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The Evidence in the Case

by James M. Beck · English · public domain in the US

  • Language English
  • PG edition 2010
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    The Evidence in the Case by James M. Beck is an English public-domain text held from Project Gutenberg (ebook #31457). A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic Records of England, Germany, Russia, France, Austria, Italy and Belgium.

    "EVERY INCH A KING"

    Justum, et tenacem propositi virum Non civium ardor prava jubentium, Non vultus instantis tyranni, Mente quatit solida, neque Auster

    Dux inquieti turbidus Adriæ, Nec fulminantis magna manus Jovis.

    Si fractus illabatur orbis,
    Impavidum ferient ruinæ.

    HORACE.

    =Publishers' Note=

    The volume The Evidence in the Case is based upon an article by the Hon. James M. Beck, which came into print in the "New York Times" of October 25th. The article in question made so deep an impression with thinking citizens on both sides of the Atlantic that it has been translated into a number of European languages, and some 400,000 copies have been sold in England alone.

    In making this acknowledgment, which is due for the courtesy of "The Times" in permitting an article prepared for its columns to be utilized as the basis for the book, it is in order for the publishers to explain to the readers that the material in the article has itself been rewritten and amplified, while the book contains, in addition to this original paper, a number of further chapters comprising together more than six times the material of the first article.

    The present book is an independent work, and is deserving of consideration on the part of all citizens who are interested in securing authoritative information on the issues of the great European contest.

    New York, December 12, 1914

    INTRODUCTION

    BY THE HON. JOSEPH H. CHOATE, FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO GREAT

    BRITAIN[1]

    [Footnote 1: Reprinted, by permission, from the N. Y. Times.]

    For five months now all people who read at all have been reading about the horrible war that is devastating Europe and shedding the best blood of the people of five great nations. In fact, they have had no time to read anything else, and everything that is published about it is seized upon with great avidity. No wonder, then, that Mr. James M.

    Beck's book, The Evidence in the Case, published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, which has grown out of the article by him contributed to the New York Times Sunday Magazine, has been warmly welcomed both here and in England as a valuable addition to the literature of the day.

    An able and clear-headed lawyer and advocate, he presents the matter in the unique form of a legal argument, based upon an analysis of the diplomatic records submitted by England, Germany, Russia, France, and Belgium, as "A Case in the Supreme Court of Civilization," and the conclusions to be deduced as to the moral responsibility for the war.

    The whole argument is founded upon the idea that there is such a thing as a public conscience of the world, which must and will necessarily pass final judgment upon the conduct of the parties concerned in this infernal struggle. Many times in the course of the book he refers emphatically to that "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" to which Jefferson appealed in our Declaration of Independence as the final arbiter upon our conduct in throwing off the British yoke and declaring our right to be an independent nation.

    That this "public opinion of the world" is the final tribunal upon all great international contests is illustrated by the fact that all mankind, including Great Britain herself, has long ago adjudged that our great Declaration was not only just, but necessary for the progress of mankind.

    It is evident from his brief preface that Mr. Beck is a sincere admirer of historic Germany, and on the eve of the war he was at Weimar, after a brief visit to a little village near Erfurt, where one of his ancestors was born, who had migrated at an early date to Pennsylvania, a Commonwealth whose founder had made a treaty with the Indians which, so far from being treated as a "mere scrap of paper," was never broken. Like many Americans, Mr. Beck is of mixed ancestry, being in part English and in part Swiss-German. He has therefore viewed the great question objectively, and without any racial prejudice.

    A careful study of the diplomatic correspondence that preceded the outbreak of the war had convinced Mr. Beck that Germany was chiefly responsible for it, and he proceeds con amore to demonstrate the truth of this conviction by the most earnest and forceful presentation of the case.

    Forensic lawyers in the cases they present are about half the time on the wrong side, or what proves by the final judgment to have been the wrong side, but it is always easy to tell from the manner of presentation whether they themselves are thoroughly convinced of the justice of the side which they advocate. It is evident that Mr.

    Beck did not undertake to convince "the Supreme Court of Civilization" until he was himself thoroughly persuaded of the justice of his cause, that the invasion of Belgium by Germany was not only a gross breach of existing treaties, but was in violation of settled international law, and a crime against humanity never to be forgotten, a crime which converted that peaceful and prosperous country into a human slaughterhouse, reeking with the blood of four great nations.

    How any intelligent lawyer could have come to any other conclusion it is not easy to imagine, since Germany confessed its crime while in the very act of committing it, for on the very day that the German troops crossed the Belgian frontier and hostilities began, the Imperial Chancellor at the great session of the Reichstag on August 4th declared, to use his own words:

    Necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg,
    and have possibly already entered on Belgian soil. That is
    a breach of international law.... We were forced to ignore
    the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and
    Belgium, and the injustice--I speak openly--the injustice we
    thereby commit, we will try to make good as soon as our
    military aims have been attained.
    Anybody who is threatened
    as we are threatened and is fighting for his highest
    possessions can have only one thought--how he is to hack his
    way through.

    Thank God, their military aims have not yet been attained, and from present appearances are not likely to be, but, as Mr. Beck believes, Germany will still be held by the judgment of mankind to make good the damage done.

    In reviewing the diplomatic correspondence published by Germany that preceded the outbreak of the war, Mr. Beck lays great stress, and we think justly, upon the obvious suppression of evidence by Germany, in omitting substantially all the important correspondence on vital points that passed between Germany and Austria, and the suppression of important evidence in judicial proceedings always carries irresistible weight against the party guilty of it. While England and France and Russia were pressing Germany to influence and control Austria in the interests of peace, not a word is disclosed of what, if anything, the German Foreign Office said to Austria toward that end. To quote Mr.

    Beck's own words:

    Among the twenty-seven communications appended to the German
    White Paper, it is most significant that not a single
    communication is given of the many which passed from the
    Foreign Office of Berlin to that of Vienna, and only two
    which passed from the German Ambassador in Vienna to the
    German Chancellor, and the purpose of this suppression is
    even more clearly indicated by the complete failure of
    Austria to submit any of its diplomatic records to the
    scrutiny of a candid world.

    Notwithstanding the disavowal given by the German Ambassador at Petrograd to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the German Government had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was handed in, and did not exercise any influence on its contents, Mr. Beck establishes clearly by the admissions of the German Foreign Office itself that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum, and that it not only approved of its course, but literally gave to Austria carte blanche to proceed.

    And the German Ambassador to the United States formally admitted in an article in The Independent of September 7, 1914, that "Germany had approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum to Servia."

    This brutal ultimatum by a great nation of fifty millions of people, making impossible demands against a little one of four millions which had itself just emerged from two conflicts and was still suffering from exhaustion--an ultimatum which set all the nations of Europe in agitation--is proved to have been jointly concocted by the two members of the Triple Alliance, Germany and Austria. But the third member of that Alliance, Italy, found it to be an act of aggression on their part which brought on the war, and that the terms of the Triple Alliance, therefore, did not bind her to take any part.

    The peace parleys which passed between the several nations involved are carefully reviewed by Mr. Beck, who concludes, as we think justly, that up to the 28th of July, when the German Imperial Chancellor sent for the English Ambassador and announced the refusal of his Government to accept the conference of the Powers proposed by Sir Edward Grey, every proposal to preserve peace had come from the Triple Entente, and that every such proposal had met with an uncompromising negative from Austria, and either that or obstructive quibbles from Germany.

    At this point, the sudden return of the Kaiser to Berlin from his annual holiday in Norway, which his own Foreign Office regretted as a step taken on his Majesty's own initiative and which they feared might cause speculation and excitement, and his personal intervention from that time until his troops invaded Luxemburg and he made his abrupt demand upon the Belgian Government for permission to cross its territory are reviewed with great force and effect by Mr. Beck, with the conclusion on his part that the Kaiser, who by a timely word to Austria might have prevented all the terrible trouble that followed, was the supremely guilty party, and that such will be the verdict of history.

    Mr. Beck's review of the case of Belgium is extremely interesting, and his conclusion that England, France, Russia, and Belgium can await with confidence the world's final verdict that their quarrel was just, rests safely upon the plea of "Guilty" by Germany, a conclusion which seems to have been already plainly declared by most of the civilized nations of the world.

    We think that Mr. Beck's opinion that England and France were taken unawares and were wholly unprepared for war is a little too strongly expressed. France, certainly, had been making ready for war with Germany ever since the great conflict of 1870 had resulted in her loss of Alsace and Lorraine, and had had a fixed and unalterable determination to get them back when she could, although it is evident that she did not expect her opportunity to come just when and as it did. That Great Britain had no present expectation of immediate war with Germany is clearly obvious.

    That she had long been apprehending the danger of it in the indefinite future is very clear, but that Sir Edward Grey and the Government and the people that he represented did all that they possibly could to prevent the war seems to be clearly established.

    Mr. Beck's book is so extremely interesting from beginning to end that it is difficult when once begun to lay it down and break off the reading, and we shall not be surprised to hear, not only that it has had an immense sale in England and America, but that its translation into the languages of the other nations of Europe has been demanded.

    JOSEPH H. CHOATE.

    NEW YORK, January 10, 1915.

    FOREWORD

    On the eve of the Great War I sat one evening in the reading room of the Hotel Erbprinz in classic Weimar. I had spent ten happy days in Thuringia, and had visited with deep interest a little village near Erfurt, where one of my forbears was born. I had seen Jena, from whose historic university this paternal ancestor had gone as a missionary to North America in the middle of the eighteenth century.

    This simple-minded German pietist had cherished the apparent delusion that even the uncivilized Indians of the American wilderness might be taught--the Bernhardis and Treitschkes to the contrary notwithstanding--that to increase the political power of a nation by the deliberate and highly systematized destruction of its neighbors was not the truest political ideal, even of an Indian tribe.

    This missionary had gone most fittingly to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, where its enlightened founder had already given a demonstration of the truth that a treaty of peace, even though not formally expressed in a "scrap of paper," might be kept by white men and so-called savages with scrupulous fidelity for at least three quarters of a century, for even the cynical Voltaire said in sincerest admiration that the compact between William Penn and the Indians was the only treaty which was never reduced to parchment, nor ratified by an oath and yet was never broken.

    When Penn, the great apostle of peace, died in England, a disappointed, ruined, and heart-broken man, and the news reached the Indians in their wigwams along the banks of the Delaware, they had for him, whom they called the "white Truth Teller" so deep a sense of gratitude that they sent to his widow a sympathetic gift of valuable skins, in memory of the "man of unbroken friendship and inviolate treaties."

    These reflections in a time of broken friendships and violated treaties are not calculated to fill the man of the twentieth century with any justifiable pride.

    My mind, however, as I spent the quiet evening in the historic inn of Thackeray's Pumpernickel, did not revert to these far distant associations but was full of other thoughts suggested by the most interesting section of Germany, through which it had been my privilege to pass.

    I had visited Eisenach and reverentially stood within the room where the great master of music, John Sebastian Bach, had first seen the light of day, and as I saw the walls that he loved and which are forever hallowed because they once sheltered this divine genius, the question occurred to me whether he may not have done more for Germany with his immortal harmonies, which are the foundation of all modern music, than all the Treitschkes, and Bernhardis, with their gospel of racial hatred, pseudo-patriotism, and imperial aggrandizement.

    I had climbed the slopes of the Wartburg and from Luther's room had gazed with delight upon the lovely Thuringian forests. Quite apart from any ecclesiastical considerations that room seemed to suggest historic Germany in its best estate. It recalled that scene of undying interest at the Diet of Worms, when the peaceful adherence to an ideal was shown to be mightier than the power of the greatest empire since the fall of Rome.

    The monk of Wittenburg, standing alone in the presence of the great Emperor, Charles the Fifth, and the representatives of the most powerful religious organization that the world has ever known, with his simple, "Hier stehe ich; ich kann nicht anders," represented the truest soul and highest ideal of the nobler Germany.

    These and other glorious memories, suggested by Eisenach, Frankfort, Erfurt, Weimar, Jena, and Leipzig, made this pilgrimage of intense interest, and almost the only discord was the sight of the Leipzig Voelkerschlacht Denkmal, probably the largest, and certainly the ugliest monument in all the world. It has but one justification, in that it commemorates war, and no monument ever more fully symbolized by its own colossal crudity the moral ugliness of that most ghastly phenomenon of human life.

    Let us pray that in the event of final victory Prussia will not commission the architects of the Leipzig monument, or the imperial designer of the Sièges-Allée to rebuild that Gothic masterpiece, the Rheims Cathedral. That day in Leipzig an Alsatian cartoonist, Hansi, had been sentenced to one year's imprisonment for a harmless cartoon in a book for children, in which the most supersensitive should have found occasion for nothing, except a passing smile.

    On the library table of the Erbprinz, I found a large book, which proved to be a Bismarck memorial volume. It contained hundreds of pictures glorifying and almost deifying the Iron Chancellor. One particularly arrested my attention. It was the familiar picture of the negotiations for peace between Bismarck and Jules Favre in the terrible winter of 1871. The French statesman has sunk into a chair in abject despair, struck speechless by the demands of the conqueror.

    Bismarck stands triumphant and his proud bearing and arrogant manner fail to suggest any such magnanimous courtesy as that with which Grant accepted the sword of Lee at Appomattox. The picture breathed the very spirit of "væ victis." Had a French artist painted this picture, I could understand it, for it would serve effectively to stimulate undying hatred in the French heart. It seemed strange that a German artist should treat a subject, calling for a spirit of most delicate courtesy, in a manner which represented Prussian militarism in its most arrogant form.

    This unworthy picture reminded me of a later scene in the Reichstag, in which the Iron Chancellor, after reviewing with complacency the profitable results of Germany's deliberately provoked wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, added the pious ejaculation:

    Wir Deutsche fürchten Gott sonst nichts in der Welt.
    (We Germans fear God but nothing else in the world.)

    It is not necessary to impeach the sincerity of this pious glorification of the successful results of land grabbing. The mind in moments of exaltation plays strange tricks with the soul. Bismarck may have dissembled on occasion but he was never a hypocrite. It is the spirit which inspired this boastful and arrogant speech, which has so powerfully stimulated Prussian Junkerism, to which I wish to refer.

    Had an American uttered these words we would have treated the boast as a vulgar exhibition of provincial "spread-eagleism," such as characterized certain classes in this country before the Civil War, and which Charles Dickens somewhat over-caricatured in Martin Chuzzlewit, but in the mouth of Bismarck, with his cynical indifference to moral considerations in questions of statecraft, this piece of rhetorical spread double-eagleism, manifests the spirit of the Prussian military caste since its too easy triumph over France in 1870-1871, a triumph, which may yet prove the greatest calamity that ever befell Germany, not only in the seeds of hatred which it sowed, of which there is now a harvest of blood past precedent, but also in the development of an arrogant pride which has profoundly affected to its prejudice the noble Germany of Luther, Bach, Beethoven, Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Humboldt, and Lessing.

    To say that Germany "fears" nothing save God is contradicted by its whole diplomatic history of the last half century. In this it is not peculiar. The curse of modern statecraft is the largely unreasoning fear which all nations have of their neighbors. England has feared Germany only less than Germany has feared England and this nervous apprehension has bred jealousy, hatred, suspicion, until to-day all civilized nations are reaping a harvest horrible beyond expression.

    The whole history of Germany since 1870 has shown a constant, and at times an unreasoning fear, first of France, then of the Slav, and latterly and in its most acute form, of England. I do not mean that Germany has been or is now animated by any spirit of craven cowardice.

    There has not been in recorded history a braver nation, and the dauntless courage with which, even at this hour, thousands of Germans are going with patriotic songs on their lips to "their graves as to their beds," is worthy of all admiration.

    The whole statecraft of Germany for over forty years has been inspired by an exaggerated apprehension of the intentions of its great neighbors. This fear followed swiftly upon the triumph of 1871, for Germany early showed its apprehension that France might recover its military strength. When that fallen but indomitable foe again struggled to its feet in 1875, the Prussian military caste planned to give the stricken gladiator the coup de grâce and was only prevented by the intervention of England and Russia.

    Later this acute and neurotic apprehension took the form of a hatred and fear of Russia, and this notwithstanding the fact that the Kaiser had in the Russo-Japanese War exalted the Czar as the "champion of Christianity" and the "representative of the white race" in the Far East.

    When the psychology of the present conflict is considered by future historians, this neuropathic feature of Germany's foreign policy will be regarded as a contributing element of first importance.

    Latterly the Furor Teutonicus was especially directed against England, and although it was obvious to the dispassionate observer in neutral countries that no nation was making less preparations or was in point of fact so illy prepared for a conflict as England, nevertheless Germany, with a completeness of preparation such as the world has never witnessed, was constantly indulging in a very hysteria of fear at the imaginary designs of England upon Germany's standing as a world power.

    Luther's famous saying, already quoted, and Bismarck's blustering speech to the Reichstag measure the difference between the Germany of the Reformation and the Prussia of to-day.

    I refuse to believe that this Bismarckian attitude is that of the German people. If a censored press permitted them to know the real truth with respect to the present crisis, that people, still sound in heart and steadfast in soul, would repudiate a policy of duplicity, cunning, and arrogance, which has precipitated their great nation into an abyss of disaster. The normal German is an admirable citizen, quiet, peaceable, thrifty, industrious, faithful, efficient, and affectionate to the verge of sentimentality. He, and not the Junker, has made Germany the most efficient political State in the world.

    If to his genius for organization could be added the individualism of the American, the resultant product would be incomparable. A combination of the German fortiter in re with the American suaviter in modo would make the most efficient republic in the world.

    The Germany of Luther, that still survives and will survive when "Junkerism" is a dismal memory of the past, believes that "the supreme wisdom, the paramount vitality, is an abiding honesty, the doing of right, because right is right, in scorn of consequence."

    That the German people have rallied with enthusiastic unanimity to the flag in this great crisis, I do not question. This is, in part, due to the fact that the truth has never yet been disclosed to them, and is not likely to be until the war is over. They have been taught that in a time of profound peace England, France, and Russia deliberately initiated a war of aggression to destroy the commercial power of Germany. The documents hereinafter analyzed will show how utterly baseless this fiction is.

    Even if the truth were known, no one can blame the German, who now rallies to his flag with such superhuman devotion, for whether the cause of his country is just or unjust, its prestige, and perhaps its very existence, is at stake, and there should be for the rank and file of the German people only a feeling of profound pity and deep admiration.

    Edmund Burke once said, "We must pardon something to the spirit of liberty." We can paraphrase it and say in this crisis, "We must pardon something to the spirit of patriotism." The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its flag is worthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Thor did not wield his thunder hammer with greater effect than these descendants of the race of Wotan.

    If the ethical question depended upon relative bravery, who could decide between the German, "faithful unto death"; the English soldier, standing like a stone wall against fearful odds, the French or Russian not less brave or resolute, and the Belgian, now as in Cæsar's time the "bravest of all the tribes of Gaul."

    No consideration, either of sympathy, admiration, or pity, can in any manner affect the determination of the great ethical question as to the moral responsibility for the present crime against civilization.

    That must be determined by the facts as they have been developed, and the nations and individuals who are responsible for this world-wide catastrophe must be held to a strict accountability. The truth of history inexorably demands this.

    To determine where this moral responsibility lies is the purpose of these pages.

    In determining this question Posterity will distinguish between the military caste, headed by the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, which precipitated this great calamity, and the German people.

    The very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the world and the failure to disclose to the German nation the diplomatic communications hereinafter quoted, strongly suggest that this detestable war is not merely a crime against civilization, but also against the deceived and misled German people. They have a vision and are essentially progressive and peace-loving in their national characteristics, while the ideals of their military caste are those of the dark ages.

    One day the German people will know the full truth and then there will be a dreadful reckoning for those who have plunged a noble nation into this unfathomable gulf of suffering.

    Though the mills of God grind slowly,
    Yet they grind exceeding small,
    Though with patience He stands waiting,
    With exactness grinds He all.

    Or to put this ancient Greek proverb in its German form:

    "Gottes Mühle geht langsam aber die mahlt fein."

    JAMES M. BECK.

    NEW YORK, November 30, 1914.

    The Witnesses

    ENGLAND

    HIS MAJESTY, KING GEORGE V.

    MR. ASQUITH Premier.

    MR. BEAUMONT Councilor of Embassy at
    Constantinople.
    SIR F. BERTIE Ambassador at Paris.
    SIR G. BUCHANAN Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
    SIR M. DE BUNSEN Ambassador at Vienna.
    SIR E. GOSCHEN Ambassador at Berlin.
    SIR EDWARD GREY Foreign Secretary.
    SIR A. JOHNSTONE Minister at Luxemburg.
    SIR ARTHUR NICHOLSON Under Secretary for Foreign
    Affairs.
    SIR R. RODD Ambassador to Italy.
    SIR H.

    RUMBOLD Councilor of Embassy at Berlin.
    SIR F. VILLIERS Minister to Belgium.

    GERMANY

    HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

    HERR VON BELOW (SALESKE[2]) Minister to Belgium.

    DR. VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG Chancellor.

    HERR VON BUCH Minister at Luxemburg.

    HERR VON HEERINGEN Minister of War.

    HERR VON JAGOW Secretary of State.

    PRINCE LICHNOWSKY Ambassador at London.

    HERR VON MUELLER Minister at The Hague.

    COUNT POURTALES Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

    BARON VON SCHOEN Ambassador at Paris.

    HERR VON ZIMMERMANN Under Secretary of State.

    HERR VON TSCHIRSCHKY Ambassador at Vienna.

    [Footnote 2: Herr von Below Saleske is referred to in despatches as Herr von Below.]

    FRANCE

    PRESIDENT RAYMOND POINCARÉ

    M. VIVIANI Premier of France.

    M. BERTHELOT Of the French Ministry for Foreign
    Affairs.
    M. PAUL CAMBON Ambassador to England.
    M. KLOBUKOWSKI Minister to Belgium.
    M. DE MARGERIE Of the French Diplomatic Service.
    M. JULES CAMBON Ambassador to Germany.

    RUSSIA

    HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR NICHOLAS II.

    M. SAZONOF Minister of Foreign Affairs.

    COUNT BENCKENDORFF Ambassador at London.

    M. BRONEWSKY Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

    M. DE ETTER Councilor of Embassy at London.

    M. ISVOLSKY Ambassador to France.

    PRINCE KUDACHEF Councilor of Embassy at Vienna.

    M. SALVIATI Consul General at Fiume.

    M. SCHEBEKO Ambassador to Austria.

    M. SEVASTOPOULO Chargé d'Affaires at Paris.

    M. STRANDTMAN Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade.

    M. SUCHOMLINOF Minister for War.

    M. DE SWERBEEW Ambassador to Germany.

    BELGIUM

    HIS MAJESTY, KING ALBERT

    M. DAVIGNON Minister of Foreign Affairs.

    BARON VON DER ELST Secretary General to Ministry
    of Foreign Affairs.
    COUNT ERREMBAULT DE DUDZEELE Minister at Vienna.
    BARON FALLON Minister at The Hague.
    BARON GRENIER Minister at Madrid.
    BARON GUILLAUME Minister at Paris.
    COUNT DE LALAING Minister at London.

    SERVIA

    HIS MAJESTY, KING PETER

    M. PACHITCH Premier and Minister of Foreign
    Affairs.
    M. BOSCHKOVITCH Minister at London.
    DR. PATCHOU Minister of Finance.

    AUSTRIA

    HIS MAJESTY, EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH

    COUNT BERCHTOLD Minister of Foreign Affairs.

    COUNT CLARY UND ALDRINGEN Minister at Brussels.

    BARON GIESL VON GIESLINGEN Minister at Belgrade.

    BARON MACCHIO Councilor of Austrian Ministry of
    Foreign Affairs.
    COUNT MENSDORFF Ambassador to England.
    COUNT SZÁPÁRY Ambassador to Russia.

    ITALY

    HIS MAJESTY, KING VICTOR EMMANUEL III.

    MARQUIS DI SAN GIULIANO Minister of Foreign Affairs.

    CONTENTS

    PAGE

    INTRODUCTION v

    FOREWORD xv

    THE WITNESSES xxvii

    CHAPTER I

    THE SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION

    Existence of the Court--The conscience of mankind--The philosophy of Bernhardi--The recrudescence of Machiavelliism--Treitschke and Bernhardi's doctrine--Recent utterances of the Kaiser, Crown Prince, and representative officials--George Bernard Shaw's defense--Concrete illustration of Bernhardiism 1

    CHAPTER II

    THE RECORD IN THE CASE

    The issues stated--Proximate and underlying causes--A war of diplomats--The masses not parties to the war--The official defenses--The English White Paper--The German White Paper--The Russian Orange Paper--The Belgian Gray Paper--Austria and Italy still silent--Obligation of these nations to disclose facts 18

    CHAPTER III

    THE SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE

    No apparent suppression by England, Russia, and Belgium--Suppression by Germany of vital documents--Suppression by Austria of entire record--Significance of such suppression 27

    CHAPTER IV

    GERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AUSTRIAN

    ULTIMATUM

    Silence which preceded ultimatum--Europe's ignorance of impending developments--Duty to civilization--Germany's prior knowledge of ultimatum--Its disclaimer to Russia, France, and England of any responsibility--Contradictory admission in its official defense--Further confirmation in Germany's simultaneous threat to the Powers--Further confirmation in its confidential notice to States of Germany to prepare for eventualities 31

    CHAPTER V

    THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA

    Extreme brutality of ultimatum--Limited time given to Servia and Europe for consideration--Ultimatum and Servia's reply contrasted in parallel columns--Relative size of two nations--Germany's intimations to Servia--Brutality of ultimatum shown by analogy--Disclaimer of intention to take territory valueless 47

    CHAPTER VI

    THE PEACE PARLEYS

    Possibility of peace not embarrassed by popular clamor--Difficulties of peaceful solution not insuperable--Policy of Germany and Austria--Russia's and England's request for time--Germany's refusal to coöperate--Germany's and Austria's excuses for refusal to give extension of time--Berchtold's absence from Vienna--Austria's alleged disclaimer of territorial expansion--Sazonof's conference with English and French Ambassadors--Their conciliatory counsel to Servia--Servia's pacific reply to ultimatum--Austria, without considering Servian reply, declares war--England proposes suspension of hostilities for peace parleys--Germany refuses--Its specious reasons--Germany's untenable position as to localization of conflict--England's proposal for a conference--Germany's refusal--Austria declines all intervention, refusing to discuss Servian note--Germany supports her with a quibble as to name of conference--Russia proposes further discussion on basis of Servian note--Russia then again proposes European conference--Austria and Germany decline 61

    CHAPTER VII

    THE ATTITUDE OF FRANCE

    The French Yellow Book--Its editors and contents--M.

    Jules Cambon--The weakness of German diplomacy--Cambon's experience and merits--Interview between the German Kaiser and the King of Belgium--The Kaiser's change of attitude--The influence of the Moroccan crisis--The condition of the German people in 1913--The suppression of news in Austria--Attitude of the military party--Servia's warning to Austria--Germany's knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum before its issuance--Italy's ignorance of the Austrian ultimatum--Significance of the fact--Germany's reasons for concealing its intentions from Italy--The policy of secrecy--Prince Lichnowsky's anxiety--Cambon's interview with von Jagow--The methods of deception--Sazonof's frank offer--Germany's attempt to influence France--Cambon's dramatic interview with von Jagow--His plea "In the name of humanity"--The different attitudes of the two groups of powers 102

    CHAPTER VIII

    THE INTERVENTION OF THE KAISER

    The Kaiser's return to Berlin--His inconsistent record and complex personality--German Foreign Office deprecates his return--Its many blunders--The Kaiser takes the helm--He telegraphs the Czar--The Czar's reply--The Kaiser's second telegram--His untenable position--The Czar's explanation of military preparations and pledge that no provocative action would be taken by Russia--King George's telegram proposing temporary occupation by Austria of Belgrade pending further peace negotiations--The Kaiser's reply--The Kaiser's telegram to the Czar demanding Russian discontinuance of military preparations--His insistence upon unilateral conditions--Germany's preparations for war--Its offer to England to insure its neutrality--England's reply--Russia's offer to stop conditionally military preparations--England requests Germany to suggest any peace formula--Austria expresses willingness to discuss with Russia Servian note--Motives of Austria for this reversal of policy--The Kaiser sends ultimatum to Russia--The Czar's last appeal--The Kaiser's reply--Russia's inability to recall mobilization--England's last efforts for peace--Germany declares war--The Czar's telegram to King George 138

    CHAPTER IX

    THE CASE OF BELGIUM

    The verdict of history not affected by result of war--Belgium at outbreak of war--The Treaty of 1839--Its affirmation by Bismarck--France's action in 1871--Reaffirmation by Germany of Belgian neutrality in 1911-1914--The Hague Peace Conference of 1907--England asks Germany's and France's intentions with respect to Belgium's neutrality--France replies--Germany's refusal to reply--Germany's second offer to England--Germany's ultimatum to Belgium--Belgium's reply--France's offer of five army corps--Belgium refuses aid--Germany's declaration of war against Belgium--The German Chancellor's explanation in the Reichstag--The Belgian King appeals to England--England's ultimatum to Germany--The "scrap of paper" incident--England declares war against Germany--The apologies for Germany's action discussed--Belgium's rights independent of Treaty of 1839 or The Hague Convention--Germany's allegation that France had violated Belgium's neutrality an afterthought--Von Mach's plea for the suspension of judgment--The Brussels documents discussed--The negotiations between England and Belgium--The German Chancellor's belated explanation of the "scrap of paper" phrase--Invasion of Belgium a recrudescence of Machiavelliism--The great blunder of Germany's diplomats and soldiers 196

    CHAPTER X

    THE JUDGMENT OF THE WORLD

    The completeness of the evidence--The force of public opinion--The judgment of neutral States--The United States as a moral arbiter--A summary of the probable verdict of history 246

    EPILOGUE 252

    The Evidence in the Case

    CHAPTER I

    THE SUPREME COURT OF CIVILIZATION

    Let us suppose that in this year of dis-Grace, 1914, there had existed, as let us pray will one day exist, a Supreme Court of Civilization, before which the sovereign nations could litigate their differences without resort to the iniquitous arbitrament of arms and that each of the contending nations had a sufficient leaven of Christianity or shall we say commonplace, everyday morality, to have its grievances adjudged not by the ethics of the cannon, but by the eternal criterion of justice.

    What would be the judgment of that august tribunal?

    It may be suggested that the question is academic, as no such Supreme Court exists or is likely to exist within the life of any living man.

    Casuists of the Bernhardi school of moral philosophy will further suggest that to discuss the ethical merits of the war is to start with a false premise that such a thing as international morality exists, and that when once the conventionalities of civilization are laid aside the leading nations commence and make war in a manner that differs only in degree and not in kind from the methods of Frederick the Great and Napoleon, and that these in turn only differed in degree from those of Alaric and Attila. According to this theory, the only law of nations is that ascribed by the poet to Rob Roy:

    "The good old rule
    Sufficeth them, the simple plan
    That they should take who have the power,
    And they should keep who can."

    Does the Twentieth Century only differ from its predecessors in having a thin veneering of hypocrisy, or has there developed in the progress of civilization an international morality, by which, even though imperfectly, the moral conduct of nations is judged?

    The answer can be an unqualified affirmative. With the age of the printing press, the steamship, the railroad, and the telegraph there has developed a conscience of mankind.

    When the founders of the American Republic severed the tie which bound them to Great Britain, they stated that "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation."

    The Declaration assumed that there was a rule of right and wrong that regulated the intercourse of nations as well as individuals; it believed that there was a great human conscience, which rises higher than the selfish interests and prejudices of nations and races, and which approves justice and condemns injustice. It felt that this approval is more to be desired than national advantage. It constituted mankind a judge between contending nations and lest its judgment should temporarily err it established posterity as a court of last resort. It placed the tie of humanity above that of nationality. It proclaimed the solidarity of mankind.

    In the years that have intervened since this noble Declaration, the world has so far progressed towards an enlightened sense of justice that a "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" has proved an efficient power in regulating peacefully and justly the intercourse of nations. Each nation does at least in some measure fear to-day the disapproval of civilization. The time gives this proof in the eager desire of Germany to-day--despite its policy of "blood and iron"--to gain the sympathetic approval of the American people, not with the remotest hope of any practical coöperation but to avoid that state of moral isolation, in which the land of Luther now finds itself.

    The Supreme Court of Civilization does exist. It consists of cosmopolitan men in every country, who put aside racial and national prejudices and determine the right and wrong of every issue between nations by that slowly forming system of international morality which is the conscience of mankind.

    To a certain class of German statesmen and philosophers this Court of Public Opinion is a visionary abstraction. A group of distinguished German soldiers, professors, statesmen, and even doctors of divinity, pretending to speak in behalf of the German nation, have consciously or unconsciously attempted to revive in the twentieth century the cynical political morality of the sixteenth.

    As Symonds, the historian of the Renaissance, says in his Age of the Despots, Machiavelli was the first in modern times to formulate a theory of government in which the interests of the ruler are alone regarded, which assumes

    a separation between statecraft and morality, which
    recognizes force and fraud among the legitimate means of
    attaining high political ends, which makes success alone the
    test of conduct and which presupposes the corruption,
    baseness, and venality of mankind at large.

    Even the age of Cesare Borgia revolted against this philosophy and the name of Machiavelli became a byword. "Am I a Machiavel?" says the host in The Merry Wives of Windsor, and the implication of this question indirectly manifests the revolt of the seventeenth century against the sinister philosophy of the great Florentine.

    Nothing can be more amazing than that not only leading militarists of Germany but many of its foremost philosophers and teachers have become so intoxicated with the dream of Pan-Germanism that in the utmost sincerity they have espoused and with a certain pride proclaimed the vicious principles of Machiavelli in all their moral nudity. There is an emotional and mystical element in the advanced German thinker, which makes him capable of accepting in full sincerity intellectual and moral absurdities of which the more robust common sense of other nations would be incapable.

    The advanced German doctrinaire is the "wisest fool in Christendom." The depth of his learning is generally in the inverse ratio to the shallowness of his common sense.

    Nothing better demonstrates this than the present negation by advanced and doubtless sincere German thinkers of the very foundations of public morality and indeed of civilization. They have been led with Nietzsche to revile the Beatitudes and exalt the supremacy of cruelty over mercy. Indeed Treitschke in his lectures on Politik, which have become the gospel of Junkerdom, avowedly based his gospel of force upon the teaching of Machiavelli, for he points out that it was Machiavelli who first clearly saw that the State is power (der Staat ist Macht).

    Therefore "to care for this power is the highest moral duty of the State" and "of all political weaknesses that of feebleness is the most abominable and despicable; it is the sin against the holy spirit of politics." He therefore holds that the State as the ultimate good "cannot bind its will for the future over against other States," and that international treaties are therefore only obligatory "for such time as the State may find to be convenient."

    To enforce the will of the nation contrary to its own solemn promises and to increase its might, war is the appointed means. Both Treitschke and Moltke conceived it as "an ordinance set by God" and "one of the two highest functions" of the State.

    The doctrine is carried to the blasphemous conclusion that war is an ordinance of a just and merciful God; that, to quote Bernhardi, "it is a biological necessity" and that "the living God will see to it that war shall always recur as a terrible medicine for humanity." Therefore "might is at once the supreme right and the dispute as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war," which gives a "biologically just decision."

    This means that the 42 centimeter howitzer is more moral than a gun of smaller caliber and that the justice of God depends upon the superiority of Krupp to other ordnance manufacturers.

    Treitschke tells us, and the statement is quoted by Bernhardi with approval, that "the end all and be all of a state is power, and he who is not man enough to look this truth in the face should not meddle with politics." To this Bernhardi adds that the State's highest moral duty is to increase its power and in so doing "the State is the sole judge of the morality of its own action. It is in fact above morality or, in other words whatever is necessary is moral."

    Again we learn that the State must not allow any conventional sympathies to distract it from its object and that "conditions may arise which are more powerful than the most honorable intentions."

    All efforts directed towards the abolition of war are denominated as not only "foolish but absolutely immoral." To indicate that in this prosecution of war for the increase of dominion, chivalry would be a weakness and magnanimity a crime, we are finally told that "the State is a law unto itself" and that "weak nations have not the same right to live as powerful and vigorous nations." Even as to weak nations, we are further advised that the powerful and vigorous nation--which alone apparently has the right to live--must not wait for some act of aggression or legitimate casus belli, but that it is justified in deliberately provoking a war, and that the happiest results have always followed such "deliberately provoked wars," for "the prospects of success are the greatest when the moment for declaring war can be selected to suit the political and military situation."

    As the weak nations have no moral right to live it becomes important to remember that in the economy of Prussian Junkerdom there is only one strong race--his own. "Wir sind die Weltrasse." The ultimate goal is the super-nation, and the premise upon which the whole policy is based is that Germany is predestined to be that super-nation.

    Bernhardi believes--and his belief is but the reflex of the oft-repeated boast of the Kaiser--that history presents no other possibility. "For us there are two alternatives and no third--world power or ruin" (Weltmacht oder Niedergang). To assimilate Germany to ancient Rome the Kaiser on occasion reminds himself of Cæsar and affects to reign, not by the will of the people, but by divine right.

    No living monarch has said or done more to revive this mediæval fetich. To his soldiers he has recently said: "You think each day of your Emperor. Do not forget God." What magnanimity!

    At the outbreak of the present war he again illustrated his spirit of fanatical absolutism, which at times inspires him, by saying to his army:

    Remember that the German people are the chosen of God. On
    me, as German Emperor, the spirit of God has descended. I am
    His weapon; His sword; His Vicegerent. Woe to the
    disobedient! Death to cowards and unbelievers!

    The modern world has had nothing like this since Mahomet and, accepted literally, it claims for the Kaiser the divine attributes attributed to the Cæsars. Even the Cæsars, in baser and more primitive times, found posing as a divine superman somewhat difficult and disconcerting. Shakespeare subtly suggests this when he makes his Cæsar talk like a god and act with the vacillation of a child.

    When the war was precipitated as the natural result of such abhorrent teachings, the world at large knew little either of Treitschke or Bernhardi. Thoughtful men of other nations did know that the successful political immoralities of Frederick the Great had profoundly affected the policies of the Prussian Court to this day.

    The German poet, Freiligrath, once said that "Germany is Hamlet," but no analogy is less justified. There is nothing in the supersensitive, introspective, and amiable dreamer of Elsinore to suggest the Prussia of to-day, which Bebel has called "Siegesbetrunken." (Victory-drunk.)

    Since the beginning of the present war, the world has become familiar with these abhorrent teachings and as a result of a general revolt against this recrudescence of Borgiaism attempts have been made by the apologists for Prussia, especially in the United States, to suggest that neither Treitschke nor Bernhardi fairly reflect the political philosophy of official Germany. Treitschke's influence as an historian and lecturer could not well be denied but attempts have been made to impress America that Bernhardi has no standing to speak for his country and that the importance of his teachings should therefore be minimized.

    Apart from the wide popularity of Bernhardi's writings in Germany, the German Government has never repudiated Bernhardi's conclusions or disclaimed responsibility therefor. While possibly not an officially authorized spokesman, yet he is as truly a representative thinker in the German military system as Admiral Mahan was in the Navy of the United States. Of the acceptance by Prussia of Bernhardi's teachings there is one irrefutable proof. It is Belgium. The destruction of that unoffending country is the full harvest of this twentieth-century Machiavelliism.

    A few recent utterances from a representative physician, a prominent journalist, and a distinguished retired officer of the German Army may be quoted as showing how completely infatuated a certain class of German thinkers has become with the gospel of force for the purpose of attaining world power.

    Thus a Dr. Fuchs, in a book on the subject of preparedness for war, says:

    Therefore the German claim of the day must be: The family to
    the front. The State has to follow at first in the school,
    then in foreign politics. Education to hate. Education to
    the estimation of hatred. Organization of hatred. Education
    to the desire for hatred. Let us abolish unripe and false
    shame before brutality and fanaticism.
    We must not hesitate
    to announce: To us is given faith, hope, and hatred, but
    hatred is the greatest among them
    .

    Maximilian Harden, one of the most influential German journalists, says:

    Let us drop our miserable attempts to excuse Germany's
    action. Not against our will and as a nation taken by
    surprise did we hurl ourselves into this gigantic venture.
    We willed it. We had to will it. We do not stand before
    the judgment seat of Europe. We acknowledge no such
    jurisdiction. Our might shall create a new law in Europe.

    It is Germany that strikes. When she has conquered new
    domains for her genius then the priesthoods of all the gods
    will praise the God of War.

    Still more striking and morally repellent was the very recent statement by Major-General von Disfurth, in an article contributed by him to the Hamburger Nachrichten, which so completely illustrates Bernhardiism in its last extreme of avowed brutality that it justifies quotation in extenso.

    No object whatever is served by taking any notice of the
    accusations of barbarity leveled against Germany by our
    foreign critics. Frankly, we are and must be barbarians, if
    by these we understand those who wage war relentlessly and
    to the uttermost degree....

    We owe no explanations to any one. There is nothing for
    us to justify and nothing to explain away. Every act of
    whatever nature committed by our troops for the purpose of
    discouraging, defeating, and destroying our enemies is a
    brave act and a good deed, and is fully justified....
    Germany stands as the supreme arbiter of her own methods,
    which in the time of war must be dictated to the world....

    They call us barbarians. What of it? We scorn them and
    their abuse. For my part I hope that in this war we have
    merited the title of barbarians.
    Let neutral peoples and
    our enemies cease their empty chatter, which may well be
    compared to the twitter of birds. Let them cease their talk
    of the Cathedral at Rheims and of all the churches and all
    the castles in France which have shared its fate. These
    things do not interest us. Our troops must achieve victory.
    What else matters?

    These hysterical vaporings of advanced Junkers no more make a case against the German people than the tailors of Tooley Street had authority to speak for England, but they do represent the spirit of the ruling caste, to which unhappily the German people have committed their destiny. It would not be difficult to quote both the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, who on more than one occasion have manifested their enthusiastic adherence to the gospel of brute force.

    The world is not likely to forget the Crown Prince's congratulations to the brutal military martinet of the Zabern incident, and still less the shameful fact that when the Kaiser sent his punitive expedition to China, he who once stood within sight of the Mount of Olives and preached a sermon breathing the spirit of Christian humility, said to his soldiers:

    When you encounter the enemy you will defeat him. No
    quarter shall be given, no prisoners shall be taken. Let all
    who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns
    a thousand years ago under the leadership of Etzel (Attila),
    gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in
    historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become
    known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever
    again even dare to look askance at a German.

    And this campaign of extermination--worthy of a savage Indian chief--was planned for the most pacific and unaggressive race, the Chinese, for it is sadly true that the one nation which has more than any other been inspired for two thousand years by the spirit of "peace on earth" is the hermit nation, into which until the nineteenth century the light of Christianity never shone.

    In a recent article, George Bernard Shaw, the Voltaire of the twentieth century, with the intellectual brilliancy and moral shallowness of the great cynic, attempts to justify Bernhardiism by resort to the unconvincing "et tu quoque" argument. He contends that England also has had its "Bernhardis," and refers to a few books which he affects to think bear out his argument. That these books show that there have been advocates of militarism in England is undoubtedly true.

    The present war illustrates that there was need of such literature, for a nation which faced so great a trial as the present, with a standing army that was pitiful in comparison with that of Germany and without any involuntary service law, certainly had need of some literary stimulus to self-preparation. No one quarrels with Bernhardi in his discussions of the problems of war as such. It is only when the soldier ceases to be a strategist and becomes a moralist that the average man with conventional ideas of morality revolts against Bernhardiism.

    The books to which Mr. Shaw refers can be searched in vain for any passages parallel to those which have been quoted from Treitschke, Bernhardi, and other German writers. The brilliant but erratic George Bernard Shaw cannot find in all English literature any such Machiavelliisms as those of Treitschke and Bernhardi.

    Shaw's whole defense of Germany, betrays his characteristic desire to be clever and audacious without regard to nice considerations of truth. Much as we may admire his intellectual badinage under other circumstances, it may be questioned whether in this supreme tragedy of the world it was fitting for Shaw to daub himself anew with his familiar vermilion and play the intellectual clown.

    It was either courage of an extraordinary but unenviable character or else crass stupidity that led Bernhardi to submit to the civilization of the present day such a debasing gospel, for if his brain had not been hopelessly obfuscated by his Pan-Germanic imperialism, he would have seen that not only would this philosophy do his country infinitely more harm than a whole park of artillery but would inevitably carry his memory down to a wondering posterity, like Machiavelli, detestable but, unlike Machiavelli, ridiculous.

    Machiavelli gave to his Prince a literary finish that placed his treatise among the classics, while Bernhardi has gained recognition chiefly because his book is a moral anachronism.

    One concrete illustration from Bernhardi clearly shows that the sentences above quoted are truly representative of his philosophy, and not unfair excerpts. In explaining that it is the duty of every nation to increase its power and territory without regard for the rights of others, he alludes to the fact that England committed the "unpardonable blunder from her point of view of not supporting the Southern States in the American War of Secession," and thus forever severing in twain the American Republic.

    In this striking illustration of applied Bernhardiism, there is no suggestion as to the moral side of such intervention. Nothing is said with respect to the moral question of slavery, or of the obligations of England to a friendly Power. Nothing as to how the best hopes of humanity would have been shattered if the American Republic--that "pillar of cloud by day and pillar of fire by night" to struggling humanity--had been brought to cureless ruin.

    All these considerations are completely disregarded, and all Bernhardi can see in the situation, as it presented itself to England in 1861, was its opportunity, by a cowardly stab in the back, to remove forever from its path a great and growing nation.

    Poor Bernhardi! He thought to serve his royal master. He has simply damned him. As Machiavelli, as the eulogist of the Medicis, simply emphasized their moral nudity, so Bernhardi has shown the world the inner significance of this crude revival of Cæsarism.

    CHAPTER II

    THE RECORD IN THE CASE

    All morally sane men in this twentieth century are agreed that war abstractly is an evil thing,--perhaps the greatest of all indecencies,--and that while it may be one of the offenses which must come, "woe to that man (or nation) by whom the offense cometh!"

    They are of one mind in regarding this present war as a great crime--perhaps the greatest crime--against civilization, and the only questions which invite discussion are:

    Which of the two contending groups of Powers is morally
    responsible?

    Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?

    Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and
    France?

    Was Germany justified in declaring war against Belgium?

    Was England justified in declaring war against Germany?

    Primarily and perhaps exclusively these ethical questions turn upon the issues developed by the communications which passed between the various chancelleries of Europe in the last week of July, for it is the amazing feature of this greatest of wars that it was precipitated by the ruling classes and, assuming that all the diplomats sincerely desired a peaceful solution of the questions raised by the Austrian ultimatum (which is by no means clear) the war is the result of ineffective diplomacy.

    I quite appreciate the distinction between the immediate causes of a war and the anterior or underlying causes. The fundamental cause of the Franco-German War of 1870 was not the incident at Ems nor even the question of the Spanish succession. These were but the precipitating pretexts or, as a lawyer would express it, the "proximate causes." The underlying cause was unquestionably the rivalry between Prussia and France for political supremacy in Europe.

    Behind the Austrian ultimatum to Servia were also great questions of State policy, not easily determinable upon any tangible ethical principle, and which involved the hegemony of Europe.

    Germany's domination of Europe had been established when by the rattling of its saber it compelled Russia in 1908 to permit Austria to disturb the then existing status in the Balkans by the forcible annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and behind the Austrian-Servian question of 1914, arising out of the murder of the Crown Prince of Austria at Serajevo, was the determination of Germany and Austria to reassert that dominant position by compelling Russia to submit to a further humiliation of a Slav State.

    The present problem is to inquire how far Germany and her ally selected a just pretext to test this question of mastery.

    The pretext was the work of diplomatists. It was not the case of a nation rising upon some great cause which appealed to popular imagination. The acts of the statesmen in that last fateful week of July, 1914, were not the mere echo of the popular will.

    The issues were framed by the statesmen and diplomats of Europe and whatever efforts were made to preserve the peace and whatever obstructive tactics were interposed were not the acts of any of the nations now in arms but those of a small coterie of men who, in the secrecy of their respective cabinets, made their moves and countermoves upon the chessboard of nations.

    The future of Europe in that last week of July was in the hands of a small group of men, numbering not over fifty, and what they did was never known to their respective nations in any detail until after the fell Rubicon had been crossed and a world war had been precipitated.

    If all of these men had sincerely desired to work for peace, there would not have been any war.

    So swiftly did events move that the masses of the people had time neither to think nor to act. The suddenness of the crisis marks it as a species of "mid-summer madness," a very "witches' sabbath" of diplomatic demagoguery.

    In a peaceful summer, when the nations now struggling to exterminate each other were fraternizing in the holiday centers of Europe, an issue was suddenly precipitated, made the subject of communications between the various chancelleries, and almost in the twinkling of an eye Europe found itself wrapped in a universal flame. The appalling toll of death suggests the inquiry of Hamlet: "Did these bones cost no more the breeding, but to play at loggats with 'em?" and if the diplomatic "loggats" of 1914 were ineffectively played, some one must accept the responsibility for such failure.

    This sense of responsibility against the dread Day of Accounting has resulted in a disposition beyond past experience to justify the quarrel by placing before the world the diplomatic record.

    The English Government commenced shortly after the outbreak of hostilities by publishing the so-called White Paper, consisting of a statement by the British Government and 160 diplomatic documents as an appendix. This was preceded by Sir Edward Grey's masterly speech in Parliament. That speech and all his actions in this fateful crisis may rank him in future history with the younger Pitt.

    On August 4th, the German Chancellor for the first time explained to the representatives of his nation assembled in the Reichstag the causes of the war, then already commenced, and there was distributed among the members a statement of the German Foreign Office, accompanied by 27 Exhibits in the form of diplomatic communications, which have been erroneously called the German White Paper and which sets forth Germany's defense to the world.

    Shortly thereafter Russia, casting aside all the traditional secrecy of Muscovite diplomacy, submitted to a candid world its acts and deeds in the form of the so-called Russian Orange Paper, with 79 appended documents, and this was followed later by the publication by Belgium of the so-called Belgian Gray Paper.

    Late in November France published its Yellow Book, the most comprehensive of these diplomatic records. Of the two groups of powers, therefore, only Austria and Italy have failed to disclose their diplomatic correspondence to the scrutiny of the world.

    The former, as the originator of the controversy, should give as a matter of "decent respect to the opinions of mankind" its justification, if any, for what it did. So far, it has only given its ultimatum to Servia and Servia's reply.

    Italy, as a nation that has elected to remain neutral, is not under the same moral obligation to disclose the secrets of its Foreign Office, and while it remains on friendly terms with all the Powers it probably feels some delicacy in disclosing confidential communications, but as the whole world is vitally interested in determining the justice of the quarrel and as it is wholly probable that the archives of the Italian Foreign Office would throw an illuminating searchlight upon the moral issues involved, Italy, in a spirit of loyalty to civilization, should without further delay disclose the documentary evidence in its possession.

    While it is to be regretted that the full diplomatic record is not made up, yet as we have the most substantial part of the record in the communications which passed in those fateful days between Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, there is sufficient before the court to justify a judgment, especially as there is reason to believe that the documents as yet withheld would only confirm the conclusions which the record already given to the world irresistibly suggests.

    Thus we can reasonably assume that the Italian documentary evidence would fairly justify the conclusion that the war was on the part of Germany and Austria a war of aggression, for Italy, by its refusal to act with its associates of the Triple Alliance, has in the most significant manner thus adjudged it.

    Under the terms of the Triple Alliance, Italy had obligated itself to support Germany and Austria in any purely defensive war, and if therefore the communications, which undoubtedly passed between Vienna and Berlin on the one hand, and Rome on the other, justified the conclusion that Germany and Austria had been assailed by Russia, England, and France or either of them, then we must assume that Italy would have respected its obligation, especially as it would thus relieve Italy from any possible charge of treachery to two allies, whose support and protection it had enjoyed from the time that the Triple Alliance was first made.

    When Italy decided that it was under no obligation to support its allies, it effectually affirmed the fact that they had commenced a war of aggression, and until the contrary is shown, we must therefore assume that the archives of the Foreign Office at Rome would merely confirm the conclusions hereinafter set forth as to the moral responsibility for the war.

    Similarly upon considerations that are familiar to all who have had any experience in the judicial investigation of truth, it must be assumed that if Austria had in its secret archives any documentary evidence that would justify it in its pretension that it had been unjustly assailed by one or more of the Powers with which it is now at war, it would have published such documents to the world in its own exculpation. The moral responsibility for this war is too great for any nation to accept it unnecessarily.

    Least of all could Austria--which on the face of the record commenced the controversy by its ultimatum to Servia--leave anything undone to acquit itself at the bar of public opinion of any responsibility for the great crime that is now drenching Europe with blood. The time is past when any nation can ignore the opinions of mankind or needlessly outrage its conscience.

    Germany has recognized this in publishing its defense and exhibiting a part of its documentary proof, and if its ally, Austria, continues to withhold from the knowledge of the world the documents in its possession, there can be but one conclusion as to its guilt.

    Upon the record thus made up in the Supreme Court of Civilization, that tribunal need no more hesitate to proceed to judgment than would an ordinary court hesitate to enter a decree because one of the litigants has deliberately suppressed documents known to be in its possession. It does not lie in the mouth of such a litigant to ask the court to suspend judgment or withhold its sentence until the full record is made up, when the incompleteness of that record is due to its own deliberate suppression of vital documentary proofs.

    CHAPTER III

    THE SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE

    The official defenses of England, Russia, France, and Belgium do not apparently show any failure on the part of either to submit any essential diplomatic document in their possession. They have respectively made certain contentions as to the proposals that they made to maintain the peace of the world, and in every instance have supported these contentions by putting into evidence the letters and communications in which such proposals were expressed.

    When the German White Paper is examined it discloses on its very face the suppression of documents of vital importance. The fact that communications passed between Berlin and Vienna, the text of which has never been disclosed, is not a matter of conjecture. Germany asserts as part of its defense that it faithfully exercised its mediatory influence on Austria, but not only is such influence not disclosed by any practical results, such as we would expect in view of her dominating relations with Austria, but the text of these vital communications is still kept in the secret archives of Berlin and Vienna.

    Germany has carefully selected a part of her diplomatic records for publication but withheld others. Austria has withheld all.

    Thus in the official apology for Germany it is stated that, in spite of the refusal of Austria to accept the proposition of Sir Edward Grey to treat the Servian reply "as a basis for further conversations,"

    we [Germany] continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost
    and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise
    consistent with the dignity of the Monarchy.[3]

    [Footnote 3: German White Paper.]

    This would be more convincing if the German Foreign Office had added the text of the advice which it thus gave Vienna.

    A like significant omission will be found when the same official defense states that on July 29th the German Government advised Austria "to begin the conversations with Mr. Sazonof." But here again the text is not found among the documents which the German Foreign Office has given to the world. The communications, which passed between that office and its ambassadors in St.

    Petersburg, Paris, and London, are given in extenso, but among the twenty-seven communications appended to the German White Paper it is most significant that not a single communication is given of the many which passed from the Foreign Office of Berlin to that of Vienna and only two which passed from the German Ambassador in Vienna to the German Chancellor.

    While the Kaiser has favored the world with his messages to the Czar and King George, he has wholly failed to give us any message that he sent in those critical days to the Austrian Emperor or the King of Italy. We shall have occasion to refer hereafter to the frequent failure to produce documents, the existence of which is admitted by the exhibits which Germany appended to its White Paper.

    This cannot be an accident. The German Foreign Office has seen fit to throw the veil of secrecy over the text of its communications to Vienna, although professing to give the purport of a few of them. The purpose of this suppression is even more clearly indicated by the complete failure of Austria to submit any of its diplomatic records to the scrutiny of a candid world. Until Germany and Austria are willing to put the most important documents in their possession in evidence, they must not be surprised that the World, remembering Bismarck's garbling of the Ems dispatch, which precipitated the Franco-Prussian War, will be incredulous as to the sincerity of their pacific protestations.

    ADDENDUM

    The Austrian Red Book, published more than six months
    after the declaration of war, simply emphasizes the policy
    of suppression of vital documents, which we have already
    discussed. Of its 69 documentary exhibits, there is not one
    which passed directly between the Cabinets of Berlin and
    Vienna
    .

    The text of the communications, in which Germany
    claims to have exercised a mediatory and conciliatory
    influence with its ally, is still withheld. Not a single
    document is produced which was sent between July the 6th and
    July the 21st
    , the period when the great coup was
    secretly planned by Berlin and Vienna.

    In the Red Book we find eight communications from Count
    Berchtold to the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin and four
    replies from that official, but not a letter or telegram
    passing between Berchtold and von Bethmann-Hollweg or
    between the German and Austrian Kaisers.

    The Austrian Red
    Book
    gives additional evidence that at the eleventh hour,
    and shortly before Germany issued its ultimatum to Russia,
    Austria did finally agree to discuss the Servian question
    with Russia; but the information, which Germany presumably
    gave to its ally of its intention to send the ultimatum
    to Russia, is carefully withheld.

    Notwithstanding this
    suppression of vital documents, the diplomatic papers of
    Germany and Austria, now partially given to the world,
    disclose an unmistakable purpose, amounting to an open
    confession, that they intended to force their will upon
    Europe, even though this course involved the most stupendous
    war in the history of mankind.

    March 1, 1915.

    CHAPTER IV

    GERMANY'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM

    On June 28, 1914, the Austrian Crown Prince was murdered at Serajevo.

    For nearly a month thereafter there was no public statement by Austria of its intentions, with the exception of a few semi-inspired dispatches to the effect that it would act with the greatest moderation and self-restraint. A careful examination made of the files of two leading American newspapers, each having a separate news service, from June 28, 1914, to July 23, 1914, has failed to disclose a single dispatch from Vienna which gave any intimation as to the drastic action which Austria was about to take.

    The French Premier, Viviani, in his speech to the French Senate, and House of Deputies, on August 4, 1914, after referring to the fact that France, Russia, and Great Britain had coöperated in advising Servia to make any reasonable concession to Austria, added:

    This advice was all the more valuable in view of the fact
    that Austria-Hungary's demands had been inadequately
    foreshadowed to the governments of the Triple Entente, to
    whom during the three preceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian
    Government had repeatedly given assurance that its demands
    would be extremely moderate
    .

    The movements of the leading statesmen and rulers of the Triple Entente clearly show that they, as well as the rest of the world, had been lulled into false security either by the silence of Austria, or, as Viviani avers, by its deliberate suggestion that its treatment of the Serajevo incident would be conciliatory, pacific, and moderate.

    Thus, on July 20th, the Russian Ambassador, obviously anticipating no crisis, left Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence. The President of the French Republic and its Premier were far distant from Paris.

    Pachitch, the Servian Premier, was absent from Belgrade, when the ultimatum was issued.

    The testimony of the British Ambassador to Vienna is to the same effect. He reports to Sir Edward Grey:

    The delivery at Belgrade on the 23d of July of the note to
    Servia was preceded by a period of absolute silence at the
    Ballplatz.

    He proceeds to say that with the exception of the German Ambassador at Vienna (note the significance of the exception) not a single member of the Diplomatic Corps knew anything of the Austrian ultimatum and that the French Ambassador, when he visited the Austrian Foreign Office on July 23d (the day of its issuance), was not only kept in ignorance that the ultimatum had actually been issued, but was given the impression that its tone would be moderate. Even the Italian Ambassador was not taken into Count Berchtold's confidence.[4]

    [Footnote 4: Dispatch from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, dated September 1, 1914.]

    The Servian Government had formally disclaimed any responsibility for the assassination and had pledged itself to punish any Servian citizen implicated therein. No word came from Vienna excepting the semi-official intimations as to its moderate and conciliatory course, and after the funeral of the Archduke, the world, then enjoying its summer holiday, had almost forgotten the Serajevo incident. The whole tragic occurrence simply survived in the sympathy which all felt with Austria in its new trouble, and especially with its aged monarch, who, like King Lear, was "as full of grief as age, wretched in both."

    Never was it even hinted that Germany and Austria were about to apply in a time of peace a match to the powder magazine of Europe.

    Can it be questioned that loyalty to the highest interests of civilization required that Germany and Austria, when they determined to make the murder of the Archduke by an irresponsible assassin the pretext for bringing up for final decision the long-standing troubles between Austria and Servia, should have given all the European nations some intimation of their intention, so that their confrères in the family of nations could coöperate to adjust this trouble, as they had adjusted far more difficult questions after the close of the Balko-Turkish War?

    Whatever the issue of the present conflict, it will always be to the lasting discredit of Germany and Austria that they were false to this great duty, and that they precipitated the greatest of all wars in a manner so underhanded as to suggest a trap. They knew, as no one else knew, in those quiet mid-summer days of July, that civilization was about to be suddenly and most cruelly torpedoed. The submarine was Germany and the torpedo, Austria, and the work was most effectually done.

    This ignorance of the leading European statesmen (other than those of Germany and Austria) as to what was impending is strikingly shown by the first letter in the English White Paper from Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rumbold, dated July 20, 1914. When this letter was written it is altogether probable that Austria's arrogant and unreasonable ultimatum had already been framed and approved in Vienna and Berlin, and yet Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Minister of a great and friendly country, had so little knowledge of Austria's policy that he

    asked the German Ambassador to-day (July 20th) if he had any
    news of what was going on in Vienna. He replied that he had
    not, but Austria was certainly going to take some step.

    Sir Edward Grey adds that he told the German Ambassador that he had learned that Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister,

    in speaking to the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, had
    deprecated the suggestion that the situation was grave, but
    had said that it should be cleared up.

    The German Minister then replied that it would be desirable "if Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Servia," so that the first suggestion of Russia playing the part of the peacemaker came from the German Ambassador in London. Sir Edward Grey then adds that he told the German Ambassador that he

    assumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything
    until they had first disclosed to the public their case
    against Servia, founded presumably upon what they had
    discovered at the trial,

    and the German Ambassador assented to this assumption.[5]

    [Footnote 5: English White Paper, No. 1.]

    Either the German Ambassador was then deceiving Sir Edward Grey, or the submarine torpedo was being prepared with such secrecy that even the German Ambassador in England did not know what was then in progress.

    The interesting and important question here suggests itself whether Germany had knowledge of and approved in advance the Austrian ultimatum. If it did, it was guilty of duplicity, for the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg gave to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs an express assurance that

    the German Government had no knowledge of the text of the
    Austrian note before it was handed in and had not exercised
    any influence on its contents. It is a mistake to attribute
    to Germany a threatening attitude.
    [6]

    [Footnote 6: Russian Orange Paper, No. 18.]

    This statement is inherently improbable. Austria was the weaker of the two allies, and it was Germany's saber that it was rattling in the face of Europe. Obviously Austria could not have proceeded to extreme measures, which it was recognized from the first would antagonize Russia, unless it had the support of Germany, and there is a probability, amounting to a moral certainty, that it would not have committed itself and Germany to the possibility of a European war without first consulting Germany.

    Moreover, we have the testimony of Sir M. de Bunsen, the English Ambassador in Vienna, who advised Sir Edward Grey that he had "private information that the German Ambassador (at Vienna) knew the text of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia before it was dispatched, and telegraphed it to the German Emperor," and that the German Ambassador himself "indorses every line of it."[7] As he does not disclose the source of his "private information," this testimony would not by itself be convincing, but when we examine Germany's official defense in the German White Paper, we find that the German Foreign Office admits that it was consulted by Austria previous to the ultimatum and not only approved of Austria's course but literally gave that country a carte blanche to proceed_.

    [Footnote 7: English White Paper, No. 95.]

    This point seems so important in determining the sincerity of Germany's attitude and pacific protestations that we quote in extenso. After referring to the previous friction between Austria and Servia, the German White Paper says:

    In view of these circumstances Austria had to admit that
    it would not be consistent either with the dignity or
    self-preservation of the Monarchy to look on longer at the
    operations on the other side of the border without taking
    action. The Austro-Hungarian Government advised us of its
    view of the situation and asked our opinion in the matter.
    We were able to assure our Ally most heartily of our
    agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her
    that any action that she might consider it necessary to take
    in order to put an end to the movement in Servia directed
    against the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
    would receive our approval.
    We were fully aware in this
    connection that warlike moves on the part of Austria-Hungary
    against Servia would bring Russia into the question and
    might draw us into a war in accordance with our duties as an
    Ally.

    Sir M. de Bunsen's credible testimony is further confirmed by the fact that the British Ambassador at Berlin in his letter of July 22d, to Sir Edward Grey, states that on the preceding night (July 21st) he had met the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and an allusion was made to a possible action by Austria.

    His Excellency was evidently of opinion that this step on
    Austria's part would have been made ere this. He insisted
    that the question at issue was one for settlement between
    Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no
    interference from outside in the discussions between those
    two countries.

    He[8] adds that while he had regarded it as inadvisable that his country should approach Austria in the matter, he had

    [Footnote 8: von Jagow.]

    on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian
    Minister, emphasized the extreme importance that
    Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper
    footing.[9]

    [Footnote 9: English White Paper, No. 2.]

    Here we have the first statement of Germany's position in the matter, a position which subsequent events showed to be entirely untenable, but to which it tenaciously adhered to the very end, and which did much to precipitate the war.

    Forgetful of the solidarity of European civilization, and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse continuing through many centuries a united European State exists, even though its organization be as yet inchoate, he took the ground that Austria should be permitted to proceed to aggressive measures against Servia without interference from any other Power, even though, as was inevitable, the humiliation of Servia would destroy the status of the Balkan States and threaten the European balance of power.

    The inconsistency between Germany's claim that it could give Austria a carte blanche to proceed against Servia and agree to support its action with the sword of Germany, and the other contention that neither Russia nor any European State had any right to interfere on behalf of Servia is obvious. It was the greatest blunder of Germany's many blunders in this Tragedy of Errors.

    No space need be taken in convincing any reasonable man that this Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in its demands. It would be difficult to recall a more offensive document, and its iniquity was enhanced by the short shriving time which it gave either Servia or Europe. Servia had forty-eight hours to answer whether it would compromise its sovereignty, and virtually admit its complicity in a crime which it had steadily disavowed. The other European nations had little more than a day to consider what could be done to preserve the peace of Europe before that peace was fatally compromised.[10]

    [Footnote 10: English White Paper, No. 5; Russian Orange Paper, No. 3.]

    Further confirmation that the German Foreign Office did have advance knowledge of at least the substance of the ultimatum is shown by the fact that on the day the ultimatum was issued the Chancellor of the German Empire instructed its Ambassadors in Paris, London, and St.

    Petersburg to advise the English, French, and Russian governments that

    the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian
    Government cannot but be looked upon as justified.[11]

    [Footnote 11: German White Paper, Annex 1 B.]

    How could Germany thus indorse the "demands" if it did not know the substance of the ultimatum? Is it probable that Germany would have given in a matter of the gravest importance a blanket endorsement of Austria's demands, unless the German Government had first been fully advised as to their nature?

    The hour when these instructions were sent is not given, so that it does not follow that these significant instructions were necessarily prior to the service of the ultimatum at Belgrade at 6 P.M.

    Nevertheless, as the ultimatum did not reach the other capitals of Europe until the following day, as the diplomatic correspondence clearly shows, it seems improbable that the German Foreign Office would have issued this very carefully prepared and formal warning to the other Powers on July the 23d unless it had full knowledge not only of Austria's intention to serve the ultimatum but also of the substance thereof.

    While it may be that Germany, while indorsing in blank the policy of Austria, purposely refrained from examining the text of the communication, so that it could thereafter claim that it was not responsible for Austria's action--a policy which would not lessen the discreditable character of this iniquitous conspiracy against the peace of Europe,--yet the more reasonable assumption is that the simultaneous issuance of Austria's ultimatum at Belgrade and Germany's warning to the Powers was the result of a concerted action and had a common purpose. No court or jury, reasoning along the ordinary inferences of human life, would question this conclusion.

    The communication from the German Foreign Office last referred to anticipates that Servia "will refuse to comply with these demands"--why, if they were justified?--and Germany suggests to France, England, and Russia that if, as a result of such noncompliance, Austria has "recourse to military measures," that "the choice of means must be left to it."

    The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed

    to lay particular stress on the view that the above question
    is one, the settlement of which devolves solely upon
    Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the Powers should
    earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,

    and the instruction added that Germany strongly desired

    that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of
    another Power, on account of the various alliance
    obligations, would bring consequences impossible to
    measure
    .

    This is one of the most significant documents in the whole correspondence. If the German Foreign Office were as ignorant as its Ambassador at London affected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany were not then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous course, why should the German Chancellor have served this threatening notice upon England, France, and Russia, that Austria "must" be left free to make war upon Servia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker nation would "bring consequences impossible to measure"?[12]

    [Footnote 12: German White Paper, Annex 1 B.]

    A still more important piece of evidence is the carefully prepared confidential communication, which the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Federated Governments of Germany shortly after the Servian reply was given.

    In this confidential communication, which was nothing less than a call to arms to the entire German Empire, and which probably intended to convey the intimation that without formal mobilization the constituent states of Germany should begin to prepare for eventualities, von Bethmann-Hollweg recognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty "to take the part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if Austria's case was so clearly justified?

    The Imperial Chancellor added that

    if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in
    this conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,

    but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would therefore alone

    bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the
    Austro-Servian question, which all the rest of the great
    European Powers wish to localize.

    In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor declares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of Servia by Austria. He says, "our closest interests therefore summon us to the side of Austria-Hungary," and he adds that

    if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the
    intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an Ally,
    we should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the
    entire might of the German Empire.[13]

    [Footnote 13: German White Paper, Annex 2.]

    It staggers ordinary credulity to believe that this portentous warning to the constituents of the German Empire to prepare for "the Day" should not have been written with advance knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum, which had only been issued on July 23d and only reached the other capitals of Europe on July 24th.

    The subsequent naïve disclaimer by the German Foreign Office of any expectation that Austria's attack upon Servia could possibly have any interest to other European Powers is hardly consistent with its assertion that Germany's "closest interests" were involved in the question, or the portentous warnings to the States of the Empire to prepare for eventualities.

    The German Ambassador to the United States who attempted early in the controversy and with disastrous results, to allay the rising storm of indignation in that country, formally admitted in an article in the Independent of September 7, 1914, that Germany "did approve in advance the Austrian ultimatum to Servia."

    Why then was Germany guilty of duplicity in disclaiming, concurrently with its issuance, any such responsibility? The answer is obvious.

    This was necessary to support its contention that the quarrel between Austria and Servia was purely "local."

    NOTE.--In Chapter VII it will appear from the French Yellow Book that the Prime Minister of Bavaria had knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum before its delivery in Belgrade.

    CHAPTER V

    THE ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA

    To convince any reasonable man that this Austrian ultimatum to Servia was brutal in its tone and unreasonable in its demands, and that the reply of Servia was as complete an acquiescence as Servia could make without a fatal compromise of its sovereignty and self-respect, it is only necessary to print in parallel columns the demands of Austria and the reply of Servia.

    AUSTRIA'S ULTIMATUM TO SERVIA

    "To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Government sees
    itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government
    a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous
    propaganda against the Monarchy; in other words, the whole
    series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach
    from the Monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it
    undertakes to suppress by every means this criminal and
    terrorist propaganda.

    "In order to give a formal character to this undertaking the
    Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of
    its 'Official Journal' of the 26th July, the following
    declaration:

    "'The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda
    directed against Austria-Hungary--i.e., the general
    tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the
    Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and
    it sincerely deplores the fatal consequence of these
    criminal proceedings.

    "'The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers
    and functionaries participated in the above-mentioned
    propaganda, and thus compromised the good neighborly
    relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged
    by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909.

    "'The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all
    idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the
    destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of
    Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn
    officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the
    kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the
    utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such
    machinations, which it will use all its efforts to
    anticipate and suppress.'

    "This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to
    the Royal Army as an order of the day by His Majesty the
    King and shall be published in the 'Official Bulletin' of
    the Army.

    "'The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

    "1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and
    contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general
    tendency of which is directed against its territorial
    integrity;

    "2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Narodna
    Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to
    proceed in the same manner against other societies and their
    branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the
    Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take
    the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved
    from continuing their activity under another name and form;

    "3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in
    Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as
    regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves,
    or might serve, to foment the propaganda against
    Austria-Hungary:

    "4. To remove from the military service, and from the
    administration in general, all officers and functionaries
    guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
    whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government
    reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal
    Government;

    "5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives
    of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the
    subversive movement directed against the territorial
    integrity of the Monarchy;

    "6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the
    plot of the 28th June who are on Servian territory.
    Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part
    in the investigation relating thereto;

    "7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija
    Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a
    Servian State employé, who have been compromised by the
    results of the magisterial enquiry at Serajevo;

    "8. To prevent by effective measures the coöperation of the
    Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and
    explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish
    severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz
    and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of
    the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the
    frontier;

    "9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with
    explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high
    Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who,
    notwithstanding their official position, did not hesitate
    after the crime of the 28th June to express themselves in
    interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian
    Government; and finally,

    "10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without
    delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the
    preceding heads.

    "The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the reply of the
    Royal Government at the latest by six o'clock on Saturday
    evening, the 25th July."

    "The Royal Servian Government is of the opinion that it is
    mutually advantageous not to hinder the settlement of this
    question, and therefore, in case the Austro-Hungarian
    Government should not consider itself satisfied with this
    answer, it is ready as always to accept a peaceful solution,
    either by referring the decision of this question to the
    international tribunal at The Hague, or by leaving it to the
    great Powers who coöperated in the preparation of the
    explanation given by the Servian Government on the 17th-31st
    March, 1909."

    THE SERVIAN REPLY

    "The Royal Government has received the notification of the
    Austro-Hungarian Government of the 10th inst., and is
    convinced that its answer will remove every misunderstanding
    that threatens to disturb the pleasant neighborly relations
    between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Servian
    Kingdom.

    "The Royal Government is certain that in dealing with the
    great neighboring monarchy these protests have under no
    pretexts been renewed which formerly were made both in the
    Skupshtina and in explanations and negotiations of
    responsible representatives of the State, and which, through
    the declaration of the Servian Government of March 18, 1909,
    were settled; furthermore, that since that time none of the
    various successive Governments of the kingdom, nor any of
    its officers, has made an attempt to change the political
    and legal conditions set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    The
    Royal Government is certain that the Austro-Hungarian
    Government has made no representations of any kind along
    this line except in the case of a textbook concerning which
    the Austro-Hungarian Government received an entirely
    satisfactory reply. Servia, during the Balkan crisis, gave
    evidence in numerous cases of her pacific and temperate
    policies, and it will be thanks to Servia alone and the
    sacrifices that she alone made in the interest of European
    peace if that peace continue.

    "The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for
    utterances of a private character such as newspaper articles
    and the peaceful work of societies, utterances which are
    quite ordinary in almost all countries, and which are not
    generally under State control, especially since the Royal
    Government, in the solution of a great number of questions
    that came up between Servia and Austria-Hungary, showed much
    consideration as a result of which most of these questions
    were settled in the best interests of the progress of the
    two neighboring countries.

    "The Royal Government was therefore painfully surprised to
    hear the contention that Servian subjects had taken part in
    the preparations for the murder committed in Serajevo. It
    had hoped to be invited to coöperate in the investigations
    following this crime, and was prepared, in order to prove
    the entire correctness of its acts, to proceed against all
    persons concerning whom it had received information.

    "In conformity with the wish of the Austro-Hungarian
    Government, the Royal Government is prepared to turn over to
    the court, regardless of station or rank, any Servian
    subject concerning whose participation in the crime at
    Serajevo proofs may be given to it. The Government pledges
    itself especially to publish on the first page of the
    official organ of July 26th the following declaration:

    "'The Royal Servian Government condemns every propaganda
    that may be directed against Austria-Hungary; that is to
    say, all efforts designed ultimately to sever territory from
    the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and it regrets sincerely the
    sad consequences of these criminal machinations.'

    "The Royal Government regrets that, in accordance with
    advices from the Austro-Hungarian Government, certain
    Servian officers and functionaries are taking an active part
    in the present propaganda, and that they have thereby
    jeopardized the pleasant neighborly relations to the
    maintenance of which the Royal Government was formally
    pledged by the declaration of March 31, 1909.

    "The Government (what follows here is similar to the text
    demanded).

    "The Royal Government further pledges itself:

    "1. To introduce a provision in the press law on the
    occasion of the next regular session of the Skupshtina,
    according to which instigations to hatred and contempt of
    the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, as well as any publication
    directed in general against the territorial integrity of
    Austria-Hungary, shall be punished severely.

    "The Government pledges itself, on the occasion of the
    coming revision of the Constitution, to add to Article XXII.
    a clause permitting the confiscation of publications, the
    confiscation of which, under the present Article XXII. of
    the Constitution, would be impossible.

    "2. The Government possesses no proof--and the Note of the
    Austro-Hungarian Government provides it with none--that the
    'Narodna Odbrana' Society and other similar associations
    have up to the present committed any criminal acts through
    any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government
    will accept the demand of the Austro-Hungarian Government
    and dissolve the Narodna Odbrana Society, as well as all
    societies that may work against Austria-Hungary.

    "3. The Royal Servian Government agrees to eliminate
    forthwith from public education in Servia everything that
    might help the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, provided
    that the Austro-Hungarian Government gives it actual proof
    of this propaganda.

    "4. The Royal Government is also ready to discharge from
    military and civil service such officers--provided it is
    proved against them by legal investigation--who have
    implicated themselves in acts directed against the
    territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; the
    Government expects that, for the purpose of instituting
    proceedings, the Austro-Hungarian Government will impart the
    names of these officers and employés and the acts of which
    they are accused.

    "5. The Royal Servian Government must confess that it is
    not quite clear as to the sense and scope of the desire
    of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the effect that the
    Royal Servian Government bind itself to allow the
    coöperation within its territory of representatives of the
    Austro-Hungarian Government, but it nevertheless declares
    itself willing to permit such coöperation as might be in
    conformity with international law and criminal procedure,
    as well as with friendly neighborly relations.

    "6. The Royal Government naturally holds itself bound to
    institute an investigation against all such persons as were
    concerned in the plot of June 15th-28th, or are supposed to
    have been concerned in it, and are on Servian soil. As to
    the coöperation of special delegates of the Austro-Hungarian
    Government in this investigation, the Servian Government
    cannot accept such coöperation, since this would be a
    violation of the laws and criminal procedure. However, in
    individual cases, information as to the progress of the
    investigation might be given to the Austro-Hungarian
    delegates.

    "7. On the very evening on which your Note arrived the Royal
    Government caused the arrest of Major Voislar Tankosic.
    But, regarding Milan Ciganovic, who is a subject of the
    Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and who was employed until June
    15th (as candidate) in the Department of Railroads it has
    not been possible to arrest this man up till now, for which
    reason a warrant has been issued against him.

    "The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested, in order that
    the investigation may be made as soon as possible, to make
    known in the specified form what grounds of suspicion exist,
    and the proofs of guilt collected at the investigation in
    Serajevo.

    "8. The Servian Government will increase the severity and
    scope of its measures against the smuggling of arms and
    explosives.

    "It goes without saying that it will at once start an
    investigation and mete out severe punishment to the frontier
    officials of the Sabac-Loznica line who failed in their duty
    and allowed those responsible for the crime to cross the
    frontier.

    "9. The Royal Government is willing to give explanations of
    the statements made in interviews by its officials in Servia
    and foreign countries after the crime, and which, according
    to the Austro-Hungarian Government, were anti-Austrian, as
    soon as the said Government indicates where these statements
    were made, and provides proofs that such statements were
    actually made by the said officials. The Royal Government
    will itself take steps to collect the necessary proofs and
    means of transmission for this purpose.

    "10. The Royal Government will, in so far as this has not
    already occurred in this Note, inform the Austro-Hungarian
    Government of the taking of the measures concerning the
    foregoing matters, as soon as such measures have been
    ordered and carried out.

    It increases the ineffaceable discredit of this brutal ultimatum when we consider the relative size of the two nations. Austria has a population of over 50,000,000 and Servia about 4,000,000. Moreover, Servia had just emerged from two terrible conflicts, from which it was still bleeding to exhaustion. Austria's ultimatum was that of a Goliath to David, and, up to the hour that this book goes to press, the result has not been different from that famous conflict.

    Germany itself had already given to Servia an intimation of its intended fate. It had anticipated the Austrian ultimatum by some pointed suggestions to Servia on its own account, for in the letter already quoted from Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey, we learn that the German Secretary of State told the British Ambassador before the ultimatum was issued that he

    on several occasions, in conversation with the Servian
    Minister, emphasized the extreme importance that
    Austro-Servian relations should be put on a proper
    footing.[14]

    [Footnote 14: In English White Paper, No. 2.]

    This pointed intimation from Germany, thus preceding the formal ultimatum from Austria, naturally gave Servia a quick appreciation that within the short space allowed by the ultimatum, it must either acquiesce in grossly unreasonable demands or perish as an independent nation.

    To appreciate fully the brutality of this ultimatum let us imagine a precise analogy.

    The relations of France and Germany--leaving aside the important difference of relative size--are not unlike the relations that existed between Servia and Austria. In 1908, Austria had forcibly annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, both of them Slav countries, and when Servia had emerged from the Balko-Turkish War with signal credit to itself, it was again Austria that had intervened and deprived it of the fruit of its victories by denying it access to the sea.

    Similarly, by the Treaty of Frankfort, Germany had forcibly annexed Alsace and Lorraine from France. As there existed in Servia voluntary organizations of men, which ceaselessly agitated for the recovery of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so in France similar patriotic organizations have for the last forty years continuously agitated for a war which would lead to the ultimate recovery of Alsace and Lorraine. The statue of Strassburg in the Place de la Concorde has been covered with the emblems of mourning from the time that Bismarck wrung from Jules Favre the cession of the Rhine territory.

    If Austria's grievance against Servia were just, Germany has an equal and similar grievance against France.

    Under these circumstances let us suppose that on the occasion of the visit of the German Crown Prince to Strassburg, that an Alsatian citizen of German nationality, having strong French sympathies, had assassinated the Crown Prince, and that France had formally disclaimed any complicity in the assassination and expressed its sympathy and regret.

    Mutatis mutandis, let us suppose that Germany had thereupon issued to France the same ultimatum that Austria issued to Servia, requiring France to acknowledge moral responsibility for a crime, which it steadily disavowed.

    The ultimatum to France in that event would have included a peremptory demand that the government of France, a proud and self-respecting country, should publish in the Official Journal, and communicate as an "order of the day" to the army of France, a statement that the French Government formally denounced all attempts to recover Alsace and Lorraine; that it regretted the participation of French officers in the murder of the German Crown Prince; that it engaged to suppress in the Press of France any expressions of hatred or contempt for Germany; that it would dissolve all patriotic societies that have for their object the recovery of the "lost provinces"; that it would eliminate from the public schools of France all instruction which served to foment feeling against Germany; that it would remove from its army all officers who had joined in the agitation against Germany; that it would accept in the courts of France the participation of German officials in determining who were guilty, either of the Strassburg murder or of the propaganda for the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine; that it would further proceed to arrest and punish certain French officers, whom the German Government charged with participating in the offensive propaganda, and that it would furnish the German Government with full explanations and information in reference to its execution of these peremptory demands.

    Let us suppose that such an ultimatum having been sent, that France had been given forty-eight hours to comply with conditions which were obviously fatal to its self-respect and forever destructive of its prestige as a great Power.

    Can it be questioned what the reply of France or the judgment of the world would be in such a quarrel?

    Every fair-minded man would say without hesitation that such an ultimatum would be an unprecedented outrage upon the fine proprieties of civilized life.

    The only difference between the two cases is the fact that in the case of Germany and France the power issuing the ultimatum would be less than double the size of that nation which it sought to coerce, while in the case of Austria and Servia, the aggressor was twelve times as powerful as the power whose moral prestige and political independence it sought to destroy.

    In view of the nature of these demands, the assurance which Austria subsequently gave Russia, that she would do nothing to lessen the territory of Servia, goes for nothing. From the standpoint of Servia, it would have been far better to lose a part of its territory and keep its independence and self-respect as to the remainder, than to retain all its existing land area, and by submitting to the ultimatum become virtually a vassal state of Austria.

    Certainly if Servia had acquiesced fully in Austria's demands without any qualification or reservation (as for the sake of peace it almost did), then Austria would have enjoyed a moral protectorate over all of Servia's territory, and its ultimate fate might have been that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which Austria first governed as a protectorate, and later forcibly annexed.

    CHAPTER VI

    THE PEACE PARLEYS

    The issuance of the Austrian ultimatum precipitated a grave crisis. It did not, however, present any insoluble problem. Peace could and should have been preserved. Its preservation is always possible when nations, which may be involved in a controversy, are inspired by a reasonably pacific purpose. Only when the masses of the people are inflamed with a passionate desire for war, and in a time of popular hysteria responsible statesmen are helplessly borne along the turgid flow of events as bubbles are carried by the swift current of a swollen river, is peace a visionary dream.

    It is the peculiarity of the present crisis that no such popular hysteria existed. No popular demand for war developed until after it was virtually precipitated. Even then large classes of workingmen, both in Germany and France, protested.

    The peoples of the various countries had scant knowledge of the issues which had been raised by their diplomats and had little, if any, interest in the Servian trouble. The chief exception to this was in Austria, where unquestionably popular feeling had been powerfully excited by the murder of the Archduke and where there had been, especially in Vienna, popular manifestations in favor of war. In Russia also there was not unnaturally a strong undercurrent of popular sympathy for Servia.

    The writer was in the Engadine at the time referred to, and cosmopolitan St. Moritz, although a little place, was, in its heterogeneous population, Europe in microcosmic form. There the average man continued to enjoy his mid-summer holiday and refused to believe that so great a catastrophe was imminent until the last two fateful days in July. The citizens of all nations continued to fraternize, and were one in amazement that a war could be precipitated on causes in which the average man took so slight an interest.

    Unembarrassed by any popular clamor, this war could have been prevented, and the important question presents itself to the Supreme Court of Civilization as to the moral responsibility for the failure of the negotiations.

    Which of the two groups of powers sincerely worked for peace and which obstructed those efforts?

    In reaching its conclusion our imaginary Court would pay little attention to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an individual, can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, "Art thou in health, my brother?" and even the peace of civilization can be betrayed by a Judas-kiss. Professions of peace belong to the cant of diplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations.

    No war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending that his nation wished nothing but peace, and invoking divine aid for its murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a noted occasion, when Sir Joseph Surface talked much of "honor," it might be as well in such instances to leave the name of God out of the question.

    The writer will so far anticipate the conclusions, which he thinks these records indisputably show, as to suggest the respective attitudes of the different groups of diplomats and statesmen as revealed by these papers. If the reader will realize fully the policy which from the first animated Germany and Austria, then the documents hereinafter quoted will acquire new significance.

    Germany and Austria had determined to impose their will upon Servia, even though it involved a European war. From the outset they clearly recognized such a possibility and were willing to accept the responsibility.

    The object to be gained was something more than a neutralization of the pro-Slav propaganda. It was to subject Servia to such severe punitive measures that thereafter her independence of will and moral sovereignty would be largely impaired, if not altogether destroyed.

    To do this it was not enough to have Servia take measures to prevent pro-Slav agitation within her borders. Austria neither wanted nor expected the acceptance of her impossible ultimatum.

    It planned to submit such an ultimatum as Servia could not possibly accept and, to make this result doubly sure, it was thought desirable to give not only Servia but Europe the minimum time to take any preventive measures. Giving to Servia only forty-eight hours within which to reach a decision and to Europe barely twenty-four hours to protect the peace of the world, it was thought that Servia would do one of two things, either of which would be of incalculable importance to Germany and Austria.

    If Servia accepted the ultimatum for lack of time to consider it, then its self-respect was hopelessly compromised and its independence largely destroyed. Thenceforth she would be, at least morally, a mere vassal of Austria.

    If, however, Servia declined to accept the ultimatum, then war would immediately begin and Servia would be, as was thought, speedily subjected to punitive measures of such a drastic character that the same result would be attained.

    From the commencement, both Germany and Austria recognized the possibility that Russia might intervene to protect Servia. To prevent this it was important that Russia and her allies of the Triple Entente should be given as little time as possible to consider their action, and it was thought that this would probably lead to Russia's acquiescence in the punishment of Servia and, if so, France and England, having no direct interest in Servia, would also undoubtedly acquiesce.

    If, however, slow-moving Russia, instead of acquiescing, as she did in 1908 in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, should take up the gauntlet which Germany and Austria had thrown down, then it was all important to Germany and Austria that Russia should seem to be the aggressor.

    For this there were two substantial reasons: the one was Italy and the other was England. Germany and Austria desired the coöperation of Italy and could not claim it as of right under the terms of the Triple Alliance, unless they were attacked. Upon the other hand, if England believed that Russia and France had declared war upon Germany and Austria, there was little probability of her intervention. For these reasons it was important that Germany and Austria should impress both England and Italy that their purposes were sincerely pacific and that on the other hand they should so clearly provoke Russia and France that those nations would declare war.

    If the reader will keep this Janus-faced policy steadily in mind, he will understand the apparent inconsistencies in the diplomatic representations of the German Foreign Office. He will understand why Germany and Austria, while at times flouting Russia in the most flagrant manner and refusing her the common courtesies of diplomatic intercourse, were at the same time giving to England the most emphatic assurance of pacific intentions.

    With this preliminary statement, let the record speak for itself. We have seen that the first great, and as events proved, fatal obstacle to peace which Germany interposed was practically contemporaneous with the issuance of the ultimatum. Germany did not wait for any efforts at conciliation. On the contrary, it attempted to bar effectually all such efforts by serving notice upon France, England, and Russia almost simultaneously with the issuance of the Austrian ultimatum,

    that the acts as well as the demands of the Austro-Hungarian
    Government cannot but be looked upon as justified;

    and the communication concluded:

    We strongly desire that the dispute be localized, since any
    intervention of any Power on account of the various alliance
    obligations would bring consequences impossible to
    measure.[15]

    [Footnote 15: German White Paper, Annex, 1 B.]

    This had only one meaning. Austria was to be left to discipline Servia at will, or there would be war. Germany did not even wait for any suggestion of intervention, whether conciliatory or otherwise, but sought to interpose to any plan of peace, short of complete submission, an insuperable barrier by this threat of war. With this pointed threat to Europe, the next move was that of Russia, and it may be remarked that throughout the entire negotiations Russian diplomacy was more than equal to that of Germany.

    Russia contented itself in the first instance by stating on the morning of July 24th, that Russia could not remain indifferent to the Austro-Servian conflict. This attitude could not surprise any one, for Russia's interest in the Balkans was well known and its legitimate concern in the future of any Slav state was, as Sir Edward Grey had said in Parliament in March, 1913, "a commonplace in European diplomacy in the past."

    With this simple statement of its legitimate interest in a matter affecting the balance of power in Europe, Russia, instead of issuing an ultimatum or declaring war, as Germany and Austria may have hoped, joined with England in asking for a reasonable extension of time for all the Powers to concert for the preservation of peace. On July 24th, the very day that the Austrian ultimatum had reached St. Petersburg, the Russian Foreign Minister transmitted to the Austrian Government through its Chargé in Vienna the following communication:

    The communication of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the
    Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum to
    Belgrade leaves to the Powers a delay entirely insufficient
    to undertake any useful steps whatever for the straightening
    out of the complications that have arisen
    .

    To prevent the
    incalculable consequences, equally disastrous for all the
    Powers, which can follow the method of action of the
    Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems indispensable to us
    that above all the delay given to Servia to reply should be
    extended. Austria-Hungary, declaring herself disposed to
    inform the Powers of the results of the inquiry upon which
    the Imperial and Royal Government bases its accusations,
    should at least give them also the time to take note of them
    (de s'en rendre compte).
    In this case, if the Powers should
    convince themselves of the well-groundedness of certain of
    the Austrian demands they would find themselves in a
    position to send to the Servian Government consequential
    advice
    .

    A refusal to extend the terms of the ultimatum
    would deprive of all value the step taken by the
    Austro-Hungarian Government in regard to the Powers and
    would be in contradiction with the very bases of
    international relations.[16]

    [Footnote 16: Russian Orange Paper, No. 4.]

    Could any court question the justice of this contention? The peace of the world was at stake. Time only was asked to see what could be done to preserve that peace and satisfy Austria's grievances to the uttermost.

    Germany had only to intimate to Austria that "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind," as well as common courtesy to great and friendly nations, required that sufficient time be given not only to Servia, but to the other nations, to concert for the common good, especially as the period was one of mid-summer dullness, and many of the leading rulers and statesmen were absent from their respective capitals.

    If Germany made any communication to Austria in the interests of peace the text has yet to be disclosed to the world. A word from Berlin to Vienna would have given the additional time which, with sincerely pacific intentions, might have resulted in the preservation of peace. Germany, so far as the record discloses, never spoke that word.

    England had already anticipated the request of Russia that a reasonable time should be given to all interested parties. When the Austrian Minister in London handed the ultimatum to Sir Edward Grey on July the 24th, the following conversation took place, which speaks for itself:

    In the ensuing conversation with his Excellency I (Sir
    Edward Grey) remarked that it seemed to me a matter for
    great regret that a time limit, and such a short one at
    that, had been insisted upon at this stage of the
    proceedings.

    The murder of the Archduke and some of the
    circumstances respecting Servia quoted in the note aroused
    sympathy with Austria, as was but natural, but at the same
    time I had never before seen one State address to another
    independent State a document of so formidable a character
    .
    Count Mensdorff replied that the present situation might
    never have arisen if Servia had held out a hand after the
    murder of the Archduke.

    Servia had, however, shown no sign
    of sympathy or help, though some weeks had already elapsed
    since the murder; a time limit, said his Excellency, was
    essential, owing to the procrastination on Servia's part.

    I said that if Servia had procrastinated in replying a time
    limit could have been introduced later; but, as things now
    stood, the terms of the Servian reply had been dictated by
    Austria, who had not been content to limit herself to a
    demand for a reply within a limit of forty-eight hours from
    its presentation
    .

    Unfortunately both Russia and England's requests for time were refused, on the plea that they had reached the Austrian Foreign Minister too late, although it has never yet been explained why, even if Count Berchtold were unable to take up the requests before the expiration of the ultimatum, the matter might not have been reopened for a few days by a corresponding extension of the time limit.

    In the absence of some explanation, which as yet remains to be made, the absence of the Austrian Premier from Vienna at the time intervening between the issuance of the ultimatum and the expiration of the time limit seems like an extraordinarily petty piece of diplomatic finesse. He had without any warning to the great Powers of Europe, launched a thunderbolt, and if there ever was a time when a pacific foreign minister should have been at his post and open to suggestions of peace, it was in those two critical days.

    And yet, after issuing the ultimatum, he immediately takes himself beyond reach of personal parleys by going to Ischl, and this was taken by the German Foreign Office as a convenient excuse for an anticipated failure to extend this courtesy to Russia and England. Upon this we have the testimony of the English Ambassador at Berlin, who in his report to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th, says:

    [The German] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says
    that on receipt of a telegram at ten o'clock this morning
    from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed
    German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to the Austrian
    Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion, for an
    extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency
    about it. Unfortunately it appeared from the press that
    Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought
    that in these circumstances there would be delay and
    difficulty in getting time limit extended.

    Secretary of
    State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had
    ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that
    Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a
    lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also
    admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain
    of the Austro-Hungarian demands....

    A like excuse is found in a conversation with the Russian Chargé at Berlin, in which Bethmann-Hollweg expressed the fear "that in consequence of the absence of Berchtold at Ischl, and seeing the lack of time, his (Bethmann-Hollweg's telegrams suggesting delay) will remain without result."[17]

    [Footnote 17: Russian Orange Paper, No. 14.]

    These conversations are most illuminating. They refer to instructions to the German Ambassador in Vienna, which are not found in the German White Paper, although they would have thrown a searchlight upon the sincerity with which Germany "passed on" the most important request of England and Russia for a little time to save the peace of Europe, and it strongly suggests the possibility that Count Berchtold's most inopportune absence in Ischl was to be the excuse for the gross discourtesy of refusing to give any extension of time.

    Kudachef, the Russian Chargé at Vienna, did not content himself with submitting the request to the Acting Foreign Minister (Baron Macchio) but to deprive Austria of the flimsy excuse of Berchtold's absence at Ischl, the Russian Chargé went over the head of the Austrian Acting Foreign Minister and telegraphed the request for time to Count Berchtold at Ischl. Let the record tell for itself how this most reasonable request was made and refused.

    The Russian Chargé sent on July 25th the two following telegrams to the Russian Foreign Minister:

    Count Berchtold is at Ischl. Seeing the impossibility of
    arriving there in time, I have telegraphed him our proposal
    to extend the delay of the ultimatum, and I have repeated it
    verbally to Baron Macchio. This latter promised me to
    communicate it in time to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
    but added that he could predict with assurance a
    categorical refusal
    .[18]

    [Footnote 18: Russian Orange Paper, No. 11.]

    Sequel to my telegram of to-day. Have just received from
    Macchio the negative reply of the Austro-Hungarian
    Government to our proposal to prolong the delay of the
    note.[19]

    [Footnote 19: Russian Orange Paper, No. 12.]

    It is evident from the Russian Orange Paper that that country had no illusions as to the possibility of a peaceful outcome. Germany has contended that on July the 24th, before Count Berchtold made his inopportune visit to Ischl, he sent for the Russian Chargé at Vienna and assured him that the punitive measures which Austria had determined to take against Servia at all costs would not involve any territorial acquisitions.

    Of this interview the chief evidence comes indirectly from two sources, which are not entirely in accord.

    In a telegram from the German Ambassador at Vienna to the German Chancellor, dated July 24th, it is said:

    Count Berchtold to-day summoned the Russian Chargé
    d'Affaires in order to explain to him in detail and in
    friendly terms the position of Austria regarding Servia.
    After going over the historical developments of the last few
    years, he laid stress on the statement that the monarchy
    did not wish to appear against Servia in the rôle of a
    conqueror.

    He said that Austria-Hungary would demand no
    territory, that the step was merely a definitive measure
    against Servian machinations; that Austria-Hungary felt
    herself obliged to exact guarantees for the future friendly
    behavior of Servia toward the monarchy; that he had no
    intention of bringing about a shifting of the balance of
    power in the Balkans. The Chargé d'Affaires, who as yet had
    no instructions from St. Petersburg, took the explanations
    of the Minister ad referendum adding that he would
    immediately transmit them to Sazonof.[20]

    [Footnote 20: German White Paper, No. 3.]

    In a report of the same interview from the English Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward Grey, it is said:

    Russian Chargé d'Affaires was received this morning by
    Minister for Foreign Affairs, and said to him, as his own
    personal view, that Austrian note was drawn up in a form
    rendering it impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that
    it was both unusual and peremptory in its terms. Minister of
    Foreign Affairs replied that Austrian Minister was under
    instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian demands were
    accepted integrally by 4 P.M. to-morrow. His Excellency
    added that Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at
    stake; and that the step taken had caused great satisfaction
    throughout the country.

    He did not think that objections to
    what had been done could be raised by any power.[21]

    [Footnote 21: English White Papers, No. 7.]

    It will be noted that in the report of the English Ambassador there is no suggestion of any disclaimer of an intention to take Servian territory.

    In the Russian Orange Paper, we find no report from its representative at Vienna of any such interview and Austria has never produced any document or memorandum either of such an interview or of such a concession to Russia. It is probable that such a concession was made, as Germany contends, and if so, Russian diplomacy was far too keen to be led upon a false trail by this empty promise and as the evidences multiplied that Austria would not consider either an extension of time or any modification of its terms and that Germany was acting in complete accord and coöperated with her Ally, the probability of war was unmistakable.

    Sazonof at once sent for the English and French Ambassadors, and the substance of the conference is embodied in the telegram from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 24th, which throws a strong light upon the double effort of Russia and France to preserve the peace and also as an obvious necessity to prepare for the more probable issue of war:

    Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's conduct was
    both provocative and immoral; she would never have taken
    such action unless Germany had first been consulted; some of
    her demands were quite impossible of acceptance. He hoped
    that his Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim
    their solidarity with Russia and France.

    The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France
    would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance
    with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia
    strongly in any diplomatic negotiations.

    I said that I would telegraph a full report to you of what
    their Excellencies had just said to me. I could not, of
    course, speak in the name of his Majesty's Government, but
    personally I saw no reason to expect any declaration of
    solidarity from his Majesty's Government that would entail
    an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia
    and France by force of arms. Direct British interests in
    Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would
    never be sanctioned by British public opinion.

    To this M.
    Sazonof replied that we must not forget that the general
    European question was involved, the Servian question being
    but a part of the former, and that Great Britain could not
    afford to efface herself from the problems now at issue.

    In reply to these remarks I observed that I gathered from
    what he said that his Excellency was suggesting that Great
    Britain should join in making a communication to Austria to
    the effect that active intervention by her in the internal
    affairs of Servia could not be tolerated. But, supposing
    Austria nevertheless proceeded to embark on military
    measures against Servia in spite of our representations, was
    it the intention of the Russian Government forthwith to
    declare war on Austria?

    M. Sazonof said that he himself thought that Russian
    mobilization would at any rate have to be carried out; but
    a council of ministers was being held this afternoon to
    consider the whole question. A further council would be
    held, probably to-morrow, at which the Emperor would
    preside, when a decision would be come to....

    Had England then followed the sagacious suggestion of Sazonof, would war have been averted?

    Possibly, perhaps probably. Germany's principal fear was the intervention of England. In view of its supremacy on the seas this was natural. It was England's intimation in the Moroccan crisis of 1911, made in Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, which at that time induced Germany to reverse the engines. Might not the same intimation in 1914 have had a like effect upon the mad counsels of Potsdam? The answer can only be a matter of conjecture. It depends largely upon how deep-seated the purpose of Germany may have been to provoke a European war at a time when Russia, France, or England were not fully prepared.

    It does not follow that if Sazonof was right, Sir Edward Grey was necessarily wrong in declining to align England definitely with Russia and France at that stage. He was the servant of a democratic nation and could not ignore the public opinion of his country as freely as the Russian Foreign Minister. To take such a course, it would have been necessary for Grey to submit the matter to Parliament, and while with a large liberal majority his policy might have been endorsed, yet it would have been after such an acrimonious discussion and such vehement protests that England would have stood before the world "as a house divided against itself."

    Both Sazonof and Sir Edward Grey from their respective standpoints were right. Neither made a single false step in the great controversy.

    As a result of this interview, Russia, England, and France, after the request for time had been abruptly refused, next proceeded in the interests of peace to persuade Servia to make as conciliatory a reply to the impossible ultimatum as was possible without a fatal compromise of her political independence.

    While the lack of time prevented France and Russia from making any formal communication to Servia on the question, yet Sazonof had a conference with the Servian Minister and discussed the wisdom of avoiding an attack on Belgrade by having the Servian forces withdrawn to the interior and then appealing to the Powers, and Russia thereupon made the broad and magnanimous suggestion that if Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy.

    This interview, as reported by the British Ambassador at St.

    Petersburg to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th, is as follows:

    I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and
    communicated to his Excellency the substance of your
    telegram of to-day to Paris, and this afternoon, I discussed
    with him the communication which the French Ambassador
    suggested should be made to the Servian Government, as
    recorded in your telegram of yesterday to Belgrade....

    The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite
    ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved
    to be guilty, but that no independent State could be
    expected to accept the political demands which had been put
    forward. The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a
    conversation which he had with the Servian Minister
    yesterday, that in the event of the Austrians attacking
    Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade and
    withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at
    the same time appeal to the Powers to help them.

    His
    Excellency was in favor of their making this appeal. He
    would like to see the question placed on an international
    footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to
    which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were
    given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

    If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be
    quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the
    hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was
    possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to
    submit the question to arbitration.

    Pursuant to this policy of conciliation Sir Edward Grey in direct communication with the Servian Minister at London, Mr. Crackenthorpe, the British Ambassador at Belgrade, in direct communication with the Servian Foreign Ministry, and Sazonof in interviews with the Servian Minister at St. Petersburg, all brought direct influence upon Servia to make a conciliatory reply.

    Thus Sir Edward Grey instructed Crackenthorpe:

    Servia ought to promise that if it is proved that Servian
    officials, however subordinate they may be, were accomplices
    in the murder of the Archduke at Serajevo, she will give
    Austria the fullest satisfaction. She certainly ought to
    express concern and regret. For the rest, Servian Government
    must reply to Austrian demands as they consider best in
    Servian interests.

    It is impossible to say whether military action by Austria
    when time limit expires can be averted by anything but
    unconditional acceptance of her demands, but only chance
    appears to lie in avoiding an absolute refusal and replying
    favorably to as many points as the time limit allows....

    I have urged upon the German Ambassador that Austria should
    not precipitate military action.[22]

    [Footnote 22: English White Paper, No. 12.]

    In response to these suggestions, Mr. Crackenthorpe communicated Sir Edward Grey's pacific suggestions to the Servian Minister and received the following reply, as reported in Crackenthorpe's report to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 25th.

    The Council of Ministers is now drawing up their reply to
    the Austrian note. I am informed by the Under Secretary of
    State for Foreign Affairs that it will be most conciliatory
    and will meet the Austrian demands in as large a measure as
    is possible....

    The Servian Government consider that, unless the Austrian
    Government want war at any cost, they cannot but be content
    with the full satisfaction offered in the Servian reply.[23]

    [Footnote 23: English White Paper, No. 21.]

    These pacific suggestions to Servia met with complete success, and as a result that country on July 25th, and before the expiration of the ultimatum, made a reply to Austria which astonished the world with its spirit of conciliation and for a short time gave rise to optimistic hopes of peace.

    At some sacrifice of its self-respect as a sovereign State, it accepted substantially the demands of Austria, with a few minor reservations, which it expressed its willingness to refer either to arbitration at The Hague Tribunal or to a conference of the Powers.[24]

    [Footnote 24: English White Paper, No. 39.]

    Neither Germany nor Austria seriously contended that the reply was not on its face a substantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian demands. They contented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of the assurances, calling the concessions "shams." Unless Austria, in asking assurances from Servia, were content to accept them as made in good faith and allow their sincerity to be determined by future deeds, why should the ultimatum, calling for such assurances, have been made?

    If Germany and Austria had accepted Servia's reply as sufficient, and Servia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises in the utmost good faith, there would have been little sympathy for Servia, and no general war. Russia and England pledged their influence to compel Servia, if necessary, to meet fully any reasonable demand of Austria.

    The principal outstanding question, which Servia agreed to arbitrate or leave to the Powers, was the participation of Austrian officials in the Servian courts. This did not present a difficult problem.

    Austria's professed desire for an impartial investigation could have been easily attained by having the Powers appoint a commission of neutral jurists to make such investigation.

    In any event, Austria could have accepted the very substantial concessions of Servia and without prejudice to its rights proceeded to The Hague Tribunal or to a concert of the Powers as to the few and comparatively simple open points. When one recalls the infinite treasure of property and life, which would thus have been saved the world, had Germany and Austria accepted this reasonable and pacific course, one can only exclaim, "But oh, the pity of it!"

    It is significant that while the entire official German press gave ample space to the Austrian ultimatum and rejoiced in Austria's energetic attitude, it withheld from the German people any adequate information as to the conciliatory nature of the Servian reply, for the Russian Chargé at Berlin telegraphed to Sazonof:

    The Wolff Bureau has not published the text of the Servian
    response which was communicated to it. Up to this moment
    this note has not appeared in extenso in any of local
    journals, which according to all the evidence do not wish to
    give it a place in their columns, understanding the calming
    effect which this publication would produce upon the German
    readers.[25]

    [Footnote 25: Russian Orange Paper, No. 46.]

    Instead of getting the truth, the Berlin populace proceeded to make riotous demonstrations against the Russian and Servian Embassies.

    The time limit on the ultimatum expired on July the 25th at six o'clock in the evening.

    There is no more significant and at the same time discreditable feature of an infinitely discreditable chapter in history than that the Austrian Government, without giving the Servian answer the consideration even of a single hour, immediately severed all diplomatic intercourse with Belgrade and at 6.30 P.M. the Minister of Austria

    informed the Servian Government by note that, not having
    received within the delay fixed a satisfactory response, he
    is leaving Belgrade with the whole personnel of the
    legation.

    On the same night Austria ordered the mobilization of a considerable part of its army.

    Notwithstanding these rebuffs, England, France, and Russia continued to labor for peace, and made further pacific suggestions, all of which fell upon deaf ears.

    On July 25th, Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four Powers (England, France, Italy, and Germany) should unite

    in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross
    the frontier and to give time for the four Powers, acting at
    Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If
    Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and
    ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly
    coöperate.[26]

    [Footnote 26: English White Paper, Nos. 24 and 25.]

    To this reasonable request the German Chancellor replied:

    The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between the
    Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian conflict is quite correct.
    We wish as little as England to mix in the first, and, first
    and last, we take the ground that this question must be
    localized by the abstention of all the Powers from
    intervention in it. It is therefore our earnest hope that
    Russia will refrain from any active intervention, conscious
    of her responsibility and of the seriousness of the
    situation.

    If an Austro-Russian dispute should arise, we are
    ready, with the reservation of our known duties as Allies,
    to coöperate with the other great Powers in mediation
    between Russia and Austria.[27]

    [Footnote 27: German White Paper, Exhibit 13.]

    This distinction is hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia's current difference with Austria concerned the attempt of the latter to crush Servia without interference. Russia claimed such right of intervention. Germany would not interfere in the former matter, but would abstractly but not concretely mediate between Russia and Austria in the latter. Mediate about what? To refuse to mediate over the Servian question was to refuse to mediate at all. For all practical purposes the two things were indistinguishable.

    All that Germany did on July 25th, so far as the record discloses, was to "pass on" England's and Russia's requests for more time, but subsequent events indicate that it was "passed on" without any endorsement, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its ally's request for more time if it had ever been made? Here again we note with disappointment the absence from the record of Germany's message to Austria, "passing on" the reasonable request for an extension of time. The result indicates that the request received, if any endorsement, the "faint praise" which is said to "damn."

    Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext? A little time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to preserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted. A snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging diplomats. The peace of the world was to be torpedoed by submarine diplomacy. The Austrian Government could wait nearly three months to try the assassin, who admittedly slew the Austrian Archduke, but could not wait even a few hours before condemning Servia to political death.

    It could not grant Russia any time to consider a matter gravely affecting its interests, even if the peace of Europe and the happiness of the world depended on it. It would be difficult to find in recorded history a greater discourtesy to a friendly Power, for Austria was not at war with Russia.

    Defeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France, and Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily arresting military proceedings until further efforts toward conciliation could be made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany, France, Russia, and Italy that they should unite in asking Austria and Servia not to cross the frontier "until we had had time to try and arrange matters between them," but the German Ambassador read Sir Edward Grey a telegram that he had received from the German Foreign Office saying

    that his Government had not known beforehand, and had had no
    more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the
    Austrian note to Servia, but that once she had launched that
    note, Austria could not draw back. Prince Lichnowsky said,
    however, that if what I contemplated was mediation between
    Austria and Russia, Austria might be able with dignity to
    accept it. He expressed himself as personally favorable to
    this suggestion.

    It will be noted that Germany thus gave to England, as it had already given to Russia and France in the most unequivocal terms, a disclaimer of any responsibility for the Austrian ultimatum, but we have already seen that when the German Foreign Office prepared its statement for the German nation, which was circulated in the Reichstag on August 4th, Germany confessed the insincerity of these assurances by admitting that before the ultimatum was issued the Austrian Government had advised the German Foreign Office of its intentions and asked its opinion and that

    we were able to assure our ally most heartily of our
    agreement with her view of the situation and to assure her
    that any action that she might consider it necessary to take
    ... would receive our approval.

    Here again it is to be noted that the telegram, which the German Foreign Office sent to Prince Lichnowsky, and which that diplomat simply read to Sir Edward Grey, is not set forth in the exhibits to the German White Paper.

    As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought in any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession until after the Kaiser's return from Norway and then only if we accept the assurances of its Foreign Office which are not supported by official documents. Its attitude was shown by the declaration of its Ambassador at Paris to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, while again disclaiming that Germany had countenanced the Austrian ultimatum, yet added that Germany "approved" its point of view,

    and that certainly, the arrow once sent, Germany could not
    allow herself to be guided except by her duty as ally.[28]

    [Footnote 28: Russian Orange Paper, No. 19.]

    This seemed to be the fatal error of Germany, that its duties to civilization were so slight that it should support its ally, Austria, whether the latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, and it carried it out with fatal consistency. To support its ally in actual war without respect to the justice of the quarrel may be defensible, but to support it in a time of peace in an iniquitous demand and a policy of gross discourtesy to friendly States offends every sense of international morality.

    On the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter into an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in common of some clauses of the Austrian ultimatum. To this Austria never even replied.

    The Russian Minister communicated this suggestion to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he would "find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal," but this did not accord with German policy, for on that day the German Ambassador in Paris called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and submitted the following formal declaration:

    "Austria has declared to Russia that she does not seek
    territorial acquisitions, and that she does not threaten the
    integrity of Servia. Her only object is to insure her own
    tranquillity. Consequently it rests with Russia to avoid
    war. Germany feels herself at one with France in her keen
    desire to preserve the peace, and strongly hopes that France
    will use her influence at St.

    Petersburg in the direction of
    moderation." The [French] Minister observed that Germany
    could on her side take similar steps at Vienna, especially
    in view of the conciliatory spirit which Servia had shown.
    The Ambassador answered that that was not possible, in
    view of the resolution taken not to interfere in the
    Austro-Servian conflict.
    Thereupon the Minister asked if
    the four Powers--England, Germany, Italy, and France--were
    not able to take steps at St. Petersburg and Vienna, since
    the affair reduced itself in essentials to a conflict
    between Russia and Austria.

    The Ambassador pleaded the
    absence of instructions. Finally, the Minister refused to
    adhere to the German proposal.[29]

    [Footnote 29: Russian Orange Paper, No. 28.]

    This significant interview states the consistent attitude of Germany.

    The burden is put upon France to induce its ally to desist from any intervention and thus give Austria a free hand, while Germany emphatically declines to promote the same pacific object by suggesting to Austria a more conciliatory course.

    On the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in London for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of Europe, and to this fruitful suggestion, which might have saved that peace, the German Secretary of State, after conferring with the British Ambassador at Berlin, replied that the conference

    would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could
    not, in his opinion, be called together except at the
    request of Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall
    in with your [Sir Edward Grey's] suggestion, desirous though
    he was to coöperate for the maintenance of peace. I [Sir E.
    Goschen] said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do
    with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four
    nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest
    means for avoiding a dangerous situation.

    He [von Jagow]
    maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed
    was not practicable.[30]

    [Footnote 30: English White Paper, No. 43.]

    Germany's refusal to have Servia's case submitted to the Powers even for their consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that on the same day the German Ambassador at London quoted the German Secretary of State as saying

    that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia
    could hardly be expected to accept,

    thus recognizing that Austria's ultimatum was, at least in part, unjust. Sir Edward Grey then called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Servia and marched into that country

    it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all
    costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be
    involved.

    He added that the Servian reply

    should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and
    pause,

    and asked that the German Government should urge this at Vienna but, as we have already seen, the German Secretary of State had already replied that such a conference "was not practicable," and that it "would practically amount to a court of arbitration," and could not, in his opinion, be called together "except at the request of Austria and Russia."[31]

    [Footnote 31: English White Paper, No. 16.]

    That this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. Germany already knew that Austria would not ask for such a conference, for Austria had already refused Russia's request for an extension of time and had actually commenced its military operations.

    Germany's attitude is again clearly indicated by the letter of the Russian Minister in Germany to the Russian Foreign Office in which he states that on July 27th he called at the German Foreign Office and asked it,

    to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to take up
    this line of conciliation. Von Jagow replied that he could
    not advise Austria to yield.[32]

    [Footnote 32: Russian Orange Paper, No. 38.]

    Why not? Russia and its allies had advised Servia to yield and Servia had conceded nearly every claim. Why could not the German Foreign Office advise Vienna to meet conciliation by conciliation, if its desire for peace were sincere?

    Before this interview took place, the French Ambassador had called at the German Foreign Office on a similar errand and urged the English suggestion that action should at once be taken by England, Germany, Russia, and France at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to the effect that Austria and Servia

    should abstain from any act which might aggravate the
    situation at the present hour.

    By this was meant that there should be, pending further parleys, no invasion of Servia by Austria and none of Austria by Russia. To this the German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical refusal.

    On the same day the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had "a long and earnest conversation" with the Austrian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He expressed the earnest hope that

    something would be done before Servia was actually invaded.
    Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a
    skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the
    Servians had been aggressors.

    The Russian Ambassador then said that his country would do all it could to keep the Servians quiet, "and even to fall back before an Austrian advance in order to gain time."

    He urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussions with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,

    who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that
    could be fairly asked of her as an independent Power.

    The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.[33]

    [Footnote 33: English White Paper, No. 56.]

    On the same day the German Ambassador at Paris called upon the French Foreign Office and "strongly insisted on the exclusion of all possibility of mediation or a conference"[34]; and yet contemporaneously the Imperial German Chancellor was advising London that he had

    started the efforts towards mediation in Vienna, immediately
    in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further
    communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of
    the Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna.

    [Footnote 34: Russian Orange Paper, No. 34.]

    What hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the German Foreign Office, after stating its conviction

    that an act of mediation could not take into consideration
    the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an
    Austro-Hungarian affair,

    claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey's further suggestion to Vienna, in which Austro-Hungary was urged

    either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient
    or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations;

    but the Austro-Hungarian Government--playing the rôle of the wicked partner of the combination--"in full appreciation of our mediatory activity" (so says the German White Paper with sardonic humor), replied to this proposition that, coming after the opening of hostilities, "it was too late."

    Can it be fairly questioned that if Germany had done something more than merely "transmit" these wise and pacific suggestions, Austria would have complied with the suggestions of its powerful ally or that Austria would have suspended its military operations if Germany had given any intimation of such a wish?

    On the following day, July 28th, the door was further closed on any possibility of compromise, when the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs

    said, quietly, but firmly, that no discussion could be
    accepted on the basis of the Servian note
    ; that war would
    be declared to-day, and that the well-known pacific
    character of the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own,
    might be accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just
    and inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled
    directly between the two parties immediately concerned.

    To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept the guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness of Austria's quarrel, the British Ambassador suggested "the larger aspect of the question," namely, the peace of Europe, and to this "larger aspect," which should have given any reasonable official some ground for pause, the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he

    had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to
    oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at
    territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be
    postponed.[35]

    [Footnote 35: English White Paper, No. 62.]

    The private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus failed, Russia returned to the proposition of a European conference to preserve its peace. Its Ambassador in Vienna on July 28th had a further conference with Berchtold and again earnestly pleaded for peace on the basis of friendly relations not only between Austria and Servia but between Austria and Russia. The conversation in the light of present developments is so significant that it bears quotation in extenso:

    I pointed out to him in the most friendly terms how much it
    was desirable to find a solution which, while consolidating
    the good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia,
    should give to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy serious
    guarantees for its future relations with Servia.

    I called the attention of Count Berchtold to all the
    dangers to the peace of Europe
    which would be brought about
    by an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Servia.

    Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well
    the seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a
    frank explanation with the Cabinet of St. Petersburg. He
    told me that on the other hand the Austro-Hungarian
    Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the
    energetic measures which it had taken against Servia, could
    now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the
    terms of the Austro-Hungarian note.

    Count Berchtold added that the crisis had become so acute
    and that public opinion had been excited to such a degree
    that the Government, even if it desired, could no longer
    consent to it, all the less, he said to me, because the very
    reply of Servia gave proof of the lack of sincerity in its
    promises for the future.

    On the same day, July 28th, the German Imperial Chancellor sent for the English Ambassador and excused his failure to accept the proposed conference of the neutral Powers, on the ground that he did not think it would be effective,

    because such a conference would, in his opinion, have the
    appearance of an "Areopagus" consisting of two Powers of
    each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining
    Powers.

    After engaging in this narrow and insincere quibble, and, being reminded of Servia's conciliatory reply,

    his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the
    Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he
    agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely
    Austrian concern, with which Russia had nothing to do.[36]

    [Footnote 36: English White Paper, No. 71.]

    At this stage of the controversy it will be noted that every proposal to preserve peace had come from the Triple Entente and that every such proposal had met with an uncompromising negative from Austria, and either that or obstructive quibbles from Germany.

    CHAPTER VII

    THE ATTITUDE OF FRANCE

    Before proceeding to record the second and final stage in the peace parleys, in which the German Kaiser became the protagonist, it is desirable to interpolate the additional data, which the French Yellow Book has given to the world since the preceding chapter was written and the first editions of this book were printed. This can be done with little sacrifice to the chronological sequence of this narrative.

    The evidence of the Yellow Book is fuller in scope and greater in detail than the other governmental publications, and while largely cumulative in its character, it serves to bring into a sharper light certain phases of this extraordinary controversy.

    It has been prepared with great care by M. Jules Cambon, who was the French Ambassador at Berlin during the controversy, and MM. de Margerie and Berthelot, experienced and influential diplomats in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It consists of 160 documents, classified into seven chapters, each dealing with different periods of time in the great controversy. The delay in its presentation is somewhat compensated by the exceptional fullness of the data which is thus submitted to the scrutiny of a candid world.

    The French Yellow Book confirms the impression that France was most fortunate in having entrusted its interests at the difficult post of Berlin in this great crisis to so distinguished and experienced a diplomat as M. Jules Cambon.

    Throughout the whole controversy the impartial reader is deeply impressed with the fact, which the more candid apologists for Germany are themselves disposed to admit, that Germany's chief weakness lay in its incapable diplomatic representatives. An interesting subject for conjecture suggests itself as to what would have happened if Prince Bismarck had been at the helm at this critical juncture. His guiding principles of statecraft with reference to foreign relations were to isolate the enemy, make him the apparent aggressor, and then crush him as effectually and speedily as possible. He never would have initiated this war. His nature was that of the fox as well as the lion.

    In the years that have succeeded his dismissal, a certain dry rot, due to the tendency of the Prussian Government to distribute its diplomatic offices among highborn but incompetent Junkers,--une petite gentilhommerie pauvre et stupide, as Bismarck once described them--had affected the efficiency of German diplomacy. Feebly attempting to walk in the steps of the Iron Chancellor, they wittingly or unwittingly reversed Bismarck's policy by almost isolating Germany, consolidating its enemies, and then proceeding to attack them simultaneously. This may have been magnificent courage, but it was not wise statecraft.

    The might of the German sabre was supposed to offset these blundering disciples of Machiavelli.

    Russia, England, and France were more fortunate and of their representatives few, if any, shone with greater intellectual distinction or moral courage than M. Jules Cambon. This distinguished diplomat had had exceptional experience in representing his country in various capitals of the world, and the author, who enjoyed the honor of his acquaintance, when he was accredited to Washington, already knew, what the documents in the French Yellow Book so clearly reveal, that Cambon was a diplomat of great intellectual ability.

    With acute sagacity he grasped the significance of the fateful events, in which he was a participant. To his calm and well-poised intellectuality he added a moral force, resulting from the clear integrity of his purpose and the broad humanity of his aims.

    On more than one occasion he spoke "in the name of humanity," and in his constant attempt to convince the German Foreign Office as to its clear duty to civilization to preserve the peace of the world, he became the representative, not merely of France, but of civilization itself.

    In this great diplomatic controversy, one of the greatest in the history of the world, the three representatives, who stand out with the greatest intellectual and moral distinction, are Sazonof, Grey, and Cambon.

    The first displayed the greatest sagacity in divining from the very outset the real purposes of Germany and Austria and in checkmating the diplomatic moves, which sought to make Russia apparently the aggressor.

    Sir Edward Grey's chief merit lay in his unwearying but ineffectual efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem and also in the absolute candor--so unusual in diplomacy--with which he dealt on the one hand with the efforts of Russia and France to align England on their side at the beginning of the quarrel, and on the other, to continue friendly negotiations with Germany and Austria, without in any respect unfairly misleading them as to England's possible ultimate action.

    The French Ambassador will justly receive the approval of posterity for the high courage and moral earnestness with which he pressed upon the German Foreign Office the inevitable consequences of its acts.

    The first chapter of the French Yellow Book consists largely of communications written from Berlin by M. Jules Cambon in the year

    1. Its most interesting document is his report from Berlin under

    date November 22, 1913, as to a conversation between the Kaiser and the King of Belgium, with reference to a change in the pacific attitude, which Cambon had previously imputed to the Kaiser.

    To the world at large this statement would be more convincing if the source of the information had been disclosed. Those who know M. Jules Cambon, however, will have a reasonable confidence that when he states that he received the record of this conversation "from an absolutely sure source," more than usual credence can be given to the statement.

    Reading between the lines, the implication is not unreasonable that the source of Cambon's authority was King Albert himself, but this rests only on a plausible conjecture.

    The fact that so trained an observer as the French Ambassador had seen in the Kaiser a marked change as early as 1913 is significant, and history may justify Cambon in his shrewd conjecture that "the impatience of the soldiers," meaning thereby the German General Staff, and the growing popularity of his chauvinistic son, the Crown Prince, had appreciably modified the pacific attitude of the Kaiser, which had served the cause of peace so well in the Moroccan crisis. Cambon's recital of the incident in question, written on November 22, 1913, justifies quotation in extenso.

    I have received from an absolutely sure source a record of a
    conversation which is reported between the Emperor and the
    King of the Belgians, in the presence of the Chief of the
    General Staff, General von Moltke, a fortnight ago--a
    conversation which would appear greatly to have struck King
    Albert. I am in no way surprised by the impression created,
    which corresponds with that made on me some time ago.
    Hostility against us is becoming more marked, and the
    Emperor has ceased to be a partisan of peace.

    The German
    Emperor's interlocutor thought up to the present, as did
    everybody, that William II., whose personal influence has
    been exerted in many critical circumstances in favor of the
    maintenance of peace, was still in the same state of mind.
    This time, it appears, he found him completely changed. The
    German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of
    peace against the bellicose tendencies of certain German
    parties. William II. has been brought to think that war with
    France is inevitable, and that it will have to come one day
    or the other.

    The Emperor, it need hardly be said, believes
    in the crushing superiority of the German army and in its
    assured success.

    General von Moltke spoke in exactly the same sense as his
    sovereign. He also declared that war was necessary and
    inevitable, but he showed himself still more certain of
    success. "For," said he to the King, "this time we must put
    an end to it" (cette fois il faut en finir), "and your
    Majesty can hardly doubt the irresistible enthusiasm which
    on that day will carry away the whole German people."

    The King of the Belgians protested that to interpret the
    intentions of the French Government in this manner was to
    travesty them, and to allow oneself to be misled as to the
    feelings of the French nation by the manifestations of a few
    hotheads, or of conscienceless intriguers.

    The Emperor and his Chief of General Staff none the less
    persisted in their point of view.

    During this conversation the Emperor, moreover, appeared
    overwrought, and irritable. As the years begin to weigh upon
    William II. the family traditions, the retrograde feelings
    of the Court, and, above all, the impatience of the
    soldiers
    , are gaining more ascendency over his mind.
    Perhaps he may feel I know not what kind of jealousy of the
    popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of
    the Pan-Germans, and perhaps he may find that the position
    of the Empire in the world is not commensurate with its
    power.

    Perhaps, also, the reply of France to the last
    increase in the German army, the object of which was to
    place Germanic superiority beyond question, may count for
    something in these bitternesses, for whatever one may say it
    is felt here that the Germans cannot do much more. One may
    ask what lay behind the conversation. The Emperor and his
    Chief of General Staff may have intended to impress the King
    of the Belgians, and to lead him not to resist in case a
    conflict with us should arise
    [37]....

    [Footnote 37: French Yellow Book, No. 6.]

    This picture of the Kaiser is interesting and significant.

    Germany's loss of prestige in the Moroccan controversy, due to the Kaiser's unwillingness to precipitate a war at that time and his somewhat diminished popularity with his people, not only accentuated the desire of his military camarilla to find another pretext for a war, but may have modified the Kaiser's resistance to this bellicose policy. Until that time he had been quite content to play the part of Cæsar. It may be questioned whether he had previously a real desire to be a Cæsar.

    To describe himself metaphorically as "clad in shining armor" and to shake the "mailed fist" was his constant pose. "And so he played his part." As long as the world was content to take this imperial fustian in a Pickwickian sense, the imperial impresario found the same enjoyment as when he staged Sardanapalus on the boards of the Berlin Theater.

    The Kaiser was destined to stage a greater spectacle than the burning of a Babylonian palace. His crowning achievement was to apply the torch to civilization itself.

    Prior to 1913 neither his wishes nor plans carried him further than the congenial art of imperial posing. Behind his natural preference for peace was ever the lurking fear that a disastrous war might cost him his throne. The experience of Napoleon the Third was quite too recent to be ignored.

    In the Moroccan controversy, the unwillingness of France to assent to all demands and the resolute purpose of England to support its ally, presented a crisis, which could not be met with rhetorical phrases, and the Kaiser found himself confronted with a situation, in which a very considerable number of thoughtful and influential Germans favored an immediate appeal to arms, and as to which only his word was wanted to precipitate hostilities in 1911.

    The Kaiser at that time failed to meet the expectations of those who had expected a more warlike attitude from the knight "clad in shining armor," and the expression "William the Peaceful" was bandied about with increasing contempt by the war party in Germany, whose passions the Crown Prince--not unwilling to push his royal father prematurely from the pedestal of popularity--was assiduously fanning.

    While the fact cannot yet be regarded as established, the writer believes that the future may indubitably show that the Kaiser did have full knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum in advance of its issuance and gave his consent to the policy of that coup in the hope that it would somewhat restore his diminished prestige.

    He probably followed this policy in the confident expectation that Russia would yield, as it had yielded in 1908 in the Bosnian incident, and when he discovered in Norway that Russia, while willing to maintain peace upon any reasonable terms, was not disposed to surrender all its legitimate interests in the Servian question, he, as will be more fully narrated in the next chapter, hurried back to Berlin and for a time attempted to reverse the policy and bring about a peaceful adjustment.

    Unfortunately this attempt came too late. His military camarilla had determined upon war. Preparations were then being feverishly made, and the German and Austrian chancelleries were steadily and deliberately shutting the door upon any possibility of peace.

    To withdraw under these circumstances from an untenable position meant a substantial impairment of his already diminished prestige. A Washington would have saved the situation, but the Kaiser was not a Washington.

    Another most illuminating feature of this chapter of the Yellow Book is a report from the French Embassy in Berlin to its Foreign Office on the public opinion of Germany in the summer of 1913, as disclosed by the reports of the French consular representatives in Germany. It gives an extraordinary analysis of conditions in Germany prior to the war, and it describes in great fullness the many causes which were contributory to the creation of a powerful war party in Germany.

    As it is not in strictness a part of the diplomatic record, it is not embodied in the text of this book, but its value as an acute analysis of conditions in Germany--made before the passions of the war had clouded the judgment--will repay the reader's careful consideration.

    The second chapter of the French Yellow Book deals with the events which took place between the murder of the Archduke and the Austrian ultimatum and presents new and cumulative evidence of substantial value.

    The French Consul General at Budapest, in a report to his Foreign Office under date July 11, 1914, after showing that the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza, had refused to disclose, even to the Hungarian Chamber, the results of the judicial inquiry into the Serajevo murder and the decision taken by the Austrian Cabinet, proceeds to show how the suppression of the news in Austria was a part of the scheme to make the ultimatum to Servia so abrupt and speedy that no course would be open to Servia and Europe other than an immediate and unconditional surrender.

    Everything is for peace in the newspapers, but the mass of
    the public believes in war and fears it.... The Government,
    whether it be seriously desirous of peace, or whether it be
    preparing a coup, is now doing everything it can to allay
    this anxiety. That is why the tone of the Government
    newspapers has been lowered first, by one note and then by
    two, until now it has become almost optimistic. But the
    Government newspapers themselves have carefully spread the
    alarm. Their optimism to order is really without an echo.
    The nervousness of the Bourse, a barometer one cannot
    neglect, is a sure proof of that.

    Stocks, without exception,
    have fallen to improbably low prices. The Hungarian four per
    cent. was yesterday quoted at 79.95, a price which has never
    been quoted since the first issue.[38]

    [Footnote 38: French Yellow Book, No. 11.]

    Simultaneously a very different note was sounded by the organ of the military party in Vienna. The Militärische Rundschau, a few days before the ultimatum to Servia, said:

    "The moment is still favorable for us. If we do not decide
    upon war, the war we shall have to make in two or three
    years at the latest will be begun in circumstances much less
    propitious; now the initiative belongs to us. Russia is not
    ready, the moral factors are for us, might as well as right.
    Since some day we shall have to accept the struggle, let us
    provoke it at once.
    "[39]

    [Footnote 39: Ibid., No. 12.]

    Before the Austrian ultimatum was issued there had been some preliminary informal negotiations between Austria and Servia and the latter had expressed its willingness to give to Austria the most ample reparation "provided that she did not demand judiciary coöperation," and the Servian Minister at Berlin warned "the German Government that it would be dangerous to endeavor by this inquiry (i.e., by the participation of Austrian officials in the courts of Servia) to damage the prestige of Servia."[40]

    [Footnote 40: French Yellow Book, No. 15.]

    It thus appears that Austria and Germany had warning in advance of the issuance of the ultimatum that if this humiliating demand were included it would meet with refusal. Their intention to precipitate this war or impose their will upon Europe may therefore be measured by the fact that, with full knowledge that that particular demand would not be accepted, it was made a leading feature of the ultimatum, and finally became the principal outstanding difference after Servia had accepted substantially all the other demands of Austria.

    This was reported by Cambon to his Foreign Office two days before the ultimatum was issued and at that time Germany was fully advised as to the one demand, which Servia could not in justice to its sovereignty accept.

    In the same letter, Cambon advises his Foreign Office that Germany had already issued the "preliminary warning of mobilization, which places Germany in a sort of garde-à-vous during periods of tension."[41]

    [Footnote 41: Ibid., No. 15.]

    A further corroboration of Germany's knowledge of the Austrian ultimatum before its issuance is found in a report of the French Minister at Munich to the French Foreign Office, written on the day when the Austrian ultimatum was issued, and a full day before it reached any capital except Berlin and Belgrade. He writes:

    The Bavarian Press appears to believe that a peaceful
    solution of the Austro-Servian incident is not only possible
    but even probable. Official circles, on the contrary, for
    some time past, have displayed with more or less sincerity
    positive pessimism.

    The Prime Minister notably said to me to-day that the
    Austrian note, of which he had cognizance, was in his
    opinion drawn up in terms acceptable to Servia, but that the
    present situation appeared to him none the less to be very
    grave.
    [42]

    [Footnote 42: French Yellow Book, No. 21.]

    As it is unlikely that the Austrian Government would have dealt directly with the Bavarian Government without similar communications to the German Foreign Office, it follows as a strong probability that the German Foreign Office and probably each of the constituent States of Germany knew on July the 23d that Austria intended to demand that which Servia had previously indicated its unalterable determination to refuse.

    Under these circumstances the repeated and insistent assurances that the German Foreign Office gave to England, France, and Russia that it "had no knowledge of the text of the Austrian note before it was handed in and had not exercised any influence on its contents"[43] presents a policy of deception unworthy of a great nation or of the twentieth century.

    [Footnote 43: Ante, p. 36.]

    It regarded this policy of submarine diplomacy as necessary, not only to throw the other nations off their guard while Germany was arming, but also to support its contention that the quarrel between Servia and Austria was a local quarrel. If it appeared that Germany had instigated Austria in its course, it could not have supported its first contention that the quarrel was a local one and it could not reasonably dispute the right of Russia to intervene. For this purpose the fable was invented. It deceived no one.

    The French Yellow Book discloses another even more amazing feature of this policy of deception, for it shows on the authority of the Italian Foreign Minister that Germany and Austria did not even take their own ally into their confidence. The significance of this fact cannot be overestimated. Nothing in the whole record more clearly demonstrates the purpose of the German and Austrian diplomats to set a trap for the rest of Europe.

    Under the terms of the Triple Alliance it was the duty of each member to submit to its associates all matters which might involve the possibility of joint coöperation. Even if this had not been written in the very terms of the Alliance, it would follow as a necessary implication, for when each member obligated itself to coöperate with its allies in any attack upon either of them, but not in any aggressive war, it necessarily followed that each ally had the right to the fullest information as to any controversy which might involve such action, so that it might determine whether it fell within the terms of the obligation.

    Neither the German nor the Austrian Foreign Office have ever submitted any documentary proof that they discharged this obligation to their ally and it may be added they have never pretended that they did so.

    If further proof were needed, we find in the French Yellow Book a report from the French Minister at Rome to his Foreign Office, under date July the 27th, reporting a conversation between the French Minister and the Italian Foreign Minister, the Marquis di San Giuliano, on that day, in which the latter spoke of the

    contents of the Austrian note, and assured me that he had
    had no previous knowledge of them whatever
    .

    He was well aware that the note was to be vigorous and
    energetic in character, but he had no idea that it could
    take such a form. I asked him if it was true, as is stated
    in certain newspapers, that in this connection he had
    expressed in Vienna approval of Austrian action, and had
    given the assurance that Italy would fulfill her duties as
    an ally towards Austria. He replied, "In no way have we
    been consulted; we have been told nothing whatever.
    We have
    therefore had no reason to make any communication of this
    nature in Vienna."[44]

    [Footnote 44: French Yellow Book, No. 72.]

    The reason for this secrecy is not far to seek. Almost a year before the Archduke's death, Austria had sounded Italy as to its willingness to acquiesce or participate in a war by Austria against Servia, and Italy had refused. For this reason and also because an Austrian war against Servia was not to the interests of Italy, Austria and Germany both recognized, without even consulting their ally, that they could not count upon its coöperation in such a war.

    To submit their proposed action to Italy was to invite a deliberate expression of disapproval, and this would make it more difficult for them to demand its coöperation, if they could carry out their policy of so flouting Russia as to compel it to initiate an aggressive war, as they clearly hoped to do.

    There was, however, another and very practical reason for this failure to consult their ally. We have seen that the whole policy of the Austrian ultimatum was founded upon secrecy. The plan was to give to Europe no possible intimation of the intended action until it was accomplished and then to give to Europe only twenty-four hours within which to deliberate or act.

    If as a matter of courtesy Austria and Germany submitted to their ally their proposed course of action, Italy, being wholly opposed to any such unprovoked attack upon Servia, might find a way, either by open and public protest or by dropping a confidential intimation, to advise the other countries as to what was in preparation. This would defeat the principal purpose of Germany and Austria, to force a quick decision and to prepare for eventualities before any other country could make ready.

    Germany and Austria therefore wholly ignored their ally and pursued their stealthy policy to its discreditable end.

    When their diplomatic communications are disclosed in full, this feature of their policy may disclose some significant admissions.

    We have already seen (ante, p. 35) that when on July the 20th, three days before the Austrian ultimatum was issued, Sir Edward Grey asked Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, as to what news he had from Vienna with reference to the intentions of his country, Prince Lichnowsky affected to be ignorant. But it appears from a letter, which M. Paul Cambon[45] wrote to his Foreign Office on July the 24th, 1914, that Prince Lichnowsky had returned to London from Berlin about a month before and had "displayed pessimistic views as to the relations between St.

    Petersburg and Berlin." Cambon adds that the English Foreign Office and his other diplomatic colleagues had all been struck "by the anxious appearance of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin."[46]

    [Footnote 45: The French Ambassador at London.]

    [Footnote 46: French Yellow Book, No. 32.]

    So designedly was the Austrian ultimatum withheld from the chancelleries of Europe, other than Vienna and Berlin, that on the day following its issuance at Belgrade, the only information which M.

    Jules Cambon had of its issuance were the extracts in the press, and he thereupon saw the German Secretary of State and asked him whether such an ultimatum had been sent.

    Herr von Jagow replied affirmatively, adding that the note
    was energetic, and that he approved it, the Servian
    Government having long since exhausted Austrian patience. He
    considers, moreover, that for Austria the question is one of
    a domestic nature, and he hopes that it will be localized. I
    then said to him that, not having received any instructions,
    I only wished to have with him an entirely personal exchange
    of views.

    I then asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really
    been in complete ignorance of the Austrian claims before
    they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he replied that
    this was so
    , I expressed my surprise that he should thus
    undertake to support pretensions, the limit and nature of
    which he ignored.

    "It is only," said Herr von Jagow, interrupting me, "because
    we are talking personally between ourselves that I allow you
    to say that to me."

    "Certainly," I replied, "but if Peter I. humiliates himself
    Servia will probably be given over to internal troubles.
    That will open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you
    know where Vienna will lead you?" I added that the language
    of the German Press was not that of a people who were
    indifferent and foreign to the affair, but told of active
    support. Finally, I remarked that the shortness of the time
    given to Servia in which to yield would make a bad
    impression upon Europe.

    Herr von Jagow replied that he expected "un peu
    d'émotion
    ," on the part of Servia's friends, but that he
    counted upon their giving Servia good advice.

    "I do not doubt," I then said, "that Russia will make an
    effort in Belgrade to bring the Cabinet to make what
    concessions are acceptable, but if you ask something of one,
    why not ask it of the other? And if it be expected that
    advice will be given in Belgrade, is it not legitimate to
    expect that on the other hand advice will also be tendered
    to Vienna?"

    The Secretary of State allowed himself to say that that
    would depend on circumstances, but, recovering himself
    immediately, declared that the matter must be localized. He
    asked me if really I considered the situation serious.
    "Assuredly," I replied, "for, if what is going on has been
    pondered over, I do not understand why people have cut their
    bridges behind them."[47]

    [Footnote 47: French Yellow Book, No. 30.]

    The Yellow Book throws further light upon the extraordinarily petty finesse, with which the chancelleries of Berlin and Vienna attempted to take a snap judgment upon the rest of Europe. We learn from Exhibit No. 55 that Count Berchtold had given to the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, prior to the issuance of the ultimatum, an express assurance "that the claims against Servia would be thoroughly acceptable," and that upon this assurance Count Schebeko had left Vienna on a leave of absence.

    During his absence and at a time when the President of the French Republic, the French Premier, and its Minister of Foreign Affairs were far distant from Paris and on the high seas, the ultimatum was issued, and, as we have seen, Count Berchtold immediately betook himself to Ischl and remained there until the expiration of the brief time limit in the ultimatum.

    The same policy was pursued with reference to other Ambassadors, for when France instructed its representative in Vienna "to call the attention of the Austrian Government to the anxiety aroused in Europe, Baron Macchio stated to our Ambassador that the tone of the Austrian note and the demands formulated by it permitted one to count upon a pacific dénouement."[48]

    [Footnote 48: French Yellow Book, No. 20.]

    In the same communication, in which this information is embodied, we gain the important information that "in the Vienna Diplomatic Corps the German Ambassador recommends violent resolutions whilst declaring ostensibly that the Imperial Chancellery is not wholly in agreement with him on this point."

    Pursuant to the same ostrich policy, the German Secretary of State, as we have previously seen (ante, pp. 71-75), gave to both the French and English Ambassadors the absence of Count Berchtold at Ischl as an excuse for the failure of Germany to get any extension of the time limit, and not only did he assure them repeatedly and in the most unequivocal way that the German Foreign Office had no knowledge of, or responsibility for, the Austrian ultimatum, but when on July the 25th the Russian Chargé requested a personal appointment with von Jagow in order to present his country's request for such an extension, the German Secretary of State only gave "him an app

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    Title
    The Evidence in the Case
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    Front matter as received (title page, contents)
     THE EVIDENCE
     IN THE CASE
    
     A Discussion of the Moral Responsibility for the
     War of 1914, as Disclosed by the Diplomatic
     Records of England, Germany, Russia,
     France, Austria, Italy and Belgium.
    
     BY
    
     JAMES M. BECK, LL.D.
     Late Assistant Attorney-General of the U. S.
     Author of "The War and Humanity."
    
     With an Introduction by
     HON. JOSEPH H. CHOATE
     Late U. S. Ambassador to Great Britain
    
     "_Did these bones cost no more the breeding but to play at loggats
     with 'em? Mine ache to think on 't._"
              HAMLET--Act V., Sc. 1.
    
     _Revised Edition, with Additional Material_
    
     NEW YORK
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     Published by Arrangement with G. P. Putnam's Sons
    
    
    
    
     COPYRIGHT, 1914, BY
     JAMES M. BECK
    
     COPYRIGHT, 1915, BY
     JAMES M. BECK
    
     (_For Revised Edition_)
    
    
     Thirteenth Impression
    
    
     BY JAMES M. BECK
     The Evidence in the Case.  The War and Humanity.
    
    
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    Title: The Evidence in the Case
    
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