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Know the Truth: A Critique on the Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation

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Title: Know the Truth: A Critique on the Hamiltonian Theory of Limitation

Author: Jesse Henry Jones


        
Release date: October 27, 2011 [eBook #37864]

Language: English

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Produced by Charlene Taylor, Marilynda Fraser-Cunliffe,
Matthew Wheaton and the Online Distributed Proofreading
Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from
images generously made available by the Digital & Multimedia
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    KNOW THE TRUTH;

    A CRITIQUE ON THE HAMILTONIAN THEORY OF LIMITATION,

    INCLUDING

    SOME STRICTURES UPON THE THEORIES OF REV. HENRY L. MANSEL AND
    MR. HERBERT SPENCER

    BY JESSE H. JONES


    "Give me to see, that I may know where to strike."


    NEW YORK:
    PUBLISHED FOR THE AUTHOR BY HURD AND HOUGHTON.
    BOSTON: NICHOLS AND NOYES
    1865.


    Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1865, by JESSE
    H. JONES, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the
    Southern District of New York.

    RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE:
    STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY
    H. O. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY.


    Dedication.

    TO MY FELLOW-STUDENTS AND FRIENDS OF ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL
    SEMINARY WHO HAVE READ MANSEL AND REJECTED HIS TEACHINGS,

    This Little Treatise

    IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED BY

    _THE AUTHOR_.




PREFACE.


This book has been written simply in the interest of Truth. It was
because the doctrines of the Hamiltonian School were believed to be
dangerous errors, which this process of thought exposes, that it was
undertaken.

Logically, and in the final analysis, there can be but two systems of
philosophical theology in the world. The one will be Pantheism, or
Atheism,--both of which contain the same essential principle, but viewed
from different standpoints,--the other will be a pure Theism. In the
schools of Brahma and Buddh, or in the schools of Christ, the truth is
to be found. And this is so because every teacher is to be held
responsible for all which can be logically deduced from his system; and
every erroneous result which can be so deduced is decisive of the
presence of an error in principle in the foundation; and all schemes of
philosophy, by such a trial, are seen to be based on one of these two
classes of schools. Just here a quotation from Dr. Laurens Hickok's
"Rational Psychology" will be in point:

"Except as we determine the absolute to be personality wholly out of and
beyond all the conditions and modes of space and time, we can by no
possibility leave nature for the supernatural. The clear-sighted and
honest intellect, resting in this conclusion that the conditions of
space and time cannot be transcended, will be Atheistic; while the
deluded intellect, which has put the false play of the discursive
understanding in its abstract speculations for the decisions of an
all-embracing reason, and deems itself so fortunate as to have found a
deity within the modes of space and time, will be Pantheistic. The
Pantheism will be ideal and transcendent, when it reaches its
conclusions by a logical process in the abstract law of thought; and it
will be material and empiric, when it concludes from the fixed
connections of cause and effect in the generalized law of nature; but in
neither case is the Pantheism any other than Atheism, for the Deity,
circumscribed in the conditions of space and time with nature, is but
nature still, and, whether in abstract thought or generalized reality,
is no God."

The Hamiltonian system is logically Atheism. Perceiving that the Deity
cannot be found in Nature, it denies that he can be known at all. What
the mind cannot know at all, _it is irrational to believe_. If man
cannot _know that_ God is, and have a clear sight of his attributes as a
rational ground of confidence in what he says, it is the height of blind
credulity to believe in him. And more; if man cannot have such
knowledge, he has _no standard_ by which to measure teachings, and be
_sure_ he has the truth. Under such circumstances, faith is
_impossible_. Faith can only be based on _Reason_. If there is no
Reason, there can be no faith. Hence he who talks about faith, and
denies Reason, does not know what faith is. The logician rightfully held
that God could not be found in Nature; but he was just as wrong in
asserting that man is wholly in Nature and cannot know God, as he was
right in the former instance. The acceptance of his one truth, and one
error, compels man to be an Atheist; because then he has no faculty by
which to know aught of God; and few thorough men will accept blind
credulity as the basis of Religion.

The author's sense of obligation to President Hickok cannot be too
strongly stated. But for his works, it is believed that this little
treatise could never have been written. Indeed, the author looks for but
scanty credit on the score of originality, since most of what he has
written he has learned, directly or indirectly, from that profound
thinker. He has deemed it his chief work, to apply the principles
developed by others to the exposure of a great error. And if he shall be
judged to have accomplished this, his ambition will have been satisfied.

After the substance of this treatise had been thought out, and while the
author was committing it to paper, the essays on "Space and Time," and
on "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," in the numbers of the "North
American Review" for July and October, 1864, happened to fall under his
notice. Some persons will appreciate the delight and avidity with which
he read them; and how grateful it was to an obscure student, almost
wholly isolated in the world, to find the views which he had wrought out
in his secluded chamber, so ably advocated in the leading review of his
country. Not that he had gone as far, or examined the subjects in hand
as thoroughly as has been there done. By no means. Rather what results
he had attained accord with some of those therein laid down. Of those
essays it is not too much to say, that, if they have not exhausted the
topics of which they treat, they have settled forever the conclusions to
be reached, and leave for other writers only illustration and comment.
If the author shall seem to differ from them on a minor question,--that
of quantitative infinity,--the difference will, it is believed, be found
to be one of the form of expression only. And the difference is
maintained from the conviction that no term in science should have more
than one signification. It is better to adopt illimitable and
indivisible, as the technical epithets of Space, in place of the
commonly used terms infinite and absolute.

A metaphysical distinction has been incidentally touched upon in the
following discussion, which deserves a more extensive consideration than
the scope and plan of this work would permit to it here; and which, so
far as the author's limited reading goes, has received very little
attention from modern writers on metaphysics. He refers to the
distinction between the animal nature and spiritual person, so
repeatedly enounced by that profound metaphysical theologian, the
apostle Paul, and by that pure spiritual pastor, the apostle John, in
the terms "flesh" and "spirit." The thinkers of the world, even the best
Christian philosophers, seem to have esteemed this a moral and religious
distinction, and no more, when in fact it cleaves down through the whole
human being, and forms the first great radical division in any proper
analysis of man's soul, and classification of his constituent elements.
_This is a purely natural division._ It is organic in man. It belonged
as much to Adam in his purity, as it does to the most degraded wretch on
the globe now. It is of such a character that, had it been properly
understood and developed, the Hamiltonian system of philosophy could
never have been constructed.

An adequate statement of the truth would be conducted as follows. First,
the animal nature should be carefully analyzed, its province accurately
defined, and both the laws and forms of its activity exactly stated.
Second, a like examination of the spiritual person should follow; and
third, the relations, interactions, and influences of the two parts upon
each other should be, as extensively as possible, presented. But it is
to be remarked, that, while the analysis, by the human intellect, of
these two great departments of man's soul, may be exhaustive, it is
doubtful if any but the All-seeing Eye can read all their relations and
inter-communications. The development of the third point, by any one
mind, must needs, therefore, be partial. Whether any portion of the
above designated labor shall be hereafter entered upon, will depend upon
circumstances beyond control of the writer.

As will appear, it is believed, in the development of the subject, the
great, the _vital_ point upon which the whole controversy with the
Hamiltonian school must turn, is a question of _fact_; viz., whether man
has a Reason, as the faculty giving _a priori_ principles, or not. If he
has such a Reason, then by it the questions now at issue can be settled,
and that finally. If he has no Reason, then he can have no knowledge,
except of appearances and events, as perceived by the Sense and judged
by the Understanding. Until, then, the question of fact is decided, it
would be a gain if public attention was confined wholly to it. Establish
first a well ascertained and sure foundation before erecting a
superstructure.

The method adopted in constructing this treatise does not admit the
presentation of the matter in a symmetrical form. On the contrary, it
involves some, perhaps many, repetitions. What has been said at one
point respecting one author must be said again in reply to another. Yet
the main object for which the work was undertaken could, it seemed, be
thoroughly accomplished in no other way.

The author has in each case used American editions of the works named.




KNOW THE TRUTH.




PART I.

THE SEEKING AND THE FINDING.


In April, 1859, there was republished in Boston, from an English print,
a volume entitled "The Limits of Religious Thought Examined," &c., "by
Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D."

The high position occupied by the publishers,--a firm of Christian
gentlemen, who, through a long career in the publication of books either
devoutly religious, or, at least, having a high moral tone, and being
marked by deep, earnest thought, have obtained the confidence of the
religious community; the recommendations with which its advent was
heralded, but most of all the intrinsic importance of the theme
announced, and its consonance with many of the currents of mental
activity in our midst,--gave the book an immediate and extensive
circulation. Its subject lay at the foundation of all religious, and
especially of all theological thinking. The author, basing his teaching
on certain metaphysical tenets, claimed to have circumscribed the
boundary to all positive, and so valid effort of the human intellect in
its upward surging towards the Deity, and to have been able to say,
"Thus far canst thou come, and no farther, and here must thy proud waves
be stayed." And this effort was declaredly made in the interest of
religion. It was asserted that from such a ground only, as was therein
sought to be established, could infidelity be successfully assailed and
destroyed. Moreover, the writer was a learned and able divine in the
Anglican Church, orthodox in his views; and his volume was composed of
lectures delivered upon what is known as "The Bampton Foundation;"--a
bequest of a clergyman, the income of which, under certain rules, he
directed should be employed forever, in furthering the cause of Christ,
by Divinity Lecture Sermons in Oxford. Such a book, on such a theme, by
such a man, and composed under such auspices, would necessarily receive
the almost universal attention of religious thinkers, and would mark an
era in human thought. Such was the fact in this country. New England,
the birthplace and home of American Theology, gave it her most careful
and studious examination. And the West alike with the East pored over
its pages, and wrought upon its knotty questions. Clergymen especially,
and theological students, perused it with the earnestness of those who
search for hid treasures. And what was the result? We do not hesitate to
say that it was unqualified rejection. The book now takes its place
among religious productions, not as a contribution to our positive
knowledge, not as a practicable new road, surveyed out through the
Unknown Regions of Thought, but rather as possessing only a negative
value, as a monument of warning, erected at that point on the roadside
where the writer branched off in his explorations, and on which is
inscribed, "In this direction the truth cannot be found."

The stir which this book produced, naturally brought prominently to
public attention a writer heretofore not extensively read in this
country, Sir William Hamilton, upon whose metaphysical teachings the
lecturer avowedly based his whole scheme. The doctrines of the
metaphysician were subjected to the same scrutinizing analysis, which
dissolved the enunciations of the divine; and they, like these, were
pronounced "wanting." This decision was not reached or expressed in any
extensive and exhaustive criticism of these writers; in which the errors
of their principles and the revolting nature of the results they
attained, were presented; but it rather was a shoot from the spontaneous
and deep-seated conviction, that the whole scheme, of both teacher and
pupil, was utterly insufficient to satisfy the craving of man's highest
nature. It was rejected because it _could_ not be received.

Something more than a year ago, and while the American theological mind,
resting in the above-stated conviction, was absorbed in the tremendous
interests connected with the Great Rebellion, a new aspirant for honors
appeared upon the stage. A book was published entitled "The Philosophy
of Herbert Spencer: First Principles." This was announced as the
foundation of a new system of Philosophy, which would command the
confidence of the present, and extort the wonder of all succeeding ages.
Avowing the same general principles with Mansel and Hamilton, this
writer professed to have found a radical defect in their system, which
being corrected, rendered that system complete and final; so that, from
it as a base, he sets out to construct a new scheme of Universal
Science. This man, too, has been read, not so extensively as his
predecessors; because when one has seen a geometrical absurdity
demonstrated, he does not care, unless from professional motives, to
examine and disprove further attempts to bolster up the folly; but still
so widely read, as to be generally associated with the other writers
above mentioned, and, like them, rejected. Upon being examined, he is
found to be a man of less scope and mental muscle than either of his
teachers; yet going over the same ground and expressing the same ideas,
scarcely in new language even; and it further appears that his discovery
is made at the expense of his logic and consistency, and involves an
unpardonable contradiction. Previous to the publication of the books
just mentioned, an American writer had submitted to the world a system
of thought upon the questions of which they treat, which certainly
seems worthy of some notice from their authors. Yet it has received
none. To introduce him we must retrace our steps for a little.

In 1848, Laurens P. Hickok, then a Professor in Auburn Theological
Seminary, published a work entitled "Rational Psychology," in which he
professed to establish, by _a priori_ processes, positions which, if
true, afford a ground for the answer, at once and forever, of all the
difficulties raised by Sir William Hamilton and his school. Being
comparatively a new writer, his work attracted only a moiety of the
attention it should have done. It was too much like Analytical Geometry
and Calculus for the popular mind, or even for any but a few patient
thinkers. For them it was marrow and fatness.

Since the followers of Sir William Hamilton, whom we will hereafter term
Limitists, have neglected to take the great truths enunciated by the
American metaphysician, and apply them to their own system, and so be
convinced by their own study of the worthlessness of that system, it
becomes their opponents, in the interest of truth, to perform this work
in their stead; viz., upon the basis of immutable truth, to unravel each
of their well-knit sophistries, to show to the world that it may "_know
the truth_;" and thus to destroy a system which, if allowed undisputed
sway, would sap the very foundations of Christian faith.

The philosophical system of the Limitists is built upon a single
fundamental proposition, which carries all their deductions with it. He
who would strike these effectually, must aim his blow, and give it with
all his might, straight at that one object; sure that if he destroys
that, the destruction of the whole fabric is involved therein. But, as
the Limitists are determined not to confess the dissolution of their
scheme, by the simple establishment of principles, which they cannot
prove false, and which, if true, involve the absurdity of their own
tenets, it is further necessary to go through their writings, and
examine them passage by passage, and show the fallacy of each. In the
former direction we can but re-utter some of the principles of the great
American teacher. In the latter there is room for new effort; and this
shall be our especial province.

The proposition upon which the whole scheme of the Limitists is founded,
was originally enunciated by Sir William Hamilton, in the following
terms. "The Unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable; its notion
being only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be
positively known or conceived." "In our opinion, the mind can conceive,
and consequently can know, only the _limited and the conditionally
limited_. The unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, the
unconditionally limited, or the Absolute, cannot positively be construed
to the mind; they can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or
abstraction of, those very conditions under which thought itself is
realized; consequently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only
negative--negative of the conceivable itself. For example, on the one
hand we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, that is, a
whole so great, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a
still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so small,
that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into
smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent, or
realize, or construe to the mind, (as here understanding and imagination
coincide,) an infinite whole, for this could only be done by the
infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would itself
require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same
reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of
parts.... As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the
conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge, and of
positive thought--thought necessarily supposes conditions. _To think_ is
_to condition_; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the
possibility of thought." ... "The conditioned is the mean between two
extremes--two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, neither of
which _can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on the principles of
contradiction and excluded middle, one _must be admitted as necessary_."

This theory may be epitomized as follows:--"The Unconditioned denotes
the genus of which the Infinite and Absolute are the species." This
genus is inconceivable, is "negative of the conceivable itself." Hence
both the species must be so also. Although they are thus incognizable,
they may be defined; the one, the Infinite, as "that which is beyond all
limits;" the other, the Absolute, as "a whole beyond all conditions:"
or, concisely, the one is illimitable immensity, the other,
unconditional totality. As defined, these are seen to be "mutually
repugnant:" that is, if there is illimitable immensity, there cannot be
absolute totality; and the reverse. Within these two all possible being
is included; and, because either excludes the other, it can be in only
one. Since both are inconceivable we can never know in which the
conditioned or conceivable being is. Either would give us a
being--God--capable of accounting for the Universe. This fact is assumed
to be a sufficient ground for faith; and man may therefore rationally
satisfy himself with the study of those matters which are
cognizable--the conditioned.

It is not our purpose at this point to enter upon a criticism of the
philosophical theory thus enounced. This will fall, in the natural
course, upon a subsequent page. We have stated it here, for the purpose
of placing in that strong light which it deserves, another topic, which
has received altogether too little attention from the opponents of the
Limitists. Underlying and involved in the above theory, there is a
question of _fact_, of the utmost importance. Sir William Hamilton's
metaphysic rests upon his psychology; and if his psychology is true, his
system is impregnable. It is his diagnosis of the human mind, then,
which demands our attention. He has presented this in the following
passage:--

"While we regard as conclusive Kant's analysis of Time and Space into
conditions of thought, we cannot help viewing his deduction of the
'Categories of Understanding' and the 'Ideas of Speculative Reason' as
the work of a great but perverse ingenuity. The categories of
understanding are merely subordinate forms of the conditioned. Why not,
therefore, generalize the _Conditioned--Existence Conditioned_, as the
supreme category, or categories, of thought?--and if it were necessary
to analyze this form into its subaltern applications, why not develop
these immediately out of the generic principle, instead of
preposterously, and by a forced and partial analogy, deducing the laws
of the understanding from a questionable division of logical
proposition? Why distinguish Reason (Vernunft) from Understanding
(Verstand), simply on the ground that the former is conversant about, or
rather tends toward, the unconditioned; when it is sufficiently
apparent, that the unconditioned is conceived as the negation of the
conditioned, and also that the conception of contradictories is one? In
the Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same function, both
seek the one in the many;--the Idea (Idee) is only the Concept (Begriff)
sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the Understanding which
has 'overleaped itself.'"

Not stopping now to correct the entirely erroneous statement that "both
faculties," _i. e._, Understanding and Reason, "perform the same
function," we are to notice the two leading points which are made,
viz.:--1. That there is no distinction between the Understanding and the
Reason; or, in other words, there is no such faculty as the Reason is
claimed to be, there is none but the Understanding; and, 2. A
generalization is the highest form of human knowledge; both of which may
be comprised in one affirmation; the Understanding is the highest
faculty of knowledge belonging to the human soul. Upon this, a class of
thinkers, following Plato and Kant, take issue with the logician, and
assert that the distinction between the two faculties named above, has a
substantial basis; that, in fact, they are different in _kind_, and that
the mode of activity in the one is wholly unlike the mode of activity
in the other. Thus, then, is the great issue between the Hamiltonian and
Platonic schools made upon a question of _fact_. He who would attack the
former school successfully, must aim his blow straight at their
fundamental assumption; and he who shall establish the fact of the Pure
Reason as an unquestionable faculty in the human soul, will, in such
establishment, accomplish the destruction of the Hamiltonian system of
philosophy. Believing this system to be thoroughly vicious in its
tendencies; being such indeed, as would, if carried out, undermine the
whole Christian religion; and what is of equal importance, being false
to the facts in man's soul as God's creature, the writer will attempt to
achieve the just named and so desirable result; and by the mode
heretofore indicated.

It is required, then, to _prove_ that there is a faculty belonging to
the human soul, essentially diverse from the Sense or the Understanding;
a faculty peculiar and unique, which possesses such qualities as have
commonly been ascribed by its advocates to the Pure Reason; and thereby
to establish such faculty as a fact, and under that name.

Previous to bringing forward any proofs, it is important to make an
exact statement of what is to be proved. To this end, let the following
points be noted:--

_a._ Its modes of activity are essentially diverse from those of the
Sense or Understanding. The Sense is only capacity. According to the
laws of its construction, it receives impressions from objects, either
material, and so in a different place from that which it occupies, or
imaginary, and so proceeding from the imaging faculty in itself. But it
is only capacity to receive and transmit impressions. The Understanding,
though more than this, even faculty, is faculty shut within the limits
of the Sense. According to its laws, it takes up the presentations of
the Sense, analyzes and classifies them, and deduces conclusions: but it
can attain to nothing more than was already in the objects presented. It
can construct a system; it cannot develop a science. It can observe a
relation it cannot intuit a law. What we seek is capacity, but of
another and higher kind from that of the Sense. Sense can have no object
except such, at least, as is constructed out of impressions received
from without. What we seek does not observe outside phenomena; and can
have no object except as inherent within itself. It is faculty moreover,
but not faculty walled in by the Sense. It is faculty and capacity in
one, which, possessing inherent within itself, as objects, the _a
priori_ conditional laws of the Universe, and the _a priori_ conditional
ideal forms which these laws, standing together according to their
necessary relations, compose, transcends, in its activity and
acquisitions, all limitations of a _Nature_; and attends to objects
which belong to the Supernatural, and hence which absoluteness
qualifies. We observe, therefore,

_b._ The objects of its activity are also essentially diverse in kind
from those of the Sense and the Understanding. All the objects of the
Sense must come primarily or secondarily, from a material Universe; and
the discussions and conclusions of the Understanding must refer to such
a Universe. The faculty which we seek must have for its objects, _laws_,
or, if the term suit better, first principles, which are reasons why
conduct must be one way, and not another; which, in their combinations,
compose the forms conditional for all activity; and which, therefore,
constitute within us an _a priori_ standard by which to determine the
validity of all judgments. To illustrate. Linnaeus constructed a system
of botanical classification, upon the basis of the number of stamens in
a flower. This was satisfactory to the Sense and the Understanding.
Later students have, however, discovered that certain _organic laws_
extend as a framework through the whole vegetable kingdom; which, once
seen, throw back the Linnaean system into company with the Ptolemaic
Astronomy; and upon which laws a _science_ of Botany becomes possible.
That faculty which intuits these laws, is called the Pure Reason.

To recapitulate. What we seek is, in its modes and objects of activity,
diverse from the Sense and Understanding. It is at once capacity and
faculty, having as object first principles, possessing these as an
_inherent heritage_, and able to compare with them as standard all
objects of the Sense and judgments of the Understanding; and to decide
thereby their validity. These principles, and combinations of
principles, are known as _Ideas_, and, being innate, are denominated
_innate Ideas_. It is their reality which Sir William Hamilton denies,
declaring them to be only higher generalizations of the Understanding,
and it is the faculty called the Pure Reason, in which they are supposed
to inhere, whose actuality is now to be proved.

The effort to do this will be successful if it can be shown that the
logician's statement of the facts is partial, and essentially defective;
what are the phenomena which cannot be comprehended in his scheme; and,
finally, that they can be accounted for on no other ground than that
stated.

1. The statement of facts by the Limitists is partial and essentially
defective. They start with the assumption that a generalization is the
highest form of human knowledge. To appreciate this fully, let us
examine the process they thus exalt. A generalization is a process of
thought through which one advances from a discursus among facts, to a
conclusion, embodying a seemingly general truth, common to all the facts
of the class. For instance. The inhabitants of the north temperate zone
have long observed it to be a fact, that north winds are cold; and so
have arrived at the general conclusion that such winds will lower the
temperature. A more extensive experience teaches them, however, that in
the south temperate zone, north winds are warm, and their judgment has
to be modified accordingly. A yet larger investigation shows that, at
one period in geologic history, north winds, even in northern climes,
were warm, and that tropical animals flourished in arctic regions; and
the judgment is again modified. Now observe this most important fact
here brought out. _Every judgment may be modified by a larger
experience._ Apply this to another class of facts. An apple is seen to
fall when detached from the parent stem. An arrow, projected into the
air, returns again. An invisible force keeps the moon in its orbit.
Other like phenomena are observed; and, after patient investigation, it
is found to be a fact, that there is a force in the system to which our
planet belongs, which acts in a ratio inverse to the square of the
distance, and which thus binds it together. But if a generalization is
the highest form of knowledge, we can never be sure we are right, for a
subsequent experience may teach us the reverse. We know we have not _all
the facts_. We may again find that the north wind is elsewhere, or was
once here, warm. Should a being come flying to us from another sphere so
distant, that the largest telescope could catch no faintest ray, even,
of its shining, and testify to us that there, the force we called
gravitation, was inversely as the _cube_ of the distance, we could only
accept the testimony, and modify our judgment accordingly. Conclusions
of to-day may be errors to-morrow; and we can never know we are right.
The Limitists permit us only interminable examinations of interminable
changes in phenomena; which afford no higher result than a new basis for
new studies.

From this wearisome, Io-like wandering, the soul returns to itself,
crying its wailing cry, "Is this true? Is this all?" when suddenly, as
if frenzied by the presence of a god, it shouts exultingly "The truth!
the truth! I see the eternal truth."

The assumption of the Limitists is not all the truth. Their diagnosis is
both defective and false. It is defective, in that they have failed to
perceive those qualities of _universality_ and _necessity_, which most
men instinctively accord to certain perceptions of the mind; and false,
in that they deny the reality of those qualities, and of the certain
perceptions as modified by them, and the actuality of that mental
faculty which gives the perceptions, and thus qualified. They state a
part of the truth, and deny a part. The whole truth is, the mind both
generalizes and intuits.

It is the _essential_ tenet of their whole scheme, that the human mind
nowhere, and under no circumstance, makes an affirmation which it
unreservedly qualifies as necessary and universal. Their doctrine is,
that these affirmations _seem_ to be such, but that a searching
examination shows this seeming to be only a bank of fog. For instance.
The mind seems to affirm that two and two _must_ make four. "Not so,"
says the Limitist. "As a fact, we see that two and two do make four, but
it may make five, or any other sum. For don't you see? if two and two
must make four, then the Infinite must see it so; and if he must see it
so, he is thereby conditioned; and what is worse, we know just as much
about it as he does." In reply to all such quibbles, it is to be
said,--there is no seeming about it! If the mind is not utterly
mendacious, it affirms, positively and unreservedly, "Two and two are
four, _must_ be four; and to see it so, _is conditional for_ ALL
_intellect_." Take another illustration. The mind instinctively, often
unconsciously, always compulsorily, affirms that the sentiment, In
society the rights of the individual can never trench upon the rights of
the body politic,--is a necessary, and universally applicable principle;
which, however much it may be violated, can never be changed. The whole
fabric of society is based upon this. Could a mind think this away, it
could not construct a practical system of society upon what would be
left,--its negation. But the Limitists step in here, and say, "All this
seems so, perhaps, but then the mind is so weak, that it can never be
sure. You must modify (correct?) this seeming, by the consideration
that, if it is so, then the Infinite must know it so, and the finite and
Infinite must know it alike, and the Infinite will be limited and
conditioned thereby, which would be impious." Again, the intellect
unreservedly asserts, "There is no seeming in the matter. The utterance
is true, absolutely and universally true, and every intellect _must_ see
it so."

Illustrations like the above might be drawn from every science of which
the human mind is cognizant. But more are not needed. Enough has been
adduced to establish the _fact_ of those qualities, universality and
necessity, as inherent in certain mental affirmations. Having thus
pointed out the essential defect of the logician's scheme, it is
required to state:

2. What the phenomena are which cannot be comprehended therein.

In general, it may be said that all those perceptions and assertions of
the mind, which are instinctive, and which it involuntarily qualifies as
universal and necessary, are not, and cannot be comprehended in Sir
William Hamilton's scheme. To give an exhaustive presentation of all the
_a priori_ laws of the mind, would be beyond the scope of the present
undertaking, and would be unnecessary to its success. This will be
secured by presenting a classification of them, and sufficient examples
under each class. Moreover, to avoid a labor which would not be in place
here, we shall attempt no new classification; but shall accept without
question, as ample for our purpose, that set forth by one of our purest
and every way best thinkers,--Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., President of
Williams College, Mass.

"The ideas and beliefs which come to us thus, may be divided into,
first, mathematical ideas and axioms. These are at the foundation of the
abstract sciences, having for their subject, quantity. In the second
division are those which pertain to mere being and its relations. Upon
these rest all sciences pertaining to actual being and its relations.
The third division comprises those which pertain to beauty. These are at
the foundation of aesthetical science. In the fourth division are those
which pertain to morals and religion. Of these the pervading element is
the sense of obligation or duty. Of this the idea necessarily arises in
connection with the choice by a rational being of a supreme end, and
with the performance of actions supposed to bear upon that."--_Moral
Science_, p. 161.

First.--Mathematical ideas and axioms.

Take, for instance, the multiplication table. Can any one, except a
Limitist, be induced to believe that it was originally _constructed_;
that a will put it together, and might take it apart? Seven times seven
now make forty-nine. Will any one say that it might have been made to
make forty-seven; or that at some future time such may be the case? Or
again, take the axiom "Things which are equal to the same thing are
equal to one another." Will some one say, that the intellectual beings
in the universe might, with equal propriety, have been so constructed as
to affirm that, in some instances, things which are equal to the same
thing are _unequal_ to one another? Or consider the properties of a
triangle. Will our limitist teachers instruct us that these properties
are a matter of indifference; that for aught we know, the triangle might
have been made to have three right angles? Yet again. Examine the
syllogism. Was its law constructed?

    All M is X;
    All Z is M;
    All Z is X.

Will any one say that _perhaps_, we don't know but it might have been so
made, as to appear to us that the conclusion was Some Z is not X? Or
will the Limitists run into that miserable petty subterfuge of an
assertion, "All this _seems_ to us as it is, and we cannot see how it
could be different; but then, our minds are so feeble, they are confined
in such narrow limits, that it would be the height of presumption to
assert positively with regard to stronger minds, and those of wider
scope? Perhaps they see things differently." _Perhaps_ they do; but if
they do, their minds or ours falsify! The question is one of _veracity_,
nothing more. Throughout all the range of mathematics, the positive and
_unqualified_ affirmation of the mind is that its intuitions are
absolute and universal; that they are _a priori_ laws conditional of
_all_ intellect; that of the Deity just as much as that of man.
Feebleness and want of scope have nothing to do with mind in its
affirmation, "Seven times seven _must_ make forty-nine; _and cannot by
any possibility of effort make any other product_;" and every intellect,
_if it sees at all, must see it so_. And so on through the catalogue.
From this, it follows in this instance, that human knowledge is
_exhaustive_, and so is exactly similar, and equal to the Deity's
knowledge.

Second. Those ideas and beliefs which pertain to mere being and its
relations.

Take, for instance, the axiom, A material body cannot exist in the
Universe without standing in some relation to all the other material
bodies in that Universe. Either this is absolutely true, or it is not.
If it is so true, then every intellectual being to whom it presents
itself as object at all, must see it as every other does. One may see
more relations than another; but the axiom in its intrinsic nature must
be seen alike by all. If it is not absolutely true, then the converse,
or any partially contradictory proposition, may be true. For example. A
material body may exist in the Universe, and stand in no relation to
some of the other material bodies in that Universe. But, few men will
hesitate to say, that this is not only utterly unthinkable, but that it
could only become thinkable by a denial and destruction of the laws of
thought; or, in other words, by the stultification of the mind.

Take another instance, arising from the fact of parentage and offspring,
in the sentient beings of the world. A pair, no matter to what class
they belong, by the fact of becoming parents, establish a new relation
for themselves; and, "after their kind," they are under bonds to their
young. And, to a greater or less extent, their young have a claim upon
them. As we ascend in the scale of being, the duty imposed is greater,
and the claim of the offspring stronger. Whether it be the fierce eagle,
or the timid dove, or the chirping sparrow; whether it be the prowling
lion, or the distrustful deer, or the cowering hare; or whether it be
the races of man who are examined, the relations established by
parentage are everywhere recognized. Now, will one say that all this
might be changed for aught we know; that, what we call law, is only a
judgment of mankind; and so that this relation did not exist at first,
but was the product of growth? And will one further say that there is no
necessity or universality in this relation; but that the races might,
for aught we know, have just as well been established with a parentage
which involved no relation at all; that the fabled indifference of the
ostrich, intensified a hundredfold, might have been the law of sentient
being? Yet such results logically flow from the principles of the
Limitists. Precisely the same line of argument might be pursued
respecting the laws of human society. But it is not needed here. It is
evident now, that what gives validity to judgments _is the fact that
they accord with an a priori principle in the mind_.

Third. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to beauty. A science of
beauty has not yet been sufficiently developed to permit of so extensive
an illustration of this class as the others. Yet enough is established
for our purpose. Let us consider beauty as in proportioned form. It is
said that certain Greek mathematicians, subsequently to the Christian
era, studied out a mathematical formula for the human body, and
constructed a statue according to it; and that both were pronounced at
the time _perfect_. Both statue and formula are now lost. Be the story
true, or a legend, there is valid ground for the assertion, that the
mind instinctively assumes, in all its criticisms, the axiom, There is a
perfect ideal by which as standard, all art must be judged. The very
fact that the mind, though acknowledging the imperfection of its own
ideal, unconsciously asserts, that somewhere, in some mind, there is an
ideal, in which a perfect hand joins a perfect arm, and a perfect foot a
perfect leg, and these a perfect trunk; and a perfect neck supports a
perfect head, adorned by perfect features, and thus there is a perfect
ideal, is _decisive_ that such an ideal exists. And this conclusion is
true, because God who made us, and constructed the ground from whence
this instinctive affirmation springs, is true.

Take another instance. Few men, who have studied Gothic spires, have
failed to observe that the height of some, in proportion to their base,
is too great, and that of others, too small. The mind irresistibly
affirms, that between these opposite imperfections, there is a golden
mean, at which the proportion shall be _perfect_. When the formula of
this proportion shall be studied out, any workman, who is skilled with
tools, can construct a perfect spire. The law once discovered and
promulgated, becomes common knowledge. Mechanical skill will be all that
can differentiate one workman from another. The fact that the law has
not been discovered yet, throws no discredit upon the positive
affirmation of the mind, that there must be such a law; any more than
the fact of Newton's ignorance of the law of gravitation, when he saw
the apple fall, discredited his instinctive affirmation, upon seeing
that phenomenon, there is a law in accordance with which it fell.

Now how comes the mind instinctively and positively to make these
assertions. If they were judgments, the mind would only speak of
probabilities; but here, it qualifies the assertion with necessity. Men,
however positive in their temperament, do not say, "I know it will rain
to-morrow," but only, "In all probability it will." Not so here. Here
the mind refuses to express itself doubtfully. Its utterance is the
extreme of positiveness. It says _must_. And if its affirmation is not
true, then there is no _reason_ why those works of art which are held in
highest esteem, should be adjudged better than the efforts of the tyro,
except the whim of the individual, or the arbitrary determination of
their admirers.

Fourth. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to morals and religion.

We now enter a sphere of which no understanding could by any possibility
ever guess, much less investigate. Here no sense could ever penetrate;
there is no object for it to perceive. Here all judgments are
impertinent; for in this sphere are only laws, and duties, and
obligations. An understanding cannot "conceive" of a moral law, because
such a law is inconceivable; and it cannot perceive one, because it has
no eye. If it were competent to explain every phenomenon in the other
classes, it would be utterly impotent to explain a single phenomenon in
this. What is moral obligation? Whence does it arise, or how is it
imposed? and who will enforce it, and how will it be enforced? All
these, and numerous such other questions, cannot be raised even by the
Understanding, much less answered by it. The moral law of the Universe
is one which can be learned from no judgment, or combination of
judgments. It can be learned only by being _seen_. The moral law is no
conclusion, which may be modified by a subsequent experience. It is an
affirmation which is _imperative_. To illustrate. It is an axiom, that
the fact of free moral agency involves the fact of obligation. Man is a
free moral agent; and so, under the obligation imposed. At the first, it
was optional with the Deity whether he would create man or not. But will
any one assert that, having determined to create man such as he is, it
was optional with him, whether man should be under the obligation, or
not? Can man be a free moral agent, and be free from the duties inherent
therein? Does not the mind instinctively and necessarily affirm, that
the fact of free moral agency assures the fact of such a relation to
God's moral government, that obligation _must_ follow? One cannot
hesitate to say, that the formula, A free agent may be released from his
obligation to moral law, is absolutely unthinkable.

Again, no judgment can attain to the moral law of the Universe; and yet
man knows it. Jesus Christ, when he proclaimed that law in the words
"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy mind and strength, and
thy neighbor as thyself," only uttered what no man can, in thought,
deny. A man can no more think selfishness as the moral law of the
Universe, than he can think two and two to be five. Man not only sees
the law, but he feels and acknowledges the obligation, even in his
rebellion. In fact there would be no rebellion, no sense of sin, if
there were no obligation. Whence comes the authority of the law? No
power can give it authority, or enforce obedience. Power can crush a
Universe, it cannot change a heart. The law has, and can have authority;
it imposes, and can impose obligation; only because _it is an a priori
law of the Universe_, alike binding upon _all_ moral beings, upon God as
well as man; and is so seen immediately, and necessarily, by a direct
intuition. Man finds this law fundamental to his self; and as well, a
necessarily fundamental law of _all_ moral beings. _Therefore_ he
acknowledges it. And the very efforts he makes to set up a throne for
Passion, over against the throne of Benevolence, is an involuntary
acknowledgment of the authority of that law he seeks to rival.

It was said above, that neither Sense nor Understanding can take any
cognizance of the objects of investigation which fall in this class.
This is because the Sense can gather no material over which the
Understanding can run. Is the moral law matter? No. How then can the
Sense observe it? One answer may possibly be made, viz.: It is deduced
from the conduct of men; and sense observes that. To this it is replied

_a._ The allegation is not true. Most men violate the moral law of the
Universe. Their conduct accords with the law of selfishness. Such
conclusions as that of Hobbes, that war is the natural condition of
Society, are those which would follow from a consideration of man, as he
appears to the Sense.

_b._ If it were true, the question obtrudes itself,--How came it there?
_How came this fundamental law to be?_ and to this the Sense and
Understanding return no shadow of answer.

But from the stand-point of a Pure Reason, all is clear. All the ideas
and beliefs, every process of thought which belongs to this sphere, are
absolute and universal. They must be what they are; and so are
conditional of all moral beings. Here what the human mind sees, is just
what the Deity sees; and it sees just as the Divine mind sees, so that
the truth, as far as so seen, is _common_ to both.

Although the facts which have been adduced above, are inexplicable by
the Limitists, and are decisive of the actuality of the Reason, as it
has been heretofore described, yet another line of argument of great
wight must not be omitted. There are in language certain _positive_
terms, which the Limitists, and the advocates of the Reason agree in
asserting cannot convey any meaning to, or be explained by the Sense and
Understanding. Such are the words infinite and absolute. The mere
presence of such words in language, as positive terms, is a decisive
evidence of the fact, that there is also a faculty which entertains
positive ideas corresponding to them. Sir William Hamilton's position in
this matter, is not only erroneous, but astonishing. He asserts that
these words express only "negative notions." "They," the infinite and
absolute, "can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or abstraction
of, those very conditions under which thought itself is realized;
consequently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative--negative
of the conceivable itself." But, if this is true, how came these words
in the language at all? Negative ideas produce negative expressions.
Indeed, the Limitists are confidently challenged to designate another
case in language, in which a positive term can be alleged to have a
_purely_ negative signification. Take an illustration to which we shall
recur further on. The question has been raised, whether a sixth sense
can be. Can the Limitists find in language, or can they construct, a
positive term which will represent the negation of a sixth sense? We
find in language the positive terms, ear and hearing; but can such
positive terms be found, which will correspond to the phrase, no sixth
sense? In this instance, in physics, the absurdity is seen at once. Why
is not as readily seen the equal absurdity of affirming that, in
metaphysics, positive terms have grown up in the language which are
simple negations? Here, for the present, the presentation of facts may
rest. Let us recapitulate those which have been adduced. The axioms in
mathematics, the principles of the relations of being, the laws of
aesthetics, and most of all the whole system of principles pertaining to
morals and religion, standing, as they do, a series of mental
affirmations, which all mankind, except the Limitists, qualify as
necessary and universal, compel assent to the proposition, that
there must be a faculty different in kind from the Sense and
Understanding,--for these have already been found impotent--which can be
ground to account of all these facts satisfactorily. And the presence in
language of such positive terms as absolute and infinite, is a most
valuable auxiliary argument. The faculty which is required,--the faculty
which qualifies all the products of its activity with the
characteristics above named, is the Pure Reason. And its actuality may
therefore be deemed established.

The Pure Reason having thus been proved to be, it is next required to
show the mode of its activity. This can best be done, by first noticing
the _kind_ of results which it produces. The Reason gives us, not
thoughts, but ideas. These are simple, pure, primary, necessary. It is
evident that any such object of mental examination can be known only in,
and by, itself. It cannot be analyzed, for it is simple. It cannot be
compared, for it is pure; and so possesses no element which can be
ground for a comparison. It cannot be deduced, for it is primary and
necessary. _It can only be seen._ Such an object must be known under the
following circumstances. It must be inherent in the seeing faculty, and
must be _immediately and directly seen_ by that faculty; all this in
such a manner, that the abstraction of the object seen, would annihilate
the faculty itself. Now, how is it with the Reason? Above we found it to
be both capacity and faculty: capacity in that it possessed as integral
elements, _a priori_ first principles, as objects of sight; faculty in
that it saw, brought forward, and made available, those principles. The
mode of activity of the Pure Reason is then a _seeing_, direct,
immediate, _sure_; which holds pure truth _fast_, right in the very
centre of the field of vision. This act of the Reason in thus seeing
pure truth is best denominated an intuition of the Reason. And here it
may be said,--If perception and perceive could be strictly confined to
the Sense; concept and conceive to the Understanding; and intuition and
intuit to the Reason, a great gain would be made in accuracy of
expression regarding these departments of the mind.

Having thus, as it is believed, established the fact of the existence of
a Pure Reason, and shown the mode of its activity, it devolves to
declare the function of that faculty.

The function of the Pure Reason is, first:--to intuit, by an immediate
perception, the _a priori_ elemental principles which condition all
being; second,--to intuit, by a like immediate perception, those
principles, combined in _a priori_ systematic processes, which are the
conditional ideal forms for all being; and third,--again to intuit, by
another immediate perception, precisely similar in kind to the others,
the fact, at least, of the perfectly harmonious combination of all _a
priori_ elemental principles, in all possible systematic processes, into
a perfect unity,--an absolute, infinite Person,--God.

To illustrate.

1. The Reason asserts that "Malice is criminal;" and that it is
_necessarily_ criminal; or, in other words, that no act, of any will,
can make it otherwise than it is. The assertion, then, that "Malice is
criminal," is an axiom, and conditions all being, God as well as man.

2. The Reason asserts that every mathematical form must be seen in Space
and Time, and it affirms the same necessity in this as in the former
case.

3. The full illustration of this point would be Anselm's _a priori_
argument for the existence of God. His statement of it should, however,
be so modified as to appear, not as an _a priori_ argument for the
existence of God, but as an amplified declaration of the fact, that the
existence of God is a first principle of Reason; and as such, can no
more be denied than the multiplication table. Objection.--This doctrine
degrades God to the level of the finite; both being alike conditioned.
Answer.--By no means; as will be seen from the two following points.

1. It is universally acknowledged that God must be self-existent, which
means, if it means anything, that the existence of God is _beyond his
own control_; or, in other words, that self-existence is an _a priori_
elemental principle, which conditions God's existing at all.

2. In the two instances under consideration, the word condition has
entirely different significations. God is conditioned only by _Himself_.
Not only is this conditioning not a limitation, properly speaking, but
the very absence of limitation. The fact that He is absolute and
infinite, is a condition of His existence. Man's conditions are the very
opposite of these. He is relative, instead of absolute; finite, instead
of infinite; dependent, instead of self-existent. Hence he differs in
_kind_ from God as do his conditions.

Such being the function of the Pure Reason, it is fully competent to
solve the difficulties raised by Sir William Hamilton and his followers;
and the statement of such solution is the work immediately in hand.

Much of the difficulty and obscurity which have, thus far, attended
every discussion of this subject, will be removed by examining the
definitions given to certain terms;--either by statement, or by
implication in the use made of them;--by exposing the errors involved;
and by clearly expressing the true signification of each term.

By way of criticism the general statement may be made,--that the
Limitists--as was natural from their rejection of the faculty of the
Pure Reason--use only such terms, and in such senses, as are pertinent
to those subjects which come under the purvey of the Understanding and
the Sense; but which are entirely impertinent, in reference to the
sphere of spiritual subjects. The two following phases of this error
are sufficient to illustrate the criticism.

1. The terms Infinite and Absolute are used to express abstractions. For
instance, "_the infinite_, from a human point of view, is merely a name
for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible."
"It is thus manifest that a consciousness of the Absolute is equally
self-contradictory with that of the Infinite."--_Limits of Religious
Thought_, pp. 94 and 96. If asked "Absolute" what? "Infinite" what? Will
you allow person, or other definite term to be supplied? Mansel would
reply--No! no possible answer can be given by man.

Now, without passing at all upon the question whether these terms can
represent concrete objects of thought or not, it is to be said, that the
use of them to express abstract notions, is utterly unsound. The mere
fact of abstraction is an undoubted limitation. There may be an Infinite
and Absolute Person. By no possibility can there be an abstract
Infinite.

2. But a more glaring and unpardonable error is made by the Limitists in
their use of the words infinite and absolute, as expressing quantity.
Take a few examples from many.

"For example, we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole,
that is, a whole so great that we cannot also conceive it as a relative
part of a still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so
small, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible
into smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent,
or realize, or construe to the mind (as here understanding and
imagination coincide), an infinite whole, for this could only be done by
the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes which would itself
require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same
reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of
parts."--_Hamilton's Essays_, p. 20.

"The metaphysical representation of the Deity as absolute and infinite,
must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged,
amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality."--_Limits of
Religious Thought_, p. 76.

"Is the First Cause finite or infinite?... To think of the First Cause
as finite, is to think of it as limited. To think of it as limited,
necessarily implies a conception of something beyond its limits; it is
absolutely impossible to conceive a thing as bounded, without conceiving
a region surrounding its boundaries."--_Spencer's First Principles_, p.
37.

The last extract tempts one to ask Mr. Spencer if he ever stood on the
north side of the affections. Besides the extracts selected, any person
reading the authors above named, will find numerous phrases like these:
"infinite whole," "infinite sum," "infinite number," "infinite series,"
by which they express sometimes a mathematical, and sometimes a material
amount.

Upon this whole topic it is to be said, that the terms infinite and
absolute have, and can have, no relevancy to any object of the Sense or
of the Understanding, judging according to the Sense, or to any number.
There is no whole, no sum, no number, no amount, but is definite and
limited; and to use those words with the word infinite, is as absurd as
to say an infinite finite. And to use words thus, is to "multiply words
without knowledge."

Again, the lines of thought which these writers pursue, do not tend in
any degree to clear up the fogs in which they have lost themselves, but
only make the muddle thicker. Take, for instance, the following
extract:--

"Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot be
conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious; it
cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple;
it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by
the absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the
Universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the
Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike
incomprehensible."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 79.

The soul, while oaring her way with weary wing, over the watery waste of
such a philosophy, can find no rest for the sole of her foot, except on
that floating carcase of a doctrine, Chaos is God. The simple fact that
such confusion logically results from the premises of the Limitists, is
a sufficient warrant for rejecting their whole system of
thought,--principle and process; and for striking for a new base of
operations. But where shall such a base be sought for? On what immutable
Ararat can the soul find her ark, and a sure resting-place? Man seeks a
Rock upon which he can climb and cry, I KNOW that this is truth. Where
is the Everlasting Rock? In our search for the answer to these queries,
we may be aided by setting forth the goal to be reached,--the object to
be obtained.

By observation and reflection man comes to know that he is living in,
and forms part of, a system of things, which he comprehensively terms
the Universe. The problem is,--_To find an Ultimate Ground, a Final
Cause, which shall be adequate to account for the existence and
sustentation of this Universe_. There are but two possible directions
from which the solution of this problem can come. It must be found
either within the Universe, or without the Universe.

Can it be found within the Universe? If it can, one of two positions
must be true. Either a part of the Universe is cause for the existence
of the whole of the Universe; or the Universe is self-existent. Upon the
first position nothing need be said. Its absurdity is manifested in the
very statement of it. A full discussion, or, in fact, anything more than
a notice of the doctrine of Pantheism, set forth in the second point,
would be beyond the intention of the author. The questions at issue lie
not between theists and pantheists, but between those who alike reject
Pantheism as erroneous. The writer confesses himself astonished that a
class of rational men could ever have been found, who should have
attempted to find the Ultimate Ground of the Universe _in itself_. All
that man can know of the facts of the Universe, he learns by
observation; and the sum of the knowledge he thus gains is, that a vast
system of physical objects exists. From the facts observed, he draws
conclusions: but the stream cannot rise higher than its fountain. With
reference to any lesser object, as a watch, the same process goes on. A
watch is. It has parts; and these parts move in definite relations to
each other; and to secure a given object. If now, any person, upon being
asked to account for the existence of the watch, should confine himself
wholly to an examination of the nature of the springs, the wheels, the
hands, face, &c., endeavoring to find the reason of its being within
itself, the world would laugh at him. How much more justly may the world
laugh, yea, shout its ridicule, at the mole-eyed man who rummages among
the springs and wheels of the vast machine of the Universe, to find the
reason of _its_ being. In the former instance, the bystander would
exclaim,--"The watch is an evidence of intelligence. Man is the only
intelligent being on the earth; and is superior to the watch. Man made
the watch." And his assertion would be true. _A fortiori_ would a
bystander of the Universe exclaim, "The Universe is an evidence of
intelligence. An intelligent Being, superior to the Universe, made the
Universe." And his assertion is true. We are driven then to our last
position; but it is the Gibraltar of Philosophy.

THE ULTIMATE GROUND OF THE UNIVERSE MUST BE SOUGHT FOR, AND CAN ONLY BE
FOUND, WITHOUT THE UNIVERSE.

From this starting-point alone can we proceed, with any hope of reaching
the goal. Setting out on our new course we will gain a step by noticing
a fact involved in the illustration just given. The bystander exclaims,
"The watch is an evidence of intelligence." In this very utterance is
necessarily expressed the fact of two diverse spheres of existence: the
one the sphere of matter, the other the sphere of mind. One cannot think
of matter except as inferior, nor of mind except as superior. These
two, matter and mind, comprise all possible existence. The Reason not
only cannot see _how_ any other existence can be, but affirms _that_ no
other can be. Mind, then, is the Ultimate Ground of the Universe. What
mind?

By examination, man perceives what appears to be an order in the
Universe, concludes that there is such an order, assumes the conclusion
to be valid, and names the order Nature. Turning his eye upon himself,
he finds himself not only associated with, but, through a portion of his
faculties, forming a part of that Nature. But a longer, sharper
scrutiny, a profounder examination, reveals to him his soul's most
secret depth; and the fact of his spiritual personality glows refulgent
in the calm light of consciousness. He sees himself, indeed, in Nature;
but he thrills with joy at the quickly acquired knowledge that Nature is
only a nest, in which he, a purely supernatural being, must flutter for
a time, until he shall be grown, and ready to plume his flight for the
Spirit Land. If then, man, though bound in Nature, finds his central
self utterly diverse from, and superior to Nature, so that he
instinctively cries, "My soul is worth more than a Universe of gold and
diamonds;" _a fortiori_ must that Being, who is the Ultimate Ground, not
only of Nature, but of those supernatural intelligences who live in
Nature, be supernatural, spiritual, and supreme?

Just above, it was seen that matter and mind comprise all possible
existence. It has now been found that mind, in its highest form, even in
man, is pure spirit; and as such, wholly supernatural. It has further
been determined, that the object of our search must be the Supreme
Spirit.

Just at this point it is suitable to notice, what is, perhaps, the most
egregious and unpardonable blunder the Limitists have made. In order to
do this satisfactorily, the following analysis of the human mind is
presented. The soul is a spiritual person, and an animal nature. To this
animal nature belong the Sense and the Understanding. It is universally
acknowledged,--at least the Limitists will not deny,--that the Sense and
the Understanding are wholly within, and conditioned by Nature. Observe
then their folly. They deny that a part can account for a whole; they
reject Pantheism; _and yet they employ only those faculties which they
confess are wholly within and conditioned by Nature_--for they deny the
existence of the Pure Reason, the perceptive faculty of the spiritual
person--_to search, only in Nature, for the cause of Nature_. A fly
would buzz among the wheels of a clock to as little purpose.

The result arrived at just above, now claims our careful attention.

_The Ultimate Ground of the Universe is_ THE SUPREME SPIRIT.

To appreciate this result, we must return to our analysis of man. In his
spiritual personality we have found him wholly supernatural. We have
further found that, only as a spiritual person is he capable of pursuing
this investigation to a final and valid termination. If, then, we would
complete our undertaking, we must ascend into a sphere whose light no
eagle's eye can ever bear; and whose atmosphere his daring wing can
never beat. There no sense can ever enter; no judgments are needed.
Through Reason--the soul's far-darting eye,--and through Reason alone,
can we gaze on the Immutable.

Turning this searching eye upon ourselves, we find that man, as
spiritual person, is a Pure Reason,--the faculty which gives him _a
priori_ first principles, as the standard for conduct and the forms for
activity,--a Spiritual Sensibility, which answers with emotive music to
the call of the Reason; and lastly, a Will, in which the Person dwells
central, solitary, and supreme, the final arbiter of its own destiny.
Every such being is therefore a miniature final cause.

The goal of our search must be near at hand. In man appears the very
likeness of the Being we seek. His highest powers unmistakably shadow
forth the form of that Being, who is The Final. Man originates; but he
is dependent for his power, and the sphere of that power is confined to
his own soul. We seek a being who can originate, who is utterly
independent; and the sphere of whose activity extends wherever, without
himself, he chooses. Man, after a process of culture, comes to intuit
some first principles, in some combinations. We seek a being who
necessarily sees, at once and forever, all possible first principles, in
all possible relations, as the ideal forms for all possible effort. Man
stumbles along on the road of life, frequently ignorant of the way, but
more frequently perversely violating the eternal law which he finds
written on his heart. We seek a being who never stumbles, but who is
perfectly wise; and whose conduct is in immutable accord with the _a
priori_ standards of his Reason. Man is a spiritual person, dependent
for existence, and limited to himself in his exertions. He whom we seek
will be found to be also a spiritual person who is self-existent, and
who sets his own bounds to his activity.

That the line of thought we are now pursuing is the true one, and that
the result which we approach, and are about to utter, is well founded,
receives decisive confirmation from the following facts. Man perceives
that malice must be criminal. Just so the Eternal Eye must see it. A
similar remark is true of mathematical, and all other _a priori_ laws.
Sometimes, at least, there awakens in man's bosom the unutterable thrill
of benevolence; and thus he tastes of the crystal river which flows,
calmly and forever, through the bosom of the "Everlasting Father." For
his own conduct, man is the final cause. In this is he, must he be, the
likeness of the Ultimate. Spiritual personality is the highest possible
form of being. It is then a form common to God and man. Here, therefore,
Philosophy and Revelation are at one. With startling, and yet grateful
unanimity, they affirm the solemn truth, "GOD MADE MAN IN HIS OWN
IMAGE."

We reach the goal at last. The Final Truth stands full in the field of
our vision. "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith
Jehovah, who is, and who was, and who is to come, the Almighty." THAT
SPIRITUAL PERSON WHO IS SELF-EXISTENT, ABSOLUTE, AND INFINITE, IS THE
ULTIMATE GROUND, THE FINAL CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE.

The problem of the Universe is solved. We stand within the portico of
the sublime temple of truth. Mortal has lifted, at last, the veil of
Isis, and looked upon the eternal mysteries.

It is manifest now, how irrelevant and irreverent those expressions must
be, in which the terms infinite and absolute are employed as signifying
abstractions or amounts. They can have no meaning with reference to the
Universe. But what their true significance is, stands out with
unmistakable clearness and precision.

1. _Absoluteness is that distinctive spiritual_ QUALITY _of the
necessary Being which establishes Him as unqualified except by Himself,
and as complete_.

2. Absoluteness and Unconditionedness are,--the one the positive, and
the other the negative term expressive of the same idea.

3. _Infinity is that distinctive spiritual_ QUALITY _of the necessary
Being which gives to Him universality_.

Absoluteness and Infinity are, then, spiritual qualities of the
self-existent Person, which, distinguishing Him from all other persons,
constitute Him unique and supreme.

It is a law of Logic, which even the child must acknowledge, that
whenever, by a process of thought, a result has been attained and set
forth, he who propounds the result is directly responsible for all that
is logically involved in it. The authority of that law is here both
acknowledged and invoked. The most rigid and exhaustive logical
development of the premises heretofore obtained, which the human mind is
capable of, is challenged, in the confidence that there can be found
therein no jot of discrepancy, no tittle of contradiction. As germain,
and important to the matter in hand, some steps in this development will
be noted.

In solving the problem placed before us, viz: To account for the being
and continuance of the Universe, we have found that the Universe and its
Cause are two distinct and yet intimately and necessarily connected
beings, the one dependent upon the other, and that other utterly
independent; and so that the one is limited and finite, and the other
absolute and infinite; that the one is partly thing and partly person,
and that to both thing and person limitation and finiteness belong;
while the other is wholly person, and consequently the pure, absolute,
and infinite Person. We have further found that absoluteness and
infinity are spiritual qualities of that one Person, which are
incommunicable, and differentiate Him from all other possible beings;
and which establish Him as the uncaused, self-active ground for all
possible beings besides. It is then a Person with all the limitations
and conditions of personality,--a Person at once limited and unlimited,
conditioned and unconditioned, related and unrelated, whose limitations,
conditions, and relations are entirely consistent with his absoluteness
and infinity, who is the final Cause, the Ultimate Ground of the
Universe.

The finite person is self-conscious, and in a measure
self-comprehending; but he only partially perceives the workings of his
own being. _A fortiori_, must the infinite Person be self-conscious, and
exhaustively self-comprehending. The finite person is an intellect,
sensibility, and will; but these are circumscribed by innumerable
limitations. So must the infinite Person be intellect, sensibility, and
will; but His intellect must be Universal Genius; His sensibility Pure
Delight, and His will, as choice, Universal Benevolence, and as act,
Omnipotence.

1. As intellect, the infinite Person is Universal Genius.

Then, he "must possess the primary copies or patterns of what it is
possible may be, in his own subjective apprehension;" or, in other
words, "The pure ideals of all possible entities, lie as pure reason
conceptions in the light of the divine intelligence, and in these must
be found the rules after which the creative agency must go forth."
These _a priori_ "pure ideals" are _conditional_ of his knowledge. They
are the sum and limit of all possible knowledge. He must know them as
they are. He cannot intuit, or think otherwise than in accordance with
them. However many there may be of these ideals, the number is fixed and
definite, and must be so; and so the infinite Person must see it. In
fine, in the fact of exhaustive self-comprehension is involved the fact,
that the number of his qualities, attributes, faculties, forms of
activity, and acts, are, and must be limited, definite, and so known to
him; and yet he is infinite and absolute, and thoroughly knows himself
to be so.

2. As sensibility, the infinite Person is Pure Delight.

Then he exists in a state of unalloyed and complete bliss, produced by
the ceaseless consciousness of his perfect worth and worthiness, and his
entire complacency therein. Yet he is pleased with the good conduct, and
displeased with the evil conduct, of the moral beings he has made. And
if two are good, and one better than another, he loves the one more than
the other. Yet all this in no way modifies, or limits, or lessens his
own absolute self-satisfaction and happiness.

3. As will, the infinite Person is, in choice, Universal Benevolence; in
act, Omnipotence.

_a._ In choice, the whole personality,--both the spontaneous and self
activity, are entirely and concordantly active in the one direction.
Some of the objects towards which this state manifests itself may be
very small. The fact that each receives the attention appropriate to his
place in the system of beings in no way modifies the Great Heart, which
spontaneously prompts to all good acts. But

_b._ In act, the infinite Person, though omnipotent, is, always must be,
limited. His ability to act is limited and determined by the "pure
ideals," in which "must be found the rules after which the creative
agency must go forth." In act he is also limited by his choice. The fact
that he is Universal Benevolence estops him from performing any act
which is not in exact accordance therewith. He cannot construct a
rational being, to whom two and two will appear five; and if he should
attempt to, he would cease to be perfect Goodness. Again, the infinite
Person performs an act--of Creation. The act is, must be, limited and
definite; and so must the product--the Universe be. He cannot create an
unlimited Universe, nor perform an infinite act. The very words
unlimited Universe, and as well the notions they express, are
contradictory, and annihilate each other. Further, an infinite act, even
if possible, would not, could not create, or have any relation to the
construction of a Universe. An infinite act must be the realization of
an infinite ideal. The infinite Person has a thorough comprehension of
himself; and consequently a complete idea of himself. That idea, being
the idea of the infinite Person, is infinite; and it is the only
possible infinite idea. He finds this idea realized in himself. But,
should it be in his power to realize it _again_, that exertion of power
would be an infinite act, and its product another infinite Person. No
other infinite act, and no other result, are rationally supposable.

The Universe, then, however large it be, is, must be, limited and
definite. Its magnitude may be inconceivable to us; but in the mind of
its Creator every atom is numbered. No spirit may ever have skirted its
boundary; but that boundary is as clear and distinct to his eye as the
outline of the Alps against a clear sky is to the traveller's. The
questions Where? How far? How long? How much? and the like, are
pertinent only in the Universe; and their answers are always limited and
definite.

The line of thought we have been pursuing is deemed by a large class of
thinkers not only paradoxical, but utterly contradictory and
self-destructive. We speak of a Person, a term which necessarily
involves limitation and condition, as infinite and absolute. We speak of
this infinity and absoluteness as spiritual qualities, which are
conditional and limiting to him. We speak of him as conditioned by an
inability to be finite. In fine, to those good people, the Limitists,
our sense seems utter nonsense. It is required, therefore, for the
completion of this portion of our task, to present a rational ground
upon which these apparent contradictions shall become manifestly
consistent.

In those sentences where the infinite Person is spoken of as limited and
unlimited, &c., it is evident that there is a play upon words, and that
they apply to different qualities in the personality. It is not said, of
course, that the number of his faculties is limited and unlimited; or
that his self-complacency is boundless and constrained; or that his act
is conditioned and unconditioned. Nor are these seeming paradoxes stated
to puzzle and disturb. They are written to express a great, fundamental,
and all-important truth, which seems never once to have shadowed the
minds of the Limitists,--a truth which, when once seen, dispels forever
all the ghostly battalions of difficulties which they have raised. The
truth is this.

That Being whose limitations, conditions, and relations are wholly
subjective, _i. e._ find their whole base and spring in his self; and
who is therefore entirely free from on all possible limitations,
conditions, and relations, from without himself; and who possesses,
therefore, all possible fulness of all possible excellences, and finds
the perennial acme of happiness in self-contemplation, and the
consciousness of his perfect worth; and being such is ground for all
other possible being; is, in the true philosophical sense, unrelated,
unconditioned, unlimited. Or, in other words, the conditions imposed by
Universal Genius upon the absolute and infinite Person are _different in
kind_ from the conditions imposed upon finite persons and physical
things. The former in no way diminish aught from the fulness of their
possessor's endowments; the latter not only do so diminish, but render
it impossible for their possessor to supply the deficiency.

The following dictum will, then, concisely and exactly express the truth
we have attained.

_Those only are conditions, in the philosophical sense, which diminish
the fulness of the possessor's endowments._

An admirable illustration of this truth can be drawn from some
reflections of Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., which we quote. "What we need
is not merely a rule by which to direct _the process_ in the attainment
of any artistic end, but we must find the legislator who may determine
the end itself"...

Whence is the ultimate behest that is to determine the archetype, and
control the pure spontaneity in its action.

       *       *       *       *       *

"Must the artist work merely because there is an inner want to gratify,
with no higher end than the gratification of the highest constitutional
craving? Can we find nothing beyond a want, which shall from its own
behest demand that this, and not its opposite, shall be? Grant that the
round worlds and all their furniture are _good_--but why good? Certainly
as means to an end. Grant that this end, the happiness of sentient
beings, is _good_--but why good? Because it supplies the want of the
Supreme Architect. And is this the _supreme good_? Surely if it is, we
are altogether within nature's conditions, call our ultimate attainment
by what name we may. We have no origin for our legislation, only as the
highest architect finds such wants within himself, and the archetypal
rule for gratifying his wants in the most effectual manner; and
precisely as the ox goes to his fodder in the shortest way, so he goes
to his work in making and peopling worlds in the most direct manner.
Here is no will; no personality; no pure autonomy. The artist finds
himself so constituted that he must work in this manner, or the craving
of his own nature becomes intolerable to himself, and the gratifying of
this craving is _the highest good_."

We attain hereby a mark by which to distinguish the diminishing from the
undiminishing condition. A sense of want, _a craving_, is the necessary
result of a diminishing condition. Hence the presence of any craving is
the distinguishing mark of the finite; and that plenitude of endowments
which excludes all possible craving or lack, is the distinguishing mark
of the infinite and absolute Person. In this plenitude his infinity and
absoluteness consist; and it is, therefore, conditional of them. Upon
this plenitude, as conditional of this Person's perfection, Dr. Hickok
speaks further, as follows:--

"We must find that which shall itself be the reason and law for
benevolence, and for the sake of which the artist shall be put to his
beneficent agency above all considerations that he finds his nature
craving it. It must be that for whose sake, happiness, even that which,
as kind and benevolent, craves on all sides the boon to bless others,
itself should be. Not sensient nor artistic autonomy, but a pure ethic
autonomy, which knows that within itself there is an excellency which
obliges for the sake of itself. This is never to be found, nor anything
very analogous to it, in sensient nature and a dictate from some
generalized experience. It lies within the rational spirit, and is law
in the heart, as an inward imperative in its own right, and must there
be found.... This inward witnessing capacitates for self-legislating and
self-rewarding. It is inward consciousness of a worth imperative above
want; an end in itself, and not means to another end; a user of things,
but not itself to be used by anything; and, on account of its intrinsic
excellency, an authoritative determiner for its own behoof of the entire
artistic agency with all its products, and thus a conscience excusing or
accusing.

"This inward witnessing of the absolute to his own worthiness, gives the
ultimate estimate to nature, which needs and can attain to nothing
higher, than that it should satisfy this worthiness as end; and thereby
in all his works, he fixes, in his own light, upon the subjective
archetype, and attains to the objective result of that which is
befitting his own dignity. It is, therefore, in no craving want which
must be gratified, but from the interest of an inner behest, which
should be executed for his own worthiness' sake, that 'God has created
all things, and for his pleasure they are and were created.'"

In the light of the foregoing discussion and illustrations, the division
of conditions into two classes--the one class, conditions proper,
comprising those which diminish the endowments of the being upon whom
they lie, and are ground for a craving or lack; and the other class,
comprising those conditions which do not diminish the endowments of the
being upon whom they lie, and which are, therefore, ground for perfect
plenitude of endowments, and of self-satisfaction on account thereof--is
seen to be thoroughly philosophical. And let it be here noted, that the
very construction, or, if the term suit better, perception of this
distinction, is a decisive evidence of the fact, and a direct product of
the operation of the Pure Reason. If our intellect comprised only what
the Limitists acknowledge it to be, a Sense and an Understanding, not
only could no other but diminishing conditions be thought of, but by no
possibility could a hint that there were any others flit through the
mind. Such a mind, being wholly in nature, and conditioned by nature,
_cannot_ climb up out of nature, and perceive aught there. But those
conditions which lie upon the infinite Person are supernatural and
spiritual; and could not be even vaguely guessed at, much more examined
critically and classified, but by a being possessed of a faculty the
same in kind with the intellect in which such spiritual conditions
inhere.

The actual processes which go on in the mind are as follows. The Sense,
possessing a purely mechanical structure, a structure not differing in
_kind_ from that of the vegetable,--both being alike entirely
conditioned by the law of cause and effect,--perceives phenomena. The
relation of the object to the sensorium, or of the image to the sensory,
and the forms under which the Sense shall receive the impression, are
fixed. Because the Sense acts compulsorily, in fixed mechanical forms,
it is, by this very construction, incapable, not only of receiving
impressions and examining phenomena outside of those forms, but it can
never be startled with the guess that there _is_ anything else than what
is received therein. For instance: A man born blind, though he can have
no possible notion of what light is, knows that light is, from the
testimony of those who can see. But if a race of men born blind should
be found, who had never had any communication with men who could see, it
is notorious that they could have no possible notion even that light
was. A suspicion of its existence could never cross their minds. This
position is strengthened and established beyond controversy, by the
failure of the mind in its efforts to construct an entirely new sense.
Every attempt only intensifies our appreciation of the futility of the
effort. From fragments of the five senses we might, perhaps, construct a
patchwork sixth; but the mind makes no presentation to itself of a new
sense. The reason is, that, to do so, the Sense, as mental faculty, must
transcend the very conditions of its existence. It is precisely with the
Understanding as with the lower faculty. It cannot transcend its limits.
It can add no item to the sum of human knowledge, except as it deduces
it from a presentation by the Sense. Hence its conditions correspond to
those in its associate faculty.

It is manifest, then, that a being with only these faculties may
construct a _system_, but can never develop a _science_. It can arrange,
classify, by such standards as its fancy may select, the phenomena in
nature; but this must be in accordance with some sensuous form. _No law
can be seen_, by which it ought to be so, and not otherwise. Such
classification must always be determined by the number of stamens in the
flower, for instance; and that standard, though arbitrary, will be as
good as any other, _unless there comes a higher faculty_ which,
overlooking all nature, perceives the _a priori_ law working in nature,
which gives the ultimate ground for an exhaustive development of a
science which in its _idea_ cannot be improved. It is manifest, further,
that those conditions, to which we have applied the epithet proper, lie
upon the two faculties we have been considering. In this we agree with
the Limitists.

It now behooves to present the fact that the faculty whose existence was
proved in the earlier part of our work, is competent to overlook, and so
comprehend nature, and all the conditions of nature, and thereby assign
to said conditions their true and inferior place, while it soars out of
nature, and intuits those _a priori_ laws which, though the conditions
of, are wholly unconditioned _by nature_; but which are both the
conditions of and conditioned by the supernatural; and this in an
entirely different sense from the other. This is the province of the
Pure Reason. Standing on some lofty peak, above all clouds of sense,
under the full blaze of eternal truth, the soul sees all nature spread
like a vast map before her searching eye, sharply observes, and
appreciates all the conditions of nature; and then, while holding it
full in the field of her vision, with equal fulness perceives that other
land, the spiritual plains of the supernatural, sees them too in all
their conditionings; and sees, with a clearness of vision never
approximated by the earthly eye, the fact that these supernatural
conditions are no deprivation which awaken a want, but that they inhere
and cohere, as final ground for absolute plenitude of endowments and
fulness of bliss, in the Self-existent Person.

It will be objected to the position now attained, that it involves the
doctrine that the Pure Reason in the finite spiritual person is on a par
with the Universal Genius in the infinite spiritual Person. The
objection is fallacious, because based upon the assumption that likeness
in mode of action involves entire similarity. The mode of action in the
finite Pure Reason is precisely similar to that of the Universal Genius;
the objects perceived by both are the same, they are seen in the same
light, and so are in accord; but the _range_ of the finite is one, and
the _range_ of the infinite is another; and so diverse also are the
circumstances attending the act of seeing. The range of the finite
Reason is, _always must be, partial_: the range of the infinite Reason
is, _always must be, exhaustive_ (not infinite). In circumstances, the
finite Reason is created dependent for existence, must begin in a germ
in which it is inactive, and _must_ be developed by association with
nature, and under forms of nature; and can never, by any possibility of
growth, attain to that perfectness in which it shall be satisfied, or to
a point in development from which it can continue its advance as _pure
spirit_. It always must be spirit in a body; even though that be a
spiritual body. The infinite Reason is self-existent, and therefore
independent; and is, and always must be, in the absolute possession of
all possible knowledge, and so cannot grow. Hence, while the infinite
and finite reasons see the same object in the same light, and therefore
_alike_, the difference in range, and the difference in circumstance,
must forever constitute them dissimilar. The exact likeness of sight
just noticed is the _necessary a priori_ ground upon which a moral
government is _possible_.

In thus declaring the basis upon which the above distinction between the
two classes of conditions rests, we have been led to distinguish more
clearly between the faculties of the mind, and especially to observe how
the Pure Reason enables us thereby to solve the problems she has raised.
In this radical distinction lies the rational ground for the explication
of all the problems which the Limitists raise. It also appears that the
terms must, possible, and the like, being used to express no idea of
restraint, as coming from without upon the infinite Person, or of lack
or craving, as subsisting within him, are properly employed in
expressing the fact that his _Self, as a priori ground for his
activity_, is, though the only, yet a real, positive, and irremovable
limit, condition, and law of his action. Of two possible ends he may
freely choose either. Of all possible modes of action he may choose one;
but the constituting laws of the Self he _cannot_, and the moral laws of
his Self he _will not_, violate.

That point has now been reached at which this branch of the discussion
in hand may be closed. The final base from which to conduct an
examination of the questions respecting absoluteness and infinity has
been attained. In the progress to this consummation it was found that a
radical psychological error lay at the root of the philosophy taught by
the Limitists. Their theory was seen to be partial, and essentially
defective. Qualities which they do not recognise were found to belong to
certain mental affirmations. Four classes of these affirmations or ideas
were named and illustrated; and by them the fact of the Reason was
established. Then its mode of activity and its functions were stated;
and finally the great truth which solves the problem of the ages was, by
this faculty, attained and stated. It became evident that the final
cause of the Universe must be found without the Universe; and it was
then seen that

     That spiritual Person who is self-existent, absolute, and
     infinite, is the Ultimate Ground, the Final Cause, of the
     Universe.

Definitions of the terms absolute and infinite suitable to such a
position were then given, with a few concluding reflections. From the
result thus secured the way is prepared for an examination of the
general principles and their special applications which the Limitists
maintain, and this will occupy our future pages.




PART II.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITION OF THE LIMITISTS, AND OF
CERTAIN GENERAL COROLLARIES UNDER IT.


It has been attempted in the former pages to find a valid and final
basis of truth, one which would satisfy the cravings of the human soul,
and afford it a sure rest. In the fact that God made man in his own
image, and that thus there is, _to a certain extent_, a community of
faculties, a community of knowledge, a community of obligations, and a
community of interests, have we found such a basis. We have hereby
learned that a part of man's knowledge is necessary and final; in other
words, that he can know the truth, and be sure that his knowledge is
correct. If the proofs which have been offered of the fact of the Pure
Reason, and the statements which have been made of the mode of its
activity and of its functions, and, further, of the problem of the
Universe, and the true method for solving it, shall have been
satisfactory to the reader, he will now be ready to consider the
analysis of Sir William Hamilton's fundamental proposition, which was
promised on an early page. We there gave, it was thought, sufficiently
full extracts for a fair presentation of his theory, and followed them
with a candid epitome. In recurring to the subject now, and for the
purpose named, we are constrained at the outset to make an
acknowledgment.

It would be simple folly, a childish egotism, to pass by in silence the
masterly article on this subject in the "North American Review" for
October, 1864, and after it to pretend to offer anything new. Whatever
the author might have wrought out in his own mental workshop,--and his
work was far less able than what is there given,--that article has left
nothing to be said. He has therefore been tempted to one of two courses:
either to transfer it to these pages, or pass by the subject entirely.
Either course may, perhaps, be better than the one finally chosen; which
is, while pursuing the order of his own thought, to add a few short
extracts therefrom. One possibility encourages him in this, which is,
that some persons may see this volume, who have no access to the Review,
and to whom, therefore, these pages will be valuable. To save needless
repetition, this discussion will presuppose that the reader has turned
back and perused the extracts and epitome above alluded to.

Upon the very threshold of Sir William Hamilton's statement, one is met
by a logical _faux pas_ which is truly amazing. Immediately after the
assertion that "the mind can know only the _limited and the
conditionally limited_," and in the very sentence in which he denies the
possibility of a knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute, _he proceeds to
define those words in definite and known terms_! The Infinite he defines
as "the unconditionally unlimited," and the Absolute as "the
unconditionally limited." Or, to save him, will one say that the
defining terms are unknown? So much the worse, then! "The Infinite," an
unknown term, may be represented by _x_; and the unconditionally
unlimited, a compound unknown term, by _ab_. Now, who has the right to
say, either in mathematics or metaphysics, in any philosophy, that
_x_=_ab_? Yet such dicta are the basis of "The Philosophy of the
Unconditioned." But, one of two suppositions is possible. Either the
terms infinite and absolute are known terms and definable, or they are
unknown terms and undefinable. Yet, Hamilton says, they are unknown and
definable. Which does he mean? If he is held to the former, they are
unknown; then all else that he has written about them are batches of
meaningless words. If he is held to the latter, they are definable;
then are they known, and his system is denied in the assertion of it.
Since his words are so contradictory, he must be judged by his deeds;
and in these he always assumes that we have a positive knowledge of the
infinite and absolute, else he would not have argued the matter; for
there can be no argument about nothing. Our analysis of his theory,
then, must be conducted upon this hypothesis.

Turn back for a moment to the page upon which his theory is quoted, and
read the last sentence. Is his utterance a "principle," or is it a
judgment? Is it an axiom, or is it a guess. The logician asserts that we
know only the conditioned, and yet bases his assertion upon "the
principles," &c. What is a principle, and how is it known? If it is
axiom, then he has denied his own philosophy in the very sentence in
which he uttered it. And this, we have no hesitation in saying, is just
what he did. He blindly assumed certain "fundamental laws of
thought,"--to quote another of his phrases--to establish the impotence
of the mind to know those laws _as fundamental_. Again, if his
philosophy is valid, the words "must," "necessary," and the like are
entirely out of place; for they are unconditional. In the conditioned
there is, can be, no must, no necessity.

From these excursions about the principle let us now return to the
principle itself. It may be stated concisely thus: There are two
extremes,--"the Absolute" and the "Infinite." These include all being.
They are contradictories, that is, one must be, to the exclusion of the
other. But the mind can "conceive" of neither. What, then, is the
logical conclusion? _That the mind cannot conceive of anything._ What is
his conclusion? That the mind can conceive of something between the
infinite and the absolute, which is neither the one nor the other, but a
_tertium quid_--the conditioned. Where did this _tertium quid_ come
from, when he had already comprehended everything in the two extremes?
If there is a mean, the conditioned, and the two extremes, then
"excluded middle" has nothing to do with the matter at all.

To avoid the inevitable conclusion of his logic as just stated, Hamilton
erected the subterfuge of _mental imbecility_. To deny any knowledge to
man, was to expose himself to ridicule. He, therefore, and his followers
after him, drew a line in the domain of knowledge, and assigned to the
hither side of it all knowledge that can come through generalizations in
the Understanding; and then asserted that the contradictions which
appeared in the mind, when one examined those questions which lie on the
further side of that line, resulted from the impotency of the mind to
comprehend the questions themselves. This was, is, their psychology. How
satisfactory it may be to Man, a hundred years, perhaps, will show. But
strike out the last assertion, and write, Both are cognizable; and then
let us proceed with our reasoning. The essayist in the North American
presents the theory under four heads, as follows:--

"1. The Infinite and Absolute as defined, are contradictory and
exclusive of each other; yet, one must be true.

"2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible.

"3. Each is inconceivable; and the inconceivability of each is referable
to the same cause, namely, mental imbecility.

"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable between
them."

The first and fourth points require our especial attention.

1. Let us particularly mark, then, that it is _as defined_, that the
terms are "contradictory." The question, therefore, turns upon the
definitions. Undoubtedly the definitions are erroneous; but in order to
see wherein, the following general reflections may be made:--

The terms infinite and absolute, as used by philosophers, have two
distinct applications: one to Space and Time, and one to God. Such
definitions as are suitable to the latter application, and
self-consistent, have already been given. Though reluctant to admit into
a philosophical treatise a term bearing two distinct meanings, we shall
waive for a little our scruples,--though choosing, for ourselves, to
use the equivalent rather than the term.

Such definitions are needed, then, as that absolute Space and Time shall
not be contradictory to infinite Space and Time. Let us first observe
Hamilton's theory. According to it, Space, for instance, is either
unconditional illimitation, or it is unconditional limitation; in other
words, it is illimitable, or it is a limited whole. The first part of
the assertion is true. That Space is illimitable, is unquestionably a
self-evident truth. Any one who candidly considers the subject will see
not only that the mind cannot assign limits to Space, but that the
attempt is an absurdity just alike in kind with the attempt to think two
and two five. The last part is a psychological blunder, has no
pertinence to the question, and is not what Hamilton was groping for. He
was searching for the truth, that _there is no absolute unit in
Space_. A limited whole has nothing to do with the matter in
hand--absoluteness--at all. The illimitability of Space, which has just
been established as an axiom, precludes this. What, then, is the
opposite pole of thought? We have just declared it. There is no absolute
unit of Space; or, in other words, all division is in Space, but Space
is indivisible. This, also, is an axiom, is self-evident. We attain,
then, two poles of thought, and definitions of the two terms given,
which are exhaustive and consistent.

    "Space is illimitable.
    Space is indivisible."

The one is the infinity of Space, the other is the absoluteness of
Space. The fact, then, is, all limitation is _in_ Space, and all
division is _in_ Space; but Space is neither limited or divided. One of
the logician's extremes is seen, then, to have no foundation in fact;
and that which is found to be true is also found to be consistent with,
nay, essential to, what should have been the other.

Having hitherto expressed a decided protest against any attempt to find
out God through the forms of Space and Time, a repetition will not be
needed here. God is only to be sought for, found, and studied, by such
methods as are suitable to the supreme spiritual Person. Hence all the
attempts of the Limitists to reason from spatial and temporal
difficulties over to those questions which belong to God, are simply
absurd. The questions respecting Space and Time are to be discussed by
themselves. And the questions respecting God are to be discussed by
themselves. He who tries to reason from the one to the other is not less
absurd than he who should try to reason from a farm to the
multiplication table.

In Sir William Hamilton's behalf it should be stated, that there is just
a modicum of truth underlying his theory,--just enough to give it a
degree of plausibility. The Sense, as faculty for the perception of
physical objects, or their images, and the Understanding as discursive
faculty for passing over and forming judgments upon the materials
gathered by the Sense, lie under the shadow of a law very like the one
he stated. The Sense was made _incapable_ of perceiving an ultimate atom
or of comprehending the universe. From the fact that the Sense never has
perceived these objects, the Understanding concludes that it never will.
Only by the insight and oversight of that higher faculty, the Pure
Reason, do we come to know that it never _can_. It was because those
lower faculties are thus walled in by the conditions of Space and Time,
and are unable to perceive or conceive anything out of those conditions,
and because, in considering them, he failed to see the other mental
powers, that Sir William Hamilton constructed his Philosophy of the
Unconditioned.

2. Neither of them can be conceived as possible.

Literally, this is true. The word "conceive" applies strictly to the
work of the Understanding; and that faculty can never have any notion of
the Infinite or Absolute. But, assuming that "conceive" is a general
term for cognize, the conclusion developed just above is inevitable. If
all being is in one or the other, and neither can be known, nothing can
be known.

3. They cannot be known, because of mental imbecility. If man can know
nothing because of mental imbecility, why suppose that he has a mental
faculty at all? Why not enounce, as the fundamental principle of one's
theory, the assertion, All men are idiots? This would be logically
consistent. The truth is, the logician was in a dilemma. He must confess
that men know something. By a false psychology he had ruled the Reason
out of the mind, and so had left himself no faculty by which to form any
notion of absoluteness and infinity; and yet they would thrust
themselves before him, and demand an explanation. Hence, he constructed
a subterfuge. He would have been more consistent if he had said, There
is no absolute and infinite. The conditioned is the whole of existence;
and this the mind knows.

"4. As opposite extremes, they include everything conceivable between
them."

What the essayist in the North American says upon this point is so apt,
and so accords with our own previous reflections, that we will not
forbear making an extract. "The last of the four theses will best be
re-stated in Hamilton's own words; the italics are his. 'The conditioned
is the mean between two extremes--two inconditionates, exclusive of each
other, neither of which _can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on
the principles of contradiction and excluded middle, one _must be
admitted as necessary_.' This sentence excites unmixed wonder. To
mention in the same breath the law of excluded middle, and two
contradictions with a mean between them, requires a hardihood
unparalleled in the history of philosophy, except by Hegel. If the two
contradictory extremes are themselves incogitable, yet include a
cogitable mean, why insist upon the necessity of accepting either
extreme? This necessity of accepting one of two contradictories is
wholly based upon the supposed impossibility of a mean; if the mean
exists, that may be true, and both the contradictories false. But if a
mean between the two contradictories be both impossible and absurd,
(and we have hitherto so interpreted the law of excluded middle,)
Hamilton's conditioned entirely vanishes."

Upon a system which, in whatever aspect one looks at it, is found to be
but a bundle of contradictions and absurdities, further criticism would
appear to be unnecessary.

Having, impliedly at least, accepted as true Sir William Hamilton's
psychological error,--the rejection of the Reason as the intellectual
faculty of the spiritual person,--and having, with him, used the terms
limit, condition, and the like, in such significations as are pertinent
to the Sense and Understanding only, the Limitists proceed to present in
a paradoxical light many questions which arise concerning "the
Infinite." They take the ground that, to our view, he can be neither
person, nor intellect, nor consciousness; for each of these implies
limitation; and yet that it is impossible for us to know aught of him,
except as such. Then having, as they think, completely confused the
mind, they draw hence new support for their conclusion, that we can
attain to no satisfactory knowledge on the subject. The following
extracts selected from many will show this.

"Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in
whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction
between one object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of
something; and that something can only be known as that which it is, by
being distinguished from that which it is not. But distinction is
necessarily a limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from
another, it must possess some form of existence which the other has not,
or it must not possess some form which the other has. But it is obvious
that the Infinite cannot be distinguished, as such, from the Finite, by
the absence of any quality which the Finite possesses; for such absence
would be a limitation. Nor yet can it be distinguished by the presence
of an attribute which the Finite has not; for as no finite part can be a
constituent of an infinite whole, this differential characteristic must
itself be infinite; and must at the same time have nothing in common
with the finite....

"That a man can be conscious of the Infinite, is thus a supposition
which, in the very terms in which it is expressed, annihilates itself.
Consciousness is essentially a limitation; for it is the determination
of the mind to one actual out of many possible modifications. But the
Infinite, if it is conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially
everything, and actually nothing; for if there is anything in general
which it cannot become, it is thereby limited; and if there is anything
in particular which it actually is, it is thereby excluded from being
any other thing. But again, it must also be conceived as actually
everything, and potentially nothing; for an unrealized potentiality is
likewise a limitation. If the infinite can be that which it is not, it
is by that very possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a
higher perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no
characteristic feature by which it can be distinguished from anything
else, and discerned as an object of consciousness....

"Rationalism is thus only consistent with itself when it refuses to
attribute consciousness to God. Consciousness, in the only form in which
we can conceive it, implies limitation and change,--the perception of
one object out of many, and a comparison of that object with others. To
he always conscious of the same object, is, humanly speaking, not to be
conscious at all; and, beyond its human manifestation, we can have no
conception of what consciousness is."--_Limits of Religious Thought_,
pp. 93-95.

"As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the
conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge and of
positive thought--thought necessarily supposes conditions. To _think_ is
to _condition_; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the
possibility of thought....

"Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible
under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought; known only in
correlation, and mutually limiting each other; while, independently of
this, all that we know either of subject or object, either of mind or
matter, is only a knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of
the different, of the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit that the
consequence of this doctrine is--that philosophy, if viewed as more than
a science of the conditioned, is impossible. Departing from the
particular, we admit that we can never, in out highest generalizations,
rise above the finite; that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter,
can be nothing more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of
an existence, which in itself it is our highest wisdom to recognize as
beyond the reach of philosophy."

"In all this, so far as human intelligence is concerned, we cordially
agree; for a more complete admission could not be imagined, not only
that a knowledge, and even a notion, of the absolute is impossible for
man, but that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such a
knowledge even in the Deity himself, without contradicting our human
conceptions of the possibility of intelligence itself."--_Sir William
Hamilton's Essays_, pp. 21, 22, 38.

"The various mental attributes which we ascribe to God--Benevolence,
Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, for example--can be conceived by us only as
existing in a benevolent and holy and just and wise Being, who is not
identical with any one of his attributes, but the common subject of them
all; in one word, a _Person_. But Personality, as we conceive it, is
essentially a limitation and relation. Our own personality is presented
to us as relative and limited; and it is from that presentation that all
our representative notions of personality are derived. Personality is
presented to us as a relation between the conscious self and the various
modes of his consciousness. There is no personality in abstract thought
without a thinker: there is no thinker unless he exercises some mode of
thought. Personality is also a limitation; for the thought and the
thinker are distinguished from and limit each other; and the various
modes of thought are distinguished each from each by limitation
likewise...."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 102.

"Personality, with all its limitations, though far from exhibiting the
absolute nature of God as He is, is yet truer, grander, more elevating,
more religious, than those barren, vague, meaningless abstractions in
which men babble about nothing under the name of the Infinite and
Personal conscious existence, limited though it be, is yet the noblest
of all existence of which man can dream.... It is by consciousness alone
that we know that God exists, or that we are able to offer Him any
service. It is only by conceiving Him as a Conscious Being, that we can
stand in any religious relation to Him at all; that we can form
such a representation of Him as is demanded by our spiritual
wants, insufficient though it be to satisfy our intellectual
curiosity."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 104.

The conclusions of these writers upon this whole topic are as follows:--

"The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive
of each other as equally possible; _but only as unable to understand_ as
possible two extremes; one of which, however, on the ground of their
mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognize as true.... And by a
wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very consciousness of our
inability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, inspired with
a belief in the existence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere
of all comprehensive reality."--_Sir William Hamilton's Essays_, p. 22.

"To sum up briefly this portion of my argument. The conception of the
Absolute and Infinity, from whatever side we view it, appears
encompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing
such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others;
and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a
contradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in
conceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as
personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal.
It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active; nor, without
equal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived
as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only
of that sum."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, pp. 84, 85.

We have quoted thus largely, preferring that the Limitists should speak
for themselves. Their doctrine, as taught, not simply in these passages,
but throughout their writings, may be briefly summed up as follows.

The human mind, whenever it attempts to investigate the profoundest
subjects which come before it, and which it is goaded to examine, finds
itself in an inextricable maze of contradictions; and, after vainly
struggling for a while to get out, becomes nonplussed, confused,
confounded, dazed; and, falling down helpless and effortless in the
maze, and with devout humility acknowledging its impotence, it finds
that the "highest reason" is to pass beyond the sphere and out of the
light of reason, into the sphere of a superrational and therefore dark,
and therefore _blind_ faith.

But it is to be stated, and here we strike to the centre of the errors
of the Limitists, that a perception and confession of mental impotence
is _not_ the logical deduction from their premises. Lustrous as may be
their names in logic,--and Sir William Hamilton is esteemed a sun in the
logical firmament,--no one of them ever saw, or else dared to
acknowledge, the logical sequence from their principles. They have
climbed upon the dizzy heights of thought, and out on their verge; and
there they stand, hesitating and shivering, like naked men on Alpine
precipices, with no eagle wings to spread and soar away towards the
Eternal Truth; and not daring to take the awful plunge before them.
Behold the gulf from which they shrink. Mr. Mansel says:--

"It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our duty
to believe that He is infinite. It is true that we cannot reconcile
these two representations with each other, as our conception of
personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion
of infinity. But it does not follow that this contradiction exists
anywhere but in our own minds: it does not follow that it implies any
impossibility in the absolute nature of God. The apparent contradiction,
in this case, as in those previously noticed, is the necessary
consequence of an attempt on the part of the human thinker to transcend
the boundaries of his own consciousness. It proves that there are limits
to man's power of thought; and it proves no more."--_Limits of Religious
Thought_, p. 106.

Or, to put it in sharp and accurate, plain and unmistakable English. "It
is our duty to think of God as personal," when to think of Him as
personal is to think a lie; "to believe that He is infinite," when so to
believe is to believe the lie already thought; and when to believe a lie
is to incur the penalty decreed by the Bible--God's book--upon all who
believe lies. And this is the religious teaching of a professed
Christian minister in one of the first Universities in the world. Not
that Mr. Mansel meant to teach this. By no means. But it logically
follows from his premises. In his philosophy the mind instinctively,
necessarily, and with equal authority in each case, asserts

That there must be an infinite Being;

That that Being must be Self-conscious,

Must be unlimited; and that

Consciousness is a limitation.

These assertions are contradictory and self-destructive. What follows
then? That the mind is impotent? No! It follows that the mind is a
deceiver! We learn again the lesson we have learned before. It is not
weakness, it is falsehood: it is not want of capacity, it is want of
integrity that is proved by this contradiction. Man is worse than a
hopeless, mental imbecile, he is a hopeless, mental cheat.

But is the result true? How can it be, when with all its might the mind
revolts from it, as nature does from a vacuum? True that the human mind
is an incorrigible falsifier? With the indignation of outraged honesty,
man's soul rejects the insulting aspersion, and reasserts its own
integrity and authority. Ages of controversy have failed to obliterate
or cry down the spontaneous utterance of the soul, "I have within myself
the ultimate standard of truth."

It now devolves to account for the aberrations of the Limitists. The
ground of all their difficulties is simple and plain. While denying to
the human mind the faculty of the Pure Reason, they have, _by the (to
them) undistinguished use of that faculty_, raised questions which the
Understanding by no possibility could raise, which the Reason alone is
capable of presenting, and which that Reason alone can solve; and have
attempted to solve them solely by the assistance, and in the forms of,
the Sense and the Understanding. Their problems belong to a spiritual
person; and they attempt to solve them by the inferior modes of an
animal nature. Better, by far, could they see with their ears. All their
processes are developed on the vicious assumption, that the highest form
of knowledge possible to the human mind is a generalization in the
Understanding, upon facts given in the Sense: a form of knowledge which
is always one, whether the substance be distinguished in the form, be a
peach, as diverse from an apple; or a star, as one among a million. The
meagreness and utter insufficiency of this doctrine, to account for all
the phenomena of the human mind, we have heretofore shown; and shall
therefore need only now to distinguish certain special phases of their
fundamental error.

As heretofore, there will be continual occasion to note how the doctrine
of the Limitists, that the Understanding is man's highest faculty of
knowledge, and the logical sequences therefrom respecting the laws of
thought and consciousness vitiate their whole system. One of their most
important errors is thus expressed:--"To be conscious, we must be
conscious of something; and that something can only be known as that
which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not." "Thought
cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only possible under the
antithesis of subject and object of thought known only in correlation,
and mutually limiting each other; while, independently of this, all that
we know either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only a
knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of the different, of
the modified, of the phenomenal." In other words, our highest possible
form of knowledge is that by which we examine the peach, distinguish its
qualities among themselves, and discriminate between them and the
qualities of the apple. And Sir William Hamilton fairly and truly
acknowledges that, as a consequence, science, except as a system of
objects of sense, is impossible.

The fact is, as has been made already sufficiently apparent, that the
diagnosis by the Limitists of the constitution of the mind is erroneous.
Their dictum, that all knowledge must be attained through "relation,
plurality, and difference," is not true. There is a kind of knowledge
which we obtain by a direct and immediate _sight_; and that, too, under
such conditions as are no limitation upon the object thought. For
instance, the mind, by a direct intuition, affirms, "Malice is
criminal." It also affirms that this is an eternal, immutable, universal
law, conditional for all possibility of moral beings. This direct and
immediate sight, and the consciousness attending it, are _full_ of that
one object, and so are occupied only with it; and it does NOT come under
any forms of relation, plurality, and difference. So is it with all _a
priori_ laws. The mode of the pure reason is thus seen to be the direct
opposite of that of the Understanding and the Sense.

Intimately connected with the foregoing is a question whose importance
cannot be overstated. It is one which involves the very possibility of
God's existence as a self-conscious person. To present it, we recur
again to the extracts made just above from Sir William Hamilton.
"Consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and
object of thought known only in correlation, and mutually limiting each
other." Subsequently, he makes the acknowledgment as logically following
from this: "that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such
knowledge," _i. e._ of the absolute, "even in the Deity himself." That
is, God can be believed to be self-conscious only on the ground that the
human intellect is a cheat. The theory which underlies this assertion of
the logician--a theory not peculiar to the Limitists, but which has,
perhaps, been hitherto universally maintained by philosophers--may be
concisely stated thus. In every correlation of subject and object,--in
every instance where they are to be contrasted,--the subject must be
one, and the object must be _another and different_. Hamilton, in
another place, utters it thus: "Look back for a moment into yourselves,
and you will find, that what constitutes intelligence in our feeble
consciousness, is, that there are there several terms, of which the one
perceives the other, of which the other is perceived by the first; in
this consists self-knowledge," &c. Mark the "several terms," and that
the one can only see the other, never itself.

This position is both a logical and psychological error. It is a logical
error because it _assumes_, without argument, that there is involved in
the terms subject and object such a logical contradiction and
contradistinction that the subject cannot be object to itself. This
assumption is groundless. As a matter of fact, it is _generally_ true
that, so far as man is concerned, the subject is one, and the object
another and different. But this by no means proves that it is _always_
so; it only raises the presumption that such may be the case. And when
one comes to examine the question in itself, there is absolutely no
logical ground for the assumption. It is found to be a question upon
which no decision from logical considerations can have any validity,
because _it is purely psychological_, and can only be decided by
evidence upon a matter of fact. Furthermore, it is a psychological
error, because a careful examination shows that, in some instances, the
opposite is the fact; that, in certain experiences, the subject and
object are identical.

This fact that the subject and object are often identical in the
searching eye of human reason, and _always_ so under the eye of
Universal Genius, is of too vast scope and too vital importance to be
passed with a mere allusion. It seems amazing that a truth which, the
instant it is stated, solves a thousand difficulties which philosophy
has raised, should never yet have been affirmed by any of the great
spiritual-eyed thinkers, and that it should have found utterance, only
to be denied, by the pen of the Limitists. A word of personal
reminiscence may be allowed here. The writer came to see this truth
during a process of thought, having for its object the solution of the
problem, How can the infinite Person be self-comprehending, and still
infinite? While considering this, and without ever having received a
hint from any source that the possibility of such a problem had dawned
on a human mind before, there blazed upon him suddenly, like a heaven
full of light, this, which appeared the incomparably profounder
question: How can any soul, not God only, but any soul, be a
self-examiner? Why don't the Limitists entertain and explain this? It
was only years after that he met the negative statement in Herbert
Spencer's book. The difficulty is, that the Limitists have represented
to their minds the mode of the seeing of the Reason, by a sensuous
image, as the eye; and because the eye cannot see itself, have concluded
that the Reason cannot see itself. It is always dangerous to argue from
an illustration; and, in this instance, it has been fatal. If man was
only an animal nature, and so only a _receiver_ of impressions, with a
capacity to generalize from the impressions received, the doctrine of
the Limitists would be true. But once establish that man is also a
spiritual _person_, with a reason, which sees truth by immediate
intuition, and their whole teaching becomes worthless. The Reason is not
receptivity merely, or mainly; it is originator. In its own light it
gives to itself _a priori_ truth, and itself as seeing that truth; and
so the subject and object are identical. This is one of the
differentiating qualities of the spiritual person.

Our position may be more accurately stated and more amply illustrated
and sustained as follows:

_Sometimes, in the created spiritual person, and always in the
self-existent, the absolute and infinite spiritual Person, the subject
and object are_ IDENTICAL.

1. Sometimes in the created spiritual person, the subject and object are
identical. The question is a question of fact. In illustrating the fact,
it will be proved. When a man looks at his hands, he sees they are
instruments for _his_ use. When he considers his physical sense, he
still perceives it to be instrument for _his_ use. In all his
conclusions, judgments, he still finds, not himself, but _his_
instrument. Even in the Pure Reason he finds only _his_ faculty; though
it be the highest possible to intellect. Yet still he searches, searches
for the _I am_; which claims, and holds, and uses, the faculties and
capacities. There is a phrase universally familiar to American
Christians, a fruit of New England Theology, which leads us directly to
the goal we seek. It is the phrase, "self-examination." In all thorough,
religious self-examination the subject and object are identical. In the
ordinary labors and experiences of life, man says, "I can do this or
that;" and he therein considers only his aptitudes and capabilities. But
in this last, this profoundest act, the assertion is not, "I can do this
or that." It is, "I am this or that." The person stands unveiled before
itself, in the awful sanctuary of God's presence. The decision to be
made is not upon the use of one faculty or another. It is upon the end
for which all labor shall be performed. The character of the person is
under consideration, and is to be determined. The selfhood, with all its
wondrous mysteries, is at once subject and object. The I am in man,
alike in kind to that most impenetrable mystery, the eternal I AM of
"the everlasting Father," is now stirred to consider its most solemn
duty. How shall the finite I am accord _itself_ to the pure purpose of
the infinite I AM? It may be, possibly is, that some persons have never
been conscious of this experience. To some, from a natural inaptitude,
and to others, from a perverse disinclination, it may never come. Some
have so little gift of introspection, that their inner experiences are
never observed and analyzed. Their conduct may be beautiful, but they
never know it. Their impressions ever come from without. Another class
of persons shun such an experience as Balshazzar would have shunned, if
he could, the handwriting on the wall. Their whole souls are absorbed in
the pursuit of earthly things. They are intoxicated with sensuous
gratification. The fore-thrown shadow of the coming thought of
self-examination awakens within them a vague instinctive dread; and they
shudder, turn away, and by every effort avoid it. Sometimes they
succeed; and through the gates of death rush headlong into the
spirit-land, only to be tortured forever there with the experience they
so successfully eluded here. For the many thousands, who know by
experience what a calm, candid, searching, self-examination is, now that
their attention has been drawn to its full psychological import, no
further word is necessary. They know that in that supreme insight there
was seen and known, at one and the same instant, in a spontaneous and
simultaneous action of the soul, the seer and the seen as one, as
identical. And this experience is so wide-spread, that the wonder is
that it has not heretofore been assigned its suitable place in
philosophy.

2. Always in the self-existent, the absolute and infinite, spiritual
Person, the subject and object are identical. This question, though one
of fact, cannot be determined _by us_, by our experience; it must be
shown to follow logically from certain _a priori_ first principles. This
may be done as follows. Eternity, independence, universality, are
qualities of God. Being eternal, he is ever the same. Being independent,
he excludes the possibility of another Being to whom he is necessarily
related. Being universal, he possesses all possible endowment, and is
ground for all possible existence; so that no being can exist but by his
will. As Universal Genius, all possible objects of knowledge or
intellectual effort are immanent before the eye of his Reason; and this
is a _permanent state_. He is an object of knowledge, comprehending all
others; and therefore he _exhaustively_ knows himself. He distinguishes
his Self as object, from no what else, because there is no else to
distinguish his Self from; but having an exhaustive self-comprehension,
he distinguishes within that Self all possible forms of being each from
each.

He is absolute, and never learns or changes. There is nothing to learn
and nothing to change to, except to a wicked state; and for this there
_can be to him no temptation_. He is ever the same, and hence there can
be no instant in time when he does not _exhaustively_ know himself. Thus
always in him are the subject and object identical.

These two great principles, viz: That the Pure Reason sees _a priori_
truth _immediately_, and out of all relation, plurality and difference,
and that in the Pure Reason, in self-examination, the subject and object
are identical, by their simple statement explode, as a Pythagorean
system, the mental astronomy of the Limitists. Reason is the sun, and
the Sense and the Understanding, with their satellite faculties, the
circumvolving planets.

The use of terms by the Limitists has been as vicious as their processes
of thought, and has naturally sprung from their fundamental error. We
will note one in the following sentence. "Consciousness, in the only
form in which we can conceive it, implies limitation and change,--the
perception of one object out of many, and a comparison of that object
with others." Conceive is the vicious word. Strictly, it is usable only
with regard to things in Nature, and can have no relevancy to such
subjects as are now under consideration. It is a word which expresses
_only_ such operations as lie in the Sense and Understanding. The
following definition explains this: "The concept refers to all the
things whose common or similar attributes or traits it conceives
(con-cepis), or _grasps together_ into one class and one act of
mind."--_Bowen's Logic_, p. 7. This is not the mode of the Reason's
action at all. It does not run over a variety of objects and select out
from them the points of similarity, and grasp these together into one
act of mind. It sees one object in its unity as pure law, or first
truth; and examines that in its own light. Hence, the proper word is,
_intuits_. Seen from this standpoint, consciousness does _not_ imply
limitation and change. A first truth we always see as _absolute_,--we
are conscious of this sight; and yet we know that neither consciousness
nor sight is any limitation upon the truth. We would paraphrase the
sentence thus: Consciousness, in the highest form in which we know it,
implies and possesses _permanence_; and is the light in which pure truth
is seen as pure object by itself, and forever the same.

It is curious to observe how the Understanding and the Pure Reason run
along side by side in the same sentence; the inferior faculty
encumbering and defeating the efforts of the other. Take the following
for example.

"If the infinite can be that which it is not, it is by that very
possibility marked out as incomplete, and capable of a higher
perfection. If it is actually everything, it possesses no characteristic
feature by which it can be distinguished from anything else, and
discerned as an object of consciousness." The presence in language of
the word infinite and its cognates is decisive evidence of the presence
of a faculty capable of entertaining it as a subject for investigation.
This faculty, the Reason having presented the subject for consideration,
the Understanding seizes upon it and drags it down into her den, and
says, "can be that which it is not." This she says, because she cannot
act, except to conceive, and cannot conceive, except to distinguish
this from something else; and so cannot perceive that the very utterance
of the word "infinite" excludes the word "else." The Understanding
conceives the finite as one and independent, and the infinite as one and
independent. Then the Reason steps in, and says the infinite is
all-comprehending. This conflicts with the Understanding's _conception_,
and so the puzzle comes. In laboring for a solution, the Reason's
affirmation is expressed hypothetically: "If it (the infinite) is
actually everything;" and thereupon the Understanding puts in its blind,
impertinent assertion, "it possesses no characteristic feature by which
it can be distinguished from anything else." _There is nothing else from
which to distinguish it._ The perception of the Reason is as follows.
The infinite Person comprehends intellectually, and is ground for
potentially and actually, all that is possible and real; and so there
can be no else with which to compare him. Because, possessing all
fulness, he is actually everything, by this characteristic feature of
completeness he distinguishes himself from nothing, which is all there
is, (if no-thing--void--can be said to _be_,) beside him; and from any
part, which there is within him. Thus is he object to himself in his own
consciousness.

This vicious working of the Understanding against the Reason, in the
same sentences, can be more fully illustrated from the following
extracts. "God, as necessarily determined to pass from absolute essence
to relative manifestation, is determined to pass either _from the better
to the worse, or from the worse to the better_. A third possibility that
both states are equal, as contradictory in itself, and as contradicted
by our author, it is not necessary to consider."--_Sir William
Hamilton's Essays_, p. 42. "Again, how can the Relative be conceived as
coming into being? If it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it
must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence. But to
conceive an object as non-existent is again a self-contradiction; for
that which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that
conception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; but if we
think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at
one time not to think of an object at all, and at another to think of it
as already in being; but to think of it in the act of becoming, in the
progress from not being into being, is to think that which, in the very
thought, annihilates itself. Here again the Pantheistic hypothesis seems
forced upon us. We can think of creation only as a change in the
condition of that which already exists; and thus the creature is
conceivable only as a phenomenal mode of the being of the
Creator."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 81.

"God," a word which has _no significance_ except to the Reason: "as
necessarily determined,"--a phrase which belongs only to the
Understanding. The opposite is the truth: "to pass from absolute
essence." This can have no meaning except to the Pure Reason: "to
relative manifestation." This belongs to the Understanding. It
contradicts the other; and the process is absurd. The mind balks in the
attempt to think it. In creation there is no such process as "passing
from absolute essence to relative manifestation." The words imply that
God, in passing from the state of absolute essence, ceased to be
absolute essence, and became "relative manifestation." All this is
absurd; and is in the Understanding and Sense. God never _became_. The
Creator is still absolute essence, as before creation; and the
logician's this or that are both false; and his third possibility is not
a contradiction, but the truth. The fact of creation may be thus stated.
The infinite Person, freely according his will to the behest of his
worth, and yet equally free to not so accord his will, put forth from
himself the creative energy; and this under such modes, that he neither
lost nor gained by the act; but that, though the latter state was
diverse from the first, still neither was better than the other, but
both were equally good. Before creation, he possessed absolute plenitude
of endowments. All possible ideals were present before his eye. All
possible joy continued a changeless state in his sensibility. His will,
as choice, was absolute benevolence; and, as act, was competent to all
possible effort. To push the ideal out, and make it real, added nothing
to, and subtracted nothing from, his fulness.

The fact must be learned that muscular action and the working of pure
spirit are so diverse, that the inferior mode cannot be an illustration
of the superior. A change in a pure spirit, which neither adds nor
subtracts, leaves the good unchanged. Hence, when the infinite Person
created, he passed neither from better to worse, nor from worse to
better; but the two states, though diverse, were equally good.

We proceed now to the other extract. "Again, how can the relative," etc.
"If the Relative is a distinct reality from the absolute," then each is
_self-existent_, and independent. The sentence annihilates itself. "It
must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence." The
image here is from the Sense, as usual, and vicious accordingly. It is,
that the soul is to look into void, and see, out of that void, existence
come, without there being any cause for that existence coming. This
would be the phenomenon to the Sense. And the Sense is utterly unable to
account for the phenomenon. The object in the Sense must appear as
_form_; but in the Reason it is idea. Mr. Mansel's presentation may well
be illustrated by a trick of jugglery. The performer stands before his
audience, dressed in tights, and presents the palms of his hands to the
spectators, apparently empty. He then closes his right hand, and then
opening it again, appears holding a bouquet of delicious flowers, which
he hands about to the astonished gazers. The bouquet seems to come from
nothing, _i. e._ to have no cause. It appears "to pass from
non-existence to existence." But common sense corrects the cheating
seeming, and asserts, "There is an adequate cause for the coming of the
bunch of flowers, though we cannot see it." Precisely similar is
creation. Could there have been a Sense present at that instant,
creation would have seemed to it a juggler's trick. Out of nothing
something would have seemed to come. But under the correcting guide of
the Pure Reason, an adequate cause is found. Before creation, the
infinite Person did not manifest himself; and so was actually alone. At
creation his power, which before was immanent, he now made emanent; and
put it forth in the forms chosen from his Reason, and according to the
requirement of his own worth. Nothing was added to God. That which was
ideal he now made actual. The form as Idea was one, the power as
Potentiality was another, and each was in him by itself. He put forth
the power into the form, the Potentiality into the Idea, and the
Universe was. Thus it was that "the Relative came into being." In the
same manner it might be shown how, all along through the writings of the
Limitists, the Understanding runs along by the Reason, and vitiates her
efforts to solve her problems. We shall have occasion to do something of
this farther on.

The topic now under discussion could not be esteemed finished without an
examination of the celebrated dictum, "To think is to condition." Those
who have held this to be universally true, have also received its
logical sequence, that to the finite intellect God cannot appear
self-comprehending. In our present light, the dictum is known to be, not
a universal, but only a partial, truth. It is incumbent, therefore, to
circumscribe its true sphere, and fix it there. We shall best enter upon
this labor by answering the question, What is thinking?

First. In general, and loosely, any mental operation is called thinking.
Second. Specifically, all acts of reflection are thinkings. Under this
head we notice two points. _a._ That act of the Understanding in which
an object presented by the Sense is analyzed, and its special and
generic elements noted, and is thus classified, and its relations
determined, is properly a thinking. Thus, in the object cat I
distinguish specifically that it is domestic, and generically that it is
carnivorous. _b._ That act of the finite spiritual person by which he
compares the judgments of the Understanding with the _a priori_ laws of
the Pure Reason, and by this final standard decides their truth or
error. Thus, the judgment of the young Indian warrior is, that he ought
to hunt down and slay the man who killed his father in battle. The
standard of Reason is, that Malice is criminal. This judgment is found
to involve malice, and so is found to be wrong. Third, the intuitions of
the reason. These, in the finite person, come _after_ a process of
reflection, and are partly consequent upon it; yet they take place in
another faculty, which is developed by this process; but they are such,
that by no process of reflection _alone_ could they be. Thinking, in the
Universal Genius, is the _sight_, at once and forever, of all possible
object of mental effort. It is necessary and _spontaneous_, and so is an
endowment, not an attainment; and is possessed without effort. We are
prepared now to entertain the following statements:--

A. So far as it represents thinking as the active, _i. e._ causative
ground, or agent of the condition, the dictum is not true. The fact of
the thinking is not, cannot be, the ground of the condition. The
condition of the object thought, whatever the form of thinking may be,
must lie as far back at least as the ground of the thinker. Thus, God's
self, as ground for his Genius, must also be ground for _all_
conditions. Yet men think of an object _in its conditions_. This is
because the same Being who constructed the objects in their conditions,
constructed also man as thinker, _correlated to those conditions_, so
that he should think upon things _as they are_. In this view, to think
is not condition, but is mental activity in the conditions already
imposed. Thus it is with the Understanding; and the process of thinking,
as above designated, goes on in accordance with the law stated in _a_,
of the second general definition. It follows, therefore,

B. That so far as the dictum expresses the fact, that within the sphere
of conditions proper,--observing the distinction of conditions into two
classes heretofore made,--the finite intellect must act under them, and
see those objects upon which they lie, accordingly,--as, for instance,
a geometrical figure must be seen in Time and Space,--so far it is true,
and no farther. For instance: To see an eagle flying, is to see it under
all the conditions imposed upon the bird as flying, and the observer as
seeing. But when men intuit the _a priori_ truth, Malice is criminal,
they perceive that it lies under no conditions proper, but is absolute
and universal. We perceive, then,

C. That for all mental operations which have as object pure laws and
ideal forms, and that Being in whom all these inhere, this dictum is not
true. The thinker may be conditioned in the proper sense of that term;
yet he entertains objects of thought which are unconditioned; and they
are not affected by it. Thus, it does not affect the universality of the
principle in morals above noted that I perceive it to be such, and that
necessarily.

Assuming, then, that by the dictum, To think is to condition, is meant,
not that the thinker, by the act of thinking, constructs the conditions,
but that he recognizes in himself, as thinking subject, and in the
object thought, the several conditions (proper) thereof,--the following
statements will define the province of this dictum.

1. The Universe as physical object, the observing Sense, and the
discursive Understanding, lie wholly within it.

2. Created spiritual persons, _as constituted beings,_ also lie wholly
within it. _But it extends no farther._ On the other hand,

3. Created spiritual persons, in their capacities to intuit pure laws,
and pure ideal forms; and those laws and forms themselves lie wholly
without it.

4. So also does God the absolute Being in whom those laws and forms
inhere. Or, in general terms,

When conditions (proper) already lie upon the object thought, since the
thinker must needs see the object under its conditions, it is true that,
To think is to condition. But so far as it is meant that thinking is
such a kind of operation that it cannot proceed except the object be
conditioned, it is not true; for there are processes of thought whose
objects are unconditioned.

The question, "What are Space and Time?" with which Mr. Spencer opens
his chapter on "Ultimate Scientific Ideas," introduces a subject common
to all the Limitists, and which, therefore, should be considered in this
part of our work. A remark made a few pages back, respecting an essay in
the "North American Review" for October 1864, applies with equal force
here in reference to another essay by the same writer, in the preceding
July number of that periodical. At most, his view can only be unfolded.
He has left nothing to be added. In discussing a subject so abstruse and
difficult as this, it would seem, in the present stage of human thought
at least, most satisfactory to set out from the Reason rather than the
Sense, from the idea rather than the phenomenon; and so will we do.

In general, then, it may be said that Space and Time are _a priori_
conditions of created being. The following extracts are in point. "Pure
Space, therefore, as given in the primitive intuition, is pure form for
any possible phenomenon. As unconjoined in the unity of any form, it is
given in the primitive intuition, and is a cognition necessary and
universal. Though now obtained from experience, and in chronological
order subsequent to experience, yet is it no deduction from experience,
nor at all given by experience; but it is wholly independent of all
experience, prior to it, and without which it were impossible that any
experience of outer object should be." "Pure Time, as given in the
intuition, is immediately beheld to be conditional for all possible
period, prior to any period being actually limited, and necessarily
continuing, though all bounded period be taken away."--_Rational
Psychology_, pp. 125, 128.

Again, a clearly defined distinction may be made between them as
conditions. Space is the _a priori_ condition of _material_ being.
Should a spiritual person, as the soul of a man, be stripped of all its
material appurtenances, and left to exist as pure spirit, it could hold
no communication with any other being but God; and no other being but he
could hold any communication with it. It would exist out of all relation
to Space. Not so, however, with Time. Time is the _a priori_ condition
of all created being, of the spiritual as well as material. In the case
just alluded to, the isolated spiritual person would have a
consciousness of succession and duration, although he would have no
standard by which to measure that duration, he could think in processes,
and only in processes, and thus would be necessarily related to Time.
Dr. Hickok has expressed this thus: "Space in reference to time has no
significancy. Time is the pure form for phenomena as given in the
internal sense only, and in these there can be only succession. The
inner phenomenon may endure in time, but can have neither length,
breadth, nor thickness in space. A thought, or other mental phenomenon,
may fill a period, but cannot have superficial or solid content; it may
be before or after another, but not above or below it, nor with any
outer or inner side."--_Rational Psychology_, p. 135.

Space and Time may also be distinguished thus: "Space has three
dimensions," or, rather, there can be three dimensions in
space,--length, breadth, and thickness. In other words, it is solid
room. "Time has but one dimension," or, rather, but one dimension can
enter into Time,--length. In Time there can only be procession. Space
and Time may then be called, the one "statical," the other "dynamical,"
illimitation. Following the essayist already referred to, they may be
defined as follows:

"Space is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Matter.

"Time is the infinite and indivisible Receptacle of Existence."

Both, then, are marked by receptivity, indivisibility, and
illimitability. The one is receptivity, that material object may come
into it; the other, that event may occur in it. There is for neither a
final unit nor any limit. All objects are divisible in Space, and all
periods in Time; and thus also are all limits comprehended, but they are
without limit. Turning now from these more general aspects of the
subject, a detailed examination may be conducted as follows.

The fundamental law given by the Reason is, as was seen above, that
Space and Time are _a priori_ conditions of created being. We can best
consider this law in its application to the facts, by observing two
general divisions, with two sub-divisions under each. Space and Time
have, then, two general phases, one within, and one without, the mind.
Each of these has two special phases. The former, one in the Sense, and
one in the Understanding. The latter, one within, and one without, the
Universe.

First general phase within the mind. First special phase, in the Sense.
"As pure form in the primitive intuition, they are wholly limitless, and
void of any conjunction in unity, having themselves no figure nor
period, and having within themselves no figure nor period, but only pure
diversity, in which any possible conjunction of definite figures and
periods may, in some way, be effected." In other words, they are pure,
_a priori_, formal laws, which are conditional to the being of any sense
as the perceiver of a phenomenon; and yet this sense could present no
figure or period, till some figure or period was produced into it by an
external agency. As such necessary formal laws, Space and Time "have a
necessity of being independently of all phenomena." Or, in other words,
the fact that all phenomena _must_ appear in them, lies beyond the
province of power. This, however, is no more a limit to the Deity than
it is a limit to him that he cannot hate his creatures and be good. In
our experience the Sense gives two kinds of phenomena: the one the
actual phenomena of actual objects, the other, ideal phenomena with
ideal objects. The one is awakened by the presentation, in the physical
sense, of a material object, as a house; the other, by the activity of
the imaging faculty, engaged in constructing some form in the inner or
mental sense, from forms actually observed. Upon both alike the formal
law of Space and Time must lie.

Second special phase, in the Understanding. Although there is pure form,
if there was no more than this, no notion of a system of things could
be. Each object would have its own space, and each event its own time.
But one object and event could not be seen in any relation to another
object and event. In order that this shall be, there must be some ground
by which all the spaces and times of phenomena shall be joined into a
unity of Space and Time; so that all objects shall be seen in one Space,
and all events in one Time. "A notional connective for the phenomena may
determine these phenomena in their places and periods in the whole of
all space and of all time, and so may give both the phenomena and their
space and time in an objective experience." The operation of the
Understanding is, then, the connection, by a notional, of all particular
spaces and times; _i. e._ the space and time of each phenomenon in the
Sense, into a comprehensive unity of Space and Time, in which all
phenomena can be seen to occur; and thus a system can be. In a word, not
only must each phenomenon be seen in its own space and time, but all
phenomena must be seen in _one_ Space and Time. This connection of the
manifold into unity is the peculiar work of the Understanding. An
examination of the facts as above set forth enables us to construct a
general formula for the application to all minds of the fundamental law
given by the Reason. That law, that all objects must be seen in Space,
and all events in Time, involves the subordinate law:

_That no mind can observe material objects or any events except under
the conditions of Space and Time_; or, to change the phraseology, _Space
and Time are_ a priori _conditional to the being of any mind or faculty
in a mind capable of observing a material object or any event_. This
will, perhaps, be deemed to be, in substance, Kant's theory. However
that may be, this is true, but is only _a part of the truth_. The rest
will appear just below. The reader will notice that no exception is made
to the law here laid down, and will start at the thought that this law
lies upon the Deity equally as upon created beings. No exception is
made, because none can be truthfully made. The intellect is just as
unqualified in its assertion on this point as in those noticed on an
earlier page of this work. Equally with the laws of numbers does the law
of Space and Time condition all intellect. The Deity can no more see a
house out of all relation to Space and Time than he can see how to make
two and two five.

Second general phase, without the mind. First special phase, within the
Universe. All that we are now to examine is objective to us; and all the
questions which can arise are questions of fact. Let us search for the
fact carefully and hold it fearlessly. To recur to the general law. It
was found at the outset that Reason gave the idea of Space and Time as
pure conditions for matter and event. We are now to observe the pure
become the actual condition; or, in other words, we are to see the
condition _realized_. Since, then, we are to observe material objects
and events in a material system, it is fitting to use the Sense and the
Understanding; and our statements and conclusions will conform to those
faculties.

We have a concept of the Universe as a vast system in the form of a
sphere in which all things are included. This spherical system is
complete, definite, limited, and so has boundaries. A portion of
"immeasurable void"--Space--has been occupied. Where there was nothing,
something has become. Now it is evident that the possibility of our
having a concept of the Universe, or of a space and a time in the
Universe, is based upon the presence of an actual, underlying,
all-pervading substance, which fills and forms the boundaries of the
Universe, and thus enables spaces and times to be. We have no concept
except as in limits, and those limits are conceived to be substance. In
other words, space is distance, and time is duration, in our concept.
Take away the boundaries which mark the distance, and the procession of
events which forms the duration, and in the concept pure negation is
left. To illustrate. Suppose there be in our presence a cubic yard of
vacuum. Is this vacuum an entity? Not at all. It can neither be
perceived by the Sense nor conceived by the Understanding. Yet it is a
space. Speaking carelessly, we should say that this cube was object to
us. Why? Because it is enclosed by substantial boundaries. All, then,
that is object, all that is entity, is substance. In our concept,
therefore, a space is solid distance within the substance, and the
totality of all distances in the Universe is conceived to be Space.
Again; suppose there pass before our mind a procession of events. One
event has a fixed recurrence. In our concept the procession of events is
a time, and the recurring event marks a period in time. The events
proceeding are all that there is in the concept; and apart from the
procession a conception of time is impossible. The procession of all the
events of the Universe, that is _duration_, is our concept of Time.
Thus, within the Universe, space is solid distance and time is duration;
and neither has any actuality except as the Universe is. Let us assume
for a moment that our concept is the final truth, and observe the
result. In that concept space is limited by matter, and matter is
conceived of as unlimited. This result is natural and necessary, because
matter, substance, "a space-filling force," is the underlying notional
upon which as ground any concept is possible. If matter is truly
illimitable, then materialistic pantheism, which is really atheism,
logically follows. Again; in our concept time is duration, and duration
is conceived of as unlimited. If so, the during event is unlimited. From
this hypothesis idealistic pantheism logically follows. But bring our
concept into the clear light, and under the searching eye of Reason, and
all ground for those systems vanishes instantly. Instead of finding
matter illimitable and the limit for a space, Space is seen to be
illimitable and pure condition, that matter may establish a limit within
it. And Time, instead of being duration, and so limited by the during
event, is found to be illimitable and pure condition, that event may
have duration in it. This brings us to the

Second special phase, without or independent of the Universe. We have
been considering facts in an objective experience, and have used
therefore the Sense and Understanding, as was proper. What we are now to
consider is a subject of which all experience is impossible. It can
therefore be examined only by that faculty which presents it, the Pure
Reason. Remove now from our presence all material object in Space, and
all during event in Time; in a word, remove the Universe, and what will
be left? As the Universe had a beginning, and both it and all things in
it are conditioned by Space and Time, so also let it have an end. Will
its conditions cease in its ceasing? Could another Universe arise, upon
which would be imposed no conditions of Space and Time? These questions
are answered in the statement of them. Those conditions must remain.
When we have abstracted from our _concept_ all substance and duration,
there is left only _void_. Hence, in our concept it would be proper to
say that without the Universe is void, and before the Universe there was
void. Also, that in void there is no thing, no where, and no when; or,
void is the negation of actual substance, space and time. But pure Space
and Time, as _a priori_ conditions that material object and during event
may be, have not ceased. There is still _room_, that an object may
become. There is still _opportunity_, that an event may occur. By the
Reason it is seen that these conditions have the same necessary being
for material object and occurring event, as the conditions of mental
activity have for mind; and they have their peculiar characteristics
exactly according with what they do condition, just as the laws of
thought have their peculiar characteristics, which exactly suit them to
what they condition. If there be a spiritual person, the moral law must
be given in the intuition as necessarily binding upon him; and this is
an _a priori_ condition of the being of such person. Precisely similar
is the relation between Space and Time as _a priori_ conditions, and
object and event upon which they lie. The moral law has its
characteristics, which fit it to condition spiritual person. Space and
Time have their characteristics, which fit them to condition object and
event. Space, then, as room, and Time as opportunity, and both as _a
priori_ conditions of a Universe, must have the same necessity of being
that God has. They _must_ be, as he _must_ be. But observe, they are
pure conditions, and no more. They are neither things nor persons. The
idea of them in the Reason is simple and unanalyzable. They can be
assigned their logical position, but further than this the mind cannot
go.

The devout religious soul will start, perhaps, at some of the positions
stated above. We have not wrought to pain such soul, but only for truth,
and the clue of escape from all dilemmas. The only question to be raised
is, are they true? If a more patient investigation than we have given to
this subject shall show our positions false, then we shall only have
failed as others before us have; but we shall love the truth which shall
be found none the less. But if they shall be found true, then is it
certain that God always knew them so and was always pleased with them,
and no derogation to his dignity can come from the proclamation of them,
however much they may contravene hitherto cherished opinions. Most
blessed next after the Saviour's tender words of forgiveness are those
pure words of the apostle John, "No lie is of the truth."

The conclusions to which we have arrived enable us to state how it is
that primarily God was out of all relation to Space and Time. He was out
of all relation to Space, because he is not material object, thereby
having limits, form, and position in Space. He was out of all relation
to Time, because he holds immediately, and at once, all possible
objects of knowledge before the Eye of his mind. Hence he can learn
nothing, and can experience no process of thought. Within his mind no
event occurs, no substance endures. Yet, while this is true, it is
equally true that, as the Creator, he is conditioned by Space and Time,
just as he is conditioned by himself; and it may be found by future
examination that they are essential to that Self. But, whatever
conclusion may be arrived at respecting so difficult and abstract a
subject, this much is certain: God, as the infinite and absolute
spiritual Person, self-existent and supreme, is the great Fact; and
Space and Time, whatever they are, will, _can_ in no wise interfere with
and compromise his perfectness and supremacy. It is a pleasure to be
able to close this discussion with reflections profound and wise as
those contained in the following extract from the essay heretofore
alluded to.

"The reciprocal relations of Space, Time, and God, are veiled in
impenetrable darkness. Many minds hesitate to attribute real infinity to
Space and Time, lest it should conflict with the infinity of God. Such
timidity has but a slender title to respect. If the Laws of Thought
necessitate any conclusion whatever, they necessitate the conclusion
that Space and Time are each infinite; and if we cannot reconcile this
result with the infinity of God, there is no alternative but to accept
of scepticism with as good a grace as possible. No man is worthy to join
in the search for truth, who trembles at the sight of it when found. But
a profound faith in the unity of all truth destroys scepticism by
anticipation, and prophesies the solutions of reason. Space is infinite,
Time is infinite, God is infinite; three infinites coexist. Limitation
is possible only between existences of the same kind. There could not be
two infinite Spaces, two infinite Times, or two infinite Gods; but while
infinites of the same kind cannot coexist, infinites of unlike kinds
may. When an hour limits a rod, infinite Time will limit infinite Space;
when a year and an acre limit wisdom, holiness, and love, infinite Space
and Time will limit the infinite God. _But not before._ Time exists
ubiquitously, Space exists eternally, God exists ubiquitously and
eternally. The nature of the relations between the three infinites, so
long as Space and Time are ontologically incognizable, is utterly and
absolutely incomprehensible; but to assume contradiction, exclusion, or
mutual limitation to be among these relations, is as gratuitous as it is
irreverent."




PART III.

AN EXAMINATION IN DETAIL OF CERTAIN IMPORTANT PASSAGES IN THE WRITINGS
OF THE LIMITISTS.

ADDITIONAL REFLECTIONS UPON THE WRITINGS OF SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON.


It never formed any part of the plan of this work to give an extended
examination of the logician's system of metaphysics, or even to notice
it particularly. From the first, it was only proposed to attempt the
refutation of that peculiar theory which he enounced in his celebrated
essay, "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," a monograph that has
generally been received as a fair and sufficient presentation thereof;
and which he supplemented, but never superseded. If the arguments
adduced, and illustrations presented, in the first part, in behalf of
the fact of the Pure Reason, are satisfactory, and the analysis and
attempted refutation of the celebrated dictum based upon two extremes,
an excluded middle and a mean, in the second part, are accepted as
sufficient, as also the criticisms upon certain general corollaries, and
the explanation of certain general questions, then, so far at least as
Sir William Hamilton is concerned, but little, if any, further remark
will be expected. A few subordinate passages in the essay above referred
to may, however, it is believed, be touched with profit by the hand of
criticism and explanation. To these, therefore, the reader's attention
is now called.

In remarking upon Cousin's philosophy, Hamilton says: "Now, it is
manifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin is involved in the
proposition, _that the Unconditioned, the Absolute, the Infinite, is
immediately known in consciousness, and this by difference, plurality,
and relation_." It is hardly necessary to repeat here the criticism,
that the terms infinite, absolute, &c. are entirely out of place when
used to express abstractions. As before, we ask, infinite--what? The
fact of abstraction is one of the greatest of limitations, and vitiates
every such utterance of the Limitists. The truth may be thus
stated:--The infinite Person, or the necessary principle as inhering in
that Person, is _immediately_ known in consciousness, and this, not by
difference, plurality, and relation, but by a direct intuition of the
Pure Reason. In this act the object seen--the idea--is held right in the
Reason's eye; and so is seen by itself and in itself. Hence it is not
known by difference, because there is no other object but the one before
that eye, with which to compare it. Neither is it known by plurality,
because it is seen by itself, and there is no other object contemplated,
with which to join it. Nor is it known by relation, because it is seen
to be what it is _in itself_, and as out of all relation. A little
below, in the same paragraph, Hamilton again remarks upon Cousin,
thus:--"The recognition of the absolute as a constitutive principle of
intelligence, our author regards as at once the condition and the end of
philosophy." The true idea, accurately stated, is as follows. The fact
that, by a constituting law of intelligence, the Pure Reason immediately
intuits absoluteness as the distinctive quality of _a priori_ first
principles, and of the infinite Person in whom they inhere, is the
condition, and the application of that fact is the end of philosophy.

These two erroneous positions the logician follows with his celebrated
"statement of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the
Unconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of thought." The
four "opinions," to which he reduces all those held by philosophers, are
too well known to need quotation here. They are noticed now, only to
afford an opportunity for the presentation of a fifth, and, as it is
believed, the true opinion, which is as follows.

The infinite Person is "inconceivable," but is cognizable as a fact, is
known to be, and is, to a certain extent, known to be such and such; all
this, by an immediate intuition of the Pure Reason, of which the
spiritual person is definitely conscious; and that Person is so seen to
be primarily unconditioned, _i. e._ out of all relation, difference, and
plurality.

"Inconceivable." As we have repeatedly said, this word has no force
except with regard to things in nature.

Is cognizable as a fact, &c. Nothing can be more certain than that an
_exhaustive_ knowledge of the Deity is impossible to any creature. But
equally certain is it, that, except as we have some true, positive,
_reliable_ knowledge of him _as he is_, we cannot be moral beings under
his moral government. Take, for instance, the moral law as the
expression of God's nature. 1. Either "God is love," or he is not
love--hate; or he is indifferent, _i. e._ love has no relation to him.
If the last alternative is true, then the other two have no relevancy to
the subject in hand. Upon such a supposition, it is unquestionably true
that he is utterly inscrutable. Then are we in just the condition which
the Limitists assert. But observe the results respecting ourselves. Our
whole moral nature is the most bitter, tantalizing falsehood which it is
possible for us to entertain as an object of knowledge. We feel that we
ought to love the perfect Being. At times we go starving for love to him
and beg that bread. He has no love to give. He never felt a pulsation of
affection. He sits alone on his icy throne, in a realm of eternal snow;
and, covered with the canopy, and shut in by the panoply, of inscrutable
mystery, he mocks our cry. We beg for bread. He gives us a stone. Does
such a picture instantly shock, yea, horrify, all our finer
sensibilities? Does the soul cry out in agony, her rejection of such a
conclusion? In that cry we hear the truth in God's voice; for he made
the soul. Still less can the thought be entertained that he is hate. It
is impossible, then, to think of God except as _love_. We know what love
is. We know what God is. There is a somewhat common to the Deity and
his spiritual creatures. This enables us to attain a final law, as
follows.

_In so far as God's creatures have faculties and capacities in common
with him, in so far do they know him positively; but in all matters to
which their peculiarities as creatures pertain, they only know him
negatively;_ i. e. _they know that he is the opposite of themselves._

That passage which was quoted in a former page, simply to prove that Sir
William Hamilton denied the reality of the Reason as distinct from the
Understanding, requires and will now receive a particular examination.
He says: "In the Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same
function; both seek the one in the many;--the Idea (Idee) is only the
Concept (Begriff) sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the
Understanding which has 'overleaped itself.'" In this sentence, and the
remarks which follow it, the logician shows that he neither comprehends
the assigned function and province of the Reason, nor possesses any
accurate knowledge of the mental phenomena upon which he passes
judgment. A diagnosis could not well be more thoroughly erroneous than
his. For "both faculties" do _not_ "perform the same function." Only the
Understanding seeks "the one in the many." The Reason seeks _the many in
the one_. The functions and modes of activity of the two faculties are
exactly opposite. The Understanding runs about through the universe, and
gathers up what facts it may, and concludes truth therefrom. The Reason
sees the truth _first_, as necessary _a priori_ law, and holding it up
as standard, measures facts by it, or uses the Sense to find the facts
in which it inheres. Besides, the author, in this assertion, is guilty
of a most glaring _petitio principii_. For, the very question at issue
is, whether "both faculties" do "perform the same function"; whether
"both" do "seek the one in the many." In order not to leave the hither
side of the question built upon a bare assertion, it will be proper to
revert to a few of those proofs adduced heretofore. The Reason sees the
truth first. Take now the assertion, Malice is criminal. Is this
primarily learned by experience; or is it an intuitive conviction, which
conditions experience. Or, in more general terms, does a child need to
be taught what guilt is, before it can feel guilty, as it is taught its
letters before it can read; or does the feeling of guilt arise within it
spontaneously, upon a breach of known law. If the latter be the true
experience, then it can only be accounted for upon the ground that an
idea of right and wrong, as an _a priori_ law, is organic in man; and,
by our definition, the presentation of this law to the attention in
consciousness is the act of the Reason. Upon such a theory the one
principle was not sought, and is not found, in the many acts, but the
many acts are compared with, and judged by, that one standard, which was
seen _first_, and as necessarily true. Take another illustration. All
religions, in accounting for the universe, have one common point of
agreement, which is, that some being or beings, superior to it and men,
produced it. And, except perhaps among the most degraded, the more
subtle notion of a final cause, though often developed in a crude form,
is associated with the other. These notions must be accounted for. How
shall it be done? Are they the result of experience? Then, the first
human beings had no such notions. But another and more palpable
objection arises. Are they the result of individual experience? Then
there would be as many religions as individuals. But, very ignorant
people have the experience,--persons who never learned anything but the
rudest forms of work, from the accumulated experience of others; nor by
their own experience, to make the smallest improvement in a simple
agricultural instrument. How, then, could they learn by experience one
of the profoundest speculative ideas? As a last resort, it may be said
they were taught it by philosophers. But this is negatived by the fact,
that philosophers do not, to any considerable extent, teach the people,
either immediately or mediately; but that generally those who have the
least philosophy have the largest influence. And what is most in point,
none of these hypotheses will account for the fact, that the gist of the
idea, however crude its form, is everywhere the same. Be it a Fetish, or
Brahm, or God, in the kernel final cause will be found. It would seem
that any candid mind must acknowledge that no combined effort of men,
were this possible, could secure such universal exactitude. But turn now
and examine any individual in the same direction, as we did just above,
respecting the question of right and wrong, and a plain answer will come
directly. The notion of first cause, however crude and rudimentary its
form, is organic. It arises, then, spontaneously, and the individual
takes it--"the one,"--and in it finds a reason for the phenomena of
nature--"the many,"--and is satisfied. And this is an experience not
peculiar to the philosopher; but is shared equally by the
illiterate,--those entirely unacquainted with scientific abstractions.
These illustrations might be carried to an almost indefinite length,
showing that commonly, in the every-day experiences of life, men are
accustomed not only to observe phenomena and form conclusions, as "It is
cloudy to-day, and may rain to-morrow," but also to measure phenomena by
an original and fixed standard, as, "This man is malicious, and
therefore wicked." Between the two modes of procedure, the following
distinction may always be observed. Conclusions are always doubtful,
only probable. Decisions are always certain. Conclusions give us what
may be, decisions what must be. The former result from concepts and
experience, the latter from intuitions and logical processes. Thus is
made plain the fact that, to give it the most favorable aspect, Sir
William Hamilton, in his eagerness to maintain his theory, has entirely
mistaken one class of human experiences, and so was led to deny the
actuality of the most profound and important faculty of the human mind.
In view of the foregoing results, one need not hesitate to say that,
whether he ever attempted it or not, Kant never "has clearly shown that
the idea of the unconditioned can have no objective reality," for it is
impossible to do this, the opposite being the truth. Its objective
reality is God; it therefore "conveys" to us the most important
"knowledge," and "involves" no "contradictions." Moreover,
unconditionedness is a "simple," "positive," "notion," and not "a
fasciculus of negations"; but is an attribute of God, who comprehends
all positives. A little after, Hamilton says: "And while he [Kant]
appropriated Reason as a specific faculty to take cognizance of these
negations, hypostatized as positive, under the Platonic name of
_Ideas_," &c. Here, again, the psychological question arises, Is the
Reason such a faculty? Are its supposed objects negations? Are they
hypostatized as positive? Evidently, if we establish an affirmative
answer to the first question, a negative to the others follows directly,
and the logician's system is a failure. Again, the discrimination of
thought into _positive_ and _negative_ is simply absurd. All thought is
_positive_. The phrase, negative thought, is only a convenient
expression for the refusal of the mind to think. But "Ideas" are not
thoughts at all, in the strict sense of that term. It refers to the
operations of the mind upon objects which have been presented. Ideas are
a part of such objects. All objects in the mind are positive. The
phrase, negative object, is a contradiction. But, without any deduction,
we see immediately that ideas are positives. The common consciousness of
the human race affirms this.

The following remark upon Cousin requires some notice. "For those who,
with M. Cousin, regard the notion of the unconditioned as a positive and
real knowledge of existence in its all-comprehensive unity, and who
consequently employ the terms _Absolute_, _Infinite_, _Unconditioned_,
as only various expressions for the same identity, are imperatively
bound to prove that their idea of _the One corresponds, either with that
Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Absolute, or with that
Unconditioned we have distinguished as the Infinite, or that it includes
both, or that it excludes both_. This they have not done, and, we
suspect, have never attempted to do." The italics are Hamilton's. The
above statement is invalid, for the following reasons. The Absolute,
therein named, has been shown to be irrelevant to the matter in hand,
and an absurdity. It is self-evident that the term "limited whole," as
applied to Space and Time, is a violation of the laws of thought. Since
we seek the truth, that Absolute must be rejected. Again, the
definitions of the terms absolute and infinite, which have been found
consistent, and pertinent to Space and Time, have been further found
irrelevant and meaningless, when applied to the Being, the One, who is
the Creator. That Being, existing primarily out of all relation to Space
and Time, must, if known at all, be studied, and known as he is. The
terms infinite and absolute will, of necessity, then, when applied to
him, have entirely different significations from what they will when
applied to Space and Time. So, then, no decision of questions arising in
this latter sphere will have other than a negative value in the former.
The questions in that sphere must be decided on their own merits, as
must those in this. What is really required, then, is, that the One, the
Person, be shown to be both absolute and infinite, and that these, as
qualities, consistently inhere in that _unity_. As this has already been
done in the first Part of this treatise, nothing need be added here.

Some pages afterwards, in again remarking upon M. Cousin, Hamilton
quotes from him as follows: "The condition of intelligence _is
difference_; and an act of knowledge is only possible where there exists
a plurality of terms." In a subsequent paragraph the essayist argues
from this, thus: "But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the
condition of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference;
consequently, the condition of the absolute as existing, and under which
it must be known, and the condition of intelligence, as capable of
knowing, are incompatible. For, if we suppose the absolute cognizable,
it must be identified either, first, with the subject knowing; or,
second, with the object known; or, third, with the indifference of
both." Rejecting the first two, Hamilton says: "The _third_ hypothesis,
on the other hand, is _contradictory of the plurality of intelligence_;
for, if the subject of consciousness be known as one, a plurality of
terms is not the necessary condition of intelligence. The alternative is
therefore necessary: Either the absolute cannot be known or conceived at
all, or our author is wrong in subjecting thought to the conditions of
plurality and difference."

In these extracts may be detected an error which, so far as the author
is informed, has been hitherto overlooked by philosophers. The logician
presents an alternative which is unquestionably valid. Yet with almost,
if not entire unanimity, writers have been accustomed to assign
plurality, relation, difference, and--to adopt a valuable suggestion of
Mr. Spencer--likeness, as conditions of all knowledge; and among them
those who have claimed for man a positive knowledge of the absolute. The
error by which they have been drawn into this contradiction is purely
psychological; and arises, like the other errors which we have pointed
out, from an attempt to carry over the laws of the animal nature, the
Sense and Understanding, by which man learns of, and concludes about,
things in nature, to the Pure Reason, by which he sees and knows, with
an _absolutely certain_ knowledge, principles and laws; and to subject
this faculty to those conditions. Now, there can be no doubt but that if
the logician's premiss is true, the conclusion is unavoidable. If "an
act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality of
terms," then is it impossible that we should know God, _or that he
should know himself_. The logic is impregnable. But the conclusion is
revolting. What must be done, then? Erect some makeshift subterfuge of
mental impotence? It will not meet the exigency of the case. It will not
satisfy the demand of the soul. Nay, more, she casts it out utterly, as
a most gross insult. Unquestionably, but one course is left; and that is
so plain, that one cannot see how even a Limitist could have overlooked
it. Correct the premiss. Study out the true psychology, and that will
give us perfect consistency. Hold with a death-grip to the principle
that _every truth is in complete harmony with every other truth_; and
hold with no less tenacity to the principle that the human intellect is
true. And what is the true premiss which through an irrefutable logic
will give us a satisfactory, a true, an undoubted conclusion. This. A
plurality of terms is _not_ the necessary condition of intelligence; but
objects which are pure, simple, unanalyzable, may be directly known by
an intellect. Or, to be more explicit. Plurality, relation, difference,
and likeness, are necessary conditions of intelligence through the Sense
and Understanding; but they do not in the least degree lie upon the
Reason, which sees its objects as pure, simple ideas which are
_self-evident_, and, consequently, are not subject to those conditions.
Whatever knowledge we may have of "mammals," we undoubtedly gain under
the conditions of plurality, relation, difference, and likeness; for
"mammals" are things in nature. But absoluteness is a pure, simple,
unanalyzable idea in the Reason, and as such is seen and known by a
direct insight as out of all plurality, relation, difference, and
likeness: for this is a _quality_ of the self-existent Person, and so
belongs wholly to the sphere of the supernatural, and can be examined
only by a spiritual person who is also supernatural.

Let us illustrate these two kinds of knowledge. 1. The knowledge given
by the Sense and Understanding. This is of material objects. Take, for
example, an apple. The Sense observes it as one of many apples, and that
many characteristics belong to it as one apple. Among these, color,
skin, pulp, juices, flavor, &c. may be mentioned. It observes, also,
that it bears a relation to the stem and tree on which it grows, and, as
well, that its several qualities have relations among themselves. One
color belongs to the skin, another to the pulp. The skin, as cover,
relates to the pulp as covered, and the like. The apple, moreover, is
distinguished from other fruits by marks of difference and marks of
likeness. It has a different skin, a different pulp, and a different
flavor. Yet, it is like other fruits, in that it grows on a tree, and
possesses those marks just named, which, though differing among
themselves, according to the fruit in which they inhere, have a
commonality of kind, as compared with other objects. This
distinguishing, analyzing, and classifying of characteristics, and
connecting them into a unity, as an apple, is the work of the Sense and
Understanding.

2. The knowledge given by the Pure Reason. This is of _a priori_ laws,
of these laws combined in pure archetypal forms, and of God as the
Supreme Being who comprehends all laws and forms. A fundamental
difference in the two modes of activity immediately strikes one's
attention. In the former case, the mode was by distinguishment and
_analysis_. In the latter it is by comprehension and _synthesis_. Take
the idea of moral obligation to illustrate this topic. No one but a
Limitist will, it is believed, contend against the position of Dr
Hopkins, "that this idea of obligation or _oughtness_ is a simple idea."
This being once acceded, carries with it the whole theory which the
author seeks to maintain. How may "a simple idea" be known? It cannot be
distinguished or analyzed. Being simple, it is _sui generis_. Hence, it
cannot be known by plurality or relation, difference or likeness. If
known at all, it must be known _as it is in itself_, by a spontaneous
insight. Such, in fact, is the mode of the activity of the Pure Reason,
and such are the objects of that activity. In maintaining, then, the
doctrine of "intellectual intuition," M. Cousin was right, but wrong in
subjecting all knowledge "to the conditions of plurality and
difference."

Near the close of the essay under examination Sir Wm. Hamilton states
certain problems, which he is "confident" Cousin cannot solve. There is
nothing very difficult about them; and it is a wonder that he should
have so presented them. Following the passage--which is here
quoted--will be found what appear simple and easy solutions.

"But (to say nothing of remoter difficulties)--(1) how liberty can be
conceived, supposing always a plurality of modes of activity, without a
knowledge of that plurality;--(2) how a faculty can resolve to act by
preference in a particular manner, and not determine itself by final
causes;--(3) how intelligence can influence a blind power, without
operating as an efficient cause;--(4) or how, in fine, morality can be
founded on a liberty which at best only escapes necessity by taking
refuge with chance;--these are problems which M. Cousin, in none of his
works, has stated, and which we are confident he is unable to solve."

1. Liberty cannot be _conceived_. It must be intuited. There is "a
plurality of modes," and there is "a knowledge of that plurality." 2. "A
faculty" cannot resolve to act; cannot have a preference; and cannot
determine itself _at all_. Only a _spiritual person_ can _resolve_, can
have a preference, can determine. 3. Intelligence cannot influence.
Blind power cannot be influenced. Only a spiritual person can be
influenced, and he by object through the intelligence as medium, and
only he can be an efficient cause. 4. Morality cannot "be founded on a
liberty, which only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance;"
and, what is more, such a liberty is impossible, and to speak of it as
possible is absurd. What vitiates the processes of thought of the
Limitists so largely, crops out very plainly here: viz., the employment
both in thinking and expressions of faculties, capacities, and
qualities, as if they possessed all the powers of persons. This habit is
thoroughly erroneous, and destructive of truth. The truth desired to
answer this whole passage, may be stated in exact terms thus: The
infinite and absolute spiritual Person, the ultimate and indestructible,
and indivisible and composite unit, possesses as a necessary quality of
personality pure liberty; which is freedom from compulsion or restraint
in the choice of one of two possible ends. This Person intuits a
multitude of modes of activity. He possesses also perfect wisdom, which
enables him, having chosen the right end, to determine with unerring
accuracy which one of all the modes of activity is the best to secure
the end. Involved in the choice of the end, is the determination to put
in force the best means for securing that end. Hence this Person decides
that the best mode shall _be_. He also possesses all-power. This is
_his_ endowment, not that of his intelligence. The intelligence is not
person, but _faculty_ in the person. So is it with the _power_. So then
this Person, intuiting through his intelligence what is befitting his
dignity, puts forth, in accordance therewith, his power; and is
efficient cause. Such a being is neither under necessity nor chance. He
is not under necessity, because there is no constraint which compels him
to choose the right end, rather than the wrong one. He is not under
chance, because he is _certain_ which is the best mode of action to gain
the end chosen. In this distinction between ends and modes of activity,
which has been so clearly set forth by Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., and in
the motions of spiritual persons in each sphere, lie the ground for
answering _all_ difficulties raised by the advocates of necessity or
chance. With these remarks we close the discussion of Hamilton's
philosophical system, and proceed to take up the teachings of his
followers.




REVIEW OF "LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT."


This volume is one which will always awaken in the mind of the candid
and reflective reader a feeling of profound respect. The writer is
manifestly a deeply religious man. The book bears the marks of piety,
and an earnest search after the truth respecting that august Being whom
its author reverentially worships. However far wrong we may believe him
to have gone in his speculative theory, his devout spirit must ever
inspire esteem. Though it is ours to criticize and condemn the
intellectual principles upon which his work is based, we cannot but
desire to be like him, in rendering solemn homage to the Being he deems
inscrutable.

In proceeding with our examination, all the defects which were formerly
noticed as belonging to the system of the Limitists will here be found
plainly observable. Following his teacher, Mr. Mansel holds the
Understanding to be the highest faculty of the human intellect, and the
consequent corollary that a judgment is its highest form of knowledge.
The word "conceive" he therefore uses as expressive of the act of the
mind in grasping together various marks into a concept, when that word
and act of mind are utterly irrelevant to the object to which he applies
them; and hence they can have no meaning as used. We shall see him speak
of "starting from the divine, and reasoning down to the human"; or of
"starting from the human, and reasoning up to the divine"; where, upon
the hypothesis that the two are entirely diverse, no reasoning process,
based upon either one, can reach the other. On the other hand, if any
knowledge of God is possible to the created mind, it is only on the
ground that there is a similarity, an exact likeness in certain
respects, between the two; in other words, that the Creator plainly
declared a simple fact, in literal language, when he said, "God made man
in his own image." If man's mind is wholly unlike God's mind, he cannot
know truth as God knows it. And if the human intellect is thus faulty,
man cannot be the subject of a moral government, for every subject of a
moral government is amenable to law. In order to be so amenable, he must
know the law _as it is_. No phantasmagoria of law, no silhouette will
do. It must be immediately seen, and known to be binding. Truth is
_one_. He, then, who sees it as it is, and knows it to be binding, sees
it as God sees it, and feels the same obligation that God feels. And
such an one must man be if he is a moral agent. Whether he is such an
agent or not, we will not argue here; since all governments and laws of
society are founded upon the hypothesis that he is, it may well be
assumed as granted.

Of the "three terms, familiar as household words," which Mr. Mansel, in
his second lecture, proceeds to examine, it is to be said, that "First
Cause," if properly mentioned at all, should have been put last; and
that "Infinite" and "Absolute" are not pertinent to Cause, but to
Person. So then when we consider "the Deity as He is," we consider him,
not as Cause, for this is _incidental_, but as the infinite and absolute
Person, for these three marks are _essential_. Further, these
last-mentioned terms express ideas in the Reason; while the term Cause
expresses "an _a priori_ Element of connection, and thus a primi

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