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My Three Years in America

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Title: My Three Years in America

Author: Graf von Johann Heinrich Bernstorff


        
Release date: January 6, 2010 [eBook #30865]

Language: English

Other information and formats: www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/30865

Credits: E-text prepared by Robert J. Hall


*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA ***


E-text prepared by Robert J. Hall



MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA

by

COUNT BERNSTORFF

1920




CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER
    I.  GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE WAR
   II.  THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES
  III.  POLITICAL EVENTS PRECEDING THE "LUSITANIA" INCIDENT
   IV.  ECONOMIC QUESTIONS
    V.  THE SO-CALLED GERMAN CONSPIRACIES
   VI.  THE "LUSITANIA" INCIDENT
  VII.  THE "ARABIC" INCIDENT
 VIII.  THE SECOND "LUSITANIA" INCIDENT
   IX.  THE "SUSSEX" INCIDENT
    X.  AMERICAN MEDIATION
   XI.  THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
  XII.  THE RETURN HOME

INDEX


MY THREE YEARS IN AMERICA


INTRODUCTION

MY FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL VIEWS BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR

It was in my own home, the German Embassy in London, where the
atmosphere was entirely political, that I learned my first steps
in politics. My father did not belong to that class of diplomats,
so prevalent to-day, who treat politics as an occupation to be
pursued only in their spare time. His whole life was consecrated
to the cause of the German nation, and from my earliest childhood
my mind was filled with the same idea, to the exclusion of all
others.

Owing to my father's share in the negotiations which brought about
the marriage of the Emperor Frederick with the Princess Royal of
England, the Imperial couple became closely connected with my parents,
and, as Crown Prince and Princess, frequently resided at the Embassy
in London. It was the entourage of the Emperor Frederick that first
inspired in me those political views, which, during a long diplomatic
career, gradually crystallized into the deep-rooted convictions
of my political outlook. I believed Germany's salvation to lie
in the direction of a liberal development of Unification and
Parliamentary Government, as also in an attitude of consistent
friendliness towards England and the United States of America.
Thus, to use a modern phrase, I was an avowed supporter of the
Western Policy. At the present moment, while we are standing as
mourners at the grave of our national hopes, I am more than ever
convinced, that had this policy been steadily pursued, we should
have been spared the catastrophe that has overtaken us.

On the other hand, I will not deny, that even the Oriental Policy
would have proved a feasible political scheme, if only we had decided
to pursue it in good time. Albeit, I am of opinion that even Bismarck
had already started us in the direction of the Western Policy, when
in 1879 he decided in favor of Austria-Hungary and not Russia.
Despite all that the careworn recluse of Friedrichsruhe may have
written against Caprivi's policy, which was decidedly Western in
tendency, he was himself the founder of the Triple Alliance, which,
without the good-will of England, could not have come into existence.
Had we pursued an Eastern Policy, though it would ultimately have
led to the sacrifice and partition of Austria-Hungary, it would not
have secured us those advantages in the Orient of which Marschall
speaks. Nevertheless, I have always regretted that we sent such a
first-rate man to Constantinople, for him ultimately to become the
able director of the false policy which we pursued there. There
is an Oriental proverb which says: "Never lay your load on a dead
camel's back."

If, as I always used to hope, we had resolved to adopt the Western
Policy, we should in any case have had to be prepared, in certain
circumstances, to venture with England's help upon a war against
Russia. And the experiences of the Five-Years War have taught us that
we should have won such a conflict with ease. I never wanted a war
with Russia, and was never an enemy of that country; but I believed
that our position among the nations of the world would compel us to
decide one way or the other, and I felt, just as Caprivi did, that
we should not very well be able to avoid war. Even if, in the event
of a war between the Triple Alliance and Russia and France, England
had only maintained an attitude of friendly neutrality, this would
have proved very much more favorable for us than the situation which
developed out of the Encirclement Policy (_Einkreisungspolitik_).
Furthermore, had we pursued the Western Policy, we should have had
to reckon with the possibility of England's wishing to moderate,
even in a perfectly friendly manner, our somewhat explosive economic
development. I should not, however, have regarded this altogether as
a disadvantage. For, truth to tell, we grew a little too rapidly.
We ought, as "junior partners" in Britain's world-empire, to have
gathered our strength more slowly. As an example of what I mean, take
the policy which France and Japan have pursued since the beginning
of the present century. If we had done the same, we should, at all
events, have been saved from so seriously overheating the boilers
of our industrial development, we should not have outstripped England
as quickly as we undoubtedly could have done if we had been left to
develop freely, but we should also have escaped the mortal danger
which we drew upon ourselves by provoking universal hostility.

It is impossible now for me to demonstrate retrospectively that we
should have been able to conclude an alliance with England. Prince
Bülow denies that this was ever the case. Maybe that during his tenure
of office this possibility did not offer a sufficient guarantee of
future security to warrant our incurring the hostility of Russia. I
am convinced, however, that an alliance with England would have been
within our power, if we had pursued Caprivi's policy consistently,
and the Kruger telegram had never been dispatched. Unfortunately we
have always had statesmen at the helm in Germany,--Bismarck not
excepted,--the bulk of whose views and knowledge were essentially
continental, and who never felt quite at home with English ways
of thinking. I feel perfectly satisfied on this point, however,
that English commercial jealousy, with which we naturally had to
reckon, would not have proved an insuperable obstacle to a good
understanding with England, provided that we had declared ourselves
ready, if necessary, to fight Russia.

The policy of the free hand, which we pursued until the outbreak
of war, aimed at the highest possible results. Prince Bülow, who
was the inaugurator of this policy, might possibly have known how
to steer us through the "Danger-Zone" without provoking war. And
then in a few years to come, we should have become so strong and
should have left the Danger-Zone so very far behind us, that, as
far as human judgment could tell, we should no longer have had any
need to fear war. German naval construction from the beginning of the
present century certainly made our relationship to England very much
worse, while it also materially increased the danger of our position
from the standpoint of world-politics. The Bülow-Tirpitz notion of
a _Risikoflotte,_[*] may, however, only have been practicable on
condition that our diplomacy were sufficiently skilful to avoid
war, as long as the "risk" idea in England was not able, of itself,
to maintain peace.

[Footnote *: Literally: a fleet for risks or for taking risks; a
fleet to be used at a venture.]

German foreign policy had been ably conducted by Bismarck; but, in
keeping with the times, it had been almost exclusively Continental
and European. At the very moment when Bismarck withdrew from the arena,
Germany's era of world-politics began. It was not the free bloom of
our statesmen's own creative powers; but a bitter necessity, born
of the imperative need of providing Germany's increasing population
with sufficient foodstuffs. But it was not our world-politics, as
such, that brought about our downfall; but the way we set to work
in prosecuting our policy. The Triple Alliance, with its excellent
Reinsurance Treaty, did not constitute a sufficiently powerful
springboard from which to take our plunge into world-politics. The
Reinsurance contract could not be anything but a makeshift, which
merely deferred the inevitable choice which had to be made between
Russia and Austria-Hungary. In the course of time, we should either
have had to decide entirely in favor of Russia, in the manner outlined
above, or we should have had to try to come to an understanding with
England, upon terms which, at all events, we should not have been
at liberty to choose for ourselves. Unfortunately, however, it was
an axiom of post-Bismarckian German politics, that the differences
between Russia and England were irreconcilable, and that the Triple
Alliance would have to constitute the needle-index of the scales
between these two hostile Powers. This proposition was incessantly
contested both verbally and in writing by Herr von Holstein, who
was then the leading spirit at the Foreign Office. He perceived
that its chief flaw was the weak point in the Triple Alliance
itself,--that is to say, the differences between Austria-Hungary
and Italy on the one hand, and Italy's dependence upon England's
superior power in the Mediterranean on the other. Furthermore, he
recognized the prodigious possibility, which was not beyond the
art of English statesmanship, of a compromise between England and
Russia. He did not see, however, how the hostility of the French
to ourselves would serve as a medium for this universal coalition
against us.

In the last Entente Note of the Five-Years War there is the following
passage:

"For many years the rulers of Germany, true to the Prussian tradition,
strove for a position of dominance in Europe. They required that they
should be able to dictate and tyrannize to a subservient Europe,
as they dictated and tyrannized over subservient Germany."


We Germans know that this indictment is a lie; but unfortunately
all unprejudiced Germans must acknowledge that for years this lie
has been believed outside Germany. We, for our part, cherished
similar views about our enemies, nor did we make a sufficient effort
to dissipate their prejudices. On the contrary we constantly lent
color to them by means of the extravagant and high-flown speeches,
which formed the accompaniment to our world and naval policy, and
by means of our opposition to pacifism, disarmament, and arbitration
schemes, etc., etc. The extent to which our attitude at the Hague
Conference damaged us in the eyes of the whole world is no longer
a secret to anybody. As Heinrich Friedjung rightly observes:


"At the Hague Conference German diplomacy delivered itself up to
the vengeance of the pacifists, like a culprit."


During my tenure of office in Washington I succeeded on three occasions
in coming to an agreement with the Government there regarding the
terms of an arbitration treaty. All three treaties were, however,
rejected in Berlin, and consequently in America I never ceased from
being questioned reproachfully as to the reason why the United
States had been able to conclude arbitration treaties with every
other State in the world, but not with Germany.

The Entente Note, already quoted above, contained this further
statement:


"As soon as their preparations were complete, they encouraged a
subservient ally to declare war against Serbia at forty-eight hours'
notice, knowing full well that a conflict involving the control
of the Balkans could not be localized and almost certainly meant
a general war. In order to make doubly sure, they refused every
attempt at conciliation and conference until it was too late, and
the world war was inevitable for which they had plotted, and for
which alone among the nations they were fully equipped and prepared."


The leaders of the Entente Powers would like to exalt this distortion
of history into a dogma, in order that their various peoples may not
bring any unpleasant charges against them. And yet the historical
truth is already pretty clear to all who look for it honestly and
without prejudice. The German Government believed that the Serbian
propaganda would annihilate Austria-Hungary, and hoped, moreover,
that her last faithful ally would experience a political renaissance
as the result of her chastisement of Serbia. That is why they gave
Count Berchtold a free hand, in the belief that Count Bülow's success
over the Bosnian crisis could be repeated. Meanwhile, however, the
situation had changed. Russia and France, relying upon England's
help, wanted to risk a war. When the German Government saw this
they tried, like a driver of a car about to collide with another
vehicle, to jam on all breaks, and to drive backwards. But it was
then too late. The mistake our Government made was to consent to
Austria-Hungary's making so daring an experiment, at a moment of
such critical tension.

It is not true either that we were thoroughly equipped and prepared
for war. We had neither sufficient supplies of munitions, foodstuffs
and raw materials, nor any plan of campaign for a war with England.
Be this as it may, we should not have been defeated if we had abided
firmly by our defensive policy. The heroic spirit displayed by
the German people surpassed all bounds, and they believed quite
honestly that they were fighting a war of defence. If our policy
had been conducted with corresponding consistency we should have
saved our position in the world. We ought always to have borne in
mind the analogy of the Seven Years War, in order to have been
ready at any moment to extricate ourselves from the hopeless business
with the least possible amount of loss.

After the first battle of the Marne, President Wilson consistently
maintained that a decision was no longer possible by force of arms.
This view, which I also shared, gave us some common ground, upon
which, despite our other differences, we were able to some extent
to work together.

Regarding Dr. Wilson's personality certain doubts have been and
are still entertained by many people. He is the most brilliant
and most eloquent exponent of the American point of view. But he
does not devote the same energy and consistency to the execution
of his various programmes as he does to their formation. There
can be no question that, as a result both of his origin and his
training, the President is very much under the sway of English
thought and ideals. Nevertheless, his ambition to be a Peacemaker
and an _Arbiter Mundi_ certainly suggested the chance of our winning
him over to our side, in the event of our being unable to achieve
a decisive victory with the forces at our disposal. In this case,
Wilson, as the democratic leader of the strongest neutral Power,
was the most suitable person to propose and to bring about a Peace
by arrangement.

After the opening of the U-boat campaign, two alternatives remained
open to us, one of which we were compelled to choose. If the prospects
of a U-boat war promised to secure a victory, it was naturally
incumbent upon us to prosecute it with all possible speed and energy.
If, as I personally believed, the U-boat war did not guarantee a
victory, it ought, owing to the enormous amount of friction to
which it could not help giving rise, under all circumstances to
have been abandoned; for, by creating American hostility, it did
us more harm than good.

I, as the German Ambassador, in the greatest neutral State, with
the evidences of American power all about me, could not help feeling
it my duty to maintain our diplomatic relations with the United
States. I was convinced that we should most certainly lose the
war if America stepped in against us. And thus I realized ever
more and more the supreme importance of preventing this from taking
place.

My communications to the Central Government were framed with a
view to inducing them also to adopt this attitude; but they, of
course, had to form their conclusions, not from one source, but
from all the sources of information they possessed. At all events,
isolated as I was at Washington, I could not confine myself merely
to the task of furnishing my Government with information; but was
compelled on occasion to act on my own initiative, in order to
prevent any premature development in the diplomatic situation from
becoming utterly hopeless.

The policy for which I stood not only promised the negative success
of keeping America out of the war, but it also offered the only
prospect there was of obtaining, with neutral help, a Peace by
arrangement. My belief that such a peace could have been obtained
through Dr. Wilson is, of course, no longer susceptible of proof
to-day. It may perhaps sound improbable in view of the President's
behavior at Versailles. It is my opinion, however, that, previous
to the 31st of January, 1917, Dr. Wilson's attitude towards us
was radically different. I base my assumption that Wilson might
in those days have assisted us in obtaining a Peace by negotiation
upon the following points:


(1) A Peace by mediation was the only way in which the United States
could avoid becoming involved in the war, and this is what the
American public opinion of the day wished above all to prevent.

(2) It is true that even if he had wished to do so, Wilson could
not have declared war on England, neither could he by any exercise
of force have prevented the delivery of munitions to the Allies, or
have compelled England to observe the rights of nations. He could,
however, have obliged England to conclude a Peace by arrangement
with us; not only because in so doing he would have had the support
of American public opinion, but also because such a policy was in
keeping with the best political interests of the United States.


I therefore pursued the policy of Peace with undeviating consistency,
and to this day I still believe it to have been the only right
policy. A thorough prosecution of the U-boat campaign was also a
feasible scheme. But the worst thing that we could possibly do,
was, to steer the zigzag course; for by so doing we were certain
not only to cause constant vexations to America, but, by our half
measures and partial pliancy, also to drive Mr. Wilson even further
and further into the inflexible attitude of a policy of prestige.
Unfortunately, however, it was precisely this zigzag course that
we adopted; and thus, in addition to destroying the prospects which
my policy had offered, according to the view of the Naval people,
we also crippled the effects of the U-boat campaign.

My policy might best be described as that of "a silent resolve to
obtain Peace." It was utterly wrong to publish our readiness for
Peace broadcast. We should have presented a strong front to the
outside world, and we should have increased the powers of resistance
which we actually possessed by emphasizing our strength both to
our people at home and to other States. According to my view, we
ought, after the first battle of the Marne, to have recognized
in our heart of hearts that victory was out of the question, and
consequently we should have striven to conclude a Peace, the relatively
unfavorable terms of which might perhaps have temporarily staggered
public opinion in Germany and created some indignation. It was not
right, however, to allow deference to public opinion to outweigh
other considerations, as it did in our case. The political leaders
of the Empire ought to have kept the High Military Command, which
from its point of view naturally demanded firmer "assurances" than
the general situation warranted, more thoroughly within bounds,
just as Bismarck did. Presumably the High Military Command would
have been able to perform its duties quite as efficiently if it
had been prevented from exercising too much influence on the policy
which aimed at a conclusion of peace.

As a politician I consider that the ultimate cause of our misfortune
was our lack of a uniform policy both before and during the war.
If, at the time of Bismarck's retirement, we had made a timely
and resolute decision either in favor of the Western Policy that
he advocated, or in favor of the Eastern Policy, we should have
prevented the development of a situation in the politics of the
world which ultimately led to our own undoing. If, during the war,
however, we had completely abandoned the U-boat campaign, and had
made every possible effort to come to an understanding with America,
we should, in my opinion, have been able to extricate ourselves
from it satisfactorily. Be this as it may, it is also possible
that if the U-boat campaign had been prosecuted resolutely, and
without any shilly-shallying--a thing I never wished--we should not
have suffered so complete a collapse from the military, economic,
political and moral point of view, as we must otherwise have done.
According to my view it is the hesitating zigzag course that we
pursued which is chiefly to blame for the fact that of all possible
results of the epoch of German world-politics, the unhappiest for
ourselves has come to pass. The Wilhelminian Age perished owing to
the fact that no definite objects were either selected or pursued
in good time, and, above all, because both before and during the
war, two systems in the Government of the country were constantly
at variance with each other and mutually corroding.




CHAPTER I

GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES BEFORE THE WAR

Anyone who has lived some time in the United States will feel with
Goethe that "America is better off than our own Continent." Owing to
the almost perfect autarchy existing there, grave economic problems
never really arise. Nowhere else, during the whole course of my
various diplomatic wanderings, have I ever seen a happier people, who
looked more cheerfully into the future. In view of the comparatively
sparse population of the country, intensive agricultural production
has only become necessary in a few isolated districts; there are
always purchasers in plenty for the rich surplus of raw materials
available, and industry has not yet been directed solely towards
export. As a result of these happy conditions, the American citizen
feels but little interest for what goes on in other countries. In
the period preceding the Five-Years War, if the political interests
of the United States ever happened to cross those of Europe, it was
almost exclusively in regard to American questions. As a proof
of this we have only to think of the Spanish-American War, and of
the various incidents relating to Venezuela; whereas it was only
with difficulty that the German Government succeeded in inducing
President Roosevelt's Administration to take part in the Algeciras
Conference, at which the presence of the United States representative
in no way alleviated our task.

Up to the time of the Five-Years War, the Foreign Policy conducted
from Washington was almost entirely Pan-American, and the Monroe
Doctrine was the beginning and end of it; for even if that versatile
man, President Roosevelt, was fond of extending his activities to
other spheres, as, for instance, when he brought the Russo-Japanese
War to an end by the Peace of Portsmouth, the Panama Canal scheme
remained his favorite child. But in the case of the Russo-Japanese
War, it was home politics, which in America are chiefly responsible
for turning the scales in regard to Foreign Policy, that again
played the principal part. Mr. Roosevelt wished to win over to
his side the very strong pacifist element in America; whereas the
Imperialists--particularly later on--deprecated these successful
attempts at mediation, because they prevented a further weakening
of both of the belligerent parties. Even Roosevelt's Secretary of
State, John Hay, concerned himself actively with the Far East,
and was known in America as the spiritual founder of the policy of
the "Open Door." In this particular matter, the German Government
frequently acted hand in hand with the American, and it was owing
to this circumstance that the Foreign Office at Berlin very much
wished to have the United States represented at the Algeciras
Conference. The German Government believed that the Americans would
also declare themselves in favor of the "Open Door" even in Morocco.
This assumption, however, turned out to be a false one, owing to
the fact that the political and economic interest shown by the
United States for countries on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean
was not sufficiently keen. The Algeciras Conference was a fairly
trustworthy forecast of all that subsequently happened at the Peace
Conference at Versailles. Equally lacking in foundation was also
the assumption, so prevalent in Germany, that, as the result of
their energetic Far-Eastern policy, the Americans would plunge
themselves into a serious conflict with Japan.

The question of the Philippines, which arose out of the Spanish-American
War and the Cuban affair, constitutes a certain contrast to the
customary Pan-American Foreign Policy of the United States. A large
number of Americans--possibly the majority--would like to relinquish
the Philippines as soon as the inhabitants of these islands are in
a position to rule themselves. At its inception, the question of
the Philippines brought us into a conflict with the United States,
which was remembered by Americans for years. Heinrich Friedjung,
referring to this incident, says:


"Quite superfluously it occurred to the German Government to make
our East-Asiatic Squadron, under Admiral Diederichs, appear before
Manila precisely at the moment when, in 1898, the decision was made
regarding the Philippines. This was done simply out of a pointless
consciousness of power, without any intention to cause offence."


This criticism is partly justified. And yet the affair was somewhat
different from the version of it which the American Ambassador,
Andrew White, allowed to filter through; for, seeing that, as the
United States did not intend to retain the Philippines, they could
raise no objection to Germany's wishing to acquire them. Thanks to
his friendly attitude towards Germany, Andrew White had, on his
own initiative, exceeded his instructions and was duly censured
by his Government for his zeal. Nevertheless, a misunderstanding
had occurred, as the result of which the Berlin Foreign Office
had acted in perfect good faith. In the public mind in the United
States, however, the feeling still rankled that Germany had wished
to make a demonstration against their Government; and the English
Press, which at that time was hostile to us, applied the bellows
enthusiastically to the glowing embers of American ill-humor.

The Venezuela affair, in the year 1902, which was a matter of lodging
certain complaints against the Venezuelan Government, ended in a
similar manner. Germany and England together sent their ultimatum
to Venezuela, and when no heed was paid to it, they instituted
a blockade of a number of Venezuelan ports. It was at this time
that I was appointed Secretary to the Embassy in London, where
I had to conduct a good deal of the negotiations regarding the
Venezuela question, with the Foreign Office. The whole affair, as
initiated by ourselves, was, in proportion to the German claims,
much too elaborate. The first suggestion which led to the common
action on the part of the British and ourselves, came from the
English side; but we should have been wiser, from the point of view
of our own advantage, if we had not listened to the suggestion.
It was absolutely clear from the start that the American Government
would raise objections to this sort of procedure, on the part of
European powers, in South America, and that England, true to her
usual custom, would climb down before the United States the moment
she recognized plainly the latter's displeasure. And when public
opinion in America raised a violent protest, and, incidentally,
resolutely assumed that Germany wished to obtain a footing in Venezuela,
the English Press attacked us in the rear by asserting that the
whole affair had been engineered by Germany, in order to embroil
England with the United States. At President Roosevelt's wish the
matter was finally settled with America's help; but in the United
States it left behind the widely prevalent impression that Germany
would infringe the Monroe Doctrine the moment she had the power
to do so.

President Taft, who in the year 1909 took President Roosevelt's
place, endeavored, with his Secretary of State, Philander Knox, to
develop still further the policy of the "Open Door," inaugurated
by John Hay. Both gentlemen felt the keenest interest in the Far
East. The former had been Governor of the Philippines, the latter had
been closely connected with the Pittsburgh iron industry, and knew
the need of extending its sphere of activities. Mr. Knox suggested
the proposal of internationalizing the railways of Manchuria. When,
however, this American notion met with response in Germany, and
apart from its general rejection elsewhere, had the further effect
of drawing Japan and Russia together again, Mr. Knox abandoned his
active Far-Eastern policy, and confined himself to stimulating the
large banks of America into becoming interested in the building of
railways and other economic means of development in China. This policy
was described as "Dollar Diplomacy" by the Democratic Opposition,
and violently opposed. When, therefore, the votes went against the
Republican Party, and President Wilson came to the helm, he let
the Far-Eastern policy drop. High Finance immediately seized this
opportunity in order to extricate itself from Chinese undertakings.
It had only embarked upon "Dollar Diplomacy" at the request of the
Government, and the venture had yielded but little profit, owing
to the fact that Americans are not inclined to invest in foreign
securities.

Secretary of State Knox's policy, which was always supported by
us, accounted for the fact that the official relations between
the German and American Governments were never more cordial than
during the years 1909-13, in spite of a short disturbance resulting
from a dispute over our potash exports to the United States. The best
proof of how friendly the official relations of the two Governments
were is shown by the ease with which this quarrel was settled. We
were also successful in concluding a commercial agreement which
was satisfactory to both sides, and overcame the danger of a customs
war as the result of America's new customs tariffs; whereas Taft's
economic plans, which aimed at reciprocity and union with Canada,
came to grief for political reasons, as the result of Canadian
Opposition, and left behind a bitter after-taste both in the United
States, Canada and England.

Official diplomatic communications excepted, however, it must
unfortunately be admitted, that mutual misunderstanding has been
the principal feature of German-American relations. In Germany
there was no understanding for the curious mixture of political
sagacity, commercial acumen, tenacity and sentimentality, which
goes to make up the character of the American people. The power of
the Union was therefore underestimated by us, and the high-spirited
utterances of American youthful strength were more disapproved of
than was necessary, because they were interpreted as mere "bluff"
and arrogance. We never sufficiently allowed for the fact that
the Americans are very "emotional"--that is to say, that they are
easily carried away by their feelings and then become uncertain.
Political surprises in the United States are almost the rule.

On the other hand, Americans never give themselves time to learn
to understand a foreign nation. A knowledge of foreign languages is
by no means general in the United States. The Americans unconsciously
borrow their thoughts and ideas from England, because it is the only
nation whose literature and Press are accessible to them in the
original tongue. Naturally this fact contributed very considerably,
before the Five-Years War, towards making the comprehension of
Germany difficult; because in those days German-English relations
were growing more and more unfavorable every day, and this decline
in friendliness found a powerful echo in the English Press and
other literature. The English language exercises more absolute
power in the United States than even in England itself. For example,
it would never occur to any diplomat in Washington to transact his
business in any other language than English. Whereas, in London,
I never once heard the French Ambassador pronounce one word of
English--even in an after-dinner speech--M. Jusserand in Washington
always spoke English. But, in spite of the claim that the French
make, that their language prevails in diplomatic circles, he could
not have done otherwise; because I have never, during the whole
of the eight years of my official activities in Washington, met
one Secretary of State who had mastered any other language than
English. It is obvious that this state of affairs opens all doors
and avenues to English political and cultural influences.

Thus, before the outbreak of the Five-Years War, the majority of
Americans already looked upon the Germans, however unconsciously,
through the optics of the English Press and English literary
publications. A large number of people in the United States honestly
believed, moreover, in the rumored German scheme to seize the empire
of the world. Our enormous successes in the economic field provoked
unbounded admiration and led, on the one hand, to an over-estimation
of our power, which did not prove favorable to us politically,
while, on the other hand, the Americans who frequently indulged in
generalizations about Germany were prone to judge us according to
the German-American Beer-Philistine, whom they disdainfully called a
"Dutchman." The Americans' view of the German people wavered between
these two extremes; but every year opinion tended to incline more
and more in the direction of the former. The phantom of a German
world-empire, extending from Hamburg to Bagdad, had already taken
possession of the American mind long before the war; and in the
United States it was feared that the next step would be that this
world-empire would infringe the Monroe Doctrine and found colonies in
South America. Professor Baumgarten, in an entertaining book, has
pointed out to what extent the publications of the Pan-German party
contributed towards promoting such conceptions in America.

Our Press was a little too fond of making attacks on the Monroe
Doctrine in particular. I was always of the opinion that we ought,
openly and officially, to have recognized this American article of
faith. As regards the Monroe Doctrine, the question is not one of
Right, but one of Power. We certainly had not the power to infringe
the Monroe Doctrine, even if we had had the intention, which was never
the case. It would, therefore, have been more wise to acknowledge
it, and thus to improve the political attitude, towards ourselves,
of a country on which we were so very much dependent for a number
of our raw-material supplies. I have often wondered whether the
Imperial Government would not have regarded it as its duty to avoid
war at all costs, if our economic dependence upon foreign countries
had been more clearly recognized. German prosperity was based to
a great extent on the Germans overseas, who had settled down in
every corner of the earth, just as in former days the Greeks had
settled all over the Roman Empire. The Germans overseas constituted
a colonial empire, which was a far more precious source of wealth
than many a foreign possession belonging to other Powers. In my
opinion not sufficient allowance was made for this state of affairs.

Finally, a further cause of misunderstandings, as I have already
mentioned in the Introduction, was to be found in the general disfavor
with which American pacifist tendencies were regarded in Germany.
Nine-tenths of the American nation are pacifists, either through their
education and sentimental prepossession in favor of the principle,
or out of a sense of commercial expediency. People in the United
States did not understand that the German people, owing to their
tragic history, are compelled to cultivate and to uphold the martial
spirit of their ancestors. The types of the German officer of the
reserve and of the members of the student corps are particularly
unsympathetic to the American, and, for certain German foibles,
all sign of that understanding that readily forgives, is entirely
absent in the United States, owing to the fact that our historical
development is not realized over there.

Although the Americans are largely and unconsciously swayed by the
influence of English ideas, we must be careful to avoid falling into
the error, so common in Germany, of regarding them as Anglo-Saxons.
The Americans themselves, in their own country, scarcely ever call
themselves Anglo-Saxons. This term is used by the English when
they are anxious to claim their American cousins as their own.
Occasionally, too, an American may use the expression when making
an after-dinner speech at some fraternizing function. As a rule,
however, the Americans insist on being Americans, and nothing else.
On the 11th May, 1914, at a memorial service for the men who fell
at Vera Cruz, President Wilson, in one of his finest speeches,
said:

"Notice how truly these men were of our blood. I mean of our American
blood, which is not drawn from any one country, which is not drawn
from any one stock, which is not drawn from any one language of
the modern world; but free men everywhere have sent their sons
and their brothers and their daughters to this country in order
to make that great compounded nation which consists of all the
sturdy elements and of all the best elements of the whole globe. I
listened again to this list of the dead with a profound interest,
because of the mixture of the names, for the names bear the marks
of the several national stocks from which these men came. But they
are not Irishmen or Germans or Frenchmen or Hebrews or Italians
any more. They were not when they went to Vera Cruz; they were
Americans; every one of them, with no difference in their Americanism
because of the stock from which they came. They were in a peculiar
sense of our blood, and they proved it by showing that they were
of our spirit, that no matter what their derivation, no matter
where their people came from, they thought and wished and did the
things that were American; and the flag under which they served
was a flag in which all the blood of mankind is united to make
a free nation."


The above words of President Wilson are the key to the attitude of
the Americans who are of German origin. True, these people, almost
without exception, still cling to their old home with heartfelt
affection; but they are Americans, like the rest of the nation.
"Germania is our mother, and Columbia is our bride," said Carl
Schurz, and with these words he described the situation in a nutshell.
Just as a man shall "leave his father and his mother, and shall
cleave unto his wife," so the man who is generally styled the
German-American decides in favor of his new home-land, when a conflict
arises between America and Germany. He will, however, do anything
in his power to avoid such a conflict. Even before the war, we in
Germany entirely failed to understand the difficult and delicate
position of the American of German origin. And during the war this
was more than ever the case. The question of the "German-Americans"
has never been dealt with tactfully in Germany. Our greatest mistake
was to expect too much from them. The Americans of German origin
have retained in their new home all the failings and virtues of
the German people. _We_ could not, therefore, blame them if they
showed less interest and less understanding in regard to political
questions than the rest of America; for did they not, on the other
hand, distinguish themselves by their respect for the established
order of things, and by the fidelity and industry with which they
pursued their various callings? The inevitable consequence of these
national qualities was that they did not exercise the political
influence which would have been only in keeping with their numerical
superiority. For instance, I might mention that, on the occasion
when I first visited Milwaukee, I was welcomed by an Irish mayor,
a circumstance which somewhat surprised me, seeing that at the
time the town contained from 300,000 to 400,000 Germans.

In consequence of the state of affairs described above, the principal
object of German policy in the United States before the war was
to try to bring about a more satisfactory understanding between
the two peoples. Prince Henry's journey to America, the exchange
of University professors and school teachers, which took place on
this occasion, the visits of the two fleets, the American Institute
in Berlin, and similar more or less successful undertakings served
the same purpose. German diplomatic representatives were instructed
to promote this policy with all their power. When I was appointed
Ambassador in Washington, the Kaiser's and the Chancellor's principal
injunction, in taking leave of me, was that I should enlighten
public opinion in the United States regarding the peaceful and
friendly intentions of German policy. Prince Bülow also said to me
that I must without fail bring the negotiations about an Arbitration
Treaty with the United States, which had been left unfinished owing
to the death of my predecessor, to a satisfactory conclusion. Despite
these definite instructions, the German Government, as I have already
pointed out, ultimately blundered and stumbled over legal quibbles.
In any case, however, Prince Bülow had meanwhile vacated his office.
The effect upon the American mind of our obstruction of this matter
should not be under-estimated. It helped not a little to convince
public opinion in the United States of the alleged warlike intentions
of the German people.

In accordance with American custom, the semi-official and semi-private
activities concerned with fostering a better understanding between
the two States had to be published to the whole world, and this
had the inevitable disadvantage of provoking opposition, both in
Germany and in the United States, among all those who had reasons
for being hostile. Unfortunately, the official representatives of
Germany in Washington were always a thorn in the side of a certain
section of the German Press, whenever they tried, in consideration
of the American attitude of mind and social customs, to introduce
a warmer feeling into the relations between the two sides. Even
in the time of my predecessor, Speck von Sternburg, the German
Embassy was on such occasions charged with softness and an excessive
desire to become adapted to American ways; and this remained the
case during my tenure of office.

Our Press in general, moreover, never revealed a sufficient amount
of interest or understanding in regard to American affairs. There
were only a very few German newspaper correspondents in the United
States, and those that did happen to be there were too poorly paid
to be able to keep properly in touch with American social life.
About twelve months before the war, the well-known wealthy
German-American, Hermann Sielcken, offered to help me out of this
difficulty by undertaking to pay the salary of a first-rate American
journalist, of German origin, who was to reside in Washington, and
act as the representative there of Wolff's telegraphic bureau.
I immediately took steps to organize this telegraphic service.
Very shortly afterwards, however, I was informed by Berlin, that
the telegrams would be too expensive, as the subject was not of
enough interest, and in this case the Wolff Bureau would only have
had to defray the cost of the actual telegrams. This was the way
the supply of news was organized in a country that imagined it
was practising world-politics.

Mr. Wilson took up his quarters in the White House, Washington,
about a year before the war, and opened his period of office with
several internal reforms. Then came the American-Mexican crisis,
and relations with Europe in general, and Germany in particular,
therefore, fell somewhat into the background.

Woodrow Wilson was a University don and an historian. His works
are distinguished by their brilliant style and the masterly manner
in which he wields the English language--a power which was also
manifested in his political speeches and proclamations. Mr. Wilson
sprang into political and general fame when he was President of the
University of Princeton, and was elected as Governor of the State
of New Jersey. Even in those days he displayed, side by side, on
the one hand, his democratic bias which led him violently to oppose
the aristocratic student-clubs, and on the other, his egocentric and
autocratic leanings which made him inaccessible to any advice from
outside, and constantly embroiled him with the governing council
of the University. As Governor of New Jersey, The Holy Land of
"Trusts," Mr. Wilson opened an extraordinarily sharp campaign against
their dominion. Mr. Roosevelt, it is true, had spoken a good deal
against the trusts, but he had done little. He could not, however,
have achieved much real success, because the Republican Party was
too much bound up with the trusts, and dependent on them. At the
time when Mr. Roosevelt wanted to take action, he also succeeded in
splitting up his party, so that real reform could only be expected
from the Democratic side. The conviction that this was so was the
cause of Mr. Wilson's success in the Presidential election of 1912.

In regard to external politics, Mr. Wilson was pacifistic, as was
also his party; whereas the Imperialists belonged almost without
exception to the Republican Party. In spite of "Wall Street," and
the influence of English ideas and opinions upon American society,
Pacifist tendencies largely prevailed in the United States before
the outbreak of the Five-Years War; how much more was this the case,
therefore, when Mr. Wilson, in accordance with American custom,
gave the post of Secretary of State to the politician to whose
influence he owed his nomination as candidate for the Presidency
by the Democratic Party. Thus did Mr. William Jennings Bryan attain
to the dignity of Secretary of State after he had thrice stood as
a candidate for the Presidency without success.

In all political questions, Mr. Bryan followed a much more radical
tendency than Mr. Wilson. His opponents call him a dishonest demagogue.
I, on the contrary, would prefer to call Mr. Bryan an honest visionary
and fanatic, whose passionate enthusiasm may go to make an exemplary
speechmaker at large meetings, but not a statesman whose concern is
the world of realities. He who in his enthusiasm believes he will
be able to see his ideal realized in this world next Thursday week
is not necessarily dishonest on that account, even if he overlooks
the fact that things are going very badly indeed.

It was believed in a large number of circles that Mr. Bryan would
not accept the post of Secretary of State, for even at that time
everybody who was in the know was already aware that Mr. Wilson could
only tolerate subordinates and not men with opinions of their own.
Mr. Bryan, however, felt the moral obligation, at least to attempt to
give his radical views a chance of succeeding, and declared, as he
took over the post, that so long as he was Secretary of State the
United States would never go to war. He even wanted this principle
to be generally accepted by the rest of the world, and with this
end in view, submitted to all foreign Governments the draft of
an Arbitration and Peace-Treaty, which was to make war utterly
impossible in the future. As is well known, the German Government,
unlike all the others, refused to fall in with Mr. Bryan's wishes.
The Secretary of State was a little mortified by this, even though
he still hoped that we should ultimately follow the example of
the other Powers. Every time we met, he used to remind me of his
draft Arbitration Treaty, which I had forwarded to Berlin. Later on
I often regretted that we did not fall in with Mr. Bryan's wishes;
who, by the by, during the war, again returned to the question, but
in vain. If the treaty had been signed by us, it would most probably
have facilitated the negotiations about the U-boat campaign.

The diplomatic corps in Washington thus found itself confronted
by an entirely new situation. The Republican Party had been at
the helm for sixteen years, and had now to vacate every one of
the administrative posts. Even our personal intercourse with the
President was governed by different formalities from those which
existed in the days of his predecessors. Mr. Roosevelt liked to
maintain friendly relations with those diplomats whose company
pleased him. He disregarded the old traditional etiquette, according
to which the President was not allowed to visit the Ambassadors
or any private houses in Washington. The friendly relations that
existed between Mr. Roosevelt and Baron Speck von Sternburg are
well known. When in the year 1908, after this gentleman's decease,
I assumed his post at Washington, Mr. Roosevelt invited me to the
White House on the evening after my first audience, to a private
interview, in which every topic of the day was discussed. Invitations
of this kind were of frequent occurrence during the last two months
of Roosevelt's administration, which, at the time of my entering
office, was already drawing to its close. For instance, Mr. Roosevelt
showed me the draft of the speech which after his retirement he
delivered at the University of Berlin.

My dealings with President Taft were on the same footing; for he
also was in favor of an amicable and unconventional relationship.
On one occasion he invited me to join him in his private Pullman on
a journey to his home in Cincinnati, where we attended the musical
festival together. On another occasion, he suddenly appeared, without
formal notice, at the Embassy, while we were holding a ball in
honor of his daughter, and later on he accepted an invitation to
my daughter's wedding.

President Wilson, who by inclination and habit is a recluse and
a lonely worker, does not like company. He re-introduced the old
etiquette and confined himself only to visiting the houses of Cabinet
members, which had been the customary tradition. He also kept himself
aloof from the banquets, which are such a favorite feature of social
life in America, and severely limited the company at the White
House. Thus the New Year Reception was discontinued entirely. This
attitude on the part of the President was the outcome of his tastes
and inclinations. But I certainly do not believe that he simply
developed a theory out of his own peculiar tastes, as so often
happens in life. I am more inclined to believe that Mr. Wilson
regarded the old American tradition as more expedient, on the grounds
that it enabled the President to remain free from all intimacy,
and thus to safeguard the complete impartiality which his high
office demanded. The peculiar friendship which unites Mr. Wilson
with Mr. House is no objection to this theory, for the latter has
to some extent always been in the position of a minister without
portfolio. An adviser of this sort, who incurs no responsibility by
the advice he gives, is more readily accepted by American opinion
than by any other, because the President of the United States is
known to be alone and exclusively responsible, whereas his ministers
are only looked upon as his assistants.

Generally speaking, the political situation in the United States
before the Five-Years War was as follows: On the one hand, owing
to the influence of English ideas, which I have already mentioned,
it was to be expected that a feeling of sympathy with the Entente
would probably preponderate in the public mind; while on the other
hand, owing to the general indifference that prevailed with regard to
all that happened in Europe, and to the strong pacifist tendencies,
no interference in the war was to be expected from America, unless
unforeseen circumstances provoked it. At all events it was to be
feared that the inflammability of the Americans' feelings would
once again be under-estimated in Germany, as it had been already.
It has never been properly understood in our country, despite the
fact that the Manila and Venezuela affairs might have taught us a
lesson in this respect. The juxtaposition in the American people's
character of Pacifism and an impulsive lust of war should have been
known to us, if more sedulous attention had been paid in Germany to
American conditions and characteristics. The American judges affairs
in Europe, partly from the standpoint of his own private sentiment of
justice, and partly under the guidance of merely emotional values;
but not, as was generally supposed in Germany, simply from a cold
and business-like point of view. If this had been reckoned with in
Germany, the terrible effect upon public opinion in America of the
invasion of Belgium and of the sinking of the _Lusitania_--particularly
in view of the influence of English propaganda--would have been
adequately valued from the start.

On May 17th, 1915, in a report addressed to the Imperial Chancellor,
I wrote as follows:


"It is not a bit of good glossing over things. Our best plan, therefore,
is frankly to acknowledge that our propaganda in this country has,
as the result of the _Lusitania_ incident, completely collapsed.
To everyone who is familiar with the American character this could
have been foreseen. I therefore beg leave to point out in time,
that another event like the present one would certainly mean war
with the United States. Side by side in the American character
there lie two apparently completely contradictory traits. The cool,
calculating man of business is not recognizable when he is deeply
moved and excited--that is to say, when he is actuated by what is
here called 'emotion.' At such moments he can be compared only
to an hysterical woman, to whom talking is of no avail. The only
hope is to gain time while the attack passes over. At present it is
impossible to foresee what will be the outcome of the _Lusitania_
incident. I can only hope that we shall survive it without war. Be
this as it may, however, we can only resume our propaganda when
the storm has subsided."


Here I should like to intrude a few of my own views regarding the
importance of public opinion in the United States.

In Europe, where people are constantly hearing about the truly
extraordinary and far-reaching authority of the American President--the
London _Times_ once said that, after the overthrow of the Russian
Czar, the President of the United States was the last remaining
autocrat--it is difficult to form a correct estimate of the power
of public opinion in the Union. In America, just as no mayor can
with impunity ignore the public opinion of his city, and no governor
the public opinion of his state, so the President of the Republic,
despite his far-reaching authority, cannot for long run counter to
the public opinion of his country. The fact has often been emphasized
by Mr. Wilson himself, among others, that the American President
must "keep his ear to the ground"--that is to say, must pay strict
attention to public opinion and act in harmony with it. For the
American statesman, whose highest ambition consists either in being
re-elected, or at least in seeing his party returned to power, any
other course would amount to political suicide; for any attempt
at swimming against the tide will certainly be avenged at the next
elections.

It must be remembered that public opinion in the United States
is seldom so homogeneous and unanimous a thing as, for example,
in England. Particularly in questions of foreign politics, public
opinion in the Union, stretching, as it does, over a whole continent,
reacts in widely varying ways in different localities, and to a very
different degree. Thus, in the States bordering on the Atlantic
coast, which are more closely in touch with the Old World, there is,
as a rule, a very definite public opinion on European questions,
while the West remains more or less indifferent. On the other hand,
in the Gulf States a very lively interest is taken by the public in
the Mexican problem, and the Pacific States are closely concerned
with the Japanese question, matters which arouse hardly more than
academic interest in other localities. This is also reflected in
the American Daily Press, which does not produce papers exerting
equal influence over the whole nation, but rather, in accordance
with the customary geographical division of the Union into seven
economic spheres of interest--namely, New York, New England, Middle
Atlantic States, Southern States, Middle West, Western and Pacific
States, comprises seven different daily presses, each of which
gives first place to quite a different problem from the rest. It is
true that the New York Press is certainly the most important mirror
of American public opinion on European questions. Nevertheless,
this importance should not lead to the erroneous assumption that
the American Press and the New York Press are synonymous terms.
The perusal of the latter does not suffice for the formation of
a reliable judgment of American public opinion, with regard to
certain questions which concern the whole nation; rather it is
necessary also to study the leading papers of New England, the
Middle Atlantic States, and particularly the West. The reports of
German and English correspondents on feeling in America, which, as
so often happens, are based purely on the New York Press, frequently
play one false, if one relies on them for an estimate of the public
opinion of the whole nation. The "Associated Press," therefore,
makes it a rule with all questions of national importance, not
only to reproduce extracts from the New York Press, but also to
publish précis of the opinions of at least fifty leading journals
from all parts of the Union.

The American daily papers are more important as a medium for influencing
public opinion than as a mirror for reflecting it. The United States is
the land of propaganda _par excellence!_ Every important enterprise,
of no matter what nature, has its Press agent; the greatest of all
is the propaganda lasting for months, which is carried on before
the biennial elections, and of the magnitude of which it is difficult
for the average European to gain any conception. It is therefore
not surprising that the political leaders of the country make very
wide use of the Press in important questions of foreign politics,
to influence public opinion in favor of the Government policy.
Not only the great news agencies, but also all leading newspapers
of the Union maintain their permanent special correspondents in
Washington, and these are received almost daily by the Secretary of
State, and as a rule once a week by the President. The information
that they receive at these interviews they communicate to their
papers in the greatest detail, without naming the high officials
from whom it has emanated, and in this way they naturally act as
megaphones through which the views of the Government are spread
throughout the whole country. In foreign questions it was often
striking how newspapers would hold back their comments until they
had received in this way a _mot d'ordre_ from Washington.

Of course this possibility for the Government to create opinion on
concrete questions only applies so long as a firm public opinion has
not already set in. As soon as the process of "crystallization," as
it is called, is complete, there is nothing left for the Government
but to follow the preponderating public opinion. Even a man like
Mr. Wilson, who possesses an unusually high degree of self-will,
has always followed public opinion, for the correct interpretation
of which--apart from his own proverbial instinct--he commands the
services of his secretary, Mr. Tumulty, and a large staff, as well
as the organization of the Democratic party, which spreads through
the length and breadth of the country. If, in a few exceptional
cases, the President has set himself in opposition to public opinion,
we might be sure that it would not be long before he again set his
course on theirs.




CHAPTER II

THE GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES

When I received the news of the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand,
I was dining with the Spanish Ambassador at the Metropolitan Club
in Washington. Signor Riano and I were not for a moment in doubt as
to the very serious, peace-menacing character of the incident, but
we found little interest in the matter among the Americans in the
club, who, as always, regarded European affairs with indifference.
As to the results of the murder, I received in Washington no
information, either officially or through the Press.

I therefore, on the 7th July, began my usual summer leave, which
had been granted a few weeks before. For the last time I crossed
the ocean on one of the proud German liners, and, indeed, on the
finest of our whole merchant fleet, the _Vaterland_. For the last
time I saw, on my arrival, the port of Hamburg and the lower Elbe
in all their glory. Germans who live at home can hardly imagine
with what love and what pride we foreign ambassadors and exiled
Germans regarded the German shipping-lines.

A few days after I had arrived in my home at Starnberg there began
strong public excitement and uneasiness over the political situation.
However, of late years so many crises had been successfully averted
at the eleventh hour, that this time, too, I hoped up to the last
minute that a change for the better would set in. It seemed as
though the responsibility for a war was too great to be borne by
anyone man--whoever he might be--who would have to make the final
decision.

On the wonderful, still summer evening of the 1st August, we heard
across the Starnberger Lake, in all the surrounding villages, the
muffled beat of drums announcing mobilization. The dark forebodings
with which the sound of the drums filled me have fixed that hour
indelibly in my memory.

The following day was devoted to preparations for the journey to
Berlin, where I had to receive instructions before returning with
all possible speed to Washington. The journey from Munich to Berlin,
which could only be made in military trains, occupied forty-eight
hours.

In the Wilhelmstrasse I had interviews with the authorities, the
substance of which was instructions to enlighten the Government
and people of the United States on the German standpoint. In doing
so I was to avoid any appearance of aggression towards England,
because an understanding with Great Britain had to be concluded
as soon as possible. The Berlin view on the question of guilt was
even then very much the same as has been set down in the memorandum
of the commission of four of the 27th May, 1919, at Versailles,
namely, that Russia was the originator of the war.

Further, I was informed at the Foreign Office, that in addition
to some other additions to the staff of the Washington Embassy,
the former Secretary of State of the Colonial Office, Dr. Dernburg,
and Privy Councillor Albert, of the Ministry of the Interior, were
to accompany me; the former as representative of the German Red
Cross, the latter as agent of the "Central Purchasing Company."
Dr. Dernburg's chief task, however, was to raise a loan in the
United States, the proceeds of which were to pay for Herr Albert's
purchases for the aforesaid company. For this purpose the Imperial
Treasury supplied us with Treasury notes, which could only be made
negotiable by my signature. This gave rise later to the legend that
Dr. Dernburg was armed with millions for propaganda purposes.

Our journey was wearisome but passed off without incident. In
forty-eight hours we reached Rotterdam, where we boarded the Dutch
steamer _Noordam_. As we went aboard we were all in high spirits,
for we had seen everywhere in Germany a wonderful, self-sacrificing
and noble enthusiasm. On the steamer, however, which incidentally was
badly overloaded, the picture changed. We suddenly found ourselves
surrounded by hostile feeling, and among our fellow-passengers
there were only a few friendly to the German cause. The bitter
daily struggle toward which we were travelling was to begin on the
ship. We plunged straight into it, and tried as far as possible
to influence our fellow passengers.

At Dover the ship was inspected by a British officer; the inspection,
however, passed off without any inconvenience to us, as in those
first days of the war the regulations of international law were
still to some extent respected. We had already made all preparations
to throw the Treasury notes overboard, in case we were searched.
As a curiosity I mention a comic interlude that occurred after we
had left Dover Harbor. A friendly German-American from a Western
State, who did not know who I was, but had recognized me as a German,
accosted me with the remark: "Take care that you don't expose yourself
to annoyance; the people on board think you are the German Ambassador
in Washington." The excellent man was overcome with amazement when
I admitted my identity. We had not had our names entered on the
passengers' list, but apart from this made no secret of our journey,
as it was already known in Rotterdam.

After an eleven days' voyage, we landed in New York on the 23rd
August. Our arrival was a relief, as during the journey we had
been overwhelmed exclusively with enemy wireless reports of French
victories. Every day we had received news of the annihilation of a
fresh German Army Corps. In comparison with this mental torture,
the cross-fire of questions from countless American Pressmen, not
altogether friendly towards Germany, was comparatively easy to
bear.

As is known, American public opinion at that time had been given a
one-sided view of the causes and course of the war, for England, who,
immediately after the declaration of war, had cut our Transatlantic
cable, held the whole of the Transatlantic news apparatus in her hands.
Apart from this, however, our enemies found from the beginning very
important Allies in a number of leading American newspapers, which,
in their daily issue of from three to six editions, did all they could
to spread anti-German feeling. In New York the bitterest attacks
on Germany were made by the _Herald_ and the _Evening Telegram_,
which were in close touch with France, as well as the _Tribune_ and
_Times_, which followed in England's wake; somewhat more moderate
were the _Sun_ and the _Globe_; the only neutrals were the _Evening
Post_ and the _American_. Outside New York the Press raged against
us, particularly in New England and the Middle-Atlantic States.
In the South and West we were also baited by the Press, but with
considerably less intensity. The only papers which could be called
neutral were those of the Hearst Press, which took up an outspoken
National-American standpoint, and, in addition, the _Chicago Tribune_,
the _Washington Post_, and a few minor newspapers. It was already
very significant that papers like the _Boston Transcript_, the
_Brooklyn Eagle_, the _Baltimore Sun_, and a few others opened
their letter-boxes to anti-German articles, which, it is true,
they condemned with fair regularity in their leading articles or
editorial notes. Against this campaign, fed systematically and
daily with British propaganda information--especially on the subject
of German atrocities in Belgium--the small number of papers in the
German language, which, moreover, were little heeded by public
opinion, and at the head of which stood the old _New Yorker
Staatszeitung_ and the courageous weekly _Fatherland_, founded
shortly after the outbreak of war by the young German-American,
G. S. Vierick, could make but little headway.

On my arrival in New York, and during the next few weeks, I made
an honest effort by daily interviews of the representatives of
the leading daily newspapers to explain the German standpoint to
the American public. I soon noticed, however, that these efforts
were not only practically fruitless but that they were even fraught
with certain dangers for me. The daily struggle with the Press was
threatening to undermine my official position and to compromise
my relations with the Washington Government so seriously that I
should not have been in a position to carry through with success
the diplomatic negotiations which were likely to be called for.
I therefore considered it as my duty to the German people to give
up, as far as I personally was concerned, all propaganda in favor
of the German cause. Certainly I have had a good deal further to
do with American journalists until the final rupture; but I
categorically refused to grant interviews or to receive newspaper
correspondents who were not prepared to treat my statements purely
as confidential, private information.

I should like to take this opportunity to remark that the American
journalist is far better than the reputation he enjoys in Europe.
In spite of the hostile atmosphere which surrounded me in America
I have never had to complain of an indiscretion. True, many minor
New York reporters whom I did not receive invented statements which
I had never made; but such experiences are common to all politicians
in America. Moreover, the results of these journalistic tricks were
almost always local and were easily contradicted. In Washington
such things never occurred. The journalists there were quite
extraordinarily capable and trustworthy men, who always behaved
like "gentlemen." My relations with them remained very friendly
to the last. In so far as I was not forced to keep silence for
political reasons I have always told them the real truth. Of course,
I was as little capable as the American journalists of foreseeing
that the policy I was representing was doomed to ultimate failure.

Just at the time when I gave up personal propaganda in order to
devote myself to my political and diplomatic activities in Washington,
the financial mission of Secretary of State Dr. Dernburg had failed.
President Wilson had stated clearly that it would be an unneutral
act for loans to be raised in the Union by the combatant States.
Our friends in high financial circles in New York regarded this
decision as favorable to Germany, for they foresaw--what actually
happened--that for every million received by us, our enemies would
raise a hundred millions. As a result of this decision of the President,
Privy Councillor Albert had to finance his purchases as far as
possible privately, while Dr. Dernburg, whose time was not fully
occupied by his duties as delegate of the Red Cross, which had
meanwhile been organized by Geheim Oberregierungrat Meyer Gerhardt
and Rittmeister Hecker, would have left America if there had remained
any possibility of doing so. There was not, however, as the English
inspected all neutral ships shortly after they left the American
ports and--in flagrant contravention of international law, which
only allows the arrest of persons who are already enrolled in the
fighting forces--summarily arrested and interned every German capable
of bearing arms. As Dr. Dernburg was thus an unwilling prisoner
in New York he began to write articles on the world-war for the
daily Press. He had a gift for explaining the causes of the war
in a quiet, interesting manner, and particularly for setting out
the German standpoint in a conciliatory form. His propaganda work
therefore met with extraordinary success. The editors of newspapers
and periodicals pressed him to contribute to their columns, and
the whole New York Press readily printed all the articles he sent
in to contradict the statements of the anti-Germans.

Out of this activity developed, in co-operation with the Foreign
Office, Dr. Dernburg's New York Press Bureau, a solution of the
propaganda question which was exceedingly welcome to me. As a private
person Dr. Dernburg could say and write much that could not be said
officially and therefore could not come from me. Consequently I
took it for granted that--in spite of certain suggestions to the
contrary--Dr. Dernburg would not be attached to the Embassy, which
would only hamper his work, and also that the Press Bureau would
retain its independent and unofficial character. I may take it as a
well-known fact that Washington is the political, and New York the
economic, capital of the United States, which has always resulted
in a certain geographical division of the corresponding diplomatic
duties. It naturally had its disadvantages that there should be,
apart from the Consulate-General, four other independent German
establishments in New York, namely, the offices of Dr. Dernburg,
Privy Councillor Albert, the military attaché Captain von Papen
and the naval attaché Commander Boy-Ed. In order to keep, to some
extent, in touch with these gentlemen, I occasionally travelled to
New York and interviewed them together in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel,
where I usually stayed and in which Dr. Dernburg lived; for their
offices, scattered as they were over the lower town, and which,
moreover, I never entered, were unsuitable for the purpose. Our
mutual personal relations were always of the best. On the other hand,
it was naturally difficult to make any headway with our official
business, since each received independent instructions from Berlin.
This was least the case with Dr. Dernburg, because his responsible
authority as far as propaganda was concerned was partly the Foreign
Office itself and partly the semi-official "Central Office for
Foreign Service." The other three gentlemen, however, were all
responsible to home departments other than mine. Captain von Papen
and Commander Boy-Ed frequently held back from me the instructions
they had received from Berlin in order not to embarrass the Embassy
by passing on military or naval information. Financially, too,
the four officials were completely independent and had their own
banking accounts, for which they had to account individually to
their respective departments at home. Only Privy Councillor Albert
had, for the purchase on a large scale of raw material, definite
funds which were in any event under my control. Concerning the
activities of these four gentlemen, countless legends have been
spread in America and in part have found their way to Germany. In
spite of all the reproaches levelled against them, and indirectly
against myself, with regard to propaganda--I shall speak of the
so-called conspiracies in Chapter V.--nothing has reached my ears
of which these gentlemen need in any way be ashamed. Individual
mistakes we have, of course, all made; in view of the ferocity and
protraction of the struggle they were inevitable. But in general
the German propaganda in America in no way deserves the abuse with
which it has been covered, in part, too, at home. If it had really
been so clumsy or ineffective as the enemy Press afterwards claimed,
the Entente and their American partisans would not have set in
motion such gigantic machinery to combat it. One need only read
G. Lechartier's book, "Intrigues et Diplomaties à Washington," to
see what importance was attached to our propaganda by the enemy.
In spite of all the bitterness which the author infuses into his
fictitious narration, admiration for the German activity in the
United States shines through the whole book. Further, at the end
of 1918 a Commission of the Senate appointed to investigate German
propaganda, as a result of the publication of protocols on this
subject, repeatedly stated that its work had in no way been in
vain, but rather its after effects had made themselves strongly
felt "like poison gas" long after America's entry into the war.
One may well venture to say that, had it not been for the serious
crisis caused by the submarine war, it would probably in time have
succeeded in completely neutralizing the anti-German campaign.

As regards our justification for openly championing the German cause
before the people of the United States by written and spoken word,
this is self-evident in a country which recognizes the principles of
freedom of the Press and free speech. Apart from this, however,
the American Government have themselves provided a precedent in
this connection during the civil war, when President Lincoln in
1863 sent to England the famous preacher, Henry Ward Beecher, whose
sympathies were strongly on the side of the Federals. Through his
speeches, afterwards published as "Patriotic Addresses," he did
much towards swaying public opinion in favor of the Northern States.
In this war, too, America, after abandoning her neutrality, has
carried out vigorous propaganda in neutral countries, as is shown by
the mission of the well-known New York supporter of woman suffrage,
Mrs. Norman Whitehouse, under the auspices of the official Press
Bureau and with the special approval of Secretary of State Lansing.
Moreover our justification has been expressly upheld by a statement
of Commissioner Bruce Bielaski of the American Law Department, who
appeared as chief witness against us before the above mentioned
Commission of Inquiry. He declared that there was no law in the
United States which, before her entry into the war, rendered illegal
German or any other foreign propaganda. Why all this noise then?--it
is reasonable to ask. Why, then, has the suggestion persisted at
home and abroad, almost from the appearance of Dr. Dernburg until
the present day, that we had, with our propaganda campaign, made
ourselves guilty of treachery to the United States?

From the moral point of view, too, no exception can be taken to
the German propaganda. The United States was neutral and wished to
remain so. The German propaganda was working for the same end. I
have never heard of a single case of bribery by our representatives.
If money was spent on our side, it was purely for the purpose of
spreading articles and pamphlets pleading United States neutrality.
Applications were frequently made to us by writers and editors who
from inner conviction were ready to write and circulate articles
of this kind, but were not financially in a position to do so. The
leaders of German propaganda would surely have been neglectful
of their duty if in such cases they had not provided the necessary
funds. All Governments in the world have always proceeded in a
similar way, and in particular that of the United States since
their entry into the war, as is shown by the case of the _Freie
Zeitung_ of Bern--therefore equally in a neutral country. These
facts must throw a strange light on the inquiry of the American
Senate into German propaganda, delayed as it was until last winter
and carried through with such elaborate machinery. It is obvious
that beneath it all there lay--what irony!--a purely propagandist
purpose, namely, that of humiliating Germany in the person of her
late official representative accredited to the United States, and to
make her appear contemptible in the eyes of the uncritical public!

Whereas in the first months of the war no one in America had thought
of connecting "German Propaganda" with anything shocking, our opponents
afterwards succeeded in disseminating the idea that a few offences
against the law committed by Imperial and American Germans represented
an important, even the most important, part of the German propaganda
work. So it was brought about that even in the time before America's
entry into the war, everyone who openly stood up for Germany's
cause was stamped by the expression "German Propagandist" as a
person of doubtful integrity. The gradual official perpetuation
of this admittedly misleading identification of our absolutely
unexceptionable propaganda with a few regrettable offences against
the American penal code--this and no other was the object of that
inquiry by the Senate. The prejudicial headlines under which the
published articles were printed, such as "Brewery and Brandy Interests"
and "German-Bolshevist Propaganda," themselves sufficed to indicate
that our propaganda was to be crucified between two "malefactors";
for to the average American citizen there is nothing more horrifying
than the distillery on the one hand and Bolshevism on the other. In
this connection I must not omit to mention that the great majority
of the documents laid before the Commission had been secured by
means of bribery or theft. It is also worth while to remind the
reader of the significant words of Senator Reed, a member of the
Commission, who said at one point in the examination: "I am interested
in trying to distil some truth from a mass of statements which are
so manifestly unfair and distorted that it is hard to characterize
them in parliamentary language."

As for the fantastic figures with which the Americans have undertaken
to estimate the cost of our propaganda, they rest--in so far as
they are not simply the fruit of a malicious imagination--on the,
to say the least of it, superficial hypothesis that all the money
paid out by the different German offices from the outbreak of war
until the breaking off of diplomatic relations between Germany and
America, the amount of which has been arrived at on the strength
of a minute scrutiny of the books of all the banks with which these
offices have done business, were used for purposes of propaganda.
As a matter of fact, of course, far the greater part of this outlay
went to finance the very extensive purchases of Privy Councillor
Albert as well as certain business transactions concluded by Captain
von Papen, which will be discussed later. In comparison with this
the sum we devoted to propaganda work was quite small. The Press
Bureau was frequently very appreciably hampered by the fact that
even for quite minor expenditure outside the fixed budget, previous
sanction had to be obtained from Berlin. Consequently much useful
work would have had to remain undone if, particularly in the first
months of the war, self-sacrificing German-Americans to whom it
was only of the slightest interest that the German point of view
should be accurately and emphatically explained, had not placed
small sums at the disposal of the leaders of our propaganda. In the
two and a half years between the outbreak of war and the rupture
between Germany and America the sums paid out from official funds
for propaganda work in the Union--including minor contributions
for other countries, as, for example, the pictures distributed
from New York over South America and Eastern Asia--do not, all
told, exceed a million dollars. That is surely only a small fraction
of what England and France have expended during the war in order,
in spite of very thorough preparation in peace time, to win over
American public opinion to their cause. It is actually only a sixth
of what, according to the _Chicago Tribune_ on the 1st November,
1919, the official American Press Bureau of Mr. George Creel has
spent in order to "cement enthusiasm for the war" during the eighteen
months between America's entry into the war and the conclusion of
the Armistice. The thirty-five to fifty million dollars which,
according to the statements of our enemies, were swallowed up by
German propaganda in the United States belong, therefore, to the
realms of fable.

In this connection I must mention yet another, far more malicious
legend, namely, the slander widely spread in America last year,
that the funds collected in America for the German Red Cross were
used to finance German propaganda. It is a fact that every dollar
that went to the German Red Cross Delegation in New York was remitted
to the home organization for which it was intended. Of course these
funds were in the first place paid into the various New York banking
accounts from which Dr. Dernburg drew the funds for the Press Bureau.
But, as Captain Hecker has most definitely stated, their equivalent
was remitted to Germany through the bank, regardless of the changes
in the exchange.

Dr. Dernburg, in organizing the Press Bureau, availed himself of
the assistance he found in New York. The suggestion, widely current
in America and repeated by a member of the American Secret Service
before the Senatorial inquiry, that this Press Bureau had formed,
as it were, a part of the German mobilization, and that, therefore,
the most skilled propaganda experts from Europe and the Far East
had been gathered together in New York in order that, after a
preliminary run there, they might be let loose on the American
world, is a ridiculous invention. Just as Dr. Dernburg himself
became a propagandist without any premeditation, so it was also
the case with his colleagues. At first his only assistants were
the New York Press Agent of the Hamburg-Amerika line, Herr M. B.
Claussen, and after the entry of Japan into the war a Government
official from that country who was unable to continue his journey
to Germany, because the passport across the Atlantic granted him
through the instrumentality of the State Department was rejected
by the British authorities. This official, Dr. Alexander Fuehr,
the interpreter of the Consulate-General in Yokohama, who had great
experience in Press matters and possessed an intimate knowledge
of American affairs, assisted by quite a small staff of assistants
engaged in New York, issued the daily bulletins of the "German
Information Service," which appeared for a year and consisted of
translations of the substance of the German newspapers, comments on
daily events and occasional interviews with people who had returned
from Europe. It was Herr Claussens's duty to circulate the bulletins,
the arrival of which was in no way kept secret, among the American
Press, and to see to it that they should be reproduced as fully
as possible, which was done, especially in the provincial Press.

Later, when the propaganda movement had developed to the extent of
publishing and circulating leaflets, brochures and longer pamphlets,
Dr. Dernburg decided to employ in the Press Bureau a well-known
American publicist in the person of Mr. William Bayard Hale, who
had already done good work, by speaking and writing, towards an
unbiassed appreciation of the German point of view, and he was
assisted by two younger New York journalists. Later, when the bureau
took up war-picture and war-film propaganda, these were joined by
two more young German Government officials, Dr. Mechlenburg and
Herr Plage, who also were held up in America on their way from
Japan. More than a dozen persons, including messengers, have never
been employed by the Press Bureau at a time. Of the thirty-one
trained propagandists imported from Germany who, according to Captain
Lester's evidence before the Senatorial Commission, were supposed
to have worked in the Press Bureau, in so far as their names were
given in the protocols of the inquiry, we are assured by Herr Fuehr
that not one was employed there!

In addition to his direction of the Press Bureau Dr. Dernburg,
who continued with inexhaustible energy to write articles for the
periodicals and instructive letters for the daily Press, was responsible
for keeping in touch with the directors of the American Press.
He also availed himself of invitations to speak in American and
German circles, and sometimes in other places than New York. As far
as I know he never founded any societies for propaganda purposes.
On the other hand, when such societies which had arisen, without
his influence turned to him, he of course supported them by word
and deed.

For all questions of propaganda Dr. Dernburg had the assistance of
a small committee nominated by himself and consisting, in addition
to Herren Albert, Meyer Gerhardt and Fuehr, of a few American
journalists and business men. It was his custom to confer with
this committee once or twice a month, when the general situation,
the prevailing fluctuations of public opinion and the probable
influence of the propaganda material about to be published, were
discussed in detail.

With this entirely improvised and, as will be seen, very modest
machinery, Dr. Dernburg began his campaign. The enemy statement
that the German propaganda in the United States had been actually
organized many years before the war, so that in 1914 we might have
ready at our disposal an organization with branches in every part
of the country, is unfortunately devoid of any foundation. It is
a regrettable fact that, in spite of my repeated warnings to the
authorities, nothing was ever done on the German side before the
war. It is well known that at that time the power of public opinion
in democratic countries was very little understood in Germany. It was
thought at home--which is typical of the objective, matter-of-fact
German national character--that it was much more important that the
right should be done than that it should be recognized as right by
the public. Added to this was the under-estimation of the influence
of the United States on the development of world politics.

Before the war no one in Germany had thought it possible that the
Union would have to be reckoned with as a factor, much less a decisive
factor, in a European war. This was a mistake, the effect of which
unfortunately was felt until well into 1917--the result was that
there was never enough money available to keep in touch and co-operate
with the American Press. As a matter of fact I had, in the course
of my activities in Washington, personally entered into certain
social relations with the proprietors of a few great American
newspapers. But from Berlin no advances were made. Even with the
German-American papers there was no organized connection, and they
themselves did not work together in any way. It is true that for
years there had been a business connection between the greatest
American news-agency, the Associated Press, and the Wolff Telegraphic
Bureau; as, however, the agency was not served direct with Berlin
Wolff-telegrams, but by its own representatives there, this did
not amount to much. England, on the other hand--quite apart from
the close relationship resulting from a common language--had for
years maintained and systematically cultivated the closest contact
with the American Press. It followed, then, that on the outbreak of
war the English influence on the American daily Press was enormous.
It did not rest as exclusively as has been assumed in Germany on
direct proprietary rights. I do not think that, with the exception
of a single newspaper in one of the smaller cities any great American
paper was directly bought by England. Here and there considerable
blocks of American newspaper shares may have been in English hands
and influenced the tendency of certain papers. If, however, it is
true--as was credibly stated in Irish-American quarters during
the first year of the war--that Lord Northcliffe boasted a year
or two before the war of "controlling" seventeen American papers,
it is difficult to believe that this influence of the English
press-magnates was based on hard cash. Rather is it the case that
certain newspapers received their otherwise very costly private
news-service from England on very advantageous terms. To others,
English writers of leading articles are said to have been attached,
without cost to the newspaper--a scheme of which I have often heard in
America, but which is difficult to prove, as all American newspapers
maintain the strictest secrecy as to the origin of their leading
articles. It is, however, common knowledge that with regard to
European affairs the American news service was swayed by this entirely
English organization. Until the outbreak of the war the American
news agencies drew exclusively from English sources. Moreover,
those newspapers which in the United States play a very important
part, inasmuch as they are the fount of most of the new ideas by
which the tone of the Press in influenced, were in a very considerable
degree served from England. On the other hand, the wide field of
cinematographic production was strongly influenced by the French
film. In this way our enemies in the United States had, at the
outbreak of war, a boundless and excellently prepared field for
the propagation of their news, and the representation of their
point of view, but more particularly for their attack on the German
cause. In spite of this, however, they immediately inundated the
Union with propagandist literature, particularly through the agents
of the English shipping lines, who were scattered all over the
country, and the well-known author and politician, Sir Gilbert
Parker, sent from London tons of this matter to well-known American
business men, professors and politicians.

On our side, it is true, and I should like to emphasize this to their
credit, that on the outbreak of war the German-American newspapers
took up our cause unhesitatingly and as one man. Further, they
have, until America's entry into the war, honestly striven to win
full justice for the American point of view, and to combat the
unneutral leanings of the majority of the Americans and the slanderous
attacks of our enemies. As, however, they are not accessible to the
general public, who do not know German, and in particular scarcely
ever come into the hands of the authoritative American political
circles, their support remained more or less academic. Very valuable
services were rendered to the German cause by the already-mentioned
weekly paper _Fatherland_, which was printed in English; in view,
however, of its reputation as a partisan journal, it naturally
could not exert so deep an influence as the local daily papers,
which carried on the English propaganda without allowing it to
become too conspicuous. For telegraphic communication from Germany
to America we had to rely solely on the two German wireless stations
at Sayville and Tuckerton, erected shortly before the outbreak of
war, and we soon succeeded, subject to American censorship, in
getting a regular Press-service, which was spread, not only over
the whole of the United States, but was also passed on to South
America and East Asia. But in the first place, in spite of repeated
extension and strengthening, these two stations were quite inadequate;
in the second place, the Press-service never succeeded in adapting
itself thoroughly to American requirements. The same may be said
of most of the German propaganda literature which reached America
in fairly large quantities since the third month of the war, partly
in German and partly in not always irreproachable English. This,
like the Press telegrams, showed a complete lack of understanding
of American national psychology. The American character, I should
like to repeat here, is by no means so dry and calculating as the
German picture of an American business man usually represents.
The outstanding characteristic of the average American is rather
a great, even though superficial, sentimentality. There is no news
for which a way cannot be guaranteed through the whole country,
if clothed in a sentimental form. Our enemies have exploited this
circumstance with the greatest refinement in the case of the German
invasion of "poor little Belgium," the shooting of the "heroic
nurse," Edith Cavell, and other incidents. Those who had charge
of the Berlin propaganda, on the other hand, made very little of
such occurrences on the enemy side, e.g., the violation of Greece,
the bombing of the Corpus Christi procession in Karlsruhe, etc. One
thing that would have exerted a tremendous influence in America,
if its publicity had been handled with only average skill, was
the sufferings of our children, women and old people as a result
of the British hunger blockade--that they have made no attempt
to bring to the notice of the world.

On the other hand they put themselves to the greatest possible
trouble to lay "The Truth About the War" before American public
opinion. This, however, fell on unfavorable ground, for the American
does not care to be instructed. He had no interest in learning
the "truth" which the German Press communications and explanatory
pamphlets were so anxious to impress upon him. The American likes
to form his own opinions and so only requires facts. The possibility
of exerting influence therefore lies rather in the choice of the
facts and the way in which they are presented, than in logical
and convincing argument. It is all the easier to influence him by
the well-timed transmission of skilfully disposed facts, since his
usually very limited general knowledge and his complete ignorance of
European affairs deprive him of the simplest premises for a critical
judgment of the facts presented to him from the enemy side. It is
quite incredible what the American public will swallow in the way
of lies if they are only repeated often enough and properly served
up. It all turns on which side gets the news in first; for the first
impression sticks. Corrections are generally vain, especially as
they appear as a rule in small print and in inconspicuous places.
When, for example, the American Press got the first news of the
"destruction" of Rheims cathedral from London and in the English
version, no German correction, however well-founded, would succeed
in removing the first impression.

Particularly ineffective in their influence on American public
opinion--as may be said here in anticipation--have been the majority
of our official Notes. In view of the subsequent ever-increasing
interruption of the news service from Germany, they were the last
and only means by which the German standpoint could be brought
before the American people. Their effectiveness depended entirely
on the impression that they made on American public opinion and
not on the Washington Government; yet they were nearly always drawn
up in Berlin in the form of juristic précis, propagandist but quite
futile.

All these factors must be taken into consideration in attempting
to estimate the success of our propaganda in the United States.
They show that on the one hand the prevailing conditions of American
public opinion were extraordinarily unfavorable to our propaganda,
and that the support it received from home, with a few exceptions,
was misguided.

Dr. Dernburg, then, had not a chance during the eight months of his
activity in America of transforming her into a pro-German country,
and it is certain that no one else could have done it in his place.
But he succeeded to a great extent, and within a comparatively short
time, in more or less crippling the enemy propaganda, and at least
in gradually rendering ineffective the grossest misrepresentations
of our enemies. By his own writings and other methods of spreading
the truth, and particularly by the numerous brochures and books,
which at his suggestion were written by American supporters of the
German cause and distributed in thousands directly or indirectly by
the Press Bureau with the help of a skilfully compiled address-book,
he succeeded in exerting very considerable influence. By keeping
in touch with American journalists and other influential persons
he did much good work, particularly in the first months of the
war. His connection with Irish leaders laid the foundation for a
co-operation which in the following year was of great importance
to our position in the United States, and which, with a somewhat
more intelligent backing by our Government departments at home,
might have been more fruitful still.

One branch of our propaganda which was also initiated under Dr.
Dernburg, but was chiefly developed after his departure, was the
moving-picture propaganda, for which a very efficient company was
floated by Privy Councillor Albert. At first it was intended to be
an agency for the circulation of films from Germany. As, however,
suitable material for the American market could not be obtained
there, the "American Correspondent Film Co." decided to send its
own agents to Germany and Austria with a view to making suitable
films for their purpose. In this way several important film-dramas
were produced which have had great success in hundreds of American
cinemas. In spite of this the company had finally to be liquidated,
chiefly owing to lack of support from the military authorities at
home.

With the sinking of the _Lusitania_ our propaganda of enlightenment
in the United States substantially came to an end. Henceforward
the principal aim of its activity, which, after Dr. Dernburg's
departure, came under the direction of Privy Councillor Albert,
was to keep the United States out of the war. Side by side with
this, an attempt was made to influence public feeling against the
export of arms and ammunition and against the Anglo-French loan,
and to demonstrate the increasingly prejudiced effect wrought by
England on American economic interests. In November, 1915, I urged,
as I cabled at the time to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg, the complete
suppression of propaganda. The Press Bureau in New York continued
under the direction of Dr. Fuehr, until the breaking off of relations
between America and Germany. It concerned itself, however, apart
from certain regular literary contributions to certain journals,
less with propaganda work than with keeping an eye on the American
Press and the development of the news service to and from Germany
as well as to South America and Eastern Asia.




CHAPTER III

POLITICAL EVENTS PRECEDING THE "LUSITANIA" INCIDENT

As I mentioned in the first chapter, it was to be expected that
public opinion in America would range itself overwhelmingly on
the side of the Entente. As a result of the violation of Belgian
neutrality, this happened far in excess of expectation. The violence
of the statements of the anti-German party called forth strong
replies from those who desired a strict neutrality on the part of
the United States. The adherents of the latter party were always
stigmatized as pro-Germans, although even the German-Americans never
called for anything more than an unconditional neutrality. This also
was the aim for which the German policy was working through its
representatives in America. We never hoped for anything further.

The waves of excitement ran so high that even the private relations
of the adherents of both parties contending suffered. President
Wilson, therefore, on the 18th August, 1914, issued a proclamation
to the American people which is of special interest because it
lays down in a definite form the policy to which he logically and
unwaveringly adhered until the rupture.

In this proclamation the following sentences occur: "Every man
who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of
neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and
friendliness to all concerned." And further: "The people of the
United States ... may be divided in camps of hostile opinion....
Such divisions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind and
might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our
duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself
ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels
of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend."

The policy outlined in these quotations from Mr. Wilson's proclamation
won the approval of an overwhelming majority of the American people,
for even among the supporters of the Entente there was only a small
minority who desired an active participation in the war by the
United States. Apart from the fact that the traditional American
policy seemed to preclude any such intervention in European affairs,
it was to the interest of the United States to play with unimpaired
power the rôle of _Arbiter mundi_, when the States of ancient Europe,
tired of tearing one another to pieces, at last longed for peace
again. America could not but hope that neither of the two warring
parties would come out of the war in a dominating position. There
is, therefore, a certain modicum of truth in the view frequently
expressed in Germany that the United States would in any case finally
have entered the war to prevent the so-called "German Peace." But
the question is whether such a peace was possible in face of the
superior strength of our enemies. If we had won the first battle
of the Marne and had then been prepared to restore Belgium and
conclude a moderate peace, it is conceivable that we might have
come to terms with England on the basis of a kind of Treaty of
Amiens. After the loss of the battle of the Marne a "German Peace"
was out of the question. The possibility of such a peace has never
recurred. It was therefore necessary for the German policy to strive
for a peace by understanding on the basis of the _status quo_.
Just as Frederick the Great defended Prussia's newly won position
as a great Power against overwhelming odds, so we were fighting
under similar conditions for the maintenance of Germany's position
in the world.

Our Government had declared _urbi et orbi_ that they were waging a
defensive war, and were therefore obliged to regulate their policy
accordingly. If we had desired a peace like that of Hubertusburg we
should have won. It is often contended in Germany to-day that it
would still have been possible to attain this end. I have struggled
for it in America for two and a half years and am as convinced
to-day as I was then, that by acquiescing in the policy of the
United States we should have obtained a peace which would have
met the needs of the German people, if only those who desired the
same thing at home had been in a position to carry their wishes
through.

In Germany it is also alleged, contrary to my own opinion, that the
German people could not have held out if they had not been driven
on by the "Will to conquer." I regard this view as an injustice to
the German nation. If our home propaganda, instead of continually
awakening vain hopes, had insisted on telling the real truth, the
German people would have faced danger to the last. We ought to
have repeated constantly that our situation was very serious, but
that we must clench our teeth, and our Government must be ready
to seize the first opportunity to end the defensive war by a
corresponding peace.

The controversy about the "German peace" or "peace by negotiation"
must be touched on here because it formed the nucleus of the diplomatic
struggle in Washington. At the beginning of the war these catchwords
had not yet been invented, but their substance even then controlled
the situation. The attitude of the American Government and public
opinion towards us depended in the first place on whether they
thought that we were striving for world-mastery or were waging a
defensive war.

Immediately after my return from Europe I called on President Wilson,
who had taken the opportunity of the war and the death of his first
wife, to withdraw even more than ever from the outer world. He was
generally known as the recluse of the White House. He only received
people with whom he had political business to settle. Particularly
from diplomats and other foreigners Mr. Wilson kept very aloof,
because he was anxious to avoid the appearance of preference or
partiality.

After the disillusionment of Versailles it is difficult for a German
to form an unbiassed judgment of Mr. Wilson. We must not forget,
however, that no serious attempt has ever been made in Germany
to get an unprejudiced estimate of Mr. Wilson's personality. In
the course of the war he has come to be regarded more and more
as unneutral and anti-German, whereas, to the average American
public opinion, he appeared in quite a different light. Later,
after the defeat of our arms, we hailed Mr. Wilson as the Messiah
who was to save Germany and the whole world from dire distress.
When, therefore, at Versailles, the President, instead of unfolding
and carrying through a far-reaching programme for the general
reconstruction of the world, approved all the ultra-chauvinistic
and nationalistic mistakes of the European statesmen and proclaimed
as the aim of the peace the punishment of Germany, Mr. Wilson was
set down in Germany without more ado as a hypocrite.

I think that through all the phases of the war the German opinion of
Mr. Wilson has suffered from sheer exaggeration. The chief mistake lay
in separating Wilson's personality from public opinion in the United
States. In spite of his strong will and his autocratic leanings, Mr.
Wilson is still, in the first place, a perfect type of the American
politician. In his speeches he always tries to voice public opinion,
and in his policy to follow its wishes.

He certainly tries to direct and influence public opinion. But he
changes his front at once if he notices that he has strayed from
the way that the _aura popularis_ would have him follow. In order
to form a correct judgment of Mr. Wilson's actions and speeches
it is always necessary to ask oneself, in the first place, what
end he has in view for his own political position and that of his
party in America. He proclaims in a most dazzling way the ideals
of the American people. But their realization always depends on
his own actual political interests and those of the Democratic
party. Mr. Wilson's attitude has always been synonymous with that
of his party, because the latter can produce no other personality
capable of competing with the President. Therefore, Mr. Wilson
always met with little or no opposition within the Democratic party,
and he was able to follow for a long time his own inclination to
adopt a quite independent policy.

Socially the President is very congenial when once he has made up
his mind to emerge from his narrow circle. He has not the reputation
of being a loyal friend, and is accused of ingratitude by many of
his former colleagues and enthusiastic adherents. In any case,
however, Mr. Wilson is an implacable enemy when once he feels himself
personally attacked or slighted. As a result of his sensitiveness
he has a strong tendency to make the mistake of regarding political
differences of opinion as personal antipathy. The President has
never forgiven the German Government for having caused the failure
of his peace-policy of 1916-17, which was supported by public opinion
in America. In Germany his later speeches, in which he drew a
distinction between the German people and the Imperial Government,
were regarded as hypocrisy. Such a differentiation was at that
time based on American public feeling, which held autocracy and
militarism responsible for the disasters which had been brought
upon the world. The question has, however, never been answered
why this distinction was abandoned by Mr. Wilson at Versailles.
Without wishing in any way either to accuse or defend him I consider
the answer to this riddle to be that the President allowed himself to
be convinced of the complicity of the German people by the statesmen
of the Entente. He was at the time in a mood with regard to us which
predisposed him to such influences. Mr. Wilson was by origin,
up-bringing and training a pacifist. When it is remembered that
with us and in neutral countries it was the pacifists themselves
who were the most indignant at the Peace of Versailles, that they
were the very people who for the most part advised against the
signature of this peace, one can imagine the feelings aroused in
a disillusioned pacifist like Wilson by those whom he regards as
responsible for having thwarted the possibility of an ideal pacifist
peace.

Apart from this, Mr. Wilson at Versailles no longer dominated American
public opinion, and his political power consequently collapsed. In
the United States the old indifference to European affairs regained
the upper hand. Men were satisfied with having brought about a
victory over autocracy and militarism. They wanted nothing further.
The American troops were crowding home, and, finally, feeling in
the United States was still so strongly against us that no one
would have understood the President if he had caused a rupture with
his Allies on our behalf.

At Versailles, too, an outstanding peculiarity of Mr. Wilson's may
have played a part which even during the earlier negotiations had
been of great importance. He is a man who is slow to make up his
mind, and likes to postpone decisions until they are inevitable. He
is always ready to wait and see whether the situation may not improve
or some unexpected event occur. How often during the Washington
negotiations did, first I and then our enemies, believe that we had
set President Wilson on a definite course. But again and again
the requisite decision would be postponed. In Washington it was
generally taken under the strong pressure of public opinion. In
Versailles the Entente statesmen may well have forced a decision
by displaying a stronger will and a wider knowledge of European
affairs. Mr. Wilson was at Versailles in the position of the giant
Antæus, who drew his strength from his native soil. Once away from
American ground Hercules (Clemenceau) was able to crush him.

At the time I am now describing the circumstances were quite different,
because at that time Mr. Wilson had a reliable support for his
policy in American public opinion. In Germany, at the very beginning
of the war, great resentment was felt against Mr. Wilson for the
cold negative in his reply to the Emperor's telegram in which Mr.
Wilson was asked to condemn the atrocities perpetrated by the Belgian
population and _francs-tireurs_. It was not, however, noticed in
Germany that the President at the same time likewise refused to
receive a Belgian deputation which came to America to beg for his
help.

During my conversation with the President already mentioned, he
made a statement on the lines of his proclamation of neutrality
of which I have already given the substance. My reply that the
American neutrality seemed to us to be tinged with sympathy for
our enemies Mr. Wilson contradicted emphatically. He thought that
this appearance was the result of England's naval power, which
he could do nothing to alter. In this connection the President
made the following remark, which struck me very forcibly at the
time:

"The United States must remain neutral, because otherwise the fact
that her population is drawn from so many European countries would
give rise to serious domestic difficulties."


My remark about the benevolence of the United States' neutrality
towards our enemies was at the time chiefly prompted by the differences
that had arisen with regard to the wireless stations.

The fact that this question arose gives yet another proof of how
little we were prepared for war. By German enterprise two wireless
stations had been erected on the east coast of the United States
as a means of direct communication with Europe, one at Sayville
(Long Island), the other at Tuckerton (New Jersey). Both were partly
financed by American and French capital. As at the beginning of the
war the cable fell entirely into English hands and was destroyed by
them, we had no telegraphic communication with home at our disposal.
We had to fall back exclusively on the wireless stations, when, as
frequently happened, we were unable to make use of the circuitous
routes via neutral countries. Unfortunately it appeared that the
legal position with regard to the proprietorship of the two stations
was not clear. Actions were immediately brought on the French side,
and the closing of the stations by decree of the courts demanded.
Under these circumstances it was fortunate for us that the American
Government, after tedious negotiations with me, took over possession
of both stations. Otherwise they would have been closed and we
should have been unable to use them.

Our satisfaction at this decision was modified by the establishment
of a censorship of radio-telegrams on the part of the American
Government on the strength of the Hague Convention, which prohibits
the communication by wireless from a neutral country with the military
or naval forces of a combatant. If the stations had been publicly
used before the war we should have stood on firm legal ground, for
such cases are excepted by the Hague Convention. Unfortunately the
stations were in 1914 only partially completed, and the application
of the clauses in question was therefore doubtful. It is true that
the stations were ready for immediate use, but as a result of the
French protest the American Government held strictly to the legal
standpoint. In these negotiations we had to content ourselves with
pointing out that whereas our enemies could pass on military information
to their Governments by means of coded cablegrams, we should be
confined to the use of the wireless stations. Finally we came to
an agreement with the American Government that they should have
a copy of the code which we used for the wireless telegrams. In
this way their contents were kept secret from the enemy, but not
from the Washington Government. This course we only agreed to as
a last resource as it was not suitable for handling negotiations
in which the American Government was concerned.

The course of this controversy was typical of the fate of German
interests in America throughout the whole period of American neutrality.
Unfortunately we had absolutely no means at hand for putting any
pressure on America in our own favor. In comparison with the public
opinion in the Eastern States, which followed in the wake of the
Entente, and with the authoritative circles of New York, Wilson's
Administration without question strove for an honorable neutrality.
In spite of this most of their decisions were materially unfavorable
to us, so that a German observer from a distance might, not without
reason, obtain the impression that the neutrality of the American
Government was mere hypocrisy and that all kinds of pretexts were
found for helping England.

This was not the chief impression made on a near observer. In politics
the Americans are first and foremost jurists, and indeed in a narrower
and more literal sense than the English Imperialists, with whom,
according to their old traditions, justice only serves as a cloak
for their political ambitions. I cannot judge how far the Americans
have become full-blooded Imperialists since their entry into the
war, i.e., since about 1917. At the time of which I speak this was
far from being the case. If, moreover, it is a fact that the majority
of the decisions of the United States turned out unfavorably to us,
the question of the American motives should have been carefully
differentiated from the other question as to what inferences may be
drawn from the state of affairs. Even if we had had just reason
to complain of unfair treatment it was for us to be as indulgent
towards America as was compatible with our final aim not to lose
the war. The question is not whether we had cause for resentment
and retaliation, but simply what benefit could be extracted for
Germany out of the existing situation.

At this visit to the White House, the only question that was acute
was that of the wireless stations. This and the negotiations which
I shall mention later, dealing with the coaling of our ships of war
and the American export of arms and ammunition, I discussed with
Secretary of State Bryan. The first time I visited this gentleman he
exclaimed with great warmth: "Now you see I was right when I kept
repeating that preparation for war was the best way of bringing
war about. All the European Powers were armed to the teeth and
always maintained that this heavy armament was necessary to protect
them from war. Now the fallacy is obvious. We alone live in peace
because we are unarmed."

Mr. Bryan has always been a genuine pacifist, and later sacrificed
his Ministerial appointment to his convictions. So long as he remained
in office he continued to influence the American Government to
maintain neutrality and constantly strove to bring about peace.

A first attempt in this direction was made from Washington immediately
after the outbreak of the war, but met with no response from the
combatant Powers. At the beginning of September, Mr. Bryan repeated
the offer of American mediation.

At that time a vigorous agitation had begun in New York for the
restoration of peace. Mr. William Randolph Hearst, the well-known
editor of widely circulated newspapers, and other well-known
personalities, called together great meetings at which America's
historical mission was said to be the stopping of the wholesale
murder that was going on in Europe. At this time I was, together
with several other gentlemen, staying with James Speyer, the banker,
at his country house. The host and the majority of the guests,
among whom was the late ambassador in Constantinople, Oscar Straus,
were supporters of the prevailing pacific movement. The question
of American mediation was eagerly discussed at the dinner table.
Mr. Straus was an extremely warm adherent of this idea. He turned
particularly to me because the German Government were regarded as
opponents of the pacifist ideas. I said that we had not desired the
war and would certainly be ready at the first suitable opportunity
for a peace by understanding. Thereupon Mr. Straus declared that
he would at once travel to Washington and repeat my words to Mr.
Bryan. Immediately after dinner he went to the station and on the
following day I received a wire from the Secretary of State, asking
me to return to Washington as soon as I could to discuss the matter
with him. There we had a long interview in his private residence,
with the result that an American offer of mediation was sent to
the Imperial Chancellor. Meanwhile Mr. Straus had gone to the
ambassadors of the other combatant Powers, who all more or less
rejected the proposal. The friendly reply of the German Government
coincided in principle with what I had said, but added that Mr.
Bryan should first address himself to the enemy, as the further
course of the negotiations depended on their attitude, which was not
yet known. The American Government never returned to the question
and I had no reason to urge them to do so. Any importunity on our
side would have given an impression of weakness. Nevertheless this
interlude was so far favorable to us that it contrasted our readiness
for negotiation with the enemy's refusal.

In consequence of the failure of their first attempt to intervene the
American Government thought it necessary to exercise more restraint.
In spite of this, however, President Wilson, before the end of
the winter of 1914-15, sent his intimate friend, Colonel Edward
M. House, to London, Paris and Berlin, in order to ascertain
semi-officially whether there were any possibilities of peace.

Mr. House, who lived in an unpretentious abode in New York, occupied
a peculiar and very influential position at the White House. Bound
to the President by intimate friendship, he has always refused
to accept any Ministerial appointment, either at home or abroad,
although he was only possessed of modest means and could certainly
have had any post in the Cabinet or as an ambassador that he had
liked to choose. In this way he remained entirely independent, and
since President Wilson's entry into office, was his confidential
adviser in domestic, and particularly in foreign politics. As such
Colonel House had a position that is without precedent in American
history. During his stay in London, at this time, he is said to
have described himself to the wife of an English Cabinet Minister,
herself not favorably disposed towards America, as the "eyes and
ears of the President." I know from my own experience how thoroughly
and effectively he was able to inform his friend on the European
situation, and how perfectly correctly, on the other hand, he
interpreted Mr. Wilson's views.

It was not easy to become more closely acquainted with Colonel
House, whose almost proverbial economy of speech might be compared
with the taciturnity of old Moltke.

Unlike the majority of his fellow-nationals, and particularly his
immediate fellow-countrymen of the Southern States, Colonel House,
while possessing great personal charm and the courtesy that is
characteristic of the Southern States, is reserved and retiring.
It took a considerable time before I got to know this able and
interesting man at all intimately. I did not become intimate with
him until the time of the journey to Berlin already mentioned.
Even then it was the earnest wish of Colonel House to obtain for
his great friend the chief credit of being the founder of peace.
Colonel House was particularly well fitted to be the champion of the
President's ideas. I have never known a more upright and honorable
pacifist than he. He had a horror of war because he regarded it as
the contradiction of his ideals of the nobility of the human race.
He often spoke with indignation of the people who were enriching
themselves out of the war, and added that he would never touch the
profits of war industry. He afterwards repeatedly told me that
he had spoken as energetically in London against the blockade,
which was a breach of international law, as against the submarine
war in Berlin. Both these types of warfare were repugnant to the
warm, sympathetic heart of Colonel House. He could not understand
why women and children should die of hunger or drowning in order
that the aims of an imperialist policy, which he condemned, might
be attained. At the same time he was convinced that neither of
these types could decide the war, but would only serve to rouse
in both the combatant countries a boundless hatred which would
certainly stand in the way of future co-operation in the work of
restoring peace. In many of his remarks at that time, Colonel House
proved to be right, since the war was decided mainly by the entry
of America and the consequent overwhelming superiority in men,
money and material.

Meanwhile, as a result of the traffic in munitions, feeling in
Germany had turned sharply against the United States. Our position
with regard to this question was very unfavorable as we had no legal
basis for complaint. The clause of the Hague Convention which permitted
such traffic had been included in the second Hague Convention at our
own suggestion. Nevertheless it was natural that the one-sided support
of our enemies by the rapidly growing American war industry roused
strong feeling in Germany. As a result there began a controversy
with the American Government similar to that with England during the
war of 1870-71. Even in the United States there was a considerable
minority which disapproved of the munitions traffic, though on moral
rather than political or international grounds. It goes without
saying that the agitation of this minority was supported in every
way by the German representatives. There was no law in America
to prohibit such support, which could not, moreover, be regarded
as a breach of American neutrality. It is true that in this way a
few Germans got themselves into an awkward position because they
were suspected of stirring up the German-Americans, who together
with the Irish played a leading part in the agitation against the
Government. In particular, Dr. Dernburg became unpopular in America,
since he began to address meetings in addition to his journalistic
work. The Washington Government regarded him as the leader of the
"hyphenated Americans" who were opposing the policy of the President's
Administration, because the latter took up the strict legal standpoint
that the traffic in munitions was permissible, and that it would
therefore be a breach of neutrality in our favor if such traffic
were forbidden after the outbreak of hostilities. President Wilson
himself even had an idea of nationalizing the munition factories,
which would have rendered traffic with the combatant Powers a breach
of international law. When, however, he sounded Congress on this
matter, it became evident that a majority could not be obtained
for such a step. The United States had already brought forward
a similar proposal at the Hague Conference with the intention of
conceding one of the chief demands of the pacifists. It was in
wide circles in America an axiom that the munitions factories were
the chief incentives to war. As during the first winter of the
war there were very few such factories in America the President's
plan was not merely Utopian but meant in all seriousness, in which
connection it should be noted that American industrial circles were
among Mr. Wilson's bitterest opponents. If Mr. Wilson's proposal
had been known to German public opinion he would have been more
favorably judged.

The negotiations which I had to carry out on this question of the
munitions traffic concerned themselves also with the question of
the coaling of our ships of war. This was based on an agreement
between the American Government and the Hamburg-Amerika line. The
port authorities had at first shown themselves agreeable. As a
result of the English protest the attitude of the American Government
became increasingly strict. With the actual coaling I had nothing
to do. That came within the sphere of the Naval Attaché, who, for
obvious reasons connected with the conduct of the war at sea, kept
his actions strictly secret. My first connection with this question
was when I was instructed to hand over to the American Government
the following memorandum, dated 15th December, 1914:


"According to the provisions of general international law, there is
nothing to prevent neutral States from allowing contraband of war
to reach the enemies of Germany through or out of their territory.
This is also permitted by Article VII. of the Hague Convention of the
19th October, 1907, dealing with the rights and duties of neutrals
in the case of land or sea war. If a State uses this freedom to the
advantage of our enemies, that State, according to a generally
recognized provision of international law, which is confirmed in
Article IX. of the two aforesaid Conventions, may not hamper Germany's
military power with regard to contraband through or out of its
territory.

"The declaration of neutrality of the United States takes this
view fully into account since the furnishing of contraband of war
to all combatants is likewise permitted: 'All persons may lawfully
and without restriction by reason of the aforesaid state of war,
manufacture and sell within the United States, arms and ammunitions
of war and other articles ordinarily known as contraband of war.'

"This principle has been accepted in the widest sense by the public
declaration of the American State Department of the 15th October,
1914, with regard to neutrality and contraband.

"Nevertheless different port authorities in the United States have
refused to supply the necessary fuel to merchant vessels in which
it might be carried to German ships of war on the high seas or in
other neutral ports. According to the principles of international
law already mentioned, there is no need for a neutral State to
prevent the transport of fuel in this way; such a State then ought
not to hold up merchant ships loaded in this way nor interfere with
their freedom of movement, once it has countenanced the supply
of contraband to the enemy. The only case in which it would be the
duty of such a nation to hamper the movements of these ships in
this one-sided fashion would be one in which such traffic might
be turning the ports into German naval bases. This might perhaps
have been the case if German coal depots had been situated at these
ports, or if the ships used them for a regular calling port on
their way to the German naval forces. It is, however, unnecessary
to urge that the occasional sailing of a merchant ship with coal
for German ships of war does not make a port into a base for German
naval enterprises out of keeping with neutrality.

"Our enemies are obtaining contraband of war from the United States,
in particular rifles, to the value of many milliards of marks; this
is within their rights. But toleration becomes serious injustice
if the United States refuses to allow the occasional provisioning of
our ships of war from her ports. This would mean unequal treatment
of the combatants and a recognized rule of neutrality would be
infringed to our disadvantages."


This memorandum played an important part in the subsequent negotiations,
because Mr. Flood, the president of the Committee for Foreign Affairs
of the American House of Representatives, interpreted it as amounting
to a German agreement to the supply of arms and ammunition to her
enemies.

In view of the situation in the United States, it was to our interest
to leave the struggle for a prohibition of the munitions traffic to
our American friends. The efforts of Senator Stone in this direction
are well known, and have been recently quoted before the Commission of
the German National Assembly. If a considerable number of influential
Americans took up the case for the prohibition there was far more
hope of bringing it about than if it was apparent that the American
Government were surrendering to German pressure. The pacifist Mr.
Bryan was very sensitive on this point and visited me frequently
to assert his neutrality.

I therefore advised the Imperial Government in this matter not to
send an official Note for the moment, so that the American agitation
in favor of the prohibition of munition traffic might have full freedom
for development. As, however, our enemies continually harked back
to the idea that the Imperial Government did not take exception
to the supply of munitions, I was forced, as the result of continual
pressure from our American friends, to alter my attitude, and,
after receiving permission from Berlin, to hand to the Washington
Government on 4th April, 1915, a memorandum, of which I give the
most important part here.

"Further I should like to refer to the attitude of the United States
towards the question of the export of arms. The Imperial Government
is convinced that the Government of the United States agree with
them on this point, that questions of neutrality should be dealt
with not merely with regard to the strict letter, but the spirit
also must be taken into consideration, in which neutrality is carried
through.

"The situation arising out of the present war cannot be compared
with that in any previous war. For this reason no reference to
supplies of arms from Germany in such wars is justified; for then
the question was not whether the combatants should be supplied
with material but which of the competing States should secure the
contract.

"In the present war all the nations which possess a war-industry of
any importance are either themselves involved in the war, or occupied
with completing their own armament, and therefore have prohibited
the export of war material. The United States are accordingly the
only neutral State in a position to supply war-material. The idea
of neutrality has, therefore, assumed a new significance, which
is quite independent of the strict letter of the laws that have
hitherto prevailed. On the other hand the United States are founding
a gigantic war industry in the broadest sense, and they are not
only working the existing plant but are straining every nerve to
develop it and to erect new factories. The international agreement
for the protection of the rights of neutrals certainly arose from
the necessity of protecting the existing branches of industry in
neutral countries as far as possible against an encroachment upon
their prerogatives. But it can in no way accord with the spirit of
honorable neutrality, if advantage is taken of such international
agreements to found a new industry in a neutral State, such as
appears in the development in the United States of an arms-industry,
the output of which can, in view of the existing situation, be
solely to the advantage of the combatant powers.

"This industry is at present only delivering its wares to the enemies
of Germany. The readiness, in theory, to do the same for Germany,
even if the transport were possible, does not alter the case. If
it is the desire of the American people to maintain an honorable
neutrality, the United States will find the means to stop this
one-sided traffic in arms, or at least to use it for the purpose
of protecting legitimate commerce with Germany, particularly in
respect of foodstuffs. This conception of neutrality should appeal
all the more to the United States in view of the fact that they
have allowed themselves to be influenced by the same standpoint
in their policy in regard to Mexico. On the 4th February, 1914,
President Wilson, according to a statement of a member of Congress
on 30th December, 1914, before the commission for foreign affairs
with regard to the withdrawal of the prohibition of the export of
arms to Mexico, said: 'We shall be observing true neutrality by
taking into consideration the accompanying circumstances of the
case.... He then took up the following point of view: 'Carranza, in
contrast to Huerta, has no ports at his disposal for the importation
of war-material, so in his case we are bound, as a State, to treat
Carranza and Huerta alike, if we are to be true to the real spirit
of neutrality and not mere paper neutrality.'

"This point of view, applied to the present case, indicates prohibition
of the export of arms."

Although during the war all Notes were at once made public, the
American Government were very annoyed at my publishing this memorandum,
which in any case would have met with no success. The agitation for
the prohibition of the export of arms and munitions was vigorously
pressed, and in spite of the "_Lusitania_ incident" never completely
subsided. But the American Government held to their point of view,
which they explained to me on the 21st April, as follows:

"In the third place, I note with sincere regret that, in discussing
the sale and exportation of arms by citizens of the United States
to the enemies of Germany, Your Excellency seems to be under the
impression that it was within the choice of the Government of the
United States, notwithstanding its professed neutrality and its
diligent efforts to maintain it in other particulars, to inhibit
this trade, and that its failure to do so manifested an unfair
attitude toward Germany. This Government holds, as I believe Your
Excellency is aware, and as it is constrained to hold in view of
the present indisputable doctrines of accepted international law,
that any change in its own laws of neutrality during the progress
of a war which would affect unequally the relations of the United
States with the nations at war would be an unjustifiable departure
from the principle of strict neutrality by which it has consistently
sought to direct its actions, and I respectfully submit that none
of the circumstances urged in Your Excellency's memorandum alters
the principle involved. The placing of an embargo on the trade
in arms at the present time would constitute such a change and
be a direct violation of the neutrality of the United States. It
will, I feel assured, be clear to Your Excellency that, holding
this view and considering itself in honor bound by it, it is out
of the question for this Government to consider such a course."

In the meantime, Colonel House returned from Europe without having
met with any success, but he had opened useful personal relations.
The Governments of all the combatant Powers then held the opinion
that the time had not yet come when they could welcome the mediation
of President Wilson. Colonel House, however, did not allow the
lack of success of his first mission to deter him from further
efforts, and remained to the last the keenest supporter of American
mediation. Since this journey Colonel House and I became on very
friendly and intimate terms, which should have helped to bring
about such a peace.




CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

In the preceding chapter I mentioned that Dr. Dernburg's plan for
raising a loan in the United States had failed. Later the direction
of all our economic and financial affairs passed into the hands of
Geheimrat Albert. His original task was to organize in New York
extensive shipments of foodstuffs, particular wheat and fats, which
were to be exported through the New York office of the Hamburg-Amerika
line. This depended, in the first place, on the possibility of
raising the necessary funds, and in the second, on the possibility
that England, out of regard for the neutrals, and particularly the
United States, would be compelled to abide by the codified principles
of international law. Neither of these premises materialized.

As the necessary means for carrying through the scheme could not be
raised it might have been possible to finance it if the Government
had taken over the not inconsiderable funds of the German banks and
the great industrial enterprises, e.g., the chemical factories in
the United States, and used them for the shipments. The suggestions
we made to this effect were not answered until the end of August,
when we arrived in New York and had already lost many weeks in
trying to negotiate the loan. One organ, which immediately after
the war had taken up these questions on its own initiative, failed,
and so nothing was done in the whole wide sphere of credit, supply
of raw materials and foodstuffs and shipping until my arrival with
the other gentlemen, so that the most favorable opportunity was lost.
Remittances from Germany did not arrive until long afterwards, and
then only to a very modest extent. Consequently the whole economic
scheme was considerably narrowed and hampered from the beginning.

The second assumption, that the United States, in consideration
of her great commercial connections with Germany, would maintain
her rights as a neutral State to unrestricted sea trade within the
provisions of international law, proved to be unfounded. The United
States, at any rate according to the view of some very distinguished
Americans, as, for example, in the journal _New Republic_, violated
the spirit of neutrality when she allowed commerce of the neutrals
one with another to be strangled by England. To the interest in
traffic with the neutral States, and indirectly with Germany, was
opposed the interest in the still greater trade with our enemies,
to which was added, and indeed to a rapidly increasing extent,
the supply of war material. The United States did not realize the
extent of their economic power in respect of England, as the
inexperienced, newly-appointed Democratic Government had no statistics
to which to refer, and from a military point of view were defenceless
for want of an army or fleet. So England was able, slowly and
cautiously, but surely, to cut off the Central Powers from the
American market. In view of this state of things the important
thing was to pass all shipments off as neutral. The exporter had
to be an American or a subject of neutral Europe. The financing
had also to be European, at any rate outwardly. The destination
could only be a port in Holland, Scandinavia, Spain or--at that
time--Italy. Consequently it was not long before the consignments
could no longer be made through the New York representative of
the Hamburg-Amerika line, but were taken in hand by Herr Albert
himself, who merely availed himself of the professional advice
of the Hamburg-Amerika line.

All decisions therefore could emanate from the same source, which
prevented loss of time, especially as the financial responsibility
also rested with Herr Albert. The most important thing, however,
was that attention was distracted from the shipping, as for a long
time Herr Albert remained unknown, whereas the Hamburg-Amerika line
from the first was kept under the closest observation by England. On
the other hand, this arrangement exposed the cargoes to condemnation
by the English prize courts as they were now State-owned. But Herr
Albert could assume--and, as it turned out, rightly--that so long
as the English respected neutral property, it would be difficult
as a rule to trace the shipments back to him. Otherwise there would
have been no security for a German private undertaking.


In carrying out his task, Herr Albert at first shipped the purchased
goods by the usual lines (Scandinavia-American line). Soon, however,
difficulties arose, because these lines, in order to avoid being
held up in English ports, would no longer accept cargoes which
were intended, if possible, for Germany, so a special line was
formed sailing under the American flag. The direction of this line
was in the hands of an American firm who represented themselves
as the owners, whereas, in reality, the ships were chartered by
Herr Albert. As, at the beginning of the war, the American flag
was more respected by the English than those of the other neutrals,
a number of these ships got through without much delay. Later this
method of shipping also became impossible. Then single ships were
chartered--mostly under the American flag--and when the owners, from
fear of loss, refused the charter, or when outrageous conditions
made chartering impossible, they were bought outright. The ships
were consigned as blockade runners to a neutral port, and later
either made direct for Germany or were taken in by a German ship
of war. As the most important examples I may mention the _Eir,
Maumee, Winneconne, Duneyre, Andrew, Welch_ and _Prince Waldemar_.

With the tightening up of the English measures and blockade these
undertakings became increasingly difficult, and finally had to be
abandoned. Moreover the cost and the trouble of preparation grew
out of all proportion to the results. Every individual shipment
had to be prepared long beforehand. Out of ten attempts often only
one would succeed. Very often an attempt which had cost weeks of
work would fall through at the last moment owing to the refusal
of credit by the banks, particularly when the political position
was strained, or to an indiscretion, or English watchfulness, or
difficulties with the American port authorities.

The English surveillance had assumed dimensions that would not
have been possible without the tacit connivance, which at times
became active support, of the American authorities. Not only did
the English consuls demand that in each individual case the bills
of lading should be submitted to them, but in addition to this an
efficient surveillance and spy service was organized, partly by
American detective bureaus and partly by a separate and wide-reaching
service. The English had confidential agents in all the shipping
offices, whose services had for the most part been acquired by
bribery. At various times attempts were made to break into Herr
Albert's office, to learn the combination for opening his safe, to
get hold of papers through the charwomen and other employees, and
even to rob him personally of papers. The control of the American
port authorities was within the letter of the law, but in practice
it worked very unfavorably to us. The regulation was that ship
and cargo must be consigned to a definite port. This regulation
was drawn up purely for purposes of statistics, and consequently
no importance was attached to it before the war. As a rule the
bills of lading were filled in by subordinate employees of the
exporter. Soon after the outbreak of the war a special "neutrality
squad" was attached to the "Collector of the Port of New York"
whose duty it was to maintain strict neutrality by seeing that
the said laws were properly observed. This led, in cases where
there was a suspicion that the cargo was not intended for the given
port of destination, but for Germany, to an exhaustive inquiry. This
measure could not fail to act as a deterrent, and even Herr Albert
was seriously hampered in his enterprises. The whole system amounted
to a complement of the English blockade. When Herr Albert finally
succeeded in coming to an agreement with the Customs authorities in
this matter a great number of opportunities had been missed and
the shipments had been made practically impossible by the tightening
of the English blockade.

There was no question of entrusting the shipping to American exporters
who had had long experience of German trade. Herr Albert from the
first considered it advisable to interfere as little as possible
with the existing business relations between the two countries,
and he left it to the firms trading with Germany to carry through
their commissions as best they could. This method of supplying
Germany with food, however, completely failed. The fault also lies
partly with the importers in Germany. In these circles it was for a
long time hoped, but in vain, to obtain consignments from American
firms. Further, they clung too long to the business methods of peace,
demanded estimates, bargained about prices, and, most important of
all, did not realize that the risk to the exporter as a result of
the English blockade made special compensation or payment necessary.
In consequence the valuable time at the beginning of the war was
lost. Very soon, however, the American exporters withdrew completely,
because those who had had previous business relations with Germany
were known to the English, and so were suspected and finally placed
on the black list. A shipment by one of these firms would then at
once have been marked down as destined for Germany, and would have
run risk of capture. Herr Albert, therefore, made use of special
agencies. At first, in addition to employing Danish firms, he founded
several new American export companies. These new organizations
were of course only available for a short time, and, as soon as
they came under English suspicion and were consequently rendered
useless, had to be replaced by others.

The reproach that has been made from time to time that these enterprises
were confined to a small clique of confidential persons and firms
seems to be unjustified by the facts. The circumstances demanded the
closest possible secrecy, for otherwise the origin and destination
of the cargoes would have been discovered by the English secret
service before they left New York. This would have involved the
complete loss of the cargo as a result of the English embargo.
That firms already engaged, even though for a short time, in
German-American commerce could not be considered is obvious. Not only
were they known to the English, but in some cases their German names
already laid them open to suspicion. Accordingly, their occasional
requests that they should carry through enterprises of this nature
were consistently refused. This criticism is only made by a small
circle of German-American firms grouped round the German Union and
the so-called German-American Chamber of Commerce, and originated
in an anxiety, understandable but based on an inadequate knowledge
of the facts, to participate in the undertakings.

Although the export of raw material did not actually come within
the scope of Herr Albert's original commission, it often became
necessary, at special request or from the nature of the case, to
lend a helping hand in the export of raw material, particularly
wool and cotton. In this way, in the autumn of 1914, the American
steamer _Luckenbach_ was successfully run through direct to Germany
with several million pounds of wool on board. With regard to cotton,
Herr Albert, also in the autumn of 1914, by negotiations which he
carried on through me with the State Department and the Foreign
Trade Adviser, succeeded in obtaining English recognition that
cotton should not be regarded as contraband of war. Even after
this recognition, England made the export of cotton practically
impossible by intimidating the cotton exporters in every possible
way, among others by spreading the rumor that the ships would be
captured nevertheless, and by prohibiting English insurance companies
from underwriting such cargoes. Here Herr Albert intervened by
effecting the insurance through German insurance companies, and
proved by the loading and arming of cotton ships, e.g., the American
ship _Carolyn_, that the threat of capture was not to be taken
seriously but was simply an attempt at intimidation on the part
of the English. In this way, confidence was so far restored that
in the autumn of 1914 and the beginning of 1915 a large number
of other firms joined in the business. When, later, cotton was
made unconditional contraband of war, Herr Albert made attempts
to fit out blockade runners--which ended with the arrival at a
German port of the _Eir_ with 10,000 bales of cotton.

The various attempts to export copper, rubber and other raw materials
which were unconditional contraband, apart from the cases already
mentioned of wool and cotton, proved impossible, in spite of repeated,
extensive and very cautious preparation. A very ambitious scheme
of this kind with the S.S. _Atlantic_ had to be abandoned at the
last moment owing to difficulties with the port authorities.

All these enterprises, the purchase, sale and shipment of foodstuffs
and raw material, the chartering, buying and selling of ships, the
founding of shipping lines, new companies, etc., as well as the
financial business had their political as well as their purely
business side. They were either intended to serve as precedents in
the definite phases of development of international maritime law
or to exert influence on American public opinion from an economic
point of view.

When the result of these shipping enterprises is weighed after
the event, it will be seen that they did not play a decisive part
in the supply of Germany with foodstuffs and raw material. Germany
would during the first year of war have managed to get along even
without the few hundred thousand tons which in this way were brought
in via neutral countries. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the
imports from neutral countries, they several times served to relieve
the situation. Very important in this respect was the successful
struggle for the free import of cotton at the end of 1914 and the
beginning of 1915, quite apart from our own shipments. Without
this we should have come to an end of our supplies considerably
earlier.

The question of war and marine insurance very soon called for particular
attention to the interests of our own shipping. The American insurance
market was dominated by the English companies. The latter not only
conducted about two-thirds of the whole insurance business of the
country, but also exerted a decisive influence on the American
companies. In addition to this, they held an authoritative position
as holding a share of the capital. England very soon gave instructions
that English insurance companies should not participate in any
business in which German interests were in any way involved.
Consequently in making shipments to neutral countries, we were
faced with great difficulties, for the power of the German insurance
companies and the few American companies that were independent of
England did not suffice.

The two most important German companies with branches in New York,
the _Norddeutsche Versicherungsgesellschaft_ and the _Mannheimer
Versicherungsgesellschaft_, which was excellently, actively, and
very loyally represented in New York by the firm F. Hermann & Co.,
at first offered an insurance limit of about 75,000 dollars, that
is 150,000 dollars together, which in any case was insufficient.
At first they had no authority to undertake war insurance.

The economic importance of the insurance question is obvious on the
face of it. No marine insurance was possible without war insurance.
In particular the American Government bureau for war insurance made
the covering of the marine insurance an essential condition. This
example was followed by all the American insurance companies. A
satisfactory settlement of the insurance--both war and marine--on
the other hand was a necessary condition for the financing of the
shipments. The shippers only obtained credit from the bank on handing
over the insurance policies. In addition to this it came about later
that the few American shipping lines which remained independent
of England, and so were on the black list, were no longer in a
position to cover the "Hull Insurance," i.e., the insurance of the
ship herself, and therefore the solution of the insurance question
became a necessary condition for obtaining freight space. Here
too, then, it was to our interest to come to the rescue, because
otherwise the lines in question would have been forced to come to
an understanding with the English firms, which would have placed
their tonnage at the service of our enemies.

To begin with, Herr Albert himself undertook the insurance in cases
of exceptional importance. It was at most a question of a small
balance, by the furnishing of which an immediate risk or a dangerous
delay in shipment was avoided. Our chief efforts were directed
towards raising the insurance limit of the German companies. As
a result a pool of German insurance companies was formed whose
limit for marine and war insurance was gradually raised more and
more. In this way it was possible to carry through a number of
shipments to European countries, to keep a not inconsiderable
tonnage--about 30,000 tons--out of the hands of the Allies, as well
as to enable a number of important German firms in South America
to carry on extensive trade between North and South America, and
so to maintain their business activity in spite of the measures
adopted by the English.

About our propaganda I have already spoken in detail in the second
chapter. It may be mentioned again here that the centre of gravity
of our active propaganda lay in the economic question, which was
to a certain extent the key to the understanding of our American
policy during the war.

Though the vast and rapid development of American export trade
through the trade in war material, and the change in position from
debtor to creditor, was only effected gradually, and the loss of
the German market at first made itself adversely felt both actively
and passively, the size of the contracts from the Allies and the
consequent profits at once acted like a narcotic on public opinion.
This was all the more the case as a result of the extraordinarily
skilful way in which the English handled the question. They always
proceeded cautiously and gradually. For instance, they at first
accepted the Declaration of London in principle, but made several
alterations which to the public, who did not realize the extent of
their effect, seemed unimportant and which yet formed the basis for
the gradual throwing overboard of the Declaration of London. After
public opinion had grown accustomed to the English encroachments and
the interests affected had been pacified by the Allied contracts,
the blockade was introduced after careful preparation in the Press;
it was not at first described as a blockade, but was gradually
and systematically tightened. Among other things, the export of
cotton to Germany was expressly agreed to at the end of 1914, but
was afterwards hampered in practice by various measures, as, for
example, the holding up of individual ships, and the refusal of
marine insurance, and finally brought to an end by the declaration
of cotton as unconditional contraband. It is characteristic that
the declaration of cotton as unconditional contraband was made
public on the very day on which the whole American Press was in
a state of great excitement over the _Arabic_ case, so that this
comparatively unimportant incident filled the front pages and leading
articles of the newspapers, while the extremely important economic
measure was published in a place where it would hardly be noticed.

We made vigorous efforts to oppose this English step. We got into
touch with the importers of German goods, who formed an association
and forwarded a protest to Washington. Without attracting attention,
we gave the association the assistance of a firm of solicitors,
whose services were at our disposal, as legal advisers. Relations
were entered into with the cotton interest, which, through the
political pressure of the Southern States, exerted great influence
on public opinion and in Congress. Various projects for buying
cotton on a large scale for Germany were considered, discussed
with the cotton interest and tested by small purchases. In the same
way negotiations were entered upon with the great meat companies,
the copper interest and others by systematic explanation and emphasis
of the interests with regard to the German market. The result, partly
for the reasons given, partly owing to the political development of
the general relations between Germany and the United States, was
small. This, however, can hardly be taken as an argument against
the expediency of the steps taken as at that time. No one could
foresee the later development of the war and particularly the length
of time it was going to last; whereas had the war been shorter
there is no doubt that these measures would have attained their
object.

An important part of the economic propaganda was the institution of
the so-called "Issues," i.e., the attempt by carefully construing
individual incidents to make clear to public opinion the fundamental
injustice of the English encroachments and their far-reaching
consequences in practice. The most important case in this direction
is that of the _Wilhelmina_. According to the prevailing principles
of international law, foodstuffs were only conditional contraband.
They might be imported into Germany if they were intended for the
exclusive use of the civil population. As, however, England succeeded
in restraining the exporters from any attempt to consign foodstuffs
to Germany, especially as in view of the enormous supplies that
were being forwarded to our enemies they had little interest in
such shipment, the question never reached a clear issue. Herr Albert
therefore induced an American firm to ship foodstuffs for the civil
population of Germany on the American steamer _Wilhelmina_, bound
for Hamburg, by himself undertaking the whole risk from behind the
scenes. This was arranged in such a way as to preserve in appearance
the good faith of the American firm, and to make the shipment seem
purely American in the eyes of the American Government and the
English.

The _Wilhelmina_ was taken by the English into Falmouth and detained
on the grounds that Hamburg was a fortified town, and that, according
to the measures adopted by Germany for supplying the civil population
with food--requisitioning, centralization of distribution, etc.--there
was no longer any distinction between the supply of the military
and the civil population. While the negotiations on this question
were still in the air, and seemed to be progressing favorably for
us, England resorted to a general blockade. Consequently the case
lost its interest, both practical and as a question of principle,
especially as England declared her readiness to pay for the goods
at Hamburg prices. As, on the other hand, insistence on the purely
theoretical claims would give rise to the danger that the English
or American secret service might in the end succeed in proving
the German origin of the undertaking, Herr Albert accepted the
proffered payment of the English Government, and received as
compensation a sum which covered all the expenses.

Such incidents could have been construed in several ways. One of
the most important, and also the most popular, was the shipment of
cotton to Germany for the civilian population between the autumn of
1915 and the middle of 1916. The declaration of cotton as absolute
contraband was at first only on paper, as no American exporters had
hitherto ventured to ship cotton. Consequently, detailed discussions
took place as to whether such an undertaking should be entered upon
in the full light of publicity. Great excitement among the cotton
growers proved the extremely keen and widespread interest. England
would have been forced to act on her declaration at a time when the
American Government could not afford to ignore the interests of the
cotton industry, with its influence on domestic politics. The full
effect of the meagreness of the crops, and on the other hand the
increase of consumption in the United States, and consequent rise
in price, was not yet realized by the public, nor even in cotton
circles. The cotton industry viewed with anxiety the increased
difficulty of finding a market, and were anxious for a reopening
of that of the Central Powers.

Certainly a shipment of cotton to Germany would only have been
justified in conjunction with comprehensive other measures, particularly
purchases on the American cotton market on German account. As a
result of detailed discussion with American interested parties,
who repeatedly urged us to such a step, we forwarded proposals
to Berlin on these lines. Their general purport was that about
a million bales of cotton should be bought outright on behalf of
Germany, and that in addition options should be secured on a further
million or two million bales on the understanding that the taking up
of the options should be dependent on the possibility of shipment
to Germany. On the strength of these measures the shipment of one
big consignment should have been undertaken. The plan had sound
prospects of success. In any case there would have been no risk
worth mentioning, as, to the initiated, there was no doubt as to
the rise of prices. In view of the new bank legislation (Federal
Reserve Act), no insuperable difficulties would have stood in the
way of financing the shipment. The indirect political pressure
on the American Government and public opinion, with its reaction
on England, would have been considerable.

Unfortunately the plan was frustrated by the taking up of the matter
in America direct from Germany, without regard to the shipment
difficulty, without going into the question of the options and
without knowledge of the political or economic situation. Bremen
actually placed a contract in New York for one million bales to be
delivered in Bremen at a fixed price. It was, however, clear from
the first to anyone acquainted with the circumstances that such a
step was bound to be futile. The whole thing turned on the question
of shipping. The American Press, again under English influence, at
once pointed the finger of scorn, saying that the contract was
not meant seriously, but was merely a piece of bluff for purposes
of German propaganda.

After this had brought about the collapse of the more ambitious
plan, the shipment of a single cargo still continued to be discussed
and detailed preparations were made. The idea had, however, to be
abandoned, because the difficulties of passing off the shipment as
a purely American enterprise were practically insuperable without
the background of great economic measures, which placed the cost
out of all proportion to the chances of success. The whole cost,
as in the "_Wilhelmina_ case" would have to be guaranteed from
Germany, and would of course have been lost if the English secret
service succeeded in establishing the German connection.

The propaganda for preventing and hampering the supply of war material
to our enemies turned at first on the question of principle whether
such supplies were reconcilable with neutrality. The attempt was
made--as has been briefly mentioned already--with the special support
of the German-American circles, to impress upon the American people
the immorality and essentially unneutral nature of the supplies,
especially in view of the vast scale they were assuming. It is
well known that these attempts, which extended to a strictly legal
exertion of influence on Congress, failed. The lack of unity and
limited political experience of the German-Americans contributed
to this result, but the economic interest of the nation in the
supplies, in which the whole American Administration and industry
were finally concerned, formed the decisive factor.

Attempts too were very soon made to hamper the supplies in a practical
way. In August, 1914, it might perhaps have been possible to buy up
the Bethlehem Steel Works, if the outlay of the necessary capital
had been promptly decided upon. At that time the Americans themselves
did not foresee what a gigantic proportion these supplies were
to assume. The purchase of these works would have deprived the
whole munition industry of its main support. Similar proposals have
repeatedly been worked out by us, as, for example, the proposal
to amalgamate the whole shrapnel industry of the United States.
The fear, well grounded in itself, that such an arrangement was
scarcely within the bounds of practical politics and could have
been got round, could be ignored. In case of disputes as to the
validity of such a step we should have gained more by the publicity
than we stood to lose. At that time, however, the Berlin Government
took up a negative attitude, and did not interest itself in the
question until the beginning of 1915, when the vast supplies of
material from America began to make themselves felt and the
concentration of German industry on the production of munitions
was not yet complete. The Military Attaché received instructions
to do everything possible to hamper the fulfilment of the great
outstanding French and Russian contracts for shrapnel, which was
at that time still the chief shell used by the Allies. This was
done successfully, if on a small scale, by founding an undertaking
of our own, called the Bridgeport Projectile Company, and entering
into contracts to establish the most important machinery for the
manufacture of powder and shrapnel. Through this company, which
originally passed as entirely American, the special machinery required
for the manufacture of shrapnel was bought on a scale which seriously
affected the American output, and in particular hindered the acceptance
and carrying through of further contracts from the Allies for a
considerable time. Herr Albert assisted and advised the Military
Attaché in making these contracts, arranged the financing of the
enterprise later on, and worked at its development after Herr von
Papen's departure.

Still more successful were the efforts to remove from the market
the surplus benzol, which is the raw product for the production
of picric acid. The benzol was bought up by a company specially
formed for the purpose, who sent it to a chemical works under German
management to be manufactured into salicylic preparations. These
products were sold for the most part for the American market, and
also, with the approval of the Ministry for War, exported to neutral
countries. The undertaking was eventually closed down after making
considerable profits for the Imperial Treasury. In the same way,
for some time, all the bromine coming on to the market, the products
of which were used to manufacture and increase the density of gas,
were bought up.

To these efforts to hamper and delay the supply of war material
belonged also the much-discussed agreement with the Bosch Magneto
Company, the American branch of the Stuttgart firm. The substance
of the arrangement was that this company, which was under German
direction, should not immediately refuse Allied contracts for fuses,
but should appear to accept them and delay their fulfilment, and, to
complete the deception, even occasionally deliver small quantities,
and finally, at the last moment, refuse to complete the contract. This
procedure was attacked at the time by a German-American journalist,
von Skal. On the strength of short notices which Herr von Skal
published in the German Press, in ignorance of the real state of
the case, public opinion in Germany turned against the parent firm,
the Bosch works in Stuttgart. The question then became the subject of
my reports, and was submitted to an inquiry by the home authorities
and the courts. I still hold to my opinion that the whole affair was
unnecessarily exaggerated by German public opinion, and that the
detailed investigation into its legality by the home authorities
and courts was unnecessary, as the managing director of the American
branch and the directors of the German company had acted in perfect
good faith in an attempt to advance the interests of the German
cause. It was merely a question of the result. If their policy
of procrastination had succeeded in delaying the contracts and
had kept our enemies for a considerable time from building their
own factory for fuses and aeroplane magnetoes, their action would
have been justified; in the contrary event it would have been vain,
but blameless from a moral and legal point of view. The fact that at
the beginning the English relied on the possibility of the production
and supply of such fuses from America, and only later gradually
came to a decision to build and fit out their own factories,
consequently under much more difficult circumstances, offered an
opening for this procedure. That difficulties were caused to the
enemy in this respect until quite recently is unmistakably shown
by the messages that reached America from England.

As a result of the extensive purchases of the Allies, there came
about a gradual change in the attitude of the American Government
to the question of issuing loans. At the end of March, 1915, we
succeeded, acting on instructions from Berlin, in raising a small
loan. It involved an unusual amount of trouble. The American financial
world was already completely dominated by the Morgan trust. This
domination resulted from the fact that the Allied commissions were
concentrated in English hands and were placed by England in the
hands of J. P. Morgan & Co., who acted as the agents of the English
Government. As these commissions finally included every sphere of
economic life, all the great American banks and bankers were called
upon, and so drawn into the Morgan circle. The result was that
no big firm could be induced to undertake a German loan. However,
several trust companies of repute, who already had or wished to
have business relations with Germany, declared their readiness
to become partners in a syndicate if we succeeded in finding a
"Syndicate Manager." A certain New York firm which afterwards made
a name for itself, but at that time was comparatively unknown, seemed
suited for this position. When all the preparations and preliminary
agreements had been carried through, the trust companies, under
the pressure of the Morgan influence, declared that their names
must not be associated with the syndicate. Meanwhile the matter
had gone so far that withdrawal would have meant a moral surrender
which would have been dangerous for our credit. Consequently, we
had to make up our minds to negotiate the loan under the signature
of this one firm, which was naturally undesirable for the general
interest.

Looking back, I am of the opinion that we should have done better not
to consider a loan in the United States, but to remit the necessary
funds from Berlin. This had to be done later to redeem the loan,
and at a time when the rate of exchange was much more unfavorable.
When the loan was raised we had certainly no idea that it would
have to be redeemed during the war, as we had reckoned on a shorter
duration of hostilities. On the other hand there is no truth in the
statement that this loan in some way cleared the way for further
Allied loans. These loans, which were the natural result of the
great supplies of material to the Allies, would have come in any
case. We did, however, deprive ourselves by this loan of an argument
to prove the defective neutrality of the United States.


In 1916 we succeeded in getting hold of some five millions in Treasury
notes without formal loan negotiations.


Another economic question which occupied my attention was connected
with the export of German dye-stuffs to the United States. In Berlin
it was held that German dye-stuffs should be withheld from the
United States as a lever for inducing them to protest against the
English blockade, and possibly have it raised. The same point of
view was adopted with regard to other goods which were necessities
for the United States, as, for example, potassic salt, sugar beetroot
seed and other commodities. A change of view did not occur until
the spring of 1916 at my suggestion. It is my belief that the
withholding of these goods proved a serious mistake. The political
aim of bringing pressure to bear on England with a view to the raising
of the blockade was not realized. The American industry partly got over
the difficulty by obtaining dye-stuffs in other ways--importation of
German dyes from China, where they had been systematically bought,
smuggling of German dyes via neutral countries, importation of Swiss
dyes, introduction of natural dyes and dye-substitutes--but more
especially by the foundation of a dye industry of their own. In the
case of potash, they had simply to do with what little they could
get; which was all the easier as the American manure manufacturers
and dealers had already in their own interests begun a systematic
propaganda to prove that potash was not indispensable, but could
be replaced by their own products. It might be observed as a
generalization that ultimately no individual product has proved
to be really indispensable. The result of holding back our exports
was therefore simply--apart from a quite unnecessary straining of
political relations, since England succeeded in diverting all the
odium on to us--a scarcity of important German commodities in the
United States and the substitution of their own production.

In negotiating the German loan, the chief difficulty was that grasping
speculators got hold of the market, discredited the war loan by
underbidding one another and in part by direct dishonorable dealing,
and also that owing to the impossibility of producing ready money,
interest in the war loan flagged. Early on I suggested the issue
of bills _ad interim_. The scheme, however, failed, because the
representative of the Deutsche Bank opposed it, and because the
natural opposition of two great institutions, who were making a
profitable business out of the sale of war loans and the speculations
on the value of the mark, which were closely connected with it, could
not be overcome. I am still of the opinion that with well-timed
organization the sum raised by the war loan could have been increased
by several millions.




CHAPTER V

THE SO-CALLED GERMAN CONSPIRACIES

Immediately after the outbreak of war, our cruisers in foreign
waters were cut off from their base of operations, and the German
Reservists in North and South America were prevented from returning
home owing to the British Command of the Sea. Measures to assist them
were therefore taken by the German Nationals and German Americans
in the United States, which although not in themselves aimed at the
Union, certainly transgressed its laws. Moreover during the year
1915 and succeeding years, several deeds of violence against the
enemies of Germany, or preparations for such deeds, were discovered,
involving more or less serious offences against the laws of America.
Both kinds of activity, comprised under the suggestive term "German
Conspiracies" or "German Plots against American Neutrality," were
skilfully used by our enemies to discredit us, and these agitations
did considerable harm to the German cause, besides being a serious
obstacle in the way of my policy.

Among the measures for assisting the German fleet may be mentioned,
in the first place, the case of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, which has
already been noticed. The New York branch, acting in accordance
with the instructions of their head offices in Hamburg, dispatched
about a dozen chartered vessels, laden with coal and provisions,
to the squadron of German cruisers and auxiliary cruisers then
on the high seas. This cargo was declared in the ships' clearing
papers to be consigned to ports beyond the area of open sea where
the German cruisers were known to be. When it came out later that
the New York branch of the Hamburg-Amerika Line had made use of
this device for coaling German men-of-war the chief officials were
brought up on the charge of deliberately making false declarations
in their clearing papers, and their chief, Dr. Bünz, a man of the
highest character, with three of his subordinates, was condemned,
in December, 1915, to eighteen months' imprisonment in the first
instance.

The severity of the penalty thus inflicted on a man so universally
respected, who had, during his long tenure of the office of
Consul-General in Chicago and New York, gained the warm affection
of many Americans, was regarded merely as a manifestation for the
benefit of the outside world of the American Government's intention
to preserve a strict neutrality. No one supposed that the aged Dr.
Bünz would really have to undergo his sentence, and as a matter
of fact he remained at liberty for some time even after America's
declaration of war. In the summer of 1917 a violent press-campaign
broke out against him, whereupon, despite his ill health he offered
of his own accord to serve his sentence and was removed to the
State prison at Atlanta, where he died in 1918. All honor to his
memory!

Considering that his offence was nothing more than a technical
violation of the letter of the American Customs regulations and
was actuated by no base motive, nor by hostility to the United
States, the punishment inflicted was excessively harsh. It was
pleaded on his behalf in the speech for the defence that America
during the war against Spain had acted in exactly the same way,
when ships were dispatched from the neutral harbor of Hong Kong
to coal Admiral Dewey's fleet before Manila and their cargo was
declared as being scrap-iron consigned to Macao. An indication of
the state of public opinion in the Eastern States of America at
the end of 1915 may be found in the fact that the heavy sentence
on this "German Conspirator" met with general approval apart from
a few emphatic protests on the part of the German-American papers.

A number of German Reserve officers domiciled in America succeeded,
despite the close watch maintained by England on the seas, in effecting
their return to the Fatherland, thanks to a secret bureau in New
York, organized by German-Americans, which provided them with false
or forged American passports. This bureau was closed by the American
police consequent on the discovery in January, 1915, of four German
Reservists, with such papers in their possession, on board a Norwegian
ship in New York harbor. The organizer had apparently fled from
New York some time before, but finally fell into the hands of the
British, and was drowned in a torpedoed transport. The Reservists
were discharged on payment of heavy fines. One, however, was sentenced
to three years' penal servitude. In estimating this affair, it
must be remembered that according to the recognized conventions
of international law, British men-of-war were not justified in
making prisoners of individual unarmed Germans returning to their
homes in neutral vessels. The American Government itself explicitly
affirmed as much when a ship flying the Stars and Stripes was held
up in mid-ocean for examination. As a rule, however, neutral Powers
were too weak to stand up for their rights against British violations
of international law, and so all Germans who were discovered by the
British on their homeward voyage were made prisoners of war. Our
countrymen, therefore, if they wished to do their duty by going to the
defence of their Fatherland, were compelled, in face of this flagrant
violation of the Law of Nations, to provide themselves with false
passports. They had thus to choose between two conflicting duties,
a dilemma all too common in life and one which the individual must
solve according to his lights. The bearers of such false passports
certainly risked heavy penalties, but shrank still more from incurring
any suspicion of skulking or cowardice.

It would seem, moreover, that there is little to choose, from the
moral point of view, between their "sailing under false flags,"
for the purpose of evading the British guardians of the sea, and
the hoisting of neutral ensigns by British ships to escape from
German submarines.

There can, at all events, be no question of a "German conspiracy"
in these cases of forged passports as I had officially announced on
behalf of the German Government, that under the circumstances no one
who remained in America would, on his arrival in Germany, be punished
for not answering the call to the Colors. I can repudiate in the
most express terms any personal responsibility for the activities
of the above-mentioned secret bureau in New York, although attempts
have been made to connect my name with it on the sole ground of a
letter, said to have been written to me by von Wedell before his
departure, which was, as a matter of fact, first made known to me
by its publication in the Press. It is true that this gentleman,
a New York barrister before the war, was a personal acquaintance of
mine; he had, however, immediately after the outbreak of hostilities,
hastened back to Germany to join his own regiment, and later returned
secretly to America, presumably under orders from his superiors,
only to disappear again with equal secrecy after a short stay. I
had never even heard the name of Rueroede before his arrest, but
in view of his denial that any personal profit accrued to him from
his services in providing his fellow-countrymen with documents for
the purpose of facilitating their escape from British vigilance,
I much regret the severity of the penalty inflicted on him.

If the cases of the Hamburg-Amerika Line and the falsification
of the passports damaged the German cause in America, this was
still more true of the acts of violence planned or carried out
by Germans or German-Americans against individuals known to be
hostile to our cause. The few authentic cases of this sort of thing
were, as every impartial person must recognize, engineered by a
few patriotic but foolish hotheads; the more sober and responsible
German elements in the United States were certainly no party to
them.

To the list of these outrages, the enemies of Germany deliberately
added others which probably had no foundation in fact. Thus, for
every accident which occurred in any American munition factory--and
many accidents were bound to happen in the new works which had
sprung up like mushrooms all over the land, and were staffed with
absolutely untrained personnel--"German agents" were regularly
held responsible, and the anti-German Press, particularly the
_Providence Journal_, announced these accidents as "a clear
manifestation of the notorious German system of frightfulness."
Worse still, these papers instilled into their readers the firm
conviction that these crimes were an essential part of German
propaganda, and in their cartoons represented the German, more
particularly the German-American, as a bearded anarchist with a
bomb ready in his hand.

I myself was frequently libelled in this manner by the "Yellow
Press," and represented both by pen and pencil as the ringleader
and instigator of the so-called "conspiracies"; this accusation,
at first tentative, later grew increasingly clear and unmistakable.
The campaign of calumny in which even the more respectable Press
took its share, was, however, directed more particularly against
the Military Attaché, Captain von Papen, and the Naval Attaché,
Captain Boy-Ed, whose names were openly coupled with some of the
crimes which came before the American Courts of Justice. Both these
officers finally fell victims to this agitation, and had to be
recalled from America in December, 1915, in accordance with a request
from the United States Government. At the same time, in the annual
Presidential message to Congress, statutory measures were laid
down against Americans implicated in these conspiracies, or, as
the phrase ran, against all those "contriving schemes for the
destruction of the independence, and implicated in plots against
the neutrality, of the Government." Not until the declaration of war
against Germany, on April 2nd, 1917, did President Wilson venture
openly to accuse the official German representatives in America
of complicity in these designs, in the following words: "It is
unhappily not a matter of conjecture but a fact proved in our courts
of justice, that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously
near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the
country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support,
and even under the personal direction of official agents of the
Imperial Government accredited to the Government of the United
States." Since then my own name has been mentioned as the supreme
head of the German "Conspiracy" in America, in the innumerable
propaganda pamphlets with which the official "Committee of Public
Information" has flooded America and Europe. And I have been openly
accused of having instigated and furthered, or at the very least
been privy to, all manner of criminal activities. In interviews with
American journalists I have more than once refuted these calumnies,
which can be supported by no evidence, and were solely intended
to arouse popular feeling against Germany; but I must now refer
again to the more definite of these accusations.

It must be left to the impartial historian of the future to establish
the full truth concerning the German conspiracies in the United
States; any evidence given under the influence of the passions
arising out of the war can, of course, possess only a limited value.
It is obvious from the proceedings concerning the constitution of
the Senate Committee that much of the evidence was prejudiced and
unreliable, probably because it was based solely on information
given by Germans or former Germans, whose identities were kept
strictly secret, and who told deliberate lies, either because,
like Judas, they had received a reward for their treachery, or
because, having severed all ties with their old country, they wished
to secure their footing in the new.

In any case I myself was never a partner to any proceedings which
contravened the laws of the United States. I never instigated such
proceedings, nor did I consciously afford their authors assistance,
whether financially or otherwise. I was in no single instance privy
to any illegal acts, or to any preparations for such acts. Indeed,
as a rule I heard of them first through the papers, and even then
scarcely believed in the very existence of most of the conspiracies
for which I was afterwards held accountable. I shall hardly be
blamed for this by anyone who remembered the number of projects
which we were all duly accused of entertaining, such as the various
alleged plans for the invasion of Canada with a force recruited
from the German-American rifle clubs, and many another wild-cat
scheme attributed to us in the first months of the war.

Such offences against the laws of America as were actually committed
were certainly reprobated by none more sincerely than by myself,
if only because nothing could be imagined more certain to militate
against my policy, as I have here described it, than these outrages
and the popular indignation aroused by them. I fully realized that
these individual acts, in defiance of the law of the land and the
resulting spread of Germanophobia, were bound to damage me in the
eyes of the United States Government and public opinion. It is
thus obviously absurd to accuse me of being responsible in any
way for the acts in question, seeing that any such instigation,
or even approval on my part, would have involved the utter ruin
of my own policy!

Another accusation against my conduct while in America is that
I at all events connived at the commission of crimes under the
direction of officers attached to the Embassy of which I was in
charge, or of other German Secret Service agents. The evidence
for this consists of certain cipher telegrams from the military
authorities in Germany, addressed to the Embassy in Washington;
these were decoded in England and said to contain instructions
for outrages to be committed in Canadian territory. I cannot say
if these messages were genuine or no. Military cipher telegrams,
formally addressed to the military attaché, were frequently received
at the Embassy, but were always sent forward at once by the registry
to Captain von Papen's office in New York, as a matter of routine,
and without being referred to me in any way. Von Papen certainly
never told me a word about any instructions from his superiors
that he should endeavor to foment disorders as alleged. For the
present, then, I consider that there is insufficient evidence for
his having received any such orders; but in all these matters I can,
of course, speak only for myself, military matters being entirely
out of my province. Soon after von Papen's recall I entered a protest
against the sending of a successor, as there was no longer any
useful purpose to be served by the employment of a Military Attaché,
whose presence would only serve as a pretext for a renewed hostile
agitation against us.

Whether the illegal acts of the Secret Agents sent to the United
States by the military authorities were committed in accordance
with their orders or on their own initiative I had no means of
knowing at the time, nor have I been able to discover since my
return home. I may observe, however, that I more than once urgently
requested the Foreign Office to use all their influence against
the dispatch of Secret Service men to America. Moreover, I had
published in the Press a notice, couched in strong terms and signed
by myself, warning all Germans domiciled in the United States not to
involve themselves in any illegal activities under any circumstances
whatever. And I think I am justified in saying that twelve months
before the severance of diplomatic relations, I had made a clean
sweep of all "conspiracies" and extorted a promise that no more
"agents" should be sent over from Germany. On my arrival home,
I was held by some to have been at fault for not having put down
the movement earlier; to which my reply must be that as a matter
of fact it was the cases of Rintelen and Fay that first earned
us the reputation of "conspirators"; all the rest came to light
later, and were in great measure connected with their machinations.
I took steps, as soon as I heard of these two affairs, to avoid
any repetition of them, in which effort I was successful.

The following throws some light on the attitude of the United States
Government towards me in the matter of the "conspiracies." When
in November, 1915, the Press campaign had reached the height of
its violence, I forwarded a Note to Mr. Lansing, the Secretary
of State, protesting strongly against the unjustifiable attacks
aimed at myself and my colleagues of the Embassy and requesting
that some effort should be made to suppress them, as follows:

  "Washington, Nov. 16, 1915.

"The continuance of the baseless attacks on myself and the colleagues
of my Embassy in the columns of the _Providence Journal_ impels
me to ask whether your Excellency cannot see your way to make it
clear that these attacks are not countenanced by the American
Government. Such slanders against the representatives of a friendly
Power who have a right to claim the protection and hospitality
of the United States authorities would be incomprehensible, were
it not a matter of common knowledge that the _Providence Journal_
is a 'hyphenated' Anglo-American paper. To borrow the phrase of
the United States President, this journal is obviously a greater
friend of other countries than its own.

"For the last fifteen months I and all my colleagues have had,
if I may say so, a whole army of American private detectives on
our track. Day and night they have pursued us in the service of
our enemies. Yet, although official German documents have been
stolen, no one has yet succeeded in producing a single proof of
illegal activities on the part of anyone of us.

"I should esteem it a great favor if your Excellency could see your
way to secure this Embassy against a repetition of these baseless
attacks, which have as their sole foundation the pre-supposition
of conspiracies which have no existence in fact."


I never received any reply to this letter, but a short time after
Mr. Lansing while informing me that the American Government felt
itself compelled to ask for the recall of Captains Boy-Ed and von
Papen, as being no longer acceptable to them (this affair I propose
to refer to again in another place), stated in the most explicit
terms that I was in no way implicated in the matter. The fact that
the American Government, even after the departure of the two attachés,
maintained the same intimate relations with me throughout the fourteen
months which elapsed before its diplomatic representatives were
recalled from Germany, proves that this was no empty compliment
but was meant in all sincerity.

I feel myself compelled to insist on these facts, in view of the
efforts subsequently made to represent me as the originator or
leader of the famous "conspiracies," which were later immeasurably
exaggerated by American propaganda. This propaganda has poisoned
the mind of the average American citizen to such an extent that he
firmly believes the German Embassy to have been a nest of anarchists,
who even during the period of his country's neutrality "waged war"
in the most dastardly manner against her.

And yet these stories of so-called conspiracies, with their legions
of conspirators, and resulting lengthy lists of German outrages
in America, will not bear serious examination.

Irrefutable evidence on the subject can be found in the official
report of the Senate Committee of Inquiry into the activities of
German propaganda, which has already been mentioned more than once.
After the depositions of Mr. Bruce Bielaski on this subject had gone
on for two days, Senator Nelson, being tired of this dry recital--he
had already expressed the opinion that most of the evidence given
so far was too academic--asked this officer of the Department of
Justice for a report on the German attempts "to foment strikes
and cause explosions in munition factories" which he apparently
considered to be an integral part of German propaganda. Mr. Bielaski
then referred to the "more important cases of offences against
the law, which had been fathered by the German Government." He
prefaced his statement with the remark that the list he was about
to give was complete in every way; twenty-four cases were dealt with,
and the names of the incriminated individuals given, as reproduced
below:

1. Falsification of passports (von Wedell, Rueroede).

2. Destruction of a bridge in Canada (Horn).

3. Falsification of passports (Stegler, Madden, Cook).

4. Falsification of passports (Lüderitz).

5. Attempted destruction of a canal in Canada (von der Goltz, Tauscher,
Fritzen).

6. Falsification of passports (Sanders, Wunmerburg, and two
accomplices).

7. Supplying of coal, etc., to German men-of-war at sea (Bunz, Koeter,
Hofmeister, Poppinghaus).

8. Attempt to bring about a revolution in India (Bopp, von Schack,
von Brinken, Ram Chandra, and twenty-five accomplices).

9. Attempt to blow up a railway tunnel in Canada (Bopp and three
accomplices).

10. Attempted destruction of munition factories and railway bridges
in Canada (Kaltschmidt, and five accompli

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