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The world war

by Logan Marshall · English · Gutenberg #3779 · 618,110 chars · public domain (US)

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Title: The world war
        a history of the nations and empires involved and a study of the events culminating in the great conflict

Author: Logan Marshall


        
Release date: February 1, 2003 [eBook #3779]
                Most recently updated: May 6, 2023

Language: English

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3779

Credits: Theresa Armao


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE WORLD WAR ***




[Illustration]

The World War

A History of
The Nations and Empires Involved and
a Study of the Events Culminating in
The Great Conflict

by Logan Marshall




PREFACE


When the people of the United States heard the news of the
assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne of
Austria-Hungary, and his wife in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, it
was with a feeling of great regret that another sorrow had been added
to the many already borne by the aged Emperor Francis Joseph. That
those fatal shots would echo around the world and, flashing out
suddenly like a bolt from the blue, hurl nearly the whole of Europe
within a week’s time from a state of profound peace into one of
continental war, unannounced, unexpected, unexplained, unprecedented in
suddenness and enormity, was an unimaginable possibility. And yet the
ringing of the church bells was suddenly drowned by the roar of cannon,
the voice of the dove of peace by the blare of the trump of war, and
throughout the world ran a shudder of terror at these unwonted and
ominous sounds.

But in looking back through history, tracing the course of events
during the past century, following the footsteps of men in war and
peace from that day of upheaval when medieval feudalism went down in
disarray before the arms of the people in the French Revolution, some
explanation of the Great European war of 1914 may be reached. Every
event in history has its roots somewhere in earlier history, and we
need but dig deep enough to find them.

Such is the purpose of the present work. It proposes to lay down in a
series of apposite chapters the story of the past century, beginning,
in fact, rather more than a century ago with the meteoric career of
Napoleon and seeking to show to what it led, and what effects it had
upon the political evolution of mankind. The French Revolution stood
midway between two spheres of history, the sphere of medieval barbarism
and that of modern enlightenment. It exploded like a bomb in the midst
of the self-satisfied aristocracy of the earlier social system and rent
it into the fragments which no hand could put together again. In this
sense the career of Napoleon seems providential. The era of popular
government had replaced that of autocratic and aristocratic government
in France, and the armies of Napoleon spread these radical ideas
throughout Europe until the oppressed people of every nation began to
look upward with hope and see in the distance before them a haven of
justice in the coming realm of human rights.

It required considerable time for these new conceptions to become
thoroughly disseminated. A down-trodden people enchained by the theory
of the “divine right of kings” to autocratic rule, had to break the
fetters one by one and gradually emerge from a state of practical
serfdom to one of enlightened emancipation. There were many setbacks,
and progress was distressingly slow but nevertheless sure.

The story of this upward progress is the history of the nineteenth
century, regarded from the special point of view of political progress
and the development of human rights. This is definitely shown in the
present work, which is a history of the past century and of the
twentieth century so far as it has gone. Gradually the autocrat has
declined in power and authority, and the principle of popular rights
has risen into view. This war will not have been fought in vain if, as
predicted, it will result in the complete downfall of autocracy as a
political principle, and the rise of the rule of the people, so that
the civilized nations of the earth may never again be driven into a
frightful war of extermination against peaceful neighbors at the nod of
a hereditary sovereign. Logan Marshall




CONTENTS

Chapter I. All Europe Plunged into War
Dramatic Suddenness of the Outbreak—Trade and Commerce
Paralyzed—Widespread Influences—Terrible Effects of War—The Tide of
Destruction—Half Century to Pay Debts

Chapter II. Underlying Causes of the Great European War
Assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince—Austria’s Motive in Making
War—Servia Accepts Austria’s Demand—The Ironies of History—What Austria
Has to Gain—How the War Became Continental—An Editorial Opinion—Is the
Kaiser Responsible?—Germany’s Stake in the War—Why Russia Entered the
Field—France’s Hatred of Germany—Great Britain and Italy—The Triple
Alliance and Triple Entente

Chapter III. Strength and Resources of the Warring Powers
Old and New Methods in War—Costs of Modern Warfare—Nature of National
Resources—British and American Military Systems—Naval
Strength—Resources of Austria-Hungary—Resources of Germany—Resources of
Russia—Resources of France—Resources of Great Britain—Servia and
Belgium

Chapter IV. Great Britain and the War
The Growth of German Importance—German Militarism—Great Britain’s Peace
Efforts—Germany’s Naval Program—German Ambitions—Preparation for
War—Effect on the Empire

Chapter V. The World’s Greatest War
Wars as Mileposts—A Continent in Arms—How Canada Prepared for War—the
British Sentiment—Lord Kitchener’s Career—A Forceful Character

Chapter VI. The Earthquake of Napoleonism
Its Effect on National Conditions Finally Led to the War of 1914
Conditions in France and Germany—The Campaign in Italy—The Victory at
Marengo—Moreau at Hohenlinden—The Consul Made Emperor—The Code
Napoleon—Campaign of 1805—Battle of Austerlitz—The Conquest of
Prussia—The Invasion of Poland—Eylau and Friedland—Campaign of
1809—Victory at Wagram—The Campaign in Spain—The Invasion of Russia—A
Fatal Retreat—Dresden and Leipzig—The Hundred Days—The Congress of
Vienna—The Holy Alliance

Chapter VII. Pan-Slavism Versus Pan-Germanism
Russia’s Part in the Servian Issue—Strength of the Russian Army—The
Distribution of the Slavs—Origin of Pan-Slavism—The Czar’s
Proclamation—The Teutons of Europe—Intermingling of Races—The Nations
at War

Chapter VIII. The Ambition of Louis Napoleon
The Coup-d’état of 1851—From President to Emperor—The Empire is
Peace—War With Austria—The Austrians Advance—The Battle of
Magenta—Possession of Lombardy—French Victory at Solferino—Treaty of
Peace—Invasion of Mexico—End of Napoleon’s Career

Chapter IX. Garibaldi and Italian Unity
Power of Austria Broken
The Carbonari—Mazzini and Garibaldi—Cavour, the Statesman—The Invasion
of Sicily—Occupation of Naples—Victor Emmanuel Takes Command—Watchword
of the Patriots—Garibaldi Marches Against Rome—Battle of
Ironclads—Final Act of Italian Unity

Chapter X. The Expansion of Germany
Beginnings of Modern World Power
William I of Prussia—Bismarck’s Early Career—The Schleswig-Holstein
Question—Conquest of the Duchies—Bismarck’s Wider Views—War Forced on
Austria—The War in Italy—Austria’s Signal Defeat at Sadowa—The Treaty
of Prague—Germany after 1866

Chapter XI. The Franco-Prussian War
Birth of the German Empire and the French Republic
Causes of Hostile Relations—Discontent in France—War with Prussia
Declared—Self deception of the French—First Meeting of the Armies—The
Stronghold of Metz—Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte—Napoleon III at
Sedan—The Emperor a Captive; France a Republic—Bismarck Refuses
Intervention—Fall of the Fortresses—Paris is Besieged—Defiant Spirit of
the French—The Struggle Continued—Operations Before Paris—Fighting in
the South—The War at an End

Chapter XII. Bismarck and the German Empire
Building the Bulwarks of the Twentieth Century Nation
Bismarck as a Statesman—Uniting the German States—William I Crowned at
Versailles—A Significant Decade—The Problem of Church Power—Progress of
Socialism—William II and the Resignation of Bismarck—Old Age
Insurance—Political and Industrial Conditions in Germany

Chapter XIII. Gladstone as an Apostle of Reform
Great Britain Becomes a World Power
Gladstone and Disraeli—Gladstone’s Famous Budget—A Suffrage Reform
Bill—Disraeli’s Reform Measure—Irish Church Disestablishment—An Irish
Land Bill—Desperate State of Ireland—The Coercion Bill—War in
Africa—Home Rule for Ireland

Chapter XIV. The French Republic
Struggles of a New Nation
The Republic Organized—The Commune of Paris—Instability of the
Government—Thiers Proclaimed President—Punishment of the Unsuccessful
Generals—MacMahon a Royalist President—Bazaine’s Sentence and
Escape—Grevy, Gambetta and Boulanger—The Panama Canal Scandal—Despotism
of the Army Leaders—The Dreyfus Case—Church and State—The Moroccan
Controversy

Chapter XV. Russia in the Field of War
The Outcome of Slavic Ambition
Siege of Sebastopol—Russia in Asia—The Russo-Japanese War—Port Arthur
Taken—The Russian Fleet Defeated

Chapter XVI. Great Britain and Her Colonies
How England Became Mistress of the Seas
Great Britain as a Colonizing Power—Colonies in the Pacific
Region—Colonization in Africa—British Colonies in Africa—The Mahdi
Rebellion in Egypt—Gordon at Khartoum—Suppression of the Mahdi
Revolt—Colonization in Asia—The British in India—Colonies in
America—Development of Canada—Progress in Canada

Chapter XVII. The Open Door in China and Japan
Development of World Power in the East
Warlike Invasions of China—Commodore Perry and His Treaty—Japan’s Rapid
Progress—Origin of the China-Japan War—The Position of Korea—Li Hung
Chang and the Empress—How Japan Began War—The Chinese and Japanese
Fleets—The Battle of the Yalu—Capture of Wei Hai Wei—Europe Invades
China—The Boxer Outbreak—Russian Designs on Manchuria—Japan Begins War
on Russia—The Armies Meet—China Becomes a Republic

Chapter XVIII. Turkey and the Balkan States
Checking the Dominion of the Turk in Europe
The Story of Servia—Turkey in Europe—The Bulgarian Horrors—The Defense
of Plevna—The Congress of Berlin—Hostile Sentiments in the
Balkans—Incitement to War—Fighting Begins—The Advance on
Adrianople—Servian and Greek victories—The Bulgarian Successes—Steps
toward Peace—The War Resumed—Siege of Scutari—Treaty of Peace—War
Between the Allies—The Final Settlement

Chapter XIX. Methods in Modern Warfare
Ancient and Modern Weapons—New Types of Weapons—The Iron-clad
Warship—The Balloon in War—Tennyson’s Foresight—Gunning for
Airships—The Submarine—Under-water Warfare—The New Type of
Battleship—Mobilization—The Waste of War

Chapter XX. Canada’s Part in the World War
New Relations Toward the Empire—Military Preparations—The Great Camp at
Valcartier—The Canadian Expeditionary Force—Political Effect of
Canada’s Action on Future of the Dominion




Chapter I.
ALL EUROPE PLUNGED INTO WAR


Dramatic Suddenness of the Outbreak—Trade and Commerce
Paralyzed—Widespread Influences—Terrible Effects of War—The Tide of
Destruction—Half Century to Pay Debts

At the opening of the final week of July, 1914, the whole world—with
the exception of Mexico, in which the smouldering embers of the
revolution still burned—was in a state of profound peace. The
clattering hammers and whirling wheels of industry were everywhere to
be heard; great ships furrowed the ocean waves, deep-laden with the
world’s products and carrying thousands of travelers bent on business
or enjoyment. Countless trains of cars, drawn by smoke-belching
locomotives, traversed the long leagues of iron rails, similarly laden
with passengers engaged in peaceful errands and freight intended for
peaceful purposes. All seemed at rest so far as national hostile
sentiments were concerned. All was in motion so far as useful
industries demanded service. Europe, America, Asia, and Africa alike
had settled down as if to a long holiday from war, and the advocates of
universal peace were jubilant over the progress of their cause, holding
peace congresses and conferences at The Hague and elsewhere, fully
satisfied that the last war had been fought and that arbitration boards
would settle all future disputes among nations, however serious.

Such occasions occur at frequent intervals in nature, in which a deep
calm, a profound peace, rests over land and sea. The winds are hushed,
the waves at rest; only the needful processes of the universe are in
action, while for the time the world forgets the chained demons of
unrest and destruction. But too quickly the chains are loosened, the
winds and waves set free; and the hostile forces of nature rush over
earth and sea, spreading terror and devastation in their path. Such
energies of hostility are not confined to the elements. They exist in
human communities. They underlie the political conditions of the
nations, and their outbreak is at times as sudden and unlooked-for as
that of the winds and waves. Such was the state of political affairs in
Europe at the date mentioned, apparently calm and restful, while below
the surface hostile forces which had long been fomenting unseen were
ready to burst forth and whelm the world.

DRAMATIC SUDDENNESS OF THE OUTBREAK

On the night of July 25th the people of the civilized world settled
down to restful slumbers, with no dreams of the turmoil that was ready
to burst forth. On the morning of the 26th they rose to learn that a
great war had begun, a conflict the possible width and depth of which
no man was yet able to foresee; and as day after day passed on, each
day some new nation springing into the terrible arena until practically
the whole of Europe was in arms and the Armageddon seemed at hand, the
world stood amazed and astounded, wondering what hand had loosed so
vast a catastrophe, what deep and secret causes lay below the
ostensible causes of the war. The causes of this were largely unknown.
As a panic at times affects a vast assemblage, with no one aware of its
origin, so a wave of hostile sentiment may sweep over vast communities
until the air is full of urgent demands for war with scarce a man
knowing why.

What is already said only feebly outlines the state of consternation
into which the world was cast in that fateful week in which the doors
of the Temple of Janus, long closed, were suddenly thrown wide open and
the terrible God of War marched forth, the whole earth trembling
beneath his feet. It was the breaking of a mighty storm in a placid
sky, the fall of a meteor which spreads terror and destruction on all
sides, the explosion of a vast bomb in a great assemblage; it was
everything that can be imagined of the sudden and overwhelming, of the
amazing and incredible.

TRADE AND COMMERCE PARALYZED

For the moment the world stood still, plunged into a panic that stopped
all its activities. The stock exchanges throughout the nations were
closed, to prevent that wild and hasty action which precipitates
disaster. Throughout Europe trade, industry, commerce all ceased,
paralyzed at their sources. No ship of any of the nations concerned
except Britain dared venture from port, lest it should fall a prey to
the prowling sea dogs of war which made all the oceans unsafe. The
hosts of American tourists who had gone abroad under the sunny skies of
peace suddenly beheld the dark clouds of war rolling overhead, blotting
out the sun, and casting their black shadows over all things fair.

What does this state of affairs, this sudden stoppage of the wheels of
industry, this unforeseen and wide spread of the conditions of war
portend? Emerson has said: “When a great thinker comes into the world
all things are at risk.” There is potency in this, and also in a
variation of Emerson’s text which we shall venture to make: “When a
great war comes upon the world all things are at risk.” Everything
which we have looked upon as fixed and stable quakes as if from mighty
hidden forces. The whole world stands irresolute and amazed. The
steady-going habits and occupations of peace cease or are perilously
threatened, and no one can be sure of escaping from some of the dire
effects of the catastrophe.

WIDESPREAD INFLUENCES

The conditions of production vanish, to be replaced by conditions of
destruction. That which had been growing in grace and beauty for years
is overturned and destroyed in a moment of ravage. Changes of this kind
are not confined to the countries in which the war rages or the cities
which conquering column of troops occupy. They go beyond the borders of
military activity; they extend to far-off quarters of the earth. We
quote from the New York WORLD a vivid picture drawn at the opening of
the great European war. Its motto is “all the world is paying the cost
of the folly of Europe.”

Never before was war made so swiftly wide. News of it comes from Japan,
from Porto Rico, from Africa, from places where in old days news of
hostilities might not travel for months.

“Non-combatants are in the vast majority, even in the countries at war,
but they are not immune to its blight. Austria is isolated from the
world because her ally, Germany, will take no chances of spilling
military information and will not forward mails. If, telephoning in
France, you use a single foreign word, even an English one, your wire
is cut. Hans the German waiter, Franz the clarinettist in the little
street band, is locked up as a possible spy. There are great German
business houses in London and Paris; their condition is that of English
and French business houses in Berlin, and that is not pleasant. Great
Britain contemplates, as an act of war, the voiding of patents held by
Germans in the United Kingdom.

“Nothing is too petty, nothing too great, nothing too distant in kind
or miles from the field of war to feel its influence. The whole world
is the loser by it, whoever at the end of all the battles may say that
he has won.

DILEMMA OF THE TOURISTS

Let us consider one of the early results of the war. It vitally
affected great numbers of Americans, the army of tourists who had made
their way abroad for rest, study and recreation and whose numbers,
while unknown, were great, some estimating them at the high total of
100,000 or more. These, scattered over all sections of Europe, some
with money in abundance, some with just enough for a brief journey,
capitalists, teachers, students, all were caught in the sudden flurry
of the war, their letters of credit useless, transportation difficult
or impossible to obtain, all exposed to inconveniences, some to
indignities, some of them on the flimsiest pretence seized and searched
as spies, the great mass of them thrown into a state of panic that
added greatly to the unpleasantness of the situation in which they
found themselves.

While these conditions of panic gradually adjusted themselves, the
status of the tourists continued difficult and annoying. The railroads
were seized for the transportation of troops, leaving many Americans
helplessly held in far interior parts, frequently without money or
credit. One example of the difficulties encountered will serve as an
instance which might be repeated a hundred fold.

Seven hundred Americans from Geneva were made by Swiss troops to leave
a train. Many who refused were forced off at the point or guns. This
compulsory removal took place at some distance from a station near the
border, according to Mrs. Edward Collins, of New York, who with her
three daughters was on the train. With 200 others they reached Paris
and were taken aboard a French troop train. Most of the arrivals were
women; the men were left behind because of lack of space. One hundred
women refused to take the train without their husbands; scores struck
back for Geneva; others on foot, carrying articles of baggage, started
in the direction of Paris, hoping to get trains somewhere. Just why
Swiss troops thus occupied themselves is not explained; but in times of
warlike turmoil many unexplainable things occur. Here is an incident of
a different kind, told by one of the escaping host: “I went into the
restaurant car for lunch,” he said. “When I tried to return to the car
where I’d left my suitcase, hat, cane and overcoat, I couldn’t find it.
Finally the conductor said blithely, ‘Oh, that car was taken off for
the use of the army.’

“I was forced to continue traveling coatless, hatless and minus my
baggage until I boarded the steamer FLUSHING, when I managed to swipe a
straw hat during the course of the Channel passage while the people
were down eating in the saloon. I grabbed the first one on the hatrack.
Talk about a romantic age. Why, I wouldn’t live in any other time than
now. We will be boring our grandchildren talking about this war.”

The scarcity of provisions in many localities and the withholding of
money by the banks made the situation, as regarded Americans,
especially serious. Those fortunate enough to reach port without
encountering these difficulties found the situation there equally
embarrassing. The great German and English liners, for instance, were
held up by order of the government, or feared to sail lest they should
be taken captive by hostile cruisers. Many of these lay in port in New
York, forbidden to sail for fear of capture. These included ships of
the Cunard and International Marine lines, the north German Lloyd, the
Hamburg-American, the Russian-American, and the French lines, until
this port led the world in the congestion of great liners rendered
inactive by the war situation abroad. The few that put to sea were
utterly incapable of accommodating a tithe of the anxious and appealing
applicants. It had ceased, in the state of panic that prevailed, to be
a mere question of money. Frightened millionaires were credited with
begging for steerage berths. Everywhere was dread and confusion, men
and women being in a state of mind past the limits of calm reasoning.
Impulse is the sole ruling force where reason has ceased to act.

Slowly the skies cleared; calmer conditions began to prevail. The
United States government sent the battleship TENNESSEE abroad with
several millions of dollars for the aid of destitute travelers and the
relief of those who could not get their letters or credit and
travelers’ checks cashed. Such a measure of relief was necessary, there
being people abroad with letters of credit for as much as $5,000
without money enough to buy a meal. One tourist said: “I had to give a
Milwaukee doctor, who had a letter of credit for $2,500 money to get
shaved.” London hotels showed much consideration for the needs of
travelers without ready cash, but on the continent there were many such
who were refused hotel accommodation.

As for those who reached New York or other American ports, many had
fled in such haste as to leave their baggage behind. Numbers of the
poorer travelers had exhausted their scanty stores of cash in the
effort to escape from Europe and reached port utterly penniless. The
case was one that called for immediate and adequate solution and the
governmental and moneyed interests on this side did their utmost to
cope with the situation. Vessels of American register were too few to
carry the host applying for transportation, and it was finally decided
to charter foreign vessels for this purpose and thus hasten the work of
moving the multitude of appealing tourists. From 15,000 to 20,000 of
these needed immediate attention, a majority of them being destitute.

AN OCEAN INCIDENT

Men and women needed not only transportation, but money also, and in
this particular there is an interesting story to tell. The German
steamer KRONPRINZESSIN CECILIE, bound for Bremen, had sailed from New
York before the outbreak of the war, carrying about 1,200 passengers
and a precious freight of gold, valued at $10,700,000. The value of the
vessel herself added $5,000,000 to this sum. What had become of her and
her tempting cargo was for a time unknown. There were rumors that she
had been captured by a British cruiser, but this had no better
foundation than such rumors usually have. Her captain was alert to the
situation, being informed by wireless of the sudden change from peace
to war. One such message, received from an Irish wireless station,
conveyed an order from the Bremen company for him to return with all
haste to an American port.

It was on the evening of Friday, July 31st, that this order came. At
once the vessel changed its course. One by one the ship’s lights were
put out. The decks which could not be made absolutely dark were
enclosed with canvas. By midnight the ship was as dark as the sea
surrounding. On she went through Saturday and on Sunday ran into a
dense fog. Through this she rushed with unchecked speed and in utter
silence, not a toot coming from her fog-horn. This was all very well as
a measure of secrecy, but it opened the way to serious danger through a
possible collision, and a committee of passengers was formed to request
the captain to reconsider his action. Just as the committee reached his
room the first blast of the fog-horn was heard, its welcome tone
bringing a sense of security where grave apprehension had prevailed.

A group of financiers were on board who offered to buy the ship and
sail her under American colors. But to all such proposals Captain
Polack turned a deaf ear. He said that his duty was spelled by his
orders from Bremen to turn back and save his ship, and these he
proposed to obey. A passenger stated:

“There were seven of the crew on watch all the time, two aloft. This
enabled the captain to know of passing vessels before they came above
the horizon. We were undoubtedly in danger on Sunday afternoon. We
intercepted a wireless message in French in which two French cruisers
were exchanging data in regard to their positions.

“The captain told me that he imagined those to be two vessels who
regularly patroled the fishing grounds in the interest of French
fisheries. If the captain of either of those vessels should have come
out of the fog and found us, his share of the prize in money might have
amounted to $4,000,000. Did privateer ever dream of such booty!

“Early on Saturday our four great funnels were given broad black bands
in order to make us look like the Olympic, which was supposed to be
twenty-four hours ahead of us. There was a certain grim humor in the
fact that the wireless operator on the Olympic kept calling us all
Friday night. Of course we did not answer.”

On Tuesday, August 4th, the great ship came within sight of land at the
little village of Bar Harbor, Mount Desert Island, off the coast of
Maine; a port scarce large enough to hold the giant liner that had
sought safety in its waters. Wireless messages were at once flashed to
all parts of the country and the news that the endangered vessel, with
its precious cargo, was safe, was received with general relief. As
regards the future movements of the ship Captain Polack said:

“I can see no possibility of taking this ship to New York from here
with safety. To avoid foreign vessels we should have to keep within the
three-mile limit, and to accomplish this the ship would have to be
built like a canoe. We have reached an American port in safety and that
was more than I dared to hope. We have been in almost constant danger
of capture, and we can consider ourselves extremely lucky to have come
out so well.

“I know I have been criticized for making too great speed under bad
weather conditions, but I have not wilfully endangered the lives of the
passengers. I would rather have lost the whole whip and cargo than have
assumed any such risk. Of course, aside from this consideration, my one
aim has been to save my ship and my cargo from capture.

“I have not been acting on my own initiative, but under orders from the
North German Lloyd in Bremen, and although I am an officer in the
German navy my duty has been to the steamship line.”

CLOSING THE STOCK MARKETS

We have so far dealt with only a few of the results of the war. There
were various others of great moment, to some of which a passing
allusion has been made.

On July 30th, for the first time in history, the stock markets of the
world were all closed at the same time. Heretofore when the European
markets have been closed those on this side of the ocean remained open.
The New York Exchange was the last big stock market to announce
temporary suspension of business. The New York Cotton Exchange closed,
following the announcement of the failure of several brokerage firms.
Stock Exchanges throughout the United States followed the example set
by New York. The Stock Exchanges in London and the big provincial
cities, as well as those on the Continent, ceased business, owing to
the breakdown of the credit system, which was made complete by the
postponement of the Paris settlement.

Depositors stormed every bank in London for gold, and the runs
continued for a couple of days. In order to protect its dwindling gold
supply the Bank of England raised its discount rate to 8 per cent.
Leading bankers of London requested Premier Asquith to suspend the bank
act, and he promised to lay the matter before the Chancellor of the
Exchequer. In all the capitals of Europe financial transactions
virtually came to a standstill. The slump in the market value of
securities within the first week of the war flurry was estimated at
$2,000,000,000, and radical measures were necessary to prevent hasty
action while the condition of panic prevailed.

This sudden stoppage of ordinary financial operations was accompanied
by a similar cessation of the industries of peace over a wide range of
territory. The artisan was forced to let fall the tools of his trade
and take up those of war. The railroads were similarly denuded of their
employees except in so far as they were needed to convey soldiers and
military supplies. The customary uses of the railroad were largely
suspended and travel went on under great difficulties. In a measure it
had returned to the conditions existing before the invention of the
locomotive. Even horse traffic was limited by the demands of the army
for these animals, and foot travel regained some of its old ascendency.

War makes business active in one direction and in one only, that of
army and navy supply, of the manufacture of the implements of
destruction, of vast quantities of explosives, of multitudes of
death-dealing weapons. Food supplies need to be diverted in the same
direction, the demands of the soldier being considered first, those of
the home people last, the latter being often supplied at starvation
prices. There is plenty of work to do—of its kind. But it is of a kind
that injures instead of aiding the people of the nations.

TERRIBLE EFFECTS OF WAR

This individual source of misery and suffering in war times is
accompanied by a more direct one, that of the main purpose of
war—destruction of human life and of property that might be utilized by
an enemy, frequently of merciless brigandage and devastation. It is
horrible to think of the frightful suffering caused by every great
battle. Immediate death on the field might reasonably be welcomed as an
escape from the suffering arising from wounds, the terrible
mutilations, the injuries that rankle throughout life, the conversion
of hosts of able-bodied men into feeble invalids, to be kept by the
direct aid of their fellows or the indirect aid of the people at large
through a system of pensions.

The physical sufferings of the soldiers from wounds and privations are
perhaps not the greatest. Side by side with them are the mental
anxieties of their families at home, their terrible suspense, the
effect upon them of tidings of the maiming or death of those dear to
them or on whose labor they immediately depend. The harvest of misery
arising from this cause it is impossible to estimate. It is not to be
seen in the open. It dwells unseen in humble homes, in city, village,
or field, borne often uncomplainingly, but not less poignant from this
cause. The tears and terrors thus produced are beyond calculation. But
while the glories of war are celebrated with blast of trumpet and roll
of drum, the terrible accompaniment of groans of misery is too apt to
pass unheard and die away forgotten.

To turn from this roll of horrors, there are costs of war in other
directions to be considered. Those include the ravage of cities by
flame or pillage, the loss of splendid works of architecture, the
irretrievable destruction of great productions of art, the vanishing of
much on which the world had long set store.

THE TIDE OF DESTRUCTION

Not only on land, but at sea as well, the tide of destruction rises and
swells. Huge warships, built at a cost of millions of dollars and
tenanted by hundreds of hardy sailors, are torn and rent by shot and
shell and at times sent to the bottom with all on board by the
explosion of torpedoes beneath their unprotected lower hulls. The
torpedo boat, the submarine, with other agencies of unseen destruction,
have come into play to add enormously to the horrors of naval warfare,
while the bomb-dropping airships, letting fall its dire missiles from
the sky, has come to add to the dread terror and torment of the
battle-field.

We began this chapter with a statement of the startling suddenness of
this great war, and the widespread consequences which immediately
followed. We have been led into a discussion of its issues, of the
disturbing and distracting consequences which cannot fail to follow any
great modern war between civilized nations. We had some examples of
this on a small scale in the recent Balkan-Turkish war. But that was of
minor importance and its effects, many of them sanguinary and horrible,
were mainly confined to the region in which it occurred. But a war
covering nearly a whole continent cannot be confined and circumscribed
in its consequences. All the world must feel them in a measure—though
diminishing with distance. The vast expanse of water which separates
the United States from the European continent could not save its
citizens from feeling certain ill effects from the struggle of war
lords. America and Europe are tied together with many cords of business
and interest, and the severing or weakening of these cannot fail to be
seriously felt. Canada, at a similar width of removal from Europe, had
reason to feel it still more seriously, from its close political
relations with Great Britain.

In these days in which we live the cost of war is a giant to be
reckoned with. With every increase in the size of cannon, the tonnage
of warships, the destructiveness of weapons and ammunition, this
element of cost grows proportionately greater and has in our day become
stupendous. Nations may spend in our era more cold cash in a day of war
than would have served for a year in the famous days of chivalry. A
study of this question was made by army and navy experts in 1914, and
they decided that the expense to the five nations concerned in the
European war would be not less than $50,000,000 a day.

If we add to this the loss of untold numbers of young men in the prime
of life, whose labor is needed in the fields and workshops of the
nations involved, other billions of dollars must be added to the
estimate, due to the crippling of industries. There is also the
destruction of property to be considered, including the very costly
modern battleships, this also footing up into the billions.

When it is considered that in thirteen years the cost of maintenance of
the armies and navies of the warring countries, as well as the cost of
naval construction, exceeded $20,000,000,000 some idea may be had of
the expense attached to war and the preparations of European countries
for just such contingencies as those that arose in Europe in 1914. The
cost of the Panama Canal, one of the most useful aids to the commerce
of the world, was approximately $375,000,000, but the expense of the
preparations for war in Europe during the time it took to build the
canal exceeded the cost of this gigantic undertaking nearly sixty to
one.

The money thus expended on preparation for war during the thirteen
years named would, if spent in railroad and marine construction, have
given vast commercial power to these nations. To what extent have they
been benefited by the rivalry to gain precedence in military power?
They stand on practically the same basis now that it is all at an end.
Would they not be on the same basis if it had never begun? Aside from
this is the incentive to employ these vast armaments in the purpose for
which they were designed, the effect of creating a military spirit and
developing a military caste in each by the nations, a result very
likely to be productive of ill effects.

The total expense of maintenance of armies and navies, together with
the cost of construction in thirteen years, in Germany, Austria,
Russia, France and Great Britain, was as follows:

Naval expenditures $5,648,525,000
Construction 2,146,765,000
Cost of armies 13,138,403,000
Total $20,933,693,000


The wealth of the same nations in round figures is:

Great Britain $80,000,000,000
Germany 60,500,000,000
Austria 25,000,000,000
France 65,000,000,000
Russia 40,000,000,000
Total 270,500,000,000


This enormous expense which was incurred in preparation for war needed
to be rapidly increased to meet the expenses of actual warfare. The
British House of Commons authorized war credits amounting to
$1,025,000,000, while the German Reichstag voted $1,250,000,000.
Austria and France had to set aside vast sums for their respective war
chests.

HALF CENTURY TO PAY DEBTS

In anticipation of trouble Germany in 1913 voted $250,000,000 for
extraordinary war expenses and about $100,000,000 was spent on an
aerial fleet. France spent $60,000,000 for the same purpose.

The annual cost of maintaining the great armies and navies of Europe
even on a peace basis is enormous, and it must be vastly increased
during war. The official figures for 1913–14 are:

British army $224,300,000
British navy 224,140,000
German army 183,090,00
German navy 111,300,000
French army 191,431,580
French navy 119,571,400
Russian army 317,800,000
Russian navy 122,500,000
Austrian army 82,300,000
Austrian navy 42,000,000
Total $1,618,432,980


It was evident that taxes to meet the extraordinary expenses of war
would have to be greatly increased in Germany and France. As business
became at a standstill throughout Europe and every port of entry
blocked, experts wondered where the money was to come from. All agreed
that, when peace should be declared and the figures were all in, the
result financially would be staggering and that the heaviest burden it
had ever borne would rest upon Europe for fifty years to come. For when
the roar of the cannon ceases and the nations are at rest, then dawns
the era of payment, inevitable, unescapable, one in which for
generations every man and woman must share.




Chapter II.
UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE GREAT EUROPEAN WAR


Assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince—Austria’s Motive in Making
War—Servia Accepts Austria’s Demand—The Ironies of History—What Austria
Has to Gain—How the War Became Continental—An Editorial Opinion—Is the
Kaiser Responsible?—Germany’s Stake in the War—Why Russia Entered the
Field—France’s Hatred of Germany—Great Britain and Italy—The Triple
Alliance and Triple Entente

What brought on the mighty war which so suddenly sprang forth? What
evident, what subtle, what deep-hidden causes led to this sudden
demolition of the temple of peace? What pride of power, what lust of
ambition, what desire of imperial dominion cast the armed hosts of the
nations into the field of conflict, on which multitudes of innocent
victims were to be sacrificed to the insatiate hunger for blood of the
modern Moloch?

Here are questions which few are capable of answering. Ostensible
answers may be given, surface causes, reasons of immediate potency. But
no one will be willing to accept these as the true moving causes. For a
continent to spring in a week’s time from complete peace into almost
universal war, with all the great and several of the small Powers
involved, is not to be explained by an apothegm or embraced within the
limits of a paragraph. If not all, certainly several of these nations
had enmities to be unchained, ambitions to be gratified, long-hidden
purposes to be put in action. They seemed to have been awaiting an
opportunity, and it came when the anger of the Servians at the seizure
of Bosnia by Austria culminated in a mad act of assassination

ASSASSINATION OF THE AUSTRIAN CROWN PRINCE

The immediate cause, so far as apparent to us, of the war in question
was the murder, on June 29, 1914, of the Austrian Crown Prince Francis
Ferdinand and his wife, while on a visit to Sarajevo, the capital of
Bosnia, the assassin being a Servian student, supposed to have come for
that purpose from Belgrade, the Servian capital. The inspiring cause of
this dastardly act was the feeling of hostility towards Austria which
was widely entertained in Servia. Bosnia was a part of the ancient
kingdom of Servia. The bulk of its people are of Slavic origin and
speak the Servian language. Servia was eager to regain it, as a
possible outlet for a border on the Mediterranean Sea. When, therefore,
in 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been under
her military control since 1878, the indignation in Servia was great.
While it had died down in a measure in the subsequent years, the
feeling of injury survived in many hearts, and there is little reason
to doubt that the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand was a result of
this pervading sentiment.

In fact, the Austrian government was satisfied that the murder plot was
hatched in Belgrade and held that Servian officials were in some way
concerned in it. The Servian press gave some warrant for this, being
openly boastful and defiant in its comments. When the Austrian
consul-general at Belgrade dropped dead in the consulate the papers
showed their satisfaction and hinted that he had been poisoned. This
attitude of the press evidently was one of the reasons for the
stringent demand made by Austria on July 23d, requiring apology and
change of attitude from Servia and asking for a reply by the hour of 6
P.M. on the 25th. The demands were in part as follows:

1. An apology by the Servian government in its official journal for all
Pan-Servian propaganda and for the participation of Servian army
officers in it, and warning all Servians in the future to desist from
anti-Austrian demonstrations.

2. That orders to this effect should be issued to the Servian army.

3. That Servia should dissolve all societies capable of conducting
intrigues against Austria.

4. That Servia should curb the activities of the Servian press in
regard to Austria.

5. That Austrian officials should be permitted to conduct an inquiry in
Servia independent of the Servian government into the Sarajevo plot.

An answer to these demands was sent out at ten minutes before 6 o’clock
on the 25th, in which Servia accepted all demands except the last,
which it did not deem “in accordance with international law and good
neighborly relations.” It asked that this demand should be submitted to
The Hague Tribunal. The Austrian Minister at Belgrade, Baron Giesl von
Gieslingen, refused to accept this reply and at once left the capital
with the entire staff of the legation. The die was cast, as Austria
probably intended that it should be.

AUSTRIA’S MOTIVE IN MAKING WAR

It had, in fact, become evident early in July that the military party
in Austria was seeking to manufacture a popular demand for war, based
on the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand and his wife. Such was
the indication of the tone of the Vienna newspapers, which appeared
desirous of working up a sentiment hostile to Servia. It may be doubted
if the aged emperor was a party to this. Probably his assent was a
forced one, due to the insistence of the war party and the public
sentiment developed by it. That the murder of the Archduke was the real
cause of the action of Austria can scarcely be accepted in view of
Servia’s acceptance of Austria’s rigid demands. The actual cause was
undoubtedly a deeper one, that of Austria’s long-cherished purpose of
gaining a foothold on the Aegean Sea, for which the possession of
Servia was necessary as a preliminary step. A plausible motive was
needed, any pretext that would serve as a satisfactory excuse to Europe
for hostile action and that could at the same time be utilized in
developing Austrian indignation against the Servians. Such a motive
came in the act of assassination and immediate use was made of it. The
Austrian war party contended that the deed was planned at Belgrade,
that it had been fomented by Servian officials, and that these had
supplied the murderer with explosives and aided in their transfer into
Bosnia.

What evidence Austria possessed leading to this opinion we do not know.
While it is not likely that there was any actual evidence, the case was
one that called for investigation, and Austria was plainly within its
rights in demanding such an inquiry and due punishment of every one
found to be connected with the tragic deed. But Austria went farther
than this. It was willing to accept nothing less than a complete and
humiliating submission on the part of Servia. And the impression was
widely entertained, whether with or without cause, that in this Austria
was not acting alone but that it had the full support of Germany. That
country also may be supposed to have had its ends to gain. What these
were we shall consider later.

SERVIA ACCEPTS AUSTRIA’S DEMANDS

Imperious as had been the demand of Austria, one which would never have
been submitted to a Power of equal strength, Servia accepted it,
expressing itself as willing to comply with all the conditions imposed
except that relating to the participation of Austrian officials in the
inquiry, an explanation being asked on this point. If this reply should
be deemed inadequate, Servia stood ready to submit the question at
issue to The Hague Peace Tribunal and to the Powers which had signed
the declaration of 1909 relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The subsequent action of Austria was significant. The Austrian Minister
at Belgrade, as before stated, rejected it as unsatisfactory and
immediately left the Servian capital. He acted, in short, with a
precipitancy that indicated that he was acting under instructions. This
was made very evident by what immediately followed. When news came on
July 28th that war had been declared and active hostilities commenced,
it was accompanied by the statement that Austria would not now be
satisfied even with a full acceptance of her demands.

That the intention of this imperious demand and what quickly followed
was to force a war, no one can doubt. Servia’s nearly complete assent
to the conditions imposed was declared to be not only unsatisfactory,
but also “dishonorable,” a word doubtless deliberately used. Evidently
no door was to be left open for retrogressive consideration.

THE IRONIES OF HISTORY

It is one of the ironies of history that a people who once played a
leading part in saving the Austrian capital from capture should come to
be threatened by the armies of that capital. This takes us back to the
era when Servia, a powerful empire of those days, fell under the
dominion of the conquering Turks, whose armies further overran Hungary
and besieged Vienna. Had this city been captured, all central Europe
would have lain open to the barbarities of the Turks. In its defense
the Servians played a leading part, so great a one that we are told by
a Hungarian historian, “It was the Serb Bacich who saved Vienna.” But
in 1914 Servia was brought to the need of saving itself from Vienna.

WHAT AUSTRIA HAD TO GAIN

If it be asked what Austria had to gain by this act; what was her aim
in forcing war upon a far weaker state; the answer is at hand. The
Balkan States, of which Servia is a prominent member, lie in a direct
line between Europe and the Orient. A great power occupying the whole
of the Balkan peninsula would possess political advantages far beyond
those enjoyed by Austria-Hungary. It would be in a position giving it
great influence over, if not strategic control of, the Suez Canal, the
commerce of the Mediterranean, and a considerable all-rail route
between Central Europe and the far East. Salonika, on the AEgean Sea,
now in Greek territory, is one of the finest harbors on the
Mediterranean Sea. A railway through Servia now connects this port with
Austria and Germany. In addition to this railway it is not unlikely
that a canal may in the near future connect the Danube with the harbor
of Salonika. If this project should be carried out, the commerce of the
Danube and its tributary streams and canals, even that of central and
western Germany, would be able to reach the Mediterranean without
passing through the perilous Iron Gates of the Danube or being
subjected to the delays and dangers incident to the long passage
through the Black Sea and the Grecian Archipelago.

We can see in all this a powerful motive for Austria to seek to gain
possession of Servia, as a step towards possible future control of the
whole Balkan peninsula. The commercial and manufacturing interests of
Austria-Hungary were growing, and mastership of such a route to the
Mediterranean would mean immense advantage to this ambitious empire.
Possession of northern Italy once gave her the advantage of an
important outlet to the Mediterranean. This, through events that will
be spoken of in later chapters, was lost to her. She apparently then
sought to reach it by a more direct and open road, that leading through
Salonika.

Such seem the reasons most likely to have been active in the Austrian
assault upon Servia. The murder of an Austrian archduke by an
insignificant assassin gave no sufficient warrant for the act. The
whole movement of events indicates that Austria was not seeking
retribution for a crime but seizing upon a pretext for a predetermined
purpose and couching her demands upon Servia in terms which no
self-respecting nation could accept without protest. Servia was to be
put in a position from which she could not escape and every door of
retreat against the arbitrament of war was closed against her.

But in this retrospect we are dealing with Austria and Servia alone.
What brought Germany, what brought France, what brought practically the
whole of Europe into the struggle? What caused it to grow with
startling suddenness from a minor into a major conflict, from a contest
between a bulldog and a terrier into a battle between lions? What were
the unseen and unnoted conditions that, within little more than a
week’s time, induced all the leading nations of Europe to cast down the
gage of battle and spring full-armed into the arena, bent upon a
struggle which threatened to surpass any that the world had ever seen?
Certainly no trifling causes were here involved. Only great and
far-reaching causes could have brought about such a catastrophe. All
Europe appeared to be sitting, unknowingly or knowingly, upon a powder
barrel which only needed some inconsequent hand to apply the match. It
seems incredible that the mere pulling of a trigger by a Servian
student and the slaughter of an archduke in the Bosnian capital could
in a month’s time have plunged all Europe into war. From small causes
great events may rise. Certainly that with which we are here dealing
strikingly illustrates this homely apothegm.

HOW THE WAR BECAME CONTINENTAL

We cannot hope to point out the varied causes which were at work in
this vast event. Very possibly the leading ones are unknown to us. Yet
some of the important ones are evident and may be made evident, and to
these we must restrict ourselves.

Allusion has already been made to the general belief that the Emperor
of Germany was deeply concerned in it, and that Austria would not have
acted as it did without assurance of support, in fact without direct
instigation, from some strong allied Power, and this Power is adjudged
alike by public and private opinion to have been Germany, acting in the
person of its ambitious war lord, the dominating Kaiser.

It may be stated that all the Powers concerned have sought to disclaim
responsibility. Thus Servia called the world to witness that her answer
to Austria was the limit of submission and conciliation. Austria,
through her ambassador to the United States, solemnly declared that her
assault upon Servia was a measure of “self-defense.” Russia explained
her action as “benevolent intervention,” and expressed “a humble hope
in omnipotent providence” that her hosts would be triumphant. Germany
charged France with perfidious attack upon the unarmed border of the
fatherland, and proclaimed a holy war for “the security of her
territory.” France and England, Belgium and Italy deplored the conflict
and protested that they were innocent of offense. So far as all this is
concerned the facts are generally held to point to Germany as the chief
instigator of the war.

Russia, indeed, had made threatening movements toward Austria as a
warning to her to desist from her threatened invasion of Servia. Great
Britain proposed mediation. Germany made no movement in the direction
of preventing the war, but directed its attention to Russia, warning it
to stop mobilization within twenty-four hours, and immediately
afterward beginning a similar movement of mobilization in its own
territory. On August 1st Germany declared war against Russia, the first
step towards making the contest a continental one. On the 2d, when
France began mobilization, German forces moved against Russia and
France simultaneously and invaded the neutral states of Luxembourg and
Belgium. It was her persistence in the latter movement that brought
Great Britain into the contest, as this country was pledged to support
Belgian neutrality. On August 4th, Great Britain sent an ultimatum to
Germany to withdraw from the neutral territory which her troops had
entered and demanded an answer by midnight. Germany declined to answer
satisfactorily and at 11 o’clock war was declared by Great Britain.

AN EDITORIAL OPINION

As regards the significance of these movements, in which Germany hurled
declarations of war in rapid succession to east and west, and forced
the issue of a continental war upon nations which had taken no decisive
step, it may suffice to quote an editorial summing up of the situation
as regards Germany, from the Philadelphia North American of August 7th:

“From these facts there is no escape. Leaving aside all questions of
justice or political expediency, the aggressor throughout has been
Germany. Austria’s fury over the assassination of the heir to the
throne was natural. But Servia tendered full reparation.

So keen and conservative an authority as Rear Admiral Mahan declares
that ‘the aggressive insolence’ of Austria’s ultimatum ‘and Sevia’s
concession of all demands except those too humiliating for national
self-respect’ show that behind Austria’s assault was the instigation of
Berlin. He adds:

“Knowing how the matter would be viewed in Russia, it is incredible
that Austria would have ventured on the ultimatum unless assured
beforehand of the consent of Germany. The inference is irresistible
that it was the pretext for a war already determined upon as soon as
plausible occasion offered.’

“Circumstantial evidence, at least, places responsibility for the
flinging of the first firebrand upon the government of the Kaiser. Now,
who added fuel to the flames, until the great conflagration was under
way?

“The next move was the Czar’s. ‘Fraternal sentiments of the Russian
people for the Slavs in Servia,’ he says, led him to order partial
mobilization, following Austria’s invasion of Servia. Instantly Germany
protested, and within forty-eight hours sent an ultimatum demanding
that Russia cease her preparations. On the following day Germany began
mobilizing, and twenty-four hours later declared war on Russia.
Mobilization in France, necessitated by these events, was anticipated
by Germany, which simultaneously flung forces into Russia, France,
Luxembourg and Belgium.

“It was Germany’s historic policy of “blood and iron” that fired
Austria to attempt the crushing of Servia. It was Germany that hurled
an ultimatum, swiftly followed by an army, at Russia. It was Germany
that struck first at the French frontier. It was Germany that trampled
upon solemn treaty engagements by invading the neutral states of
Luxembourg and Belgium. And it was Germany that, in answer to England’s
demand that the neutrality of Belgium be protected, declared war
against Great Britain.

“Regardless, therefore, of questions of right and wrong, it is
undeniable that in each succeeding crisis Germany has taken the
aggressive. In so doing she has been inspired by a supreme confidence
in her military might. But she has less reason to be proud of her
diplomacy. The splendid audacity of her moves cannot obscure the fact
that in making the case upon which she will be judged she has been
outmaneuvered by the deliberation of Russia, the forbearance of France
and the patience of Great Britain. She has assumed the role of
international autocrat, while giving her foes the advantage of
prosecuting a patriotic war of defense.

“Particularly is this true touching the violation of neutral territory.
For nearly half a century the duchy of Luxembourg has been considered a
‘perpetually neutral state,’ under solemn guarantee of Austria, Great
Britain, Germany and Russia. Since 1830, when Belgium seceded from the
Netherlands, it, too, has been held ‘an independent and perpetually
neutral state,’ that status being solemnly declared in a convention
signed hy Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia. Yet the
first war move of Germany was to overrun these countries, seize their
railroads, bombard their cities and lay waste their territories.

“For forty years Germany has been the exemplar of a progressive
civilization. In spite of her adherence to inflated militarism, she has
put the whole world in her debt by her inspiring industrial and
scientific achievements. Her people have taught mankind lessons of
incalculable value, and her sons have enriched far distant lands with
their genius. Not the least of the catastrophes inflicted by this
inhuman war is that an unbridled autocracy has brought against the
great German empire an indictment for arrogant assault upon the peace
of nations and the security of human institutions.”

IS THE KAISER RESPONSIBLE?

How much reliance is to be placed on the foregoing newspaper opinion,
and on the prevailing sentiment holding Kaiser Wilhelm responsible for
flinging the war bomb that disrupted the ranks of peace, no one can
say. Every one naturally looked for the fomenter of this frightful
international conflict and was disposed to place the blame on the basis
of rumor and personal feeling. On the other hand each nation concerned
has vigorously disclaimed responsibility for the cataclysm.
Austria—very meekly—claimed that Servia precipitated the conflict.
Germany blamed it upon Russia and France, the former from Slavic race
sentiment, the latter from enmity that had existed since the loss of
Alsace and Lorraine in 1870. They, on the contrary, laid all the blame
upon Germany. In the case of England alone we have a clear vista. The
obligation of the island kingdom to maintain the neutral position of
Belgium and the utter disregard of this neutrality by Germany forced
her to take part and throw her armies into the field for the
preservation of her international obligations.

Many opinions were extant, many views advanced. One of these, from
Robert C. Long, a war correspondent of note, laid the total
responsibility upon Austria, which, he said, plunged Europe into war in
disregard of the Kaiser, who vigorously sought to prevent the outbreak,
even threatening his ally in his efforts to preserve peace. In his
view, “All the blood-guiltiness in this war will rest upon two Powers,
Austria and Russia. It rests on Austria for her undue harshness to
Servia and on Russia for its dishonesty in secretly mobilizing its
entire army at a time when it was imploring the Kaiser to intervene for
peace, and when the Kaiser was working for peace with every prospect of
success.”

We have quoted one editorial opinion holding Germany wholly
responsible. Here is another, from the New York TIMES, which, with a
fair degree of justice, distributes the responsibility among all the
warring nations of Europe:

“Germany is not responsible; Russia is not responsible, or Austria, or
France, or England. The pillars of civilization are undermined and
human aspirations bludgeoned down by no Power, but by all Powers; by no
autocrats, but by all autocrats; not because this one or that has erred
or dared or dreamed or swaggered, but because all, in a mad stampede
for armament, trade and territory, have sowed swords and guns,
nourished harvests of death-dealing crops, made ready the way.

“For what reason other than war have billions in bonds and taxes been
clamped on the backs of all Europe? None sought to evade war; each
sought to be prepared to triumph when it came. At most some
chancelleries whispered for delay, postponement; they knew the clash to
be inevitable; if not today, tomorrow. Avoid war! What else have they
lived for, what else prepared for, what else have they inculcated in
the mind of youth than the sureness of the conflict and the great glory
of offering themselves to this Moloch in sacrifice?

“No Power involved can cover up the stain. It is indelible, the sin of
all Europe. It could have been prevented by common agreement. There was
no wish to prevent it. Munition manufacturers were not alone in urging
the race to destruction, physical and financial. The leaders were for
it. It was policy. A boiling pot will boil, a nurtured seed will grow.
There was no escape from the avowed goal. A slow drift to the
inevitable, a thunderbolt forged, the awful push toward the vortex!
What men and nations want they get.”

GERMANY’S STAKE IN THE WAR

What had Germany to gain in the war in the instigation of which she is
charged with being so deeply involved? Territorial aggrandizement may
have been one of her purposes. Belgium and Holland lay between her and
the open Atlantic, and the possession of these countries, with their
splendid ports, would pay her well for a reasonable degree of risk and
cost. The invasion of Belgium as her first move in the war game may
have had an ulterior purpose in the acquisition of that country, one
likely to be as distasteful to France as the taking over of
Alsace-Lorraine. Perhaps the neutral position taken by Holland, with
her seeming inclination in favor of Germany, may have had more than
racial relations behind it. Considerations of ultimate safety from
annexation may have had its share in this attitude of neutrality.

The general impression has been that Germany went to war with the
purpose of establishing beyond question her political and military
supremacy on the European continent. Military despotism in Germany was
the decisive factor in making inevitable the general war. The Emperor
of Germany stood as the incarnation and exponent of the Prussian policy
of military autocracy. He had ruled all German States in unwavering
obedience to the militarist maxim: “In times of peace prepare for war.”
He had used to the full his autocratic power in building up the German
Empire and in making it not only a marvel of industrial efficiency, but
also a stupendous military machine. In this effort he had burdened the
people of Germany with an ever-increasing war budget. The limit in this
direction was reached with the war budget of the year 1912 when the
revenues of the princes and of all citizens of wealth were specially
taxed. No new sources of revenue remained. A crisis had come.

That crisis, as sometimes claimed, was not any menace from Britain or
any fear of the British power. It was rather the very real and very
rapidly rising menace of the new great Slav power on Germany’s border,
including, as it did, the Russian Empire and the entire line of Slav
countries that encircled Germanic Austria from the Adriatic to Bohemia.
These Slav peoples are separated from the governing Teutonic race in
the Austrian Empire by the gulfs of blood, language, and religion. And
in Europe the Slav population very largely outnumbers the Teuton
population and is growing much more rapidly.

Recent events, especially in the Balkan wars, had made it plain, not to
the German Emperor alone, but to all the world, that the growth into an
organized power of more than two hundred millions of Slav peoples along
nearly three thousand miles of international frontier was a menace to
the preservation of Teuton supremacy in Europe. That Teuton supremacy
was based on the sword. The German Emperor’s appeal was to “My sword.”
But when the new sword of the united Slav power was allowed to be
unsheathed, German supremacy was threatened on its own ground and by
the weapon of its own choosing.

However all this be, and it must be admitted that it is to a degree
speculative, there were in 1914 conditions existing that appeared to
render the time a suitable one for the seemingly inevitable continental
war. Revelations pointing to defects in the French army, deficiencies
of equipment and weaknesses in artillery, had been made in the French
Parliament. The debate that occurred was fully dwelt upon in the German
papers. And on July 16th the organ of Berlin radicalism, the VOSSICHE
ZEITUNG, published a leading article to show that Russia was not
prepared for war, and never had been. As for France, it said: “A Gallic
cock with a lame wing is not the ideal set up by the Russians. And when
the Russian eagle boasts of being in the best of health who is to
believe him? Why should the French place greater confidence in the
inveterate Russian disorganization than in their own defective
organization?”

As regards the Kaiser’s own estimate of his preparedness for war, and
the views of national polity he entertained, we shall let him speak for
himself in the following extracts from former utterances:

“We will be everywhere victorious even if we are surrounded by enemies
on all sides and even if we have to fight superior numbers, for our
most powerful ally is God above, who, since the time of the Great
Elector and Great King, has always been on our side.”—At Berlin, March
29, 1901.

“I vowed never to strike for world mastery. The world empire that I
then dreamed of was to create for the German empire on all sides the
most absolute confidence as a quiet, honest and peaceable neighbor. I
have vowed that if ever the time came when history should speak of a
German world power or a Hohenzollern world power this should not be
based on conquest, but come through a mutual striving of nations after
a common purpose.

“After much has been done internally in a military way, the next thing
must be the arming ourselves at sea. Every German battleship is a new
guarantee for the peace of the world. We are the salt of the earth, but
must prove worthy of being so. Therefore, our youth must learn to deny
what is not good for them.

“With all my heart I hope that golden peace will continue to be present
with us.”—At Bremen, March 22, 1905.

“My final and last care is for my fighting forces on land and sea. May
God grant that war may not come, but should the cloud descend, I am
firmly convinced that the army will acquit itself as it did so nobly
thirty-five years ago.”—At Berlin, February 25, 1906.

In the early days of the reign of William II war was prominent in his
utterances. He was the War Lord in full feather, and the world at that
time looked with dread upon this new and somewhat blatant apostle of
militarism. Yet year after year passed until the toll of almost three
decades was achieved, without his drawing the sword, and the world
began to regard him as an apostle of peace, a wise and capable ruler
who could gain his ends without the shedding of blood. What are we to
believe now? Had he been wearing a mask for all these years, biding his
time, hiding from view a deeply cherished purpose? Or did he really
believe that a mission awaited him, that regeneration of the world
through the sanguinary path of the battle-field was his duty, and that
by the aid of a successful war he could inaugurate a safer and sounder
era of peace?

We throw out these ideas as suggestions only. What the Kaiser purposed,
what deep-laid schemes of international policy he entertained, will,
perhaps, never be known. But if he was really responsible for the great
war, as he was so widely accused of being, the responsibility he
assumed was an awful one. If he was not responsible, as he declared and
as some who claim to have been behind the scenes maintain, the world
will be ready to absolve him when his innocence has been made evident.

WHY RUSSIA ENTERED THE FIELD

In this survey of the causes of the great war under consideration the
position of Russia comes next. That country was the first to follow
Austria and begin the threatening work of mobilization. Germany’s first
open participation consisted in a warming to Russia that this work must
cease. Only when her warning was disregarded did Germany begin
mobilization and declare war. All this was the work of a very few days,
but in this era of active military preparedness it needs only days,
only hours in some instances, to change from a state of peace into a
state of war and hurl great armed hosts against the borders of hostile
nations.

The general impression was that it was the Slavic race sentiment that
inspired Russia’s quick action. Servia, a country of Slavs, brothers in
race to a large section of the people of Russia, was threatened with
national annihilation and her great kinsman sprang to her rescue,
determined that she should not be absorbed by her land-hungry neighbor.
This seemed to many a sufficient cause for Russia’s action. Not many
years before, when Austria annexed her wards, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
both Slavic countries, Russia protested against the act. She would
doubtless have done more than protest but for her financial and
military weakness arising from the then recent Russo-Japanese War. In
1914 she was much stronger in both these elements of national power and
lost not a day in preparing to march to Servia’s aid.

But was this the whole, or indeed the chief, moving impulse in Russia’s
action? Was she so eager an advocate of Pan-Slavism as such a fact
would indicate? Had she not some other purpose in view, some fish of
her own to fry, some object of moment to obtain? Many thought so. They
were not willing to credit the Russian bear with an act of pure
international benevolence. Wars of pure charity are rarely among the
virtuous acts of nations. As it had been suggested that Germany saw in
the war a possible opportunity to gain a frontier on the Atlantic, so
it was hinted that Russia had in mind a similar frontier on the
Mediterranean. Time and again she had sought to wring Constantinople
from the hands of the Turks. In 1877 she was on the point of achieving
this purpose when she was halted and turned back by the Congress of
Berlin and the bellicose attitude of the nations that stood behind it.

Here was another and seemingly a much better opportunity. The Balkan
War had almost accomplished the conquest of the great Turkish capital
and left Turkey in a state of serious weakness. If Europe should be
thrown into the throes of a general war, in which every nation would
have its own interests to care for, Russia’s opportunity to seize upon
the prize for which she had so long sought was an excellent one, there
being no one in a position to say her nay. To Russia the possession of
Constantinople was like the possession of a new world, and this may
well have been her secret motive in springing without hesitation into
the war. Her long-sought prize hung temptingly within reach of her
hand, the European counterpart of the “Monroe Doctrine” could not now
be evoked to stay her grasp, and it seems highly probable that in this
may have lain the chief cause of Russia’s participation in the war.

FRANCE’S HATRED OF GERMANY

The Republic of France was less hasty than Russia and Germany in
issuing a declaration of war. Yet there, too, the order of mobilization
was quickly issued and French troops were on the march toward the
German border before Germany had taken a similar step. France had not
forgotten her humiliation in 1870. So far was she from forgetting it
that she cherished a vivid recollection of what she had lost and an
equally vivid enmity towards Germany in consequence. Enmity is hardly
the word. Hatred better fits the feeling entertained. And this was kept
vitally alive by the fact that Alsace and Lorraine, two of her former
provinces, still possessing a considerable French population, were now
held as part of the dominions of her enemy. The sore rankled and hope
of retribution lay deep in the heart of the French. Here seemed an
opportunity to achieve this long-cherished purpose, and we may
reasonably believe that the possibility of regaining this lost
territory made France eager to take part in the coming war. She had
been despoiled by Germany, a valued portion of her territory had been
wrested from her grasp, a promising chance of regaining it lay before
her. She had the men; she had the arms; she had a military organization
vastly superior to that of 1870; she had the memory of her former
triumphs over the now allied nations of Austria and Germany; she had
her obligations to aid Russia as a further inducement. The causes of
her taking part in the war are patent, especially in view of the fact
that in a very brief interval after her declaration her troops had
crossed the border and were marching gaily into Alsace, winning battles
and occupying towns as they advanced.

GREAT BRITAIN AND ITALY

We have suggested that in the case alike of Austria, Russia, Germany
and France the hope of gaining valuable acquisitions of territory was
entertained. In the case of France, enmity to Germany was an added
motive, the territory she sought being land of which she had been
formerly despoiled. These purposes of changing the map of Europe did
not apply to or influence Great Britain. That country had no territory
to gain and no great military organization to exercise. She possessed
the most powerful navy of any country in the world, but she was moved
by no desire of showing her strength upon the sea. There was no reason,
so far as any special advantage to herself was concerned, for her
taking part in the war, and her first step was a generous effort to
mediate between the Powers in arms.

Only when Belgium—a small nation that was in a sense under the
guardianship of Great Britain, so far as its nationality and neutrality
were concerned—was invaded by Germany without warning, did Britain feel
it incumbent upon her to come to its aid. This may not have been
entirely an act of benevolence. There was a probability that Germany,
once in control of Belgium, could not readily let go. She might add it
to her empire, a fact likely to seriously affect British sea-power.
However this be, Great Britain lost no time after the invasion in
becoming a party to the continental war, sending her fleet abroad and
enlisting troops for service in the aid of her allies, France and
Belgium.

Italy, a member of the Triple Alliance, the other members of which were
Germany and Austria, was the only one of the great Powers that held
aloof. She had absolutely nothing to gain by taking part in the war,
while her late large expenses in the conquest of Tripoli had seriously
depleted her war chest. As regards her alliance with Germany and
Austria, it put her under no obligation to come to their aid in an
offensive war. Her obligation was restricted to aid in case they were
attacked, and she justly held that no such condition existed. As a
result, Germany and Austria found themselves at war with the three
powerful members of the Triple Entente, while Italy, the third member
of the Triple Alliance, declined to draw the sword.

The defection of Italy was a serious loss to the power of the allies,
so much so that Emperor William threatened her with war if she failed
to fulfil her assumed obligations. This threat Italy quietly ignored.
She gave indications, in fact, that her sympathies were with the
opposite party. Thus Germany and Austria found themselves pitted
against three great Powers and a possible fourth, with the addition of
the two small nations of Servia and Belgium. And the latter were not to
be despised as of negligible importance. Servia quickly showed an
ability to check the forward movements of Austria, while Belgium,
without aid, long held a powerful German army at bay, defending the
city and fortresses of Liege with a boldness and success that called
forth the admiring acclamations of the world.

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND TRIPLE ENTENTE

This review of causes and motives may be supplemented by a brief
statement of what is meant by the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente,
terms which come into common prominence in discussing European
politics. They indicate the division of Europe, so far as its greater
Powers are concerned, into two fully or partially allied bodies, the
former consisting of Germany, Austria and Italy, the latter of Great
Britain, France and Russia. These organizations are of comparatively
recent date. The Alliance began in 1879 in a compact between Germany
and Austria, a Dual Alliance, which was converted into a Triple one in
1883, Italy then, through the influence of Bismarck, joining the
alliance. In this compact Austria and Germany pledged themselves to
mutual assistance if attacked by Russia; Italy and Germany to the same
if attacked by France.

The Triple Entente—or Understanding—arose from a Dual Alliance between
France and Russia, formed in 1887, an informal understanding between
Britain and France in 1904 and a similar understanding between Britain
and Russia in 1907. Its purpose, as formed by Edward VII, was to
balance the Triple Alliance and thus convert Europe into two great
military camps. When organized there seemed little probability of its
being called into activity for many years.




Chapter III.
STRENGTH AND RESOURCES OF THE WARRING POWERS


Old and New Methods in War—Costs of Modern Warfare—Nature of National
Resources—British and American Military Systems—Naval
Strength—Resources of Austria-Hungary—Resources of Germany—Resources of
Russia—Resources of France—Resources of Great Britain—Servia and
Belgium

Within the whole history of mankind the nations of the earth had never
been so thoroughly equipped for the art of warfare as they were in
1914. While the arts of construction have enormously developed, those
of destruction have fully kept pace with them; and the horrors of war
have enormously increased side by side with the benignities of peace.
It is interesting to trace the history of warfare from this point of
view. Beginning with the club and hammer of the stone age, advancing
through the bow and arrow and the sling-shot of later times, this art,
even in the great days of ancient civilization, the eras of Greece and
Rome, had advanced little beyond the sword and spear, crude weapons of
destruction as regarded in our times. They have in great part been set
aside as symbols of military dignity, emblems of the “pomp and
circumstance of glorious war.”

Descending through the Middle Ages we find the sword and spear still
holding sway, with the bow as an important accessory for the use of the
common soldier. As for the knight, he became an iron-clad champion, so
incased in steel that he could fight effectively only on horseback,
becoming largely helpless on foot. At length, the greatest stage in the
history of war, the notable invention of gunpowder was achieved, and an
enormous transformation took place in the whole terrible art. The
musket, the rifle, the pistol, the cannon were one by one evolved, to
develop in the nineteenth century into the breech-loader, the machine
gun, the bomb, and the multitude of devices fitted to bring about death
and destruction by wholesale, instead of by the retail methods of older
days.

At sea, the sailing vessel, with her far-flung white wings and rows of
puny guns, has given way to the steel-clad battleship with her fewer
but enormously larger cannons, capable of flinging huge masses of iron
many miles through the air and with a precision of aim that seems
incredible for such great distances.

We must add to this the torpedo boat, a tiny craft with a weapon
capable of sinking the most costly and stupendous of battleships, and
the submarine, fitted to creep unseen under blockading fleets, and deal
destruction with nothing to show the hand that dealt the deadly blow.
Even the broad expanse of the air has been made a field of warlike
activity, with scouting airships flying above contending armies and
signaling their most secret movements to the forces below.

OLD AND NEW METHODS IN WAR

In regard to loss of life on the battle-field, it may be said that many
of the wars of ancient times surpassed the bloodiest of those of modern
days, despite the enormously more destructive weapons and implements
now employed. When men fought hand to hand, and no idea of quarter for
the defeated existed, entire armies were at times slaughtered on the
field. In our days, when the idea of mercy for the vanquished prevails,
this wholesale slaughter of beaten hosts has ceased, and the death list
of the battle-field has been largely reduced by caution on the part of
the fighters. With the feeling that a dead soldier is utterly useless,
and a wounded one often worse than useless, as constituting an
impediment, every means of saving life is utilized. Soldiers now fight
miles apart. Prostrate, hidden, taking advantage of every opportunity
of protection, every natural advantage or artificial device, vast
quantities of ammunition are wasted on the empty air, every ball that
finds its quarry in human flesh being mayhap but one in hundreds that
go astray. In the old-time wars actual hand-to-hand fighting took
place. Almost every stroke told, every thrusting blade was directly
parried or came back stained with blood. In modern wars fighting of
this kind has ceased. A battle has become a matter of machinery. The
strong arm and stalwart heart are replaced by the bullet-flinging
machine, and it is a rare event for a man to know to whose hand he owes
wound or death. Such, at least, was largely the case in the war between
Russia and Japan in 1905. But in recent battles we read of hordes of
soldiers charging up to the muzzles of machine guns, and being mowed
down like ripened wheat.

COSTS OF MODERN WARFARE

But while loss of human life in war has not greatly increased, in other
directions the cost of warfare has enormously grown. In the past,
little special preparation was needed by the fighter. Armies could be
recruited off-hand from city or farm and do valiant duty in the field,
with simple and cheap weapons. In our days years of preliminary
preparation are deemed necessary and the costs of war go on during
times of profound peace, millions of men who could be used effectively
in the peaceful industries spending the best years of their lives in
learning the most effective methods of destroying their fellow men.

This is only one phase of the element of cost. Great workshops are
devoted to the preparation of military material, of absolutely no use
to mankind except as instruments of destruction. The costs of war, even
in times of peace, are thus very large. But they increase in an
enormous proportion after war has actually begun, millions of dollars
being needed where tens formerly sufficed, and national bankruptcy
threatening the nation that keeps its armies long in the field. The
American Civil War, fought half a century ago, was a costly procedure
for the American people. If it had been fought five or ten years ago
its cost would have been increased five-fold, so great has been the
progress in this terrible art in the interval.

NATURE OF NATIONAL RESOURCES

It is our purpose in the present chapter to take up the subject of this
cost and review the condition and resources of the several nations
which were involved in the dread internecine struggle of 1914, the
frightful conflict of nations that moved like a great panorama before
our eyes. These resources are of two kinds. One of them consists in the
material wealth of the nations concerned, the product of the fields and
factories, the mineral treasures beneath the soil, the results of trade
and commercial activity and the conditions of national finance,
including the extent of available revenue and the indebtedness which
hangs over each nation, much of it a heritage from former wars which
have left little beyond this aggravating record of their existence. It
is one which adds something to the cost of every particle of food
consumed by the people, every shred of clothing worn by them. Additions
to this incubus of debt little disturb the rules when blithely or
bitterly engaging in new wars, but every such addition adds to the
burdens of taxation laid on the shoulders of the groaning citizens, and
is sure to deepen the harvest of retribution when the time for it
arrives.

A second of these resources is that of preparation for war in time of
peace, the training of the able-bodied citizens in the military art,
until practically the entire nation becomes converted into a vast army,
its members, after their term of compulsory service, engaging in
ordinary labors in times of peace, yet liable to be called into the
field whenever the war lords desire, to face the death-belching field
piece and machine gun in a sanguinary service in which they have little
or no personal concern. This preparedness, with the knowledge of the
duties of a soldier which it involves, is a valuable war resource to
any nation that is saddled with such a system of universal military
training. And few nations of Europe and the East are now without it.
Great Britain is the chief one in Europe, while in America the United
States is a notable example of a nation that has adopted the opposite
policy, that of keeping its population at peaceful labor, steadily
adding to its resources, during the whole time in which peace prevails,
and trusting to the courage and mental resources of its citizens to
teach them quickly the art of fighting when, if ever, the occasion
shall arrive.

It must be admitted that the European system of militarism is likely to
be of great advantage in the early days of a war, in which large bodies
of trained soldiers can be hurled with destructive force against
hastily gathered militia. The distinction between trained and untrained
soldiers, however, rapidly disappears in a war of long continuance.
Experience in the field is a lesson far superior to any gained in mock
warfare, and the taking part in a few battles will teach the art of
warfare to an extent surpassing that of years of marching and
counter-marching upon the training field.

BRITISH AND AMERICAN MILITARY SYSTEMS

Britain and the United States, the only two of the greater nations that
have adopted the policy here considered, are not trusting completely to
chance. Each of them has a body of regular troops, fitted for police
duty in time of peace and for field duty in time of war, and serving as
a nucleus fitted to give a degree of coherence to raw militia when the
sword is drawn. Subsidiary to these are bodies of volunteer troops,
training as a recreation rather than as an occupation, yet constituting
a valuable auxiliary to the regular forces. This system possesses the
advantage of maintaining no soldiers except those kept in constant and
needful duty, all the remaining population staying at their regular
labors and adding very materially every year to the resources of the
nation, while saving the great sums expended without adequate return in
the process of keeping up the system of militarism.

What is above said refers only to the human element in the system. In
addition is the necessity of preparing and keeping in store large
quantities or war material—cannons, rifles, ammunition, etc.—the
building of inland forts and coast and harbor fortifications, for ready
and immediate use in time of war. In this all the nations are alike
actively engaged, the United States and Britain as well as those of the
European continent, and none of them are likely to be caught amiss in
this particular. Cannon and gunpowder eat no food and call for no pay
or pension, and once got ready can wait with little loss of efficiency.
They may, indeed, become antiquated through new invention and
development, and need to be kept up to date in this particular. But
otherwise they can be readily kept in store and each nation may with
comparative ease maintain itself on a level with others as regards its
supply of material of war.

NAVAL STRENGTH

In one field of war-preparation little of the distinction indicated
exists. This is that of ocean warfare, in which rivalry between the
great Powers goes on without restriction—at least between the
distinctively maritime nations. In this field of effort, the building
of gigantic battleships and minor war vessels, Britain has kept itself
in advance of all others, as a nation in which the sea is likely to be
the chief field of warlike activity. Beginning with a predominance in
war ships, it has steadily retained it, adding new and constantly
greater war ships to its fleet with a feverish activity, under the idea
that here is its true field of defense. It has sought vigorously to
keep itself on a level in this particular with any two of its rivals in
sea power. While it has not quite succeeded in this, the United States
and Germany pushing it closely, it is well in the lead as compared with
any single Power, and to keep this lead it is straining every nerve and
fiber of its national capacity.

RESOURCES OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Coming now to a statement of the strength and resources of the chief
Powers concerned in the present war, Austria-Hungary, as the originator
of the outbreak, stands first. It is scarcely necessary to repeat that
its severe demands upon Servia, arising from the murder of the Archduke
Ferdinand and its refusal to accept Servia’s almost complete acceptance
of its terms, led to an immediate declaration of war upon the small
offending state, the war fever thus started quickly extending from side
to side of the continent. Therefore in considering the existing
conditions of the various countries involved, those of Austria-Hungary
properly come first, the others following in due succession.

Austria-Hungary is a dual kingdom, each partner to the union having its
separate national organization and legislative body. While both are
under the rule of one monarch, Francis Joseph being at once the Emperor
of Austria and the King of Hungary, their union is not a very intimate
one. There is large racial distinction between the two countries, and
Hungary cherishes a strong feeling of animosity to Austria, the outcome
of acts of tyranny and barbarity not far in the past.

The two countries closely approach each other in area, Austria having
115,903 and Hungary 125,039 square miles; making a total of 240,942.
The populations also do not vary largely, the total being estimated at
about 50,000,000. Of these the Slavs number more than 24,000,000,
approaching one half the total , while of Germans there are but
11,500,000, little more than half of the Slavic population. The
Magyars, or Hungarians, a people of eastern origin, and the main
element of Hungarian population, number about 8,750,000. In addition
there are several millions of Roumanian and Italic stock, and a
considerable number of Jews and Gypsies. The inclusion of this
heterogeneous population into one kingdom dates far back in medieval
history, and it was not until 1867, as a consequence of a vigorous
Hungarian demand, that Austria and Hungary became divided into separate
nations, the remnant of their former close union remaining in their
being ruled by one monarch, the venerable Francis Joseph, who is still
upon the throne. This division quickly followed the war between Prussia
and Austria in 1866, and was one of the results of the defeat of
Austria in that war.

Austria is a hilly or mountainous country, its plains occupying only
about one fifth of the total territory. The most extensive tracts of
low or flat land occur in Hungary, Galicia and Slavonia, the great
Hungarian plain having an area of 36,000 square miles. Much of this is
highly fertile, and Hungary is the great granary of the country.
Austria-Hungary is well watered by the Danube and its tributaries and
has a small extent of sea-coast on the Adriatic, its principal ports
being Trieste, Pola and Fiume. Its railways are about 30,000 miles in
length. In consequence of its interior position its largest trade is
with Germany, through which empire there is also an extensive transit
commerce. Its mountainous character makes it rich in minerals, the
chief of these being coal, iron, and salt.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, formerly part of Turkey in Europe, were put
under the military occupation and administrative rule of Austria after
the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–8, and in 1908 were fully annexed by
Austria, an act of spoliation which had its ultimate result in the
assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914, and may thus be considered
the instigating agency in the 1914 war.

The finances of Austria-Hungary may be briefly given. Austria has an
annual revenue of $636,909,000; Hungary of $410,068,000; their
expenditure equaling these sums. The debt of Austria is stated at
$1,433,511,000; of Hungary, $1,257,810,000; and of the joint states at
$1,050,000,000. Military service is obligatory on all over twenty years
of age who are capable of bearing arms, the total terms of service
being twelve years, of which three are passed in the line, seven in the
reserve, and two in the Landwehr. The army is estimated to number
390,000 on the peace footing and over 2,000,000 on the war footing. Its
navy numbers four modern and nine older battleships, with twelve
cruisers and a number of smaller craft.

RESOURCES OF GERMANY

Germany, in the census of 1910, was credited with a population of
64,925,993. This is in great part composed of Teutons, or men of German
race, its people being far less heterogeneous than those of Austria,
though it includes several millions of Slavs, Lithuanians, Poles and
others. It has an area of 208,738 square miles. It is mountainous in
the south and center, but in the north there is a wide plain extending
to the German Ocean and the Baltic Sea, and forming part of the great
watershed which stretches across Europe. Its soil, except in the more
rugged and mountainous districts, is prolific, being well watered and
bearing abundant crops of the ordinary cereals. Potatoes, hemp, and
flax are very abundant crops and the sugar beet is extensively
cultivated. The forests are of great extent and value, and are
carefully conserved to yield a large production without over cutting.
Among domestic animals, the cattle, sheep and swine of certain
districts have long been famous.

The minerals are numerous and some of them of much value, those of
chief importance being coal, iron, zinc, lead and salt. While much
attention is given to mining and agriculture, the manufacturing
industries are especially important. Linens and other textiles are
widely produced and iron manufacture is largely carried on. The Krupp
iron works at Essen are of world-wide fame, and the cannon made there
are used in the forts of many distant nations.

These are a few only of the large variety of manufactures, a market for
which is found in all parts of the world, the commerce of Germany being
widely extended. In short, the empire has come into very active rivalry
with Great Britain in the development of commerce, and to its progress
in this direction it owes much of its flourishing condition. Hamburg is
by far the most important seaport, Bremen, Stettin, Danzig and others
also being thriving ports. The total length of railway is over 40,000
miles.

The annual revenue of the German Empire is nearly $900,000,000; that of
its component states, $1,500,000,000; that of the states at
$3,735,000,000. The revenue is derived chiefly from customs duties,
excise duties on beet-root sugar, salt, tobacco and malt and
contributions from the several states.

Germany is the foster home of modern militarism and is held to have the
most complete army system in the world. Every man capable of bearing
arms must begin his military training on the 1st of January of the year
in which he reaches the age of twenty, and continue it to the end of
his forty-second year, unless released from this duty by the competent
authorities, either altogether or for times of peace.

Seven years of this time must be spent in the army or fleet; three of
them in active service, four in the reserve. Seven more years are
passed in the Landwehr, the members of which may be called out only
twice for training. The remaining time is passed in the Landsturm,
which is called out only in case of invasion of the empire. The total
peace strength of the army is given at 870,000; of the reserves at
4,430,000; the total being 5,300,000.

The navel force of Germany is very powerful, though considerably less
than that of Great Britain. It comprises 19 of the enormous modern
battleships, 7 cruiser battleships, and 20 of older type; 9 first-class
and 45 second and third-class cruisers, and numerous smaller warships,
including 47 torpedo boats, 141 destroyers and 60 submarines.

RESOURCES OF RUSSIA

Russia, the third of the three nations to which the war was most
immediately due, is the most extensive consolidated empire in the
world, its total area being estimated at 8,647,657 square miles, of
which 1,852,524 are in Europe, the remainder in Asia. The population is
given at about 160,000,000, of which 130,000,000 are in Europe.

Agriculture is the chief pursuit of this great population, though
manufactures are largely developing. The forests, immense in extent,
cover forty-two per cent of the area and contain timber in enormous
quantities. While a large part of the area is level ground, there is
much elevated territory, and the mineral wealth is very important. It
includes gold, silver, platinum, iron, copper, coal and salt, all of
large occurrence. Of the people, over 1,800,000 are employed in
manufacture, and the annual value of the commerce amounts to
$1,300,000,000. The length of railway is about 50,000 miles.

Russia is heavily in debt, Germany being its largest creditor. The
total debt is stated at $4,553,000,000, its revenue $1,674,000,000. The
liability to military service covers all able-bodied men between the
ages of twenty and forty-two years. Five years must be passed in active
service, the remainder in the various reserves. On a peace footing the
army is 1,290,000 strong; its war strength is 5,500,000. The
territorial service is capable of supplying about 3,000,000 more,
making a possible total of 7,500,000. As regards the navy, it was
greatly reduced in strength in the war with Japan and has not yet fully
recovered. The empire now possesses nine modern battleships, four
cruiser battleships, and eight of old type. There are also cruisers and
other vessels, including 23 torpedo boats, 105 destroyers, and 48
submarines.

RESOURCES OF FRANCE

France, the one large Power in Europe in which the people have created
a republic and have got rid of the FACT of a king, as illustrated in
the other continental Powers,—and in addition to the mountain realm of
Switzerland, in which the people govern themselves through their
representatives,—has taken up the dogma of militarism in common with
its neighbors and constitutes the fourth of the Powers in which this
system has been carried to its ultimate conclusion of a world-wide war.

France had a startling object lesson in 1870. It had, under Napoleon
III, been imitating Prussia in its military establishment, and its
government officials coincided with the emperor in the theory that its
army was in a splendid state of preparation. Marshal Leboeuf lightly
declared that “everything was ready, more than ready, and not a gaiter
button missing,” and it was with a light-hearted confidence that the
Emperor Napoleon declared war against Prussia, the insensate multitude
filling Paris with their futile war cry of “On to Berlin.”

This is not the place to deal with this subject, but it may be said
that France quickly learned that nothing was ready and the nation went
down in the most sudden and awful disaster of modern times. A lesson
had been taught, one not easy to forget. The Republic succeeded the
Empire, and has since been working on the theory that war with its old
enemy might at any time become imminent and no negligence in the matter
of preparation could be permitted. As a consequence, France went into
the war of 1914 in a state of fitness greatly superior to that of 1870,
and Germany found France waiting on its border line, alert and able,
ready alike for offense or defense.

What are the natural conditions, the strength and resources, of this
great republic? France has an area of 207,054 square miles, almost the
same as that of the German Empire. If its numerous colonies be added,
its total area is over 4,000,000 square miles. But this vast colonial
expanse is of no special advantage to it in a European war. Its
population is 39,601,509; if Algeria, its most available colony, be
added, it is about 45,000,000, a total 20,000,000 less than the
population of Germany.

Its soil is highly fitted for agricultural use, about nine tenths of it
being productive and more than half of it under the plow, the cereals
forming the bulk of its products. Its wheat crop is large and oats, rye
and barley are also of value, though the raising of the domestic
animals is of less importance than in the surrounding countries. The
growth of the vine is one of its most important branches of
agriculture, and in good years France produces about half of the total
wine yield of the world. In mineral wealth it stands at a somewhat low
level, its yield of coal, iron, etc. being of minor importance.

France enjoys a large and valuable commerce and active manufacturing
industries, products of a more or less artistic character being
especially attended to. Of the textile fabrics, those of silk goods are
much the most important, this industry employing about 2,000,000
persons and yielding more than a fourth in value of the whole
manufactured products of France. Other products are carpets, tapestry,
fine muslins, lace and cotton goods. Products of different character
are numerous and their value large. The fisheries of France are also of
much importance. Its commerce, while large, is very considerably less
than that of Great Britain and Germany, France being especially a
self-centered country, largely using what it makes.

There is abundant provision for internal trade and travel, there being
30,000 miles of railway, 3,000 miles or canal, and 5,500 miles of
navigable rivers. The annual revenue approaches $1,000,000,000, and the
public debt in 1914 was at the large total of over $6,200,000,000. This
is much the largest debt of any nation in the world, the debt of
Russia, which comes next in amount, being about $1,700,000,000 less. It
is largely due to the cost of the war of 1870 and the subsequent large
payment to Germany. Yet the French people carry it without feeling
seriously overburdened.

Coming now to the French military system, it rivals that of Germany in
efficiency. The law requires the compulsory military service of every
French citizen who is not unfit for such service. They have to serve in
the regular army for three years, in the regular reserves for six
years, in the territorial army for six years, and finally in the
reserves of this army for ten years. This gives France a peace strength
of 720,000 and a total war strength of 4,000,000. The navy is manned
partly by conscription, partly by voluntary enlistment, the naval
forces comprising about 60,000 officers and men.

The naval strength of the republic embraces 17 modern battleships, 25
of older type, 18 first-class, 13 second and third-class cruisers, 173
torpedo boats, 87 destroyers, and 90 submarines. There is another
element of modern military strength of growing importance and sure to
be of large use in the war under review. This is that of the airship.
In 1914 France stood at the head in this particular, its aeroplanes,
built or under construction, numbering 550. Germany had 375, Russia
315, Italy 270, Austria 220, Britain 180 and Belgium 150. In dirigible
balloons Germany stood first, with 50. France had 30, Russia 15,
Austria 10 and Britain 7. These air-soaring implements of war came into
play early in the conflict and Tennyson’s vision of “battles in the
blue” was realized in attacks of aeroplanes upon dirigibles, with death
to the crews of each.

RESOURCES OF GREAT BRITAIN.

Great Britain, the remaining party to the five-fold war of great
European Powers, is an island country of considerably smaller area than
those so far named. Including Ireland it has an area of 121,391 square
miles, about equal to that of the American State of New Mexico and not
half the size of the Canadian province of Saskatchewan. Its population,
however, surpasses that of France, amounting to 45,221,615. If the
outlying dominions of Great Britain be added it becomes the greatest
empire in the world’s history, its colonial dominions being estimated
at over 13,000,000 square miles, and the total population of kingdom
and colonies at 435,000,000, the greatest population of any country in
the world. And Britain differs from France in the fact that much of
this outlying population is available for war purposes in case of peril
to the liberties of the mother country. At the outbreak of the war of
1914 the loyal Dominion of Canada sprang at once into the field,
mobilized its forces, and offered the mother land material aid in men
and gifts of varied nature.

The same sense of loyalty was shown in Australia and South Africa and
in others of the British oversea dominions, while India added an
important contingent to the army and much other aid.

As for the immediate kingdom, it is not of high value in agricultural
wealth, being at present divided up to a considerable extent into large
unproductive estates, and it is quite unable to feed its teeming
population, depending for this on its large commerce in food products.
Its annual imports amount to about $3,000,000,000, its exports to
$2,250,000,000.

Commercially and industrially alike Great Britain stands at the head of
all European nations. Its abundant mineral wealth, especially in coal
and iron, has stimulated manufactures to the highest degree, while its
insular character and numerous seaports have had a similar stimulating
effect upon commerce. Its revenue, aside from that of the colonies,
amounts to about $920,000,000 annually, and its public debt reaches a
total of $3,485,000,000.

The British government depends largely for safety from invasion upon
its insular position and its enormously developed navy, and has not
felt it necessary to enter upon the frenzy of military preparation
which pervades the continental nations. No British citizen is obliged
to bear arms except for the defense of his country, but all able-bodied
men are liable to militia service, the militia being raised, when
required, by ballot. Enlistment among the regulars is either for twelve
years’ army service, or for seven years’ army service and five years’
reserve service. The peace strength of the army is estimated at about
255,000 men, the reserves at 475,000; making a total of 730,000.

It is in its navy that Great Britain’s chief warlike strength exists,
the naval force being much greater than that of any other nation. It
possesses in all 29 modern battleships, many of them of the great
dreadnaught and super-dreadnaught type. In addition it has 10 cruiser
battleships, and 38 older battleships, most of the latter likely to be
of little service for warlike duty. There are also 45 first-class, and
70 second and third-class cruisers, 58 torpedo boats, 212 destroyers
and 85 submarines, the whole forming a total navel strength approaching
that of any two of the other Powers.

SERVIA AND BELGIUM

As regards the remaining nations engaged in the war, Servia, in which
the contest began, has an area of 18,782 square miles, a population of
4,000,000, and a standing army of 240,000, a number seemingly very
inadequate to face the enormously greater power of Austria-Hungary. But
the men had become practically all soldiers, very many of them tried
veterans of the recent Balkan War; their country is mountainous and
admirably fitted for defensive warfare, and their power of resistance
to invasion was quickly shown to be great.

Belgium, the other early seat of the war, is still smaller in area,
having but 11,366 square miles. But it is very densely populated,
possessing 7,432,784 inhabitants. Its army proved brave and capable,
its fortifications modern and well adapted to defense, and small as was
its field force it held back the far more numerous German invaders
until France and Great Britain had their troops in position for
available defense. This small intermediate kingdom therefore played a
very important part in the outset of the war.

If one judges by the figures given of the available military strength
of the nations involved, the huge host said to have followed Xerxes to
the invasion of Greece could easily be far surpassed in modern warfare.
The fact is, however, that these huge figures greatly exceed the
numbers that could, except in the most extreme exigency, be available
for use in the field, and for real active service we should be obliged
to greatly reduce these paper estimates. It must be taken into account
that the fields and factories of the nations cannot be too greatly
denuded of their trained workers. It was a shrewd saying of Napoleon
Bonaparte that “An army marches on its stomach,” and the important duty
of keeping the stomach adequately filled can not be overlooked.

In actual war also there is an enormous exhaustion of military
material, which must be constantly replaced, and this in turn demands
the services of great numbers of trained artisans. The question of
finance also cannot be overlooked. It needs vast sums of money to keep
a modern army in the field, this increasing rapidly as the forces grow
in numbers, and no national treasure chest is inexhaustible. Tax as
they may, the war lords cannot squeeze out of their people more blood
than flows in their veins, and exhaustion of the war-chest may prove
even more disastrous than exhaustion of the regiments. For these
reasons a limit to the size of armies is inevitable and in any great
war this limitation must quickly make itself apparent.




Chapter IV.
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE WAR


The Growth of German Importance—German Militarism—Great Britain’s Peace
Efforts—Germany’s Naval Program—German Ambitions—Preparation for
War—Effect on the Empire

The influence of the European War permeated everything from and through
the nation to the individual, from trade and commerce and world-finance
to the cost of food and the price of labor. The whole world, civilized
and uncivilized, was drawn into this whirlpool of disaster—the majority
of the population of the earth was actually at war. Was it possible
that such a vast conflict—so far reaching in its racial and national
elements, so bitter in its old and new animosities, so great in its
territorial area, so tremendous in the numbers of men in arms—could
come, as some commentators say, like a thief in the night or have
fallen upon the world like a bolt from the blue! All available
information of an exact character, all the preparation of the preceding
few years, all the inner statecraft of the world as revealed in policy
and action, prove the fallacy of this supposition.

THE GROWTH OF GERMAN IMPORTANCE

As a matter of fact one nation had been for nearly half a century the
pivot upon which European hopes and fears have turned in the matter of
peace and war, of military and naval preparation, of diplomatic
interchange. During this period Germany rose to a foremost place
amongst the nations of Europe, to the first place in strength of
military power and organized fighting force, to the second place in
naval strength and commercial progress. The growth itself was a
legitimate one in the main; and, given the character of its people and
their cultivated convictions as to inherent greatness, was inevitable.
For other nations the vital question asked in diplomacy and answered in
their military or naval preparations was equally inevitable: How would
Germany use this power, against whom was it aimed, for what specific
purpose was it being organized with such capable precision, such
splendid skill?

GERMAN MILITARISM

Great Britain, meanwhile, had devoted her main attention to the trade
and diplomacy and little wars associated with the maintenance of a
world-empire and, in self-defense, had cultivated friendships with
Russia and France and the United States and Japan as this German power
began to come closer and touch the most vital British interests. France
naturally strengthened itself as its historic enemy grew in power;
Russia improved her military position after the Japanese was as she was
bound to do; Germany appeared to set the pace upon sea and land with an
aggressive diplomacy in Morocco and in China, at Paris and at St.
Petersburg, which was bound to cause trouble and to promote what is
commonly called militarism. The vast ambitions and persistent policy of
the German ruler and his people, the unsatisfied characteristics of
German diplomacy, the militant ideals and military preparations and
naval expansion of Germany between 1900 and 1914 became the dominant
consideration in the chancelleries of Europe. Armies and navies, wars
in the Balkans or struggles for colonial spheres of influence,
financial reserves and naval construction and volunteer forces—all came
to be measured against current developments in this center of European
gravity.

GREAT BRITAIN’S PEACE EFFORTS

Great Britain tried to hold aloof from this international rivalry, this
preparation for a war which her people and leaders hoped against hope
would be averted. Royal visits of a pacific character were exchanged,
parties of Great Britain’s business men visited Berlin, while leaders
such as King Edward and Lord Haldane exercised all their ability in
striving for some mutual ground of friendly action. Lovers of peace
wrote many volumes and filled many newspapers with articles on the
beneficence of that policy and the terrors of militarism—books and
articles which were never seen in Germany except by those who regarded
them as so many confessions of national weakness. Between 1904 and 1908
Great Britain actually reduced her naval expenditures and limited her
construction of battleships in the hope that Germany would follow the
lead, pleaded at two Hague Conferences for international reduction of
armaments, kept away from all increase in her own almost ridiculous
military establishment, urged upon two occasions (in 1912–1913) a naval
holiday in construction. The following figures from Brassey’s
authoritative NAVAL ANNUAL shows that her naval expenditure upon new
ships in 1913 was actually less than in 1904, that Germany’s was nearly
three times greater, that France and Russia and Italy had doubled
theirs:

      Great Britain   Germany      France       Russia       Italy        Austro-Hungary
1904  £13,508,176     £4,275,489   £4,370,102   £4,480,188   £1,121,753   £1,329,590
1908    8,660,202      7,795,499    4,193,544   2,703,721     1,866,158    716,662
1911   17,566,877     11,710,859    5,876,659   3,240,394     2,677,302    3,125,000
1912   17,271,527     11,491,157    6,997,552   7,904,094     2,500,000    3,620,881
1913   13,276,400     11,176,407    7,595,010  10,953,616     2,800,000    3,280,473

GERMANY’S NAVAL PROBLEM

Between 1909 and 1914 British leaders became convinced, as France and
Russia and other countries had long been certain, that Germany meant
war as soon as she was ready; that her policy was to take the two
border enemies, or rivals, first with a great war-machine which would
give them no chance for preparation or success, to dictate a peace
which would give her control of the sea-coasts and channel touching
Britain, to make that country the seat of war preparations, naval
uncertainty, perhaps financial difficulty and commercial injury, to
prepare at leisure for the war which would conquer England and acquire
her colonies. In the first-named year British statesmen of both parties
told an amazed Parliament and country that German naval construction of
big ships was approaching the British standard, that the cherished
policy of a British navy equal to those of any two other nations was
absolutely gone, that England would be lucky if, in a few years, she
held a 60 per cent superiority over that of Germany alone, that the
latter country’s naval construction was clearly aimed at Britain and
could be for no other than a hostile purpose. British ships had already
been recalled from the Seven Seas to hold the North Sea against the
growing naval power of a nation which had 5,000,000 soldiers behind its
ships as compared with England’s 250,000 men scattered over the world.
From that date in 1909 all who shared in the statecraft of the British
Empire understood the issue to be a real one—with France and Russia as
allies or without them.

What was back of this situation? Germany was already dominant in
Continental Europe. It had compelled Russia to submit when Austria in
1908 annexed the Slav states of Bosnia and Herzegovina and defied
Servia to interfere or its proud patron at St. Petersburg to prevent
the humiliation; it had brought France to her knees over the Morocco
incident and the Delcasse resignation, and would have done so again in
1911 if Great Britain had not ranged herself behind the French
republic; it held the issues of peace and war between the great Powers
during the Balkan struggles of 1912 and 1913 and prevented Servia from
winning its legitimate fruits of victory or Montenegro from holding
what it had won; it had watched with delight the defeat of unorganized
Russia at the hands of Japan and saw what its writers described as a
decadent British Empire holding in feeble hands a quarter of the earth
in fee, with revolt coming in Ireland, rebellion seething in India,
dissatisfaction in South Africa, separation upon the horizon in Canada
and Australia. Here lay the secret of German naval policy, of German
hopes that Britain would remain out of the inevitable struggle with
France and Russia, of German ambitions for a world-empire.

GERMAN AMBITIONS

The German nation had not up to the passing of Bismarck been the enemy
of the British people and until its belated entrance upon the field of
world politics and expansion the people had not even been rivals. In
the long series of European wars between 1688 and 1815, the German
states were allies and friends of England. After that, Prussia, and
then the German Empire, became gradually a great national force in the
world and its spirit of unity, pride of power, energy in trade, skill
and success in industry, vigor of development in tariffs, progress in
military power and naval construction were, from the standpoint of its
own people, altogether admirable. Following the Franco-Prussian War it
had steadily attained a position of European supremacy. Then came the
increase of population and trade, the desire for colonies, the
restriction of emigration to foreign countries.

It was a natural though difficult ambition. The marriage of Queen
Wilhelmina, and later the birth of a heir, averted any immediate
probability of acquiring Holland and, with it, the Dutch colonial
possessions, except by means of force. The assertion of the United
States’ Monroe Doctrine checked German efforts which had been directed
to South America and concentrated in Brazil, where 100,000 Germans had
settled and where trade relations had become very close. British
diplomacy of a trade, as well as political character, in Persia,
prevented certain railway schemes from being carried out, which would
have given Germany a dominating influence in Asia Minor and on the
Persian Gulf. Although the partition of Africa gave the German Empire
nearly one million square miles and an obvious opening for colonization
and power, the inexperience and ineptitude of German officials in
Colonial government, the dislike, also, of Germans for emigration and
the fact that the movement of settlers abroad steadily decreased in
late years, tended to prevent, on the Continent, an expansion which
would have been assured under British colonization and business effort.

At the same time the acquisition of these and other regions such as
Samoa was significant. Prior to 1870 Germany was a geographical
expression which meant a loose combination of States with sometimes
clashing interests, and incoherent expression, and varied patriotism.
German trade was then small, the industries too poor to compete with
those of Britain, while its people possessed not an acre of soil beyond
their European boundaries. Since then it had become a closely-united
people with an army of over five million men—admittedly the
best-trained troops in the world; with a trade totalling $4,400,000,000
and competing in Britain’s home market, taking away her contracts in
India and some of the colonies, beating her in many foreign fields;
with an industrial production which included great steel works such as
Krupps, ship-building yards said to be of greater productive power than
those of Britain, factories of well-kept character operating at high
pressure with workmen trained in the best technical system of the world
today; with other productive conditions aided by high protective duties
and with exports totalling (1910) $2,020,000,000 and imports of
$2,380,000,000; with Savings Bank deposits in 1911 totalling
$4,500,000.0000 as against a British total of $1,135,000,000.

Couple these conditions with Colonial ambitions dwarfed, or
unsuccessful in comparison with British success; continental power as
supreme, by virtue of military strength, as Napoleon’s was one hundred
years before by the force of genius, but hampered, as was his, by the
power of Britain on the seas; a productive force of industry increasing
out of all proportion to home requirements, competing with British
commerce in every corner of the world and threatened by a possible but
finally postponed combination of British countries in a system of
inter-Empire tariffs; a population of 64,000,000, increasing at the
rate of one million a year and having no suitable opening for
emigration or settlement within its own territories; and we have
conditions which explained and emphasized German naval construction.
Both German ambition and German naval construction were therefore
easily comprehensible.

Nor was the ambition for sea-power concealed. The first large naval
program was passed by the Reichstag in 1898 and fixed the naval
estimate up to 1903, when the total expenditure was to be
$45,000,000—in 1906 the naval expenditure was over $60,000,000. The
second Naval Bill was passed in 1900 during the Boer War, and the
preamble to this Act stated that its object was to give Germany “a
fleet of such strength that even for the mightiest Naval Power, a war
with her would involve such risks as to endanger its own supremacy.”
Other Acts were passed in 1906 and 1908, and for the years 1908 to 1917
arrangements were made for a total expenditure of $1,035,000,000—this
including a portion of the “accelerated program” and the Special
Dreadnought construction which caused the memorable debate in the
British Commons in 1909.

The Law of 1912—passing the Reichstag on May 21st of that year—provided
for an addition to the program of three battleships, three large
cruisers and three small ones. During the years 1898–1904 Great Britain
launched 26 battleships to Germany’s 14, with 27 armored cruisers, 17
protected cruisers and 55 destroyers to Germany’s 5, 16 and 35
respectively, or a total of 125 to 70. In 1905–11 Great Britain
launched 20 battleships to Germany’s 15, with 13 armored cruisers, 10
protected cruisers and 80 destroyers to Germany’s 6, 16 and 70
respectively, or a total of 123 to 107. Excluding destroyers Great
Britain launched 70 sea-going warships in the first period to Germany’s
25 and in the second period 43 to 37.

PREPARATION FOR WAR

Meanwhile German preparations for war went on apace in every direction.
Following up the war teachings of Nietzsche and Treitschke and others,
General Von Bernhardi issued book after book defining in clear language
the alleged national beneficence, biological desirability and
inevitability of war, which, when it came, would be “fought to conquer
for Germany the rank of a world-power;” the universities and schools
and press teemed with militarist ideals and practices; the army charges
rose to $250,000,000 and the trained soldiers available at the
beginning of 1910 were alleged to have 6,000 field-guns; Colonel
Gaedke, the German naval expert, stated on February 24th of that year
that the German government was building a fleet of 58 battleships and
that “the time is gradually approaching when the German fleet will be
superior to all the fleets of the world, with the single exception of
the English fleet,” and that in the past twelve years Germany had spent
on new ships alone 63,200,000 pounds, or $316,000,000, while between
then and 1914 she would spend 57,500,000 pounds more, or $287,500,000.

The annual report of the German Navy League in 1910 showed a total of
1,031,339 members as against an estimated membership in Britain’s
League of 20,000. Professor T. Schieman of the University of Berlin, in
the New York MCCLURE’S MAGAZINE for May of that year, clearly stated
that Germany would not submit in future to British naval supremacy or
to any limitation of armaments. During this period, also, Heligoland,
the island handed over by Britain in 1890 in exchange for certain East
African rights, became the key and center of the whole German coast
defense system against England. Cuxhaven, Borkum, Emden,
Wilhelmshaven—with twice as many Dreadnought docks as
Portsmouth—Wangeroog, Bremerhaven, Geestemunde, etc., were
magnificently fortified and guarded. Whether dictated by diplomatic
considerations and affected latterly by the British-French alliance or
influenced by Colonial and naval and commercial ambitions, there could
be no doubt as to the danger of the situation at the beginning of 1914.
In a book entitled “England and Germany,” published during 1912, Mr. A.
J. Balfour, the British conservative leader, replied to various German
contributors and gave the British view of the situation:

It must be remembered in the first place that we are a commercial
nation, and war, whatever its issue, is ruinous to commerce and to the
credit on which commerce depends. It must be remembered in the second
place that we are a political nation, and unprovoked war (by us) would
shatter in a day the most powerful Government and the most united
party. It must be remembered in the third place that we are an insular
nation, wholly dependent upon sea-borne supplies, possessing no
considerable army, either for home defense or foreign service, and
compelled therefore to play for very unequal stakes should Germany be
our opponent in the hazardous game of war. It is this last
consideration which I should earnestly ask enlightened Germans to weigh
well if they would understand the British point of view. It can be made
clear in a very few sentences. There are two ways in which a hostile
country can be crushed. It can be conquered or it can be starved. If
Germany were supreme in our home waters she could apply both methods to
Britain. Were Britain ten times Mistress in the North Sea she could
apply neither method to Germany. Without a superior fleet Britain would
no longer count as a Power. Without any fleet at all Germany would
remain the greatest power in Europe.

The Balkan wars proved and strengthened the power of Germany in
diplomacy and in the Eastern Question, while it showed that a deadly
struggle between nations might spring to an issue in a few days and a
million armed men leap into war at a word. The enormous German special
taxation of $250,000,000 authorized in the first part of 1913 for an
additional military establishment of 4,000 officers, 15,000
non-commissioned officers and 117,000 men indicated the basic strength
of the people’s military feeling, and ensured the still greater
predominance of its army.

EFFECT ON THE EMPIRE

When war broke out on August 1, 1914, between the five greater Powers
of Europe—Great Britain, Russia and France, on the one side and Germany
and Austria on the other—the issue was at once brought home to about
450 millions of people in America, Asia and Africa who were connected
with these nations by ties of allegiance or government, by racial
association, or historic conquest. Of these peoples and lands by far
the greater proportion were in the British Empire and included India,
Burmah, South Africa, Australia, Canada and a multitude of smaller
states and countries. Not the least remarkable of the events which
ensued in the succeeding early weeks of the great War was the
extraordinary way in which this vast and complex Empire found itself as
a unit in fighting force, a unit in sentiment, a unit in co-operative
action. Irish sedition, whether “loyal or disloyal,” Protestant or
Catholic, largely vanished like the shadow of an evil dream; Indian
talk of civil war and trouble disappeared; South African threats of
rebellion took form in a feeble effort which melted away under the
pressure of a Boer statesman and leader—General Botha; the idea that
Colonial Dominions were seeking separation and would now find it proved
as evanescent as a light mist before the sun. The following table
indicates the nature of the resources of opposing nations and the
character of their Colonial sources of support:


                Wealth            Population    Total Army   Navy   Population of Colonies
Great Britain   $80,000,000,000   45,000,000    800,000      681    368,000,000
France          65,000,000,000    39,000,000  2,100,000      382     41,000,000
Russia          40,000,000,000   171,000,000  8,000,000      249      5,000,000
Germany         60,000,000,000    65,000,000  5,000,000      354     12,000,000
Austria         25,000,000,000    49,000,000  2,200,000      155


It was a curious characteristic of the press comments and magazine
articles and book studies of the War during these months that while
varied fighting was going on in the various Colonies of these Powers
and in the case of Great Britain, notably, countries like Canada,
Australia, New Zealand and India were pouring out men and gifts to aid
the Empire, statistical calculations usually rated Great Britain as not
an Empire but simply a nation with the wealth and population of its two
little islands in the North Sea.

Properly the $80,000,000,000 of estimated British wealth should have e
included the thousands of millions of treasure in India and Egypt, the
gold mines and diamond resources of South Africa, the wheat fields and
mines of Canada, the sheep farms and gold of Australia and many other
sources; the estimate of population should have included the countless
millions from which Britain could draw and did draw in the day of
emergency. In this vast Empire British capital had been invested to an
enormous amount—the estimated total in 1914 being $2,570,0000,000 for
Canada and Newfoundland, $1,893,000,000 in India and
Ceylon,$1,850,000,000 in south Africa, $1,660,000,000 in Australia, or
a total in all British countries of $8,900,000,000. When the War broke
out these Dominions endeavored to help the Mother Country in every
possible way and the following table shows what was done in Canada
alone during the first few months of the conflict:

THE DOMINION

Expeditionary force of over 32,000 men, fully equipped; 50,000 others
under training for the front. Over 200 field and machine guns. Two
submarines, for general service ($1,050,000); H.M.C.S. Niobe and
Rainbow for general service. 1,000,000 bags of flour. $100,000 for
“Hospice Canadien” in France. $50,000 for the relief of Belgian
sufferers.

THE PROVINCES

ALBERTA: 500,000 bushels of oats; 5,000 bags of flour for Belgians.
Civil service, 5 per cent of salaries up to $1500 per annum, and 10 per
cent in excess of that amount to Canadian Patriotic Fund.

BRITISH COLUMBIA: 25,000 cases of canned salmon; $5,000 to Belgian
Relief Fund.

MANITOBA: 10,000 men; 50,000 bags of flour; $5,000 to Belgian Relief
Fund.

NEW BRUNSWICK: 1,000 men; 100,000 bushels of potatoes, 15,000 barrels
of potatoes for Belgium.

NOVA SCOTIA: $100,000 to the Prince of Wales Fund; apples for the
troops; food and clothing for Belgium.

ONTARIO: $500,000; 250,000 bags of flour; 100,000 lbs of evaporated
apples for the Navy; $15,000 to the Belgian Relief Fund.

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND: 100,000 bushels of oats; cheese and hay.

QUEBEC: 4,000,000 lbs of cheese; $25,000 to Belgian Relief Fund.

SASKATCHEWAN: 1,500 horses ($250,000); $5,000 to Belgian Relief Fund

THE YUKON: $6,000 to the Canadian Patriotic fund

THE CITIES

OTTAWA: $300,000 (for machine gun sections—4 guns on armored motors and
a detachment of 30 men); $50,000 to the Canadian Patriotic Fund.

QUEBEC: $20,000 Canadian Patriotic fund; insuring lives of Quebec
volunteers.

MONTREAL: $150,000 (Canadian Patriotic Fund); battery of quick-firing
guns; $10,000 to Belgian Relief fund.

TORONTO: $50,000 (Canadian Patriotic Fund); insuring lives of all
Toronto volunteers; 100 horses for training purposes; carload for
Belgians of canned provisions.

WINNIPEG: $5,000 monthly to Patriotic Fund

REGINA: $1,000 for comfort of the city’s soldiers; $62,500 To Belgian
Relief Fund.

CALGARY: 1,000 MEN (Legion of Frontiersmen).

HAMILTON: $20,000 Patriotic Fund; $5,000 for local relief.

BERLIN: $10,000 Patriotic Fund.

ST. JOHNS, N.B. $10,000 Patriotic Fund; $2,000 Belgian Fund

THE WOMEN OF CANADA: Building, equipping and maintenance of “Canadian
Women’s Hospital” of 100 beds to supplement Naval Hospital at Haslar
($182,857); $100,000 To War Office (40 motor ambulance cars purchased).
Women of Nova Scotia $15,170 ($7,000 to Hospital, $5,000 Canadian
Patriotic fund and rest to Red Cross).

THE BANKS AND THE PATRIOTIC FUNDS

BANK OF MONTREAL $110,000
CANADIAN BANK OF COMMERCE 50,000
ROYAL BANK OF CANADA 50,000
MERCHANTS BANK 30,000
DOMINION BANK 25,000
UNION BANK OF CANADA 25,000
BANK OF TORONTO 25,000
BANK OF OTTAWA 25,000
BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA 25,000
BANK OF HAMILTON 25,000
BANK OF BRITISH NORTH AMERICA 25,000


Little Newfoundland sent a contingent of 510; placed a Naval Reserve
force of 1,000 men in training and prepared a second contingent of 500
men, while contributing $120,000 to a local Patriotic Fund. Australia
handed over its fleet of battleships and cruisers to the Admiralty and
one of these, The Sydney, captured the Emden of German fame, while the
New Zealand, a dreadnought from the Island Dominion of that name, held
a place in the North Sea fighting line. Australia also sent 20,000 men
who saw service before the end of the year in Egypt, provided reserves
and prepared two more contingents, while sending donations of all kinds
of food supplies for the poor in Britain or for the Belgian refugees.
From India at once went a portion of the British Army which was
replaced by native troops and then a large contingent of the latter,
which took part in the protection of Egypt and in the fighting in
France.

The great Princes of India—notably the Maharajahs of Nepaul, Gwalior,
Patiala, Baratppur, Sikkim and Dholpur—placed the entire military
resources of tens of millions of people at the disposal of the
King-Emperor. The Maharajah of Rewa cabled this splendid message: “What
orders from His Majesty for me and my troops?” The Nizam of Hyderabad
and the Maharajah of Bikanir offered not only their troops, but the
entire resources of their great states and their own personal services
at the front. Bengal gave a million bags of jute for the army and the
Maharajah of Mysore proffered 3,500 men and 50 lakhs of rupees (about
$350,000). Practically all the 700 native rulers of states in India
offered personal services, men and money. For active personal service
the Viceroy selected the Chiefs of Jodhpur, Bikanir, Kishangarh,
Rutlam, Sachin, Patiala, Sir Pertab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur, and
others. Contingents of cavalry and infantry, supplies and transports
were forwarded besides a camel corps from Bikanir, horses from many
states, machine guns, hospital-bed contributions, motor cars and large
gifts to the Patriotic and Belgian Relief Funds. New Zealand sent a
first contingent of 8,000 troops and relief forces, prepared to send
more and promised, like Canada and Australia, to continue training and
sending troops as long as they should be required. On the other hand
Great Britain undertook to finance the actual military operations of
these countries by lending the four Dominions $210,000,000 and
undertaking to provide more when needed.

It was with this unity, and in this spirit, that the British Empire
entered the great War for the redemption of its pledges to Belgium and
adherence to its French obligations—Russia only coming indirectly into
the first stage of the question and Japan, through the force of its
Treaty, undertaking to guard British interests in the East.




Chapter V.
THE WORLD’S GREATEST WAR


Wars as Mileposts—A Continent in Arms—How Canada Prepared for War—the
British Sentiment—Lord Kitchener’s Career—A Forceful Character

The history of the leading events in the nations of Europe during a
hundred years of the past, so far as they related to the decline of
autocratic power in the monarchs and the development of popular rights
and liberty, has been given in the preceding chapters, where it is
brought down to the close of the Balkan War and the opening of the
great war that succeeded in 1914. As regards this war, its story cannot
be told or even summarized in a chapter, but some indication of its
general character may be given.

WARS AS MILEPOSTS

Wars serve as convenient mileposts in the history of mankind. They deal
with the great struggles which break up the monotony of peace and bring
the nations into volcanic relations. They have been many and their
causes and effects various; strifes for spoil or dominion; savage
invasions of civilized lands; overflow of vast areas by conquering
tribes or nations. But among all the world has so far known there has
been none so stupendous in character, so portentous in purpose, so vast
in fighting multitudes, so terrible in bloodshed, as the one with which
we are here concerned, the lurid meeting of the nations on the
blood-stained fields of battle which broke upon the quiet of the world
with startling suddenness in the summer of 1914. Launched on the
borders of little Servia, it soon had the continent for its field of
action, and all but one of the greater nations of Europe for its
participants. It may therefore fitly be designated the Great War. Great
it was, alike in the number and strength of the Powers involved, in the
enormous array of armed men engaged, in the destructive power of the
weapons employed, in the loss of life and waste of wealth that attended
its earthquaking development.

In reading the history of the past we find it thickly strewn with
stories of fierce battles, a day, two days, rarely much longer in
extent, protracted intervals of marching and countermarching succeeding
before the armies again locked horns. Such was the case in the American
Civil War, in which the three days’ battle at Gettysburg was the
greatest in length, if the six days’ fighting before Richmond be taken
to constitute a succession of battles.

In the Russo-Japanese war much longer struggles took place. The armies
at Liaoyung fought for eight days and those before Mukden for twenty
days. But a more obstinate struggle still was that of September and
October, 1914, when two armies, stretched out over a line two hundred
miles or more in length, fought with ceaseless fury, by day and night
alike, for more than a month. On the moving picture screen of time this
vast conflict stands out without parallel in the world’s annals, the
most unyielding, incessant battling ever known.

A CONTINENT IN ARMS

In the giant warfare here described we behold a continent, well nigh a
world, in arms. Along the rivers north of Paris three powerful nations,
Germany, France and Britain, wrestled like mighty behemoths for
supremacy. Far eastward, on the borders of Russia, Austria and Germany,
two other great Powers, Russia and Austria, with German armies to aid
the latter, strove with equal fury for victory.

Thus raged the Great War. How many took part it is difficult to
estimate. Among the war tales of the past the most stupendous army on
record is that of Xerxes, said by Herodotus to number 2,317,600 men,
who marched from Asia to face defeat in the diminutive land of Greece.
How large this fabulously great army really was we shall never know,
but even at the figures given it was dwarfed by the hosts in arms in
the Great European War, in which between four and five million men
fought with fierceness unsurpassed.

The field of action of this mighty contest was not confined to Europe.
On the far-off border of Asia another Power, the warlike empire of
Japan, sent forth its soldiers to drive the Germans from China. In
Africa and on the South Pacific the colonists of Britain set other
forces in motion to invade the German colonial regions. From British
India sailed a strong array of dark-skinned warriors to take part in
the war in France. From Algeria and Senegal came hordes of sable
recruits for the French army, and from the cities and provinces of the
Dominion of Canada came still another army of ardent patriots eager to
aid the forces of their fatherland. We may well speak of the contest as
not one of a continent but of the entire world.

HOW CANADA PREPARED FOR WAR

The story of the patriotic ardor of the Canadians is of interest, as
given by a correspondent of the London GRAPHIC, who passed through the
Dominion after the opening of the war.

“The news of the great war came like a bolt from the blue. The effect
was startling. The ordinary flow of Canadian life was suddenly
arrested. The customary routine seemed to stop dead still. The whole of
Canadian thought and much of the people’s energy were switched on to
the great staggering fact that Europe was at war, and the old country
fighting for its life. A most wonderful and touching patriotism welled
up in the heart of the Canadians. The air became electric with
excitement and enthusiasm. The prairie was indeed on fire. Passing
through English towns on my journey to London the calm and peaceful
demeanor of the people and the even flow of life seemed in strange
contrast with the land I had just left, where the population was
throbbing with loyal passion, and the war dominated the existence of
the inhabitants, high and low, from Victoria to Halifax. One Canadian
scene that remains impressed upon my mind was the sea of upturned faces
in front of the offices of the Calgary News Telegram—every ear
straining to the point where the war news was announced at intervals
through a megaphone.

“‘We stand shoulder to shoulder.’ Sir Robert Borden, the Premier, had
said, ‘with Britain and the other British Dominions in this quarrel,
and that duty we shall not fail to fulfil as the honor of Canada
demands.’ It is being fulfilled in a score of different ways, but
mainly in the practical spirit that is characteristic of the country.
The Dominion is the Empire’s granary, and through the granary doors, as
the Motherland knows, are passing huge gifts of food to the British
population. At the same time the stoppage of the export of all
foodstuffs to other countries is proposed.

“Soon the Dominion began to mobilize. Regiments seemed to spring up, as
if by magic, from the ground—not hordes of untrained men, but stalwart
horsemen, accustomed to the rifle and inured to a hard outdoor life.
The Germans will knock against another ‘bit of hard stuff’ when they
meet the Canadian contingents. One of the regiments carries the name of
the Princess Patricia, who, by the way, holds quite a unique position
in the hearts of the people. The popular Princess was, shortly after I
left, to have presented her regiment with their colors—worked by her
own hands.

“Londoners were happy in the knowledge that more such men could be
sent, if necessary, up to 200,000 in number—such was the earnestness of
the people. One met this practical earnestness in a dozen different
directions—in such facts, for instance, as the conversion of the great
Winnipeg Industrial Hall into a military training center—and not the
least significant feature in the situation is the manner in which the
prevalent enthusiasm had spread to the American inhabitants of the
country. The trade intimacy between the United States and the Dominion
was, indeed, constantly growing, and the many great American
manufacturing concerns which had planted themselves in Canada had
attained prosperity. It was pleasant and reassuring to think that this
had not weakened the ties of attachment to the old country. In the days
to succeed the war the Dominion can look back with pride upon the part
she bore in sustaining the arms of Mother England, and can take her
place with happy confidence and added strength as the eldest daughter
in the great family of British peoples.”

The enthusiasm thus indicated among the Canadians, which had its
outcome in the despatch of 323,000 sons of the dominion in late
September to the seat of war, to be quickly followed by a second
contingent, was paralleled in India, which sent to France 70,000 of its
dusky sons to join the struggling hosts. As for the remaining countries
of the British empire, Australia, South Africa, East Africa, etc., a
similar sentiment of loyalty prevailed, manifested there by the sending
of contingents or in expeditions against the German colonies in the
South Sea and in Africa. The whole empire was ready to support the
mother country.

Certainly the Kaiser of Germany, William the War Lord, had set loose in
the air a nest of hornets to sting his well-trained warriors. By his
side stood only Austria, a composite empire which soon found all its
strength too little to hold back the mighty Russian tide that swept
across its borders. Thus this one stalwart nation, with its weak
auxiliary, was forced to face now east, now west, against a continent
in arms. It is difficult to imagine that the Kaiser could have hoped to
succeed, despite the training of his people and the strength of his
artillery. “God fights with the heaviest battalions,” said one who
knew, and the weight of battalions, though at first on William’s side,
could not remain so.

THE BRITISH SENTIMENT

While the British people, with their lack of a system of militarism,
were not in condition to send large bodies of troops at once to the aid
of the mobilized French, they were soon ready to despatch a useful
contingent of trained men. Probably the German emperor counted upon the
disturbance in Ireland between the Ulsterites and the people of the
Catholic provinces to tie the hands of the government, but these people
at once suspended their hostile sentiments in favor of the larger needs
of their country. In England itself the militant suffragettes showed
equal patriotism, at once agreeing to desist from all acts of violence
and offering to aid their country to the extent of their powers.

LORD KITCHENER’S CAREER

The British government appointed Lord Kitchener, the hero of many
successful expeditions, Secretary of State for War, putting the whole
management of military affairs into his competent hands. His fitness
for this was thoroughly attested by his long and brilliant service, and
as the presence of Napoleon was said to be equal to an army, so was
that of this able military leader.

For those who are not familiar with Kitchener’s career a brief
statement concerning it may be useful. Born in 1850, Horatio Herbert
Kitchener entered the army in 1871, was in civil life 1874–82, then
returned to army duty. He took part in the Nile expedition of 1884 for
the rescue of General Gordon and commanded a brigade in the Suakim
campaign of 1888. Governor of Suakim 1886–88, adjutant-general of the
Egyptian army 1888–92, he was appointed to the command of this army,
with the Egyptian rank of Sirdar, in 1890.

His service in Egypt was during the period of the Mahdi outbreak, which
began in 1883, defeated all the armies sent to quell it, and for years
held the Sudan region of Egypt. In 1896 Kitchener set out for its
suppression, recovering Dongola, and organizing an expedition against
the Khalifa, the successor of the Mahdi. He defeated the Dervish army
of the Khalifa in April, 1898, and on September 2d of that year utterly
crushed the Dervish hosts at Omdurman, regaining the Sudan for Egypt
and Britain.

This exploit brought him the thanks of parliament and the title of
baron, with a grant of 30,000 pounds and a sword of honor. In 1899 he
went with Lord Roberts to South Africa as chief of staff, and on Lord
Roberts’ return in 1900 he succeeded him as commander-in-chief and
brought the Boer War to a successful conclusion. He was now made full
general, with the rank of viscount, and subsequently served as
commander-in-chief in India.

A FORCEFUL CHARACTER

In an illuminating article in COLLIER’S WEEKLY, the well-known Irish
journalist, T. P. O’Connor, thus brought out the character of the hero
of Khartoum:

“I attribute something of the Lord Kitchener we know to the fact that,
though English by blood, he spent the first years of his life in
wandering over the hills and looking down on the sea-tossed shores of
County Kerry. That tact which enabled him to settle the issue with
Marchand, the French explorer, at Fashoda, suggests some of the lessons
in the soft answer which Ireland can teach. You remember how, when it
was possible that a collision between him and Marchand might mean a war
between England and France, Lord Kitchener sent some fresh vegetables
and champagne to the daring French explorer, who had gone through the
hunger, thirst, and hardship of the desert for months. Marchand had to
go from Fashoda all the same, but he went with no personal grievance.

“If I look for the roots of Lord Kitchener’s greatness, I trace them to
intense ambition to succeed, to make the most of his
opportunities—above all, to the incessant desire to work and fill every
hour of his days with something done. He is sent as a youngster to
Palestine, through peril to life, through great privation, through
heart-breaking drudgery, he pursues his work until he has completed a
map of all western Palestine to the amazement and delight of his
employers. And he values this experience so largely because he learns
Arabic, and, above all, he learns the Arabic character. One of the
chroniclers of his career makes the apt observation that, while the
baton of the marshal is in every French soldier’s knapsack, Kitchener
found his coronet in the Arab grammar. But how many soldiers or men of
any class would have devoted the leisure hours of a fiercely active
task like Kitchener’s in Palestine to the study of one of the most
difficult of languages?

“Hard work, patience, and the utilization of every second of time, the
eagerness always to learn—these are the chief secrets of Lord
Kitchener’s enormous success in life. But the man who works himself is
ineffective in great things unless he has the gift to choose the men
who can work for him and with him. This choice of subordinates is one
of Lord Kitchener’s greatest powers. He nearly always has had the right
man in the right place. And his men return his confidence because he
gives them absolute confidence. He never thinks of asking a subordinate
whether he has done the job he has given him; he takes that for
granted, knowing his man; and he never worries his subordinates.

“This is one of the reasons why, though he works so terrifically, he
never is tired, never worried. He sits down at his desk at the War
Office for about ten hours a day; but he sits there calmly, isn’t
ringing at bells and shouting down pipes; he does it all so quietly
that it seems mere pastime; and the effect of this perfect tranquillity
produces an extraordinary result on those who work with him. They also
do their work easily, tranquilly, and without feeling it.

“A great soldier certainly; but perhaps a greater organizer than
anything else. This is his supreme quality, and for that quality there
is necessary, above all things, a clear, penetrating brain. He doesn’t
form any visions—as Napoleon used to complain of some of his marshals.
At school he was celebrated for his knowledge of mathematics, and
especially for his phenomenal rapidity in dealing with figures, and it
was not accident that so truly a scientific mind found its natural
place in the engineers. A mathematician, an engineer, a man of science,
a great accountant—these things he has been in all his enterprises. It
was these qualities that enabled him to make that astounding railway
which brought Cairo almost into touch with the Khalifa, who, with his
predecessor, the Mahdi, and with his tragically potent ally, the hungry
and all-devouring desert, had beaten back so many other attempts to
reach and to beat him.

“This man, who has fought such tremendous and historic battles and
confronted great odds, is yet a man who prefers a deal to a struggle;
and, though he can be so stern, has yet a diplomatic tact that gets him
and his country out of difficult hours. The nature, doubtless, is
complex, and stern determination and tenacity are part of it; but there
is also the other side, which is much forgotten—especially by that
class of writers who have to describe human character as rigidly
symmetrical and unnaturally harmonious.

“That cold and penetrating eye of his makes it impossible to imagine
anybody taking any liberties with Lord Kitchener; yet one of his
greatest qualities, at once useful and charming, is his accessibility.
Anybody who has anything to say to him can approach him; anybody who
has anything to teach him will find a ready and grateful learner. This
is one of the secrets of his extraordinary success and universal
popularity in Egypt. Lord Cromer was a great Egyptian ruler, and his
services are imperishable and gigantic; but Lord Cromer was the stern,
solitary, and inaccessible bureaucrat who worked innumerable hours
every day at his desk, never learned the Arabic language, and possibly
never quite grasped the Arab nature. Lord Kitchener is the cadi under
the tree. The mayor or the citizens of the little Arab village can come
to him, and the old soldier, and even the fellah, alone; and they will
find Lord Kitchener ready to listen and to talk to them in their own
tongue, to enter with gusto into the pettiest details of their daily
and squalid lives, and ready also to apply the remedy to such
grievances as commend themselves to his judgment.

“As an illustration of his accessibility, let me repeat a delicious
story which delighted all Egypt. An old peasant came out of the depths
of the land all the way to Cairo to see the great Kitchener, with the
complaint that his white mule had been stolen. The whole official
machinery was interrupted for a while, and the old fellah went back
with his white mule. You can fancy how that story was repeated in every
fellah cabin in the land, and how the devotion to Kitchener and trust
in his justice and in his sympathy went trumpet-tongued among this
race, downtrodden and neglected almost from the beginning of time.”

Such is the man who, when chosen to head the British War Department,
had his bed sent to the office, that he might be on duty day and night
if needed; who insisted that no raw recruits should be sent to the
front, but put them through a rigid system of drill and physical
exercise to toughen their muscles and fit them for the work of a
soldier; who said that there would be abundant time for fighting, as in
his judgment there was a year or more of war in prospect.




Chapter VI.
THE EARTHQUAKE OF NAPOLEONISM


Its Effect on National conditions Finally Led to the War of 1914

Its Effect on National Conditions Finally Led to the War of 1914
Conditions in France and Germany—The Campaign in Italy—The Victory at
Marengo—Moreau at Hohenlinden—The Consul Made Emperor—The Code
Napoleon—Campaign of 1805—Battle of Austerlitz—The Conquest of
Prussia—The Invasion of Poland—Eylau and Friedland—Campaign of
1809—Victory at Wagram—The Campaign in Spain—The Invasion of Russia—A
Fatal Retreat—Dresden and Leipzig—The Hundred Days—The Congress of
Vienna—The Holy Alliance

When, after a weary climb, we find ourselves on the summit of a lofty
mountain, and look back from that commanding altitude over the ground
we have traversed, what is it that we behold? The minor details of the
scenery, many of which seemed large and important to us as we passed,
are now lost to view, and we see only the great and imposing features
of the landscape, the high elevations, the town-studded valleys, the
deep and winding streams, the broad forests. It is the same when, from
the summit of an age, we gaze backward over the plain of time. The
myriad of petty happenings are lost to sight, and we see only the
striking events, the critical epochs, the mighty crises through which
the world has passed. These are the things that make true history, not
the daily doings in the king’s palace or the peasant’s hut. What we
should seek to observe and store up in our memories are the turning
points in human events, the great thoughts which have ripened into
noble deeds, the hands of might which have pushed the world forward in
its career; not the trifling occurrences which signify nothing, the
passing actions which have borne no fruit in human affairs. It is with
such turning points, such critical periods in modern history, that we
are here dealing; not to picture the passing bubbles on the stream of
time, but to point out the great ships which have sailed up that stream
laden with a noble freight. This is history in its deepest and best
aspect, and we have set our camera to photograph only the men who have
made and the events which constitute history in the phase here
outlined.

The first fifteen years of the nineteenth century in Europe yield us
the history of a man rather than of a continent. France was the center
of Europe; Napoleon, the Corsican, was the center of France. All the
affairs of all the nations seemed to gather around this genius of war.
He was respected, feared, hated; he had risen with the suddenness of a
thunder-cloud on a clear horizon, and flashed the lightnings of victory
in the dazzled eyes of the nations. All the events of the period were
concentrated into one great event, and the name of that event was
Napoleon. He seemed incarnate war, organized destruction; sword in
hand, he dominated the nations, and victory sat on his banners with
folded wings. He was, in a full sense, the man of destiny, and Europe
was his prey.

Never has there been a more wonderful career. The earlier great
conquerors began life at the top; Napoleon began his at the bottom.
Alexander was a king; Caesar was an aristocrat of the Roman republic;
Napoleon rose from the people, and was not even a native of the land
which became the scene of his exploits. Pure force of military genius
lifted him from the lowest to the highest place among mankind, and for
long and terrible years Europe shuddered at his name and trembled
beneath the tread of his marching legions. As for France, he brought it
glory and left it ruin and dismay.

The career of Napoleon Bonaparte began in a very modest way. Born in
Corsica and trained in a military school in France, his native ability
as a man of action was first made evident in 1794, when, under the
orders of the National Convention, he quelled the mob of Paris with
loaded cannon and put a final end to the Reign of Terror that had long
prevailed.

Placed at the head of the French army in Italy, Napoleon quickly
astonished the world by a series of the most brilliant victories,
defeating the Austrians and the Sardinians wherever he met them,
seizing Venice, the city of the lagoon, and forcing almost all Italy to
submit to his arms. A republic was established here and a new one in
Switzerland, while Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine were held by
France.

His wars here at an end, Napoleon’s ambition led him to Egypt, inspired
by great designs which he failed to realize. In his absence anarchy
arose in France. The five Directors, then at the head of the
government, had lost all authority, and Napoleon, who had unexpectedly
returned, did not hesitate to overthrow them and the Assembly which
supported them. A new government, with three Consuls at its head, was
formed, Napoleon, as First Consul, holding almost royal power. Thus
France stood in 1800, at the end of the eighteenth century.

CONDITIONS IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

In the remainder of Europe there was nothing to compare with the
momentous convulsion which had taken place in France. England had gone
through its two revolutions more than a century before, and its people
were the freest of any in Europe. Recently it had lost its colonies in
America, but it still held in that continent the broad domain of
Canada, and was building for itself a new empire in India, while
founding colonies in twenty other lands. In commerce and manufactures
it entered the nineteenth century as the greatest nation on the earth.
The hammer and the loom resounded from end to end of the island, mighty
centers of industry arose where cattle had grazed a century before,
coal and iron were being torn in great quantities from the depths of
the earth, and there seemed everywhere an endless bustle and whirr. The
ships of England haunted all seas and visited the most remote ports,
laden with the products of her workshops and bringing back raw material
for her factories and looms. Wealth accumulated, London became the
money market of the world, the riches and prosperity of the island
kingdom were growing to be a parable among the nations of the earth.

On the continent of Europe, Prussia, destined in time to become great,
had recently emerged from its medieval feebleness, mainly under the
powerful hand of Frederick the Great, whose reign extended until 1786,
and whose ambition, daring, and military genius made him a fitting
predecessor of Napoleon the Great, who so soon succeeded him in the
annals of war. Unscrupulous in his aims, this warrior king had torn
Silesia from Austria, added to his kingdom a portion of unfortunate
Poland, annexed the principality of East Friesland, and lifted Prussia
into a leading position among the European states.

Germany, now—with the exception of Austria—a compact empire, was then a
series of disconnected states, variously known as kingdoms,
principalities, margravates, electorates, and by other titles, the
whole forming the so-called Holy Empire, though it was “neither holy
nor an empire.” It had drifted down in this fashion from the Middle
Ages, and the work of consolidation had but just begun, in the
conquests of Frederick the Great. A host of petty potentates ruled the
land, whose states, aside from Prussia and Austria, were too weak to
have a voice in the councils of Europe. Joseph II, the titular emperor
of Germany, made an earnest and vigorous effort to combine its elements
into a powerful unit; but he signally failed, and died in 1790, a
disappointed and embittered man.

Austria, then far the most powerful of the German states, was from 1740
to 1780 under the reign of a woman, Maria Theresa, who struggled in
vain against her ambitious neighbor, Frederick the Great, his kingdom
being extended ruthlessly at the expense of her imperial dominions.
Austria remained a great country, however, including Bohemia and
Hungary among its domains. It was lord of Lombardy and Venice in Italy,
but was destined to play an unfortunate part in the coming Napoleonic
wars.

We have briefly epitomized Napoleon’s early career, his doings in the
Revolution, in Italy, and in Egypt, unto the time that France’s worship
of his military genius raised him to the rank of First Consul, and gave
him in effect the power of a king. No one dared question his word, the
army was at his beck and call, the nation lay prostrate at his feet—not
in fear but in admiration. Such was the state of affairs in France in
the closing year of the eighteenth century. The Revolution was at an
end, the Republic existed only as a name; Napoleon was the autocrat of
France and the terror of Europe. From this point we resume the story of
his career.

The First Consul began his reign with two enemies in the field, England
and Austria. Prussia was neutral, and he had won the friendship of
Paul, the emperor of Russia, by a shrewd move. While the other nations
refused to exchange the Russian prisoners they held, Napoleon sent home
6,000 of these captives, newly clad and armed, under their own leaders,
and without demanding ransom. This was enough to win to his side the
weak-minded Paul, whose delight in soldiers he well knew.

Napoleon now had but two enemies in arms to deal with. He wrote letters
to the king of England and the emperor of Austria, offering peace. The
answers were cold and insulting, asking France to take back her Bourbon
kings and return to her old boundaries. Nothing remained but war.
Napoleon prepared it with his usual rapidity, secrecy, and keenness of
judgment.

THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY

There were two French armies in the field in the spring of 1800, Moreau
commanding in Germany, Massena in Italy. Switzerland, which was
occupied by the French, divided the armies of the enemy, and Napoleon
determined to take advantage of the separation of their forces, and
strike an overwhelming blow. He sent word to Moreau and Massena to keep
the enemy in check at any cost, and secretly gathered a third army,
whose corps were dispersed here and there, while the Powers of Europe
were aware only of the army of reserve at Dijon, made up of conscripts
and invalids. All was ready for the great movement which Napoleon had
in view.

Twenty centuries before, Hannibal had led his army across the great
mountain barrier of the Alps, and poured down like an avalanche upon
the fertile plains of Italy. The Corsican determined to repeat this
brilliant achievement and emulate Hannibal’s career. Several passes
across the mountains seemed favorable to his purpose, especially those
of the St. Bernard, the Simplon and Mount Cenis. Of these the first was
the most difficult; but it was much the shorter, and Napoleon
determined to lead the main body of his army over this ice-covered
mountain pass, despite its dangers and difficulties. The enterprise was
one to deter any man less bold than Hannibal or Napoleon, but it was
welcome to the hardihood and daring of these men, who rejoiced in the
seemingly impossible and spurned faltering at hardships and perils.

The task of the Corsican was greater than that of the Carthaginian. He
had cannon to transport, while Hannibal’s men carried only swords and
spears. But the genius of Napoleon was equal to the task. The cannon
were taken from their carriages and placed in the hollowed-out trunks
of trees, which could be dragged with ropes over the ice and snow.
Mules were used to draw the gun-carriages and the wagon-loads of food
and munitions of war. Stores of provisions had been placed at suitable
points along the road.

The sudden appearance of the French in Italy was an utter surprise to
the Austrians. They descended like a torrent into the valley, seized
Ivry, and five days after reaching Italy met and repulsed an Austrian
force. The divisions which had crossed by other passes one by one
joined Napoleon. On June 9th Marshal Lannes met and defeated the
Austrians at Montebello, after a hot engagement. “I heard the bones
crackle like a hailstorm on the roofs,” he said. On the 14th, the two
armies met on the plain of Marengo, and one of the most famous of
Napoleon’s battles began.

THE VICTORY AR MARENGO

Napoleon was not ready for the coming battle, and was taken by
surprise. He had been obliged to break up his army in order to guard
all the passages open to the enemy. Suddenly attacked and taken by
surprise, his army was defeated and driven back in retreat in the first
stage of the battle. But Napoleon was not the man to accept defeat.
Hurrying up Desaix, one of his most trusted generals, with his corps,
he flung these fresh troops upon the enemy, following up the assault
with the dragoons of Kellermann. The result was a disastrous rout of
the Austrians, who were driven from the field, leaving thousands of
dead, and other thousands of prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

A few days afterwards on the 19th, Moreau in Germany won a brilliant
victory at Hockstadt, near Blemheim, took 5,000 prisoners and twenty
pieces of cannon, and forced from the Austrians an armed truce which
left him master of South Germany. A still more momentous armistice was
signed by Melas in Italy, by which the Austrians surrendered Piedmont,
Lombardy, and all their territory as far as the Mincio, leaving France
master of Italy.

MOREAU AT HOHENLINDEN

What followed must be briefly detailed. Only a truce, not a peace, had
followed the victories of Napoleon and Moreau, and five months later,
Austria refusing to make peace without the concurrence of England, the
war began again. Moreau winning another famous victory on the plains of
Hohenlinden, the Austrians losing 8,000 in killed and wounded and
12,000 in prisoners.

Moreau advanced to Vienna, where the emperor was forced to sign an
armistice, giving up to France the valley of the Danube, the country of
the Tyrol, a number of fortresses and large magazines of war material.
This truce was followed by a peace in February, 1801. It was one that
left Napoleon the idol of France, the terror of Europe, and the
admiration of the world. He had proved himself the mate of Caesar and
Alexander as a conqueror.

THE CONSUL MADE EMPEROR

The events that followed must be briefly epitomized. For nearly the
only time in his career Napoleon had a period of peace. In this he
showed himself an autocratic but able ruler, making himself king in
everything but name, restoring the old court customs and etiquette, but
not interfering with the liberties and privileges which the people had
won by the Revolution. Feudalism had been definitely overthrown and
Napoleon’s supremacy in the state was one that recognized the popular
freedom.

The culmination of Napoleon’s ambition came in 1804, when he followed
the example of Caesar, the Roman conqueror, seeking the crown as a
reward for his victories. Like Caesar, he had his enemies, but, more
fortunate than Caesar, he escaped their plots and was elected Emperor
of the French by an almost unanimous vote of the people. The Pope was
obliged to come to Paris at the fiat of the new autocrat and to anoint
him as emperor, the sanction of the Church being thus given to his new
dignity. His empire was one founded upon modern ideas, one called into
existence by the votes of a free people, not resting upon the necks of
a nation of serfs.

THE CODE NAPOLEON

During his brief respite from war Napoleon’s activity was great, his
statesmanship notable. Great public works, monuments to his glory, were
constructed, wide schemes of public improvement were entered upon, and
important changes were made in the financial system that provided the
great sums needed for these enterprises. The most important of these
evidences of intellectual activity was the Code Napoleon, the first
organized code of French law and still the basis of jurisprudence in
France. This, first promulgated in 1801 as the civil code of France,
had its title changed to Code Napoleon in 1804, and as such stands as
one of the greatest monuments to the mental capacity of this
extraordinary man.

The period of peace during which these events took place was one of
brief endurance. It practically ended in 1803, when Great Britain,
Napoleon’s most persistent foe, again declared war. But actual war did
not begin until two years later.

The Emperor’s role in this period was one of threat. England had been
invaded and conquered from France once before. It might be again. Like
William of Normandy, Napoleon prepared a large fleet and strong army
and threatened an invasion of the island kingdom. This might possibly
have been successful but for the shrewd policy of William Pitt, the
British Prime Minister, who organized a coalition of Napoleon’s enemies
in Europe which gave him a new use for his army.

CAMPAIGN OF 1805

The coalition embraced Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sweden and Norway,
with Great Britain at their back. The bold Corsican had roused nearly
all Europe against him. He dealt with it in his usual alert and
successful manner.

Quick as were his enemies to come into the field, they were not quick
enough for their vigilant foe. The army prepared for the invasion of
England was at once set in motion towards the Rhine, and was handled
with such skill as to surround at Ulm the Austrian army under General
Mack and force its surrender.

This took place in October. On the 1st of December the two armies
(92,000 of the allies to 70,000 French) came face to face on the field
of Austerlitz, where on the following day was to be fought one of the
world’s most memorable battles.

BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ

The Emperor Alexander had joined Francis of Austria, and the two
monarchs with their staff officers, occupied the castle and village of
Austerlitz. Their troops hastened to occupy the plateau of Pratzen,
which Napoleon had designedly left free. His plans of battle were
already fully made. He had, with the intuition of genius, foreseen the
probable maneuvers of the enemy, and had left open for them the
position which he wished them to occupy. He even announced their
movement in a proclamation to his troops.

“The positions that we occupy are formidable,” he said, “and while the
enemy march to turn my right they will present to me their flank.”

This movement to the right was indeed the one that had been decided
upon by the allies, with the purpose of cutting off the road to Vienna
by isolating numerous corps dispersed in Austria and Styria. It had
been shrewdly divined by Napoleon in choosing his ground.

He held his own men in readiness while the line of the enemy deployed.
The sun was rising, its rays gleaming through a mist, which dispersed
as it rose higher. It now poured its brilliant beams across the field,
the afterward famous “sun of Austerlitz.” The movement of the allies
had the effect of partly withdrawing their troops from the plateau of
Pratzen. At a signal from the emperor the strongly concentrated center
of the French army moved forward in a dense mass, directing their march
towards the plateau, which they made all haste to occupy. They had
reached the foot of the hill before the rising mist revealed them to
the enemy.

The two emperors watched the movement without divining its intent. “See
how the French climb the height without staying to reply to our fire,”
said Prince Czartoryski, who stood near them.

They were soon to learn why their fire was disdained. The allied force,
pierced in its center by the French, was flung back in disorder and on
all sides broke into a disorderly retreat. The slaughter was frightful.
One division, cut off from the army, threw down its arms and
surrendered. Two columns rushed upon the ice of a frozen lake. Upon
this the fire of the French cannon was turned, the ice splintered and
gave way beneath their feet and thousands of the despairing troops
perished in the freezing waters. Of the whole army only one corps left
the field in order of battle. More than 30,000 prisoners, including
twenty generals, remained in Napoleon’s hands, and with them a hundred
and twenty pieces of cannon and forty flags. Thus ended the most famous
of Napoleon’s battles.

The victory of Austerlitz left Germany in Napoleon’s hands, and the
remodeling of the map of Europe was one of the greatest that has ever
taken place at any one time. Kingdoms were formed and placed under
Napoleon’s brothers or favorite generals. His changes in the states of
Germany were numerous and radical. Those of south and west Germany were
organized into the Confederation of the Rhine, under his protection.
Many of the small principalities were suppressed and their territories
added to the larger states. As to the “Holy Roman Empire,” a once
powerful organization which had long since sunk into a mere shadow, it
finally ceased to exist. The empire of France was extended by these and
other changes until is spread over Italy, the Netherlands and the south
and west of Germany.

Changes so great as these could scarcely be made without exciting
bitter opposition. Prussia had been seriously affected by Napoleon’s
map-making, and in the end its king, Frederick William, became so
exasperated that he broke off all communication with France and began
to prepare for war.

THE CONQUEST OF PRUSSIA

It is by no means impossible that Napoleon had been working for this.
It is certain that he was quick to take advantage of it. While the
Prussian king was slowly collecting his troops and war material, the
veterans of France were already on the march and approaching the
borders of Prussia. The hasty levies of “Frederick William were no
match for the war-hardened French, the Russians failed to come to their
aid, and on the 4th of October, 1806, the two armies met at Jena.

The Prussians proved incapable of withstanding the impetuous attack of
the French and were soon broken and in panic and flight. Nothing could
stop them. Reinforcements coming up, 20,000 in number, were thrown
across their path, but in vain, being swept away by the fugitives and
pushed back by the triumphant pursuers.

At the same time another battle was in progress near Auerstadt between
Marshal Davoust and the forces of the Duke of Brunswick. This, too,
ended in victory for the French. The king had been with the duke and
was borne back by the flying host, the two bodies of fugitives finally
coalescing. In that one fatal day Frederick William had lost his army
and placed his kingdom in jeopardy. “They can do nothing but gather up
the debris,” said Napoleon.

The occupation of Berlin, the Prussian capital, quickly followed, and
the war ended with new map-making which greatly reduced the influence
of Prussia as a European Power.

THE INVASION OF POLAND

Russia was still in arms, and occupied Poland. Thither the victorious
French now advanced, making Warsaw, the Polish capital, the goal of
their march. The Russians were beaten and forced back in every battle,
and the Poles, hoping to regain their lost liberties, gladly rose in
aid of the invader. But the French army found itself exposed to serious
privations. The country was a frozen desert, incapable of supplying
food for an army. The wintry chill and the desolate character of the
country seriously interfered with Napoleon’s plans, the troops being
obliged to make their way through thick and rain-soaked forests, and
march over desolate and marshy plains. The winter of the north fought
against them like a strong army and many of them fell dead without a
battle. Warlike movements became almost impossible to the troops of the
south, though the hardy northerners, accustomed to the climate,
continued their military operations.

EYLAU AND FRIEDLAND

By the end of January the Russian army was evidently approaching in
force, and immediate action became necessary. The cold increased. The
mud was converted into ice. On January 30, 1807, Napoleon left Warsaw
and marched in search of the enemy. General Benningsen retreated,
avoiding battle, and on the 7th of February entered the small town of
Eylau, from which his troops were pushed by the approaching French. He
encamped outside the town, the French in and about it; it was evident
that a great battle was at hand.

The weather was cold. Snow lay thick upon the ground and still fell in
great flakes. A sheet of ice covering some small lakes formed part of
the country upon which the armies were encamped, but was thick enough
to bear their weight. It was a chill, inhospitable country to which the
demon of war had come.

Before daybreak on the 8th Napoleon was in the streets of Eylau,
forming his line of battle for the coming engagement. Soon the
artillery of both armies opened, and a rain of cannon balls began to
decimate the opposing ranks. The Russian fire was concentrated on the
town, which was soon in flames. That of the French was directed against
a hill which the emperor deemed it important to occupy. The two armies,
nearly equal in numbers,—the French having 75,000 to the Russian
70,000—were but a short distance apart, and the slaughter from the
fierce cannonade was terrible.

Nature, which had so far acted to check the advance of the French in
Poland, now threatened their defeat and destruction. A snow-fall began,
so thick and dense that the armies lost sight of each other, the French
columns losing their way in the gloom. When the snow ceased, after a
half-hour’s fall, the French army was in a critical position. It was in
a wandering and disorganized state, while the Russians were on the
point of executing a vigorous turning movement.

Yet the genius of Napoleon turned the scale. He ordered a grand charge
of all the cavalry of his army, driving the Russians back, occupying a
hilly ground in their rear, and in the end handling them so vigorously
that a final retreat began.

Thus ended the most indecisive of Napoleon’s victories, one which had
almost been a defeat and which left both armies so exhausted that
months passed before either was in condition to resume the war. It was
the month of June before the armies were again put in motion. Now the
wintry desolation was replaced by a scene of green woodland, shining
lakes and attractive villages, the conditions being far more favorable
for warlike operations.

On June 13th the armies again met, this time at the town of Friedland,
on the River Alle, in the vicinity of Konigsberg, toward which the
Russians were marching. Here Benningsen, the Russian general, had
incautiously concentrated his troops within a bend of the river, a
tactical mistake of which Napoleon hastened to take advantage.

General Ney fought his way into the town and took the bridges, while
the main force of the French marched upon the entrapped enemy, who met
with complete defeat, many being killed on the field, many more drowned
in the river. Konigsberg, the prize of victory, was quickly occupied by
the French, Prussia the ally of Russia, thus losing all its area except
the single town of Memel. The result was disastrous to the Prussian
king, who was forced to yield more than half his kingdom.

Louisa, the beautiful queen of Frederick William of Prussia, had an
interview with Napoleon and earnestly sought to induce him to mitigate
his harsh terms. In vain she brought to bear upon him all her powers of
persuasion and attractive charm of manner. He continued cold and
obdurate and she left Tilsit deeply mortified and humiliated.

If Napoleon had come near defeat in the campaign of 1807, he came much
nearer in that of 1809, in which his long career of victory was for a
time diversified by an example of defeat, from the consequences of
which only his indomitable energy saved him. And this was at the hands
of the Austrians, who had so often met with defeat and humiliation at
his hands.

In 1808 the defeat of his armies in Spain by the people organized into
guerilla bands forced him to take command there in person. He defeated
the insurgents wherever met, took the city of Saragossa and replaced
his brother Joseph on the throne. Then the outbreak of war in Austria
called him away and he was forced to leave Spain for later attention

CAMPAIGN OF 1809

The declaration of war by Austria arose from indignation at the
arbitrary acts of the conqueror, this growing so intense that in April
1809, a new declaration was made and new armies called into the field.

The French campaign was characterized by the usual rapidity. But on
this occasion the Archduke Charles, who led the Austrians, proved
equally rapid, and was in the field so quickly that the widely-spread
French army was for a time in imminent danger of being cut in two by
the alert enemy.

Only a brief hesitation on the part of the Archduke saved the French
from this peril. They concentrated with the utmost haste, forced the
Austrians back, and captured a large number of prisoners and cannon. In
Italy, on the contrary, the Austrians, were victorious, but the rapid
advance of Napoleon towards Vienna caused their recall and the campaign
became a race for the capital of Austria. In this Napoleon succeeded,
the garrison yielding the city to his troops.

Meanwhile the Archdukes Charles and John, the latter in command of the
army from Italy, were marching hastily towards the opposite side of the
Danube. Napoleon, seeking to strike a blow before a junction between
the armies could be made, crossed the river by the aid of bridges
thrown from the island of Lobau and occupied the villages of Aspern and
Essling.

This was done on May 20th, but during that night the strong current of
the river carried away the bridge, leaving the French in a perilous
situation. On the afternoon of the 21st the entire Austrian army,
70,000 to 80,000 strong, attacked the French in the two villages, who
held their posts only with the greatest difficulty.

By dawn of the 21st more than 70,000 French had crossed, but at this
critical interval the bridge again gave way, broken by the fireships
and the stone-laden boats sent by the Austrians down the swift current.
The struggle went on all day, the bridge being again built and again
broken, and at night the French, cut off from their supply of
ammunition, were forced to retreat. Napoleon, for the first time in his
career, had met with defeat. More than 40,000 dead and wounded lay on
that fatal field, among them the brilliant Marshal Lannes, one of
Napoleon’s ablest aids.

VICTORY AT WAGRAM

Napoleon, however, had no thought of yielding his hold upon Vienna. He
brought forward new troops with all haste, until by July 1st he had an
army of 150,000 men. The Austrian army had also been augmented and now
numbered 135,000 or 140,000 men. They had fortified the positions of
the recent battle, expecting a new attack in that quarter.

But of this Napoleon had no intention. He had selected the heights from
Neusiedl to Wagram, occupied by the Austrians, but not fortified by
them, as a more favorable point, and during the night of July 4th he
threw fresh bridges from Lobau to the main land and set in motion the
strong force occupying the island. This moved against the heights of
Wagram, occupying Aspern and Essling in its advance.

The battle of the next day was one of desperate fury. Finally the
height was gained, giving the French the key of the battlefield. The
Archduke Charles looked in vain for the army under his brother John,
which failed to appear, and, assailed at every point, was obliged to
order a retreat. But this was no rout. The retreat was conducted slowly
and in battle array. Both the Russians and the Austrians were proving
worthy antagonists of the great Corsican. Further hostilities were
checked by a truce, preliminary to a treaty of peace, signed October
14, 1809.

Ambition, unrestrained by caution, uncontrolled by moderation, has its
inevitable end. An empire built upon victory, trusting solely to
military genius, prepared for itself the elements of its overthrow.
This fact Napoleon was to learn. In the outset of his career he opposed
a new art of war to the obsolete one of his enemies, and his path to
empire was over the corpses of slaughtered armies and the ruins of
fallen kingdoms. But year by year his foes learned his art, in war
after war their resistance grew more stringent, each successive victory
was won with more difficulty and at greater cost, and finally, at the
crossing of the Danube, the energy and genius of Napoleon met their
equal, and the standards of France, for the first time under Napoleon’s
leadership, went back in defeat. It was the tocsin of fate. His career
of victory had culminated. From that day its decline began.

THE CAMPAIGN IN SPAIN

The second check to Napoleon’s triumphant career came from one of the
weaker nations of Europe, aided by the British under a commander of
renown. Napoleon, as already stated, after overturning Spain had been
called away by the Austrian war. This ended by the treaty of peace, he
filled Spain once more with his veterans, increasing the strength of
the army there to 300,000 men, under his ablest generals, Soult,
Massena, Ney, Marmont, Macdonald and others. They marched through Spain
from end to end, yet, though they held all the salient points, the
people refused to submit, but from their mountain fastnesses kept up a
petty and annoying war.

Massena invaded Portugal in 1811, but here he was faced by General
Wellington, leading a British army, and was forced to retreat. Soult,
who followed him, was equally unsuccessful, and when Napoleon in 1812
depleted his army in Spain for the Russian campaign, Wellington marched
his army into Spain and, aided by the Spanish patriots, took possession
of Madrid, driving King Joseph from his throne.

THE INVASION OF RUSSIA

Meanwhile Napoleon had entered upon the greatest and most disastrous
campaign in his history. Defied by Alexander I, Czar of Russia, he had
declared war upon that empire and sought its conquest with the greatest
army that ever marched under his banners. On the banks of the Niemen, a
river that flows between Prussia and Poland, there gathered near the
end of June 1812, an immense army of more than 600,000 men, attended by
an enormous multitude of non-combatants, their purpose being the
invasion of the empire of Russia. Of this great army, made up of troops
from half the nations of Europe, there reappeared six months later on
that broad stream about 16,000 armed men, almost all that were left of
that stupendous host. The remainder had perished on the desert soil or
in the frozen rivers of Russia, few of them surviving as prisoners in
Russian hands. Such was the character of the dread catastrophe that
broke the power of the mighty conqueror and delivered Europe from his
autocratic grasp.

We cannot give the details of this fatal campaign, and shall only
summarize its chief incidents. Barclay de Tolly, Alexander’s commander
in chief, adopted a Fabian policy, that of persistently avoiding
battle, and keeping the French in pursuit of a fleeting
will-of-the-wisp while their army wasted away from hardship and disease
in the inhospitable Russian clime.

His method was a wise one, desertion, illness, death of the untrained
recruits in rapid march under the hot midsummer sun, did the work of
many battles, and when Smolensk was reached after two months of
bootless marching, the “Grand Army” was bound to have been reduced to
half its numbers.

Moscow, the old capital of the Empire, was Napoleon’s goal. He felt
sure that the occupation of that city would bring the Russians to bay
and force them to accept terms of peace. He was sadly mistaken. The
Russians, weary of retreating, faced him in one battle, that of
Borodino. Here they fought stubbornly, but with the usual result. They
could not stand against the impetuous dash of Napoleon’s veterans and
were forced to retreat, leaving 40,000 dead and wounded upon the field.
But the French army had lost more than 30,000, including an unusual
number of generals, two being killed and thirty-nine wounded.

A FATAL RETREAT

On the 15th of September, Moscow, the “Holy City” of Russia was
occupied, Napoleon taking up his quarters in the famous palace of the
Kremlin, from which he hoped to dictate terms of peace to the obstinate
Czar. What were his feelings on the next morning when word was brought
him that Moscow was on fire, and flames were seen leaping into the air
in all directions.

The fire had been premeditated. From every quarter rose the devouring
flames. Even the Kremlin did not escape and Napoleon was obliged to
seek shelter outside the city, which continued to burn for three days,
when the wind sank and rain poured upon the smoldering embers.

The dismayed conqueror waited in vain. He wrote letters to the Czar,
suggesting peace. His letters were left unanswered. He hung on
despairingly until the 18th of October, when he reluctantly gave the
order to retreat. Too long he had waited, for the terrible Russian
winter was about to descend.

That retreat was a frightful one. The army had been reduced to 103,000
men; the army followers had also greatly decreased in numbers. But it
was still a large host that set out upon its long march over the frozen
Russian plains.

The Russian policy now changed. The retreating army was attacked at
every suitable point. The food supply rapidly failed. On again reaching
Smolensk the army was only 42,000 strong, though the camp followers are
said to have still numbered 60,000.

On the 26th of November the ice-cold River Beresina was reached,
destined to be the most terrible point on the whole dreadful march. Two
bridges were thrown in all haste across the stream, and most of the men
under arms crossed, but 18,000 stragglers fell into the hands of the
enemy. How many were trodden to death in the press or were crowded from
the bridge into the icy river cannot be told. It is said that when
spring thawed the ice, 30,000 bodies were found and burned on the banks
of the stream. A mere fragment of the great army remained alive. Ney,
who had been the hero of the retreat, was the last man to cross that
frightful stream.

On the 13th of December some 16,000 haggard and staggering men, almost
too weak to hold the arms to which they still despairingly clung,
recrossed the Niemen, which the “Grand Army” had passed in such
magnificent strength and with such abounding resources less than six
months before. It was the greatest and most astounding disaster in the
military history of the world.

DRESDEN AND LEIPZIG

The lion was at bay, but there was fight left in him still. He hurried
back to France, gathered another army, refused all offers of peace on
the terms suggested by his enemies, and concentrated an army at
Dresden. Here on August 26, 1813, his last great victory was won.

The final stand came at Leipzig, where, October 16–18, he waged a three
days’ battle against all the powers of central and eastern Europe.
Then, his ammunition nearly exhausted, he was forced to give the order
to retreat.

The struggle was soon at an end. France was quickly invaded, Paris was
obliged to surrender, and on April 7, 1814, the emperor signed an act
of abdication and was exiled to the small island of Elba, in the
Mediterranean, with an army of 400 men, chosen from his famous Old
Guard. But the Powers of Europe, despite their long experience of
Napoleon, did not yet recognize the ability and audacity of the man
with whom they had to deal. While the Congress of Vienna, convened to
restore the old constitution of Europe, was deliberating and disputing,
word came that their dethroned enemy was again on the soil of France
and Louis XVIII, his successor, was in full flight. He had landed on
March 1, 1815, and was marching back to Paris, the people and the army
rallying to his support.

THE HUNDRED DAYS

Then came the famous Hundred Days, in which Napoleon showed much of his
old ability, rapidly organizing a new army, with which in June he
marched into Belgium, where the British under Wellington and the
Prussians under Blucher had gathered to meet him.

On the 16rh he defeated Blucher at Ligny. On the 18th he met Wellington
at Waterloo, and after a desperate struggle went down in utter defeat.
All day long the French and British had fought without victory for
either, but the arrival of Blucher with his Prussians turned the scale.
The French army broke and fled in disastrous rout, three-fourths of its
force being left on the field, dead, wounded, or prisoners. It was the
great soldier’s last fight. He was forced to surrender the throne, and
was again exiled, this time to the island of St. Helena, in the south
Atlantic. No such mistake as that of Elba was safe to make again. Here
ended the days of Napoleon Bonaparte, the greatest soldier the world
had ever known. His final hour of glory came in 1842, when his remains
were brought in pomp to Paris, there to find a final resting place in
the Hotel des Invalides.

THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

This Congress of the rulers and statesmen of Europe, which opened in
September, 1814, and continued its work after the fall of Napoleon at
Waterloo, occupied itself with map-making on a liberal scale. The
empire which the conqueror had built up at the expense of the
neighboring countries, was quickly dismembered and France reduced to
its former limits, while all the surrounding Powers took their shares
of the spoils, Belgium and Holland being combined into a single
kingdom.

As for the rights of the people, what had become of them? Had they been
swept away and the old wrongs of the people brought back? Not quite.
The frenzied enthusiasm for liberty and human rights of the past
twenty-five years could not go altogether for nothing. The lingering
relics of feudalism had vanished, not only from France but from all
Europe, and no monarch or congress could bring them back again. In its
place the principles of democracy had been carried by the armies of
France throughout Europe and deeply planted in a hundred places, and
their establishment as actual conditions was the most important part of
the political development of the nineteenth century.

THE HOLY ALLIANCE

Map-making was not the whole work of the Congress of Vienna. An
association was made of the rulers of Russia, Austria and Prussia,
under the promising title of the “Holy Alliance.” These devout
autocrats proposed to rule in accordance with the precepts of the
Bible, to govern their subjects like loving parents, and to see that
peace, justice and religion should flourish in their dominions.

Such was the theory, the real purpose was one of absolute dominion,
that of uniting their forces against democracy and revolution wherever
these should show themselves. It was not long before there was work for
them to do. The people began to move. The attempt to re-establish
absolute governments shook them out of sluggish acceptance. Revolution
lifted its head in spite of the Holy Alliance, its first field being
Spain. Revolt broke out t

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