The Panama Canal: A history and description of the enterprise
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Title: The Panama Canal: A history and description of the enterprise
Author: J. Saxon Mills
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THE PANAMA CANAL
[Illustration: _Clinedinst--Washington, D.C._
COL. GEORGE W. GOETHALS, U.S.A.,
Chairman and Chief Engineer Isthmian Canal Commission.]
THE PANAMA CANAL
A HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ENTERPRISE
BY
J. SAXON MILLS, M.A.
BARRISTER-AT-LAW
WITH MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS
THOMAS NELSON AND SONS
LONDON, EDINBURGH, DUBLIN, MANCHESTER, LEEDS
PARIS, LEIPZIG, MELBOURNE, AND NEW YORK
PREFACE.
The literature on the subject of the Panama Canal is rather dispersed. A
full and entertaining history of the project will be found in Mr. W. F.
Johnson's "Four Centuries of the Panama Canal" (Cassell and Co., 1907),
a work to which I am greatly indebted. Dr. Vaughan Cornish has given the
results of much research and several visits to the canal in "The Panama
Canal and its Makers" (T. Fisher Unwin, 1909), and in several lectures,
especially one before the Royal Colonial Institute, June 11, 1912. An
inexhaustible mine of information will be found in Mr. Emory R.
Johnson's Official Report on Panama Canal Traffic and Tolls (Washington,
1912). The Report on the Trade and Commerce of the Republic of Panama
for the year 1911, by Mr. H. O. Chalkley, Acting British Consul at
Colon, contains useful information. A valuable series of articles on
the Panama Canal appeared in _The Times_ of 1912. The _National
Geographic Magazine_ of February 1911 contains an authoritative article
by Colonel G. W. Goethals, Chief Engineer of the Canal, and the number
for February 1912 an interesting appreciation by Mr. W. J. Showalter. In
_Scribner's Magazine_ for February 1913, Mr. J. B. Bishop, Secretary of
the Isthmian Canal Commission, writes a very useful paper on the
Sanitation of the Isthmus. In his recent work on South America Mr. Bryce
devotes one of his delightful chapters to the Isthmus of Panama. A
chapter on the Panama Canal will be found in Mr. A. E. Aspinall's "The
British West Indies," and many references in Mr. C. G. Murray's "A
United West Indies." I must thank Mr. G. E. Lewin, the Librarian of the
Royal Colonial Institute, for his unfailing help and courtesy.
BUSHEY, 1913.
CONTENTS.
PREFACE 5
DATE HISTORY OF THE CANAL 11
I. THE SECRET OF THE STRAIT 15
II. CANAL PROJECTS 23
III. THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY AND THE SUEZ CANAL 42
IV. THE FRENCH FAILURE 52
V. THE HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY 64
VI. THE UNITED STATES AND COLOMBIA 77
VII. A MINIATURE REVOLUTION 88
VIII. THE BATTLE OF THE LEVELS 112
IX. MAN AND THE GNAT 129
X. LIFE AT THE ISTHMUS 153
XI. THE PROBLEM OF CONSTRUCTION 172
XII. THE CULEBRA CUT 186
XIII. THE LOCKS 195
XIV. THE COMPLETED CANAL 207
XV. PANAMA AND THE ISTHMUS 226
XVI. THE NEW OCEAN HIGHWAYS 242
XVII. THE CANAL AND THE AMERICAS 265
XVIII. THE CANAL AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE 284
XIX. THE NEW PACIFIC 316
APPENDIX I.--HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY 323
APPENDIX II.--PANAMA DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 327
APPENDIX III.--HAY-BUNAU-VARILLA TREATY CLAUSES 1-9 AND 23 332
APPENDIX IV.--PROCLAMATION AS TO CANAL TOLL RATES 343
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
Col. George W. Goethals, U.S.A. _Frontispiece_
Chairman and Chief Engineer Isthmian Canal Commission.
Col. William C. Gorgas 144
Medical Department, U.S. Army, Head of the Department
of Sanitation, Ancon.
Culebra Cut, from West Bank 192
Gatun Locks, looking South-West 201
Gatun Upper Lock, looking North 208
Gatun Upper Lock--West Chamber 216
Pedro Miguel Locks 224
DATE HISTORY OF THE CANAL.
Conquest of Constantinople by Turks 1453
Columbus's First Voyage 1492
Columbus discovers Bay of Limon 1497
Rodrigo de Bastidas, Balboa, and La Cosa reach the Isthmus 1500
Columbus's Fourth Voyage, vainly seeks the strait 1502
Balboa sights the Pacific Sept. 25, 1513
Pedrarias founds the old town of Panama 1519
Magellan discovers the straits that bear his name 1519-21
Gonzalez de Avila discovers Lake Nicaragua 1522
The quest of Isthmian Strait given up as hopeless _circa_ 1532
Gomara appeals to Charles V. to construct canal 1551
Drake sights the Pacific 1573
Philip III. directs surveys for Darien Canal 1616
English seize Jamaica 1655
Henry Morgan destroys old Panama 1671
Paterson's settlement at Panama 1698
Spanish surveys of Tehuantepec and Nicaragua 1771 and 1779
Von Humboldt's residence in Central America 1799-1804
Panama declares its independence and joins New Granada 1822
Overtures made by Central America to United States for canal 1825
Goethe's prophecies 1827
Dutch canal concession from Nicaraguan Government 1829
abandoned 1830
British Honduras annexed by Great Britain 1835
United States Treaty with New Granada 1846
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 1850
Panama Railway opened to traffic 1855
Dickinson-Ayon Treaty between United States and Nicaragua 1868
President Grant recommends canal under United States control 1869
Appoints Interoceanic Canal Commission 1869
Suez Canal opened 1869
La Societe Civile Internationale du Canal Interoceanique founded 1876
Grant's Commission reports in favour of Nicaraguan route 1876
The De Lesseps Company formed 1878
Company starts work 1881
Bankruptcy of French company 1889
New Panama Company formed 1889
Construction work at Nicaragua 1890-3
Ferdinand de Lesseps died 1894
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty 1901
Spooner Act 1902
Panama revolts from Colombia 1903
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty 1904
American occupation of Isthmus begins 1904
Completion of canal 1914
Formal opening 1915
THE PANAMA CANAL.
CHAPTER I.
THE SECRET OF THE STRAIT.
It was either very careless or very astute of Nature to leave the entire
length of the American continent without a central passage from ocean to
ocean, or, having provided such a passage at Nicaragua, to allow it to
be obstructed again by volcanic action. This imperviousness of the long
American barrier had, as we shall see, important economic and political
results, and the eventual opening of a waterway will have results
scarcely less important. The Panama Canal will achieve, after more than
four centuries, the object with which Columbus spread his sails
westwards from the port of Palos--the provision of a sea-route westwards
to China and the Indies. The capture of Constantinople in 1453 by the
Turks interrupted the ancient trade routes between East and West.
Brigands held up the caravans which plodded across the desert sands from
the Euphrates and the Indus, and pirates swarmed in the Mediterranean
and Red Sea, intercepting the precious cargoes of silks and jewels and
spices consigned to the merchants of Italy. The eyes of all Europe were
turned to the Atlantic, and an ocean route westwards to India and the
Orient, the existence of which had been fabled from the days of
Aristotle, became an economic necessity.
Columbus, as every one knows, died in the belief that he had discovered
this route, and that the lands he had visited were fringes and islands
of the Eastern Asiatic continent. The geographers of those days greatly
exaggerated the eastern extension of Asia, with the result that the
distance from Europe to China and India was underestimated by at least
one-half. This was a fortunate mistake, for it is improbable that if
Columbus had known that Cathay and Cipangu (Japan) were a good 12,000
miles westwards from the coast of Spain he would have ventured upon a
continuous voyage of that length in the vessels of his time.
It was in his fourth voyage (1502) that Columbus first reached and
explored the coastline of the isthmus and Central America. He was
apparently not the first to land on the isthmus. That distinction
belongs either to Alfonso Ojeda, who is said to have reached "Terra
Firma" earlier in 1502, or to Rodrigo de Bastidas, who, we are told, set
sail from Cadiz with La Cosa in 1500, and, reached the isthmus somewhere
near Porto Bello. About the doings of Columbus on the mainland we get
some detailed information from the Portuguese historian and explorer of
the sixteenth century, Galvano. It is interesting to read that the great
navigator visited the exact spot where the newly-constructed canal
starts from the Caribbean coast. From the Rio Grande, we read, Columbus
"went to the River of Crocodiles which is now called Rio de Chagres,
which hath its springs near the South Sea, within four leagues of
Panama, and runneth into the North Sea." It was this same river, as we
shall see, that became the feeder of the canal when the high-level
scheme was adopted. So far out of his reckoning was Columbus that at
Panama he imagined himself to be ten days' journey from the mouth of the
Ganges! One of his objects, as we know from his own journal, was to
convert the Great Khan of Tartary to the Christian faith, and this
entanglement in what he called "the islands of the Indian Sea" was a
sore hindrance to that and all his other purposes. He began that search
for the strait which engaged the attention and tried the temper of
Spanish, Portuguese, and English navigators for the next thirty years.
He had heard from the natives of the coast of "a narrow place between
two seas." They probably meant a narrow strip of land as at Panama. But
Columbus understood them to mean a narrow waterway, and rumours of such
a passage no doubt existed then, as they still do among the isthmian
tribes. He must also have heard accounts of the great ocean only thirty
miles away, and it is rather surprising he should not have made a dash
across and anticipated Balboa and Drake. In May 1503, however, he
quitted the "Terra Firma" without solving the great secret, and he never
returned to the mainland. He died in 1506, still in complete ignorance
of the nature of his discovery. He knew nothing of the continent of
America or of that seventy million square miles of ocean beyond, to
which Magellan gave the name of "Pacific."
The Holy Grail itself was not pursued with more persistence and devotion
than this mythical, elusive strait by the navigators of the early years
of the sixteenth century. The isthmian governor sent out from Spain went
with urgent instructions to solve the "secret of the strait." In 1513
Balboa set himself to the great enterprise. If he could not discover a
waterway he would at least see what lay beyond the narrow land barrier.
From Coibo on the Gulf of Darien he struck inland on September 6 with a
hundred Indian guides and bearers. It is eloquent of the difficulties of
the country which he had to traverse that it was not until September 26
that he won, first of European men, his distant view of the nameless and
mysterious ocean.[1] It was he, and not Cortez, who "with eagle eyes,
stared at the Pacific."
"And all his men
Looked at each other with a wild surmise,
Silent upon a peak in Darien."
Cortez was himself a persistent searcher for the mythical strait. He
wrote home to the King of Spain saying, "If the strait is found, I shall
hold it to be the greatest service I have yet rendered. It would make
the King of Spain master of so many lands that he might call himself the
lord of the whole world."
These vain attempts had very important results. They led incidentally to
the exploration of the whole coastline of the American continent. For
example, Jacques Cartier, who was sent out by the King of France about
this time to find "the shorter route to Cathay," searched the coast
northwards as far as Labrador and thus prepared the way for the planting
of a French colony in Canada. At last, in 1520, a sea-passage from the
Atlantic to the Pacific was actually discovered by the first great
circumnavigator, Magellan, but it was far away from the narrow lands
between North and South America. Through the perilous straits that have
ever since borne his name at the southern extremity of the continent,
Magellan pushed his venturous way into the great ocean beyond. But even
Magellan had no idea that a few miles south of his strait the land ended
and Atlantic and Pacific mingled their waters in one great flood. That
truth was accidentally discovered by the English Drake more than fifty
years afterwards (1579). Drake had been driven southward by stormy
weather when he made the discovery which almost eclipsed in its
importance even Magellan's exploit. In his exultation, we are told, he
landed on the farthest island, and walking alone with his instruments to
its extremity threw himself down, and with his arms embraced the
southernmost point of the known world. From that point Drake sailed up
the western coast of South America, engaged mainly in his favourite
pursuit of "singeing the King of Spain's beard"--capturing, that is, the
treasure-ships bound to Panama. But he did not forget the more
scientific duty of searching for the strait. Far northward he held his
course, past the future California, till he must have been off the
coastline of what is now British Columbia, ever hoping to find the
Pacific outlet of the famous North-West Passage. But always the coast
trended to the north-west, and Drake, giving up the quest, turned his
prow westward and continued his voyage of circumnavigation.
But we are over-running our dates and must return to events at the
isthmus. It was about the year 1530 that the non-existence of a natural
waterway became recognized. And no sooner was this fact accepted than
projects for an artificial canal began to be put forward. It was clear
to the geographers and traders of those days that an isthmian route
westward offered great advantages to the routes _via_ the Cape of Good
Hope, Magellan Straits, or the problematical North-West Passage.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The eminence known as "Balboa Hill" in the American canal zone is
certainly not that from which Balboa first sighted the Pacific, though
very likely a tradition to that effect will now gradually be
established.
CHAPTER II.
CANAL PROJECTS.
It appears that the honour of first conceiving and proposing the project
of an artificial waterway through the isthmus belongs to Alvaro de
Saavedra Ceron, a cousin of Cortez, who had been with Balboa at Panama.
Ceron had been for twelve years engaged in the search for the strait,
and had finally begun to doubt its existence. His thoughts turned to the
isthmus at Panama, where the narrowness and low elevation of the land
seemed to offer the likeliest chance of an artificial canal. We learn
from the old historian Galvano that Ceron prepared plans for the
construction of a waterway there--almost precisely along the route
chosen for the American canal nearly four hundred years later. Ceron's
death, however, put an end to this early project.
It is interesting to find the Portuguese historian Galvano, who
flourished in the middle of the sixteenth century, mentioning four
possible routes for the canal--namely, Darien, Panama, Nicaragua, and
Tehuantepec. The choice, however, quickly confined itself to the Panama
and Nicaraguan lines. The reader may feel some surprise that at such an
early date as this an engineering project should be seriously considered
which was only accomplished in the end by the wealth and mechanical
resources of one of the greatest of modern Powers. The explanation is
that the tiny vessels of the early sixteenth century could have taken
advantage of the natural rivers and lakes in the isthmus, especially
those on the Nicaraguan route, and that far less artificial construction
would have been necessary than in these days of the mammoth liner and
warship.
Charles V., King of Spain, seems to have been quite alive to the
importance of these canal projects. In 1534 he directed the Governor of
Costa Firme, the old name for the Panama district, to survey the valley
of the Chagres, the river which supplies the water for the upper reaches
of the American canal. This gentleman, however, seems scarcely to have
shared the royal enthusiasm. He may be supposed to have known the
isthmus at these points very well, and his scepticism about the prospect
of canal construction there in those days was not wholly groundless. The
Spanish historian Gomara, who wrote a history of the Indies in 1551 and
dedicated it to Charles V., declared a canal to be quite feasible along
any of the four routes mentioned by Galvano. It is true he recognized
obstacles. "There are mountains," he wrote, "but there are also hands.
If determination is not lacking, means will not fail; the Indies, to
which the way is to be made, will furnish them. To a king of Spain,
seeking the wealth of Indian commerce, that which is possible is also
easy."
But Charles V. died without making any practical advance in this
enterprise, and a rather remarkable reaction took place under his
successor, Philip II. It should be noted that by this time a permanent
roadway had been established across the isthmus from Panama to Porto
Bello, along which the Spanish treasure-convoys passed from sea to sea
without much interruption. The rapidly growing power of the English at
sea made Philip fear that, if a canal were built, he would be unable to
control it, and would probably lose his existing monopoly of isthmian
transit. So he issued a veto against all projects of canal construction.
He even persuaded himself that it would be contrary to the Divine
purpose to link together two great oceans which God had set asunder, and
that any such attempt would be visited by a terrible nemesis.[2] So his
Majesty not only forbade all such schemes but declared the penalty of
death against any one who should attempt to make a better route across
Central America than the land-route between Panama and Porto Bello.
In course of time the king's beard was so horribly singed by English
navigators and adventurers in the Caribbean Sea that the Atlantic end of
the overland trail became almost useless, and the Spanish argosies were
compelled to sail homewards round the far Magellan Straits. But in 1579,
as we have seen, Sir Francis Drake ("El Draque" as he was called by the
terrified Spaniards) had suddenly attacked, captured, and scattered the
Spanish ships off the Pacific coast of South America. So the isthmian
land-route was once more resumed, and it took the Spaniard all his time
to hold that open.
For many years no progress was made with the idea of an isthmian canal.
War between England and Spain was the natural order of things in these
Central American regions. In 1655 the English seized Jamaica, and soon
afterwards established themselves on the coast of Honduras and
Nicaragua. The old city of Panama, of which only a picturesque
church-tower remains to-day, had been founded by a Spanish governor
named Pedrarias in 1519. In 1671 the city was destroyed by that wicked
Welsh buccaneer, Sir Henry Morgan. The town was rebuilt two years later
by Alonzo Mercado de Villacorta, five miles west of the old site.
The project of a canal across the isthmus was never allowed entirely to
disappear. In 1694 a very determined attempt was made to plant a
British colony on the isthmus at Darien, a little east of the Panama
route. The pioneer was William Paterson, a Scotsman, who founded "the
Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies." Sir Walter Scott,
in his "Tales of a Grandfather," thus describes the project:--
The produce of China, Japan, the Spice Islands, and Eastern
India, brought to the Bay of Panama, were to be transferred
across the isthmus to the new settlement, and exchanged for
the commodities of Europe. In Paterson's enthusiastic words,
"This door of the seas and key of the universe will enable
its possessors to become the legislators of both worlds and
the arbitrators of commerce. The settlers at Darien will
acquire a nobler empire than Alexander or Caesar, without
fatigue, expense, or danger, as well as without incurring
the guilt and bloodshed of conquerors."
So 1,200 settlers set sail from Leith in July 1698, no doubt with a high
hope and courage. In November the expedition arrived and established
itself at a point of the coast still called Puerto Escoces, or Scotch
Port, in Caledonian Bay, also named from the same event. "New Edinburgh"
and "New St. Andrews" were founded, but the settlers soon got into
difficulties. The climate was intolerable, and the project was opposed
from the outset by the English and Dutch East India Companies, who were
alarmed on the score of their own exclusive rights, while Spaniards and
Indians were a perpetual menace. Broken down by these adversities the
original settlers left the place, but were succeeded at once by another
company which, after some successful fighting with the Spaniards, were
compelled by the superior forces of the enemy to evacuate the
settlements in the year 1700. It is possible that if this attempt at
colonization had been made after and not before the Union of Scotland
and Ireland it would have met with much less opposition in England,
perhaps would have received government sympathy and support. In that
case the isthmus would have been added to the British dominions, and a
waterway might have been constructed under the British flag. It should
be added that Paterson, who had personally surveyed the isthmus,
positively declared that the construction of a canal was a feasible
undertaking.
During the eighteenth century, though surveying was carried out in many
parts of the isthmus by European engineers, the project of a canal was
never seriously taken up. It may be remembered that in 1780 our own
Nelson was at Nicaragua, annexing the lake and getting control of the
interoceanic route in this region, but doing little more than injuring
his own health. With the nineteenth century, however, events began to
move at the isthmus. The great scientist, Alexander von Humboldt, spent
the first few years of the new century in Mexico and Central America. In
his "Political Essay on New Spain" he described the impervious isthmus,
"the barrier against the waves of the Atlantic," as for ages "the
bulwark of the independence of China and Japan."
The absence of any water communication at the isthmus between the two
oceans has indeed had highly important political and economic results.
It kept East and West far asunder. It removed the west coast of North
America from the colonizing rivalries of the Old World. England and the
United States seemed for long ages only semiconscious of their
territories on the Pacific which were awaiting colonization. Even in
recent times very few emigrants from Europe, who went out with the
intention of going far west, penetrated much further than Chicago or
Manitoba. Population and industrial enterprise were concentrated in the
east of Canada and the United States, and have only begun within modern
times to move effectually westwards. England was indeed so indifferent
about her territories along a far coast, which could be reached only
round the Horn or by an almost impossible land-transit, that in the
settlement of the Oregon boundary in the middle of last century she
accepted a Canadian frontier-line much further north than would
otherwise have contented her. She had at least as good a right to
California and the territories to the northwards as the descendants of
her revolted colonists. The absence of a waterway at the narrow lands
secured to the United States and to England their expansion westwards,
but imposed on the westward movement a very slow and gradual pace. One
result of the new canal will be a very rapid development of these
Pacific slopes, especially those of British Columbia.
The effect on South America of this complete severance of East and West
has also been very important. The republics on the Pacific have been
sheltered as much as possible from European influences. Immigration has
been naturally restricted, the population, especially that of Chile,
kept free from negro admixture, and the development of the countries
effectually checked. The opening of the canal will, of course, have a
contrary effect all along these lines.
But, to return from this digression, Humboldt described six routes in
Central America where a canal would be practicable, including that which
was afterwards adopted at Panama. He investigated and discussed many
physiographical questions in connection with the subject. There had
arisen a general belief that the level of the Pacific was much higher
than that of the Atlantic, and that a sea-level canal would therefore be
impossible. Humboldt declared against this theory. But it is curious to
find him favouring the idea that the construction of a tide-level canal
might have the effect of diverting the Gulf Stream from our shores, and
thus making the climate of our British islands much more rigorous and
inhospitable.
The researches of Humboldt in the West Indies and Central America much
interested the scientist's great fellow-countryman, Goethe. A passage
from Goethe's "Conversations with Eckermann" is worth quoting as an
example of prophecy wonderfully fulfilled:--
Humboldt [said Goethe] has with great practical knowledge
mentioned other points where, by utilizing some of the
rivers which flow into the Gulf of Mexico, the end could
perhaps be more advantageously attained than at Panama.
Well, all this is reserved for the future, and for a great
spirit of enterprise. But so much is certain: if a project
of the kind succeeded in making it possible for ships of
whatever lading or size to go through such a canal from the
Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean, quite incalculable
results would ensue for the whole of civilized and
uncivilized humanity. I should be surprised, however, if
the United States were to let the opportunity escape them of
getting such an achievement into their own hands. We may
expect this youthful Power, with its decided tendency
westwards, in thirty or forty years to have also occupied
and peopled the extensive tracts of land beyond the Rocky
Mountains. We may further expect that along the whole
Pacific coast, where Nature has already formed the largest
and safest harbours, commercial cities of the utmost
importance will gradually arise, to be the medium of trade
between China, together with the East Indies, and the United
States. Were this to happen, it would be not alone desirable
but even almost necessary that merchantmen as well as
men-of-war should maintain a more rapid connection between
the west and east coasts of North America than has
previously been possible by the wearisome, disagreeable, and
costly voyage round Cape Horn. I repeat, then: it is
absolutely indispensable for the United States to effect a
way through from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean,
and I am certain they will compass it. This I should like to
live to see, but I shall not. Secondly, I should like to
live to see a connection established between the Danube and
the Rhine. But this, too, is an undertaking so gigantic that
I doubt its being accomplished, especially when I consider
our German means. Thirdly and lastly, I should like to see
the English in possession of a Suez Canal. These three great
things I should like to live to see, and it would almost be
worth while for their sakes to hold out for some fifty
years.
Many projects for canal construction, chiefly by the Nicaraguan route,
were started and failed during the first half of the nineteenth century.
The second decade of that century witnessed the revolt one by one of all
the Spanish provinces in Central and South America. The Colombian
Confederation, comprising Venezuela, Ecuador, and New Granada, achieved
their independence in 1821. Panama quickly followed, and allied itself
with New Granada (now Colombia). In 1825 the Central American envoy to
the United States urged the American government to co-operate in the
canal enterprise with the states he represented. The result was that
Henry Clay, the American Secretary of State, ordered an official survey
at Nicaragua, and scheme followed scheme in quick succession. In 1829
the King of Holland was granted a canal concession by the Nicaraguan
government. This enterprise was frustrated by the outbreak of the
revolution in the Netherlands and Belgium. It would be tedious to
enumerate the many projects started during the following years. But it
is worth recalling that Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, who was then a
prisoner in the fortress of Ham, became interested in the subject, and
while still a captive obtained a concession and franchise for a canal
company from the Nicaraguan government. He published a pamphlet on the
Isthmian Canal question which aroused a good deal of attention, though
its author's interest was soon diverted to political events nearer home.
A passage from his little book is interesting for its strong advocacy of
the Nicaraguan route by the San Juan River and the lakes:--
The geographical position of Constantinople rendered her the
queen of the ancient world. Occupying, as she does, the
central point between Europe, Asia, and Africa, she could
become the entrepot of the commerce of all these countries,
and obtain over them immense preponderance; for in politics,
as in strategy, a central position always commands the
circumference. This is what the proud city of Constantine
could be, but it is what she is not, because, as Montesquieu
says, "God permitted that the Turks should exist on earth,
as a people most fit to possess uselessly a great empire."
There exists in the New World a state as admirably situated
as Constantinople, and we must say, up to this time, as
uselessly occupied. We allude to the State of Nicaragua. As
Constantinople is the centre of the Ancient World, so is the
town of Leon the centre of the New, and if the tongue of
land which separates its two lakes from the Pacific Ocean
were cut through, she would command by virtue of her central
position the entire coast of North and South America. The
State of Nicaragua can become, better than Constantinople,
the necessary route of the great commerce of the world, and
is destined to attain an extraordinary degree of prosperity
and grandeur. France, England, and Holland have a great
commercial interest in the establishment of a communication
between the two oceans, but England has more than the other
Powers--a political interest in the execution of this
project. England will see with pleasure Central America
becoming a powerful and flourishing state, which will
establish a balance of power by creating in Spanish America
a new centre of active enterprise, powerful enough to give
rise to a feeling of nationality, and to prevent, by backing
Mexico, any further encroachments from the north.
The idea of a trans-isthmian canal seemed likely in the 'fifties of last
century to prove a cause of discord, if not of war, between England and
the United States. Under the rather "pushful" foreign policy of Lord
Palmerston, England rapidly increased her influence and possessions in
Central America. In 1835 "British Honduras" was practically constituted
a British colony, and British influence was subsequently extended into
Nicaragua and Mosquitia, thus covering the favourite route for an
isthmian waterway. The United States were establishing themselves on the
Pacific through their encroachments on Mexico. In 1846 they acquired the
states of California, Nevada, Arizona, and New Mexico, and naturally
began to attach more importance to the canal project and to feel more
sensitive as regards rival ambitions in Central America. Soon after they
had acquired these Pacific territories, began the great rush for gold to
California, and some shorter way from east to west became necessary than
the sea-trail round the Horn or the weary wagon-trek over the broad
North American continent. Already in 1846, before the Mexican War and
the discovery of gold in California, the United States had made a treaty
with New Granada, by which the former secured rights of transit over the
isthmus "upon any modes of communication that now exist or may hereafter
be constructed," and by which they guaranteed the sovereignty of New
Granada over all the territories at the isthmus.
It was under this treaty that the Panama Railway was constructed which
brought the town of Colon (formerly Aspinwall) into existence, and was
subsequently taken over by the United States government. This railroad
made the isthmus for the first time a highway of world-traffic. It had a
monopoly of isthmian transportation, and was able to make any charges it
pleased. Steamship services to the southern and northern coasts of
America from Panama were developed, and the railway succeeded so well
that it paid down to 1895 an average dividend of 15 per cent. It was
bought by the first French Panama Company for the outrageously high sum
of L5,100,000. The existence of the railway really determined De
Lesseps' choice of the Panama route, and the immense amount of
excavation done by the French had a great deal to do in turn with the
American choice of the same route, so that the construction of the
Panama Railway was a highly important event at the isthmus. The United
States took over the railroad from the French with the unfinished
canal, together with a steamship service from Colon to New York, owned
by the railroad.
The rivalry between England and the United States along the Nicaraguan
route became so acute and dangerous that a very important treaty was
concluded between the two countries in 1850, when we may say that the
Panama Canal question entered the domain of modern politics. The
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, so-called from Mr. John M. Clayton, the American
Secretary of State, and Sir Henry Bulwer, British Minister at
Washington, who negotiated it, held the field for fifty years, and
became the subject of endless discussion between England and the United
States.
FOOTNOTES:
[2] Herodotus tells a story how the people of Knidos were forbidden by
the Delphic oracle to make a canal through the isthmus, along which
their Persian enemies could advance by land to attack them. The oracle
said that if Zeus had wished the place to be an island he would have
made it one. There is a curious resemblance between this story and that
related in the text.
CHAPTER III.
THE CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY AND THE SUEZ CANAL.
The treaty of 1850 was concerned primarily with a canal along the
Nicaraguan route--that is, as the preamble expresses it, a canal
"between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by way of the river San Juan de
Nicaragua and either or both of the lakes of Nicaragua or Managua to any
port or place on the Pacific Ocean." But as Article VIII. says, it
established "a general principle" relating to any waterway across the
isthmus between North and South America. The two contracting parties
undertook in the treaty that neither should "obtain or maintain for
itself any exclusive control over the said canal," or "maintain any
fortifications commanding the same, or in the vicinity thereof," or
"occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion
over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central
America." This agreement, as I said, subsisted for fifty years, but it
was scarcely concluded when it was found inconsistent with the growing
importance and ambition of the United States, where a demand quickly
arose for an American-owned canal.
Again there followed a series of schemes for canal construction at
various points of the isthmus. For example, Dr. Edgar Cullen created
some excitement in England in the early Victorian days by giving a very
favourable account of the Caledonian route across the isthmus at Darien,
in a lecture to the Royal Geographical Society. The doctor was received
by the young queen and the Prince Consort, a corporation was formed, and
an engineer sent out to make surveys from Caledonian Bay. A British and
a French man-of-war were dispatched to the isthmus to make
investigations. But the surveyor was driven from Caledonian Bay by local
tribes, and so went on to Panama, giving a favourable report of that
route on his return to England. But nothing came of these incidents,
and the American Civil War in the early 'sixties diverted the attention
of the United States from isthmian affairs. At the end of the war
American interest revived, and public opinion set more and more against
the idea of sharing a canal with any other Power. In 1869 President
Grant gave the first public expression to the demand for an American
canal under American control. "I regard it," he said, "as of vast
political importance to this country that no European government should
hold such a work." Later, in an article in the _North American Review_,
he said, "I commend an American canal, on American soil, to the American
people."
Just before the President's declaration of policy the United States had
concluded an important treaty, known as the "Dickinson-Ayon Treaty,"
with Nicaragua, securing a right of way for a canal over the Nicaraguan
route; and, just afterwards, President Grant appointed an Interoceanic
Canal Commission which investigated four routes for a canal, and
finally, in 1875, reported unanimously in favour of the Nicaraguan route
from Grey town to the San Juan River, to Lake Nicaragua, through the Rio
del Medio and Rio Grande valleys, to Brito on the Pacific coast.
In 1869 an event occurred which was to have a very decisive effect on
isthmian affairs--the opening for traffic of the Suez Canal. These two
isthmuses in the eastern and western hemispheres have some obvious
features in common. They both link two vast continents and form a
barrier between two oceans or oceanic systems. They are fairly equal in
breadth--Suez, sixty miles, and Panama about fifty-four. The shortest
line across each runs almost exactly north and south. And they were both
until recent times uninhabited country. But there are many
dissimilarities. The isthmus at Suez is a flat and sterile desert; that
at Panama is hilly and covered with an almost impenetrable jungle of
tropical vegetation. Again, Suez is a healthy district, whereas Panama
was, until recent years, a pest-house as deadly as Sierra Leone or the
Guinea coast.
Mr. Bryce in his charming book on "South America" compares these two
inter-continental causeways from a more historical point of view. He
writes:--
A still more remarkable contrast, between these two necks of
land, lies in the part they have respectively played in
human affairs. The isthmus of Panama in far-off prehistoric
days has been the highway along which those wandering tribes
whose forefathers had passed in their canoes from
North-eastern Asia along the Aleutian Isles into Alaska
found their way, after many centuries, into the vast spaces
of South America. But its place in the annals of mankind,
during the four centuries that have elapsed since Balboa
gazed from a mountain top rising out of the forest upon the
far-off waters of the South Sea, has been small indeed
compared to that which the isthmus of Suez has held from the
beginning of history. It echoed to the tread of the armies
of Thothmes and Rameses marching forth on their invasions of
Western Asia. Along the edge of it Israel fled forth before
the hosts of Pharaoh. First the Assyrian and afterwards the
Persian hosts poured across it to conquer Egypt; and over
its sands Bonaparte led his regiments to Palestine in that
bold adventure which was stopped at St. Jean d'Acre. It has
been one of the great highways for armies for forty
centuries, as the canal cut through it is now one of the
great highways for commerce.
The turn of the isthmus of Panama is now come, and,
curiously enough, it is the isthmus of Suez that brought
that turn, for it was the digging of a ship canal from the
Mediterranean to the Red Sea, and the vast expansion of
Eastern trade which followed, that led to the revival of the
old designs, mooted as far back as Philip II. of Spain, of
piercing the American isthmus. Thus the comparison of the
two isthmuses becomes now more interesting than ever, for
our generation will watch to see whether the commerce and
politics of the Western World will be affected by this new
route which is now being opened, as those of the Old World
have been affected by the achievement of Ferdinand de
Lesseps.
It will be seen from this quotation how the completion of the Suez Canal
affected the Panama project. Lesseps, fresh from his success at Suez
and not contented with his great achievement there, was easily attracted
by the schemes which were afoot for constructing a ship canal at another
land-barrier which, like the isthmus at Suez, had obstructed the
quickest lines of communication between East and West. In 1876 a
corporation was established, called "La Societe Civile Internationale du
Canal Interoceanique," for the purpose of promoting canal schemes on the
lower isthmus. Its head was Lieutenant Lucien Napoleon Bonaparte Wyse,
who easily obtained a canal concession at Bogota from the Colombian
government. In 1879 an International Engineering Congress was assembled
at Paris by Lesseps, whose partisans compelled a decision in favour of
the Panama route.
But the United States, determined by this time to construct a canal for
themselves without any joint control or international guarantee of
neutrality, opposed the French scheme from the outset. No amount of
bluff from the French promoters affected this opposition. The American
people had indeed some right to complain. The Colombian concession to
the French was quite inconsistent with the treaty of 1846 between this
South American republic and the United States. This treaty Lesseps tried
to induce Colombia to abrogate, and every effort, fair and foul, was
employed to overcome the American objection to the scheme. In 1880
Lesseps was feted at a public banquet at New York, but even the personal
presence of the great man failed to have the desired effect. President
Hayes addressed a strong message to the Senate on the subject, a few
passages of which are interesting as showing the very decided views now
held by the American government and people:--
An interoceanic canal across the American isthmus will
essentially change the geographical relations between the
Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States, and
between the United States and the rest of the world. It will
be the great ocean thoroughfare between our Atlantic and our
Pacific shores, and virtually a part of the coastline of the
United States. Our mere commercial interest in it is larger
than that of all other countries, while its relation to our
power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of defence,
our unity, peace, and safety, are matters of paramount
concern to the people of the United States. No other great
Power would, under similar circumstances, fail to assert a
rightful control over a work so closely and vitally
affecting its interests and welfare.
Without urging further the grounds of my opinion, I repeat,
in conclusion, that it is the right and the duty of the
United States to assert and maintain such supervision and
authority over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus
that connects North and South America as will protect our
national interests. This, I am quite sure, will be found not
only compatible with, but promotive of, the widest and most
permanent advantage to commerce and civilization.
The reader will see that all this is inconsistent with the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, under which the United States had actually
undertaken to claim no such exclusive control as was now desired.
Lengthy negotiations were now set on foot with England for the
abrogation of a treaty which forbade the United States to build a canal
of their own and prevented them from effectually opposing the French
scheme. Lord Granville, however, saw no reason why England should
abandon the treaty solely in the interests of the United States, and the
negotiations were fruitless.
Meantime the French persisted in their undertaking. Their canal was to
be tide-level, twenty-eight feet deep, costing L26,400,000. A
corporation entitled the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Interoceanique
de Panama was formed in 1881, and in the same year the work of
construction was begun. So it looked as though the Americans were to
lose all chance of constructing an isthmian canal under their own
control. Events, however, were to decide otherwise.
CHAPTER IV.
THE FRENCH FAILURE.
The French company began work on the isthmus in February, and such a
rake's progress set in as the world has seldom seen. The name of
Ferdinand de Lesseps inspired such confidence that plenty of money was
forthcoming from the French people. A great deal of it was subscribed by
small investors who could ill afford to lose their savings, and no fewer
than 16,000 women took shares in their own names. The beginning of the
excavations was celebrated with a "gala" performance in the little
theatre at Panama, among the artistes being Sarah Bernhardt. Then began
a drama or a melodrama of extravagance and profligacy lasting seven
years. Money was poured out like the torrential flood-waters down the
river Chagres. I have mentioned the exorbitant sum which the company
paid for the Panama Railway. All the expenditure was on the same scale.
Princely salaries were paid to the managers and directors, and elegant
mansions erected for their accommodation. Building operations--warehouses,
hospitals, hotels, etc.--were carried on "regardless." Mr. W. F. Johnson
tells of a man who owned thirty acres of land useful mainly as a
breeding-place for mosquitoes, but lying right across the route of the
canal. It was worth perhaps 300 dollars. The man demanded just a
thousand times that sum; the Colombian courts awarded it, and the French
paid it. For one great mistake the French made was that they failed to
secure a canal zone in which they would have exercised full powers of
administration. They began to build their canal on Colombian territory,
under Colombian control, and the consequence was that they were fleeced
on every side. Probably this mistake was inevitable, as the United
States would have vetoed any territorial concession by Colombia to
France as a transgression of the Monroe doctrine.
The isthmus rapidly degenerated into a moral as well as a climatic
pest-house. Froude described the condition of things at Panama in one
terrible sentence: "In all the world there is perhaps not now
concentrated in any single spot so much swindling and villainy, so much
foul disease, such a hideous dung-heap of moral and physical
abomination." In fairness, however, it must be said that Lesseps himself
cannot be held directly responsible for this state of affairs. He lived
in Paris, and had probably little notion of what was happening at
Panama. He furnished an example of the proverbial effects of too much
success and prosperity. He seems to have become a superstitious believer
in his own star, and to have thought that nothing could fail with which
he was associated. Still less can the French nation be blamed for the
wild doings of their representatives at the isthmus. And there is at
least one redeeming feature in the conduct of this enterprise. In the
midst of the moral and physical abominations that infested the isthmus
during the French occupation, the engineering work went on steadily and
conscientiously. Much of the French work was available for the Americans
when they took over the task, and the engineers of the United States
have always testified generously to the excellence of the French
excavation and construction along the Canal route.
It must be carefully noted that the French canal was to be sea-level
like the Suez, Corinth, and Kiel Canals. The construction of such a
waterway differed in many important ways from that of the high-level
lock canal which the United States have completed. To understand this we
must consider briefly the character of the country which lies between
Panama and Colon. The dominant and decisive features of the isthmus at
this point are the Chagres River and the Culebra Mountains. The Chagres
enters the Caribbean a little west of Colon. Its valley runs right
across the isthmus south-south-eastwardly towards Panama for about
twenty-six miles, then, at a place called Bas Opisbo, suddenly swerves
away to the north-east into the trackless and jungle-clad hill country.
This valley is the only transverse trench which the isthmus affords at
this stretch, and it has always fixed the attention of surveyors looking
out for a canal site. If the isthmus had been a rainless desert like
that of Suez, a canal could have been constructed by a further
preparation of this river valley and some heavy excavations along the
nine-mile reach from Obispo to the Pacific. The sea would then have been
admitted, the ebb and flow of the Pacific (the Atlantic shore is almost
tideless) being regulated by a tidal lock. But the problem is not nearly
so simple. The isthmus is one of the rainiest places in the world,
enjoying on the Atlantic side 140 inches of rain a year. At Panama the
rate is much smaller, not more than 60 inches. In the central hills the
rainfall averages 90 to 95 inches. The average number of rainy days in
the year is 246 at Bohio (inland on the Atlantic side), 196 at Colon,
and 141 at Panama. The reader must not imagine a perpetual downpour or
drizzle. The rain comes down in thundering tropical cataracts, leaving
spaces of fine weather between the storms. Still, the isthmus is
undoubtedly rainy and damp, and it is this humidity which makes the
climate so trying, though the variations of the thermometer are by no
means extreme and the average air temperature not particularly high. For
example, the average temperature at Panama ranges from 81.6 Fahrenheit
in November to 86.1 in March--that is, during the hottest time of the
day, from two to four o'clock p.m. The coolest time is from six to seven
a.m., when the average temperature ranges between 74.0 in January to
76.6 in June. The yearly average daily temperature is 79.6. The
thermometer seems never to have recorded 100 degrees Fahrenheit at
Panama, whereas 104 has been touched even at Washington.
But to return to the Chagres River. The tropical rains convert this
stream very quickly into a raging torrent. The Chagres is capable of
rising over forty feet in twenty-four hours. If the Chagres valley was
to be the site of the canal, as was obviously necessary, how did the
French propose to "care for" this tremendous and capricious flow of
water? Mr. Johnson remarks that "those who have seen the antics of the
Chagres under the stress of a characteristic isthmian rain must be
pardoned if they regard the harnessing of the Chagres to the canal as
something much like the harnessing of a mad elephant to a family
carriage." The only course open to the French with their sea-level
project was to divert the Chagres with its twenty-six tributaries,
chief of which are the Gatun and the Trinidad, from its old valley into
another channel, along which it could rage as it pleased on its short
journey to the Caribbean. This would have been a tremendous, though
probably not an impossible, task. The New Panama Company, which took the
French work from the Lesseps Company in 1893, dropped the tide-level in
favour of a lock or high-level canal, and adopted the plan of a dam
across the river valley at Bohio, creating a lake above this point and
discharging the flood waters to the level below by means of a spillway
in the adjacent hills. We shall see later how the Americans adopted the
same principle but modified it in practice.
So much at present for the Chagres problem. The other main feature of
the isthmus is met with about the point where the river suddenly changes
its direction--that is at Bas Obispo, or Gamboa, about nine miles from
the Pacific outlet. Here are the hills, the backbone or "continental
divide," averaging over 300 feet high but rising to much higher points,
which connects the Cordilleras of South with the Sierras of North
America. For eight or nine miles the canal must run through this
central barrier on its way to the Pacific. The earliest French notion
was for a ship tunnel--a project perhaps never seriously contemplated.
The only other course was to cut right down through this hilly country.
That was a tremendous undertaking, which required, even for its
inception, a good deal of the faith which is said to be able to "remove
mountains." We shall look more closely at the famous "Culebra Cut" when
we come to the American canal. Most of the work of the French companies
consisted of the dredging of the sea-level channels at the Atlantic and
Pacific ends. But they drove a pretty deep furrow as well through the
Culebra Mountains, excavating in all about 22,600,000 cubic yards.
With their sea-level scheme the French had, of course, a bigger
proposition before them at the hills than their American successors.
They would have had to cut right down below sea-level, whereas the
bottom of the cut in the American lock-canal is forty feet above that
level. Considering the difficulty the United States engineers have had
with "slides" and "breaks" along the sides of their cutting, one
suspects that the much deeper and narrower channel of the French would
have proved impracticable. The French scheme gave a width to the channel
at this point of only 74 feet, while the bottom width of the American
canal is 300 feet. The French work at the "Cut" was all utilizable by
the Americans, who, though with different machinery, adopted the same
general method of excavation.
In 1888 the French company suspended payments and went into bankruptcy.
The canal was completed to the extent of about two-fifths, and had
already cost nearly L80,000,000. It was said at the time that about
one-third of this sum was spent on the canal, one-third wasted, and
one-third stolen. The original capital with the eight subscription lists
between 1882 and 1888 produced nominally L78,701,020, but actually only
L40,309,348, the loss in discounts, etc., amounting to L38,391,672. The
collapse of the company was followed by investigations and trials in
France. Ten senators and deputies, together with the directors, were
brought to trial. Ferdinand and his son Charles de Lesseps were, among
others, condemned to fines and imprisonment, but the sentences upon the
Lesseps were never carried out. Neither the son nor the father was
probably responsible for the iniquities which had marked the history of
the company. The genius who had created the Suez Canal was indeed
completely broken down by the tragical conclusion of his second venture,
and died in 1894 in a condition of mental and physical collapse.
But financial profligacy was not the only cause of the French failure.
Disease and death fought against the enterprise from the first. Yellow
fever and malaria caused as much mortality among the French employees as
would suffice for a great military campaign. Sir Ronald Ross, the great
expert in tropical diseases, was told in 1904, when at the isthmus, that
the French attempt cost at least 50,000 lives. This may have been an
over-estimate, but there is no doubt that the mortality was terrible,
and would probably have brought the French operations to an end even if
greater economy and honesty had prevailed in the administration. It must
not be supposed that the French made no provision for the victims of
these endemic diseases. Excellent hospitals were built at Ancon, near
Panama, at a cost of over a million of money; while those at Colon cost
more than a quarter of a million--in both cases about three times a fair
and honest price. At the time of the French occupation of the isthmus
nothing was known of the real nature and cause of yellow fever and
malaria, of the manner in which they are transmitted, and the only
effective means of prevention. All the recent and marvellous advance in
scientific knowledge of these diseases was available when the Americans
began their work, and was applied with the greatest efficiency and
success. Medical science, quite as much as engineering skill, made a
Panama canal possible, and we shall have a good deal more to say on this
subject when we come to describe the American operations.
Let us not forget, then, that despite their failure the French did a
great deal of good work, which they passed on many years afterwards to
their American successors. A quantity of the French machinery, tools,
and hardware was also available. It is true that among this was included
a large consignment of snow-shovels (for use at sea-level less than 10
degrees from the Equator!), and a quantity of petroleum torches for the
festivities which were one day to celebrate the completion of the canal.
But a great deal of the plant was in good condition. The extravagance
and corruption which prevailed at the isthmus during the first French
company were almost incredible. But it may be doubted whether any other
nation could have succeeded in the 'eighties of last century where the
French failed.
CHAPTER V.
THE HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY.
In 1893 a new corporation, known as the New Panama Canal Company, took
over all the assets of the De Lesseps Company, including the railway,
and the work of construction was continued, or at least not wholly
interrupted. Meanwhile the people of the United States were not greatly
displeased at the collapse of the great French enterprise. They became
more and more determined to construct an American canal under American
control. The Nicaraguan route was still favoured by many as compared
with that at Panama. In 1887 a surveying party was sent to Nicaragua,
and the next year the Maritime Canal Company was established to promote
the building of a canal there. It is important to notice this particular
scheme, for under it work was actually begun. Wharves, warehouses, and
a breakwater were constructed at Greytown, a railway was built, and
some progress made with the canal itself. Outside the Panama route this
was the only actual work of canal construction performed in Isthmian and
Central America. The project failed owing to the great depression of
trade which occurred in 1893 and the impossibility of getting more
capital. It should be noticed that these projects of constructing an
American canal at Nicaragua quite independently of Great Britain were
right in the teeth of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which still
remained in force. Most sensible persons saw that the first preliminary
to an American canal was to get this treaty abrogated or modified. But
this purpose and canal schemes in general were delayed by the outbreak
in 1898 of the Spanish-American War.
This was a naval war, and the United States were to feel the
inconvenience and danger of having no sea communication between their
eastern and western coasts except _via_ the far southern extremity of
the continent. United fleet action over the whole theatre of the war was
rendered impossible. An event soon occurred which finally completed the
conviction of the American people that, in the words of President Grant,
"an American canal on American soil" was a national necessity. At the
beginning of the war the battleship _Oregon_, one of the finest ships in
the United States navy, lay off San Francisco. She was not wanted there,
but she was very badly wanted at the West Indies, the main scene of the
naval struggle. To get there the _Oregon_ had to sail 13,400 miles round
Cape Horn instead of 4,600 miles _via_ a Panama canal, if there had been
one. Everybody in the United States knew that the precious warship was
making that perilous journey exposed all the way to the attack of the
enemy. If she had been lost, the course of the war might have been very
different, and even the delay of this long passage was a serious
consideration at so critical a time. However, the vessel arrived safely
and in a record time off Florida, and the suspense and anxiety of the
American people were changed into jubilation. But "never again" was the
moral they drew from this painful and exciting experience.
At the end of the war a fresh canal campaign broke out in Congress, the
claims of Nicaragua and Panama being urged by their respective
champions. The outcome of this rivalry was the appointment of a
commission, the third of the kind, to go to the isthmus and investigate
both Nicaragua and Panama. We shall have something to say about the
report of this commission, which was issued in December 1900. But
already, before that appeared, negotiations had been set on foot between
the United States and Great Britain with regard to the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty. Allusions to the subject by Mr. M'Kinley in his second message
to Congress had brought the question prominently before the people of
both countries. The president had spoken thus:--
That the construction of such a maritime highway is now more
than ever indispensable to that intimate and ready
communication between our eastern and western seaboards
demanded by the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and the
prospective expansion of our influence and commerce in the
Pacific, and that our national policy now more imperatively
than ever calls for its control by this government, are
propositions which I doubt not the Congress will duly
appreciate and wisely act upon.
It is obvious that the annexation by the United States of Hawaii and the
Philippines, the beginnings of an American oversea empire, had greatly
strengthened the case for a canal owned and controlled by the United
States, and bringing the eastern coasts, the governmental centre of the
States, into far more direct communication with these new acquisitions
in the west.
Mr. M'Kinley's pronouncement was soon followed by conversations between
Mr. John Hay, the American Secretary of State, and Lord Pauncefote,
British Ambassador at Washington. The result was a treaty which was laid
before the Senate in February 1900. This first attempt, however, was
unsuccessful. The American people were annoyed to find that it did not
abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, but left the United States with
something very short of that independent control which they desired.
Amendments were introduced, and, so altered, the treaty was ratified by
the Senate on December 20, 1900. But in this new shape it proved
unacceptable to the British government, and it was permitted to lapse;
Lord Lansdowne, however, suggesting that another attempt at agreement
should be made.
It may be asked why Great Britain, who had hitherto taken the view that
it had nothing to gain, and perhaps much to lose, from the
reconsideration of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, should now have been so
willing to bring it under review. There was a variety of reasons. The
government of the United States had protested for nearly fifty years
against the agreement, and this pertinacity, together with the changed
conditions since the Spanish-American War, may have weighed with the
British government. Then the Alaskan boundary question was at that time
still under discussion between the two countries, and a settlement was
proving difficult. An obstinate resistance to the United States over the
canal question might have continued that deadlock indefinitely. At this
time, too, England was at the beginning of the Boer War, and finding
that business a good deal more intricate than she had expected. The
sentiment of Anglo-American friendship had also grown much warmer since
the days when Lord Granville had repulsed the advances of Mr. Blaine.
In November 1901 a new treaty made its appearance. This was ratified by
the Senate without amendment, and was ultimately concluded between the
two Powers, being known as the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.[3]
It is very important to note the provisions of this treaty, because it
establishes what is known as the political "status" of the new canal.
The Hay-Pauncefote expressly supersedes the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and
provides for the construction of a canal (mentioning no particular
route) "under the auspices of the government of the United States,"
which country is "to have and enjoy all the rights incident to such
construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the
regulation and management of the canal." It adopts the principles of
"neutralization" which were embodied in the Treaty of Constantinople of
1888 in connection with the Suez Canal. Both treaties provide for:--
1. Freedom of transit in time of peace or war for the vessels of all
nations.
2. Freedom of the canal and its terminals from blockade.
3. A code of procedure for war-vessels entering or leaving the canal.
No special reference is made to the question of fortification, but the
United States are to be at liberty to maintain such military police
along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness
and disorder. A treaty, however, subsequently concluded between the
United States and the Republic of Panama (known as the Hay-Bunau-Varilla
Treaty) contains the following provision:--
If it should become necessary at any time to employ armed
forces for the safety and protection of the canal, or of the
ships that make use of the same, or the railways and
auxiliary works, the United States shall have the right, at
all times and in its discretion, to use its police and its
land and naval forces or to establish fortifications for
these purposes.
But the most important provision of all related to the question of the
charges and other conditions of traffic through the canal. The meaning
of the section seems plain enough, though it became a subject of rather
acute controversy:--
The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce
and war of all nations observing these rules, on terms of
entire equality; so that there shall be no discrimination
against any such nation, or its citizens or subjects, in
respect of the conditions and charges of traffic, or
otherwise. Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be
just and equitable.
This provision is reaffirmed in Article XVIII. of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla
Treaty. There is no doubt that the British government regarded this
promise of equal treatment as some compensation for the surrender of
those rights of joint construction and control which Great Britain
enjoyed under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. In fact, Mr. Hay, in a
memorandum he sent to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
described the treaty as a sort of contract between Great Britain and
the United States by which the former gave up those rights just
mentioned in return for the "rules and principles" included in the new
treaty, the chief among these being, of course, the provision about
equality of treatment for all nations.
It was, therefore, a surprise when the United States government decided
that the expression "all nations" did not include the United States
themselves, and that it was quite open to them to give preferential
treatment to their "coastwise" traffic. Under the term "coastwise" the
United States include the sea-traffic not only between ports along a
continuous coast, but between such points as San Francisco or Washington
and the Philippine Islands. As a matter of fact, an amendment proposed
by Mr. Burd in the Senate, reserving to the United States the right of
favouring its "coastwise" traffic, had been defeated, when the new
treaty was under discussion.
But, leaving these controversial questions, the most important thing for
us to notice is that the Panama Canal has what is known as an
"international status." It is not quite the sole and absolute property
of the United States in the sense in which the Kiel Canal belongs to
Germany, the Corinth Canal to Greece, and the Amsterdam or North Sea
Canal to the Netherlands. Its status is governed by treaties which
impose certain obligations and restrictions upon the United States and
lay down certain rules of administration. It was intended at first to
make the status of the Panama and the Suez Canal identical. But there
are considerable differences. The "neutrality" of the Suez Canal is
guaranteed by all the Powers of Europe, that of the Panama Canal by two
only, England and the United States, and it is safeguarded and
maintained by the United States alone. Then the Suez Canal is and must
remain unfortified, while the Panama Canal will be strongly fortified by
the United States.
The reader may wonder what precisely is meant by the word "neutral" as
applied to the new waterway. The position will be as nearly as possible
that indicated by Dr. Vaughan Cornish in the following passage:--
If there be a war in which the United States is not a party,
the canal will be used by belligerents in exactly the same
way as was the Suez Canal--for example, in the
Russo-Japanese War--and the government of the United States
has pledged itself to see that such neutrality is preserved.
But if there be a war in which the United States is a party,
the circumstances of fortification and operation by the
United States in fact render it impossible for the other
belligerent to use the canal, and are intended to have that
effect. This being so, the United States is preparing to
defend the canal from attack. Thus it is important to the
proper understanding of the undertaking on which the United
States government has embarked that we should clearly
realize that the canal is only neutral in a restricted
sense.[4]
As a matter of fact the status of the Panama Canal lies somewhere
between neutralization and American control. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty
also lays down the rules which are to be observed by the ships of war
of a belligerent using the canal and the waters adjacent to the
canal--that is, within three marine miles of either end. They are
similar to those in force at Suez, and need not be repeated here.
FOOTNOTES:
[3] Appendix i.
[4] "The Panama Canal and its Makers," pp. 42, 43.
CHAPTER VI.
THE UNITED STATES AND COLOMBIA.
Those citizens of the United States who thought that with the
disappearance of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty all the difficulties in the
way of obtaining a canal of their own had also disappeared were doomed
to a severe disappointment. They had not reckoned with a South American
republic on the verge of bankruptcy and suddenly presented with a
glorious opportunity to fill its empty treasury. Two preliminaries were
necessary before the United States could settle down at the isthmus of
Panama to the work of canal construction. They had to purchase the
concession, the unfinished works and the other assets of the New Panama
Company, at as reasonable a price as they could obtain; and, secondly,
it was necessary to conclude a treaty with Colombia, securing to the
United States on satisfactory terms the perpetual control of a strip of
territory on the isthmus from sea to sea within which the canal could be
constructed.
The first of these undertakings presented, as it turned out, no great
difficulty. The New Panama Company had begun to despair of its own
ability to get a canal finished across the isthmus, and to realize that
their best course was to transfer the whole business to the United
States. This disposition had been greatly strengthened by the Report of
the Third Canal Commission, issued in December 1900. Probably the
members of the commission were convinced of the advantages of the Panama
route and the desirability of continuing the work of the French
engineers. But they were shrewd people. They dwelt in their report on
the improbability that the New Panama Company would sell its property to
the United States, and on the difficulty of getting the Colombian
concession transferred. They decided, therefore, that "the most
practicable and feasible route for an isthmian canal to be under the
control, management, and ownership of the United States is that known as
the Nicaraguan route."
The commission probably foresaw the effect such a decision was likely to
have on the directors and shareholders of the New Panama Company. If an
American canal were constructed at Nicaragua, all the property and work
of the company at Panama would be thrown on the scrap-heap. The company
estimated the value of its property at $109,141,500, a price which the
commission, representing the American government, declined to look at.
The commission thought $40,000,000 quite enough for the property, and so
completely were the Americans master of the situation that that price
was agreed upon in January 1902. The commission thereupon issued a
supplementary report, which reversed the former decision and recommended
the Panama route and the purchase of the French property.
Then arose in the Congress of the United States a tremendous conflict
between the Nicaraguans and the Panamanians, the champions of the two
routes which had so long been in rivalry. The former party insisted that
Panama was farther from the United States than Nicaragua, and therefore
the journey from the eastern to the western seaboard of the States
would be longer. They argued that Panama was unfavourable to sailing
vessels on account of the prevailing calms on that coast; that it would
be easier to deal with Costa Rica and Nicaragua than with Colombia; and
that Nicaragua was "the traditional American route" as compared with the
Frenchified Panama. The claims of the old Darien route were also
advanced. This was probably done by American railway people who were
against any canal, for the Darien route would have involved a rock
tunnel five miles long and three hundred feet broad, the attempt to
achieve which would probably have ended all canal adventures at the
isthmus.
From these discussions emerged the celebrated "Spooner Bill," under
which the Panama Canal has been constructed. It empowered the American
government to secure the rights and property of the Panama Company for
not more than $40,000,000; to obtain from Colombia the perpetual control
of a strip of land, not less than six miles wide, in which the canal
should run; and then to proceed with the work. But if it should prove
impossible to come to terms with Colombia and the New Panama Company,
then the Nicaraguan project was to be revived. We shall see how, in the
sequel, this latter proviso came very near fulfilment. But, as a matter
of fact, the Spooner Bill marks the end of the great battle of the
routes which had lasted for four centuries.
The purchase price of the New Panama Company's property was happily
settled, but the purchase was of course conditional on the conclusion of
a satisfactory agreement between the United States and Colombia. It was
no use for the United States to acquire unfinished canal-works if they
were to be prevented from continuing and completing them. The situation
was interesting. The Republic of Colombia was extremely "hard up." Its
currency was debased, its treasury empty, its debt rapidly increasing
through a large annual deficit. The government, if one may so express
it, of the Colombian Republic was therefore not likely to overlook the
chance of "making a bit" out of the necessities of the bigger and richer
republic farther north. The United States wished to get their concession
as cheaply as possible; Colombia wished to sell as dearly as possible.
This is not infrequently the case with buyers and sellers; but Colombia
pushed her haggling a little too far, and in the end very badly
overreached herself.
The United States began by proposing terms on which they might obtain
the desired strip of territory. The conditions were carefully laid down.
The territory was to remain under Colombian sovereignty, but to be
administered by the United States. Sanitary and police services were to
be maintained by both governments jointly. Colombia was to police the
zone, with the help of the United States if necessary. But the business
terms were chiefly interesting to Colombia. The United States were to
pay Colombia a bonus of $7,000,000 in cash, and after fourteen years an
annuity of $250,000. These terms, which were not ungenerous, the
Colombian minister at Washington declined to accept.
A brilliant idea had, indeed, struck the statesmen of the Colombian
Republic. They had remembered that the concession to the Panama Company
lapsed in October 1904, and that all its property that could not be
carried away would revert to the Colombian government. Only defer any
agreement with the United States till then, and the $40,000,000 to be
paid to the New Panama Canal Company by the United States would drop
like a golden nest-egg into the empty exchequer of the Colombian
Republic. It was a brilliant idea, but the Colombian method of pursuing
it was rather too crude and obvious.
In order to meet the Colombian government the United States improved
their offer, considerably increasing the bonus and making other changes.
An agreement, known as the Hay-Herran Treaty, was actually arranged
between the United States and Colombia, the latter represented by her
minister at Washington, Dr. Tomas Herran. This treaty, before it became
operative, had to be ratified by the Congress of Colombia, and the
president of that state took care that a congress should be elected
which would do no such thing. Meantime all kinds of influences, secret
and open, were at work. The German "colonial party" had become
interested in the question, and had conceived the possibility of
Germany, rather than the United States, succeeding to the French
concession. It is quite certain that the United States would have
resisted any such proceeding, if necessary by actual war. There is
little doubt, also, that the party in the United States which had
supported the Nicaraguan scheme were throwing every obstruction in the
way of a satisfactory agreement between the big and the little republic.
The reader may guess what was the anxiety of the New Panama Canal
Company during all this diplomacy and intrigue. They knew that the
completion of the sale of its property to the United States depended on
an agreement being concluded between that country and Colombia; and they
also knew that unless they sold before October 1904, they would have
practically nothing to sell, because the franchise and possessions of
the company would be forfeited to the Colombian government at that date.
It would be better to sell on the best terms they could obtain to
Germany or anybody else before the fatal day arrived. Meantime the
United States brought every force of argument and menace to bear on the
Colombian government. Secretary Hay sent urgent dispatches to the
American minister at Bogota. He reminded Colombia that the decision to
adopt the Panama route was not irrevocable. The Spooner law authorized
the American president to await only "a reasonable time" for an
agreement with Colombia. Having waited so long, he was able and indeed
bound to resume the Nicaraguan project.
When the Colombian Congress duly rejected the Hay-Herran Treaty in
August 1903, the New Panama Company became very seriously alarmed. Other
offers of purchase were renewed, and the situation became critical for
the United States. The American counsel for the company, Mr. William
Nelson Cromwell, who had done his utmost to promote the agreement, had
the utmost difficulty in keeping his clients to their compact with the
United States. He made a hurried trip to Paris, where he said something
which had the desired effect. There is no reason to believe that Mr.
Cromwell took any part in the surprising events which were soon to alter
the entire situation. But he had heard the proverbial "little bird," and
the tidings he passed on brought the New Panama directors to the desired
mood of patience and expectancy.
Colombia meanwhile kept on marking time. She suggested that a new treaty
should be negotiated between the United States and Colombia, to be
ratified by the Colombian Senate some time in 1904. That would have put
the clock forward splendidly, but the device was duly understood at
Washington. In October a committee of the Colombian Senate reported to
the Senate a recommendation that no agreement should be concluded with
the United States until the French concession had lapsed. This
recommendation was not acted upon by the Colombian Senate, nor yet were
any steps taken towards the negotiation of a new treaty. The American
government gave a generous interpretation to the "reasonable time"
specified in the Spooner Bill, and kept on waiting in the hope that the
Colombian Congress would still change its mind and ratify the Hay-Herran
Treaty, whose terms, as we have seen, were liberal to the Colombian
Republic. But when the congressional session at Bogota came to an end on
October 31, 1903, without any further action over the Hay-Herran Treaty,
the Americans concluded that the whole business was over so far as
negotiations with Colombia on the Panama question were concerned.
Obviously the only course was to turn to the Nicaraguan alternative.
And the Colombian government no doubt thought it had won the day by
sheer force of astute statesmanship.
Then came a coincidence more astonishing than any since the day when Mr.
Weller, senior, upset the Eatanswill outvoters (purely by accident) into
another canal. The Panama revolution broke out, and the United States
suddenly and without further difficulty obtained all they wanted of the
isthmus. And Colombia? She lost every stick and stone of the canal which
was to have been hers in October 1904, never made a farthing on a Panama
deal, got no thanks from Germany or anybody else, and lost a whole
province into the bargain. Such were the results of very astute
statesmanship at Bogota.
CHAPTER VII.
A MINIATURE REVOLUTION.
It was not to be expected that Panama, one of the constituent provinces
of the United States of Colombia, would be very enthusiastic about all
this haggling and intriguing at Bogota. Panama asked for nothing better
than that a rich and powerful country like the United States should
continue the French enterprise and carry it through. The canal would run
right through the province, and would bring it into the main stream of
the world's traffic and commerce. No doubt the central government at
Bogota would skim off as much as possible of this new wealth and
prosperity at the isthmus; but even so, Panama would reap a great
advantage from the running of this new and much-frequented highway of
communication between east and west through its territory. The dealings
of the central government with the United States had roused a growing
disgust and resentment at the isthmus.
The relations between the province of Panama with New Granada and its
successor Colombia had been very chequered ever since the revolt of the
Spanish colonies in Central and South America in the early years of last
century. Panama declared her independence in 1821, and allied herself at
once with New Granada. But troubles began forthwith. Again and again the
isthmian province seceded from New Granada or Colombia, and was induced
to return by promises of more favourable terms of union, these always
remaining unfulfilled. In his annual message to Congress in 1903,
President Roosevelt enumerated some fifty-three "revolutions,
rebellions, insurrections, riots, and other outbreaks" that had occurred
at the isthmus in fifty-seven years. Not long before these difficulties
between the United States and Colombia, Panama had received a new
constitution which was far from satisfactory to the people of the
province. There was in truth little to be gained by a continued
allegiance to the government at Bogota. Some idea of the depths to
which Colombia had sunk through a long course of bad administration and
corruption may be gathered from a passage in the official address of Dr.
Marroquin on his becoming vice-president of Colombia in 1898. He said:--
Hatred, envy, and ambition are elements of discord; in the
political arena the battle rages fiercely, not so much with
the idea of securing the triumph of principles as with that
of humbling, and elevating persons and parties; public
tranquillity, indispensable to every citizen for the free
enjoyment of what he possesses either by luck or as the
fruit of his labour, is gradually getting unknown; we live
in a sickly atmosphere; crisis is our normal state; commerce
and all other industries are in urgent need of perfect
calmness for their development and progress; poverty invades
every home. The notion of mother country is mistaken or
obliterated, owing to our political disturbances. The
conception of mother country is so intimately associated
with that of political disorders, and with the afflictions
and distrust which they engender, that it is not unusual to
hear from one of our countrymen what could not be heard from
a native of any other country: "I wish I had been born
somewhere else." Could many be found among us who would feel
proud when exclaiming, "I am a Colombian," in the same way
as a Frenchman does when exclaiming, "I am a Frenchman"?
This was a cheerful pronouncement for a people to hear from the lips of
a man who was just assuming high office in their midst. It suggests some
further reasons why the Panamanians should have so readily asserted
their independence once more when the negotiations between Colombia and
the United States fell through.
Long before that happened, before the Colombian Congress which was to
deal with the Hay-Herran Treaty had assembled, a much-respected citizen
of Panama, Dr. Manuel Amador (Guerrero), had written to the Colombian
president warning him that serious consequences would follow at Panama
if that treaty were not ratified. For answer the central government
foisted on Panama a candidate for Congress who was well known as an
enemy of the United States and of the isthmian canal scheme.
Representations to the government at Bogota were useless, and Panama saw
the prospect of a canal being constructed through her territory fading
into distance.
Then it was that an eminent Panamanian, Jose Agustin Arango, a senator
at the Colombian Congress of 1903, who had vainly urged the ratification
of the Hay-Herran Treaty, conceived the idea that Panama might declare
her independence and then make her own treaty with the United States
regarding a trans-isthmian canal. It soon turned out that the same idea
had struck many others, and a junta of zealous conspirators was quickly
formed. Senor Arango chanced to meet Dr. Amador one day at the offices
of the Panama Railroad, and unfolded his revolutionary design to that
gentleman. The doctor proved highly sympathetic. There was indeed no
difficulty in finding adherents. Senor Arango, Dr. Amador, and C. C.
Arosemena undertook the conduct of the movement, and among the other
leaders were Senor Arango's sons and sons-in-law, Nicanor A. de Obarrio,
Federico Boyd, Tomas and Ricardo Arias, and Manuel Espinosa. A very
important person, General Esteban Huertas, commander of the troops in
Panama, was easily enrolled, as were also alcaldes, chiefs of police,
and other important officials.
The first thing to do was to sound official opinion in Washington as to
what treatment the revolted province might expect from the American
government. Moreover, revolutions cost money, and supplies must be
obtained from somewhere. So Dr. Amador and Ricardo Arias were deputed to
go to the United States. There they called on Mr. Cromwell, the counsel
of the New Panama Company, who gave them very little encouragement.
Moreover, they were carefully "shadowed" by Colombian agents, so that
they were able to cable to their expectant friends at the isthmus only
the single depressing word, "desanimado" (disappointed).
Then Dr. Amador called at the office of a Panamanian friend and
sympathizer, Joshua Lindo, and asked for counsel in his difficulties.
Mr. Lindo at once suggested that the likeliest person to help was Mr.
Bunau-Varilla, who had been chief engineer under the French Canal
Company. It is interesting to know that this gentleman had been a
fellow-student of Alfred Dreyfus, and had given effective help in the
campaign which ended in that officer's liberation from the island prison
not so very far from the isthmus of Panama. Unfortunately, said Mr.
Lindo, Mr. Bunau-Varilla was in Paris; but even as the friends deplored
his absence the telephone rang, Mr. Lindo answered the call, and lo! Mr.
Bunau-Varilla announced his return to New York. Such a coincidence might
well seem providential, for Mr. Varilla proved a friend in need and in
deed. He promised the necessary funds as well as other practical help,
and asked for only one return--that he might be appointed minister of
the reconstituted Panama to the United States for just so long a time as
was necessary for the arrangement of the new treaty between the two
countries for the construction of the isthmian canal.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the next telegram sent home by the
revolutionary agents was more cheerful. It consisted of the single word
"esperanzas" (hopes). Dr. Amador now made some efforts to ascertain the
sentiment and intentions of the United States government. He called on
Mr. Hay, the Secretary of State, at the state department. Now it is
obvious that when a gentleman calls at a foreign office and announces
himself as a conspirator against a government with which that office has
friendly relations, the visitor cannot expect much practical help and
sympathy. But the authorities at Washington, whose nerves were raw from
the prolonged struggle with Colombia, would scarcely have been human if
they had not felt a secret joy at a movement which promised such an
ample retribution on Colombia and so easy a settlement of the Panama
problem. Dr. Amador was politely informed that he must pay no more calls
at the department. But he had seen and heard enough to assure him that
the United States would at least remain neutral, and, if the revolution
succeeded, would conclude a canal treaty with the new republic. He felt
that there were two very important conditions to be fulfilled. Firstly,
the revolution must be effected without bloodshed, for public sympathy
in the United States would be alienated by any fighting or violent
disturbance. The conspirators were also not without a certain natural
solicitude for their own skins. Secondly, there must be a brand-new
government ready to take the place of the Colombian administration so
soon as this was abolished.
The scene now changes to the isthmus. The conspirators were inclined at
first to be sceptical about Dr. Amador's report of the probable attitude
of the United States, but on November 2, 1903, the arrival of the
American gunboat _Nashville_ at Colon reassured them. The _Nashville_
had come, as American men-of-war had frequently come in the past to
Colon or Panama, not to take sides with any party in a scrimmage, but
calmly and impartially to maintain order and keep transit open at the
isthmus, in accordance with treaty obligations. The orders to the
_Nashville_, as subsequently to the _Boston_ and the _Dixie_, were
these:--
Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption
threatened by armed force, occupy line of railroad. Prevent
landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either
government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or
other point.[5]
A similar order was sent to Rear-Admiral Glass at Acapulco, who was to
proceed to Panama with the same object.
But the coming _coup d'etat_ was known at Bogota as well as at
Washington. The date fixed for the outbreak was November 4. General
Huertas was to be ready with his troops, and the signal to be given by
the blowing of bugles by the firemen. But the Colombian government at
last decided to act, and on November 3 the steamer _Carthagena_ arrived
at Colon, having on board General Tovar with a force of about four
hundred and fifty men. The commander with three other resplendent
warriors, Generals Castro, Alban, and Amaya, at once took train for
Panama; while their troops, many of whom had brought their wives, camped
out in the streets of Colon. These events were duly telephoned to
Panama. The news reached Dr. Amador and his friends at ten o'clock,
just an hour before the arrival of the Colombian officers. It was "a
crowded hour of glorious life" for the conspirators, some of whom found
the excitement too much for their nerves, disappeared from the scene,
and gave up the conspiracy business altogether. But the leaders were of
better mettle, and while the trans-isthmian train was rapidly bringing
the representatives of the established government to Panama a good many
plans were discussed. The desperate nature of the occasion may be
gathered from the fact that one of the proposals was to drug the
Colombian officers, and when thus disabled convey them to durance vile.
In great perplexity Dr. Amador sought General Huertas; but he had put on
his dress uniform and gone to the station to meet his superiors. So
matters were to be allowed to take their own course.
At eleven o'clock a gush of glittering uniforms, fifteen in all,
counting the generals and the staffs, descended upon the Panama
platform. One might almost have expected them to advance to the
footlights and announce their arrival and intentions in a four-part
chorus. Here obviously were the properties, the stage scenery, and the
artistes, principals and chorus, of a first-rate comic opera. In the
harbour lay three Colombian gunboats whose political views were not
fully ascertained, though it was thought the commanders had been won
over to the revolutionary cause. The new arrivals were welcomed by
General Huertas and conducted to headquarters, while the conspirators,
no doubt with quickened pulses, awaited subsequent events from a
distance.
The Colombian officers wished to be conducted forthwith to the
fortifications and the sea-wall. Now this was precisely what General
Huertas, whose heart beat loyally under his official gold braid to the
cause of freedom and independence, wished to avoid, and for two reasons:
firstly, it would have been easy for the federal generals to signal to
the gunboats in the harbour and thus get command of the entire
situation; secondly, on that same sea-wall there were some modern
quick-firing guns, behind which even fifteen men might quickly get the
whole city at their mercy. So General Huertas determined that on the
whole he would conduct his guests anywhere but to the sea-wall. He
suggested that there were better ways of spending the hot hours of the
day than in going round fortifications in stiff and sweltering uniforms.
After luncheon, followed by a little siesta behind sun-shutters, would
be a better time for the business of inspection. The generals were
probably both hot and hungry, and they allowed themselves to be
persuaded.
But even as they lunched their suspicions seemed to have awakened. Some
one, it is said, warned them of the trap into which they had walked. And
moreover, why did the Bogota troops not arrive from Colon? What exactly
happened is not recorded, but it is a fact that the generals suddenly
insisted on the Panama troops being paraded and themselves being
conducted to the fortifications.
General Huertas made some excuse for leaving the luncheon room, and
outside the door found Dr. Amador, the respectable physician of Panama,
now an arch-conspirator, though without the black mantle and stiletto.
"The contrast between these two men," writes Mr. Johnson, "was most
striking. The one was advanced in years, venerable and stately in
aspect, and yet impetuous as youth. The other was only a boy in stature
and scarcely more than a boy in years, yet at the time deliberate and
dilatory. The latter, however, quickly responded to the zealous
initiative of the former. 'Do it,' exhorted Dr. Amador in an impassioned
whisper, 'do it now.'"
The business was soon over. Huertas ordered out his soldiers, who knew
well enough what was going to happen. Then, as the military swells from
Bogota came on the ground, the little general gave the order, the rifles
were levelled on the Colombians, and they were walked off to police
headquarters and safely locked up. Then Governor Obaldia was also
arrested and taken to prison, but this was only a formality. He was an
ardent conspirator, but as he represented the central government, it was
thought desirable to perform the symbolical act of arresting and
deposing him. He was at once released.
There was now no going back. The next step was to announce the fact of
the revolution to the gunboats, in the harbour, which were still a
doubtful factor. Two of them, the _Padilla_ and the _Chucuito_,
remained silent; but the third, the _Bogota_, sent word that if the
generals were not released by ten o'clock it would turn its guns on to
the city. The generals were, of course, not released, so at ten o'clock
the _Bogota_ launched three shells into the city. One of these killed an
unfortunate and innocent Chinese coolie near the barracks, and that was
the only casualty that occurred during the whole course of the great
Panama revolution. Then the _Bogota_, that deed of slaughter
accomplished, steamed out of the harbour.
The next morning the gunboat _Padilla_, which had been considering the
situation during the night, suddenly made up its mind, steamed in to a
snug anchorage under the fortified sea-wall, and hoisted the flag of
free and independent Panama. The _Padilla_ might have been called upon
to make good its new allegiance, for a report was spread that the
terrible _Bogota_ was returning to bombard, this time to good purpose.
So a letter was drawn up by the consuls of the United States, Great
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Holland, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Salvador, Denmark, Belgium, Cuba, Mexico, Brazil, Honduras, and Peru,
protesting against the bombardment of a defenceless city without due
notice to the consular corps as contrary to the rights and practices of
civilized nations. What answer the justly enraged commander of the
_Bogota_ would have returned to this rather representative address
cannot be known, for the _Bogota_, no doubt unnerved by the sensation of
casting three live shells into a live town, never returned to witness
the devastation it had wrought.
What in the meantime was occurring at Colon? Why had the 450 Colombian
soldiers not flown to the rescue and vengeance of their captured
officers? The explanation is simple, though perhaps unexpected--they
could not pay their railway fares! After the departure of the generals
for Panama on November 3, Colonel Torres, who had been left in charge of
the government troops, demanded a "special" to take them across the
isthmus. The superintendent of the line intimated that specials were
procurable, but that fares must be paid. And the fares of 450 persons
ran into money, in fact nearly $2,000 in gold, or quite a little
wheelbarrowful of the depreciated Colombian silver. Anywhere but in
Panama or Ruretania the plea of state necessity, which in presence of
the 450 needed no demonstration, would have procured some concession
from the railway authorities. But the railway rules provided for no such
emergencies. No fare, no journey--that was the immutable railway law,
and Colonel Torres had to lead his men back to their street encampments.
It is one of the many remarkable coincidences at this juncture that the
telegraphic and telephonic system also broke down, the wires refusing to
transmit any messages from Colon to the officers at Panama.
At last, on November 4, Colon received the news of the revolution and
the impounding of the Colombian officers. Some little impatience then
appeared among the Colombian troops. They actually threatened to seize
the railway and go across in spite of regulations. Also it was rumoured
that Colonel Torres, losing for a moment his self-command, threatened to
kill every American citizen in Colon unless his fellow-officers were at
once liberated. At any rate, that rumour was duly reported to the
commander of the _Nashville_, who, on the strength of it, at once
landed fifty bluejackets to preserve the peace of the town. The
commander also wrote to the alcalde of Colon and the chief of the
police, giving the gist of an official order he had received from
Washington. The order pointed out that to allow the passage of Colombian
troops from Colon to Panama would excite a conflict between the forces
of the two parties, and would thus interrupt the free and open transit
of the isthmus which the United States was bound to maintain. The
commander had therefore instructed the superintendent of the railways to
afford carriage to the troops of neither party. Never was officer so
outrageously impeded in the performance of his obvious duty as Colonel
Torres. And right in the middle of the situation thus created the
_Carthagena_, which had brought the Colombian troops to Colon, sailed
demurely home.
In a few days there assembled some nine or ten vessels of the United
States navy at Colon or Panama. On November 4 it was announced that the
United States would permit the landing of no forces hostile to Panama
within fifty miles of the city of Panama or anywhere at all on the
Caribbean coast. Was not the United States government compelled by
treaty obligations to preserve peace, the paying of fares, and "free and
uninterrupted transit" at the isthmus? How unreasonable to suggest that
the great and grown-up republic was protecting and taking the side of
the little baby republic which had just been born at Panama!
But the 450 soldiers encamped with their wives in the streets of Colon
were becoming an inconvenience, and it was highly desirable to remove
this substantial lump of grit from the machinery of revolution. The
commander of these troops himself helped to effect that object. He, in
fact, offered to take his little army away in return for a satisfactory
honorarium. The Panama treasury fortunately contained at that time a sum
of $140,000 in debased Colombian coinage, worth about $56,000 in gold. A
little of this might well be expended on clearing the country of the
Colombian troops. The commander accepted $8,000 in gold, and quickly
bundled the loyal troops and their spouses on board the Royal Mail
steamship _Orinoco_ for passage homewards. He himself did not propose
to return home and report himself. His scheme was to go to Jamaica and
spend his suddenly acquired wealth in "that loveliest of the Antilles."
Then a cruel thing happened. The 450 got wind of the bargain their
commander had made with the Panama government, and by a swift logical
process concluded that the $8,000 which had been paid for their
departure belonged to themselves as well as to their commander. So they
laid hands on the hapless officer and took all the money from him. We
may imagine the annoyance of the gentleman who had betrayed his country,
dishonoured his name, and then lost the "tip" which had made it all
worth while. His subsequent proceedings are nowhere recorded.
Just after the Colombian troops had set sail homewards a special train
arrived at Colon bringing the captive generals, who had promised to go
home without further fuss. They left Colon on November 12, so that they
had plenty of time to contemplate the beginnings of the new regime in
Panama. All kinds of reports began to arrive about the intentions of the
government at Bogota. A naval expedition was said to be on the way from
Buenaventura, but the United States navy had instructions to take care
of any experiments of that sort. Then the news came that a land
expedition was approaching along the isthmus. That would have implied a
real triumph of original exploration. It would have meant clearing a
road for troops through impenetrable jungle, through which it is hard to
cut the narrowest track by means of the machete or the long Spanish
cutlass. The untamed San Blas Indians, who permit no white man to spend
a single night in their territory, would have mobilized against the
invasion, and so would the wild cats and anacondas and monkeys, who
share with the Indians the sovereignty of that tangled wilderness.
The revolution was an accomplished fact, and Colombia could do nothing
but accept the inevitable and reflect on the disappointment of her
golden dreams. The revolutionists had been ready with their
constitutional arrangements. The municipal council of Panama had met
immediately after the _coup d'etat_. It was unanimously voted that
Panama should be a free and independent republic, and a provisional
ministry was at once appointed. These proceedings were ratified the
same afternoon at a mass meeting of the people of Panama held in the
cathedral square. A formal manifesto was also issued, constituting a
declaration of independence and a justification of the revolt. It opens
magniloquently: "The transcendental act that by a spontaneous movement
the inhabitants of the isthmus of Panama have just executed is the
inevitable consequence of a situation which has become graver daily." It
goes on to set forth the grievances of Panama under the Colombian
connection and the events which had led to the revolution. It ends in an
almost pathetic note:--
At separating from our brothers of Colombia we do it without
hatred and without any joy. Just as a son withdraws from his
paternal roof, the isthmian people in adopting the lot it
has chosen have done it with grief, but in compliance with
the supreme and inevitable duty it owes to itself--that of
its own preservation and of working for its own welfare. We
therefore begin to form a part among the free nations of the
world, considering Colombia as a sister nation, with which
we shall be whenever circumstances may require it, and for
whose prosperity we have the most fervent and sincere
wishes.[6]
By November 7 the new government had settled down so steadily to its
work, and so obviously commanded the adherence of the whole people, that
it received formal recognition from the United States in these words:--
As it appears that the people of Panama have, by unanimous
movement, dissolved their political connection with the
Republic of Colombia and resumed their independence, and as
there is no opposition to the provisional government in the
state of Panama, I have to inform you that the provisional
government will be held responsible for the protection of
the persons and property of citizens of the United States,
as well as to keep the isthmian transit free, in accordance
with the obligations of existing treaties relative to the
isthmian territory.
We need not dwell upon the desperate efforts made by the Colombian
government to retrieve the situation. A respected Colombian, General
Reyes, was sent to Washington to offer to revive the old Hay-Herran
Treaty, with modifications greatly in the American interest, if the
United States would help to restore Colombian sovereignty at the
isthmus. But all was in vain. Colombia must lie on the bed she had made,
and before the end of the year the new republic had been recognized by
all the leading Powers of the world. The new government was true to the
undertaking on the strength of which Mr. Bunau-Varilla had given his
help and support to the movement. On November 7 he was appointed
minister of Panama to the United States, and on November 18 the
Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty[7] was signed at Washington, which finally
placed the United States in a position to begin the work of canal
construction at the isthmus.
FOOTNOTES:
[5] See "Four Centuries of the Panama Canal," p. 188 (W. F. Johnson).
[6] For full text of declaration see Appendix ii.
[7] Appendix iii.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE BATTLE OF THE LEVELS.
By the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty the United States guaranteed and
undertook to maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama. The
new republic granted to the United States in perpetuity the use,
occupation, and control of a strip ten miles wide and extending three
nautical miles into the sea at either terminal, with all lands lying
outside of the zone necessary for the construction of the canal, and
with the islands in the Bay of Panama. The cities of Panama and Colon
were not embraced in the canal zone, but the United States assumed their
sanitation and, in case of need, the maintenance of order therein. All
railway and canal property rights belonging to Panama and needed for the
canal passed to the United States, including any property of the railway
and canal companies in the cities of Panama and Colon. The works,
property, and personnel of the canal and railways were exempted from
taxation in the cities of Colon and Panama as well as in the actual
canal zone. Free immigration of the workers and free importation of
supplies for the construction and operation of the canal were granted.
Provision was made for the use of military force and the building of
fortifications by the United States for the protection of the transit.
The United States were to pay $10,000,000 down on exchange of
ratifications and an annuity of $250,000, beginning nine years from the
same date. It will be noticed that the United States enjoyed in the
canal zone all the rights, though not the name and title, of
sovereignty.
The treaty was finally ratified on February 26, 1904, and four days
later the first Isthmian Canal Commission, consisting of seven members,
was appointed by President Roosevelt to arrange for the conduct of the
great enterprise. Careful instructions were given to the commission. The
Isthmian Canal Commission were authorized and directed:--
First.--To make all needful rules and regulations for the
government of the zone, and for the correct administration
of the military, civil, and judicial affairs of its
possessions until the close of the fifty-eighth session of
Congress. Second.--To establish a civil service for the
government of the strip and construction of the canal,
appointments to which shall be secured as nearly as
practicable by merit system. Third.--To make, or cause to be
made, all needful surveys, borings, designs, plans, and
specifications of the engineering, hydraulic, and sanitary
works required, and to supervise the execution of the same.
Fourth.--To make, and cause to be executed after due
advertisement, all necessary contracts for any and all kinds
of engineering and construction works. Fifth.--To acquire by
purchase or through proper and uniform expropriation
proceedings, to be prescribed by the commission, any private
lands or other real property whose ownership by the United
States is essential to the excavation and completion of the
canal. Sixth.--To make all needful rules and regulations
respecting an economical and correct disbursement and an
accounting for all funds that may be appropriated by
Congress for the construction of the canal, its auxiliary
works, and the government of the canal zone; and to
establish a proper and comprehensive system of bookkeeping
showing the state of the work, the expenditures by classes,
and the amounts still available. Seventh.--To make
requisition on the Secretary of War for funds needed from
time to time in the proper prosecution of the work, and to
designate the disbursing officers authorized to receipt for
the same.
The work of this commission was not wholly satisfactory, and in April
1905 another was appointed, which was ordered to meet at Panama
quarterly, the first commission having conducted its operations from
Washington.
The first two and a half years of the American occupation were spent
mainly in preparing for the great task. One very important question had
now to be finally decided. The battle of the routes was over, and now
began the battle of the levels. We have seen that the French began with
the idea of a tide-level canal. The New Panama Canal Company had changed
to the lock or high-level plan, but the French had not advanced in their
work to the point when the one or the other scheme must be definitively
adopted. The excavation they had carried out was all available for
either type of canal. But the Americans had now to come to a decision.
A few more words about the main physical features of the isthmus are
necessary for the reader to understand the nature of the problem. The
two most important factors in the problem, as we have seen, are,
firstly, the river Chagres with its tributaries, the Trinidad, Gatun,
and twenty others; and, secondly, the range of low hills on the Pacific
side through which any canal from Colon to Panama must pass. The river
Chagres is a great mountain torrent which enters the Caribbean Sea a
little west of Colon. The canal follows its course inland for about 26
miles, when the river valley turns sharply north-east and the canal
continues straight on to the Pacific. The Chagres is not a river to be
despised. The rainfall on the isthmus is very heavy, especially on the
Atlantic side, where 140 inches per annum have been recorded. The
isthmian rivers are all liable to quickly-swelling floods, the Chagres
at Gamboa having been known to rise 35-1/2 feet in twenty-four hours.
The two different types of canal involve equally different methods of
dealing with this formidable stream. It must either be harnessed to the
work or firmly and finally shut off from any interference with the
canal. De Lesseps, who had chosen the tide-level scheme, proposed to
turn the Chagres and other rivers into diversion channels, so that they
could get safely to the sea without crossing the line of the canal or
having any connection with it. This would have involved a work of
excavation and construction scarcely less gigantic than the building of
the canal itself.
On the other plan, the Chagres and its tributaries would be made the
feeders of the upper reaches of the canal. So far from being politely
shown off the premises, the question rather was whether they would be
able to supply sufficient water all the year round for the needs of the
canal. Then this harnessing of the Chagres meant the taming of its
waters in a huge artificial lake, in which the impetuous current would
be quenched and through which the dredged channel of the waterway would
run. The New Panama Company had recommended the construction of a huge
dam for this purpose at Bohio towards the Atlantic end of the canal, and
this plan had been adopted by the first American Isthmian Commission,
which issued its report in 1901. I may add that the Spooner Act, which
authorized the construction of a canal, also contemplated a lock or
high-level waterway. As we shall see, Bohio was not in the end adopted
as the site of the big dam, but Gatun, where it is now constructed, with
its concrete spillway carrying away the overflow waters of the lake down
the old Chagres channel to the near Atlantic. I need not say that these
were two very different ways of "caring for" the Chagres and its
affluents. The tide-level canal would also, of course, be supplied with
sea-water, while the high-level will be a fresh-water canal. Colonel
Goethals, the chief engineer of the canal, anticipates rather a curious
result from this latter circumstance. He thinks the bed of the upper
reaches of the canal will in course of time be quite paved with the
barnacles washed by the fresh-water from the bottoms of the great
ocean-going vessels passing through the canal.
The second physical feature is the hill country or the "Continental
Divide" which the canal enters near the point where the Chagres River
crosses its course. Here runs the famous Culebra Cut, the nine-mile-long
artificial canyon, the biggest excavation in the world. Now the highest
elevation of these hills along the centre line of the canal was 312 feet
above sea-level. The bottom of the canal at the cutting is 40 feet, so
that the vertical depth of the cut on the centre line is 272 feet. The
engineers of the tide-level scheme would have had not only to excavate
85 feet deeper--that is, to 45 feet below sea-level--but to make the
cutting immensely wider in order to avoid the danger of disastrous
landslides. This would have meant an enormous amount of additional work,
as well as expense. Nevertheless, the controversy between the two
principles was very warmly and equally sustained. It may be mentioned
that Mr. Bunau-Varilla was an especially ardent advocate of the
tide-level scheme. In fact, he was not for calling the waterway a canal
at all; he would have christened it "the Straits of Panama."
However, a decision was necessary, and in 1905 a board of consulting or
advisory engineers was appointed, mainly to consider whether the canal
should be constructed at high-level or sea-level. Five members were
appointed by European governments, and the president was Major-General
George W. Davis, formerly of the United States army. The instructions
given to this board by President Roosevelt will afford a very clear idea
of the problem it had to solve:--
There are two or three considerations which I trust you will
steadily keep before your minds in coming to a conclusion as
to the proper type of canal. I hope that ultimately it will
prove possible to build a sea-level canal. Such a canal
would undoubtedly be best in the end, if feasible; and I
feel that one of the chief advantages of the Panama route
is that ultimately a sea-level canal will be a possibility.
But while paying due heed to the ideal perfectibility of the
scheme from an engineer's standpoint, remember the need of
having a plan which shall provide for the immediate building
of a canal on the safest terms and in the shortest possible
time. If to build a sea-level canal will but slightly
increase the risk, then, of course, it is preferable. But if
to adopt the plan of a sea-level canal means to incur a
hazard, and to insure indefinite delay, then it is not
preferable. If the advantages and disadvantages are closely
balanced, I expect you to say so. I desire also to know
whether, if you recommend a high-level multi-lock canal, it
will be possible, after it is completed, to turn it into or
substitute for it, in time, a sea-level canal without
interrupting the traffic upon it. Two of the prime
considerations to be kept steadily in mind are:
First.--The utmost practicable speed of construction.
Second.--Practical certainty that the plan proposed will be
feasible; that it can be carried out with the minimum risk.
The quantity of work and the amount of work should be
minimized as far as possible.
There may be good reason why the delay incident to the
adoption of a plan for an ideal canal should be incurred;
but if there is not, then I hope to see the canal
constructed on a system which will bring to the nearest
possible date in the future the time when it is practicable
to take the first ship across the isthmus--that is, which
will in the shortest time possible secure a Panama waterway
between the oceans of such a character as to guarantee
permanent and ample communication for the greatest ships of
our navy and for the larger steamers on either the Atlantic
or the Pacific. The delay in transit of the vessels owing to
additional locks would be of small consequence when compared
with shortening the time for the construction of the canal
or diminishing the risks in its construction.
In short, I desire your best judgment on all the various
questions to be considered in choosing among the various
plans for a comparatively high-level multi-lock canal; for a
lower level, with fewer locks; and for a sea-level canal.
Finally, I urge upon you the necessity of as great
expedition in coming to a decision as is compatible with
thoroughness in considering the conditions.
The board went to the isthmus and investigated the subject with great
care. In January 1906 they issued three reports. A majority of eight to
five pronounced in favour of the sea-level scheme "as the only one
giving reasonable assurance of safe and uninterrupted navigation." "Such
a canal," it said, "can be constructed in twelve or thirteen years'
time; the cost will be less than $250,000,000; it will endure for all
time."
The minority were just as confidently in favour of a high-level canal.
They concluded:--
In view of the unquestioned fact that the lock canal herein
advocated will cost about $100,000,000 less than the
proposed sea-level canal; believing that it can be built in
much less time; that it will afford a better navigation;
that it will be adequate for all its uses for a longer time,
and can be enlarged, if need should arise, with greater
facility and less cost, we recommend the lock canal at
elevation 85 for adoption by the United States.
The third report was made by the chief engineer, Mr. Stevens, who, quite
apart from all considerations of expense, was strongly in favour of the
high-level plan.
The three reports were considered by the canal commissioners, a majority
of whom ultimately agreed with the minority of the advisory board. They
admitted that a sea-level canal was ideally the best, but considered
that the cost of making such a canal sufficiently wide would be
prohibitive. They declared therefore for a lock canal at an elevation of
85 feet above sea-level. They gave their decision thus:--
It appears that the canal proposed by the minority of the
board of consulting engineers can be built in half the time
and at a little more than half the cost of the canal
proposed by the majority of the board, and that when
completed it will be a better canal, for the following
reasons:
1. It provides greater safety for ships and less danger of
interruption to traffic by reason of its wider and deeper
channels.
2. It provides quicker passage across the isthmus for large
ships or a large traffic.
3. It is in much less danger of damage to itself or of
delays to ships from the flood-waters of the Chagres and
other streams.
4. Its cost of operation and maintenance, including fixed
charges, will be less by some $2,000,000 or more per annum.
5. It can be enlarged hereafter much more easily and cheaply
than can a sea-level canal.
6. Its military defence can be effected with as little or
perhaps less difficulty than the sea-level canal.
7. It is our opinion that the plan proposed by the minority
of the board of consulting engineers is a most satisfactory
solution of an isthmian canal, and therefore we recommend
that the plan of the minority be adopted.
In February 1906 the president referred the question for final decision
to Congress. In his message on the subject he spoke thus:--
It must be borne in mind that there is no question of
building what has been picturesquely termed "the Straits of
Panama"--that is, a waterway through which the largest
vessels could go with safety at uninterrupted high speed.
Both the sea-level canal and the proposed lock canal would
be too narrow and shallow to be called with any truthfulness
a strait, or to have any of the properties of a wide, deep
water strip. Both of them would be canals, pure and simple.
Each type has certain disadvantages and certain advantages.
But, in my judgment, the disadvantages are fewer and the
advantages very much greater in the case of a lock canal
substantially as proposed in the papers forwarded herewith;
and a careful study of the reports seems to establish a
strong probability that the following are the facts: The
sea-level canal would be slightly less exposed to damage in
the event of war; the running expenses, apart from the
heavy cost of interest on the amount employed to build it,
would be less; and for small ships the time of transit would
probably be less. On the other hand, the lock canal, at a
level of 80 feet or thereabouts, would not cost much more
than half as much to build, and could be built in about half
the time, while there would be very much less risk connected
with building it, and for large ships the transit would be
quicker; while, taking into account the interest on the
amount saved in building, the actual cost of maintenance
would be less. After being built, it would be easier to
enlarge the lock canal than the sea-level canal.
The law now on our statute books seems to contemplate a lock
canal. In my judgment a lock canal as herein recommended is
advisable. If the Congress directs that a sea-level canal be
constructed, its direction will, of course, be carried out.
Otherwise, the canal will be built on substantially the plan
for a lock canal outlined in the accompanying papers, such
changes being made, of course, as may be found actually
necessary.
In June 1906 Congress finally decided for a high-level canal, and the
controversy was officially closed. But the friends of the sea-level
scheme were by no means silenced. Whenever any serious difficulty
occurred in the construction of the canal on the lock principle their
voices were heard again. In fact, the conflict cannot be said to have
ended until 1909, and even then it is not certain that the sea-levellers
modified their convictions.
CHAPTER IX.
MAN AND THE GNAT.
Almost at the beginning of their great task the Americans were faced
with a problem which involved the success or failure of the whole
enterprise. I have said something about the climate and health
conditions at the isthmus. It is fairly certain that yellow fever and
malaria would have wrecked the French undertaking even if there had been
no other obstacles to its success. It is not less probable that if the
Americans had been in no better a position to wage war with these
plagues, their work at the isthmus would also have been in vain. The
French had built excellent hospitals and provided efficiently for the
comfort and recovery of those who were stricken with these diseases. But
being totally ignorant of the sources and method of transmission of
malaria and yellow fever, they could do nothing effectual in the way of
prevention and eradication. They could only take the individual victim
when they found him and do their best to cure him. They still believed
that malaria was produced by climatic conditions, by marshy emanations,
mists, and so forth. The fleecy clouds which gather round the isthmian
hills in the rainy season were given the very undeserved title of "the
white death" by the French workers at the isthmus. Yellow fever, again,
was just as mistakenly attributed to the climate, and especially to
filthy ways of living. It is not surprising that, with these
misconceptions, medical skill should have been almost useless during the
French occupation, and that the employees at the isthmus should have
died in their thousands.
But since the days of the Lesseps company, science had thrown a flood of
light on the nature of these tropical scourges and the secret of their
transmission. As these medical and scientific pioneers made a Panama
Canal possible, though their names are not directly linked with its
construction, we may look back for a few moments at their triumphs of
discovery. The credit for first discovering that malaria is not due to
poisonous emanations or contagion but is carried from people infected
with the disease by the _anopheles_ mosquito belongs to Major (now Sir)
Ronald Ross, formerly of the Indian Medical Service, who devoted himself
to this subject during the last years of the 19th century. By a series
of experiments he proved that malaria is due to the presence in the
human blood of an organism which is conveyed from person to person by
this mosquito, and that the mosquito is harmless unless it has become
infected with the germ by biting a person who has caught malaria. The
value of this discovery was soon shown by practical applications. Major
Ross was engaged by the Suez Canal Company to deal with the malaria
which had become firmly established at Ismailia, a little town of 10,000
inhabitants on that canal. No fewer than 2,500 cases had been supplied
in one year by this small population. The new methods founded on the new
discovery proved so effectual that in three years the disease was
stamped out, and there has been no relapse ever since. The same results
were achieved at Port Said.
Now, if malaria is thus caused by mosquito bite, there was some _a
priori_ reason for thinking that yellow fever might be transmitted in
the same way. At any rate the insect was again laid under a very grave
suspicion. The opportunity for studying this further question was
afforded during the Spanish-American war, when a serious outbreak
occurred among the troops occupying Havana, in Cuba. The doctors were
quite unable to deal with this most terrible of all diseases. Knowing
nothing whatever of its cause, their treatment of it could be only
experimental and casual. So a board of inquiry was formed consisting of
four army surgeons serving in Cuba--Walter Reed, James Carroll, Jesse W.
Lazear, and Aristides Agramonte. The experiments were begun in June
1900, and continued into the next year. Of these four, Dr. Agramonte was
not liable to the disease, and Dr. Reed was called away on duty to
Washington. The other two determined to experiment on their own persons
rather than risk the lives of other people.
Dr. Carroll first allowed himself to be bitten by the mosquitoes, not
the _anopheles_ but another variety known as the _stegomyia_. He fell
ill with a bad attack of yellow fever, which very nearly cost him his
life. Later, in the yellow fever hospital, Dr. Lazear deliberately
allowed a mosquito to feed on his hand. In four days he was down with
the disease in so acute a form that he died of it--a true martyr, if
ever there was, to the cause of science and the welfare of mankind.
These and other experiments proved conclusively that yellow fever, like
malaria, is transmitted by mosquito bites, but it was still uncertain
how soon after biting an infected person the mosquito becomes itself
harmful and how soon a person stricken with malaria is able to infect a
healthy mosquito. So further experiments were necessary, and volunteers
were invited to offer themselves for this service. Everybody in the army
knew what had happened to Doctors Carroll and Lazear, but in spite of
this plenty of willing martyrs appeared. The first to present themselves
were two young soldiers from Ohio, John R. Kissinger and John J. Moran.
Dr. Reed talked the matter over with them, explaining fully the danger
and suffering involved, and stating the money consideration offered by
General Wood. Both young men declared that they were prepared to
undergo the experiment, but only on condition that they should receive
no pecuniary reward. When he heard this declaration, Dr. Reed touched
his hat with profound respect, saying, "Gentlemen, I salute you!"[8]
Kissinger took the disease from the mosquito bites, and recovered. A
room was prepared for Moran, a sort of mosquito den into which fifteen
gnats, all suffering from yellow fever, had been admitted. Major Reed
describes what happened:--
At noon on the same day, five minutes after the mosquitoes
had been placed therein, a plucky Ohio boy, Moran by name,
clad only in his night-shirt and fresh from a bath, entered
the room containing the mosquitoes, where he lay down for a
period of thirty minutes. Within two minutes of Moran's
entrance he was being bitten about the face and hands by the
insects, that had promptly settled down upon him. Seven, in
all, bit him at this visit. At 4.30 p.m. the same day, he
again entered and remained twenty minutes, during which time
five others bit him. The following day, at 4.30 p.m., he
again entered and remained fifteen minutes, during which
time three insects bit him; making the number fifteen that
had fed at these three visits. On Christmas morning, at 11
a.m., this brave lad was stricken with yellow fever, and had
a sharp attack, which he bore without a murmur.
But still the demonstration was not complete. It was necessary to prove
by equally undeniable evidence that yellow fever is not conveyed by
contagion with the clothes and persons of infected people. These
experiments were even more trying and heroic than those which preceded.
A small wooden hut, 14 by 20 feet, was prepared, and into this was
stored a large amount of bedding and clothes which had been used and
worn by persons suffering from the fever. The building was carefully
guarded against the intrusion of mosquitoes, and a temperature of
seventy-six degrees, with a sufficient moisture, maintained. For twenty
consecutive days Dr. Clarke and his men went into this room, handled,
wore, and slept in the contaminated clothing, although the stench was so
offensive as to be almost appalling. They emerged from the ordeal in
perfect health, proving beyond possibility of dispute that the disease
was not contagious, and that the mosquito was the sole method of
transmission.
When distributing the credit for the new channel of world-traffic
through the isthmus of Panama, let us not forget Dr. Lazear who
sacrificed his life and the many others who cheerfully risked their
lives to establish truths and facts without which the construction and
continued operation of the canal would almost certainly have been
impossible.
One mosquito may look very much like another, but the _stegomyia_ and
the _anopheles_ differ in many important respects. The latter finds its
most favourable breeding-places in stagnant pools of fresh water, such
as are left by the heavy rains of the isthmus. It is essentially a gnat
of the country-side. The _stegomyia_, on the other hand, inclines to a
more frivolous town life. Cisterns and tanks and other receptacles for
storing water are his favourite haunts. In length of life and power of
flight the species also differ, though these details are not yet fully
ascertained. The _stegomyia_ is said to live three months. Dr. Cornish
states that it becomes dangerous only by attacking man during the first
three days of yellow fever, and that, even then, twelve days elapse
before its bite is infectious. Six days after a man has been bitten by
an infected _stegomyia_ he falls ill with yellow fever, and for the next
three days he is capable of transmitting it to the healthy mosquito. Mr.
Bishop informs us that if there is no fresh case of yellow fever within
a period of sixty days after the latest one in an epidemic, it is a safe
conclusion that the disease has been stamped out, because there is no
mosquito alive to carry the parasite. After a period of ninety days all
doubt on the subject is removed.[9] If a community, therefore, which has
thus got rid of its last case of yellow fever could be completely
isolated, yellow fever could never possibly return. It could only be
reintroduced from outside. It should be possible, with a proper system
of sanitation and quarantine, to free any district entirely from this
awful scourge.
The case of the _anopheles_ and his little contribution to human
suffering is very different. Whereas the victim of yellow fever either
dies or gets better and quickly ceases to be a source of infection to
the mosquito, the victim of malaria seldom dies of the disease, but he
remains infectious to the _anopheles_ for three years. The disease does
not simply attack new-comers or white people. Natives of the isthmus and
the West Indies are subject to it, and, indeed, seem to be in a
chronically malarious condition. It is said that 50 per cent. of the
population of the isthmus were found in 1904-5 to have the parasite of
malaria in their systems. It is difficult to estimate or imagine the
part played by this widespread malady on conditions of life and
civilization within the tropics.
Sir Ronald Ross, the greatest living authority on the subject, made some
interesting remarks in an address at the Royal Colonial Institute in
January of this year. He said:--
Nothing has been more carefully studied of recent years than
the existence of malaria amongst indigenous populations. It
often affects every one of the children, probably kills a
large proportion of the new-born infants, and renders the
survivors ill for years; only a partial immunity in adult
life relieves them of the incessant sickness. Here in Europe
nearly all our children suffer from certain
diseases--measles, scarlatina, and so on. But these maladies
are short and slight compared with the enduring infection of
malaria. When I was studying malaria in Greece in 1906, I
was struck with the impossibility of conceiving that the
people who are now intensely afflicted with malaria could be
like the ancient Greeks who did so much for the world; and I
therefore suggested the hypothesis that malaria could only
have entered Greece at about the time of the great Persian
wars. One can scarcely imagine that the physically fine race
and the magnificent athletes figured in Greek sculpture
could ever have spent a malarious and splenomegalous
childhood. And, conversely, it is difficult to imagine that
many of the malarious natives in the tropics will ever rise
to any great height of civilization while that disease
endures amongst them. I am aware that Africa has produced
some magnificent races, such as those of the Zulus and
Masai, but I have heard that the countries inhabited by them
are not nearly so disease-ridden as many of the larger
tracts. At all events, whatever may be the effect of a
malarious childhood upon the physique of adult life, its
effects on the mental development must certainly be very
bad, while the disease always paralyzes the material
prosperity of the country where it exists in an intense
form.
The isthmus of Panama was beautifully adapted to the breeding of the
_anopheles_ and the widest dissemination of malaria. In fact, the canal
zone taken over by the Americans was perhaps the most malarial strip of
territory in the world. The heavy rains leave the country covered with
those marshes and pools from which these little ghostly insects are
always rising in swarms, ready to carry the germs of disease from the
sick to the healthy and thus perpetuate and extend the domain of this
distressing malady. The reader will notice that, as the yellow fever
victim is only infectious to the mosquito for three days, while the
malarial person can convey the poison for three years, it is a much more
practical problem to eradicate yellow fever than to stamp out malaria.
It is true the causes of malaria are now fully known and the only
effective methods of propagation ascertained. If one could isolate all
malarial patients, including all who are capable of transmitting the
disease, in buildings screened with fine copper-gauze to keep out the
mosquitoes and thus gradually diminish the area of infection to
vanishing point, it would not be necessary to deal with the
breeding-places of the mosquitoes, and man and the gnat might live
together in perfect amity. But with fifty and even seventy per cent. of
the people malarially infected, such a heroic course is obviously
impossible, and one can hope only to diminish to a considerable degree
the prevalence of the disease.
The first two and a half years of the American occupation of the isthmus
was spent in looking round and preparing for the great work. It soon
became evident that the most pressing and immediate task was one of
cleaning up and sanitation. In July 1904, Colonel W. C. Gorgas, whose
name will always be associated with the triumphs won over disease at the
isthmus, became the head of the department of sanitation under the Canal
Commission. He quickly recognized that everything depended on the
efficiency and success of his own department. "The experience of our
predecessors," he wrote, "was ample to convince us that unless we could
protect our force against yellow fever and malaria we would be unable to
accomplish the work."[10] When the Americans took over, yellow fever,
though present, was quiescent, but the figures began almost at once to
mount up. In December 1904 there were six cases on the isthmus and one
death. In January 1905 there were nineteen cases and eight deaths, seven
and one respectively among the canal employees. In May there were
thirty-three cases, twenty-two on the canal, with seven deaths in all,
including three employees. In June there was an alarming advance.
Sixty-two cases occurred on the isthmus, thirty-four of them among the
employees. There were nineteen deaths, six on the canal. Something like
a panic then set in among the Americans engaged on the canal works. Many
threw up their positions, and the homeward-bound steamers were filled
with employees fleeing from this real "yellow peril." In the annual
report of the Commission for 1905 we read:--
A feeling of alarm, almost amounting to panic, spread among
the Americans on the isthmus. Many resigned their positions
to return to the United States, while those who remained
became possessed with a feeling of lethargy or fatalism,
resulting from a conviction that no remedy existed for the
peril. There was a disposition to partly ignore or openly
condemn all preventive measures. The gravity of the crisis
was apparent to all.
This loss of moral tone was the most dangerous symptom of all. A feeling
of "let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die" gained possession of
the canal workers, and in the indifference of despair many tore down the
nettings over the windows of the canal building and began to neglect all
the sanitary precautions enjoined on them by the department. Evidently a
calamity was in prospect which would have brought to an end, perhaps for
ever, American canal ambitions at the isthmus. The restoration of public
confidence and sense of responsibility seems to have been due largely to
Mr. Charles E. Magoon, governor of the canal zone. He set himself to
rebuke and remove the morbid bravado then prevailing. "He began by
frankly and publicly declaring that he, personally, was afraid of the
fever, and that in his opinion all non-immunes who professed not to be
afraid were 'talking rot!' Then he ordered all the window-screens to be
repaired and kept in place, and announced that if any man was caught
leaving them open or tearing holes in them, something uncommonly
unpleasant would happen to him. Now when a man of Judge Magoon's mental
and physical stature admits that he is afraid, any lesser man is a fool
to say he isn't; and when a man of Judge Magoon's resolution gives an
order and prescribes a penalty for its violation, that order is very
likely to be obeyed."[11]
[Illustration: _Clinedinst--Washington, D.C._
COL. WILLIAM C. GORGAS,
Medical Dept., U.S. Army, Head of the Department of Sanitation,
Ancon.]
Governor Magoon arrived at the isthmus in May 1905, just as the yellow
fever epidemic was reaching its climax. From that moment he and Colonel
Gorgas, to whom he gave the most complete support, set themselves to
fight the fever. The first thing to do was to get all the patients
within screened buildings, whether the hospital or their own homes, so
that no _stegomyia_ mosquitoes could saunter in and take the poison.
Then the towns of Colon and Panama were handed over to a campaign of
spring-cleaning such as the world has never witnessed. Then the canal
building was thoroughly fumigated with pyrethrum powder or sulphur, and
not simply the official building but every single house in the city of
Panama was similarly disinfected. Dust and refuse were everywhere burnt.
A very efficient system of inspection was adopted, and a rigid
quarantine enforced against all foreign places whence the yellow plague
could be imported into the zone.
But more important than the immediate expedients were the more
permanent sanitary improvements carried out in Colon and Panama. These
towns were repaired with brick or cement, and provided with what they
had never yet enjoyed, a proper system of drainage. Waterworks were also
constructed outside the towns, and a supply of pure water made available
for every household. Hitherto water had had to be stored during the dry
season in tanks and cisterns, in which the _stegomyia_ mosquito revelled
exceedingly. These were now no longer necessary, and stagnant water,
wherever it collected in the town, was drained away. In order to
expedite these splendid reforms, Governor Magoon withdrew the workers
from the canal and concentrated all efforts on the sewers and
waterworks. So speedily was the work carried forward that the water was
turned on for public use from the main in the Cathedral Plaza on July 4.
The results of this drastic campaign were soon apparent in the dwindling
of the yellow fever returns. In July there were still forty-two cases
and thirteen deaths on the isthmus, with twenty-seven cases and ten
deaths among the employees. August showed a great improvement, with
twenty-seven cases and nine deaths on the isthmus, and twelve cases and
only one death on the canal. The improvement continued through
September, October, November, and in December only one case was reported
on the isthmus and one on the canal. Three months having elapsed since
the last case, and, therefore, every _stegomyia_ which could possibly be
infected with malaria having departed this life, the epidemic was
entirely past and over. As I have pointed out, there cannot possibly be
any return of it under these conditions unless the infection is brought
from without. And if any new cases are at once isolated and screened
from afternoon calls of the mosquito, the outbreak may be easily and
infallibly suppressed. We may say, therefore, that the yellow spectre at
the isthmus has been shorn of all its terrors.
Malaria is, however, a very different proposition. A corresponding
crusade has been carried on for six years against the little _anopheles_
gnat, the little criminal who carries the malarial poison. His happy
breeding-grounds are in open country marshes and pools, and there is no
lack of these in the canal zone. It was impossible to deal with the
entire three-quarters of a million acres of that territory, but wherever
the canal workers were settled determined war was waged against the
mosquitoes. It should be remembered that the _anopheles_ can fly only
about a hundred or two hundred yards. The jungle was therefore cleared
away for a few hundred yards round each village and settlement, marshes
and pools in this area were drained off, and into all the ditches where
stagnant water had collected oil was poured, which so effectually turns
the mosquito's stomach that it never recovers. Some 1,200 acres of the
zone were thus treated, and of course the regulations as to
house-screening applied to malaria no less than to yellow fever. The
employees were also supplied freely and generously with quinine.
The result has been not the eradication of malaria, but the reduction of
the cases to about one-third the number at which they stood in 1906. Yet
even so, among the 40,000 employees on the canal during the year ending
June 30, 1912, there were 7,000 malaria cases in the hospitals, with 32
deaths, 22 of these being white people. The heavy rainfalls at the
isthmus will probably prevent the complete sanitation of the country in
this respect, for the simple reason that the destruction of the
_anopheles_ mosquito or the eradication of the malarial germ can never
be complete. There will always be people going about with the malarial
organism in their blood, and always _anopheles_ mosquitoes ready to
become infected with it and to carry the infection about. But, as we
have seen, much can be done by the means described to reduce the ravages
of the disease. In 1906, out of a working force of 26,000, there were
21,739 cases of malaria. We have seen how this figure had been brought
down in 1912. In 1906 it was almost certain that any white person coming
to reside at the isthmus would catch malaria. Now it is quite possible
to live there in perfect health, quite free from any malarial infection.
It may be useful to mention that the entire death-roll among the
employees on the Panama Canal and railway from the American occupation
down to June 30, 1912--that is, about eight years--was 5,141, of whom
284 were Americans. Of this total, 4,119 died of disease and 1,022 from
violence or accident. During the same period 49 American women and 87
American children died.[12] Sir Ronald Ross, as I have said, was told by
the British Consul at Panama in 1904 that the French lost in the nine
years of their occupancy some 50,000 lives, principally from malaria and
yellow fever. This may be an over-estimate, but there is no doubt that
the American figure shows an enormous improvement on the French.
It is easy to conclude that what has been done in sanitation at the
isthmus of Panama may be done anywhere else in the tropics, where
malaria and yellow fever prevail. That may be true, but we must also
remember that the work of Panama had behind it all the wealth and
resources of a mighty republic of 90,000,000 citizens. The expenditure
on these hygienic purposes at the isthmus has been enormous, though not
a penny has been wasted. Down to the end of December, 1912, the total
outlay of the Department of Sanitation was $15,500,000. Waterworks,
sewers, etc., accounted for another $2,500,000, so that we get a grand
total expenditure on sanitation of $18,000,000. This will certainly rise
to $20,000,000 before the canal is finished, so that for the ten and a
half years of its construction there will have been an annual
expenditure for all health purposes of $1,900,000. It is not likely that
there will be many tropical areas of this kind with so large a sum
available for the luxury of scientific sanitation. Again, it must be
noticed that the administration had special advantages at the isthmus.
It exercised something like military authority. It had absolute powers
of deportation, and could enforce its regulations as it pleased. And in
considering the statistics it must also be borne in mind that not only
the physical but the moral and mental health of the work-people at the
isthmus was promoted in every way. We shall look into the life of the
Panama construction camps in the next chapter. The social interest and
amusement provided for the employee must have counted for something
beside the sewering and screening and mosquito-hunting. All the same,
the success achieved at Panama is full of hope and promise for tropical
life in the future. Colonel Gorgas writes encouragingly:--
I think the sanitarian can now show that any population
coming into the tropics can protect itself against these two
diseases (malaria and yellow fever) by measures that are
both simple and inexpensive; that with these two diseases
eliminated life in the tropics for the Anglo-Saxon will be
more healthful than in the temperate zones; that gradually,
within the next two or three centuries, tropical countries,
which offer a much greater return for man's labour than do
the temperate zones, will be settled up by the white races,
and that again the centres of wealth, civilization, and
population will be in the tropics, as they were in the dawn
of man's history, rather than in the temperate zone, as at
present.
Apart from the question of disease, it is far from certain that the
white man can ever remain as "fit," as capable of bodily labour, in
equatorial regions as in his native temperate conditions, or that his
descendants will also maintain the same standard of health and strength.
Ordinary non-professional opinion would perhaps discount Colonel
Gorgas's forecast as a little too optimistic.
FOOTNOTES:
[8] "Sanitation of the Isthmus." Mr. J. B. Bishop in _Scribner's
Monthly_, February 1913.
[9] _Scribner's Monthly_, February 1913, p. 248.
[10] _Journal American Medical Association_, July 6, 1907.
[11] "Four Centuries of the Panama Canal."
[12] See _Scribner's Magazine_, February 1913, p. 251.
CHAPTER X.
LIFE AT THE ISTHMUS.
Before we go on to describe the canal and its method of construction, we
must look at the sort of social life and civil administration which has
prevailed since the Americans arrived. Construction camps in tropical
climes are not usually distinguished for order and good morals. The
Americans determined to make an exception at Panama. They had a
perfectly free hand and the enjoyment of all sovereign rights at the
isthmus, and were able to construct a brand-new little state on the most
approved and ideal principles. We have seen what instructions were given
by President Roosevelt to the first commission. An entire administrative
system had to be established within this little plot 10 miles wide and
50 long. Laws had to be framed and civil government established, with
all the needful accessories of judicial courts, police force,
fire-brigades, customs and revenue service, post-offices, public works
and financial department. The administration carried what is known as
"paternalism" to all lengths. That is, it did all the catering and
providing itself, and left little or nothing to private companies. Of
course, everything had to be imported, for the little territory itself
produced nothing. Whole villages and settlements with all the
accessories of social life had to be built along the line of works. Over
2,000 structures, including offices, hospitals, hotels, messes,
kitchens, shops, storehouses, and living quarters, were constructed, and
more than 1,500 buildings taken over from the French, which were made
available by necessary repairs.
Colonel Goethals gives us a brief insight into the work of the
Commissary Department of the Panama Railroad:--
The Commissary Department of the Panama Railroad Company was
enlarged until it is now [1911] a great department store,
supplying to the employees whatever may be necessary for
their comfort and convenience. Manufacturing, cold-storage,
and laundry plants were established, and turn out each day
about 90 tons of ice, 14,000 loaves of bread, 2,400 rolls,
250 gallons of ice-cream, 1,000 pounds of roasted coffee,
and 7,500 pieces of laundry. Four or five refrigerator cars,
loaded with meats, vegetables, and such fruits as can be
obtained, are sent out on the night freight to distant
points, and every morning a supply train of about 16 cars,
of which number six to eight are refrigerator cars, leaves
Cristobal at 4.30 to distribute foodstuffs and laundry to
the local commissaries along the line, where the employees
make their purchases, and where the hotels, messes, and
kitchens secure their supplies for the day.
A graphic and representative picture of one of the construction
settlements along the canal was given by the correspondent of _The
Times_ at Panama.[13] He chose "Emperador," or "Empire," as the typical
village. This is the headquarters of the central division of the
construction work, and is situated about halfway along the great
Culebra Cut. The correspondent writes:--
According to the census just completed, it contains 7,152
inhabitants, of whom 1,757 are whites, 3,701 negroes, 1,569
mestizos, 101 Chinese, and 24 East Indians. North of the
main street is a section called the "native town,"
apparently because it is inhabited by natives of other
countries than Panama, but really because here was situated
the native hamlet alongside which the French built their
construction camp in 1881. It is occupied by the part of the
population not employed by the government, and here are the
American saloons, the Spanish _cantinas_ and restaurants,
Chinese shops, East Indian fancy-work shops, and negro
tailoring and shoemaking places. On the south side of the
American settlement are the labour "camps," consisting of
barracks and eating-places. All the buildings are of wood,
constructed to last not over ten years; and none are large,
excepting the administration buildings and the club-house.
On three sides of the village are the huts of the labourers
who prefer the half-jungle life with its freedom; and here,
with discomfort and squalor and liberty, is the only
picturesque part of the settlement; all else is orderly, of
one pattern, almost smug. On the fourth side the village is
limited by the canal itself.
In the centre of the village is the commissariat, where the
canal and railroad workers buy their food and clothing. Here
congregate every morning the housewives of the village to do
their shopping, and at night, after work, the men, to
complete the family purchases. There is a similar store in
each canal village--eighteen in all. The commissariat does
away with the middleman's profit and buys in such large
quantities, and for cash, that it obtains the lowest prices,
while the many ways in which the materials purchased can be
used prevent waste. If there is cause for complaint on the
part of any class in the canal workers, that class is the
bachelors, for they are discriminated against in the matter
of quarters. But good provision is made for their meals, at
the so-called "hotels" for the white employees, and the
messes and kitchens for Spanish and negro labourers.
Another remarkable evidence of how the canal administration stands _in
loco parentis_ to all its work-people is that it has provided twenty-six
churches and maintains fifteen ministers of religion. This is
interesting because it shows how the state, when conducted on
common-sense principles, may provide for religious instruction without
causing any offence or inflicting any injustice. The administration
treated all denominations with perfect impartiality. Of the fifteen
ministers it supported, four were Episcopalian, four Baptist, three
Roman Catholic, one Wesleyan, and one Presbyterian. But this was not the
entire provision of churches and chapels on the isthmus. There were
fourteen other churches not under direct government control, but
assisted by the government in many ways. Of the forty in all, thirteen
were Episcopalian, seven Baptist, seven Roman Catholic, two Wesleyan,
and eight undenominational.
As I have pointed out, the moral sanitation of the isthmus was cared for
as well as the physical. For example, in September 1905, a man living in
the canal zone was charged with running a roulette table. He pleaded
that he owned a concession from the Republic of Panama. That excuse was
not allowed, and he was sentenced to fine and imprisonment for
transgressing one of the canal zone laws. Gambling, which had always
been one of the Panamanian vices, was quite forbidden within the zone.
Remembering the descriptions given of the state of morals at the isthmus
during the French occupation, one cannot help being struck with the
contrast afforded by the American regime. Criticisms of the canal
scheme, of climatic and social conditions in the zone, appeared in the
early days from time to time. Mr. Johnson quotes an example which is so
amusing as to bear repetition:--
A land as feverish to the imagination as to the body is
Panama. It is a land making a fitting environment to the
deeds of conspiracy, piracy, loot, cruelty, and blood that
have principally made its history for centuries. This
gloomy, God-forsaken isthmus is a nightmare region. One
descriptive writer has truly said of it that it is a land
where the flowers have no odour, the birds no song; where
the men are without honour and the women without virtue. He
is not far wrong. The birds, brilliant as is their plumage,
have no musical notes. The dense forests teem with
bright-hued parrots, parroquets, and other birds, which
squeak and scream but do not sing. There are beautiful
orchids to be found in the swamps and jungles--fair to look
upon, but they have no odour. The oranges have green skins
instead of golden, the plantains must be fried to make them
fit to eat, the reptiles and insects are often venomous, and
myriads of parasites are ever ready to invade the human body
and bring disease and death. In the atmosphere itself is
something suggestive of the days of the old pirates and
their fiendish cruelties and orgies. There is no life in the
air; it is depressing, damp, miasmatic, and intensely hot.
For a great part of the year thunder-showers succeed each
other all day long and half the night, with sheet lightning
all around the horizon after dark. There is practically no
twilight, day passing almost instantly into night. It is no
wonder that this uncanny land has made its residents
degenerate into plotters, revolutionists, murderers, and
thieves. Its aspect is one of darkness, treachery, and
curse.
President Roosevelt had something to say on these recurring criticisms
in a message to Congress in January 1906. He wrote:--
From time to time various publications have been made, and
from time to time in the future various similar
publications, doubtless, will be made, purporting to give an
account of jobbing or immorality or inefficiency or misery
as obtaining on the isthmus. I have carefully examined into
each of these accusations which seemed worthy of attention.
In every instance the accusations have proved to be without
foundation in any shape or form. They spring from several
sources. Sometimes they take the shape of statements by
irresponsible investigators of a sensational habit of mind,
incapable of observing or repeating with accuracy what they
see, and desirous of obtaining notoriety by widespread
slander. More often they originate with or are given
currency by individuals with a personal grievance. The
sensation mongers, both those who stay at home and those who
visit the isthmus, may ground their accusations on false
statements by some engineer who, having applied for service
on the commission and been refused such service, now
endeavours to discredit his successful competitors, or by
some lessee or owner of real estate who has sought action or
inaction by the commission to increase the value of his
lots, and is bitter because the commission cannot be used
for such purposes, or on the tales of disappointed bidders
for contracts, or of office-holders who have proved
incompetent, or who have been suspected of corruption and
dismissed, or who have been overcome by panic and have fled
from the isthmus. Every specific charge relating to jobbery,
to immorality, or to inefficiency, from whatever source it
has come, has been immediately investigated, and in no
single instance have the statements of these sensation
mongers and the interested complainants behind them proved
true. The only discredit adhering to these false accusations
is to those who originate and give them currency, and who,
to the extent of their abilities, thereby hamper and
obstruct the completion of the great work in which both the
honour and the interest of America are so deeply involved.
It matters not whether those guilty of these false
accusations utter them in mere wanton recklessness and
folly, or in a spirit of sinister malice to gratify some
personal or political grudge.
The soundness and purity of the canal zone administration has long ago
been established beyond all question and cavil. The Americans have given
an example to the world how a great work of this kind, involving the
gathering together of a large multitude of workers from many races and
nations, may be carried on without those moral and physical evils which
have marked too many enterprises of the kind. In fact, the way in which
the Americans have arranged and controlled the life of the canal zone
stands quite as much to their credit as the skill and determination they
have shown in the actual construction of the canal.
But we have said nothing yet about the workers themselves on the canal.
The Americans, on taking over the work from the French, found about 700
West Indian negroes engaged in excavating the Culebra Cut. From this
contingent as a nucleus a much larger army of workers was built up. The
numbers rapidly grew. In December 1905 there were 5,000 employees; in
1906, 24,000; in 1908, 31,000; the highest figure being reached in 1910,
when there were 50,000 workers available for duty. Of the employees,
speaking roughly, one-seventh have been white Americans, all, of course,
skilled workers, one-seventh European labourers, and five-sevenths West
Indian negroes. The British West Indies, especially Barbados, have
continued to be the main source of labour supply. But the West Indian at
the outset left a great deal to be desired in his work and efficiency.
In 1905 complaints were made on the subject by the chairman of the
canal commission to the President of the United States. In 1906 the
chief engineer reported:--
The criticisms of the character of the common labour which
were made in last year's report still hold good. Our labour
consists almost entirely of West Indian negroes, and their
efficiency is very low, although we have a few of this class
who are fairly steady workers--by this it is meant that they
average to work all the time, but the great body of them do
not. The majority work just long enough to get money to
supply their actual bodily necessities, with the result
that, while we are quartering and caring for twenty odd
thousand of these people, our daily effective force is many
thousands less. Preliminary steps have been taken toward
securing a large number of Spanish labourers direct from the
north-west provinces of Spain, also for the securing of a
trial shipment of Cantonese Chinese, as it is believed that
the introduction of labourers of different nationalities
will be beneficial.
The Chinese project was frustrated through the influence of trade unions
in the United States, backed up by representations from the Pacific
coast states. The West Indian labourer quickly began to earn a better
report. It was found that his inefficiency was largely due to
insufficient and improper food. He speedily improved when turned on to
the generous and nourishing diet provided in the zone. In order to be
certain that he had the full advantage of the provided meals, the price
of them was very wisely deducted from his wages. Moreover, the American
foremen soon began to learn that the men from Barbados, Trinidad, and
elsewhere were British subjects and could not be treated as though they
were southern state "coons." With a better understanding and more
sympathetic treatment of the black employees, much more work was got out
of them, and a good deal of the credit for the building of the Panama
Canal is due to the 30,000 workers[14] who have been recruited mainly
from the British islands in the West Indies.
But the southern European contingent has been found to be excellent
material. It was thought that the work-people of Spain, Italy, and
Greece would take more easily to navvying work in the tropics than
people from more northerly regions of the temperate zone. The results
were, on the whole, satisfactory. The Greeks were, it is true, not equal
to the Italians or the Spaniards, and very few of them were recruited
for canal work. The Italians, also, though several thousands of them
were engaged, proved rather hard to handle. They were bitten with
collectivist ideas, and inclined to act on trade union lines. The
Spaniard was, in every way, the most satisfactory workman introduced
from Europe. He was taken in an unsophisticated state directly from his
village in Galicia or Castile. He was tractable and orderly, and quick
and ready to learn. Hard labour under the tropical sun and in the hot
damp of the isthmus seemed to have no exhausting or enervating influence
whatever upon him. The Spaniard shows no sign of settling down on the
isthmus. He either goes home with his savings or on to railway work in
Brazil. Some 9,000 have been directly recruited, but this number does
not include all the Spanish labourers whose muscle has helped to the
completion of this great work.
A word or two should be said about the wages earned on the canal. The
West Indian recruit was offered 6-1/2d. an hour for common labour and an
eight-hour day, in addition to free quarters, medical care, and
repatriation. Meals were supplied to him at the rate of 1s. 2-1/2d. per
day. Later the pay of all not under contract was reduced to 5d. per
hour, and the price of the three meals to 1s. 1-1/2d. Negro artisans,
such as carpenters, masons, blacksmiths and others, of whom there were
some 5,000 employed in connection with the canal works, received pay
varying from 8d. to 22d. per hour. There were in 1912 4,400 negro
artisans receiving 8d. an hour or more, while 400 received 1s. an hour,
and the work was constant.
The European labourer, in addition to free quarters, received $1.60 per
eight-hour day, and more for overtime work. He was charged 40 cents a
day for his three meals, which left him a minimum net wage per day of
$1.20, or a little less than thirty shillings a week. Many, however,
received more, and a good number of Spanish work-people must have gone
home with a nice little nest-egg in their pockets.
The skilled labour was done almost entirely by United States employees,
though the "gold roll," as it was called, included at first some
Europeans. The pay was excellent, the social life, with its gymnasia,
billiard-rooms, concerts and so forth, attractive, and the commissariat,
with its three good meals at a fixed charge, quite up to the standard of
a good hotel. The billets on the isthmus were therefore popular, and
about 7,000 Americans on an average have been in employment there.
As I have pointed out, the responsibility for the construction of the
canal was vested in the President of the United States, who acted
through an executive commission resident in the canal zone. The work was
organized in a large number of departments, each responsible for a big
task. These were excavation and dredging; locks and dams; machinery and
buildings (also responsible for paving and other improvements in Colon
and Panama); labour, subsistence, and quarters; material and supplies;
sanitation (responsible also for hygiene in Panama and Colon, which
towns are technically outside the zone); civil administration; the
Panama railroad. There were also some smaller divisions, such as
accounts and an office of a purchasing officer in Washington, nearly all
the supplies for the canal being obtained in the United States. It
should be added that the Republic of Panama is responsible for the
policing of the two big towns, but the department of civil
administration of the Panama Canal Commission employed 200 police, 88 of
which were native West Indians.
This busy hive of labour will soon present a very different aspect. With
the approach of the canal to completion the numbers of the workmen will
gradually be reduced. A drastic process of sifting and selection will be
carried out among the Americans employed on the works. Only about 2,500
men will be necessary to operate the canal, when it is in full working
order. These will be established at the locks and other important
points. In fact, the canal authorities recommend a complete depopulation
of the isthmus except, of course, the terminal cities and the operating
stations on the canal. Otherwise, they think, a large expense for
sanitation will be necessary which might thus be avoided. But the
question of defence must not be forgotten. It will certainly be found
advisable to maintain a pretty large American garrison at the isthmus,
and to the population we have mentioned perhaps even 8,000 American
troops must be added. The busy scenes still prevailing in the canal zone
will now soon have disappeared like a dream, and the future traveller
who looks from the ship-rail over the shining waters of Gatun Lake or
beyond to the vast and silent tropical forest will have difficulty in
reconstructing the spectacle which the narrow lands presented during the
ten strenuous years of construction.
FOOTNOTES:
[13] _The Times_, September 26, 1912.
[14] This is the figure of official recruiting. Very many more came to
the isthmus of their own accord.
CHAPTER XI.
THE PROBLEM OF CONSTRUCTION.
We may now begin to consider the canal itself, the problems which its
designers had to solve, the methods of construction, and the features of
the completed work. As we have seen, the first two and a half years were
a time mainly of preparation for the titanic enterprise of excavation
and construction. In fact, it might have been better if the work during
that period had been entirely restricted to scavenging, sewering, and so
forth. The labourers were hurried a little too fast to the isthmus,
before the isthmus was properly cleaned up to receive them. Hence the
yellow fever panic and difficulties which might have been avoided. The
people of the United States were responsible for this over-haste at the
start. The great thing, they cried, is to "make the dirt fly." They
wanted evidence that the steam-navvies were actually at work in the bed
of the canal and that the task was well in hand. In fact, the public at
home took an interest in the canal operations which was sometimes
embarrassing. Some newspaper man at the isthmus would report an accident
or unforeseen difficulty, probably with a good deal of exaggeration, an
anxious excitement sprang up among the people, and special commissions
had to go to the isthmus in order to investigate the true state of
affairs and if possible restore confidence at home.
As the reader knows, the Americans had no clean slate on which to write
at Panama. They succeeded two French companies which had been at work
for twenty years. True, the New Panama Canal Company which succeeded the
Lesseps Company had not greatly perspired over the undertaking. It had
kept a certain amount of work going, chiefly in order to maintain its
concession. All the same, the French had ploughed a pretty deep furrow
between Colon and Panama, and much of the work they had done was
fortunately available whichever type of canal should be adopted,
high-level or tide-level. They had carried out a good deal of dredging
for the channel through the tidal flats at either end of the canal, and
they had made a very visible impression on the "continental divide" at
what is known as the Culebra Cut. Altogether the French companies
excavated 81,548,000 cubic yards. The Americans inherited from their
predecessors a large amount of machinery and tools, in addition to a
great deal of work well done. Much of the machinery, even of the Lesseps
Company, was found to be in serviceable condition, and operations could
be continued with it, though the extent and efficiency of the plant was,
of course, as time went on, greatly increased.
The main problem which the American engineers had to solve was how to
deal with the Chagres River. On the tide-level scheme, that violent and
capricious stream, which in the rainy season was navigable for half its
length of 100 miles, would have had to be diverted into another channel
or ponded back in its upper waters by a high dam at Gamboa, some of the
overflow of which might perhaps have been permitted to pass into the
canal. But, as we have seen, the Chagres would have to be utilized and
at the same time controlled if the high-level plan was adopted. A river
which is capable of rising 35-1/2 feet in twenty-four hours needed a
great deal of regulation and discipline before it could be used as the
feeder of the upper reaches of a lock canal. The only way to do this was
to diffuse its waters over a vast artificial lake which it would keep
full, but in which its floods and current would be effectually tamed.
This could only be done by a huge dam intercepting the course of the
river in its lower reaches, at some point before it entered the
Caribbean Sea. When the New Panama Canal Company changed its plans and
decided for an elevated waterway, it was intended to construct such a
barrier at Bohio, a point much higher up stream than Gatun, the site
ultimately chosen by the American engineers. The Isthmian Canal
Commission which reported in 1901, also arranged for a dam at Bohio to
control the Chagres River. On this plan the river would have been
intercepted much higher up, and the artificial lake would have been much
smaller. But when the Americans finally decided on the high-level type
in 1906, the site of the proposed dam was shifted from Bohio to Gatun,
nearer the river's mouth, which involved the inundation of a much vaster
area of country. This position for the dam was first suggested by a
French engineer, Godin de Lepinay, who, in a paper read before the
congress of engineers in Paris in 1879, advocated a lock canal with a
dam controlling the Chagres River at Gatun. This, then, was the biggest
problem peculiar to the high-level scheme, for the cutting through the
"continental divide," though an even more titanic labour, would have had
to be accomplished whatever type of canal had been adopted.
No feature of the construction has been subject to so much criticism and
anxious solicitude as this Gatun dyke. On it depends the maintenance of
Gatun Lake and the supply of water for the canal. If the dam fails,
everything fails. The real cause of the difficulty was the foundation
upon which this big artificial hill had to be laid. The great dam at
Assouan in Egypt is based upon the eternal granite, upon which masonry
of natural stone is built. It is, therefore, part and parcel of the
solid framework of our planet, and will probably last as long. The Gatun
dam is, however, founded upon the alluvial deposits of the Chagres
River. This alluvium consists of gravel firmly cemented with mud and
clay, and is unquestionably water-tight. These deposits go down in
places to a depth of 280 feet before the solid rock is reached. The dam
had, therefore, to be laid down on the top of them.
Now this foundation, though water-tight, is soft. It would have been
impossible to place upon it a massive structure of rock or concrete. The
deposits would have given way under its weight. The only plan was to
dump down in the valley an earthen dam, making it very broad so as to
distribute the weight over as large a space as possible of the alluvium
underneath. A steep slope would have been impossible, for the weight of
the central portion would have pushed the clay and gravel outwards, and
the whole mass would have subsided. The earth-dam was to block the
valley through which the Chagres had hitherto flowed uninterruptedly to
the sea. This valley is a mile and a half wide, and this is, therefore,
the length of the dam. Its base is 2,100 feet wide. It is 398 feet
through at the surface of the water, 100 feet wide at the top, and was
to be 115 feet above sea-level. The last figure has, it seems, been
brought down to 104 feet, which will be an advantage, as the weight upon
the foundations will be proportionately less.
In the middle of the dam the level of the lake is controlled by a
channel called the "spillway," with walls and floor of concrete, by
which the surplus waters will be sluiced off into the old bed of the
Chagres River and so passed on to the sea. The entrance to this channel
is closed with falling gates or doors. This safety-valve will no doubt
be capable of dealing with the biggest and quickest rise of the
lake-level that is ever likely to take place. It can pass off 137,000
cubic feet of water a second, the water issuing at a speed of 35 feet a
second. But, to complete the security, the big culverts of the mighty
Gatun locks close by can be turned open, and 170,000 cubic feet a second
carried off there. Indeed, as regards the Gatun Lake the anxiety, if
there be any, is that the water-supply will be insufficient rather than
dangerously excessive.
The level of the lake is to be kept at 85 feet above mean
sea-level--that is, the dam, or a considerable length of it, will be
exposed to what is called a "head" of water of 85 feet. The lake itself
will be 164 square miles in extent. There have been many rational
anxieties on the sufficiency of the dam. A certain American senator,
however, who visited the works during the construction, worried himself
rather unnecessarily on this last figure. Colonel Goethals was showing a
congressional delegation round the works, and in the course of the
survey they came to the dam with the broad expanse of water behind it.
"Colonel," he said, "how is it that so small a body of earth as the
Gatun dam can hold in check such a tremendous body of water as the Gatun
Lake?" The chief engineer explained that the pressure of a body of water
is determined by its height and not by its volume. The inquirer seems
not to have been satisfied with the statement of this hydrostatic law.
Senator Knox, afterwards Secretary of State, then came to his aid.
"Senator," he said, "if your theory were true, how could the dykes of
Holland hold in check the Atlantic Ocean?" This was a clincher, and the
sceptic joined in the laugh at his own expense.
All the same, the Gatun dam has two extremely responsible and heavy
duties to perform. It has to withstand the horizontal thrust of a head
of 85 feet of water so as not to be carried bodily down the Chagres bed
into the Atlantic. And it has to block up the valley so effectually that
the water of the lake shall not percolate through at any point. There is
every reason to believe that, in spite of all alarums and excursions
during its construction, it will fulfil both these requirements. Its
composition and construction may be briefly described. Two bulwarks of
big rocky fragments were built up on either outer line or "toe" of the
structure. This rough material was obtained from the lock site, or
Mindi, or the Culebra Cut twenty-six miles away. The area between these
piles is filled with silt, and water pumped into it by hydraulic dredges
from the Chagres valley. The surplus water is carried off through pipes.
The sodden silt remains and is packed down and consolidated by
atmospheric pressure. Such a "hydraulic fill" is impervious to water,
the thrust or "head" of which is very quickly lost in the minute
interstices or pores of the material. It will be seen how such a
structure differs from a dam of concrete or stone masonry. It is
porous, while at the same time impervious to water.
The future traveller through the Panama Canal will probably never guess
the immensity of the labour that has gone to the building of the Gatun
dam. Already, indeed, it looks so much like a part of the natural
landscape that it might well escape special observation altogether. Yet
nothing less than 21,145,931 cubic yards of material were laid
down--enough to make a wall of earth three feet high and three feet
thick reaching nearly halfway round the world. The spillway itself
contains 225,485 cubic yards of concrete.
It will be noticed that in the dam proper there is no core of masonry or
puddled chalk or clay whatever. It was at one time intended that there
should be. I have alluded to the alarmist rumours that were raised again
and again at Panama and created much uneasiness in the United States.
These were especially concerned with the great dam, and that word must
have frequently been on the lips of the engineers in more than one
significance. Every possible test was applied to determine the exact
character of the underlying materials, to ascertain whether there was
any connection between the swamp areas to the north and south through
the deposits in the gorges which the earthwork was to bridge, to prove
the ability of the material below to support the structure, and to find
out whether suitable material for the dam could be found in its
neighbourhood. "As the result of all these investigations," wrote
Colonel Goethals,[15] "it may be briefly stated that the underlying
material is impervious to water; that it possesses ample strength to
uphold the structure that will be placed upon it, and, the subsoil being
impervious, that there is no connection between the swamps above and the
sea below."
In order to make assurance doubly sure, Colonel Goethals planned the dam
so as to include triple interlocking steel sheet-piling across the
valley, driven down to bedrock, and decided to carry the dam to a height
of 135 feet. Even so, the news of a collapse was wired home, and this so
impressed President Roosevelt that he sent a commission of engineers to
the isthmus accompanied by President-elect Taft. The investigations had
a different result from what had been expected. Instead of being
dissatisfied with the size and strength of the dam, the engineers
declared that it was being built too high and that the steel piling was
unnecessary. It must be admitted, therefore, that the efficiency of the
Gatun dam has been subjected to the most rigorous tests, and that no
further anxiety on the subject need be felt.
With the blocking of the Chagres outlet at Gatun, the waters of the lake
have gradually accumulated until they cover an area of 164 square miles.
Not only the Chagres itself but its tributaries, the Trinidad and
others, are thus ponded back. The reservoir extends up a number of long
and winding arms, and is thus very irregular in shape. The bed of the
channel itself was cleared of brushwood and trees, but the rest of the
valley was thickly overgrown. As the waters rose, therefore, and
gradually submerged this primeval forest, a rather dismal spectacle was
presented of decay and destruction. The lake has, indeed, completely
altered the aspect of the country. Villages and even small towns, whose
names had come down from the days of the old navigators, lie buried for
ever beneath the waters of Lake Gatun. Even now the great expanse of
water with its wooded islands looks like a natural feature of the
landscape rather than yesterday's creation of engineering enterprise.
The vessels in transit will, of course, keep to the dredged and buoyed
channel, but the channel will itself be invisible, and the traveller,
after tossing on the restless Caribbean Sea, will enjoy the full
sensation of a cruise over a landlocked fjord or lake. Lake Gatun is
indeed twice the size of Lago Maggiore and four-fifths the size of Lake
Geneva. The journey from Gatun to Bas Obispo, where the waterway again
assumes the appearance of a canal and enters the Culebra gorge, is 22
miles, but the same 85-foot level is maintained right to the locks at
Pedro Miguel, where the waters of Lake Gatun are again retained by a dam
connecting the walls of the lock with a hill to the west. The rest of
the lake is held in by the natural configuration of the country, the
only outlets being at the Gatun spillway and, of course, through the
locks.
But we must not overlook the main purpose of the lake, which is to
supply the water for the canal and the lockages. For this purpose
everything, of course, depends on the rainfall at the isthmus, and the
question arises whether this may be relied upon to replenish the canal
with the needful water-supply. Colonel Goethals estimates that in an
average dry season 58 "lockages," or transits of the canal, per day
would be possible, which is a greater number than the twenty-four hours
of the day would permit, allowing vessels to follow each other at
intervals of one hour. Happily, a resource is still left if the supply
of water should show signs of proving insufficient. At Alhajuela, on the
Chagres River, some nine or ten miles above Obispo, there is an
excellent site for a dam, forming a reservoir where some of the surplus
water of the rainy season could be stored and supplied to the canal as
required in the dry months. Details of the construction of such a dam
were prepared in connection with a former canal-scheme, and would be
available in case of need.
FOOTNOTES:
[15] _The National Geographic Magazine_, February 1911.
CHAPTER XII.
THE CULEBRA CUT.
The most famous section of work on the canal has been that at the
vertebra or "continental divide," which runs along the isthmus on the
Pacific side and had to be pierced through by any canal running from
Colon to Panama. This tremendous work, known as the "Culebra Cut," from
the name of one of the hills, extends for nine miles from Bas Obispo to
Pedro Miguel. Mr. Bryce has truly said, referring to this section, that
"never before on our planet have so much labour, so much scientific
knowledge, and so much executive skill been concentrated on a work
designed to bring the nations nearer to one another and serve the
interests of all mankind."[16] The bottom of the canal in the cut, as in
the channel through Lake Gatun, is 40 feet above sea-level. The highest
elevation of the original surface of the ground above the centre line of
the canal was 312 feet above sea-level, so that the total excavation
along this saddle was 312 minus 40, or 272 feet. This was, however, not
actually the highest point of excavation. Gold Hill, close to the canal
line, is 534 feet above sea-level, and from the top of this hill a new
and steeper slope had to be made. The surface of the water is 85 feet
above sea-level, and so is 227 feet below the original saddle at its
highest elevation. We have already noticed that a tide-level canal would
have involved an excavation 85 feet deeper, and the width of the cutting
would have had to be immensely wider. The slides and breaks which have
rendered the American excavation so much more difficult lead one to
suppose that the tide-level cutting might have proved impracticable.
All the work at Culebra performed by the French was available for their
successors. The French companies accounted for 18,646,000 cubic yards of
material on this section. They had already cut down 152 feet below the
original surface at its highest elevation, and the cliff they had cut
in the face of Gold Hill was 374 feet in vertical height. It is well to
mention such figures, as some people imagine that the French wasted all
their time and resources at Panama. It may be added that the bottom
width of the channel adopted by the French engineers was 74 feet,
whereas that of the American canal will be 300 feet.
Many descriptions have been given by visitors of the spectacle presented
in this long and deep gash through the mountains during the progress of
the excavations. From these and the numerous photographs taken at that
stage the traveller will be able to reconstruct the scene--the two
hundred miles of railroad construction track, laid down tier above tier
at different levels; the thousands of men busily at work; the roar and
smoke of the dynamite tearing the rock into fragments; the mighty
steam-shovels like great dragons burying their iron teeth in the surface
of the bank, engulfing a huge mouthful, then swinging round and belching
it all into the dirt trucks, to be carried off to the dumping-ground at
Gatun near the Atlantic or Balboa at the Pacific end of the canal. At
Culebra, Colonel Goethals made the "dirt fly" to the full satisfaction
of public opinion in the United States. All sorts of devices and
machinery were employed to hasten and economize the process. For
example, there was the Ledgerwood Unloader. Railway trucks provided with
flaps were used, these flaps making a single platform of the whole
train. At the rear of the train was a plough which could be drawn by a
wire rope attached to a drum carried on a special car in the fore part
of the train. When the train arrived at the dumping-ground the drum was
started, and the plough, advancing from the rear, swept the 320 cubic
yards and rock from the sixteen cars in seven minutes. Then there was a
"track-shifter," invented by an employee on the isthmus, which lifted
and relaid the railway lines as the spoil-tracks had to be shifted. This
powerful engine raised the track and ties clear of the ground and
deposited them from three to nine feet sideways.
The "spoil trains" were treated with all the respect which is accorded
to the fastest mail trains of the day on an English main line. They
followed one another from the cutting at intervals of three minutes, and
any delay, of course, balked the mammoth steam-shovel of its gluttonous
meal on the stones and rubble of the mountain-side. Any cause of delay
was at once reported by telephone to the superintendent of
transportation at Empire, and the obstruction was immediately dealt
with. By this persistent concentration on the main object the dirt has
been made to fly not only more speedily but more cheaply.
One of the most serious causes of anxiety and difficulty along the canal
line were the "slides" and "breaks" which kept occurring in the Culebra
Cut. To use a condensed Americanism, the sides would not "stay put."
Large masses of material would slide or move from the banks into the
excavated area, closing off the drainage, upsetting the steam-shovels,
and tearing up the tracks. A very unpleasant phenomenon was the lifting
of the shovels in the bottom of the canal due to the bulgings of the
earth there. It is not necessary to enter into the distinction between
"slides" and "breaks," or into the learned disquisitions that have been
written about them. It is sufficient for us to note that they added
immensely to the amount of material which had to be got out of the
Culebra gorge. Colonel Goethals tells us that of the 14,325,876 cubic
yards removed during the year 1909, 884,530 cubic yards, or 6 per cent.,
were due to slides; that in 1910 of 14,921,750 cubic yards removed,
2,649,000, or 18 per cent., came from slides or breaks that had
previously existed or that had developed during the year.
It might have been imagined that these discouraging additions to the
work would have seriously delayed progress on the canal and put forward
the date of its completion. But able and economic organization triumphed
over all these lets and hindrances. At the beginning of the American
excavations the engineers estimated that 103 million cubic yards of
"dirt" had still to be removed
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