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Calvinistic Controversy

by Wilbur Fisk · English · Gutenberg #38232 · 487,372 chars · public domain (US)

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Title: Calvinistic Controversy

Author: Wilbur Fisk


        
Release date: December 6, 2011 [eBook #38232]

Language: English

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/38232

Credits: Produced by Keith G Richardson


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY ***




Produced by Keith G Richardson




CALVINISTIC CONTROVERSY:

EMBRACING A SERMON

ON PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION,

AND SEVERAL NUMBERS,

FORMERLY PUBLISHED IN THE CHRISTIAN ADVOCATE AND JOURNAL.

BY REV. WILBUR FISK, D. D.

NEW-YORK,

PUBLISHED BY B. WAUGH AND T. MASON,

For the Methodist Episcopal Church at the Conference Office, 200
Mulberry-street.

_J. Collord, Printer_.

1835.




"Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1835, by B. Waugh and
T. Mason, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern
District of New-York."




CONTENTS.

Advertisement

Sermon on Predestination and Election

I. Reply to the Christian Spectator

II. A proposition to Calvinists

III. Indefiniteness of Calvinism

IV. Brief sketch of the past changes and present state of Calvinism in
this country

V. Same subject continued

VI. Predestination

VII. Predestination, continued

VIII. Moral agency and accountability

IX. Moral agency and accountability, continued

X. Moral agency as affected by the fall, and the subsequent provisions
of grace

XI. Same subject continued

XII. Objections to gracious ability answered

XIII. Regeneration

XIV. Regeneration, continued

XV. Regeneration, continued




ADVERTISEMENT.

The numbers following the sermon on predestination and election, were
written at different times, and in some instances at quite distant
intervals from each other. This will be received, it is hoped, as an
apology for any want of connection or uniformity of style, which the
reader may notice. And if any farther apology be necessary, it may be
found in the fact, that the entire contents of the volume as it is now
presented, were written in the midst of other pressing duties.--And the
same reason has prevented my giving the work such a thorough revision,
as it should have had, before it was presented to the public, in the
more set and imposing form of a book. Such a form was not originally
thought of--and now that this is called for, the author is well aware
that the public might expect a careful revision and correction of the
whole. From this however, he must, of _necessity_, be excused. He has
been able to do little more than correct the typographical errors. If
the public have it, therefore, it must go "with all its imperfections on
its head." Only let it be understood, that _I do not send it out_. The
publishers say it is called for; and I consent that it may go. The
doctrines I believe, will stand the test of reason and Scripture,
although some of the arguments by which they are defended may be found
defective.

It was my original design to have added one or two numbers on election;
but upon farther reflection, it appeared to me that enough had been said
in the sermon on that point; and that at any rate, if Calvinian
predestination, and the Calvinistic views of moral agency and
regeneration, were found to be fallacious, the whole superstructure must
fall of course. On these points therefore, we may safely rest the entire
question between us and the Calvinists.

W. Fisk.

_Wesleyan University, April_ 28, 1835.




A DISCOURSE

ON

PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION.

According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the
world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love.

Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ,
to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, Ephesians i, 4,
5.

In this passage, the kindred doctrines of predestination and election
are brought into view. To discuss them, to notice some errors respecting
them, and to exhibit what is believed to be the Scriptural and rational
view of these doctrines, is the proposed object of the present
discourse. In doing this, much that is new cannot be expected. The whole
ground of this controversy has been examined and re-examined; and the
various arguments, on both sides, have been urged and opposed, by the
most able polemics in philosophy and theology. The most, therefore, that
can now be expected, is to give a concise view of the subject, in a form
and manner suited to the present state of the controversy, and to the
circumstances of the present congregation.

It is hoped, at least, that the subject may be investigated in the
spirit of Christianity; and that there will be no loss of brotherly and
Christian candour, if there be no gain, on the side of truth. Yet, in a
desire to give no offence, I must not suppress the truth, nor neglect to
point out, as I am able, the absurdity of error, and its unprofitable
influences on the minds of those who propagate or receive it. The truth
should be spoken, but it should be spoken in love. Neither the subject,
nor the age, nor the occasion, will admit of temporizing. With these
views, we come to our subject, by examining,

I. Predestination in general;

II. Predestination, in its particular relation to the doctrine of
election.

I. By predestination, we understand an efficient predetermination to
bring about or accomplish any future event. But as God alone has
knowledge to comprehend futurity, and power to direct and control future
events; predestination, in a _proper_ and _strict_ sense, can only be
used in reference to him. And with respect to God, predestination is
that efficient determination which he has maintained from eternity,
respecting the control, direction, and destiny of the laws, events, and
creatures of the universe.--That God hath a predetermination of this
kind, there can be no doubt; and therefore, on this fact, there can be
no dispute. But the ground of controversy is, the unlimited extent to
which some have carried this idea of predestination. Calvin, on this
subject, says, "Every action and motion of every creature is governed by
the hidden counsel of God, so that nothing can come to pass, but was
ordained by him." The Assembly's Catechism is similar:--"God did, from
all eternity, unchangeably ordain whatever comes to pass." And Mr. Buck
defines predestination to mean, "The decree of God, whereby he hath, for
his own glory, foreordained whatever comes to pass." With these
definitions, which, it is seen, are the same in substance, agree all the
Calvinistic divines in Europe and America.--To this view of
predestination, others, and we confess ourselves of that number, have
objected. We believe that the character and acts of intelligent beings,
so far at least as their moral accountability is concerned, are not
definitely fixed, and efficiently produced, by the unalterable purpose
and efficient decree of God. Here therefore we are at issue. We believe,
with the rigid predestinarians, that God hath fixed the laws of the
physical and moral world, and that he hath a general plan, suited to all
the various circumstances and contingencies of his government; but that
it is no part of this plan, efficiently to control and actuate the human
will. So far, therefore, as these ultra-predestinarians go beyond us,
they affirm what we deny; and of course the burden of proof falls upon
them. We shall first, then, hear and answer the arguments in defence of
their system, and then bring up our arguments against it.[1]

The supporters of this system endeavour to establish their views by a
threefold argument--the foreknowledge of God--the necessity of a
plan--and Scripture testimony.

1. The first argument is founded on foreknowledge. It is sometimes
contended that predestination and foreknowledge are the same. This,
however, by the more judicious, is not now insisted on. For it is
self-evident, that _to know_, and _to decree_, are distinct operations;
and to every one acquainted with the common definition of the terms,
they must convey distinct and different ideas. And if these are distinct
operations in the _human_ mind, they must be also in the _Divine_ mind,
unless it can be shown that these terms, when applied to God, have an
entirely different meaning from that by which they are understood among
men. And as this cannot be pretended, the more common and plausible
argument is, that the foreknowledge of God necessarily _implies_
predestination. "For how," they ask, "can an action that is really to
come to pass, be foreseen, if it be not determined? God foreknew every
thing from the beginning; but this he could not have known, if he had
not so determined it." "God," says Piscator, "foresees nothing but what
he has decreed, and his decree precedes his knowledge." And Calvin says,
"God therefore foreknows all things that will come to pass, because he
has decreed they shall come to pass." But to this idea there are
insuperable objections. Prescience is an essential attribute of the
Divine nature. But a determination to do this or that, is not essential
to the Divine nature. For aught we can see, God might determine to make
a particular planet or not to make it, and in either case the perfection
of his nature is not affected. But _to know_, is so essential to him,
that the moment he ceases to know all that is, or will be, or might be,
under any possible contingency, he ceases to be God. Is it not absurd,
then, to say the least, to make an essential attribute of Deity depend
upon the _exercise_ of his attributes?--the Divine prescience depend
upon his decrees and determinations? It would seem, by this argument,
that, if not in the order of time, at least, in the order of thought,
and in the order of cause and effect, the exercise of an attribute
preceded the attribute itself; and, in short, the attribute must be
exercised, as a cause, to bring it into existence! To this monstrous
conclusion we are led by following out this argument. And connected with
it is another, equally monstrous and absurd. If God must predetermine
events in order to know them, then, as the cause is in no case dependent
on the effect, the decrees of God must be passed and his plan contrived,
independently of his knowledge, which only had an existence as the
effect of these decrees. What must be the character of that plan, and of
those decrees, which were formed and matured without knowledge, we will
not stop to examine, for the idea borders too closely upon the ludicrous
to be dwelt upon in a serious discourse. And yet I cannot see how this
conclusion can be avoided, reasoning from such premises. It seems to us,
therefore, altogether more consistent to consider that, in the order of
cause and effect, the exercise of the Divine attributes is consequent
upon their existence; and that the plan of the Almighty is the result of
his infinite knowledge; and that the decrees of his throne flow forth
from the eternal fountain of his wisdom. This idea, moreover, accords
with the Scriptures:--"For whom he did foreknow, he also did
predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son." "Elect according
to the foreknowledge of God the Father." In these passages
predestination and the decree of election are most clearly founded on
foreknowledge. This, therefore, must settle the question: God foreknows
in order to predestinate; but he does not predestinate in order to
foreknow.[2]

But foreknowledge is pressed into this argument in another form. "The
foreknowledge of God," it is said, "is tantamount to a decree; because,
inasmuch as God cannot be in a mistake, whatever he foreknows must take
place--his knowledge makes it certain." This is indeed shifting the
argument; for if God's knowledge makes an event certain, of course it is
not his predetermination. But, according to this notion, every thing
contained in the idea of predestination is implied in foreknowledge,
which is only throwing the subject back on the ground first glanced at,
that knowledge and decree are both one, which is obviously absurd.
Beside, such an idea would make the scriptures that represent God's
foreknowledge as distinct from his decree and antecedent to it, worse
than unmeaning: "Whom he did foreknow, them he did predestinate," would
mean, "whom he did predestinate, them he did predestinate"--and, "Elect
according to the foreknowledge of God," would only mean, "that the
decree of election was _according_ to the decree of election!" the
absurdity of which is too apparent to need comment. And it may be urged,
farther, in reply to this argument, that knowledge or foreknowledge
cannot, in the nature of things, have the least possible influence in
making an event certain. It is not at all difficult to conceive how the
certainty of an event can beget knowledge; but if any one thinks that
knowledge is the cause of certainty, let him show it--to me such a
connection is inconceivable. Whatever God foreknows or foresees, will
undoubtedly come to pass. But the simple question is, Does the event
take place because it is foreknown, or is it foreknown because it will
take place? Or, in other words, Does God know an event to be certain
because it is certain, or does his knowing it to be certain make it
certain? The question thus stated, at once suggests the true answer; for
he would be considered a fool or a madman who should seriously assert
that a knowledge of a certainty produced that certainty. According to
that, a certainty must exist in order to be foreknown; and it must be
foreknown in order to exist! From all which it appears that
foreknowledge can have no influence in making a future event certain.
Since, therefore, foreknowledge is not predestination; and does not,
according to Scripture or reason, follow predestination as a
consequence, and has no possible influence in making an event certain,
no proof can be drawn from the Divine prescience in favour of the
doctrine that _God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass_.

2. But predestination is argued from the necessity of a Divine plan. "It
cannot be conceived," it is said, "that God would leave things at
random, and have no plan. But no alteration of his plan can take place
upon condition that his creatures act in this or that way." But this
argument is easily answered, at least for the present. For it assumes
what ought to be proved; and what has not, to my knowledge, ever been
proved, viz. that to deny Calvinian predestination, is to deny that God
has a perfect plan. We acknowledge and maintain that God has a plan, one
part of which is, to govern his responsible subjects, without
controlling their will, by a fixed decree--to punish the incorrigible,
and save those who repent and believe. Does such a plan imply the
necessity of a change, "on condition that his creatures act in this or
that way?" If, indeed, it was necessary for God to decree an event, in
order to foreknow it, this inference might be just. But as this is seen
to be false, it follows that a perfect God, whose eye surveys immensity
and eternity at a glance, and who necessarily knows all possibilities
and contingencies; all that is, or will be, can perfectly arrange his
plan, and preclude the possibility of a disappointment, although he does
not, by a decree of predestination, fix all the volitions and acts of
his subjects. Even in human governments, where the rulers can have no
knowledge of the individuals who will transgress, or of the nature and
extent of the transgressions, the principles and plan of government
undergo no change to accommodate themselves to the contingent acts of
the subjects. How absurd, then, to suppose that the all-wise Ruler of
the universe will be subject to disappointment, unless he predestinate
the transgressions of sinners, and the obedience of his saints! The
truth is, in my view, this idea detracts from the wisdom of God; for the
perfection of his plan, as they maintain it, is predicated on the
imperfection of his attributes. But our view of the Divine plan accords
well with our idea of his infinite nature. Over the universe, and
through eternity, he throws his all-pervading knowledge--as he is in
every point of wide immensity, so he is in every moment of long
eternity--and can such a God be disappointed?

3. "But," say the advocates of this system, "supposing there are
difficulties in this subject, the Scriptures abound with passages which
at once prove the doctrine." If this is true, then indeed we must
submit. But the question is, where are these passages? After such a
strong assertion, it would probably appear surprising to one
unacquainted with this subject, to learn that there is not a single
passage which teaches directly that God hath foreordained whatsoever
comes to pass. Yet this is the fact. If this doctrine is taught in
Scripture, it is in an indirect manner. Nor will it follow, because God
hath predestinated some things, that he hath, therefore, decreed all
things. All those passages then which have been so frequently quoted as
proof of this doctrine, which only go to prove, that God hath
predetermined certain events, are not proof in point. Where are the
passages that say he hath decreed all things? We know of many which say
of certain events that have come to pass, that God did not _command_
them, nor _will_ them; so that the abundant Scripture proof seems
altogether on the other side of the question. It is argued, however,
that certain acts of moral agents, even those acts for which they are
held responsible, are, according to the Scriptures, the results of God's
predetermination, and therefore it is reasonable to infer that all are.
This general conclusion, however, is not contained in the premises;
nevertheless, if the premises are true, if it can be proved from
Scripture that God holds his creatures responsible for the results of
his own decrees, such Scripture proofs would be strong arguments to ward
off the objections that are brought against this system. For if it is
consistent with a righteous God to make a moral agent responsible for
one event which was the result of a Divine decree, upon the same
principle, perhaps, he might make him responsible for all, though all
were decreed. Let us then look at those scriptures, "As for you," says
Joseph to his brethren, speaking of their injustice to him, "ye thought
evil against me, but God meant it for good." Now without stopping here
to inquire whether Joseph was inspired to utter this sentiment, we are
ready to acknowledge, that there are a number of similar scriptures
which teach that, in the results of the wicked acts of wicked men, God
had a design and a controlling influence, and thereby made them
subservient to his own purposes. He hath wisdom and power "to make the
wrath of man praise him, and to restrain the remainder of wrath." But
does he therefore decree the wrath itself? And is this wrath necessary
to the accomplishment of his purposes? As well might it be said, that
because a government, in quelling a rebellion, replenished its exchequer
from the confiscated estates of the rebels, therefore that government
decreed the rebellion, and was dependent upon it for the prosperity of
the nation. Let it be distinctly understood then, that to overrule and
control the _results_ of an act is altogether different from making the
act itself the result of an overruling and controlling power.

Again it is said, "The Lord hath made all things for himself, yea, even
the wicked for the day of evil." That the Lord hath made all things for
his own glory, is a proposition easily understood, and doubted, I trust,
by none; and this is evidently the meaning of the former member of this
passage. The latter clause, if it helps the cause for which it is quoted
at all, must mean, that the Lord has predestinated men to be wicked,
that he might make them miserable. But it is not necessary to make the
text speak this shocking sentiment. We should do the text no violence to
explain it thus--The Lord hath destined the wicked for the day of evil,
and this shall be for his glory.

But there is another class of passages like the following:--"He doeth
according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants
of the earth." "He worketh all things after the counsel of his will." "I
will do all my pleasure." But these passages establish nothing, in
opposition to our views, unless it should first be proved, by other
passages, or in some other way, that it is God's will and pleasure to
work _all things_, even wickedness, in the wicked. These scriptures
prove that all _God's works_ are in accordance with his own will and
pleasure; and that he will accomplish them in spite of the opposition of
sinners. If it pleases him to form his moral government, so as to leave
the responsible acts of his subjects unnecessitated by his decree, this
he will do, for "he will do all his pleasure."

But there is still another class of texts, which are supposed to favour
the doctrine we are opposing, more than any others, viz. those passages
which seem to represent God as bringing about and procuring the
wickedness of the wicked. Like the following:--"And I will harden
Pharaoh's heart, that he should not let the people go." "Now therefore
the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy
prophets." "He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts." "Him,
being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye
have taken, and by wicked hands ye have crucified and slain." On these
and similar passages it may be remarked, that God blinds men and hardens
their hearts judicially, as a just punishment for their abuse of their
agency. And for this act of his, in blinding and hardening them, he does
not make them responsible. But he holds them responsible for that degree
of wickedness which made it just and necessary to give them over to this
hardness of heart and blindness of mind. And since there are wicked men
and lying spirits, they become fit instruments in deceiving and
tormenting each other; and therefore God gives them power and liberty to
go abroad, "deceiving and being deceived." But how does this prove that
God hath decreed sin? The idea that God hath made sin and wicked spirits
the instruments of hardening and tormenting the incorrigible sinner, and
finally of shutting the door of hope against him, has no kind of
affinity to the idea, that he decreed the sin which occasioned this
hardness, or ordained the wickedness of this lying spirit.

As to the passage from the Acts, none of us deny but that Jesus Christ
was delivered up to suffer and die, by the determinate counsel and
foreknowledge of God; but it is most emphatically denied, that this or
any other scripture proves, that the taking and slaying of Jesus Christ
by wicked hands, was the result of the determinate counsel and
foreknowledge of God. If any think otherwise, let them prove it.

Having stated and, as our time would permit, examined the arguments in
favour of the sentiment we are opposing, we are prepared to urge against
this doctrine, not only that its arguments are unsound and insufficient,
but also that the system itself is liable to the most serious and
formidable objections.

1. This doctrine of predestination makes God the author of sin. Some
acknowledge this, and expressly assert, that God is the "_efficient_
cause" of sin. Others affirm it in fact, while they deny it in word.
Take for instance the words of Calvin. "I will not scruple to own," he
says, "that the will of God lays a necessity on all things, and that
every thing he wills, necessarily comes to pass." In accordance with
this, Piscator, Dr. Twiss, Peter Martyr and others tell us, that "God
procures adultery, cursings, and lyings"--"God is the author of that
act, which is evil"--"God, by his working on the hearts of the wicked,
binds them and stirs them to do evil." They deny, however, that God is
the author of sin, because they say, "God necessitates them to the
_act_, and not to the _depravity_ of sin:" or, that "God does not sin
when he makes men sin, because _he_ is under no law, and therefore
cannot sin." But these are miserable shifts. Has not the _deformity_ of
sin come to pass? Then God has decreed this deformity. To deny this, is
to give up the doctrine. But to acknowledge it, is to own that God is as
much the author of the deformity, as he is of the act. Again, God
doubtless decreed that sin should be _sin_, and not _holiness;_ and it
came to pass as sin, because it was so decreed. Is he not then the
direct procuring cause? A thousand turns of this kind, therefore, are
nothing but evasions. The _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as certainly
as it made the world.

We are often told, when we quote Calvin and his contemporaries, that
these are old authors; that modern Calvinists do not hold thus, and that
they ought not to be accountable for these writers. But the fact is, we
make them accountable only for the logical consequences of their own
doctrine. The whole system turns on this hinge, "God foreordains
whatsoever comes to pass." For he that, by his will and decree, produces
and causes sin, that makes sin a necessary part of his plan, and is the
author of the very elements and materials of his own plan, must be the
proper and sole cause of sin, or we have yet to learn the definition of
common words, and the meaning of plain propositions. The distinction
therefore, of _ancient_ and _modern_, of _rigid_ and _moderate_
Calvinists, is more in word, than in reality. And it would add much to
the consistency of this system, if all its advocates would acknowledge,
what is evidently deducible from the premises, that God is the efficient
cause of sin.

2. This doctrine of predestination destroys the free agency, and of
course the accountability of man. That it destroys free will was seen
and acknowledged by many predestinarians of the old school. And the
opposers of Mr. Wesley and Mr. Fletcher violently assailed them on this
subject. Mr. Southey informs us, in his Life of Wesley, that the
Calvinists called this doctrine of free will, "a cursed doctrine"--"the
most God-dishonouring and soul-destroying doctrine of the day"--"one of
the prominent features of the beast"--"the enemy of God"--"the offspring
of the wicked one"--"the insolent brat of hell." Others, and the greater
part of the Calvinists of the present day, endeavour to reconcile the
ideas of _necessity_ and _free agency_. Man, they say, sins voluntarily,
because he chooses or wills to sin; therefore he is a free agent. Hence
they exhort sinners to repent, and tell them they can repent if they
will. By which they mean, the only impossibility of their repenting, is
in their will--their _cannot_ is their _will not_. This has led many to
think that there is no difference, between their preachers and the
Arminians. But let us look at this subject a little, and see if there is
not some sophistry concealed in this dexterous coil of words. God,
according to this doctrine, secures the end as well as the means, by his
decree of predestination. And therefore, as Calvin says, "every action
and motion of every creature is governed by the hidden counsel of God."
The will, therefore, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly
controlled by some secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling
arrangement. It is altogether futile, then, to talk about free agency
under such a constitution; the very spring of motion to the whole
intellectual machinery is under the influence of a secret, invincible
power. And it _must_ move as that power directs, or it is the hand of
Omnipotence that urges it on. He _can_ act as he _wills_, it is true,
but the whole responsibility consists in the volition, and this is the
result of God's propelling power. He wills as he is _made_ to will--he
chooses as he _must_ choose, for the immutable decree of Jehovah is upon
him. And can a man, upon the known and universally acknowledged
principles of responsibility, be accountable for such a volition? It is
argued, I know, that man is responsible, because he _feels_ that he acts
freely, and that he might have done otherwise. To this I reply, that
this is a good argument, on our principles, to prove that men are
free--but on the Calvinistic ground, it only proves that God hath
deceived us. He has made us _feel_ that we might do otherwise, but _he
knows_ we _cannot_--he has _determined_ we _shall not_. So that, in
fact, this argument makes the system more objectionable. While it does
not change the fact in the case, it attributes deception to the
Almighty. It is logically true, therefore, from this doctrine, that man
is not a free agent, and therefore not responsible. A moral agent, to be
free, must be possessed of a self-determining principle. Make the will
any thing short of this, and you put all the volitions, and of course
the whole moral man, under foreign and irresistible influences.

3. Another strong objection to the doctrine we oppose, is, it arrays
God's secret decrees against his revealed word. God commands men not to
sin, and yet ordains that they shall sin, In his word, he sets before
them, in striking relief, motives of fear and of hope, for the express
purpose, as he informs us, "that they sin not;" but by his
predestination and secret counsel, he irresistibly impels them in an
opposite course, for the express purpose, as this doctrine informs us,
to secure their transgression. _His_ rule of action is in direct
opposition to _our_ rule of duty. And yet he is the author of both! Is
God at war with himself, or is he sporting and trifling with his
creatures? Or is it not more probable than either, that the premises are
false? When or where has God ever taught us, that he has two opposing
wills? A character so suspicious, to say the least of it, ought not,
without the most unequivocal evidence, to be attributed to the adorable
Jehovah. In his word, we are taught, that he is "of _one_ mind"--that
his "ways are equal;" and who can doubt it? We are told, it is true, to
relieve the difficulty, that this seeming contradiction is one of the
mysteries of God's incomprehensible nature. But it is not a _seeming_
contradiction, it is a _real_ one; not an insolvable mystery, but a
palpable absurdity. _God prohibits the sinful act--God ordains and
procures the sinful act--God wills the salvation of the reprobate, whom
he has from all eternity irreversibly ordained to eternal death!_ When I
can embrace such opposite propositions by calling them mysteries, I can
believe that two and two are more than four, that all the parts are less
than the whole, and that a thing may be made to exist and not exist at
the same time and explain them by a reference to the mystery of God's
incomprehensible nature.

4. In close connection with the foregoing objection, it may be added,
that this system mars, if it does not destroy, the moral attributes of
God. If he holds men responsible for what is unavoidable--if he makes
laws and then impels men to break them, and finally punishes them for
their transgressions--if he mourns over the evils of the world, and
expostulates with sinners, saying, "How can I give thee up--my heart is
melted within me, my repentings are kindled together,"--"O Jerusalem!
Jerusalem! how oft would I have gathered you, and ye would not,"--and
still he himself "impels the will of men," to all this wickedness--if I
say God does all this, where is his veracity? Where is his mercy? Where
is his justice? What more could be said of the most merciless tyrant?
What, of the most arrant hypocrite? What, of Satan himself? What does
this doctrine make of our heavenly Father? I shudder to follow it out
into its legitimate bearings. It seems to me, a belief of it is enough
to drive one to infidelity, to madness, and to death. If the supporters
of this system _must_ adhere to it, I rejoice that they can close their
eyes against its logical consequences, otherwise it would make them
wretched in the extreme, or drive them into other dangerous theoretical
and practical errors. Indeed, in many instances it has done this--which
leads to another objection to this doctrine.

5. It puts a plea into the mouth of sinners to justify themselves in
their sins, and leads to Universalism and infidelity. They reason thus:
Whatever God decrees is according to his will, and therefore right. And
God will not punish his creatures for doing right. Whatever God decrees
is unavoidable, and God will not punish his creatures for what is
unavoidable. But "every action and motion of every creature is governed
by the hidden counsel of God." Therefore God will not punish any of his
creatures for any of their acts. Now, who can point out any fallacy in
this reasoning? If therefore predestination be true, Universalism is
true, according to the universally acknowledged principles of justice.
And it is a notorious fact, that modern Universalism, which is
prevailing so generally through the country, rests for its chief support
on the doctrine of predestination. Others having seen, as they thought,
that the Scriptures would not support the doctrine of Universalism, and
that matter of fact seemed to contradict the above reasoning, inasmuch
as men are made to suffer, even in this life, for their sins, have
leaped over all Scriptural bounds into infidelity and philosophical
necessity. I have personally known numbers who have been driven, by the
doctrine we object to, into open infidelity. And it is well known, that
the doctrine of fate, which is closely allied to Calvinian
predestination, is the element in which infidelity "lives and moves and
has its being." And can this be the doctrine of the Bible? How much is
it to be regretted, that our worthy pilgrim fathers should have sowed
this Geneva seed in our happy country! The evils done to the Church are
incalculable.

These, candid hearers, are some of the objections we have to this
doctrine--objections so serious, and, as we think, so obvious, that you
may well ask, What has induced good men to advocate it so long? It is,
doubtless, because it stands connected intimately with the doctrine of
unconditional election, and what have been called by Calvinists "the
doctrines of grace." But for unconditional election, predestination
would not be desired, even by those who now hold to it; and but for
predestination, unconditional election could not be maintained. Hence
these have very properly been called "twin doctrines," and must stand or
fall together. Let us pass then to the next proposition.

II. We come to examine predestination in its particular relation to
election.

Several kinds of election are spoken of in the Scriptures. There is an
election of individuals, to perform certain duties appointed by
God:--thus Christ was God's elect, for the redemption of the world; and
Cyrus was elected by him to rebuild the temple. There is an election of
whole communities and nations to the enjoyment of certain peculiar
privileges, political and ecclesiastical, relating of course to this
life:--thus Jacob and his descendants were God's chosen people, to the
enjoyment of religious and national privileges, from which Esau and his
descendants, together with the whole Gentile world, were excluded; and
thus, too, subsequently, the middle wall of partition, made by the
former decree of election between Jew and Gentile, being broken down,
the Gentiles became equal sharers with the Jews in the privileges of the
new covenant, called the "election of grace." This election is
unconditional, and is believed to be the one spoken of in our text, and
many other passages of Scripture. Of these, however, I shall speak more
particularly in another place.

There is a third election--an election unto eternal life, and this is
the one which has given rise to the great controversy in the
Church.--Those who contend for predestination, as objected to by us,
maintain that, "By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his
glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and
others foreordained to everlasting death. Those of mankind that are
predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world, hath
chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, _without any foresight of
faith or good works_." Others, and this also is our doctrine, hold that
"God did decree from the beginning, to elect, or choose in Christ, all
that should believe unto salvation, and this decree proceeds from his
own goodness, and is not built on any goodness of the creature; and that
God did from the beginning decree to reprobate all who should finally
and obstinately continue in unbelief." Thus it is seen, from the
statement of the two doctrines, that ours is an election of character,
and so far as it relates to individuals, it relates to them only as they
are foreseen to possess that character; whereas the other relates
directly to individuals, without any reference to character. It is an
absolute act of sovereignty--God elects them for no other reason or
condition than because he chooses. He makes no account of man's agency
or responsibility in this decree of election, but it precedes and is
entirely independent of any knowledge of the character of the elect. Our
views of election, on the contrary, make it conditionally dependent on
the responsible agency of man. In the one case, the sinner is made to
receive Christ, because he is elected; and in the other, he is elected,
because he receives Christ. From this difference, too, proceed other
differences. The Calvinistic election, to be consistent with itself,
requires that, as the end is arbitrarily fixed, so the means must be
also--hence the doctrines of irresistible grace, effectual calling, and
infallible perseverance. Calvinian election, therefore, stands
intimately allied to Calvinian predestination; and the whole forms a
chain of doctrines differing materially from ours. And here we
acknowledge we have a position to prove as well as our opponents. We
assert that election to eternal life is conditional; they, that it is
unconditional. We will first attempt to prove our position--then state
and answer the arguments in favour of unconditional election--and
finally, urge some objections against unconditional election and
reprobation.

1. Our first argument in favour of conditional election to eternal life,
is drawn from the position already established, that the decrees of God
are predicated on his foreknowledge. And especially, that the decree of
election to salvation, according to the Scriptures, is founded on the
Divine prescience. "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God, through
sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience, and sprinkling of the blood
of Jesus Christ." "Whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate, to be
conformed to the image of his Son." These scriptures seem to us
decisive, that the decree of election rests on foreknowledge, and that
this election is made, not according to the arbitrary act of God, but on
the ground of sanctification and obedience. The doctrine, therefore,
that men are predestinated to eternal life, "without any foresight of
faith or good works," must be false.

2. The rewardableness of obedience, or the demerit of disobedience, can
only exist in connection with the unnecessitated volitions of a free
moral agent. The Scriptures abundantly teach, that to be saved, man must
believe and obey; and hence they command and exhort men to believe and
obey, and promise them the reward of eternal life if they do this, and
criminate them, if they neglect it. But, according to the doctrine of
free agency already explained, man's obedience or disobedience, if it
has any just relation to rewards and punishments, must rest, in its
responsible character, upon the self-determining principle of the will.
And if this view of the will be correct, there is an _utter
impossibility_ of an unconditional election. For the very act of God,
imparting this self-determining principle to man, renders it impossible,
in the nature of things, for the Almighty himself to elect a moral
agent, unconditionally. The argument stands thus--The Scriptures make
man a responsible moral agent; but this he cannot be, if his will be
controlled by foreign and unavoidable influences, therefore it is not so
controlled: that is, man has within himself a self-determining
principle, in the exercise of which he becomes responsible. This being
established, we argue again--The doctrine of unconditional election
necessarily implies irresistible grace, absolutely impelling and
controlling the will. But this would be to counteract God's own work,
and to destroy man's accountability; therefore there is no such
irresistible grace, and, of course, no such unconditional election. And
since there is an election to eternal life, spoken of in the Scriptures,
it follows conclusively, if the foregoing reasoning be sound, that this
election is conditional.--Hence we may bring forward, in one
overwhelming argument, all the numerous and various Bible conditions of
salvation, as so many Scripture proofs of a conditional election.

3. The cautions to the elect, and the intimations of their danger, and
the possibility of their being lost, are so many Scripture proofs of a
conditional election. Why should the saints be exhorted "to take heed
lest they fall?" "lest there be in them an evil heart of unbelief, in
departing from the living God?" "lest a promise being left of entering
into rest, any should come short?" lest _they_ should "also be cut off?"
Why should St. Paul fear lest, after having preached to others, he
should be a castaway? Either there is, or is not, danger of the elect's
being lost. If not, then all these passages are not only without
meaning, but savour very strongly of deception. They are false colours
held out to the elect, for the purposes of alarm and fear, where no fear
is. Will it be said, that possibly some of those addressed were not of
the elect, and were therefore deceiving themselves, and needed to be
cautioned and warned? I answer, they had then nothing to fall from, and
no promise of which to come short. Besides, to warn such to _stand
fast_, seems to imply, that the Holy Spirit cautioned the reprobates
against the danger of becoming the elect, which idea, while it intimates
a very ungracious work for the "Spirit of grace" to be engaged in,
clearly indicates, that there was danger of breaking the decree of
reprobation! We ask again, therefore, What do these scriptures mean?
Will it be said, as some have argued, that these warnings and cautions
are all consistent, because they are the very means by which the decree
of election is made sure? But let it be understood, that the end is
fixed, before the means; because Calvinism tells us, that this election
is "independent of any faith or good works foreseen," and that "God's
decree lays a necessity on all things, so that every thing he wills
necessarily comes to pass," and is therefore sure, "because he has
decreed it." The moment, therefore, God decrees an event, it becomes
sure, and to talk of danger of a failure in that event, implies either a
falsehood, or that God's decree can be _broken_. But Calvinists, I
presume, will not allow that there is any danger of counteracting or
frustrating the plan of the Almighty. Hence there is no danger of the
elect's coming short of salvation. All the exhortations, cautions, and
warnings therefore, recorded in the Scriptures, are false colours and
deceptive motives. They are like the attempts of some weak parents, who
undertake to frighten their children into obedience, by superstitious
tales and groundless fears. God knows, when he is giving out these
intimations of danger, that there is no such danger; his own eternal,
unchangeable decree had secured their salvation before the means were
planned--all this if election is unconditional. But far be this from a
God of truth. If he exhorts his creatures to "make their election sure,"
_he_ has not made it sure.--If he teaches them to fear, lest they fail
of the grace of God, there is doubtless real danger. The conclusion
therefore is irresistible, that Cod hath suspended his decree of
election to eternal life, on conditions; "He that believeth: shall be
saved."

4. This accords also with Christian experience. What is it that produces
much fear and trembling in the mind of the awakened sinner? Why does he
feel that there is but a step between him and destruction? Is it fancy,
or is it fact? If it is imagination merely, then all his alarm is
founded in deception, and he has either deceived himself, or the Spirit
of God hath deceived him. In either case, this alarm seems necessary, in
order to lead him to Christ. That is, it is necessary for the conversion
of one of the elect that he be made to believe a lie. But if it be said,
that it is no lie, for he is really in danger, then we reply again, the
decree of God hath not made his election sure, and of course, therefore,
it is conditional.

5. Express passages of Scripture teach a conditional election. We have
time only to notice a few of them. Matt. xxii, 14, "For many are called,
but few are chosen." This passage, with the parable of the wedding that
precedes it, teaches that the _choice_ was made subsequently to the
call, and was grounded on the fact, that those chosen had actually and
fully complied with the invitation, and had come to the wedding duly
prepared. John xv, 19, "If ye were of the world, the world would love
you, but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of
the world, therefore the world hateth you." This passage teaches that
Christ's disciples were once of the world, and that he had chosen them
out of the world, and this _choice_ evidently refers to that time when
they became of a different character from the world; for then it was,
and in consequence of that election, that the world hated them.--2
Thess. ii, 13, "Because God hath from the beginning, _chosen_ you to
salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the
truth." Here is a condition plainly expressed. This is not an election
_unto_ sanctification, but an election _through_ or _by_ sanctification
and faith unto salvation.

From the whole then it appears, that the Holy Scriptures, the Divine
attributes and government, and the agency of man, stand opposed to an
unconditional, and are in favour of a conditional election.

In opposition to these arguments, however, and in favour of
unconditional election, our opponents urge various scriptures, which, as
they think, are strong and incontrovertible arguments in favour of their
system. And as these scriptures are their strong and only defence, it is
proposed that they should be noticed. The limits of this discourse,
however, will admit of but a short notice, and that not of individual
texts, but of classes of texts.

1. The first class of passages that we will now examine, which are
supposed to favour the idea of unconditional election, is those that
speak of a predestination _unto_ holiness. Our text is one of the
strongest instances of this kind, "He hath chosen us from the foundation
of the world, that we should be holy--having predestinated us unto the
adoption of sons," &c. See also Rom. viii, 29, "For whom he did
foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his
Son," and "whom he did predestinate--he called--justified--and
sanctified." The argument upon these and similar passages is, that the
decree of predestination could not be founded on their faith or
holiness; because they were predestinated to _become_ holy--the decree
of predestination had their holiness for its object and end. But if
these passages had an allusion to a personal election to eternal life,
they would not prove unconditional election, "because," to use the
language of another, "it would admit of being questioned, whether the
choosing in Christ, before the foundation of the world here mentioned,
was a choice of certain persons _as men merely_, or as _believing_ men,
which is certainly the most rational." This exposition must necessarily
be given to the passage from the Romans, since those who were the
subjects of predestination, were first _foreknown_: foreknown, not
merely as existing, for in this sense _all_ were foreknown, but
foreknown, as possessing something which operated as a reason why _they_
should be elected, rather than others: foreknown doubtless as believers
in Christ, and as such, according to the plan and decree of God, they
were to be made conformable to the image of Christ's holiness here, and
glory hereafter. And according to the same Divine plan, the order of
this work was, 1. The call; 2. Justification; 3. Glorification. And this
interpretation, which so obviously upon the face of it is the meaning of
the passage from Romans, would also be a good meaning to the passage in
Ephesians, if that passage should be understood in reference to personal
election. But I do not so understand it; and I think any unprejudiced
reader, by looking at the context, and especially from the 9th to the
11th verses inclusive, in this chapter, and at most of the 2d chapter,
will perceive that the apostle is here speaking of that general plan of
God, which had been fixed from the beginning, of admitting the Gentiles
as well as the Jews to the privileges of the covenant of grace, on equal
terms and conditions. Thus the middle wall of partition was to be broken
down between Jew and Gentile; and this was the mystery which was
concealed for ages, not being understood even by the Jews themselves,
but then by the Gospel was brought to light. According to this plan, the
Ephesians and all other Gentiles were chosen or elected to these
Christian privileges, the very design and purpose of which were to make
them holy; and in the improvement of which, according to the prescribed
conditions of faith in Christ, and repentance toward God, they should
become his adopted children.

This fore appointing of the Gentiles to the privileges of the gracious
covenant, is the election most spoken of in the New Testament.--And the
reason why it was so often introduced, especially in the writings of
Paul, who was the chief apostle to the Gentiles, was, because the Jews
so uniformly and earnestly opposed this feature of Christianity. They
could not be reconciled to the idea, that the peculiar and distinctive
character of their theocracy and ecclesiastical policy should be so
changed, or that the dealings of God with the world should be explained
in such a manner as to give _them_ no superior claims, in the privileges
of the Divine covenant, over the Gentiles. They considered themselves to
be God's elect and favourite people, but the Gentiles were reprobates.
The apostles felt themselves under the strongest obligations to oppose
these notions, not only because, if allowed, they would operate as a
barrier to the diffusion of the Gospel among the heathens, and thus the
designs of Divine mercy to the world would be thwarted, but also because
these Jewish sentiments were in direct opposition to the grace of God.
They implied, that the original design of God in favouring the Jews, was
founded, not upon his mere mercy and grace, but upon some goodness in
them or their fathers. Hence they not only limited the blessings of the
Gospel, but they also corrupted its gracious character, and thereby fed
their own Pharisaic pride, and dishonoured God. This will open the way
for explaining many other scriptures which the Calvinists press into
their service.

2. Especially will it assist in explaining those passages which speak of
election as depending solely on the sovereign will of God. The strongest
of these are in the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. This
portion of revelation is the strong hold, as is supposed, of Calvinism.
Whereas, we humbly conceive that _there is not one word_ in the whole
chapter, of unconditional and personal election to eternal life. It is
only necessary to read that epistle carefully, to see that the apostle
is combatting that exclusive and Pharisaic doctrine of the Jews, already
alluded to, and is proving in a forcible strain of argumentation, from
reason and Scripture, that the foundation of the plan of salvation for
sinners, was the goodness and unmerited love of God--that all, both Jews
and Gentiles, were sinners, and therefore stood in the same relation to
God--all equally eligible to salvation, and must, if saved at all, be
saved on the same terms. To prove this, he argues strenuously, that
God's favour to the Jews, as a nation, was not of any goodness in them,
but of his own sovereign will and pleasure, so that his covenant of
favour with the Hebrews, and his covenant of grace which embraced the
Gentiles, was "not of works, lest any man should boast," "not of him
that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy."
The apostle shows them, too, that the covenant made with Abraham was not
for circumcision, nor for the works of the law, so far as it affected
him or his posterity, because it was made while Abraham was in
uncircumcision, and on the condition of faith. He argues farther, that
this election of the Jews to the enjoyment of these national and
ecclesiastical privileges, was not because they were children of
Abraham, for Ishmael was a child of Abraham, and yet he and his
posterity were rejected; nor yet because they were the children of
Abraham through Isaac, because Esau and his posterity were reprobated
from these national privileges, while Jacob and his posterity were the
chosen seed--not chosen to eternal life, because many of them perished
in sin and unbelief, but to the peculiar privileges of God's covenant
people. And all this because it was the good pleasure of his will. And
as a sovereign, he had the same right to elect the Gentiles to the
enjoyment of the covenant of mercy, and upon the same conditions of
faith. The apostle concludes this reasoning by an argument which cuts
off entirely the idea of unconditional personal election and
reprobation. He informs us, that the reason why the unbelieving Jews did
not attain to personal righteousness, was "because they sought it not by
faith, but as it were by the works of the law;" and the Gentiles
attained to personal righteousness, because they sought it by faith.
Hence, those that were not his people, became his people, and those that
were not beloved, became beloved--and these, "not of the Jews only, but
also of the Gentiles." Whereas, if the doctrine we oppose be true, the
elect were _always_ his people, and _always_ beloved, and that because
he pleased to have it so. That portion of Scripture, therefore, on which
Calvinism leans for its greatest support, not only affords it no aid,
but actually teaches a different doctrine. There is indeed something of
mystery hanging over the providence of God, in bestowing peculiar
advantages on some, and withholding them from others. But on this
subject much light is cast from various considerations which we have not
time to enlarge upon; but especially from that wholesome and consistent
Scripture doctrine, that "it is required of a man according to what he
hath, and not according to what he hath not." This removes at once all
complaint of Jew and Gentile, and authorizes the reply, so often
misapplied, "Who art thou that repliest against God?" As a sovereign,
God has a right to make his creatures differ in these things, so long as
he requires only as he gives. But this differs as widely from the
Calvinistic idea of sovereignty, as _justice_ from _injustice_, as
_equity_ from _iniquity_. In fact, God no where in the Scripture, places
the election of individuals to eternal life, solely on the ground of his
sovereignty, but uniformly on the ground of their complying with the
conditions of the covenant of grace. Hence his people are a _peculiar
people_--his sheep _hear his voice and follow him_--they are _chosen out
of the world_--they are _in Christ_, not by an eternal decree of
election, but _by faith_--for "if any man be _in Christ_, he is a _new
creature_"--and of course, he is not _in him_, until he is a "new
creature"--then, and not before, they become his, and he seals them as
such, "In whom, _after that ye believed_, ye were sealed with the Holy
Spirit of promise." But if they were elected from eternity, they would
be his when they did not _hear his voice_, and were not _new creatures_.

3. From what has been said, we can easily answer a third class of
scriptures which the Calvinists dwell upon to support their system
--viz, those which declare salvation to be of _grace_ and not of
_works_. Of these there is evidently a large catalogue of very express
and unequivocal passages. Take two or three for an example of the whole,
"Even so then, at the present time, there is a remnant, according to the
election of grace, and if it be by grace then it is no more of works,
otherwise grace is no more grace; but if it be of works, then it is no
more grace, otherwise work is no more work." "By grace ye are saved."
"Having predestinated us unto the adoption of his children, &c, to the
praise of the glory of his grace." "Not by works of righteousness which
we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of
regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost." Now we profess to believe
these scriptures as unqualifiedly and as cordially as the Calvinists;
and we think them perfectly in accordance with our views of election.
For we believe, as has been already stated, that God's plan for saving
sinners originated entirely in his love to his undeserving creatures.
There was nothing in all the character and circumstances of the fallen
family, except their sin and deserved misery, that could claim the
interposition of God's saving power. The way of executing his gracious
plan, and rendering it available in any case, he of course, as a
sovereign, reserved to himself. And if he saw that a conditional
election was best suited to the principles of his government, and the
responsibility of man, shall it be said, this cannot be, for it destroys
the idea of grace? _Cannot_ a conditional election be of grace? Let the
intelligent and candid answer. Even many of the Calvinists acknowledge
that _salvation_ is conditional, and yet it is of grace; for "by grace
ye are saved." Now if salvation is conditional and yet of grace, why not
election? Let Calvinists answer this question.

But that our doctrine of election is of grace, will appear evident, I
think, from the following considerations. 1. It was pure unmerited love
that moved God to provide salvation for our world. 2. The Gospel plan,
therefore, with all its _provisions_ and _conditions_, is of grace. Not
a step in that whole system, but rests in grace, is presented by grace,
and is executed through grace. 3. Even the power of the will to choose
life, and the conditions of life, is a _gracious power_. A fallen man,
without grace, could no more choose to submit to God than a fallen
angel. Herein we differ widely from the Calvinists. They tell us man has
a _natural_ power to choose life. If so, he has power to get to heaven
without grace! We say, on the contrary, that man is utterly unable to
choose the way to heaven, or to pursue it when chosen, without the grace
of God. It is grace that enlightens and convinces the sinner, and
strengthens him to seek after and obtain salvation, for "without Christ
we _can do nothing_." Let the candid judge between us, then, and decide
which system most robs our gracious Redeemer of his glory, that which
gives man a _native_ and _inherent_ power to get to heaven of himself,
or that which attributes all to grace. 4. Finally, when the sinner
repents and believes, there is no merit in these acts to procure
forgiveness and regeneration, and therefore, though he is _now_, and _on
these conditions_, elected, and made an heir of salvation, yet it is for
Christ's sake, and "not for works of righteousness which he has done."
Thus we "bring forth the top stone with shouting, crying _grace_,
_grace_, unto it." Having gone over and examined the arguments in favour
of unconditional election, we come to the last part of our subject;
which was to urge some objections against this doctrine.

1. The doctrine of the unconditional election of a part, necessarily
implies the unconditional reprobation of the rest. I know some who hold
to the former, seem to deny the latter; for they represent God as
reprobating sinners, in view of their sins. When all were sinners, they
say God passed by some, and elected others. Hence, they say the decree
of damnation against the reprobates is just, because it is against
_sinners_. But this explanation is virtually giving up the system,
inasmuch as it gives up all the principal arguments by which it is
supported. In the first place, it makes predestination dependent on
foreknowledge; for God first foresees that they will be sinners, and
then predestinates them to punishment. Here is one case then, in which
the argument for Calvinian predestination is destroyed by its own
supporters. But again if God must fix by his decree all parts of his
plan, in order to prevent disappointment, then he must fix the destiny
of the reprobates, and the means that lead to it. But if he did not do
this, then the Calvinistic argument in favour of predestination, drawn
from the Divine plan, falls to the ground. Once more: this explanation
of the decree of reprobation destroys all the strongest Scripture
arguments which the Calvinists urge in favour of unconditional election.
The passages, for instance, in the ninth of Romans, which are so often
quoted in favour of Calvinian election, are connected with others,
equally strong, in favour of unconditional reprobation. When it is said,
"He will have mercy on whom he will have mercy," it is said also, "Whom
he will he hardeneth." He that "makes one vessel unto honour, maketh
another unto dishonour." He that says, "Jacob have I loved," says also
in the same manner, "Esau have I hated." Now if these relate to personal
election to eternal life, they relate also to personal reprobation to
eternal death. But if there is any explanation, by which these are
showed not to prove unconditional reprobation to eternal death, the same
principle of explanation will, and _must_ show, that they do not prove
Calvinistic election. From henceforth, therefore, let all those
Calvinists who profess not to believe in unconditional reprobation,
cease to urge, in favour of their system, any arguments drawn from the
foreknowledge of God, or the necessity of a Divine plan, or from those
scriptures that are most commonly quoted in favour of their doctrine.
But when they do this, their system must necessarily fall; for all its
main pillars will be removed. But I have not done with this objection
yet. Whoever maintains that "God hath foreordained whatsoever comes to
pass," must also hold to unconditional reprobation. Does it come to
pass, that some are lost? Then this was ordained. Was sin necessary, as
a pretence to damn them? Then this was ordained. From these and other
views of the subject, Calvin was led to say, that "election could not
stand without reprobation," and that it was "quite silly and childish"
to attempt to separate them. All, therefore, who hold to the
unconditional election of a part of mankind to eternal life, _must_, to
be consistent with themselves, take into their creed, the "horrible
decree" of reprobation.--They must believe that in the ages of eternity
God determined to create men and angels for the express purpose to damn
them eternally! That he determined to introduce sin, and influence men
to commit sin, and harden them in it, that they might be fit subjects of
his wrath! That for doing as they were impelled to do, by the
irresistible decree of Jehovah, they must lie down for ever, under the
scalding phials of his vengeance in the pit of hell! To state this
doctrine in its true character, is enough to chill one's blood--and we
are drawn by all that is rational within us, to turn away from such a
God with horror, as from the presence of an Almighty Tyrant.

2. This doctrine of election, while it professes to vindicate free grace
and the mercy of God, destroys them altogether. To the reprobates, there
is certainly no grace or mercy extended. Their very existence, connected
as it necessarily is with eternal damnation, is an infinite curse. The
temporal blessings which they enjoy, the insincere offers that are held
out to them, and the Gospel privileges with which they are mocked, if
they can be termed grace at all, must be called _damning grace_. For all
this is only fattening them for the slaughter, and fitting them to
suffer, to a more aggravated extent, the unavoidable pains and torments
that await them. Hence Calvin's sentiment, that "God calls to the
reprobates, that they may be more deaf--kindles a light, that they may
be more blind--brings his doctrine to them, that they may be more
ignorant--and applies the remedy to them, that they may not be healed,"
is an honest avowal of the legitimate principles of this system. Surely,
then, no one will pretend, that, according to this doctrine, there is
any grace for the reprobate. And perhaps a moment's attention will show,
that there is little or none for the elect. It is said, that God, out of
his mere sovereignty, without any thing in the creature to move him
thereto, elects sinners to everlasting life. But if there is nothing in
the creature to move him thereto, how can it be called _mercy_ or
_compassion?_ He did not determine to elect them because they were
miserable, but because he pleased to elect them. If misery had been the
exciting cause, then as all were equally miserable, he would have
elected them all. Is such a decree of election founded in love to the
suffering object? No: _it is the result of the most absolute and
omnipotent selfishness conceivable_. It is the exhibition of a character
that sports most sovereignly and arbitrarily, with his Almighty power,
_to create, to damn, and to save_.

Some indeed pretend that, at any rate, _salvation_ is of grace, if
election is not, because God saves _miserable_, _perishing_ sinners. But
who made them miserable perishing sinners? Was not this the effect of
God's decree? And is there much mercy displayed in placing men under a
constitution which necessarily and unavoidably involves them in sin and
suffering, that God may afterward have the sovereign honour of saving
them? Surely the _tenderest_ mercies of this system are cruel--its
brightest parts are dark--its boasted mercy hardly comes up to sheer
justice, even to the elect; since they only receive back what God had
deprived them of, and for the want of which they had suffered perhaps
for years; and to obtain which, they could do nothing even as a
condition, until God by his sovereign power bestowed it upon them. And
as for the reprobates, the Gospel is unavoidably to them, a savour of
death unto death. To them Christ came, that they might have death, and
that they might have it more abundantly. Thus, turn this system as you
will, it sweeps away the mercy and goodness of God, destroys the grace
of the Gospel, and in most cases, transforms even the invitations and
promises into scalding messages of aggravated wrath.

3. The doctrine we oppose makes God partial and a respecter of persons;
contrary to express and repeated declarations of Scripture. For it
represents God as determining to save some and damn others, without
reference to their character, all being precisely in the same state. To
deny this, is to acknowledge that the decree of election and reprobation
had respect to character, which is to give up the doctrine. Some indeed
pretend, that the decree of election was unconditional, but not the
decree of reprobation. But this is impossible; for there could be no
decree of election, only in view of the whole number from which the
choice was to be made; and the very determination to select such a
number, and those only, implied the exclusion of all the rest. If it be
said, as the Sublapsarians contend, that the decree of election did not
come in until all were fallen, or viewed in the mind of God as fallen;
and therefore since all might have been justly damned, there was no
injustice to those who were left, though some of the guilty were taken
and saved; we reply, That even this would not wholly remove the
objection of partiality. But we need not dwell here, because we have a
shorter and more decisive way to dispose of this argument. The truth is,
it does not cover the whole ground of our objection. Had God nothing to
do with man until his prescient eye beheld the whole race in a ruined
state? How came man in this state? He was plunged there by the sin of
his federal head. But how came _he_ to sin? "Adam sinned," says Calvin,
"because God so ordained." And so every one must say, that believes God
foreordained whatsoever comes to pass. Taking all the links together,
they stand thus:--God decreed to create intelligent beings--he decreed
that they should all become sinners and children of wrath--and it was
so. He then decreed that part of those whom he had constituted heirs of
wrath, should be taken, and washed, and saved, and the others left to
perish; and then we are told there is no unjust partiality in God, since
they all deserve to be damned! What a singular evasion is this! God
wishes to damn a certain portion of his creatures, and save the rest;
but he cannot do this without subjecting himself to the charge of
partiality. To avoid this, he plunges them all into sin and ruin, and
forthwith he declares them all children of wrath, and heirs of hell. But
in the plenitude of his grace, he snatches some from the pit of ruin,
and leaves the rest in remediless wo! Is such a supposition worthy of
our righteous God?--Does it accord either with his justice or wisdom?
Reason, with half an eye, can see through the flimsy veil, and discover
the weakness of the device. I know an attempt has been often made to
charge these consequences upon our system, as well as upon the
Calvinistic doctrine. For if it is acknowledged that man is born
depraved, and this depravity is damning in its nature, does it not
follow, it is asked, that all deserve to perish? And therefore God may
elect some and justly pass by the rest. I answer--Although all moral
depravity, derived or contracted, is damning in its nature, still, by
virtue of the atonement, the destructive effects of derived depravity
are counteracted; and guilt is not imputed, until by a voluntary
rejection of the Gospel remedy, man makes the depravity of his nature
the object of his own choice.--Hence, although abstractly considered,
this depravity is destructive to the possessors, yet through the grace
of the Gospel, _all_ are born free from condemnation. So the Apostle
Paul, "As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to
condemnation, so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon
all men, unto justification of life." In accordance with these views
also, the ground of condemnation, according to the Scriptures, is not
our native depravity; but the sinner is condemned for _rejecting
Christ_,--for _refusing_ to occupy upon the _talents given_,--for
_rejecting light_,--for _quenching the Spirit_,--for _unbelief_. Here
then is the difference on this point between the Calvinists and us. They
hold that God, by his decree, plunged Adam and all his race into the pit
of sin, from which none of them had the means of escape; but by an
omnipotent act of partial grace, he delivers a part, and the remainder
are left unavoidably to perish. We, on the contrary, believe that by
Adam's unnecessitated sin he, and in him all his posterity, became
obnoxious to the curse of the Divine law. As the first man sinned
personally and actively, he was personally condemned; but as his
posterity had no agency or personal existence, they could only have
perished seminally in him. By the promise of a Saviour however, our
federal head was restored to the possibility of obtaining salvation,
through faith in the Redeemer. And in this restoration, _all_ the
seminal generations of men were included. Their possible and prospective
existence was restored; and their personal and active existence secured.
And with this also, the possibility of salvation was secured to all. To
such as never come to a personally responsible age, this salvation was
secured unconditionally by Christ; to _all_ those who arrived to the age
of accountability, salvation was made possible, on equal and impartial
conditions. Thus, while on our principle, there is not the slightest
ground for a charge of partiality; on the Calvinistic principle, the
charge seems to lie with all its weight. It makes God, in the worst
sense of the terms, _partial, and a respecter of persons_.

4. This doctrine is objectionable, because, contrary to express and
repeated passages of Scripture, it necessarily limits the atonement. It
will surely not be expected, that we should attempt to prove that Christ
"tasted death for every man"--that he "gave himself a ransom for
all"--that he "died for all"--that he became "a propitiation for the
sins of the whole world"--because, these are so many express Scripture
propositions, and rest directly on the authority of God. And while these
stand, the doctrine of particular and unconditional election must fall,
for the two doctrines are incompatible. That particular election and
partial redemption must stand or fall together, has been acknowledged,
and is still maintained by most Calvinists; and therefore they have
endeavoured to explain away those passages, which so clearly declare
that "Christ died for all." But in this work they have found so many
difficulties, that others, and among them most of the Calvinistic clergy
in New-England, have acknowledged a general redemption, and have
undertaken to reconcile with it the doctrine of particular election and
reprobation. But this reconciliation is as difficult as the other. To
say nothing now of the utter uselessness of making an atonement for the
reprobates, unless for the purpose of making their unavoidable damnation
more aggravated, we would ask, What is the object of the atonement? Let
these very Calvinists themselves answer. They tell us, that its object
was, to open the way, by which it might be possible for sinners to be
saved. But has the atonement made it possible for the reprobates to be
saved? If so, then perhaps they will be saved, and therefore the idea of
unconditional election and reprobation is false. But if the atonement
has only made it possible for the elect to be saved, then it was made
only for the elect. Let the supporters of this system choose which horn
of this dilemma they please; either will destroy their doctrine. For as
it is absurd to talk about redeeming grace and Gospel provisions,
_sufficient_ to save those who are eternally and effectually excluded
from these blessings, so it is idle to talk about a redemption for
_all_, which includes provisions sufficient only to save the _elect_.
Not even the fiction of a _natural ability_ in all men to serve God and
get to heaven, will help this difficulty. For allowing, in the argument,
that the reprobates have ability to serve God and gain heaven, without
grace, and in spite of God's decree, still, as this is called a
_natural_ ability, it is plain it is not the fruit of the atonement. It
is equally irrelevant to argue that the atonement may be said to be
universal, because it contains enough to save the whole world, if they
would or could embrace it, and it is only their excessive depravity
which renders it impossible for them to receive the atonement. For this
is the same as to say, that a physician has an efficient remedy to heal
his patient, only he is so sick he cannot take it. This excessive
weakness is that for which the physician should prescribe, and to which
the medicine should be applied. And if it does not come to this it is no
medicine for this case. So the atonement, if it is not a remedy for
man's extreme depravity, it is no provision for him. If it does not give
a gracious power to all sinners to embrace salvation, it has
accomplished nothing for the depraved reprobate. Since, therefore,
according to Calvinism, the atonement provides for the reprobate neither
natural nor moral ability to serve God, nor makes it possible for him to
be saved, it follows, that the atonement is made only for the elect. But
as this is contrary to the word of God, the doctrine that leads to this
conclusion must be false.

5. If time would permit, I might here notice at some length several
objections to this doctrine:--Such as that it takes away all motives to
repentance, by giving the sinner just cause to say, "If I am to be
saved, I shall be, do what I may; and if I am to be damned, I must be,
do what I can;"--it leads to the idea of infant damnation--it weakens
the zeal and paralyzes The efforts of devotion and benevolence--it
destroys the end of punishment, the original design of which was to
prevent sin, but which, according to this doctrine, was designed merely
for the glory of God; and sin was ordained for the purpose of giving God
an opportunity of glorifying himself in punishing it. These and others
might be dwelt upon with effect; but passing them all, I hasten to the
conclusion of my arguments, by urging only one more objection to the
system I am opposing.

6. We are suspicious of this doctrine, because its advocates themselves
seem studious to cover up and keep out of sight many of its features,
and are constantly changing their manner of stating and defending their
system. A little attention to the history of the controversy between
predestinarians and their opposers, will show the truth and force of
this objection. The charge that Calvinism covers up and keeps out of
sight some of its most offensive features, does not lie so much against
its advocates of the old school, as those of the modern. With the
exception of some logical consequences, which we think chargeable upon
the system, and which they were unwilling to allow, these early
defenders of unconditional election came out boldly and fearlessly with
their doctrine. If modern Calvinists would do the same, we should need
no other refutation of the system. But even the early supporters of
Calvinism, when pressed by their opponents, resorted to various forms of
explanation and modes of proof, and also to various modifications of the
system itself. Goodwin, in his work entitled, "Agreement of Brethren,"
&c, says:--"The question, as to the object of the decrees, has gone out
among our Calvinistic brethren into endless digladiations and
irreconcilable divisions," and then goes on to mention nine of these
"irreconcilable divisions" that prevailed at his day. At the present day
these school subtleties are not so prevalent, but numerous changes of a
more popular cast, and such as are suited to cover up the offensive
features of the system, are now introduced. The modern defence of this
doctrine consists chiefly in the dexterous use of certain ambiguous
technicalities which, in this theology, mean one thing, and in common
language another. And this is carried to such an extent, that it is now
a common thing to hear parishioners contend strenuously that their
pastors do not hold to predestination, when it is well known to some, at
least, that they do; and that they are exerting themselves to spread the
sentiment.

This is a subject, permit me here to say, on which I touch with more
reluctance than upon any other point involved in this controversy. To
represent the thing as it is, seems so much like accusing our brethren
of insincerity and duplicity, that nothing but a regard to truth would
induce me to allude to it. Whether this arises from an excessive but
honest zeal for their system, or whether it is supposed the cause is so
important, and at the same time so difficult to be sustained, that the
end will justify what, in other cases, would be judged questionable
policy, and hardly reconcilable with the spirit of a guileless
Christianity, is certainly not for me to decide. With respect to their
motives, they will stand or fall by the judgment of Him that trieth the
reins. But the course, at any rate, seems very reprehensible. Take one
instance:--All sinners, we are told, may come to Christ _if they will;_
and therefore they are criminal if they do not.--Now this mode of speech
corresponds very well with Scripture and reason. And who, that had not
been specially instructed in the dialect of this theology, would
understand that this mode of speech, according to Hopkinsian technics,
implied an inability and an impossibility of obtaining salvation? And
yet this is the fact: for though, according to this system, if we have a
will to come to Christ, we _may_, yet by a _Divine constitution_ it is
as much impossible to have this will as it is to break the decree of
Jehovah,--Hence all such modes of speech are worse than unmeaning; they
have a deceptive meaning. They mean one thing in this creed, and another
thing in popular language. It never occurs to the generality of mankind,
when they are told they may do thus and thus, _if they will_, that there
is a secret omnipotent influence impelling and controlling the will.
They suppose these expressions, therefore, mean that, independent of all
irresistible foreign influences, they have, within themselves, the power
to choose or not to choose: and yet the real meaning of the speaker
differs as much from this, as a negative differs from an affirmative.

In perfect accordance with the foregoing, is the common explanation that
is given to the doctrine of election and reprobation. Reprobation is
kept out of sight; and yet it is as heartily believed by modern
Calvinists, as it was by John Calvin himself. It is taught too; but it
is taught covertly. And yet when we quote old-fashioned Calvinism, in
its primitive plain dress, we are told _these are old authors;_ we do
not believe with them: "if we had lived in the days of our fathers, we
would not have been partakers with them in _their errors_," and yet
"they are witnesses unto themselves, that they _are the children_ of
them" who taught these errors. They recommend their writings, they
garnish their sepulchres, they teach their catechisms to the rising
generation; they say, even in their Church articles of faith, "We
believe in the doctrines of grace, as held and taught by the _fathers_
and _reformers_ in the Church,"--and especially do they hold to that
root and foundation of the whole system, "God hath, from all eternity,
foreordained whatsoever comes to pass."

Since I have alluded to Church articles, it will be in support of this
objection to say that the written creeds of Churches partake of this
same ambiguous character. They are either expressed in texts of
Scripture, or in doubtful and obscure terms; so that different
constructions can be put upon them, according to the faith of the
subscriber. And instances have been known, in which articles of faith
have been altered, again and again, to accommodate scrupulous
candidates. And yet their candidates for holy orders, and for
professorships, in their theological institutions, are required to
subscribe to a rigid Calvinistic creed. In this way it is expected,
doubtless, that the doctrine will be maintained and perpetuated, though
in other respects public opinion should be accommodated. How would
honest John Calvin, if he could be introduced among us, with the same
sentiments he had when on earth, frown upon the Churches that bear his
name! He would not only call them "silly and childish," but he would,
doubtless, in his bold, blunt manner, charge them with disingenuousness
and cowardice, if not with downright duplicity, for thus shunning and
smoothing over and covering up the more repulsive features of their
system. How would he chide them for shifting their ground, and changing
their system, while they nevertheless pretend to build on the same
foundation of predestination! He would, we believe, sternly inquire of
them what they meant by saying, all sinners, not excepting reprobates,
may come to Christ and be saved?--why they pretended to hold to
election, and not to reprobation?--how they could reconcile general
redemption with particular election?--and especially would he frown
indignantly upon that new doctrine, lately preached and defended, in
what has been supposed to be the head quarters of orthodoxy in New
-England, by which we are taught that derived depravity is not any taint
or sinful corruption of our moral constitution, but consists,
exclusively and entirely, in _moral exercise!_ But probably he would get
little satisfaction from those who profess his creed and bear his name.
They would tell him that the old forms of this system were so repulsive,
the people would not receive them; and that, being hard pressed by their
antagonists, they had thrown up these new redoubts, and assumed these
new positions, not only to conceal their doctrine, but if possible to
defend it. And as he could get little satisfaction of _them_, he would
get less from us.--Could we meet the venerable reformer, we would thank
him for his successful zeal and labour in the Protestant cause; but we
would expostulate with him for giving sanction and currency to his
"horrible decree." We would tell him he had committed to his followers a
system so abhorrent to reason, and so difficult to be supported by
Scripture, that they had been _driven_ into all these changes in hope of
finding some new and safe ground of defence; and that, while we
considered this as a striking and convincing argument against the
doctrine itself, we viewed it as auspicious of its final overthrow; that
these changes, refinements, and concealments, were symptoms that the
doctrine was waxing old, and was ready to vanish away.

But I must conclude this discourse. To your serious consideration,
Christian brethren, I commend the sentiments contained in it. Whatever
you may think of the discourse itself, I cannot fail, I think, of
escaping censure. Those who accord with the sentiments here defended,
will of course approve; and those who believe in predestination will of
course be reconciled to the preaching because God hath decreed it. It
hath come to pass that I have preached as I have, and therefore it is a
part of the Divine plan. It hath come pass that Arminianism exists, and
therefore this is a part of the Divine plan. We beg our brethren who
differ from us, not to fight against God's plan if they say it is right
for us to fight against it, because this also is decreed--I answer, This
only confirms our objections against the system, for it arrays the Deity
against himself. From all such inconsistencies, _may the God of truth
deliver us_. Amen.




NUMBER I.

REPLY TO THE CHRISTIAN SPECTATOR.[3]

This sermon had been before the public almost two years before it
received any notice, so far as the author is informed, from any of the
advocates of predestination. After the third edition was announced,
there were several passing acrimonious censures in some of the
Calvinistic periodicals, which did not affect the merits of the question
at issue between us and the predestinarians. At length the Rev. Mr.
Tyler, of this city, (Middletown, Conn.) published a sermon which was
evidently written in reference to the sermon on predestination. This
sermon of Mr. T. might have been noticed; but its general positions were
so indefinite, and its modes of illustration so vague, it seemed hardly
calculated to narrow the field of controversy or hasten a decision of
the question at issue. For example: Mr. T. defines election to be "the
eternal purpose of God to renew, sanctify, and save every man whom he
wisely can, and no others." With such a proposition there certainly can
be no controversy, for it leaves the subject more vague, and the point
in dispute more confused than before a definition was attempted. There
are two errors, the antipodes of each other, which, in all controversy,
and especially religious controversy, ought to be carefully guarded
against. The one is an attempt to make the subjects of difference more
numerous and consequential than they are in truth; and the other is an
attempt to cover up real differences under indefinite propositions and
ambiguous terms. Both these errors may be the result of honest motives:
the former may arise from a jealous regard to the truth, and the latter
from a love of peace. Both, however, are injurious; for neither does the
one promote the cause of truth, nor does the other secure a permanent
peace. Indeed, bringing antagonist principles into contact gives an
additional impulse to their repellent forces, so that a transient union
produces, in the end, greater discord. Though the controversy in the
Church, between Calvinists and Arminians, has been long and injurious;
yet, as an individual, I never can sign a _union creed_ of doubtful
terms and ambiguous articles. Nor can I deem it worth my while to
contend about such terms and articles. I should fear the searching
interrogatory of Him who questioned Job: "Who is this that darkeneth
counsel by words without knowledge?" In the present controversy there is
danger of this ambiguity also from a less commendable principle than a
love of peace, viz. an adherence to old symbols of faith to avoid the
imputation of a change; while, at the same time, to escape the force of
unanswerable argument, vague propositions, ambiguous definitions, and
equivocal terms are made the bulwark of defence. This principle was
alluded to in the sermon on predestination; and although it has given
great offence to some of the Calvinists, and is represented by the
author of the review which we are about to notice as being "utterly
unworthy of the attention of a person who is honestly inquiring after
truth;" yet it seems to me he knows little of his own heart who thinks
himself incapable of such a course. Nor does it seem _utterly unworthy_
of an honest inquirer after truth to mark the effects of arguments upon
systems, since the changes effected in those systems, by the arguments
urged against them, show the strength of the one and the weakness of the
other. If; therefore, I should undertake to answer Mr. Tyler's sermon,
my strictures would consist chiefly in pointing out its indefiniteness
and incongruity. But this, without convincing, might give offence. And
although I see no way of continuing the controversy, as the Calvinists
now manage it, without alluding to this course of the advocates of
predestination, yet I am happy to say there is less of it in the
"review" before us than is common in modern treatises on that subject.
Though it is a laboured article of about forty-three pages, yet it is
generally in a manly style, and sustained by a train of close and
skilful argumentation. It would afford me great pleasure to be able to
equal the reviewer's ingenuity, and still more to throw into my reply
the serenity of his spirit. I have little occasion, however, in the
present case, to dread his talents or lose my temper; for if I
understand the reviewer, though his essay bears upon it, if not the
"rugged," at least the decided "aspect of controversy" with my sermon,
he is nevertheless in principle an Arminian. I allude now more
especially to his views of predestination. On election there is
evidently a greater difference between us; and yet it strikes me when a
man discards Calvinian predestination, consistency would require that
the peculiarities of Calvinian election should be discarded also. At any
rate, as the settling of the former question will have a very strong
bearing upon the other, I shall confine myself in this article to
predestination. I am not certain that I understand the reviewer; but his
candour authorizes me to believe that he will explain himself frankly,
and correct me if I misunderstand him. If we are agreed on this point we
ought to know it, and give over the controversy. If we are not, let us
know the precise ground of difference. And in either case we shall be
the better prepared to pursue the question of election.

The question in dispute is simply this: What relation is there between
the decrees or purposes of God and the responsible acts of man? The
Arminian views on this question, as I understand them, are these: God,
as a Sovereign, in deciding upon his works, had a right to determine on
such a system as pleased him; but, being infinitely wise and good, he
would of course choose, in the contemplation of all possible systems, to
create such a one as, all things considered, would bring the most glory
to himself, and the greatest good to the universe. In infinite wisdom he
decided that such a system would be a _moral government_, consisting of
himself, as the supreme and rightful Governor, and of intelligent
subjects, having full and unrestrained power to obey or disobey the
mandates of their Sovereign. He foresaw that one of the unavoidable
incidents of such a government would be the possible existence of moral
evil; and, in glancing through the proposed system, he foresaw that
moral evil would _certainly_ exist, involving innumerable multitudes in
its ruinous consequences. He did not approve of the evil; he did not
decree that it should exist: but still evil was a remote result of a
decree of his: for although he foresaw that _if_ he made such free
agents, and governed them in the manner proposed, they would certainly
sin, yet he determined, notwithstanding this _certainty_, to make these
agents and govern them as proposed. He determined, however, that they
should be under no necessity of sinning, either by his decree, or by the
circumstances in which they should be placed; but if they sinned, it
should be their own free choice. As he foresaw they would sin, he also
determined upon the plan he would pursue in reference to them as
sinners, and arranged, in the counsels of his own infinite mind, the
extended concatenation of causes and effects, so as to make the "wrath
of man praise him," and deduce the greatest possible good from the best
possible system. Such, it is believed, is Arminianism--such is
Methodism--such is the doctrine of the sermon--and such are the dictates
of the Bible and of sound philosophy.

The next question is, What is the doctrine of the reviewer? He shall
speak for himself. On page 612, of the review, he asks the question,
"But in what sense are we to understand the position that he (God)
purposes the existence of sin?" He proceeds to answer: "Not necessarily,
in the sense of his preferring its existence in his kingdom to its
non-existence, &c. In affirming the doctrine of predestination we affirm
no more necessarily than that God, with the knowledge that these beings
would sin in despite of the best measures of providence and government
he could take, purposed to create them and pursue those measures, not
for the sake of their sin, but for the good which he nevertheless saw it
was possible to secure in his moral kingdom. This would be a purpose
with respect to the existence of sin, a purpose to permit its existence,
rather than to have no moral system."--Again, page 613: "Nothing more
(touching free agency) is implied in the purpose spoken of than a
CERTAINTY _foreseen_ of God, that if he creates and upholds that being,
and pursues wise and good measures of providence, he (the being) will at
a given time, fully choose in a given way." In page 612 he says, "God
confers on them (mankind) in their creation the powers of free agency,
and he uses _no influence_ in his providence or government to procure
their sin." Page 614, "He (God) most obviously has no will opposed to
his law, though with a foresight of their conduct he should purpose to
permit their sin, rather than dispense with the existence of a moral
kingdom." But it is useless to multiply quotations. Suffice it to say
that the reviewer's whole ground of defence against the arguments of the
sermon, on the question of predestination, is solely this Arminian
explanation of the doctrine of predestination. He acknowledges, nay
boldly asserts, in a strain "of rugged controversy" with his brethren
who may differ from this view of the subject, that there is no other
explanation by which the arguments of the sermon can be avoided--that
is, as I understand it, the only way to avoid the arguments against the
doctrine of Calvinian predestination is to give it up, and assume the
Arminian sentiment on this subject. If the reviewer does not mean this,
he will of course explain himself fully, and point out the precise
difference between his views and those of the Arminians. If, on this
subject, the reviewer is an Arminian, he has too much candor, I trust,
not to acknowledge it frankly, and too much moral courage to be afraid
of the name. If he is not, the cause of truth and his own consistency of
character imperiously demand an explanation. Until this point,
therefore, is decided, farther arguments on the merits of the question
in which we are supposed to be at issue, are useless.

I am not, however, quite ready to dismiss the review. I stated at the
commencement it was difficult to pursue this controversy without
alluding to the manner in which it had been conducted on the part of our
Calvinistic brethren; but that there was less ground for objection in
this article in the Spectator than in most others. There are some things
in this article, however, that I cannot justify. I will state them
frankly, though I trust in Christian friendship. I cannot approve of the
reviewer's use of terms: though, to my understanding, he has evidently
given the doctrine of predestination not merely a new _dress_, but a new
_character_, yet he more than intimates that it is the old doctrine with
only a new method of explanation; and seriously and repeatedly complains
of the author of the sermon for "confounding the _fact_ of God's
foreordaining the voluntary actions of men with this or any other
_solution_ of that fact or theory as to the _mode_ in which it comes to
pass." And so confident is the reviewer that he still believes in the
_fact_ of predestination, in the old Calvinistic sense, that in stating
his sentiments on this subject he uses the same forms of expression
which Calvinists have used, when their meaning was as distant from his
as the two poles from each other. He tells us, for instance, that "God
determined that the events which take place should take place in the
very manner in which they do, and for the very ends." Now if the writer
mean what the words naturally imply, then he believes that, in the case
of a finally impenitent sinner, God predetermined that all his sins
_should_ take place in the manner they did, and for the very end that he
might be damned! Again he tells us, "God, in his eternal purpose, has
predetermined all events." And, quoting from the Assembly's Catechism,
"God, from all eternity, did freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever
comes to pass," he tells us that this expresses essentially the views
entertained by the orthodox Congregationalists of New-England, among
whom, I suppose of course, he would include himself. Now, after what I
have said of the reviewer's Arminianism, I doubt not but some of my
readers will be startled at these quotations, and be ready to accuse me
of great credulity in the judgment I have formed of the writer's
sentiments. I shall exculpate myself, however, by saying, in the first
place, that if there is any contradiction in the writer's sentiments or
language, it is not my fault, but his; and if I should attempt to
reconcile them, perhaps the reviewer would not thank me for my
officiousness. Beside, after what has been said, I feel safer in
understanding the reviewer in an _Arminian sense_, because he and some
others take it very ill of me that I have represented them as
Calvinists. But, in fairness to the reviewer, it is presumed that he
will not consider himself justly chargeable with contradiction. He has
used these old terms, it is true, and thus has _subscribed_ to the
Calvinistic creed as positively as the staunchest Calvinist; but then,
let it be understood, he has _explained_ that creed, and defined the
terms, and protests against being held responsible for any other
construction than his own. Hence by God's predetermining that sin
_should_ take place, in the very manner, and for the very ends it
does--by God's foreordaining whatsoever comes to pass--he only means
that God foresaw that sin would certainly take place, and predetermined
that he would not hinder it, either by refraining from creating moral
agents, or by throwing a restraint upon them that would destroy their
free agency. In short, that he would submit to it as an evil unavoidably
incident to the best possible system, after doing all that he wisely
could to prevent it! This is _foreordaining sin!!_ This is
_predetermining_ that it _should be!!!_ I cannot but express my _deepest
regret_ that a gentleman of the reviewer's standing and learning should
lend his aid and give his sanction to such a perversion of language--to
such a confusion of tongues. We do not complain of the doctrine
contained in the _explanation;_ but we protest, in the name of all that
is pure in language, in the name of all that is important in the
sentiments conveyed by language, against such an abuse of terms. Alas
for us! When will the watchmen see eye to eye! when will the Church be
at peace! while our spiritual guides, our doctors in divinity, pursue
this course? By what authority will the reviewer support this
definition? Do the words _predestinate_, or _foreordain_, or _decree_
mean, in common language, or even in their radical and critical
definition, nothing more than _to permit--not absolutely to hinder--to
submit to as an unavoidable but offensive evil?_ The reviewer certainly
will not pretend this. Much less do they mean this when used in a
magisterial or authoritative sense, to express the mind and will of a
superior or governor toward an inferior or a subject.--What is the
_decree_ of a king? What is the _ordinance_ of a senate? What is the
official determination of a legislative body? Let common sense and
common usage answer the question. Not a man probably can be found, from
the philosopher to the peasant, who would say these words would bear the
explanation of the reviewer. Yet it is in this official and
authoritative sense that theologians, and our reviewer among them, use
these terms. The Assembly's Catechism, as quoted by himself, says, "God,
from all eternity, _did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own
will, freely and unchangeably ordain_," &c. Now it would be a gross
insult to common sense to say of such language as this, in the mouth of
an earthly potentate, that the sovereign meant by this nothing more than
that he permitted the existence of certain unavoidable, and in
themselves, highly offensive evils in his kingdom, because he could not
remove them without embarrassing the essential operations of his
government. There is not, probably, a clearer case in the whole range of
philology.

But the use of these terms by those who believe as I understand the
reviewer to believe, is the more unjustifiable, because they are used by
most Calvinistic authors in a different sense.--Why, then, should the
reviewer, believing as he does, continue to use them in the symbols of
his faith? Different persons might give different answers to such a
question. For one, I would prefer he should answer it himself.

I cannot approve of the reviewer's censures upon my manner of treating
the doctrine of predestination. He accuses me of confounding the
_doctrine_ itself, with _modes_ of explanation. He says they are
perfectly distinct; and though some may have been unfortunate in their
modes of explanation, and though he acknowledges my arguments bear
against such, yet the _fact_ of the doctrine itself is not thereby
affected. His mode of explanation, for example, he thinks untouched by
the arguments of the sermon. But his mode of explanation, as we have
seen, turns the doctrine into _Arminianism_. And it would, perhaps, be
no difficult matter to show, that any explanation of the doctrine, short
of doing it away, would be exposed to all the weight of the arguments
urged in the sermon. But the sermon was never written to oppose those
who hold to the decrees of God in an Arminian sense. Why then does the
reviewer complain of the sermon? Why does he so "deeply regret" that the
author of the sermon "should come before the public with an attack on
the faith of a _large part_ of the Christian community, conducted in a
way so obviously erroneous and unjust?" The sermon was against
Calvinism, not Arminianism. It is true, the reviewer may say, the sermon
alludes, in some parts, to the Calvinism of New-England, and therefore
he felt himself implicated. But he certainly was not unless he is a
New-England _Calvinist_--unless he believes that "God foreordains
whatsoever comes to pass," in the proper sense of those terms. Indeed,
it seems that Calvinism, in its proper character, is as obnoxious to the
reviewer, as to the author of the sermon; and the former seems to have
taken this opportunity to show the _nakedness_ of the system, and bring
into notice a better doctrine. If so, is it safe that the reviewer
should still accord to them their old symbols of faith? And is it just,
that the author of the sermon should be held the defendant on the
record, when the execution is issued against Calvinism itself? In answer
to the former question, I would say, it is utterly _unsafe_, and never
will be approved of, I believe, by Arminians. With respect to the latter
question, if it is _safer_ to attack Calvinism in this indirect way, I
will not object, though it may seem at present to my disadvantage. But I
cannot see that it would be safer--an open bold front always ends best.
What if it should subject the reviewer, and the theological doctors in
New-Haven generally, to the charge of heresy? Still they ought not to
shrink from their responsibilities--they occupy a commanding influence
among the Churches and over the candidates of their theological school,
and that influence should be openly and decidedly directed to
discountenance error. They should remove it, root and branch. Especially
should they discard those old symbols of faith, which are not only in
themselves, in _their true and proper meaning_, a reflection upon the
clerical character, and a _black spot_ upon an otherwise orthodox creed,
but are also especially obnoxious, because they are the very articles
which the great body of the Calvinists have maintained, in a sense
widely different from that of the reviewer. At the head of these stands
Calvin, the author of the system, in the Protestant Church. Calvin, who
says, "I will not scruple to own that the will of God lays a necessity
on all things, and that every thing he wills necessarily comes to pass."
"Adam fell, not only by the _permission_, but also by the _appointment_
of God. He not only _foresaw_ that Adam would fall, but also _ordained_
that he should." "The devil and wicked men are so held in on every side,
with the hand of God, that they cannot conceive or contrive or execute
any mischief, any farther than God himself doth not _permit_ only, but
_command_--nor are they held in fetters, but compelled also, as with a
bridle, to perform obedience to those commands." Calvin, it seems, was
far from thinking that _appointment_ only meant _permission_, or that to
_ordain_ only meant certainty _foreseen_. In this he was correct: in
this he has been followed by a host of writers down to the present day,
and copied in numerous ecclesiastical symbols, in different parts of
Christendom; and does not the reviewer know that these terms are
understood by Hopkins and Emmons, and all the Calvinists of that school,
in a sense widely different from his explanation, and in a sense, too,
much more in accordance with the _proper meaning_ of the terms? Does he
not know that a great majority of the Calvinists of the United States,
and perhaps in New-England, even understand these terms, as indeed they
ought to be understood, when used in reference to sin, as expressing a
preference of sin, in that part of the Divine plan where sin occurs, to
holiness in its stead? Indeed, as I understand the reviewer, from the
days of John Calvin down to the present hour, there is, on this point,
between the great body of Calvinists and himself, almost no likeness,
except in the use of words. Theirs is one doctrine--his another. Why,
then, does he oppose the opposers of Calvinism, and thus keep error in
countenance? Especially, why does he hail from that party, and hoist
their signals, and then, alter _seeming_ to get the victory, by
espousing the very cause of the assailed, encourage the _Calvinists_ to
triumph, as if _their_ cause had been successful? Is this justice to the
author of the sermon? Is it the best way to promote truth? But I
forbear. The reviewer's subsequent explanations may remove these
difficulties. At any rate, the cause of truth will doubtless advance.
The appearance of this review has given additional strength to the
sentiment, Calvinism "is waxing old, and is ready to vanish away." The
dogma that "God has predetermined all events, and elected (in a
Calvinistic sense) out of our guilty world all who shall be heirs of
salvation," withers at the touch of advancing truth, and is fast losing
credit in the Christian Church.

Since writing the above, I have seen an inquiry of a correspondent in
one of the Calvinistic papers, in these words, "Why do our Calvinistic
writers retain the words which seem so sadly to perplex our Arminian
brethren, when it is certain that we do not attach the signification to
them which they always pretend?" and then instances in the word
"foreordain." The editor, in reply, gives as a reason for using these
words, that they are Scriptural; and seems to deem it necessary that
they should _persist_ in this use until we submit. This reply of the
editor reminded me of a remark of Mr. Tyler, in his sermon already
alluded to: "The Calvinist contends that God resolved, from eternity, to
permit all the sins and miseries which were to take place; and this he
calls, in the language of the Bible, _foreordination_." Now, not to stop
here, to show that no true Calvinist would ever call _foreordination_
and _permission_ the same thing, for Calvin has, as we have seen,
clearly distinguished the two words from each other, I beg the privilege
of adding a thought or two on this idea of Scripture authority for the
use or these terms. For if it is only because the Scriptures use these
words in this sense, that they _persist_ in using them, I think we may
easily settle this question. Let it be shown that the Scriptures use
"foreordination," or "predestination," in the sense of mere
_permission--not absolutely hindering_. Again: let _one passage_ be
shown in which it is said, God "predestinates" all things, or
"foreordains" whatsoever comes to pass. If this cannot be done, how
futile, how more than absurd is it, to talk about using these words,
because the Scriptures use them! To use Scripture words out of the
Scripture sense, and then appeal to Scripture to sanction this use, is
as sad a perversion of the Scriptures as it is of logic. Indeed, to give
such a meaning to the word predestinate, is at once to take away the
principal scriptures quoted by the reviewer, and others, to prove
Calvinistic election. See Eph. i, 5; ii, 10; Rom. viii, 29. Does
predestination in these passages mean merely _to permit_, or not _to
hinder?_ and do these passages teach a personal election to eternal
life? Is this all the Calvinists mean by the _election_ of _sovereign
grace_, not of man, nor of the will of mans but of God? Alas! for the
elect! If man does not elect himself, and God _only predestinates_, that
is, _permits--does not hinder_ his election; who, we ask, will elect
him? How does error destroy itself! These gentlemen may take which
ground they please; they may either acknowledge that Bible
predestination means an _efficient purpose of God_ to accomplish an
object, and then meet the sermon on the issue there proposed; or they
may interpret these words as the reviewer has, and then give up those
passages which they consider their strong hold, in favour of Calvinian
election. In either case their system must suffer serious loss. Nothing
could be more unfortunate, I think, than this appeal to the Bible to
sanction such an abuse of terms. As to the word foreordain, I do not
recollect that it occurs in our translation. Jude 4, has "before of old
ordained," &c, but it is in the original very different from the word
rendered predestinate. The allusion is to characters that were
proscribed for their sins, and designated for deserved punishment. The
original for predestinate, proorizo, is used in only one place, so far
as I can find, with any direct reference to a sinful act, Acts iv, 28.
This passage is quoted by the reviewer. But the determination here
spoken of, he himself informs us, relates to "the purpose of God to make
an atonement for the sin of the world, by means of the death of Jesus
Christ." Hence the predetermination of God, in this instance, probably
refers to the _work_ of atonement, without including therein any special
decree in respect to the means of the suffering. Christ _could_ have
suffered, even unto death, in the garden without any human means. But
inasmuch as these men had the murderous purpose, God "chose to leave
Christ to their power," &c, therefore _decreed_ the atonement, but
_permitted_ the means. This seems to be the most rational construction.
But whatever Calvinists may think of this passage, the Scriptural use of
the word is clearly on the side of its _proper_ meaning--an
_authoritative ordinance_ that the thing predestinated _shall be_.

I will avail myself of this opportunity to correct one or two errors of
the reviewer, respecting the sentiment of the sermon, which had escaped
my notice. He says, my "view of predestination is a determination of God
to produce a given result by his _own immediate_ and _efficient_
energy." This is a mistake. I said nothing about _immediate energy;_
this is an essential misrepresentation of the sermon. Again: "On Dr.
Fisk's principle, it is impossible for God to use the voluntary agency
of any creature, to accomplish any valuable end in his kingdom, and yet
leave that creature accountable for his conduct." This is so manifestly
incorrect and unjust, that I am sure I need only call the attention of
the reviewer to it a second time, to secure a correction from himself.




NUMBER II.

A PROPOSITION TO CALVINISTS.

The communication below contains a proposition from Dr. W. Fisk, which,
however much we dislike theological controversies, we believe is
appropriate and interesting at this time. Such a discussion, under such
arrangements, will give the merits of the controversy to both sides; and
will, at least, convince all of one truth--that the Methodist Episcopal
Church seeks not concealment from the world or her members, as charged
by her adversaries. But it will develop a still more important truth,
and that is, what are the settled and definite opinions of the old or
the new school in the Calvinistic Churches. It is known to all the
world, that there is great difficulty in ascertaining what are the
theological opinions of those ancient Churches of the land. They seem to
be as far apart from each other as they are from Arminianism; and their
replies and rejoinders to each other are as severe as if directed
against us. The discussion must be interesting and profitable, carried
on by two such persons as Dr. Fisk and his opponent, and under the
steady supervision, as to temper and manner, of third parties as
proposed.--Eds.

I have just received a pamphlet of about forty-eight pages, containing a
series of letters, in answer to my sermon on predestination and
election. These letters are written by the Rev. David Metcalf, of
Lebanon, Connecticut, and purport to be an answer, not only to the
doctrinal part of the sermon, but to the "charges," as the writer is
pleased to call them, contained in the sermon, and published afterward
in a specific form, first in the Connecticut Observer, and then in the
Christian Advocate and Journal.

It will be recollected by your readers, that I pledged myself to
vindicate my statements against any responsible person, who, with his
own proper signature, would come forward and deny them: or if I failed
to support them, I would retract what I had written. This pledge Mr.
Metcalf calls upon me to redeem; not indeed by bringing forward my
proofs, or by making a reply; but, having thrown in his plea, he
supposes that the cause is decided, and has himself made up the
judgment, and issued the execution, and forthwith comes forward, and
claims his damage. His words are--"Of the author of the sermon we claim
a public acknowledgment of his errors, and make justice and equity the
ground of our claim." Again, "If Dr. F. makes no public retraction from
the ground taken in his sermon--if after he shall receive these letters,
[!!] remembering also what is said in the Christian Spectator's review
of his sermon, he shall allow another copy of it to be printed, I think
he will find it difficult to convince any intelligent candid man, that
he is not guilty of breaking the ninth commandment," &c. The intelligent
reader, who has studied human nature, will know how to make suitable
allowances for the dogmatical and premature decisions, and high claims
contained in the foregoing extracts. It is not an uncommon thing, that a
zealous advocate succeeds in _convincing himself_ of the truth of his
cause; but utterly fails with respect to all others. I do not say, that
this writer will not gain his argument; but it requires more
"foreknowledge" than I am disposed to accord to him, to affirm this as a
"certainty." I demur against this hasty manner of making up the
judgment. I wish to be heard in defence of my statements, and have
objections also to bring against his statements, and supposed proofs and
arguments.

In the first place, I object to him, that he has not come out and joined
issue specifically and directly on any one of my "charges," but talks
for most part in general terms, about the unfairness, injustice, and
misrepresentations of the sermon. This circumstance would, of itself,
free me from any obligation to notice these letters, on the ground of my
pledge in the Observer. But yet, as I feel the most perfect readiness to
discuss this subject, and as I hope the cause of righteousness may be
served thereby, I will willingly proceed in this controversy, both as to
doctrine and policy, provided we can secure some suitable public medium,
through which to prosecute the discussion. And on this point Mr. M.
complains bitterly of the former editors of the Advocate and
Journal--for he had applied, it seems, for the privilege of having his
letters inserted in that paper, and was refused, on the ground that "the
sermon was not published in the Advocate, and therefore justice did not
require that its answer should be." Now, since these letters are
professedly an answer to the _whole sermon_, the editors, I think, were
perfectly consistent with their former statements, in refusing to
publish them. If Mr. M. had confined himself to the charges in the
Observer, the editors would undoubtedly have given the subject a place
in the columns of the Advocate: as it was, however, I think the charge
of injustice and unfairness made against the editors by Mr. M. is
entirely gratuitous and _unjustifiable_. If it was expected to produce
an _effect_ on the public, by such a complaint, I think such an
expectation will be disappointed in all places where the subject is
understood. And that this was the expectation appears evident from
another charge against Methodist preachers, in the following words:--"It
is supposed to be the common sentiment, if not 'the common talk in our
land,' that the Methodist preachers have a strong aversion against their
hearers reading our writings. The reason of this, in part, is supposed
to be, that they choose to have their people receive all their knowledge
of our creed from their statements of it, instead of ours; lest they
should be convinced, by our arguments, of the truth of our belief." Now
this charge we wholly and positively deny, and challenge the writer for
the proofs of what we know to be, not only an ungenerous, but an unjust
allegation. Nothing can be farther from the whole genius of Methodism
than this. Does not the reverend gentleman know, that a great portion of
our members in New England are those who were once members of
Calvinistic congregations? Does he not know that they were trained up in
these doctrines from their infancy, and have heard them explained and
defended from their earliest recollections? Does he not know that
Methodism has made its way against the impressions of the nursery, the
catechetical instruction of the priest and the school master--the
influence of the pulpit and the press, and in maturer age against the
still stronger influence of academies and colleges? Does he not know,
also, that all this has been done in this generation? And shall we now
be told that Methodists examine but one side of the question? How
astonishing such a charge, from a man who can make any pretension to a
knowledge of ecclesiastical matters in our country! Does not this writer
know, also, that the editors of the Advocate, and others, have called
loudly, and almost continually, for information upon this subject, that
we might know what the Calvinistic standards are, and ascertain what
Calvinism is? and shall we now be told, that Methodists are ignorant of
the Calvinistic faith, and, what is worse, the preachers strive to keep
them in ignorance, and that with the base purpose of keeping them from a
conviction of the truth! We say, if Calvinism is essentially what it was
from five to thirty years ago, we know its character as well as we ever
can know it. If we do not understand it now, it is either because we
have not _natural ability_ to understand it, (and therefore. Calvinism
itself being judge, we are not criminal,) or it is because the teachers
of Calvinism have not had _natural ability_ to make it plain. But if
Calvinism is not essentially what it was, we ask what it now is? If it
is changed in the hands of its supporters, how much has it changed? Is
it Calvinism still, or has it lost its identity? In what does the
identity of Calvinism consist? Shall we take the Rev. Mr. Metcalf's
answer to these questions? Shall we take the Christian Spectator's
answers? Mr. M. appears fully to agree with the Spectator, for he makes
frequent reference to it, with great apparent approbation. And yet two
numbers of this periodical have been issued since my reply to the review
of my sermon in that work, in which reply I stated my understanding of
the reviewer's doctrine of predestination, and requested to be informed
if I was incorrect; and neither my reply nor my request has been
noticed. And yet, let it be understood, that in the last number there is
a very laboured article, to show that Dr. Taylor does not differ
essentially from the orthodox Calvinistic faith heretofore received.

It is also known, that though Drs. Woods, Griffin, Tyler, Green, and
various others, come out and charge a portion of their brethren with a
serious and dangerous dereliction from the Calvinistic faith, yet the
accused, in their turn, strenuously maintain that they preserve the old
landmarks unremoved, and the essential principles of Calvinism
unimpaired; and that it is a calumnious charge to say they have departed
from the faith of the party.

How shall we judge in this matter? If we think, from our understanding
of their writings, that some of them have changed their views, and we
ask them if they have, they are silent. If their brethren charge them
with changing, they deny it; and, standing up before the world and
before the Churches, and before their God, pronounce _deliberately_ and
_emphatically_, the old symbols of faith, as a test oath to prove their
orthodoxy. Should we doubt their repeated asseverations? Mr. M., or
somebody else, might write another pamphlet to screw us into repentance
and confession, for bearing false witness against our neighbour. But if
we hold them to the old doctrine, which we have had a good opportunity
of learning, from our youth up, we are accused of misrepresentation, and
of bearing false witness. None but the advocates of the New-Haven
divinity have, to my knowledge, taken a public stand against my sermon;
and _they_ oppose it because _they_ say it is a misrepresentation of
their doctrine.

This, therefore, seems to us to be the state of the case with respect to
these gentlemen--We make a representation of Calvinism as we have found
it, and have heretofore understood it--they object, because this is not
their belief, and therefore we break the ninth commandment! Their own
brethren charge _them_ with a departure from the old doctrines, and they
deny it! and charge them in turn with bearing false witness! In the
midst of our perplexity on this subject, while we are looking every way
for light, up comes Mr. M. and tells us, we are unwilling our people
should know what Calvinists believe!! Is this generous, or just? We
repel the charge, and demand proof. And in the mean time, as a farther
proof that the charge is unfounded, I will, Messrs. Editors, with your
consent and approbation, make a proposition to Mr. Metcalf. It is
certainly desirable, that both Calvinists and Methodists should hear
_both sides_. Mr. M. seems very desirous to enlighten the Methodists.
This is very well. But we also wish to enlighten the Calvinists. To
accomplish this, the discussion on both sides should be put into the
hands of the people on both sides. If, then, some reputable and
extensively circulated Calvinistic periodical will publish my sermon,
and the discussion which _has_ arisen, or _may_ arise out of it, on both
sides, the Christian Advocate and Journal will publish Mr. M.'s letters
and the discussions which shall follow; provided always, that it shall
be submitted to the respective editors, whether the pieces are written
in respectful and becoming style and language; and provided also, that
the Calvinistic editor shall, by consenting to this arrangement, he
considered as thereby acknowledging, that Mr. Metcalf is a suitable man
to manage the controversy in behalf of the Calvinists, and that you,
Messrs. Editors, by consenting to the arrangement, will thereby consent
that you are willing to trust the controversy in my hands, to be managed
in behalf of the Methodists. To give an opportunity for the Calvinistic
periodical to be prepared, I shall wait a reasonable time, when, if the
offer is not complied with, I shall want the privilege, perhaps, of
occupying the columns of the Advocate, by the insertion of a few numbers
touching the present Calvinistic controversy, both as relates to their
own differences, and also as relates to the general question between
them and us.




NUMBER III.

INDEFINITENESS OF CALVINISM.

THE readers of the Christian Advocate and Journal will recollect the
proposition, made to the Rev. David Metcalf, in the 8th No. of the
present volume, on the subject of his review of my sermon. This
proposition has not been complied with on the part of Mr. M., and
according to the following extract from the New-York Evangelist, no
compliance can be expected:--

"We have seen," says the editor of the Evangelist, "in the Advocate,
since Mr. Metcalf's work was published, a letter from Dr. F., in which
he shows his desire that the discussion shall still go forward. There is
one condition he exacts, however, which we think impracticable. It is,
that some person should be designated, by a sort of common suffrage, as
the champion of Calvinism. Now the truth is, Calvinists, as a class, are
rather remarkable for thinking for themselves; and of course, while
there are great principles on which, as a class, they all agree, there
are many things which will be held or stated differently, by different
minds. Consequently, we can, each of us, defend ourselves, and defend
Calvinists as a class; notwithstanding, each one may think his fellow
holds some errors, and therefore, in his contest with Calvinism, Dr. F.
must assume to himself the responsibility of selecting those doctrinal
points and modes of statement which distinguish _Calvinists as a class_.
And when he has found these principles, we hope he will either confute
or embrace them."

I have copied the above for the farther notice of the public, not only
as a remarkable paragraph in itself, but also as having an important
bearing on the present controversy. There are several things in it
worthy of special notice.

In the first place we see, if other editors think with this one, and
that they do, we are left to infer from their not offering their
periodicals for the controversy, there is no hope that my proposition
will be accepted. We then have the reason--because there is one
impracticable condition. But why impracticable? The editor tells us,
"Dr. F. exacts that some person should be designated by a sort of common
suffrage to be the champion of Calvinism." I cannot believe the editor
means to misrepresent me; and yet he has done it. My words are,
"Provided that the Calvinistic _editor_ shall, by consenting to this
arrangement, be considered as thereby acknowledging that Mr. Metcalf is
a suitable man to manage the controversy on the part of the Calvinists."
Here is nothing said about a "sort of common suffrage." In case of
compliance by Mr. Leavitt, or any other editor, the only vote to be
polled and counted would be his own. Not a very extensive suffrage this!
And if Mr. L. thinks the condition impracticable, it must be owing to
_moral inability_ existing in his own mind, growing out of the belief
that Mr. Metcalf _is not a suitable person_ to manage this controversy.
Hence it is well I took the precaution I did; for Mr. M. is a stranger
to me; and I do not wish to engage in a controversy on this subject with
any man who is not, by his class, considered responsible. Perhaps Mr.
Leavitt knows of some one, who would be suitable, in his judgment, and
who would accept of the offer; or perhaps he himself would be willing to
engage in the discussion. I do not wish to confine it to Mr. M.; nor do
I wish to be considered in the light of a general challenger who is
seeking an adventure. The subject is an important one, and I am willing
to discuss it with any candid responsible man. We were most unjustly, as
I believed, accused of keeping our people in ignorance of Calvinism, and
of preventing them from reading on the other side, for the base purpose
of preventing them from being convinced of the truth. To render the
subject fair and equal, therefore, and to wipe off this aspersion, I
made the proposal; and if Mr. M. is not a suitable man, let some other
be found.

But we are informed farther in this paragraph, that one great difficulty
in complying with my condition is, that "Calvinists, as a class, are
remarkable for thinking for themselves," &c. If the editor designs to
say, as the natural construction would imply, that the whole class are
remarkable, in their character as Calvinists, for thinking and believing
differently and independently of each other, then his proposition is a
contradiction. They, _as a class_, are remarkable _for not being a class
at all_, having no properties or qualities in common! His argument also
would require this construction, because he is showing why no one could
be the proper champion of the class, for the reason that, as a class,
they did not think alike. If _Calvinism_ be a general term, it includes,
in its extension, all those individuals or sub-classes of individuals,
and only those, that hold certain doctrines in common, and it embraces
all those doctrines, and only those that are held in common by the
class. If, therefore, there is any such class, then most certainly they
think alike in all those things that constitute them a class; and by
consequence, any one of the number, otherwise competent, would be
qualified to represent and defend the class as such, however much he
might differ from many of "his fellows," in other things. If, therefore,
there is any force in the argument, that it is impracticable for any one
of the number bearing the name, to become the champion of _the class as
such_, because they differ so among themselves, it must arise from the
fact, that there are no "great principles" held in common among them,
and, of course, there is _no class_. All the writer says afterward,
therefore, about "great principles in which they all agree," is mere
verbiage, signifying nothing. For if we give it any meaning, it would be
a contradiction of what he had stated before, and a complete
nullification of the only argument adduced as a reason for not complying
with my proposal. There is another reason why I think the above a fair
view of this subject. In the same paragraph it is said, "Therefore, in
his contest with Calvinism, Dr. F. must assume to himself the
responsibility of selecting those doctrinal facts and modes of statement
which distinguish _Calvinists as a class_." This is more unreasonable
than the requisition of Nebuchadnezzar, when he commanded the wise men
to _make known the dream_, as well as the interpretation. Would an
intelligent and ingenuous man, such as we have a right to expect a
religious editor to be, give such an answer, under such circumstances,
if he could have told us what Calvinism is? We have been accused, not by
Mr. Metcalf only, but by Calvinists of the old school, and the new
school, and _all the schools_, that we misrepresent them, that our
preachers make it their business to misrepresent them,--that my sermon
was a most scandalous misrepresentation, and that we studied to keep our
people ignorant of what Calvinism is. When this is replied to, by
entreating and conjuring those who bear the name of Calvinism, to tell
us what it is; and when we offer to discuss the subject, in their own
periodicals, and give them an opportunity to discuss it in ours, and to
inform our people, in their own way, on this doctrine--a death-like
silence on the subject reigns throughout the whole _corps editorial;_
until at length the Evangelist speaks,--We cannot comply; we each and
all, as a class, are so remarkable for thinking for ourselves, it is
impracticable for any one to state and defend those doctrinal facts
which _distinguish us as a class_, and therefore Dr. F. must assume to
himself the responsibility of selecting them!! If Calvinists cannot
agree in their own system, and cannot trust any of their fraternity to
state and defend it in behalf of the class, why do they accuse us of
willful misrepresentations, in stating their system? Why, in short, do
they not begin to doubt whether, _as a class_, they have any system? It
is time for those who bear the name to know, and for the public to be
distinctly informed, whether there is any thing _real_ represented by
the term Calvinism? If there is, then, whether the term is a common or a
proper noun? If it is a common noun, or a general name, then, what are
the qualities, the properties, or doctrines designated by it? If no one
can tell,--if those who "write about it, and about it," week after week,
think it _impracticable_ to define or describe those doctrines for the
class, because they think so differently, of course it follows, if the
name is retained, it is not a general, but a _proper name_, and belongs
only to individuals. And though it has been assumed by many individuals,
yet it has in each case an individual definition, which by no means
enters into the definition of the term, as assumed by any other
individual. And therefore it is as inconsistent to talk about the _class
of Calvinists_, as it is to talk about the class of Johns or Joshuas,
and as absurd to infer that two men are in any of their real
characteristics alike, because each is called _Calvinist_, as to argue
that the editor of the Evangelist and Joshua, the son of Nun, belonged
to the same class, because both are called Joshua. And this appears to
me to be very nearly the true state of the case. Calvinism, as
designating a class, has always been rather vague and unsettled in its
definition, from the days of John Calvin himself. And this was one of
the offensive objections brought against it in my sermon--an objection,
however, that has been abundantly confirmed by recent events. As I wrote
and published of another doctrine some years since, so I may say of
Calvinism now. It is a proteus that changes its shape before one can
describe it--an _ignis fatuus_, that changes its place before one can
get his hand on it. And here I will stop to say, It will avail nothing
for any one to take offence at this statement. It is not because I
dislike men who are called Calvinists, that I thus speak. I know many of
them personally, and esteem them highly, but of their doctrine, and
their system, and their name, I must speak freely. And the best
refutation they can give, is to come out if they can, and define and
explain their system. I care not what shape it is presented in; I am
willing to meet it. If it puts on an Arminian character and dress, like
the review in the Christian Spectator, I will only ask the privilege of
baptizing it anew, and giving it a legitimate name. But as there seems
now little hope of being permitted to meet it in the manner proposed, it
only remains that I proceed, according to promise, to "occupy the
columns of the Advocate with a few numbers, touching the present
Calvinistic controversy, both as relates to their own differences, and
as relates to the general question between them and us."

I cannot but think this an important moment to look into this subject.
The signs of the times indicate that the spirit of inquiry is abroad,
and the old platforms are shaken. In this breaking up of erroneous
systems, there is danger of extremes and extravagancies, more to be
dreaded, perhaps, than the old errors themselves. Hence, the necessity
for every man who _has_ the truth to be on his guard against the
currents, new and unprovided for, that may otherwise drive him from his
safe moorings: and hence the necessity also, that he who has weighed
anchor, and is afloat upon the unexplored sea of philosophic speculation
should be aware of the rocks and the quicksands on the opposite shore.
An abler hand than mine is certainly needed on this occasion; such a one
I hope may be found. But in the mean time I will, as I am able, say a
_few things_, with the sincere prayer that I and my readers may be led
into all truth.




NUMBER IV.

SKETCH OF THE PAST CHANGES AND PRESENT STATE OF CALVINISM IN THIS
COUNTRY.

In the former No. it was seen that the indefiniteness and mutability of
the Calvinistic system had thrown a kind of irresponsibility around it;
which renders this controversy, in many respects, extremely
unsatisfactory. This might, at first, lead to the conclusion, that
farther discussion would be useless. On farther thought, however, it
_may_ appear, that this very circumstance will render the controversy
both easier and more promising. This diversity of opinions has produced
serious discussion among the predestinarians themselves, and has thrown
the system open to public view, and driven its advocates to a clearer
statement of their respective opinions. The effervescence, in short,
growing out of this excitement, has led to a more distinct analysis of
the system, and of course to a clearer discovery of its constituent
parts. Their arguments against each other, and the logical consequences
which they urge against each other's views, are, in many cases,
precisely the same that we should advance, and have often urged, in
opposition to predestination. Much of the work, therefore, is prepared
for us, and brought forward in a way to produce an effect among
Calvinists themselves, where we could not be heard.

To understand this subject however fully, and to follow out this
discussion advantageously, it will be necessary to glance at the
different changes and modifications of the Calvinistic system; and to
take a brief survey of the present state of the parties.

The religious faith of our puritanical fathers is too well known to need
a delineation here. This faith was at an early day defined and formally
recognized, in the Cambridge and Saybrook platforms. The first
refinement (improvement it can hardly be called) upon this ancient
faith, was the metaphysical theory of Dr. Hopkins. The leading dogmas of
this theory were, that God was the _efficient cause_ of all moral
action, holy and unholy; and that holiness consisted in disinterested
benevolence. Insomuch, that the answer to the question, "Are you willing
to be damned?" was deemed a very good criterion by which to judge of a
religious experience. While the doctrine of predestination was in this
manner _going to seed_, and bearing its legitimate fruits, in one
direction, it received a remarkably plausible modification in another.
The atonement, which was formerly limited to the elect, was now extended
to all; and the invitations of the Gospel, instead of being restrained,
as before, to the world of the elect, were extended to the world of
mankind. But as it would be useless to hold out invitations to those who
could not accept of them, another refinement was introduced, and man was
found to possess a natural ability to receive salvation, although he
laboured under an invincible moral _inability_, which would for ever
keep him from Christ, until drawn by irresistible grace. This discovery
led to other refinements in language, so that a kind of technical
nomenclature was formed, out of words in popular use, which words, by an
accompanying glossary, were so defined as to correspond with the
Calvinistic system. Thus, "You can repent if you will," meaning,
according to the technical definition, "You can repent when God _makes_
you willing," and so of the rest.

This theory, sustained as it was by Dr. Hopkins, Dr. Emmons, and others,
gained many proselytes, and seemed likely, at one time, to become the
universal creed. Its metaphysical abstrusities and distinctions gave it
an interest for the student; and its plausible and commonsense terms
gave it popularity with the people. In the mean time, however, several
causes conspired to introduce a great revolution in the religious
sentiments of many, which, as it has had a very important influence in
modifying Calvinism itself; I must here stop to notice; I allude to the
introduction of Unitarianism and Universalism. The proximate causes of
the introduction of these sentiments were, among others, probably the
following. The Antinomian features of old Calvinism had introduced into
the Churches a heartless Christianity and a very lax discipline. It was
natural, therefore, when religion had come, in point of fact, to consist
chiefly in external performances, for its votaries to seek a theory that
would accord with their practice. Unitarianism was precisely such a
theory. It is also to be noticed, that the state of formality and
spiritual death that prevailed, was greatly increased by the withering
alliance which then existed between the Church and civil government.
This revolution was undoubtedly hastened also by the ultraism, on the
one part, and the technical inconsistencies on the other, of the
Hopkinsian theory. The elements had been long in motion, and at length
they united in an array of numbers and influence that wrested the
fairest portions of their ecclesiastical domain from the orthodox
Churches of Mass., and turned them over, together with the richly
endowed university of the state, into the hands of the Unitarians.

In Connecticut, Unitarianism, as that term is commonly understood among
us, has not prevailed. There is, I believe, but one Unitarian pastor,
properly so called, in the state. This sentiment, however, prevails very
extensively in this and all the other New-England states, as well as in
many other parts of the union, under the name of Universalism; a
sentiment which differs but little from Socinianism, and had its origin
doubtless from the same source. About half a century since, a
Calvinistic clergyman, as he was supposed to be to the day of his death,
left a posthumous work, which was published, entitled, "Calvinism
Improved." It was merely an extension of the doctrines of unconditional
election and irresistible grace to all instead of a part. From the
premises, the reasoning seemed fair, and the conclusions legitimate.
This made many converts. And this idea of universal salvation, when once
it is embraced, can easily be moulded into any shape, provided its _main
feature_ is retained.--It has finally pretty generally run into the semi
infidel sentiments, of _no atonement--no Divine Saviour--no Holy Ghost_,
and _no supernatural change of heart;_ as well as "no hell--no devil--no
angry God." It may be a matter of some surprise, perhaps, to a
superficial observer, or to one not personally acquainted with the
circumstances of the case, why, in leaving Calvinism, these men should
go so far beyond the line of truth. But in this we see the known
tendency of the human mind to run into extremes. The repulsive features
of the old system drove them far the other way. It ought to be
remembered, also, that there were few, if any, who were stationed on the
medium line, to arrest and delay the public mind in its fearful recoil
from the "horrible decree." Had Methodism been as well known in
New-England fifty years ago, as it now is, it is doubtful whether
Universalism or Unitarianism would have gained much influence in this
country. Late as it was introduced, and much as it was opposed, it is
believed to have done much toward checking the progress of those
sentiments. And perhaps it is in part owing to the earlier introduction,
and more extensive spread of Methodism, in Connecticut, that
Unitarianism has not gained more influence in the state. This is
undoubtedly the fact in the states of Vermont, New-Hampshire, and Maine,
where Methodism was introduced nearly as early as those other
sentiments. The result has shown that the foregoing supposition is
corroborated by facts in those cases where the experiment has been
tried. These remarks may not now be credited, but the time will come,
when the prejudices of the day are worn out, that the candid historian
will do the subject justice. But to return--though Unitarianism and
Universalism are believed to be dangerous errors, yet, as is often the
case, they have contributed much, doubtless, to detect the errors and
modify the features of the opposite system. Simultaneously with them,
the Methodists have engaged in opposing the Calvinistic dogmas. This
close examination and thorough opposition, with such other causes as may
have cooperated in the work, have driven some of the peculiarities of
the Hopkinsian theory into disrepute, more suddenly even than they rose
into credit. The sublimated doctrine of disinterested benevolence was so
like "an airy nothing," that even the speculative minds of the shrewdest
metaphysicians could not find for it "a local habitation," in heaven or
on earth; and the almost blasphemous dogma, that God was the efficient
cause of sin, was more abhorrent, if possible, than even the horrible
decree of reprobation. Both, therefore, with the exceptions hereafter
mentioned, disappeared. The former, being of an ethereal character,
silently evaporated into "thin air;" but the other, being of a grosser
nature, and withal more essential to the system itself, _settled to the
bottom_, and is now rarely visible, except when the hand of controversy
shakes up the sediment. The doctrine of universal atonement, however,
was retained, and the theological vocabulary was not only retained, but
enlarged and improved. So that from that day to this, we hear but little
of the doctrine of reprobation, or of the decrees of God, but much is
said of God's "electing love," his "Divine sovereignty," and "gracious
purposes." By which is meant, according to the glossary, the doctrine of
unconditional election and reprobation, and of absolute predestination.
The scriptures, also, which used to be quoted to prove the direct
efficiency of God, in producing sin and securing the condemnation of the
reprobate, receive a different explanation, varying but little, if any,
from the Arminian interpretation of those passages. It cannot be
doubted, I think, but there has been quite a change in the views of the
great body of the Calvinists--and yet not so great and so thorough a
change as appearances and terms might at first view seem to indicate. It
is not easy to _eradicate_ old prejudices. And it is often found that
the mind will cling to the first principles of a favourite system, even
after the other parts are so modified as that the new principles would
supplant the old, if suffered to be carried out into a consistent whole.
In every such case, much labour and argument will be spent in trying to
unite the old with the new; but in every instance the rent becomes
worse. This leads to a kind of vacillating policy, and an ambiguous
course of argument, accompanied with reiterated complaints, that the
opposers of the system misunderstand and misrepresent it. And it would
be no wonder if the constant friction in the incongruous machinery
should chafe the mind, and lead to a dogmatic and an impatient spirit.
How far this corresponds with the existing facts, in the Calvinistic
controversy, others can judge. In my own view, the peculiar
circumstances of the case, connected with the known character of the
human mind, fully account for the _apparent_ tergiversation and changing
of argument, in this controversy, without criminating the _motives_ of
our predestinarian brethren, as some have unjustly accused me of doing.
The different parts of the system have lost, in a measure, their
original affinities, and yet they have some partial and irregular
attractions, which lead them to unite in unnatural and grotesque forms.
And as there is no common consent and settled mode of operating among
the many who are experimenting upon the materials, there are various
sectional and individual formations, which are inconsistent with each
other. And their incongruity is the more apparent from the unanimous
effort (which I believe is the only work of union in "the class") to
amalgamate each and every variety with the old substratum of the
system,--"God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass."

The completion of this historical sketch, together with a view of the
present state of the Calvinistic parties, may be expected in the next
number. After which it is proposed to proceed to an examination of the
doctrines in dispute.




NUMBER V.

SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.

One modification of Calvinism remains to be mentioned. It is known by
the name of the "New Divinity." The theological doctors connected with
Yale college are the reputed authors of this system. It is evident,
however, that the tendency of the Calvinistic theory has been in this
direction for a number of years. The "New Divinity," so alarming to some
of the Calvinists, is only the ripe fruits of the very plants which they
have long cultivated with assiduous care. And why should they start back
at results which they have long laboured to produce? This theory, in the
first place, is an attempt to make the doctrine, and the technical terms
alluded to, coincide. In the second place, it is designed, by a new
philosophy of predestination, to get rid of the "logical consequences"
that have always pressed heavily upon the old system. Finally, it is a
device to reconcile the doctrine of depravity with the former current
sentiment, that man has _natural ability_ to convert himself and get to
heaven without grace. The two pillars of the new system are, 1. "Sin is
not a propagated property of the human soul, but consists wholly in
_moral exercise_." 2. "Sin is not the necessary means of the greatest
good;" or, in other words, "Sin is not preferable to holiness in its
stead." The Calvinistic opposers of this theory tell us that these
sentiments have been held and taught to some extent for the last ten
years. They were more fully and more openly announced, however, by Dr.
Taylor, of the theological school belonging to Yale College, in a concio
ad clerum preached Sept. 10th, 1828. From the time of the publication of
this sermon the alarm has been sounded, and the controversy has been
carried on. The opposers of the new doctrine call it heresy; and in a
late publication they seem to intimate that Dr. T. and his associates
are nearly if not quite as heretical as the author of the sermon on
predestination and election. The doctor and his friends, on the other
hand, strenuously maintain that they are orthodox; and to prove it, they
repeat, again and again, "We believe that God did, for his own glory,
foreordain whatsoever comes to pass." The Christian Spectator, an ably
conducted quarterly journal, is devoted chiefly to the defence of this
theory, aided by the New-York Evangelist, and several other minor
periodicals, and by a very respectable body of the clergy. What
proportion, however, have embraced this system is not known; but many,
both in and out of Connecticut, have espoused the cause with great zeal.
The contest waxes warmer each year. Against the theory, Dr. Woods, of
the Andover theological seminary, Dr. Griffin, of Williams college, Dr.
Tyler, of Portland, the Rev. Mr. Hervey, of Connecticut, and several
others have entered the lists of controversy; and last of all, a
pamphlet, supposed to be the joint labour of a number of clergymen, has
been published, in which the New Divinity is denounced as heresy, a
formal separation of the Churches is predicted, and a withdrawal of
patronage from Yale college is threatened on the ground that "Yale will
become in Connecticut what Harvard is in Massachusetts." It is
uncertain, however, whether those ultra measures will be responded to by
the great body of the clergy in New-England. There is a party which
still adheres to the old--I may say, perhaps, to the _oldest_
modification of Calvinism in this country. This party are for
maintaining the old landmarks at all hazards, rightly judging that these
palliations and explanations of the system will ultimate in its
destruction. They are not numerous, but still respectable as to numbers
and talents. They are sustained in Boston by the Boston Telegraph, so
called, a weekly periodical, which does not hesitate to go the whole
length--_logical consequences and all_. Witness the following quotation
from a review of my sermon, in the number for Jan. 23d. Speaking of the
charge in the sermon, that Calvinism makes God the author of sin, the
writer says:--"The word author is sometimes used to mean _efficient
cause_. Now I am willing to admit that those scriptures which teach that
God has decreed the sinful conduct of men, do imply that he is the
efficient cause of moral evil. For his own glory and the greatest good
he said, _Let there be sin, and there was sin!!!_" The following is
another specimen of Calvinism from the same periodical. If any man
"affirms that man really chooses, and that his acts of will are caused
by his own free, voluntary, and efficient mind, then he is _no
Calvinist_." In this last quotation, as well as in the preceding, there
is the most direct opposition to Dr. Taylor, since he maintains, if I
understand him, that man's is an independent agency--that the human mind
is the originator of thought and volition. Thus are these two branches
of the Calvinistic family directly at variance with each other. And, in
fact, the Telegraph and its supporters are not only at variance with the
newest divinity, but with all the different degrees of _new, newer,
newest_, and denounce them all as heresy.

The present advocates of predestination and particular election may be
divided into four classes:--1. The old school Calvinists. 2.
Hopkinsians. 3. Reformed Hopkinsians. 4. Advocates of the New Divinity.
By the reformed Hopkinsians I mean those who have left out of their
creed Dr. Hopkins' doctrine of disinterested benevolence, Divine
efficiency in producing sin, &c, and yet hold to a general atonement,
natural ability, &c. These constitute, doubtless, the largest division
in the "class" in New-England. Next, as to numbers, probably, are the
new school, then Hopkinsians, and last, the old school. These
subdivisions doubtless run into each other in various combinations; but
the outlines of these four sub-classes are, I think, distinctly marked.

The preceding sketch has been confined mostly to the theological changes
in New-England; but it will apply, to a considerable extent, to other
parts of the nation. The Presbyterian Church, by reason of its
ecclesiastical government, is more consolidated, and of course less
liable to change than the independent Congregational Churches of the
eastern states. But the Presbyterian Church has felt the changes of the
east, and is coming more and more under their influence. It is now a
number of years since the "triangle," as it was called, was published in
New-York. This was a most severe and witty allegory, against the dogmas
and bigotry of old Calvinism. From this work this old theory has
obtained the epithet of "triangular." Whenever a man advocates the
doctrine of limited atonement, imputed sin, and imputed righteousness,
he is said to be "triangular." These old triangular notions are giving
place very rapidly to modern improvements. And although the most
strenuous opposition has been made in the General Assembly, in different
publications, and elsewhere, yet the votes in the last General Assembly
show, I think, that the whole Church is yielding herself up to the
resistless march of innovation. It may be doubted whether the state of
New-York is not emphatically the strong hold of the New Divinity, so far
as popular sentiment is concerned; and whether, indeed, with the
exception of New-Haven, there is not the greatest moral influence
enlisted there, for the propagation of the new theory.

Thus have I endeavoured to glance over the various modifications and
present characteristics of that mode of Christian doctrines called
Calvinism. Here a few suggestions present themselves, which, from their
relation to the present controversy, I will now set down.

It seems singular that, differing as they profess to, so materially, on
many points, each individual of each sub-class should feel himself
injured whenever Calvinism, under this common name, is opposed in any of
its features. The sermon on predestination was against _Calvinism_, and
lo! all parties rise up against the sermon. And yet, whether it object
to Calvinistic policy or to Calvinistic doctrine, the different parties
accuse their opponents of being guilty of the charge, but they
themselves are clear. I cannot think of a single important position
assumed by the sermon against predestination and election, which is not
sustained by Calvinists themselves in opposition to some of their
brethren; nor yet of a single charge against their policy, for their
changes and ambiguous methods of stating and defending their doctrines,
which has not been reiterated by professed Calvinists themselves against
their brethren. Thus the sermon is sustained by the Calvinists
themselves, and yet they all condemn it! If _some_ Calvinists think that
the objections of the sermon lie against some modifications of their
system, is it not possible that these objections have a more _general_
application than any of them seem willing to acknowledge? For example:
it is objected to predestination that it "makes God the author of sin,
destroys free agency, arrays God's decrees against his revealed word,
mars his moral attributes, puts an excuse into the mouth of the
impenitent sinner, implies unconditional reprobation, makes God partial
and a respecter of persons, necessarily limits the atonement," &c. These
charges, say the Calvinists, are very unjust, ungenerous--in fact, they
bear false witness against our neighbours. This is said by Mr. Metcalf,
and by others of the New-Haven school. And yet what says the Spectator,
the organ and oracle of that school? It says of Dr. Tyler, and of others
who oppose the peculiar views of Dr. Taylor, comprising, as we have
seen, the great majority of Calvinists, that their views "limit God in
power and goodness"--"make the worst kind of moral action the best"--"if
carried out in their legitimate consequences, would lead to
universalism, to infidelity, to atheism"--"they confound right and
wrong, and subvert all moral distinctions"--"according to these views,
mankind are bound to believe that they shall please and glorify God more
by sin than by obedience, and therefore to act accordingly"--"nothing
worse can be imputed to the worst of men than this theory imputes to
God"!!![4] Has the author of the sermon said more than this, and worse
than this, of Calvinism? And shall he be accused by these very men of
bearing false witness against his brethren? And let it be observed
farther, in justification of the sermon, that these charges in the
Spectator are made by men who have been brought up at the feet of the
Calvinistic doctors, and have themselves grown up to the character and
rank of doctors in theology. They know the system thoroughly; they have
made it the study of their lives, and have they testified to the truth
respecting this theory? _So then has the author of the sermon_. Such is
the testimony on the one side; and on the other we have decided
predestinarians acknowledging, as an article of their creed, what in the
sermon was urged as only a logical consequence. According to this
system, says the sermon, "the _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as
certainly as it made the world." Hear the Boston Telegraph:--"God, for
his own glory and for the good of the world, said, _Let there be sin,
and there was sin!_" Now I beg the reader to look at this subject for a
moment. For brevity's sake we will call the Boston Telegraph and its
supporters No. 1; the Andover theological seminary and its supporters,
which constitute by far the larger body of predestinarians in
New-England, No. 2; and the New-Haven divines and their supporters No.
3. The sermon charges predestination with making God the author of sin.
No. 2 says this is false: I neither believe it, nor is it to be inferred
from my premises. _It is true_, says No. 1: I am willing to admit that
God is the efficient cause of sin. He said, Let there be sin, and there
was sin. _It is true_, responds No 3, that all who hold and explain
predestination as Nos. 1 and 2 explain it, are exposed to the full force
of the objections in the sermon--against such views "the arguments of
the sermon are unanswerable." No. 2, in vindication, says that No. 1 is
on the old plan--very few hold with him in these days. And as for No. 3,
he is already a rank Arminian; and if he would be consistent, he must
give up unconditional election, and embrace the whole Arminian theory.
Thus do they destroy each other, and confirm the doctrine of the sermon.
And shall we still be told that we do not understand this doctrine? Have
anti-predestinarians misunderstood this from John Calvin's day to the
present? Does honest No. 1 misunderstand it? Does well instructed No. 3
misunderstand it? What then is Calvinism, that cannot, through the lapse
of centuries, make itself understood either by friend or foe? Is not
this, of itself, a suspicious trait in its character? Let us quote a
Calvinistic writer, whose sentiments are much in point, though aimed at
the New Divinity:--"It is a serious ground of suspicion," says this
writer, "that Dr. Taylor has failed, according to his own repeated
declarations, to render his speculations intelligible to others. It must
be granted that a man of sense, who is acquainted with the power of
language, can, if he is disposed, make himself understood." "Some of the
most intelligent men in the country have utterly failed to compass Dr.
T.'s meaning in argument: so that he declares again and again, I am not
understood--I am misrepresented. Who under such circumstances can
refrain from suspicion?" "Another suspicious circumstance in the case
is, that Dr. Taylor expresses himself in ambiguous terms and phrases,
which, though they are designed to influence the mind of a reader,
afford him the opportunity to avoid responsibility." See pamphlet by
Edwardian, pp. 28 and 29. If this is justly said of Dr. Taylor's
_recent_ theory, what shall we say of a system the advocates of which,
"according to their repeated declarations, have not been able to render
their speculations intelligible," after the theory has had exhausted
upon it the highly cultivated intellects of hosts of expositors through
successive generations? "Who, under such circumstances, can refrain from
suspicion?" especially since these advocates have learned "to express
themselves in ambiguous terms and phrases which, though they are
designed to influence the mind of a reader, afford them an opportunity
to avoid responsibility." To Calvinism it may truly be said, "Out of
thine own mouth will I judge thee." Let not the author of the sermon
then be accused of bearing false witness, when his testimony is
predicated on principles which Calvinists have laid down, and is also
corroborated by men of their "own class."

Will it be said, All this is not argument. I answer, The sermon, it is
supposed, contains arguments--arguments which professed predestinarians
themselves tell us are unanswerable against the prevailing modes of
stating and explaining the doctrine. Now let them be answered, if they
can be. Let them be answered, not by giving up predestination, in the
Calvinistic sense, and still professing to hold it--not by attempting to
avoid the logical consequences, by giving the system the thousandth
explanation, when the nine hundred and ninety-nine already given have
made it no plainer, nor evaded at all the just consequences, so often
charged upon it; and when these are answered, it will then be time
enough to call for new arguments.

Having prepared the way, as I hope, by the preceding numbers, for the
proper understanding of the controversy; and having, by the remarks just
made, attempted (with what success the reader must judge) to repel the
charges of misrepresentation and bearing false witness, made against me,
as the author of the sermon which gave rise to the controversy, I am now
prepared, in my next number to commence an examination of some of the
questions of doctrine, connected with this discussion. In doing which,
my object will be, to let "Greek with Greek contend" so far as to show,
if possible, the inconsistency of both, and then present the doctrine
which we believe to be the true system, and show how it stands untouched
by the conflicting elements around it as the immovable foundation of the
Church of God. I shall begin with the Divine purposes including
foreknowledge; then take up human agency and responsibility; and last,
regeneration, connected with the doctrine of human depravity, Divine and
human agency, &c. May He that said, "Let light be, and light was,"
"shine in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of
God, in the face of Jesus Christ."




NUMBER VI.

PREDESTINATION.

Definitions are the foundations of reasoning. Hence in any reply to my
sermon on predestination and election it was natural and fair that the
first inquiry should be, Are the definitions correct? The definition of
predestination assumed in the sermon was, that unalterable purpose and
efficient decree of God, by which the moral character and responsible
acts of man were definitely fixed and efficiently produced. On this
point the sermon joined issue. To this definition most of the notices
and reviews, to the number of six or seven, which I have seen, have
taken exceptions. The review in the Boston Telegraph, however, is not of
this number.--That, as has already been noticed, agrees with the charge
in the sermon, that "the _fiat_ of God brought forth sin as directly as
it made the world." We have only to leave those Calvinists, who accord
to that sentiment, to struggle, as they can, against the arguments of
the sermon--against the common sense of the world--against their own
convictions of right and wrong--and, I may add, against their own
brethren of "the class," some of whom have already publicly denounced
the sentiment as "horrid blasphemy." At this day of light, in which
_naked Calvinism_ is abhorred by most of those who bear the name of
Calvinists, it is hardly necessary to give a formal answer to such a
review. We approve of the _logical consistency_ of these men--we admire
the moral courage that, from assumed premises, pushes out a theory to
its legitimate results without flinching; but we are astonished at the
_moral nerve_ that can contemplate such results with complacency. For
myself I confess when I see this naked system of Calvinism fulminating
the curse of reprobation in the teeth of the miserable wretch whose only
crime is, that his God has made him a sinner, my heart recoils with
indescribable horror! Let him contemplate this picture who can. I covet
not his head or his heart.

Of others who have expressed their views of the sermon there are two
classes: 1. The conductors of the Christian Spectator and those who
favour their views; and 2. Those who in a former number were called
Reformed Hopkinsians. The latter comprehend the larger portion of
Calvinists in New-England, and probably in the United States. Their
views on predestination shall be noticed in another number. At present I
shall direct my remarks to the letters of Mr. Metcalf and to the first
and second notices of the sermon in the Christian Spectator. And here
let me say, once for all, that I do not consider either of these
gentlemen, or any who think with them, responsible for the doctrine of
predestination as stated and opposed in the sermon. This I hope will be
satisfactory. If these gentlemen should ask me why I published my sermon
in terms that included Calvinists generally, without making the
exception in their favour, I answer, 1. The views of Dr. Taylor and
"those who believe with him," on this particular point, were unknown to
me at the time. Nor is this strange, for it is but lately that those
views have been fully developed--never so fully before, probably, as in
Dr. Fitch's review of my sermon, already alluded to. 2. It never
occurred to me that any man or any set of men holding, in respect to
predestination, the doctrine of James Arminius, John Wesley, and the
whole body of Methodists, would call themselves Calvinists!! This is all
the apology I have, and whether or not it is sufficient, the public must
judge. By acknowledging the views of these gentlemen to be Methodistical
on the subject of predestination, I by no means would be understood to
say this of their system as a whole--the objectionable parts will be
noticed in their place. But whatever is true is none the less so for
being mixed with error. There are some things, however, to be regretted
and exposed in the manner in which these reviewers have expressed their
doctrine of predestination, and also in the manner in which they have
opposed the sermon and Arminianism generally. They complain of my
definition of predestination. Mr. M. thinks it is bearing false witness.
The reviewer thinks it is obviously erroneous and unjust. And yet they
themselves acknowledge that the sermon is an unanswerable refutation of
predestination as held by Dr. Tyler and others who oppose their views.
But what is a matter of the greatest surprise is the determination with
which these gentlemen persist in holding up the idea that their views
essentially differ from ours. Dr. Fitch, in his answer to my reply,
says:--

"There are three views, and only three, which can be taken of the Divine
purposes in relation to a moral kingdom:--

1. That God, foreseeing the certainty of the conduct of his creatures,
purposes merely to _treat them in a corresponding manner_.

2. That he, first of all, resolves _what the conduct of his creatures
shall be_, and next resolves on such measures as _shall bring_ them to
that conduct.

3. That, foreseeing the conduct which will certainly ensue on the
different measures it is possible for him to take, he purposes to
_pursue those measures which will certainly lead to the best possible
results_."

"The first view is that which we understood to be advocated by Dr. Fisk,
in the sermon we reviewed." The writer goes on farther to say that his
objection to this is, "that it is utterly deficient"--"that it passes
over in silence all those acts of God in creation and government by
which he determines character." Of course he means to say that the
_sermon_ advocated a theory which left out of the question all the
Divine influence in determining character. How strangely he has
misunderstood the sermon, let those judge who have read it. It teaches
that God hath fixed the laws of the physical and moral world: that he
has a general plan, suited to all the various circumstances and
contingencies of government; that God gives the sinner power to choose
life; that his grace enlightens and strengthens the sinner to seek after
and obtain salvation. In short, it must be obvious that no man who
believes in the Divine government and in Gospel provisions can leave
this influence out of his system. I will therefore venture upon the
following declaration, which it is presumed Dr. Fitch cannot gainsay,
namely, Dr. F. _never saw a man and never heard of a man_ that was a
believer in revelation, who left out of his creed all that conduct in
God which determines character. That such was not the character of my
creed, the reviewer might have learned in my reply to his first review,
if he could not from the sermon. In the reply it is said, "As God
foresaw men would sin, he also determined upon the plan he would pursue
in reference to them as sinners, and arranged in the counsels of his own
infinite mind the extended concatenation of causes and effects so as to
'make the wrath of man praise him,' and _deduce the greatest possible
good from the best possible system_."--And yet, strange to tell, in his
answer to my reply, the reviewer says as decidedly as if it were an
undisputed truth, "Dr. Fisk advocates the first," (meaning the first
view of the Divine purposes given above.) "We brought forward the
third," (meaning the third view.) "Now since the third upholds the fact
of foreordination, free from the objections of Dr. F., we have succeeded
in upholding the fact which Dr. F., as an Arminian, denies, and which
Calvinists maintain." Whereas he ought to have said, for he had my
statement for it directly before him, "Dr. Fisk advocates the third,"
and then he might have added, "Now since the third destroys the
Calvinistic doctrine of foreordination, therefore in assisting Dr. Fisk
to sustain the third we have succeeded in disproving the doctrine of
foreordination, which Arminians deny, and Calvinists have attempted to
maintain." In fact, as the reviewer says, there can be but those three
views taken of the Divine purposes; and since neither I nor any other
Arminian ever believed in the first, and as Dr. Fitch himself
acknowledges we are directly opposed to the second, it follows that we
must believe the third. But the third is the reviewer's creed: therefore
on this point he is an Arminian, or we are Calvinists.

That the reviewer's theory on predestination is about the same with the
Methodists' appears evident from the following quotations from Mr.
Wesley, in which it will be seen that not only does Mr. Wesley's creed
include all the Divine influence that goes "to determine character," but
also that God "pursues measures which will certainly lead to the best
possible results;" nay, that he does all that he _wisely can_ to exclude
sin from the moral universe. These are points for which the advocates of
the New-Haven theory strongly contend. Let them see, then, how in this
matter they have identified themselves with Arminians.

"To God," says Mr. Wesley, in his sermon on Divine providence, "all
things are possible; and we cannot doubt of his exerting all his power,
as in sustaining so in governing all that he has made. Only he that can
do all things else cannot deny himself--he cannot counteract himself or
oppose his own work. Were it not for this, he would destroy all sin,
with its attendant pain, in a moment. But in so doing he would
counteract himself, and undo all that he has been doing since he created
man upon the earth. For he created man in his own image--a spirit endued
with understanding, with will or affections, and liberty, without which
he would have been incapable of either virtue or vice. He could not be a
moral agent, any more than a tree or a stone. Therefore (with reverence
be it spoken) the Almighty himself cannot do this thing. He cannot thus
contradict himself or undo what he has done. But were he to do this, it
would imply no wisdom at all, but barely a stroke of omnipotence.
Whereas all the manifold wisdom of God (as well as all his power and
goodness) is displayed in governing man as man--as an intelligent and
free spirit, capable of choosing either good or evil."

Again. In the sermon entitled, The Wisdom of God's Counsels: "In the
moral world evil men and evil spirits continually oppose the Divine
will, and create numberless irregularities. Here therefore is full scope
for the exercise of all the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of
God in counteracting all the wickedness and folly of men and all the
subtlety of Satan, to carry on his glorious design, the salvation of
lost mankind." Now let me ask the reviewer, is this leaving out all the
Divine influence that determines character? Is not this maintaining
that, "in view of the measures that it was possible tor God to take, he
purposes to pursue those measures that will certainly lead to the best
possible result?" Is Dr. Fitch ignorant of what Methodists hold to? or
is he unwilling to identify himself with us? Ignorant of _my_ views he
could not be, I think, after reading my reply.--Why, then, does he
persist in talking of a difference where there is none?

Mr. Metcalf has taken a more correct view of the subject. After reading
my reply, he says, "if you will preach this doctrine to your Methodist
brethren thoroughly and forcibly, and sustain it with the strong
arguments on which the doctrine rests, if they do not call it Calvinism,
I will acknowledge they do not understand the term as I do. And if you
will preach in the same way to Calvinists, if they too do not call it
Calvinism, I will grant that even _they_ too sometimes differ about
terms. If you will take this course, I think when you shall see what the
doctrine will be called, the astonishment you express that it should be
regarded as Calvinism will wear away." Now how surprised Mr. M. will be
when he learns that we have always preached this doctrine as thoroughly
and forcibly as we could, and neither Methodists nor Calvinists ever
suspected it was Calvinism until he and those who believe with him
incorporated it into their creed, and _for some reason_ unknown to us,
called it Calvinism! And how surprised we all are to find that he who
was so anxious to be heard in the Christian Advocate and Journal, for
the purpose of informing Methodists what Calvinism was, and of
disabusing their minds of erroneous conceptions on this subject, himself
understands neither Methodism nor Calvinism!! Yet so it is, Calvinists
themselves being judges. Dr. Tyler, Dr. Griffin, Dr. Woods, the author
of "Views in Theology," the author or authors of the pamphlet by an
Edwardian, all condemn the New-Haven theory of predestination as
anti-Calvinistic, and as being essentially Arminian.

Dr. Fitch acknowledges that we agree in some of the first principles. In
reply to my answer he says, "It was certainly our intention to place
this contested doctrine on grounds which our Wesleyan brethren _could
not_ dispute, and it gives us pleasure to find that in this we have had
complete success!" There are two things a little remarkable connected
with this sentiment. One is, that the writer should so express himself
as to convey the idea that _he_ has traced up the subject to first
principles with much care, and, to his _great satisfaction, has
succeeded in convincing us_ of the correctness of his premises. Whereas
it is evident from the passages already given from Mr. Wesley, and from
the universal sentiments of the Wesleyan Methodists, that the New-Haven
doctors have _at length_ come on to our ground; and it gives _us great
pleasure_ to find that, from _some source_, arguments in favour of our
system have with them met with _complete success_. The other thing that
strikes me as remarkable is, that after the reviewer had acknowledged
that we were agreed in these first principles, he should immediately go
on to say, as has already been mentioned, that I and the Arminians hold
to the first view he has given of the three possible views that might be
taken of predestination, and deny the third; when at the same time the
third contains _those very first principles_ in which he says we are
agreed. This looks so much like a contradiction, almost in the same
breath, that I really know not what other name to give it. If these
gentlemen are disposed to come into the fortress of truth, and assist us
in manning our guns and working our artillery against error, we
certainly can have no objection. We are fond of help. But they must
pardon us if we revolt a little at the idea of their taking the lead in
this business, and accounting us as mere novices who have only learned,
and that too from themselves, some of the _elementary principles_. Nay,
they must not wonder if we refuse outright to be crowded from our
present commanding position in the fortress of truth, and to be placed
in front of our own batteries, merely to give our _new allies_ an
opportunity to blow us up _with our own ordnance!_

In reply to my objection to the reviewer that "it was an abuse of terms
to call the _permission of sin, not hindering it_, &c, a foreordination
or purpose that it shall be," &c, he has said, "If an evil, unavoidable
and hateful, is allowed by the Creator to come into his kingdom, in one
place and time rather than any other, and is thus _particularly disposed
of_ by his providence, because it is a disposition of it the best
possible, is there no purpose of God in relation to the thing? In doing
his own pleasure, in this case, does he not decide on the fact of the
entrance of sin into his kingdom just when and where it does?" Now I beg
the reader to go over this last paragraph once more, and then say if he
does not agree with me in the following sentiment, namely, there rarely
occurs in any writer an instance of so complete an evasion of a
contested question as is here exhibited. Is there no difference between
a "purpose in relation to a thing," and the foreordaining or decreeing
that the thing shall be? And pray what is meant by God's "deciding on
the fact of the entrance of sin into his kingdom?" You can make it mean
almost any thing. But taking the whole of Dr. Fitch's theory on the
subject, he means to say, doubtless, that since the entrance of sin was
unavoidable, God determined to restrain and control it so as to suffer
it to do the least harm possible--preferring holiness in its stead in
every place where it occurs. And this is foreordaining sin!! This is
predestination!! Let us illustrate this by a case in point. Cicero, a
Roman consul, knew that Cataline was plotting treason against the
commonwealth. Cicero perceived that this _hated treason_, though
unavoidable, was not wholly unmanageable. He determined therefore to
"make a disposition of it the best possible." He took his measures
accordingly. By these Cataline and the principal conspirators were
driven out of the city, and compelled, before their plans were matured,
to resort to open hostilities. Thus the citizens were aroused and
united, and the state saved. In this way the evils of the conspiracy
were suffered to come upon the commonwealth "in one place and time
rather than any other," and "were thus _particularly disposed of_" by
Cicero. In this case the consul had a special "purpose about the thing."
He determined to drive the conspirators into open war, rather than
suffer them privately to corrupt all they could, and then fill the city
with fire and slaughter. The question now is, and it is put not to the
reviewer, for he still persists in the use of his terms, but it is put
to the common understanding of community, Did the Roman consul ordain or
foreordain, or predestinate the treason of Cataline? If by common
consent all answer, No, such a statement is a libel upon the consul; and
if, in addition to this common understanding of the term, the
theological use of the term will not bear such a construction; if the
great body of the Calvinists of the present day, and of New-England
even, use the term in a different sense, it remains to be seen how the
New-Haven divines can stand up before the world and say, "We believe God
hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass."

Before closing this number I ought, perhaps, to say a few things, if not
in the defence, at least explanatory of that course of reasoning in the
sermon in which I undertook to show that foreknowledge is antecedent to
foreordination. To this Mr. Metcalf and others have objected because,
say they, God must first have determined to make moral agents before he
could know they would sin: therefore his knowledge or his foreknowledge
in this case must depend upon his determination. This objection, at
least so far as the New-Haven theology is concerned, is founded in
error. What says Dr. Fitch? "That God, _foreseeing_ the conduct which
will certainly ensue on the different measures it is possible for him to
take, _purposes_," &c. The sermon says, "God knows all that is, or will
be, or might be, under any possible contingency," and that "his plan is
the result of his infinite knowledge--the decrees of his throne flow
forth from the eternal fountain of his wisdom." Where is the discrepancy
here? God saw this general plan, as a whole, before he resolved upon its
adoption; (I speak now of the order of thought;) he saw, if he made free
moral agents, and governed them as such, sin would ensue. And he also
saw what he might do in that case to counteract and overrule it to his
own glory and the good of the universe.--And he judged, in his infinite
wisdom, that such a moral universe, notwithstanding the sin that would
certainly result from it, would, on the whole, be the best; and
therefore upon this _foreknowledge_ of the whole, God _founded_ his
determination to create the universe, and govern it as proposed. God's
foreknowledge of the _certainty_ of any event in this universe, it must
be acknowledged, depended upon his determination to create and govern
the universe. And in _this sense_ his purpose was _causa sine qua non_,
a cause without which any given event would not have happened, and
therefore could not have been foreseen as _certain_. But then it should
be remembered that there was a foreknowledge anterior to all this, and
which was, in fact, the foundation of all subsequent instances of
knowing or decreeing. It is therefore true in the sense in which the
sentiment is advanced and sustained in the sermon, that "God foreknows
in order to predestinate, but he does not (primarily) predestinate in
order to foreknow."

To conclude: from the view taken in this number it appears that one
class of Calvinists acknowledge that predestination is chargeable with
all that was included in my definition of it. Another, and a rapidly
increasing class, have given up Calvinian predestination, and, in all
but the name, have in that point come on to the Methodist ground. There
is still another class, who are evidently not Arminians, but still deny
the correctness of my definition of their doctrine. They say they are
not chargeable with such a doctrine, either directly or by inference. In
the next number, therefore, an attempt will be made to sustain from
their own positions this definition.




NUMBER VII.

PREDESTINATION, CONTINUED.

From my last number the reader will perceive that there are two classes
of Calvinists, so-called, with whom we have no need to contend; with one
there is no cause of controversy, because they have given up the
doctrine; and with the other there is no _need_ of controversy, because
their plain manner of avowing the doctrine, _logical consequences and
all_, renders any arguments against it unnecessary. Its character is too
monstrous and abhorrent to gain much credit. There is yet another and a
larger portion, who, while they reject the views both of the New-Haven
divines and of the old school and Hopkinsian Calvinists, are
nevertheless strongly opposed to the issue proposed in the sermon. They
deny, as appears from some public intimations and many private
statements, that I have given a fair representation of the doctrine.
They appear to manifest as much horror as an Arminian would to the idea,
that "the responsible acts of moral agents are definitely fixed and
efficiently produced by the purpose and decree of God,"--that these acts
"are the result of an overruling and controlling power,"--"that the
will, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly controlled by
some secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling arrangement." Hence,
I suppose, if it can be proved that these are the genuine
characteristics of Calvinism, the system itself will, by many at least,
be given up. At any rate, since the exception is taken to the definition
of the doctrine, it may be presumed, by sustaining this, we sustain our
own cause and refute the opposite. The present inquiry then is, are
these, in very deed, the characteristics of absolute predestination? I
shall endeavour to maintain that they are. Let the intelligent and the
candid judge.

1. It may be urged as a consideration of no small weight in this
question, that all but predestinarians, as well as many predestinarians
themselves, have entertained these views of the doctrine. With respect
to anti-predestinarians, I know of no exception; all unite, in charging
these things, directly or by consequence, upon the Calvinistic system.
And will Calvinists say, this is owing to prejudice and to a want of
understanding the subject? With what kind of modesty will they assume
that they are free from blinding prejudice in _favour_ of their own
doctrine, and all the world beside are prejudiced against it? It may be
asserted, as it often has been, that these doctrines are humbling to the
pride of the natural heart, and this is the ground of the universal
opposition to them! But this is a gratuitous assumption of what ought
first to be proved, viz. that these doctrines are true; and it also
exhibits a most reprehensible spirit of pride and Pharisaism--a spirit
that says to a brother, "Stand by, for I am holier than thou!" There
have doubtless been as many eminently pious Arminians as Calvinists, and
how is it, that these men have never had this doctrine so explained to
them as to be able to see it free from these charges?

But not only anti-predestinarians have universally entertained these
opinions of this doctrine; even the advocates themselves have, in a
great variety of instances, acknowledged the same. Mention has before
been made, (in the sermon,) of the opposition raised against free will,
by the Calvinists of Mr. Wesley's day--and quotations have also been
given from the early Calvinistic authors, showing how decidedly they
held that God moved the will to sin, by a direct positive influence. To
these we may add all the Hopkinsians of modern days, who openly
acknowledge "that those scriptures which teach that God has decreed the
sinful acts of men, do imply that he is the efficient cause of moral
evil." (See review of my sermon in the Boston Telegraph.) It should not
be forgotten, moreover, that the New-Haven divines, who have studied
Calvinism all their lives, with the best opportunities for understanding
it, inform us that the view of Calvinism which makes sin preferable to
holiness in its stead, is unanswerably exposed to all the objections
brought against it in the sermon. It is known too, that most of the
Methodists in New-England, and many elsewhere, were educated
predestinarians; but have revolted from the traditions of their fathers
for the very reason that Calvinism is what we have described it to be.
The Universalists are almost all predestinarians, and they understand
that this doctrine necessarily implies the _Divine efficiency_ in
producing sin; and hence they very consistently infer that God is not
angry with them, and will not punish them for being controlled by his
decrees.

Suppose now an intelligent person, who knew nothing of the arguments on
either side, should be informed of what is true in this case, viz. that
a great portion, probably on the whole by far the greatest portion of
predestinarians, and _all_ anti-predestinarians, understood the doctrine
of absolute predestination, as involving directly, or by consequence,
certain specified principles; but that a portion of predestinarians
persisted in denying that these principles were involved in the
doctrine; and suppose this intelligent person should be informed of the
additional facts, that these predestinarians had tried all their skill
at explanation and argument, generation after generation, but had never
succeeded in the view of the other party in freeing their doctrine from
these charges, nay, that they had so far failed of it, that many, very
many were leaving them, and adopting the anti-predestinarian system, for
the _very reason_ that they could not rid the system, in which they had
been educated, from those principles which were charged upon it--and
that even among those who had adhered to the old doctrine there were new
modes of explaining and stating the theory, constantly springing up,
until finally numbers of them _had explained themselves entirely out of
the doctrine_, and into the opposite sentiment; and that very many
others, by adhering to the doctrine, and following out the principles
involved in it, had come to the conclusion that there was "no hell"--no
judgment, and "no angry God." Suppose, I say, this intelligent man
should be informed of all these facts, and then be requested to
_presume_ whether or not these contested principles were involved in the
doctrine--what would be his judgment? I need not answer this question.
There is _strong_ presumptive evidence that the views in the sermon are
correct.

2. Another reason for believing that this doctrine is what we have
defined it to be, and involves in it the principles we have charged upon
it, is drawn from the terms in which it is expressed, and the manner and
circumstances in which these terms are used. The more common terms are
_decree, predestination, foreordination, predetermination, purpose_,
&c.--These are all authoritative terms, and carry with them the idea of
absolute sovereignty. But lest they should not be sufficiently strong
and imperious, they are, in this theory, generally accompanied by some
strong qualifying terms, such as _sovereign decree, eternal and
immutable purposes;_ and without any reference to other bearings, the
whole is placed on the ground of God's absolute and sovereign will.
These sovereign decrees, however, are not proposed to his subjects in
the light of a law enforced by suitable sanctions, and liable to be
broken. They are the _secret counsels_ of his own will; and so far from
being law, that often, perhaps oftener than otherwise, in the moral
world, they are in direct opposition to the precepts of the law. When
these decrees come in contact with the law they supersede it. Laws may
sometimes be broken, the decrees, never. God commits his law to
subordinate moral agents, who may break or keep them; but his decrees he
executes himself. It should also be understood that the advocates of
this theory, in their late controversy with Dr. Taylor, strenuously
maintain that sin, wherever it occurs, is preferable to holiness in its
stead, and is the _necessary means_ of the _greatest good_. The idea
that God, foreseeing what moral agents would do, under all possible
circumstances, _so ordered his works_ as to take up and incorporate into
his plan the foreseen volitions of moral agents, and thus constitute a
grand whole, as perfect as any system which involves a moral government
could be, they discard as rank Arminianism. Now is it possible that
decrees like these, concealed in the eternal mind of him that conceived
them--dependent solely on Almighty power to execute them, not modified
by subordinate agencies, but made to control these agencies with
absolute and arbitrary sway; can it be _possible_, I say, that such
decrees do not efficiently control and actuate the human will? Must not
he who, in this manner, forms and executes the general plan, also form
and execute all its parts? Must not he who gives the first impulse to
this concatenation of events, linked together by his eternal purposes,
follow up the whole with his continued and direct agency, and carry on
this work in every mind and through every emotion? Most assuredly he
must. His is, undoubtedly, according to this doctrine, that operative,
controlling and propelling energy that

   "Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
   Acts undivided, operates unspent."

And that we may be sure not to misrepresent the Calvinists on this
subject, let them speak for themselves. Dr. Hill, who is a modern, and
is reputed a moderate Calvinist, says:--"The Divine decree is the
determination to _produce_ the universe, that is, the _whole series_ of
_beings_ and _events_ that was then future." Dr. Chalmers, who has been
esteemed so moderate a Calvinist, that some had doubted whether he had
not given up absolute predestination altogether, comes out in his sermon
on predestination in the following language:--"Every step of every
individual character, receives as determinate a character from the hand,
of God, as every mile of a planet's orbit, or every gust of wind, or
every wave of the sea, or every particle of flying dust, or every
rivulet of flowing water. This power of God knows no exceptions: it is
absolute and unlimited. And while it embraces the vast, it carries its
resistless influence to all the minute and unnoticed diversities of
existence. It _reigns_ and operates through all the secrecies of the
inner man. It gives birth to every purpose, it gives impulse to every
desire, it gives shape and colour to every conception. It wields an
entire ascendancy over every attribute of the mind; and the will, and
the fancy, and the understanding, with all the countless variety of
their hidden and fugitive operations, are submitted to it. It gives
movement and direction through every one point of our pilgrimage. At no
moment of time does it aba

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