The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 07
by unknown · English · Gutenberg #37898 · 949,924 chars · public domain (US)
The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 07
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
before using this eBook.
Title: The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 07
Editor: Jared Sparks
Release date: November 1, 2011 [eBook #37898]
Language: English
Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/37898
Credits: Produced by Frank van Drogen, Melissa McDaniel and the
Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
(This file was produced from images generously made
available by the Bibliothèque nationale de France
(BnF/Gallica) at http://gallica.bnf.fr)
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, VOL. 07 ***
Produced by Frank van Drogen, Melissa McDaniel and the
Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
(This file was produced from images generously made
available by the Bibliotheque nationale de France
(BnF/Gallica) at http://gallica.bnf.fr)
THE
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION.
VOL. VII.
THE
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION;
BEING
THE LETTERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, SILAS DEANE, JOHN ADAMS, JOHN JAY,
ARTHUR LEE, WILLIAM LEE, RALPH IZARD, FRANCIS DANA, WILLIAM
CARMICHAEL, HENRY LAURENS, JOHN LAURENS, M. DE LAFAYETTE, M. DUMAS,
AND OTHERS, CONCERNING THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE WHOLE REVOLUTION;
TOGETHER WITH
THE LETTERS IN REPLY FROM THE SECRET COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS, AND THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
ALSO,
THE ENTIRE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE FRENCH MINISTERS, GERARD AND LUZERNE,
WITH CONGRESS.
Published under the Direction of the President of the United States,
from the original Manuscripts in the Department of State, conformably
to a Resolution of Congress, of March 27th, 1818.
EDITED
BY JARED SPARKS.
VOL. VII.
BOSTON:
NATHAN HALE AND GRAY & BOWEN;
G. & C. & H. CARVILL, NEW YORK; P. THOMPSON, WASHINGTON.
1830.
Steam Power Press--W. L. Lewis' Print.,
No. 6, Congress Street, Boston.
CONTENTS
OF THE
SEVENTH VOLUME.
JOHN ADAMS'S CORRESPONDENCE,
CONTINUED.
Page.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, December 14th, 1782, 3
The King of Sweden's compliment to the United
States.--The signing of the preliminaries announced to
Parliament.--Quotes a note from the Courier de
l'Europe.--Requests leave to return.
Robert R. Livingston to John Adams. Philadelphia, December
19th, 1782, 4
Mr Jefferson accepts his appointment.--Financial
arrangements for raising a revenue.
To Charles W. F. Dumas. Paris, January 1st, 1783, 6
M. Brantzen.--Conversation with Mr Oswald on freedom of
navigation.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, January 22d, 1783, 8
Preliminaries and armistice between England, and Spain,
and France, signed and sealed.--Terms England offers to
the Dutch.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, January 23d, 1783, 10
Grounds of Mr Adams's opinions of European politics.--Mr
Laurens's services.--The northern powers friendly to
America.--America has suffered by reposing confidence in
a certain minister.
To C. W. F. Dumas. Paris, January 29th, 1783, 13
Proceedings of Congress in reference to the armed
neutrality.--America is ready to accede to its
principles.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, February 5th, 1783, 14
Causes of the revocation of his commission for
negotiating a treaty of commerce with Great
Britain.--Recommends the appointment of a Minister to
England for negotiating a treaty of commerce.--Mr
Adams's idea of the qualifications necessary for an
American Minister, particularly at the English
Court.--Address and fluency in speaking French of little
importance.--Mr Jay's services and qualifications.
Robert R. Livingston to John Adams. Philadelphia, February
13th, 1783, 23
Financial embarrassments of the country.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, March 2d, 1783, 25
Transmitting an application from a French house at
Leghorn to be appointed consul or commercial agent of
the United States.
Robert R. Livingston to John Adams. Philadelphia, April 14th,
1783, 26
Ambiguous expressions in the declaration of the
cessation of hostilities.--Affairs of the Dutch.--Mr
Adams's accounts.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, April 14th, 1783, 28
Mr Hartley succeeds Mr Oswald.--Prospect of a general
congress at Paris.
To Robert Morris. Paris, May 21st, 1783, 30
The Dutch loan; perplexities and embarrassments.--Wishes
to be at home to persuade the Americans to pay taxes and
build ships.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, May 24th, 1783, 31
A temporary regulation of commerce with England will be
necessary.--The American ministers invited to London
with a promise that they should be treated as the
ministers of other sovereign states.--The English court
wishes to interchange ministers with America.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, May 30th, 1783, 34
Receives the ratification by Congress of the treaty with
Holland.--Delay in the negotiations of the definitive
treaty.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, June 9th, 1783, 35
"Letters from a Distinguished American," written by Mr
Adams.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, June 16th, 1783, 36
Ambiguities in the articles of the provisional treaty
occasioned by the critical state of affairs.--The Dutch
have been of important service in bringing about the
termination of the war.--Expresses a wish to return; is
unwilling to remain in Europe if the embassy to England
is given to any other person.--Policy to be pursued in
raising a loan in Holland.--Conduct of General
Washington during the discontent in the army.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, June 23d, 1783, 41
Obstacles in the way of agreeing upon a regulation of
commerce.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, June 23d, 1783, 42
Embarrassments of the English Ministry.--A party in
England in favor of restricting the commerce of the
Americans.--America and the West Indies are mutually
necessary to each other.--Thinks it politic to revive
the trade on the former footing, if necessary.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, June 24th, 1783, 45
Fictions of the European Gazetteers.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, June 27th, 1783, 46
Progress of the negotiations of the other
powers.--Expects to obtain nothing more favorable than
the terms of the provisional treaty.--Conduct,
character, and materials of the British Ministry.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, June 27th, 1783, 48
American ships arrive in England.--Dubious policy of
the Ministry.--The American Ministers would effect more
in England.--France does not desire a reconciliation
between England and the United States.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, July 3d, 1783, 51
The American Ministers make visits to the Ministers of
all the powers.--The coalition.--The commerce with the
West Indies.--Receives a visit from the Ambassador of
the Emperor of Germany.--The other Ministers return his
visit.
To Robert Morris. Paris, July 5th, 1783, 56
State of affairs in Europe at the moment of signing the
peace.--Expediency of signing it without consulting the
French Minister.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, July 7th, 1783, 59
The British Ministry avoid any definitive
propositions.--The West India commerce in regard to the
different powers.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, July 9th, 1783, 63
Mediation of the Imperial Courts.--Explains the
necessity for concealing the separate article from
France; and for signing the treaty without a previous
communication of it to the French Court.--The foreign
Ministers cease to treat the American Ministers with
reserve.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, July 10th, 1783, 67
French policy in regard to the fisheries.--Letter of M.
Marbois.--M. de Rayneval's correspondence with Mr
Jay.--France wishes the exclusion of the Americans from
the West Indies.
To Robert Morris. Paris, July 10th, 1783, 70
Means of raising a loan in Holland.
To Robert Morris. Paris, July 11th, 1783, 72
Necessity of sustaining the credit of the United States
by providing for the prompt settlement of all claims.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, July 11th, 1783, 74
Obligations of America to France.--Reasons for
maintaining a close connexion with France.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, July 12th, 1783, 75
Algiers.--Negotiations with Portugal.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, July 13th, 1783, 77
Reasons for forming a treaty of commerce with the
Emperor of Germany.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, July 14th, 1783, 81
Jealousy of American ships and trade in France and
England.--Proclamation of the English court permitting
intercourse between America and the West Indies in
British vessels.--Fish, potash and pearlash not
admitted.--This measure is the result of French
policy--Remedies to be applied by America.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, July 14th, 1783, 85
Exclusive policy of the European powers in regard to
commerce.--Views of Austria and Russia towards the Black
Sea, the Danube, the Archipelago and Turkey.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, July 15th, 1783, 88
Mr Hartley offers no definitive
propositions.--"Observations on the American States."
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, July 16th, 1783, 89
Visit to the Count de Vergennes.--Conversation relative
to the West India commerce.--Means of retaliating the
British restrictions on the commerce with their
islands.--The Americans ought to send ships to
China.--Doubtful complexion of British politics.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, July 17th, 1783, 94
Conversation with Mr Hartley on the English trade and
policy in the East.--Importance of forming commercial
connexions with the Dutch.--Conversation with the Duc de
la Vauguyon relative to the French and English policy in
Eastern Europe; on the colonial commerce.--The British
restrictive policy will produce wars.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, July 18th, 1783, 99
The United States must counteract French and British
policy by forming connexions with other
nations.--Necessity of a common authority in America for
managing foreign affairs, regulating commerce, raising a
revenue, &c.--The friendship of the Dutch must be
secured.
To Robert R. Livingston. The Hague, July 23d, 1783, 103
Sugar trade, and sugar refineries may be carried on by
Americans as well as by the Dutch.--Conversation with M.
Visscher and M. Van Berckel on the trade with the Dutch
Colonies.--M. Van Berckel's remarks on a loan in
Holland.--Conversation with the Prince of Orange on the
ranks of foreign Ministers.
To Robert R. Livingston. The Hague, July 25th, 1783, 109
Intrigues of the English to restore their former
connexions with Holland.--The Dutch complain of having
been deceived by the French Ministers.--No progress in
the negotiations between England and Holland.
To Robert R. Livingston. Amsterdam, July 28th, 1783, 112
Sugar trade.--American loan in Holland.--Loans of the
other powers there.
To Robert Morris. Amsterdam, July 28th, 1783, 115
The loan in Holland.--Suggests the expediency of sending
out ships loaded by the States with their respective
staples.--Probability of obtaining a loan in England.
To Robert R. Livingston. The Hague, July 30th, 1783, 117
Trade with the Dutch Colonies.--Account of the limits,
&c. of the Dutch West India Company received from the
secretary.--General commerce with the European West
India Colonies.
To Robert R. Livingston. The Hague, July 31st, 1783, 122
Conversation with the Sardinian Minister, who advises
the sending of a circular by Congress to the European
powers, giving an account of the Declaration of
Independence, of the acknowledgment by other powers,
&c.; recommends commercial connexions with Italy;
remarks on the Austrian policy towards Turkey.--Efforts
to detach Holland from her connexion with France.
To Robert R. Livingston. The Hague, August 1st, 1783, 127
Conversation with the Portuguese Minister on commercial
matters.--Dr Franklin's treaty with Portugal.
To Robert R. Livingston. The Hague, August 2d, 1783, 131
Conversation with M. Berenger on the European politics
of the day.
To Robert R. Livingston. The Hague, August 3d, 1783, 133
Necessity of securing reciprocity in the commercial
treaties.--Dissatisfaction in Holland with France.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, August 10th, 1783, 136
Interview with the Spanish and Portuguese Ministers on
commercial subjects.--Extraordinary increase of the
commerce of the neutrals.--No progress in the
negotiation.--Causes of the delay.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, August 13th, 1783, 140
Exchange ratifications of the provisional treaty with Mr
Hartley.--The project of a definitive treaty produced by
Mr Hartley in the words of the provisional treaty.--Mr
Hartley objects to the mediation of the Imperial Courts.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, August 13th, 1783, 143
Probable policy of France in regard to
Turkey.--Situation of the Count de Vergennes considered
precarious.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, August 13th, 1783, 145
Expresses his discontent with Dr Franklin's negotiating
treaties with several powers without communicating with
other Ministers.--Remarks on the treaty with Denmark.
To Robert R. Livingston. Paris, August 15th, 1783, 149
The belligerent powers except Holland are
agreed.--Remarks of M. Brantzen on the conduct, policy,
and situation of the Count de Vergennes.--The Queen and
some of the council are opposed to him.
To the President of Congress. Paris, September 5th, 1783, 152
The definitive treaty signed, sealed, and delivered.--A
new commission necessary for negotiating a treaty of
commerce.--The Count de Vergennes was not desirous of
admitting the mediation of the Imperial Courts.--Mr
Adams regrets not having admitted the mediation.--Policy
of forming commercial connexions with the European
powers.
To Elias Boudinot, President of Congress. Paris, September
8th, 1783, 156
Accepts the joint commission for negotiating a treaty of
commerce with England.--Advises that it be extended to
the other powers.
To the President of Congress. Paris, September 8th, 1783, 158
Management of the European Journals.--Courier de
l'Europe.
To the President of Congress. Paris, September 10th, 1783, 160
Advises the opening of negotiations with all the Courts
of Europe, and with the Barbary powers.
JOHN JAY'S CORRESPONDENCE.
To the President of Congress. St Pierre's, Martinique,
December 20th, 1779, 171
Action at sea between the French and English.
To the President of Congress. St Pierre's, Martinique,
December 22d, 1779, 172
Repairs of the ship.
To the President of Congress. St Pierre's, Martinique,
December 24th, 1779, 174
An account of the condition of the ship, and the causes
of his favoring the steering for Martinique.
To the President of Congress. St Pierre's, Martinique,
December 25th, 1779, 190
Recommends Mrs Smith to the attention of Congress.
To the President of Congress. St Pierre's, Martinique,
December 25th, 1779, 191
Draws on the fund for the payment of his salary for a
hundred guineas, to be distributed among the officers of
the Confederacy.
To the President of Congress. St Pierre's, Martinique,
December 26th, 1779, 192
M. Gerard proposes to send home the Confederacy to
refit.--She is permitted to refit in Martinique, and a
French frigate is ordered to carry Mr Jay and M. Gerard
to France.--Mr Bingham's services.
To Arthur Lee. Cadiz, January 26th, 1780, 194
Requests of Mr Lee information.
To the Count de Vergennes. Cadiz, January 27th, 1780, 195
Recapitulation of former proceedings relative to
Spain.--Requests the interposition of the King in favor
of America.
To Don Joseph Galvez, Minister of the Spanish Court. January
27th, 1780, 199
Stipulation in the treaty between France and the United
States providing for the accession of Spain.--Mr Jay
appointed to carry it into effect.
To the President of Congress. Cadiz, January 27th, 1780, 202
Reasons for his landing in Cadiz.
Instructions to William Carmichael. Cadiz, January 27th,
1780, 203
Directions as to his conduct towards M. Galvez, the
Spanish Minister, and the French Ambassador, for
procuring information.
William Carmichael to John Jay. Madrid, February 15th, 1780, 207
Cordial reception by the French Ambassador.--Should have
been addressed to the Count de Florida Blanca.--Prospect
of reception by the Spanish Ministry.--M. Miralles has
been instructed to assist in the conquest of
Florida.--There is no coldness between the French and
Spanish Courts.
To the President of Congress. Cadiz, February 20th, 1780, 209
Mr Bingham advanced the hundred guineas distributed
among the officers of the Confederacy.
Count de Florida Blanca to John Jay. Pardo, February 24th,
1780, 210
Expresses his Majesty's satisfaction with Mr Jay's
arrival, and declares there is no obstacle to his coming
to Court in an informal character.
To William Carmichael. Cadiz, February 25th, 1780, 211
Was informed by M. Gerard that M. Galvez was the
Minister with whom all business with the United States
was to be transacted.--Wished to have discovered the
sentiments of Spain towards America, independently of
French influence.--Requests further information as to
the instructions to M. Miralles.
To the President of Congress. Cadiz, February 29th, 1780, 215
Transmitting papers.--Generally believed that the
American islands will be the theatre of the next
campaign.
To the President of Congress. Cadiz, March 3d, 1780, 216
M. Guatier of Barcelona desires to be American consul
there.--Necessity for consuls in Spain.
To the President of Congress. Cadiz, March 3d, 1780, 217
Reason for not making personal application to the
Ministry at first.--Policy of France.--M. Gerard's
opinion.--Spain is already at war with England.
De Neufville & Son to John Jay. Amsterdam, April 6th, 1780, 219
Congratulations on his arrival.
Answer to De Neufville & Son. Madrid, April 27th, 1780, 219
Their letters to Congress were received before his
departure.--The success of America important to Holland.
To the President of Congress. Madrid, May 26th, 1780, 220
Arrival at Cadiz.--Draws on Dr Franklin.--Extract of a
letter from Dr Franklin (April 7th, 1780), contradicting
the report that the Loan Office bills payable in France
were not honored.--Certificate of Mr Grand to the same
effect.--Correspondence with Mr Lee.--Letter of the
Count de Vergennes in reply to that of Mr Jay announcing
his arrival.--Reply of Mr Jay (Aranjues, May 9th, 1780),
to the Count de Vergennes assuring him of his confidence
in M. de Montmorin.--M. Gerard informs him that he
should address himself to M. Galvez.--Writes to that
Minister.--Answered by the Count de Florida
Blanca.--Letter of Mr Jay (Cadiz, March 6th, 1780), to
the Count, expressing the confidence of the United
States in the King's favorable disposition, and
declaring his intention of setting out for
Madrid.--Arrives at Madrid.--Questions from the Count de
Florida Blanca (dated March 9th, 1780), requesting
information on the civil and military state of the
American Provinces.--Reply of Mr Jay (Madrid, April
25th, 1780), to the preceding questions, comprising his
commission and that of Mr Carmichael, with details in
reply to the questions; the democratic nature of the
American governments renders a knowledge of their
affairs easily attainable. 1. THE CIVIL STATE;
population of each State; government of each State and
the Articles of the Confederation; disposition of the
people, who were at first only desirous of a redress of
grievances; but now determined on independence, with the
grounds of this opinion; there is no British party in
America; revenues; public debts; resources; possibility
of supporting their credit in the operations of
Government, in commerce, in the protection of the
national industry; advantages to result to Spain from
the independence of American States, in the reduction of
the British power, and in the commerce with America;
ability of the United States to furnish naval stores.
2. THE MILITARY STATE; number of the troops; the
commander in chief; means of recruiting by the militia;
deficiency of arms, of clothing; means of subsistence;
naval forces; the people will not submit; their
disposition towards the Kings of France and of Spain;
financial embarrassments; sending supplies to America
would be the surest means of humiliating Great
Britain.--Receives the resolutions of Congress drawing
on Mr Laurens and himself for L100,000 sterling
each.--Letter of Mr Jay (Aranjues, April 29th, 1780), to
the Count de Florida Blanca in consequence of the
foregoing resolution, giving an account of the financial
operations of Congress, and requesting aid from his
Majesty.--Conference with the Count on the subject of
the preceding letter; the Count states that Spain has
been subject to heavy expenses during the preceding
year, but that his Majesty intends to give America all
assistance in his power, and has directed him to confer
with his colleagues in the Ministry on this point;
wishes Mr Jay to contract to furnish Spain with frigates
and light vessels; promises to engage in the King's name
to pay the bills of exchange if presented; the
pretensions of America to the navigation of the
Mississippi an obstacle to a treaty.--Letter of Mr Jay
(Aranjues, May 12th, 1780), to the Count de Florida
Blanca stating his confidential connexion with the
French Ambassador, and wishing to know if he may
communicate to him the subject of the conference.--Reply
of the Count de Florida Blanca (Aranjues, May 14th,
1780).--Mr Jay's note to the French Ambassador informing
him of Sir J. Dalrymple's arrival at Madrid.--Note of M.
de Montmorin in reply, declaring his entire confidence
in the Spanish Ministry.--Extract of a letter from Mr
Jay (April 26th 1780), to Mr Adams informing him of Sir
J. Dalrymple's arrival at Aranjues.--Sir J. Dalrymple
requests permission to go through Spain, and a passport
through France.--Sir J. Dalrymple presents to the Count
de Florida Blanca Lord Rochford's project to prevent the
war by a confederation between France, Spain, Portugal
and England; the confederates to guaranty mutually their
Colonial possessions; to participate in the commerce of
the English Colonies under certain limitations, to be
settled by five persons, one from each country; to
settle the contested privileges of the Americans on just
principles; disadvantages resulting to Spain from the
independence of the English American Colonies, first by
promoting a contraband trade between the American States
and the Spanish Colonies, and secondly by exposing the
Spanish Colonies to the attacks of the Americans, who
will soon form establishments in the South Seas; all
Europe is interested in preventing the independence of
America.--The Gardoquis; Mr Jay is destitute of
resources; difficulty of conveying intelligence;
expenses of a Minister at the Spanish Court; coldly
treated by the Ministers of the Northern powers;
ignorance of American affairs in Spain; the secrets of
Congress well known to the Spanish and French Courts.
To the Committee of Foreign Affairs. Madrid, May 27th, 1780, 282
Mr Laurens is not arrived.
To James Lovell. Madrid, May 27th, 1780, 283
Want of intelligence from America.
William Carmichael to John Jay. Aranjues, May 27th, 1780, 283
Destination of the Spanish fleet.
To the President of Congress. Madrid, May 28th, 1780, 284
Enclosing the preceding, the information in which he
considers authentic.
To the President of Congress. Madrid, May 30th, 1780, 285
Receives the resolution of Congress, desiring the
Ex-Presidents of Congress to lodge their public
correspondence in the Secretary's office.--Mr Jay did
this at the time of his retirement from the office.
To the President of Congress. Madrid, May 30th, 1780, 285
Bills drawn upon him are arrived.
De Neufville & Son to John Jay. Without date, 286
Bills drawn on Mr Laurens, who is not arrived.--Have
promised the holders to accept them.
De Neufville & Son to John Jay. Amsterdam, June 1st, 1780, 287
Are willing to accept the bills drawn on Mr Laurens,
provided they are permitted to draw on Dr Franklin at
seven or eight months.
De Neufville & Son to John Jay. Amsterdam, June 8th, 1780, 288
Have accepted the bills on Mr Laurens, and request that
some method of reimbursing them may be adopted.
Committee of Foreign Affairs to John Jay. Philadelphia, June
16th, 1780, 288
Reasons for drawing on him.--Have drawn for an
additional sum.
To De Neufville & Son, at Amsterdam. Madrid, June 18th, 1780, 290
Thanking them for their offer to accept the bills drawn
on Mr Laurens.
To De Neufville & Son. Madrid, June 25th, 1780, 291
Is uncertain whether he shall be able to reimburse them
for their advances.
To the President of Congress. Madrid, July 10th, 1780, 292
Remittances from America are necessary.
De Neufville & Son to John Jay. Amsterdam, July 13th, 1780, 293
Cannot accept any more bills.--Would undertake a loan if
authorised.
De Neufville & Son to John Jay. Amsterdam, July 28th, 1780, 295
Dr Franklin has offered to accept further bills drawn on
Mr Laurens; they will therefore continue to accept those
presented.
To De Neufville & Son. Madrid, July 29th, 1780, 296
Has not power to authorise them to raise a loan.--The
capture of Charleston will have no effect on the
determination of the Americans.
To De Neufville & Son. Madrid, August 16th, 1780, 298
Expresses his sense of their friendly conduct towards
America.
To Silas Deane. St Ildefonso, September 8th, 1780, 299
Desires to correspond with him.
To the President of Congress. St Ildefonso, September 16th,
1780, 299
It is necessary to cease drawing bills on him.--The King
of Spain has offered his responsibility to facilitate a
loan.
Instructions to John Jay. In Congress, October 4th. 1780, 300
Directing him to insist on the navigation of the
Mississippi.--The boundary.--Florida.
To De Neufville & Son. Madrid, October 4th, 1780, 302
Connexion between Holland and the United States.--Shall
recommend their house to Congress.--Spanish ordinance
establishing a paper currency.--Effect of this measure
on the bills drawn on him; wishes to know if money could
be raised in Holland for Congress on the joint credit of
Spain and the United States.
To James Lovell. Madrid, October 27th, 1780, 304
Difficulties of finding a safe conveyance for his
letters.--Receives little information from the
committee.--M. Dohrmer.
To the President of Congress. Madrid, November 6th, 1780, 306
The Abbe Hussey arrives at Madrid with Mr
Cumberland.--Notes of Mr Jay's conference with the Count
de Florida Blanca.--Conference of Mr Carmichael with the
Minister.--Note from the Count de Florida Blanca
(Aranjues, June 9, 1780); to Mr Jay on the subject of
aids; his Majesty is willing to become responsible at the
expiration of two years to the holders of the bills drawn
on Mr Jay, provided Congress will build four frigates and
some light vessels for the King; the Americans may send
for stores to the Spanish ports for this purpose; the
squadron manned by Americans and under Spanish colors to
intercept the English East India vessels.--Reply of Mr
Jay (Aranjues, June 9th, 1780); expectations of the
Americans from Spain; the holders of the bills will
prefer recovering the amount on protest, to waiting for
the payment two years; the Spanish treasure from America
may arrive before the bills become payable; Mr Jay is
authorised to pledge the faith of the United States for
the repayment of any sums his Majesty may lend; former
aids; Congress has not the resources necessary for
building ships; difficulty of manning them with American
sailors, who prefer sailing in privateers; the country is
not in a condition to undertake foreign enterprises; the
Americans will always be ready to cooperate with Spain
against the Floridas or elsewhere; unfavorable
conclusions will be drawn as to the condition of Spain,
if she cannot supply such aid to men in arms against her
enemy.--Mr Jay's reasons for not touching on other points
of the proposition.--Note from Mr Jay to the Count,
informing him of a new draft.--Reply of the Count,
promising to pay the bill, and declaring that no more can
be paid without consulting the King; the proposition of
the Count having been rejected, it becomes necessary for
Mr Jay to devise other means.--Reply of Mr Jay to the
preceding (Madrid, June 22d, 1780), proposing as a means
of paying the bills the advance of the L25,000 to L40,000
sterling promised; the sum necessary for building the
ships cannot be raised by Congress; America cannot pay
the debts occasioned by the war till peace; advantages
resulting to Spain by the furnishing of aid to
America.--Reasons for not pushing the treaty at this
time.--Letter from Mr Jay to the Count de Florida Blanca
(Madrid, June 28th, 1780), transmitting the resolutions
of Congress, directing that bills be issued redeemable in
specie in six years; this plan may enable the United
States to supply the vessels, his Majesty becoming
responsible for a certain part of the sum so
issued.--Note from Mr Jay to the Count de Florida Blanca,
stating that he has been called on to accept new
bills.--Reply of the Count de Florida Blanca, declaring
nothing can be done in regard to the new drafts without
consulting the King and the other Ministers; requests
further explanations of Mr Jay's plan for furnishing the
ships and engaging the responsibility of the King.--Note
from the Count de Florida Blanca to Mr Jay, requesting to
know when the bills lately arrived will become due.--News
of the capture of Charleston.--Mr Jay's notes of a
conference with the Count de Florida Blanca, July 5th;
capture of Charleston; death of M. Miralles; the Count
advises Mr Jay to be cautious of Messrs Joyce, who hold
the bills; regrets the precipitancy of Congress in
drawing; specie might have been remitted from the Spanish
Colonies directly to the United States; remarks on the
deranged state of the finances of the United States; the
difficulty of raising money in Europe; wishes to wait the
arrival of a certain person; Mr Jay observes, that
Congress have adopted measures for restoring the
finances; suggests that Spain might furnish aid by bills
on Havana; states in reply to a question of the Count,
that ship timber may be furnished from America; urges the
importance of accepting the bills; reminds the Minister
of the promise of clothing; evasive and uncertain nature
of this conference.--Note from Mr Jay to the Count de
Florida Blanca (Madrid, July 11th, 1780), informing him
that new bills have been presented; the Messrs Joyce
consent to have their bills payable at Bilboa.--Answer of
the Count to the preceding, desiring a delay till the
arrival of a certain person.--Mr Jay requests that Mr
Harrison be allowed to remain at Cadiz.--Note from the
Count de Florida Blanca (July 29th), granting Mr Harrison
permission to remain at Cadiz; still waits the arrival of
the person above mentioned.--Note from Mr Jay to the
Count de Florida Blanca (August 11th), announcing the
presentation of more bills.--Reply of the Count de
Florida Blanca, regretting that he must still wait the
arrival of a certain person.--Letter of Mr Jay (Madrid,
August 16th, 1780), to the Count de Florida Blanca,
stating that the holders of the bills grow
impatient.--Letter of Mr Jay to the Count de Florida
Blanca (Madrid, August 18th, 1780), informing him that
bills have been received by the Gardoquis, which will be
immediately presented.--Letter from Mr Jay to the Count
de Florida Blanca (St Ildefonso, August 25th, 1780),
urging the necessity of providing for the acceptance of
the bills.--Mr Jay's notes of a conference with the
French Ambassador, August 27th; Mr Jay gives an account
of his proceedings since his arrival, and requests the
Ambassador to obtain an answer for him from the Spanish
Minister; Mr Jay was encouraged to expect that he should
be supplied with money to meet the bills; the Ambassador
thinks that the Spanish Minister will pay the bills, and
promises to speak to him on the subject.--Subsequent
coolness of the French Ambassador.--Second visit to him;
he advises Mr Jay to write again to the Count de Florida
Blanca, praying an audience; Mr Jay declines making any
supplications, or purchasing by concessions the
acknowledgment of independence; declares his
determination to write on the subject of the treaty, and
if treated with the same neglect to return; conduct of
France.--Mr Jay consents to send Mr Carmichael to the
Minister.--Note from the Count de Florida Blanca
introducing M. Gardoqui.--Conversation with M. Gardoqui
on the subject of the bills; second conversation with M.
Gardoqui, who proposes the surrender of the navigation of
the Mississippi.--Objections to this
measure.--Conversation with M. Del Campo on the same
subjects.--Conversation with the Secretary of the French
Ambassador.--M. Gardoqui informs him from the Count de
Florida Blanca that no more bills can be paid by
Spain.--Letter of Mr Jay (St Ildefonso, September 14th,
1780), to the Count de Florida Blanca, requesting to know
if any aid is to be expected from Spain.--Answer to the
preceding, dictated by M. Del Campo, in the name of the
Count de Florida Blanca, to M. Gardoqui, declaring the
readiness of his Majesty to assist the States.--Letter
from Mr Jay to Count de Vergennes (St Ildefonso,
September 22d, 1780), giving an account of his
proceedings in Spain; requesting the aid of France in
meeting the bills.--Letter of Mr Jay to Dr Franklin (same
date), on the same subject.--Notes of a conference
between Mr Jay and the Count de Florida Blanca (September
23d); satisfaction of the King with the measures of
Congress for supplying the Spanish forces in the West
Indies; plan of the English Court to attempt an
accommodation with America; Mr Jay enters upon the points
mentioned in the paper dictated to M. Gardoqui; on the
manner of making known the King's responsibility; on the
King's being disgusted with the drawing of bills without
his consent, and without terms of recompense; the bills
were drawn on Mr Jay, and the faith of the United States
was pledged for the payment of any sum advanced; Mr Jay
wishes the evidence of an understanding between America
and England; Congress had given proofs of friendship by
sending a Minister to negotiate treaties of amity and
alliance; the delaying of the negotiations owing to the
Minister not sending the promised notes on the subject;
terms of such a treaty; Spain ought not to expect the
expenses of the war will be refunded; America will be
ready to render every assistance possible.--Mr Jay
returns to Madrid and accepts the bills.--Equivocal
nature of the Spanish policy.--Extract of a letter from
the Count de Vergennes to the French Ambassador, stating
that it will be difficult to make advances to Mr
Jay.--Letter from Messrs Couteulx and Co. to Mr Jay
(Cadiz, October 3d, 1780), complaining of the expenses
and difficulty of supplying and sending home American
seamen.--Mr Jay to Messrs Couteulx and Co. (Madrid,
October 15th, 1780), directing them to settle accounts
with Mr Harrison.--Difficulties in the conveyance of
correspondence.--A copy of the correspondence of the
Commissioners in France in the hands of a certain
foreigner.
To the President of Congress. Madrid, November 30th, 1780, 389
Enclosing copies of papers from Morocco.--Delays of the
Spanish Court.--Remarks on the enclosed account of the
revenues and expenditures of Spain for 1778.
From D'Audibert Caille to John Jay. Aranjues, April 21st,
1780, 392
Is authorised to declare the pacific intentions of the
Emperor of Morocco towards the United States.
To D'Audibert Caille, 393
Expresses his satisfaction with the disposition of the
Emperor of Morocco.
Copy of M. D'Audibert Caille's Appointment, 394
Copy of M. D'Audibert Caille's appointment to officiate
as consul of all nations who have no consul in Morocco.
Copy of the Declaration by the Emperor of Morocco, February
20th 1778, 396
Certificate of Pedro Umbert, that the above is
conformable to the truth.
Certificate of M. D'Audibert Caille. December 1st, 1779, 397
Certificate of M. D'Audibert Caille that Don Pedro
Umbert is employed for foreign affairs at the Court of
Morocco.
D'Audibert Caille to Congress. Sale, September 6th, 1779, 397
The Emperor of Morocco intends to be at peace with the
United States.
General State of the Revenues of Spain in the Year 1778, 399
To the Committee of Foreign Affairs. Madrid, November 30th,
1780, 401
Necessity of providing means for the safe conveyance of
the public correspondence.--His letters are opened and
many kept back both in Spain and the United States.
Instructions to John Jay. In Congress, February 15th, 1781, 403
Instructing him to recede from the demand of a free
navigation of the Mississippi below 31 deg..
James Lovell to John Jay. February 20th, 1781, 404
Has received no letters from him of late.
James Lovell to John Jay. March 9th, 1781, 405
Ratification of the articles of the Confederacy.
To the President of Congress. Madrid, March 22d, 1781, 405
Supplies from Spain.--Russian mediation.--M. Necker's
report.
To the President of Congress. Madrid, April 25th, 1781, 406
Spain insists on the exclusive navigation of the
Mississippi.--Letter from Mr Jay to De Neufville and Son
(Madrid, January 8th, 1781), renouncing the idea of a
loan in Holland separate from that negotiated by Mr
Adams.--Mr Jay's proceedings in regard to the payment of
the bills.--Advises that the unfinished ships be sold to
Spain.--Disposition of Portugal.--Dr Franklin.--Mr
Cumberland's mission.--Disposition of Spain.
The President of Congress to John Jay. In Congress, May 28th,
1781, 415
Expressing the satisfaction of Congress with his
conduct.--Instructs him to disavow any understanding
between the United States and Great Britain; to avoid
referring to the treaty with France in his negotiations
with Spain; to declare that facilities will be granted
for the exportation of naval stores for the Spanish
marine; to continue to provide as far as possible for
American seamen in Spain; to open a correspondence with
M. D'Audibert Caille.
To the President of Congress. Aranjues, May 29th, 1781, 419
Conversation with the Count de Florida Blanca on the
admission of letters.
James Lovell to John Jay. Philadelphia, June 4th, 1781, 420
The affair of the Dover cutter.
James Lovell to John Jay. Philadelphia, June 15th, 1781, 421
Case of Dumain and Lyon.
Robert Morris to John Jay. Philadelphia, July 4th, 1781, 421
Mr Morris is appointed Superintendent of
Finance.--Objects to be accomplished by this
office.--Expectations of aid from Spain.--State of the
finances.--Disposition of the nation.--State of the
army.--Advantages that will result to Spain by aiding
America.--The United States cannot be dangerous to
Spain.--Amount desired.
Robert Morris to John Jay. Philadelphia, July 7th, 1781, 435
Necessity of immediate aids.
Robert Morris to John Jay. Office of Finance, July 9th, 1781, 436
Proposes a plan for sending home American seaman.
Robert Morris to John Jay. Philadelphia, July 13th, 1781, 438
Reasons which induced him to adopt the enclosed plan of
a national bank.--Wants aid from Spain.--Suggests that
an attempt should be made to obtain money from Portugal.
Robert Morris to John Jay. Office of Finance, August 15th,
1781, 449
Directing to protest certain bills, assigning as a
reason his instructions.
James Lovell to John Jay. Philadelphia, August 15th, 1781, 450
Surrender of Pensacola.
To the President of Congress. St Ildefonso, September 20th,
1781, 451
Regrets that instructions should have been given the
American Ministers to concur in any terms to which
France should accede.
To the President of Congress. St Ildefonso, October 3d, 1781, 454
Conversation with the Count de Florida Blanca, who
complains that Congress has not shown any disposition to
oblige the King; remarks relative to M. Gardoqui.--Mr
Jay regrets that the instructions concerning the
Mississippi had not been kept secret; use that might
have been made of the claim.--Has another interview with
the Minister; stoppage of the letters from America; the
affair of the Dover cutter; cession of the claims of the
United States to the navigation of the Mississippi; the
Count remarks that these affairs can be settled at a
general peace.--Letter from Mr Jay (Madrid, July 2d,
1781), to the Count de Florida Blanca, declaring that he
has been instructed to cede the exclusive navigation of
the Mississippi.--Letter from Mr Jay (Madrid, July 2d,
1781), to the Count de Montmorin, communicating the
above.--Receiving no answer from the Minister, Mr Jay
calls upon him, and is informed that he cannot attend to
the matter.--Letters from Mr Jay (Madrid, July 13th,
1781), to the Count de Florida Blanca communicating his
instructions.--Note from the Count de Florida Blanca (St
Ildefonso, July 1st, 1781), to Mr Jay proposing to
attend to American affairs.--Mr Jay visits the Minister
with Major Franks; general conversation.--Renewed
delays.--Letter from Mr Jay (St. Ildefonso, September
16th, 1781), to the Count de Montmorin, enclosing the
draft of a letter to the Count de Florida Blanca, and
requesting the advice of the Ambassador.--Note from the
Count de Florida Blanca to Mr Jay requesting him to call
upon him.--Notes of the conference between Mr Jay and
the Count de Florida Blanca (September 19th, 1781); the
Count requests Mr Jay to draw up an outline of the
proposed treaties; aids; commercial connexion; treaty of
alliance; the Count observes that Congress has done
nothing to gratify the King; a person will be appointed
to confer further with Mr Jay.--Letter from Mr Jay (St
Ildefonso, September 22d, 1781), to the Count de Florida
Blanca requesting that some decisive measure be taken in
regard to American affairs.--Propositions toward a plan
of a treaty, with remarks; the subject of aids will
require a separate convention; also the regulation of
the mutual conduct of the parties during the war.--Mr
Jay's reason for limiting the duration of the offer
contained in the sixth proposition, relating to the
navigation of the Mississippi; arts of Spain.--Note from
the Count de Florida Blanca to Mr Jay, expressing a hope
that some progress will soon be made in the
consideration of the propositions.--Embarrassments in
providing for the payment of the bills.--Mr Harrison's
services.--Proposes the sending of an agent to Portugal.
To the President of Congress. Madrid, October 18th, 1781, 506
Has protested some of the bills.
Robert R. Livingston to John Jay. Philadelphia, November 1st,
1781, 507
Organization of the new executive departments.--The debt
of the United States not so large as might have been
expected.--British American recruits.--Proposes that
Spain should furnish a convoy between Havana and the
United States.--Plan for paying the French troops in
specie from Havana.
Robert R. Livingston to John Jay. Philadelphia, November
28th, 1781, 511
State of military affairs.--The Marquis de la Fayette.
THE
CORRESPONDENCE
OF
JOHN ADAMS,
ONE OF THE COMMISSIONERS TO FRANCE, MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY TO
HOLLAND, AND ONE OF THE COMMISSIONERS FOR NEGOTIATING THE TREATY OF
PEACE.
THE
CORRESPONDENCE
OF
JOHN ADAMS.
CORRESPONDENCE CONTINUED.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, December 14th, 1782.
Sir,
There is more matter than time to write at present. The King of Sweden
has done the United States great honor in his commission to his
Minister here, to treat with them, by inserting, that he had a great
desire to form a connexion with States, which had so fully established
their independence, and by their wise and gallant conduct so well
deserved it; and his Minister desired it might be remembered, that his
sovereign was the first who had voluntarily proposed a treaty with
us.[1]
Mr Secretary Townshend announced, on the 3d of December, in a letter
to the Lord Mayor, the signature of our preliminaries. On the 5th, his
Majesty announced it in his speech to both Houses. Addresses of
thanks, in both Houses, passed without a division.
There is a note in the _Courier de l'Europe_, of the 6th instant,
worth transcribing, viz. "We mark these three lines in italics, to
notice at present the assertion, which we shall consider more fully
hereafter, that we do not owe to any of the causes assigned at
present, even in the two Houses of Parliament, the peace, the
blessings of which we consider as certain, but to the armed
neutrality. This peace will be durable."
I have transcribed this note, because it falls in with an opinion,
that I have long entertained. The armed neutrality, and even Mr Dana's
mission to it, have had greater effects, than the world is yet
informed of, and would have had much greater, if his hands had not
been tied.
On the 4th instant, I wrote a resignation of all my employments in
Europe, which I have now the honor to confirm, and to request, that
the acceptance of it may be transmitted to me several ways, by the
first ships.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[1] See Dr Franklin's letter on this subject, dated June the 25th,
1782. _Franklin's Correspondence_, Vol. III. p. 371.
* * * * *
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN ADAMS.
Philadelphia, December 19th, 1782.
Sir,
The enclosed letter for Mr Dana you will open and peruse. It may
possibly contain information, that may be useful to you, which it will
be unnecessary to repeat here.
I mentioned in my last, Mr Jefferson's appointment; I have the
pleasure of adding now, that I have received an account from him of
his acceptance of the place. He will be here in the course of ten or
twelve days, and sail with Count de Rochambeau, who proposes to return
to France. The French troops have embarked with the Marquis de
Vaudreuil, and are to sail for the West Indies, unless they should
receive counter orders, by a frigate, which is now in the river. Her
letters are not yet come up, as she unfortunately ran ashore at Dover;
it is yet uncertain whether she will be saved.
The great political question, which at present engages the attention
of Congress, is the means of providing for the payment of the public
debts, or at least establishing such funds for the regular discharge
of the interest, as may set their creditors at ease as to their
capitals. It was imagined, that a duty of five per cent upon all
imposts would afford a fund adequate to this. Congress accordingly
recommended it to the several States to impose the duty. They have all
complied, except Rhode Island. Her refusal renders the other laws
nugatory, as they contain clauses suspending their operation until the
measure is generally adopted. Congress are about to send down a
committee to endeavor to persuade Rhode Island to comply with a
measure, that they deem so essential to public credit. It is extremely
difficult in a country, so little used to taxes as ours is, to lay
them directly, and almost impossible to impose them so equally as not
to render them too oppressive on some members of the community, while
others contribute little or nothing. This difficulty is increased by
the continued change of property in this country, and by the small
proportion the income bears to the value of lands.
By a short letter just received from Mr Jay, it appears, that England
has at length swallowed the bitter pill, and agreed to treat with the
"Thirteen United States of America." I am still at a loss to account
for this commission's being directed to Mr Oswald, while Mr
Fitzherbert's continues in force; or is that revoked?[2] I will not
trouble myself with guesses, as I must receive despatches today, that
will explain the mystery, if either Dr Franklin or Mr Jay have kept
their words with me.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
FOOTNOTE:
[2] The two commissions were for distinct purposes; Mr Oswald's to
treat with the American Commissioners alone; and Mr Fitzherbert's to
treat for a general peace with the European powers, then at war with
England.
* * * * *
TO CHARLES W.F. DUMAS.
Paris, January 1st, 1783.
Dear Sir,
Returning this evening from Versailles, where I had been to make the
compliments of the season, I found your favors of the 26th and 27th of
December. The letters enclosed shall be forwarded, as you desire.
The Dutch Ministers here have no occasion for my assistance. _Non tali
auxilio._ I have the honor to be more particularly acquainted with M.
Brantzen, who is certainly a very able man, and universally
acknowledged to be so by all who know him. The arguments, which I know
he has used with the British Minister, are such as can never be
answered, both upon the liberty of navigation, and the compensation
for damages. He is an entire master of his subject, and has urged it
with a degree of perspicuity and eloquence, that I know has much
struck his antagonists.
Unnecessary, however, as any exertions of mine have been, I have not
omitted any opportunity of throwing in any friendly suggestions in my
power, where there was a possibility of doing any good to our good
friends, the Dutch. I have made such suggestions to Mr Fitzherbert.
But with Mr Oswald, I have had several very serious conversations upon
the subject. So I have also with Mr Vaughan and Mr Whiteford.
To Mr Oswald I urged the necessity of Great Britain's agreeing with
the Dutch upon the unlimited freedom of navigation, from a variety of
topics, some of which I may explain to you more particularly
hereafter. Thus much I may say at present, that I told him, that it
was impossible for Great Britain to avoid it; it would probably be
insisted upon by all the other powers. France and Spain, as well as
Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, the Emperor, and Portugal, as well
as Holland, had already signed the armed neutrality. The United States
of America had declared themselves ready to sign, and were ready. The
combination being thus powerful, Great Britain could not resist it.
But if she should refuse to agree to it with Holland, and the other
powers should acquiesce, and Holland should make peace without it
(which would never, however, be the case,) yet all would be
ineffectual, for Holland would forever be able to make use of other
neutral bottoms, and would thus enjoy the benefit of this liberty and
reality, though denied it by treaty, and in appearance. It would,
therefore, be more for the honor and interest of Great Britain to
agree to it with a good grace, in the treaty with Holland. Nay, the
wisest part she could act would be to set on foot a negotiation
immediately for signing herself the Treaty of Armed Neutrality, and
then admitting it into the treaty with Holland would be a thing of
course. At one of these conversations Dr Franklin was present, who
supported me with all his weight; at another, Mr Jay seconded me with
all his abilities and ingenuity. Mr Oswald has several times assured
me, that he had written these arguments and his own opinion, in
conformity with them, to the King's Ministers in London, and I doubt
not they will be adopted.
With respect to the compensation for damages, it is impossible to add
anything to the arrangements M. Brantzen has urged to show the justice
of it, and if Britain is really wise, she will think it her policy to
do everything in her power to soften the resentment of the Dutch, and
regain their good will and good humor.
The rage of Great Britain, however, has carried her to such
extravagant lengths, in a cause unjust from beginning to end, that she
is scarcely able to repair the injuries she has done. America has a
just claim to compensation for all her burnt towns and plundered
property, and indeed for all her slaughtered sons, if that were
possible. I shall continue to embrace every opportunity that presents,
of doing all the little service in my power to our good friends the
Dutch, whose friendship for us I shall not soon forget. This must be
communicated with great discretion, if at all.
My best respects to all.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, January 22d, 1783.
Sir,
Upon a sudden notification from the Count de Vergennes, Dr Franklin
and myself, in the absence of Mr Jay and Mr Laurens, went to
Versailles, and arrived at the Count's office at ten o'clock on
Monday, the 20th of this month. At eleven, arrived the Count d'Aranda
and Mr Fitzherbert. The Ministers of the three Crowns, signed and
sealed the preliminaries of peace and an armistice, in presence of
Doctor Franklin and myself, who also signed and sealed a declaration
of an armistice between the Crown of Great Britain and the United
States of America, and received a counter declaration from Mr
Fitzherbert. Copies of these declarations are enclosed.[3]
The King of Great Britain has made a declaration concerning the terms,
that he will allow to the Dutch; but they are not such as will give
satisfaction to that unfortunate nation, for whom, on account of their
friendship for us, and the important benefits we have received from
it, I feel very sensibly and sincerely. Yesterday we went to
Versailles again to make our court to the King and royal family upon
the occasion, and received the compliments of the Foreign Ministers.
The Count d'Aranda invited me to dine with him on Sunday next, and
said he hoped that the affairs of Spain and the United States would be
soon adjusted _a l'aimable_. I answered, that I wished it with all my
heart. The two Floridas and Minorca are more than a _quantum meruit_
for what this Power has done, and the Dutch unfortunately are to
suffer for it. It is not in my power to say when the definitive treaty
will be signed. I hope not before the Dutch are ready, in six weeks or
two months at farthest I suppose.
It is no longer necessary for Congress to appoint another person in my
place in the commission for peace, because it will be executed before
this reaches America. But I beg leave to renew the resignation of the
credence to the States-General, and the commission for borrowing money
in Holland, and to request, that no time may be lost in transmitting
the acceptance of this resignation, and another person to take that
station, that I may be able to go home in the spring ships.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[3] Contained in the Correspondence of the Ministers for negotiating
peace.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, January 23d, 1783.
Sir,
The letters you did me the honor to write on the 6th, and 18th of
November, came safe to hand.
You do me honor, Sir, in applauding the judgment I have formed from
time to time of the Court of Britain, and future ages will give me
credit for the judgment I have formed of some other Courts. The true
designs of a Minister of State are not difficult to be penetrated by
an honest man of common sense, who is in a situation to know anything
of the secret of affairs, and to observe constantly the chain of
public events; for whatever ostensible appearances may be put on,
whatever obliquities may be imagined, however the web may be woven, or
the thread doubled and twisted, enough will be seen to unravel the
whole.
My opinions, as you observe, sometimes run counter to those generally
received; but the reason of this has generally been, that I have had
earlier evidence than the generality, and I have had the satisfaction
to find, that others have formed the same judgment, when they have
had the same intelligence. I do not affect singularity, nor love to be
in a minority, though truth and justice have sometimes obliged me to
be so. You say, that nothing can be more conformable to your wishes
than the instructions I transmitted. I am not surprised at this; it is
very natural. Had I never been on this side of the Atlantic, I believe
I should have been of your mind in this particular. At present I
cannot be, and I believe, by this time, the Dutch regret having given
them. You will hear enough of the reason of it. I have lived long
enough, and had experience enough of the conduct of governments, and
people, nations, and courts, to be convinced, that gratitude,
friendship, unsuspecting confidence, and all the most amiable passions
in human nature, are the most dangerous guides in politics. I assure
you, Sir, if we had not been more cautious than the Dutch, we should
have been worse off than they, and our country would have suffered
much more.
Mr Laurens has been here, and has behaved with great caution,
firmness, and wisdom. He arrived so late, as only to attend the two
last days of the conferences, the 29th and 30th of November. But the
short time he was with us, he was of great service to the cause. He
has done great service to America in England, where his conversation
has been such as the purest and firmest American could wish it, and
has made many converts. He is gone again to Bath, and his journey will
do as much good to his country as to his health. He will return to the
signature of the definitive treaty.
The ratifications of my contracts have been received.
The release of Captain Asgill was so exquisite a relief to my
feelings, that I have not much cared what interposition it was owing
to. It would have been a horrid damp to the joys of peace, if we had
received a disagreeable account of him.
The difference between Denmark and Holland is of no serious nature.
The clue to the whole is, the Queen Dowager is sister to the Duke of
Brunswick; but there is nothing to fear from Denmark. As to the
northern powers, we have nothing to fear from any of them. All of
them, and all the neutral powers, would have acknowledged our
independence before now, by receiving Mr Dana to sign the principles
of the armed neutrality, if he had not been restrained from acting.
The unlimited confidence of Congress has been grossly abused, and we
should have been irreparably injured, if we had not been upon our
guard. As our liberties and most important interests are now secured,
as far as they can be, against Great Britain, it would be my wish to
say as little as possible of the policy of any Minister of our first
ally, which has not been as we could desire, and to retain forever a
grateful remembrance of the friendly assistance we have received. But
we have evidence enough to warn us against unlimited confidence in any
European Minister of State.
I have never drawn upon Dr Franklin for any money, since the end of my
two and a half years' salary; and he tells me he has made no use of
the bills. I had received money for my subsistence of Messieurs
Willinks, and as it will be but a few months more, at farthest, that I
shall have to subsist in Europe, I beg leave to proceed to the end in
the same way. I shall receive only the amount of my salary, and settle
the account with Congress on my return.
I hope to be safely landed on my native shore in the month of June;
and to this end, I beg that an appointment may be made to the Dutch
mission, and the acceptance of my resignation be transmitted to me by
the first ships.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO C. W. F. DUMAS.
Paris, January 29th, 1783.
Sir,
Upon receiving the letter, which you did me the honor to write me on
the 24th, late last evening, I went immediately to consult with my
colleague, Mr Jay, and we agreed to go this morning to Dr Franklin.
Accordingly today we went together to Passy, and communicated your
letter to him, and after recollecting the powers we have received, we
all agreed that I should make you the following answer.
You will readily recollect the resolutions of Congress, which I did
myself the honor two years ago to communicate to the President of
their High Mightinesses, and to the Ministers of Russia, Sweden, and
Denmark, at the Hague. The letter to the President was sent "_au
greffe_," and there may, perhaps, be now found. These resolutions
contained the approbation of Congress, of the principles of the
declaration of the Empress of Russia, and authorised any of the
American Ministers in Europe, if invited thereto, to pledge the faith
of the United States to the observance of them.
Sometime after this, Congress sent Mr Dana a commission with full
power to accede to the principles of the Marine Treaty between the
neutral powers, and he is now at Petersburg, vested with these powers,
and, according to late intelligence received from him, has well
founded expectations of being soon admitted.
It is the opinion of my colleagues, as well as my own, that no
commission of mine to their High Mightinesses contains authority to
negotiate this business, and we are all of opinion, that it is most
proper that Mr Dana should negotiate it.
But as there has been no express revocation of the power given to all
or any of us, by the first resolutions, and if the case should happen,
that Mr Dana could not attend in season, on account of the distance,
for the sake of accelerating the signature of the definitive treaty of
peace, we should not hesitate to pledge the faith of the United States
to the observance of the principles of the armed neutrality. I wish it
were in my power to give you a more satisfactory answer, but candor
will warrant no other.
With great respect to the gentlemen, as well as to you,
I have the honor to be, Sir, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, February 5th, 1783.
Sir,
The resolution of Congress of the 12th of July, 1781, "That the
commission and instructions, for negotiating a Treaty of Commerce
between these United States and Great Britain, given to the Honorable
John Adams, on the 29th day of September, 1779, be, and they are
hereby revoked," was duly received by me in Holland; but no
explanation of the motives to it, or the reasons on which it was
founded, was ever transmitted to me by Congress, or the Committee of
Foreign Affairs, or any individual member, nor has anybody in Europe,
or America, ever once attempted, that I know of, to guess at the
reason. Whether it was intended as a punishment to me, or with a
charitable design not to lead me into temptation; whether it was
intended as a punishment to the English for their insolence and
barbarity; whether it was intended to prevent or remove suspicions of
allies, or the envy and green eyed jealousy of copatriots, I know not.
Of one thing, however, I am fully satisfied, that Congress had
reasons, and meant well; but whether those reasons were founded on
true or mistaken information, I know not.
When I recollect the instructions, which were given and revoked with
that commission, I can guess, and only guess, at some considerations,
which might, or might not, operate with Congress. In these
instructions, Congress determined,
1st. That the common right of fishing should in no case be given up.
2dly. That it is essential to the welfare of all these United States,
that the inhabitants thereof, at the expiration of the war, should
continue to enjoy the free and undisturbed exercise of their common
right to fish on the Banks of Newfoundland, and the other fishing
banks and seas of North America, preserving inviolate the treaties
between France and the said States, &c. &c.
3dly. "That our faith be pledged to the several States, that without
their unanimous consent no Treaty of Commerce shall be entered into,
nor any trade or commerce whatever carried on with Great Britain,
without the explicit stipulation hereinafter mentioned. You are,
therefore, not to consent to any Treaty of Commerce with Great
Britain, without an explicit stipulation on her part, not to molest or
disturb the inhabitants of the United States of America, in taking
fish on the Banks of Newfoundland, and other fisheries in the American
seas, anywhere, excepting within the distance of three leagues of the
shores of the territories remaining to Great Britain at the close of
the war, if a nearer distance cannot be obtained by negotiation. And
in the negotiation you are to exert your most strenuous endeavors to
obtain a nearer distance in the Gulf of St Lawrence, and particularly
along the shores of Nova Scotia; as to which latter we are desirous,
that even the shores may be occasionally used for the purpose of
carrying on the fisheries by the inhabitants of these States."
These instructions are very decisive in favor of our indubitable right
to the fisheries; and it is possible, that Congress might be of
opinion, that commerce would be the strongest inducement to the
English to make peace, and at the same time, that there was something
so naval in the fisheries, that the dread of acknowledging our right
to them would be the strongest obstacle in the way of peace. They
might think, too, that peace was of more importance to the United
States, than a British acknowledgment of our right to the fisheries,
which, to be sure, would have been enjoyed by our people in a good
degree without it.
Reasonings like these might influence Congress to revoke the
commission and instructions in question. But whatever probability
there might appear in them at that time, experience has since shown,
that they were not well founded. On the contrary, arguments have been
found to convince the British Ministers themselves, that it was the
interest of their King and country, not only to acknowledge the
American right to the fisheries, but to encourage the unrestrained
exercise of it. These considerations, therefore, can be no longer of
any weight against a treaty of commerce with Great Britain, or against
accrediting a Minister to the Court of St James. Nor can I conceive of
any motive now existing against this measure. On the contrary, so many
advantages present themselves to view, that I think it my duty to
recommend them to Congress as proper to be adopted without loss of
time. If there are in Congress any of those gentlemen, with whom I had
the honor to serve in the years 1775 and 1776, they may possibly
remember, that in arguing in favor of sending Ministers to Versailles,
to propose a connexion with that Court, I laid it down as a first
principle, that we should calculate all our measures and foreign
negotiations in such a manner, as to avoid a too great dependence upon
any one power of Europe; to avoid all obligations and temptations to
take any part in future European wars. That the business of America
with Europe was commerce, not politics or war. And above all, that it
never could be our interest to ruin Great Britain, or injure or weaken
her any further than should be necessary to support our independence,
and our alliances; and that as soon as Great Britain should be brought
to a temper to acknowledge our sovereignty and our alliances, and
consent that we should maintain the one, and fulfil the others, it
would be our interest and duty to be her friends, as well as the
friends of all the other powers of Europe, and enemies to none.
We are now happily arrived, through many tremendous tempests, at that
period. Great Britain respects us as sovereign States, and respects
all our political engagements with foreign nations, and as long as she
continues in this temper of wisdom, it is our duty to respect her. We
have accordingly made a treaty with her and mutually sworn to be
friends. Through the whole period of our warfare and negotiations, I
confess I have never lost sight of the principles and the system, with
which I set out, which appeared to me to be the sentiments of Congress
with great unanimity, and I have no reason to believe that any change
of opinion has taken place; if there has not, every one will agree
with me, that no measure we can pursue will have such a tendency to
preserve the government and people of England in the right system for
their own and our interest, and the interest of our allies too, well
understood, as sending a Minister to reside at the Court of London.
In the next place, the Court of London is the best station to collect
intelligence from every part, and by means of the freedom of the press
to communicate information for the benefit of our country, to every
part of the world. In time of peace, there is so frequent travelling
between Paris, London, and the Hague, that the correspondence of our
Ministers at those Courts may be carried on by private hands, without
hazarding anything from the infidelity of the posts, and Congress may
reasonably expect advantages from this circumstance.
In the third place, a treaty of commerce with Great Britain is an
affair of great importance to both countries. Upon this occasion I
hope I shall be excused if I venture to advise, that Congress should
instruct their Minister not to conclude such a treaty, without sending
the project to them for their observations and fresh instructions, and
I think it would not be improper, on this occasion, to imitate the
Dutch method, and take the project, _ad referendum_, and transmit it
to the Legislatures of all the States for their remarks, before
Congress finally resolve. Their Minister may be authorised and
instructed, in the mean time, to enter into a temporary convention for
regulating the present trade, for a limited number of months or years,
or until the treaty of commerce shall be completed.
In the fourth place, it is our part to be the first to send a Minister
to Great Britain, which is the older, and as yet the superior State.
It becomes us to send a Minister first, and I doubt not the King of
Great Britain will very soon return the compliment. Whereas if we do
not begin, I believe there will be many delicacies at St James',
about being the first to send. I confess I wish a British Minister at
Philadelphia, and think we should derive many benefits from his
residence there. While we have any foreign Ministers among us, I wish
to have them from all the great powers with whom we are much
connected. The _Corps Diplomatique_ at every Court is, or ought to be,
a system representing at least that part of the system of Europe, with
which that Court is most conversant.
In the same manner, or at least from similar reasons, as long as we
have any one Minister abroad at any European Court, I think we ought
to have one at every one to which we are most essentially related,
whether in commerce or policy, and therefore while we have any
Minister at Versailles, the Hague, or London, I think it clear we
ought to have one at each, though I confess I have sometimes thought,
that after a very few years, it will be the best thing we can do to
recall every Minister from Europe, and send embassies only on special
occasions.
If, however, any members of Congress should have any delicacies, lest
an American Minister should not be received with a dignity becoming
his rank and character at London, they may send a commission to make
a treaty of commerce with Great Britain, to their Minister at Madrid,
or Versailles, or the Hague, or St Petersburg, and instruct him to
carry on the negotiation from the Court where he may be, until he
shall be invited to London, or a letter of credence may be sent to one
of these, with instructions to go to London, as soon as the King shall
appoint a Minister to go to Philadelphia.
After all, however, my opinion is, that none of these manoeuvres are
necessary, but that the best way will be to send a Minister directly
to St James', with a letter of credence to the King, as a Minister
Plenipotentiary, and a commission to treat of a treaty of commerce,
but with instructions not to come to any irrevocable conclusion, until
Congress and all the States have an opportunity to consider of the
project, and suggest their amendments.
There is one more argument in favor of sending a Minister forthwith;
it is this, while this mission lies open, it will be a source of
jealousy among present Ministers, and such as are or may be candidates
to be foreign Ministers, a source of intrigue and faction among their
partisans and adherents, and a source of animosity and division among
the people of the States. For this reason, it is a pity, that the
first choice had not been such as Congress could have continued to
approve, and the first measure such as Congress could have constantly
persevered in. If this had been the case, the door of faction would
have been kept shut. As this, however, was once my department, by the
voice of eleven States, in twelve present, and as I will be answerable
at any hazard, it will never be the department of any one by a greater
majority, there seems to be a propriety in my giving my advice
concerning it, on taking leave of it, if such is the will of
Congress, as I have before done in this letter, according to the best
of my judgment. And if it should not be thought too presumptuous, I
would beg leave to add, what is my idea of the qualifications
necessary for an American foreign Minister in general, and
particularly and above all to the Court of St James'.
In the first place, he should have had an education in classical
learning, and in the knowledge of general history, ancient and modern,
and particularly the history of France, England, Holland, and America.
He should be well versed in the principles of ethics, of the law of
nature and nations, of legislation and government, of the civil Roman
law, of the laws of England, and the United States, of the public law
of Europe, and in the letters, memoirs, and histories of those great
men, who have heretofore shone in the diplomatic order, and conducted
the affairs of nations, and the world. He should be of an age to
possess a maturity of judgment, arising from experience in business.
He should be active, attentive, and industrious, and above all, he
should possess an upright heart, and an independent spirit, and should
be one, who decidedly makes the interest of his country, not the
policy of any other nation, nor his own private ambition or interest,
or those of his family, friends, and connexions, the rule of his
conduct.
We hear so much said about a genteel address, and a facility in
speaking the French language, that one would think a dancing master
and a French master the only tutors necessary to educate a statesman.
Be it remembered, the present revolution, neither in America nor
Europe, has been accomplished by elegant bows, nor by fluency in
French, nor will any great thing ever be effected by such
accomplishments alone. A man must have something in his head to say,
before he can speak to effect, how ready soever he may be at
utterance. And if the knowledge is in his head, and the virtue in his
heart, he will never fail to find a way of communicating his
sentiments to good purpose. He will always have excellent translators
ready, if he wants them, to turn his thoughts into any language he
desires.
As to what is called a fine address, it is seldom attended to after a
first or second conversation, and even in these, it is regarded no
more by men of sense of any country, than another thing, which I heard
disputed with great vivacity among the officers of the French frigate,
the Sensible. The question was, what were the several departments of
an Ambassador and a Secretary of Legation. After a long and shrewd
discussion, it was decided by a majority of votes, "that the
Secretary's part was to do the business, and that of an Ambassador to
keep a mistress." This decision produced a laugh among the company,
and no ideas of the kind will ever produce anything else, among men of
understanding.
It is very true, that it is possible, that a case may happen, that a
man may serve his country by a bribe well placed, or an intrigue of
pleasure with a woman. But it is equally true, that a man's country
will be sold and betrayed a thousand times by this infamous commerce,
where it will be once served. It is very certain, that we shall never
be a match for European statesmen in such accomplishments for
negotiation, any more than, I must and will add, they will equal us in
any solid abilities, virtues, and application to business, if we
choose wisely among the excellent characters, with which our country
abounds.
Among the Ministers, who have already crossed the Atlantic to Europe,
there have been none exceeding Mr Jay and Mr Dana, in all the
qualifications I have presumed to enumerate, and I must say, that if I
had the honor to give my vote in Congress, for a Minister at the Court
of Great Britain, provided that injustice must be finally done to him,
who was the first object of his country's choice, such have been the
activity, intelligence, address, and fortitude of Mr Jay, as well as
his sufferings in his voyage, journeys, and past services, that I
should think of no other object of my choice than that gentleman. If
Congress should neglect all their old Ministers, and send a fresh one
from America, they cannot be at a loss, for there are in that country
great numbers of men well qualified for the service. These are most
certainly better known by name to Congress than to me, and, therefore,
I shall venture no further, but conclude, by wishing this arduous
business well settled, and by assurances to Congress, and to you, Sir,
of my warmest attachment and respect.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN ADAMS.
Philadelphia, February 13th, 1783.
Dear Sir,
On my return, the night before last, from a journey to the State of
New York, I found your favors of the 6th, the 7th, the 17th, the 19th,
and the 23d of September. They contain important and useful
information; and that particularly of the 6th is replete with matter,
which deserves an attention, that I lament not having it in my power
to give it at this moment, as the express, by which this goes to
Baltimore, is on the wing.
I congratulate you most sincerely upon having surmounted all the
obstacles, that opposed themselves to the completion of our important
connexion with the United States [of Holland]. It has, I think, given
the last blow to the pride of Britain. Its power, so far as it could
endanger us, was past recovery before, except as it derived force from
its pride, which, like the last struggles of a dying man, gave an
appearance of vigor to the body, which it was about to destroy.
This covers a ratification of the treaty. The first copy sent by Mr
Jefferson has not been signed by me, owing to my absence. That
gentleman has not yet sailed from Baltimore, having been delayed by a
number of the enemy's cruisers, which infest the Bay.
We this day received the speech of his Britannic Majesty. It breathes
so much the language of peace, that I begin to think it will be
unnecessary to give Mr Jefferson the trouble of going over at all. The
delays he has met with leave you longer without intelligence from
hence, than I would ever wish you to be, though no important event has
taken place, except the evacuation of Charleston. Our distress for
want of money has rather increased, than diminished. This object will
demand your attention, full as much if the war should be terminated,
as if it should continue. The army, and the other public creditors,
begin to grow very uneasy, and our present exhausted situation will
not admit of internal loans, or such taxes as will suffice to give
them relief.
I have sent you three different sets of cyphers, not thinking it
advisable to send duplicates. Be pleased to let me know whether any
and which have arrived safe.
I am, Sir, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, March 2d, 1783.
Sir,
I am very much of your opinion, that all places in general, in foreign
countries, under the United States, should be filled with Americans,
but am sometimes requested to transmit to Congress applications and
recommendations in so pressing a manner, and by persons of
distinction, that it would be scarcely civil to refuse.
Such an instance is the following, and if Congress should depart from
the general rule, I suppose, that no person at Leghorn has so good
pretensions.
The application to me is this,--"Messrs Touissaint, Doutremont & Co.,
merchants of great credit at Leghorn, who obtained, fortyfive years
ago, letters of nobility from the Court of France, pray the gentlemen,
the deputies of the United States of America, to grant them the place
of Consul, or of Agent of their commerce at Leghorn."
At least, if Congress, or their Ministers, have occasion for a
correspondent in that city, they will not be at a loss.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN ADAMS.
Philadelphia, April 14th, 1783.
Sir,
I received two days ago your favors of the 22d and 23d of January,
with the declarations for the cessation of hostilities, on which a
doubt of much importance to the people of this country is started, to
wit, to know at what period hostilities ceased on this coast, that is,
what is meant by "as far as the Canaries." If it means in the same
_latitude_, hostilities ceased here the 3d of March, and a great
number of vessels must be restored. If it does not mean a latitudinal
line, what does it mean, which carries any certainty with it? The
terms of the provisional treaty also occasion much debate. A variety
of questions have been started, but these I shall speak of in my
letter to you in conjunction with your colleagues, that you may, if
opportunity should offer before the Definitive Treaty is concluded,
find some means to rid them of their ambiguity.
It would give me pain to find, that the Dutch do not attain their
objects in the close of the war, and still more to impute their
misfortunes to any desertion of their interests by France, since I
confess freely to you, that her conduct, as far as I have observed it,
has appeared to me in the highest degree generous and disinterested.
The extreme langour of the Dutch, their divisions, and the less than
nothing that they have done for themselves, entitle them to little.
Without the uncommon exertions of France, they would not have had a
single settlement left, either in the East or West Indies. So that
they lay absolutely at her mercy, and, therefore, I was pleased to
find their instructions to their Ministers so expressed as to leave no
room to fear, that they would obstruct the peace, when they
contributed so little to the prosecution of the war. But I rather
pitied, than blamed their weakness; they were torn by factions, and
clogged by an executive, which strove to find reasons for having no
execution.
Congress, the day before yesterday, agreed to ratify the Provisional
Articles as such, and to release their prisoners, in which the British
took the lead. The tories have little reliance upon the effect of the
recommendations of Congress; great numbers of them have sailed, and
are daily sailing for Nova Scotia.
With respect to your salary, I must pray you to settle with Dr
Franklin the amount of bills drawn in your favor. You will, with those
that go by this conveyance, receive the amount of three quarters'
salary, at two thousand seven hundred and seventyseven dollars and
sixtyeight ninetieths per quarter, which were laid out in bills at six
shillings three pence, this money, for five livres, which was a very
advantageous exchange for you. This, however, Congress have directed,
by the enclosed resolution, to be altered, and your salaries to be
paid in bills at the rate of five livres, five sous per dollar. As
this resolution retrospects you will have, with the bills transmitted
to you, livres more than is due for three quarters' salary. This will
be deducted from the last quarter, for which I will get a warrant, and
leave it with the Treasury here for you or your order. By settling
this matter with Dr Franklin, and redrawing upon your banker in
Holland, you will leave my accounts unembarrassed, which is of
consequence to me, as I have determined to quit the place I now hold,
in the course of a few weeks, and enjoy in retirement the pleasures of
peace. I have charged no commissions on these money transactions, nor
do I propose to charge any.
Your account of contingent expenses is before a committee. Should
Congress agree to accept your resignation, (which I am sorry to see
you offer, since the connexions you have formed, and the experience
you have acquired, might render you particularly serviceable in
Holland) it will be best that you settle it with them yourself on your
arrival. The want of permanent funds, and the opposition which some
States have given to every attempt to establish them, the demands of
the public creditors, and particularly of the army, have excited much
uneasiness here. Satisfactory measures will, I hope, be adopted to
calm it, and do ample justice. The army, whose proceedings I transmit,
have done themselves honor by their conduct on this occasion. Too much
praise could not be given to the commander-in-chief, for the share he
had in the transaction, if he was not above all praise.
I have the honor to be, &c.
ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, April 14th, 1783.
Sir,
You may easily imagine our anxiety to hear from America, when you know
that we have no news to this hour, either of your reception of the
news of peace, or that of the treaty with Holland, four copies of
which I put on board different vessels at Amsterdam, in October.
We have been in equal uncertainty about the turn, which affairs might
take in England. But by letters from Mr Laurens we expect him every
day, and Mr David Hartley with him, in order to complete the
definitive treaty. It would have been more agreeable to have finished
with Mr Oswald. But the present Ministry are so dissatisfied with what
is past, as they say, though nobody believes them, that they choose to
change hands.
It will be proposed, I believe, to make a temporary arrangement of
commercial matters, as our powers are not competent to a durable one,
if to any. Congress will, no doubt, soon send a Minister with full
powers, as the treaty of commerce with Great Britain is of great
importance, and our affairs in that country require an overseer.
It is confidently asserted, in letters from Holland, that M. Markow,
the Minister Plenipotentiary from the Empress of Russia, has received
from his mistress a full power to come to Paris, to the assistance of
the Prince Bariatinski at a Congress for a general pacification. There
is, as yet, no answer received from the Emperor. If the two Imperial
Courts accept of the mediation, there will be a Congress; but I
suppose it will relate chiefly to the affairs of Holland, which are
not yet arranged, and to the liberty of neutral navigation, which is
their principal point. I wish success to that Republic in this
negotiation, which will help to compose their interior disorders,
which are alarming.
I know not whether it will be insisted or expected, that we should
join in the Congress, nor do I know what we have to do in it, unless
it be to settle that point as far as it relates to us. There is
nothing in difference between us and Great Britain, which we cannot
adjust ourselves, without any mediation.
A spring passage to America is so great an object, that I should be
very sorry to have the negotiations spun out to such a length as to
oblige me to lose it, and I take it for granted, I shall now receive
the acceptance of my resignation by the first ships.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT MORRIS.
Paris, May 21st, 1783.
Sir,
I am just now honored with yours of the 19th of January, by the way of
London. We have not yet had the happiness to receive, as we should be
disposed to do with open arms, our excellent old friend Jefferson, and
begin to fear that the news of peace has determined him not to come.
I thank you, Sir, for your polite congratulations; when the tide
turned, it flowed with rapidity, and carried the vessel, as I hope,
into a safe harbor.
As to the loan in Holland, I have never troubled you, nor any one else
in America, with details of the vexations of various kinds, which I
met with in the negotiation of it; indeed, I never thought it prudent
or safe to do it. If I had told the whole truth, it could have done no
good, and it might have done infinite mischief. In general, it is now
sufficient to say, that private interest, party spirit, factions,
cabals, and slanderers, have obstructed, perplexed, and tortured our
loan in Holland, as well as all our other affairs, foreign and
domestic. But as there has been a greater variety of clashing
interests, English, French, Stadtholderian, Republican, and American,
mixing in the affair of our loan in Holland, it has been more puzzled
than anything else. If, in the bitterness of my soul, I had described
the fermentation, and mentioned names, and drawn characters, I might
have transmitted a curious tale, but it would have only served to
inflame old animosities, and excite new ones.
A great many things are said to me, on purpose that they may be
represented to you or to Congress. Some of these I believe to be
false, most of them I suspect, and some of them that are true would do
no good. I think it necessary, therefore, to employ a little
discretion in such cases.
Messrs Willinks & Co. will write you from time to time, as they tell
me they have done, the state of the loan. Mr Grand wants all the
money, but they wait your orders. The loan has been and will be damped
by transmitting the money to France, but your necessities were so
urgent, that you could not avoid it.
In my opinion, if you had a Minister at St James's, and he were
authorised to borrow money generally, in England or elsewhere, it
would serve you greatly, by causing an emulation even in Holland,
besides the money you would procure in London, which would not be a
trifling sum.
I wish I were in Congress, that I might assist you in persuading our
countrymen to pay taxes and build ships.
With great esteem and respect, I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, May 24th, 1783.
Sir,
I have the honor to enclose copies, to be laid before Congress, of
several papers. 1st. Mr Hartley's full powers of May 14th. 2dly. The
order of the King of Great Britain in Council, for regulating the
American trade, of May 14th. 3dly. Articles proposed by the American
Ministers to Mr Hartley, April 29th. 4thly. Mr Hartley's observations
left with us May 21st. And 5thly. Mr Hartley's proposition of the same
day.[4]
This proposition, however, upon inquiry, we find Mr Hartley does not
incline to subscribe to, before he sends it to his Court for their
orders. So that we have not yet given him our opinion of it. He has
sent a courier to London, before whose return we hope to have further
intelligence from Philadelphia.
The present British Ministry discover an indecision and timidity,
which indicate instability. Some persons from England imagine, that my
Lord Shelburne will come in again. The change would produce a longer
delay; but I think would be no disadvantage to America. If he had
continued in power, I think we should have finished, or been ready to
finish, before now with Mr Oswald. Mr Hartley's dispositions, however,
are very good, and if left to his own judgment, would be liberal and
fair.
The idea of reviving the trade, upon the plan of the laws of Great
Britain before the war, although those laws were calculated so much
for the advantage of that country and so little for the advantage of
ours, might be admissible for a few months, until Ministers could be
appointed on both sides to frame a treaty of commerce; provided no
advantage should be ceded by it, in the negotiation of such treaty,
and provided, that such a temporary convention for trade should
neither delay nor influence the definitive treaty. It is much to be
wished, that the definitive treaty of peace, and a permanent treaty of
commerce, could be signed at the same time. This, however, seems now
to be impossible; and, therefore, some temporary regulation of
commerce seems unavoidable. But we are as yet too uncertain of the
sentiments of the Court of St James, to be able to foresee, whether we
shall be able to agree with them. Mr Hartley has been here four weeks,
and nothing has been done, although he was very sanguine before he
left London, that he should send home a convention in less than half
of four days.
Congress will see by Mr Hartley's commission, that they are become the
"good friends" of the King of Great Britain. Mr Hartley on his first
arrival here communicated to us in form, an invitation from the
Ministers, with the knowledge and consent of the King, to all the
American Ministers to go to London, with the assurance, that we should
be there presented at Court, and treated in all respects like the
Ministers of any other sovereign State. He also communicated the
desire of his Court, that the two Powers should interchange Ministers
as soon as possible. I hope that the first ship will bring a Minister
for that Court, or a commission to some one to go there, because I
think it would have been useful to us to have had one there three
months ago, and that it would not be less useful now. The permanent
treaty of commerce, nevertheless, should not he hastily concluded, nor
before Congress shall have had an opportunity to judge of the project,
suggest their amendments, and transmit their orders.
No preliminaries are yet signed with the Dutch, and I am very anxious
for their lot.
With great respect, I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[4] These papers will be found in the Correspondence of the
Commissioners for making peace.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, May 30th, 1783.
Sir,
On the 28th of this month, the letter which you did me the honor to
write me on the 13th of February, which arrived at the Hague, I
received, enclosed with the ratification of the treaty with their High
Mightinesses, which will be exchanged by M. Dumas, as the conferences
here for the definitive treaty will not admit of my taking so long a
journey at this time.[5]
This arrival in season to exchange the ratifications before the
departure of M. Van Berckel, which is to be in about three weeks, is
fortunate. I hope that the first ships from America will bring my
letter of recall from that Republic, and another Minister, or credence
to some one now in Europe, to take my place.
I am happy to find that any letters of mine in September last
contained information that you think of consequence, although, not
having my letter book here, I am not able to recollect the subject.
The final completion of the negotiation with Holland gives me a
pleasure, which will not be equalled, but by that of the definitive
treaty of peace, which languishes at present for want of decisive
instructions from Mr Hartley, in such a manner, as gives cause to
suspect that the present Ministry are not firm in their seats.
The presence of a Minister in Holland would encourage your loan of
money there, but it would be quickened still more, by your sending a
Minister to London, with powers to borrow money there. Emulation is
the best spring; or call it rivalry, or jealousy, if you will, it will
get you money if you put it in motion.
I have received two cyphers from you, Sir, one beginning with No. 1,
and ending with No. 1011. The other beginning with Amsterdam, and
ending with Provinces.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[5] The particulars of the ratification will be seen in M. Dumas's
Correspondence.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, June 9th, 1783.
Sir,
The enclosed, No. 121 of the _Politique Hollandais_ having translated
a few sentences of mine, and the author intending to insert more, as
he has already inserted a good deal of the same correspondence, I
think it proper to transmit you a short relation of it.
In 1780, at Paris, a number of pamphlets of Mr Galloway's were sent me
from England. I wrote to a friend an answer to them. He sent it to
London to be published. But whether the printers were afraid, or from
what other motive, I know not. I heard nothing of them until the
spring and summer of 1782, when some of them appeared in print, in
Parker's General Advertiser, under the title of "_Letters from a
distinguished American_," &c. but with false dates.
There are in those letters so many of the characteristic features of
the Provisional Treaty, of the 30th of November, 1782, that the
publication of them in England, at the time when they appeared, may be
supposed to have contributed, more or less, to propagate such
sentiments as the more private circulation of them before had
suggested to a few. And as they were written by one of your Ministers
at the conferences for peace, who repeated and extended the same
arguments to the British Ministers in the course of the negotiation,
it is proper that you should be informed of them. Whether I have in
any former letter mentioned this subject, or not, I do not recollect.
If I have, I pray you to excuse the repetition.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, June 16th, 1783.
Sir,
Yesterday afternoon, the duplicate of your letter of the 14th of
April, No. 16, was brought in to me, with the post-mark "Brest" upon
it. As soon as I had read it, I went out to Passy, in hopes that other
despatches had arrived there, but I found none. While I was there, a
packet of newspapers addressed to us all was brought in, with the
post-mark of Brest on it. I still hope and believe, that other
despatches, by the same conveyance, will appear in a few days, but
whether they are still in the post office, or whether the Duc de
Lauzun intends to bring them in person, is uncertain.
I think, Sir, there is no room to doubt the justice of your opinion,
that the latitude of the Canaries is meant, and, consequently, that
hostilities ceased on the whole coast of the United States on the 3d
of March.
I am well aware, that a variety of questions may be started upon the
provisional articles. The great points of sovereignty, limits, and
fisheries, are sufficiently clear. But there are too many other things
in much obscurity. No one of us alone would ever have put his hand to
such a writing. Yet there is no one to blame. It must be confessed,
that it was done in haste, but that haste was inevitable. The peace
depended absolutely upon the critical moment, when that treaty was
signed. The meeting of Parliament was so near, and the state of the
Ministry so critical, that if that opportunity had been lost, there
would have been at least another campaign. There were never less than
three of us, and there were finally no less than three to be consulted
on the other side. These inaccuracies are much to be lamented, but
they were quite unavoidable. We shall endeavor to explain them in the
definitive treaty, but I fear without success.
I hope, Sir, you will excuse me, if I think your expressions fall
short of the real merit of the Dutch. If they had accepted the Russian
mediation for a separate peace, we should have seen a very formidable
difference. The vast weight of the Dutch in the East Indies, being
added to that of France, has influenced the minds of the natives in
such a manner, as to turn the scale against England. The Cape of Good
Hope was indispensable to France, and we are not yet informed what
proportion of the expense of French operations in the East Indies is
to be borne by the Dutch East India Company, at whose solicitations,
by their agents, sent early to Versailles, they were undertaken. From
twelve to fifteen British ships of the line, in the best condition,
with the best officers and men, have been kept almost constantly in
the North seas to watch the Dutch, a momentous diversion, which made
the balance more clear in favor of the allies in the East and West
Indies, as well as in the Channel; and it may be added, and that with
strict truth, the battle of Doggerbank imprinted more terror on the
imaginations of the British navy and nation, than all the other sea
engagements of the war.
Your observations of their unfortunate situation are, however, very
just, and their exertions have not been such as they might and ought
to have been. But this was the fault of the enemies of France in
Holland, not of their friends, and, unhappily, those enemies are to be
gratified by the terms of peace prescribed to that power, and those
friends mortified. And this misfortune probably arises from the
instructions in question, by which they made themselves of no
importance, instead of acting the part of a sovereign, independent,
and respectable power. If they had held their own negotiations in
their own hands, they would probably have obtained better terms. I
could mention many facts and anecdotes of much importance; but these
have been communicated to me in confidence, and as this is a
discussion that concerns us only indirectly, and as our instructions
were parallel to theirs, although the execution of them was different,
and the event different, I shall waive any further observations upon
the subject.
We are happy to learn, that Congress have ratified the treaty,
imperfect as it is, and that each side has released its prisoners. Mr
Hartley communicated to us officially, two days ago, that orders were
gone to New York to evacuate the United States.
Dr Franklin has never made any use of the bills for my salary, and I
have never received any part of them. I shall easily settle that
matter when I get home, which your letter encourages me to hope will
be very soon. The connexions I have formed in Holland may be of use to
the public, wherever I may be, in America, or elsewhere, as well as
even in that country itself. Those connexions will readily become
those of any Minister Congress may send there. It cost me all my
happiness, and had very nearly cost me my life, to form them; it cost
me more; it has left me in an ill state of health, which I never shall
fully repair. I shall carry Holland in my veins to my grave. It will
cost no man anything to go there now. His mind will be at ease, and he
will have spirits necessary to take care to preserve his health. To me
it has become physically necessary, as well as a moral and religious
duty, to join my family. This can be done only by going to them, or
bringing them to me; and to bring them to Holland is what I cannot
think of, both because, that on account of my own health, as well as
theirs, and on other considerations, I should not choose to live among
those putrid lakes, and because I think I can do my country more and
better service at home than there.
I will not disguise another motive, which would be altogether
insurmountable, if it were alone. I do not think it consistent with
the honor of the United States, any more than with my own, for me to
stay in Holland, after the appointment of any other Minister
whatsoever to the mission upon which I came to Europe, and which has
been taken from me without assigning any reason. Congress are the
sovereign judges for themselves and the public of the persons proper
for all services, excepting that every citizen is a sovereign judge
for himself. I have never adopted the principle, that it is a
citizen's duty to accept of any trust, that is pointed out to him,
unless he approves of it. On the contrary, I think it a right and a
duty, that no law of society can take away, for every man to judge
for himself, whether he can serve consistently with his own honor, and
the honor and interest of the public.
When the existence of our country and her essential interests were at
stake, it was a duty to run all risks, to stifle every feeling, to
sacrifice every interest, and this duty I have discharged with
patience and perseverance, and with a success, that can be attributed
only to Providence. But in time of peace, the public in less danger
abroad than at home, knowing I can do more good at home, I should do a
very wrong thing to remove my family to stay in Holland, merely for
the sake of holding an honorable commission, making and receiving
bows, and compliments, and eating splendid suppers at Court.
There is one piece of advice I beg leave to offer to the Minister who
may go to Holland, respecting a future loan of money. It is, to
inquire whether the house of Hope would undertake a loan for us,
either in conjunction with the houses who have the present one, or
with any of them, or alone. In my private opinion, which ought to be
kept as secret as possible, we might obtain a large loan in that way,
and that we cannot in any other. The people in that interest have the
money. I am not personally known to that House, nor any one of them to
me, but I know they are all powerful in money matters, and I believe
they would engage.
The happy turn given to the discontents of the army, by the General,
is consistent with his character, which, as you observe, is above all
praise, as every character is whose rule and object are duty, not
interest, nor glory, which I think has been strictly true with the
General from the beginning, and I trust will continue to the end. May
he long live, and enjoy his reflections, and the confidence and
affections of a free, grateful, and virtuous people.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, June 23d, 1783.
Sir,
Your favor of the 14th of April, No. 16, acknowledged the receipt of
mine of the 21st and the 22d of January, but took no notice of any
letters, which went by Captain Barney. Neither Dr Franklin, Mr Jay,
nor myself have any answer to the despatches, which went by this
express; although yours to me, No. 16, gave cause to expect letters to
us all, with instructions concerning the Definitive Treaty. This
profound silence of Congress, and the total darkness in which we are
left, concerning their sentiments, is very distressing to us, and very
dangerous and injurious to the public.
I see no prospect of agreeing upon any regulation of commerce here.
The present Ministry are afraid of every knot of merchants. A clamor
of an interested party, more than an evil to their country, is their
dread. A few West India merchants, in opposition to the sense and
interest of the West India planters, are endeavoring to excite an
opposition to our carrying the produce of the West India Islands from
those islands to Europe, even to Great Britain. There are also secret
schemes to exclude us, if they can, from the trade of Ireland, to
possess themselves of the carrying trade of the United States, by
prohibiting any American vessel to bring to Great Britain any
commodity but those of the State to which it belongs. Thus, a
Philadelphia vessel can carry no tobacco, rice, or indigo, nor a
Carolina vessel wheat or flour, nor a Boston vessel either, unless
grown in its own State. In this way, a superficial party think they
can possess themselves of the carriage of almost all the productions
of the United States, annihilate our navigation and nurseries of
seamen, and keep all to themselves more effectually than ever. They
talk too of discouraging the people of the United States, and
encouraging those of Canada and Nova Scotia, in such a manner as to
increase the population of those two Provinces, even by migrations
from the United States. These are dreams, to be sure; but the dreamers
are so many, as to intimidate the present Ministry, who dare venture
upon nothing that will make a clamor. I have lately heard, that the
merchants in America are waiting to hear the regulations of trade made
here. They will wait, I know not how long. There is no present
prospect of our agreeing at all upon any regulations of trade.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, June 23d, 1783.
Sir,
The British nation and Ministry are in a very unsettled state; they
find themselves in a new situation, and have not digested any plan.
Ireland is in a new situation; she is independent of Parliament, and
the English know not how to manage her. To what an extent she will
claim a right of trading with the United States, is unknown. Canada
too, and Nova Scotia, are in a new situation; the former, they say,
must have a new government. But what form to give them, and, indeed,
what kind of government they are capable of, or would be agreeable to
them, is uncertain. Nothing is digested.
There is a party, composed probably of refugees, friends of the old
hostile system, and fomented by emissaries of several foreign nations,
who do not wish a cordial reconciliation and sincere friendship
between Great Britain and the United States, who clamor for the
conservation of the navigation act, and the carrying trade. If these
should succeed so far as to excite Parliament or the Ministry to adopt
a contracted principle, to exclude us from the West India trade, and
from trading with Canada and Nova Scotia, and from carrying freely, in
vessels belonging to any one of the Thirteen States, the production of
any other to Great Britain, the consequences may be to perplex us for
a time, may bind us closer to France, Spain, Holland, Germany, Italy,
and the northern nations, and thus be fatal to Great Britain, without
being finally very hurtful to us.
The nations of Europe, who have islands in the West Indies, have, at
this moment, a delicate part to take. Upon their present decisions,
great things will depend. The commerce of the West India Islands, is a
part of the American system of commerce. They can neither do without
us, nor we without them. The Creator has placed us upon the globe in
such a situation, that we have occasion for each other. We have the
means of assisting each other, and politicians and artful contrivances
cannot separate us. Wise statesmen, like able artists of every kind,
study nature, and their works are perfect in proportion as they
conform to her laws. Obstinate attempts to prevent the islands and the
continent, by force or policy, from deriving from each other those
blessings, which nature has enabled them to afford, will only put
both to thinking of means of coming together. And an injudicious
regulation at this time may lay a foundation for intimate
combinations, between the islands and the continent, which otherwise
would not be wished for, or thought of by either.
If the French, Dutch, and Danes, have common sense, they will profit
of any blunder Great Britain may commit upon this occasion. The ideas
of the British cabinet and merchants, at present, are so confused upon
all these subjects, that we can get them to agree to nothing. I still
think, that the best policy of the United States is, to send a
Minister to London to negotiate a treaty of commerce, instructed to
conclude nothing, not the smallest article, until he has sent it to
Congress, and received their approbation. In the meantime, Congress
may admit any British or Irish ships, that have arrived, or may
arrive, to trade as they please.
For my own part, I confess I would not advise Congress to bind
themselves to anything, that is not reasonable and just. If we should
agree to revive the trade upon the old footing, it is the utmost that
can, with a color of justice or modesty, be requested of us. This is
not equal, but might be borne. Rather than go further, and deny
ourselves the freight from the West Indies to Europe, at least, to
Great Britain, especially rather than give away our own carrying
trade, by agreeing that the ships of one State should not carry to
Great Britain the produce of another, I would be for entering into
still closer connexions with France, Spain, and Holland, and purchase
of them, at the expense of Great Britain, what she has not wisdom
enough to allow us for her own good.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, June 24th, 1783.
Sir,
The gazettes of Europe still continue to be employed, as the great
engines of fraud and imposture to the good people of America.
Stockjobbers are not the only people, who employ a set of scribblers
to invent and publish falsehoods for their own peculiar purposes.
British and French, as well as other politicians, entertain these
fabricators of paragraphs, who are stationed about in the various
cities of Europe, and take up each other's productions in such a
manner, that no sooner does a paragraph appear in a French, Dutch, or
English paper, but it is immediately seized on, and reprinted in all
the others; this is not all; in looking over the American newspapers,
I observe, that nothing is seized on with so much avidity by the
American _nouvellists_, for republication in their gazettes, as these
political lies. I cannot attribute this merely to the credulity of the
printers, who have generally more discernment than to be deceived. But
I verily believe, there are persons in every State employed to select
out these things, and get them reprinted.
Sometimes the invention is so simple, as really to deceive. Such, I
doubt not, will be that of a long paragraph in the English papers, all
importing that Mr Hartley had made a treaty of commerce with us, or
was upon the point of concluding one. Nothing is further from the
truth. We have not to this hour agreed upon one proposition, nor do I
see any probability that we shall at all, respecting commerce.
We have not, indeed, as yet, agreed upon a point respecting the
definitive treaty. We are waiting for those instructions of yours,
which you mentioned in yours of the 14th of April, which I have not
yet received.
Americans should be cautious of European newspapers, as well as of
their own; more so, indeed, because they have not so much knowledge,
and so good opportunities to detect the former as the latter. There is
a great number of persons in Europe, who insert things in the papers
in order to make impressions in America. Characters are in this way
built up and pulled down, without the least consideration of justice,
and merely to answer sinister purposes, sometimes extremely pernicious
to the United States.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, June 27th, 1783.
Sir,
Yesterday Dr Franklin, Mr Jay, and myself, met to prepare the
definitive treaty, and made so much progress in it, that tomorrow we
shall be ready to communicate to Mr Hartley the result. But I have
small hopes of obtaining anything more by the definitive treaty.
The Duke of Manchester, and Count d'Aranda have arranged everything
between England and Spain, and are ready to finish for their two
Courts. France, I presume, waits only for Holland, or perhaps for some
other negotiation with the Imperial Courts. If all the other parties
were now to declare themselves ready, we should be puzzled. In such a
case, however, I am determined (and I believe, but do not know, that
my colleagues would join me) to declare myself ready to sign the
provisional treaty, _totidem verbis_, for a definitive treaty.
From all I can learn, I am persuaded we shall gain nothing by any
further negotiation. If we obtain anything by way of addition or
explanation, we shall be obliged to give more for it than it is worth.
If the British Minister refuses to agree to such changes as we may
think reasonable, and refuses to sign the provisional articles as
definitive ones, I take it for granted, France will not sign till we
do. If they should they are still safe, for the provisional articles
are to constitute the treaty as soon as France has made peace, and I
should rather have it on that footing, than make any material
alteration.
I have put these several cases, because I should be supprised at
nothing from the present British Ministry. If they have any plan at
all, it is a much less gracious one towards America, than that of
their immediate predecessors. If Shelburne, Townshend, Pitt, &c. had
continued, we should have had everything settled long ago, to our
entire satisfaction, and to the infinite advantage of Great Britain
and America, in such a manner as would have restored good humor and
affection, as far as in the nature of things they can now be restored.
After the great point of acknowledging our independence was got over,
by issuing Mr Oswald's last commission, this Shelburne administration
conducted towards us like men of sense and honor. The present
administration have neither discovered understanding nor sincerity.
The present British administration is unpopular, and it is in itself
so heterogeneous a composition, that it seems impossible it should
last long. Their present design seems to be not to commit themselves
by agreeing to anything. As soon as anything is done, somebody will
clamor. While nothing is done, it is not known what to clamor about.
If there should be a change in favor of the Ministry that made the
peace, and a dissolution of this profligate league, which they call
the coalition, it would be much for the good of all who speak the
English language. If fame says true, the coalition was formed at
gambling tables, and is conducted as it was formed, upon no other than
gambling principles.
Such is the fate of a nation, which stands tottering on the brink of a
precipice, with a debt of two hundred and fiftysix millions sterling
on its shoulders; the interest of which, added to the peace
establishment only, exceeds by above a million annually all their
revenues, enormously and intolerably as they are already taxed. The
only chance they have for salvation is in a reform, and in recovering
the affection of America. The last Ministry were sensible of this, and
acted accordingly. The present Ministry are so far from being sensible
of it, or caring about it, that they seem to me to be throwing the
last dice for the destruction of their country.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, June 27th, 1783.
Sir,
A few vessels have arrived in England from various parts of America,
and have probably made the Ministry, merchants, and manufacturers less
anxious about a present arrangement of commerce. Whether these vessels
have rashly hazarded these voyages against the laws of their country,
or whether they have permission from Congress, or their States, we are
not informed.
It would have been better, no doubt, to have had an agreement made
before the trade was opened, but the eagerness of both sides may not
easily be restrained. Whether it is practicable for Congress to stop
the trade, I know not, or whether it would be expedient if
practicable, I doubt.
The balance of parties in England is so nicely poised, that the
smallest weight shifts the scales. In truth nothing can be done
without changing the Ministry, for whatever is done raises a cry
sufficient to shake those who do it. In this situation, it is a
question whether it is best to keep things in suspense, or bring them
to a decision. If Congress were to prohibit all trade with England,
until a Treaty of Commerce were made, or some temporary convention at
least, it might bring on a decision, by exciting a cry against the
Ministry for not making a convention. But the moment a convention is
made, a cry will be raised against them for making it. The present
Ministry, to judge by their motions hitherto, will hazard the clamor
for not making one, rather than that for making one. They think it
least dangerous to them, especially since they have seen so many
American vessels arrive in England, and have heard, that British ships
are admitted to an entry in the ports of America, particularly
Philadelphia.
The most difficult thing to adjust in a Treaty of Commerce, will be
the communications we shall have with the West India Islands. This is
of great importance to us, and to the islands, and I think to Great
Britain too. Yet there is a formidable party for excluding us at least
from carrying the produce of those islands to Great Britain.
Much will depend upon the Minister you first send to London. An
American Minister would be a formidable person to any British Minister
whatever. He would converse with all parties, and if he is a prudent,
cautious man, he would at this moment have more influence there than
you can imagine.
We are chained here on the only spot in the world, where we can be of
no use. If my colleagues were of my mind, we would all go together to
London, where we could negotiate the Definitive Treaty, and talk of
arrangements of commerce to some purpose. However, one Minister in
London, with proper instructions, would do better than four. He would
have the artifices of French emissaries to counteract, as well as
English partizans; for you may depend upon it, the French see with
pleasure the improbability of our coming soon and cordially together,
as they saw with manifest regret, the appearances of cordial
reconciliation under the former administration. These sentiments are
not unnatural, but we are under no obligation, from mere complaisance,
to sacrifice interests of such deep and lasting consequence. For it is
not merely mercantile profit and convenience, that is at stake; future
wars, long and bloody wars, may be either avoided or entailed upon our
posterity, as we conduct wisely or otherwise the present negotiation
with Great Britain.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 3d, 1783.
Sir,
On the last Ambassador's day, which was last Tuesday, Dr Franklin, Mr
Jay, and myself waited on the Count de Vergennes, who told us, he
thought he had agreed with the Duke of Manchester, but that his Grace
had not yet received the positive approbation of his Court. The Count
advised us to make a visit altogether to the Ambassadors of the two
Imperial Courts. Accordingly, yesterday morning we went, first to the
Count de Mercy Argenteau, the Ambassador of the Emperor of Germany,
and King of Hungary and Bohemia. His Excellency was not at home, so we
left our card.
We went next to the Prince Bariatinski, Minister Plenipotentiary from
the Court of Russia; our servant asked if the Prince was at home, and
received for answer, that he was. We were shown into the Prince's
apartment, who received us very politely. While we were here, Mr
Markoff came in. He also is a Minister Plenipotentiary, adjoined to
the Prince in the affair of the mediation. I told him we proposed to
do ourselves the honor of calling on him. He answered, "As you are an
old acquaintance I shall be very happy to see you." Whether this was a
turn of politeness, or whether it was a political distinction, I know
not. We shall soon know, by his returning, or not returning, our
visit. The Prince asked where I lodged, and I told him. This indicates
an intention to return the visit.
We went next to the Dutch Ambassador's, M. de Berkenrode. He was not
at home, or not visible. Next to the Baron de Blome, Envoy
Extraordinary of the King of Denmark; not at home. Next to M.
Markoff's. The porter answered, that he was at home. We alighted, and
were going to his apartment, when we were told he was not come in. We
left a card, and went to the other Dutch Ambassador's, M. Brantzen,
who was not at home; _en passant_, we left a card at the Swedish
Minister's, and returned home, the heat being too excessive to pursue
our visits any further.
Thus, we have made visits to all the Ministers, who are to be present
at the signature of the definitive treaty. Whether the Ministers of
the Imperial Courts will be present, I know not. There are many
appearances of a coldness between France and Russia, and the Emperor
seems to waver between two opinions, whether to join in the war that
threatens, or not. Perhaps the Ministers of the Imperial Courts will
write for instructions whether to return or not our visit.
After I had begun this letter, Captain Barney came in, and delivered
me your duplicate of No. 12, November the 6th, 1782; duplicate of No.
14, December the 19th, 1782, and triplicate of No. 16, April the 14th,
1783, and the original of your letter of the 18th of April, 1783, not
numbered. The last contained my account. But as I have never received
any of this money from Dr Franklin, or M. Gerard, but have my salary
from Messrs Willinks & Co. at Amsterdam, I am extremely sorry you have
had so much trouble with this affair.
Although in your later letters you say nothing of my resignation, or
the acceptance of it, I expect to receive it soon, and then I shall
have an opportunity to settle the affair of my salary at
Philadelphia.
After reading your letters to me, I went out to Passy to see those
addressed to us all. Dr Franklin, Mr Jay, and myself, (Mr Laurens
being still in England) read them all over together. We shall do all
in our power to procure the advantages in the definitive treaty, you
mention. The state of parties is such in England, that it is
impossible to foresee when there will be a Ministry, who will dare to
take any step at all. The coalition between Lord North and his
connexions, and Mr Fox and his, is a rope of sand. Mr Fox, by pushing
the vote in the House of Commons disapproving the peace, and by
joining so many of the old Ministers in the new administration, has
justly excited so many jealousies of his sincerity, that no confidence
can be placed in him by us. I am extremely sorry, that the most
amiable men in the nation, Portland, and the Cavendishes, should have
involved themselves in the same reproach.
In short, at present, Shelburne, Pitt, Townshend, and the
administration of which they were members, seem to have been the only
ones, who, for a moment, had just notions of their country and ours.
Whether these men, if now called to power, would pursue their former
ideas, I know not. The Bible teaches us not to put our trust in
Princes, and _a fortiori_ in Ministers of State.
The West India commerce now gives us most anxiety. If the former
British Ministry had stood, we might have secured it from England,
and, in that case, France would have been obliged to admit us to their
islands, _se defendendo_. The first maxim of a statesman, as well as
that of a statuary, or a painter, should be to study nature; to cast
his eyes round about his country, and see what advantages nature has
given it. This was well attended to, in the boundary between the
United States and Canada, and in the fisheries. The commerce of the
West India Islands, falls necessarily into the natural system of the
commerce of the United States. We are necessary to them and they to
us; and there will be a commerce between us. If the government forbid
it, it will be carried on clandestinely; France can more easily
connive at a contraband trade than England. But we ought to wish to
avoid the temptation to this. I believe, that neither France nor
England will allow us to transport the productions of their Islands to
other parts of Europe.
The utmost we may hope to obtain would be permission to import the
productions of the French Islands into France, giving bond to land
them in some port of that kingdom, and the productions of the English
Islands into some port of Great Britain, giving bonds to land them
there. It must, however, be the care of the Minister, who may have to
negotiate a treaty of commerce with Great Britain, to obtain as ample
freedom in this trade as possible.
While I was writing the above, my servant announced the Imperial
Ambassador, whom I rose to receive. He said, that he was happy that
the circumstances of the times afforded him an opportunity of forming
an acquaintance with me, which he hoped would be improved into a more
intimate one. I said, his Excellency did me great honor, and begged
him to sit, which he did, and fell into a conversation of an hour. We
ran over a variety of subjects, particularly the commerce which might
take place between the United States and Germany, by the way of
Trieste and Fiume, and the Austrian Netherlands, and the great
disposition in Germany to migration to America. He says he knows the
country round about Trieste very well, having an estate there; that
it is a very extensive and a very rich country, which communicates
with that maritime city, and that the navigation of the Adriatic sea,
though long, is not dangerous. I asked him what we should do with the
Barbary powers. He said, he thought all the powers of the world ought
to unite in the suppression of such a detestable race of pirates, and
that the Emperor had lately made an insinuation to the Porte upon the
subject. I asked him if he thought France and England would agree to
such a project, observing that I had heard that some Englishmen had
said, "if there were no Algiers, England ought to build one." He said,
he could not answer for England.
It is unnecessary to repeat any more of the conversation, which turned
upon the frugal and industrious character of the Germans, the best
cultivators in Europe, and the dishonorable traffic of some of the
German Princes in men, a subject he introduced and enlarged on
himself. I said nothing about it. Rising up to take leave, he repeated
several compliments he had made when he first came in, and added, "The
Count de Vergennes will do me the honor to dine with me one of these
days, and I hope to have that of your company. We will then speak of
an affair upon which the Count de Vergennes and you have already
conversed."
This shows there is something in agitation, but what it is I cannot
conjecture; whether it is to induce us to make the compliment to the
two Imperial Courts to sign the definitive treaty as mediators,
whether there is any project of an association for the liberty of
navigation, or whether it is any other thing, I cannot guess at
present, but I will write you as soon as I know. Whatever it is, we
must treat it with respect, but we shall be very careful how we
engage our country in measures of consequence without being clear of
our powers, and without the instructions of Congress.
I went out to Passy, and found from Mr Jay, that he had made his visit
there, in the course of the day, but had said nothing to Dr Franklin
or him about the dinner with the Count de Vergennes. In the course of
the day, I had visits from the Prince Bariatinski and M. de Markoff,
the two Ministers of the Empress of Russia. The porter told these
gentlemen's servants, that I was at home, but they did not come up,
but only sent up their cards.
While I was gone to Passy, Monsieur de Blome, Envoy Extraordinary from
the King of Denmark, called and left his card. Thus the point of
etiquette seems to be settled, and we are to be treated in character
by all the Powers of Europe.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT MORRIS.
Paris, July 5th, 1783.
Sir,
Your favors of the 12th and 29th of May were delivered to me on the 3d
of this month by Captain Barney. Every assistance, in my power, shall
be given to Mr Barclay. Mr Grand will write you the amount of all the
bills which have been paid in Holland, which were accepted by me. You
may banish your fears of a double payment of any one bill. I never
accepted a bill without taking down in writing a very particular
description of it, nor without examining the book, to see whether it
had been accepted before. I sent regularly, in the time of it, copies
of these acceptances to Dr Franklin, and I have now asked him to lend
them to me, that I may copy them and send them to you. The Doctor has
promised to look up my letters, and let me have them. The originals
are at the Hague, with multitudes of other papers, which I want every
day.
Among the many disagreeable circumstances attending my duty in Europe,
it is not the least, that instead of being fixed to any one station, I
have been perpetually danced about from "post to pillar," unable to
have my books and papers with me, unable to have about me the
conveniences of a house-keeper for health, pleasure, or business, but
yet subjected in many articles to double expenses.
Mr Livingston has not informed me of any determination of Congress
upon my letter to you of the 17th of November, which distresses me
much on Mr Thaxter's account, who certainly merits more than he has
received, or can receive, without the favor of Congress.
I thank you, Sir, most affectionately for your kind congratulation on
the peace. Our late enemies always clamor against a peace, but this
one is better for them than they had reason to expect after so mad a
war. Our countrymen too, I suppose, are not quite satisfied. This
thing and that thing should have been otherwise, no doubt. If any man
blames us I wish him no other punishment than to have, if that were
possible, just such another peace to negotiate, exactly in our
situation. I cannot look back upon this event without the most
affecting sentiments, when I consider the number of nations concerned,
the complications of interests, extending all over the globe, the
characters of actors, the difficulties which attended every step of
the progress, how everything labored in England, France, Spain, and
Holland, that the armament at Cadiz was upon the point of sailing,
which would have rendered another campaign inevitable, that another
campaign would have probably involved France in a continental war, as
the Emperor would in that case have joined Russia against the Porte;
that the British Ministry was then in so critical a situation, that
its duration for a week or a day depended upon its making peace; that
if that Ministry had been changed, it could have been succeeded only
either by North and Company, or by the coalition; that it is certain,
that neither North and Company, nor the coalition, would have made
peace upon any terms, that either we or the other Powers would have
agreed to; and that all these difficulties were dissipated by one
decided step of the British and American Ministers. I feel too
strongly a gratitude to Heaven for having been conducted safely
through the storm, to be very solicitous whether we have the
approbation of mortals or not.
A delay of one day might, and probably would, have changed the
Ministry in England, in which case all would have been lost. If, after
we had agreed with Mr Oswald, we had gone to Versailles to show the
result to the Count de Vergennes, you would have been this moment at
war, and God knows how or when you would have got out. What would have
been the course? The Count de Vergennes would have sprinkled us with
compliments, the holy water of a Court. He would have told us; "you
have done, gentlemen, very well for your country. You have gained a
great deal. I congratulate you upon it, but you must not sign till we
are ready; we must sign altogether here in this room." What would have
been our situation? We must have signed against this advice, as Mr
Laurens says he would have done, and as I believe Mr Jay and I should
have done, which would have been the most marked affront, that could
have been offered, or we must have waited for France and Spain, which
would have changed the Ministry in England, and lost the whole peace,
as certainly as there is a world in being. When a few frail vessels
are navigating among innumerable mountains of ice, driven by various
winds, and drawn by various currents, and a narrow crevice appears to
one, by which all may escape, if that one improves the moment and sets
the example, it will not do to stand upon ceremonies, and ask, which
shall go first, or that all may go together.
I hope you will excuse this little excursion, and believe me to be,
with great respect and esteem, your most obedient and most humble
servant,
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 7th, 1783.
Sir,
We cannot as yet obtain from Mr Hartley, or his principals, an
explicit consent to any one proposition whatever. Yet England and
France, and England and Spain are probably agreed, and Holland, I
suppose, must comply. Our last resource must be to say, we are ready
to sign the Provisional Treaty, _totidem verbis_, as the Definitive
Treaty.
I think it is plain, that the British Ministry do not intend to sign
any treaty till Parliament rises. There are such dissensions in the
Cabinet, that they apprehend a treaty laid before Parliament, if it
did not obtain advantages, of which they have no hope, would furnish
materials to overthrow them. A new administration is talked of, under
Lord Temple. The West India commerce is now the object, that interests
us the most nearly. At dinner with the Duc de la Vauguyon, on Saturday
last, he told me, that he believed the commerce between the French
West India Islands and the United States, would be confined to ships
built in France, and navigated by French seamen.
"So then, M. le Duc," said I, laughing, "you have adopted the ideas of
the British navigation act. But suppose the United States should adopt
them too, and make a law, that no commerce should be carried on with
any West India Islands, French, English, Spanish, Dutch, or Danish,
but in ships built in America, and navigated with American seamen? We
can import sugar from Europe. But give me leave to tell you, that this
trade can never be carried on without a great number of seamen, which
the French vessels being all large require, and your navigators are
too slow. The trade itself was only profitable to us as a system, and
little vessels, with a few hands, run away at any season of the year,
from any creek or river, with a multitude of little articles,
collected in haste. Your merchants and mariners have neither the
patience to content themselves with much and long labor, and dangerous
voyages for small profits, nor have they the economy, nor can they
navigate vessels with so few hands." "Aye, but we think," said the
Duke, "if we do not try, we shall never learn to do these things as
well and as cheap as you." The Duke told me, some days before, that he
had had a great deal of conversation with the Count de Vergennes, and
he found he had a great many good ideas of commerce. The Count
himself told me a few weeks ago, "in our regulations of the commerce
between our Islands and you, we must have regard to our shipping, and
our nurseries of seamen for our marine; for," said he, smiling
politely enough, "without a marine, we cannot go to your succor."
In short, France begins to grow, for a moment, avaricious of
navigation and seamen. But it is certain, that neither the form of
government, nor the national character, can possibly admit of great
success in it. Navigation is so dangerous a business, and requires so
much patience, and produces so little profit among nations who
understand it best, and have the best advantages for it, where
property is most secure, lawsuits soonest and cheapest ended, (and by
fixed certain laws,) that the French can never interfere much with the
Dutch, or Americans, in ship building or carrying trade. If any French
merchants ever begin to carry on this commerce, between America and
the Islands, they will break to pieces very soon, and then some new
plan must be adopted. The English, for aught I know, will make a
similar law, that the communications between us and their Islands
shall be carried on in British built ships, or ships built in Canada
or Nova Scotia, and navigated by British seamen. In this case, we must
try what we can do with the Dutch and Danes. But the French and
English will endeavor to persuade them to the same policy, for the Duc
de la Vauguyon told me, that he thought it a common tie (_lien
commun_.) In this they will not succeed, and we must make the most we
can of the Dutch friendship, for luckily, the merchants and Regency of
Amsterdam had too much wit to exclude us from their Islands by the
treaty. Happily, Congress will have a Dutch Minister, with whom they
may consult upon this matter, as well as any others, but I should
think it would not be convenient to invite an English or French
Minister to be present at the consultation.
I am at a loss, Sir, to guess what propositions made to us Congress
have been informed of, which they had not learned from us. None have
been made to us. The Dutch Ambassadors did once propose a meeting to
us, and had it at my house. Dr Franklin came, but Mr Jay did not, and
Mr Laurens was absent. The Ambassadors desired to know, whether we had
power to enter into any engagements, provided France, Spain, and
Holland, should agree to any, in support of the armed neutrality. We
showed them the resolution of Congress, of the 5th of October, 1780,
and told them, that Mr Dana had been since vested with a particular
commission to the same effect. We never heard anything further about
it.
Not seeing, at the time, any probability that anything would come of
this, nor intending to do anything of any consequence in it, if we
should hear further of it, without the further orders of Congress, we
did not think it necessary to write anything about it, at least, till
it should put on a more serious appearance. If the Count de Mercy's
dinner, to which we are to be invited, with the Count de Vergennes,
should produce any insinuations on this subject, (which I do not,
however, expect) we shall inform you, and request the orders of
Congress.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 9th, 1783.
Sir,
Since the dangerous fever I had in Amsterdam, two years ago, I have
never enjoyed my health. Through the whole of the last winter and
spring, I have suffered under weaknesses and pains, which have
scarcely permitted me to do business. The excessive heats of the last
week or two have brought on me a fever again, which exhausts me in
such a manner, as to be very discouraging, and incapacitates one for
everything. In short, nothing but a return to America will ever
restore my health, if even that should do it.
In these circumstances, however, we have negotiations to go through,
and your despatches to answer. The liberal sentiments in England
respecting the trade are all lost for the present, and we can get no
answer to anything. It is the same thing with the Dutch. One of the
Dutch Ambassadors told me yesterday at Versailles, that now, for five
weeks, the English had never said one word to them, nor given them any
answer. These things indicate, that the Ministry do not think
themselves permanent.
The Count de Vergennes asked Dr Franklin and me, yesterday, if we had
made our visits. We answered, that we had, and that they had been
promptly returned. "The thing in agitation," says the Count, "is for
you to determine whether your definitive treaty shall be signed under
the mediation of the two Imperial Courts, or not. Ours and the Spanish
treaty with England are to be so finished, and if you determine in
favor of it, you have only to write a letter to the Ministers of the
Imperial Courts, who are here." I told him, in the present case, I
did not know what a mediation meant. He smiled, but did not seem to
know any better than I; at least, he did not explain it. We told him
we would determine upon it soon.
How we shall determine, I cannot say. For my own part, I see no harm
in accepting the mediation, nor any other good, than a compliment to
the two empires. In Europe it may be thought an honor to us, and,
therefore, I shall give my voice, as at present informed, in favor of
it, as it seems rather to be the inclination of the Count de Vergennes
that we should.
Your late despatches, Sir, are not well adapted to give spirits to a
melancholy man, or to cure one sick with a fever. It is not possible
for me, at present, to enter into a long detail in answer to them. You
will be answered, I suppose, by all the gentlemen jointly. In the
meantime, I beg leave to say to you a few words upon two points.
1st. The separate article never appeared to me of any consequence to
conceal from this Court. It was an agreement we had a right to make;
it contained no injury to France or Spain. Indeed, I know not what
France has, or ever had, to do with it. If it had been communicated to
this Court, it would probably have been communicated to Spain, and she
might have thought more about it than it was worth. But how you could
conceive it possible for us to treat at all with the English, upon
supposition, that we had communicated every, the minutest thing, to
this Court, when this Court were neither obliged, nor thought proper,
to communicate anything whatever to us, I know not. We were bound by
treaty no more than they to communicate. The instructions were found
to be absolutely impracticable. That they were too suddenly
published, is very true.
2dly. A communication of the treaty to this Court, after it was agreed
upon, and before it was signed, would have infallibly prevented the
whole peace. In the first place, it was very doubtful, or rather, on
the contrary, it is certain, the English Minister never would have
consented that we should have communicated it. We might, it is true,
have done it without his consent or knowledge; but what would have
been the consequence? The French Minister would have said, the terms
were very good for us, but we must not sign till they signed; and this
would have been the continuance of the war for another year, at least.
It was not so much from an apprehension, that the French would have
exerted themselves to get away from us terms that were agreed on, that
they were withheld. It was then too late, and we have reasons to
apprehend, that all of this kind had been done, which could be done.
We knew they were often insinuating to the British Ministers things
against us, respecting the fisheries, tories, &c. during the
negotiation, and Mr Fitzherbert told me, that the Count de Vergennes
had "fifty times reproached him for ceding the fisheries, and said it
was ruining the English and French commerce both." It was not
suspicion, it was certain knowledge, that they were against us on the
points of the tories, fisheries, Mississippi, and the western country.
All this knowledge, however, did not influence us to conceal the
treaty. We did not, in fact, conceal it. Dr Franklin communicated the
substance of it to the Count and M. de Rayneval. So did I. In a long
conversation with the Count and M. de Rayneval together, I told them
the substance of what was agreed upon, and what we further insisted
on, and the English then disputed. But the signing before them is the
point. This we could not have done, if we had shown the treaty, and
told them we were ready. The Count would certainly have said to us,
you must not sign till we sign. To have signed after this would have
been more disagreeable to him, and to us too. Yet we must have signed
or lost the peace. The peace depended on a day.
Parliament had been waiting long, and once prorogued. The Minister was
so pressed, he could not have met Parliament and kept his place,
without an agreement upon terms, at least, with America. If we had not
signed, the Ministry would have been changed, and the coalition come
in, and the whole world knows the coalition would not have made peace
upon the present terms, and, consequently, not at all this year. The
iron was struck in the few critical moments when it was of a proper
heat, and has been moulded into a handsome vessel. If it had been
suffered to cool, it would have flown in pieces like glass. Our
countrymen have great reason to rejoice, that they have obtained so
good a peace, when, and as they did. With the present threatening
appearances of a northern war, which will draw in France, if our peace
was still to be made we might find cause to tremble for many great
advantages, that are now secured. I believe the Count himself, if he
were now to speak his real sentiments, would say, he is very glad we
signed when we did, and that without asking his consent.
The Duc de la Vauguyon told me and M. Brantzen together, last
Saturday, "if you had not signed when you did, we should not have
signed when we did." If they had not signed when they did, d'Estaing
would have sailed from Cadiz, and in that case nobody would have
signed to this day. It is not possible for men to be in more
disagreeable circumstances than we were. We are none of us men of
principles or dispositions to take pleasure in going against your
sentiments, Sir, much less those of Congress. But in this case, if we
had not done it, our country would have lost advantages beyond
computation.
On Monday, Sir, we pursued our visits, and today we finish. Yesterday
at Court all the foreign Ministers behaved to us without reserve, as
members of the _Corps Diplomatique_, so that we shall no longer see
those lowering countenances, solemn looks, distant bows, and other
peculiarities, which have been sometimes diverting, and sometimes
provoking, for so many years.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 10th, 1783.
Sir,
In the present violent heat of the weather, and feverish state of my
health, I cannot pretend to sit long at my pen, and must pray you to
accept of a few short hints only.
To talk in a general style of confidence in the French Court, &c. is
to use a general language, which may mean almost anything, or almost
nothing. To a certain degree, and as far as the treaties and
engagements extend, I have as much confidence in the French Court as
Congress has, or even as you, Sir, appear to have. But if, by
confidence in the French Court is meant an opinion, that the French
Office of Foreign Affairs would be advocates with the English for our
rights to the fisheries, or to the Mississippi river, or our Western
Territory, or advocates to persuade the British Ministers to give up
the cause of the refugees, and make Parliamentary provision for them,
I own I have no such confidence, and never had. Seeing and hearing
what I have seen and heard, I must have been an idiot to have
entertained such confidence, I should be more of a Machiavelian, or a
Jesuit, than I ever was, or will be, to counterfeit it to you, or to
Congress.
M. Marbois' letter is to me full proof of the principles of the Count
de Vergennes. Why? Because I know, (for it was personally communicated
to me upon my passage home, by M. Marbois himself,) the intimacy and
confidence there is between these two. And I know further, that letter
contains sentiments concerning the fisheries, diametrically opposite
to those, which Marbois repeatedly expressed to me upon the passage,
viz. "That the Newfoundland fishery was our right, and we ought to
maintain it." From whence I conclude, M. Marbois' sentiments have been
changed by the instructions of the Minister. To what purpose is it
where this letter came from? Is it less genuine, whether it came from
Philadelphia, Versailles, or London? What if it came through English
hands? Is there less weight, less evidence in it for that? Are the
sentiments more just, or more friendly to us for that?
M. de Rayneval's correspondence too with Mr Jay. M. de Rayneval is a
_Chef de Bureau_. But we must be very ignorant of all Courts not to
know that an Under Secretary of State dares not carry on such a
correspondence without the knowledge, consent, and orders of the
principal.
There is another point now in agitation, in which the French will
never give us one good word. On the contrary, they will say everything
they can think of to persuade the English to deprive us of the trade
of their West India Islands. They have already, with their emissaries,
been the chief cause of the change of sentiment in London on this head
against us. In general they see with pain every appearance of
returning real and cordial friendship, such as may be permanent
between us and Great Britain. On the contrary, they see with pleasure
every seed of contention between us. The tories are an excellent
engine of mischief between us, and are, therefore, very precious.
Exclusion from the West India Islands will be another. I hold it to be
the indispensable duty of my station, not to conceal from Congress
these truths. Do not let us be dupes, under the idea of being
grateful. Innumerable anecdotes happen daily to show, that these
sentiments are general. In conversation, a few weeks ago, with the Duc
de la Vauguyon, upon the subject of the West India trade, I endeavored
to convince him, that France and England both ought to admit us freely
to their islands. He entered into a long argument to prove, that both
ought to exclude us. At last, I said, the English were a parcel of
sots to exclude us, for the consequence would be, that in fifteen or
twenty years we should have another war with them. _Tant mieux! tant
mieux! je vous en felicite_," cried the Duke, with great pleasure.
"_Tant mieux pour nous_," said I, because we shall conquer from the
English in that case all their islands, the inhabitants of which would
now declare for us, if they dared. But it will not be the better for
the English. They will be the dupes, if they lay a foundation for it.
"Yes," said the Duke, "I believe you will have another war with the
English." And in this wish he expressed the vows of every Frenchman
upon the face of the earth. If, therefore, we have it in contemplation
to avoid a future war with the English, do not let us have too much
confidence in the French, that they will favor us in this view.[6]
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[6] See a letter from Dr Franklin, containing remarks on Mr Adams's
opinions of the policy and designs of the French Court, dated July the
22d, 1783. _Franklin's Correspondence_, Vol. IV. p. 138. Also a letter
from Mr Laurens, Vol. II. p. 486.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT MORRIS.
Paris, July 10th, 1783.
Sir,
Upon the receipt of the despatches by Barney, I sent off your letters
for Messrs Willinks & Co. and I received last night an answer to the
letter I wrote them upon the occasion. They have engaged to remit Mr
Grand a million and a half of livres in a month, which has relieved Mr
Grand from his anxiety.
This Court has refused to Dr Franklin any more money. They are
apprehensive of being obliged to take a part in the northern war, and
their own financiers have not enough of the confidence of the public
to obtain money for their own purposes.
Your design of sending cargoes of tobacco and other things to
Amsterdam, to Messrs Willinks & Co. is the best possible to support
our credit there. The more you send, the more money will be obtained.
Send a Minister too; residing there, he may promote it much. It is a
misfortune, that I have not been able to be there, but this post
cannot be deserted. Instruct your Minister to inquire whether the
House of Hope could be persuaded to engage with Willinks in a new
loan. This should be done with secrecy and discretion. If that House
would undertake it, you would find money enough for your purpose, for
I rely upon it, the States will adopt a plan immediately for the
effectual payment of interest. This is indispensable. The foundation
of a happy government can only be laid in justice; and as soon as the
public shall see, that provision is made for this, you will no longer
want money.
It is a maxim among merchants and monied men, that "every man has
credit who does not want it." It is equally true of States. We shall
want it but little longer, if the States make provision for the
payment of interest, and therefore we shall have enough of it. There
is not a country in the world whose credit ought to be so good,
because there is none equally able to pay.
Enclosed is a pamphlet of Dr Price's, for your comfort. You will see
by it, that the only nation we have reason to fear wants credit so
much, that she is not likely to have it always, and this is our
security. By some hints from Mr Hartley, he will probably return to
London, and not be here again. The present Ministry is so undecided
and feeble, that it is at least doubtful whether they will make the
definitive treaty of peace.
With great respect, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT MORRIS.
Paris, July 11th, 1783.
Sir,
In my letter to you of yesterday, I hinted in confidence, at an
application to the house of Hope. This is a very delicate measure. I
was induced to think of it merely by a conversation which M. Van
Berckel, (who will soon be with you, as he sailed the 26th of June
from the Texel,) had with M. Dumas. It would be better to be steady to
the three Houses already employed, if that is possible. You will now
be able to converse freely with that Minister upon the subject. I
should not advise you to take any decisive resolution at Philadelphia,
but leave it to your Minister to act as shall appear to him best upon
the spot. The Houses now employed are well esteemed, and I hope will
do very well. But no House in the Republic has the force of that of
Hope.
All depends, however, upon the measures to be taken by Congress and
the States for ascertaining their debts, and a regular discharge of
the interest. The ability of the people to make such an establishment
cannot be doubted; and the inclination of no man who has a proper
sense of public honor can be called in question. The Thirteen States,
in relation to the discharge of the debts of Congress, must consider
themselves as one body animated by one soul. The stability of our
confederation at home, our reputation abroad, our power of defence,
the confidence and affection of the people of one State towards those
of another, all depend upon it. Without a sacred regard to public
justice no society can exist; it is the only tie which can unite men's
minds and hearts in pursuit of the common interest.
The commerce of the world is now open to us, and our exports and
imports are of so large amount, and our connexions will be so large
and extensive, that the least stain upon our character in this respect
will lose us in a very short time advantages of greater pecuniary
value than all our debt amounts to. The moral character of our people
is of infinitely greater worth than all the sums in question. Every
hesitation, every uncertainty about paying or receiving a just debt,
diminishes that sense of moral obligation of public justice, which
ought to be kept pure, and carefully cultivated in every American
mind. Creditors at home and abroad, the army, the navy, every man who
has a well founded claim upon the public, have an unalienable right to
be satisfied, and this by the fundamental principles of society. Can
there ever be content and satisfaction? Can there ever be peace and
order? Can there ever be industry or decency without it? To talk of a
sponge to wipe out this debt, or of reducing or diminishing it below
its real value, in a country so abundantly able to pay the last
farthing, would betray a total ignorance of the first principles of
national duty and interest.
Let us leave these odious speculations to countries that can plead a
necessity for them, and where corruption has arrived at its last
stages; where infamy is scarcely felt, and wrong may as well assume
one shape as another, since it must prevail in some.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 11th, 1783.
Sir,
As there are certain particulars, in which it has appeared to me, that
the friendship of a French Minister has been problematical, at least,
or rather, not to exist at all, I have freely mentioned them to
Congress; because I hold it to be the first duty of a public Minister,
in my situation, to conceal no important truth of this kind from his
masters.
But ingratitude is an odious vice, and ought to be held in detestation
by every American citizen. We ought to distinguish, therefore, between
those points, for which we are not obliged to our allies, from those
in which we are.
I think, then, we are under no particular obligations of gratitude to
them for the fisheries, the boundaries, exemption from the tories, or
for the progress of our negotiations in Europe.
We are under obligations of gratitude, for making the treaty with us
when they did; for those sums of money, which they have generously
given us, and for those, even, which they have lent us, which I hope
we shall punctually pay, and be thankful still for the loan; for the
fleet and army they sent to America, and for all the important
services they did. By other mutual exertions, a dangerous rival to
them, and I may be almost warranted in saying, an imperious master,
both to them and us, has been brought to reason, and put out of the
power to do harm to either. In this respect, however, our allies are
more secure than we. The House of Bourbon has acquired a great
accession of strength, while their hereditary enemy has been weakened
one half, and incurably crippled.
The French are, besides, a good natured and humane nation, very
respectable in arts, letters, arms, and commerce, and, therefore,
motives of interest, honor, and convenience, join themselves to those
of friendship and gratitude, to induce us to wish for the continuance
of their friendship and alliance. The Provinces of Canada and Nova
Scotia in the hands of the English are a constant warning to us to
have a care of ourselves, and, therefore, a continuance of the
friendship and alliance of France is of importance to our
tranquillity, and even to our safety. There is nothing, which will
have a greater effect to overawe the English, and induce them to
respect us and our rights, than the reputation of a good understanding
with the French. My voice and advice will, therefore, always be for
discharging, with the utmost fidelity, gratitude, and exactness, every
obligation we are under to France, and for cultivating her friendship
and alliance by all sorts of good offices. But I am sure, that to do
this effectually, we must reason with them at times, enter into
particulars, and be sure that we understand one another. We must act a
manly, honest, independent, as well as a sensible part.
With great respect, I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 12th, 1783.
Sir,
Reports have been spread, that the Regency of Algiers has been
employed in fitting out ships to cruise for American vessels. There
are reports too, that Spain has an armament prepared to attack their
town. How much truth there may be in either, I cannot pretend to say.
Whether Congress will take any measures for treating with these
piratical States, must be submitted to them. The custom of these
Courts, as well as those of Asia and Africa, is to receive presents
with Ambassadors. The Grand Pensionary of Holland told me, that the
Republic paid annually to the Regency of Algiers a hundred thousand
dollars. I hope a less sum would serve for us; but in the present
state of our finances, it would be difficult to make any payment. Mr
Montgomery, of Alicant, has ventured to write a letter to the Emperor
of Morocco, in consequence of which, his Majesty was pleased to give
orders to all his vessels to treat American vessels with all
friendship. Mr Montgomery ventured too far, however, in writing in the
name of the United States, and what will be the consequences of the
deception I know not.
Dr Franklin lately mentioned to Mr Jay and me, that he was employed in
preparing, with the Portuguese Ambassador, a treaty between the United
States and Portugal. The next Ambassador's day at Versailles, I asked
him if we could be admitted to the Brazils? He said, no, they admitted
no nation to the Brazils. I asked, if we were admitted to the Western
Islands? He said he thought Madeira was mentioned. I told him, I
thought it would be of much importance to us to secure an admission to
all the Azores, and to have these Islands, or some of them, made a
depot for the sugars, coffee, cotton, and cocoa, &c. of the Brazils.
He liked this idea, and went immediately, and spoke to the Ambassador
upon it. He said, the Ambassador had told him, that they could furnish
us with these articles at Lisbon, fifteen per cent cheaper than the
English could from their West India Islands.
This treaty, I suppose, will be submitted to Congress before it is
signed, and I hope Congress will give a close attention to it, in
order to procure an exemption from as many duties as possible, and as
much freedom and security of trade in all their ports of Europe and
the Western Islands as possible. If any particular stipulations should
be necessary, concerning the free admission of all the articles of our
produce, as rice, wheat, flour, salt-fish, or any other, the members
of Congress may readily suggest them.
I could wish that the Court of Lisbon had sent a Minister to
Philadelphia to negotiate a treaty there. I wish that advantages may
not be lost by this method of preparing treaties here, by Ministers
who have made no particular study of the objects of them.[7] Benefits
on both sides may escape attention in this way. A good treaty with
Portugal is of so much consequence to us, that I should not wonder if
Congress should think it necessary to send a Minister to Lisbon to
complete it.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[7] See the draft of a Treaty with Portugal, in _Franklin's
Correspondence_, Vol. IV. p. 150.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 13th, 1783.
Sir,
Yesterday Colonel Ogden arrived with the originals of what we had
before received in duplicates by Captain Barney. The ratification of
the Dutch treaty had been before received and exchanged. The
ratification of their High Mightinesses is in the safe custody of M.
Dumas, at present at the Hague.
I believe we shall accept of the mediation of the two Imperial Courts
at the definitive treaty, as it is a mere formality, a mere
compliment, consisting wholly in the Imperial Ministers putting their
names and seals to the parchment, and can have no ill effect. The
inclination of the Count de Vergennes seems to be, that we should
accept it, and as he calls upon us to decide in the affirmative or
negative, I believe we shall give an answer in the affirmative.
The Empress has promised to receive Mr Dana, as soon as the definitive
treaty shall be signed, and he has prepared a treaty of commerce,
which will be valuable if he can obtain it.
The Emperor of Germany has caused to be intimated several ways, his
inclination to have a treaty of commerce with us; but his rank is so
high, that his House never makes the first formal advance. I should
think it advisable, that we should have a treaty with that power for
several reasons.
1st. Because, as Emperor of Germany, and King of Bohemia and Hungary,
he is at the head of one of the greatest interests and most powerful
connexions in Europe. It is true it is the greatest weight in the
scale, which is, and has been, from age to age, opposite to the House
of Bourbon. But for this very reason, if there were no other, the
United States ought to have a treaty of commerce with it, in order to
be in practice with their theory, and to show to all the world, that
their system of commerce embraces, equally and impartially, all the
commercial States and countries of Europe.
2dly. Because the present Emperor is one of the greatest men of this
age. The wisdom and virtue of the man, as well as of the monarch; his
personal activity, intelligence, and accomplishments; his large and
liberal principles in matters of religion, government, and commerce,
are so much of kin to those of our States, (perhaps indeed so much
borrowed from them, and adopted in imitation of them,) that it seems
peculiarly proper we should show this respect to them.
3dly. Because, that if England should ever forget herself again so
much as to attack us, she may not be so likely to obtain the alliance
or assistance of this Power against us. A friendship once established
in a treaty of commerce, this power would never be likely to violate,
because she has no dominions near us, and could have no interest to
quarrel with us.
4thly. Because the countries belonging to this power upon the Adriatic
sea, and in the Austrian Flanders, are no inconsiderable sources of
commerce for America. And if the present negotiations between the two
Imperial Courts and the Porte shall terminate in a free navigation of
the Danube, the Black sea, and the Archipelago, the Emperor's
hereditary dominions will become very respectable commercial
countries.
5thly. Because, although we have at present a pleasant and joyful
prospect of friendship and uninterrupted alliance with the House of
Bourbon, which I wish may never be obscured, yet this friendship and
alliance will be the more likely to continue unimpaired, for our
having the friendship and commerce of the House of Austria. And (as in
the vicissitudes of human affairs all things are possible) if in
future times, however unlikely at present, the House of Bourbon
should deal unjustly by us, demand of us things we are not bound to
perform, or any way injure us we may find in the alliance, of Austria,
England, and Holland a resource against the storm. Supernumerary
strings to our bow, and provisions against possible inconveniences,
however improbable, can do us no harm.
If we were not straitened for money, I should advise Congress to send
a Minister to Vienna. But as every Mission abroad is a costly article,
and we find it difficult, at present, to procure money for the most
necessary purposes, I should think it proper for Congress to send a
commission to their Minister at Versailles, London, Madrid,
Petersburg, or the Hague, who might communicate it to the Court of
Vienna, by means of the Imperial Ambassador. The Emperor in such a
case would authorize his Ambassador at that Court to prepare and
conclude a treaty, and in this way the business may be well done,
without any additional expense.
M. Favi, _Charge d'Affaires_ of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the
Emperor's brother, has called upon me so often to converse with me
upon this subject, that I doubt not he has been employed, or at least
knows that it would be agreeable to his Court and their connexions,
although he has never made any official insinuations about it. This
gentleman has been employed by the Republic of Ragusa to consult
American Ministers upon the subject of commerce too. I have told him,
that the American ports were open to the Ragusan Vessels, as well as
to all others, and have given him the address, by which they propose
to write to Congress.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 14th, 1783.
Sir,
A jealousy of American ships, seamen, carrying-trade, and naval power,
appears every day more and more conspicuous. This jealousy, which has
been all along discovered by the French Minister, is at length
communicated to the English. The following proclamation, which will
not increase British ships and seamen in any proportion as it will
diminish those of the United States, will contribute effectually to
make America afraid of England, and attach herself more closely to
France. The English are the dupes, and must take the consequences.
This proclamation is issued in full confidence, that the United States
have no confidence in one another; that they cannot agree to act in a
body as one nation; that they cannot agree upon any navigation act,
which may be common to the Thirteen States. Our proper remedy would be
to confine our exports to American ships, to make a law, that no
article should be exported from any of the States in British ships,
nor in the ships of any nation, which will not allow us reciprocally
to import their productions in our ships. I am much afraid there is
too good an understanding upon this subject between Versailles and St
James's.
Perhaps it may be proper for Congress to be silent upon this head
until New York, Penobscot, &c. are evacuated. But I should think, that
Congress would never bind themselves by any treaty built upon such
principles. They should negotiate, however, without loss of time, by a
Minister in London. A few weeks' delay may have unalterable effects.
PROCLAMATION
_At the Court of St James, the 2d of July, 1783._
Present, the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.
"Whereas, by an Act of Parliament, passed this session,
entitled an 'Act for preventing certain instruments from
being required from ships belonging to the United States of
America, and to give his Majesty, for a limited time, certain
powers for the better carrying on trade and commerce, between
the subjects of his Majesty's dominions, and the inhabitants
of the said United States;' it is amongst other things
enacted, that, during the continuance of the said act, 'it
shall and may be lawful for his Majesty in Council, by order
or orders to be issued and published from time to time, to
give such directions, and to make such regulations, with
respect to duties, drawbacks, or otherwise, for carrying on
the trade and commerce between the people and territories
belonging to the Crown of Great Britain, and the people and
territories of the said United States, as to his Majesty in
Council shall appear most expedient and salutary, any law,
usage, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding;' his
Majesty doth, therefore, by and with the advice of his Privy
Council, hereby order and direct, that pitch, tar,
turpentine, hemp and flax, masts, yards, and bowsprits,
staves, heading, boards, timber, shingles, and all other
species of lumber, horses, neat cattle, sheep, hogs, poultry,
and all other species of live stock, and live provisions;
peas, beans, potatoes, wheat, flour, bread, biscuit, rice,
oats, barley, and all other species of grain, being the
growth, or production of any one of the United States of
America, may, until further order, be imported by British
subjects, in British built ships, owned by his Majesty's
subjects, and navigated according to law, from any port of
the United States of America, to any of his Majesty's West
India Islands; and that rum, sugar, molasses, coffee,
cocoa-nuts, ginger, and pimento, may, until further order, be
exported by British subjects, in British built ships, owned
by his Majesty's subjects, and navigated according to law,
from any of his Majesty's West India Islands, and to any port
or place within the said United States, upon payment of the
same duties on exportation, and subject to the like rules,
regulations, securities, and restrictions, as the same
articles by law are, or may be, subject and liable to, if
exported to any British colony or plantation in America. And
the Right Honorable the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's
Treasury, and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, are
to give the necessary directions herein, as to them may
respectively appertain.
STEPHEN COTTRELL."
One of the most remarkable things in this proclamation is, the
omission of salt-fish, an article, which the islands want as much as
any that is enumerated. This is, no doubt, to encourage their own
fishery, and that of Nova Scotia, as well as a blow aimed at ours.
There was, in a former proclamation concerning the trade between the
United States and Great Britain, an omission of the articles of
_potash_ and _pearlash_. These omissions discover a _choice love_ for
New England. France, I am afraid, will exclude fish too, and imitate
this proclamation but too closely; if, indeed, this proclamation is
not an imitation of their system adopted, as I believe it is, upon
their advice and desire.
These, however, are important efforts. Without saying, writing, or
resolving anything suddenly, let us see what remedies or equivalents
we can obtain from Holland, Portugal and Denmark. Let us bind
ourselves to nothing, but reserve a right of making navigation acts
when we please, if we find them necessary or useful. If we had been
defeated of our fisheries, we should have been wormed out of all our
carrying-trade too, and should have been a mere society of
cultivators, without any but a passive trade. The policy of France has
succeeded, and laid, in these proclamations, if persisted in, the sure
source of another war between us and Great Britain.
The English nation is not, however, unanimous in this new system, as
Congress will see by the enclosed speculations,[8] which I know to
have been written by a confidential friend of my Lord Shelburne; I
mean Mr Benjamin Vaughan. This Minister is very strong in the House of
Lords, and Mr Pitt, in the House of Commons, has attached to him many
members in the course of this session. If that set should come in
again, we shall have a chance of making an equitable treaty of
commerce. To this end a Minister must be ready; and I hope in mercy to
our country, that such an opportunity will not be lost in delays, in
compliance to our allies.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTE:
[8] This paper is missing.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON
Paris. July 14th, 1783.
Sir,
The United States of America have propagated far and wide in Europe
the ideas of the liberty of navigation and commerce. The powers of
Europe, however, cannot agree, as yet, in adopting them in their full
extent. Each one desires to maintain the exclusive dominion of some
particular sea, or river, and yet to enjoy the liberty of navigating
all others. Great Britain wishes to preserve the exclusive dominion of
the British seas, and, at the same time, to obtain of the Dutch a free
navigation of all the seas in the East Indies. France has contended
for the free use of the British and American seas; yet she wishes to
maintain the Turks in their exclusive dominion of the Black sea, and
of the Danube, which flows into it through some of their Provinces,
and of the communication between the Black Sea and the Archipelago, by
the Dardanelles. Russia aims at the free navigation of the Black Sea,
the Danube, and the passage by the Dardanelles, yet she contends, that
the nations, which border on the Baltic, have a right to control the
navigation of it. Denmark claims the command of the passage of the
Sound, and by the late Marine Treaty between the neutral powers, it
was agreed, that the privateers of all the belligerent powers should
be excluded from the Baltic. France and Spain too begin to talk of an
exclusive dominion of the Mediterranean, and of excluding the Russian
fleet from it; or, at least, France is said to have menaced Russia
with a fleet of observation in the Mediterranean, to protect her
commerce to the trading seaport towns of the Levant. But, as England
possesses Gibraltar, and the Emperor of Morocco the other side of the
Straits, France and Spain cannot command the entrance; so that it will
be difficult for them to support their pretensions to any exclusive
dominion of the Mediterranean, upon the principle on which the
northern powers claim that of the Baltic, and the Porte the passage of
the Dardanelles.
France, at present, enjoys a large share of the trade to the Levant.
England has enjoyed a share too, and wishes, no doubt, to revive it.
The Emperor and the Empress, if they succeed in their views of
throwing open the Danube, Black Sea, and Archipelago, will take away
from France and England a great part of this trade; but it is not
likely that England will join with France in any opposition to the
Emperor and Empress.
In order to judge of the object, which the two Empires have in view,
we should look a little into the geography of those countries.
The project of setting at liberty the whole country of ancient Greece,
Macedonia, and Illyricum, and erecting independent Republics in those
famous seats, however splendid it may appear in speculation, is not
likely to be seriously entertained by the two Empires, because it is
impracticable. The Greeks of this day, although they are said to have
imagination and ingenuity, are corrupted in their morals to such a
degree, as to be a faithless, perfidious race, destitute of courage,
as well as of those principles of honor and virtue, without which
nations can have no confidence in one another, nor be trusted by
others.
The project of conquering the Provinces of Albania, Romelia,
Wallachia, Moldavia, and Little Tartary, from the Turks, and dividing
them between the two Empires, may be more probable; but the Turks, in
Asia and Europe together, are very powerful, and, if thoroughly
awakened, might make a great resistance; so that it is most probable,
the two Imperial Courts would be content, if they could obtain by
negotiation, or by arms, the free navigation of the Danube, Black Sea,
and Archipelago. This freedom alone would produce a great revolution
in the commerce of Europe. The river Don or Tanais, with its branches,
flows through the Ukraine, and a considerable part of the Russian
dominions, into the Black Sea. The Danube flows very near Trieste,
through the Kingdom of Hungary, and then through a Turkish Province
into the Black Sea. If, therefore, the Black Sea and the Danube only
were free, a communication would be immediately opened between Russia
and Hungary quite to Trieste, to the great advantage of both Empires.
But if, at the same time, the passage of the Dardanelles was laid
open, all the Levant trade would be opened to the two Empires, and
might be carried to Trieste, either by the Danube, or through the
Archipelago and the Gulf of Venice. This would be such an accession of
wealth, commerce, and naval power to the two Empires, as France is
jealous of, and may be drawn into a war to prevent.
It is a question how the King of Prussia will act. It is the general
opinion, that, as he is advanced in years, loves and enjoys his
laurels and his ease, and cannot hope to gain anything by the war, he
will be neuter. If he is, the issue cannot be foreseen. The Emperor is
vastly powerful, and his preparations are immense. Perhaps France may
not think it prudent to declare war. I should be sorry to see her
again involved in a war, especially against the principles she has
lately espoused with so much glory and advantage.
For my own part, I think nature wiser than all the Courts and States
in the world, and, therefore, I wish all her seas and rivers upon the
whole globe free, and am not at all surprised at the desire of the two
Empires to set those near them at liberty.
I think, however, that whatever turn these negotiations may take, they
cannot directly affect us, although we may be remotely interested in
the freedom of the Levant trade, and of the seas and rivers in the
neighborhood of it.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 15th, 1783.
Sir,
Enclosed are copies of papers, which have passed between Mr Hartley
and the American Ministers. We have not thought it prudent to enter
into any written controversy with him, upon any of these papers. We
have received whatever he has offered us. But he has offered nothing
in the name of his Court, has signed nothing, and upon inquiry of him
we have found that he has never had authority to sign officially any
proposition he has made.
I think it is evident, that his principals, the coalition, do not
intend to make any agreement with us about trade, but to try
experiments by their proclamations. I think, too, that they mean to
postpone the definitive treaty as long as possible. We can get no
answer, and I believe Mr Hartley gets no decisive answers to anything.
Enclosed also is a pamphlet, entitled, "Observations on the American
States," said to have been published by Lord Sheffield, and to have
been composed by four American renegadoes. The spirit of it needs no
comments. It deserves to be attended to, however, by Congress. It is a
fatal policy, as it appears to me, to see a British Ambassador at
Versailles, and a French Ambassador at St James's, and no American
Minister at the latter. This is admired at Versailles, I doubt not,
but not because they think it for our interest.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, Sir, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.
Paris, July 16th, 1783.
Sir,
Yesterday we waited on the Count de Vergennes at Versailles, and
showed him the project of a letter to the Ministers of the two
Imperial Courts, which he read and approved. We told him, that we were
at a loss what might be the effect of the mediation; possibly we might
be involved in difficulties by it; possibly the British Ministers
might persuade the mediators to offer us their advice upon some
points, respecting the royalists for example, which we could not
comply with. The Count said, that he had told them, that as soon as he
had fully agreed with England upon all points, their mediation should
be accepted, and they should sign the treaty as such; and we might
agree to it in the same manner. He said we were not obliged to this,
but as they were to be present and sign one treaty, it would look
better to sign both. It would be a very notorious, public, and
respectable acknowledgment of us, as a power, by those Courts. Upon
this footing we left the letter with him to be shown to the Imperial
Ministers.
We asked the Count if he had seen the British proclamation of the 2d
of July. He answered, that he had. I asked him if the King had
determined anything on the subject of salt provisions, and salt-fish,
whether we might import them into his islands. He said we might depend
upon it, they could not supply their islands with fish, that we had
two free ports in their islands, St Lucia, and a port in Martinique.
By the thirtysecond article of the Treaty of Commerce, these free
ports are secured to us; nothing, he said, was determined concerning
salt beef and pork, but the greatest difficulty would be about flour.
I told the Count, that I did not think it would be possible either for
France or England to carry on this commerce between the islands and
continent; it was profitable to us only as it was a part of a system;
that it could not be carried on without loss in large vessels,
navigated by many seamen, which could sail only at certain seasons of
the year, &c. Upon the whole, I was much pleased with this
con
Showing first 200,000 characters. Full text: gutenberg.org/ebooks/37898