Anarchism
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Title: Anarchism
Author: Paul Eltzbacher
Translator: Steven T. Byington
Release date: July 10, 2011 [eBook #36690]
Language: English
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*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ANARCHISM ***
Produced by Fritz Ohrenschall, Martin Pettit and the Online
Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This
file was produced from images generously made available
by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.)
ANARCHISM
BY
DR. PAUL ELTZBACHER
Gerichtsassessor and Privatdozent in Halle an der Saale
Translated by
STEVEN T. BYINGTON
Je ne propose rien, je ne suppose rien, j'expose
[Illustration]
NEW YORK: BENJ. R. TUCKER.
LONDON: A. C. FIFIELD.
1908.
Copyright, 1907, by
Benjamin R. Tucker
_Gratefully dedicated to the memory of my father_
DR. SALOMON ELTZBACHER
1832-1889
CONTENTS
PAGE
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE vii
BOOKS REFERRED TO xvii
INTRODUCTION 3
CHAPTER I. THE PROBLEM
1. General 6
2. The Starting-point 10
3. The Goal 13
4. The Way to the Goal 15
CHAPTER II. LAW, THE STATE, PROPERTY
1. General 18
2. Law 24
3. The State 31
4. Property 36
CHAPTER III. GODWIN'S TEACHING
1. General 40
2. Basis 41
3. Law 42
4. The State 45
5. Property 53
6. Realization 58
CHAPTER IV. PROUDHON'S TEACHING
1. General 65
2. Basis 67
3. Law 69
4. The State 72
5. Property 80
6. Realization 86
CHAPTER V. STIRNER'S TEACHING
1. General 93
2. Basis 96
3. Law 97
4. The State 100
5. Property 106
6. Realization 109
CHAPTER VI. BAKUNIN'S TEACHING
1. General 115
2. Basis 117
3. Law 119
4. The State 121
5. Property 127
6. Realization 132
CHAPTER VII. KROPOTKIN'S TEACHING
1. General 139
2. Basis 141
3. Law 145
4. The State 149
5. Property 159
6. Realization 171
CHAPTER VIII. TUCKER'S TEACHING
1. General 182
2. Basis 183
3. Law 187
4. The State 190
5. Property 201
6. Realization 209
CHAPTER IX. TOLSTOI'S TEACHING
1. General 219
2. Basis 220
3. Law 230
4. The State 234
5. Property 249
6. Realization 260
CHAPTER X. THE ANARCHISTIC TEACHINGS
1. General 270
2. Basis 270
3. Law 272
4. The State 276
5. Property 280
6. Realization 284
CHAPTER XI. ANARCHISM AND ITS SPECIES
1. Errors about Anarchism and its Species 288
2. The Concepts of Anarchism and its Species 292
CONCLUSION 303
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE
Every person who examines this book at all will speedily divide its
contents into Eltzbacher's own discussion and his seven chapters of
classified quotations from Anarchist leaders; and, if he buys the book,
he will buy it for the sake of the quotations. I do not mean that the
book might not have a sale if it consisted exclusively of Eltzbacher's
own words, but simply that among ten thousand people who may value
Eltzbacher's discussion there will not be found ten who will not value
still more highly the conveniently-arranged reprint of what the
Anarchists themselves have said on the cardinal points of Anarchistic
thought. Nor do I feel that I am saying anything uncomplimentary to
Eltzbacher when I say that the part of his work to which he has devoted
most of his space is the part that the public will value most.
And yet there is much to be valued in the chapters that are of
Eltzbacher's own writing,--even if one is reminded of Sir Arthur Helps's
satirical description of English lawyers as a class of men, found in a
certain island, who make it their business to write highly important
documents in closely-crowded lines on such excessively wide pages that
the eye is bound to skip a line now and then, but who make up for this
by invariably repeating in another part of the document whatever they
have said, so that whatever the reader may miss in one place he will
certainly catch in another. The fact is that Eltzbacher's work is an
admirable model of what should be the mental processes of an
investigator trying to determine the definition of a term which he finds
to be confusedly conceived. Not only is his method for determining the
definition of Anarchism flawless, but his subsidiary investigation of
the definitions of law, the State, and property is conducted as such
things ought to be, and (a good test of clearness of thought) his
illustrations are always so exactly pertinent that they go far to redeem
his style from dullness, if one is reading for the sense and therefore
cares for pertinence. The only weak point in this part of the book is
that he thinks it necessary to repeat in print his previous statements
wherever it is necessary to the investigation that the previous
statement be mentally renewed. But, however tiresome this may be, one
gets a steady progress of thought, and the introductory part of the book
is not very long at worst.
The collection of quotations, which form three-fourths of the book both
in bulk and in importance, is as much the best part as it is the
biggest. Here the prime necessity is impartiality, and Eltzbacher has
attained this as perfectly as can be expected of any man. Positively,
one comes to the end of all this without feeling sure whether Eltzbacher
is himself an Anarchist or not; it is not until we come to the last
dozen pages of the book that he lets his opposition to Anarchism become
evident. To be sure, one feels that he is more journalistic than
scientific in selecting for special mention the more sensational points
of the schemes proposed (the journalistic temper certainly shows itself
in his habit of picking out for his German public the references to
Germany in Anarchist writers). Yet it is hard to deny that there is
legitimate scientific importance in ascertaining how much of the
sensational is involved in Anarchism; and, on the other hand, Eltzbacher
recognizes his duty to present the strongest points of the Anarchist
side, and does this so faithfully that one often wonders if the man can
repeat these words without feeling their cogency. So far as any bias is
really felt in this part of the book it is the bias of
over-methodicalness; now and then a quotation is made to go into the
classification at a place where it will not go in without forcing, and
perspective is distorted when some _obiter dictum_ that had never seemed
to its author to be worth repeating a second time is made to serve as
illuminant now for this division of the "teaching," now for that, till
it seems to the reader like a favorite topic of the Anarchist. However,
the bias of methodicalness is as nearly non-partisan as any bias can be,
and its effect is to put the matter into a most convenient form for
consultation and comparison.
Next to impartiality, if not even before it, we need intelligence in our
compiler; and we have it. Few men, even inside the movement, would have
been more successful than Eltzbacher in picking out the important parts
of the Anarchist doctrines, and the quotations that will show these
important parts as they are. I do not mean that this accuracy has not
exceptions--many exceptions, if you count such things as the failure to
give due weight to some clause which might restrict or modify the
application of the words used; a few serious exceptions, of which we
reap the fruit in his final summary. But in admitting these errors I do
not retract my statement that Eltzbacher has made his compilation as
accurate as any man could be expected to. More than this, it may well be
said that he has, except in three or four points, made it as accurate as
is even useful for ordinary reading; he has overlooked nothing but what
his readers would have been sure to overlook if he had presented it. As
a gun is advertised to shoot "as straight as any man can hold," so
Eltzbacher has, with three or four exceptions, told his story as
straight as any man with ordinary attention can read. The net result is
that we have here, without doubt, the most complete and accurate
presentation of Anarchism that ever has been given or ever will be given
in so short a space. If any one wants a fuller and more trustworthy
account, he will positively have to go direct to the writings of the
Anarchists themselves; nowhere else can he find anything so good as
Eltzbacher. Withal, this main part of the book is decidedly readable.
Eltzbacher's repetitiousness has no opportunity to become prominent
here, and the man is not at all dull in choosing and translating his
quotations. On the contrary, his fondness for apt illustrations is a
great help toward making the compilation constantly readable, as well as
toward making the reader's impressions of the Anarchistic teachings
vivid and definite.
I do not mean to say that this book can take the place of a
consultation of the original sources. For instance, the Bakunin chapter
follows next after the Stirner chapter; but the exquisite contrariness
of almost every word of Bakunin to Stirner's teaching can be appreciated
only by those who have read Stirner's book--Eltzbacher's quotations are
on a different aspect of Stirner's teaching from that which applies
against Bakunin. (Stirner and Bakunin, it will be noted, are the only
Anarchist leaders against whom Eltzbacher permits himself a
disrespectful word before he has presented their doctrines.) It is to be
hoped that many who read this book will go on to examine the sources
themselves. Meanwhile, here is an excellent introduction, and the
chronological arrangement makes it easy to watch the historical
development and see whether the later schools of Anarchism assail the
State more effectively than the earlier.
I have not reserved any expressions of praise for the small part of the
book which comes after the compiled chapters, because it calls for none.
All Eltzbacher's weak points come out in this concluding summary; the
best that can be said for it is that it deserves careful attention, and
that the author continues to be oftener right than wrong. But now that
he has gathered all his knowledge he wants it to amount to omniscience,
and most imprudently shuts his eyes to the places where there is nothing
under his feet. He charges men with error for not using in his sense a
term whose definition he has not undertaken to determine. He accepts all
too unquestioningly such statements as fit most conveniently into his
scheme of method. His most glaring offence in this direction is his
classification of the Anarchist-Communist doctrines as mere prediction
and not the expression of a will or demand or approval or disapproval of
anything, simply because the fashionableness of evolutionism and of
fatalism has led the leaders of that school to prefer to state their
doctrine in terms of prediction. Eltzbacher has forgotten to compare his
judgment with the actions of the men he judges; _solvitur ambulando_; if
Kropotkin's proposition were merely predictive and not pragmatic, it
would have less trouble with the police than it has. Again, he does one
of the most indiscreet things that are possible to a votary of strict
method when he asserts repeatedly that he has listed not merely all that
is to be found but all that could possibly exist under a certain
category. For instance, he declares that every possible affirmative
doctrine of property must be either private property, or common property
in the wherewithal for production and private property in the
wherewithal for consumption, or common property. Why should not a scheme
of common property in the things that are wanted by all men and private
property in the things that are wanted only by some men have as high a
rank in the classification as has Eltzbacher's second class? A look at
the quotations from Kropotkin will show that I have not drawn much on my
own ingenuity in conceiving such a scheme as supposable. He claims to
have listed all the standpoints from which Anarchism has been or can be
propounded or judged, yet he has omitted legitimism, the doctrine that a
political authority which is to claim our respect and obedience must
appear to have originated by a legitimate foundation and not by
usurpation. The great part that legitimism has played in history is
notorious; and it lends itself very readily to the Anarchist's purpose,
since some governments are so well known to have originated in
usurpation and others are so easily suspected of it. Nay, legitimism is
in fact a potent factor in shaping the most up-to-date Anarchism of our
time; for it is largely concerned in Lysander Spooner's doctrine of
juries, of which some slight account is given in Eltzbacher's quotations
from Tucker. And he claims to have recited all the important arguments
that sustain Anarchism: where has he mentioned the argument from the
evil that the State does in interfering with social and economic
experimentation? or the argument from the fact that reforms in the State
are necessarily in a democracy, and ordinarily in a monarchy, very slow
in coming to pass, and when they do come to pass they necessarily come
with all-disturbing suddenness? or the argument from the evil of
separating people by the boundary lines which the State involves? or the
fact that war would be almost inconceivable if the States were replaced
by voluntary and non-monopolistic organizations, since such
organizations could have no "jurisdiction" or control of territory to
fight for, and war for any other cause has long been unknown among
civilized nations? By these and other such unwarranted claims of
absolute completeness, and by the conclusions based on these pasteboard
premises, Eltzbacher makes it necessary to read his final chapters with
all possible independence of judgment.
It remains for me to say something of my own work on this book. I have
consulted the originals of some of the works cited--such as
circumstances have permitted--and given the quotations not by
translation from Eltzbacher's German but direct from the originals. The
particulars are as follows:
Of Godwin's "Political Justice" I used an American reprint of the second
British edition. This second edition is greatly revised and altered from
the first, which Eltzbacher used. Godwin calls our attention to this,
and especially informs us that the first edition did not in some
important respects represent the views which he held at the time of its
publication, since the earlier pages were printed before the later were
written, and during the writing of the book he changed his mind about
some of the principles he had asserted in the earlier chapters. In the
second edition, he says, the views presented in the first part of the
book have been made consistent with those in the last part, and all
parts have been thoroughly revised. It will astonish nobody, therefore,
that I found it now and then impossible to identify in my copy the
passages translated by Eltzbacher from the first edition. In particular,
I got the impression that what Eltzbacher quotes about promises, from
the first part of the book, is one of those sections which Godwin says
he retracts and no longer believed in even at the time he wrote the
later chapters of the first edition. If so, a bit of the foundation for
Eltzbacher's ultimate classification disappears. Besides giving the
pages of the first edition as in Eltzbacher, I have added in brackets
the page numbers of the copy I used, wherever I could identify them.
Throughout the book brackets distinguish footnotes added by me from
Eltzbacher's own, and in a few places I have used them in the text to
indicate Eltzbacher's deviations from the wording of his original, of
which matter I will speak again in a moment.
The passages from Proudhon's works I translated from the original French
as given in the collected edition of his "_OEuvres completes_." In this
edition some of the works differ only in pagination from the editions
which Eltzbacher used, while others have been extensively revised. I
know of no changes of essential doctrine.
Since in Stirner's case German is the original language, I have accepted
as my original the quotations given by Eltzbacher. It is probable that
they are occasionally condensed; but a fairly faithful memory, and the
fact that it is less than a year since I was reading the proofs of my
translation of Stirner's book, enable me to be confident that there is
no change amounting to distortion. I have here made no use of that
translation of mine[1] except from memory, because I well knew that in
dealing with Stirner there is no assurance that the best possible
translation of the continuous whole will be made up of the best possible
translations of the individual parts. Neither have I used the extant
English translations of Bakunin's "God and the State," Kropotkin's
"Conquest of Bread," Tolstoi's works, or any of the other books cited. I
have not had at hand any originals of Bakunin or Tolstoi, nor any of
Kropotkin except "Anarchist Communism." Of this I had the first edition,
and Eltzbacher, contrary to his habit, the second; but I judge that the
two are from the same plates, for all the page-numbers cited agree.
Toward the Tucker chapter I have taken a special attitude. I am myself
one of Tucker's followers and collaborators; I may claim to be an
"authority" on the exposition of his doctrine--
_Nennt man die besten Namen,
So wird auch der meine genannt_--
and I have tried to have an eye to the precise correctness of everything
in that chapter. That I used the original of "Instead of a Book" is a
matter of course; and I have not only taken Tucker's words where
Eltzbacher had translated the whole, but have had an eye to all points
where Eltzbacher had condensed anything in a way that could affect the
sense, and have restored the words that made the passage mean something
a little bit different from what Eltzbacher made it mean. (I did about
the same in this respect with Kropotkin's "Anarchist Communism"; and
indeed something of the kind is inevitable if one is to consult
originals at all.) On the other hand, I have not, in general, drawn
attention to passages where Eltzbacher makes merely formal changes for
the purpose of inserting in a sentence of a certain grammatical
structure what Tucker had said in a sentence of different structure.
The renderings of Tolstoi's biblical quotations are taken from the
"Corrected English New Testament," a conservative version which is now
spoken of as the best English New Testament extant. It fits well into
Tolstoi, at least so far as the present quotations go.
I have spoken above of Eltzbacher's qualities as compiler; it here
becomes necessary to say something of his work as translator. His
translation is that of a very intelligent man, trusting to his
intelligence to justify him in translating quite freely. He is confident
that he knows what the idea to be presented is, and his main concern is
to express that in the language best suited to the purpose. He even
avows, as will be seen, that he has "cautiously revised" other people's
translations from the Russian, without himself claiming to be familiar
with the Russian language. I would as soon entrust this extremely
delicate task to Eltzbacher as to anybody I know, for he is in general
remarkably correct in his re-wordings. The justification of his
confidence in his knowledge of the author's thought may be seen in the
fact that in passages which happen not to affect the main thought he
makes a few such slips as _zahlen mit ihrer Vergiftung_ for "pay to be
poisoned," _Willkuer_ for "arbitrament," and even _eine blutige
Revolution ruecksichtslos niederwuerfe_ for "would do anything in his
power to precipitate a bloody revolution" (can he have been misled by
the chemist's use of "precipitate"?), but in passages where these
blunders would do real harm he keeps clear of them, being safeguarded by
his knowledge of the sense. But it makes a difference whom you translate
in this way. Tucker is a man who uses language with especial precision:
every phrase in a sentence of his may be presumed to contribute
something definite to the thought; and Eltzbacher treats him as if the
less conspicuous phrases were merely ornamental work which might safely
be omitted or amended when they seemed not to be advantageous for
ornamental purposes. I must confess that I have little faith in the
Eltzbacher method of translation for the rendering of any author; but it
works especially ill with an author like Tucker.
Of course all defects of translation are cured, silently, by
substituting the original English. Therefore, at the expense of slightly
increasing the bulk of the Tucker chapter, this edition gives American
readers a much more accurate presentation of the utterances of the
American champion of Anarchism than can be had in Eltzbacher's German;
and, since I have the same advantage as regards Godwin, I think I may
claim in general terms that mine is the best edition of Eltzbacher for
those who read both English and German.
Besides looking out for the accurate presentation of the passages quoted
from Tucker, I have kept watch of the correctness of the subject-matter.
Whatever seemed to me to represent Tucker's book unfairly, either by
misrepresenting his doctrine or by misapplying the quotations, has been
corrected by a note. This will be useful to the reader not only by
giving him a better Tucker, but also by giving a sample from which he
may judge what amount of fault the followers of Kropotkin or Tolstoi or
the rest would be likely to find with the chapters devoted to them. The
merely popular reader will probably get the impression that Eltzbacher
is really a rather unreliable man. The competent student, who knows what
must be looked out for in all work of this sort, will have his
confidence in Eltzbacher increased by seeing how little of serious fault
appears in such a search.
The index is compiled independently for this translation. Omitting such
entries as merely duplicate the utility of the table of contents, and
making an effort to head every entry with the word under which the
reader will actually seek it, I hope I have bettered Eltzbacher's index;
and I hope the index will be not only a place-finder but a help toward
the appreciation of the Anarchistic teachings.
I have not in general undertaken to criticise those features of the book
which embody Eltzbacher's own opinions. Whether it was in fact right to
select these seven men as the touchstone of Anarchism,--whether
Eltzbacher is right in discussing the definition of the State as he
does, or whether he might better simply have taken as authoritative that
definition which has legal force in international law,--whether he ought
to have added any other feature to his book,--are points on which the
reader does not care for my judgment, nor am I eager to express a
judgment. Having had to work over the book very carefully in detail, I
have felt entitled to express an opinion as to how well Eltzbacher has
done the work that he did choose to do; I have also told what work I as
translator claim to have done; and it is time this preface ended.
STEVEN T. BYINGTON.
_Ballardvale, Mass., August 28, 1907._
BOOKS REFERRED TO BY ABBREVIATED TITLES
Adler, "Handwoerterbuch" = GEORG ADLER, "Anarchismus," in
_Handwoerterbuch der Staatswissenschaften_, 2d ed. (Jena 1898), vol. 1
pp. 296-327.
Adler, "Nord und Sued" = GEORG ADLER, "Die Lehren der Anarchisten," in
_Nord und Sued_ (Breslau) vol. 32 (1885) pp. 371-83.
Ba. "Articles" = "Articles ecrits par Bakounine dans l'Egalite de 1869,"
in _Memoire presente par la federation jurassienne de l'Association
internationale des travailleurs a toutes les federations de
l'Internationale_ (Sonvillier, n. d.), "Pieces justificatives" pp.
68-114.
Ba. "Briefe" = "Briefe Bakunins," in Dragomanoff (see below) pp. 1-272.
Ba. "Dieu" = MICHEL BAKOUNINE, _Dieu et l'Etat_, 2d ed. (Paris 1892).
Ba. "Dieu" OEuvres = "Dieu et l'Etat," in MICHEL BAKOUNINE, _OEuvres_,
3d ed. (Paris 1895), pp. 261-326.
Ba. "Discours" = "Discours de Bakounine au congres de Berne," in
_Memoire presente par la federation jurassienne de l'Association
internationale des travailleurs a toutes les federations de
l'Internationale_ (Sonvillier, n. d.), "Pieces justificatives" pp.
20-38.
Ba. "Programme" = BAKOUNINE, "Programme de la section slave a Zurich,"
in Dragomanoff (see below) pp. 381-3.
Ba. "Proposition" = "Federalisme, socialisme et antitheologisme.
Proposition motivee au Comite central de la Ligue de la paix et de la
liberte," in MICHEL BAKOUNINE, _OEuvres_, 3d ed. (Paris 1895), pp.
1-205.
Ba. "Statuts" = "Statuts secrets de l'Alliance" and "Programme et
reglement de l'Alliance publique," in "L'Alliance" (see below) pp.
118-35.
Ba. "Volkssache" = M. BAKUNIN, "Die Volkssache. Romanow, Pugatschew oder
Pestel?" in Dragomanoff (see below) pp. 303-9.
Bernatzik = BERNATZIK, "Der Anarchismus," in _Jahrbuch fuer
Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Volkswirtschaft im Deutschen Reich_
(Leipzig) vol. 19 (1895) pp. 1-20.
Bernstein = EDUARD BERNSTEIN, "Die soziale Doktrin des Anarchismus," in
_Die Neue Zeit_ (Stuttgart) year 10 (1891-2) vol. 1 pp. 358-65, 421-8;
vol. 2 pp. 589-96, 618-26, 657-66, 772-8, 813-19.
Crispi = FRANCESCO CRISPI, "The Antidote for Anarchy," in _Daily Mail_
(London) no. 807 (1898) p. 4.
"Der Anarchismus und seine Traeger" = _Der Anarchismus und seine
Traeger. Enthuellungen aus dem Lager der Anarchisten von [**symbol:
circle in triangle], Verfasser der Londoner Briefe in der Koelnischen
Zeitung_ (Berlin 1887).
"Die historische Entwickelung des Anarchismus" = _Die historische
Entwickelung des Anarchismus_ (New York 1894).
Diehl = KARL DIEHL, _P.-J. Proudhon_. _Seine Lehre und sein Leben._ (3
vol., Jena 1888-96.)
Dragomanoff = MICHAIL DRAGOMANOW, _Michail Bakunins sozial-politischer
Briefwechsel mit Alexander Iw. Herzen und Ogarjow, deutsch von Boris
Minzes_ (Stuttgart 1895).
Dubois = FELIX DUBOIS, _Le Peril anarchiste_ (Paris 1894).
Ferri = "Discours de FERRI" in _Congres international d'anthropologie
criminelle, compte rendu des travaux de la quatrieme session, tenue a
Geneve du 24 au 29 aout 1896_ (Geneve 1897) pp. 254-7.
Garraud = R. GARRAUD, _L'Anarchie et la Repression_ (Paris 1895).
Godwin = WILLIAM GODWIN, _An Enquiry concerning Political Justice and
its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness_ (2 vol., London 1793).
[Bracketed references are to the "First American from the second London
edition, corrected," Philadelphia, 1796.]
"Hintermaenner" = _Die Hintermaenner der Sozialdemokratie. Von einem
Eingeweihten_ (Berlin 1890).
Kr. "Anarchist Communism" = PETER KROPOTKINE, _Anarchist Communism: its
Basis and Principles_, 2d ed. (London 1895). [Reprinted from the
_Nineteenth Century_.]
Kr. "Conquete" = PIERRE KROPOTKINE, _La Conquete du pain_, 5th ed.
(Paris 1895).
Kr. "L'Anarchie dans l'evolution socialiste" = PIERRE KROPOTKINE,
_L'Anarchie dans l'evolution socialiste_ (Paris 1892).
Kr. "L'Anarchie. Sa philosophie--son ideal" = PIERRE KROPOTKINE,
_L'Anarchie. Sa philosophie--son ideal_ (Paris 1896).
Kr. "Morale" = PIERRE KROPOTKINE, _La Morale anarchiste_ (Paris 1891).
Kr. "Paroles" = PIERRE KROPOTKINE, _Paroles d'un revolte, ouvrage publie
par Elisee Reclus, nouv. ed_. (Paris, n. d.)
Kr. "Prisons" = PIERRE KROPOTKINE, _Les Prisons_ (Paris 1890).
Kr. "Siecle" = PIERRE KROPOTKINE, _Un siecle d'attente. 1789-1889_
(Paris 1893).
Kr. "Studies" = _Revolutionary Studies, translated from "La Revolte" and
reprinted from "The Commonweal"_ (London 1892).
Kr. "Temps nouveaux" = PIERRE KROPOTKINE, _Les Temps nouveaux
(conference faite a Londres)_ (Paris 1894).
"L'Alliance" = _L'Alliance de la democratie socialiste et l'Association
internationale des travailleurs_ (Londres et Hambourg 1873).
Lenz = ADOLF LENZ, _Der Anarchismus und das Strafrecht. Sonderabdruck
aus der Zeitschrift fuer die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, Bd. 16,
Heft 1_ (Berlin, n. d.).
Lombroso = C. LOMBROSO, _Gli Anarchici_, 2d ed. (Torino 1895).
Mackay, "Anarchisten" = JOHN HENRY MACKAY, _Die Anarchisten.
Kulturgemaelde aus dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts_. Volksausgabe (Berlin
1893).
Mackay, "Magazin" = JOHN HENRY MACKAY, "Der individualistische
Anarchismus: ein Gegner der Propaganda der That," in _Das Magazin fuer
Litteratur_ (Berlin und Weimar) vol. 67 (1898) pp. 913-15.
Mackay, "Stirner" = JOHN HENRY MACKAY, _Max Stirner. Sein Leben und sein
Werk_ (Berlin 1898).
Merlino = F. S. MERLINO, _L'Individualismo nell'anarchismo_ (Roma 1895).
Pfau = "Proudhon und die Franzosen," in LUDWIG PFAU, _Kunst und Kritik_,
vol. 6 of _Aesthetische Schriften_, 2d ed. (Stuttgart, Leipzig, Berlin,
1888), pp. 183-236.
Plechanow = GEORG PLECHANOW, _Anarchismus und Sozialismus_ (Berlin
1894).
Pr. "Banque" = P.-J. PROUDHON, _Banque du peuple, suivie du rapport de
la commission des delegues du Luxembourg_ (Paris 1849). (In Proudhon's
_OEuvres completes_, Paris 1866-83, this forms part of the volume
"Solution.")
Pr. "Contradictions" = P.-J. PROUDHON, _Systeme des contradictions
economiques, ou philosophie de la misere_ (2 vol., Paris 1846).
Pr. "Confessions" = P.-J. PROUDHON, _Les Confessions d'un
revolutionnaire, pour servir a l'histoire de la revolution de fevrier_
(Paris 1849).
Pr. "Droit" = P.-J. PROUDHON, _Le Droit au travail et le Droit de
propriete_ (Paris 1848). (In the _OEuvres_ this forms part of the volume
"La Revolution sociale.")
Pr. "Idee" = P.-J. PROUDHON, _Idee generate de la revolution au XIXe
siecle (choix d'etudes sur la pratique revolutionnaire et industrielle)_
(Paris 1851).
Pr. "Justice" = P.-J. PROUDHON, _De la justice dans la revolution et
dans l'Eglise. Nouveaux principes de philosophie pratique_ (3 vol.,
Paris 1858).
Pr. "Organisation" = P.-J. PROUDHON, _Organisation du credit et de la
circulation, et solution du probleme social_ (Paris 1848). (In the
_OEuvres_ this forms part of the volume "Solution.")
Pr. "Principe" = P.-J. PROUDHON, _Du principe federatif et de la
necessite de reconstituer le parti de la revolution_ (Paris 1863).
Pr. "Propriete" = P.-J. PROUDHON, _Qu'est-ce que la propriete? ou
recherches sur le principe du droit et du gouvernement. Premier memoire_
(Paris 1841).
Pr. "Solution" = P.-J. PROUDHON, _Solution du probleme social_ (Paris
1848).
Proal = LOUIS PROAL, _La Criminalite politique_ (Paris 1895).
Reichesberg = NAUM REICHESBERG, _Sozialismus und Anarchismus_ (Bern und
Leipzig 1895).
Rienzi = RIENZI, _L'Anarchisme, traduit du neerlandais par August
Dewinne_ (Bruxelles 1893).
Sernicoli = E. SERNICOLI, _L'Anarchia e gli Anarchici. Studio storico e
politico di E. Sernicoli_ (2 vol., Milano 1894).
Shaw = GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, _The Impossibilities of Anarchism_ (London
1895).
Silio = CESAR SILIO, "El Anarquismo y la Defensa Social," in _La Espana
Moderna_ (Madrid) vol. 61 (1894) pp. 141-8.
Stammler = RUDOLF STAMMLER, _Die Theorie des Anarchismus_ (Berlin 1894).
Stirner = MAX STIRNER, _Der Einzige und sein Eigentum_ (Leipzig 1845).
Stirner "Vierteljahrsschrift" = M. St., "Rezensenten Stirners," in
_Wigands Vierteljahrsschrift_ (Leipzig) vol. 3 (1845) pp. 147-94.
To. "Confession" = GRAF LEO TOLSTOJ, _Bekenntnisse. Was sollen wir denn
thun? deutsch von H. von Samson-Himmelstjerna_ (Leipzig 1886), pp.
1-102.
To. "Gospel" = GRAF LEO N. TOLSTOJ, _Kurze Darlegung des Evangeliums,
deutsch von Paul Lauterbach_ (Leipzig, n. d.).
To. "Kernel" = "Das Korn," in GRAF LEO N. TOLSTOJ, _Volkserzaehlungen,
deutsch von Wilhelm Goldschmidt_ (Leipzig, n. d.), pp. 87-9.
To. "Kingdom" = LEO N. TOLSTOJ, _Das Reich Gottes ist in euch, oder das
Christentum als eine neue Lebensauffassung, nicht als mystische Lehre,
deutsch von R. Loewenfeld_ (Stuttgart, Leipzig, Berlin, Wien, 1894).
To. "Linen-Measurer" = "Leinwandmesser. Die Geschichte eines Pferdes,"
in _Leo N. Tolstoj_, _Gesammelte Werke, deutsch herausgegeben von
Raphael Loewenfeld_, vol. 3 (Berlin 1893) pp. 573-631.
To. "Money" = GRAF LEO TOLSTOJ, _Geld! Soziale Betrachtungen, deutsch
von August Scholz_ (Berlin 1891).
To. "Morning" = "Der Morgen des Gutsherrn," in LEO N. TOLSTOJ,
_Gesammelte Werke, deutsch herausgegeben von Raphael Loewenfeld_, vol.
2, 2d ed. (Leipzig, n. d.), pp. 1-81.
To. "On Life" = GRAF LEO TOLSTOJ, _Ueber das Leben, deutsch von Sophie
Behr_ (Leipzig 1889).
To. "Patriotism" = GRAF LEO N. TOLSTOJ, _Christentum und
Vaterlandsliebe, deutsch von L. A. Hauff_ (Berlin n. d.).
To. "Persecutions" = _Russische Christenverfolgungen im Kaukasus. Mit
einem Vor- und Nachwort von Leo Tolstoj_ (Dresden und Leipzig 1896) pp.
7-8, 38-48.
To. "Reason and Dogma" = GRAF LEO N. TOLSTOJ, _Vernunft und Dogma. Eine
Kritik der Glaubenslehre, deutsch von L. A. Hauff_ (Berlin n. d.).
To. "Religion and Morality" = GRAF LEO TOLSTOJ, _Religion und Moral.
Antwort auf eine in der "Ethischen Kultur" gestellte Frage, deutsch von
Sophie Behr_ (Berlin 1894).
To. "What I Believe" = GRAF LEO TOLSTOJ, _Worin besteht mein Glaube?
Eine Studie, deutsch von Sophie Behr_ (Leipzig 1885).
To. "What Shall We Do" = GRAF LEO TOLSTOJ, _Was sollen wir also thun?
deutsch von August Scholz_ (Berlin 1891).
Tripels = "Discours de Tripels," in _Congres international
d'anthropologie criminelle, compte rendu des travaux de la quatrieme
session, tenue a Geneve du 24 au 29 aout 1896_ (Geneve 1897) pp. 253-4.
Tucker = BENJ. R. TUCKER, _Instead of a Book. By a Man Too Busy to Write
One. A fragmentary exposition of philosophical Anarchism_ (New York
1893).
Van Hamel = VAN HAMEL, "L'Anarchisme et le Combat contre l'anarchisme au
point de vue de l'anthropologie criminelle," in _Congres international
d'anthropologie criminelle, compte rendu des travaux de la quatrieme
session, tenue a Geneve du 24 au 29 aout 1896_ (Geneve 1897) pp. 254-7.
Zenker = E. V. ZENKER, _Der Anarchismus. Kritische Geschichte der
anarchistischen Theorie_ (Jena 1895).
FOOTNOTE:
[1] Entitled "The Ego and His Own." N. Y., Benj. R. Tucker, 1907.
INTRODUCTION
1. We want to know Anarchism scientifically, for reasons both personal
and external.
We wish to penetrate the essence of a movement that dares to question
what is undoubted and to deny what is venerable, and nevertheless takes
hold of wider and wider circles.
Besides, we wish to make up our minds whether it is not necessary to
meet such a movement with force, to protect the established order or at
least its quiet progressive development, and, by ruthless measures, to
guard against greater evils.
2. At present there is the greatest lack of clear ideas about Anarchism,
and that not only among the masses but among scholars and statesmen.
Now it is a historic law of evolution[2] that is described as the
supreme law of Anarchism, now it is the happiness of the individual,[3]
now justice.[4]
Now they say that Anarchism culminates in the negation of every
programme,[5] that it has only a negative aim;[6] now, again, that its
negating and destroying side is balanced by a side that is affirmative
and creative;[7] now, to conclude, that what is original in Anarchism is
to be found exclusively in its utterances about the ideal society,[8]
that its real, true essence consists in its positive efforts.[9]
Now it is said that Anarchism rejects law,[10] now that it rejects
society,[11] now that it rejects only the State.[12]
Now it is declared that in the future society of Anarchism there is no
tie of contract binding persons together;[13] now, again, that Anarchism
aims to have all public affairs arranged for by contracts between
federally constituted communes and societies.[14]
Now it is said in general that Anarchism rejects property,[15] or at
least private property;[16] now a distinction is made between
Communistic and Individualistic,[17] or even between Communistic,
Collectivistic, and Individualistic Anarchism.[18]
Now it is asserted that Anarchism conceives of its realization as taking
place through crime,[19] especially through a violent revolution[20] and
by the help of the propaganda of deed;[21] now, again, that Anarchism
rejects violent tactics and the propaganda of deed,[22] or that these
are at least not necessary constituents of Anarchism.[23]
3. Two demands must be made of everybody who undertakes to produce a
scientific work on Anarchism.
First, he must be acquainted with the most important Anarchistic
writings. Here, to be sure, one meets great difficulties. Anarchistic
writings are very scantily represented in our public libraries. They are
in part so rare that it is extremely difficult for an individual to
acquire even the most prominent of them. So it is not strange that of
all works on Anarchism only one is based on a comprehensive knowledge of
the sources. This is a pamphlet which appeared anonymously in New York
in 1894, "_Die historische Entwickelung des Anarchismus_" which in
sixteen pages gives a concise presentation that attests an astonishing
acquaintance with the most various Anarchistic writings. The two large
works, _"L'anarchia e gli anarchici, studio storico e politico di E.
Sernicoli_" 2 vol., Milano, 1894, and "_Der Anarchismus, kritische
Geschichte der anarchistischen Theorie von E. V. Zenker_," Jena, 1895,
are at least in part founded on a knowledge of Anarchistic writings.
Second, he who would produce a scientific work on Anarchism must be
equally at home in jurisprudence, in economics, and in philosophy.
Anarchism judges juridical institutions with reference to their economic
effects, and from the standpoint of some philosophy or other. Therefore,
to penetrate its essence and not fall a victim to all possible
misunderstandings, one must be familiar with those concepts of
philosophy, jurisprudence, and economics which it applies or has a
relation to. This demand is best met, among all works on Anarchism, by
Rudolf Stammler's pamphlet, "_Die Theorie des Anarchismus_," Berlin,
1894.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] "_Der Anarchismus und seine Traeger_" pp. 124, 125, 127; Reichesberg
p. 27.
[3] Lenz p. 3.
[4] Bernatzik pp. 2, 3.
[5] Lenz p. 5.
[6] Crispi.
[7] Van Hamel p. 112.
[8] Adler p. 321.
[9] Reichesberg p. 13.
[10] Stammler pp. 2, 4, 34, 36; Lenz pp. 1, 4.
[11] Silio p. 145; Garraud p. 12; Reichesberg p. 16; Tripels p. 253.
[12] Bernstein p. 359; Bernatzik p. 3.
[13] Reichesberg p. 30.
[14] Lombroso p. 31.
[15] Silio p. 145; Dubois p. 213.
[16] Lombroso p. 31; Proal p. 50.
[17] Rienzi p. 9; Stammler pp. 28-31; Merlino pp. 18, 27; Shaw p. 23.
[18] "_Die historische Entwickelung des Anarchismus_" p. 16; Zenker p.
161.
[19] Garraud p. 6; Lenz p. 5.
[20] Sernicoli vol. 2 p. 116; Garraud p. 2; Reichesberg p. 38; Van Hamel
p. 113.
[21] Garraud pp. 10, 11; Lombroso p. 34; Ferri p. 257.
[22] Mackay "_Magazin_" pp. 913-915; "_Anarchisten_" pp. 239-243.
[23] Zenker pp. 203, 204.
CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
1.--GENERAL
The problem for our study is, to get determinate concepts of Anarchism
and its species. As soon as such determinate concepts are attained,
Anarchism is scientifically known. For their determination is not only
conditioned on a comprehensive view of all the individual phenomena of
Anarchism; it also brings together the results of this comprehensive
view, and assigns to them a place in the totality of our knowledge.
The problem of getting determinate concepts of Anarchism and its species
seems at a first glance perfectly clear. But the apparent clearness
vanishes on closer examination.
For there rises first the question, what shall be the starting-point of
our study? The answer will be given, "Anarchistic teachings." But there
is by no means an agreement as to what teachings are Anarchistic; one
man designates as "Anarchistic" these teachings, another those; and of
the teachings themselves a part designate themselves as Anarchistic, a
part do not. How can one take any of them as Anarchistic teachings for a
starting-point, without applying that very concept of Anarchism which he
has yet to determine?
Then rises the further question, what is the goal of the study? The
answer will be given, "the concepts of Anarchism and its species." But
we see daily that different men define in quite different ways the
concept of an object which they yet conceive in the same way. One says
that law is the general will; another, that it is a mass of precepts
which limit a man's natural liberty for other men's sake; a third, that
it is the ordering of the life of the nation (or of the community of
nations) to maintain God's order of the world. They all know that a
definition should state the proximate genus and the distinctive marks of
the species, but this knowledge does them little good. So it seems that
the goal of the study does still require elucidation.
Lastly rises the question, what is the way to this goal? Any one who has
ever observed the conflict of opinions in the intellectual sciences
knows well, on the one hand, how utterly we lack a recognized method for
the solution of problems; and, on the other hand, how necessary it is in
any study to get clearly in mind the method that is to be used.
2. Our study can come to a more precise specification of its problem.
The problem is to put concepts in the place of non-conceptual notions of
Anarchism and its species.
Every concept-determining study faces the problem of comprehending
conceptually an object that was first comprehended non-conceptually, and
therefore of putting a concept in the place of non-conceptual notions of
an object. This problem finds a specially clear expression in the
concept-determining judgment (the definition), which puts in immediate
juxtaposition, in its subject some non-conceptual notion of an object,
and in its predicate a conceptual notion of the same object.
Accordingly, the study that is to determine the concepts of Anarchism
and its species has for its problem to comprehend conceptually objects
that are first comprehended in non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and
its species; and therefore, to put concepts in the place of these
non-conceptual notions.
3. But our study may specify its problem still more precisely, though at
first only on the negative side. The problem is not to put concepts in
the place of all notions that appear as non-conceptual notions of
Anarchism and its species.
Any concept can comprehend conceptually only one object, not another
object together with this. The concept of health cannot be at the same
time the concept of life, nor the concept of the horse that of the
mammal.
But in the non-conceptual notions that appear as notions of Anarchism
and its species there are comprehended very different objects. To be
sure, the object of all these notions is on the one hand a genus that is
formed by the common qualities of certain teachings, and on the other
hand the species of this genus, which are formed by the addition of
sundry peculiarities to these common qualities. But still these notions
have in view very different groups of teachings with their common and
special qualities, some perhaps only the teachings of Kropotkin and
Most, others only the teachings of Stirner, Tucker, and Mackay, others
again the teachings of both sets of authors.
If one proposed to put concepts in the place of all the non-conceptual
notions which appear as notions of Anarchism and its species, these
concepts would have to comprehend at once the common and special
qualities of quite different groups of teachings, of which groups one
might embrace only the teachings of Kropotkin and Most, another only
those of Stirner, Tucker, and Mackay, a third both. But this is
impossible: the concepts of Anarchism and its species can comprehend
only the common and special qualities of a single group of teachings;
therefore our study cannot put concepts in the place of all the notions
that appear as notions of Anarchism and its species.
4. By completing on the affirmative side this negative specification of
its problem, our study can arrive at a still more precise specification
of this problem. The problem is to put concepts in the place of those
non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and its species, having in view one
and the same group of teachings, which are most widely diffused among
the men who at present are scientifically concerned with Anarchism.
Because the only possible problem for our study is to put concepts in
the place of part of the notions that appear as non-conceptual notions
of Anarchism and its species,--to wit, only in the place of such notions
as have in view one and the same group of teachings with its common and
special qualities,--therefore we must divide into classes, according to
the groups of teachings that they severally have in view, the notions
that appear as notions of Anarchism and its species, and we must choose
the class whose notions are to be replaced by concepts.
The choice of the class must depend on the kind of men for whom the
study is meant. For the study of a concept is of value only for those
who non-conceptually apprehend the object of the concept, since the
concept takes the place of their notions only. For those who form a
non-conceptual notion of space, the concept of morality is so far
meaningless; and just as meaningless, for those who mean by Anarchism
what the teachings of Proudhon and Stirner have in common, is the
concept of what is common to the teachings of Proudhon, Stirner,
Bakunin, and Kropotkin.
But the men for whom this study is meant are those who at present are
scientifically concerned with Anarchism. If all these, in their notions
of Anarchism and its species, had in view one and the same group of
teachings, then the problem for our study would be to put concepts in
the place of this set of notions. Since this is not the case, the only
possible problem for our study is to put concepts in the place of that
set of notions which has in view a group of teachings that the greatest
possible number of the men at present scientifically concerned with
Anarchism have in view in their non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and
its species.
2.--THE STARTING-POINT
In accordance with what has been said, the starting-point of our study
must be those non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and its species,
having in view one and the same group of teachings, which are most
widely diffused among the men who at present are scientifically
concerned with Anarchism.
1. How can it be known what group of teachings the non-conceptual
notions of Anarchism and its species most widely diffused among the men
at present scientifically concerned with Anarchism have in view?
First and foremost, this may be seen from utterances regarding
particular Anarchistic teachings, and from lists and descriptions of
such teachings.
We may assume that a man regards as Anarchistic those teachings which he
designates as Anarchistic, and, further, those teachings which are
likewise characterized by the common qualities of these. We may further
assume that a man does not regard as Anarchistic those teachings which
he in any form contrasts with the Anarchistic teachings, nor, if he
undertakes to catalogue or describe the whole body of Anarchistic
teachings, those teachings unknown to him which are not characterized by
the common qualities of the teachings he catalogues or describes.
What group of teachings those non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and
its species which are most widely diffused among the men at present
scientifically concerned with Anarchism have in view, may be seen
secondly from the definitions of Anarchism and from other utterances
about it. We may doubtingly assume that a man regards as Anarchistic
those teachings which come under his definition of Anarchism, or for
which his utterances about Anarchism hold good; and, on the contrary,
that he does not regard as Anarchistic those teachings which do not come
under that definition, or for which these utterances do not hold good.
When these two means of knowledge lead to contradictions, the former
must be decisive. For, if a man so defines Anarchism, or so speaks of
Anarchism, that on this basis teachings which he declares
non-Anarchistic manifest themselves to be Anarchistic,--and perhaps
other teachings, which he counts among the Anarchistic, to be
non-Anarchistic,--this can be due only to his not being conscious of the
scope of his general pronouncements; therefore it is only from his
treatment of the individual teachings that one can find out his opinion
of these.
2. These means of knowledge inform us what group of teachings the
non-conceptual notions of Anarchism and its species most widely diffused
among the men at present scientifically concerned with Anarchism have in
view.
We learn, first, that the teachings of certain particular men are
recognized as Anarchistic teachings by the greater part of those who at
present are scientifically concerned with Anarchism.
We learn, second, that by the greater part of those who at present are
scientifically concerned with Anarchism the teachings of these men are
recognized as Anarchistic teachings only in so far as they relate to
law, the State, and property; but not in so far as they may be concerned
with the law, State, or property of a particular legal system or a
particular group of legal systems, nor in so far as they regard other
objects, such as religion, the family, art.
Among the recognized Anarchistic teachings seven are particularly
prominent: to wit, the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Bakunin,
Kropotkin, Tucker, and Tolstoi. They all manifest themselves to be
Anarchistic teachings according to the greater part of the definitions
of Anarchism, and of other scientific utterances about it. They all
display the qualities that are common to the doctrines treated of in
most descriptions of Anarchism. Some of them, be it one or another, are
put in the foreground in almost every work on Anarchism. Of no one of
them is it denied, to an extent worth mentioning, that it is an
Anarchistic teaching.
3.--THE GOAL
In accordance with what has been said, the goal of our study must be to
determine, first, the concept of the genus which is constituted by the
common qualities of those teachings which the greater part of the men at
present scientifically concerned with Anarchism recognize as Anarchistic
teachings; second, the concepts of the species of this genus, which are
formed by the accession of any specialties to those common qualities.
1. The first thing toward a concept is that an object be apprehended as
clearly and purely as possible.
In non-conceptual notions an object is not apprehended with all possible
clearness. In our non-conceptual notions of gold we most commonly make
clear to ourselves only a few qualities of gold; one of us, perhaps,
thinks mainly of the color and the lustre, another of the color and
malleability, a third of some other qualities. But in the concept of
gold color, lustre, malleability, hardness, solubility, fusibility,
specific gravity, atomic weight, and all other qualities of gold, must
be apprehended as clearly as possible.
Nor is an object apprehended in all possible purity in our
non-conceptual notions. We introduce into our non-conceptual notions of
gold many things that do not belong among the qualities of gold; one,
perhaps, thinks of the present value of gold, another of golden dishes,
a third of some sort of gold coin. But all these alien adjuncts must be
kept away from the concept of gold.
So the first goal of our study is to describe as clearly as possible on
the one side, and as purely as possible on the other, the common
qualities of those teachings which the greater part of the men at
present scientifically concerned with Anarchism recognize as Anarchistic
teachings, and the specialties of all the teachings which display these
common qualities.
2. It is further requisite for a concept that an object should have its
place assigned as well as possible in the total realm of our
experience,--that is, in a system of species and genera which embraces
our total experience.
In non-conceptual notions an object does not have its place assigned in
the total realm of our experience, but arbitrarily in one of the many
genera in which it can be placed according to its various qualities. One
of us, perhaps, thinks of gold as a species of the genus "yellow
bodies," another as a species of the genus "malleable bodies," a third
as a species of some other genus. But the concept of gold must assign it
a place in a system of species and genera that embraces our whole
experience,--a place in the genus "metals."
So a further goal of our study is to assign a place as well as possible
in the total realm of our experience (that is, in a system of species
and genera which embraces our total experience) for the common qualities
of those teachings which the greater part of the men at present
scientifically concerned with Anarchism recognize as Anarchistic
teachings, and for the specialties of all the teachings that display
these common qualities.
4.--THE WAY TO THE GOAL
In accordance with what has been said, the way that our study must take
to go from its starting-point to its goal will be in three parts. First,
the concepts of law, the State, and property must be determined. Next,
it must be ascertained what the Anarchistic teachings assert about law,
the State, and property. Finally, after removing some errors, we must
get determinate concepts of Anarchism and its species.
1. First, we must get determinate concepts of law, the State, and
property; and this must be of law, the State, and property in general,
not of the law, State, or property of a particular legal system or a
particular family of legal systems.
Law, the State, and property, in this sense, are the objects about which
the doctrines which are to be examined in their common and special
qualities make assertions. Before the fact of any assertions about an
object can be ascertained,--not to say, before the common and special
qualities of these assertions can be brought out and assigned to a place
in the total realm of our experience,--we must get a determinate concept
of this object itself. Hence the first thing that must be done is to
determine the concepts of law, the State, and property (chapter II).
2. Next, it must be ascertained what the Anarchistic teachings assert
about law, the State, and property;--that is, the recognized Anarchistic
teachings, and also those teachings which likewise display the qualities
common to these.
What the recognized Anarchistic teachings say, must be ascertained in
order to determine the concept of Anarchism. What all the teachings that
display the common qualities of the recognized Anarchistic teachings
say, must be ascertained in order that we may get determinate concepts
of the species of Anarchism.
So each of these teachings must be questioned regarding its relation to
law, the State, and property. These questions must be preceded by the
question on what foundation the teaching rests, and must be followed by
the question how it conceives the process of its realization.
It is impossible to present here all recognized Anarchistic teachings,
not to say all Anarchistic teachings. Therefore our study limits itself
to the presentation of seven especially prominent teachings (chapters
III to IX), and then, from this standpoint, seeks to get a view of the
totality of recognized Anarchistic teachings and of all Anarchistic
teachings (chapter X).
The teachings presented are presented in their own words,[24] but
according to a uniform system: the first, for security against the
importation of alien thoughts; the second, to avoid the uncomparable
juxtaposition of fundamentally different courses of thought. They have
been compelled to give definite replies to definite questions; it was
indeed necessary in many cases to bring the answers together in tiny
fragments from the most various writings, to sift them so far as they
contradicted each other, and to explain them so far as they deviated
from ordinary language. Thus Tolstoi's strictly logical structure of
thought and Bakunin's confused talk, Kropotkin's discussions full of
glowing philanthropy and Stirner's self-pleasing smartness, come before
our eyes directly and yet in comparable form.
3. Finally, after removing widely diffused errors, we are to get
determinate concepts of Anarchism and its species.
We must, therefore, on the basis of that knowledge of the Anarchistic
teachings which we have acquired, clear away the most important errors
about Anarchism and its species; and then we must determine what the
Anarchistic teachings have in common, and what specialties are
represented among them, and assign to both a place in the total realm of
our experience. Then we have the concepts of Anarchism and its species
(chapter XI).
FOOTNOTE:
[24] Russian writings are cited from translations, which are cautiously
revised where they seem too harsh.
CHAPTER II
LAW, THE STATE, PROPERTY
1.--GENERAL
_In this discussion we are to get determinate concepts of law, the
State, and property in general, not of the law, State, and property of a
particular legal system or of a particular family of legal systems. The
concepts of law, State, and property are therefore to be determined as
concepts of general jurisprudence, not as concepts of any particular
jurisprudence._
1. By the concepts of law, State, and property one may understand,
first, the concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a
particular legal system.
These concepts of law, State, and property contain all the
characteristics that belong to the substance of a particular legal
system. They embrace only the substance of this system. They may,
therefore, be called concepts of the science of this system. For we may
designate as the science of a particular legal system that part of
jurisprudence which concerns itself exclusively with the norms of a
particular legal system.
The concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a legal
system are distinguished from the concepts of law, State, and property
in the sciences of other legal systems by this characteristic,--that
they are concepts of norms of this particular system. From this
characteristic we may deduce all the characteristics that result from
the special substance of this system of law in contrast to other such
systems. The concepts of property in the present laws of the German
empire, of France, and of England are distinguished by the fact that
they are concepts of norms of these three different legal systems.
Consequently they are as different as are the norms of the present
imperial-German, French, and English law on the subject of property. The
concepts of law, State, and property in different legal systems are to
each other as species-concepts which are subordinate to one and the same
generic concept.
2. Second, one may understand by the concepts of law, State, and
property the concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a
particular family of laws.
These concepts of law, State, and property contain all the
characteristics that belong to the common substance of the different
legal systems of this family. They embrace only the common substance of
the different systems of this family. They may, therefore, be called
concepts of the science of this family of laws. For we may designate as
the science of a particular family of laws that part of jurisprudence
which deals exclusively with the norms of a particular family of legal
systems, so far as these are not already dealt with by the sciences of
the particular legal systems of this family.
The concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a family of
laws are distinguished from the concepts of law, State, and property in
the sciences of the legal systems that form the family by lacking the
characteristic of being concepts of norms of these systems, and
consequently lacking also all the characteristics which may be deduced
from this characteristic according to the special substance of one or
another legal system. The concept of the State in the science of present
European law is distinguished from the concepts of the State in the
sciences of present German, Russian, and Belgian law by not being a
concept of norms of any one of these systems, and consequently by
lacking all the characteristics that result from the special substance
of the constitutional norms in force in Germany, Russia, and Belgium.
Its relation to the concepts of the State in the science of these
systems is that of a generic concept to subordinate species-concepts.
The concepts of law, State, and property in the science of a family of
laws are distinguished from the concepts of law, State, and property in
the sciences of other such families by this characteristic,--that they
are concepts of norms of this particular family. From this
characteristic we may deduce all the characteristics that are peculiar
to the common substance of the different legal systems of this family in
contrast to the common substance of the different legal systems of other
families. The concept of the State in the science of present European
law and the concept of the State in the science of European law in the
year 1000 are distinguished by the fact that the one is a concept of
constitutional norms that are in force in Europe to-day, the other of
such as were in force in Europe then; consequently they are different in
the same way as what the constitutional norms in force in Europe to-day
have in common is different from what was common to the constitutional
norms in force in Europe then. These concepts are to each other as
species-concepts which are subordinate to one and the same generic
concept.
3. Third, one may understand by the concepts of law, State, and property
the concepts of law, State, and property in general jurisprudence.
These concepts of law, State, and property contain all the
characteristics that belong to the common substance of the most
different systems and families of laws. They embrace only what the norms
of the most different systems and families of laws have in common. They
may, therefore, be called concepts of general jurisprudence. For that
part of jurisprudence which treats of legal norms without limitation to
any particular system or family of laws, so far as these norms are not
already treated by the sciences of the particular systems and families,
may be designated as general jurisprudence.
The concepts of law, State, and property in general jurisprudence are
distinguished from the concepts of law, State, and property in the
particular jurisprudences by lacking the characteristic of being
concepts of norms of one of these systems or at least one of these
families of systems, and consequently lacking also all the
characteristics which may be deduced from this characteristic according
to the special substance of some system or family of laws. The concept
of law _per se_ is distinguished from the concept of law in present
European law and from the concept of law in the present law of the
German empire by not being a concept of norms of that family of laws,
not to say that particular system, and consequently by lacking all the
characteristics that might belong to any peculiarities which might be
common to all legal norms at present in force in Europe or in Germany.
Its relation to the concepts of law in these particular jurisprudences
is that of a generic concept to subordinate species-concepts.
4. In which of the senses here distinguished the concepts of law, State,
and property should be defined in a particular case, and what matters
should accordingly be taken into consideration in defining them, depends
on the purpose of one's study.
If, for example, the point is to describe scientifically the
constitutional norms of the present law of the German empire, then the
concept of the State as defined on this occasion must be a concept of
the science of this particular legal system. For scientific work on the
norms of a particular legal system requires that concepts be formed of
the norms of just this system. Consequently the material to be taken
into consideration will be only the constitutional norms of the present
law of the German empire.--That the concepts defined in the scientific
description of a system of law are in fact concepts of the science of
this system may indeed seem obscure. For every concept of the science of
any particular system of law may be defined as the concept of a species
under the corresponding generic concept of general jurisprudence. We
define this generic concept, say the concept of the State in general
jurisprudence, and add the distinctive characteristic of the
species-concept, that it is a concept of norms of this particular system
of law, say of the present law of the German empire. And then we often
leave this additional characteristic unexpressed, where we think we may
assume (as is the case in the scientific description of the norms of any
particular system of law) that everybody will regard it as tacitly
added. The consequence is that the definition given in the scientific
description of a particular system of law looks, at a superficial
glance, like the definition of a concept of general jurisprudence.
Or, if the point is to compare scientifically the norms of present
European law regarding property, the concept of property as defined on
this occasion must be a concept of the science of this particular family
of laws. For the scientific comparison of norms of different legal
systems demands that concepts of the sciences of these different legal
systems be subordinately arranged under the corresponding concept of the
science of the family of laws which is made up of these systems.
Consequently the material to be taken into consideration will be only
the norms of this family of laws.--Here again, indeed, it may seem
obscure that the concepts defined are really concepts of the science of
this family of laws. For the concepts that belong to the science of a
family of laws may likewise be defined by defining the corresponding
concepts of general jurisprudence and tacitly adding the characteristic
of being concepts of norms of this particular family of laws.
Finally, if it comes to pass that the point is to compare scientifically
what the norms of the most diverse systems of law have in common, the
concept of law as defined on this occasion must be a concept of general
jurisprudence. For the scientific comparison of norms of the most
diverse systems and families of laws demands that concepts which belong
to the sciences of the most diverse systems and families of laws be
subordinately arranged under the corresponding concept of general
jurisprudence. Consequently the material to be taken into consideration
will be the norms of the most diverse systems and families of laws.
Here,--where the point is to take the first step toward a scientific
comprehension of teachings which pass judgment on law, the State, and
property in general, not only on the law, State, or property of a
particular system or family of laws,--the concepts of law, State, and
property must necessarily be defined as concepts of general
jurisprudence. For a scientific comprehension of teachings which deal
with the common substance of the most diverse systems and families of
laws demands that concepts of this common substance--consequently
concepts belonging to general jurisprudence--be formed. Therefore we
have to take into consideration, as our material, the norms (especially
regarding the State and property) of the most diverse systems and
families of laws.
2.--LAW
_Law is the body of legal norms. A legal norm is a norm which is based
on the fact that men have the will to see a certain procedure generally
observed within a circle which includes themselves._
1. A legal norm is a norm.
A norm is the idea of a correct procedure. A correct procedure means one
that corresponds either to the final purpose of all human procedure
(unconditionally correct procedure,--for instance, respect for another's
life), or at any rate to some accidental purpose (conditionally correct
procedure,--for instance, the skilled handling of a picklock). And the
idea of a correct procedure means that the unconditionally or
conditionally correct procedure is to be thought of not as a fact but as
a task, not as something real but as something to be realized; it does
not mean that I shall in fact spare my enemy's life, but that I am to
spare it--not how the thief really did use the picklock, but how he
should have used it. The idea of a correct procedure is what we
designate as an "ought": when I think of an "ought," I think of what has
to be done in order to realize either the final purpose of all human
procedure or some accidental personal purpose. All passing of judgment
on past procedure is conditioned upon the idea of a correct
procedure--only with regard to this idea can past procedure be described
as good or bad, expedient or inexpedient; and so is all deliberation on
future procedure--only with regard to this idea does one inquire whether
it will be right, or at any rate expedient, to proceed in a given
manner.
Every legal norm represents a procedure as correct, declares that it
corresponds to a particular purpose. And it represents this correct
procedure as an idea, designates it not as a fact but as a task, does
not say that any one does proceed so but that one is to proceed so.
Hence a legal norm is a norm.
2. A legal norm is a norm based on a human will.
A norm based on a human will is a norm by virtue of which one must
proceed in a certain way in order that he may not put himself in
opposition to the will of some particular men, and so be apprehended by
the power which is at the service of these men. Such a norm, therefore,
represents a procedure only as conditionally correct; to wit, as a means
to the end (which we are perhaps pursuing or perhaps despising) of
remaining in harmony with the will of certain men, and so being spared
by the power which serves this will.
Every legal norm tells us that we must proceed in a certain way in order
that we may not contravene the will of some particular men and then
suffer under their power. Therefore it represents a procedure only as
conditionally correct, and instructs us not as to what is good but only
as to what is prescribed. Hence a legal norm is a norm based on a human
will.
3. A legal norm is a norm based on the fact that men will to have a
certain procedure for themselves and others.
A norm is based on the fact that men will to have a certain procedure
for themselves and others when the will on which the norm is based has
reference not only to others who do not will, but also, at the same
time, to the willers themselves also; when, therefore, these not only
will that others be subject to the norm but also will to be subject to
it themselves.
Every legal norm, and of all norms only the legal norm, has the
characteristic that the will on which it is based reaches beyond those
whose will it is, and yet embraces them too. The rule, "Whoever takes
from another a movable thing that is not his own, with the intent to
appropriate it illegally, is punished with imprisonment for theft," is
not only based on the will of men, but each of these men is also
conscious that, while on the one hand the rule applies to other men, on
the other hand it applies to himself.
Here it might be alleged that, after all, the mere fact of men's will to
have a certain procedure for themselves and others does not always
establish law; for example, the efforts of the Bonapartists do not
establish the empire in France. But it is not when this bare will exists
that law is established, but only when a norm is based on this will;
that is, when it has in its service so great a power that it is
competent to affect the behavior of the men to whom it relates. As soon
as Bonapartism spreads so widely and in such circles that this takes
place, the republic will fall and the empire will indeed become law in
France.
One might further appeal to the fact that in unlimited monarchies (in
Russia, for instance) the law is based solely on the will of one man,
who is not himself subject to it. But Russian law is not based on the
czar's will at all; the czar is a weak individual man, and his will in
itself is totally unqualified to affect many millions of Russians in
their procedure. Russian law is based rather on the will of all those
Russians--peasants, soldiers, officials--who, for the most various
reasons--patriotism, self-interest, superstition--will that what the
czar wills shall be law in Russia. Their will is qualified to affect the
procedure of the Russians; and, if they should ever grow so few that it
would no longer have this qualification, then the czar's will would no
longer be law in Russia, as the history of revolutions proves.
4. It has been asserted that legal norms have still other qualities.
It has been said, first, that it belongs to the essence of a legal norm
to be enforceable, or even to be enforceable in a particular way, by
judicial procedure, governmental force.
If by this we are to understand that conformity can always be enforced,
we are met at once by the great number of cases in which this cannot be
done. When a debtor is insolvent, or a murder has been committed,
conformity to the violated legal norms cannot now be enforced after the
fact, but their validity is not impaired by this.
If by enforceability we mean that conformity to a legal norm must be
insured by other legal norms providing for the case of its violation, we
need only go on from the insured to the insuring norms for a while, to
come to norms for which conformity is not insured by any further legal
norms. If one refuses to recognize these norms as legal norms, then
neither can the norms which are insured by them rank as legal norms, and
so, going back along the series, one has at last no legal norms left.
Only if one would understand by the enforceability of the legal norm
that a will must have at its disposal a certain power in order that a
legal norm may be based on it, one might certainly say in this sense
that enforceability belongs to the essence of a legal norm. But this
quality of the legal norm would be only such a quality as would be
derivable from its quality of being a norm, and would therefore have no
claim to be added as a further quality.
Again, it has been named an essential quality of a legal norm that it
should be based on the will of a State. But even where we cannot speak
of a State at all, among nomads for instance, there are yet legal norms.
Besides, every State is itself a legal relation, established by legal
norms, which consequently cannot be based on its will. And lastly, the
norms of international law, which are intended to bind the will of
States, cannot be based on the will of a State.
Finally, it has been asserted that it was essential to a legal norm that
it should correspond to the moral law. If this were so, then among the
different legal norms which to-day are in force one directly after the
other in the same territory, or at the same time in different
territories under the same circumstances, only one could in each case be
regarded as a legal norm; for under the same circumstances there is only
one moral right. Nor could one speak then of unrighteous legal norms,
for if they were unrighteous they would not be legal norms. But in
reality, even when legal norms determine conduct quite differently under
the same circumstances, they are all nevertheless recognized as legal
norms; nor is it doubted that there are bad legal norms as well as good.
5. As a norm based on the fact that men have the will to see a certain
procedure generally observed within a circle which includes themselves,
the legal norm is distinguished from all other objects, even from those
that most resemble it.
By being based on the will of men it is distinguished from the moral law
(the commandment of morality); this is not based on men's willing a
certain procedure, but on the fact that this procedure corresponds to
the final purpose of all human procedure. The maxim, "Love your enemies,
bless those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, pray for those
who abuse and persecute you," is a moral law; so is the maxim, "Act so
that the maxims of your will might at all times serve as the principles
of a general legislation." For the correctness of such a procedure is
not founded on the fact that other men will have it, but on the fact
that it corresponds to the final purpose of all human procedure.
By being based on the will of men the legal norm is distinguished also
from good manners; these are not based on the fact that men will a
certain procedure, but on the fact that they themselves proceed in a
certain way. It is manners that one goes to a ball in a dress coat and
white gloves, uses his knife at table only for cutting, begs the
daughter of the house for a dance or at least one round, takes leave of
the master and mistress of the house, and lastly presses a tip into the
servant's hand; for the correctness of such a behavior is not based on
the fact that other men ask this of us,--to those who start a new
fashion it is often actually unpleasant to find that the fashion is
spreading to more extensive circles,--but solely on the fact that other
men themselves behave so, and that we want "not to be peculiar," "not to
make ourselves conspicuous," "to do like the rest," etc.
By being based on a will which relates at once to those whose will it is
and to others whose will it is not, it is distinguished on the one hand
from an arbitrary command, in which one's will applies only to others,
and on the other from a resolution, in which it applies only to himself.
It is an arbitrary command when Cortes with his Spaniards commands the
Mexicans to bring out their gold, or when a band of robbers forbids a
frightened peasantry to betray their hiding-place; here a human will
decides, indeed, but a will that relates only to other men, and not at
the same time to those whose will it is. A resolution is presented when
I have decided to get up at six every morning, or to leave off smoking,
or to finish a piece of work within a specified time--here a human will
is indeed the standard, but it relates only to him whose will it is, not
at all to others.
6. What is briefly summed up in the definition of the legal norm may, if
one takes into account the explanations which have been given with this
definition, be expanded as follows:
Men will that a given procedure be generally observed within a circle
which includes themselves, and their power is so great that their will
is competent to affect the men of this circle in their procedure. When
such is the condition of things, a legal norm exists.
3.--THE STATE
_The State is a legal relation by virtue of which a supreme authority
exists in a certain territory._
1. The State is a legal relation.
A legal relation is the relation, determined by legal norms, of an
obligated party, one to whom a procedure is prescribed, to an entitled
party, one for whose sake it is prescribed. Thus, for instance, the
legal relation of a loan is a relation of the borrower, who is bound by
the legal norms concerning loans, to the lender, for whose sake he is
bound.
The State is the legal relation of all the men who by legal norms are
subjected to a supreme territorial authority, to all those for whose
sake they are subjected to it. Here the circle of the entitled and the
obligated is one and the same; the State is a bond upon all in favor of
all.
To this it might perhaps be objected that the State is not a legal
relation but a person. But the two propositions, that an association of
men is a person in the legal sense and that it is a legal relation, are
quite compatible; nay, its attribute of personality is based mainly on
its attribute of being a legal relation of a particular kind; law, in
viewing the association in its outward relationships as a person, starts
from the fact that men are bound together by a particular legal
relation. A joint-stock corporation is a person not although, but
because, it is a legal relation of a peculiar kind. And similarly, the
fact that the State is a person is not only reconcilable with its being
a legal relation, but is founded on its being a peculiar legal relation.
2. As to the conditions of its existence, this legal relation is
involuntary.
A voluntary legal relation exists when legal norms make entrance into
the relation conditional on actions of the obligated party, of which
actions the purpose is to bring about the legal relation; for instance,
entrance into the relation of tenancy is conditioned on agreeing to a
lease. _Per contra_, an involuntary legal relation exists when legal
norms do not make entrance into the relation conditional on any such
actions of the obligated party, as, for instance, a patent is not
conditioned on any action of those who are bound by it, and the sentence
of a criminal is at least not conditioned on any action whereby he
intended to bring it about.
If the State were a voluntary legal relation, a supreme authority could
exist only for those inhabitants of a territory who had acknowledged it.
But the supreme authority exists for all inhabitants of the territory,
whether they have acknowledged it or not; the legal relation is
therefore involuntary.
3. The substance of this legal relation is, that a supreme authority
exists in a territory.
An authority exists in a territory by virtue of a legal relation when,
according to the legal norms which found the relation, the will of some
men--or even merely of a man--is regulative for the inhabitants of this
territory. A supreme authority exists in a territory by virtue of a
legal relation when according to those norms the will of some men is
finally regulative for the inhabitants of the territory,--that is, is
decisive when authorities disagree. What we here designate as a supreme
authority, therefore, is not the men on whose will the legal norms in
force in a territory are based, but rather their highest agents, whose
will they would have finally regulative within the territory.
What men it is whose will is finally regulative for the inhabitants of a
territory by virtue of a legal relation--for instance, members of a
royal family according to a certain order of inheritance, or persons
elected according to a certain election law--depends on the legal norms
by which the legal relation is determined. On these legal norms, too,
depends the question within what limits the will of these men is
regulative. But this limited nature of the authority does not stand in
the way of its being a supreme authority; the highest agent need not be
an agent with unrestricted powers.
Here one might perhaps object that in federal States, in the German
empire for instance, the individual States have not supreme authority.
But in reality they have it. For, even if there are a multitude of
subjects in reference to which the highest authority of the individual
States of the German empire has to bow to the imperial authority, yet
there are also subjects enough about which the highest authority of the
individual States gives a final decision. As long as there are such
subjects, a supreme authority exists in the individual States; if some
day there should no longer be such, one could no longer speak of
individual States.
4. As a legal relation, by virtue of which a supreme authority exists in
a territory, the State is distinguished from all other objects, even
from those that most resemble it.
By being a legal relation it is distinguished on the one hand from
institutions such as would exist in a conceivable kingdom of God or of
reason, on the basis of the moral law, and on the other hand from the
dominion of a conqueror in the conquered country, which can never be
anything but an arbitrary dominion.
Being an involuntary legal relation, the State is distinguished from a
conceivable association of men who should set up a supreme authority
among themselves by an agreement, as well as from leagues under
international law, in which a supreme authority exists on the basis of
an agreement.
The fact that by virtue of a legal relation an authority over a
territory is given distinguishes the State from the tribal community of
nomads and from the Church; for in the former there is given an
authority over people of a certain descent, in the latter over people of
a certain faith, but in neither over people of a certain territory. And
finally, in the fact that this territorial authority is a supreme
authority lies the difference between the State and towns, counties, or
provinces; in the latter there is indeed a territorial authority
instituted, but one that by the very intent of its institution must bow
to a higher authority.
5. What is briefly summed up in the definition of the State may be
expanded as follows, if one takes into consideration on the one hand the
previous definition of a legal norm and on the other hand the above
explanations of the definition of the State:
Some inhabitants of a territory are so powerful that their will is
competent to affect the inhabitants of this territory in their
procedure, and these men will have it that for all the inhabitants of
the territory, for themselves as well as for the rest, the will of men
picked out in a certain way shall within certain limits be finally
regulative. When such is the condition of things, a State exists.
4.--PROPERTY
_Property is a legal relation, by virtue of which some one has, within a
certain group of men, the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of
a thing._
1. Property is a legal relation.
As has already been stated, a legal relation is the relation of an
obligated party, one to whom a procedure is prescribed by legal norms,
to an entitled party, one for whose sake it is prescribed.
Property is the legal relation of all the members of a group of men who
by legal norms are excluded from ultimately disposing of a thing, to
him--or to those--for whose sake they are excluded from it. Here the
circle of the obligated is much broader than that of the entitled; the
former embraces, say, all the inhabitants of a territory or all who
belong to a tribe, the latter only those among them in whom certain
further conditions (for instance, transfer, prescription, appropriation)
are fulfilled.
2. As to the conditions of its existence, this legal relation is
involuntary.
As discussion has already shown, a voluntary legal relation exists when
legal norms make entrance into the relation conditional on actions of
the obligated party, of which actions the purpose is to bring about the
legal relation; _per contra_, an involuntary legal relation exists when
legal norms do not make entrance into the relation conditional on any
such actions of the obligated party.
If property were a voluntary legal relation, then there could be
excluded from ultimately disposing of a thing only those members of a
group of men who had consented to this exclusion. But all members of the
group--for instance, all the inhabitants of a territory, all who belong
to a tribe--are excluded, whether they have consented or not.
3. The substance of this legal relation consists in some one's having,
within a certain group of men, the exclusive privilege of ultimately
disposing of a thing.
Some one's having, within a certain group of men, the exclusive
privilege of ultimately disposing of a thing means that this group is
excluded from the thing in his favor; that is, they must not hinder him
from dealing with the thing according to his will, nor may they
themselves deal with it against his will. Now, the exclusive disposition
of a thing within a certain group of men may by virtue of a legal
relation belong to several, part by part, in this way: that some--or
one--of them have it in this or that particular respect (for instance,
as to the usufruct), and one--or some--in all other respects which are
not individually alienated. Whoever thus has, within a group of men, the
exclusive disposition of a thing in all those respects which are not
individually alienated, to him belongs, within that group, the exclusive
privilege of ultimately disposing of the thing.
To whom this belongs by virtue of the legal relation--whether, for
instance, it belongs among others to him who by labor has made a thing
into some new thing--depends on the legal norms by which the legal
relation is determined. On them also depends the question, within what
limits this belongs to him: the dispository authority of him to whom the
exclusive disposition of a thing within a group of men ultimately
belongs is limited not only by the dispository authority of those to
whom the exclusive disposition within the group proximately belongs, but
also by the limits within which such dispository authority is at all
allowed to anybody in the group. Especially, it depends on these legal
norms whether a privilege of exclusive ultimate disposition belongs to
individuals as well as to corporations, or only to corporations, and
whether it applies to every kind of things or only to one kind or
another.
4. As a legal relation by virtue of which some one has, within a certain
group of men, the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of a
thing, property is distinguished from all other objects, even from those
which most resemble it.
By being a legal relation it is distinguished from all the relations in
which one has the exclusive ultimate disposition of a thing guaranteed
to him solely by the reasonableness of the men who surround him, or
solely by his own might, as might be the case in a conceivable kingdom
of God or of reason, and as is often the case in a conquered country.
Being an involuntary legal relation, it is distinguished from those
legal relations by virtue of which the exclusive privilege of ultimately
disposing of a thing belongs to some one solely on the ground of a
contract, and solely as against the other contracting parties.
That by virtue of this legal relation some one has, within a group of
men, the exclusive privilege of ultimately disposing of a thing,
distinguishes property from copyright, by virtue of which some one has
exclusively, within a group of men, not the disposition of a thing, but
somewhat else; and furthermore from rights in the property of others, by
virtue of which some one has, within a group of men, the exclusive
privilege of disposing of a thing, but not of ultimately disposing of
it.
5. What is briefly summed up in the definition of property may be
expanded as follows, if one takes into consideration on the one hand the
previously given definition of a legal norm, and on the other the above
explanations of the definition of property.
Some men are so powerful that their will is able to affect in its
procedure a group of men which embraces them, and these men will have it
that no member of this group shall, within certain limits, hinder a
member picked out in a certain way from dealing with a thing according
to his will, nor, within these limits, himself deal with the thing
against the will of that member, so far as the will of another member is
not already in particular respects regulative with respect to that thing
equally with the will of that member. When such is the condition of
things, property exists.
* * * * *
[Distinguishing the State from arbitrary dominion as he here does
(p. 34), and then saying that Anarchism consists solely in the
negation of the State, Eltzbacher implies the unsound conclusion
that Anarchism does not involve the negation of arbitrary dominion.
This is because he incautiously takes the word of the learned
public that the only cardinal points of Anarchism are law, the
State, and property, without making sure that those who say this
are using the term "State" in the precise sense defined by him. But
are not many of his "arbitrary commands" law and State by his
definitions? Every robber in his band (p. 31) is as much required
to keep the secret as are the peasantry, and under the same
penalties. In restraining a subject population I restrict my
liberty of emigration or investment, and forbid myself to be an
accomplice in certain things.]
CHAPTER III
GODWIN'S TEACHING
1.--GENERAL
1. William Godwin was born in 1756 at Wisbeach, Cambridgeshire. He
studied theology at Hoxton, beginning in 1773. In 1778 he became
preacher at Ware, Hertfordshire; in 1780, preacher at Stowmarket,
Suffolk. In 1782 he gave up this position. From this time on he lived in
London as an author. He died there in 1836.
Godwin published numerous works in the departments of philosophy,
economics, and history; also stories, tragedies, and juvenile books.
2. Godwin's teaching about law, the State, and property is contained
mainly in the two-volume work "An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice
and its Influence on General Virtue and Happiness" (1793).
"The printing of this treatise," says Godwin himself, "was commenced
long before the composition was finished. The ideas of the author became
more perspicuous and digested as his inquiries advanced. This
circumstance has led him into some inaccuracies of language and
reasoning, particularly in the earlier part of the work. He did not
enter upon the subject without being aware that government by its very
nature counteracts the improvement of individual intellect; but he
understood the proposition more completely as he proceeded, and saw more
distinctly into the nature of the remedy."[25] Godwin's teaching is
here presented exclusively in the developed form which it shows in the
second part of the work.
3. Godwin does not call his teaching about law, the State, and property
"Anarchism." Yet this word causes him no terror. "Anarchy is a horrible
calamity, but it is less horrible than despotism. Where anarchy has
slain its hundreds, despotism has sacrificed millions upon millions,
with this only effect, to perpetuate the ignorance, the vices, and the
misery of mankind. Anarchy is a short-lived mischief, while despotism is
all but immortal. It is unquestionably a dreadful remedy, for the people
to yield to all their furious passions, till the spectacle of their
effects gives strength to recovering reason: but, though it be a
dreadful remedy, it is a sure one."[26]
2.--BASIS
_According to Godwin, our supreme law is the general welfare._
What is the general welfare? "Its nature is defined by the nature of
mind."[27] It is unchangeable; as long as men are men it remains the
same.[28] "That will most contribute to it which expands the
understanding, supplies incitements to virtue, fills us with a generous
consciousness of our independence, and carefully removes whatever can
impede our exertions."[29]
The general welfare is our supreme law. "Duty is that mode of action on
the part of the individual, which constitutes the best possible
application of his capacity to the general benefit."[30] "Justice is the
sum of all moral duty;"[31] "if there be such a thing, I am bound to do
for the general weal everything in my power."[32] "Virtue is a desire to
promote the benefit of intelligent beings in general, the quantity of
virtue being as the quantity of desire;"[33] "the last perfection of
this feeling consists in that state of mind which bids us rejoice as
fully in the good that is done by others, as if it were done by
ourselves."[34]
"The truly wise man"[35] strives only for the welfare of the whole. He
is "actuated neither by interest nor ambition, the love of honor nor the
love of fame. [He knows no jealousy. He is not disquieted by the
comparison of what he has attained with what others have attained, but
by the comparison with what ought to be attained.] He has a duty indeed
obliging him to seek the good of the whole; but that good is his only
object. If that good be effected by another hand, he feels no
disappointment. All men are his fellow laborers, but he is the rival of
no man."[36]
3.--LAW
I. _Looking to the general good, Godwin rejects law, not only for
particular local and temporary conditions, but altogether._
"Law is an institution of the most pernicious tendency."[37] "The
institution once begun, can never be brought to a close. No action of
any man was ever the same as any other action, had ever the same degree
of utility or injury. As new cases occur, the law is perpetually found
deficient. It is therefore perpetually necessary to make new laws. The
volume in which justice records her prescriptions is for ever
increasing, and the world would not contain the books that might be
written."[38] "The consequence of the infinitude of law is its
uncertainty. Law was made that a plain man might know what he had to
expect, and yet the most skilful practitioners differ about the event of
my suit."[39] "A farther consideration is that it is of the nature of
prophecy. Its task is to describe what will be the actions of mankind,
and to dictate decisions respecting them."[40]
"Law we sometimes call the wisdom of our ancestors. But this is a
strange imposition. It was as frequently the dictate of their passion,
of timidity, jealousy, a monopolizing spirit, and a lust of power that
knew no bounds. Are we not obliged perpetually to revise and remodel
this misnamed wisdom of our ancestors? to correct it by a detection of
their ignorance, and a censure of their intolerance?"[41] "Legislation,
as it has been usually understood, is not an affair of human competence.
Reason is [our sole legislator, and her decrees are unchangeable and
everywhere the same.]"[42] "Men cannot do more than declare and
interpret law; nor can there be an authority so paramount, as to have
the prerogative of making that to be law, which abstract and immutable
justice had not made to be law previously to that interposition."[43]
To be sure, "it must be admitted that we are imperfect, ignorant, and
slaves of appearances."[44] But "whatever inconveniences may arise from
the passions of men, the introduction of fixed laws cannot be the
genuine remedy."[45] "As long as a man is held in the trammels of
obedience, and habituated to look to some foreign guidance for the
direction of his conduct, his understanding and the vigor of his mind
will sleep. Do I desire to raise him to the energy of which he is
capable? I must teach him to feel himself, to bow to no authority, to
examine the principles he entertains, and render to his mind the reason
of his conduct."[46]
II. _The general welfare requires that in future it itself should be
men's rule of action in place of the law._
"If every shilling of our property, [every hour of our time,] and every
faculty of our mind, have received their destination from the principles
of unalterable justice,"[47] that is, of the general good,[48] then no
other decree can any longer control it. "The true principle which ought
to be substituted in the room of law, is that of reason exercising an
uncontrolled jurisdiction upon the circumstances of the case."[49]
"To this principle no objection can arise on the score of wisdom. It is
not to be supposed that there are not men now existing, whose
intellectual accomplishments rise to the level of law. But, if men can
be found among us whose wisdom is equal to the wisdom of law, it will
scarcely be maintained, that the truths they have to communicate will
be the worse for having no authority, but that which they derive from
the reasons that support them."[50]
"The juridical decisions that were made immediately after the abolition
of law, would differ little from those during its empire. They would be
the decisions of prejudice and habit. But habit, having lost the centre
about which it revolved, would diminish in the regularity of its
operations. Those to whom the arbitration of any question was entrusted
would frequently recollect that the whole case was committed to their
deliberation, and they could not fail occasionally to examine
themselves, respecting the reason of those principles which had hitherto
passed uncontroverted. Their understandings would grow enlarged, in
proportion as they felt the importance of their trust, and the unbounded
freedom of their investigation. Here then would commence an auspicious
order of things, of which no understanding man at present in existence
can foretell the result, the dethronement of implicit faith, and the
inauguration of unclouded justice."[51]
4.--THE STATE
I. _Since Godwin unconditionally rejects law, he necessarily has to
reject the State as unconditionally. Nay, he regards it as a legal
institution peculiarly repugnant to the general welfare._
Some base the State on force, others on divine right, others on
contract.[52] But "the hypothesis of force appears to proceed upon the
total negation of abstract and immutable justice, affirming every
government to be right, that is possessed of power sufficient to enforce
its decrees. It puts a violent termination upon all political science,
and is calculated for nothing farther than to persuade men, to sit down
quietly under their present disadvantages, whatever they may be, and not
exert themselves to discover a remedy for the evils they suffer. The
second hypothesis is of an equivocal nature. It either coincides with
the first, and affirms all existing power to be alike of divine
derivation; or it must remain totally useless, till a criterion can be
found, to distinguish those governments which are approved by God, from
those which cannot lay claim to that sanction."[53] The third hypothesis
would mean that one "should make over to another the control of his
conscience and the judging of his duties."[54] "But we cannot renounce
our moral independence; it is a property that we can neither sell nor
give away; and consequently no government can derive its authority from
an original contract."[55]
"All government corresponds in a certain degree to what the Greeks
denominated a tyranny. The difference is, that in despotic countries
mind is depressed by a uniform usurpation; while in republics it
preserves a greater portion of its activity, and the usurpation more
easily conforms itself to the fluctuations of opinion."[56] "By its very
nature positive institution has a tendency to suspend the elasticity and
progress of mind."[57] "We should not forget that government is,
abstractedly taken, an evil, a usurpation upon the private judgment and
individual conscience of mankind."[58]
II. _The general welfare demands that a social human life based solely
on its precepts should take the place of the State._
1. Men are to live together in society even after the abolition of the
State. "A fundamental distinction exists between society and government.
Men associated at first for the sake of mutual assistance."[59] It was
not till later that restraint appeared in these associations, in
consequence of the errors and perverseness of a few. "Society and
government are different in themselves, and have different origins.
Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wickedness.
Society is in every state a blessing; government even in its best state
but a necessary evil."[60]
But what is to hold men together in "society without government"?[61]
Not a promise,[62] at any rate. No promise can bind me; for either what
I have promised is good, then I must do it even if there had been no
promise; or it is bad, then not even the promise can make it my
duty.[63] "The fact that I have committed an error does not oblige me to
make myself guilty of a second also."[64] "Suppose I had promised a sum
of money for a good and worthy object. In the interval between the
promise and its fulfilment a greater and nobler object presents itself
to me, and imperiously demands my co-operation. To which shall I give
the preference? To the one that deserves it. My promise can make no
difference. I must be guided by the value of things, not by an external
and alien point of view. But the value of things is not affected by my
having taken upon me an obligation."[65]
"Common deliberation regarding the general good"[66] is to hold men
together in societies hereafter. This is highly in harmony with the
general welfare. "That a nation should exercise undiminished its
function of common deliberation, is a step gained, and a step that
inevitably leads to an improvement of the character of individuals. That
men should agree in the assertion of truth, is no unpleasing evidence of
their virtue. Lastly, that an individual, however great may be his
imaginary elevation, should be obliged to yield his personal pretensions
to the sense of the community, at least bears the appearance of a
practical confirmation of the great principle, that all private
considerations must yield to the general good."[67]
2. The societies are to be small, and to have as little intercourse with
each other as possible.
Small territories are everywhere to administer their affairs
independently.[68] "No association of men, so long as they adhered to
the principles of reason, could possibly have any interest in extending
their territory."[69] "Whatever evils are included in the abstract idea
of government, are all of them extremely aggravated by the
extensiveness of its jurisdiction, and softened under circumstances of
an opposite species. Ambition, which may be no less formidable than a
pestilence in the former, has no room to unfold itself in the latter.
Popular commotion is like the waves of the sea, capable where the
surface is large of producing the most tragical effects, but mild and
innocuous when confined within the circuit of a humble lake. Sobriety
and equity are the obvious characteristics of a limited
circle."[70]--"The desire to gain a more extensive territory, to conquer
or to hold in awe our neighboring States, to surpass them in arts or
arms, is a desire founded in prejudice and error. Power is not
happiness. Security and peace are more to be desired than a name at
which nations tremble. Mankind are brethren. We associate in a
particular district or under a particular climate, because association
is necessary to our internal tranquillity, or to defend us against the
wanton attacks of a common enemy. But the rivalship of nations is a
creature of the imagination."[71]
The little independently-administered territories are to have as little
to do with each other as possible. "Individuals cannot have too frequent
or unlimited intercourse with each other; but societies of men have no
interests to explain and adjust, except so far as error and violence may
render explanation necessary. This consideration annihilates at once the
principal objects of that mysterious and crooked policy which has
hitherto occupied the attention of governments. Before this principle
officers of the army and the navy, ambassadors and negotiators, and all
the train of artifices that has been invented to hold other nations at
bay, to penetrate their secrets, to traverse their machinations, to form
alliances and counter-alliances, sink into nothing."[72]
3. But how are the functions that the State performs at present to be
performed in the future societies? "Government can have no more than two
legitimate purposes, the suppression of injustice against individuals
within the community" (which includes the settling of controversies
between different districts[73]), "and the common defence against
external invasion."[74]
"The first of these purposes, which alone can have an uninterrupted
claim upon us, is sufficiently answered by an association of such an
extent as to afford room for the institution of a jury, to decide upon
the offences of individuals within the community, and upon the questions
and controversies respecting property which may chance to arise."[75]
This jury would decide not according to any system of law, but according
to reason.[76]--"It might be easy indeed for an offender to escape from
the limits of so petty a jurisdiction; and it might seem necessary at
first that the neighboring parishes or jurisdictions should be governed
in a similar manner, or at least should be willing, whatever was their
form of government, to co-operate with us in the removal or reformation
of an offender whose present habits were alike injurious to us and to
them. But there will be no need of any express compact, and still less
of any common centre of authority, for this purpose. General justice and
mutual interest are found more capable of binding men than signatures
and seals."[77]
The second function would present itself to us only from time to time.
"However irrational might be the controversy of parish with parish in
such a state of society, it would not be the less possible. Such
emergencies can only be provided against by the concert of several
districts, declaring and, if needful, enforcing the dictates of
justice."[78] Foreign invasions too would make such a concert necessary,
and would to this extent resemble those controversies.[79] Therefore it
would be "necessary upon certain occasions to have recourse to national
assemblies, or in other words assemblies instituted for the joint
purpose of adjusting the differences between district and district, and
of consulting respecting the best mode of repelling foreign
invasion."[80]--But they "ought to be employed as sparingly as the
nature of the case will admit."[81] For, in the first place, the
decision is given by the number of votes, and "is determined, at best,
by the weakest heads in the assembly, but, as it not less frequently
happens, by the most corrupt and dishonorable intentions."[82] In the
second place, as a rule the members are guided in their decisions by
all sorts of external reasons, and not solely by the results of their
free reflection.[83] In the third place, they are forced to waste their
strength on petty matters, while they cannot possibly let themselves be
quietly influenced by argument.[84] Therefore national assemblies should
"either never be elected but upon extraordinary emergencies, like the
dictator of the ancient Romans, or else sit periodically, one day for
example in a year, with a power of continuing their sessions within a
certain limit. The former is greatly to be preferred."[85]
But what would be the authority of these national assemblies and those
juries? Mankind is so corrupted by present institutions that at first
the issuing of commands, and some degree of coercion, would be
necessary; but later it would be sufficient for juries to recommend a
certain mode of adjusting controversies, and for national assemblies to
invite their constituencies to co-operate for the common advantage.[86]
"If juries might at length cease to decide and be contented to invite,
if force might gradually be withdrawn and reason trusted alone, shall we
not one day find that juries themselves, and every other species of
public institution, may be laid aside as unnecessary? Will not the
reasonings of one wise man be as effectual as those of twelve? Will not
the competence of one individual to instruct his neighbors be a matter
of sufficient notoriety, without the formality of an election? Will
there be many vices to correct and much obstinacy to conquer? This is
one of the most memorable stages of human improvement. With what
delight must every well-informed friend of mankind look forward to the
auspicious period, the dissolution of political government, of that
brute engine, which has been the only perennial cause of the vices of
mankind, and which has mischiefs of various sorts incorporated with its
substance, and no otherwise to be removed than by its utter
annihilation!"[87]
5.--PROPERTY
I. _In consequence of his unconditional rejection of law, Godwin
necessarily has to reject property also without any limitation. Nay,
property, or, as he expresses himself, "the present system of
property,"_[88]--_that is, the distribution of wealth at present
established by law,--appears to him to be a legal institution that is
peculiarly injurious to the general welfare._ "The wisdom of law-makers
and parliaments has been applied to creating the most wretched and
senseless distribution of property, which mocks alike at human nature
and at the principles of justice."[89]
The present system of property distributes commodities in the most
unequal and most arbitrary way. "On account of the accident of birth, it
piles upon a single man enormous wealth. If one who has been a beggar
becomes a well-to-do man, we usually know that he has not precisely his
honesty or usefulness to thank for this change. It is often hard enough
for the most diligent and industrious member of society to preserve his
family from starvation."[90] "And if I receive the reward of my work,
they give me a hundred times more food than I can eat, and a hundred
times more clothes than I can wear. Where is the justice in this? If I
am the greatest benefactor of the human race, is that a reason for
giving me what I do not need, especially when my superfluity might be of
the greatest use to thousands?"[91]
This unequal distribution of commodities is altogether opposed to the
general welfare. It hampers intellectual progress. "Accumulated property
treads the powers of thought in the dust, extinguishes the sparks of
genius, and reduces the great mass of mankind to be immersed in sordid
cares, beside depriving the rich of the most salubrious and effectual
motives to activity."[92] And the rich man can buy with his superfluity
"nothing but glitter and envy, nothing but the dismal pleasure of
restoring to the poor man as alms that to which reason gives him an
undeniable right."[93]
But the unequal distribution of commodities is also a hindrance to moral
perfection. In the rich it produces ambition, vanity, and ostentation;
in the poor, oppression, servility, and fraud, and, in consequence of
these, envy, malice, and revenge.[94] "The rich man stands forward as
the principal object of general esteem and deference. In vain are
sobriety, integrity, and industry, in vain the sublimest powers of mind
and the most ardent benevolence, if their possessor be narrowed in his
circumstances. To acquire wealth and to display it, is therefore the
universal passion."[95] "Force would have died away as reason and
civilization advanced, but accumulated property has fixed its
empire."[96] "The fruitful source of crimes consists in this
circumstance, one man's possessing in abundance that of which another
man is destitute."[97]
II. _The general welfare demands that a distribution of commodities
based solely on its precepts should take the place of property._ When
Godwin uses the expression "property" for that portion of commodities
which is assigned to an individual by these precepts, he does so only in
a transferred sense; only a portion assigned by law can be designated as
property in the strict sense.
Now, according to the decrees of the general welfare, every man should
have the means for a good life.
1. "How is it to be decided whether an object that may be used for the
benefit of man shall be my property or yours? There is only one answer;
according to justice."[98] "The laws of different countries dispose of
property in a thousand different ways; but only one of them can be most
consonant with justice."[99]
Justice demands in the first place that every man have the means for
life. "Our animal needs, it is well known, consist in food, clothing,
and shelter. If justice means anything, nothing can be more unjust than
that any man lacks these and at the same time another has too much of
them. But justice does not stop here. So far as the general stock of
commodities holds out, every one has a claim not only to the means for
life, but to the means for a good life. It is unjust that a man works to
the point of destroying his health or his life, while another riots in
superfluity. It is unjust that a man has not leisure to cultivate his
mind, while another does not move a finger for the general
welfare."[100]
2. Such a "state of equality"[101] would advance the general welfare in
the highest degree. In it labor would become "so light, as rather to
assume the appearance of agreeable relaxation, and gentle
exercise."[102] "Every man would have a frugal, yet wholesome diet;
every man would go forth to that moderate exercise of his corporal
functions that would give hilarity to the spirits; none would be made
torpid with fatigue, but all would have leisure to cultivate the kindly
and philanthropical affections, and to let loose his faculties in the
search of intellectual improvement."[103]
"How rapid would be the advances of intellect, if all men were admitted
into the field of knowledge! It is to be presumed that the inequality of
mind would in a certain degree be permanent; but it is reasonable to
believe that the geniuses of such an age would far surpass the greatest
exertions of intellect that are at present known."[104]
And the moral progress would be as great as the intellectual. The vices
which are inseparably joined to the present system of property "would
inevitably expire in a state of society where men lived in the midst of
plenty, and where all shared alike the bounties of nature. The narrow
principle of selfishness would vanish. No man being obliged to guard his
little store, or provide with anxiety and pain for his restless wants,
each would lose his individual existence in the thought of the general
good. No man would be an enemy to his neighbor, for they would have no
subject of contention; and of consequence philanthropy would resume the
empire which reason assigns her."[105]
3. But how could such a distribution of commodities be effected in a
particular case?
"As soon as law was abolished, men would begin to inquire after equity.
In this situation let us suppose a litigated succession brought before
them, to which there were five heirs, and that the sentence of their old
legislation had directed the division of this property into five equal
shares. They would begin to inquire into the wants and situation of the
claimants. The first we will suppose to have a fair character and be
prosperous in the world: he is a respectable member of society, but
farther wealth would add little either to his usefulness or his
enjoyments. The second is a miserable object, perishing with want, and
overwhelmed with calamity. The third, though poor, is yet tranquil; but
there is a situation to which his virtue leads him to aspire and in
which he may be of uncommon service, but which he cannot with propriety
accept, without a capital equal to two-fifths of the whole succession.
One of the claimants is an unmarried woman past the age of
child-bearing. Another is a widow, unprovided, and with a numerous
family depending on her succor. The first question that would suggest
itself to unprejudiced persons having the allotment of this succession
referred to their unlimited decision, would be, what justice is there in
the indiscriminate partition which has hitherto prevailed?"[106] And
their answer could not be doubtful.
6.--REALIZATION.
_The change which is called for by the general welfare should, according
to Godwin, be effected by those who have recognized the truth persuading
others how necessary the change is for the general welfare, so that law,
the State, and property would spontaneously disappear and the new
condition would take their place._
I. The sole requirement is to convince men that the general welfare
demands the change.
1. Every other way is to be rejected. "Our judgment will always suspect
those weapons that can be used with equal prospect of success on both
sides. Therefore we should regard all force with aversion. When we enter
the lists of battle, we quit the sure domain of truth and leave the
decision to the caprice of chance. The phalanx of reason is
invulnerable; it moves forward with calm, sure step, and nothing can
withstand it. But, when we lay aside arguments, and have recourse to the
sword, the case is altered. Amidst the clamorous din of civil war, who
shall tell whether the event will be prosperous or adverse? We must
therefore distinguish carefully between instructing the people and
exciting them. We must refuse indignation, rage, and passion, and desire
only sober reflection, clear judgment, and fearless discussion."[107]
2. The point is to convince men as generally as possible. Only when this
is accomplished can acts of violence be avoided. "Why did the revolution
in France and America find all sorts and conditions of men almost
unanimous, while the resistance to Charles the First divided our nation
into two equal parties? Because the latter occurred in the seventeenth
century, the former at the end of the eighteenth. Because at the time of
the revolutions in France and America philosophy had already developed
some of the great truths of political science, and under the influence
of Sydney and Locke, of Montesquieu and Rousseau, a number of strong and
thoughtful minds had perceived what an evil force is. If these
revolutions had taken place still later, not a drop of civic blood would
have been shed by civic hands, not in a single case would force have
been used against persons or things."[108]
3. The means to convince men as generally as possible of the necessity
of a change consist in "proof and persuasion. The best warrant of a
happy outcome lies in free, unrestricted discussion. In this arena truth
must always be victor. If, therefore, we would improve the social
institutions of mankind, we must seek to convince by spoken and written
words. This activity has no limits; this endeavor admits of no
interruption. Every means must be used, not so much to draw men's
attention and bring them over to our opinion by persuasion, as rather to
remove every barrier to thought and to open to everybody the temple of
science and the field of study."[109]
"Therefore the man who has at heart the regeneration of his species
should always bear in mind two principles, to regard hourly progress in
the discovery and dissemination of truth as essential, and calmly to let
years pass before he urges the carrying into effect of his teaching.
With all his prudence, it may be that the boisterous multitude will
hurry ahead of the calm, quiet progress of reason; then he will not
condemn the revolution that takes place some years before the time set
by wisdom. But if he is ruled by strict prudence he can without doubt
frustrate many over-hasty attempts, and considerably prolong the general
quietness."[110]
"This does not mean, as one might think, that the changing of our
conditions lies at an immeasurable distance. It is the nature of human
affairs that great alterations take place suddenly, and great
discoveries are made unexpectedly, as it were accidentally. When I
cultivate a young person's mind, when I exert myself to influence that
of an older person, it will long seem as if I had accomplished little,
and the fruits will show themselves when I least expect them. The
kingdom of truth comes quietly. The seed of virtue may spring up when it
was fancied to be lost."[111] "If the true philanthropist but tirelessly
proclaims the truth and vigilantly opposes all that hinders its
progress, he may look forward, with heart at rest, to a speedy and
favorable outcome."[112]
II. As soon as the conviction that the general welfare demands a change
in our condition has made itself generally felt, law, the State, and
property will disappear spontaneously and give way to the new condition.
"Reform, under this meaning of the term, can scarcely be considered as
of the nature of action. [It is a general enlightenment.] Men feel their
situation; and the restraints that shackled them before, vanish like a
deception. When such a crisis has arrived, not a sword will need to be
drawn, not a finger to be lifted up in purposes of violence. The
adversaries will be too few and too feeble, to be able to entertain a
serious thought of resistance against the universal sense of
mankind."[113]
In what way may the change of our conditions take place?
1. "The opinion most popular in France at the time that the national
convention entered upon its functions, was that the business of the
convention extended only to the presenting a draft of a constitution, to
be submitted in the sequel to the approbation of the districts, and then
only to be considered as law."[114]
"The first idea that suggests itself respecting this opinion is, that,
if constitutional laws ought to be subjected to the revision of the
districts, then all laws ought to undergo the same process. [But if the
approbation of the districts to any declarations is not to be delusive,
the discussion of these declarations in the districts must be unlimited.
Then] a transaction will be begun to which it is not easy to foresee a
termination. Some districts will object to certain articles; and, if
these articles be modeled to obtain their approbation, it is possible
that the very alteration introduced to please one part of the community
may render the code less acceptable to another."[115]
"This principle of a consent of districts has an immediate tendency, by
a salutary gradation perhaps, to lead to the dissolution of all
government."[116] It is indeed "desirable that the most important acts
of the national representatives should be subject to the approbation or
rejection of the districts whose representatives they are, for exactly
the same reason as it is desirable that the acts of the districts
themselves should, as speedily as practicability will admit, be in force
only so far as relates to the individuals by whom those acts are
approved."[117]
2. This system would have the effect, first, that the constitution would
be very short. The impracticability of obtaining the free approbation of
a great number of districts to an extensive code would speedily manifest
itself; and the whole constitution might consist of a scheme for the
division of the country into parts equal in their population, and the
fixing of stated periods for the election of a national assembly, not to
say that the latter of these articles may very probably be dispensed
with.[118]
A second effect would be, that it would soon be found a proceeding
unnecessarily circuitous to send laws to the districts for their
revision, unless in cases essential to the general safety, and that in
as many instances as possible the districts would be suffered to make
laws for themselves. "Thus, that which was at first a great empire with
legislative unity would speedily be transformed into a confederacy of
lesser republics, with a general congress or Amphictyonic council,
answering the purpose of a point of co-operation upon extraordinary
occasions."[119]
A third effect would consist in the gradual cessation of legislation. "A
great assembly collected from the different provinces of an extensive
territory, and constituted the sole legislator of those by whom the
territory is inhabited, immediately conjures up to itself an idea of the
vast multitude of laws that are necessary. A large city, impelled by the
principles of commercial jealousy, is not slow to digest the volume of
its by-laws and exclusive privileges. But the inhabitants of a small
parish, living with some degree of that simplicity which best
corresponds with nature, would soon be led to suspect that general laws
were unnecessary, and would adjudge the causes that came before them,
not according to certain axioms previously written, but according to the
circumstances and demands of each particular cause."[120]
A fourth effect would be that the abrogation of property would be
favored. "All equalization of rank and station strongly tends toward an
equalization of possessions."[121] So not only the lower orders, but
also the higher, would see the injustice of the present distribution of
property.[122] "The rich and great are far from callous to views of
general felicity, when such views are brought before them with that
evidence and attraction of which they are susceptible."[123] But even so
far as they might think only of their own emolument and ease, it would
not be difficult to show them that it is in vain to fight against truth,
and dangerous to bring upon themselves the hatred of the people, and
that it might be to their own interest to make up their minds to
concessions at least.[124]
FOOTNOTES:
[25] Godwin pp. IX-X [1. VI-VII].
[26] _Ib._ pp. 548-9 [2. 132-3].
[27] _Ib._ p. 90 [1, 120].
[28] _Ib._ p. 150 [1, 164].
[29] _Ib._ p. 90 [1, 120-21].
[30] Godwin p. 101 [1. 134].
[31] _Ib._ pp. 150, 80 [1. 120, 112].
[32] _Ib._ p. 81 [1. 117-18?].
[33] _Ib._ p. 254 [1. 253].
[34] _Ib._ pp. 360-61 [1. ?42].
[35] _Ib._ p. 361. [Not in ed. 2.]
[36] _Ib._ p. 361 [1. 342; bracketed words omitted in ed. 2]
[37] _Ib._ p. 771 [2. 294].
[38] Godwin pp. 766-7 [2. 290-91].
[39] _Ib._ p. 768 [2. 291].
[40] _Ib._ p. 769 [2. 292].
[41] _Ib._ p. 773 [2. 295].
[42] _Ib._ p. 166 [1. 182, except bracketed words].
[43] _Ib._ p. 381 [2. 3]
[44] Godwin p. 774 [2. 296].
[45] _Ib._ p. 775 [2. 296].
[46] _Ib._ p. 776 [2. 297].
[47] _Ib._ p. 151 [1. 165, except bracketed words].
[48] _Ib._ pp. 121, 81 [1. 145, 118].
[49] _Ib._ p. 773 [2. 295].
[50] Godwin pp. 773-4 [2. 295].
[51] _Ib._ p. 778 [2. 298-9].
[52] _Ib._ p. 140-1 [1. 156].
[53] Godwin p. 141 [2. 156]
[54] _Ib._ p. 148. [Not in ed. 2.]
[55] _Ib._ p. 149. [Not in ed. 2.]
[56] _Ib._ p. 572 [2. 149-50].
[57] _Ib._ p. 185 [1. 200].
[58] Godwin p. 380 [2. 2].
[59] _Ib._ p. 79 [1. 111].
[60] _Ib._ p. 79 [1. 111; credited to Paine's "Common Sense," p. 1].
[61] _Ib._ p. 788 [2. 305].
[62] _Ib._ p. 163 [1. 174-6? 180?].
[63] _Ib._ p. 151 [1. 164-5; but see _per contra_ p. 170].
[64] _Ib._ p. 156. [Not in ed. 2.]
[65] Godwin p. 151. [Not in ed. 2.]
[66] _Ib._ pp. 161-2 [1. 179].
[67] _Ib._ 164-5 [1. 181].
[68] _Ib._ p. 561 [2. 142].
[69] _Ib._ 566 [2. 145].
[70] Godwin p. 562 [2. 142].
[71] _Ib._ 559 [2. 140].
[72] Godwin p. 561 [2. 141. Obviously Eltzbacher has misunderstood this
passage. His German translation shows that he mistook "interests" for
"interest" in the sense of "incentive." Note also that Godwin expressly
restricts the application of this paragraph, even in its right sense, on
pp. 111, 145].
[73] _Ib._ p. 566 [2. 145].
[74] _Ib._ p. 564 [2. 144].
[75] _Ib._ p. 564-5 [2. 144].
[76] _Ib._ pp. 773, 778, 779-80 [2. 295, 298-300]
[77] Godwin p. 565 [2. 144].
[78] _Ib._ p. 566 [2. 145].
[79] _Ib._ p. 566 [2. 145].
[80] _Ib._ pp. 573-4 [2. 150-51].
[81] _Ib._ pp. 573-4 [2. 150-51].
[82] _Ib._ pp. 568-9, 571-2 [2. 146, 149].
[83] Godwin pp. 569-70 [2. 148].
[84] _Ib._ pp. 570-71 [2. 148-49].
[85] _Ib._ p. 574 [2. 151]
[86] _Ib._ pp. 576-8 [2. 152-3].
[87] Godwin pp. 578-9 [2. 154]
[88] _Ib._ p. 794 [2. 326].
[89] _Ib._ p. 803. [Not in ed. 2.]
[90] _Ib._ p. 794. [Not in ed. 2.]
[91] Godwin p. 795. [Not in ed. 2; cf. 2. 312].
[92] _Ib._ p. 806 [2. 335].
[93] _Ib._ p. 795. [Not in ed. 2.]
[94] _Ib._ pp. 811, 810 [2. 339, 338--but the words "in the poor" seem
to be added out of Eltzbacher's head].
[95] Godwin p. 802 [2. 332].
[96] _Ib._ p. 809 [2. 338]
[97] _Ib._ p. 809 [2. 337]
[98] _Ib._ p. 789. [Not in ed. 2; cf. 2. 306-7.]
[99] _Ib._ p. 790. [Not in ed. 2.]
[100] Godwin pp. 790-91. [Not in ed. 2.]
[101] _Ib._ p. 821 [2. 351].
[102] _Ib._ p. 821 [2. 352]
[103] _Ib._ p. 806 [2. 335].
[104] _Ib._ p. 807 [2. 336].
[105] Godwin p. 810 [2. 338].
[106] Godwin pp. 779-80 [2. 299-300].
[107] Godwin p. 203 [1, 223, only the two sentences beginning at "But"].
[108] _Ib._ pp. 203-4. [Not in ed. 2.]
[109] Godwin pp. 202-3. [Not in ed. 2.]
[110] _Ib._ p. 204. [Not in ed. 2.]
[111] _Ib._ p. 223. [Not in ed. 2; cf. 1. 226.]
[112] Godwin p. 225. [Not in ed. 2.]
[113] _Ib._ pp. 222-3 [1. 222, except bracketed words].
[114] _Ib._ pp. 657-8 [2. 210].
[115] Godwin pp. 658-9 [2. 211-12; bracketed words a paraphrase].
[116] _Ib._ pp. 659-60 [2. 212].
[117] _Ib._ p. 660 [2. 212].
[118] _Ib._ pp. 660-61 [2. 212-13].
[119] Godwin pp. 661-2 [2. 213-14].
[120] _Ib._ p. 662 [2. 214].
[121] Godwin p. 888 [cf. 2. 396].
[122] _Ib._ pp. 888-9 [2. 396].
[123] _Ib._ pp. 882-3 [2. 392].
[124] _Ib._ pp. 883-84 [2. 393].
CHAPTER IV
PROUDHON'S TEACHING
1.--GENERAL
1. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon was born at Besancon in 1809. At first he
followed the occupation of a printer there and in other cities. In 1838
a stipend of the Academy of Besancon enabled him to go to Paris for
scientific studies. In 1843 he took a mercantile position at Lyons. In
1847 he gave it up and moved to Paris.
Here, in the years from 1848 to 1850, Proudhon published several
periodicals, one after the other. In 1848 he became a member of the
National Assembly. In 1849 he founded a People's Bank. Soon after this
he was condemned to three years' imprisonment for an offence against the
press laws, and served his time without having to interrupt his activity
as an author.
In 1852 Proudhon was released from prison. He remained in Paris till, in
1858, he was again condemned to three years' imprisonment for an offence
against the press laws. He fled and settled in Brussels. In 1860 he was
pardoned, and returned to France. Thenceforth he lived at Passy. He died
there in 1865.
Proudhon published many books and other writings, especially in the
fields of jurisprudence, political economy, and politics.
2. Of special importance for Proudhon's teaching about law, the State,
and property are, among the writings before 1848, the book "_Qu'est-ce
que la propriete? ou recherches sur le principe du droit et du
gouvernement_" (1840) and the two-volume work "_Systeme des
contradictions economiques, ou philosophie de la misere_" (1846); among
the writings from 1848 to 1851 the "_Confessions d'un revolutionnaire_"
(1849) and the "_Idee generale de la revolution au XIXe siecle_" (1851);
and lastly, among the writings after 1851, the three-volume work "_De la
justice dans la revolution et dans l'Eglise, nouveaux principes de
philosophie pratique_" (1858) and the book "_Du principe federatif et de
la necessite de reconstituer le parti de la revolution_" (1863).[125]
Proudhon's teaching regarding law, the State, and property underwent
changes in minor points, but remained the same in its essentials; the
opinion that it changed also in essentials is caused by Proudhon's
arbitrary and varying use of language. Since no history of the evolution
of Proudhon's teaching can be given here, I shall present, so far as
concerns such minor points, only the teaching of 1848-51, in which years
Proudhon developed his views with especial clearness and did especially
forcible work for them.
3. Proudhon calls his teaching about law, the State, and property
"Anarchism." "'What form of government shall we prefer?' 'Can you ask?'
replies one of my younger readers without doubt; 'you are a Republican.'
'Republican, yes; but this word makes nothing definite. _Res publica_ is
"the public thing"; now, whoever wants the public thing, under whatever
form of government, may call himself a Republican. Even kings are
Republicans.' 'Well, you are a Democrat.' 'No.' 'What? can you be a
Monarchist?' 'No.' 'A Constitutionalist?' 'I should hope not.' 'You are
an Aristocrat then?' 'Not a bit.' 'You want a mixed government, then?'
'Still less.' 'What are you then?' 'I am an Anarchist.'"[126]
2.--BASIS
_According to Proudhon the supreme law for us is justice._
What is justice? "Justice is respect, spontaneously felt and mutually
guaranteed, for human dignity, in whatever person and under whatever
circumstances we find it compromised, and to whatever risk its defence
may expose us."[127]
"I ought to respect my neighbor, and make others respect him, as myself;
such is the law of my conscience. In consideration of what do I owe him
this respect? In consideration of his strength, his talent, his wealth?
No, what chance gives is not what makes the human person worthy of
respect. In consideration of the respect which he in turn pays to me?
No, justice assumes reciprocity of respect, but does not wait for it. It
asserts and wills respect for human dignity even in an enemy, which
causes the existence of _laws of war_; even in the murderer whom we kill
as having fallen from his manhood, which causes the existence of _penal
laws_. It is not the gifts of nature or the advantages of fortune that
make me respect my neighbor; it is not his ox, his ass, or his
maid-servant, as the decalogue says; it is not even the welfare that he
owes to me as I owe mine to him; it is his manhood."[128]
"Justice is at once a reality and an idea."[129] "Justice is a faculty
of the soul, the foremost of all, that which constitutes a social being.
But it is more than a faculty; it is an idea, it indicates a relation,
an equation. As a faculty it may be developed; this development is what
constitutes the education of humanity. As an equation it presents
nothing antinomic; it is absolute and immutable like every law, and,
like every law, very intelligible."[130]
Justice is for us the supreme law. "Justice is the inviolable yardstick
of all human actions."[131] "By it the facts of social life, by nature
indeterminate and contradictory, become susceptible of definition and
arrangement."[132]
"Justice is the central star which governs societies, the pole about
which the political world revolves, the principle and rule of all
transactions. Nothing is done among men that is not in the name of
_right_; nothing without invoking justice. Justice is not the work of
the law; on the contrary, the law is never anything but a declaration
and application of what is _just_."[132] "Suppose a society where
justice is outranked, however little, by another principle, say
religion; or in which certain individuals are regarded more highly, by
however little, than others; I say that, justice being virtually
annulled, it is inevitable that the society will perish sooner or
later.[133]
"It is the privilege of justice that the faith which it inspires is
unshakable, and that it cannot be dogmatically denied or rejected. All
peoples invoke it; reasons of State, even while they violate it, profess
to be based on it; religion exists only for it; skepticism dissembles
before it; irony has power only in its name; crime and hypocrisy do it
homage. [If liberty is not an empty phrase, it acts only in the service
of right; even when it rebels against right, at bottom it does not curse
it.]"[134] "All the most rational teachings of human wisdom about
justice are summed up in this famous adage: _Do to others what you would
have done to you; Do not to others what you would not have done to
you._"[135]
3.--LAW
I. _In the name of justice Proudhon rejects, not law indeed, but almost
all individual legal norms, and the State laws in particular._
The State makes laws, and "as many laws as the interests which it meets
with; and, since interests are innumerable, the legislation-machine must
work uninterruptedly. Laws and ordinances fall like hail on the poor
populace. After a while the political soil will be covered with a layer
of paper, and all the geologists will have to do will be to list it,
under the name of _papyraceous formation_, among the epochs of the
earth's history. The Convention, in three years one month and four days,
issued eleven thousand six hundred laws and decrees; the Constituent and
Legislative Assemblies had produced hardly less; the empire and the
later governments have wrought as industriously. At present the
'_Bulletin des Lois_' contains, they say, more than fifty thousand; if
our representatives did their duty this enormous figure would soon be
doubled. Do you believe that the populace, or the government itself, can
keep its sanity in this labyrinth?"[136]
"But what am I saying? Laws for him who thinks for himself, and is
responsible only for his own acts! laws for him who would be free, and
feels himself destined to become free! I am ready to make terms, but I
will have no laws; I acknowledge none; I protest against every order
which an ostensibly necessary authority shall please to impose on my
free will. Laws! we know what they are and what they are worth. Cobwebs
for the powerful and the rich, chains which no steel can break for the
little and the poor, fishers' nets in the hands of the government."[137]
"You say they shall make _few_ laws, make them _simple_, make them
_good_. But it is impossible. Must not government adjust all interests,
decide all disputes? Now interests are by the nature of society
innumerable, relationships infinitely variable and mobile; how is it
possible that only a few laws should be made? how can they be simple?
how can the best law escape soon being detestable?"[138]
II. _Justice requires that only one legal norm be in force: to wit, the
norm that contracts must be lived up to._
"What do we mean by a _contract_? A contract, says the civil code, art.
1101, is an agreement whereby one or more persons bind themselves to one
or more others to do or not to do something."[139] "That I may remain
free, that I may be subjected to no law but my own, and that I may
govern myself, the edifice of society must be rebuilt upon the idea of
CONTRACT."[140] "We must start with the idea of contract as the dominant
idea of politics."[141] This norm, that contracts must be lived up to,
is to be based not only on its justice, but at the same time on the fact
that among men who live together there prevails a will to enforce the
keeping of contracts, if necessary, with violence;[142] so it is to be
not only a commandment of morality, but also a legal norm.
"Several of your fellow-men have agreed to treat each other with good
faith and fair play,--that is, to respect those rules of action which
the nature of things points out to them as being alone capable of
assuring to them, in the fullest measure, prosperity, safety, and peace.
Are you willing to join their league? to form a part of their society?
Do you promise to respect the honor, the liberty, the goods, of your
brothers? Do you promise never to appropriate to yourself, neither by
violence, by fraud, by usury, nor by speculation, another's product or
possession? Do you promise never to lie and deceive, neither in court,
in trade, nor in any of your dealings? You are free to accept or to
refuse.
"If you refuse, you form a part of the society of savages. Having left
the fellowship of the human race, you come under suspicion. Nothing
protects you. At the least insult anybody you meet may knock you down,
without incurring any other charge than that of cruelty to animals.
"If you swear to the league, on the contrary, you form a part of the
society of free men. All your brothers enter into an engagement with
you, promising you fidelity, friendship, help, service, commerce. In
case of infraction on their part or on yours, through negligence, hot
blood, or evil intent, you are responsible to one another, for the
damage and also for the scandal and insecurity which you have caused;
this responsibility may extend, according to the seriousness of the
perjury or the repetition of the crime, as far as to excommunication and
death."[143]
4.--THE STATE
I. Since Proudhon approves only the single legal norm that contracts
must be lived up to, he can sanction only a single legal relation, that
of parties to a contract. Hence he must necessarily reject the State;
for it is established by particular legal norms, and, as an involuntary
legal relation, it binds even those who have not entered into any
contract at all. _Proudhon does accordingly reject the State
absolutely, without any spatial or temporal limitation; he even regards
it as a legal relation which offends against justice to an unusual
degree._
"The government of man by man is slavery."[144] "Whoever lays his hand
on me to govern me is a usurper and a tyrant; I declare him my
enemy."[145] "In a given society the authority of man over man is in
inverse ratio to the intellectual development which this society has
attained, and the probable duration of this authority may be calculated
from the more or less general desire for a true--that is, a
scientific--government."[146]
"Royalty is never legitimate. Neither heredity, election, universal
suffrage, the excellence of the sovereign, nor the consecration of
religion and time, makes royalty legitimate. In whatever form it may
appear, monarchical, oligarchic, democratic,--royalty, or the government
of man by man, is illegal and absurd."[147] Democracy in particular "is
nothing but a constitutional arbitrary power succeeding another
constitutional arbitrary power; it has no scientific value, and we must
see in it only a preparation for the REPUBLIC, one and
indivisible."[148]
"Authority was no sooner begun on earth than it became the object of
universal competition. Authority, Government, Power, State,--these words
all denote the same thing,--each man sees in it the means of oppressing
and exploiting his fellows. Absolutists, doctrinaires, demagogues, and
socialists, turned their eyes incessantly to authority as their sole
cynosure."[149] "All parties without exception, in so far as they seek
for power, are varieties of absolutism; and there will be no liberty for
citizens, no order for societies, no union among workingmen, till in the
political catechism the renunciation of authority shall have replaced
faith in authority. _No more parties, no more authority, absolute
liberty of man and citizen_,--there, in three words, is my political and
social confession of faith."[150]
II. _Justice demands, in place of the State, a social human life on the
basis of the legal norm that contracts must be lived up to._ Proudhon
calls this social life "anarchy"[151] and later "federation"[152] also.
1. After the abrogation of the State, men are still to live together in
society. As early as 1841 Proudhon says that the point is "to discover a
system of absolute equality, in which all present institutions, minus
property or the sum of the abuses of property, might not only find a
place, but be themselves means to equality; individual liberty, the
division of powers, the cabinet, the jury, the administrative and
judiciary organization."[153]
But men are not to be kept together in society by any supreme authority,
but only by the legally binding force of contract. "When I bargain for
any object with one or more of my fellow-citizens, it is clear that
then my will alone is my law; it is I myself who, in fulfilling my
obligation, am my government. If then I could make that contract with
all, which I do make with some; if all could renew it with each other;
if every group of citizens, commune, canton, department, corporation,
company, etc., formed by such a contract and considered as a moral
person, could then, always on the same terms, treat with each of the
other groups and with all, it would be exactly as if my will was
repeated _ad infinitum_. I should be sure that the law thus made on all
points that concern the republic, on the various motions of millions of
persons, would never be anything but my law; and, if this new order of
things was called government, that this government would be mine. The
_regime of contracts_, substituted for the _regime of laws_, would
constitute the true government of man and of the citizen, the true
sovereignty of the people, the REPUBLIC."[154]
"The Republic is the organization by which, all opinions and all
activities remaining free, the People, by the very divergence of
opinions and of wills, thinks and acts as a single man. In the Republic
every citizen, in doing what he wishes and nothing but what he wishes,
participates directly in legislation and government, just as he
participates in the production and circulation of wealth. There every
citizen is king; for he has plenary power, he reigns and governs. The
Republic is a positive anarchy. It is neither liberty subjected TO
order, as in the constitutional monarchy, nor liberty imprisoned IN
order, as the provisional government would have it. It is liberty
delivered from all its hobbles, superstition, prejudice, sophism,
speculation, authority; it is mutual liberty, not self-limiting liberty;
liberty, not the daughter but the MOTHER of order."[155]
2. Anarchy may easily seem to us "the acme of disorder and the
expression of chaos. They say that when a Parisian burgher of the
seventeenth century once heard that in Venice there was no king, the
good man could not get over his astonishment, and thought he should die
of laughing. Such is our prejudice."[156] As against this, Proudhon
draws a picture of how men's life in society under anarchy might perhaps
shape itself in detail, to execute the functions now belonging to the
State.
He begins with an example. "For many centuries the spiritual power has
been separated, within traditional limits, from the temporal power. [But
there has never been a complete separation, and therefore, to the great
detriment of the church's authority and of believers, centralization has
never been sufficient.] There would be a complete separation if the
temporal power not only did not concern itself with the celebration of
mysteries, the administration of sacraments, the government of parishes,
etc., but did not intervene in the nomination of bishops either. There
would ensue a greater centralization, and consequently a more regular
government, if in each parish the people had the right to choose for
themselves their vicars and curates, or to have none at all; if in each
diocese the priests elected their bishop; if the assembly of bishops,
or a primate of the Gauls, had sole charge of the regulation of
religious affairs, theological instruction, and worship. By this
separation the clergy would cease to be, in the hands of political
power, an instrument of tyranny over the people; and by this application
of universal suffrage the ecclesiastical government, centralized in
itself, receiving its inspirations from the people and not from the
government or the pope, would be in constant harmony with the needs of
society and with the moral and intellectual condition of the citizens.
We must, then, in order to return to truth, organic, political,
economic, or social (for here all these are one), first, abolish the
constitutional cumulation by taking from the State the nomination of the
bishops, and definitively separating the spiritual from the temporal;
second, centralize the church in itself by a system of graded elections;
third, give to the ecclesiastical power, as we do to all the other
powers in the State, the vote of the citizens as a basis. By this system
what to-day is GOVERNMENT will no longer be anything but
_administration_; all France is centralized, so far as concerns
ecclesiastical functions; the country, by the mere fact of its electoral
initiative, governs itself in matters of eternal life as well as in
those of this world. And one may already see that if it were possible to
organize the entire country in temporal matters on the same bases, the
most perfect order and the most vigorous centralization would exist
without there being anything of what we to-day call constituted
authority or government."[157]
Proudhon gives a second example in judicial authority. "The judicial
functions, by their different specialties, their hierarchy, [their
permanent tenure of office,] their convergence under a single
departmental head, show an unequivocal tendency to separation and
centralization. But they are in no way dependent on those who are under
their jurisdiction; they are all at the disposal of the executive power,
which is appointed by the people once in four years with authority that
cannot be diminished; they are subordinated not to the country by
election, but to the government, president or prince, by appointment. It
follows that those who are under the jurisdiction of a court are given
over to their 'natural' judges just as are parishioners to their vicars;
that the people belong to the magistrate like an inheritance; that the
litigant is the judge's, not the judge the litigant's. Apply universal
suffrage and graded election to the judicial as well as the
ecclesiastical functions; suppress the permanent tenure of office, which
is an alienation of the electoral right; take away from the State all
action, all influence, on the judicial body; let this body, separately
centralized in itself, no longer depend on any but the people,--and, in
the first place, you will have deprived power of its mightiest
instrument of tyranny; you will have made justice a principle of liberty
as well as of order. And, unless you suppose that the people, from whom
all powers should spring by universal suffrage, is in contradiction with
itself,--that what it wants in religion it does not want in
justice,--you are assured that the separation of powers can beget no
conflict; you may boldly lay it down as a principle that _separation_
and _equilibrium_ are henceforth synonymous."[158]
Then Proudhon goes on to the army, the customhouses, the public
departments of agriculture and commerce, public works, public education,
and finance; for each of these administrations he demands independence
and centralization on the basis of general suffrage.[159]
"That a nation may manifest itself in its unity, it must be centralized
in its religion, centralized in its justice, centralized in its army,
centralized in its agriculture, industry, and commerce, centralized in
its finances,--in a word, centralized in all its functions and
faculties; the centralization must work from the bottom to the top, from
the circumference to the centre; all the functions must be independent
and severally self-governing.
"Would you then make this invisible unity perceptible by a special
organ, preserve the image of the old government? Group these different
administrations by their heads; you have your cabinet, your _executive_,
which can then very well do without a Council of State.
"Set up above all this a grand jury, legislature, or national assembly,
appointed directly by the whole country, and charged not with appointing
the cabinet officers,--they have their investiture from their particular
constituents,--but with auditing the accounts, making the laws, settling
the budget, deciding controversies between the administrations, all
after having heard the reports of the Public Department, or Department
of the Interior, to which the whole government will thenceforth be
reduced; and you will have a centralization the stronger the more you
multiply its foci, a responsibility the more real the more clear-cut is
the separation between the powers; you have a constitution at once
political and social."[160]
5.--PROPERTY
I. Since Proudhon sanctions only the one legal norm that contracts must
be kept, he can approve only one legal relation, that between
contracting parties. Hence he must necessarily reject property as well
as the State, since it is established by particular legal norms, and, as
an involuntary legal relation, binds even such as have in no way entered
into a contract. _And he does reject property[161] absolutely, without
any spatial or temporal limitation; nay, it even appears to him to be a
legal relation which is particularly repugnant to justice._
"According to its definition, property is the right of using and
abusing; that is to say, it is the absolute, irresponsible domain of man
over his person and his goods. If property ceased to be the right to
abuse, it would cease to be property. Has not the proprietor the right
to give his goods to whomever he will, to let his neighbor burn without
crying fire, to oppose the public good, to squander his patrimony, to
exploit the laborer and hold him to ransom, to produce bad goods and
sell them badly? Can he be judicially constrained to use his property
well? can he be disturbed in the abuse of it? What am I saying? Is not
property, precisely because it is full of abuse, the most sacred thing
in the world for the legislator? Can one conceive of a property whose
use the police power should determine, whose abuse it should repress? Is
it not clear, in fine, that if one undertook to introduce justice into
property, one would destroy property, just as the law, by introducing
propriety into concubinage, destroyed concubinage?"[162]
"Men steal: first, by violence on the highway; second, alone or in a
band; third, by burglary; fourth, by embezzlement; fifth, by fraudulent
bankruptcy; sixth, by forgery; seventh, by counterfeiting. Eighth, by
pocket-picking; ninth, by swindling; tenth, by breach of trust;
eleventh, by gambling and lotteries.--Twelfth, by usury. Thirteenth, by
rent-taking.--Fourteenth, by commerce, when the profits are more than
fair wages for the trader's work.--Fifteenth, by selling one's own
product at a profit, and by accepting a sinecure or a fat salary."[163]
"In theft such as the laws forbid, force and fraud are employed alone
and openly; in authorized theft they are disguised under a produced
utility, which they use as a device for plundering their victim. The
direct use of violence and force was early and unanimously rejected; no
nation has yet reached the point of delivering itself from theft when
united with talent, labor, and possession."[164] In this sense property
is "theft,"[165] "the exploitation of the weak by the strong,"[166]
"contrary to right,"[167] "the suicide of society."[168]
II. _Justice demands, in place of property, a distribution of goods
based on the legal norm that contracts must be lived up to._
Proudhon calls that portion of goods which is assigned to the individual
by contract, "property." In 1840 he had demanded that individual
possession be substituted for property; with this one change evil would
disappear from the earth.[169] But in 1841 he is already explaining that
by property he means only its abuses;[170] nay, he even then describes
as necessary the creation of an immediately applicable social system in
which the rights of barter and sale, of direct and collateral
inheritance, of primogeniture and bequest, should find their place.[171]
In 1846 he says, "Some day transformed property will be an idea
positive, complete, social, and true; a property which will abolish the
old property and will become equally effective and beneficent for
all."[172] In 1848 he is declaring that "property, as to its principle
or substance, which is human personality, must never perish; it must
remain in man's heart as a perpetual stimulus to labor, as the
antagonist whose absence would cause labor to fall into idleness and
death."[173]
And in 1850 he announces: "What I sought for as far back as 1840, in
defining property, what I am wanting now, is not a destruction; I have
said it till I am tired. That would have been to fall with Rousseau,
Plato, Louis Blanc himself, and all the adversaries of property, into
_Communism_, against which I protest with all my might; what I ask for
property is a BALANCE,"[174]--that is, "justice."[175]
In all these pronouncements property means nothing else than that
portion of goods which falls to the individual on the basis of
contracts, on which society is to be built up.[176] The property which
Proudhon sanctions cannot be a special legal relation, but only a
possible part of the substance of the one legal relation which he
approves, the relation of contract. It can afford no protection against
a group of men whose extent is determined by legal norms, but only
against a group of men who have mutually secured a certain portion of
goods to each other by contract. Proudhon, therefore, is here using the
word "property" in an inexact sense; in the strict sense it can denote
only a portion of goods set apart in an involuntary legal relation by
particular legal norms.
Accordingly, when in the name of justice Proudhon demands a certain
distribution of property, this means nothing more than that the
contracts on which society is to be built should make a certain sort of
provision with respect to the distribution of goods. And the way in
which they should determine it is this: that every man is to have the
product of his labor.
"Let us conceive of wealth as a mass whose elements are held together
permanently by a chemical force, and into which new elements incessantly
enter and combine in different proportions, but according to a definite
law: value is the proportion (the measure) in which each of these
elements forms a part of the whole."[177] "I suppose, therefore, a force
which combines the elements of wealth in definite proportions and makes
of them a homogeneous whole."[178] "This force is LABOR. It is labor,
labor alone, that produces all the elements of wealth and combines them,
to the last molecule, according to a variable but definite law of
proportionality."[179] "Every product is a representative sign of
labor."[180]
"Every product can consequently be exchanged for another."[181] "If then
the tailor, in return for furnishing the value of one day of his work,
consumes ten times the weaver's day, it is as if the weaver gave ten
days of his life for one day of the tailor's. This is precisely what
occurs when a peasant pays a lawyer twelve francs for a document that it
costs one hour to draw up; and this inequality, this iniquity in
exchange, is the mightiest cause of poverty. Every error in commutative
justice is an immolation of the laborer, a transfusion of a man's blood
into another man's body."[182]
"What I demand with respect to property is a BALANCE. It is not for
nothing that the genius of nations has equipped Justice with this
instrument of precision. Justice applied to economy is in fact nothing
but a perpetual balance; or, to express myself still more precisely,
justice as regards the distribution of goods is nothing but the
obligation which rests upon every citizen and every State, in their
business relations, to conform to that law of equilibrium which
manifests itself everywhere in economy, and whose violation, accidental
or voluntary, is the fundamental principle of poverty."[183]
2. That every man should enjoy the product of his labor is possible only
through reciprocity, according to Proudhon; therefore he calls his
doctrine "the theory of _mutuality_ or of the _mutuum_."[184]
"RECIPROCITY is expressed in the precept, 'Do to others what you would
have done to you,' a precept which political economy has translated into
its celebrated formula, 'Products exchange for products.' Now the evil
which is devouring us results from the fact that the law of reciprocity
is unrecognized, violated. The remedy consists altogether in the
promulgation of this law. The organization of our mutual and reciprocal
relations is the whole of social science."[185]
And so Proudhon, in the solemn declaration which he prefixed to the
constitution of the People's Bank when he first published it, gives the
following assurance: "I protest that in criticising property, or rather
the whole body of institutions of which property is the pivot, I never
meant either to attack the individual rights recognized by previous
laws, or to dispute the legitimacy of acquired possessions, or to
instigate an arbitrary distribution of goods, or to put an obstacle in
the way of the free and regular acquisition of properties by bargain and
sale; or even to prohibit or suppress by sovereign decree land-rent and
interest on capital. I think that all these manifestations of human
activity should remain free and optional for all; I would admit no other
modifications, restrictions, or suppressions of them than naturally and
necessarily result from the universalization of the principle of
reciprocity and of the law of synthesis which I propound. This is my
last will and testament. I allow only him to suspect its sincerity, who
could tell a lie in the moment of death."[186]
6.--REALIZATION
_The change which justice calls for is to come about in this way, that
those men who have recognized the truth are to convince others how
necessary the change is for the sake of justice, and that hereby,
spontaneously, law is to transform itself, the State and property to
drop away, and the new condition to appear._ The new condition will
appear "as soon as the idea is popularized";[187] that it may appear, we
must "popularize the idea."[188]
I. Nothing is requisite but to convince men that justice commands the
change.
1. Proudhon rejects all other methods. His doctrine is "in accord with
the constitution and the laws."[189] "Accomplish the Revolution, they
say, and after this everything will be cleared up. As if the Revolution
itself could be accomplished without a leading idea!"[190] "To secure
justice to one's self by bloodshed is an extremity to which the
Californians, gathered since yesterday to seek for gold, may be reduced;
but may the luck of France preserve us from it!"[191]
"Despite the violence which we witness, I do not believe that hereafter
liberty will need to use force to claim its rights and avenge its
wrongs. Reason will serve us better; and patience, like the Revolution,
is invincible."[192]
2. But how shall we convince men, "how popularize the idea, if the
_bourgeoisie_ remains hostile; if the populace, brutalized by servitude,
full of prejudices and bad instincts, remains plunged in indifference;
if the professors, the academicians, the press, are calumniating you; if
the courts are truculent; if the powers that be muffle your voice? Don't
worry. Just as the lack of ideas makes one lose the most promising
games, war against ideas can only push forward the Revolution. Do you
not see already that the _regime_ of authority, of inequality, of
predestination, of eternal salvation, and of reasons of State, is daily
becoming still more intolerable for the well-to-do classes, whose
conscience and reason it tortures, than for the mass, whose stomach
cries out against it?"[193]
3. The most effective means for convincing men, according to Proudhon,
is to present to the people, within the State and without violating its
law, "an example of centralization spontaneous, independent, and
social," thus applying even now the principles of the future
constitution of society.[194] "Rouse that collective action without
which the condition of the people will forever be unhappy and its
efforts powerless. Teach it to produce wealth and order with its own
hands, without the help of the authorities."[195]
Proudhon sought to give such an example by the founding of the People's
Bank.[196]
The People's Bank was to "insure work and prosperity to all producers by
organizing them as beginning and end of production with regard to one
another,--that is, as capitalists and as consumers."[197]
"The People's Bank was to be the property of all the citizens who
accepted its services, who for this purpose furnished money to it if
they thought that it could not yet for some time do without a metallic
basis, and who, in every case, promised it their preference in
discounting paper, and received its notes as cash. Accordingly the
People's Bank, working for the profit of its customers themselves, had
no occasion to take interest for its loans nor to charge a discount on
commercial paper; it had only to take a very slight allowance to cover
salaries and expenses. So credit was GRATUITOUS!--The principle being
realized, the consequences unfolded themselves ad _infinitum_."[198]
"So the People's Bank, giving an example of popular initiative alike in
government and in public economy, which thenceforth were to be
identified in a single synthesis, was becoming for the _proletariat_ at
once the principle and the instrument of their emancipation; it was
creating political and industrial liberty. And, as every philosophy and
every religion is the metaphysical or symbolic expression of social
economy, the People's Bank, changing the material basis of society, was
ushering in the revolution of philosophy and religion; it was thus, at
least, that its founders had conceived of it."[199]
All this can best be made clear by reproducing some provisions from the
constitution of the People's Bank.
Art. 1. By these presents a commercial company is founded under the
name of _Societe de la Banque du Peuple_, consisting of Citizen
Proudhon, here present, and the persons who shall give their assent
to this constitution by becoming stockholders.
Art. 3.... For the present the company will exist as a partnership
in which Citizen Proudhon shall be general partner, and the other
parties concerned shall be limited partners who shall in no case be
responsible for more than the value of their shares.
Art. 5.... The firm name shall be P. J. Proudhon & Co.
Art. 6. Besides the members of the company proper, every citizen is
invited to form a part of the People's Bank as a co-operator. For
this it suffices to assent to the bank's constitution and to accept
its paper.
Art. 7. The People's Bank Company being capable of indefinite
extension, its virtual duration is endless. However, to conform to
the requirements of the law, it fixes its duration at ninety-nine
years, which shall commence on the day of its definitive
organization.
Art. 9.... The People's Bank, having as its _basis_ the essential
gratuitousness of credit and exchange, as its _object_ the
circulation, not the production, of values, and as its _means_ the
mutual consent of producers and consumers, can and should work
without capital.
This end will be reached when the entire mass of producers and
consumers shall have assented to the constitution of the company.
Till then the People's Bank Company, having to conform to
established custom and the requirements of law, and especially in
order more effectively to invite citizens to join it, will provide
itself with capital.
Art. 10. The capital of the People's Bank shall be five million
francs, divided into shares of five francs each.
... The company shall be definitively organized, and its business
shall begin, when ten thousand shares are taken.
Art. 12. Stock shall be issued only at par. It shall bear no
interest.
Art. 15. The principal businesses of the People's Bank are, 1, to
increase its cash on hand by issuing notes; 2, discounting endorsed
commercial paper; 3, discounting accepted orders (_commandes_) and
bills (_factures_); 4, loans on personal property; 5, loans on
personal security; 6, advances on annuities and collateral
security; 7, payments and collections; 8, advances to productive
and industrial enterprises (_la commande_).
To these departments the People's Bank will add: 9, the functions
of a savings bank and endowment insurance; 10, insurance; 11, safe
deposit vaults; 12, the service of the budget.[200]
Art. 18. In distinction from ordinary bank notes, payable in
_specie_ to some one's _order_, the paper of the People's Bank is
an order for goods, vested with a social character, rendered
perpetual, and is payable at sight by every stockholder and
co-operator in the _products_ or _services_ of his industry or
profession.
Art. 21. Every co-operator agrees to trade by preference, for all
goods which the company can offer him, with the co-operators of the
bank, and to reserve his orders exclusively for his fellow
stockholders and fellow co-operators.
In return, every producer or tradesman co-operating with the bank
agrees to furnish his goods to the other co-operators at a reduced
price.
Art. 62. The People's Bank has its headquarters in Paris.
Its aim is, in the course of time, to establish a branch in every
_arrondissement_ and a correspondent in every commune.
Art. 63. As soon as circumstances permit, the present company shall
be converted into a corporation, since this form allows us to
realize, according to the wish of the founders, the threefold
principle, first, of election; second, of the separation and the
independence of the branches of work; third, of the personal
responsibility of every employee.[201]
II. If once men are convinced that justice commands the change, then
will "despotism fall of itself by its very uselessness."[202] The State
and property disappear, law is transformed, and the new condition of
things begins.
"The Revolution does not act after the fashion of the old governmental,
aristocratic, or dynastic principle. It is Right, the balance of forces,
equality. It has no conquests to pursue, no nations to reduce to
servitude, no frontiers to defend, no fortresses to build, no armies to
feed, no laurels to pluck, no preponderance to maintain. The might of
its economic institutions, the gratuitousness of its credit, the
brilliancy of its thought, are its sufficient means for converting the
universe."[203] "The Revolution has for allies all who suffer oppression
and exploitation; let it appear, and the universe stretches its arms to
it."[204]
"I want the peaceable revolution. I want you to make the very
institutions which I charge you to abolish, and the principles of law
which you will have to complete, serve toward the realization of my
wishes, so that the new society shall appear as the spontaneous,
natural, and necessary development of the old, and that the Revolution,
while abrogating the old order of things, shall nevertheless be the
progress of that order."[205] "When the people, once enlightened
regarding its true interests, declares its will not to reform the
government but to revolutionize society,"[206] then "the dissolution of
government in the economic organism"[207] will follow in a way about
which one can at present only make guesses.[208]
FOOTNOTES:
[125] Not (as stated by Diehl vol. 2 p. 116, Zenker p. 61) 1852.
[126] Proudhon "_Propriete_" p. 295 [212. Bracketed references under
Proudhon are to the collected edition of his "_OEuvres completes_,"
Paris, 1866-83.--The passage quoted above is probably the first case in
history where anybody called himself an Anarchist, though the word had
long been in use as a term of reproach for enemies].
[127] Pr. "_Justice_" 1. 182-3 [1. 224-5].
[128] Pr. "_Justice_" 1. 184-5 [1. 227].
[129] _Ib._ 1. 73 [132? but there he says _must be_, not _is_].
[130] _Ib._ 1. 185 [1. 228].
[131] _Ib._ 1. 195 [1. 235].
[132] _Ib._ 1. 185 [1. 228].
[133] Pr. "_Justice_" 1. 195 [1. 235].
[134] _Ib._ 3. 45 [3. 276, but with the bracketed sentence much
abridged. For the phrase "rebel against right," remember that in French
_right_ and _common law_ are one and the same word].
[135] Pr. "_Propriete_" p. 18 [24-5].
[136] Pr. "_Idee_" 147-8 [136-7]
[137] _Ib._ 149 [138].
[138] Pr. "_Idee_" pp. 149-50 [138].
[139] Pr. "_Principe_" p. 64 [44].
[140] Pr. "_Idee_" p. 235 [215].
[141] Pr. "_Principe_" p. 64 [44].
[142] Pr. "_Idee_" p. 343 [312].
[143] Pr. "_Idee_" pp. 342-3 [311-12].
[144] Pr. "_Confessions_" p. 8 [29].
[145] _Ib._ p. 6 [23].
[146] Pr. "_Propriete_" p. 301 [216].
[147] _Ib._ pp. 298-9 [214].
[148] Pr. "_Solution_" p. 54 [39].
[149] Pr. "_Confessions_" p. 7 [24].
[150] _Ib._ p. 7 [25-6].
[151] Pr. "_Propriete_" p. 301 [216], "_Confessions_" p. 68 [192],
"_Solution_" p. 119 [87].
[152] Pr. "_Principe_" p. 67 [46].--Proudhon's teaching was not, as
asserted by Diehl vol. 2 p. 116, vol. 3 pp. 166-7, and Zenker p. 61,
Anarchism till 1852 and Federalism thenceforward; his Anarchism was
Federalism from the start, only he later gave it the additional name of
Federalism.
[153] Pr. "_Propriete_" pp. XIX-XX [10-11].
[154] Pr. "_Idee_" pp. 235-6 [215-16].
[155] Pr. "_Solution_" p. 119 [87].
[156] Pr. "_Propriete_" pp. 301-2 [216].
[157] Pr. "_Confessions_" p. 65 [180-3; bracketed words a paraphrase.]
[158] Pr. "_Confessions_" pp. 65-6 [183-4, except bracketed words].
[159] _Ib._ pp. 66-8 [185-9].
[160] Pr. "_Confessions_" p. 68 [191-2].
[161] Pfau pp. 227-31, Adler p. 372, Zenker pp. 26, 41, fail to see
this, being influenced by the improper sense in which Proudhon uses the
word "property" for a contractually guaranteed share of goods.
[Eltzbacher's statement, on the other hand, is not so much drawn from
Proudhon himself as deduced from a comparison of Eltzbacher's definition
of property with the statement that Proudhon admits no law but the law
of contract. I do not think this last statement is correct; I think
Proudhon would have his voluntary contractual associations protect their
members in certain definable respects--among others, in the possession
of goods--against those who stood outside the contract as well as
against those within. Then this would be, by Eltzbacher's definitions,
both law and property.]
[162] Pr. "_Contradictions_" 2. 303-4 [2. 237-8].
[163] Pr. "_Propriete_" pp. 285-90 [205-9].
[164] Pr. "_Propriete_" p. 293 [211].
[165] _Ib._ pp. 1-2 [13].
[166] _Ib._ p. 283 [204].
[167] _Ib._ p. 311 [223].
[168] _Ib._ p. 311 [223].
[169] _Ib._ p. 311 [223].
[170] _Ib._ pp. XVIII-XIX [10; consult the passage].
[171] _Ib._ pp. XIX-XX [11].
[172] Pr. "_Contradictions_" 2. 234-5 [2. 184].
[173] Pr. "_Droit_" p. 50 [230].
[174] Pr. "_Justice_" 1. 302-3 [1. 324-5].
[175] _Ib._ 303 [1. 325].
[176] Pr. "_Idee_" p. 235 [215]; "_Principe_" p. 64 [44].
[177] Pr. "_Contradictions_" 1. 51 [1. 74].
[178] _Ib._ 1. 53 [1. 75].
[179] _Ib._ 1. 55. [1. 76-7].
[180] _Ib._ 1. 68 [1. 87].
[181] _Ib._ 1. 68 [1. 87].
[182] _Ib._ 1. 83 [1. 98-9].
[183] Pr. "_Justice_" 1. 302-3 [1. 325].
[184] Pr. "_Contradictions_" 2. 528 [2. 414].
[185] Pr. "_Organisation_" p. 5 [93].
[186] Pr. "_Banque_" pp. 3-4 [260].
[187] Pr. "_Justice_" 1. 515 [2. 133].
[188] _Ib._ 1. 515 [2. 133].
[189] Pr. "_Confessions_" p. 71 [201].
[190] Pr. "_Justice_" 1, 515 [2, 133. Eltzbacher finds the sense "all
will be enlightened" where I translate "everything will be cleared up."
Eltzbacher's view of the sense--that to those who say "Enlightenment
must come by the Revolution" Proudhon replies, "No, the Revolution must
come by enlightenment"--correctly gives the thought brought out in the
context].
[191] Pr. "_Justice_" 1. 466 [2. 90].
[192] _Ib._ 1. 470-71 [2. 94].
[193] _Ib._ 1. 515 [2. 133-4].
[194] Pr. "_Confessions_" p. 69 [196].
[195] _Ib._ p. 72 [203].
[196] _Ib._ p. 69 [196].
[197] _Ib._ p. 69 [196].
[198] _Ib._ pp. 69-70 [197].
[199] Pr. "_Confessions_" p. 70 [197-8].
[200] [French dictionaries leave us somewhat in the lurch as to
commercial usages which differ from the English. Eltzbacher translates
8, "investment as silent partner"; 12, "balancing accounts."]
[201] Pr. "_Banque_" pp. 5-20 [261-77].
[202] Pr. "_Confessions_" p. 72 [202-3].
[203] Pr. "_Justice_" 1. 509 [2. 128-9].
[204] _Ib._ 1. 510 [2. 129].
[205] Pr. "_Idee_" pp. 196-7 [181].
[206] _Ib._ p. 197 [181].
[207] _Ib._ p. 277 [253].
[208] _Ib._ pp. 195, 197 [180-81].
CHAPTER V
STIRNER'S TEACHING
1.--GENERAL
1. Johann Kaspar Schmidt was born in 1806, at Bayreuth in Bavaria. He
studied philosophy and theology at Berlin from 1826 to 1828, at Erlangen
from 1828 to 1829. In 1829 he interrupted his studies, made a prolonged
tour through Germany, and then lived alternately at Koenigsberg and Kulm
till 1832. From 1832 to 1834 he studied at Berlin again; in 1835 he
passed his tests there as _Gymnasiallehrer_. He received no government
appointment, however, and in 1839 became teacher in a young ladies'
seminary in Berlin. He gave up this place in 1844, but continued to live
in Berlin, and died there in 1856.
In part under the pseudonym Max Stirner, in part anonymously, Schmidt
published a small number of works, mostly of a philosophical nature.
2. Stirner's teaching about law, the State, and property is contained
chiefly in his book "_Der Einzige und sein Eigentum_" (1845).
--But here arises the question, Can we speak of such a thing as a
"teaching" of Stirner's?
Stirner recognizes no _ought_. "Men are such as they should be--can be.
What should they be? Surely not more than they can be! And what can they
be? Not more, again, than they--can, _i. e._ than they have the
ability, the strength, to be."[209] "A man is 'called' to nothing, and
has no 'proper business,' no 'function,' as little as a plant or beast
has a 'vocation.' He has not a vocation; but he has powers, which
express themselves where they are, because their being consists only in
their expression, and which can remain idle as little as life, which
would no longer be life if it 'stood still' but for a second. Now one
might cry to man, 'Use your power.' But this imperative would be given
the meaning that it was man's proper business to use his power. It is
not so. Rather, every one really does use his power, without first
regarding this as his vocation; every one uses in every moment as much
power as he possesses."[210]
Nay, Stirner acknowledges no such thing as truth. "Truths are phrases,
ways of speaking, words (_logos_); brought into connection, or arranged
by ranks and files, they form logic, science, philosophy."[211] "Nor is
there a truth,--not right, not liberty, humanity, etc.,--which could
subsist before me, and to which I would submit."[212] "If there is a
single truth to which man must consecrate his life and his powers
because he is man, then he is subjected to a rule, dominion, law, etc.;
he is a man in service."[213] "As long as you believe in truth, you do
not believe in yourself; you are a--servant, a--religious man. You
alone are truth; or rather, you are more than truth, which is nothing
at all before you."[214]
If one chose to draw the extreme inference from this, Stirner's book
would be only a self-avowal, an expression of thoughts without any claim
to general validity; in it Stirner would not be informing us what he
thinks to be true, or what in his opinion we ought to do, but only
giving us an opportunity to observe the play of his ideas. Stirner did
not draw this inference,[215] and one should not let the style of the
book, which speaks mostly of Stirner's "I," lead him to think that
Stirner did draw it. He calls that man "blinded, who wants to be only
'Man'."[216] He takes the floor against "the erroneous consciousness of
not being able to entitle myself to as much as I want."[217] He mocks at
our grandmothers' belief in ghosts.[218] He declares that "penalty must
make room for satisfaction,"[219] that man "should defend himself
against man."[220] And he asserts that "over the door of our time stands
not Apollo's 'Know thyself,' but a 'Turn yourself to account!'"[221] So
Stirner intends not only to give us information about his inward
condition at the time he composed his book, but to tell us what he
thinks to be true and what we ought to do; his book is not a mere
self-avowal, but a scientific teaching.
3. Stirner does not call his teaching about law, the State, and property
"Anarchism." He prefers to use the epithet "anarchic" to designate
political liberalism, which he combats.[222]
2.--BASIS
_According to Stirner the supreme law for each one of us is his own
welfare._
What does one's own welfare mean? "Let us seek out the enjoyment of
life!"[223] "Henceforth the question is not how one can acquire life,
but how he can expend it, enjoy it; not how one is to produce in himself
the true ego, but how he is to dissolve himself, to live himself
out."[224] "If the enjoyment of life is to triumph over the longing or
hope for life, it must overcome it in its double significance which
Schiller brings out in 'The Ideal and Life'; it must crush spiritual and
temporal poverty, abolish the ideal and--the want of daily bread. He who
must lay out his life in prolonging life cannot enjoy it, and he who is
still seeking his life does not have it, and can as little enjoy it;
both are poor."[225]
Our own welfare is our supreme law. Stirner recognizes no duty.[226]
"Whether what I think and do is Christian, what do I care? Whether it is
human, humane, liberal, or unhuman, inhumane, illiberal, what do I ask
about that? If only it aims at what I would have, if only I satisfy
myself in it, then fit it with predicates as you like; it is all one to
me."[227] "So then my relation to the world is this: I no longer do
anything for it 'for God's sake', I do nothing 'for man's sake', but
what I do I do 'for my sake'."[228] "Where the world comes in my
way--and it comes in my way everywhere--I devour it to appease the
hunger of my egoism. You are to me nothing but--my food, just as I also
am fed upon and used up by you. We have only one relation to each other,
that of utility, of usableness, of use."[229] "I too love men, not
merely individuals, but every one. But I love them with the
consciousness of egoism; I love them because love makes me happy, I love
because love is natural to me, because it pleases me. I know no
'commandment of love'."[230]
3.--LAW
I. _Looking to each one's own welfare, Stirner rejects law, and that
without any limitation to particular spatial or temporal conditions._
Law[231] exists not by the individual's recognizing it as favorable to
his interests, but by his holding it sacred. "Who can ask about 'right'
if he is not occupying the religious standpoint just like other people?
Is not 'right' a religious concept, _i. e._ something sacred?"[232]
"When the Revolution stamped liberty as a 'right' it took refuge in the
religious sphere, in the region of the sacred, the ideal."[233] "I am to
revere the sultanic law in a sultanate, the popular law in republics,
the canon law in Catholic communities, etc. I am to subordinate myself
to these laws, I am to count them sacred."[234] "The law is sacred, and
he who outrages it is a criminal."[235] "There are no criminals except
against something sacred";[236] crime falls when the sacred
disappears.[237] Punishment has a meaning only in relation to something
sacred.[238] "What does the priest who admonishes the criminal do? He
sets forth to him the great wrong of having by his act desecrated that
which was hallowed by the State, its property (in which, you will see,
the lives of those who belong to the State must be included)."[239]
But law is no more sacred than it is favorable to the individual's
welfare. "Right--is a delusion, bestowed by a ghost."[240] Men have "not
recovered the mastery over the thought of 'right,' which they themselves
created; their creature is running away with them."[241] "Let the
individual man claim ever so many rights; what do I care for his right
and his claim?"[242] I do not respect them.--"What you have the might to
be you have the right to be. I deduce all right and all entitlement from
myself; I am entitled to everything that I have might over. I am
entitled to overthrow Zeus, Jehovah, God, etc., if I can; if I cannot,
then these gods will always remain in the right and in the might as
against me."[243]
"Right crumbles into its nothingness when it is swallowed up by
force,"[244] "but with the concept the word too loses its meaning."[245]
"The people will perhaps be against the blasphemer; hence a law against
blasphemy. Shall I therefore not blaspheme? Is this law to be more to me
than an order?"[246] "He who has might 'stands above the law'."[247]
"The earth belongs to him who knows how to take it, or who does not let
it be taken from him, does not let himself be deprived of it. If he
appropriates it, then not merely the earth, but also the right to it,
belongs to him. This is egoistic right; _i. e._, it suits me, therefore
it is right."[248]
II. _Self-welfare commands that in future it itself should be men's rule
of action in place of the law._
Each of us is "unique,"[249] "a world's history for himself,"[250] and,
when he "knows himself as unique,"[251] he is a "self-owner."[252] "God
and mankind have made nothing their object, nothing but themselves. Let
me then likewise make myself my object, who am, as well as God, the
nothing of all else, who am my all, who am the Unique."[253] "Away then
with every business that is not altogether my business! You think at
least the 'good cause' must be my business? What good, what bad? Why, I
myself am my business, and I am neither good nor bad. Neither has
meaning for me. What is divine is God's business, what is human 'Man's.'
My business is neither what is divine nor what is human, it is not what
is true, good, right, free, etc., but only what is mine; and it is no
general business, but is--unique, as I am unique. Nothing is more to me
than myself!"[254]
"What a difference between freedom and self-ownership! I am free from
what I am rid of; I am owner of what I have in my power."[255] "My
freedom becomes complete only when it is my--might; but by this I cease
to be a mere freeman and become a self-owner."[256] "Each must say to
himself, I am all to myself and I do all for my sake. If it ever became
clear to you that God, the commandments, etc., do you only harm, that
they encroach on you and ruin you, you would certainly cast them from
you just as the Christians once condemned Apollo or Minerva or heathen
morality."[257] "How one acts only from himself, and asks no questions
about anything further, the Christians have made concrete in the idea of
'God.' He acts 'as pleases him'."[258]
"Might is a fine thing and useful for many things; for 'one gets farther
with a handful of might than with a bagful of right.' You long for
freedom? You fools! If you took might, freedom would come of itself.
See, he who has might 'stands above the law.' How does this prospect
taste to you, you 'law-abiding' people? But you have no taste!"[259]
4.--THE STATE
I. _Together with law Stirner necessarily has to reject also, just as
unconditionally, the legal institution which is called State._ Without
law the State is not possible. "'Respect for the statutes!' By this
cement the whole fabric of the State is held together."[260]
The State as well as the law, then, exists, not by the individual's
recognizing it as favorable to his welfare, but rather by his counting
it sacred, by "our being entangled in the error that it is an I, as
which it applies to itself the name of a 'moral, mystical, or political
person.' I, who really am I, must pull off this lion's skin of the I
from the parading thistle-eater."[261] The same holds good of the State
as of the family. "If each one who belongs to the family is to recognize
and maintain that family in its permanent existence, then to each the
tie of blood must be sacred, and his feeling for it must be that of
family piety, of respect for the ties of blood, whereby every
blood-relative becomes hallowed to him. So, also, to every member of the
State-community this community must be sacred, and the concept which is
supreme to the State must be supreme to him too."[262] The State is "not
only entitled, but compelled, to demand" this.[263]
But the State is not sacred. "The State's behavior is violence, and it
calls its violence 'law', but that of the individual 'crime'."[264] If I
do not do what it wishes, "then the State turns against me with all the
force of its lion-paws and eagle-talons; for it is the king of beasts,
it is lion and eagle."[265] "Even if you do overpower your opponent as a
power, it does not follow that you are to him a hallowed authority,
unless he is a degenerate. He does not owe you respect, and reverence,
even if he will be wary of your might."[266]
Nor is the State favorable to the individual's welfare. "I am the mortal
enemy of the State."[267] "The general welfare as such is not my
welfare, but only the extremity of self-denial. The general welfare may
exult aloud while I must lie like a hushed dog; the State may be in
splendor while I starve."[268] "Every State is a despotism, whether the
despot be one or many, or whether, as people usually conceive to be the
case in a republic, all are masters, _i. e._ each tyrannizes over the
others."[269] "Doubtless the State leaves the individuals as free play
as possible, only they must not turn the play to earnest, must not
forget it. The State has never any object but to limit the individual,
to tame him, to subordinate him, to subject him to something general; it
lasts only so long as the individual is not all in all, and is only the
clear-cut limitation of me, my limitedness, my slavery."[270]
"A State never aims to bring about the free activity of individuals, but
only that activity which is bound to the State's purpose."[271] "The
State seeks to hinder every free activity by its censorship, its
oversight, its police, and counts this hindering as its duty, because it
is in truth a duty of self-preservation."[272] "I am not allowed to do
all the work I can, but only so much as the State permits; I must not
turn my thoughts to account, nor my work, nor, in general, anything
that is mine."[273] "Pauperism is the valuelessness of Me, the
phenomenon of my being unable to turn myself to account. Therefore State
and pauperism are one and the same. The State does not let me attain my
value, and exists only by my valuelessness; its goal is always to get
some benefit out of me, _i. e._ to exploit me, to use me up, even if
this using consisted only in my providing a _proles_ (_proletariat_); it
wants me to be 'its creature'."[274]
"The State cannot brook man's standing in a direct relation to man; it
must come between as a--mediator, it must--intervene. It tears man from
man, to put itself as 'spirit' in the middle. The laborers who demand a
higher wage are treated as criminals so soon as they want to get it by
compulsion. What are they to do? Without compulsion they don't get it,
and in compulsion the State sees a self-help, a price fixed by the ego,
a real, free turning to account of one's property, which it cannot
permit."[275]
II. _Every man's own welfare demands that a social human life solely on
the basis of its precepts should take the place of the State._ Stirner
calls this sort of social life "the union of egoists."[276]
1. Even after the State is abolished men are to live together in
society. "Self-owners will fight for the unity which is their own will,
for union."[277] But what is to keep men together in the union?
Not a promise, at any rate, "If I were bound to-day and hereafter to my
will of yesterday," my will would "be benumbed. My creature, _viz._, a
particular expression of will, would have become my dominator. Because I
was a fool yesterday I must remain such all my life."[278] "The union is
my own creation, my creature, not sacred, not a spiritual power above my
spirit, as little as any association of whatever sort. As I am not
willing to be a slave to my maxims, but lay them bare to my constant
criticism without any warrant, and admit no bail whatever for their
continuance, so still less do I pledge myself to the union for my future
and swear away my soul to it as men are said to do with the devil, and
as is really the case with the State and all intellectual authority; but
I am and remain more to myself than State, Church, God, and the like,
and, consequently, also infinitely more than the union."[279]
Rather, men are to be held together in the union by the advantage which
each individual has from the union at every moment. If I can "use" my
fellow-men, "then I am likely to come to an understanding and unite
myself with them, in order to strengthen my power by the agreement, and
to do more by joint force than individual force could accomplish. In
this joinder I see nothing at all else than a multiplication of my
strength, and only so long as it is my multiplied strength do I retain
it."[280]
Hence the union is something quite different from "that society which
Communism means to found."[281] "You bring into the union your whole
power, your ability, and assert yourself; in society you with your
labor-strength are spent. In the former you live egoistically, in the
latter humanly, _i. e._ religiously, as a 'member in the body of this
Lord'. You owe to society what you have, and are in duty bound to it,
are--possessed by 'social duties'; you utilize the union, and, undutiful
and unfaithful, give it up when you are no longer able to get any use
out of it. If society is more than you, then it is of more consequence
to you than yourself; the union is only your tool, or the sword with
which you sharpen and enlarge your natural strength; the union exists
for you and by you, society contrariwise claims you for itself and
exists even without you; in short, society is sacred, the union is your
own; society uses you up, you use up the union."[282]
2. But what form may such a social life take in detail? In reply to his
critic, Moses Hess, Stirner gives some examples of unions that already
exist.
"Perhaps at this moment children are running together under his window
for a com
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