two opposite flanking moves; but to justify either he
must first test the feasibility of the direct route. The ride to his left
disclosed rough ground, rocky heights cut by streamlets, and covered by
heavy forest tangle, as formidable to military manoeuvres of raw troops as
armed battlements. According to preconceived plans, this eliminated the
question of the flanking move by the Confederate right.
Under the instructions, as General Tyler construed them, he followed the
Confederates to the heights of Centreville, overlooking the valley of Bull
Run, with a squadron of cavalry and two companies of infantry. From the
heights to the Run, a mile away, the field was open, and partially
disclosed the Confederate position on his right. On the left the view was
limited by a sparse growth of spreading pines. On the right was Mitchell's
Ford, on the left Blackburn's. To have a better knowledge of the latter,
he called up a brigade of infantry under General Richardson, Ayres's
battery of six field-guns, and two twenty-pound rifle guns under Benjamin.
The artillery was brought into action by the twenty-pound rifle guns, the
first shot aimed at the section of the Washington Artillery six-pounders
in rear of Blackburn's Ford, showing superior marksmanship, the ball
striking close beside the guns, and throwing the dust over the caissons
and gunners.
It was noticed that the enemy was far beyond our range, his position
commanding, as well as his metal, so I ordered the guns withdrawn to a
place of safety, till a fairer opportunity was offered them. The guns were
limbered and off before a second shot reached them. Artillery practice of
thirty minutes was followed by an advance of infantry. The march was made
quite up to the bluff overlooking the ford, when both sides opened fire.
The first pouring-down volleys were most startling to the new troops.
Part of my line broke and started at a run. To stop the alarm I rode with
sabre in hand for the leading files, determined to give them all that was
in the sword and my horse's heels, or stop the break. They seemed to see
as much danger in their rear as in front, and soon turned and marched back
to their places, to the evident surprise of the enemy. Heavy firing was
renewed in ten or fifteen minutes, when the Federals retired. After about
twenty minutes a second advance was made to the top of the bluff, when
another rousing fusillade followed, and continued about as long as the
first, with like result. I reinforced the front line with part of my
reserve, and, thinking to follow up my next success, called for one of the
regiments of the reserve brigade.
Colonel Hays, of the Seventh Louisiana Regiment, was sent, but was not in
time for the next attack. He was in position for the fourth, and did his
share in that fight. After the fourth repulse I ordered the advance, and
called for the balance of the reserve brigade. The Fourth Brigade, in
their drills in evolution, had not progressed as far as the passage of
defiles. The pass at the ford was narrow, unused, and boggy. The lagoons
above and below were deep, so that the crossing was intricate and slow.
Colonel Early came in with his other regiments, formed his line behind my
front, and was asked to hurry his troops to the front line, lest the next
attack should catch him behind us, when his raw men would be sure to fire
on the line in front of them. He failed to comprehend, however, and
delayed till the next attack, when his men promptly returned fire at
anything and everything before them. I thought to stop the fire by riding
in front of his line, but found it necessary to dismount and lie under it
till the loads were discharged. With the Federals on the bluff pouring
down their fire, and Early's tremendous fire in our rear, soldiers and
officers became mixed and a little confused. Part of my men got across the
Run and partially up the bluff of the enemy's side; a body of the Union
soldiers were met at the crest, where shots were exchanged, but passing
the Run, encountering the enemy in front, and receiving fire from our
friends in rear were not reassuring, even in handling veterans. The recall
was ordered as the few of the enemy's most advanced parties joined issue
with Captain Marye of my advance. Federal prisoners were brought in with
marks of burnt powder on their faces, and Captain Marye and some of his
men of the Seventeenth, who brought them in, had their faces and clothing
soiled by like marks. At the first moment of this confusion it seemed that
a vigorous pressure by the enemy would force us back to the farther edge
of the open field, and, to reach that stronger ground, preparations were
considered, but with the aid of Colonels Garland and Corse order was
restored, the Federals were driven off, and the troops better distributed.
This was the last effort on the part of the infantry, and was followed by
the Federal batteries throwing shot and shell through the trees above our
heads. As we were under the bluff, the fire was not annoying, except
occasionally when some of the branches of the trees were torn off and
dropped among us. One shot passed far over, and dropped in the house in
which General Beauregard was about to sit down to his dinner. The
interruption so annoyed him that he sent us four six-pound and three rifle
guns of the Washington Artillery, under Captain Eshleman, to return fire
and avenge the loss of his dinner. The guns had good cover under the
bluff, by pushing them as close up as would admit of effective fire over
it; but under tactical formation the limbers and caissons were so far in
rear as to bring them under destructive fire. The men, thinking it
unsoldier-like to flinch, or complain of their exposure, worked away very
courageously till the limbers and caissons were ordered forward, on the
right and left of the guns, to safer cover. The combat lasted about an
hour, when the Federals withdrew to their ground about Centreville, to
the delight of the Confederates. After this lively affair the report came
of a threatened advance off to our right. General Beauregard recalled
Early's command to its position in that quarter. He was ordered to march
to the right, under the bluff, so that his men could not come within range
of the batteries, but he chose to march back on the road leading directly
to the rear, when the dust of his columns drew fire of a battery, and
several damaging shots were thrown among his troops. The Confederate
losses were sixty-eight; Federal, eighty-three. The effect of this little
affair was encouraging to the Confederates, and as damaging to the
Federals. By the double action of success and failure the Confederate
infantry felt themselves christened veterans. The Washington Artillery was
equally proud of its even combat against the famed batteries of United
States regulars.
McDowell was disposed to ignore this fight as unwarranted under his
instructions, and not a necessary adjunct of his plans. His course and
that of the officers about him reduced the aggressive spirit of the
division commander to its minimum, and had some influence upon the troops
of the division. For battle at this time McDowell had 37,300[3] men and
forty-nine guns. Beauregard had 20,500[4] men and twenty-nine guns.
CHAPTER III.
BATTLE OF MANASSAS, OR BULL RUN.
Commanders on both Sides generally Veterans of the Mexican
War--General Irvin McDowell's Preconceived Plan--Johnston reinforces
Beauregard and approves his Plans--General Bernard E. Bee--Analysis of
the Fight--Superb Work of the Federal Artillery--Christening of
"Stonewall Jackson"--McDowell's Gallant Effort to recover Lost
Power--Before he was shorn of his Artillery he was the Samson of the
Field--The Rout--Criticism of McDowell--Tyler's
Reconnoissance--Ability of the Commanding Generals tested.
Before treating of future operations, I should note the situation of the
Confederate contingents in the Shenandoah Valley and at Acquia Creek. The
latter was ordered up to reinforce Beauregard as soon as the advance from
Washington took definite shape, and arrived as a supporting brigade to his
right on the 19th of July. At the same time orders were sent authorizing
Johnston's withdrawal from the Valley, to join with Beauregard for the
approaching conflict. The use of these contingents was duly considered by
both sides some days before the campaign was put on foot.
Opposing Johnston in the Valley was General Robert Patterson, of
Philadelphia, a veteran of the war of 1812 and of the Mexican War,
especially distinguished in the latter by the prestige of the former
service. Johnston was a veteran of the Mexican War, who had won
distinction by progressive service and was well equipped in the science of
war. Beauregard and McDowell were also veterans of the Mexican War, of
staff service, and distinguished for intelligent action and attainments,
both remarkable for physical as well as mental power.
[Illustration: BATTLE OF BULL RUN July 21st, 1861]
Between Johnston and Beauregard the Blue Ridge stretched out from the
Potomac southwest far below the southern line of Virginia, cut
occasionally by narrow passes, quite defensible by small bodies of
infantry and artillery. Patterson was ordered to hold Johnston in the
Valley, while McDowell should direct his strength against Beauregard.
McDowell seems to have accepted that order as not only possible, but sure
of success, while the Confederates viewed the question from the other
side, in a reverse light, and, as will presently appear, with better
judgment.
So far as it is possible to project a battle before reaching the field, it
seems that McDowell had concluded upon the move finally made before
setting out on his march from Washington. It was to give him an open
field, with superior numbers and appointments, and when successful was to
give him the approach to the base line of his adversary with fine
prospects of cutting off retreat. His ride to view the approaches of the
Confederate right on the morning of the 18th was made to confirm his
preconceived plan. The reconnoissance made by Tyler on the same morning
reinforced his judgment, so that the strategic part of the campaign was
concluded on that morning, except as to the means to be adopted to secrete
or mislead in his movement as long as possible, leaving, we may say, the
result to tactical operations. But tactics is time, and more decisive of
results than strategy when wisely adjusted.
Johnston was sixty miles away from Beauregard, but the delay of three
days, for McDowell's march _via_ Sudley Springs, so reduced the distance
in time and space as to make the consolidation easy under well-organized
transportation facilities. Holmes's brigade and six-gun battery were
posted in rear of Ewell's brigade.
General McDowell's order for battle on the 21st of July was issued on the
afternoon of the 20th, directing his First Division to march by the
Warrenton Turnpike, and make a diversion against the crossing of Bull Run
at the Stone Bridge, while the Second and Third Divisions, following on
the turnpike, were to file to the right, along the farm road, about
half-way between Centreville and the bridge, cross Bull Run at Sudley
Springs, and bear down against the Confederate rear and left; the First
Division, under Tyler, to march at two o'clock in the morning, to be
closely followed by the others under Hunter and Heintzelman; the turning
divisions, after crossing, to march down, clear the bridge, and lift Tyler
over the Run, bringing the three into compact battle order.
General Johnston came in from the Shenandoah Valley on the 20th with the
brigades of Bee, Bartow, and Jackson. The brigades were assigned by
Beauregard, the former two in reserve near the right of Blackburn's Ford,
the latter near its left.
Beauregard's order for battle, approved by General Johnston, was issued at
five A.M. on the 21st,--the brigades at Union Mills Ford to cross and
march by the road leading towards Centreville, and in rear of the Federal
reserve at that point; the brigades at McLean's Ford to follow the move of
those on their right, and march on a converging road towards Centreville;
those at and near Blackburn's to march in co-operative action with the
brigades on the right; the reserve brigades and troops at Mitchell's Ford
to be used as emergency called, but in the absence of special orders to
seek the most active point of battle.
This order was only preliminary, coupled with the condition that the
troops were to be held ready to move, but to wait for the special order
for action. The brigade at Blackburn's Ford had been reinforced by the
Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiments, under
Lieutenant-Colonel Jones and Colonel Kemper. I crossed the Run under the
five o'clock order, adjusted the regiments to position for favorable
action, and gave instructions for their movements on the opening of the
battle.
While waiting for the order to attack, a clever reconnoissance was made by
Colonels Terry and Lubbock, Texans, on the brigade staff, which disclosed
the march of the heavy columns of the Federals towards our left. Their
report was sent promptly to head-quarters, and after a short delay the
brigade was ordered back to its position behind the Run.
Tyler's division moved early on the 21st towards the Stone Bridge. The
march was not rapid, but timely. His first shells went tearing through the
elements over the heads of the Confederates before six o'clock. The Second
and Third Divisions followed his column till its rear cleared the road
leading up to the ford at Sudley Springs, when they filed off on that
route. McDowell was with them, and saw them file off on their course, and
followed their march. His Fifth Division and Richardson's brigade of the
First were left in reserve at Centreville, and the Fourth Division was
left in a position rearward of them. The march of the columns over the
single track of the farm road leading up to Sudley Springs was not only
fatiguing, but so prolonged the diversion of Tyler's division at the
bridge as to expose its real intent, and cause his adversary to look
elsewhere for the important work. Viewing the zone of operations as far as
covered by the eye, Evans discovered a column of dust rising above the
forest in the vicinity of Sudley Springs. This, with the busy delay of
Tyler in front of the bridge, exposed the plans, and told of another
quarter for the approaching battle; when Evans, leaving four companies of
infantry and two pieces of artillery to defend the bridge, moved with the
rest of his command to meet the approaching columns off his left. Bearing
in mind his care of the bridge, it was necessary to occupy grounds north
of the pike. The position chosen was the plateau near the Matthews House,
about a thousand yards north of the pike, and about the same distance from
Bull Run, commanding the road by which the turning divisions of the enemy
were to approach. His artillery (two six-pound guns) was posted to his
right and left, somewhat retired. Meanwhile, Tyler's batteries maintained
their position at and below the Stone Bridge, as did those near the lower
fords. McDowell's column crossed at Sudley's Ford at nine o'clock, and
approached Evans a few minutes before ten. The leading division under
Hunter, finding Evans's command across its route, advanced the Second
Rhode Island Regiment and battery of six guns of Burnside's brigade to
open the way. Evans's infantry and artillery met the advance, and after a
severe fight drove it back[5] to the line of woodland, when Burnside,
reinforced by his other three regiments, with them advanced eight guns.
This attack was much more formidable, and pressed an hour or more before
our forces retired to the woodland. The fight, though slackened,
continued, while the brigade under Porter advanced to Burnside's support.
Waiting some time to witness the opening of his aggressive fight towards
Centreville, Beauregard found at last that his battle order had
miscarried. While yet in doubt as to the cause of delay, his attention was
drawn to the fight opened by McDowell against Evans. This affair,
increasing in volume, drew him away from his original point and object of
observation. He reconsidered the order to attack at Centreville, and rode
for the field just opening to severe work. The brigades of Bee and
Bartow,--commanded by Bee,--and Jackson's, had been drawn towards the
left, the former two near Cocke's position, and Jackson from the right to
the left of Mitchell's Ford. They were to await orders, but were
instructed, and intrusted, in the absence of orders, to seek the place
where the fight was thickest. About twelve o'clock that splendid soldier,
Bernard E. Bee, under orders to find the point of danger, construed it
as calling him to Evans's support, and marched, without other notice than
the noise of increasing battle, with his own and Bartow's brigades and
Imboden's battery. The move against the enemy's reserve at Centreville
suspended, Colonels Terry and Lubbock, volunteer aides, crossed the Run to
make another reconnoissance of the positions about Centreville. Captain
Goree, of Texas, and Captain Sorrel, of Georgia, had also joined the
brigade staff. As Bee approached Evans he formed line upon the plateau at
the Henry House, suggesting to Evans to withdraw to that as a better field
than the advance ground held by the latter; but in deference to Evans's
care for the bridge, which involved care for the turnpike, Bee yielded,
and ordered his troops to join Evans's advance. Imboden's artillery,
however, failed to respond, remaining on the Henry plateau; leaving Bee
and Evans with two six-pounder smoothbore guns to combat the enemy's
formidable batteries of eight to twelve guns of superior metal, as well as
the accumulating superior infantry forces, Imboden's battery making a show
of practice with six-pounders at great range. The infantry crossed Young's
Branch under severe fire, and were posted on the line of Evans's battle.
[Illustration: Thos. J. Goree. Captain and Aide-de-Camp.]
Burnside was reinforced by Porter's brigade, and afterwards by a part of
Heintzelman's division. Ricketts's battery, and subsequently the battery
under Griffin, pressed their fight with renewed vigor. The batteries,
particularly active and aggressive, poured incessant fire upon the
Confederate ranks, who had no artillery to engage against them except
Imboden's, far off to the rear, and the section of Latham's howitzers. The
efforts of the Federal infantry were cleverly met and resisted, but the
havoc of those splendid batteries was too severe, particularly Griffin's,
that had an oblique fire upon the Confederates. It was the fire of this
battery that first disturbed our ranks on their left, and the increasing
pounding of that and Ricketts's eventually unsettled the line. At this
juncture two brigades of Tyler's division, with General W. T. Sherman and
General Keyes, crossed the Run at a ford some distance above the bridge
and approached the Confederate right, making more unsettled their
position. At the same time the attacking artillery and infantry followed
up their opportunity in admirable style, pushed the Confederates back, and
pursued down to the valley of Young's Branch.
At one P.M., Colonels Terry and Lubbock returned from their reconnoissance
of the ground in front of Centreville, with a diagram showing points of
the Union lines and troops there posted. I sent it up to head-quarters,
suggesting that the brigades at the lower fords be put across the Run, and
advance against the reserves as designed by the order of the morning.
Colonel Terry returned with the suggestion approved, and we communicated
the same to the brigades at McLean's and Union Mills Fords, commanded by
officers of senior dates to myself. The brigades were prepared, however,
for concert of action. Bee, Bartow, and Evans made valorous efforts, while
withdrawing from their struggle on the Matthews plateau, to maintain the
integrity of their lines, and with some success, when General Wade Hampton
came with his brigade to their aid, checked the progress of pursuit, and
helped to lift their broken ranks to the plateau at the Henry House. The
fight assumed proportions which called for the care of both General
Johnston and General Beauregard, who, with the movements of their right
too late to relieve the pressure of the left, found it necessary to draw
their forces to the point at which the battle had been forced by the
enemy. At the same time the reserve brigades of their right were called to
the left. General Thomas J. Jackson also moved to that quarter, and
reached the rear crest of the plateau at the Henry House while yet Bee,
Bartow, Evans, and Hampton were climbing to the forward crest. Quick to
note a proper ground, Jackson deployed on the crest at the height, leaving
the open of the plateau in front. He was in time to secure the Imboden
battery before it got off the field, and put it into action. Stanard's
battery, Pendleton's, and Pelham's, and part of the Washington Artillery
were up in time to aid Jackson in his new formation and relieve our
discomfited troops rallying on his flank. As they rose on the forward
crest, Bee saw, on the farther side, Jackson's line, serene as if in
repose, affording a haven so promising of cover that he gave the
christening of "Stonewall" for the immortal Jackson.
"There," said he, "is Jackson, standing like a stone wall."
General Johnston and General Beauregard reached the field, and busied
themselves in getting the troops together and in lines of defence. Other
reinforcements were ordered from the right, including the reserve brigades
at McLean's and Union Mills Fords, and a number of batteries. Bee and
Evans reformed their lines upon Jackson's. After permitting Burnside's
brigade to retire for rest, McDowell pushed his battle by his strong
artillery arm, advancing against and turning the Confederate left, only
giving some little time to select positions for his batteries to plunge
more effective fire into the Confederate ranks. This time, so necessary
for McDowell's renewal, was as important to the Confederates in getting
their reinforcements of infantry and artillery in position, and proved of
even greater value in lengthening out the fight, so as to give Kirby Smith
and Elzey, just off the train from the Shenandoah Valley, time to appear
at the last moment.
After arranging the new position of the troops about Jackson, General
Johnston rode back to the Lewis House, where he could better comprehend
the entire field, leaving Beauregard in charge of the troops engaged on
his left. McDowell gave especial care to preparing his batteries for
renewal against the Confederate left. He massed Ricketts's and Griffin's
batteries, and made their practice grand. So well executed was it that the
Confederate left was again in peril, and, seeing reinforcements
approaching towards their rear, General Johnston sent orders to the
brigades at the lower fords revoking authority given them to advance
against Centreville, and ordering their return to the south side, and the
brigade at Union Mills was ordered to reinforce the Confederate left. The
brigade at Blackburn's Ford received the recall order in ample time, but
that at McLean's,--Jones's,--being a little farther away, became partially
engaged before the recall reached it. The brigades resumed their former
position, however, without serious trouble.
With this order came a message to me, saying that the Federals were
pressing severely on our left, and to the limit of its tension, that
reinforcements were in sight, approaching their right, which might prove
too heavy for our brave men, and force us back, for which emergency our
brigades should be held ready to cover retreat. These anxious moments were
soon relieved by the approach of General Kirby Smith's command, that had
been mistaken as reinforcements for the enemy. General Smith was wounded,
but was succeeded in command by the gallant Elzey, who by a well-timed
attack approached the rear of the massed batteries. At the same time a
brave charge on the part of Beauregard, in co-operation with this
fortunate attack of Smith and Elzey, captured the greater part of the
batteries and turned some of the guns upon the brave men who had handled
them so well.
McDowell made a gallant effort to recover his lost power, riding with his
troops and urging them to brave efforts, but our convex line, that he was
just now pressing back upon itself, was changed. Though attenuated, it had
become concave by reinforcement, and in elliptical curve was delivering a
concentrated fire upon its adversary. Before the loss of his artillery he
was the Samson of the field; now he was not only shorn of his power, but
some of his mighty strength was transferred to his adversary, leaving him
in desperate plight and exposed to blows increasing in force and
effectiveness. Although his renewed efforts were brave, his men seemed to
have given confidence over to despair. Still a show of battle was made
until General Johnston directed the brigades of Holmes and Early to good
positions for attack, when fight was abandoned and flight ensued.
The regulars under Sykes maintained order, and with the regular cavalry
covered the confused retreat. The Confederates in the field and
approaching at the moment were ordered in pursuit. At the same time
another order was sent the brigades at the lower fords, explaining that
the reinforcements, supposed to be Federals, proved to be Confederates,
and that the former were not only forced back, but were then in full
retreat, directing our brigades to cross again and strike the retreating
line on the turnpike. All of D. R. Jones's brigade that had crossed at
McLean's Ford under the former order had not yet returned to its position
under the order to that effect, and Ewell had gone from Union Mills Ford
to the battle on the extreme left, so that neither of them came in
position ready to take part in the pursuit. Those at Mitchell's and
Blackburn's Fords advanced, the former, under General Bonham, with orders
to strike at Cub Run, the latter at Centreville. Finding some obstruction
to his march, General Bonham kept the Centreville road, and joined the
brigade from Blackburn's, taking the lead as the ranking officer.
Through the abandoned camps of the Federals we found their pots and
kettles over the fire, with food cooking; quarters of beef hanging on the
trees, and wagons by the roadside loaded, some with bread and general
provisions, others with ammunition. When within artillery range of the
retreating column passing through Centreville, the infantry was deployed
on the sides of the road, under cover of the forest, so as to give room
for the batteries ordered into action in the open, Bonham's brigade on the
left, the other on the right.
As the guns were about to open, there came a message that the enemy,
instead of being in precipitate retreat, was marching around to attack the
Confederate right. With this report came orders, or reports of orders, for
the brigades to return to their positions behind the Run. I denounced the
report as absurd, claimed to know a retreat, such as was before me, and
ordered that the batteries open fire, when Major Whiting, of General
Johnston's staff, rising in his stirrups, said,--
"In the name of General Johnston, I order that the batteries shall not
open."
I inquired, "Did General Johnston send you to communicate that order?"
Whiting replied, "No; but I take the responsibility to give it."
I claimed the privilege of responsibility under the circumstances, and
when in the act of renewing the order to fire, General Bonham rode to my
side and asked that the batteries should not open. As the ranking officer
present, this settled the question. By that time, too, it was near night.
Colonel G. W. Lay, of Johnston's staff, supported my views,
notwithstanding the protest of Major Whiting.
Soon there came an order for the brigades to withdraw and return to their
positions behind the Run. General Bonham marched his brigade back, but,
thinking that there was a mistake somewhere, I remained in position until
the order was renewed, about ten o'clock. My brigade crossed and recrossed
the Run six times during the day and night.
It was afterwards found that some excitable person, seeing Jones's
brigade recrossing the Run, from its advance, under previous orders, took
them for Federal troops crossing at McLean's Ford, and, rushing to
head-quarters at the Junction, reported that the Federals were crossing
below and preparing for attack against our right. And upon this report one
of the staff-officers sent orders, in the names of the Confederate chiefs,
revoking the orders for pursuit.
From the effective service of the two guns of Latham's battery, _at short
range_, against the odds brought against them, the inference seems fair
that the Imboden battery, had it moved under Bee's orders, could have so
strengthened the position on the Matthews plateau as to hold it and give
time for them to retire and meet General Jackson on the Henry plateau.
Glorious Victory spread her generous wings alike over heroes and
delinquents.
The losses of the Confederates in all arms were 1982. Federal losses in
all arms, 3333[6] officers and soldiers, twenty-five cannon.[7]
On the 22d the cavalry troop of Captain Whitehead was sent forward with
Colonel Terry, volunteer aide, on a ride of observation. They picked up a
number of prisoners, and Colonel Terry cut the lanyards of the Federal
flag over the court-house at Fairfax by a shot from his six-shooter, and
sent the bunting to head-quarters.
The plan of the Union campaign was that their army in the Valley of the
Shenandoah, under General Patterson, should stand so surely against the
Confederates in that field, under General Johnston, as to prevent the
withdrawal of the latter through the Blue Ridge, which goes to show that
the concentration was considered, and thought possible, and that McDowell
was, therefore, under some pressure to act in time to gain his battle
before Johnston could have time for his swoop from the mountains. At
Centreville on the 18th, McDowell was within five miles of his immediate
objective,--Manassas Junction,--by the route of Tyler's reconnoissance.
The Sudley Ford route involved a march of twenty miles and drew him nearer
the reach of Johnston's forces. So, if Tyler's reconnoissance proved the
route by Blackburn's Ford practicable, it was imperative on McDowell to
adopt it. If it was proved impracticable, the route by Sudley's Ford was
necessary and justified the delay. But it has been claimed that the Union
commander did not intend to have the reconnoissance, and that he could
have made his move a success by that route if he had adopted it; which, if
true, would put him in a more awkward position than his defeat. He was
right in his conclusion that the Confederates were prepared for him on
that route, but it would have been a grave error to leave the shorter,
more direct line for the circuitous route without first so testing the
former as to know if it were practicable, knowing as he did that the
Confederate left was in the air, because of leaven looked for from over
the Blue Ridge. After the trial of General Tyler on the 18th, and finding
the route closed against him, he should have given credit to the division
commander and his troops for their courageous work, but instead he
disparaged their efforts and put them under criticism. The experiment and
subsequent events go to show that the route was not practicable except for
seasoned troops.
McDowell's first mistake was his display, and march for a grand military
picnic. The leading proverb impressed upon the minds of young soldiers of
the line by old commanders is, "Never despise your enemy." So important a
part of the soldier's creed is it, that it is enjoined upon subalterns
pursuing marauding parties of half a dozen of the aborigines. His
over-confidence led him to treat with levity the reconnoissance of General
Tyler on the 18th, as not called for under his orders, nor necessary to
justify his plans, although they involved a delay of three days, and a
circuitous march around the Confederate left. Then, he put upon his
division commander the odium of error and uncalled-for exposure of the
troops. This broke the confidence between them, and worked more or less
evil through the ranks in the after-part of the campaign. Had he
recognized the importance of the service, and encouraged the conduct of
the division commander, he would have drawn the hearts of his officers and
soldiers towards him, and toned up the war spirit and _morale_ of his men.
Tyler was right in principle, in the construction of duty, under the
orders, and in his more comprehensive view of the military zodiac. In no
other way than by testing the strength along the direct route could
McDowell justify delay, when time was power, and a long march with raw
troops in July weather was pending.
The delay gave Beauregard greater confidence in his preconceived plan, and
brought out his order of the 21st for advance towards McDowell's reserve
at Centreville, but this miscarried, and turned to advantage for the plans
of the latter.
Had a prompt, energetic general been in command when, on the 20th, his
order of battle was settled upon, the division under Tyler would have been
deployed in front of Stone Bridge, as soon after nightfall as darkness
could veil the march, and the divisions under Hunter and Heintzelman
following would have been stretched along the lateral road in bivouac, so
as to be prepared to cross Sudley's Ford and put in a good day's work on
the morrow. Had General Tyler's action of the 18th received proper
recognition, he would have been confident instead of doubting in his
service. McDowell's army posted as it should have been, a march at
daylight would have brought the columns to the Henry House before seven
o'clock, dislodged Evans, busied by Tyler's display at the bridge, without
a chance to fight, and brought the three divisions, reunited in gallant
style, along the turnpike with little burning of powder. Thus prepared and
organized, the compact battle-order of twenty thousand men would have been
a fearful array against Beauregard's fragmentary left, and by the events
as they passed, would have assured McDowell of victory hours before Kirby
Smith and Elzey, of the Army of the Shenandoah, came upon the field.
Beauregard's mistake was in failing to ride promptly after his
five-o'clock order, and handling his columns while in action. As events
actually occurred, he would have been in overwhelming numbers against
McDowell's reserve and supply depot. His adversary so taken by surprise,
his raw troops would not have been difficult to conquer.
As the experience of both commanders was limited to staff service, it is
not surprising that they failed to appreciate the importance of prompt and
vigorous manoeuvre in the hour of battle. Beauregard gave indications of a
comprehensive military mind and reserve powers that might, with experience
and thorough encouragement from the superior authorities, have developed
him into eminence as a field-marshal. His adversary seemed untoward, not
adapted to military organization or combinations. Most of his men got back
to Washington under the sheltering wings of the small bands of regulars.
The mistake of supposing Kirby Smith's and Elzey's approaching troops to
be Union reinforcements for McDowell's right was caused by the
resemblance, at a distance, of the original Confederate flag to the colors
of Federal regiments. This mishap caused the Confederates to cast about
for a new ensign, brought out our battle-flag, led to its adoption by
General Beauregard, and afterwards by higher authority as the union shield
of the Confederate national flag.
The supplies of subsistence, ammunition, and forage passed as we marched
through the enemy's camps towards Centreville seemed ample to carry the
Confederate army on to Washington. Had the fight been continued to that
point, the troops, in their high hopes, would have marched in terrible
effectiveness against the demoralized Federals. Gaining confidence and
vigor in their march, they could well have reached the capital with the
ranks of McDowell's men. The brigade at Blackburn's Ford (five regiments),
those at McLean's and Mitchell's Fords, all quite fresh, could have been
reinforced by all the cavalry and most of the artillery, comparatively
fresh, and later by the brigades of Holmes, Ewell, and Early. This
favorable aspect for fruitful results was all sacrificed through the
assumed authority of staff-officers who, upon false reports, gave
countermand to the orders of their chiefs.
On the 21st a regiment and battery were discharged from the Union army,
reducing its aggregate to about 34,000. The Confederates had 31,860.
McDowell crossed Bull Run with 18,500 of his men, and engaged in battle
18,053 Confederates.
There seem to be no data from which the precise figures can be had. These
estimates, though not strictly accurate, are justified by returns so far
as they have been officially rendered.
The CONFEDERATE ARMY in this battle was organized as follows:
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC (AFTERWARDS FIRST CORPS), under Brig.-Gen. G. T.
Beauregard:--_Infantry_: _First Brigade_, under Brig.-Gen. M. S.
Bonham, 11th N. C., 2d, 3d, 7th, and 8th S. C.; _Second Brigade_,
Brig.-Gen. R. S. Ewell, 5th and 6th Ala., 6th La.; _Third Brigade_,
Brig.-Gen. D. R. Jones, 17th and 18th Miss., 5th S. C.; _Fourth
Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. James Longstreet, 5th N. C., 1st, 11th, and 17th
Va.; _Fifth Brigade_, Col. P. St. George Cocke, 1st La. Battn., 8th
Va. (seven companies), 18th, 19th, 28th, and 49th Va. (latter, three
companies); _Sixth Brigade_, Col. J. A. Early, 13th Miss., 4th S. C.,
7th and 24th Va.; _Troops not brigaded_: 7th and 8th La., Hampton
Legion, S. C., 30th Va. (cav.), Harrison's Battn. (cav.); _Independent
companies_: 10th Cav., Washington (La.) Cav.; _Artillery_: Kemper's,
Latham's, Loudoun, and Shield's batteries, Camp Pickens companies.
ARMY OF THE SHENANDOAH (JOHNSTON'S DIVISION), Brig.-Gen. Joseph E.
Johnston:--_First Brigade_, Col. T. J. Jackson, 2d, 4th, 5th, and 27th
Va., Pendleton's Batt.; _Second Brigade_, Col. F. S. Bartow, 7th, 8th,
and 9th Ga., Duncan's and Pope's Ky. Battns., Alburti's Batt.; _Third
Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. Barnard E. Bee, 4th Ala., 2d and 11th Miss., 1st
Tenn., Imboden's Batt.; _Fourth Brigade_, Col. A. Elzey, 1st Md.
Battn., 3d Tenn., 10th and 13th Va., Grane's Batt.; _Not brigaded_:
1st Va. Cav., 33d Va. Inf.
The FEDERAL ARMY, commanded by Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell, was
organized as follows:
FIRST DIVISION, Brig.-Gen. Daniel Tyler:--_First Brigade_, Col. E. D.
Keyes, 2d Me., 1st, 2d, and 3d Conn.; _Second Brigade_, Brig.-Gen. R.
C. Schenck, 2d N. Y., 1st and 2d Ohio, Batt. E, 2d U. S. Art.; _Third
Brigade_, Col. W. T. Sherman, 13th, 69th, and 79th N. Y., 2d Wis.,
Batt. E, 3d U. S. Art.; _Fourth Brigade_, Col. I. B. Richardson, 1st
Mass., 12th N. Y., 2d and 3d Mich., Batt. G, 1st U. S. Art., Batt. M,
2d U. S. Art.
SECOND DIVISION, (1) Col. David Hunter (wounded); (2) Col. Andrew
Porter:--_First Brigade_, Col. Andrew Porter, 8th (militia), 14th, and
27th N. Y., Battn. U. S. Inf., Battn. U. S. Marines, Battn. U. S.
Cav., Batt. D, 5th U. S. Art.; _Second Brigade_, Col. A. E. Burnside,
2d N. H., 1st and 2d R. I., 71st N. Y.
THIRD DIVISION, Col. S. P. Heintzelman (wounded):--_First Brigade_,
Col. W. B. Franklin, 5th and 11th Mass., 1st Minn., Batt. I, 1st U. S.
Art.; _Second Brigade_, Col. O. B. Wilcox (wounded and captured), 11th
N. Y. (Fire Zouaves), 38th N. Y., 1st and 4th Mich., Batt. D, 2d U. S.
Art.; _Third Brigade_, Col. O. O. Howard, 3d, 4th, and 5th Me., 2d Vt.
FOURTH (RESERVE) DIVISION,[8] Brig.-Gen. Theodore Runyon, 1st, 2d, 3d,
and 4th N. J. (three months), 1st, 2d, and 3d N. J., 41st N. Y. (three
years).
FIFTH DIVISION, Col. Dixon S. Miles:--_First Brigade_,[9] Col. Louis
Blenker, 8th N. Y. (Vols.), 29th and 39th N. Y., 27th Penn., Batt. A,
2d U. S. Art., Rookwood's N. Y. Batt.; _Second Brigade_, Col. Thomas
A. Davies, 16th, 18th, 31st, and 32d N. Y., Batt. G, 2d U. S. Art.
CHAPTER IV.
THE CONFEDERATES HOVERING AROUND WASHINGTON.
An Early War-Time Amenity--The Author invited to dine with the
Enemy--"Stove-pipe Batteries"--J. E. B. Stuart, the Famous
Cavalryman--His Bold Dash on the Federals at
Lewinsville--Major-General G. W. Smith associated with Johnston and
Beauregard in a Council--Longstreet promoted Major-General--Fierce
Struggle at Ball's Bluff--Dranesville a Success for the Union
Arms--McClellan given the Sobriquet of "The Young Napoleon."
After General McDowell reached Washington my brigade was thrown forward,
first to Centreville, then to Fairfax Court-House, and later still to
Falls Church and Munson's and Mason's Hills; the cavalry, under Colonel J.
E. B. Stuart, constituting part of the command.
We were provokingly near Washington, with orders not to attempt to advance
even to Alexandria. Well-chosen and fortified positions, with soldiers to
man them, soon guarded all approaches to the capital. We had frequent
little brushes with parties pushed out to reconnoitre. Nevertheless, we
were neither so busy nor so hostile as to prevent the reception of a
cordial invitation to a dinner-party on the other side, to be given to me
at the head-quarters of General Richardson. He was disappointed when I
refused to accept this amenity, and advised him to be more careful lest
the politicians should have him arrested for giving aid and comfort to the
enemy. He was my singularly devoted friend and admirer before the war, and
had not ceased to be conscious of old-time ties.
The service at Falls Church, Munson's and Mason's Hills was first by my
brigade of infantry, a battery, and Stuart's cavalry. During that service
the infantry and batteries were relieved every few days, but the cavalry
was kept at the front with me. As the authorities allowed me but one
battery, and that was needed from time to time to strike out at anything
and everything that came outside the fortified lines, we collected a
number of old wagon-wheels and mounted on them stove-pipes of different
calibre, till we had formidable-looking batteries, some large enough of
calibre to threaten Alexandria, and even the National Capitol and
Executive Mansion. It is needless to add that Munson's Hill was so safe as
not to disturb our profound slumbers. This was before the Federals began
to realize all of their advantages by floating balloons above our heads.
One of the most conspicuous and successful of our affairs occurred on the
11th of September. A brigade of the enemy's infantry, with eight pieces of
artillery and a detachment of cavalry, escorting a reconnoitring party,
advanced to Lewinsville. If they had secured and fortified a position
there they would have greatly annoyed us. Colonel Stuart, who from the
start had manifested those qualities of daring courage, tempered by
sagacity, which so admirably fitted him for outpost service, had his
pickets so far to the front that he was promptly informed of the presence
of the enemy. He was ordered, with about eight hundred infantry, a section
of Rosser's battery, and Captain Patrick's troop of cavalry, to give
battle, and so adroitly approached the enemy as to surprise him, and by a
bold dash drove him off in confusion, with some loss.
We had a number of small affairs which served to season the troops and
teach the importance of discipline and vigilance. It was while at Falls
Church that Major-General G. W. Smith reported for duty with the Army of
Northern Virginia, and was associated with General Johnston and General
Beauregard, the three forming a council for the general direction of the
operations of the army. General McClellan had by this time been appointed
to superior command on the Federal side.
[Illustration: GENERAL J. E. B. STUART]
Despairing of receiving reinforcement to enable him to assume the
offensive, General Johnston regarded it as hazardous to hold longer the
advanced post of Munson's and Mason's Hills, drew the troops back to and
near Fairfax Court-House, and later, about the 19th of October, still
farther to Centreville, and prepared for winter quarters by strengthening
his positions and constructing huts, the line extending to Union Mills on
the right. These points were regarded as stronger in themselves and less
liable to be turned than the positions at and in advance of Fairfax
Court-House. We expected that McClellan would advance against us, but were
not disturbed. I was promoted major-general, which relieved me of the
outpost service, to which Colonel Stuart was assigned.
The autumn and early winter were not permitted to pass without some
stirring incidents in our front. Soon after the battle of July 21, Colonel
Eppa Hunton was ordered to reoccupy Leesburg with his regiment, the Eighth
Virginia. Later, the Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth Mississippi
Regiments were sent to the same vicinity, and with the regiment already
there and a battery constituted the Seventh Brigade, Brigadier-General N.
G. Evans commanding. To cover a reconnoissance and an expedition to gather
supplies made by General McCall's division to Dranesville, General
McClellan ordered General C. P. Stone, commanding at Poolesville,
Maryland, to make a demonstration in force against Leesburg, and, if
practicable, to dislodge the Confederates at that place. Early in the
morning of the 21st of October four of General Stone's regiments crossed
the Potomac at Edwards's Ferry, and about the same time five other
regiments, under the immediate command of Colonel Baker, late United
States Senator from Oregon, crossed the river above at Ball's Bluff.
Leaving Colonel Barksdale with his Thirteenth Mississippi, with six pieces
of artillery as a reserve, to hold in check the force that had crossed at
Edwards's Ferry, Evans with his main force assailed the force under
Colonel Baker, and after a long and fierce struggle, under a heavy fire of
batteries on both sides of the river, drove them down the bluff to the
river, many surrendering, others plunging into the river to recross,
overcrowding and sinking the boats that had brought them over; some
drowning in the Potomac.
Two months later, December 20, there was an affair at Dranesville which
for us was by no means so satisfactory as Evans's at Leesburg and Ball's
Bluff. It was known that food for men and horses could be found in the
vicinity of Dranesville. All of the available wagons of the army were sent
to gather and bring it in, and Colonel Stuart, with one hundred and fifty
of his cavalry, the Sumter Flying Artillery (Captain A. S. Cutts), and
four regiments of infantry detailed from different brigades, was charged
with the command of the foraging party. The infantry regiments were the
Eleventh Virginia, Colonel Samuel Garland; Tenth Alabama, Colonel Forney;
Sixth South Carolina, Lieutenant-Colonel Secrest; and First Kentucky,
Colonel Thomas Taylor; the cavalry, Ransom's and Bradford's.
General McCall, commanding the nearest Union division, happened just then
to want those supplies, or, as seems more probable, had information
through a spy of Stuart's expedition.
He took measures to gather the supplies, or surprise and perhaps capture
or destroy Stuart's party. However that may be, when Stuart reached the
vicinity of Dranesville he found himself in the presence of General Ord,
who had under him his own brigade of five regiments of infantry, Easton's
battery, two twenty-four-pound howitzers and two twelve-pound guns, and
two squadrons of cavalry. Finding that he was anticipated, and that his
only way of saving the train was to order it back to Centreville in all
haste, Stuart decided to attack, in order to give it time to get to a
place of safety, and despatched a detachment of cavalry on the turnpike
towards Leesburg to warn the wagons to hasten back to Centreville, the
cavalry to march between them and the enemy. He ordered his artillery and
infantry to hasten to the front, and as soon as they came up assailed the
enemy vigorously, continuing the engagement until he judged that his
wagon-train had passed beyond danger; then he extricated his infantry and
artillery from the contest, with a much heavier loss than he had inflicted
on the enemy, leaving the killed and some of the wounded. It was the first
success that had attended the Union arms in that quarter, and was
magnified and enjoyed on that side. This action advanced McClellan
considerably in popular estimation and led to the bestowal upon him, by
some enthusiast, of the sobriquet "the Young Napoleon."
During the autumn and early winter the weather had been unusually fine.
The roads and fields in that section were generally firm and in fine
condition for marching and manoeuvring armies. With the beginning of the
new year winter set in with rain and snow, alternate freezing and thawing,
until the roads and fields became seas of red mud.
As no effort of general advance was made during the season of firm roads,
we had little apprehension of trouble after the winter rains came to make
them too heavy for artillery service.
CHAPTER V.
ROUND ABOUT RICHMOND.
The Defences of the Confederate Capital--Army of Northern Virginia at
Centreville--Aggressive Action--Council with the President and
Secretary of War--Mr. Davis's High Opinion of McClellan--Operations on
the Peninsula--Engagements about Yorktown and Williamsburg--Severe
Toil added to the Soldiers' Usual Labors by a Saturated Soil.
Apropos of the attack upon Richmond, apprehended in the winter of 1861-62,
it should be borne in mind that there were four routes supposed to be
practicable for the advance of the enemy:
1. The original route by Manassas Junction and the Orange and Alexandria
Railroad.
2. By crossing the Potomac near Potomac Creek, thence by Fredericksburg to
Richmond.
3. By land,--the shortest,--to go down the Potomac to the Lower
Rappahannock, landing at or near Urbana, and thence march for the
Confederate capital.
4. By transports to Fortress Monroe, thence by the Peninsula, between the
James and York Rivers.
General McClellan's long delay to march against General Johnston, when he
was so near and accessible at Centreville, indicated that he had no
serious thought of advancing by that route. To prepare to meet him on
either of the other routes, a line behind the Rapidan was the chosen
position.
General Beauregard had been relieved of duty in Virginia and ordered West
with General A. S. Johnston.
The withdrawal from Centreville was delayed some weeks, waiting for roads
that could be travelled, but was started on the 9th of March, 1862, and on
the 11th the troops were south of the Rappahannock.
General Whiting's command from Occoquan joined General Holmes at
Fredericksburg. Generals Ewell and Early crossed by the railroad bridge
and took positions near it. General G. W. Smith's division and mine
marched by the turnpike to near Culpeper Court-House. General Stuart, with
the cavalry, remained on Bull Run until the 10th, then withdrew to
Warrenton Junction.
During the last week of March our scouts on the Potomac reported a large
number of steamers, loaded with troops, carrying, it was estimated, about
one hundred and forty thousand men, passing down and out of the Potomac,
destined, it was supposed, for Fortress Monroe, or possibly for the coast
of North Carolina. We were not left long in doubt. By the 4th of April,
McClellan had concentrated three _corps d'armee_ between Fortress Monroe
and Newport News, on the James River. The Confederate left crossed the
Rapidan, and from Orange Court-House made connection with the troops on
the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg. About the 1st of April, Generals
Johnston and G. W. Smith were called to Richmond for conference with the
War Department, leaving me in command. On the 3d I wrote General Jackson,
in the Shenandoah Valley, proposing to join him with sufficient
reinforcements to strike the Federal force in front of him a sudden,
severe blow, and thus compel a change in the movements of McClellan's
army. I explained that the responsibility of the move could not be taken
unless I was with the detachment to give it vigor and action to meet my
views, or give time to get back behind the Rapidan in case the authorities
discovered the move and ordered its recall.
I had been left in command on the Rapidan, but was not authorized to
assume command of the Valley district. As the commander of the district
did not care to have an officer there of higher rank, the subject was
discontinued.
General Johnston, assigned to the Department of the Peninsula and
Norfolk, made an inspection of his new lines, and on his return
recommended that they should be abandoned. Meanwhile, his army had been
ordered to Richmond. He was invited to meet the President to discuss
military affairs, and asked General G. W. Smith and myself to go with him.
The Secretary of War and General R. E. Lee were with the President when we
met.
It was the first time that I had been called to such august presence, to
deliberate on momentous matters, so I had nothing to say till called on.
The views intended to be offered were prefaced by saying that I knew
General McClellan; that he was a military engineer, and would move his
army by careful measurement and preparation; that he would not be ready to
advance before the 1st of May. The President interrupted, and spoke of
McClellan's high attainments and capacity in a style indicating that he
did not care to hear any one talk who did not have the same appreciation
of our great adversary. McClellan had been a special favorite with Mr.
Davis when he was Secretary of War in the Pierce administration, and he
seemed to take such reflections upon his favorites as somewhat personal.
From the hasty interruption I concluded that my opinion had only been
asked through polite recognition of my presence, not that it was wanted,
and said no more. My intention was to suggest that we leave Magruder to
look after McClellan, and march, as proposed to Jackson a few days before,
through the Valley of Virginia, cross the Potomac, threaten Washington,
and call McClellan to his own capital.
At the time of McClellan's landing on the peninsula, the Confederate army
on that line was commanded by Major-General J. Bankhead Magruder, and
consisted of eleven thousand men of all arms. The defensive line was
pitched behind the Warwick River, a sluggish stream that rises about a
mile south of Yorktown, and flows south to its confluence with James
River. The Warwick was dammed at different points, thus flooding the
intervening low lands as far as Lee's Mills, where the river spreads into
marsh lands. The dams were defended by batteries and rifle-trenches. The
left rested at Yorktown, which was fortified by continuous earthworks,
strong water and land batteries, and rifle-trenches reaching to the right,
connecting with those behind the Warwick. Yorktown is on the right bank of
York River, which narrows at that point, with Gloucester Point on the
opposite bank. This point was also fortified, and held by a strong
garrison. On the south side of the James, General Huger held Norfolk, near
its mouth, fortified and garrisoned by about ten thousand men, while the
James River floated the Confederate vessels "Virginia" ("Merrimac"),
"Yorktown," "Jamestown," and "Teaser."
McClellan's army, embarked from Alexandria and moved by transports to the
vicinity of Fortress Monroe, as first collected, numbered one hundred and
eight thousand of all arms, including the garrison at Fortress Monroe.
Magruder was speedily reinforced by a detachment from Huger's army, and
afterwards by Early's brigade of Johnston's army, and after a few days by
the balance of Johnston's army, the divisions of G. W. Smith, D. H. Hill,
and Longstreet, with Stuart's cavalry, General Johnston in command.
General McClellan advanced towards the Confederate line and made some
efforts at the dams, but it was generally understood that his plan was to
break the position by regular approaches. After allowing due time for the
completion of his battering arrangements, Johnston abandoned his line the
night of May 3 and marched back towards Richmond, ordering a corresponding
move by the troops at Norfolk; but the Confederate authorities interfered
in favor of Norfolk, giving that garrison time to withdraw its army
supplies. The divisions of G. W. Smith and D. H. Hill were ordered by the
Yorktown and Williamsburg road, Magruder's and Longstreet's by the Hampton
and Lee's Mill road, Stuart's cavalry to cover both routes.
Anticipating this move as the possible result of operations against his
lower line, General Magruder had constructed a series of earthworks about
two miles in front of Williamsburg. The main work, Fort Magruder, was a
bastion. On either side redoubts were thrown up reaching out towards the
James and York Rivers. The peninsula is about eight miles wide at that
point. College Creek on the right flows into James River, and Queen's
Creek on the left into the York, both giving some defensive strength,
except at mill-dams, which were passable by vehicles. The redoubts on the
left of Fort Magruder commanded the dam in Queen's Creek at Sanders's
Pond, but the dam in College Creek was beyond protection from the
redoubts.
The four redoubts on the right of Fort Magruder had commanding positions
of the fort.
Finding the entire line of intrenchments at Yorktown empty on the morning
of May 4, McClellan ordered pursuit by his cavalry under its chief,
General Stoneman, with four batteries of horse artillery, supported by
Hooker's division on the Yorktown road and W. F. Smith's on the Hampton
road.
They were followed on the Hampton road by General Heintzelman (Kearny's
division), Third Corps, and Couch's and Casey's divisions of Keyes's
(Fourth) Corps, Sumner's (Second) Corps on the Yorktown road. Nearing
Williamsburg, the roads converge and come together in range of field
batteries at Fort Magruder. About eight miles out from Yorktown, on the
Hampton road, Stuart, hearing of severe cavalry fight by the part of his
command on the Yorktown road, thought to ride across to the enemy's rear
and confuse his operations, but presently found a part of the enemy's
cavalry and a battery under General Emory marching in his rear by a
cross-road from the Yorktown road. He formed and charged in column of
fours, gaining temporary success, but fell upon the enemy's battery, and
found Benson prompt in getting into action, and in turn, with dismounted
troopers, drove him back, cutting his line of retreat and forcing him off
to the beach road along the James River. The march of Emory's cavalry
across to the Hampton road misled Hooker's division to the same march, and
that division, crowding the highway, caused Smith's division to diverge by
a cross-road, which led it over into the Yorktown road. These misleadings
delayed the advance on both roads. Emory followed Stuart until the latter
in turn came upon strong grounds, where pursuit became isolated and
hazardous.
The removal of the Confederate cavalry from the Hampton road left Hooker's
march free of molestation. But not advised of the opportunity, he took the
precautions usual on such occasions. His early approach, however, hurried
the movements of the Confederate cavalry on the Yorktown road, and let the
enemy in upon us on that road before we were advised of his approach.
General Johnston rode near the rear of his army to receive despatches from
his cavalry commander. General Stuart wrote and sent them, but his
couriers found the enemy's cavalry in the way and returned to him. The
cavalry fight on the Yorktown road was also damaging to the Confederates,
and not reported to the commanding general.
About four P.M., General Cook's cavalry and the horse artillery under
Gibson debouched from the woodlands on the Yorktown road and began to
examine the open ground in front of the Confederate field-works. General
Johnston, who was at the rear, hurried Semmes's brigade of McLaws's
division into the nearest redoubts, and ordered McLaws to call back
another brigade. Kershaw was ordered, and Manly's battery. The battery had
to go at a run to be sure of their cover in the redoubts. Another battery
was ordered by McLaws, who rode and took command. When Kershaw got to the
fort, part of his men were deployed in the wood beyond, to his left.
Meanwhile, the Federal cavalry was advancing, Gibson's horse artillery and
Manly's Confederate battery were in severe combat, the latter having the
benefit of gun-proof parapets. Observing the approach of cavalry near his
left, McLaws ordered two of Manly's guns into Fort Magruder, which, with
the assistance of Kershaw's infantry, drove off that column. Some cavalry,
riding near the left redoubt with little concern, were first taken for
Confederates, but the next moment were identified as Federals, when the
artillery was turned upon them, and, with the Confederate cavalry, pushed
them quite away. When the left redoubt, commanding the dam at Sanders's
Pond, was occupied by a part of Kershaw's men, McCarthy's battery came
into action, and, with the assistance of others, gave Gibson's battery, in
the open, serious trouble. McLaws ordered an advance of part of Semmes's
brigade, led by Colonel Cummings. This, with the severe artillery fire
from the redoubts and guns afield, cleared the open, leaving one of
Gibson's guns in the mud, which was secured by McCarthy's men as a trophy
of the day's work. Ten horses had been sent back to haul the piece off,
but the mud was too heavy for them. Stuart, with the troopers of his
immediate following and his section of horse artillery, crossed College
Creek near James River, and came in after the action at the redoubts.
Emory abandoned the pursuit as not feasible, and bivouacked on the route.
Cavalry rencounters of the day were reported, in which both sides claimed
success. Stuart reported Lieutenant-Colonel Wickham and four men wounded.
Of the other side, Cooke reported thirty-five killed, wounded, and
missing. Gibson reported one officer and four men wounded, and one gun
abandoned. Emory reported two killed and four wounded, and Sanders one
officer wounded. But most of the Federal losses were in the encounters at
the redoubts with the artillery and infantry.
The enemy's cavalry reported the redoubt on the Confederate left
unoccupied, and Hancock's brigade (Smith's division) was ordered forward
to take it, but the woods through which he marched were tangled and
swampy, and delayed him until night brought him to bivouac. Meanwhile, the
Confederates who drove the cavalry from its reconnoissance had occupied
the redoubt.
The corps commanders Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes and the cavalry leader
Stoneman were together that night in conference. The highways, over flats
but little above tide-water, were saturated by the spring rains, cut into
deep ruts by the haul of heavy trains, and puddled by the tramp of
infantry and cavalry. The wood and fallow lands were bogs, with occasional
quicksands, adding severest labor to the usual toils of battle. So no
plans were formed, further than to feel the way forward when there was
light to see.
The enemy got some of our men who were worn out by the fatigue of the
siege and the heavy march of the night and day.
CHAPTER VI.
THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.
The Attack on Fort Magruder--Hancock occupies two Redoubts--The
Slaughter in Early's Brigade--The Fifth North Carolina Regiment and
Twenty-Fourth Virginia mercilessly exposed--A Hard-Fought
Engagement--A Confederate Victory--McClellan not on the Field the
Greater Part of the Day--Hancock called "The Superb" by
McClellan--Johnston pays High Tribute to Longstreet.
Before quitting his trenches at Yorktown, Johnston anticipated a move of
part of McClellan's army by transports to the head of York River, to cut
his line of march towards Richmond, and conceived it important to have a
strong force at that point in time to meet and check the move. To that end
he ordered Magruder to march at two A.M. on the 5th of May with D. R.
Jones's and McLaws's divisions, to be followed by the divisions of G. W.
Smith and D. H. Hill; Longstreet's division to cover the movement of his
trains and defend Stuart's cavalry in case of severe pressure. Late in the
afternoon of the 4th I was ordered to send a brigade to the redoubts to
relieve McLaws's division. The brigades being small, I sent two, R. H.
Anderson's and Pryor's, with Macon's battery, under Lieutenant Clopton,
two guns under Captain Garrett, and two under Captain McCarthy, to report
to General Anderson, the senior brigadier. At the time it was thought that
the army would be on the march by daylight in the morning, and that the
rear-guard would closely follow; but after nightfall a down-pour of rain
came, flooding thoroughfares and by-ways, woodlands and fields, so that
parts of our trains were stalled on the ground, where they stood during
the night. It was dark when Anderson joined McLaws, who had drawn his men
together in readiness to join the advance march. Anticipating an early
march himself, Anderson occupied Fort Magruder and advanced his pickets so
as to cover with their fire the junction of the Yorktown and Hampton
roads. Heavy clouds and darkness settling down upon him, he made no effort
at a critical survey of the surroundings; while the steady rain through
the night gave signs of serious delay in the movements of the army, but he
little thought that by the delay he could be called into battle. In the
morning when time grew heavier he was advised to call in the brigades near
him, in case he should need them, and instructions were sent them to
answer his call.
At daylight he occupied the redoubts on the right of Fort Magruder, and
two of those on the left. Two others farther on the left were not seen
through the rain, and no one had been left to tell him of them or of the
grounds. The field in his front and far off on his right was open. That in
the immediate front had been opened by felling trees. On his left were
woodland and the swampy creek. General Hooker's division of the Third
Corps came to the open on the Hampton road at seven A.M. of the 5th, and
engaged by regiments,--the First Massachusetts on his left, preceded by a
battalion of skirmishers; the Second New Hampshire on the right, in the
same order; Hancock's brigade of W. F. Smith's division of the Fourth
Corps threatening on the Yorktown road; supported by part of Davidson's
brigade and artillery. After the advance of his infantry in the slashes,
General Hooker, with the Eleventh Massachusetts and Thirty-sixth
Pennsylvania Regiments of Grover's brigade, cleared the way for
communication with the troops on the Yorktown road, and ordered Webber's
six-gun battery into action towards the front of the fallen timber. As it
burst from the wood our infantry and every gun in reach opened upon it a
fire so destructive that it was unmanned before it came into practice.
Volunteers to man the battery were called, and with the assistance of men
of Osborn's battery the guns were opened. Bramhall's battery was advanced
and put into action on the right of Webber's, when the two poured an
unceasing fire against our troops about the fort and redoubts. It was not
very destructive, however, and they thought to reserve their ammunition.
The Fifth New Jersey Regiment, of Patterson's brigade, was added to the
guard of the batteries, and the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth were deployed
on the left in the woodland. Anderson called up Wilcox's brigade, and
ordered it to his right, reinforced it by the men of Pryor's brigade not
needed at the forts, and presently called for the brigades of A. P. Hill
and Pickett, to further support his right.
From the swelling noise of battle I concluded that it would be well to
ride to the front, and ordered the remaining brigade (Colston's) and the
batteries of Dearing and Stribling to follow. Stuart sent his horse
artillery under Pelham into the action on the open field.
Viewing the ground on the left, I thought it not so well protected as
Anderson conceived, and sent to D. H. Hill, who was but little advanced on
his march, for one of his brigades. Early's was sent, to whose brigade
were temporarily attached the Florida regiment and a Mississippi
battalion. Anderson had left the fort, and was busy handling the brigades
engaged in the woods on the right. Colston's was put in with the other
brigades under Anderson, who afterwards called for another regiment. The
Florida regiment and the Mississippi battalion were sent. Early, with his
brigade, was posted on the field in rear of our left.
When it became evident that the fight was for the day, D. H. Hill was
asked to return with the balance of his division. Meanwhile, Hooker was
bracing the fight on his left. Emory reported to him with his cavalry and
light battery, but as his fight was in the wood, Emory was asked to
reconnoitre on his extreme left. The fight growing in the wood, Grover
drew off part of his brigade to reinforce against it. The Seventy-second
and Seventeenth New York Regiments of Taylor's brigade were also sent;
then the Seventy-third and Seventy-fourth New York Regiments of the same
brigade; but the Confederates gained ground gradually. They were, however,
getting short of ammunition. While holding their line, some of the
regiments were permitted to retire a little to fill their cartridge-boxes
from those of the fallen of the enemy and of their comrades. This move was
misconstrued into an order to withdraw, and the line fell back a little.
But the mistake was rectified, and the ground that had been abandoned was
recovered.
Hooker ordered the Eleventh Massachusetts and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania
Regiments to the support of the batteries, and the Second New Hampshire
Regiment to his left. Anderson, drawing his troops together near the
batteries, made a concentrated move upon them, and cleared them of the
gunners, securing four of Webber's guns and forty horses. Just then he was
reinforced by Colston's brigade, the Florida regiment, and the Mississippi
battalion. General Stuart taking it that the enemy was badly broken and in
retreat, rode up with his cavalry, insisting upon a charge and pursuit. As
he did not recognize authority except of the commander-in-chief, he was
only cautioned that the break was only of the enemy's front, that he would
find reinforcements coming up, and this he began to realize by the clearer
ring of their muskets. He speedily encountered them, but in time to get
away before meeting serious trouble. About three o'clock Kearny's division
arrived, and only a few minutes later D. H. Hill's, of the Confederates.
On the approach of Kearny's leading brigades, one regiment was detached
from Berry's to reinforce Emory's Cavalry detachment on their left. The
other regiments were deployed, the Fifth Michigan on the left of the
road, the Thirty-seventh New York on its left, along the road, one company
of the New York regiment from left to rear. Six companies of the Michigan
regiment were broken off to the rear of its right as reserve, leaving its
forward battalion partly across the road, while that in rear had two
companies on the right and two on the left of the road. Two regiments of
Birney's brigade were deployed, the Thirty-eighth on the right of, and the
Fortieth across, the road, to relieve some of Hooker's regiments. Then
Peck's brigade of Couch's division came, and was put in on the right, the
One Hundred and Second Pennsylvania and the Fifty-fifth New York on the
left, the Sixty-second New York in the wood, the Ninety-third Pennsylvania
on the left, and after a little the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania.
Before the reinforcements arrived for Hooker's relief, Anderson had
established his advance line of skirmishers, so as to cover with their
fire Webber's guns that were abandoned. The Federal reinforcing columns
drove back his advance line, when, in turn, he reinforced, recovered the
ground, and met General Peck, who led the last reinforcing brigade. This
advance was so firm that General Peck found it necessary to put in his
last regiment, the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania, but neither our force nor
our condition of march could warrant further aggressive work of our right.
General Couch, left in command on the Federal left, posted his troops for
the night,--General Devens with the Seventh Massachusetts Regiment and
Second Rhode Island, General Palmer with two, and General Keim with three
other regiments, supporting General Peck. General Peck's ammunition being
exhausted, his brigade was relieved by six of the new regiments, and
reported that "Every preparation was made to resist a night attack."[10]
On the Confederate side, General Anderson reported his position safe to
hold until the time to withdraw for the march. About noon, General
Hancock, in command of his own and Davidson's brigades in front of our
left, started with three of his own regiments and two of Davidson's and
the six-gun battery under Lieutenant Carson in search of the unoccupied
redoubts in that quarter. He approached by the dam at Sanders's Pond,
passed the dam, and occupied one of the redoubts, leaving three companies
to guard a road crossing on the right of his line of march. He put three
companies of infantry in the redoubt and advanced his regiments and
battery to the field in front. He then found another redoubt not occupied,
and posted three other companies in it. He was reinforced by a four-gun
battery under Captain Wheeler, which he posted in rear of his line of
battle and awaited developments. When the last engagement on our right had
calmed down to exchange of desultory shots, D. H. Hill's division was
waiting to know if Anderson would need further support. Meanwhile, some of
his officers had made a reconnoissance in front of his ground, and
reported a route by which favorable attack could be made upon the Federals
at the redoubt under Hancock.
General Johnston had arrived at my head-quarters, near Fort Magruder, when
General Hill sent to report the reconnoissance, and to ask that he be
allowed to make a move against Hancock, by Early's brigade. General
Johnston received the message, and referred the officer to me. I ordered
that the move should not be made, explaining that we were only fighting
for time to draw off our trains, that aggressive battle was necessary on
our right in order to keep the enemy back in the woodland from the open,
where, by his superior artillery and numbers, he might deploy beyond our
limits, and turn us out of position; that on our left there was no cause
for apprehension of such action, and we could not risk being drawn into
serious delay by starting new work so late in the day. Very soon General
Hill rode over to report of the opportunity: that he thought he could get
through before night, and would not be likely to involve delay of our
night march. General Johnston referred him to me. I said,--
"The brigade you propose to use is not in safe hands. If you will go
with it, and see that the troops are properly handled, you can make
the attack, but don't involve us so as to delay the march after
night."
In a letter from General Hill, after the war, he wrote of the fight by
this brigade,--
"I cannot think of it, till this day, without horror. The slaughter of
the Fifth North Carolina Regiment was one of the most awful things I
ever saw, and it was caused by a blunder. At your request, I think, I
followed Early's brigade, following the right wing."
General Hill was in advance of the brigade with the Fifth and Twenty-third
North Carolina Regiments, General Early in rear with the Twenty-fourth and
Thirty-eighth Virginia Regiments. General Hill ordered the advance
regiments to halt after crossing a streamlet and get under cover of the
wood till the brigade could form; but General Early, not waiting for
orders or the brigade, rode to the front of the Twenty-fourth Virginia,
and with it made the attack. The gallant McRae, of the Fifth North
Carolina, seeing the Twenty-fourth Virginia hotly engaged, dashed forward,
_nolens volens_, to its relief. The other regiments, seeing the confusion
of movements and of orders, failed to go forward. Part of my troops, on
Early's right, seeing that a fight was open on that part of the field,
started without orders to go to his relief, but found the fight lost
before they were engaged. After the brigade was collected on its first
position, General Johnston rode to his head-quarters. At dark the
Confederates were withdrawn and took up the line of march, the division
of D. H. Hill taking the rear of the column, Rains's brigade the rear of
the division. On his march, General Rains found, in a broken-down
ammunition-wagon, several loaded shells, four of them with sensitive fuse
primers, which he placed near some fallen trees, cut down as obstructions.
He afterwards heard that some of them were tramped upon by the Federal
cavalry and exploded.
The pursuit was not active, hardly annoying. The roads were cut into deep
mud by the trains, and the side-ways by troops far out on either side,
making puddles ankle-deep in all directions, so that the march was slow
and trying, but giving almost absolute safe-conduct against pursuit, and
our men were allowed to spread their ranks in search of ground strong
enough to bear them.
My estimate, made on the field, of the troops engaged was, Confederate,
9000; Union, 12,000. The casualties of the engagement were, Confederate,
1565 aggregate;[11] Federal, 2288 aggregate.[12]
General McClellan was at Yorktown during the greater part of the day to
see Franklin's, Sedgwick's, and Richardson's divisions aboard the
transports for his proposed flanking and rear move up York River, but upon
receiving reports that the engagement at Williamsburg was growing serious
and not satisfactory, he rode to the battle, and called the divisions of
Sedgwick and Richardson to follow him.
The object of the battle was to gain time to haul our trains to places of
safety. The effect, besides, was to call two of the divisions from their
flanking move to support the battle, and this so crippled that expedition
that it gave us no serious trouble. The trophies of the battle were with
the Confederates, and they claim the honor to inscribe Williamsburg upon
their battle-flags.
The success of General Hancock in holding his position in and about the
forts with five regiments and two batteries against the assault of the
Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiments was given heroic
proportions by his chief, who christened him "The Superb," to relieve, it
is supposed, by the picturesque figure on his right, the discomfiture of
his left. But, reading between the lines, the highest compliment was for
the two Confederate regiments.
In his official account, General Johnston said,--
"The action gradually increased in magnitude until about three
o'clock, when General Longstreet, commanding the rear, requested that
a part of Major-General Hill's troops might be sent to his aid. Upon
this I rode upon the field, but found myself compelled to be a
spectator, for General Longstreet's clear head and brave heart left no
apology for interference."
Franklin's division was taken by transports to the mouth of Pamunkey
River, and was supported by the navy. On the 7th a brigade of Sedgwick's
division joined Franklin. On the same day, Johnston's army was collected
near Barhamville. General Whiting, with Hood's brigade and part of
Hampton's, engaged the advance of Franklin's command and forced it back.
This cleared our route of march towards Richmond, Smith's and Magruder's
divisions by the road to New Kent Court-House, Hill's and Longstreet's
nearer the Chickahominy.
General McClellan's plans were laid according to strict rules of strategy,
but he was not quick or forcible in handling his troops.
CHAPTER VII.
SEVEN PINES, OR FAIR OAKS.
A New Line of Defence--Positions of the Confronting Armies--Fitz-John
Porter--Terrific Storm on the Eve of Battle--General Johnston's Orders
to Longstreet, Smith, and Huger--Lack of Co-operation on the
Confederate Side, and Ensuing Confusion--Fatalities among Confederate
Officers--Kearny's Action--Serious Wounding of General Johnston at the
Close of the Battle--Summary and Analysis of Losses.
On the 9th of May the Confederate army was halted, its right near Long
Bridge of the Chickahominy River; its left and cavalry extending towards
the Pamunkey through New Kent Court-House. On the 11th the commander of
the Confederate ram "Virginia" ("Merrimac"), finding the water of James
River not sufficient to float her to the works near Richmond, scuttled and
sank the ship where she lay.
On the 15th the Federal navy attacked our works at Chapin's and Drury's
Bluffs, but found them too strong for water batteries. That attack
suggested to General Johnston that he move nearer Richmond to be in
position to lend the batteries assistance in case of need. He crossed the
Chickahominy, his right wing at Long Bridge, his left by Bottom's Bridge,
and took position from Drury's Bluff on his right, to the Mechanicsville
turnpike, with his infantry, the cavalry extending on the left and front
to the lower Rappahannock and Fredericksburg. The right wing, D. H. Hill's
and Longstreet's divisions, under Longstreet, from James River to White
Oak Swamp; the left under G. W. Smith. Smith's division and Magruder's
command from White Oak Swamp, extending thence to the Mechanicsville pike,
with Jackson a hundred miles away in the Shenandoah Valley.
After careful study of the works and armaments at Drury's Bluff, I
ventured the suggestion that we recross the Chickahominy at Mechanicsville
and stand behind Beaver Dam Creek, prepared against McClellan's right when
he should be ready to march towards Richmond, and call him to relieve his
flank before crossing the river.
Although the country between McClellan's landing on the Pamunkey to the
Chickahominy was free of all obstacles on the 15th of May, the head of his
advance did not reach the banks of the latter river till the 21st. On the
16th he established his permanent depot at the White House, on the
Pamunkey, and organized two provisional army corps,--the Fifth, of
Fitz-John Porter's division, and Sykes's, under command of Porter; the
Sixth, of Franklin's and W. F. Smith's divisions, under Franklin. On the
26th the York River Railroad as far as the bridge across the Chickahominy
was repaired and in use. This, with other bridges, was speedily repaired,
and new bridges ordered built at such points as should be found necessary
to make free communication between the posts of the army.
On the 24th parties were advanced on the Williamsburg road as far as Seven
Pines, where a spirited affair occurred between General Naglee's forces
and General Hatton's brigade, the latter withdrawing a mile and a half on
the Williamsburg road. At the same time two other parties of Federals were
sent up the left bank, one under General Davidson, of the cavalry, with
artillery and infantry supports, as far as Mechanicsville, where he
encountered and dislodged a Confederate cavalry force under Colonel B. H.
Robertson and occupied the position. The third party, under Colonel
Woodbury, the Fourth Michigan Infantry and a squadron of the Second United
States Cavalry, moved up to New Bridge, where the Fifth Louisiana, Colonel
Hunt, of Semmes's brigade, was on picket. Finding the bridge well guarded,
a party, conducted by Lieutenant Bowen, Topographical Engineers, marched
up the river, concealing their movements, crossed to the west bank, and,
passing down, surprised the Fifth Louisiana, threw it into disorder, and
gained position on the west side.
Pleased at these successes, General McClellan sent a sensational despatch
to the President. His position thus masked, rested his right upon Beaver
Dam Creek, a stream that flows from the height between the Chickahominy
and Pamunkey Rivers south to its confluence with the former a few hundred
yards below Mechanicsville Bridge. Its banks are scarped, about six feet
high, and eight feet apart, making a strong natural ditch for defensive
works.
On commanding ground south of the creek admirably planned field-works were
soon constructed, which made that flank unassailable. Two miles out from
the river the creek loses its value as a defensive line. From Beaver Dam
the line was extended down the river to New Bridge, where it crossed and
reached its left out to White Oak Swamp, and there found as defensible
guard as the right at Beaver Dam Creek. The swamp is about a quarter of a
mile wide at the left, and down to the Chickahominy studded with heavy
forest-trees, always wet and boggy, but readily forded by infantry, and at
places by cavalry.
Near the middle of the line, back from New Bridge, was Stoneman's cavalry.
Fitz-John Porter's corps (Fifth) was posted at Beaver Dam Creek,
Franklin's (Sixth) two miles lower down, Sumner's (Second) near the middle
of the line, about three miles from the river. The Third and Fourth Corps
were on the south side, Kearny's division of the Third at Savage Station
of the York River Railroad, Hooker's division at White Oak Swamp Bridge,
with entrenched lines. The Fourth Corps was posted on the Williamsburg
road, Couch's division about a mile in advance of Hooker's, of the Third,
at the junction of the Nine Miles road, entrenched, and field of abatis;
Casey's division of the Third half a mile in advance of Couch's,
entrenched, and field of abatis. The point occupied by Couch's division is
known as Seven Pines. His advanced picket-guard on the Nine Miles road was
at Fair Oaks Station of the York River Railroad.
The line, which was somewhat concave towards Richmond, was strengthened at
vulnerable points by field-works. General Sumner was senior of the corps
commanders, and in command of the right wing; General Heintzelman, the
senior of the south side, was in command of the left wing. The
Chickahominy is a hundred feet wide as far up as Mechanicsville Bridge,
but narrows above to forty and thirty. Along the line of McClellan's
deployment its course was through lowlands of tangled woods that fringe
its banks, the valley seldom more than a hundred yards wide. Artillery was
posted to command all bridges and those ordered for construction. On the
26th, General McClellan ordered General Fitz-John Porter to organize a
force to march against a Confederate outpost near Hanover Court-House.
Porter took of Morell's division three brigades,--Martindale's,
Butterfield's, and McQuade's,--Berdan's Sharp-shooters and three
batteries, two regiments of cavalry under General Emory, and Benson's
horse battery; Warren's brigade to march up the right bank of the Pamunkey
in connection with operations projected for the fighting column. Porter
was the most skilful tactician and strongest fighter in the Federal army,
thoroughly trained in his profession from boyhood, and of some experience
in field work.
The Confederate outpost was commanded by Brigadier-General L. O'B. Branch,
six regiments of infantry, one battery, under Captain Latham, and a
cavalry regiment, under Colonel Robertson. General Branch was a brigadier
from civil life. The result of the affair was the discomfiture of General
Branch, with the loss of one gun and about seven hundred prisoners.
Losses in action, not including prisoners: Confederates, 265; Federals,
285.
A. P. Hill was promoted to major-general, and assigned to command of a
division at that outpost and stationed at Ashland.
On the 27th, General Johnston received information that General McDowell's
corps was at Fredericksburg, and on the march to reinforce McClellan's
right at Mechanicsville. He prepared to attack McClellan before McDowell
could reach him. To this end he withdrew Smith's division from the
Williamsburg road, relieving it by the division of D. H. Hill; withdrew
Longstreet's division from its position, and A. P. Hill's from Ashland.
The fighting column was to be under General G. W. Smith, his next in rank,
and General Whiting was assigned command of Smith's division,--the column
to consist of A. P. Hill's, Whiting's, and D. R. Jones's divisions. The
latter was posted between the Mechanicsville pike and Meadow Bridge road.
A. P. Hill was to march direct against McClellan's outpost at
Mechanicsville, Whiting to cross the river at Meadow Bridge, and D. R.
Jones at Mechanicsville, thus completing the column of attack on the east
side.
I was to march by the Mechanicsville road to the vicinity of the bridge,
and to strike down against the Federal right, west of the river, the march
to be made during the night; D. H. Hill to post a brigade on his right on
the Charles City road to guard the field to be left by his division, as
well as the line left vacant by Longstreet's division.
At nightfall the troops took up the march for their several assigned
positions. Before dark General Johnston called a number of his officers
together for instructions,--viz., Smith, Magruder, Stuart, and Longstreet.
When we were assembled, General Johnston announced later information: that
McDowell's line of march had been changed,--that he was going north.
Following the report of this information, General Smith proposed that the
plan for battle should be given up, in view of the very strong ground at
Beaver Dam Creek.[13] I urged that the plan laid against the concentrating
columns was made stronger by the change of direction of McDowell's column,
and should suggest more prompt and vigorous prosecution. In this Magruder
and Stuart joined me. The _pros_ and _cons_ were talked over till a late
hour, when at last General Johnston, weary of it, walked aside to a
separate seat. I took the opportunity to draw near him, and suggested that
the Federal position behind Beaver Dam Creek, so seriously objected to by
General Smith, could be turned by marching to and along the high ground
between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey Rivers; that the position of the
enemy when turned would be abandoned without a severe struggle, and give a
fair field for battle; that we should not lose the opportunity to await
another possible one.
General Johnston replied that he was aware of all that, but found that he
had selected the wrong officer for the work. This ended the talk, and I
asked to be allowed to halt my columns as soon as possible. The other
movements were arrested, except that of A. P. Hill's division, which was
ordered to continue its march, cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge,
and take position between the Meadow Bridge road and the Brooke turnpike.
The counter-order reinstated my command of the right wing, including D. H.
Hill's division on the Williamsburg road and extending to the York River
Railroad. Before leaving the conference, I announced that we would fight
on the Williamsburg road if we had to find the enemy through bayous.
The order to halt the columns found Smith's division between the
Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridge roads, Longstreet's near the city at the
Nine Miles road; D. R. Jones had not moved.
On the 29th and 30th, General D. H. Hill sent out reconnoitring parties on
the Williamsburg and Charles City roads. On the 30th he received a fair
report of Casey's intrenched camp, and the probable strength and extent of
the line of his skirmishers reaching out his left front to White Oak
Swamp. On the 29th, General Johnston wrote General Whiting, commanding
Smith's division, giving notice of a reconnoissance ordered by General
Hill, cautioning the former that his division should be drawn towards the
right, to be in better position for support of a battle of his right, and
adding,--
"Who knows but that in the course of the morning Longstreet's scheme
may accomplish itself? If we get into a fight here, you will have to
hurry to help us."
The report of General D. H. Hill's reconnoissance of the 30th was
forwarded to head-quarters. I followed it, and found General Johnston
ready to talk over plans for battle. General Huger had reported with three
of his brigades, and was in camp near the outskirts of Richmond on Gillis
Creek. The plan settled upon was that the attack should be made by General
D. H. Hill's division on the Williamsburg road, supported by Longstreet's
division. Huger's division, just out of garrison duty at Norfolk, was to
march between Hill's right and the swamp against the enemy's line of
skirmishers, and move abreast of the battle; G. W. Smith's division, under
Whiting, to march by the Gaines road to Old Tavern, and move abreast of
the battle on its left. The field before Old Tavern was not carefully
covered by the enemy's skirmishers north of Fair Oaks, nor by parties in
observation.
Experience during the discussion of the battle ordered for the 28th caused
me to doubt of effective work from the troops ordered for the left flank,
but the plan seemed so simple that it was thought impossible for any one
to go dangerously wrong; and General Johnston stated that he would be on
that road, the better to receive from his troops along the crest of the
Chickahominy information of movements of the enemy on the farther side of
the river, and to look to the co-operation of the troops on the Nine Miles
road.
To facilitate marches, Huger's division was to have the Charles City road
to the head of White Oak Swamp, file across it and march down its northern
margin; D. H. Hill to have the Williamsburg road to the enemy's front;
Longstreet's division to march by the Nine Miles road and a lateral road
leading across the rear of General Hill on the Williamsburg road; G. W.
Smith by the Gaines road to Old Tavern on the Nine Miles road.
The tactical handling of the battle on the Williamsburg road was left to
my care, as well as the general conduct of affairs south of the York River
Railroad, the latter line being the left of the field to which I had been
assigned, the right wing.
While yet affairs were under consideration, a terrific storm of vivid
lightning, thunderbolts, and rain, as severe as ever known to any climate,
burst upon us, and continued through the night more or less severe. In the
first lull I rode from General Johnston's to my head-quarters, and sent
orders for early march.
For a more comprehensive view of affairs as ordered, it may be well to
explain that General Johnston ordered Smith's division by the Gaines road,
so that, in case of delay of its march, McLaws's division, on that road
and nearer the field of proposed action, could be brought in to the left
of the battle, leaving the place of his division to be occupied by
Smith's, when the latter reached McLaws's vacated line. There was,
therefore, no reason why the orders for march should be misconstrued or
misapplied. I was with General Johnston all of the time that he was
engaged in planning and ordering the battle, heard every word and thought
expressed by him of it, and received his verbal orders; Generals Huger and
Smith his written orders.
General Johnston's order to General Smith was:
"HEAD-QUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
"May 30, 9.15 P.M.
"MAJOR-GENERAL G. W. SMITH:
"GENERAL,--If nothing prevents, we will fall upon the enemy in front
of Major-General Hill (who occupies the position on the Williamsburg
road from which your troops moved to the neighborhood of Meadow
Bridge) early in the morning, as early as practicable. The
Chickahominy will be passable only at the bridge, a great advantage to
us. Please be ready to move by the Gaines road, coming as early as
possible to the point at which the road to New Bridge turns off.
Should there be cause for haste, Major-General McLaws, on your
approach, will be ordered to leave his ground for you, that he may
reinforce General Longstreet.
"Most respectfully your obedient servant,
"J. E. JOHNSTON."[14]
General Johnston's order for General Huger read:
"HEAD-QUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
"May 30, 1862, 8.30 P.M.
"MAJOR-GENERAL HUGER:
"GENERAL,--The reports of Major-General D. H. Hill give me the
impression that the enemy is in considerable strength in his front. It
seems to me necessary that we should increase our force also; for that
object I wish to concentrate the troops of your division on the
Charles City road, and to concentrate the troops of Major-General Hill
on the Williamsburg road. To do this it will be necessary for you to
move, as early in the morning as possible, to relieve the brigade of
General Hill's division now on the Charles City road. I have desired
General Hill to send you a guide. The road is the second large one
diverging to the right from the Williamsburg road. The first turns
off near the toll-gate. On reaching your position on the Charles City
road, learn at once the route to the main roads, to Richmond on your
right and left, especially those to the left, and try to find guides.
Be ready, if an action should begin on your left, to fall upon the
enemy's left flank.
"Most respectfully your obedient servant,
"J. E. JOHNSTON.
"P.S.--It is necessary to move very early."[15]
The Nine Miles road takes the name from the distance by that road from
Richmond to Seven Pines. The Williamsburg road to the same point was
sometimes called the Seven Miles road, because of the distance by that
road to Seven Pines.
As expressed and repeated in his orders, General Johnston's wish was to
have the battle pitched as early as practicable. When his orders were
issued, he was under the impression that I would be the ranking officer on
the right of the York Railroad, and would give detailed instructions to
govern the later operations of Huger's troops.
Subsequent events seem to call for mention just here that General Smith,
instead of moving the troops by the route assigned them, marched back to
the Nine Miles road near the city, rode to Johnston's head-quarters about
six in the morning, and reported that he was with the division, but not
for the purpose of taking command from General Whiting. As General
Johnston did not care to order him back to his position as commander of
the left wing, he set himself to work to make trouble, complained that my
troops were on the Nine Miles road in the way of his march, and presently
complained that they had left that road and were over on the Williamsburg
road, and induced General Johnston to so far modify the plans as to order
three of my brigades down the Nine Miles road to the New Bridge fork.
The order was sent by Lieutenant Washington, of Johnston's staff, who,
unused to campaigning, failed to notice that he was not riding on my line
of march, and rode into the enemy's lines. This accident gave the enemy
the first warning of approaching danger; it was misleading, however, as it
caused General Keyes to look for the attack by the Nine Miles road.
The storms had flooded the flat lands, and the waters as they fell seemed
weary of the battle of the elements, and inclined to have a good rest on
the soft bed of sand which let them gently down to the substratum of clay;
or it may have been the purpose of kind Providence to so intermix the
upper and lower strata as to interpose serious barriers to the passing of
artillery, and thus break up the battle of men.
My march by the Nine Miles and lateral roads leading across to the
Williamsburg road was interrupted by the flooded grounds about the head of
Gillis Creek. At the same time this creek was bank full, where it found a
channel for its flow into the James. The delay of an hour to construct a
bridge was preferred to the encounter of more serious obstacles along the
narrow lateral road, flooded by the storm. As we were earlier at the
creek, it gave us precedence over Huger's division, which had to cross
after us. The division was prepared with cooked rations, had wagons packed
at six o'clock, and rested in the rear of General Hill's at nine A.M.
Meanwhile, General G. W. Smith's division had marched by the Nine Miles
road and was resting near the fork of the New Bridge road at Old Tavern.
Upon meeting General Huger in the morning, I gave him a succinct account
of General Johnston's plans and wishes; after which he inquired as to the
dates of our commissions, which revealed that he was the ranking officer,
when I suggested that it was only necessary for him to take command and
execute the orders. This he declined. Then it was proposed that he should
send two of his brigades across to join on the right of the column of
attack, while he could remain with his other brigade, which was to relieve
that of General Hill on the Charles City road. Though he expressed himself
satisfied with this, his manner was eloquent of discontent. The better to
harmonize, I proposed to reinforce his column by three of my brigades, to
be sent under General Wilcox, to lead or follow his division, as he might
order. Under this arrangement it seemed that concert of action was
assured. I gave especial orders to General Wilcox to have care that the
head of his column was abreast the battle when it opened, and rode forward
to join General Hill, my other three brigades advancing along the
Williamsburg road.
Opposing and in the immediate front of General Hill was the division of
General Casey, of the Fourth (Keyes's) Corps. The division stood in an
intrenched camp across the Williamsburg road, with a pentagonal redoubt
(unfinished) on the left of his line. Half a mile in rear of Casey's
division was that of Couch, of the same corps, behind a second trenched
line, at its junction of the Nine Miles road, part of Couch's extending
along the latter road to Fair Oaks Station of the York River Railroad, and
intrenched; farther forward he had a guarded picket station. Between Couch
and Casey a skirt of wood stretched from the swamp on their left across
the Williamsburg and Nine Miles roads and the railroad. Between the
stretch of forest and Couch was an open; spreading across the roads, and
at Casey's front, was another open, though more limited, some abatis being
arranged along their front lines. These were the only cleared fields on
the south side of the railroad within two miles of Casey's picket line,
our line of march and attack.
General D. H. Hill stood ready for battle at an early hour, waiting for
his brigade on the Charles City road. Under the delay to relieve that
brigade by one of Huger's divisions, I sent orders to General Wilcox to
pull off from column on that road and march for the position assigned him
near the head of White Oak Swamp.
The detailed instructions for battle were that the advance should be made
in columns of brigades two on each side the Williamsburg road, preceded by
strong lines of skirmishers; the advance, approaching an open or abatis or
trench line, should reinforce the skirmish line to strong engagement,
while the lines of battle turned those obstacles by flank or oblique march
when the general advance should be resumed. As the wooded field was not
convenient for artillery use, we only held the batteries of Bondurant and
Carter ready for call. At eleven o'clock, weary of delay, General Hill
asked to let loose his signal-gun and engage, but was ordered to wait for
his absent brigade.
The reports of the hour of opening battle are more conflicting in this
than in most battles, owing possibly to the fact that many are fixed by
the beginning of the hot battle about the trenched camp, while others are
based on the actual firing of the signal-guns. The weight of evidence
seems conclusive of the former attack at one P.M., and this would place
the firing of the signal-guns back to noon or a little after. As events
occurred, however, the hour is not of especial interest, as it is shown
that the battle was in time for a finish before night if it had been
promptly followed up. I will say, therefore, that General Hill's second
appeal to open the signal-gun was made a little before noon, and that he
stated in this appeal that his brigade from the Charles City road was
approaching, and would be with him. He was then authorized to march, but
to give instructions that the advance should be carefully conducted until
all the troops were in place, to give full force to his battle. He had
four brigades, and was ordered to advance in columns of brigades, two on
each side of the road. Garland's and G. B. Anderson's brigades in columns,
preceded by skirmishers, advanced on the left of the road at the sound of
the guns, and engaged after a short march from the starting. As Rodes's
brigade was not yet in position, some little time elapsed before the
columns on the right moved, so that Garland's column encountered more than
its share of early fight, but Rodes, supported by Rains's brigade, came
promptly to his relief, which steadied the advance. The enemy's front was
reinforced and arrested progress of our skirmishers, but a way was found
by which the enemy was turned out of position, and by and by the open
before the intrenched camp was reached. In the redoubt was a six-gun
battery, and on the right another section of two pieces. General Hill
ordered Bondurant's battery to the open into action, and presently the
battery of Captain Carter.
Garland and G. B. Anderson had severe contention at one o'clock, but by
pushing front and flank movements got to the enemy's strong line. R. H.
Anderson's brigade was pushed up in support of their left, when a bold
move gave us the section of artillery and that end of the line. At the
same time Carter's battery was in close practice with five guns within
four hundred yards of the redoubt, and the enemy was seriously disturbed;
but General Hill was disposed to wait a little for Huger, thought to be
between him and the swamp, to get farther in; then, fearing that longer
wait might be hazardous of his opportunity, he ordered Rains's brigade
past the enemy's left, when Rodes seized the moment, rushed in, and gained
the redoubt and the battery. The officers at the battery made a brave
effort to spike their guns, but were killed in the act. So Rodes, who had
some artillerists acting as infantry, turned them with some effect upon
the troops as they retired.
When General Hill reported that he must use Rains's brigade to march
around the redoubt, other orders were sent General Wilcox to leave General
Huger's column and march to his position on the right of General Hill's
battle, directing, in case there were serious obstacles to his march by
the Charles City road, to march over to and down the Williamsburg road. A
slip of paper was sent General Johnston reporting progress and asking
co-operation on our left.
The battle moved bravely on. R. H. Anderson's brigade was ordered to
support its left at Fair Oaks, and Pickett's, on the railroad, was drawn
near. Hill met Casey's troops rallying, and reinforcements with them
coming to recover the lost ground, but they were forced back to the second
intrenched line (Couch's), where severe fighting ensued, but the line was
carried at two o'clock, cutting Couch with four regiments and two
companies of infantry, and Brady's six-gun battery, off at Fair Oaks
Station. Finding that he could not cut his way back to his command, Couch
stood back from the railroad and presently opened his battery fire across
our advancing lines. As he was standing directly in front of Smith's
division, we thought that he would soon be attacked and driven off.
Nevertheless, it was not prudent to leave that point on our flank
unguarded until we found Smith's division in action. The force was shut
off from our view by the thick pine wood, so that we could know nothing of
its strength, and only knew of its position from its artillery fire. We
could not attack it lest we should fall under the fire of the division in
position for that attack. Anderson's other regiments, under the gallant
Colonel M. Jenkins, were ordered into Hill's forward battle, as his troops
were worn. Jenkins soon found himself in the van, and so swiftly led on
that the discomfited troops found no opportunity to rally. Reinforcements
from the Third Corps came, but in the swampy wood Jenkins was prompt
enough to strike their heads as their retreating comrades passed. Right
and left and front he applied his beautiful tactics and pushed his battle.
General Kearny, finding that he could not arrest the march, put Berry's
brigade off to the swamp to flank and strike it, and took part of
Jamison's brigade to follow. They got into the swamp and followed it up to
the open near the Couch intrenchment,[16] but Jenkins knew that there was
some one there to meet them, and pushed his onward battle. General Hill
ordered Rains's brigade to turn this new force, while Rodes attacked, but
the latter's men were worn, and some of them were with the advance.
Kemper's brigade was sent to support the forward battle, but General Hill
directed it to his right against Berry, in front of Rains, and it seems
that the heavy, swampy ground so obstructed operations on both sides as to
limit their work to infantry fusillades until six o'clock.
Our battle on the Williamsburg road was in a sack. We were strong enough
to guard our flanks and push straight on, but the front was growing heavy.
It was time for Wilcox's brigades under his last order, but nothing was
heard of them. I asked General Stuart, who had joined me, if there were
obstacles to Wilcox's march between the Charles City and Williamsburg
roads. He reported that there was nothing more than swamp lands, hardly
knee-deep. He was asked for a guide, who was sent with a courier bearing
orders for them to remain with General Wilcox until he reported at my
head-quarters.
Again I reported the cramped condition of our work, owing to the artillery
practice from beyond the railroad, and asked General Johnston to have the
division that was with him drive that force away and loose our left. This
note was ordered to be put into General Johnston's hands. He gave
peremptory commands to that effect, but the movements were so slow that he
lost patience and rode with Hood's leading brigade, pulled it on, and
ordered communication opened with my left.
[Illustration: FIELD OF SEVEN PINES (FAIR OAKS). POSITIONS OF TROOPS May
31st, Morning; May 31st, Night; June 1st]
At one o'clock, General McClellan, at his head-quarters beyond the river,
six miles away, heard the noise of battle and ordered Sumner's (Second)
corps under arms to await orders. General Sumner ordered the command under
arms, marched the divisions to their separate bridges, and put the columns
on the bridges, partly submerged, to hold them to their moorings,
anxiously awaiting authority from his chief to march to the relief of his
comrades. The bridge where Sedgwick's division stood was passable, but
Richardson's was under water waist-deep, and the flooding river rising.
Richardson waded one brigade through, but thought that he could save time
by marching up to the Sedgwick bridge, which so delayed him that he did
not reach the field until after night.
As General Johnston rode with Hood's brigade, he saw the detachment under
General Couch marching north to find at the Adams House the road to
Grapevine Bridge, his open way of retreat. Directly he heard firing where
Couch was marching, but thought that Smith's other brigades were equal to
work that could open up there, and rode on, ordering Hood to find
communication with my left. Smith's other brigades were: Whiting's,
commanded by Colonel Law; Hampton's, Pettigrew's, and Hatton's; Whiting
commanding the division, Smith commanding the left wing. Smith quotes
Colonel Frobel, who was with him at the time,--viz.:
"Whiting's brigade was gone; it had been ordered forward to charge the
batteries which were firing upon us. The brigade was repulsed, and in
a few minutes came streaming back through the little skirt of woods to
the left of the Nine Miles road, near the crossing. There was only a
part of a brigade in this charge. Pender soon rallied and reformed
them on the edge of the woods. General Whiting sent an order to him
to reconnoitre the batteries, and if he thought they could be taken,
to try it again. Before he could do so, some one galloped up,
shouting, 'Charge that battery!' The men hurried forward at
double-quick, but were repulsed as before."[17]
It seems that at that moment General Sumner reached the field. He
reported:
"On arriving on the field, I found General Couch, with four regiments
and two companies of infantry and Brady's battery. These troops were
drawn up in line near Adams's House, and there was a pause in the
battle."
He received his orders at 2.30 P.M. and marched with Sedgwick's
division--three brigades--and Kirby's battery, and reached the ground of
Couch's work at 4.30. In less than an hour he had surveyed the ground and
placed his troops to receive battle.
General S
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