Gutenberg · e01.org
Cover of The Judicial Murder of Mary E. Surratt
Project Gutenberg cover, or a typographic cover where none is held.

Gutenberg · ebook 36188

The Judicial Murder of Mary E. Surratt

by David Miller DeWitt · English · public domain in the US

  • Language English
  • PG edition 2011
  • Rights public domain (US)
  • Source Project Gutenberg
0%

Contents

    The Judicial Murder of Mary E. Surratt by David Miller DeWitt is an English public-domain text held from Project Gutenberg (ebook #36188). "_Oceans of horse-hair, continents of parchment, and learned-sergeant eloquence, were it continued till the learned tongue wore itself small in the indefatigable learned mouth, cannot make the unjust just. The grand question still remains, Was the judgment just?

    --OF--

    MARY E. SURRATT.

    DAVID MILLER DEWITT.

    Baltimore:
    JOHN MURPHY & CO.
    1895.

    COPYRIGHT, 1894, BY DAVID MILLER DEWITT.

    "Oceans of horse-hair, continents of parchment, and learned-sergeant eloquence, were it continued till the learned tongue wore itself small in the indefatigable learned mouth, cannot make the unjust just. The grand question still remains, Was the judgment just? If unjust, it will not and cannot get harbour for itself, or continue to have footing in this Universe, which was made by other than One Unjust. Enforce it by never such statuting, three readings, royal assents; blow it to the four winds with all manner of quilted trumpeters and pursuivants, in the rear of them never so many gibbets and hangmen, it will not stand, it cannot stand.

    From all souls of men, from all ends of Nature, from the Throne of God above, there are voices bidding it: Away! Away!"

    PAST AND PRESENT.

    CONTENTS.

    PAGE.

    PRELIMINARY

    CHAPTER I. The Reign of Terror, 1

    CHAPTER II. The Bureau of Military (In)Justice, 15

    PART I. THE MURDER.

    CHAPTER I. The Opening of the Court. Was She Ironed? 23

    CHAPTER II. Animus of the Judges. Insults to Reverdy Johnson
    and General Edward Johnson, 41

    CHAPTER III. Conduct of the Trial, 56

    CHAPTER IV. Arguments of the Defense, 70

    CHAPTER V. Charge of Judge Bingham, 82

    CHAPTER VI. Verdict, Sentence and Petition, 91

    CHAPTER VII. The Death Warrant and Execution, 112

    CHAPTER VIII. Was it not Murder? The Milligan Case, 126

    PART II. THE VINDICATION.

    CHAPTER I. Setting Aside the Verdict. Discharge of Jefferson
    Davis, 145

    CHAPTER II. Reversal on the Merits. Trial of John H. Surratt, 165

    CHAPTER III. The Recommendation to Mercy, 182

    CHAPTER IV. Trial of Joseph Holt, 207

    CHAPTER V. Andrew Johnson Signs another Death Warrant, 236

    CHAPTER VI. Conclusion, 249

    PRELIMINARY.

    CHAPTER I.

    THE REIGN OF TERROR.

    The assassination of Abraham Lincoln burst upon the City of Washington like a black thunder-bolt out of a cloudless sky. On Monday, the 3d of April, 1865, Richmond was taken. On the succeeding Sunday (the ninth), General Lee with the main Army of the South surrendered. The rebellion of nearly one-half the nation lay in its death-throes. The desperate struggle for the unity of the Republic was ending in a perfect triumph; and the loyal people gave full rein to their joy. Every night the streets of the city were illuminated.

    The chief officers of the government, one after another, were serenaded. On the evening of Tuesday, the eleventh, the President addressed his congratulations to an enthusiastic multitude from a window of the White House. On the night of Thursday (the thirteenth) Edwin M. Stanton, the Secretary of War, and Ulysses S. Grant, the victorious General of the Army of the North, were tumultuously greeted with banners and music and cannon at the residence of the Secretary.

    The next day, Friday the 14th, was the fourth anniversary of the surrender of Fort Sumter to the South, and that national humiliation was to be avenged by the restoration of the flag of the United States to its proper place above the fort by the hand of the same gallant officer who had been compelled to pull it down. In the evening, a torch-light procession perambulated the streets of the Federal Capital.

    Enthusiastic throngs filled the theatres, where the presence of great officials had been advertised by huge placards, and whose walls were everywhere festooned with the American flag. After four years of agonizing but unabating strain, all patriots felt justified in yielding to the full enjoyment of the glorious relaxation.

    Suddenly, at its very zenith, the snap of a pistol dislimns and scatters this great jubilee, as though it were, indeed, the insubstantial fabric of a vision. At half past ten that night, from the box of the theatre where the President is seated, a shot is heard; a wild figure, hatless and clutching a gleaming knife, emerges through the smoke; it leaps from the box to the stage, falls upon one knee, recovers itself, utters one shout and waves aloft its bloody weapon; then turns, limps across in front of the audience and disappears like a phantom behind the scenes.

    Simultaneously, there breaks upon the startled air the shriek of a woman, followed close by confused cries of "Water! Water!" and "The President is shot!"

    For the first few moments both audience and actors are paralyzed. One man alone jumps from the auditorium to the stage and pursues the flying apparition. But, as soon as the hopeless condition of the President and the escape of the assassin begin to transpire, angry murmurs of "Burn the Theatre!" are heard in the house, and soon swell into a roar in the street where a huge crowd has already assembled.

    The intermingling throng surges into the building from every quarter, and mounts guard at every exit. Not one of the company of actors is allowed to go out. The people seem to pause for a moment, as if awaiting from Heaven a retribution as sudden and awful as the crime.

    All their joy is turned to grief in the twinkling of an eye. The rebellion they had too easily believed to be dead could still strike, it seemed, a fatal blow against the very life of the Republic. A panic seizes the multitude in and around the theatre, and from the theatre spreads, "like the Night," over the whole city. And when the frightened citizens hear, as they immediately do, the story of the bloody massacre in the house of the Secretary of State, occurring at the same hour with the murder of the President, the panic swells into a reign of terror.

    The wildest stories find the quickest and most eager credence. Every member of the Cabinet and the General of the Army have been, or are about to be, killed; the government itself is at a standstill; and the lately discomfited rebels are soon to be in possession of the Capital. Patriotic people, delivering themselves over to a fear of they know not what, cry hoarsely for vengeance on they know not whom. The citizen upon whose past loyalty the slightest suspicion can be cast cowers for safety close to his hearth-stone.

    The terror-stricken multitude want but a leader cool and unscrupulous enough, to plunge into a promiscuous slaughter, such as stained the new-born revolution in France. A leader, indeed, they soon find, but he is not a Danton. He is a leader only in the sense that he has caught the same madness of terror and suspicion which has seized the people, that he holds high place, and that he has the power and is in a fit humor to pander to the panic.

    Edwin M. Stanton was forced by the tremendous crisis up to the very top of affairs. Vice-President Johnson, in the harrowing novelty of his position, was for the time being awed into passive docility. The Secretary of State was doubly disabled, if not killed. The General of the Army was absent.

    The Secretary of War without hesitation grasped the helm thus thrust into his hand, but, alas! he immediately lost his head.

    His exasperation at the irony of fate, which could so ruthlessly and in a moment wither the triumph of a great cause by so unexpected and overwhelming a calamity, was so profound and intense, his desire for immediate and commensurate vengeance was so uncontrollable and unreasoning, as to distort his perception, unsettle his judgment, and thus cause him to form an estimate of the nature and extent of the impending danger as false and exaggerated as that of the most panic-stricken wretch in the streets.

    Personally, besides, he was unfitted in many respects for such an emergency.

    Though an able and, it may be, a great War-Minister, he exerted no control over his temper; he habitually identified a conciliatory and charitable disposition with active disloyalty; and, being unpopular with the people of Washington by reason of the gruffness of his ways and the inconsistencies of his past political career, he had reached the unalterable conviction that the Capital was a nest of sympathizers with the South, and that he was surrounded by enemies of himself and his country.

    When, therefore, upon the crushing news that the President was slain, followed hard the announcement that another assassin had made a slaughter-house of the residence of the Minister's own colleague, self-possession--the one supreme quality which was indispensable to a leader at such an awful juncture--forsook him and fled.

    Before the breath was out of the body of the President, the Secretary had rushed to the conclusion, unsupported as yet by a shadow of testimony, that the acts of Booth and of the assailant of Seward (at the moment supposed to be John H. Surratt) were the outcome of a widespread, numerous and powerful conspiracy to kill, not only the President and the Secretary of State, but all the other heads of the Departments, the Vice-President and the General of the Army as well, and thus bring the government to an end; and that the primary moving power of the conspiracy was the defunct rebellion as represented by its titular President and his Cabinet, and its agents in Canada.

    This belief, embraced with so much precipitation, immediately became more than a belief; it became a fixed idea in his mind.

    He saw, heard, felt and cherished every thing that favored it. He would see nothing, would hear nothing, and hated every thing, that in the slightest degree militated against it. Upon this theory he began, and upon this theory he prosecuted to the end, every effort for the discovery, arrest, trial and punishment of the murderers.

    He was seconded by a lieutenant well-fitted for such a purpose--General Lafayette C. Baker, Chief of the Detective Force. In one of the two minority reports presented to the House of Representatives by the Judiciary Committee, on the Impeachment Investigation of 1867, this man and his methods are thus delineated:

    "The first witness examined was General Lafayette C. Baker, late chief
    of the detective police, and although examined on oath, time and
    again, and on various occasions, it is doubtful whether he has in any
    one thing told the truth, even by accident. In every important
    statement he is contradicted by witnesses of unquestioned credibility.
    And there can be no doubt that to his many previous outrages,
    entitling him to an unenviable immortality, he has added that of
    wilful and deliberate perjury; and we are glad to know that no one
    member of the committee deems any statement made by him as worthy of
    the slightest credit.

    What a blush of shame will tinge the cheek of
    the American student in future ages, when he reads that this miserable
    wretch for years held, as it were, in the hollow of his hand, the
    liberties of the American people.

    That, clothed with power by a
    reckless administration, and with his hordes of unprincipled tools and
    spies permeating the land everywhere, with uncounted thousands of the
    people's money placed in his hands for his vile purposes, this
    creature not only had power to arrest without crime or writ, and
    imprison without limit, any citizen of the republic, but that he
    actually did so arrest thousands, all over the land, and filled the
    prisons of the country with the victims of his malice, or that of his
    masters."

    In this man's hands Secretary Stanton placed all the resources of the War Department, in soldiers, detectives, material and money, and commanded him to push ahead and apprehend all persons suspected of complicity in the assumed conspiracy, and to conduct an investigation as to the origin and progress of the crime, upon the theory he had adopted and which, as much as any other, Baker was perfectly willing to accept and then, by his peculiar methods, establish. Forthwith was ushered in the grand carnival of detectives. Far and wide they sped. They had orders from Baker to do two things:

    I.--To arrest all the "Suspect." II.--By promises, rewards, threats, deceit, force, or any other effectual means, to extort confessions and procure testimony to establish the conspiracy whose existence had been postulated.

    At two o'clock in the morning of Saturday, the fifteenth, they burst into the house of Mrs. Surratt and displaying the bloody collar of the coat of the dying Lincoln, demanded the whereabouts of Booth and Surratt. It being presently discovered that Booth had escaped on horseback across the Navy Yard Bridge with David Herold ten minutes in his rear, a dash was made upon the livery-stables of Washington, their proprietors taken into custody, and then the whole of lower Maryland was invaded, the soldiers declaring martial law as they progressed.

    Ford's theatre was taken and held by an armed force, and the proprietor and employees were all swept into prison, including Edward Spangler, a scene-shifter, who had been a menial attendant of Booth's.

    The superstitious notion prevailed that the inanimate edifice whose walls had suffered such a desecration was in some vague sense an accomplice; the Secretary swore that no dramatic performance should ever take place there again; and the suspicion was sedulously kept alive that the manager and the whole force of the company must have aided their favorite actor, or the crime could not have been so easily perpetrated and the assassin escaped.

    On the night of the fifteenth (Saturday) a locked room in the Kirkwood House, where Vice President Johnson was stopping, which had been engaged by George A. Atzerodt on the morning of the fourteenth, was broken open, and in the bed were found a bowie-knife and a revolver, and on the wall a coat (subsequently identified as Herold's), in which was found, among other articles, a bank book of Booth's. The room had not been otherwise occupied--Atzerodt, after taking possession of it, having mysteriously disappeared.

    On the morning of the seventeenth (Monday), at Baltimore, Michael O'Laughlin was arrested as a friend of Booth's, and it was soon thought that he "resembled extremely" a certain suspicious stranger who, it was remembered, had been seen prowling about Secretary Stanton's residence on the night of the 13th, when the serenade took place, and there doing such an unusual act as inquiring for, and looking at, General Grant.

    On the same day at Fort Monroe, Samuel Arnold was arrested, whose letter signed "Sam" had been found on Saturday night among the effects of Booth.

    On the night of the seventeenth, also, the house of Mrs. Surratt with all its contents was taken possession of by the soldiers, and Mrs. Surratt, her daughter, and all the other inmates were taken into custody. While the ladies were making preparations for their departure to prison, a man disguised as a laborer, with a sleeve of his knit undershirt drawn over his head, a pick-axe on his shoulder, and covered with mud, came to the door with the story that he was to dig a drain for Mrs.

    Surratt in the morning; and that lady asseverating that she had never seen the man before, he was swept with the rest to headquarters, and there, to the astonishment of everybody, turned out to be the desperate assailant of the Sewards.

    During these few days Washington was like a city of the dead. The streets were hung with crape. The obsequies, which started on its march across the continent the colossal funeral procession in which the whole people were mourners, were being celebrated with the most solemn pomp. No business was done except at Military Headquarters. Men hardly dared talk of the calamity of the nation. Everywhere soldiers and police were on the alert to seize any supposed or denounced sympathizer with the South. Mysterious and prophetic papers turned up at the White House and the War Department.

    Women whispered terrible stories of what they knew about the "Great Crime." To be able to give evidence was to be envied as a hero.

    And still the arch-devil of the plot could not be found!

    The lower parts of Maryland seethed like a boiling pot, and the prisons of Washington were choking with the "suspect" from that quarter. Lloyd--the drunken landlord of the tavern at Surrattsville, ten miles from Washington, at which Booth and Herold had stopped at midnight of the fatal Friday for carbines and whisky--after two days of stubborn denial was at last frightened into confession; and Doctor Mudd, who had set Booth's leg Saturday morning thirty miles from Washington, was in close confinement.

    All the intimate friends of the actor in Washington, in Baltimore, in Philadelphia, in New York and even in Montreal were in the clutches of the government. Surratt himself--the pursuit of whom, guided by Weichman, his former college-chum, his room-mate, and the favorite guest of his mother, had been instant and thorough--it was ascertained, had left Canada on the 12th of April and was back again on the 18th.

    But where was Booth? where Herold? where Atzerodt?

    On the 20th, the Secretary of War applied the proper stimulus by issuing a proclamation to the following effect:

    "$50,000 reward will be paid by this department for the apprehension
    of the murderer of our late beloved President.

    "$25,000 reward for the apprehension of John H. Surratt, one of
    Booth's accomplices.

    "$25,000 reward for the apprehension of Herold, another of Booth's
    accomplices.

    "Liberal rewards will be paid for any information that shall conduce
    to the arrest of either of the above-named criminals or their
    accomplices.

    "All persons harboring or secreting the said persons, or either of
    them, or aiding or assisting in their concealment or escape, will be
    treated as accomplices in the murder of the President and the
    attempted assassination of the Secretary of State, and shall be
    subject to trial before a military commission and the punishment of
    death."

    What is noteworthy about this document is that Stanton had already made up his mind as to the guilt of the persons named as accomplices of Booth; that he needed only their arrest, being assured of their consequent conviction; and that he had already determined that their trial and the trial of all persons connected with the great crime, however remotely, should be had before a military tribunal, and that the punishment to follow conviction should be death.

    At four o'clock in the morning of the very day this proclamation was issued, Atzerodt was apprehended at the house of his cousin in Montgomery County, Md., about twenty-two miles northward of Washington, by a detail of soldiers, to whom, by the way, notwithstanding the arrest preceded the proclamation, $25,000 reward was subsequently paid. With Atzerodt his cousin, Richter, was taken also.

    O'Laughlin, Payne, Arnold, Atzerodt and Richter, as they were severally arrested, were put into the custody of the Navy Department and confined on board the Monitor Saugus, which on the morning of Saturday, when the President died, had been ordered to swing out into the middle of the river opposite the Navy Yard, prepared to receive at any hour, day or night, dead or alive, the arch-assassin. Each of these prisoners was loaded with double irons and kept under a strong guard.

    On the 23d, Atzerodt, by order of the Secretary of War, was transferred to the Monitor Montauk, to separate him from his cousin, and Payne, in addition to his double irons, had a ball and chain fastened to each ankle by the direction of the same officer. On the next day Spangler, who had hitherto been confined in the Old Capitol Prison, was transferred to one of the Monitors and presumably subjected to the same treatment. On the same day the following order was issued:

    "The Secretary of War requests that the prisoners on board iron-clads
    belonging to this department for better security against conversation
    shall have a canvass bag put over the head of each and tied around the
    neck, with a hole for proper breathing and eating, but not seeing, and
    that Payne be secured to prevent self-destruction."

    All of which was accordingly done.

    And still no Booth! It seems as though the Secretary were mad enough to imagine that he could wring from Providence the arrest of the principal assassin by heaping tortures on his supposed accomplices.

    At length, in the afternoon of the 26th--Wednesday, the second week after the assassination--Col. Conger arrived with the news of the death of Booth and the capture of Herold on the early morning of that day; bringing with him the diary and other articles found on the person of Booth, which were delivered to Secretary Stanton at his private residence. In the dead of the ensuing night, the body of Booth, sewed up in an old army blanket, arrived, attended by the dog-like Herold; and the living and the dead were immediately transferred to the Montauk.

    Herold was double ironed, balled and chained and hooded. The body of Booth was identified; an autopsy held; the shattered bone of his neck taken out for preservation as a relic (it now hangs from the ceiling of the Medical Museum into which Ford's Theatre was converted, or did before the collapse); and then, with the utmost secrecy and with all the mystery which could be fabricated, under the direction of Col.

    Baker, the corpse was hurriedly taken from the vessel into a small boat, rowed to the Arsenal grounds, and buried in a grave dug in a large cellar-like apartment on the ground floor of the Old Penitentiary; the door was locked, the key removed and delivered into the hands of Secretary Stanton. No effort was spared to conceal the time, place and circumstances of the burial. False stories were set afloat by Baker in furtherance of such purpose.

    Stanton seemed to fear an escape or rescue of the dead man's body; and vowed that no rebel or no rebel sympathizer should have a chance to glory over the corpse, or a fragment of the corpse, of the murderer of Lincoln.

    CHAPTER II.

    THE BUREAU OF MILITARY (IN)JUSTICE.

    Mingling with the varied emotions evoked by the capture and death of the chief criminal was a feeling of deepest exasperation that the foul assassin should after all have eluded the ignominious penalty of his crime. Thence arose a savage disposition on the part of the governing powers to wreak this baffled vengeance first, on his inanimate body; secondly, on the lives of his associates held so securely in such close custody; and thirdly, on all those in high places who might be presumed to sympathize with his deeds. It was too horrible to imagine that the ghost of the martyred Lincoln should walk unavenged.

    So stupendous a calamity must of necessity be the outcome of as stupendous a conspiracy, and must in the very justice of things be followed by as stupendous a retribution.

    A sacrifice must be offered and the victims must be forthcoming. To employ the parallel subsequently drawn by General Ewing on the trial of the conspirators: On the funeral pyre of Patroclus must be immolated the twelve Trojan captives. They were sure of Payne and of Herold. They held Arnold and O'Laughlin and Atzerodt and Spangler and Doctor Mudd--all the supposed satellites of Booth, save one. John H. Surratt could not be found.

    Officers in company with Weichman and Holahan, boarders at his mother's house, who in the terror of the moment had given themselves up on the morning of the fifteenth, traced him to Canada, as has already been noticed, but had there lost track of him. They had returned disappointed; and now Weichman and Holahan were in solitary confinement. Notwithstanding the large rewards out for his capture, as to him alone the all-powerful government seemed to be baffled.

    One consolation there was, however--if they could not find the son, they held the mother as a hostage for him, and they clung to the cruel expectation that by putting her to the torture of a trial and a sentence, they might force the son from his hiding place.

    In the meanwhile the Bureau of Military Justice, presided over by Judge-Advocate-General Holt, had been unceasingly at work. General Baker with his posse of soldiers and detectives scoured the country far and wide for suspected persons and witnesses, hauled them to Washington and shut them up in the prisons. Then the Bureau of Military Justice took them in hand, and, when necessary, by promises, hopes of reward and threats of punishment, squeezed out of them the testimony they wanted. Colonel Henry L.

    Burnett, who had become an expert in such proceedings from having recently conducted the trial of Milligan before a military tribunal at Indianapolis, was brought on to help Judge Holt in the great and good work. In the words of General Ewing in his plea for Dr. Mudd:

    "The very frenzy of madness ruled the hour. Reason was swallowed up in
    patriotic passion, and a feverish and intense excitement prevailed
    most unfavorable to a calm, correct hearing and faithful repetition of
    what was said, especially by the suspected. Again, and again, and
    again the accused was catechised by detectives, each of whom was
    vieing with the other as to which should make the most important
    discoveries, and each making the examination with a preconceived
    opinion of guilt, and with an eager desire, if not determination, to
    find in what might be said the proofs of guilt.

    Again, the witnesses
    testified under the strong stimulus of a promised reward for
    information leading to arrest and followed by convictions."

    The Bureau conducted the investigation on the preconceived theory, adopted, as we have seen, by the Secretary of War, that the Confederate Government was the source of the conspiracy; and, by lavishing promises and rewards, it had no difficulty in finding witnesses who professed themselves to have been spies on the rebel agents in Canada and who were ready to implicate them and through them the President of the defunct Confederacy in the assassination.

    Richard Montgomery and Sanford Conover, who had been in personal communication with these agents during the past year, were eagerly taken into the employ of the Bureau, and made frequent trips to Canada, to return every time laden with fresh proofs of the complicity of the rebels.

    To illustrate how the Bureau of Military Justice dealt with witnesses who happened to have been connected more or less closely with Booth, and who were either reluctant or unable to make satisfactory disclosures, here are two extracts from the evidence given on the trial of John H. Surratt in 1867.

    The first is from the testimony of Lloyd, the besotted keeper of the Surratt tavern:

    "I was first examined at Bryantown by Colonel Wells. I was next
    examined by two different persons at the Carroll prison. I did not
    know either of their names. One was a military officer. I think some
    of the prisoners described him as Colonel Foster. I saw a man at the
    conspiracy trial as one of the Judges who looked very much like him. *
    * * I told him I had made a fuller statement to Colonel Wells than I
    could possibly do to him under the circumstances, while things were
    fresh in my memory.

    His reply was that it was not full enough, and
    then commenced questioning me whether I had ever heard any person say
    that something wonderful or something terrible was going to take
    place. I told him I had never heard anyone say so. Said he I have seen
    it in the newspapers.

    "He jumps up very quick off his seat, as if very mad, and asked me if
    I knew what I was guilty of. I told him, under the circumstances I did
    not. He said you are guilty as an accessory to a crime the punishment
    of which is death. With that I went up stairs to my room."

    The next is from the testimony of Lewis J. Carland, to whom Weichman confessed his remorse after the execution of Mrs. Surratt:

    "He [Weichman] said it would have been very different with Mrs.
    Surratt if he had been let alone; that a statement had been prepared
    for him, that it was written out for him, and that he was threatened
    with prosecution as one of the conspirators if he did not swear to it.
    He said that a detective had been put into Carroll prison with him,
    and that this man had written out a statement which he said he had
    made in his sleep, and that he had to swear to that statement."

    Let us add another; it is so short and yet so suggestive. It is from the testimony of James J. Gifford, who was a witness for the prosecution on both trials.

    "Q.--Do you know Mr. Weichman?

    "A.--I have seen him.

    "Q.--Were you in Carroll prison with him?

    "A.--Yes, sir.

    "Q.--Did he say in your presence that an officer of the government had
    told him that unless he testified to more than he had already stated
    they would hang him too?

    "A.--I heard the officer tell him so."

    After a fortnight of such wholesale processes of arrest, imprisonment, inquisition, reward and intimidation, the Bureau of Military Justice announced itself ready to prove the charges it had formulated. Thereupon two proclamations were issued by President Johnson. One, dated May the first, after stating that the Attorney General had given his opinion "that all persons implicated in the murder of the late President, Abraham Lincoln, and the attempted assassination of the Hon. William H.

    Seward, Secretary of State, and in an alleged conspiracy to assassinate other officers of the Federal Government at Washington City, and their aiders and abettors, are subject to the jurisdiction of and legally triable before a Military Commission," ordered 1st, "that the Assistant Adjutant-General (W. A.

    Nichols) detail nine competent military officers to serve as a Commission for the trial of said parties, and that the Judge-Advocate-General proceed to prefer charges against said parties for their alleged offences, and bring them to trial before said Military Commission." 2d, "that Brevet Major-General Hartranft be assigned to duty as Special Provost-Marshal-General for the purpose of said trial and attendance upon said Commission, and the execution of its mandates."

    The other proclamation, dated May 2nd, after reciting that "it appears from evidence in the Bureau of Military Justice, that the atrocious murder of the late President, Abraham Lincoln, and the attempted assassination of the Hon. William H. Seward, Secretary of State, were incited, concerted, and procured by and between Jefferson Davis, late of Richmond, Va., and Jacob Thompson, Clement C. Clay, Beverly Tucker, George N. Sanders, William C. Cleary, and other rebels and traitors against the Government of the United States, harbored in Canada," offered the following rewards:

    "$100,000 for the arrest of Jefferson Davis.

    "$25,000 for the arrest of Clement C. Clay.

    "$25,000 for the arrest of Jacob Thompson, late of Mississippi.

    "$25,000 for the arrest of Geo. N. Saunders.

    "$25,000 for the arrest of Beverly Tucker.

    "$10,000 for the arrest of Wm. C. Cleary, late clerk of Clement C.
    Clay.

    "The Provost-Marshal-General of the United States is directed to cause
    a description of said persons, with notice of the above rewards, to be
    published."

    At this date the President of the defunct Confederacy was a fugitive, without an army; and bands of U. S. Cavalry were already on the scout to intercept his flight. Military Justice, however, was too impatient to await the arrest of the prime object of its sword; and in obedience to the first proclamation proceeded without delay to organize a court to try the prisoners selected from the multitude undergoing confinement as the fittest victims to appease the shade of the murdered President.

    Over some of the "suspect" the Judge-Advocates for a time vacillated, whether to include them in the indictment or to use them as witnesses; but, after a season of rigid examinations, renewed and revised, they at last concluded that such persons would be more available in the latter capacity.

    On the third day of May the funeral car, which, leaving Washington on the twenty-first of April, had borne the body of the lamented Lincoln through State after State, arrived at last at Springfield; and on the following day the cherished remains were there consigned to the tomb. On the sixth, by special order of the Adjutant-General, a Military Commission was appointed to meet at Washington on Monday, the eighth day of May, or as soon thereafter as practicable, "for the trial of David E. Herold, George A.

    Atzerodt, Lewis Payne, Michael O'Laughlin, Edward Spangler, Samuel Arnold, Mary E. Surratt, Samuel A. Mudd and such other prisoners as may be brought before it, implicated in the murder of the late President and in the attempted assassination of the Secretary of State and in an alleged conspiracy to assassinate other officers of the Federal Government at Washington City, and their aiders and abettors. By order of the President of the United States." And so, all things being in readiness, let the curtain rise.

    PART I.

    THE MURDER.

    CHAPTER I.

    THE OPENING OF THE COURT.

    On the ninth day of May the Commission met but only to adjourn that the prisoners might employ counsel. On the same day, two of its members, General Cyrus B. Comstock and Colonel Horace Porter--names to be noted for what may have been a heroic refusal--were relieved from the duty of sitting upon the Commission, and two other officers substituted in their stead.

    So that Tuesday, May 10th, 1865--twenty-six days after the assassination, a period much too short for the intense excitement and wild desire for vengeance to subside--may properly be designated as the first session of the Court. On the early morning of that day--before daylight--Jefferson Davis had been captured, and was immediately conducted, not to Washington to stand trial for his alleged complicity in the assassination, but to Fort Monroe. On the next day Clement C. Clay, also, surrendered himself to the United States authorities, and was sent, not to Washington to meet the awful charge formulated against him, but to the same military fortress.

    The room in which the Commission met was in the northeast corner of the third story of the Old Penitentiary; a building standing in the U. S.

    Arsenal Grounds at the junction of the Potomac with the Eastern Branch, in a room on the ground floor of which the body of Booth had been secretly buried. Its windows were guarded by iron gratings, and it communicated with that part of the prison where the accused were now confined, by a door in the western wall. The male prisoners had been removed some days before from the Monitors to the Penitentiary, where Mrs. Surratt was already incarcerated, and each of them, including the lady, was now immured in a solitary cell under the surveillance of a special guard.

    Around a table near the eastern side of this room sat, resplendent in full uniform, the members of the Court.

    At the head as President was Major-General David Hunter--a stern, white-headed soldier, sixty-three years old; a fierce radical; the first officer to organize the slaves into battalions of war; the warm personal friend of Lincoln, at the head of whose corpse he had grimly sat as it rested from place to place on the triumphal progress to its burial, and from whose open grave he had hurried, in no very judicial humor to say the least, to take his seat among the Judges of the accused assassins.

    On his right sat Major-General Lew Wallace, a lawyer by profession; afterwards the President of the Court-Martial which tried and hung Henry Wirz; but now, by a sardonic freak of destiny, known to all the world as the tender teller of "Ben Hur, a Tale of the Christ." To the right of General Wallace sat Brevet Brigadier-General James A. Ekin and Brevet Colonel Charles A. Tompkins; about whom the only thing remarkable is that they had stepped into the places of the two relieved officers, Colonel Tompkins being the only regular army officer on the Board.

    On the left of General Hunter sat, first, Brevet Major-General August V. Kautz, a native of Germany; next, Brigadier-General Robert S. Foster, who may or may not have been the "Colonel Foster" alluded to in the testimony of Lloyd quoted above, as threatening the witness and as afterwards being seen by him on the Commission--the presence of an officer, previously engaged by the Government in collecting testimony against the accused, as one of the judges to try him not being considered a violation of Military Justice.

    Next sat Brigadier-General Thomas Mealey Harris, a West Virginian, and the author of a book entitled "Calvinism Vindicated;" next, Brigadier-General Albion P. Howe, and last, Lieutenant-Colonel David R. Clendenin.

    Not one of these nine men could have withstood the challenge which the common law mercifully puts into the hands of the most abandoned culprit.

    They had come together with one determined and unchangeable purpose--to avenge the foul murder of their beloved Commander-in-Chief. They dreamt not of acquittal. They were, necessarily, from the very nature of their task, organized to convict.

    The accused were asked, it is true, whether they had any objections to any member of the Court. But this was the emptiest of forms, as bias is no cause of challenge in military procedure, and peremptory challenges are unknown.

    Moreover, it was nothing but a cruel mockery to offer to that trembling group of prisoners an opportunity, which, if any one of them had the temerity to embrace, could only have resulted in barbing with the sting of personal insult the hostile predisposition of the judges.

    At the foot of the table around which the Court sat--the table standing parallel with the north side of the room--there was another, around which were gathered the three prosecuting officers, who, according to military procedure, were also members of the Commission.

    First, was Brigadier-General Joseph Holt, the Judge-Advocate of the U. S.

    Army, and the Recorder of the Commission. During his past military career he had distinguished himself on many a bloody court-martial.

    Second, designated by General Holt as First Assistant or Special Judge-Advocate, was Hon. John A. Bingham, of Ohio--long a Representative in Congress, then for a short interval a Military Judge-Advocate, now a Representative in Congress again, and to become in the strange vicissitudes of the near future, one of the managers of the impeachment of President Johnson, whom he now cannot praise too highly.

    He was one of those fierce and fiery western criminal lawyers, gifted with that sort of vociferous oratory which tells upon jurors and on the stump, by nature and training able to see but one side to a case and consequently merciless to his victims.

    His special function was to cross-examine and brow-beat the witnesses for the defense, a branch of his profession in which he was proudly proficient, and, above all, by pathetic appeals to their patriotism and loyalty, and by measureless denunciations of the murder of their Commander-in-Chief and of the Rebellion, to keep up at a white heat the already burning passions of the officers composing the tribunal. Next to him came Colonel Henry L.

    Burnett; brought from Indiana where he had won recent laurels in conducting the trial of Milligan for treason before a Military Commission--laurels, alas! soon to be blasted by the decision of the U. S. Supreme Court pronouncing that and all other Military Commissions for the trial of citizens in places where the civil courts are open illegal, and setting free the man this zealous public servant had been instrumental in condemning to death.

    In the centre of the room was a witness-stand facing the Court. To the left of the witness-stand a table for the official reporters. Along the western side and directly opposite the Court was a platform about a foot high and four feet broad, with a strong railing in front of it. This was the prisoners' dock. The platform was divided near the left hand or southern corner by the doorway which led to the cells. In front of the southern end of the dock and behind the witness-stand was the table of the prisoners' counsel.

    At the appointed hour the door in the western side opens and an impressive and mournful procession appears. Six soldiers armed to the teeth are interspersed among seven male prisoners and one woman.

    First walks Samuel Arnold, the young Baltimorean, who is to sit at the extreme right (i. e., of the spectators), followed close by his armed guard; next, Dr. Samuel T. Mudd and a soldier; next, Edward Spangler and a soldier; next, Michael O'Laughlin, another Baltimorean, and his soldier; next, George B. Atzerodt and a soldier; next, Lewis Payne, a tall gladiator, though only twenty years old, and his soldier; and then David E. Herold, looking like an insignificant boy, who is to sit next the door.

    As they enter, their fetters clanking at every step, they turn to their left and take seats on the platform in the order named, the six soldiers being sandwiched here and there between two of the men.

    Each of these prisoners, during the entire trial, was loaded down with irons made as massive and uncomfortable as possible. Their wrists were bound with the heaviest hand-cuffs, connected by bars of iron ten inches long (with the exception of Dr. Mudd, whose hand-cuffs were connected by a chain), so that they could not join their hands. Their legs were weighed down by shackles joined by chains made short enough to hamper their walk.

    In addition to these fetters, common to all, Payne and Atzerodt had, attached by chains to their legs, huge iron balls, which their guards had to lift and carry after them whenever they entered or left the Court room.

    Last, there emerges from the dungeon-like darkness of the doorway the single female prisoner, Mary E. Surratt. She, alone, turns to her right and, consequently, when she is seated has the left hand corner of the platform to herself. But she is separated from her companions in misery by more than the narrow passage-way that divides the dock; for she is a lady of fair social position, of unblemished character and of exemplary piety, and, besides, she is a mother, a widow, and, in that room amongst all those soldiers, lawyers, guards, judges and prisoners, the sole representative of her sex. Her womanhood is her peculiar weakness, yet still her only shield.

    Is she too ironed?

    The unanimous testimony of eye-witnesses published at the time of the trial is, that, though not hand-cuffed, she was bound with iron "anklets" on her feet. And this detail, thus universally proclaimed in the Northern Press and by loyal writers, was mentioned not as conveying the slightest hint of reprobation, but as constituting, like the case of the male prisoners, a part of the appropriate treatment by the military of a person suffering under such a charge. And, moreover, no contemporaneous denial of this widespread circumstance was anywhere made, either by Provost-Marshal, Counsel, Judge-Advocate or member of the Court.

    It passed unchallenged into history, like many another deed of shame, over which it is a wonder that any man could glory, but which characterized that period of frenzy.

    Eight years after, during the bitter controversy between Andrew Johnson and Joseph Holt over the recommendation of mercy to Mrs. Surratt, General Hartranft, the former Special Provost-Marshal in charge of the prisoners, first broke silence and, coming to the aid of the sorely-tried Ex-Judge-Advocate, sent him a vehement categorical denial that Mrs.

    Surratt was ever manacled at any time, or that there was ever a thought of manacling her in any one's mind. Now, what force should be given to such a denial by so distinguished an officer, so long delayed and in the face of such universal contemporaneous affirmation?

    No one knows how close and exclusive the charge of the prisoners by the special Provost-Marshal was, nor how liable to interruption, interference and supersession by the omnipotent Bureau of Military Justice, or by the maddened Secretary of War and his obsequious henchmen.

    At the time the naked assertion was made, to heap indignities upon the head of the only woman in the whole country whom the soldiery took for granted was the one female fiend who helped to shed the blood of the martyred President, was so consonant with the angry feeling, in military circles, that an officer, having only a general superintendence over the custody and treatment of what was called "a band of fiends," would be very likely to overlook such a small matter as that the she-assassin was not exempted, in one detail, from the contumelies and cruelties it was thought patriotic to pile upon her co-conspirators.

    The only wonder ought to be that they relieved her from the hand-cuffs. They appear to have discriminated in the case of Dr. Mudd also, substituting a chain for an inflexible bar so that he for one could move his hands. There may have been some unmentioned physical reasons for both of these alleviations, but we may rest assured that neither sex, in the one case, nor profession in the other, was among them.

    General Hartranft (or any other General) never denied, or thought it necessary to deny, that the seven male prisoners sat through the seven weeks of the trial, loaded, nay tortured, with irons. And there is no doubt that this unspeakable outrage, if thought of at all at the trial by the soldiery--high or low--so far from being thought of as a matter of reprobation, was a subject of grim merriment or stern congratulation.

    Eight years, however, passed away--eight years, in which a fund of indignation at such brutality, above all to a woman, had been silently accumulating, until at length to a soldier, whose beclouding passions of the moment had in the meantime cooled down, its weight made every loop-hole of escape an entrance for the very breath of life.

    The entire atmosphere had changed, and denials became the order of the day. Memory is a most convenient faculty; and to forget what the lapse of years has at last stamped with infamy is easy, when the event passed at the time as a mere matter of course. Leaving these tardy repudiators of an iniquity, the responsibility for which in the day of its first publication they tacitly assumed with the utmost complacency, to settle the question with posterity;--we insist that the preference is open to writers upon the events of the year 1865 to rely upon the unprejudiced and unchallenged statements of eye-witnesses; and, therefore, we do here reaffirm that Mary E.

    Surratt walked into the court-room, and sat during her trial, with shackles upon her limbs.

    At this late day it is a most natural supposition that these nine stalwart military heroes, sitting comfortably around their table, arrayed in their bright uniforms, with their own arms and their own legs unfettered, must have felt at least a faint flush of mingled pity, shame and indignation, as they looked across that room at that ironed row of human beings.

    Culprits arraigned before them, guarded by armed soldiery, without arms themselves--why, in the name of justice, drag them into Court and force them to sit through a long trial, bound with iron, hand and foot? Was it to forestall a last possible effort of reckless and suicidal despair?

    These brave warriors could not have feared the naked arm of Payne, nor have indulged the childish apprehension that seven unarmed men and one unarmed woman might overpower six armed soldiers and nine gallant officers, and effect their escape from the third story of a prison guarded on all sides with bayonets and watched by detective police! And yet, so far as appears, no single member of the Court, to whom such a desecration of our common humanity was a daily sight for weeks, thought it deserving of notice, much less of protest.

    There is but one explanation of this moral insensibility, and that applies with the same force to the case of the woman as to those of the men. It is, that the accused were already doomed. For them no humiliation could be thought too deep, no indignity too vile, no hardship too severe, because their guilt was predetermined to be clear.

    And the members of the Military Commission, as they looked across the room at that sorry sight, saw nothing incongruous with justice, or even with the most chivalrous decorum, that the traitorous murderers of their beloved Commander-in-Chief should wear the shackles which were the proper precursors of the death of ignominy, they were resolved the outlaws should not escape.

    We, civilians, must ever humbly bear in mind that the rule of the common law, that every person accused of crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt--a rule the benignity of which is often sneered at by soldiers as giving occasion for lawyers' tricks and quibbles, and as an impediment to swift justice, is reversed in military courts, where every person accused of crime is presumed to be guilty until he himself prove his innocence.

    After the prisoners had been seated, and the members of the Commission, the Judge-Advocates and the official reporters sworn in, the accused were severally arraigned. There was but one Charge against the whole eight.

    Carefully formulated by the three Judge-Advocates upon the lines of the theory adopted by the Secretary of War, and which Gen. Baker and the Bureau of Military Justice had been moving heaven and earth to establish, it was so contrived as to allege a crime of such unprecedented, far-reaching and profound heinousness as to be an adequate cause of such an unprecedented and profound calamity.

    The eight prisoners were jointly and severally charged with nothing less than having, in aid of the Rebellion, "traitorously" conspired, "together with one John H. Surratt, John Wilkes Booth, Jefferson Davis, George N. Sanders, Beverley Tucker, Jacob Thompson, William C. Cleary, Clement C. Clay, George Harper, George Young and others unknown, to kill and murder" "Abraham Lincoln, late President of the United States and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, Andrew Johnson, then Vice-President, Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, and Ulysses S.

    Grant, Lieutenant-General;" and of having, in pursuance of such "traitorous conspiracy," "together with John Wilkes Booth and John H. Surratt" "traitorously" murdered Abraham Lincoln, "traitorously" assaulted with intent to kill, William H. Seward, and lain in wait "traitorously" to murder Andrew Johnson and Ulysses S. Grant.

    On this elastic comprehensive Charge, in which treason and murder are vaguely commingled, every one of the men, and Mary E. Surratt, were arraigned, plead not guilty, and were put upon trial. There is no doubt, by the way, that the Secretary of War would have been included as one of the contemplated victims, had not Edwin M. Stanton borne so prominent a part in the prosecution; and it was for this reason, and not because of any change in the evidence, that General Grant stood alone, as the mark of O'Laughlin.

    To this single Charge there was, also, but a single Specification. This document alleged that the design of all these traitorous conspirators was, to deprive the Army and Navy of their Commander-in-Chief and the armies of their Commander; to prevent a lawful election of President and Vice-President; and by such means to aid and comfort the Rebellion and overthrow the Constitution and laws.

    It then alleged the killing of Abraham Lincoln by Booth in the prosecution of the conspiracy, and charged the murder to be the act of the prisoners, as well as of Booth and John H. Surratt. It then alleged that Spangler, in furtherance of the conspiracy, aided Booth in obtaining entrance to the box of the theatre, in barring the door of the theatre box, and in effecting his escape. Then, that Herold, in furtherance of the conspiracy, aided and abetted Booth in the murder, and in effecting his escape.

    Then, that Payne, in like furtherance, made the murderous assault on Seward and also on his two sons and two attendants. Then, that Atzerodt, in like furtherance, at the same hour of the night, lay in wait for Andrew Johnson with intent to kill him. Then, that Michael O'Laughlin, in like furtherance, on the nights of the 13th and 14th of April, lay in wait for General Grant with like intent.

    Then, that Samuel Arnold, in prosecution of the conspiracy, "did, on or before the 6th day of March, 1865, and on divers other days and times between that day and the 15th day of April, 1865, combine, conspire with and counsel, abet, comfort and support" Booth, Payne, Atzerodt, O'Laughlin and their confederates. Then, "that, in prosecution of the conspiracy, Mary E.

    Surratt, on or before the 6th of March, 1865, and on divers other days and times between that day and the 20th of April, 1865, received, entertained, harbored and concealed, aided and assisted" Booth, Herold, Payne, John H. Surratt, O'Laughlin, Atzerodt, Arnold and their confederates, "with the knowledge of the murderous and traitorous conspiracy aforesaid, and with intent to aid, abet and assist them in the execution thereof, and in escaping from justice." And, lastly, that in prosecution of the conspiracy Samuel A.

    Mudd did from on or before the 6th day of March, to the 20th of April "advise, encourage, receive, entertain, harbor and conceal, aid and assist" Booth, Herold, Payne, John H. Surratt, O'Laughlin, Atzerodt, Mary E. Surratt, Arnold and their confederates, in its execution and their escape.

    After the prisoners, who as yet had no counsel, had pleaded not guilty to the Charge and Specification, the Court adopted rules of proceeding--one of which was that the sessions of the Court should be secret, and no one but the sworn officers and the counsel for the prisoners, also sworn to secrecy, should be admitted, except by permit of the President of the Commission; and that only such portions of the testimony as the Judge-Advocate should designate should be made public.

    On the next day (Thursday, May 11th), Mr. Thomas Ewing, Jr. and Mr.

    Frederick Stone appeared as counsel for Dr. Mudd, and Mr. Frederick A.

    Aiken and Mr. John W. Clampitt for Mrs. Surratt; and on the succeeding day (12th), Mr. Frederick Stone appeared for Herold "at the earnest request of his widowed mother and estimable sisters;" General Ewing for Arnold (and on Monday, the 15th, for Spangler); Mr. Walter S. Cox for O'Laughlin, and Mr. William E. Doster for Payne and Atzerodt.

    By the rules of the Commission no counsel could appear for the prisoners unless he took the "iron-clad oath" or filed evidence of having taken it.

    So supersensitive was the loyalty of the Court that it could not brook the presence of a "sympathizer with the South," even in such a confidential relation as counsel for accused conspirators in aid of the Rebellion.

    The demeanor of the Court towards the counsel for the defense, reflecting as in a mirror the humor of the Judge-Advocates, was highly characteristic. Sometimes they were treated with haughty indifference, sometimes with ironical condescension, often with contumely, generally with contempt. Their objections were invariably overruled, unless acceded to by the Judge-Advocate. The Commission could not conceal its secret opinion that they were engaged in a disreputable and disloyal employment.

    This statement must be somewhat qualified, however, so far as it relates to General Ewing. He was, or had been recently, of equal rank in the army of the Union with the members of the Court. He was a brother-in-law of General Sherman, and he had acquired a high reputation for gallantry and skill, as well as loyalty, during the war.

    That such a distinguished fellow-soldier should appear to defend the fiendish murderers of their beloved Commander-in-Chief--outlaws they were detailed as a Court to hang--evidently perplexed and disconcerted these military Judges and tended in some degree to curb the over-bearing insolence of the Special Judge-Advocate.

    Thus, this able lawyer and gallant officer and noble man was enabled to be "the leading spirit of the defense;" and, as we shall see, he wrought the miracle of plucking from the deadly clutches of the Judge-Advocates the lives of every one of the men he defended. But this instance was a most notable exception. As a rule, even the silent presence of the counsel for the accused jarred upon the feelings of the Court, and their vocal interference provoked, at intervals, its outspoken animadversion. A trifling incident will serve to illustrate.

    The witnesses, while giving their testimony, were required to face the Court, so that they necessarily turned their backs on the counsel for the prisoners who were placed some distance behind the witness-stand.

    These counsel were also forced to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, and interrogate their own, without seeing their faces; and as often as a witness in instinctive obedience to the dictates of good manners would turn round to answer a question, the President of the Court would check him by a "sharp reprimand" and the stern admonition: "Face the Court!" The confusion of a witness, especially for the defense, when thundered at in this way by General Hunter, and the reiterated humiliation of counsel implied in the order, seem to have only called forth the wonder that witnesses "would persist in turning towards the prisoners' counsel!"

    Clearly these lawyers were an unmeaning, an impeding, an offensive, though unavoidable, superfluity.

    CHAPTER II.

    ANIMUS OF THE JUDGES.

    On Saturday, the 13th of May, an incident occurred which throws much light upon the judicial temper of the Court at the very beginning of the trial.

    On that day Reverdy Johnson appeared as counsel for Mrs. Surratt.

    Admitted to the bar in 1815, Senator of the United States as far back as 1845, Attorney-General of the United States as long ago as 1849, and holding the position of Senator of the United States again at that very moment; having taken the constitutional oath in all the Courts including the Supreme Court of the United States at whose bar he was one of the most eminent advocates; three years after this time to be Minister Plenipotentiary to England; as he stood there, venerable both in years and in honors, appearing at great personal and professional sacrifice, gratuitously, for a woman in peril of her life, one would have thought him secure at least from insult.

    Yet no sooner did he announce his intention, if the Court would permit him at any time to attend to his imperative duties elsewhere, to act as counsel, than the President of the Commission read aloud a note he had received from one of his colleagues objecting "to the admission of Reverdy Johnson as a counsel before this Court on the ground that he does not recognize the moral obligation of an oath that is designed as a test of loyalty;" and, in support of the objection, referring to Mr.

    Johnson's letter to the people of Maryland pending the adoption of the new constitution of 1864.

    The following colloquy then took place:

    "Mr. Johnson.--May I ask who the member of the Court is that makes
    that objection?

    "The President.--Yes, sir, it is General Harris, and, if he had not
    made it, I should have made it myself.

    "Mr. Johnson.--I do not object to it at all. The Court will decide if
    I am to be tried.

    "The President.--The Court will be cleared.

    "Mr. Johnson.--I hope I shall be heard.

    "General Ekin.--I think it can be decided without clearing the Court.

    "General Wallace.--I move that Mr. Johnson be heard.

    "The President and others.--Certainly.

    "Mr. Johnson.--Is the opinion here to which the objection refers?

    "The President.--I think it is not."

    It was discovered, farther on, that General Harris by his own admissions had not even seen the opinion since he had read it a year ago, and that his objection, involving so grave an attack upon the moral character of so distinguished a man, was based upon a mere recollection of its contents after that lapse of time.

    Naturally, the gray-haired statesman and lawyer was indignant at this premeditated insult. In his address to the Court he repudiated with scorn the interpretation put upon his letter by his accuser.

    He explained the circumstances under which the opinion was delivered; that the Maryland Convention had prescribed an oath to the voter which they had no right to exact; "and all that the opinion said, or was intended to say, was, that to take the oath voluntarily was not a craven submission to usurped authority, but was necessary in order to enable the citizen to protect his rights under the then constitution; and that there was no moral harm in taking an oath which the Convention had no authority to impose."

    Among other things he said:

    "There is no member of this Court, including the President, and the
    member that objects, who recognizes the obligation of an oath more
    absolutely than I do; and there is nothing in my life, from its
    commencement to the present time, which would induce me for a moment
    to avoid a comparison in all moral respects between myself and any
    member of this Court.

    "If such an objection was made in the Senate of the United States,
    where I am known, I forbear to say how it would be treated.

    "I have lived too long, gone through too many trials, rendered the
    country such services as my abilities enabled me, and the confidence
    of the people in whose midst I am has given me the opportunity, to
    tolerate for a moment--come from whom it may--such an aspersion upon
    my moral character. I am glad it is made now, when I have arrived at
    that period of life when it would be unfit to notice it in any other
    way.

    "I am here at the instance of that lady (pointing to Mrs. Surratt)
    whom I never saw until yesterday, and never heard of, she being a
    Maryland lady; and thinking that I could be of service to her, and
    protesting as she has done her innocence to me--of the facts I know
    nothing--because I deemed it right, I deemed it due to the character
    of the profession to which I belong, and which is not inferior to the
    noble profession of which you are members, that she should not go
    undefended.

    I knew I was to do it voluntarily, without compensation;
    the law prohibits me from receiving compensation; but if it did not,
    understanding her condition, I should never have dreamed of refusing
    upon the ground of her inability to make compensation."

    General Harris, in reply, insisted that the remarks of Mr. Johnson, explanatory of the letter, corroborated his construction. "I understand him to say that the doctrine which he taught the people of his state was, that because the Convention had framed an oath, which was unconstitutional and illegal in his opinion, therefore it had no moral binding force, and that people might take it and then go and vote without any regard to the subject matter, of the oath."

    Mr. Johnson, interrupting, denied having said any such thing. General Hunter, thereupon, to help his colleague out, had the remarks read from the record. Mr. Johnson assenting to the correctness of the report, General Harris continued: "If that language does not justify my conclusion, I confess I am unable to understand the English language;" and then repeated his construction of the letter.

    After he had concluded, Mr. Johnson endeavored to show the author of "Calvinism Vindicated" that he did not understand the English language, by pointing out the distinction between stating "there was no harm in taking an oath, and telling the people of Maryland that there would be no harm in breaking it after it was taken." Again repelling the misconstruction attempted to be put upon his words, he proceeded to open a new line as follows:

    "But, as a legal question, it is something new to me that the objection, if it was well founded in fact is well founded in law. Who gives to the Court the jurisdiction to decide upon the moral character of the counsel who may appear before them? Who makes them the arbiters of the public morality and professional morality? What authority have they, under their commission, to rule me out, or to rule any other counsel out, upon the ground, above all, that he does not recognize the validity of an oath, even if they believed it?"

    General Harris, in rejoinder, stated that under the rules adopted by the Commission gentlemen appearing as counsel for the accused must either produce a certificate of having taken the oath of loyalty or take it before the Court, and that therefore the Court had a right to inquire whether counsel held such opinions as to be incompetent to take the oath.

    He then expressed his gladness "to give the gentleman the benefit of his disclaimer. It is satisfactory to me, but it is, I must insist, a tacit admission that there was some ground for the view upon which my objection was founded."

    Mr. Johnson closed this irritating discussion by saying:

    "The order under which you are assembled gives you no authority to
    refuse me admission because you have no authority to administer the
    oath to me.

    I have taken the oath in the Senate of the United
    States--the very oath that you are administering; I have taken it in
    the Circuit Court of the United States; I have taken it in the Supreme
    Court of the United States; and I am a practitioner in all the Courts
    of the United States in nearly all the States; and it would be a
    little singular if one who has a right to appear before the supreme
    judicial tribunal of the land, and who has a right to appear before
    one of the Legislative departments of the Government whose law creates
    armies, and creates judges and courts-martial, should not have a right
    to appear before a court-martial.

    I have said all that I proposed to
    say."

    The President of the Court, who had already made himself a party to this gross insult to a distinguished counsel--as if disappointed that the affair was about to end so smoothly--here burst out:

    "Mr. Johnson has made an intimation in regard to holding members of
    this Court personally responsible for their action.

    "Mr. Johnson.--I made no such intimation; did not intend it.

    "The President.--Then I shall say nothing more, sir.

    "Mr. Johnson.--I had no idea of it. I said I was too old to feel such
    things, if I even would.

    "The President.--I was going to say that I hoped the day had passed
    when freemen from the North were to be bullied and insulted by the
    humbug chivalry; and that, for my own part, I hold myself personally
    responsible for everything I do here. The Court will be cleared."

    On reopening, the Judge-Advocate read a paper from General Harris withdrawing his objection because of Mr. Johnson's disclaimer. General Wallace remarked that it must be known to every member of the Commission that Mr. Senator Johnson had taken the oath in the Senate of the United States. He therefore suggested that the requirement of his taking the oath be dispensed with.

    "The suggestion was acquiesced in, nem. con.

    "Mr. Johnson.--I appear, then, as counsel for Mrs. Surratt."

    In reviewing, at this distance of time, the foregoing scene, it is scarcely possible to realize the state of mind of a member of a tribunal claiming at least to be a court of justice, that could prompt such an onslaught--so shocking to the universal expectation of dignity and decorum, not to say absolute impartiality, in a judge.

    The interpretation put upon the letter of Reverdy Johnson to his constituents by Generals Harris and Hunter was the ordinary, ill-considered, second-hand version circulated by blind party hostility.

    This is clearly shown by the fact that the objection of General Harris was not founded upon a recent perusal of the letter, but upon his own recollection of the impression it made in his own party circles the year before.

    When, on the next Wednesday, General Harris, having in the meantime looked it up, presented a copy of the incriminated opinion, prefacing a request that it be made a part of the record by the sneering remark that "the Honorable gentleman ought to be very thankful to me for having made an occasion for him to disclaim before the country any obliquity of intention in writing that letter;" and, on the suggestion of General Hunter, the letter was read; every fair minded man ought to have been convinced that it was open to such a malign misconstruction only by an unscrupulous political enemy.

    But suppose for a moment that their own hasty and uncharitable construction was correct, what right--what color of justification--did that give these two military Judges to make that letter of the year before the pretext for a sudden attack in open court upon such a man as Reverdy Johnson, and on the consecrated occasion of his appearing as counsel for a lady on trial for her life?

    As to General Harris' argument that the requirement of an oath gave the Commission a right to inquire whether the written opinions of a counsel chosen for a defendant, previously delivered as a party leader, were of such a character as to render him incompetent to take an oath which the Supreme Court of the United States and the Senate of the United States had recognized his competency to take; why, it is charitable to suppose--and his subsequent claim would have been scouted as preposterous in any law-court in the world.

    With regard to General Hunter, his ferocious personal defiance, hurled from the very Bench, demonstrated in a flash his preeminent unfitness for any function that is judicial even in a military sense. It is manifest that this whole attack, whether concerted or not, was not made from any conscientious regard for the sanctity of an oath, nor from any sensitive fear that Reverdy Johnson, as an oath-breaker, might contaminate the tribunal; but it was either a mere empty ebullition of party spleen, or of party hatred towards a distinguished democrat, or it was made with a deliberate design to rob a poor woman of any probable advantage such eminent counsel might procure for her.

    And whether the latter terrible suspicion be well founded or not, true it is that this cruel result, notwithstanding the withdrawal of the objection, did not fail of full accomplishment.

    Reverdy Johnson, though suffered to appear as counsel, was virtually out of the case. He was present only at rare intervals during the trial, and sent in his final argument to be read by one of his juniors. The Court had put its brand upon him, and to any subsequent effort of his it turned an indifferent countenance and a deaf ear. He, forsooth, had "sympathized" with the Rebellion and that was enough! His appearance worked only harm to his client, if harm could be done to one whom the Court believed to have been also a sympathizer with rebellion, and who was already doomed to suffer in the place of her uncaptured son.

    Another incident, occurring after the testimony on behalf of the prisoners had begun, will illustrate still more clearly, if possible, the mental attitude of the Court.

    Among the witnesses sworn on the first day of the trial in secret session was one Von Steinacker, who, according to his own statement, had been in the Confederate Army, on the staff of Major-General Edward Johnson. He told the usual cock-and-bull story about seeing Booth in Virginia, in 1863, consorting with the rebel officers and concocting the assassination of Lincoln. At the time of his examination he was a prisoner of war, but after he had given his testimony he was discharged. The counsel for the defense knowing nothing of the witness did not cross-examine him at all.

    But, subsequently, they discovered that, after having once been convicted of an attempt to desert, he had at last succeeded in deserting the Union Army, and had entered the service of the Confederates; that he had been convicted of theft by a court-martial; and that his whole story was a fiction. Thereupon, as soon as possible, the counsel for Mrs.

    Surratt applied for the recall of the witness for cross-examination, so as to lay the basis for his contradiction and impeachment; and they embodied the facts they were ready to prove in a paper which was signed by Reverdy Johnson and the other counsel for Mrs. Surratt. This application seems to have strangely disturbed the Judge-Advocates and aroused the ire of the Court. The prosecuting officers professed to have no knowledge of the whereabouts of the witness; and General Wallace, moved from his wonted propriety, delivered himself as follows:

    "I, for my part, object to the appearance of any such paper on the
    record, and wish to say now that I understand distinctly and hold in
    supreme contempt, such practices as this. It is very discreditable to
    the parties concerned, to the attorneys, and, if permitted, in my
    judgment will be discreditable to the Court."

    Mr. Clampitt, with the most obsequious deference to the Court, deprecated any such reflection upon the conduct of counsel and alluded to their duty to their unfortunate clients. But this humble apology was declared not satisfactory to the General or to the Court; and the application was not only refused but the paper was not allowed to go upon the record. However, this summary method of keeping facts out of sight availed nothing. Mrs.

    Surratt's counsel had caused to be summoned as a witness, to contradict and impeach Von Steinacker, Edward Johnson, the very Major-General on whose staff the witness had sworn he had been.

    General Johnson, a distinguished officer in the Confederate Army, was taken prisoner in 1864 and had been in confinement since, as such, at Fort Warren. From thence he had been brought to attend before the Commission in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Court.

    On the 30th of May, he was called as a witness and appeared upon the stand to be sworn. As he stood there, in his faded uniform, bearing, doubtless, traces of the six months' imprisonment from which he had come at the command of the Court, facing the officers of the Army he had so often encountered, and with his back turned upon the woman on whose behalf he had been summoned; General Albion P. Howe deemed it his duty as an impartial judge to make the following attack upon him.

    After stating that it was well known that "the person" before the Court had been educated at the National Military Academy, and had since for many years held a commission in the U. S. Army, and had therefore taken the oath of allegiance, this gallant officer and upright judge proceeded:

    "In 1861, it became my duty as an officer to fire upon a rebel party,
    of which this man was a member, and that party fired upon, struck
    down, and killed loyal men that were in the service of the Government.
    I understand that he is brought here now as a witness to testify
    before this Court, and he comes here as a witness with his hands red
    with the blood of his loyal countrymen, shed by him or by his
    assistants, in violation of his solemn oath as a man and his faith as
    an officer. I submit to this Court that he stands in the eye of the
    law as an incompetent witness, because he is notoriously infamous.

    To
    offer as a witness a man who stands with this character, who has
    openly violated the obligations of his oath, and his faith as an
    officer, and to administer the oath to him and present his testimony,
    is but an insult to the Court and an outrage upon the administration
    of justice. I move that this man, Edward Johnson, be ejected from the
    Court as an incompetent witness on account of his notorious infamy on
    the grounds I have stated."

    General Ekin welcomed the opportunity to distinguish himself by seconding the motion and characterizing the appearance of the witness before the Commission, "with such a character" as "the height of impertinence!" In his haste to insult a fallen foe, he seems to have forgotten that the witness had no alternative but to come.

    The counsel for the prisoner humbly reminded the Court that the prosecution itself had sworn as its own witnesses men who had borne arms against the Government. The Judge-Advocate saw that the members of the Court had gone too far, and, after calling their attention to the familiar rule that the record of conviction in a judicial proceeding was the only basis of a total rejection of a witness, proceeded to provide a channel for the relief of the Court by suggesting that they could discredit the witness upon the ground stated, although they could not declare him incompetent to testify.

    The assertion is confidently made that in the whole annals of English criminal jurisprudence, full as they are of instances of the grossest unfairness to persons on trial, no such outrage upon the administration of justice as the foregoing can be found. To find its parallel you must go to the records of the French Revolutionary Tribunal. What are we to think of the complaint of a Union General, that "a rebel party" fired (first? No! but that when "it became his duty as an officer to fire upon a rebel party" the rebel party fired) back? What in Mars' name did this warrior expect?

    Would he have had kinder feelings towards his brave adversary if, in response to his own volley, the Confederate General had tamely laid down his arms, or played the coward and run?

    Nowadays, when the blue and the gray meet, charges of infamy are no longer heard, but the more deadly the past warfare, the greater the reciprocal respect.

    However, this unprovoked assault upon an unoffending officer, powerless to repel it, although it did not result in his ejection from the Court, effectually disposed of General Johnson as a witness.

    In answer to the questions of counsel he calmly gave his testimony, which exploded both Von-Steinacker and his story. Judge Bingham confined his cross-examination to eliciting the facts, that the witness had graduated from West Point, served in the U. S. Army until 1861, resigned, and joined the Confederate Army. The Court paid no attention to his direct testimony because he had fired upon Union men when they had fired upon him.

    The foregoing incidents conclusively show (were any such demonstration necessary) that a Board of nine military officers, fresh from service in the field in a bloody civil war, with all the fierce prejudices naturally bred by such a conflict hot within their bosoms, was the most unfit tribunal possible to administer impartial justice to eight persons charged with the murder of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to which every member of the Court belonged, committed in aid of that Rebellion which during four years of hard fighting they had helped to suppress.

    CHAPTER III.

    THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL.

    The whole conduct of the trial emphasizes this conclusion. The Court, in weighing the evidence, adopted and acted upon the following proposition; that any witness, sworn for any of the prisoners, who had enlisted in the Confederate service, or had at any time expressed secession sentiments, or sympathized in any way with the South, was totally unworthy of credit. The Court went a step farther, and adopted the monstrous rule that participation in the Rebellion was evidence of participation in the assassination!

    This assertion now seems incredible, but it is fully attested by the record. At one stage of the trial, the Judge-Advocate asked a witness whether or not the prisoner Arnold had been in the military service of the rebels. General Ewing, his counsel, strenuously objected to this question on the ground, that it tended to prove the prisoner guilty of another crime than the one for which he was on trial, and thus to prejudice him in the eyes of the Court.

    Judge Holt remarked: "How kindred to each other are the crimes of treason against a nation and assassination of its chief magistrate.

    "The murder of the President * * * was preeminently a political assassination.

    "When, therefore, we shall show, on the part of the accused, acts of intense disloyalty, bearing arms in the field against the Government, we show with him the presence of an animus towards the Government which relieves this accusation of much, if not all, of its improbability."

    He asserted that such a course of proof was constantly resorted to in criminal courts; and when General Ewing challenged him (as well he might) to produce any authorities for such a position, he called upon the indomitable Bingham to state them.

    The Special Judge-Advocate responded, but he courteously, but unmistakably, shied away from his colleague's position and put the competency of the testimony upon another ground, viz.: that where the intent with which a thing was done is in issue, other acts of the prisoner which tend to prove the intent may be given in evidence. Here he was dealing with a familiar principle, and could cite any number of cases. He then proceeded to apply his good law. How?

    By claiming that conspiracy to murder having been laid in the charge, "with the intent to aid the Rebellion," that was the intent in issue here, and therefore to prove that a man was in the Rebellion went to prove that intent.

    At the request of General Ewing he read the allegation which ran "in aid of the Rebellion," and not "with intent to aid," and the counsel pointed out that that was "an allegation of fact, and not of intent;" but the Judge insisted that it was in effect an allegation of intent--implied if not expressed.

    General Ewing then replied to his adversary's argument by showing that such an allegation was an unnecessary allegation. Conspiracy to murder and attempted murder were crimes done with intent to kill; and it was a matter of no moment in pleading to allege a general intent to aid the Rebellion. Courts had no right to violate the laws of evidence because the prosecution has seen fit to violate the laws of pleading.

    Judge Bingham contended (and cited authorities) for his familiar law, and then again in applying it triumphantly asked:

    "When he [Arnold] entered it (i. e., the Rebellion) he entered into it to aid it, did he not?"

    "Mr. Ewing. He did not enter into that to assassinate the President."

    At this, the Assistant Judge-Advocate rising to the decisive and culminating point of his argument gave utterance to the following proposition:

    "Yes: he entered into it to assassinate the President; and everybody
    else that entered into the Rebellion entered into it to assassinate
    everybody that represented the Government, that either followed the
    standard in the field, or represented its standard in the counsels.
    That is exactly why it is germane."

    And, thereupon, the Commission immediately overruled the objection.

    General Ewing told the exact truth, without a particle of rhetorical exaggeration, when, in the closing sentence of his argument against the jurisdiction of the Commission, he exclaimed:

    "Indeed, the position taken by the learned Assistant Judge-Advocate * * * goes to this--and even beyond it--namely, that participation in the Rebellion was participation in the assassination, and that the Rebellion itself formed part of the conspiracy for which these men are on trial here."

    Throughout the whole trial, the Commission took the law from the Judge-Advocates with the unquestioning docility usually manifested by a jury on such matters in civil courts. In truth, the main function of a Judge-Advocate appears to be to furnish law to the Court, as in civil courts the main function of the Judge is to furnish law to the jury.

    Consequently, his exposition of the law on any disputed point--whether relative to modes of procedure, or to the competency of testimony, or even to questions of jurisdiction--instead of standing on the same level with the antagonistic exposition of counsel for the accused as an argument to be weighed by the Court against its opposite in the equal scales of decision, was at all times authoritative, like the opinion of a judge overruling the contention of a lawyer.

    This, surely, was bad enough for a defendant; but, what was still more fatal to his chances of fair dealing, this habit of domination, acquiesced in by the Court on questions of law, had the effect (as is also seen in civil courts) of giving the same superior force to the expositions of questions of fact by the Judge-Advocate.

    And as this office combined the functions of a prosecuting officer with the functions of a judge, there could be no restraints of law, custom or personal delicacy, against the enforcement, with all the powers of reasoning and appeal at command, the conclusion of the Judge-Advocate upon the matters of fact.

    In a word, the judgment of the prosecuting officer--the retained counsel for the Government, the plaintiff in the action--ruled with absolute sway, both on the law and on the facts, the judgment of the Commission; the members of which, for that matter, were also in the pay of the Government.

    It may, therefore, be readily anticipated with how little impartiality the trial was conducted.

    Mrs. Surratt (as did the rest of the accused) plead to the jurisdiction of the Commission on the grounds (1) that she was not and had not been in the military service of the United States, and (2) that when the crimes charged were committed the civil courts were open in Washington; both of which allegations were admitted and were notoriously true.

    Whatever might be the indifference with which the rights of the men to a constitutional trial may have been viewed, it was so utterly incongruous with the spirit of military jurisprudence and so unprecedented in practice to try a woman by court-martial, that had Mrs. Surratt been alone before that Commission we venture to say those nine soldiers could not have brought themselves, or allowed the Judge-Advocate to bring them, to the overruling of her plea.

    As it was, however, the court-room was cleared of all save the members of the Commission and the three Judge-Advocates; and after a season of what is called "deliberation" (which meant the further enforcement of the opinion of the prosecuting officers upon the point under discussion, where necessary), the court reopened and "the Judge-Advocate announced that the pleas * * * had been overruled by the Commission."

    Mrs. Surratt (as did the other prisoners) then asked for a separate trial; a right guaranteed to her in all the civil courts of the vicinage. It was denied to her, without discussion, as a matter of course.

    And yet no one now can fail to recognize the grievous disadvantage under which this one woman labored, coupled in a single trial with such culprits as Payne who confessed his guilt, and Herold who was captured with Booth.

    In fact, the scheme of trial contrived by the Judge-Advocates on a scale comprehensive enough to embrace the prisoners, the Canadian exiles and the Confederate Cabinet, would not work on a trial of Mrs. Surratt alone. Of this pet plan they were highly proud and greatly enamoured. To it, everything--the rights of woman as well as man; considerations of equity and of common fairness--must be made to give way.

    To the maintenance of this scheme in its integrity, they had marshalled the witnesses, and they guided the Commission with a firm hand so that not a jot or tittle of its symmetry should be marred.

    This determined purpose is indicated by the starting-point they chose for the testimony.

    On Friday, the twelfth, the first witness was sworn, and his name was Richard Montgomery. His testimony, as well as that of the other witnesses sworn that day, was taken in secret session, and no portion of it was allowed to reach the public until long after the trial. It was all directed to establish the complicity of the rebel agents in Canada and through them the complicity of Jefferson Davis and other officers of the "Confederacy" in the assassination.

    In other words, this testimony was given to prove the guilt, not of the men much less of the woman on trial, but of the men included in the charge but not on trial; and whom, as it now appears, the United States never intended to try.

    To connect the defunct Confederacy in the person of its captive Chief with the murder of the President would throw a halo of romantic wickedness about the crime, and chime in with the prevalent hatred towards every human being in any way connected with the Rebellion.

    This class of testimony continued to be introduced every now and then during the trial--whenever most convenient to the prosecution--and as often as it was given the court-room was cleared of spectators and the session secret; the isolated counsel for Mrs. Surratt, utterly at a loss to imagine the connection of such testimony, given under such solemn precautions, with their own client, and knowing nothing whatever of the witnesses themselves, must have looked on in bewildered amazement, and had no motive for cross-examination.

    The chief witnesses who gave this carefully suppressed evidence were spies upon the rebel agents in Canada paid by the United States, and, at the same time, spies upon the United States paid by the rebel agents.

    They were, of course, ready to swear to as many conversations with these agents, both before and after the assassination, in which those agents implicated themselves and the heads of government at Richmond in the most reckless manner, as the Judge-Advocates thought necessary or advisable.

    The head, parent and tutor of this band of witnesses was a man called Sanford Conover. After giving his testimony before the Commission, he went to Canada and again resumed his simulated intimacy with the Confederates there, passing under the name of James W. Wallace. An unauthorized version of his testimony having leaked out and appearing in the newspapers, he was called to account for it by his Canadian friends.

    He then made and published an affidavit that the person who had given testimony before the Commission was not himself but an imposter, and at the same time also published an offer of $500 reward for the arrest of "the infamous and perjured scoundrel who secretly personated me under name of Sanford Conover, and deposed to a tissue of falsehood before the military Commission at Washington."

    Being reclaimed by the government from his Canadian perils, he appeared again before the Court after the testimony had been closed and the summing up of all the prisoners' counsel had been completed (June 27th); when he testified that his affidavit had been extorted from him by the Confederates in Canada by threats of death at the point of a pistol. This man Conover was subsequently (in 1867) tried and convicted of perjury and sent to the penitentiary; and with him the whole structure of perjured testimony, fabricated for reward by him and Montgomery and their co-spies, fell to the ground.

    Secretary Seward testified before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, in 1867, that, "the testimony of these witnesses was discredited and destroyed by transactions in which Sanford Conover appeared and the evidence of the alleged complicity of Jefferson Davis thereupon failed."

    But, at the period of the trial, when the passionate desire for vengeance was at its height, any plausible scoundrel, whose livelihood depended on the rewards for wholesale perjury, and who was sure to be attracted to Washington by the scent of his favorite game, was thrice welcome to the Bureau of Military Justice. Any story, no matter how absurd or incredible, provided it brought Jefferson Davis within conjectural fore-knowledge of the assassination, was greedily swallowed, and, moreover, was rewarded with money and employment.

    These harpies flocked, like buzzards, around the doors of the old Penitentiary, and all--black and white, from Richmond, from Washington and from Montreal--were eager, for a consideration, to swear that Davis and Benjamin were the instigators of Booth and Surratt. And such testimony as it was! For the most part the sheerest hearsay! The private impressions of the witness!

    In one instance, his recollection of the contents of a letter the witness had heard read or talked about, the signature of which, although he did not see it himself, he heard was the signature of Jefferson Davis!! Testimony wholly inadmissible under the most elementary rules of evidence, but swept before the Commission in the absence of counsel for the parties implicated and under the immunity of a secret session.

    For example: a blind man, who had been, at an undated period during the war, a hanger-on around the camp at Richmond, being asked whether he had heard any conversations among the rebel officers in regard to the contemplated assassination, answered:

    "In a general way, I have heard sums offered, to be paid with a
    Confederate sum, for any person or persons to go North and assassinate
    the President."

    Being pressed to name the amount and by what officers, he answered:

    "At this moment, I cannot tell you the particular names of
    shoulder-straps, &c.

    "Q.--Do you remember any occasion--some dinner occasion?

    "A.--I can tell you this: I heard a citizen make the remark once, that
    he would give from his private purse $10,000, in addition to the
    Confederate amount, to have the President assassinated; to bring him
    to Richmond dead or alive, for proof.

    "Q.--I understood you to say that it was a subject of general
    conversation among the rebel officers?

    "A.--It was. The rebel officers, as they would be sitting around their
    tent doors, would be conversing on such a subject a great deal. They
    would be saying they would like to see his head brought there, dead or
    alive, and they should think it could be done; and I have heard such
    things stated as that they had certain persons undertaking it."

    In the introduction of evidence against Mrs. Surratt, as well as the others on trial, the Judge-Advocates allowed themselves the most unlimited range.

    Narrations of all sorts of events connected with the progress of the War--historical, problematical or fabulous--having no relevancy to the particular charge against her, or them, but deadly in their tendency to steel the minds of the Court against her, were admitted without scruple or hesitation.

    Seven soldiers who had been prisoners of war at Libby Prison, Belle Island or Andersonville were called and testified, in all its ghastly details, to the terrible treatment they and their fellow-prisoners had undergone.

    Three witnesses were sworn to prove that the rebel government buried a torpedo under the centre of Libby Prison, to be fired if the U. S. troops entered Richmond. Letters found in the Richmond Archives were read, offering to rid the world of the Confederacy's deadliest enemies, and projecting wholesale destruction to property in the North. Testimony was allowed to be given of the burning of U.

    S. transports and bridges by men in the Confederate service; of the raids from Canada into the United States; of the alleged plot in all its horrible features to introduce the yellow-fever into Northern cities by infected clothing, testified to by the villain who swore he did it for money.

    It is scarcely to be credited, yet it is a fact, that the confession of Robert Kennedy, hung in March previous for attempting to burn the City of New York, was read in evidence; as was also a letter from a Confederate soldier, detailing the blowing up of vessels by a torpedo and the killing of Union men at City Point, indorsed by a recommendation of the operator to favor.

    On June 27th, after the testimony had been closed and the summing up of counsel for the defense ended, the case was reopened and there was introduced an advertisement clipped from the "Selma Dispatch" of December 1st, 1864, wherein some anonymous lunatic offered, if furnished $1,000,000, to cause the lives of Lincoln, Seward and Johnson to be taken before the first of March.

    The prosecution closed its direct testimony on May 25th, reserving the right (of which we have seen they availed themselves from time to time) thereafter to call further witnesses on the character of the Rebellion and the complicity of its leaders in the assassination.

    Out of about one hundred and fifty witnesses sixty-six gave testimony of that kind. Of the remaining eighty-four about fifty testified to the circumstances attending the assassination, the pursuit and capture of Booth and Herold, and the terrific assault of Payne on William H. Seward and his household. Of the remaining thirty-four there were nine whose testimony was directed to the incrimination of Mrs. Surratt.

    The important witnesses against her were three soldiers testifying under the eye of their superior officers as to her non-recognition of Payne, and two informers who had turned state's evidence to save their own necks, who connected her with Booth.

    The witnesses for the defense, for the most part, were treated by the Special Judge-Advocate as virtual accomplices of the accused; and, as soon as, by a searching cross-examination, he had extorted from them a reluctant admission of the slightest sympathy with the South (as in almost every case he was able to do), he swept them aside as impeached, and their testimony as unworthy of a moment's consideration. A former slave, who announced himself or herself as ready to give evidence against his or her former master, was a delicious morsel for the Bureau of Military Justice; and several such were sworn for the prosecution.

    While, on the other hand, nothing so exasperated the loyal Bingham or so astonished the Court as the apparition of an old slave-woman, summoned by the defense, eagerly endeavoring to exculpate her former master.

    Several priests testified as to the good character of Mrs. Surratt as a lady and a christian, but the effect of their testimony was immediately demolished in the eyes of the Court, when, on cross-examination, although they refused to substantiate what the Judge-Advocate called "her notorious intense disloyalty," they could not remember that they had ever heard her "utter one loyal sentiment."

    Chapter IV.

    ARGUMENTS FOR THE DEFENSE.

    The testimony for the several defenses of the eight accused closed on the 7th of June, and the testimony in rebuttal ended on the 14th, with the evidence of the physicians on the sanity of Payne.

    Thereupon, General Ewing endeavored to extract from the Judge-Advocate an answer to the two following questions: First.--Whether his clients were on trial for but one crime, viz.: Conspiracy, or four crimes, viz.:

    Conspiracy, Murder, Attempt at murder, Lying in wait? and

    Second.--By what statute or code of laws the crimes of "traitorously" murdering, or "traitorously" assaulting with intent to kill, or "traitorously" lying in wait, were defined, and what was the punishment affixed?

    The Judge-Advocate's reply to the first question was, in substance, that all the accused were charged with conspiring to assassinate the President and the other members of the Government named, and further, with having executed that conspiracy so far as the assassination of the President and the assault on the Secretary of State were concerned, and "to have attempted its execution so far as concerns the lying in wait and other matters."

    Assistant Judge-Advocate Bingham added:

    "The act of any one of the parties to a conspiracy in its execution is
    the act of every party to that conspiracy; and therefore the charge
    and specification that the President was murdered in pursuance of it
    by the hand of Booth, is a direct and unequivocal charge that he was
    murdered by every one of the parties to this conspiracy, naming the
    defendants by name.

    "Mr. Ewing.--I understand * * * but I renew my inquiry, whether these
    persons are charged with the crime of conspiracy alone, and that these
    acts of murdering, assaulting, and lying in wait, were merely acts
    done in execution of that conspiracy.

    "Mr. Bingham (interrupting).--And not crimes?

    "Mr. Ewing.--Or whether they are charged with four distinct crimes in
    this one charge?

    "Mr. Bingham.--'Where parties are indicted for a conspiracy, and the
    execution thereof, it is but one crime at the common law. And that as
    many * * * overt acts in the execution of the conspiracy as they are
    guilty of, may be laid in the same count.'

    "Mr. Ewing.--It is then, I understand, one crime with which they are
    charged.

    "Mr. Bingham.--One crime all round, with various parts performed.

    "Mr. Ewing.--The crime of conspiracy.

    "Mr. Bingham.--It is the crime of murder as well. It is not simply
    conspiring but executing the conspiracy treasonably and in aid of the
    Rebellion.

    "Mr. Ewing.--I should like an answer to my question, if it is to be
    given: How many crimes are my clients charged with and being tried
    for? I cannot tell.

    "Mr. Bingham.--We have told you, it is all one transaction."

    General Ewing, not being able to get an answer intelligible to himself to the first question, then respectfully asked an answer to the second: By what code or statute the crime was defined and the punishment provided?

    "The Judge-Advocate.--I think the common law of war will reach that
    case. This is a crime which has been committed in the midst of a great
    civil war, in the capital of the country, in the camp of the
    Commander-in-Chief of our armies, and if the common law of war cannot
    be enforced against criminals of that character, then I think such a
    code is in vain in the world.

    "Mr. Ewing.--Do you base it, then, only on the law of nations?

    "The Judge-Advocate.--The common law of war.

    "Mr. Ewing.--Is that all the answer to the question?

    "The Judge-Advocate.--It is the one I regard as perfectly appropriate
    to give.

    "Mr. Ewing.--I am as much in the dark now as to that as I was in
    reference to the other inquiry."

    It is significant that the ready Special Judge-Advocate rendered no aid to his colleague on the latter branch of the inquiry.

    According to the theory of the prosecution, then, Mary E. Surratt was tried, as a co-conspirator of Jefferson Davis and seven of his agents, of the seven men tried with her, and of Booth and her own son, for the crime of "traitorous conspiracy" to murder the President, Vice-President, Secretary of State and Lieutenant-General, of the United States; and for the following crimes committed in pursuance thereof:

    1. Assassination of the President, with Booth.
    1. Attempt to murder the Secretary of State, his two sons and two

    attendants (five crimes instead of one), with Payne.

    1. Lying in wait to kill the Vice-President, with Atzerodt.
    1. Lying in wait to kill the Lieutenant-General, with O'Laughlin.

    Eight separate species of crimes, beside the generic one of "traitorous conspiracy." And she, a citizen, a non-combatant, a woman, was tried on this nine-fold, omnibus charge, jointly with seven men, under "the common law of war"!

    • * * * *

    On the 16th of June (Friday), Mr. Clampitt read the argument of Reverdy Johnson against the jurisdiction of the Commission--one of the most cogent and convincing ever delivered in a court of justice.

    The Supreme Court of the United States, subsequently (December, 1866), in deciding the Milligan case, did but little more than reiterate the propositions maintained by this great lawyer.

    He opened his address by reminding the Court that the question of their jurisdiction to try and sentence the accused was for the Court alone to decide, and that no mandate of the President, if in fact and in law the Constitution did not tolerate such tribunals in such cases, could protect any member of the Commission from the consequences of his illegal acts.

    He then advanced and proved the following propositions: that none but military offenses are subject to the jurisdiction of military courts, and that the offenders when they commit such offenses must be subject to military jurisdiction--in other words, must belong to the army or navy; that the President himself had no right to constitute military courts of his own motion, but that such power must first be exercised by Congress under the constitutional grant to that body to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; that, by the fifth and sixth amendments of the constitution, every person, except those belonging to the land or naval forces or to the militia in active service in time of war, and, being such, committing a military or naval crime, is guaranteed an investigation by a grand jury as a preliminary to trial, and a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.

    He then took up and examined the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the Commission was sought to be maintained.

    Calling the Court's attention to the constitutional provision that, if the institution of such Commission was an incident to the war power, that power was lodged exclusively in Congress and not at all in the President, and, therefore, Congress only could authorize such tribunals, he showed that, neither by the articles of war nor by the two acts, relied on, passed during the Rebellion, had Congress ever authorized any such tribunal; and that a military commission like the present and under present circumstances "is not to be found sanctioned, or the most remotely recognized, or even alluded to, by any writer on military law in England or the United States, or in any legislation of either country."

    And, in this connection, he pronounced the suggestion that the civil courts and juries of the District of Columbia could not safely be relied upon for the trial of these cases, "an unjust reflection upon the judges, upon the people, upon the marshal, an appointee of the President, by whom the juries were summoned, and upon our civil institutions themselves;" and he closed his remarks upon this branch of his subject by saying that the foregoing suggestion,

    "upon another ground, is equally without force. It rests on the idea
    that the guilty only are ever brought to trial; that the only object
    of the Constitution and laws in this regard is to afford the means to
    establish alleged guilt; that accusation, however made, is to be
    esteemed prima facie evidence of guilt, and that the Executive
    should be armed, without other restriction than his own discretion,
    with all the appliances deemed by him necessary to make the
    presumption from such evidence conclusive. Never was there a more
    dangerous theory.

    The peril to the citizen from a prosecution so
    conducted, as illustrated in all history, is so great that the very
    elementary principles of constitutional liberty, the spirit and letter
    of the Constitution itself repudiated it."

    After depicting the peril to the rights of the citizen of confiding to the option of the Executive the power of substituting a secret for a public tribunal for the trial of offenses, he established the following propositions: That the creation of a Court is an exclusively legislative function; that constitutional guarantees are designed for times of war as well as times of peace; that the power to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus carries with it only the temporary suspension of the right to inquire into the cause of the arrest, and does not extend in any way over the other rights of the accused.

    The distinguished advocate then further maintained that, conceding the articles of war provide for a military court like this, yet the offense charged in the present case being nothing less than treason could not under the provision of the constitution, regulating the trial of treason, be tried by a military commission; and, also, that under the articles of war persons who were not and never had been in the army were not subject to military law.

    And, in order to illustrate this branch of his argument as forcibly as possible, passing in review the guaranteed and historic rights of accused persons on trials before civil courts, he arrayed the open and flagrant violations of these rights which had been permitted by the Commission on the present trial:

    First, in the character of the pleadings, which for indefiniteness and duplicity would not have been tolerated by any civil tribunal. Second, as to the rules of evidence, which, according to the Judge-Advocate, allowed proof of separate and distinct offenses alleged to have been committed, not only by the parties on trial, but by other persons, and which the accused, however innocent, could not be supposed able to meet.

    Third, he quoted Lord Holt to show that in a civil court "these parties could not have been legally fettered during their trial." Referring to the row of miserable beings weighed down with shackles as they had entered the court-room, as they confronted their epauletted judges, and as they departed to their solitary cells, day by day, for more than a month, he repeated the words of the great jurist, then 200 years old:

    "Hearing the clanking of chains, though no complaint was made to him,
    he said, 'I should like to know why the prisoner is brought in ironed.
    Let them be instantly knocked off. When prisoners are tried they
    should stand at their ease.'"

    Then, characterizing the claim, that martial law prevailing in the District of Columbia therefore warranted the Commission, as alike indefensible and dangerous, and at the same time irrelevant because martial law had never been proclaimed and the civil courts were in the full and undisturbed exercise of all their functions, the counsel drove this point home as follows:

    "We learn, and the fact is doubtless true, that one of the parties,
    the very chief of the alleged conspiracy, has been indicted, and is
    about to be tried before one of those courts. If he, the alleged head
    and front of the conspiracy, is to be and can be so tried, upon what
    ground of right, of fairness or of policy, can the parties who are
    charged to have been his mere instruments be deprived of the same mode
    of trial?"

    At the close of his speech he recurs to the warning that the President's command can furnish no justification to the members of the tribunal. If their function were only to act as aides to the President to enable him to discharge his prerogative of punishment, and is to that extent legal, then it is only so because the President might have dispensed with the Court altogether, and ordered the punishment of the culprits without any formal trial.

    No, he warned them, in the most courtly and courteous manner, they could not shield themselves behind the President.

    "Responsibility to personal danger can never alarm soldiers who have
    faced * * * death on the battle-field. But there is a responsibility
    that every gentleman, be he soldier or citizen, will constantly hold
    before him and make him ponder--responsibility to the constitution and
    laws of his country and an intelligent public opinion--and prevent his
    doing anything knowingly that can justly subject him to the censure of
    either. I have said that your responsibility is great. If the
    Commission under which you act is void and confers no authority,
    whatever you may do may involve the most serious personal liability."

    He then cited the case of Governor Wall, hung in London in 1802 for murder--a soldier, under his government in the island of Goree, having been whipped to death by sentence of a regimental court-martial, twenty years before.

    "In that instance want of jurisdiction in the court-martial was held
    to be fatal to its judgment as a defense for the death that ensued
    under it. In this, if the Commission has no jurisdiction, its judgment
    for the same reason will be of no avail, either to Judges, Secretary
    of War, or President, if either shall be called to a responsibility
    for what may be done under it."

    The learned counsel then added:

    "The opinion I have endeavored to maintain is believed to be the
    almost unanimous opinion of the profession and certainly is of every
    judge or court who has expressed any."

    And he cited the then recent charge of Judge Bond to the grand jury at Baltimore, in which the Judge declared in reference to such military commissions as the present, that,

    "Such persons exercising such unlawful jurisdiction are liable to
    indictment by you as well as responsible in civil actions to the
    parties."

    And he quoted to the Court that portion of the charge of Judge Rufus W.

    Peckham to a grand jury in New York City, delivered during the progress of this very trial, wherein the right of a military commission to try was denied:

    "A great crime has lately been committed that has shocked the
    civilized world. Every right-minded man desires the punishment of the
    criminals, but he desires that punishment to be administered according
    to law, and through the judicial tribunals of the country. No
    star-chamber court, no secret inquisition, in this nineteenth century,
    can ever be made acceptable to the American mind.

    • * * * *

    "Grave doubts, to say the least, exist in the minds of intelligent
    men, as to the constitutional right of the Military Commission at
    Washington to sit in judgment upon the prisoners now on trial for
    their lives before that tribunal. Thoughtful men feel aggrieved that
    such a commission should be established in this free country, when the
    war is over, and when the common law courts are open and accessible to
    administer justice according to law, without fear or favor. * * *

    "The unanimity with which the leading press of our land has condemned
    this mode of trial ought to be gratifying to every patriot."

    On the twenty-third, General Ewing, too, assailed the jurisdiction of the Court in a short but powerful speech from which are taken the following extracts:

    "The jurisdiction of the Commission has to be sought dehors the
    Constitution, and against its express prohibition. It is, therefore,
    at least of doubtful validity. If that jurisdiction do not exist; if
    the doubt be resolved against it by our judicial tribunals, when the
    law shall again speak, the form of trial by this unauthorized
    Commission cannot be pleaded in justification of the seizure of
    property or the arrest of persons, much less the infliction of the
    death penalty.

    In that event, however fully the recorded evidence may
    sustain your findings, however moderate may seem your sentences,
    however favorable to the accused your rulings on the evidence, your
    sentence will be held in law no better than the rulings of Judge
    Lynch's courts in the administration of lynch law.

    "Our judicial tribunals, at some future day * * * will be again in the
    full exercise of their constitutional powers, and may think, as a
    large proportion of the legal profession think now, that your
    jurisdiction in these cases is an unwarranted assumption; and they may
    treat the judgment which you pronounce and the sentence you cause to
    be executed, as your own unauthorized acts.

    "Conviction may be easier and more certain in this Military
    Commission, than in our constitutional courts. Inexperienced as most
    of you are in judicial investigation, you can admit evidence which the
    courts would reject, and reject what they would admit, and you may
    convict and sentence on evidence which those courts would hold to be
    wholly insufficient.

    Means, too, may be resorted to by detectives,
    acting under promise or hope of reward, and operating on the fears or
    the cupidity of witnesses, to obtain and introduce evidence, which
    cannot be detected and exposed in this military trial, but could be
    readily in the free, but guarded, course of investigation before our
    regular judicial tribunals. The Judge-Advocate, with whom chiefly
    rests the fate of these citizens, is learned in the law, but from his
    position he can not be an impartial judge, unless he be more than a
    man. He is the prosecutor in the most extended sense of the word.

    As
    in duty bound, before this court was called, he received the reports
    of detectives, pre-examined the witnesses, prepared and officially
    signed the charges, and, as principal counsel for the Government,
    controlled on the trial the presentation, admission and rejection of
    evidence. In our courts of law, a lawyer who has heard his client's
    story, if transferred from the bar to the bench, may not sit in the
    trial of the cause, lest the ermine be sullied through the partiality
    of counsel. This is no mere theoretical objection--for the union of
    prosecutor and judge works practical injustice to the accused.

    The
    Judge-Advocate controls the admission and rejection of evidence--knows
    what will aid and what will injure the case of the prosecution, and
    inclines favorably to the one and unfavorably to the other. The
    defense is met with a bias of feeling and opinion on the part of the
    judge who controls the proceedings of the Court, and on whom, in great
    measure, the fate of the accused depends, which morals and law alike
    reject."

    Whatsoever else may be pleaded in excuse or palliation of the acts of the Commission, it can never be said that its members were driven on by an overpowering sense of their duty as soldiers, in blind ignorance of the Constitution and the law. Each and every officer was made fully aware of his awful responsibility and apprised of the precarious footing of his authority.

    CHAPTER V.

    CHARGE OF JUDGE BINGHAM.

    From the sixteenth to the twenty-seventh of June the time was consumed by the summing up of the several counsel for the prisoners on the facts disclosed by the evidence; and on the last mentioned day and the succeeding one, Special Judge-Advocate Bingham delivered his address in answer to all the foregoing pleas, both as to the jurisdiction of the Court and also as to the merits of the case.

    This long, carefully prepared and yet impassioned speech may be fairly considered as embodying the very proof-charge of the prosecution. Indeed, under the rules of military procedure, it occupies the place and performs the functions of the judge's charge in the common-law courts. As such, it deserves a closer analysis and a more extended examination than can be given to it here. The briefest and most cursory review, however, will suffice to show its tone and temper.

    After a solemn asseveration of his desire to be just to the accused, and a warning to the Court that "a wrongful and illegal conviction or a wrongful and illegal acquittal * * * would impair somewhat the security of every man's life and shake the stability of the Republic," the learned advocate specifically declares, that the charge "is not simply the crime of murdering a human being" but a "combination of atrocities," committed as charged upon the record, "in pursuance of a treasonable conspiracy entered into by the accused with one John Wilkes Booth, and John H. Surratt, upon the instigation of Jefferson Davis, Jacob Thompson, George N.

    Sanders and others, with intent thereby to aid the existing rebellion and subvert the constitution and laws of the United States."

    A denunciation of the Rebellion as "itself simply a criminal conspiracy and a gigantic assassination"; the following glowing period--"Now that their battalions of treason are broken and flying before the victorious legions of the republic, the chief traitors in this great crime against your government secretly conspire with their hired confederates to achieve by assassination what they in vain attempt by wager of battle";--and the unequivocal announcement that "it is for this secret conspiracy in the interest of the rebellion, formed at the instigation of the chief in that rebellion, and in pursuance of which the acts charged and specified are alleged to have been done, and with the intent laid, that the accused are upon trial": finish the exordium.

    The speaker then tackles the question of jurisdiction, which, he remarks by the way, "as the Court has already overruled the plea," he would pass over in silence, "but for the fact that a grave and elaborate argument has been made by the counsel for the accused, not only to show want of jurisdiction, but to arraign the President of the United States before the country and the world as a usurper of power over the lives and the liberties of the prisoners."

    He dexterously evades the force of the argument that the civil courts of the District were open when the crime was committed, by asserting that "they were only open * * * and are only open at this hour by force of the bayonet;" and he claims that the President acting by a military force had as much right to try the co-conspirators of Booth, as to pursue, capture and kill the chief criminal himself; which, if true, leads us into the maintenance of the monstrous doctrine that the President by a summary order might have strung up the culprits without the interposition of any court.

    He then enters upon an argument to show that the Commission, from the very nature of its organization, cannot decide that it is no Court, and he ridicules the idea that these nine subordinate military officers could question the authority of their Commander-in-Chief.

    In this connection, he gently rebukes Mr. Ewing for his bold statement to the Commission: "You, gentlemen, are no court under the Constitution!" reminding him that "not many months since he was a general in the service of the country and as such in his department in the West proclaimed and enforced martial law;" and asks him whether he is "quite sure he will not have to answer for more of these alleged violations of the rights of citizens than any of the members of the Court?"

    He professes his high regard for General Ewing as a military commander who has made a "liberal exercise of this power," and facetiously wishes "to know whether he proposes, by his proclamation of the personal responsibility awaiting all such usurptions," that he himself shall be "drawn and quartered."

    After disposing of General Ewing in this gingerly manner, he compensates himself for the slight restraint by pouring the vials of his unstinted wrath upon Reverdy Johnson; representing him as "denouncing the murdered President and his successor," as making "a political harangue, a partisan speech against his government and country, thereby swelling the cry of the armed legions of sedition and rebellion that but yesterday shook the heavens." He characterizes one of the most temperate and dignified of arguments as "a plea in behalf of an expiring and shattered rebellion," and "a fit subject for public condemnation."

    He calls upon the people to note,

    "That while the learned gentleman [Mr.

    Johnson], as a volunteer,
    without pay, thus condemns as a usurpation the means employed so
    effectually to suppress this gigantic insurrection, the New York News,
    whose proprietor, Benjamin Wood, is shown by the testimony upon your
    record to have received from the agents of the rebellion $25,000,
    rushes into the lists to champion the cause of the rebellion, its
    aiders and abettors, by following to the letter his colleague [Mr.
    Johnson], and with greater plainness of speech, and a fervor
    intensified doubtless by the $25,000 received, and the hope of more,
    denounces the Court as a usurpation and threatens the members with the
    consequences."

    And he interrupts his tirade against one of the greatest men this country has produced to burst forth into the following grandiloquent apostrophe:

    "Youngest born of the Nations! Is she not immortal by all the dread
    memories of the past--by that sublime and voluntary sacrifice of the
    present, in which the bravest and noblest of her sons have laid down
    their lives that she might live, giving their serene brows to the dust
    of the grave, and lifting their hands for the last time amidst the
    consuming fires of battle!"

    After a brief defense of the secret sessions of the Commission, the learned advocate enters upon his circumstantial reply to the argument of Mr. Johnson, into which it is not worth while to follow him, as the main points of his contention have been rendered obsolete by the Supreme Court of the United States.

    Suffice it to say, he holds that the President of the United States has the power, of his own motion, to declare martial law in time of war, over the whole United States, whether the States are within the theatre of the war or not; and that President Lincoln exercised this power by his proclamation of September, 1862, by virtue of which martial law prevailed over the whole North, including, of course, the District of Columbia, on the day of the assassination; and, farther, that certain subsequent acts of Congress, though not in express terms yet by fair implication, had ratified the proclamation.

    He contends, in consequence, that "nothing can be clearer than that citizen and soldier alike, in time of civil or foreign war, are triable by military tribunals for all offences of which they may be guilty, in the interest of, or in concert with the enemy;" and that "these provisions, therefore, of your Constitution for indictment and trial by jury in civil courts of all crimes are * * * silent and inoperative in time of war when the public safety requires it."

    Listen to this judicial expounder of constitutional law!

    "Here is a conspiracy organized and prosecuted by armed traitors and
    hired assassins, receiving the moral support of thousands in every
    State and district, who pronounced the war for the Union a failure,
    and your now murdered but immortal Commander-in-Chief a tyrant.

    "It is in evidence that Davis, Thompson, and others * * * agreed and
    conspired with others to poison the fountains of water which supply
    your commercial metropolis, and thereby murder its inhabitants; to
    secretly deposit in the habitation of the people and in the ships in
    your harbor inflammable materials, and thereby destroy them by fire;
    to murder by the slow and consuming torture of famine your soldiers,
    captives in their hands; to import pestilence in infected clothes to
    be distributed in your capital and camps, and thereby murder the
    surviving heroes and defenders of the Republic.

    "I claim that the Constitution itself * * * by express terms, has
    declared whatever is necessary to make the prosecution of the war
    successful, may be done, and ought to be done, and is therefore
    constitutionally lawful.

    "Who will dare to say that in the time of civil war no person shall be
    deprived of life, liberty and property, without due process of law?
    This is a provision of your Constitution, than which there is none
    more just and sacred in it; it is, however, only the law of peace, not
    of war.

    "In time of war the civil tribunals of justice are wholly or partially
    silent, as the public safety may require; * * * the limitations and
    provisions of the Constitution in favor of life, liberty and property
    are therefore wholly or partially suspended."

    He makes allusion to the recent re-election of President Lincoln, as ratifying any doubtful exercise of power by him:

    "The voice of the people, thus solemnly proclaimed, by the omnipotence
    of the ballot * * * ought to be accepted, and will be accepted, I
    trust, by all just men, as the voice of God."

    He concludes his plea in favor of the jurisdiction of the Commission, by declaring that for what he had uttered in its favor "he will neither ask pardon nor offer apology," and by quoting Lord Brougham's speech in defence of a bill before the House of Lords empowering the Viceroy of Ireland to apprehend and detain all Irishmen suspect of conspiracy.

    The Special Judge-Advocate then proceeds to sum up the evidence, in doing which he leaves nothing to the free agency of the Court. He, first, by a review of the testimony of the Montgomeries and Conovers, proves to his own and, presumably, to the Court's satisfaction, that "Davis, Thompson, Cleary, Tucker, Clay, Young, Harper, Booth and John H. Surratt did combine and conspire together in Canada to kill and murder Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, Wm. H. Seward and Ulysses S. Grant."

    "Surely no word further need be spoken to show that John Wilkes Booth
    was in this conspiracy; that John H. Surratt was in this conspiracy;
    and that Jefferson Davis, and his several agents named, in Canada,
    were in this conspiracy.

    "Whatever may be the conviction of others, my own conviction is that
    Jefferson Davis is as clearly proven guilty of this conspiracy as is
    John Wilkes Booth, by whose hand Jefferson Davis inflicted the mortal
    wound upon Abraham Lincoln."

    After such utterances as these, it is hardly necessary to state that this impartial Judge declares every single person on trial, as well as John H.

    Surratt, guilty beyond the shadow of a doubt.

    "That John H. Surratt, George A. Atzerodt, Mary E. Surratt, David E.
    Herold, and Louis Payne entered into this conspiracy with Booth, is so
    very clear upon the testimony, that little time need be occupied in
    bringing again before the Court the evidence which establishes it.

    "It is almost imposing upon the patience of the Court to consume time
    in demonstrating the fact, which none conversant with the testimony of
    this case can for a moment doubt, that John H. Surratt and Mary E.
    Surratt were as surely in the conspiracy to murder the President as
    was John Wilkes Booth himself."

    He lets out the secret that the mother is on trial as a substitute for her son, whom the Secretary of War and the Bureau of Military Justice had failed to capture, by saying:

    "Nothing but his conscious coward guilt could possibly induce him to
    absent himself from his mother, as he does, upon her trial."

    After having reiterated over and over again, with all the authority of his office, what he had for hours endeavoured to enforce by all the resources of his intellect, that the guilt "of all these parties, both present and absent" is proved "beyond any doubt whatever," and "is no longer an open question;" he closes by formally, and with a very cheap show of magnanimity, leaving "the decision of this dread issue" to the Court.

    CHAPTER VI.

    THE VERDICT, SENTENCE AND PETITION.

    With the loud and repeated denunciations of this elaborate and vindictive harangue, full as it was of rhetorical appeals to the members of the Commission to avenge the murder of "their beloved Commander-in-Chief," and of repeated and most emphatic assurances of the undoubted guilt of each and every one of the prisoners, as well as of all their alleged accomplices, still ringing in the ear of the Court; the room is for the last time cleared of spectators, counsel for the prisoners and reporters; the mournful procession of the accused marches for the last time from the dock to their solitary cells, their fetters clanking as they go; and the Commission meets to deliberate upon its verdict.

    But who remains in the room, meets with the Court and participates in its secret and solemn deliberations? Who but Colonel Burnett, the officer who had so zealously conducted the preliminary examinations of the witnesses and marshalled the evidence for the prosecution? Who but Recorder Joseph Holt, the head of the Bureau of Military Justice, the left hand of Stanton as Baker was his right? Who but John A.

    Bingham, the Special Judge-Advocate, who had so mercilessly conducted the trial, assailing counsel, browbeating witnesses for the defense, declaring that all participants in the rebellion were virtually guilty of the assassination, and who had just closed his long speech, in which he had done his utmost to stir up the Commission to the highest pitch of loyalty, unreasoning passion and insatiable desire for vengeance?

    Where can we look in the history of the world for a parallel to such a spectacle?

    A woman of refinement and education, thrown together in one mass with seven men, to be tried by nine soldiers, for the crime of conspiring with Jefferson Davis, the arch-enemy of every member of the tribunal, to kill, and killing, the beloved Commander-in-Chief of every member of the tribunal; three experienced criminal lawyers eagerly engaging in the task of proving her guilty; pursuing it for days and weeks with the unrelenting vigor of sleuth-hounds; winding up by reiterating in the most solemn manner their overwhelming conviction of her guilt; and then all three being closeted with the Court to take part in making up the doom of death!

    And here let us pause to consider one feature of the trial and of the summing up of Judge Bingham, which has not yet been noticed because it deserves special and prominent remark.

    It appeared from the testimony on the part of the prosecution, unmistakably, that, during the fall of 1864 and the winter of 1864-5, Booth was brooding over a wild plot for the capture of the President (either on one of his drives, or in the theatre, where the lights were to be turned off), then hurrying off the captive to lower Maryland, thence across the Potomac, and thence to Richmond; thereby to force an exchange of prisoners, if not, possibly, a cessation of the war.

    It was a plot of the kind to emanate from the disordered brain of a young, spoiled, dissipated and disappointed actor. During this period, Booth made some trifling and miserably inadequate preparations, and endeavored to enlist some of his associates in its execution; and, by his personal ascendency over them, he did in fact entangle, in a more or less vague adhesion to the plot, Arnold, O'Laughlin, Atzerodt, Payne, Herold, John H. Surratt, Lloyd, and, possibly, Dr. Mudd and Weichman.

    On the fall of Richmond, and the surrender of Lee, this any-how impracticable scheme was necessarily abandoned. Indeed, the proof showed that Arnold and O'Laughlin had deserted their leader some time before.

    It further appeared in the testimony that it was not until after the forced abandonment of this plot and the desertion of most of his adherents, that Booth, plunged as he was into the depths of chagrin and despair because of the collapse of the rebellion, suddenly, as a mere after-thought, the offspring of a spirit of impotent revenge, seized upon the idea of murder, which was not in fact brought to the birth until the afternoon of the fourteenth, when he was first informed of the promised attendance of President Lincoln and General Grant at the theatre.

    Now, the existence of the plot to capture, although it looked forth from the evidence steadily into their faces, the Judge-Advocates bound themselves not to recognize. In the first place, such a concession would forever demolish the preconceived theory of the Secretary of War, Colonel Baker and the Bureau of Military Justice, that the conspiracy to murder emanated from the Confederate Government through its Canadian agents, by pointing directly to another plot than the one to kill as that in which these agents had been interested.

    The horrid monster of a widespread, treasonable conspiracy to overthrow the government, which had been conjured up in the imagination of the Secretary of War and then cherished in the secret recesses of the Bureau of Military Justice, would have immediately shrunk into the comparatively simple case of an assassination of the President and an attempted assassination of the Secretary of State, by two worthless villains suddenly seizing opportunity by the forelock to accomplish their murderous purpose.

    And, in the next place, the concession of such a plot as a fact would go far to establish the innocence of Mrs.

    Surratt, Arnold, O'Laughlin and Mudd, as well as that of John H. Surratt, by explaining such suspicious circumstances as the frequent rendezvous of Booth, Payne and others at Mrs. Surratt's house, which practice, as it was proved, ceased altogether on the fall of Richmond and the immediate departure of the son to Canada. To the Judge-Advocates, if not to the Court, any evidence looking towards innocence was most distasteful and unwelcome.

    They were in no mood to reconcile what they considered the damning proofs of a conspiracy to kill their "beloved Commander-in-Chief" with the innocence of the fettered culprits before them, by admitting a plot to capture, into which nevertheless those same proofs fitted with surprising consistency. Besides, in the eyes of Bingham and Holt, complicity in a plot to capture, although unexecuted, was proof of complicity in the plot to murder, and also of itself deserved death. In this direction, therefore, the Judge-Advocates were mole-eyed.

    On the contrary, they hailed the slightest indication of guilt with a glow of triumph. In the direction of guilt, they were lynx-eyed.

    Consequently, they bent every energy to identify the plot to capture with the plot to kill. They introduced anonymous letters, dropped letters; a letter mailed nearly a month after the assassination directed to J. W. B.; a letter in cipher, purporting to be dated the day after the assassination, addressed to John W. Wise, signed "No Five," found floating in the water at Morehead City, North Carolina, as late as the first of May; this last, the most flagrant violation and cynical disregard of the law of evidence on record.

    They did more. They labored to keep out all reference to the plot to capture. And it was for this reason, that the Judge-Advocates deliberately suppressed the diary found on the body of Booth. Its contents demonstrated the existence of the plot to capture.

    Instead of allowing the officer who testified to the articles taken from the dead body of Booth to make a detailed statement in response to one general question as to what they were, the examining counsel shows him first the knife, then the pistols, then the belt and holster, then a file with a cork at one end, then a spur, then the carbine, then the bills of exchange, then the pocket-compass; following the exhibition of every article with the interrogatory, "Did you take this from the corpse of the actor?" But no diary was exhibited or even spoken of, although, as has been mentioned, it was carried by this same officer and Colonel Baker to Secretary Stanton on the night following the capture.

    That these Judge-Advocates had carefully searched through the diary for items they could use against the prisoners, is shown by their calling one of the proprietors of the "National Intelligencer," as a witness, to contradict the statement that Booth had left a written article, setting forth the reasons for his crime, for publication in that paper--a statement found only in the diary whose very existence they kept secret.

    Therefore, when Judge Bingham came to review the evidence, he utterly refused to recognize in the testimony any such thing as a plot to capture; he shut his eyes to it and obstinately ignored it; he scornfully swept it aside as an absurdity it would be waste of time to combat; and he twisted every circumstance which looked to a connection, however remote, with an abandoned plot to kidnap, into a proof, solid and substantial, of complicity in the plot to murder.

    And, therefore, when this same thorough-going advocate, with his two emulous associates, proceeded in secret conclave with the members of the Commission to go over the testimony for the purpose of making up their verdict and sentence, he summarily stifled any hint as to the possibility of a plot to capture; he banished from the minds of the Court, if they ever entertained such a purpose, any attempt to reconcile the circumstantial evidence with the existence of such a plot; and, besides, he held it up to the condemnation of those military men as equally heinous and as deserving the same punishment as the actual assassination.

    Thus, the presence of these prosecutors during the deliberations of the Court must have exerted a deadly influence (if any influence were necessary) against the prisoners, and benumbed any impartiality and freedom of judgment which might otherwise have lodged in the members of the Commission.

    The Commission, with its three attending prosecuting officers, held two secret sessions--Thursday and Friday, the 29th and 30th of June; on the first day from 10 o'clock in the morning until 6 o'clock in the evening, on the second day, probably, during the morning only. The record of the proceedings is meagre, but contains enough to show the lines of the discussion which, in such an unexpected manner through one whole day, prolonged the deliberations of a tribunal organized solely to obey the predetermination of a higher power, and even made necessary an adjournment over night.

    There was no difficulty with the verdicts, except in the case of Spangler, over the degree of whose guilt a majority of the Commission presumed for the first time to differ with the Judge-Advocates. They would unite in a conviction of the crime of assisting Booth to escape from the theatre with knowledge of the assassination, but they would go no farther.

    They would not find him a participant in the "traitorous conspiracy." This poor fellow, as we can see now, was clearly innocent of the main charge; but that was no reason, then, why the Commission should find him so. There was more testimony pointing to his complicity with Booth on the fatal night than there was against Arnold or O'Laughlin or even Mrs.

    Surratt; and Judge Bingham, the guardian and guide of the Court, had pronounced it "Conclusive and brief." The testimony of the defense, however, appears overwhelmingly convincing, and, moreover, his case was admirably managed by General Ewing.

    For all the rest there was no mercy in the verdict. Every one was found guilty of the charge as formulated (eliminating Spangler); that is, in the judgment of the Commission, they had, each and all, been engaged in a treasonable conspiracy with Jefferson Davis, John H. Surratt, John Wilkes Booth and the others named, to kill Abraham Lincoln, President, Andrew Johnson, Vice-President, Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State, U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General; and that in pursuance of such conspiracy they (the prisoners) together with John H. Surratt and J. Wilkes Booth, had murdered Abraham Lincoln, assaulted with intent to kill W. H. Seward, and lain in wait with intent to kill Andrew Johnson and U.

    S. Grant.

    This was the deliberate judgment of the Commission as guided by Judge-Advocates Holt, Burnett and Bingham. With the same breath with which they pronounced the guilt of Mrs. Surratt, they pronounced also the guilt of her son, of Jefferson Davis, of Clement C. Clay, of George H. Sanders, of Beverly Tucker. And there can be no doubt that if these men had also been upon trial, they all would have been visited with the same condemnation and would have met the same doom.

    The Commission, further, found Herold, Atzerodt, Payne and Arnold guilty of the Specification as formulated (eliminating Spangler); Mrs. Surratt guilty, except that she had not harbored and concealed Arnold or O'Laughlin; Dr. Mudd guilty, except that he had not harbored or concealed Payne, John H. Surratt, O'Laughlin, Atzerodt or Mrs. Surratt; and, strangest of all, they found O'Laughlin guilty of the Specification, except that he had not lain in wait for General Grant with intent to kill him, which was the very part in the conspiracy he was charged in the Specification with having undertaken.

    It should be recollected that, in the first moments of the panic succeeding the assassination, Stanton and his subordinates had included among the objects of the conspiracy, as if to complete its symmetry, the murder of the Secretary of War, himself.

    Afterwards, probably because of the attitude of Stanton relative to the prosecution, Grant was substituted as the victim of O'Laughlin and not of Booth; Stanton's son having discovered a resemblance of the captured O'Laughlin to the mysterious visitor at his father's house during the serenade on the night of the 13th of April, when General Grant was also present. This pretty romance, the testimony on behalf of O'Laughlin effectually dissipated on the trial, but the indomitable Bingham still insisted on holding the prisoner to a general complicity with the plot.

    In this instance, as well as in that of Spangler, there may have been some dissension between a majority of the officers and the Judge-Advocates, but, taken altogether, the eight verdicts could not have cost the Commission much time. It was organized to convict, and it did convict.

    So that it was not until the Court, having made up its verdicts, proceeded to affix its sentences, that the three advocates, still assisting at the work of death, encountered the unforeseen difficulties which compelled a prolongation of the session. The crime or crimes of which the prisoners were all pronounced guilty (with the possible exception of Spangler's) were capital, and the Secretary of War, on the eve of the assembling of the Commission, had already denounced against such offenses (not excepting Spangler's) the punishment of death.

    The sentence, however, under the rules governing military commissions, was wholly within the power of the Court, which, no matter what the nature of the verdict, could affix any punishment it saw fit, from a short imprisonment up to the gallows. Its two-fold function was, like a jury to find a verdict, not only, but, like the judge in a common-law court, to pronounce sentence; and, unlike such a judge, in pronouncing sentence, the Commission was confined within certain limits by no statute.

    Although the whole proceedings of the Court must be subjected to the final approval of the President, yet its members were clothed alike with the full prerogative of justice and the full prerogative of clemency. There was one limit, however. While a majority could find the verdict and prescribe every other punishment, it required two-thirds of the Commission to inflict the penalty of death. Four officers, therefore, could block the way to the scaffold, and five could mitigate any sentence, to any degree, and for any, or for no reason.

    The Commission must have taken up the cases for sentence in the order adopted in the formal Charge. As to the first three--Herold, Atzerodt and Payne--there could have been no dissent or hesitation. The Commission, with hardly a moment's deliberation, must have ratified the judgment of the Judge-Advocates and condemned the prisoners to be hung by the neck until dead.

    The sentences of death formally declare in every instance that two-thirds of the Commission concur therein, but, as to these three, we can scarcely be in error in stating the Court was unanimous. It was not until the cases of the next three--O'Laughlin, Spangler and Arnold--were reached, that symptoms of dissatisfaction with the sweeping doom of death, so confidently pronounced by Judge Bingham in his charge, first began to show themselves amongst the members of the Court.

    It seems that now, after having joined with the counsel in pronouncing capital punishment upon the three most prominent culprits, the majority could no longer whet their appetite for blood so as to keep it up to the same fierce edge as that of the Judge-Advocates.

    The deviations from the Charge and Specification, the Court had finally prescribed in the verdicts against O'Laughlin and Spangler, were not thought by the prosecutors to be of such importance as to warrant a softening of the sentence. But here the loyalty of some members of the Commission began to falter, and refuse to bear the strain.

    They had found O'Laughlin guilty of the "traitorous conspiracy," and Spangler guilty of aiding Booth to escape, and Arnold guilty in the same degree as Herold, Atzerodt and Payne, but in none of these cases could the attending advocates extort a two-thirds vote for death. In the case of Spangler, owing, it is said, to the impression made by General Ewing and the influence of General Wallace, they were compelled to allow a sentence of but six years imprisonment.

    And in the case of the two others--convicted co-conspirators with Booth and Davis though they were--these prosecuting officers had to rest satisfied with but life-long imprisonment.

    It was too evident that five members of the Commission had slipped the bloody rein. Three lives had they taken. Henceforth they would stop just this side the grave.

    At this point--when the Commission had sentenced to death three men and had just declined to sentence to death two more whom it had pronounced guilty of the same crime--at this point it was, that the sentence of Mary E. Surratt came up for determination.

    Now, the crimes of which Arnold had been found guilty were both in law and in fact the same of which she had been found guilty. Even the particular allegation in the Specification is the same in both cases, except some immaterial variance in the verbiage and in the names of co-conspirators.

    Of course, it will be presumed that the Commission had found the woman guilty without being pressed. But, equally of course, it will not be doubted that, in determining the sentence which should follow the verdict, the question of exercising the same mercy as the Commission had just exercised in the case of a man convicted of the same crime, must have arisen in the case of the woman.

    And, the question once having arisen, the first impulse of the majority, if inclined still to mercy, must have been to exert their own unquestioned function, and, as in the other cases, mitigate the sentence themselves. They would have, originally, no motive to thrust upon the President, who was to know comparatively nothing of the evidence, the responsibility of doing that thing, which they themselves who had heard the whole case thought ought to be done, and which in a parallel case they had just done.

    Even if they believed the woman's crime had a deeper tinge of iniquity than either Arnold's or Mudd's (of which the respective verdicts, however, give no hint), but that nevertheless her age and sex ought to save her from the scaffold, they need not have turned to the President for mercy on such a ground. The woman clothed upon by her age and sex had sat for weeks bodily before them. This very mitigation was what a majority of the Court had power to administer. The reason of the mitigation was a matter of no moment.

    The Court could commute for "age and sex" as well as the President, and, for that matter, could state the reason for the milder penalty in the sentence itself.

    Therefore, it may be taken for granted that here the Judge-Advocates again found that two-thirds of the Court would not concur in the infliction of the death penalty. Nay, that even a majority could not be obtained. Five out of the nine officers announced themselves in favor of imprisonment for life.

    Here, indeed, was a coil! The prosecutors were at their wits' ends. And lo! when they passed on to consider the last case, that of Dr. Mudd, the same incomprehensible reluctance to shed more blood did but add to their discomfiture. The verdict indeed had been easily obtainable, but the coveted death-sentence would not follow. The whole day had been spent in these debatings. The expedient of adjourning over to the next day, perhaps, was now tried; and the dismayed Judge-Advocates, with but three out of the eight heads they had made so sure of, and their "female fiend" likely to slip the halter, hurry away to consult with their Chief.

    Edwin M. Stanton, as he had presided over the whole preparatory process, so too had kept watch over the daily progress of the trial from afar.

    Every evening his zealous aide-de-camps made report for the day and took their orders for the morrow.

    After the death of Booth and the escape of John H. Surratt, the condemnation to death of the mother of the fugitive had become his one supreme aim.

    The condemnation of the other prisoners was to him either a matter of no doubt or was a minor affair. Three heads of the band of assassins stood out in bloody prominence--Booth, John H. Surratt and Payne. The first had been snatched from his clutches by a death too easy. Payne, with hand-cuffs and fetters and chains and ball and hood, he might be confident, could not evade his proper doom.

    Surratt, by the aid of some inscrutable, malignant power, had contrived to baffle all the efforts of his widespread and mighty machinery of military and detective police. But he had the mother, the friend of Booth and the entertainer of Payne; and she, the relentless Secretary with his accordant lackeys had sworn, should not fail to suffer in default of the self-surrender of her son.

    She, moreover, was to be made an example and a warning to the women of the South, who, in the judgment of these three patterns of heroism, had "unsexed" themselves by cherishing and cheering fathers, brothers, husbands and sons on the tented field.

    In the conclave which Stanton and his two co-adjutors held, either during the recesses of the prolonged session of the first day, or most likely during the night of the adjournment, it was resolved, that if the manly reluctance of five soldiers to doom a woman to the scaffold could be overcome in no other way, to employ as a last resort the "suggestion," that the Court formally condemn her to death, and then, as a compromise, the soft-hearted five petition the President to commute--the three plotters trusting to the chances of the future, with the petition in their custody and the President under their dominion, to render ineffectual this forced concession to what they scorned as a weak sentimentalism.

    This suggestion of what was in truth a most extraordinary device--a petition to the President to do what the Court could do itself--could not have emanated from the merciful majority of the Court, which subsequently did sign the fatal document. They, at least, were sincere, and, if let alone, would have proceeded immediately to embody their own clemency in a formal sentence, as they had done with O'Laughlin and Arnold, and as they were about to do with Mudd.

    Had there been but one, or two, or three dissentients, so that they were powerless in the face of two-thirds of the Commission; or even had there been four--a number sufficient to block a death-sentence but not sufficient to dictate the action of the Court, then, indeed, recourse to the clemency of the Executive might have been a natural proceeding.

    But a clear majority had no need to look elsewhere for a power of commutation which they themselves possessed in full vigor, and which, in all probability, after the first three death-penalties, they had determined to apply in every one of the other cases. Neither could the suggestion have been made by one of the minority, because none of them signed the petition to the last. The four must have been steadfast and uncompromising for blood.

    The whole scheme proceeded from a quarter outside the Court--a quarter which, on the one hand, was possessed by an overmastering revengeful passion, such as was required to point the five officers to a seeming source of mercy to which they might appeal and thus avoid the exercise of their own prerogative in antagonism to their four brethren, and, on the other hand, harbored some secret knowledge or malign intent that the petition would or should be, in fact, an empty form; from a quarter, in short, where the desire for the condemnation to death of Mrs.

    Surratt was all-controlling and where the condition of the President was well known. They, who suggested the death-sentence and the petition as a substitute for the milder penalty, were surely all on the side of death, and hoped, if they did not believe, that the prayer of the petition would be of no avail; else they would not have adopted such a circuitous method to do what the five officers could immediately have accomplished themselves.

    In one word, the contrivers of the device of petition were not those who desired to save the bare life of the convicted she-conspirator, but were those who would be satisfied with nothing less than her death on the scaffold. The suggestion was wholly sinister and malevolent.

    On the other hand, the majority of the Court did really desire that her punishment should not exceed that of Arnold, O'Laughlin and Mudd, and they certainly would never have had recourse to a petition to the President, had they not been cheated into believing that that method of proceeding was likely to effectuate what they had full power to do. Never would these five soldiers, or any two of them, have given their voices for the death of this woman, had they dreamed for a moment that their signing of the petition was, and was meant to be, but a farce.

    They would not have played such a ghastly trick under the shadow of the gibbet.

    Accordingly, when the Commission reassembled, either after recess or adjournment, the reinvigorated counsellors immediately unfolded their plan. We can almost hear their voices, in that upper room of the Old Penitentiary, as they alternately urge on the Court. Holt, making a merit of yielding in the cases of Spangler, of O'Laughlin, of Arnold and of Mudd, denounces the universal disloyalty of the women of the South, and pleads the necessity of an example.

    Bingham, holding up both mother and son as equally deep-dyed in blood with Booth and Payne, both insinuates and threatens at the same time, that, if "tenderness," forsooth, is to be shown because of the age and sex of such a she-assassin, then, for the sake of the blood of their murdered Commander-in-Chief, do not his own soldiers show it, but let his successor take the fearful responsibility.

    One of the five gives way, and now there is a majority for death. One more appeal! The life of the woman trembles in the balance. Once more to the breach! The supreme reserve is at last brought forward--an argument much in use with Judge-Advocates in cases of refractory courts-martial, as a last resort--that the President will not allow a hair of her head to be harmed, but that terror, TERROR, is necessary; in this instance, to force the son to quit his hiding place, the life of the mother must be the bait held out to catch the unsurrendering son. We will hang him and then free the woman's neck.

    Another vote comes over. Two-thirds at last concur, and her doom is sealed. They sentence "Mary E. Surratt to be hanged by the neck until she be dead." Judge Bingham sits down and embodies the memorable "suggestion" in writing as follows:

    [It is without address.]

    "The undersigned, members of the Military Commission detailed to try
    Mary E. Surratt and others for the conspiracy and the murder of
    Abraham Lincoln, late President of the United States, &c.,
    respectfully pray the President, in consideration of the sex and age
    of the said Mary E. Surratt, if he can, upon all the facts in the
    case, find it consistent with his sense of duty to the country, to
    commute the sentence of death, which the Court have been constrained
    to pronounce, to imprisonment in the penitentiary for life.

    Respectfully submitted."

    General Ekin copies it on a half-sheet of legal-cap paper, and the five officers, viz.: Generals Hunter, Kautz, Foster and Ekin, and Colonel Tompkins, sign the copy; General Ekin keeping the draft of Bingham as a memento of so gentle an executioner.

    The Commission then proceeds to the next and last case, and, again exercising its prerogative of clemency, sentences Dr. Mudd to imprisonment for life. It is now Friday noon. The result of the two-days' secret session, consisting of a succinct statement of the verdict and sentence in every case, in the foregoing order, is redacted into a record. The presiding officer signs, and the Recorder countersigns it. It is placed in the hands of the Judge-Advocate, together with the petition to the President. There is an adjournment without day. The members disperse, and the work of the Military Commission is over.

    CHAPTER VII.

    THE DEATH WARRANT AND THE EXECUTION.

    From Friday afternoon, the thirtieth of June, through Saturday, Sunday, Monday and Tuesday, the first four days of July, the record of the findings and sentences remained under the seal of sworn secrecy in the custody of the Judge-Advocate-General. To consummate the work of the Commission, the signature of the President to a warrant approving its action and directing the execution of its judgment was necessary. But, during this interval, as it was given out from the White House, President Johnson was too ill to attend to public business. In the meantime, the city, and even the whole country to its very borders, were agitated by the question: What is to be the fate of Mrs. Surratt?

    The doom of the male culprits was for the moment forgotten in the intense anxiety over hers.

    Despite the seven-fold seal of secrecy which covered the proceedings of the secret sessions, whispers of a recommendation of mercy filled the air.

    In the War Department, the main source of anxiety, at the same time, must have been this superfluous paper--the distressing outcome of an unsuspected sentimental weakness in five of our chosen men. After the final adjournment of the Commission, the unobtrusive, unaddressed half-sheet had been fastened to the record of the sentences by the same narrow yellow silk ribbon which held its own sheets together, and to which it now dangled as a last leaf, or back.

    A safety-valve to the misplaced chivalry of the Court--it had served its purpose, and was henceforth useless. That it should now turn itself into an implement of evil, minister to the cause of rebellion and assassination, cause "Our Own Andy" to flinch at last and thus the she-fiend of the Bureau escape her doom! It would be treason to suffer it. Upon that resolve, the Triumvirate of Stanton, Holt and Bingham had once for all determined. Indestructible, inconcealable, omnipotent, indeed, must that paper be, which could thwart their united purpose.

    At length, on the morning of Wednesday, the fifth, Preston King, who, in those days, was a favored guest at the White House, announced in the Judge-Advocate's office that the President was so much better as to be able to sit up; and at a later hour in the day, General Holt, in pursuance of an appointment, started on his solemn errand. The volumes of testimony taken before the Commission by official stenographers, daily reports of which had been furnished, he, of course, did not carry with him. In the interview that was to come, there would be no time and no inclination to read over bulky rolls of examinations and cross-examinations of witnesses.

    From aught that appears, the President was not expected to read over the evidence, nor was it customary in such cases. It may have been the duty of the Secretary of War or the Attorney-General to scrutinize the testimony, either from day to day or at the close of the trial. But all that the President was supposed to know about the merits of the case appears to have been derived from what any of his Cabinet saw fit to inform him, from what he himself casually and unofficially read, but, especially and principally, from what the Judge-Advocate was now coming to tell him. As to the guilt of the accused, and especially of Mrs.

    Surratt, his mind had long ago been made up for him by his imperious War Minister, from whose despotic sway he had not as yet recovered energy enough to free himself.

    He was still in that brief introductory period of his Presidency which may be called his Stanton Apprenticeship; still eager "to make treason odious;" full of threatenings to hang Davis and other Southern leaders. He had not yet awakened from the state of semi-stupefaction into which his sudden and awful elevation seems to have thrown him; and, in this state, he must have been extremely averse to dwelling on any of the circumstances of the assassination to which he owed his high place.

    The idea of clemency to any one of the band of assassins, male or female, which his War-Secretary's court might convict, would have been intolerable to his imagination and sickening to his sense of security. What Andrew Johnson, at this moment, wanted was to push away from his mind all thoughts of the tragic end of his predecessor, and to allow retributive vengeance to take the most summary course with the least possible knowledge and trouble to himself.

    And this mood of the presidential mind was well known to the Judge-Advocate-General, as he entered the President's room. He brought with him so much of the record of the proceedings of the Commission as was necessary to the accomplishment of his errand--viz.: the record of the findings and sentences, which the President was to endorse.

    This document consisted of a few sheets of legal-cap paper fastened together at the top, written on both sides in the fashion of legal papers, i. e., beginning at the top of the first page and, on reaching the bottom, turning up the paper and writing on the back from the bottom to top. It was a document complete in itself, the written record ending on the first page of the last half-sheet--thus leaving blank the remainder of that page and the whole of the obverse side; ample room for the death-warrant.

    To this record, but forming no part of it, the Petition, as we have said, had been affixed, but in such a manner as to be easily separable without mutilation. He must also have brought with him his official report of the trial--styled "The formal brief review of the case," which was subsequently appended to the regular Report of the Judge-Advocate-General to the Secretary of War and transmitted to the Congress in December following--because it is addressed "To the President," is dated "July 5, 1865," and is signed "J.

    Holt." It recites the verdicts and sentences; justifies its brevity by referring to "the full and exhaustive" argument of Judge Bingham; certifies to the regularity and fairness of the proceedings; and recommends the execution of the sentences; but it makes no mention of the Petition, or any "suggestion" of mercy.

    The Judge-Advocate could have anticipated no difficulty in obtaining the approval of the President, conscious as he was that the grounds of such approval were to be furnished to the President by himself. The approval being had, the fixing of the day of execution could cause no disagreement.

    His only possible source of embarrassment was the petition for commutation. But it would be strange, indeed, if a few apt words could not further emasculate the mild, hypothetical language in which his colleague, Bingham, had seen fit to clothe that paper.

    He found the President "alone," and (as he himself says) "waiting for" him, "very pale, as if just recovered from a severe illness."

    "Without delay" he "proceeded to discharge the duty which brought" him "into his presence." What took place at this "confidential interview" (as Holt calls it) can never be precisely known; the distinguished interlocutors having subsequently risen into unappeasable quarrel over the presence or absence of the petition, and given contradictory versions.

    Whatever the truth may be, it is evident that everything went smoothly at the moment. The Judge-Advocate was not disappointed. No difficulty was encountered. What was done was done quickly and at once. The record may have been read over; but this was hardly necessary, as the bare mention of the several sentences would convey a correct summary of its contents. He may have read the "brief review of the case" he had prepared.

    As Judge Holt relates, he said to the President, "frankly, as it was his official duty to do," that in his judgment "the proceedings of the Court were regular, and its findings and sentences justified by the evidence, and that the sentences should be enforced." And this was what he had written in his "Brief Review." What more could the successor of the murdered Lincoln want? His approval must have been spontaneous and immediate. As Holt says, "at that time Mr.

    Johnson needed no urging." Mention may have been made of the curious weakness infecting some members of "our Court" towards the wicked woman, who, as Johnson seems then to have thought, "had kept the nest that hatched the egg;" but only to be scouted by both Judge-Advocate and President as most reprehensible and actually disloyal.

    Their unanimity over the salutary effect of the hanging of this one woman on the female rebels was more than fraternal. And it is probable that no more explicit mention of an actual petition was made by Judge Holt in his conversation with the President than was made in his written report to the President, dated the same day, and which he had with him at the time.

    The day of execution was fixed upon with the same alacrity. "Make it as soon as possible, so that the disagreeable business may be over; say the day after to-morrow--Friday, the seventh." And, thereupon, everything being agreed upon, Judge Holt turns over the papers to the last page of the record and spreads it upon the table. Beginning, a few lines below the signature of "D. Hunter, President" which closes the record, with the date,

    "Executive Mansion, July 5th, 1865,"

    "with his own hand" he writes out the death warrant. As this includes the approval of the sentences, the appointment of the day and hour of execution, and the designation of the place of confinement of those condemned to imprisonment, the bottom of the page is reached before he completes his task.

    If he had turned up the page and continued his writing on the obverse side from the bottom down, as all the foregoing had been written, then the petition of mercy, unaddressed as it was, would have been, if still attached, directly beneath the eye of the President as he signed the death-warrant. But, as now appears from the record itself, the careful Judge-Advocate did not turn up the page from the bottom.

    On the contrary, reverting to the layman's way of writing papers, he whisks the whole record over, and continues the writing of the death-warrant on the back of the last half-sheet of the record from the top to the bottom--by this change of method, either throwing the petition under the leaves of the record, or, if disengaged, leaving it upside down.

    When he has thus finished his draft he shoves it over to the President.

    The President signs it with tremulous hand. The "confidential interview" is at an end; and the Judge-Advocate, taking up the papers, hurries out and over to the Department of War.

    At this moment the petition disappears from view. We hear no more of it.

    Thrust as a convenient succedaneum into the hands of the majority of the Commission, ignored, suppressed or slurred over when before the President, it had served its pitiful purpose. Neither the Adjutant-General nor any of his clerks, appear to have noticed it, although the record must have been copied more than once in his office. It seems to have sunk suddenly into oblivion; its very existence became the subject of dispute. It was omitted from the authorized published proceedings of the Commission. It was omitted from the annual report of the Judge-Advocate.

    The disloyal paper must have been laid alongside the suppressed "Diary," there to repose unseen until the Impeachment of Johnson and the Trial of Surratt summoned them together into the light of day.

    • * * * *

    On the morning of Thursday, the sixth day of July, the six days ominous silence of the War-Department is broken. An order issues from the Adjutant-General's office which, bearing date the day before and reciting the findings and death-sentences of the Commission and the death-warrant of the President, commands Major-General Hancock to see execution done, on the seventh, between the hours of ten and two.

    This order was read to Mrs. Surratt at noon. She had all along been encouraged to hope. She, herself, had never been able to realize the possibility of a capital condemnation in her own case. And, here, suddenly, was Death, with violence and shame, within twenty-four hours.

    She sank down under the blow. In faltering accents she protested that she had no hand in the murder of the President, and pleaded for a few days more time to prepare for death. During the remainder of the day and throughout the night, she was so prostrated by physical weakness and mental derangement as to necessitate medical aid to keep her alive and sane. The cries of her daughter could be heard in the still darkness outside the prison. At five o'clock in the morning, the mother (with the three condemned men), was removed to a solitary cell on the first floor, preparatory to the execution.

    In the meantime, when it first became known that, by the sentence of the Commission and the direction of the President, Mrs. Surratt was to die by the rope on the same scaffold with Payne, Herold and Atzerodt within twenty-four hours, a chill of despairing terror froze the blood of her relatives and friends, a thrill of consternation swept over the body of the citizens, and dark misgivings disturbed even the most loyal breasts. A stream of supplicants at once set in towards the Executive Mansion--not only friends and acquaintances of the condemned woman, but strangers, high-placed men, and women too, who were haunted by doubts of her guilt and could in some degree realize her agony.

    But even this expiring effort of sympathy, the powers behind the President had anticipated. Apprehensive that Andrew Johnson, at the last moment, might yield to distressing importunities for more time, they had already taken measures that their sick man's wish to hear nothing till all was over should be scrupulously respected. Preston King and General James Lane undertook to keep the door and bar all access to the President during the dreadful interval between the promulgation of the sentence and its execution. It was rumored that they, with a congenial crew, held high revelry around their passive Chief in his private apartments.

    Be this as it may, no supplicant--friend, acquaintance or stranger--was allowed to gain access to the President.

    The priests, who had attested upon her trial the good character, the piety and the general worth of their parishioner, instinctively turned their steps to the White House to beg for clemency, or, at least, a respite.

    They were repulsed from its door. In ghastly mockery, they were told to go to ---- Judge Holt.

    At last, the daughter of the victim made her way to the very threshold of the President's room. Frenzied with grief she assailed the portal with her cries for admission to plead for her dying mother. She was denied admittance. In the extremity of her despair she lay down upon the steps, and, in the name of God, appealed to the President and to the wardens, only to listen to her prayer. The grim guardians of the door held it shut in her face.

    Denied, thus, even an appeal to Executive clemency, the friends of the poor woman, as a last most desperate resort, invoked the Constitution of their and her country through the historic writ of Habeas Corpus. On the morning of the day of the execution, they found a judge (Judge Wylie; all honor to his memory!) who had the independence and courage to grant the writ. At half-past eleven, General Hancock appeared before the Judge and made return that by order of the President the Habeas Corpus was suspended and therefore he did not produce the body. The order of the President dated ten o'clock, same morning, was annexed to the return and directed the General to proceed with the execution.

    No sooner had the guarantees of the Constitution been, thus, finally set at naught, than the cell-doors were thrown open and the prisoners summoned to their doom. As the enfeebled widow raised her trembling limbs from off the coarse mattress which alone separated her body from the stone floor of her dungeon, she strove, in broken words, to assure the soldiers, who had come to bind her arms behind her back and tie cords around her skirts above and below the knee, of her utter, yet helpless innocence. Her confessor, who stood by her until the last, gently pointed out to her the uselessness of such appeals, at such a moment, and directed her hopes towards Heaven.

    Amid the tolling of the bells, sending a shudder through the silent population of the city, and heralded by the tramp of armed men, the death-march of the doomed woman and the doomed men begins. The still breathing men and still breathing woman are clothed already in their shrouds. As she totters first along the corridor, accompanied by her priest and requiring two soldiers to hold her erect, the very extremity of her helplessness and woe bears witness in her favor. Even the bloody Payne, who walks next behind her, has broken through that stolid indifference to his own fate, so remarkable as to indicate insanity, to clear her from all complicity with the assassination.

    Herold and Atzerodt, who follow, though themselves speechless with terror, seem to wave her mute acquittal, as they stumble along into the swift-coming Darkness.

    They reach the prison-yard. They mount the high scaffold. They are seated in four chairs facing the four dangling nooses, while the death-warrant is once more read. Their graves, already dug, are in full sight close by.

    Their coffins stand by the side of the open graves. They are raised up and pushed forward upon the two drops, Herold and Atzerodt on one, Mrs.

    Surratt and Payne on the other; the half-conscious woman still supported by the two guards. The ropes are adjusted. The hoods drawn over the face.

    The signal is given. The two drops fall. Surrounded by the unpitying soldiery, headed by the unpitying Hartranft, the woman and the men hang writhing in the agonies of an ignominious death. When pronounced dead, the bodies are cut down. They are laid out on the top of the coffins. A hurried post-mortem examination is made. And, then, at four o'clock in the afternoon, they are inclosed in the coffins and buried side by side. The soldiers depart with flourish of trumpet and beat of drum. Silence descends on the grounds of the old Arsenal; broken only by the pace of the sentinel set to guard the four corpses.

    The daughter may beg the stern Secretary to yield up the body of her murdered mother, that she may place it in consecrated ground. But she will beg in vain.

    And so ended the fell tragedy. And so did brave soldiers avenge the murder of their "beloved Commander-in-Chief." Methinks their beloved Commander-in-Chief, could his freed spirit have found a mortal voice, would have spurned, with indignant horror, the savage sacrifice of a defenseless woman to appease his gentle shade.

    CHAPTER VIII.

    WAS IT NOT MURDER?

    And now what shall be said as to this taking of human life?

    Maintaining the most rigorous allegiance to the simple unadulterated truth, what can be said? Arraigned at the bar of the common law as expounded by the precedents of centuries, and confronted by plain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, which need no exposition and yet have been luminously expounded; but one thing can be said.

    Had Mary E. Surratt the right guaranteed by the Constitution to a trial singly and alone, in a regularly constituted civil court, and by a jury of the vicinage, the individuals of which she might select by challenge, both for cause, in all cases, and without cause to a certain number, before she could be legally convicted of any crime whatever, or be lawfully punished by the most trivial loss of property or the minutest injury to limb, to say nothing of the brutal crushing out of her life? That's the unevadable question which the ages put and will continue to put.

    And upon its precisely truthful answer, depend the character and color of the acts of every person who had lot or part in the execution of this woman.

    • * * * *

    On the 21st day of October, 1864--while the war was still raging--Lambdin P. Milligan, a citizen of the United States and a resident of Indiana, was arraigned before a Military Commission convened by the commanding General of that Military District, at Indianapolis, on the following charges preferred against him by Henry L. Burnett, Judge-Advocate of the Department of the West:

    1. Conspiracy against the Government of the United States.
    1. Affording aid and comfort to the rebels.
    1. Inciting insurrection.
    1. Disloyal practices.
    1. Violation of the laws of war.

    There were also specifications, the substance of which was that Milligan had joined and aided a secret society, known as the Order of American Knights or Sons of Liberty, for the purpose of overthrowing the Government and authorities of the United States; had communicated with the enemy; conspired to seize munitions of war in the arsenals, and to liberate prisoners; resisted and encouraged resistance to the draft: at or near Indianapolis, in Indiana, "a State within the military lines of the Army of the United States, and the theatre of military operations, and which had been and was constantly threatened to be invaded by the enemy."

    On these charges and specifications, Milligan was subjected to a lengthy trial by this Military Commission which finally found him guilty on all the charges and sentenced him to be hanged. The record was approved by the Commanding General, and then transmitted to President Lincoln, who held it long under advisement, and was so holding it when he was killed. His successor, at about the same time that he summoned the Commission to try Mrs. Surratt, at length approved the findings and ordered the sentence to be executed on Friday, the 19th day of May, 1865.

    But this object-lesson to the Commission sitting at that date in the old Penitentiary was intercepted. On the 10th of May, Milligan brought the record before the United States Circuit Court by a petition for his discharge, and, the two judges differing upon the main question of the jurisdiction of the Commission, the cause was certified under the statute to the Supreme Court of the United States; in deference to which action the President suspended the execution. The argument before that high tribunal coming on in the winter of 1865-66, a great array of counsel appeared upon both sides; David D. Field, James A. Garfield and Jeremiah S.

    Black for the prisoner, and Attorney-General Speed and Benjamin F.

    Butler for the United States. The counsel for the Government followed the same line as did Judge Bingham in his argument on the "Conspiracy Trial;" the counsel for the prisoner on their side, only enlarging, emphasizing and enforcing the argument of Reverdy Johnson. At the close of the term the Court unanimously decided that the Military Commission had no jurisdiction to try Milligan; that its verdict and sentence were void; and ordered the defendant discharged.

    At the next term, the Court handed down two opinions--one the opinion of the Court, read by Judge Davis, in which four of his colleagues concurred, and one by Chief-Justice Chase, in which three of his colleagues concurred. The two opinions agreed that, as matter of law, the President could not of his own motion authorize such a Commission, and that, as matter of fact, the Congress had not authorized such a Commission; and therefore they were at one in their conclusion.

    But they differed in this; that, whereas the majority of the Court held that not even the Congress could authorize such a Court, the minority, while agreeing that the Congress had not exercised such a power, were of opinion that such a power was lodged in that branch of the Government.

    The attempt has often been made to distinguish the case of Mrs. Surratt from that of Milligan by alleging that Washington at the time of the assassination was within the theatre of military operations, and actually under martial law, whereas Indiana at the time of the Commission of Milligan's alleged offenses was not.

    Now, it must be admitted that at the time of the murder of President Lincoln the war had swept far away from the vicinity of the Capital.

    There had been no Confederate troops near it since Early's raid in the summer of 1864, and no enemy even in the Shenandoah Valley since October.

    It must also be admitted, and was, in fact, proved on the trial, that the civil courts were open and in full and unobstructed discharge of their functions. As for the reiterated affirmation of Judge Bingham that the courts were only kept open by the protection of the bayonet; that is precisely what was affirmed by General Butler, in his argument before the Supreme Court, to have been the fact in Indiana.

    None of the counsel in the Milligan case claimed that a Military Commission could possibly have jurisdiction to try a simple citizen in a State where there was no war or rumors of war.

    "We do fully agree, that if at the time of these occurrences there
    were no military operations in Indiana, if there was no army there, if
    there was no necessity of armed forces there, * * * then this
    Commission had no jurisdiction to deal with the relator, and the
    question proposed may as well at once be answered in the negative."

    They contended, as the very basis of their case, that the acts of Milligan "took place in the theatre of military operations, within the lines of the army, in a State which had been, and then was constantly threatened with invasion."

    And, in fact, the record in so many words so stated, and the statement was uncontroverted by the relator.

    General Butler with great earnestness put the question:

    "If the Court takes judicial notice that the courts are open, must it
    not also take judicial notice how, and by whose protection, and by
    whose permission they were so open? that they were open because the
    strong arm of the military upheld them; because by that power these
    Sons of Liberty and Knights of the American Circle, who would have
    driven them away, were arrested, tried and punished.

    "If the soldiery of the United States, by their arms, had not held the
    State from intestine domestic foes within, and the attacks of traitors
    without; had not kept the ten thousand rebel prisoners of war confined
    in the neighborhood from being released by these Knights and men of
    the Order of the Sons of Liberty; there would have been no courts in
    Indiana, no place in which the Circuit Judge of the United States
    could sit in peace to administer the laws."

    Moreover, the opinion of the minority Judges bases their contention that Congress had the power, if it had chosen to exercise it, to authorize such a Military Commission, upon this very fact.

    "In Indiana, for example, at the time of the arrest of Milligan and
    his co conspirators, it is established by the papers in the record,
    that the State was a military district; was the theatre of military
    operations, had been actually invaded, and was constantly threatened
    with invasion.

    It appears, also, that a powerful secret association,
    composed of citizens and others, existed within the State, under
    military organization, conspiring against the draft, and plotting
    insurrection, the liberation of the prisoners of war at various
    depots, the seizure of the State and national arsenals, armed
    co-operation with the enemy, and war against the national government."

    Not one of which circumstances (except that it was a military district) can be truthfully predicated of the District of Columbia at the time of the assassination.

    As for actual martial law, there was no declaration of martial law claimed for the City of Washington, other than the proclamation of the President which applied as well to Indiana, and, indeed, to the whole North.

    We are justified, therefore, in saying, that the Supreme Court of the United States, in this case of Milligan, pronounced the final condemnation of the whole proceedings of the Military Commission which tried and condemned Mary E. Surratt; declaring, with all the solemn force of a determination of the highest judicial tribunal known to this nation, that every one of its acts, from its creation by the President to its transmission of its record of doom to the President, was in direct contravention of the Constitution of the United States and absolutely null and void.

    That illustrious Court, speaking by Judge David Davis, thus enunciates the law:

    "The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
    equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
    protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
    circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences,
    was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions
    can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.
    Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism."

    "From what source did the Military Commission * * derive their
    authority?"

    "It is not pretended that the commission was a court ordained or
    established by Congress."

    "They cannot justify on the mandate of the President; because he is
    controlled by law and has his appropriate sphere of duty, which is to
    execute not to make the law; and there is no unwritten criminal code
    to which resort may be had as a source of jurisdiction."

    "The laws and usages of war can never be applied to citizens in states
    which have upheld the authority of the government and where the courts
    are open and their processes unobstructed. And no usage of war could
    sanction a military trial there for any offence whatever of a citizen
    in civil life, in nowise connected with the military service. Congress
    could grant no such power; and to the honor of our national
    legislature be it said it has never been provoked by the state of the
    country even to attempt its exercise."

    "All other persons," (i. e., all other than those in the military
    and naval service) "citizens of states where the courts are open, if
    charged with crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial
    by jury. This privilege is a vital principle, underlying the whole
    administration of criminal justice; it is not held by sufferance, and
    cannot be frittered away on any plea of state or political necessity."

    "It is claimed that martial law covers with its broad mantle the
    proceedings of this Military Commission."

    "Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity
    must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually
    closes the courts and deposes the civil administration."

    "Martial law can never exist where the courts are open, and in the
    proper and unmolested exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also
    confined to the locality of actual war."

    Had the swift process by which this unfortunate woman was hurried to the scaffold been interrupted by a stay to allow a review by the same high tribunal which rescued Milligan from the jaws of death, it cannot be doubted that in her case, as in his, the same conclusions would have been reached, viz.:

    1st. "One of the plainest constitutional provisions was, therefore,
    infringed when" (Mary E. Surratt) "was tried by a court not ordained
    and established by Congress, and not composed of judges appointed
    during good behavior."

    2nd. "Another guarantee of freedom was broken when" (Mary E. Surratt)
    "was denied a trial by jury;"

    that, in her case, as in his, the Court would have set the prisoner free; there would have been no hanging, no felon's grave, and not even an ulterior attempt at a constitutional trial.

    For it is remarkable that although the Military tribunal which tried Milligan pronounced him guilty of crimes deserving a traitor's death; the seeming strength of the evidence must have melted away, strangely enough, when subjected to the prospective investigation of constitutional courts, as there was not even a subsequent effort on the part of the Government to call him to account.

    Let us add, as a final corollary to this exposition of the Constitution by the Supreme Court, the following remark: that the ground and argument employed by Attorney General Speed in his opinion upon the right of the President to order the trial of the alleged assassins by Military Commission, and by Judge-Advocate Bingham in his address to that Commission, involve a reductio ad absurdum, or, rather, a reductio ad monstrosum, that is, a Reductio ad absurdum quia monstrosum.

    For, that ground and that argument, invoked to uphold and sanction the trial of civilians by military commissions, necessarily and inevitably go farther, and proclaim the right of President Johnson, alone, of his own motion and without the interposition of a formal court, whether military commission or drum-head court-martial, to have commanded the immediate execution of every person whom he might believe to be guilty of participation in the assassination of his predecessor or in the presumed attempt upon himself.

    The conclusion forced upon us, therefore,--the one only thing to be said--is, that the hanging of Mary E. Surratt was nothing less than the crime of murder.

    Murder, not only in the case of the private soldiers who dragged her to the scaffold and put the rope about her neck; they, at least can plead the almost irresistible force of military discipline.

    But murder, also, in the case of the Major-General whose sword gave the signal for the drop to fall. General and soldiers are in the precise position, before the law, of a mob of Lynchers carrying out the judgment of a Lynch court.

    Murder, not only in the case of the one military officer who superintended the details of the execution. He, too, though with much less force, can plead that he was the mere bailiff of what he believed to be a competent Court.

    But murder, also, on the part of the nine military officers and the three advocates who tried and sentenced this woman to death. These men, in the forum of the law, stand in the precise position of any nine policemen steered by any three police attorneys in the city of New York, who should dare to try, convict and sentence to death a citizen of that city.

    Murder, not only on the part of the Commission and its lawyers; they too might, possibly, plead--though with still diminishing force--that, although they were warned and took the awful responsibility, still they believed in their competency.

    But murder, also, in the President of the United States, who appointed the court, approved its findings, and commanded the execution of its sentence.

    He stands before the law in the same position as though, sweeping aside all empty forms, he had seized a sword and with his own hand cut off the head of the woman, without the mockery of a trial. In our frame of government, there is surely no room for such a twi-formed barbarian-despot, as a President having the power to pick out from the army, of which he is the commander-in-chief, the members of a court to try and punish with death, at his option, any one of the citizens, for an abortive attempt on his own life.

    And it was murder, not only in the case of the President; he, too, but with scarcely audible voice, might plead the coercion of his situation--sitting as he did in the seat of the murdered Lincoln.

    But it was murder, also, in the Secretary of War, who initiated the iniquitous process, pushed on the relentless prosecution, shut his own ears and the ears of the President to all pleas for mercy, presided like a Moloch over the scaffold, and kept the key of the charnel-house, where, beside the unpitied carcasses of the reputed ruffians forced upon her in her ordeal of torture and in the hour of death, the slaughtered lady lay mouldering in her shroud. Here, at least, the plea of mitigation exhales in a cry like that of Payne, "I was mad!"

    Weigh the extenuating circumstances in whatever scale you may; extend as much mercy as possible to those who showed no mercy in their day of power--still, the offense of every one and all, who had hand, part or lot in this work of death, contains every element which, under the most rigorous definition of the law, makes up the Crime of Murder. The killing was there. The unlawful killing was there. The premeditated design to effect death was there. The belief of the perpetrators, that they had a right to kill, or that they were commanded to kill by an overruling power, before a court of law avails not a whit.

    Ignorance of the constitution as well as the law excuses no man, be he civilian or soldier, President or assassin, War-Minister or Payne.

    Murder it essentially was, and as such it should be denounced to the present and future generations.

    Garrett Davis told no more than the exact truth when he declared in his place in the Senate of the United States:

    "There is no power in the United States, in time of war or peace, that
    can legitimately and constitutionally try a civilian who is not in the
    naval or military service of the United States, or in the militia of a
    State in the actual service of the United States, by a court-martial
    or by a military commission.

    It is a usurpation, and a flagitious
    usurpation of power for any military court to try a civilian, and if
    any military court tries a civilian and sentences him to death and he
    is executed under the sentence, the whole court are nothing but
    murderers, and they may be indicted in the State courts where such
    military murders are perpetrated; and if the laws were enforced firmly
    and impartially every member of such a court would be convicted,
    sentenced and punished as a murderer."

    Although the actual guilt of any of the victims constitutes no legal defense to this fearful charge, yet as the unquestioning obedience which the soldier yields, as a matter of course, to the commands of his superior officer must alleviate, if it do not wipe away, the guilt of the members of the Commission, in the forum of morals; so the ascertainment that the sufferers on the scaffold and in prison, in fact, deserved their doom, cannot but blunt the edge of our condemnation of the iniquity of the trial, as well as weaken our pity for the condemned and our sense of shame over the tyrannous acts of the government.

    A word or two, therefore, will be appropriate in respect to the sufficiency of the testimony to establish the guilt of the accused.

    I. As to Arnold and O'Laughlin, it may be said in one emphatic word, that there was no evidence at all against them of complicity in the plot to kill. The letter of Arnold to Booth shows, when fairly construed, that, if the writer had conspired with the actor, he conspired to abduct; and, also, for the time being, even that conspiracy he had abandoned. He was at Fort Monroe for the two weeks prior to the assassination. His confession, used

    Edition notice Project Gutenberg source, credits & licence

    The reading text above is the public-domain work. The Project Gutenberg header, production credits and licence are kept here as provenance rather than shown before the book.

    Title
    The Judicial Murder of Mary E. Surratt
    Author
    David Miller DeWitt
    Release date
    May 22, 2011 [eBook #36188]
    Language
    English
    Credits
    Produced by Carla Foust and the Online Distributed
    Transcriber and production notes
    Produced by Carla Foust and the Online Distributed
    Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This book was
    produced from scanned images of public domain material
    from the Google Print project.)
    
    Transcriber's Notes:
    
    Passages in italics are indicated by _italics_.
    
    In the original text, the list on pages 72-73 skips from 2 to 7.
    Front matter as received (title page, contents)
      THE JUDICIAL MURDER
    Header as received
    The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Judicial Murder of Mary E. Surratt
        
    This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
    most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
    whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
    of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online
    at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States,
    you will have to check the laws of the country where you are located
    before using this eBook.
    
    Title: The Judicial Murder of Mary E. Surratt
    
    Author: David Miller DeWitt
    
    
            
    Release date: May 22, 2011 [eBook #36188]
    
    Language: English
    
    Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/36188
    
    Credits: Produced by Carla Foust and the Online Distributed
            Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This book was
            produced from scanned images of public domain material
            from the Google Print project.)
    Full Project Gutenberg licence
        
    
    Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
    be renamed.
    
    Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright
    law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works,
    so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United
    States without permission and without paying copyright
    royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part
    of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project
    Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™
    concept and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark,
    and may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following
    the terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use
    of the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
    copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very
    easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as creation
    of derivative works, reports, performances and research. Project
    Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given away—you may
    do practically ANYTHING in the United States with eBooks not protected
    by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark
    license, especially commercial redistribution.
    
    
    START: FULL LICENSE
    
    THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG™ LICENSE
    
    PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
    
    To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free
    distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work
    (or any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project
    Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full
    Project Gutenberg License available with this file or online at
    www.gutenberg.org/license.
    
    Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg
    electronic works
    
    1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg
    electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to
    and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
    (trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all
    the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or
    destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg electronic works in your
    possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a
    Project Gutenberg electronic work and you do not agree to be bound
    by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person
    or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
    
    1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be
    used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who
    agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few
    things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg electronic works
    even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See
    paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project
    Gutenberg electronic works if you follow the terms of this
    agreement and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg
    electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
    
    1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
    Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection
    of Project Gutenberg electronic works. Nearly all the individual
    works in the collection are in the public domain in the United
    States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in the
    United States and you are located in the United States, we do not
    claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing, performing,
    displaying or creating derivative works based on the work as long as
    all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope
    that you will support the Project Gutenberg mission of promoting
    free access to electronic works by freely sharing Project Gutenberg
    works in compliance with the terms of this agreement for keeping the
    Project Gutenberg name associated with the work. You can easily
    comply with the terms of this agreement by keeping this work in the
    same format with its attached full Project Gutenberg License when
    you share it without charge with others.
    
    1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern
    what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are
    in a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States,
    check the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this
    agreement before downloading, copying, displaying, performing,
    distributing or creating derivative works based on this work or any
    other Project Gutenberg work. The Foundation makes no
    representations concerning the copyright status of any work in any
    country other than the United States.
    
    1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:
    
    1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other
    immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg License must appear
    prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg work (any work
    on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or with which the
    phrase “Project Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed,
    performed, viewed, copied or distributed:
    
        This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and most
        other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
        whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
        of the Project Gutenberg™ License included with this eBook or online
        at www.gutenberg.org. If you
        are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws
        of the country where you are located before using this eBook.
      
    1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is
    derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not
    contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the
    copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in
    the United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are
    redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project
    Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must comply
    either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or
    obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project Gutenberg
    trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
    
    1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg electronic work is posted
    with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
    must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any
    additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms
    will be linked to the Project Gutenberg License for all works
    posted with the permission of the copyright holder found at the
    beginning of this work.
    
    1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg
    License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this
    work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg.
    
    1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this
    electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
    prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
    active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
    Gutenberg License.
    
    1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
    compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including
    any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access
    to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg work in a format
    other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in the official
    version posted on the official Project Gutenberg website
    (www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense
    to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means
    of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain
    Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the
    full Project Gutenberg License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
    
    1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,
    performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg works
    unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
    
    1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing
    access to or distributing Project Gutenberg electronic works
    provided that:
    
        • You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
            the use of Project Gutenberg works calculated using the method
            you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is owed
            to the owner of the Project Gutenberg trademark, but he has
            agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the Project
            Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments must be paid
            within 60 days following each date on which you prepare (or are
            legally required to prepare) your periodic tax returns. Royalty
            payments should be clearly marked as such and sent to the Project
            Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the address specified in
            Section 4, “Information about donations to the Project Gutenberg
            Literary Archive Foundation.”
        
        • You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies
            you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he
            does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
            License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
            copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and discontinue
            all use of and all access to other copies of Project Gutenberg™
            works.
        
        • You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of
            any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the
            electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days of
            receipt of the work.
        
        • You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
            distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.
        
    
    1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project
    Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different terms than
    are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing
    from the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of
    the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set
    forth in Section 3 below.
    
    1.F.
    
    1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable
    effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread
    works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating the Project
    Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg™
    electronic works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may
    contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate
    or corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other
    intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or
    other medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
    cannot be read by your equipment.
    
    1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the “Right
    of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project
    Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project
    Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party distributing a Project
    Gutenberg™ electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all
    liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal
    fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT
    LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
    PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
    TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE
    LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR
    INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
    DAMAGE.
    
    1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a
    defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can
    receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a
    written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you
    received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium
    with your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you
    with the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in
    lieu of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person
    or entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
    opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If
    the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing
    without further opportunities to fix the problem.
    
    1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth
    in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO
    OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT
    LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.
    
    1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied
    warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
    damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement
    violates the law of the state applicable to this agreement, the
    agreement shall be interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or
    limitation permitted by the applicable state law. The invalidity or
    unenforceability of any provision of this agreement shall not void the
    remaining provisions.
    
    1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the
    trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone
    providing copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in
    accordance with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the
    production, promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg™
    electronic works, harmless from all liability, costs and expenses,
    including legal fees, that arise directly or indirectly from any of
    the following which you do or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this
    or any Project Gutenberg work, (b) alteration, modification, or
    additions or deletions to any Project Gutenberg work, and (c) any
    Defect you cause.
    
    Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg
    
    Project Gutenberg is synonymous with the free distribution of
    electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
    computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It
    exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations
    from people in all walks of life.
    
    Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the
    assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg’s
    goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg collection will
    remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project
    Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure
    and permanent future for Project Gutenberg and future
    generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary
    Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help, see
    Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.
    
    Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
    
    The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit
    501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
    state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
    Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification
    number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg Literary
    Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent permitted by
    U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws.
    
    The Foundation’s business office is located at 41 Watchung Plaza #516,
    Montclair NJ 07042, USA, +1 (862) 621-9288. Email contact links and up
    to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website
    and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact
    
    Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg
    Literary Archive Foundation
    
    Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without widespread
    public support and donations to carry out its mission of
    increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be
    freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the widest
    array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations
    ($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt
    status with the IRS.
    
    The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating
    charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
    States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
    considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up
    with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations
    where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To SEND
    DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any particular state
    visit www.gutenberg.org/donate.
    
    While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we
    have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition
    against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who
    approach us with offers to donate.
    
    International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make
    any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
    outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.
    
    Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation
    methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other
    ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. To
    donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.
    
    Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg electronic works
    
    Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
    Gutenberg concept of a library of electronic works that could be
    freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
    distributed Project Gutenberg eBooks with only a loose network of
    volunteer support.
    
    Project Gutenberg eBooks are often created from several printed
    editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in
    the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not
    necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper
    edition.
    
    Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
    facility: www.gutenberg.org.
    
    This website includes information about Project Gutenberg,
    including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
    Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to
    subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.

    Source: Project Gutenberg ebook #36188. Public-domain status is recorded per item; the licence text above is reproduced unchanged.

    Source
    Project Gutenberg
    Record
    ebook 36188
    Rights
    public domain (US)
    Rendered
    2026-11-22
    Completeness
    First 200,000 characters rendered.